

# *A Companion to American Military History*

## BLACKWELL COMPANIONS TO AMERICAN HISTORY

This series provides essential and authoritative overviews of the scholarship that has shaped our present understanding of the American past. Edited by eminent historians, each volume tackles one of the major periods or themes of American history, with individual topics authored by key scholars who have spent considerable time in research on the questions and controversies that have sparked debate in their field of interest. The volumes are accessible for the non-specialist, while also engaging scholars seeking a reference to the historiography or future concerns.

### Published

*A Companion to the American Revolution* edited by Jack P. Greene and J. R. Pole

*A Companion to 19th-Century America* edited by William L. Barney

*A Companion to the American South* edited by John B. Boles

*A Companion to American Indian History* edited by Philip J. Deloria and Neal Salisbury

*A Companion to American Women's History* edited by Nancy Hewitt

*A Companion to Post-1945 America* edited by Jean-Christophe Agnew and Roy Rosenzweig

*A Companion to the Vietnam War* edited by Marilyn Young and Robert Buzzanco

*A Companion to Colonial America* edited by Daniel Vickers

*A Companion to 20th-Century America* edited by Stephen J. Whitfield

*A Companion to the American West* edited by William Deverell

*A Companion to American Foreign Relations* edited by Robert Schulzinger

*A Companion to the Civil War and Reconstruction*, edited by Lacy K. Ford

*A Companion to American Technology*, edited by Carroll Pursell

*A Companion to African-American History*, edited by Alton Hornsby

*A Companion to American Immigration*, edited by Reed Ueda

*A Companion to American Cultural History*, edited by Karen Halttunen

*A Companion to California History*, edited by William Deverell and David Igler

*A Companion to American Military History*, edited by James C. Bradford

### In preparation

*A Companion to the History of American Science*, edited by Mark Largent

*A Companion to American Urban History*, edited by David Quigley

*A Companion to the History of Los Angeles*, edited by William Deverell and Greg Hise

*A Companion to American Environmental History*, edited by Douglas Sackman

# A COMPANION TO AMERICAN MILITARY HISTORY

*Edited By*

James C. Bradford

VOLUME I



**WILEY-BLACKWELL**

A John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., Publication

This edition first published 2010  
© 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd

Blackwell Publishing was acquired by John Wiley & Sons in February 2007. Blackwell's publishing program has been merged with Wiley's global Scientific, Technical, and Medical business to form Wiley-Blackwell.

*Registered Office*

John Wiley & Sons Ltd, The Atrium, Southern Gate, Chichester, West Sussex, PO19 8SQ, United Kingdom

*Editorial Offices*

350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148-5020, USA

9600 Garsington Road, Oxford, OX4 2DQ, UK

The Atrium, Southern Gate, Chichester, West Sussex, PO19 8SQ, UK

For details of our global editorial offices, for customer services, and for information about how to apply for permission to reuse the copyright material in this book please see our website at [www.wiley.com/wiley-blackwell](http://www.wiley.com/wiley-blackwell).

The right of James C. Bradford to be identified as the author of the editorial material in this work has been asserted in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, except as permitted by the UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, without the prior permission of the publisher.

Wiley also publishes its books in a variety of electronic formats. Some content that appears in print may not be available in electronic books.

Designations used by companies to distinguish their products are often claimed as trademarks. All brand names and product names used in this book are trade names, service marks, trademarks or registered trademarks of their respective owners. The publisher is not associated with any product or vendor mentioned in this book. This publication is designed to provide accurate and authoritative information in regard to the subject matter covered. It is sold on the understanding that the publisher is not engaged in rendering professional services. If professional advice or other expert assistance is required, the services of a competent professional should be sought.

*Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data*

A companion to American military history / edited by James C. Bradford.

p. cm. – (Blackwell companions to American history)

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 978-1-4051-6149-7 (hardcover : alk. paper)

1. United States--History, Military. I. Bradford, James C.

E181.C735 2010  
355.00973--dc22

2009009785

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

Set in 10 on 13pt Gilliard by SNP Best-set Typesetter Ltd., Hong Kong  
Printed in Singapore

01 2010



To my battlefield “companions,” the OFOTs,

Mike Beal  
Russell Bradley  
Randy Haynes  
John Hicks  
Kenny Mallard  
Lynn Stuart

# Contents

## Volume I

<i>Acknowledgements</i>	<i>xi</i>
<i>Notes on Contributors</i>	<i>xii</i>
<i>Introduction</i>	1
<b>Part I Wars</b>	7
1 Warfare during the Colonial Era, 1607–1765 <i>John Grenier</i>	9
2 War of American Independence, 1775–83 <i>Stephen R. Conway</i>	22
3 Foreign Wars of the Early Republic, 1798–1816 <i>Gene Allen Smith</i>	39
4 Indian Wars in the East, 1783–1859 <i>Roger L. Nichols</i>	59
5 The Texas War for Independence and War with Mexico <i>Thomas W. Cutrer</i>	73
6 The Civil War, 1861–5 <i>Brian Holden Reid</i>	99
7 Indian Wars of the Trans-Mississippi West, 1862–90 <i>Robert Wooster</i>	123
8 The Spanish–American and Philippine Wars, 1898–1902 <i>Graham A. Cosmas</i>	139
9 America Emergent: The United States in the Great War <i>Aaron Anderson and Michael Neiberg</i>	153
10 World War II in the Atlantic, North Africa, the Mediterranean, and Europe <i>Harold R. Winton</i>	173

11	World War II in Asia and the Pacific <i>John Wukovits</i>	194
12	The Korean War <i>James I. Matray</i>	222
13	The Vietnam War <i>Ron Milam</i>	257
14	The Cold War <i>Elizabeth Lutes Hillman</i>	272
15	The Gulf Wars against Iraq <i>John R. Ballard</i>	284
16	Global War on Terrorism <i>Hall Gardner</i>	298
<b>Part II</b>	<b>The Armed Forces</b>	<b>319</b>
17	The Continental Army <i>Charles P. Neimeyer</i>	321
18	The Navies and Marines of the American Revolution <i>Frank C. Mevers</i>	329
19	The US Army to 1900 <i>Samuel J. Watson</i>	338
20	The US Army since 1900 <i>Ronald L. Spiller</i>	360
21	The US Navy, 1794–1860: Men, Ships, and Governance <i>Christopher McKee</i>	378
22	The US Navy, 1860–1920 <i>Kurt H. Hackemer</i>	388
23	The US Navy since 1920 <i>David F. Winkler</i>	399
24	The US Marine Corps <i>Jon Hoffman</i>	411
25	The US Coast Guard and Its Predecessor Agencies <i>C. Douglas Kroll</i>	429
26	The US Air Force <i>John W. Huston</i>	444
27	The Confederate Army <i>Arthur W. Bergeron, Jr.</i>	454
28	The Confederate Navy and Marine Corps <i>Michael E. Krivdo</i>	460

29	The Citizen Soldier in America: Militia, National Guard, and Reserves <i>James C. Bradford</i>	472
30	Defense Unification, Joint Commands, and Joint Operations <i>Leo P. Hirrel</i>	497
31	Mercenaries, Private Military Contractors, and Non-Traditional Forces <i>Jonathan Phillips</i>	507

## Volume II

	<i>Acknowledgements</i>	<i>xi</i>
	<i>Notes on Contributors</i>	<i>xii</i>
	<i>Introduction</i>	517
<b>Part III</b>	<b>Foreign Military Operations Short of Declared War</b>	<b>523</b>
32	Expanding and Defending a Maritime Republic, 1816–95 <i>John H. Schroeder</i>	525
33	Interventions in Central America and the Caribbean, 1900–30 <i>Anne Cipriano Venzon</i>	536
34	Military Interventions in Asia, 1899–1927 <i>Stephen K. Stein</i>	554
35	The Occupation of Germany, Austria, Trieste, Japan, Okinawa, and Korea <i>James Jay Carafano</i>	564
36	Military Operations in Latin America, 1961–2001 <i>Lawrence Yates</i>	572
37	Military Interventions Short of War in the Post 1975 Era <i>James Meernik</i>	584
38	Alliances and Coalitions in US History <i>T. Michael Ruddy</i>	593
39	Attachés, MAAGs, and MACs <i>Brian Tyrone Crumley</i>	604
<b>Part IV</b>	<b>Homeland Security</b>	<b>617</b>
40	Early American Insurrections <i>William Hogeland</i>	619

41	The Military and Reconstruction, 1862–77 <i>Margaret M. Storey</i>	640
42	The Military, Civil Disorder, and Natural Disasters, 1877–2007 <i>Charles A. Byler</i>	650
43	Coastal Defenses <i>Dale E. Floyd</i>	662
44	Air Defense <i>Edward B. Westermann</i>	681
<b>Part V Military Specialties</b>		<b>693</b>
45	Military Intelligence <i>David F. Trask</i>	695
46	Military Education and Training <i>Jennifer L. Speelman</i>	709
47	US Military Chaplains <i>John W. Brinsfield, Jr., Tierian Cash, and Thomas Malek-Jones</i>	722
48	Military Communications <i>Jonathan Reed Winkler</i>	733
49	Military Order and Discipline <i>Benjamin R. Beede</i>	746
50	Covert Warfare and Special Operations Forces <i>Bob Seals</i>	762
51	US War Planning: Changing Preferences and the Evolution of Capabilities <i>Donald Chisholm</i>	774
52	Military Justice <i>Mark Weitz</i>	802
53	Photography and the American Military <i>Frank J. Wetta</i>	815
54	Music in the Military <i>Edward H. McKinley</i>	833
<b>Part VI The Military, American Society, and Culture</b>		<b>841</b>
55	The American Way of War <i>Antulio J. Echevarria II</i>	843
56	Civil–Military Relations <i>Charles A. Stevenson</i>	856

57	Women in the American Military <i>D'Ann Campbell</i>	869
58	Minorities in the Military <i>Thomas A. Bruscino, Jr.</i>	880
59	Medals and Decorations <i>David T. Zabecki</i>	899
60	The Military, the Cinema, and Television <i>Joseph G. Dawson III</i>	918
61	The Military, the News Media, and Censorship <i>Edward L. Walraven</i>	941
62	The Military–Industrial Complex <i>Benjamin Franklin Cooling</i>	966
63	The Military, War, and Memory <i>G. Kurt Piehler</i>	990
64	American Military Ethics <i>Thomas B. Grassey</i>	1000
65	The Military and Sports <i>Wanda Ellen Wakefield</i>	1018
66	American Veterans' Movements <i>William Pencak</i>	1026
67	Care for the Military Dead <i>Constance Potter and John Deeben</i>	1034
	<i>Index</i>	1045

# Acknowledgements

A work such as this is a cooperative effort and the first debt of gratitude is due to the contributors. Peter Coveney suggested the project to me and he and Galen D. Smith have proved supportive over the past three years. From the outset Joseph G. Dawson and Leo Hirrel have provided invaluable advice and information. During the production phase of the project the professionalism of Mervyn Thomas, Liz Granger, and Janey Fisher have made them a pleasure to work with. Joseph G. Dawson, Charles Todovich, and John W. Huston applied their sharp eyes and historical knowledge to the manuscript during the laborious proofreading process; without their assistance there would be more of the inevitable typesetting errors that creep into manuscripts. Throughout the endeavor my wife Judy has been supportive taking on numerous tasks to give me time for this and other projects.

# Contributors

**Aaron Anderson** is a PhD Candidate at the University of Southern Mississippi, with a specialization in US Economic History and War and Society. He is currently completing his dissertation and has several publications, including a forthcoming article and several book reviews in nationally recognized scholarly journals. He is also the recipient of a University of Southern Mississippi Dissertation Fellowship, and a Dissertation Research Grant by the Economic History Association.

**John R. Ballard** is Professor of Strategic Studies at the US National War College in Washington, DC. He served previously as Professor of Joint Military Operations at the US Naval War College, the Foundation Professor of Defence Studies at New Zealand's Massey University and as Professor of History at the US Joint Forces Staff College. A graduate of the US Naval Academy and the French Command and Staff College in Paris, Ballard is a retired Marine and combat veteran of the Iraq War. He is the author of *Upholding Democracy* (1997), *Continuity during the Storm* (2000), *Fighting*

*for Fallujah* (2006), and *Triumph of Self-Determination* (2008).

**Benjamin R. Beede** is a Librarian Emeritus, Rutgers – The State University of New Jersey. He holds an MA in political science and an MLS from Rutgers, and he has done graduate study at Princeton University. His primary research interests are the United States experience with small wars and the Progressive Era in United States history, especially in a comparative context. He co-authored *The Legal Sources of Public Policy* (1977), and he has edited or compiled several reference books, including *The War of 1898 and U.S. Interventions 1898–1934: An Encyclopedia* (1994). His articles have appeared in *The Historian*, *Journal of Political and Military Sociology*, *Policy Studies Journal*, and *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society*, among other journals.

**Arthur W. Bergeron, Jr.**, is a Reference Historian with the US Army Military History Institute at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. He received his master's degree and PhD from



Louisiana State University. He is a past president of the Louisiana Historical Association and of the Richmond and Baton Rouge Civil War Round Tables and a member of the Society of Civil War Historians and the Blue & Gray Education Society. Bergeron's publications include *A Thrilling Narrative: The Memoir of a Southern Unionist* (2006), *The Civil War in Louisiana, Part B: The Home Front* (2004), *The Civil War in Louisiana, Part A: Military Activity* (2002), *Louisianians in the Civil War* (2002), *The Civil War Reminiscences of Major Silas T. Grisamore, CSA* (1993), *Confederate Mobile, 1861–1865* (1991), and *Guide to Louisiana Confederate Military Units, 1861–1865* (1989).

**James C. Bradford** received his PhD at the University of Virginia and teaches at Texas A&M University. He has been a visiting professor at the Air War College and is the editor of a dozen books including *Atlas of American Military History* (2003) and *The International Encyclopedia of Military History*, 2 vols. (2006). He currently serves as president of the North American Society for Oceanic History.

**John W. Brinsfield, Jr.**, Chaplain (Colonel) US Army Retired, is the Army Chaplain Corps Historian at the US Army Chaplain Center and School at Fort Jackson, South Carolina. A native of Atlanta, Chaplain Brinsfield is a member of the North Georgia Conference of the United Methodist Church. He has degrees from Vanderbilt, Yale, Emory, and Drew Universities and has taught military history for 14 years at such institutions as the United States Military Academy, the US Army War College, and the US Army Chaplain

School. A veteran of Operation Desert Storm, Chaplain Brinsfield has authored or co-authored seven books and numerous journal and newspaper articles.

**Thomas A. Bruscino, Jr.** is an assistant professor of military history at the US Army Command and General Staff College's School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He holds an MA and PhD in military history from Ohio University. Prior to joining SAMS, he worked as a historian at the US Army Center of Military History in Washington, DC, and then at the US Army Combat Studies Institute at Fort Leavenworth, where he wrote *Out of Bounds: Transnational Sanctuary in Irregular Warfare* (2006), and two case studies of actions from the Global War on Terrorism. He is currently at work on a book manuscript on World War II and ethnicity in America.

**Charles A. Byler** is Professor of History at Carroll College in Waukesha, Wisconsin. He received a BA from Whitman College, an MA from the University of Washington, and a PhD from Yale University. He has published articles on topics in US political and military history and is the author of *Civil-Military Relations on the Frontier and Beyond, 1865–1917* (2006).

**D'Ann Campbell** is Professor of History and Provost/Vice Chancellor of Academic Affairs at Montana State University, Billings. The author of *Women at War with America: Private Lives in a Patriotic Era* (1984), her articles on women and the military include a widely-reprinted study of US, British, German, and Soviet Union women in combat during World War II that first

appeared in *The Journal of Military History*. Campbell's research interests focus on American military women's history, American social history, and Americans during World War II, both on the homefront and in the military.

**James Jay Carafano** analyzes defense affairs, military operations and strategy, and homeland security at The Heritage Foundation. A graduate of the US Military Academy, Carafano has an MA in strategy from the US Army War College and an MA and PhD from Georgetown University. He has taught at West Point, Mount Saint Mary College, and Naval War College, been a visiting professor at the National Defense University and Georgetown University, and served as Executive Editor of *Joint Force Quarterly*. He is the author of *Private Sector, Public Wars: Contractors in Combat—Afghanistan, Iraq, and Future Conflicts* (2008), *GI Ingenuity: Improvisation, Technology and Winning World War II* (2006), *After D-Day: Operation Cobra and the Normandy Breakout* (2000), and *Waltzing Into the Cold War: The Struggle for Austria* (2002), as well as the coauthor of *Winning the Long War: Lessons from the Cold War for Defeating Terrorism and Preserving Freedom* (2005), and of *Homeland Security: A Complete Guide to Understanding, Preventing, and Surviving Terrorism* (2005).

**Tierian (Randy) Cash**, Chaplain Corps, United States Navy, is the Commanding Officer of the Naval Chaplain's School in Newport, Rhode Island. A native of Lincolnton, North Carolina, Chaplain Cash is a Southern Baptist minister and has pastored churches in South Carolina and Georgia. He has

degrees from Carson Newman College, Southeastern Baptist Theological Seminary and further studies in education and history at the University of South Carolina. His naval career spanning 27 years includes numerous operational assignments with the Navy and Marine Corps both at sea and ashore, including Operation Desert Storm and Operation Enduring Freedom. Captain Cash is the author of numerous articles regarding USN Chaplain Corps history.

**Donald Chisholm** is Professor of Joint Military Operations at the Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island. He received his AB, MA, and PhD in political science at the University of California, Berkeley. He previously taught at several universities, including the University of Illinois, Chicago, the University of California, Los Angeles, and the Ohio State University. He is the author of numerous articles in organization theory, public administration, and military organization and operations, along with two books: *Coordination without Hierarchy: Informal Structures in Multiorganizational Systems* (1989), and *Waiting for Dead Men's Shoes: Origins and Development of the U.S. Navy's Officer Personnel System, 1793–1941* (2001), which latter volume received the 2001 Rear Admiral Samuel Eliot Morison Award.

**Stephen R. Conway** is a professor of history at University College London. He has published several articles in *The William & Mary Quarterly* on aspects of the War of Independence and Anglo-American relations in the eighteenth century, and is the author of *The War of American Independence, 1775–1783* (1995), *The British Isles and the War of*

*American Independence* (2000), and *War, State, and Society in Mid-Eighteenth-Century Britain and Ireland* (2006). He is currently working on a book on the relationship between Britain and continental Europe in the eighteenth century.

**Benjamin Franklin Cooling** currently serves as Professor of National Security Studies in the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National Defense University, Washington, DC. Educated at Rutgers and the University of Pennsylvania, he has authored and edited numerous works in military, naval and air history and specializes in the historical dimensions of business and the defense sector as well as the Civil War. Those books include *Gray Steel and Blue Water Navy: The Formative Years of America's Military-Industrial Complex, 1881-1917* (1979), *War, Business, and World Military-Industrial Complexes* (1981), *USS Olympia: Herald of Empire* (2000), and *Counter Thrust: From the Peninsula to the Antietam* (2008).

**Graham A. Cosmas**, Chief of the Joint Staff History Branch and Deputy Director in the Joint History Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was educated at Columbia University, Oberlin College, and the University of Wisconsin. He taught at the University of Texas at Austin and the University of Guam, before joining the History and Museums Division of the US Marine Corps, 1973-9, and the US Army Center of Military History, 1979-2001. Cosmas, is the author of *An Army for Empire: The U. S. Army in the Spanish-American War, 1898-1899* (1971), a two-volume history of Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (2007-8), and

numerous journal articles. He is the co-author of *U. S. Marines in Vietnam: Vietnamization and Redeployment, 1970-71* (1986), and *The Medical Department: Medical Service in the European Theater of Operations* (1992). At present, he is revising the official histories of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Vietnam War for unclassified publication.

**Brian Tyrone Crumley**, a former US Army NCO, earned his BA from Columbia College in Missouri while on active duty, retired after 22 years of service, then completed his MA at the University of Louisville. After earning his PhD at Texas A&M University, he worked for the National Park Service in Atlanta where he wrote a history of Roanoke Island. He has taught at Elizabethtown Community College and the University of Louisville. Crumley is now an Adjunct Lecturer at Indiana University Southeast and teaches dual high school-college credit history courses at Oldham County High School in Kentucky.

**Thomas W. Cutrer**, a professor of history and American studies at Arizona State University, earned his BA and MA at Louisiana State University, served for three years in the US Air Force (including a tour as a combat intelligence officer in Viet Nam), then earned a PhD at the University of Texas. He is the author or editor of two award-winning books: *Parnassus on the Mississippi: The Southern Review and the Baton Rouge Literary Community, 1935-1942* (1984) and *Ben McCulloch and the Frontier Military Tradition* (1992), plus *Longstreet's Aide: The Civil War Letters of Maj. Thomas J. Goree* (1994), *Brothers*

in *Gray: The Civil War Letters of the Pierson Family* (with T. Michael Parrish, 1997), *Oh, What a Loansome Time I Had: The Civil War Letters of Major William Moxley and Emily Moxley* (2000), “Our Trust is in the God of Battles”: *The Civil War Letters of Robert F. Bunting, Chaplain, Eighth Texas Cavalry* (2006), and “Stepping Stone to Still Greater Distinction”: *The Mexican War Papers of George B. McClellan* (forthcoming).

**Joseph G. Dawson III** is Professor of History at Texas A&M University where he served as Director of the Military Studies Institute from 1986 to 2000. Dawson received his MA and PhD from Louisiana State University. His publications include *Army Generals and Reconstruction: Louisiana, 1862–1877* (1982), *Doniphan’s Epic March: The 1st Missouri Volunteers in the Mexican War* (1999), and essays in *The Journal of Military History*, *American Nineteenth Century History*, *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, and other professional journals. His teaching interests include “History & Film,” including films on military subjects.

**John Deeben**, a genealogy archives specialist with the Research Support Branch (NWCC1) at the National Archives and Records Administration in Washington, DC, provides orientations to research, and frequently lectures and writes about federal records of genealogical interest with a particular emphasis on nineteenth-century military service. His articles have appeared in *Prologue*, *New England Ancestors*, *NGS News Magazine*, and *Nuestras Raíces* (Journal of the Genealogical Society of Hispanic America). He also serves as a

board member of the Lutheran Historical Society of the Mid-Atlantic, and has transcribed and published several volumes of church records from Northumberland County, Pennsylvania. John holds his BA from Gettysburg College and an MA from Pennsylvania State University.

**Antulio J. Echevarria II**, graduated from the US Military Academy and Army War College and holds MA and PhD degrees in history from Princeton University. The Director of Research at the US Army War College, his articles have appeared in *War & Society*, the *Journal of Military History*, *War in History*, *Military Review*, *Airpower Journal*, *Parameters*, *Joint Forces Quarterly*, and the *Journal of Strategic Studies*. He served as chairman of the Regional Strategy and Planning Department at the Strategic Studies Institute and is the author of *After Clausewitz: German Military Thinkers before the Great War* (2000), and *Clausewitz and Contemporary War* (2007).

**Dale E. Floyd** received his BSE at Ohio University, and an MA from the University of Dayton. He was an archivist in military records at the National Archives, 1969–80; a historian in the Office of History, US Army Corps of Engineers, 1980–91; the historian on the Civil War Sites Advisory Commission staff, 1991–3; and a historian with the American Battlefield Protection Program, National Park Service, 1993–5. His publications include *A World Bibliography of Armed Land Conflict from Waterloo to World War I*, 2 vols. (1979), “Dear Friends at Home ...”: *The Letters and Diary of Thomas James Owen, Fiftieth New York Volunteer*

*Engineer Regiment, During the Civil War* (1985), *Military Fortifications: A Selective Bibliography* (1992), *Defending America's Coasts, 1775–1950: A Bibliography* (1997), and *A Historic Resources Study of the Civil War Defenses of Washington, D.C.* (2004). He has served as president of the Civil War Fortification Study Group, 1992–9; the Coast Defense Study Group, 1995–6; and Council on America's Military Past (CAMP), 2001–6.

**Hall Gardner** is Professor of International Relations at the American University of Paris and the author of *Averting Global War: Regional Challenges, Overextension, and Options for American Strategy* (2007), *American Global Strategy and the War on Terrorism* (2005), *Dangerous Crossroads: Europe, Russia, and the Future of NATO* (1997), and *Surviving the Millennium: American Global Strategy, the Collapse of the Soviet Empire, and the Question of Peace* (1994). He is also editor and contributor to *NATO and the European Union: New World, New Europe, New Threats* (2004), *The New Transatlantic Agenda: Facing the Challenges of Global Governance* (2001), and *Central and Southeastern Europe in Transition: Perspectives on Success and Failure Since 1989* (1999). He is a frequent commentator on FRANCE 24 and other news media and has additionally written many articles, poems, and editorials on international political issues.

**Thomas B. Grassey** earned his PhD at the University of Chicago, taught philosophy for 15 years, directed the intelligence studies program at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, for six years, edited *The Naval War College*

*Review* for nine years, and held the James B. Stockdale Chair of Leadership and Ethics at the Naval War College, before joining the faculty of the Stockdale Center for Ethical Leadership at the US Naval Academy.

**John Grenier** is the author of *The Far Reaches of Empire* (2008) and *The First Way of War* (2005), which won the Society of Military History's Outstanding Book in American History Award. He taught for several years at the US Air Force Academy and after a 20-year career retired from the Air Force as a lieutenant colonel. He lives with his family in Colorado and teaches in the military history program at Norwich University.

**Kurt H. Hackemer** is Professor of History and Associate Dean of the College of Arts & Sciences at the University of South Dakota, where he regularly teaches courses in naval and military history. He holds his BA from the University of Chicago and his MA and PhD from Texas A&M University. His books include *The U.S. Navy and the Origins of the Military-Industrial Complex, 1847–1883* (2001) and *To Rescue My Native Land: The Civil War Letters of William T. Shepherd, First Illinois Light Artillery* (2005). His articles have appeared in such journals as the *Naval War College Review*, *Military History of the West*, *Civil War History*, and *The Historian*.

**Elizabeth Lutes Hillman** (JD, Yale Law School; PhD, history, Yale University) is Professor of Law at the University of California Hastings College of the Law. Her work focuses on United States military law and history since the



mid-twentieth century, the definition of military crime, and the impact of gender and sexual norms on military culture. A veteran of the US Air Force, she taught history at the US Air Force Academy and at Yale University and now teaches military law, constitutional law, legal history, and estates and trusts. She is the author of *Defending America: Military Culture and the Cold War Court-Martial* (2005) and co-author of *Military Justice Cases and Materials* (2007).

**Leo P. Hirrel** received his PhD in American history from the University of Virginia in 1989. Since that time he has worked in a variety of public history positions, both as a contractor and as a government historian. Much of his work has been informed by his additional career as an Army Reserve officer. Presently he is the command historian for US Joint Forces Command. His most recent work is *United States Joint Forces Command, Sixtieth Anniversary, 1947–2007*. The views in his chapter in this book are his own.

**Jon Hoffman**, former deputy director of the Marine Corps History and Museums Division, is now chief of the Contemporary Studies Branch at the US Army Center of Military History. A retired Marine Corps Reserve colonel, he has a law degree from Duke University and an MA degree in military history from Ohio State University. His publications include *Once a Legend: "Red Mike" Edson of the Marine Raiders* (1994) and *Chesty: The Story of Lieutenant General Lewis B. Puller, USMC* (1994).

**William Hogeland** is the author of *The Whiskey Rebellion: George Washington, Alexander Hamilton, and the Frontier*

*Rebels Who Challenged America's New-Found Sovereignty* (2006). He is currently writing a narrative history of events in Philadelphia leading up to the signing of the Declaration of Independence. Hogeland's articles have appeared in *The New York Times*, *The Huffington Post*, *The Boston Review*, *Tikkun*, History News Network, *The Atlantic Monthly*, and elsewhere, and he has appeared on the PBS series "History Detectives."

**John W. Huston**, Professor Emeritus, US Naval Academy, holds an MA and PhD from the University of Pittsburgh. He flew combat missions with the 8th Air Force over occupied Europe during World War II and, as a major general, served as Chief of Air Force History, 1976–81. His publications include *American Airpower Comes of Age: General Henry H. "Hap" Arnold's World War II Diaries*, 2 vols. (2003) which won the Air Force Historical Foundations "Best Military History Award."

**Michael E. Krivdo** is a PhD candidate at Texas A&M University, specializing in nineteenth-century American military and naval history. He has written several articles related to the Confederate States Navy and Marine Corps, and is currently revising a book manuscript entitled *Marines in Gray: The Birth, Life and Death of the Confederate States Marine Corps*. A retired Marine officer, he has also authored or contributed to the publication of over 20 service, joint, or combined doctrinal publications.

**C. Douglas Kroll**, an associate professor of history at the College of the Desert in Palm Desert, California, received his BS degree from the US Coast Guard

Academy in 1971 and served as a Coast Guard officer afloat and overseas. He holds an MA from the University of San Diego and a PhD from the Claremont Graduate University and is the author of numerous articles dealing with Coast Guard and naval history. Kroll is the author of *Commodore Ellsworth P. Bertholf: First Commandant of the Coast Guard* (2002), and *"Friends in Peace and War": The Russian Navy's Landmark Visit to Civil War San Francisco* (2007). He is currently writing *A Coast Guardsman's History of the Coast Guard*, to be published by the Naval Institute Press. Kroll and his wife, Lana, have two sons, Timothy an officer in the Coast Guard Reserve, and Matthew, a Coast Guard officer in flight school at Pensacola, Florida.

**Thomas Malek-Jones**, US Air Force Reserve, serves as the Chaplain Service Historian, Office of the Chief of Chaplains, Bolling Air Force Base, DC. He is the former Moderator of the Newark Presbytery of the Presbyterian Church (USA). He also serves as Chief, Chaplain Service, VA New Jersey Health Care System. He holds graduate degrees from Princeton and New York Theological Seminaries as well as Rutgers University. As a Licensed Clinical Social Worker (LCSW), Colonel Malek-Jones has mentored graduate students from Rutgers and Temple Universities.

**James I. Matray** is Professor and Chair of the History Department at California State University, Chico. He has published more than 40 articles and book chapters on US-Korean relations during and after World War II as well as *The Reluctant Crusade: American Foreign Policy in Korea, 1941-1950* (1985) and

*Japan's Emergence as a Global Power* (2001). His most recent books are *Korea Divided: The 38th Parallel and the Demilitarized Zone* (2004) and *East Asia and the United States: An Encyclopedia of Relations Since 1784* (2003). During 2003 and 2004, Matray was an international columnist for the *Donga Ilbo* in South Korea. From 2005 to 2007, he served on the Board of Editors for *Diplomatic History*.

**Christopher McKee** is Samuel R. and Marie-Louise Rosenthal Professor at Grinnell College, Grinnell, Iowa, and a scholar-in-residence at the Obermann Center for Advanced Studies at the University of Iowa. He is the author of *Edward Preble: A Naval Biography, 1761-1807* (1972), *A Gentlemanly and Honorable Profession: The Creation of the U.S. Naval Officer Corps, 1794-1815* (1991), and *Sober Men and True: Sailor Lives in the Royal Navy, 1900-1945* (2002). The latter is the product of his current research, the comparative study of enlisted men in the United States and British navies, work that he began in 1990/91 while he held the Secretary of the Navy's Research Chair at the Naval Historical Center. He is currently at work on a related volume with the tentative title: "Ungentle Goodnights: Life in a Home for Elderly Naval Sailors, 1831-1895."

**Edward H. McKinley**, BA University of California Berkeley; MA, PhD University of Wisconsin Madison, is Professor of History and Department Chair at Asbury College, Wilmore, Kentucky, where he teaches courses in diplomatic and military history. He is the author of several books and articles on the history of The Salvation Army in the United

States and is currently a member of the Society of Historians of American Foreign Relations, the Society for Military History, and the International Military Music Society.

**James Meernik** is currently Professor and Chair of the Department of Political Science at the University of North Texas. He received his PhD from Michigan State University in 1992. His research focuses on United States foreign policy, and particularly the political use of military force. He has also served as associate editor of *International Studies Quarterly*.

**Frank C. Mevers** received an MA from Louisiana State University in 1967 and a PhD from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in 1972. He was an assistant editor on *The Papers of James Madison* project and edited *The Papers of Josiah Bartlett* (1979) for the New Hampshire Historical Society. He has served as New Hampshire State Archivist since 1979.

**Ron Milam** teaches military history, including a course on the Vietnam War, at Texas Tech University where he also serves as the Academic Advisor for the annual Vietnam Center-sponsored student trips to Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand. Dr Milam is the author of the forthcoming book *Not a Gentleman's War: Junior Officers in the Vietnam War*. He currently serves as Interim Director of the Center for War and Diplomacy in the Post-Vietnam War Era. This center is responsible for developing archives for future research on those conflicts since the Vietnam War, with specific interest in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.

**Michael Neiberg** is Professor of History and Co-Director of the Center for the Study of War and Society at the University of Southern Mississippi. He is the author or editor of 12 published and forthcoming books, as well as articles and book reviews in 20 different journals. He specializes in World War I and the global dimensions of the history of warfare. His most recent books include *The Second Battle of the Marne* (2008), *Soldiers' Daily Lives through History: The Nineteenth Century* (2006), and *Fighting the Great War: A Global History* (2005) which received a Choice Reviews Outstanding Academic Title award.

**Charles P. Neimeyer**, Director and Chief of Marine Corps History at Marine Corps University, Quantico, Virginia, earned an MA and PhD degrees from Georgetown University. He also earned an MA from the Naval War College where he later taught while holding the Forrest Sherman Chair of Public Diplomacy, 1997–2002, and served as Dean of Academics. Neimeyer had previously been an award-winning history professor at the US Naval Academy and the University of Central Oklahoma where he was named Liberal Arts “Outstanding Professor of the Year.” He retired from the Marines in 1996 as a Lieutenant Colonel. That same year he published *America Goes to War: A Social History of the Continental Army, 1775–1783* (1996) which he followed with *The Revolutionary War* (2007).

**Roger L. Nichols** was trained at the University of Wisconsin, Madison, and has served in history departments at Wisconsin, Maryland, Georgia and



Arizona. He has also taught at three German universities. During his career he has published numerous articles and books on American frontier and Western issues. His publications include *Indians in the United States and Canada: A Comparative History* (1998), and *The American Indian: Past and Present* (1981). His present book project is an analysis of the patterns of causes for Indian wars from 1790 to 1890.

**William Pencak**, Professor of History at the Pennsylvania State University, has written and edited numerous books on American history including *War, Politics, and Revolution in Provincial Massachusetts* (1981), *For God and Country: The American Legion, 1919–1941* (1989), and, most recently, *Jews and Gentiles in Early America, 1654–1800* (2005), runner up for the National Book Award in American Jewish History.

**Jonathan Phillips**, an Assistant Professor of History at Old Dominion University, Norfolk, Virginia, specializes in American military affairs, war and society, civil–military relations, and the culture and society of the American South. He received his PhD from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.

**G. Kurt Piehler** is author of *Remembering War the American Way* (1995), *World War II* (2007) in the “American Soldiers’ Lives Series,” and co-editor of *Major Problems in American Military History*. He is consulting editor for the *Oxford Companion to American Military History* and associate editor of *Americans at War: Society, Culture, and*

*the Homefront*. Piehler lives in Knoxville and teaches at the University of Tennessee.

**Constance Potter** is a reference archivist at the National Archives and Records Administration in Washington, DC, specializing in federal records of interest to genealogists. She has written and spoken about graves registration and Gold Star Mothers. She received her BA and MA in history at Washington State University in Pullman, WA, and has worked at the National Archives since 1983.

**Brian Holden Reid** is Professor of American History and Military Institutions, King’s College London. A former Head of Department (2001–7), in 2007 he was awarded the Fellowship of King’s College London (FKC), the highest honor the College can award its alumni and staff, and he is both. He is a Trustee of the Society of Military History, Honorary Vice President of the Society of Army Historical Research, and a member of the Council of the National Army Museum, London. His books include *J. F. C. Fuller: Military Thinker* (1987, 1990), *The Origins of the American Civil War* (1996), *Studies in British Military Thought* (1998), *Robert E. Lee: Icon for a Nation* (2005, 2007), and *America’s Civil War: The Operational Battlefield, 1861–1863* (2008).

**T. Michael Ruddy** received his PhD at Kent State University. He is currently a professor at Saint Louis University. Among his publications are *The Cautious Diplomat: Charles E. Bohlen and the Soviet Union* (1986) and *Charting an Independent Course: Finland’s Place in the Cold War and in U.S. Policy*

(1998). He is currently researching US relations with Europe's neutrals during the Cold War.

**John H. Schroeder** is Professor of History and former Chancellor at the University of Wisconsin – Milwaukee. His writings on naval history include *Shaping a Maritime Empire: The Commercial and Diplomatic Role of the American Navy, 1829–1861* (1985) and *Commodore John Rodgers: Paragon of the Early American Navy* (2006). His study of *Commodore Matthew Calbraith Perry: Antebellum Sailor and Diplomat* (2001) was awarded the Theodore and FDR Naval History Prize and the John Lyman Book Award. He is currently writing a book on the commercial and diplomatic role of the US Navy in the Pacific during the nineteenth century.

**Bob Seals**, a retired Special Forces officer, served with the 1st and 3rd SFG (A), the 1st Special Warfare Training Group (A), the US Army Special Forces Command (A), the Security Assistance Training Management Office, and Special Operations Command-Korea. He is currently serving with the US Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Ft. Bragg, NC.

**Gene Allen Smith**, Professor of Early American History at Texas Christian University, received his PhD from Auburn University and is author, editor, or co-author of a number of books, including *Thomas ap Catesby Jones: Commodore of Manifest Destiny* (2000), *“For the Purposes of Defense”: The Politics of the Jeffersonian Gunboat Program* (1995), and an edited version of Arsène Lacarrière Latour's 1816 publication,

*The Historical Memoir of the War in West Florida and Louisiana in 1814–15: With an Atlas* (1999). Currently his research focuses on politics, frontier expansion, and naval and maritime history during the revolutionary era and early republic.

**Jennifer L. Speelman** is an Associate Professor of History at The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina. She received her BA from the Pennsylvania State University and her MA and PhD from Temple University in Philadelphia. She has lectured at the United States Merchant Marine Academy, the SUNY Maritime Academy, and the California Maritime Academy. Speelman contributed the chapter “The United States Navy and the Genesis of Maritime Education” to the volume *Beyond Combat: Essays in Honor of Russell F. Weigley* (2007) and is currently working on a manuscript entitled “When the Sea was a Hard School: A History of United States Maritime Education.”

**Ronald L. Spiller** is the Director of the Master of Arts in Social Sciences Program at Edinboro University of Pennsylvania. A native of Natchitoches, Louisiana, from 1970 to 1999 he served in the US Army in a variety of intelligence, operations, and administrative assignments in the United States, Europe and the Pacific, on active duty and in the Army Reserve. His assignments included command of the 549th Military Intelligence Battalion (CEWI) and J2, Joint Task Force PROVIDE PROMISE (Forward). In 1997 he served at Headquarters, US European Command as the senior US military historian in Europe. He received a BA in

Government from Northwestern State University of Louisiana, an MA in History from Stephen F. Austin State University, and a PhD in History from Texas A&M University.

**Stephen K. Stein** earned his doctorate in military history from The Ohio State University in 1999. An assistant professor at the University of Memphis, he was recently named to direct its new online degree program. An adjunct professor for the US Naval War College (College of Distance Education), he teaches courses in military strategy. A specialist in naval history and the history of technology, he has written on topics ranging from ancient battles to the iPod. He recently published his first book: *From Torpedoes to Aviation: Washington Irving Chambers and Technological Innovation in the New Navy, 1877–1913* (2007). His article “The Greely Relief Expedition and the New Navy,” *International Journal of Naval History* (2006) won the Rear Admiral Ernest M. Eller Prize in Naval History.

**Charles A. Stevenson** teaches at the Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University and is the author of three recent books: *Congress at War: The Politics of Conflict since 1789* (2007); *Warriors & Politicians: U.S. Civil–Military Relations under Stress* (2006); and *SecDef: The Nearly Impossible Job of Secretary of Defense* (2006). He received his AB and PhD from Harvard and an MA from the Fletcher School at Tufts University plus was awarded a Fulbright Grant to study at King’s College, London. Dr Stevenson was a Legislative Assistant for defense and foreign policy issues in the US Senate, 1970–92 and professor of

national security policy at the National War College, 1992–2005.

**Margaret M. Storey**, an associate professor in the History Department of DePaul University in Chicago, received her BA from Macalester College in 1991 and her PhD from Emory University in 1999. Trained in US History with specializations in the American South and the Civil War era, she has published articles and essays in *The Journal of Southern History*, *North and South Magazine*, and *Reconstructing America: The Civil War’s Unfinished Business* (forthcoming), as well as a monograph, *Loyalty and Loss: Alabama’s Unionists in the Civil War and Reconstruction* (2004). Storey is currently editing the memoir of a Tennessee Union soldier and working on a book about the history of Memphis during the Civil War.

**David F. Trask**, PhD Harvard University (1968), taught at Boston University, Wesleyan University, University of Nebraska-Lincoln, and the State University of New York at Stony Brook (1956–76). He served as the historian of the US Department of State, where he edited *Foreign Relations*, (1976–81); Chief Historian of the US Army, 1981–8, where he directed books in various series, including those on World War II, the Korean War, and the Vietnam conflict. He retired in 1988 and has since been an independent historian. His publications include five books on World War I, including *The AEF and Coalition Warmaking* (1993), *The War With Spain in 1898* (1981), *Victory without Peace: American Foreign Relations During the Twentieth Century* (1968), and major bibliographies on US–Latin

American Relations and public history. He was a founder of the Society for the History of American Foreign Relations, The National Council on Public History, and the Society for History in the Federal Government.

**Anne Cipriano Venzon** earned her doctorate in history from Princeton University where she was a researcher for *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson*. She currently works as a consultant and an independent historian. She is the author or editor of several books, including *From Whaleboats to Amphibious Warfare: "Howling Mad" and the U.S. Marine Corps* (2003) and *Leaders of Men: Ten Marines Who Changed the Corps* (2008).

**Wanda Ellen Wakefield** is Associate Professor of History at the SUNY College at Brockport. Her book, *Playing to Win: Sports and the American Military, 1898–1945*, appeared in 1997. Most recently, she has been studying the effects of the Cold War on winter sports and has published an article about the role athletes in the sliding sports played in the debate over the amateur Sports Act of 1978 in the *International Journal of the History of Sport*. Dr Wakefield is also a long time luge official and served as Chief of Control for luge at the 2002 Olympic Winter Games in Salt Lake City.

**Edward L. Walraven** is a Senior Lecturer in Journalism at Texas A&M University, where he has taught classes in the history of journalism, media law, and newsgathering. In addition, he has carried out scholarly research in the fields of warfare and media, folklore, English literature, and American history.

Walraven has an undergraduate degree in journalism from Angelo State University, a master's degree in English, as well as a PhD in history, both from Texas A&M University. He grew up in a small ranching and oilfield town in West Texas where storytelling and recalling history were an intricate part of daily life.

**Samuel J. Watson** is Associate Professor at the United States Military Academy, where he teaches an elective on American frontiers and a senior seminar on the nineteenth-century Army. He edited *The International Library of Essays in Military History: Warfare in the USA, 1783–1861* (2005) and is completing *Frontier Diplomats: The U.S. Army Officer Corps, Civil–Military Relations, and the State in the Borderlands of the Early Republic, 1814–1846* for publication by the University Press of Kansas.

**Mark Weitz** is a full-time practicing attorney in Austin, Texas, with an active trial and appellate litigation practice. He has held teaching positions at Auburn University-Montgomery and Gettysburg College, where he served as the Director of the Civil War Era Studies Program from 2002 through 2004. His scholarship focuses on US military and legal history. In 2005 he published *More Damning than Slaughter*, a broad study of desertion in the Confederate army. That same year he published *The Confederacy on Trial*, a legal work that draws on three highly publicized trials in 1861 that helped shed light on the Confederacy's status as a nation, both within its own borders, and in the eyes of the international community.

**Edward B. Westermann** received his PhD from the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill in 2000. He has published extensively in the areas of German military, airpower, and Holocaust history. His publications include *Hitler's Police Battalions: Enforcing Racial War in the East* (2005) and *Flak: German Anti-Aircraft Defenses, 1914–1945* (2001). A former Fulbright Fellow, fellow of the US Holocaust Memorial Museum, and recipient of two German Academic Exchange Service research fellowships, Colonel Westermann is a member of the international academic advisory panel for Royal Air Force Centre for Air Power Studies. He was a Professor of Military Strategic Studies at the US Air Force Academy before assuming his current duties as the commander of the US Air Force's Basic Military Training program at Lackland Air Force Base, Texas.

**Frank J. Wetta** is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of History at Kean University, New Jersey. He received a BS and MA from St Louis University, Missouri in history and a PhD in history from Louisiana State University. He is the co-author with Stephen J. Curley of *Celluloid Wars: A Guide to Film and the American Experience of War* (1992). His publications include studies of the John Ford cavalry films and the image of strategic bombing in film.

**David F. Winkler** of the Naval Historical Foundation is author of *Cold War at Sea: High Seas Confrontation between the U.S. and Soviet Union* (2000) and *Amirs, Admirals, and Desert Sailors: The U.S. Navy, Bahrain, and the Gulf* (2007). A commander in the Naval Reserve, Winkler supervises the oral

history program of the Naval Historical Foundations, writes a monthly column for the Navy League's journal *Sea Power*, and is Campaign Director for the National Museum of the United States Navy Cold War Gallery.

**Jonathan Reed Winkler** is an assistant professor of history at Wright State University in Dayton, Ohio. He earned his AB from Ohio University's Honors Tutorial College and his MA, MPhil, and PhD from Yale University. The author of *Nexus: Strategic Communications and American Security in World War I* (2008), he is a historian of US foreign relations, military and naval history, and international affairs in the modern era.

**Harold R. Winton** is Professor of Military History and Theory, School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. A 1964 graduate of the United States Military Academy, he earned an MA in History from Stanford University in 1971 and his PhD in History, also from Stanford, in 1977. He is the author of *To Change an Army: General Sir John Burnett-Stuart and British Armored Doctrine, 1927–1938* (1988), *Corps Commanders of the Bulge: Six American Generals and Victory in the Ardennes* (2007); as well as co-editor of *The Challenge of Change: Military Institutions and New Realities, 1918–1941* (2000).

**Robert Wooster** is professor of history at Texas A&M University-Corpus Christi, where he has taught since 1986. He has written, edited, or co-edited nine books on the Civil War and the army and the American West, most recently *Frontier Crossroads: Fort Davis*



and the American West (2006), and is co-editor of *The Reminiscences of Major General Zenas R. Bliss, 1854–1876* (2007). He is currently writing a one-volume history of the army and the American frontiers.

**John Wukovits**, an authority on the Pacific Theater of World War II, received his BA from Notre Dame and MA from Michigan State University. He is the author of *Devotion to Duty: A Biography of Admiral Clifton A. F. Sprague* (1995), *Pacific Alamo: The Battle for Wake Island* (2003), *One Square Mile of Hell: The Battle for Tarawa* (2006), and *Eisenhower: A Biography* (2006). He has also written numerous articles for such publications as *WWII History*, *Naval History*, *World War II*, *The Journal of Military History*, *The Naval War College Review*, and *Air Power History*.

**Lawrence Yates** is a native of Kansas City, Missouri. After receiving his PhD in history from the University of Kansas in 1981, he joined the Combat Studies Institute at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. During his 24 years with CSI, he taught and wrote about US military interventions, contingency and stability operations, and unconventional warfare. He is the author of *Power Pack: U.S. Intervention in the Dominican Republic, 1965–1966* (1988), *The US Military's Experience in Stability Operations, 1789–2005* (2006), and *The U.S. Military Intervention in Panama: Origins, Planning, and Crisis Management, June 1987–December 1989* (2008), coauthor of *My Clan Against the World:*

*U.S. and Coalition Forces in Somalia, 1992–1994* (2004), and coeditor of – and a contributor to – *Block by Block: The Challenges of Urban Operations* (2003). Retired from government service since 2005, he is currently working on a history of the US invasion of Panama in 1989.

**David T. Zabecki** served in the military 1966 to 2007, serving first in Vietnam as an infantry rifleman. After receiving his commission as a field artillery officer, he commanded as a captain, lieutenant colonel, colonel, brigadier general, and major general. He was Deputy Chief of the Army Reserve, 2000–2; Senior Security Advisor on the US Coordinating and Monitoring Mission in Israel, 2003; Department of Defense Executive Director for all World War II 60th Anniversary observances in Europe, 2004–5; and commander of the US Southern European Task Force Rear and served as the senior US Army commander south of the Alps, 2005–6. A graduate of the Army Command and General Staff College, the Army War College, and the John F. Kennedy School of Government, he holds a PhD from the Royal Military College of Science, Cranfield University. Major General Zabecki is the author or editor of nine books including *Steel Wind: Colonel Georg Bruchmüller and the Birth of Modern Artillery* (1994), *The German 1918 Offensives: A Case Study in the Operational Level of War* (2006), and *Chief of Staff: The Principal Officers behind History's Great Commanders*, 2 vols. (2008).

# INTRODUCTION

War – no matter how destructive and regrettable – forms an important component of human history and has played a determining role in America’s development as a nation (Anderson and Cayton 2005). Military conflict dates from the very beginning of English settlement in the New World, when, in April 1607, the first colonists were opposed on landing in Virginia by hostile Native Americans. That clash turned into open warfare in less than a decade and for two and a half centuries such warfare remained a constant as white settlement expanded across the continent. Disagreement concerning how best to deal with the Native Americans contributed to the first internal conflicts, for example, those between the Pilgrims at Plymouth and Thomas Morton’s settlement at nearby Merrymount in 1628 and particularly to Bacon’s Rebellion half a century later. While internal rebellions tended to be localized, they directly influenced much wider regions. The slave revolts of the Antebellum era, for example, were centered in Virginia, Louisiana, and South Carolina, but sent shock waves rippling throughout the South. Both Native Americans and those more recently arrived from the Old World participated in European wars of empire. For over a century after achieving independence Americans engaged in military conflicts whose operations were conducted almost exclusively in the Western Hemisphere, but during the succeeding century and a quarter Americans participated in wars that came to span the globe often with a loose assemblage of allies and client states linked by a system of alliances during the Cold War. Protection of the “Free World” led to wars in Korea and Vietnam, and the Cold War against Communism provided an ideological justification for the continued military action in Latin America, operations undertaken by a government that in other settings championed the principles of self-determination of nations in Asia and Africa.

Wars have shaped American development in a myriad of ways ranging from delineating the physical boundaries of the nation and determining patterns of settlement, to influencing the development of business and industry, the nature of the political system (being a veteran has usually been a political asset; and the execution of war powers has strongly influenced the nature of the American presidency),

and the content of popular culture. Wars and military policies, such as those dealing with racial and gender integration, have significantly affected demographic patterns, class structure, gender roles, and community standards. All of these military influences and experiences combine to form a major component in shaping the character and culture of American society.

Throughout American history citizen soldiers of the militia, national guard and reserves, as well as members of the uniformed services, the Army, Navy (including the Marine Corps), Air Force, and Coast Guard, have both reflected and profoundly influenced America's society, culture, economy, and politics in times of both peace and war.

Given its importance, it is not surprising that military history has long been the subject of interest to the general public, military professionals, and academics (Lynn 2008). Average citizens are as likely to seek entertainment as insight and to acquire their "military history" from a combination of television and cinema and from magazines that focus on a particular era or war, and from the thousands of books on military subjects that are published each year. Military professionals have traditionally sought "lessons" and insights from the past to guide current and future operations and to help in understanding their relations with society as a whole (Reardon 1990).

The focus in this volume is on the published scholarship of the third group, academic historians, most of whom can be placed in one of three main subgroups that have developed over the past half century: Members of the first group have maintained their focus as traditional military historians on battles and leaders, strategy and tactics, weapons and warfare (Millet 1992). Walter Millis (1961) had the second group, the military professionals, in mind when he asserted that the two functions of the study of military history were "to train professional military men in the exercise of their profession and ... to educate governments and peoples in the military requirements of today." Citing the revolution in military affairs wrought by the development of nuclear weapons and systems capable of delivering them to any point in the world, Millis pronounced dead the utility of studying military history. Millis failed to foresee the emergence later in that decade of the "New Military History" group of academics who often are less interested in these traditional topics than in the relationships between "war and society." They often employ the tools of social scientists and focus on military institutions to examine individuals serving in the military ("history from the bottom up") (Reardon 2008), the impact of military operations on other institutions and on the public, and the interface between the military and civilian society including the role of race, class, and gender (Chambers 1991). Another group of military historians has begun to probe broader cultural phenomena such as "war and memory" to gain insight into the human mentalité, i.e., the thought processes, mores, and attitudes of military organizations and the societies that give rise to them, as well as the shaping of memory and its use by later generations (Linenthal 1991, Reardon 1997, Lepore 1998, Cray 1999, Rosenberg 2003, Bradley and Powers 2000, Brinkley 2005, Linn 2007).

The status of American military history as an academic discipline has been surveyed regularly in books and professional journals over the last 50 years (Morton



1962; Mahon 1965; Millett 1970; Weigley 1975; Kaegi 1981; Kennedy 1989; Charters, Milner, and Wilson 1992; Coffman 1997; Black 2004, Moyar 2007), and most recently by academic historians in a Round Table (2007) in *The Journal of American History*, and in a collection of essays in the journal *Academic Questions* (Bunting 2008, Lynn 2008). Themes common to these publications include surveys of scholarship, which institutions include military historians on their faculty and military history courses in their curricula, suggestions for future study, and the standing of military history in academe. Robert Citino (2007: 1070) succinctly summarized views on the last of these: "Military history today is in the same curious position it has been in for decades: extremely popular with the American public at large, and relatively marginalized within professional academic circles." An issue of the Organization of American Historians *Magazine of American History* devoted to "reimagining military history in the classroom," contained ten essays identifying resources and suggesting ways to integrate military history in high school and college level US history survey courses (OAH 2008).

The popularity of the field among general readers explains the plethora of military encyclopedias and guides to military history. The goal of this volume is to include essays on topics largely ignored by other studies, such as the military and music, care for the dead, and air defense. Those essays are designed to provide basic information about their subject, but just as importantly to assess the historiography of the topic. They are not meant to be bibliographical in the sense of listing all books, not even all valuable books on a topic, but to identify the major areas of interpretive discussion. In doing so the authors explore the ways that the study of American military history has evolved over the century since history emerged as an academic discipline. Bibliographical citations are to the first published editions of the works to make clear the development of historiography over time. Some nineteenth and early twentieth-century works have been reprinted several times and these reprint editions are acknowledged only if they contain significant annotations or a particularly useful introduction. In such instances, the revised edition will be cited with the date of the original publication noted in square brackets at the end of the entry.

Space considerations imposed a level of selectivity. Priority was given to military institutions and practices, the conduct of operations, and links between American service personnel and civilians and to the omission of topics, such as the causes of war and the impact of war on American society, as being beyond the scope of this volume. Separate essays on such subjects as Americans held as prisoner of war, military procurement and logistics, military medicine, weapons systems, the military use of outer space, and opposition to war and the military, topics which have recently begun to receive scholarly attention, were considered but in the end not included. Some of these topics are addressed in essays that were included, for example, military procurement in the essay on the military-industrial complex and the use of space in the essay on military communications. Many of the essays address closely related subjects. For example, the essay on "Civil-Military Relations" focuses on the interaction of civilian and uniformed leaders of military services and the division between civilian and military societies in America while

the interaction of military forces with civilians is probed in “Early American Insurrections,” “The Military and Reconstruction,” and “The Military, Civil Disorder, and Natural Disasters.”

Taken together, the essays in this volume analyze the ways in which Americans have formed their military institutions; the operations, both domestic and foreign, that their military services have conducted; and the interaction between the military and civilian sectors of society. Just under half the essays focus on traditional topics, including the institutional development of the military services and the conduct of war. Others deal with topics that have gained increasing scholarly interest, such as the place of minorities and women in the military, military operations in time of peace, the depiction of the military in the cinema and on television, relations of the military with the media and defense contractors, and the interaction of military personnel with foreign peoples while serving as attachés and military advisers. A final group of essays address topics receiving relatively little attention from historians in the past, notably the military use of photography and music, the roles of veterans groups, the care for the dead, the military and sports, and issues of war and memory.

The authors include both established historians and emerging scholars all writing with a single aim: to make the subfields of military history accessible to a broad audience. It is hoped that members of the general public who wish to gain a basic knowledge of a topic and learn about the issues which historians debate will find the essays useful, as will students seeking term paper, thesis, and dissertation topics, and teachers and professors preparing for the classes that they present.

During the two centuries between the colonial period and the Cold War those who studied the sweep of American military history virtually all did so in a chronological narrative moving from era to era and war to war, but that approach has changed as historians have instead traced various threads of military history across a span of years. This volume is organized in Parts, each composed of essays examining a group of related topics. The essays in Part I focus on warfare from the colonial era through the global war on terrorism, those in Part II trace the institutional development of American armed forces from the Continental Army, Navy and Marines of the Revolution through the unification of the services and the establishment of area and joint forces commands in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. Part III's essays explore the conduct of military operations short of a declared war, the occupation of former Axis powers and their dependencies after World War II, the role of military alliances and conduct of coalition warfare, and the work of military attachés and military advisers. Part IV addresses the role of the military in providing homeland security against foreign attack and in the face of domestic disorder. Part V deals with military specialties and themes, such as military justice and special forces, that span the various services. Part VI, one of the largest Parts, consists of thematic essays that examine the relationship between the military, civil society, and American culture. Taken together these essays reflect the healthy state of military history scholarship and bear witness to the fact that military history continues to attract numerous fine historians who employ a variety of methods to approach the field from numerous perspectives.

Considered collectively the essays raise some lively questions, ones of American exceptionalism, for example. Is the American way of war unique? Were the experiences of American military personnel typical of those of servicemen of other nations during the same era? In what ways and for what reasons did American military institutions develop differently than those of other nations? The essays in this *Companion* provide an excellent understanding of American military history that can be drawn upon for additional comparative studies.

#### BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Anderson, Fred, and Andrew Cayton (2005). *The Dominion of War: Empire and Liberty in North America, 1500–2000*. New York: Viking.
- Black, Jeremy (2004). “The Sound of Guns: Military History Today,” in Jeremy Black, *Rethinking Military History*. New York: Routledge, 26–65.
- Bradley, James, with Ron Powers (2000). *Flags of our Fathers*. New York: Bantam Books.
- Brinkley, Douglas (2005). *Boys of Pointe du Hoc: Ronald Reagan, D-Day and the U.S. Army 2nd Ranger Battalion*. New York: William Morrow.
- Bunting, Josiah, III (2008). “Why Military History?” *Academic Questions*, 21:1 (March), 12–17.
- Chambers, John Whiteclay, II (1991). “The New Military History: Myth and Reality,” *Journal of Military History*, 55:3 (July): 395–406.
- Charters, David A., Marc Milner, and J. Brent Wilson (1992). *Military History and the Military Profession*. Westport, CT: Greenwood.
- Citino, Robert M. (2007). “Military Histories Old and New: A Reintroduction,” *American Historical Review*, 112:4 (October), 1070–90.
- Coffman, Edward M. (1997). “The Course of Military History in the United States Since World War II,” *Journal of Military History*, 61:4 (October), 761–76.
- Cray, Robert E., Jr. (1999). “Commemorating the Prison Ship Dead: Revolutionary Memory and the Politics of Sepulture in the Early Republic, 1776–1808,” *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3rd ser., 56:3 (July), 565–90.
- Kaegi, Walter E. (1981). “The Crisis in Military Historiography,” *Armed Forces and Society*, 7:2 (Winter), 299–316.
- Kennedy, Paul M. (1989). “The Fall and Rise of Military History,” *Yale Journal of World Affairs*, 1:1 (Fall), 12–19.
- Lee, Wayne E. (2007). “Mind and Matter – Cultural Analysis in American Military History: A Look at the State of the Field,” *Journal of American History*, 93:4 (March), 1116–42.
- Lepore, Jill (1998). *The Name of War: King Philip’s War and the Origins of American Identity*. New York: Knopf.
- Linenthal, Edward Tabor (1991). *Sacred Places: Americans and Their Battlefields*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
- Linn, Brian McAllister (2007). *The Echo of Battle: The Army’s Way of War*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Lynn, John (2008). “Breaching the Walls of Academe: The Purposes, Problems, and Prospects of Military History,” *Academic Questions*, 21:1 (March), 18–36.
- Mahon, John K. (1965). “Teaching and Research on Military History in the United States,” *The Historian*, 27:2 (February), 170–84.
- Miller, John J. (2006). “Sounding Taps: Why Military History is Being Retired,” *National Review*, 58:18 (9 October).

- Millett, Allan R. (1970). "American Military History: Over the Top," in Herbert J. Bass, ed., *The State of American History*. Chicago: Quadrangle Press, 157–82.
- Millett, Allan R. (1992). "American Military History: Clio and Mars as 'Pards,'" in David A. Charters, Marc Milner, and J. Brent Wilson, eds., *Military History and the Military Profession*. Westport, CT: Praeger, 3–21.
- Millis, Walter (1961). *Military History*. Washington: American Historical Association.
- Morton, Louis (1962). "The Historian and the Study of War," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, 48:4 (March), 599–613.
- Moyar, Mark (2007). "The Current State of Military History," *Historical Journal*, 50:1 (March), 225–40.
- OAH [Organization of American Historians] (2008). "Military History," *Magazine of American History*, 22:4 (October).
- Reardon, Carol (1990). *Soldiers and Scholars: The U.S. Army and the Uses of Military History, 1865–1920*. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press.
- Reardon, Carol (1997). *Pickett's Charge in History and Memory*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Reardon, Carol (2008). "View from the Ranks: Social and Cultural History of the American Armed Forces," *Magazine of American History*, 22:4 (October), 11–16.
- Rosenberg, Emily S. (2003). *A Date Which Will Live: Pearl Harbor in American Memory*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Round Table (2007). "'Round Table' American Military History," *Journal of American History*, 93:4 (March), 1116–62, [seven essays by six participants].
- Shy, John (1993). "The Cultural Approach to the History of War," *Journal of Military History*, 57:5 (October), 13–26.
- Weigley, Russell F., ed. (1975). *New Dimensions in Military History: An Anthology*. Darby, PA: Diane Publishing Co.

# Part I

## WARS

## Chapter One

# WARFARE DURING THE COLONIAL ERA, 1607–1765

*John Grenier*

The colonial period of United States history covers almost seven generations and nearly 160 years (from 1607 to 1765). At no time in American history has society been more diverse than in the colonial period. Indians of a multitude of “nations,” Frenchmen, Spaniards, Britons, Anglo-Americans, Americans, Swedes, Germans, Dutchmen, Africans, and African-Americans inhabited a polyglot North America. Interactions among cultures, societies, and individuals were ubiquitous; no single group, no matter how hard it tried, remained insular. Moreover, colonial America was a geographically enormous and diverse place. There were several British North Americas, from the Maritimes and New England, through the Middle Colonies, across the Upper South, and into the Deep South. There also stood a multiplicity of North Americas from the perspectives of the Spanish (New Spain, New Mexico, and Florida) and the French (Acadia, New France, the *pays d’en haut* [the Upper Great Lakes region], and the Ohio and Illinois countries). Nor should we exclude the most valuable of all the colonies, the Caribbean. Indians had their North America as well. Indian Country was an amorphous place that Europeans did not control, although they often claimed large swaths of it on their maps (for example: the French claimed control over the *pays d’en haut*). Africans and African-Americans also built their own worlds, although their place in colonial military history has received little attention from historians. Boundaries and borders, like people, were always on the move in colonial North America. Taken together, the military history of the colonial period is wide ranging and diverse.

Indians, colonists, and dynastic European states struggled, sometimes independently of one another, often concurrently, for control of North America. A synthesis of colonial military history that points to the imposition of Anglo-American dominion and suzerainty over the eastern half of the continent is hardly appealing. It reeks of a self-congratulatory Anglo-American belief in the manifest destiny of impending nationhood. Such a synthesis, however, is essentially unavoidable. More than any other factor – more than trade, more than religious proselytizing, more than ideology, more than settlement – the wars among Indians,

settlers and Indians, and the Imperial powers of Great Britain, France, and Spain enabled Anglo-Americans to dominate the eastern half of North America.

Yet, American military historians are now conditioned to see the colonial period as little more than a prelude to the larger scale and, the implication being, more important events that followed. The single most important book in shaping that view is Russell Weigley's *The American Way of War* (1973). It established the metanarrative of United States military history that still dominates the field. Weigley marked the mid-nineteenth century as the period in which Americans defined their military culture. Thus, American military historians have had little reason to look back from the Civil War beyond the Mexican War. The War of American Independence, let alone the distant seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, is a stretch. Those historians who have focused on the twentieth century question the relevancy of colonial period military developments for understanding modern US military history. For example, when Brian Linn (2002) critiqued the "Weigley Thesis" in "*The American Way of War Revisited*," he made virtually no mention of how Americans' military experience in the two and a half centuries before the Civil War shaped the parameters of the American way of war.

Colonial military history, however, did not always take second seat. Antiquarian historians produced a detailed historiography of the pre-1765 Indian and Imperial Wars. George Percy's "A Trewe Relacyon" (1922) of the first war in Virginia between English settlers and Indians offers a sobering look at a pattern of ferocity and brutality that would follow. John Mason (1736) and John Underhill (1638) recalled their central roles in destroying the Pequot nation during the war of 1637–8 in their respective *A Brief History of the Pequot War* and *News from America*. Philip Vincent (1637) offered further details on the massacre of the Pequots at the Mystic River fort in *A True Relation of the Late Battell Fought in New England*. William Hubbard (1677) offered a contemporary's narrative history of King Philip's War (1675–6). Nathaniel Saltonstall likewise wrote about King Philip's War in his *A New and Further Narrative of the State of New-England* (1676). Cotton Mather (1699) used his *Decennium Luctuosum* (*Mournful Decade*) to describe King William's War (1689–97). Samuel Penhallow (1726) added narratives of Queen Anne's War (1702–14) and Dummer's War (1723–7), and Charles Drake (1870) presented a "Diary of Depredations" to describe the frontier war aspects of King George's War (1744–8). Samuel Niles (1837) brought all the early New England wars together in one volume in his *A Summary Historical Narrative of the Wars in New-England with the French and Indians*. Among the early authors, there was a particularly strong bias toward the "righteousness" of Protestant Anglo-American actions and the "savage" character of Indian and French-Roman Catholic actors. Moreover, their view of military history focused almost exclusively on the Northeast, and New England in particular.

Francis Parkman stood as the most influential of the antiquarians. His *A Half Century of Conflict* (1892) covered the period before the Seven Years' War (1754–63), his two-volume *Montcalm and Wolfe* (1884) specifically addressed the last of the imperial wars – the "French and Indian War" – as a contest between "good" (Anglo-American civilization) and "bad" (French and Indian worldviews), and his



*The Conspiracy of Pontiac* (1851) spoke to Pontiac's War (1763). All were considered masterpieces of both history and literature until at least the 1950s. The Society of American Historians continues to award annually the Parkman Prize for the best book in American history.

Following World War II, picking apart Parkman's writings for inaccuracies and biases became a cottage industry. Francis Jennings went so far as to call Parkman "a liar" because of the latter's openly pro-Anglo bias and racist views of Indians and Roman Catholics. Jennings's (1975, 1984, 1988) counterpoint to Parkman is an often turgid and tendentious three-volume history of colonial America (*The Invasion of America*, *The Ambiguous Iroquois Empire*, and *Empire of Fortune*) that reads like a catalogue of Anglo-American abuses of Indians. William Eccles (1969, 1972), a Canadian historian who focused more on his nation's military heritage than the colonies that became the United States, was not as strident as Jennings in his criticism of Parkman's body of work, but nevertheless judged it as undeserving of the title of history; as fiction, it was fine.

With the realization that there was more to colonial history than Parkman had said, a handful of military historians reassessed the colonial period. In 1948, Howard Peckham strove to fill out, and in some places correct, Parkman's narrative with *Pontiac and the Indian Uprising*. Verner Crane's 1928 offering, *The Southern Frontier*, was republished in 1956 and again in 2004. The staying power of Crane's interpretation of the late-seventeenth and early eighteenth-century military history of the colonial Southeast is indeed impressive. Edward Hamilton offered *The French and Indian Wars* (1962) as a macro narrative of the colonial wars. Peckham moved on to writing about the War for Independence, which opened the door for another historian, Douglas Edward Leach, to claim the unofficial title of "Dean of Colonial Military Historians." In his first book, *Flintlock and Tomahawk* (1958), Leach discussed King Philip's War. Leach branched out with a survey that included war on the frontier in *The Northern Colonial Frontier* (1966). Leach's *Arms for Empire* (1973), part of the incomplete series on the "Wars of the United States" that included Weigley's *The American Way of War*, synthesized much of the writing about colonial military history till that time. In 1986, Leach offered *Roots of Conflict* to elucidate how the British Army, over the course of the imperial wars, managed through its heavy-handed and authoritarian behavior to alienate Americans. He thus became most identified with the argument that British arrogance in the Seven Years' War led directly to the American Revolution.

Some colonial military historians preferred to focus on individual personalities. Three fine examples of colonial military biography written in the 1950s and 1960s include: Stanley M. Pargellis's *Lord Loudoun in North America* (1933); John Cuneo's *Robert Rogers of the Rangers* (1952); and G. M. Waller's *Samuel Vetch, Colonial Enterpriser* (1960). Each of them focused on an iconic figure as opposed to the larger events that shaped the subjects' societies. Recent biographies that use a soldier's life as a vehicle to examine the social and cultural milieu of early America include William Godfrey's biography of John Bradstreet, *Pursuit of Profit and Preferment in Colonial North America* (1976); Emerson Baker and John Reid's



life of Sir William Phips, *The New England Knight* (1998); and Steven Brumwell's *White Devil* (2004), a quasi biography of Robert Rogers that explains the ferocity of settler-Indian warfare on the northern frontier. Brumwell's *Paths of Glory* (2006) stands as the first major biography of James Wolfe in over a generation. It provides a much more critical assessment of James Wolfe than previous historians have written.

First-rate battle studies of the colonial period are limited in number. By far the best known is C. P. Stacey's *Quebec, 1759* (1959). Written to help commemorate the bicentennial of the British victory on the Plains of Abraham, Stacey positioned the one-day battle between James Wolfe's British regulars and the Marquis de Montcalm's French professionals as the deciding event in Great Britain's victory over France in the Seven Years' War. Ian Steele's *Betrayals* (1990) examines perhaps the most infamous event in colonial military history: the 1757 Fort William Henry Massacre. More than any other work, Steele's supplies insight into the profound differences between European and Indian forms and rationale for warfare in colonial America.

Several other historians have taken the clash between European and Indian military cultures in North America as their topic. The definitive work on Indian tactics remains Patrick Malone's *The Skulking Way of War* (1991). Donald Worster and Thomas Schilz (1984) discuss the spread of Europeans' firearms technology among Indians in their "The Spread of Firearms among the Indians of the Anglo-French Frontier." Leory Eid, in "National War among the Indians of Northeastern America" (1985), suggests that Indians could understand and conceive of warfare on more than a localized village level. Wayne Lee's "Fortify, Fight, or Flee" (2004) points to how the Tuscaroras adopted European strategies of fortification that were much at odds with the skulking way of war that Malone describes. In the end, Lee argues, the Cherokee learned from the Tuscaroras defeat and reverted to strategies of dispersal, ambush, and attacks on European supplies rather than fixed battles. Adam Hirsch's "The Collision of Military Cultures in Seventeenth-Century New England" (1988) shows how European tactics and strategy forced escalations in violence and scale in Indian warfare. Richard Johnson, in "The Search for a Usable Indian" (1977) demonstrates New Englanders' difficulties with incorporating Indian warriors into the formers' military structure. Ronald Dale Karr (1999) builds on Hirsch's argument to argue that the Pequot War caused a virulent hybridization of Indian and European military cultures. In answering the question "Who Invented Scalping?," James Axtell and William Sturtevant (1980) find that scalping was a pre-contact practice that Europeans adopted to encourage Indians to serve as their proxies. In a similar study, Andrew Lipman (2008) shows that Europeans and "friendly" Indians used the exchange of scalps and other body parts to cement their alliance during the Pequot War. Daniel Beattie (1986) contends that New World conditions forced the Seven Years' War British Army to change its logistical and tactical methods though Peter Russell suggests in his "Redcoats in the Wilderness" (1978) that the modifications the army made in North America were hardly new. The British Army, he argues, had made similar changes while fighting irregular wars in Ireland and Central

Europe. Each of these works point to perhaps the fundamental (and yet unresolved) question whether American conditions created an Americanized version of warfare.

The decades of the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s saw three overlapping and iterative developments reenergize the study of colonial military history. John Shy's masterful work on the British Army in North America in the years before the American Revolution, *Toward Lexington* (1965), became an exemplar of the "new" military history and suggested the value of studying military institutions in their social, cultural, and economic dimensions. Near the same time, social history was emerging as a powerful force in all of American historiography, and colonial historians, many of them frankly uninterested in the "drum and bugle" approach to military history that focused on battles and unit maneuvers, sought to write the history of the rank-and-file soldiers that made up the colonial armies. Following closely on the heels of social history was the emergence of ethnohistory that placed Indians at the center of all colonial, not just colonial military, history.

The combined new military and social history's heyday was in the late 1980s. William Shea started the ball rolling in 1983 with *The Virginia Militia in the Seventeenth Century*, a study that focused on military service in a specific locale and the effect that service had on both individual soldiers and the larger community. The next year, Fred Anderson offered *A People's Army* (1984), which proved to be the best of the social-military histories of Anglo-Americans. We learned in *A People's Army* that the typical New England provincial soldier came from the younger sons of the middling-sort in search of opportunities. They hoped to make their way in society, and they understood their service to be governed by contractual principles. If their superiors broke the contract, they saw themselves relieved of their obligation and moral responsibility to serve. Anderson's book helped explain one of the fundamental issues of colonial military history: why the professionals of the British Army viewed the Yankee provincials as such bad soldiers. On the heels of *A People's Army*, we received social histories of other locales in colonial America, to include Connecticut (Selesky 1990) and Virginia (Titus 1991), which showed how forming and maintaining an army produced profound social and cultural strains and changes on the societies from which those armies came. In a Massachusetts counterpart to Shea's study of seventeenth-century Virginia and one inviting comparison with the works of Anderson and Selesky on eighteenth-century New England, Kyle Zelner (2009) analyzed the formation and composition of the militia unit raised in Essex County, Massachusetts, during King Philip's War finding that criminals, drunkards, and members of the lower socioeconomic strata of society were forced to serve in the militia thereby placing the burden of defending the community on the individuals who would be least missed should they be killed while serving.

Inexplicably, it took almost 20 years until historians wrote the social history of the British regulars who served in colonial America. Steven Brumwell (2002) shows that the standard view that British regulars of the Seven Years' War were the "scum of the earth" who hailed from the most destitute segments of British society was little more than a trope. Many of them resembled the provincials in

Anderson's *A People's Army* who had chosen military service in search of a better life. Many were also Americans. Michael McConnell's *Army and Empire* (2004) provides insight into the day-to-day life of the British soldier on frontier garrison duty between 1758 and 1775. Historians always suspected that terrible food, poor healthcare, inadequate equipment, and harsh discipline overshadowed the soldiers' life. Beyond that, McConnell shows that the troops that garrisoned the frontier quickly became less soldiers and more settlers. Their concerns were not military preparedness or fighting, but gardening for vegetables and hoping to survive winters in the wilderness.

The early 1990s witnessed the flowering of an ethnohistoriography on native peoples' accommodation and opposition to colonization. It began with James Merrell's *The Indians' New World* (1989), which won the Bancroft Prize as the distinguished book in American history from Colombia University. Merrell gives insight into the varied responses – both conflict and consensus – that the Catawbas of the Carolina lowlands adopted in the face of European colonization. For the military historian, his insights into the little studied Tuscorara War (1714–15) and the Yamasee War (1717–19), two conflicts in which the Catawbas served as English proxies, are particularly illuminating. Just as important, his focus on the Catawbas shifts the focus away from New England to the South.

Richard White followed with *The Middle Ground* (1991), winner of the Parkman Prize. An entire generation of historians is now indebted to White for making clear that accommodation as much as conflict defined the *pays d'en haut*, where Indians and Europeans found a middle ground because no single group could dominate. In White's tale, the 1600's Beaver Wars stand out as costly and complex events for the participants. In some ways, White's narrative picks up where Daniel Richter's *The Ordeal of the Longhouse* (1992), which won the Frederick Jackson Turner Prize as the Organization of American Historians outstanding first book by an author, left off. Traditionally, historians saw the Iroquois League as successfully playing the French and the English against one another. Richter showed how the Iroquois League was in fact deeply divided within itself. The Grand Settlement of 1701, in which the Iroquois League staked out a neutral position in the Europeans' wars, was therefore as much a last-ditch effort to prevent civil war among pro-French, pro-English, and neutralist factions within the League as a master stroke of externally focused diplomacy. Another stellar work that focused on peacemakers and diplomacy as much as soldiers and war is James Merrell's other Bancroft Prize winning book, *Into the American Woods* (1999). Merrell shows how the inexorable momentum of Anglo-American imperial ambitions overwhelmed the best efforts of cultural intermediaries who sought to find accommodation on the eighteenth-century Pennsylvania frontier.

While they are not strictly military histories, ethnohistories of Indians offer a different lens through which to see colonial military history. Alan Gallay's *The Indian Slave Trade* (2002), winner of the Bancroft Prize, offers insights in the pervasiveness and destructiveness of wars to enslave the indigenous peoples of the Southeast. Daniel Usner's *Indians, Settlers, and Slaves in a Frontier Exchange Economy* (1990) covers the Choctaws and Chickasaws and their relationship –

one that violence often shaped – with Frenchmen. Usner's work, by offering insights into the Mississippi Valley's rich eighteenth-century colonial military history, is particularly useful for Anglophone historians who often assume that colonial military history is centered on the Atlantic seaboard or the British "back-country." Thomas Hatley (1993) presents the Cherokees' on-again-off-again conflict with Anglo-Americans, as does John Oliphant (2001) whose interpretation of the Cherokee War (1760–1) has become the standard. Another work that must be considered in the same light as Usner's is Kathern Holland Braund's (1993) study of the Creek Confederacy that Braund describes as a powerful force in the colonial Southeast, one that influenced military events in the region and skillfully played British, Spanish, and French interests against each other. In fact, the Creek Confederacy managed to juggle conflicting interests among its internal factions and European influences more successfully than the Iroquois League. Claudio Saunt's (1999) *A New Order of Things* suggests the impact that the wars of colonization had in changing the nature of Creek society. Switching focus from the Southeast to New England, Colin Calloway's *The Western Abenakis of Vermont* (1990) offers a look at Dummer's War as a war of anti-colonialism. Eric Hinderaker's *Elusive Empires* (1997) explains how Anglo-American designs and military might shattered the middle ground that White described. Hinderaker's book is especially important for understanding Virginians' war of conquest in Kentucky during Lord Dunmore's War (1774), which often gets lost between military narratives of the colonial period that end in 1765 and the War for Independence that started in 1775. Richter's *Facing East from Indian Country* (2001) is a broad synthesis that repositions the view of colonial history from the eastern seaboard to Indian lands.

Identity studies developed concurrently, and in some ways, symbiotically with ethnohistory. They quickly found a place in colonial military historiography. Russell Bourne (1990) employs the issue of "racial identity" to explain King Philip's War in his *The Red King's Rebellion*. Jill Lepore's *The Name of War* (1998), winner of the Bancroft Prize, and James Drake's *King Philip's War* (1999) both examine identity to better explain seventeenth-century New England's bloodiest and most costly war. Lepore shows how Americans used their shared collective memory of King Philip's War to forge the definition of "American." Drake takes Lepore's argument a step further, and in stressing the interdependence of colonists and Indians in New England, helps explain King Philip's War as a civil war that broke out along ethnic and identity lines as much as a clash between colonizers and colonized. In a similar nod to the importance of examining how peoples created their identities, Geoffrey Plank offers his *An Unsettled Conquest* (2001). Plank discusses Anglo-Americans' military conquest of Nova Scotia, which he ends with the expulsion of the Acadians in 1755. He uses the "conquest" of Nova Scotia to illuminate how Anglo-Americans created and embraced a "British" identity at the heyday of the First British Empire.

Historians have long known that colonial military history and British Imperial history are different sides of the same coin. Lawrence Henry Gipson's 15-volume *The British Empire before the American Revolution* (1936–70) stood over the field

like a colossus, and perhaps may have turned many would-be historians from writing imperial history. Nonetheless, the early 2000s saw a new group of historians who made much of the interconnectedness of imperial and military history. Fred Anderson's *Crucible of War* (2000), a grand narrative in the traditional sense that won the Francis Parkman Prize, conveys a powerful argument about the dangers of the unintended consequences of military victory – in this particular case, the victory of the British Empire in the Seven Years' War. Anderson and Andrew Cayton collaborated on another important work for colonial military historians in *The Dominion of War* (2005). In offering a major reconceptualization of the master narrative of North American military history, Anderson and Cayton positioned the genesis of the wars to spread America's "Empire of Liberty" squarely in the colonial period. Colin Calloway, in *The Scratch of a Pen* (2006), rightly contends that the British victory in the Seven Year's War – also known as "The Great War for Empire" – formalized in the 1763 Peace of Paris radically changed the course of American history. He argues that few wars have had a more profound and lasting impact on American history as the Seven Years' War. The first test of the new empire occurred in the Ohio Country and the *pays d'en haut* before the war officially ended at the Peace of Paris. Gregory Evans Dowd's *A Spirited Resistance* (1992) explains the Indian movement – the anti-imperial struggle – to resist Anglo-American expansion. His *War under Heaven* (2002) and David Dixon's *Never Come to Peace Again* (2005) both use Pontiac's War to stress the difficulties that the British encountered in managing the empire (both the peoples and the territories) after their battlefield victories in New France. Richard Middleton's balanced account of *Pontiac's War* (2007) probes both the long and immediate causes of the conflict and the Indian diplomacy preceding it (particularly that of the Senecas), provides a garrison-by-garrison, skirmish-by-skirmish account of operations, and explains how the success of the Indians forced the British to abandon a policy of force and return to diplomacy in their dealings with the Native Americans. In *The Far Reaches of Empire*, John Grenier (2008) shows the functioning of the British Empire at the ground level. He argues that on the Nova Scotia frontier, the actions of the military officers and administrators assigned to the colonies, not decrees from London, shaped the Empire. The on-scene imperial officials accommodated resistance and opposition only when a lack of resources prevented them from compelling obedience. Taken together, the new imperial-military historiography demonstrates that when the opportunity presented itself, Anglo-American imperialists and soldiers would stop at no ends, including ethnic cleansing in the case of the Acadians, to secure their empire.

Studies that focus on a single war or specific campaign have become more common as well. For nearly 20 years following Larry Ivers's (1974) *British Drums on the Southern Frontier*, which stands as the best study of the War of Jenkins's Ear (1739–41) in Georgia and Florida, "war" studies were lacking. Alfred Cave (1996) began to fill the void with a detailed and thorough examination of the Pequot War. Evan Haefeli and Kevin Sweeney (2003) made an important contribution to understanding one of the best known events of colonial military history

– the French and Indian raid on Deerfield in 1704 – in their *Captors and Captives*. Matthew Ward gave historians a detailed look at the Seven Years' War on the Pennsylvania and Virginia frontiers in his *Breaking the Backcountry* (2003) and the British Army's Canada campaign in his *The Battle for Quebec, 1759* (2005).

Although the British Empire was in many ways a seaborne empire in the eighteenth century, surprisingly few naval historians have looked beyond the operations of the Royal Navy in European and Caribbean waters to examine how it operated in the North American littoral. Julian Gwyn's *Frigates and Foremasts* (2003) begins to fill that lacuna by examining naval operations in the Maritimes. James Pritchard, in *Anatomy of a Naval Disaster* (1995), in which he discusses the destruction of France's 1746 naval expedition to North America, and Jonathan Dull, in *The French Navy in the Seven Years' War* (2005), both point to the importance that sea power had in shaping the outcome of campaigns in the colonies.

Several historians have attempted to contextualize colonial military history within the scope of all American military history. The main question driving those works remains the "Americanization" of warfare in the colonial period. Ian Steele's *Warpaths* (1994) stands as the model for overarching grand syntheses that address the question whether an American way of war emerged in the colonial period. Steele shows that between the late sixteenth and mid-eighteenth centuries, Indians and Europeans adapted each other's technologies, tactics, and strategies in a life-and-death struggle for North America. Armstrong Starkey presents a compelling argument in his *European and Native American Warfare* (1998) that Americans were unskilled at Indian-style warfare, and as a result, turned to European models of war making. Guy Chet, in his *Conquering the American Wilderness* (2003) challenges the notion that the wilderness of North America and Indian fighting catalyzed an "Americanization" of European warfare. He argues that Anglo-Americans remained wedded to European-style tactics throughout the colonial period. John Grenier wrote *The First Way of War* (2005) – which was the first book on colonial military history to win the Society of Military History's Distinguished Book Award – to argue that Americans created a military tradition in the colonial period built on irregular warfare and unlimited warfare, primarily through attacks on enemy resources and populations rather than enemy armies. His goal was to reposition military history of the colonial frontier as a key to understanding the entire span of American military history.

The field of colonial military history has a promising future. Because most military historians have taken to looking elsewhere, examination of the colonial period's martial affairs generally has fallen to social, cultural, economic, and ethnohistorians. Without intending it, scholars who would never identify themselves as military historians have laid the foundation upon which practitioners of the War and Society Approach will be able to offer a nuanced and subtle understanding of the role of warfare in shaping the first 40 percent of American history. Indeed, because of the richness of its historiography, few eras in American history as the colonial period are bettered poised for students and scholars who hope to understand war in all its varied dimensions.



## BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Anderson, Fred (1984). *A People's Army: Massachusetts Soldiers and Society in the Seven Years' War*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Anderson, Fred (2000). *Crucible of War: The Seven Years' War and the Fate of Empire in British North America, 1754–1766*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Anderson, Fred, and Andrew Cayton (2005). *The Dominion of War: Empire and Liberty in North America, 1500–2000*. New York: Viking.
- Axtell, James, and William C. Sturtevant (1980). "The Unkindest Cut, or, Who Invented Scalping?" *William and Mary Quarterly*, 37:3 (July), 451–72.
- Baker, Emerson, and John Reid (1998). *The New England Knight: Sir William Phips, 1651–1695*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- Beattie, Daniel (1986). "The Adaptation of the British Army to Wilderness Warfare, 1755–1763," in Maarten Ultee, ed., *Adapting to Conditions: War and Society in the Eighteenth Century*. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 56–83.
- Bourne, Russell (1990). *The Red King's Rebellion: Racial Politics in New England, 1675–1678*. New York: Atheneum.
- Braund, Kathern Holland (1993). *Deerskins & Duffels: The Creek Indian Trade with Anglo-America, 1685–1815*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
- Brumwell, Steven (2002). *The British Soldier and War in the Americas, 1755–1763*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Brumwell, Steven (2004). *White Devil: A True Story of War, Savagery, and Vengeance in Colonial America*. New York: DaCapo Press.
- Brumwell, Steven (2006). *Paths of Glory: The Life and Death of General James Wolfe*. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press.
- Calloway, Colin (1990). *The Western Abenakis of Vermont, 1600–1800: War, Migration, and the Survival of an Indian People*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Calloway, Colin (2006). *The Scratch of a Pen: 1763 and the Transformation of North America*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Cave, Alfred A. (1996). *The Pequot War*. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press.
- Chet, Guy (2003). *Conquering the American Wilderness: The Triumph of European Warfare in the Colonial Northeast*. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press.
- Crane, Verner (1956 [1928]). *The Southern Frontier, 1670–1732*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Cunco, John (1987 [1952]). *Robert Rogers of the Rangers*. New York: Richardson & Steirman.
- Dixon, David (2005). *Never Come to Peace Again: Pontiac's Uprising and the Fate of the British Empire in North America*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Dowd, Gregory Evans (1992). *A Spirited Resistance: The North American Indian Struggle for Unity, 1745–1815*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Dowd, Gregory Evans (2002). *War under Heaven: Pontiac, the Indian Nations, and the British Empire*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Drake, Charles (1870). *A Particular History of the Five Years French and Indian War in New England*. Albany, NY: Joel Munsell.
- Drake, James (1999). *King Philip's War: Civil War in New England, 1675–1676*. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press.
- Dull, Jonathan (2005). *The French Navy in the Seven Years' War*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.

- Eid, Leory (1985). "National War among the Indians of Northeastern America," *Canadian Review of American Studies*, 16:2 (Summer), 125–54.
- Eccles, W. J. (1969). *The Canadian Frontier, 1534–1760*. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston.
- Eccles, W. J. (1972). *France in America*. New York: Harper & Row.
- Gallay, Alan (2002). *The Indian Slave Trade: The Rise of the English Empire in the American South, 1670–1717*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Gipson, Lawrence Henry (1936–70). *The British Empire before the American Revolution*, 15 vols. Caldwell, ID: Caxton Press [vols. 1–3]; New York: Alfred A. Knopf. [vols. 4–15].
- Godfrey, William G. (1976). *Pursuit of Profit and Preferment in Colonial North America: John Bradstreet's Quest*. Waterloo, Ont.: Wilfrid Laurier University.
- Grenier, John (2005). *The First Way of War: American War Making on the Frontier, 1607–1814*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Grenier, John (2008). *The Far Reaches of Empire: War in Nova Scotia, 1710–1760*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Gwyn, Julian (2003). *Frigates and Foremasts: The North American Squadron in Nova Scotia Waters, 1745–1815*. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press.
- Haefeli, Evan, and Kevin Sweeney (2003). *Captors and Captives: The 1704 French and Indian Raid on Deerfield*. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press.
- Hamilton, Edward (1962). *The French and Indian Wars: The Story of Battles and Forts in the Wilderness*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday.
- Hatley, Thomas (1993). *The Dividing Paths: Cherokees and South Carolinians through the Era of Revolution*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Hinderaker, Eric (1997). *Elusive Empires: Constructing Colonialism in the Ohio Valley, 1673–1800*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Hirsch, Adam (1988). "The Collision of Military Cultures in Seventeenth-Century New England," *Journal of American History*, 74:4 (March), 1187–1212.
- Hubbard, William (1677). *The History of the Indian Wars in New England from the First Settlement to the Termination of the War with King Philip, in 1677*. Boston: np [reprinted: New York: Kraus Reprint Co., 1969].
- Ivers, Larry (1974). *British Drums on the Southern Frontier: The Military Colonization of Georgia, 1733–1739*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Jennings, Francis (1975). *The Invasion of America: Indians, Colonialism, and the Cant of Conquest*. New York: W. W. Norton.
- Jennings, Francis (1984). *The Ambiguous Iroquois Empire: The Covenant Chain Confederation of Indian Tribes with the English Colonies*. New York: W. W. Norton.
- Jennings, Francis (1988). *Empire of Fortune: Crown, Colonies, and Tribes in the Seven Years War*. New York: W. W. Norton.
- Johnson, Richard (1977). "The Search for a Usable Indian: An Aspect of the Defense of Colonial New England," *Journal of American History*, 64:3 (December), 623–51.
- Karr, Ronald Dale (1999). "‘Why Should You Be So Ferocious?': The Violence of the Pequot War," *Journal of American History*, 85:3 (December), 876–909.
- Leach, Douglas Edward (1958). *Flintlock and Tomahawk: New England in King Philip's War*. New York: Macmillan.
- Leach, Douglas Edward (1966). *The Northern Colonial Frontier*. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press.
- Leach, Douglas Edward (1973). *Arms for Empire: A Military History of the British Colonies in North America, 1607–1763*. New York: Macmillan.



- Leach, Douglas Edward (1986). *Roots of Conflict: British Armed Forces and Colonial Americans, 1677–1763*. University of North Carolina Press
- Lee, Wayne (2004). "Fortify, Fight, or Flee: Tuscarora and Cherokee Defensive Warfare and Military Cultural Adaptation," *Journal of Military History*, 68:3 (July), 713–70.
- Lepore, Jill (1998). *The Name of War: King Philip's War and the Origins of American Identity*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Linn, Brian (2002). "The American Way of War Revisited," *Journal of Military History*, 66:2 (April), 501–33.
- Lipman, Andrew (2008). "'A meanes to knitt them together': The Exchange of Body Parts in the Pequot War," *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3rd ser., 65:1 (January), 1–28.
- Malone, Patrick (1991). *The Skulking Way of War: Technology and Tactics among the New England Indians*. New York: Madison Books.
- Mason, John (1736). *A Brief History of the Pequot War*. Boston: S. Kneeland and T. Green [reprinted Freeport, NY: Books for Library Press, 1971].
- Mather, Cotton (1699). *Decennium Luctuosum*. Boston: B. Green, 1699 [reprinted New York: Garland Publishers, 1978].
- McConnell, Michael (2004). *Army and Empire: British Soldiers on the American Frontier, 1758–1775*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
- Merrell, James (1989). *The Indians' New World: Catawbas and Their Neighbors from European Contact through the Era of Removal*. New York: W. W. Norton.
- Merrell, James (1999). *Into the American Woods: Negotiators on the Pennsylvania Frontier*. New York: W.W. Norton.
- Middleton, Richard (2007). *Pontiac's War: Its Causes, Course, and Consequences*. New York: Routledge.
- Niles, Samuel (1837 and 1861). *A Summary Historical Narrative of the Wars in New-England with the French and Indians, in Several Parts of the Colony*. Part I, [Massachusetts Historical Society] *Collections* 3rd ser., 6 and part II, [Massachusetts Historical Society] *Collections* 4th ser., 5.
- Oliphant, John (2001). *Peace and War on the Anglo-Cherokee Frontier, 1756–63*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.
- Parkman, Francis (1851). *The Conspiracy of Pontiac*. Boston: C.C. Little and J. B. Brown.
- Parkman, Francis (1884). *Montcalm and Wolf*, 2 vols. Boston: Little, Brown, and Co.
- Parkman, Francis (1892). *A Half Century of Conflict*. Boston: Little, Brown, and Co.
- Pargellis, Stanley M. (1933). *Lord Loudoun in North America, 1756–1758*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Peckham, Howard (1961 [1948]). *Pontiac and the Indian Uprising*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Penhallow, Samuel (1726). *The History of the Wars of New-England, with the Eastern Indians*. Boston: np [reprinted as *History of the Indian Wars*. Williamston, MA: Corner House Publishers, 1973].
- Percy, George (1922). "'A Trewe Relacyon': Virginia from 1609 to 1612," *Tyler's Quarterly Historical and Genealogical Magazine*, 3: 259–82.
- Plank, Geoffrey (2001). *An Unsettled Conquest: The British Campaign against the Peoples of Acadia*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Pritchard, James (1995). *Anatomy of a Naval Disaster: The 1746 French Naval Expedition to North America*. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press.
- Richter, Daniel (1992). *The Ordeal of the Longhouse: The Peoples of the Iroquois League in the Era of European Colonization*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

- Richter, Daniel (2001). *Facing East from Indian Country: A Native History of Early America*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Russell, Peter E. (1978). "Redcoats in the Wilderness: British Officers and Irregular Warfare in Europe and America, 1740 to 1760," *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3rd ser., 35:4 (October), 629–52.
- Saltonstall, Nathaniel (1676). *A New and Further Narrative of the State of New-England, by N.S. 1676*. London: F.B. Dorman Newman [reprinted in Charles H. Lincoln, ed. *Narratives of the Indian Wars, 1675–1699*. New York: Barnes & Noble, 1952].
- Saunt, Claudio (1999). *A New Order of Things: Property, Power, and the Transformation of the Creek Indians, 1733–1816*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Selesky, Harold (1990). *War and Society in Colonial Connecticut*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Shea, William (1983). *The Virginia Militia in the Seventeenth Century*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.
- Shy, John (1965). *Toward Lexington: The Role of the British Army in the Coming of the American Revolution*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Stacey, C. P. (1959). *Quebec, 1759: The Siege and the Battle*. Toronto: Macmillan.
- Starkey, Armstrong (1998). *European and Native American Warfare, 1675–1815*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Steele, Ian (1990). *Betrays: Fort William Henry and the Massacre*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Steele, Ian (1994). *Warpaths: Invasions of North America*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Titus, James (1991). *The Old Dominion at War: Society, Politics, and Warfare in Late Colonial Virginia*. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.
- Underhill, John (1638). *News from America: Or, A New and Experimentall Discoverie of New England*. London: Printed by J.D. for Peter Cole [available on line at: <http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1037&context=etas>].
- Usner, Daniel (1990). *Indians, Settlers, and Slaves in a Frontier Exchange Economy: The Lower Mississippi Valley before 1783*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Vincent, Philip (1637). *A True Relation of the Late Battell Fought in New England, between the English and Pequet Salvages*. London: M[armaduke] P[arsons] for Nathanael Butter and John Bellamie [reprinted Norwood, NJ: Walter J. Johnson, 1974. Available on line at: <http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1035&context=etas>]. [Reprinted 1833, Massachusetts Historical Society] *Collections*, 3rd ser., 6.
- Waller, G. M. (1960). *Samuel Vetch, Colonial Enterpriser*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Ward, Matthew (2003). *Breaking the Backcountry: The Seven Years' War in Virginia and Pennsylvania, 1754–1765*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
- Ward, Matthew (2005). *The Battle for Quebec, 1759: Britain's Conquest of Canada*. Gloucestershire: Tempus.
- Weigley, Russel. (1973). *The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- White, Richard (1991). *The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650–1815*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Worster, Donald E., and Thomas F. Schliz (1984). "The Spread of Firearms among the Indians of the Anglo-French Frontier," *American Indian Quarterly*, 8:2 (Spring), 103–15.
- Zelner, Kyle F. (2009). *A Rabble in Arms: Massachusetts Towns and Militiamen During King Philip's War*. New York: New York University Press.

## Chapter Two

# WAR OF AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE, 1775–83

*Stephen R. Conway*

How one views the War of American Independence depends, to a considerable extent, on from where one looks. To American historians, this is the conflict that saw the birth and survival of their country; to British historians the war severed not just a transatlantic empire but the transatlantic British nation. Even the name commonly attached to the struggle differs on the two sides of the ocean: to the British it is the War of American Independence, or even just the American War; to Americans, the conflict is usually known as the Revolutionary War. More fundamentally, American historians tend to view the military contest almost exclusively as a war to secure American independence from Britain, and therefore concentrate on its American aspects (Wallace 1951, Ward 1952, Peckham 1958, Alden 1969, Higginbotham 1971, Middlekauff 1982, Ferling, 2007). British historians, by contrast, are more inclined to emphasize that from 1778, when the French entered the war, it became much more than a struggle for America, and took on the character of a world war (Mackesy 1964; Conway 1995).

In this brief essay on a long and complicated armed conflict, a compromise will be attempted in which the American campaigns of the war will be centre-stage, and no detailed treatment will be provided of other theatres of operation. But, in order to capture the importance of the wider conflict, reference will be made to the war in the Caribbean, Central America, West Africa, Europe, and Asia, particularly as they affected British strategy and British operational capability in North America. It is impossible, in the space available, to do justice to all aspects of the war even in America, and reference to many of the lesser engagements has been omitted. What is offered here is a synoptic overview of the conflict, which will stress the key role of French intervention, and particularly the French navy, in securing the independence of the United States. Richard Blanco (1984) provides an annotated bibliography of numerous works published in the 200 years since the war ended and Paul David Nelson (1978) assesses the historiography of Britain's conduct of the war.

The war began as an intensification of a long-running dispute between the American colonies and the British government over the authority of the

Westminster Parliament. To British politicians it was axiomatic that Parliament was the national legislature, able to pass laws for Britons everywhere – including in colonial America (Gould 2000). The legislative power of Parliament had been resisted in the seventeenth-century colonies, where the validity of the Navigation Acts, designed to control colonial trade, was contested on the grounds that the colonies possessed legislatures of their own. By the middle of the eighteenth century, however, parliamentary regulation of colonial overseas trade was generally accepted, in part for the simple reason that it was found to be beneficial to the development of shipbuilding in New England, and not very onerous for the plantation colonies of the South. But if Parliament had passed laws for the colonies, it had not attempted to tax them. When, after the Seven Years War (1756–63), Parliament sought to raise taxes in America to help meet the costs of the permanent British military garrison needed to police newly conquered Canada and the Appalachian frontier of the old British colonies, American opposition was determined and widespread. Successive crises were resolved by British retreat over first the Stamp Act (passed in 1765, repealed in 1766) and the Townshend Duties (introduced in 1767, partly repealed in 1770), until in 1774 the dispute came to a head with Parliament's passage of the Coercive Acts, which Americans referred to (with the addition of the Quebec Act) as the Intolerable Acts. Most important were the Quebec Act, which established a government for that colony without an elected legislature and included in its borders the region north of the Ohio River and west of the Alleghany Mountains (areas claimed by several of the 13 colonies), and the Massachusetts Government Act, which attempted to remodel the constitution of the colony to strengthen the authority of its governor and reduce the role of the elected assembly. The other colonies, fearing that the system established in Quebec and what was happening in Massachusetts marked a prelude to the curbing of the power of their own assemblies, rallied to help the New Englanders (Christie 1966, Ammerman 1974). A military build-up on both sides led finally to an armed clash at Lexington and Concord in April 1775, when General Thomas Gage's British troops sought to destroy colonial munitions (Tourtellot 1959).

The war aims of the two sides were at this stage limited. Americans sought to resist what they saw as the aggression of Lord North's ministry. The Continental Congress, convened to coordinate resistance to British measures, became the effective organ of American military policy. Significantly, its members proclaimed their continuing loyalty to George III, and appealed to him to protect the colonies from the wicked designs of an authoritarian ministry. We can surmise that in the first months of the war the American hope was that Lord North's ministry would be removed by the king, and a new government, more favourably disposed to the colonies, would negotiate a settlement on terms acceptable to American opinion. Given the pattern of British concessions to colonial resistance over the past decade, such a hope was far from unrealistic. The main opposition group in Parliament was led by the Marquis of Rockingham, whose brief ministry of 1765–6 had repealed the hated Stamp Act. George III, however, soon made it clear that he supported North's government and the authority of the British Parliament. The final recognition by leading Americans that the king would not shield them, and

had sided unequivocally with their enemies, was an important precondition for the idea of complete independence gaining ground and eventually becoming the colonial objective. But independence, it should be stressed, was most certainly not what most Americans were seeking when the war began. To avoid ruining any chance of a settlement, they held back from bombarding the British garrison in Boston in the winter of 1775–6, even when they had the artillery to accomplish much destruction. For this reason, it seems appropriate to describe the first months of the conflict as no less of a “phoney war” than the opening phase of the Second World War on the western front (Fleming 1975, Thomas 1991).

For the British, the original aim had been to subdue the rebellion in Massachusetts; to this end military force had been concentrated in Boston during 1774, and the rest of the North American colonies almost denuded of troops. After the initial skirmishes at Lexington and Concord, Gage found himself and his army besieged in Boston by a great mass of New England militiamen. The battle of Bunker Hill, fought on June 17, 1775, achieved very little. Essentially an attempt to break the rebel stranglehold, and restore the reputation of the regulars, the battle was technically a British victory, but the losses amongst Gage’s troops were so heavy that his army was thereafter in no position to consider offensive operations (Fleming 1960, Ketchum 1962). The amateur troops besieging the battered British garrison, furthermore, had been renamed by Congress the Continental Army, and placed under the command of the Virginian George Washington, to demonstrate that Gage was confronted not just by enraged New Englanders, but by the united efforts of the United Colonies. Perhaps worse still, from the British perspective, as a consequence of the military build-up in Massachusetts, the rebels were able rapidly to establish control over all of the other old mainland British colonies. They even began an invasion of Canada – designed, one assumes, to bring the benefits of liberty to the poor benighted French-Canadians – and reached Quebec before their advance was halted (Bird 1968, Shelton 1994, Desjardin 2006). To recover the situation after this distinctly unpromising start was going to be no easy task for the British government and its military commanders.

Opinion was divided in Britain itself about whether the war should be fought at all. Significant numbers of Britons signed petitions calling for the conciliation of the Americans, while many others pressed, in loyal addresses, for the government to do what was needed to subdue the rebellion (Bradley 1986, 1990; Conway 2000, Gould 2000). But, whatever the divisions within the political nation, there was agreement within the ministry that the colonies should be brought into line by force if necessary. The North American provinces were viewed as vital to British prosperity and British power. They consumed increasingly important quantities of British manufactures, and sent to Britain, for home use or re-export, lucrative staples such as tobacco, fish, rice, cereals, potash, and naval stores. This valuable commerce aided the British economy and helped British public finances. Perhaps most important of all, the seventeenth-century Navigation Acts, which stipulated that carriage of goods between Britain and its colonies should be in British ships manned by predominantly British crews, ensured that there was a substantial quantity of experienced British mariners, schooled in the long Atlantic

crossing, who could be conscripted into sea service during time of war. As the Royal Navy was seen as the protector of the British Isles from invasion, and as Britain's chief claim to a high standing amongst the European powers, it followed that every effort had to be made to keep the American colonies within the system created by the Navigation Acts (Conway 2007). There was also a concern about the need to put down unlawful rebellion against legitimate authority. Fears were expressed in governing circles that if the rebellion in North America succeeded, then it would spread elsewhere: Ireland was known to be restless, and an uprising in London itself was thought to be a real possibility by some anxious ministers (Thomas 1976).

Yet if Lord North and his colleagues were agreed that the Americans had to be compelled to remain under British authority, they were far from in accord about how this could best be achieved. One view, favoured by the secretary at war, Lord Barrington, was that the rebellion could be put down by naval power alone. If the colonies could be successfully blockaded, internal tensions might be allowed to grow and at least some of the provinces might sue for terms. In part, this approach was recommended because of lack of confidence in the ability of the British army to expand rapidly enough from its peace-time establishment to carry out the military subjugation of the colonies. Barrington, who was responsible for mobilizing the army, was convinced that it would be impossible to provide the field force required in North America for the 1776 campaign. Preference for a naval strategy was also influenced by an appreciation of the enormous difficulties of trying to maintain a considerable army in a hostile environment more than 3,000 miles from the home islands. The logistical problems were truly daunting, and even if they were to be effectively mastered in 1776, there was good reason to believe that they might prove insurmountable. It was notable that the adjutant-general, an experienced soldier, believed that relying on the army to crush the American rebellion was "as wild an Idea, as ever controverted Com[mon] Sense" (The National Archives of the United Kingdom, War Office Papers, WO 3/5, 37, Gen. Edward Harvey to Gen. John Irwin, 30 June 1775).

There were, however, powerful arguments against a naval blockade as the principal means of bringing the Americans back under British control, and, supported by the king, by North and by Lord George Germain, the secretary of state for the colonies, these arguments won the day (Brown 1963). An effective blockade of the North American colonies would be very difficult to secure, and would require a substantial naval commitment. This would be costly (always a worry to the parsimonious North). Full-scale naval mobilization, furthermore, would alarm the French government, which could see it as a threat to the French West Indies, and so might be tempted to enter the conflict on the American side. Other European powers might be similarly concerned about any attempt to interfere with trade with their Caribbean islands. No less important was the belief that the rebellion rested on very unstable foundations, and that most Americans were in truth "friends to government." A purely naval war would mean the abandonment of these loyalists. Over-optimistic reports from royal governors fed the fantasy that the majority of Americans, given the appropriate encouragement, would willingly



help to restore British authority. Germain, already predisposed to view the rebellion as a conspiracy, was convinced that significant bodies of British troops were therefore absolutely essential to help liberate the good Americans from the bad (Smith 1964).

The British strategy for 1776 was based on three separate armies converging to bring the rebellion to an end. The principal force, led by Gage's successor, General William Howe, made up of the old Boston garrison, heavily reinforced by fresh troops from Europe, was to begin operations in the lower Hudson River Valley of New York. A second army, commanded by Generals Charles, Earl Cornwallis and Henry Clinton, would campaign in the South, where it was thought that loyalists were particularly plentiful, and that the slave labour system would inhibit the mobilization of white manpower in the revolutionary cause. It was imagined that once the southern provinces had been brought back into line, this British army could be transported north under naval cover and join Howe in New York. The third army, under John Burgoyne and Guy Carleton, was to clear the rebels from Canada, and then push south to meet Howe in the Hudson valley.

Execution proved more difficult than planning. Howe started well, defeating the Americans under Washington at Long Island in August and capturing New York shortly afterwards. Howe's failure to finish off Washington's army was seen by some contemporaries as a sign of his unwillingness to go for the American jugular; and modern scholars similarly see political considerations as inhibiting the full application of British military strength (Gruber 1972). Logistical difficulties, however, might well have acted as the real restraining influence: reinforcements had to come from across the Atlantic, which necessarily encouraged a cautious approach by British commanders. In any event, Newport, Rhode Island, was seized at the end of the year, and the rebellion seemed on the verge of collapse. But Howe failed again to catch Washington's disintegrating army as it retreated across New Jersey, and the ill-conduct of his troops – British regulars and German auxiliaries – toward the civilian population might well have helped rekindle the dying embers of resistance (McCullough 2005). In the last days of December the Americans boldly and successfully counter-attacked at Trenton and then, at the beginning of 1777, at Princeton, ending British hopes of an imminent end to the war (Bell 1948). Elsewhere, British plans did not come to fruition either. Cornwallis and Clinton brought their army from the South and helped in Howe's operations in the Hudson valley, but they did so only after having failed to carry out the first part of their remit: indeed, their attempt to take Charleston, South Carolina, had ended in ignominious defeat. Carleton and Burgoyne successfully cleared the Americans from Canada, but the halt to construct a flotilla to counter American ships on Lake Champlain delayed their advance into New York until winter threatened to close in (Nelson 2006).

Not only was the campaign of 1776 ultimately unsuccessful from a British point of view, it also saw the Americans formally declaring themselves independent from the British crown. From July of that year, the Americans fought not for a better position within the British empire, but to sustain their separation from British control. The change in objective was significant in many respects. It led to a rapid

growth in American loyalism, as many colonists who had been willing to resist the claims of Lord North and the British Parliament could not accept the final break with the British crown (Nelson 1961, Brown 1963). More positively, from an American perspective, it made likely foreign aid to sustain the American cause. Foreign powers – and especially the French and the Spanish, Britain's defeated enemies in the Seven Years War – were not going to commit resources to aiding a rebellion that might end in a settlement that kept the colonies within the British system. They needed reassurance that their money and material help would contribute to the permanent weakening of British power. The Declaration of Independence, important though it was for domestic consumption, was accordingly aimed principally at the wider world. It was an announcement that there would be no compromise settlement with the British (Dull 1985).

For Lord North's government, and the British commanders in North America, another year of campaigning was therefore necessary. Despite the limited achievements of 1776, British planners decided to follow a broadly similar strategy in 1777. This time southern operations were to wait until the north had been subdued, but again two armies were to converge in the Hudson valley. Burgoyne was to lead the northern army from Canada, while Howe was to advance up from New York. The intention, it seems, was to cut off New England – viewed as the nerve centre of the uprising – from the rest of the rebellious provinces. But what had been intended as a co-ordinated push to bring the war to an end, turned out to be two separate campaigns, waged with only fitful reference to each other. Howe became beguiled by the prospect of defeating Washington in Pennsylvania and occupying Philadelphia, which he believed would lead to the successful termination of the war. He consequently downgraded his commitment to helping Burgoyne. The result was that while Howe won his victory over Washington at Brandywine, Pennsylvania, in September 1777, and captured Philadelphia shortly afterwards (Taaffe 2003, McGuire 2006), Burgoyne, advancing through the wilderness of upper New York, found himself worn down and eventually overwhelmed by numerically superior American forces. In October 1777, with his escape route back to Canada cut off, Burgoyne negotiated terms of surrender with the American commander Horatio Gates at Saratoga (Mintz 1990, Ketchum 1997).

For the Americans to have withstood the British assault in 1776 was a major achievement; to have compelled the surrender of a British field army in 1777 was still more impressive. The best chance of British victory had passed. While the Americans were fighting alone, the British might conceivably have been able to subdue the rebellion, despite the logistical problems that they confronted; but once the French entered the war, the balance of advantage perceptibly and dramatically shifted. Saratoga might not have been the cause of French intervention, which had been planned for some time; but it certainly encouraged the French government to believe that their assistance was likely to produce the desired result – a humbling of the British and the restoration of French prestige and power after defeat in the Seven Years War.

Burgoyne's defeat led to a major reappraisal of strategy by the British government. It was immediately assumed that France, and perhaps its ally Spain also,



would become involved on the American side. In January 1778 the cabinet, advised by the commander-in-chief, Lord Amherst, decided to move onto the defensive in North America, securing what the army held and using the navy to attack American trade and intercept supplies destined for the rebel colonies from Europe. At the beginning of March, Germain told Clinton, the new British commander-in-chief in North America, to concentrate on a naval war, but to prepare for another expedition to tap the loyalism still believed to exist in the southern provinces. When the British government learned of the signing of the Franco-American treaties, Clinton was told to evacuate Philadelphia and send an expedition to take the French Caribbean island of St. Lucia. He was further instructed to reinforce the British presence in the Floridas, which it was thought would be a likely target for Spanish attack. Peace commissioners, led by the Earl of Carlisle, were sent across the Atlantic in an attempt to conclude the war with the Americans before the conflict with the Bourbons began in earnest.

The main result of the strategic reappraisal was to shift British attention from North America to other theatres, especially the West Indies, to a lesser extent to the Mediterranean, India, and West Africa, and also the home territories, which were now exposed to the danger of French invasion. Troops and ships were redeployed accordingly, and military and naval mobilization was stepped up in an attempt to meet the challenge of a much broader and more complex war. The decision to attack St. Lucia shows that the British were not thrown entirely on the defensive. But the intention at this stage was not so much to add new territories to the British empire as to undermine French war-making capacity. The logic behind the expedition was probably the same as in earlier eighteenth-century wars. French public finances were thought to be reliant on colonial commerce, and particularly trade with the West Indies. If French islands could be taken, the French government would run out of money to fund its war effort. Once the Spanish entered the war in June 1779, British ministers hatched ambitious plans to seize parts of the scattered and vulnerable Spanish empire, including the Philippines, though again the intention was at least partly to bring the Spanish to terms as quickly as possible, which was understandable given the greatly increased threat posed to the British Isles themselves if the fleets of France and Spain could be brought to act in concert. Dutch involvement in the war from the end of 1780 made the British government more ambitious still, and attacks were launched on Dutch possessions in the West Indies, West Africa, and Asia, though in part for the negative reason that it was believed that if the British did not take Dutch overseas posts, then they would effectively come under French control.

So, what had begun for the British government as a war to defeat rebellion in North America became from 1778 a global conflict, with military and naval operations in every area of competition between Britain and its European opponents (Dupuy, Hammerman, and Hayes 1977). The strategies pursued by France, Spain, the Netherlands, and members of the Armed Neutrality are beyond the purview of this chapter, but in countering those strategies, the British became increasingly overstretched, and found themselves in a position not unlike that of the French in the Seven Years War (Stoker, Hagan, and McMaster 2009). British success in

that struggle was achieved by devoting substantial military and naval resources to maritime and colonial campaigns, and subsidizing allies on the Continent to tie down the formidable French army. France could not give equal attention to the war in Europe and the war overseas, and by concentrating on the conflict on the Continent lost much of its empire. Once the French intervened in the American war, Britain found itself in a broadly similar position. The British government was obliged to conduct a continental war – in North America rather than in Europe – and simultaneously to engage in an imperial and maritime struggle. With no conflict on the European mainland to worry about, the French government was able to devote far larger resources to the navy – by 1782 the equivalent of nearly £9 million, compared with only £500,000 in 1760 (Dull 1975).

It might legitimately be asked why the British government did not cut its losses in North America and concentrate exclusively on the wider conflict with France and its other European enemies. Opposition politicians, who had not supported the war in America, were much more enthusiastic about a struggle with France, the long-standing ideological enemy, so there was a real opportunity for the creation of national unity in place of bitter domestic division. The government itself clearly would have liked to have ended the American conflict prior to effective French intervention: the Carlisle Peace commission was permitted to offer the Americans complete freedom from parliamentary taxation – the original matter of dispute – so long as parliamentary authority to regulate the overseas trade of the colonies was accepted.

Yet when Carlisle's terms were rejected by Congress, Lord North's government pressed on with the war in America. A continuing sense of obligation to the loyalists probably provides part of the explanation. Fear that Britain without America would sink to the status of a second- or even third-rate European power was still more influential. The fact that the Carlisle peace commission was instructed to insist on parliamentary regulation of American trade is significant: if the colonies were freed from the provisions of the Navigation Acts, it was assumed that British naval power would be fatally undermined. Yet if the considerations that had originally led the British government into the war still applied, ministerial expectations were now much more modest than before. There was probably a recognition that it was highly unlikely that all of the rebellious colonies might be brought back into the British fold. But there was a hope that at least some of them might be reclaimed. The provinces that offered the best prospects were in the south, and it was in this region that the main British campaigning efforts were made from the end of 1778, even though the principal Continental Army under Washington remained in the north, shadowing the British head-quarters in New York. The southern provinces attracted British attention not so much because of their reputed loyalty – though Germain still believed that this was a resource just waiting to be exploited – but more as a result of their perceived value as servicing centres for the British West Indies. The Caribbean islands, especially the smaller ones, relied heavily on imports of foodstuffs and other necessities to support their slave labour force, as most cultivable land had been given over to sugar production. Before the American war began, vital supplies largely came from the mainland British

colonies; once the war disrupted the flow of food, slave mortality rates soared, sugar production dropped, and the island economies teetered on the verge of destruction. If the British army could return Georgia and South Carolina to royal control, then these provinces could sustain the islands with rice, meat products, and timber. The war in North America, in other words, was to be pursued largely for Caribbean purposes (Toth 1975).

While plans were being laid for renewed operations in America, the war in European waters demanded British attention. Fears of a joint French-Spanish invasion coupled with the Spanish besieging of Gibraltar, the formation of an Armed Neutrality by Russia, and unsettled relations with the Dutch, plus the alarm spread around the coasts of Great Britain by the Continental Navy's John Paul Jones, forced ministers to retain significant naval forces nearer to home (De Madariaga 1962, Nordholt 1982, Syrett 1998). Britain's focus on Europe appeared to open the door for offensive actions by American forces (Palmer 1975). When Clinton evacuated Philadelphia and retired to New York, Washington struck the rear of his column at Monmouth Court House in New Jersey. The result was a draw, but demonstrated that the Continental Army was much improved as a fighting force after the drill and training it received at Valley Forge over the previous winter (Bodle 2002). Meanwhile, in the Old Northwest Virginia state troops commanded by George Rogers Clark captured British posts (Sosin 1967, Harrison 1976).

The British forces were to have some successes in North America after 1778, capturing and returning Georgia to British rule, and defeating a joint Franco-American attack on Savannah the following year (Lawrence 1951). In May 1780, British forces captured Charleston, the most important town in the South, and followed up at Camden in August with Lord Cornwallis's defeat of Horatio Gates's Continentals and local militia, opening up the prospect that the whole of South Carolina would be returned to British rule (Wilson 2005). For a brief heady period, it appeared as if British authority might be restored more widely by picking off the rebel provinces one by one. But even though British progress in South Carolina seemed initially to be a re-run of the triumphs of 1776 in New York, the war had completely changed its character. Before French intervention, the British army had been free to campaign anywhere along the Atlantic coast: as American general Charles Lee wrote in May 1776, "the enemy (furnished with canvas wings) can fly from one spot to another" (*Lee Papers*, New-York Historical Society Collections, 4th series, x, New York, 1871, 795). British naval superiority had also made the task of supplying and reinforcing the army in North America from Britain and Ireland at least feasible, if not always easy. Once the French entered the war, these advantages disappeared. The extended Atlantic supply route was now very exposed to attack by French ships, which meant that British commanders in North America could be much less confident of their ability to survive, let alone accumulate sufficient stores to embark on ambitious offensive operations. At the end of 1776, General Howe had been able to report that his forces had been "under no Apprehension of Want" during that year's campaign (The National Archives of the United Kingdom, Treasury Papers, T 64/108, fo. 73); in November 1778, Clinton was to complain that "4 times since I came to this Command have I been

within 3 weeks of Starving” (Nottingham University Library, Newcastle of Clumber MSS, NeC 2646) (Bowler 1975).

Of more immediate concern was the threat posed by the French navy to British bases on the American coast. If the French fleet could co-operate with American forces on land, vulnerable British garrisons might be compelled to surrender. The British government might perhaps have prevented the French navy from posing such a threat if ministers had stuck to the successful policy of the previous two wars – the War of the Austrian Succession of 1740–8 and the Seven Years War. In the first of these mid-century conflicts, the British admiralty had developed a strategy of concentrating naval power in home waters, with the Western Squadron being formed in 1745. The thinking behind concentration was that a strong British naval force in this location could prevent invasion, protect homeward bound trade, intercept French commerce, and, crucially, confine the French fleet to its ports. The strategy began to bear fruit by the end of the Austrian Succession struggle, when Canada was effectively cut off from metropolitan France. But it was in the Seven Years War that the potential of the Western Squadron was fully realized. By 1760, French overseas commerce was badly hit, British trade was flourishing, and the French navy was reduced to near impotence. Lord Sandwich, first lord of the admiralty in North’s government, wanted to follow the same policy of concentrating British naval power in home waters once the French entered the American war. But Sandwich failed to persuade his cabinet colleagues, especially Germain, who pressed instead for a policy of naval dispersal designed to retain the initiative across the Atlantic. An unsatisfactory compromise was reached, which neither provided the advantages of concentration nor allowed consistent local superiority elsewhere (Rodger 2004).

But in truth there was no easy solution to the British dilemma. Even if Sandwich had won the argument in 1778, the strategy of concentration would have taken time to work. But time was not on the British side. The addition of the Spanish fleet to the French in 1779 put the Royal Navy at a marked numerical disadvantage. From this point onwards there was little opportunity for the British to repeat the successes of the Seven Years War, when Spain had entered the conflict only in 1762 – too late to assist the already enfeebled French navy. In the summer of 1779, by contrast, Franco-Spanish naval forces effectively controlled the Channel and threatened to put troops ashore and attack Plymouth; only sickness on board the combined fleet prevented a landing. There was to be another major invasion scare in 1781. It might be argued that the advocates of a dispersal strategy were proved right in the end: the presence of a substantial British fleet in the West Indies in the spring of 1782 enabled Admiral Rodney to defeat the French under Admiral de Grasse at the Saintes, a victory that saved Jamaica, boosted morale at home, and probably enabled the British negotiators to secure more favourable terms in the final peace treaties of 1782–3. But, long before Rodney’s triumph, the French navy had sealed the fate of the British army in North America and secured the independence of the United States (Dull 1975).

The first indication of the danger to the British position came in July 1778, when Admiral d’Estaing appeared off New York with a strong body of French ships

of the line from the Toulon fleet. The French admiral's aim was to deliver a knock-out blow to the British head-quarters, and so bring the war to an immediate close. As it transpired, d'Estaing was unable to force a decisive action, or to maintain a blockade of New York. Even so, the dramatically changed nature of the war had been underlined. And, as if further to underscore the point, the following month d'Estaing almost won the consolation prize of taking Newport, Rhode Island. The French fleet, cooperating with Continental troops and local New England militia, came close to compelling the surrender of the British garrison (Dearden 1980).

Poor coordination between the French fleet and American troops prevented the Rhode Island episode ending triumphantly for the allies, and the British placed much faith in the impossibility of such unnatural partners as the Catholic and monarchical French and the Protestant and republican Americans ever being able to work effectively together. Shortly after the failed siege of Newport, Admiral James Gambier wrote gleefully that "The French and the rebels are most cordially sick of each other, a most reciprocal enmity and contempt" (Barnes and Owen 1932-8, ii, 308). The disastrously unsuccessful Franco-American attack on the exposed British garrison at Savannah, Georgia, in the autumn of 1779 no doubt appeared to prove the difficulties of securing full cooperation. We might note, however, that in the aftermath of the attempt on Savannah, Clinton, recognizing the risk to his other exposed posts, decided to abandon Newport and pull its garrison back to New York. Whatever his shortcomings, the British commander-in-chief fully appreciated both the new strategic situation, and his very limited opportunities to turn it to his advantage.

The following year, when the British took Charleston, the spectre of the French navy still haunted Clinton. After having brought much of his army to South Carolina, the British commander-in-chief became fearful that his denuded garrison at New York was in danger from a combination of French ships and Washington's army. His anxiety led Clinton on 8 June 1780 to set sail back to New York, taking with him more than half of the troops who had been employed in capturing Charleston. Cornwallis, left in charge in the south, was therefore denied the numerical strength on the ground that successful operations required, and was compelled to rely on raising local support. When South Carolina proved impossible to subdue, and descended into a bitter and bloody civil war, Cornwallis moved into neighbouring North Carolina, in search of the elusive "friends to government." He defeated Nathaniel Greene's army at Guilford Court House in March 1781, but at enormous cost to his small British force (Buchanan 1997). As Cornwallis's troops recuperated, Greene, bettered but far from crushed, moved back into South Carolina, and began the process of recapturing the scattered British posts. By the end of the summer, British troops were confined to their coastal bases at Savannah and Charleston. Meanwhile, Clinton, still anxious about a French and American threat to New York, refused to reinforce Cornwallis; indeed, he repeatedly called for the small southern army to send a detachment to strengthen his forces in the north.

Cornwallis, disappointed in his hopes of raising loyalists in North Carolina, moved into Virginia in the spring of 1781, with the intention of linking with a

British force already operating in the province – a force which had been destroying stores, creating a diversion to favour Cornwallis's efforts further south, and seeking to establish a naval base to cover the army's operations. Cornwallis took charge of the combined detachments, and set about trying to find a suitable naval anchorage. He chose Yorktown, which was able to accommodate ships of the line, and early in August his troops started to build defensive works. In retrospect, we can see that this was a fatal mistake. On the move, Cornwallis was able to brush aside local resistance; once his little army halted and established itself on the coast, encirclement by the French and the Americans was always a risk.

In June the French army under General Comte de Rochambeau left its Rhode Island cantonments and joined Washington's American forces before New York. Clinton was convinced that his head-quarters was again the target. But in mid-August the French and American forces began to move south to ensnare Cornwallis. Further French troops were brought up from the Caribbean by de Grasse, and Cornwallis was laid under siege in September. A British squadron under Admiral Thomas Graves sailed from New York to help the beleaguered Cornwallis, but a two-hour naval engagement with de Grasse off the entrance to Chesapeake Bay ended with Graves returning north to refit his damaged vessels. Clinton, realizing that Cornwallis was now trapped, belatedly decided to commit everything to his rescue. But repairing the damaged British ships delayed his departure – with 7,000 troops – until October 19. By then it was too late. The allied army, 16,000 strong, had sealed off Cornwallis's escape routes, and the French fleet controlled the surrounding waters. On October 17, with his position hopeless, Cornwallis proposed a negotiation of terms. Two days later his troops laid down their arms. The nightmare that had discomforted Clinton from the moment that he took command in North America had at length become reality.

The vital contribution of the French navy to changing the course of the war in North America was further underlined after Yorktown. Washington wanted to deliver a final blow to the British by launching a similarly coordinated attack on either Charleston or New York. But the French fleet was transferred to the West Indies, and without it, Washington was unable to make much headway. His troops could prevent the British army from leaving its enclaves, but the Americans were in no position to do anything more adventurous in the absence of the French navy. The war in North America accordingly settled down into a stalemate, and the British evacuated Savannah, then Charleston, and finally New York when they chose to do so, not because they were forced out by the Continental Army.

In short, the entry of France into the American war completely changed the nature of the conflict. The Americans fought tenaciously to survive before Saratoga, and by doing so denied the British their best chance of winning the war. From 1778, British strategists struggled to meet the challenge, and never found a way of satisfactorily meeting all their various commitments. French intervention, followed by that of the Spanish and then of the Dutch, turned a colonial rebellion into a world war. From the British perspective, the struggle in North America now became a secondary matter: home defence and the war in other areas of imperial competition took precedence. But the war in North America was not terminated,



and so French intervention was also significant because it meant that the British army operating there became very vulnerable. Its transatlantic supply line was exposed to French attack, and its bases in North America might simultaneously be blockaded by the French navy and besieged by American land forces. Clinton was only too aware of the danger, and it clearly influenced his own operations. But he could do little to avert the disaster that, sooner or later, was almost bound to occur.

In the final peace treaties, concluded at Paris in 1782–3, the British government acknowledged the independence of the United States, on new boundaries more generous than the American negotiators had originally envisaged. Britain ceded the Floridas and Minorca to Spain, and restored St. Lucia and Tobago to France, which was also given back Senegal in West Africa. From the British perspective, it might have been still worse; thanks to the successful defence of Gibraltar against Franco-Spanish assault, and Rodney's decisive naval victory at the Saintes, the British were in far stronger position during the final negotiations than had appeared possible in the aftermath of the surrender at Yorktown. Most of their West Indian possessions were retained, and their position in India was preserved. There was no mistaking, however, that Britain's international standing had diminished. Diplomatic isolation was widely assumed to be the cause of defeat, and the search for new alliances, already begun during the war, took on a new urgency (Simms 2007).

Peace brought an end to the problem of prisoners of war which commanders had struggled to deal with since the start of hostilities. In 1775 George III declared all rebels to be traitors guilty of treason and thus, by implication, not entitled to treatment as prisoners of war. Over the next eight years approximately 25,000 Americans fell into British hands, with perhaps two-thirds that number of British and allied troops being taken by Continental and state forces. Fearing reprisals, British commanders did not execute American prisoners for treason, as the contemporary "laws of war" would have allowed, but instead with their American counterparts worked out an informal system for exchanging prisoners on the local level. This worked well until late 1777 when the surrender of General Burgoyne at Saratoga brought the Americans 5,800 British prisoners, a number far exceeding that of Americans held by the British. The story of this "Convention Army," its movement to western Virginia and then back to Pennsylvania has been described (Dabney 1954, Sampson 1995), but the plight of other prisoners taken on land has received little modern treatment (Dandridge 1911, Burrows 2008). British officials employed sixteen hulks, including the notorious *Jersey*, anchored in Wal-labout Bay off Brooklyn, New York, as makeshift prisons. As many as 10,000 Americans died from malnutrition, exposure, and neglect in the deplorable conditions (Armbruster 1920, Cogliano 2001). Many of these were prisoners taken from American merchant vessels and Continental Navy warships. Records did not distinguish between mariners (perhaps 20,000 in all) taken from American merchant vessels, privateers, or warships, but British officials strongly opposed the exchange of any type of maritime prisoners. Those taken in European waters or by ships bound for Britain were held at Mill Prison near Plymouth and Forton

Prison near Portsmouth (Abell 1914). John Paul Jones sought without success to exchange the prisoners he captured in the *Drake* (1778) and *Serapis* (1779) for Americans held in England. Though released shortly after the signing of the Treaty of Paris, most of the prisoners held in England were destitute and could not make their way home to America for many months.

#### BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Abell, Francis (1914). *Prisoners of War in Britain, 1756 to 1815*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Alden, John R. (1969). *A History of the American Revolution*. New York: Knopf.
- Ammerman, David (1974). *In the Common Cause: American Response to the Coercive Acts of 1774*. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia.
- Armbruster, Eugene L. (1920). *The Wallabout Prison Ships: 1776–1783*. New York: privately printed.
- Barnes, G. R., and J. H. Owen, eds. (1932–8). *The Private Papers of John, Earl of Sandwich*, 4 vols. London: Navy Records Society.
- Bell, Alfred Hoyt (1948). *The Campaign of Princeton, 1776–1777*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Bird, Harrison (1968). *Attack on Quebec: The American Invasion of Canada, 1775*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Black, Jeremy (1991). *The War for America*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Blanco, Richard L., ed. (1984). *The War of the American Revolution: A Selected Annotated Bibliography of Published Sources*. New York: Garland.
- Bodle, Wayne K. (2002). *The Valley Forge Winter: Civilians and Soldiers in War*. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.
- Bowler, R. Arthur (1975). *Logistics and the Failure of the British Army in America, 1775–1783*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Bradley, James E. (1986). *Popular Politics and the American Revolution in England: Petitions, the Crown, and Public Opinion*. Macon, GA: Mercer University Press.
- Bradley, James E. (1990). *Revolution and English Radicalism: Non-Conformity in Eighteenth-Century Politics and Society*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Brown, Gerald S. (1963). *The American Secretary: The Colonial Policy of Lord George Germain, 1775–1778*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Brown, Wallace (1969). *The Good Americans: The Loyalists in the American Revolution*. New York: Morrow.
- Buchanan, John (1997). *The Road to Guilford Courthouse: The American Revolution in the Carolinas*. New York: Wiley.
- Burrows, Edwin G. (2008). *Forgotten Patriots: The Untold Story of American Prisoners During the Revolutionary War*. New York: Basic Books.
- Christie, Ian R. (1966). *Crisis of Empire: Great Britain and the American Colonies, 1754–1783*. New York: W. W. Norton.
- Clark, William Bell (1956). *Ben Franklin's Privateers: A Naval Epic of the American Revolution*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.
- Cogliano, Francis D. (2001). *American Maritime Prisoners in the Revolutionary War: The Captivity of William Russell*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Conway, Stephen (1995). *The War of American Independence 1775–1783*. London: Edward Arnold.



- Conway, Stephen (2000). *The British Isles and the War of American Independence*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Conway, Stephen (2007). "Empire, Europe and British Naval Power," in David Cannadine, ed., *Empire, the Sea and Global History: Britain's Maritime World, c.1763–c.1840*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 22–40.
- Dabney, William M. (1954). *After Saratoga: The Story of the Convention Army*. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press.
- Dandridge, Danske (1911). *American Prisoners of the Revolution*. Baltimore, MD: Genealogical Publishing Co.
- De Madariaga, Isabel de (1962). *Britain, Russia and the Armed Neutrality of 1780*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Dearden, Paul F. (1980). *The Rhode Island Campaign of 1778: Inauspicious Dawn of Alliance*. Providence: Rhode Island Bicentennial Foundation, 1980.
- Desjardin, Thomas A. (2006). *Through a Howling Wilderness: Benedict Arnold's March to Quebec, 1775*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Dull, Jonathan R. (1975). *The French Navy and American Independence: A Study of Arms and Diplomacy 1774–1787*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Dull, Jonathan R. (1985). *A Diplomatic History of the American Revolution*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Dupuy, R. Ernest, Gay M. Hammerman, and Grace P. Hayes (1977). *The American Revolution: A Global War*. New York: David McKay.
- Ferling, John (2007). *Almost a Miracle: The American Victory in the War of Independence*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Fleming, Thomas (1960). *Now We Are Enemies: The Story of Bunker Hill*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Fleming, Thomas (1975). *1776: Year of Illusions*. New York: W. W. Norton.
- Gould, Eliga H. (2000) *The Persistence of Empire: British Political Culture in the Age of the American Revolution*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Gruber, Ira D. (1972). *The Howe Brothers and the American Revolution*. New York: Atheneum.
- Harrison, Lowell H. (1976). *George Rogers Clark and the War in the West*. Lexington: University of Kentucky Press.
- Higginbotham, Don (1971). *The War of American Independence: Military Attitudes, Policies and Practice, 1763–1789*. New York: Macmillan.
- Higginbotham, Don, ed. (1978). *Reconsiderations on the Revolutionary War*, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
- Higginbotham, Don (1988). *War and Society in Revolutionary America: The Wider Dimensions of Conflict*. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.
- Ketchum, Richard M. (1962). *The Battle for Bunker Hill*. Garden City, New York: Doubleday.
- Ketchum, Richard M. (1997). *Saratoga: Turning Point of America's Revolutionary War*. New York: Henry Holt.
- Larrabee, Harold A. (1964). *Decision at the Chesapeake*. New York: Bramhall House.
- Lawrence, Alexander A. (1951). *Storm over Savannah: The Story of Count d'Estaing and the Siege of the Town in 1779*. Athens: University of Georgia Press.
- Mackesy, Piers (1964, 1993). *The War for America*, rev. edn. ed. by John Shy. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
- McCullough, David (2005). *1776*. New York: Simon & Schuster.

- McGuire, Thomas J. (2006). *The Philadelphia Campaign*. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books.
- Middlekauff, Robert (1982). *The Glorious Cause: The American Revolution 1763–1789*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Mintz, Max M. (1990). *The Generals of Saratoga: John Burgoyne and Horatio Gates*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Nelson, James L. (2006). *Benedict Arnold's Navy: The Ragtag Fleet that Lost the Battle of Lake Champlain but Won the American Revolution*. Camden, ME: International Marine, McGraw-Hill.
- Nelson, Paul David (1978). "British Conduct of the American Revolutionary War: A Review of Interpretations," *Journal of American History*, 65:3 (December), 623–53.
- Nelson, William H. (1961). *The American Tory*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Nordholt, Jan Willem Schulte (1982). *The Dutch Republic and American Independence*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Palmer, Dave R. (1975). *The Way of the Fox: American Strategy in the War for America, 1775–1783*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
- Pancake, John S. (1985). *This Destructive War: The British Campaign in the Carolinas, 1780–1782*. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press.
- Peckham, Howard H. (1958). *The War for Independence: A Military History*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Pengelly, Colin (2008). *"We All Did Our Best": Sir Samuel Hood and the Battle of the Chesapeake*. Gainesville: University Press of Florida.
- Rodger, N. A. M. (2004). *The Command of the Ocean: A Naval History of Britain 1649–1815*. New York: W. W. Norton.
- Sampson, Richard (1995). *Escape in America: The British Convention Prisoners, 1777–1783*. Chippenham, UK: Picton.
- Selby, John (1976). *The Road to Yorktown*. London: H. Hamilton.
- Shelton, Hal T. (1994). *General Richard Montgomery and the American Revolution*. New York: New York University Press.
- Shy, John (1976). *A People Numerous and Armed: Reflections on the Military Struggle for American Independence*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Simms, Brendan (2007). *Three Victories and a Defeat: The Rise and Fall of the First British Empire, 1714–1783*. London: Allen Lane.
- Smith, Paul H. (1964). *Loyalists and Redcoats: A Study in British Revolutionary Policy*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Sosin, Jack M. (1967). *The Revolutionary Frontier, 1763–1783*. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
- Stoker, Donald J., Kenneth J. Hagan, and Michael T. McMaster, eds. (2009). *Strategy in the American War of Independence: A Global Approach*. London: Routledge.
- Syrett, David (1998). *The Royal Navy in European Waters during the American Revolutionary War*. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.
- Taaffe, Stephen R. (2003). *The Philadelphia Campaign, 1777–1778*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
- Thomas, P. D. G. (1976). *Lord North*. London: Allen Lane.
- Thomas, P. D. G. (1991). *Tea Party to Independence: The Third Phase of the American Revolution, 1773–1776*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Toth, Charles (1975). *The American Revolution and the West Indies*. Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press.

- Tourtellot, Arthur Bemon (1959). *Lexington and Concord: The Beginning of the War of the American Revolution*. New York: W. W. Norton.
- Wallace, Willard M. (1951). *Appeal to Arms: A Military History of the American Revolution*. New York: Harper.
- Ward, Christopher (1952). *The War of the Revolution*, 2 vols., ed. by. John Richard Alden. New York: Macmillan.
- Willcox, William B. (1964). *Portrait of a General: Sir Henry Clinton in the War of Independence*. New York: Knopf.
- Wilson, David K. (2005). *The Southern Strategy: Britain's Conquest of South Carolina and Georgia, 1775–1780*. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.

## Chapter Three

# FOREIGN WARS OF THE EARLY REPUBLIC, 1798–1816

*Gene Allen Smith*

The United States secured its independence from Great Britain through a prolonged military struggle, but once established the new nation sought a peaceful existence. It cut its army to a bare minimum and dismantled completely its navy. The desire to reduce financial obligations and extinguish outstanding debts prompted American leaders to rely primarily on diplomacy for national security. Most of its early leaders believed that given its geographic isolation, the young republic did not require a permanent military establishment, but that a citizen-based militia would be adequate to preserve its freedom and independence.

Though reluctantly acknowledging American independence, Great Britain and Spain refused to relinquish their influence in the region west of the Allegheny Mountains through which their merchants retained control of the fur trade and their agents encouraged Native American to do everything in their power to resist American expansion westward. As a result the United States had to fight hostile Indians in the old Northwest during much of the 1790s and suffered reoccurring depredations along the Southwestern frontier throughout the period before 1815.

Overseas the Barbary States of North Africa soon declared war on the new nation and began seizing its merchant ships. Within a decade the great powers of Europe began a series of wars that lasted a quarter century during which they also violated the rights of American merchants trying to trade in the Atlantic and Caribbean. Still hopeful that the American experiment would fail, European agents tried to sabotage American trading plans and plotted to dismantle western, southern, and northeastern territories. Moreover, European operatives armed, supplied, and encouraged Native Americans to withstand American growth and expansion. When diplomacy failed to secure a redress of grievances, the United States found itself fighting French marauders in the Caribbean during the Quasi-War, North African corsairs during the early years of the nineteenth century, and Great Britain, her Canadian subjects, and Indian allies during the War of 1812.

From the late 1780s until 1816, the United States survived in the midst of a hostile world while trying to maintain its freedom, independence, and define for itself a place among the world community of nations. Diplomacy proved less than

successful, while war jeopardized the American experiment and offered only mixed results. And while historians have debated the role that war played in defining the early republic – and that question still remains contentious – there is little disagreement that the conflicts helped define the American character and identity (Watts 1987).

The military history of the early republic has not been studied as attentively as has the history of the War for Independence or the American Civil War, both of which now have marvelous and sophisticated accounts documenting their causes, combatants, operations and strategies, and consequences; both conflicts also have unit-level histories that detail the origin of men within the ranks in specific regiments, and that follow those soldiers throughout campaigns, as well as a host of biographies of top ranked officers and lower grade commanders. The wars of the early republic have not garnered such scholarly attention or detailed analyses despite the abundance of published and unpublished materials. Much military history of the period, instead, is intertwined with the ideological debate of the era and attempts to explain how statecraft evolved from the ideological to the practical, in the process leading the country to war.

Since the army did not have an active combat role in either the Quasi-War or the Barbary Wars (Marines participated in the latter), scholars have instead focused on the origins of the American military establishment under constitutional government, and the dichotomy between a professional military and the citizen soldiers of the militia. In 1783 George Washington, Alexander Hamilton, and other politicians and soldiers advanced an ambitious plan for a national army and extensive military establishment, but the Continental Congress quickly rejected the proposal. Yet a decade and a half later, by the time that the Federalists left office in 1801, the United States had embraced a small professional army and military establishment as necessary instruments for peace and survival (Kohn 1975). During the 1790s the Federalists had worked to centralize the government and its power; they established a viable financial plan for the country, established diplomatic relations that supported and enhanced their commercial aspirations, and created procedures to enforce federal law including tax collection. A small professional army, supplemented by state militias, provided the means to enforce compliance to federal directives. Putting this Hamiltonian system into place created a divisive ideological debate that, according to Kohn, ultimately drove the Federalists from power and destroyed the party.

The Jeffersonian Republican opponents of the Federalists feared standing armies because centralized control could threaten individual civil liberties and destroy republican government (Cress 1982). Moreover, a permanent standing army drained money from public coffers, leaving citizens perpetually indebted to the system that oppressed them. The Hamiltonian plan of the 1790s created dependency. It forced the government to raise money to implement its programs, to pay the national debt and government employees, and to use the army to enforce the taxation that supported governmental policy and maintained order and peace. Employing citizen soldiers, who swore to execute federal law, suppress insurrections and repel invasions, theoretically reduced the need for high taxes, removed

the need for the centralized programs to raise those funds, and eliminated the need for a professional military force. Citizen soldiers had a vested interest in the American experiment and would willingly defend their country in time of need. But as C. Edward Skeen (1999) has argued, the militia was generally untrained, undisciplined, and ill-equipped. Though willing to fight, Skeen maintains that the militia frequently lacked the ability to fight. The federal government, empowered to organize, arm, and discipline the militia, often refused to permit militia calls because of the expense involved. State governments, which had the power to appoint officers and train them occasionally refused to place their units under federal control, instead claiming that the federal government had not met constitutional requirements. The glaring division of responsibilities also broke down when militiamen showed up for muster lacking weapons, clothing, and basic equipment needed for a campaign. In addition, only in the rarest of instances did the militiamen have the training necessary to perform basic military duties, and as a result they often broke and ran even before engaging the enemy in battle. In the strategically important frontier areas, as Mark Pitcavage (1993) has revealed for Ohio, the small population and tax base doomed the militia to failure. In fact, by the end of the War of 1812 most leaders agreed that the militia could not serve as the primary defense force. Still, society at large harbored republican prejudice toward a standing army despite the growing professionalism of that institution.

To aid the process of Republicanizing the military, and to enhance its professional training, President Thomas Jefferson created a Hamiltonian style national military academy at West Point. Theodore J. Crackel (1987) describes persuasively how Jefferson co-opted the military by dismissing outspoken Federalists and replacing them with Republicans. Building on the work of Mary P. Adams's (1958) study of frontier military policy, which posits that Jefferson paid extremely close attention to military matters, Crackel argues that Jefferson exercised extensive, structured, and purposeful attention to military affairs. It was in response to the crisis of 1798–1800, the Quasi-War with France in which the Adams administration enlarged the army to meet a possible invasion, that Jefferson realized once elected he needed to reshape that institution socially and politically to insure its loyalty. He created the US Military Academy at West Point to provide institutional training to politically acceptable but otherwise inadequately prepared Republican sons, thus perpetuating his transformation over the military well into the future. As president, he rapidly enlarged the army, immediately minimizing the influence of his Federalist opposition and Republican-trained West Point graduates soon constituted the new officer corps for the enlarged army. In doing so, Crackel suggests that Jefferson turned the army and its officer corps over to the people with appointments from every portion of the country and every segment of the citizenry, ultimately creating a citizens army out of the regular professional establishment.

Several authors have explored the long-term professionalization of the American military. Most important for detailing the army during the early republic is William B. Skelton (1992), who insists that Americans distrusted military power but generally accepted a small regular army as a permanent feature of the emerging federal

system. And although individual professionalism waned in the small force during the era, the army developed an institutional preparedness role that officers nurtured throughout the antebellum era. During the same period, according to Christopher McKee (1991), the navy reached a much higher level of professional cohesion and competence. Effective civilian management, combined with a system of shipboard training and socialization of newly appointed midshipmen, created a well-trained junior and middle grade officer corps capable of and willing to make decisions on the spot. When questioning how the poorly-run navy department could perform as well as it did during the War of 1812, J. C. A. Stagg (1983) did not acknowledge the degree of latitude that officers exercised on stations far removed from Washington, the continuity of staffing within department, or the strengths of individual secretaries and the precedents they established. The navy's system of apprenticeship nurtured successful officers for promotion while winnowing weak ones from the ranks, building competency from the bottom up. By 1816 the navy – having faced two decades of almost continual combat experience in the Quasi-War, Barbary Wars, and the War of 1812 – had emerged as a capable, competent, and highly experienced professional officer corps.

Just as historians have actively debated the militia-regular army issue during the early republic, they have also confronted the naval-antinavalist debate of the era. Born during the American War for Independence, the Continental Navy had dwindled to near extinction by war's end and its last ship was sold at auction in 1785 despite the continuing need for protection of the coast and avenues of seagoing commerce. The rebirth of the US Navy in March 1794 under President George Washington occurred as a direct result of the outbreak of war between Great Britain and Revolutionary France and the depredations of North African pirates who seized American ships and imprisoned American sailors. Yet the construction of six frigates would raise new questions about the role of the United States in world affairs; this debate involving the type and number of ships would determine the force structure of the navy and according to Craig L. Symonds (1980) define the US role in world affairs. Navalists, generally Federalists, wanted to build a seagoing fleet capable of influencing the European powers, of protecting American seaborne commerce, and of enhancing American prestige abroad. Anti-navalists, generally Republicans, preferred a coastal naval force designed to defend the country's shoreline. Some antinavalists were prepared to build a navy capable of defending American coastal waters and merchantmen against the Barbary Corsairs, but none would support a naval force that could challenge or might provoke European nations.

The type of naval force that the country needed depended exclusively on the scope and nature of US interests, and both changed as the country passed from Federalist to Republican control. The vessels authorized during the Washington administration, supplemented with others built during the Quasi-War, gave the United States a respectable cruising force predicated on projecting power outward and protecting seagoing commerce. Yet when Jefferson and the Republicans assumed control in 1801, the country embraced a new complex yet flexible naval policy determined by time and world events rather than ideology (Smith 1995a).



Jefferson preferred small shallow-draft coastal gunboats rather than large seagoing ships because these defensive craft were unlikely to involve the country in provocative incidents at sea. Some historians, such as Harold and Margaret Sprout (1939), Alfred Thayer Mahan (1905), Theodore Roosevelt (1882), and more recently Dean R. Mayhew (1982) and Frederick C. Leiner (1983) have condemned the gunboat program mainly because it was not a seagoing fleet. Moreover, as Spencer Tucker (1993) has argued, the lack of gunboat success during the War of 1812 proved that the country needed capital ships to protect American commerce. According to Julia H. Macleod (1945), Tucker (1993), and Smith (1995a), the nation needed both large and small ships – a flexible, pluralistic naval policy – to meet its objectives of security and freedom. Even so, the large ship versus small ship controversy has continued since 1801, redefined time and again as the scope of US foreign policy objectives changed.

The ideological debate between Federalists and Republicans during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries underscored the way in which the United States would fight wars during the early republic. The composition of the army and the navy determined the type of operations and the strategy that could be employed. Not surprisingly, domestic politics and foreign diplomacy could not be separated from war. Such was the case when strained diplomatic relations with France, the Barbary States, and with Great Britain fuelled American nationalism, pushing the country into war. Military preparedness or capability never influenced the rationale for these wars, but they did determine the way in which Americans fought them.

### The Quasi-War with France

In February 1778 France allied with the struggling American colonies, agreeing to join the United States in their war against Great Britain. The decision did not derive from an affinity for the Americans or their cause, but rather as an opportunity to injure Britain and rebuild the French empire. Yet neither happened, as Britain lost political control of the American colonies but did not lose its economic or cultural domination of the new nation, and France did not regain territory or obtain the concessions in the New World it anticipated. Instead the war laid the foundation for bankruptcy and the onset of the French Revolution that began in 1789. Once the *ancien regime* collapsed, Americans celebrated in the belief that a republican French nation would plant the seeds of liberty in the Old World. Yet when France quickly descended into violent bloodshed, war, and chaos, Americans winced. When Great Britain and France went to war in 1793 the Washington administration declared the United States neutral yet negotiated the pro-British Jay Treaty of 1795. The abrogation of the Franco-American alliance of 1778 strained relations between the two countries, so much so that by the time that John Adams became president in March 1797 French marauders had seized more than three hundred American merchant ships in the Caribbean. Adams's attempt to normalize relations, resulting in the failed XYZ mission, convinced



American congressional leaders to spend millions for defense but not one cent for tribute. By early 1798 the United States found itself in an undeclared naval war (Quasi-War) against France fought primarily in the Caribbean (DeConde 1958).

The Quasi War is one of the least studied conflicts in American history, as no major study focused on the war until Gardner Allen's 1909 book. Expanding on the work of Charles Goldsborough (1824), James Fenimore Cooper (1839), Edgar Stanton Maclay and Roy C. Smith (1894), and John Randolph Spears (1897), all of whom had treated the war in general studies on the navy, Allen used official and private collections and he also introduced simplistic statistical analysis, asserting that the Quasi-War was successful because the US Navy captured 85 French vessels while losing only one national craft. Gene A. Smith (1995b) has challenged Allen's simplistic and patriotic contention regarding numbers, revising slightly upward the number of French vessels taken, but also noting that most were but small coastal vessels, hardly resembling armed warships.

Michael A. Palmer's (1987) analytical operational history of the conflict is the most complete available. Building on Frederic H. Hayes's (1965) article on Adams and the navy, Palmer focuses on how the first Secretary of the Navy Benjamin Stoddert prosecuted the war against France. The pro-navy Stoddert constantly needed money to build ships, to purchase equipment and supplies, and to acquire land for bases, and these fiscal problems forced him to rely on small converted merchantmen and on subscription ships contributed by ten American cities; Frederick C. Leiner (1999) explains how the subscription idea materialized, who subscribed and built the ships, how the craft were constructed and what contributions they made to the war. Ultimately Stoddert's single-minded devotion to building big seagoing ships, Palmer maintains, contributed to the navy's lack of small shallow draft ships that would be needed in the subsequent Barbary Wars.

Perhaps the best understanding of the war emerges from the number of biographies of naval officers who participated. Eugene Ferguson's biography of Thomas Truxtun, *Truxtun of the Constellation* (1956), appointed by Washington as one of the first six captains of the reconstituted navy in 1794, is dated but still provides the best account of the popular hero of the Quasi-War; Truxtun commanded the *Constellation* in its epic ship-to-ship victories against the French frigates *L'Insurgente* and *La Vengeance*. Truxtun's first lieutenant, John Rodgers, has been served by two worthy biographies: Charles Oscar Paullin's (1909) account devotes but 22 pages to the conflict, while John H. Schroeder's (2006) biography reveals in two chapters Rodgers' disappointment at being dismissed in the post-war demobilization that occurred under Jefferson and the Republicans. David Porter served as the sixth midshipman aboard the *Constellation*, but his subsequent colorful career provided justification for David F. Long's (1970) meticulous biography. Porter was retained as one of the 36 lieutenants in the navy after the Jeffersonian downsizing. Christopher McKee's (1972) magisterial study of Edward Preble devotes some discussion to his Quasi-War exploits, but it does a much better job at detailing his fighting effectiveness in the Barbary Wars.

The best comprehensive examination of the war remains Alexander DeConde's (1966) written during and influenced by the Vietnam War. Touching lightly on

military affairs, DeConde judiciously blends political and diplomatic history with naval history to conclude that the conflict between France and the United States ultimately remained a half war because while it promised great risk it also offered little if any benefit. DeConde acknowledged that his book was the first to present a full synthesis and interpretation of the diplomacy of the Quasi-War. In fact, it remains to this day, the only study that embraces the naval war, its diplomatic origins, and its domestic consequences. Yet since it was an “undeclared” war, Gregory E. Fehlings (2000) has used the conflict to question the country’s constitutional ability to wage conflicts with limited objectives, scale, forces, and targets – Fehlings concludes that since all three branches of the federal government assented to the war, and since several of the Constitution’s framers were then serving in federal offices, that the undeclared war complied with the intent of the framers.

### Barbary Wars: Tripolitan War 1801–5 and Algerine War 1815–16

Scholars had paid scant attention to the Barbary Wars prior to September 11, 2001. Gardner Allen’s (1905) naval history of the conflict, published in the centennial year of the war’s conclusion, offered a rousing patriotic description of the struggle against the “barbarians” (363). Glenn Tucker’s (1963) popular account, the first modern study, combines history of American–Mediterranean relations with the naval history of the conflict and a history of the Barbary States. It reads very well but unfortunately contains many historical errors. Similar in style, A. B. C. Whipple’s *To the Shores of Tripoli: The Birth of the U.S. Navy and Marines* (1991) must also be read with caution. Robert J. Allison’s (1995) study of the American perception of the Muslim World and Richard B. Parker’s (2004) diplomatic history of US affairs in the Barbary World have offered balanced views of American relations with the Moslem world but neither focuses on the naval war itself.

Since 2001 Americans have struggled to find meaning in the terrorist attacks and the subsequent conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, and historians and pundits have pointed to the Barbary Wars (Tripolitan War 1801–5, and the Algerine War 1815–16) as evidence of long-standing hostility between Islamic extremists and American Christians. For example, Joseph Wheelan (2003) insists that the country’s first war on foreign soil – an unconventional conflict fought from foreign bases with commandos and native troops – represented a struggle with terror. Joshua E. London (2005) posits that the North African Barbary states influenced by a religious worldview of militant Islam prosecuted a holy jihad against the United States. Ultimately, these books tell us more about twenty-first century attitudes than about the historical reality of the early-nineteenth century.

The most balanced and fair-minded account of the Barbary episode is Frank Lambert’s (2005), which maintains that the North African pirates waged a commercial war motivated by the lure of money rather than religious passion. The conflict against the United States simply represented a war against trade – not a war of terror or a holy jihad against Christians. After securing independence, the

United States assumed that free and fair trade would accompany their other new-found freedoms, but it did not. In 1784 the Barbary States began capturing American ships and enslaving US citizens. Within the Atlantic world, the US was a powerless entity that needed to purchase the right to trade, suffer the seizure of ships and men, or fight for the rights and principles they thought they had secured in 1783. Successive American governments – under the Articles of Confederation and the administrations of Washington through Jefferson – paid a monetary tribute to protect American ships and men from seizures by the North African states. By 1800 US–Barbary relations had resulted in the American payment of more than \$1,000,000 in tribute. Compounding matters, the piratical states also had a long history of using threats, insults, as well as torturing hostages to ensure that black-mail was paid. The United States and all other countries with Mediterranean commercial interests suffered the same.

The humiliation afforded to Captain William Bainbridge and the US frigate *George Washington* in September 1800 provided a vivid example of the conduct perpetrated by the Barbary States. American tribute to Algiers, being three years in arrears, had made the Dey very angry. His intolerance resulted in an order to Bainbridge to transport passengers and cargo to the Sultan at Constantinople or be fired upon. Bainbridge, realizing that his failure to comply with the Dey's order meant war, acknowledged that his only sensible choice was to acquiesce and make the trip. Early biographers judged Bainbridge to have been the victim of bad luck, but David Long (1981) is more critical of Bainbridge and Craig Symonds (1985) maintains that Bainbridge did not necessarily suffer bad luck, but rather lacked the breadth of vision and insight necessary to avoid compromising situations such as he suffered in Algiers.

Nonetheless, news of this humiliation reached the United States by December, which prompted the incoming Jefferson administration to choose between using the navy to force the issue in the Mediterranean and buying peace. Jefferson decided that sending a small fleet to the Mediterranean would cost little more than maintaining it in American waters. Additionally, American officers and men would acquire invaluable training which coastal maneuvers did not provide. As such, Jefferson became determined, according to Gene A. Smith (1995a), to pursue a limited offensive action in the Mediterranean, dictated by money, not desire, pacifism, nor constitutional limitations.

The administration sent three frigates and a schooner under Richard Dale to the Mediterranean, but upon his arrival Dale learned that the US consul at Tunis, William Eaton, had proclaimed a blockade of Tripoli. For the remainder of 1801 and until May 1802, Dale passively enforced Eaton's blockade. Dale's replacement, Commodore Richard V. Morris, who served from June 1802 until July 1803, had an enlarged squadron of five frigates, but he did not achieve any substantial results during his tour. In fact, the US fleet could not institute a truly effective blockade because its large ships could not prevent shallow-draft Barbary vessels from escaping into the coastal shoals. Moreover, Morris's unwillingness to secure auxiliary craft, and his reluctance to maintain the blockade resulted in his dismissal. His replacement Edward Preble, who arrived in the Mediterranean in September 1803,

quickly saw the need for shallow-draft vessels and a vigorous blockade. Preble also began reorganizing his squadron and instilled his own rules for shipboard conduct and discipline; writer Fletcher Pratt (1950), whose scholarship often lacks historical basis, maintained that all American naval victories during the War of 1812 except for Oliver Hazard Perry's on Lake Erie in 1813 were won by Preble subordinates, nurtured during the war against Tripoli. As such, Preble became the model for American naval officers and he laid the foundation for US naval tradition. Christopher McKee (1985) retorts in a persuasive statistical-based essay that Pratt overstated Preble's influence; determined and decisive, Preble's successes only embodied moral victories that made him a model and mythic hero.

Throughout the remainder of 1803 Preble tightened the blockade of Tripoli. Yet while chasing a corsair back into Tripoli harbor on October 31, 1803, the frigate *Philadelphia*, then commanded by William Bainbridge, ran aground on an uncharted reef at an unusual angle. Left defenseless, the ship could not bring her guns to bear on the Tripolitan gunboats that soon swarmed around. After four hours of unsuccessful attempts to refloat the ship, Bainbridge attempted to scuttle his ship before striking his colors. That evening the Tripolitans paraded Bainbridge and more than 300 crewmen through the city, signifying a humiliating American setback. In mid-February 1804, Stephen Decatur partially redressed the nation's honor by heroically setting fire to *Philadelphia* under the walls and guns of the harbor, denying the Tripolitans use of the frigate. Decatur's bravery elevated him to an international sensation, with Congress promoting the 25 year old from lieutenant to captain. Decatur exhibited bravado and flair, yet a premature death in 1820, combined with a small collection of surviving personal papers limited scholars' attempts to flesh out the man and officer. For this reason Alexander Slidell Mackenzie's (1846) biography remains useful because it provides anecdotal information from contemporaries that can never be replaced. Spencer Tucker's (2004) short biography offers insight to Decatur the naval officer, while Robert J. Allison's (2005) and Leonard Guttridge's (2006) accounts offer additional assessments of Decatur the person. James Tertius de Kay's (2004) popular study simply has too much hero worship and hyperbole.

Preble aggressively attacked Tripoli during the summer of 1804 in a series of inconclusive battles, while he also made diplomatic overtures in the hopes of ending the conflict. Yet as Christopher McKee (1972) notes Preble did not have the temperament to be a successful diplomat because he was too impatient and too irritable. He also lacked the force to maintain a prolonged effective blockade. His replacement Samuel Barron, who arrived in September 1804, continued the blockade and tried to undermine the pasha's authority. The turning point came when ex-consul William Eaton led a combined force of American Marines, Arab, Greek, and Berber mercenaries in a 500-mile overland trek to attack the second largest Tripolitan city of Derna (Wright and MacLeod 1944). Richard Zacks (2005) insists that Eaton's campaign to overthrow the legitimate government of Tripoli – by placing the pasha's older brother on the throne – brought an ignominious end to the conflict. Eaton captured and held Derna and had even won local support during the occupation, but his attempt to create a new American-

friendly government failed because the pasha, fearing that his overthrow was eminent, quickly negotiated an end to the war; in June 1805 the US agreed to pay a \$60,000 ransom for American prisoners, but no more annual tribute. Peace stranded Eaton's ally without US support and the uprising against the pasha waned.

In 1807 Algiers resumed its seizure of American ships but the United States could not respond because of growing problems with Britain and France that led to the War of 1812. After the war with Britain ended in 1815, Congress authorized deployment of a fleet to bring an end to the Algerine War (against Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli). Stephen Decatur arrived first and, turning their own tactics against them by taking prisoners and demanding ransom and tribute, forced the Dey of Algiers to accept peace with the US in late June 1815. Decatur then proceeded to Tunis where he forced its ruler, the Bey, to pay a \$46,000 indemnity for permitting the capture of two American merchantmen by British warships during the War of 1812. Next he sailed to Tripoli where he extracted a similar indemnity of \$25,000 from the Pasha. When he left the Mediterranean for home, Decatur, under no illusions concerning the Barbary rulers, left behind ships which formed the nucleus of a permanent Mediterranean Squadron to protect American rights. Indeed, almost as soon as Decatur's fleet departed Algiers, the Dey repudiated the treaty and resumed his predatory warfare against commerce. A combined British–Dutch fleet finally ended the Algerine War in August 1816, breaking the power of the Barbary States.

During the 30 year period, 1785–1815, the US confronted not only the Barbary problem but also tremendous turmoil in the Atlantic World. Intermittent fighting between Britain and France placed the United States and the Barbary States on the periphery, with both trying to maintain an independent course – one through free trade and the other through piracy and tribute. Ultimately, free trade, open markets, and expanding commerce secured economic freedom for the United States. These economic changes, according to Frank Lambert (2005), ultimately sealed the fate of the Barbary pirates more than did American naval and military exploits.

### **The War of 1812**

In 1987 Donald Hickey's account of the War of 1812 included the subtitle, "*A Forgotten Conflict*," hinting that Americans had overlooked the war. In reality more than 2,000 works about the war had been published prior to the mid-1980s, and since the publication of Hickey's study more than 80 additional books have appeared. So, while the war may have been forgotten in the American public consciousness, historiography on almost every facet the war has flourished.

The ill-defined causes of the conflict dominated much of the early study of the war and disagreement prevented historians from reaching a consensus. During the nineteenth century most studies insisted that maritime issues caused the war, yet by the early twentieth century scholars had posited the thesis that the war resulted

from American land hunger, that is, the desire by Westerners to expand into British and Spanish holdings (Pratt 1925). During the 1960s Bradford Perkins (1961) concluded that neither side wanted the war, but that emotionalism and a sense of injured national honor led the United States to declare war; and Roger Brown (1964) argued that President James Madison's fear for the continued success of the Republican Party, the safety of the American republic, and republicanism in the wider world led him to ask Congress for a declaration of war against Great Britain; two decades later John Stagg (1983) endorsed Brown's view to which he added an assessment of James Madison's ideas about the political economy of the British Empire. Ronald Hatzenbuehler and Robert Ivie (1983) plumb the motives of the congressmen who voted for war. With the emergence of identity as an avenue of scholarship, the twenty-first century suggests that national psychological issues and the definition of collective and individual identity will offer new theses for the war's origins.

For general accounts of the overall war, Hickey's book along with studies by Reginald Horsman (1969) and John Mahon (1972) provide comprehensive, accurate, and detailed narratives of the conflict from the American perspective. Jon Latimer, *1812: War with America* (2007), presents an equally well-researched analysis from the British viewpoint, and J. Mackay Hitsman (1965) and George F. G. Stanley (1983) provide lightly documented Canadian perspectives. Pierre Berton's (1980, 1981) description of the impact of the war on Canadian society contains numerous eyewitness accounts of military operations.

As for the outcome, Hickey maintains that the United States lost the war because the country had not achieved its war aims – an assertion that remains debatable. Latimer agrees with Hickey that the war “must be seen as a British victory, however marginal,” asserting that both sides performed rather ineptly by adopting poor strategies and committing numerous operational errors. Latimer believes that the most significant outcomes of the war were the sense of unity and confidence gained by Canadians and the recognition by Great Britain and the United States of the futility of fighting each other. Canadian scholar Donald E. Graves's (1999) updated version of Hitsman's book offers an explanation for why Canadians have believed that the militia won the war for Canada. Another Canadian, Wesley Turner (2000), insists that both sides won, highlighting the continued disagreement over the outcome of the war.

Regardless, the conflict began poorly for the United States during the fall of 1812 as the American army lost every engagement in which it participated, while the navy won each of its ship-to-ship encounters against the British. William Skelton (1994) attributes the army's failure to the service's institutional weaknesses rather than to the incompetence of the officer corps. Robert Quimby's (1997) two-volume operational study of the army during the war is a useful resource that compares officers' wartime records with their postwar memoirs but its cumbersome writing style leaves it useful as only a reference source. Wesley Turner's (1999) innovative study of the five British commanders in Canada – George Prevost, Isaac Brock, Roger Sheaffe, Francis de Rottenburg, and George Drummond – during the war offers an explanation of their civilian and military leadership. Theodore



Roosevelt's (1882) late nineteenth century book on the naval war and Alfred Thayer Mahan's (1905) assessment of naval strategy both remain very useful general accounts. Wade Dudley's (2003) modern account of the British blockade of the United States successfully challenges Mahan's assessment, concluding that the blockade resembled not an effective wooden wall but an ineffective fence easily splintered by American privateers and warships. Faye M. Kert (1997, 1998) insists that the blockade and convoys contributed greatly to British overall strategy and describes operations of privateers based in Canada during the war. Jerome Garitee (1977) analyzes privateering as an economic enterprise as practiced in Baltimore arguing that commerce raiding contributed significantly to the American campaign at sea. Novelist C. S. Forester (1956) provides a stirring narrative of the war at sea in which he faults the arrogance of British naval officers and a decline in their abilities since the victory at Trafalgar in 1805 for American success in single-ship duels. Other authors focus on particular officers, including Isaac Hull (Maloney 1986), David Porter (Long 1970), Stephen Decatur (Long 1970, de Kay 2004, Tucker 2004, Allison 2005, Guttridge 2006), and Charles Stewart (Berube and Rodgaard 2005); or on engagements, such as *Shannon vs Chesapeake* (Poolman 1961, Padfield 1968, Pullen 1970). Ira Dye (1994) combines biographies of William Allen of the USS *Argus* and John Maples of the HMS *Pelican* to document the 1813 battle between the two ships. Stephen W. H. Duffy (2001) details the fate of the USS *Wasp* that disappeared at sea in 1814. R. Blake Dunnavent (1999) examines the neglected riverine operations during the war.

The Northwest campaign opened with William Hull's scandalous surrender of Detroit in August 1812, saw Oliver Hazard Perry's stunning victory on Lake Erie in September 1813, and largely concluded with William Henry Harrison's victory on the River Thames the following month (Zaslow 1964). Hull's humiliating failure became synonymous with the betrayal of Benedict Arnold perhaps explaining the absence of a modern biography. Several authors have taken up the naval war on Lake Erie; David Curtis Skaggs and Gerard T. Altoff (2007) have written a fine assessment based on American sources. Skaggs (2006) has also produced a candid assessment of Oliver Hazard Perry's character flaws, including his ineffective command and control procedures during the battle of Lake Erie. Sandy Antal (1997) documents British General Henry Procter's victories in the Detroit River region in 1812 as well as his stunning defeat by William Henry Harrison at the Thames the following year. W. A. B. Douglas, "The Anatomy of Naval Incompetence" (1979), focuses on the role of the Provincial Marine in the defense of Upper Canada against American invasion. Barry Gough's (2002) work on the naval war on Lake Huron illustrates how shipbuilding and the limits of sea power helped determine the course of the war in that isolated region, while Richard White's (1991) study on the middle ground places Indians at the center of the struggle for the region – it demonstrates that their actions were not necessarily motivated by or influenced by European imperial ambitions.

Fighting along the Niagara frontier throughout resembled a tug-of-war with both sides gaining momentary advantages before exhaustion permitted the other side to regain an edge. Richard V. Barbuto's (2000) analysis of the Niagara



campaign reveals how US military leaders lost the opportunity to secure victory and territory because the American government could never harness, coordinate, or focus its resources and efforts in a meaningful way to win victory. Robert Malcomson's (2003) book on the Battle of Queenston Heights provides the best account of the American defeat during the fall of 1812, and his balanced treatment of the naval war on Lake Ontario (1998) demonstrates how shipbuilding ultimately decided supremacy on those waters. Donald Graves (1994, 1997) has clearly documented the July 1814 battles of Chippewa and Lundy's Lane; biographies of John Armstrong (Skeen 1981), Jacob Brown (Morris 1997), and Winfield Scott (Johnson 1998) illustrate the influence these officers had on the 1814 Niagara campaign. Joseph Whitehorne's (1992) concise operational analysis of the battles fought at Fort Erie makes clear the importance of supplies and logistics, while Carl Benn's (1999) study of the Iroquois reveals how their defense of Canada during the war ultimately destroyed the once powerful confederation.

The campaigns along the St. Lawrence and Lake Champlain consisted of initial setbacks for the United States (Everest 1981). Donald Graves's (1999) description of the British victory at the Battle of Crysler's Farm, along with the triumph of the French Canadians at Chateaugay, brought down the entire incompetent command structure of American senior officers, which had condemned the war effort to failure. David Skaggs's (2003) biography of Thomas Macdonough contends that the defense of Lake Champlain represented the most significant tactical and strategic victory for the United States during the war, and David Fitz-Enz (2001) concurs, proclaiming that Macdonough's naval victory doomed the land assault against Plattsburgh by British Peninsula veterans. News of the defeat and the calculation that it would take at least two years of preparations before Britain could mount another offensive in the region certainly moved that government toward negotiating peace.

The contest along the Chesapeake Bay had received little scholarly attention prior to the 1990s. British hit-and-run tactics beginning in 1813 demoralized American defenders and exposed the vulnerabilities of the extended coastline (Byron 1964). C.J. Bartlett and Gene A. Smith (2004) describes the degree to which the British Admiral Alexander F.I. Cochrane prosecuted the war in the Chesapeake; the British tried to break the American will to fight by burning public and private property, looting, requisitioning livestock, and in one instance even committing rape and murder. This raiding type of warfare as implemented by Admiral Sir George Cockburn during an almost two-year campaign is well documented in James Pack's (1987) biography, while Roger Morris (1997) focuses more exclusively on Cockburn's role in the evolution of British naval tradition. Christopher George's (2000) detailed account of British operations in the Chesapeake provides the context for Anthony Pitch's (1998) anecdotal but well-written description of the British burning of Washington, DC, and failed attack of Baltimore. Throughout British operations in 1813–14, Joshua Barney's gunboat flotilla harassed and delayed British plans; Louis Arthur Norton's (2000) biography of Barney addresses his selfless defense during the campaign. British operations ultimately achieved mixed results in the Chesapeake region but they did not bring

an end to the war as the British anticipated. *The Dawn's Early Light*, by Baltimore native Walter Lord (1972), provides a highly readable popular account of operations along Chesapeake Bay in 1814.

By the fall of 1814 Admiral Cochrane was convinced that the conquest of New Orleans would destroy American morale and will to fight, while also diverting American forces from Canada. He sent Cockburn to the Georgia and South Carolina coast as a diversion. Additionally, British agents worked to secure support from Native American and African American allies to supplement their forces. Frank L. Owsley's (1981) account of the struggle for the Gulf borderlands, and Claudio Saunt's (1999) study of the Creek Indians recounts British support for and efforts to recruit southern Indians during the war. Kathryn E. Holland Braund's (1993) examination of Creek trade explains how white contact reshaped Creek society, leading to divisiveness, civil war, and near destruction by Andrew Jackson, while Gregory A. Waselkov's (2006) account of the August 1813 Fort Mims massacre explains the spark that prompted the Creek's civil war. James G. Cusick (2003) links the American war in Florida against the Spanish to the larger War of 1812, as British forces moved against Pensacola and Mobile in preparation for their attack on New Orleans. While the campaign against New Orleans has been documented by many authors, perhaps the most complete is Owsley's because it ties British efforts to the Creek Civil War. Wilburt S. Brown (1969) reviews the strategy and tactics of the combined land and naval campaign for New Orleans, while Gene A. Smith's (2000) biography of Thomas ap Catesby Jones describes his and the navy's war against privateers, pirates and the British. Smith (1999) has also revised Arsène Lacarrière Latour's 1816 book on the battle that contains an explanatory essay detailing Latour's contribution; the contemporary account remains invaluable for understanding how Andrew Jackson won the battle.

The Treaty of Ghent, signed on Christmas Eve 1814, officially ended the War of 1812 but it left unresolved the issues that had caused the conflict. During the years that followed, the US and Britain worked to settle most of the outstanding differences, but the emotional issue of impressment remained for many years. Nonetheless, the small war had a significant impact on both Britain and the United States that, according to Donald Hickey (2006b), remains evident still today. Fred L. Engelman, *The Peace of Christmas Eve* (1962), a popular account of the negotiations, captures some of the spirit of the time.

The foreign wars of the early republic taught the United States that it could not rely on its isolation and citizen soldiers as the nation's primary defense. The country's isolation had not prevented conflicts with France or the Barbary States, nor had the militia prevented the British from raiding coastal areas or marching on the US capital. Although the United States did not confront another foreign enemy until the 1840s, during the years immediately following the War of 1812 the country did use its battle-trained military to deal with Native American problems on the southern frontier, ultimately influencing the Spanish to relinquish the Florida peninsula formally in 1821. Future diplomatic negotiations with the British settled most of the outstanding difficulties concerning the US-Canadian border, and the presence of a powerful British neighbor in Canada prevented northward

American expansion (Perkins 1964). But to the south and west, the declining Spanish Empire and emergent Mexican nation could not withstand American frontiersmen who pushed the boundaries of settlement into Texas, resulting by the 1830s in the Texas Revolution and 1840s American War with Mexico. By the time these conflicts occurred the United States had built a system of coastal fortifications, developed a professionalized army, and had constructed a fleet of seagoing ships, which provided a mid-nineteenth-century sense of security. The army and navy would be tested against Mexico, but the fortifications would never confront a foreign enemy. Just as Republican ideas about isolation and defense gave way to post-war nationalism after the War of 1812, American ideas about defending their country against foreign invasion evolved and changed as the US developed as a nation.

#### BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Adams, Mary P. (1958). "Jefferson's Military Policy with Special Reference to the Frontier, 1805–1809," PhD dissertation: University of Virginia.
- Allen, Gardner W. (1905). *Our Navy and the Barbary Corsairs*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co. [reprinted: Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1965].
- Allen, Gardner W. (1909). *Our Naval War with France*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co. [reprinted: Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1967].
- Allison, Robert J. (1995). *The Crescent Obscured: The United States and the Muslim World, 1776–1815*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Allison, Robert J. (2005). *Stephen Decatur: American Naval Hero, 1779–1820*. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press.
- Antal, Sandy (1997). *A Wampum Denied: Procter's War of 1812*. Ottawa: Carleton University Press.
- Barbuto, Richard V. (2000). *Niagara 1814: America Invades Canada*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
- Bartlett, C. J., and Gene A. Smith (2004). "A 'Species of Milito-Nautico-Guerilla-Plundering Warfare': Admiral Alexander Cochrane's Naval Campaign Against the United States, 1814–15," in Julie Flavell and Stephen Conway, eds., *Britain and America Go to War: The Impact of War and Warfare in Anglo-America, 1754–1815*. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 173–204.
- Benn, Carl (1999). *The Iroquois in the War of 1812*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- Berton, Pierre (1980). *The Invasion of Canada, 1812–1813*. Boston: Little, Brown.
- Berton, Pierre (1981). *Flames across the Border: The Canadian-American Tragedy, 1813–1814*. Boston: Little, Brown.
- Berube, Claude G., and John A. Rodgaard (2005). *A Call to the Sea: Captain Charles Stewart of the USS Constitution*. Washington: Potomac Books.
- Braund, Kathryn E. Holland (1993). *Deerskins & Duffels: The Creek Indian Trade with Anglo-America, 1685–1815*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
- Brown, Roger H. (1964). *The Republic in Peril: 1812*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Brown, Wilburt S. (1969). *The Amphibious Campaign for West Florida and Louisiana, 1814–1815: A Critical Review of Strategy and Tactics at New Orleans*. University: University of Alabama Press.

- Byron, Gilbert (1964). *The War of 1812 on the Chesapeake Bay*. Baltimore: Maryland Historical Society.
- Crackel, Theodore J. (1987). *Mr. Jefferson's Army: Political and Social Reform of the Military Establishment, 1801–1809*. New York: New York University Press.
- Cress, Lawrence Delbert (1982). *Citizens in Arms: The Army and Militia in American Society to the War of 1812*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Cooper, James Fenimore (1839). *The History of the Navy of the United States of America*. Philadelphia: Lea & Blanchard.
- Cusick, James G. (2003). *The Other War of 1812: The Patriot War and the American Invasion of Spanish East Florida*. Gainesville: University Press of Florida.
- DeConde, Alexander (1958). *Entangling Alliance Politics & Diplomacy under George Washington*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- DeConde, Alexander (1966). *The Quasi-War: The Politics and Diplomacy of the Undeclared War with France, 1798–1801*. New York: Scribners.
- de Kay, James Tertius (2004). *A Rage for Glory: The Life of Commodore Stephen Decatur, USN*. New York: Free Press.
- Douglas, W. A. B. (1979). "The Anatomy of Naval Incompetence: The Provincial Marine in Defense of Upper Canada before 1813," *Ontario History*, 81:1 (March), 3–24.
- Dudley, Wade G. (2003). *Splintering the Wooden Wall: The British Blockade of the United States, 1812–1815*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Duffy, Stephen W. H. (2001). *Captain Blakeley and the "Wasp": The Cruise of 1814*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Dunnavent, R. Blake (1999). "Broadships and Brown Water: The U.S. Navy in Riverine Warfare during the War of 1812," *American Neptune* 59:3 (Summer), 199–210.
- Dye, Ira (1994). *The Fatal Cruise of the "Argus": Two Captains in the War of 1812*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Engelman, Fred L. (1962). *The Peace of Christmas Eve*. New York: Harcourt Brace & Co.
- Everest, Allan Seymour (1981). *The War of 1812 in the Champlain Valley*. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press.
- Fehlings, Gregory E. (2000). "America's First Limited War," *Naval War College Review* 53:3 (Summer), 101–44.
- Ferguson, Eugene S. (1956). *Truxtun of the Constellation*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Fitz-Enz, David G. (2001). *The Final Invasion: Plattsburgh, the War of 1812's Most Decisive Battle*. New York: Cooper Square Press.
- Forester, C. S. (1956). *The Age of Fighting Sail: The Story of the Naval War of 1812*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday.
- Garitee Jerome R. (1977). *The Republic's Private Navy: The American Privateering Business as Practiced by Baltimore during the War of 1812*. Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press.
- George, Christopher T. (2000). *Terror on the Chesapeake: The War of 1812 on the Bay*. Shippensburg, PA: White Mane Books.
- Goldsborough, Charles W. (1824). *The United States' Naval Chronicle*, vol. 1. Washington: J. Wilson.
- Gough, Barry (2002). *Fighting Sail on Lake Huron and Georgian Bay: The War of 1812 and its Aftermath*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Graves, Donald E. (1994). *Red Coats and Grey Jackets: The Battle of Chippawa, 5 July 1814*. Toronto: Dundurn Press.

- Graves, Donald E. (1997). *Where Right and Glory Lead: The Battle of Lundy's Lane, 1814*. Toronto: Robin Brass Studios.
- Graves, Donald E. (1999). *Field of Glory: The Battle of Chrysler's Field, 1813*. Toronto: Robin Brass Studio.
- Guttridge, Leonard F. (2006). *Our Country, Right or Wrong: The Life of Stephen Decatur, the U.S. Navy's Most Illustrious Commander*. New York: Forge Books.
- Guttridge, Leonard F., and Jay D. Smith (1969). *The Commodores*. New York: Harper and Row.
- Hatzenbuehler, Ronald L., and Robert L. Ivie (1983). *Congress Declares War: Rhetoric, Leadership, and Partisanship in the Early Republic*. Kent, OH: Kent State University Press.
- Hayes, Frederic H. (1965). "John Adams and American Sea Power," *The American Neptune*, 25:1 (January), 35–45.
- Hickey, Donald R. (2006a [1987]). *The War of 1812: A Forgotten Conflict*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
- Hickey, Donald R. (2006b). *Don't Give Up the Ship!: Myths of the War of 1812*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
- Hitsman, J. Mackay (1965). *The Incredible War of 1812: A Military History*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- Horsman, Reginald (1969). *The War of 1812*. New York: Knopf.
- Johnson, Timothy D. (1998). *Winfield Scott: The Quest for Military Glory*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
- Kert, Faye M. (1997). *Pride and Prejudice: Privateering and Naval Prize in Atlantic Canada in the War of 1812*. St. John's, NFL: International Maritime Economic History Association.
- Kert, Faye M. (1998). "The Fortunes of War: Commercial Warfare and Maritime Risk in the War of 1812," *Northern Mariner*, 8:1 (October), 1–16.
- Kitzen, Michael (1996). "Money Bags or Cannon Balls: The Origins of the Tripolitan War, 1795–1801," *Journal of the Early Republic*, 16:4 (Winter), 601–24.
- Kohn, Richard H. (1975). *Eagle and Sword: The Beginnings of the Military Establishment in America*. New York: Free Press.
- Lambert, Frank (2005). *The Barbary Wars: American Independence in the Atlantic World*. New York: Hill and Wang.
- Latimer, Jon (2007). *1812: War with America*. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of the Harvard University Press.
- Leiner, Frederick C. (1983). "The 'Whimsical Philosophic President' and His Gunboats," *American Neptune*, 43:3 (October), 245–66.
- Leiner, Frederick C. (1999). *Millions for Defense: The Subscription Warships of 1798*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- London, Joshua E. (2005). *Victory in Tripoli: How America's War with the Barbary Pirates Established the U.S. Navy and Built a Nation*. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley Publishers.
- Long, David F. (1970). *Nothing Too Daring: A Biography of Commodore David Porter, 1780–1843*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Long, David F. (1981). *Ready to Hazard: A Biography of Commodore William Bainbridge, 1774–1833*. Hanover, NH: University Press of New England.
- Lord, Walter (1972). *The Dawn's Early Light*. New York: W. W. Norton.
- Mackenzie, Alexander Slidell (1846). *The Life of Stephen Decatur, a Commodore in the Navy of the United States*. Boston: C. C. Little and J. Brown.
- Maclay, Edgar Stanton, and Roy C. Smith (1894). *A History of the United States Navy, from 1775 to 1893*. New York: D. Appleton and Co.



- Macleod, Julia H. (1945). "Jefferson and the Navy: A Defense," *Huntington Library Quarterly*, 8:2 (February), 153–84.
- Mahan, Alfred Thayer (1905). *Sea Power in its Relation to the War of 1812*. Boston: Little, Brown, and Co. [reprinted: New York: Haskell House Publishers, 1969].
- Mahon, John K. (1972). *The War of 1812*. Gainesville: University of Florida Press.
- Malcomson, Robert (1998). *Lords of the Lake: The Naval War on Lake Ontario, 1812–1814*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Malcomson, Robert (2003). *A Very Brilliant Affair: The Battle of Queenston Heights, 1812*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Maloney, Linda M. (1986). *The Captain from Connecticut: The Life and Naval Times of Isaac Hull*. Boston: Northeastern University Press.
- Mayhew, Dean R. (1982). "Jeffersonian Gunboats in the War of 1812," *American Neptune*, 42:2 (April), 101–17.
- McKee, Christopher (1972). *Edward Preble: A Naval Biography, 1761–1807*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- McKee, Christopher (1985). "Edward Preble and the 'Boys': The Officer Corps of 1812 Revisited," in James C. Bradford, ed. *Command Under Sail: Makers of the American Naval Tradition, 1775–1850*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 71–96.
- McKee, Christopher (1991). *A Gentlemanly and Honorable Profession: The Creation of the U.S. Naval Officer Corps, 1794–1815*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Morris, John D. (2000). *Sword of the Border: Major General Jacob Brown, 1775–1828*. Kent, OH: Kent State University Press.
- Morriss, Roger (1997). *Cockburn and the British Navy in Transition: Admiral Sir George Cockburn, 1772–1853*. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.
- Norton, Louis Arthur (2000). *Joshua Barney: Hero of the Revolution and 1812*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Owsley, Frank L., Jr. (1981). *Struggle for the Gulf Borderlands: The Creek War and the Battle of New Orleans, 1812–1815*. Gainesville: University Presses of Florida.
- Pack, James (1987). *The Man Who Burned the White House: Admiral Sir George Cockburn, 1772–1853*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Padfield, Peter (1968). *Brooke and the Shannon*. London: Hodder & Stoughton.
- Palmer, Michael A. (1987). *Mr. Stoddert's War: Naval Operations During the Quasi-War, 1798–1801*. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.
- Parker, Richard B. (2004). *Uncle Sam in Barbary: A Diplomatic History*. Gainesville: University Press of Florida.
- Paullin, Charles Oscar (1909). *Commodore John Rodgers; Captain, Commodore, and Senior Officer of the American Navy, 1773–1838*. Cleveland: Arthur H. Clark. [reprinted: New York: Arno Press, 1980].
- Perkins, Bradford (1961). *Prologue to War: England and the United States, 1805–1812*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Perkins, Bradford (1964). *Castlereagh and Adams: England and the United States, 1812–1823*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Pitcavage, Mark (1993). "Ropes of Sand: Territorial Militia, 1801–1812," *Journal of the Early Republic*, 13:4 (Winter), 481–500.
- Pitch, Anthony (1998). *The Burning of Washington: The British Invasion of 1814*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Pratt, Fletcher (1950). *Preble's Boys: Commodore Preble and the Birth of American Sea Power*. New York: Sloane.

- Pratt, Julius W. (1925). *Expansionists of 1812*. New York: Macmillan.
- Poolman, Kenneth (1961). *Guns off Cape Ann: The Story of the Shannon and the Chesapeake*. Chicago: Rand McNally.
- Pullen, H. F. (1970). *The Shannon and the Chesapeake*. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart.
- Quimby, Robert S. (1997). *The U.S. Army in the War of 1812: An Operational and Command Study*, 2 vols. East Lansing: Michigan State University.
- Roosevelt, Theodore (1882 [1987]). *The Naval War of 1812*. New York: G. P. Putnam [reprinted: Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1987].
- Saunt, Claudio (1999). *A New Order of Things: Property, Power, and the Transformation of the Creek Indians, 1733–1816*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Schroeder, John H. (2006). *Commodore John Rodgers: Paragon of the Early Navy*. Gainesville: University Press of Florida.
- Skaggs, David Curtis. (2003). *Thomas Macdonough: Master of Command in the Early U.S. Navy*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Skaggs, David Curtis. (2006). *Oliver Hazard Perry: Honor, Courage, and Patriotism in the Early U.S. Navy*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Skaggs, David Curtis, and Gerard T. Altoff (1997). *A Signal Victory: The Lake Erie Campaign, 1812–1813*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Skeen, C. Edward (1981). *John Armstrong, Jr., 1758–1843*. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press.
- Skeen, C. Edward (1999). *Citizen Soldiers in the War of 1812*. Lexington: University of Kentucky Press.
- Skelton, William B. (1992). *An American Profession of Arms: The Army Officer Corps, 1784–1861*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
- Skelton, William B. (1994). "High Army Leadership in the Era of the War of 1812: The Making and Remaking of the Officer Corps," *William and Mary Quarterly*. 3rd ser., 51 (April), 253–74.
- Smith, Gene A. (1995a). *"For the Purposes of Defense": The Politics of the Jeffersonian Gunboat Program*. Newark: University of Delaware Press.
- Smith, Gene A. (1995b). "Ninety-Nine to One: Was the Quasi-War an American Naval Victory?," *Consortium on Revolutionary Europe, 1750–1850: Selected Papers 1995*. 25, 253–9.
- Smith, Gene A., ed. (1999). *Historical Memoir of the War in West Florida and Louisiana in 1814–15: With an Atlas*, by Arsène Lacarrière Latour (1816). Gainesville: The Historic New Orleans Collection and the University Press of Florida.
- Smith, Gene A. (2000). *Thomas ap Catesby Jones: Commodore of Manifest Destiny*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Spears, John Randolph (1897). *The History of our Navy from its Origin to the Present Day, 1775–1897*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons.
- Sprout, Harold, and Margaret Sprout (1939). *The Rise of American Naval Power*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Stagg, J. C. A. (1983). *Mr. Madison's War: Politics, Diplomacy, and Warfare in the Early Republic*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Stanley, George F. G. (1983). *The War of 1812: Land Operations*. Toronto: Macmillan of Canada and National Museum of Canada.
- Symonds, Craig L. (1980). *Navalists and Antinavalists: The Naval Policy Debate in the United States, 1785–1827*. Newark: University of Delaware Press.



- Symonds, Craig L. (1985). "William S. Bainbridge: Bad Luck or Fatal Flaw?," in James C. Bradford, ed., *Command Under Sail: Makers of the American Naval Tradition, 1775–1850*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 97–125.
- Tucker, Glenn (1963). *Dawn Like Thunder: The Barbary Wars and the Birth of the U.S. Navy*. Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill Company.
- Tucker, Spencer C. (1993). *The Jeffersonian Gunboat Navy*. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.
- Tucker, Spencer C. (2004). *Stephen Decatur: A Life Most Bold and Daring*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Turner, Wesley B. (1999) *British Generals in the War of 1812: High Command in the Canadas*. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press.
- Turner, Wesley B. (2000 [1990]). *The War of 1812: The War that Both Sides Won*. Toronto: Dundurn Press.
- Waselkov, Gregory A. (2006). *A Conquering Spirit: Fort Mims and the Redstick War of 1813–1814*. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press.
- Watts, Steven (1987). *The Republic Reborn: War and the Making of Liberal America, 1790–1820*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Wheelan, Joseph (2003). *Jefferson's War: America's First War on Terror, 1801–1805*. New York: Carroll and Graf Publishers.
- Whipple, A. B. C. (1991). *To the Shores of Tripoli: The Birth of the U.S. Navy and Marines*. New York: Morrow.
- White, Richard (1991). *The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650–1815*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Whitehorne, Joseph W. A. (1992). *While Washington Burned: The Battle for Fort Erie, 1814*. Baltimore: Nautical and Aviation Publishing Company.
- Wright, Louis B., and Julia H. MacLeod (1944). "First American Campaign in Africa," *Huntington Library Quarterly*, 7:3 (May), 281–305.
- Zacks, Richard (2005). *The Pirate Coast: Thomas Jefferson, the First Marines, and the Secret Mission of 1805*. New York: Hyperion.
- Zaslow, Morris, ed. (1964). *The Defended Border: Upper Canada and the War of 1812*. Toronto: Macmillan.

## Chapter Four

---

# INDIAN WARS IN THE EAST, 1783–1859

*Roger L. Nichols*

Conflicts between the United States and groups of American Indians in the eastern half of the country have received far less attention than the more famous wars on the Plains or in the Southwest during the last half of the nineteenth century. Fighting against tribal groups long pre-dated independence, but, as Barbara Alice Mann's *George Washington's War on Native America* (2005) demonstrates the American Revolution set patterns for what was to follow. During the 75 years, except for the decades of 1800–10 and 1820–30, the American government fought against native people in the East repeatedly. Not only was this violence frequent, but it occurred in virtually all regions between the Appalachian Mountains and the Mississippi River, as the Creek, Cherokee, Seminole, Kickapoo, Winnebago, Miami, Shawnee, Sauk/Sac, and Fox/Mesquakie resisted white incursion into their ancestral lands. Yet often these disputes did not resemble formal warfare at the time. Frequently the numbers of combatants remained small, actual physical danger did not threaten highly populated areas and in some cases the fighting lasted a few weeks or months rather than years.

As a result most accounts of the nation's first eight decades give such conflicts only modest attention. Certainly, both diplomatic and military histories generally do not highlight those wars. For example, Edward Coffman's excellent study *The Old Army* (1986) focuses entirely on peacetime activities. A host of articles consider particular people, battles, campaigns or incidents but a broad overview of all American Indian wars can be obtained in the pertinent chapters of multi-century narratives by Axelrod (1993), Dillon (1983), or Tebbel and Jennison (1960). For a more focused survey of the period between the American Revolution and the US conflict with Mexico the reader should consult Francis Paul Prucha's, *The Sword of the Republic* (1968). For that era he presents the US Army as an agent of empire that proved essential to America's successful occupation of the trans-Appalachian region. He argues that victory over the Indians demanded a trained and disciplined military force rather than dependence on territorial militiamen. R. Douglas Hurt treats early US–Indian wars effectively in *The Indian Frontier, 1763–1846* (2002). Two other scholars analyze the creation of a federal army to

deal with the on-going frontier turmoil. James Ripley Jacobs (1947), and Richard H. Kohn (1975) both show that despite fears of a standing army resulting from earlier American experiences with British troops, frontier Indian wars forced the government to fund such a force.

Certainly the repeated violence on the Ohio River and Tennessee frontiers played a central role in the thoughts and actions of the citizens and their government during the nation's early history. For pioneers and would-be settlers Native Americans represented a potential physical threat. Even more important, the tribes inhabited the land and claimed resources frontier people desired. As new settlements appeared, their inhabitants considered Indians more as physical obstacles than threats. National leaders saw their government as weak and the nation as nearly encircled by the British and Spanish who they suspected were using the native people as diplomatic pawns and military allies. So from the start Indian relations and warfare played significant roles in shaping an American self-image and the directions of frontier settlement and commerce.

### **Warfare in the Old Northwest, 1790–5**

In fact American pretensions that victory over the British in the War for Independence had brought about a corresponding defeat of the Indians in the Ohio country led to immediate trouble there. Acting on that principle federal negotiators extracted the treaties of Ft Stanwix (1784), Ft McIntosh (1785) and Ft Finney (1786). Under these agreements the US attempted to seize tribal lands. They paid little or nothing for the cessions and their demands infuriated Indian leaders. As a result, when pioneers tried to occupy territory they assumed the treaties had opened, tribesmen attacked them repeatedly. During most of the 1780s tribal forces raided pioneer communities in Kentucky, travelers on the Ohio River, and illegal squatters trying to take land north of that stream, while armed gangs of pioneers retaliated by attacking Indian villages in Ohio and Indiana.

As Indians defended their homeland, reports of their repeated attacks prodded the government into action. Secretary of War Henry Knox ordered General Josiah Harmar, then in command at Ft Washington near present Cincinnati, to “extirpate, utterly, [the Indians responsible] if possible.” So at the end of September, 1790 Harmar set out with a force of 1,453 men. His small army burned deserted Indian villages but encountered few warriors. On his way back to Ft Washington Harmar ordered smaller groups of men to find and attack the enemy, but within a few days two of three such parties stumbled into disastrous Indian ambushes. Led by Miami Chief Little Turtle, the villagers killed over 200 of the soldiers and turned the invasion into a rout.

Stung by news of this defeat, in 1791 Congress provided money for another infantry regiment and to pay for the call up of another 2,000 militiamen. Territorial Governor Arthur St. Clair took command of the force with the rank of Major General. He received orders to seek peace first, but if that failed he was to build forts in the heart of the Indian country. Following those instructions the troops

moved north slowly, and on November 4, 1791 well-armed Indians attacked them at the village of Kekionga near Ft Recovery. When the fighting ended, the Indians led by Miami and Shawnee warriors had killed 900 and nearly destroyed the American force. Harvey L. Carter's (1987) biography of Little Turtle and John Sugden's (2000) of Blue Jacket give an analysis of these events as much from the Indian side as appears possible. William O. Odom (1993) blames St. Clair for failure to assess the potential danger and for underestimating the Indians' ability to carry out a large scale attack. Leroy V. Eid (1993) disagrees and claims that he made sound command decisions and that the defeat resulted from the Indians having achieved a unified battlefield command and using effective tactics.

Shocked and infuriated by this second defeat, Congress appropriated money for an entirely new army to serve no more than three years and to be disbanded when it had defeated the Indians. George Washington appointed Anthony Wayne to command this grandly titled "Legion of the United States." During the rest of 1792 and 1793 Wayne trained his men and moved them west to Ft Washington at Cincinnati. The next summer the force moved north along the border separating western Ohio from Indiana, where some 2,000 Indians prepared to resist Wayne's invasion. Their sporadic raids had little result and in late July, 1794 Wayne led his 3,500 men forward. On August 20 they attacked at Fallen Timbers. The outnumbered Indians fled to Ft. Miami hoping for support from the British, but they had orders to remain at peace and ignored their allies' calls for help.

An immense literature details parts or all of the three campaigns, led by Generals Harmar, St. Clair and Wayne. Reginald Horsman (1992) places these events into the broad context of American frontier expansion, Indian defense of tribal homelands, and the continuing disputes between the US and the British in Canada. He demonstrates that while American leaders suffered from near paranoia when it came to British-Indian relations along the northern border, their fears had some basis in fact. The British did encourage the tribes living north of the Ohio River to resist the expansion of settlement into that area, and at times provided them with economic and military aid. Building on those ideas, two recent accounts are by Wiley Sword (1985), and Alan D. Gaff (2004). The first examines the three campaigns of 1790, 1791, and 1794 and provides graphic battlefield details. Gaff begins with St. Clair's defeat at Kekionga and analyzes actions leading to Wayne's August, 1794 victory at Fallen Timbers. That event broke coordinated Indian resistance and led to their signing the 1795 Treaty of Greenville which ceded most of Ohio to the United States. His treatment is clear and offers a balanced and effective discussion of this conflict. Of the three white commanders, only two have biographies. These are Frazer E. Wilson, *Arthur St. Clair* (1944) and Paul David Nelson, *Anthony Wayne* (1985); Harmar has none.

### Tecumseh and the War of 1812

Unfortunately, the collapse of large-scale Indian resistance after Wayne's 1794 victory did not bring lasting peace to the region. For the next decade scattered

groups of warriors continued raiding as they responded to American settlers who swept into the area north of the Ohio River. Nevertheless, the 1794 signing of Jay's Treaty led to the withdrawal of British troops from the seven posts they had continued to occupy after Independence. However, although the Red Coats left the forts they remained near the border and British civilian Indian agents and traders continued to deal with elements of upper Mid-Western tribes for the next several decades. Going far beyond their orders from their superiors in London, some of them supplied weapons and encouraged tribal resistance to American settlement in Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois.

By this time native groups in those regions saw their economies in near ruin, their populations in rapid decline, and, for at least some villages, their societies facing collapse. Indiana territorial governor William Henry Harrison played a central role in this situation. Serving as the primary federal negotiator under President Thomas Jefferson, he signed treaties that acquired millions of acres of tribal land for the US. Land acquisition went hand-in-hand with American efforts to encourage Christian missionaries to bring "civilization" to the Indians. All of the Eastern tribes had farmed long before the whites arrived, so this effort tried to convince them to give up hunting and their roles in the fur trade so they could concentrate their efforts on farming. If that happened, tribal land holdings could be further reduced, thereby opening more territory for the pioneers.

By the first decade of the nineteenth century the continuing disruption of village life and the seemingly unending US demands for more land cessions rekindled bitter anti-American feelings among many tribes in the Northwest. Gregory E. Dowd (1992) and Alfred A. Cave (2006) place the events that followed into a broad context by examining a long tradition of shamans or religious leaders who provided leadership during times of crisis. In this case a minor prophet, who had formerly been ridiculed as a drunk, received a vision and became a charismatic spokesman for the Indians. Calling himself Tenskwatawa or the Open Door he demanded that his adherents reject the white man's goods totally and a return to native clothing, tools, food, and religious practices. R. David Edmunds' (1983) biographical study of the Shawnee Prophet analyzes his ideas and actions during the early nineteenth century.

By 1808 Tenskwatawa had established a multi-tribal village the whites called Prophetstown in western Indiana, and from there he sent out converts to other villages to spread his teachings. His ideas and actions laid a foundation on which his brother Tecumseh worked to establish a pan-Indian movement to resist further American expansion. R. David Edmunds' brief *Tecumseh and the Quest for Indian Leadership* (1984), and John Sugden's (1997) much longer biography of Tecumseh trace his efforts to oppose Harrison's treaty negotiations and to create an Indian confederacy that stretched from the Great Lakes south to the Gulf Coast. The chief's absence from Prophetstown gave Harrison an opportunity to attack the village in late 1811, and the whites' victory at the Battle of Tippecanoe served as a premature opening of the War of 1812.

With his hopes for an Indian confederacy that could block further settlement destroyed, an enraged Tecumseh returned to Indiana. When the War of 1812 broke

out the next summer he decided that the Shawnee and their neighbors had little choice but to help the British against the United States. That year hundreds of Indian men from a dozen tribes joined English General Isaac Brock as he captured Detroit and an entire American army. Both as actual allies of the British, and as raiders, Indians swept across the frontiers from Missouri to Ohio. Alec R. Gilpin (1958) details the campaigns in the eastern Great Lakes area. In *Mr. Madison's War* (1983), J. C. A. Stagg provides a multi-sided account, while Donald R. Hickey (1989) gives the most recent discussion of the varied campaigns.

For over a year Tecumseh remained with British forces operating around Detroit and south into northern Indiana and Ohio. By early autumn 1813, William Henry Harrison had led an effective force to Detroit and in September that year they invaded Canada. On October 5, 1813 he attacked the smaller British and Indian defenders near Moravian Town on the Thames River. When the English troops fled, Tecumseh and the Indians fought on, only to be overrun by Harrison's men. Tecumseh was killed in this battle, and his death along with continuing American victories discouraged the Indians so they began to abandon the war. In 1815 federal negotiators forced leaders of upper Mississippi Valley and Great Lakes tribes who had been allies of the British to accept new treaties that recognized US dominance. John Sugden's *Tecumseh's Last Stand* (1985) details the chief's role as an Indian leader who died trying to defend his people from aggression. Paul Prucha's (1969) military history puts these events into context briefly.

### Creek War, 1813–14

Although scholarship on this conflict dates back more than a century, it has received less attention than that afforded to the wars discussed above. At the same time it involved many similar issues, at least as related to the War of 1812. The Creek confederacy stood near a national border, this one with Spanish Florida. As a result expansion-minded Americans saw trouble with the Indians as a direct result of agitation by British and Spanish agents. Two early accounts by George C. Eggleston (1878) and H. S. Halbert and T. H. Ball (1895 [1995]) present this view. Foreigners did provide some encouragement and assistance, but the conflict had other, more fundamental causes, and most recent scholarship incorporates a broader range of causal factors. Those include the encroachment of pioneer settlers, repeated efforts by federal authorities to force assimilation on the villagers, the impact of Tecumseh's 1811 efforts to establish an anti-American Indian alliance, and a strong religious cultural revival among the Creeks at the time.

In some ways the Creek War included many of the same elements as the Ohio Valley conflicts. Yet the specific causes varied too. Land cessions, by the nearby Cherokee, Choctaw, and Chickasaw tribes left the Creeks as an island of resistance to American expansion into Alabama and Mississippi. Of more direct immediate consequence, the early-nineteenth-century American efforts to encourage Creek acculturation brought serious division within the tribe. These manifested themselves in several ways. Some of the tribal leaders decided to profit from stock raising

and large-scale agriculture, and their success led to obvious economic and social divisions in the villages. With the creation of the Creek National Council in the 1790s, acculturated leaders, determined to remain at peace with the US, tried to impose a non-traditional central authority within the tribe. For example, in 1811 the established peace chiefs agreed to American demands that the army be allowed to build a military road through the heart of Creek territory.

By that year a series of events combined to drive opponents of the acculturation program into open opposition to their own tribal headmen. Today scholars of the Creek or Red Stick War depict it as first an intra-tribal civil war, and then a conflict with the United States. Gregory Evans Dowd's (1992) analysis of the spiritual underpinnings of Indian resistance makes a connection with the ideas of the Shawnee Prophet then operating in Indiana, and in particular with Tecumseh's 1811 recruiting visit to the Southern tribes. Although he failed to attract many followers immediately, natural events later that year took on significant religious meanings for traditional Creeks. Nativist shamans used the sighting of a major comet in November, 1811 and then the first of the 1811–12 New Madrid earthquakes felt across most of the eastern United States as portends of disaster ahead. Their teachings increased resistance to the National Council and entrenched tribal leadership.

The disputes that tore through the Creek Confederacy have received increasing attention for some decades. Articles by Theron A. Nunez, Jr. (1958), Ross Hassig (1974) and Frank L. Owsley, Jr. (1985) laid the foundation for the recent studies that present the Creek War with the United States as a direct result of the Red Stick War, an internal conflict between the Creek National Council which favored cooperation with the US, and their opponents who supported Tecumseh's call for a pan-tribal resistance to it. Murders and retaliation by both sides spiraled quickly into open civil war in which the Red Stick prophets and warriors focused their rage against the wealthy chiefs and their livestock. In his *Sacred Revolt* (1991) Joel W. Martin focuses on these internal developments, and in *A New Order of Things* (1999), Claudio Saunt analyzes the actions of individual prophets and leaders in the civil war. He and others note that the battle at Ft Mims came as retaliation to an earlier attack on the Red Sticks, and that many of those killed there were mixed race or partially acculturated Creeks, not just white pioneers. The definitive study of the fight at Ft Mims is found in Gregory A. Waselkov (2006). Studies of the War of 1812 mentioned previously told of this strife as a part of their broader focus but often as a backdrop for Andrew Jackson's stunning victory over the British at the Battle of New Orleans. David S. Heidler and Jeanne T. Heidler's *Old Hickory's War* (1996) does this while describing the March, 1814 battle at Horseshoe Bend where Andrew Jackson's forces destroyed most of the Red Stick fighters. In his *Struggle for the Gulf Borderland*, (1981 [2003]), Frank L. Owsley gives the Red Stick War considerable attention, devoting one-third of his chapters to it. His analysis suggests that Creek impatience to open hostilities played a central role in their crushing defeat. He posits that had they waited for promised British arms, munitions, and assistance they would have outnumbered and outgunned the frontier militia forces sent against them. The victorious American forces swept



through the rest of the Creek homeland destroying crops and villages as they went. The next year General Jackson forced the peaceful Creeks, some of whom had been his allies, to cede 22 million acres of their land to the United States.

On February 12, 1825, several Creek leaders signed the Treaty of Indian Springs ceding most Creek lands in Georgia. Ten weeks later, on May 31, one of those chiefs, William McIntosh, was assassinated, and the Creek National Council was able to get the treaty annulled. Georgia Governor Troup ignored the new Treaty of Washington and began expelling the Creeks from their lands. When President John Quincy Adams attempted to intervene, Troup called out the state militia and Adams backed down saying, "The Indians are not worth going to war over." Though forced from Alabama, 20,000 Upper Creeks remained in Alabama until they signed the Treaty of Cusseta, March 24, 1832, in which Creeks ceded sovereignty over all their lands east of the Mississippi. When whites began defrauding Creeks of their lands and the Indians resisted, federal troops entered the area and, in the Creek War of 1836, forced the remainder of that tribe to move west of the Mississippi.

### **First Seminole War**

Although American troops destroyed most of the Red Stick fighting men and Jackson stripped the remainder of the confederacy of much of its land, some of the combatants fled south into northern Florida where they joined the Seminoles and other anti-American groups. In some ways the situation in the Southeast following the Treaty of Ghent which ended the War of 1812 resembled circumstances in the North before that conflict. In both regions native groups had legitimate grievances against the United States, and they received help and encouragement from the British. Several basic differences existed too. First, Florida lay outside the United States. That made it attractive to runaway slaves who escaped across the border and many of these Blacks joined with Indians to fight against the Americans. Unlike the defeated tribes in the North, the Red Sticks who escaped from Jackson's troops rejected the Treaty of Fort Jackson, demanded that their lands be returned and remained hostile. So while British and, to a lesser extent, Spanish assistance played a role in the conflict that followed, the Seminoles, the Creek fugitives, and the former slaves all had good reasons to hate and fear the United States.

J. Leitch Wright, Jr. (1975) places the Southern borderlands and American interest in acquiring the Gulf Coast region and Florida into context well. He and other authors demonstrate clearly that although Jackson's victory at Horseshoe Bend in 1814 ended most of the fighting with the Creeks, the surviving and embittered Red Sticks continued anti-American raids from Florida. The 1816 destruction of Negro Fort on the Apalachicola River by US and Indian attackers failed to end the violence because the victors ignored the local issues. Continuing pioneer efforts to rustle Seminole cattle and Indian retaliation kept the frontier on the brink of war. At the same time British adventurers caused further trouble by trying to gain land and expand trade with the Indians.

David and Jeanne Heidler (1996) show the significance of these elements as they trace Andrew Jackson's military incursion into Florida and its dramatic diplomatic consequences. Among his voluminous work on Jackson's life and career, Robert V. Remini has two books that analyze this situation. The most focused is *Andrew Jackson and His Indian Wars* (2001) which devotes several chapters to his actions leading to and during the First Seminole War. As do most students of the general's life, this depicts him as stubborn, belligerent and apparently determined to threaten the Spanish in Florida through his policy of "hot pursuit" in the Indian war. The second study is volume I of his earlier biography *Andrew Jackson and the Course of American Empire* (1977) which depicts his actions against the Seminoles as part of the larger pattern of American territorial expansion. J. Leitch Wright, Jr. (1981, 1986) provides the Indian sides to these events in two studies of the Southeastern tribes. A recent study, *The Seminole Wars*, by John Missall and Mary Lou Missall (2004) depicts this war as part of the long-term Seminole resistance in Florida. While Jackson's 1818 invasion ended direct fighting with the Indians along the Southern border, it proved more important as a part of US acquisition of Florida. Once that region became part of the nation in 1821 at least the minimal threat of a foreign role in Indian affairs there ended. However, the Seminoles did fight two more wars several decades later.

### The Black Hawk War

As hundreds of thousands of Americans poured into the states and territories beyond the Appalachians, they exerted political pressure on the government to open the remaining Indian lands for settlement. This led directly to the Indian Removal Policy which sought to push the tribes west of the Mississippi River. Some groups moved voluntarily while others accepted this option grudgingly or not at all. Those groups who rejected the entire idea of removal in the 1830s helped to bring about the last major Indian wars in the East. The Black Hawk War of 1832 occurred in Illinois and Wisconsin, and its causes resembled earlier conflicts at least slightly. As in several of those, Indian hopes for British assistance, divisions among Sauk and Mesquakie leaders, and prophetic influence all played roles in bringing about what became accidental hostilities.

In his *American Indian Policy in the Jacksonian Era* (1975), Ronald N. Satz provides the social and political context for President Jackson's determination to push tribal people west. At the same time William T. Hagan, in *The Sac and Fox Indians* (1958), traces relations between those tribes and the United States before, during, and after the war. Narratives of the campaign themselves appeared almost as soon as the smoke of battle cleared. Sauk leader Black Hawk's story first appeared in print as *Life of Ma-Ka-Tai-Me-She-Kia-Kiak or Black Hawk* (1833) edited by J. B. Patterson. This account has gone through several other editions, the most useful modern one being edited by Donald Jackson (1955). A useful biography of the Sauk leader is Roger L. Nichols, *Black Hawk and the Warrior's Path* (1992). Anyone looking for the contemporary political and military

correspondence during the war will find Ellen M. Whitney's four-volume *The Black Hawk War, 1831–1832* (1970–8) a gold mine. The actions of General Henry Atkinson, commander of US troops, in 1832 are analyzed by Roger L. Nichols (1965).

The conflict occurred when Maka-tai-me-she-kia-kiak, known to whites as Black Hawk, and about 1,800 Sauk, Mesquakie and Kickapoo men, women and children of the so-called British Band crossed the Mississippi moving eastward from Iowa into Illinois. They did not expect war and claimed to be traveling up the Rock River in Illinois to settle near the Winnebago-Sauk prophet White Cloud's village on that stream. Their appearance in western Illinois led Governor John Reynolds to call out the militia and demand that federal troops help end this Indian "invasion." As his party moved up the Rock River, it became clear that none of the nearby tribes would help them, so Black Hawk decided to surrender to Atkinson and return to Iowa. Before that happened, on May 14, 1832, troops under Major Isaiah Stillman's command attacked Sauks carrying a white flag and the war had begun. For the next two and a half months the regulars trudged across northern Illinois and southern Wisconsin encountering few Indians. Meanwhile units of mounted militiamen accidentally found the fleeing Indians, and when the regulars caught up the combined force pursued the Indians to the Mississippi. There, at the Battle of Bad Axe, 2 August 1832, the troops destroyed all but about 300 of the fugitives.

Even a casual reading of Black Hawk's *Autobiography* shows the Indians' lack of aggressive action toward the pioneers until after the accidental war began. Even then, most of the leaders' efforts focused on a frantic search for allies, food, and then escape. Francis P. Prucha (1969) provides a clear narrative of the summer campaign, while Roger L. Nichols (1965) traces and analyzes both Indian and military actions that summer. Cecil D. Eby, in "That disgraceful affair," *The Black Hawk War* (1973), is the longest modern treatment of these events, but it does not utilize existing work on the topic successfully. More careful and detailed accounts may be found in Kerry A. Trask, *Black Hawk* (2006) and Patrick J. Jung, *The Black Hawk War of 1832* (2007).

### The Second and Third Seminole Wars

Like the Black Hawk War these two conflicts resulted from the Removal policy to clear Indians out of the East. Unlike the results in many of the earlier wars, US forces did not prevail quickly or easily. Having resisted Andrew Jackson's 1817–18 invasion of their country, the remaining Red Stick Creeks and the Seminoles in north Florida sought to avoid forced removal. This became increasingly more difficult after 1822 when territorial government began operating in Florida. That event helped encourage pioneer settlement in the lush grazing areas already used extensively by the Indians. It also led US officials to negotiate the Treaty of Moultrie Creek (1823) which acknowledged Seminole title to much of central Florida. Despite that agreement Southeastern anti-Indian sentiment continued,

particularly over the practice of welcoming and incorporating escaped slaves into their villages.

In 1832 American negotiators extracted the Treaty of Payne's Landing, which called on the Seminoles to accept removal to the West. The agreement allowed the Indians three years to get ready for their move, but when the advance party returned with a negative report on their new home village leaders decided they could remain in their homeland. A letter from President Jackson demanding their cooperation persuaded some bands to accept removal, but others refused. Their reasons varied, but are readily apparent. The treaty called on them to unite with the Creeks once they moved west. It also threatened the freedom of the Black Seminoles many of whom had married into Indian families and were considered to be part of the tribe. On this topic see Kenneth W. Porter (1996). Unlike the other large Southern tribes, the Florida Indians had not yet faced swarms of pioneer settlers and speculators trying to get their land. They appear not to have feared American actions. Previously mentioned books by Wright (1981, 1986) and the Seminole tribal history by James W. Covington (1993) provide a solid context.

One can argue about exactly when the war began, but violence erupted in the Summer and Autumn of 1835 when frontiersmen attacked peaceful Indians who retaliated. In late December, 1835 the Seminoles inflicted a crushing defeat on troops under Maj. Francis L. Dade as only two soldiers survived the attack (Laumer 1995). This opened a bitter and costly conflict and victory eluded every commander regardless of his skills or tactics. Nearly unending strings of casualties coupled with reassignments of commanders and resignations by dozens of lower ranking officers pushed the army to desperate measures. These included importing bloodhounds from Cuba to track the Indians and, as George E. Buker shows in *Swamp Sailors* (1975), using Viet Nam-like river-borne expeditions to find and engage the enemy. If not the most desperate, the move that generated the most criticism was General Thomas S. Jesup's seizure of Osceola when meeting the Indian leader under a flag of truce. Chester L. Kieffer (1979) tries to defend this action. Biographies of current and later senior officers including George Rollie Adams (2001) on William Harney, Rembert W. Patrick (1963) on Duncan Clinch, Allan Peskin (2003) on Winfield Scott, and K. Jack Bauer (1985) on Zachary Taylor all demonstrate American frustration at being unable to locate and defeat the Seminoles. John K. Mahon, *History of the Second Seminole War, 1835–1842* (1991 [1967]) is the most detailed account. George Walton's *Fearless and Free* (1977) is less detached. In *The Florida Wars* (1979), Virginia Bergman Peters analyzes all three US–Seminole conflicts, as does the previously mentioned study by Missall and Missall (2004). J. Leitch Wright (1986) and James W. Covington (1993) present the tribal context for understanding these events. The only study of an Indian leader in the war is William and Ellen Hartley, *Osceola* (1973). As a result of the repeated American campaigns narrated by the authors already cited, many Seminoles accepted the inevitability of removal and went west. When the war ended federal officers packed just over 3,000 of the villagers off

to Indian Territory. During the late 1840s a few hundred more left Florida and headed west.

A modest number of others, however, refused to migrate, and they clung precariously to their forest and everglades hideouts. Cooperating with federal officials the remaining Seminoles sought isolation and peace. Because he spoke English Chief Billy Bowlegs (Holata Micco) became the man who dealt most often with the whites. In 1849 a violent incident broke the uneasy calm. Five outlaw Seminoles murdered several whites and the army dispatched 1,400 troops while Florida officials called out the militia. Bowlegs and other Indian leaders quickly sent warriors after the murderers. They killed one, turned over three others to the army, and managed to avoid any other fighting. Missall and Missall (2004) show how the effect of the 1850 Swamp and Overflowed Land Act brought the Seminoles back into contact and eventual conflict with other Americans.

To protect pioneers moving into southern Florida, the army began placing forts near the Indians, and that, in turn, encouraged more settlement. Causes for the incident that reopened hostilities are obscure, but a December 1855 attack on a small party of soldiers set off the Third Seminole War. This conflict received brief mention in Charles H. Coe, *Red Patriots* (1974; 1918), but since then scholars have given it only modest attention. Peters (1979) devotes a chapter to narrating the events. She claims that by then the Indians had no more than 120 adult males who could fight, so perhaps even the label “war” is a misnomer. Wright (1986) gives these events only a few pages. More a guerrilla conflict than anything else, most of the small-scale incidents occurred in the south. By Spring, 1858 Chief Billy Bowlegs came in for talks. Soon all but 150 Seminoles followed him to Indian Territory. For his story consult James W. Covington (1982).

From the time when American militia forces faced large numbers of effective Indians during the 1790s through the late 1850s, the relative strength of whites and Indians changed drastically. The Washington administration represented only 15 states and a couple of territories. By the 1850s the nation spanned the continent and included 33 states and 5 territories. The army had gained considerable experience in the 1846–8 war with Mexico and had better weapons and munitions than did the tribal people. This extraordinary growth in size and strength played a central role in causing Indian wars. Not only did pioneers fear Indians as a physical threat, but saw them as a physical obstacle to the acquisition of the land and its resources. Much of the time Indians wanted trade but little else from the United States, and when the government or its citizens mistreated particular tribes few options other than flight or war presented themselves.

The decade before the Civil War was one of relative peace between whites and Indians east of the Mississippi, but to the west of that river clashes took place between units of the US Army and Cheyennes at Solomon’s Fork and with Comanches at Crooked Creek. William Y. Chalfant (1989, 1991) describes the expeditions mounted by the army that climaxed at battles typical of those fought on the Great Plains in the decades after the Civil War.

Most of the material cited here is primarily narrative. One has to search carefully to find modest differences of opinion. Particular incidents or tactics may raise some discussion, but essentially little historiographic debate exists. Authors of the newest items may have access to materials not available previously, but clearly in this field no heated arguments enliven the scholarship.

#### BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Adams, George Rollie (2001). *General William S. Harney: Prince of Dragoons*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
- Axelrod, Alan (1993). *Chronicle of the Indian Wars from Colonial Times to Wounded Knee*. New York: Prentice Hall.
- Bauer, K. Jack (1985). *Zachery Taylor: Soldier, Planter, Statesman of the Old Southwest*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.
- Black Hawk (1833). *Life of Ma-Ka-Tai-Me-She-Kai-Kiak or Black Hawk*. Cincinnati: J. B. Patterson.
- Buker, George E. (1975). *Swamp Sailors: Riverine Warfare in the Everglades, 1835–1842*. Gainesville: University Presses of Florida.
- Carter, Harvey Lewis (1987). *The Life and Times of Little Turtle, First Sagamore of the Wabash*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
- Cave, Alfred A. (2006). *Prophets of the Great Spirit: Native American Revitalization Movements in Eastern North America*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
- Chalfant, William Y. (1989). *Cheyennes and Horse Soldiers: The 1857 Expedition and the Battle of Solomon's Fork*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Chalfant, William Y. (1991). *Without Quarter: The Wichita Expedition and the Fight at Crooked Creek*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Coe, Charles H. (1974; 1898). *Red Patriots: The Story of the Seminoles*. Gainesville: University Presses of Florida.
- Coffman, Edward M. (1986). *The Old Army: A Portrait of the American Army in Peacetime, 1784–1898*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Covington, James W. (1982). *The Billy Bowlegs War*. Chuluota, FL: Mickler House.
- Covington, James W. (1993). *The Seminoles of Florida*. Gainesville: University Press of Florida.
- Dillon, Richard H. (1983). *North American Indian Wars*. New York: Facts on File.
- Dowd, Gregory Evans (1992). *A Spirited Resistance: The North American Indian Struggle for Unity, 1745–1815*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Eby, Cecil D. (1973). "That Disgraceful Affair," *The Black Hawk War*. New York: Norton.
- Edmunds, R. David (1983). *The Shawnee Prophet*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
- Edmunds, R. David (1984). *Tecumseh and the Quest for Indian Leadership*. Boston: Little Brown.
- Eggleston, George Cary (1878). *Red Eagle and the Wars with the Creek Indians of Alabama*. New York: Dodd, Mead, & Co.
- Eid, Leroy V. (1993). "American Military Leadership: St. Clair's 1791 Defeat," *The Journal of Military History*, 57:1 (January), 71–88.
- Gaff, Alan D. (2004). *Bayonets in the Wilderness: Anthony Wayne's Legion in the Old Northwest*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Gilpin, Alec R. (1958). *The War of 1812 in the Old Northwest*. East Lansing: Michigan State University Press.



- Hagan, William T. (1958). *The Sac and Fox Indians*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Halbert, H. S., and T. H. Ball (1995 [1895]). *The Creek War of 1813 and 1815*. with introduction and notes by Frank L. Owsley, Jr., Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press.
- Hartley, William B., and Ellen Hartley (1973). *Osceola: The Unconquered Indian*. New York: Hawthorn Books.
- Hassig, Ross (1974). "Internal Conflict in the Creek War of 1813–1814," *Ethnohistory*, 21:3 (Summer), 251–71.
- Heidler, David S., and Jeanne T. Heidler (1996). *Old Hickory's War: Andrew Jackson and the Quest for Empire*. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books.
- Hickey, Donald R. (1989). *The War of 1812: A Forgotten Conflict*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
- Horsman, Reginald (1992 [1967]). *Expansion and American Indian Policy, 1783–1812*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Hurt, R. Douglas (2002). *The Indian Frontier, 1763–1846*. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico.
- Jackson, Donald, ed. (1964; 1955). *Black Hawk: An Autobiography*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
- Jacobs, James Ripley (1947). *The Beginnings of the U. S. Army, 1783–1812*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Jung, Patrick J. (2007). *The Black Hawk War of 1832*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Kieffer, Chester L. (1979). *Maligned General: The Biography of Thomas S. Jessup*. San Rafael, CA: Presidio Press.
- Kohn, Richard H. (1975). *Eagle and Sword: The Federalists and the Creation of the Military Establishment in America, 1783–1802*. New York: Free Press.
- Laumer, Frank (1995). *Dade's Last Command*. Gainesville: University Press of Florida.
- Mahon, John K. (1991; 1967). *History of the Second Seminole War, 1835–1842*. Gainesville: University Presses of Florida.
- Mann, Barbara Alice (2005). *George Washington's War on Native America*. Westport, CT: Praeger.
- Martin, Joel W. (1991). *Sacred Revolt: The Muskogees' Struggle for a New World*. Boston: Beacon Press.
- Missall, John, and Mary Lou Missall (2004). *The Seminole Wars: America's Longest Indian Conflict*. Gainesville: University Press of Florida.
- Nelson, Paul David (1985). *Anthony Wayne: Soldier of the Early Republic*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Nichols, Roger L. (1965) *General Henry Atkinson: A Western Military Career*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Nichols, Roger L. (1992). *Black Hawk and the Warrior's Path*. Arlington Heights, IL: Harlan Davidson.
- Nunez, Theron A., Jr. (1958). "Creek Nativism and the Creek War of 1813–14," *Ethnohistory*, 5:1 (Winter), 1–47.
- Odom, William O. (1993). "Destined for Defeat: An Analysis of the St. Clair Expedition of 1791," *Northwest Ohio Quarterly*, 65:1 (Spring), 68–93.
- Owsley, Frank L., Jr. (1985). "Prophet of War: Josiah Francis and the Creek War," *American Indian Quarterly*, 9:3 (Summer), 273–93.
- Owsley, Frank L., Jr. (2000; 1981). *Struggle for the Gulf Borderlands: The Creek War and the Battle of New Orleans, 1812–1815*. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press.



- Patrick, Rembert W. (1963). *Aristocrat in Uniform: General Duncan L. Clinch*. Gainesville: University of Florida Press.
- Peskin, Allan (2003). *Winfield Scott and the Profession of Arms*. Kent, OH: Kent State University Press.
- Peters, Virginia Bergman (1979). *The Florida Wars*. Hamden, CT: Archon Books.
- Porter, Kenneth W. (1996). *The Black Seminoles: History of a Freedom Loving People*, revised and ed. by Alcione M. Amos and Thomas P. Senter. Gainesville: University Press of Florida.
- Prucha, Francis Paul (1969). *The Sword of the Republic: The United States Army on the Frontier, 1783–1846*. New York: Macmillan.
- Remini, Robert V. (1977). *Andrew Jackson and the Course of American Empire*. New York: Harper & Row.
- Remini, Robert V. (2001). *Andrew Jackson & His Indian Wars*. New York: Viking.
- Satz, Ronald N. (1975). *American Indian Policy in the Jacksonian Era*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
- Saunt, Claudio (1999). *A New Order of Things: Property, Power, and the Transformation of the Creek Indians, 1733–1816*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Stagg, J. C. A. (1983). *Mr. Madison's War: Politics, Diplomacy and Warfare in the Early American Republic, 1783–1830*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Sugden, John (1985). *Tecumseh's Last Stand*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Sugden, John (1997). *Tecumseh: A Life*. New York: Henry Holt.
- Sugden, John (2000). *Blue Jacket: Warrior of the Shawnees*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
- Sword, Wiley (1985). *President Washington's Indian War: The Struggle for the Old Northwest, 1790–1795*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Tebbel, John, and Keith Jennison (1960). *The American Indian Wars*. New York: Harper & Brothers.
- Trask, Kerry A. (2006). *Black Hawk: The Battle for the Heart of America*. New York: Henry Holt.
- Walton, George (1977). *Fearless and Free: the Second Seminole War, 1835–1842*. Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill.
- Waselkov, Gregory A. (2006). *A Conquering Spirit: Fort Mims and the Redstick War of 1813–1814*. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press.
- Whitney, Ellen M., ed. (1970–8). *The Black Hawk War, 1831–1832*, 4 vols. Springfield: Illinois State Historical Library.
- Wilson, Frazer E. (1944). *Arthur St. Clair: Rugged Ruler of the Old Northwest: An Epic of the American Frontier*. Richmond: Garrett and Massie.
- Wright, J. Leitch, Jr. (1975). *Britain and the American Frontier, 1783–1815*. Athens: University of Georgia Press.
- Wright, J. Leitch, Jr. (1981). *The Only Land They Knew: The Tragic Story of the American Indians in the Old South*. New York: Free Press.
- Wright, J. Leitch, Jr. (1986). *Creeks & Seminoles: The Destruction and Regeneration of the Muscogulge People*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.

## Chapter Five

# THE TEXAS WAR FOR INDEPENDENCE AND WAR WITH MEXICO

*Thomas W. Cutrer*

The conquest of the American Southwest by the United States, while unquestionably a brilliant military achievement, has, since the first stirrings of a Texas independence movement, been highly controversial on moral grounds. Most contemporary participants and observers – in the main Jacksonian Democrats from the South and West – viewed the event as the culmination of America’s Manifest Destiny, the belief in the nation’s God-given mandate to establish sovereignty over the entire continent in the name of Protestant Christianity, political democracy, and capitalist economics. A highly vocal minority, mostly New England Whigs who feared the growing influence of the Western regions – an increasing number of whom abominated the spread of chattel slavery into new territories – saw their country’s annexation of Texas and the subsequent seizure of lands that would come to constitute all or significant portions of the present states of New Mexico, Arizona, California, Nevada, Utah, and Colorado as, at best, a blatant land grab at the expense of a weaker sister republic and at worst the manifestation of a deliberate conspiracy to establish an empire for slavery extending to the Pacific Ocean (Schroeder 1973).

Indeed, in the first comprehensive history of the Mexican War attempted by a scholar, N. C. Brooks (1849) wrote, “In relation to the origin of the Mexican War ... public opinion has been divided, and much affected by the political bias of the two leading parties; so that it is impossible for an impartial chronicler to please both, and difficult even to avoid giving offense to either” (v). The extremes of viewpoints are evident in the works of William Jay (1849) who candidly admitted that his aim in writing *A Review of the Causes and Consequences of the Mexican War* was to exhibit “the wickedness, the baseness, and the calamitous consequences” of the war, “effecting all the ends for which it was waged” (4). In contrast, in 1908, at the high tide of American imperialism, Clark H. Owen of Yale University wrote *The Justice of the Mexican War* (1908) “to vindicate the justice of that war; to acquit the United States, as a nation, of the most serious, if not the only, charge ever laid against her honor; and to remove the cloud from her just title to her largest possession” (iii).

The seeds of conflict were sown in 1821 when, with the sanction of the Republic of Mexico, 300 American colonists were established on the Brazos River in the Mexican province of Texas with the intention of extending the rapidly growing cotton frontier beyond the boundaries of the United States. Under the Constitution of 1824, which was based, to the largest degree, on that of the United States, the colonists were content to remain nominally Mexican citizens, and under the empresarial authority of Stephen F. Austin and the benign neglect of a Mexican government that allowed them to evade the constitution's ban on slavery, they prospered. In 1835, however, General of Division Antonio López de Santa Anna executed a military *coup d'état*, abrogated the liberal constitution, seized control of the Mexican government, and established himself as generalissimo of the Mexican national army. In common with Yucatan, Zacatecas, Coahuilla, and several other of the outlying states, the province of Texas rebelled against Santa Anna's usurpations and the centralization of the federal government under his control.

The opening skirmish of what was to become the war for Texas independence was fought near the village of Gonzales on October 2, 1835, when 18 local militiamen met a Mexican cavalry patrol at the ford of the Guadalupe River. The Mexican lancers had been sent to recover a diminutive cannon lent to Empresario Green DeWitt's colonists to aid in the defense of the settlement against nearby Karankawa Indians. Under a homemade banner inscribed with the defiant challenge, "Come and Take It," the militiamen turned back the Mexican column and, reinforced by militia companies from other settlements, pursued it into San Antonio, where General of Brigade Martín Perfecto Cós had fortified and garrisoned an abandoned Spanish mission known locally as the Alamo.

The 800-man garrison was surrounded by a numerous if ill-organized, ill-equipped, and undisciplined throng of Texas volunteers, and when, on December 5, the rebels, led by Colonel Edward Burleson, stormed the Alamo, Cós surrendered, accepting the rebels' terms that he remove his army south of the Rio Grande and no longer participate in hostilities against Texas.

Upon learning of Cós's capitulation, however, Santa Anna renounced the terms of the treaty and, declaring that he would maintain Mexico's territorial integrity "whatever the cost," marched an army of 3,000 men back to San Antonio. "With the fires of patriotism in my heart and dominated by a noble ambition to save my country," the Mexican leader wrote in his autobiography, "I took pride in being the first to strike in defense of the independence, honor, and rights of my nation" (Santa Anna 1988: 49–50).

The call for reinforcements from the Alamo's commandant, Lieutenant Colonel William Barrett Travis, went largely unheeded, and, on March 6, 1836, after sustaining a 13-day siege, the 187-man garrison was overrun and utterly destroyed. Much has been made of the heroic stand of the defenders of the Alamo, and the popular media have, since the event, maintained that their resistance allowed Sam Houston the necessary time to recruit and organize an army with which to defeat Santa Anna and win Texas independence. As one historian of the Alamo wrote,

The twelve days of grace which the garrison personally gave to the rest of Texas was only a part of the accomplishment. In a word, Santa Anna's army had been so badly mauled that it wasn't able to sweep ahead as planned but had to pause for a complete reorganization of its principal units. The additional enforced delay, it can categorically be stated, was the only thing which saved the North American colonies from being conquered and subjected to the devastating brutality Santa Anna had promised. (Myers 1948: 227)

That author states that "well over fifteen hundred" Mexican soldiers were killed at the Alamo (Myers 1948: 227). Dallas journalist Lon Tinkle (1958) suggests that this number may be too low, calling Mexican casualties at the Alamo "staggering," and places them "conservatively" at between 1,200 and 1,500, ten times the number suffered by the Texans. The facts, however, do not bear out this popular belief. At the other extreme, Santa Anna placed his losses at "about seventy killed and three-hundred wounded," a figure accepted by Fred Anderson and Andrew Cayton (2005), but the Mexican general also places the Texan dead at 600, which is, of course, preposterous. Stephen L. Hardin (1994), the finest historian of the campaign, places total Mexican losses at around 600, which is no doubt accurate.

What is known of a certainty is that the men of the Alamo did not die in the knowledge that they were fighting for Texas independence. In fact, a convention at Washington-on-the-Brazos drafted and signed a declaration of independence on March 2, four days prior to the storming of the Alamo and too late for the defenders to have been informed that they were fighting for an independent republic. Several authorities, in fact, maintain that the defenders died under the Mexican national flag, the red, white, and green tricolor, onto which was superimposed the figure, "1824," indicating that they were fighting to restore the constitution that Santa Anna had overthrown. The only known flag to have flown over the Alamo, however, was that of an independent volunteer company from New Orleans. Its capture inspired Santa Anna to report that its inscription "show plainly the true intention of the treacherous colonists and of their abettors, who came from the ports of the United States of the north" [quoted in Tinkle 1958: 233].

Even Santa Anna, however, paid tribute to the bravery of the garrison. The "filibusters," he wrote, "defended themselves relentlessly," but, no doubt attempting to shield himself from the charge of brutality, he created another of the Alamo's legends: that all of the defenders were killed in action. "Not one soldier showed signs desiring to surrender," he claimed, "and with fierceness and valor, they died fighting" (Crawford 1967: 51). This myth, too, has been successfully exploded by modern historians, with the execution of Davy Crockett, in particular, being sufficiently documented to be almost beyond question (Kilgore 1978).

Alwyn Barr's *Texans in Revolt* (1990) is the standard work on the San Antonio campaign of 1835. Literature focusing more narrowly on events at the Alamo is as uneven as it is extensive. Important primary sources are by Juan N. Seguín (De la Teja 1991), Vicente Filisola (Santos 1968), and José Enrique de la Peña (Peña

1975). Although almost totally spurious, Richard Penn Smith's *Col. Crockett's Exploits and Adventures in Texas* (1836) was long accepted as a genuine "eye witness account" and became the source for much Alamo lore and the hyper-inflated myth of American heroism and sacrifice there. The best monographs are those of Jeff Long *Duel of Eagles* (1990) and William C. Davis's *Three Roads to the Alamo: The Lives and Fortunes of David Crockett, James Bowie, and William Barret Travis* (1998). Dan Kilgore's *How Did Davy Die?* (1978) is the best of several books on the fate of those who may have sought to surrender.

The Mexican generalissimo furthered his reputation for brutality with his order to execute the prisoners captured at the battle of Coleto Creek, March 20, 1836. There the command of Colonel James Walker Fannin, after waiting too long to evacuate its position at Presidio La Bahía near the village of Goliad, was cut off and forced to surrender to Santa Anna's subordinate, General of Brigade José de Urrea. Urrea's terms stated that "Fannin and the wounded shall be treated with all possible consideration upon the surrender of their arms," and that "the whole detachment shall be treated as prisoners of war and shall be subject to the disposition of the supreme government." Santa Anna, however, countermanded Urrea's humane terms and ordered the rebels, most of whom were newly arrived volunteers from the United States, to be executed on March 27. Although he claimed that the executions were legal under a law passed November 27, 1835, "in compliance with which the war in Texas was waged 'without quarter,'" Santa Anna characteristically attempted to absolve himself of the blame for the so-called Goliad massacre by attempting to shift the responsibility to Urrea, whom he spuriously quoted as having said, "As these filibusters entered Texas with arms to assist the colonists in their revolt, they were judged outlaws and all prisoners were shot" (Crawford 1967: 51–2).

The Goliad campaign has been treated in several monographs, none of which quite measure up to modern scholarly standards. The best is the work of Craig H. Roell, but his *Remember Goliad!*, at less than 100 pages, is too brief to be entirely comprehensive.

The annihilation of the garrison of the Alamo and the capture and execution of Fannin and his men at Goliad for practical purposes eradicated armed resistance in Texas but provided the Texan rebels two powerful battle cries: "Remember the Alamo!" and "Remember Goliad!" Such atrocities as these also sowed a bitter harvest of reprisals not only against Santa Anna's soldiers at the battle of San Jacinto but against unoffending Mexican citizens by US volunteers – primarily Texas Rangers – during the invasion and occupation of Mexico that was to follow in 1846.

On March 4, 1835, the convention assembled at Washington-on-the-Brazos had appointed Sam Houston as commander of Texas's armed forces with the rank of major general and instructed him to create an army with which to drive Santa Anna from the newly declared republic. Despite bitter complaints and even charges of cowardice from his officers and men, Houston retreated across east Texas toward the Louisiana border, gathering recruits and training his make-shift army while Santa Anna's command, struggling eastward through the heaviest rainfall

then on record, lost its cohesion and its line of communication became increasingly attenuated.

Then, on April 21, 1836, Houston turned on Santa Anna's pursuing army. At San Jacinto, Houston's army of some 900 men, primarily volunteers from the southern and western United States, utterly routed Santa Anna's overextended vanguard, killing or capturing virtually the entire Mexican force of 1,300 and, on the following day, capturing the fleeing Santa Anna, himself. Under extreme duress, the Mexican general signed the Treaty of Velasco, requiring him to order all Mexican forces out of Texas and to recognize Texas independence with territorial boundaries extending to the Rio Grande.

Remarkably little historical work has been done on San Jacinto, considering how decisive the battle was. Not only did it achieve Texas's independence, but it also assured the westward march of Anglo-American civilization, much as the battle of New Orleans had done 21 years earlier. Frank Tolbert's *Day of San Jacinto* (1959), never a scholarly treatment of the battle, is now dated, and no newer title has taken its place. The memoir of Colonel Pedro Delgado (1919), an officer on Santa Anna's staff, is the finest primary description from a Mexican source. This account was written in 1837 but was not published until 1870.

The earliest, and highly biased, military history of the war for Texas independence is that of Chester Newell (1838), an Episcopal minister who had served as a missionary in Texas in 1837. Many others have followed, but Stephen Hardin's *Texian Iliad* (1994) is by far the superior work, with Paul D. Lack's *The Texas Revolutionary Experience* (1992) providing a solid political and social history. Also excellent are Randolph B. Campbell's (1993) biography of Sam Houston and Gregg Cantrell's (1999) biography of Stephen F. Austin. For a contemporary attack on Houston's generalship, see Robert M. Coleman, *Houston Displayed* (1964). Also useful are the published papers of Stephen F. Austin (Barker 1924, 1927, 1928), of Sam Houston (Barker and Williams 1938–43, Day and Ullom 1954), and of the second president of the Republic of Texas, Mirabeau Buonaparte Lamar (Gulick 1921–8). Essential is John Jenkins's edition of *The Papers of the Texas Revolution* (1973).

From the Mexican point of view, in addition to the highly self-serving memoirs of Santa Anna (Crawford 1967), those of Jose Enrique de la Peña (Perry 1975), Vincente Filisola (Woolsey 1985), and José Antonio Navarro (1995) are most useful. The finest anthology of reminiscences from the chief Mexican participants is Carlos E. Casteñeda's collection, *The Mexican Side of the Texas Revolution* (1956). Robert J. Scheina's (2002) military profile of Santa Anna is brief but solid.

From 1836 until 1846, the Lone Star Republic existed as an independent country. The Mexican government, however, refused to ratify the Treaty of Velasco, instead keeping up a desultory effort at retrieving its breakaway province. Raid and counter raid characterized the 10-year existence of the Republic of Texas, with San Antonio twice falling briefly into Mexican hands in 1842. The government of Texas launched a spectacularly unsuccessful attempt to occupy Santa Fe, which it claimed under the terms of the Treaty of Velasco, and an invasion of Mexico which ended disastrously at Mier on the Rio Grande.



Several good books have been written on the continuing if sporadic war between Mexico and its erstwhile province. Among the most important primary sources are George Wilkins Kendall's *Narrative of the Texan Santa Fe Expedition* (1844), Thomas Jefferson Green's *Journal of the Texian Expedition against Mier* (1845), Joseph D. McCutchan's *Mier Expedition Diary* (1978), Samuel H. Walker's *Account of the Mier Expedition* (Sibley 1978), and William Preston Stapp's *Prisoners of Perote* (1845, 1977). The memoir of Juan N. Seguín (de la Teja 1991) offers a glimpse into the conflicted loyalties of a Tejano who was one of Travis's messengers from the Alamo and who led a unit of Houston's cavalry at San Jacinto but who, in 1842, returned to Texas at the head of a column of Mexican troops to recapture San Antonio. Scholarly examinations of the war between the republics of Texas and Mexico include J. Milton Nance's *After San Jacinto* (1963) and *Attack and Counterattack* (1964) and Sam W. Haynes's *Soldiers of Misfortune* (1991).

In addition, the Republic of Texas maintained a respectable sized navy, which kept up a remarkably successful war for control of the Gulf of Mexico. Perhaps the finest hour of the Texas Navy was the victory of the sloop-of-war *Austin*, accompanied by the brig *Wharton*, over the Mexican steam frigate *Moctezuma*, May 16, 1843. This duel, reportedly the first involving a steam powered ship, was commemorated in the engraving that adorned the cylinder of the Colt Navy revolver. The colorful history of the Texas Navy is treated in Jim Dan Hill, *The Texas Navy* (1937), and Jonathan W. Jordan, *Lone Star Navy* (2006), and the story of its commanding officer is told in Tom H. Wells, *Commodore Moore and the Texas Navy* (1960). One of the few personal recollections of a sailor in the Texas navy is found in S. W. Cushing, *Adventures in the Texas Navy and the Battle of San Jacinto* (1985).

Although President Houston wanted desperately to see his embattled nation annexed to the United States, increasing anti-slave sentiment in Congress blocked Texas statehood. In the chiding words of U. S. Grant, "the same people – who with permission of Mexico had colonized Texas, and afterwards set up slavery there, and then seceded as soon as they felt strong enough to do so – offered themselves to the United States." In Grant's view, and in the opinion of many other Northerners, "the occupation, separation and annexation were, from the inception, a conspiracy to acquire territory out of which slave states might be formed for the American Union" (Grant 1885, 1:54).

When Texas was admitted to the Union on December 29, 1845, a final act of the outgoing John Tyler administration, Mexico considered this annexation an act of piracy on the part of its neighbor to the north, but was in no position to offer immediate military response. Even Mexican moderates, who viewed Texas's independence as accomplished in fact if not in legality, saw the United States' recognition of the Rio Grande boundary, claimed in the Treaty of Velasco, as an outrageous fraud, as no Anglo-American settlement existed west or south of San Antonio. Further, the so-called Nueces Strip, a 90 mile wide swath of land between the Rio Grande and the Nueces River, was considered a part of the state of Coahuilla, and the Valley of the Rio Grande north of El Paso, including the valuable outpost at Santa Fe, had always been part of the province of New Mexico.



Nevertheless, the James K. Polk administration, eager to annex California as well as Texas, insisted on the Rio Grande frontier, and, when negotiations to purchase Alta California and Nuevo Mexico failed, the American president ordered an "Army of Observation," under the command to Brevet Brigadier General Zachary Taylor, to the Nueces, hoping to pressure Mexico into alienating its northern territories. Mexico responded by sending an army under General of Division Mariano Arista to Matamoras on the Rio Grande, but neither side, for the present, entered the disputed Nueces Strip. When further diplomatic efforts failed, however, Polk ordered Taylor to the Rio Grande, "apparently," in Grant's view, "in order to force Mexico to initiate war" (Grant 1885: 1:55). To Mexico, Taylor's move south constituted an invasion of its sovereign territory and a flagrant act of war.

In response to this perceived North American aggression, Arista sent patrols across the river to harass Taylor's troops and to threaten their line of communication. Thus, on April 25, 1846, a clash with Mexican cavalry resulted in the death of 11 United States dragoons and the wounding or capture of some 50 others. Taylor thereupon set out to prepare a strong defensive position opposite Matamoras, ordering the construction of Fort Texas (later Fort Brown) on the site of the present city of Brownsville, Texas, and then, leaving a small garrison there, marched with the largest part of his army for Point Isabel at the mouth of the Rio Grande, there to open direct water communications with New Orleans.

Arista's 3,300-man Division of the North intercepted Taylor's returning 2,200-man army at Palo Alto, Texas, on May 8, 1846. The ensuing battle was largely a duel of artillery in which the technological superiority of US guns and the tactical superiority of US gunnery – especially the new "flying artillery" developed by Major Samuel Ringgold – proved decisive. Unable to engage the enemy's infantry due to the rate and accuracy of his cannon fire, Arista abandoned the battlefield and fell back to a defensible position at the Resaca de la Palma where the two armies again clashed on May 9, 1846.

There the Mexican army occupied the resaca or ravine that served as a natural breastwork athwart the road to Fort Brown. With both flanks covered by dense chaparral, Arista was assured that the North Americans would be compelled to attack his seemingly invulnerable position head on and thus suffer ruinous casualties. After pushing the Third US Infantry around the Mexican left, fighting its way through the heavy brush, Taylor ordered Captain Charles A. May's company of dragoons to charge up the Matamoras road and silence the battery defending the crossing. Such a charge should have been obliterated by artillery fire, but as the Mexican gunners had supplied their caissons with the wrong ammunition, May's charge swept over the guns, rallied behind the Mexican line, and rode back the way they came, capturing General Rómulo Díaz de la Vega in the process. Counterattacks by the Mexican cavalry, previously held in reserve, failed to repulse the infantry regiments that had exploited May's breach of the Mexican center, and soon the entire line gave way and withdrew beyond the Rio Grande.

Upon receiving the news of fighting north of the Rio Grande, President Polk declared that "the cup of forbearance had been exhausted." Mexico, he alleged, "has passed the boundary of the United States, has invaded our territory and shed

American blood upon the American soil.” With hostilities with Mexico now underway, “notwithstanding all our efforts,” as Polk claimed, “to avoid it,” the President called upon the Congress, “by every consideration of duty and patriotism to vindicate with decision the honor, the rights, and the interests of our country,” with an immediate declaration of war. Although the Congress accepted and funded the President’s call to arms, not all Americans supported “Mr. Polk’s War” (Schroeder 1973). Abraham Lincoln, for example, then a junior congressman from Illinois, deconstructed the President’s war message, observing that Polk had fallen “far short of proving his justification” and positing “that the President would have gone farther with his proof, if it had not been for the small matter, that the truth would not permit him.”

Indeed, President Polk, the political heir of Andrew Jackson and his strong sense of America’s Manifest Destiny, seemed determined to wrest California and the Southwest away from Mexico at whatever cost. To Lincoln, however, Polk was “a bewildered, confounded, and miserably perplexed man” (Lincoln 1894: 1:107), and U. S. Grant, although he served honorably in the war against Mexico, declared himself “bitterly opposed” to the annexation of Texas and regarded the resultant war as “one of the most unjust ever waged by a strong against a weaker nation. It was an instance of a republic following the bad example of European monarchies, in not considering justice in their desire to acquire additional territory” (Grant 1885: 1:53).

The administration’s strategy was to seize the desired portions of Mexican territory, plus enough of the rest of the country to force the cession of California and New Mexico in return for peace and the return of other occupied lands. To this end, the President moved Taylor’s army across the Rio Grande and ordered “the Army of the West,” to be commanded by Colonel (soon to be Brevet Brigadier General) Stephen Watts Kearney, to march from Fort Leavenworth, Kansas Territory, down the Santa Fe Trail to Santa Fe, and then across what is now Arizona to San Diego (Clarke 1961). There it was to cooperate with naval forces under Commodore Robert F. Stockton and a small army detachment under Colonel John Charles Frémont in securing California for the United States. Another small army under Brevet Brigadier General John E. Wool was to march south from San Antonio toward Monterrey to secure the states of Coahuila and Nuevo León as bargaining chips for future peace negotiations.

In an attempt to draw Taylor’s army deep into the inhospitable desert of northern Mexico and defeat it once it had out marched its line of supply, the Division of the North, now under the command of General of Division Pedro Ampudia, fell back from the Rio Grande to the fortified city of Monterrey. Taylor followed and attempted to take the city by storm, attacking its eastern front while sending a division under Brigadier General William J. Worth around the city to cut its communications with Mexico City and become the anvil against which the hammer of the two divisions under Taylor’s personal command would crush the Mexican army. In a reversal of Taylor’s expectations, however, the fortifications fronting Monterrey defied the Americans’ attempt to enter the city, while Worth’s command, attacking from the rear, overran two significant Mexican forts – the Bishop’s Palace

on Federation Hill and El Soldado on Independence Hill – and gained the center of the city. After three days of fighting, September 21–23, 1846, Ampudia called for a truce, and in the armistice negotiated on the American side by colonels Albert Sidney Johnston and Jefferson Davis, the Mexican army was allowed to evacuate the city, bearing away all of their arms and equipment, with both sides to observe an eight-week cessation of hostilities. President Polk, claiming that the army had no authority to negotiate truces, only to “kill the enemy,” abrogated the treaty and ordered Taylor to assume a defensive posture in the city.

Seeing no further strategic advantage in pursuing a campaign in northern Mexico and fearing the political ascendancy of “Old Rough and Ready,” already spoken of as the likely Whig candidate for president in 1848, Polk ordered Taylor to cease offensive operations and to hand over the best of his regiments to Major General Winfield Scott for an amphibious assault on Vera Cruz and a march directly against Mexico City, following Hernán Cortéz’ route to the Mexican capital via Jalapa, Perote, and Puebla.

Outraged by the stripping of his command, Taylor, rather than concentrating his remaining troops in a defensive position at Monterrey as he had been instructed, advanced beyond Saltillo. Taking advantage of this exposure of the much-reduced American army, Santa Anna, who was once again at the head of the Mexican state and armed forces, moved his 20,000-man army north to attack Taylor’s 5,000. At Buena Vista, however, February 22 and 23, 1847, Taylor repulsed the Mexican army in a hard fought, near run battle, effectively ending the war in the north.

During the period of the Monterrey and Buena Vista campaigns, a second United States army was also driving deep into Mexican territory. The Army of the West under Stephen Watts Kearny consisted of five companies of Kearny’s own First Dragoons plus a regiment of Missouri mounted rifles and a battalion of Mormon volunteers, willing to trade military service for paid passage to the new Mormon Zion of Deseret at present Salt Lake City, Utah (Ricketts 1997, Fleek 2006). This improbable mixture of units started down the Santa Fe Trail from Fort Leavenworth during the last week of June 1846, expecting to capture Santa Fe only after hard fighting against the local militia under the command of Governor Manuel Armijo. To Kearny’s surprise, however, Armijo evacuated the city, and on August 18 the Army of the West occupied this vital trade center without opposition.

After proclaiming New Mexico Territory a part of the United States and providing it with a constitution, Kearny detached the Missourians under their colonel, Alexander W. Doniphan, to march down the Rio Grande to El Paso and from there to Ciudad Chihuahua, taking possession of the state of Chihuahua as a potential bargaining chip in future peace negotiations. “Doniphan’s Thousand,” as the regiment came to be known, made one of the longest marches in US military history, covering a total of some 5,500 miles from Saint Joseph, Missouri, to Santa Fe, to El Paso, to Chihuahua, to Taylor’s army at Monterrey, and thence to the Gulf coast and, by sea, to New Orleans, and then, by steamboat, back to Saint Louis. En route they fought two significant battles, at Brazito, just north of El Paso, on Christmas Day 1846, and, on February 28, 1847, at Sacramento, some

15 miles north of Chihuahua City. Both were tactically decisive victories, but in the strategic sense, Doniphan's campaign accomplished little as he had not the men to occupy the territory that his regiment traversed. The fact that, for the most part, the regiment made its trip unmolested demonstrated the lack of interest that most Mexicans felt for the war going on around them. Joseph G. Dawson's *Doniphan's Epic March* (1999) is the best account of this campaign, but a number of memoirs by soldiers of the Missouri regiment, those of John Taylor Hughes (1997) and Jacob S. Robinson (1932) notable among them, are also available.

Kearny, in the meantime, set out for San Diego with his five companies of dragoons and the Mormon Battalion, there to assist the Navy, under Commodore Stockton, in the conquest of California. Colonel John Charles Frémont, in Mexico with a small detachment of "explorers" at the outbreak of the war, somewhat dubiously declared the "Bear Flag Republic" and detached California from Mexico by proclamation. His subsequent failure to subordinate himself to General Kearny became the grounds for his court martial, but his career was saved by the influence of his powerful father-in-law, Senator Thomas Hart Benton, and his beautiful and energetic wife, Jessie Benton Frémont. Frémont's highly controversial role in the conquest of California is best discussed in Tom Chaffin's biography, *Pathfinder* (2002). *Notes of a Military Reconnaissance* by Kearny's topographical engineer, Major William H. Emory (1951), is a classic of its kind. The single best account of the war on the West Coast is that of Neal Harlow, *California Conquered* (1982).

Of the naval aspect of the war, which consisted primarily of blockading Mexico's gulf coast and seizing the ports of California, the best account is K. Jack Bauer's *Surf Boats and Horse Marines* (1969). Other perspectives are provided by Harry Langley (1985) who describes Stockton's unauthorized attempts to precipitate a war between Texas and Mexico that would provide a pretext for US intervention in early 1845 and the joint operations he undertook in California with Frémont. Langley shows that Stockton "exceeded his instructions and the provisions of the Constitution" (p. 290) when he set up a civil government for California with himself as governor. Thomas ap Catesby Jones, Stockton's successor as naval commander in California, had prematurely occupied Monterey in 1842, and, like Stockton, overstepped his authority in California (Smith 2000). David Conner, American naval commander in the Gulf of Mexico who twice unsuccessfully attacked the Mexican naval base at Alvarado before successfully directing naval forces during the landing of Scott's army at Vera Cruz has not been the subject of a modern biography although his son, Philip Conner (1896) described the operations of the Home Squadron under his father's command. Operations of the squadron under Conner's successor are covered in Samuel Eliot Morison's *Old Bruin* (1967), a biography of Matthew Calbraith Perry. First hand accounts by naval personnel are few, but among the best is Joseph T. Downey's *The Cruise of the Portsmouth* (1958). For the history of the Mormon Battalion, see the books of Norma Baldwin Ricketts (1997) and Sherman L. Fleek (2006).

Despite major setbacks at Monterrey and Santa Fe, the Mexican national government still refused to negotiate a peace with the invaders, vowing to fight on

until all of its territory was redeemed and national honor was restored. The Polk administration, therefore, sought another more vital point at which to strike its enemy. Vera Cruz, Mexico's most important port and the gateway to Mexico City, was an obvious strategic prize. In November 1846, Winfield Scott presented to the President a proposal to take the city by siege, following an amphibious landing to the south, out of range of the heavy guns of Vera Cruz's guardian fortress, the castle of San Juan de Ulúa.

With Polk's grudging approval, Scott moved an army of 15,000 men by sea from Tampico, landing on Collado Beach below the city on March 9, 1847. Although, quite astonishingly, the landing met with no resistance, Scott remained greatly concerned that the onset of the yellow fever season would catch his army still in the low country and destroy it more surely than could Mexican guns. At the same time, he wished to avoid the high casualty rate that storming the walls of Vera Cruz would entail. Accordingly, on March 22, having laid formal siege to the fortress city, he began its systematic bombardment, imperiling Mexican civilians and the sizable foreign community. The Mexican commandant, General of Division Juan Morales, resigned in favor of General of Brigade José Juan de Landero, who, on March 27, agreed to surrender the city and castle and their 4,000-man garrison.

Although Scott had acquired a deepwater port from which to supply his march on Mexico City, with the yellow fever season fast approaching, it remained vital that he move his troops into the highlands before they were savaged by the dreaded "vomito." Santa Anna, recovered from his check at Buena Vista, raised a new army and swiftly moved south to confront the threat to his capital. Occupying and fortifying a naturally strong position at Cerro Gordo, a pass through which the National Highway led into the interior, the Mexican general confidently expected to pin Scott against the mosquito infested Gulf coast.

A daring reconnaissance by Captain Robert E. Lee revealed a route around the seemingly impregnable Mexican left wing, however, and on April 17, 1847, Scott ordered a demonstration against Santa Anna's front, to be conducted by a volunteer brigade under Brigadier General Gideon Pillow, while a division of regulars, under Brigadier General David E. Twiggs turned the enemy's left and severed his line of communication with the capital. Under Pillow's mismanagement, the feint, meant only to hold the Mexican line in place while Twiggs maneuvered to its rear, turned into a poorly conceived frontal assault, suffering heavy casualties. The flanking movement, however, succeeded to near perfection, panicking Santa Anna's army and leading to the loss of 1,000 killed and wounded and 3,000 captured. Also among the spoils of the battle were the generalissimo's personal carriage, containing his war chest and one of his several artificial legs. Scott's losses amounted to 63 killed and 353 wounded.

Scott quickly moved inland, hoping to capitalize on the virtual destruction of Santa Anna's army at the battle of Cerro Gordo. By May 15, 1847, Puebla, the largest city between Vera Cruz and Mexico City, was in his hands, but there, astonishingly, his volunteer regiments demanded their release from service, their period of enlistment having been nearly served, and Scott was obliged to let them

go. For the next 11 weeks, therefore, until fresh volunteers could be forwarded from the States, Scott's regulars remained in Puebla while the energetic Santa Anna rebuilt his shattered army and proceeded to fortify the Mexican capital. At last, on August 7, with new units having arrived, Scott began his final drive toward the Mexican capital. Mexico City had been well endowed by nature with a strong defensive position, encircled as it was by a series of lakes and mountains. To this already formidable array of defenses, Santa Anna, in addition to having raised a new army, had added new batteries, forts, and redoubts that now ringed the city. Approaching from the east, Scott, informed by the invaluable reconnaissance work of his engineering officers, cut loose from his line of supply and outflanked the strongest of the Mexican barriers at El Piñon. Maneuvering to the south side of the city, Scott attacked General of Division Gabriel Valencía on August 20, 1847, at Contreras, where he virtually destroyed the detached Army of the North. Later that same day he assaulted the fortified convent of Churubusco, winning a bridgehead beyond the Rio Churubusco and, Scott believed, opening the way for negotiations to end the war.

Despite the twin victories of Contreras and Churubusco, Scott abstained from entering the Mexican capital. Believing peace to be at hand, he felt "a treaty would be more possible while the Mexican government was in possession of the capital than if it was scattered and the capital in the hands of an invader" (Grant 1885: 1:147). Accordingly, on 22 August, Scott and Trist negotiated an armistice with Santa Anna, preliminary, they hoped, to a treaty of peace. Contrary to the terms of the treaty, however, Santa Anna continued to recruit soldiers and to fortify Mexico City, forcing Scott, on September 6, to abrogate the armistice and resume hostilities.

Molino del Rey, a link in the chain of fortifications surrounding Mexico City, was reportedly a cannon foundry and therefore a place of strategic significance. Under the tactical control of William J. Worth, what was to have been only a raid against the supposed foundry became a full scale frontal assault. For the only time in the campaign, Scott's army failed to do proper reconnaissance at Molino del Rey and for the only time placed its reliance solely on the bayonet in storming a heavily fortified position. In the attack of September 8, Worth's division suffered 800 casualties, the most severe, and the most useless, of the entire campaign. Recriminations were bitter, especially against General Worth, with the officers of the regular army, in particular, seeking to place the blame for the loss of so many of their comrades.

The army, now within sight of Mexico City, pressed on, however, circling to the western outskirts and the formidable castle of Chapultepec, formerly the Spanish governor's official residence, but then the home of the Mexican military academy. It was also the gateway to the city. On September 12, after an extensive artillery bombardment, Scott ordered the castle stormed. His troops scaled the walls, and, after a spirited fight, drove the enemy from his positions. Those of Chapultepec's 1,000 defenders who were neither killed nor captured fled into Mexico City. Six cadets were killed in defense of their academy, with one reportedly leaping from a rampart to his death, draped in the Mexican flag, rather



than surrender. These young men, Los Niños Héroes, have become a large part of the Mexican national identity and have been idealized as perfect citizens and patriots.

On the following day, simultaneous attacks against the Beléne Gate and the San Cosme Gate breached the city's final defenses, and as Scott's victorious veterans swarmed into the city, the first foreign capital ever to fall to US forces, Santa Anna and the remainder of his army escaped to Guadalupe Hidalgo. Thus, although Santa Anna conducted an unsuccessful siege of the garrison that Scott had left at Puebla to guard his communications with Vera Cruz, the fighting was virtually over. Scott's army occupied the Mexican capital for four-and-one-half months, however, while the treaty that would put an official close to the war was under negotiation. In the best single-volume treatment of the campaign for Mexico City, Timothy D. Johnson (2007) argues that it was Scott's strategy aimed at securing peace that led him to pause after each victory en route to the capital city in order to give Mexican leaders opportunities to sue for peace and thereby limit casualties on both sides. By banning foraging and purchasing supplies from civilians, Scott minimized popular support for guerrillas who could threaten his supply lines. Such treatment continued while peace was negotiated.

Astonishingly, during this occupation, Polk, fearing Scott's growing political popularity, recalled "Old Fuss and Feathers" under various charges of misconduct. For the negotiation of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, which was signed on February 2, 1848, ceding to the United States almost half of Mexico's national territory, see Wallace Ohrt's biography of Nicholas Trist, *Defiant Peacemaker* (1997). Polk was, nevertheless, highly displeased with both his commanding general and his chief negotiator, Nicholas P. Trist, having desired that his envoy hold out for even more of Mexico's territory. "It is to the credit of the American nation, however," offered U. S. Grant, "that after conquering Mexico, and while practically holding the country in our possession, so that we could have retained the whole of it, or made any terms we chose, we paid a round sum for the additional territory taken; more than it was worth or likely to be worth to Mexico. To us it was an empire of incalculable value; but it might have been obtained by other means" (Grant 1885: 1:56).

No less an authority on warfare than the Duke of Wellington was astonished by the North American success. How could an army, scarcely ever more than half the size of its opponent in any major battle, cut off from its base of supply and fighting far from home, and constituted primarily of largely untrained and undisciplined volunteers, have possibly achieved such a victory? At the outbreak of the war, the United States Army consisted of a mere 8,600 officers and men, most of whom were stationed at remote frontier outposts. The officer corps, however, was outstanding by almost any standard, with most of the junior officers having graduated from the excellent military academy at West Point. The enlisted men were generally from poorer families, with approximately 40 percent of the rank and file being made up of immigrants, and fully one-third being illiterate. They were, nevertheless, by and large, well-trained, well-disciplined, and inured to the hardships of campaign.

With the regular military establishment clearly numerically insufficient to deal with its first major war in 30 years, the country called, as it had always done in the past, on volunteers. The 73,532 men who responded to the call, however, were not absorbed into the regular regiments, but became part of short-term state regiments. Their company officers were elected by the men, their field colonels were appointed by their state governor, and their generals were appointed by the President. Although at least initially enthusiastic and from a more prosperous and better educated stratum of American society than the regulars, the volunteers who swelled the army's ranks in Mexico were notoriously resistant to discipline and proper subordination or even basic camp hygiene, and their officers' lack of professional training and experience was disgraceful. Their one-year enlistment period, as well, meant that they returned home almost as soon as they were sufficiently trained and experienced to be actually considered as soldiers.

Nevertheless, their courage, their patriotism, and their commitment to their cause – the majority having volunteered from Southern and Western states where the hunger for new lands was keenest – were enough to keep desertion rates among volunteers at around 5 percent, despite poor food, long marches, liaisons with local women, and the lure of the California gold fields. These martial virtues, coupled with superior weapons, a more reliable commissary, and the presence of regulars in camp and field to set a positive if not always followed example, made them more than a match for the Mexican *soldados* against whom they fought.

Nevertheless, service in Mexico was harsh, with food – although generally abundant – monotonous and unhealthy; the climate often severe; diseases, ranging from yellow fever through malaria and dysentery, endemic; and medical care, although probably as good as that available to most civilians back home, rudimentary. In consequence, of the 12,518 US soldiers who died in Mexico – at 11 percent, the highest *per capita* death rate of any American war – roughly 11,000 died of disease or accident. Deaths due to combat are estimated at 1,548, with many succumbing to wounds that would not have been fatal had medical attention been of a higher quality. Two excellent books cover the life of the soldier, James M. McCaffrey's *Army of Manifest Destiny* (1992) and Richard Bruce Winders's *Mr. Polk's Army* (1997). For a physician's view of the war, see the journal of Dr. Thomas Neely Love (Love and Grady 1995).

By contrast, the Mexican national army consisted largely of unwilling conscripts, often from remote Indian villages, illiterate and with no love for the national government. A vast gulf existed between these hardy, self-reliant but unmotivated enlisted men and their officers who were drawn from the Mexican elite, but often without suitable military training or experience. Santa Anna, himself, referred to the men in the ranks as “mere chickens.” In consequence, logistics and medical care were rudimentary at best and military justice was a travesty. As an officer of the regular US army noted, “the physical strength, confidence of the men in their officers, and the training of the men were all in favor of the Americans.” Not that the Mexican soldiers lacked bravery. Indeed, Charles S. Hamilton (1930), then a second lieutenant in the Fifth Infantry, but later to become a major general of volunteers in the Civil War, believed, “proper training would have made them

invaluable soldiers,” but courage alone “was not sufficient to enable them to meet or withstand a charge of American soldiers.” Mexican losses in the war cannot now be reliably established, but the best estimates are three times higher than those of the United States. The finest study of the Mexican national army is William A. DePalo, Jr.’s *The Mexican National Army* (1997). For an analysis of Mexican national politics during the period of 1845 to 1848, see Pedro Santoni’s *Mexicans at Arms* (1997).

As much as discipline and motivation, weapons and tactics were responsible for the lopsided United States victory over Mexico. Although the Mexican army was, to a large degree, trained by European veterans of the Napoleonic Wars, and no less a military authority than the Duke of Wellington predicted that it would overwhelm its northern foe, it was fighting with outmoded weapons. The standard shoulder arm of the Mexican soldier, the .75 calibre British “Tower” musket, was literally surplus from the battle of Waterloo, although some units were armed with the more modern Baker rifle.

The cream of the Mexican army was its cavalry, an arm already beginning to be outdated by the mid-nineteenth century. As fine as Mexican horsemen were, their horses were wiry, tough mustangs, capable of traveling long distances without grain or water, but unable to stand up against the larger American bred horses in mounted combat. The Mexican cavalry’s standard shoulder weapon was the escopeta, a light, .69 caliber musket with a 38½” barrel, in service since being popularized in the mid-seventeenth century by Spanish cavalry on the colonial frontier. According to one observer, the escopeta was a “short bell-mouth, bull-doggish looking musket, carrying a very heavy ball, which is ‘death by law’ when it hits, but that is seldom, for they shoot with little accuracy. They are good for nothing except to make a noise.” More remarkably still, most of the Mexican cavalry regiments were still armed with lances. On September 20, 1846, when they encountered John Coffee Hayes’s Texas mounted rifles outside of Monterrey, the Rangers, mounted on heavier horses and armed with sawed off shotguns and Samuel Colt’s newly developed revolvers, committed mayhem on the Mexican ranks long before they could close in to use their lances with any effect. At the skirmish at San Pasquale, California, December 6, 1846, on the other hand, Californio lancers under Major Andrés Pico dealt a stinging defeat to Stephen Watts Kearny’s dragoons, whose horses were badly jaded from crossing the brutal southwestern deserts and whose powder was dampened by one of the region’s infrequent rainfalls.

Although most United States regulars still carried the Model 1816 or Model 1835 muzzle-loading, flintlock musket, many of the volunteer regiments were armed with the .54 calibre Model 1841 percussion cap rifle, better known as the Mississippi Rifle, whose range and accuracy greatly exceeded that of their opponents. Jefferson Davis’s 370-man regiment of Mississippi rifles, for example, in its famed “inverted V” formation, shattered the charge of two infantry divisions and a cavalry brigade, some 4,000 men, at Buena Vista.

Equally decisive was the superiority of American artillery. Recent advances in metallurgy had allowed US arms makers to cast bronze artillery tubes which, although strong enough to throw a six or twelve pound ball 1,500 yards, were

light enough to be maneuvered from point to point on the battlefield and redeployed at the place of greatest need. These so-called “flying batteries,” manned by regulars commanded by West Point trained officers, were able to sustain a rate and accuracy of fire that their Mexican counterparts, still firing iron cannon, which were both heavier and prone to bursting, could not hope to match.

Superior leadership, too, played a vital role in the North American victory. A major factor in the almost uniform success of the United States armies was the liberal distribution and, in Scott’s case, the wise use of graduates from the military academy at West Point. Especially in their capacity as engineers did such company grade officers as Robert E. Lee, P. G. T. Beauregard (Williams 1956), George B. McClellan, Isaac Ingalls Stevens (Stevens 1900), and Gustavus Woodson Smith (Hudson 2001) contribute to the American victory, but the war with Mexico also provided more than 160 former West Point cadets, including U. S. Grant, “Stonewall” Jackson, Joseph E. Johnston, and James Longstreet, with their first combat experience.

Winfield Scott was certainly the finest American military leader between George Washington and Robert E. Lee. He had established a formidable reputation as a tactician and disciplinarian in the War of 1812, becoming the youngest major general in United States service, and, at the battles of the Chippewa and Lundy’s Lane on the Canadian frontier, had demonstrated that American soldiers could exchange bayonet charges and volleys of musket fire with British regulars and drive them from the field. Scott, unfortunately, could be his own worst enemy. Scott was scientific in his approach to combat, always avoiding the frontal assault in favor of the flanking movement. He ensured that his men were well clothed and well fed, and he rigorously enforced regulations respecting civilian property, religion, and civil government, thus keeping combat casualties, death from disease, and the animosity of the population of the territory that he had conquered at a minimum. Nevertheless, he never enjoyed the popularity of the less talented Zachary Taylor, and was regarded as an aristocrat in a democratic army. Prolix and pompous, he became known among his men and to the nation as “Old Fuss and Feathers,” and has been characterized as the only American general who never lost a battle or won an election. Of the several recent Scott biographies, those of Timothy D. Johnson (1999) and William Peskin (2003) are superior.

Zachary Taylor was, in many respects, Scott’s mirror opposite. “As to the management of the war,” observed Lieutenant Hamilton, “the earlier battles in the northern part of Mexico under General Taylor ... were nearly all won by charging the enemy with the bayonet from which [the enemy] invariably fled. The war [in the north] afforded instances of great military skill and others of blundering imbecility” (Hamilton 1930: 88). Scott’s opinion of Taylor was not particularly positive. “With a good store of common sense,” Scott wrote in his memoirs,

General Taylor’s mind had not been enlarged and refreshed by reading, or much converse with the world. Rigidity of ideas was the consequence. The frontiers and small military posts had been his home. Hence, he was quite ignorant, for his rank, and quite bigoted in his ignorance. His simplicity was childlike, and with innumerable

prejudices – amusing and incorrigible – well suited to the tender age. ... In short, few men have ever had a more comfortable, labor-saving contempt for learning of every kind. (Scott 1864: 382–3)

Taylor's Mexican War letters have been collected and edited by William K. Bixby (1908). Of the several modern biographies of Taylor, K. Jack Bauer's (1985) is both authoritative and readable.

Sadly, President Polk's political zeal far outstripped his military judgment, and he frequently and flagrantly undermined the authority of his generals in the field when he felt that their popularity was becoming too great and that they were a threat to the continuity of the line of Democratic succession initiated by Andrew Jackson. Polk was hooked on the horns of a particularly unpleasant dilemma. On the one hand, it was incumbent upon his administration to win the war with Mexico. On the other, as an ardent Democrat he could not make political candidates of his successful generals, the most popular of whom were Whigs.

At the beginning of the war he pointedly sidelined Winfield Scott, his most able commander, because of Scott's demonstrated political ambition. When Taylor, successful on the Rio Grande and at Monterrey, became the greater threat to Democratic hegemony, Polk stripped him of his best regiments to give to Scott. Even then, however, he greatly circumscribed Scott's authority, and, despite his brilliant string of successes in the campaign against Mexico City, Polk had Scott removed from command and returned to the States to face an absurd set of charges, on all of which he was found not guilty, in order to deflate his status as a popular hero.

Polk not only hamstrung both Scott and Taylor, but commissioned and sought to promote officers of his own party, directly from civilian life, despite an appalling lack of training, experience, and, in many cases, good sense among those who he appointed to field and general grades. In the most flagrant of his attempts to recast the army as a tool of his political dynasty, Polk sought, unsuccessfully, to have Senator Thomas Hart Benton commissioned as a lieutenant general to supersede all of his regular officers. Among the few of Polk's political appointees who played a credible role was Major Gen. John A. Quitman. Others, such as James Shields and future president Franklin Pierce, were merely competent. Gideon Pillow had no qualification for high command other than having been President Polk's law partner, and was arguably the worst general officer in the history of the United States Army. Perhaps the best of Polk's biographies is that by Paul H. Bergeron, *The Presidency of James K. Polk* (1987). Among the better biographies of subordinate US generals in Mexico are Edward S. Wallace, *General William Jenkins Worth* (1953) and Robert May, *John A. Quitman* (1985).

Although not so nearly voluminous as those of the Civil War, primary source accounts of the Mexican War are numerous, and the list is steadily growing. Among the most useful of the many autobiographies of those in high command is that of Scott (1864) himself, although, as Robert E. Lee commented, the general "of course stands out very prominently & does not hide his light under a bushel." Other officers of the regular army whose published memoirs, letters, and diaries

have significant Mexican War material include those of William S. Henry (1847), Robert Anderson (1911), Philip Norbourne Barbour (Doubleday 1936), P. G. T. Beauregard (Williams 1956), Samuel Ryan Curtis (Chance 1994), Napoleon Jackson Tecumseh Dana (Ferrell 1990), Abner Doubleday (Chance 1998), Samuel Gibbs French (1999), Daniel Harvey Hill (Hughes and Johnson 2002), Erasmus D. Keyes (1884), Ralph W. Kirkham (Miller 1991), George B. McClellan (Cutrer 2009), Dabney Herndon Maury (1894), George Gordon Meade (1913), E. Kirby Smith (Blackwood 1917), Ethan Allen Hitchcock (Croffut 1909), Lucien Webster (Baker 2000), Theodore Laidley (McCaffrey 1997), and, remarkably, a naval officer who marched with Scott, Raphael Semmes (1852), left a detailed if biased account of the Mexico City campaign.

Volunteer officers are represented in print by John A. Quitman (Clairborne 1860), Franklin Smith (Chance 1991), William Barton Roberts (Anson 1956), John R. Kenly (1873), Rankin Dilworth (Clayton and Chance 1996), and Sydenham Moore (Butler 1998). Samuel E. Chamberlin (1996), and Frederick Zeh (Orr and Miller 1995) are among the enlisted men of the regular army who left first hand accounts of the war, and primary accounts by volunteer soldiers include those of George C. Furber (1848), J. J. Archer (1959), William Augustine (McCaffrey 1995), Stephen F. Nunnalee (1957), Richard Smith Elliott (Gardner and Simmons 1997), Chauncey Forward Sargent (1990), Benjamin F. Scribner (1847, 1975), S. Compton Smith (1857), George Ballentine, (1853), and Thomas D. Little (Livingston-Little 1970).

The diary and correspondence of James K. Polk is also informative and useful, although warped by Polk's character flaws (Polk 1910, 1969). In the words of historian Bernard DeVoto, "Polk's mind was rigid, narrow, obstinate, far from first rate.... He was pompous, suspicious, and secretive; he had no humor; he could be vindictive; and he saw spooks and villains.... But if his mind was narrow it was also powerful and he had guts" (DeVoto 1943: 7). Useful anthologies of first hand accounts have been collected in *Chronicles of the Gringos* (Smith and Smith 1968) and in *To Mexico with Taylor and Scott* (McWhiney and McWhiney 1969).

Far fewer accounts from the Mexican side are available in English, but the best group of those that have been translated and published are in Cecil Robinson's collection, *The View from Chapultepec* (1989). For biographical data on the Mexican officer corps, we have the elderly but still useful Fayette Robinson, *Mexico and Her Military Chieftains* (1847, 1970).

The great number of foreign-born enlisted men in the ranks led to an inevitable tension between the native born and the immigrant soldier, especially in the case of the Irish, who were generally discriminated against due, in large part, to their Catholic faith. Perceiving themselves to be despised in the land that they served, the army's Irish enlisted men were especially susceptible to the blandishments of Mexican recruiters who sought to persuade them to defect to the Mexican army in exchange for generous cash and land bounties. More than 200 Irish-born soldiers did, indeed, desert their colors to fight in defense of a Catholic nation, a not unreasonable reaction as their native Ireland was plagued by persistent and repres-



sive anti-Catholic laws. These men were organized in the Saint Patrick Battalion or *San Patricios*, the finest artillery unit of the Mexican army. Their service was especially gallant at Churubusco and Molino del Rey where many of them were captured, standing to their guns when the Mexican units on both of their flanks broke and fled. The dilemma of these Irish soldiers led to what is perhaps the most tragic incident of the war, when, after a court martial, seventy were sentenced to death for desertion. Although Scott stayed the executions of 20 of those men, 50 were hanged on September 12, 1847, the day of the storming of Chapultepec. Ironically, the signal for their execution was the raising of the Stars and Stripes over the Mexican citadel (Miller 1989).

Santa Anna sowed the seeds of evil with his cold-blooded assassination of prisoners at the Alamo and Goliad and with the notorious “black bean incident,” in which the prisoners of the Mier expedition were decimated by Mexican firing squads after the victims were chosen by a gruesome lottery. This savagery was reaped in a bitter harvest of reprisals, against both soldiers and innocent noncombatants in Mexico, especially by the men of the mounted volunteer regiments. The officers of the regular army, especially young West Pointers, were outraged by such atrocities with Lieutenant George B. McClellan noting that the Mexican people “are very polite to the Regulars (Soldados especiales de la leina) but they hate the Volunteers as they do Old Scratch himself” (Cutrer 2009, 38).

This situation was exacerbated as Scott moved deeper into Mexico, giving opportunity for mounted partisans, known as *rancheros*, to employ irregular tactics against his attenuated line of communication to Vera Cruz, ambushing couriers and supply trains and seldom taking prisoners. To these irregular tactics, Scott responded by requisitioning the services of Colonel John Coffee Hays’s regiment of Texas Mounted Rifles who repaid atrocity with atrocity and earned an unenviable reputation for assassinating Mexican civilians on only the slightest of pretexts. Samuel Reid, a New Orleans attorney who rode as a private in Ben McCulloch’s company of Texas Rangers, cynically observed:

Our orders were most strict not to molest any unarmed Mexican, and if some of the most notorious of these villains were found shot, or hung up in the chaparral ... the government was charitably bound to suppose, that during some fit of remorse and desperation, tortured by conscience for the many evil deeds they had committed, they had recklessly laid *violent hands upon their own lives!* “Quien sabe?” (Reid 1847: 53)

Accounts of atrocities and irregular warfare are found in Paul Foos, *A Short, Offhand, Killing Affair* (2002) and in Irving W. Levinson, *Wars within War* (2005).

Such atrocities as these impelled Scott to publish the United States Army’s first general orders on martial law issued outside the country, without which, he later wrote, he “could not have maintained the discipline and honor of the army, or have reached the capital of Mexico.” Distributed in both English and Spanish, the order specified that “all offenders, Americans and Mexicans, were alike punished

– with death for murder and rape, and for other crimes proportionally.” These orders did not interfere with Mexican civil or criminal law or with the courts of the country but, in Scott’s words, “conciliated Mexicans; intimidated the vicious of the several races, and being executed with impartial rigor, gave the highest moral deportment and discipline ever known in an invading army” (Scott 1864: 395–6).

The US–Mexican War was the first in world history to be observed by war correspondents, with George Wilkins Kendall, editor of the New Orleans *Picayune*, serving as a private in Ben McCulloch’s “spy company” in order to better report on the action. His reportage from the front has been collected as *Dispatches from the Mexican War* (Kendall 1999). This war, too, saw the advent of the camera following the armies. Photographs from the front have been collected in Martha A. Sandweiss, Rick Stewart, and Ben W. Huseman, *Eyewitness to War* (1989). The war also coincided with the golden age of the lithograph. Many of the war’s hundreds of illustrations for the popular press have been collected in Ronnie C. Tyler, *The Mexican War: A Lithographic Record* (1973).

Although Justin H. Smith’s *The War with Mexico* (1919) remains the most complete overall history of the war, K. Jack Bauer’s (1974) one-volume history has to some degree brought Smith up to date and is the most readable of the several more recent overviews, for example, John S. D. Eisenhower’s popular *So Far From God: The U.S. War With Mexico* (1989). Certainly the best work on the Mexican War and American culture is Robert W. Johansen’s *To the Halls of the Montezumas* (1985). Donald S. Frazier’s *The United States and Mexico at War* (1998), an excellent encyclopedia, provides information on a wide range of subjects linked to the conflict. The standard bibliography of the Mexican War (Tutorow 1981), is now dated and badly in need of revision.

#### BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Anderson, Fred, and Andrew R. L. Cayton (2005). *The Dominion of War: Empire and Liberty in North America, 1500–2000*. New York: Viking.
- Anderson, Robert (1911). *An Artillery Officer in the Mexican War, 1846–47: Letters of Robert Anderson, Captain, Third Artillery, U.S.A.* New York: G. P. Putnam.
- Anson, Bert, ed. (1956). “Colonel William Barton Roberts in the Mexico City Campaign – 1847,” *Western Pennsylvania Historical Magazine*, 39:4 (Winter), 243–63.
- Archer, J. J. (1959). “A Marylander in the Mexican War; Some Letters of J. J. Archer,” ed. by C. A. Porter Hopkins. *Maryland Historical Magazine*, 54:4 (December), 408–22.
- Baker, Van R., ed. (2000). *Websters: Letters of an American Army Family in Peace and War, 1836–1853*. Kent, OH: Kent State University Press.
- Ballentine, George (1853). *Autobiography of an English Soldier in the United States Army*. New York: Stringer and Townsend.
- Barker, Eugene C., ed. (1924, 1927, 1928). *The Austin Papers*, 3 vols. Vols. 1–2: Washington, DC: Government Printing Office; Vol. 3: Austin: University of Texas Press.
- Barker, Eugene C., and Amelia W. Williams, eds. (1938–43). *The Writings of Sam Houston, 1828–1858*, 8 vols. Austin: University of Texas Press.

- Barr, Alwyn (1990). *Texans in Revolt: The Battle for San Antonio, 1835*. Austin: University of Texas Press.
- Bauer, K. Jack (1969). *Surfboats and Horse Marines: U.S. Naval Operations in the Mexican War, 1846–48*. Annapolis MD: United States Naval Institute.
- Bauer, K. Jack (1974) *The Mexican War, 1846–1848*. New York: Macmillian.
- Bauer, K. Jack (1985) *Zachary Taylor: Soldier, Planter, Statesman, of the Old Southwest*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.
- Bergeron, Paul H. (1987). *The Presidency of James K. Polk*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
- Bixby, William K., ed. (1908). *Letters of Zachary Taylor from the Battle-Fields of the Mexican War*. Rochester, NY: Genesee Press.
- Blackwood, E. J., ed. (1917). *To Mexico with Scott: Letters of Captain E. Kirby Smith to his Wife*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Brooks, N. C. (1849). *A Complete History of the Mexican War: Its Causes, Conduct, and Consequence: Comprising an Account of the Various Military and Naval Operations from its Commencement to the Treaty of Peace*. Philadelphia: Grigg, Elliot and Co. and Baltimore: Hutchinson and Seebold.
- Butler, Steven R., ed. (1998). *The Eutaw Rangers in the War with Mexico: The Mexican War Journal and Letters of Capt. Sydenham Moore and the Mexican War Journal of Pvt. Stephen F. Nunnalee, Company D, First Regiment of Alabama Volunteers*. Richardson, TX: Descendants of Mexican War Veterans.
- Campbell, Randolph B. (1993) *Sam Houston and the American Southwest*. New York: Addison-Wesley.
- Cantrell, Gregg (1999). *Stephen F. Austin: Empresario of Texas*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Castañeda, Carlos E., ed. (1956) *The Mexican Side of the Texas Revolution*. Dallas, TX: P. L. Turner.
- Chaffin, Tom (2002). *Pathfinder: John Charles Frémont and the Course of American Empire*. New York: Hill and Wang.
- Chamberlin, Samuel E. (1996). *My Confession: Recollections of a Rogue*, ed. William H. Goetzmann. Austin: Texas State Historical Association.
- Chance, Joseph E., ed. (1991). *The Mexican War Journal of Captain Franklin Smith*. Jackson: University Press of Mississippi.
- Chance, Joseph E., ed. (1994). *Mexico Under Fire: Being the Diary of Samuel Ryan Curtis, 3rd Ohio Volunteer Regiment During the American Military Occupation of Northern Mexico, 1846–1847*. Fort Worth: Texas Christian University Press.
- Chance, Joseph E., ed. (1998). *My Life in the Old Army: The Reminiscences of Abner Doubleday*. Fort Worth: Texas Christian University Press.
- Clairborne, John Francis Hamtramck, ed. (1860). *Life and Correspondence of John A. Quitman, Major-General, U.S.A., and Governor of the State of Mississippi*, 2 vols. New York: Harper & Brothers.
- Clarke, Dwight L. (1961). *Stephen Watts Kearny: Soldier of the West*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Clayton, Lawrence R., and Joseph E. Chance, eds. (1996). *The March to Monterrey: The Diary of Lt. Rankin Dilworth*. El Paso: Texas Western Press.
- Coleman, Robert M. (1964). *Houston Displayed, or, Who Won the Battle of San Jacinto?* ed. with an intro. by John H. Jenkins. Austin, TX: Brick Row Book Shop [1st published 1837].

- Conner, Philip S. (1896). *The Home Squadron under Commodore Conner in the War with Mexico*. Philadelphia: Privately printed.
- Crawford, Ann Fears, ed. (1967). *The Eagle: The Autobiography of Santa Anna*. Austin: Pemberton Press.
- Croffut, William Augustus, ed. (1909). *Fifty Years in Camp and Field: Diary of Major-General Ethan Allen Hitchcock, U.S.A.* New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons.
- Cushing, S. W. (1985). *Adventures in the Texas Navy and the Battle of San Jacinto*. Austin: W. M. Morrison.
- Cutrer, Thomas W., ed. (2009). *The Mexican War Diary and Correspondence of George B. McClellan*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.
- Davis, William C. (1998). *Three Roads to the Alamo: The Lives and Fortunes of David Crockett, James Bowie, and William Barret Travis*. New York: HarperCollins.
- Dawson, Joseph G., III. (1999) *Doniphan's Epic March: The First Missouri Volunteers in the Mexican War*. Topeka: University of Kansas Press.
- Day, Donald, and Harry Herbert Ullom, eds. (1954). *The Autobiography of Sam Houston*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
- De la Teja, Jesús, ed. (1991). *A Revolution Remembered: The Memoirs and Selected Correspondence of Juan N. Seguín*. Austin, TX: State House Press.
- Delgado, Pedro (1919). *Mexican Account of the Battle of San Jacinto*. Deer Park, TX: W. C. Day, 41–53 [1st published in *The Texas Almanac*. Galveston, TX: Richardson Co, 1870].
- DePalo, William A., Jr. (1997). *The Mexican National Army, 1822–1852*. College Station: Texas A&M University Press.
- De Voto, Bernard (1943). *The Year of Decision: 1846*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
- Doubleday, Rhoda van Bibber Tanner, ed. (1936). *Journals of the Late Brevet Major Philip Norbourne Barbour, Captain in the Third Regiment, U.S. Infantry, and His Wife, Martha Isabella Hopkins Barbour, Written during the War with Mexico – 1846*. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons.
- Downey, Joseph T. (1958) *The Cruise of the Portsmouth, 1845–47: A Sailor's View of the Naval Conquest of California*. ed. Howard R. Lamar. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Eisenhower, John S. D. (1989). *So Far From God: The U.S. War with Mexico*. New York: Random House.
- Emory, William H. (1951). *Notes of a Military Reconnaissance, from Fort Leavenworth, in Missouri, to San Diego, in California. 1848*. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press.
- Ferrell, Robert H., ed. (1990). *"Monterrey Is Ours!": The Mexican War Letters of Lieutenant Dana, 1845–1847*. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky.
- Fleek, Sherman L. (2006). *History May Be Searched In Vain: A Military History of the Mormon Battalion*. Spokane, WA: Arthur H. Clark.
- Foos, Paul (2002). *"A Short, Offhand, Killing Affair": Soldiers and Social Conflict during the Mexican–American War*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Frazier, Donald S., ed. (1998). *The United States and Mexico at War: Nineteenth-Century Expansionism and Conflict*. New York: Macmillan.
- French, Samuel Gibbs (1999). *Two Wars: An Autobiography of Gen. Samuel G. French*. Huntington, WV: Blue Acorn Press.
- Furber, George C. (1848). *Twelve Months Volunteer; or Journal of a Private in the Campaign in Mexico*. Cincinnati: J. A. & U. P. James.
- Gardner, Mark L., and Marc Simmons, eds. (1997). *The Mexican War Correspondence of Richard Smith Elliott*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.

- Grant, Ulysses S. (1885). *Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant*, 2 vols. New York: Charles L. Webster & Co.
- Green, Thomas Jefferson (1845). *Journal of the Texian Expedition against Mier*. New York: Harper and Bros.
- Gulick, Charles Adams, ed. (1921–8) *The Papers of Mirabeau Buonaparte Lamar*, 6 vols. Austin, TX: A. C. Baldwin & Sons.
- Hamilton, Charles S. (1930). "Memoirs of the Mexican War," *Wisconsin Magazine of History*, 14, 63–92.
- Hardin, Stephen L. (1994). *Texian Iliad: A Military History of the Texas Revolution*. Austin: University of Texas Press.
- Harlow, Neal (1982). *California Conquered: War and Peace on the Pacific, 1846–1850*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Haynes, Sam W. (1991). *Soldiers of Misfortune: The Somerville and Mier Expeditions*. Austin: University of Texas Press.
- Henry, William S. (1847). *Campaign Sketches of the War with Mexico*. New York: Harper & Brothers.
- Hill, Jim Dan. (1937). *The Texas Navy in Forgotten Battles and Shirtsleeve Diplomacy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Hudson, Leone M., ed. (2001). *Company "A" Corps of Engineers, U.S.A., in the Mexican War, by Gustavus Woodson Smith*. Kent, OH: Kent State University Press.
- Hughes, John Taylor (1997). *Doniphan's Expedition*, with an intro. by Joseph G. Dawson III. College Station: Texas A&M University Press.
- Hughes, Nathaniel Cheairs, and Timothy D. Johnson, eds. (2002). *"A Fighter from Way Back": The Mexican War Diary of Lt. Daniel Harvey Hill, 4th Artillery, USA*. Kent, OH: Kent State University Press.
- Jay, William (1849). *A Review of the Causes and Consequences of the Mexican War*. Boston: Benjamin B. Mussey and Co.
- Jenkins, John Holmes, III, ed. (1973). *The Papers of the Texas Revolution, 1835–1836*. Austin: Presidential Press.
- Johansen, Robert W. (1985). *To the Halls of the Montezumas: The Mexican War in the American Imagination*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Johnson, Timothy D. (1999). *Winfield Scott: The Quest for Military Glory*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
- Johnson, Timothy D. (2007). *A Gallant Little Army: The Mexico City Campaign*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
- Jordan, Jonathan W. (2006) *Lone Star Navy: Texas, the Fight for the Gulf of Mexico, and the Shaping of the American West*. Dulles, VA: Potomac Books.
- Kendall, George Wilkins (1844). *Narrative of the Texan Santa Fe Expedition*. New York: Harper and Bros.
- Kendall, George Wilkins (1999). *Dispatches from the Mexican War*, ed. Lawrence Delbert Cress. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Kenly, John R. (1873). *Memoirs of a Maryland Volunteer: War with Mexico in the Years 1846–7–8*. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co.
- Keyes, Erasmus D. (1884). *Fifty Years Observation of Men and Events, Civil and Military*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons.
- Kilgore, Dan. (1978). *How Did Davy Die?* College Station: Texas A&M University Press.
- Lack, Paul D. (1992). *The Texas Revolutionary Experience: A Political and Social History, 1835–1836*. College Station: Texas A&M University Press.



- Langley, Harold (1985). "Robert F. Stockton: A Naval Officer and Reformer," in James C. Bradford, ed., *Command under Sail: Makers of the American Naval Tradition, 1775–1850*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 273–304.
- Levinson, Irving W. (2005). *Wars within War: Mexican Guerrillas, Domestic Elites, and the United States of America, 1846–1848*. Fort Worth: Texas Christian University Press.
- Levinson, Irving W. (2009). "A New Paradigm for an Old Conflict: The Mexican–United States War," *The Journal of Military History*, 73:2 (April), 393–416.
- Lincoln, Abraham (1894). *The Complete Works of Abraham Lincoln*, 12 vols., eds. John G. Nicolay and John Hay. Harrogate, TN: Lincoln Memorial University.
- Livingston-Little, D. E., ed. (1970). *The Mexican War Diary of Thomas D. Little*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Long, Jeff (1990). *Duel of Eagles: The Mexican and U.S. Fight for the Alamo*. New York: William Morrow.
- Lord, Walter (1961) *A Time to Stand: The Epic of the Alamo Seen as a Great National Experience*. New York: Harper and Row.
- Love, Thomas Neely, and H. Grady Howell (1995). *A Southern Lacrimosa: The Mexican War Journal of Thomas Neely Love, Surgeon, Second Regiment Mississippi Volunteer Infantry, U.S.A.* Madison, MS: Chickasaw Bayou Press.
- Matovina, Timothy M., ed. (1995) *The Alamo Remembered: Tejano Accounts and Perspectives*. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press.
- Maury, Dabney Herndon (1894). *Recollections of a Virginian in the Mexican, Indian, and Civil Wars*. New York: C. Scribner's Sons.
- May, Robert E. (1985). *John A. Quitman: Old South Crusader*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.
- McCaffrey, James M. (1992). *Army of Manifest Destiny: The American Soldier in the Mexican War, 1846–1848*. New York: New York University Press.
- McCaffrey, James M., ed. (1995). "America's First D-Day: The Vera Cruz Landing of 1847," *Military History of the West*, 25:1 (Spring), 51–68.
- McCaffrey, James M., ed. (1997). "Surrounded by Dangers of All Kinds": *The Mexican War Letters of Lieutenant Theodore Laidley*. Denton: University of North Texas Press.
- McCutchan, Joseph D. (1978). *Mier Expedition Diary: A Texan Prisoner's Account*, ed. J. Milton Nance. Austin: University of Texas Press.
- McWhiney, Grady, and Sue McWhiney, eds. (1969). *To Mexico with Taylor and Scott, 1845–1847*. Waltham, MA: Blaisdell.
- Meade, George Gordon (1913). *The Life and Letters of George Gordon Meade, Major-General United States Army*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons.
- Miller, Robert Ryal (1989). *Shamrock and Sword: The Saint Patrick's Battalion in the U.S.–Mexican War*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Miller, Robert Ryal, ed. (1991) *The Mexican War Journal and Letters of Ralph W. Kirkham*. College Station: Texas A&M University Press.
- Morison, Samuel Eliot (1967). "Old Bruin": *Commodore Matthew C. Perry, 1794–1858*. Boston: Little, Brown.
- Myers, John Myers (1948). *The Alamo*. New York: E. P. Dutton.
- Nance, J. Milton (1963). *After San Jacinto: The Texas–Mexican Frontier, 1836–1841*. Austin: University of Texas Press.
- Nance, J. Milton (1964). *Attack and Counterattack: The Texas–Mexican Frontier, 1842*. Austin: University of Texas Press.
- Navarro, José Antonio (1995). *Defending Mexican Valor in Texas*, eds. David R. McDonald and Timothy M. Matovina. Austin, TX: State House Press.



- Newell, Chester (1838). *History of the Revolution in Texas; Particularly of the War of 1835 & '36*. New York: Wiley and Putnam.
- Nunnalee, Stephen F. (1957). "Letter to Dr. W. S. Wyman from S. F. Nunnalee," *Alabama Historical Quarterly*, 19:4 (Fall), 415–34.
- Ohr, Wallace (1997). *Defiant Peacemaker: Nicholas Trist in the Mexican War*. College Station: Texas A&M University Press.
- Orr, William J., and Robert Ryal Miller, eds. (1995). *An Immigrant Soldier in the Mexican War*, by Frederick Zeh, trans. by William J. Orr. College Station: Texas A&M University Press.
- Owen, Clark H. (1908). *The Justice of the Mexican War: A Review of the Causes and Results of the War, with a View to Distinguishing Evidence from Opinion and Inference*. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons.
- Peña, José Enrique de la (1975). *With Santa Anna in Texas: A Personal Narrative of the Revolution* trans. and ed. by Carmen Perry; intro. by Llerena Friend. College Station: Texas A&M University Press.
- Peskin, William (2003). *Winfield Scott and the Profession of Arms*. Kent, OH: Kent State University Press.
- Polk, James K. (1910). *The Diary of James K. Polk during His Presidency, 1845 to 1849*, ed. Milo M. Quaife, 4 vols. Chicago: A. C. McClurg and Co.
- Polk, James K. (1969– ). *Correspondence of James K. Polk*, 10 vols. to date, ed. by Herbert Weaver, Wayne Cutler, et al. Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University Press.
- Reid, Samuel C., Jr. (1847). *Scouting Expedition of McCulloch's Texas Rangers...* Philadelphia: G. B. Zieber and Co. [reprinted Cranbury, NJ: Scholar's Bookshelf, 2005].
- Ricketts, Norma Baldwin (1997). *The Mormon Battalion: U.S. Army of the West*. Logan: Utah State University Press.
- Robinson, Cecil, trans. and ed. (1989). *The View from Chapultepec: Mexican Writers on the Mexican–American War*. Tucson: University of Arizona Press.
- Robinson, Fayette (1847). *Mexico and Her Military Chieftains*. Philadelphia: E. H. Butler & Co. [reprinted Glorietta, NM: Rio Grande Press, 1970].
- Robinson, Jacob S. (1932). *A Journal of the Santa Fe Expedition under Colonel Doniphan*, with an intro. by Carl L. Cannon. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Roell, Craig H. (1994). *Remember Goliad!* Austin: Texas State Historical Association.
- Sandweiss, Martha A., Rick Stewart, and Ben W. Huseman (1989). *Eyewitness to War: Prints and Daguerreotypes of the Mexican War, 1846–1848*. Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press.
- Santa Anna, Antonio López de, and Ann Fears Crawford (1988). *The Eagle: The Autobiography of Santa Anna*. Austin, TX: State House Press.
- Santoni, Pedro (1997). *Mexicans at Arms: Puro Federalists and the Politics of War, 1845–1848*. Fort Worth: Texas Christian University Press.
- Santos, Richard G. (1968). *Santa Anna's Campaign against Texas, 1835–1836, Featuring the Field Commands Issued to Major General Vicente Filisola*. Salisbury, NC: Documentary Publications.
- Sargent, Chauncey Forward (1990). "Gathering Laurels in Mexico": *The Diary of an American Soldier in Mexican American War*, ed. by Ann Brown Janes. Lincoln, MA: Cottage Press.
- Scheina, Robert L. (2002) *Santa Anna: A Curse upon Mexico*. Washington, DC: Brassey's.
- Schroeder, John H. (1973) *Mr. Polk's War: American Opposition and Dissent, 1846–1848*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

- Scott, Winfield (1864). *Memoirs of Lieut.-General Winfield Scott, LL.D.* New York: Sheldon and Company.
- Scribner, Benjamin F. (1847). *A Campaign in Mexico, or a Glimpse of Life in Camp*. Philadelphia: Grigg, Elliot & Co. [reprinted Austin: Jenkins Publishing Co., 1975].
- Semmes, Raphael (1852). *General Scott's Campaign in the Valley of Mexico*. Cincinnati: Moore and Anderson.
- Sibley, Marilyn, ed. (1978). *Samuel H. Walker's Account of the Mier Expedition*. Austin: Texas State Historical Association.
- Smith, Gene A. (2000). *Thomas ap Catesby Jones: Commodore of Manifest Destiny*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Smith, George Winston, and Charles Smith, eds. (1968). *Chronicles of the Gringos: The U.S. Army in the Mexican War, 1846–1848, Accounts of Eyewitnesses and Combatants*. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press.
- Smith, Justin H. (1919). *The War with Mexico*, 2 vols. New York: Macmillan.
- Smith, Richard Penn. (1836). *Col. Crockett's Exploits and Adventures in Texas*. Philadelphia: T. K. and P. G. Collins [reprinted as Smith, Richard Penn (2003). "On to the Alamo": *Col. Crockett's Exploits and Adventures in Texas*, ed. with an intro. by John Seelye. New York: Penguin Classics].
- Smith, S. Compton (1857). *Chile con Carne; or the Camp and Field*. New York: Miller and Curtis.
- Stapp, William Preston. (1977 [1845]). *The Prisoners of Perote: A Firsthand Account of the Mier Expedition*. Austin: University of Texas Press.
- Stevens, Hazard (1900). *The Life of Isaac Ingalls Stevens by his Son*, 2 vols. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
- Tinkle, Lon. (1958). *13 Days to Glory: The Siege of the Alamo*. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Tolbert, Frank X. (1959). *Day of San Jacinto*. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Tyler, Ronnie C. (1973). *The Mexican War: A Lithographic Record*. Austin: Texas State Historical Association.
- Tutorow, Norman E., comp. and ed. (1981). *The Mexican–American War: An Annotated Bibliography*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
- Wallace, Edward S. (1953). *General William Jenkins Worth: Monterrey's Forgotten Hero*. Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press.
- Wells, Tom H. (1960). *Commodore Moore and the Texas Navy*. Austin: University of Texas Press.
- Williams, T. Harry, ed. (1956). *With Beauregard in Mexico: The Mexican War Reminiscences of P. G. T. Beauregard*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.
- Winders, Richard Bruce (1997). *Mr. Polk's Army: The American Military Experience in the Mexican War*. College Station: Texas A&M University Press.
- Woolsey, Wallace, trans. and ed. (1985). *Memoir for the History of the War in Texas*, 2 vols. by Vincente Filisola. Austin, TX: Eakin Press.

## Chapter Six

# THE CIVIL WAR, 1861–5

*Brian Holden Reid*

Dwight Macdonald once remarked that there were three types of American literature: fiction, non-fiction, and Civil War. The stream of literature on the Civil War, scholarly, popular, and imaginative, has become a torrent and is unabated. The interest in E. L. Doctorow's novel, *The March* (2005) is indicative of the hold of the Civil War over the American imagination. On average some 150 new Civil War books are added each year to the tally. In 2002 Civil War books were estimated to number over 60,000 with a further 6,000 books on Abraham Lincoln. Thus one book has appeared every day since Lee's surrender at Appomattox. The numerous different names given to the war impart a sense of the continuing controversy that sparked the greatest conflict of the nineteenth century between the Napoleonic Wars and the outbreak of the First World War in 1914. A random list might include "The War of the Great Rebellion" – indeed, "The War of the Rebellion" is the official title of the *Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies*. The War has also been styled the "War for Southern Independence," the "War Between the States," the "War of Northern Aggression," and latterly as a counter-weight to the pro-Confederate bias of these last three, the "War of Southern Aggression." James M. McPherson has also suggested that it be regarded as the "Second American Revolution."

The Civil War was a conflict of great scale, involving 8,700 battles and skirmishes squeezed into just four years, with 620,000 lives lost and immense destruction. In 1860 the slave states contained 30 percent of total American wealth but recovery from wartime destruction and failure to keep pace with the economic expansion experienced in the North, spurred in part by war, meant that by 1870 this figure had recovered to only 12 percent. Given such a level of death and destruction, it has also been a controversial event and has provoked verdicts on its significance, and whether it needed to have been fought in the first place. The war's moral significance lies at the heart of such discussions as to whether it formed a tragic or noble struggle. Frantic debates have occurred over the war's causes, the issues over which it was fought, and discussion of the war aims on both sides have carried over into discussions of the way that the war was fought. Today's students of the war

do not need a detailed knowledge of the early histories of the war but they should be aware of the ideas that were bequeathed by these historians.

By the beginning of the twentieth century, a markedly pro-Southern bias can be discerned in the literature, one influenced by a school of writers that identified with the notion of a Lost Cause. Many of these were professional writers, novelists, and screen writers in Hollywood, but it is important to emphasize that the historical profession was dominated by an all-embracing Southern bias until the 1960s. As James McPherson observes, "history and popular culture on this occasion marched hand in hand" (McPherson 2007: 7). Most of these writers were dedicated to a rather sentimental conception of a gallant Confederacy doomed to eventual destruction at the hands of an irresistibly powerful North that could muster infinitely greater manpower and material resources. Southerners consoled themselves in defeat that they had won a kind of moral victory as they had shown greater flair and dash on the battlefield. Confederate generalship, moreover, had been superior and its leaders had exhibited greater moral grandeur. The symbolic importance of General Robert E. Lee was especially important in sustaining all three of these propositions. No less a person than Theodore Roosevelt, no mean historian himself, proclaimed that Lee's achievements were a "matter of pride to all our countrymen" (Connelly 1977: 99).

The Lost Cause gained a certain kind of appeal because it was *lost*. This view is sustained by the perennial attraction of Margaret Mitchell's novel, *Gone With the Wind* (1936). A sentimental portrait of the gallant underdog, almost succeeding but going down to defeat, is infinitely more appealing than the alternative picture of the precursors of corporate America, shabby and probably corrupt, putting into operation the cold, machine-like efficiency of the northern war effort. Its leaders were smug and uninspired, allowing their vast superiority in numbers and resources to steam-roller the South into submission. The South's moral victory despite its defeat was increasingly acknowledged by the 1890s, as "reconciliation" between North and South gathered pace. The success of this process depended on the acceptance of a moral equivalence between the sections and the causes they fought for. This equivalence, in turn, could only convince if slavery was written out of Confederate war aims, and the contribution of blacks to the northern victory was excised from histories of the Union war effort.

Views on the nature of the war tended to shape opinions on its moral character, and the validity of the causes upheld by force of arms. By the 1890s the view that the South had fought, not for slavery, but for independence based on states rights, that is, constitutional liberty and the consent of the governed, became the main message of the Lost Cause. The United Confederate Veterans took up an additional cause, namely to ensure that a "fair and impartial" account of Southern aims and conduct made its way into school textbooks. They appointed textbook commissioners to remove any repugnant references, that is, censor all such books, and northern publishers were happy to meet their demands.

This process, set well in train by the first decade of the twentieth century, could only have influenced professional historians if the North accepted these southern tenets. A persistent tradition during the war itself, especially among northern

“dough faces,” – supporters of slavery – such as former presidents Franklin Pierce and James Buchanan, was that the conflict was “needless,” the product of fanaticism stirred up by a reckless and violent group of “abolitionists.” In short, the war could only be the North’s fault. During the 1920s a group of historians called the “revisionists” developed anew this clutch of ideas. They were disillusioned by the experience of American intervention in the First World War after 1917, and believed that the Civil War had been “needless,” – an avoidable tragedy that had been precipitated by blundering fanatics, mainly radical Republicans and abolitionists on the northern side, who after 1862 injected their extreme and brutal opinions into the conduct of the war. A compromise could and should have been found to avoid the outbreak of war in April 1861 as good will existed on both sides. Disagreements between North and South were not divisive, but they were taken up and exploited by anti-slavery fanatics, and agreement was rendered impossible. Here was a reading back into the 1850s and 1860s of disquiet about “hysteria” that had led the United States to declare war against Germany in 1917 when none of its vital interests were at stake. Revisionists judged slavery an issue not worth fighting over, and certainly southern whites were more often the victims of abolitionist attacks than vice versa.

It followed, therefore, that the South, but the North especially, fought for no grand or uplifting cause. The military occupation of the South that followed could only be explained by mercenary or hypocritical motives. Revisionists’ view of Reconstruction was summed up in the title of Claude Bower’s widely read book, *The Tragic Era* (1929). Revisionists expressed, too, the most pessimistic views on the utility of war. Warmongering, they claimed was never justified. The most distinguished revisionist, James G. Randall, argued that “Peace was normal and a basic demand”; war, he thought, “artificial, irrational and abnormal” (quoted in Tulloch 1999: 128). The most persuasive southern revisionist, Avery O. Craven, judged that “Those who force the settlement of human problems by war can expect only an unsympathetic hearing from the future” (Tulloch 1999: 129). Revisionists were convinced that the political and social status quo was infinitely better than changes promoted by the ravages of war. Such views have left a lingering legacy that continues to influence the writing of Civil War history.

Three points emerge from this preliminary discussion. First, the historiography of the conduct of any war, but especially the Civil War, is influenced in important ways by the attitudes that prevail concerning its origins and outbreak. As Brian Holden Reid argues in *The Origins of the American Civil War* (1996), there is no bulkhead that separates them from the way the course of the war develops. The historiography of the causes of a war shapes and defines the issues later explored by military historians. Second, as Hugh Tulloch has suggested in *The Debate on the American Civil War Era* (1999), “historiography, far from being otiose and irrelevant, is highly pertinent and central to our sense of how we interpret the world around us” (5). Third, historical myths create their own reality, they are not necessarily untruths, and their grip can be tenacious, especially the Lost Cause. As David Potter warned almost half a century ago, “myth has grown like ivy over the brick and mortar of the Southern historical experience; sentimentality and

eneration had inhibited realism" (quoted in Tulloch 1999: 375–6). There are few signs that such myths have succumbed to weed killer; indeed the influence of neo-Confederate sympathy, seems to have become more, not less, pervasive.

Military history is not just an extension of political and social history; it has a series of problems and issues of its own. By 1939, despite the outpouring of war memoirs and detailed coverage in multi-volume histories of the United States, historians were more interested in explaining the war's causes than assessing its conduct. In the 1930s and 1940s Douglas Southall Freeman dominated the field with his four volumes on Robert E. Lee (1934–5) and three on the Army of Northern Virginia (1942–4). The revision of this undue preoccupation with the Confederacy, and especially the Virginia theatre, would be the main scholarly objective of the two generations of historians that followed. The coverage of the Civil War in this chapter focuses on command and generalship; civil–military relations and the influence of wartime politics; the relative place of battle and manoeuvre; and whether the Civil War can be deemed "total"; the increasing importance attached to the experience of men in the front line; and finally, the "legacy" of the war will also be covered, as this issue brings out the strong relationship expressed in the literature between 1861–5 and the World Wars of the twentieth century.

The first point of reference in any historical inquiry is a reliable bibliography. The Civil War is well served in this respect. *The American Civil War: A Handbook of Literature and Research* edited by Steven E. Woodworth (1996) is a most comprehensive guide, covering general surveys, reference works (including further bibliographies) as well as specialized political and military studies. It also has chapters dealing with imaginative literature, films, television, music, and commemoration. Also helpful are entries in Peter J. Parish, ed., *The Reader's Guide to American History* (1997).

### Province of Military Professionals

Some of the most important, and certainly historiographically most significant work was composed by military professionals who sought to learn from the lessons of the Civil War's conduct as a guide to the conduct of future wars. Many of the most influential books were written by non-Americans, especially British writers. As a result, the study of the American Civil War developed a strong link with the history of British military thought and the two subjects have fertilized one another. The most important books began to appear from the 1880s onwards. By far the most significant and influential was Colonel G. F. R. Henderson's magisterial and beautifully written *Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War* (1898). Henderson saw military history as a form of vicarious experience. Military students could read analyses of commanders' lives, and judge the types of future decisions they might be called on to take, and reach a conclusion as to its "soundness ... by the actual event." It was a way of *training* the mind of officers. But Henderson succeeded so well as a historian, especially as a writer, that his books transcended this



approach and were widely accepted as history. His work, with its discerning tone and beautiful evocation of terrain and careful depiction of the dilemmas that confront a commander, contributed to the powerful pro-Confederate bias that permeates the literature. His skill as a biographer, moreover, led to an exaggeration of both Jackson's significance as a commander and the importance of his operations in the Shenandoah Valley in the spring of 1862 for the Civil War generally. Such an interpretation rests on an assumption of the self-evident, supreme importance of the Virginia theatre to the successful conclusion of the war.

After 1918 the experience of the First World War demanded some reorientation in the perspective that military writers had brought to bear on the military experience of 1861–5. Major General Sir Frederick Maurice (1925) switched the attention towards Lee and away from Jackson. He extolled Lee's ability to manoeuvre skilfully, especially in achieving superiority of numbers at the decisive point despite being outnumbered, and upheld the validity and future relevance of the basic Confederate model. No less an authority than Douglas Southall Freeman regarded Maurice's concise study, *Robert E. Lee: The Soldier* (1925) as the best short biography of Lee then available. Maurice (1926) also explored the complexities of civil–military relations both North and South informed by the tensions of 1914–18 in his elegant study, *Soldiers and Statesmen of the Civil War*. Able though these books were, the most original and influential books were written by two authors who rejected the worship of Confederate idols, and saluted instead the qualities of Union military leadership, Major General J. F. C. Fuller and Captain Sir Basil Liddell Hart. Both these writers were veterans of the Western Front, Fuller as chief of staff of the infant Tank Corps and Liddell Hart as a young regimental officer. They accepted Henderson's view that a study of Civil War generalship aided the training of officers, but they drew very different conclusions from the same historical experience. They argued that the First World War had shown the importance of scale in war, not just in terms of the actual battles fought but also the breadth of conception needed to direct them. In their respective studies of Grant (1929) and Sherman (1929) they argued that their northern heroes were greater strategists than Lee and better able to harness the resources of the industrialized state in “modern” war. Indeed Liddell Hart went further than Fuller in claiming that the campaigns in the West had greater strategic impact and were more decisive than Jackson's skirmishes in the Shenandoah Valley. Liddell Hart attributed to Sherman in his campaigns, but especially in his conduct of operations before the fall of Atlanta in September 1864, and in his Marches through Georgia and the Carolinas after it, a skilful implementation of his favoured theory of the strategy of the indirect approach. This permitted commanders to manoeuvre towards points of physical or psychological vulnerability without sustaining heavy loss of life.

Much of Liddell Hart's interpretation though rested on the pioneering work of Fuller, especially in the Civil War's relationship to the general evolution of warfare. Fuller, for instance, popularized the term, “the first of the modern wars” to sum up the unique characteristics of 1861–5. The Civil War was, he contended, “the first of the great wars begotten of the Industrial Revolution”; the second he thought being the First World War (Fuller 1929: viii). This understanding of the

relationship between these two wars was crucial to Fuller and Liddell Hart's interpretation and governed the way the war was perceived for the next half century. Their views did not lack American critics, especially those who admired Robert E. Lee.

Indeed, Lee's reputation generally suffered at Fuller and Liddell Hart's hands. Despite flashes of operational brilliance he seemed to lack a consistent strategic view. They also stressed how costly his battles were for the Confederacy. By comparison with Grant and Sherman, Lee appeared parochial, "obsessed" with the war in Virginia, and a poor logistician. Liddell Hart also thought him unduly preoccupied with battle.

Such arguments were provocative, and not all military writers accepted the full implications of Fuller and Liddell Hart's new sweeping interpretation. A cogent work, based however on shallow research, that makes some effective criticisms of their views, is Lieutenant Colonel A. H. Burne, *Lee, Grant and Sherman: A Study in Leadership in the 1864-65 Campaign* (1939). He conceded that Lee was inferior to Grant as a grand strategist, but argued that as a field strategist and tactician, he had no peer because of his readiness to take risks and because he understood the potential of the offensive-defensive. Burne admired Grant's record, but he argued that Grant often lacked the imagination and ability to exploit the opportunities that he had created for himself. Burne's most severe criticisms were directed at Sherman who he judged to have been too cautious and wrapped up in gaining geographical objectives. Burne's American edition carried an introduction by Douglas Southall Freeman who warned of an imminent Armageddon. "The great masters of strategy still sit in council with the commander who has ears to hear." Freeman's observation only points up the commingling of military history and military thinking that is such a powerful feature of Civil War historiography.

Fuller's books on Grant and Lee had one other valuable by-product. Fuller's stress on Grant's greatness as a general, indeed his superiority to Lee – a comparison made manifest in his *Grant and Lee* (1933) – encouraged American writers to see him in a new light. Yet despite a growing acknowledgement of Grant's talents, a full reconsideration of his record had to wait until another World War brought a fresh perspective to bear.

### A New Union Interpretation

A full challenge to the pervasive pro-Southern view did not arise until after 1945. The experience of the Second World War showed, in the words of one of its official historians, Samuel Eliot Morison, that "war does accomplish something, that war is better than servitude, and war has been an inescapable aspect of the human story" (Tulloch 1999: 139). Historians' attitudes toward the Civil War were turned upside down. The degree to which this had occurred was not manifest until the publication of T. Harry Williams' *Lincoln and his Generals* (1952). This brilliant and important book began by declaring: "The Civil War was the first of the modern total wars, and the American democracy was almost totally unready to

fight it" (3). Williams offered a study of Lincoln as Commander in Chief. He considered him a great war president, who "by his larger strategy, did more than Grant or any general to win the war for the Union." Lincoln's great insight, Williams suggested, was his grasp of the need to mount a simultaneous, coordinated effort aimed at vital centres on all fronts that would stretch Confederate resources to the breaking point; he also understood the need for the destruction of Confederate armies in the field rather than for the occupation of geographical points. In attempting to mount an operation on this scale, Lincoln created a modern command system. At key points, Williams evokes the spirit of Dwight D. Eisenhower, referring to "global strategy" and labeling Grant's plans for 1864 "Operation Crusher." Williams shows that he had read and understood the earlier, technical military writings of Maurice, Fuller, and Liddell Hart, but in this powerful and trenchantly argued book, he fuses their insights into a synthesis that is individual and entirely his own, and linked to central American concerns.

Williams made several assumptions while developing his core arguments, and these relate to military thought and its application. First, Williams argued that the North won because it was a more modern society, and relied on more modern ideas about how to fight a war. Its commanders were more ruthless and acted according to the precepts of Carl von Clausewitz's treatise *On War* rather than the pedantic "limited" war theories of Baron Jomini. Second, he assumed that the influence of military thought on commanders could only be direct. Generals put into practice what they had read in books. David Donald would later take this type of analysis a stage further in an influential essay published in *Lincoln Reconsidered* (1956). Third, Williams argued that the North showed itself superior to the South in overall military leadership, and this military factor was a crucial factor in the Union victory (Williams 1960).

Williams' judgment on the relative merits of the opposing generals-in-chief echoed for a generation: "Lee was the last of the great old fashioned generals, Grant the first of the great moderns" (Williams 1952: 314). The central arguments of *Lincoln and his Generals* would have a major influence on many later books.

Grant and Sherman were the heroes of this new interpretation; their predecessors were the subject of searching and remorseless criticism. Kenneth P. Williams had offered scathing criticism of George B. McClellan even before the publication of *Lincoln and his Generals*. His massive, 5-volume study, *Lincoln Finds a General* (1949–59) conscientiously based on the *Official Records*, was designed to prepare the ground for the coming of Grant, the commander Lincoln had been "searching" for since 1861. Williams excoriated McClellan's fumbling indecisiveness and unrealistic plans and his effrontery in treating the president with such unbecoming condescension. T. Harry Williams, too, offered a concise but scathing treatment in his assessment of the three most important Union commanders (1962).

The fullest account set in the broadest context of the view that the northern victory represented the triumph of a superior, better organized society can be found in the eight volumes of Allan Nevins, *The Ordeal of the Union* (1947–71). The series can be broken up into three sub-sets: the first two volumes that carry the series title, cover the rising tide of political strife down to 1857, *The Emergence*

of *Lincoln*, 2 volumes (1950) trace the political crisis that culminated in the Presidential Election of 1860, and *The War for the Union*, 4 volumes (1959–71), sets the war firmly within a political, economic, and social context. Nevins has no doubt that slavery caused the war, and that its course brought major benefits to northern industrialization and the nurturing of its governmental institutions. In short, it brought an administrative revolution and created a modern America. His history is redolent of the American Century at the heights of its confidence and prestige before the debilitating effects of the Vietnam War were felt (the widespread protests and revulsion against the war that spilled over into the universities only left Nevins perplexed). He manages to convey an enormous range of information with ease, and these volumes can still be consulted with profit. The overall trend of Nevins' structural argument was confirmed in the early work of Russell F. Weigley, notably his biography of the Union's Quartermaster General, Montgomery C. Meigs (1959). Nevins' great book offers a massive rethinking of the overall significance of the Civil War that weighed heavily in the North's favor.

The Union interpretation of the higher direction of the war, as propounded during the 1950s, held sway for more than half a century. James M. McPherson (2008) has only tinkered with its edges. Craig Symonds (2008) has offered important new perspectives on the conduct of the naval war. What is needed is a new synthesis on grand strategy, especially the correlation of military with foreign, economic, and financial affairs. Doris Kearns Goodwin (2005) offers some hints as to the political background, but the figure that needs most emphasis in her book gets the least, Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton, because he does not fit her thesis of Lincoln harnessing the abilities of his political rivals.

By the mid-1960s military historians had become much more interested in the influence of ideas in their social context on military affairs, an approach encapsulated in the term "war and society." Two seminal works should be noted. First, Jay Luvaas, *The Military Legacy of the Civil War: The European Inheritance* (1959) surveyed its impact on the way Europeans thought about future war, and attempted to assess the Civil War's influence on European military thought and practice. He became a pupil, friend, and disciple of Sir Basil Liddell Hart, demonstrating the continuing influence of that British writer on Civil War history. Luvaas upheld the latter's operational arguments, and judged the "modern" characteristics of the Civil War by reference to the two World Wars. The second work of note was a work by a British scholar who did not consider himself primarily a military historian, Marcus Cunliffe. His *Soldiers and Civilians: The Martial Spirit in America, 1775–1865* is such a wide ranging discussion of the American military ethos that some reviewers doubted that it was military history. It is essentially an intellectual history that covers in a novel way a number of controversial topics, such as the Southern military tradition and politics and military affairs. Cunliffe's pupil, Michael C. C. Adams, developed further some of his themes in *Our Masters the Rebels: A Speculation on Union Military Failure in the East, 1861–1865* (1978). Adams argued that ideas about a superior, martial South were so deep-seated that they contributed to the over-caution, lack of self-confidence, and defeatism that McClellan bequeathed to his successors after his dismissal in November 1862. It

took a commander like Grant, who came from the West and exhibited a powerful self-confidence wrought by a string of victories, to overcome this pernicious influence in 1864–5.

The tendency of intellectual history to cement the Union interpretation is evidenced by the chapters on the Civil War in Russell F. Weigley's important study, *The American Way of War* (1973). Weigley contended that Lee's costly Napoleonic strategy that sought out a decisive battle was self-defeating because it proved beyond the resources of the Confederacy – a theme that would feature strongly in books on the South during the 1970s. Grant developed what Weigley termed a "Strategy of Annihilation," a specifically American style that embraced not just attacks on the Confederate armies but on "the enemy's resources in their entirety" (Weigley 1973: 148). In a later chapter he made the relationship with the Second World War explicit by entitling the chapter on the European War, 1941–5, "The Strategic Tradition of U. S. Grant." The central problem with Weigley's book, which he later acknowledged, lay in his vague and confusing definitions, because what he described was attrition, not annihilation, for the latter more accurately described Lee's strategy.

In the 1970s the reputation of Grant never stood higher. Bruce Catton's biography that continued the series started by Lloyd Lewis, *Captain Sam Grant* (1950) with *Grant Moves South* (1960) and *Grant Takes Command* (1970), filled out the portrait with unrivalled research although occasionally it reveals an unnecessarily defensive tone. Sherman, by comparison, was rather neglected, not receiving a full length biography of similar quality until the appearance of that by John Marszalek (1993) nearly a quarter of a century later.

Peter J. Parish brought supreme skills as a synthesizer to bear when he attempted to organize a lot of diverse material drawn from these perspectives in his one volume history, *The American Civil War* (1975). The most important point that emerges from his book tended to be overlooked later when a fascination with defeat took hold again. Parish pointed out the enormous importance of the resilience of northern morale as a signal reason for the northern victory (579). A new direction in Civil War history, alas, would obscure this key insight for another 15 years.

### Civil–Military Relations

If the perspectives of the Second World War transformed our understanding of the Union war effort, so the social forces unleashed after 1945 – especially the Civil Rights revolution from 1954 onwards – turned upside down the received wisdom concerning the relations between soldiers and civilians. The study of wartime political activity was also influenced by a re-evaluation of Reconstruction after 1865. Since about 1960 historians had begun to appreciate Reconstruction more for its high-mindedness and real but incomplete achievements, and tended to dismiss earlier judgments that had emphasized hypocrisy, corruption and misrule. In the light of these changing perspectives the motives and aims of wartime politicians were reappraised.

The starting point was the portrayal of wartime politics in the North as a long-running conflict between a sensible, prudent and conservative president, Abraham Lincoln, and a group of ferocious, partisan, radical “Jacobins” who pursued an abolitionist, anti-Southern, revengeful policy. Such was the approach of T. Harry Williams in his first major book, *Lincoln and the Radicals* (1941). This book still contains valuable information and offers a powerful and individual interpretation. Together with James G. Randall, whose four-volume study of *Lincoln the President* (1947–55) represents the culmination of the “revisionist” interpretation, Williams signalled that members of the Congressional Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, set up in December 1861, were malign partisans of the Republican Party. The committee harried the executive branch, harassed Lincoln, persecuted generals it did not like, such as McClellan, and made a general nuisance of itself. In short, as narrow and self-interested politicians, the radicals negated creative statesmanship.

During the 1960s this unflattering portrait changed drastically. David Donald produced an analysis that questioned whether the radicals existed as a distinct faction with a clear-cut programme. Williams (1964) defended his earlier interpretation skilfully in “Lincoln and the Radicals.”

Hans L. Trefousse made an important contribution to the debate with his important biography of the committee’s chairman, Senator Benjamin F. Wade (1963) when he doubted whether the committee enjoyed inquisitorial powers and concluded that overall it “performed a significant service.” Far from harrying a reluctant president, Trefousse characterised the radicals as “the shock troops of the Republican Party” who entered “a voluntary relationship” with Lincoln, and he employed them as his “vanguard” in introducing radical policies on matters of race – he did not have them forced upon him. An important casualty of this re-evaluation was the notion that graduates of West Point were “innocent” of political interests and ambitions. “Revisionists” had invariably defended McClellan by stressing his lack of political experience. His later biographers, such as Stephen Sears (1988) revealed McClellan as a well-informed Democrat with presidential ambitions, and the Republicans were right to fear him as a potential rival. Randall’s thesis that party politics had proved detrimental to the Union war effort was demolished by Eric L. McKittrick (1967) who argued that when compared with the Confederacy, where efforts were made to eradicate party politics, the North benefited from its creative tension.

Within 30 years, the interpretation that presents Lincoln and the radicals as in partnership came under challenge. Reid (1992) points out that even if the Joint Committee lacked direct executive power, it deployed enormous influence. Bruce Tap’s (1998) detailed assessment of the committee’s activities focuses less on its members’ motives and underlines their complete lack of military knowledge. His critical verdict is much closer to that of Williams than to that of Trefousse. Mark Neely’s (2002) account of wartime politics targets McKittrick’s view, stresses its divisiveness and inefficiency, and shifts the ground back to the orthodoxies of half a century ago. One aspect of this debate remains constant if comparatively neglected. Allen C. Guelzo’s (2004) analysis of the Emancipation Proclamation, which Lincoln regarded as the greatest single act of his administration, shows it



was a conscious act of policy. Lincoln drafted it deliberately in clinical legal language because he expected it to be contested in the courts. It also encouraged Lincoln to explore and extend his war powers, and the proclamation's corrosive effect on slavery more than justified his confidence.

### Defensive Preferences and the Influence of Vietnam

By the 1970s a pessimistic trend can be discerned in Civil War literature that shows the influence of the Vietnam defeat. In 1965 Grady McWhiney anticipated its flavour when he published a brilliant article that encapsulated the main characteristics of Civil War scholarship over the next 40 years. In "Who Whipped Whom?" and in a later book *Attack and Die* (1982), written with co-author Perry D. Jamieson, McWhiney opened up important areas of debate by reference to a Southern theme. The key assumption in these works is that the defensive is *always* more economical in lives than the offensive whatever the circumstances. Thus "the Confederates bled themselves to death in the first three years of the war by making costly attacks more often than did the Federals." McWhiney mixed this provocative argument up with an unconvincing ethnic explanation (bordering on a crude stereotype), namely, that Confederates favoured "offensive warfare because the Celtic charge was an integral part of their heritage." The reference here is typified by the "forlorn hope," ill-fated charge of Highland infantry at the Battle of Culloden (1746) during the closing stage of Jacobite Rebellion (McWhiney 1965: 5, 17; McWhiney and Jamieson 1982: xxv, 157).

By the 1970s a consensus had developed that attributed the Confederate defeat, rather than the Union victory, to a Southern failure to develop a defensive strategy that would have eroded Northern support for the war. This was linked to a theme that had emerged out of studies published during the Centennial, namely, that the South had really lost the war in the West. The most judicious exploration of this theme is Archer Jones, *Confederate Strategy: From Shiloh to Vicksburg* (1961). The culprit who had failed to rise to the challenges of organizing a viable strategy in the West was Robert E. Lee, a general who had been consistently over-praised because of his strategic rigidity and "obsession" with the war in Virginia. Indeed one historian, Thomas L. Connelly (1969), went so far as to ask "whether the South may not have fared better had it possessed no Robert E. Lee" (132).

Connelly's work evinced a new interest in the previously neglected subject of the Confederate war effort in the Mississippi basin. He published a two-volume history of the Army of Tennessee and its predecessors, *Army of the Heartland* (1967) and *Autumn of Glory* (1971), a mature, powerful and elegant work. Yet its general thrust did not reinforce Connelly's overall perspective on the war. Connelly was scathingly critical of Confederate generalship in the West, even treating Joseph E. Johnston's defensive campaign in northern Georgia disdainfully – considering it halting, timorous and ill thought-out. On Connelly's evidence it was difficult to see how a viable strategy that could have led to victory in the West could have been achieved. Craig Symonds' (1992) assessment of Johnston is

critical, but judges his tactic of avoiding battle with superior Union armies to have saved lives and made it possible for him to maintain his army intact longer than Lee's Army of Northern Virginia.

Connelly turned his gifts as a polemicist instead to the eastern theatre. His work represents a powerful Southern counterblast to the pieties of the Lost Cause as its adherents were dedicated to celebrating ephemeral Confederate triumphs in Virginia. Connelly's essential ideas are developed in a general work on the Confederate strategic debate co-written with Archer Jones, *The Politics of Command: Factions and Ideas in Confederate Strategy* (1973). His argument rests on two themes. First, he believed that Lee's "pendant for the offensive" was inconsistent with the generally defensive strategy that Jefferson Davis preferred. Second, the failure of Lee's offensives, especially those north of the Potomac River, could be measured not to the extent to which they gained their strategic objectives, but by the number of casualties sustained. Connelly was keen to point out that Lee's first three months in command of the Army of Northern Virginia, cost 50,000 men. Connelly thus introduced an argument that would become increasingly influential in Civil War historiography, namely, that the objective of war was to save life, not defeat the enemy. This was a significant departure from the approach of the scholarship influenced by the experience of the Second World War.

Such a position had implications for the Northern war effort too, as McWhiney and Jamieson agreed. In arguing that Northern generals were less aggressive than their Southern counterparts, they were critical of the offensive strategy put into practice in 1864–5 by Ulysses S. Grant. Indeed in a twist that is emblematic of the Southern tenor of this debate, they concluded that "The Civil War might have ended sooner if all Union generals had been as aggressive as Grant, but the outcome well could have been an independent Confederacy" (McWhiney and Jamieson 1982: 157). This type of argument has a superficial plausibility. However, just at a time when military historians were priding themselves on their broad approach to the questions of war and its political and social implications, it rests on a presumption that *tactical* considerations are paramount, and especially a preoccupation with economizing life. The reasons why commanders fought their campaigns, the need to seize the initiative, the state of public opinion *at the time*, the political pressures that bore down on commanders, and numerous other factors are not given much attention by McWhiney and Jamieson and those historians who agreed with their essential standpoint. How Grant actually won the war could not be explained by them. How could any war be won for that matter?

The 1980s saw the scholarly consolidation of an interpretation of the Civil War influenced by the Vietnam Syndrome. It rested on a profound belief in the futility of war and its ultimate wastefulness. In its most sophisticated form it questioned the utility of battle and exalted the defensive as the stronger form of war. The ingredients of this interpretation had been used by historians, both civilian and military, since the 1920s. Its exponents brought a deterministic attitude to their treatment of the impact of industrialization on mid-nineteenth century warfare, especially the railroad and the telegraph that permitted the movement of larger numbers of men to the battlefield but did not aid in organizing them when they

got there. Defensive firepower and the spread of entrenchment, accentuated by the ineffectiveness of cavalry, slowed down operations to the point of deadlock. The most distinguished and persuasive analysis of these trends, that bucks them to the extent that its appraisal of Robert E. Lee is admiring, is Edward Hagerman's *The American Civil War and the Origins of Modern Warfare* (1988). Hagerman's book is especially interesting and original because he attempts an analysis of the organizational methods necessary to maintain operational momentum. The problem became one of logistics, sustainability, and method over great distances to get armies moving again. Hagerman's yardstick of "modernity" though remains the tendency of Civil War armies to evolve in directions that would culminate in the military methods and forms of the two World Wars of the twentieth century.

Within this framework emerged two central works, Herman Hattaway and Archer Jones, *How the North Won* (1983), and the same two authors plus William E. Beringer and William N. Still Jr., who published *Why the South Lost the Civil War* (1986). The change of emphasis in the titles is less than coincidental. Southern failures again were placed in the forefront of the explanatory model. To their credit, these two works exploit much more effectively than the 1941–70 generation of historians (such as T. Harry Williams and David Donald) theoretical writings about war produced by Baron Jomini and Carl von Clausewitz, especially the latter's treatise, *On War*. They grasp the common ground shared by these two authors. In this regard Beringer, Hattaway, Jones, and Still were drawing upon the renaissance in military theory that flowered in the US Army during post-Vietnam reforms. Nonetheless, the revival in the operational art and "manoeuvre warfare" had little impact on historians' view of the utility of military operations in the Civil War. On the contrary, a reappraisal of manoeuvre and the potency of future technology made during the last phase of the NATO–Warsaw Pact confrontation in Central Europe only seemed to confirm the comparative indecisiveness of mid-nineteenth century warfare. Its technology contributed to an inevitable and unbreakable deadlock, and seemed to demand an avoidance of battle.

In *How the North Won* Hattaway and Jones develop an explanation of continuing deadlock rather than offer any discussion of the methods by which it was eventually broken. The analysis is governed by a thesis emphasizing "the mid-nineteenth century army's virtual invulnerability to destruction in the open field." They play down the importance of the "decisive battle," even Gettysburg. They insist that "battles do not win wars." "The relative insignificance of battle," they write, "is simply another way of perceiving the primacy of the defence when well-articulated and relatively manoeuvrable units of rifle-armed infantry dominated the battlefield." The air of inevitability pervading these conclusions does not take into account how close to decisive victory Grant and Sherman came in May and June 1864 at Spotsylvania and after the crossing of the James River, and Snake Creek Gap and Resaca respectively (Hattaway and Jones 1983: 230, 415, 420n.19).

They went on to argue that Grant acknowledged that he could not secure a decisive success. In *Why the South Lost the Civil War* they contend that Grant's strategy was based on a series of "raids"; military progress rested on incremental attrition. Grant relied on attacks on the railroads and Confederate infrastructure,

particularly the marches through Georgia and the Carolinas, the devastation of the Shenandoah Valley, and the raids on Mississippi and Alabama. The result was Confederate exhaustion. In sum, Southern defeat in 1865 resulted from the failure of the Confederacy not just to protect its territory and resources, but to nurture any deep sense of coherent national identity. Confederate nationalism emerges as a fragile reed that could not carry the burdens of conducting a great war against the odds. In short, feebleness of will and pessimism on the Southern side, rather than Northern resolve and determination led to defeat in 1865. Once again historians underplayed the vitality needed for victory, and preferred to stress the reasons for defeat, *not a positive outcome* but a negative one; at a time when the Vietnam Syndrome appears as such a marked feature of American political and cultural life, they failed to underscore that the northern victory of 1864–5 was the result of a confident display of military power rather than the exclusive consequence of feebleness, despair and disillusion (Beringer, Hattaway, Jones, and Still 1986: 300–35, 426–30, 440–2).

Even by the turn of the millennium the infection of the Vietnam Syndrome had not been thrown off. In 2000 Russell F. Weigley produced a cautious, ambivalent book, *A Great Civil War*, that is not wedded so firmly to the primacy of the defence as some of his earlier writings. He blames the Union failure to win the war by July 1862 down to structural and doctrinal failures and the inability to evolve any concept of operational art. But he accepts uncritically the “failure of will” thesis and concludes his book gloomily saying it can only be agreed that the war amounted to a tragedy, because of “so much bloodshed around a flag whose opponents [Confederates, who] did not really want to pull it down.” A few days after September 11, 2001, another military history appeared, David J. Eicher’s *The Longest Night* (2001) which despite its solid tactical competence, is suffused with the imagery of darkness cast by *Apocalypse Now* (1989) – the ultimate symbol of the awful futility of Vietnam. Books such as these represent a throw back to the “revisionists” after 1920, arguing that the Civil War was both “needless” and avoidable as its cost did not outweigh any positive benefit. Reid (2008) offers a challenge to the defensive-minded, pessimistic assumptions of such approaches. He employs a concept of the operational level of war that identifies command and staff failures as the main reason for indecisiveness.

### The Confederacy

The intersection of political and military issues with all other resources of war – grand strategy – still remains the central, but neglected question of Confederate history.

As we have already noted, historians have tended to explain Confederate defeat either by reference to other failures in military strategy or to the national mood (or its lack). Issues of grand strategy tend to be neglected. There are four general surveys of the Confederacy. All touch in some way on strategic miscalculations without enlarging our understanding of their fundamental errors and the failure

of Confederate leaders to think through their grand strategic problems. Each represents a stage in the shedding of Lost Cause sympathy. E. Merton Coulter, *The Confederate States of America* (1950) still retains a firm adherence to its comforting myths. Clement Eaton, *A History of the Southern Confederacy* (1954) strives to be more objective, and is especially good on integrating political, social, economic and cultural history with military affairs. Frank E. Vandiver, *Their Tattered Flags: The Epic of the Confederacy* (1970) makes less effort to be impartial. Emory M. Thomas, *The Confederate Nation, 1861–1865* (1979) is a witty and skilfully written survey but does not advance the debate. Steven E. Woodworth's two books (1990, 1995) on Jefferson Davis' role as Commander in Chief are lucid and worthwhile studies but tend to view his performance through an operational prism. On the plethora of books on the Confederacy, two books stand out. Gary Gallagher has essayed an effective rebuttal of Beringer et al in *The Confederate War* (1997) that emphasizes the vitality of Confederate patriotism and the importance of Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia in sustaining morale; Gallagher also finds in the middle ranking, pro-slavery officers of that army a vibrant source of Southern national identity. Gallagher also has little patience with the idea of a defensive strategy as a panacea. The other pioneering work is George Rable, *The Confederate Republic* (1994), a study of Southern political ideas and practices, and the tensions that resulted from an attempt to eradicate parties.

The most innovative work on Confederate history has shifted the focus away from national questions to the local, such as Martin Crawford's work on Appalachia (2001).

This approach has permitted a detailed investigation of the "failure of will" thesis and the fissures that ran through the Confederacy. Richard N. Current opened up this theme with *Lincoln's Loyalists* (1992) by showing that every southern state except South Carolina fielded at least one regiment of troops in the Union Army, and estimates that 104,000 white southerners fought for the Union. William Freehling (2002) has explored the implications of such strife in terms of a civil war within a civil war. One significant cavity has been filled with Mark A. Weitz's important study, *More Damning than Slaughter: Desertion in the Confederate Army* (2005) which shows that significant levels of desertion occurred in 1861, a fact that reveals shaky loyalty from the outset. Finally, the stress placed on the disintegration of the South has led to a fresh evaluation of the significance of guerrilla warfare that is placed within an explanatory framework rather than presented as a series of entertaining yarns. Here Michael Fellman's (1989) study of Missouri is the seminal work.

### Experience of Men in the Ranks

Even the best campaign studies of the 1960s did not feature a single voice from the ranks. Specialized studies of their experience had appeared before then, notably Bell I. Wiley's (1943, 1952) two volumes on the men in gray and blue. He was concerned to develop an argument that the soldiers of both sides were not committed

to any great cause, especially for or against slavery. Such books tended to be anecdotal. The great change in attitude occurred with the appearance of John Keegan's *The Face of Battle* (1976). Keegan's book integrated the experience of fighting within a sophisticated explanatory model. In many important respects the influence exerted by this approach represents the most important shift in Civil War historiography, because it opened up an entirely new vista on the subject with new, virtually untouched sources to be mined. These developments are surveyed conveniently by Haughton (2000a), whose study of drill and training in the Army of Tennessee (2000b) should also point the way for other studies of a neglected subject.

Initially, works on the experience of junior officers and men tended to embrace the pessimism of the Vietnam Syndrome. Linderman's important work, *Embattled Courage* (1987) traced how romantic illusions were replaced by empty, bitter cynicism. This approach has been the subject of sustained criticism as the dynamic study of Civil War experience became the first area to show evidence of sloughing off the influence of the Syndrome. Reid Mitchell's survey (1988) underlines the importance of patriotism, duty and the expectations of a soldier's community in sustaining his sense of commitment. The two most significant works in this genre are Earl J. Hess, *The Union Soldier in Battle: Enduring the Ordeal of Combat* (1997), an entertaining as well as instructive work that has the additional benefit of focusing on northern soldiers, and James M. McPherson, *For Cause and Comrades: Why Men Fought in the Civil War* (1997). Both books advance the thesis that soldiers North and South fought the war enthusiastically for ideological reasons. Such an argument needs to be treated with care, so that camp fire discussions are not misconstrued as university seminars. McPherson is now inclined to accept that he underestimated the importance of leadership in creating effective fighting units (McPherson 2007). Costa and Kahn (2008) take forward this general approach to the experience of war. Their stimulating analysis focuses on the choices made by soldiers, not just on the battlefield, for they consider desertion and prison camps; but these choices are interpreted rather too literally, and with a degree of tendentious zeal. Glatthaar (2008) discusses this experience within the Southern context and dismantles the last vestiges of Confederate special pleading. He emphasizes how important slavery was to Lee's soldiers and explores issues of leadership, discipline, plundering, and the evolution of the combat arms within military structures – perhaps where they belong.

Nonetheless, Hess and McPherson make a strong case that Northern soldiers fought for the Union and all it stood for, and after 1863 to destroy slavery; southerners fought for freedom, too, and for constitutional rights, but they were defined in pro-slavery terms. This insight links with Gallagher's argument that the exponents of Confederate nationalism tended to be pro-slavery zealots. The most significant legacy of McPherson's argument, in particular, lies in his demonstration that in a democracy the feelings soldiers express concerning the righteousness of a cause they are fighting for has a profound impact on war aims as well as on the ways wars are fought. McPherson and Gallagher are the spokesmen for an alternative, emerging orthodoxy that underplays divisions on both sides and salutes the dedication of each side's adherents. In this respect, *For Cause and Comrades* can



be viewed as an extension of McPherson's grand narrative, *The Battle Cry of Freedom* (1988) that remains the best, single volume history of the war.

The other growth area has been the attention devoted to the experience of black soldiers. Susan-Mary Grant (2000) traces the outlines of the subject. McPherson (1988) introduced the work of an earlier generation of black scholars to a new generation of readers. By far the best of these studies remains Dudley Taylor Cornish, *The Sable Arm: Black Troops in the Union Army, 1861–1865* (1966), a beautifully written and controlled book. Joseph Glatthaar, *Forged in Battle: The Civil War Alliance of Black Soldiers and White Officers* (1990) adds important perspectives based on conscientious research. Nor have black soldiers been exempted from the exploration of previously ignored quantities of letters and diaries, as Edwin Redkey's edition of correspondence, *A Grand Army of Black Men* (1992) shows. As for black soldiers in the Confederate Army, Bruce Levine (2000) demolishes most of the misconceptions surrounding Confederate emancipation in return for military service; it was the first stage in the creation of a new state of peonage.

Civil War historians have also accorded the sacrifice demanded by war increasing attention. Drew Gilpin Faust's *Republic of Suffering* (2008) opened up the field. Schantz (2008) has consolidated her initial foray by suggesting that "messages about death ... made it easier to kill and to be killed" (2). Schantz views such sacrifice as a way of questioning a heroic, positive "master-narrative" of Civil War historiography. But the Faust-Schantz approach tends to invert the dominant view, with soldiers as "victims" of great invisible forces with war itself as the ultimate yardstick of purposelessness. Grant (2008) discusses the reasons why half a million wounded are often overlooked in this preoccupation with the dead. She finds these rooted in a tendency buttressed by Faust and Schantz, of viewing 1861–5 "as a conflict apart" (289). Her comparative approach is to be preferred, especially when judging whether individual sacrifices were born with pride.

### A Total War?

Historians' discussion of the importance of the shifting tides of opinion in influencing the character of war aims leads to discussion of one of the perennial debates of Civil War history, namely, whether or not it was a "total" war. The Union interpretation of the post-war years declared that it was. But subscribers provided little evidence to support their claims. Writers, like John B. Walters (1973), presumed that William T. Sherman's famous Marches were symptomatic of a total war approach.

The problem with using this term is that it is elastic and relative. By exploiting such ambiguities, Mark E. Neely (1997) offers several grounds for doubting whether the Civil War can be described as a total war. Mobilization of resources was patchy and not centrally organized by either government (considered in the 1960s a central feature of a modern, total war). And the distinction between combatants and non-combatants was maintained, even by Sherman. "Total war may describe certain isolated and uncharacteristic aspects of the Civil War," Neely

writes, “but it is at most a partial view” (49). Neely (2007) by implication downplays the exceptional character of the Civil War because he claims that it shares important features with other wars of the period. He surveys sources of restraint and compares them with the greater brutality of the Mexican Civil War. But the theme is sustained episodically and too idiosyncratically to satisfy. James M. McPherson takes a diametrically opposed view. He argues the case for totality based on three grounds: first, the levels of devastation inflicted on the South; second, the radical changes it wrought on American political and social life, not least the destruction of slavery; and third, the degree of mobilization required to sustain the war efforts of both sections. They mobilized a larger proportion of their manpower than in 1941–5. Joseph G. Dawson III (2000), in his careful dissection of the areas of controversy, tends to side with McPherson, but in referring to a “brutal contest of wills that demanded sledgehammer blows” (130), he refrains from using the term “total” himself.

In his analysis of the opening years of the war Brian Holden Reid argues that expectations of a short victorious conflict and hopes for a negotiated peace influenced the strategies and tactics adopted by political and military commanders on both sides. It took over two years of inconclusive military operations that resulted in horrendous loss of lives before the realities of the war set in and changed how the leaders would conduct it.

Mark Grimsley, *The Hard Hand of War* (1995), reflects this view when he suggests that it is more accurate to describe the more ruthless form the Union adopted after 1863 as “hard war,” a term first employed by Bruce Catton (1958) in “Making Hard War.” Grimsley’s monograph offers a judicious and scholarly analysis of the change in attitude that the scale of the war, combined with a series of defeats in the East, forced on Union commanders. Another change of perspective arising from recent research is the realization that an attack on resources coupled with harsher treatment of civilians was not a monopoly of northerners but shared by Confederates. Charles Royster’s book of essays, *The Destructive War* (1991) shows that in blood-curdling rhetoric, Stonewall Jackson matched Sherman who Joseph Glatthaar (1985) demonstrates sought to save lives by the destruction of property. To compare the Marches with the strategic bombing of Germany or Japan in 1944–5 is to misconceive their purpose. A further complication arose from the type of resistance that Sherman’s troops faced – mainly female – and they did not crush it by the use of pitiless force, as Jacqueline Glass Campbell shows (2003: 55–7).

For over a century naval commanders and operations were examined in numerous narratives (Anderson 1962, Fowler 1990, Tucker 2002), but few historians integrated analysis of the naval dimensions of the war into their broader works. Early writers who examined the naval blockade of the South stressed the profits made by blockade runners (Soley 1883, Bradlee 1925). None analyzed the impact of the blockade on the Confederate war effort, but most implied that it was significant. Frank L. Owsley (1935) challenged this view by arguing that blockade runners brought in important supplies for Confederate armies, a view supported by Stephen Wise’s *Lifeline of the Confederacy* (1988). Other writers calculated the relative success of blockade runners in evading capture thus suggesting that the

blockade was so porous as to be ineffective and that the blockade did not contribute significantly to Southern defeat (Vandiver 1947, Still 1983, Beringer, Hattaway, Jones, and Still 1986). This assessment has recently been challenged by David G. Surdam in *Northern Naval Superiority and the Economics of the American Civil War* (2001). Rather than focus simply on ships and cargoes that evaded blockaders and entered Southern ports, Surdam shows that the blockade crippled Confederate coastal transport and severely limited its exporting of cotton and other goods that could be sold to finance foreign purchases. Mark Thornton (1992) argues that the increase in prices caused by the shortage of goods, a product of the blockade, and the impact of those shortages and prices led to a serious decline in civilian morale in the Confederacy. He and Robert B. Ekelund expand this analysis in *Tariffs, Blockades, and Inflation: The Economics of the Civil War* (2004).

Perhaps it was the experience of Vietnam that awakened an interest in coastal and riverine operations during the Civil War. Pioneering studies by John Milligan (1965) and Rowena Reed (1978) emphasize the critical role played by both in establishing bases for the operation of the blockade, tying down Confederate manpower away from the major theaters of operations, and supporting army operations in the Mississippi River and its tributaries, the latter detailed in a biography of Admiral S. Phillips Lee (Cornish and Laas 1986).

Lincoln's relationship with naval leaders has recently received attention similar to that accorded the president's interaction with army generals. Historians have traditionally viewed Lincoln as delegating authority in naval affairs to Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles who in turn relied on Assistant Secretary of the Navy Gustavus Fox to supervise Navy docks and yards and shipbuilding programs, including contracting for the construction of new ships (Niven 1973). Stephen R. Taaffe's *Commanding Lincoln's Navy* (2009) accepts this basic interpretation, but two recent works significantly challenge it. In his biography of Fox, Ari Hoogenboom (2008) shows that the assistant secretary played a much greater role in planning and administering both the blockade of Southern ports and operations along the Confederate coast. Craig Symonds, *Lincoln and His Admirals* (2008) depicts the president as taking a significant part in selecting commanders and planning strategy.

During the period under review, historians' interpretations of the Civil War have been transformed. The pro-Southern tendency, heavily influenced by Lost Cause mythology, has been dismantled. It has been replaced by interpretations that are much more favorable to the Northern war effort. The stress placed on unlimited war aims and ruthless strategy has led to comparisons with the World Wars of the twentieth century, especially the Second. Yet their conclusion nearly 70 years ago has stretched the meaning of "modern" beyond recognition; the comparison is losing its appeal, especially as military theorists now consider that war is fought in the twenty-first century "amongst the people." It might well be that this perspective has stimulated the interest in guerrilla warfare and internal strife as a source of defeat. Nonetheless, the southern dimension retains its capacity to hypnotize historians. Invariably explanatory models are first explored with reference to the South – as with recent work on desertion. Discussion of the North – not least the

contribution of the northern home front to bolstering enthusiasm for the war – is comparatively neglected. In history writing many things may change, but certain things never change.

#### BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Adams, Michael C. C. (1978). *Our Masters the Rebels: Speculation on Union Military Failure in the East, 1861–1865*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press (reprinted as *Fighting for Defeat: Union Military Failure in the East, 1861–1865*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1992).
- Anderson, Bern (1962). *By Sea and by River: The Naval History of the Civil War*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Beringer, William E., Herman Hattaway, Archer Jones, and William N. Still Jr., (1986). *Why the South Lost the Civil War*. Athens: University of Georgia Press.
- Bowers, Claude G. (1929). *The Tragic Era: The Revolution after Lincoln*. Cambridge, MA: Houghton Mifflin Co.
- Bradlee, B. C. (1925). *Blockade Running during the Civil War, and the Effect of Land and Water Transportation on the Confederacy*. Salem, MA: Essex Institute.
- Burne, Alfred H, (2000 [1939]). *Lee, Grant and Sherman: A Study in Leadership in the 1864–65 Campaign*, with foreword and endnotes by Albert Castel. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
- Campbell, Jacqueline Glass (2003). *When Sherman Marched North from the Sea: Resistance on the Confederate Home Front*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Catton, Bruce (1958). “Making Hard War,” in Bruce Catton, *America Goes to War*. Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 68–86.
- Catton, Bruce (1960). *Grant Moves South*. Boston: Little Brown.
- Catton, Bruce (1969). *Grant Takes Command*. Boston: Little Brown.
- Connelly, Thomas L. (1967). *Army of the Heartland: Army of Tennessee, 1861–1862*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.
- Connelly, Thomas L. (1969). “Robert E. Lee and the Western Confederacy: A Criticism of Lee’s Strategic Ability,” *Civil War History*, 15:2 (June), 116–32.
- Connelly, Thomas L. (1971). *Autumn of Glory: Army of Tennessee 1862–1865*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.
- Connelly, Thomas L. (1977). *The Marble Man: Robert E. Lee and his Image in American Society*. New York: Alfred A Knopf.
- Connelly, Thomas L., and Archer Jones. (1973). *The Politics of Command; Factions and Ideas in Confederate Strategy*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.
- Cornish, Dudley Taylor (1956). *The Sable Arm: Black Troops in the Union Army, 1861–1865*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
- Cornish, Dudley Taylor, and Virginia Jeans Laas (1986). *Lincoln’s Lee: The Life of Samuel Phillips Lee, United States Navy, 1812–1897*. Lawrence: University Press.
- Costa, Dora L., and Matthew E. Kahn (2008). *Heroes and Cowards: The Social Face of War*. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Coulter, E. Merton (1950). *The Confederate States of America, 1861–1865. A History of the South*, vol. 7. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.
- Crawford, Martin (2001). *Ashe County’s Civil War: Community and Society in the Appalachian South*. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia.
- Cunliffe, Marcus (1968). *Soldiers and Civilians: The Martial Spirit in America, 1775–1865*. Boston: Little Brown.

- Current, Richard N. (1992). *Lincoln's Loyalists: Union Soldiers from the Confederacy*. Boston: Northeastern University Press.
- Dawson, Joseph G., III (2000). "The First Modern War?" in Susan-Mary Grant and Brian Holden Reid, eds., *The American Civil War: Explorations and Reconsiderations*. New York: Pearson, 121–41.
- Doctorow, E. L. (2005). *The March*. London: Random House.
- Donald, David (1956). "Re-fighting the Civil War," in David Donald, *Lincoln Reconsidered*. New York: Vintage Books, 82–102.
- Donald, David ed. (1960). *Why the North Won the Civil War*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.
- Eaton, Clement (1954). *A History of the Southern Confederacy*. New York: Macmillan.
- Eicher, David J. (2001). *The Longest Night: A Military History of the Civil War*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Ekelund, Robert B., and Mark Thornton (2004). *Tariffs, Blockades, and Inflation: The Economics of the Civil War*. Wilmington, DE: SR Books.
- Faust, Drew Gilpin (2008). *This Republic of Suffering: Death and the American Civil War*. New York: Knopf.
- Fellman, Michael (1989). *Inside War: The Guerrilla Conflict in Missouri during the American Civil War*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Fowler, William M. (1990). *Under Two Flags: The American Navy in the Civil War*. New York: W. W. Norton.
- Freehling, William W. (2002). *The South vs. The South: How Anti-Confederate Southerners Shaped the Course of the Civil War*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Freeman, Douglas Southall (1934–5). *R. E. Lee: A Biography*, 4 vols. New York: Scribner's.
- Freeman, Douglas Southall (1942–4). *Lee's Lieutenants: A Study in Command*, 3 vols. New York: Scribner's.
- Fuller, J. F. C. (1929). *The Generalship of Ulysses S. Grant*, 2nd ed. New York: Dodd, Mead, and Co.
- Fuller, J. F. C. (1933). *Grant and Lee: A Study in Personality and Generalship*. New York: C. Scribner's Sons.
- Gallagher, Gary W. (1997). *The Confederate War*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Glatthaar, Joseph T. (1985). *Sherman's March to the Sea and Beyond*. New York: New York University Press.
- Glatthaar, Joseph T. (1990). *Forged in Battle: The Civil War Alliance of Black Soldiers and White Officers*. New York: Free Press.
- Glatthaar, Joseph T. (2008). *General Lee's Army: From Victory to Collapse*. New York: Free Press.
- Goodwin, Doris Kearns (2005). *Team of Rivals: The Political Genius of Abraham Lincoln*. New York: Simon & Schuster.
- Grant, Susan-Mary (2000). "Fighting for Freedom: African-American Soldiers in the Civil War," in Susan-Mary Grant and Brian Holden Reid, eds., *The American Civil War: Explorations and Reconsiderations*. New York: Pearson, 191–213.
- Grant, Susan-Mary (2008). "Reconstructing the National Body: Masculinity, Disability and Race in the American Civil War," *Proceedings of the British Academy*, 154, 273–317.
- Grimsley, Mark (1995). *The Hard Hand of War: Union Military Policy toward Southern Civilians, 1861–1865*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Guelzo, Allen C. (2004). *Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation: The End of Slavery in America*. New York: Simon and Schuster.

- Hagerman, Edward (1988). *The American Civil War and the Origins of Modern Warfare*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Hattaway, Herman, and Archer Jones (1983). *How the North Won: A Military History of the Civil War*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
- Haughton, Andrew R. (2000a). "The Experience of the Civil War: Men at War, 1861–1865," in Susan-Mary Grant and Brian Holden Reid, eds., *The American Civil War: Explorations and Reconsiderations*. New York: Pearson, 169–90.
- Haughton, Andrew R. (2000b). *Training, Tactics and Leadership in the Confederate Army of Tennessee*. London: Frank Cass.
- Henderson, G. F. R. (1988 [1898]). *Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War*, 2 vols. New York: Longman, Green and Co.
- Hess, Earl J. (1997). *The Union Soldier in Battle: Enduring the Ordeal of Combat*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
- Hoogenboom, Ari A. (2008). *Gustavus Vasa Fox of the Union Navy: A Biography*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Jones, Archer (1961). *Confederate Strategy: From Shiloh to Vicksburg*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.
- Keegan, John (1976). *The Face of Battle*. New York: Viking Press.
- Liddell Hart, Sir Basil (1929). *Sherman: Soldier, Realist, American*. New York: Dodd Mead.
- Linderman, Gerald F. (1987). *Embattled Courage: The Experience of Combat in the American Civil War*. New York: Free Press.
- Levine, Bruce (2000). "'What Did We Go to War For?' Confederate Emancipation and its Meaning," in Susan-Mary Grant and Brian Holden Reid, eds., *The American Civil War: Explorations and Reconsiderations*. New York: Pearson, 239–64.
- Lewis, Lloyd (1950). *Captain Sam Grant*. Boston: Little, Brown.
- Luvaas, Jay (1959). *The Military Legacy of the Civil War: The European Inheritance*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
- Marszalek, John F. (1993). *Sherman: A Soldier's Passion for Order*. New York: Free Press.
- Maurice, Sir Frederick (1925). *Robert E. Lee: The Soldier*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co.
- Maurice, Sir Frederick (1926). *Soldiers and Statesmen of the Civil War*. Boston: Little Brown.
- McKittrick, Eric (1967). "Party Politics in the Union and Confederate War Efforts," in William Nisbet Chambers and Walter Dean Burnham, eds., *The American Party Systems: Stages of Political Development*. New York: Oxford University Press, 117–51.
- McPherson, James M. (1988). *The Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- McPherson, James M. (1997). *For Cause and Comrades: Why Men Fought in the Civil War*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- McPherson, James M. (2007). *This Mighty Scourge: Perspectives on the Civil War*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- McPherson, James M. (2008). *Tried by War: Abraham Lincoln as Commander in Chief*. New York: Penguin Press.
- McWhiney, Grady, ed. (1964). *Grant, Lee, Lincoln and the Radicals*. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.
- McWhiney, Grady (1965). "Who Whipped Whom? Confederate Defeat Re-Examined," *Civil War History*, 11:1 (March), 5–26.
- McWhiney, Grady, and Perry D. Jamieson (1982). *Attack and Die: Civil War Tactics and the Southern Heritage*. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press.
- Milligan, John D. (1965). *Gunboats Down the Mississippi*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.



- Mitchell, Margaret (1936). *Gone With the Wind*. New York: Macmillan.
- Mitchell, Reid (1989). *Civil War Soldiers*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Neely, Mark E., Jr. (1997). "Was the Civil War a Total War?," in Stig Forster and Jorg Nagel, eds., *On the Road to Total War: The American Civil War and the German Wars of Unification, 1861–1871*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 29–51.
- Neely, Mark E., Jr. (2002). *The Union Divided: Party Conflict in the Civil War North*. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.
- Nevins, Allan (1947–71). *The Ordeal of the Union*, 8 vols. New York: Scribner's.
- Niven, John (1973). *Gideon Welles: Lincoln's Secretary of the Navy*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Owsley, Frank L. (1931). *King Cotton Diplomacy: Foreign Relations of the Confederate States of America*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Parish, Peter J. (1975). *The American Civil War*. New York: Holmes and Meier.
- Parish, Peter J. ed. (1997). *The Reader's Guide to American History*. London: Fitzroy Dearborn.
- Rable, George (1994). *The Confederate Republic: A Revolution against Politics*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Randall, James G. (1947–55). *Lincoln the President*, 4 vols. (the final volume was completed by Richard N. Current). London: Eyre and Spottiswoode.
- Redkey, Edwin (1992). *A Grand Army of Black Men: Letters from African American Soldiers in the Union Army, 1861–1865*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Reed, Rowena (1978). *Combined Operations in the Civil War*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Reid, Brian Holden (1992). "Historians and the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War," *Civil War History*, 38:4 (December), 319–41.
- Reid, Brian Holden (1996). *The Origins of the American Civil War*. New York: Addison Wesley Longman.
- Reid, Brian Holden (2008). *America's Civil War: The Operational Battlefield, 1861–1863*. Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books.
- Royster, Charles (1991). *The Destructive War: William T. Sherman, Stonewall Jackson and the Americans*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Schantz, Mark S. (2008). *Awaiting the Heavenly Country: The Civil War and America's Culture of Death*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Sears, Stephen (1988). *George B. McClellan: The Young Napoleon*. New York: Ticknor and Fields.
- Soley, James R. (1883). *The Blockade and the Cruisers*. New York: C. Scribner's Sons.
- Still, William N., Jr. (1983). "A Naval Sieve: The Union Blockade in the Civil War," *Naval War College Review*, 66 (May/June), 38–45.
- Surdam, David G. (2001). *Northern Naval Superiority and the Economics of the American Civil War*. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.
- Symonds, Craig L. (1992). *Joseph E. Johnston: A Civil War Biography*. Boston: Little Brown.
- Symonds, Craig L. (2008). *Lincoln and His Admirals: Abraham Lincoln, the U.S. Navy, and the Civil War*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Taaffe, Stephen R. (2009). *Commanding Lincoln's Navy: Union Naval Leadership during the Civil War*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Tap, Bruce (1998). *Over Lincoln's Shoulder: The Committee on the Conduct of the War*. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press.
- Thomas, Emory M. (1992). *The Confederate Nation: 1861–1865*. New York: Harper & Row.

- Thornton, Mark (1992). "The Union Blockade and the Demoralization of the South: Relative Prices in the Confederacy," *Social Science Quarterly*, 73:4 (December), 890–902.
- Trefousse, Hans L. (1963). *Benjamin Franklin Wade: Radical Republican from Ohio*. New York: Twayne.
- Trefousse, Hans L. (1964). "The Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War: A Reassessment," *Civil War History*, 10:1 (March), 5–19.
- Trefousse, Hans L. (1969). *The Radical Republicans: Lincoln's Vanguard for Racial Justice*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Tucker, Spencer (2002). *A Short History of the Civil War at Sea*. Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources.
- Tulloch, Hugh (1999). *The Debate on the American Civil War Era*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Vandiver, Frank E., ed. (1947). *Confederate Blockade Running through Bermuda, 1861–1865*. Austin: University of Texas Press.
- Vandiver, Frank E. (1970). *Their Tattered Flags: The Epic of the Confederacy*. New York: Harper and Row.
- Walters, John B. (1973). *Merchant of Terror: General Sherman and Total War*. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill.
- Weigley, Russell F. (1959). *Quartermaster General of the Union Army: A Biography of M. C. Meigs*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Weigley, Russell F. (1973). *The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy*. New York: Macmillan.
- Weigley, Russell F. (2000). *A Great Civil War: A Military and Political History*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Weitz, Mark A. (2005). *More Damning than Slaughter: Desertion in the Confederate Army*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
- Wiley, Bell I. (1943). *The Life of Johnny Reb: The Common Soldier of the Confederacy*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.
- Wiley, Bell I. (1952). *The Life of Billy Yank: The Common Soldier of the Union*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.
- Williams, Kenneth P. (1949–59). *Lincoln Finds a General: A Military Study of the Civil War*, 5 vols. New York: Macmillan.
- Williams, T. Harry (1941). *Lincoln and the Radicals*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
- Williams, T. Harry (1952). *Lincoln and His Generals*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Williams, T. Harry (1960). "The Military Leadership of North and South," in David Donald, ed., *Why the North Won the Civil War*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 38–57.
- Williams, T. Harry (1962). *McClellan, Sherman and Grant*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.
- Williams, T. Harry (1964). "Lincoln and the Radicals: An Essay in Civil War History and Historiography," in Grady McWhiney, ed., *Grant, Lee, Lincoln and the Radicals*. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 72–177.
- Wise, Stephen R. (1988). *Lifeline of the Confederacy: Blockade Running during the Civil War*. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.
- Woodworth, Steven E. (1990). *Jefferson Davis and his Generals: The Failure of Confederate Command in the West*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
- Woodworth, Steven E. (1995). *Davis and Lee at War*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
- Woodworth, Steven E. ed. (1996). *The American Civil War: A Handbook of Literature and Research*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.

## Chapter Seven

# INDIAN WARS OF THE TRANS-MISSISSIPPI WEST, 1862–90

*Robert Wooster*

Following the Civil War, the United States Army was involved in over a thousand battles and skirmishes against American Indians, a figure which does not include those conflicts fought entirely by civilian volunteers or militia. Regular army combat casualties (killed, wounded, and missing) numbered over 2,000; the army claimed that it had inflicted some 16,000 casualties against Indians deemed hostile. As these figures suggest, these conflicts, though frequent, typically occurred between relatively small forces on both sides. But these were hardly “limited” wars, for the death and destruction – which often involved noncombatants – were conducted with a savagery that was very real indeed.

Good modern histories about these conflicts have avoided the racially-demeaning language that often marred earlier works, but scholars in the field still face difficult challenges. Federal government records concerning Indian affairs are plentiful; the army, in particular, tried to document just about everything. From monthly company returns to after-action reports to requisitions for forage, military authorities kept records intended to justify their actions before a public often skeptical about the need for a large standing army. Supplemented by mountains of newspaper reports, private letters, and published memoirs and reminiscences, a huge paper trail documents the government’s side of the story. Enjoying a superabundance of evidence on the one hand, historians have been less successful in documenting the other perspective. Only scattered written testimonies, recorded interviews, and physical artifacts from contemporary American Indians remain. Too often, the oral traditions which preserved tribal culture and history have been lost, misunderstood, or simply ignored. Some scholars dealing with the military–Indian conflicts have made concerted efforts to reach out to related disciplines, such as anthropology, ethnography, and archaeology. Unfortunately, many who have advanced such multi-disciplinary approaches have found it difficult to translate the specialized languages of social scientists into forms accessible to more general readers.

Early descriptions of the conflicts between the United States and American Indians usually adopted the perspective of the romantic works of the officer-turned novelist Charles King. As military historian Gunther Rothenberg (1974) explained,

“As pictured by King ... the Indian-fighting regulars looked on themselves as a rough and ready little band of brothers, carrying the white man’s burden and serving as vanguard of a superior civilization.” These traditional narratives, though often well-written, typically shied away from the rigorous research and critical analysis necessary to understand the complex realities of these wars.

### Robert M. Utley and the Rise of Modern Scholarship

During the 1960s and early 1970s, a trio of books by Robert M. Utley revolutionized the field. A long-time historian for the National Park Service, Utley’s first major work, *The Last Days of the Sioux Nation* (1963), brilliantly depicts the Wounded Knee disaster of 1890–1, in which 25 soldiers and over 150 Miniconjou Lakota Sioux – many of whom were women and children – were killed. Although some label the affair as a massacre (Beasley 1995), Utley portrays the tragedy as the result of frightful errors and miscalculations on both sides. “The vast majority of both Indians and soldiers were – within their differing cultural frameworks – decent, ordinary, people,” concludes Utley.

They suddenly found themselves thrust into battle, and they reacted with behavioral extremes that battle from time immemorial has induced in ordinary people. It is time that Wounded Knee be viewed for what it was – a regrettable, tragic accident of war that neither side intended, and that called for behavior for which some individuals on both sides, in unemotional retrospect, may be judged culpable, but for which neither side as a whole may be properly condemned. (Utley 1965: 230)

Utley also published two seminal works in Macmillan’s *Wars of the United States Series*: *Frontiersmen in Blue: The United States Army and the Indian 1848–1865* (1967); and *Frontier Regulars: The United States Army and the Indian 1866–1891* (1973). Every serious historian still uses these surveys, for Utley blended his broad reading of secondary sources, research in the manuscript collections of the papers of generals William Sherman and Philip Sheridan, command of printed primary sources, and pioneering exploitation of government documents published as part of the Congressional Serial Set. With a careful eye for detail, he transformed that research into coherent narratives. Throughout his work, Utley recognizes that the army was hardly alone in “conquering” American Indians. After all, a military institution that typically numbered about 25,000 posed less of a threat to the tribes than the nearly nine million settlers who occupied their former lands by 1890. As Utley (1967: 349) explains, the army “was but one of many groups, some organized, some not, joined in a largely uncontrolled and uncontrollable movement” (349). In a later work (Utley 1973: 410–11), he continues: “Trappers, traders, miners, stockmen, farmers, railroad builders, [and] merchants ... rather than the soldiers, deprived the Indian of the land and the sustenance that left him no alternative but to submit. The army’s particular contribution was to precipitate a final collapse that had been ordained by other forces” (410–11).

Those who made up the army, Utley argues, defied easy stereotype. Sharing the views of their countrymen, most believed that Indians were inferior savages who needed to be shunted aside as the nation achieved its manifest destiny across the continent. And few seemed to recognize that the tactics they so often hoped to employ – the surprise strike against the Indian village that the government had deemed “enemy” – were almost guaranteed to result in the deaths of many more Indian women and children than they would ever have countenanced among “civilized” peoples. Demanding that the West be cleared as quickly as was possible, the nation, through its army, inflicted what Utley calls a “monstrous wrong” upon Indians.

What emerges in all of Utley’s works is the theme of an army caught in the middle, an institution made up of very human beings torn between the racism that permeated their culture, a public that pressured the government to get about the business of opening up the West while at the same time insisting that the government remain small, and their own experiences with Indians. The soldiers were caught in a moral dilemma. “Most officers and men,” Utley contends, “saw [the Indian] as degraded and inferior but still a human being upon whom a great wrong was being inflicted” (Utley 1973: 346–7). Many bluecoats found most distasteful the actions of government Indian agents who they dismissed as being incompetent, overly naïve, or simply dishonest. The very Congress which expected that the army oversee Reconstruction, maintain domestic order during labor strikes, assist destitute citizens, conduct scientific missions, build roads and string telegraph wires, protect settlers and the railroads, and police the fledgling national parks also kept military salaries low, funded inferior uniforms and equipment, and refused to allot sufficient troops to go around.

But Utley’s sympathy for the army never leads him to excuse its failures and inadequacies, particularly regarding the difficulties a conventional army faces in confronting an unconventional enemy. In one particularly revealing essay, he concludes that the army saw the wars against the Indians as a “fleeting bother” (Utley 1978: 9), hardly worthy of systematic intellectual attention. The main nineteenth century threat to national security, assumed War Department officials and the top army brass, was the potential threat posed by some unnamed European power. During and after the Civil War, the bluecoats thus approached their wars against the Indians as they had for the past century – via individual trial and error, gained through hard experience, rather than according to thoughtful doctrine.

### Biographies

Utley’s giant shadow extends into the biographical realm, where authors have added much to our understanding of military–Indian conflicts of the late nineteenth century. His works on Lt. Col. George A. Custer and Sitting Bull offer important insights on the era’s most famous leaders. Utley (1988) portrays Custer as a flawed but talented officer who patterned his conduct at the Little Bighorn after earlier successes. Custer, he argues, died the victim of bad luck rather than

his own bad leadership, a significant departure from the more critical assessment of Stephen E. Ambrose (1975). In *The Lance and the Shield* (Utley 1993) Sitting Bull emerges as the principal leader of the remarkable Cheyenne, Brule, Oglala, Sans Arc, Miniconjou, Hunkpapa, and Blackfeet coalition that crushed Custer. To the end, writes Utley, Sitting Bull was a "Hunkpapa patriot, steadfastly true to the values and principles and institutions that guided his tribe" (314). In so doing, Sitting Bull became a spiritual, military, and political leader who steadfastly resisted the forced acculturation of reservation life.

From the army's perspective, commanding generals William Sherman, Phil Sheridan, and Nelson A. Miles have received considerable attention. John F. Marszalek (1993) explains Sherman's western policies as part of his subject's larger search for order. The messy and complex milieu of fiercely independent Indian tribes and uncontrollable non-Indian settlers jarred Sherman's sense of propriety, argues Marszalek. Not surprisingly, he contends that Sherman sought to impose order through the firm hand of the army. Paul Andrew Hutton's (1985) biography remains the most compelling examination of Sheridan, who as department and division commander oversaw some of the army's largest campaigns against American Indians. Hutton successfully places his subject's well-known determination to force the tribes to accept government reservations within the larger contexts of Reconstruction and the Gilded Age. Both Marszalek and Hutton offer objective, though sympathetic, analyses of their subjects. More critical is Robert Wooster's (1993) depiction of Sheridan's successor, Nelson A. Miles. Though recognizing Miles's personal bravery (he would eventually be awarded a Medal of Honor for his courageous leadership in the Battle of Chancellorsville) and skilled military leadership, Wooster finds his subject's broader influence limited by his massive ego and refusal to help modernize the army of the late 1880s and 1890s.

Good biographies also depict the lives of a number of other army officers. Among the best of this genre are Charles M. Robinson, III's treatments of Ranald S. Mackenzie (1993) and George Crook (2001), who along with Miles ranked among the army's most active campaigners. Having graduated first from his West Point class of 1862, the hard-charging Mackenzie, known as "Bad Hand" (for wounds suffered during the Civil War) by many Indians, led troops in the controversial foray into Mexico at Remolino in 1873, slaughtered hundreds of Indian ponies following his victory at Palo Duro Canyon the following year, and fought in several engagements during the Powder River campaign in 1876. Robinson argues that the insanity that drove Mackenzie out of the service at the age of 43 resulted not from syphilis, but from the post traumatic stress disorder stemming from his own wounds and many battlefield experiences. More famous, but according to Robinson less successful as a military leader, was George Crook, a controversial enigma whose penchant for insuring that friendly journalists and soldier-authors accompanied his columns helped his reputation. In his later life, Crook became noted for his outspoken advocacy for Indian rights, a trait that Robinson argues came from his subject's genuine concerns for those he had fought so often. Both Mackenzie and Crook are depicted from the perspective of an enlisted man in Sherry L. Smith's *Sagebrush Soldier* (1989). Richard Irving Dodge's



three books (1876, 1877, 1882), four volumes of his journals (Kime 1996, 1997, 2000, 2002), and a biography by Wayne R. Kime (2006), the editor of those journals, provide insight into army operations and the attitudes of a senior officer during his two decades of service in the West following the Civil War.

Scholars have recognized that wives played vital roles not only in supporting and promoting their husbands' military careers, but in shaping and influencing garrison life. Patricia Stallard's *Glittering Misery: Dependents of the Indian-Fighting Army* (1978) remains the most thorough introduction. Careful research reveals that many officers' wives, though not directly challenging traditional notions of domesticity, subtly influenced very public activities. The best of these works are William H. Leckie and Shirley A. Leckie, *Unlikely Warriors: General Benjamin H. Grierson and His Family* (1984) and Robert H. Steinbach, *A Long March: The Lives of Frank and Alice Baldwin* (1989). Shirley A. Leckie, *Elizabeth Bacon Custer and the Making of a Myth* (1993), emphasizes Libbie's role in making her deceased husband a popular hero. In many senses a "professional widow," Ms. Custer spent 50 years shaping her husband's memory, paid at the terrible personal price of forsaking an independent life of her own. In a fascinating article, Verity McInnis (2005) argues that frontier officers' wives used feudal imagery and notions of courtly love to exploit accepted codes of military honor, in the process securing for themselves greater personal safety and authority in their often isolated environments. Editions of the memoirs of William Henry Corbusier (Wooster 2003) and the "recollections" of his wife, Fanny Dunbar Corbusier (Stallard 2003) allow comparison of differing perspectives on several topics and incidents. A child's perspective is recorded in Mary Leefe Laurence's *Daughter of the Regiment: Memoirs of a Childhood in the Frontier Army, 1878–1898* (1999).

### Little Bighorn

On June 25, 1876, an unusually large coalition of northern Plains tribes annihilated Lieutenant Colonel George Custer and much of the Seventh Cavalry Regiment along the banks of the Little Bighorn River. Scholarship on this most famous battle of the period abounds. For his part, Robert Utley realized that one must understand the Indian's side of the story in order to adequately deal with the army who fought them. In his *Custer and the Great Controversy* (1962) he identifies a key to beginning to understand the Battle of the Little Bighorn. "One cannot emerge from a study of Indian testimony without the thought that it may some day, if sifted through the right mental equipment, unravel the enigma of the Little Bighorn." Further development came in his biography of George Custer, in which Utley (1988) outlines the questions that had dominated traditional approaches: "How could it have happened? What flagrant blunders produced so awful a debacle? How could a commander and a regiment widely perceived as the best on the frontier succumb so spectacularly to a mob of untrained, unlettered natives?" Utley then pointed out something that many previous scholars, in their quest to either lionize or demonize Custer, seemed to have ignored. "The simplest answer," he concludes,

“is that the army lost largely because the Indians won” (p. 194). After all, the Sioux and Cheyenne were confident, well-led, and enjoyed numerical superiority.

Recent scholarship has continued in the analytical tradition pioneered by Utley. Much broader than its title suggests, John S. Gray’s *Custer’s Last Campaign: Mitch Boyer and the Little Bighorn Reconstructed* (1991) is a difficult but rewarding read. Gray uses the testimony of several Indian scouts and time-motion analysis to establish Custer’s last movements in meticulous detail. Larry Sklenar, *To Hell with Honor: Custer and the Little Bighorn* (2000), attempts to rehabilitate Custer’s sometimes tarnished reputation. Arguing that Custer’s tactics represented a reasonable attempt to unnerve and confuse his enemies, Sklenar faults Maj. Marcus Reno for failing to properly support his commanding officer. At least implicitly, Sklenar suggests that Custer could have won the battle.

Students of the Little Bighorn received an important source of historical artifacts after an August 1983 grassfire laid bare the battlefield. The results of these intense recovery efforts are summarized in Douglas D. Scott, P. Willey, and Melissa A. Connor, *They Died with Custer: Soldiers’ Bones from the Battle of the Little Bighorn* (1998), and Richard A. Fox, Jr., *Archaeology, History, and Custer’s Last Battle* (1993). Adopting a decidedly revisionist tact, Fox contends that archaeological evidence demonstrates that Custer’s men were not victims of malfunctioning weapons or shortages of ammunition. Nor was there anything resembling a “defiant last stand” (330). Instead, he argues that the exhausted Seventh Cavalrymen, having only minimal training and little sense of unit cohesiveness, “rode into battle susceptible to the deleterious effects of shock” (271); the effectiveness of their carbines negated by the close-in fighting and the unexpectedly large number of repeating weapons among the Indians, Custer’s mounted battalion quickly disintegrated.

### Other Military Operations

Fighting between the United States and American Indians during the Civil War was long a stepchild of both Civil War and Indian wars specialists. For many years, Jay Monaghan’s *Civil War on the Western Border* (1955) served as the standard history of the period, but Alvin M. Josephy, Jr., *The Civil War in the American West* (1991) has now taken center stage. In a broad survey, Josephy incorporates conflicts against the Indians into the larger war effort. He deals with the war thematically, moving, in turn, from the Confederate invasion of New Mexico, to the Sioux uprising in Minnesota, to the campaigns of Gen. Nathaniel P. Banks against Port Hudson and along the Red River, to wartime conflicts on the western trails, to the confusing struggles for control of Missouri, Arkansas, and Oklahoma. Of more focused analyses, David Paul Smith, *Frontier Defense in the Civil War: Texas’ Rangers and Rebels* (1992), argues that the volunteer forces cobbled together by the Lone Star state during the Civil War provided effective replacements for the regulars, who had been recalled from their western garrisons to fight the Confederates.

Several scholars have examined the impact of the wars against the Indians upon US military policy. Many have suggested that the army eventually adopted elements

of what is now known as “total warfare” – especially as practiced during the Civil War – to fight Indians. In a revisionist work, however, Robert Wooster, *The Military and United States Indian Policy, 1865–1903* (1988), argues that the regulars were too divided and focused on other security challenges to adopt any specialized doctrine directed at Indians. Seeking to minimize the direct connection between the Civil War and the nation’s subsequent conflicts in the West, Wooster insists that methods commonly associated with total warfare had long been employed when fighting Indians, and that the army “reached no clear consensus” (143) about how best to defeat the tribes. Taking a different tack, military historian Russell F. Weigley has frequently suggested that the US Army’s penchant for mobility, crucial to fighting Indians west of the Mississippi River, directly influenced subsequent doctrine. This theme may be found most directly in his essay, “The Long Death of the Indian-Fighting Army” (1987). Brian Linn, *Guardians of Empire: The United States Army and the Pacific, 1902–1940* (1997), points out the links between the “old army” and the more modern force that occupied the nation’s new Pacific empire. As Linn notes, many officers who fought against the Filipino insurgency had also been present during the army’s occupation of the American West.

Scholars have long bemoaned the army’s institutional failure to take counterinsurgency doctrine more seriously. In an important essay, John M. Gates (1983) points to the army’s long history of involvement in such operations. Andrew J. Birtle’s more recent *U. S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1860–1941* (2001) thoroughly documents numerous examples where the army practiced irregular warfare during and after the Civil War. In this well-researched volume, Birtle demonstrates that many officers understood the necessity of balancing force with programs designed to win the “hearts and minds” of local populations. Although finding a “strong continuity in the manner in which the U. S. Army performed counterinsurgency and overseas constabulary missions” (vii), Birtle acknowledges that such programs were designed on an ad hoc basis through informal networking rather than as a result of formal doctrine.

Historians of the wars between the United States and American Indians after 1861 have more commonly focused on the operational level. The best practitioner of this craft is Jerome A. Greene, author of important books on the Great Sioux War (1991) and the war against Chief Joseph and the Nez Perce (2000), the Powder River Expedition of 1876 (2003), and the army’s 1867–9 campaigns against the Southern Cheyennes (2004). Collectively, Greene’s work symbolizes the best of traditional operational histories. Skillfully exploiting Indian as well as army sources, he offers balanced narratives of some of the most important conflicts of the period. Shying away from any dramatic reinterpretations or judgments, his works are instead typified by careful analysis and an unusually good sensitivity to the cultural clashes that often led to violence. For the role of individual military posts in these conflicts, especially recommended are books by Paul Hedren (1988) and Douglas C. McChristian (2005) on Forts Laramie and Bowie, respectively.

Two books by Sherry Smith offer unusually perceptive insights into often-ignored aspects of the army–Indian conflicts. In *Sagebrush Soldier: Private William Earl Smith’s View of the Sioux War of 1876* (1989) Smith weaves a private’s diary

and numerous other first-hand accounts (by Indians as well as Anglos) into a compelling narrative which brilliantly captures the human side of the campaign. Here the mundane realities of life in the field are conjoined with the physical and emotional brutality of the sudden strike on an Indian village. Likewise, her *The View from Officers' Row: Army Perceptions of Western Indians* (1990), finds that military men and women were typically condescending and paternalistic in their views about American Indians. But opinions varied widely, insists Smith, with some coming to respect particular tribes and individual Indians.

### Army Life

Traditionally, military historians have focused on events from the “top down.” Closely scrutinizing troop movements and campaign plans, they have emphasized the deeds and decisions of leaders, or the “great captains.” More recently, students of the military experience have placed these events within appropriate cultural, economic, and social contexts, and examined more closely the lives of common soldiers. Edward M. Coffman’s magisterial *The Old Army: A Portrait of the American Army in Peacetime, 1784–1898* (1986) provides an immensely important account of army life, society, customs, and demography. Two decades after its publication, *The Old Army* remains the definitive bible on not only the officers, enlisted men, and dependents who comprised the nation’s frontier constabulary, but of the institution itself. Coffman’s exhaustively researched work blends traditional narrative accounts with demographic studies to paint a thoroughly objective account that captures the glories, as well as the tragedies, of military life in nineteenth century America. Less comprehensive studies include books by Robert Wooster (1987) and Don Rickey, Jr. (1963). In a highly original work, Kevin Adams (2009) contends that differences of class, rather than ethnicity, explained the yawning divide between enlisted men (40 percent of whom were foreign-born) and officers.

Following the Civil War, the United States reserved several regiments for black enlisted men, and these units – the Ninth and Tenth Cavalry, and the Twenty-fourth and Twenty-fifth Infantry – saw extensive frontier service. Charles L. Kenner (1999) offers a thoroughly researched narrative of the most famous of these regiments, the Ninth Cavalry. William A. Dobak and Thomas D. Phillips, *The Black Regulars, 1866–1898* (2001), argue that racial prejudice, while evident, had less of an impact on the treatment the army’s black troops received than is sometimes believed. Dobak and Phillips also demonstrate that the term “buffalo soldier,” which has now become an accepted label for these soldiers, came into usage well after their original terms of service. Paul H. Carlson describes the experiences of an unfortunate company of African American soldiers that got lost – and ran out of water – in the blazing summer heat of the Texas Panhandle in his *The Buffalo Soldier Tragedy of 1877* (2003). James N. Leiker, *Racial Borders: Black Soldiers Along the Rio Grande* (2002), broadens this approach to examine relationships between whites, Hispanics, Indians, and black soldiers in the Southwest.

### The Army and Western Nation-Building

The frontier army did much more than simply fight Indians: it built roads, conducted scientific explorations, stimulated economic growth, and brought new cultures to the frontiers. Robert G. Athearn's *William Tecumseh Sherman and the Settlement of the West* (1956) was among the first works to focus on the army's "nation-building" activities following the Civil War, placing particular emphasis on Sherman's role in encouraging western railroad construction. The army's close association with railroads is also the subject of fascinating studies by Robert G. Angevine (2004) and M. John Lubetkin (2006). Michael L. Tate (1999) has documented the army's role in advancing science, assisting emigrants, improving communication and transportation, enforcing laws, providing public relief, and advancing culture across much of the American West. Tate's synthesis illustrates the "multipurpose" nature of the nineteenth century American Army. The army also had an important economic impact in the West. Soldiers spent their pay; War Department contractors bought food, fuel, forage, and building materials; the army employed battalions of civilian freighters, scouts, and mechanics. The best and most ambitious of a burgeoning literature on this subject is Thomas T. Smith, *The U. S. Army and the Texas Frontier Economy, 1845–1900* (1999). Smith concludes that the army disbursed \$58 million in Texas from 1849 to 1889, equivalent to fully 8 percent of the valuation increase in state property during that period. In another important study, Darlis A. Miller (1989) points out that "the military was the single largest employer of civilians in the Southwest"; moreover, she concludes that army money was "widely distributed, reaching all segments of society" (353–4).

Several related studies also merit attention. William A. Dobak (1998), Thomas R. Buecker (1999), and Robert Wooster (2006) have all tied their histories of individual forts to civilian regional development. By contrast, in his study of the Fort Griffin region of Texas, Ty Cashion (1996) argues that the army "was not as influential as writers have asserted" (291). Of course, civilians often criticized the army for not pushing its wars against the Indians more aggressively, and sometimes turned to volunteers or state militias to carry out their bidding. The most famous of the non-regular army units were the Texas Rangers, an institution which has alternately been hailed by its champions and vilified by its critics. Fortunately, Robert M. Utley (2002) provides a balanced corrective of the group.

In light of such nation-building activities, it is not surprising that recent scholars have suggested that the army's relationship with American society as a whole was not as strained as once believed. In his study of American state-building in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, for example, Stephen Skowronek (1982) uses the army as an important case study. The army, he insists, was eventually reconstituted, just as were the civil service and the state's ability to regulate business, as part of the necessary transformation of the federal government. Charles A. Byler, *Civil-Military Relations on the Frontier and Beyond, 1865–1917* (2006) argues that although fears of a standing military remained evident, the army and

navy “actually fared reasonably well” (xiv) once the controversies of Reconstruction dimmed from memory.

### American Indian Military Resistance

Military historians have devoted less attention to the Indian side of the story. Although most have dabbled in Indian oral histories, anthropological records, and archaeological evidence, and are making concerted efforts to incorporate these materials into their studies, the lure of the army’s voluminous records, the vast stores of personal correspondence, and the written observations of civilians have proved irresistible to most military experts. Thus the balance still tilts to the federal side of the story. Ironically, many of those specializing in American Indian history have focused their attention on tribal cultures, societies, and politics, thus widening this gap. Fortunately, there are exceptions. Frank Raymond Secoy’s *Changing Military Patterns on the Great Plains* (1992 [1953]), traces the impact of guns and horses upon Indian military affairs in the west. Stan Hoig, *Tribal Wars of the Southern Plains* (1993), boasts a good analysis of Indian combat tactics and emphasizes the importance of military affairs to tribal culture and structure, William Y. Chalfant focuses on a single battle in *Cheyennes at Dark Water Creek* (1997), Jerome A. Greene’s *Lakota and Cheyenne: Indian Views of the Great Sioux War, 1876–1877* (1994) presents that conflict as seen through Indian eyes, while Orin G. Libby does the same for a single campaign in *Arikara Narrative of Custer’s Campaign and the Battle of the Little Bighorn* (1998). Jeffrey Ostler (2004) challenges recent interpretations of Wounded Knee by charging that General Miles and the army used the Ghost Dance movement, which Ostler dubs an “anticolonial movement” (262), to justify “a massive military operation, designed in part to demonstrate the continued relevance of the western army” (9). Tribal histories with detailed examinations of warfare include Donald J. Berthrong, *The Southern Cheyennes* (1963); Royal B. Hassrick, *The Sioux: Life and Customs of a Warrior Society* (1964); and Paul H. Carlson, *The Plains Indians* (1998). Karl W. Laumbach’s richly detailed *Hembrillo: An Apache Battlefield of the Victorio War* (2000), uses archeology and forensics to capture the Apache perspective. Of course, the army often hired Indians to combat other Indians, and Thomas W. Dunlay’s *Wolves for the Blue Soldiers: Indian Scouts and Auxiliaries with the United States Army 1860–1890* (1982), is a well-researched history of this practice.

Biographies of Indian military leaders also offer useful perspectives. Robert W. Larson provides balanced accounts of Lakota military and political leaders *Red Cloud* (1997) and *Gall* (2007). David Roberts’ *Once They Moved Like the Wind: Cochise, Geronimo, and the Apache Wars* (1993) is a sympathetic narrative of the two most important Chiricahua war leaders. Kingsley Bray (2006) delves into the childhood and character of Crazy Horse to weave a more nuanced account of his life than contained in previous biographies. Countering the usual tendency to view these disputes from either an American Indian or United States perspective, Richard B. Etulain and Glenda Riley, eds., *Chiefs and Generals: Nine Men Who*



*Shaped the American West* (2004), includes essays on Red Cloud, Victorio, Chief Joseph, Geronimo, Oliver O. Howard, Crook, Custer, Mackenzie, and Miles. Brad D. Lookingbill (2006) describes the captivity of Kiowa, Cheyenne, Comanche, and Arapaho chiefs held by the Army.

### Opportunities for Further Research

As Bruce Dinges (1991) has noted, recent scholarship on the Indian wars of the Trans-Mississippi has successfully incorporated the “new” military history into the field. Nonetheless, several aspects of these conflicts are especially attractive for future scholars. As noted earlier, systematic studies of Indian tactics and operations are badly needed. And Sherry L. Smith (1998) has pointed out that many modern western historians have minimized – or too often even ignored – the army’s role in regional development. Of course, this trend away from things military makes it all the more important that military historians themselves integrate all aspects of American politics, culture, and society into their own works.

Relatively few comparisons have been made between the US experiences with Indians and European powers’ confrontations with indigenous peoples. James O. Gump, *The Dust Rose Like Smoke: The Subjugation of the Zulu and the Sioux* (1994), offers a notable and provocative exception. Gump points out that Zulus and Sioux had undergone profound economic and territorial expansion in the years prior to their encounters with western powers. At Little Bighorn (1876) and Isandhlwana (1879), each of these groups annihilated powerful invading columns, using superior numbers and tactics to defeat western commanders who divided their forces and failed to conduct adequate reconnaissance. But the victories proved short-lived; the sharp challenges for control of land, labor, and resources posed by global powers Britain and the United States, the “breechloader revolution” (137), and the internal divisions between indigenous collaborators and resisters overwhelmed the abilities of both Sioux and Zulus to defend their interests. Similarly, Bruce Vandervort (2006) finds that, by the late nineteenth century, the governments of Canada, Mexico, and the United States “became much more proactive” (xiv) in wiping out cross-border sanctuaries traditionally used by Indians. Additional comparative studies would suggest fresh new perspectives and help to place the late nineteenth century wars for American empire within a global context.

Innovative research by Thomas T. Smith has greatly clarified and illuminated our understanding of the tactics of army–Indian warfare, but considerably more work can be done here as well. Smith’s ground-breaking essay, “U.S. Army Combat Operations in the Indian Wars of Texas, 1849–1881” (2000), confirms many of the generalizations of earlier scholars, albeit in a much more systematic fashion. Basing his work on his thorough scouring of official army documents, Smith analyzes the 219 engagements between Texas-based army units and Indians between 1849 and 1881 (about 20 percent of all the US Army–Indian conflicts during that period). Nearly half of these fights involved parties of 20 or fewer Indians, and almost three in four involved an army unit of less than company

strength (a company in the field typically numbered between 35 and 70 soldiers). Smith's conclusion that 70 percent of these fights were hasty attacks, in which the attacker sacrificed coordination in order to gain the advantage of speed and surprise, emphasizes the extraordinarily fluid nature of Plains warfare. But similar studies of conflicts elsewhere are needed if we are to truly understand the complex realities of warfare between American Indians and the United States in the late nineteenth century.

#### BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Adams, Kevin (2009). *Class and Race in the Frontier Army: Military Life in the West, 1870–1890*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Ambrose, Stephen E. (1975). *Crazy Horse and Custer: The Parallel Lives of Two American Warriors*. New York: Doubleday.
- Angevine, Robert G. (2004). *The Railroad and the State: War Politics, and Technology in Nineteenth Century America*. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Athearn, Robert G. (1956). *William Tecumseh Sherman and the Settlement of the West*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Beasley, Conger, Jr. (1995). *We Are a People in This World: The Lakota Sioux and the Massacre at Wounded Knee*. Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press.
- Berthrong, Donald J. (1963). *The Southern Cheyennes*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Birtle, Andrew J. (2001). *U. S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1860–1941*. Washington: Center of Military History.
- Bray, Kingsley M. (2006). *Crazy Horse: A Lakota Life*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Buecker, Thomas R. (1999). *Fort Robinson and the American West, 1874–1899*. Lincoln: Nebraska State Historical Society.
- Byler, Charles A. (2006). *Civil–Military Relations on the Frontier and Beyond, 1865–1917*. Westport, CT: Praeger Security International.
- Carlson, Paul H. (1998). *The Plains Indians*. College Station: Texas A&M University Press.
- Carlson, Paul H. (2003). *The Buffalo Soldier Tragedy of 1877*. College Station: Texas A&M University Press.
- Cashion, Ty (1996). *A Texas Frontier: The Clear Fork Country and Fort Griffin, 1849–1887*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Chalfant, William Y. (1997). *Cheyennes at Dark Water Creek: The Last Fight of the Red River War*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Coffman, Edward M. (1986). *The Old Army: A Portrait of the American Army in Peacetime, 1784–1898*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Dawson, Joseph G., III (1990). *The Late 19th Century U. S. Army, 1865–1898: A Research Guide*. New York: Greenwood Press.
- Dinges, Bruce J. (1991). "New Directions in Frontier Military History: A Review Essay," *New Mexico Historical Review*, 66:1 (January), 103–16.
- Dobak, William A. (1998). *Fort Riley and its Neighbors: Military Money and Economic Growth, 1853–1895*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Dobak, William A., and Thomas D. Phillips (2001). *The Black Regulars, 1866–1898*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Dodge, Richard Irving (1876). *The Black Hills*. New York: J. Miller.

- Dodge, Richard Irving (1877). *The Plains of the Great West and Their Inhabitants*. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons [reprint edition: Kime, Wayne R., ed. (1989). *The Plains of the Great West and Their Inhabitants*. Newark: University of Delaware Press].
- Dodge, Richard Irving (1882). *Our Wild Indians*. Hartford: A. D. Worthington, and Chicago: A. G. Nettleton.
- Dunlay, Thomas W. (1982). *Wolves for the Blue Soldiers: Indian Scouts and Auxiliaries with the United States Army 1860–1890*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
- Etulain, Richard B., and Glenda Riley, eds. (2004). *Chiefs and Generals: Nine Men Who Shaped the American West*. Golden, CO: Fulcrum Press.
- Fox, Richard A., Jr. (1993). *Archaeology, History, and Custer's Last Battle: The Little Big Horn Reconsidered*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Gates, John M. (1983). "Indians and Insurrectos: The U. S. Army's Experience with Insurgency," *Parameters*, 13 (March), 59–68.
- Glasrud, Bruce A., and Michael N. Searles, eds. (2007). *Buffalo Soldiers in the West: A Black Soldiers Anthology*. College Station: Texas A&M University Press.
- Gray, John S. (1991). *Custer's Last Campaign: Mitch Boyer and the Little Bighorn Reconstructed*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
- Greene, Jerome A. (1991). *Yellowstone Command: Colonel Nelson A. Miles and the Great Sioux War, 1876–1877*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
- Greene, Jerome A. (1994). *Lakota and Cheyenne: Indian Views of the Great Sioux War, 1876–1877*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Greene, Jerome A. (2000). *Nez Perce Summer, 1877: The U. S. Army and the Nee-Me-Poo Crisis*. Missoula: Montana Historical Society Press.
- Greene, Jerome A. (2003). *Morning Star Dawn: The Powder River Expedition and the Northern Cheyennes, 1876*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Greene, Jerome A. (2004). *Washita: The U. S. Army and the Southern Cheyennes, 1867–1869*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Gump, James O. (1994). *The Dust Rose Like Smoke: The Subjugation of the Zulu and the Sioux*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
- Hassrick, Royal B. (1964). *The Sioux: Life and Customs of a Warrior Society*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Hedren, Paul (1988). *Fort Laramie in 1876: Chronicle of a Frontier Post at War*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
- Hoig, Stan (1961). *The Sand Creek Massacre*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Hoig, Stan (1993). *Tribal Wars of the Southern Plains*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Hutton, Paul Andrew (1985). *Phil Sheridan and His Army*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
- Joseph, Alvin M., Jr. (1991). *The Civil War in the American West*. New York: Knopf.
- Kenner, Charles L. (1999). *Buffalo Soldiers and Officers of the Ninth Cavalry, 1867–1898: Black and White Together*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Kime, Wayne R., ed. (1996). *The Black Hills Journals of Colonel Richard Irving Dodge*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Kime, Wayne R., ed. (1997). *The Powder River Expedition Journals of Colonel Richard Irving Dodge*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Kime, Wayne R., ed. (2000). *The Indian Territory Journals of Colonel Richard Irving Dodge*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Kime, Wayne R., ed. (2002). *The Sherman Tour Journals of Colonel Richard Irving Dodge*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.

- Kime, Wayne R. (2006). *Colonel Richard Irving Dodge: The Life and Times of a Career Army Officer*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Larson, Robert W. (1997). *Red Cloud: Warrior-Statesman of the Lakota Sioux*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Larson, Robert W. (2007). *Gall: Dakota War Chief*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Laumbach, Karl W. (2000). *Hembrillo: An Apache Battlefield of the Victorio War*. Las Cruces, NM: Human Systems Research.
- Laurence, Mary Leefe (1999). *Daughter of the Regiment: Memoirs of a Childhood in the Frontier Army, 1878–1898*, ed. Thomas T. Smith. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
- Leckie, Shirley A. (1993). *Elizabeth Bacon Custer and the Making of a Myth*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Leckie, William H., and Shirley A. Leckie (1984). *Unlikely Warriors: General Benjamin H. Grierson and His Family*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Leckie, William H., and Shirley A. Leckie (2003). *The Buffalo Soldiers: A Narrative of the Black Cavalry in the West*, rev. ed. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Leiker, James N. (2002). *Racial Borders: Black Soldiers along the Rio Grande*. College Station: Texas A&M University Press.
- Libby, Orin G. (1998). *Arikara Narrative of Custer's Campaign and the Battle of the Little Bighorn*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Linn, Brian (1997). *Guardians of Empire: The United States Army and the Pacific, 1902–1940*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Lookingbill, Brad D. (2006). *War Dance at Fort Marion: Plains Indian War Prisoners*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Lubetkin, M. John (2006). *Jay Cooke's Gamble: The Northern Pacific Railroad, the Sioux and the Panic of 1873*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Marszalek, John (1993). *Sherman: A Soldier's Passion for Order*. New York: Free Press.
- McChristian, Douglas C. (2005). *Fort Bowie, Arizona: Combat Post of the Southwest, 1858–1894*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
- McInnis, Verity (2005). "Ladies of the Frontier Forts," *Military History of the West*, 35, 35–56.
- Miller, Darlis A. (1989). *Soldiers and Settlers: Military Supply in the Southwest, 1861–1885*. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press.
- Monaghan, Jay (1955). *Civil War on the Western Border, 1854–1865*. Boston: Little, Brown.
- Ostler, Jeffrey (2004). *The Plains Sioux and U. S. Colonialism from Lewis and Clark to Wounded Knee*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Rickey, Don, Jr. (1963). *Forty Miles a Day on Beans and Hay: The Enlisted Soldier Fighting the Indian Wars*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Roberts, David (1993). *Once They Moved Like the Wind: Cochise, Geronimo, and the Apache Wars*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Robinson, Charles M., III (1993). *Bad Hand: A Biography of General Ranald S. Mackenzie*. Austin: State House Press.
- Robinson, Charles M., III (2001). *General Crook and the Western Frontier*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Rothenberg, Gunther E. (1974). "Reassessing the Indian Fighting Army: A Review Essay," *Red River Valley Historical Review* 1:3 (Spring), 294–300.
- Scott, Douglas D., P. Willey, and Melissa A. Connor (1998). *They Died with Custer: Soldiers' Bones from the Battle of the Little Bighorn*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Secoy, Frank Raymond (1992 [1953]). *Changing Military Patterns on the Great Plains*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.

- Sklenar, Larry (2000). *To Hell with Honor: Custer and the Little Bighorn*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Skowronek, Stephen (1982). *Building a New American State: The Expansion of National Administrative Capacities, 1877–1920*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Smith, David Paul (1992). *Frontier Defense in the Civil War: Texas' Rangers and Rebels*. College Station: Texas A&M University Press.
- Smith, Sherry L. (1989). *Sagebrush Soldier: Private William Earl Smith's View of the Sioux War of 1876*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Smith, Sherry L. (1990). *The View from Officers' Row: Army Perceptions of Western Indians*. Tucson: University of Arizona Press.
- Smith, Sherry L. (1998). "Lost Soldiers: Re-Searching the Army in the American West," *Western Historical Quarterly*, 29:2 (January), 149–63.
- Smith, Thomas T. (1999). *The U. S. Army and the Texas Frontier Economy, 1845–1900*. College Station: Texas A&M University Press.
- Smith, Thomas T. (2000). "U.S. Army Combat Operations in the Indian Wars of Texas, 1849–1881," in *The Old Army in Texas: A Research Guide to the U.S. Army in Nineteenth-Century Texas*. College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 13–46.
- Stallard, Patricia (1978). *Glittering Misery: Dependents of the Indian-Fighting Army*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Stallard, Patricia (2003). *Fanny Dunbar Corbusier: Recollections of Her Army Life, 1869–1908*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Steinbach, Robert H. (1989). *A Long March: The Lives of Frank and Alice Baldwin*. Austin: University of Texas Press.
- Tate, Michael L. (1999). *The Frontier Army in the Settlement of the West*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Utley, Robert M. (1962). *Custer and the Great Controversy: The Origin and Development of a Legend*. Pasadena, CA: Westernlore Press.
- Utley, Robert M. (1963). *The Last Days of the Sioux Nation*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Utley, Robert M. (1967). *Frontiersmen in Blue: The United States Army and the Indian 1848–1865*. New York: Macmillan.
- Utley, Robert M. (1973). *Frontier Regulars: The United States Army and the Indian 1866–1891*. New York: Macmillan.
- Utley, Robert M. (1978). "The Frontier and the American Military Tradition," in James P. Tate, ed., *The American Military on the Frontier: The Proceedings of the 7th Military History Symposium*. Washington: Office of Air Force History, 3–13.
- Utley, Robert M. (1988). *Cavalier in Buckskin: George Armstrong Custer and the Western Military Frontier*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Utley, Robert M. (1993). *The Lance and the Shield: A Life and Times of Sitting Bull*. New York: Henry Holt.
- Utley, Robert M. (2002). *Lone Star Justice: The First Century of the Texas Rangers*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Vandervort, Bruce (2006). *Indian Wars of Mexico, Canada and the United States, 1812–1900*. New York: Routledge.
- Weigley, Russell (1987). "The Long Death of the Indian-Fighting Army," in Gerry P. Ryan and Timothy K. Nenninger, eds., *Soldiers and Civilians: The US Army and the American People*. Washington: National Archives and Records Administration, 27–39.
- Wooster, Robert (1987). *Soldiers, Sutlers, and Settlers: Garrison Life on the Texas Frontier*. College Station: Texas A&M University Press.

- Wooster, Robert (1988). *The Military and United States Indian Policy, 1865–1903*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Wooster, Robert (1993). *Nelson A. Miles and the Twilight of the Frontier Army*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
- Wooster, Robert, ed. (2003). *Soldier, Surgeon, Scholar: The Memoirs of William Henry Corbusier*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Wooster, Robert (2006). *Frontier Crossroads: Fort Davis and the West*. College Station: Texas A&M University Press.



## Chapter Eight

# THE SPANISH–AMERICAN AND PHILIPPINE WARS, 1898–1902

*Graham A. Cosmas*

The Spanish–American War of 1898 was a small war with large consequences. In the space of five months, the United States secured for itself an overseas empire. It annexed outright Spain’s former possessions, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines, and established a de facto protectorate over Cuba. As a side result, the United States completed its acquisition of Hawaii. Annexation of the Philippines led to a second war, more costly and difficult than that with Spain, one between American forces and Filipino nationalists. That conflict ran from early 1899 to its official end in 1902, but localized revolts and skirmishes continued after that date. Occurring as the US Army and Navy were in the early stages of organizational, technological, and tactical reform, the Spanish war accelerated that process but did not change its fundamental direction. In the world at large, the events of 1898 signaled the emergence of the United States as at least an adjunct member of the “club” of great imperial powers (Graves 1992, Traxel 1998). Each of these events was the subject of controversy at the time, and historians since have continued those debates and added new issues reflecting the concerns of their own eras.

Before the Spanish–American War, there was the Cuban–Spanish War. From 1895 until the US intervention in 1898, Cuban irregulars fought for independence from Spain in a struggle that laid waste much of the island. Publicized by insurgent propagandists and extensively covered and sensationalized by American journalists, the Cuban people’s suffering at the hands of the Spaniards inflamed US public opinion even as the chaos in Cuba threatened American investments in the island’s sugar industry and American strategic interests in the Caribbean. Without the Cuban–Spanish War, America’s war with Spain would not have taken place at the time and in the way that it did.

Historians have produced sharply differing interpretations of the course of the Cuban–Spanish War and the United States role in ending it. In the story as told by Cuban nationalist historians, a united Cuban people, after inflicting enormous Spanish casualties, had all but won the war by their own efforts, only to have the United States intervene to steal their victory and deny them true independence. Emilio Roig de Leuchsenring (1950) summed up this thesis in a speech that he

gave in 1923 that was later published as a book with the title: *Cuba No Debe su Independencia a los Estados Unidos* (Cuba does not owe its independence to the United States). Among non-Cuban historians, Philip Foner (1972) also emphasized the role of Cubans in winning their own freedom and the repressive role of the United States.

Although acknowledging the Cuban contribution to the struggle, John Lawrence Tone (2006) offers a more nuanced view of the war and America's part in it. Working from Spanish military archives only recently opened, Tone, a specialist in Spanish history, emphasizes the weakness of the insurgents, especially in the more highly developed western provinces of Cuba, and the effectiveness of Spanish strategy as executed by Captain General Valeriano Weyler y Nicolau. By mid-1897, Tone argues, Weyler's ruthless campaign had brought the insurgents to the edge of defeat. Only political changes in Spain that led to Weyler's recall and an effort to conciliate the insurgents, plus US military intervention, saved the revolution and secured what degree of independence the Cubans gained. Far from being united in its struggle, Tone pictures a Cuban society divided by region, class, and race; he notes that about as many Cubans bore arms for Spain in the war as fought in the rebel ranks. Along this same line, Ada Ferrer (1999) finds that, although Cuban revolutionary rhetoric proclaimed equality, white-over-black racial hierarchy ultimately prevailed in the insurgent ranks and was reinforced by the US occupation.

Whatever their views on the relative United States and Cuban contributions to the war's outcome, most historians agree that the conflict inflicted grievous harm upon the common people of Cuba. The principal cause of this suffering was General Weyler's policy of Reconcentration, the forced movement of thousands of Cubans from the countryside into the towns to deny food and support to the insurgents. Although Reconcentration achieved Weyler's military purpose, starvation and disease ravaged the poorly administered and supplied concentration zones. Historians' estimates of the number of *reconcentrados* who died range from as high as 300,000 to a low of 96,000. In what is perhaps the most thorough current assessment of the evidence, Tone (2006) concludes that between 155,000 and 170,000 persons perished in the Reconcentration camps, about 10 per cent of Cuba's then population of 1.7 million. And beyond the deaths, Cuba's agricultural economy was left in ruins.

Humanitarian outrage over conditions in Cuba helped to drive the United States to intervention, but historians have suggested many other motives. Especially during the years of post-World War I disillusionment, the Spanish War came to be viewed as unnecessary since Spain during 1897 supposedly had acceded to US demands that she cease Reconcentration and allow the Cubans autonomy – self-government within her empire. The war, then, had to be attributed to non-rational impulses of some kind. In what is still a most readable and occasionally insightful example of this literature, Walter Millis in *The Martial Spirit* (1931) described a bellicose public, inflamed by sensationalist newspapers, pushing a reluctant but weak President William McKinley toward a resort to arms. In similar vein, the political and cultural historian Richard Hofstadter (1952) ascribed the war to a “psychic crisis” among the American people caused by the closing of the

western frontier and the economic depression and class conflict of the late nineteenth century.

Since World War II, a number of diplomatic historians, notably David Trask (1981), Ernest May (1961), and H. Wayne Morgan (1963, 1965), on the basis of research in American and foreign archives, have cast grave doubt on the notion that Spain had agreed to all US demands and that the Cuban problem was solved before McKinley went to war. Spain, they point out, still rejected full Cuban independence, the only political solution acceptable to the insurgents. Within Cuba, Madrid's plans for establishing an autonomous insular government had met resistance and obstruction from the Spanish military and civilian colonial establishment. Spanish officers had rioted in Havana against autonomy. Thus, Spain's concessions were incomplete and her ability to implement them on the ground was minimal. Substantive reasons remained for US intervention.

Among historians who accept this point, however, there remain disagreements over the precise reasons for American intervention and over where the Spanish-American War fits into the context of late-nineteenth-century US expansionism. One school, associated with University of Wisconsin historian William Appleman Williams (1969), cites economic causes as the primary driver of expansion and war, notably American businessmen's search for foreign markets following the depression of the 1890s. A well-reasoned and researched example of this school is Walter LaFeber's *The New Empire* (1963). Other writers, including Trask (1981), May (1961), and Morgan (1963), see strategic motives (securing the Caribbean and the approaches to the future Central American canal) and humanitarian concerns as equally or more influential than economic interests. Recently, cultural factors have received attention. In *The New World Power* (2002), Robert E. Hannigan attempts a synthesis of strategic, economic, and cultural elements. He argues that, from McKinley to Woodrow Wilson, American leaders engaged in a search for a congenial global system, defined in terms of race, gender, nationality, and culture, in which "mature" white western powers maintained peace among themselves while guiding "immature" non-western peoples toward order and enlightenment. The war over Cuba was an early episode in that search.

Taking all these possible motives into account, the United States intervention in Cuba in 1898 would seem to have enjoyed a surfeit of causes. The Cuban-Spanish conflict affected virtually every sector of American society and every interest and sensibility. Perhaps the real question should be not why the US intervened but why it waited three years to do so.

On the night of February 15, 1898, as diplomatic relations between the United States and Spain were growing tense, the US battleship *Maine* exploded at its anchorage in Havana harbor, killing 267 members of its crew. The vessel had been sent to Havana to show the flag and pressure Spain after the anti-autonomy riot mentioned above. As everyone recognized at the time, most of the damage to the ship resulted from the detonation of part of its forward magazines. Then and since, the issue has been what set off the magazines.

At the time, the American press and public blamed the disaster on a Spanish mine. Two US Navy investigations, in 1898 and 1911, both endorsed the mine

explanation but named no perpetrator of the deed. The Spaniards, then and later, claimed the explosion had internal causes, possibly a fire in a coal bunker next to the magazine, a common risk in warships of that time. In a modern study based on a re-examination of the evidence collected by the earlier investigations, two Navy engineers, working at the direction of Admiral Hyman G. Rickover (1976), concluded that the Spaniards were right. In their study, published as *How the Battleship Maine was Destroyed*, they declared that the Navy investigators in 1898 and 1911 had been mistaken; there was no mine and the explosion had been entirely internal, probably caused by a coal bunker fire. However, surviving officers and crew members of the *Maine* insisted there had been no such fire, which would have been hard to overlook if it reached proportions that would ignite a magazine. Citing this objection to the Rickover thesis, Peggy and Harold Samuels (1995) revive the possibility of a mine. They note that various US officials in Cuba received threats and warnings of action against the *Maine* and that both anti-autonomy Spaniards and Cuban insurgents would have had means, motive, and opportunity for an attack. Viewed from the present era of global terrorism, the *Maine* in Havana harbor was a terrorist incident waiting to happen. However, after a century, no hard evidence of a conspiracy has surfaced. In the end, the verdict on the destruction of the *Maine* must be cause unknown but accident probable. What is certain is that the disaster in Havana helped push the United States and Spain to war.

After a final US diplomatic effort to persuade Spain to accept Cuban independence came to nothing, and with the Congress and public almost unanimously demanding action, President McKinley on April 11, 1898 asked Congress for authority to use the United States armed forces to restore peace in Cuba. On April 21, after Congress authorized intervention, McKinley ordered the US Navy's Atlantic squadron, already assembled at Key West, to blockade Havana and other Cuban ports. Formal declarations of war by the United States and Spain followed within days.

The coming of war found the US Army and Navy in the midst of profound organizational and technological change and also in the process of rethinking their missions in America's coming age of world power. James Abrahamson, in *America Arms for a New Century* (1981) provides an overview of this process and the ideas that drove it.

Influenced by Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan's theories of sea power and maritime commercial expansion, the Navy by 1898 was well into its transformation from a coast defense and commerce raiding force into a fleet dominated by steam-powered armored battleships capable of contesting for command of the high seas. Numerous general histories recount this process, notably Harold and Margaret Sprout's *The Rise of American Naval Power* (1939), Walter Herrick's *The American Naval Revolution* (1966), and Kenneth J. Hagan's *This People's Navy* (1991). Historians today view Mahan as a summarizer of widely held views rather than an originator of theory. The most authoritative current biography is Robert Seager II's *Alfred Thayer Mahan: The Man and His Letters* (1977). In *Professors of War* (1977), Ronald Spector recounts the history of the Naval War College, which became in the 1880s and 1890s the service's center of strategic theory and

planning. Peter Karsten, in *The Naval Aristocracy*, analyzes the naval officers of Mahan's era as a social group and attributes their efforts at reform partially to status anxiety and a search for promotion. The US Marine Corps, its role as ships' police and fighting top sharpshooters rapidly disappearing, also was trying to adapt to the new era of naval warfare, as Jack Shulimson describes in *The Marine Corps' Search for a Mission* (1993). Partly as a result of its actions in the Spanish-American War, the Corps began its evolution into the fleet's amphibious landing force.

The US Army of the period lacked a strategic thinker comparable to Mahan, but it experienced significant change in the decade between the ending of the Indian campaigns and the outbreak of war with Spain. The service concentrated its 25,000-man standing force at fewer larger posts, adopted new weapons (notably the bolt-action Krag-Jorgensen repeating rifle), began training its troops in open-order tactics, and invested in a major modernization of the nation's coast defenses. Like the Navy, it took tentative steps toward advanced officer professional education. Strategically, Army officers sought to justify improvement in their service in relation to the new Navy. Coast defense, for example, was presented as the defensive shield complementing the offensive sword of the battle fleet.

In *An Army for Empire* (1971), Graham Cosmas summarizes pre-war Army developments and also delivers a more favorable evaluation of the Army's Spanish War performance than did earlier accounts. The Army in 1898 benefited from the actions of its pre-war Commanding General, Major General John M. Schofield (1888-95). Donald B. Connelly (2006) provides details of Schofield's efforts to improve Army administration and his conceptual contribution to the post-war modernization of Army command and staff. Before and during the Spanish war, Army leaders struggled to remodel their infantry tactics for the lethal battlefield created by repeating rifles and machine guns. In *Crossing the Deadly Ground* (1994), Perry D. Jamieson concludes that the service made progress in adopting open-order tactics to replace Civil War era closed ranks, but that the problem of attacking against modern firepower was far from solved in 1898. Aspiring to be the war reserve of the Regular Army, the organized state militia, the National Guard, also tried to reform itself during the decades before 1898. In *The Rise of the National Guard*, Jerry Cooper (1997) provides a thorough account of this effort, its mixed results, and the Guard's achievements and failures in the conflict with Spain.

Both armed services expanded hastily to fight the war. For the Navy, mobilization was primarily a matter of acquiring various types of auxiliary vessels to support its core modern fleet of five battleships, two armored cruisers, and thirteen protected (partially armored) cruisers. To provide crews for the new vessels and fill out those of other fleet units, the Navy drew upon state Naval Reserve organizations. Trask, in *The War with Spain in 1898* (1981) fully describes naval preparations. The reader also can profitably consult French E. Chadwick's contemporary account, *The Relations of the United States and Spain: The Spanish-American War* (1911), and the summary and bibliography in *The Spanish-American War* published by the US Navy Historical Center for details of the naval buildup and operations (Crawford, Hayes, and Sessions 1998).

The Army's mobilization was more complicated and messy. Congress delayed until after the declaration of war any augmentation of the 25,000-man standing force. Late in April, it authorized expansion of the Regular Army to about 60,000 by adding men to existing regiments and created a Volunteer force to be organized and officered by the states. As a result, the bulk of the war Army of nearly 300,000 was made up of National Guard regiments taken into federal service. In addition, the federal government directly organized and officered some 10,000 US Volunteers, including the 1<sup>st</sup> US Volunteer Cavalry, Theodore Roosevelt's Rough Riders. In *An Army for Empire*, Cosmas recounts the organization, training, and equipping of this army. He concludes that, starting from an inadequate base of equipment and trained men, the service produced a competent force in a commendably short time, meanwhile dispatching three overseas expeditions at an early point in mobilization. Russell A. Alger, Secretary of War at the time, vigorously defends his own, the War Department's, and the Army's record in *The Spanish-American War* (Alger 1901).

Reflecting the concerns of a later age, historians have taken notice of the efforts of African Americans to gain a place in the fight against Spain. The four black regiments of the Regular Army, the 9<sup>th</sup> and 10<sup>th</sup> Cavalry and 24<sup>th</sup> and 25<sup>th</sup> Infantry, served valiantly in the battle for Santiago de Cuba, several men earning the Medal of Honor. African American Volunteer regiments, some drawn from southern black militia units, were mobilized but never saw combat and endured much discrimination, both in camp and outside it. The struggles of these African American patriots in the age of white supremacy and Jim Crow are well recounted by Bernard Nalty in *Strength for the Fight* (1986) and Marvin Fletcher in "The Black Volunteers in the Spanish-American War" (1974).

The military course of the war can be quickly summarized. Based on planning done by the Navy War College and an ad hoc joint board assembled by President McKinley, the United States blockaded Cuba, sent its Far East squadron to make a diversionary attack on Manila in the Philippines, and began mobilizing its Army for a possible assault on Havana. Action came first in the Philippines. On 1 May, Commodore George Dewey's squadron shot to pieces an overmatched Spanish naval force, leaving Manila helpless under American guns (Dewey 1900, Hattendorf 1998, Leeke 2009). Meanwhile, Spain's principal Atlantic battle squadron, four armored cruisers under Admiral Pascual Cervera, which the US Navy considered a threat that must be disposed of before any other action could be taken in Cuba, had made no appearance in the Caribbean. In response to these events, during the first days of May, President McKinley discarded the initial cautious US approach. He ordered immediate dispatch of an Army force, which eventually amounted to 20,000 men, to occupy Manila. At the same time, he directed an attack on Havana by 70,000 troops, to be launched as soon as supplies and transports could be assembled. As the first step in this operation, Major General William R. Shafter's V Army Corps, consisting of the bulk of the pre-war Regular Army, would secure a lodgment in Cuba at the port of Mariel, some 26 miles west of Havana. As state Volunteer regiments became ready for action, they would be dispatched to Mariel to reinforce the Regulars.



While preparations for these expeditions were under way, in late May Admiral Cervera's squadron finally arrived in the Caribbean and took refuge in the harbor of Santiago, the principal city of eastern Cuba, at the opposite end of the island from Havana. The US fleet quickly located the Spanish vessels and blockaded them. However, Rear Admiral William T. Sampson could not attack the enemy squadron because he and the Navy Department refused to risk the few American armored vessels against the guns and mines of Santiago's harbor defenses, which the Navy believed to be strong. Hence, the Navy asked for Army assistance in neutralizing the harbor fortifications. President McKinley and his Army and Navy advisers on May 26 reshaped their plans for the Caribbean. They directed Shafter's V Corps, concentrated at Tampa, to go to Santiago instead of Havana and assist the Navy in rooting out Cervera. Following up this operation, a separate force of Volunteer regiments was to invade Puerto Rico. If those operations, plus the attack on Manila, did not bring Madrid to terms, the Havana assault would occur in the autumn after the Army was fully mobilized.

These decisions shaped the campaigns. After delays in embarkation, Shafter's 15,000 troops landed east of Santiago on 22 June and marched on the city instead of attacking the harbor forts as Sampson had wished. The general's decision caused a bitter Army-Navy argument but all ended well. On July 1, the V Corps fought the war's only major land engagement at San Juan Hill and El Caney, taking Santiago's outer defenses at the cost of about 1,200 American dead and wounded (Cosmas 1986). With the city under siege and sure to fall, if only to starvation, Admiral Cervera on July 3 took his ships out of Santiago harbor in a vain attempt to escape capture. Sampson's warships destroyed the Spanish squadron, losing in the action one American sailor killed (Concas y Palau 1900, Trask 1998, Leeke 2009). The garrison of Santiago surrendered to Shafter's forces on July 14 (Sargent 1907). On the 25th, US troops under Major General Nelson A. Miles, Commanding General of the Army, landed in Puerto Rico. By mid-August, they had overrun most of the weakly defended island after skirmishes in which four Americans were killed and about 40 wounded (Demontravel 1998). At Manila, Major General Wesley Merritt's VIII Corps attacked the city on August 13 in what was something of a "fixed" battle, waged to give the Spanish governor an excuse to surrender, which he promptly did.

On July 18, having lost the best part of its fleet, with eastern Cuba in American hands, and with Puerto Rico and the Philippines under attack, Spain sued for peace. With France acting as intermediary, the United States and Spain concluded an armistice on August 12. Under its terms, Spain was to evacuate Cuba and Puerto Rico, which US forces would occupy. Madrid formally ceded Puerto Rico and Guam – which had surrendered to Captain Henry Glass and the USS *Charleston* on June 21, 1898 (Farenholt 1924) – to the United States and renounced sovereignty over Cuba, leaving its fate to be determined by the Americans and Cubans. Spain also agreed (too late to prevent the battle at Manila) that American forces would occupy the Philippine capital until the islands' future was settled at a formal peace conference, to assemble in Paris on October 1, 1898.

As an overall account of the war, covering diplomacy and land and naval operations, making wide use of American and Spanish sources, and including the view

from the Spanish side, Trask's *The War with Spain* (1981) is definitive. G. J. A. O'Toole (1984) provides a basic history for a general audience. Tone's (2006) volume on the Cuban–Spanish War includes an illuminating discussion of how Spaniards expected to win in 1898, to a great extent because they believed themselves racially superior to Americans. For the naval war, Chadwick's (1911) volumes, although old, are indispensable. Cosmas's *An Army for Empire* (1971) is the most thorough account available of the Army's difficulties, successes, and failures in the war. On Army tactics, Jamieson in *Crossing the Deadly Ground* (1994) notes that due to unique circumstances American troops in 1898 succeeded in attacks that would have been suicidal on the Western Front a decade later. The operations of 1898 were all joint, requiring Army–Navy cooperation. Many aspects of this subject are covered from various viewpoints in James Bradford's anthology *Crucible of Empire* (1993). Among first-hand accounts of the fighting, those of Charles Johnson Post (1960), John Bigelow, Jr. (1899), and Theodore Roosevelt (1899) on the land battles at Santiago and their aftermath are outstanding. An extensive list of first-person Navy accounts is in the Naval Historical Center's *The Spanish–American War* (Crawford, Hayes, and Sessions 1998).

In spite of the swiftness and completeness of the American triumph, which caused John Hay to label the conflict a “splendid little war,” it ended unhappily for the US Army and Navy. Both services were plagued by controversies and scandals. The Navy came off better than the Army. Nevertheless, Rear Admiral Sampson, the victor of Santiago, engaged in a prolonged, nasty argument with his principal subordinate, Commodore Winfield Scott Schley, over their roles in the campaign, keeping the public amused for many months. An official Navy publication (US Navy Department 1902) contains the record and documents of the court of inquiry that resulted.

The Army's war was not as neat and bloodless as the Navy's and provoked more controversy. Army officers, including temporary Colonel Theodore Roosevelt, loudly condemned General Shafter's tactics in the campaign and denounced the logistical performance of the War Department staff bureaus. Nelson A. Miles, the Major General Commanding the Army, had a bitter falling out with most of the War Department leadership, notably Secretary of War Alger. Miles made sensational newspaper headlines by accusing Alger, among other things, of providing the troops with unfit food that made them sick. Cosmas, in *An Army for Empire* (1971), reviews the details of this unedifying spectacle and concludes that Alger was guiltless of corruption and malfeasance. Regardless of his guilt or innocence, Alger nevertheless became a political liability for President McKinley, who finally compelled the besieged Secretary to resign in July 1899. This story is told in the McKinley biographies of H. Wayne Morgan (1963) and Margaret Leech (1959).

Although not caused by unfit food, sickness did ravage the Army in 1898 and left an indelible black mark on the service's record in the war. At Santiago following the Spanish surrender, the V Corps was rendered combat ineffective by malaria, dysentery, and a few cases of yellow fever. Fearing spread of the latter disease to the United States, the War Department hastily returned the corps to an initially ill-equipped quarantine camp at Montauk Point, Long Island. Newspapers filled columns with

tales of the suffering that resulted. Even more embarrassing, the Volunteer units, most of which sat out the war in camps in the United States, were hit by an epidemic of typhoid that sickened more than 20,000 men and killed about 1,500. In all, about 2,500 Army officers and men died of disease during the brief war, about ten times as many as fell in combat. This record was not unusual; in pre-twentieth century wars germs regularly slew as many or more men than did bullets.

In fact, the Army Medical Department's record was not all bad. Informed by the newly established germ theory of disease, Army medical officers in 1898 for the first time engaged in antiseptic surgery and made use of new technologies, for example x-ray machines, substantially reducing the number of men who died of wounds. After the war, they took the lead in the fight against tropical diseases and won many victories, notably Major Walter Reed's confirmation of the anopheles mosquito as the carrier of yellow fever. The trials and tribulations of the Army Medical Department, as well as its ultimate triumphs, are described in works by Mary C. Gillett (1995) and Vincent J. Cirillo (1999). Charles Johnson Post (1960) recounts an enlisted man's experience of sickness in Cuba and the evacuation to Montauk.

Then and now, the most controversial aspect of the Treaty of Paris, which formally ended the war, was the US annexation of all the Philippine Islands. President McKinley made the decision to demand this from Spain, and his motives for doing so have been much debated by historians, the more so as McKinley left little record of his private thoughts on the matter. Ephraim K. Smith, in "William McKinley's Enduring Legacy" (1993), summarizes the various schools of thought. At one extreme, historians picture a weak President, manipulated by an expansionist cabal headed by Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge and driven by public opinion, making a decision he scarcely understood. At the other extreme are historians who believe in a Macchiavellian McKinley, a skilled manipulator of men and events who from the start intended to seize the Philippines and engineered war with Spain, ostensibly over Cuba, to carry out his expansionist master plan. The middle position, which is reflected in McKinley's official communications to the American negotiators in Paris, interprets the President as a cautious, even reluctant, expansionist who arrived step by step at the conclusion that acquisition of the entire archipelago was the most practical course under the circumstances. In this view, McKinley made decisions incrementally while taking account of and attempting to shape public opinion to support his course.

Whatever his motives, with the Philippines President McKinley annexed another war (Salamanca 1984). While American troops were occupying Manila, Filipino nationalist forces, led by Emilio Aguinaldo and acting as allies or at least co-belligerents of the United States, drove the Spaniards out of the rest of the Philippines. At the end of hostilities, an organized Filipino army surrounded the American garrison of the capital. News of the Treaty of Paris shattered the fragile American-Filipino alliance. On February 4, 1899, just as the US Senate was debating ratification of the peace treaty, fighting broke out around Manila. The resulting conflict had two phases. In the first, which lasted throughout 1899, the US Army, gradually reinforced from the United States, scattered Aguinaldo's conventional forces on Luzon. In the second, more difficult phase, the Americans spread out to occupy the islands;

the Filipinos countered with a guerrilla war of ambush and terrorism. This phase of the war lasted until 1902, by which time the Americans had captured Aguinaldo and secured the surrender of most of the resistance leaders and their troops.

At peak strength, the US Army in the islands included about 70,000 men, in Regular Army units and new Volunteer regiments raised especially for this conflict. American deaths during the war amounted to about 5,000, most of them from disease. Estimates of Filipino military and civilian deaths caused directly or indirectly by the war run as high as 600,000. However, John Gates (1984) argues that the high estimates are unreliable, based on questionable statistical methods and colored by political bias. In a detailed demographic study of Batangas Province in Luzon, Glenn May (1985) also emphasizes the unreliability of census data in that period and concludes that most of the province's population loss in the years from 1887–1903 was due to recurrent disease epidemics only tangentially related to the war.

In the United States, the Philippine War was controversial at the time, endorsed as a necessary civilizing mission by many and opposed by a vocal minority of Anti-Imperialists that included such luminaries as Mark Twain and Andrew Carnegie. During the Vietnam conflict, a later anti-war generation echoed the Anti-Imperialist view of the conflict as a discreditable episode in American history. Prior to the 1960s historians usually attributed US victory in the Philippines to the fact that the Americans were simply better armed, better trained, and better supplied than their opponents (Zaide 1954, Dulles 1956).

A shift took place in historiography during the Vietnam era. Henceforth historians of the war have tended to sympathize with one or the other of the contemporary camps. Much of the argument centers around how the United States won the counterinsurgency war, which all agree it did. One school, typified by Leon Wolff in *Little Brown Brother* (1961) and Stuart C. Miller in "*Benevolent Assimilation*" (1982) repeats the anti-imperialist vision of a campaign of conquest, characterized by racist brutality, with massacre, torture, and devastation the pacification methods of choice. They note that Americans in the Philippines at times reconcentrated civilians in much the same way General Weyler had done in Cuba.

Although not defending imperialism as a policy, a second group of historians takes a more favorable view of how Americans conducted themselves as colonialists in the Philippines. For example, John Gates, in *Schoolbooks and Krags* (1973), while acknowledging that brutalities occurred, emphasizes that they were not the whole story and that American success stemmed in good part from benevolent efforts to win the "hearts and minds" of the Filipinos. Brian M. Linn (1989, 2000), in two thoroughly researched studies, pictures an Army that mixed conciliation and harshness, with conciliation predominant, in an ultimately effective combination. Andrew J. Birtle (1998), in a history of Army counterinsurgency doctrine and operations in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, reaches much the same conclusion as Linn. Historians of this school, notably Linn and Glenn May (1982, 1993), also address the question of why the resistance lost, attributing the failure to poor leadership, military mistakes, and class and ethnic divisions in Filipino society. Largely drawn from the Tagalog elite, the nationalists had no social

program to win the peasants and alienated the population through terrorism and brutality of their own. In the end, these authors argue, the majority of Filipinos found more incentives to accept American rule than to continue opposing it.

Focusing on Emilio Aguinaldo and the Filipino people, David Silbey (2007) concludes that erratic leadership and a society fragmented by race, ethnicity, and class division doomed the movement for self-government, but that the struggle unified the disparate peoples of the archipelago and helped prepare them for ultimate independence. Examining the transition from military to civilian administration of the islands, Rowland Berthoff (1953) concludes that civil-military friction was inevitable given the personalities involved and the faulty structure established to execute the shift of power from Military Governor Major General Arthur MacArthur to Civil Governor William Taft.

During the autumn and winter of 1898, the McKinley administration was preoccupied, not with the Philippines, but with Cuba. In accord with the terms of the August armistice, the US Army, in its largest operation of the war, managed the evacuation of some 150,000 Spanish troops from the island and replaced them with a 45,000-man American occupation force. Graham Cosmas describes the military details of this effort in "Securing the Fruits of Victory" (1974) and more briefly in the revised edition of *An Army for Empire* (1994). After a three-year occupation, the United States withdrew from Cuba, leaving behind an independent republic with strings on its independence that protected American strategic and economic interests. David Healy (1963) analyzes the policy-making process that led to this point, which involved lengthy bargaining among a variety of American personalities and interest groups as well as the Cuban nationalists. Healy concludes that in future US interventions in what is now called the "Third World," the Cuban model of indirect control, not the Philippine one of formal colonial rule, would prevail.

In the era of the world wars and the Cold War, the Spanish and Philippine conflicts largely faded into obscurity in American historical consciousness. With the end of the Cold War, however, and with the United States once more engaged in intervention – now labeled "peacekeeping" and "nation-building" – in disordered foreign states, the history and lessons of these earlier "little wars" again have attracted public and official interest (Trask and Perez 1998). For example, in 2007, the US Army's Combat Studies Institute at Fort Leavenworth published two monographs on counterinsurgency in the Philippine War as part of a series of "Occasional Papers" on the "Long War" against international terrorism (Ramsey 2007a, b). As the story of America as a world power continues to unfold, so will the conflicts at the turn of the twentieth century that signaled its beginning and shaped some of its modes of operation remain relevant.

#### BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Abrahamson, James L. (1981). *America Arms for a New Century: The Making of a Great Military Power*. New York: Free Press.
- Alger, Russell A. (1901). *The Spanish-American War*. New York: Harper and Brothers.
- Berthoff, Rowland T. (1953). "Taft and MacArthur, 1900–1901: A Study in Civil-Military Relations," *World Politics*, 5:2 (January), 196–213.

- Bigelow, John, Jr. (1899). *Reminiscences of the Santiago Campaign*. New York: Harper and Brothers.
- Birtle, Andrew J. (1998). *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1860–1941*. Washington: US Army Center of Military History.
- Bradford, James C., ed. (1993). *Crucible of Empire: The Spanish–American War and Its Aftermath*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Chadwick, French Ensor (1911). *The Relations of the United States and Spain: The Spanish–American War*, 2 vols. New York: Scribner's.
- Cirillo, Vincent J. (1999). *Bullets and Bacilli: The Spanish–American War and Military Medicine*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.
- Concas y Palau, Victor M. (1900). *The Squadron of Admiral Cervera*. Washington: Government Printing Office.
- Connelly, Donald B. (2006). *John M. Schofield and the Politics of Generalship*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Cooper, Jerry (1997). *The Rise of the National Guard: The Evolution of the American Militia, 1865–1920*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
- Cosmas, Graham A. (1971). *An Army for Empire: The United States Army in the Spanish–American War*. Columbia: University of Missouri Press [2nd edn., Shippensburg, PA: White Mane Publishing Company, Inc, 1994].
- Cosmas, Graham A. (1974). "Securing the Fruits of Victory: The U.S. Army Occupies Cuba, 1898–1899," *Military Affairs*, 38:3 (October), 85–91.
- Cosmas, Graham A. (1986). "San Juan Hill and el Caney, 1–2 July 1898," in Charles E. Heller and William A. Stofft, eds., *America's First Battles, 1776–1965*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 109–48.
- Crawford, Michael J., Mark L. Hayes, and Michael D. Sessions (1998). *The Spanish–American War: Historical Overview and Select Bibliography*. Washington: Naval Historical Center.
- Demontravel, Peter R. (1998). *A Hero to His Fighting Men: Nelson A. Miles, 1839–1925*. Kent, OH: Kent State University Press.
- Dewey, George (1900). *The War with Spain: Operations of the United States Navy on the Asiatic Station*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office.
- Dulles, Foster Rhea (1956). *The Imperial Years*. New York: Crowell.
- Farenholt, A. (1924). "Incidents of the Voyage of the USS *Charleston* to Manila in 1898," *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, 50: 753–70.
- Ferrer, Ada (1999). *Insurgent Cuba: Race, Nation, and Revolution, 1868–1898*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Fletcher, Marvin (1974). "The Black Volunteers in the Spanish–American War," *Military Affairs*, 38:2 (April), 48–53.
- Foner, Phillip (1972). *The Spanish–American War and the Birth of American Imperialism*, 2 vols. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Gates, John M. (1973). *Schoolbooks and Krags: The United States Army in the Philippines, 1899–1902*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
- Gates, John M. (1984). "War-Related Deaths in the Philippines, 1898–1902," *Pacific Historical Review*, 53:3 (August), 367–78.
- Gillett, Mary C. (1995). *The Army Medical Department, 1865–1917*. Washington: US Army Center of Military History.
- Graves, Ralph (1992). "When a Victory Really Gave Us a New World Order," *Smithsonian*, 22:3 (March), 88–97.



- Hagan, Kenneth J. (1991). *This People's Navy: The Making of American Sea Power*. New York: The Free Press.
- Hannigan, Robert E. (2002). *The New World Power: American Foreign Policy, 1898–1917*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Hattendorf, John B. (1998). "The Battle of Manila Bay," in Jack Sweetman, ed. *Great American Naval Battles*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 175–97.
- Healy, David F. (1963). *The United States in Cuba, 1898–1902: Generals, Politicians, and the Search for Policy*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
- Herrick, Walter R., Jr. (1966). *The American Naval Revolution*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.
- Hofstadter, Richard (1952). "Manifest Destiny and the Philippines," in Daniel Aaron, ed., *America in Crisis*. New York: A. A. Knopf, 173–200.
- Jamieson, Perry D. (1994). *Crossing the Deadly Ground: United States Army Tactics, 1865–1899*. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press.
- Karsten, Peter (1972). *The Naval Aristocracy: The Golden Age of Annapolis and the Emergence of Modern American Navalism*. New York: Free Press.
- LaFeber, Walter (1963). *The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion, 1860–1898*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Leech, Margaret (1959). *In the Days of McKinley*. New York: Harper and Row.
- Leeche, Jim (2009). *Manila and Santiago: The New Steel Navy in the Spanish–American War*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Linn, Brian M. (1989). *The U.S. Army and Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War, 1899–1902*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Linn, Brian M. (2000). *The Philippine War, 1899–1902*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
- May, Ernest R. (1961). *Imperial Democracy: The Emergence of America as a Great Power*. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World.
- May, Glenn (1982). "Why the United States Won the Philippine–American War, 1899–1902," *Pacific Historical Review*, 52:4 (November), 353–77.
- May, Glenn (1985). "150,000 Missing Filipinos: A Demographic Crisis in Batangas, 1887–1903," *Annales de Demographie Historique*, 1985. Paris: Editions de L'Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales.
- May, Glenn (1993). *Battle for Batangas: A Philippine Province at War*. Quezon City, Philippines: New Day Press.
- Miller, Stuart C. (1982). *"Benevolent Assimilation": The American Conquest of the Philippines, 1899–1903*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Millis, Walter (1931). *The Martial Spirit: A Study of Our War with Spain*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
- Morgan, H. Wayne (1963). *William McKinley and His America*. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press.
- Morgan, H. Wayne (1965). *America's Road to Empire: The War with Spain and Overseas Expansion*. New York: John Wiley and Sons.
- Nalty, Bernard C. (1986). *Strength for the Fight: A History of Black Americans in the Military*. New York: Free Press.
- O'Toole, G. J. A. (1984). *The Spanish War: An American Epic – 1898*. New York: W. W. Norton.
- Post, Charles Johnson (1960). *The Little War of Private Post: The Spanish–American War Seen Up Close*. Boston: Little, Brown.

- Ramsey, Robert D., III (2007a). *A Masterpiece of Counter guerrilla Warfare: BG J. Franklin Bell in the Philippines, 1901–1902*. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press.
- Ramsey, Robert D., III (2007b). *Savage Wars of Peace: Case Studies of Pacification in the Philippines, 1900–1902*. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press.
- Rickover, Hyman G. (1976). *How the Battleship Maine Was Destroyed*. Washington: Naval History Division, Department of the Navy.
- Roig de Leuchsenring, Emilio (1950). *Cuba No Debe su Independencia a los Estados Unidos*. Havana, Cuba: Sociedad Cubana de Estudios Históricos e Internacionales.
- Roosevelt, Theodore (1899). *The Rough Riders*. New York: Scribner.
- Salamanca, Bonifacio S. (1984). *The Filipino Reaction to American Rule, 1901–1913*. Hamden, CT: Shoe String Press.
- Samuels, Peggy, and Harold Samuels (1995). *Remembering the Maine*. Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press.
- Sargent, Herbert H. (1907). *The Campaign of Santiago de Cuba*, 3 vols. Chicago: A. C. McClure [reprinted: Freeport, NY: Books for Libraries Press, 1970].
- Seager, Robert, II. (1977). *Alfred Thayer Mahan: The Man and His Letters*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Shulimson, Jack (1993). *The Marine Corps Search for a Mission, 1880–1898*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
- Silbey, David J. (2007). *A War of Frontier and Empire: The Philippine–American War, 1899–1902*. New York: Farrar Straus & Giroux.
- Smith, Ephraim K. (1993). “William McKinley’s Enduring Legacy,” in James C. Bradford, ed., *Crucible of Empire: The Spanish–American War and Its Aftermath*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 204–49.
- Spector, Ronald H. (1977). *Professors of War: The Naval War College and the Development of the Naval Profession*. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press.
- Sprout, Harold, and Margaret Sprout (1939). *The Rise of American Naval Power, 1776–1918*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Tone, John Lawrence (2006). *War and Genocide in Cuba, 1895–1898*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Trask, David F. (1981). *The War with Spain in 1898*. New York: Macmillan.
- Trask, David F. (1998). “The Battle of Santiago,” in Jack Sweetman, ed. *Great American Naval Battles*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 198–218.
- Trask, David F., and Louis A. Perez, Jr. (1998). *The War of 1898: The United States and Cuba in History and Historiography*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Traxel, David (1998). *1898: The Birth of the American Century*. New York: A. A. Knopf.
- US Navy Department (1902). *Record of Proceedings of a Court of Inquiry in the Case of Rear-Admiral Winfield S. Schley, U.S. Navy*, 2 vols. Washington: Government Printing Office.
- Venzon, Anne Cipriano (1990). *The Spanish–American War: An Annotated Bibliography*. New York: Garland.
- Welsh, Richard E., Jr. (1979). *Response to Imperialism: The United States and the Philippine–American War*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Williams, William Appleman (1969). *The Roots of the Modern American Empire: A Study in the Growth and Shaping of Social Consciousness in a Marketplace Society*. New York: Random House.
- Wolff, Leon (1961). *Little Brown Brother: How the United States Purchased and Pacified the Philippine Islands at the Century’s Turn*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday.
- Zaide, Gregorio F. (1954). *The Philippine Revolution*. Manila: Modern Book Co.

## Chapter Nine

# AMERICA EMERGENT: THE UNITED STATES IN THE GREAT WAR

*Aaron Anderson and Michael Neiberg*

It is a fearful thing to lead this great peaceful people into war, into the most terrible and disastrous of all wars, civilization itself seeming to be in the balance. But the right is more precious than peace, and we will fight for the things which we have always carried nearest our hearts ... to such a task we can dedicate our lives and our fortunes, everything that we are and everything we have, with the pride of those who know that the day has come when America is privileged to spend her blood and her might for the principles that gave her birth and happiness and the peace which she has treasured.

(Woodrow Wilson's Resolution for War, April 2, 1917 (Link 1954: 282))

America had been a latecomer to nineteenth-century imperialism, yet in the two decades that followed the Spanish–American War of 1898, the United States evolved from a regional hegemon in the Western Hemisphere to a global power that commanded one of the victor's seats at the Paris Peace Conference. Never before had a great nation risen so rapidly, against such serious and divisive concerns as those that dominated the American socio-economic landscape in the early twentieth century: virulent racism; social changes brought on by the inequities of industrialization; vigorous anti-trust actions; and a large influx of immigrants from southern and eastern Europe whose appearance threatened both established elites and the working class alike. America's longstanding desire to keep clear of "entangling alliances" with the kings and empires of Europe was mitigated by the nation's need of foreign markets and free trade. The descent of "civilized" Europe into the abyss of the most deadly war ever fought shocked Americans, but also inexorably pulled the United States closer to conflict as a profitable, but often-deadly, neutrality proved increasingly untenable. Although the Great War represented the first time that American troops had fought in Europe and led to the nation's emergence as the world's largest creditor nation, popular understanding of the United States' participation in the Great War pales in comparison to that of the Civil War or World War II.

Scholarly appreciations are more complex than popular ones, as historians debate the ways that the Great War transformed domestic social and economic

patterns, in addition to transforming America's global role. Among general studies and reference works, David M. Kennedy's *Over Here* (1980) remains the gold standard of single-volume studies, delivering a fine scholarly examination of intellectual and social components of the war. Kennedy analyzes the war through a wide variety of social experiences, while focusing on the theme that America participation represented a "historic departure of the United States from isolation and all that isolation implied" (vii). John Whiteclay Chambers' *Tyranny of Change* (1992) provides an excellent mid-length scholarly overview of America's newfound imperialism and its march through a divisive Progressive Age that highlights "the penchant of American presidents during the era for using the nation's growing economic and military means in support of expansive national goals" (x).

Ronald Schaffer's *America in the Great War* (1991) argues that America's experience with total war led to a massive increase in the influence of the federal government in numerous facets of American daily life. In his view, the war acted as a watershed between an older, localized America, and the centralized, interconnected nation it became. Robert H. Zieger's *America's Great War* (2000) offers a socially oriented study that delves more deeply into the importance of race, class, and gender in a defining national event, while Meirion and Susie Harries *The Last Days of Innocence* (1997) suggests that all the lost lives and treasure of war netted America little but shattered turn-of-the-century confidence and loss of innocence. Byron Farwell's *Over There: The United States in the Great War* (1999) presents an informative social history survey of the war years that is inclusive of minority groups, while also touching on less prominent subjects like venereal disease and the telephone operators known as the "Hello Girls." More narrow in focus, the multi-volume official histories of the Army (US Department of the Army 1948) and the Air Service, precursor to the Air Force (Maurer 1978) describe the operations of those services and reproduce an extensive range and selection of original reports and documents. The Navy has yet to produce such a documentary work and there appeared only recently even a detailed narrative of its operations (Still 2006).

### The Road to War

American entry into World War I marked a sharp change in the nation's foreign policy, which in turned forced revolutionary changes on the military. The scholarly literature pits a selfish national desire for material gain (LaFeber 1963, Parrini 1967) against burgeoning idealism embodied in Progressivism and Wilsonian meliorism. Arthur Link (1954) argues that idealism, in tandem with the "big navy imperialists, the armor-plate monopoly, the big industrialists, and the bankers," influenced American entry (181). "The United States had by now become virtually an arsenal for the allies," while Wilson dreamed of a just, American brokered peace (172).

Other authors (Buehrig 1955, May 1959, Coogan 1981) have stressed the influence of Anglo-American cultural unity, the coinciding of the strategic interests of the two nations, and the role of Anglophile Woodrow Wilson as virtually guaranteeing the entry of the United States into the war as an ally of Great Britain.

Naval building programs and the development of a military-industrial complex that witnessed tremendous expansion prior to the Great War are analyzed in Paul Koistinen's well-regarded multi-volume *Mobilizing for Modern War* (1997), which argues that the "embryonic" military-industrial consortium that built the "New Navy" of the early twentieth century became a "permanent production team composed of government officials, naval officers, and industrialists that eroded the barriers between private and public, civilian and military institutions," enabling the industrial efforts of World War I (56).

Some newer works reflect methodological changes introduced by the new social history and other recent trends in the study of war and society. Thomas J. Knock's *To End All Wars* (1992) argues that Wilson's overriding desire to broker world peace at the war's conclusion was the main reason for his decision to enter the war, a contention that pervades many other studies as well. Fredrick S. Calhoun's *Power and Principle* (1986) and *Uses of Force* (1993) seek to illuminate the dichotomy created by the "idealist" Wilson's seven armed interventions in two terms, particularly the multiple pre-war uses of military power in the Western Hemisphere – most notably in Mexico, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti – but also in wartime France and later Russia. Calhoun generates five categories in which Wilson chose to use force, with each subject to Wilson's desire for limited application and restraint, "to control the military and not allow it to get carried away" (Calhoun 1986, 267).

The myriad arguments concerning American entry into the Great War elevate the significance of growing American economic and military power in an increasingly dangerous and uncertain world, counterbalanced by a self-righteous moral component of America's mission to spread peace and democracy. While traditional isolationism tempered by Progressive reform clearly shaped American domestic concerns well into the years of neutrality, strong elements of economic growth and nationalist concern over German aggression coincided with growing American desire for dominance in the Western Hemisphere and elsewhere. And in this way, Wilson emerges as the critical actor of this struggle between the needs and desires of a growing nation, and the high-minded ideals the nation wished to live by and export.

### **Mobilization and the Home Front**

The mobilization of America's manpower and material resources in a home front undergoing social and demographic changes has attracted great scholarly attention, particularly from newer works influenced by social history. David M. Kennedy's *Over Here* (1980) is the benchmark of general mobilization and home front treatments, providing useful coverage of financial and economic mobilization, while also being rich in social treatment of the war's impact on disparate groups including African Americans, women, and organized labor. While both the Union and Confederate militaries had employed conscription during the Civil War, the United States military had always depended primarily on voluntary enlistment to fill its ranks and had never engaged in a massive program of compulsory service, and this

element represents a key issue in mobilization. It was clear to the Wilson administration and American military from the beginning that the numbers of men needed to turn the tide in the Great War would far exceed the capabilities of an all-volunteer force, while pressure from the Allies for large numbers of troops was intense.

While Kennedy demonstrates the inherent social difficulties “to mobilize a people for total war” by “requiring all people to do what but few wished” (143), John Whiteclay Chambers’ *To Raise an Army* (1987) offers a more specific and thorough treatment of the relatively new American institution of the military draft, and the profound changes it wrought on the American military and society. The adoption of the Selective Service system in 1917 was nothing short of “revolutionary,” building a “nation-state” model of participation that produced 72 percent of the 3.5 million men that served. And while the Federal Government demonstrated that it could raise large numbers of troops, the Army in particular was ill-prepared for the massive influx and had neither heavy modern weapons to train with, nor adequate numbers of instructors; this problem was never fully remedied and US troops who served in France used large numbers of French weapons and armaments until the end of the war. For the Navy, the problem was the exact opposite as the technologically driven service had near state-of-the-art equipment in its newly constructed dreadnought battleships, but increasingly found that the caliber of enlistees needed improvement to match new technology. The enlistment-driven Navy made major changes in its recruitment patterns to target morally solid, strong young men from the interior Midwestern heartland who were viewed as more loyal and able, believing they made better “career” sailors in an increasingly complex machinery-driven Navy (Harrod 1978). Jennifer D. Keene reveals the social impact wrought by greater interaction between the citizen-soldiers and the Federal Government as a result of the draft. Her *Doughboys, the Great War, and the Remaking of America* (2001) finds that “conscription filled the ranks of the U.S. military and set in motion a volatile relationship that shaped American society for next twenty-five years [and] both the federal government and its citizen-soldiers emerged from their joint wartime undertaking indelibly changed” (1). The new sense of entitlement and the closer connection to the Federal Government the soldiers felt was demonstrated by the volatile “bonus marches” on Washington DC by World War I veterans during the Great Depression (Dickson and Allen 2005).

Concerning the men and their training, James W. Rainey (1992–3) doubts that the drafted doughboys received adequate stateside preparation for the battlefield of Europe. Infantrymen trained with wooden rifles and machine guns while stateside, and most received no live-fire training with modern weapons – particularly machine guns and artillery – until they reached France. Nancy K. Bristow’s *Making Men Moral* (1996) finds Progressive reformers alive and well in the government’s “Commission on Training Activities” (CTCA), an agency through which federal bureaucrats policed Army training camps while “attempting to remake American culture in their own white, urban, middle-class image” (4). “The CTCA reformers cultivated and ultimately enforced a form of cultural nationalism [and] their norms, they hoped, would become national standards, replacing the multitude of American cultures with a homogeneous one,” while combating the “specter of



innocent American boys overwhelmed by the forces of alcohol, sex, and immorality" (xviii, 4).

The government mobilized more than morality. Paul Koistinen's projected five volume series (two of which are complete) provides a state-of-the-art review of the economic, technological, and industrial achievements needed to mobilize the military-industrial complex to feed the war effort. His *Mobilizing for Modern War* (1997) is especially helpful in defining the growing relationship between the military and American industrialists under the aegis of the War Industries Board, while the Wilson administration fretted over the big industrialists gaining more power and influence after being limited by years of Progressive reform. Robert D. Cuff's *The War Industries Board* (1973) remains an authoritative work on the vital role played by the civilians on the Board, contending that "interest group politics, corporate ideology, and the structural imperatives of the economy and state are among the major processes that defined business-government relations" during the war years (272). Valerie Jean Conner's *The National War Labor Board* (1983) details the role of the closely related labor board that "worked both to centralize federal war-labor policies and to secure voluntary acceptance of its rulings ... to stop labor unrest in war-related industries" (vii).

As David M. Kennedy's *Over Here* (1980) has most ably pointed out in his chapter "The War for the American Mind," public opinion and propaganda were crucial because "the Great War was particularly an affair of the mind" (46). George T. Blakey's *Historians on the Home Front* (1970) reveals that Wilson and his advisors "issued appeals for support and service during the national crisis ... to muster the intellectual resources of historians in the defense of America's position," creating an able and influential class of American propaganda purveyors (1). Steven Vaughn (1980) shows how Progressives, acting through the Committee on Public Information (CPI) mobilized public opinion in support of the war, a theme explored by Walton H. Rawls (1988) who focuses on the impact of posters on American public opinion. The propaganda power of the wartime poster and government-sponsored art was immense, and the United States printed more posters to whip up public sentiment than all of the European belligerents combined.

But not everyone fell into line and joined the war effort. The American home front also included a group of dissenters and opponents to the war, both real and imagined. The Alien, Sedition, and Espionage Acts meted out severe penalties to mostly benign pacifists, while often targeting unfortunate immigrants who were also drafted in large numbers. The often unsavory effort to achieve national consensus at the expense of non-conformists, Socialists, or Radicals is well covered by Horace Peterson and Gilbert Fite (1957) who present a harsh picture of American wartime efforts to eliminate dissent. Though William Preston (1963) finds that "the antidemocratic treatment often accorded aliens and radicals by the federal government" was nothing distinct to the war, citing a clampdown on the radical Industrial Workers of the World (I.W.W., also known as the "Wobblies") during the neutrality years and culminating with the wholesale round-ups of the "Red Scare" of 1919 (1). Nancy Gentile Ford's *Americans All! Foreign-Born Soldiers in World War I* (2001) presents a more positive treatment, arguing that despite all

the suspicion and injustices heaped upon aliens and recent immigrants, “the U.S. government drafted into military service nearly half a million immigrants of forty-six different nationalities, creating an army with over 18 percent of its soldiers born in foreign countries” and that the United States military treated immigrants in “a rather enlightened fashion,” providing an “atmosphere of dual identity that made both American and ethnic pride acceptable,” while simultaneously attempting to “lay the foundations of Americanization for immigrant soldiers” (1,14–15).

The Great War proved to be a watershed event for American women, whose increased wartime participation in new arenas such as the military and industry, due to the national crisis, culminated in their winning the right to vote. Jeanne Holm (1992) and Lettie Gavin (1997) study the women who served in all branches of the service and the hundreds who went overseas as nurses, Red Cross Volunteers, Salvation Army Workers – even Army Signal Corps “Hello Girls” (telephone operators). Gavin’s *American Women in World War I* (1997) reveals that “on April 6, 1917 – 200 eager young women had become Navy yeomen, the very first officially recognized military enlisted women in the country’s history” (2). In France, women often served in field hospitals and other military installations close behind the front lines, and many of these volunteers were killed or wounded by hostile artillery and air attack, while the influenza pandemic of 1918 killed over a hundred American women in Europe alone.

The social, economic, and political effects of mobilizing the American home front for the Great War were profound. For the first time the nation engaged in an industrial war that required a developed military-industrial complex formed by civilians and military men in new levels of cooperation. Conscription produced high levels of civilian participation in a federally-controlled military system that changed the nature of the American military and wrought enormous social changes. New means of social control and scrutiny were introduced in the feverish desire to quell domestic dissent, treading heavily on civil liberties and engendering far reaching consequences. Recent immigrants and aliens bore the disproportionate brunt of government and popular suspicion, yet were drafted in large numbers in the largest immigrant assimilation program in American history. The war years were pivotal for the nation’s African Americans, creating a large urban black population outside the South, and tantalizing black soldiers who served in Europe with a taste of freedom and citizenship that planted seeds for the Civil Rights movement. Women served in the armed forces, gaining a new prominence in society that included gaining the right to vote in 1919 and expanded social freedoms flaunted by the “flappers” of the 1920s. Yet, throughout these changes, the nation still struggled to find its new identity in a complex world.

### **Yanks in France: Battlefield Performance and Contribution to Victory**

The Second American Division may be classed as a very good division, perhaps even as assault troops. The various attacks of both regiments on Belleau Wood were carried

out with dash and recklessness. The moral effect of our firearms did not materially check the advances of the enemy. The nerves of the Americans are still unshaken ... the individual soldiers are very good. They are healthy, vigorous and physically well-developed men, ages ranging from eighteen to twenty-eight, who at present lack only necessary training to make them redoubtable opponents. The troops are fresh and full of straightforward confidence. A remark of one of the prisoners is indicative of their spirit: "We kill or get killed." They still regard the war from the point of view of the "big brother" who comes to help his hard-pressed brethren and is therefore welcomed everywhere. A certain moral background is not lacking. The majority of the prisoners simply took it as a matter of course that they have come to Europe to defend their country. (German Intelligence Officer Lieutenant Von Berg, quoted in Hallas 2000: 98)

America's military presence in Europe was brief, but critical to Allied victory. Scholars have focused on the strategic implications of American military participation, the nature of the nation's place in the Allied coalition, and the battlefield performance and results of American soldiers. The best single-volume general survey of the experiences of the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) in Europe remains *The War to End All Wars* (1968), in which Edward M. Coffman closely analyzes American strategy and military operations, with interesting assessments of the green American troops like this one by a battle hardened French veteran: "As human beings and raw material, they're the very best ... but they need a deal of training ... [and] the hardest thing to teach them is not to be too brave" (4). Retired General John S. D. Eisenhower's *Yanks* (2001) provides a positive evaluation of the AEF in France which argues that "if the United States had not entered the war ... Germany would have won ... [and that] the AEF and John J. Pershing were the emblem and instrument of that decisive intervention" (297).

The AEF fought in France as part of an Allied political and military coalition, with its own dynamic already in place. French and British missions arrived in Washington soon after the American declaration of war with requests for American troops to serve in their armies under the concept of "amalgamation," but the Wilson administration had already decided for a separate American presence. David F. Trask's *The AEF and Coalition Warmaking* (1993) analyzes the complex and cooperative political and military efforts between the AEF and the Allies to achieve victory on the Western Front. Trask argues that the Europeans wanted the AEF to relieve veteran Allied units, but the AEF did much more, guaranteeing "Wilson's control of the postwar peace negotiations, the purpose for which the AEF fought in France" (175). In *A Fraternity of Arms* (2003), Robert B. Bruce downplays the often-perceived "acrimonious relationship" between the French and Americans who were in reality "not just allies, but friends" (xiii). Bruce's innovative study provides the most complete coverage available of Franco-American cooperation on all levels, including politics, leadership, strategy, the amalgamation question, and joint combat operations. Bruce finds not only a great boost to French morale by the presence of the Americans, but also that "the soldiers of America and France had trained, fought, bled, and died, side by side on the battlefields of the Great War, and it was this shared sacrifice in a common cause

that forged an unbreakable bond of fraternity between the two republics” (290). Andrew Wiest (2007) argues that the Americans nevertheless proved to be stubborn allies and refused on principle to learn from their allies. The Americans, he contends, held for too long to an outmoded and outdated system of open warfare preferring to learn their lessons in the breach instead of from the more experienced British and French.

David R. Woodward (1993) finds the state of Anglo-American relations to have been less cordial. He argues that “the tension between American and British military leadership over the development and manner of employment of an American expeditionary force in Western Europe boded ill for any Anglo-American world order,” while frustrating British attempts to subjugate the United States to further British political and strategic goals (2). The Americans and British emerged from the war with “the best two armies and fleets on the globe [but] the failure to achieve a true Anglo-American partnership during and after the war thus represented a great setback to world stability” (1, 220). Mitchell Yockelson (2008) presents a more positive picture in his study of the 27th and 30th Divisions that made up the II Corps of the AEF, a component of the British Fourth Army concluding that the Americans benefited from the experience of their British comrades.

The collision of national aims and Anglo-American rivalry is well illustrated by W. B. Fowler (1969), Richard Challener (1973), and David Trask (1972), who identify the interaction between British and American naval forces as a point of contention – but also a source of some agreement. Challener concentrates on the role of the Canadian-born American Admiral William Sims and his efforts to accommodate British desires for an American concentration on anti-submarine warfare – even at the expense of its capital ship construction – while Trask emphasizes the deep suspicion between the English-speaking allies over the status and use of their rival postwar fleets. These suspicions were based in part on maritime and commercial rivalries (Parrini 1969, Safford 1978, Parsons 1978). American leaders made protection of troop convoys a higher priority than anti-submarine warfare and believed that the key to defeating the U-boats was to attack their home ports and the laying of the North Sea and Dover Mine Barrages to prevent them from getting into the Atlantic (Allard 1980).

American military leadership in the Great War has generated significant scholarship and controversy, with the critical actor in American participation being General John J. Pershing (Vandiver 1977). The AEF commander’s nearly autonomous authority in Europe and the firm dictate he carried with him by the Wilson administration against amalgamation of American troops stood alongside the intense logistical and political difficulties he encountered in France. Donald Smythe’s *Pershing* (1986) provides a balanced view of this important and complex general, arguing that while “there was perhaps no other man who would or could have built the structure of the American army on the scale he planned,” his faults included a unrelenting commitment to rifle marksmanship-centered “open warfare,” in which “he omitted but one factor from his calculations – German machine guns ... and their effects” (234–5). Edward Coffman (1975) describes the process by which commanders were selected by the War Department and

presents portraits of a host of rising young American officers tempered in the crucible of France, such as – George S. Patton, Omar Bradley, and Douglas MacArthur – while arguing that Pershing was a “hard, tough soldier” and a “superb military manager” who “was ruthless in relieving those [officers] who failed” (191). James Cooke (1997) examines how Pershing built his staff and used it to select and direct his subordinate commanders. Timothy Nenninger (2000) offers a more critical view of American AEF commanders, in which he argues that Pershing and his subordinates “seemed to lack vision and sophistication in dealing with matters of tactics, doctrine, and the art of war ... [and that] the most successful AEF commanders were activists, who sought centralized, tightly controlled operations; who were impatient with the failures of subordinates” (743, 767).

Examination of the strategy and tactics of the AEF leadership is crucial to understanding how the Americans fit into the scheme of warfare in France. The first major test of late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Army efforts to conceptualize unified strategy under the aegis of a professional officer corps receives close attention in Carol Reardon’s *Soldiers and Scholars* (1990), a study which examines US military efforts to use a “‘progressive coordinated history program’ to kindle a vital spirit of professionalism among its officers,” a spirit which proved crucial as “World War I supplied the officer corps of the U.S. Army with its first great opportunity to apply the lessons learned in peacetime classrooms to the grim test of active campaigning” (1, 201). This differs slightly from Russell Weigley’s (1973) view that while American strategists were still largely influenced by the Clausewitzian stratagems of annihilation, the American approach in World War I embraced the notion “that resourceful and resolute opponents could be conquered by maneuver alone, without direct collisions of armies” in an open war of movement (197).

Several critics of American battlefield tactics and doctrine in France have emerged in the past two decades. Timothy Nenninger (1987) argues that American battlefield effectiveness was impeded by a “lack of sound doctrine, that sought to adjust organization, equipment, and tactics, to overcoming the stalemate on the Western Front” (177). The most important error was Pershing’s preference for “open warfare” built around riflemen attacking with bayonets, creating a serious hindrance to American effectiveness in the face of entrenched German forces with automatic weapons. James W. Rainey (1983) is equally critical of the AEF, contending that Pershing’s insistence upon open warfare reflected his desire for the AEF to retain an aggressive posture and not fall into the Allies’ “defensive mentality and an acceptance of a war of attrition,” even though Pershing knew the doctrine was “unworkably at odds with the reality of the battlefield” (35). Rainey asserts that American officers could “satisfy Black Jack Pershing only if they smothered German machine guns with American flesh” (44). Mark Grotelueschen offers powerful case studies of tactical evolution in several American divisions in France. His *The AEF Way of War* (2007) finds that divisional commanders reworked and adapted Pershing’s open warfare doctrine to make it more consistent with experiences on the ground. His work is a reminder to scholars not to over-emphasize the words of senior commanders. Each American unit interpreted doctrine in ways best suited to its battlefield conditions.

Many newer works and case studies show the influence of social history and the focus on soldier's experiences in wartime. Presenting a synthesis of available scholarship and newly mined manuscript sources, James J. Cooke's *The Rainbow Division in the Great War* (1994) follows the famed 42nd division from its inception as a combination of the finest National Guard units from 26 states in summer 1917 through its occupation of the German Rhineland in 1919. Cooke's chronological narrative emphasizes Colonel Douglas MacArthur's role in the unit and its baptism under fire at the Second Battle of the Marne and at St. Mihiel. He argues that "Pershing's insistence on maneuver warfare" was ill-suited to the battlefields of 1918, and in reality combat was "muscle-against-muscle affairs that produced horrendous casualties" (241). Donald Smythe (1983) argues that while the limited offensive against the St. Mihiel salient by the newly formed First American Army produced a surprising victory and "demonstrated that the American Army was able to handle an operation of some magnitude," it also showed that the army "was not well oiled and coordinated" (54–6). Paul F. Braim (1998) picks up where Smythe leaves off in the difficult redeployment of the First Army from the St. Mihiel salient to the Meuse–Argonne offensive only days later. Braim provides an excellent survey of various historical sources on the combat effectiveness of the Americans coupled with a useful appendix, arguing that "the performance of the First Army in Meuse–Argonne must be given a fairly low rating" and rating "Pershing's leadership as too narrow" (161, 173). But Pershing must be credited with a difficult tactical redeployment from St. Mihiel, and his attack did smash deep into enemy lines before being temporarily stalled by an extension of the Hindenburg Line while grinding ever-shrinking German forces to the breaking point. In his assessment of the performance of the 35th Division in the Meuse–Argonne, Robert Ferrell (2004) cites lack of experience, poor leadership, and an inability to learn from previous experience as the root causes of the 35th's poor performance. Ferrell has edited the diary of Major General William M. Wright (2004), commander of the 89th Division, which advanced almost 20 miles during the Meuse–Argonne Offensive. Wright is the only AEF division commander known to have kept a diary and his descriptions of his superiors, subordinates, and their actions provide unique insights into the AEF decision-making process. Bringing together these and other sources, Edward Lengel in, *To Conquer Hell: The Meuse-Argonne, 1918* (2008), has produced the most in-depth study of any American campaign of World War I explaining the tactics, terrain, and operations as well as the misconceptions – Pershing believed the Americans could break through German lines in 36 hours – that led the million American doughboys to suffer 120,000 casualties including 26,000 dead in the battle that lasted six weeks, to the end of the war.

Other battle studies examine the AEF experience of ground combat as part of a larger coalition. Colonels Douglas V. Johnson and Rolfe L. Hillman (1999) praise the role of the 1st and 2nd US Divisions in counter-attack against the last German drive in July 1918, arguing that while AEF soldiers demonstrated "exemplary dedication and endurance," much needed to be learned as the "attacking formations were too tightly bunched ... [the] infantry units needed to employ their auxiliary weapons better ... [and] better coordination between infantry and



artillery was necessary" (144, 151). Michael S. Neiberg's *The Second Battle of the Marne* (2008) places the AEF within the larger context of the multinational force directed and coordinated by French Marshal Ferdinand Foch. He argues that the debate over amalgamation did not prevent American units from working effectively within a French command structure. Like Bruce, he finds that Franco-American cooperation worked well, thus allowing the Americans to prove their place on the battlefield to their European comrades in arms.

Several recent studies have examined the experiences of American soldiers under fire during the war. The wartime memoirs of the half Irish-half German Albert Ettinger (1992) in the largely Irish 69th New York National Guard regiment assigned to the 42nd Rainbow Division detail the personages, horror, camaraderie, and minutiae of service in one of the AEF's premier divisions, including references like "some soldiers wear medals as certificates of courage; others find greater satisfaction in the display of scalps or dried ears" (127). Elton E. Mackin's *Suddenly We Didn't Want to Die: Memoirs of a World War I Marine* (1993) recounting the role of Marines in the 5th Battalion in Belleau Wood and many other battles through individual sketches, including one of his tough commander: "the bullet caught him in the muscles of the neck and scarcely made him stagger. I swear he didn't even stop puffing on that big old black cigar. He stood there flat-footed and serene, as though it were a matter of everyday occurrence" (203). Peter Owen (2007) traces the history of a single unit, the Second Battalion of the Sixth Regiment of the US Marines, from its formation through its service in France showing that outmoded tactics led the marines to suffer staggering numbers of casualties in battles at Belleau Wood and Soissons, but that its members made adjustments based on these experiences and became a much more proficient unit. Providing a more social approach, Peter Kindsvatter's excellent *American Soldiers* (2003) begins with an analysis of the World War I years, and he also covers subjects such as the specialized nature of training, the effects of friendly fire, and the quality of the Army's R & R system. Richard Schweitzer examines the presence (and absence) of religion in the lives of American and British soldiers in his comparative work, *The Cross and the Trenches* (2003). These three strong books notwithstanding, more work on the social history of American soldiers would be welcome.

While American power in the sea and air occupied a lesser role than ground combat in the Great War, many newer works supported by older classics enliven the literature of this vital wartime element. James J. Cooke's well-researched *The U.S. Air Service in the Great War, 1917-1919* (1996) provides a scholarly survey of the Air Service's efforts to create a brand new combat arm with few trained men and no American-built aircraft. Cooke argues that General Pershing recognized the value of air formations early on, but that the "aero observation squadrons and the balloon units were considered the main arm of the U.S. Air Service" in support of the ever-important AEF infantry and artillery (vii). James J. Hudson's *Hostile Skies* (1968) contributes a lively narrative treatment of American aerial combat operations that concentrates on the experiences of individual airmen in battle. Hudson elevates the role of the pursuit squadrons and feels that the "Americans learned their lessons well" in exchanges with top German units, and agrees with General Billy

Mitchell that “had the war lasted a few more months, the Air Service ... would have reached the awesome potential so optimistically predicted by its advocates” (viii, 300). The image of the dashing airman “ace” captivated the public imagination and was used ruthlessly to justify the tremendous expense of building an aircraft industry. Linda R. Robertson’s *The Dream of Civilized Warfare* (2003) traces “the significance of the dream of achieving American victory through air power” (437). Robertson argues that the striking image of the “lone wolf and freelance” ace produced “grand copy” in media and propaganda to foster an erroneous public belief that America “could quickly build the largest aerial armada in the world” and force a breakthrough in France with airpower instead of infantry (xi).

Both America’s admirals and the general public were disappointed in the limited role of the US Navy during the Great War, but in fact America’s surface fleets provided an essential contribution to victory. David F. Trask’s essay “The American Navy in a World at War, 1914–1919” (1984) provides a succinct scholarly survey that argues that American naval policy was out of date, and ambitious naval construction of capital ships did not aid the navy’s new role as troop transports and anti-submarine convoy escorts. American desires to create a first line navy and “vaulting naval aspirations during World War I had placed the United States on a collision course with another potential rival [Japan]” (218). William Still’s *Crisis at Sea* (2006) and A.B. Feuer’s *The U.S. Navy in World War I* (1999) provide surveys of American naval activities in the Great War, and Still’s well-researched work promises to be the standard treatment for many years to come. In narrower studies, Jerry W. Jones (1998) traces the role of US capital ships in Europe, arguing that American admirals abandoned complete subscription to Alfred Thayer Mahan’s precepts of a decisive clash between grand battle fleets, and Alex Larzelere (2003) chronicles the operations of the Coast Guard in both European and American waters during the time it was operated as part of the Navy, April 1917–August 1919.

Other technological innovations beyond air and sea were vital to American combat efforts, and several important works demonstrate the quick learning curve US troops needed to make in the face of a rapidly changing battlefield. Mark Grotelueschen’s first-rate monograph *Doctrine Under Trial* (2001) provides a detailed examination of evolving artillery employment in the US 2nd Division. Grotelueschen seeks a middle ground between the traditionalist “open warfare” camp of General Pershing and later historians who doubted its effectiveness, arguing that “the 2<sup>nd</sup> Division demonstrated that when it had sufficient time to make detailed attack plans and was given additional artillery support, its conservative fire-power based attack style was capable of making thoroughly successful assaults on even strong enemy positions” (xxii). In *Treat ’em Rough* (1989), Dale E. Wilson examines the pivotal role of Colonel George S. Patton in the formation of an embryonic tank corps, providing a narrative that argues that while the “presence of tanks on the battlefield seems to have had little impact on the vast majority of the infantrymen they supported ... other observers spoke highly of the efficiency of the tanks, highlighting their ability to eliminate German machine-gun positions and strong points” (182). Poison gas, Stokes gas projectors, and thermite bombs were also employed by the AEF, and *Gas and Flame in World War I* (1965) relates

the personal account of Harvard historian William L. Langer in the 1st Gas Regiment of the Chemical Warfare Service. Langer and his peers found themselves launching “phosgene and thermite to weaken the resistance of the enemy and ‘skunk gas’ to make him wear his mask and interfere with his work” (50).

In keeping with the increasing importance of social history in the study of war and society, many useful works analyze the role of women, and members of minority groups. Almost a half million African-Americans served in the Great War’s segregated military, and thousands died in combat on the Western Front. Arthur W. Little’s *From Harlem to the Rhine* (1936) provides an excellent account of New York’s 15th National Guard regiment (later the 369th Infantry), which served in France and Germany from December 1917 until early 1919. The unit achieved an impeccable combat record, earned countless medals, was under fire for 191 days, and lost over 1,500 men. Yet in an incident telling of that Jim Crow age, their proud Colonel William Hayward had “begged [for the unit] to be included in the Rainbow Division – only to be told that black was not one of the colors of the rainbow” (42). Steven L. Harris’ *Harlem’s Hell Fighters* (2003) offers an account of New York City’s storied African-American colored regiment. Harris employs an unusual tactic of opening and closing his work though concerts of jazz great James Reese Europe and his efforts to raise enlistments by forming a first rate unit band “that apparently put all other such American and European units in the shade” (xiv). Harris provides solid coverage of the harassment and prejudice the unit endured stateside, and their metamorphosis into a veteran combat unit that served with the French as “shock troops” and spent more time on the front lines than any American unit of the war.

Susan Zeiger’s *In Uncle Sam’s Service* (2000) offers a recent and useful treatment of the vital service rendered by American women in France. De-emphasizing the well-documented role of upper-class women in the war effort, Zeiger employs the latest techniques of women’s history and gender studies to reveal the contribution of largely lower middle-class women as nurses, clerks, and office workers in France, where the “vast majority of AEF servicewomen were wage earners, white, literate, lower-middle-class, and often self supporting” (2). The war represented not only a chance for women to demonstrate patriotism and be a part of a crucial national event, but also to achieve a greater sense of social and economic opportunity. World War I represented “the first U.S. war in which women were mobilized on a large scale [and] marked an irrevocable shift in the meaning and practice of war in the United States” (2).

The works that cover the effectiveness and combat performance of the AEF in Europe reveal a wide range of scholarship and views. US entry into the war forced a risky German gambit to end the war before the Americans arrived in force but the Germans put their plan into operation too late, as the Yanks’ role in stopping the German offensive at Belleau Wood and Château-Thierry later demonstrated. Few historians question the courage and raw potential of the green American troops, but most studies are critical of American training and tactics. America’s relationship with its allies, especially the British, was strained, but the morale boost engendered by the arrival of fresh and healthy American troops is undeniable.

American industrial capabilities were helpful, but not enough to produce the much-anticipated avalanche of war production: America could not even supply suitable arms for the men it sent to France, forcing most US units to use French armaments. While logistical and tactical doctrine was in need of revision, American troops fought bravely and quickly developed critical skills in artillery, aerial, and armored warfare. America's final contribution to victory is undeniable

### The Impact of the War on the US Military

Studies of the impact of the war on the doctrine, technology, and tactics of the American military in the inter-war years used to focus on mavericks and supposed visionaries like the air power enthusiast William "Billy" Mitchell and the armor advocate George Patton. More recently, scholars have begun to look beyond the personalities and have undertaken more probing studies of the lessons the American military took away from its brief experience of modern war in France. While they do not agree on all of their conclusions, they have reached consensus on the failure of the Army and the nation more generally to implement a set of lessons for future war. Consequently, the nation was caught as unprepared for war in 1941 as it had been in 1917.

Two recent studies of the Army's incorporation of new technologies reflect the shift from personalities to systems. Tami Davis Biddle (2002) argues that the Army came away from the war intrigued by the possibilities of strategic bombing, but at the same time air-minded leaders were aware of the difficulties of proving their arguments that airplanes could provide combat power more efficiently than artillery. Unlike their British counterparts, they came to the conclusion that air power could be most effective in the specific targeting of industrial and military targets well behind the front lines. They were aware, however, that much more work needed to be done before such a vision could become reality. They were also aware that they were proposing a revolutionary new form of fighting wars, leading to the formation of the Air Corps Tactical School in 1926 with the motto *Proficimus More Irretenti* (We Progress Unhindered by Tradition).

David Johnson (2003) offers a comprehensive study of the Army's attempts to incorporate airpower and armor. His *Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers* comes to the conclusion that the Army's leadership never fully integrated either. Infantry and cavalry officers sought to limit the role of the tanks, while officers who envisioned a separate air force on the British RAF model developed a doctrine inappropriate to the needs of the ground forces. Thus the tanks were held back by conservatives while the airplanes were mismanaged by futurists. As to leadership at the top, the late Russell Weigley (2006) saw John Pershing as the imperfect architect of a military force that survived the crucible of total war. Although the army he built showed clear limits in its tactics and its manifest lack of preparedness for war, it learned critical lessons. Weigley sees Pershing's greatest accomplishment as the building of an army ready to stand alongside the world's great powers with pride. Although the Americans were not yet ready to accept the mantle of global respon-

sibility Pershing had helped them assure “a future of American global preponderance was discernable” (345).

Grotelueschen (2007) argues that three schools of doctrinal thought emerged from the war. Traditionalists argued that the war confirmed the open warfare doctrine of the US Army that had been based on mobility and marksmanship. A second group came away from the war convinced of the need to apply mass firepower on the battlefield, thus substituting artillery for infantry. A third group kept the infantry at the heart of doctrine, but recognized the need for much more fire support from combined arms operations in the form of new weapons systems like tanks and airplanes (355). The 1923 Field Service Regulations were a compromise of the three approaches, thus complicating the effort to divine one generally accepted set of conclusions from the war years.

In a recent battle analysis, Robert Ferrell (2007) argues that the US Army took thousands of unnecessary casualties, mostly from inexperience and the inability of its senior leaders to effectively incorporate artillery and poison gas. Even in the war’s final few weeks, he contends, too many AEF officers were ordering senseless offensives. To be sure, Ferrell sees improvements in American set-piece tactics during the AEF’s time on the western front, but the process of reform was by no means complete at the armistice. Most significantly, Ferrell argues that the Army failed to undertake a deep probe of the lessons of 1917 and 1918, content instead to go back to its pre-war assumptions.

William Odom (1999) provides a solid, in-depth examination of the often incoherent process of developing a post-war doctrine. In his view, officers showed considerable intellectual vigor in challenging pre-war sacred cows and in translating the war experience into a blueprint for the future. Thus the 1923 Field Service Regulations (FSR) was a reasonable summation of the Army’s experiences, but the War Department failed to make the commitments needed to keep the Army in touch with changes in the next decade and a half. The Field Service Regulations was not revised until 1939, with the terrible consequence that the United States was caught unprepared for war once again.

## Conclusion

For all the sweeping changes, sacrifices, privations, efforts, national treasure, and lives spent, Americans soon rejected much of what the nation fought for, and what it now represented. Tired of decades of Progressive reform, divisive social concerns, and the third most deadly war in the nation’s history, Americans turned their focus inward in rejection of the new liberal internationalism. Warren G. Harding’s 1920 campaign speech summed up the views of most Americans: “America’s present need is not heroics, but healing; not nostrums, but normalcy; not revolution, but restoration; not agitation, but adjustment; not surgery, but serenity; not the dramatic, but the dispassionate; not experiment, but equipoise; not submergence in internationality, but sustainment in triumphant nationality” (Freidel 1987: 62). But the new America was different, and no desire to retreat from the entanglements and

problems of the world could fend off the devastating trials to come. America was now a great nation, first among equals, interconnected and intertwined with the fate of the world's people like never before, and Americans could no longer escape within the country's great expanse. And this, more than anything else, defines the American experience in the Great War. While the nation embarked upon the most raucous, decadent, and freewheeling decade in its history to that time, "Lost Generation" spokesmen F. Scott Fitzgerald pondered about the meaning of it all:

France was a land, England was a people, but America, having about it still that quality of the idea, was harder to utter – it was the graves at Shiloh and the tired, drawn, nervous faces of its great men, and the country boys dying in the Argonne for a phrase that was empty before their bodies withered. It was a willingness of the heart. ("The Swimmers," *The Saturday Evening Post*, October 19, 1929)

#### BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Allard, Dean C. (1980). "Anglo-American Naval Differences during World War I," *Military Affairs*, 44:2 (April), 75–81.
- Biddle, Tami Davis (2002). *Rhetoric and Reality in Air Warfare: The Evolution of British and American Ideas about Strategic Bombardment, 1914–1945*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Blakey, George T. (1970). *Historians on the Home Front: American Propagandists for the Great War*. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky.
- Braim, Paul F. (1998 [1987]). *The Test of Battle: The American Expeditionary Force in the Meuse-Argonne Campaign*. rev. ed. Shippensburg, PA: White Mane Press.
- Bristow, Nancy K (1996). *Making Men Moral: Social Engineering during the Great War*. New York: New York University Press.
- Bruce, Robert B. (2003). *A Fraternity of Arms: America and France in the Great War*. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press.
- Buehrig, Edward H. (1955). *Wilson and the Balance of Power*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Calhoun, Frederick S. (1986). *Power and Principle: Armed Intervention in Wilsonian Foreign Policy*. Kent, OH: Kent State University Press.
- Calhoun, Frederick S. (1993). *Uses of Force and Wilsonian Foreign Policy*. Kent, OH: Kent State University Press.
- Challenger, Richard D. (1973). *Admirals, Generals, and American Foreign Policy, 1898–1914*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Chambers, John W., II (1987). *To Raise an Army: The Draft Comes to Modern America*. New York: Free Press.
- Chambers, John W., II (1992). *The Tyranny of Change: America in the Progressive Era, 1890–1920*, 2nd edn. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Chambers, John W., II (1999). *The Oxford Companion to American Military History*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Coffman, Edward M. (1968). *The War to End all Wars: The American Military Experience in World War I*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Coffman, Edward M. (1975). "American Command and Commanders in World War I," in Russell F. Weigley, ed., *New Dimensions in Military History*. San Rafael, CA: Presidio Press, 17–34.



- Conner, Valerie J. (1983). *The National War Labor Board: Stability, Social Justice, and the Voluntary State in World War I*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Coogan, John W. (1981). *The End of Neutrality: The United States, Britain, and Maritime Rights, 1899–1915*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Cooke, James J. (1994). *The Rainbow Division in the Great War, 1917–1919*. Westport, CT: Praeger.
- Cooke, James J. (1996). *The U.S. Air Service in the Great War, 1917–1919*. Westport, CT: Praeger.
- Cooke, James J. (1997). *Pershing and his Generals: Command and Staff in the AEF*. Westport, CT: Praeger.
- Cuff, Robert D. (1973). *The War Industries Board*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Dickson, Paul, and Thomas B. Allen (2005). *The Bonus Army: An American Epic*. New York: Walker and Co.
- Eisenhower, John S. D. (2001). *Yanks: The Epic Story of the American Army in World War I*. New York: Free Press.
- Ettinger, Albert (1992). *A Doughboy with the Fighting 69th*. Shippensburg, PA: White Mane Press.
- Farwell, Byron (1999). *Over There: The United States in the Great War, 1917–1918*. New York: W. W. Norton.
- Ferrell, Robert H. (2004). *America's Deadliest Battle: Meuse–Argonne, 1918*. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press.
- Ferrell, Robert H. (2007). *Collapse at Meuse–Argonne: The Failure of the Missouri–Kansas Division*. Columbia: University of Missouri Press.
- Feuer, A.B. (1999). *The United States Navy in World War I: Combat at Sea and in the Air*. Westport, CT: Praeger.
- Ford, Nancy (2001). *Americans All! Foreign-Born Soldiers in World War I*. College Station: Texas A&M University Press.
- Fowler, W. B. (1969). *British–American Relations, 1917–1918*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Freidel, Frank (1987). *The Presidents of the United States of America*. Washington: White House Historical Association.
- Gavin, Lettie (1997). *American Women in World War I: They Also Served*. Niwot: University Press of Colorado.
- Groteleuschen, Mark E. (2001). *Doctrine Under Trial: American Artillery Employment in World War I*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
- Grotelueschen, Mark E. (2007). *The AEF Way of War: The American Army and Combat in World War I*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Hallas, James H. (2000). *Doughboy War: The American Expeditionary Force in World War I*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Harries, Meirion, and Susie Harries (1997). *The Last Days of Innocence: America at War, 1917–1918*. New York: Random House.
- Harris, Stephen L. (2003). *Harlem's Hell Fighters: The African-American 369th Infantry Regiment in World War I*. Washington: Brassey's.
- Harrod, Frederick S. (1978). *Manning the New Navy: The Development of a Modern Naval Enlisted Force, 1899–1940*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
- Holm, Jeanne (1992). *Women in the Military: An Unfinished Revolution*. Novato, CA: Presidio Press.

- Hudson, James J. (1968). *Hostile Skies: A Combat History of the American Air Service in World War I*. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press.
- Johnson, David (2003). *Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers: Innovation in the U. S. Army, 1917–1945*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Johnson, Douglas V., II, and Rolfe L. Hillman (1999). *Soissons 1918*. College Station: Texas A&M University Press.
- Jones, Jerry W. (1998). *U.S. Battleship Operations in World War I*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Keene, Jennifer D. (2001). *Doughboys, the Great War, and the Remaking of America*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Kennedy, David M. (1980). *Over Here: The First World War and American Society*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Kindsvatter, Peter S. (2003). *American Soldiers: Ground Combat in the World Wars, Korea, and Vietnam*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
- Knock, Thomas J. (1992). *To End All Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the Quest for a New World Order*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Koistinen, Paul A. C. (1997). *Mobilizing for Modern War: The Political Economy of American Warfare, 1865–1919*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
- LaFeber, Walter (1963). *The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion, 1860–1898*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Langer, William L. (1965). *Gas and Flame in World War I*. New York: Knopf.
- Larzeler, Alex R. (2003). *The Coast Guard in World War I: An Untold Story*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Lengel, Edward G. (2008). *To Conquer Hell: The Meuse–Argonne, 1918*. New York: Henry Holt and Co.
- Link, Arthur S. (1954). *Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, 1910–1917*. New York: Harper.
- Little, Arthur W. (1936) *From Harlem to the Rhine: The Story of New York's Colored Volunteers*. New York: Covici, Friede.
- Mackin, Elton (1993). *Suddenly We Didn't Want to Die: Memoirs of a World War I Marine*, ed. by George B. Clark. Novato, CA: Presidio Press.
- Maurer, Maurer, ed. (1978). *The U.S. Air Service in World War I*, 4 vols. Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, Headquarters USAF.
- May, Ernest R. (1959). *The World War and American Isolation, 1914–1917*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- May, Ernest R. (1961). *Imperial Democracy: The Emergence of America as a Great Power*. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World.
- Neiberg, Michael (2008). *The Second Battle of the Marne*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Nenninger, Timothy (1987). "Tactical Dysfunction in the AEF, 1917–1918," *Military Affairs*, 51:4 (October), 177–81.
- Nenninger, Timothy (2000). "Unsystematic as a Mode of Command: Command and the Process of Command in the American Expeditionary Forces, 1917–1919," *Journal of Military History*, 64:3 (July) 739–68.
- Odom, William (1999). *After the Trenches: The Transformation of U.S. Army Doctrine, 1918–1945*. College Station: Texas A&M University Press.
- Owen, Peter F. (2007). *To the Limit of Endurance: A Battalion of Marines in the Great War*. College Stations: Texas A&M University Press.

- Parrini, Carl (1969). *Heir to Empire: United States Economic Diplomacy, 1916–1923*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
- Parsons, Edward (1978). *Wilsonian Diplomacy*. St. Louis: Forum Press.
- Peterson, Horace C., and Gilbert C. Fite (1957). *Opponents of the War, 1917–1918*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
- Preston, William, Jr. (1963). *Aliens and Dissenters: Federal Suppression of Radicals, 1903–1933*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Rainey, James W. (1983). “Ambivalent Warfare: The Tactical Doctrine of the AEF in World War I,” *Parameters*, 13 (September), 34–46.
- Rainey, James W. (1992–3). “The Questionable Training of the AEF in World War I,” *Parameters*, 22:4 (Winter), 89–103.
- Rawls, Walton (1988). *Wake Up, America! World War I and the American Poster*. New York: Abbeville Press.
- Reardon, Carol (1990). *Soldiers and Scholars: The U.S. Army and the Uses of Military History, 1865–1920*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
- Robertson, Linda R. (2003). *The Dream of Civilized Warfare: World War I Flying Aces and the American Imagination*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Safford, Jeffrey J. (1978). *Wilsonian Maritime Diplomacy, 1913–1921*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.
- Schaffer, Ronald (1991). *America in the Great War: The Rise of the Welfare State*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Schweitzer, Richard (2003). *The Cross and the Trenches: Religious Faith and Doubt among British and American Great War Soldiers*. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers.
- Smythe, Donald (1983). “St. Mihiel: The Birth of an American Army,” *Parameters*, 13:2 (June), 47–57.
- Smythe, Donald (1986). *Pershing: General of the Armies*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Still, William N. (2006). *Crisis at Sea: The United States in European Waters in World War I*. Gainesville: University Press of Florida.
- Trask, David F. (1972). *Captains and Cabinets: Anglo–American Naval Relations, 1917–1918*. Colombia: University of Missouri Press.
- Trask, David F. (1984). “The American Navy in a World at War, 1914–1919,” in Kenneth J. Hagan, ed., *In Peace and War: Interpretations of American Naval History, 1775–1984*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 205–20.
- Trask, David F. (1993). *The AEF and Coalition Warmaking, 1917–1918*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
- United States Department of the Army (1948). *United States Army in the World War, 1917–1919*, 17 vols. Washington: United States Government Printing Office.
- Vandiver, Frank E. (1977). *Black Jack: The Life and Times of John J. Pershing*, 2 vols. College Stations: Texas A&M University Press.
- Vaughn, Stephen (1980). *Holding Fast the Inner Lines: Democracy, Nationalism, and the Committee on Public Information*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Weigley, Russell F. (1973). *The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy*. New York: Macmillan.
- Weigley, Russell F. (2006). “Strategy and Total War in the United States: Pershing and the American Military Tradition,” in Roger Chickering and Stig Förster, eds. *Great War, Total War: Combat and Mobilization on the Western Front, 1914–1918*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Wiest, Andrew. (2007). "Preferring to Learn from Experience: The American Expeditionary Force in 1917," in Peter Dennis and Jeffrey Grey, eds. *1917: Tactics: Training and Technology*. Canberra: Australian Military History Publications, 137–54.
- Wilson, Dale E. (1989). *Treat 'em Rough: The Birth of American Armor, 1917–1920*. Novato, CA: Presidio Press.
- Woodward, David R. (1993). *Trial by Friendship: Anglo–American Relations, 1917–1918*. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky.
- Wright, William M. (2004). *Meuse–Argonne Diary: A Division Commander in World War I*, ed. by Robert H. Ferrell. Columbia: University of Missouri Press.
- Yockelson, Mitchell A. (2008). *Borrowed Soldiers: Americans under British Command, 1918*. Norman: University Press of Oklahoma.
- Zieger, Robert H. (2000) *America's Great War: World War I and the American Experience*. New York: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Zeiger, Susan (2000). *In Uncle Sam's Service: Women Workers with the American Expeditionary Force, 1917–1919*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

## Chapter Ten

# WORLD WAR II IN THE ATLANTIC, NORTH AFRICA, THE MEDITERRANEAN, AND EUROPE

*Harold R. Winton*

The war between the United States and Germany was the most significant military contest of World War II. Although Germany's struggle with Russia, known in Soviet parlance as The Great Patriotic War, produced more German casualties, the combination of America's industrial output, advanced technology, (barely) sufficient manpower, and slowly but gradually maturing fighting prowess was the fundamental Allied cause of Germany's demise. And once Germany fell, the defeat of Japan, though potentially both costly and painful, was only a matter of time. America's fascination with this epic struggle that triumphed over National Socialism and, together with victory in the Pacific, propelled the nation to the center of the world stage helps explain the tremendous outpouring of historical literature it has produced. This fascination is most recently exemplified by Rick Atkinson's decision to make it the subject of a "liberation trilogy," two volumes of which have been released at this writing (Atkinson, 2002 and 2007). The avowed purpose of this effort is to create a grand combat narrative, doing for this portion of World War II what Bruce Catton and Shelby Foote have done for the American Civil War. The fact that a man as talented as Atkinson would devote the better part of 15 years of his life to such a venture speaks powerfully of the place of this war within a war in the broad sweep of American history. In order to give appropriate attention to the most significant works covering the multiple theaters of operations involved in this struggle and to the three principal arms of military service that fought in it, this chapter will necessarily be cast in broad strokes.

### Surveys

To put the America's war with Germany into a global context, two studies of World War II as a whole deserve special mention. Gerhard Weinberg's *A World at Arms* (1994) offers a comprehensive, almost magisterial, account of the grand strategies, diplomatic activities, and military strategies of all the major belligerents and many of the minor ones. It shows clearly how events in one theater of war

affected the dynamics of other theaters. One of Weinberg's principal themes is the freedom that Germany's invasion of the Soviet Union gave to Japan to pursue its policy of aggrandizement in Asia and the Pacific. H. P. Willmott's *The Great Crusade* (1989) examines all theaters of the war. Willmott argues that the war was one between systems and societies in which the Allies won for a variety of reasons. Several other valuable works are more narrow in their interpretative focus. Writing from an American perspective, Williamson Murray's and Allan Millett's *A War to Be Won* (2000) takes the global story one level deeper by chronicling the conduct of military operations and shrewdly assessing their effectiveness. Among surveys of the war against Germany, Dwight Eisenhower's memoir, *Crusade in Europe* (1948), provides a remarkably durable account of the European theater's strategy and major operations, seen through the eyes of the Supreme Allied Commander. Although Eisenhower is at times overly generous to his principal subordinates and tends to minimize the depth of Allied disagreement over strategic issues, his candor concerning his own shortcomings and his incisive military mind continue to make this work surprisingly useful. Forrest Pogue's *The Supreme Command* (1954) fleshes out Eisenhower's account with a good deal of organizational detail. Charles B. MacDonald's *The Mighty Endeavor* (1969) remains an exceptionally reputable single-volume account of the entire American war against Germany, embracing the activities of the three services in all theaters of operation addressed in this chapter. Russell Weigley's *Eisenhower's Lieutenants* (1981), patterned consciously on Douglas Southall Freeman's *Lee's Lieutenants* that chronicled the leadership of the Army of Northern Virginia in the American Civil War, is a tour de force that places the US Army's campaigns from D-Day, June 6, 1944, to V-E Day, May 8, 1945, squarely in the context of its institutional history.

### Peacetime Planning and Preparation

Unpreparedness for war is an enduring theme of the American military experience, and World War II was no exception. The country's opening campaigns revealed glaring weaknesses in ideas, leadership, weapons, and training brought about both by lack of imagination among senior military leaders and budgetary neglect. Nevertheless, President Franklin Roosevelt shrewdly maneuvered between a war that was becoming increasingly likely in the late 1930s and the early 1940s and an electorate and Congress ill-disposed to consider the prospects of such a war seriously. And both the Army (including the Army Air Forces) and the Navy had senior leaders and staff officers whose realistic view of the world allowed them to think about fighting even if they could not do all that was required to prepare for it. In June 1940, General George Marshall, propelled by the imminent prospect of a German-occupied France, began to support passage of a Selective Service bill, which, after acrimonious debate, passed both houses of Congress in September (Pogue 1966). In November, Admiral Harold Stark articulated the fundamental strategic imperative of the war – defeat Germany first, then Japan. This construct received Allied sanction in January 1941 during secret talks between British and



American planners held in Washington (Matloff and Snell 1953, Greenfield 1960). In March, Roosevelt convinced a badly divided Congress to give him broad authority to transfer war materiel to any nation whose defense he deemed vital to the defense of the United States. The "Lend-Lease" Act bought time for America to arm by propping up Britain, with huge consequences for the conduct of the war. In July, the president directed Secretary of War Henry Stimson to determine the total industrial production requirements to defeat the country's potential enemies (Larrabee 1987). His terse memorandum worked its way to the desk of Major Albert C. Wedemeyer, a member of General George C. Marshall's War Plans Division (Cline 1951). Working with both Navy and Army Air planners, Wedemeyer used intelligent estimates of the country's military manpower potential and some visionary guesses about the strategy required to defeat both Germany and Japan to answer Roosevelt's question (Wedemeyer 1958, Hansell 1972). The fundamental conclusion: we can win. The "Victory Program" that flowed from Wedemeyer's analysis helped transform America into an arsenal of democracy (Watson 1950).

### Initial Operations at Sea, 1941-2

There was, however, universal realization that American war production was worthless if it could not be transported safely across the Atlantic. This stark reality pitted Germany against Britain in a declared war and Germany against America in an undeclared war, making the United States and Britain *de facto* allies during a state of *de jure* American neutrality. Throughout 1941, Roosevelt and Hitler played a cat-and-mouse game in the Atlantic (Bailey and Ryan 1979). Roosevelt gradually extended the defensive zone in which German submarines would be regarded as hostile and provided escorts to British shipping as far as Iceland, while the Germans sought to isolate Britain from the United States. This intense clash of American and German interests on the high seas resulted in several engagements between German submarines and American naval vessels. In September, the captain of U-652, believing his boat to have been attacked by the USS *Greer*, fired two torpedoes at the latter, both of which missed. In October, while coming to the aid of a Canadian convoy attacked by a German "wolf-pack," the USS *Kearny* was struck by torpedoes from U-568, killing 11 American sailors. But Roosevelt and Hitler were both careful not to allow these and similar incidents to drag them into a declared war. All that changed with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. The United States immediately declared war on Japan. What it would have done about Germany had Hitler not obligingly declared war on the United States remains one of those fascinating questions that continue to beguile historians. But with the mutual declarations of hostilities, the Battle of the Atlantic was transformed into a full-scale shooting war.

1942 was a year of German triumph and American defeat in this grim contest (Morison 1947, Blair 1966). The problems were legion. Initially, merchant vessels sailing independently along the eastern seaboard were silhouetted by the lights of the coastal towns and cities and taken to the bottom almost at will. Faced with

extraordinary losses, the Navy finally ordered civilians to turn out the lights. Even so, from January through April, the Germans sank over 80 ships along the East Coast, grossing 500,000 tons. When convoying was instituted in May, these figures dropped dramatically; but the U-boats then moved to the Caribbean where in May alone they sank over 70 ships, grossing more than 300,000 tons (Gannon 1990). The Germans then shifted their main target area to the mid-Atlantic, where they continued to pile up impressive victories. But the worst route of all was the run to northern Russia. In July 1942, the 33 merchant ships of Convoy PQ 17 set out from Iceland bound for Murmansk. Despite the protection of a large escort of destroyers, anti-aircraft ships, submarines, and auxiliaries, the convoy was torn to shreds by the *Kriegsmarine* and the *Luftwaffe*. After enduring almost incessant attacks, only 11 ships reached their destination (Irving 1968). During 1942, over 5,000,000 tons of Allied and neutral shipping were lost to German U-boats in the Atlantic and Arctic waters. Winning the Battle of the Atlantic was clearly the most urgent task of American military strategy.

### Forging Allied Strategy, 1942–3

The Anglo–American alliance was unified by the desire of both parties to prevail in their struggle against National Socialism, by their determination to defeat “Germany first,” and by their mutual assessment of the criticality of the Atlantic battle. But they were divided by much else. The principal sticking points were when, where, and how they should confront the Germans on the ground. The oft-stated American preference was “the sooner the better,” to which the British invariably replied, “not until we are (all) ready.” This river of tension was fed by many springs. The Americans were influenced by an innate optimism, a keen awareness of the power of their industrial might and vast manpower, a preference for direct solutions, and an appreciation of their own people’s limited tolerance for long wars. The British strategic temperament stemmed from their much longer experience of fighting the Germans, most recently with mildly bad to catastrophic results; an awareness of their industrial and manpower paucity; a fondness for indirect solutions; and a willingness to rely on the stoicism of John Bull.

All these ingredients were active in the spring and summer of 1942 as the two Allies struggled to develop a mutually satisfactory concept for the employment of ground and supporting air forces against the Germans (Matloff and Snell 1953, Greenfield 1963). Marshall pushed for a buildup of American troops in Britain, known as Operation Roundup, in preparation for a 1943 cross-channel attack called Operation Bolero. The British argued instead for various initiatives in the Mediterranean. Roosevelt was inclined to support Bolero but realized that if Americans were not directly engaged with Germans during 1942, the American people would expect combat action somewhere else. That somewhere else could only be the Pacific, and hostile operations in that theater alone could endanger the whole Germany first strategy. He thus insisted that Marshall compromise with the British, leading to the late July decision to invade North Africa before the year was out.

This made the Mediterranean a major theater of operations in World War II. Because of America's reluctance to enter that theater, which Marshall and others saw as protective of British interests but not contributing directly to the conquest of Germany, many have regarded operations therein to have been an unwonted diversion from the main task. But Douglas Porch (2004) has recently put forward a cogent defense of those operations, arguing that they helped mature the Anglo-American coalition, ate away at German military strength, and won Allied control of a vital sea line of communication to Russia, the Middle East, and South Asia.

In January 1943, Roosevelt, Churchill, and their senior military advisers traveled to Casablanca for perhaps their most auspicious strategic conference of the war (Matloff 1959, Greenfield 1963). Here, they hammered out a rough blueprint for action to establish conditions for an eventual cross-channel invasion: win in the Atlantic, engage Germany on the periphery, initiate a Combined Bomber Offensive with the American Army Air Forces hitting Germany by day and the Royal Air Force striking by night, and support resistance movements in the occupied countries. One day after Tunis fell to an Anglo-American attack in mid-May, the Combined Chiefs of Staff approved Eisenhower's plan for the invasion of Sicily in August. When Mussolini's government was deposed in late July, the Allies agreed that the invasion of Italy was both practical and beneficial. There followed a long tug of war over the assault on northwest Europe that was not resolved until November when Roosevelt and Churchill met with Stalin in Tehran. At a conference in Cairo held immediately thereafter, Roosevelt designated Eisenhower to command the invasion force. Although there would be continued disagreements over operational details, the most contentious issue of Anglo-American strategy had finally been decided.

### **North Africa: From Torch to Tunis**

Although ultimately successful, the North African invasion, known as Operation Torch, revealed just how unprepared the Americans really were (Howe 1957, Atkinson 2002). Three task forces landed, from west-to-east, near Casablanca, Oran, and Algiers. Political negotiations to obtain Vichy French neutrality were only partially successful. Nevertheless, within two days of the landings on November 8, 1942, French resistance had virtually ceased. The Germans promptly began sending forces to Tunis and occupied Vichy France. The French governor, Admiral Jean Francois Darlan, thereupon renounced his allegiance to Vichy, giving Eisenhower, the Allied commander, an unsavory but effective civil partner, a condition that continued even after Darlan's assassination shortly thereafter. The Germans halted (British) General Kenneth Anderson's First Army west of Tunis; and rain, mud, and inadequate railroads conspired to slow the rest of the invasion force as it worked its way eastward. With the large German force under General Juergen von Arnim that occupied Tunis being subject to interdiction from the sea and Field Marshal Erwin Rommel's panzer army withdrawing across Libya and into Tunisia, the stage seemed set for a junction between Eisenhower's and General Bernard Montgomery's forces and an ejection of the Germans from North Africa.

But Eisenhower's troops were widely dispersed, and the tactical command arrangements were chaotic. Rommel struck like a cobra at Kasserine Pass, a gap in the Western Dorsal chain of the Atlas Mountains about two hundred miles southwest of Tunis, revealing glaring deficiencies in American tactics, equipment, training, and leadership. Confusion in the Axis high command prevented Rommel from exploiting his victory, but the battle was costly. II Corps, the tactical unit commanding the operation, lost roughly 300 killed, nearly 3,000 wounded, another 3,000 missing, and about 200 each of tanks and artillery tubes. Rommel's punch pushed American troops back 50 miles, caused great anguish in the United States, and raised serious questions in the minds of British senior officers about the competence of their ally (Blumenson 1967, 1986). But Eisenhower tightened up his command, and the combined might of the Torch force and Montgomery's Eighth Army ultimately produced an Allied victory at Tunis in which nearly 300,000 Axis prisoners were captured in the last week of fighting.

### The Invasion of Sicily

With the entire North African littoral in Allied hands, the question was, "What next?" Sardinia offered airfields that would allow American bombers to strike Germany, but it lacked easy access to the Italian mainland. This made Sicily the logical target (Garland and Smyth 1965, Atkinson 2007). The problem lay in working out the operational details. A glance at the map made Messina, the port city on Sicily's northeast corner, the most productive point of attack because its capture would bottle up the German and Italian forces defending the island. But its range beyond Allied air cover and the presence of numerous shore batteries convinced Anglo-American planners it was too risky. There was also a tension between the concentration needed to withstand Axis counterattacks and the dispersion required to capture the much-desired Sicilian airfields. Concentration carried the day. On July 10, 1943, the British Eighth Army under Montgomery landed on the southeast corner and the American Seventh Army under Lieutenant General George S. Patton, Jr., hit the coast just to the west. Overall ground command was exercised by (British) General Harold Alexander's 15th Army Group whose plan called for Montgomery to drive up the east coast to Messina, while Patton protected his left flank. The American assault was complicated by rough seas, badly dispersed airborne drops, and the presence of the *Herman Goering Panzer Division*. But with the assistance of generous doses of naval gunfire and gutsy paratroopers fighting off German tanks with Garand rifles and inadequate anti-tank weapons, the Seventh Army established a viable lodgment (Morison 1954, Blair 1985). Montgomery ran into stiff German defenses and tough terrain working his way up the east coast, and Patton was too impetuous to stay in a supporting role for very long. Instead, he raced north insubordinately against only token resistance, capturing both Palermo and headlines in the American newspapers. Patton and Montgomery then made converging advances on Messina, while the Germans conducted a gradual, textbook withdrawal. In the final phase of this evacuation, the Germans transported

nearly 40,000 soldiers, 15,000 wounded, 10,000 vehicles, and 20,000 tons of equipment to the Italian mainland (D'Este 1988). Despite this lost opportunity, the political repercussions of the Sicily invasion were profound. Fed up with Mussolini's craven capitulation to Hitler's military occupation of Italy and backed by disaffected elements in the government, King Victor Emmanuel forced Mussolini from office, opening Italy to detachment from the Axis.

### **The Italian Campaign: Salerno to Rome**

Both military momentum and political opportunity led to the invasion of the Italian mainland. But having been forced to cancel a cross-channel invasion in 1943 by acquiescing to the Mediterranean strategy, the Americans were now absolutely determined to invade northwest Europe in the spring/summer of 1944. This meant that the Italian campaign would increasingly have to take second priority to preparations for the main event.

The Italian government announced its surrender on September 8. On the next day, the American Fifth Army, commanded by Lieutenant General Mark Clark, landed at Salerno (Blumenson 1969; Atkinson 2007). Things seemed well in hand at first blush. But the German Tenth Army commander, General Heinrich von Vietinghoff, counterattacked with a vengeance, almost driving the Fifth Army into the sea. A stubborn stand by the 45th Infantry Division, aided by paratroopers from Major General Matthew Ridgway's 82nd Airborne Division and a heavy plastering from American ships and aircraft, blunted the German attack, preventing what might have been another Dunkirk. The Americans then pressed north, but the Germans established a solid defense in the mountains between Naples and Rome along what became known as the Gustav Line. In January 1944 General Clark launched a two-pronged attack to break the impasse. By land, he sent the 36th Infantry Division across the Rapido River in one of the most tactically inept American ventures of the war (Blumenson 1970). By sea, Clark launched an amphibious attack on Anzio that was met by stiff German resistance and failed to gain significant ground beyond the beachhead. The Anzio attack remains shrouded in controversy. Without naming names, Churchill castigated the lack of audacity on the part of the American leadership (Churchill 1951). Martin Blumenson, *Anzio: The Gamble that Failed* (1963), apportions blame widely among Churchill, Alexander, and Clark but is kinder to John Lukas, the commander at Anzio, than most historians (Blumenson 1963). More recent scholarship has argued that the means allotted were inadequate to the task at hand (D'Este 1991). In May 1944, the British launched a major attack against the Gothic Line and the Americans pushed a significantly reinforced VI Corps out of the Anzio lodgment (Fisher 1977). But General Clark deemed the capture of Rome so important that he ignored General Alexander's instructions to capture Valmontone, which would have cut off the German Tenth Army. Clark got his fleeting glory, but the survival of a major German formation would force the Americans to conduct a long, painful drive to the north after the fall of the Italian capital (Botjer 1996).

### **Securing the North Atlantic, 1943–5**

Winning the Battle of the North Atlantic was arguably the most important thing the Allies had to do to defeat Germany. In a worst-case scenario, the British people could starve; but even in rosier circumstances, without a reliable bridge across the Atlantic, Hitler's Fortress Europe would remain impregnable to attack from the west. Like all tough problems in war, it took a good while to accomplish and the concerted efforts of many approaches (Morison 1947, 1956; Syrett 1994; Blair 1988). The first four months of 1943 remained grim – in March alone, over 100 Allied ships were sunk, totaling more than 600,000 tons, in return for only 15 German submarines. But then things began to turn. The Allies convened a conference in Washington at which technical problems were hashed out and national areas of operations established. The Canadian and British forces took responsibility for north of the fortieth latitude, with the Americans operating to the south. Radio interception and direction finding stations were expanded along the Atlantic rim in Britain, Greenland, Iceland, the United States, and Bermuda. The Canadians and Americans both established "all-source" submarine tracking centers analogous to that set up by the British Admiralty before the war. Increased cooperation was garnered from both the Royal Air Force and the US Army Air Forces to provide aerial escort using specially modified B-24 Liberators (Warnock 1999). Even so, a troubling gap remained in the mid-Atlantic, referred to as the "black hole." This was finally closed in mid-1943 by the assignment of escort carriers, small aircraft carriers originally designed to ferry airplanes, to convoy duty (Y'Blood 1983). Scientists and operational researchers perfected the tactical techniques for convoy defense and attacks against U-boats (Meigs 1990). And production of Liberty ships ramped up significantly (Bunker 1972). The net result: in May 1943, only 200,000 tons were lost, while 1,200,000 tons came into production. Although the U-boat menace would continue to irritate until the end of the war, by the end of 1943 the battle was essentially won; and the Germans never recovered the initiative.

### **Strategic Air Attack, 1943–4**

The concept of strategic attack predates the advent of powered flight, but its practice up to the early part of World War II had been very uneven and would remain controversial throughout the war (Biddle 2002). The "Combined Bomber Offensive" approved at Casablanca in January 1943 was a euphemism for allowing the Royal Air Force and the US Army Air Forces each to follow its own preferences: the former for night bombing against cities, the latter for relatively more accurate day bombing against specific German military and industrial targets.

For the Americans, 1943 was a year of build-up and disappointment bordering on disaster (Craven and Cate 1949, Mets 1988, Davis 1993). Fighter protection for bombers could reach only the western portions of Germany. August raids beyond the range of escorts against ball bearing and aircraft factories in the German cities of Schweinfurt and Regensburg, by Eighth Air Force B-17s, inflicted



significant damage but lost 60 of the 376 planes launched. Two months later, a return raid against Schweinfurt resulted in 60 losses of the 291 planes dispatched. Casualties of this magnitude simply could not be sustained (Middlebrook 1983). There followed a long pause during which the Eighth Air Force was reinforced with hundreds of aircrew and air frames and supplied with the P-51 Mustang, equipped with air-droppable fuel tanks. This plane could escort bombers into the heart of Germany.

The combined effects of these changes brought dramatic new results in a February 1944 air offensive designed to eviscerate the German Air Force. By the end of March, the Luftwaffe, though still not defeated, was being forced to pick and choose its defensive battles. From April to June, the major air objective was to prepare for the cross-channel attack. Eisenhower insisted that he be given authority over the employment of the strategic as well as the tactical air forces. With the effort thus focused and with additional air reinforcements pouring into England, good things continued to happen. Lieutenant General James Doolittle freed the fighter escorts to sweep the skies for German air formations and attack them on the ground. The Allies achieved clear air superiority over France by the end of May. Thus, the Normandy landings were made with virtually no German opposition from the air. In mid-September, direction of the RAF Bomber Command and the Eighth Air Force reverted from Eisenhower to the Combined Chiefs of Staff; and the heavy bombers went back to pummeling German cities and industrial targets, with the Americans taking particular aim on synthetic oil production.

### **The Role of Ultra**

In 1974 Group Captain F. W. Winterbotham of the Royal Air Force revealed that the Allies had broken the German high command's supposedly secret code throughout a good deal of the war (Winterbotham 1974). Without access to official records, Winterbotham's revelation was only a sketch; but it opened the floodgates. Four years later, an account of the war against Germany, based on early access to decoded messages and written mostly from the British perspective, described how "Ultra" (the de-coded messages' level of classification) information was obtained by spiriting a German Enigma coding machine out of Poland, assembling an unorthodox group of mathematicians at a place called Bletchley Park, systematically deciphering the German codes, and devising a secure transmission channel to route this valuable intelligence to political and senior military leaders (Lewin 1978). This was followed by works that analyzed in more detail Ultra's contributions to the campaign in northwest Europe, the Mediterranean, and the Atlantic (Bennett 1979, 1989; Gardner 1999). In 1980, the US Air Force published the official account of the role of Ultra in the air war against Germany, which had been compiled by its Ultra liaison officer in late 1945 (US Army Air Force 1980). More recent scholarship has shown how Patton's drive across France in the summer of 1944 was orchestrated around the shrewd integration of Ultra information, ground maneuver, and tactical airpower (Shwedo 2001). The burden

of this scholarship: Ultra gave Allied leaders a significant advantage in the war against Germany; the Allies astutely concealed the fact of the code-breaking; and the Germans obtusely failed to suspect that their Enigma-based code had been broken. Nevertheless, Ultra was not a panacea. At times, such as nine critical months during the Battle of the Atlantic and the period leading up the massive German Ardennes offensive of December 1944, either the Allies were not able to break the code or the Germans deliberately suppressed their radio transmissions. Furthermore, Ultra could not be read as a magic key to German intentions. Rather, it had to be integrated into a wide variety of other sources to produce a holistic analysis. The commanders and intelligence officers who did this best were those who reaped Ultra's full rewards.

### **Forging Allied Strategy, 1944–5**

The major locus of Anglo-American tension in 1944 remained the Mediterranean (Matloff 1959). Eisenhower put forth a military rationale for an invasion of southern France, then referred to as Anvil, while Churchill focused on the political effects in the Balkans that might flow from a rapid drive into northern Italy, followed by an excursion to Trieste. Roosevelt backed Eisenhower; and Churchill had no choice but to acquiesce, merely squeezing the concession that the attack be re-named Dragoon to reflect the intense pressure that had been brought to bear on him. The final Anglo-American conference of the war, held in September at Quebec, was mostly agreeable, with the only area of discord being the extent of British naval participation in the closing phases of the Pacific War against Japan. By February 1945, with the Red Army occupying most of Poland and southeast Europe, the time had clearly come for another Anglo-American-Soviet conference. At Stalin's insistence it was held at Yalta (Weinberg 1994). Clearly reflecting Mao Zedong's dictum that political power grows out of the barrel of a gun, Stalin refused to grant any significant concessions on the establishment of communist-friendly regimes in Poland and Czechoslovakia. He did, however, agree to attack the Japanese forces occupying Manchuria within three months of the defeat of Germany, which both Churchill and Roosevelt felt would hasten victory in the Pacific. Given the military realities on the ground and the uncertainties regarding the future, the western Allies arguably got virtually all they could from this final conference before V-E Day.

### **Cross-Channel Attack**

Next to the Battle of the Atlantic, the invasion of northwest Europe was the most decisive enterprise of the European war (Harrison 1951, Ryan 1959, Ambrose 1994). The successful assault forced Hitler to fight on two fronts and stretched German resources to the breaking point; had it failed, Germany might have been able to battle the Soviets to a stalemate, with consequences that can only be imagined. The shadow of Britain's World War I amphibious failure in the Dardanelles

haunted Churchill; and although the Americans were noticeably more sanguine, they, too, realized the venture was perilous. Out of this desperation was born an imaginative deception scheme to convince the Germans that the main Allied landings would be around Calais, the nearest point to Britain across the Channel (Cave Brown 1975). In reality, however, the landings would be in Normandy, which, despite the absence of a major port, provided suitable landing beaches and adequate room for airfields. The final plan called for an assault force of five divisions to come in over the shore and another three to assault by air to protect the invasion beaches from armored counterattack (Morison 1957, Marshall 1962). Aggressive air action had cut all the Seine River bridges between the Channel and Paris, further complicating the Germans' ability to move reinforcements to the invasion area (Craven and Cate 1951). Despite less than optimal weather, The Allies got ashore successfully on June 6, 1944, though the unexpected presence of one German division and the steep bluffs in the American assault area known as Omaha Beach caused Eisenhower and Lieutenant General Omar Bradley, the US First Army commander, a good deal of anxiety (Balkoski 2004). The airborne operation was plagued by friction, with numerous "sticks" of American paratroopers being scattered across the Norman countryside. But they did what they were supposed to do; and no enemy reinforcements reached Omaha Beach, which anchored the western flank of the invasion area (Blair 1985, Balkoski 2005). Fighting thereafter was mixed (Bradley 1951). One of Bradley's corps captured Cherbourg on June 27, but the port's use was denied by wholesale German demolition. Then the whole First Army became bogged down in desperate fighting among the Norman hedgerows, thickly vegetated borders of French farm plots the Germans defended with consummate tactical skill. St. Lô was not in American hands until July 13; and with the Germans even more stubbornly resisting General Miles Dempsey's Second British Army at Caen, Bradley paced his command tent with understandable agitation.

### **Breakout and Pursuit**

Bradley's concept for a breakout, known as Cobra, envisioned the use of American heavy bombers to blow a hole in the German defenses, through which he would pour the concentrated force of five divisions under his most aggressive corps commander, Major General J. Lawton Collins (Blumenson 1961, D'Este 1983). There pursued an extended tug of war between Bradley and the air commanders, who saw the use of these "strategic" assets in a "tactical" role as the mis-use of a prized asset (Craven and Cate 1951, Davis 1993). There was also disagreement on whether the bombers should fly perpendicular to the line of troops, which would minimize the exposure of the bombers to German anti-air defenses, or parallel thereto, which would minimize the risk of bombs falling on friendly troops. Bradley believed he had secured agreement for a parallel run; but the Army Air Forces executed the mission perpendicularly, killing 25 American soldiers and wounding over 100. After a one-day cancellation and another short bombing, Collins launched

the attack anyway, breaking into but not through the German defenses. That night, however, Collins decided to commit two mobile columns on the next day. The defending Germans came apart at the seams; and in less than a week, the Americans had advanced 40 miles to Avranches, key to the interior of France.

Hitler ordered a counterattack by the German Seventh Army directed against Mortain (Blumenson 1961). But the Allies, forewarned by Ultra intercepts, blocked this effort with relative ease (Bennett 1979). The resulting opportunity to surround the Seventh Army near Falaise was forfeited by lack of coordination between Montgomery's 21st Army Group and Bradley's newly formed 12th Army Group (Blumenson 1993). As a result, while large numbers of German soldiers were killed and captured and countless vehicles were destroyed by Allied airpower, the higher formation staffs escaped, around which were subsequently built a defense of Germany's western border. But with the Germans in full retreat, the Americans raced from victory to victory. Before the end of August, Paris was in Allied hands; and Patton's spearheads had reached Troyes, a hundred miles south-east of the French capital.

### **The Maturation of Tactical Airpower**

These advances were substantially aided by an American air arm that had noticeably matured in its ability to support ground operations. Such support had been only marginally effective in North Africa, due to an aggressive *Luftwaffe*; inadequately trained aircrews; and neither the communications equipment, organizational structures, nor detailed procedures to weld the ground and air arms together (Cooling 1990, Mortensen 1998). Out of this experience emerged a doctrinal manual that established the coequality and interdependence of air and ground formations. But more practical work still had to be done in Sicily and Italy to translate this precept into reality. The air support for the Normandy invasion was uneven – poor at Omaha Beach but quite good at Utah. The broken country of the Norman hedgerows complicated close support, but the Army Air Forces viciously harassed the movement of German reinforcements to the lodgment area. After Cobra, the work of airmen and soldiers finally came together. The key was a grand compromise on just how centralized command of the air forces would actually be. The American Ninth Air Force commander, Major General Hoyt Vandenberg, commanded all the medium bombers and fighter-bombers supporting Bradley's 12th Army Group (Meilinger 1989). But subordinate to him, the commanders of tactical air commands (TACs) worked with the field army commanders in co-located headquarters. The most significant of these relationships were between Major General Elwood "Pete" Quesada's IX TAC and Lieutenant General Courtney Hodges's First Army and between Brigadier General Otto "Opie" Weyland's XIX TAC and Patton's Third Army (Hughes 1995, Spires 2002). These arrangements allowed Vandenberg to shift air assets in response to changing priorities, while also giving Hodges and Patton responsiveness to the requirements of ground operations. With continued development of the

coordinating techniques to bring these forces to bear, the German soldiers came to dread the presence of the American *Jagbos*, or hunter-bombers.

### The Invasion of Southern France

Operation Dragoon was launched on 15 August, with the American Seventh Army, now commanded by General Alexander Patch, landing on the French Riviera and French forces landing to the west a day later to capture Toulon and Marseilles (Clarke and Smith 1993). Within two weeks these ports were in Allied hands, and the American had advanced nearly 100 miles north along the Rhone Valley. With the situation in Normandy turning dire, Hitler ordered the defending Germans to withdraw to the Vosges Mountains. In mid-September, a 6th Army Group was created, commanded by Lieutenant General Jacob Devers and operating under Eisenhower. Devers had at his disposal the First French Army and Patch's Seventh, the latter of which had only a single corps. There was little for 6th Army Group to do. The obstacles of the Vosges, the upper Rhine, and the Black Forest to the east made its area of operations an unpromising venue for any major effort. The result was a slow, frustrating advance into Alsace that reached Strasbourg by mid-December but allowed a major pocket of German forces to remain west of the Rhine near Colmar (Colley 2008).

### Autumn Frustration

Devers's problems in the south resembled in microcosm the problems further north. With Eisenhower's decision to pursue the retreating Germans rather than pausing at the Seine, American operations became bedeviled by the tyranny of logistical reality (Ruppenthal 1953). This forced difficult choices about priorities. Eisenhower's support of Montgomery's plan to beat the logistical odds by launching a major airborne operation to seize a bridgehead over the lower Rhine at Arnhem in mid-September produced no appreciable gains (Ryan 1974, Harvey 2001). Thereafter, he reverted to his broad-front strategy, a cautious but sensible approach to grinding down the *Wehrmacht*. But this meant the American army would be ground down as well. Patton's campaign in Lorraine was impeded by intemperate weather and stiffening German resistance (Cole 1950). His lead corps did not reach the West Wall until early December, and the entire army was short of infantry replacements and artillery shells. The northern prong of Bradley's drive into Germany's western defenses fared even worse (MacDonald 1963). Inexplicably committing the First Army to a major battle in the Huertgen Forest, Hodges and several of his subordinates reached the nadir of tactical competence at the battle of Schmidt (Currey 1984, Miller 1995). There, the 28th Infantry Division, at V Corps order, launched a diverging attack to capture the town that overlooked a key dam on the Roer River. The center regiment had to traverse a steep gorge that virtually prohibited resupply, evacuation, or tank support. Although the town

was seized, the Germans counterattacked with a vengeance, driving the Americans back in total disarray. The debacle at Schmidt served as a metaphor for all the difficulties of attacking in this deep forest – no observation, no possibility of air support, and tenacious German defense of their own territory (Rush 2001). It is no wonder that pictures of Eisenhower from this phase of the war show him gaunt, haggard, and exhausted. For the GIs it was even worse.

### The Battle of the Bulge

Shortly before dawn on December 16, the Germans launched a massive surprise attack into the Ardennes, a forested area of eastern Belgium and Luxembourg that was thinly defended by five American divisions (Cole 1965, Eisenhower 1969, MacDonald 1985). This offensive was not a mere “spoiling attack” to disrupt Hodges’s drive toward the Roer River or Patton’s impending offensive into the Saar. Rather, it was a huge counteroffensive designed by Hitler to force a crossing of the Meuse River, split the American and British armies, capture the logistical lifeline of Antwerp, and bring about a negotiated settlement on the Western Front. Its odds of achieving these grandiose objectives were exceedingly low, but the size and ferocity of the attack were totally unexpected and set many American units back on their heels. Within four days, two regiments of the 106th Infantry Division had surrendered *en masse*; German armored spearheads were on the outskirts of the important road junction of Bastogne; St. Vith, another important road intersection to the north, was on the verge of capture; and multiple Waffen-SS divisions were banging against the vital Elsenborn Ridge on the penetration’s northern shoulder. The defenders at Elsenborn held despite repeated German assaults, and Eisenhower committed the airborne units in theater reserve with sufficient alacrity for the 101st Airborne Division to meet the Germans on the eastern edge of Bastogne. St. Vith was grudgingly surrendered after a gallant stand by a conglomeration of units built around the 7th Armored Division. But with no defensive forces in the middle, the Germans advanced 60 miles, almost reaching the Meuse at Dinant.

A week into the battle, things began to turn. XVIII (Airborne) Corps, whose headquarters had flown from England to Rheims and trucked to the Ardennes, began to cobble together a defense west of St. Vith (Winton 2007). Patton, whose intelligence officer had alertly picked up indications of a possible enemy attack, swung a corps to the north to chew into the southern flank of the “Bulge,” from which the battle got its name, and relieve the now-encircled defenders of Bastogne. Meanwhile, Montgomery, to whom Eisenhower had assigned responsibility for managing the northern half of the penetration, moved Collins’s VII Corps into position to blunt the tip of the German advance. This was accomplished with Collins’s usual panache on Christmas Day. All these efforts were aided by a Siberian high that cleared the wintry skies for several days and brought the *Jagbors* out in force.

Frustrated in his major pursuit, Hitler launched an attack into Alsace, known as Northwind, and directed an all-out effort to capture Bastogne. The Alsatian offensive amounted to little, but the attack on Bastogne created anxious moments



for Patton and his immediate subordinates. Nevertheless, by January 4 the jig was up – General Walter Model, the Army Group B Commander, had thrown in all his chips and come up short. From then on, with Hitler's grudging permission, he fought a skillful withdrawal that inflicted as many American casualties as had been caused in the early phases of the offensive and delayed the closing of the Bulge until the end of January.

### **Strategic Air Attack, 1945**

With the Anglo–American Allies advancing relentlessly eastward, Germany's early-warning radar net disintegrated; and its fighter force was spent in an abortive New Year's Day attack on Allied tactical airfields. This gave the more than 4,000 American bombers now stationed in Europe free rein over the skies of Germany. The Ardennes offensive focused Allied attacks on the German transportation network for purposes of military interdiction. These attacks now began producing even more wide-ranging effects (Mierzejewski 1988). Coal distribution throughout Germany became almost totally disrupted, seriously hampering electrical production and virtually collapsing the German war economy. The Soviet capture of Silesia made a dire situation almost intolerable. Although there had been bitter controversies about whether oil or transportation was the optimal target, the complementary effects of striking them both produced devastating results. An Anglo–American attack on Dresden in mid-February killed some 25,000–35,000 Germans, almost all of whom were civilians. The raid was controversial at the time and remains so because its muddled rationale blurred the line between deliberate terror bombing and the legitimate use of force against military targets (Sherry 1987, Crane 1993, Taylor 2004). The effect of strategic bombing on German military effectiveness also remains controversial. Although a post-war survey sponsored by the Army Air Forces downplayed its significance, more recent scholarship has pointed out the positive effects of delaying the fielding of Hitler's "wonder weapons" such as the V-2 rocket and, as noted above, of the attacks on energy and its means of distribution (Weinberg 1994, Mierzejewski 1988).

### **The Italian Campaign: Rome to the Alps**

The major conundrum facing Allied leaders about what to do in Italy after the fall of Rome was simply to answer the question "Why should we be here?" Churchill's idea for using an advance into northern Italy and on to Trieste as a prelude to fomenting liberation movements in the Balkans was clearly undercut by American insistence on making northwest Europe the main theater. This made the only justifiable rationale for operations in Italy the engagement of German forces so they could not be used more profitably elsewhere (Fisher 1977, Strawson 1988). This reasoning required offensive operations. But attacks faced two significant problems. The first was terrain: the mountains of northern Italy were just as

defensible as those in the south. The second was Kesselring, a skilled tactician who “guaranteed” Hitler that he could hold the Americans, British, and other Allied forces at arm’s length from Germany with minimal strength. These two considerations, allied with the inherent advantages of the defense, meant that the Allies would never be able to engage more German divisions than they had to commit themselves and produced a level of frustration that was felt from the front-line soldier to the army group commander, to which position General Clark was elevated in mid-December 1944.

The initial advance from Rome went relatively well; but by the end of August, Kesselring had established a string of fortifications across the peninsula that became known as the Gothic Line. Here, the going became tough; and when winter approached at the end of September, Fifteenth Army Group was into but not through Kesselring’s defenses. Over the next five months, GIs and their multinational partners painfully clawed their way from hilltop to hilltop. By early March 1945 they found themselves in position for a spring offensive into the beckoning valley of the Po River (Brooks 1996). The big push came in April, and the Germans finally became unglued. The US Fifth Army streamed into the Po Valley and beyond to the Alps, and on 4 May General Clark accepted the unconditional surrender of the German forces in Italy.

### Victory in Europe

With the Germans having gambled everything and lost in the Ardennes and with the Red Army continuing to advance remorselessly from the east, the destruction of National Socialism was now only a matter of time. But the Allied policy of unconditional surrender, whose potentially dire consequences were skillfully magnified by Joseph Goebbels, Hitler’s minister for information and propaganda, kept the Germans fighting, albeit with noticeable degradations of military effectiveness.

In February, Hodges’s First Army and Patton’s Third chewed their way through the West Wall and into the western reaches of the German Rhineland (MacDonald 1973). By March 10, Bradley’s entire 12th Army Group had closed on the Rhine from Coblenz to Cologne. Then Patton forced a crossing of the Moselle and reached the west bank of the Rhine as far south as Mannheim by March 21. Meanwhile, Patch’s Seventh Army, under Devers, attacked from northern Lorraine into the Saar. With its military industry virtually shut down and the *Wehrmacht* eviscerated, Germany’s mystical western guardian, the Rhine, simply could not be defended. By the end of March, the Americans had established viable enclaves east of the river – by Hodges beyond Remagen, where the Ludendorff Bridge had almost miraculously been captured intact, and by Patton beyond Oppenheim. By early April, Hodges had encircled the Ruhr industrial area from the south, while Lieutenant General William Simpson’s Ninth Army, operating under Montgomery’s command, had closed the trap from the north. This action not only captured the heart of German industrial might, it destroyed Army Group B, netted over 300,000 German prisoners, and led Model to take his own life (Toland

1966). Bradley continued to attack across central and southern Germany, while Devers advanced to the Alps. On 25 April patrols of Hodges's First Army and General A. S. Zhadov's Soviet 5th Guards Army linked up at Torgau on the Elbe River (Glantz and House 1995). On 7 May General Jodl signed the capitulation document in Rheims, and Eisenhower's staff prepared a valedictory message to be signaled to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. But Eisenhower, with a keen eye for the elegance of understated simplicity, changed it to read merely, "The Mission of this Allied Force was fulfilled at 0241 local time, May 7<sup>th</sup>, 1945, Eisenhower" (Pogue 1954). Although the Russians insisted on conducting another surrender ceremony in Berlin the next day, the war in Europe was over.

During six years of combat, three and a half for the United States, World War II destroyed the balance of power system that had characterized Europe since the seventeenth century and laid the seeds for the Cold War of the next half century. The Soviet Union and United States emerged as super powers. The American armed services came of age during the conflict emerging to world leadership for the first time. Thus it is little wonder that World War II had fascinated both historians and the general public from the moment it came to a close. Literally hundreds of books about it appear every year. No brief chapter can do justice to them all. Indeed, while virtually every aspect of the war has been scrutinized, it was so complicated and massive and the documentation so rich and varied that opportunities for historians to analyze, interpret, and seek meaning in its conduct will never be exhausted.

#### BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Ambrose, Stephen (1994). *D-Day, June 6, 1944: The Climatic Battle of World War II*. New York: Simon & Schuster.
- Atkinson, Rick (2002). *An Army at Dawn: The War in North Africa, 1942–1943*. New York: Henry Holt.
- Atkinson, Rick (2007). *The Day of Battle: The War in Sicily and Italy, 1943–1944*. New York: Henry Holt.
- Bailey, Thomas A., and Paul B. Ryan (1979). *Hitler vs. Roosevelt: The Undeclared Naval War*. New York: Free Press.
- Balkoski, Joseph (2004). *Omaha Beach: D-Day June 6, 1944*. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole.
- Balkoski, Joseph (2005). *Utah Beach: The Amphibious Landing and Airborne Operations on D-Day June 6, 1944*. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole.
- Bennett, Ralph (1979). *Ultra in the West: The Normandy Campaign 1944–45*. London: Hutchinson.
- Bennett, Ralph (1989). *Ultra and Mediterranean Strategy*. New York: Morrow.
- Biddle, Tami Davis (2002). *Rhetoric and Reality: The Evolution of British and American Ideas about Strategic Bombing, 1914–1945*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Blair, Clay (1966). *Hitler's U-Boat War: The Hunters 1939–1942*. New York: Random House.
- Blair, Clay (1985). *Ridgway's Paratroopers: The American Airborne in World War II*. Garden City, NY: Dial Press.

- Blair, Clay (1988). *Hitler's U-Boat War: The Hunted 1943–1945*. New York: Random House.
- Blumenson, Martin (1961). *Breakout and Pursuit*. Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History.
- Blumenson, Martin (1963). *Anzio: The Gamble that Failed*. Philadelphia, Lippincott.
- Blumenson, Martin (1967). *Kasserine Pass*. Boston, Houghton Mifflin Co.
- Blumenson, Martin (1969). *Salerno to Casino*. Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History.
- Blumenson, Martin (1970). *Bloody River: The Real Tragedy of the Rapido*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
- Blumenson, Martin (1986). "Kasserine Pass, 30 January–22 February 1941," in Charles E. Heller, and William A. Stofft, eds. *America's First Battles, 1776–1965*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
- Blumenson, Martin (1993). *The Battle of the Generals: The Untold Story of the Falaise Pocket: The Campaign that Should Have Won World War II*. New York: Morrow.
- Botjer, George F. (1996). *Sideshow War: The Italian Campaign, 1943–1945*. College Station: Texas A&M University Press.
- Bradley, Omar N. (1951). *A Soldier's Story*. New York: Henry Holt.
- Brooks, Thomas R. (1996). *The War North of Rome, June 1944–May 1945*. New York: Sarpedon.
- Bunker, John (1972). *Liberty Ships: The Ugly Ducklings of World War II*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Cave Brown, Anthony (1975). *Bodyguard of Lies*. New York: Harper & Row.
- Churchill, Winston S. (1951). *Closing the Ring*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
- Clarke, Jeffrey J., and Robert Ross Smith (1993). *Riviera to the Rhine*. Washington: Center for Military History.
- Cline, Ray S. (1951). *Washington Command Post: The Operations Division*. Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History.
- Cole, Hugh M. (1950). *The Lorraine Campaign*. Washington: US Army Historical Division.
- Cole, Hugh M. (1965). *The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge*. Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History.
- Colley, David P. (2008). *Decision at Strasbourg: Ike's Strategic Mistake to Halt the Sixth Army Group at the Rhine in 1944*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Cooling, Benjamin Franklin, ed. (1990). *Case Studies in the Development of Close Air Support*. Washington: Office of Air Force History.
- Crane, Conrad C. (1993). *Bombs, Cities, and Civilians: American Airpower Strategy in World War II*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
- Craven, Wesley Frank, and James Lea Cate (1983 [1949]). *The Army Air Forces in World War II*, vol. 2: *Europe: Torch to Pointblank, August 1942 to December 1943*. Washington: Office of Air Force History.
- Craven, Wesley Frank, and James Lea Cate (1983 [1951]). *The Army Air Forces in World War II*, vol. 3: *Europe: Argument to V-E Day, January 1944 to May 1945*. Washington: Office of Air Force History.
- Currey, Cecil B. (1984). *Follow Me and Die: The Destruction of an American Division in World War II*. New York: Stein and Day.
- Davis, Richard G. (1993). *Carl A. Spaatz and the Air War in Europe*. Washington: Center for Air Force History.
- D'Este, Carlo (1983). *Decision in Normandy*. New York: Dutton.

- D'Este, Carlo (1988). *Bitter Victory: The Battle for Sicily 1943*. Glasgow: Collins.
- D'Este, Carlo (1991). *Fatal Decision: Anzio and the Battle for Rome*. New York: Harper Collins.
- Doubler, Michael D. (1994). *Closing with the Enemy: How GIs Fought the War in Europe, 1944–1945*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
- Eisenhower, Dwight D. (1948). *Crusade in Europe*. New York: Doubleday.
- Eisenhower, John S. D. (1969). *The Bitter Woods: The Dramatic Story, Told at All Echelons – from Supreme Commander to Squad Leader – of the Crisis that Shook the Western Coalition: Hitler's Surprise Ardennes Offensive*. New York: Putnam's.
- Fisher, Ernest F. (1977). *Cassino to the Alps*. Washington: Center of Military History.
- Gannon, Michael (1990). *Operation Drumbeat: The Dramatic True Story of Germany's First U-Boat Attacks along the American Coast in World War II*. New York: Harper & Row.
- Gardner, W. J. R. (1999). *Decoding History: The Battle of the Atlantic and Ultra*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Garland, Albert N., and Howard McGaw Smyth (1965). *Sicily and the Surrender of Italy*. Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History.
- Glantz, David M., and Jonathan M. House (1995). *When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
- Greenfield, Kent Roberts, ed. (1960). *Command Decisions*. Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History.
- Greenfield, Kent Roberts (1963). *American Strategy in World War II: A Reconsideration*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Hansell, Haywood S. (1972). *The Air Plan that Defeated Hitler*. Atlanta: Higgins-McArthur/Longino and Porter.
- Harrison, Gordon A. (1951). *Cross Channel Attack*. Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History.
- Harvey, A. D. (2001). *Arnhem*. London: Cassell.
- Howe, George F. (1957). *Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the West*. Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History.
- Hughes, Thomas Alexander (1995). *Over Lord: General Pete Quesada and the Triumph of Tactical Air Power in World War II*. New York: Free Press.
- Irving, David (1968). *The Destruction of Convoy PQ17*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Larrabee, Eric (1987). *Commander in Chief: Franklin Delano Roosevelt, His Lieutenants, and Their War*. New York: Harper & Row.
- Leighton, Richard M., and Robert W. Coakley (1955). *Global Logistics and Strategy, 1940–1943*. Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History.
- Leighton, Richard M., and Robert W. Coakley (1968). *Global Logistics and Strategy, 1944–1945*. Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History.
- Leinbaugh, Harold P., and John D. Campbell (1985). *The Men of Company K: The Autobiography of a World War II Rifle Company*. New York: William Morrow.
- Lewin, Ronald (1978). *Ultra Goes to War*. London: Hutchinson.
- MacDonald, Charles B. (1963). *The Siegfried Line Campaign*. Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History.
- MacDonald, Charles B. (1969). *The Mighty Endeavor: American Armed Forces in the European Theater in World War II*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- MacDonald, Charles B. (1973). *The Last Offensive*. Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History.
- MacDonald, Charles B. (1985). *A Time for Trumpets: The Untold Story of the Battle of the Bulge*. New York: William Morrow.

- Marshall, S. L. A. (1962). *Night Drop: The American Airborne Invasion of Normandy*. Boston: Little, Brown.
- Matloff, Maurice (1959). *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1943–1944*. Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History.
- Matloff, Maurice, and Edwin Marion Snell (1953). *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1939–1942*. Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History.
- Meigs, Montgomery (1990). *Slide Rules and Submarines: American Scientists and Subsurface Warfare in World War II*. Washington: National Defense University Press.
- Meilinger, Phillip S. (2000 [1989]). *Hoyt S. Vandenberg: The Life of a General*. Washington: Air Force History and Museums Program.
- Mets, David R. (1988). *Master of Airpower: General Carl A. Spaatz*. Novato, CA: Presidio.
- Middlebrook, Martin (1983). *The Schweinfurt–Regensburg Mission*. New York: Scribners.
- Mierzejewski, Alfred C. (1988). *The Collapse of the German War Economy, 1944–1945: Allied Air Power and the German National Railway*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Miller, Edward G. (1995). *A Dark and Bloody Ground: The Hürtgen Forest and the Roer River Dams, 1944–1945*. College Station: Texas A&M University Press.
- Morison, Samuel Eliot (1947). *History of United States Naval Operations in World War II*, vol. 1: *The Battle of the Atlantic, September 1939–May 1943*. Boston: Little, Brown.
- Morison, Samuel Eliot (1954). *History of United States Naval Operations in World War II*, vol. 9: *Sicily–Salerno–Anzio, January 1943–June 1944*. Boston: Little, Brown.
- Morison, Samuel Eliot (1956). *History of United States Naval Operations in World War II*, vol. 10: *The Atlantic Battle Won, May 1943–May 1945*. Boston: Little, Brown.
- Morison, Samuel Eliot (1957). *History of United States Naval Operations in World War II*, vol. 11: *The Invasion of France and Germany, 1944–1945*. Boston: Little Brown.
- Mortensen, Daniel R. (1998). *Airpower and Ground Armies: Essays on the Evolution of American Air Doctrine 1940–1943*. Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press.
- Murray, Williamson, and Allan Reed Millett (2000). *A War to Be Won: Fighting the Second World War*. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University.
- Pogue, Forrest C. (1954). *The Supreme Command*. Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History.
- Pogue, Forrest C. (1966). *George C. Marshall: Ordeal and Hope 1939–1942*. New York: Viking.
- Pogue, Forrest C. (1973). *George C. Marshall: Organizer of Victory 1943–1945*. New York: Viking.
- Porch, Douglas (2004). *Path to Victory: The Mediterranean Strategy in World War II*. New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux.
- Ratcliff, R. A. (2006). *Delusions of Intelligence: Enigma, Ultra, and the End of Secure Ciphers*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Ruppenthal, Roland G. (1953). *Logistical Support of the Armies*, vol 2: *September 1944–May 1945*. Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History.
- Rush, Robert Sterling (2001). *Hell in the Hürtgen Forest*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
- Ryan, Cornelius (1959). *The Longest Day: June 6, 1944*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Ryan, Cornelius (1974). *A Bridge Too Far*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Schrijvers, Peter (2005). *The Unknown Dead: Civilians in the Battle of the Bulge*. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky.
- Sherry, Michael S. (1987). *The Rise of American Air Power: The Creation of Armageddon*. New Haven: Yale University Press.



- Shwedo, Bradford J. (2001). *XIX Tactical Air Command and ULTRA: Patton's Force Enhancers in the 1944 Campaign in France*. Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press.
- Spies, David N. (2002). *Air Power for Patton's Army: The XIX Tactical Air Command in the Second World War*. Washington: Air Force History and Museums Program.
- Strawson, John (1988). *The Italian Campaign*. New York: Carroll & Graf.
- Syrett, David (1994). *Defeat of the German U-Boats: The Battle of the Atlantic*. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.
- Taylor, Fred (2004). *Dresden: Tuesday, February 13, 1945*. New York: HarperCollins.
- Toland, John (1966). *The Last 100 Days*. New York: Random House.
- US Army Air Forces (1980). *Ultra and the History of the United States Strategic Air Forces in Europe vs. the German Air Force*. Frederick, MD: University Publications of America.
- van Creveld, Martin (1977). *Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- van Creveld, Martin (1982). *Fighting Power: German and U.S. Army Performance, 1939–1945*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
- Warnock, A. Timothy (1999). *The U.S. Army Air Forces in World War II: Air Power versus U-Boats: Confronting Hitler's Submarine Menace in the European Theater*. Washington: Air Force History and Museums Program.
- Watson, Mark Skinner (1950). *Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations*. Washington: Army Historical Division.
- Wedemeyer, Albert C. (1958). *Wedemeyer Reports!* New York: Holt.
- Weigley, Russell F. (1981). *Eisenhower's Lieutenants: The Campaigns in France and Germany, 1944–1945*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Weinberg, Gerhard (1994). *A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Willmott, H. P. (1989). *The Great Crusade: A New Complete History of the Second World War*. New York: Free Press.
- Winterbotham, F. W. (1974). *The Ultra Secret*. New York: Harper & Row.
- Winton, Harold R. (2007). *Corps Commanders of the Bulge: Six American Generals and Victory in the Ardennes*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
- Y'Blood, William T. (1983). *Hunter-Killer: U.S. Escort Carriers in the Battle of the Atlantic*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.

# Chapter Eleven

## WORLD WAR II IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

*John Wukovits*

During World War II combat spanned the globe, resulted in destruction on an unprecedented scale, and took the lives of sixty million people. In Asia it began with the Japanese invasion of China in 1937 and spread to the Indian and Pacific Oceans – and to include the United States four years later when Japanese forces simultaneously struck at British forces in Malaya and American forces in Hawaii. While engaged in combat stretching from Hawaii and Alaska to Burma and India, the major allies, the United States, Great Britain, and China each focused its resources in separate theaters of operation. Indeed, to manage operations on such a vast scale, the Allies established separate theaters of operation assigning command and primacy to the British in the China, Burma, India (CBI) Theater, and to the United States in the Pacific and Southwest Pacific Theaters.

Conflict on the massive scale of World War II is difficult to describe, much less analyze, in a single volume though several authors have attempted to do so. Among the most successful are the English historians Martin Gilbert (1989), John Keegan (1990), R. A. C. Parker (1990), and H. P. Willmott (1991). The American Gerhard Weinberg (1994) must be included in any list of authors who have produced excellent overviews of the entire war. The task is no less daunting for historians limiting their scope to the Pacific–East Asian portion of the war, where works by John Toland (1970), Akira Iriye (1981), John Costello (1982), Ronald Spector (1985), and Alan Schom (2004) – though some were written decades ago – remain solid.

These syntheses are based on an abundance of works describing leaders, battles, strategies, and campaigns. Though select shortcomings need to be addressed, swarms of historians and biographers have turned to the war against Japan, much like writers turn to the Civil War when searching for drama and riveting tales.

### **Official Histories**

The military services have led the way. Fortunately for readers and researchers, each of the four main service branches has published multi-volume histories of that service at war. The official histories run the gamut from the Army's and

Marine's comprehensive, if somewhat dry, volumes, to the Air Force's more captivating books, and on to the stirring writings of Samuel Eliot Morison contained in the Navy's monumental series.

The Army's massive *United States Army in World War II* (1948–62) series, commonly referred to as the “Green Books” after the color of the volumes' covers, dedicates 11 of its more than 70 books to the Pacific War. Each title deals with a certain area in which the Army played a prominent role, such as Okinawa or the Philippines, and is written by a top-caliber historian, such as John Miller, Jr., Louis Morton, and Philip A. Crowl. A superb collection of maps supplement the fluid writing that marks most volumes.

As well-written as many of the Green Books are, they – and most every other book about World War II – pale in comparison to Samuel Eliot Morison's splendid 14-volume *History of United States Naval Operations in World War II*, nine of which cover the Pacific clash (1948–60). Morison breathes life to Pacific naval encounters much as he did with his breathtaking biography of Christopher Columbus, which garnered numerous accolades, including 1942's Pulitzer Prize for biography. Though the volumes contain shortcomings – Morison's team assembled the information and produced the series by 1960, before much relevant material was available, and a Japanese perspective is minimal – the books provide an excellent foundation for anyone interested in learning the US Navy's role in the Pacific.

The five-volume *History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II* (1958–71) by the Historical Branch at Marine Headquarters, offers a solid, if unspectacular, assessment of the US Marines in the Pacific. The authors focus more on strategy and tactics than on individual contributions to victory, and as such provide a unit-by-unit history of each campaign. An interested reader can here learn the basics of the Marine assaults against Tarawa, Iwo Jima, or any other island campaign – precisely the purpose of these and other official military service histories – but he or she would have to consult other works to gain a more personal view.

Unlike the other services, the Marine Corps updated its information in the 1990s with the *Marines in World War II Commemorative Series*, a collection of pamphlets published by the Marine Historical Center in Washington, DC. The 26 pamphlets cover every Marine campaign in the Pacific, Marine aviation, and Marine training. Although brief, each one offers updated materials which supplements the five-volume official histories.

Like the other official military sources, the seven-volume *The Army Air Forces in World War II*, edited by Wesley F. Craven and James L. Cates (1948, 1950, 1953) suffers from being published before much crucial information was available. Despite the omissions, the three volumes concerning air power in the Pacific are the starting point for any reader interested in that aspect of the war.

### General Histories

The war in eastern Asia and the western Pacific has attracted writers of sweeping narratives aimed at both general readers and scholars. Indeed, such broad narratives have been published in almost every year since the beginning of the war. From those

written and published during the war one can gain a perspective not always available in other books. Those histories published while the war still raged, while obviously lacking detail and sometimes suffering from wartime fever, give the reader an absorbing glimpse of how the home front viewed what to them were current events, while those published in the last few years offer a more balanced, complete viewpoint. All are valuable to the reader seeking to grasp the essence of the Pacific War.

A few examples illustrate the point. The 1942 book, *How War Came*, written by Forrest Davis and Ernest K. Lindley, was one of the first books to analyze the crucial political events occurring from the fall of France to Pearl Harbor. The book focuses on Franklin Roosevelt's efforts to delay the march of the Axis nations, such as his destroyer-for-bases deal with Great Britain, until the nation was ready to hurl its military resources into the fray. A sense of desperation emanates from its pages that later books cannot hope to capture.

Reporter Robert J. Casey does the same with his brilliant 1942 book, *Torpedo Junction: With the Pacific Fleet from Pearl Harbor to Midway*. Casey rode the Pacific with Admiral William Halsey's ships as they bombarded Japanese atolls and ferried Jimmy Doolittle's bombers to within striking range of Tokyo. Before and in between those raids, he talked with civilians in Hawaii who vented their frustrations at the seeming inability of the Navy to retaliate for Pearl Harbor. "I wonder what's happened to the fleet," a concerned Hawaiian resident asked Casey in the aftermath of December 7. Casey added his own perspective by writing, "You got the impression that whatever the inventory of damage, the United States wasn't going to hit back because the United States couldn't hit back." These books provide the immediacy, the drama, and the fears that subsequent books cannot.

Later histories obviously took advantage of freer access to information and a profusion of biographies, memoirs, and other writings to offer more proper histories of the war. Thousands exist.

Two of the finest are John Costello's *The Pacific War, 1941–1945* (1982) and Ronald H. Spector's *Eagle Against the Sun: The American War with Japan* (1985). Costello's 650-page volume places equal emphasis on every theater of the Pacific, including one that is often overlooked – the China-Burma-India theater – while Spector complements Costello by heavily employing what was then newly-available communications intelligence sources. Both authors' solid research and fluid writing make these books indispensable. As is true with many general histories of the Pacific, the books lack perspective from the Japanese side. In 1970 John Toland attempted to remedy that defect in his *The Rising Sun: The Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire, 1936–1945*. Basing his book on official Japanese sources and on interviews with Japanese officers and civilians, Toland crafted an absorbing glimpse of the Japanese at war.

More recent books continue to add to the record. Alan Schom, in *The Eagle and the Rising Sun* (2004), focuses on the interrelationship between diplomacy at the highest levels of government and how that unfolded on the battlefields of the Pacific. He also shows that, while the United States was totally unprepared for global war, the Japanese embarked on a conflict for which they were economically ill-prepared.

### Steps to War

Many historians have analyzed the events that led to the attack at Pearl Harbor. Several historians have traced the roots of Japanese–American antipathy to the beginning of the twentieth century. Gerald Wheeler (1968) focuses on the decade of the 1920s with emphasis on competing navies while William Braisted (2008) finds cooperation between the two navies to have been great on the operational level in China during the same period, a relationship that changed with the Shanghai Incident of 1932. In *From Mahan to Pearl Harbor: The Imperial Japanese Navy and the United States*, Sadao Asada (2006) examines the same era from a Japanese perspective detailing how the “ghost” of the American theorist guided Japanese navy leaders as they sought to adapt to changing naval technology, competed with the Japanese army for resources, and planned for what most considered an inevitable clash with the United States. Craig C. Felker (2007) finds that US naval officers were equally dominated by the ideas of Mahan as they sought to integrate air power into their fleet and to prepare for war with Japan.

In 1967 Herbert Feis heavily leaned on official United States and Japanese government sources to write his *The Road to Pearl Harbor*, a book which focuses on the diplomatic moves and the political consequences of those steps. Stephen E. Pelz’s *Race to Pearl Harbor* (1974) and Arthur Marder’s *Old Friends, New Enemies* (1981) complement Feis’s work with updated sources, while Christopher Thorne (1978) examined the delicate relationship between the United States and Great Britain. James W. Morley has edited two valuable volumes – *Deterrent Diplomacy: Japan, Germany and the USSR* (1976) and *The Fateful Choice: Japan’s Negotiations with the United States, 1941* (1980) – containing translations of Japanese documents pertaining to the war’s roots. More recently Edward S. Miller, *Bankrupting the Enemy: The U.S. Financial Siege of Japan before Pearl Harbor* (2007) shows that Roosevelt believed that its war in China would bankrupt Japan and that his July 1941 freezing of Japan’s assets was designed to force its leaders to abandon their expansive goals in East Asia, but that when executed his plan drove Japan’s desperate leaders to expand the war by attacking Britain and the United States.

The December 7 attack has a burgeoning library of works in itself, with historians debating the causes of the disaster and whether the United States had any advance knowledge of the coming assault. Gordon W. Prange’s *At Dawn We Slept* (1981) may be the most comprehensive account of the war’s opening day, while two books present a revisionist view. Ladislav Farago’s *The Broken Seal: The Story of “Operation Magic” and the Pearl Harbor Disaster* (1967) contends that intelligence allowed President Franklin D. Roosevelt to know of the impending attack, but that certain decoded information was ignored and dismissed, while John Toland in *Infamy: Pearl Harbor and Its Aftermath* (1982) concludes that Roosevelt did indeed have prior knowledge, but believed the Japanese carrier force would quickly be destroyed once it launched what Roosevelt contended would be an ineffective strike on American soil, one that would unite the nation in a war he had long felt was coming.

In 1990 Hilary Conroy and Harry Wray edited the contributions of 18 American and Japanese historians in their *Pearl Harbor Reexamined: Prologue to the Pacific War*. The editors present all sides to the issue, but an obvious focus is on the difference in diplomacy between perception of what occurs and what actually occurs. Numerous books trace the actions of individuals and of the various ships involved at Pearl Harbor. Two of the best are Walter Lord's *Day of Infamy* (1957) and Paul Stilwell's *Battleship Arizona: An Illustrated History* (1991).

### The Early Fighting

As Japanese carrier aircraft pounded Pearl Harbor, Japanese bombers hit Wake Island, an American possession in the middle of the Pacific. James P. S. Devereux (1947), commander of the Marines on the island, and W. Scott Cunningham (1961), overall commander on the island tell the story of its defenders from their personal points of view. Two historians deliver good, basic descriptions of the fighting at Wake Island: Robert J. Cressman (1995) who focuses on military action and John F. Wukovits (2003) whose wider study, *Pacific Alamo*, also includes the island's civilian defenders and the men's struggles in prison camp and in the war's aftermath. It is doubtful, however, whether any writer will ever top Gregory J. W. Urwin's *Facing Fearful Odds: The Siege of Wake Island* (1997) for comprehension, Urwin spent years interviewing Wake's veterans, and his massive book tells every facet of the story up to and including their December 1941 surrender. He is currently working on a second volume that focuses on the men's captivity.

Within hours of their attack on Pearl Harbor and Wake Island, Japanese forces struck at British forces in Malaya and American forces the Philippines. After air strikes against US bases on Luzon on the same day as the strikes on Pearl Harbor, Japanese troops began landing on islands off Luzon on December 8, and on Luzon itself two days later. The struggle in the Philippines has been well documented, including accounts written while the war raged. W. L. White's (1942) account of PT boat action in the Philippines, *They Were Expendable*, was later made into a motion picture. Three who survived the Bataan Death March and escaped from Japanese captivity published accounts of their ordeal before the end of the war. William E. Dyess, *The Dyess Story* (1944) and Melvyn H. McCoy and S. M. Mellnik, *Ten Escape from Tojo* (1944) offer damning indictments of the Japanese treatment of foes, both military and civilian. The same event receives a more thorough examination in Stanley Falk's *Bataan: The March of Death* (1972), which takes Japanese officers to task for their poor organization of the march, and Donald Knox's *Death March: The Survivors of Bataan* (1981), which relates the story through the experiences of the men who endured the atrocity. Wider in scope, James H. and William M. Belote's *Corregidor: The Saga of a Fortress* (1967), chronicles the stirring story of Allied servicemen battling against overwhelming numbers in 1942, as well as the island's recapture in 1945 by American forces.

Few general accounts of the fighting in the Philippines in 1942 exist, though John Toland includes a few chapters on the Philippines in his *But Not in Shame*:



*The Six Months After Pearl Harbor* (1961), a well-written account. The most complete account of operations in Luzon, outside of Louis Morton's *The Fall of the Philippines* (1953) in the Army's "Green Books" is found in Duane Schultz's *Hero of Bataan* (1981), a biography of Gen. Jonathan M. Wainwright, the beleaguered officer, who took command of US forces in the Philippines when President Roosevelt ordered Douglas MacArthur to Australia, supervised the outnumbered American and Filipino forces in their doomed defense of the islands, and joined the survivors in Japanese captivity.

Two excellent recent books describe the ordeals faced by American nurses in the Philippines. Dorothy S. Danner, herself a survivor of capture by the Japanese, portrayed the experiences of fellow Navy nurses in her book, *What A Way to Spend A War: Navy Nurse POWs in the Philippines* (1995). Four years later Elizabeth M. Norman relied on extensive interviews with survivors to produce *We Band of Angels* (1999) which relates the experiences of all nurses in the Philippines, not just Navy nurses.

The recapture of the Philippines in 1944 and 1945 receives better coverage. William B. Breuer's *Retaking the Philippines* (1986) is a fine account of how the United States landed in the islands, then gradually swept across the archipelago against bitter resistance. Breuer also includes information on the liberation of Allied personnel languishing in Philippine prison camps and how Filipino guerrillas aided the Allied cause. Rafael Steinberg's *Return to the Philippines* (1979) adds relevant information about the land campaign to liberate the islands.

The important role played by the guerrillas appears in Bernard Norling's *Behind Japanese Lines: An American Guerrilla in the Philippines* (1986), the story of US Army Sgt Ray C. Hunt, who escaped during the Bataan Death March and spent the remainder of the war organizing Filipino bands in central Luzon.

Though the longest American campaign of the Pacific War, New Guinea has received relatively little attention from historians. Japan occupied the northern portion of the island between February and April 1942 from which it moved southward along the Kokoda Trail until first checked then thrown on the defensive by Australian and US troops. George Johnston produced one of the most powerful books written during the war, *The Toughest Fighting in the World* (1943), which movingly describes the battle then raging in New Guinea. He focuses mostly on the Australian troops, but his powerful prose makes the reader feel as if he were smack in the middle of New Guinea's dense jungles. Unfortunately, only a few books have since appeared on the fighting in New Guinea, including Robert L. Eichelberger's *Our Jungle Road to Tokyo* (1950), based on his experiences as one of MacArthur's top commanders in the Southwest Pacific. John Vader, *New Guinea: The Tide is Stemmed* (1971); David Dexter, *The New Guinea Offensives* (1961); and Stephen Taaffe, *MacArthur's Jungle War: The 1944 New Guinea Campaign* (1998) describe portions of the campaign, and Lida Mayo's *Bloody Buna* (1974) details one of the key battles. Other portions of the campaign, including the amphibious landings along the northern coast of the island, the airborne capture of Nadzeb (one of the few airborne operations of the Pacific War), and operations on New Britain that followed those on New Guinea, have yet to receive detailed studies.

### China-Burma-India

The campaigns fought in the China-Burma-India (CBI) theater were among the most diverse, complex, and controversial of World War II. Over 1,500 articles and books have been published on it (Rasor 1998), yet it can be argued that historians have yet to adequately cover either the theater as a whole or most of the operations conducted within it. Charles Romanus and Riley Sunderland produced three superb volumes for the US Army's "Green Book" series, including *Stilwell's Mission to China* (1953), *Stilwell's Command Problems* (1956), and *Time Runs Out in CBI* (1959), but little beyond memoirs or biographies has appeared in the intervening years. Descriptions of India's contributions to the war exist in British official histories, but little has appeared from American sources.

Barbara Tuchman's *Stilwell and the American Experience in China, 1911–45* (1971), fills a huge gap by telling the story of General Joseph W. Stilwell, a visionary who labored to bring knowledge of China to a United States far too ignorant. A more recent biography (Rooney 2005) depends heavily on the volume of papers that Stilwell's widow, Winifred, arranged to have published shortly after his death (Stilwell 1948), but is of value because it augments Tuchman's biography by focusing on Stilwell's relations with British allies and by discussing more fully operations in Burma, as does Nathan Prefer's *Vinegar Joe's War: Stilwell's Campaigns for Burma* (2000). Claire Chennault (1949), an American Army Air Force officer who helped construct Allied air defenses in China, described his experiences in *Way of A Fighter*. Daniel Ford, *Flying Tigers* (1995), penetrates the myths that shroud Chennault and the American Volunteer Group arguing that their operations had little impact on the war in China. Michael Schaller's comprehensive *The U.S. Crusade in China* (1979), shows that American strategy toward China was often based upon a series of misconceptions and generalizations that led them to support the regime of Chiang Kai-shek and ignore the growing influence of Mao Tse-tung's communist forces. The erred policies led to disaster in China and elsewhere in Southeast Asia after the war.

The main link between China and its Western allies was the 700-mile Burma Road that ran between Kunming in southwestern China to Lashio in Burma. In *The Burma Road* (2004) the journalist Donovan Webster describes the construction of the road and the campaign to keep it open.

Louis Allen, *Burma: The Longest War* (1984) and Gerald Aston, *Jungle War* (2004) provide overviews of operations in Burma. The chief American commanders have all received biographies that illuminate the fighting in Burma. Immediately after the war the army published a brief description of the operations conducted during the first half of 1944 by the Army's 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional), commonly called "Merrill's Marauders" (Bjorge 1945), a study expanded upon a decade later in *The Marauders* (Ogburn 1956). Brigadier General Frank D. Merrill, the daring leader for whom the group is named, guided his men in raids that plunged deep into Japanese territory. Lieutenant Colonel Charles Hunter (1963), who succeeded Merrill in command of the unit, wrote a history of its year-long

existence. A fine complementary account, Richard Dunlop's *Behind Japanese Lines: With the OSS in Burma* (1979), focuses on Detachment 101, a band of American fighters and Burmese natives who waged a three-year campaign against the enemy. The same year Shelford Bidwell published *The Chindit War* (1979), which examines the struggle in Burma and relates it to the rest of the Pacific fighting. British authors have given Burma more attention. Raymond Callahan, *Burma, 1942–1945* (1978) devotes nearly as much space to Anglo–American relations as he does to military operation while Burma veteran Louis Allen (1984) uses over 700 pages to describe operations in the country, but quickly passes over those conducted by Americans implying they were of minor importance.

### The Island Campaign

Historians have heavily mined this aspect of the Pacific War, with the result that many fine works exist, some that might be considered classics of wartime literature. Edward S. Miller's *Plan Orange* (1991) traces the development of American planning for war in the Pacific in the decades prior to Pearl Harbor and demonstrates that those plans served as a blueprint for wartime operations. General accounts of the United States march across the Pacific include Rafael Steinberg's *Island Fighting* (1978), Keith Wheeler's *The Road to Tokyo* (1979) and *The Fall of Japan* (1983). Richard Wheeler describes the struggle from the US Marine point of view in *A Special Valor: The U.S. Marines and the Pacific War* (1983). The Japanese vantage comes with Meirion and Susie Harries' *Soldiers of the Sun: The Rise and Fall of the Imperial Japanese Army* (1991), which focuses on developments within the Japanese military, and Haruko Taya Cook and Theodore F. Cook's *Japan at War: An Oral History* (1992), which emphasizes the war's effects on different individuals in Japan.

Individual assaults receive thorough attention. The campaign for the Solomon Islands that began in August 1942 offers two classics written by correspondents who accompanied the troops as the fighting raged on Guadalcanal. In his *Guadalcanal Diary* (1943), Richard Tregaskis explained the importance of the combat that raged on the first Japanese-held island attacked by US ground forces. Though his book stops with the monumental October sea clashes and before Vice Admiral William Halsey arrived to uplift sagging spirits with his optimism and aggressiveness, this Pulitzer-prize winning book turned a spotlight on the gallant experiences of individual American servicemen.

That same year correspondent John Hersey published his description of the Guadalcanal fighting. Whereas Tregaskis examines combat on a broader scale, in *Into the Valley* (1943) John Hersey writes of one unit of Marines fighting in one skirmish – the Third Battle of the Matanikau River – in an attempt to educate people back home as to what unfolded on a battlefield. He admirably succeeded in his purpose, which he stated was to “recapture the feelings of Rigaud (the Marine captain leading the skirmish), his men, and myself, when we went into the jungle valley” so that the home front could better understand the emotions of combat and thus feel more a part of the war.

Since those two books numerous historians have mined Guadalcanal. Most concentrate on one portion of the combat, such as Thomas G. Miller, Jr., *The Cactus Air Force* (1969) which describes the deeds performed by the aviators who helped save Henderson Field, or Denis and Peggy Warner's account of the naval clash off Savo Island, *Disaster in the Pacific* (1992). If one wants a full account of the fighting that raged on and near Guadalcanal during the final months of 1942 and into 1943, one must turn to Richard B. Frank's jewel, *Guadalcanal* (1990), a smoothly written book based on impeccable research. Frank is one of a handful of historians who incorporate the three main aspects of fighting on the island – the combat which occurred on land, at sea, and in the air. He ably shows how each arena depended upon the other two for ultimate success. Frank was also one of the first historians to extensively utilize Japanese sources, including translations of the official multi-volume Japanese Defense Agency series on the war.

Historians have erratically covered the remainder of the American drive across the Pacific, with Iwo Jima and Okinawa receiving the most attention. That is not surprising. Because of their historic importance, immense size of the attacking and defending forces, and the carnage that occurred in those places, they will long be subjects for analysis. Unfortunately other stories, mainly the assaults on the northern Solomons, in the Aleutians, in the Marshall Islands, and along New Guinea's northeastern coastline, are overshadowed.

The Aleutians campaign is best covered in Brian Garfield's *The Thousand-Mile War: World War II in Alaska and the Aleutians* (1969). Garfield laments that "Few Americans recall even its highlights," but he employs official documents plus individual accounts to create a valuable account. The main naval battle is dissected in John A. Lorelli, *The Battle of the Komandorski Islands* (1984). Lieutenant Robert J. Mitchell was wounded during the May 1943 recapture of Attu, the western-most inhabited island in the Aleutians and while recovering recorded the memories of veterans of the campaign. First published in 1944, these firsthand accounts have been reprinted several times (Mitchell 2000).

Of the books that cover the fighting in the northern Solomons, three stand out. In *Munda Trail: The New Georgia Campaign*, Eric Hammel (1989) relates the Army's assault against New Georgia, in the midst of the Solomon Island chain. Hammel contends that this campaign helped secure the United States' victory in the Solomons, which ignited the long drive toward Tokyo. Harry Gailey's *Bougainville* (1991), sheds light on the fighting in that crucial Solomon island, while William L. McGee summarizes the entire Solomon Islands campaign in his *The Solomons Campaigns, 1942–1943* (2002).

The next assault, the November 1943 attack against Tarawa in the Gilbert Islands, produced gallantry and bloodshed on a scale that had yet then been seen by the home front (although later island assaults would produce their own on even larger scales). As such, historians have culled the Tarawa story since its inception. Reporter Robert Sherrod, who covered that grisly action as *Time* magazine's top Pacific war correspondent, produced a World War II classic in *Tarawa: The Story of a Battle* (1944). Sherrod's gripping writing and moving stories of Marines under fire off and on Tarawa, so reminiscent of the opening assault scenes in Steven

Spielberg's *Saving Private Ryan*, opened people's eyes in the United States that the war in the Pacific was to be a long, brutal campaign. So powerful are Sherrod's descriptions that the book still resonates with immediacy and makes the reader feel as if he were standing in the warm lagoon water with the Marines as Japanese bullets sliced through the air. The next year a group of military correspondents, headed by Captain Earl J. Wilson, wrote *Betio Beachhead: U. S. Marines' Own Story of the Battle for Tarawa* (1945). The book contains numerous individual accounts of the fighting on that small isle, as well as many of the photographs that recorded the frightening destruction.

Other historians have subsequently examined the Tarawa fighting. In the mid-1990s, Michael B. Graham (1993) and Joseph Alexander (1995) ably describe the planning, execution, and results of the battle, while John Wukovits's *One Square Mile of Hell* (2006) focuses on the effects of the fighting on the Marines, on their families, and on the homefront. The capture of the Gilbert Islands proved to be the first step in what became the Navy-led drive across the Central Pacific that complemented Army-directed operations in the Southwest Pacific.

Lessons learned in the Gilberts were applied in the February 1944 attack on the Marshall Islands, operations which went so well that they have been largely ignored by historians other than those writing the official histories or, who, like John Lorelli, *To Foreign Shores: U.S. Amphibious Operations in World War II* (1995), survey virtually every major island campaign. Combat at Roi-Namur and at Kwajalein, although small when compared to other campaigns, still awaits a definitive telling.

In June 1944 US forces attacked the Marianas Islands, the third step in the drive across the Central Pacific, a campaign opposed by Douglas MacArthur who preferred to emphasize a more southerly line of advance, but strongly supported by General Henry "Hap" Arnold because the islands would provide bases from which the Army Air Force could prosecute its strategic air campaign against the Japanese home islands. Historical accounts of the action on Saipan, Tinian, and Guam are a mixed bag. Harold J. Goldberg's *D-Day in the Pacific: The Battle of Saipan* (2007) describes the American conquests of Saipan and neighboring Tinian as the turning points in the Pacific War because with their capture the United States penetrated Japan's inner defensive ring and obtained bases from which to prosecute the strategic bombing campaign against the Japanese home islands. Beyond this book and coverage in official histories, Saipan, the largest assault, has received the most coverage, while operations on Tinian and Guam languish in near-obscure.

Of the Saipan books, Harry A. Gailey's *Howlin' Mad vs the Army: Conflict in Command, Saipan 1944* (1986) describes the controversy that developed between Marine Major General Holland M. Smith, commander of the Northern Troops and Landing Force and his subordinate, Army Major General Ralph Smith, commander of the Army's 27th Infantry Division, over the proper employment of ground forces. More recently, Francis A. O'Brien defends the US Army's 27th Infantry Division from Marine criticism in *Battling for Saipan* (2003). Bruce M. Petty's *Saipan: Oral Histories of the Pacific War* (2001) includes accounts by US soldiers as well as Saipan natives.

One book provides decent coverage of the action on Guam. In 1946 correspondent Alvin M. Josephy wrote the powerful *The Long and the Short and the Tall: The Story of a Marine Combat Unit in the Pacific*, in which he relates the exploits of the 3rd Marine Division as it seized Guam from the Japanese. Harry Gailey added his *The Liberation of Guam: 21 July–10 August 1944* (1997), but little else exists to complement these two works. Loss of the Marianas, part of the Japan's inner ring of defenses, first caused the Japanese to start considering the possibility of ultimate defeat.

The approach to the Philippines from the south and the subsequent assaults on Iwo Jima and Okinawa have been more deeply researched. This is particularly true for the controversial assault on Peleliu which is analyzed in two excellent studies: Bill D. Ross's *Tragic Triumph* (1991), delves into the controversy of whether the assault was even necessary, and Bill Sloan's *Brotherhood of Heroes* (2005), which focuses on the rigorous fighting demanded of the Marines in Peleliu's forbidding hills and ridges. Like Ross, Sloan takes to task the US high command for allowing this assault to occur at a location that was soon pushed to the war's backwaters by a giant leap to the Philippines.

In a book that will (or at least, should) be read for years to come for its potent descriptions of life under fire, Eugene B. Sledge's memoir, *With the Old Breed: At Peleliu and Okinawa* (1981), yanks the reader from his chair and places him directly amidst exploding shells, maggot-infested bodies, and mud-encrusted uniforms. A Marine in the 1st Marine Division who participated in the fighting, Sledge has given readers an insightful account of what life is like for a combatant. One walks away from the book feeling as if the war had intruded into their very homes, and consequently leaves with a profound respect for the men who fought the war.

Both Iwo Jima and Okinawa have been the subject of several fine studies. Any location that serves as the setting for one of history's most epic photographs, the raising of the flag atop Mount Suribachi on Iwo Jima by a handful of Marines, is certain to receive attention. In 1980 Richard Wheeler, a veteran of the Iwo Jima campaign, wrote *Iwo*, in which he told the story from both the American and Japanese perspective. Another book of his, *The Bloody Battle for Suribachi* (1965) focuses more on the American perspective. Richard Newcomb's *Iwo Jima* (1965), offers a well-written account of the assault, whose focus is narrowed in James Bradley's *Flags of Our Fathers* (2000), a book about the men who raised the flag at Iwo Jima, told by the son of one of the men.

Because of its sheer vastness – on land and at sea – historians have culled Okinawa for many years. In 1970 James H. and William M. Belote produced *Typhoon of Steel*, a superb general description of the assault. Nakajima Inoguchi and Roger Pineau add a valuable Japanese perspective with their *The Divine Wind: Japan's Kamikaze Forces in World War II* (1958). They examine the terrifyingly effective kamikaze campaign against US ships stationed off Okinawa. An account of one of those ships comes with Rear Admiral F. Julian Becton's *The Ship That Would Not Die* (1980), the moving story of the USS *Laffey* DD 459, written by the ship's commanding officer.



One could search long before finding a better account of Okinawa than George Feifer's *Tennozan: The Battle of Okinawa and the Atomic Bomb* (1992). Feifer employed extensive research and interviewing to obtain the story from the American, Japanese, and Okinawan side. Feifer is especially powerful in emphasizing the destructive effects of the battle on Okinawa's civilians and culture and the impact of the campaign on the decision of American leaders to actually use atomic bombs against Japan. Bill Sloan's (2007) recreation of events at Okinawa evokes the atmosphere of the battle unmatched by other accounts.

### The War at Sea

Historians have long turned to the epic Pacific naval clashes for drama and riveting stories, although some of the encounters lack the depth of examination they deserve. Samuel Eliot Morison's (1948–60) multi-volume history of naval operations serves as the foundation for many subsequent accounts. No similar work exists in English that describes the war from Japan's perspective, though Paul S. Dull (1978) provides a brief operational overview.

The fighting in the Java Sea in the Netherlands Indies has long been ignored. David A. Thomas published his *The Battle of the Java Sea* (1968) and F. C. Van Oosten added his *The Battle of the Java Sea* in 1976, but no historian since then has researched the important encounter. Two books do yield gripping accounts of the fighting as part of their overall glimpse at combat in the Java Sea. W. G. Winslow's *The Fleet the Gods Forgot: The U.S. Asiatic Fleet in World War II* (1982) provides a stellar foundation for obtaining the details of the series of naval encounters in 1942, while James D. Hornfischer's *Ship of Ghosts: The Story of the USS Houston* (2006) relates the experiences of one of the ships involved. Hornfischer's powerful prose brings this story to life.

Historians need to spend more time with the Battle of the Coral Sea, which has been eclipsed in the wake of the exploits that unfolded at Midway the next month. Chris Henry's *The Battle of the Coral Sea* (2003) provides a basic, almost simplistic account of the battle, but little else exists that focuses solely on that battle. Fortunately, John B. Lundstrom's (2006) extensive biography of Frank Jack Fletcher gives a superlative rendering of the decisions and actions at all three crucial battles. Lundstrom resurrects Fletcher's reputation, which had been savaged by historians since the war as timid and ineffectual, almost cowardly.

The Battle of Midway has been looked at from every angle. In 1967 Walter Lord published *Incredible Victory*, in which he examines the battle through the experiences of the men involved. More scholarly books may have appeared since, but few match Lord's astounding talent for writing. Gordon W. Prange, Donald M. Goldstein, and Karen V. Dillon's *Miracle at Midway* (1982), delivered an in-depth examination that built upon Lord's work, while Mistuo Fuchida and Masatake Okumiya present the crucial battle from the Japanese side in *Midway: The Battle That Doomed Japan* (1955).

One of the most important books dealing with the Pacific War appeared in 2005 when Jonathan Parshall and Anthony Tully published *Shattered Sword: The Untold Story of the Battle of Midway*. The authors were the first to so extensively examine Japanese records, and in doing so, they offer important revisions to the prevailing accounts. They claim that most historians relied far too heavily on Fuchida and Okumiya's book to cover the Japanese side, a book long dismissed by Japanese historians for its errors. They also explode certain myths that have evolved about the Battle of Midway. For instance, they assert that the advance into the Aleutians was an operation of its own rather than an adjunct to Midway. This extensive volume, and the thorough manner in which the authors researched both American and Japanese sources, will be a landmark book that other historians, not just of Midway, but for all Pacific naval battles, should try to emulate.

The naval battles in the waters surrounding the Solomons have given birth to an uneven allotment of books. Single volumes covering individual battles exist, such as the aforementioned study of Savo Island (Warner and Warner 1992) and Eric Hammel's (1999) *Guadalcanal: Decision at Sea: The Naval Battle of Guadalcanal, November 13–15, 1942*. Hammel emphasizes that superior Japanese tactics were defeated in this crucial clash by a determined US Navy. What is most needed, however, is a study that places the entire naval campaign off the Solomons – the battle for Savo Island, the Battle of the Eastern Solomons, the Battle of Cape Esperance, the Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands, the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal, the Battle of Tassafaronga, and the Battle of Rennel Island – into context.

Historians have contributed valuable works on the next major naval encounter, the Battle of the Philippine Sea in 1944. The best account is William T. Y'Blood's *Red Sun Setting: The Battle of the Philippine Sea* (1981). He directly tackles the main controversy surrounding this battle – whether Vice Admiral Raymond A. Spruance erred on the side of caution on the night of June 20–21 by not pursuing the Japanese remnants of the fighting that occurred earlier in the day. Spruance contended that his primary mission was to safeguard the landing forces ashore on Saipan and that he could not leave to pursue his foes. Y'Blood believes that Spruance let a resounding defeat of his foe elude him by remaining close to Saipan, an action which he claims later resulted in more casualties at Leyte Gulf. In 2005 Barrett Tillman countered Y'Blood in his *Clash of the Carriers* by arguing that Spruance was wise not to take Japanese Admiral Jisaburo Ozawa's bait and pursue him out to sea. Tillman agrees that Spruance's main purpose was to protect the beachhead and forces on Saipan, not chase Japanese carriers already bereft of aircraft.

The final naval battle of the war also was the largest seaborne clash in history. The October 1944 Battle of Leyte Gulf – in actuality four separate encounters combined as one – has given birth to a wide array of books and proven fertile ground for controversy, particularly over Vice Admiral William Halsey's decision to leave the San Bernardino Strait unguarded so he could pursue Japanese carriers. C. Vann Woodward kicked off a long line of books about the battle with *The Battle for Leyte Gulf* (1947) in which he blames a lack of unified command for the confusion off San Bernardino Strait, but also attributes Japanese Vice Admiral

Takeo Kurita's timidity as being the prime cause of the Americans emerging as victorious as they did.

In the best single-volume examination of the immense battle, Thomas Cutler (1994) calls Kurita "the true enigma of the battle," for disengaging when victory seemed apparent over the outgunned escort carriers off Samar. Cutler also blames both Halsey and the commander of the Seventh Fleet, Vice Admiral Thomas Kinkaid, for the confusion that existed off San Bernardino Strait. Kinkaid assumed Halsey was covering the strait, and Halsey compounded the problem by taking his entire force in pursuit of the enemy carriers, rather than keeping part of his force off San Bernardino Strait. This would have blocked the door to Kurita, avoided the fighting off Samar, and ended with a more dramatic victory.

Other books continue the debate, including Carl Solberg's *Decision and Dissent: With Halsey at Leyte Gulf* (1995). Solberg, an intelligence officer on Halsey's staff, sheds light on the operations in Halsey's flagship. In 2006 Evan Thomas's *Sea of Thunder: Four Commanders and the Last Great Naval Campaign, 1941–1945*, offered an illuminating glimpse of the battle through the experiences of four officers involved in Leyte Gulf – Admiral Halsey, Admiral Kurita, Admiral Matome Ugaki, and Commander Ernest Evans.

A complete history of the fighting involving submarines has yet to appear. Two fine accounts do exist – W. J. Holmes's, *Undersea Victory: The Influence of Submarine Operations on the War in the Pacific* (1966) and Clay Blair, Jr.'s *Silent Victory* (1975) – but they suffer from being completed before valuable archive material had been opened to researchers. This facet of the Pacific War is fertile ground for any historian looking for topics that have not been rehashed many times.

Richard H. O'Kane (1977), commander of the USS *Tang*, provides an excellent account of that submarine's five patrols in 1944, during which time O'Kane, his crew, and their boat sank one Japanese ship every 11 days.

### Battle in the Skies

Besides the official histories, readers again have their choice of numerous volumes dealing with the fighting in the air. In his excellent account of aerial combat during the desperate days of early 1942, Walter D. Edmonds (1951) emphasizes how, due to no fault of their own, ill-prepared the fliers were in the Southwest Pacific, a situation that subsequently makes the feats of individual pilots in that region even more astounding. Burke Davis (1969) depicts the events surrounding the April 1943 interception and downing of the aircraft carrying Japanese Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, while Nathan Miller ably tackles naval air contributions in *The Naval Air War, 1939–1945* (1980). In *Titians of the Sea*, James and William Belote (1975) argue that the Americans were much quicker to adapt to lessons learned in the battles of 1942 and by the Battle of the Philippine Sea had developed operational doctrine far superior to that of their Japanese counterparts. William H. Tunner (1964) captures the dramatic exploits of fliers piloting aircraft over the Himalaya Mountains in *Over the Hump*.

Curtis LeMay, the main architect of the devastating fire bombings of Tokyo, with Bill Yenne wrote of the importance of the plane that delivered the destruction in *Superfortress* (1988). Robert Guillain (1981), a French journalist, presents the other side. Based on his time in Japan during the fire bombings, Guillain shows the effects of those raids in *I Saw Tokyo Burning*, one of the few books in English to tell the story of the war from a Japanese vantage.

### The Intelligence War

A flurry of books asserts the importance of espionage and intelligence to the war effort. W. J. Holmes, a member of the Combat Intelligence Unit in Hawaii before the war, sheds light on intelligence with his 1979 book, *Double-Edged Secrets: U. S. Naval Intelligence Operations in the Pacific during World War II*.

In one of the first extensive examinations of the intelligence battle, Ronald Lewin, *The American Magic: Codes, Ciphers and the Defeat of Japan* (1982), argued that the United States' ability to read Japanese messages contributed to victory as much as any assault, but that competition among the three military arms almost negated any benefits. Six years later Ronald H. Spector published *Listening to the Enemy* (1988), a collection of documents and accompanying analysis that shows that the Navy launched intelligence operations focusing on Japanese naval maneuvers as early as the 1920s, and that the Marines established a listening post at Shanghai before the war. Spector also presents evidence on the consequences of ignoring intelligence information, as when MacArthur's air commanders in the Philippines rejected intelligence information pointing to an attack against the Philippines, a failure that resulted in smoking aircraft and burning installations on December 8, 1941. One of the most difficult tasks facing an intelligence officer was walking the fine line between the proper employment of intelligence information and overuse of such material, which could lead to the Japanese discovery that the United States had penetrated its codes. John Winton underscored this Catch-22 situation existing with intelligence – underuse of information hinders operations, overuse threatens to expose the nation's ability to decipher Japanese codes. However, Winton shows that the Japanese helped their foe by stubbornly believing their codes to be unbreakable by Westerners and continued to attribute Allied successes to luck or good fortune rather than to the ability to read secret messages. Edward J. Drea's *MacArthur's Ultra* (1992), focuses on that commander's deft use of intelligence to help select his targets on the route to the Philippines and to bypass Japanese troop concentrations.

Two books concerning intelligence operations eclipse all others. In the first, *"And I was There,"* Rear Admiral Edwin T. Layton (1985), who was the Pacific Fleet's intelligence officer, explains the failures of the Office of Naval Intelligence and his men in Hawaii to foretell the attack at Pearl Harbor and analyzes the precise nature of their contributions to the victory at Midway. John Prados (1995) produced the finest book about intelligence operations, *Combined Fleet Decoded*. In it, Prados combs familiar ground, such as the December 7 attack and the assault

against MacArthur's forces in the Philippines, but he broadens his scope to include activities in the Netherlands East Indies, information about the famed Japanese Zero fighter aircraft, and how intelligence gave the upper hand to William Halsey during the Solomons campaign.

### The Atom Bomb and the End of the War

As seems to be true with many areas pertaining to the writing of the Pacific War, one of the best books about the dropping of the atom bomb was written while the ashes of destruction still smoldered in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Correspondent John Hersey, who also contributed *Into the Valley*, wrote *Hiroshima* (1946), a book based on his observations of the Japanese town and told through the experiences of six people who survived the event. Hersey grippingly presents the bomb's effects on a single city and shows how lives were altered in a single instant.

Two books that best address the Manhattan Project that built the bomb and the men behind the project are Leslie Groves, *Now It Can Be Told: The Story of the Manhattan Project* (1962) and Richard Rhodes, *The Making of the Atomic Bomb* (1986). Groves, the general in charge of the Manhattan Project, describes the struggles he faced in trying to coordinate such a mammoth undertaking and in keeping on track a group of irascible scientists. Rhodes offers a fascinating glimpse of the scientists who grappled with the intricacies of making the bomb, especially Niels Bohr and J. Robert Oppenheimer. These men, geniuses all, turned their full efforts toward developing a weapon that, by extension through the years, could ultimately cause the extinction of the human race. The attraction of solving such a complex problem as creating an atom bomb that worked, coupled with the moral dilemma in furthering such a project, provide a powerful backdrop to the story.

Despite its age Robert J. C. Butow's *Japan's Decision to Surrender* (1954), is still valuable for tracing the steps leading to war's end. John D. Chappell added to Butow's work with his *Before the Bomb: How America Approached the End of the Pacific War* (1996), a fascinating study of public sentiment toward ending the war that existed in 1944–5. Stunned by lengthy casualty lists caused by American assaults at Iwo Jima and Okinawa, people on the homefront began to doubt the value of invading the Japanese homeland. Chappell cites newspapers and magazine articles of the day to support his arguments. He also examines the role of racism in the war showing that while Americans divided Germans into "good" and "bad" groups, all Japanese were viewed negatively. Although focusing on the struggle to seize Okinawa, George Feifer's *Tennozan* (1992) also discusses the link between the ghastly casualty count emanating from Okinawa and the urge to end the war quickly.

Broader in scope than *Tennozan* and *Before the Bomb*, Richard Frank's *Downfall: The End of the Imperial Japanese Empire* (1999), covers events from the spring 1945 Tokyo firebombing campaign to the August 1945 dropping of the bomb. Frank, who successfully attempts to view things as the Allies did in 1945, persuasively argues that a Japanese military that was far from defeated was nudged to the peace table by the use of the bombs, and suggests that the bombs saved millions

of lives, not only American and Japanese, but Chinese casualties that would have occurred in a cruel occupation that monthly killed thousands of civilians.

A sparse collection of material presents the end of the war from the Japanese vantage. One of the best is the aforementioned *Japan at War: An Oral History*, by Haruko Taya Cook and Theodore F. Cook (1992), a collection of oral histories that offers the experiences of Japanese civilians throughout the war. One portion deals with the effects of the bomb on the Japanese themselves.

An interesting collection of books examines the effects of the bombing on a small group of Americans – the crews who manned the bombers. The books show that, while the men delivered mass destruction, they felt justified in doing so because they ended a war that would have taken more lives had it continued. Two veterans of the bombing mission, Paul Tibbets (1978), pilot of the *Enola Gay*, and George R. Caron (1995), tail gunner of the plane, have published their memoirs, and Gordon Thomas and Max Morgan-Witts's *Enola Gay* (1977) describes the mission from a third person perspective. An exhibit at the Smithsonian Institution on the fiftieth anniversary of Hiroshima generated controversy that can be explored in the essays published in Edward Linenthal and Tom Engelhardt, eds., *History Wars: The Enola Gay and Other Battles for the American Past* (1996) and in Michael J. Hogan, ed. *Hiroshima and History in Memory* (1996).

### Allied Prisoners

In recent years historians have turned their attention to war crimes and the plight of Allied prisoners of war. Lord Russell of Liverpool started the process with his *The Knights of Bushido* (1958). Based on official records and the words of survivors, Russell wrote a damning account of Japanese atrocities, including slaughters of civilians, death marches, and cannibalism. E. Bartlett Kerr added a more balanced study with *Surrender and Survival: The Experience of American POWs in the Pacific, 1941–1945* (1958), in which he argued that the plight of American prisoners of war had been largely ignored before his book, mainly because in the jubilation following the war's end, few wanted to hear of, or to believe, the shocking tales of the Allied soldiers incarcerated in obscure prison camps.

Gavan Daws spent years digging in archives and interviewing former prisoners of war to write his searing *Prisoners of the Japanese* (1994), a book similar to Lord Russell in its indictments, some of which Daws directs toward American commanders, whose bombings of prison camps inadvertently killed Americans. Daws also argues that the atom bomb, by so quickly ending the war, saved the lives of many prisoners who would have perished had the Allies undertaken the costly and slow assault on the Home Islands. Daws saves his harshest censure for the Japanese government, which refused to admit responsibility for its actions in the war.

In *Judgment at Tokyo: The Japanese War Crimes Trials*, Tim Maga (2001) rebukes the charges that the war crimes trials were, in effect, kangaroo courts established to administer speedy, if uneven, justice. In fact, he contends that because Japanese defendants were harder to prosecute than their German



counterparts in Europe, whose actions in the Holocaust were abundantly documented, the lawyers created tactics that are still used in courtrooms.

The same year Laurence Rees (2001) published *Horror in the East: Japan and the Atrocities of World War II*. Rees, who earlier had written and produced an acclaimed documentary on the Holocaust, turned his investigative skills toward the Pacific, and asks how the Japanese military, which had acted nobly toward prisoners in World War I, could have so ghastly deteriorated in its treatment in the second conflict.

In another valuable addition Linda Goetz Holmes (2001) published *Unjust Enrichment: How Japan's Companies Built Postwar Fortunes Using American POWs* in which she asserts that one of the largest injustices of the war is not only that some of today's most profitable Japanese companies survived the war by using Allied slave labor, but that the American government has compounded the unfairness by moving with astounding tardiness in coming to the aid of the former prisoners and holding the Japanese government accountable.

### Lives of Enlisted Men

Some excellent books exist that present what life was like for the American servicemen in the Pacific. Nothing has matched Stephen Ambrose's *Band of Brothers* (1992), which follows a unit of soldiers throughout most of the European fighting, but a few offerings illuminate what men endured and felt under combat.

Ernie Pyle, the venerable newspaper reporter who endeared himself to every foot soldier with his moving descriptions of life for the infantryman, wrote *Last Chapter* (1946), a book that appeared after his untimely death while covering the fighting at Ie Shima on Okinawa. Pyle took the reader onto the battlefields of Saipan and Okinawa, aboard an aircraft carrier, and in a B-29 bomber.

A trio of historians examines life for a soldier in the Pacific. Lee Kennett's *G.I.: The American Soldier in World War II* (1987) explained the process by which a man was transformed from a peacetime civilian, through draft/enlistment into training, and then onto the Pacific battlefields. Ten years later Gerald F. Linderman published his fascinating *The World Within War: America's Combat Experience in World War II* (1997). Rather than going through the experiences of soldiers as Kennett does, Linderman examines the affects of soldiers' attitudes and beliefs on the effectuality of the fighting, and assesses the affects combat has on attitudes and beliefs. In *The Deadly Brotherhood* John C. McManus (1998) attempts to discover what motivated young men, most barely out of high school, to engage in the killing and maiming that marked the war.

Several sailors have published memoirs of their service in the Pacific, but none match the potency of Marines Eugene B. Sledge's previously noted *With the Old Breed* or William Manchester's *Goodbye to Darkness* (1980). The best work to offer a similar glimpse of the life of an ordinary sailor is the diary Seaman First Class James J. Fahey (1963) kept of his experiences aboard the light cruiser, USS *Montpelier*.

No book approaches John W. Dower's *War Without Mercy* (1986). This landmark study examines the stereotypes and prejudices of both the American and Japanese leaders and soldiers and how those beliefs influenced the conduct of the war. For instance, while the Americans considered the Japanese to be inferior to Westerners, the Japanese believed Westerners to be soft and unwilling to endure the rigors of combat. Race played a prominent role in the Pacific, leading to a brutal kill-or-be-killed and a "take no prisoners" posture on the American side, and the suicidal charges and kamikaze attacks of the Japanese. Both combatants headed to war buttressed by their stereotypes of the other side, a condition that led to misunderstanding and a willingness to resort to brutality.

### Biographies

Numerous biographers have examined every major military figure, many subordinate commanders, and memoirs offer glimpses of individuals in each branch of the service. Several are particularly valuable for understanding their subjects and the war in Asia and the Pacific.

E. B. Potter's *Nimitz* (1976) details the life of the major naval commander of the Pacific War. Based on extensive research, it is unlikely to be topped for many years. His *Bull Halsey* (1985), is a less even study of that complex and controversial commander, and anything that can be considered definitive is yet to be written. The strongest portion of Potter's (1990) biography of Arleigh Burke is that describing his development of destroyer tactics in the Solomons campaign during the war.

Thomas B. Buell's biography of Raymond A. Spruance, *The Quiet Warrior* (1974), is one of the best-written biographies in World War II literature and effectively defends its subject against criticism that over caution prevented him from inflicting complete defeat on his opponents. The reader comes away with a deep understanding of, and appreciation for, the underrated Spruance. Six years later Buell (1980) presented an insightful assessment of Ernest King, the last five-star commander of the war to receive a scholarly biography, in which King gains flesh and humanity. John Wukovits added another helpful biography with his 1995 *Devotion to Duty*, the story of Clifton Sprague, the commander who saved the day at Samar.

Admirals Thomas C. Kinkaid, Charles A. Lockwood, Daniel E. Barbey, A. W. Fitch, still await scholarly biographies, and Richmond Kelley Turner needs a more balanced biography than that accorded him by his fellow admiral George Dyer (1971).

Douglas MacArthur would have relished the fact that, of all the military figures in the Pacific War, historians have turned to his life for more accounts than any other individual. An excellent companion to MacArthur's own memoir, *Reminiscences* (1964), is D. Clayton James's multi-volume biography, *The Years of MacArthur* (1970-85), which presents both the genius of MacArthur as well as his shortcomings. William Manchester, *American Caesar* (1978), and Geoffrey

Perret, *Old Soldiers Never Die* (1996) are well-written accounts interpretive of the fascinating man.

The life of one of the war's most controversial Army Air Force commanders, Curtis LeMay, receives thorough coverage in Thomas Coffey's *Iron Eagle* (1988). Coffey explains LeMay's advocacy of the horribly effective fire bombing campaign that reduced Japanese cities to cinders.

Two historians highlight the roles played by diverse commanders in books offering collections of biographical chapters. Eric Larrabee's *Commander in Chief: Franklin Delano Roosevelt, His Lieutenants, and Their War* (1987) presents the contributions to the war and the relationship with President Roosevelt of ten top military figures, six of whom figure prominently in the Pacific. Larrabee's insightful commentary produces a delightful book. The next year William M. Leary took a similar approach by presenting the biographical essays of eight historians in his *We Shall Return!: MacArthur's Commanders and the Defeat of Japan, 1942-1945* (1988). The historians examine the relationship each commander had with MacArthur and cast light on men who, during the war, received little publicity in the MacArthur-dominated Southwest Pacific.

While the historical literature of the American war in Asia and the Pacific is extensive, that conflict is so massive that lacunae are inevitable and the opportunities for scholarly research remain great.

#### BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Alexander, Joseph (1995). *Utmost Savagery: The Three Days of Tarawa*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Allen, Louis (1984). *Burma: The Longest War, 1941-1945*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Ambrose, Stephen E. (1992). *Band of Brothers: E Company, 506th Regiment, 101st Airborne from Normandy to Hitler's Eagle's Nest*. New York: Simon & Schuster.
- Asada, Sadao (2006). *From Mahan to Pearl Harbor: The Imperial Japanese Navy and the United States*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Aston, Gerald (2004). *Jungle War: Mavericks, Marauders and Madmen in the China-Burma-India Theater of World War II*. New York: John Wiley & Sons.
- Becton, F. Julian (1980). *The Ship That Would Not Die*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc.
- Belote, James H., and William M. Belote (1967). *Corregidor: The Saga of a Mighty Fortress*. New York: Harper & Row.
- Belote, James H., and William M. Belote (1970). *Typhoon of Steel: The Battle for Okinawa*. New York: Harper & Row.
- Belote, James H., and William M. Belote (1975). *Titans of the Seas: The Development and Operations of Japanese and American Carrier Task Forces during World War II*. New York: Harper & Row.
- Bidwell, Shelford (1979). *The Chindit War: Stilwell, Wingate, and the Campaign in Burma, 1944*. New York: Macmillan.
- Bjorge, Gary J. (1945). *Merrill's Marauders: Combined Operations in Northern Burma, 1944*. Washington: Historical Division, War Department.

- Blair, Clay, Jr. (1975). *Silent Victory: The U.S. Submarine War against Japan*. New York: J. B. Lippincott Co.
- Bradley, James (2000). *Flags of Our Fathers*. New York: Bantam Books.
- Braisted, William Reynolds (2008). *Diplomats in Navy Blue: U.S. Naval Officers in China, 1922–1933*. Gainesville: University Press of Florida.
- Breuer, William B. (1986). *Retaking the Philippines*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Buell, Thomas B. (1974). *The Quiet Warrior: A Biography of Admiral Raymond A. Spruance*. Boston: Little, Brown and Company.
- Buell, Thomas B. (1980). *Master of Sea Power: A Biography of Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King*. Boston: Little, Brown and Company.
- Butow, Robert J. C. (1954). *Japan's Decision to Surrender*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Callahan, Raymond (1978). *Burma, 1942–1945*. London: Associated University Press.
- Caron, George R., and Charlotte E. Meares (1995). *Fire of a Thousand Suns: The George R. "Bob" Caron Story, Tail Gunner of the Enola Gay*. Web Publishing Company.
- Casey, Robert J. (1942). *Torpedo Junction: With the Pacific Fleet from Pearl Harbor to Midway*. Indianapolis, IN: The Bobbs-Merrill Company.
- Chappell, John D. (1996). *Before the Bomb: How America Approached the End of the Pacific War*. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky.
- Chennault, Claire Lee (1949). *Way of a Fighter: The Memoirs of Claire Lee Chennault*, ed. by Robert Hotz. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons.
- Coffey, Thomas (1988). *Iron Eagle: The Turbulent Life of General Curtis LeMay*. New York: Avon Books.
- Conroy, Hilary, and Harry Wray, eds. (1990). *Pearl Harbor Reexamined: Prologue to the Pacific War*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.
- Cook, Haruko Taya, and Theodore F. Cook (1992). *Japan at War: An Oral History*. New York: New Press.
- Costello, John (1982). *The Pacific War 1941–1945*. New York: Quill Books.
- Craven, Wesley, and James Lea Cate, eds. (1948). *The Army Air Forces in World War II*, vol. 1: *Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Craven, Wesley, and James Lea Cate, eds. (1950). *The Army Air Forces in World War II*, vol. 4: *The Pacific: Guadalcanal to Saipan, August 1942 to July 1944*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Craven, Wesley, and James Lea Cate, eds. (1953). *The Army Air Forces in World War II*, vol 5: *The Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Cressman, Robert J. (1995). "A Magnificent Fight": *The Battle for Wake Island*. Annapolis, MD: Naval institute Press.
- Cunningham, W. Scott (1961). *Wake Island Command*. Boston: Little, Brown.
- Cutler, Thomas (1994). *The Battle of Leyte Gulf, 23–26 October 1944*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Danner, Dorothy S. (1995). *What A Way to Spend A War: Navy Nurse POWs in the Philippines*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Davis, Burke (1969). *Get Yamamoto*. New York: Random House.
- Davis, Forrest, and Ernest K. Lindley (1942). *How the War Came*. New York: Simon & Schuster.
- Daws, Gavan (1994). *Prisoners of the Japanese: POWs of World War II in the Pacific*. New York: William Morrow and Co.

- Devereux, James P. S. (1947). *The Story of Wake Island*. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott.
- Dexter, David (1961). *The New Guinea Offensives*. Canberra: Australian War Memorial.
- Dower, John W. (1986). *War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War*. New York: Pantheon Books.
- Drea, Edward J. (1992). *MacArthur's Ultra: Codebreaking and the War against Japan, 1942–1945*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
- Dull, Paul S. (1978). *Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1941–1945*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Dunlop, Richard (1979). *Behind Japanese Lines: With the OSS in Burma*. Chicago: Rand-McNally.
- Dyer, George (1971). *The Amphibians Came to Conquer: The Story of Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner*, 2 vols. Washington: Naval Historical Center.
- Dyess, William E. (1944). *The Dyess Story*. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons.
- Edmonds, Walter D. (1951). *They Fought With What They Had*. Boston: Little, Brown and Co.
- Eichelberger, Robert L. (1950). *Our Jungle Road to Tokyo*. New York: Viking Press.
- Fahey, James J. (1963). *Pacific War Diary, 1942–1945*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
- Falk, Stanley (1972). *Bataan: The March of Death*. New York: W. W. Norton.
- Farago, Ladislav (1967). *The Broken Seal: The Story of "Operation Magic" and the Pearl Harbor Disaster*. New York: Random House.
- Feifer, George (1992). *Tennozan: The Battle of Okinawa and the Atomic Bomb*. New York: Ticknor & Fields.
- Feis, Herbert (1968). *The Road to Pearl Harbor*. New York: Atheneum.
- Felker, Craig C. (2007). *Testing American Sea Power: U.S. Navy Strategic Exercises, 1923–1940*. College Station: Texas A&M University Press.
- Ford, Daniel (1995). *Flying Tigers: Clair Chennault and the American Volunteer Group*. Washington: Smithsonian Press.
- Frank, Richard B. (1990). *Guadalcanal: The Definitive Account of the Landmark Battle*. New York: Random House.
- Frank, Richard B. (1999). *Downfall: The End of the Imperial Japanese Empire*. New York: Random House.
- Fuchida, Mistuo, and Masatake Okumiya (1955). *Midway: The Battle that Doomed Japan*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Gailey, Harry (1986). *Howlin' Mad vs the Army: Conflict in Command, Saipan 1944*. Novato, CA: Presidio Press.
- Gailey, Harry (1991). *Bougainville, 1943–1945: The Forgotten Campaign*. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky.
- Gailey, Harry (1997). *The Liberation of Guam: 21 July–10 August 1944*. Novato, CA: Presidio Press.
- Garfield, Brian (1969). *The Thousand-Mile War: World War II in Alaska and the Aleutians*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, Inc.
- Gilbert, Martin (1989). *The Second World War: A Complete History*. New York: Henry Holt.
- Goldberg, Harold J. (2007). *D-Day in the Pacific: The Battle of Saipan*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Graham, Michael B. (1993). *Mantle of Heroism: Tarawa and the Struggle for the Gilberts, November 1943*. Novato, CA: Presidio Press.
- Groves, Leslie (1962). *Now It Can Be Told: The Story of the Manhattan Project*. Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press.

- Guillain, Robert (1981). *I Saw Tokyo Burning: An Eyewitness Narrative from Pearl Harbor to Hiroshima*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, Inc.
- Hammel, Eric (1989). *Munda Trail: The New Georgia Campaign*. New York: Orion Books.
- Hammel, Eric (1999). *Guadalcanal: Decision at Sea: The Naval Battle of Guadalcanal, November 13–15, 1942*. New York: Crown Books.
- Harries, Meirion, and Susie Harries (1991). *Soldiers of the Sun: The Rise and Fall of the Imperial Japanese Army*. New York: Random House.
- Henry, Chris (2003). *The Battle of the Coral Sea*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Hersey, John (1943). *Into the Valley*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Hersey, John (1946). *Hiroshima*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Hogan, Michael J., ed. (1996). *Hiroshima in History and Memory*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Holmes, Linda Goetz (2001). *Unjust Enrichment: How Japan's Companies Built Postwar Fortunes Using American POWs*. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books.
- Holmes, W. J. (1966). *Undersea Victory: The Influence of Submarine Operations on the War in the Pacific*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, Inc.
- Holmes, W. J. (1979). *Double-Edged Secrets: U. S. Naval Intelligence Operations in the Pacific during World War II*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Hornfischer, James D. (2006). *Ship of Ghosts: The Story of the USS Houston, FDR's Legendary Lost Cruiser, and the Epic Saga of Her Survivors*. New York: Bantam Books.
- Hunter, Charles N. (1963). *Galahad*. San Antonio, TX: Naylor Co.
- Inoguchi, Nakajima, and Roger Pineau (1958). *The Divine Wind: Japan's Kamikaze Forces in World War II*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Iriye, Akira (1981). *Power and Culture: The Japanese-American War, 1941–1945*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- James, Clayton (1970–85). *The Years of MacArthur*, 3 vols. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
- Johnston, George (1943). *The Toughest Fighting in the World*. New York: Duell, Sloan, and Pearce.
- Joseph, Alvin M. (1946). *The Long and the Short and the Tall: The Story of a Marine Combat Unit in the Pacific*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Keegan, John (1990). *The Second World War*. New York: Penguin Books.
- Kennett, Lee (1987). *G.I.: The American Soldier in World War II*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons.
- Kerr, E. Bartlett (1958). *Surrender and Survival: The Experience of American POWs in the Pacific, 1941–1945*. New York: William Morrow.
- Knox, Donald (1981). *Death March: The Survivors of Bataan*. New York: Harcourt Brace and Jovanich.
- Larrabee, Eric (1987). *Commander in Chief: Franklin Delano Roosevelt, His Lieutenants, and Their War*. New York: Harper & Row.
- Layton, Edwin T., with Roger Pineau and John Costello (1985). "And I Was There": *Pearl Harbor and Midway – Breaking the Secrets*. New York: William Morrow.
- Leary, William M. (1988). *We Shall Return!: MacArthur's Commanders and the Defeat of Japan, 1942–1945*. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky.
- LeMay, Curtis, and Bill Yenne (1988). *Superfortress: The Story of the B-29 and American Air Power*. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Lewin, Ronald (1982). *The American Magic: Codes, Ciphers and the Defeat of Japan*. New York: Farrar Strauss Giroux.
- Linderman, Gerald F. (1997). *The World Within War: America's Combat Experience in World War II*. New York: Free Press.



- Linenthal, Edward, and Tom Englehardt, eds. (1996). *History Wars: The Enola Gay and Other Battles for the American Past*. New York: Metropolitan.
- Lord, Walter (1957). *Day of Infamy*. New York: Henry Holt.
- Lord, Walter (1967). *Incredible Victory*. New York: Harper & Row.
- Lorelli, John A. (1984). *The Battle of the Komandorski Islands, March 1943*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Lorelli, John A. (1995). *To Foreign Shores: U.S. Amphibious Operations in World War II*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Lundstrom, John B. (2006). *Black Shoe Carrier Admiral: Frank Jack Fletcher at Coral Sea, Midway, and Guadalcanal*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- MacArthur, Douglas (1964). *Reminiscences*. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Maga, Tim (2001). *Judgment at Tokyo: The Japanese War Crimes Trials*. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky.
- Manchester, William (1978). *American Caesar*. New York: Dell.
- Manchester, William (1980). *Goodbye, Darkness: A Memoir of the Pacific War*. Boston: Little, Brown.
- Marder, Arthur J. (1981). *Old Friends, New Enemies*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Mayo, Lida (1974). *Bloody Buna*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, Inc.
- McCoy, Melvyn H., and S. M. Mellnik (1944). *Ten Escape from Tojo*. New York: Farrar & Rinehart.
- McGee, William L. (2002). *The Solomons Campaigns, 1942–1943: From Guadalcanal to Bougainville*. Santa Barbara, CA: BMC Publications.
- McManus, John C. (1998). *The Deadly Brotherhood: The American Combat Soldier in World War II*. Novato, CA: Presidio.
- Miller, Edward S. (1991). *War Plan Orange: The U.S. Strategy to Defeat Japan, 1897–1945*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Miller, Edward S. (2007). *Bankrupting the Enemy: The U.S. Financial Siege of Japan before Pearl Harbor*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Miller, Nathan (1980). *The Naval Air War, 1939–1945*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Miller, Thomas G., Jr. (1969). *The Cactus Air Force*. New York: Bantam Books.
- Mitchell, Robert J. (2000 [1944]). *The Capture of Attu: A World War II Battle as Told by the Men Who Fought There*, intro. by Gregory Urwin. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
- Morison, Samuel Eliot (1948). *History of United States Naval Operations in World War II*, vol. 3: *The Rising Sun in the Pacific, 1931–April 1942*. Boston: Little, Brown.
- Morison, Samuel Eliot. (1949a). *History of United States Naval Operations in World War II*, vol. 4: *Coral Sea, Midway and Submarine Actions, May 1942–August 1942*. Boston: Little, Brown.
- Morison, Samuel Eliot (1949b). *History of United States Naval Operations in World War II*, vol. 5: *The Struggle for Guadalcanal, August 1942–February 1943*. Boston: Little, Brown.
- Morison, Samuel Eliot (1950). *History of United States Naval Operations in World War II*, vol. 6: *Breaking the Bismarck's Barrier, 22 July 1942–1 May 1944*. Boston: Little, Brown.
- Morison, Samuel Eliot (1951). *History of United States Naval Operations in World War II*, vol. 7: *Alentians, Gilberts, and Marshalls, June 1942–April 1944*. Boston: Little, Brown.
- Morison, Samuel Eliot (1953). *History of United States Naval Operations in World War II*, vol. 8: *New Guinea and the Marianas, March 1944–August 1944*. Boston: Little, Brown.
- Morison, Samuel Eliot (1958). *History of United States Naval Operations in World War II*, vol. 12, *Leyte, June 1944–January 1945*. Boston: Little, Brown.

- Morison, Samuel Eliot (1959). *History of United States Naval Operations in World War II*, vol. 13: *The Liberation of the Philippines: Luzon, Mindanao, the Visayas, 1944–1945*. Boston: Little, Brown.
- Morison, Samuel Eliot (1960). *History of United States Naval Operations in World War II*, vol. 14: *Victory in the Pacific, 1945*. Boston: Little, Brown.
- Morley, James W., ed. (1976). *Deterrent Diplomacy: Japan, Germany and the USSR*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Morley, James W., ed. (1980). *The Fateful Choice: Japan's Negotiations with the United States*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Morton, Louis (1953). *The Fall of the Philippines*. Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History.
- Newcomb, Richard F. (1965). *Iwo Jima*. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
- Norling, Bernard (1986). *Behind Japanese Lines: An American Guerrilla in the Philippines*. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky.
- Norman, Elizabeth M. (1999). *We Band of Angels: The Untold Story of American Nurses Trapped on Bataan by the Japanese*. New York: Random House.
- O'Brien, Francis A. (2003). *Battling for Saipan*. New York: Ballantine Books.
- Ogburn, Charlton (1956). *The Marauders*. New York: Harper & Brothers.
- O'Kane, Richard (1977). *Clear the Bridge!: The War Patrols of the USS Tang*. New York: Rand McNally.
- Parker, R. A. C. (1990). *Struggle for Survival: The History of the Second World War*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Parshall, Jonathan, and Anthony Tully (2005). *Shattered Sword: The Untold Story of the Battle of Midway*. Dulles, VA: Potomac Books.
- Pelz, Stephen E. (1974). *Race to Pearl Harbor*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Perret, Geoffrey (1996). *Old Soldiers Never Die: The Life of Douglas MacArthur*. Holbrook, MA: Adams Media Corporation.
- Petty, Bruce M., ed. (2001). *Saipan: Oral Histories of the Pacific War*. Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company.
- Potter, E. B. (1976). *Nimitz*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Potter, E. B. (1985). *Bull Halsey*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Potter, E. B. (1990). *Admiral Arleigh Burke*. New York: Random House.
- Pados, John (1995). *Combined Fleet Decoded: The Secret History of American Intelligence and the Japanese Navy in World War II*. New York: Random House.
- Prange, Gordon W. (1981). *At Dawn We Slept*. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co.
- Prange, Gordon W., Donald M. Goldstein, and Karen V. Dillon (1982). *Miracle at Midway*. New York: Penguin Books.
- Prefer, Nathan N. (2000). *Vinegar Joe's War: Stilwell's Campaigns for Burma*. Novato, CA: Presidio.
- Pyle, Ernie (1946). *Last Chapter*. New York: H. Holt and Co.
- Rasor, Eugene L., comp. (1998). *The China-Burma-India Campaign, 1931–1945: History and Annotated Bibliography*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
- Rees Laurence (2001). *Horror in the East: Japan and the Atrocities of World War II*. Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press.
- Rhodes, Richard (1986). *The Making of the Atomic Bomb*. New York: Simon & Schuster.
- Romanus, Charles F., and Riley Sunderland (1953). *Stilwell's Mission to China*. Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History.

- Romanus, Charles F., and Riley Sunderland (1956). *Stilwell's Command Problems*. Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History.
- Romanus, Charles F., and Riley Sunderland (1959). *Time Runs Out in CBI*. Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History.
- Rooney, David (2005). *Stilwell the Patriot: Vinegar Joe, the Brits, and Chiang Kai-Shek*. London: Greenhill Books.
- Ross, Bill D. (1991). *Peleliu: Tragic Triumph, The Untold Story of the Pacific War's Forgotten Battle*. New York: Random House.
- Russell of Liverpool, [Edward Frederick], Baron (1958). *The Knights of Bushido: A Short History of Japanese War Crimes*. London: Cassell.
- Schaller, Michael (1979). *The U.S. Crusade in China*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Schom, Alan (2004). *The Eagle and the Rising Sun*. New York: W.W. Norton & Company.
- Schultz, Duane P. (1981). *Hero of Bataan: The Story of General Jonathan M. Wainwright*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Sherrod, Robert (1944). *Tarawa: The Story of a Battle*. New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce.
- Sledge, E. B. (1981). *With the Old Breed: At Peleliu and Okinawa*. Novato, CA: Presidio Press.
- Sloan, Bill (2005). *Brotherhood of Heroes: The Marines at Peleliu, 1944: The Bloodiest Battle of the Pacific War*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Sloan, Bill (2007). *The Ultimate Battle: Okinawa 1945 – The Last Epic Struggle of World War II*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Solberg, Carl (1995). *Decision and Dissent: With Halsey at Leyte Gulf*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Spector, Ronald H. (1985). *Eagle against the Sun: The American War with Japan*. New York: Free Press.
- Spector, Ronald H. (1988). *Listening to the Enemy: Key Documents on the Role of Communications Intelligence in the War with Japan*. Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Inc.
- Steinberg, Rafael (1978). *Island Fighting*. Alexandria, VA: Time-Life Books.
- Steinberg, Rafael (1979). *Return to the Philippines*. Alexandria, VA: Time-Life Books.
- Stilwell, Joseph W. (1948). *The Stilwell Papers* (arranged and edited by Theodore H. White). New York: W. Sloane Associates.
- Stilwell, Paul (1991). *Battleship Arizona: An Illustrated History*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Stoler, Mark A. (2000). *Allies and Adversaries: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, The Grand Alliance, and U.S. Strategy in World War II*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Taaffe, Stephen R. (1998). *MacArthur's Jungle War: The 1944 New Guinea Campaign*. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press.
- Thomas, David A. (1968). *The Battle of the Java Sea*. London: Pan Books.
- Thomas, Evan (2006). *Sea of Thunder: Four Commanders and the Last Great Naval Campaign, 1941–1945*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Thomas, Gordon, and Max Morgan-Witts (1977). *Enola Gay: Mission to Hiroshima*. New York: Stein and Day.
- Thorne, Christopher G. (1978). *Allies of a Kind: The United States, Britain, and the War Against Japan, 1941–1945*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Tibbetts, Paul, with Clair Stebbins (1978). *The Tibbetts Story*. New York: Stein and Day.
- Tillman, Barrett (2005). *Clash of the Carriers: The True Story of the Marianas Turkey Shoot of World War II*. New York: New American Library.

- Toland, John (1961). *But Not in Shame: The Six Months after Pearl Harbor*. New York: Random House.
- Toland, John (1970). *The Rising Sun: The Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire, 1936–1945*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Co.
- Toland, John (1982). *Infamy: Pearl Harbor and its Aftermath*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Co.
- Tregaskis, Richard (1943). *Guadalcanal Diary*. New York: Random House.
- Tuchman, Barbara (1971). *Stilwell and the American Experience in China, 1911–45*. New York: Macmillan.
- Tunner, Whilliam H. (1964). *Over the Hump*. Washington: Office of Air Force History.
- United States Army in World War II: The War in the Pacific*. Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History.
- Appleman, Roy E, et al. (1948). *Okinawa: The Last Battle*.
- Cannon, M. Hamlin (1954). *Leyte: The Return to the Philippines*.
- Crowl, Philip A. (1959). *Campaign in the Marianas*.
- Crowl, Philip A. and Edmund G. Love (1955). *Seizure of the Gilberts and Marshalls*.
- Miller, John, Jr. (1949). *Guadalcanal: The First Offensive*.
- Miller, John, Jr. (1959). *Cartwheel: The Reduction of Rabaul*.
- Milner, Samuel (1957). *Victory in Papua*.
- Morton, Louis (1953). *The Fall of the Philippines*.
- Morton, Louis (1962). *Strategy and Command: The First Two Years*.
- Romanus, Charles F., and Riley Sunderland (1952). *Stilwell's Mission to China*.
- Romanus, Charles F., and Riley Sunderland (1956). *Stilwell's Command Problems*.
- Romanus, Charles F., and Riley Sunderland (1959). *Time Runs Out in CBI*.
- Smith, Robert Ross (1953). *The Approach to the Philippines*.
- Smith, Robert Ross (1963). *Triumph in the Philippines*.
- United States Marine Corps (1958). *History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II*, 5 vols. Washington: Headquarters, US Marine Corps:
- vol. 1: (1958). *Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal*, by Frank O. Hough, Verle E. Ludwig, and Henry I. Shaw, Jr.
  - vol. 2: (1963). *Isolation of Rabaul*, by Henry I. Shaw, Jr., and Douglas T. Kane.
  - vol. 3: (1966). *Central Pacific Drive*, by Henry I. Shaw, Jr., Bernard. C. Nalty, and Edwin T. Turnbladh.
  - vol. 4: (1971). *Western Pacific Operations*, by George W. Garand and T. R. Strobridge.
  - vol. 5: (1968). *Victory and Occupation*, by Benis M. Frank and Henry I. Shaw, Jr.
- Urwin, Gregory J. W. (1997). *Facing Fearful Odds: The Siege of Wake Island*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
- Vader, John (1971). *New Guinea: The Tide is Stemmed*. New York: Ballantine Books.
- Van Oosten, F. C. (1976). *The Battle of the Java Sea*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Warner, Denis, and Peggy Warner (1992). *Disaster in the Pacific*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Webster, Donovan (2004). *The Burma Road: The Epic Story of the China-Burma-India Theater in World War II*. New York: Macmillan.
- Weinberg, Gerhard L. (1994). *A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Wheeler, Gerald E. (1968). *Prelude to Pearl Harbor: The United States Navy and the Far East, 1921–1931*. Columbia: University of Missouri Press.

- Wheeler, Keith (1979). *The Road to Tokyo*. Alexandria, VA: Time-Life Books.
- Wheeler, Keith (1983). *The Fall of Japan*. Alexandria, VA: Time-Life Books.
- Wheeler, Richard (1965). *The Bloody Battle for Suribachi*. New York: Crowell.
- Wheeler, Richard (1980). *Iwo*. New York: Lippincott & Crowell.
- Wheeler, Richard (1983). *A Special Valor: The U.S. Marines and the Pacific War*. New York: New American Library.
- White, W. L. (1942). *They Were Expendable*. New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Co.
- Willmott, H. P. (1991). *The Great Crusade: A New Complete History of the Second World War*. New York: Free Press.
- Wilson, Earl J. (1945). *Betio Beachhead: U. S. Marines' Own Story of the Battle for Tarawa*. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons.
- Winslow, W. G. (1982). *The Fleet the Gods Forgot: The U.S. Asiatic Fleet in World War II*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Winton, John (1993). *Ultra in the Pacific: How Breaking Japanese Codes & Cyphers Affected Naval Operations against Japan, 1941-45*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Woodward, C. Vann (1947). *The Battle for Leyte Gulf*. New York: W. W. Norton & Co.
- Wukovits, John (1995). *Devotion to Duty: A Biography of Admiral Clifton A. F. Sprague*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Wukovits, John (2003). *Pacific Alamo: The Battle for Wake Island*. New York: New American Library.
- Wukovits, John (2006). *One Square Mile of Hell: The Battle for Tarawa*. New York: New American Library.
- Y'Blood, William T. (1981). *Red Sun Setting: The Battle of the Philippine Sea*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.

## Chapter Twelve

---

# THE KOREAN WAR

*James I. Matray*

Military historian Clay Blair titled his 1987 study of the Korean conflict *The Forgotten War* because arguably the most important event of the early Cold War seemed at that time unknown to most Americans. Paul G. Pierpaoli, Jr. (2001), who has written about the domestic impact of the war, identifies three reasons for this public disinterest. First, its placement between the “good war” of World War II and “bad war” in Vietnam obscured Korea. Second, “the Korean War fit into a larger schema that viewed Northeast Asia as an integral part of the United States’ imperative to maintain and expand liberal capitalism around the world.” Third, Americans preferred to forget this highly politicized and inconclusive limited war because it raised questions about national self-worth when the political culture equated social reform, racial justice, and measured criticism with disloyalty and subversion. Pierpaoli concludes that publication of new studies during the 1980s and access to Communist sources in the 1990s has reinvigorated the historiography of the Korean conflict and as a result elevated public knowledge about the war. His assessment, however, applies to that part of the Korean War literature that focuses on asking and answering diplomatic and political questions.

Korea in fact has attracted steady and serious attention from military historians since an armistice ended the fighting there in July 1953. Nevertheless, there have been few historiographical articles surveying writings that focus on the military aspects of the conflict. An exception is Allan R. Millett’s (1997b) outstanding essay “A Reader’s Guide to the Korean War” – an updated version of which (2001) extends his coverage to political and diplomatic issues. Editor Lester H. Brune (1996) and ten other scholars have written 23 historiographical essays contained in an excellent volume that covers all aspects of the war. Divided into six sections, one addresses military aspects. James I. Matray (2003) and Rosemary Foot (1991) cover the important military events in the war, such as North Korea’s attack, the Inchon Landing, and Chinese military intervention, but focus more on diplomatic and political issues, as does Hakjoon Kim (1990). Annotated bibliographies that Paul M. Edwards has edited on the Pusan Perimeter (1993), the Inchon Landing (1994), and the Korean War (1998) have special value because they provide brief



summaries of nearly all studies that examine military developments during the conflict. But the one Keith D. McFarland (1986) has compiled is dated. Spencer C. Tucker (2000) has edited the most comprehensive encyclopedia on the Korean War, which presents detailed entries on all important military figures, weaponry, issues, and events in rich and thorough detail. Edwards (2006) and Harry G. Summers (1990) each have published an almanac on the war containing concise summaries emphasizing the military dimension. Despite similar structure and purpose, Matray (1991) and Stanley Sandler (1995) are less helpful because they focus more on politics and diplomacy.

Few military histories of the Korean War devote much attention to discussing the events before the North Korean invasion of South Korea on June 25, 1950. This pattern reflects an almost universally accepted belief among military historians that took hold as soon as the war began that the Soviet Union had ordered its puppet to attack as part of its plan for global conquest. Beginning in the early 1980s, however, other Korean War scholars argued that the origins of the war dated from at least the start of World War II, forging a consensus in support of this interpretation. Building on some earlier accounts, many recent studies have examined the activities and impact of the US Army during its occupation of southern Korea from September 1945 to June 1949, either directly or indirectly assigning or denying it responsibility for the civil strife raging on the peninsula during the five years after the end of World War II. With little preparation, Washington redeployed the XXIV Corps under the command of Lieutenant General John R. Hodge from Okinawa to Korea to accept the surrender of Japanese forces in Korea. This force of approximately 45,000 men, who knew nothing about this country's history or culture, were unable to maintain order because Koreans wanted immediate independence, not occupation. John C. Caldwell (1952) witnessed as an information officer with the XXIV Corps the difficulties these US soldiers experienced, reporting their rising discontent climaxing in public demands for prompt return to civilian life in the United States. Fred Ottoboni (1997), an infantryman in Korea during 1947 and 1948, provides an account of how US occupation forces had to endure bitter cold, fuel shortages, dirty clothing, and insufficient food, as well as unpleasant relations with suffering South Koreans.

Certainly, the greatest challenge that the US military faced in postwar Korea was achieving a basis for cooperation and coordination with Soviet military forces that had occupied the nation north of the 38th parallel under an agreement made just before Japan surrendered. Donald W. Boose, Jr. (1995) argues that the hasty US occupation was a tactical military success, but lack of a firm plan for reunification and preparations for civil administration created conditions that led to the Korean War. Michael C. Sandusky (1983) examines in greater detail the connection between US military strategy and Korea's division. Historians agree that the emergence of the Cold War increased the odds against realizing the US goal of establishing the foundation for postwar economic development and democracy in a united Korea. Accounts of the US occupation of southern Korea differ sharply in their assessment of the performance of the American military. Defenders attribute failures to US officials in Washington, pointing out that Hodge did not receive

detailed instructions to govern his operations until nine months after arrival. Donald S. Macdonald (1988), who was an officer in the XXIV Corps, acknowledges the mistakes of the US Army Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK), but insists that despite limited resources, it succeeded in mitigating human suffering, reviving the economy, and establishing an administrative infrastructure. Allan R. Millett (2005) agrees, emphasizing as well the USAMGIK's role in promoting land reform. Both Millett and Gregg Brazinsky (2007) also laud the work of US military advisors in building a constabulary army after 1946 that became the nucleus for the army of the Republic of Korea (ROK).

Other writers contend that the US military followed the Japanese colonial model in establishing an authoritarian government in southern Korea. George M. McCune and Arthur L. Grey, Jr. (1950) and James I. Matray (1985) criticize Hodge and his associates for relying on wealthy landlords and businessmen who could speak English for advice, appointing them to top positions in a later interim government. Not only had many of these individuals collaborated with the Japanese, but as Carl Berger (1957) explains, they had little interest in responding to the demands of Korean workers and peasants for reform. Matray (1995) targets Hodge as primarily responsible for the failures of the occupation, pointing to his administrative inexperience, visceral anti-communism, and obsession with maintaining security. All these writers join Bruce Cumings (1981) in emphasizing how the US military recruited rightwing extremists who had served in the Japanese army as officers in the Korean constabulary army. Moreover, the USAMGIK tolerated rightist paramilitary units that terrorized and murdered leftist politicians and their suspected sympathizers. Park Chan-Pyo (2002) agrees that US military officials wanted to create an anti-Communist bulwark in South Korea, but imposed democratic procedures and institutions that made possible the future emergence of a democratic polity. By contrast, Cho Soon-Sung (1967) argues that the USAMGIK should have been less concerned with promoting democracy and more with returning the Korean Provisional Government from exile in China and placing it in power in the south alone.

Cold War demands on US resources ultimately compelled President Harry S. Truman to approve plans for the withdrawal of American forces from Korea. The first step was accepting the necessity to form a separate government in South Korea in the face of Soviet refusal to approve reunification on American terms. Denied access to North Korea, the United Nations sponsored elections in the south alone in May 1948, leading to the establishment of the ROK the following August under President Syngman Rhee. By then, Peter Clemens (2002) and Millett (1997a) document how a dedicated and skilled US Army advisory team under the direction of the talented and tireless Captain James Hausman had trained and equipped an army cadre of 25,000 men in the south. US military advisors also had supervised the formation and training a National Police Force. Despite these internal security forces and the continuing presence of US troops, the new government faced violent opposition from the start, climaxing in October 1948 with the Yosu-Sunchon Rebellion. US military advisors played a key role in helping purge leftists and then supervised a dramatic improvement in the ROK army before and after

US military withdrawal in late June 1949. Robert K. Sawyer and Walter G. Hermes, Jr. (1962) have written the official history of the Korea Military Advisory Group (KMAG) that not only describes the activities and impact of these US officers and enlisted men but also their hardships, such as living conditions, food, climate, and language barrier.

KMAG was so successful that the ROK army began initiating provocative attacks northward across the 38th parallel beginning in the summer of 1949. John Merrill (1989) has described the series of major border clashes that these assaults ignited with North Korea, often involving battalion-sized units. A kind of war then was underway already on the peninsula when the conventional phase of the conflict began on June 25, 1950. Fears that Rhee might initiate an offensive to achieve forcible reunification had caused the Truman administration to limit the ROK's military capabilities, for example denying its request for warplanes and tanks. Nevertheless, I. F. Stone (1952) was the first to question the assumption that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) had initiated hostilities, claiming North Korea's invasion was in response to a South Korean incursion. Adding a new twist, Robert R. Simmons (1975) asserts that Kim Il Sung, North Korea's leader, launched the invasion, but without the knowledge of Soviet leader Joseph Stalin. Bruce Cumings (1990) revives Stone's argument, speculating that the ROK probably attacked first, but insisting that if North Korea was culpable, the Soviets had nothing to do with Pyongyang's war plans. Release of previously classified Soviet documents during the 1990s settled this and other basic questions about the origins of the Korean War. Sergei Goncharov, John Lewis, and Xue Litai (1993) relied on these sources and interviews with participants to show that Stalin was aware of Kim's invasion plans and gave his consent, along with more arms and supplies to ensure success.

Kathryn Weathersby (1993a, 1993b, 1995) has devoted many years to examining Soviet documents related to the outbreak of the Korean War. In her string of important articles, she emphasizes the DPRK's total dependence on the Soviet Union, assigning responsibility for North Korea's aggression to Stalin's obsession with expansionism. Having read the same sources, Evgueni Bajanov (1995/1996), Alexandre Y. Mansourov (2004), and Shen Zhihua (2000) emphasize that Kim Il Sung made the decision for war and Stalin agreed with reluctance because he feared US military intervention. What is important for US military history is that President Truman decided to commit American combat forces to prevent the DPRK from absorbing South Korea. For many observers then and thereafter, this was a dramatic policy reversal after Washington had decided to abandon the ROK. In fact, when Truman met with his top advisors at Blair House on June 25 and 26, 1950 to consider the Korean crisis, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) opposed sending troops. The president waited a week before authorizing direct military intervention in hopes that the ROK could defend itself. Glenn D. Paige (1968) examines this decision making process in detail, praising Truman for being calm and rational in making the right decision. Ernest R. May (1973) elaborates on Paige's claim that avoiding appeasement was Truman's primary motive. For William Stueck (1981), preserving US credibility demanded American action to save the ROK. But

Brazinsky (2007), building on the earlier work of Gene M. Lyons (1961), documents vigorous US nation building in the ROK before the war, supporting Matray's (1985) argument that US intervention to save South Korea constituted the fulfillment of a commitment.

Official US military histories of the Korean War are essential sources. Roy E. Appleman (1961) contributes the first of four richly detailed volumes in the US Army's written record, covering the period from the North Korean attack until China's massive counteroffensives in late November 1950. He describes the early defeats that the two US infantry divisions redeployed from occupation duty in Japan sustained, attributing this surprising outcome to the units being seriously under strength and only partially trained and equipped. In a long delayed and less well-written study, Billy C. Mossman (1990) then describes the US retreat into South Korea before a counterattack pushed the enemy back into North Korea. This study stresses how weather and terrain imposed limits on fighting capabilities, while Truman's desire for an armistice restrained US military operations. Ending in July 1951 with the front stabilized, Mossman argues that the US Eighth Army unwisely allowed the Chinese after recent defeats to rebuild their forces and strengthen their defenses. Addressing the same events as Appleman and Mossman, James F. Schnabel (1972) focuses more on explaining the development and direction of US military strategy during the first year of the war. Global responsibilities and fear of escalation in a nuclear age, he argues, justified the US decision to fight a limited war. Walter G. Hermes, Jr. (1966) covers the war's last two years, discussing the truce talks and continued intense fighting at the front. Military officers sought victory, he explains, not on the battlefield but at the conference table, where politics determined exchanges and diplomacy decided the outcome.

Two other official histories exceed the US Army volumes in referencing a fuller array of primary source documents. In the third volume of *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy*, James F. Schnabel and Robert J. Watson (1979) provide detailed coverage of the role the JCS played in managing the Korean War, integrating discussion of wartime military matters into the larger context of US national security policy. Similarly, Doris M. Condit (1988) provides a different perspective on mainly the first year of the Korean War in the volume she contributes to the history of the Office of Secretary of Defense. Like Schnabel and Watson, she covers planning and decision making at the Pentagon, arguing that a lack of clarity regarding the relationship between the JCS and Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall in providing direction to General Douglas MacArthur, the head of the United Nations Command (UNC) in Korea, contributed to the mistakes that escalated the war. In his official history of naval operations, James A. Field, Jr. (1962) documents the navy's importance in supply, amphibious operations, land bombardment, and air support. Robert F. Futrell (1983) in a twice revised version of his official US Air Force Historical Division study provides a solid factual account of how air power played a vital role in US military successes in Korea, also describing the transition to use of jet fighters and internal disputes over close air support and strategic bombing. Completed over a period of nearly 20 years, Lynn Montross (1954–72) supervised the writing of the official history

of US Marine operations in the Korean War. Both detailed and comprehensive, the five volumes address respectively the Pusan Perimeter, the Inchon-Seoul Operation, Chosin Reservoir Campaign, East-Central Front, and West Korea.

General J. Lawton Collins (1969), who was US Army Chief of Staff during the Korean War, provides a thoughtful and carefully written insider's view of the conflict. Offering insights on the difficulties of fighting a limited war, he concludes that Korea's lesson was never to fight a war without clear objectives and the means to achieve them. Almost as valuable is the firsthand account of General Matthew B. Ridgway (1967), who became commander of the US Eighth Army in December 1950 and then the UNC in April 1951. Ridgway describes the measures he implemented to reenergize and rebuild a dispirited army that was in mass retreat when he assumed command after Chinese intervention, as well as his role in restoring battle lines north of the 38th parallel and in the truce talks. His unvarnished analysis directs criticism at US military preparedness prior to the war and MacArthur's efforts to escalate the conflict. MacArthur (1964) has defended his decisions and strategic recommendations in his memoirs, while Truman (1956) and Secretary of State Dean Acheson (1969) make the case for limiting the war in theirs. General Mark W. Clark (1954), the UNC commander for the last 15 months of the war, shared MacArthur's views and harshly criticizes the decision to fight for a military stalemate. Washington, he insists, should have approved his proposals for aggressive action to defeat the Communists. Like Clark, General Omar N. Bradley (1983) in his autobiography covers more than just the Korean War, when he was chair of the JCS. William T. Y'Blood (1999) has edited the text of the diary of Lieutenant General George E. Stratemeyer, who commanded the US Far East Air Forces when the war began. Carefully footnoted, it presents solid explanations of personalities and events.

Fifteen members of the United Nations joined the United States in defending the ROK and a sizeable literature directly addresses their contributions but space limitations prevent discussion of these works in this chapter. A long list of overviews of the Korean War covers their participation but focus on the US military. Establishing an interpretive baseline, T. R. Fehrenbach (1963) in this early full-length study argues that the United States was not prepared militarily or mentally for fighting a limited war in Korea. Military intervention, however, was critical for preserving US credibility and prestige. Robert Leckie (1962), an experienced military historian, contributes a straightforward narrative history of the war, concluding that the stalemate was a victory because the invasion had been repelled and a major defeat inflicted on the Communists. David Rees (1964), a British historian, relies on sounder scholarship and research in documents available at the time to write what stood for two decades as the standard history of the conflict. His richly detailed account praises the United States for waging a limited war that defeated aggression. Joseph Goulden (1982) does not focus as exclusively on the military side of the war in his entertaining narrative targeted at a popular audience. Bevin Alexander (1986), an army historian during the war, provides sweeping coverage of events both in Washington and on the battlefield. While the United States won the first war against aggression, it lost the second because it failed to

reunite Korea or weaken China. Clay Blair (1987) provides a detailed account of the ground war that benefits from his military experience, but devotes only 73 of 976 pages to the last two years of the war.

There are a handful of superb overviews of the Korean War that cover military developments, but concentrate more on politics and diplomacy. These include Burton I. Kaufman (1986), Callum A. MacDonald (1986), and William Stueck (1995). Intended for a more popular audience, British historian Max Hastings (1987) highlights experiences of individual soldiers. He directly links Korea with the Vietnam War, attributing most of the military failures to the inability of US infantrymen to execute a strategy based on sophisticated military technology against a lightly equipped force in a divided country with a primitive economy. Rod Paschall (1995) has written a unique history examining the war through retelling the recollections of combatants of all ranks from private to general. A West Point graduate and experienced soldier, he also covers the activities of South Korean guerrillas in North Korea. Despite ending in a stalemate, Paschall insists that US fighting of the war was necessary because it strengthened both containment and collective defense. Edward F. Dolan (1998) targets military actions in his detailed treatment of each campaign and its strategic objective, as well as profiling many US commanders. D. M. Giangreco (1990) adds visual depth with his illustrated history that presents more than five hundred photographs on every aspect of the war. Two recent popular histories of the war offer contrasting judgments regarding the wisdom of US military involvement, but cover familiar ground. Richard Whelan (1990) criticizes the United States for risking another world war to save a corrupt and authoritarian regime. Replicating his typically sweeping style and vivid prose, John Toland (1991) praises the heroism of US soldiers in taking the first step toward winning the Cold War.

These military histories emphasize how after early defeats, US ground and air forces were primarily responsible for halting North Korea's advance, stabilizing defense lines along the Pusan Perimeter in the far southeastern corner of the peninsula. South Korean troops receive little credit for preventing conquest of the ROK, as well as much criticism for displaying neither will nor skill in weakly resisting the Communist advance. US soldiers and war correspondents regularly reported examples of the incompetence, corruption, and brutality of South Korean officers. Experiences while working with the Korean Augmentation to the US Army (KATUSA) program added further disillusionment. David C. Skaggs (1974) explains that these recruits showed little capacity to learn how to wage war from their American counterparts. Recent writers challenge this criticism as unfair, insisting that ROK army units often fought effectively under South Korean officers who were very professional. Allan R. Millett (2002) presents support for this judgment with insightful commentary connecting his presentation of episodic "war stories" from South Korean, American, and European participants in the conflict. John Kieh-chiang Oh (2004) denies that the ROK army collapsed when North Korea invaded, emphasizing how it delayed the advance toward Pusan, was responsible for the critical defense of Taegu, and led the offensive into North Korea. In his memoirs, General Paik Sun-yup (1992), an ROK corps and division commander,



blames South Korean military failures on US Army policies that provided poor equipment and limited its firepower. Kim Chum-kon (1980), a wartime division commander, also writes from the ROK army's perspective in South Korea's first comprehensive and detailed study of the war.

Access to primary source documents in South Korea, if permitted, would have strengthened all these studies of the Korean War. The ROK has sponsored, however, the publication of nine volumes of official histories that make limited use of these materials (War History Compilation Committee, Ministry of National Defense 1967–70) written in the Korean language. Five years later, it published a six-volume history that chronicles the military operations of United Nations forces in the Korean War (War History Compilation Committee 1975). More accessible is the Korean Institute of Military History's (2001) three-volume account that the University of Nebraska Press has published in the English language. The first volume provides a comprehensive view of the ROK army's performance from the period before North Korea's invasion to Chinese intervention. Relying on Soviet and Chinese documents and firsthand experiences, it stresses the valor and sacrifice of the ROK soldiers in the operations along the Naktong and then the counteroffensive north across the parallel. Volume 2 examines the actions of the ROK army to the start of the truce negotiations in July 1951. It provides a detailed description of the diplomatic and strategic background of Beijing's decision to intervene, as well as its painstaking military preparations and success in driving UNC forces out of North Korea. This volume concludes with the UNC counterattack in early 1951, the Chinese Spring Offensives, and the arrival at military stalemate in June 1951. The last volume covers the final two years of the war, incorporating limited coverage of the operations of the South Korean air force, navy, and marines. It also discusses the truce negotiations, ending with a summary of the Geneva Conference in April 1954.

Historians debate the performance of the ROK army but there is a consensus that Americans soldiers deserve most of the credit for preventing Communist conquest of South Korea. DPRK forces routed Task Force Smith at the Battle of Osan on July 5, 1950 in the first US–North Korean engagement, but scholars agree that this was mainly a consequence of the Americans being inadequately trained and armed with weapons incapable of halting Soviet-made tanks. There are excellent oral histories that retell the experiences of US soldiers during the retreat, counteroffensive, defeat, counterattack, and stalemate of the “accordion war” that followed. Donald Knox (1985, 1988) presents powerful depictions of the fighting in Korea in two volumes of personal recollections, the first from North Korea's attack to the end of 1950 and the second covering the period from the winter of 1951 to the completion of the war. Based on interviews with over 100 soldiers, Rudy Tomedi (1993) personalizes a “brutal, bruising, physical” war, presenting recollections documenting how Americans answered the call to duty, endured great personal hardship, and admired the Communist enemy, but had trouble understanding the reasons for the war. Louis Baldovi (2002), a rifleman with the US Army's 45th Infantry Division during the Korean War, interviewed 50 Hawaiian veterans, who recalled being targets of racism, as *haole* US

soldiers misidentified and ridiculed them as South Koreans. Of special value, their recollections include gritty images of battlefield horror and gruesome descriptions of treatment of prisoners. Most recently, William T. Bowers (2008) has edited a book focusing on the first two months of 1951, reprinting excerpts from interviews with participants retelling their experiences just hours or days after the event. It is the first in a projected three-volume study of US Army combat operations in the Korean War "at the lowest levels: battalion, company, platoon, squad, and individual soldiers."

US Army veterans of the Korean War have written several firsthand accounts. In his memoir, Addison Terry (2000), a lieutenant with the 27th Infantry "Wolfhounds," describes how hungry and sleep-deprived US soldiers in poorly equipped and under strength units halted the North Korean invasion. He blames civilian bureaucrats for creating these deficiencies. Sherman W. Pratt (1992) provides an infantry company commander's insightful perspective in his detailed coverage of the war's most decisive battles. A 1949 graduate of West Point, Harry J. Maihafer (1993) retells his experiences as an armored officer and later an infantry platoon commander. This provides a narrative framework to relate personal recollections of his classmates that explain how they relied on valor and leadership to overcome prewar atrophy of the military and national complacency. Howard Matthias (1992), a young combat platoon leader, discusses in detail the life of his foot soldiers on daily patrols and in the trenches and bunkers of Korea's mountains. Providing a platoon sergeant's perspective, Boris R. Sprioff (1998) describes the human suffering he witnessed while fighting during the first 18 months of the war. Platoon leader John A. Sullivan (1991) provides a firsthand account of intense fighting later in the war, especially close combat at night. Harshly critical of the military bureaucracy, he characterizes his superiors in the 7th Division as incompetent and venal. William D. Dannenmaier (1999), a radioman after December 1952 with the 15th Infantry, speaks for the common soldier, describing his exhaustion and horror after battle, as well as frustration at never seeing a commander or receiving promised leave. While Deneil and Denzil Batson (1999) have written another account relating the experiences of US combat infantrymen in Korea, Robert I. Channon (1993) focuses on the Third Airborne Ranger Company during the first year of the war.

Unlike Vietnam, the United States deployed National Guard units in Korea after China's intervention placed new demands for manpower on an already over-extended US Army. Lewis Sorely (1993) argues without providing evidence that despite inferior equipment, limited funding, and deficiencies in strength and training, US Reserve and National Guard units "played a major role in the Korean War." He contends that failure in Vietnam to deploy these forces contributed to popular acceptance of defeat. William Berebitsky and Herbert Temple, Jr. (1996) have written a popular history that highlights the service in Korea of the 43 National Guard units, including the 40th and 45th Infantry Divisions, 9 artillery battalions, and many support units. Relying mainly on interviews, they document insufficient training, deployment of underage soldiers, and hostility from regulars, as well as US Army seizure of equipment without replacement. William M. Donnelly (2001) examines the performance of 138,600 National Guardsmen

during the Korean War, as well as describing how their service informed American communities about the costs of the conflict. He discusses not just divisions that critically reinforced the US Eighth Army in 1951, but the contributions from the other units that comprised 86 percent of the total mobilization. In a more focused study, Donnelly (2000) praises the performance of Oklahoma's 45th Infantry. When it arrived in December 1951, the conflict had settled into positional warfare that the US Army's training program had not readied the "Thunderbirds" to fight. Donald C. Harrison (1989) covers the contributions of Virginia's National Guard. In a summary article, Peter Karsten (1966) assesses the performance of citizen soldiers in the Korean War as more a triumph than a disaster.

A source of controversy in the military history of the Korean War has been the performance of African American soldiers. War correspondents covering North Korea's advance to the Pusan Perimeter in the summer of 1950 reported that the all-black US 24th Infantry Regiment had retreated without a fight and was guilty of cowardice. These charges later became part of the first official military histories of the conflict. Charles M. Bussey (1991), an African American officer in the regiment, vigorously challenges this view, describing the heroism of his comrades in July at the town of Yechon where they registered the first important US Army victory in Korea. Lyle Rishell (1993), a white officer in the 24th Infantry Regiment, describes the daily actions of his African American platoon during the first year of the war. He relates examples of honor, fear, and fighting spirit in fierce combat, concluding that his troops fought well in nearly constant frontline action. William T. Bowers, William M. Hammond, and George L. MacGarrigle (1996), authors of a full history of the 24th Infantry Regiment in Korea, explain how this unit suffered from the same deficiencies as other units but also racial prejudice during the retreat to the Pusan Perimeter. Many African American soldiers fought heroically, but the authors attribute battlefield failures to racist attitudes and unwise policies in the US Army. Alan L. Gropman (1993) explains how the Korean War hastened integration after US military leaders realized that without African American reinforcement of under strength white units, the US Army faced defeat. This was partially a consequence of defects in the US conscription system that George Q. Flynn (1988) exposes as poorly staffed, allowing many young men to avoid service with a series of deferments.

Bussey (1991) discusses persistent racism existing in the military at that time, blaming it for denying him a Congressional Medal of Honor that was awarded to 131 other men in the Korean War. Edward F. Murphy (1997) describes the actions of these recipients, covering details for each hero chronologically in the context of the conflict. Kenneth N. Jordan, Jr. (1995) presents all 131 Medal of Honor citations plus official communiqués and newspaper accounts of various battles related to each award. Certainly not as heroic, the easily ignored contributions of combat service support soldiers were vital for the success of US military operations in the Korean War. John G. Westover (1955), in the first volume of the *U.S. Army in Action Series*, provides personal perspectives based on the results of a collection of interviews with members of all the arms and services of the US Army other than Infantry, Artillery, and Armor. His oral history gives snapshots of service and

support activities in Korea at the small unit level. By contrast, Terrence J. Gough (1987) in the official history describes the overall difficulties that the US Army encountered and resolved in supplying without much prior planning the large forces it fielded in Korea. James A. Huston (1989) has written a conventional history of logistics in the US Army during the conflict, explaining how it delivered a troop buildup of nearly 100,000 men and provided two million tons of supplies before and during defense of the Pusan Perimeter. D. Clayton James and Anne S. Wells (1993) elaborate further on Huston's discussion of how the United States fought in Korea with leftover supplies and equipment from World War II, as well as recycled strategic and tactical doctrines.

Providing medical treatment for injured American soldiers in the field at Mobile Army Surgical Hospital (MASH) units was another important aspect of support during the Korean War. Alfred E. Cowdrey (1987) has written the official history of the tireless efforts of US Army doctors, nurses, and enlisted medics to save lives, repair wounds, and treat disease. He describes the compassionate treatment they gave both UNC and enemy soldiers despite having to work in an inhospitable and dangerous environment. Otto F. Apel, Jr., and Pat Apel (1998), the former a MASH surgeon in Korea, provide personal perspective, describing the irreverent attitudes of medical personnel (partially confirming later characterizations in the popular television series), eccentric culture, and emergency medical care innovations in these MASH units. Adding insight, Dorothy G. Horwitz (1997) reprints the daily letters she exchanged with her husband, a US Army surgeon who arrived in Korea in May 1952. Discussing not only female nurses in the US Army, Navy and Air Force, Linda Witt, Judith Bellafaire, Britta Granrud, and Mary Jo Binker (2005) describe the experiences of women serving in other military capacities during the Korean War, as well as those who worked overseas in the Red Cross, USO, and other nongovernmental organizations that supported US military personnel. Mary Anne Schofield (2003–4) assesses what American women have written about the Korean War, arguing that the unpopularity of the conflict left male soldiers incapable of recording their experiences. War correspondent Marguerite Higgins and other female authors told the story for them, inscribing and transcribing the male war experience.

Witnessing atrocities contributed to the unwillingness of many American Korean War veterans to discuss their experiences then and thereafter. Jon Halliday and Bruce Cumings (1988) describe examples of Korean soldiers on both sides committing horrific acts of brutality against civilians suspected of sympathizing with the enemy, and present evidence of US atrocities. One example became notorious when Charles J. Hanley, Sang-Hun Choe, and Martha Mendoza (2001) published a full-length account of how US soldiers had killed innocent South Koreans on July 26, 1950 at a bridge near the village of No Gun Ri. Their original Associated Press story in December 1999, which won the 2000 Pulitzer Prize, reported that American troops had fired on a large group of refugees without provocation and murdered between 200 and 400 civilians. To discredit these accusations, Robert L. Bateman (2002) relies on interviews with veterans and careful research in government documents. His recreation describes how US troops fired in self-defense

on refugees after misdirected mortar rounds to halt their advance landed on the group and killed roughly 25 people. According to Sahr Conway-Lanz (2005), American soldiers at No Gun Ri and elsewhere acted on an informal, but illegal, understanding authorizing use of lethal force to stop Korean civilians outside a two-hour window allowing movement under police supervision. Philip D. Chinnery (2001) uses records declassified to investigate No Gun Ri to examine over 1,600 other incidents, providing evidence that the North Koreans and Chinese committed numerous atrocities against UNC soldiers. While the Communists would escape punishment for these war crimes, accusations against US soldiers led to 22 trials and 11 convictions.

Histories of the air war in Korea are not as plentiful as accounts of US Army operations. Conrad C. Crane (2000a) explains the excessive confidence that American leaders had in the efficacy of its airpower strategy in the best of these studies. Because the US Air Force believed that its operations produced the armistice, he argues, most of the lessons about airpower in limited wars were forgotten until being relearned at high cost in Vietnam. Crane's study counters the argument in the dated anthology edited by James T. Stewart (1957) that airpower was decisive in the Korean War. Robert Jackson (1973) repeats this opinion in his popular, but detailed, study of the Korean air war. Larry Davis (1978) describes aerial combat in MiG Alley. Two other useful overviews are Jack C. Nichols and Warren E. Thompson (1991) and Jerry Scutts (1982). Former US Air Force historian Richard P. Hallion (1986) has written an excellent study on the US naval air support system in Korea. Judging the Korean conflict a watershed in the evolution of carrier air doctrine, he describes how US Navy and Marine Corps pilots flew both the obsolete propeller and then new jet warplanes to help defend strategic UNC positions. In a later article, Hallion (1993) avows that Korea rehabilitated carrier aviation, doubled the number of US Navy pilots who then were flying jets, put nuclear weapons on navy planes, and made naval air operations a vital and viable element in US defense plans. John R. Bruning (1999) also summarizes US Air Force and Navy operations, but his focus is on the experiences of the pilots, rather than strategy and tactics. John Darrell Sherwood (1996) achieves the same goals in his study of US Air Force pilots. While Douglas Evans (1984) offers insights about jet engagements in his firsthand account, Robert F. Dorr and Warren E. Thompson (1994) have contributed a visual record, presenting a pictorial history from the personal photo archives of Korean War veterans.

There are a number of books that assess the performance of specific aircraft in the Korean War. Beginning in World War II, Barrett Tillman (1979) focuses his study on the F4U Corsair, describing how this airplane became a legend. It flew day or night in Korea on both combat and reconnaissance missions, taking off either from carriers or land. David R. McLaren (1999) discusses the F-51 Mustang, among the most famous fighters built during the conflict, that four air forces – United States, the ROK, Australia, and South Africa – operating under the United Nations flag flew in Korea. This fighter dropped more napalm and fired more rockets than any other aircraft during the Korean War, as well as sustaining the highest number of losses. Warren E. Thompson (1999b) explains how

in June 1950, the F-80 Shooting Star was the US Air Force's standard fighter in East Asia. Because it showed a lack of endurance in contesting North Korean aircraft, the United States rushed 145 F-51 Mustangs to Korea and the fighter stayed in operation until the armistice. Former US Air Force (USAF) pilot Kenneth P. Werrell (2005) has written the best of these works on aircraft, describing what he labels as the one clear US victory of the Korean War – the jet fighter battle between the initially superior MiG-15 and the F-86. The USAF won air superiority in Korea because of the superior skill and aggressiveness of US pilots. Werrell also documents intentional violations of orders in engaging and destroying MiGs over China. Warren E. Thompson (1999a), in a study of all US fighters in the Korean War, examines the performance of the Mustang, Starfire, Shooting Star, Sabre, Tigercat, Panther, Corsair, Banshee, and Thunderjet.

Werrell's (2005) study provides profiles of US air aces in the Korean War, but Robert F. Dorr, Jon Lake, and Warren Thompson (1995) focus exclusively on their experiences and accomplishments, as well as examining in detail the specifications and markings of the planes they flew. Both writers also devote attention to North Korea's and China's air forces and a few of their leading pilots. Jennie Ethell Chancey and William R. Forstchen (2000) have edited a useful oral history of combat pilots of the Korean War. Suspected after the conflict ended and now confirmed, many dueled with Soviet pilots. Bruning's (1999) study, mentioned earlier, builds on Jon Halliday's (1993) important article that relies on interviews with Soviet veterans to provide statistics on levels of commitment, casualties, and downed planes. Both sides disguised evidence of Soviet involvement to prevent escalation of the war. Providing more coverage of these US–Soviet engagements, G. G. O'Rourke and E. T. Wooldridge (1998) describe the night skirmishes between the US Navy-Marine Skyknights – the jet-powered F3Ds – and their Communist opponents. O'Rourke relates how the team of Skyknights that he commanded – the US Navy's only jet night fighter squadron to see combat in the war – used darkness as an advantage against its adversary. Unpolished and anecdotal, John Moore (1997) describes his personal experiences during two tours of duty flying jets in Korea as a US Navy combat pilot and later as an experimental test pilot. Richard C. Kirkland (1999), in his collection of stories, begins in World War II with the encounters he and his fellow airmen had with some of the American aces of the era. He then shifts to describing his important and instructive experiences during the Korean War rescuing US soldiers and pilots in the world's first military helicopters.

Malcolm W. Cagle and Frank A. Manson (1957) have written the official history of the naval war in Korea describing operations and presenting detailed information on issues ranging from tactics to equipment. They argue convincingly that at a moment early in the Cold War and in a limited war like Korea control of the sea had to be maintained to achieve victory. In 1999 the Naval Historical Foundation contracted for and later published seven short reexaminations of select aspects of the war which were later combined in a single volume (Marolda 2007). As for firsthand accounts, Max Miller (1951), a wartime lieutenant commander, reports his experiences during the first year of the naval war. He describes how the war in



Korea surprised the US Navy, creating initial difficulties in providing firepower and supplies to support ground troops. Charles F. Cole (1995) records the operations of the USS *Ozbourn* during the destroyer's first tour in Korea, describing the close personal bonds that developed among crewmen. Cole, a newly commissioned US Navy ROTC ensign on the ship at the time, points to dependence on naval reservists as a prime example of how the United States struggled to equip and man warships to support land troops and implement the blockade. James Alexander (1996) relates his experiences also serving on a destroyer during the war. Providing a different perspective, Jack Sauter (1995) writes about his service as an aviation electronics technician on board the USS *Midway* and the USS *Champlain* during the Korean War. Manning radios and radar, this aircrewman flew 21 early warning and anti-submarine missions from the rear seat of a Douglas Skyraider.

Examinations of unconventional warfare operations during the Korean War are partial and uneven. Michael E. Haas (2000), a retired US Army officer, describes special operations that the US services conducted to foment rebellion and subversion behind enemy lines. The US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) enlisted large numbers of South Korean infiltrators to conduct covert operations and raids to provide cover for US intelligence collection activities in North Korea that Haas sees as foolish. Ben S. Malcom (1996) was one of the US intelligence officers who led these covert operations deep inside North Korea. He relates his experiences leading South Koreans based on islands near the Chinese–Korean border, who replaced their first code-name, “Donkeys,” with “White Tigers.” Only 4,000 of 22,000 partisans who operated behind enemy lines escaped North Korea. Ed Evanhoe (1995), who served in the US Eighth Army's G-3 Miscellaneous Group, chronicles special operations during the Korean War, including intelligence gathering, raids, sabotage, guerrilla forays, and prisoner of war (POW) rescues. Combining recollections and research, he describes successes and failures, portraying the American, British, and ROK soldiers involved as thrill seekers who used unorthodox methods and tactics. In a popular account, William B. Breuer (1996) tells stories about commando operations to assassinate a North Korean general. Relying on memories of participants, John B. Dwyer (1998) covers the activities of US amphibious special warfare units during World War II and later in the Korean War. He concentrates on describing heroic feats in operations that ranged from secret joint military–CIA missions to the training and insertion of Korean commandos for a secret war in North Korea.

US intelligence efforts have been the target of criticism because North Korea's attack came as a complete surprise. Matthew M. Aid (1999) identifies as the principal reason for the failure the decrepit state of the American intelligence community in East Asia in June 1950. He provides evidence not only of poor coordination and collection of intelligence, but also of flawed processing, analysis, and reporting practices and procedures as well. Thoroughly unprepared, the immediate US reaction was to dispatch Task Force Smith from Japan to block the Communist drive toward Pusan. Roy Flint (1986) and Michael Cannon (1988) describe how the 406 US troops of the force delayed twice that number of North Koreans for seven hours at the Battle of Osan suffering 150 casualties to approximately 42 for the enemy.

Many observers at the time, including MacArthur, did not consider surprise to be a satisfactory explanation for the US military reverses that followed. By July 20, the Korean People's Army (KPA) had shattered five US battalions and moved 100 miles south of Seoul, the ROK's capital. On July 26, MacArthur traveled to Korea and told Lieutenant General Walton H. Walker, commander of the US Eighth Army, that he would not tolerate further retreat. Walker then issued his famous "stand or die" order, but the KPA continued to advance. Then and later, Walker would receive blame for this series of battlefield defeats. But Robert A. Cole (2003–4) instead faults MacArthur for sending into battle poorly trained and armed soldiers with no sense of purpose and low morale. Uzal W. Ent (2003–4), a retired US Army brigadier general, concurs, arguing that Walker was a strong and determined leader who won "the most important campaign of the entire war." Ent (1996) and Edwin P. Hoyt (1984a), a popular historian, have written the only non-official book-length histories that focus exclusively on the defense of the Pusan Perimeter, where UN forces finally stabilized battle lines during the first week of August.

Walker's US Eighth Army that defended the Pusan Perimeter consisted of the 1st Cavalry and the 2nd, 24th, and 25th Infantry Divisions. Early in August, the 1st US Marine Brigade arrived and soon was fighting fiercely to defend its section of the front. Andrew Geer (1952) has written a full history of the US Marines in Korea, explaining that while they came reasonably late to the battle, their arrival boosted morale and contributed to accelerating the growing UNC advantage in manpower. On August 7, the Eighth Army staged its first counterattack. By then, MacArthur had devised a plan for an amphibious landing behind enemy lines at the port of Inchon on the northwest coast, roughly 20 miles west of Seoul. Walt Sheldon (1968), in his detailed study of the landing, explains US military leaders in Washington raised strong objections, not least because it would require redeployment of troops from Japan. Dangerous conditions at the landing site included shifting tides, mud flats, and seawalls, creating great risk for a military debacle. But in late August, MacArthur at a meeting in Tokyo convinced skeptical representatives of the JCS that surprise alone guaranteed success. Controversy then swirled around the operation after MacArthur appointed Major General Edward M. Almond, his chief of staff, to command the newly formed X Corps that would land at Inchon. Not only would this unit operate separately from Walker's Eighth Army, but along with the 7th US Army Division, Almond would command the 1st US Marines. Shelby L. Stanton (1989), in his excellent military history of the X Corps, stresses the personal dislike that Almond, who he admires, and Major General Oliver P. Smith, the US Marine commander, had for each other and how this undermined essential cooperation between the two units.

MacArthur's Inchon Landing on September 15 was a spectacular success that reversed the course of the Korean War. It allowed Walker's forces to break out of the Pusan Perimeter and move north to join with the X Corps in liberating Seoul. Robert D. Heinl (1968), a US Marine colonel who participated in these operations, has written an authoritative study of arguably the most important military campaign of the Korean War, asserting that his comrades overcame government indecision and inter-service bickering to achieve victory. Both Sheldon (1968) and

British historian Michael Langley (1979), however, assign near exclusive credit for the success at Inchon to MacArthur. Since the landing – labeled “Operation Common Knowledge” in press reports at the time – was no secret, they insist, this military triumph was the direct result of the superior planning, leadership, courage, determination, and luck of MacArthur. While many historians are less effusive in their praise for the general, Russel H. S. Stolfi (2004) focuses his critique on the slow US advance on Seoul. Consuming 11 days, this measured operation, he argues, was an operational disaster because it gave the KPA the chance to escape destruction. Nevertheless, Martin Lichterman (1963) and other writers have asserted that the Inchon Landing created the momentum and surge of optimism motivating the US decision to stage a military offensive across the 38th parallel in pursuit of reunification. For Walter LaFeber (1974) and Barton J. Bernstein (1977), however, a more purposeful motivation was scoring a political victory in the Cold War. James I. Matray (1979) not only agrees, but dates Truman’s decision to cross the parallel a month before the Inchon Landing.

Following Inchon, US military leaders did not intrude on MacArthur’s conduct of the war, allowing the general to interpret his ambiguous instructions as he saw fit. For example, they did not object when MacArthur created a divided command. His naval redeployment of the X Corps to Wonsan on the northeast coast of Korea required nearly a month to complete, drawing criticism from later historians. Meanwhile, the US Eighth Army continued its slow advance northward after occupying Pyongyang on October 19. Geer (1952) and many other writers have pointed to this strategy as contradicting long held principles of war, but MacArthur (1964) later insisted that the Taebaek Mountains created communication problems and de facto separation. These circumstances meant that UNC units were ignorant of each other’s situation as they moved northward. Edwin P. Hoyt (1984b) relies on published sources to provide a popular account of the advance of UNC forces toward China’s border. He and James McGovern (1972) harshly criticize MacArthur’s offensive, charging that his reckless pursuit of the retreating KPA ignored the danger of Chinese intervention. Despite a military clash with Chinese forces earlier in the month, on November 24 MacArthur launched his “Home by Christmas Offensive” with US troops in the vanguard. Initially, there was little resistance, but two days later, the Chinese counterattacked in force. There is an extensive literature that examines the reasons for the decision of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to join the fighting in the Korean War, but consideration of it falls beyond the scope of this chapter.

Critics claim that MacArthur failed to anticipate Chinese intervention because he relied on his own inept intelligence estimates rather than the CIA. Eliot A. Cohen (1990) shows, however, that the CIA’s position on this question was changing constantly, while consistently downplaying the possibility and minimizing Chinese capabilities. Accounts of the US response to China’s entry are numerous. Roy E. Appleman has written four volumes that provide comprehensive and complete coverage of military developments in Korea from November 1950 to April 1951. In *Disaster in Korea* (1989), he describes the UNC retreat in north-west Korea, rejecting the consensus that the Chinese exploited the gap between

the US Eighth Army and X Corps. Rather, Appleman blames Walker for issuing orders that encouraged what US soldiers called “Bug Out Fever.” In a very early account, S. L. A. Marshall (1953), a US Army officer and journalist, describes the longest military retreat in American history. Even though the US Eighth Army basically disintegrated, he still lauds the performance of American soldiers. By contrast, Edwin P. Hoyt (1990) treats sympathetically the Chinese decision to intervene, describing the provocative actions of MacArthur and US officials in Washington. Far less reliable than Appleman’s account, his study is often simplistic and at times confused in covering battlefield action and high-level policy making in the winter of 1950 and 1951. Richard T. Ruetten (1967) examines MacArthur’s claim then and later that the offensive was a “reconnaissance in force.” Questioning the logic of sending his entire army to probe the intentions of the Chinese, he rejects the general’s argument that he had sprung China’s trap, judging his explanations as rationalizations for his strategic blunder.

There are numerous military histories covering events at the Changgin (Chosin) Reservoir. Relying extensively on interviews with veterans, Appleman (1987a) recounts the neglected story of the 7th US Infantry Division in its defense of the east flank of the 1st Marine Division in December 1950. Under constant Communist attack and running out of ammunition, the courageous efforts of these American soldiers, he argues, was decisive in helping the US Marines to escape from Chosin. In a volume titled *Escaping the Trap*, Appleman (1987b) blames MacArthur’s division of his forces for placing the X Corps in a perilous situation, describing how it avoided annihilation. Martin Russ (1999), a US Marine wounded in Korea, offers a contrary opinion in this detailed study that relies on the recollections of participants. The 1st US Marine Division, he argues, entered a trap at Chosin where 12,000 Americans fought 60,000 Chinese because of MacArthur’s arrogance, US Army incompetence, and Chinese military acumen. Unit cohesion, individual courage, and skillful leadership allowed the US Marines to lead US Army soldiers in breaking out of the encirclement and reaching the northeast coast of North Korea for evacuation, carrying most of their wounded and many of their dead with them. Offering different numbers of combatants, Berry Craig (1989) portrays as heroic the 15,000 American soldiers that for two weeks fought 120,000 Chinese troops at the Chosin Reservoir. He presents revealing information in personal anecdotes and recollections, providing as well the biographies of 1,200 veterans who survived. Eric M. Hammel (1981) focuses less directly on Chosin, covering not only that campaign, but also describing the operations of US Marine forces throughout the Korean War.

In his military history of X Corps, Stanton (1989) covers the amphibious invasion at Inchon, the march to the Yalu, and the retreat from the Chosin Reservoir. Glenn C. Cowart (1992) has written a brief, but well-researched account of the evacuation of US forces at Hungnam in December 1950, emphasizing the adverse impact of bad weather on military operations. If Chinese forces had destroyed the X Corps, he contends, the United States might have been compelled to abandon South Korea. There are a couple of firsthand accounts that add insights on events at Chosin and Hungnam. Joseph R. Owen (1996), who served as a lieutenant in

a marine rifle company deployed in Korea early in the war, relates his combat experiences at the Chosin Reservoir, including good descriptions of enemy night assaults and patrols through Chinese lines. Anson Chang and Charles J. Hilton (1993) provide one of few accounts of 7th Division US soldiers at Chosin. Emilio Aguirre (1959), another US Marine, recalls his experiences fighting in Korea from the landing at Inchon through the Chosin campaign, while Peter R. Senich (1993) discusses his service as a US Marine Corps scout and sniper first in World War II and then in Korea. Among the first US Marines to fight in Korea, Joseph A. Saluzzi (1993), a corporal wounded in September 1950, describes his close combat encounters with the enemy. Intended for entertainment rather than enlightenment, C. S. Crawford (1998) contributes a collection of anecdotes based on his observations as a forward observer in a mortar company. Rather than focusing on the battlefield, he concentrates in his memoir on describing the irreverent behavior of US Marines when not engaged with the enemy, such as making midnight requisitions from US Army depots.

War correspondents who accompanied US soldiers reported on this shocking reversal of American military fortunes in the Korean War. Jim Wilson (1988), then photo editor for the *Los Angeles Times*, has written a simplistic and generalized version of the Chosin campaign that relies on interviews with veterans. Glowing in its treatment of the US Marine operations, the account almost ignores the role of US Army forces. British journalist Reginald Thompson (1951), who personally witnessed the Inchon Landing, criticizes the US Marines for excessive violence and brutality during the operation. For him, the way these Americans waged war confirmed, as Paul Edwards writes, that the United States was fighting *in* Korea, but not *for* Korea. E. J. Kahn, Jr. (1952), a reporter for the *New Yorker*, spoke with soldiers and civilians during his tour of South Korea from April to June 1951. He presents their reactions to the war, as well as offering judgments about the attitudes and performance of US military leaders. Marguerite Higgins (1951) gained fame with her firsthand battlefield reports from Korea. In a dramatic account of what she witnessed, she blames the inferior fighting ability of US Army forces for the unnecessary retreat early in the war. Higgins came ashore at Inchon with US Marines who she praises, while MacArthur receives sharp criticism. Robert J. Dvorchak (2000) has written a history of writers and photographers of the American press who covered the conflict from the front lines. Heavily illustrated, his study describes the extraordinary effort required to keep people on the home front informed about the Korean War.

Few American military leaders have attracted the attention of biographers more than General Douglas MacArthur. There is neither reason nor space to consider in this chapter accounts that cover his entire career. But a handful of works concentrate on the general's performance and eventual recall in the Korean War. In the third volume of his authoritative biography, D. Clayton James (1985) provides a sympathetic treatment of MacArthur's conduct of the war, although he records how the general regularly ignored, exceeded, or violated instructions from the JCS. By contrast, Stanley Weintraub (2000) portrays MacArthur as a duplicitous, lying self-promoter, who as commander of the UNC was uninformed, indecisive,

and incompetent. Michael Schaller (1989) agrees, finding that the general's reputation exceeded his achievements in Korea, as well as criticizing his mixing of partisan politics and military affairs. Trumbull Higgins (1960) interprets the clash between MacArthur and the Truman administration over conduct of the conflict as a consequence of waging a limited war that created strains in the relationship between military and civilian command. Truman's decision to recall MacArthur in April 1951 was, Higgins explains, a result of a fundamental disagreement on military strategy. John W. Spanier (1959) echoes this opinion, but insists that Truman's action was a necessity to ensure civilian control over the military. Using sources unavailable to Spanier, Schaller (1989) shows how preparations to make atomic weapons available for use in Korea motivated Truman to act because he and his civilian and military advisors feared MacArthur would provoke an incident to widen the war. Weintraub (2000) concurs, but insists that the general engineered his dismissal to create public outrage and gain election as president. Michael D. Pearlman (2008) basically affirms the conclusions of Higgins and Spanier, but places the Truman-MacArthur relationship in the even broader context of administration politics, US relations with America's European allies, and a longstanding clash between the President and general over policy toward Nationalist China.

Certainly there was evidence that MacArthur would not be a cautious steward of atomic weapons. Submitted in late November, his "Plan for Victory" in the Korean War called for blockading China's coast, bombing military installations in Manchuria, using Chinese Nationalist forces in Korea, and launching a Nationalist attack on the mainland. Truman decided not to implement these recommendations, choosing instead to seek an armistice recognizing a more defensible border just north of the parallel. Rejecting the idea of fighting for a tie, MacArthur publicly criticized this strategy, setting the stage for his recall. During Senate hearings on MacArthur's firing, members of the JCS in their testimony were unanimous in defense of the need to limit the war to Korea. General Maxwell D. Taylor (1972), who was US Eighth Army commander when the Korean War ended, later provided a full explanation and justification for not escalating the war, focusing especially on the decision not to use nuclear weapons. By then, many writers were presenting positive assessments of the efficacy of limited war and praising Truman for applying this strategy in Korea. Bernard Brodie (1973), for example, establishes the relationship between war and politics in his examination of the conflicts to that point in the twentieth century, focusing his analysis in the second half of his study on Korea. Morton H. Halperin (1978) utilizes theoretical approaches in combination with historical studies of the limited war in Korea and other local conflicts to recommend this type of warfare as a means to settle international disputes. Emphasizing the restricted utility of nuclear weapons, Daniel Calingaert (1988) shows how a strategy of limited war alone would allow Truman to achieve his goal of restoring the prewar status quo in Korea.

Despite later denials, however, neither Truman nor his advisors ever completely embraced limited war as the US strategy in Korea. In truth, the JCS seriously thought about expanding the war after Chinese military intervention, endorsing implementation of MacArthur's recommendations prior to receiving favorable



reports from the battlefield late in December. By spring 1951, Truman had approved the first two proposals if UNC forces faced annihilation or China expanded the war beyond Korea, while Conrad Crane (2000b) documents the US military's planning for the possible use of nuclear weapons. Rosemary Foot (1985) demonstrates that the president actually had been considering using nuclear weapons since the early days of the fighting. With US forces in retreat in mid-December, Truman's comment at a press conference about possible use of atomic weapons to halt the Chinese offensive caused US allies to fear another world war was near. Barton J. Bernstein (1981) argues that the Truman administration at that moment was giving serious thought to using the atomic bomb in Manchuria. Based on thorough research in primary documents, Roger V. Dingman (1988–9) explains how the Truman administration was considering the use of atomic weapons from the moment the Korean War began until it left office. Roger M. Anders (1988) confirms that the JCS persuaded Truman in April 1951 to secure the transfer of nine atomic bombs from the custody of the Atomic Energy Commission to the US Air Force. Sean L. Malloy (2003–4) shows how pressure to break the battlefield stalemate caused Truman to seriously consider nuclear options, but he never could find a way to transform this power into effective diplomatic leverage. Moreover, there were no suitable targets left in North Korea.

Truman never faced the necessity to use atomic weapons because Lieutenant General Matthew B. Ridgway, who became US Eighth Army commander after Walker died in a freak jeep accident in December 1950, was able to restore the capacity of US soldiers to fight effectively. By early 1951, the UNC halted China's advance southward, making it possible for Washington to implement its preference for fighting a limited war in Korea. Restoration of a unified command with the US Eighth Army's absorption of the X Corps contributed to this success. Roy E. Appleman (1990) provides coverage of the military engagements from January to April 1951, relying on archival materials and interviews with Ridgway. Edwin P. Hoyt (1985) describes the success of UNC units in implementing Ridgway's strategy of inflicting maximum punishment on Chinese forces, rather than recapturing territory. Kenneth E. Hamburger (2003) has written an excellent study that examines the key Battles of Twin Tunnels and Chip'yong-ni in February 1951. The first engagements in which UNC troops defeated Chinese forces, he attributes the outcome to proper equipment and effective leadership with airpower providing "the margin of victory." Relying extensively on oral histories and interviews with veterans, Hamburger writes superb personal profiles and skillfully utilizes anecdotal information. To the west at Osan, Albert Kapikian (2001) describes how on February 7, 1951 Captain Lewis L. Millet led soldiers from the 25th US Infantry Division against Chinese forces in occupying a hill. What made this engagement remarkable was that Millet required his comrades to advance with fixed bayonets, screaming "blood curdling war hoops like Apache Indians" and yelling "She-lie sa-ni" (I'm going to kill you with a bayonet!).

By March 1951, UNC counterattacks in Ridgway's Operations Ripper and Killer had pushed the Chinese to defensive positions just north of the parallel. Two months later, UNC forces successfully repulsed the second of two massive

Chinese Communist offensives. A battlefield stalemate then emerged that persuaded the belligerents – with Soviet encouragement – to open negotiations for an armistice in July at Kaesong. US leaders insisted on confining discussions to military matters, thus preventing the PRC from exploiting the talks to gain admission to the United Nations or control over Taiwan. As a consequence, both sides appointed military officers, rather than diplomats, as main negotiators, reducing prospects for flexibility and compromise. Donald W. Boose, Jr. (2000) provides a succinct and balanced description of the armistice talks, attributing the failure to achieve a quick armistice to the lack of direct diplomatic contact between the main belligerents, preconceptions derived from cultural differences, domestic politics on both sides, the isolation and austerity of the conference site, but most important the intensity of clashing national interests. North Korea and China created an acrimonious atmosphere at the outset with efforts to score propaganda points, but the United States raised the first major roadblock when it proposed a demilitarized zone deep in North Korea. Nevertheless, there was relatively rapid progress in resolving all but one of the agenda items. The delegates agreed that the demilitarized zone would follow the line of battle, while adopting inspection procedures to enforce the truce. After approving a postwar political conference to discuss withdrawal of foreign troops, a tradeoff settled disputes on airfield rehabilitation and members of a neutral supervisory commission.

Vice Admiral C. Turner Joy (1955), the chief UNC negotiator until May 1952, has written his own account of the talks in which he condemns his Communist counterparts for stalling and stubbornness in preventing a settlement. He also criticizes the Truman administration for allowing the enemy to gain concessions at the truce table that they could not win on the battlefield. Allen E. Goodman (1978) has carefully edited a printed version of the diary Joy kept at the negotiations that records his unhappy experiences in intricate detail. William H. Vatcher, Jr. (1958), the UNC psychological warfare advisor in Korea, reinforces Joy's assessment, as well as blaming Washington for imposing limits both on the negotiators and on the battlefield that prevented an early settlement and unnecessarily prolonged the war. By contrast, Rosemary Foot (1990) emphasizes the concessions of the Communists, characterizing the United States as truculent because, accustomed to total victory, it did not want to negotiate with an enemy it could not defeat militarily. Sydney D. Bailey (1992) in his coverage of the truce talks argues that it was a mistake to place military leaders in charge of the negotiations because they thought "courtesy was synonymous with concessions and weakness." Furthermore, the United States did not have direct diplomatic access to the Chinese or North Koreans and had to resort to intermediaries that American leaders considered untrustworthy or inept. He criticizes the UNC's preference at the armistice talks for delivering ultimatums, as well as faulting the United States for ignoring the United Nations both in the conduct of military operations and the peace negotiations in Korea.

Events at the truce talks influenced how US civilian and military leaders made decisions about conducting the war. For example, after the UNC delegation protested when Chinese forces marched into the neutrality zone at Kaesong, the Communists, to save face, adjourned the talks after manufacturing evidence of a US plane

attack near the conference site. In response, US B-29 bombers carried out mock atomic bombing test runs over North Korea in September and October 1951 to intimidate and punish the Communist negotiators. Following suit, the Chinese government early in 1952 began publicizing charges that the United States was waging bacteriological warfare in Korea. Secretary of State Dean Acheson denied these claims and demanded an international investigation, but North Korea and China stymied International Red Cross efforts to do so. After examining the issue, both John Gittings (1975) and Conrad C. Crane (2002) endorse as accurate the US denial of Communist charges about the UNC's alleged use of both biological and chemical warfare. Stephen Endicott and Edward Hagerman (1998), by contrast, point to evidence of American guilt. But Kathryn Weathersby (1998) relies on declassified Soviet and Chinese documents to show that these Chinese charges were false, as well as Communist efforts to hide their prevarication. Milton Leitenberg (1998) references Soviet documents to reveal that in 1953, Moscow told its Korean and Chinese allies to cease making unsubstantiated accusations about germ warfare.

Despite intense mutual acrimony, negotiators would have signed an armistice ten months after the talks began had they not deadlocked over disposition of prisoners of war (POWs). Truman refused to authorize return of Communist prisoners to China and North Korea against their will. His stand on voluntary repatriation not only prolonged the fighting in Korea, but it kept American POWs incarcerated for more than one additional year. The highest-ranking UNC prisoner was Major General William F. Dean (1954), who the KPA captured in July 1950 at Taejon and held captive until September 1953. His account describes the confusion of his unprepared soldiers in fighting the enemy and the brutal treatment causing psychological trauma for him in captivity. Raymond B. Lech (2000) uses court-martial transcripts and recollections of survivors to document how American POWs were the recipients of appalling treatment and sophisticated indoctrination. Fearing indefinite confinement or death, many divulged information or broadcast harangues against capitalist aggression and appeals for an end to the war. Providing another firsthand account, Wallace L. Brown (1961) relates his experiences as a prisoner of war of the Chinese Communists for two and a half years. Harry Spiller (1998) has edited the personal accounts of 16 American POWs in the Korean War. Eugene Kinkead (1959), a reporter for the *New Yorker*, received the reluctant, but full cooperation of the US Army in completing an investigation concluding that two-thirds of American POWs cooperated or collaborated. Refuting this damning portrayal, Albert D. Biderman (1963) finds in his study far less evidence of disloyalty or treason. Virginia Paisley (1955) explains why 21 American POWs refused repatriation.

Mirroring the impasse on prisoner exchange was stalemate on the battlefield in Korea from late 1951 until the war ended on July 27, 1953. The UNC adopted a strategy of "active defense" after the line of battle emerged as the de facto final demarcation line for a demilitarized zone early in 1952. Ridgway, having replaced MacArthur as the UNC commander, had sent a fresh directive to new US Eighth Army commander Lieutenant General James A. Van Fleet instructing him to limit the size of operations to no more than one division and their scope to capturing outposts in terrain suitable for temporary instead of permanent defense. The

Korean War soon resembled World War I, with a static battlefield and armies depending on barbed wire, trenches, artillery, and mortars. Paul F. Braim (2001) has written a solid biography of Van Fleet, characterizing him as a natural leader with dynamic command capabilities and leadership skills. He instinctively opposed fighting a military stalemate and proposed many plans for offensive action, but Ridgway and the JCS rejected all of them. US rotation policy left the US Eighth Army consistently under strength, but the UNC nevertheless fought a succession of bloody engagements without altering the course of the conflict. Rudolph W. Stephens (1995) describes the fighting at Old Baldy, Arned L. Hinshaw (1989) at Heartbreak Ridge, and S. L. A. Marshall (1956) and Bill McWilliams (2003) at Pork Chop Hill. Describing what combat was like for most American soldiers in this last phase of the war, Martin Russ (1957) has written a memoir of his experiences after arriving in Korea in December 1952. A US Marine trained as a small arms mechanic, he spent most of his time as a rifleman in trenches with Chinese forces no more than 200 yards away and firefights occurring every night.

Critics charged that active defense allowed the Communists to build permanent defenses and needlessly lengthened the conflict. During the summer of 1952, massive UNC bombing raids devastated the north, but failed to force Communist concessions at Panmunjom. In November, American voters angry over “Mr. Truman’s War” elected Dwight D. Eisenhower president largely because they expected him to end the conflict. Edward C. Keefer (1986) and William Stueck (1995) have shown that the new president entered office thinking seriously about using expanded conventional bombing and the threat of nuclear attack to force concessions from the Communist negotiators. In his analysis of Eisenhower’s statements about using nuclear weapons, Michael G. Jackson (2005) concludes that he viewed them as a compellent force, rather than as instruments of deterrence. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and JCS Chairman Admiral Arthur W. Radford agreed, both favoring a more aggressive approach, as did General Mark W. Clark, who had replaced Ridgway in May 1952. Eisenhower (1963) later insisted that China agreed to a truce after Dulles informed India’s prime minister in May 1953 that in the absence of progress toward an armistice, the United States would expand the war. Official military histories and many overviews of the military aspects of the war do not address, let alone assess the accuracy of Eisenhower’s claim. However, they do cover escalation of the air war early in 1953, climaxing with UNC bombing of North Korea’s dams and irrigation system in May. Another important event influencing the decision making process of the Chinese Communists was the death of Stalin in March 1953.

For diplomatic and political historians, how Eisenhower ended the Korean War remains contested terrain. Edward Friedman (1975), Daniel Calingaert (1988), and Sean Malloy (2003–4) all deny that Eisenhower’s nuclear threats had an impact on China. While Rosemary Foot (1988–9) allows that atomic diplomacy may have played a role, she asserts that the PRC, confronting enormous domestic economic problems and wanting peaceful coexistence with the West, already had decided to make peace once Truman left office. Stalin’s death in March only added to China’s sense of political vulnerability. Several weeks before Dulles made his

threat, Chinese negotiators signaled a change in policy when they accepted the UNC's proposal for exchanging sick and wounded POWs and then recommended turning non-repatriates over to a neutral state. And when the administration conveyed its nuclear threats, Edward Keefer (1986) and Roger Dingman (1988–9) have stressed that they were not clearly or forcefully delivered to Beijing. Also, in late May and early June 1953, Chinese forces launched powerful attacks against positions that ROK units were defending along the front line. Far from being intimidated, Beijing thus showed its continuing resolve, relying on military means to persuade US civilian and military leaders to compromise on the final terms of the armistice. Adding to these arguments, Thomas Allen (1994) claims that domestic and international pressures on the belligerents dictated the timing of the armistice including the lobbying of US allies on Washington and Moscow's new leaders on Beijing for a prompt end to the war.

Consensus more than contention has characterized the literature covering the military history of the Korean War. Coverage of the role of US armor and artillery in the conflict provides a good example of this pattern. Referencing action reports, Russell A. Gugeler (1954) presents a narrative account of numerous battles, while both Simon Dunstan (1982) and Jim Mesko (1983) contribute richly illustrated histories making note of the importance of armor only early in the war. Lynn Montross (1954) alone covers the role of US Marine combat helicopters in Korea that opened a new era in the tactics of warfare on display later in Vietnam. Further linking these two conflicts, the Korean War caused American leaders to embrace a new Cold War policy that accepted the need for global military intervention. Establishing a pattern of large peacetime defense budgets that would last for four decades, Korea in its first year justified the expansion of the US military from about 1.5 million to nearly 3.5 million men, while raising defense spending from a proposed \$13.5 billion to \$48.2 billion. At the end of the war, the amount spent in the prior fiscal year was \$60.4 billion. Moreover, the United States acted vigorously to strengthen the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) militarily and pressed for rearming West Germany. David T. Fautua (1997) denies that Korea alone accounted for the US Cold War military buildup, insisting that American military leaders always considered the conflict secondary to commitments in Europe. William Stueck (1993) contends that had North Korea not attacked, the buildup of NATO at most would have been slower and on a lesser scale. That this sort of interpretive debate is uncommon in the literature covering military aspects of the Korean conflict constitutes another reason why it remains for Americans the "Forgotten War" in their nation's military history.

#### BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Acheson, Dean G. (1969). *Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department*. New York: W. W. Norton.
- Aid, Matthew M. (1999). "US HUMINT and COMINT in the Korean War: From the Approach to War to the Chinese Intervention," *Intelligence and National Security*, 14:1 (Winter), 17–63.

- Aguirre, Emilio (1959). *We'll Be Home for Christmas: A True Story of the United States Marine Corps in the Korean War*. New York: Greenwich.
- Alexander, Bevin (1986). *Korea: The First War We Lost*. New York: Hippocrene Books.
- Alexander, James Edwin (1996). *Inchon to Wonsan: From the Deck of a Destroyer in the Korean War*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Allen, Thomas (1994). "No Winners, Many Losers: The End of the Korean War," in Phil Williams, Donald M. Goldstein, and Henry L. Andrews, Jr., eds., *Security in Korea: War, Stalemate, and Negotiation*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 110–26.
- Anders, Roger M. (1988). "The Atomic Bomb and the Korean War: Gordon Dean and the Issue of Civilian Control," *Military Affairs* 52:1 (January), 1–6.
- Apel, Otto F., Jr., and Pat Apel (1998). *MASH: An Army Surgeon in Korea*. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky.
- Appleman, Roy E. (1961). *South of the Naktong, North to the Yalu, June–November 1950*. Washington: Center of Military History.
- Appleman, Roy E. (1987a). *East of Chosin: Entrapment and Breakout in Korea*. College Station: Texas A&M University Press.
- Appleman, Roy E. (1987b). *Escaping the Trap: The U.S. Army X Corps in Northeast Korea, 1950*. College Station: Texas A&M University Press.
- Appleman, Roy E. (1989). *Disaster in Korea: The Chinese Confront MacArthur*. College Station: Texas A&M University Press.
- Appleman, Roy E. (1990). *Ridgway Duels for Korea*. College Station: Texas A&M University Press.
- Bailey, Sydney (1992). *The Korean Armistice*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Bajanov, Evgueni (1995–6). "Assessing the Politics of the Korean War, 1949–1951," *Cold War International History Project Bulletin*, 6–7 (Winter), 54, 87–91.
- Baldovi, Louis, ed. (2002). *A Foxhole View: Personal Accounts of Hawaii's Korean War Veterans*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.
- Bateman, Robert L. (2002). *No Gun Ri: A Military History of the Korean War Incident*. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books.
- Batson, Deneil, and Denzil Batson (1999). *We Called It War: The Untold Story of the Combat Infantry in Korea*. Leawood, KA: Leathers Publishing.
- Berebitsky, William, and Herbert Temple, Jr. (1996). *A Very Long, Weekend: The Army National Guard in Korea, 1950–1953*. Shippensburg PA: White Mane Publishing Co.
- Berger, Carl (1957). *The Korea Knot: A Military–Political History*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Bernstein, Barton J. (1977). "The Policy of Risk: Crossing the 38th Parallel and Marching to the Yalu," *Foreign Service Journal*, 54:1 (March), 16–22, 29.
- Bernstein, Barton J. (1981). "New Light on the Korean War," *International History Review*, 3:2 (April), 256–77.
- Biderman, Albert D. (1963). *March to Calumny: The Story of American POWs in the Korean War*. New York: Macmillan.
- Blair, Clay (1987). *The Forgotten War: America in Korea, 1950–1953*. New York: Times Books.
- Boose, Donald W., Jr. (1995). "Portentous Sideshow: The Korean Occupation Decision," *Parameters*, 25:4 (Winter), 112–29.
- Boose, Donald W., Jr. (2000). "The Korean War Truce Talks: A Study in Conflict Termination," *Parameters*, 30:1 (Spring), 102–16.
- Bowers, William T., ed. (2008). *The Line: Combat in Korea, January–February 1951*. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky.



- Bowers, William T., William M. Hammond, and George L. MacGarrigle (1996). *Black Soldier, White Army: The 24th Infantry Regiment in Korea*. Washington: Center of Military History.
- Bradley, Omar N., and Clay Blair (1983). *A General's Life: An Autobiography*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Braim, Paul F. (2001). *The Will to Win: The Life of General James A. Van Fleet*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Brazinsky, Gregg (2007). *Nation Building in South Korea: Koreans, Americans, and the Making of Democracy*. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press.
- Breuer, William B. (1996). *Shadow Warriors: The Covert War in the Korea*. New York: John Wiley.
- Brodie, Bernard (1973). *War and Politics*. New York: Macmillan.
- Brown, Wallace L. (1961). *The Endless Hours: My Two and a Half Years As a Prisoner of the Chinese Communists*. New York: W. W. Norton.
- Brune, Lester H., ed. (1996). *The Korean War: Handbook of the Literature and Research*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
- Bruning, John R. (1999). *Crimson Sky: The Air Battle for Korea*. Dulles, VA: Brassey's.
- Bussey, Charles M. (1991). *Firefight at Yechon: Courage and Racism in the Korean War*. Dulles, VA: Brassey's.
- Cagle, Malcolm W., and Frank A. Manson (1957). *The Sea War in Korea*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Caldwell, John C. (1952). *The Korea Story*. Chicago: Henry Regnery.
- Calingaert, Daniel (1988). "Nuclear Weapons and the Korean War," *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 11:2 (June), 177–202.
- Cannon, Michael (1988). "Task Force Smith: A Study in (Un)Preparedness and (Ir)Responsibility," *Military Review*, 68:2 (February), 63–74.
- Chancey, Jennie Ethell, and William R. Forstchen, eds. (2000). *Hot Shots: An Oral History of Combat Pilots of the Korean War*. New York: Morrow.
- Chang, Anson, and Charles J. Hilton (1993). *Chosin: The Untold Story*. New York: Honeoye International Association.
- Channon, Robert I. (1993). *The Cold Steel Third: Third Airborne Ranger Company Korean War, 1950–51*. Baltimore, MD: Genealogy Publishing.
- Chinnery, Philip D. (2001). *Korean Atrocity!: Forgotten War Crimes, 1950–1953*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Cho Soon-Sung (1967). *Korea in World Politics, 1940–1950: An Evaluation of American Responsibility*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Clark, Mark W. (1954). *From the Danube to the Yalu*. New York: Harper.
- Clemens, Peter (2002). "Captain James Hausman, U.S. Army Military Advisor to Korea, 1946–1948: The Intelligent Man on the Spot," *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 25:1 (March), 163–98.
- Cohen, Eliot A. (1990). "'Only Half the Battle': American Intelligence and the Chinese Intervention in Korea, 1950," *Intelligence and National Security*, 5:1 (January), 129–49.
- Cole, Charles F. (1995). *Korea Remembered: Enough of a War: The USS Ozbourn's First Korean Tour, 1950–1951*. Las Cruces, NM: Yucca Tree Press.
- Cole, Robert A. (2003–4). "Leadership in Korea: The War of Movement, 1950–1951," in David Culver, ed., "The Forgotten War: Korea Fifty Years Later," *New England Journal of History*, 60:1–3 (Fall–Spring), 185–211.
- Collins, J. Lawton (1969). *War in Peacetime: The History and Lessons of the Korean War*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

- Condit, Doris (1988). *History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense*, vol. 2: *The Test of War, 1950–1953*. Washington: Office of the Secretary of Defense.
- Conway-Lanz, Sahr (2005). "Beyond No Gun Ri: Refugees and the United States Military in the Korean War," *Diplomatic History*, 29:1 (January), 49–81.
- Cowart, Glenn C. (1992). *Miracle in Korea: The Evacuation of X Corps from the Hungnam Beachhead*. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.
- Cowdrey, Alfred E. (1987). *The Medic's War*. Washington: Center of Military History.
- Craig, Berry (1989). *The Chosin Few: North Korea, November–December 1950*. Paducah, KY: Turner Publishing.
- Crane, Conrad C. (2000a). *American Airpower Strategy in Korea, 1950–1953*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
- Crane, Conrad C. (2000b). "To Avert Impending Disaster: American Military Plans to Use Atomic Weapons During the Korean War," *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 23:2 (June), 72–88.
- Crane, Conrad C. (2002). "'No Practical Capabilities': American Biological and Chemical Warfare Programs During the Korean War," *Perspectives in Biology and Medicine*, 45:2 (Spring), 241–9.
- Crawford, C. S. (1998). *The Four Deuces: A Korean War Story*. Novato, CA: Presidio Press.
- Cummings, Bruce (1981). *The Origins of the Korean War*, vol. 1: *Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes, 1945–1947*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Cummings, Bruce (1990). *The Origins of the Korean War*, vol. 2: *The Roaring of the Cataract, 1947–1950*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Dannenmaier, William D. (1999). *We Were Innocents: An Infantryman in Korea*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
- Davis, Larry (1978). *MiG Alley: Air-to-Air Combat Over Korea*. Carrollton, TX: Squadron/Signal Publications.
- Dean, William F., and William J. Worden (1954). *General Dean's Story*. New York: Viking Press.
- Dingman, Roger (1988–9). "Atomic Diplomacy during the Korean War," *International Security*, 13:1 (Winter), 50–91.
- Dolan, Edward F. (1998). *America in the Korean War*. Brookfield, CT: Millbrook Press.
- Donnelly, William M. (2000). "Thunderbirds in Korea: The U.S. 45th Infantry Division, 1950–1952," *Journal of Military History*, 64:4 (October), 1113–39.
- Donnelly, William M. (2001). *Under Army Orders: The Army National Guard during the Korean War*. College Station: Texas A&M University Press.
- Dorr, Robert F., and Warren E. Thompson (1994). *The Korean Air War*. Osceola, WI: Motorbooks International.
- Dorr, Robert F., Jon Lake, and Warren Thompson (1995). *Korean War Aces: Aircraft of the Aces*. London: Osprey Publishers.
- Dunstan, Simon (1982). *Armor of the Korean War, 1950–1953*. London: Osprey Publishing.
- Dvorchak, Robert J. (2000). *Battle for Korea: The Associated Press History of the Korean Conflict*. Conshohocken, PA: Combined Publishing.
- Dwyer, John B. (1998). *Commandos from the Sea: The History of Amphibious Special Warfare in World War II and the Korean War*. Boulder, CO: Paladin Press.
- Edwards, Paul M., ed. (1993). *The Pusan Perimeter, Korea, 1950: An Annotated Bibliography*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
- Edwards, Paul M. ed. (1994). *The Inchon Landing, Korea, 1950*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.

- Edwards, Paul M., ed. (1998). *The Korean War: An Annotated Bibliography*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
- Edwards, Paul M., ed. (2006). *Korean War Almanac*. New York: Facts on File.
- Eisenhower, Dwight D. (1963). *The White House Years, vol. 2: Mandate for Change, 1953–1956*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday.
- Endicott, Stephen, and Edward Hagerman (1998). *The United States and Biological Warfare: Secrets from the Early Cold War and Korea*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Ent, Uzal W. (1996). *Fighting on the Brink: Defense of the Pusan Perimeter*. Paducah, KY: Turner Publishing.
- Ent, Uzal W. (2003–4). "Walton Walker: Defender of the Pusan Perimeter," in David Culver, ed., "The Forgotten War: Korea Fifty Years Later," *New England Journal of History*, 60:1–3 (Fall–Spring), 163–84.
- Evanhoe, Ed (1995). *Dark Moon: Eighth Army Special Operations in the Korean War*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Evans, Douglas (1984). *Sabre Jets over Korea: A Firsthand Account*. Blue Ridge Summit, PA: TAB Books.
- Fautua, David T. (1997). "The 'Long Pull' Army: NSC 68, the Korean War, and the Creation of the Cold War U.S. Army," *Journal of Military History*, 61:1 (January), 93–120.
- Fehrenbach, T. R. (1963). *This Kind of War: A Study of Unpreparedness*. New York: Macmillan.
- Field, James A., Jr. (1962). *History of the United States Naval Operations: Korea*. Washington: Director of Naval History.
- Flint, Roy (1986). "Task Force Smith and the 24th Division: Delay and Withdrawal, 5–19 July 1950," in Charles Heller and William Stofft, eds., *America's First Battles: 1776–1965*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 266–99.
- Flynn, George Q. (1988). "The Draft and College Deferments During the Korean War," *The Historian*, 50:3 (May), 369–85.
- Foot, Rosemary J. (1985). *The Wrong War: American Policy and the Dimensions of the Korean Conflict*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Foot, Rosemary J. (1988–9). "Nuclear Coercion and the Ending of the Korean Conflict," *International Security*, 13:3 (Winter), 92–112.
- Foot, Rosemary J. (1990). *A Substitute for Victory: The Politics of Peacemaking at the Korean Armistice Talks*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Foot, Rosemary J. (1991). "Making Known the Unknown War: Policy Analysis of the Korean Conflict in the Last Decade," *Diplomatic History*, 15:3 (Summer), 411–31.
- Friedman, Edward (1975). "Nuclear Blackmail and the End of the Korean War," *Modern China*, 1:1 (January), 75–91.
- Futrell, Robert F. (1983). *The United States Air Force in Korea, 1950–1953*. Washington: Office of the Chief of Air Force History.
- Geer, Andrew (1952). *The New Breed: The Story of the U.S. Marines in Korea*. New York: Harper.
- Giangreco, D. M. (1990). *War in Korea, 1950–1953: A Pictorial History*. Novato, CA: Presidio Press.
- Gittings, John (1975). "Talks, Bombs and Germs: Another Look at the Korean War," *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, 5:2 (Spring), 205–17.
- Goncharov, Sergei N., John W. Lewis, and Xue Litai (1993). *Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

- Goodman, Allen E., ed. (1978). *Negotiating While Fighting: The Diary of Admiral C. Turner Joy at the Korean Armistice Negotiations*. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution.
- Gough, Terrence J. (1987). *U.S. Army Mobilization and Logistics in the Korean War*. Washington: US Army Center for Military History.
- Goulden, Joseph C. (1982). *Korea: The Untold Story of the War*. New York: Times Books.
- Gropman, Alan L. (1993). "The Korean War and Armed Forces Racial Integration," in William J. Williams, ed., *A Revolutionary War: Korea and the Transformation of the Postwar World*. Chicago: Imprint Publications, 83–107.
- Gugeler, Russell A. (1954). *Combat Actions in Korea: Infantry, Artillery, and Armor*. Washington: Combat Forces Press Institute.
- Haas, Michael E. (2000). *In the Devil's Shadow: UN Special Operations during the Korean War*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Halliday, Jon (1993). "Air Operations in Korea: The Soviet Side of the Story," in William J. Williams, ed., *A Revolutionary War: Korea and the Transformation of the Postwar World*. Chicago: Imprint Publications, 149–70.
- Halliday, Jon, and Bruce Cumings (1988). *Korea: The Unknown War*. New York: Pantheon.
- Hallion, Richard P. (1986). *The Naval Air War in Korea*. Baltimore, MD: Nautical and Aviation Publishing.
- Hallion, Richard P. (1993). "Naval Air Operations in Korea," in William J. Williams, ed., *A Revolutionary War: Korea and the Transformation of the Postwar World*. Chicago: Imprint Publications, 129–47.
- Halperin, Morton H. (1978). *Limited War in the Nuclear Age*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
- Hamburger, Kenneth E. (2003). *Leadership in the Crucible: The Korean War Battles of Twin Tunnels & Chipyong-ni*. College Station: Texas A&M University Press.
- Hamme, Eric M. (1981). *Chosin: Heroic Ordeal of the Korean War*. New York: Vanguard Press.
- Hanley, Charles J., Sang-Hun Choe, and Martha Mendoza (2001). *The Bridge at No Gun Ri: A Hidden Nightmare from the Korean War*. New York: Henry Holt.
- Harrison, Donald C. (1989). *Distant Patrol: Virginia and the Korean War*. Chelsea, MI: Scarborough House.
- Hastings, Max (1987). *The Korean War*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Heinl, Robert D. (1968). *Victory at High Tide: The Inchon–Seoul Campaign*. Philadelphia: Lippincott.
- Hermes, Walter J., Jr. (1966). *Truce Tent and Fighting Front*. Washington: Center of Military History.
- Higgins, Marguerite (1951). *War in Korea: The Report of a Woman Combat Correspondent*. New York: Doubleday.
- Higgins, Trumbull (1960). *Korea and the Fall of MacArthur: A Précis in Limited War*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Hinshaw, Arned L. (1989). *Heartbreak Ridge: Korea, 1951*. New York: Praeger.
- Horwitz, Dorothy, ed. (1997). *We Will Not Be Strangers: Korean War Letters between a M.A.S.H. Surgeon and His Wife*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
- Hoyt, Edwin P. (1984a). *The Pusan Perimeter: Korea, 1950*. New York: Stein and Day.
- Hoyt, Edwin P. (1984b). *On to the Yalu*. New York: Stein and Day.
- Hoyt, Edwin P. (1985). *The Bloody Road to Panmunjom*. New York: Stein and Day.
- Hoyt, Edwin P. (1990). *The Day the Chinese Attacked, Korea, 1950: The Story of the Failure of America's China Policy*. New York: McGraw-Hill.

- Huston, James Alvin (1989). *Guns and Butter, Powder and Rice: U.S. Army Logistics in the Korean War*. Selinsgrove, PA: Susquehanna University Press.
- Jackson, Michael G. (2005). "Beyond Brinkmanship: Eisenhower, Nuclear War Fighting, and Korea, 1953–1968," *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, 35:1 (March), 52–75.
- Jackson, Robert (1973). *Air War Korea 1950–1953*. New York: Scribners.
- James, D. Clayton (1985). *The Years of MacArthur*, vol. 3: *Triumph and Disaster, 1945–1964*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
- James, D. Clayton with Anne Sharp Wells (1993). *Refighting the Last War: Command and Crises in Korea, 1950–1953*. New York: Free Press.
- Jordan, Kenneth N., Jr. (1995). *Forgotten Heroes: 131 Men of the Korean War Awarded the Medal of Honor, 1950–1953*. Atglen, PA: Schiffer Publishing.
- Joy, C. Turner (1955). *How Communists Negotiate*. New York: Macmillan.
- Kahn, E. J., Jr. (1952). *The Peculiar War: Impressions of a Reporter in Korea*. New York: Random House.
- Kapikian, Albert (2001). "'Fix Bayonets': The Attack on Hill 180 in the Korean War," *Prologue*, 33:1 (Spring), 36–44.
- Karsten, Peter (1966). "The American Democratic Citizen Soldier: Triumph or Disaster?" *Journal of Military History*, 30:1 (Spring), 34–40.
- Kaufman, Burton I. (1986). *The Korean War: Challenges in Crisis, Credibility, and Command*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Keefer, Edward C. (1986). "President Dwight D. Eisenhower and the End of the Korean War," *Diplomatic History*, 10:3 (Summer), 267–89.
- Kim, Chum-kon (1980). *The Korean War, 1950–1953*. Seoul: Kwangmyong.
- Kim, Hakjoon (1990). "International Trends in Korean War Studies," *Korean War Studies*, 14:2 (Summer), 326–70.
- Kinkead, Eugene (1959). *In Every War but One*. New York: W. W. Norton.
- Kirkland, Richard C. (1999). *Tales of a War Pilot*. Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press.
- Knox, Donald (1985). *The Korean War: Pusan to Chosin: An Oral History*. San Diego, CA: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
- Knox, Donald, with Albert Coppel (1988). *The Korean War: Uncertain Victory: An Oral History*. San Diego, CA: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
- Korean Institute of Military History (2001). *The Korean War*, 3 vols., intro. by Allan R. Millett. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
- LaFeber, Walter (1974). "Crossing the 38th: The Cold War in Microcosm," in Lynn H. Miller and Ronald W. Pruessen, eds., *Reflections on the Cold War: A Quarter Century of American Foreign Policy*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 71–90.
- Langley, Michael (1979). *Inchon Landing: MacArthur's Last Triumph*. New York: Times Books.
- Lech, Raymond B. (2000). *Broken Soldiers: American Prisoners of War in North Korea*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
- Leckie, Robert (1962). *Conflict: The History of the Korean War, 1950–1953*. New York: Putnam.
- Leitenberg, Milton (1998). "New Russian Evidence on the Korean War Biological Warfare Allegations: Background and Analysis," *Cold War International History Project Bulletin*, 11 (Winter), 185–99.
- Lichterhan, Martin (1963). "To the Yalu and Back," in Harold Stein, ed., *American Civil-Military Decisions: A Book of Case Studies*. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 569–642.



- Lyons, Gene M. (1961). *Military Policy and Economic Aid: The Korean Case, 1950–1953*. Columbus: Ohio State University Press.
- MacArthur, Douglas (1964). *Reminiscences*. New York: McGraw Hill.
- MacDonald, Callum A. (1986). *Korea: The War before Vietnam*. New York: Free Press.
- Macdonald, Donald Stone (1988). *The Koreans: Contemporary Politics and Society*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Maihafer, Harry J. (1993). *From the Hudson to the Yalu: West Point '49 in the Korean War*. College Station: Texas A&M University Press.
- Malcom, Ben S. (1996). *White Tigers: My Secret War in North Korea*. Washington: Brassey's.
- Malloy, Sean L. (2003–4). "A 'Paper Tiger?': Nuclear Weapons, Atomic Diplomacy and the Korean War," in David Culver, ed., "The Forgotten War: Korea Fifty Years Later," *New England Journal of History*, 60:1–32 (Fall–Spring), 227–52.
- Mansourov, Alexandre Y. (2004). "Enigmas of D-Day," in Mark F. Wilkinson, ed., *The Korean War at Fifty: International Perspectives*. Lexington, VA: Virginia Military Institute, 40–65.
- Marolda, Edward J., ed. (2007). *The U.S. Navy in the Korean War*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Marshall, S. L. A. (1953). *The River and the Gauntlet: Defeat of the Eighth Army by the Chinese Communist Forces November, 1950, in the Battle of the Chongchon River, Korea*. New York: Morrow.
- Marshall, S. L. A. (1956). *Pork Chop Hill: The American Fighting Man in Action, Korea, Spring, 1953*. New York: Morrow.
- Matray, James I. (1979). "Truman's Plan for Victory: National Self-Determination and the Thirty-Eighth Parallel Decision in Korea," *Journal of American History*, 66:2 (September), 314–33.
- Matray, James I. (1985). *The Reluctant Crusade: American Foreign Policy in Korea, 1941–1950*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.
- Matray, James I., ed. (1991). *Historical Dictionary of the Korean War*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
- Matray, James I. (1995). "Hodge Podge: U.S. Occupation Policy in Korea, 1945–1948," *Korean Studies*, 19: 17–38.
- Matray, James I. (2003). "The Korean War," in Robert D. Schulzinger, ed., *A Companion to American Foreign Relations*. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 275–91.
- Matthias, Howard (1992). *Korean War Reflections of a Young Combat Platoon Leader*. Tallahassee, FL: Father and Son Publishing.
- May, Ernest R. (1973). *"Lessons of the Past": The Use and Misuse of History in American Foreign Policy*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- McCune, George M., and Arthur L. Grey (1950). *Korea Today*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- McFarland, Keith D., ed. (1986). *The Korean War: An Annotated Bibliography*. New York: Garland.
- McGovern, James (1972). *To the Yalu: From the Chinese Invasion of Korea to MacArthur's Dismissal*. New York: Morrow.
- McLaren, David R. (1999). *Mustangs over Korea: The North American F-51 at War 1950–1953*. Atglen, PA: Schiffer Publishing.
- McWilliams, Bill (2003). *On Hallowed Ground: The Last Battle for Pork Chop Hill*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Merrill, John (1989). *Korea: The Peninsular Origins of the War*. Wilmington: University of Delaware Press.



- Mesko, Jim (1983). *Armor in Korea: A Pictorial History*. Carrollton, TX: Signal Publications.
- Miller, Max (1951). *I'm Sure We've Met Before: The Navy in Korea*. New York: E. P. Dutton.
- Millett, Allan R. (1997a). "Captain James H. Hausman and the Formation of the Korean Army, 1945–1950," *Armed Forces and Society*, 23:4 (Summer), 503–39.
- Millett, Allan R. (1997b). "A Reader's Guide to the Korean War," *Journal of Military History*, 61:3 (July), 583–97.
- Millett, Allan R. (2001). "The Korean War: A 50 Year Critical Historiography," *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 24:1 (March), 188–224.
- Millett, Allan R. (2002). *Their War in Korea: American, Asian, and European Combatants and Civilians, 1945–1953*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Millett, Allan R. (2005). *The War for Korea, 1945–1950: A House Burning*. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press.
- Montross, Lynn (1954). *Cavalry of the Sky: The Story of U.S. Marine Combat Helicopters*. New York: Harper and Brothers.
- Montross, Lynn, et al. (1954–72). *History of U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950–1953*, 5 vols. Washington: Historical Branch, G-3, Headquarters, Marine Corps.
- Moore, John (1997). *The Wrong Stuff: Flying on the Edge of Disaster*. Osceola, WI: Motorbooks International.
- Mossman, Billy C. (1990). *Ebb and Flow: November 1950–July 1951*. Washington: Center of Military History.
- Murphy, Edward F. (1997). *Korean War Heroes*. Novato, CA: Presidio Press.
- Nichols, Jack C., and Warren E. Thompson (1991). *Korea: The Air War, 1950–1953*. London: Osprey.
- Oh, John Kieh-chiang (2004). "The Forgotten Soldiers of the Korean War," in Mark F. Wilkinson, ed., *The Korean War at Fifty: International Perspectives*. Lexington, VA: Virginia Military Institute, 101–16.
- O'Rourke, G. G., and E. T. Wooldridge (1998). *Night Fighters over Korea*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Ottoboni, Fred (1997). *Korea Between the Wars: A Soldier's Story*. Sparks, NV: Vincente Books.
- Owen, Joseph R. (1996). *Colder Than Hell: A Marine Rifle Company at Chosin Reservoir*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Paige, Glenn D. (1968). *The Korean Decision, June 24–30, 1950*. New York: Free Press.
- Paik Sun-yup (1992). *From Pusan to Panmunjom: Wartime Memoirs of the Republic of Korea's First Four-Star General*. Dulles, VA: Brassey's.
- Paisley, Virginia (1955). *21 Stayed*. London: W. H. Allen.
- Park Chan-Pyo (2002). "The American Military Government and the Framework for Democracy in South Korea," in Bonnie B. C. Oh, ed., *Korea under the American Military Government, 1945–1948*. Westport, CT: Praeger, 123–49.
- Paschall, Rod (1995). *Witness to War: Korea*. New York: Berkley Publishing Group.
- Pearlman, Michael D. (2008). *Truman and MacArthur: Policy, Politics, and the Hunger for Honor and Renown*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Pierpaoli, Paul G., Jr. (2001). "Beyond Collective Amnesia: A Korean War Retrospective," *International Social Science Review*, 76:3/4 (Fall–Winter), 92–102.
- Pratt, Sherman W. (1992). *Decisive Battles of the Korean War: An Infantry Company Commander's View of the War's Most Critical Engagements*. New York: Vantage Press.
- Rees, David (1964). *Korea: The Limited War*. New York: Macmillan.

- Ridgway, Matthew B. (1967). *The Korean War*. New York: Doubleday.
- Rishell, Lyle (1993). *With a Black Platoon in Combat: A Year in Korea*. College Station: Texas A&M University Press.
- Ruetten, Richard T. (1967). "General Douglas MacArthur's 'Reconnaissance in Force': The Rationalization of a Defeat in Korea," *Pacific Historical Review*, 36:1 (February), 79–94.
- Russ, Martin (1957). *The Last Parallel: A Marine's War Journal*. New York: Rhinehart.
- Russ, Martin (1999). *Breakout: The Chosin Reservoir Campaign, Korea, 1950*. New York: Fromm International.
- Saluzzi, Joseph A. (1993). *Red Blood ... Purple Hearts: The Marines in the Korean War*. Atglen, PA: Schiffer Publishing.
- Sandler, Stanley, ed. (1995). *The Korean War: An Encyclopedia*. New York: Garland.
- Sandusky, Michael C. (1983). *America's Parallel*. Alexandria, VA: Old Dominion Press.
- Sauter, Jack (1995). *Sailors in the Sky: Memoir of a Navy Aircrewman in the Korean War*. Jefferson, NC: MacFarland.
- Sawyer, Robert K., and Walter G. Hermes, Jr. (1962). *Military Advisors in Korea: KMAC in War and Peace*. Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History.
- Schaller, Michael (1989). *Douglas MacArthur: The Far Eastern General*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Schnabel, James F. (1972). *The United States Army in the Korean War, Policy and Direction: The First Year*. Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History.
- Schnabel, James F., and Robert J. Watson (1979). *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy*, vol. 3: *The Korean War*. Wilmington, DE: Michael Glazier.
- Schofield, Mary Anne (2003–4). "'America's Finest Women Stand Behind her Finest Men': Women Write the Korean War," in David Culver, ed., "The Forgotten War: Korea Fifty Years Later," *New England Journal of History*, 60:1–3 (Fall–Spring), 118–29.
- Scutts, Jerry (1982). *Air War over Korea*. London: Arms and Armour Press.
- Senich, Peter R. (1993). *U.S. Marine Corps Scout-Sniper: World War II and Korea*. Boulder, CO: Paladin Press.
- Sheldon, Walt (1968). *Hell or High Water: MacArthur's Landing at Inchon*. New York: Macmillan.
- Shen Zhihua (2000). "Sino-Soviet Relations and the Origins of the Korean War," *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 2:2 (Spring), 44–68.
- Sherwood, John Darrell (1996). *Officers in Flight Suits: The Story of American Air Force Fighter Pilots in the Korean War*. New York: New York University Press.
- Simmons, Robert R. (1975). *The Strained Alliance: Peking, Pyongyang, Moscow, and the Politics of the Korean War*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Skaggs, David C. (1974). "The KATUSA Experiment: The Integration of Korean Nationals into the U.S. Army, 1950–1965," *Military Affairs*, 38:2 (April), 53–8.
- Sorely, Lewis (1993). "Reserve Forces in Limited War," in William J. Williams, ed., *A Revolutionary War: Korea and the Transformation of the Postwar World*. Chicago: Imprint Publications, 109–27.
- Spanier, John W. (1959). *The Truman-MacArthur Controversy and the Korean War*. New York: W. W. Norton.
- Spiller, Harry, ed., (1998) *American POWs in Korea: Sixteen Personal Accounts*. Jefferson, NC: MacFarland.
- Sprioff, Boris R. (1998). *Korea: Frozen Hell on Earth: A Platoon Sergeant's Diary Korean War 1950–1951*. Baltimore, MD: American Literary Press.

- Stanton, Shelby (1989). *America's Tenth Legion: X Corps in Korea, 1950*. Novato, CA: Presidio Press.
- Stephens, Rudolph W. (1995). *Old Ugly Hill: A G.I.'s Fourteen Months in the Korean Trenches, 1952–1953*. Jefferson, NC: MacFarland.
- Stewart, James T., ed. (1957). *Air Power, the Decisive Force in Korea*. Princeton, NJ: Van Nostrand.
- Stolfi, Russel H. S. (2004). "A Critique of Pure Success: Inchon Revisited, Revised, and Contrasted," *Journal of Military History*, 68:2 (April), 505–25.
- Stueck, William W., Jr. (1981). *The Road to Confrontation: American Policy Toward China and Korea, 1947–1950*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Stueck, William W., Jr. (1993). "The Korean War, NATO, and Rearmament," in William J. Williams, ed., *A Revolutionary War: Korea and the Transformation of the Postwar World*. Chicago: Imprint Publications, 171–84.
- Stueck, William W., Jr. (1995). *The Korean War: An International History*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Stone, I. F. (1952). *The Hidden History of the Korean War, 1950–51*. Boston: Little Brown.
- Sullivan, John A. (1991). *Toy Soldiers: Memoir of a Combat Platoon Leader in Korea*. Jefferson, NC: MacFarland.
- Summers, Harry G., ed. (1990). *Korean War Almanac*. New York: Facts on File.
- Taylor, Maxwell D. (1972). *Swords and Plowshares*. New York: W. W. Norton.
- Terry, Addison (2000). *The Battle for Pusan: A Memoir*. New York: Ballantine Books.
- Thompson, Reginald (1951). *Cry Korea*. London: MacDonald.
- Thompson, Warren E. (1999a). *Fighters over Korea: Mustang, Starfire, Shooting Star, Sabre Tigercat, Panther, Corsair, Banshee, Thunderjet*. Osceola, WI: Motorbooks International.
- Thompson, Warren E. (1999b). *F-51 Mustang Units over Korea*. Oxford: Osprey Publishing.
- Tillman, Barrett (1979). *Corsair: The F4U in World War II and Korea*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Toland, John (1991). *In Mortal Combat: Korea, 1950–1953*. New York: Morrow.
- Tomedi, Rudy, ed. (1993). *No Bugles, No Drums: An Oral History of the Korean War*. New York: John Wiley.
- Truman, Harry S (1956). *Memoirs*, vol. 2: *Years of Trial and Hope*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday.
- Tucker, Spencer C., et al., eds. (2000). *Encyclopedia of the Korean War: A Political, Social, and Military History*. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO.
- Vatcher, William H., Jr. (1958). *Panmunjom: The Story of the Korean Military Armistice Negotiations*. New York: Praeger.
- War History Compilation Committee, Ministry of National Defense, Republic of Korea (1967–70). *Hanguk Cheonchaengsa [History of the Korean War]*, 9 vols. Seoul: Ministry of National Defense.
- War History Compilation Committee, Ministry of National Defense, Republic of Korea (1975). *History of the United Nations Forces in Korea*, 6 vols. Seoul: Ministry of National Defense.
- Weathersby, Kathryn (1993a). "The Soviet Role in the Early Phase of the Korean War: New Documentary Evidence," *Journal of American–East Asian Relations*, 2:4 (Winter), 425–58.
- Weathersby, Kathryn (1993b). "New Findings on the Korean War: Translation and Commentary," *Cold War International History Project Bulletin*, 3 (Fall), 14–18.

- Weathersby, Kathryn (1995). "Korea, 1949–50: To Attack or Not to Attack: Stalin, Kim Il Sung, and the Prelude to War," *Cold War International History Project Bulletin*, 5 (Spring), 1–9.
- Weathersby, Kathryn (1998), "Deceiving the Deceivers: Moscow, Beijing, Pyongyang, and the Allegations of Bacteriological Weapons Use in Korea," *Cold War International History Project Bulletin*, 11 (Winter), 176–85.
- Weintraub, Stanley (2000). *MacArthur's War: Korea and the Undoing of an American Hero*. New York: Free Press.
- Werrell, Kenneth P. (2005). *Sabres over MiG Alley: The F-86 and the Battle for Air Superiority in Korea*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Westover, John G. (1955). *Combat Support in Korea*. Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History.
- Whelan, Richard (1990). *Drawing the Line: The Korean War, 1950–1953*. Boston: Little, Brown.
- Wilson, Jim (1988). *Retreat, Hell!* New York: Morrow.
- Witt, Linda, Judith Bellafaire, Britta Granrud, and Mary Jo Binker (2005). "A Defense Weapon Known to be of Value": *Servicewomen of the Korean War Era*. Lebanon, NH: University Press of New England.
- Y'Blood, William T., ed. (1999). *The Three Wars of George E. Stratemeyer: His Korean War Diary*. Washington: Air Force History and Museums Program.

# Chapter Thirteen

## THE VIETNAM WAR

*Ron Milam*

America's longest war. America's most controversial war. The war that divided Americans on a myriad of issues, not all of which were related directly to the war. The first war that America lost. All are phrases employed to describe the war in Vietnam. Few would disagree that it had a profound impact on American culture, politics, military preparedness and the perception of America's role in the world.

Amid all of the diversity of opinion on the morality and conduct of the war, thousands of authors have felt compelled to express their ideas about the conflict. From soldiers on the ground to pilots in the air, and sailors serving on ships along its coasts and on its waterways; from diplomats in Washington, DC, to Saigon to Hanoi; from scholars and anti-war critics to generals; even six Presidents have had something to say about America's involvement in Southeast Asia. Thus, the historiography of this war is vast, and involves many aspects of the conflict, ranging from the fighting to the decision-making, to the negotiating.

Unlike many wars fought by Americans, the Vietnam War can be characterized by several levels of moral ambiguity that have permeated historiography. The first is the institutional decision-making by American leaders that authorized the military to take up arms against a sovereign nation. Following the Geneva Accords of 1954, the US supported South Vietnam's attempt to create a democracy led by Ngo Dinh Diem, and subsequently 16,000 advisors were sent to assist the military effort. The second is the conduct of the war itself, the combat behavior of "grunts," the bombing campaigns, the relationship to allies, and the hegemonic efforts in adjacent countries. In 1965, the United States sent ground troops to Vietnam, and at the zenith, 585,000 troops would serve throughout South Vietnam. The third moral ambiguity is the peace settlement and subsequent withdrawal of troops and the resulting effects on both America and Vietnam. Paris would be the site, and the negotiations would last for five years. After America pulled out, the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) could not prevent the Peoples Army of Vietnam (PAVN) from moving south, and Saigon fell. And the fourth level of moral ambiguity is the legacy of the war, and America's treatment

of its veterans. Each of these issues will be addressed through the literature that has developed over the ensuing decades since the end of the war.

Because the Vietnam War impacted America so profoundly, and because those who fought it, opposed it, or “sat-on-the-sidelines” are still living, the historiography has taken on a certain degree of presentism, which has been described by many reviews of cited works as conservative, liberal, or more likely left and right. This chapter avoids the use of such terms, unless they are unavoidable due to the author’s own words. But when dealing with moral ambiguity, it is likely that present day events will influence how one views historical events. This is particularly true today with the War in Iraq being discussed in academe and publishers re-issuing books about Vietnam.

General histories of the war, those which address US entry, conduct and execution, and withdrawal from Vietnam, have usually been written to satisfy the collegiate market for texts in courses. The most frequently used and therefore most widely quoted and cited is George Herring’s *America’s Longest War* (2001), a seminal work now in its fourth edition, that first appeared in 1979. It is a balanced, diplomatic history of the war that chronicles the history of Vietnam from 1945 to 1975 and America’s role there from what is called the First Indochina War to the Fall of Saigon in 1975. Herring writes in his preface: “I believe now, as I did then, that U.S. intervention in Vietnam was misguided. ... I do not believe that the war could have been won in any meaningful sense or at a moral or material price Americans would – or should – have been willing to pay” (xiii–xiv). With these admissions, Herring proceeds to write a book that presents a factual account of America’s involvement in the war, with a heavy emphasis on strategy and deliberations by leaders in Washington. It is not a military history of the war, but rather a textbook that students can read and chronologically follow the events of the 30-year war as Herring describes it.

Among those who wrote about the war from the perspective of having been there, Stanley Karnow’s *Vietnam* (1997) is the most complete, not only of the war, but also of Vietnam before the Americans arrived. At 784 pages, it is comprehensive, and places the American involvement in the context of a nationalist, Vietnamese history of thousands of years. And one has to respect the writing of a journalist who was in the theater for virtually the entire length of the war. In *The Best and the Brightest* (2001 [1973]), David Halberstam dealt with civilian decision-making in Washington during the entire war. The title alone indicates the contempt that the author felt for those who directed the war from a distance, including advisors such as William and McGeorge Bundy, Walt Rostow, and Clark Clifford, all of whom graduated from elite universities, hence the ironic, if not sardonic title. The inspiration for researching the book was Halberstam’s experiences in the field – accompanying American advisors at Ap Bac, he witnessed the poor performance of the ARVN when it was defeated by the Viet Cong in the first “big battle” of the war – which he wrote about in *The Making of a Quagmire* (1988 [1965]).

Gabriel Kolko’s *Anatomy of a War* (1994) also recognizes that there was a beligerent other than the United States, and he uses some Vietnamese archival sources



to support his position that America could never have succeeded militarily because members of the PAVN were more dedicated to their cause than soldiers of the ARVN or those fighting for the United States. Kolko admits to being part of the anti-war movement during the war, and his later work *Vietnam: Anatomy of a Peace* (1997) argues that the failure of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) to maintain Communist ideals led to its failure to provide people with a decent standard of living. Kolko would obviously disagree with the current Vietnamese government's move toward a free-market economy, and his criticism of postwar conduct is consistent with the socialist ideals that he expressed in both monographs.

Other textbook approaches to the war that address issues chronologically include Larry Addington's *America's War in Vietnam* (2000), David Anderson's *The Vietnam War* (2005), and Marilyn B. Young's *The Vietnam Wars 1945–1975* (1991). These authors generally write from an ethnocentric American viewpoint, with Young's book offering the most extensive Vietnamese perspective, particularly regarding the first Indo-China War. The limitations of all three are that they focus more on big picture issues and decision-making at the civilian, State Department level than at the soldier level, which is a flaw prevalent in most of the literature on the war. The subtitle of the most recent addition to general histories of the war, John Prados' *Vietnam: The History of an Unwinnable War* (2009), identified his thesis. At 665 pages, the book contributes significantly to the continuing debate on the potential outcome of the war.

Soldiers who were willing to be vocal, irreverent to “the cause,” and accessible to the press were not ignored during the war. Neil Sheehan's *A Bright Shining Lie* (1998 [1988]) uses the vehicle of an American advisor, Lieutenant Colonel John Paul Vann, to tell the tale of both the early advisory effort, from 1960–5, and the later advisory effort from 1970–3, after most American troops had left the country. Sheehan was the first to write extensively about the “credibility gap,” when the troops on the ground expressed contrarian insights from those of the generals in Saigon. This Pulitzer Prize winning book is among the most insightful on the American conduct of the war, written by someone who was there for most of the important events. Using a well-known figure like Vann to expose the intricacies of American strategy was brilliant, because advisors were in a position to observe both the enemy and the ally. While somewhat hagiographic toward the end of the book, which parallels the final days of Vann's life, Sheehan captures the futility of America's efforts as the leaders realize that victory in Vietnam will be difficult, if not impossible.

Other authors who deal with the early, advisory phase of the war but who also write extensively about the later periods include Frances FitzGerald, whose *Fire in the Lake* (1972) produced the most extensive portrayal of the Vietnamese side of the war, and William J. Duiker's *Sacred War* (1995) which explored the Viet Minh and Viet Cong side of the war with equanimity, reminding us that there were at least two, if not three or four, belligerents in this war.

Among journalists who wrote of the early period, Bernard Fall, a French citizen who taught at American and Howard Universities paid the ultimate price for his reporting on Vietnam when he stepped on a landmine while covering a US Marine

operation just south of Hue. Ironically he was killed on a road that he had named *Street Without Joy* (1994 [1961]), which chronicled the frustrations of the French in battling the Viet Minh for eight years, until their defeat in 1954 at Dien Bien Phu. Fall also covered that decisive battle, with his landmark book *Hell in a Very Small Place* (2002 [1966]), which was released just a few weeks after his death. In seven books, Fall wrote extensively about the French and Americans' lack of understanding about Ho Chi Minh's nationalistic tendencies and instead concentrated on his revolutionary approach to governing. While vehemently anti-communist in his rhetoric, Fall exposed many of the fallacies of western Cold War analysis. His writings are essential to the historiography of the early period, both French and American and his works are among the most international in scope and cultural sensitivities.

Lloyd Gardner was the first historian to place US policy-making regarding Vietnam in the context of the Cold War. In *Approaching Vietnam: From World War II through Dienbienphu, 1941–1954* (1988), Gardner described the origins of American involvement as early as World War II, and the subsequent support of the French re-entering Southeast Asia after the war. Without this policy decision of the Truman administration, the French could not have been set up for the failure that would follow, nor one could surmise the American defeat that followed.

So the early period of both French and American involvement was dealt with by most historians as part of the build-up to the war, but the focus of most authors who wrote just after the war was over, was to address the mistakes that the US made in its conduct of the war. There was a group of former military officers who had served in Vietnam who looked critically at leadership mistakes that had been made during the war – both in the junior officer corps, which contained the most leaders, and in the less numerous field and general grade officers. These authors could be called “angry colonels” because most of them retired before making general grade, their offerings reflecting a sense of outspoken disgust with the results of the war. Their studies mirrored the contempt that the Army's own investigative report published by the BDM Corporation in 1981 had shown: that a lack of effective leadership during the war had been a major cause of American failure to achieve victory. Published as *Strategic Lessons Learned in Vietnam* (1981), this voluminous report identified many junior officers as potential Lieutenant Calleys, he being the only soldier convicted of a crime at the My Lai massacre. Several books fit this category; the first chronologically was Edward L. King's *The Death of the Army* (1972). This retired Lieutenant Colonel believed that the Vietnam War continued because there was too much incentive for aggressive combat performance built into the promotion system. For example, he blames the Hamburger Hill episode on Major General Melvin Zais' desire to earn a third star, and that the only way to achieve this was to lead a division on a significant real estate acquisition operation.

This was a strong indictment. King's conversation with General Zais prior to another tour in Vietnam supposedly gave him insight into the general's motivation, when Zais said: “you know if I'm ever going to make a third star I need to have command of a division” (King 1972: 99). Hill 937, the military terminology for what later would be known as Hamburger Hill would be assaulted by elements

of the 101st Airborne Division, and the ten-day battle would result in the death of 56 American soldiers and 600 PAVN troops. (Zais would later say that his third star had been approved before the operation and that the report of the battle had been written by an inexperienced AP reporter who based his entire story on an interview with one private.) The story made headlines in the United States papers, and Zais was denounced on the Senate floor by Senator Ted Kennedy. King agreed with the Senator's assessment that the operation was done for the glory of a "commander seeking advancement and promotion." This early "angry colonel" book was also on target with its prediction that only a young inexperienced lieutenant would be found guilty at My Lai.

Another significant book written by an "angry colonel" on active duty during the war was *America's Army in Crisis* (1973) by Lieutenant Colonel William L. Hauser, who had commanded an artillery battalion in the Mekong Delta of Vietnam. Writing as a Research Associate of Johns Hopkins University's Washington Center for Foreign Policy Research, Hauser focused on the problems the Army encountered in fighting a war that was not supported by society. This was particularly consequential when recruiting junior officers, since the Army had to compete with business, academia and other branches who could offer more safety, money and prestige than could an institution that was being shunned by the very society that it represented. The Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) was particularly highlighted and Hauser delved into the statistics regarding the precipitous drop in enrollment in ROTC. Hauser's book focused on solving the problems that the Army faced in a post-Vietnam War world, rather than criticizing the institution without a plausible remedy.

Not qualifying as an angry colonel book only because he does not use his retired title as an author is William R. Corson's *Consequences of Failure* (1974). Having previously written *The Betrayal* in 1968, his 1974 book addressed the issue of incompetent junior officers. He concluded that those who fought in the early days of the war, defined by Corson as 1966 through early 1967, were an elite group of young men who shared their civilian contemporaries' views on race, foreign affairs, and other modern day societal ills. But as the war intensified, these attributes became liabilities to effective combat performance. According to Corson, the military then lowered its standards and began to take anyone into the officer corps, "the epitome being Lieutenant William Calley" (Corson 1974: 84) Again, Corson accepted the "Calley is bad, therefore standards were lowered" thesis, which does not appear to have happened.

The previously cited books were all written when America's actions were being criticized throughout society, but before actual defeat was known – before the Fall of Saigon in April 1975. Once the humiliation of a Communist victory was realized, several authors published books that analyzed America's defeat, whereas previous books discussed America's poor performance in a war that most authors predicted would end in a stalemate, like Korea. One of the best and most quantitatively researched was *The War Managers* (1977), written by Brigadier General Douglas Kinnard, a veteran who served two tours in Vietnam whose interest in the war went beyond soldier performance. As a social scientist, he was interested

in quantifying the responses to a series of questions directed to all of the generals who served in Vietnam. The significance of his work was that he proved that the majority of those who directed the activities of combat soldiers doubted the leadership that was coming from the politicians in Washington. Questioning the objectives of the war itself, these commanders also revealed their distaste for the horrendous decision to not call up the reserves, thus failing to bring the war to all facets of society.

Published at virtually the same time, Guenter Lewy's *America in Vietnam* (1976) addressed political, military, and social aspects of the war. Lewy, a political scientist, was among the first authors to challenge some of the conventional wisdom about America's failures of both strategy and tactics, and to question whether lack of leadership was one of the overriding issues in the US defeat. Unlike most previous authors, his conclusion regarding atrocities was that the records did not indicate that American soldiers committed such acts at a rate greater than that of previous wars. And he excused many of the actions as part of the nature of a "guerilla war without fronts" (309). One of his theses was that "the sense of guilt created by the Vietnam War in the minds of many Americans is not warranted and that the charges of officially condoned illegal and grossly immoral conduct are without substance" (vii). For Lewy, the Vietnam War was less morally ambiguous than for other authors writing during this time period.

One of the most captious of the postwar studies was *Crisis in Command* (1978) by Richard A. Gabriel and Paul L. Savage. Retired staff and intelligence officers, they indicted the entire officer corps. Central to the Gabriel and Savage thesis is the premise that not enough officers died when compared to enlisted men, and compared to other wars. They believed that the troops being led observed this lack of total commitment on the part of officers, and drew conclusions about the officers' self-interests when issuing operations orders. Citing "available evidence" but not referencing where the data was found, they wrote that "the number of officers who actually died in combat in Vietnam was smaller proportionately compared to the number of Americans killed in other wars and to officer losses suffered by other Armies" (16). Their book also endorsed the thesis that the junior officer corps diminished in quality as the war wound down, evidenced by William Laws Calley's actions.

One of the most scathing indictments of the officer corps, but most critical of field and general grade officers was, *Self-Destruction* (1981). Written by "Cincinnatus," a pseudonym adopted by a field-grade officer on the Pentagon staff, who has since been identified as Cecil B. Curry, the book's jacket proclaimed that "the old refrain that the Army failed because of political softness and social unrest at home is still the theme song of the upper ranks. The fact is that the military disaster in Vietnam grew out of ineptitude at the top." His analysis of the My Lai massacre, unlike many of the previously cited works, is that it was not an isolated incident, and that "Vietnam had been turned into a gigantic My Lai" (99). Because of the rules of engagement, guerilla type warfare and civilians on the battlefield, incidents like My Lai were bound to occur. But the leadership did nothing to work within the context of such a war, develop appropriate plans, or proceed to

accomplish the mission. Had the senior officers understood the environment, My Lai and others like it could have been avoided (96).

Three years later, Victor H. Krulak's highly personal "history" of the Marine Corps, *First to Fight* (1984) included his assessment of strategy in Vietnam. As Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency Activities for the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Krulak visited Vietnam in August 1963. On September 10 he reported to President Kennedy that the war was going well, an assessment at odds with that presented by Joseph Mendenall, leading Kennedy to quip, "The two of you did visit the same country, didn't you?" Krulak, commander of the Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, 1964–8, consistently advocated a "Spreading Ink Blot" strategy that relied on using small units to win control of villages and to win the support of civilians in a slowly expanding area beginning on the coastal plain. This strategy was rejected by the JCS in favor of the "Search and Destroy" strategy of employing overwhelming firepower to destroy enemy forces by attacking troop concentrations in the Central Highlands. In addition, the Air Force's bombing campaign, dubbed "Rolling Thunder," begun in March 1965, was designed "to supply a measured amount of strategic airpower in order to persuade the North Vietnamese leaders to cease their aggressive actions and to accede to President Johnson's offer of negotiating a peaceful settlement of the conflict." The CIA, DIA, and State Department cautioned that such a policy might be counterproductive and instead of breaking the will of the North Vietnamese, could simply steel their resolve to resist.

As a military history book, *The Rise and Fall of an American Army* (1985) by Shelby L. Stanton has been generally considered one of the classic chronological studies of the war. Based upon after-action reports and military historians' contemporaneous accounts, the book describes battle after battle and frequently comments on failures and leadership mistakes in operations. But since most of the battles were won decisively by the American forces, his criticism is reserved more for the political decisions made in Washington. The book received very positive reviews by both the general press, and military reviewers, but Stanton's status as an author has been diminished when his military resumé was questioned.

Virtually all of the books that have been discussed here have been critical of both senior and junior officer leadership. After the successful completion of the Gulf War in 1991, books began to appear which cast a more positive light on leadership in Vietnam. Norman Schwarzkopf's *It Doesn't Take a Hero* (1996), Colin Powell's *My American Journey* (1996), and James Kitfield's *Prodigal Soldiers* (1995), all compared the political aspects of Vietnam to the Gulf War, and drew stark distinctions between the operational plans. Kitfield's book gave credit to the military's superb performance in Desert Storm and to the leadership shown by generals who had served as lieutenants in Vietnam. The victory in Desert Storm most likely made such assessments acceptable.

In 1993, historian Ronald H. Spector published *After TET* (1993), a book which questioned many of the stereotypes of the 1970s studies about soldiers in the Vietnam War. "Vietnam GIs of 1968 were not simply a collection of ill-educated, impoverished youths from the bottom rungs of society. Rather they represented the solid middle of American Society" (38). This book, coupled with

Christian Appy's seminal work: *Working Class War* (1993) began to question the findings of previous scholars, who had stated that the war was fought by the impoverished youth of America. Spector also identified the American soldier and officer as more educated than the soldier in World War II or Korea, and this education was a positive attribute for both soldiers and officers. Spector's analysis of the problems with the American military in Vietnam minimizes the deficiencies of the junior officer corps and lays most of the blame on Saigon and Washington. In the most recent study of junior officers the author of this chapter confirms this view and concludes that the vast majority of lieutenants who served in combat were dedicated to carrying out their duties, respected and cared for the men they led, and performed well across the board (Milam 2009).

Another recent book by Peter S. Kindsvatter, *American Soldiers* (2003) took a similar position to that of Spector by identifying the Vietnam leaders as more educated than their predecessor wartime officers, but afflicted with a different set of problems than officers of previous wars. "Even for those junior leaders who did their best to carry out their assigned missions, and the majority undoubtedly fell into this category, the yardstick for measuring success increasingly became a low number of friendly casualties, not damage done to the enemy" (149). Thus, these officers had a different set of motives than those in World War II, because this war was so different.

Those who have written about leadership have believed that wars are won and lost by officers and their decision-making, which is partially true. But the Vietnam War, because of its length and diversity of experiences among soldiers, produced a historiography by and about soldiers that explains more about the war than textbooks can provide.

The most significant individual battle of the Vietnam War was fought on November 14, 1965 in the Ia Drang Valley in the Central Highlands. It was the first engagement of North Vietnamese Forces and an American unit, bolstered by the technology of the helicopter to deliver troops into battle. The 1st Air Cavalry Division prevailed, but not without sustaining significant casualties, and the victory was sealed when US airpower was unleashed against the numerically superior forces of the PAVN. This earliest of battles is described with great detail using eyewitness accounts in Hal Moore and Joe Galloway's *We Were Soldiers Once ... and Young* (2004 [1992]). Such writing was possible because the authors had been involved in the battle as commander and reporter, respectively. They not only chronicle the battle moment by moment, but they offer a gripping analysis of the impact of the outcome of the battle on decision-making in Washington, Saigon and Hanoi. The American leadership assumed massive force and technology would always prevail, and the PAVN leadership decided to minimize force size to avoid casualties. They also realized that Cambodia provided sanctuary: "I was always taught as an officer that in a pursuit situation you continue to pursue until you either kill the enemy or he surrenders. ... Not to follow them into Cambodia violated every principle of warfare. It became perfectly clear to the North Vietnamese that they then had sanctuary; they could come when they were ready to fight and leave when they were ready to quit" (341). Ultimately, the North Vietnamese analysis of the battle and subsequent battlefield strategy would prevail.



There are few other books on particular battles, because the Vietnam War was not about individual campaigns, but about sustained warfare. However a 77-day siege in the central highlands near the De-Militarized Zone in 1968 was the setting of what was feared to be America's Dien Bien Phu. Two books on the battle tell the story from different perspectives. Robert Pisor's *The End of the Line* (2002 [1982]) focuses on the siege itself, the background of the TET Offensive, and the strategy of the PAVN to eventually abandon the surrounding mountains after having held the US Marines at bay for nearly three months. Another look at the siege with corresponding background from Washington, Saigon and Hanoi is John Prados and Ray Stubbe's *Valley of Decision* (2004 [1991]). Stubbe served with the US Marines at Khe Sanh and Prados directs the Vietnam Documentation Project at the National Security Archives at George Washington University. Their book places the siege within the context of the geo-political standoff between Washington and Hanoi, and describes the fears of Washington that the US could lose the war if Khe Sanh were to be overrun, particularly in light of the TET Offensive having just occurred.

Beyond Khe Sanh and Ia Drang, most books about the soldiers who fought in Vietnam look at them more generically, almost anonymously, and authors have presented their stories as individual accounts of combat. Because everyone's experiences were different, depending on where and when one served, and whether they were in a combat or a combat support role, there is a remarkable diversity of experience expressed in books such as *A Life in a Year* (2004 [1993]) by James Ebert, *Light Ruck: Vietnam 1969*, (2002), by Tom Lacombe and *The Only War We Had*, (2007 [1987]) by Michael Lee Lanning. Each of these accounts describes soldiering from a different perspective, but every author tells of the confusion surrounding jungle warfare and fighting an enemy that looked exactly like our allies. The authors seldom express political views about the war, nor do they discuss to any great extent the decision that Washington was making about the strategic interests of the nation, or about the prospects for success. These books are about soldiering, which is also the basic content of *Some Even Volunteered* (1994) by Alfred S. Bradford, *Red Thunder, Tropic Lightning* (1994 [1993]) by Eric Bergerud and *Year In Nam* (2000), by Leroy Te Cube. Each book depicts different locations, different fears, and different circumstances, but all embrace the idea that warfare is about soldiers, not politicians.

No historiography on soldiers and their behavior would be complete without mention of Michael Herr's *Dispatches* (1997 [1977]). The account is simply daily notes from his reports to editors in the States about what he witnessed in his patrolling with "grunts" or infantrymen in various locations during various times of the war. Most of these "dispatches" could not have been printed in newspapers because of the profanity, nor the obvious hallucinogenic state that Herr was in during the writing of each passage. But it is a powerful piece that depicts the best – and worst – of combat.

Moral ambiguity is more prevalent among fighters than talkers, but five years of negotiating contained elements that could raise doubts about the "rightness" of extensive bombing campaigns. When the Paris Peace talks finally began in the

fall of 1968, after a lengthy debate regarding who could be seated at an unspecified shaped table, both the United States and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam sought to take advantage of their own military strengths. Within nine months of the first discussions, secret negotiations began between Le Duc Tho and American National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger, and it would be these clandestine forays into uncharted territories that would ultimately bring success. After the PAVN had launched the Easter offensive in 1972 and had failed to dislodge ARVN troops from the area northwest of Saigon at An Loc, the mood seemed to change in Paris. James Willbanks' *Battle of An Loc* (2005) describes in great detail the near catastrophe that would have resulted had the ARVN not held their ground – with the necessary assistance of US advisors calling in US air power, and how the pathway to Saigon was interrupted by much bravery and sacrifice. In Paris, the North Vietnamese representatives began to negotiate more seriously, and they dropped their insistence on the resignation of Nguyen Van Thieu. They did, however, insist on allowing PAVN troops already in South Vietnam to remain in place, a condition vehemently opposed by Thieu. Three authors have provided excruciating details about those eventful years in Paris, each providing a different perspective. Bui Diem's *In The Jaws of History* (1999 [1987]) is a personal account of the war from the perspective of a diplomat – one who was trained in the North, knew General Vo Nguyen Giap and Ho Chi Minh, and ultimately served as South Vietnam's Ambassador to the United States. His perspective on Paris was that the United States did try to leave with honor, but that it had few choices based upon the American society's eroding support for the war.

Jeffrey Kimball's *Nixon's Vietnam War*, (2002 [1998]) describes Paris as the final result of Nixon's Vietnamization policy, but that both he and Kissinger were willing to withdraw American troops, knowing full well that the ARVN were not capable of defeating the PAVN as long as they were allowed to stay in the South after the Paris accords were signed. The "decent interval" strategy was the basis for the final settlement, and according to Kimball, Nixon felt no remorse for having brought the North Vietnamese government to its knees by the Christmas bombings of 1972.

Larry Berman is no less complimentary as to the machinations of Nixon and Kissinger in *No Peace, No Honor* (2002 [2001]). The new thesis developed by Berman is that Kissinger knew that the ARVN would ultimately be incapable of holding off the advancing PAVN troops, and that the final outcome of a Communist Vietnam was inevitable. But Nixon believed that if the PAVN violated the Paris Peace agreement, he would order US planes to attack not only the troops in the South, but also military targets in the north. And, according to Berman, it was only the Watergate incident that kept Nixon from being able to prosecute the war according to his own contingency plans.

All three of the aforementioned books addressed political and diplomatic issues at the end of a long, drawn-out war. Lewis Sorley addressed military issues during the same time-frame in *A Better War* (2007 [1999]). According to Sorley, the United States left the ARVN the capacity necessary to defeat the North and were

it not for the US Congress “pulling the plug” and therefore not allowing the ARVN to fulfill their capabilities, they could have been victorious.

Sorley is among the historians who could now be referred to, at least by many in academe, as revisionist historians, who now look at newly de-classified archival evidence and have determined that America’s role in Vietnam has been erroneously reported by historians over the last 40 years. The new archival evidence, particularly when examining the Vietnamese primary sources, indicates that America could have won the war if the political climate at home had been more supportive of the military’s efforts on the ground. Michael Lind, Washington editor of *Harper’s Magazine* was among the first to take on both the left and the right, both of whom had previously dominated the discussion on the war. Lind’s thesis held that the left was wrong to accept Communist propaganda about imperialism being the reason for America’s invasion, and the right was wrong to claim that the war could have been won if not for the politicians’ interference. Instead, the Vietnam War should be viewed as just another war in the Cold War, which was inevitable if the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China were to be stopped from dominating every third world nation in Southeast Asia – the Eisenhower era adage known as the domino theory. In *Vietnam: The Necessary War* (1999) Lind claims that Vietnam was no different than Korea, or Afghanistan for the Soviet Union, or any number of smaller conflicts and that the United States was both correct in waging the war, and wrong in its approach. “The Vietnam War was a just, constitutional and necessary proxy war in the Third World War that was waged by methods that were often counter productive and sometimes arguably immoral” (284). Mark Moyar’s new book *Triumph Forsaken: The Vietnam War, 1954–1965*, (2006), addresses the early advisory period when, according to Moyar, the CIA and Defense Department, like Krulak, believed that South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem was adequately resisting the Communist insurgency in the South, and it was the undermining of his efforts by the State Department and the media represented by journalists such as Neil Sheehan and David Halberstam, that caused Diem’s failure. Had America stayed in support of Diem, not given tacit approval to several proposed *coups d’etat*, and allowed him to aggressively confront the National Liberation Front, there might never have been a need to introduce ground troops into the war as was done in 1965. The Moyar thesis is controversial among Vietnam scholars, but is supported by historians who view the war from both sides, and who give credence to the Vietnamese sources now available. Equally contentious is Moyar’s assertion that American leaders who believed in the Domino Theory were correct, that pro-American leaders in Asia also agreed with this assessment, and that a defeat in Vietnam would damage “America’s standing with its allies across the world” (378).

Finally, authors have written extensively about the legacy of the Vietnam War, many of them began right after the war ended as was discussed previously in “angry colonel” books. Colonel Harry Summers wrote *On Strategy* (1982), and blamed America’s failure to succeed on the military establishment’s lack of adherence to Karl Clausewitz’ (2007) principles espoused in *On War*. Thus, politicians did not understand that society must support a war if it is to be used as an instrument of

public policy. And politicians must see the war as an instrument of policy that has no limitations, including that of massive force even if such action causes allies of the enemy to enter the conflict as was feared regarding China and the Soviet Union. Summer's book became one of the most widely read at the graduate war colleges and academies, because it related conduct in the war to a previously taught classic.

A more recent contribution to the offerings on legacy of the war is H. R. McMaster's, *Dereliction of Duty* (1997). Written by an active duty field grade officer and based upon his dissertation which met partial requirements for his PhD from the University of North Carolina, the author was critical of the planning and execution of the war, including specifically military leaders. "The failings were many and reinforcing: arrogance, weakness, lying in the pursuit of self-interest, and, above all, the abdication of responsibility to the American people" (334). The author is currently a Colonel and having served a tour in Iraq as commander of the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment, has recently become part of the "brain-trust" advising the Pentagon on Iraqi Freedom.

The historiography of legacy regarding veterans is also reflective of some revisionist scholarship. Psychiatrist Robert Lifton first addressed the issue of what is now diagnosed as Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) in his book *Home From the War* (1973). Many years later, Jonathan Shay in his book *Achilles in Vietnam* (1994), developed a thesis that the reason PTSD existed among so many Vietnam veterans was due to the American society's rejection of the soldier upon his return from the theater. He compared Vietnam veterans to the returning hoplite warriors in the Greek wars, who were typically met with laurels upon their return from battle. He reinforced this position with his most recent book, *Odysseus in America* (2002). His work was buttressed by the efforts of Larry Tritle in *From Melos to My Lai* (2000). Tritle is a Vietnam veteran who is also a Professor of Classics at Loyola Marymont, and he agrees with the Shay thesis, and cites particular incidents in the Greek wars that support the difference in warriors' attitudes when a society neither supports the war, nor the warrior.

Jeffrey Lembcke vehemently disagrees with Lifton, Shay, and Tritle in that his scholarship supports the thesis that Vietnam veterans were not rejected by the American society; that they were supported like those of previous wars, including World War II. In *Spitting Image* (2000), this Vietnam veteran claims that there is no archival evidence that a piece of expectorate ever landed on a returning soldier from Vietnam; that memory has betrayed those who served in the war. Lembcke does not look at the reasons why the US Congress passed the Vietnam Era Veterans Readjustment Assistance Act of 1974 to require Affirmative Action for veterans in hiring and other areas of potential discrimination.

This chapter began with a discussion of moral ambiguities, and proceeded to identify various levels and the historiographic support for each. Such ideas have re-surfaced with the current controversy over the War in Iraq, and scholarship prepared 40 years ago is now being re-examined to affect an understanding of the complexities and failures in Vietnam. Thus, one can conclude that all future wars that require American men and women to engage an enemy will be viewed through the lens of America's longest war.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Addington, Larry (2000). *America's War in Vietnam: A Short Narrative History*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Anderson, David L. (2005). *The Vietnam War*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Appy, Christian (1993). *Working Class War: American Combat Soldiers and Vietnam*. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press.
- BDM Corporation (1981). "Strategic Lessons Learned in Vietnam," vol. 1: *The Enemy*. McLean, VA: BDM Corporation.
- Bergerud, Eric (1994 [1993]). *Red Thunder, Tropic Lightning: The World of a Combat Division in Vietnam*. New York: Penguin.
- Berman, Larry (2002 [2001]). *No Peace, No Honor: Nixon, Kissinger, and Betrayal in Vietnam*. New York: Free Press.
- Bradford, Alfred S. (1994). *Some Even Volunteered: The First Wolfhounds Pacify Vietnam*. Westport: Praeger.
- Cincinnatus [Cecil B. Curry] (1981). *Self-Destruction: The Disintegration and Decay of the United States Army During the Vietnam War Era*. New York: W. W. Norton.
- Clausewitz, Karl (2007 [1982]). *On War*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Corson, William R. (1968). *The Betrayal*. New York: W. W. Norton.
- Corson, William R. (1974). *Consequences of Failure*. New York: W. W. Norton.
- Diem, Bui, and David Chanoff (1999 [1987]). *In The Jaws of History*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Duiker, William (1995). *Sacred War: Nationalism and Revolution in a Divided Vietnam*. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Ebert, James R. (2004 [1993]). *A Life in a Year: The American Infantryman in Vietnam, 1965–1972*. Novato, CA: Presidio Press.
- Fall, Bernard (1994 [1961]). *Street Without Joy: The French Debacle in Indochina*. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books.
- Fall, Bernard (2002 [1966]). *Hell in a Very Small Place*. Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press.
- FitzGerald, Frances (1972). *Fire in the Lake: The Vietnamese and the Americans in Vietnam*. Boston: Little, Brown.
- Gabriel, Richard A., and Paul L. Savage (1978). *Crisis in Command: Mismanagement in the Army*. New York: Hill and Wang.
- Gardner, Lloyd C. (1988). *Approaching Vietnam: From World War II through Dienbienphu, 1941–1954*. New York: W. W. Norton & Co.
- Halberstam, David (1988 [1965]). *The Making of a Quagmire: America and Vietnam During the Kennedy Era*. New York: Ballantine Books.
- Halberstam, David (2001 [1973]). *The Best and the Brightest*. New York: Modern Library.
- Hauser, William L. (1973). *America's Army in Crisis: A Study in Civil–Military Relations*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Herr, Michael (1997 [1991, 1977]). *Dispatches*. New York: Picador Publishing.
- Herring, George C. (2001 [1979]). *America's Longest War: The United States and Vietnam*. New York: McGraw-Hill Higher Education.
- Karnow, Stanley (1997 [1984]). *Vietnam: A History*. New York: Penguin.
- Kimball, Jeffrey (2002 [1998]). *Nixon's Vietnam War*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
- Kindsvatter, Peter S. (2003). *American Soldiers: Ground Combat in the World Wars, Korea and Vietnam*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.

- Kinnard, Douglas (1977). *The War Managers: American Generals Reflect on Vietnam*. New York: Da Capo Press.
- King, Edward L. (1972). *The Death of the Army: A Pre-Mortem*. New York: Saturday Review Press.
- Kitfield, James (1995). *Prodigal Soldiers: How the Generation of Officers Born of Vietnam Revolutionized the American Style of War*. Washington: Brassey's.
- Kolko, Gabriel (1994 [1986]). *Anatomy of a War: Vietnam, the United States, and the Modern Historical Experience*. New York: New Press.
- Kolko, Gabriel (1997). *Vietnam: Anatomy of a Peace*. New York: Routledge.
- Krulak, Victor H. (1984). *First to Fight: An Inside View of the U.S. Marine Corps*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Lacombe, Tom (2002). *Light Ruck: Vietnam, 1969*. Fort Valley, VA: Loft Press.
- Lanning, Michael Lee (2007 [1987]). *The Only War We Had: A Platoon Leader's Journal of Vietnam*. College Station: Texas A&M University Press.
- Lembcke, Jeffrey (2000). *The Spitting Image: Myth, Memory and the Legacy of Vietnam*. New York: New York University Press.
- Lewy, Guenter (1976). *America in Vietnam*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Lifton, Robert (1973). *Home from the War: Vietnam Veterans – Neither Victims nor Executioner*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Lind, Michael (1999). *Vietnam: The Necessary War: A Reinterpretation of America's Most Disastrous Military Conflict*. New York: Free Press.
- McMaster, H.R. (1997). *Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies That Led to Vietnam*. New York: Harper Perennial.
- Milam, Ron (2009). *Not a Gentleman's War: An Inside View of Junior Officers in the Vietnam War*. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press.
- Moore, Hall G., and Joseph L. Galloway (2004 [1992]). *We Were Soldiers Once ... and Young: Ia Drang – the Battle That Changed the War in Vietnam*. Novato, CA: Presidio Press.
- Moyar, Mark (2006). *Triumph Forsaken: The Vietnam War, 1954–1965*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Pisor, Robert (2002, [1982, 1985]). *The End of the Line: The Siege of Khe Sanh*. New York: W. W. Norton.
- Powell, Colin (1996). *My American Journey*. New York: Ballantine Books.
- Prados, John, (2009). *Vietnam: The History of an Unwinnable War, 1945–1975*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
- Prados, John, and Ray Stubbe (2004 [1991]). *Valley of Decision: The Siege of Khe Sanh*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Schwarzkopf, Norman (1996). *It Doesn't Take A Hero*. New York: Ballantine Books.
- Shay, Jonathan (1994). *Achilles in Vietnam: Combat Trauma and the Undoing of Character*. New York: Scribner.
- Shay, Jonathan (2002). *Odysseus in America: Combat Trauma and the Trials of Homecoming*. New York: Scribner.
- Sheehan, Neil (1998 [1988]). *A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam*. London: Pimlico.
- Sorley, Lewis (2007 [1999]). *A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America's Last Years in Vietnam*. New York: Harvest Books.
- Spector, Ron (1993). *After TET: The Bloodiest Year in Vietnam*. New York: Vintage Books.
- Stanton, Shelby (1985). *The Rise and Fall of an American Army: U.S. Ground Forces in Vietnam, 1965–1973*. New York: Dell Books.



- 
- Summers, Harry (1982). *On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War*. Novato, CA: Presidio Press.
- Te Cube, Leroy (2000). *Year in Nam: A Native American Soldier's Story*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska.
- Tritle, Larry (2000). *From Melos to My Lai: Violence, Culture and Survival*. New York: Routledge.
- Willbanks, James (2005). *Battle of An Loc*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Young, Marilyn B. (1991). *The Vietnam Wars, 1945–1975*. New York: HarperCollins.

# Chapter Fourteen

---

## THE COLD WAR

*Elizabeth Lutes Hillman*

The “Cold War” describes both a mindset of political anxiety and a period of military history. Because of its length and ideological focus, its demands reshaped the culture and demographics of the US military as well as its mission, size, and structure (Miller 1999). With roots as deep as the nineteenth-century conflict between the United States and Russia and with an impact that stretched into virtually every corner of the world, the Cold War dominated geopolitics for more than four decades (LaFeber 2006 [1993]). The struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union began as World War II ended and lasted until the fall of the Communist regime in the Soviet Union in the early 1990s. It led to the creation of a permanent, large American military force, to the research and development of elaborate and nuclear weapons systems, and to a culture that valued conformity and punished dissent because of a desire to resist Communist thought (Sherry 1995). These trends transformed the American military into a massive bureaucracy within a new Department of Defense and altered military life for the millions of Americans who served in uniform during this time. The military history of the Cold War was shaped by mutual provocation between the United States and the Soviet Union. Both nations repeatedly failed to accurately assess the threats each posed to the other (Cowley 2005). Mobilizing for, and fighting, the nuclear, global Cold War was unlike mobilizing for or fighting any other US war. Its legacy for the organization and make-up of American military institutions remained long after the post-Cold War readjustment of foreign policy, military strategy, and global threat assessments.

### **A Permanent Military**

Russian–American relations became openly antagonistic after the Russian Revolution brought the Communists to power and Russia withdrew from World War I (Davis and Trani 2002). In a sign of that depth of that antagonism, the United States refused to recognize the legitimacy of the Communist government until

1933 (Bennett 1970, Maddux 1980). The Soviet–American alliance of World War II represented a marriage of necessity and good relations did not long survive the end of the war (DeSantis 1980, Bennett 1985, 1990). Historians disagree over both the precise triggers for the Cold War and whether the US–Soviet conflict was inevitable or the result of foreign policy miscalculations (Maddux 1980, Leffler 1992, Gaddis 1997), but none dispute the impact of the Communist threat on the contours of the American military. The post-World War II drawdown of military forces and reduction in defense spending was dramatic but short-lived because of the onset of the Cold War. The US commitment to preventing the spread of Communism and restraining the dominance of the Soviet Union required an investment in personnel and weapons that did not abate in the absence of outright conflict (Carroll 2006). This was not the view of the general American public in the immediate aftermath of World War II though the military invested heavily in public relations activities aimed at winning support for defense preparedness (Bogle 2004). The change was evident outside of the defense department as well; new civil agencies appeared to address issues of national security alongside the military (Robin 2001).

The Communist threat escalated dramatically in 1949 when the Soviet Union detonated its first atomic bomb in August, surprising the American intelligence community, which had anticipated a much longer nuclear monopoly, and Mao Zedong announced a Communist People's Republic of China on October 1 (Leffler 1972, Freedman 2003). In June 1950 communist-backed North Korean forces invaded the South precipitating the Korean War (Halberstam 2007). Though the need for more US military personnel heightened in the years of heaviest ground combat in the Korean conflict and, later, the Vietnam Wars, the armed forces remained sizable even in times of relative peace. During the Korean conflict, more than three million service members per year were on active duty (compared to the approximately 16 million who served during all of World War II) (Hillman 2005). After the Korean ceasefire in 1953, the number of troops dropped below three million and then stayed relatively constant until 1966, when the demands of the war in Vietnam pushed the number higher. Troop strength peaked again in 1968 with 3.5 million service members, and then began another decline, falling to 3 million by 1970 and 2.25 million in 1973 and about two million thereafter. The constant need to recruit and retain service members, especially after the end of conscription in 1973, put new stress on government planners and military leaders.

Inter-service rivalry was also a prominent feature of the Cold War armed forces. Differing perceptions of the nature of the military threat posed by the Soviet Union led Navy and Air Force leaders to advocate contrasting strategies and to contend for the development and acquisition of weapons systems designed to counter those threats. The army, navy, and air force competed for funding and credit for defeating Soviet aggression. Each branch of service wanted some control, for instance, over the marquee weapon of the Cold War, the atomic bomb, and its catastrophic effects, and each sought adoption of strategic plans that would ensure increased funding and public acknowledgement of its successes (Carroll 2006). Air Force leaders most feared a land war in Europe and argued that only the threat of massive

retaliation against targets in the Soviet Union could contain Communist expansion. Navy leaders believed that the balance of nuclear weapons and the fear of “mutually assured destruction” would deter a direct Soviet challenge to the United States diplomatic policy of “containment.” To them, a war on the periphery, waged in the Third World by Soviet “clients” posed a more likely threat and to counter this they proposed a strategy of “flexible response,” the execution of which would require maintenance of a variety of military forces capable of meeting any Soviet threat anywhere, on any level (Palmer 1990, Sale 1998). The multiple theaters in which the US military anticipated and encountered Soviet intervention had a profound impact on military strategy and policy (Feste 1992).

### “Hot” Wars in Asia

The Cold War, despite its name, involved many “hot” conflicts between US troops and foreign military forces. The two largest were the Korean War and the Vietnam War, each of which had a tremendous impact on the American military. The Korean War (1950–3) came on the heels of demobilization after World War II, and exposed an under-manned US military to great hardship as it found itself fighting in extremely difficult terrain, climate, and cultural conditions (Lech 2000). During the first few months of the war, the White House and civilian officials in the Departments of State and Defense debated how far into Korea US troops should advance (should they cross the 38th parallel, which separated South from North Korea, and risk provoking a war with China on the Asian mainland?), whether atomic weapons should be used, and how to allocate military resources across the continents of Europe and Asia (Leffler 1992). Meanwhile, military leaders struggled to slow the advance of relentless North Korean armies in desperate hand-to-hand skirmishes until US and United Nations forces held only the Pusan perimeter, a toehold in the southeast corner of the Korean peninsula. The tide turned on September 15, 1950, with the spectacular success of the Inchon landing, a daring gamble conceived by General Douglas MacArthur and carried out by Marine regiments (Halberstam 2007). The aftermath of MacArthur’s brilliant ploy helped lead him into the confrontation with President Harry S. Truman that ended his career, to the grave mistake of sending troops north toward the Yalu River, and to open hostilities between the US military and political officials.

The Korean War set a pattern of high costs, limited success, and military–political conflict that shaped other military operations during the Cold War. The Vietnam War (1964–73) made the US military even more vulnerable than the Korean War had. It lasted three times longer, galvanized greater protest and dissent by soldiers as well as civilians, exacerbated tension between military and political leaders, and ended with US withdrawal and the fall of South Vietnam. American involvement in Vietnam began with aid to the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam) as opposition to the Communist Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam) and escalated into extensive but frustratingly indecisive

ground operations, massive but ineffective aerial bombing, and confusion over political objectives and military missions as the United States sought to roll back Communist gains (Young 1991). The personnel demands of the war led to protests over the burdens of conscription and the assignment of troops to dangerous tasks while larger strategic questions about the potential use of nuclear weapons and strategic bombing (directed at non-military targets such as industrial infrastructure) dominated debates among air force and other military leaders. The casualties, atrocities, and strategies of the war, along with the failure to adequately care for and treat its veterans, became touchstones in subsequent debates over the funding and deployment of US military forces. They also determined presidential politics; the decision of President Lyndon B. Johnson not to seek re-election in 1968 hinged on his misbegotten strategy in Vietnam, and Richard M. Nixon's successful campaign that year depended heavily on his promise – which could not be fulfilled – to bring victory in the war.

### **New Technology and Personnel**

The arms race created great pressure for innovation, and every advance was countered by a comparable Soviet achievement (FitzGerald 2000). The US had an atomic bomb in 1945, an intercontinental bomber in 1948, a hydrogen bomb in 1952, a submarine-launched ballistic missile in 1960, and a multiple, independently targeted re-entry vehicle (MIRV) in 1970 – each followed soon after by a Soviet version (Carroll 2006). This escalation drove the military–industrial complex of which President Dwight Eisenhower had warned, creating opportunity as well as insecurity and anxiety in the ranks of military leaders.

The Cold War US military was larger and more technically sophisticated than in earlier eras, and staffing it required new recruiting and personnel policies. Even with the aid of conscription to supplement volunteers, attracting enough qualified recruits from a war-weary population in a booming economy was no easy task (Flynn 1993). The era's prosperity hindered recruiting and retention, even after the military instituted policies more conducive to family life and raised the pay scales of officers in an effort to keep pace with civilian salaries (Hillman 2005). Americans were apprehensive about the future of warfare in an age of nuclear weapons, and waning public confidence jeopardized the positive image of the armed forces that the services relied upon for recruiting and political support.

Changes in the demographics of service members also posed new problems for the leaders of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps, with each branch of service trying to populate its ranks with qualified, orderly troops. In addition to worrying about the number of soldiers in uniform, officials fretted over the quality of service members, as measured by aptitude tests and educational achievement (Appy 1993). The military complained often of recruits who entered the service with poor educational backgrounds (Robin 2001). These young men were considered disciplinary problems from the start of their military careers, and were in fact more likely to end up facing courts-martial. Indicators of quality in the male

enlisted forces dropped precipitously after World War II as recruits became younger, poorer, and less educated (Appy 1993).

Concerns about this achievement gap helped bring about two 1948 “man-power” reforms: the Women’s Armed Forces Integration Act, which allowed for the possibility of military careers for at least a few servicewomen, and President Truman’s order to desegregate the armed forces. Despite having little immediate impact on the make-up of the armed forces, these reforms were powerful symbols of the United States’ intent to widen the range of Americans to whom the honor and prestige of military service would be available. Yet high tensions accompanied the possibility as well as the actual implementation of racial and gender desegregation (Nalty 1986). Both veterans and active-duty military officers were concerned about the military’s effectiveness and status in an era of greater inclusion. Part of their concern was targeted at homosexuality in the ranks, and during the 1950’s, efforts to oust both civilian and military gay and lesbian government employees were common (Johnson 2004).

Technological change and demographic shifts complicated the task of training and organizing troops, who were no longer best managed with the coercive methods that had characterized military leadership in the past (Hillman 2005). The younger generation of Americans upon whom the military relied were seen as increasingly rebellious, frustrating those who would control them, whether parents or military officers. Meeting the military’s personnel needs was further complicated by the bureaucratic intricacies of managing conscription, volunteering, deferments, and guard and reserve forces all at one time. As a new psychology of management took hold of the post-World War II military bureaucracy, the unique quality of military discipline as distinct from civilian corporate culture seemed to be dissolving (Robin 2001). Military leaders sought new ways to ensure orderly troops at the same time they tried to protect the armed forces’ integrity in the eyes of a skeptical public that feared the consequences of the nuclear age.

Each branch of service devised a recruiting strategy to remedy low re-enlistment rates and counter the impression of low-quality recruits. Concerns that the Air Force was hoarding the brightest recruits prompted then-Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall to adopt a “qualitative distribution policy” in 1951 that created a system of service quotas based on the mental aptitude of personnel. Marshall’s plan to share the recruiting wealth among the services foreshadowed Project 100,000, the brainchild of Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara. Project 100,000 was a Great Society program intended to augment the armed forces with recruits previously rejected because of low scores on pre-admission intelligence tests. This plan, which Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan viewed as a means of rescuing young African-American men from a destructive, matriarchal pathology, brought over 400,000 young men, most from poverty, into the service between 1966 and 1972. Moynihan’s rationale for the program combined two popular perspectives on military service: that it built character and made men, and that the modern armed forces could be an instrument of social change. The additional training that was supposed to accompany the induction of these under-prepared men did not materialize, and the consequences were dire, half were sent to



Vietnam, where they died at a rate twice that of other troops (Appy 1993). Although African Americans comprised only 10 percent of the military in the late 1960s, they were 40 percent of the Project 100,000 inductees. A prime reason for the disproportionately high casualty rate among these troops was the high percentage sent into combat occupations, which made up most of the military occupations deemed suitable for "Project 100,000 men."

In spite of commanders' complaints about the capabilities of recruits and the difficulty of training ill-prepared troops, not all Cold War demographic shifts worked against the "quality" that recruiters sought among potential soldiers (Hillman 2005). Better-educated, older, and married service members were associated with lower rates of crime and disciplinary incidents. The percentage of high-school graduates among enlistees rose steadily throughout the cycles of military build-up and decline in the 1950s and 1960s, reflecting national trends in education. The Department of Defense estimated that over 50 percent of enlisted troops had graduated from high school in 1952, a figure that rose to 62 percent by 1958, 72 by 1962, over 80 by 1965 and near 90 by 1978. The median age of male military personnel rose gradually between and after the build-ups for war, and an increasing number of service members were married.

There was one group of recruits who were consistently older, more educated, and less prone to disciplinary problems than the average enlisted person during the 1950s and 1960s: women (Stiehm 1996). They were, however, an almost completely overlooked resource during the first decades of the Cold War. At the outbreak of war in Korea, only 22,000 women were serving on active duty, less than half the number that could have been under existing law. The 45,000 women on active duty in 1953 amounted to just over 1 percent of the total number of active-duty personnel. By the late 1950s, the number of servicewomen had fallen to about 30,000, where it would stay until a gradual increase began in 1967 and then accelerated with the end of the draft in 1973.

Even with the limitations placed on servicewomen's occupational specialties during this period, many servicemen performed the same military duties as servicewomen. In fact, many more servicemen than women performed the less-than-martial tasks to which most female soldiers were assigned. During the Vietnam War, nearly 15 percent of the male enlisted force worked in administrative positions, 22 percent in technical or scientific jobs, and 13 percent as "service workers" (Holm 1982). "Military"-style duties were scarcer for men than in the past because of the high percentage of technically demanding jobs during the Cold War. Military-specific occupational specialties, including "combat" duties, were assigned to only 18 percent of the total enlisted force during Vietnam, down from 38 percent in World War II and 30 percent during the Korean War (Hillman 2005).

The Cold War military policies that preferred men to women were less a functional imperative than an attempt to preserve a culture that celebrated masculine authority (Karst 1991). The decision of the armed forces to implement programs such as "Project 100,000" rather than to mobilize more women reserved the duty and privilege of military service for American men. The possibility of women being "masculinized" by military service was disturbing to many female military leaders,

who repeatedly sought ways to make women appear more conventionally attractive in their uniforms. But preventing the armed forces from being “feminized” was of greater concern to the military as a whole. The military’s increasing rejection of gay men, at least during times of force reduction, also reflected its desire to promote an image of virile, heterosexual servicemen. With the image of the soldier as a warrior jeopardized by technology and bureaucracy, putting more women in uniform was not an acceptable solution to the military’s personnel needs.

### **Ideology and Anti-Communism**

During the Cold War, government and military leaders wanted soldiers to be viewed as strong, free-thinking men who accepted the constraints of military life as one of the burdens of democracy. The Cold War enemy was no ordinary foe; it was an awesome, omnivorous Soviet Union, famously termed the Evil Empire by President Ronald Reagan, that required new methods to defeat (FitzGerald 2000). The armed forces expected service members to be staunchly anti-Communist and to engage in only limited types of sexual activity lest they corrupt the armed forces with vulnerability and weakness (Hillman 2005). Cold War military law and regulations denied to service members many of the freedoms most cherished in American democratic culture – speech, association, travel, privacy – in order to protect democracy itself. These restraints, so at odds with political notions of equality and freedom, were considered a necessary concession in the battle to prove American democracy superior to Communism. Through persuasion, coercion, and, as a last resort, criminal prosecution, the United States’ standing armed forces curtailed individualism in favor of molding obedient troops.

Because of Cold War politics, dissent posed a new threat to the American military at the same time that soldiers’ sexual and political opportunities blossomed (Johnson 2004). Enforcing ideological and behavioral norms became more important as doubts grew about service members’ ability to resist Communist seduction (Robin 2001). Soldiers expected, and sometimes challenged, restrictions on appearance, speech, and conduct long before the rise of the Soviet Union or the spread of communism in Asia. But on the battlefields of the Cold War, service members who violated military rules and regulations about politics and sex did not only embarrass military leaders, service members’ mistakes in judgment seemed to undermine the very standards of the American culture that the armed forces sought to defend.

In reality, the service members who were court-martialed or otherwise punished for challenging the military’s political and sexual norms appear to have posed little danger to the political viability or on-the-ground effectiveness of the armed forces. Nonetheless, military leaders’ and government officials’ fear that the rapidly expanding armed forces could be undone from within was powerful enough to inspire the prosecution of even insignificant breaches of conduct (Hillman 2005).

The military’s efforts to uncover and punish dissent during the Cold War were a critical part of the nation’s effort to eliminate internal threats while fighting the

forces of Communism abroad (Schrecker 1998). Although neither anti-Communist fervor nor efforts to repress extra-martial or same-sex sexual behavior were limited to the armed forces, dissidents in uniform were an especially frightening prospect. They could subvert military values from within, operating from trusted positions with access to classified information (Engelhardt 1995). If known to the public but unpunished by the military, their behavior could make the military appear ideologically weak, susceptible to manipulation by foreign agents and vulnerable to Communist persuasion. Although fear of spying was a standard feature of Cold War political culture, the possibility of spies within the military heightened anxiety because of service members' knowledge of government secrets, weapons systems, and tactics. Military leaders who sought to uncover "reds" could not rely on simple visual cues. Instead, they tried to ferret out treasonous intent and faltering allegiance through constant surveillance and aggressive investigation. Such all-out efforts to find closet communists threatened to transform the US government into an oppressive authoritarian regime, frightening those wary of totalitarianism as well communism (Schrecker 1998). To many observers, military institutions' mechanisms of enforcing conformity, including courts-martial, bore a troubling resemblance to the tools by which a totalitarian government controlled its body politic. But as the military fought to maintain the culture of hierarchy and exclusiveness that seemed so critical to victory, it also fought against the changing sexual mores and social climate of the post-World War II United States.

### Desegregation

Hastened by the personnel needs of the Cold War and the civil rights movement, the successful integration of the armed forces has been celebrated as one of the signal achievements of the US armed forces (Dudziak 2000). The crucial first step was President Truman's 1948 order, which set the armed forces on course to end segregation and treat service members equally, regardless of race. The military's promise of racial equality did not go unnoticed. Because the armed forces were more visible internationally than any other American organization, the rhetoric and appearance of racial equity in the military was especially important to the United States' effort to claim the moral high ground in the war against communism. Desegregation, along with the economic benefits of military service and the enhanced social status often accorded soldiers, encouraged many African Americans to enlist. The Gesell Committee, appointed by President John F. Kennedy in 1962 to study progress toward racial integration in the armed forces, lauded the military as a "pace setter" compared to civilian workplaces (Nalty 1986).

The president's committee, however, also pointed out areas of troubling disparity in the military's treatment of soldiers of color, including the low number of black officers in uniform and the military's failure to integrate its police forces and shore patrolmen. Given the military's emphasis on deference to those of higher rank, the paucity of non-white commissioned officers was an especially notable shortcoming in the military's efforts to integrate. The percentage of African

Americans in the total force stayed close to 8 percent through the 1960s, but African American officers remained an anomaly into the 1970s.

Discrimination off-base, as well as on-post, affected service members of color and became the target of civil rights protests (Westheider 1997). Efforts to end civilian discrimination around military posts were especially successful when court decisions coincided with civil rights legislation, as they did in the Department of Defense's 1968 push to reduce housing discrimination. The black press kept a close watch on the plight of African Americans in the military throughout this period, but major protests against discriminatory policies did not occur until the escalation of troops in Vietnam. Most inflammatory were revelations that black troops suffered disproportionately high casualty rates during the first years of heavy US involvement, a consequence of the personnel policies that consigned many African Americans to combat duty. Racial tensions climaxed in the early 1970s, echoing the unrest within American civil society, when race riots aboard ships and on military posts forced the armed forces to confront the costs of racism directly.

As the civil rights movement gradually transformed the armed forces and the rest of the United States, the military justice system became a focus of resentment over ongoing discrimination. Whether racial factors were decisive in legal decision-making regarding courts-martial and other disciplinary measures is not easy to determine. Statistics cannot reveal the subjective mindsets of the commanders and judge advocates who determined the course of military justice. Yet the sum of quantitative data and case histories make clear that assumptions about race influenced whether a commander decided to prosecute, how a judge advocate chose to defend a client, and how a court-martial panel viewed an accused service member even in an environment of heightened awareness of the political and social importance of racial justice.

### **Military Impact on American Culture**

The massive American investment in military forces and anti-communism during the Cold War had a profound impact on American popular culture (Whitfield 1998 [1995], Henriksen 1997). Newspapers, magazines, and radio and television news covered theaters of war and military personnel issues closely; frequent congressional hearings considered military spending, scandals, and benefits; and the entertainment industry embraced military life as a prominent theme of Cold War culture. Historian and cultural critic Tom Engelhardt (1995) describes how the Pentagon in the 1950s helped to produce television shows and movies that were "war spectacles and spectacles" for an American public hungry for demonstrations of military power.

Military leaders spent precious resources on such collaborations partly to promote and protect the positive image of American fighting forces (Sherry 1995). The military needed to protect its political viability – to defend itself, not only the nation – as doubts about its ability to defeat Communism, resist coercion, and

win wars surfaced. If the military lost the faith of the American public and its foreign allies, it was that much closer to losing the all-important ideological and emotional, as well as perhaps the military and strategic, dimensions of the Cold War. Doubt about US military effectiveness was at its peak during and after the Vietnam War, when anti-war protests placed service members and veterans on the defensive (Young 1991). Images of college students burning draft cards, of people marching up to buildings from the Pentagon to ROTC buildings on campus, and of soldiers suffering in Vietnam had a long-term impact on the morale of military leaders. It was recognition of that impact that led President George H.W. Bush to remark that the US military success in the post-Cold War conflict in the Persian Gulf in 1990–1 had finally erased “Vietnam syndrome” from the American psyche.

### The End of the Cold War

The Cold War continued to influence political debate, military affairs, and public attitudes well into the twenty-first century, but its conventional end is held as 1989, when the Berlin Wall fell, ending the east–west partition of Europe, into the early 1990s, when an era of *glasnost* (openness) and *perestroika* (restructuring) under Mikhail Gorbachev ended the Communist domination of the Soviet Union. The United States and the Soviet Union came closest to open conflict in the Berlin blockade (1948–9), the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962), and the Soviet war in Afghanistan (1979–89), but the Cold War ended without the use of atomic weapons or the outbreak of open conflict between the two superpower nations (LeFeber 2006). When the primary threat to the United States ceased to be Communism, the American military faced another set of challenges as it adapted to the demands of a post-Soviet era.

### BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Ali, S. Mahmud (2005). *U.S.–China Cold War Collaboration, 1971–1989*. New York: Routledge.
- Appy, Christian G. (1993). *Working-Class War: American Combat Soldiers and Vietnam*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Barlow, Jeffery G. (1994). *Revolt of the Admirals: The Fight for Naval Aviation, 1945–1950*. Washington: Naval Historical Center.
- Bennett, Edward M. (1970). *Recognition of Russia: An American Foreign Policy Dilemma*. Waltham, MA: Blaisdell.
- Bennett, Edward M. (1985). *Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Search for Security: American–Soviet Relations, 1933–1939*. Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources.
- Bennett, Edward M. (1990). *Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Search for Victory: American–Soviet Relations, 1939–1945*. Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources.
- Bogle, Lori (2004). *The Pentagon’s Battle for the American Mind: The Early Cold War*. College Station: Texas A&M University Press.
- Botti, Timothy J. (1996). *Ace in the Hole: Why the United States Did Not Use Nuclear Weapons in the Cold War, 1945 to 1965*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.

- Burrows, William E. (2001). *By Any Means Necessary: America's Secret Air War in the Cold War*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
- Carroll, James (2006). *House of War: The Pentagon and the Disastrous Rise of American Power*. New York: Houghton Mifflin.
- Chernus, Ira (2008). *Apocalypse Management: Eisenhower and the Discourse of National Insecurity*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Cowley, Robert, ed. (2005). *The Cold War: A Military History*. New York: Random House.
- Craven, John Pina (2001). *The Silent War: The Cold War Battle beneath the Sea*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Davis, Donald E., and Eugene P. Trani (2002). *The First Cold War: The Legacy of Woodrow Wilson in U.S.-Soviet Relations*. Columbia: University of Missouri Press.
- Denitch, Bogdan (1990). *The End of the Cold War: European Unity, Socialism, and the Shift in Global Power*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- DeSantis, Hugh (1980). *The Diplomacy of Silence: The American Foreign Service, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War, 1933-1947*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Dudziak, Mary L. (2000). *Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Durning, Marvin B. (2007). *World Turned Upside Down: U.S. Naval Intelligence and the Early Cold War Struggle for Germany*. Washington: Potomac Books.
- Engelhardt, Tom (1995). *The End of Victory Culture: Cold War America and the Disillusioning of a Generation*. New York: Basic Books.
- Feste, Karen A. (1992). *Expanding the Frontiers: Superpower Intervention in the Cold War*. Westport, CT: Praeger.
- FitzGerald, Frances (2000). *Way Out There in the Blue: Reagan, Star Wars, and the End of the Cold War*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Flynn, George Q. (1993). *The Draft, 1940-1973*. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press.
- Freedman, Lawrence (2003 [1981]). *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy*, 3rd edn. Basingstoke: Macmillan Press.
- Gaddis, John Lewis (1997). *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Halberstam, David (2007). *The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War*. New York: Hyperion.
- Hattendorf, John B. (2004). *The Evolution of the U.S. Navy's Maritime Strategy, 1977-1986*. Newport, RI: Naval War College, Center for Naval Warfare Studies.
- Henriksen, Margot A. (1997). *Dr. Strangelove's America: Society and Culture in the Atomic Age*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Hess, Gary R. (2001). *Presidential Decisions for War: Korea, Vietnam, and the Persian Gulf*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Hillman, Elizabeth Lutes (2005). *Defending America: Military Culture and the Cold War Court-Martial*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Holm, Jeanne (1982). *Women in the Military: An Unfinished Revolution*. Novato, CA: Presidio.
- Johnson, David K. (2004). *The Lavender Scare: The Cold War Persecution of Gays and Lesbians in the Federal Government*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Karst, Kenneth L. (1991). "The Pursuit of Manhood and the Desegregation of the Armed Forces," *UCLA Law Review*, 38 (February), 499-581.
- LaFeber, Walter (2006 [1993]). *America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-1992*, 9th edn. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Lech, Raymond B. (2000). *Broken Soldiers*. Chicago: University of Illinois Press.



- Leffler, Melvyn P. (1992). *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- MacGregor, Morris J. (1982). *Integration of the Armed Forces, 1940–1965*. Washington: Center for Military History, US Army.
- Maddux, Thomas R. (1980). *Years of Estrangement: American Relations with the Soviet Union, 1933–1941*. Tallahassee: University Press of Florida.
- McGee, George (1990). *The U.S.–Turkish–NATO Middle East Connection: How the Truman Doctrine Contained the Soviets in the Middle East*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Miller, David (1999). *The Cold War: A Military History*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Moser, Richard (1996). *The New Winter Soldiers: GI and Veteran Dissent during the Vietnam War*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.
- Nalty, Bernard C. (1986). *Strength for the Fight: A History of Black Americans in the Military*. New York: Free Press.
- Palmer, Michael (1990). *Origins of the Maritime Strategy: The Development of American Naval Strategy, 1945–1955*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Robin, Ron (2001). *The Making of the Cold War Enemy: Culture and Politics in Mid-Century America*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Sale, Sara L. (1998). *The Shaping of Containment: Harry S. Truman, the National Security Council, and the Cold War*. Saint James, NY: Brandywine Press.
- Schrecker, Ellen (1998). *Many are the Crimes: McCarthyism in America*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Sherry, Michael S. (1995). *In the Shadow of War: The United States Since the 1930s*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Stiehm, Judith Hicks, ed. (1996). *It's Our Military, Too! Women and the U.S. Military*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- Vogele, William B. (1994). *Stepping Back: Nuclear Arms Control and the End of the Cold War*. Westport, CT: Praeger.
- Walsh, David (2008). *The Military Balance in the Cold War: U.S. Perceptions and Policy, 1976–85*. London: Routledge.
- Westad, Odd Ame (2005). *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Westheider, James E. (1997). *Fighting on Two Fronts: African Americans and the Vietnam War*. New York: New York University Press.
- Whitfield, Stephen J. (1998 [1995]). *The Culture of the Cold War*, 2nd edn. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Winkler, David F. (2000). *Cold War at Sea: High-Seas Confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Young, Marilyn (1991). *The Vietnam Wars, 1945–1990*. New York: HarperCollins.

## Chapter Fifteen

---

# THE GULF WARS AGAINST IRAQ

*John R. Ballard*

Though combat operations continue in the Middle East, a large body of literature already fills library shelves attempting to explain the origins, conduct, and implications of the multiple conflicts between Iraq and other nations since 1979. Most significant among these were the two wars fought by coalitions led by the United States in 1991 and 2003. All of these wars have been controversial, yet they were each determined to some degree by the mistaken strategies of Saddam Hussein. Hussein's extreme dominance over Iraq compensated for the great religious and ethnic schisms in Iraqi society, and the geostrategic location of Iraq and its oil reserves gave these fault lines global import. Any comprehensive study of this series of Gulf Wars against Iraq must begin with an understanding of Iraqi culture.

### Understanding a Complex Society

Iraq is far from a monolithic society. It has been plagued by severe, domestic ethnic and religious divisions and geographic stress as only a state with no clear boundaries, split by two major rivers, and standing between the Arab West and the Persian East can exhibit. In order to understand fully the modern Iraq of the Gulf Wars period, one should be familiar with some of its long history. The finest treatment of ancient Iraq covers over 6,000 years but retains a clear, useful focus on what that ancient record means for Iraqis today (Roux 1992). Pierre-Jean Luizard (1991) also provides a great deal of complementary value to those who want to understand Iraq, given the book's strong focus on the underrepresented Shia population and their unique contributions to Iraqi society.

As a former British colony and the survivor of weak post-colonial governments, Iraq also needs to be understood as a nation with little pulling it together politically and much that pulls it apart. Phebe Marr's *The Modern History of Iraq* (2004), the most useful book on the political history of the modern Iraq, gives rare objectivity to the topic of the Iraqi state; it focuses appropriately on Iraq's lack of a national identity and the absence of a magnet to unite its three main ethnic groups.

Marr's assessment includes constructive references, appendices, and a solid bibliography. Close behind in overall quality, and with a similar unemotional approach, is Charles Tripp's *A History of Iraq* (2007).

In contrast, Kanan Makiya, *Republic of Fear* (1998), gives a much more sensational analysis, outlining the peculiar and repressive relationships between the Iraqi militias, army and police towards the Iraqi people; the many repressive and sometimes unimaginable norms that Saddam used to maintain control in Iraq; and the negative effect these "norms" had on law and morality there. Biased and emotional, the book remains important given that it has framed the views of many Western decision-makers and led many politicians down the road to justification of a preventative attack on the Ba'ath regime.

Iraq has historically witnessed a great deal of ethnic and religious strife, but as Makiya makes clear, modern Iraq became the focus of international attention largely due to Saddam Hussein and his Ba'ath party. Thus, the number of books and scholarly articles that focus on Saddam and his party is large – but unfortunately their quality is often low. One recent publication, Shiva Balaghi's *Saddam Hussein* (2006) strikes a good balance between insight and objectivity. Two other biographies of Saddam Hussein are of use: Efraim Karsh and Inari Rautsi (1991) has been accused of some bias but the book does provide useful insight into the motivations of Saddam, and Said K. Aburish (2000), provides more of an insider's view of the man who drove many of the confrontations between Iraq and the West.

### Historical Perspective-Antecedents to War: the Iran–Iraq War

To understand how Iraqis envisioned waging war, scholars should be familiar with the Iran–Iraq war, conducted from 1979 to 1988. Four publications address this little understood but useful prism into Iraqi military operations. Of these, the best overall is Stephen C. Pelletiere and Douglas V. Johnson (1991), which precisely outlines the strategy, tactics, and implications of the Iran–Iraq war from a military analyst's perspective. Dilip Hiro (1991) describes the war in broad terms, though his focus is primarily on the geo-political context and he covers little of the actual combat. The combat actions are best covered in Efraim Karsh (2002). Several of the essays in Karsh's edited volume, *The Iran–Iraq War Impact and Implications* (1989) provide valuable insights from neighboring states as they considered the horror of the conflict. Both of the Karsh books and the Pelletiere and Johnson study provide useful analysis that clarifies the impact of the war on the conflicts that would follow.

### The US Military in the Gulf

United States interests in the region were limited prior to World War II, though US Navy vessels periodically visited the Persian Gulf beginning in 1833 (Palmer 1992). When Great Britain began its withdrawal after World War II (Darby 1973,

Dockrill 2002, Kennedy 2003), the United States expanded its ties with the region (Winkler 2007). In 1982, the United States became concerned that Iran might decisively defeat Iraq and began supplying Iraq with intelligence and economic aid. The “Tanker War” began two years later when both nations began attacking oil tankers in the Gulf. In 1987, the United States allowed the “reflagging” of tankers and provided armed escort for those then flying the US flag, which it continued for two years to safeguard the export of oil from the Gulf (Wise 2007, Zatarain 2008). In May 1987, an Iraqi plane attacked the USS *Stark* (Levinson and Edwards 1997).

When Iraq invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990, the United States responded with a massive deployment of military force, known as operation *Desert Shield*, designed to provide protection for Saudi Arabia, and to intimidate Saddam Hussein into withdrawing his forces. President George H. W. Bush assembled a coalition of 34 nations to oppose the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait. When Saddam Hussein refused to withdraw from Kuwait, the international coalition launched operation *Desert Storm*, beginning with air attacks against Iraqi forces on January 17, 1991. When Saddam Hussein continued to resist, on February 24 coalition forces launched a ground campaign, which brought Iraqi capitulation three days later.

### The First Gulf War

Studies of the 1991 Gulf War can be divided into three broad categories: those that focus on grand or national strategy, ones describing operations and tactics (unit-focused histories), and personal accounts of the experience of war. Among the publications that address the strategy of the war, Bob Woodward, *The Commanders* (1991) provides the best overall insight into the motivations and key national-level decisions made on the march to war, but it does not address the combat actions that implemented those decisions. For a solid view of the key strategic actions of the combat phase of the war, one needs to read Norman Schwarzkopf's (1992) autobiography. Though far from neutral in its approach, it does offer a fairly comprehensive overview of the issues and it portrays the effort required to translate the national goals of the conflict into operational actions very well. It also sheds light on how poorly prepared the coalition was for the cease-fire dialog held at Safwan airfield to end combat operations.

Still, Schwarzkopf mostly tells his own story. Michael R. Gordon's and Bernard E. Trainor's *The Generals' War* (1995) remains the very best source for an understanding of the broader operational conduct of the 1991 war. The book provides the most balanced overview of the key operational decisions of the war, chronicles the interplay of the major subordinate coalition commanders, and explains the weak termination of hostilities. Gordon and Trainor's insight into the personalities of the key players (particularly supporting division commanders, for example, Generals Barry McCaffrey and Bill Keys) is extremely useful, and their explanation of numerous background actions (such as the role played by Air Force Colonel John Warden, his Checkmate team, and the Army “Jedi Knights” in planning the

war) and contentious issues such as the inter-service rivalry among the US armed services is superb. Rick Atkinson (1993) also fills in the combat operations gap and gives an admirably thorough account of the major issues of the fight, using a bit more prosaic style. Both books are commendably fair, balanced, and comprehensive.

Norman Friedman, *Desert Victory* (1991); Robert H. Scales, *Certain Victory* (1993); and Frank N. Schubert and Theresa L. Kraus, *The Whirlwind War* (1995), all address the unit-level story of the war. Friedman's strength is his coverage of the undervalued role of maritime and air forces in the conflict. Scales and Schubert and Kraus are both limited in focus to army units and actions in the war, but both have the advantage of also covering the all-important buildup operation *Desert Shield*, which was crucial to the success of the actual combat phase of the war.

One of the central operational debates of the war concerned the role that airpower played in the victory over Saddam's forces. The creation of the Joint Force Air Component Command's operational plan and its employment by General Chuck Horner's staff was well chronicled in Eliot Cohen, *Gulf War Air Power Survey* (1993), William F. Andrews, *Airpower against an Army* (1998), and also in Tom Clancy and Chuck Horner, *Every Man a Tiger* (1999). For a more generic airpower-centric view that places the Gulf War in a context of growing airpower theory development, see Richard Hallion, *Storm Over Iraq: Air Power and the Gulf War* (1992).

Another key element of the Gulf War campaign was the maneuver theory employed to bring decisive force around the main Iraqi defenses and into the rear areas of Saddam's Republican Guard Force. Harry Summers (1992) provides the most focused application of Clausewitzian theory to analyze the conduct of the first Gulf War. It also addresses the exorcism of the now famous "Vietnam War syndrome" by the resounding tactical success of that war.

The role of the media in modern war first became a significant issue during the 1991 Gulf War, not only because some felt that the coalition used the media to deceive Saddam Hussein as to its operational scheme, but also because of the intensive coverage of the war by embedded members of the media and the extensive coverage of technology brought into homes all over the world by Cable News Network (CNN), which began reporting from Baghdad as the first bombs fell.

W. Lance Bennett and David L. Paletz, *Taken by Storm: The Media, Public Opinion, and U.S. Foreign Policy in the Gulf War* (1992), provides a comprehensive and fair review of the role of the media in Gulf War policy development, operational execution, and the evaluation of the war. Also valuable are Perry Smith, *How CNN Fought the War* (1991) and Judith Raine Baroody, *Media Access and the Military: The Case of the Gulf War* (1998). Molly Moore, *A Woman at War: Storming Kuwait with the U.S. Marines* (1993) set the tone for other female views of warfare in Iraq, which would become much more significant after 2003.

Personal accounts of the war offer valuable perspectives on decision-making and the toll of combat on people. Fortunately, there are several worthwhile autobiographical accounts of the 1991 Gulf War worth consulting, both from the high command level and from the perspective of the individual soldier. First, students

of war should consider the memoir of General Prince Khaled bin Sultan (1995), the Arab commander of the coalition force during the war. Entitled *Desert Warrior: A Personal View of the Gulf War by the Joint Forces Commander*, it is particularly valuable for its non-western insights into the key actions of the war and its illumination of the coalition decision-making process. Also very valuable from the coalition leadership perspective are: *Storm Command: A Personal Account of the Gulf War* by General Sir Peter de la Billière (1992), the commander of all British forces during the war, and Tom Clancy and Fred Franks, *Into the Storm* (1997) which provides a unique account of the operational conduct of the war – a much needed, solid counter to Schwarzkopf (1992). Though published well after the war was over, Anthony Swofford's *Jarhead* (2003), tells an important story, and gained such an audience that it has stimulated a new, more powerful role for personal accounts by average participants in the professional study of warfare.

The most influential issues from the 1991 war remain the development and maintenance of the international coalition that fought the war and the imperfect termination of its combat operations, short of a drive to control Baghdad. Those two aspects are covered by both Gordon and Trainor (1995) and Summers (1992), but one should read George H. W. Bush and Brent Scowcroft, *A World Transformed* (1998) to gain the fullest understanding of those two issues from the perspective of the national policymakers.

### The Inter-War Years (1992–2002)

Future historians may view the two Gulf Wars as one long conflict; two extremely rapid conventional operations split by a poorly executed cease-fire and monitoring regimen, and followed by a lengthy insurgency. Given the details of the United Nations Security Council Resolution that terminated combat operations in 1991, this view will always have some merit. The involvement of several of the same policy makers (Saddam Hussein on one side and the Bush presidential father and son duo and Dick Cheney on the other) will also reinforce the validity of this view. But there are also several significant factors that will work against this theory – prominent among which will be the rise of international terrorism as a *causis belli*. Still, the inter-war period should be an important conduit for every thoughtful study of the two Gulf conflicts because much of what went wrong in 2003 could have been anticipated through better understanding of what occurred in Iraq between 1992 and the start of that war.

The post-hostilities phase of the first Gulf War dragged on for a decade, but one of its early successes, the humanitarian operation in support of the Kurds in northern Iraq, set an important, yet false precedent for the future – concerning the receptiveness of “Iraqis” to foreign intervention. Gordon W. Rudd, *Humanitarian Intervention* (2004) outlines the one successful stability operation in Iraq in the 1990s, operation *Provide Comfort*, directed by General Jay Garner. Garner would return to Iraq in 2003 as the ill-fated leader of the US Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), bringing with him a very rosy



view of Iraqi acceptance of foreign intervention, which would color the planning and execution of the 2003 assault into Iraq.

This period also saw a significant downturn in the economic viability of Iraq and a reduction in its military capacity – both of which were obscured by increasingly poor intelligence gathering capability, which, in turn, severely altered the accuracy of assessments concerning the threat Saddam Hussein's Iraq posed to the rest of the world in 2002. The long search for weapons of mass destruction is chronicled well in Hans Blix, *Disarming Iraq* (2004). G. L. Simons, *The Scourging of Iraq: Sanctions, Law, and Natural Justice* (1998) and *Targeting Iraq: Sanctions and Bombing in US Policy* (2002) both provide valuable perspectives on the impacts of the sanctions regime and the no-fly zone enforcement operations on Iraq. Anthony Cordesman, *Iraq and the War of Sanctions: Conventional Threats and Weapons of Mass Destruction* (1999) outlines the same issues in a much less emotional manner. It is a tragedy that these studies were largely unread by the planners of the 2003 conflict in Iraq.

### The Second Gulf War

By the late 1990s, Saddam's Hussein's continuing intransience and his refusal to comply with all aspects of the 1991 cease fire agreement convinced many American policymakers that he had to be removed from power. Various non-military efforts to end his regime had already failed, and he continued sufficient media bluster about Iraqi WMD production that he had been relegated to a pariah status by 2001. Had it not been for the startling September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, Saddam might have continued to evade efforts to end his regime, but after that date, American policy makers quickly acquiesced to a military option to change the regime in Iraq.

The development of the national decision-making for the 2003 war against Iraq has been covered best by Bob Woodward's sterling trilogy, *Bush at War* (2002), *Plan of Attack* (2004), and *State of Denial: Bush at War, Part III* (2006). These three books will likely remain controversial until more of the senior US government officials' memoirs are mined for war causation, but Woodward's access to the power-brokers inside the George W. Bush Administration makes these three books exhaustive in detail and riveting in impact. The series develops the idea that a small group within the Bush White House drove a march to war against Iraq that was motivated partly by the failure to "close the door" against Saddam's threats in 1991, and partly the result of fears that Saddam was in league with terrorists.

For a concise, yet comprehensive overview of the key actions of the 2003 war, readers should consult John Keegan, *The Iraq War* (2004) or Williamson Murray and Robert H. Scates, *The Iraq War: A Military History* (2003). Both of these books are accurate and unbiased, plus Keegan has the advantage of offering a British view of the primarily American actions in Iraq. These two books treat the operational details in a cursory manner, but for a survey of the major issues, both perform well.

The current conflict in Iraq remains controversial because its causation over Iraqi possession of weapons of mass destruction was shown to be misinformed, and because the 2003 fall of Baghdad spawned a horrific insurgency which embroiled the entire region. The best descriptions of the national strategy development for the war can be found in two books. Thomas E. Ricks, *Fiasco* (2006) provides a rather unflattering but fairly accurate description of the key national players and the major issues of the war's first year in its initial 11 chapters. Ricks is damning of the Bush Administration, but his strength is the linkage he can draw between strategic issues and the impact they had on the military actions on the ground in Iraq. Ricks also captures the crucial interplay between the most significant national strategic personalities involved in the war and sets that against the impressions of numerous military officers serving at the tactical level in Iraq at the time critical decisions were being made. *Fiasco* is a very enlightening book about war and the lack of strategy.

For the best understanding of the context and motivations of the subsequent insurgency in Iraq, see Ahmed Hashim, *Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq* (2006). Hashim blends his academic perspective with his own service in Iraq and a variety of interviews to accurately describe the key elements of both the coalition and insurgent operational efforts in Iraq. The insight he provides on the motivations of the various subgroups making up the complex movement pitting itself against the coalition in Iraq, his well-focused critique of the coalition effort (including the coalition's share in responsibility for the insurgency) and the dearth of understanding about Iraqi Sunni and Shia issues among American policy makers makes the book invaluable.

For operational insights, Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, *Cobra II* (2006) should be read alongside the overly sensational Ricks (2006), not only because Gordon and Trainor offer a more even-handed review, but because the central operational story is reinforced by the two books, from different perspectives and using differing sources. The conduct of military operations outlined in Gordon and Trainor is the best available: clear, well-focused and very understandable. In particular, they bridge from the strategic issues to the tactical actions and back to strategic implications easily and artfully.

The list of most valuable books focused on the tactics (unit-focused histories) of the war include Gregory Fontenot, E.J. Degen, and David Tohn, *On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom* (2005); Nicholas Reynolds, *Basrah, Baghdad, and Beyond: The U.S. Marine Corps in the Second Iraq War* (2005); Francis J. West and Ray L. Smith, *The March Up: Taking Baghdad with the 1st Marine Division* (2003); Jim Lacey, *Takedown: the 3rd Infantry Division's Twenty-one Day Assault on Baghdad* (2007); and Charles H. Briscoe, *All Roads Lead to Baghdad: Army Special Operation Forces in Iraq* (2006). Of these five West and Smith gives the most accurate feel for the tactical actions during the attack on Baghdad; Briscoe addresses the critical and much less well known role played by special operations units in shaping the operational environment and augmenting conventional units as the campaign transformed from one phase to another.

The published personal experiences of participants in the two Iraq wars are so numerous and many of them are of such high quality that they have changed

the way that scholars view the two conflicts. This was already becoming clear in the years following the 1991 war, but the impact of such books increased with the publication of Swofford's *Jarhead* (2003) and its production as a movie in 2005; now many publishers offer a wide range of popular and insightful memoirs from a broad spectrum of war veterans. John R. Ballard, *Fighting for Fallujah* (2006), Nathaniel Fick, *One Bullet Away, The Making of a Marine Officer* (2005), and Seth W. B. Folsom, *The Highway War: A Marine Company Commander in Iraq* (2006) all give important insights into what fighting the war was like up close.

The 2003 invasion and its resultant stabilization campaign generated two very high quality studies of Americans at war that stand apart from other books. George Packer, *The Assassins' Gate* (2005), provides the best view of Iraqi impressions of the war found in any western book. It is a must read if one is to really understand the war after the fall of Baghdad in 2003. Rajiv Chandrasekaran, *Imperial Life in the Emerald City: Inside Iraq's Green Zone* (2006) contributes a great deal as well, even if it is completely and purposely limited to life inside "little America" in the Baghdad "Green Zone" – for life for many Americans in Iraq was also similarly isolated there! Its penetrating view into the everyday yet surreal life of Americans in Baghdad not only tells the story of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and the problems of the coalition government in Iraq, but also explains a great deal about how America and Americans react when placed under pressure. *Imperial Life in the Emerald City* and *The Assassin's Gate* give a view of the Iraq under occupation that should be mandatory reading for anyone who wants to fully understand the American Way of War.

The US administration of Iraq and the subsequent insurgency effort there were key turning points in the war. L. Paul Bremer, *My Year in Iraq* (2006) and Eric Herring and Glen Rangwala, *Iraq in Fragments* (2006) both illustrate the complexity of the rebuilding task. Bremer defends his actions as Administrator of the CPA while outlining the compelling story of the Sisyphus-like task of Iraqi reconstruction, whereas Herring and Rangwala offer a fragmentation of power theory that contends the actions of the CPA and its largely uncoordinated regional offices actually exacerbated the normal centrifugal trends in Iraqi politics. Another useful book addressing the rise of the insurgency in early 2004 is Bing West's *No True Glory: The Battle for Fallujah* (2005).

Still, none of these books develops a view of the "enemy side" of the war. To understand the insurgent views, Hashim can be augmented usefully by Nir Rosen, *In the Belly of the Green Bird* (2006), which powerfully demonstrates several misconceptions held by the coalition about the insurgents in Iraq and shows the serious impact of the long-standing hatred between the Iraqi Sunni and Shia on any hope of reconciliation. Rosen gives a personal perspective from the "other side" that needs to be read alongside any study of the coalition fighting in Najaf, Fallujah, or Baghdad. Another very insightful book is Mohammed M. Hafez, *Suicide Bombers in Iraq* (2007), which analyses one of the most unique and influential aspects of the current conflict in Iraq – the suicide bomber. One can not gain a complete picture of the insurgency in Iraq without consulting these two books.

As in the 1991 war, the media played a powerful role in the 2003 Gulf War. Embedded journalists accompanied the assault forces into Baghdad getting the world's attention in the spring of 2003; most then stayed just long enough to develop a healthy skepticism about the CPA, and those who remained after the fall of 2003 soon became outspoken critics of the war. Five books by members of the media illustrate the perspective of professional reporters of the war in a way that helps to explain the complex causation of the Iraqi insurgency. Jackie Spinner and Jenny Spinner, *Tell Them I Didn't Cry: A Young Journalist's Story of Joy, Loss, and Survival in Iraq* (2006) gives a first hand view of learning about war, but also about learning of fear – a crucial aspect of combat. Martha Raddatz, *The Long Road Home: A Story of War and Family* (2007), tells the story of the families and the suffering of those at home while warriors are in combat, and Ashley Gilbertson, *Whiskey Tango Foxtrot: A Photographer's Chronicle of the Iraq War* (2007) illustrates the inexplicable nature of combat to the professional observer, as photographer Gilbertson learned his trade, and has the advantage of being written with the help of *New York Times* reporter Dexter Filkins. Patrick O'Donnell, *We Were One: Shoulder to Shoulder with the Marines Who Took Fallujah* (2006), provides the best observations of small unit combat from a reporter who was so fully embedded that he became part of the fighting force. Similarly, John Koopman, *McCoy's Marines: Darkside to Baghdad* (2004), tells the story of the drive in Baghdad from the vantage point of a former Marine and *San Francisco Chronicle* reporter.

Another key trend of the Gulf Wars was the role played by women at war. In 1991, the topic was controversial and most media stories were tinged with satire. Moore (1993) reported on the male breed in combat during that war as an outside observer, but by the second conflict, women had been integrated in such a way that they could no longer be excluded from participating in combat. In fact one of the most famous actions of the early phases of the war became so because the first female captives (Jessica Lynch and Shoshana Johnson) and the first female combat death (Lori Ann Piestewa) occurred in Nasiriyah in March 2003. Though biased towards the employment of females in war, Kirsten A. Holmstedt, *Band of Sisters: American Women at War in Iraq* (2007) reveals many typical and unvarnished accounts of combatant women in Iraq. James E. Wise and Scott Baron, *Women at War: Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Conflicts* (2006) give a broader perspective with a greater range of interviews from veterans of multiple conflicts.

Military medical care is another area of great interest in both the 1991 war and the twenty-first century Iraq conflict. In the 1990s the primary medical concern was for veterans injured by the Gulf War Syndrome, variously reported as caused by stress or by chemicals found in Iraq during the war. The best studies of 1991 syndrome are Alison Johnson, *Gulf War Syndrome Legacy of a Perfect War* (2001), and the much more sensational Seymour M. Hersh, *Against All Enemies Gulf War Syndrome: The War between America's Ailing Veterans and Their Government* (1998). In the many more casualty-producing 2003 war, the issue was the severity of trauma in the insurgency and the huge advances in healthcare which returned a large percentage of soldiers and marines to the fighting. The best of this genre is Richard Jadick and Thomas Hayden, *On Call in*

*Hell: A Doctor's Iraq War Story* (2007), outlines the medical story of combat in the treacherous city of Ramadi, Iraq.

Anthony Cordesman deserves a special mention for his writing about the Iraq Wars. Cordesman has now written more than ten very good studies devoted to various aspects of conflict in Iraq. In addition to his study of the first Gulf War (Cordesman 2003) and his two volumes of analysis of the sanctions regime following (Cordesman 1997 and 1999), he has also written the best study of Iraqi security force development, *Iraqi Security Forces A Strategy for Success* (Cordesman and Baetjer 2006); an analysis of the strategic lessons of the second Gulf War, *The War After the War, Strategic Lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan* (Cordesman 2004); and several excellent studies of the sectarian violence that currently plaques Iraq.

The really important issues to be understood about the 2003 invasion of Iraq are the failure to anticipate the poor state of Iraqi affairs upon conflict termination and the difficult transition that the US military underwent in order to shift from conventional force on force operations in 2003 to counterinsurgency actions in 2004. The infrastructure issues could have been anticipated if more policy makers had studied Anthony Cordesman, *Iraq and the War of Sanctions, Conventional Threats, and Weapons of Mass Destruction* (1999), and G. L. Simons, *The Scourging of Iraq: Sanctions, Law, and Natural Justice* (1998), in 2002, but little was available outside the then passé developers of 1960s "traditional" insurgency theory (Galula 1964, Thompson 1966, and Trinquier 2006) to help strategists anticipate the challenges that evolved as the unanticipated insurgency developed in Iraq.

In 2005 conditions in Iraq reached a critical stage as opposition to what many Iraqis and Islamists viewed as the American occupation of Iraq peaked. In the United States concerned officers, of whom General David H. Petraeus and Raymond Odierno were the most prominent; retired officers, notably former Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, General John Keane; and civilian analysts including Eliot Cohen, and Frederick W. Kagan (2007), convinced President Bush and his new Secretary of Defense Robert Gates to adopt a counterinsurgency strategy since dubbed "The Surge" that reversed the trend of events, decreased the intensity of violence, and brought a degree of stability to Iraq by 2008 (Woodward, 2008, Robinson 2008, Ricks 2009). This change enabled the administration of President Barack Obama to begin the withdrawal of American forces from Iraq in 2009.

The growing Gulf Wars bibliography will certainly continue to evolve as more facts are revealed about the still ongoing war in Iraq, but the field is already vibrant and compelling. Emotions will run high for years, critiquing with cause, because the 2003 war was America's first preemptive attack. The literature should be critical, for more citizens need to understand these conflicts when others of a similar nature are inevitably considered in the future. In particular, the personal accounts of war and the media portrayals of fighting in Iraq should help a broader spectrum of today's population understand the real costs of modern combat. If the officials who make war had understood Iraq in 2001, the strategies would have been more effective and the toll of death and destruction enacted on all the peoples involved would have been reduced.



## BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Aburish, Said K. (2000). *Saddam Hussein: The Politics of Revenge*. New York: Bloomsbury.
- Andrews, William F. (1998). *Airpower against an Army: Challenge and Response in CENTAF's Duel with the Republican Guard*. CADRE Paper. Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press.
- Atkinson, Rick (1993). *Crusade: The Untold Story of the Persian Gulf War*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
- Balaghi, Shiva (2006). *Saddam Hussein: A Biography*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
- Ballard, John R. (2006). *Fighting for Fallujah: A New Dawn for Iraq*. Westport, CT: Praeger Security International.
- Baroody, Judith Raine (1998). *Media Access and the Military: The Case of the Gulf War*. Lanham, MD: University Press of America.
- Bennett, W. Lance, and David L. Paletz (1992). *Taken by Storm: The Media, Public Opinion, and U.S. Foreign Policy in the Gulf War*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Billière, General Sir Peter de la (1992). *Storm Command: A Personal Account of the Gulf War*. London: HarperCollins.
- bin Sultan, Khaled, with Patrick Seale (1995). *Desert Warrior: A Personal View of the Gulf War by the Joint Forces Commander*. New York: HarperCollins.
- Blix, Hans (2004). *Disarming Iraq*. New York: Pantheon Books.
- Bremer, L. Paul, III, with Malcolm McConnell (2006). *My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope*. New York: Simon & Schuster.
- Briscoe, Charles H. (2006). *All Roads Lead to Baghdad: Army Special Operation Forces in Iraq*. Fort Bragg, NC: USASOC History Office.
- Bush, George, and Brent Scowcroft (1998). *A World Transformed*. New York: Knopf.
- Chandrasekaran, Rajiv (2006). *Imperial Life in the Emerald City: Inside Iraq's Green Zone*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Clancy, Tom, with Fred Franks, Jr. (1997). *Into the Storm*. New York: Putnam.
- Clancy, Tom, and Chuck Horner (1999). *Every Man a Tiger*. New York: Putnam.
- Cohen, Eliot A. (1993). *Gulf War Air Power Survey*. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office.
- Cordesman, Anthony H. (1999). *Iraq and the War of Sanctions, Conventional Threats, and Weapons of Mass Destruction*. Westport, CT: Praeger.
- Cordesman, Anthony H. (2003). *The Iraq War: Strategy, Tactics, and Military Lessons*. Westport, CT: Praeger.
- Cordesman, Anthony H. (2004). *The War After the War: Strategic Lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan*. Washington: CSIS Press, Center for Strategic and International Studies.
- Cordesman, Anthony H., and Patrick Baetjer (2006). *Iraqi Security Forces: A Strategy for Success*. Westport, CT: Praeger Security International.
- Cordesman, Anthony H., and Ahmed Hashim (1997). *Iraq Sanctions and Beyond*. CSIS Middle East Dynamic Net Assessment. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Darby, Phillip (1973). *British Defence Policy East of Suez, 1947–68*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Dockrill, Saki (2002). *Britain's Retreat from East of Suez: The Choice between Europe and the World, 1945–1968*. New York: Palgrave.
- Etherington, Mark (2005). *Revolt on the Tigris: The Al-Sadr Uprising and the Governing of Iraq*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Fick, Nathaniel (2005). *One Bullet Away: The Making of a Marine Officer*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.



- Folsom, Seth W. B. (2006). *The Highway War: A Marine Company Commander in Iraq*. Washington, DC: Potomac Books.
- Fontenot, Gregory, E.J. Degen, and David Tohn (2005). *On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Friedman, Norman (1991). *Desert Victory: The War for Kuwait*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Galula, David (1964). *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*. Westport, CT: Praeger.
- Gilbertson, Ashley (2007). *Whiskey Tango Foxtrot: A Photographer's Chronicle of the Iraq War*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Gordon, Michael R., and Bernard E. Trainor. (1995). *The Generals' War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf*. Boston: Little, Brown.
- Gordon, Michael R., and Bernard E. Trainor. (2006). *Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq*. New York: Pantheon.
- Hafez, Mohammed M. (2007). *Suicide Bombers in Iraq: The Strategy and Ideology of Martyrdom*. Washington: United States Institute of Peace.
- Hallion, Richard (1992). *Storm Over Iraq: Air Power and the Gulf War*. Smithsonian History of Aviation Series. Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press.
- Hashim, Ahmed S. (2006). *Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Herring, Eric, and Glen Rangwala (2006). *Iraq in Fragments: The Occupation and Its Legacy*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Hersh, Seymour M. (1998). *Against All Enemies Gulf War Syndrome: The War between America's Ailing Veterans and Their Government*. New York: Ballantine Publishing.
- Hiro, Dilip (1991). *The Longest War: The Iran–Iraq Military Conflict*. New York: Routledge.
- Holmstedt, Kirsten A. (2007). *Band of Sisters: American Women at War in Iraq*. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books.
- Jadick, Richard, and Thomas Hayden (2007). *On Call in Hell: A Doctor's Iraq War Story*. New York: NAL Caliber.
- Johnson, Alison (2001). *Gulf War Syndrome: Legacy of a Perfect War*. Brunswick, ME: MCS Information Exchange.
- Kagan, Frederick W. (2007). "Choosing Victory: A Plan for Success in Iraq: Phase I Report." Washington: American Enterprise Institute. [[http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.25396/pub\\_detail.asp](http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.25396/pub_detail.asp)].
- Karsh, Efraim (1989). *The Iran–Iraq War: Impact and Implications*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Karsh, Efraim (2002). *The Iran–Iraq War, 1980–1988*. Oxford, UK: Osprey.
- Karsh, Efraim, and Inari Rautsi (1991). *Saddam Hussein: A Political Biography*. New York: Free Press.
- Keaney, Thomas A. (1993). "Surveying Gulf War Airpower," *Joint Force Quarterly*, 2 (Autumn), 25–36.
- Keegan, John (2004). *The Iraq War*. New York: Knopf.
- Kennedy, Greg (2003). *British Maritime Strategy East of Suez, 1900–2000: Influence and Actions*. London: Routledge.
- Koopman, John (2004). *McCoy's Marines: Darkside to Baghdad*. St. Paul, MN: Zenith Press.
- Lacey, Jim (2007). *Takedown: The 3rd Infantry Division's Twenty-One Day Assault on Baghdad*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Levinson, Jeffrey L., and Randy L. Edwards (1997). *Missile Inbound: The Attack on the Stark in the Persian Gulf*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.

- Luizard, Pierre-Jean (1991). *La formation de l'Irak contemporain. Le rôle politique des ulémas chiïtes en Irak à la fin de la domination ottomane et au moment de la construction de l'Etat irakien*. Paris: Éditions du CNRS.
- Makiya, Kanan (original ed. under pseudonym Samir al-Khalil) (1998). *Republic of Fear*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Marr, Phebe (2004). *The Modern History of Iraq*, 2nd. edn. Boulder, CO: Westview.
- Moore, Molly (1993). *A Woman at War: Storming Kuwait with the U.S. Marines*. New York: Scribner's.
- Murray, Williamson, and Robert H. Scales, Jr. (2003). *The Iraq War: A Military History*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- O'Donnell, Patrick K. (2006). *We Were One: Shoulder to Shoulder with the Marines Who Took Fallujah*. Cambridge, MA: Da Capo.
- Packer, George (2005). *The Assassins' Gate: America in Iraq*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
- Palmer, Michael A. (1992). *Guardians of the Gulf: A History of America's Expanding Role in the Persian Gulf, 1833–1992*. New York: Free Press.
- Pelletiere, Stephen C., and Douglas V. Johnson (1991). *Lessons Learned: The Iran–Iraq War*. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College.
- Raddatz, Martha (2007). *The Long Road Home: A Story of War and Family*. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons.
- Reynolds, Nicholas E. (2005). *Basrah, Baghdad, and Beyond: The U.S. Marine Corps in the Second Iraq War*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Ricks, Thomas E. (2006). *Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq*. New York: Penguin.
- Ricks, Thomas E. (2009). *The Gamble: General David Petraeus and the American Military Adventure in Iraq, 2006–2008*. New York: Penguin.
- Robinson, L. (2008). *Tell Me How This Ends: General David Petraeus and the Search for a Way Out of Iraq*. New York: Public Affairs.
- Rosen, Nir (2006). *In the Belly of the Green Bird: The Triumph of the Martyrs in Iraq*. New York: Free Press.
- Roux, Georges (1992). *Ancient Iraq*, 3rd edn. London: Penguin Books.
- Rudd, Gordon W. (2004). *Humanitarian Intervention: Assisting the Iraqi Kurds in Operation Provide Comfort, 1991*. Washington: Center of Military History.
- Scales, Robert H. Jr. (1993). *Certain Victory: The US Army in the Gulf War*. Washington: Office of the Chief of Staff, United States Army.
- Schubert, Frank N., and Theresa L. Kraus, eds. (1995). *The Whirlwind War: The United States Army in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm*. Washington: Center of Military History.
- Schwarzkopf, H. Norman, with Peter Petre (1992). *It Doesn't Take a Hero*. New York: Linda Grey/Bantam Books.
- Simons, G. L. (1998). *The Scourging of Iraq: Sanctions, Law, and Natural Justice*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Simons, G. L. (2002). *Targeting Iraq: Sanctions and Bombing in US Policy*. London: Saqi Books.
- Smith, Perry M. (1991). *How CNN Fought the War: A View from the Inside*. New York: Carol Publishing Group.
- Spinner, Jackie, and Jenny Spinner (2006). *Tell Them I Didn't Cry: A Young Journalist's Story of Joy, Loss, and Survival in Iraq*. New York: Scribner.

- Summers, Harry G. (1992). *On Strategy II: A Critical Analysis of the Persian Gulf War*. New York: Dell.
- Swofford, Anthony (2003). *Jarhead: A Marine's Chronicle of the Gulf War and Other Battles*. New York: Scribner.
- Thompson, Robert (1966). *Defeating Communist Insurgency: The Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam*. New York: F. A. Praeger.
- Trinquier, Roger (2006). *Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency*. "PSI Classics of the Counterinsurgency Era," Westport, CT: Praeger Security International.
- Tripp, Charles (2007). *A History of Iraq*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Walker, George K. (2000). *The Tanker War, 1980–88: Law and Policy*. Newport, RI: Naval War College.
- West, Francis J. (2005). *No True Glory: A Frontline Account of the Battle for Fallujah*. New York: Bantam Books.
- West, Francis J., and Ray L. Smith (2003). *The March Up: Taking Baghdad with the 1st Marine Division*. New York: Bantam.
- Winkler, David F. (2007). *Amirs, Admirals & Desert Sailors: Bahrain, the U.S. Navy, and the Arabian Gulf*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Wise, Harold Lee (2007). *Inside the Danger Zone: The U.S. Military in the Persian Gulf, 1987–1988*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Wise, James E., and Scott Baron (2006). *Women at War: Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Conflicts*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Woodward, Bob (1991). *The Commanders*. New York: Simon & Schuster.
- Woodward, Bob (2002). *Bush at War*. New York: Simon & Schuster.
- Woodward, Bob (2004). *Plan of Attack*. New York: Simon & Schuster.
- Woodward, Bob (2006). *State of Denial: Bush at War, Part III*. New York: Simon & Schuster.
- Woodward, Bob (2008). *The War Within: A Secret White House History, 2006–2008*. New York: Simon & Schuster.
- Zatarain, Lee Allen (2008). *Tanker War: America's First Conflict with Iran, 1987–88*. Drexel Hill, PA: Casemate.

# Chapter Sixteen

---

## GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM

*Hall Gardner*

In the immediate aftermath of the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon, President George W. Bush declared a “war on terror” in his September 20, 2001 address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People: “Our war on terror begins with al-Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated” (Bush 2001). Thus, from the very outset, the “war on terror” was not to be limited to fighting against al-Qaeda, which was held responsible for the September 11 attacks, but would be waged against “every terrorist group of global reach.” Concurrent with the declaration of the “war on terror” was the passage of the 2001 USA Patriot Act (Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism) which passed the Senate 98-1. The Patriot Act redefined the conception of domestic terrorism and gave the Department of Justice the right to investigate all offenses related to terrorism, as opposed to permitting several agencies to investigate. The Bush administration also federalized airport security and established the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC), which then became the National Terrorism Center, to integrate all analysis on “terrorism” and “terrorists.”

A year later Congress passed the Homeland Security Act, which amended laws dealing with the cross-flow of information between a number of governmental agencies, in particular laws checking the flow of information between the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) put in place in 1978 (White House 2002). The act also established the new cabinet-level Department of Homeland Security transferring the Secret Service, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, and the Customs Department from the Treasury Department, the Coast Guard from the Transportation Department, and the FBI from the Justice Department (Maxwell 2004). US statutory law (the *Posse Comitatus* Act) still forbids the use of military forces to deal with domestic terrorist threats – unless permitted by the Constitution or in accord with the President’s powers as Commander and Chief (Beckman 2007).

Formation of the new department was intended to reduce the bureaucratic rivalry between the CIA and FBI that had made for uncoordinated sharing of information and procedures prior to September 11, but the Department of Homeland Security suffered from problems in coordinating its own massive bureaucracy. After September 11, for example, the FBI and CIA disagreed about the best way to interrogate al-Qaeda partisans and suspects. Experience dealing with pan-Islamist suspects after the 1993 World Trade Center bombings led the FBI to advocate a less aggressive style of questioning than did the CIA, which was under orders from the White House for more rapid and “actionable measures” (Suskind 2006). Issues concerning the legal and moral right of the US government to use “torture” (however defined) sparked Congressional and popular debate (Lubin 2002). In addition, the federal response to the Hurricane Katrina disaster in August 2005 raised questions about the ability of the Department of Homeland Security to respond to terrorist attacks.

One of the primary concerns of the Patriot and Homeland Security acts was to dissolve the distinction generally made in the post-World War II era between acts of “terrorism at home” versus acts of “terrorism abroad” in that perpetrators of domestic acts could have links with entities abroad. In addition to domestic political opposition to the possible creation of a Gestapo-like organization, and the fact that the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) was rapidly dismantled in September 1945 before the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was eventually established by the 1947 National Security Act, the historical roots of the domestic–international distinction lie in giving the CIA jurisdiction abroad and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) jurisdiction with a legalist and largely domestic orientation. While the FBI did engage in intelligence collection and manhunting in Latin America, the US had no intelligence service in Europe and Asia before World War II. The decision to separate domestic and international intelligence services was based in part upon J. Edgar Hoover’s decision not to let FBI agents cooperate with the British overseas intelligence during World War II. Instead the OSS created X-2, a special counter-espionage service that would work with the British in signals intelligence (Naftali 2005).

Historical precedents to the “war of terrorism” (involving homeland security concepts and anti-terrorist legislation) date at least from Quasi-War with France, 1798–1800 (Maxwell 2004). The 1798 Congress passed the Sedition Act, the Alien Enemies Act, the Alien Friends Act, and the Naturalization Act, all of which expired in 1801–2. The Sedition Act aimed to silence critics of the government, the Alien Acts to facilitate control of non-citizens, many of whom it was feared sympathized with the French revolution, and the Naturalization Act increased to 14 years the residency in the United States required before an alien could seek citizenship. During the Civil War, President Abraham Lincoln suspended the *writ of habeas corpus* for those suspected of subversive acts or speech in support of secession. An amnesty was granted in 1862 for those no longer considered dangerous, but the *writ of habeas corpus* was suspended again by the 1863 Habeas Corpus Act to allow the detaining of individuals who resisted the 1862 draft law, which was seen by its opponents as being despotic and Napoleonic. The South likewise

suspended the *writ of habeas corpus* in certain places. (Maxwell 2004, Beckman 2007). General William T. Sherman's "Bummers" and "March to the Sea" represented forms of state-supported "terrorism" in wartime. After the Civil War, with the deployment of northern troops in the South, one could argue that the Ku Klux Klan operated as a "terrorist" organization.

During World War I, the 1917 Espionage and 1918 Sedition Acts were aimed at individuals and immigrants with anarchist, communist, or socialist ideologies. In 1940, the Alien Registration Act (Smith Act) was passed, making it a criminal offense to publish, advocate, or teach with the intention of overthrowing or destroying the US government. President Franklin D. Roosevelt's Executive Order 9066 for the internment of American citizens of Japanese descent was upheld by the Supreme Court in 1944 in the case of "Korematsu vs. the United States" when it ruled that "exclusion from a threatened area ... has a definite and close relationship to the prevention of espionage and sabotage" (Maxwell 2004, Beckman 2007). Toward the end of World War II, OSS officials feared that a Nazi special operations unit led by SS-Sturmabführer Otto Skorzeny was plotting the assassination of General Dwight D. Eisenhower and to set off a terrorist campaign in Europe in such a way so as to lay blame upon left-wing elements and Communists (Naftali 2005).

During the McCarthy Era, the Alien Registration Act of 1940, Internal Security Act of 1950, and Communist Control Act of 1956 were used to prosecute thousands of alleged Communists (Maxwell 2004, Beckman 2007). While Americans focused their fears of terrorism and subversion on those loyal to foreign ideologies, some of the first major acts of "terrorism" on American soil in the post-World War II period were not instigated by pro-Communist agents or militants, but occurred when radical members of a Puerto Rican independence movement attempted to assassinate President Harry S. Truman in 1950; Puerto Rican nationalists also opened fire in the House of Representatives in 1954, wounding five Congressmen. Yet such actions were seen as largely incidental, and largely impossible to prevent (Hunter and Bainbridge 2005, Naftali 2005). While the United States continued to sustain vigilance against alleged Communists, Washington also cracked down on anti-Vietnam war and civil rights activists as well as on Black Americans and other ethnic minority militants.

The recognition that the US government needed to take sound and appropriate administrative steps to deal with the growing threats of international terrorism – groups that were not necessarily backed by Moscow – really began during the Nixon administration. The confluence of the Palestinian "Black September" kidnapping of Israeli athletes at the 1972 Munich Olympics and the hijacking of Southern Airlines Flight 49 by three criminals who threatened to crash the plane into Oak Ridge nuclear reactor, before ultimately flying to Cuba, accentuated the need for the US government to develop a domestic counter-terrorist capability. The Nixon administration responded by forming a cabinet committee, which dealt with terrorism, and sought to establish tougher airport security measures, for example, in addition to reaching a negotiated deal on air hijacking with Fidel Castro that helped to discourage air hijacking on both sides (Naftali 2005). At



the same time, however, both CIA and FBI surveillance of American citizens during the Civil Rights and anti-Vietnam movements led to a counter-offensive in defense of civil liberties in the quest to limit government capabilities to spy on American citizens. (Maxwell 2004, Church Committee 1975). In addition, domestic lobbying groups blocked efforts to strengthen airport security, preventing, for example, mandatory inspection of baggage (Naftali 2005).

There was also significant domestic American protest in the 1970s and 1980s against US/CIA support for regimes that engaged in terrorism against their own citizens, often in the name of anti-Communism. These regimes included: Chile (under General Augusto Pinochet); Argentina (particularly under the military dictatorship of Jorge Rafael Videla); Guatemala (following the CIA backed overthrow of the Arbenz government in 1954); Nicaragua (under Anastasio Somoza); the Philippines (under Ferdinand Marcos); Indonesia (under General Suharto); Iran (under the Shah of Iran prior to the Iranian revolution in 1979); and South Africa (prior to the abolishment of Apartheid), among others. As protests against American foreign policy intensified, President Gerald Ford banned “assassinations” (Executive Order 11905, Ford 1976) after the 1975 Senate Select Committee on Intelligence criticized FBI/CIA domestic spying operations as well as attempts by the CIA to assassinate various world leaders (Church Committee 1975). The 1978 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act then established a secret panel of judges that would oversee requests from intelligence agencies to conduct electronic surveillance. While the US Congress never enacted a *legislative* ban on assassination, every administration from that of Jimmy Carter through George W. Bush sought, in different ways, to circumvent Executive Order 11905, which was updated by Executive Order 12333 in December 1981 (National Archives 1981), in targeting Mu’ammar Qaddafi, Saddam Hussein, and Osama bin Laden, among others (Canestaro 2003).

During the late 1970s and 1980s, militant pan-Islamist groups gained control of national governments for the first time, at roughly the same time that the Carter, and then the Reagan, administrations augmented American support for anti-Communist movements throughout much of the world – in an effort to “roll back” global Soviet influence. Most significantly, the 1978–9 Iranian Revolution, which brought to power a militant pan-Shi’a Islamist movement, and engaged in acts of state-supported terrorism, helped to stimulate conflicting Sunni–Shi’a Islamist movements throughout the region. At virtually the same time, the brutal Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 1979 – in which Washington had “augmented the chances” that Moscow would intervene in the words of President Carter’s National Security advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski – likewise helped to spur anti-Soviet Islamist movements (Gardner 2007a). In geostrategic terms, US and Saudi financial support for the essentially Sunni Moslem and ethnic Pushtun *mujahedin* (or “freedom fighters”) in Afghanistan in the 1980s (with political and logistical backing from Pakistan) was intended to both roll back Moscow and contain pan-Shi’a Iran (Coll 2004, Dreyfuss 2005). Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan by 1989 eventually resulted in war among rival Afghan political-religious factions followed by the victory of the essentially ethnic Pushtun Sunni

extremist group, the Taliban, in 1996. Afghanistan then became a known haven of various “terrorist” organizations. Yet even for a decade after its founding by bin Laden in Afghanistan in 1988, al-Qaeda (meaning “the base”) had little success against US interests until it blew up two US embassies in Africa in 1998 and damaged the destroyer USS *Cole* in 2000. These acts brought the latter organization to the forefront of “terrorist” organizations in the prelude to the September 11, 2001 attacks.

The Carter administration’s Presidential Security Memorandum 30 (PSM-30) had created a new Executive Committee on Combating Terrorism under the National Security Council, plus an interagency Working Group on Terrorism. Yet even at this time, Carter National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski did not consider terrorism a “strategic” issue, but considered it of secondary importance. When his administration took office, Ronald Reagan signed NSDD 30, making the State Department, not the NSC, the lead agency in charge of the Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism which would focus on international terrorism, although it did not draw a distinction between domestic and international (Naftali 2005). Ronald Reagan’s Secretary of State Alexander Haig attempted to blame the Soviet Union for training and funding the world’s major terrorist groups, a position opposed by both James Baker and Ed Mease, and was depicted as a form of neo-McCarthyism by critics. With Haig’s resignation in 1982, the Reagan administration began to focus on Libya’s role in supporting terrorism (bombing of PanAm flight 103 plus the alleged threat of a Libyan hit squad targeting the White House, among others) in addition to focusing on groups supported by Moscow. In addition to Libyan threats, the US accused Iran (and Syria) of supporting *Hizb’allah* (with Islamic Jihad as a front group) in bombing of the US marine barracks in Lebanon in October 1983. The Abu Nidal attacks on airline ticket offices and an attempted bombing of the US embassy in Cairo in 1985 led the CIA to consider the creation of a special counterterrorism unit. The Iran-Contra scandal of the 1980s, however, increased public criticism of US policies involving counterterrorism (Naftali 2005).

During the Clinton administration, the February 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center by Ramzi Yousef and other pan-Islamists and the April 1995 bombing of the Murray Federal Building in Oklahoma City by the rightwing American extremist, Timothy McVeigh, began to further break down the distinction between domestic and international terrorism. These events led to the 1996 Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act. This bill was the first comprehensive attempt to deal with terrorism but was watered down in the wake of Congressional investigation into the alleged misconduct of Federal law officials in handling of the Branch Davidians at Waco, Texas. Many of the 1996 provisions would, however, be adopted by 2001 Patriot Act (Beckman 2007).

In August 1998, President Clinton attempted to decapitate al-Qaeda with cruise missile strikes in the Sudan (hitting a pharmaceutical plant believed to be producing chemical weaponry) and al-Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan, but failed to eliminate its leader, Osama bin Laden. The Clinton administration did attempt to focus attention upon eliminating the threat posed by al-Qaeda, an

emphasis not shared by the incoming George W. Bush administration, as President Bush's advisors appeared to have other priorities (primarily Iraq), despite numerous warnings by the Clinton administration and outside experts (Clarke 2004, Maxwell 2004).

Within months of the September 11 attacks, the US government began to re-focus on the need to interconnect the domestic and international aspects of terrorism. Academics and analysts produced works that catalogued and attempted to explain the roots of the "new" pan-Islamist form of terrorism. (Schmid and Jongman 1988, Alexander and Swetnam 2001, Hoge and Gideon 2001, Gunaratna 2002, Hoffman 2002, Stanley and Kegley 2002). In one of the best-researched and most balanced books, Lawrence Wright (2006) traced the twentieth-century roots of al-Qaeda's pan-Islamic ideology and its development as an anti-state partisan organization that has sought to destabilize regimes throughout the Islamic world in order to establish a pan-Islamic *ummah* (or community of believers) by the use of terror and force.

In his September 2001 address, while proclaiming American intent to seek out all groups of global reach and not just al-Qaeda, President Bush offered no clear definition as to what "terror" actually is or how one can wage war against what is essentially considered to be a tactic or an emotional effect of extreme violence (Ackerman 2006). Yet despite the lack of precision in defining what the "war on terror" actually was, its essential characteristics and goals would nevertheless be: (1) a long-term war; (2) a war aimed at "every terrorist group of global reach"; and (3) a war likewise aimed at "nations that provide aid or safe haven to terrorism." The war would thus be long term, global – not just against the one anti-state partisan group alone – al-Qaeda – but without distinguishing among partisan groups with differing goals and ideologies. (There are more than 100 definitions of the word "terror" (Schmid and Jongman 1988, Tucker 1997, Hoffman 1998, 2002). In effect, the Bush administration did not make it clear as to whom the "enemy" actually was and precisely whom the "war" was to be fought against; nor did the Bush administration explicate what were the ultimate goals of that "war."

Moreover, although the definition of term "war" is clearer than that of the term "terror," one can still question why the term "war" was used by the Bush administration in a non-traditional situation in which the attackers did not represent an officially recognized state (as had been the case when Japan bombed Pearl Harbor in December 1941). Yet after the September 11, 2001 attacks, American public officials no longer sought euphemisms for the word "war" as did public officials in the Clinton administration during the 1990s. By contrast, Bush administration officials went out of their way to emphasize that the conflict was to be brutal, costly, and protracted, that it would last years if not decades (Bacevich 2002, Clarke 2004, Mann 2004, Woodward 2004).

The use of the term "war" resulted in misinterpretations of US policy in Europe – as many Europeans believed that Washington was using the term lightly, as in "war on poverty" or "war on drugs." For both domestic political and legal reasons, the Europeans officially preferred the term, "fight against terrorism" (Van Herpen 2004). Furthermore, concern was raised that use of the term "war" permitted the

US to pursue political goals abroad that were not necessarily related to fighting “terrorism” while simultaneously providing greater license to restrict civil liberties at home (Ackerman 2006). The 9/11 Commission Report argued that the “shift of power and authority to the government calls for an enhanced system of checks and balances to protect the precious liberties that are vital to our way of life” (9/11 Commission Report 2004). Europeans were deeply concerned at the significant division in political–military strategy that had developed at the outset of the US-led intervention in Afghanistan (backed by the UN and NATO) between the view of Secretary of State Colin Powell that “building the coalition was all important” versus the view of Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld that “the mission determines the coalition. And the coalition must not be permitted to determine the mission” (Rumsfeld 2001a, b). This key difference in the political–military approaches of Powell and Rumsfeld – as to what extent to incorporate the European Allies in the decision-making process of US-led warfare – was, at least in part, responsible for the growing rupture between the United States and its NATO allies, especially France and Germany – that manifested itself in August 2002 prior to the essentially unilateral US-led “coalition of the willing” intervention in Iraq in March 2003.

Ironically, Donald Rumsfeld, after stepping down as US Secretary of Defense in November 2006, belatedly stated his regret for having chosen the term “war.” He stated that he would have preferred to have used the term “struggle”; he also regretted the Bush administration’s efforts to parallel the “war on terror” with World War II, which Rumsfeld believed implied a short war in the popular mind. Rumsfeld additionally stated that he would also have preferred to use the term “extremist” as opposed to “terrorist” (Rumsfeld 2006). The Bush Administration belatedly developed the acronym, G-SAVE or “Global Struggle Against Violent Extremism” in May 2005 to replace “Global War on Terrorism (GWOT)” as the war had been designated in December 2001 (Schmitt and Shanker 2005). Yet the acronym G-SAVE did not appear to be generally adopted (Gardner 2007b).

Despite belated misgivings, the “war on terror” – and what subsequently became officially referred to as the “Global War on Terrorism (GWOT)” in December 2001 – took primarily two forms: (1) A war against “anti-state terror” represented by essentially independent partisan groups; and (2) a war against “state-supported terror” or states that supported acts of terrorism or that harbored terrorist groups. The lack of a clear definition of “terrorism” raised questions of “double standards” and resulted in questions as to why one partisan group should be listed by the State Department as a “terrorist organization” and why specific states should be labeled as “sponsors of terror” rather than other states (US State Department, 2006).

This raised questions as to why some partisan groups, such as Arafat’s al Fatah party, for example, could be taken off the list of terrorist organizations, when groups such as Hamas and Hizb’allah, stayed on the list. Concurrently, differing Palestinian groups accused Israel of “state supported terrorism” and Russia accused various Chechen factions of acts of terrorism, while Chechen partisans accused

Russia of “state supported terrorism.” As the US augmented its engagement in the GWOT, often resulting in “collateral damage,” the US itself has been accused of “double standards” by supporting acts of “terrorism” and in engaging in “rogue state” behavior (Johnson 2000, Achcar 2002, Bishara 2004). Here, for example, the Bush administration refused to abide by the Geneva Convention in its battle with non-official anti-state combatants (Weiss, Crahan, and Goering 2004). The Bush administration’s legal approach to human rights has been described as a “hybrid war-law approach” that sought to maximize the use of lethal force while eliminating or suspending the rights of both adversaries and innocent bystanders in areas concerned (Luban 2002).

Another issue is that the US government often limited its definition of acts of terrorism to politically motivated violence (Stern 1999), and to confuse “acts of sabotage” with “terrorism.”<sup>1</sup> An additional concern is that by focusing primarily on anti-state “terrorism,” US policy could be ignoring acts of state-supported terrorism, in that crimes committed in the name of the state generally far outnumber crimes committed by anti-state groups (Stohl and Lopez 1984). Furthermore, although the “global war on terrorism” initially focused on al-Qaeda, not all anti-state groups necessarily adopt Islamist ideologies: Other anti-state “terrorist” groups could be categorized as anarchist, anti-globalization, communist/socialist, leftist, nationalist/separatist, racist, and religious (Anheier and Isar 2007).

At least from some viewpoints, US efforts to engage in “counter-terrorism” could be seen as acts of state-supported terrorism. Extreme viewpoints argue that September 11 was a huge conspiracy plotted by American elites. The fact that the Project for the New American Century had, for example, used the Pearl Harbor analogy in its September 2000 report *Rebuilding America’s Defense* – as an illustration of how to galvanize the American public into supporting a more interventionary global role – helped to foster conspiracy theories that “neo-conservatives” had plotted September 11, along with the military-industrial complex and the Pentagon (Donnelly 2000, Meyssan 2002, Chossudovsky 2005, Tarpley 2006).

In addition to leaving important questions open and ambivalent as to precisely what was being fought against, the “either/or” nature of Bush administration rhetoric immediately caused reaction among US allies and foes – in that the “war on terror” threatened to become a Messianic “good versus evil” struggle. President Bush’s September 20, 2001 declaration that “Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists” (Bush 2001) appeared to mean that all countries and individuals had to accept American definitions of the “terrorist” or of the “enemy,” and thus fight against terrorism with the United States – or else take the risk that they might be considered on the side of the still ill-defined terrorists. Moreover, the declaration raised the question as to whether the United States would possibly wage war or engage in sanctions against those states that did not accept American definitions of anti-state terrorism and state-supported terrorism – in that they might be regarded as supporting such “terrorist” groups. The dilemma is that what one society/government or partisan group considered to be an act of “terrorism” could be justified as a military action or act of revenge by another: Such actions may be considered “justifiable,” but they are rarely “just.”

Here, the first phase of the “war on terrorism” – in which the United States obtained both UN and NATO support for the US-led Operation Enduring Freedom – involved the effort to eradicate al-Qaeda and to remove the Taliban from power in Afghanistan (Rashid 2000). While Operation Enduring Freedom targeted Taliban forces from the air with heavy bombing, the Pentagon kept the use of US Special Forces limited. Two months after Operation Enduring Freedom began, the United States helped install a new Afghan coalition government in power in Kabul, yet rejected the use of US ground forces to eliminate al-Qaeda and remaining Taliban that had not dispersed. Instead, Washington relied upon anti-Taliban Afghan *mujahedin* who worked to disperse al-Qaeda fighters, but who also may possibly have assisted their escape. In any case, by not deploying its own forces, the United States lost control of the ground; both Mullah Mohammed Omar (leader of the Taliban) and Osama Bin Laden (leader of al-Qaeda) escaped (Bacevich 2002, Daalder and Lindsay 2003).

The “war on terror” in Afghanistan appeared to become permanent as US efforts to engage in “nation building” stalled, and as the Taliban eventually regrouped, particularly once US attention shifted its focus to Iraq in 2003. Despite the fact that President George W. Bush had previously derided President Clinton’s efforts to engage in “nation-building,” the Bush administration belatedly began to focus on the need for social and political development as a means to decrease support for terrorist groups and, for example, to eradicate “street terrorism.” Here, “street terrorism” refers to acts of small-scale violence that could possess political motivations, such as kidnapping, blackmail, extortion, and assassination; it could also refer to socio-economic conditions that can provide recruits for terrorist activities (Gardner 2007a). The Bush administration belatedly concerned itself with training and education, in the effort to cut funding for “fundamentalist” Islamic schools (Madrasas) in Pakistan, or else attempt to alter their method of teaching, by introducing a more scientific curriculum, for example. At the same time, the United States did not thoroughly address the question of how poverty, lack of social status, and perception or experience of state repression can drive individuals to join, or be recruited, by “terrorist” organizations as was acknowledged internally by the Bush administration itself (Rumsfeld 2003).

The first-term Bush administration likewise began to press for “regime change” or the elimination of governments, such as North Korea, Iran, and Iraq, which sponsored terrorism or which harbored, assisted, or tolerated individuals or anti-governmental organizations that conducted terrorist activities. In his first State of the Union address on January 29, 2002, President Bush widened the “war on terror” to include additional “rogue states” – in depicting Iran, Iraq, and North Korea as forming an “axis of evil” (Bush 2002a). Here, the term “axis of evil” had originally included Iraq, with Iran and then North Korea largely added as afterthoughts (Mann 2004). North Korea may have been added so as not to point the finger at Islamic regimes alone; nevertheless the concept of “axis” appeared to make reference to the Axis powers of World War II, while the term “evil” had heavy Biblical, if not Koranic, implications, thus appearing to confirm the Messianic dimension of the “global war on terrorism.”



### GWOT and Doctrine of “Pre-Emption”

In his speech to the graduating class of the US Military Academy at West Point (June 1, 2002), President George W. Bush argued that traditional notions of deterrence would not hold in post-September 11 circumstances:

For much of the last century, America’s defense relied on the Cold War doctrines of deterrence and containment. In some cases, those strategies still apply. But new threats also require new thinking. Deterrence – the promise of massive retaliation against nations – means nothing against shadowy terrorist networks with no nation or citizens to defend. Containment is not possible when unbalanced dictators with weapons of mass destruction can deliver those weapons on missiles or secretly provide them to terrorist allies.

President Bush continued to argue:

We cannot put our faith in the word of tyrants, who solemnly sign non-proliferation treaties, and then systemically break them. If we wait for threats to fully materialize, we will have waited too long.... Homeland defense and missile defense are part of stronger security, and they’re essential priorities for America. Yet the war on terror will not be won on the defensive. We must take the battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans, and confront the worst threats before they emerge. ... In the world we have entered, the only path to safety is the path of action. And this nation will act. (Bush, 2002b)

From this speech it was clear that the Bush administration extended the global war on terror to include a concept of “pre-emption” and thus an offensive policy based upon prevention or else preclusion (if not predation). The Bush administration’s National Security Presidential Directive-17/HSPD “National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction” (December 12, 2001) thus represented, in effect, a step beyond Clinton Administration policy, by using the September 11, 2001 attacks as rationalization. It was argued the US requires “new methods of deterrence” against those states that were aggressively pursuing WMD and their means of delivery (Bush 2002b). While deterrence had been described during the Cold War as a “delicate balance of terror” by a forerunner of American neo-conservatism, Albert Wohlstetter (1958), the post-Cold War epoch could increasingly be characterized as an “imbalance of terror” (Gardner 2004).

President Clinton’s Presidential Directive 62 “Protection Against Unconventional Threats to the Homeland and Americans Overseas” had taken a first step toward developing a formal policy of pre-emption (a policy option which lay dormant at least since the Cuban Missile Crisis, not to overlook contingency plans to pre-empt Soviet and then later, Chinese nuclear capabilities). Here, it was President Clinton who had been the first to launch and publicly acknowledge a pre-emptive strike against an anti-state terrorist organization or network after launching cruise missile strikes against presumed al-Qaeda targets in Afghanistan

and in Sudan (Perl 1998). The Clinton administration attempted to forewarn the Bush administration as to the real dangers of terrorism, but President Bush's advisors appeared to have other priorities (Clarke 2004). President Clinton's National Security Advisor Anthony Lake argued that the most politically problematic feature of terrorism was not so much "asymmetrical warfare" but "ambiguous warfare" in which other governments could attack the United States without claiming responsibility (Lake 2000).

The ideological justification for the so-called pre-emptive war with Iraq, based upon a re-assessment of precisely when a threat becomes "imminent" and of regime change had been provided by leading "neo-conservatives," William Kristol and Laurence F. Kaplan (Kristol 1999, Kaplan and Kristol 2003). The latter justified pre-emptive war with the following unsubstantiated rationalization: "One of the virtues of preemptive action ... is that it is often less costly than the alternative" (Kaplan and Kristol 2003). The doctrine of pre-emption had, at least in part, been based upon the Israeli decision to bomb the Iraqi Osirak nuclear facility in 1981. The argument was that Israel needed to prevent the facility from producing enriched uranium (as if the reactor itself was used to enrich uranium). Yet the neo-conservative belief that the Israeli strike against the Osirak program slowed the Iraqi nuclear program has been challenged: the strike may actually have sped up the Iraqi program, at least initially, prior to Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. The Osirak bombing also played an indirect role in Tehran's decision to speed up Iran's nuclear program (Betts 2006).

While George W. Bush's administration denied allegations that it rescinded President Gerald Ford's 1976 Executive Order 11905 banning assassinations (Fleischer 2003), it did appear – through its support of *anticipatory* or *pre-emptive* actions in purported self-defense – to support the possible option of Saddam Hussein's assassination and the killing of his sons as extrajudicial executions. Thus, it has been alleged that the Bush administration had legalized assassination in cases when it would be impractical to capture terrorists and when large-scale civilian casualties could be avoided (Cohn 2003).

Not only did the Bush administration stray far from the traditional Cold War concept of deterrence and Mutual Assured Destruction, but President George W. Bush also abandoned the "Powell Doctrine" which had characterized the military strategy of his father, George H. W. Bush. The Powell doctrine had raised the following "realist" questions prior to engaging in the use of force: "Is a vital national security interest threatened? Do we have a clear, attainable, objective? Have the risks and costs been fully and frankly analyzed? Have all other non-violent policy means been fully exhausted? Is there a plausible exit strategy to avoid endless entanglement? Have the consequences of our action been fully considered? Is the action supported by the American people? Do we have genuine broad international support?" (Powell 1992–3).

While the George W. Bush administration did obtain broad international support from both the UN and NATO for the initial phase of the "war on terror" in Afghanistan (against both the Taliban and al-Qaeda), the questions raised by the Powell Doctrine did not influence Bush administration policy with regard to

the essentially preclusive, if not predatory, US intervention in Iraq (even if the US was accompanied by coalition partners, including Great Britain, Australia, Italy, and Poland). At the same time, Washington did not appear to have developed a plausible – and, if possible, “honorable” – exit strategy for US forces from either Afghanistan or Iraq.

Despite increasing criticism of the Bush administration’s first term mismanagement of the “global war on terror,” the inability of the intelligence agencies to coordinate and share information, the propaganda linking al-Qaeda and Saddam Hussein, plus outright exaggeration of Iraq’s nuclear and missile capability (Bamford 2004), the Bush administration was able to gain a strong domestic American mandate in his second term, defeating his democratic rival, John Kerry. The latter did not so much critique the overall strategy of the GWOT in his failed presidential campaign but rather the Bush administration’s poor tactics in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Kerry thus did not critique the rationale for the “global war on terrorism” itself or the risky prospects for an open-ended war, but the fact that the war had been “extraordinarily mismanaged and ineptly prosecuted” and that US troops in Iraq lacked “the preparation and hardware they needed to fight as effectively as they could” (Bacevich 2005).

It is too early to assess with any degree of certainty exactly what impact the “Global War on Terrorism” will have on the US military services. Congressman John Murtha warned:

While we are fighting an asymmetric threat in the short term, we have weakened our ability to respond to what I believe is a grave long term conventional and nuclear threat. At the beginning of the Iraq war, 80 percent of ALL Army units and almost 100 percent of active combat units were rated at the highest state of readiness. Today, virtually all of our active-duty combat units at home and ALL of our guard units are at the lowest state of readiness, primarily due to equipment shortages resulting from repeated and extended deployments to Iraq ... Our Army has no strategic reserve, and while it is true that the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Air Force can be used to project power, there is a limit to what they can achieve. Overall, our military remains capable of projecting power, but we must also be able to sustain that projection, and in this regard there is no replacement for boots on the ground. (Murtha 2007)

In its March 2005 National Defense Strategy, the Pentagon identified four methods of warfare that could be used by both state and anti-state actors – in a world it characterized by increasing numbers of threats to American security and higher degrees of “uncertainty.” These methods of warfare included the “traditional,” the “irregular” (or asymmetrical), the “catastrophic” (the use of WMD, for example), and the “disruptive” (the innovative or unexpected use of new technologies, such as cybertechnology).

The continued dilemma is that the global war of terror has required restructuring of the US military and has risked overextension in “unpredictable” circumstances (Nardulli 2003). The changing military priorities of the US armed forces in unpredictable circumstances can be seen in the fact that since 2006 the most urgent requirement for the US Air Force has not been a new bomber or fighter

but a new combat-rescue helicopter, because of the urgent need to be able to evacuate the hundreds of troops being wounded every month on the battlefields in Afghanistan and Iraq. For the army, the most urgent requirement has been for new mine-resistant, ambush-resistant vehicles (Rogers 2007).

The Army has furthermore contracted with the Rand Corporation for a study of what demands could be expected to be levied upon it and for framing proposals in ways in which the Army could respond to these demands and suggestions as to how it could best expand its counter-terrorism capabilities. The resulting report (Nardulli 2003) concluded that the Department of Defense has “the threefold responsibilities of waging an offensive counter-terrorism campaign overseas, shaping the long-term security environment abroad to reduce the threat of global terrorism, and supporting homeland security.” Here, however, the Army may need to ‘think outside the box’ in that US Army doctrine for operations against asymmetrical strategies has been relatively barren; dealing with asymmetrical (or “ambiguous”) warfare may thus require a change in US military culture (Cassidy 2003, 2006). As the US has adapted poorly to fighting the new type of “asymmetrical” warfare, the armed services must become more flexible and less hierarchical in command and control if they are to be successful (Hammes 2004).

The role of US naval forces in GWOT had been enhanced in December 2002 when “The National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction” had been issued which led to the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) announced by President Bush on May 31, 2003 (Richardson 2004, Valencia 2005). Here the role of the US Navy in interdicting Weapons of Mass Destruction has become particularly prominent: “Because more than 95 percent of the world’s commerce moves by sea, it is likely that terrorist networks utilize merchant shipping to move cargo and passengers. The United States naval forces are well trained to carry out the mission of deterring, delaying, and disrupting the movement of terrorists and terrorist-related material at sea” (O’Rourke 2006). In addition, as piracy, drug smuggling, and terrorism become intertwined, naval deterrence and protection becomes crucial (Young and Valencia 2004).

The US Coast Guard was the most immediately impacted when it was transferred from the Department of Transportation to the newly created Department of Homeland Security and charged with providing maritime security for the nation’s ports and waterways. What had been basically a humanitarian and law enforcement agency became tasked with important new responsibilities. The following questions were consequently raised to make for more effective Navy and Coast Guard operations: “Are policies, concepts of operations, procedures, and tactics for coordinating Navy and Coast Guard HLS and HLD operations complete and sufficient? If not, what additional work needs to be done? Are the two services conducting sufficient exercises and training in joint HLS and HLD operations? Are Navy and Coast Guard systems sufficiently interoperable to reach desired levels of coordination? Is the Navy providing the right numbers and kinds of ships to assist the Coast Guard in performing HLS operations?” (O’Rourke 2005).

In addition, the National Guard has also been significantly impacted as more than 210,000 of the National Guard’s 330,000 soldiers have served in Iraq and

Afghanistan (with mobilizations averaging 460 days) as of 2005. Members of the National Guard and Reserve, for example, made up nearly 35 percent of the total US forces stationed in Iraq in 2005 (Bennis and Leaver 2005). The National Guard consequently appears to be shifting from a strategic back-up force to an active operational force, but without the necessary adjustments in policies and funding that are needed to make it more effective and truly operational.

Waging asymmetrical warfare (what was historically referred to as “irregular warfare”) has appeared far more difficult in part because differing “terrorist” organizations or partisan groups can use high tech communications to serve their purposes. The Internet, for example, permits terrorists/extremists to bypass the requirements of traditional media (television, radio, or print media) to reach hundreds of millions of people directly. The Internet permits communication, fundraising, propaganda, recruitment; it displays libraries of speeches, training manuals, and multimedia resources; it allows communication with diverse global audiences of members, sympathizers, media, enemies, and the public (Qin 2007). “Cyberwarfare” or “cyberterrorism” or “post-modern terrorism” (really a type of sabotage) can additionally take the form of spreading computer viruses or overloading computer systems so as to incapacitate electronic communications systems of business and government (Arquilla and Ronfeldt 1997, Laqueur 2003).

As the GWOT progressed, the September 2006 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism outlined both a short-term and long-term approach. The short-term approach has sought to prevent attacks by terrorist networks; deny terrorists entry into the United States and disrupt their travel internationally; defend potential targets of attack; deny WMD to rogue states and terrorist allies who seek to use them; deny terrorists the support and sanctuary of rogue states; deny terrorists control of any nation they would use as a base and launching pad for terror. The US government then saw its long-term approach as advancing effective democracy by overcoming alienation. This was to be accomplished by “empowering individuals” and giving them an “ownership stake in society,” establishing rule of law, supporting freedom of independent media, and fostering respect for human beings against ideologies that justify murder (White House 2006).

Although the long-term approach is intended to address the issues of societal development and nation building, it is not clear that the US is winning either the “short” or “long” war. As early as October 16, 2003 after US intervention in Iraq, Donald Rumsfeld raised the question as to whether or not the US was “winning” the war on terrorism in that the US was having “mixed results with al-Qaeda.” He furthermore stated:

Today, we lack metrics to know if we are winning or losing the global war on terror. Are we capturing, killing or deterring and dissuading more terrorists every day than the madrasas and the radical clerics are recruiting, training and deploying against us? Does the US need to fashion a broad, integrated plan to stop the next generation of terrorists? The US is putting relatively little effort into a long-range plan, but we are putting a great deal of effort into trying to stop terrorists. The cost-benefit ratio is against us! Our cost is billions against the terrorists’ costs of millions. (Rumsfeld 2003)

As the direct and indirect costs of GWOT have augmented, the US has sought NATO assistance in prosecuting the war in Afghanistan. The Pentagon pulled troops out of Bosnia and Afghanistan in order to concentrate on containing what has become sectarian civil warfare in Iraq through the “troop surge” in late 2006, while simultaneously engaging in the long-term containment of Iran, a member of the “axis of evil.” In the case of Iraq, Donald Rumsfeld stated, after stepping down as Secretary of Defense: “the greater your [troop] presence, the more it plays into extremist lies that you’re there to take their oil, to occupy their nation, stay and not leave; that you’re against Islam, as opposed to being against violent extremists.” In effect, the deployment of more troops “can have exactly the opposite effect. It can increase recruiting for extremists. It can increase financing for extremists (Rumsfeld 2006).

General public recognition that the US had become bogged down in Iraqi quicksand helped lead the US Congress to demand an alternative strategy in opposition to the Bush administration’s willingness to “stay the course.” The victory of the Democratic Party in both the US House and in the Senate elections in November 2006 – coupled with the publication of the bipartisan Baker–Hamilton report – then boosted efforts among both Democrats, plus a minority of Republicans, to pressure the Bush administration to change strategy toward Iraq (but not necessarily Iran) and to at least consider more diplomatic, as opposed to primarily military, options in the “global war on terror” (Baker and Hamilton 2006). In addition to the need for greater inter-agency cooperation within the Federal Government, involving long-term planning, the Pentagon needs to be able to involve civilian bodies and experts and to find ways to produce better coordinated operational planning with allies and partners (Murdoch 2004).

With the victory of Barack Obama in the November 2008 US presidential elections, the focus of American attention largely shifted from Iraq to Afghanistan and to an increasingly instable Pakistan. Despite ongoing acts of inter-communal terrorism in Iraq, the Obama administration planned to reduce US forces deployed in Iraq in 2009 from roughly the 142,000 in the country when the administration took office (this did not count private security contractors) to between 35,000 and 50,000 by 2010, and then to withdraw all US forces from Iraq by 2011. The Obama administration simultaneously planned to augment military and development assistance to both Afghanistan and Pakistan, and to upgrade US forces in Afghanistan, merging both NATO and US forces under a single command structure for a total deployment of roughly 50,000 troops by the end of 2009, up from 34,000 at the start of the year. With Taliban and al Qaeda forces resurgent in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, the political and military outcomes, as well as domestic and international consequences, of the global war on terrorism remain to be seen.

#### NOTE

- 1 Section 212(a)(3)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) defines “terrorist activity” to mean: “any activity which is unlawful under the laws of the place where it is committed (or which, if committed in the United States, would be unlawful under



the laws of the United States or any State) and which involves any of the following: (I) The hijacking or sabotage of any conveyance (including an aircraft, vessel, or vehicle). (II) The seizing or detaining, and threatening to kill, injure, or continue to detain, another individual in order to compel a third person (including a governmental organization) to do or abstain from doing any act as an explicit or implicit condition for the release of the individual seized or detained. (III) A violent attack upon an internationally protected person (as defined in section 1116(b)(4) of title 18, United States Code) or upon the liberty of such a person. (IV) An assassination. (V) The use of any – (a) biological agent, chemical agent, or nuclear weapon or device, or (b) explosive, firearm, or other weapon or dangerous device (other than for mere personal monetary gain) – with intent to endanger, directly or indirectly, the safety of one or more individuals or to cause substantial damage to property. (VI) A threat, attempt, or conspiracy to do any of the foregoing.” (For a list of terrorist organizations, see, US State Department (October 11, 2005) <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/fs/37191.htm>. For state sponsors of terrorism, see US State Department (April 30, 2007) <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2006/82736.htm>.)

#### BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Achcar, Gilbert (2002). *Clash of Barbarisms: September 11 and the Making of the New World Disorder*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Ackerman, Bruce (2006). *Before the Next Attack: Preserving Civil Liberties in an Age of Terrorism*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Alexander, Yonah, and Michel S. Swetnam (2001). *Usama bin Laden's al Qaeda: Profile of a Terrorist Network*. Ardsley, NY: Transnational Publishers.
- Anheier, Helmut, and Yudhishtir Raj Isar (2007). *Cultures and Globalisation: Conflicts and Tensions*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Arendt, Hannah (1976). *Origins of Totalitarianism*, 3 vols. San Diego: Harcourt, Brace Jovanovich.
- Arquilla, John, and David Ronfeldt (1997). *In Athena's Camp: Preparing for Conflict in the Information Age*. Santa Monica, CA: Rand.
- Bacevich, Andrew J. (2002). *American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of US Diplomacy*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Bacevich, Andrew J. (2005). *The New American Militarism: How Americans Are Seduced by War*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Baker, James A., and Lee H. Hamilton, Co-Chairs (2006). *The Iraq Study Group Report: The Way Forward: A New Approach*. Washington: US Institute for Peace.
- Bamford, James (2004). *A Pretext for War: 9/11, Iraq, and the Abuse of America's Intelligence Agencies*. New York: Doubleday.
- Beckman, James (2007). *Comparative Legal Approaches to Homeland Security and Anti-Terrorism*. Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Bennis, Phyllis, and Erik Leaver (2005). *The Iraq Quagmire: The Mounting Costs of War and the Case for Bringing Home the Troops*. Institute for Policy Studies and Foreign Policy in Focus. (August 31), <http://www.ips-dc.org/reports/#1174> (accessed April 20, 2009).
- Betts, Richard K. (2006). “The Osirak Fallacy,” *The National Interest*, 83 (Spring), 23–5.
- Bishara, Marwan (2004). “Asymmetrical Conflict: A Critical Assessment,” in Hall Gardner, ed., *NATO and the EU: New World, New Europe, New Threats*. Aldershot: Ashgate.

- Bush, George W. (2001). "Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People." (September 20), <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html>.
- Bush, George W. (2002a). "State of the Union Address." (January 29), <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/onpolitics/transcripts/sou012902.htm> (accessed April 20, 2009).
- Bush, George W. (2002b) "Speech to the Graduating Class of the US Military Academy at West Point" (June 1), <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/06/#> <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020601-3.v.html> (video accessed April 24, 2009).
- Canestaro, Nathan (2003). "American Law and Policy on Assassinations of Foreign Leaders: The Practicality of Maintaining the Status Quo," *Boston College International & Comparative Law Review*, 26:1, <http://www.bc.edu/schools/law/lawreviews/meta-elements/journals/bcicl/261/01FMS.htm>.
- Cassidy, Robert M. (2003). *Russia in Afghanistan and Chechnya: Military Culture and the Paradoxes of Asymmetrical Conflict*. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, February.
- Cassidy, Robert M. (2006) *Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror: Military Culture and Irregular War*. Westport, CT: Praeger.
- Chossudovsky, Michel (2005). *America's "War on Terrorism"*, 2nd edn. Pincourt, Quebec: Global Research.
- Church Committee Reports, Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (1975–6), ed. Assassination Archives and Research Center: <http://www.aarclibrary.org/publib/church/contents.htm>
- Clarke, Richard A. (2004). *Against All Enemies*. New York: Free Press.
- Cohn, Marjorie (July 29, 2003). "Assassination and Display in Iraq: The Killings of Uday and Qusai Hussein in International Law," *The Jurist*, <http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forum/forumnew121.php>
- Coll, Steve (2004). *Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan and bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001*. New York: Penguin Press.
- Daalder, Ivo H., and James M. Lindsay (2003). *America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy*. Washington: Brookings Institution Press.
- Donnelly, Thomas [Donald Kagan and Gary James Schmitt, Project Co-Chairmen] (2000). *Rebuilding America's Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century*. Washington: Project for the New American Century, <http://www.newamericancentury.org/RebuildingAmericasDefenses.pdf> (accessed April 20, 2009).
- Dreyfuss, Robert (2005). *Devil's Game: How the United States Helped Unleash Fundamentalist Islam*. New York: Henry Holt and Co.
- Fleischer, Ari (2003). "Press Briefing by Ari Fleischer" The White House, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030225-9.html>
- Ford, Gerald (1976). "Executive Order 11905," *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, 12:8 (February 23), <http://www.ford.utexas.edu/LIBRARY/speeches/760110e.htm> (accessed April 24, 2009).
- Gardner, Hall (2004). "From Balance to Imbalance of Terror," in Hall Gardner, ed., *NATO and the EU: New World, New Europe, New Threats*. Aldershot: Ashgate, 49–76.
- Gardner, Hall (2007a). *American Global Strategy and the War on Terrorism*. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate.
- Gardner, Hall (2007b). *Averting Global War: Regional Challenges, Overextension and Options for American Strategy*. New York: Palgrave.
- Gunaratna, Rohan (2002). *Inside Al Qae'da*. London: Hurst.

- Hammes, Thomas X. (2004). *The Sling and the Stone*. New York: Zenith Press.
- Hayden, Patrick, Tom Lansford, and Robert P. Watson, eds. (2003). *America's War on Terror*. Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Hoffman, Bruce (1998). *Inside Terrorism*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Hoffman, Bruce (2002). "Defining Terrorism," in Russell D. Howard and Reid L. Sawyer, eds., *Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism*. Guilford, CT: McGraw Hill/Dushkin.
- Hoge, James F., and Gideon Rose, eds. (2001). *How Did This Happen?: Terrorism and the New War*. New York: Public Affairs.
- Hunter, Stephen, and John Bainbridge, Jr. (2005). *American Gunfight: The Plot to Kill Harry Truman- and the Shoot-out that Stopped It*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Johnson, Chalmers (2000). *Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire*. New York: Metropolitan Books.
- Johnson, Chalmers (2004). *The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Republic*. New York: Metropolitan Books.
- Kaplan, Lawrence F., and William Kristol (2003). *The War Over Iraq: Saddam's Tyranny and America's Mission*. San Francisco: Encounter Books.
- Kristol, Irving (1999). *Neo-Conservatism: The Autobiography of an Idea*. Chicago: Ivan R. Dee Publisher.
- Kristol, Irving (2003). "The Neoconservative Persuasion: 'What It Was, and What It Is,'" *The Weekly Standard*, 8:47 (August 25).
- Lake, Anthony (2000). *Six Nightmares: Real Threats in a Dangerous World and How America Can Meet Them*. Boston: Little, Brown & Co.
- Laqueur, Walter (2003). "Postmodern Terrorism," in Charles W. Kegley, ed., *The New Global Terrorism*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
- Lubin, David (2002). "The War on Terrorism and the End of Human Rights," *Philosophy and Public Policy Quarterly* 22, and in James E. White (2006), *Contemporary Moral Problems: War, Terrorism, and Torture*. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.
- Mann, James (2004). *Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush's War Cabinet*. New York: Viking.
- Maxwell, Bruce (2004). *Homeland Security: A Documentary History*. Washington DC: Congressional Quarterly Press.
- Meyssan, Thierry (2002). *9/11: The Big Lie*. London: Carnot Publishing.
- Murdoch, Clark A. (2004). *Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era*. Center for Strategic and International Studies (March), [http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/bgn\\_ph1\\_report.pdf](http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/bgn_ph1_report.pdf) (accessed May 11, 2009).
- Murtha, John (2007) "Testimony before Senate Foreign Affairs Committee" (January 23), [http://www.house.gov/list/press/pa12\\_murtha/PRtestimony.html](http://www.house.gov/list/press/pa12_murtha/PRtestimony.html) (accessed April 20, 2009).
- Naftali, Timothy J. (2005). *Blind Spot: The Secret History of American Counterterrorism*. New York: Basic Books.
- Nardulli, Bruce (2003). *The Global War on Terrorism: An Early Look at Implications for the Army*. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation.
- National Archives (1981). Executive Order 12333—United States intelligence activities (December 4). <http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/codification/executive-order/12333.html#2.11> (accessed April 25, 2009).
- 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States* (July 22, 2004). Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, <http://www.gpoaccess.gov/911/index.html>

- O'Rourke, Ronald (2005) *Homeland Security: Navy Operations – Background and Issues for Congress*. Washington: Congressional Research Service (June 2).
- O'Rourke, Ronald (2006). *Navy Role in Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) – Background and Issues for Congress*. RS22373. Washington: Congressional Research Service.
- Perl, Raphael F. (1998). *Terrorism: U.S. Response to Bombings in Kenya and Tanzania: A New Policy Direction?* Congressional Research Office, CRS Report for Congress, 98-733F The Library of Congress, Washington, updated, September 1998.
- Powell, Colin L. (1992–3). "U.S. Forces: Challenges Ahead," *Foreign Affairs*, 71:5 (Winter).
- Qin, Jialun, Yilu Zhou, Edna Reid, Guanpi Lai, and Hsinchun Chen (2007). "Analyzing Terror Campaigns on the Internet: Technical Sophistication, Content Richness, and Web Interactivity," *International Journal of Human-Computer Studies*, 65:1 (January), 71–84.
- Rashid, Ahmed (2000). *Taliban*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Richardson, Michael (2004). *A Time Bomb for Global Trade: Maritime-Related Terrorism in an Age of Weapons of Mass Destruction*. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
- Rogers, Paul (2007). "US, Iran: The Fire Next Time," *ISN Security Watch* (May 29), <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Current-Affairs/Security-Watch/Detail/?ots591=4888CAA0-B3DB-1461-98B9-E20E7B9C13D4&lng=en&cid=53335> (accessed April 24, 2009).
- Rumsfeld, Donald (2001a). "Guidelines to be Considered When Committing U.S. Forces," (March 2001) Cited in "In Rumsfeld's Words: Guidelines for Committing Forces," *New York Times*, October 14, 2002, <http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/bush/guidelines.htm> (accessed April 24, 2009).
- Rumsfeld, Donald (2001b). "Secretary Rumsfeld Media Stakeout in Washington US Department of Defense News Transcript, September 24." <http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=1926> (accessed April 24, 2009).
- Rumsfeld, Donald (2003). "Memo: Global War on Terrorism" (October 16), <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/dod/rumsfeld-d20031016sdmemo.htm> (accessed April 24, 2009).
- Rumsfeld, Donald (2006). Interview with Cal Thomas (December 11), [http://www.townhall.com/Columnists/CalThomas/2006/12/11/donald\\_rumfeld\\_w\\_cal\\_thomas\\_transcript](http://www.townhall.com/Columnists/CalThomas/2006/12/11/donald_rumfeld_w_cal_thomas_transcript) (accessed April 24, 2009).
- Schmid, Alex P., and Albert J. Jongman (1988). *Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories and Literature*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books.
- Schmitt, Eric, and Thom Shanker (2005). "U.S. Officials Retool Slogan for Terror War," *New York Times* (July 26).
- Slann, Martin, and Bernard Schechterman, eds. (1987). *Multidimensional Terrorism*. Boulder, CO, and London: Lynne Rienner.
- Stanley, William D., and Charles W. Kegley (2002). *The New Global Terrorism: Characteristics, Causes, Controls*. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall.
- Stern, Jessica (1999). *The Ultimate Terrorists*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Stohl, Michael, and George A. Lopez, eds. (1984). *The State as Terrorist: The Dynamics of Governmental Violence and Repression*. Westport, CT: Greenwood.
- Suskind, Ron (2006). *The One Percent Doctrine: Deep Inside America's Pursuit of its Enemies Since 9/11*. Detroit: Thorndike Press, Thomson Gale.
- Tarpley, Webster Griffin (2006). *9/11 Synthetic Terror: Made in USA*, 4th edn. Joshua Tree, CA: Progressive Press.

- Tucker, David (1997). *Skirmishes at the Edge of Empire: The United States and International Terrorism*. Westport, CT: Praeger.
- US State Department (2005). *Foreign Terrorist Organizations* (October 11), <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/fs/37191.htm> (accessed April 24, 2009).
- US State Department (2006). *State Sponsors of Terrorism: Country Reports on Terrorism* (April 28), <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2005/64337.htm> (accessed April 24, 2009).
- US State Department (2007). *State Sponsors of Terrorism: Country Reports on Terrorism* (April 30), <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2006/82736.htm> (accessed April 20, 2009).
- Valencia, Mark J. (2005) *The Proliferation Security Initiative: Making Waves in Asia*, Adelphi Paper 376. Oxford: Routledge.
- Van Herpen, Marcel (2004). "Six Dimensions of the Growing Transatlantic Divide," in Hall Gardner, ed., *NATO and the EU: New World, New Europe, New Threats*. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 198–216.
- Weiss, Thomas G., Margaret E. Crahan, and John Goering (2004). *Wars on Terrorism and Iraq: Human Rights, Unilateralism, and U.S. Foreign Policy*. New York: Routledge.
- White House (2002). *Homeland Security Act*. Washington, DC: US Government. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/deptofhomeland/bill/hsl-bill.pdf>
- White House (2006). *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*. Washington, DC: US Government, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nsct/2006/nsct2006.pdf>
- Wohlstetter, Albert (1958). *The Delicate Balance of Terror*. San Monica: Rand. <http://www.rand.org/publications/classics/wohlstetter/P1472/P1472.html> (accessed April 26, 2009).
- Woodward, Bob (2004). *Plan of Attack*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Wright, Lawrence (2006). *The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11*. New York: Knopf.
- Young, Adam, and Mark Valencia (2004). "The Conflation of Piracy and Terrorism in Southeast Asia: Rectitude and Utility," *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, 25:2 (August), 269–83.

## Part II

# THE ARMED FORCES



## Chapter Seventeen

---

# THE CONTINENTAL ARMY

*Charles P. Neimeyer*

In our mind, many of us see the American War for Independence in the same way we view the Revolutionary era artwork of John Trumbull or Charles Willson Peale – as a bigger than life national drama, that in the end, thanks in large part to good old fashioned perseverance and republican virtue, turned out successfully for America. In Trumbull's *The Death of General Warren at Bunker's Hill*, painted immediately after the war (1786), we are led by the artist to recognize several recurrent revolutionary war themes: the overarching presence of suffering on the battlefield and most importantly, sacrifice. Here you are invited to witness the moment where the British are beginning to overwhelm the American defenders. Your eyes are immediately drawn to a fierce looking British grenadier about to bayonet a prostrate and dying Joseph Warren – only to have his hand stayed at the last moment by a gallant British officer. In the left background of the painting stands a grim and resolute line of musket wielding Massachusetts militiamen in their shirt sleeves determined to resist the British until the last possible moment. The fact that these men were not dressed in a uniform and seem out of place on the battlefield was purposeful. It makes the fight against the violent bayonet-wielding redcoats almost unfair. Yet, Trumbull's painting is purposely designed to convey that very idea. His imagery strongly hinted that despite their military inferiority, the valor, resolve and republican virtue of the Americans at Bunker Hill were attributes worthy of memory.

In fact, post-revolutionary war art seemed to revel in emphasizing this sort of romanticized and nationalistic iconography that has been so hard to overcome by later generations of historians. And thanks to this particular trend, the history of the war for American Independence remains partially obscured as if seen “through a glass darkly.”

Following in the same vein as Trumbull and Peale, early American historians such as David Ramsay, immediately got to work on establishing these very themes in the printed word. Ramsay was a physician from South Carolina and was himself a major figure in the struggle for independence. The brother of a Congressman and brother in law of artist Charles Willson Peale, following the war, Ramsay wrote

a very influential *History of the American Revolution* (1789). While most historians are quick to dismiss his work as error ridden, (which indeed it was), others, such as the eminent Wesley Frank Craven (1956), noted that, despite its flaws, Ramsay's work represented a starting point for the study of the war and was the first attempt by a historian to deal with the American Revolution in any meaningful way. In fact, Ramsay's postwar influence over how early historians viewed the American Revolution was so important that Arthur Shaffer (1991) wrote a full length monograph on Ramsay's impact on the historiography of the Revolution.

During the nineteenth century, the highly influential "godfather" of modern American history and future President of the American Historical Association (AHA), George Bancroft, picked up where Ramsay left off. Although Bancroft's *The History of the United States* (1834–75) lacked the finesse of modern historical research, it contained nonetheless a fairly credible and traditional account of the Revolution. Two of the most influential and widely read historians of this era were Jared Sparks (1840) and Washington Irving (1855–9). While Irving was perhaps better known for his "Rip Van Winkle" and "Legend of Sleepy Hollow" fiction his multivolume biography of his namesake George Washington, completed on his deathbed in 1859 gave his audience another highly romanticized view of the war and the role that George Washington had played in it. Spark's *Life of Washington* (1840) also heavily romanticized the central role of George Washington in winning the war and went to further reinforce the virtuous republican themes writ large in his hagiography of the nation's "first citizen."

Toward the end of the nineteenth century, a renewed interest in the specific battles fought by the Continental Army reemerged. This interest was led by two veterans of the Civil War, William S. Stryker and Henry Phelps Johnston, who can be considered part of a new "nationalist" and less romanticized school of historical inquiry. For example, eschewing the usual recounting of various unverifiable tales told by Sparks and Irving, Stryker instead relied on what confirmed facts he could gather and used a significant amount of primary source material to back up his work. As a result, William Stryker's study on *The Battles of Trenton and Princeton* (1898) has largely stood the test of time and is still considered a fairly reliable account of these two pivotal engagements of the Revolution. In his post Civil War years, Henry Johnston became a professor of history at the College of the City of New York and primarily focused his work on the 1776 New York campaign. Like Stryker, Johnston went to great trouble to include a large amount of primary source material including accounts from the British and Hessian perspectives. Although Stryker and Johnston's work were vast improvements over the romantic notions of their predecessors, their history can be generally characterized as fairly accurate but straight forward battlefield narratives that gave readers the sense of seeing the war through a soda straw. Little thought was given to the social conditions of the men in the ranks or the contextual relationship of battles to the politics of war as a whole. Nonetheless, both authors remained close cousins to their romantic school predecessors and clearly desired to use history to celebrate the accomplishments of the army during the Revolution (Fischer 2004: 439–40).

By the 1930s, interest in the Revolution shifted from those who fought on the American side to those who had opposed them. Thus began a more modern reexamination of the loyalist perspective. During the 1930s, scholarly and sympathetic works on the British high command and even the long reviled Hessians appeared on the market. All this historical activity enabled the loyalist oppositional point of view to be considered as legitimate for the very first time and made their activities less vilified than their prior treatment at the hands of the romantic and nationalist schools.

Following the end of World War II and largely continuing to the present day, there has been a renewed interest in the Continental Army. Lynn Montross, *Rag, Tag, and Bobtail* (1952) and Joseph B. Mitchell *Discipline and Bayonets* (1967) tell the story of the army and men who served it to a popular audience. Robert K. Wright's *The Continental Army* (1983) presents a more comprehensive and scholarly assessment of the service. The evolution of the Continental Army from a rather ineffective collection of individualists at New York in 1776 into an effective fighting force three years later has been traced by John Buchanan (2004) and Thomas Fleming (2005), though a contemporary writer, Wayne Bodle (2004) challenges these works and the traditional view that Washington's army was transformed during the winter at Valley Forge. Bodle argues that Frederick von Steuben and the drill he instituted at Valley Forge did not play a significant role in transforming the army and bringing it success in the future and asserts Washington overstated the gravity of supply problems to pressure Congress into providing better support for the army, thus implying a need to revise the assessment of E. Wayne Carp, *To Starve the Army at Pleasure* (1984), and the traditional view that the army's supply system was totally inadequate.

Dozens of soldier's diaries and journals were republished by various publishing houses in anticipation of the Bicentennial celebration of 1976. Several of the works reprinted in the 56-volume *Eyewitness Accounts of the American Revolution* (1968–71) series were by individuals who served in the Continental Army. These were photographic reproductions of previously published works, but new editions appeared of the diaries of Continental Army enlisted men Jeremiah Greenman (Bray and Bushnell 1978) and Joseph Plumb Martin (Martin 1993), and junior army officer Joseph Bloomfield (Lender and Martin 1982).

So did editions of officers in the army, including *General John Glover's Letterbook* (Knight 1976), General Philip Van Cortlandt's memoir and correspondence (Judd 1976), *This Glorious Cause: The Adventures of Two Company Officers* [Joseph Hodgkins and Nathaniel Wade] in *Washington's Army* (Wade and Lively 1958); *A Salute to Courage: The American Revolution as Seen through Wartime Writings of Officers of the Continental Army and Navy* (Ryan 1979); and the writings of Benjamin Gilbert (Symmes 1980, Shy 1989). Short extracts from the writings of several veterans of the war are included in *America Rebels: Narratives of the Patriots* (Dorson 1953) and *The Spirit of 'Seventy-Six: The Story of the American Revolution as Told by Participants* (Commager and Morris 1976). The Bicentennial also saw publication of the useful *The Sinews of Independence: Monthly Strength Reports of the Continental Army* (Lesser 1975).

Despite these new sources of available information on the men and women of the army, the study of the military aspects of the war still languished. The primary reason was because the study of military history had long been stigmatized by modern historians as irrelevant (and even unscholarly) in comparison to the larger amount of work being done on the social movements of the Revolutionary era.

By the late 1970s various leftist leaning reinterpretations of the Revolution emerged, most of which had little or nothing to do with the military. The new focus was now on the “inarticulate,” or masses of men and women who heretofore had been little heard from but whose wartime contributions were certainly worthy of further consideration. For example, until Benjamin Quarles published his highly respected and influential book, *The Negro in the American Revolution* (1961), there had been little recognition of the role played by African-Americans during the war. But Quarles inspired other historians such as John Hope Franklin (1967) and Eugene Genovese (1974) to write on the important issue of slavery and how it related to the Revolution. Other historians similarly followed in their wake such as James Axtell’s influential treatment of Native-Americans (1986) and Gary Nash’s path breaking work on *Race and Revolution* (1990), Sylvia Frey’s African-American focus in *Water From the Rock* (1991), and Judith L. Van Buskirk’s “Claiming Their Due: African Americans in the Revolutionary War and Its Aftermath” (2007). Linda Grant De Pauw (1975) and Holly Mayer (1996, 2007) likewise focused on the role of women during the war. Charles Neimeyer’s *A Social History of the Continental Army, 1775–1783* (1996) focused on the role that various ethnicities such as the Irish and Germans played in the manning of the first national army. Piers Mackesy (1964), a British historian, urged us to see the war in a broader, more global perspective. In sum, the study of the Revolution greatly benefited from the rich social historical scholarship that emerged as a result of the changes that occurred during this tumultuous time. Recently, John Resch and Walter Sargent edited an anthology of essays, *War and Society in the American Revolution* (2007), that focused on the mobilization of colonial manpower and the role that the home front played in keeping the army manned and supported. Charles Neimeyer’s “Town Born, Turn Out” (2007), Walter Sargent’s study “The Massachusetts Rank and File of 1777” (2007), John Resch’s “The Revolution as a People’s War” (2007), and Michael McConnell’s essay on Virginia’s mobilization for war, “Fit for Common Service?” (2007) all served to connect local politics with the formation of a first-ever continental army and point out that national mobilization depended on a blending of congressional, provincial, and local initiatives that tended to greatly vary from town to town and even region to region.

While social history did indeed play an important role in the renewed examination of the American Revolution and those who served in the Continental army, it did not perform this role in isolation. A growing number of influential and military-minded historians such as Don Higginbotham (1971, 1988), John Shy (1976), Charles Royster (1979), and James Kirby Martin and Mark E. Lender (1982) emerged to explain how and why the army operated the way it did during the Revolution. Instead of taking the traditional battles and leaders approach of the old nationalist school or the strongly anti-military and socialist direction of the

“new left” historians alone, these particular military-minded scholars utilized a wide variety of approaches to their research that enabled them to see the war through a broader contextual lens than had heretofore been considered. In fact, the approach of these historians was so multidisciplinary that it is with great difficulty that we use the term “military historian” in relation to them at all. In reality, they were historians who just happened to believe the activity of the army was central toward the outcome of the war. One of the very best books of the multidisciplinary genre has to be David Hackett Fischer’s *Paul Revere’s Ride* (1994). Leading a trend toward using a wide variety of investigative approaches, Fischer’s account places Revere in the forefront of early Revolutionary War activity while providing a highly readable history on a Revolutionary War figure whose real history had been largely skewed by earlier romantic era historical accounts. This book, along with Fischer’s earlier award winning work on British folkways in America, *Albion’s Seed* (1989), and *Washington’s Crossing* (2004), established him as one of the finest multidisciplinary Revolutionary Era historians writing history today.

In the first years of the twenty-first century, thanks largely to the digitization of numerous and readily accessible sources of historical information we are now seeing the emergence of a wide variety of histories and historical styles that are no longer confined by the politics of the times. The army, and the men and women who manned it, are back as a central focus of historical scholarship. Caroline Cox’s *A Proper Sense of Honor* (2004) is a good example of this current trend. Her recent work on the Continental army was more a cultural history than a military one. By placing the Continental army into cultural context, Cox enables us to emerge with a richer understanding of what it was like to serve as an officer or enlisted soldier in the ranks and how this possibly affected their performance on the battlefield. After an early swing to the right and then a late twentieth-century swing to the left, the new multidisciplinary approach to the study of the war and the army are now being published in large and regular numbers. John A. Nagy’s study of *Rebellion in the Ranks* (2008) probes the causes of dissent in the Continental Army concluding that, while it is difficult to define exactly what constituted the crime of mutiny during the American Revolution, there was significant unrest among enlisted personnel.

Two of the most recent and highly readable accounts, David Hackett Fischer’s *Washington’s Crossing* (2004) and David McCullough’s *1776* (2005), achieved wide acclaim well beyond traditional academic circles. Both authors focused on the army yet no one refers to them as strictly military historians. The tone of these works is more positive than that of Harry W. Ward, *George Washington’s Enforcers* (2006) which analyzes military justice in the Continental Army, describes the methods with which it was enforced, and compared discipline in the Continental Army with that in the British armies finding that the treatment of enlisted personnel and officers was unequal in both organizations, but that in general, treatment of all men was more humane in the American than the British armed forces.

It is a providential time to study the history of the Continental Army. Armed with new tools of investigation and the ability to harness vastly greater amounts of information than was available to earlier generations of historians, today’s

scholar on the American Revolution is living in a golden era for further historical research. Indeed, the field has never been richer.

#### BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Axtell, James (1986). *The Invasion Within: The Contest of Cultures in Colonial North America*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Bancroft, George (1834–75). *The History of the United States from the Discovery of the American Continent*, 10 vols. Boston: C. Bowen.
- Bodle, Wayne K. (2004). *The Valley Forge Winter: Civilians and Soldiers in War*. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.
- Bray, Robert C., and Paul E. Bushnell, eds. (1978). *Diary of a Common Soldier in the American Revolution, 1775–1783: An Annotated Edition of the Military Journal of Jeremiah Greenman*. DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press.
- Buchanan, John (2004). *The Road to Valley Forge: How Washington Built the Army that Won the Revolution*. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons.
- Carp, E. Wayne (1984). *To Starve the Army at Pleasure: Continental Army Administration and American Political Culture, 1775–1783*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Commager, Henry Steele, and Richard B. Morris (1976). *The Spirit of 'Seventy-Six: The Story of the American Revolution as Told by Participants*. New York: Harper & Row.
- Cox, Caroline (2004). *A Proper Sense of Honor: Service and Sacrifice in George Washington's Army*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Craven, Wesley Frank (1956). *The Legend of the Founding Fathers*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- De Pauw, Linda Grant (1975). *Founding Mothers: Women in America in the Revolutionary Era*. Boston, MA: Houghton-Mifflin Co.
- Dorson, Richard Mercer, ed. (1953). *America Rebels: Narratives of the Patriots*. New York: Pantheon.
- Eyewitness Accounts of the American Revolution*, 56 vols. (1968–9). New York: New York Times and Arno Press.
- Fischer, David Hackett (1989). *Albion's Seed*. New York: Oxford Press.
- Fischer, David Hackett (1994). *Paul Revere's Ride and the Battle of Lexington and Concord*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Fischer, David Hackett (2004). *Washington's Crossing*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Fleming, Thomas (2005). *Washington's Secret War: The Hidden History of Valley Forge*. New York: Smithsonian Books/Collins.
- Franklin, John Hope (1967). *From Slavery to Freedom: A History of Negro Americans*. New York: A. A. Knopf.
- Frey, Sylvia R. (1991). *Water from the Rock: Black Resistance in a Revolutionary Age*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Genovese, Eugene D. (1974). *Roll, Jordan, Roll: The World the Slaves Made*. New York: Pantheon Books.
- Higginbotham, Don (1971). *The War of American Independence: Military Attitudes, Policies, and Practice, 1763–1789*. New York: Macmillan.
- Higginbotham, Don (1988). *War and Society in Revolutionary America: The Wider Dimensions of Conflict*. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.



- Irving, Washington (1855–9). *The Life of George Washington*, 5 vols. New York: G. P. Putnam.
- Johnston, Henry Phelps (1878 [2005]). *The Campaign of 1776 around New York and Brooklyn*. Brooklyn, NY: Long Island Historical Society; (reprinted 2005, Cranbury, NJ: Scholar's Bookshelf).
- Judd, Jacob, ed. (1976). *The Revolutionary War Memoir and Selected Correspondence of Philip Van Cortlandt*. Tarrytown, NY: Sleepy Hollow Restorations.
- Knight, Russell W., ed. (1976). *General John Glover's Letterbook, 1776–1777*. Salem, MA: Essex Institute.
- Lender, Mark E., and James Kirby Martin, eds. (1982). *Citizen Soldier: The Revolutionary Journal of Joseph Bloomfield*. Newark: New Jersey Historical Society.
- Lesser, Charles H., ed. (1975). *The Sinews of Independence: Monthly Strength Reports of the Continental Army*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Mackesy, Piers (1964). *The War for America, 1775–1783*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Martin, James Kirby, ed. (1993). *Ordinary Courage: The Revolutionary War Adventures of Joseph Plumb Martin*. St. James, NY: Brandywine Press.
- Martin, James Kirby, and Mark Edward Lender (1982). *A Respectable Army: The Military Origins of the Republic, 1763–1789*. Arlington Heights, IL: Harlan Davidson.
- Mayer, Holly (1996). *Belonging to the Army: Camp Followers and Community During the American Revolution*. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.
- Mayer, Holly (2007). "Wives, Concubines, and Community: Following the Army," in John Resch and Walter Sargent, eds., *War and Society in the American Revolution: Mobilization and Home Fronts*. DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 235–62.
- McConnell, Michael A. (2007). "Fit for Common Service?": Class, Race, and Recruitment in Revolutionary Virginia," in John Resch and Walter Sargent, eds., *War and Society in the American Revolution: Mobilization and Home Fronts*. DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 103–31.
- McCullough, David (2005). *1776*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Middlekauff, Robert. (1982). *The Glorious Cause*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Mitchell, Joseph B. (1967). *Discipline and Bayonets: The Armies and Leaders in the War of the American Revolution*. New York: Putnam.
- Montross, Lynn (1952). *Rag, Tag, and Bobtail: The Story of the Continental Army, 1775–1783*. New York: Harper.
- Nagy, John A. (2008). *Rebellion in the Ranks: Mutinies of the American Revolution*. Yardley, PA: Westholme.
- Nash, Gary B. (1990). *Race and Revolution*. Madison, WI: Madison House Publishers.
- Neimeyer, Charles P. (1996). *A Social History of the Continental Army, 1775–1783*. New York: New York University Press.
- Neimeyer, Charles P. (2007). "'Town Born Turn Out': Town Militias, Tories, and the Struggle for Control of the Massachusetts Backcountry," in John Resch and Walter Sargent, eds., *War and Society in the American Revolution: Mobilization and Home Fronts*. DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 23–41.
- Quarles, Benjamin (1961). *The Negro in the American Revolution*. New York: W. W. Norton.
- Ramsay, David (1789). *The History of the American Revolution*. Philadelphia: R. Aitken & Son [reprinted 1991, Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Classics].
- Resch, John (2007). "The Revolution as a People's War," in John Resch and Walter Sargent, eds., *War and Society in the American Revolution: Mobilization and Home Fronts*. DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 70–102.

- Resch, John, and Walter Sargent, eds. (2007). *War and Society in the American Revolution*. DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press.
- Royster, Charles (1979). *A Revolutionary People at War: The Continental Army and American Character, 1775–1783*. New York: W. W. Norton.
- Ryan, Dennis P., ed. (1979). *A Salute to Courage: The American Revolution as Seen through Wartime Writings of Officers of the Continental Army and Navy*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Sargent, Walter (2007). “The Massachusetts Rank and File of 1777,” in John Resch and Walter Sargent, eds., *War and Society in the American Revolution: Mobilization and Home Fronts*. DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 42–69.
- Shaffer, Arthur K. (1991). *To Be An American: David Ramsay and the Making of the American Consciousness*. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.
- Shy, John (1976). *A People Numerous and Armed*, rev. edn. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Shy, John, ed. (1989). *Winding Down: The Revolutionary War Letters of Lieutenant Benjamin Gilbert of Massachusetts, 1780–1783*. Ann Arbor, MI: William L. Clements Library.
- Sparks, Jared (1840). *The Life of Washington*, 2 vols. New York: Saxton.
- Stryker, William S. (1898). *The Battles of Trenton and Princeton*. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin [reprinted 2001, ed. Mark Edward Lender, Trenton, NJ: Old Barracks Assoc.].
- Symmes, Rebecca D., ed. (1980). *A Citizen-Soldier in the American Revolution: The Diary of Benjamin Gilbert in Massachusetts and New York*. Cooperstown: New York State Historical Association.
- Van Buskirk, Judith L. (2007). “Claiming Their Due: African Americans in the Revolutionary War and Its Aftermath,” in John Resch and Walter Sargent, eds., *War and Society in the American Revolution: Mobilization and Home Fronts*. DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 132–60.
- Wade, Herbert T., and Robert A. Lively. (1958). *This Glorious Cause: The Adventures of Two Company Officers in Washington’s Army*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Walker, Paul K. (1988). *Engineers of Independence: A Documentary History of the Army Engineers in the American Revolution, 1775–1783*. Washington: Office of the Chief of Engineers.
- Ward, Harry M. (2006). *George Washington’s Enforcers: Policing the Continental Army*. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press.
- Wood, Gordon S. (1991). *The Radicalism of the American Revolution*. New York: Vintage Books.
- Wright, Robert K., Jr. (1983). *The Continental Army*. Washington: Center of Military History.

## Chapter Eighteen

# THE NAVIES AND MARINES OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

*Frank C. Mevers*

As relations worsened between Great Britain and her North American colonies, representatives of 13 of those colonies met in Philadelphia to discuss ways to induce King George III and Parliament to change their policies. During 1775 resistance to British rule became rebellion as blood was shed at Lexington and Concord in April and the Continental Congress assumed control of the New England minutemen who gathered outside Boston. Shortly after assuming command of the new Continental Army in July 1775 at Cambridge, Massachusetts, George Washington took note of a water-borne force under the command of John Glover of nearby Gloucester. This hearty crew of New England mariners stayed with Washington and participated in the evacuation of Boston and then of Long Island, in the crossing of the Delaware near Trenton, and in other events (Billias 1960). They formed the heart of what was known as Washington's Navy, an essential element of his immediate command, separate from the naval force that Congress was talking about establishing to operate at sea. Washington ordered his mariners to capture ships carrying supplies to the British army at Boston and the 11 took 55 prizes in the two years of its existence (Clark 1960, Hearn 1995).

During the same period 11 states established navies, several of which have been the subject of publications: John Jackson (1974) on the Pennsylvania state navy and its defense of the Delaware River; William Still (1976) on North Carolina's navy; Joseph Goldenberg and Marion West Stoer (1981) on Maryland's navy; Myron Smith, Jr. and John G. Earle (1981) on Virginia's navy; and James Lewis (1999) on the frigate *South Carolina* and that state's navy. Patriot forces in upstate New York were constructing a flotilla of vessels on Lake Champlain. Well-documented, too, are the exploits of Benedict Arnold and the Valcour Island expedition as related by Harrison Bird (1962) and James Nelson (2006). Recent discovery of records of the gunboat *Philadelphia* and study of her remains (Britten 2002) have shed much light on the defense of Lake Champlain in 1776.

Sooner or later the Continental Congress would have to address the issue of establishing a navy for defense of the North American coastline. The issue became pressing in late 1775 as Congress responded to depravities inflicted by British forces

on New England coastal towns. In October Congress finally authorized formation of the Continental Navy and appointed a Naval Committee to oversee the new service. Less than a month later, on November 10, 1775, it authorized the raising of two battalions of soldiers able to serve on land or at sea, an act which the US Marine Corps celebrates as its birthday. Within months the Naval Committee was replaced by a larger and more permanent Marine Committee composed of a congressional member from each province. It was the function of these committees to build or obtain ships, men, stores, and supplies, as well as to develop policies by which the American navy was to operate – that is, to set up an administrative system for its navy and for the marines who would accompany it. Frank Mevers (1972) shows that a navy by committee had some limited success, but that the system did not function efficiently and thus by 1779 the Marine Committee had been dissolved and replaced by a Board of Admiralty, a body which also soon ceased to function. Direction of naval affairs was then entrusted to Robert Morris, who served also as Superintendent of Finance. Tangentially, during the war, Congress had to deal with privateering, which, because it proved more lucrative to individual participants than was naval service, made Congress's job more difficult by competing for men, ships, and supplies. It is clear from the record that Congress felt overwhelmed by its attempt to establish and operate a viable navy and marine force, a feeling attributable to the lack of resources granted to Congress by the states, to the lack of strong leadership within naval ranks, and to competition from the more lucrative, thus more appealing service in privateers (Patton 2008).

Adding to administrative woes, the vessels ready to sail by January 1776 became icebound at Philadelphia and could get out only in February. Commodore Ezek Hopkins led his fleet of eight to the Bahamas where it succeeded in capturing some mortars, cannon, and shot and, perhaps just as importantly, demonstrated the weakness of defenses thus far established there. On its return voyage, the fleet encountered HMS *Glasgow* off Point Judith, Rhode Island, but acted individually instead of in unison allowing British Captain Tyringham Howe to continue his voyage leaving the Americans in confusion and with casualties. William Fowler (1976) presents a vivid account of the unsuccessful attack by Hopkins's flagship *Alfred* on the *Glasgow*. Hopkins was ultimately removed from command for his lack of success, and one of his subordinates, John Paul Jones became the most successful naval officer of the Revolution (Lorenz 1943).

Promoted to command first of the sloop *Providence*, then the *Alfred*, Jones attacked the British fishing fleet of Nova Scotia and took a score of prizes, including the armed transport *Mellish* with a cargo of 10,000 winter uniforms that were much appreciated by Washington's army. In 1778 Jones sailed to Europe in the *Ranger*. Gustavus Conyngham and Lambert Wickes had attacked merchant shipping in British waters before him (Clark 1932, Neeser 1970), but Jones added to the alarm of British citizens when he led raiding parties ashore at Whitehaven, England, and St. Mary's Isle, Scotland, then captured the Royal Navy warship *Drake* and took it into a French port in 1778 (Bradbury 2005). The following year Jones, now in command of the *Bonhomme Richard*, continued his attacks on British shipping, laid the port of Leith under contribution, and captured the frigate

*Serapis* off Flamborough Head (Walsh 1978). For his audacious victories Jones was vilified in England and lionized in Paris.

American naval forces did not fare as well nearer to home. On Lake Champlain Benedict Arnold commanded vessels that were part of the army in a campaign that resulted in the loss of every one of the vessels but did halt the British invasion of 1776 and thereby help lay the basis for the Continental Army's defeat of General John Burgoyne's advance from Canada the following year (Bird 1962). During that same year, 1777, ships of the Continental Navy joined those of the Pennsylvania State Navy in defending the Delaware River from British attack. As on Lake Champlain, the Americans slowed but could only delay British operations around Philadelphia before all were destroyed (Jackson 1974). In the meantime, less than half the 13 frigates ordered by Congress were completed and made it to sea. 1779 and 1780 proved disastrous for the Continental Navy. Captain Dudley Saltonstall commanded the naval component of a campaign designed to evict the British from Penobscot Bay. The result was a fiasco in which three ships of the Continental Navy, three Massachusetts brigantines, a New Hampshire State Navy brig, and 13 privateers taken into state service were virtually annihilated by the British (Buker 2002). The Continental Navy lost four more ships trying to defend Charleston, South Carolina, in 1780 leaving it with only six ships by the middle of the year. In 1781 three more were lost leaving the Continental Navy with only two ships in commission and one under construction. For the remaining years of the war, the ships and men of the Continental Navy rarely went to sea. It was French, not American, naval action at the Battle of the Virginia Capes that set the stage for the American victory at Yorktown.

Once Americans achieved independence in 1783 few believed that the young republic needed a navy, officers and enlisted personnel were discharged from the service, and the last ship of the Continental Navy, the frigate *Alliance*, was sold in 1785. The Continental Marines, whose fate was linked to that of the Navy, disappeared as well. For over a decade the nation was without a navy before war between France and Britain and war with Algiers led to the establishment of the new United States Navy. The officers of the new service preferred to ignore the record of their Revolutionary counterparts and the record of the institution in which they served.

It is also this record that led William Fowler, *Rebels Under Sail* (1976), to conclude that the Continental Navy had contributed little to the struggle for independence and that the Continental Congress's investment in the service had been a waste of precious resources, an assessment shared by Jonathan Dull (1984). William Dudley and Michael Palmer (1985) evaluated and rejected this assessment. Fowler's highly skeptical view of the Continental Navy is also questioned implicitly by Hope Rider (1977) in her study of the sloop *Providence*, by John McManemin in his essays on *Captains of the Continental Navy* (1981), by Philip Chadsworth Foster Smith's 1976 biography of Samuel Tucker, and by E. Gordon Bowen-Hassell, Denis Conrad, and Mark Hayes (2003) in their *Sea Raiders of the American Revolution* (2003). Philip C. F. Smith (1977) shares Fowler's heroic view of John Manley in his biography of that captain.

Though largely ignored by historians for over a century, the Continental Navy and Marine Corps has, during the twentieth century, garnered significant scholarly attention. It is not surprising that nineteenth-century historians would not be drawn to many portions of the history of the two services. Following the Revolution, when personal memoirs were being compiled, John Paul Jones faded from the scene leaving no family member to immediately tout his victories. Nor did Commodore Esek Hopkins, or Captains Abraham Whipple, Nicholas Biddle, or any other naval commander inspire commendation in the form of biographical publication. Naval history took a back seat to military achievements at Trenton, Saratoga, Yorktown, and New Orleans (in the War of 1812) until toward the end of the nineteenth century when the influence of Assistant Secretary of the Navy Theodore Roosevelt and a few others who gave not only life and imagination to sea service but also saw to it that ample resources were provided for productive performance. It was Alfred Thayer Mahan who boosted naval stature, and hence, naval history in his book *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660–1783* (1890). That, and especially the Navy's record in the Spanish–American War brought the service public prominence and inspired historians to explore its past.

Publication of works on the Continental Navy began with Edward Field's *Esek Hopkins Commander in Chief of The Continental Navy* (1898). This less than scholarly work undoubtedly derived from the naval hype begun by the writings of Mahan. The Navy's support from the Roosevelt administration led to interest in the Navy's history and Charles Oscar Paullin produced *The Navy of the American Revolution* (1906) which took an extremely broad view of the Revolutionary navy, including various state navies and privateers. Paullin supplemented his narrative work with a printed edition of *Out-Letters of the Continental Marine Committee and Board of Admiralty* (1914). During the same era Gardner Allen (1913) produced a narrative account of naval operations, one which relies too much on quotation and is weak on analysis but which stood alone as a tactical study for a number of decades.

Publications of the journals of the Continental Congress (Ford 1907–37), the *Letters of Members of the Continental Congress* (Burnett 1921–38), and other documents of the Revolutionary Era led authors of general histories of the navy, for example, Dudley Knox (1936) and Harold and Margaret Sprout (1967 [1939]) to include more coverage of the Continental Navy in their works than earlier historians had. The availability of these sources combined with renewed interest in the Revolution and naval affairs led to publication of biographies of naval officials, for example, Gardner Allen (1921–2) on Captain Hector McNeill; James Howard (1930) on Seth Harding; Lawrence Shaw Mayo (1937) on John Langdon, who built ships for the Navy in Portsmouth, New Hampshire; William Bell Clark (1938) on Captain John Barry; and Dudley Knox's (1932) *The Naval Genius of George Washington*. The letter book and correspondence of Esek Hopkins were edited (Beck 1932, 1933), a transcription of the *Letter Book of the Navy Board of the Eastern Department, 1778–1779* (Brewington and Clark 1942), and the operations of *Connecticut's Naval Office* (Rogers 1933) described. Howard Chapelle's



histories of *American Sailing Ships* (1935) and the *American Sailing Navy* (1949) included significant coverage of ships of the Continental Navy.

In the decade following World War II, one man, William Bell Clark, kept research in the Continental Navy alive with biographies of Nicholas Biddle (1949) and John Young (1953), studies of *Ben Franklin's Privateers* (1956) and *George Washington's Navy* (1960), and the launching of the *Naval Documents of the American Revolution* (NDAR) (Clark 1964–). In 1959 Samuel Eliot Morison published his best-selling biography of John Paul Jones and William James Morgan (1959) a collective biography of Continental Navy captains from New England. The appearance of the first of the 1,100+ page NDAR volumes and the celebration of the Bicentennial of the American Revolution contributed to renewed interest in both the Continental Navy and the Marine Corps. Jack Coggins's *Ships and Seamen of the American Revolution* (1969), Nathan Miller's *Sea of Glory* (1974), Charles Smith's *Marines in the Revolution* (1975), and William Fowler's *Rebels Under Sail* (1976) provided overviews of the naval war.

During the same era historians widened their interests beyond operations and leaders. Frank Mevers (1972) studied the founding and administration of the Continental Navy. Other historians began to examine the experiences of average seamen. John Dann's (1988) edition of Jacob Nagle's diary, Michael Crawford's (2002) account of prisoner of war Christopher Prince, and Francis Cogliano's (2001) study of William Russell, a common seaman held prisoner by the British during the Revolution help us understand the human side of the navy under sail.

The life, character, and exploits of John Paul Jones continue to receive attention from historians. Samuel Eliot Morison's 1959 study stood alone as a book-length biography for over three decades, but the publication of Gerard Gawalt's translation of Jones's *Memoir of the American Revolution* (1979) and James Bradford's (1986) comprehensive microfilm edition of Jones's papers provide easy access to the study of various portions of his career. Joseph Sawtelle's (1994) study of Jones and the *Ranger* draws on Bradford's edition of Jones's papers to publish in book format the cruise logs, letters and communications and other tangential documents to detail the construction of the ship in John Langdon's shipyard and its operations in European waters. John Evangelist Walsh (1978), Jean Boudroit (1987), and James Bradford (1998) analyze the battle between Jones in the *Bonhomme Richard* and Richard Pearson in the British frigate *Serapis*, and Bradford (2003) explores the strategic thought of Jones. During the opening years of the twenty-first century three biographers presented quite different pictures of Jones. Evan Thomas (2003) depicted the darker side of his character and likened his raids on England and Scotland to modern terrorist attacks on civilian targets; Peter Vansittart's subtitle, "A Restless Spirit," (2004) reflects that author's view of Jones, just as does the subtitle "America's First Sea Warrior" of Admiral Joseph Callo (2006) in his celebratory biography of Jones.

In recent years Jonathan Dull's 1975 study of the navy of America's ally France and David Syrett's studies of the operations of Britain's Royal Navy in American waters (1989) and European waters (1998) and of British Admiral William Howe (2005) have provided context in which to assess the

significance of American naval forces and their operations during the nation's quest for independence.

The public retains an interest in the Continental Navy as is reflected in the publication of new biographies of Jones and a general operational history of the service (Volo 2007) and there remain many areas to be investigated, including the lives of secondary officers, the construction of many of the Continental navy's vessels, the relationship of the service to maritime communities, and the lives of men serving on board ship. The history of the Continental Marines remains virtually unstudied except in Smith's 1976 work cited above, in popular histories of the US Marine Corps, and in James Bradford's study of "Samuel Nicholas: Senior Officer, Continental Marines" (2004). In short, much work remains before the Continental Navy and Marine Corps will be as well studied as their military compatriots of the American Revolution.

#### BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Allen, Gardner Weld (1913). *A Naval History of the American Revolution*, 2 vols. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co.
- Allen, Gardner Weld (1921–2). "Captain Hector McNeill, Continental Navy," Massachusetts Historical Society, *Proceedings*, 55 (November), 46–152.
- Allen, Gardner Weld (1905). "American Revolutionary Naval Service: The Continental Frigate *Raleigh*," *New Hampshire Genealogical Record*, 3 (April), 177–87, (July), 19–30, (October), 65–76.
- Beck, Alverda S., ed. (1932). *The Letter Book of Esek Hopkins, Commander-in-Chief of the United States Navy, 1775–1777*. Providence: Rhode Island Historical Society.
- Beck, Alverda S., ed. (1933). *The Correspondence of Esek Hopkins, Commander-in-Chief of the United States Navy*. Providence: Rhode Island Historical Society.
- Billias, George Athan (1960). *General John Glover and His Marblehead Mariners*. New York: Henry Holt and Co.
- Bird, Harrison (1962). *Navies in the Mountains: the Battles on the Waters of Lake Champlain and Lake George, 1609–1814*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Boudroit, Jean (1987). *John Paul Jones and the Bonhomme Richard: A Reconstruction of the Ship and an Account of the Battle with H.M.S. Serapis*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Bowen-Hassell, Gordon, Dennis M. Conrad, and Mark L. Hayes (2003). *Sea Raiders of the American Revolution: The Continental Navy in European Waters*. Washington: Naval History Center.
- Bradbury, David (2005). *Captain Jones's Irish Sea Cruise*. Whitehaven, UK: Past Presented.
- Bradford, James C., ed. (1985). *Command Under Sail: Makers of the American Naval Tradition, 1775–1780*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Bradford, James C., ed. (1986). *The Papers of John Paul Jones, 1747–1792*, 10 reels of microfilm and guide. Alexandria, VA: Chadwyck-Healey.
- Bradford, James C. (1998). "The Battle of Flamborough Head," in Jack Sweetman, ed., *Great American Naval Battles*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 27–47.
- Bradford, James C. (2003). "John Paul Jones and *Guerre de Razzia*," *The Northern Mariner*, 13:4 (October), 1–16.

- Bradford, James C. (2004). "Samuel Nicholas: Senior Officer, Continental Marines," in Allan R. Millet and Jack Shulimson, eds., *The Commandants of the Marine Corps*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 17–26.
- Bratten, John R. (2002). *The Gondola Philadelphia and the Battle of Lake Champlain*. College Station: Texas A&M University Press.
- Brewington, Dorothy E. R., and William Bell Clark (1942). *Letter Book of the Navy Board of the Eastern Department From October 24, 1778 to October 29, 1779*. Transcribed from microfilm by Brewington. Typed and annotated by Clark. Washington: Library of Congress.
- Buker, George E. (2002). *The Penobscot Expedition: Commodore Saltonstall and the Massachusetts Conspiracy of 1779*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Burnett, Edmund C., ed. (1921–38). *Letters of Members of the Continental Congress*, 8 vols. Washington: Carnegie Institute of Washington.
- Burnett, Edmund C. (1941). *The Continental Congress*. New York: Macmillan.
- Callo, Joseph F. (2006). *John Paul Jones: America's First Sea Warrior*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Chapelle, Howard I. (1935). *The History of American Sailing Ships*. New York: W. W. Norton.
- Chapelle, Howard I. (1949). *The History of the American Sailing Navy: The Ships and Their Development*. New York: W. W. Norton.
- Claghorn, Charles E. (1988). *Naval Officers of the American Revolution: A Concise Biographical Dictionary*. Metuchen, NJ: The Scarecrow Press, Inc.
- Clark, William Bell (1932). *Lambert Wickes, Sea Raider and Diplomat: The Story of a Naval Captain of the Revolution*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Clark, William Bell (1938). *Gallant John Barry, 1745–1803*. New York: Macmillan.
- Clark, William Bell (1949). *Captain Dauntless: The Story of Nicholas Biddle of the Continental Navy*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.
- Clark, William Bell (1953). *The First Saratoga: Being the Saga of John Young and His Sloop-of-War*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.
- Clark, William Bell (1956). *Ben Franklin's Privateers: A Naval Epic of the American Revolution*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.
- Clark, William Bell (1960). *George Washington's Navy: Being an Account of His Excellency's Fleet in New England Waters*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.
- Clark, William Bell, William James Morgan, and Michael J. Crawford, Jr., eds. (1964–). *Naval Documents of the American Revolution*, 11 vols. to date. Washington: Naval Historical Center.
- Coggins, Jack (1969). *Ships and Seamen of the American Revolution: Vessels, Crews, Weapons, Gear, Naval Tactics, and Actions of the War for Independence*. Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books.
- Cogliano, Francis D. (2001). *American Maritime Prisoners in the Revolutionary War: The Captivity of William Russell*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Crawford, Michael J., ed. (2002). *Autobiography of a Yankee Mariner: Christopher Prince and the American Revolution*. Washington: Brassey's.
- Dann, John C., ed. (1988). *The Nagle Journal: A Diary of the Life of Jacob Nagle, Sailor, from the Year 1775 to 1841*. New York: Weidenfeld & Nicholson.
- Dexter, Franklin Bowditch (1885–96). *Biographical Sketches of the Graduates of Yale College*, 2 vols. New York: Henry Holt and Co.
- Dudley, William S., and Michael A. Palmer (1985). "No Mistake About It: A Response to Jonathan R. Dull," *American Neptune*, 45:4 (Fall), 244–8.

- Dull, Jonathan R. (1975). *The French Navy and American Independence: A Study of Arms and Diplomacy, 1774–1787*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Dull, Jonathan R. (1984). "Was the Continental Navy a Mistake?" *American Neptune*, 44:3 (Summer), 167–70.
- Field, Edward (1898). *Esek Hopkins Commander-in-Chief of the Continental Navy during the American Revolution, 1775–1778: Master Mariner, Politician, Brigadier-General, Naval Officer, and Philanthropist*. Providence, RI: Preston and Rounds Co.
- Force, Peter, ed. (1837–1853). *American Archives... a Documentary History of... the North American Colonies*, 7 vols. Washington: M. St. Clair Clarke and Peter Force.
- Ford, Worthington C., ed. (1904–1937). *Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774–1789*, 34 vols. Washington: Government Printing Office.
- Fowler, William M., Jr. (1976). *Rebels Under Sail: The American Navy during the Revolution*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons.
- Gawalt, Gerard W., trans. and ed. (1979). *John Paul Jones' Memoir of the American Revolution Presented to King Louis XVI of France*. Washington: Library of Congress.
- Goldenberg, Joseph A., and Marion West Stoer (1981). "The Virginia State Navy," in Ernest M. Eller, ed., *The Chesapeake Bay in the American Revolution*. Centreville, MD: Tidewater Publishers, 170–203.
- Hearn, Chester G. (1995). *George Washington's Schooners: The First American Navy*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Howard, James L. (1930). *Seth Harding Mariner: A Naval Picture of the Revolution*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Jackson, John W. (1974). *The Pennsylvania Navy, 1775–1781: The Defense of the Delaware*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.
- Knox, Dudley W. (1932). *The Naval Genius of George Washington*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
- Knox, Dudley W. (1936). *A History of the United States Navy*. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons.
- Lewis, James A. (1999). *Neptune's Militia: The Frigate South Carolina during the American Revolution*. Kent, OH: Kent State University Press.
- Lorenz, Lincoln (1943). *John Paul Jones: Fighter for Freedom and Glory*. Annapolis, MD: United States Naval Institute.
- Mahan, Alfred Thayer (1890). *The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1873*. Boston: Little, Brown.
- Mayo, Lawrence Shaw (1937). *John Langdon of New Hampshire*. Concord, NH: Rumford Press.
- McManemin, John A. (1981). *Captains of the Continental Navy*. Spring Lake, NJ: Ho-Ho-Kus Publishing Company.
- Mevers, Frank C. (1972). "Congress and the Navy: The Establishment and Administration of the American Revolutionary Navy by the Continental Congress, 1774–1784," PhD dissertation, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
- Mevers, Frank C. (1977). "Naval Policy of the Continental Congress," in *Maritime Dimensions of the American Revolution*. Washington: Department of the Navy, 3–11.
- Miller, Nathan (1974). *Sea of Glory: The Continental Navy Fights for Independence, 1775–1783*. New York: David McKay Co.
- Morgan, William James (1959). *Captains to the Northward: The New England Captains in the Continental Navy*. Barre, MA: Barre Gazette.
- Morison, Samuel Eliot (1959). *John Paul Jones: A Sailor's Biography*. Boston: Little, Brown.
- Neeser, Robert W. (1970). *Letters and Papers Relating to the Cruises of Gustavus Conyngham*. Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press.

- Nelson, James L. (2006). *Benedict Arnold's Navy: The Ragtag Fleet that Lost the Battle of Lake Champlain but Won the American Revolution*. Camden, ME: International Marine/McGraw-Hill.
- Patton, Robert H. (2008). *Patriot Pirates: The Privateer War for Freedom and Fortune in the American Revolution*. New York: Pantheon.
- Paullin, Charles Oscar (1901). "Papers of William Vernon and the Navy Board," *Rhode Island Historical Society Publications*, 8 (January), 197–277.
- Paullin, Charles Oscar (1906). *The Navy of the American Revolution: Its Administration, its Policy, and its Achievements*. Cleveland: Burrows Brothers Co.
- Paullin, Charles Oscar, ed. (1914). *Out-Letters of the Continental Marine Committee and Board of Admiralty, August, 1776–September 1780*, 2 vols. New York: DeVinne Press for the Naval History Society.
- Rider, Hope S. (1977). *Valour Fore & Aft: Being the Adventures of the Continental Sloop Providence*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Rogers, Ernest E. (1933). *Connecticut's Naval Office during the War of the American Revolution*. New London, CT: New London County Historical Society.
- Sanders, Jennings B. (1935). *Evolution of the Executive Departments of the Continental Congress, 1774–1789*. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press.
- Sawtelle, John G., ed. (1994). *John Paul Jones and the Ranger: Portsmouth, New Hampshire July 12–November 1, 1777 and the Log of the Ranger November 1, 1777–May 18, 1778*. Portsmouth, NH: Peter E. Randall for the Portsmouth Marine Society.
- Smith, Charles R. (1975). *Marines in the Revolution: A History of the Continental Marines in the American Revolution 1775–1783*. Washington: History and Museums Division, Headquarters, US Marine Corps.
- Smith, Myron J., Jr., and John G. Earle (1981). "The Maryland State Navy," in Ernest M. Eller, ed., *The Chesapeake Bay in the American Revolution*. Centreville, MD: Tideawater Publishers, 204–60.
- Smith, Philip Chadwick Foster (1976). *Captain Samuel Tucker 1747–1833*. Salem, MA: Essex Institute.
- Smith, Philip Chadwick Foster (1977). *Fired by Manley Zeal: A Naval Fiasco of the American Revolution*. Salem, MA: Peabody Museum of Salem.
- Sprout, Harold, and Margaret Sprout (1967 [1939]). *The Rise of American Naval Power, 1776–1918*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Still, William N., Jr. (1976). *North Carolina's Revolutionary War Navy*. Raleigh: North Carolina Department of Cultural Resources.
- Syrett, David (1989). *The Royal Navy in American Waters, 1775–1783*. Brookfield, VT: Gower Publishing.
- Syrett, David (1998). *The Royal Navy in European Waters during the American Revolution*. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.
- Syrett, David (2005). *Admiral Lord Howe: A Biography*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Thomas, Evan. (2003). *John Paul Jones: Sailor, Hero, Father of the American Navy*. New York: Simon and Shuster.
- Vansittart, Peter (2004). *John Paul Jones: A Restless Spirit*. London: Robson Books.
- Volo, James M. (2007). *Blue Water Patriots: The American Revolution Afloat*. Westport, CT: Praeger.
- Walsh, John Evangelist (1978). *Night on Fire: The First Complete Account of John Paul Jones's Greatest Battle*. New York: McGraw-Hill.

# Chapter Nineteen

---

## THE US ARMY TO 1900

*Samuel J. Watson*

The history and historiography of the nineteenth-century Army revolves around two fundamental issues: civil–military relations and military effectiveness. These concerns were inextricably entwined; the degree of policymaker emphasis on one or the other shaped contemporary force structures, and scholarly views of one or the other have shaped interpretation ever since. This complex relationship is particularly evident in five major areas of scholarship: military efficacy in general and the nineteenth-century Army’s conduct of the Indian Wars in particular; the relations between regulars and citizen-soldiers; the development, degree, and desirability of military professionalism; and civil–military relations more generally.

Apart from popularizers eager to applaud American feats of arms, the first historians of the army were its own officers. In the post-Revolutionary era these were often former militiamen or veterans of the Continental Army, and the two groups advanced a dichotomous interpretation of the Revolutionary War that has underlain thinking about the landpower component of national security ever since. Social and political historians of the Revolution can easily identify parallels to the debate over whether the conflict was most fundamentally about national independence or “who shall rule at home.” For former Continental officers, the struggle was essentially international, between the forces of nation-states, whose leaders, elected or appointed by constitutional and statutory procedures, were authorized to exercise hierarchically coercive power over subordinates in order to further national objectives. The liberty of some individuals was temporarily subordinated to power in order to attain a larger liberty, for the nation and all of its citizens. The revolutionaries did so largely with conventionally organized forces, through conventional battles and campaigns, employing the conventions of European strategy, operations, tactics, and logistics. Facing the experience and power of Great Britain, commanders like George Washington saw no other way to win American independence (Shy 1988, 1990). Though they sought to do so in harmony with the new nation’s political authorities, they believed that general political and specific military considerations could be distinguished, and that the precise political character of the nation could be settled



among Americans after the international war for independence from Britain had been won.

Advocates of the citizen-soldier, not infrequently former militiamen themselves, were less sanguine about either the desirability or effectiveness of these priorities and distinctions. They feared that military hierarchy would encourage political hierarchy, that military discipline would foster a similar social discipline, threatening the underlying values of the Revolution. They also doubted such trade-offs were necessary: whether from faith in the motivation and morale of free citizens, or from a sense of the distinctive qualities of the American physical landscape, they erected an American military exceptionalism. Drawing on a faith in the natural virtue of men fighting in defense of their communities, they believed that citizen-soldier volunteers, presumed representative of their communities, would prove more cohesive than regulars, often recruited from impoverished circumstances, presumably motivated by pay and held together by coercive discipline. Like Indians, or the volunteer rangers who fought them, the militia would use their initiative and knowledge of the country to fight from ambush, using cover and concealment to baffle enemies unable to transcend the snares of aristocratic European convention. Indeed, the discipline of military training might actually undermine the militia's natural esprit.

These values clashed in postwar interpretations of how and why the Revolution was won: standing firm in line of battle, or wearing the British down through raids and the difficulty of catching the agile militia. Both sides made good points, and their interpretations are still used in classrooms today. Nor were their views militarily incompatible: historians now recognize that the militia as well as the Continentals performed essential functions (Ferguson 1978, Shy 1990, Kwasny 1996). The immediate postwar issue was whether the United States would maintain a standing force, trained as regulars to fight conventional battles like the Continental Army, in peacetime. Some militia advocates argued that regulars were entirely unnecessary, others that they could be trained so quickly that no standing army was necessary prior to the outbreak of war. Ultimately, despite the fragility of international relations, domestic fiscal and political realities dictated that any peacetime force would be small. Many militia supporters were willing to accept such a force as a shield against Indians; native victories in 1790 and 1791 led to renewed debate and a gradual expansion of the standing force. After the regulars defeated the Ohio Indians at Fallen Timbers, the standing army was again reduced; fiscal economy and fears of military intervention in politics led to another reduction when Thomas Jefferson was elected president; when he needed a reliable force to threaten Britain it was increased, and so on depending on American fortunes in the international arena. The debate over the value and significance of standing forces was repeated before, during, and after the War of 1812, during the Jacksonian ascendancy of the 1830s, and after the Civil War.

This instability in force structure, though overtly due to ideological conflict, was ultimately rooted in debates over the army's mission. The regular army's force structure stabilized after 1820; the core of the regular army was not reduced below the level that had preceded any specific war for more than a century. Virtually all

political leaders paid homage to volunteer militiamen and the minuteman tradition, yet citizen-soldiers had little patience for long campaigns, whether against Indians or Europeans. Thus most agreed that a standing army was necessary to construct, maintain, and garrison coastal and inland fortifications; to intimidate Indians; and, hopefully, to deter Europeans. Even the most sincere militia advocates recognized the utility of regulars for these and other “constabulary” missions, such as exploration, road-building, and deterring slave unrest. More fundamentally, the nation’s westward expansion demanded soldiers for long expeditions through the Plains and a seven-year war against the Seminoles in Florida, and citizen-soldiers did not step forward in sufficient numbers or enthusiasm to fill the gap. Thus, even as the Jacksonian assault pounded against the ramparts of West Point and the regular army, Jackson and the Democrats found regulars their most effective military tool in the territorial expansion they so ardently sought.

“Manifest Destiny” would not have been realized so quickly without the regular army. This is reflected in the historiography of the post-Jeffersonian and pre-Civil War army, which is almost entirely about the regulars. The principal debate regarding this era is over the development and extent of the regular army’s professionalism, which all agree was enhanced to some degree by reforms in officer selection and training at the Military Academy and the administrative and logistical staffs after the War of 1812. Sometimes this debate has involved differing views of the extent and effect of the Jacksonian critique (Winders 1997, Ball 2001, Wettemann 2001, 2004, 2006, Watson 2004, 2006), but more commonly it has revolved around different meanings and definitions of professionalism. The earliest such interpretations – negative ones – were implicit in Jeffersonian criticism, which reappeared in Jacksonian attacks on West Pointers (who filled the regular army officer corps after 1820, regardless of the administration in office) as effete aristocrats, stuffed with book-learning rather than experience, neither capable leaders of citizen-soldiers, geniuses as generals, nor responsive to the spirit of American democracy. Andrew Jackson, himself, epitomized the citizen soldier, the idealized Cincinnatus.

West Pointers and their sponsors, including almost all of the army’s higher ranks, responded in muted fashion, primarily within their own professional journals and in congressional testimony, lest belligerent public stances draw further criticism, but West Point engineering professor Dennis Hart Mahan (who taught the Academy’s limited course in the art of war) and fortification engineer Henry Halleck gave permanence to their arguments in a number of field manuals and a book (Halleck 1846) about national defense. Both recognized and accepted the essential role citizen-soldiers would play in large-scale conflicts, but followed Washington, Hamilton, and John C. Calhoun (Secretary of War, 1817–25) in espousing the regular army’s value as a repository of military experience and expertise, to plan and build fortifications in peacetime and to train and direct volunteers in war. By 1846 the outlines of the interpretations usually associated with Emory Upton (1904) and other late nineteenth-century professional reformers were substantially in place. Within the army, only General Edmund P. Gaines, an aging veteran who saw himself primarily as a defender of the frontier, was eager to call on citizen-soldier volunteers or to dispute the Corps of Engineers’ fascination with

ever more extensive coastal fortifications (Silver 1949, Watson 1998b, Smith 2004). Indeed, Brian Linn (2002) has pointed out that coastal defense against European attack, rather than Indian warfare or even conventional operational maneuver, lay at the core of the strategic visions espoused, however vaguely, by most peacetime military intellectuals throughout the century.

The first test of the army's new professionalism came in the war against Mexico. A number of biographies and campaign narratives, largely written by former officers (e.g., Thorpe 1846, 1847, Robinson 1848, Semmes 1852), praised the army's performance, particularly its direction by generals like Winfield Scott, first blooded in the War of 1812, who had remained in service for decades reforming the army's tactics, administration, and supply. Though volunteers received great praise in the press, and a volunteer movement grew up to replace the nearly defunct universal militia, no significant voices disputed the effectiveness of the regular army in Mexico, and the next generation of historians (again largely officers and former officers themselves), led by Emory Upton in the post-Civil War era, applauded the reforms and capability the regulars developed between 1815 and 1846.

Indeed, the first substantial challenge to this consensus did not appear until 1957, but quickly proved so powerful as to entirely reshape standing interpretations. That year Samuel P. Huntington, a political scientist, published *The Soldier and the State*, which argued that a professional "Military Renaissance" during the 1830s had been smothered by Jacksonianism and a narrow technological focus ("technicism"), and more generally by American liberalism, not to be reborn until after the Civil War. Drawing on the then-standard history by William Ganoe (1942 [1924]), an army officer of the Uptonian school who labeled the 1870s "the Army's dark ages," and the period after 1880 "the Army's renaissance," Huntington asserted that the late nineteenth-century army found new professional purpose and esprit amid an alleged isolation from, and an implied antagonism toward, the dominant currents in American life. Following Upton and Ganoe, he delineated a process of professionalization from within, ultimately driven by the army's search for a mission as the Indian wars came to an end and short-sighted civilians continued to resist preparation against international threats to national security. However, self-interested, this quest embodied the commitment to developing functional expertise, the sense of responsibility for national defense, that Huntington, following sociologists of the 1950s, considered essential to the formation of a cohesive profession, recognized for and granted significant internal autonomy by political leaders in order to further develop expertise essential for national survival in a complex, rapidly changing environment. Huntington maintained that the conditions for this development – essentially a more complex, specialized economy and society that would be receptive to military efforts at similar specialization – did not exist until after the Civil War.

Huntington's interpretation was soon challenged in turn, when Russell F. Weigley published *Toward an American Army: Military Thought from Washington to Marshall* (1962). Weigley praised the work of Mahan and Halleck as both pioneering and representative; though exaggerated, this assessment of antebellum military professionalism implied that the commitment to develop expertise was

more widespread, and enduring, than Huntington had allowed. Weigley advanced a more explicit dissent in 1967 with his *History of the United States Army*, still the standard survey today, titling his chapter on the period 1821 to 1846 “The Professionalization of the Regular Army,” and reiterated his argument in *The American Way of War* (1976), but was primarily concerned with strategy and operations rather than professionalism per se. Though Weigley’s chapter on Winfield Scott accurately assessed the synergy between US war aims and the army and strategy of the war with Mexico, he also dismissed Scott’s army as irrelevant to the mass industrial Civil War coming over the horizon. Thus, despite the superiority of Weigley’s research, echoed in the army’s own military history textbook for officer training courses (Center of Military History 1969, 1973, 1988, 2005), Huntington’s interpretation of the timing of nineteenth-century army professionalization remained the norm among general as well as military historians, probably reinforced by Marcus Cunliffe’s massive *Soldiers and Civilians: The Martial Spirit in America, 1776–1865* (1968). Cunliffe attempted to strike a balance between the arguments made by contemporary advocates of citizen-soldiers and regulars, and used the term “professional” extensively, but was ultimately more anecdotal than analytical in approach, and it is difficult to identify where he finally stood. Nevertheless, Cunliffe’s critical tone fit the social and political temper of the post-Vietnam era, and he presented plenty of evidence supporting Huntington’s depiction of a pre-professional army before the Civil War.

Other challenges and perspectives were slow to emerge. Francis Paul Prucha’s 1969 contribution to the Macmillan *Wars of the United States* series, *The Sword of the Republic*, hinted at a different approach, by focusing on the army on the frontier, as Prucha (1953) had done in his earlier work on the army in the northwest. Rooted in local, essentially community studies, Prucha’s perspective has the potential to suggest the centrality of constabulary roles to the nineteenth-century army and its place in American society, but frequent emulation has not led to widespread recognition among self-described military historians, who continue to prefer studies of war and preparation for war and often perceive Prucha’s heirs (e.g., Tate 1999) as “western” or “frontier” historians. Yet, accurately enough given the weight of constabulary efforts among the army’s missions, such studies, often focused on individual forts, comprise the largest single area of scholarship on the nineteenth-century army, apart from that on the Civil War.

Walter Millis’s *Arms and Men* (1956) is intriguing but more topical than chronological, and has never had the influence among historians that some of its insights merit. T. Harry Williams (1960) praised the army of the 1820s, 1830s, and 1840s, but did not use the term professionalism, and citations of his short survey focus on the Civil War and later years. David Childress completed a broad-ranging PhD dissertation in 1974 but never published in the field. Allan R. Millett (1977) advanced a more detailed, and somewhat more nuanced, definition of military professionalism, intimating that some of the developments Huntington identified with the postbellum era had begun long before, but the focus of his essay was after 1865. Instead, the most powerful challenge came from William Skelton, beginning with his 1968 PhD dissertation and a 1975 article that explicitly posited

“Professionalization in the Age of Jackson.” In tandem with cultural historian Burton Bledstein (1976), Skelton observed that the supposed conditions of professionalization, previously thought a product of the Gilded Age and the Progressive Era, had first appeared in the Jacksonian period of urbanization and industrial growth. Skelton reminded scholars of significant efforts at military specialization and reform, and delineated a growing commitment to military careers as a lifelong profession, as measured in officer career length and retention rates.

Skelton followed with a series of explanatory articles and essays (espec. 1987 and 2004), and Millett hinted at “the beginnings of military professionalization” during the antebellum era in the widely used textbook *For the Common Defense* (1984), but their work did not fundamentally alter the popular image of a disorganized, often dissolute force, more concerned with drinking than drill. This view is effectively supported by Edward M. Coffman, *The Old Army* (1986), a work that gives more attention to the frontier dimensions of military life than most, but this perspective privileges social and service conditions over larger questions of missions, civil–military relations, and the army’s role in American life. If anything, *For the Common Defense* followed *Arms and Men* in linking antebellum military developments primarily to adaptation to technological change, with expertise rather than missions, social or political developments, or issues of civil–military relations. Yet technological change – the railroads and rifles vaunted in studies of the Civil War – had minimal impact on the army until the 1850s.

Thus, it was not until 1992, when Skelton published *An American Profession of Arms: The Army Officer Corps, 1784–1861*, by far the best researched work on the army as a whole in any period of its history, that historians actually gained an entire monograph explicitly devoted to exploring and assessing the character and meaning of antebellum military professionalism and the process of professionalization. Indeed, given Huntington’s social science approach and Cunliffe’s anecdotal reportage, and that Coffman and Weigley only treated the period within more comprehensive works, it may well be argued, however surprising it seems, that Skelton effectively inaugurated detailed modern scholarship on the antebellum army.

The superiority of Skelton’s analysis lay as much in several decades of scholarly reinterpretation of social and political history as his own decades of research. He drew on both in a devastating critique of Huntington (who published nothing further in the field after 1957) (Skelton 1996), demonstrating how the political scientist’s reliance on an extremely limited range of historical scholarship skewed his understanding of nineteenth-century America. It should also be pointed out that Huntington’s summary treatments of the nineteenth-century army were intended as prelude and context for his focus on the twentieth century, and lacked evidence from archival sources. Indeed, his comparative chapters managed to celebrate the army of Wilhelmine Germany as the paradigm for a construct he labeled “objective” civil–military relations, an interpretation of the Kaiser’s army that few historians would recognize today. (Unfortunately, Huntington does not appear to have read Gordon Craig’s *Politics of the Prussian Army* [1955], which characterized that force as “a state within a state.” However, most graduate students in military history read both works, and should note the contrast.) Most

practically important, Skelton reminded military historians that there were two major parties during the “Jacksonian” period, that the Whigs were a near-majority rather than a small minority, that the Jacksonians needed a capable military force as much as anyone else, to achieve their “manifest” expansion. No historian who reads Skelton, or any significant portion of the modern general historiography, can believe that the term “the Jacksonian era” remains sufficient to encapsulate the diversity of American life and ideas during the period between 1815 and 1860.

Skelton’s insights and historicism have not yet swept the field, however. The widespread vision of professionalism as expertise in conventional warfighting, reinforced by the century of cold and total war, has survived Skelton’s attempt at historicizing understandings of American military professionalism, and most current work in the field remains driven by a quest to identify the development of antebellum military expertise and justify its quality (Hsieh 2004, Smith 2004), or to critique it (Morrison 1973, 1986; Moten 2000). Indeed, though he criticized the army’s lack of attention to Indian warfare, Skelton’s concern to demonstrate the development of professional expertise may have encouraged the persistence of this tendency. Thus textbook treatments continue to stress preparation for conventional war as the *sine qua non* of military professionalism, sometimes dismissing constabulary missions as a “distraction” (Grimsley 1996: 310), a perspective that goes hand in hand with the assumption that frontier conditions left most officers disgruntled and drunk.

Skelton’s roots lay in the intersection of social and institutional history, and he emphasized officer socialization, the growth of commitment and cohesion, and the development of specialization and expertise more than he did responsibility to the needs or demands of society, or the variety of missions actually performed by the army in the field. One approach to reassessing the meaning of military professionalism is to reevaluate the importance of the army’s staff bureaus, which focused on administration, weapons development, and logistics rather than strategic or operational planning. These missions led Huntington to dismiss the bureaus as examples of technicism, rather than true warfighting professionalism. Skelton hinted at a greater significance, characterizing the staff as a professionalizing cadre, but looked more to its limited role in planning, as a glass half full on the way toward a modern General Staff of the type envisioned in the Root reforms after 1900 (Roberts 1980). In a 1992 article that few military historians, or even historians of the army, are likely to have seen, Terrence Gough questioned Huntington’s definition of the military professional as a “manager of violence,” placing far greater emphasis on the staff as the harbinger of a professionalism more complex than tactical and operational warfighting alone. Unfortunately, Gough has not followed on this insight, and his view of the staff remained rooted in its contribution to warfighting.

Though perhaps natural in being distinctly “military,” and easily lending itself to the study of specific institutions, programs, or processes – the Military Academy, boards of officers, the development of tactical drill – this approach remains insufficient to a comprehensive, nuanced understanding of the army’s missions, force structure, and effectiveness, civil–military relations, or its place in



nineteenth-century American history and historiography. Thus, in an extensive series of essays and articles Samuel Watson (1996a, b, 1998b, and 2006) has followed Skelton in historicizing military professionalism, positing that the most important element of nineteenth-century American military professionalism – distinct from European or Cold War military professionalism – was the development of a reliable sense of accountability – political, fiscal, and operational – to the civilian authorities of the national state. In effect, Watson has reasserted the centrality of civil–military relations, of Huntington’s concept of “responsibility” to society and the constitution, to the study of the nineteenth-century army, arguing that external context – mission or threat – has usually determined force structure. But Watson has reasserted the “western” or frontier perspective that the military missions most important to most nineteenth-century American citizens were constabulary ones, of peacekeeping and coercive diplomacy, rather than warfighting against European adversaries. If so, it is anachronistic to judge the antebellum army by its preparation to fight European adversaries or its performance in a civil war it could not have planned for.

Initially reacting to elements of Skelton’s work, and imbued with certain social science concepts, Watson began his publications emphasizing careerism in the officer corps (1996a), a perspective that seems too simple in retrospect. Watson also identified a remarkable restraint toward Manifest Destiny among these “Agents of Empire” (Prucha 1969); though remaining critical of the army’s conventional warfighting expertise (1998a), he began (1996–9) to explore an accountability to the nation-state rooted in officers’ difficult experiences of civil–military relations in peacekeeping and diplomatic operations along the borders and frontiers, in which the Jacksonians demanded the army restrain unruly American citizens in order to minimize expense and prevent untimely war. Following in the footsteps of “frontier” military historians like Prucha, Watson emphasized that the army served not just as the leading edge of national territorial expansion, but as a national police force, often doing the dirty work of maintaining national and international law and order that radical Jacksonians decried during political campaigns.

Though Watson’s PhD dissertation (1996b) contained an extensive analysis of antebellum military expertise, the thrust of his work, sometimes criticized by other scholars (Smith 2004), has been to deemphasize the significance of military expertise conventionally understood. Nevertheless, he has, with Edward Hagerman (1988), Wayne Hsieh (2004), and Mark Wilson (2006), stressed the necessity of regular army experience and ability in logistics and tactical drill to victory in Mexico and the Civil War, the processes of territorial expansion and national reunification in which the army was most crucial to nineteenth-century American history. Along with Hagerman (1988), Thomas Goss (2003), and Hsieh (2004), and contrary to interpretations stressing the politicization of officer appointments and promotions (Wade 1976, Winders 1997, and any number of Civil War histories), he has also emphasized the domination of operational and strategic command (essentially, division and above) by West Point-trained career officers, including those who left the army during the 1850s but returned during the Civil War. Like Skelton (1992), Goss (2003), Hsieh (2004), and Ethan Rafuse (2005), he provides an

interpretation that is both “internalist” – rooted in motives and developments within the army and its officer corps – and attuned to civilian social and political dynamics, recognizing the balance between the very real degree of autonomy gained during the 1820s and 1830s and the equally powerful demands of civilian policymakers. Most important, Watson (2005, 2006) has stressed that military historians must place their subject in context if they are to have an impact on wider interpretations of nineteenth-century America.

Following hints in Weigley, Cunliffe, and Prucha, together with Vernon Volpe’s work on the Topographical Engineers (2000, cf. Goetzmann 1959), Skelton, Watson, and Hsieh have laid out a school of interpretation that deemphasizes the Jacksonians (both as critics and milieu) and the politicization of military policy and affairs and suggests a growing professional autonomy to the regular army officer corps. No longer can the regular army be seen simply as a machine-like force (good or bad) for American territorial expansion, or a foil for a “classical republican” or Jacksonian democratic political culture wholly antagonistic to anything smacking of specialization, centralized power, or institutions. Nevertheless, significant issues remain open to debate, particularly army attitudes toward politics (explicitly treated for the Jacksonian and antebellum period only in Skelton [1979]) and the balance between beneficial professional autonomy and isolation or alienation from civilian society. Skelton’s work sometimes (1992, 2006) suggests a substantial degree of isolation; Wettemann (2006) addresses the issue head-on, but takes elements of Watson’s earliest work (particularly 1995) to suggest a greater isolation than the latter author has since indicated or intended. Indeed, the great majority of Watson’s work (culminating in 2006) has had as one of its principal themes that the regular officer corps was *not* isolated, much less alienated, from civil society as a whole, despite frequent friction with *elements* therein.

The immediate antebellum decade remains a wide-open field for scholarship. Skelton treated the 1850s within the period 1815–61, and does not often suggest distinct trends or trajectories during the decade. George Ness (1982) provides a wealth of information but less analysis; the best book on the army during the 1850s, Durwood Ball’s *Army Regulars on the Western Frontier* (2001), shows the persistence of the complex dynamics of the 1820s, 1830s, and 1840s, particularly those of rendering responsible service during constabulary missions, but puts far more emphasis than Cunliffe (1968), Morrison (1973, 1986), or Skelton (1992) on partisanship, politicization, and sectional loyalties. Ball’s emphasis on officer affinities for the Democratic Party and its racist expansionism may be indicative of a new turn in the 1850s, or it may require balancing: like Winders (1997), Ball greatly exaggerates the politicization of commissioning and promotion, which were dominated by Military Academy graduation and seniority during times of peace. Only a handful of “Mr. Polk’s officers,” commissioned directly from civilian life into new regiments in 1846 and 1847, remained in the postwar army two years later, and Ball’s emphasis on southern officers with Democratic loyalties (e.g., William S. Harney and George Pickett) is outweighed by his own evidence for John Wool, Edwin Vose Sumner, and Philip St. George Cooke. Ball’s forthcoming biography of Cooke, an increasingly important officer from the 1830s to the Civil

War, should prove valuable in tracing the trajectory of change across this extended period, perhaps more so than most existing biographies of general officers like Winfield Scott.

Several further issues, largely civil–military in character, are crucial to an understanding of the army’s role in American history. Several workmanlike studies of the early constabulary army (Jacobs 1947, Prucha 1969, Guthmann 1975) are available, but the most thoughtful scholarship on the Confederation and Federalist periods, and that of Thomas Jefferson’s administration, returns us to contemporary concerns about the place of military authoritarianism in a republic. Indeed, though Richard Kohn (1975) provided a detailed history of military policy and a reasonable survey of operations, including questions of mission, force structure, and expertise, during the Federalist era, his work is probably best known for the argument that Federalism and militarism, or military authoritarianism, were closely linked, and a potential threat to republican liberty. Kohn walked a taut line, attempting to avoid exaggeration, but one must wonder what influence the Vietnam War, during which he wrote his dissertation and book, had on his interpretation. Kohn (1970) also engaged in a debate with Paul Nelson (1972) and Edward Skeen (Skeen and Kohn 1974) over the significance of the Newburgh Conspiracy, in which officers of the Continental Army threatened to threaten Congress in pursuit of separation pay, but ultimately settled on “Subordination and Restraint” (Kohn 1978) as his summation of Revolutionary civil–military relations.

Following Kohn, Theodore Crackel (1981, 1982), a career army officer at the time, wrote two articles and what remains the only modern monograph on the army during Thomas Jefferson’s administration (1987), stressing tensions in civil–military relations and Jefferson’s fear that an army commissioned by Federalists would remain responsive to Federalists, rather than undertaking the missions demanded by Republicans elected in 1800 (or 1801). Crackel also provided a concise operational narrative, the first since Prucha (1969), and one of the first analyses of the Burr Conspiracy to take advantage of the newly collected Burr papers. He added (Crackel 1986) a detailed critical evaluation of the army’s readiness, particularly in tactical training and doctrine, on the eve of the War of 1812.

Yet Crackel, like Kohn and many of those who have studied the Jacksonian critique of the army (Cunliffe 1968, Wettemann 2001, 2004, Pinheiro 2007), appears to have taken his sources *too* seriously, presenting caricatures of the Federalists and the officer corps drawn almost entirely from Republican sources. As a result, such works tell us more about the fears of one segment of civilian society – albeit a slight though growing majority – than they do about the army, its officers, or their views. The army’s role enforcing Jefferson’s Embargo against American citizens has remained virtually untouched by historians. Nor are Crackel’s assertions that the Jeffersonians improved army logistics and administration convincing. He has, however, presented what has become the standard interpretation of Jefferson’s founding of West Point (Crackel 1981), as a school for Republican aspirants to officership, to gradually Republicanize the officer corps, a view echoed by Watson (2004) with more emphasis on the efforts of the officers in charge of the Academy.

Ever since the neo-Hamiltonians, led by Theodore Roosevelt (1882) and Henry Adams (1889–91), the regular army has been praised (as its officers praised one another after the war) for forming the core of the nation's defense against British attack in 1814. J. C. A. Stagg (1983) provides a thorough look at the difficulties of military policy before and during the war, but no author since Jacobs (1947) has attempted to explore the entire period 1784 to 1815. Perhaps the most balanced work on the period is Lawrence Cress's (1982) study of ideology and military policy, yet it stretches thinly across an array of complex issues. Skelton provided a hundred pages of insight in *An American Profession of Arms* (1992), and several important articles (particularly 1994) but faced similar problems of range and depth: a monograph comprehensive, balanced, and detailed remains to be written for the early national era.

The Civil War and postbellum decades raise many of the same issues as the early national and antebellum periods: the army's missions – or its quest for a mission, particularly for the conventional warfighting mission so many officers preferred – and military effectiveness, the meaning of military professionalism, the struggle between citizen-soldiers and regulars. Advocates of volunteers (Logan 1887) and regulars repeated much of the early national and antebellum debate, but a growing consensus in favor of the Washington-Hamilton-Calhoun concept of a cadre or expandable army developed among regular officers, epitomized by the works of Emory Upton (1878, 1904) and codified by Ganoe (1942). Historians have debated at great length how effectively the army's generals, drawn overwhelmingly from the ranks of the antebellum regulars, performed in the war. Like defining professionalism, the question is somewhat artificial, in that scholars hardly get much closer to truth by attempting to isolate one factor (for example, Military Academy education or antebellum regular service) as an independent variable. Like most contemporary observers, the majority of scholars agree that West Pointers were the most capable troop trainers available; a number of scholars have suggested that Winfield Scott should have dispersed even more of the regular army's officers to train and command the citizen-soldier volunteers, but this essentially occurred when regular officers accepted commissions in the volunteer forces organized by the states. A more conclusive answer will require statistical work on the proportion of regular officers who did so, and on the proportion of volunteers regiments with former regular army officers.

The task of assessing military effectiveness in the Civil War is made much more difficult because the sources and character of the forces on both sides were so similar: the military forces were even more symmetrical than is usual in conventional warfare. Nevertheless, Hagerman (1988), Watson (1996b, 2004, and 2006) and Wilson (2006) have emphasized that logistical and administrative skills developed in the regular army were critical to supplying Union power projection and the conquest of the Confederacy. With the notable exceptions of Hagerman (1988), Hsieh (2004), and Rafuse (2005), who like Linn (2007), Moten (2000), and Morrison (1974) emphasize an "engineering mentality" among the West Point-trained officer corps, there is surprisingly little work on the vision of warfare regular commanders took into the conflict; it remains open to question whether

this is because of lack of study or lack of evidence, whether historians need to look harder or are already looking too hard.

Civil-military relations were often tense during the war, when military failure reenergized civilian criticism echoing the Jacksonians. Significant recent works focusing on wartime civil-military relations, with substantial attention to the perspectives and policies of military officers, include those by Bruce Tap (1998), Mark Neely (2002), Andrew Polsky (2002), Thomas Goss (2003), Ethan Rafuse (2005), Paul Escott (2006), and Russell Weigley (2000). The army's dilemmas during Reconstruction are explored by Harold Hyman (1960), James Sefton (1967), Joseph Dawson (1982), William Richter (1987), and James Hogue (2006). Harvey Meyerson (2001) presents a broad-ranging look at constabulary missions in the frontier West in which officers displayed much the same attitudes as before the Civil War. Following in the path laid out by Ganoe and Huntington, few would doubt that the period after Reconstruction was one of significant professionalization; much of the relevant literature remains in dissertation form, but Timothy Nenninger (1978), Edward Coffman (1986), Carole Reardon (1990), Ronald Barr (1998), T. R. Brereton (2000), and Theodore Crackel (2004) have made important contributions to its study.

The most important work on the post-Civil War army is an article by Mark Grandstaff (1998), who combines Skelton's work with the longstanding emphasis on postbellum professional reform to recognize that there were two major waves of nineteenth-century American military professionalization: the formation of a cohesive, committed profession before the Civil War, as demonstrated by Skelton, and the institutionalization of procedures for the development of specialized military expertise, which gained permanence during the decades after Reconstruction. Grandstaff's insight promises to help resolve the long dispute over the chronology of professionalization, if only by affirming that different aspects of professionalization might take different trajectories and develop at different rates. This article, along with Coffman (1986), also provides a rare look at the Civil War's impact on the regular army, particularly in greatly diminishing the proportion of West Pointers in the officer corps, which Weigley (1967) and Symonds (1986) downplayed. This "deprofessionalization," combined with entanglement in the politics of Reconstruction, undermined the army's cohesion and autonomy and hindered efforts at professional education and the development of expertise for nearly a generation after the Civil War. Unfortunately, it appears that Grandstaff's research interests have shifted to the twentieth century.

The most debated question concerning the post-Reconstruction army is about civil-military relations, the degree of its isolation from civilian society. Paradoxically, scholars following Ganoe and Huntington have always combined an emphasis on the *zeitgeist* of social complexity and specialization with arguments that the army professionalized through introspection: the army's military history textbook (Center of Military History 1969, 1973, 1988) repeated their formulation as "darkness and light," while even Weigley referred to the army's "isolation from the main currents of American life." Far more than Ganoe or Huntington, Weigley saw isolation as a mixed blessing, encouraging "an unhealthy introspection" in Upton but freeing

the army “from any temptation toward political activity” and encouraging “concentration upon things military” (education and expertise) (1967: 292). Coffman (1991) and Linn (1996), on the other hand, follow decades of contemporary military officers in arguing that physical concentration was essential to professional development – meaning preparation for European warfighting – and that the army was unable to do either until the end of the Indian Wars, circa 1890. Though this definition of mission and professionalism is too narrow, the army’s physical concentration during the 1890s clearly accelerated its professional development and enhanced its capability for international power projection.

Yet how could an army tasked largely with constabulary duties, from Reconstruction to Indian-fighting to domestic law enforcement during civil disturbances, have been so isolated? Was this isolation reality, or officers’ desire, particularly their desire to escape divisive missions that drew the ire of citizens and politicians, endangering the army’s appropriations and its legitimacy as a neutral agent of the nation’s will? Such ambivalence was a common thread in officers’ views throughout the century, particularly amid conflicts with Native Americans, which officers often blamed on white greed and aggression (e.g., Utley 1967, 1973, Leonard 1974, Skelton 1976, Smith 1990, Watson 1996–9, and Hauptman 2001). As applied to the late nineteenth century, the “isolation thesis” was first questioned in studies of the army on the frontier (and for the Philippines in Gates 1973) and amid civil disorder (Cooper 1979), roles downplayed or ignored by Uptonian historians who shared the “isolationist” perspective and envisioned the army’s mission as conventional warfighting rather than peacekeeping. The floodgates should have opened with an article by John Gates (1980), who demonstrated statistically that the officer corps as a whole was not physically isolated. Many officers served on staff or in coastal fortifications, usually in or near large cities; those who served on the frontier interacted constantly with local civilians (Tate 1999). Gates also highlighted the social backgrounds, and most important the attitudes, shared by the majority of military officers and civilian leaders: military commanders did not come from isolated castes, nor were their fundamental values different from those of elite or middle-class civilians.

Gates’s insights were revised by Gough (1992), who reiterated that, physically isolated or not, many army officers disdained the commercial values widespread in civilian society. Yet, as James Abrahamson explained (1981), military officers at the end of the nineteenth century shared many of the broad values and attitudes characteristic of civilian Progressives: if there had been isolation, it seems very likely that it decreased as the nation asserted itself on the world stage, and military leaders found more congenial roles, amply supported by civilian elites. And, returning to the practical question of force structure and operational direction of national force, the very foundation of the Uptonian school of interpretation has been questioned by former colonel David Fitzpatrick (2001), who argues that Upton understood that citizen-soldiers would inevitably provide the basis for large American armies, and was most concerned to maintain regular army control over the operational direction of those volunteers. As Thomas Goss (2003) demonstrates, they ultimately did so even during the Civil War: it seems probable that Upton was over-



reacting, particularly to the influx of “political generals” early in the war. Biographies of senior officers, from Paul Hutton’s of Philip Sheridan (1985) to Donald Connelly’s of John Schofield (2006), should also give pause to claims of isolation, and the implied alienation from civilian life.

Yet Huntingtonian orthodoxy often still seems to reign in the postbellum realm: the romance of misunderstood frontier soldiers and the stereotype of money-grubbing or radical civilians’ disdain for self-sacrificing soldiers seems as powerful among historians as it did for some officers, who at least used it as motivation in their quest for professional development and recognition. As Skelton demonstrated for the antebellum period, military historians *must* understand the total context of the era they are studying, or their work will be laughed out of court by other scholars. Huntington’s portrait of the Gilded Age is as much a shibboleth as his depictions of the Jacksonian era or Wilhelmine Germany – which he held up as a model of “objective civil–military relations,” perhaps the best possible evidence of the difference between a model-making political scientist and a historian – nor would any modern historian of the Gilded Age recognize it as an accurate depiction of reality. A more thorough, nuanced exploration of the questions of isolation and alienation is one of the most important tasks for nineteenth-century American military historians.

The question of isolation touches general American history in the army’s role policing the conflict between capital and labor, particularly the railroad strikes of 1877 and 1894 and several strikes among coal miners during the 1890s. In his comparative study *The Sources of Social Power*, sociologist Anthony Mann (1993) has maintained that American labor relations were among the most violent and repressive in the late nineteenth-century western world, though he concedes that most state coercion against workers was applied by state and local rather than national military forces. Labor historian David Montgomery (1993) examines workers’ attitudes toward the military forces of the nation-state, and Charles Byler (2006) touches on them in his otherwise rather traditional survey of postbellum civil–military relations, but only Jerry Cooper (1979) has addressed their clashes in detail. Regular army forces were only used once against white workers before the Civil War; their extensive use in 1877 and during the 1890s should raise important questions about changes in the character, direction, and trajectory of American class and labor relations and the interplay of class and state, state and society. If anything, this was when Jeffersonian and Jacksonian fears about military repression or support for monopoly and class power came closest to realization, not during the 1790s. There is perhaps no other subject military historians could explore to such advantage for the larger American historical community.

Besides professionalization, civil–military relations, and the citizen-soldier, Indian-fighting, and Indian relations more generally, provide the principal thread of continuity for analysis of the nineteenth-century army and its role in American life (Utley 1967, 1973, Wooster 1988, Smith 1990). There is a near-universal consensus that the army devoted too little attention to Indian warfare, whether in strategy, operational art, or tactics, and general agreement that it succeeded more through persistence and reliance on its discipline and logistical strengths than by

innovation or tactical ability. With some exceptions (Nichols 1972, Utley 1973), military historians (particularly Athearn 1956 and Tate 1999) are much more likely to stress the army's role in the conquest of the Indians than most American historians, who lose sight of their usual thirst for "agency" and emphasize larger impersonal forces like disease, the destruction of the buffalo, and the influx of white population. Yet military historians can accurately point out that army posts usually preceded and became focal points for large-scale white settlement, that the influx of a loosely organized population with families to defend was extremely vulnerable to native attack, and unlikely to defeat the Indians on its own, especially on the Plains or in Florida. Population movements do not conquer by themselves; initially they may prove little more than larger targets.

Graham Cosmas (1971), Peter Karsten (1972), James Abrahamson (1981), David Trask (1981), and Ronald Barr (1998) have examined the army at the end of the century, when its growing professional capabilities were initially overwhelmed by the scale of the sudden mobilization for the Spanish–American War. They point out that the army soon recovered its balance and remedied deficiencies in administration and supply, but scandals in procurement, distribution, and medical care spurred a new wave of reform efforts, focusing on the staff and control over the citizen-soldier National Guard, after the turn of the century. These reforms, under Secretary of War Elihu Root, bring us to the end of the nineteenth-century army. Political scientist Thomas Langston (2003) has recently observed that civil–military relations are smoothest, and most effective in the pursuit of national values and objectives, when postwar policymakers, civil and military, are able to craft a balance between redirection toward constabulary missions and reform to enhance warfighting capability. In the Philippines, as Brian Linn (1989, 1996, 2000) demonstrates, the army's frontier constabulary experience facilitated adaptation to diverse circumstances, essentially civil–military matters of diplomacy rather than conventional warfighting expertise. Yet, the shadow of the nineteenth-century frontier army has not proven nearly as long, nor nearly as damaging, as those of Emory Upton and *The Soldier and the State*.

The nineteenth-century army has been well-served with a groundwork of biographies, published primary sources, and campaign studies, both of conventional and unconventional operations. Most recently, fine works have examined the war with Mexico (Levinson 2005, Johnson 2007). The contours of the conditions of service and daily life, of organization and administration, indeed of officer professionalism, have been effectively surveyed, though often in unpublished dissertations inaccessible to the public. The greatest opportunities for further study appear to be in the more holistic realms of civil–military relations: the nuances of military relations with Congress (particularly neglected for the period before the Civil War); the dynamic realities of ideology, partisan politics, and policy; the role of military forces in social conflict; and more comprehensive questions of military missions, military "isolation" from civil society, and the relationship between American government and society. Civil War historians have recently led the way in examining these issues (Angevine 2004), both for the Union (Wilson 2006) and Confederacy (Escott 2006). Exploring these larger questions through archival

research will help to better identify trajectories of change and patterns of continuity, to reconnect military and other histories, reintegrate the study of American politics, institutions, and society, and enhance them all.

#### BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Abrahamson, James L. (1981). *America Arms for a New Century: The Making of a Great Military Power*. New York: Free Press.
- Adams, Henry (1889–91). *History of the United States of America* [during the Administrations of Thomas Jefferson and James Madison], 9 vols. New York: C. Scribner's Sons.
- Angevine, Robert (2004). *The Railroad and the State: War, Politics and Technology in Nineteenth-Century America*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Athearn, Robert G. (1956). *William Tecumseh Sherman and the Settlement of the West*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Ball, Durwood (2001). *Army Regulars on the Western Frontier, 1848–1861*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Barr, Ronald J. (1998). *The Progressive Army: U.S. Army Command and Administration, 1870–1914*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Bledstein, Burton J. (1976). *The Culture of Professionalism: The Middle Class and the Development of Higher Education in America*. New York: W. W. Norton.
- Brereton, T. R. (2000). *Educating the U.S. Army: Arthur L. Wagner and Reform, 1875–1905*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
- Byler, Charles (2006). *Civil–Military Relations on the Frontier and Beyond, 1865–1917*. Westport, CT: Praeger Security International.
- Center of Military History (1969, 1973, 1988, 2005). *American Military History*. Washington: Government Printing Office.
- Childress, David T. (1974). "The Army in Transition: The United States Army, 1815–1846," PhD dissertation, Mississippi State University.
- Coffman, Edward M. (1986). *The Old Army: A Portrait of the American Army in Peacetime, 1784–1898*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Coffman, Edward M. (1991). "The Long Shadow of *The Soldier and the State*," *Journal of Military History*, 55:1 (January), 69–82.
- Connelly, Donald (2006). *John M. Schofield and the Politics of Generalship*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Cooper, Jerry M. (1979). *The Army and Civil Disorder: Federal Military Intervention in Labor Disputes, 1877–1900*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
- Cosmas, Graham A. (1971). *An Army for Empire: The United States Army in the Spanish–American War*. Columbia: University of Missouri Press.
- Crackel, Theodore J. (1981). "The Founding of West Point: Jefferson and the Politics of National Security," *Armed Forces and Society*, 7:4 (Summer), 529–43.
- Crackel, Theodore J. (1982). "Jefferson, Politics, and the Army: An Examination of the Military Peace Establishment Act of 1802," *Journal of the Early Republic*, 2:1 (Spring), 21–38.
- Crackel, Theodore J. (1986). "The Battle of Queenston Heights, 13 October 1812," in Charles E. Heller and William A. Stofft, eds., *America's First Battles, 1776–1965*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 33–56.
- Crackel, Theodore J. (1987). *Mr. Jefferson's Army: Political and Social Reform of the Military Establishment, 1801–1809*. New York: New York University Press.

- Crackel, Theodore J. (2004). "West Point's Contribution to the Army and to Professionalism, 1877 to 1917," in Lance Betros, ed., *West Point: Two Centuries and Beyond*. Abilene, TX: McWhiney Foundation Press, 38–56.
- Craig, Gordon (1955). *Politics of the Prussian Army, 1640–1945*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Cress, Lawrence Delbert (1982). *Citizens in Arms: The Army and the Militia in American Society to the War of 1812*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Cunliffe, Marcus (1968). *Soldiers & Civilians: The Martial Spirit in America, 1776–1865*. Boston: Little, Brown.
- Dawson, Joseph G., III. (1982). *Army Generals and Reconstruction: Louisiana, 1862–1877*, 2nd edn. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.
- Escott, Paul D. (2006). *Military Necessity: Civil–Military Relations in the Confederacy*. Westport, CT: Praeger Security International.
- Ferguson, Clyde R. (1978). "Carolina and Georgia Patriot and Loyalist Militia in Action, 1775 to 1783," in Jeffrey J. Crow and Larry E. Tise, eds., *The Southern Experience in the American Revolution*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 174–99.
- Fitzpatrick, David J. (2001). "Emory Upton and the Citizen Soldier," *The Journal of Military History*, 65:2 (April), 355–89.
- Ganoe, William A. (1942 [1924]). *History of the United States Army*. New York: D. Appleton-Century.
- Gates, John M. (1973). *Schoolbooks and Krags: The United States Army in the Philippines, 1898–1902*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
- Gates, John M. (1980). "The Alleged Isolation of the U.S. Army Officers in the Late Nineteenth Century," *Parameters*, 10:3 (September), 32–45.
- Goetzmann, William H. (1959). *Army Exploration in the American West*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Goss, Thomas J. (2003). *The War within the Union High Command: Politics and Generalship during the Civil War*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
- Gough, Terrence J. (1992). "Isolation and Professionalization of the Army Officer Corps: A Post-Revisionist View of *The Soldier and the State*," *Social Science Quarterly*, 73:2 (June), 420–36.
- Grandstaff, Mark R. (1998). "Preserving the 'Habits and Usages of War': William Tecumseh Sherman, Professional Reform, and the U.S. Army Officer Corps, 1865–1881, Revisited," *Journal of Military History*, 62:3 (July), 521–45.
- Grimsley, Mark (1996). "American Military Policy, 1783–1860: The Beginnings of Professionalism," in Robert A. Doughty and Ira D. Gruber, eds., *Warfare in the Western World: Military Operations from 1600 to 1871*. Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath, 310.
- Guthman, William H. (1975). *March to Massacre: A History of the First Seven Years of the United States Army, 1784–1791*. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Hagerman, Edward L. (1988). *The American Civil War and the Origins of Modern Warfare: Ideas, Organization, and Field Command*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Halleck, Henry Wager (1846). *Elements of Military Art and Science*. New York: D. Appleton.
- Hauptman, Laurence M. (2001). "General John E. Wool in Cherokee Country, 1836–1837: A Reinterpretation," *Georgia Historical Quarterly*, 85:1 (Spring), 1–26.
- Hogue, James K. (2006). *Uncivil War: Five New Orleans Street Battles and the Rise and Fall of Radical Reconstruction*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.
- Hsieh, Wayne (2004). "The Old Army in War and Peace: West Pointers and the Civil War Era, 1814–1865," PhD dissertation, University of Virginia.

- Huntington, Samuel P. (1957). *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Practice of Civil-Military Relations*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Hutton, Paul Andrew (1985). *Phil Sheridan and His Army*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
- Hyman, Harold M. (1960). "Johnson, Stanton, and Grant: A Reconsideration of the Army's Role in the Events Leading to Impeachment," *American Historical Review*, 66:1 (October), 85–100.
- Jacobs, James Ripley (1947). *The Beginning of the U.S. Army, 1783–1812*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Johnson, Timothy D. (2007). *A Gallant Little Army: The Mexico City Campaign*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
- Karsten, Peter (1972). "Armed Progressives: The Military Reorganizes for the American Century," in Jerry Israel, ed., *Building the Organizational Society: Essays on Associational Activities in Modern America*, with an introduction by Samuel P. Hays. New York: The Free Press, 197–232.
- Kohn, Richard H. (1970). "The Inside History of the Newburgh Conspiracy: America and the Coup d'Etat," *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3rd ser., 27:2 (April), 187–220.
- Kohn, Richard H. (1975). *Eagle and Sword: The Federalists and the Creation of the Military Establishment in America, 1783–1802*. New York: Free Press.
- Kohn, Richard H. (1978). "American Generals of the Revolution: Subordination and Restraint," in Don Higginbotham, ed., *Reconsiderations on the Revolutionary War: Selected Essays*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 104–23.
- Kwasny, Mark V. (1996). *Washington's Partisan War, 1775–1783*. Kent, OH: Kent State University Press.
- Langston, Thomas S. (2003). *Uneasy Balance: Civil-Military Relations in Peacetime America since 1783*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Leonard, Thomas C. (1974). "Red, White, and Army Blue: Empathy and Anger in the American West," *American Quarterly*, 26:2 (May), 176–90.
- Levinson, Irving W. (2005). *War within War: Mexican Guerrillas, Domestic Elites, and the United States of America, 1846–1848*. Fort Worth, TX: Texas Christian University Press.
- Linn, Brian M. (1989). *The U.S. Army and Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War, 1899–1902*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Linn, Brian M. (1996). "The Long Twilight of the Frontier Army," *Western Historical Quarterly*, 27:2 (Summer), 141–67.
- Linn, Brian M. (2000). *The Philippine War, 1899–1902*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
- Linn, Brian M. (2002). "The American Way of War Revisited, With Response by Russell F. Weigley," *Journal of Military History*, 66:2 (April), 501–33.
- Linn, Brian McAllister (2007). *The Echo of Battle: The Army's Way of War*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Logan, John A. (1887), *The Volunteer Soldier of America*. Chicago: R. S. Peale & Co. (reprinted: New York: Arno Press, 1979).
- Mann, Anthony (1993). *The Sources of Social Power: The Rise of Classes and Nation-States, 1760–1914*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Meyerson, Harvey (2001). *Nature's Army: When Soldiers Fought for Yosemite*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
- Millett, Allan R. (1977). "Military Professionalism and Officership in America," Columbus, OH: Mershon Center Briefing Paper.



- Millett, Allan R., and Peter Maslowski (1984). *For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States of America*. New York: Free Press.
- Millis, Walter (1956). *Arms and Men: A Study in American Military History*. New York: Putnam.
- Montgomery, David R. (1993). *Citizen Worker: The Experience of Workers in the United States with Democracy and the Free Market during the Nineteenth Century*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Morrison, James L., Jr. (1973). "The Struggle Between Sectionalism and Nationalism at Ante-Bellum West Point, 1830–1861," *Civil War History*, 19:2 (June), 138–48.
- Morrison, James L., Jr. (1974). "Educating the Civil War Generals: West Point, 1833–1861," *Military Affairs*, 38:3 (October), 108–11.
- Morrison, James L., Jr. (1986). *"The Best School in the World": West Point in the Pre-Civil War Years, 1833–1866*. Kent, OH: Kent State University Press.
- Moten, Matthew (2000). *The Delafield Commission and the American Military Profession*. College Station: Texas A&M University Press.
- Neely, Mark E. (2002). *The Union Divided: Party Conflict in the Civil War North*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Nelson, Paul David (1972). "Horatio Gates at Newburgh, 1783: A Misunderstood Role," *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3rd ser., 29:1 (January), 143–58.
- Nenninger, Timothy (1978). *The Leavenworth Schools and the Old Army: Education, Professionalism, and the Officer Corps of the United States Army, 1881–1918*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
- Ness, George T. Jr. (1982). *The Regular Army on the Eve of the Civil War*. Baltimore, MD: Toomey Press.
- Nichols, Roger L. (1972). "The Army and the Indians 1800–1830 – A Reappraisal: The Missouri Valley Example," *Pacific Historical Review*, 41:2 (May), 151–68.
- Pinheiro, John C. (2007). *Manifest Ambition: James K. Polk and Civil–Military Relations during the Mexican War*. Westport, CT: Praeger Security International.
- Polsky, Andrew J. (2002). "'Mr. Lincoln's Army' Revisited: Partisanship, Institutional Position, and Union Army Command, 1861–1865," *Studies in American Political Development*, 16:2 (Fall), 176–207.
- Prucha, Francis Paul (1953). *Broadax and Bayonet: The Role of the Army in the Development of the Northwest, 1815–1860*. Madison: State Historical Society of Wisconsin.
- Prucha, Francis Paul (1969). *The Sword of the Republic: The United States Army on the Frontier, 1783–1846*. New York: Macmillan.
- Rafuse, Ethan S. (2005). *McClellan's War: The Failure of Moderation in the Struggle for the Union*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Reardon, Carole (1990). *Soldiers and Scholars: The U.S. Army and the Uses of Military History, 1865–1920*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
- Richter, William L. (1987). *The Army in Texas during Reconstruction, 1865–1870*. College Station: Texas A&M University Press.
- Roberts, William R. (1980). "Loyalty and Expertise: The Transformation of the Nineteenth-Century American General Staff and the Creation of the Modern Military Establishment," PhD dissertation, Johns Hopkins University.
- Robinson, Fayette (1848). *An Account of the Organization of the Army of the United States: With Biographies of Distinguished Officers of All Grades*. Philadelphia: E. H. Butler.
- Roosevelt, Theodore (1882). *The Naval War of 1812*. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons.
- Sefton, James E. (1967). *The United States Army and Reconstruction, 1865–1877*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.



- Semmes, Raphael (1852). *The Campaign of General Scott, in the Valley of Mexico*. Cincinnati: Moore & Anderson.
- Shy, John (1988). "The American Military Profession," in Norman O. Hatch, ed., *The Professions in American History*. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 93–106.
- Shy, John (1990). *A People Numerous and Armed: Reflections on the Military Struggle for American Independence*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Silver, James W. (1949). *Edmund Pendleton Gaines: Frontier General*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.
- Skeen, C. Edward, and Richard H. Kohn (1974). "The Newburgh Conspiracy Reconsidered," *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3rd ser., 31:2 (April), 273–98.
- Skelton, William B. (1968). "The United States Army, 1821–1837: An Institutional History," PhD dissertation, Northwestern University.
- Skelton, William B. (1975). "Professionalization in the U.S. Army Officer Corps During the Age of Jackson," *Armed Forces and Society*, 1:4 (Summer), 443–71.
- Skelton, William B. (1976). "Army Officers' Attitudes towards Indians, 1830–1860," *Pacific Northwest Quarterly*, 67:3 (July), 113–24.
- Skelton, William B. (1979). "Officers and Politicians: The Origins of Army Politics in the United States before the Civil War," *Armed Forces and Society*, 6:1 (Fall), 22–48.
- Skelton, William B. (1987). "The Army Officer as Organization Man," in Garry D. Ryan and Timothy K. Nenninger, eds. *Soldiers and Civilians: The U.S. Army and the American People*. Washington: National Archives and Records Administration, 61–70.
- Skelton, William B. (1992). *An American Profession of Arms: The Army Officer Corps, 1784–1861*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
- Skelton, William B. (1994). "High Army Leadership in the Era of the War of 1812: The Making and Remaking of the Officer Corps," *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3rd ser., 51:2 (April), 253–74.
- Skelton, William B. (1996). "Samuel P. Huntington and the Roots of the American Military Tradition," *Journal of Military History*, 60:2 (April), 325–38.
- Skelton, William B. (2004). "West Point and Officer Professionalism, 1817–1877," in Lance A. Betros, ed., *West Point: Two Centuries and Beyond*. Abilene, TX: McWhiney Foundation Press, 22–37.
- Skelton, William B. (2006). "The Commanding Generals and the Question of Civil Control in the Antebellum U.S. Army," *American Nineteenth-Century History*, 7:2 (June), 153–72.
- Smith, Mark A. (2004). "The Corps of Engineers and National Defense in Antebellum America, 1815–1860," PhD dissertation, University of Alabama.
- Smith, Sherry L. (1990). *The View from Officers' Row: Army Perceptions of Western Indians*. Tucson: University of Arizona Press.
- Stagg, J. C. A. (1983). *Mr. Madison's War: Politics, Diplomacy, and Warfare in the Early American Republic, 1783–1830*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Symonds, Craig L. (1986). "An Improvised Army at War, 1861–1865," in Kenneth J. Hagan and William R. Roberts, eds., *Against All Enemies: Interpretations of American Military History from Colonial Times to the Present*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 155–71.
- Tap, Bruce (1998). *Over Lincoln's Shoulder: The Committee on the Conduct of the War*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
- Tate, Michael L. (1999). *The Frontier Army in the Settlement of the West*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.

- Thorpe, Thomas Bangs (1846). *Our Army on the Rio Grande, etc.* Philadelphia: Carey and Hart.
- Thorpe, Thomas Bangs (1847). *Our Army at Monterey, etc.* Philadelphia: Carey and Hart.
- Trask, David F. (1981). *The War with Spain in 1898*. New York: Macmillan.
- Upton, Emory (1878). *The Armies of Asia and Europe: Embracing Official Reports of the Armies of Japan, China, India, Persia, Italy, Russia, Austria, Germany, France, and England*. New York: D. Appleton & Co.
- Upton, Emory (1904). *The Military Policy of the United States*. Washington: Government Printing Office.
- Utley, Robert M. (1967). *Frontiersmen in Blue: The United States Army and the Indian, 1848–1865*. New York: Macmillan.
- Utley, Robert M. (1973). *Frontier Regulars: The United States Army and the Indian, 1866–1900*. New York: Macmillan.
- Volpe, Vernon L. (2000). "The Origins of the Frémont Expeditions: John J. Abert and the Scientific Exploration of the Trans-Mississippi West," *The Historian*, 62:2 (Winter), 245–63.
- Wade, Arthur P. (1976). "Roads to the Top – An Analysis of General-Officer Selection in the United States Army, 1789–1898," *Military Affairs*, 40:4 (December), 157–63.
- Watson, Samuel J. (1996a). "Manifest Destiny and Military Professionalism: A New Perspective on Junior Army Officers' Attitudes toward War with Mexico, 1844–1846," *Southwestern Historical Quarterly*, 99:4 (April), 466–98.
- Watson, Samuel J. (1996b). "Professionalism, Social Attitudes, and Civil–Military Accountability in the U.S. Army Officer Corps, 1815–1846," 2 vols, PhD dissertation, Rice University.
- Watson, Samuel J. (1997). "The Uncertain Road to Manifest Destiny: Army Officers and the Course of American Territorial Expansionism, 1815–1846," in Christopher Morris and Sam W. Haynes, eds. *Manifest Destiny and Empire: Essays on Antebellum American Expansionism*. College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 68–114.
- Watson, Samuel J. (1998a). "Knowledge, Interest and the Limits of Military Professionalism: The Discourse on American Coastal Defence, 1815–1860," *War in History*, 5:3 (Fall), 280–307.
- Watson, Samuel J. (1998b). "United States Army Officers Fight the 'Patriot War': Responses to Filibustering on the Canadian Border, 1837–1839," *Journal of the Early Republic*, 18:3 (Autumn), 485–519.
- Watson, Samuel J. (1999). "'This Thankless ... Unholy War': Army Officers and Civil–Military Relations in the Second Seminole War," in David Dillard and Randal Hall, eds., *The Southern Albatross: Race and Ethnicity in the South*. Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 9–49.
- Watson, Samuel J. (2004). "Developing 'Republican Machines': West Point and the Struggle to Render the Officer Corps Safe for America," in Robert M. S. McDonald, ed., *Thomas Jefferson's Military Academy: Founding West Point*. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 154–81.
- Watson, Samuel J. (2005). "Introduction," *The International Library of Essays in Military History: Warfare in the USA, 1784–1861*. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate Publishing, xv–li.
- Watson, Samuel J. (2006). "How the Army Became Accepted: West Point Socialization, Military Accountability, and the Nation-State during the Jacksonian Era," *American Nineteenth-Century History*, 7:2 (June), 219–51.
- Weigley, Russell F. (1962). *Towards an American Army: Military Thought from Washington to Marshall*. New York: Columbia University Press.

- Weigley, Russell F. (1967). *History of the United States Army*. New York: Macmillan.
- Weigley, Russell F. (1976). *The American Way of War*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Weigley, Russell F. (2000). *A Great Civil War: A Political and Military History*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Wettemann, Robert P., Jr. (2001). "‘To the Public Prosperity’: The U.S. Army and the Market Revolution, 1815–1844," PhD dissertation, Texas A&M University.
- Wettemann, Robert P., Jr. (2004). "West Point, the Jacksonian, and the Army’s Controversial Role in National Improvements," in Lance Betros, ed., *West Point: Two Centuries and Beyond*. Abilene, TX: McWhiney Foundation Press, 144–66.
- Wettemann, Robert P., Jr. (2006). "A Part or Apart: The Alleged Isolation of Antebellum U.S. Army Officers," *American Nineteenth-Century History*, 7:2 (June), 193–217.
- Williams, T. Harry (1960). *Americans at War: The Development of the American Military System*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.
- Wilson, Mark (2006). *The Business of Civil War: Military Mobilization and the State, 1861–1865*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Winders, Richard Bruce (1997). *Mr. Polk’s Army: The American Military Experience in the Mexican War*. College Station: Texas A&M University Press.
- Wooster, Robert (1988). *The Military and United States Indian Policy, 1865–1903*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.

# Chapter Twenty

## THE US ARMY SINCE 1900

*Ronald L. Spiller*

The poor performance of the US Army in the “splendid little war” with Spain marked the end of the Old Army of the nineteenth century. The century that some would come to call the “American Century” began with the Army’s first multinational operation, a brutal counterinsurgency campaign in the Philippines that brought accusations of war crimes, and led to the administrative and structural reorganization of the service. In many ways the challenges faced by the twentieth-century Army mirrored those of the previous century. The Army was no more prepared to fight the Germans in World War I than it had been to fight the British a century before. The mid-century World War II had, arguably, an even greater and more profound effect on America and its people than the Civil War of the previous century. At the turn of the twenty-first century, the Army, as it had a century before, struggled to adapt to new threats to national security. It also sought to understand its strategic, operational, and tactical roles in a world profoundly changed by the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Scholars and participants at all levels have produced scores of general surveys and texts dealing with the US Army through the twentieth century. Russell Weigley’s single-volume institutional history of the army tells the story of two armies, “a Regular Army of professional soldiers and a citizen army of various components” (Weigley 1984). The new, expanded edition of the Army’s official history provides a broader account aimed at both the Army’s junior leadership and “the American people” (Stewart 2005). Together they provide a starting point for addressing how the Army, in its broadest definition, has met its challenges and responsibilities since 1900.

The war won so quickly against the Spanish in Cuba, the Philippines, and Puerto Rico evolved into a guerrilla war in the Philippines. Organized Filipino forces had been largely defeated by the end of 1899, but for the next two and a half years insurgents waged a brutal guerrilla campaign against US forces and their local supporters (Linn 2000). Frequently Americans countered with brutality of their own, at odds with a broader political desire for a peaceful assimilation into the new American Empire.

The Philippine–American War was, from the beginning, controversial at home and complex in the Philippines. The carrot-and-stick approach to the pacification of the Philippines lends itself to conflicting interpretations, and “benevolent assimilation” was hardly benevolent in the minds of some historians (Miller 1982). But more peaceful methods were pursued, in addition to effective combat operations, and pacification operations became increasingly effective (Gates 1973, Birtle 1997). By the spring of 1902 the “Philippine Insurrection” was largely over. Success came, in part, because of the policy itself, in part because of the flexibility and initiative of regional commanders (Linn 1989). Operations against Moslem tribes – the Moros – on Mindanao and other southern islands continued for another ten years. This resistance was more a continuation of resistance to the sovereignty of Christian Manila than to American colonization.

Although complicated by culture, geography, and distance from the United States the Army’s operations in the Philippines were similar, in ultimate purpose at least, to its frontier operations of the previous century. The China Relief Expedition, however, posed a variety of potential problems with which no American commander was familiar. Brigadier General Adna Chaffee’s orders from Secretary of War Elihu Root, to cooperate but not commit the United States government to any actions limiting its options established a precedent for US operations in a multinational environment (Carter 1917, Daggett 1997).

When he became Secretary of War in 1899 Root found an army organizationally unfit for its new roles. A strong reform movement had existed in the Army since at least the 1880s, but this movement often found itself restricted by the entrenched power of the Adjutant General and other bureau chiefs and the innate conservatism of much of the Army’s leadership. An outspoken advocate for modernization and professionalization had been Emory Upton whose study, *The Military Policy of the United States*, had been circulating through the officer corps in manuscript form since shortly after his death in 1881.

During his tenure Root oversaw a profound reorganization of the Army guided in spirit, if not always in substance by Upton’s ideas (Hewes 1975, Upton 2006). Changes included the expansion of the Army’s professional education system (Nenninger 1978), the creation of a General Staff, the revision of the Militia Act of 1792, and the publication of the Army’s first *Field Service Regulations*. These “Root Reforms” created a foundation for a more modern organization capable of responding to the unprecedented expansion that would come with America’s entry into World War I. The new General Staff was not without its problems however. Statutorily the Chief of Staff was not necessarily the senior officer in the Army and the various bureau chiefs retained their power and frequently autonomy. Major General Leonard Wood, “the Army’s first effective Chief of Staff” (Hewes 1975) and Secretary of War Henry Stimson resolved this latter issue in 1912 when they forced the retirement of the primary obstacle to the General Staff’s operations, Major General Fred C. Ainsworth, the Adjutant General. The question of the precedence of the Chief of Staff among the Army’s senior generals, however, remained unanswered.

The modernized Army staff system was first put to the test during the Mexican Punitive Expedition, an abortive attempt to capture the Mexican revolutionary

Francisco “Poncho” Villa after his raid on Columbus, New Mexico, in March 1916 (Hurst 2007). Arguably the operation failed since Villa was never caught and the Army suffered an embarrassing tactical defeat at Carrizal. The expedition and the mobilization of 45,000 National Guardsmen for border duty also highlighted weaknesses in mobilization that still had to be addressed. The expedition did, however, disperse Villa’s forces. It also provided the Army with the opportunity to exercise large unit command and control in an active operational environment and begin to integrate more modern weapons and equipment – automobiles and trucks, field radios, and the airplane – into its force structure (Johnson 2001, Corum 2003). Perhaps most important, however, was the fact that thousands of Regulars and National Guardsmen received extensive training, not the least of whom was Brigadier General John J. Pershing. Some seven weeks after American troops evacuated northern Mexico President Woodrow Wilson asked Congress for a declaration of war on Germany.

Within a few months of the outbreak of war in Europe in August 1914 it became apparent that the great increases in volume and lethality of fire from modern weapons had effectively deprived field commanders on the Western Front of the ability to maneuver at both the tactical and operational level. War in the most important theater of this world wide conflict had become an endless, grinding exercise in attrition. To meet the Allied demand for additional troops the US Army, some 300,000 strong, counting the National Guard, would grow to a force of over 3.6 million men, more than a million of whom would be deployed to France as the American Expeditionary Force (AEF), commanded by General John J. Pershing.

The story of the US Army in World War I is, on one level, the story of mobilization and coalition warfare on a scale few Americans had ever imagined. Challenges were successfully met because of the foundations laid by the Root Reforms, the practical experience of Mexico, and the lessons about conscription learned from the Civil War. At the tactical level it is the simple and sometimes bloody story of young Americans and their leaders overcoming inexperience and becoming effective soldiers.

The Militia Act of 1903 and the National Defense Act of 1916 had gone a long way to reducing the traditional conflict between the Regular Army and the National Guard. Mobilization of the Guard and integration into the Army’s command and organizational structure was simpler than it had ever been, but not without difficulties, and the Guard’s total strength of less than 200,000 would hardly be enough to augment the Regular Army which had less than 110,000 men in 1916. Conscription would be required to build the army to its required strength. To overcome the natural resistance to being conscripted by the Federal government, and building on the experience of the Civil War, the Selective Service Act of 1917 placed the responsibility for selection and determining exemptions with local draft boards (Chambers 1987).

The war posed unprecedented challenges for the War Department and the Army. The broad underlying political ethos of the country in 1917 was one of Progressivism and the progressive spirit predisposed the wartime leadership to



aggressive, centralized solutions. Prior to entering the war the War and Navy Departments had explored the potential challenges of national mobilization with civilian agencies and the outgrowth of these discussions by 1917 was the War Industries Board (WIB). For some time, however, the Wilson administration resisted giving the WIB authority to regulate the US economy and the War Department resisted what the General Staff considered meddling in Army plans and procedures. In March 1918 Bernard Baruch became the chairman of the WIB and Peyton C. March became acting Army Chief of Staff. Two months later Congress passed the Overman Act (1918) which allowed reorganization of the War Department. Under March, a man who “lived, breathed, and slept efficiency” (Coffman 1968), the War Department began to cooperate more effectively with the War Industries Board. In the process of reorganizing the General Staff March broke down the barriers between the logisticians on the staff and the heads of the Army’s various bureaus. While this helped consolidate the power of the General Staff, it did not solve the problem created when the original General Staff Act failed to specifically state that the Chief of Staff was the Army’s senior general. Technically senior to March, the commander of the AEF, John J. Pershing, was also a field commander with almost independent authority in France. The March–Pershing tension, continued in their post-war memoirs (Pershing 1931, March 1932), was mitigated during the war by the judicious management of Secretary of War Newton Baker (Beaver 1966).

Greater efficiency in the industrial mobilization effort did not, however, translate into an AEF armed completely with American weapons. In the years before US entry into World War I the Army had significantly improved its weapons and equipment. The M-1903 Springfield rifle replaced the Krag-Jorgensen, the M-1911 Colt .45 caliber semi-automatic pistol replaced the .38 caliber Colt revolver, and the Army adopted a modern 3-inch field gun in 1902 (De Weerd 1939). Nevertheless, for a variety of reasons, not least of which were the existing US contracts to produce weapons for the Allies, a majority of US troops used European weapons and Army and Navy aviators flew British and French aircraft.

Pershing’s American Expeditionary Force eventually numbered more than a million men. Regulars, federalized National Guardsmen, volunteers, and draftees, they all went to France ignorant of the tactics and techniques learned by the French and British in the earlier years of the war. The American troops did not go into the line quickly however, in part because of Pershing’s extended training program. The 1st Division arrived in July 1917, but the first elements of the division did not enter the front lines until October and the Division as a whole was not committed to the front until January 1918, a full nine months after the US declaration of war. Under the pressure of the German Spring Offensive, however, Pershing was forced to abandon his extended training program and American soldiers went into combat with as little as two months training. American inexperience and lack of training had an effect at all levels (Trask 1993, Nenninger 2000, Ferrell 2004) and the European observation that American troops were “enthusiastic rather than efficient” (Keegan 1999) is probably true. American success in the last weeks of the war came in spite of American problems and was facilitated by the exhaustion of

the Germans. Nevertheless, by the autumn of 1918 American troops had learned to attack effectively at night and orchestrate artillery, air, and tank support for infantry operations (Hamberger 1997). Often by trial and error the US Army had become a truly modern army. Pershing may have asked for more than the AEF could accomplish but American soldiers were a decisive force in the Allied victory.

The transition to peace was almost as chaotic as the transition to war had been. General March and many of the officers on the General Staff believed the war provided the evidence that the nation needed a professional army as outlined by Emory Upton 35 years before. They wanted a Regular Army of 500,000 that could be expanded by conscripts who would be the products of universal military training conducted by the Regular Army. This vision relegated the National Guard to a secondary role. The performance of National Guard divisions in France, however, had proven to many officers, including Pershing, that citizen soldiers could become effective professionals. Colonel John McAuley Palmer, who had commanded Maryland and Virginia Guardsmen in the 29th Division, presented this view to the Senate Military Affairs Committee (Holley 1982) and at the Committee's request McAuley helped draft the National Defense Act of 1920. This created a Regular Army less than half the size the General Staff wanted and placed the responsibility for an expanded force directly on the shoulders of the National Guard and the Organized Reserve.

This optimistic vision of a national defense organization based on a professional Regular Army and a trained National Guard and Reserve foundered on the economic retrenchment and general anti-war attitude of the 1920s and the subsequent Depression. The Army's role in dispersing the Bonus Army in 1932 (Dickson and Allen 2004) and the later findings of the Nye Committee further reduced the public popularity of the Army and anything military. The end result was an Army less capable by the mid-1930s than it had been in the decade before the Great War.

Through the interwar period the Army led the isolated, insular, and quiet garrison life of a professional army with little to actually do. But this was also a period of innovative thought and discussion (Coffman 2004). Although subject to some criticism, the Army school system, particularly Fort Leavenworth, continued to produce officers who were, perhaps, more problem solvers than theoreticians (Nenninger 1994). Officers at Leavenworth, in Washington, and throughout the Army thought about the lessons of the previous war and the possibilities of a next war (Linn 1997, Odom 1999). Frequently, however, this was without any clear guidance on national policy from a generally isolationist government (Greene 1961).

Technology redefined the battlefield between 1914 and 1918. In all Western armies in the 1920s and 1930s idealistic younger officers contended with their more practical seniors. The developmental struggle of greatest interest to historians has been that of armor and aviation. The Army's two tank battalions did not survive the post-war reorganization (Wilson 1989). Tanks reappeared during the Army's mechanization program of the later 1920s, but cost and disagreement over the role of armor limited tank development. On the Western Front tanks had performed mainly as infantry support vehicles and those officers who argued for a separate armored force faced strong opposition from the branch chiefs of the

Infantry and Cavalry. The idea that armor and mechanized infantry should form a separate maneuver force remained alive, however, and a mechanized force became a permanent part of the Army's forces structure in 1930, evolving eventually into two armored divisions by 1940 (Gillie 1947).

Proponents of a more powerful and independent air service carried on a more public debate than did the proponents of armor. A War Department board had proposed an independent air force immediately after the war. A subsequent board provided a more conservative assessment, stopping short of complete independence. It did, however, recognize the need for both ground support and long-range bombing, as well as general aviation development and expansion. This was not enough for Colonel William "Billy" Mitchell, whose criticism of Army leadership became so intemperate and public that he was court-martialed for insubordination and resigned (Waller 2004). Mitchell's court martial provoked even more discussion about the role and organization of airpower. In 1933 this resulted in the centralization of all aviation assets under General Headquarters (GHQ), Air Force, which reported directly to the General Staff. GHQ, Air Force bent all its efforts to the development of heavy bombers, ignoring the development of ground support aircraft and air-ground coordination procedures (Weigley 1984).

The lessons of World War I helped focus Army thinking immediately after the war and through the tenure of John J. Pershing as Army Chief of Staff. Small budgets, loss of public interest and support, and bureaucratic inertia, however, pushed these lessons progressively further into the background of history. Whether mechanisms for institutionalizing innovation simply did not exist (Odom 1999) or parochial branch chiefs actively suppressed innovation (Johnson 1998), by 1939 and the new edition of *Field Service Regulations* the Army was unprepared to meet the dangers looming in Europe and the Pacific.

That war came in December 1941 did not surprise the Army. It was the location and method of delivery of the first attack that was the surprise. The National Guard had been mobilized in the summer of 1940. In September 1940 Congress had passed the Selective Service and Training Act, the nation's first peacetime draft. Eventually more than eight million Americans would be mobilized by the War and Navy Departments (Flynn 1993). Nevertheless, for the first months, in the words of General Joseph Stilwell, the Army "got a hell of a beating" (Millett and Maslowski 1994). After Pearl Harbor the brunt of the beating fell on the US Navy and the some 130,000 Filipino and American troops in the Philippines (Morton 1993, Connaughton 2001).

The historiography of the US Army in World War II is complex, not only because of the sheer size of the forces and geography involved, but because the Army fought a coalition war organized and directed, at the highest levels, by committees (Pogue 1963–87, Matloff 1990, Matloff and Snell 1990). As senior officers grew to understand the requirements of combined operations at the strategic level, operational commanders learned the art of large campaign management, and tactical commanders and their soldiers learned how to fight in radically different theaters. Murray and Millett (2000) provide a single-volume operational overview of the war and the US Army Center of Military History's venerable "Green Books"

series provides over 60 volumes of detailed coverage of almost every aspect of the Army's role in the conflict (Adamczyk and MacGregor 1992).

Because of the weakness of command and staff structures the style of command in the AEF had been personal. If the Army's organizational structure in World War II was more mature, command relationships were still personal. The higher levels of command were dominated by Regulars, products of the highly social pre-war garrison Army. The large, complex staffs required to support armies and army groups, and to conduct joint and combined operations were dynamic committee structures, albeit molded and directed by professional but very human commanders. The classic biographies of Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall (Pogue 1963–87), and theater commanders General Dwight D. Eisenhower (Ambrose 1983–4) and General Douglas MacArthur (James 1970–85) provide an introduction to the complex and personal nature of the Army's command and staff relationships. Weigley (1981), Berlin (1989), and Leary (2004) provide introductions to subordinate commanders and staff officers.

In retrospect it seems naïve that Army planners actually considered invading the continent of Europe as early as 1942. The invasion of North Africa showed how much the Army had to learn (Blumenson 2000, Atkinson 2002). As in World War I, however, soldiers and their leaders did learn. Their education that began in Tunisia (Howe 1991) continued on Sicily and the Italian mainland (Garland and Smyth 1965, Blumenson 1969, Atkinson 2007).

Army planners had believed all along, however, that the defeat of Germany would require a cross-channel invasion. That the landing on Omaha Beach came close to failing (Lewis 2001) does not change the fact that 100,000 men got ashore on the coast of France by the end of 6 June 1944, and a million men within the next 30 days (Ambrose 1994, Lewis 2001). Less than two months after American forces broke out of the Normandy lodgment (Blumenson 1993) Alexander Patch's 7th Army, moving up the Rhone valley from the south of France, linked up with elements of George Patton's 3rd Army (Clarke 1993).

The broad Allied push across France and Belgium toward the Rhine slowed as Allied supply lines got longer. The failure of Operation Market Garden to seize the Rhine River bridge at Arnhem in September and stiffening resistance along the Siegfried Line slowed the advance even more. Giving up the vision of sweeping into Germany on a broad front, Eisenhower shifted his main effort to the north. In December 1944, however, the Germans launched a major counteroffensive through the Ardennes which fell squarely on four US divisions (Cole 1993). Displaying great flexibility and determination at all levels the Americans threw back the Germans. Losses in trained troops and equipment deprived the Germans of any further ability to halt the Allied drive into the heartland of Germany.

American troops met Soviet troops on the Elbe at Torgau on April 25, 1945. Stopping the Allied advance into Germany at the Elbe was one of Eisenhower's more controversial decisions and "gave" Berlin to the Soviets. In retrospect the decision to establish a clear limit of advance and control the meeting of two large, fast moving victorious armies can be seen as a prudent one (Ambrose 2000). David P. Colley (2008) however, with his criticism of Eisenhower's earlier decision to

stop 6th Army Group's crossing of the Rhine River in November 1944, suggests that Eisenhower may have been overly cautious rather than prudent.

Despite the "Germany First" decision made in 1941 Army forces moved into the Pacific Theater as quickly as they moved into Europe. US Marines landed on Guadalcanal on August 7, 1942, just three months after the surrender of Corregidor, and the US Army Americal Division relieved the Marines in December, just a month after Army landings in North Africa.

The nature of the Pacific Theater and the personalities involved, particularly that of the senior Army commander, Douglas MacArthur, made inter-service rivalry almost inevitable. The Joint Chiefs of Staff dealt with this by dividing the theater. Admiral Chester Nimitz commanded the Pacific Ocean Areas and MacArthur the Southwest Pacific Area. A man of bold vision and great personal courage (Leckie 1992), but possessed of a self-serving ego (Murray and Millett 2000), MacArthur had been stung by his defeat in the Philippines and was publicly committed to returning.

On November 20, 1942 American and Australian troops landed at Buna and Gona on the northeast coast of New Guinea. The Japanese held out for almost four months at Buna. The Americans and Australians suffered from disease, logistical problems, and lack of training. MacArthur, impatient at the pace of the advance of the 32nd Division, replaced its commander, and Buna was eventually taken (Anders 1985, Heller and Stofft 1986). In its first major offensive operation against the Japanese the Army learned the Japanese could be defeated. MacArthur learned the value of air power and naval support. The capture of Buna eliminated the threat to Port Moresby and set in motion the larger plan to isolate the Japanese naval base at Rabaul on the northern end of New Britain. Through the second half of 1943 MacArthur's forces moved north along the coast of New Guinea, jumping across to New Britain in December. By the end of March 1944 his forces isolated Rabaul which was left to starve (Miller 1959, Taaffe 1998).

By the end of 1943 American forces were operating on two strategic lines of advance in the Pacific. In March 1944 the JCS directed Admiral Chester Nimitz, commanding the advance in the Central Pacific, to plan an invasion of Formosa and MacArthur to plan an invasion of the Philippines. As the situation developed an invasion of the Philippines proved the more logical. MacArthur's troops landed on Leyte on October 20, 1944 and on Luzon in January 1945 (Cannon 1993). Japanese resistance collapsed by June 1945 (Smith 1993).

While American forces drove west across the Pacific General Joseph Stilwell commanded American troops in the China-Burma-India Theater (CBI). He also served as Chief of Staff to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek, who was officially the Supreme Allied Commander in China. Although a secondary theater of the war, the CBI offered excruciating conditions and a byzantine political situation. Stilwell, who Barbara Tuchman described as "a master tactician, a gifted linguist, and a born teacher," had no illusions about the abilities and motivations of Chiang who, in return, detested Stilwell. Although written over 30 years ago, Tuchman's *Stilwell and the American Experience in China* (1970) remains a valuable overview of Stilwell's actions and America's wartime relationship with China. Webster (2004)

has more recently augmented Tuchman's work and that of the official Army histories (Romanus and Sunderland 1956, 1959, 2002), reiterating Stilwell's skills and innovations in unconventional operations and aerial resupply.

As Stilwell fought Chiang as well as the Japanese, American operations continued in the Pacific. US Marines took Iwo Jima by the end of March 1945. On April 1 the US Tenth Army, commanded by Lieutenant General Simon Bolivar Buckner, Jr., landed on Okinawa, which was secured by the end of June 1945 (Appleman 1993). During the following months the air assault on the Japanese home islands by B-29s from airfields in the Marshalls and Marianas intensified, the Navy tightened its blockade, and US forces prepared for the invasion of Japan. The bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki caused the Japanese to surrender but President Truman's decision to use nuclear weapons remains the most controversial decision of World War II. There is reason to believe that growing tensions with the Soviet Union were a factor in deciding to use the atomic bomb (Alperovitz 1995). Richard Frank's (1999) account of the last months of the Pacific War, based in large part on Japanese sources, suggests, however, that a far more formidable force awaited the invasion on Kyushu than MacArthur's intelligence staff estimated and that the Japanese high command was not overawed by the Hiroshima attack. The second attack on Nagasaki convinced the Emperor to accept surrender, fearing that the Japanese people might overthrow the imperial system if the Americans continued. The two atomic bombs, whatever the reason for their use, ended the war and saved the American troops from an invasion that could very well have failed, possibly forcing a negotiated surrender without an occupation, which was the Japanese objective.

The US Army faced a variety of new challenges with the end of World War II, occupation and military government duties, demobilization, and reorganization being the most immediately demanding. Although the treatment of surrendered German troops has been criticized (Bischof and Ambrose 1992), US occupation policies in both Germany and Japan succeeded in integrating both nations into the post-war order as allies in the developing cold war with the Soviet Union (Peterson 1978, Coles and Weinberg 1992, Ziemke 2003). More complicated, politically and culturally than the occupation of Germany, the occupation of Japan offered Douglas MacArthur an imperial position and authority. The period from 1945 to 1950 saw, perhaps, MacArthur's greatest contribution of his long military career, and the changes wrought by the occupation government continue to affect Japanese domestic and foreign policy today (Takemae 2002).

Ever since S. L. A. Marshall published *Men Against Fire* in 1947 writers have debated the actual quality and performance of individual American combat soldiers in World War II (Marshall 2000b). Marshall persuasively presented his argument that only a small percentage of combat infantrymen actively engaged the enemy. Additionally, Army personnel assignment policies siphoned more proficient inductees into technical services. The authors of general histories of World War II or the US Army often characterize the average infantryman as below average in intelligence and argue that the loss of junior leaders, particularly as units began to close on the Siegfried Line, caused a significant degradation in combat effectiveness



(Millett and Maslowski 1994). The preponderance of the evidence suggests, however, that as individuals (Doubler 1994, Ambrose 1998) and as units (Bonn 1994, Mansoor 1999) these men learned to outfight their opponents even in situations where they did not possess overwhelming technical and logistical superiority. This evidence appears in scores of small unit and personal accounts which also show the ultimate importance of a unit's leadership (Ambrose 1992, MacDonald 1999).

Demobilization plans, which initially presumed a partial reduction and draw-down in Europe prior to Japan's surrender, evolved quickly after August 1945. In a year the Army shrank from 8.2 million men and women to 1.8 million, and to less than 600,000 by 1950. The post-war structure reaffirmed the importance of the National Guard creating a force of 27 infantry divisions, two armored divisions, and more than 50 separate regimental combat teams and separate combat battalions (Weigley 1984). The War Department also created the Air National Guard. The Army's internal reorganization of 1946 was soon followed by the broader reorganization of the nation's defense structure. The National Security Act of 1947, amended two years later, created the Department of Defense, made the US Air Force a separate service, and retained the wartime Joint Chiefs of Staff (Rearden 1984).

For most Americans Hiroshima and Nagasaki showed that future wars would be atomic wars fought by long range bombers, with little need for the Army. This proved not to be the case, however. On June 25, 1950 North Korean forces crossed the 38th Parallel, driving the Republic of Korea (ROK) Army and its American advisors south (Blair 2003). Since occupation and partition into US and Soviet zones in late 1945, the Truman administration had never clarified Korea's place in America's global vision. Nevertheless, when General MacArthur recommended committing combat troops from the occupation force in Japan President Truman immediately agreed. This action was soon sanctioned by the United Nations, the Soviet Union having walked out of discussions, and therefore was not present to cast its veto as a permanent member of the Security Council.

American troops began arriving in Korea from Japan on July 1. Often lacking effective antitank weapons and committed piecemeal from Japan, they were driven south with relative ease by North Korean tanks and infantry into the shrinking perimeter around the port of Pusan (Heller and Stofft 1986, Hanson 2003). In September, US Marines landed far in the North Korean rear at Inchon and US, ROK, and British Commonwealth troops broke out of the encirclement at Pusan. Two weeks later American forces liberated Seoul. By October the objective of liberating South Korea and restoring the border had been achieved and the UN authorized continuation of operations to unify the peninsula. Unprepared to accept a unified Korea that would certainly be an American ally the Peoples' Republic of China (PRC) sent more than 200,000 "volunteers" across the Yalu River, attacking UN forces in strength in November and precipitating a general retreat.

The UN front finally stabilized south of the 38th Parallel in January 1951. General Matthew Ridgeway, newly appointed 8th Army commander, energized dispirited units and by April Ridgeway's main line of resistance was somewhat north of the 38th parallel. Through a series of offensives and counteroffensives

which initially saw UN forces pushed back below the 38th Parallel, Ridgeway eventually established a final defensive line generally north of the original border. What followed was a stalemate, characterized by small unit operations designed to seize local geographical advantage (Marshall 2000b).

Much of the blame for the Army's lack of preparedness in the summer of 1950 can be placed on President Truman (Blair 2003). A desire to keep defense budgets at publically acceptable levels and a belief that the Soviet threat in Europe was the most serious threat facing the United States sent what little money there was to US forces in NATO. General MacArthur, however, can be faulted for not understanding the ramifications of extending the conflict beyond Korea. Increasingly vocal in his opposition to Washington policy, President Truman had no recourse but to relieve MacArthur. The general's claim that there is no substitute for victory, however, resonated with many Americans who could not understand the limited war being fought in Korea. It would take another limited war in Asia to show that Truman's vision was probably the more prudent and effective (Summers 2007).

Shortly before the Korean War began, the National Security Council, in NSC-68, had warned of "local" confrontations with the Soviet Union or its allies. By 1954 Army doctrine addressed "limited war." While massive retaliation in the form of bomber-delivered nuclear weapons was still America's primary strategy for dealing with the Soviet Union, the limited war in Korea caused an increase in Army appropriations and an acknowledgement that national defense required considerably more than strategic bombers.

The Army grew from 660,000 in 1949 to almost 1.6 million in 1952. While the limited war in Korea and the threat of more limited wars around the globe reaffirmed the need for a strong ground force in the Nuclear Age, President Dwight Eisenhower was just as concerned about the budget as Truman had been. Eisenhower's solution was the "New Look." With the Korean armistice agreement in July 1953 defense spending dropped and forces were cut. National defense policy and strategy centered on nuclear weapons which were now in the hands of all the services (Bacevich 1986).

In 1961, when John Kennedy became Commander-in-Chief, the New Look gave way to "Flexible Response." The new Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, moved to implement "Flexible Response" with his Planning-Programming-Budgeting System, a management system that focused on missions but emphasized cost effectiveness. For the Army, Flexible Response meant a reorganization of armored and mechanized divisions to make them more tactically flexible and the development of helicopters and air assault units. The growing threat of Soviet support of "wars of national liberation" resulted in greater interest in counterinsurgency and McNamara gave the Army responsibility for developing counterinsurgency doctrine and units. Planners considered the most serious insurgent threat to be in Latin America, but in late 1961 US Army Special Forces began to operate against the Viet Cong (VC) in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) (Kelly 1991).

Between 1961 and the end of 1963 the American advisory effort in South Vietnam expanded from fewer than 1,000 to 16,000 personnel. The government of Ngo Dinh Diem, however, was not effective or particularly interested in dealing

with the economic and political problems the VC exploited. Diem's death in a coup in early November and Kennedy's assassination three weeks later provided the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong an opportunity they seized. By the end of 1964 the North Vietnamese believed they were close to victory in the south. Responding to North Vietnamese actions against the US Navy in the Gulf of Tonkin and backed by near unanimous Congressional approval of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, President Lyndon Johnson authorized the bombing of North Vietnam. Subsequent attacks on US air bases in South Vietnam provoked commitment of American ground forces, first to provide security and then to conduct ground operations against the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army (NVA).

From the first major ground engagement in the Ia Drang Valley (Heller and Stofft 1986, Moore 2004) Army forces repeatedly proved to be superior to their NVA and VC opponents (Marshall 1982). The arguments that continue about America's ultimate failure in Southeast Asia focus more on what the Army was doing, than how it was doing it (Krepinevich 1986, Summers 2007). In one of the great ironies of the war the disastrous defeat of the NVA and VC 1968 Tet Offensive resulted in a broad-based backlash against the war in the United States and confirmed President Johnson's decision to seek an end to the war.

With the election of Richard Nixon the American strategy became one of "Vietnamization" (Kimball 1998). Nixon intended to pull out of Vietnam but the protracted pullout process deprived soldiers and junior leaders of a readily understandable reason for being in Vietnam (Dawson 1993). Seemingly abandoned by the American public and subject to the same cultural turmoil that faced Americans at home, the Army entered a long night of disillusion (Moskos 1970). In early 1973 President Nixon halted all US combat operations in Vietnam, the Army deactivated Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV), and Congress ended the draft. The Army was in shambles, in the minds of some observers, because of failures in its senior leadership (Gabriel 1978).

The 20 years between the last Army combat operations in Vietnam and the spectacular performance of the Army in the liberation of Kuwait was, perhaps, the greatest period of reform in US Army history. The reform of the 1970s and 1980s was driven more by the end of the draft and the lessons of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War than by the experiences of the Vietnam War (Lock-Pullen 2003, 2006). Led, in large part, by General William DuPuy, the first commander of the Army's Training and Doctrine Command, this reform refocused the Army on mastering the profession of arms from the bottom up, emphasizing the professionalism of both soldiers and officers (Herbert 1988). The result was an exceptionally professional force built around the core vision of fighting a maneuver war in Europe with combined arms heavy divisions.

The three times the Army went into combat between Vietnam and Desert Storm, however, were neither in Europe nor with heavy maneuver divisions. The failure of operations to free Iranian hostages in 1979 (Cogen 2003), and the successful operations in Grenada in 1983 (Cole 1997) and Panama in 1989 (Cole 1995) highlighted continuing problems. The post-Vietnam reforms had ignored low intensity operations, a failure exacerbated by the Carter administration's

significant reduction of American covert and special purpose forces. The Army also demonstrated difficulty operating in a joint service environment.

The liberation of Kuwait in 1991 showed all that had been achieved in the 1970s and 1980s. Nevertheless problems remained. The coordination of units, including those providing air support, on a fast-moving, three-dimensional battlefield is difficult, a problem suggested by the fact that 35 of 122 ground force battle deaths resulted from friendly fire. The difficulty of air-ground synchronization seems to have been the reason that elements of the Iraqi Republican Guard escaped encirclement, not a lack of aggressiveness on the part of VII Corps (Bin, Hill, and Jones 1998). Other problems had surfaced during mobilization. None of the three National Guard "round out" maneuver brigades were sufficiently well-trained to be deployed although National Guard artillery and engineer units fought with distinction. Despite these problems, Gulf War I must be considered one of the US Army's most successful operations in history. It was, however, more the end of an era than the beginning. In the decade after the liberation of Kuwait the Army found itself conducting peacekeeping operations in the former Yugoslavia and Africa. As US operations in Somalia showed, these could be high risk operations whose perceived failure could have significant effects on US policy (Bowden 1999).

Whether the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, "changed everything" for America and the US Army remains to be seen. In October 2001 an American-led coalition moved to depose the Taliban government in Afghanistan for its alleged connections with Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda. In March 2003 US and allied forces invaded Iraq, ostensibly to destroy Iraq's arsenal of chemical weapons and stop attempts to develop biological and nuclear weapons. From the beginning some scholars and Army leaders disagreed with the conflation of the "War on Terrorism" and the war with Iraq (Record 2004b). The invasion of Iraq proceeded without the extended preparation or broad international support that preceded the liberation of Kuwait and without the forces some, among them Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki, thought necessary to complete the task (Gordon and Trainor 2006, Coletta 2007). Nevertheless US Army forces performed well and Iraq's conventional forces were quickly destroyed or dispersed (Atkinson 2004). The collapse of the Iraqi government and infrastructure at all levels created a situation markedly different from that of 10 years before. A strategic vision that some argued was flawed now required an army designed and trained for warfighting to execute internal defense and development operations (Record 2004b, Atkinson 2004).

Despite serious public opposition to American policy in Iraq, the Army as an institution retained the support and respect of the American people. This is one of the great legacies of the Army reforms of the 1970s and 1980s. The other legacy was the professionalization of the Army's reserve components. Expanding missions and lower active duty strength required the Army to rely more and more on its reserve components. No longer was the Army Reserve and National Guard the second line of national defense; they served as a pool of trained units and individuals which augmented the full-time force. It is unclear if this process will continue, or if the world-wide and preemptive nature of the war on terrorism presages an army of imperial scope, stretched thin and fighting on the edge of an American

empire (Morgan 2006). Whatever the future, the first decade of the twenty-first Century, like the first decade of the twentieth, was a period of great transition for the US Army.

#### BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Adamczyk, Richard D., and Morris J. MacGregor, eds. (1992). *United States Army in World War II: Reader's Guide*. Washington: Center of Military History.
- Alperovitz, Gar (1995). *The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb and the Architecture of an American Myth*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Ambrose, Stephen E. (1983–4). *Eisenhower*, 2 vols. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Ambrose, Stephen E. (1992). *Band of Brothers: E Company, 506th Regiment, 101st Airborne from Normandy to Hitler's Eagle's Nest*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Ambrose, Stephen E. (1994). *D-Day June 6, 1944: The Climactic Battle of World War II*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Ambrose, Stephen E. (1998). *Citizen Soldiers: The U.S. Army from the Normandy Beaches to the Bulge to the Surrender of Germany, June 7, 1944–May 7, 1945*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1998.
- Ambrose, Stephen E. (2000). *Eisenhower and Berlin, 1945: The Decision to Halt at the Elbe*. New York: Norton.
- Anders, Leslie (1985). *Gentle Knight: The Life and Times of Major General Edwin Forrest Harding*. Kent, OH: Kent State University Press.
- Appleman, Roy E. (1993). *Okinawa: The Last Battle*. Washington: Center of Military History.
- Atkinson, Rick (2002). *An Army at Dawn: The War in North Africa, 1942–1943*. New York: Henry Holt & Co.
- Atkinson, Rick (2004). *In the Company of Soldiers: A Chronicle of Combat*. New York: Henry Holt & Co.
- Atkinson, Rick (2007). *The Day of Battle: The War in Sicily and Italy, 1943–1944*. New York: Henry Holt & Co.
- Bacevich, A. J. (1986). *The Pentomic Era: The U.S. Army Between Korea and Vietnam*. Washington: National Defense University Press.
- Beaver, Daniel R. (1966). *Newton D. Baker and the American War Effort, 1917–1919*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
- Berlin, Robert H. (1989). *U. S. Army World War II Corps Commanders: A Composite Biography*. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, US Army Command and General Staff College.
- Bin, Alberto, Richard Hill, and Archer Jones (1998). *Desert Storm: A Forgotten War*. Westport, CT: Praeger.
- Birtle, Andrew J. (1997). "The U. S. Army's Pacification of Marinduque, Philippine Islands, April 1900–April 1901," *Journal of Military History*, 61:2 (April), 255–82.
- Bischof, Günter, and Stephen E. Ambrose, eds. (1992). *Eisenhower and the German POWs: Facts Against Falsehood*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.
- Blair, Clay (2003). *The Forgotten War: America in Korea, 1950–1953*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Blumenson, Martin (1969). *Salerno to Cassino*. Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History.
- Blumenson, Martin (1993). *Breakout and Pursuit*. Washington: Center of Military History.

- Blumenson, Martin (2000). *Kasserine Pass: Rommel's Bloody, Climatic Battle for Tunisia*. New York: Cooper Square Press.
- Bonn, Keith E. (1994). *When the Odds Were Even: The Vosges Mountains Campaign, October 1944–January 1945*. Novato, CA: Presidio.
- Bowden, Mark (1999). *Black Hawk Down: A Story of Modern War*. New York: Atlantic Monthly Press.
- Cannon, M. Hamlin (1993). *Leyte: The Return to the Philippines*. Washington: Center of Military History.
- Carter, William Giles Harding (1917). *The Life of Lieutenant General Chaffee*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Chambers, John Whiteclay, II (1987). *To Raise an Army: The Draft Comes to Modern America*. New York: Free Press.
- Clarke, Jeffrey J. (1993). *Riviera to the Rhine*. Washington: Center of Military History.
- Clendenen, Clarence C. (1969). *Blood on the Border: The United States Army and the Mexican Irregulars*. New York: Macmillan.
- Coffman, Edward M. (1968). *The War to End All Wars: The American Military Experience in World War I*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Coffman, Edward M. (2004). *The Regulars: The American Army, 1898–1941*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Cogen, Charles G. (2003). "Desert One and Its Disorders," *Journal of Military History*, 67:1 (January), 201–16.
- Cole, Hugh M. (1993). *The Ardennes: Battle of The Bulge*. Washington: Center of Military History.
- Cole, Ronald H. (1968). *The War to End all Wars: The American Military Experience in World War I*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Cole, Ronald H. (1995). *Operation Just Cause: The Planning and Execution of Joint Operations in Panama, February 1988–January 1990*. Washington: Joint History Office, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- Cole, Ronald H. (1997). *Operation Urgent Fury: The Planning and Execution of Joint Operations in Grenada, 12 October–2 November 1983*. Washington: Joint History Office, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- Coles, Harry L., and Albert K. Weinberg (1992). *Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors*. Washington: Center of Military History.
- Coletta, Damon (2007). "Courage in the Service of Virtue: The Case of General Shinseki's Testimony before the Iraq War," *Armed Forces & Society*, 34:3 (October), 109–21.
- Colley, David P. (2008). *Decision at Strasbourg: Ike's Strategic Mistake to Halt the Sixth Army Group at the Rhine in 1944*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Connaughton, Richard (2001). *MacArthur and Defeat in the Philippines*. New York: Overlook Press.
- Corum, James S. (2003). *Airpower in Small Wars: Fighting Insurgents and Terrorists*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
- Daggett, Aaron S. (1997). *America in the China Relief Expedition*. Nashville, TN: Battery Press.
- Dawson, Joseph G., III, ed. (1993). *Commanders in Chief: Presidential Leadership in Modern Wars*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
- De Weerd, H. A. (1939). "American Adoption of French Artillery 1917–1918," *Journal of the American Military Institute*, 3:2 (Summer), 104–16.
- Dickson, Paul, and Thomas B. Allen (2004). *The Bonus Army: An American Epic*. New York: Walker and Co.



- Doubler, Michael D. (1994). *Closing With the Enemy: How GIs Fought the War in Europe, 1944–1945*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
- Ferrell, Robert H. (2004). *Collapse at Meuse-Argonne: The Failure of the Missouri-Kansas Division*. Columbia: University of Missouri Press.
- Flynn, George Q. (1993). *The Draft, 1940–1973*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
- Frank, Richard B. (1999). *Downfall: The End of the Imperial Japanese Empire*. New York: Random House.
- Gabriel, Richard A. (1978). *Crisis in Command: Mismanagement in the Army*. New York: Hill and Wang.
- Garland, Albert N., and Howard McGaw Smyth (1965). *Sicily and the Surrender of Italy*. Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, US Army.
- Gates, John M. (1973). *Schoolbooks and Krags: The United States Army in the Philippines, 1898–1902*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
- Gillie, Mildred H. (1947). *Forging the Thunderbolt: A History of the Development of the Armored Force*. Harrisburg, PA: Military Service Publishing Co.
- Gordon, Michael R., and Bernard E. Trainor (2006). *Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq*. New York: Pantheon.
- Greene, Fred (1961). "The Military View of American National Policy, 1904–1940," *American Historical Review*, 64:2 (January), 354–77.
- Hamberger, Kenneth (1997). *Learning Lessons in the American Expeditionary Force*, CMH Publication 24-1. Washington: Center of Military History.
- Hanson, Thomas E. (2003). "The Eighth Army's Combat Readiness before Korea: A New Appraisal," *Armed Forces & Society*, 29:2 (Winter), 167–84.
- Heller, Charles E., and William A. Stofft (1986). *America's First Battles, 1776–1965*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
- Herbert, Paul H. (1988). *Deciding What Has to be Done: General William E. DePuy and the 1976 Edition of FM 100–5, Operations*. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, US Army Command & General Staff College.
- Hewes, James (1975). *From Root to McNamara: Army Organization and Administration, 1900–1963*. Washington: Center of Military History.
- Holley, I. B., Jr. (1982). *General John M. Palmer, Citizen Soldiers, and the Army of a Democracy*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
- Howe, George F. (1991). *Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the West*. Washington: Center of Military History.
- Hurst, James W. (2007). *Pancho Villa and Black Jack Pershing: The Punitive Expedition in Mexico*. Westport, CT: Praeger.
- James, D. Clayton (1970–85). *The Years of MacArthur*, 3 vols. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
- Johnson, David E. (1998). *Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers: Innovation in the U.S. Army, 1917–1945*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Johnson, Herbert A. (2001). *Wingless Eagle: U.S. Army Aviation Through World War I*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Keegan, John (1999). *The First World War*. New York: A. Knopf.
- Kelly, Francis J. (1991). *The Green Berets in Vietnam, 1961–71*. Washington: Brassey's.
- Kimball, Jeffrey (1998). *Nixon's Vietnam War*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
- Krepinevich, Andrew F. (1986). *The Army and Vietnam*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Leary, William M. (2004). *We Shall Return!: MacArthur's Commanders and the Defeat of Japan, 1942–1945*. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky.

- Leckie, Robert (1992). *The Wars of America*, new edn. New York: HarperCollins Publishers.
- Lewis, Adrian R. (2001). *Omaha Beach: A Flawed Victory*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Linn, Brian McAllister (1989). *The U.S. Army and Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War, 1899–1902*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Linn, Brian McAllister (1997). *Guardians of Empire: The U.S. Army and the Pacific, 1902–1940*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Linn, Brian McAllister (2000). *The Philippine War, 1899–1902*. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press.
- Lock-Pullen, Richard (2003). “‘An Inward Looking Time’: The United States Army, 1973–1976,” *Journal of Military History*, 67:2 (April), 483–511.
- Lock-Pullen, Richard (2006). *US Intervention Policy and Army Innovation: From Vietnam to Iraq*. New York: Routledge.
- MacDonald, Charles B. (1999). *Company Commander*. Short Hills, NJ: Burford Books.
- Mansoor, Peter R. (1999). *The GI Offensive in Europe: The Triumph of American Infantry Divisions, 1941–1945*. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press.
- March, Peyton C. (1932). *The Nation at War*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, Doran & Co.
- Marshall, S. L. A. (1982). *Vietnam: Three Battles*. New York: De Capo Press.
- Marshall, S. L. A. (2000a [1947]). *Men against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Marshall, S. L. A. (2000b). *Pork Chop Hill: The American Fighting Man in Action, Korea, Spring, 1953*. New York: Berkley Books.
- Matloff, Maurice (1990). *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare 1943–1944*. Washington: Center of Military History.
- Matloff, Maurice, and Edwin M. Snell (1990). *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941–1942*. Washington: Center of Military History.
- Miller, John (1959). *Cartwheel: The Reduction of Rabaul*. Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History.
- Miller, Stuart C. (1982). *“Benevolent Assimilation”: The American Conquest of the Philippines, 1899–1903*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Millett, Allan R., and Peter Maslowski (1994). *For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States of America*, rev. edn. New York: Free Press.
- Moore, Harold G. (2004). *We Were Soldiers Once – and Young: Ia Drang, the Battle that Changed the War in Vietnam*. New York: Ballantine Books.
- Morgan, Matthew J. (2006). “American Empire and the American Military,” *Armed Forces & Society*, 32:2 (January), 202–18.
- Morton, Louis (1993). *The Fall of the Philippines*. Washington: Center of Military History.
- Moskos, Charles C. (1970). *The American Enlisted Man: The Rank and File in Today’s Military*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- Murray, Williamson, and Allan R. Millett (2000). *A War to be Won: Fighting the Second World War*. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press.
- Nenninger, Timothy K. (1978). *The Leavenworth Schools and the Old Army: Education, Professionalism, and the Officer Corps of the United States Army, 1881–1918*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
- Nenninger, Timothy K. (1994). “Leavenworth and its Critics: The U.S. Army Command and General Staff School, 1920–1940,” *Journal of Military History*, 58:2 (April), 199–231.

- Neeninger, Timothy K. (2000). "‘Unsystematic as a Mode of Command’: Commanders and the Process of Command in the American Expeditionary Forces, 1917–1918," *Journal of Military History*, 64:3 (July), 739–68.
- Odom, William O. (1999). *After the Trenches: The Transformation of U.S. Army Doctrine, 1918–1939*. College Station: Texas A&M University Press.
- Pershing, John J. (1931). *My Experiences in the World War*. New York: Frederick A. Stokes Co.
- Peterson, Edward N. (1978). *The American Occupation of Germany: Retreat to Victory*. Detroit: Wayne State University Press.
- Pogue, Forrest C. (1963–87). *George C. Marshall*, 4 vols. New York: Viking Press.
- Rearden, Steven L. (1984). *History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense*, vol. 1: *The Formative Years, 1947–1950*. Washington: Government Printing Office.
- Record, Jeffrey (2004a). *Bounding the Global War on Terrorism*. Honolulu: University Press of the Pacific.
- Record, Jeffrey (2004b). *Dark Victory: America's Second War against Iraq*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Romanus, Charles F., and Riley Sunderland (1956). *Stilwell's Command Problems*. Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History.
- Romanus, Charles F., and Riley Sunderland (1959). *Time Runs Out in CBI*. Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History.
- Romanus, Charles F., and Riley Sunderland (2002). *Stilwell's Mission to China: The China-Burma-India Theater*. Washington: Government Reprints Press.
- Smith, Robert Ross (1993). *Triumph in the Philippines*. Washington: Center of Military History.
- Stewart, Richard W., ed. (2005). *American Military History*, 2 vols. Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History.
- Summers, Harry G. (2007). *On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War*. Mineola, NY: Dover Publications.
- Taaffe, Stephen B. (1998). *MacArthur's Jungle War: The 1944 New Guinea Campaign*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
- Takemae, Eiji (2002). *Inside GHQ: The Allied Occupation of Japan and its Legacy*, trans., and adapted by Robert Ricketts and Sebastian Swann. New York: Continuum.
- Trask, David F. (1993). *The AEF and Coalition Warmaking, 1917–1918*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
- Tuchman, Barbara W. (1970). *Stilwell and the American Experience in China, 1911–45*. New York: Macmillan.
- Upton, Emory (2006). *The Military Policy of the United States*. Cranbury, NJ: Scholars Bookshelf.
- Waller, Douglas (2004). *A Question of Loyalty: Gen. Billy Mitchell and the Court-Martial that Grippped the Nation*. New York: HarperCollins.
- Webster, Donovan (2004). *The Burma Road: The Epic Story of the China-Burma-India Theater in World War II*. New York: Perennial.
- Weigley, Russell F. (1981). *Eisenhower's Lieutenants: The Campaign of France and Germany 1944–1945*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Weigley, Russell F. (1984). *History of the United States Army*, enl. edn. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Wilson, Dale (1989). *Treat 'Em Rough: The Birth of American Armor, 1917–20*. Novato, CA: Presidio.
- Ziemke, Earl F. (2003). *The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany, 1944–1946*. Washington: Army Center of Military History.

## Chapter Twenty-one

# THE US NAVY, 1794–1860: MEN, SHIPS, AND GOVERNANCE

*Christopher McKee*

A visit to any bookstore with a respectable selection of titles in maritime history will demonstrate that writing and reading about the United States Navy continues to focus on traditionally popular themes: battles at sea and biographies of prominent officers. The best of such work includes general histories of the navy's beginnings by William Fowler (1984) and Ian Toll (2006), focused studies of individual wars by Michael Palmer (2000 [1987]) and Frederick Leiner (2006), and lives of Thomas Macdonough (2003) and Oliver Hazard Perry (2006) by David Curtis Skaggs. Despite the typical preference of both publishers and readers for this action-centered approach to the navy's history, and at the risk of becoming niche writers with only cult followings, a small corps of historians continues to examine the underlying organization that made those battles possible and of which the superstar captains and commodores were but the most conspicuous members.

### **Running the Navy**

The foundation work on naval administration is that of Charles Oscar Paullin, an industrious scholar with early access to the full range of the navy's manuscript archives. Paullin's history was originally published as a series of articles in the United States Naval Institute *Proceedings* between 1905 and 1914. Although locating backfiles of the *Proceedings* was sometimes a challenging task, the thoroughness and the excellent reputation of Paullin's work insured that scholars accepted that challenge and returned repeatedly to his essays. Opportunities for consulting Paullin were made easier in 1968 when the Naval Institute reprinted the articles in a single volume as *Paullin's History of Naval Administration* (1968).

Paullin's focus was a tight one on the navy and the Navy Department. If one wishes to widen the historical lens to situate the navy in the larger context of the federal government of which it was a part, that is best accomplished through Leonard D. White's magisterial history of governmental administration at the national level (1948, 1951, 1954). The navy's place within the context of a single

presidential administration is well delineated in Noble E. Cunningham's too-little-appreciated *The Process of Government under Jefferson* (1978). Internal operations of the Navy Department, 1794–1815, with emphasis on the roles of officials subordinate to the secretaries of the navy, are described in the opening chapters of Christopher McKee's history (1991) of the origins of the navy's officer corps. McKee's book also contains the only published discussion of the navy's accounting system. Accounting records are important, because much of the navy's internal and material history only comes to light when money is the subject on the table.

Rounding out the list of major works on administration of the pre-Civil War navy is the multi-author study of the secretaries of the navy edited by Paolo Coletta (1980). At least in the case of the pre-Civil War secretaries, the authors typically limited their research to published sources, such as printed reports to Congress. They made little attempt to explore the pertinent unpublished records of the Navy Department, the manuscript correspondence between the secretaries of the navy and the presidents under whom they served, or the secretaries' personal papers. These deficiencies limit the value of the essays and can lead to superficial or condescending judgments concerning the contributions of the successive secretaries.

The rich manuscript records of the Board of Navy Commissioners, established in 1815 to provide direct professional support to the secretary of the navy in the performance of his administrative duties, and of the bureau system that replaced the commissioners in 1842 have been too-little explored by historians of the US Navy. Linda Maloney made extensive use of the Commissioners' records at the National Archives in her biography of Isaac Hull (1986), as did John Schroeder to a lesser extent in his life of John Rodgers (2006). At least two books are known to be in progress that will begin to reveal the research potential of the manuscript records of the bureaus of Medicine and Surgery and of Yards and Docks, also at the National Archives. But much remains as yet untouched to excite and inspire historians who venture into the volumes and files that are the recorded heritage of the bureaus.

### Who Makes Naval Policy?

Most of these works on administration give some attention to the formation of naval policy, but two books (Smelser 1959, Symonds 1980) focus directly on the topic. Building on a tradition initiated by Harold and Margaret Sprout (1966 [1939]) in the late 1930s, Smelser and Symonds proposed to discover the foundations of United States naval policy in the debates of Congress upon naval subjects. Their approach is premised on the idea that the legislative branch of government has exercised the formative role in shaping naval policy throughout United States history. The relative accessibility of the published Congressional debates on naval policy, in contrast to the better-concealed workings of executive administration, has promoted the Sprout-Smelser-Symonds contention. On the contrary, it is this historian's perception that the initiative and the impetus for the development and nurturing of the navy have almost always come from the executive branch, whatever the superficial appearances. Cunningham (1978) has documented how skillful

President Jefferson was at making executive initiatives look like Congressional ideas – a view shared by Gene A. Smith (1995) – while John Schroeder (2006) argues that John Rodgers and the Board of Navy Commissioners played as significant a role in naval policy formation in the 1815–42 period as did presidents and secretaries of the navy.

### Ships and Shipbuilding

The first writer on the ground in any subject has an advantage which those who follow must work hard to overtake, often unsuccessfully. Of no one in the field of nineteenth-century US naval history is this truer than it is of Howard I. Chapelle (1949) and his work about the design and building of the wooden ships of the sailing navy. Chapelle was an insightful student of ships' plans and a skillful draftsman. His reputation and his work continue to dominate the field. It has proved easier to criticize Chapelle's sailing-navy book (Dunne 1989) than it has to equal or replace it. The one successful attempt is that of Donald L. Canney (2001). Chapelle's primary interest and documentary source was the ships' surviving plans. Canney's scope, narrower than Chapelle's, is sailing vessels built intentionally as warships, either by the navy itself or by contract for the navy. He ignores (most) captured or converted ships as well as smaller vessels, notably the gunboat flotillas. Canney grounds his book on many of the same ship plans as did Chapelle, but (unlike his predecessor) Canney supplements the plans with parallel research in the textual archives. Canney's earlier two volumes (1990, 1993) on the steam warships of 1815–85 are a work of similar method and merit, but of greater scope. All three volumes are essential references for the desk of anyone who studies the nineteenth-century navy.

Other recent work on the ships of the pre-Civil War navy has looked at individual ships or classes of ships. Spencer Tucker's book about the Jefferson-era gunboats (1993) is the best treatment of this controversial subject, one enhanced by excellent new graphic representations of the boats themselves. The frigate *Constitution* is arguably the most famous ship in the history of the US Navy. Tyrone Martin (1997 [1980]), the best-informed scholar on that subject, has written a comprehensive history of her two-hundred year life afloat. *Constellation*, another of the *Constitution*-generation frigates, has provoked a controversy that has often approached the intensity and intolerance of a religious war. Originally launched in 1797, *Constellation* was rebuilt four times – most recently in 1853–4. Is the ship of that name, currently preserved in the harbor at Baltimore, the original vessel? Or is it a totally redesigned sloop of war from the 1850s that incorporates timbers from the first *Constellation*? The skirmishes and battles of this wordy war can be followed in books by Chapelle and Pollard (1970), Sternlicht and Jameson (1977), Wegner (1991), Williams (2000), and Footner (2003). Finally, the growth of interest in, and academic programs supporting, underwater archaeology have begun to impact understanding of the ships of the pre-Civil War navy. Kevin Crisman's work (1987) on the brig *Eagle*, a sunken vessel from Thomas Macdonough's



Lake Champlain squadron, is a strong example of the benefits to be gained from getting out of the library and into the water.

Two other ship-related books stand as unique treatments of their subjects. Virginia Steele Wood (1995 [1981]) explored the use of sea-island live oak in shipbuilding, a volume enhanced by her personal knowledge of the region where these magnificent trees thrive. Spencer Tucker's (1989) comprehensive work on US Navy ordnance of the muzzle-loading era not only has the field to itself, but is (as with his gunboat book) strengthened by graphics of the highest quality.

### Making Officers

It would be hard to overrate the importance of Peter Karsten's *The Naval Aristocracy* (2008 [1972]) in provoking a more critical look at the navy's officer corps than had previously been the fashion. Although *The Naval Aristocracy* is primarily concerned with the post-Civil War force, Karsten's sophisticated analysis of the social origins, socialization, social alliances and intellectual world of the late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century officer corps has had an immense, if often unacknowledged, impact on the practice of naval history in the past four decades. Less salubrious in its effect was Leonard Guttridge and Jay D. Smith's highly popular *The Commodores* (1984 [1969]). Guttridge, who did the archival work in preparation for the book, was an indefatigable and imaginative researcher, but the authors' overly developed penchant for detecting animosity, scandal and conspiracy in the early officer corps has left a generation of readers with the impression of an officer class so dysfunctional that one wonders how its members could have performed as well as they did in combat in the War of 1812. McKee (1991) attempts to provide a more balanced picture of the officer corps of 1794–1815 in a book addressed to the question: How did the United States, a new nation in 1794, develop a navy that gave so impressive a showing for itself in the 1812 conflict? McKee sought to move beyond the big-name captains and commodores who have dominated the historians' stage and bring forward the younger officers who contributed so much to the navy's success and reputation. Karsten's and McKee's books are traditional social history, as that discipline was practiced in the latter years of the twentieth century. A different look is offered by Donald Chisholm (2001); he brings the insights and methods of social science to bear on the development of the navy's officer personnel system, which he interprets as a problem-solving process carried out by those charged with the direction of the nation's navy.

Education of midshipmen in the period before the establishment of the United States Naval Academy is the subject of a thoroughly researched work by Henry L. Burr (1939). Unfortunately, Burr's book appeared as a printed dissertation in a small edition, copies are all but impossible to locate, and his work has not had the impact on subsequent historians that it deserved. The transition in training the navy's future officers from primarily on-the-job shipboard education to a more land-based academic curriculum is the subject of Charles Todorich's history (1984) of the Naval Academy from its founding in 1845 to the outbreak of the Civil War.

Todorich covers this subject well, drawing on the ample archival resources available. However, he makes no attempt to develop this story as a part of the larger history of higher education in the antebellum United States. Mark C. Hunter (2006) argues that it was as much the summer cruises as the training ashore that influenced the professional development of the naval officer corps prior to the Civil War.

### The Lower Deck

To date no book directly addresses the subject of the pre-Civil War navy's before-the-mast sailors and petty officers. McKee (1991) devotes three chapters to various aspects of officer relations with the enlisted force, but necessarily from the officer perspective. *Union Jacks* by Michael Bennett (2004) offers an in-depth social portrait of the Civil War navy's enlisted corps. The extent to which Bennett's analysis can be applied to the pre-1861 navy is an open question. Bennett's sources are heavily slanted toward the diaries and memoirs of men who entered the greatly expanded wartime navy directly from civilian life. These may not yield an accurate sense of the experience and attitudes of the long-service sailors who were the backbone of the navy's enlisted force in the earlier years of the nineteenth century. *Union Jacks* projects a dark picture of the Civil War enlisted experience, a view that could be open to future revision.

Even if naval history lacks work with an exclusive focus on the navy's lower deck, much can be learned about men of enlisted ranks from studies that examine the larger US maritime workforce from which the navy's sailors were drawn. A pioneering demographic profile by Ira Dye (1976), based on his discovery of the Philadelphia seamen's protection certificates at the National Archives, set the stage for much of the work that has followed. Playing off the two meanings of the word *liberty* in the maritime world, Paul Gilje (2004) offers a synthesis of pre-Civil War maritime culture, afloat and ashore, drawn from years of dedicated research in diaries, autobiographies, court records and writings of would-be reformers. A possible Achilles' heel of Gilje's portrait is his heavy dependence on sailor autobiography. These narratives were typically published in tiny editions by small-town printers. In some cases they are complete fabrications – often cleverly disguised as the real thing by unknown authors who seemingly possessed insider knowledge of the navy. Historians have yet to address directly the question of whether, or to what extent, such autobiographies are an accurate barometer of lower-deck mentalité. Jeffrey Bolster (1997) offers the first comprehensive examination of the role of Black Americans in both the navy and the merchant service. Bolster's work is buttressed by impeccable statistical and documentary evidence, but the nature of the surviving sources is such that he could, for the most part, provide only snapshots of individual African American seafarers at particular points in their lives, rather than being able to follow them over the entire life course. Tattoos offer historians a promising key to unlocking that elusive sailor mentalité. Once again Dye (1989) has been the pioneer, with Simon Newman (2003) expanding on Dye's insights in an essay, "Seafaring Bodies."

### Discipline, Reform, and New Problems

The fascination of corporal punishment at sea – at once compelling and repellant – has assured the subject of naval discipline a dependable supply of historians and readers. Here the dominant interpretation is that of James Valle (1980). His ever-popular *Rocks & Shoals* examines pre-Civil War naval discipline primarily through voluminous naval court-martial transcripts at the National Archives. Valle's work would have been stronger if he had investigated other series of archival records that supplement, correct, and expand the information contained in the court-martial transcripts. Histories of discipline in other eighteenth- and nineteenth-century navies, published since Valle completed his work, now make a multi-nation comparison possible and would add an important dimension to the story that Valle tells. McKee (1991) presents a revisionist interpretation of the role of corporal punishment and other forms of discipline in the navy of 1798–1815. His is a potentially controversial view that has thus far failed to provoke debate on the subject.

Valle (and other historians) do not always distinguish clearly between legislation governing the navy, enacted by Congress and approved by the president, and administrative regulations issued by the Navy Department with presidential approval. The best guide to the successive revisions of these two categories of authority remains the 1947 article by Louis Bolander. Sixty years of additional scholarship has revealed only one necessary amendment to Bolander's comprehensive record: the 1798 *Marine Rules and Regulations*, issued while the navy was still under the administrative control of the War Department. This compilation is described in detail by McKee (1991).

The remaining strand of writing about naval discipline takes as its theme *reform*: the campaign to abolish corporal punishment. Here the masterwork is that of Harold Langley (1967). This comprehensive and thoroughly-researched book also studies the ultimately successful effort by reformers to abolish the daily grog ration so eagerly anticipated by men of the lower deck. Myra Glenn (1984) situates the drive against corporal punishment in the navy in the broader context of concurrent campaigns to prohibit the corporal punishment of other classes of American citizens: children, women, and persons consigned to the nation's prisons. An unfortunate consequence of both Langley's and Glenn's books is to create the impression that the humane treatment of sailors has triumphed and all is now well in the world of naval discipline. How the navy maintained discipline in a post-flogging world, and what problems the loss of this traditional sanction may have created for the navy are questions largely unrecognized and wholly uninvestigated. One consequence of the abolition of flogging was its replacement with other forms of physical brutality scarcely more humane. In the longer term the loss of the ability to inflict immediate physical punishment led to the creation of a system of naval prisons for the extended detention of scofflaws – institutions that would have seemed as incomprehensible to the sailing navy's punish-and-be-done-with-it leadership as frigates with wheels.

### Health, Sickness and the Practice of Medicine

Medicine in the nineteenth-century United States Navy offers a particularly promising field for future historical investigation. Here two historian-pioneers have taken markedly different approaches to this rich subject. Worth Estes (1998) used the detailed medical records maintained by Surgeon Peter St. Medard during the 1802–3 cruise of the frigate *New York* to create a comprehensive picture of illness, injury and death during one voyage. It would be a mistake to extrapolate a comprehensive profile of morbidity and mortality in the early navy from this one set of records. Unpublished exploratory probes by the present writer suggest that health and sickness differed from ship to ship according to the parts of the world visited and other as-yet-undiscovered variables. Langley's equally original research into the navy's medical history (1995) looks at health and its absence from the perspective of the navy's doctors and the bureaucracy that supported them. The works of both these historians scarcely begin to open up the treasures lurking in the documentary records of the navy's Bureau of Medicine and Surgery at the National Archives – records that offer the potential for a comprehensive examination of health, sickness and death at sea.

### And Finally ...

Unlike many other fields of history, the study of the pre-Civil War navy – the *Constellation* controversy aside – has been marked by little debate among its practitioners. The work as a whole is based on solid archival research, is well written and enhances understanding of the national maritime defense force in its origins and its formative years. That is no small achievement. But the absence of debate is puzzling, especially with respect to subjects such as corporal punishment or shipboard alcohol, topics about which the documentary evidence can support divergent conclusions. Equally of concern is the failure of historians of the nineteenth-century US Navy to expand their horizons with multi-navy comparative studies. Wearing single-navy blinders robs history of insight-provoking comparisons and fosters misleading perceptions of uniqueness. The most recent multi-nation study of early or mid-nineteenth-century navies written by an American historian is James Phinney Baxter's *Introduction of the Ironclad Warship*. That book was published in – 1933.

Naval biography, a sub-discipline that deserves an essay of its own, is a field in need of fresh energy and new vision. The best work is well represented by Linda Maloney's superb life of Isaac Hull (1986). Biographies that are poorly researched and merely celebratory only occasionally find their way into print. But the typical naval officer-life – and officers have been the sole subjects of naval biography – has grown formulaic and predictable. Research is based on the traditional sources: letters and diaries. Accounting records, ships' regulations, or punishment books, all of which could yield valuable new information and fresh understandings, go

unexplored. Books by Chisholm (2001) and Skaggs (2003) have demonstrated the benefits to be gained when the intellectual tools of other disciplines – organizational theory and command doctrine – are employed to illuminate historical topics. Their example should energize emulators.

Apart from the pioneering work on Jesse D. Elliott by Lawrence Friedman and David Skaggs (1990), the vital insights of clinical psychology, which have inspired the work of historians such as John Demos and Peter Gay in other fields, remain unapplied to naval biography. A case in point is Ira Dye's biography of Uriah P. Levy (2006). During his career Levy repeatedly and seriously misrepresented the facts of his early life and seafaring career. He may even have believed his self-created myths. Dye's work is filled with valuable new information about the navy between the War of 1812 and the Civil War; but the author declined to confront directly a crucial issue for any Levy biographer: the man's reliance on deception about his past. If Dye had explored the insights of psychology concerning liars and lying, he might have been able to explain Levy's behavior and understand other aspects of his subject's difficult personality.

For the historian or the biographer who is prepared to search for untold stories, who is willing to endure the challenges of exploring until-now-ignored records, and who is prepared to bring fresh perspectives and different – yes, even controversial – methods to the work, the history of the nineteenth-century United States Navy still offers exciting opportunities.

#### BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Baxter, James Phinney (2001 [1933]). *The Introduction of the Ironclad Warship*. Reprinted, with an introduction by Donald L. Canney; Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Bennett, Michael J. (2004). *Union Jacks: Yankee Sailors in the Civil War*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Bolander, Louis H. (1947). "A History of Regulations in the United States Navy," *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, 73 (November), 1355–61.
- Bolster, W. Jeffrey (1997). *Black Jacks: African American Seamen in the Age of Sail*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Burr, Henry L. (1939). *Education in the Early Navy: A Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Education*. Philadelphia: Temple University.
- Canney, Donald L. (1990, 1993). *The Old Steam Navy, 1815–1885*, 2 vols. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Canney, Donald L. (2001). *Sailing Warships of the US Navy*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Chapelle, Howard I. (1949). *The History of the American Sailing Navy: The Ships and Their Development*. New York: Norton.
- Chapelle, Howard I., and Leon D. Pollard (1970). *The Constellation Question*. Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press.
- Chisholm, Donald (2001). *Waiting for Dead Men's Shoes: Origins and Development of the U.S. Navy's Officer Personnel System, 1793–1941*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Coletta, Paolo E., ed. (1980). *American Secretaries of the Navy*, 2 vols. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.

- Crisman, Kevin J. (1987). *The Eagle: An American Brig on Lake Champlain during the War of 1812*. Shelburne, VT: New England Press.
- Cunningham, Noble E. (1978). *The Process of Government under Jefferson*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Dunne, W. M. P. (1989). "An Inquiry into H. I. Chapelle's Research in Naval History," *The American Neptune*, 49:1 (Winter), 39–58.
- Dye, Ira (1976). "Early American Merchant Seafarers," *American Philosophical Society Proceedings*, 120:5 (October), 331–60.
- Dye, Ira (1989). "The Tattoos of Early American Seafarers, 1796–1818," *American Philosophical Society Proceedings*, 133:4 (December), 520–554.
- Dye, Ira (2006). *Uriah Levy: Reformer of the Antebellum Navy*. Gainesville: University Press of Florida.
- Estes, J. Worth (1998). *Naval Surgeon: Life and Death at Sea in the Age of Sail*. Canton, MA: Science History Publications.
- Footner, Geoffrey M. (2003). *USS Constellation: From Frigate to Sloop of War*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Fowler, William M. (1984). *Jack Tars and Commodores: The American Navy, 1783–1815*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
- Friedman, Lawrence J., and David Curtis Skaggs (1990). "Jesse Duncan Elliott and the Battle of Lake Erie: The Issue of Mental Stability," *Journal of the Early Republic*, 10:4 (Winter), 493–516.
- Gilje, Paul A. (2004). *Liberty on the Waterfront: American Maritime Culture in the Age of Revolution*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Glenn, Myra C. (1984). *Campaigns against Corporal Punishment: Prisoners, Sailors, Women, and Children in Antebellum America*. Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Guttridge, Leonard F., and Jay D. Smith (1984 [1969]). *The Commodores: The U.S. Navy in the Age of Sail*. Reprinted, with an introduction by James C. Bradford; Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Hunter, Mark C. (2006). "The U.S. Naval Academy and Its Summer Cruises: Professionalization in the Antebellum U.S. Navy, 1845–1861," *Journal of Military History*, 70:4 (October), 963–94.
- Karsten, Peter (2008 [1972]). *The Naval Aristocracy: The Golden Age of Annapolis and the Emergence of Modern American Navalism*. Reprinted, with a foreword by Donald Chisholm and a new preface by the author; Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Langley, Harold D. (1967). *Social Reform in the United States Navy, 1798–1862*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
- Langley, Harold D. (1995). *A History of Medicine in the Early U.S. Navy*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Leiner, Frederick C. (2006). *The End of Barbary Terror: America's 1815 War against the Pirates of North Africa*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- McKee, Christopher (1991). *A Gentlemanly and Honorable Profession: The Creation of the U.S. Naval Officer Corps, 1794–1815*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Maloney, Linda M. (1986). *The Captain from Connecticut: The Life and Naval Times of Isaac Hull*. Boston: Northeastern University Press.
- Martin, Tyrone G. (1997 [1980]). *A Most Fortunate Ship: A Narrative History of Old Ironsides*, rev. edn. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Newman, Simon P. (2003). *Embodied History: The Lives of the Poor in Early Philadelphia*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.



- Palmer, Michael A. (2000 [1987]). *Stoddert's War: Naval Operations during the Quasi-War with France, 1798–1801*. Reprinted, with a new introduction by the author; Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Paullin, Charles Oscar (1968). *Paullin's History of Naval Administration, 1775–1911: A Collection of Articles from the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*. Annapolis, MD: US Naval Institute.
- Schroeder, John H. (2006). *Commodore John Rodgers: Paragon of the Early American Navy*. Gainesville: University Press of Florida.
- Skaggs, David Curtis (2003). *Thomas Macdonough: Master of Command in the Early U.S. Navy*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Skaggs, David Curtis (2006). *Oliver Hazard Perry: Honor, Courage, and Patriotism in the Early U.S. Navy*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Smelser, Marshall (1959). *The Congress Founds the Navy, 1787–1798*. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.
- Smith, Gene A. (1995). *For the Purposes of Defense: The Politics of the Jeffersonian Gunboat Program*. Newark: University of Delaware Press.
- Sprout, Harold, and Margaret Sprout (1966 [1939]). *The Rise of American Naval Power, 1776–1918*. Reprinted, with a new introduction by the authors; Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Sternlicht, Sanford V., and Edwin M. Jameson (1977). *U.S.F. Constellation: "Yankee Racehorse."* Cockeysville, MD: Liberty Publishing Co.
- Symonds, Craig L. (1980). *Navalists and Antinavalists: The Naval Policy Debate in the United States, 1785–1827*. Newark: University of Delaware Press.
- Todorich, Charles (1984). *The Spirited Years: A History of the Antebellum Naval Academy*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Toll, Ian W. (2006). *Six Frigates: The Epic History of the Founding of the U.S. Navy*. New York: Norton.
- Tucker, Spencer C. (1989). *Arming the Fleet: U.S. Navy Ordnance in the Muzzle-Loading Era*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Tucker, Spencer C. (1993). *The Jeffersonian Gunboat Navy*. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.
- Valle, James E. (1980). *Rocks & Shoals: Order and Discipline in the Old Navy, 1800–1861*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Wegner, Dana M. (1991). *Fouled Anchors: The Constellation Question Answered*. Bethesda, MD: David Taylor Research Center.
- White, Leonard D. (1948). *The Federalists: A Study in Administrative History*. New York: Macmillan.
- White, Leonard D. (1951). *The Jeffersonians: A Study in Administrative History, 1801–1829*. New York: Macmillan.
- White, Leonard D. (1954). *The Jacksonians: A Study in Administrative History, 1829–1861*. New York: Macmillan.
- Williams, Glenn F. (2000). *USS Constellation: A Short History of the Last All-Sail Warship Built by the U.S. Navy*. Virginia Beach, VA: Donning Co.
- Wood, Virginia Steele (1995 [1981]). *Live Oaking: Southern Timber for Tall Ships*. Reprinted; Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.

## Chapter Twenty-two

---

# THE US NAVY, 1860–1920

*Kurt H. Hackemer*

Although he was referring to the admirals of his day when Secretary of War Henry Stimson described the Navy Department as “a dim religious world in which Neptune was God, Mahan his prophet, and the United States Navy the only true church,” the same might have been said about much of the naval history written in decades past (Crowl 1986: 444). During the six decades bracketed by the American Civil War and World War I, the US Navy was transformed from a relatively small defense-oriented institution with fewer than 50 ships in service into a battleship-centric fighting force able to compete with any other navy in the world. For decades, much of the navy’s history was presented in terms of ships and operations, focusing on the rise of the ironclads in the Civil War, the commerce protection mission of the 1870s and 1880s, the birth of the New Navy in the 1880s, its ascension to the world stage during the War with Spain, and the emergence of a world-class battle fleet by the end of World War I. Fortunately, the study of American naval history from 1860–1920 has grown to encompass far more than Stimson’s famous declaration. Over the last 30 years, historians have made great strides in understanding the navy’s enlisted men and officers, efforts to professionalize the service that mirrored what was happening elsewhere in American society, technical challenges of building a modern fleet and the resulting precursors of the military-industrial complex, and the advent of a corpus of strategic thought that would direct the navy’s actions for much of the twentieth century. Selected areas remain ripe for further work, but the field now reflects the breadth of scholarship that characterizes the larger historical profession.

The navy’s Civil War transformation from a small force dispersed around the globe in support of American commerce to perhaps the best navy in the world for coastal defense and riverine operations had a profound impact on its physical, organizational, professional, and technological development through World War I. The number of ships in commission grew from 42 in 1860 to over 600 by late 1864, with new construction reflecting the latest advances in steam engineering, large-bore ordnance, armor plate, and ship design (Tomblin 1988, Canney 1990, 1993). The conflict dramatically accelerated the emerging relationship between

the navy and American industry as the service was forced to look beyond its own shipyards to build the enormous fleet required to win the war (Koistinen 1996, Roberts 2002). Beyond shipbuilding, however, much work on the navy's mobilization of resources remains to be done, with a naval equivalent to Mark Wilson's *The Business of Civil War* (2006) yet to be written.

Blockading the Confederacy took a preponderance of the navy's men and ships, which has led to a longstanding historical debate over that effort's effectiveness. Most scholarship has focused on calculating the number or percentage of ships that succeeded in running the blockade, on determining the extent to which matériel slipped past Federal patrols, and on assessing the impact of the blockade on the Confederacy's ability to sustain the war effort (Wise 1988, Underwood 2007), but recent work suggests that the blockade's disruption of the South's transportation network of rivers, railroads, coastal shipping, and blue water vessels was far more important to the conflict's outcome (Surdam 2001). Determining the extent to which that economic disruption resulted from the blockade requires further study into the interconnectedness between the two, but it does potentially recast our understanding of the reasons for Confederate defeat. On the opposite side of the blockade, much is known about the North and South Atlantic Blockading Squadrons (Browning 1993, 2002), but the East and West Gulf Blockading Squadrons have not yet received their due.

Popular attention, though, has always been captivated by the ironclads. The British and French navies had them just prior to the American Civil War, but it was the Union that first deployed significant numbers and tested them in combat (Baxter 2001 [1968]). Most Americans and Europeans alike saw ironclads as technological marvels and placed undue confidence in their impact on the war (Mindell 2000, Fuller 2008). In actual practice, they were not the panacea many hoped for, which led to their use under questionable circumstances, such as in attacks against forts in Charleston Harbor (Weddle 2005). In *Iron Afloat* William Still (1971) systematically analyzes how the Confederacy employed its ironclad warships, but how the Union chose to deploy and use the variety of ironclads it built over the course of the war has been explored only at the theater level – by John Milligan in *Gunboats Down the Mississippi* (1965), Gary D. Joiner in *Mr. Lincoln's Brown Water Navy* (2007), William C. Davis in *Duel Between the First Ironclads* (1975) and Jack D. Coombe in *Thunder Along the Mississippi* (1996), *Gunfire Along the Gulf* (1999) and *Gunsmoke Over the Atlantic* (2002). At the same time, the crisis was such that the Union Navy pressed into service all wooden vessels laid up in ordinary (i.e., in reserve); leased, purchased, and converted wooden vessels, especially for use in the Mississippi River system (Smith 2008); and constructed and deployed new wooden vessels (Silverstone 1989).

The advent of ironclad, steam-powered warships and increase in the size of the navy led to the first significant administrative changes in the service since the Bureau System replaced the Board of Navy Commissioners in 1842. In July 1861 Congress created the position of Assistant Secretary of the Navy at the request of Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles and charged Gustavus Fox, who held the position until it was abolished in 1868, with overseeing Navy contracts with ship-

builders and the Navy's legal business. In July 1862 the number of bureaus was expanded from five to eight when the duties of the Bureau of Ordnance and Hydrography were divided between the new Bureau of Ordnance and the Bureau of Navigation; those of the Bureau of Construction, Equipment, and Repairs were divided between the new Bureau of Equipment and Recruiting, the Bureau of Construction and Repair, and the Bureau of Steam Engineering. Paullin (1968) provides essential context, Canney (1998) describes the changes, and John Niven's (1973) biography of Welles contains some information on the reorganization as do Welles' published diaries (1960) and Fox's papers (1918–19), but a comprehensive administrative history of the Union navy remains to be written.

The men who crewed the navy's warships have been examined in the context of race, location, and the peculiar hierarchy of shipboard life, but a synopsis that marries the multiple environments in which they served and fought with the relatively confined caste-like system in which they lived has yet to be written (Canney 1998, Ringle 1998, Ramold 2002, Bennett 2004).

Several officers have received modern biographies. These include Dudley Cornish's (1986) study of Samuel Phelps Lee, Robert Schneller's (1996, 2002) of John A. Dahlgren and David Farragut, Chester Hearn's (1996, 1998) of David Dixon Porter and David Farragut, James Duffy's (1997) of David Farragut, Spencer Tucker's (2000) of Andrew Foote, Kevin Weddle's (2005) of Samuel DuPont, Jay Slagle's (1996) of Seth Ledyard Phelps, and Robert Johnson's (1968) of John Rodgers. Essays in Jim Dan Hill's *Sea Dogs of the Sixties* (1961) trace the careers of eight Civil War officers. James Bradford's *Captains of the Old Steam Navy* (1986) contains interpretive essays on a dozen officers who served in the mid-nineteenth century.

President Abraham Lincoln's interaction with his army commanders has received attention, but only recently has his relationship with naval leaders received similar analysis. Stephen R. Taaffe's *Commanding Lincoln's Navy* (2009) agrees with past authors who have characterized the president as delegating most authority over naval affairs, including the selection of squadron commanders, to Secretary Welles who in consultation with Gustavus Fox is depicted as making the basic personnel and strategic decisions of the naval war. Ari Higginbotham's (2008) biography of Fox emphasizes the under secretary's role not just in contracting for ships and the operation of navy yards, but also in the execution of the blockade and planning of expeditions against southern ports and fortifications. While not minimizing the roles of Welles and Fox, Craig Symonds (2008) shows that Lincoln was forced by circumstances to become more active in naval affairs than he would have preferred; that he took a direct role in the selection of commanders, in planning strategy, and in fostering technological innovation, a role that increased as the war progressed and the self-taught president became more confident of his knowledge of naval affairs.

The United States had a tradition of dramatically reducing its military after fighting major wars, and the Civil War was no exception. By 1868, congressional appropriations had been slashed, which required significant cuts in manpower and ships in commission. The navy entered what many historians later called "the doldrums" or the "Dark Ages." New ship construction and its associated innovation ground to a halt even as European navies embarked on an ambitious flurry

of expansion and experimentation. Civil War-era cruisers and monitors remained the backbone of the fleet even as they were rapidly outclassed by new designs and technologies, and the navy rapidly fell from the world's premier coastal defense force to relative insignificance. In the long run, this proved expedient for a country focused more on internal than external expansion and shifted the financial burden of experimentation to other countries, but it was a difficult time to be an American naval officer (Buhl 1984). Those men have been relatively well studied in Peter Karsten's (1972) collective portrait of the officer corps as a "strategic elite" shaped by common experiences and homogenous ideals, though individual officers of the 1865–95 era have been the subject of few analytical biographies, the main exceptions being Benjamin Isherwood (Sloan 1966), John Rodgers (Johnson 1968) and Robert Shufeldt (Drake 1984).

Without modern warships, adequate funding, or the respect of their international peers, the navy's officer corps was forced to look inward for professional development. As the 1873 *Virginian* Affair so aptly demonstrated, the navy was incapable of conducting fleet maneuvers (many of the ships ordered to rendezvous at Key West in a show of force proved to be barely seaworthy), but its officers could begin thinking about their ideal fleet in the abstract. The creation of the United States Naval Institute and its *Proceedings* that same year provided an open forum for debate and discussion. Information about the technical and organizational prowess of the world's navies was systematically collected for the first time with the creation of the Office of Naval Intelligence in 1882 (Dowart 1979). 1884 saw the founding of the Naval War College, an institution devoted to the professional education of the navy's finest officers and the study of squadron and fleet tactics. It was the first institution of its kind for naval officers and was soon copied by the world's naval powers (Albion 1980; Hattendorf, Simpson, and Wadleigh 1984; Apt 1997). The ideas generated by those officers and the actions that they, and their supporters, took to build public and political support for the navy is the subject of Mark Shulman's *Navalism and the Emergence of American Sea Power* (1995).

Alfred Thayer Mahan's lectures at the Naval War College led to his publication of *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660–1783* (1890), which transformed the way nations thought about their fleets and contributed to the emerging global naval arms race. Mahan argued that a strong navy, a prerequisite for global economic power, required maintenance of a battle fleet capable of retaining command of the sea against all foes. His writings exerted enormous influence on policy makers worldwide, but historians still debate just how significant of a strategic thinker he was. Julian Corbett and Halford Mackinder have long been viewed as more prescient thinkers, but Mahan has made something of a comeback in recent years (Kennedy 1976, Crowl 1986, Goldrick and Hattendorf 1993, Hattendorf 2001, Sumida 1997). The true extent of his influence remains an open debate and deserves further consideration.

By the time Mahan became a public figure, the navy had started the kind of physical rebirth required to put his theories into practice. The combination of surplus tariff revenue, a more pliable Congress and concerns about protecting American commerce overseas created the right conditions for the first significant shipbuilding

program since the Civil War. The navy convened an advisory board in 1881, which recommended an unrealistic building program of 120 ships over eight years. Although its proposal was quickly rejected, the board's suggestion that future construction be manufactured of steel rather than wood or iron had a lasting impact. A second advisory board that met the following year recommended building five ships rather than 120 and reiterated the call for modern steel construction. On March 3, 1883, Congress agreed that it was time to begin rebuilding the navy, authorizing funds for four modern warships and requiring that the steel used in their construction be domestically manufactured. The three cruisers and one dispatch boat that emerged from this appropriation were the *Atlanta*, *Boston*, *Chicago*, and *Dolphin*, more famously known as the ABCD ships. They were the harbingers of the New Steel Navy that would vault the United States to world prominence by World War I.

The navy was thrilled to get its new warships but faced the daunting problem that no American firm had ever built vessels of that type. Fortunately, it had some idea of how to begin the process, for while the navy had no experience building steel warships it did have a history of working with private manufacturers to introduce new technologies into the fleet. In that sense, steel was conceptually similar to the steam power plants of the 1850s and the ironclads of the 1860s. The navy turned to its network of proven contractors and managed the process much as it had in decades past (Hackemer 2001). There were obvious problems, with the first casualty being the bankruptcy of the contractor who received all four of the ABCD contracts, but modernizing the fleet to reflect America's expanding international presence became such a national priority that the navy forged ahead. Congressional appropriations expanded throughout the 1880s and 1890s, resulting in a balanced fleet initially well-suited for coastal defense and commerce raiding but later augmented with warships better able to participate in Mahanian fleet engagements.

The United States, which had all but ignored technical innovations in hull, armor, ordnance, and power plant design in the preceding decades, had to make up for lost time. In one sense, the reticence of the postwar period was a good thing; the navy's improved intelligence capability gave it a solid understanding of which innovations should be adopted or avoided. However, the navy's protracted lack of experimentation meant that the practical issues of armor and ordnance manufacturing became problematic. Generous infrastructure subsidies were awarded to the private companies engaged in this work, but technical problems resulted in cost overruns, delivery delays, and periodic congressional consideration of government-owned armor plants and foundries (Cooling 1979). Despite the sometimes acrimonious relationship between the navy and private industry, American companies benefited from these contracts. Subsidies helped upgrade their physical plants, cutting-edge fabrication techniques could be applied to civilian goods, and the contracts themselves helped corporations survive periodic economic downturns. The economic importance of naval rearmament to individual steel companies is relatively well understood, but the question of the larger impact on the American economy needs to be explored in more than a general way (Koistinen 1997). Government contracts were the only financial constant for corporations that had a disproportionate impact on the economy as a whole, and the



extent to which those contracts affected the larger economy is fertile ground for future scholarship.

The building of the New Steel Navy took place in the context of a longstanding debate about America's role in world affairs. The navy had traditionally been the nation's primary means of projecting power abroad, so discussions about what kinds of warships to build triggered a corresponding dialogue about foreign policy. From 1883 to 1890, the largest warships built were cruisers like the USS *Olympia*, both protected and unprotected, that were suitable for commerce protection and raiding (Cooling 2000). The *Oregon*-class battleships, authorized in 1890 as Mahan popularized the concept of a battle line, carried ordnance and armor similar to that found on European competitors but were deliberately limited in range and classified as coastal defense battleships (Sternlicht 1977). The acquisition of overseas territories, in the wake of the War with Spain, the prospect of defending those territories and analysis of the fleet's wartime performance all had an impact on American warship design. Battleships became even more central to the fleet and no longer had their range intentionally limited (Reckner 1988). Indeed, during the first decade of the twentieth century, the Navy played a key role in Theodore Roosevelt's foreign policy, in the Venezuelan Crisis, 1902–3; Panamanian Independence, 1903; the Morocco-Periaris Incident, 1904; and in the cruise of the Great White Fleet, 1907–9 (Hendrix 2009).

Making the transition to ships that were equal to the best built anywhere in the world fostered a contentious debate about design issues within the navy's officer corps. The bureaus, which were dominated by more conservative officers who entered service before the advent of the New Steel Navy, found themselves at odds with younger line officers who were more technologically proficient and had benefited from the advanced professional training and higher level thinking provided by the Naval War College. These younger officers were frustrated by technological change that seemed to be more driven by bureaucratic self-interest and inertia rather than pragmatic design principles (McBride 2000). Frustration over design was symptomatic of the discontent that had been building for decades with the navy's bureau system and the longstanding rift between line officers and engineers. Although the bureaus had been reorganized during the Civil War, their authority was essentially unchanged since their founding in 1842, and the 1899 merger of the line and engineering corps did little to relieve this tension (Abrahamson 1981, Chisholm 2001).

The creation of the General Board of the Navy in 1900 put strategic planning outside the bureaus' purview, but they remained powerful autonomous entities. A small group of officers began actively scheming for a new position held by a line officer that would supersede both the bureaus and the Secretary of the Navy. Secretary Josephus Daniels countered this proposal with a watered-down version of his own, and the Chief of Naval Operations was created in early 1915 with no authority over the bureaus, no staff, and lacking the highest rank in the navy. Still, this was an important change, because for the first time the navy had an officer charged with coordinating planning and resources and the position's authority and influence would grow over time (Albion 1980, Klachko and Trask 1987). Historians understand how these individual entities functioned (Spector 1974, Godin

2006). What is needed now is a synthesis that further explores the relationship between the Naval War College, the General Board (and the Joint Army–Navy Board as well), and the Chief of Naval Operations in the context of continued tensions with the existing bureau system.

Warship design and force structure continued to modernize along with the navy's bureaucracy, with both advancing significantly during the Roosevelt administration. HMS *Dreadnought* revolutionized naval architecture when it debuted as the world's first all-big-gun battleship in 1906, but a similar design was already on the drawing boards in the United States and would appear in tangible form as the *Michigan*-class battleships in 1909. The fleet that the *Michigans* joined had changed and grown significantly since the War with Spain. The General Board proposed its General Naval Scheme in 1903 with the avowed goal of making the United States Navy the world's second largest after that of Great Britain, but the plan was rejected by both President Theodore Roosevelt and Congress. Construction continued at a slower pace than that envisioned by the General Board but still fast enough that the United States was second only to Great Britain in terms of capital ships before 1910. Reflecting the influence of Mahanian strategy, the navy's longstanding squadrons were consolidated into the Atlantic, Asiatic and Pacific Fleets in 1907 for better coordination. Geopolitical uncertainties led to the Navy Act of 1916, which authorized construction of a "navy second to none" to meet whatever threats the United States might face at the end of World War I (Baer 1994).

That navy, however, would not be built, for the United States found itself drawn into World War I in early 1917. By that point, American shipyards were needed more for transports and escorts than for capital ships, a transition that the navy managed reasonably well and certainly much better than the army (Koistinen 1997). The prospect of a Mahanian fleet engagement became increasingly remote after the Battle of Jutland in 1916, but the navy still deployed almost 400 ships to European waters, where they operated as part of an amalgamated Allied force. The fleet's capital ships joined those of the Royal Navy in keeping the German High Seas Fleet bottled up, but it did its best work escorting convoys and supporting Allied logistical efforts, garnering little attention when compared to the land war (Jones 1998, Still 2006). The war's end threatened a renewed naval arms race, one which the United States was better prepared to undertake than any of its rivals and seemed willing to do with its 1919 building program. However, statesmanship would trump resurgent navalism at the Washington Naval Conference, bringing one often boisterous era to a close and paving the way for another (Buckley 1970).

The officers and enlisted personnel of the New Steel Navy await studies comparable to those accorded the Civil War generation. Karsten's *The Naval Aristocracy* (1972) draws to an end as the Navy became a world-class service. Bradford's *Admirals of the New Steel Navy* (1990) contains essays on the dozen most prominent officers, and a few officers, George Dewey (Spector 1974), Bradley Fiske (Coletta 1979), William S. Benson (Klachko and Trask 1987), Washington Chambers (Stein 2007), and William Sims (Morison 1942) have received modern biographies, but several key figures still await such treatment. Far less is known about the navy's enlisted men: Historians know who they were, what their duties were

and what policies affected them, but beyond James Reckner's work on the War with Spain and the men of the Great White Fleet (Reckner 1988, 2001), and their recruitment and training (Harrod 1978), the study of their social history is sorely lacking. The time is ripe for a naval equivalent to Edward M. Coffman's far-reaching examinations of the officers and men of the nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century US Army (Coffman 1986, 2004).

With the exception of operations, the Navy between the start of the Civil War and end of World War I was once something of a historiographical black hole, but during the last two decades, historians have opened or expanded new areas of inquiry, the result of which has been a welcome flurry of books and articles. The navy's post-Civil War history in particular seems ready for a new round of synthesis that melds recent scholarship in strategic thinking, professionalism, social history, the evolution of technology, and the economic impact of naval expansion with existing institutional and operational history. The challenge is great, but the necessary groundwork has been laid.

#### BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Abrahamson, James L. (1981). *America Arms for a New Century: The Making of a Great Military Power*. New York: Free Press.
- Albion, Robert Greenhalgh (1980). *Makers of Naval Policy, 1798–1947*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Apt, Benjamin L. (1997). "Mahan's Forbears: The Debate Over Maritime Strategy, 1868–1883," *Naval War College Review*, 50 (Summer): 86–111.
- Baer, George W. (1994). *One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The U.S. Navy, 1890–1990*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Baxter, James P. (2001 [1968]). *Introduction of the Ironclad Warship*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Bennett, Michael J. (2004). *Union Jacks: Yankee Sailors in the Civil War*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Bradford, James C., ed. (1986). *Captains of the Old Steam Navy: Makers of the American Naval Tradition, 1840–1880*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Bradford, James C., ed. (1990). *Admirals of the New Steel Navy: Makers of the American Naval Tradition, 1880–1930*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Browning, Robert M. (1993). *From Cape Charles to Cape Fear: The North Atlantic Blockading Squadron During the Civil War*. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press.
- Browning, Robert M. (2002). *Success Is All That Was Expected: The South Atlantic Blockading Squadron During the Civil War*. Washington: Brassey's.
- Buckley, Thomas H. (1970). *The United States and the Washington Conference, 1921–1922*. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press.
- Buhl, Lance C. (1984). "Maintaining 'An American Navy,' 1865–1889," in Kenneth J. Hagan, ed., *In Peace and War: Interpretations of American Naval History*, 2nd edn. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 145–73.
- Canney, Donald L. (1990). *The Old Steam Navy*, vol. 1: *Frigates, Sloops, and Gunboats, 1815–1885*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Canney, Donald L. (1993). *The Old Steam Navy*, vol. 2: *The Ironclads, 1842–1885*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.

- Canney, Donald L. (1998). *Lincoln's Navy: The Ships, Men and Organization, 1861–65*. London: Conway Maritime Press.
- Chisholm, Donald (2001). *Waiting for Dead Men's Shoes: Origins and Development of the U.S. Navy's Officer Personnel System, 1793–1941*. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Coffman, Edward M. (1986). *The Old Army: A Portrait of the American Army in Peacetime, 1784–1898*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Coffman, Edward M. (2004). *The Regulars: The American Army, 1898–1941*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Coletta, Paolo Enrico (1979). *Admiral Bradley A. Fiske and the American Navy*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
- Cooling, Benjamin Franklin (1979). *Gray Steel and Blue Water Navy: The Formative Years of America's Military–Industrial Complex 1881–1917*. Hamden, CT: Archon Books.
- Cooling, Benjamin Franklin (2000). *USS Olympia: Herald of Empire*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Coombe, Jack D. (1996). *Thunder Along the Mississippi: The River Battles that Split the Confederacy*. New York: Sarpedon Publishers.
- Coombe, Jack D. (1999). *Gunfire Along the Gulf: The Last Major Naval Campaigns of the Civil War*. New York: Bantam Books.
- Coombe, Jack D. (2002). *Gunsmoke Over the Atlantic: First Naval Actions of the Civil War*. New York: Bantam Books.
- Cornish, Dudley (1986). *Lincoln's Lee: The Life of Samuel Phillips Lee, United States Navy, 1812–1897*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
- Crowl, Philip A. (1986). “Alfred Thayer Mahan: The Naval Historian,” in Peter Paret, ed., *Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 444–77.
- Davis, William C. (1975). *Duel Between the First Ironclads*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.
- Dowart, Jeffery M. (1979). *ONI: The Office of Naval Intelligence*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Drake, Frederick C. (1984). *The Empire of the Seas: A Biography of Rear Admiral Robert Wilson Shufeldt, USN*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.
- Duffy, James (1997). *Lincoln's Admiral: The Civil War Campaigns of David Farragut*. New York: Wiley.
- Fox, Gustavus Vasa (1918–19). *Confidential Correspondence of Gustavus Vasa Fox, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, 1861–1865*, 2 vols., ed. Robert Means Thompson and Richard Wainwright. New York: De Vinne Press.
- Fuller, Howard J. (2008). *Clad in Iron: The American Civil War and the Challenge of British Naval Power*. Westport, CT: Praeger Security International.
- Godin, Jason (2006). “The Unfulfilled Hope: The Joint Board and the Panama Canal, 1903–1919,” *Joint Force Quarterly*, 42 (3rd Quarter), 86–91.
- Goldrick, James, and John Hattendorf, eds. (1993). *Mahan is Not Enough: The Proceedings of a Conference on the Works of Sir Julian Corbett and Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond*. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press.
- Hackemer, Kurt H. (2001). *The U.S. Navy and the Origins of the Military–Industrial Complex, 1847–1883*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Harrod, Frederick (1978). *Manning the New Navy: The Development of a Modern Naval Enlisted Force, 1899–1940*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
- Hattendorf, John B. (2001). “The Experience of the Spanish–American War and Its Impact on Professional Naval Thought,” in Edward J. Marolda, ed., *Theodore*

- Roosevelt, *The U.S. Navy, and the Spanish–American War*. New York: Palgrave, 61–80.
- Hattendorf, John B., Mitchell B. Simpson, and John R Wadleigh (1984). *Sailors and Scholars: The Centennial History of the U.S. Naval War College*. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press.
- Hearn, Chester (1996). *Admiral David Dixon Porter: The Civil War Years*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Hearn, Chester (1998). *Admiral David Glasgow Farragut: The Civil War Years*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Hendrix, Henry J. (2009). *Theodore Roosevelt's Naval Diplomacy: The U.S. Navy and the Birth of the American Century*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Hill, Jim Dan (1961). *Sea Dogs of the Sixties: Farragut and Seven Contemporaries*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Hoogenboom, Ari A. (2008). *Gustavus Vasa Fox of the Union Navy: A Biography*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Johnson, Robert Erwin (1968). *Rear Admiral John Rodgers, 1812–1882*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Joiner, Gary D. (2007). *Mr. Lincoln's Brown Water Navy: The Mississippi Squadron*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
- Jones, Jerry W. (1998). *U.S. Battle Operations in World War I*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Karsten, Peter (1972). *The Naval Aristocracy: The Golden Age of Annapolis and the Emergence of Modern American Navalism*. New York: Free Press.
- Kennedy, Paul M. (1976). "Mahan versus Mackinder," in Paul M. Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery*. New York: Scribner, 177–202.
- Klachko, Mary, with David F. Trask (1987). *Admiral William Shepherd Benson: First Chief of Naval Operations*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Koistinen, Paul A. C. (1996). *Beating Plowshares into Swords: The Political Economy of American Warfare, 1606–1865*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
- Koistinen, Paul A. C. (1997). *Mobilizing for Modern War: The Political Economy of American Warfare, 1865–1919*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
- Mahan, Alfred Thayer (1890). *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660–1783*. Boston: Little, Brown and Company.
- McBride, William M. (2000). *Technological Change and the United States Navy, 1865–1945*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Milligan, John D. (1965). *Gunboats Down the Mississippi*. Annapolis, MD: United States Naval Institute.
- Mindell, David A. (2000). *War, Technology, and Experience Aboard the USS Monitor*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Morison, Elting E. (1942). *Admiral Sims and the Modern American Navy*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co.
- Niven, John (1973). *Gideon Welles: Lincoln's Secretary of the Navy*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Paullin, Charles Oscar (1968). *Paullin's History of Naval Administration, 1775–1911*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Ramold, Steven J. (2002). *Slaves, Sailors, Citizens: African Americans in the Union Navy*. DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press.
- Reckner, James R. (1988). *Teddy Roosevelt's Great White Fleet*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.



- Reckner, James R. (2001). "‘The Men Behind the Guns’: The Impact of the War with Spain on the Navy Enlisted Force," in Edward J. Marolda, ed., *Theodore Roosevelt, The U.S. Navy, and the Spanish-American War*. New York: Palgrave, 95–107.
- Ringle, Dennis J. (1998). *Life in Mr. Lincoln’s Navy*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Roberts, Williams H. (2002). *Civil War Ironclads: The U.S. Navy and Industrial Mobilization*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Schneller, Robert (1996). *A Quest for Glory: A Biography of Rear Admiral John A. Dahlgren*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Schneller, Robert (2002). *Farragut: America’s First Admiral*. Washington, DC: Brassey’s.
- Shulman, Mark Russell (1995). *Navalism and the Emergence of American Sea Power, 1882–1893*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Silverstone, Paul H. (1989). *Warships of the Civil War Navies*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Slagle, Jay (1996). *Ironclad Captain: Seth Ledyard Phelps and the U.S. Navy, 1841–1864*. Kent, OH: Kent State University Press.
- Sloan, Edward W. (1966). *Benjamin Franklin Isherwood, Naval Engineer: The Years as Engineer-in-Chief, 1861–1869*. Annapolis, MD: United States Naval Institute.
- Spector, Ronald H. (1974). *Admiral of the New Empire: The Life and Career of George Dewey*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.
- Stein, Stephen K. (2007). *From Torpedoes to Aviation: Washington Irving Chambers and Innovation in the New Navy, 1876–1913*. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press.
- Sternlicht, Sanford V. (1977). *McKinley’s Bulldog: The Battleship Oregon*. Chicago: Nelson-Hall.
- Still, William N. (1971). *Iron Afloat: The Story of the Confederate Armorclads*. Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University Press.
- Still, William N. (2006). *Crisis at Sea: The United States Navy in European Waters in World War I*. Gainesville: University of Florida Press.
- Sumida, Jon Tetsuro (1997). *Inventing Grand Strategy and Teaching Command: The Classic Works of Alfred Thayer Mahan Reconsidered*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Surdam, David G. (2001). *Northern Naval Superiority and the Economics of the American Civil War*. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.
- Symonds, Craig L. (2008). *Lincoln and His Admirals: Abraham Lincoln, the U.S. Navy, and the Civil War*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Taaffe, Stephen R. (2009). *Commanding Lincoln’s Navy: Union Naval Leadership during the Civil War*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Tomblin, Barbara B. (1988). "From Sail to Steam: The Development of Steam Technology in the United States Navy, 1838–1865," PhD dissertation, Rutgers University.
- Tucker, Spencer (2000). *Andrew Foote: Civil War Admiral on Western Waters*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Underwood, Rodman L. (2006). *Waters of Discord: The Union Blockade of Texas during the Civil War*. Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Co.
- Weddle, Kevin J. (2005). *Lincoln’s Tragic Admiral: The Life of Samuel Francis Du Pont*. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press.
- Welles, Gideon (1960). *Diary*, 3 vols., ed. by Howard K. Beale. New York: W. W. Norton.
- Wilson, Mark R. (2006). *The Business of Civil War: Military Mobilization and the State, 1861–1865*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Wise, Stephen R. (1988). *Lifeline of the Confederacy: Blockade Running During the Civil War*. Columbia: University of South Carolina.



## Chapter Twenty-three

# THE US NAVY SINCE 1920

*David F. Winkler*

With the end of World War I, the guns fell silent in Europe and elsewhere, but seeds had been sown that would affect world history for much of the remainder of the century – a history in which the United States Navy would play a significant role. In the Far East, Japan – a member of the victorious alliance – would seek to strengthen its position on the Asian mainland to the dismay of the United States. Defeated Germany, failing in the 1920s as a democracy, eventually turned to National Socialism and would again threaten her neighbors. Meanwhile in Russia, a revolutionary party had seized power and after consolidating power, would position the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to challenge American hegemony three decades hence.

Technology also emerged from the World War I that would influence how navies fought until the very present – radios, submarines, and aircraft carriers being three examples. But in 1920, it was the battleship that still remained as a powerful symbol of national power and prestige.

In the wake of the war's great carnage, many looked at the naval arms race that had built fleets of dreadnoughts as a culprit. Instead of being lionized, the military and “merchants of death” in the armaments industry were vilified. A prosperous advocacy group for sea power, the Navy League of the United States nearly ceased operations (Rappaport 1962, Wright 2006).

Leaders of the victorious countries, acknowledging this pacifistic sentiment and seeking to cut military spending, were amiable to negotiate a naval arms limitation treaty. Signed in Washington in February 1922, the governments of Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, and the United States, agreed to restrict the numbers, types, and tonnage of ships that each navy possessed. And while the United States was allowed to maintain a fleet the size of the reigning world naval power Great Britain, it was forced to scrap many hulls that had been under construction and could only deploy a force that could assure control of either the eastern Pacific, or the North Atlantic and the Caribbean – not both (Buckley 1970, Vinson 1955 focuses on Senate ratification of the treaty). Early twentieth-century Anglo-American naval relations have received significant treatment (Hall 1987, Cowman 1996, O'Brien 1998) as has American rivalry with Japan (Wheeler 1963).

Treaty limits aside, the postwar expenditure cutbacks had nearly halved the Navy's size from 750 to 380 ships with the number of battleships reduced from 36 to 19. Initially, the Navy divided the brunt of these battleship-led forces between the Atlantic and Pacific coast ports with token forces deployed to support American interests in the western Pacific and the Mediterranean. With unrest in Russia, Turkey, Croatia, the Caribbean, and South America, American warships remained on hand to protect American citizens and property. The role of the US Navy in Turkey in the aftermath of war is described by William Braisted (1990) in his biographical sketch of Mark Bristol, commander of those forces. The Navy maintained a continuous presence along the coasts and in the rivers of China. Operations of the "China Navy" are described by Bernard Cole, *Gunboats and Marines: The United States Navy in China, 1925–1928* (1983), by Kemp Toley (1971), *Yangtze Patrol: The U.S. Navy in China*, a quasi-autobiographical narrative, and, most analytically by William Reynolds Braisted, *Diplomats in Blue: U.S. Naval Officers in China, 1922–1933* (2008).

The Washington Treaty further reduced the number of battleships to 15 and halted construction of fortifications in the western Pacific. Since the United States had become a colonial power with the acquisition of the Philippines as an outcome of the Spanish–American War, Army and Navy planners agonized over how best to defend this western Pacific archipelago against Japanese attack (Linn 1997). As detailed by Edward S. Miller in *War Plan Orange* (1991) most plans envisioned a holding action by American and Filipino ground forces as the Navy's battle fleet surged across the Pacific to the rescue. Covering this vast distance was within the Navy's capability. Having transitioned to black oil as its primary fuel, American warships had longer legs than their coal-fired counterparts from other navies and techniques worked out by Chester Nimitz allowed for speedy alongside refueling (Maurer 1981, Wildenberg 1996).

However, as early as 1919, the Navy's General Board recognized that an American battle fleet steaming blindly across the Pacific could be susceptible to the same fate that befell the Russians at the battle of Tsushima in 1905. Its members understood the need to design a fleet and fleet doctrine that integrated to new technologies for operating at distances far from defended bases (Kuehn 2008). Thus the aircraft carrier would provide the eyes for the line of battleships. After World War I, the Navy converted a collier into USS *Langley* (CV 1) which became an indispensable asset for the development of aviation regimens. With the creation of the Bureau of Aeronautics (BuAer) in 1921, a competent internal organization moved forward to push for more capable aircraft, standardized training, and combat doctrine. Working with the Naval War College, BuAer developed tactics that were tested in annual exercises. With the exception of a cruise to Australia and the western Pacific in 1925, the "US Fleet" operated locally from west coast ports and Hawaii and conducted a series of battle problems to test new technologies and tactics (Melhorn 1974, Felker 2007).

William Moffett lobbied Congress and worked within the Navy to guide the development of naval aviation during the 1920s without generating the acrimony that William Mitchell, his counterpart in the Army, caused in that service (Trimble

1994). Thomas Wildenberg (2005) documents the critical contribution made by Joseph Mason Reeves who demonstrated that the aircraft carrier could do more than just perform scouting missions for the battle line. If aircraft could attack enemy warships en masse, they could be as potent as salvos of 16-inch shells. The turning point came in the mid-twenties when the Americans dispensed with very deliberate launching and landing practices that had been copied from the British. Instead, by massing aircraft on the flight deck, *Langley* could triple the number of aircraft it could launch against a target and when the converted battle cruisers *Lexington* (CV 2) and *Saratoga* (CV 3) joined the fleet in the late twenties, the Navy had the capacity to launch swarms of aircraft at a potential foe. Wayne Hughes (1986) traces the development of aviation doctrine during the interwar period and Craig Felker (2007) shows how it was tested and refined in the fleet problems of the 1920s and 1930s.

During the 1930s, a resurgent Germany and an expanding Japanese Empire brought an end to the treaty system that had been fashioned in Washington and later revised in 1930 in London. During this decade, the United States maintained a building program, at first to expand the fleet to the levels it was allowed in the Washington and London treaties, and then to a size that would make it possible for the Navy to conduct operations in both the Atlantic and Pacific. *Ranger* (CV 4) was commissioned as the first ship built keel up as an aircraft carrier. *Yorktown*, *Enterprise*, and *Hornet* (CVs 5, 6, and 8) were sister flattops that would perform well during World War II. *Wasp* (CV 7), was a somewhat smaller version of these fleet carriers (Friedman 1983). Clark G. Reynolds (1968) and Norman Polmar (2006b) compare British, American, and Japanese aircraft carriers and trace the development of pre-war carrier doctrine in the opening chapters of books which focus on their operations during World War II, a topic analyzed in James and William Belote's *Titans of the Sea* (1975). In an interesting analysis, Douglas Smith (2006) probes the effect of their professional education and inner war experience on the American commanders of the five major carrier battles of the war.

In *Battle Line* (2006) Thomas and Trent Hone also discuss aviation development as part of the Navy's evolution from a fleet centered around slow battleships to one that deployed most of the warship types that proved so essential in World War II, including cruisers, destroyers, and submarines. Submarines proved to be a particular challenge for American naval architects as manufacturers had difficulty producing a reliable diesel and the London Treaty imposed tonnage restrictions on the five signatory nations. Gary E. Weir in *Building American Submarines, 1914-1940* (1991) detailed the challenges that had to be overcome. Fortunately, the Bureau of Construction and Repair would produce a satisfactory design in the late 1930s that entered mass production in time for World War II. While touching on submarine development, the Hones also covered doctrine developed with the Marine Corps for amphibious warfare as well as breakthroughs in cryptology that would prove critical in the forthcoming war.

For America that war officially came in December 1941 in the wake of a Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, that permanently removed *Arizona* and *Oklahoma* from the US Navy's line of battle and damaged six other World War I

vintage battlewagons. Following the blow at Oahu, Japanese forces advanced into the southwest Pacific, landing forces in the Philippines; capturing Hong Kong, Singapore, and the Dutch East Indies; and threatening Australia.

However, the US Navy had unofficially been engaged in the emerging global conflict for some time as President Roosevelt pledged support to a beleaguered Great Britain which by late 1940 stood alone against the German war machine. Through a number of actions, Roosevelt pushed the envelop of the meaning of neutrality as the US Navy guarded shipping heading to Britain and even provided 50 older destroyers to the Royal Navy under the Destroyers for Bases Deal. In June 1941, when Germany attacked the Soviet Union, America even lent support to a regime that opposed capitalism (Bailey and Ryan 1979).

Despite Japan's attack on the United States, the Roosevelt administration remained committed to a Europe-first strategy as the German's posed the greater long-term threat. The Navy enabled the United States to pursue the Europe-first strategy by containing Japanese advances in Pacific, first at Coral Sea, then at Midway, and finally at Guadalcanal. The Navy, working with its British and Canadian counterparts, also kept open the vital sea lines of communication to Europe that supported overseas allies, allowed the buildup of American forces in Europe, and made possible offensive operations in Africa, Italy, and Northwestern Europe. Samuel Eliot Morison's 15-volume *History of the United States Naval Operations in World War II* (1950–62) written in the immediate aftermath of the war, provides a wonderfully written narrative of the various campaigns and battles and remains an outstanding secondary source on the subject.

The industrial capacity of the United States to produce thousands of vessels and tens of thousands of aircraft contributed mightily to the final outcome. Building and manning those ships and aircraft required the recruitment and training of millions of individuals from broader segments of society. Overall, the war affected American views on racial and gender relations that would progress for decades to come. During the war the opportunities for minorities in the Navy remained limited with a majority of African-Americans serving in such ship's services ratings as stewards and storekeepers. The Navy did man the destroyer escort USS *Mason* and the submarine chaser USS *PC-1264* with African-American enlisted men during the war (Kelly 1999), but did not open the officer corps to African Americans until the war was almost over. In *The Golden Thirteen*, Paul Stillwell (1993) documents the challenges faced by an extraordinary group of men, commissioned in 1944, who overcame many of the discriminatory practices of the time. Robert J. Schneller (2005) describes the challenges overcome by Wesley Brown, a proud member of the class of 1949, to become the first black midshipman to graduate from the Naval Academy. Women also contributed to the war effort in the civilian economy and as Women Accepted for Volunteer Emergency Service (WAVES) (Ebbert and Hall 1999, Godson 2001), though admission to the Naval Academy was not opened to them until 1976 (Disher 1998).

Whereas the majority of officers prior to the war were graduates of the Naval Academy or Navy ROTC programs, the need to flesh out the wardrooms of hundreds of warships and fill cockpits required an infusion of college graduates and

students attending college into structured commissioning programs that were conducted at many of the nation's top universities and colleges (Schneider 1987). With hundreds of thousands of young men enlisting in the Navy coming from similar backgrounds, the "upstairs downstairs" hierarchy that dominated the pre-war Navy loosened considerably. The pre-war hierarchy would never return as many of the new midshipmen joining Wesley Brown at the Naval Academy served as enlisted sailors during the war (Forney 2004, Gelfand 2006). Other World War II sailors, having taken advantage of the GI Bill benefits to obtain college degrees, applied for commissions thorough Officer Candidate School programs. Following World War II the Navy acquired the majority of its officers from sources other than the US Naval Academy. For example, the number of NROTC units that produced line officers grew in number to 52 in 1963 and to 70 in 2007. Meanwhile, Officer Candidate Schools and enlisted commissioning programs added thousands of more line officers and filled the ranks of the Supply Corps; the Medical, Dental, and Nurse Corps; the Judge Advocate General Corps; Civil Engineering Corps; and the Chaplain Corps.

Having triumphed over the Axis Powers, the United States quickly demobilized its forces. In addition, the American defense establishment underwent a top-down reorganization as the Defense Act of 1947 demoted the Secretary of the Navy and Secretary of War from cabinet level positions to become subordinates of the Secretary of Defense who headed the new Department of Defense. The first individual to hold that position was James V. Forrestal (Rogow 1963, Hoopes and Brinkley 1992), the last cabinet-level Secretary of the Navy, but he was succeeded in March 1949 by Charles Wilson who was sympathetic to ideas advocated by the newly independent US Air Force.

The new service and its supporters in the Department of Defense and Congress challenged the viability of sea power, given the advent of nuclear weapons, and cancellation of funding for the aircraft carrier *United States* precipitated the Admirals Revolt later that year (Coletta 1981). Jeffrey Barlow's (1994) work adds much to an understanding of the events of that era though, as its subtitle says, it focuses on *The Fight for Naval Aviation, 1945–1950*. In his conclusion, Barlow points to the Korean War as the conflict that demonstrated the viability of sea power and tactical naval aviation.

Without American sea power, the North Koreans would have been the clear victors. American and British carrier-based aircraft as well as naval surface ship gunfire joined the battle within days of the North Korean assault on June 25, 1950. With shipping providing much of the needed logistics, American and South Korean ground forces pinned around the port of Pusan were able to hold off repeated North Korean offensives until General Douglas MacArthur used naval forces at Inchon on September 15, 1950. By landing Marines at this port city for Seoul, MacArthur flanked the enemy's supply lines and forced a panicked retreat. Faced with the prospect of losing its North Korean ally, Communist China intervened two months later and forced a continuation of the conflict (Cagle and Manson 1957, Field 1962).

In writing a perspective of the Cold War *Carriers at War: A Personal Retrospective of Korea, Vietnam and the Confrontation with the Soviet Union* (2007) former Chief of Naval Operations Admiral James L. Holloway III places the three-year

war in Korea and America's longer struggle in Vietnam in the context of an overall strategy to contain the Soviet Union's efforts to spread Communism over the globe. While open warfare was fought in Korea and in Southeast Asia, other potential battle lines passed through the heart of Europe, and throughout Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. To maintain the peace and deter aggression, the United States built a network of overseas alliances systems. Through sea power and strategic deterrence in the form of an expanding nuclear arsenal, the United States maintained its credibility as a dependable ally. To reassure allies in Europe and Asia, the United States operated sustainable combat fleets in the North Atlantic, Mediterranean Sea and Western Pacific. Early in the Cold War, these forces steamed unchallenged. During the 1960s and 1970s, a growing Soviet Navy would lay claim for its place on the high seas. Michael Isenberg (1993) details the history and operations of the Navy in the decade and a half following World War II while David Winkler (2000) provides a broader survey of the entire *Cold War at Sea*. These policies and operations are placed in context by George W. Baer in *One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The U.S. Navy, 1890–1990* (1994).

To contain the Soviet Union and defend American interests the United States developed a maritime strategy in the wake of World War II (Palmer 1988) and deployed the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean (Sheehy 1992) and the Seventh Fleet in the Far East. These forces responded to numerous crisis situations, several of which have yet to receive detailed study. Joseph F. Bouchard, *Command in Crisis* (1991) examines the role of the Navy in second of the three Taiwan Straits Crises, that of 1958–9, in the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, and in the Arab–Israeli Wars of 1967 and 1973. Joseph T. Stanik, *El Dorado Canyon* (2003) does the same for Ronald Reagan's employment of naval forces against Libya in 1986, and Harold Lee Wise (2007) covers escort operations in the Persian Gulf, 1987–8, including the Navy's largest sea battle since World War II, one that had devastating consequences for the Iranian Navy. In both the Atlantic and the Mediterranean the Navy operated in the context of its NATO alliance, which is the subject of Joel J. Sokolshy's *Seapower in the Nuclear Age* (1991).

Ironically, one of America's greatest challenges during the Cold War did not take place in a far distant sea but close to its southern shores in the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. In the tense days that followed American discovery that the Soviets were deploying missiles to the island, the US Navy's ability to control the sea and air space around Cuba played a factor in the Soviet decision to remove medium range ballistic missiles that had been clandestinely placed there (Bouchard 1991, Utz 1993). The decisive role played by conventional sea power when the United States enforced a "quarantine" line encircling Cuba was not lost on Russian leaders and was a major, if not the determining, factor in the Soviet Union's decision to build a blue water navy (Gorshkov 1979).

The Soviets had already been alarmed by America's deployment of nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines. The sailing of the USS *George Washington* with 16 Polaris missiles in 1960 marked one of the greatest feats in naval technological advances with the concurrent development of a wide range of cutting edge technologies, including nuclear propulsion, solid rocket fuel, internal navigation



systems, and warhead miniaturization (Spinardi 1994, Polmar 2006a). Given the potential dangers involved with operating nuclear reactors, as would be illustrated over time by the Soviet Navy, the American nuclear propulsion program thrived under the leadership of Admiral Hyman G. Rickover. As detailed by Francis Duncan (2001), Rickover demanded the highest standards from the people and contractors involved in his nuclear propulsion program.

A persuasive individual, Rickover managed to remain on active duty until the age of 82 and convince the Navy to use nuclear propulsion for its whole submarine force, its big deck carriers and some of their escort cruisers. Some of the significant milestones in nuclear propulsion history included the commissioning of *Nautilus* (SSN 571), the first atomic submarine, in 1954; *George Washington* (SSBN 598), the first ballistic missile submarine, in 1959; *Long Beach* (CGN 9), first nuclear-powered cruiser, in 1961; *Enterprise* (CVAN 65), first nuclear-power aircraft carrier, in 1961; *Nimitz* (CVN 68) first of a major class of nuclear-propelled aircraft carriers, in 1975; and *Ohio* (SSBN 726), first of a new class of ballistic missile submarines, in 1981.

Faced with an opponent having increasingly sophisticated combat vessels and aircraft, the Soviets responded. Robert Herrick (1988, 2003) details the struggle of the Soviet Union to build an ocean-going navy. For its leader, Admiral Sergei Gorshkov, maritime superiority was not a requirement. Denying the United States a capability to project its power across the oceans was all he asked of his men. To do it he constructed a large fleet of diesel and nuclear-powered submarines which was augmented by missile-firing surface ships and long-range naval aviation.

The arrival of this emerging navy in the 1970s came during a transformational period for the US Navy. Because the United States had become bogged in a war in Southeast Asia, resources had been unavailable for fleet modernization. Instead, constant deployments to Yankee Station in the South China Sea, on the gun line off the coast of Vietnam, and into the waterways of the Mekong Delta stressed the Navy's hulls, sailors, and logistical support systems. By the early 1970s, the operations tempo and wear and tear on the fleet had reached a point where the Navy needed to retire hundreds of World War II vintage warships and address some manpower issues including racial tension that manifested itself in riots on an oiler and an aircraft carrier and the establishment of an all-volunteer military (Bradford 2005).

To address the challenges facing the Navy, the Nixon administration dipped deep into the Navy's flag ranks to promote a three-star admiral to become the Chief of Naval Operations. In *On Watch*, Elmo R. Zumwalt Jr. (1976) explained how he brought needed changes to the Navy to make it a more appealing career to young Americans. Through a series of "Z-grams" he attempted to slash away at many of the "Mickey Mouse" rules and regulations that young sailors put up with. As a result sailors were allowed to grow beards and the Navy's trademark "Cracker Jack" uniforms were retired in favor of officer-style blue suits.

Zumwalt accelerated the retirement of World War II vintage ships to generate capital to build a modern Navy that would maintain maritime superiority over the Soviets. Unfortunately for Zumwalt and his successor Admiral James L. Holloway

III, Congress had other spending priorities. Savings realized from reducing the fleet size, closing dozens of bases, and reducing the service end-strength did not automatically translate into new construction funds. Within the Navy there was much debate on the types of ships needed to meet the nation's needs. Admiral Rickover attempted to legislate nuclear propulsion for all combatants over 8,000 tons (Duncan 1990) while Zumwalt pushed for a "high-low" mix that included a strike cruiser design (that never would be built).

Malcolm Muir in *Black Shoes and Blue Water* (1996) provides the context for this tumultuous period. He also explains the transition of surface line officers into a surface warfare community, one with its own warfare badge comparable to the dolphins worn by submariners and wings of gold donned by naval aviators.

Although not everyone's budgeting priorities were met during the 1970s, significant new ships and weapon systems did enter the inventory. Beginning with the *Spruance*-class destroyers (31 commissioned 1975–83), the Navy embarked on powering its surface warships with gas turbines. The *Spruances*, with their helicopters and Light Airborne Multi-Purpose System (LAMPS) represented Zumwalt's vision of a high-end warship and the *Oliver Hazard Perry*-class frigates (45 commissioned 1977–89), designed as open ocean escort vessels, represented a low-end. Harpoon and then Tomahawk missiles added firepower against both seaborne and land targets. Follow on *Ticonderoga* cruisers (27 commissioned 1983–94) and *Arleigh Burke*-class destroyers (which began entering service in 1991) incorporated the Aegis air defense system which is based around a phased-array radar. In the air, the F-14 Tomcat, made famous in the movie *Top Gun*, replaced the F-4 Phantom as the Navy's frontline fighter. When the Reagan administration sought to challenge an increasingly assertive Soviet Union, the Navy's Maritime Strategy that postulated offensive missions for the Navy in a global conflict fit in well with national objectives. In contrast to the Congresses of the 1970s, those of the 1980s were generous in providing funds for the military.

As detailed in his book *Command of the Seas* (1988) Secretary of the Navy John Lehman pushed for a 600-ship navy that included bringing back into service *Iowa*-class battleships. As one of the Navy's most assertive civilian leaders of the past half century, Lehman was not afraid to make changes. Beards went away and sailors once again sported the traditional "Cracker Jack" uniform. Most notable was his retirement of Admiral Rickover in 1982. A naval flight officer in the Naval Reserve, Lehman was popular with the junior ranks. However, his style did not endear him to everyone. In the wake of glitches in the "Operation Urgent Fury" intervention in Grenada in 1982, Congress moved to increase the services interoperability by increasing the power of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Lehman's resistance proved futile with the passage of the Goldwater–Nichols Act of 1986. He would step down in 1987.

Recognizing it could not keep pace with American military build-up, the Soviets chose to be less confrontational. Believing Mikhail Gorbachev to be sincere in his efforts at "glasnost" President Reagan retreated from his commitment to maintaining such a large fleet. Disagreeing, Lehman's replacement, James Webb, resigned as Secretary of the Navy in 1988 (Roush 1997).

To crew its highly sophisticated ships and aircraft, the Navy, along with its sister services, continued to rely totally on an all-volunteer manpower base. To tap the talents of an increasingly diverse American population more effectively, the Navy worked to recruit minorities and slowly opened opportunities at sea for women. By 2000, the Navy excluded women only from serving with special forces and in submarines.

With the fall of the Soviet Union, the Navy's operations tempo actually experienced an increase. Edward J. Marolda and Robert J. Schneller write about the Navy's role in the first Gulf War in *Sword and Shield* (1998), the background to which is traced by Michael A. Palmer, *Guardians of the Gulf* (1992). This war was followed by an increased naval presence in the Persian Gulf that led to the creation of the US Fifth Fleet in 1995 (Winkler 2007). Elsewhere the Navy was engaged in crises in Haiti, the Balkans, off the Horn of Africa, and in Asia. With the attack on the United States in September of 2001, the Navy was quick to respond with humanitarian assistance to New York City and then with combat power as the United States mounted a successful campaign to dislodge the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. As the global war against terrorism continues, the Navy contributes forces in the ongoing struggle in Iraq and elsewhere. In addition, with the possibility of a ballistic missile launch by a rogue state, the Navy has taken on a new mission – ballistic missile defense. Technological breakthroughs have enabled the AEGIS air defense system to morph into a ballistic missile defense system that is being installed on the Navy's cruisers and destroyers.

With little doubt in future years, when news of an overseas crisis reaches Washington, the US Navy will, as in the past, be in the forefront.

#### BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Baer, George W. (1994). *One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The U.S. Navy, 1890–1990*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Bailey, Thomas A., and Paul B. Ryan (1979). *Hitler vs. Roosevelt: The Undeclared Naval War*. New York: Free Press.
- Barlow, Jeffrey (1994). *Revolt of the Admirals: The Fight for Naval Aviation, 1945–1950*. Washington: Naval Historical Center.
- Belote, James H., and William Belote (1975). *Titans of the Sea: The Development and Operations of Japanese and American Carrier Task Forces during World War II*. New York: Harper & Row.
- Bouchard, Joseph (1991). *Command in Crisis: Four Case Studies*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Bradford, James C. (2005). "The Effects of the Vietnam War on the U.S. Navy," in Malcolm Muir, Jr., and Mark F. Wilkinson, eds., *From Quagmire to Détente: The Cold War from 1963 to 1975*. Lexington, VA: VMI, 268–83.
- Braisted, William Reynolds (1990). "Mark Lambert Bristol: Naval Diplomat Extraordinary of the Battleship Age," in James C. Bradford, ed., *Admirals of the New Steel Navy: Makers of the American Naval Tradition, 1880–1930*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 331–75.
- Braisted, William Reynolds (2008). *Diplomats in Blue: U.S. Naval Officers in China, 1922–1933*. Gainesville: University Press of Florida.

- Buckley, Thomas H. (1970). *The United States and the Washington Conference, 1921–1922*. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press.
- Cagle, Malcolm W., and Frank A. Manson (1957). *The Sea War in Korea*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Cole, Bernard D. (1983). *Gunboats and Marines: The United States Navy in China, 1925–1928*. Newark: University of Delaware Press.
- Coletta, Paolo E. (1981). *The United States Navy and Defense Unification, 1947–1953*. Newark: University of Delaware Press.
- Cowman, Ian (1996). *Dominion or Decline: Anglo–American Naval Relations on the Pacific, 1937–1941*. Washington: Berg.
- Cutler, Thomas J. (1997). “Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr.: Hero or Heretic?” in James C. Bradford, ed., *Quarterdeck and Bridge: Two Centuries of U.S. Naval Leadership*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 415–32.
- Disher, Sharon Hanley (1998). *First Class: Women Join the Ranks at the Naval Academy*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Duncan, Francis (1990). *Rickover and the Nuclear Navy: The Discipline of Technology*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Duncan, Francis (1997). “Hyman G. Rickover: Technology and Naval Tradition,” in James C. Bradford, ed., *Quarterdeck and Bridge: Two Centuries of U.S. Naval Leadership*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 395–414.
- Duncan, Francis (2001). *Rickover: The Struggle for Excellence*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Ebbert, Jean, and Marie-Beth Hall (1999). *Crossed Currents: Navy Women in a Century of Change*, 3rd edn. Washington: Brassey’s.
- Felker, Craig C. (2007). *Testing American Sea Power: U.S. Navy Strategic Exercises, 1923–1940*. College Station: Texas A&M University Press.
- Field, James A. (1962). *History of United States Naval Operations in Korea*. Washington: Naval Historical Center.
- Forney, Todd A. (2004). *The Midshipman Culture and Education Reform: The United States Naval Academy, 1946–1976*. Newark: University of Delaware Press.
- Friedman, Norman (1983). *U.S. Aircraft Carriers: An Illustrated Design History*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Gelfand, H. Michael (2006). *Sea Change at Annapolis: The United States Naval Academy, 1949–2000*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Godson, Susan H. (2001). *Serving Proudly: A History of Women in the U.S. Navy*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Gorshkov, Sergei (1979). *Seapower of the State*, (English translation). Oxford: Pergamon Press.
- Hall, Christopher (1987). *Britain, America, and Arms Control, 1921–37*. New York: St. Martin’s Press.
- Herrick, Robert (1988). *Soviet Naval Theory and Policy: Gorshkov’s Inheritance (1917–1956)*. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press.
- Herrick, Robert (2003). *Soviet Naval Doctrine and Policy: 1956–1986*, 2 vols. Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press.
- Holloway III, James L. (2007). *Carriers at War: A Personal Retrospective of Korea, Vietnam and the Confrontation with the Soviet Union*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Hone, Thomas, and Trent Hone (2006). *Battle Line: The United States Navy, 1919–1939*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.

- Hoopes, Townsend, and Douglas Brinkley (1992). *Driven Patriot: The Life and Times of James Forrestal*. New York: Knopf.
- Hughes, Wayne P. (1986). *Fleet Tactics: Theory and Practice*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Isenberg, Michael T. (1993). *Shield of the Republic: The United States Navy in the Era of the Cold War and Violent Peace, [1945–1962]*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Kelly, Mary Pat (1999). *Proudly We Served: The Men of the USS Mason*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Kuehn, John T. (2008). *Agents of Innovation: The General Board and the Design of the Fleet that Defeated the Japanese Navy*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Lehman, John F., Jr. (1988). *Command of the Seas*. New York: Scribners.
- Linn, Brian McAlister (1997). *Guardians of Empire: The U.S. Army and the Pacific, 1902–1940*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Marolda, Edward J., and Robert J. Schneller (1998). *Sword and Shield: The United States Navy in the Persian Gulf War*. Washington: Naval Historical Center.
- Maurer, John H. (1981). "Fuel and the Battle Fleet: Coal, Oil and American Naval Strategy, 1898–1925," *Naval War College Review*, 34:6 (November/December), 60–73.
- Melhorn, Charles M. (1974). *Two-Block Fox: The Rise of the Aircraft Carrier, 1911–1929*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Miller, Edward S. (1991). *War Plan Orange: The U.S. Strategy to Defeat Japan: 1897–1945*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Morison, Samuel Eliot (1950–62). *History of the United States Naval Operations in World War II*, 15 vols. Boston: Little, Brown & Co.
- Muir, Malcolm (1996). *Black Shoes and Blue Water: Surface Warfare in the United States Navy, 1945–1975*. Washington: Naval Historical Center.
- O'Brien, Phillips P. (1998). *British and American Naval Power: Politics and Policy, 1900–1936*. Westport, CT: Praeger.
- Palmer, Michael A. (1988). *Origins of the Maritime Strategy: The Development of American Naval Strategy, 1945–1955*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Palmer, Michael A. (1992). *Guardians of the Gulf: A History of American's Expanding Role in the Persian Gulf, 1833–1992*. New York: Free Press.
- Polmar, Norman (2006a). "Polaris: A True Revolution," *US Naval Institute Proceedings*, 132:6 (June), 30–4.
- Polmar, Norman (2006b). *Aircraft Carriers: A History of Carrier Aviation and its Influence in World Events*, vol. 1: 1909–1945. Washington: Potomac Books.
- Rappaport, Armin (1962). *The Navy League of the United States*. Detroit, MI: Wayne State University Press.
- Reynolds, Clark G. (1968). *Fast Carriers: The Forging of an Air Navy*. New York: McGraw Hill.
- Rockwell, Theodore (1992). *The Rickover Effect: The Inside Story of How Adm. Hyman Rickover Built the Nuclear Navy*. New York: John Wiley.
- Rogow, Arnold A. (1963). *James Forrestal: A Study in Personality, Politics, and Policy*. New York: Macmillan.
- Roush, Paul E. (1997). "A Tangled Webb," *US Naval Institute Proceedings*, 123:8 (August), 42–5.
- Ryan, Paul B. (1981). *First Line of Defense: The U.S. Navy since 1945*. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press.
- Schneider, James G. (1987). *The Navy V-12 Program: Leadership for a Lifetime*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

- Schneller, Robert John (2005). *Breaking the Color Barrier: The U.S. Naval Academy's First Black Midshipmen and the Struggle for Racial Equality*. New York: New York University Press.
- Sheehy, Edward J. (1992). *The U.S. Navy, the Mediterranean, and the Cold War*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
- Smith, Douglas V. (2006). *Carrier Battles: Command Decision in Harm's Way*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Sokolsky, Joel J. (1991). *Seapower in the Nuclear Age: The United States Navy and NATO, 1949–80*. London: Routledge.
- Spinardi, Graham (1994). *From Polaris to Trident: The Development of U.S. Fleet Ballistic Missile Technology*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Stanik, Joseph T. (2003). *El Dorado Canyon: Reagan's Undeclared War with Qaddafi*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Stillwell, Paul (1993). *The Golden Thirteen: Recollections of the First Black Naval Officers*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Toley, Kemp (1971). *Yangtze Patrol: The U.S. Navy in China*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Trimble, William F. (1994). *Admiral William A. Moffett: Architect of Naval Aviation*. Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press.
- Utz, Curtis A. (1993). *Cordon of Steel: The U.S. Navy and the Cuban Missile Crisis*. Washington: Naval Historical Center.
- Vinson, John Chalmers (1955). *The Parchment Peace: The United States Senate and The Washington Conference, 1921–1922*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
- Weir, Gary E. (1991). *Building American Submarines, 1914–1940*. Washington: Naval Historical Center.
- Wheeler, Gerald E. (1963). *Prelude to Pearl Harbor: The United States Navy and the Far East, 1921–1931*. Columbia: University of Missouri Press.
- Wildenberg, Thomas (1996). *Gray Steel and Black Oil: Fast Tankers and Replenishment at Sea in the U.S. Navy, 1912–1995*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Wildenberg, Thomas (2005). *All the Factors of Victory: Adm. Joseph Mason Reeves and the Origins of Carrier Air Power*. Washington: Potomac Books.
- Winkler, David F. (2000). *Cold War at Sea: Confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Winkler, David F. (2007). *Amirs, Admirals, and Desert Sailors: Bahrain, U.S. Navy, and the Arabian Gulf*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Wise, Harold L. (2007). *Inside the Danger Zone: The U.S. Military in the Persian Gulf, 1987–1988*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Wright, Richard L. (2006). *Navy League of the United States: Civilians Supporting the Sea Services for More Than a Century*. Arlington, VA: Navy League of the United States.
- Zumwalt, Elmo R., Jr. (1976). *On Watch: A Memoir*. New York: Quadrangle/New York Times Book Co.



# Chapter Twenty-four

## THE US MARINE CORPS

*Jon Hoffman*

The Marine Corps is the smallest of the nation's four military services and, perhaps as a result, generally has received the least attention from military historians. For more than half its existence there was reason to overlook it. Originally authorized by the Continental Congress on November 10, 1775 as a force of two battalions, it never even achieved that level during the Revolutionary War. Throughout the vast majority of the nineteenth century, the number of Marines seldom rose above 1,000. During the Civil War, when the US Army put more than a million soldiers into the field, the Corps barely exceeded 3,000 men. Even during World War I, when the Corps reached a strength of 75,000, it fielded only one brigade out of an American Expeditionary Force of nearly two million. The Leathernecks often displayed courage and competence, and frequently played a significant role on the battlefield, but public recognition and favor far exceeded their overall utility to the nation. They were primarily a footnote in the larger stories of the Army and Navy until World War II, when the value of the Corps in determining the outcome of a major conflict finally began to rival, and in some cases surpass, that of its sister services.

It is not surprising then that historians were slow to focus their effort on the Marine Corps, but scholars have begun to give it more attention in recent years. Their works generally fall into four categories: 1) general or comprehensive accounts of the service's entire history; 2) more in-depth descriptions that focus on the Corps in a particular war, battle, or era; 3) specialized subjects such as weapons, organizational processes, or social and cultural studies; and 4) biographical treatment of heroes, leaders, and other individuals. Each has utility in developing the full story of an institution and its role in history.

### **Comprehensive Histories**

The initial histories of the organization were either authored by serving Marine officers or by popular writers without an academic bent. During the decades immediately following the Civil War era, supporters of the Corps feared that the

service might not survive the military retrenchment of the era. Captain Richard S. Collum provided M. Almey Aldrich with documents from which the popular writer crafted the first *History of the U.S. Marine Corps* (1875). Displeased with the volume, Collum (1890) authored his own book on the subject. Neither work included coverage of the Continental Marines, precursors to the US Marine Corps. Shortly after World War I the Marine Corps established a historical section at Headquarters Marine Corps and its first leader, Major Edwin N. McClellan (1925–32), produced a two-volume history of the corps prior to the twentieth century. It circulated in mimeograph form and was never published, but served as the basis for a single-volume work by one of his successors, Lieutenant Colonel Clyde Metcalf (1939). This book was the first to have most of the hallmarks of a well-researched and objectively analyzed account.

Subsequent authors brought more scholarly credentials to the task, but often still had roots within the service. Robert Heintz, Jr. (1962) published the next serious volume. In analyzing how the Corps struggled to survive as an institution, he did not hesitate to cast blame on the Army and Navy, numerous generals and admirals, and more than a few political leaders. His strong partisan flavor has delighted fellow Marines for over four decades, but given more objective readers reason to question his findings.

The three current staples in the field appeared in quick succession, each one filling a different niche, but all well-researched and well-documented. Edwin Simmons (1974), who served more than two decades as head of the Marine Corps history program, boasted the best condensed account of the Corps' 233 years. Anyone looking for the essence of the Corps and what it has accomplished will find everything they need without getting bogged down in extended discussions of institutional changes, high-level strategy, or battlefield minutiae. Journalist and historian J. Robert Moskin (1977) authored a much longer work focused heavily on the battlefield exploits of the Corps, arguing that the scale of its martial accomplishments essentially mirrored the expansion of American power across a continent and then the globe. Allan Millett (1980), a professor of history and retired Marine, rounded out the trilogy with a definitive tome evaluating the development of the Corps as an organization. He echoed Heintz's theme of "institutional survival," but with a great deal more objectivity and an emphasis on "adaptation in peace and war" rather than a search for someone to blame for the challenges the Corps had to overcome (xiii).

Although many authors have contributed new books in this genre in the intervening years, none have equaled these three standards, each of which has been issued in a revised edition since its initial publication (Millett in 1991, Moskin in 2004, Simmons in 2003). Perhaps the only new book of significance has come from Beth Crumley (2002), a curator and lead history researcher for the Marine Corps Museum Division. A condensed account in the mold of Simmons, her work made judicious use of quotes from those who participated in events, thus bringing a more modern oral history flavor to the story.

Victor Krulak (1984), a retired lieutenant general, contributed a slightly different take on the institution. His is not a general history, but it belongs in this class

because he tried to explain why the nation has maintained a Corps for well over two centuries. He argued that the American people value Marines because of their reputation for thoughtful innovation, fiscal economy, readiness for war, and battlefield prowess, all of which influence the larger services to do better than they might if they had no competition from an organization that also fights in their realms of land, air, and sea. By focusing on that narrow question and using salient examples to support his points, he brought into much greater relief issues that lack as much clarity in a more comprehensive account.

While the sum total of these general histories provide a thorough overview of the Marine Corps, there remains room for a new or updated volume that evaluates the changing nature of the Corps' role in the aftermath of the Goldwater–Nichols Act and the increasing emphasis on joint warfighting. While jointness has not yet achieved the full effect advocated by its most ardent supporters, the improved interaction between the Army, Navy, and Air Force will eventually call into question the relevance of a service that fills a niche by combining elements of land, sea, and air forces into a single entity. Two other developments of recent years – the expansion of special forces and the Army's shift toward medium-weight, rapid-response units – have further eroded the uniqueness of the Corps' contribution to national defense.

### **Wars and Battles**

The US Marine Corps did not officially come into existence until 1798, when Congress passed legislation to create it. But Continental Marines served during the Revolutionary War from 1775–83 and, like General George Washington and the Continental Army for the US Army, they were the forerunners and part of the heritage of the current service. Charles Smith (1975) created the best and most thorough account of these early Marines. Like most official histories, it is reliable and objective without raising much controversy. The extensive appendices, which include journals, muster rolls, and similar material, constitute a valuable collection of primary sources.

No work of similar scope exists for the Corps' contributions in the War of 1812 and the Mexican War. Marine participation in the Civil War, by contrast, has been exhaustively captured by David Sullivan (1997–2000). His four volumes, one covering each year of the war, fleshed out a detailed narrative with the full text of numerous letters, diary entries, and official reports. Contrary to the conclusion of most historians that the Marines generally performed poorly during this conflict, Sullivan argued that they often did as much or more than other northern units. Ralph Donnelly (1989) studied the even smaller and less active Confederate States Marine Corps. His single volume contains valuable appendices and is a worthy counterpart to Sullivan's opus.

While the Navy in the late nineteenth century wrestled with the changes wrought by the onset of steam and steel, the Marine Corps faced an even deeper crisis of identity and purpose. Jack Shulimson (1993) evaluated this era by focusing

on the increasing professionalism of Marine officers and their search for a valued role with the new Navy. He effectively argues that while the qualifications and capability of Marine officers improved throughout the 1880s and 1890s, they themselves had difficulty finding a common ground within their own ranks regarding their future relevance in the modernizing naval service. In the end, the Navy and the nation's strategic needs pushed the Corps into the expeditionary and advance base missions even as most Marine officers sought to maintain their old niche providing ships guards and manning naval guns. Shulimson's work ends with a brief account of the Spanish–American War, another conflict for which there is no adequate history of Marine operations. Anne Cipriano Venzon's, *Leaders of Men: Ten Marines Who Changed the Corps* (2008), traces the careers of a group of officers, including Henry Clay Cochran, Robert W. Huntington, and John Twiggs Myers, to make a larger point about the changing nature of the institution. She argues that during the decades between the Civil War and World War II, these men led the Corps through an evolution from quasi-constabulary force into an elite fighting service with an ethos that set it apart from the other services.

There are few works on the Corps in World War I. The earliest effort, by Edwin McClellan (1920), is little more than a quick sketch, with quotes from key documents and a collection of statistical information on personnel and equipment, held together by a barebones narrative. George Clark (1999) created a more detailed account that makes use of first-person views. Although it has relatively few footnotes, his thorough bibliography shows his heavy use of a wealth of original sources. Edwin H. Simmons and Joseph H. Alexander (2008), in an effort that will stand the test of time, provide an excellent analysis of the war's effect on the Corps and the part Marines played in the outcome of this conflict. In the only significant combat narrative, Robert Asprey (1965) wrote a definitive account of Belleau Wood, giving a full perspective from both sides and proper credit to the Army half of the US 2nd Division. He concludes that the battle "resulted in a tremendous psychological victory for the Allies" (7). The action at Belleau Wood likewise largely gave birth to the sense of institutional pride that still inspires Marines today. Although only a single Marine brigade fought on the western front, there is room for additional scrutiny of its other major battles due to its pivotal place in the overall history of the Corps.

The so-called Banana Wars – the frequent US interventions in the Caribbean and Central America – formed another building block in the rapidly evolving esprit de corps of early twentieth-century Marines. Aside from relatively thin official histories, there are few works dedicated to these seminal campaigns. The only comprehensive account available is Ivan Musicant's (1990) look at the major operations from the seizure of Cuba in the Spanish–American War to the invasion of Panama in 1989. It is not expressly focused on the Corps, though the service features prominently in most of the book. Like so many works about Marines, however, it relied heavily on the slim official histories, other secondary sources and periodicals, and a sampling of personal papers, with only a smattering of official archival documents in evidence. There is also little analysis of the impact of these events on the Corps. Only two of these interventions in Cuba, 1906–9 (Millet

1968) and Haiti (Schmidt 1971) have received focused treatment: James H. McCrocklin (1956) describes the Marines' training of Haiti's military, 1915–34.

World War II has been the focus of a large share of all Marine history. The Corps itself devoted considerable effort to capturing its story in this global conflict. In the first decade after the war, its history office published more than a dozen substantial monographs on the major campaigns. Using those initial monographs and some fresh information, official historians subsequently put together five major volumes covering all significant aspects of Marine participation in the war (Hough, Ludwig and Shaw, 1958; Shaw and Kane, 1963; Shaw, Nalty and Turnbladh, 1966; Garand and Strobridge, 1968; Frank and Shaw, 1968). While these remain valuable accounts based on considerable research in primary sources, the authors clearly felt constrained, as they rarely critiqued questionable decisions and actions. Many of the subsequent accounts of Marines in World War II rely heavily on these official histories and plow little new ground beyond adding in bits and pieces garnered from oral histories and personal papers.

At the instigation of the Marine Corps following World War II, two academic historians studied the development of amphibious capability prior to and during the conflict. Relying almost entirely on sources made available by the Marines, Jeter Isley and Philip Crowl (1951) came to the unsurprising conclusion that the Corps was primarily responsible for progress in this field. Their research remains valid, but their account fails to provide a complete picture, since they concentrated on operations during the war rather than the critical period of trial and error beforehand. As an example, the creation of the seminal doctrinal manual is covered in less than two pages. Also, since there is very little coverage of Army amphibious landings in the Pacific (and none in the European theater), the authors do not discuss many of the vital contributions made by that service, thus leaving out critical context. John Lorelli (1995) provided a more comprehensive view of US amphibious operations, but it is primarily a narrative of events with little analysis of the development process.

A handful of Marine campaigns are well-covered by scholars. Robert Cressman (1995) captured the nearly mythical defense of Wake Island. Making extensive use of Japanese sources, he constructed a full description of both sides of the battle. Gregory Urwin (1997) added to the story with his extensive use of first-person accounts and his approach to the subject from the “bottom up” view of enlisted men and civilian workers. While it was a relatively small action, Urwin observed that it “took on a symbolic importance that outweighed its strategic consequences” (xv). The ordeal and triumph at Guadalcanal has received a major share of attention. Samuel Griffith (1963), a veteran of the campaign, created one of the best early works, but Richard Frank's (1990) hefty volume more than lived up to its billing as the definitive version. His thorough research and detailed evaluation of sources sorted out many of the lingering questions regarding that critical struggle.

Joseph Alexander (1997) provided a focused look at several critical amphibious assaults during the war – those “storm landings” that hit heavily defended beach-heads in the course of the campaign in the Central Pacific. His analysis of American leadership, tactics, equipment, and doctrine, coupled with the evolution of Japanese

counter-measures, supplied a valuable update to Isely and Crowl. As important, where they were constrained by the Corps' sponsorship of their effort, Alexander presented unvarnished commentary, for example, astutely describing Major General William Rupertus, the division commander at Peleliu, as "impatient, stubborn, and dour" (112). Earlier, Alexander (1995) wrote the definitive study of the Tarawa landing. Although the subject of numerous previous volumes, his work remains the most thoroughly researched and objectively analyzed. Making good use of Japanese sources, he was the first American to place the enemy commander's death on the first day and tie it to the failure of the defenders to launch a night counter-attack that would have made the battle much more costly for the Marines.

A controversial episode during the war was Marine Major General Holland M. Smith's relief of Army Major General Ralph C. Smith from command of the 27th Division on Saipan. It heightened already intense inter-service enmity. Harry Gailey (1986) undertook a strong defense of the Army point of view, arguing that both the division and its commander performed well under the circumstances. While a useful counterpoint to the more typical Marine-centric view, it is not necessarily more objective.

One of the best books to appear on the Corps in World War II is the recent re-evaluation of Iwo Jima by Robert Burrell (2006). In the aftermath of the battle, naval leaders sought to justify the high cost by citing the island's value as a fighter base and as an emergency landing strip for B-29 bombers, assertions accepted ever since by historians. Burrell traces the evolution of planning for the campaign and the sudden appearance of a new rationale after the fighting was over, demonstrates that fighters based on the island had little impact on subsequent operations, and exposes the statistical subterfuge concerning the number of airmen saved in emergency landings that has masked an operational mistake for more than 60 years. The author's questioning of long-accepted "truths" demonstrates that there is still considerable room for fresh research and analysis in the much-written-about Pacific conflict. Most campaigns, in fact, still lack any scholarly treatment beyond the official accounts.

Robert Sherrod (1952), a combat journalist who followed the Marines through several battles, wrote the most extensive history of the Corps' aviation arm during World War II. Based on thorough research, it suffered somewhat from his simple objective: "Just tell what happened" (vii). The amply detailed narrative of events was unaccompanied by much analysis of decisions, actions, and consequences. (A complete history of Marine air from its inception by Peter Mersky (1997) is marked by the same shortcoming.) There remains a need for an objective look at the growth, utility, and effectiveness of Marine aviation during the war, particularly in light of its designated role of supporting the Corps' ground units. Frank W. Walton (1986) assesses the record of a single squadron, VMF 214, the famed "Black Sheep," but no other aviation unit has received such in-depth analysis.

One long-overdue study was Gordon Rottman's (2002) compilation of order of battle information for the Corps during this conflict. More than a simple series of tables of organization, he explained the development and significance of the rapidly changing Marine establishment as it expanded from about 25,000 men in 1939 to a half million personnel (some of them women) by the war's end.



World War II marked the arrival of the Marine Corps on the scene as a major service within the US military establishment. After its bloody march across the beaches of the Pacific, it would never again act like a small branch of the Navy begging for scraps of the budget, wartime missions, and respect, though it would still have to fight for its very existence one more time. As noted by Heinl, Millett, Krulak, and others, the danger of extinction – real or imagined – had a definite impact on the Corps. One of the gravest threats to its survival came, paradoxically, immediately after World War II. Gordon Keiser (1982) studied the effort of Commandant Alexander A. Vandegrift and a handful of other officers to respond to the drive by the Army and Congress for defense unification in the period 1944–7. Behind-the-scenes public relations efforts and astute lobbying allowed the Corps to shape the resulting National Security Act of 1947 so that it actually strengthened the role of the smallest service *vis-à-vis* its counterparts. This detailed look at one inter-service battle demonstrates the substantial impact of institutional paranoia, leading the author to conclude that “survival fights have been invaluable in one respect: The doubt, apprehension, and sheer exertion have served to keep the Corps introspective, organizationally lean, and rooted in traditional military values” (135).

The official history of the Marines in the Korean War consisted of five volumes that match or exceed the quality of their World War II counterparts, but likewise suffer from the same limitations (Montross and Canzona 1954, 1955, 1957; Montross, Kuokka, and Hicks 1961; Meid and Yingling 1972). Also like World War II, the actions of the Marines in Korea, particularly in the first year, have been the subject of numerous popular histories. Of the rare scholarly works, one that stands out is Heinl’s (1968) account of the landing at Inchon and the capture of Seoul. Ever a strong partisan of the Corps, the author gave due credit to General MacArthur’s bold vision and unwavering determination, as well as the Navy’s wealth of amphibious expertise.

For Vietnam, official Marine historians produced nine volumes covering the operational aspects of the war (Whitlow 1977; Shulimson and Johnson 1978; Shulimson 1982; Telfer, Rogers and Fleming 1984; Cosmas and Murray 1986; Smith 1988; Dunham and Quinlan 1990; Melson and Arnold 1991; Shulimson, Blaisol, Smith and Dawson 1997). This controversial conflict has received somewhat more attention from academics, with considerable debate regarding what the United States might have done to avoid the fall of its South Vietnamese ally. Michael A. Hennessy (1997) succinctly described two of the major competing theories. The first argues that the US should have ignored the guerrillas and carried out a conventional defense of the northern perimeter of South Vietnam in order to cut off external Communist support for the insurgency. The other contends that a focus on the North Vietnamese Army drained resources from the anti-guerrilla campaign, which alone could result in ultimate victory for the South. In focusing on the experience of the Marines in the northern provinces, Hennessey concluded that the Communists successfully placed US forces on the horns of a dilemma in which they ignored either threat at their peril. He argued convincingly that while General William Westmoreland probably expended too much effort

trying to disrupt the enemy main forces, much of that endeavor was necessary to protect any progress being made at securing the population and improving its lot via pacification, a mission which required far more resources than it received. In the end, he finds a mismatch between US forces and the strategic objective they were tasked to achieve.

Both Krulak (1984) and Walt (1970), senior Marine commanders in the first years of the war, argued that greater emphasis on counterinsurgency would have made a difference. Michael Peterson (1989) weighed in with a more narrow study of the Marines' Combined Action Program (CAP), the operational method championed by Krulak and Walt. While he found that it accomplished some positive things in terms of providing security and modest development to the hamlets, he believed that the war could not be won by any strategy and therefore a greater reliance on CAP would not have appreciably changed the outcome.

Official historians have described Marine operations in Grenada in 1983 (Spector 1987), Lebanon (Frank 1987), and the Gulf War (Cureton 1993; Mroczkowski 1993; Quilter 1993; Brown 1998; Stearns 1999; Zimmeck 1999), but these campaigns have not yet generated much interest from the scholarly community. This is likely due at least in part to the difficulty of accessing official records that are in some cases still classified. Equally important, as electronic records have become more pervasive, it is an open question whether a sufficient volume of material will make it into permanent repositories in a form accessible for future use.

### Specialized Studies

Examinations of an institution's personnel and related policies are one major aspect in this field and might embrace issues of race, class, and gender, as well as more general categories. Until the last few decades, the record of the Corps with regard to race and gender has at best mirrored the flaws in American society as a whole. A few African-Americans served in the Continental Marines, but when the US Marine Corps came into being in 1798, the Commandant explicitly forbade enlistment of non-whites. That prohibition remained in effect against African-Americans for more than 140 years, long after the Army and Navy enlisted them (albeit usually in segregated units or in strictly limited roles such as stewards). Henry Shaw and Ralph Donnelly (1975), official historians, recounted the Corps' reluctant acceptance of African-Americans early in World War II, their eventual integration into all units just prior to the Korean War (both steps as a result of presidential decisions), and the long struggle to root out prejudice. More recently, Al Davis (2000) tracked the efforts of the Corps in the latter part of the last century to increase the number, rank, and influence of African-Americans in its officer corps. While this is another official project, it dealt honestly with the challenges that the Corps found within itself as it tried to achieve a more diverse population in its ranks.

Women found it almost as difficult to serve as Marines. Except for a brief period in World War I (when they worked as clerks in uniform with no military training), the Corps also excluded women until World War II. Pat Meid (1964) described

the advent of a female component in the Marines during the latter conflict, while Mary Stremlow (1986) covered their long march to full inclusion in the Corps over the next two decades. Both works were official histories, but they lay the groundwork for more searching studies.

Other personnel topics include discipline and recruiting. In the history of the Corps, the two intersected most vividly in 1956 when a drill instructor at Parris Island sought to punish his platoon of recruits by marching them through a tidal estuary. Six drowned. The resulting publicity and trial forced the Corps to make fundamental changes to recruit training in an effort to weed out hazing and cruelty while still retaining the essence of the process (often regarded by those who have served as a semi-mystical rite of passage) that transformed young civilians into Marines. Keith Fleming (1990) studied the incident, the stress at the time on drill instructors that instigated it, and its impact on the Corps and its training practices. John Stevens (1999) followed with a more thorough look at the trial itself. Together these two works provide valuable coverage of a critical moment in the existence of the Corps.

Wartime behavior forms another segment of the personnel arena. One of the haunting events of the Vietnam War was the Army's involvement in the My Lai massacre. While that disgraceful episode was not typical of the conduct of US forces, neither was it the sole such incident. Gary Solis (1989) reviewed the Corps' handling of the full range of serious infractions in the conflict. While not meant as an exhaustive survey of atrocities or breaches of military discipline, his work affords a good look at the conduct of that small percentage of Marines who faltered in the field and in the rear. His focus, however, was the legal system, not the conduct itself. His conclusion reported the belief of most senior military legal specialists that the full range of constitutional safeguards included in the Uniform Code of Military Justice was ill-suited to application in a war zone. Solis (1997) followed up with a volume devoted solely to one incident, a village massacre that "was the nadir of the Marine Corps' Vietnam experience" (xv). His account made clear that the Corps and the US military in general were ill-prepared to prosecute and defend cases of war crimes by their own personnel – a conclusion of more than passing interest given events in the nation's ongoing conflict.

One staple in histories of the Vietnam War is that Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara's Project 100,000 forced the Marine Corps to take in numerous under-qualified recruits, thus contributing to severe problems with discipline and performance. David Dawson (1995) looked in detail at the numbers and capabilities of the men brought in under the program and how they fared in training and in combat. He compared this data with experience in World War II, concluding that manpower needs would have led the Corps to lower its accession standards in any case, and that those taken in via the project did not "create or significantly exacerbate disciplinary problems" (194). His refutation of a long-held notion provides valuable insight on personnel issues not only during the Vietnam conflict, but for all major wars in the latter half of the twentieth century.

One of the most intriguing personnel policy studies is an evaluation by Matthew Markel (2000) of the results of promotion by selection. He compared the degree

of initiative of Marine and Army commanders at the battalion through brigade level, arguing that Army leaders showed a great deal more of that quality during World War II, but then sank to the same level of risk aversion as their Marine contemporaries by the Vietnam War. He assigns the blame for this to the adoption of promotion by selection in the Corps in the 1930s, whereas the Army did not follow suit until after World War II. This directly counters the standard wisdom that promotion by selection improved the quality of officers. However, his basis for comparison of initiative rests solely on a broad assumption about tactics over the course of three wars that is totally unsupported by any detailed evidence or analysis in his study. As an example, he postulates that Marines in the Pacific almost always conducted frontal attacks whereas the Army generally used maneuver. One need only look at the battle for Okinawa to suggest an opposite conclusion (which would be no more valid as a characterization of all leaders in the war). His work does raise a compelling issue about changes in the quality of leadership over time that should attract more rigorous study in the future.

Yet another possible thread involves motivation in war. One of the most controversial works in the field is the study of the Marines' mental approach to World War II by Craig Cameron (1994). He theorized that "the barbarization of the war [in the Pacific] related to the often abstract images men carried onto its battlefields" (2) and that "American willingness to exploit to their fullest potential technologies of mass destruction was driven by a dehumanizing, racist ideology" (166). While there is no denying his basic premise that the conflict with Japan was especially brutal (on both sides), there remains considerable room for debate about the proximate causes. Race certainly played a role, but does not explain the equal readiness of Allied forces to conduct terror bombing against cities in Germany as well as those in Japan, nor the propensity of American troops to generally spare the lives of enemy civilians when they were encountered on the battlefields of Saipan and Okinawa. His work did, however, accurately capture many psychological aspects of service in the Corps and highlights that the source of motivation and attitudes in war remains an area ripe for investigation.

Another broad avenue of study involves a military institution's development of missions and the capability to conduct them. Given the focus of Millett and Krulak on the importance of adaptation and innovation, the study of Kenneth Clifford (1973) on the development of new equipment and doctrine from 1900 to 1970 is a valuable effort to document the Corps' progress. He observed that one of the most notable features of this record is that Marines put together viable doctrine for both amphibious and vertical envelopment operations before they had effective landing craft or helicopters. His work provides a useful overview of the subject, but much remains to be researched to determine exactly how and why the Corps succeeded in these endeavors.

Keith Bickel (2001) brought a more focused look at the Corps' development of doctrine for another mission – counterinsurgency – during the period between the World Wars. His approach is not entirely historical, since he sought to analyze the process through the lens of theories about the development of doctrine and corporate learning. To his credit, he did not find any of these models a compelling

fit and his arguments were therefore not designed to make the evidence support a particular thesis. He compiles considerable research that sheds much light on the issue, but did not reach a final conclusion beyond the important role that experience in small wars played in preparing Marine leaders for combat in World War II. The work suffered to a degree from the author's limited background in the field of Marine Corps history and the narrowness of his sources (which did not include many official documents held by the National Archives). There thus remains a need for a definitive study of the origins of a manual that is still widely recognized today as a worthwhile contribution in the field of counterinsurgency doctrine.

Weapons have almost always helped define the other major services or their branches, but for the Corps – which prides itself on the notion that every Marine is a rifleman – equipment more often has been a secondary consideration. Ken Estes' (2000) thorough study of the Corps' use of tanks throughout the last century provided a detailed look at the shifting attitude of Marines toward heavy combat vehicles. He analyzed the ever-present tension between the need to remain light to facilitate amphibious operations and the requirement, once ashore, to have enough armor and firepower to defeat enemy units usually boasting strong fortifications or their own tanks or even both. Victor Croizat (1992) presented a worthwhile review of the Corps' development and use of amphibious vehicles, but his well-researched narrative lacked a policy or analytical bent to match that of Estes.

### Biographies

Both the Army and the Navy came fairly late to an organizational setup that vested overwhelming authority in a single chief of staff or chief of naval operations. The office of Commandant of the Marine Corps, by contrast, was created in the infancy of the service and the incumbent always has held considerably more institutional sway than his counterparts in the other services. Marines, as a rule, also have traditionally regarded their commandant with more awe and endowed him with more importance than other military personnel do their own service chiefs. The Millett and Shulimson (2004) compilation of biographical essays on all but the most recent commandants therefore provides considerable insight into why and how the Corps has developed as an institution. It further filled a particularly valuable niche since only two of these officers have been the subject of a full-scale biography. John Chapin (1993) contributed a similar volume on the senior enlisted leaders of the Corps. While not as scholarly, it was based on primary research and is a useful source regarding the role of the office of Sergeant Major of the Marine Corps.

In fact, the historiography of the Corps suffers from a lack of good biographies of most of its leading figures. The only commandants treated so far are General John A. Lejeune, who held the office 1920–9, and David M. Shoup, who served as head of the Corps 1960–3. Merrill Bartlett (1991) summarized Lejeune's key achievement in developing the Corps' capability to conduct amphibious operations at a time when the service was pre-occupied with ongoing colonial infantry missions in the Caribbean. Were it not for his foresight and his ability to impose his will on

the institution and to garner the support of Congress, the Marine Corps would never have gained the prominence it would achieve from World War II onward. The only shortcoming of Bartlett's account is the level of detail in its 200 pages – far too little for the story of this critical leader. In an even briefer study of Shoup, Howard Jablon (2005) devoted less space to the time Shoup served as Commandant than to the general's subsequent campaign in retirement against the Vietnam War.

Another biographical contribution covering this era is the account of General Smedley D. Butler by Hans Schmidt (1987). Butler, one of the Corps' quintessential colonial warriors, was in many respects the antithesis of Lejeune. Brash, opinionated, outspoken, and prone to lead with a "guileless theatricality" (4), he had a knack for creating favorable publicity for the Corps that helped Lejeune achieve his goals, even though they conflicted with Butler's. Schmidt developed Butler's personality and his controversial stand on issues, especially his disillusionment in retirement and ultimate opposition to imperialistic US foreign policy. But the author's focus on the larger political issues prevented this from being a completely effective military biography that fully captures Butler's impact on the Corps.

Bartlett joined with Dirk Ballendorf (1997) to investigate the career of Lieutenant Colonel Earl H. "Pete" Ellis. He has long been a mythic figure within the Corps for his well-known authorship in 1920 of a seminal evaluation of the requirement for amphibious operations, as well as his mysterious death just three years later during an intelligence-gathering mission to the Japanese-controlled islands of the western Pacific. Their thorough research cemented his reputation as a far-sighted operational thinker and debunked most of the wild tales surrounding his untimely demise due to alcoholism.

Perhaps the best entry in this genre is the study of General Gerald C. Thomas by Millett (1993). Thomas had proven his courage as an enlisted Marine and junior officer on the battlefields of France in World War I. But he would make his reputation and affect the Corps most as an intelligent and perceptive staff officer who played a major role in shepherding the Corps from a small organization fighting colonial conflicts in the 1920s and 1930s to the large service that helped determine the outcome of World War II and the Korean War. The biography of Major General Merritt A. "Red Mike" Edson by Jon Hoffman (1994) supplements the Thomas book, since the two officers were contemporaries, friends, and cohorts in the effort to enhance the effectiveness of the Corps.

Both Thomas and Edson were with General Vandegrift at Guadalcanal. In the latter stages of the war, Thomas ran the Plans and Policies Division under Commandant Vandegrift while Edson served as chief of staff of Fleet Marine Force Pacific and then head of Service Command. From their respective positions and with their influence on Vandegrift, they worked together to develop and implement changes that helped the Corps man, equip, and supply a force of half a million men and women for war. After the conflict, they played central roles in preserving the institution in the face of unification. Biographies of Krulak and General Merrill B. Twining, both of whom worked closely with Thomas and Edson throughout the war and postwar period, would help flesh out the story of a small group that wielded outsize influence on an entire service.



Two of the more senior Marine leaders in World War II have received biographical treatment. Norman Cooper (1987) covered the life of Holland Smith, primarily responsible for turning doctrine into true capability as the commander of an amphibious training force in the early days of the conflict. He went on to lead the landing force at Tarawa and eventually all Marine forces in the Pacific. His vigorous defense of Marine prerogatives versus the Army and Navy resulted in stormy relations with those services, epitomized by his relief of an Army division commander on Saipan. Anne Venzon (2003) added to the story with her brief biography of Smith, a version informed by her more extensive knowledge of Marine Corps history. Neither author made much use of official documents or Smith's personnel files, however, so a definitive portrait of this key personality awaits a fresh effort. The same can be said of the Roger Willock (1968) biography of General Roy S. Geiger, a Marine aviation pioneer who rose to command a Marine amphibious corps and, briefly, Tenth Army on Okinawa, and served as Holland Smith's successor at Fleet Marine Force Pacific. Willock's account, moreover, lacks any documentation of sources beyond a brief bibliography.

General O. P. Smith is not particularly well known, probably due as much to his quiet personality as anything else, but he served in significant roles in a number of campaigns in the Pacific conflict and commanded the 1st Marine Division throughout its epic early battles in Korea. Clifton La Bree (2001) relied heavily on Smith's extensive personal papers to craft an account of the general's life, but the result (which covers the general's first 44 years in 8 pages) consists of too many long quotations and is more a partial memoir rather than a thorough and objective study.

Other biographies capture two of the legends of the Corps. Hoffman (2001) explained how Lieutenant General Lewis B. "Chesty" Puller's "approach to the challenge of commanding men has endured as a paramount touchstone in an institution that prizes leadership above all other qualities" (538). Like many of his contemporaries, Puller fought in the Banana Wars, the Pacific, and again in Korea. While his emphasis on leading from the front and looking out for the welfare of his Marines was neither revolutionary in the Corps nor unique in history, he cultivated that image as no other Leatherneck ever had and became synonymous with it, to the point that he set the tone for Marine officers and noncommissioned officers and has been revered ever since as the very icon of the institution. Bruce Gamble (2000) chronicled the life of Colonel Gregory "Pappy" Boyington, the flamboyant World War II ace who was equally noted for his daring bravery in aerial combat and his drunken exploits on the ground. He was hardly an ideal role model, but his irreverence for authority brought him lasting notoriety and helped create the image (justified or not) of Marine fighter pilots.

Biography tends to focus on major personalities, but it can be equally useful in looking at those who did not rise to the highest ranks. Probably the only scholarly story of an enlisted Marine is Al Hemingway's (1988) account of Ira Hayes, a Pima Indian who served as a Marine paratrooper and achieved fame as one of the flag-raisers in Joe Rosenthal's immortal photo taken on Iwo Jima. The author described Hayes' descent into alcoholism, exacerbated by the glare of publicity

from the iconic image and probably also by what today would be characterized as post-traumatic stress. Perry Smith (1998) described the life of Lieutenant Colonel Aquilla James Dyess, who bore the unique distinction of receiving both the Carnegie Medal for civilian heroism and the Medal of Honor. The first came as a college student in 1928, when he risked his own life to save two women who were drowning. The second followed his valorous death in action on Roi-Namur in 1944.

While most memoirs by Marines focus on operations, those by Commandants John A. Lejeune (1930) and Alexander A. Vandegrift (1964) are of value because they provide insight into the institutional development of the Marine Corps.

In some respects, little has changed since 1890, since most authors writing about the Corps (even those who bring solid academic credentials to the task) have ties to the institution either as veterans or official historians. While that certainly does not diminish their contributions, and in fact can provide a valuable source of understanding, the quality of discourse would be enhanced by a wider range of voices focusing their effort on the subject. In all fields save comprehensive accounts, the historiography of the Corps remains very much a work in progress with ample opportunity for scholars to contribute to the evolving narrative of the Marines.

#### BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Aldrich, M. Almey (1875). *History of the U.S. Marine Corps*. Boston: H. L. Shepard & Co.
- Alexander, Joseph H. (1995). *Utmost Savagery: The Three Days of Tarawa*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Alexander, Joseph H. (1997). *Storm Landings: Epic Amphibious Battles in the Central Pacific*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Asprey, Robert B. (1965). *At Belleau Wood*. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons.
- Ballendorf, Dirk Anthony, and Merrill Lewis Bartlett (1997). *Pete Ellis: An Amphibious Warfare Prophet, 1880–1923*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Bartlett, Merrill L. (1991). *Lejeune: A Marine's Life, 1867–1942*. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.
- Bickel, Keith B. (2001). *Mars Learning: The Marine Corps' Development of Small Wars Doctrine, 1915–1940*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Brown, Ronald J. (1998). *U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990–1991: With Marine Forces Afloat in Desert Storm and Desert Shield*. Washington: History and Museums Division, Headquarters Marine Corps.
- Burrell, Robert S. (2006). *The Ghosts of Iwo Jima*. College Station: A&M University Press.
- Cameron, Craig M. (1994). *American Samurai: Myth, Imagination, and the Conduct of Battle in the First Marine Division, 1941–1951*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Chapin, John C. (1993). *Uncommon Men: The Sergeants Major of the Marine Corps*. Shippenburg, PA: White Mane Publishing.
- Clark, George B. (1999). *Devil Dogs: Fighting Marines of World War I*. Novato, CA: Presidio Press.
- Clifford, Kenneth J. (1973). *Progress and Purpose: A Developmental History of the United States Marine Corps, 1900–1970*. Washington: US Marine Corps.
- Collum, Richard S. (1890). *History of the United States Marine Corps*. Philadelphia: R. L. Hamersly and Co.

- Cooper, Norman V. (1987) *A Fighting General: The Biography of Gen. Holland M. "Howlin' Mad" Smith*. Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Association.
- Cosmas, Graham A., and Terrence P. Murray (1986). *U.S. Marines in Vietnam: Vietnamization and Redeployment, 1970–1971*. Washington: History and Museums Division, Headquarters Marine Corps.
- Cressman, Robert J. (1995). *A Magnificent Fight: The Battle for Wake Island*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Croizat, Victor J. (1992). *Across the Reef: The Amphibious Tracked Vehicle at War*. Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Association.
- Crumley, B. L. (2002) *The Marine Corps: Three Centuries of Glory*. San Diego, CA: Thunder Bay Press.
- Cureton, Charles H. (1993). *U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990–1991: With the 1st Marine Division in Desert Storm and Desert Shield*. Washington: History and Museums Division, Headquarters Marine Corps.
- Davis, Alphonse G. (2000). *Pride, Progress, and Prospects: The Marine Corps' Efforts to Increase the Presence of African-American Officers (1970–1995)*. Washington: History and Museums Division, Headquarters, US Marine Corps.
- Dawson, David A. (1995). *The Impact of Project 100,000 on the Marine Corps*. Washington: US Marine Corps.
- Donnelly, Ralph W. (1989). *The Confederate States Marine Corps: The Rebel Leathernecks*. Shippensburg, PA: White Mane Publishing.
- Dunham, George R., and David A. Quinlan (1990). *U.S. Marines in Vietnam: The Bitter End 1973–1975*. Washington: History and Museums Division, Headquarters Marine Corps.
- Estes, Kenneth W. (2000). *Marines Under Armor: The Marine Corps and the Armored Fighting Vehicle, 1916–2000*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Fleming, Keith (1990). *The U.S. Marine Corps in Crisis: Ribbon Creek and Recruit Training*. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.
- Frank, Benis M. (1987). *U.S. Marines in Lebanon, 1982–1984*. Washington: History and Museums Division, Headquarters, US Marine Corps.
- Frank, Benis M., and Henry I. Shaw, Jr. (1968). *History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II*, vol. 5: *Victory and Occupation*. Washington: Historical Branch, Headquarters Marine Corps.
- Frank, Richard B. (1990). *Guadalcanal: The Definitive Account of the Landmark Battle*. New York: Random House.
- Gailey, Harry A. (1986). *"Howlin' Mad" vs. the Army: Conflict in Command, Saipan 1944*. Novato, CA: Presidio Press.
- Gamble, Bruce (2000) *Black Sheep One: The Life of Gregory "Pappy" Boyington*. Novato, CA: Presidio Press.
- Garand, George W., and Truman R. Strobridge (1968). *History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II*, vol. 4: *Western Pacific Operations*. Washington: Historical Branch, Headquarters Marine Corps.
- Griffith, Samuel B., II (1963). *The Battle for Guadalcanal*. Philadelphia: Lippincott.
- Heinl, Robert D. Jr. (1962). *Soldiers of the Sea: The U.S. Marine Corps, 1775–1962*. Annapolis, MD: US Naval Institute.
- Heinl, Robert D., Jr. (1968). *Victory at High Tide: The Inchon-Seoul Campaign*. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott.
- Hemingway, Albert (1988). *Ira Hayes: Pima Marine*. Lanham, MD: University Press of America.

- Hennessy, Michael A. (1997). *Strategy in Vietnam: The Marines and Revolutionary Warfare in I Corps, 1965–1972*. Westport, CT: Praeger.
- Hoffman, Jon T. (1994). *Once a Legend: "Red Mike" Edson of the Marine Raiders*. Novato, CA: Presidio Press.
- Hoffman, Jon T. (2001). *Chesty: The Story of Lieutenant General Lewis B. Puller*. New York: Random House.
- Hough, Frank O., Verle E. Ludwig, and Henry I. Shaw, Jr. (1958). *History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II*, vol. 1: *Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal*. Washington: Historical Branch, Headquarters Marine Corps.
- Isely, Jeter A., and Philip A. Crowl (1951). *The U.S. Marines and Amphibious War: Its Theory, and Its Practice in the Pacific*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Jablon, Howard (2005). *David M. Shoup: A Warrior against War*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
- Keiser, Gordon W. (1982). *The U.S. Marine Corps and Defense Unification, 1944–1947: The Politics of Survival*. Washington: National Defense University Press.
- Krulak, Victor H. (1984). *First To Fight: An Inside View of the U.S. Marine Corps*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- La Bree, Clifton (2001). *The Gentle Warrior: General Oliver Prince Smith, USMC*. Kent, OH: Kent State University Press.
- Lejeune, John A. (1930). *The Reminiscences of a Marine*. Philadelphia: Dorrance and Co.
- Lorelli, John A. (1995). *To Foreign Shores: U.S. Amphibious Operations in World War II*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Markel, Matthew Wade (2000). *The Organization Man at War: Promotion Policies and Military Leadership, 1929–1992*. Ann Arbor, MI: University Microfilm.
- McClellan, Edwin N. (1920). *The United States Marine Corps in the World War*. Washington: Government Printing Office.
- McClellan, Edwin N. (1925–32). "History of the United States Marine Corps," 2 vols. [mimeographed] Washington: Headquarters Marine Corps.
- McCrocklin, James H. [comp.] (1956). *Garde d'Haiti, 1915–1934: Twenty Years of Organization and Training by the United States Marines*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Meid, Pat (1964). *Marine Corps Women's Reserve in World War II*. Washington: US Marine Corps.
- Meid, Pat, and James M. Yingling (1972). *U.S. Marine Corps Operations in Korea, 1950–1953*, vol. 5: *Operations in West Korea*. Washington: Historical Branch, Headquarters Marine Corps.
- Melson, Charles D., and Curtis G. Arnold (1991). *U.S. Marines in Vietnam: The War That Would Not End, 1971–1973*. Washington: History and Museums Division, Headquarters Marine Corps.
- Mersky, Peter B. (1997). *U.S. Marine Corps Aviation: 1912 to the Present*. Baltimore, MD: Nautical & Aviation Publishing Company of America.
- Metcalf, Clyde H. (1939). *A History of the United States Marine Corps*. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons.
- Millett, Allan R. (1968). *The Politics of Intervention: The Military Occupation of Cuba, 1906–1909*. Columbus: Ohio State University Press.
- Millett, Allan R. (1980). *Semper Fidelis: The History of the United States Marine Corps*. New York: Macmillan.
- Millett, Allan R. (1993). *In Many a Strife: General Gerald C. Thomas and the U.S. Marine Corps, 1917–1956*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.

- Millett, Allan R., and Jack Shulimson, eds. (2004). *Commandants of the Marine Corps*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Montross, Lynn, and Nicholas A. Canzona (1954). *U.S. Marine Corps Operations in Korea, 1950–1953*, vol. 1: *The Pusan Perimeter*. Washington: Historical Branch, Headquarters Marine Corps.
- Montross, Lynn, and Nicholas A. Canzona (1955). *U.S. Marine Corps Operations in Korea, 1950–1953*, vol. 2: *The Inchon-Seoul Operations*. Washington: Historical Branch, Headquarters Marine Corps.
- Montross, Lynn, and Nicholas A. Canzona (1957). *U.S. Marine Corps Operations in Korea, 1950–1953*, vol. 3: *The Chosin Reservoir Campaign*. Washington: Historical Branch, Headquarters Marine Corps.
- Montross, Lynn, Hubard D. Kuokka, and Norman W. Hicks (1961). *U.S. Marine Corps Operations in Korea, 1950–1953*, vol. 4: *The East-Central Front*. Washington: Historical Branch, Headquarters Marine Corps.
- Moskin, J. Robert (1977). *The U.S. Marine Corps Story*. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Mroczkowski, Dennis P. (1993). *U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990–1991: With the 2nd Marine Division in Desert Storm and Desert Shield*. Washington: History and Museums Division, Headquarters Marine Corps.
- Musicant, Ivan (1990). *The Banana Wars: A History of United States Military Intervention in Latin America from the Spanish–American War to the Invasion of Panama*. New York: Macmillan.
- Peterson, Michael E. (1989). *The Combined Action Platoons: The U.S. Marines' Other War in Vietnam*. New York: Praeger.
- Quilter, Charles J., II (1993). *U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990–1991: With the I Marine Expeditionary Force in Desert Storm and Desert Shield*. Washington: History and Museums Division, Headquarters Marine Corps.
- Rottman, Gordon L. (2002). *U.S. Marine Corps World War II Order of Battle: Ground and Air Units in the Pacific War, 1939–1945*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
- Schmidt, Hans (1971). *The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915–1934*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.
- Schmidt, Hans (1987). *Maverick Marine: General Smedley D. Butler and the Contradictions of American Military History*. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky.
- Shaw, Henry I., Jr., and Ralph W. Donnelly (1975). *Blacks in the Marine Corps*. Washington: US Marine Corps.
- Shaw, Henry I., Jr., and Douglas T. Kane (1963). *History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II*, vol. 2: *Isolation of Rabaul*. Washington: Historical Branch, Headquarters Marine Corps.
- Shaw, Henry I., Jr., Bernard C. Nalty, and Edwin T. Turnbladh (1966). *History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II*, vol. 3: *Central Pacific Drive*. Washington: Historical Branch, Headquarters Marine Corps.
- Sherrod, Robert (1952). *History of Marine Corps Aviation in World War II*. Washington: Combat Forces Press.
- Shulimson, Jack (1982). *U.S. Marines in Vietnam: An Expanding War 1966*. Washington: History and Museums Division, Headquarters Marine Corps.
- Shulimson, Jack (1993). *The Marine Corps' Search for a Mission, 1880–1898*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
- Shulimson, Jack, and Charles M. Johnson (1978). *U.S. Marines in Vietnam: The Landing and the Buildup 1965*. Washington: History and Museums Division, Headquarters Marine Corps.



- Shulimson, Jack, Leonard A. Blaisol, Charles R. Smith, and David A. Dawson (1997). *U.S. Marines in Vietnam: The Defining Year 1968*. Washington: History and Museums Division, Headquarters Marine Corps.
- Simmons, Edwin H. (1974). *The United States Marines: The First Two Hundred Years, 1775–1976*. New York: Viking.
- Simmons, Edwin H., and Joseph H. Alexander (2008). *Through the Wheat: the U.S. Marines in World War I*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Smith, Charles R. (1975). *Marines in the Revolution: A History of the Continental Marines in the American Revolution, 1775–1783*. Washington: US Marine Corps.
- Smith, Charles R. (1988). *U.S. Marines in Vietnam: High Mobility and Standdown, 1969*. Washington: History and Museums Division, Headquarters Marine Corps.
- Smith, Perry M. (1998). *A Hero Among Heroes: Jimmie Dyess and the 4th Marine Division*. Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Association.
- Solis, Gary D. (1989). *Marines and Military Law in Vietnam: Trial by Fire*. Washington: US Marine Corps.
- Solis, Gary D. (1997). *Son Thang: An American War Crime*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Spector, Ronald H. (1987). *U.S. Marines in Grenada, 1983*. Washington: History and Museums Division, Headquarters, US Marine Corps.
- Stearns, LeRoy D. (1999). *U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990–1991: The 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing in Desert Storm and Desert Shield*. Washington: History and Museums Division, Headquarters Marine Corps.
- Stevens, John C. III (1999). *Court-Martial at Parris Island: The Ribbon Creek Incident*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Stremlow, Mary V. (1986). *A History of the Women Marines, 1946–1977*. Washington: Marine Corps.
- Sullivan, David M. (1997–2000). *The United States Marine Corps in the Civil War*. Shipensburg, PA: White Mane Publishing.
- Telfer, Gary L., Lane Rogers, and V. Keith Fleming, Jr. (1984). *U.S. Marines in Vietnam: Fighting the North Vietnamese, 1967*. Washington: History and Museums Division, Headquarters Marine Corps.
- Urwin, Gregory J. (1997). *Facing Fearful Odds: The Siege of Wake Island*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
- Vandegrift, Alexander A. (1964). *Once a Marine: The Memoirs of General A. A. Vandegrift, as told to Robert B. Asbrey*. New York: W. W. Norton.
- Venzon, Anne Cipriano (2003). *From Whaleboats to Amphibious Warfare: Lt. Gen. "Howling Mad" Smith and the U.S. Marine Corps*. Westport, CT: Praeger.
- Venzon, Anne Cipriano (2008). *Leaders of Men: Ten Marines Who Changed the Corps*. Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press.
- Walt, Lewis W. (1970). *Strange War, Strange Strategy*. New York: Funk & Wagnalls.
- Walton, Frank E. (1986). *Once They Were Eagles*. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky.
- Whitlow, Robert H. (1977). *U.S. Marines in Vietnam: The Advisory & Combat Assistance Era, 1954–1964*. Washington: History and Museums Division, Headquarters Marine Corps.
- Willock, Roger (1968). *Unaccustomed to Fear: A Biography of the Late General Roy S. Geiger*. Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Association.
- Zimmeck, Steven M. (1999). *U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990–1991: Combat Service Support in Desert Storm and Desert Shield*. Washington: History and Museums Division, Headquarters Marine Corps.



## Chapter Twenty-five

# THE US COAST GUARD AND ITS PREDECESSOR AGENCIES

*C. Douglas Kroll*

The history of the United States Coast Guard, the fifth and smallest branch of America's armed forces is a challenging undertaking. Now a part of the Department of Homeland Security in peacetime and the Department of the Navy during time of war or whenever the President so directs, the Coast Guard is a unique, multi-mission armed force. The history of this branch of the armed forces must include the history of its four predecessor agencies for the Coast Guard, which was created in 1915 by merging the Revenue-Cutter Service with the Life-Saving Service, and has since evolved to include the Lighthouse Service in 1939 and the Bureau of Marine Inspection and Navigation in 1942.

The Revenue Cutter Service has been seen as the predominant of the predecessor services which later amalgamated to produce the present-day Coast Guard. As result the earliest histories of the Coast Guard have been histories of the Revenue Cutter Service, and even that predecessor agency has, until recently, been greatly overlooked. Irving H. King (1978) quotes the late Howard I. Chapelle, who in 1935 wrote:

Though the amount of literature dealing with various phases of American maritime history is very great, there is surprisingly little to be found regarding the United States revenue cutters or their work.... The lack of interest among American maritime historians in the United States Revenue Marine is difficult to explain for the service has had a remarkable career, full of incidents of historical importance, and was founded some years before the Navy. (Chapelle 1935: 176)

What was true in 1935 has continued to be true to this day, not only for the Revenue Cutter Service but also for the other predecessor agencies that make up today's United States Coast Guard. While in recent years there have been a number of books published in this area, there is still much research and writing to be done on this often overlooked branch on the United States Armed Forces.

In addition, most of the early histories, and even some later ones have been written by retired Coast Guard personnel, often as amateur historians. These early histories were more popular than academic and had few citations and no bibliog-

raphies. They also tended to focus on the senior officers of the service to the exclusion of civilian officials and enlisted personnel. Nevertheless, these contributions have been invaluable and significant, perhaps because of lack of interest of most maritime historians. Prior to the 1970s the only published histories were by retired Coast Guard officers: Senior Captain Horatio Smith, USRCS (1932), Captain Steven Evans, USCG (1949), and Captain Walter Capron, USCG (1965).

Capron's first general history of the Coast Guard, established the pattern of seeing the Revenue Cutter Service as the predominant of the predecessor services which later amalgamated to produce the present-day Coast Guard. This is because this seagoing establishment has absorbed all the other agencies.

Evans (1949) writes of the Revenue-Cutter Service and only deals with the Life-Saving Service and the Lighthouse Service, in so far as they impact on or were connected to the Revenue-Cutter Service. In his third book, Irving King (1996), a professor at the Coast Guard Academy, devoted one chapter to a general history of the Life-Saving Service which merged with the Revenue-Cutter Service in 1915 to form the Coast Guard. Capron (1965) and Bloomfield (1966) writing on broader Coast Guard history devote a chapter not only to the Life-Saving Service, but also to the Lighthouse Service and the Bureau of Marine Inspection and Navigation. It was not until Dennis Noble that separate histories were written of the Life-Saving Service (1994) and the Lighthouse Service (1997).

### Revenue-Cutter Service

The Revenue-Cutter Service originated in an August 4, 1790 Act of Congress authorizing construction of ten "boats or cutters ... to be employed for the protection of the revenue." Referred to as the "Revenue Service" or "Revenue-Marine" until the 1890s, it was part of the Treasury Department. When war with France threatened in 1797, the cutters, the nation's only sea-going armed service at the time, were ordered to provide coast defense and commerce protection in their cruising areas. The following October, the Service's eight cutters were transferred to the newly established Navy Department, setting the precedent for wartime duty. Additional duties assigned to the Service included enforcement of quarantine regulations (1799), assisting vessels in distress (1832), protection of live-oak preserves (1833), control of the Bering Sea fur seal and sea otter hunting (1870), and patrolling for icebergs (1912). The Division of Revenue Marine in the Treasury Department was given charge of revenue cutters, steamboat inspection, marine hospitals, and lifesaving stations in 1869.

Few documentary editions or reference works have been published to help researchers on this service. Among them are Noble's (1990) register of officers and Canney's (1995) book on cutters.

The first published history of the Revenue-Cutter Service appeared in 1932. Entitled *U.S. Revenue Cutter Service, 1789-1849*, and authored by Horatio Smith and Elliot Snow, it remains one of the best works available on the service's early history. Smith includes copies of numerous primary documents: letters, reports,

and congressional acts as well as lively accounts of Revenue-Cutter sailors enforcing customs laws, fighting the French and British, battling pirates and slavers, operations in the Mexican War, and much more.

Smith's history was followed by Stephen Hadley Evans' *The United States Coast Guard 1790–1915* (1949). The book is more a history of the Revenue-Cutter Service since the Coast Guard was not established until 1915. But seeing the Revenue-Cutter Service as the early Coast Guard is not unusual. Irving King (1978) entitled his history of the early days of the Revenue-Cutter Service, *George Washington's Coast Guard*.

In addition to its peacetime duties, the Revenue-Cutter Service participated in the quasi-war with France in 1798, in the War of 1812, in the Seminole War, in the Mexican War, and in the Civil War. All histories of the Revenue-Cutter Service include its participation in the nation's wars, but Florence Kern (1989) produced a separate history of the Revenue-Cutter Service during the Civil War. As her title indicates, it deals more with the revenue cutters than the service as a whole. With the acquisition of Alaska in 1876 the Revenue-Cutter Service took on an important new role. It became the only semblance of government known to the inhabitants of Alaska's western and northern coastlines. It helped protect both the fur seals and the fishing industry and provided a search and rescue service. Revenue cutters became floating medical centers and provided a taxi and postal service in the region. All of this has been recently examined by Strobridge and Noble (1999).

King's three volumes greatly expand and update the history of the Revenue-Cutter Service. King sees Evans as the father of Coast Guard history and fills many of Evan's gaps by presenting a scholarly, comprehensive history of the service's struggle to survive as an independent agency, its operations, its participation in the nation's wars, and its union with the Life-Saving Service to form the Coast Guard. He also included a chapter on the Coast Guard Academy, which since its inception in 1876 has educated the vast majority of the service's officer corps. King, however, disagreed with Evans over how the service evolved and drew different conclusions.

Both consider Sumner Kimball, who served as Chief of the Revenue-Marine Service, from 1871–8, to have instituted important reforms in the service. Kimball, as the first Chief of the Revenue-Marine Division, revised the *Regulations, U.S. Revenue Marine* to give the service a rational system of discipline and promotion by merit; made his office, rather than the local Collectors of Customs, responsible for operations, repair, supply, and personnel; and introduced the systematic inspection of units. Kimball's most important contribution was persuading Congress to establish a School of Instruction in 1876 so that it could select and train its own future officers. This School was the forerunner of the US Coast Guard Academy.

King agrees that the Revenue Cutter Service was improving under Kimball's leadership but is critical of both Kimball and his successor Ezra Clark (1878–89) for failing to reduce the commissioned officer corps as recommended in an 1870 special commission report to Congress. They both also unsuccessfully argued for a retirement system for revenue cutter officers similar to the Navy's.

Captain Leonard Shepard became the first serving officer designated Chief of the Revenue-Marine in 1889, a position renamed "captain-commandant" in 1908.

The School of Instruction had been closed by the government in 1890, due to a surplus of Naval Academy graduates. Shepard succeeded in getting the school reopened in 1894. He also was successful in obtaining a retirement system for the officer corps, in establishing the beginnings of a technical staff to advise and assist the Commandant in several specialties, and in increasing the enlisted men's daily ration allowance. Evans gives Shepard credit for dramatically improving the cutter fleet and the officer corps. King agrees that Shepard was an important commandant but argues that Shepard merely continued the reforms started by his civilian predecessors and that his accomplishments were quite modest.

It was under Shepard's successor, Captain Charles Shoemaker (1895–1905), that real progress came, in King's view. Shoemaker dramatically increased the number, power, and speed of the fleet of cutters. Eleven new cutters joined the fleet under Shoemaker's leadership. As a result of Congressional legislation on March 2, 1895, Shoemaker was able to force into retirement 39 officers who were disqualified for active service because of age or ill health. This enabled Shoemaker to improve the officer corps by appointing young, energetic, fully qualified men as junior officers. The public image of the service was enhanced under Shoemaker due to the 1897–8 Overland Expedition by men of the ship *Bear* that rescued whalers locked in ice near Point Barrow, Alaska (Bixby 1965), and the performance of the Revenue-Cutter Service in the Spanish–American War. King does acknowledge that Shoemaker's many accomplishments were due, in part, to the reforms already accomplished by Kimball, Clark, and Shepard.

There were numerous attempts during the life of the Revenue-Cutter Service to eliminate the service, usually by proposing transfer to the Navy or by the assumption of cutter duties by the Navy. These attempts usually took place during economy drives and frequently during low periods in the Navy's history. An attempt in 1911 led to a counter proposal to merge the Revenue-Cutter Service with the Life-Saving Service. This proposal gained strong bipartisan support and on January 30, 1915 the merger took place, forming the United States Coast Guard.

### **Life-Saving Service**

Established in 1848, the Life-Saving Service traces its roots to the Massachusetts Humane Society (est. 1785), which built life-saving stations along its coast, a movement that spread to New York and New Jersey (Ehrhardt 1950; Gibbs 1999). Its stations were manned by volunteers until 1856. When Sumner Increase Kimball became General Superintendent of the Life-Saving Service, 1871–1915, the service began a rapid expansion to 148 stations in 1878 and 279 stations on the east and west coasts and the Great Lakes by 1915 (Wolcott 1962). In that year the Life-Saving Service, also part of the Treasury Department, merged with the Revenue-Cutter Service to form the newly created US Coast Guard. In many respects it was absorbed. Prior to the 1970s the history of the US Life-Saving Service was only found within larger histories of the Coast Guard, often as a separate chapter. These were usually brief general historical overviews. There were also books the

focused on shipwrecks and rescues but did not explore the service in any depth. That began to change in the 1970s. The events leading up to the formation of the US Life-Saving Service were thoroughly covered by Robert F. Bennett (1976) and later, Dennis R. Means (1987). These led to the first book-length history of this predecessor service by Dennis L. Noble (1994). Because Bennett and Means had already covered the formative years of the service, Noble emphasizes the period from 1878 to 1915 when it merged with the Revenue-Cutter Service.

Noble not only details operational history and exploits of the Life-Saving Service but also covers its organization and rescue equipment and explores the lives and routines of early surfmen – the personnel who manned the stations and carried out rescue operations. Much different than the Revenue-Cutter Service, the Life-Saving Service consisted of civilians, many of them part-time employees. Noble argues that the demise of the Life-Saving Service was due to three factors: 1) advancements in marine technology and navigational aids meant that ships were able to stay further offshore and were less likely to run aground; 2) there was inadequate pay and no retirement system for Life-Saving Service personnel; and 3) a nationwide drive for economy and efficiency in the federal government. Ralph Shanks, Wick York, and Lisa Woo Shanks (1996) have also detailed the heroes, rescues, and architecture of this service.

The merger of the Life-Saving Service placed civilian lifesavers within a military organization. District Superintendents became commissioned officers, keepers became warrant officers, and Surfmen became enlisted men. Lifesavers also finally obtained a retirement system. While the merger took place in 1915, Capron (1965) writes from personal experience that the amalgamation of the two services was not fully implemented until the mid 1930s.

### The Lighthouse Service

The oldest of the five predecessor maritime organizations that make up the Coast Guard, the Lighthouse Service is the one that most fascinates Americans. Congress created it in 1789 as the Lighthouse Establishment, a branch of the Treasury Department, and charged it with the construction, maintenance, and operation of the nation's lighthouses. Commonly referred to as the Lighthouse Service, the organization was put under the direction of the Lighthouse Board in 1852. That body was composed of two officers from the Navy, two from the Army, two civilian scientists, and the Secretary of the Treasury. The nation was divided into 12 lighthouse districts, each of which was commanded by an army or naval officer. In 1903 the service was transferred to the new Department of Commerce and Labor. Renamed the Bureau of Lighthouses in 1910 and placed in the Commerce Department, it was merged with the Coast Guard in 1939.

Lighthouse admirers and books on lighthouses abound, but like the Life-Saving Service, Lighthouse Service history has only been found as a chapter within larger histories of the Coast Guard or brief references in the occasional book on lighthouses or a specific lighthouse. There have also been a number of excellent articles

on the service. Its development under Lighthouse Board is examined in an article by John Sands (1987).

Absorbed into the Coast Guard in 1939, a detailed history of the service has yet to be written. Such a history may be unmanageable. Perhaps separate volumes on lightships, lighthouse architecture, fog horns, and buoy tenders will be necessary. Noble (1997) was the first to author a one-volume overview in which he examines the beginning of the service and its development through 1939. He also discusses the keepers, their duties, and their routines, in addition to lightships, buoy tenders and their crews, and technological developments in aids to navigation.

Noble argued that the demise of the service resulted in part from a new Superintendent who didn't have time to gain Congressional support to save the service from the attempt to have it absorbed by the Coast Guard. Capron (1965) argued that by the mid 1930s the Lighthouse Service was having difficulty recruiting young men as assistant keepers and suggests this may have influenced the decision to amalgamate the two services.

The absorption once again meant civilian employees, many of them older, moving into a much larger military organization. While Lighthouse personnel were offered the opportunity of joining the Coast Guard as officers or enlisted personnel, most of them chose to remain civilian employees.

President Franklin Roosevelt ordered the Coast Guard to absorb the Lighthouse Service as an efficiency and money saving measure. Noble concedes that in that respect the merger was a success, even though it effectively ended one of America's oldest federal maritime services.

### **Bureau of Marine Inspection and Navigation**

The last of the predecessor agencies to be absorbed by the Coast Guard, the Bureau of Marine Inspection and Navigation was itself a merger of two former maritime agencies. The Steamboat Inspection Service was created by Congress in 1852. Originally consisting largely of field personnel, collectively called the Board of Supervising Inspectors though each inspector served in a separate geographical division. Inspectors enforced laws relating to the construction and operation of merchant vessels and their equipment, investigating marine fires and casualties, and collected tonnage and navigation fees. The organization had very few centrally located administrative personnel until 1871 when Congress approved a Supervising Inspector General, under the Secretary of the Treasury. In 1903 the Steamboat Inspection Service was transferred into the newly created Department of Labor and Commerce. When that department was divided in 1913, it remained with the new Department of Labor.

The Bureau of Navigation had been created in 1884 as a part of the Treasury Department to supervise the administration of navigation laws. It later was given duties of an administrative and statistical nature, such as the responsibility for the documentation of vessels. Like the Steamboat Inspection Service it was transferred into the newly created Department of Labor and Commerce in 1903. A rise in accidents among small pleasure boats led to the group being given responsibility



for them as well as for commercial vessels. Since the bureau had practically no field force of its own it was forced to rely largely upon customs officers who found themselves working for both the Treasury Department and the Department of Labor and Commerce.

The Steamboat Inspection Service and the Bureau of Navigation merged to become the newly formed Bureau of Navigation and Steamboat Inspection in the Department of Commerce in 1932. Four years later, in 1936, the bureau changed its name to the Bureau of Marine Inspection and Navigation. In March 1942 the bureau and its personnel were temporarily transferred to the Coast Guard. In 1946 that transfer was made permanent.

Capron (1965), again writing from personnel experience, and Johnson (1987) both note that although this transfer was logical it was not popular. Bureau personnel feared losing the identity of their organization as well as for their individual futures. Many Coast Guard officers believed that marine inspection, an entirely regulatory function, was foreign to any of the Coast Guard's former duties.

### Coast Guard

The act that created the Coast Guard in 1915 specified that it would at all times be an armed force of the United States, under the Department of the Treasury in peacetime and under the Department of the Navy during wartime or whenever the President should so direct. World War I was already underway at the time and it would not be long until the Coast Guard was transferred to the Department of the Navy.

Six of the Coast Guard's larger cutters were sent to Gibraltar for service as ocean escorts with slow moving convoys between the United Kingdom and the Mediterranean. The Coast Guard suffered its greatest tragedy of the war when one of these cutters, the *Tampa*, was lost with all hands in September 1918. Coast Guardsmen on the East Coast kept constant watch for German U-boats. Coast Guard port security activities were crucial to the war effort. Coast Guard aviation also began during the war. Coast Guard aviators commanded several Navy airbases, including one in L'Ile-Tudy, France. The Coast Guard continued most of its peacetimes functions during the war, with the exception of the International Ice Patrol, which was temporarily terminated. The Revenue-Cutter Service had gained responsibility for the International Ice Patrol shortly after the sinking of the *Titanic* in 1912.

Evans (1949) briefly describes this period in the "Postscript: 1915-1949" of his book. Every history since then has included details of that period, especially the dramatic episodes. Capron (1965) described the heroic exploits of the cutter *Seneca* on convoy duty, the rescue by men of the Chicamacomico Lifesaving Station of 42 of the 52 crewmen of the tanker *Mirlo* sunk by a German submarine off Cape Hatteras, the loss of 131 lives when the cutter *Tampa* was torpedoed and sunk, and the beginning of port security duties, all in 1918. Bloomfield (1966) gives a few more details of these incidents. Capron (1965) makes the claim, still believed by many in the Coast Guard, that the Coast Guard had the highest

casualty percentage of all the Armed Forces in World War I, but very recent research has revealed this to be incorrect and that the members of the Marine Corps had a higher casualty rate when their losses are calculated separate from the Navy. The Coast Guard did, however, suffer a higher casualty rate than the Army and significantly higher than that of the Navy.

Johnson (1978) expanded and broadened the history of this era and only mentions that the sinking of the *Tampa* was the Navy's greatest single loss of life caused by enemy action. Larzelere's (2003) volume on the Coast Guard in World War I is the current best history of this period, with valuable appendices, though he repeats Capron's incorrect claim about the Coast Guard percentage of losses during World War I. One of the difficulties in researching the Coast Guard's role in World War I is the degree with which Coast Guard personnel and assets were integrated into the Navy. Furthermore, little research has been conducted or published concerning the activities of enlisted men during the era.

Besides reinforcing its military role, the Coast Guard came out of World War I with an aviation program and its responsibility for the International Ice Patrol. Both of these had begun before the war, but were much expanded during and after it. Johnson (1978) also notes that the practice of recruit training during the war proved a success and set a precedent. The Navy and Coast Guard gained an increased respect for each other as a result of their wartime cooperation. Johnson (1978) argues that this led to a desire, by many, to keep the Coast Guard permanently in the Department of the Navy. He is the first to discuss attempts by the Navy to absorb the Coast Guard and the battle between senior Coast Guard officers and Coast Guard Commandant Ellsworth Bertholf, topics more recently addressed in Kroll's (2002) biography of Bertholf and by Larzelere (2003).

Shortly after the Coast Guard's return to the Treasury Department in August 1919, the service assumed a new role, the enforcement of prohibition, that led to an unprecedented expansion of service personnel and vessels. Twice as many men, more cutters, and aviation facilities were added to help the Coast Guard stop the flow of alcohol smuggled into the United States by sea. Evans (1949) ignored the period in his "Postscript," but Capron (1965) and Bloomfield (1966) corrected that oversight. Johnson (1978) provided even more information. Besides building new patrol boats and cutters, the Coast Guard eventually operated 25 old Navy destroyers. Although the end of National Prohibition in 1933 brought cutbacks in the Coast Guard, it nevertheless would be three times as big as it had been going into World War I.

Although "an armed service" since its creation in 1915, the Coast Guard was the only branch without a peacetime reserve. The Coast Guard Reserve Act of 1939 created a unique civilian organization composed of motorboat and yacht owners. Its members were not to hold military rank, wear uniforms or receive military training. This original reserve lasted less than two years. Early in 1941 congress created a military Coast Guard Reserve, similar to the other reserve forces, and renamed the existing civilian reserve the Coast Guard Auxiliary. On November 1, 1941, President Roosevelt signed an order transferring the Coast Guard from the Treasury Department to the Navy Department. A few weeks later the Japanese

attacked Pearl Harbor, and the Coast Guard's reserve system was put to the ultimate test. In May 1942, the Secretary of the Navy authorized uniforms for the Coast Guard Auxiliary. During the war Auxiliarists used their privately owned boats and yachts to patrol the coasts and served as a Volunteer Port Security Force. In the years since, the Auxiliary has evolved into an organization that supports the Coast Guard in all of its missions except for direct law enforcement and military operations. Its history was recently written by John Tilley (2003).

During World War II Coast Guardsmen operated escort destroyers, frigates, corvettes, patrol boats, and subchasers in the Atlantic while aviators patrolled the coasts and assisted in the war on submarines. They rescued torpedo victims snatched from death on life rafts awash in the freezing waters of the wintry North Atlantic as well as made blazing attacks on enemy submarines. Beach patrols and Port Security Units ensured coastal safety and Coast Guardsmen defended Greenland. Coast Guard personnel manned 351 Navy vessels including LSTs and LCIs that took part in the Sicilian and Italian landings. At the Normandy invasion Coast Guardsmen manned three attack transports, ten LSTs, the entire LCI(L) flotilla as well as a new Coast Guard Rescue Flotilla of 60 83-foot cutters. In the Pacific, amphibious operations employed thousands of Coast Guardsmen who manned naval transports, attack transports, supply vessels, and shore units. Douglas Munro was posthumously awarded the only Medal of Honor won by a member of the Coast Guard for his heroism during the Battle of Guadalcanal. The Coast Guard introduced helicopters, described by Beard (1996), and operated LORAN transmitting stations during the war as well. World War II expanded the Coast Guard from 12,000 members in 1939 to a peak wartime strength of 176,000 officers and enlisted persons (including its Women's Reserve, known as "SPARS").

The Coast Guard's role in World War II is covered in detail by every general history of the service written since the war, such as the ones by Capron (1965), Bloomfield (1966), and Johnson (1987). However, the best history is by Malcolm Willoughby (1957). Johnson (1987) maintains that the wartime commandant, Admiral Russell Waesche, is "the outstanding commandant of the Coast Guard." Capron (1965) emphasizes that the Coast Guard still performed its traditional peacetime role of saving life and property at sea. He also argues that the transfer of the Coast Guard back to the Treasury Department in January, 1946 was much too soon. Johnson (1987) acknowledges that debate but argues that the longer the Coast Guard remained under the Navy Department the more difficult the transfer back to the Treasury Department would have been and that the January date was not too early.

In 1947 the United States acquired the 295-foot sailing barque *Horst Wessel* from Germany as a war reparation. The *Horst Wessel*, built in 1936, was recommissioned the *Eagle* and still serves as a seagoing classroom for the cadets at the Coast Guard Academy in New London, Connecticut.

While much of the trouble experienced with the Coast Guard during demobilization paralleled that of the other armed services, much of it was peculiar to the Coast Guard. World War II had interrupted the orderly integration of the Lighthouse Service and the Coast Guard. The establishment of the Weather Patrol just before

the war had been essentially an emergency measure. In addition, the wartime development of the LORAN navigation system which relied on broadcasts from shore installations and station ships had given the service new responsibilities. In July 1946 the temporary transfer of the Bureau of Marine Inspection and Navigation to the Coast Guard was made permanent. Johnson (1987) notes that this transfer was opposed by maritime labor unions and by others who felt that a military service should not be given authority over a privately owned and manned merchant marine. Not everyone in the Coast Guard supported the transfer either. Capron (1965) describes these postwar years as challenging. Gradually, however, the personnel situation improved and by 1950 the Coast Guard was again in fairly good shape. It was manning four ocean stations in the Atlantic and two in the Pacific. Large cutters would stay on station, along transoceanic air routes, for twenty-one days, not including the travel from the homeport to ocean station and return. Most Coast Guard aircraft were still twin-engine flying boats and amphibians, but helicopters were beginning to replace fixed-wing aircraft as the primary rescue aircraft.

The Coast Guard would expand again during the Korean War, which began when North Korean forces suddenly invaded South Korea on June 25, 1950. The Coast Guard Women's Reserve program, which was discontinued after World War II, was reinstated. Although the Coast Guard remained within the Treasury Department throughout the Korean conflict and was not involved in the actual fighting, it did provide significant support to United States' forces in Korea. New LORAN chains were quickly built, covering areas around Korea, Japan, Formosa, and the Philippines, to provide accurate navigation for military aircraft. The Coast Guard set up four additional ocean stations in the Pacific to support the high volume of trans-Pacific military traffic. To meet this requirement 12 destroyer escorts (DE) were taken out of reserve fleets and assigned to the Coast Guard. Search and rescue units, each consisting of an aviation detachment and one or more cutters, and a command post with the necessary communication capability, were established in the Philippines and on Guam, Wake, Midway, and Adak islands. The Coast Guard Reserve was expanded and established 35 Port Security Units in the larger seaports. To patrol US ports more effectively, 100 diesel-powered, steel-hulled, 40-foot utility boats and 20 steel 95-footers were constructed by the Coast Guard Yard in Maryland. The Coast Guard also became responsible for a loyalty screening program for merchant seamen and dockworkers. The Korean War officially ended on July 27, 1953, with the signing of the armistice. The Coast Guard was reduced in size. The search and rescue units in the Western Pacific were discontinued, as were the additional ocean stations. The ocean station DEs were decommissioned and returned to the Navy. However, due to the increased tension of the Cold War, the port security measures were continued. The Korean War experience also led Coast Guard ships and aircraft to begin carrying out regularly scheduled exercises to prepare them for military service, with the larger vessels reporting to the Navy's fleet training commands for this purpose.

The post-World War II years had brought an explosion of pleasure boating in the United States. In response to an increasing number of boating accidents and fatalities, Congress passed the Federal Boating Act of 1958 which among other

provisions charged the Coast Guard with a wide responsibility for enforcing safety regulations and conducting an educational program for recreational boaters. The Coast Guard Auxiliary provided just such programs and was given added funds and better Coast Guard support to intensify its efforts. Its membership increased more than 30 percent by the end of the decade. In addition the Coast Guard established numerous Mobile Boarding Teams, each consisting of a petty officer, several non-rated enlisted men, a motor skiff, a trailer, and a truck or van to pull it. These teams visited the most popular boating areas for a week at a time inspecting boats and conducting education programs.

Only Johnson (1987) deals with Coast Guard history since the 1960s. It was a decade that saw many changes in Coast Guard vessels and aircraft. In 1960 the Coast Guard purchased its first Lockheed C-130 Hercules for long-range missions. In 1962 the Coast Guard placed its first LORAN-C transmitting chain in operation for primarily military use. The LORAN-A program still provided an essential service to merchant mariners, fishermen, and those flying light aircraft. Fifteen more 95-foot cutters were built to replace the surviving 83-footers before the program was terminated in favor of 82-footers designed specifically for inshore patrol, rescue, and salvage work. 1965 saw the commissioning of the first of 16 210-foot cutters. Beginning in 1967 the Coast Guard began replacing its aging 255-foot cutters with 12 new 378-foot ships. These large vessels not only served on ocean stations but also on the newly established fisheries patrols in the North Pacific and Bering Sea. The Coast Guard also began acquiring Sikorsky HH-52 (formerly S-62) amphibious helicopters for search and rescue duty. Waters (1966), a Coast Guard veteran seaplane and helicopter pilot, provides a history of this aircraft and others. In 1965, in what Johnson (1987) calls a long overdue development, the Navy transferred its four icebreakers to the Coast Guard which then became the nation's sole icebreaking service.

By 1965 the United States had begun combat operations in Vietnam. Johnson (1987) suggests that the Coast Guard Commandant, seeking a way to get the Coast Guard involved, and fearing that if his service was limited entirely to a support role as it had been during the Korean War, its status as one of the nation's armed services might be jeopardized, may have suggested sending Coast Guard 82-foot patrol boats for a naval interdiction campaign called Operation Market Time. Scotti (2000) agrees with Johnson (1987) whereas Larzelere (1997) writes that the assignment of Coast Guard units to this duty was the Navy's idea. Seventeen of these cutters were modified and hoisted aboard merchant vessels for transportation to the US naval station at Subic Bay in the Philippines. Their arrival in Vietnam in July of 1965 would be the beginning of Coast Guard involvement in the war. In 1967 Coast Guard Squadron Three was established, consisting of five large cutters, for off shore patrol and naval gunfire support. The Coast Guard focused on enemy movements at sea, port security, aids to navigation, safe and expeditious merchant shipping, and search and rescue. It established LORAN transmitting stations, Explosive Loading Detachments, an Aids to Navigation Detachment, and a port security detachment. Coast Guard pilots also served in an exchange program with the Air Force's rescue and recovery operations. The Coast

Guard's participation in Vietnam has been chronicled by two Coast Guard veterans of that conflict, Larzelere (1997) and Scotti (2000). Both detail the Coast Guard's role and are based not only on their experiences but also on those of many others whom they interviewed. Some 8,000 Coast Guardsmen served in Southeast Asia during the war, often under difficult conditions. Seven Coast Guardsmen were killed and 53 wounded in Vietnam. Among that number was Lieutenant Jack Rittichier, a Coast Guard pilot shot down when his helicopter was attempting to rescue a downed Marine pilot.

After nearly 177 years in the Treasury Department, the Coast Guard was transferred to the newly created Department of Transportation on April 1, 1967. In many respects this was primarily an administrative move, but substantive changes followed. That same year the Coast Guard decided to identify its vessels and planes more clearly by placing the now familiar orange and blue hull stripes with the Coast Guard emblem superimposed on the former, followed by COAST GUARD in block letters. In 1970 Admiral Chester R. Bender, Commandant, ordered all Coast Guard personnel into a distinctive, single breasted uniform of "Coast Guard blue" – closer to royal blue than any other. Johnson (1987) notes the unpopularity of what became known as "Bender blues" lasted for more than a decade.

By 1970 when new jet aircraft were coming to rely less on fixed ocean stations and satellites were providing weather data, the need for continuing the ocean station program was questioned. By 1974 the Coast Guard operation was reduced to three Atlantic and one Pacific station, and by the end of the following year the ocean station program ended for the Coast Guard.

Responding to the women's rights movement the Coast Guard began to offer appointments to officer candidate school to women in 1973 and also authorized four-year enlistments for women. The Coast Guard Academy was the first US service academy to admit women in the fall of 1976, which it did by choice. The other service academies admitted women only after Congress required it. These first women were commissioned in June 1980 as the first female graduates of any of the armed service academies. By that time Coast Guard women were serving aboard cutters and all restrictions based solely on sex in training, assignment and career opportunities for Coast Guard personnel had been removed. In 1976 the Coast Guard commissioned its largest ship, the *Polar Star*, a 399-foot icebreaker. The following year a sister ship, the *Polar Sea* was commissioned. The 1970s also brought expanded activity in environmental protection and vessel traffic control for the Coast Guard. Coastal drug interdiction was also gaining increasing attention.

1980 witnessed the commissioning of the first of a new class of 270-foot medium-endurance cutters. Johnson (1987) ends his history of the Coast Guard with this decade noting that due to a long history of under funding the Coast Guard faced an uncertain future. The Coast Guard Recruit Training Center in Alameda closed down in June of 1982 leaving Cape May as the only Recruit Training Center for the Coast Guard.

In August 1990, four days after Iraqi troops occupied the oil-rich emirate of Kuwait, the United States launched Operation Desert Shield to protect Saudi Arabia. It would be followed in January with Operation Desert Storm. Coast



Guard boarding teams aided the blockade of Iraq by instructing US Navy crews in interdiction and boarding techniques. Other Coast Guardsmen were assigned to various joint-service staffs. Coast Guard Reserve Port Security Units was also dispatched to Saudi Arabia.

During the opening decade of the twenty-first century two studies of ships lost in severe weather probe the unsuccessful attempts by local Coast Guard units to rescue survivors. Michael Schumacher (2008) describes the loss of the limestone carrier *Carl D. Bradley* in Lake Michigan during a November 1958 storm so severe that it prevented aircraft from the Coast Guard airstation at nearby Traverse City from operating. Dennis L. Noble (2002) analyses the attempt by a Coast Guard motor lifeboat unit at the Quillayute River Station, Washington, and the helicopter crews from Coast Guard Air Stations in Astoria, Oregon, and Port Angeles, Washington, to rescue two people from the sailboat *Gale Runner* in February 1997 that resulted in the rescue of the two sailors but the death of three Coast Guardsmen.

While the Coast Guard continues to handle its familiar missions, including counter narcotics and migrant interdiction, navigation aids, search and rescue, and environmental protection, since September 11, 2001 the Coast Guard has been transferred to the newly created Department of Homeland Security and has grown at an unprecedented rate, its tasks and budget expanded. Once seen primarily as a humanitarian service, it has become the nation's primary maritime security agency, responsible for protecting ports, coasts and inland waterways and preventing a terrorist attack from the sea, all this with a rapidly deteriorating fleet of ships and helicopters. P.J. Capelotti (undated) has recorded what the Coast Guard did on 9/11 and throughout the days that followed. Coast Guard personnel and units have served in Iraq and Afghanistan in the global war on terrorism.

When Hurricane Katrina struck the Gulf Coast on August 29, 2005 the Coast Guard took part in its largest search-and-rescue operation, saving over 33,500 people stranded by the hurricane. Regular and Reserve Coast Guardsmen, along with Coast Guard Auxiliarists performed superbly, bringing the Coast Guard much public visibility and praise. Less well known has been the fact that at its peak, the Coast Guard contributed 11 ships and more than 1,200 Coast Guardsmen to the war in Iraq.

Thus by 2008 the Coast Guard was responsible for more duties than ever before and facing challenges unthought of in previous centuries of service.

#### BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Beard, Barrett Thomas (1996). *Wonderful Flying Machines: A History of U.S. Coast Guard Helicopters*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Bennett, Robert F. (1976). "The Lifesavers: 'For Those in Peril on the Sea,'" *The US Naval Institute Proceedings*, 102:3 (March), 54–63.
- Bixby, William (1965). *Track of the Bear*. New York: David McKay.
- Bloomfield, Howard V. L. (1966). *The Compact History of the United States Coast Guard*. New York: Hawthorn Books.
- Canney, Donald L. (1995). *U. S. Coast Guard and Revenue Cutters, 1790–1935*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.

- Capelotti, P.J. (undated) *Rogue Wave: The U.S. Coast Guard on and after 9/11*. Washington: U.S. Coast Guard Historians Office.
- Capron, Walter C. (1965). *U. S. Coast Guard*. New York: Franklin Watts.
- Chapelle, Howard I. (1935) *The History of American Sailing Ships*. New York: W. W. Norton.
- Ehrhardt, John B. (1950). *Joseph Francis 1801–1893: Shipbuilder: Father of the U.S. Life-Saving Service*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press for the Newcomen Society.
- Evans, Stephen H. (1949). *The United States Coast Guard 1790–1915: A Definitive History*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Gibbs, Maurice (1999). “The Humane Society of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts,” *Wreck & Rescue*, 3:4 (Fall), 1014.
- Johnson, Robert Erwin (1987). *Guardians of the Sea: A History of the United States Coast Guard 1915 to the Present*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Kern, Florence (1989). *U. S. Revenue Cutters in the Civil War*. Bethesda, MD: Alised Enterprise.
- King, Irving H. (1978). *George Washington’s Coast Guard: Origins of the U.S. Revenue Cutter Service 1789–1801*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- King, Irving H. (1989). *The Coast Guard Under Sail: The U.S. Revenue Cutter Service 1789–1865*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- King, Irving H. (1996). *The Coast Guard Expands: 1865–1915, New Roles, New Frontiers*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Kroll, C. Douglas (2002). *Commodore Ellsworth P. Bertholf: First Commandant of the Coast Guard*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Larzelere, Alex R. (1997). *The Coast Guard at War: Vietnam 1965–1975*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Larzelere, Alex R. (2003). *The Coast Guard in World War I: An Untold Story*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Means, Dennis R. (1987). “A Heavy Sea Running: The Formation of the U.S. Life-Saving Service, 1846–1878.” *Prologue: Journal of the National Archives*, 19:4 (Winter): 222–43.
- Noble, Dennis L. (1990). *Historical Register: U.S. Revenue Cutter Service Officers, 1790–1914*. Washington: US Coast Guard.
- Noble, Dennis L. (1994). *That Others Might Live: The U.S. Life-Saving Service, 1878–1915*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Noble, Dennis L. (1997). *Lighthouses and Keepers: The U.S. Lighthouse Service and Its Legacy*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Noble, Dennis L. (2002). *The Rescue of the Gale Runner: Death, Heroism, and the U.S. Coast Guard*. Gainesville: University Press of Florida.
- Sands, John O. (1987). “The U.S. Light-House Board: Progress through Process,” *American Neptune*, 48:3 (Summer), 174–92.
- Schumacher, Michael (2008). *Wreck of the Carl D.: A True Story of Loss, Survival, and Rescue at Sea*. New York: Bloomsbury USA.
- Scotti, Paul C. (2000). *Coast Guard Action in Vietnam: Stories of Those Who Served*. Central Point, OR: Hellgate Press.
- Shanks, Ralph, Wick York, and Lisa Woo Shanks (1996). *The U.S. Life-Saving Service: Heroes, Rescues, and Architecture of the Early Coast Guard*. Petaluma, CA: Costano Books.
- Smith, Horatio Davis, and Elliot Snow (1932). *Early History of the United States Revenue Marine Service or (United States Revenue Cutter Service), 1789–1849*. [Baltimore?]

- 
- Published by special arrangement with the Naval Historical Foundation [Reprinted 1989: Washington: US Coast Guard].
- Strobridge, Truman R., and Dennis L. Noble (1999). *Alaska and the U.S. Revenue-Cutter Service, 1867–1915*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Tilley, John A. (2003). *The United States Coast Guard Auxiliary: A History, 1939–1999*. Washington: Government Printing Office.
- Waters, John M. (1966). *Rescue at Sea*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Willoughby, Malcolm F. (1957). *U. S. Coast Guard in World War II*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Wolcott, Merlin D. (1962). “Great Lakes Lifesaving Service,” *Inland Seas: The Quarterly Journal of the Great Lakes Historical Society*, 18:1 (Spring), 14–21.

# Chapter Twenty-six

## THE US AIR FORCE

*John W. Huston*

Although Northern forces used balloons to observe and direct artillery fire against the Confederates during the American Civil War, little more was done in the air by the United States during the remainder of the nineteenth century. No military were among the five observers of the Wright Brothers historic 12-second flight at Kitty Hawk, North Carolina, on December 17, 1903. Four years elapsed until the Aeronautical Division was created in the Office of the Chief Signal Officer of the Army charged with responsibility for “all matters pertaining to military ballooning, air machines and all kindred subjects.” In 1908 the US Army ordered its first airplane, taking delivery later that year from the Wrights who contracted to teach military officers to fly, among their earliest students Henry H. “Hap” Arnold.

United States interest in military aviation lagged behind other nations resulting in only \$125,00 being appropriated for that purpose in 1911, relegating America to fourteenth among the world’s nations supporting military air, less than that committed by Greece and Bulgaria.

The United States entered World War I with 131 officers and 1,087 enlisted men assigned to aviation possessing 224 aircraft, primarily trainers and 5 balloons operating from 3 airfields. Although the enthusiasm associated with US entry into the war promised “clouds of planes,” the US acceded to the Allies request that America concentrate on manufacturing trainers which made up more than 70 percent of the 11,000 aircraft delivered to the Army during the conflict. Most airplanes flown by Yanks in combat were foreign built, even though the US produced and supplied most of the American-designed 400-horsepower Liberty engines provided for Allied forces. Although the first of the 79,500 US airmen who served in France did not arrive until March 1918, they eventually operated 7 bombardment, 20 pursuit and 18 observation squadrons, all commanded by and used in support of ground troops. Even though successful against enemy concentrations in the St. Mihiel and Meuse-Argonne sectors in final stages of the war, an official history has accurately assessed that the “story of the Army air arm in World War I was one of promise rather than of achievement” (Whiteley 1974, Maurer 1987, Morrow 1983).

Normal demobilization following the armistice soon reduced the newly named Air Service from a wartime strength of 190,000 personnel to even fewer than the 1920 Congressional maximum of 17,500. They generally operated in the next decade with the increasingly obsolete numerous wartime-produced aircraft and engines. Among the most enduring legacies of that conflict, however, was the important issue over the postwar role and control of land-based air. Other than fliers, most Army officers believed that the function of the air arm was to continue in support of and under the command of ground troops. Army aviators, encouraged by what they perceived as the benefits of the independence achieved by the air forces of the British and French and the exaggerated exploits of the US Air Service in the war, argued that the air was no longer an auxiliary but a significant striking offensive force, required to be organized separately while commanded by airmen. Many studies, reports and congressional bills ensued with the "air effort" having become by 1928, in the opinion of one of its former chiefs, probably the "most investigated activity ever carried on" by the nation (Patrick 1928, Maurer 1987).

General William "Billy" Mitchell, capitalizing on limited but highly publicized success late in the war, became an unabashed and flamboyant spokesman for land-based aviation. He advocated independence of control and operations, use of air as a massed offensive force, and recognition of air's displacement of the Navy as the first line of national defense, a concept he claimed proven by bombing and sinking moored battleships (Mitchell 1925, Hurley 1975, Cooke 2002, Jeffers 2006). His 1925 court-martial and conviction along with Charles Lindbergh's historic solo flight to Paris in 1927 highlighted the potential of hostile aircraft to threaten America's protective geographical isolation while adding little to the discussion of the function and control of army air (Davis 1967, Waller 2004).

The Air Corps, renamed in 1926, influenced by the generally peaceful international climate and the strong American belief that its military was to be used primarily for defense, operated in the twenties with only 55 percent of its authorized personnel. By the 1930s, viewed by many aviators as a decade of patience and progress, significant technological change greatly improved the efficacy of the undermanned service. These involved *inter alia* use of metal fabrication, enclosed cockpits, radio communications, retractable landing gears and vastly improved instrumentation. During the same period officers assigned to the Air Corps Tactical School at Maxwell Field in Alabama developed strategy, tactics and doctrine which would be tested during World War II (Finney 1955, Copp 1980). In other areas Augustine Warner Robins played a key role, particularly in the development of a supply and maintenance system and in the development of key technologies, including new aircraft, bombsights, and other equipment (Head 1995).

The creation of the General Headquarters Air Force in 1935 separated the operational segment from the administrative, offering what many hoped was a step towards possible air independence. Italy's 1935 attack on Ethiopia along with Japan's invasion of China in 1937 together with the emergence of a German Air Force prompted a gradual build-up of army air power in the US beginning in 1938. During this period a group of younger airmen abandoned Mitchell's confrontational style and employing deft political skill won presidential and congressional support

for expansion of the air corps (Underwood 1991). The outbreak of World War II in Europe in September 1939 hastened this expansion and although promoted as a necessary defensive force, the emphasis by most airmen was on bombardment. President Franklin Roosevelt's desire to arm those fighting what became the Axis powers raised questions about an equitable allocation of the limited numbers of American-built aircraft needed to equip the growing American Army Air Forces (AAF) as opposed to the numbers "Lend-Leased" to the nations actively engaged in combat against the Axis. The Soviet Union, for example, received 14,794 Lend-Lease aircraft between 1941 and 1945 (Lukas 1970, Percy 1996, Weeks 2004).

American entrance into the war, lacking a deployable trained ground army and an adequate navy, dictated an agreed US-British strategy that emphasized at the outset the AAF joining the ongoing British strategic bombing of occupied Europe (Copp 1982). This was embraced by airman leadership as a means, if successful, of validating the use of the AAF as an offensive force and of securing postwar independence from its parent Army's concept that air was to be used primarily for ground forces support. This became the major European thrust of the AAF along with extremely effective but less heralded tactical forces operating in close support of ground armies beginning in North Africa in November 1942 and continuing through Italy, France and into central Germany in 1945.

In the Far East and China-India theaters logistical problems and the lack of viable bases near mainland Japan limited land-based air operations until the United States conquered islands close enough to stage effective strategic and area bombing against Japan, culminating in the AAF atomic bombings that prompted the Japanese surrender of August 1945 (Kennett 1982, Kerr 1991). John Dower, *War Without Mercy* (1986), has argued that racism played a significant role in the decision to firebomb Japanese cities. The official historical coverage of the army air war, produced in the decade following its conclusion, is fairly comprehensive but like many official histories, avoids many controversies (Craven and Cate 1948-58). Further insights can be found in the wartime diaries of General Henry H. Arnold, commander of the AAF (Huston 2002).

At war's end the AAF conducted a strategic bombing survey to assess the effectiveness of the air campaign (MacIsaac 1976). The conclusions reached by the authors of both the American and British survey (Cox 1998) remain controversial.

Michael S. Sherry, *The Rise of American Air Power* (1987) traces the development of the organizations and tactics which made the bombing of cities so devastating. Ronald Schaffer, *Wings of Judgment* (1985) examines the targeting decisions that resulted in the destruction of Dresden, Berlin, Tokyo, Hiroshima, and Nagasaki and the sparing of Rome, Florence, and Kyoto and the reasoning behind the decisions.

For the second time in less than 30 years, demobilization reduced the size of the military, including the Army Air Force. During the war the service had expanded to include 2.4 million wartime personnel who flew 72,000 aircraft over all but one continent while establishing separate communications, logistics, repair, and air transport systems for their branch. By 1947 the force was reduced to 300,000 people and 10,000 planes (only a handful jet-propelled). Among the



legacies of the war was a conviction shared by Air Force leaders that the first essential for airpower was pre-eminence in research.

While enjoying a temporary American atomic monopoly, strategic forces remained dominant in the postwar AAF. In 1947, in spite of strong opposition from the Navy, one of whose admirals testified against his service becoming a “numerical minority” (Barlow 1994), the National Security Act of 1947, established a Department of Defense with a separate Air Force (Wolk 1975). That year saw the flight testing of the F-86 fighter and B-47 bomber, the first of a genre of jet aircraft that would become the backbone of the USAF.

The new service was quickly tested when it was called upon in June 1948 to supply by air the city of Berlin and its two million inhabitants, now isolated because of Russian control of ground access. Before the airlift ended 15 months later, the USAF and the Royal Air Force had delivered two-and-a-third million tons of food and supplies through almost 300,000 flights into Berlin (Collier 1978, Giangreco and Griffin 1988, Clarke 2007). This latest incidence of Russian aggressive designs towards Western Europe and elsewhere was another harbinger of the “Cold War” that would continue for almost 40 years and appeared to validate continued reliance on the newly formed US Strategic Air Command (SAC) and its atomic bomb capability, still in 1949 composed entirely of wartime aircraft. For the next quarter of a century, SAC would be the dominant branch of the Air Force with its bombers, reconnaissance aircraft, and missiles providing the first line of defense and deterrent to a feared Soviet air attack on the Continental United States (Hopkins and Goldberg 1986, Burrows 2001).

Involvement of the United States in the Korean War that began in June 1950 illustrated the necessity for a balanced USAF as tactical and strategic propeller-driven aircraft of World War II vintage, along with smaller numbers of new US jet fighters, became the dominant air element in a conflict where the bulk of the war was conducted on the ground and USAF air superiority was only intermittently threatened. In air to air combat, US fighters enjoyed a kill ratio of 10 to 1 over Russian made and manned MiG 15s while B-29 bombers successfully limited North Korea to only one usable airfield at the time of the armistice (Futrell 1983, Crane 1999, Werrell 2005b).

The three-year Korean conflict, however, provided a catalyst for continuing USAF research, development and production of new weapons and methodology. Perceptions of continuing Russian intransigence and threats to noncommunist societies resulted in generous American public and political support of a strong military. The largest portion of the defense budget was committed to the USAF which in turn devoted 60 percent of its allocated resources to SAC. The command’s first intercontinental B-52 bomber with worldwide nuclear weapon capability was delivered in 1954 and quickly became the dominant element in the American policy of “massive retaliation” articulated by the Eisenhower administration in 1953 (Mandelis 1998). Some B-52s remained operational in 2009.

Assigned responsibility for developing intercontinental missiles, the USAF formed the Ballistic Missiles Division in 1954 that began deployment of its operational systems in the United States and abroad. By 1961 the USAF successfully

tested and announced as operational Minuteman nuclear-equipped missiles on alert in hardened underground silos. This new technology, however, followed Russia's startling success in launching the world's first satellite called Sputnik in 1957 followed by their sending the first man into space in 1961.

Concerned over possible attack over the North Pole, the United States and Canada began construction of early warning and interception systems – the first, the Pinetree Line just north of the US–Canadian border, was completed in 1954; followed by the Mid-Canada Line, a Doppler radar system along the 55th parallel, and the Distant Early Warning or DEW line along the 69th parallel completed in 1961 which was upgraded and renamed the North Warning Line in 1994 – possessing the ability to electronically detect and display hostile aircraft (Schaffel 1991, McCamley 2000). Interception by joint alerted ground-controlled forces could then follow. Other important developments in the decade of the 1950s included experimental flights reaching twice the speed of sound, the delivery in 1956 of the first supersonic bomber, the B-58, non-stop B-52 flights around the world in 1956, and the establishment of an Air Force Academy. The change of administrations in the early 1960s and the articulated strategy of flexible response necessitated increased USAF emphasis on tactical aircraft and worldwide deployability of forces to engage in possible limited warfare. When Air Force U-2 reconnaissance aircraft provided photographic evidence of Soviet construction of intermediate-range missile bases in nearby Cuba during 1962, President Kennedy ordered an increased alert of the USAF and the effective implementation of a naval quarantine that seemed to convince the Soviets that Americans were determined to block deployment of missiles in Cuba leading them to halt construction of the sites. Among changes in this decade was SAC commencing constant airborne alert of command post aircraft capable of deploying SAC B-52s to any target in the world, a system of readiness continued until 2006. During the 1960s new aircraft were acquired, most of which played a significant role in the Vietnam War that consumed much of the nation's attention and energies through this decade and beyond. Among those acquired were the F-4 Phantom fighter that quickly showed its versatility by flying 12,000 miles in an 18-hour non-stop aerially refueled flight and its proved its ability to launch vastly improved electronically guided missiles and to knock out radar systems and surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites. Advances were equally great in transport aircraft with the introduction of the all-jet C-141 to augment the Air Force's fleet of extremely versatile C-130s. Development also began on the C-5, the nation's largest transport/cargo aircraft. All of these aircraft continued in service for over 40 years (Boyne 1998, Donald and Jon 2002, Norton 2003).

The decade-long involvement in Vietnam, begun with the arrival of the first USAF combat aircraft in November 1961 during the Kennedy Administration, required the Air Force to reassess its strategy, equipment, training, and tactics which had been developed to conduct a nuclear war to one in a jungle environment to be fought after establishing American bases in a very distant country lacking an industrial base. The Air Force was tasked to furnish strong support for American and Vietnam ground forces in this guerilla-type war and also attempt to prevent supplies from the North from reaching insurgent forces over jungle trails in the South. The

procedures for close support with ground army units needed to be devised and/or perfected necessitating both rapid high-speed fighter and fighter/bomber responses as well as aircraft capable of flying “low and slow” to identify, monitor, and assist in interdicting hostile ground threats. By the peak year of 1969, USAF in-country personnel strength reached almost 60,000 operating from 13 new American-constructed bases. Other innovations included modifying World War II vintage propeller-driven transports so that they became rapid-firing low-flying gunships, the operation of the B-52 bomber in both tactical and strategic roles ranging from bombing jungle trails to bombing the North’s few industries, power plants, and dams, and mining the enemy’s main port from the air. Aerial resupply of besieged forces locations, increased use of paratroops, and the USAF’s first widespread use of “smart” or laser guided bombs, munitions that were to become increasingly precise, lethal and able to be launched at greater and safer distances from the aerial platform. Rotary wing operations by both the Air Force and the Army were vastly increased including battlefield evacuation of wounded and as weapons platforms.

Among the lessons learned from this conflict, particularly for the Air Force, was the need to be a flexible overall force capable of worldwide self-sustaining deployment of personnel and weapons equipped to engage hostile forces with tactical as well as strategic forces. Like the other services, the USAF was called upon to train indigenous South Vietnamese forces to use American methods and equipment, all the while creating and maintaining a very long logistical chain from the United States to anywhere in the world.

No comprehensive balanced coverage of the USAF in the Vietnam War has yet appeared. A provocative scholarly critique by an Air Force officer of bombing in the conflict is found in Mark Clodfelter, *The Limits of Air Power: The American Bombing of North Vietnam* (1989).

The long frustrating American experience in Vietnam brought significant changes to the Air Force where, to meet the challenges of the Cold War, major reliance had been on long-range strategic aircraft and nuclear capability. The end of the Southeast Asian conflict brought new emphases on flexible tactical air assets, long-range airlift, aerial refueling, reconnaissance, reliance on electronics and laser guided munitions, closer air-ground battlefield cooperation, and protection from ground identification and attack. Slower changes evolved in doctrine as a new generation of Air Force leaders with experience and background primarily in tactical operations assumed control (Werrell 2005a).

American air superiority was never really challenged during the Vietnam War, but determination to maintain a quantum lead in fighter aircraft led to the development of a new genre of fighters, represented, most notably, by the F-15 and F-16, that became the standard fighter force of the USAF and many other nations around the world for the next quarter century. Development of the A-10 ground support aircraft was began during the Vietnam War as was research into how to protect aircraft from hostile SAM (Surface to Air Missiles) and anti-aircraft fire. The result was a reduction in the cross-section radar profile of aircraft achieved by utilizing new manufacturing materials, thus inhibiting or crippling identification and subsequent destruction of aircraft. Known as stealth technology this has been

incorporated in fighters as well as a new generation of long-range bombers with the B-1 and B-2, appearing in the inventory in 1985 and 1988, respectively. Both bombers have been used tactically and strategically in the Gulf War of 1991 and more recently in Afghanistan and Iraq. Other methods devised to counteract SAMs included mounting airborne electronic countermeasure (ECM) pods, "jammer aircraft" and "Wild-Weasel" F-4 and F-111 SAM suppressor craft. One striking example of technological adaptation in warfare was that hostile SAMs had succeeded in shooting down one US aircraft for every 16 missiles fired in 1965 whereas three years later, following the introduction of ECM pods, the rate had been cut to one loss for every 100 launched.

Although the aging B-52 long-range bombers have remained active in recent USAF operations, changes in the perceived international threat and the required American response have placed less emphasis on their use. The world-wide deployability of these and other aircraft has necessitated improvement in airlift capability and refueling equipment and techniques. The C-141, a workhorse cargo aircraft of the 1960s and 1970s, was reconfigured in 1978 by adding two new sections to its fuselage increasing capacity by more than 30 percent while it was made aeri-ally refuelable. Newly added to the inventory in 1992 was the worldwide refuelable C-17 with greatly increased range and cargo ability. Further extension of the reach of Air Force striking power was achieved through the modification of a commercial airliner into the K-10 refueler. The C-130 Hercules continues to serve intra-theater airlift requirements in various configurations.

Reconnaissance has improved drastically since the Soviet "shootdown" of Gary Powers' U-2 aircraft in 1960, marked by the emergence of the SR-71 "Blackbird" a titanium stealth aircraft capable of uncontested flight more than ten miles above the earth with high resolution cameras. Its retirement in 1998 ushered in reliance on satellites, primary major military responsibility for which has been assigned to the Air Force (Graham 1996). More recent improvements have seen the introduction of RPVs, remotely piloted vehicles that appeared first in a basic form in Vietnam. Currently able to launch ordnance, another major asset of this unmanned craft which is controlled from a remote and presumably safe location, is furnishing real-time battlefield intelligence to the commander on the ground. This is achieved at a relatively low cost in construction, maintenance and crew as contrasted with manned vehicles.

Administrative changes in 1992 reflected new concepts with the renaming of SAC as Strategic Command and merging it with the former Air Defense Command in 2002. It was now commanded by generals who had risen through the fighter pilot community. This new leadership represented a change that had been going on since 1981 when, for the first time since the end of World War II, the Air Force Chief of Staff and much of the senior leadership was drawn from other than the "bomber" generals. At the same time former SAC missiles and bombers, were joined with fighters of the former Tactical Air Command as part of the newly named Air Combat Command. Additionally the reorganization called for creation of Aerospace Expeditionary Forces (AEFs), relatively self-contained units made up of variable types of aircraft to deploy quickly to meet any perceived threat (Davis

2003). The breakup of the former Soviet Union in 1991 hastened the thinking that less emphasis should be placed on strategic weapons and more on tactical, with USAF operations in Kosovo, Somalia, the first Gulf War, and currently in Afghanistan and Iraq appearing to validate these changes (Olsen 2003). The Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) I and II of 1991 and 1993 limiting the number of nuclear warheads on planes, submarines and missiles have presented further evidence of the decline of preparation for and emphasis on strategic conflict as opposed to tactical operations.

Without significant opposition to aerial supremacy affecting US operations in Iraq and Afghanistan during the first decade of the twenty-first century, the major Air Force role involved furnishing close air support, refueling aircraft both inside and en route to the theaters, and major responsibility for airlift of personnel and equipment and reconnaissance, both strategic and tactical. Its almost 400,000 personnel will continue to apply technological advances as a major part of the military force of the United States.

The challenges of the post-Cold War era stimulated the reconceptualization of air power theory, a movement strongly influenced by the work of John Warden (Warden 1989, Olsen 2007). Air operations over Kosovo and Serbia also sparked assessments of prosecution of air campaigns conducted over difficult terrain in conjunction with allies (Cordesman 2001, Wrage 2003). Thus, as it enters its second century, air warfare, and arguably its most effective practitioner, the US Air Force are entering a time of change and reconceptualization as great as any in their history (Lambeth 2000). It is also a time when much historical work remains to be done on the institutional development of the Air Force, work with great potential to ease the current time of transition.

#### BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Barlow, Jeffery G. (1994). *Revolt of the Admirals: The Fight for Naval Aviation, 1945–1950*. Washington: Naval Historical Center.
- Boyne, Walter J. (1998). *Beyond the Horizons: The Lockheed Story*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Boyne, Walter J. (2007). *Beyond the Wild Blue: A History of the United States Air Force, 1947–1997*. New York: Thomas Dunn.
- Buckley, John (1999). *Air Power in the Age of Total War*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Burrows, William E. (2001). *By Any Means Necessary: America's Secret Air War in the Cold War*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
- Clarke, Robert (2007). *The Berlin Airlift: 10 Tons for Templehoff*. Shroud, UK: Tempus.
- Clodfelter, Mark (1989). *The Limits of Air Power: The American Bombing of North Vietnam*. New York: Free Press.
- Collier, Richard (1978). *Bridge across the Sky: The Berlin Blockade and Airlift, 1948–1949*. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Cooke, James J. (2002). *Billy Mitchell*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
- Copp, DeWitt S. (1980). *A Few Great Captains: The Men and Events That Shaped the Development of U.S. Air Power*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Co.

- Copp, DeWitt S. (1982). *Forged in Fire: Strategy and Decisions in the Airwar Over Europe*. New York: Doubleday & Co.
- Cordesman, Anthony H. (2001). *The Lessons and Non-Lessons of the Air and Missile Campaign in Kosovo*. Westport, CT: Praeger.
- Cox, Sebastian, ed. (1998). *Air War against Germany, 1939–1945: Report of the British Bombing Survey Unit*. London: Frank Cass.
- Crane, Conrad (1999). *American Airpower Strategy in Korea, 1950–1953*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
- Craven, Wesley Frank, and James Lea Cate, eds. (1948–58). *The Army Air Forces in World War II*, 7 vols. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Davis, Burke (1967). *The Billy Mitchell Affair*. New York: Random House.
- Davis, Richard G. (2003). *Anatomy of a Reform: The Expeditionary Aerospace Force*. Washington: Air Force History and Museums Program.
- Donald, David, and Lake Jon, eds. (2002). *McDonnell F-4 Phantom: Spirit in the Skies*. London: AIRtime Publishing.
- Dower, John (1986). *War Without Mercy*. New York: Pantheon Books.
- Finney, Robert T. (1955). *History of the Air Corps Tactical School, 1920–1940*. Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: USAF Historical Division, Research Studies Institute, Air University.
- Futrell, Robert F. (1983). *The United States Air Force in Korea, 1950–1953*, rev. edn. Washington: Office of Air Force History.
- Glines, Carroll V. (1973). *The Compact History of the United States Air Force*. New York.
- Giangreco, D. M., and Robert E. Griffin (1988). *Airbridge to Berlin: The Berlin Crisis of 1948, Its Origins and Aftermath*. Novato, CA: Presidio Press.
- Graham, Richard H. (1996). *SR-71 Revealed: The Inside Story*. St. Paul, MN: MBI Publishing Co.
- Head, William P. (1995). *Every Inch a Soldier: Augustine Warner Robins and the Building of U.S. Airpower*. College Station: Texas A&M University Press.
- Hopkins, J. C., and Sheldon A. Goldberg (1986). *The Development of Strategic Air Command, 1946–1986*. Offutt Air Force Base, NB: Office of the Historian, Headquarters Strategic Air Command.
- Hurley, Alfred F. (1975). *Billy Mitchell, Crusader for Air Power*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Huston, John W., ed. (2002). *American Airpower Comes of Age: General Henry H. “Hap” Arnold’s World War II Diaries*. Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press.
- Jeffers, H. Paul (2006). *Billy Mitchell: The Life, Times, and Battles of America’s Prophet of Air Power*. New York: Zenith Books.
- Kennett, Lee (1982). *A History of Strategic Bombing*. New York: Scribner’s.
- Kerr, E. Bartlett (1991). *Flames Over Tokyo: The U.S. Army Air Forces’ Incendiary Campaign against Japan, 1944–1945*. New York: Fine.
- Lambeth, Benjamin S. (2000). *The Transformation of American Air Power*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Lukas, Richard C. (1970). *Eagles East: The Army Air Forces and the Soviet Union, 1941–1945*. Tallahassee: Florida State University Press.
- MacIsaac, David (1976). *Strategic Bombing in World War Two*. New York: Garland Press.
- Mandeles, Mark D. (1998). *The Development of the B-52 and Jet Propulsion: A Case Study in Organizational Innovation*. Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press.
- Mason, Herbert Molloy, Jr. (1976). *The United States Air Force: A Turbulent History*. New York: Mason/Charter.



- Maurer, Maurer, ed. (1978). *The U.S. Air Service in World War I: The Final Report and a Tactical History*, 4 vols., Washington: Office of Air Force History.
- Maurer, Maurer (1987). *Aviation in the U.S. Army, 1919–1939*. Washington: Office of Air Force History.
- McCamley, Nick (2000). *Cold War Secret Bunkers: The Passive Defence of the Western World during the Cold War*. London: Leo Cooper.
- Mitchell, William (1925). *Winged Defense: The Development and Possibilities of Modern Air Power*. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons.
- Morrow, John (1983). *The Great War in the Air: Military Aviation from 1909 to 1921*. Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press.
- Norton, Bill (2003). *Lockheed Martin C-5 Galaxy*. North Branch, MN: Specialty Press.
- Olsen, John Andreas (2003). *Strategic Air Power in Desert Storm*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Olsen, John Andreas (2007). *John Warden and the Renaissance of American Air Power*. Washington: Potomac Books.
- Patrick, Mason M. (1928). *The United States in the Air*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, Doran & Co.
- Pearcy, Arthur (1996). *Lend-Lease Aircraft in World War II*. Ocoola, WI: Motorbooks International.
- Schaffel, Kenneth (1991). *The Emerging Shield: The Air Force and the Evolution of Continental Air Defense, 1945–1960*. Washington: Office of Air Force History.
- Shaffer, Ronald (1985). *Wings of Judgment: American Bombing in World War II*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Sherry, Michael S. (1987). *The Rise of American Air Power: The Creation of Armageddon*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Trest, Warren A. (1998). *Air Force Roles and Missions: A History*. Washington: Air Force History and Museums Program.
- Underwood, Jeffery S. (1991). *The Wings of Democracy: The Influence of Air Power on the Roosevelt Administration, 1933–1941*. College Station: Texas A&M University Press.
- Waller, Douglas C. (2004). *A Question of Loyalty: Gen. Billy Mitchell and the Court-Martial that Grippled the Nation*. New York: HarperCollins.
- Warden, John A. III (1989). *The Air Campaign: Planning for Combat*. Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's.
- Weeks, Albert L. (2004). *Russia's Life-Saver: Lend-Lease Aid to the U.S.S.R. in World War II*. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.
- Werrell, Kenneth P. (2005a). "The U.S. Air Force, 1963–1975: A Turbulent Decade," in Malcolm Muir, Jr. and Mark F. Wilkinson, eds., *The Most Dangerous Years: The Cold War, 1953–1975*. Lexington, VA: John A. Adams '71 Center for Military History and Strategic Analysis, 244–56.
- Werrell, Kenneth P. (2005b). *Sabres over MiG Alley: The F-86 and the Battle for Air Superiority in Korea*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Whiteley, John F. (1974). *Early Army Aviation: The Emerging Air Force*. Manhattan, KS: Aerospace Historian.
- Wolk, Herman S. (1975). "The Defense Unification Battle, 1947–50: The Air Force," *Prologue*, 7:1 (Spring): 18–26.
- Wrage, Stephen D. (2003). *Immaculate Warfare: Participants Reflect upon the Air Campaigns over Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq*. Westport, CT: Praeger.

# Chapter Twenty-seven

---

## THE CONFEDERATE ARMY

*Arthur W. Bergeron Jr.*

Given the intense interest in the military history of the Civil War and the Confederate States of America, it is surprising that there has been so little study of the Confederate Army as a whole. There exists, for example, no equivalent for the Confederacy of Fred A. Shannon's (1928) administrative study of the Union army. Historians have produced a few studies of some components of the Confederate army. In *The Confederate Regular Army* (1991), Richard P. Weinert presents a brief overview of the various infantry, cavalry, artillery, and engineer units that comprised the regular army of the Confederacy. Although authorized to consist of 15,000 men, the government only succeeded in establishing a force of about one-tenth that size. As Weinert points out, nearly half of these men were officers. His motivation in writing the book was that "the story of the Confederate regulars has remained shrouded in ignorance and misunderstanding since the Civil War" (Weinert 1991: 111). The author admits in the end that "the Confederate regular army had no significant impact on the course of the war" (Weinert 1991: v).

Another slim volume – James L. Nichols, *Confederate Engineers* (1957) – covers that branch of the Southern armies. The book contains short but informative chapters on the formation of the engineer corps and engineer units; engineer operations on rivers and other inland waters; engineer operations at ports on the Atlantic Ocean and Gulf of Mexico; map-making and distribution of maps; and construction and repair of bridges. Despite its small size, Nichols points out, the Confederate engineer branch contained a number of able and efficient officers, many of them graduates of West Point.

Kenneth Radley's *Rebel Watchdog* (1989) describes how the Confederate provost system was intended "to maintain military discipline in the very large armies the South raised" (Radley 1989: 1) but eventually it became involved in the lives of Southern civilians as well. The men of the provost service had to administer martial law, control movement of soldiers and civilians, try to fight straggling and desertion, and control Union prisoners of war. Eventually, the provosts also had to maintain internal security either alone or in conjunction with army units. Although intended to be such, the Confederate provosts never became

“a separate and distinct corps of the army” (Radley 1989: 249). Radley concludes that the provost’s performance was generally commendable” and that “the provost must rate high marks for efficiency” (Radley 1989: 254).

The work of other staff and administrative units of the Confederate Army has been studied in less detail though a few books have been published. The work of the Confederate chaplains is examined in Herman Norton’s *Rebel Religion* (1961) and John Wesley Brinsfield has edited the memoirs of several chaplains in *The Spirit Divided* (2006). Jerrold Northrop Moore (1996) analyzed the work of the Subsistence Bureau through the life of its leader, Lucius Bellinger Northrop.

Relating to the activities of the Confederate provost service is Mark A. Weitz’s (2005) study of desertion from the Confederate army. In the first scholarly study of the topic Weitz probes the reasons for desertion and argues that desertion impacted the Confederate war effort not only through the loss of men in the ranks but also in the presence of bands of deserters who looted the farms and homes of Southern civilians. A small criticism of the book is that Weitz perhaps overplays the “rich man’s war, poor man’s fight” theme.

The life and motivations of common soldiers, “Johnny Rebs,” has received much more study than the administration of the army in which they served. In his 1943 seminal work on *The Life of Johnny Reb*, historian Bell I. Wiley described the recruiting of units for the Confederate army, their training, and the various motivations of Southern men for going to war. Other chapters of the book talk about Confederate soldiers in camp, on the march, and in battle. Wiley also covered topics such as morale and discipline, arms and equipment, and the ravages of disease. James I. Robertson, Jr. (1988) expanded upon Wiley’s work by including information about common soldiers in the Union army and by drawing upon a much larger collection of primary sources than did Wiley. Robertson looked more deeply than Wiley into motivations for enlistment: patriotism, desire for adventure, youthful enthusiasm, political persuasion, state or local pride, peer or community pressure, opportunity for a new lifestyle, “to preserve the political, social and economic ways inherited from their fathers and under attack by abolitionists (Robertson 1988: 9),” and perhaps economic pressures. Narrower in focus, but still of value are David Williams’ *Johnny Reb’s War* (2000), Gregory A. Coco’s *The Civil War Infantryman* (1996), and Robert E. Bonner’s *The Soldier’s Pen: Firsthand Impressions of the Civil War* (2006).

In two more recent studies, James M. McPherson (1994, 1997) sought to determine the reasons why Civil War soldiers joined the armies and then endured hardships and dangers on the battlefield from 1861 to 1865. He chose letters and diaries of 647 Union and 429 Confederate soldiers in seeking his answers. McPherson found that men on both sides enlisted because of feelings of duty, honor, or patriotism; a search for adventure; differing views of the legacy of the Founding Fathers; and to defend their homes and families. He found that few Southerners spoke of defending slavery as a motive for enlistment. McPherson concluded that the soldiers’ motives for continuing to fight included duty, honor, character, religious conviction, fear of being labeled a coward, unit pride, comradeship, family honor, and revenge.

Although Confederate military authorities created a number of armies during the war, two stand out as having done the majority of the fighting in the main theaters of the conflict – the Army of Northern Virginia and the Army of Tennessee. The most thorough study of the first is Douglas S. Freeman's *Lee's Lieutenants: A Study in Command* (1942–4). As the subtitle indicates, Freeman's story is really that of the high command of the Army of Northern Virginia. Nevertheless, he described all of the campaigns and battles of that army and gave occasional glimpses of the men who made up the army.

Indeed Confederate leadership, especially the rivalries and tensions within the high command have been the subject of several works, the best being Joseph Glatthaar's (1994) *Partners in Command: The Relationships between Leaders in the Civil War* and Steven Woodworth's (1990) which focuses on relations between Jefferson Davis and his generals in the West.

Philip Katcher's *The Army of Robert E. Lee* (1994), gives more coverage to the rank and file of the Army of Northern Virginia. His chapter on the soldiers includes information about the background and motivation of the soldiers, how units were recruited, how conscripts were assigned to the army, comments on the officer corps and non-commissioned officers, training, discipline, clothing, rations, and morale. Katcher also presents excellent summaries of the organization, tactics, weapons, equipment, insignia, flags, and pay of the combat units of the army. His coverage of the support arms – engineers, signal corps, medical department, provost marshal, chaplains, invalid corps, sutlers, and civilian support organizations – helps round out the picture of the army. There is much truth to Katcher's statement that "In some ways material on Lee's Army is valid for other Confederate armies, such as the Army of Tennessee, insofar as it relates to organization, pay, etc., which was mandated by the central government in Richmond" (Katcher 1994: 9).

One aspect of the Army of Northern Virginia that has received thorough coverage is its system of staff officers. J. Boone Bartholomees (1998) describes the duties and activities of the various levels of staff officers – chief of staff, adjutant general, inspector general, quartermaster, commissary, medical staff, special staff (chiefs of artillery, ordnance and engineers and signal officers), and personal staff (aides de camp, chaplains, and provosts). Bartholomees credits the effectiveness of the army's staff system with helping the army win battles and remain in the field for four years against superior odds. He outlines selection, training, duties, and their intelligence and combat functions on the battlefield.

J. Tracy Power's *Lee's Miserables* (1998) provides a comprehensive study of the soldiers of the Army of Northern Virginia during the last year of the war. In addition to excellent coverage of their activities in battle and life in camp, Power examines the morale of the men. He states that, through the Overland Campaign and the early months of the operations around Petersburg, the men remained in high spirits and seemed confident of ultimate success. Eventually, however, morale began to wane as the war turned against the Confederacy, particularly after Major General William T. Sherman's March to the Sea and campaign into the Carolinas.

In *The Army of Tennessee* (1953), Stanley Horn wrote the first scholarly treatment of that army. Like Freeman before him, however, Horn wrote of the army's battles and leaders rather than of its rank and file. Thomas Connelly (1967, 1971) produced two volumes on the army that are based on more research in manuscript sources than had Horn but still focus more on the army's battles and leadership than on its common soldiers. Connelly concluded that, because of the turnover in commanders and personal conflicts among its senior generals, the army "never attained cohesion" and "the common soldier scarcely had time to anchor his devotion to any single leader" (Connelly 1967: xi).

Andrew Haughton's *Training, Tactics and Leadership of the Confederate Army of Tennessee* (2000) examines in depth the topics mentioned in its title. He argued that "the training and tactics employed by the Army of Tennessee were weaknesses which constantly inhibited the potential of the Confederate force and contributed to its miserable performance on a dozen battlefields from Shiloh to Nashville" (Haughton 2000: 182). Haughton wrote that the army and its commanders were inflexible and never attempted to revise its battlefield tactics. He faulted the army's leadership for not experimenting with new tactics when it had time to do so on "the drill fields of Mississippi, Tennessee and Georgia" (Haughton 2000: 185).

*Soldiering in the Army of Tennessee* (1991) by Larry Daniel was the first book to tell the story of the Army of Tennessee from the viewpoint of the common soldier. After studying numerous sources, Daniel has produced a model for similar studies of other armies. He concludes that the men of the Army of Tennessee were not terribly different than their comrades in the Army of Northern Virginia. However, the soldiers who fought under Albert Sidney Johnston, Braxton Bragg, Joseph E. Johnston, and John Bell Hood never had great confidence in those generals. Daniel argued that the rank and file's "unity was grass roots in nature" and went on to show that "two factors contributed to the development of an army-level esprit: protracted encampments and marathon troop movements. It was in these settings that the army was imbued with a sense of cohesiveness, if not family" (Daniel 1991: 23).

Anyone wishing to understand the histories of the Army of Northern Virginia and the Army of Tennessee must consult *Two Great Rebel Armies* by Richard McMurry (1989). Though not a lengthy volume, this book compares the Confederacy's two major armies, looking at the various factors that made one successful and the other a failure. McMurry analyzes the policies of the Confederate government; the commanding generals of both armies; their corps, division, and brigade commanders; and their regimental officers and enlisted men. He shows how all of these impacted the performance of the armies. Of particular importance, McMurry found that the Army of Northern Virginia won more battlefield victories because it had a larger number of experienced officers (men who had served in the old army), more officers and non-commissioned officers who had received training at a military school or academy, and more men who had belonged to a pre-war militia unit.

Like their counterparts in the North, Confederate armies included many ethnic groups. Ella Lonn's *Foreigners in the Confederacy* (1940) looked at foreign born

Southerners who served not only in the Confederate army but also in its government and navy. She did yeoman work in going through surviving records to identify units that had a majority of foreigners in their ranks. Lonn found that the largest ethnic groups in order of numbers in Confederate armies were the Irish, German, English, and French. Kelly O'Grady's (2000) study of Irishmen in the Army of Northern Virginia is the most detailed account of any Southern ethnic group. He estimated that some 40,000 Irishmen served in the Lee's army during the war. The book describes their actions in several of the battles fought in Virginia, Maryland, and Pennsylvania and helps to show that "these men made a substantial contribution to the Southern war effort" (O'Grady 2000: xvii). A briefer book, Tucker (2006), surveys Irish contributions across the Confederacy.

The story of the approximately 2,000 Jews who served in Southern armies is masterfully chronicled in Robert N. Rosen's *The Jewish Confederates* (2000). He found that most of these Jews served as privates or non-commissioned officers, only a handful became officers, and not a single one became a general. Rather than forming any companies composed exclusively or primarily of Jews, most of these soldiers were dispersed in numerous companies and came from nearly every state of the Confederacy.

It should be obvious from this brief treatment that there are a number of subjects in need of coverage. The titles mentioned here should serve as a basis and/or model for further research and writing that will give readers a fuller portrait of that complex and interesting entity known as the Confederate army.

#### BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Bartholomees, J. Boone, Jr. (1998). *Buff Facings and Gilt Buttons: Staff and Headquarters Operations in the Army of Northern Virginia, 1861–1865*. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.
- Bonner, Robert E. (2006). *The Soldier's Pen: Firsthand Impressions of the Civil War*. New York: Hill and Wang.
- Brinsfield, John Wesley, Jr., ed. (2006). *The Spirit Divided: Memoirs of Civil War Chaplains: The Confederacy*. Macon, GA: Mercer University Press.
- Coco, Gregory A. (1996). *The Civil War Infantryman in Camp, on the March, and in Battle*. Gettysburg, PA: Thomas Publications.
- Connelly, Thomas L. (1967). *Army of the Heartland: The Army of Tennessee, 1861–1862*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.
- Connelly, Thomas L. (1971). *Autumn of Glory: The Army of Tennessee, 1862–1865*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.
- Daniel, Larry J. (1991). *Soldiering in the Army of Tennessee: A Portrait of Life in a Confederate Army*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Freeman, Douglas S. (1942–4). *Lee's Lieutenants: A Study in Command*, 3 vols. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons.
- Glatthaar, Joseph T. (1994). *Partners in Command: The Relationships between Leaders in the Civil War*. New York: Free Press.
- Haughton, Andrew (2000). *Training, Tactics and Leadership of the Confederate Army of Tennessee: Seeds of Failure*. Portland, OR: Frank Cass Publishers.



- Horn, Stanley F. (1953). *The Army of Tennessee*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Katcher, Philip (1994). *The Army of Robert E. Lee*. London: Arms and Armour.
- Katcher, Philip (2003). *The Army of Northern Virginia: Lee's Army in the American Civil War*. New York: Fitzroy Dearborn.
- Lonn, Ella (1940). *Foreigners in the Confederacy*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- McMurry, Richard M. (1989). *Two Great Rebel Armies: Essay in Confederate Military History*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- McPherson, James M. (1994). *What They Fought For, 1861–1865*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.
- McPherson, James M. (1997). *For Cause and Comrades: Why Men Fought in the Civil War*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Moore, Jerrold Northrop (1996). *Confederate Commissary General: Lucius Bellinger Northrop and the Subsistence Bureau of the Southern Army*. Shippensburg, PA: White Mane.
- Nichols, James L. (1957). *Confederate Engineers*. Tuscaloosa, AL: Confederate Publishing Co.
- Norton, Herman. (1961). *Rebel Religion: The Story of Confederate Chaplains*. St. Louis, MO: Bethany Press.
- O'Grady, Kelly J. (2000). *Clear the Confederate Way!: The Irish in the Army of Northern Virginia*. Mason City, IA: Savas Publishing Co.
- Power, J. Tracy (1998). *Lee's Miserables: Life in the Army of Northern Virginia from the Wilderness to Appomattox*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Radley, Kenneth (1989). *Rebel Watchdog: The Confederate States Army Provost Guard*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.
- Robertson, James I., Jr. (1988). *Soldiers Blue and Gray*. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.
- Rosen, Robert N. (2000). *The Jewish Confederates*. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.
- Shannon, Fred A. (1928). *The Organization and Administration of the Union Army, 1861–1865*, 2 vols. Cleveland: Arthur H. Clark.
- Tucker, Phillip Thomas (2006). *Irish Confederates: The Civil War's Forgotten Soldiers*. Abilene, TX: McWhiney Foundation Press.
- Weinert, Richard P. (1991). *The Confederate Regular Army*. Shippensburg, PA: White Mane Publishing Co.
- Weitz, Mark A. (2005). *More Damning than Slaughter: Desertion in the Confederate Army*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
- Wiley, Bell I. (1943). *The Life of Johnny Reb*. Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill.
- Williams, David (2000). *Johnny Reb's War: Battlefield and Homefront*. Abilene, TX: McWhiney Foundation Press.
- Woodworth, Steven E. (1990). *Jefferson Davis and His Generals: The Failure of Confederate Command in the West*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.

# Chapter Twenty-eight

## THE CONFEDERATE NAVY AND MARINE CORPS

*Michael E. Krivdo*

In February 1861, within two weeks of the establishment of the Confederate States of America, the new government established the Confederate States Navy Department and four days later selected Stephen R. Mallory, a former chairman of the US Senate Naval Affairs Committee, to head the new service. As natural extensions of the new navy, the Confederate Congress provided for an academy to train officers (Campbell 1998) and established a Marine Corps. Mallory and his subordinates faced a daunting task in breathing life into new institutions with few assets. The challenges were enormous, for “the timber for his ships stood in the forests, and when cut and laid was green and soft; the iron required was in the mines, and there were neither furnaces nor workshops; the hemp for ropes had to be sown, grown, reaped, and then there were no rope walks. ... Without a rolling mill capable of turning out a 2.5 [inch] iron plate, nor a workshop able to complete a marine engine, and with a pressing need to build, equip and maintain ships-of-war,” Mallory faced a host of problems indeed (Scharf 1887: 31). Add to these problems a lack of funding and a congress and president clearly focused on the priority of building an army first, it is amazing that Mallory and his men could make any headway.

Events developed quickly. Eight days after the first shots of the Civil War were fired at Charleston, South Carolina, Southern forces occupied the Norfolk Navy Yard. During the following month the Confederate Congress authorized privateering (Robinson 1991 [1928]) and Secretary Mallory sent Commander James D. Bulloch to England with orders to purchase and fit out warships for the Confederacy (Spencer 1983). The next day Mallory sent a letter to the Congressional Committee on Naval Affairs calling for the construction of “an iron-armoured ship as a matter of the first necessity” (Luraghi 1996: 67). Exactly a month later Lieutenant John M. Brooke and workers at Norfolk began converting the partially burned USS *Merrimack* into the ironclad CSS *Virginia* (Coski 1996). On June 30 the CSS *Sumter* (the converted merchant steamer *Habana*) sailed from New Orleans under the command of Captain Raphael Semmes to begin a most successful, if short-lived career as the first of several commerce raiders (Semmes 1869).

Thus, within 90 days of the outbreak of war, the contours of Confederate naval policy were set: new technology, represented in part by ironclad warships, would be employed to defend Southern ports as part of the overall Confederate defensive strategy; and swift, well-armed commerce raiders would be dispatched around the world to exert economic pressure on the Union. The operations of these forces and the effectiveness of their opposition to the Federal navy, particularly in countering a blockade of Southern ports, repelling attacks on coastal areas, and executing its own riverine operations, would dominate the historical study of the Confederate Navy and Marine Corps for the next century.

During that time only one book, John Thomas Scharf's massive *History of the Confederate States Navy* (1887), attempted to recount the operations of the men and vessels of the navy from its inception to its final shots. Though his narrative of the navy's combat actions reeked of what has since been called the "cult of Lee," Scharf's tome quickly became the dominant reference for Confederate naval research. Its scope and depth made similar efforts by contemporaries pale in comparison. A Confederate navy veteran, Scharf constructed his history around a prodigious quantity of first-person accounts that relate events as they unfolded in the words of the men who were there. This fact alone makes his work important today since he captures testimonials not found elsewhere.

However, Scharf's book is not without faults. His reliance on personal accounts builds into his product a bias that fails to present a balanced view. Like any work that depends on individual memories, it includes factual errors and important omissions. He also neglects to accurately document his sources, making independent verification of some material difficult, if not impossible. More importantly, Scharf's *History* is conspicuously absent of objective analysis. Nonetheless, the book remains a classic source of information among serious researchers.

Although Scharf's work remained unsurpassed in its time, several contemporary writers provided their own perspective of the South's naval history. In most cases undertaken predominantly by naval veterans of the war, these versions contain many of the same flaws as Scharf's work, yet still retain value as primary sources. Nonetheless, these accounts should also be used with caution by researchers. In this regard, they function more as selective memoirs than definitive histories. One notable example of this type is William Harwar Parker's "The Confederate States Navy," published in the series *Confederate Military History* (1899). The focus of both Scharf and Parker on the tactical level is not unusual for their time, but nonetheless limits the value of their works to modern scholars with wider interests.

During the late nineteenth and first half of the twentieth centuries general audiences remained captivated by accounts of Confederate naval actions, especially by the duel between the ironclads CSS *Virginia* and USS *Monitor*, and by tales of the near-legendary exploits of the Confederate cruisers *Alabama*, *Tallahassee*, and *Shenandoah*. Historians produced several works on these subjects and other aspects of Confederate naval history, but no significant synthesis appeared to replace Scharf's work until 1996. A product of 20 years of archival investigation, Raimundo Luraghi's well-researched and comprehensive *History of the Confederate Navy* (1996) has become a valuable contribution to the historiography of the

subject. In addition to providing details of various combat actions, Luraghi also presents analysis of major issues that are absent in Scharf's *History*. Although superior in many ways to Scharf's less-structured and sometimes difficult discourse, Luraghi's book is not without its own flaws. Critics have focused on Luraghi's tendency toward generalization and his lack of attention to detail in some areas. Some also believe he paints an overly favorable portrait of Stephen Mallory by relieving the secretary of much responsibility for questionable decisions, deflecting blame on "the Confederate navy's command system" instead (349). Reviewers have noted that Luraghi's overt admiration for the achievements of the Confederate Navy sometimes cause him to be overly generous in his assessments.

The strength of Luraghi's book lies in its assessments of Confederate naval strategy and its explanation of how strategic policy influenced the South's ship-building program. First, he reinforces the thesis of prolific naval historian William N. Still, Jr., published initially in an article (1961) and then detailed in his book *Iron Afloat* (1985 [1971]), that the Confederacy developed and fielded ironclad warships to defend Southern rivers and ports, not to break the inefficient Union blockade. Luraghi concurs with Still's argument that domestic ironclads were purpose-built specifically to protect the South's rivers and harbors from Union attack and were never intended for use as open-ocean raiders. This point counters the previously prevalent belief that the Confederacy's domestic ironclads were intended for open-ocean battle, and that their obvious inferiority in design and construction for that purpose represented a significant failure on the part of the South. Both Still and Luraghi argue that Mallory's domestic ironclads were well-suited for riverine defense and that the South's domestic ironclad program was both in line with the overall defensive strategy of the Confederacy and well within the capabilities of the ships produced.

Luraghi also reinforces a second thesis introduced by Still, namely that Mallory proposed early in the conflict to make up for the South's deficiencies in men, machines and materiel by leveraging emerging naval technologies to gain "technical surprise." Specifically, he states that Mallory's naval strategy included building "armored ships together with commerce destroyers and the wide adoption of rifled guns ... to reverse a situation that appeared desperate" (67), hoping to rapidly seize the initiative over the older, less efficient ships of his adversary. Unfortunately for the Confederacy, the North proved more agile at adopting these new technologies and easily outpaced the production of the South.

Although no new general history of the Confederate navy has surfaced that might supplant Luraghi's book, a collection of essays edited by Still (1997) provides the general reader with important information on many issues. Opening with a background essay by Luraghi, the book contains a fairly balanced compilation of informative material on ships and shipbuilding, the officers, sailors and Marines, and strategy, tactics and operations. Each essay is supported with useful photos, maps and diagrams that supplement the text.

One of the few assets possessed in adequate numbers by the Confederate navy at the onset of war was effective leadership, provided in part by officers who left the US Navy and "went South" when their home states seceded from the Union

(Dudley 1981). A few of these naval leaders have been the subject of book-length biographies. As head of the Confederate navy, Stephen Mallory has received multiple biographies, the most useful being Joseph Durkin's (1987 [1954]) comprehensive study. In it, Durkin presents a balanced portrait of Mallory, arguing that he performed his secretarial duties with diligence and competence, becoming a valued and trusted member of President Jefferson Davis's cabinet. The shortcoming of his work is that at certain critical junctures in Mallory's life, Durkin presents detailed information on all aspects of an issue but renders no judgment of his own.

Rodney Underwood's (2005) biography of Mallory, though failing to supplant Durkin, fills some of the voids left by Durkin. Underwood also presents new scholarship and sources on Mallory. Unfortunately, his biographical treatment of the secretary is not as rich as Durkin's. Underwood frequently loses focus on his subject, submerging Mallory completely within a larger narrative treatment of the overall war effort and amid several extensive digressions on select combat actions. Nonetheless, his biography serves as an excellent supplementary piece on Mallory's life.

Several other biographies of key naval leaders have been produced outside those of Mallory, yet there remain obvious gaps in terms of coverage and quality. Warren Spencer (1983) provides thoughtful, critical assessments of the men behind Mallory's shipbuilding and procurement effort in Europe, James Bulloch, Matthew Maury, and James North. Maury, a noted naval scientist prior to joining the Confederate effort, is also the subject of a deep, insightfully balanced study by Francis Leigh Williams (1963). David Shaw (2004) updates the previous biography of Charles Read by R. Thomas Campbell (1998), Craig Symonds (1999) does the same for Franklin Buchanan (Lewis 1929), and Norman Delaney (1973) offers a useful portrait of John McIntosh Kell, thereby providing coverage of three important naval officers. Stephen Fox (2007) presents an improved picture of Raphael Semmes (Roberts 1930; Taylor 1994, 2004), despite his focusing narrowly on Semmes' Confederate service years. Yet regrettably, biographies of other key leaders such as John Brooke, Josiah Tattnall, Catesby ap R Jones, and commando John Taylor Wood (Shingleton 1979; Bell 2002) pale in comparison as they lack balance, criticality of thought, or overall analytical rigor. James Bradford's edited collection *Captains of the Old Steam Navy* (1988) helps fill some of the gaps, but it is interesting to note that Southern naval leaders, unlike their Northern counterparts, have not yet received the same degree of biographical attention. Furthermore, with only one quality article on Confederate sailors (Still 1985), the subject of enlisted men and their everyday life in the Confederate naval service has yet to receive the level of scholarly attention that has been accorded their Union counterparts.

Notably, the vessels and weapons of the Confederate navy have received more thorough attention by scholars than its officer corps. William N. Still, Jr. (1969, 1985 [1971]) and George F. Amadon (1988) thoroughly describe the Confederate ironclads, Frank Lawrence Owsley (1987) traces the construction and operations of the CSS *Florida*, and both Sally M. Walker (2005) and Tom Chaffin (2008) do the same with the submarine *Hunley*. In addition to these fine works, Maxine Turner (1988) moves the focus from ship to shore, detailing the establishment and

operation of the Confederate Naval Works at Columbus, Georgia. Turner keenly notes the paralyzing effects that mismanagement, excessive local control over contracting, and an overly complicated naval bureaucracy had on the shipbuilding effort, making her regional study a valuable contribution. Finally, though broader in scope, John V. Quarstein (2006) examines the international development of ironclad ships, showing how events of the American Civil War accelerated the adoption of iron, steam and shell as the standard of modern navies.

Milton Perry (1965) describes the development and employment not just of the *Hunley* and other submersibles, but mines as well. He concludes that underwater mines, though not decisive, nonetheless bolstered the defenses of key harbors such as Charleston and Mobile and inhibited to some degree the aggressiveness of the Union navy. He also argues convincingly that Confederate submarine warfare generated a healthy respect in Northern sailors, particularly in the wake of events like the surprise torpedoing of the warships *New Ironsides* and *Housatonic*. Perry's work remains the standard in this niche despite new materials that have surfaced since its publication. Later works, like that by Louis Schafer (1996), present new information, but do not supplant Perry.

Arguments regarding the effectiveness of the Federal blockade figure centrally in all discussions of Confederate naval strategy. During the war, periodic reports from blockading squadrons spawned a mythology that the blockade was successful at strangling the South and that view persisted for almost a century. Yet by the mid-1900s, research began to unravel that school of thought. The efforts of historians like Frank Vandiver (1947) in describing blockade-runners based in Bermuda, Richard Wood's (1976) dissertation on the blockade's porosity at Wilmington, North Carolina, and Stephen Wise's (1988) more comprehensive study all began to contend that the Union blockade effort was less effective than previously believed.

In general, these works based their conclusions on quantitative studies of successful penetrations of ports by blockade-runners (Beringer 1989). Frank Merli (1970) builds on that idea and explores the larger effect the blockade had on mustering international support for the South. In a subsequent essay, Merli (1978) states bluntly that "even late in the war, when the blockade had achieved a fairly high degree of efficiency, surprising numbers of ... swift ships got through the Federal cordon" (129). Luraghi (1996) goes so far as to refer to the blockade as a "near failure" (286) and argues that Federal land attacks, not the naval blockade, closed most Southern ports (346). Other authors continue to contend that the blockade was successful and contributed significantly to Confederate defeat (Anderson 1962, Fowler 1990). Although each theory is interesting in its own right, the various authors generally employ individual and quite different definitions of what constitutes effectiveness within their arguments, for example, comparing the volume of trade before and during the war, examining prices for commodities both in the North and South and for wartime and prewar levels, counting the number of vessels clearing ports prior to the war and during the war. To date, no one measure has become accepted by a majority of historians. Accordingly, the issue of blockade effectiveness remains a subject of continued debate.



Nonetheless, Frank Merli (1978) contends that the main role of the Confederate Navy was to counter the blockade and he blames Mallory for not developing a naval strategy to do so more effectively. Historians such as Frank Owsley (1959) and Raimundo Luraghi (1996) similarly laid blame on the Confederate government itself for not regulating or nationalizing the blockade-runners early in the conflict and thereby ensuring that priority cargoes got through, a move that many argue would have further undermined the Union efforts. However, the core issue of the effectiveness of the Federal blockade remains unresolved, in part due to aforementioned differences in agreeing how to define success. Also relevant is the issue of the effect that the Confederacy's own self-imposed embargo of cotton had on trade (Owsley 1959), a move that placed the South at a distinct economic disadvantage from the outset. In his last book, Merli (2004) provides a fresh perspective on Owsley's work and hints that Great Britain took a more pragmatic stance on supporting the South diplomatically.

A similar historical discussion brews around assessments of the degree of success Confederate cruisers enjoyed in preying on the Union merchant fleet. For decades George W. Dalzell's (1940) classic study of the "flight from the flag" provided the interpretive framework by linking the decline in merchant ships registered in the United States to the depredations of Confederate cruisers. Merli's (1970, 1978, 2004) works further suggest that the cruisers' successes at seizing and destroying Federal merchant ships caused significant numbers of ship owners to transfer registration of their vessels from the United States to Great Britain to render them immune from Confederate capture, implying a degree of success on the part of the Southern cruisers. Chester Hearn's (1992) study specifically recounts the activities of eight Confederate raiders as they scoured the seas and Norman Delaney's (1983) essay analyzes the tactics employed by those vessels. All of these works suggest that the Confederate cruisers were achieving some success in their role of disrupting the Union merchant fleet on the high seas.

Studies of particular cruisers reinforce this view by emphasizing their successes in individual actions. In addition to the secondary works on cruisers mentioned earlier, several excellent primary accounts exist that round out the story of the cruisers in great detail. One of the best first-person descriptions remains Raphael Semmes' *Memoirs of Service Afloat* (1869), wherein he relates his experiences as captain of the cruisers *Sumter* and *Alabama*. A supplemental viewpoint can be found in the memoirs of Semmes' second-in-command, John McIntosh Kell (1900). Similarly, the exploits of the CSS *Tallahassee* are recounted separately in two biographies of veteran naval commando John Taylor Wood, based principally on his own written accounts after the fact (Shingleton 1979, Bell 2002). In addition, personal recollections from the officers of the CSS *Shenandoah* flesh out two other books (Curry 2006, Baldwin and Powers 2007), relating how that raider continued to ravage the North's Pacific whaling fleet more than four months following the South's surrender at Appomattox. However, while each of these accounts detail the combat actions of these raiders, none adequately addresses the critical question of whether the cruisers achieved their strategic goals of weakening Northern morale or forcing Union leaders to divert ships from blockade duties to

pursue the raiders. One recent addition that addresses these issues is that of Tom Chaffin (2006), yet much work in this area remains to be accomplished.

Lately, the roles and activities of specific Confederate squadrons and institutions have also received scholarly attention. A fine example is John Coski's (1997) study of the James River Squadron that assesses the strategic importance of the role it played in defending the Confederate capital at Richmond. R. Thomas Campbell (2005) has provided a similar assessment of Confederate naval forces on the Mississippi River and its tributaries, a subject previously addressed only from the perspective of the Union Navy (Milligan 1965, Cornish 1986). The roles and contributions of the Confederate Naval Academy are described in two histories of the institution (Campbell 1998, and the definitive Conrad 2003). Furthermore, the publication of the diary and letters of Hubbard Minor (2007) provide a rare glimpse of the Academy through the eyes of one of its students.

If there remain significant holes in historical coverage of the Confederate Navy, the historiography of the Confederate States Marine Corps (CSMC) is sparse indeed. In the few instances where historians acknowledge its existence, the organization is depicted as an insignificant unit that contributed little to the Confederate war effort. Scharf's respected *History* set this tone from the outset: of its 824 pages, less than four are allotted to the CSMC. Recent research concludes that the reality was just the opposite: Confederate Marines often constituted a significant portion of the manpower of the navy, and members of that corps served in ever-broadening combat roles, fighting with a tenacity and courage that earned the recognition and respect of senior commanders.

In *Rebel Brass* (1956), Frank Vandiver dismisses the Marines in a single blunt sentence: "The [Confederate] Marine Corps, pitifully small, was of little use" (66). Allan Millett basically agreed with this assessment, declaring in *Semper Fidelis* (1991 [1983]), his history of the US Marine Corps, that "the Confederate Marines were doomed to serve through the war with diminished usefulness and growing anonymity," implying that the Confederate Marines' lack of prominence constituted *de facto* proof of their lack of value to the South (99).

Historian Ralph Donnelly (1989) disagrees with the assessments of Vandiver and Millett and instead asserts that "the demand for [Confederate] Marines was constant and widespread, and they were used whenever available" (270), even earning some of the South's highest honors. Nonetheless, despite its uniqueness as an organization and a broadening of its combat roles, the CSMC is among the least historically documented regimental-sized units to serve in the war. There are several excellent reasons to account for the paucity of attention accorded the CSMC service, the most important being that the organization records did not survive the war.

Short of an early article (Van Hoose 1928), the first concerted effort at writing a general history of the CSMC appears in a master's thesis that describes the basic organization of the service and chronicles some of its contributions during select combat actions, yet ignores larger questions such as why the CSMC was created, how well it served in its role, and did it contribute significantly to the Confederate war effort (Gasser 1956). The thesis also neglects to correlate the

CSMC's performance and development against that of its wartime cousin, the US Marine Corps.

Following in Gasser's footsteps, Donnelly wrote several books and articles on the CSMC, making some significant contributions to its historiography. Beginning with three articles (1959, 1964, 1966), Donnelly established a foundation of research on the CSMC that supported a larger effort. In subsequent years, he expanded his work and produced four books on the CSMC: a collection of biographical essays on the commissioned officers (2001 [1973]); a compilation of enlisted service record material (1979); and two slightly different versions (1976, 1989) of a general history of the CSMC. Of the latter two, Donnelly's most valuable contribution, *Rebel Leathernecks* (1989), contains a broader sampling of primary source material and is a more refined product. He provides a general description of the CSMC, a narrative of some of its activities, and details regarding uniforms, regulations, and enlisted life. However, the book is poorly organized and produces a fragmented and discontinuous storyline that makes it difficult to discern any overall patterns in the CSMC's deployment scheme. Donnelly competently describes the organization and actions of the CSMC, but he fails to explain why Southern leaders created the CSMC with a unique structure, or to assess how well the Marines performed their missions in relation to naval strategy.

The next major contribution, Michael Krivdo's (2006) master's thesis, analyzes the inherent benefits of the new structure adopted by the CSMC as compared to that of the USMC. He also explores shifts in the roles and missions of the CSMC as the war continued, and evaluates the performance of the corps in its support of the navy's roles and missions. His research indicates that the CSMC, unlike other Confederate units, actually grew in size and value as the conflict went on (Krivdo 2007), with Confederate Marines representing "a significant percentage of the manpower in the Confederate Navy," and "a far greater percentage than that of its Northern cousin, the USMC" (Krivdo 2006: 266).

Furthermore, throughout the war the CSMC increased the breadth and range of its capabilities, assumed expanded and more complex combat roles, and was considered a valuable asset by the army and navy commanders under whom Marines served. The Confederate Marines evolved into an agile and responsive service that served widely throughout the South and aboard most navy warships, often repositioned into critical areas as a sort of national response force. Finally, Krivdo explores some of the peculiar circumstances that influenced the statistically high percentage (over 50 percent) of company grade US Marine officers who resigned and "went South" at the start of the war, and analyzes the deleterious effect it had on the Northern corps, while suggesting that the CSMC became an extension of Archibald Henderson's prewar vision of what a Marine Corps should be.

Considering the handicaps under which Confederate naval leaders persevered, the degree to which they succeeded in creating a capable military force is remarkable. To produce out of nothing a navy that could contribute significantly to the defense of Confederacy, and even to carry the fight to the enemy on the open seas required a Herculean effort in a number of areas. The Confederate successes in harnessing revolutionary naval technologies while building modern ironclad ships

in cornfields earned the respect of their Union foes, and by extension even influenced British naval planning (Fuller 2008). The South's development and employment of submarines, sea mines, rifled naval artillery, and special operations-type tactics represented a valiant effort, and a prescient one. Although these innovations, coupled with an aggressive fighting spirit proved insufficient to defeat the naval forces of their larger, more industrialized enemy, many of their ideas would resurface in later wars, with more decisive impact. While portions of the history of the Confederate naval efforts have been studied, much more work remains to be done.

#### BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Amadon, George F. (1988). *Rise of the Ironclads*. Missoula, MT: Pictorial Histories Pub Co.
- Anderson, Bern (1962). *By Sea and by River: The Naval History of the Civil War*. New York: A. A. Knopf.
- Baldwin, John, and Ron Powers (2007). *Last Flag Down: The Epic Journey of the Last Confederate Warship*. New York: Crown.
- Bell, John (2002). *Confederate Seadog: John Taylor Wood in War and Exile*. Jefferson, NC: McFarland and Co.
- Beringer, Richard E., et al. (1989). *The Elements of Confederate Defeat: Nationalism, War Aims and Religion*. Athens: University of Georgia Press.
- Bradford, James C., ed. (1988). *Captains of the Old Steam Navy*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Campbell, R. Thomas (1998). *Academy on the James: The Confederate Naval School*. Shippensburg, PA: Burd Street Press.
- Campbell, R. Thomas (2000). *Sea Hawk of the Confederacy: Lieutenant Charles Read and the Confederate Navy*. Shippensburg, PA: Burd Street Press.
- Campbell, R. Thomas (2005). *Confederate Naval Forces on Western Waters: The Defense of the Mississippi River and Its Tributaries*. Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Co.
- Chaffin, Tom (2006). *Sea of Gray: The Around-the-World Odyssey of the Confederate Raider Shenandoah*. New York: Hill and Wang.
- Chaffin, Tom (2008). *The H.L. Hunley: The Secret Hope of the Confederacy*. New York: Hill and Wang.
- Conrad, James Lee (2003). *Rebel Reefers: The Organization and Midshipmen of the Confederate States Naval Academy*. Boulder, CO: Da Capo Press.
- Cornish, Dudley Taylor (1986). *Lincoln's Lee: The Life of Samuel Phillips Lee, United States Navy, 1812-1897*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
- Coski, John M. (1996). *Capital Navy: The Men, Ships, and Organization of the James River Squadron*. Campbell, CA: Savas Woodbury Publishers.
- Curry, Angus (2006). *The Officers of the CSS Shenandoah*. Gainesville: University Press of Florida.
- Dalzell, George W. (1940). *The Flight from the Flag: The Continuing Effect of the Civil War upon the American Carrying Trade*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Delaney, Norman C. (1973). *John McIntosh Kell of the Raider Alabama*. Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press.
- Delaney, Norman C. (1983) "Raiders of the Sea," in William C. Davis, ed., *Fighting for Time*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday.

- Delaney, Norman C., William N. Still, Jr., and John N. Taylor (1998). *Raiders and Blockaders: The American Civil War Afloat*. Washington: Brassey's, Inc.
- Donnelly, Ralph W. (1959). "Battle Honors and Services of the Confederate Marines," *Military Affairs*, 23:1 (Spring), 37–40.
- Donnelly, Ralph W. (1964). "A Confederate Navy Forlorn Hope," *Military Affairs*, 28:2 (Summer), 73–8.
- Donnelly, Ralph W. (1966). "The Confederate Marines at Drewry's Bluff," *Virginia Cavalcade*, 16:2 (Autumn), 42–7.
- Donnelly, Ralph W. (1976). *The History of the Confederate States Marine Corps*. Washington, NC: Published by the author.
- Donnelly, Ralph W. (1979). *Service Records of Confederate Enlisted Marines*. New Bern, NC: Owen G. Dunn Co.
- Donnelly, Ralph W. (1989). *The Confederate States Marine Corps: The Rebel Leathernecks*. Shippensburg, PA: White Mane Books.
- Donnelly, Ralph W. (2001 [1973]). *Biographical Sketches of the Commissioned Officers of the Confederate States Marine Corps*, 3rd edn. Shippensburg, PA: White Mane Books.
- Dudley, William S. (1981). *Going South: U.S. Navy Officer Resignations and Dismissals on the Eve of the Civil War*. Washington: Naval Historical Foundation.
- Durkin, Joseph (1987 [1954]). *Confederate Navy Chief: Stephen R. Mallory*. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.
- Fowler, William M., Jr. (1990). *Under Two Flags: The American Navy in the Civil War*. New York: W. W. Norton.
- Fox, Stephen (2007). *Wolf of the Deep: Raphael Semmes and the Notorious Confederate Raider CSS Alabama*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Fuller, Howard J. (2008). *Clad in Iron: The American Civil War and the Challenge of British Naval Power*. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishing.
- Gardner, Donald Ray (1973). "The Confederate Corps of Marines," MA thesis, Memphis State University, Memphis, TN.
- Gasser, James Charles (1956). "Confederate Marines in the Civil War," MA thesis, Alabama Polytechnic Institute, Auburn, AL.
- Hearn, Chester G. (1992). *Gray Raiders of the Sea: How Eight Confederate Warships Destroyed the Union's High Seas Commerce*. Camden, ME: International Marine Pub.
- Kell, John McIntosh (1900). *Recollections of a Naval Life, Including the Cruises of the Confederate States Steamers, "Sumter" and "Alabama."* Washington: Neale Co.
- Krivdo, Michael E. (2006). "Marines in Gray: The Birth, Life and Death of the Confederate States Marine Corps," MA thesis, Texas A&M University, College Station, TX.
- Krivdo, Michael E. (2007). "Confederate Marine Corps Recruiting in New Orleans and Marine Activities in the First Year of the Civil War," *Louisiana History*, 48:4 (Winter), 441–66.
- Lewis, Charles L. (1929). *Admiral Franklin Buchanan: Fearless Man of Action*. Baltimore, MD: Norman Remington.
- Luraghi, Raimundo (1996). *A History of the Confederate Navy*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Merli, Frank J. (1970). *The Alabama, British Neutrality, and the American Civil War*. David M. Fahey, ed. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Merli, Frank J. (1978). "The Confederate Navy, 1861–1865," in Kenneth Hagan, ed., *In Peace and War: Interpretations of American Naval History, 1775–1984*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 126–44.

- Merli, Frank J. (2004). *Great Britain and the Confederate Navy, 1861–1865*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Millett, Allan R. (1991 [1983]). *Semper Fidelis: The History of the United States Marine Corps*. New York: Free Press.
- Milligan, John D. (1965). *Gunboats Down the Mississippi*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Minor, Hubbard T. R. (2007). *Confederate Naval Cadet. The Diary and Letters of Midshipman Hubbard T. Minor, with a History of the Confederate Naval Academy*, ed. by R. Thomas Campbell. Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Co.
- Owsley, Frank Lawrence (1959). *King Cotton Diplomacy: Foreign Relations of the Confederate States of America*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Owsley, Frank Lawrence (1987). *The C.S.S. Florida: Her Building and Operations*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Parker, William Harwar (1899). “The Confederate States Navy,” *Confederate Military History*, 12 vols. Atlanta: Confederate Publishing Company, 12: 1–115.
- Parker, William Harwar (1985 [1883]). *Recollections of a Naval Officer, 1841–1865*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Perry, Milton F. (1965). *Infernal Machines: The Story of Confederate Submarines and Mine Warfare*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.
- Quarstein, John V. (2006). *A History of Ironclads: The Power of Iron Over Wood*. Charleston, SC: History Press.
- Roberts, Walter (1930). *Semmes of the Alabama*. Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill.
- Robinson, William M., Jr. (1991 [1928]). *The Confederate Privateers*. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.
- Schafer, Louis (1996). *Confederate Underwater Warfare: An Illustrated History*. Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Co.
- Scharf, John Thomas (1887). *History of the Confederate States Navy from Its Organization to The Surrender of Its Last Vessel*. New York: Rogers & Sherwood.
- Semmes, Raphael (1869). *Memoirs of Service Afloat, During the War Between the States*. Baltimore: Kelly, Piet & Co.
- Shaw, David W. (2004). *Sea Wolf of the Confederacy: The Daring Civil War Raids of Naval Lieutenant Charles W. Read*. New York: Free Press.
- Shingleton, Royce Gordon (1979). *John Taylor Wood: Sea Ghost of the Confederacy*. Athens: University of Georgia Press.
- Spencer, Warren F. (1983). *The Confederate Navy in Europe*. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press.
- Still, William N., Jr. (1961). “Confederate Naval Strategy: The Ironclad,” *Journal of Southern History*, 27:3 (August), 330–43.
- Still, William N., Jr. (1969). *Confederate Shipbuilding*. Athens: University of Georgia Press.
- Still, William N., Jr. (1985). “The Common Sailor, Part 2: Confederate Tars,” *Civil War Times Illustrated*, 24 (March), 12–19.
- Still, William N., Jr. (1985 [1971]). *Iron Afloat: The Story of the Confederate Armorclads*. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.
- Still, William N., Jr., ed. (1997). *The Confederate Navy: The Ships, Men and Organization, 1861–1865*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Symonds, Craig L. (1999). *Confederate Admiral: The Life and Wars of Franklin Buchanan*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Taylor, John M. (1994). *Confederate Raider: Raphael Semmes of the Alabama*. New York: Brassey’s.



- Taylor, John M. (2004). *Semmes: Rebel Raider*. Washington: Potomac Books.
- Turner, Maxine (1988). *Navy Gray: A Story of the Confederate Navy on the Chattahoochee and Appalachian Rivers*. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press.
- Underwood, Rodney (2005). *Stephen Russell Mallory: A Biography of the Confederate Navy Secretary and United States Senator*. Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Co.
- Van Hoose, G. W. (1928). "The Confederate States Marine Corps," *Marine Corps Gazette*, (September 13), 166–77.
- Vandiver, Frank (1947). *Confederate Blockade-Running Through Bermuda, 1861–1865: Letters and Cargo Manifests*. Austin: University of Texas Press.
- Vandiver, Frank (1956). *Rebel Brass: The Confederate Command System*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.
- Walker, Sally M. (2005). *Secrets of a Civil War Submarines: Solving the Mysteries of the H. L. Hunley*. Minneapolis: Carolrhoda Books.
- Williams, Francis Leigh (1963). *Matthew Fontaine Maury: Scientist of the Sea*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.
- Wise, Stephen R. (1988). *Lifeline of the Confederacy: Blockade Running during the Civil War*. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.
- Wood, Richard E. (1976). "Port Town at War: Wilmington, North Carolina, 1860–1865," PhD dissertation, Florida State University.

## Chapter Twenty-nine

# THE CITIZEN SOLDIER IN AMERICA: MILITIA, NATIONAL GUARD, AND RESERVES

*James C. Bradford*

By the rude bridge that arched the flood,  
Their flag to April's breeze unfurled,  
Here once the embattled farmer stood,  
And fired the shot heard 'round the world.

Ralph Waldo Emerson, "Concord Hymn" (1837)

Citizen soldiers have formed a part of the fabric of American military forces and society for four centuries. Settlers at Jamestown and Plymouth feared both the Native Americans on whose land they planted their colonies and the forces of England's imperial rivals, France and Spain. The companies that financed the colonies hired military veterans, John Smith and Miles Standish, to train and lead militia units patterned after the trainbands of Elizabethan England (Leach 1951, Rutman 1964, Boynton 1967, Shea 1983). These companies of citizen soldiers were the forerunners of nineteenth-century state militias and twentieth-century National Guard and Reserve units (Ferling 1980).

Settlers at both the Jamestown and Plymouth erected forts and drilled under arms from the very beginning. As other villages were established in New England and planters moved up the rivers flowing into Chesapeake Bay, the Puritans and Virginians expanded their militia organizations. Miles Standish, for example, divided Plymouth's militia into four units in 1622 and added units at five other towns soon thereafter. Each town in New England and county in Virginia and Maryland required that virtually all adult white males serve in the militia. The importance of the mandatory service proved manifest in the many Indian Wars of the seventeenth century, the largest of which were the Pequot War, 1636–7 (Cave 1996), and King Philip's War, 1675–6 (Leach 1958, Lepore 1998, Drake 1999), in southern New England and recurring warfare in Virginia, 1607–32 and 1665–70, the later sparking Bacon's Rebellion which pitted militia units led by Governor William Berkeley against those led by Nathaniel Bacon (Washburn 1957, Powell 1958). The alliance of Plymouth and Massachusetts Bay formed during the Pequot War was joined by New Haven and Connecticut to form the Confederation of New England in 1643.

Seventeenth-century militiamen and the units they served have received little scholarly attention, the exceptions being William Shea's (1983) brief work on the Virginia militia and Kyle Zelner's (2009) detailed analysis the formation and composition of the militia unit raised in Essex County, Massachusetts, during King Philip's War. Zelner demonstrates how local leaders forced criminals, drunkards, and other members of the lower socioeconomic strata of the community into service, and thus relied on individuals they considered expendable to defend the entire community. This stands in marked contrast to the conclusion of Fred Anderson, *A People's Army: Massachusetts Soldiers and Society in the Seven Years' War* (1984), that the militia was composed largely of younger sons of the middle class who joined voluntarily in the hope of bettering their position in society.

The term "militia" has been loosely employed by writers to describe various types of military volunteers (Hill 1964, Shy 1963). This chapter focuses on the formal, institutionalized systems established by governing bodies, but recognizes that the requirements established by legislation rarely matched reality. For example, colonial law required all Anglo males from c.16 to 60 years of age to own basic military equipment (usually a gun, cartridge belt, and set amounts of powder and lead for shot) and to muster with it for formal drill and rudimentary combat training on an irregular basis, often only once or twice a year (Peterson 1947). With no war on the horizon, muster days evolved into social and political events as those present elected their company officers (more senior officers were usually appointed by the governor), drank alcohol, and sometimes gambled (DeValinger 1938, French 1945, Sharp 1945, Morton 1958, Breen 1972, Shea 1983).

Specialized militia units first appeared in mid-seventeenth century New England where Massachusetts Bay Colony, Plymouth, and Newport (Rhode Island) all formed troops of mounted men (Huling 1883). Membership in such units was limited to individuals who could afford a horse and the other required equipment. During the same era Boston formed an artillery company. In 1671 Virginia's militia consisted of 20 foot and 20 horse regiments, a decade later Massachusetts Bay had a similar number of horse regiments but fewer of foot.

Though organized in companies and regiments, the militia rarely fought that way during the eighteenth century. By then the local organizations functioned mainly as administrative units to train men and mobilize them for service beyond the local jurisdiction. When active service was required colonial governments usually assigned quotas to local districts that were usually filled by volunteers who were often offered bounties to induce enlistment. Only rarely did town meetings in the north or county courts in the south have to resort to drafting men to fill their quota. When the men required for a mission came together they were formed into new units under officers appointed by the colonial governor or assembly and paid wages from the colonial treasury.

Thus by the eighteenth century there were four types of militia: 1) Local or Standing Militia composed of mostly Anglo citizen soldiers enrolled in local companies who mustered periodically for drill and training; 2) Specialized Companies, for example, artillery, rangers, cavalry, or "guard" units, composed of volunteers drawn from the local or standing militia, the latter two usually from the economic

elite because they had to provide their own special equipment and uniforms which were expensive; 3) War or Expedition Volunteers composed of local or standing militiamen who offered or were induced to serve in units formed for specific purposes, for example, to stand ready to repel attacks by Indians or European invaders, or to embark on a campaign against the Indians or a specific enemy target, for example, to capture Louisbourg; and 4) Impressed or Conscripted Servers who were forced into service to fill the levy assigned to a county or town. Such men may have been enrolled in local militia units or they may have been vagrants or even petty criminals who were forced to serve.

Militia laws varied among the colonies, but in most cases local militia units could not be forced to serve outside the borders of the colony or for more than 90 days at a time. Local militiamen supplied their own arms, members of specialized units often purchased their own uniforms, and colonies maintained stocks of gunpowder, guns, and shot for use by war or expeditionary units (though rarely in adequate amounts).

During the decades between 1685 and 1715 the dynastic wars in Western Europe spread to North America and English militia units had to contend not only with Indians, but also with European-trained military units dispatched across the Atlantic. The volunteers who accompanied William Phips in the capture of Port Royal in French Acadia in 1690 were not mobilized through the militia system, but most were members of local units (Baker and Reid 1998). During Queen Anne's War, 1702–13, armies of men drawn from militia units from New Jersey and Pennsylvania to New England twice gathered at Lake Champlain for an attack on New France, but in each case failed to link up with a naval expedition from England and the expedition collapsed. Closer to home militia units countered numerous raids by Indians allied with the French (Leach 1966, 1973; Grenier 2005). The Treaty of Utrecht (1713) ended a quarter century of conflict ushering in over three decades of peace during which militia units in the eastern portions of colonies between Massachusetts and Pennsylvania virtually disappeared.

Such was not the case on the frontier where conflicts with Indians persisted or in the South where militia units, since the late seventeenth century, had assumed responsibility for providing defense against slave rebellions and for apprehending fugitive slaves and returning them to the owners. In the Chesapeake colonies militia units assumed these responsibilities informally (Morgan 1975), but in the southern most colonies legislatures enacted laws to codify slave patrols. In 1690, South Carolina's assembly required that slave owners serve in "slave patrols," units that were absorbed into the militia under the South Carolina Militia Act of 1721. Georgia enacted virtually identical legislation in 1735. At this same period, many slaves served as militiamen. Indeed in South Carolina they often constituted one-third of the militia and served credibly against the Yamasse Indians in 1715.

During the climactic imperial wars of the mid-eighteenth century militia continued to play a key role in America though often fighting alongside British regulars. Near the start of the Anglo-Spanish War of Jenkins' Ear, 1739–41, James Oglethorpe led a force of 400 South Carolinian volunteers (mostly militiamen),

500 Indians, and 500 British regulars in a failed attempt to capture St. Augustine, Florida, and end its use as a refuge for runaway slaves and privateers (Ivers 1974). In 1740 3,500 Americans (a mixture of volunteer militiamen and conscripts) joined 5,500 British soldiers and sailors in a disastrous campaign against Jamaica from which fewer than 600 Americans returned home. The French and their Indian allies opened King George's War, 1744–8, with a series of raids along the frontier from New York to Nova Scotia parried with only limited success by American militiamen. In 1745 a force of Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Connecticut militiamen working with ships of the Royal Navy captured Louisburg on Cape Breton Island (Plank 2001).

The last of the French and Indian Wars, 1754–63, opened with attempts first by Virginia volunteers (raised outside the militia system) commanded by George Washington, then by British regulars commanded by Edward Braddock to seize control of the forks of the Ohio River from France. Though not used to raise men until 1757, the militia system proved efficient enough to muster men from New York, New Jersey, Rhode Island, and Massachusetts for John Bradstreet's 1758 expedition that captured Fort Frontenac on the St. Lawrence River in 1758. William Byrd II commanded the Virginia, Maryland, Delaware, and North Carolina militiamen who accompanied the British regulars who drove the French from Fort Duquesne at the forks of the Ohio (Selesky 1990, Titus 1991, Ward 2003). Though they worked together colonial militiamen and British regulars did not get along and this experience reinforced American distrust of standing armies of professional soldiers (Leach 1986, Johnson 1992).

The French and Indian War resuscitated the militia system and gave colonial leaders experience in working together on military matters, but, in general, militia did not perform well on extended campaigns away from their immediate homelands, indeed many deserted. On the eve of the American Revolution the 13 colonies had a total of 500,000 men enrolled in the militias, one-third of the entire population of those colonies. As tensions between Americans and the mother country escalated, leaders of what would become the Patriot cause gained control of most militia units purging officers loyal to Britain (Shy 1975). Militia officers often assumed leadership roles in committees of correspondence, Sons of Liberty, and committees of public safety that organized opposition to British policies and enforced non-importation, non-consumption agreements. In 1774 and 1775 the Continental Congress instructed colonial governments to reorganize their militias and gather arms and ammunition. The revolutionary government in Massachusetts ordered all commanders to designate a portion of those under their command to be ready for instant service. Thus were born the Minutemen who opposed British regulars at Lexington, Concord, and Bunker Hill and laid siege to the British in Boston (Fischer 2004).

Those units were subsequently formed into the Continental Army during 1776. From 1777 to the end of the war the "American army" would consist of Continental Army "regulars" who were organized as state "lines," whose ranks state governments were responsible for filling with volunteers or conscripts; by state troops which were raised in a variety of ways, and local militia units that were

usually called to serve for short periods of time when their state was threatened (Alexander 1945, 1947, Murphy 1959–60, Royster 1979, Buel 1980, Kestnbaum 2000). Mark Kwasny (1998) traces the evolution of the militia and George Washington's employment of militia units as the war progressed concluding that they came to form an important component of his campaigns. In 1776 Charleston was defended by a force of 900 Continentals, 2,000 state troops, and 2,700 local militia. The August 16, 1777 defeat of a force of 1,250 British troops by 2,000 New Hampshire and Massachusetts militia at Bennington, Vermont, laid the basis for Major General John Burgoyne's surrender at Saratoga two months later. Brigadier General Daniel Morgan made effective use of militia units at Cowpens, South Carolina, in January 1781, and George Washington had three brigades of Virginia militia at Yorktown. In addition to providing a system through which governors could raise state armies for operations such as the Virginian campaign that captured British posts in the Old Northwest or the Massachusetts-organized debacle at Penobscot, militia conducted most operations against Britain's Indian allies and kept in check Loyalists away from the main theaters of operations (Higginbotham 1971, Ferguson 1978, Galvin 1989, Clements and Wright 1989, Resch and Sargent 2007). Patriot militiamen inflicted significant defeats on Loyalist American militiamen at Moore's Creek Bridge, North Carolina, in February 1776 and at Kings Mountain, South Carolina, in October 1780. Militia successes were balanced by failures, for example, at Groton Heights in Connecticut in 1781 and at Blue Licks in Kentucky in 1782, and many commanders, with reason, considered militiamen unreliable. Dissatisfied with the performance of Virginia's militia during the war, governor Patrick Henry sought to reorganize it during the 1780s and met resistance from local governmental officials (Ethridge 1977, Waghelstein 1995).

During the late 1780s insurrections occurred in South Carolina, Virginia, Maryland, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Massachusetts where militia units from the eastern portion of the state subdued Shay's Rebellion in the west (Szatmary 1980). When these were followed by the Whiskey Rebellion and Fries Rebellion during the 1790s it appeared for a while that domestic civil unrest might pose a greater threat to American society than any foreign enemy.

Nonetheless, always warned to fear a standing army, Americans relied, at least in theory, on militia as their first line of defense against enemies domestic and foreign for the half century of their independence (Cunliffe 1968, Crackel 1987). Richard Kohn (1975) shows that during the 1790s the Federalists created and stationed a standing force of army regulars on the frontier, and Lawrence Cress (1981) argues convincingly that within a decade, despite Republican rhetoric, most American leaders accepted, at least tacitly, a force structure in which regulars formed the core around which militia would build in time of danger.

During the opening session of the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia, Virginia's Edmund Randolph appealed to delegates to design a system in which the national government possessed the power to suppress rebellions such as that led by Daniel Shays (Coakley 1988). Members responded with the Constitution which established a federal military system and empowered Congress to raise and maintain military and naval forces and:



to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress; [and] To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions.

It did not address who should be required to serve in the militia or the terms of that service (Lofgren 1976, Higginbotham 1998).

Shortly after organization of the new government, President George Washington dispatched a force of 1,775 troops, three-quarters of them militia, against Indians in the Northwest. When it was defeated, Washington sent a second force, this time of 2,700 men of whom over 2,000 were militia. Meanwhile, at Washington's direction, Secretary of War Henry Knox submitted to Congress a plan for organizing the militia. In May 1792 Congress passed two acts which would govern the militia until the Root Reforms of 1903. The first, *An Act to Provide for Calling forth the Militia to Execute the Laws of the Union, Suppress Insurrection and Repel Invasions* stipulated the situations in which the President could call the militia into national service and limited that service to three months in any one year. The second piece of legislation, *An Act more effectually to provide for the National Defense by establishing an Uniform Militia throughout the United States*, was designed to give form and substance to the militia. It ordered that militias consist of all male citizens aged 18–45 and be divided into brigades and regiments; provided for the establishment of specialized units, including riflemen, light infantry, grenadiers, artillery and cavalry, the latter two to be filled by volunteers; and established an “adjutant general.” It was his job to ensure the training of militia, maintain records, and report annually on its condition to the President and to the state governor (Flynn 1968).

The prescribed system sometimes worked efficiently, as when Washington called for militia from Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Maryland, and Virginia to put down the Whiskey Rebellion in 1794 and John Adams for some Pennsylvania units to counter Fries Rebellion in 1799 (Newman 2004), but it was not without controversy as when Pennsylvania Governor Thomas Mifflin contended that state, not the national, government had the prime responsibility for dealing with the Whiskey Rebels who had basically taken control of the state-sanctioned militia units in the Pittsburgh region (Bouton 2007). Thomas Slaughter, *The Whiskey Rebellion* (1986) explains how Washington prevailed in federalizing the militia in 1794, but, as a rule, effective power over the militia rested in the individual states. Thus the training, readiness, and arming of militia varied widely as did the ways in which units served their states. In some areas militia garrisoned coastal fortifications during the Quasi War with France, 1798–1800, and following the *Chesapeake-Leopard* Incident in 1807 (Mahon 1960). Jeffersonian Republicans were committed to the concept of the militia as the nation's first line of defense and sought to make it more effective. Jefferson would have liked to disband the regular army but knew that an effective militia had to be established first, a goal he never achieved, in part because the

concept of centralizing control and training of the militia clashed with his state-rights principles. In 1808 Congress appropriated funds to assist states in procuring arms for the militia, but on the eve of the War of 1812, few units, particularly those in the East, were prepared for war. Neither did Jefferson achieve his parallel goal of creating a gunboat navy manned by a type of naval militia (Smith 1995). Despite his criticism of his Federalist predecessors for federalizing militia to suppress the Whiskey and Fries Rebellions, Jefferson called out militia units when he feared that the Burr Conspiracy threatened the nation and declared resistance to the Embargo in the region around Lake Champlain to be insurrection and called out militia to stop trade with Canada in 1808 (Coakley 1988).

Not surprisingly, militia, in general, performed poorly during the War of 1812. At the outbreak of hostilities, Congress voted to add 30,000 "volunteers" to the 36,000-man regular army, and asked governors to alert 80,000 militiamen for immediate call up. The governors responded erratically to this and later requests for troops. The executives of Connecticut, Rhode Island, Vermont, New Hampshire, and Massachusetts, for example, called up militia units but asserted that as no invasion had occurred their troops could not be called into federal service and refused to let their militia serve outside the borders of their home states. When Vermont changed governors the new official recalled the state's militia from New York, and militia from New York and Ohio refused to cross the border into Canada when ordered to by their commanding officers in 1812. The law stated that men who "volunteered" for federal service retained the rights of militiamen made their use problematic. During 1813 Kentucky militiamen performed well at the Battle of the Thames during William Henry Harrison's invasion of Upper Canada; repelling British incursions at Sackett's Harbor, New York, Baltimore on Chesapeake Bay; and at New Orleans. C. Edward Skeen (1999) asserts that militiamen often had the desire and courage to fight, but that they lacked training, discipline, equipment, and supplies needed to conduct a successful campaign. Indeed Mark Pitcavage (1993) demonstrates that few of the territories possessed the population or wealth necessary to support an adequate militia. Thus the militia emerged from the War of 1812 with a mixed but mainly poor reputation (Peden 2003).

Based on the experiences of the War of 1812, Secretary of War John C. Calhoun hoped to minimize the future need for federal use of state militia by forming an "Expansible Army," that is, a small regular army with a disproportionate number of officers which maintained the number of units and structure of a much larger force, one that could be rapidly expanded by adding enlisted personnel. Congress adopted plans for a limited version of Calhoun's proposal in 1821 (Spiller 1980), but provided meager funds for a military of any type. Indeed, between 1816 and 1835 Congress took no action concerning the militia, despite receiving several policy recommendations, most notably those of the 1826 Barbour Board calling for a smaller but better trained and organized militia (Mahon 1951). As state governments paid little but lip service to the units under their jurisdiction, state militia units virtually disappeared east of the Mississippi, with the exception of a few dozen volunteer units, usually elitist, and often nativist, in nature, that used militia laws for organizational reasons. These elite units were employed to quell

riots, enforce quarantines, prevent looting after fires and floods, and to protect prisoners from being lynched. "Volunteer" units largely displaced the old militia system in dealing with Indians. Pennsylvania's governor mobilized militiamen to control mobs in Harrisburg during the "Buckshot War" of 1838 (Woodburn 1913) and Rhode Island mobilized militia during the Dorr Rebellion in 1842. In 1839 Maine's governor sent militia to the border with Canada during the Aroostock War and eight states, from as far away as Alabama, pledged to send troops, so popular was the idea of a third war against Great Britain (Jones 1975).

Militia units did deploy during Indian wars, but never proved very successful in the field. Illinois mobilized its militia during the Black Hawk War, 1832, and Florida's militia was called out during the Second Seminole War, 1835–42, as were some Georgia militia who were drafted into service to join them. Indeed, in her study of militia units in Kentucky, Missouri, and the Washington Territory, Mary Ellen Rowe (2003) argues that the militia of the era should be viewed as a social and political institution rather than a military service, an assessment supported by Harry Laver in *Citizens More than Soldiers: The Kentucky Militia and Society in the Early Republic* (2007). Laver argues convincingly that militia units participated in patriotic celebrations, marched in parades, and mounted honor guards that reinforced American nationalism; that their muster days provided opportunities for political campaigning; and that militia service reinforced ideals of masculinity.

During the period when it was an independent nation the republic of Texas maintained both a regular army and the quasi-militia Texas Rangers, a group that traced its origins to 1823 when Anglo settlers in the region formed them to provide protection against Native Americans at a time when the newly independent government of Mexico was unable to do so (Wilkins 1996). During the Texas War for Independence the 200 Rangers served as scouts and couriers for the Texas Army. Many accounts of the organization gloss over some of the unit's more unsavory actions, but a few sources provide a more balanced assessment of the role played by the Rangers in defending Anglo settlers against the Indians upon whose lands they were settling (Utley 2002). Thomas Cutrer (1993) discusses both positive and negative aspects of the Rangers service during the Mexican–American War. Frederick Wilkins, *Defending the Borders* (2001), shows that during the dozen years between the admission of Texas to the Union and its secession to join the Confederacy the Rangers continued to serve along the frontier because the number of US Army troops assigned to the region was unable to cope with either the Indians or Mexicans who crossed the border to attack Texans. Following Reconstruction, the Rangers became more a police force than a militia, but anti-Indian and anti-Hispanic attitudes continued to characterize members of the force which state officials used to support the supremacy of owners of large ranches, railroads, and mines (Graybill 2007).

By the Mexican War it became difficult to differentiate between regular militia and volunteer militia units. Following the declaration of war against Mexico in April 1846 President Polk called militia units of the Gulf Coast states into federal service for six months. He later requested that other states send troops and most did so, though rarely entire militia units. In most cases governors called for volunteers

willing to serve outside their state, and outside the United States. Enough responded to fill the need and by war's end 19 of 29 states sent a total of 12,500 "militiamen." The public considered these men "volunteers" not "militia," in part because in most states the "volunteers" were neither raised nor organized though the machinery of the regular militia. Thus was laid the basis of public regard for "volunteer" units that continued through the War with Spain a half century later.

On the eve of the Civil War the militia system had atrophied. Michigan had 109,000 men on its militia rolls, Maine 63,000, but neither state could muster more than 1,250 within the 90 days that President Lincoln thought would be needed to crush secession. Despite their traditional role of deterring slave unrest, and several years of agitation for improved organization, training, and armament before secession, state militias were in no better condition in the new Confederacy. The various northern states did produce the 90,000 militiamen sought by Lincoln for 90-days service and this force both protected the city of Washington from capture by Confederates and provided time to lay plans and begin enlisting a volunteer army. A year later it appeared the numbers of volunteers might be insufficient and Congress passed the Militia Act of July 1862 that reiterated the obligation of all able-bodied men (except African Americans) between the ages of 18 and 45 to serve in the militia. It did allow for the voluntary service of "persons of African Descent" and authorize the president to call militia into federal service for up to nine months and to make all rules and regulations needed to operate the militia of any state that lacked them. Within a month Lincoln called 300,000 militia into federal service and announced that a draft would be instituted in any state which did not fulfill its allotment. This marked the first national draft in US history. A state could meet its obligation by sending nine-month militiamen or volunteers who agreed to serve for three years, with the provision that one volunteer would count as four militiamen. For all practical purposes the militia system became a mechanism for raising troops rather than for training or equipping them or for conducting operations.

Indeed, in many areas militia "units" ceased to exist, including in most of Pennsylvania by the time Robert E. Lee led his Army of Northern Virginia into the state in 1863. When Lincoln called for militia units to fend off the invasion, Pennsylvania had none it could muster. New York Governor Horatio Seymour sent the New York National Guard, a name adopted by the state's 7th Regiment (in 1825 during the visit of the Marquis de Lafayette in honor of his *Garde Nationale de Paris*) and applied to its entire militia, a practice followed by other states over the next two decades. By the time of Appomattox, it had become virtually impossible to differentiate between "volunteers" and "regular militiamen." Clearly though, the Civil War had become a "people's war" and the concept of the volunteer soldier, vice the professional or regular soldier was further enshrined in the America psyche.

When Congress took control of postwar Reconstruction in 1867, it suspended the power of the new state governments in the South to form militias, divided the region into Military Districts, and through the Army oversaw elections which established new governments. These governments formed new militia units,

including blacks, which together with US Army troops tried to protect blacks and white Republicans from the Ku Klux Klan and other groups bent on "redeeming" southern society from northern control (Singletary 1957). Tennessee, reentered the Union without undergoing "reconstruction," and in that state its militia played a role similar to the US Army in "occupied states" (Severance 2005).

Numerous US Army units remained in the South, especially near coastal cities, but also at Atlanta, Baton Rouge and other major interior urban centers. After March 1877 President Rutherford B. Hayes decided not to order troops to interfere in state politics, though many units remained stationed throughout the South. When Reconstruction came to end, "Redeemer" governments took power and one of their first actions was to remake most state militia units into whites-only organizations (Singletary 1957). That same year state militia forces were employed against railroad workers who went out on strike in several areas. While William Riker (1957), asserts that the militia/national guard would not have survived the nineteenth century were it not for its perceived value in suppressing labor unrest, most historians argue that the majority of Americans opposed utilizing citizen soldiers in this way and that it was opposition to the use of state militia in the South and against strikers that led Congress to pass the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 limiting the use of federal troops "except in such cases and under such circumstances as such employment of said force may be expressly authorized by the constitution or by act of congress" and then only under the direct authority of the president.

With the American people and most of their leaders confident that a small regular army could be augmented by volunteers in time of need, state militias returned to their pre-war state of decay. The regular Army assumed responsibility for dealing with the Indians as well as manning coastal fortifications, leaving the militia with limited responsibilities. Most important of these was quelling unrest and disorder (Reinders 1977). If the American people were satisfied with this situation, many state militia/national guard officials were not. Strongly influenced by reform movements of the era and by problems encountered while quelling strikes, many leaders wished to improve the training and utility of their units, to modernize the system, and to remake their units into a reserve component of the Regular Army. In 1879 they formed the National Guard Association to lobby state and national political leaders (Higham 1969, Kwasny 1989, Cooper 1990). They got new armories built, began holding summer camps to train in field maneuvers, became less social clubs and more professionally orientated.

During the final decades of the nineteenth century the militias, now commonly called the National Guard, saw the results of the reforms. Many expanded in size by attracting volunteers rather than by enforcing compulsory service laws. During the 1890s several states followed the example of Massachusetts, New York, and Rhode Island which had formed naval militias in 1888. The Naval Appropriations Act of 1891 authorized the Secretary of the Navy to spend up to \$25,000 a year to support state naval militia units. Some of them were termed "naval brigades," others were organized at part of the National Guard. At the start of the Spanish-American War 15 states had such units with a combined enrollment of 3,703 men,

far fewer than the 105,000 men in the National Guard. During that war a number of the naval militiamen volunteered for service in the regular navy and some units went on alert to assist in harbor defense should the Spanish navy appear off the coasts. The Navy Department did not establish the Office of Naval Militia until 1911, three years before Congress sanctioned the system in the Naval Militia Affairs Act of 1914 in anticipation that the state units would become components of a naval reserve in the future (Hart 1973, Cooper 1998).

As important as the reforms were, they were highly uneven across the nation. Many Guardsmen lacked training in basic skills from fieldcraft such as cooking and pitching tents to the use of modern weapons and tactics. Nor were they organized to mesh with other units. In March 1898, on the eve of war with Spain, leaders in Washington agreed that the nation's 114,000 guardsmen could not be forced to serve outside the borders of the United States, in an expedition to Cuba, for example, and there was no administrative machinery in place even to use them to recruit volunteers for the regular army. With the declaration of war thousands of guardsmen volunteered for duty with the regular Army and were sworn in as individuals, not as part of any unit. Along the eastern seaboard entire units mobilized to man coastal fortifications and in some cases entire units were accepted into federal service as organized and their officers received commissions in the volunteers (Cosmas 1965).

During the War with Spain two National Guard regiments, the 2nd Massachusetts and 71st New York, embarked for Cuba where the New Yorkers broke and ran when advancing up San Juan Hill. Guardsmen sent to the Philippines arrived too late to engage the Spanish, and many were displeased when forced to remain in the islands to counter the insurgency by Philippine nationalists.

The aftermath of the War with Spain and the years prior to World War I brought fundamental reform to America's military establishment. Administration was centralized in both services, institutions were established for planning and coordination between the services, and reserve components were inaugurated for each service. The National Guard was transformed to serve both as traditional state military units under the command of the governor of each state and as a federal reserve force. When called into national service for any of the three missions specified in the Constitution (to suppress insurrection, enforce the laws of the Union, or to repel invasion), units of the Guard served as parts of the Army and Air Force; members of the naval militias were taken into the Naval Reserve and the state units ceased to exist; thus there is no naval equivalent of the Army and Air National Guard.

Elihu Root was made Secretary of War to guide the reorganization of the Army. Upon their discharge from service many volunteers joined or rejoined National Guard units. Acting through the National Guard Association they demanded greater recognition and more resources than had been allotted the Guard prior to the war. Charles W. Dick, a major general in the Ohio National Guard and a Republican member of the House of Representatives, worked closely with Root to frame the Militia Act of 1903 (Colby 1959, Cantor 1969). The Dick Act, as it was commonly known, defined two "militias": the "Reserve Militia" consisting of all able-bodied adult males, and the "Organized Militia" which was referred to



as the National Guard. The act provided that the Guard would be armed and equipped at federal government expense, that units must train at least 24 times a year and hold a summer encampment of at least five days. Both regular Army and Guard officers would inspect units annually and when on maneuvers with regular Army units, guardsmen would receive pay equal to that of the regulars. Guard officers became eligible to attend Army schools and when enrolled they would receive Army pay. Lastly, service by Guard units was limited to nine consecutive months. After that time they could volunteer for extended duty and the unit would be redesignated a volunteer unit and serve under its existing officers. Congress eliminated the nine month service limitation in 1908.

That same year Congress laid the foundation of the modern reserve system when it authorized establishment of a reserve corps of medical officers who had no peacetime obligations but who could be called to active duty in time of an emergency. The Army Appropriations Act of 1912 created a general Army Reserve, and in March of the next year Congress established the Naval Reserve which took direction of the 24 state "naval militias."

In 1916 President Woodrow Wilson called 45,000 Army Reservists to active duty to provide border security while General John J. Pershing and the Punitive Expedition pursued Poncho Villa into northern Mexico. At the same time Wilson federalized 5,000 Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona Guardsmen and ordered them to work with the Reservists. Two months later he called the entire 130,000-man National Guard to active duty. The crisis passed in less than a year, but not before it provided a test of mobilization plans for both the Guard and Reserves, afforded their units with active duty experience, and offered regular Army, Reserve, and Guard officers the opportunity to work together (Clendenen 1969).

While Pershing's expedition was in Mexico, Congress passed the National Defense Act of 1916. It enlarged the peacetime Army; created the Officers Reserve Corps, the Enlisted Reserve Corps, and the Reserve Officer Training Corps; authorized expansion of the National Guard to four times its previous size; and established the concept of merging the National Guard, the Army Reserve, and the Regular Army to form the "Army of the United States" in time of war. The number of required "drills" was doubled from 24 to 48, the number of "training days" increased from 5 to 15 days, and pay for drills was authorized for the first time. In March 1917, just two weeks before the nation entered World War I, the Naval Reserve Flying Corps was established. Members of flying clubs at Yale, Harvard, and Princeton joined en masse and were designated Aerial Coast Patrol Units (Heiser 2006).

When Congress declared war on Germany in April 1917, the armed services immediately mobilized. The Regular Army had 128,000 men, the Army Reserve 56,000, and the National Guard 80,000 in federal service and 101,000 in state service. The Reservists included medical doctors, of which four times as many served during World War I as the number of doctors holding regular Army commissions. State naval reserve units provided 16,000 of the first 24,000 naval reservists called to active duty. Manpower did not pose a problem, training and equipping the soldiers did. The 1st Division (Regular Army) reached France in July, the 26th

Division (New England National Guard) followed next in September, the 2nd Division (Regular Army) in October, and the 42nd Division (the Rainbow division of National Guardsmen from 26 states and the District of Columbia) in December. The number designations were maintained, but in August 1918 the Army ordered an end to distinctions among men and units of the Regular Army, National Army, Army Reserve, and National Guard in the American Expeditionary Force, though friction continued to mar relations among officers holding commissions of different types. When mobilized for World War I, most National Guard divisions had a mix of Guard and Regular Army officers at the regimental level and above, but once they got to France most of the Guard Officers were replaced by regulars. Only a single Guard officer, Major General John F. O’Ryan of the 6th New York (National Guard) Division remained in command at the time of the Armistice (Nenninger 2000). The replacement of so many officers reflected the belief of most regular Army officers that it was impossible for anyone serving on a part-time basis to really master military skills. The persistence of this belief, and that by Reservists and Guardsmen that they can, caused friction a century later (Jacobs 1993). By the end of World War I the Guard provided 40 percent of the US combat divisions in France. According to most analysts, the levels of performance differed little between divisions with Regular Army or National Guard lineage. Meanwhile, 330,000 naval reservists, including 12,000 women yeomen, served on active duty during World War I.

In the postwar era, by terms of the National Defense Act of 1920, the United States was divided into nine corps areas. Each would have one Regular Army, two National Guard, and three Organized Reserve divisions. Training of the Guard and Reserve divisions became a major role of the Regulars. The same act authorized formation of Citizens Military Training Camps (CMTC) to train Reserve officers. Based on the pre-war preparedness organization known as the “Plattsburgh Movement” that had trained 20,000 potential Army officers at a private training camp near Lake Champlain during the summers of 1915 and 1916, CMTCs were held at 50 Army bases around the country between 1921 and 1940. Volunteers who attended four summer courses incurred no obligation for service, but could receive a reserve commission in the Army. As many as 40,000 men received training in a single year, but only a total of approximately 5,000 ever received commissions under the provisions of the program (Clifford 1972, Kington 1995).

Americans turned inward and sought to outlaw war during the 1920s; Congress reduced the military services. Nor was the Great Depression of the 1930s conducive to funding for the military, though the Guard did enjoy one legislative success. In 1933 Congress amended the National Defense Act of 1916 to give the Guard a redefined dual status: henceforth units were designated both state militia units under the militia clauses of the Constitution and permanent reserve components of the Army under the army clauses of Constitution. This meant that in the future Guardsmen would be called up not as individuals, but as members of units. Starved of funds, Guard units, which were designated to supply cadre for eighteen divisions, declined in numerical strength and training which was conducted with obsolete arms and equipment.

When war broke out in Europe in September 1939, President Franklin D. Roosevelt declared a limited national emergency and authorized increases in both the Regular Army (from 210,000 to 227,000 men) and the National Guard (from 200,000 to 235,000 men). After Germany's defeat of France the following June, Congress authorized the calling into federal service of the Guard for one year (Sligh 1992). As during World War I, many Regular Army officers doubted the abilities of their counterparts in the Guard, though they generally respected recent graduates of Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC) programs. Guard units were called up in monthly groups as training camps were completed. A similarly phased demobilization was planned to begin in February 1942, but never was implemented since by then the United States was at war.

During World War II National Guard and Regular Army units became virtually interchangeable, particularly after Congress passed legislation establishing the draft to fill the ranks of all Army divisions and the crews of all Navy ships. Five future presidents held reserve commissions in the Navy during the war.

After Allied victory in the Pacific, demobilization of Guard units kept pace with that of the Regular Army units. War Department plans called for maintaining 27 infantry and two armor divisions, 21 Regimental combat teams, 33 tank battalions, and 15 mechanized cavalry battalions, and for the formation of Air National Guard units. The desire of men to get on with their lives after the Depression and war, hindered recruitment for both the Guard and the Reserves. Equally important, Congress appropriated only limited funds to support the National Guard and authorized units to fill only 50 percent of their enlisted positions and 80–100 percent of officer billets.

North Korea's invasion of South Korea in 1950 put an end to the belief of many leaders both inside and outside the military that naval and ground warfare were unlikely in the new age of atomic weapons delivered by aircraft. In June 1950, 325,000 Guardsmen were serving in 4,600 units across the nation, 185,000 served in Ready Reserve units, and 391,000 were enrolled in the Standby Reserve. Eight Army divisions and one of Marines fought in Korea. Reserve and Guard units were activated so the United States could respond more quickly should the Soviet Union take offensive action elsewhere (Berebitsky 1996). In September four Guard divisions were called into federal service and their ranks filled with draftees. Guard units were still in the process of implementing a 1948 plan for a three-year training cycle, and a combination of low funding and the lack of a requirement meant that few officers had attended their branch basic courses. When China entered the war, two of the activated divisions, the 40th from California and 45th from Oklahoma (Donnelly 2000), were dispatched to Korea; the other two, the 28th from Pennsylvania and 43rd from Connecticut, Rhode Island and Vermont, were sent to Germany; and four additional divisions were called up. Combined with three regimental combat teams, nine artillery battalions, and 74 company-sized support units this brought the total number of Guardsmen mobilized for the Korean War to 138,600. They were joined on active duty by 244,300 Army Reservists in addition to the 43,000 Reserve officers already serving in the Regular Army. Most of the Reservists came from the Individual Ready Reserve or

the Standby Reserve because the Army needed individuals to fill units already mobilized and wanted to keep Selected Reserve units intact in the United States in case they were needed in Europe or elsewhere. The Army also established a rotation system for draftees, Reservists, and Guardsmen under which a man would serve in Korea until he accumulated 36 points. Four points were earned for each month spent on the battle line, three for each month in a combat zone, and two a month for service anywhere else in Korea. Thus a rotation could last from nine to eighteen months, spreading of the burden among more individuals and producing a growing number of Reservists and Guardsmen with operational experience. On the negative side, many units experienced so much turnover of personnel that they never developed cohesion, a lesson ignored by the Army when it established 12 months as the standard tour of duty in Vietnam (McQuiston 1953). Lewis Sorely (1993) contends that Reserve and Guard units "played a major role in the Korean War," but provides no description or analysis of specific contributions to support his view. In addition to examining the direct military service of Guardsmen, William M. Donnelly (2001) describes how they rallied support for the war in their home communities.

As the Korean War was winding down, Congress passed the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952, which divided reservists into the Ready Reserve, the Standby Reserve, and the Retired Reserve. The Ready Reserve is further subdivided into the "Selected Reserve" and the "Individual Ready Reserve." The Selected Reserve consists of units and individuals deemed essential to initial wartime operations, and its members received monthly training and spend two weeks on active duty each year. Most individuals are pre-assigned to units which they join upon mobilization. The "Individual Ready Reserve" consists of individuals who have served in the regular service or its reserve component, have time remaining of their service obligation, but do not belong to units that train monthly. The Standby Reserve contains individuals who have completed their military obligation and wish to retain a military affiliation, but are not assigned to a specific unit and are not required to train regularly. Most are specialists who can only be called to active duty during time of war or national emergency. The final reserve component, the "Retired Reserve" is composed of individuals who have completed enough active or reserve service to qualify for retirement pay at age 60. They can be called to active duty but few have been subjected to involuntary service since 1952.

The ROTC system of training future officers at civilian colleges was established in 1916, and by 1950 it replaced the service academies as the primary source of commissioned officers for the US Navy, Marine Corps, Army, and Air Force. Participants receive financial benefits to assist in paying higher education expenses and upon graduation are awarded reserve commissions in the armed forces, commissions which could be "augmented" to regular commissions after active duty. Indeed, between 1950 and 1980 two-thirds of active duty officers entered service with reserve commissions. Michael Neiberg (2000) traces the evolution of the program and the relationship between ROTC and NROTC units and their host colleges and universities from the start of the Korean War to the post-Vietnam era concluding that in addition to providing the military with well-educated officers,

it provided the American people with a military of citizen-soldiers, one in congruence with traditional American values.

President Dwight D. Eisenhower failed in an attempt to reform the Reserve by reducing its numbers and increasing the training given to those who served. Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara wished to reduce their numbers even more, believing the nation could not support adequate training and equipment for such large numbers. During McNamara's first year in office the Berlin Crisis (1961) led to the call up of 46,000 Ready Reservists and one Guard Regiment and two divisions to replace troops rushed to Europe. When the crisis subsided McNamara pushed a plan through Congress that eliminated four divisions from the Army Reserve and four from the National Guard by 1963. Two years later he tried to reduce both forces again and to place all remaining Reserve units in the National Guard to save money by eliminating dual command structures (Eliot 1962). Members of the Reserve and Guard associations joined governors and congressmen and local communities which did not want to lose "their" units in opposing the plan but McNamara succeeded by May 1968. The Army Reserve was reduced to three combat brigades, and the rest of the 260,000 individuals in paid drill billets were assigned to support and training units. The National Guard was cut from 23 to 8 divisions and the number of brigades increased from 7 to 18. All Reserve and Guard units were to be manned at a minimum of 93 percent of active duty strength.

Presidents Lyndon B. Johnson and Richard M. Nixon considered it politically inexpedient to call up Guard and Reserve units during the Vietnam War, so they turned to the draft to fill the armed services. Some Reservists and Guardsmen were disappointed by not having their unit called up. They felt even worse when Guard and Reserve units gained a reputation for being havens for middle and upper class men avoiding the draft. The single, brief call-up during the war, in 1968 in response to North Korea's seizure of the intelligence ship *Pueblo* precipitated several class action lawsuits contesting the legality of the call-up given the lack of a formal congressional declaration of war. Approximately 8,700 of the nearly 23,000 Guardsmen called up for a year of active duty were sent to Vietnam, but by the end of 1969 all 11 units called up were released from active duty (Sorley 2005).

National Guard units were activated for domestic service in the decades between the end of the Korean War and that in Vietnam. In 1957 President Eisenhower called units of the Arkansas National Guard into federal service to enforce desegregation in Little Rock schools, the first time a state militia or Guard unit was federalized for domestic service since 1867. During the 1960s succeeding presidents would do so again to enforce racial integration in the South, counter rioting and looting in Northern and Western cities, and impose order on college campus swept by anti-war demonstrations, the latter with tragic results at Kent State University in 1970 (Higham 1969, Cooper 1990). During the 1970s Guardsmen were used to replace striking public employees on almost 40 occasions, most notably in 1970 when President Nixon ordered 30,000 regular and reserve troops to replace striking postal workers in New York City. Guardsmen and Reservists were also used to temporarily replace firefighters, police officers, mental health

attendants, and prison guards. In 1981 President Ronald Reagan used military air traffic controllers to operate the civilian system.

During the 1960s and 1970s the role of women changed in the military. Public Law 90-130, passed in November 1967, authorized enlistment of women in the National Guard for the first time. Seven months later, in July 1968, the Air National Guard inducted its first women.

The reduction in size of the military services and the end of the draft in 1973 ushered in a new era for the Guard and Reserves. Various support services were transferred from Regular to Reserve and Guard units creating a situation in which the Army and Air Force could not mobilize without activating at least some Reserve or Guard units (Cohen 1985). Under the Defense Department's Total Force Policy Guard and Reserve units were to supply support troops for rapid deployment and, in the case of a conflict lasting more than a few weeks, "round out" units to serve along side regular Air Force and Army forces. The Montgomery Amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act of 1987 stipulated that governors could not block the deployment of state units to areas outside the United States, a provision upheld by the Supreme Court in the 1990 case of *Perpich v. Department of Defense*. By 1990 574,000 members of the Guard served in 4,000 units.

The new system was first tested during Gulf War I in 1990. During "Operation Desert Shield," the build up to war, 125,000 Army troops, 30,000 Marines, and six carrier battle groups were dispatched to the region. Stephen M. Duncan (1997), Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, 1987-93, describes how National Guard units were mobilized over the objection of General Norman Schwarzkopf. By war's end 228,500 members of the Guard and Reserve were called up and almost half of them sent to the Middle East. They performed varied service in the region, for example, Marine Reservists spearheaded to drive along the coast into Kuwait City, Air National Guard aircraft refueled bombers flying missions over Iraq from bases in the United States, Air Force Reserve pilots delivered a significant portion of supplies flown to the region, and minesweepers crewed by Navy Reservists kept open approaches to the war zone. Unfortunately, one-fourth of the Army Guard members, 15,000 of 60,000 called up, were declared physically unfit for combat and held in the United States. Guard artillery and engineer units performed excellently, but none of the three "round out" maneuver brigades was considered combat ready and thus were not deployed. This mixed record precipitated a clash between Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney who proposed reducing the number of units and personnel in the Guard and requiring stricter adherence to standards and congressmen whose constituents blocked the measures (Prud'homme 1991, Coyne 1992, Sorley 1992).

A dozen years later, in mid-September 2003, 128,000 members of the Army Reserve and National Guard were on active duty, with mobilized Reservists providing security at stateside military bases, and 20,000 others serving in Iraq and Kuwait. At their peak in December 2004 reservists and members of the Guard composed 37 percent of the forces deployed by Central Command during military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. While most served for a limited period, some Reserve and Guard units and individuals were called to active duty multiple times



between 2003 and 2009, occasionally for indeterminate periods or had their tours extended. This led to attempts by state officials to end deployment of troops to Iraq. In 2005, for example, the governor of Montana asked that Guard troops and helicopters from that state be returned home so they would be available to fight wildfires in the state. Three years later, the New Jersey legislature asked federal officials “to withdraw all New Jersey National Guard troops from Iraq in absence of a valid and subsisting congressional mandate for such service” (McMichael 2008). At about the same time other individuals proposed using National Guard units to secure American borders against illegal aliens (Gilchrist and Corsi 2006).

Such actions and proposals reflect the fact that while Americans have traditionally supported the concept of the citizen soldier, they have since the seventeenth century argued about when and how they can or should be employed. Given this fact, it is surprising that the militia, National Guard, and Reserves have not received greater scholarly attention. This is not to suggest that they have lacked historical treatment. The problem lies in the quality of existing studies and with the number of gaps in coverage.

Foremost among works in breadth and scope is John Mahon, *History of the Militia and the National Guard* (1983), but, given its date of publication, it leaves much unexamined. In even older studies, Jim Dan Hill, a major general in the National Guard, provides an uncritical but informative history of *The Minute Man in Peace & War* (1964), and two shorter works (under 150 pages) survey the history of the National Guard (Riker 1957, Dupuy 1971). Michael D. Doubler’s *I am the Guard* (2001), like Hill’s work is more narrative than analytical. The histories of two dozen state militias and National Guard divisions have been published, more have been treated in theses and dissertations, again with very mixed results (Mahon 1984). The histories of regiments and other units below the state and division level can be accessed through bibliographies compiled by Charles E. Dornbusch (1956, 1961–72), or through Army Pamphlet 130-2, *Civilian in Peace Soldier in War: A Bibliographic Survey of the Army and Air National Guard* (1967), but many of these must be read with caution.

James Whisker, *The American Colonial Militia, 1606–1785* (1997) traces the role of the citizen soldier in early American history, and his *The Rise and Decline of the American Militia System* (1999) expands coverage just over another century until the militia became the National Guard. Whisker considers the Guard different enough from the militia that it should be considered a separate institution. Several worthwhile monographs examine the development of the militia during the first half of the seventeenth century, but, in comparison, few investigate the institution during the next century. Coverage is good for the period of the French and Indian War through the War of 1812, then slacks off for three quarters of a century, until Jerry Cooper’s fine *The Rise of the National Guard: The Evolution of the American Militia, 1865–1920* (1998). Barry M. Stentiford, *The American Home Guard* (2002) traces the history of National Guard from that period forward with emphasis on the domestic roles and operations of the units. There exists no comparable study with coverage of the role played by Guard units in World War II, Korea, or the Gulf Wars, though James C. Elliott, (1965). *Modern Army and Air National*

*Guard* (1965) and Charles J. Gross's *The Air National Guard and the American Military Tradition* (1995) are useful.

The reserve systems of the five uniformed services have received even less attention. William R. Kreh chronicles *Citizen Sailors: The US Naval Reserve in War and Peace* (1969); James T. Currie and Richard B. Crossland (1997) do the same for the Army reservists in *Twice the Citizen: A History of the United States Army Reserve, 1908–1998* (1997); Wayne H. Heiser, *US Naval and Marine Corps Reserve Aviation* (1991), is more a compilation of facts and figures than a narrative history; and Edward J. Robeson (1990) limns the outline of the Marine Corps Reserve during its first century. Broad histories of the Coast Guard and Air Force Reserve have yet to be published.

A few narrowly focused studies are worthy of consulting, for example, Charles Johnson's *African American Soldiers in the National Guard* (1992). Those published over a decade and a half ago can be found through Jerry Cooper's (1993) research guide, but an examination of that work will just as quickly demonstrate numerous opportunities for more work in the history of the militia, Guard, and Reserves. Broad topics deserving further examination include the politicization (both real and perceived) of all three, assessments of effectiveness of units at various times and the factors influencing the degrees of success and efficiency of individual units, analyses of the socioeconomic characteristics of Reserve and Guard personnel, the selection of state commanders of Guard units, planning and preparing for mobilization, and the evolution of federal control of Guard units, including conflict between federal and state authorities.

#### BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Alexander, Arthur J. (1945). "Pennsylvania's Revolutionary Militia," *Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography*, 49:1 (January), 15–25.
- Alexander, Arthur J. (1947). "How Maryland Tried to Raise Her Continental Quotas," *Maryland Historical Magazine*, 13:3 (September), 193–5.
- Anderson, Fred (1984). *A People's Army: Massachusetts Soldiers and Society in the Seven Years' War*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Army Pamphlet 130-2 (1967). *Civilian in Peace Soldier in War: A Bibliographic Survey of the Army and Air National Guard*. Washington: Headquarters, Department of the Army.
- Baker, Emerson, and John Reid (1998). *The New England Knight: Sir William Phips, 1651–1695*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- Berebitsky, William (1996). *A Very Long, Weekend: The Army National Guard in Korea, 1950–1953*. Shippensburg, PA: White Mane Publishing Co.
- Bouton, Terry (2007). *Taming Democracy: The "People," the Founders, and the Troubled Ending of the American Revolution*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Boynton, Lindsay (1967). *The Elizabethan Militia, 1558–1638*. London: Routledge & K. Paul.
- Brayton, Abbott A. (1972). "American Reserve Policies since World War II," *Military Affairs*, 36 (December), 139–44.
- Breen, T. H. (1972). "English Origins and New World Development: The Case of the Covenanted Militia in Seventeenth-Century Massachusetts," *Past and Present*, 57 (November): 74–96.

- Buel, Richard (1980). *Connecticut's Mobilization for the Revolutionary War*. Hanover, NH: University Press of New England.
- Cantor, Louis (1969). "Elihu Root and the National Guard: Friend or Foe?" *Military Affairs*, 33:3 (December), 361–73.
- Cave, Alfred A. (1996). *The Pequot War*. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press.
- Clements, S. Eugene, and F. Edward Wright (1989). *The Maryland Militia in the Revolutionary War*. Westminster, MD: Heritage Books.
- Clendenen, Clarence C. (1969). *Blood on the Border: The United States Army and the Mexican Irregulars*. New York: Macmillan.
- Clifford, John Cary (1972). *The Citizen Soldiers: The Plattsburg Training Camp Movement, 1913–1920*. Lexington: University of Kentucky Press.
- Coakley, Robert W. (1988). *The Role of Federal Military Forces in Domestic Disorders, 1789–1878*. Washington: Center of Military History.
- Cohen, Eliot A. (1985). *Citizens and Soldiers: The Dilemmas of Military Service*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Colby, Elbridge (1959). "Elihu Root and the National Guard," *Military Affairs*, 23:1 (Spring), 28–34.
- Cole, David W. (1953). "The Organization and Administration of the South Carolina Militia System, 1670–1783," PhD dissertation, University of South Carolina.
- Cole, David W. (1955). "A Brief Outline of the South Carolina Militia System," *South Carolina Historical Association Proceedings for 1954*, 14–23.
- Cooper, Jerry M. (1990). "Federal Military Intervention in Domestic Disorders," in Richard H. Kohn, ed., *The United States Military under the Constitution of the United States, 1789–1889*. New York: New York University Press.
- Cooper, Jerry M. (1993). *The Militia and the National Guard in America since Colonial Times: A Research Guide*. Westport, CT: Greenwood.
- Cooper, Jerry M. (1998). *The Rise of the National Guard: The Evolution of the American Militia, 1865–1920*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
- Cosmas, Graham A. (1965). "From Order to Chaos: The War Department, The National Guard, and Military Policy, 1898," *Military Affairs*, 29:3 (Autumn), 105–22.
- Coyne, James (1992). "Total Storm (Air Guard and Reserve in Desert Storm)," *Air Force Magazine*, 75:6 (June), 58–62.
- Crackel, Theodore J. (1987). *Mr. Jefferson's Army: Political and Social Reform of the Military Establishment, 1801–1809*. New York: New York University Press.
- Cress, Lawrence Delbert (1981). *Citizens in Arms: The Army and Militia in American Society to the War of 1812*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Cunliffe, Marcus (1968). *Soldiers & Civilians: The Martial Spirit in America, 1776–1865*. Boston: Little, Brown.
- Currie, James T., and Richard B. Crossland (1997). *Twice the Citizen: A History of the United States Army Reserve, 1908–1998*. Washington: Office of the Chief, Army Reserve.
- Cutrer, Thomas W. (1993). *Ben McCulloch and the Frontier Military Tradition*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- DeValinger, Leon (1938). *Colonial Military Organization in Delaware, 1638–1776*. Wilmington: Delaware Tercentenary Commission.
- Donnelly, William M. (2000). "Thunderbirds in Korea: The U.S. 45th Infantry Division, 1950–1952," *Journal of Military History*, 64:4 (October), 1113–39.
- Donnelly, William M. (2001). *Under Army Orders: The Army National Guard during the Korean War*. College Station: Texas A&M University Press.

- Dornbusch, Charles E., comp. (1956). *Histories of American Army Units: World Wars I and II and the Korean Conflict*. Washington: Office of the Adjutant General.
- Dornbusch, Charles E., comp. (1961–72). *Regimental Publications and Personal Narratives of the Civil War ...*, 3 vols. New York: New York Public Library.
- Doubler, Michael D. (2001). *I am the Guard: A History of the Army National Guard, 1636–2000*. Washington: Government Printing Office. Reprinted (2003) as *Civilian in Peace, Soldier in War: The Army National Guard, 1636–2000*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
- Drake, James D. (1999). *King Philip's War: Civil War in New England, 1675–1676*. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press.
- Duncan, Stephen M. (1997). *Citizen Warriors: America's National Guard and Reserve Forces and the Politics of National Security*. Novato, CA: Presidio Press.
- Dupuy, R. Ernest (1971). *The National Guard: A Compact History*. New York: Hawthorn Books.
- Eliot, George Fielding (1962). *Reserve Forces and the Kennedy Strategy*. Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole.
- Elliott, James C. (1965). *Modern Army and Air National Guard*. New York: Van Norstrand.
- Ethridge, Harrison E. (1977). "Governor Patrick Henry and the Reorganization of the Virginia Militia, 1784–1786," *The Virginia Magazine of History and Biography*, 85:4 (October), 427–38.
- Ferguson, Clyde R. (1978), "Carolina and Georgia Patriot and Loyalist Militia in Action, 1775 to 1783," in Jeffrey J. Crow and Larry E. Tise, eds., *The Southern Experience in the American Revolution*, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 174–99.
- Ferling, John E. (1980). *A Wilderness of Miseries: War and Warriors in Early America*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
- Fischer, David Hackett (1994). *Paul Revere's Ride and the Battle of Lexington and Concord*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Flynn, Jean Martin (1968). "South Carolina's Compliance with the Militia Act of 1792," *South Carolina Historical Magazine*, 69:1 (January), 26–43.
- French, Allen (1945). "The Arms and Military Training of our Colonizing Ancestors," *Proceeding of the Massachusetts Historical Society*, 67 (1945 for 1941–1944), 13–21.
- Galvin, John R. (1989). *The Minute Men: The First Fight: Myths and Realities of the American Revolution*, 2nd edn. Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's.
- Gilchrist, Jim, and Jerome R. Corsi (2006). *Minutemen: The Battle to Secure America's Borders*. Los Angeles: World Ahead Publishing.
- Graybill, Andrew R. (2007). *Policing the Great Plains: Rangers, Mounties, and the North American Frontier, 1875–1910*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
- Grenier, John (2005). *The First Way of War: American War Making on the Frontier, 1607–1814*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Gross, Charles Joseph (1995). *The Air National Guard and the American Military Tradition: Militiaman, Volunteer, and Professional*. Washington: National Guard Bureau.
- Hart, Kevin R. (1973). "Towards A Citizen Sailor: The History of the Naval Militia Movement, 1888–1898," *American Neptune*, 33:4 (October): 258–79.
- Heiser, Wayne H. (1991). *U.S. Naval and Marine Corps Reserve Aviation*, 3 vols. Manhattan, KS: Sunflower University Press.
- Higginbotham, Don (1971). *The War of American Independence: Military Attitudes, Policies, and Practice, 1763–1789*. New York: Macmillan.

- Higginbotham, Don (1998). "The Federalized Militia Debate: A Neglected Aspect of Second Amendment Scholarship," *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3rd ser., 55:1 (January), 39–58.
- Higham, Robin, ed. (1969). *Bayonets in the Streets: The Use of Troops in Civil Disturbances*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
- Hill, Jim Dan (1964). *The Minute Man in Peace and War*. Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole.
- Huling, Ray Greene, ed. (1883). "The First Troop of Horse in Rhode Island," *Newport Historical Magazine*, 4:1 (October), 66a–d.
- Jacobs, Bruce (1993). "Tensions between the Army National Guard and the Regular Army," *Military Review*, 73:1 (October), 5–17.
- Johnson, Charles (1992). *African American Soldiers in the National Guard: Recruitment and Deployment during Peacetime and War*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
- Johnson, James M. (1992). *Militiamen, Rangers and Redcoats: The Military in Georgia, 1754–1776*. Macon, GA: Mercer University Press.
- Jones, Howard (1975). "Anglophobia and the Aroostook War," *New England Quarterly*, 48:4 (December), 519–39.
- Kestnbaum, Meyer (2000). "Citizenship and Compulsory Military Service: The Revolutionary Origins of Conscription in the United States," *Armed Forces & Society*, 27:1 (Fall), 7–36.
- Kington, Donald M. (1995). *Forgotten Summers: The Story of the Citizens' Military Training Camps, 1921–1940*. San Francisco: Two Decades Publishing.
- Kohn, Richard H. (1975). *Eagle and Sword: The Federalists and the Creation of the Military Establishment in America, 1783–1802*. New York: Free Press.
- Kreh, William R. (1969). *Citizen Sailors: The U.S. Naval Reserve in War and Peace*. New York: David McKay.
- Kwasny, Mark V. (1989). "A Test for the Ohio National Guard: The Cincinnati Riot of 1884," *Ohio History*, 84:1 (Winter/Spring), 23–51.
- Kwasny, Mark V. (1998). *George Washington's Partisan War*. Kent, OH: Kent State University Press.
- Laver, Harry S. (2007). *Citizens More than Soldiers: The Kentucky Militia and Society in the Early Republic*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
- Leach, Douglas Edward (1951). "The Militia System of Plymouth Colony," *New England Quarterly*, 24:3 (September), 342–64.
- Leach, Douglas Edward (1958). *Flintlock and Tomahawk: New England in King Philip's War*. New York: Macmillan.
- Leach, Douglas Edward (1966). *The Northern Colonial Frontier*. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press.
- Leach, Douglas Edward (1973). *Arms for Empire; A Military History of the British Colonies in North America, 1607–1763*. New York: Macmillan.
- Leach, Douglas Edward (1986). *Roots of Conflict: British Armed Forces and Colonial Americans, 1677–1763*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Lepore, Jill (1998). *The Name of War: King Philip's War and the Origins of American Identity*. New York: Vintage.
- Lofgren, Charles A. (1976). "Compulsory Military Service under the Constitution: The Original Understanding," *The William and Mary Quarterly*, 3rd ser., 33:1 (January), 61–88.
- Mahon, John K. (1951). "A Board of Officers Considers the Condition of the Militia in 1826," *Military Affairs*, 15:2 (Summer), 85–94.



- Mahon, John K. (1960). *The American Militia: Decade of Decision, 1789–1800*. Gainesville: University of Florida Press.
- Mahon, John K. (1983). *History of the Militia and National Guard*. New York: Macmillan.
- Mahon, John K. (1984). "Bibliographic Essay on Research into the History of the Militia and the National Guard," *Military Affairs*, 48:2 (April), 74–7.
- McMichael, William H. (2008). "N.J. Lawmakers Seek to Keep Guard Troops Home," *Army Times*, (30 June), 18.
- McQuiston, I. M. (1953). "History of the Reserves since the Second World War," *Military Affairs*, 17:1 (Spring), 23–7.
- Mook, H. Telfer (1938). "Training Days in New England," *New England Quarterly*, 11 (December), 675–97.
- Morgan, Edmund S. (1975). *American Slavery, American Freedom: The Ordeal of Colonial Virginia*. New York: W. W. Norton.
- Morton, Louis (1958). "The Origins of American Military Policy," *Military Affairs*, 22:2 (Summer), 75–82.
- Murphy, Orville T. (1959–60). "The American Revolutionary Army and the Concept of *Levee en Masse*," *Military Affairs*, 23:1 (Spring), 13–20.
- Neiberg, Michael S. (2000). *Making Citizen-Soldiers: ROTC and the Ideology of American Military Service*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Nenninger, Timothy K. (2000). "'Unsystematic as a Mode of Command': Commanders and the Process of Command in the American Expeditionary Forces, 1917–1918," *Journal of Military History*, 64:3 (July), 739–68.
- Newman, Paul Douglas (2004). *Fries's Rebellion: The Enduring Struggle for the American Revolution*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Peden, Henry C. (2003). *The Delaware Militia in the War of 1812*. Dover, DE: Colonial Roots.
- Peterson, H. L. (1947). "The Military Equipment of the Plymouth and Bay Colonies: 1620–1690," *New England Quarterly*, 20: (June), 197–208.
- Pitcavage, Mark (1993). "Ropes of Sand: Territorial Militias, 1801–1812," *Journal of the Early Republic*, 13:4 (Winter), 481–500.
- Plank, Geoffrey (2001). *An Unsettled Conquest: The British Campaign against the Peoples of Acadia*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Powell, William S. (1958). "Aftermath of the Massacre: The First Indian War, 1622–1632," *Virginia Magazine of History and Biography*, 66:1 (January), 44–75.
- Prud'Homme, Alex (1991). "Lessons of Desert storm Phantom Army," *Time* (10 June), online at <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,973138,00.html> (accessed 15 April 2009).
- Reinders, Robert (1977). "Militia and Public Order in Nineteenth-Century America," *Journal of American Studies*, 11:1 (April), 81–101.
- Resch, John P., and Walter Sargent, eds. (2007). *War & Society in the American Revolution: Mobilization and Home Fronts*. DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press.
- Riker, William H. (1957). *Soldiers of the States: The Role of the National Guard in American Democracy*. Washington: Public Affairs Press.
- Robeson, Edward J. (1990). "Marine Corps Reserve in the 21st Century," *Marine Corps Gazette*, (March), 71–5.
- Rosswurm, Steven (1987). *Arms, Country and Class: The Philadelphia Militia and the "Lower Sort" during the American Revolution*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.
- Rowe, Mary Ellen (2003). *Bulwark of the Republic: The American Militia in Antebellum West*. Westport, CT: Praeger.



- Royster, Charles (1979). *A Revolutionary People at War: The Continental Army and American Character, 1775–1783*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Rutman, Darrett B. (1964). "The Virginia Company and its Military Regime," in Darrett B. Rutman, ed., *The Old Dominion: Essays for Thomas Perkins Abernethy*. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1–20.
- Selesky, Harold (1990). *War and Society in Colonial Connecticut*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Severance, Ben H. (2005). *Tennessee's Radical Army: The State Guard and Its Role in Reconstruction*. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press.
- Sharp, Morison (1945). "Leadership and Democracy in Early New England Defense," *American Historical Review*, 50:2 (January), 244–60.
- Shea, William L. (1983). *The Virginia Militia in the Seventeenth Century*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.
- Shy, John W. (1963). "A New Look at Colonial Militia," *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3rd ser, 20: 175–85.
- Shy, John W. (1975). "Mobilizing Armed Forces in the American Revolution," in John Parker and Carol Urness, eds., *The American Revolution: A Heritage of Change*. Minneapolis: Associates of the James Ford Bell Library, 96–106.
- Singletary, Otis (1957). *Negro Militia and Reconstruction*. Austin: University of Texas Press.
- Skeen, C. Edward (1999). *Citizen Soldiers in the War of 1812*. Lexington: University of Kentucky Press.
- Slaughter, Thomas P. (1986). *The Whiskey Rebellion: Frontier Epilogue to the American Revolution*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Sligh, Robert B. (1992). *The National Guard and National Defense: The Mobilization of the Guard in World War II*. New York: Praeger.
- Smith, Gene A. (1995). *For the Purposes of Defense: The Politics of the Jeffersonian Gunboat Program*. Newark: University of Delaware Press.
- Sorley, Lewis (1992). "Airlift Mission to Gulf No Flight of Fancy for Reserves," *Air Force Times*, 52 (9 March), 20+.
- Sorley, Lewis (1993). "Reserve Forces in Limited War," in William J. Williams, comp., *A Revolutionary War: Korea and the Transformation of the Postwar World*. Chicago: Imprint Publications.
- Sorley, Lewis (2005). "Reserve Components: Looking Back to Look Ahead," *Joint Force Quarterly*, 36 (December), 18–23.
- Spiller, Roger J. (1980). "Calhoun's Expansive Army: The History of a Military Idea," *South Atlantic Quarterly*, 79:2 (Spring), 189–203.
- Stentiford, Barry M. (2002). *The American Home Guard: The State Militias in the Twentieth Century*. College Station: Texas A&M University Press.
- Szatmary, David P. (1980). *Shays's Rebellion: The Making of an Agrarian Insurrection*. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press.
- Titus, James (1991). *The Old Dominion at War: Society, Politics, and Warfare in Late Colonial Virginia*. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.
- Utley, Robert M. (2002). *Lone Star Justice: The First Century of the Texas Rangers*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Wagelstein, John D. (1995). "Regulars, Irregulars and Militia: The American Revolution," *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, 6:2 (Autumn), 133–58.
- Ward, Matthew (2003). *Breaking the Backcountry: The Seven Years' War in Virginia and Pennsylvania, 1754–1765*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.

- Washburn, Wilcomb E. (1957). *The Governor and the Rebel: A History of Bacon's Rebellion in Virginia*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Whisker, James B. (1997). *The American Colonial Militia, 1606–1785*. Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press.
- Whisker, James B. (1999). *The Rise and Decline of the American Militia System*. Selinsgrove, PA: Susquehanna University Press.
- Wilkins, Frederick (1996). *The Legend Begins: The Texas Rangers 1823–1845*. Austin, TX: State House Press.
- Wilkins, Frederick (2001). *Defending the Borders: The Texas Rangers, 1848–1861*. Austin, TX: State House Press.
- Woodburn, James Albert (1913). “The Buckshot War,” in James Albert Woodburn, *The Life of Thaddeus Stevens: A Study in American Political History*. Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill Co., ch. 3.
- Zelner, Kyle F. (2009). *A Rabble in Arms: Massachusetts Towns and Militiamen During King Philip's War*. New York: New York University Press.

## Chapter Thirty

# DEFENSE UNIFICATION, JOINT COMMANDS, AND JOINT OPERATIONS

*Leo P. Hirrel*

The quest to improve strategic planning and achieve fiscal efficiency, especially by avoiding duplication of weapons and capabilities, has focused on two strands during the latter part of the twentieth century. The movement first concentrated on administration in what is termed “defense unification,” – the merger of the War and Navy Departments into a single Department of Defense following World War II – and the subsequent accretion of power by the Department of Defense at the expense of the services. The second focus has been on the conduct of operations and began with the establishment of joint commands created under a Unified Command Plan consisting of two or more services and reporting to the Secretary of Defense. The term joint operations refers to military operations conducted by two or more services, typically at the joint task force level. Defense unification has been an ongoing evolution into a more centralized authority, which has been punctuated with sharp changes in law or procedure, but also marked by more subtle changes. Much of the controversies have involved bureaucratic organization and budget allocations.

### **Prior to 1947**

During the early national period Congress created a War Department for administration of the Army; and then a Navy Department for administration of the Navy and Marine Corps. The two departments operated as distinct entities. Opportunities for inter-service cooperation were limited, with several conspicuous exceptions, such as amphibious operations against Mexico or Cuba, or riverine and coastal operations during the Civil War. During those instances, inter-service cooperation depended upon the professionalism and mutual cooperation of the officers involved, which produced an uneven record of successes or failures.

In 1903 the War and Navy Departments created a Joint Board, for the purposes of coordinating war plans, and resolving administrative or logistical issues of common concern. The board did not have any directive authority, and existed

solely to make recommendations. As Jason Godin (2006) demonstrates, it enjoyed only very limited success. In fact the Joint Board stopped meeting altogether just prior in 1913, but was reconstituted in 1915. In its new form the Board consisted of the senior officers from both services; but in practice the real work was done through subordinate committees. The principal contribution of the Joint Board prior to World War II was the development of various war plans.

World War II saw the beginnings of the movement to a unified command structure. During the immediate aftermath of Pearl Harbor, the United States and Great Britain created a Combined Chiefs of Staff to coordinate their operations. Lacking a counterpart to the British Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Americans assembled the senior service officers to function as the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) starting in February 1942, but without official directives. Membership included the senior officers from the Army, Army Air Forces, and the Navy; but not the Marine Corps. Shortly afterwards Admiral William Leahy became Chief of Staff to the Commander-in-Chief, and in that role he presided over the meetings, and functioned as liaison between the Joint Chiefs and the White House. This arrangement continued throughout the war.

Ray Cline (1951) describes how working groups supported the JCS. The Joint Strategic Planners consisted of flag-rank officers who met to decide issues of importance. In 1943 the JCS created the Joint War Plans Committee (JWPC) to do the detailed planning, including logistical estimates, necessary for a workable strategic document. The JWPC was not a true joint staff. Instead it consisted of mid-grade officers from the War and Navy Departments, who worked joint issues as their primary responsibility, but remained assigned to their respective service headquarters. The Army Air Forces came to have equal representation on the JWPC.

At the beginning of World War II, the Allies agreed to the assignment of operational responsibilities within a given region to a single commander, and the Americans developed a complementary system of placing theaters under a single commander. The arrangement provided unity of effort as this war employed sea, land and air power in unprecedented close coordination in each of the command areas, but did not prevent friction between adjoining areas of command, most notably between the Pacific Command headed by Admiral Chester Nimitz, and Southeast Pacific Command headed by General Douglas MacArthur, as is described by Grace P. Hayes (1982) in her study of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the war against Japan.

Recognizing the value of this system, the Joint Chiefs of Staff created an outline for the establishment of a Unified Command Plan (UCP) in 1946, before defense unification. The plan divided most of the world into regional commands, and gave each commander-in-chief operational control over all forces within his region. The UCP also designated the Strategic Air Command as a specified command, meaning that the organization only controlled forces from a single service (the Air Force).

Grace Hayes's (1982) study of the JCS during World War II is derived from an official study completed in 1954, which describes planning the war against Japan in meticulous detail. Ray S. Cline, *Washington Command Post: The*

*Operations Division* (1951) and Mark S. Watson, *The Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations* (1950) are both part of the official history of the Army in World War II (the “green books”), and provide brief discussions of the joint planning process. Demetrios Caraley’s *The Politics of Military Unification* (1966) provides for a general background information of the era and two works published by the Joint History Office also contain additional information concerning *The Chairmanship of the Joint Chiefs of Staff* (Cole, Jaffe, Poole and Webb 1995), and *The History of the Unified Command Plan* (Cole 2003).

### Creation of Department of Defense, 1946–9

Even before the end of World War II, discussions began on how to merge the War and Navy Departments. Additionally the Army Air Forces persuasively argued that air power should become a separate service. Although all the services agreed that some form of unification was inevitable, the sharp differences regarding the eventual shape of the new department led to unprecedented acrimony between the services, in stark contrast to the wartime cooperation.

Public debate on unification began in April 1944 with hearings by a House select committee (the Woodrum Committee), and the discussions continued thereafter. Typically Army and Army Air Force witnesses favored a strong central department, under a single secretary, with a powerful JCS, with the Air Force as a separate service. Air power advocates further argued that aerial bombardment and nuclear weapons would make the Air Force the preeminent service. Navy and Marine Corps witnesses expressed skepticism about the advantages of unification and feared that the sea services would be outvoted in a unified structure.

Much of the debate focused upon the future of naval aviation and the Marine Corps. Some Air Force advocates also wanted the new service to include control over all land-based aircraft, including oceanic patrols. At the same time senior Army officers feared that the Marine Corps might become a second land service and thus wanted to limit Marine Corps functions to support of the fleet.

Following President Franklin Roosevelt’s death in April 1945, President Harry Truman favored unification and a strong central department. Nonetheless the reservations of the sea services and their congressional supporters stalled passage of any unification legislation until President Truman ordered the Secretaries of War and the Navy to negotiate a compromise, which was finally completed in 1947. The resulting National Security Act of 1947 provided for a National Military Establishment, headed by a cabinet-level Secretary of Defense who exercised “general direction, authority, and control” over the services. The Joint Chiefs of Staff received statutory recognition, although they remained a committee of equals, with a staff limited to 100 officers. The Act changed the name of the War Department to the Department of the Army, and created a separate Department of the Air Force. The service secretaries were made subordinate to the Secretary of Defense, but retained their direct access to the President and any powers not

specifically provided to the Secretary of Defense. The Unified Command Plan received statutory recognition.

James Forrestal became the first Secretary of Defense despite his opposition to a strong department when he was Secretary of the Navy. Ironically, Forrestal now had to work with the weak structure that he helped to create. Almost immediately the services began quarreling over who should get the largest share of a declining budget. The worst fighting came between the Navy and the Air Force over the Navy's proposal to create a super-carrier capable of launching aircraft large enough to deliver nuclear weapons, while the Air Force argued that the money would be better spent on the new B-36 bomber. In the meantime the Army and Marine Corps eyed each other with suspicion. Forrestal made considerable progress in defining the functions of the National Military Establishment, notably with the Key West agreements that defined the roles and missions of the services. Yet the frustrations of working with this system was a major factor in Forrestal's suicide shortly President Truman replaced him in 1949.

Towards the close of his term Forrestal recommended several changes to the National Security Act, which were incorporated in the National Security Act of 1949. That legislation replaced the National Military Establishment with the Department of Defense as an executive department, increased the power of the Secretary of Defense by removing the qualifying "general" before the phrase giving the secretary "direction, authority, and control" over the services, and the service secretaries were directed to report "to" the Secretary of Defense, rather than "through" him thereby ending their direct access to the President. The Act also provided the Secretary of Defense with a support structure through a staff including a deputy, several assistants, and a comptroller. The Act created a position of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a non-voting member, and specified that the Joint Chiefs, as a corporate body, were the principal military advisers to the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the National Security Council.

In their opening chapters, Roger R. Trask and Alfred Goldberg *The Department of Defense 1947-1997: Organization and Leaders* (1997) summarize material covered in more detail by Demetrios Caraley's (1966) previously referred to study. James Forrestal and his role in defense unification have been the subject of biographies by Arnold Rogow (1963) and by Townshend Hoopes and Douglas Brinkley (1992), and his tenure as Secretary of Defense by Steven L. Reardon (1984) in his volume on the early years of that office. A 1975 issue of the National Archives magazine, *Prologue*, contained articles on each of the services by Paolo Coletta (1975) on the Navy, Robert F. Haynes (1975) on the Army, and Herman S. Wolk (1975) on the Air Force. Coletta later published a book length study, *The United States Navy and Defense Unification* (1981). Jeffrey G. Barlow's more recent study *Revolt of the Admirals* (1994) focuses, in the words of its subtitle, on *The Fight for Naval Aviation*. Gordon W. Keiser (1966 [1953]) describes the fears and actions of the Marine Corps during this time. General Victor H. "Brute" Krulak, USMC (1984), provides a participant's perspective of the bureaucratic fights accompanying unification, with a decidedly strong point of view. Neither the Air Force nor the Army have received studies of similar length.



### **Gradual Centralization of Authority 1949–86**

The history of the Department of Defense after 1949 is characterized by accretion of power by the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Frequently this consolidation resulted from legislative or administrative changes, but personalities and modifications to procedures played an equally important role in the evolving roles of the Secretary and the Chairman.

Even with the 1949 Act, the limitations on the power of the Secretary of Defense frustrated both of Truman's last two Secretaries, leading to a reorganization directive by Dwight Eisenhower at the beginning of his presidency. In 1953, he ended any confusion regarding the authority of the Secretary of Defense by specifying that no function might be performed independently of the Secretary's authority. Eisenhower gave the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs management over the Joint Staff.

In 1958, Congress passed what would be the last major defense reorganization act for 28 years. This law further strengthened the power of the Secretary, specified the role of the President in creating unified and specified commands, and enhanced the authority of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. For the first time the Chairman was allowed a vote and he received greater control over an expanded Joint Staff. Following the 1958 act Congress considered various reorganizations, most notably during the administration of Richard Nixon, but nothing passed until 1986.

Prior to 1958 the service chiefs functioned as "executive agents" with regard to the unified and specified commands; but the 1958 Act simplified the chain of command by stating that unified commands reported directly to the Secretary of Defense for operational matters. David A. Rosenberg (1997) overstates the importance of this change with his assertion that Arleigh Burke was the "last CNO" in that he was the last Chief of Naval Operations to give operational orders to the fleet. In fact, however, the role of the service chiefs as executive agents was to implement decisions made by higher authorities. The workings of the command system in practice are described by Robert J. Watson (1997) and Byron R. Fairchild and Walter S. Pool (2000) in their respective volumes on the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

Even without statutory authority, the power of the Secretary of Defense steadily expanded through practice. One of Eisenhower's Secretaries, Neil McElroy, directed that all promotions to lieutenant general, vice admiral, or higher must pass through his office, thus giving him greater control over the senior officers. Thomas Gates, another Secretary of Defense during the Eisenhower era, personally resolved disputes between the services over the control of nuclear weapons and submarine-launched missiles.

During the 1960s, Robert McNamara expanded the power of the office in several ways. His willingness to inject his authority into operational decisions, especially during the Vietnam Conflict, reinforced the power of the civilian head of the armed services. Equally important, McNamara instituted a new budget system, known as the Planning, Programming, Budget, Execution System, which

provided the Secretary's office with far greater control over the all important funding issues. Successors continued to make incremental increases in the power of the Secretary in numerous ways, both large and small. For example, in 1969 the Deputy Secretary of Defense created the Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council, which gave him oversight of the budget and purchasing decisions of the services. Indeed, such has been the growth of the purview and responsibility of the office that Charles A Stevenson (2006) characterized it as a "nearly impossible job."

Similarly the office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff also steadily increased in power and prestige during this time. The first Chairman, General of the Army Omar Bradley, merely presided over meetings, often without expressing his own views. His successor Admiral Arthur Radford was more willing to express his own views to shape the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs. During this time the Joint Chiefs made recommendations as a corporate body, with each member having a vote. The Chairman summarized the positions and represented the Joint Chiefs to the President and Secretary of Defense. Skillful chairmen could use this access to enhance their authority, and they frequently used their influence to fashion a consensus. In 1952 the Commandant of the Marine Corps was allowed to vote in meetings when issues relevant to the Marine Corps were considered; in 1972 he became a full member of the JCS.

The Unified Command Plan remained in effect. One of the most contentious issues related to control over conventional forces based within the United States. In 1961 Secretary McNamara created US Strike Command (later US Readiness Command) with combatant command over Army and Air Force general purpose forces within the United States. Citing the need for greater flexibility the sea services persuaded the Secretary not to assign Navy or Marine Corps units to this organization. The command dissolved in 1987.

In practice, major military operations relied upon elements from all four services, and the Joint Task Force (JTF) structure evolved as the means to control multiple services. Typically the regional commander would select a lieutenant general or vice admiral from among his components and designate that person as the commander of the JTF, and his staff would become the nucleus of the JTF headquarters. For operations on land an Army corps commander might become the JTF commander, or for predominately maritime operations that role might go to the commander of a numbered fleet or a Marine Expeditionary Force. For smaller missions a smaller headquarters might be used. The headquarters assumed operational control over all forces assigned to this mission, and wherever possible personnel from other services augmented the JTF headquarters. Upon conclusion of the operation the JTF dissolved.

Although this arrangement provided a means of controlling complex joint operations it had decided disadvantages. Most staff members were not familiar with their joint roles; and it required time to assemble the headquarters. Real and perceived problems in the 1983 invasion of the Caribbean island of Grenada produced much criticism of the process and accelerated the demands for reforms in the conduct of joint operations.

Detailed histories of this period can be found in two series that are still in the process of publication. The *History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense*, edited by Alfred Goldberg (1984), and the *History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff* (Schnabel *et al.* 1978– and Webb 2002). These works are produced by the OSD History Office and the Joint History Office and reflect a meticulous level of detail. For shorter works consult *The Chairmanship of the Joint Chiefs of Staff* (Cole *et al.* 1995), or *The Department of Defense 1947–1997: Organization and Leaders* (Trask and Goldberg 1997). Douglas Kinnard, *The Secretary of Defense* (1980) is a study in the use of power by the various secretaries through 1975. Deborah Shapley's (1993) biography of Robert McNamara describes the achievements and contradictions of the controversial Secretary of Defense. H. R. McMaster's *Dereliction of Duty* (1997) provides a very critical assessment of the Joint Chiefs during the Vietnam War, arguing that service interests overrode their responsibilities to develop a strategy as a joint body.

### Goldwater–Nichols Act and Beyond, 1986–2008

During the early 1980s reform advocates criticized the Department of Defense and especially the Joint Chiefs of Staff as being too bureaucratically encumbered to manage effective operations. Although the earlier service animosities had subsided, the process for achieving consensus hindered rapid decision making. In response, Senators Sam Nunn and Barry Goldwater, plus Congressman William Nichols fashioned what became the Goldwater–Nichols DoD Reorganization Act of 1986. In contrast to previous reform efforts where Congress hesitated to enact sweeping reforms, this legislation originated in Congress despite the opposition of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The Act designated the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs as the principal military adviser to the civilian authorities, eliminating the need to seek recommendations from the Joint Chiefs as a corporate body. The law also expanded the Chairman's powers with regard to strategic planning, logistics, net assessments, joint doctrine, and budgets. To assist his expanded authority the law increased his control over the Joint Staff and authorized a Vice Chairman. Combatant commands received greater authority over subordinate units especially with regard to joint training, force organization, and force employment. The law mandated a Joint Specialty Officer program to ensure that future senior leaders had experience working in the joint environment.

The evolving role of US Atlantic Command/US Joint Forces Command has further enhanced the trend toward closer integration of the services. In 1993, US Atlantic Command added the responsibility for providing trained joint forces to its geographical mission. From that beginning the command's functional missions as the advocate for joint forces have steadily expanded, while the geographic mission diminished. In 1999, the name changed to US Joint Forces Command, and the missions included joint force provider, trainer, integrator, and the lead for joint experimentation. In essence the mission of the command evolved to that of

ensuring smooth operation of joint forces now and in the future. In 2002, the command also initiated development of a cadre of trained service members to assist in the rapid activation of a Joint Task Force headquarters. Leo P. Hirrel (2007) describes the evolution of this command.

The Unified Command Plan demonstrated an increase in the number of functional commands in addition to geographic commands. New functional commands have included US Space Command (1985), US Special Operations Command (1987), US Strategic Command (1992), and US Transportation Command (1987). With the creation of US Strategic Command the Air Force discontinued Strategic Air Command as a specified command, thus placing all strategic weapons under one organization.

Today members of all services are closely integrated for all operational matters in ways that would not have been considered at the creation of DoD. Major military operations function in a joint context to an unprecedented degree, typically under the purview of a joint command or joint task force. The services retain their roles of organizing, training, and equipping within their respective areas; yet even this role is eroding. Since its creation in 1987 the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) has exercised an expanding role in reviewing major acquisition decisions to ensure that service acquisitions meet the joint force commanders' requirements. Increasingly military operations have included participation from non-military agencies and foreign governments. Undoubtedly cooperation with both interagency and international partners will expand significantly in the future.

Gordon Lederman's *Reorganizing the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986* (1999) is a thoughtful account of the events leading to Goldwater-Nichols and the state of national security as of 1999. James R. Locher's *Victory on the Potomac: The Goldwater-Nichols Act Unifies the Pentagon* (2002) is an insider's account of the passage of this legislation that does not attempt to understand the opponents' points of view. Admiral William J. Crowe (former CJCS) provides another insider's view of the Goldwater-Nichols Act that favors the Act (Crowe 1993), but shows a better understanding of the critics' points of view. General Colin Powell (1995) describes his tenure as CJCS following passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act in *My American Journey*. Dennis J. Quinn, ed. *The Goldwater-Nichols DoD Reorganization Act: A Ten-Year Retrospective* (1999) provides an interesting collection of thoughts on the effects of this law. Peter W. Chiarelli's "Beyond Goldwater-Nichols" (1993) argues that Goldwater-Nichols does not go far enough because members continue to serve both "as advisors to the National Command Authorities and as advocates of service interests" and to devote most of their time to the later.

Defense unification, in terms of institutional integration, interoperability, and the planning and conduct of joint operations, is an ongoing and controversial process and thus will provide historians with significant opportunities for analysis for the foreseeable future. The product of their research and analyzes should be of utility for policy makers grappling with American military institutions for an equally long time.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Barlow, Jeffrey G. (1994). *Revolt of the Admirals: The Fight for Naval Aviation, 1945–1950*. Washington: Naval Historical Center.
- Caraley, Demetrios (1966). *The Politics of Military Unification: A Study of Conflict and the Policy Process*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Chiarelli, Peter W. (1993). “Beyond Goldwater–Nichols,” *Joint Forces Quarterly*, 2 (Autumn): 73–81.
- Cline, Ray S. (1951). *Washington Command Post: The Operations Division*. Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History.
- Cole, Ronald H. (2003). *The History of the Unified Command Plan, 1946–1999*. Washington: Joint History Office.
- Cole, Ronald H., Lorna S. Jaffe, Walter S. Poole, and Willard J. Webb (1995). *The Chairmanship of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*. Washington: Joint History Office.
- Coletta, Paolo E. (1975). “The Defense Unification Battle, 1947–50: The Navy,” *Prologue*, 7:1 (Spring), 6–17.
- Coletta, Paolo E. (1981). *The United States Navy and Defense Unification, 1947–1953*. Newark: University of Delaware Press.
- Crowe, William J. (1993). *The Line of Fire: From Washington to the Gulf, the Politics and Battles of the New Military*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Fairchild, Byron R., and Walter S. Poole (2000). *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1957–1960*. Washington: Office of Joint History.
- Godin, Jason (2006). “The Unfulfilled Hope: The Joint Board and the Panama Canal, 1903–1919,” *Joint Force Quarterly*, 42 (3rd Quarter), 86–91.
- Goldberg, Alfred, ed. (1984–). *History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense*, 5 vols. to date. Washington: Office of the Secretary of Defense.
- Hayes, Grace P. (1982). *The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in World War II: The War Against Japan*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Haynes, Richard F. (1975). “The Defense Unification Battle, 1947–50: The Army,” *Prologue*, 7:1 (Spring), 27–31.
- Hirrel, Leo P. (2007). *United States Joint Forces Command, Sixtieth Anniversary, 1947–2007*. Norfolk: US Joint Forces Command.
- Hoopes, Townsend, and Douglas Brinkley (1992). *Driven Patriot: The Life and Times of James Forrestal*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Keiser, Gordon W. (1996 [1953]). *The U.S. Marine Corps and Defense Unification 1944–47*. Baltimore: Nautical & Aviation Publishing Company. [Originally published in 1953 by National Defense University Press with the subtitle *The Politics of Survival*.]
- Kinnard, Douglas (1980). *The Secretary of Defense*. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky.
- Krulak, Victor H. (1984). *First to Fight: An Inside View of the U.S. Marine Corps*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Lederman, Gordon N. (1999). *Reorganizing the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Goldwater–Nichols Act of 1986*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
- Locher, James R. (2002). *Victory on the Potomac: The Goldwater–Nichols Act Unifies the Pentagon*. College Station: Texas A&M University Press.
- McMaster, H. R. (1997). *Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies that Led to Vietnam*. New York: Harper Collins.
- Powell, Colin, with Joseph Persico (1995). *My American Journey*. New York: Random House.

- Quinn, Dennis J. ed. (1999). *The Goldwater–Nichols DoD Reorganization Act: A Ten-Year Perspective*. Washington: National Defense University Press.
- Reardon, Steven L. (1984). *History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense vol. 1: The Formative Years, 1947–1950*. Washington: Office of the Secretary of Defense.
- Rogow, Arnold (1963). *James Forrestal: A Study of Personality, Politics, and Policy*. New York: Macmillan.
- Rosenberg, David Alan (1997). “Arleigh Burke: The Last CNO,” in James C. Bradford, ed., *Quarterdeck and Bridge: Two Centuries of American Naval Leaders*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 361–94.
- Schnabel James F., et al. (1978–). *History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, 7 vols. to date. Washington: Joint History Office [cover 1945–60].
- Shapley, Deborah (1993). *Promise and Power: The Life and Times of Robert McNamara*. Boston: Little, Brown.
- Stevenson, Charles A. (2006). *SECDEF: The Nearly Impossible Job of Secretary of Defense*. Washington: Potomac Books.
- Trask, Roger R., and Alfred Goldberg (1997). *The Department of Defense, 1947–1997: Organization and Leaders*. Washington: Office of the Secretary of Defense.
- Watson, Mark S. (1950). *The Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations*. Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History.
- Watson, Robert J. (1997). *History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense*, vol. 4: *Into the Missile Age, 1956–1960*. Washington: Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense.
- Webb, Willard J. (2002). *History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the War in Vietnam, 1969–1970*. Washington: Office of Joint History.
- Wolk, Herman S. (1975). “The Defense Unification Battle, 1947–50: The Air Force,” *Prologue*, 7:1 (Spring), 18–26.



## Chapter Thirty-one

# MERCENARIES, PRIVATE MILITARY CONTRACTORS, AND NON- TRADITIONAL FORCES

*Jonathan Phillips*

Scholars of American military history rarely focus on the role of mercenaries, soldiers of fortune, and other types of non-traditional forces in America's military past, though such individuals have existed since the arrival of Europeans in the Americas. To date, no single monograph focuses broadly on the American mercenary experience. There are histories of a few specific units, such as the Saint Patrick's Brigade of the Mexican War or of individuals such as Frederick Townsend Ward of Taiping Rebellion fame, but little analysis to place these units or people in a broader context. Part of the problem is that many of America's mercenary units and people are not considered mercenaries or soldiers of fortune, and thus, many scholars have not treated them as such. Yet, a brief look at America's mercenary past demonstrates that soldiers of fortune have, at times, played an important role in American military history. Some Americans have also found it in their personal interest to serve abroad as mercenaries, and not always in support of United States foreign policy.

In recent years, "private military contractor" (PMC) has replaced "mercenary" and "soldier of fortune" as the term preferred by those in the profession. "Mercenary" and "soldier of fortune," in the narrowest terms, describe an individual who is hired for his or her military skills by a foreign nation and is not considered a member of a recognized government force. Both terms, however, are used loosely, and profit is not necessarily the driving motive. The term has been applied to individuals and groups that fight for other nations in support of a cause or for citizenship, and sometimes mercenaries serve in official government units. And, even those who serve their own nation can be categorized as mercenaries. The more narrow mercenary definition refers to individuals who are hired for combat and not for the supporting role played by many of today's PMCs (Mallin and Brown 1979, Mockler 1985, Davis 2000, Singer 2003). "Filibusters" also fall under the rubric of mercenary. Generally, filibusters are American military adventurers (most common in the nineteenth century) who serve in private units and fight against nations not at war with the United States (May 2002).

The definition of mercenary has changed with time and context. In 1814, John C. Calhoun, then a young congressman from South Carolina, presented the

nation's options for military personnel. "The military force by which we can operate consists of ... the regular force, whose general characteristic is *mercenary*, the soldier enlisting for the sake of bounty and subsistence, [and the] militia called into the field by patriotic motives only" (Friedman 1969). The American militia and military school advocate, Alden Partridge, noted in 1836 that without a strong militia, the United States would have to rely on "mercenary forces," or what would be considered fulltime, professional soldiers (Andrew 2001). During the Cold War, the Soviet Union considered the professional militaries of free market nations to be mercenary units; these forces served for pay and in support of capitalism.

Calhoun's comments aside, the term mercenary is more likely to be applied to the enemy's forces than to friendly units. The 1776 American Declaration of Independence accused King George III of "transporting large armies of foreign mercenaries to complete works of death, desolation, and cruelty" in the colonies. During the American Civil War, Confederates argued, and correctly, that the Union sought out mercenaries, including Giuseppe Garibaldi, the military hero of the Italian wars of unification, and recruited the recent immigrant population (Lonn 1951). Most recent immigrants in the Union army considered themselves citizens of their new nation. The nation that hires mercenaries usually calls them, not surprisingly, "military advisors" or "foreign volunteers."

Mercenary service in the United States and its territory, both individuals and firms, is as old as the nation itself, in fact, much older. Spanish conquistadors, many fresh from victory against the Moors, found the Americas to be a golden opportunity to continue their military ways. The Spanish crown readily obliged; it is better to have mercenaries fighting for you in the "new" world than fighting against you in the old. Thus, mercenaries led and participated in the Spanish expeditions of the American southeast and southwest. English settlers also employed soldiers of fortune. Sir Walter Raleigh, a former mercenary himself, employed private soldiers in his quest to establish a colony along North Carolina's Outer Banks. Captain John Smith and Miles Standish served the Virginia Company and the Plymouth Company respectively (Vaughan 1975). Both men provided military training and leadership for English colonists in America. The early English settlers (and later, United States forces) also employed indigenous people as scouts, a tradition that continued well into the late nineteenth century in North America and through the twentieth century in military operations abroad.

During the American War of Independence, the British employed Hessians and other Germans (after failing to secure Russian soldiers) as well as Native Americans (Lowell 1970, Atwood 1980), but the Continental Army also used mercenaries, although to a far lesser extent. The Marquis de Lafayette is the best known of the private soldiers who served the cause of independence. Others made important contributions as well: Baron von Steuben, a Swiss officer who improved the training and preparation of the Continentals, the German Johann Kalb, two Polish officers, Kazimierz Pulaski and Tadeusz Kosciuszko, chief engineer of West Point, and the Irish-born Thomas Conway, known (although unjustly) for the "Conway Cabal," an attempt to replace George Washington with Horatio Gates as commander in chief of the Continental Army in 1777 (Mallin and Brown 1979,

Mockler 1985), and the highly controversial Charles Lee. Each has been the subject of more than one biography and George Athan Billias, in *George Washington's Generals* (1964), includes essays on Lee, Lafayette, and Gates.

While often overlooked, privateers are the naval version of the PMC, and many private sailors contributed to the Revolutionary War effort against the formidable British Navy (Clark 1956, McManemin 1985, Patton 2008). This was not a new enterprise for American mariners; many had secured licenses to prey on French and Spanish shipping during Britain's wars of the mid-1700s (Swanson 1991). After independence, the young nation continued its use of PMCs to compensate for America's largely non-existent navy. The 1787 Federal Constitution authorized Congress to "grant letters of marque and reprisal," thus officially sanctioning privateering. The United States used privateers in great numbers during the War of 1812 (Garitee 1977, Petrie 1999).

The nation also employed land-force mercenaries during its early years for both internal and external crises. At the beginning of Shay's Rebellion in 1786, the Massachusetts governor and a few prominent citizens organized military units and recruited private soldiers; the recruits later became members of official militias (Szatmary 1980, Richards 2002). In 1804, a former American consul to Tunis, William Eaton, organized an expedition (approved by the national government) to overthrow the Pasha of Tripoli, then at war with the United States. As presented in Max Boot's *The Savage Wars of Peace* (2003), Eaton employed a few hundred mercenaries, mostly Muslims (Mockler 1985), and nearly succeeded in 1805 before learning that the United States had come to terms with Tripoli.

In addition to the nation's use of PMCs, some of America's early war heroes served as mercenaries in foreign military units. John Paul Jones fought for Russia after his service in the War of Independence (Golder 1927, Lorenz 1954). While he considered himself an American, Jones did not become a United States citizen until 1792, just a month before his death. Naval officer David Porter, who distinguished himself during the War of 1812, eventually left the United States Navy (after controversy) and served with the Mexican Navy (Long 1970). During the United States' greatest victory in the War of 1812, the Battle of New Orleans, government forces received help from "sailors of fortune." The "gentleman pirate" of the Gulf Coast, Jean Lafitte, and several hundred of his men played a decisive role in this event (Davis 2005).

A variety of mercenary-type units served the US in the war against Mexico in the 1840s, including Mexican nationals who fought against their own nation (Santoni 1996). The United States actively recruited recent Irish immigrants, as well as others, as they arrived in American ports. One such group, the Saint Patrick's Battalion, the subject of Robert Miller's *Shamrock and Sword* (1989), was sent to Mexico to serve with General Zachary Taylor. Due to a variety of reasons, not the least of which was the increasing realization that they were fighting against fellow Catholics, the battalion's members deserted en masse, becoming the San Patricios of the Mexican Army. The San Patricios story demonstrates one of the potential risks of employing mercenary-type forces: disloyalty. The terms of service of another Mexican War unit, the Mormon Battalion, were such that they

could be considered mercenaries, but with a twist (Tyler, Taylor, and Kane 1881; Ricketts 1996). While many mercenaries use military service as a way of gaining citizenship in a nation, the Mormon battalion's members hoped that service to the United States would release them from citizenship, and permit them to live in their own Mormon nation in the American West.

As Robert E. May ably recounts in *Manifest Destiny's Underworld: Filibustering in Antebellum America* (2002), in spite of the Neutrality Act of 1818 and other laws and treaties that prohibited citizens from participating in military expeditions formed in the United States and directed against nations with which America was at peace, thousands of Americans served in private units that invaded or intended to invade Canada, Central and South America, and a few Americans even participated in various European conflicts including the war of Italian unification (with Garibaldi) and the Crimean War (for Russia and France). Filibuster William Walker controlled Nicaragua for a short time in the 1850s (Brown 1994).

Caleb Carr's *The Devil Soldier: The Story of Frederick Townsend Ward* (1992) examines the life of one of the more mysterious American soldiers of fortune of the nineteenth century. Ward began his mercenary duties in the early 1850s, probably with William Walker in a filibustering expedition in Mexico, and then served with the French during the Crimean War, but achieved fame as the leader of a Chinese mercenary force, later known as the Ever-Victorious Army, charged with defeating a massive, bloody revolt, the Taiping Rebellion (1850–64). Anxious to see action in another civil war, on American soil, the Massachusetts-born Ward hoped to serve the Union but was killed in China in 1862 (Smith 1978).

The American Civil War, as already mentioned, provided mercenary opportunities for other nationalities in the wake of the various wars of revolution in Europe. Foreign professional soldiers served with both the Union and Confederate armies, although the former attracted far greater numbers. The South, however, was hardly ignored. Europeans served on commerce raiders in the Confederate Navy and as officers for the Confederate Army, with a few achieving high rank such as the Pomerian Heros Von Borcke, chief of staff for General J. E. B. Stuart, the Frenchman Camille Arnaud Jules Marie, the Prince de Polignac, who held general rank, and Colonel George St. Leger Grenfell (Starr 1971). The motives of Civil War mercenaries varied; some fought for the cause of liberty (a prime motivator for Union mercenaries) and others to maintain or sharpen their military skills, often with the intent of gaining promotion in their country of origin. Ella Lonn, in her *Foreigners in the Confederacy* (1940) and *Foreigners in the Union Army and Navy* (1951), devotes an entire chapter of each volume to soldiers of fortune, while Philip Tucker devotes an entire book to Irish Confederates (2006) and Susannah Bruce (2006) does the same for Irish-Americans who served in the Union Army.

Despite southern fears regarding the United States' ability to lure large numbers of European immigrants to the Union cause, some of these mercenary recruiting programs actually hurt the Union and helped the Confederacy. In early 1864, advertisements placed by state of Massachusetts agents in Hamburg, Germany, newspapers attracted men interested in employment in America – three years of labor desired, with good wages and bonuses, plus room and board. The

Massachusetts Provost Marshall later claimed that they were told orally that they were joining the army. The German recruits landed near Boston and were then sent south – many eventually lost their lives, utterly confused and with little or no training, in the Battle of the Wilderness in the spring of 1864 (Dodenhoff 1969). For some Americans, the Civil War also provided the opportunity for future mercenary duties abroad. As Pierre Crabites presents in his *Americans in the Egyptian Army* (1938), during the 1870s and 1880s, several dozen Americans, mostly veterans of the Civil War, accepted commissions in the Egyptian army with the sole caveat being that they would not take up arms against the United States.

During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, American soldiers of fortune in Central America became ever more involved in filibuster-type activities as efforts to overthrow governments continued, sometimes with the tacit approval of the United States government, and sometimes without such approval. Lester Langley and Thomas Schoonover demonstrate in *Banana Men: American Mercenaries and Entrepreneurs in Central America, 1880–1930* (1995) how American soldiers of fortune worked directly for private concerns and indirectly for the United States government.

Mercenary activity continued during the twentieth century as American individuals and units served around the globe. Americans, usually motivated by cause and adventure and not profit, also served under foreign supervision in units consisting largely of American citizens on several occasions during the twentieth century including: the flyers of the Lafayette Escadrille in World War I (France) named in honor of the Marquis de Lafayette (Mason 1964, Gordon 2000); the Kościuszko Squadron (Poland), 1919–21, named after the Polish soldier of fortune who fought with the Continental Army (Murray 1932, Karolevitz and Fenn 1974, Cisek 2002, Olson 2003); the Washington and Lincoln brigades of the Spanish Civil War (Carroll 1994, Eby 2007), as well as several pilots for the Spanish Republican government; Great Britain's Eagle Squadrons, 1940–2, and members of other units in the Royal Air Force and the Royal Canadian Air Force (Haugland 1979, Caine 2002, Kershaw 2006); and Claire Chennault's Flying Tigers during World War II (Byrd 1987, Ford 2007). American citizens, inspired by ideology, glory, and profit, fought for the creation of Israel, in the Cuban Revolution (on both sides), and for and against African insurgencies in the 1960s and 1970s (Mallin and Brown 1979, Mockler 1985).

During the early Cold War, the United States trained German and Eastern European volunteers, including former Waffen SS members, for counterinsurgency in the event of an attack by the Soviet Union. As Christopher Simpson examines in *Blowback: America's Recruitment of Nazis and Its Effects on the Cold War* (1988), in addition to the recruitment of former SS troops, several thousand volunteers originally from the Soviet Union and occupied territories trained as a rapid deployment force for incursions into Soviet territory. In support of such programs, Congress passed the Lodge Act in 1950, thus permitting "alien nationals residing outside the United States" to enlist in the army. Dubbed the Volunteer Freedom Corps, part jobs program for refugees and part foreign legion, the effort expanded during the Eisenhower Administration years, but did not gain the support of western European nations and ended in 1960. Some Lodge Act recruits, or "iron

curtain nationals,” formed the core of the first Special Forces units, or Green Berets, in the early 1950s (Simpson 1988, Carafano 1999). During the 1960s and 1970s, the United States government also used American and foreign mercenaries, sometimes called “contract” soldiers, to perform duty considered politically controversial or where special local knowledge was required – in Africa, Southeast Asia, Central and South America, and the Caribbean (Mallin and Brown 1979, Davis 2000).

American-led mercenary activity during the Vietnam War is demonstrated by one of the most vivid and memorable photographs of the conflict. The 1975 photograph of the helicopter rescuing people from an apartment rooftop in Saigon symbolizes the failure of the Vietnam War. The helicopter, sometimes referred to in captions as a “US Army” or “military” helicopter, was operated by Air America, then owned by the Central Intelligence Agency but first established as a private company, Civil Air Transport [CAT], founded by Claire Chennault, the creator and leader of the Flying Tigers during World War II. Air America and CAT had a long, complex, and very secretive career in the service of American interests in Southeast Asia and elsewhere – including flying support missions for the French troops at Dien Bien Phu in 1954 (Byrd 1987, Leary 1999–2000, Davis 2000). The Degar/Montagnard tribesmen recruited, trained, and supplied by the US Army, especially Green Beret units, in the Central Highlands of Vietnam, were considered to be mercenaries by many policymakers.

Mercenary operations generally benefit from the availability of surplus warriors in the wake of extended conflicts. A few enterprising men believed that American veterans would seek out mercenary employment in the aftermath of the Vietnam War. Robert K. Brown, a former Green Beret, created *Soldier of Fortune* magazine in 1975 to advertise mercenary employment. Brown, along with *Time* correspondent Jay Mallin, later produced *Merc: American Soldiers of Fortune* (1979), a popular history detailing the exploits of mercenaries in American history. Ultimately, Brown’s mercenary movement garnered little support, for two reasons. The United States government made it clear that any American citizen who joined a foreign mercenary unit would lose his or her citizenship. In addition, American military personnel generally have little interest in or experience with serving abroad for long periods of time, at least when compared to the soldiers of traditional colonial powers (Mockler 1985).

While American soldiers of fortune played minimal roles in the third-world mercenary campaigns of the 1970s, the decade did see the “emergence” of another phenomenon that would bring the term “mercenary” into the news on a regular basis, what Peter W. Singer has dubbed “the new business face of warfare” in his prescient *Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry* (2003). Beginning in the 1970s and aided by the reduction of government forces after the Cold War, a new corporate mercenary model has emerged (Cullen 2008). These firms provide many services including combat operations, training, and, most commonly, maintenance, intelligence, and logistics services. The combat firms are located elsewhere (mainly Great Britain and South Africa), but several US corporations provide combat *support* services as well as security operations (Isenberg 1997, Davis 2000, Singer 2003, Avant 2005).



Some US firms (Dyncorp, Vinnell Corporation, and Science Applications International Corporation) started as traditional defense contractors but moved into the PMC sector. Others, such as Military Professional Resources, Inc. (MPRI), took advantage of the federal government's desire to "privatize" some government functions. The controversial Blackwater, Inc., founded in 1997 by former US Navy Seals (renamed Xe in 2009), it has thousands of "security personnel" positioned around the world (Scahill 2007). No US firm is known to have been directly involved in formal combat operations but numerous American PMC employees have died as a result of engagements with enemy forces (Adams 1999, Singer 2003, Isenberg 2004, Avant 2005).

The US government has shown little official public support for the emergence of combat-ready firms (those that can provide fully operational combat units) but has supported the growth of the greater PMC phenomenon. American use of PMCs, by some estimates, has increased one thousand percent since the Gulf War in 1991. As Peter Singer noted, largely driven by the urge to "outsource," the US Department of Defense awarded over 3,000 contracts between 1994 and 2002 with a value surpassing \$300 billion. PMCs have become essential for the US military (Adams 1999, Singer 2003, Isenberg 2004).

The Iraq War and occupation has generated greater debate over the role of mercenary-type firms. During the buildup to the March 2003 attack and during subsequent operations, 20,000 employees of private contractors constructed the camps that housed coalition forces, prepared and provided meals, operated computer and communications systems, provided "in country" training for troops in Kuwait, guarded facilities in Qatar, and maintained 28 per cent of US weapons systems, including B-2 bombers and F-117 fighters (Von Boemcken 2003). Deborah Avant's thoughtful and comprehensive *The Market of Force* (2005) examines the growing role and influence of private military companies and considers the long-term implications of the phenomenon on the nation state's ability to conduct and control military operations.

By 2007, when the United States had 160,000 troops in Iraq and Afghanistan, there were an additional 100,000 private individuals working under US contracts in those theaters of operations. James Carafano's, *Private Sector, Public Wars* (2008) traces the rise of private contractors from the seventeenth century to the present arguing that the increasing importance of these "contract warriors" constitutes a basic shift in the nature of warfare since the emergence of the modern nation state. Gerry Schumacher, *A Bloody Business* (2006), examines those firms in Kuwait and Iraq that are providing security for diplomats, transporting goods through dangerous territory, and reconstructing infrastructure. He sees the use of private contractors as a short-term solution and not a fundamental change in the nature of warfare.

While the United States, in its early years, employed mercenaries largely out of need, sometimes desperation, the new urge to use private military contractors is driven largely by political philosophy and the desire to outsource and privatize government functions. The debate continues regarding the appropriateness (moral, legal, compatibility, cost, etc.) of relying on mercenary-type units. There are many questions but very few answers to date. What can be said of the recent growth of

the PMC industry is that it is just the most recent chapter in America's long, complex, and diverse mercenary past (Adams 1999, Singer 2003, US General Accounting Office 2003, Isenberg 2004, Melton 2006, Scahill 2007).

#### BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Adams, Thomas K. (1999). "The New Mercenaries and the Privatization of Conflict," *Parameters*, 29:2 (Summer), 103–16.
- Andrew, Rod, Jr. (2001). *Long Gray Lines: The Southern Military School Tradition, 1839–1915*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Atwood, Rodney (1980). *The Hessians: Mercenaries from Hessen-Kassel in the American Revolution*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Avant, Deborah D. (2005). *The Market of Force: The Consequences of Privatizing Security*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Billias, George Athan (1964). *George Washington's Generals*. New York: William Morrow and Co.
- Boot, Max (2003). *The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power*. New York: Basic Books.
- Brown, Russell K. (1994). *To the Manner Born: The Life of General William H. T. Walker*. Athens: University of Georgia Press.
- Bruce, Susannah Ural (2006). *Harp and Eagle: Irish-American Volunteers and the Union Army, 1861–1865*. New York: New York University Press.
- Byrd, Martha (1987). *Chennault: Giving Wings to the Tiger*. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press.
- Caine, Philip D. (2002). *Eagles of the RAF: The World War II Eagle Squadrons*. Honolulu: University Press of the Pacific.
- Carafano, James Jay (1999). "Mobilizing Europe's Stateless: America's Plan for a Cold War Army," *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 1:2 (Spring), 61–85.
- Carafano, James Jay (2008). *Private Sector, Public Wars: Contractors in Combat – Afghanistan, Iraq, and Future Conflicts*. Westport, CT: Praeger Security International.
- Carr, Caleb (1992). *The Devil Soldier: The Story of Frederick Townsend Ward*. New York: Random House.
- Carroll, Peter N. (1994). *The Odyssey of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade: Americans in the Spanish Civil War*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Cisek, Janusz (2002). *Kościuszko, We Are Here!: American Pilots of the Kościuszko Squadron in Defense of Poland, 1919–1921*. Jefferson, NC: McFarland Publishing.
- Clark, William Bell (1956). *Ben Franklin's Privateers: A Naval Epic of the American Revolution*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.
- Crabites, Pierre (1938). *Americans in the Egyptian Army*. London: Routledge.
- Cullen, Patrick (2008). "The Transformation of Private Military Training," in Donald Stoker, ed., *Military Advising and Assistance: From Mercenaries to Privatization, 1815–2007*. New York: Routledge, 239–52.
- Davis, James R. (2000). *Fortune's Warriors: Private Armies and the New World Order*. Toronto: Douglas and McIntyre.
- Davis, William C. (2005). *The Pirates Lafitte: The Treacherous World of the Corsairs of the Gulf*. New York: Harcourt.
- Dodenhoff, George H. (1969). "A Historical Perspective of Mercenaries," *Naval War College Review*, 21:7 (March), 91–109.

- Eby, Cecil D. (2007). *Comrades and Commissars: The Lincoln Battalion in the Spanish Civil War*. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.
- Ford, Daniel (2007). *Flying Tigers: Claire Chennault and his American Volunteers, 1941–1942*. New York: HarperCollins.
- Friedman, Leon (1969). "Conscription and the Constitution: The Original Understanding," *Michigan Law Review* 67:8 (June), 1493–552.
- Garitee, Jerome R. (1977). *The Republic's Private Navy: The American Privateering Business as Practiced by Baltimore during the War of 1812*. Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press.
- Golder, Frank A. (1927). *John Paul Jones in Russia*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, Page & Co.
- Gordon, Dennis (2000). *The Lafayette Flying Corps: The American Volunteers in the French Air Service in World War One*. Atglen, PA: Schiffer Military History.
- Haugland, Vern (1979). *The Eagle Squadrons: Yanks in the RAF, 1940–1942*. New York: Ziff-Davis Flying Books.
- Hickey, Donald R. (1989). *The War of 1812: A Forgotten Conflict*. Urbana-Champaign: University of Illinois Press.
- Isenberg, David (1997). "Soldiers of Good Fortune Ltd.: A Profile of Today's Private Sector Corporate Mercenary Firms," Washington: *Center for Defense Information Monograph*, (November).
- Isenberg, David (2004). *A Fistful of Contractors: The Case for a Pragmatic Assessment of Private Military Contractors in Iraq*. British-American Security Information Council.
- Karolevitz, Robert F., and Ross S. Fenn (1974). *Flight of Eagles: The Story of the American Kościuszko Squadron in the Polish–Russian War 1919–1920*. Sioux Falls, SD: Brevet Press.
- Kershaw, Alex (2006). *The Few: The American "Knights of the Air" Who Risked Everything to Fight in the Battle of Britain*. New York: Da Capo Press.
- Langley, Lester D., and Thomas Schoonover (1995). *The Banana Men: American Mercenaries and Entrepreneurs in Central America, 1880–1930*. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky.
- Leary, William M. (1999–2000). "Supporting the 'Secret War': CIA Air Operations in Laos, 1955–1974." <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/docs/v43i3a07p.htm> (accessed April 20, 2009).
- Long, David F. (1970). *Nothing Too Daring: A Biography of Commodore David Porter, 1780–1843*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Lonn, Ella (1940). *Foreigners in the Confederacy*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Lonn, Ella (1951). *Foreigners in the Union Army and Navy*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.
- Lorenz, Lincoln (1954). *The Admiral and the Empress: John Paul Jones and Catherine the Great*. New York: Bookman Associates.
- Lowell, Edward Jackson (1970). *The Hessians and the Other German Auxiliaries of Great Britain in the Revolutionary War*. Williamstown, MA: Corner House.
- Mallin, Jay, and Robert K. Brown (1979). *Merc: American Soldiers of Fortune*. New York: Macmillan Publishing Company.
- Mason, Herbert Molloy, Jr. (1964). *The Lafayette Escadrille*. New York: Random House.
- May, Robert E. (2002). *Manifest Destiny's Underworld: Filibustering in Antebellum America*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- McManemin, John A. (1985). *Captains of the Privateers during the Revolutionary War*. Spring Lake, NJ: Ho-Ho-Kus Pub.

- Miller, Robert Ryal (1989). *Shamrock and Sword: The Saint Patrick's Battalion in the U.S.–Mexican War*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Mockler, Anthony (1985). *The New Mercenaries*. London: Sidgwick & Jackson.
- Melton, Robert Young (2006). *Licensed to Kill: Hired Guns on the War on Terror*. New York: Crown.
- Murray, Kenneth Malcolm (1932). *Wings over Poland: The Story of the 7th Kościuszko Squadron of the Polish Air Service, 1919, 1920, 1921*. New York: D. Appleton and Company.
- Olson, Lynne (2003). *A Question of Honor: The Kościuszko Squadron: The Forgotten Heroes of World War II*. New York: A. A. Knopf.
- Patton, Robert H. (2008). *Patriot Pirates: The Privateer War for Freedom and Fortune in the American Revolution*. New York: Pantheon.
- Petrie, Donald A. (1999). *The Prize Game: Lawful Looting on the High Seas in the Days of Fighting Sail*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Richards, Leonard L. (2002). *Shay's Rebellion: The American Revolution's Final Battle*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Ricketts, Norma Baldwin (1996). *The Mormon Battalion: U.S. Army of the West, 1846–1848*. Logan: Utah State University Press.
- Santoni, Pedro (1996). *Mexicans at Arms: Puro Federalists and the Politics of War, 1845–1848*. Fort Worth: Texas Christian University Press.
- Scahill, Jeremy (2007). *Blackwater: The Rise of the World's Most Powerful Mercenary Army*. New York: Nation Books.
- Schumacher, Gerry (2006). *A Bloody Business: America's War Zone Contractors and the Occupation of Iraq*. New York: Zenith Books.
- Simpson, Christopher (1988). *Blowback: America's Recruitment of Nazis and Its Effects on the Cold War*. New York: Weidenfeld and Nicolson.
- Singer, P. W. (2003). *Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Smith, Richard J. (1978). *Mercenaries and Mandarins: The Ever-Victorious Army in 19th Century China*. Millwood, NY: KTO Press.
- Starr, Stephen Z. (1971). *Colonel Grenfell's Wars: The Life of a Soldier of Fortune*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.
- Swanson, Carl E. (1991). *Predators and Prizes: American Privateering and Imperial Warfare, 1739–1748*. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.
- Szatmary, David P. (1980). *Shay's Rebellion: The Making of an Agrarian Insurrection*. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press.
- Tucker, Philip (2006). *Irish Confederates: The Civil War's Forgotten Soldiers*. Abilene, TX: McWhiney Foundation Press.
- Tyler, Daniel, John Taylor, and Thomas Leiper Kane (1881). *A Concise History of the Mormon Battalion, 1846–1847*. Salt Lake City [reprinted Glorieta, NM: Rio Grande Press, 1969].
- US General Accounting Office (2003) *Military Operations: Contractors Provide Vital Services to Deployed Forces but Are Not Adequately Addressed in DoD Plans*. Report to the Subcommittee on Readiness and Management Support, Committee on Armed Services, US Senate.
- Vaughan, Alden (1975). *American Genesis: Captain John Smith and the Founding of Virginia*. Boston: Little, Brown.
- Von Boemcken, Marc (2003). "The Business of War," *Peace and Conflict Monitor*, (15 December): [http://www.monitor.upeace.org/innerpg.cfm?id\\_article=121](http://www.monitor.upeace.org/innerpg.cfm?id_article=121) (accessed April 2, 2009).

# INTRODUCTION

War – no matter how destructive and regrettable – forms an important component of human history and has played a determining role in America’s development as a nation (Anderson and Cayton 2005). Military conflict dates from the very beginning of English settlement in the New World, when, in April 1607, the first colonists were opposed on landing in Virginia by hostile Native Americans. That clash turned into open warfare in less than a decade and for two and a half centuries such warfare remained a constant as white settlement expanded across the continent. Disagreement concerning how best to deal with the Native Americans contributed to the first internal conflicts, for example, those between the Pilgrims at Plymouth and Thomas Morton’s settlement at nearby Merrymount in 1628 and particularly to Bacon’s Rebellion half a century later. While internal rebellions tended to be localized, they directly influenced much wider regions. The slave revolts of the Antebellum era, for example, were centered in Virginia, Louisiana, and South Carolina, but sent shock waves rippling throughout the South. Both Native Americans and those more recently arrived from the Old World participated in European wars of empire. For over a century after achieving independence Americans engaged in military conflicts whose operations were conducted almost exclusively in the Western Hemisphere, but during the succeeding century and a quarter Americans participated in wars that came to span the globe often with a loose assemblage of allies and client states linked by a system of alliances during the Cold War. Protection of the “Free World” led to wars in Korea and Vietnam, and the Cold War against Communism provided an ideological justification for the continued military action in Latin America, operations undertaken by a government that in other settings championed the principles of self-determination of nations in Asia and Africa.

Wars have shaped American development in a myriad of ways ranging from delineating the physical boundaries of the nation and determining patterns of settlement, to influencing the development of business and industry, the nature of the political system (being a veteran has usually been a political asset; and the execution of war powers has strongly influenced the nature of the American presidency),

and the content of popular culture. Wars and military policies, such as those dealing with racial and gender integration, have significantly affected demographic patterns, class structure, gender roles, and community standards. All of these military influences and experiences combine to form a major component in shaping the character and culture of American society.

Throughout American history citizen soldiers of the militia, national guard and reserves, as well as members of the uniformed services, the Army, Navy (including the Marine Corps), Air Force, and Coast Guard, have both reflected and profoundly influenced America's society, culture, economy, and politics in times of both peace and war.

Given its importance, it is not surprising that military history has long been the subject of interest to the general public, military professionals, and academics (Lynn 2008). Average citizens are as likely to seek entertainment as insight and to acquire their "military history" from a combination of television and cinema and from magazines that focus on a particular era or war, and from the thousands of books on military subjects that are published each year. Military professionals have traditionally sought "lessons" and insights from the past to guide current and future operations and to help in understanding their relations with society as a whole (Reardon 1990).

The focus in this volume is on the published scholarship of the third group, academic historians, most of whom can be placed in one of three main subgroups that have developed over the past half century: Members of the first group have maintained their focus as traditional military historians on battles and leaders, strategy and tactics, weapons and warfare (Millet 1992). Walter Millis (1961) had the second group, the military professionals, in mind when he asserted that the two functions of the study of military history were "to train professional military men in the exercise of their profession and ... to educate governments and peoples in the military requirements of today." Citing the revolution in military affairs wrought by the development of nuclear weapons and systems capable of delivering them to any point in the world, Millis pronounced dead the utility of studying military history. Millis failed to foresee the emergence later in that decade of the "New Military History" group of academics who often are less interested in these traditional topics than in the relationships between "war and society." They often employ the tools of social scientists and focus on military institutions to examine individuals serving in the military ("history from the bottom up") (Reardon 2008), the impact of military operations on other institutions and on the public, and the interface between the military and civilian society including the role of race, class, and gender (Chambers 1991). Another group of military historians has begun to probe broader cultural phenomena such as "war and memory" to gain insight into the human mentalité, i.e., the thought processes, mores, and attitudes of military organizations and the societies that give rise to them, as well as the shaping of memory and its use by later generations (Linenthal 1991, Reardon 1997, Lepore 1998, Cray 1999, Rosenberg 2003, Bradley and Powers 2000, Brinkley 2005, Linn 2007).

The status of American military history as an academic discipline has been surveyed regularly in books and professional journals over the last 50 years (Morton



1962; Mahon 1965; Millett 1970; Weigley 1975; Kaegi 1981; Kennedy 1989; Charters, Milner, and Wilson 1992; Coffman 1997; Black 2004, Moyar 2007), and most recently by academic historians in a Round Table (2007) in *The Journal of American History*, and in a collection of essays in the journal *Academic Questions* (Bunting 2008, Lynn 2008). Themes common to these publications include surveys of scholarship, which institutions include military historians on their faculty and military history courses in their curricula, suggestions for future study, and the standing of military history in academe. Robert Citino (2007: 1070) succinctly summarized views on the last of these: "Military history today is in the same curious position it has been in for decades: extremely popular with the American public at large, and relatively marginalized within professional academic circles." An issue of the Organization of American Historians *Magazine of American History* devoted to "reimagining military history in the classroom," contained ten essays identifying resources and suggesting ways to integrate military history in high school and college level US history survey courses (OAH 2008).

The popularity of the field among general readers explains the plethora of military encyclopedias and guides to military history. The goal of this volume is to include essays on topics largely ignored by other studies, such as the military and music, care for the dead, and air defense. Those essays are designed to provide basic information about their subject, but just as importantly to assess the historiography of the topic. They are not meant to be bibliographical in the sense of listing all books, not even all valuable books on a topic, but to identify the major areas of interpretive discussion. In doing so the authors explore the ways that the study of American military history has evolved over the century since history emerged as an academic discipline. Bibliographical citations are to the first published editions of the works to make clear the development of historiography over time. Some nineteenth and early twentieth-century works have been reprinted several times and these reprint editions are acknowledged only if they contain significant annotations or a particularly useful introduction. In such instances, the revised edition will be cited with the date of the original publication noted in square brackets at the end of the entry.

Space considerations imposed a level of selectivity. Priority was given to military institutions and practices, the conduct of operations, and links between American service personnel and civilians and to the omission of topics, such as the causes of war and the impact of war on American society, as being beyond the scope of this volume. Separate essays on such subjects as Americans held as prisoner of war, military procurement and logistics, military medicine, weapons systems, the military use of outer space, and opposition to war and the military, topics which have recently begun to receive scholarly attention, were considered but in the end not included. Some of these topics are addressed in essays that were included, for example, military procurement in the essay on the military-industrial complex and the use of space in the essay on military communications. Many of the essays address closely related subjects. For example, the essay on "Civil-Military Relations" focuses on the interaction of civilian and uniformed leaders of military services and the division between civilian and military societies in America while

the interaction of military forces with civilians is probed in “Early American Insurrections,” “The Military and Reconstruction,” and “The Military, Civil Disorder, and Natural Disasters.”

Taken together, the essays in this volume analyze the ways in which Americans have formed their military institutions; the operations, both domestic and foreign, that their military services have conducted; and the interaction between the military and civilian sectors of society. Just under half the essays focus on traditional topics, including the institutional development of the military services and the conduct of war. Others deal with topics that have gained increasing scholarly interest, such as the place of minorities and women in the military, military operations in time of peace, the depiction of the military in the cinema and on television, relations of the military with the media and defense contractors, and the interaction of military personnel with foreign peoples while serving as attachés and military advisers. A final group of essays address topics receiving relatively little attention from historians in the past, notably the military use of photography and music, the roles of veterans groups, the care for the dead, the military and sports, and issues of war and memory.

The authors include both established historians and emerging scholars all writing with a single aim: to make the subfields of military history accessible to a broad audience. It is hoped that members of the general public who wish to gain a basic knowledge of a topic and learn about the issues which historians debate will find the essays useful, as will students seeking term paper, thesis, and dissertation topics, and teachers and professors preparing for the classes that they present.

During the two centuries between the colonial period and the Cold War those who studied the sweep of American military history virtually all did so in a chronological narrative moving from era to era and war to war, but that approach has changed as historians have instead traced various threads of military history across a span of years. This volume is organized in Parts, each composed of essays examining a group of related topics. The essays in Part I focus on warfare from the colonial era through the global war on terrorism, those in Part II trace the institutional development of American armed forces from the Continental Army, Navy and Marines of the Revolution through the unification of the services and the establishment of area and joint forces commands in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. Part III's essays explore the conduct of military operations short of a declared war, the occupation of former Axis powers and their dependencies after World War II, the role of military alliances and conduct of coalition warfare, and the work of military attachés and military advisers. Part IV addresses the role of the military in providing homeland security against foreign attack and in the face of domestic disorder. Part V deals with military specialties and themes, such as military justice and special forces, that span the various services. Part VI, one of the largest Parts, consists of thematic essays that examine the relationship between the military, civil society, and American culture. Taken together these essays reflect the healthy state of military history scholarship and bear witness to the fact that military history continues to attract numerous fine historians who employ a variety of methods to approach the field from numerous perspectives.

Considered collectively the essays raise some lively questions, ones of American exceptionalism, for example. Is the American way of war unique? Were the experiences of American military personnel typical of those of servicemen of other nations during the same era? In what ways and for what reasons did American military institutions develop differently than those of other nations? The essays in this *Companion* provide an excellent understanding of American military history that can be drawn upon for additional comparative studies.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Anderson, Fred, and Andrew Cayton (2005). *The Dominion of War: Empire and Liberty in North America, 1500–2000*. New York: Viking.
- Black, Jeremy (2004). “The Sound of Guns: Military History Today,” in Jeremy Black, *Rethinking Military History*. New York: Routledge, 26–65.
- Bradley, James, with Ron Powers (2000). *Flags of our Fathers*. New York: Bantam Books.
- Brinkley, Douglas (2005). *Boys of Pointe du Hoc: Ronald Reagan, D-Day and the U.S. Army 2nd Ranger Battalion*. New York: William Morrow.
- Bunting, Josiah, III (2008). “Why Military History?” *Academic Questions*, 21:1 (March), 12–17.
- Chambers, John Whiteclay, II (1991). “The New Military History: Myth and Reality,” *Journal of Military History*, 55:3 (July): 395–406.
- Charters, David A., Marc Milner, and J. Brent Wilson (1992). *Military History and the Military Profession*. Westport, CT: Greenwood.
- Citino, Robert M. (2007). “Military Histories Old and New: A Reintroduction,” *American Historical Review*, 112:4 (October), 1070–90.
- Coffman, Edward M. (1997). “The Course of Military History in the United States Since World War II,” *Journal of Military History*, 61:4 (October), 761–76.
- Cray, Robert E., Jr. (1999). “Commemorating the Prison Ship Dead: Revolutionary Memory and the Politics of Sepulture in the Early Republic, 1776–1808,” *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3rd ser., 56:3 (July), 565–90.
- Kaegi, Walter E. (1981). “The Crisis in Military Historiography,” *Armed Forces and Society*, 7:2 (Winter), 299–316.
- Kennedy, Paul M. (1989). “The Fall and Rise of Military History,” *Yale Journal of World Affairs*, 1:1 (Fall), 12–19.
- Lee, Wayne E. (2007). “Mind and Matter – Cultural Analysis in American Military History: A Look at the State of the Field,” *Journal of American History*, 93:4 (March), 1116–42.
- Lepore, Jill (1998). *The Name of War: King Philip’s War and the Origins of American Identity*. New York: Knopf.
- Linenthal, Edward Tabor (1991). *Sacred Places: Americans and Their Battlefields*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
- Linn, Brian McAllister (2007). *The Echo of Battle: The Army’s Way of War*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Lynn, John (2008). “Breaching the Walls of Academe: The Purposes, Problems, and Prospects of Military History,” *Academic Questions*, 21:1 (March), 18–36.
- Mahon, John K. (1965). “Teaching and Research on Military History in the United States,” *The Historian*, 27:2 (February), 170–84.
- Miller, John J. (2006). “Sounding Taps: Why Military History is Being Retired,” *National Review*, 58:18 (9 October).

- Millett, Allan R. (1970). "American Military History: Over the Top," in Herbert J. Bass, ed., *The State of American History*. Chicago: Quadrangle Press, 157–82.
- Millett, Allan R. (1992). "American Military History: Clio and Mars as 'Pards,'" in David A. Charters, Marc Milner, and J. Brent Wilson, eds., *Military History and the Military Profession*. Westport, CT: Praeger, 3–21.
- Millis, Walter (1961). *Military History*. Washington: American Historical Association.
- Morton, Louis (1962). "The Historian and the Study of War," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, 48:4 (March), 599–613.
- Moyar, Mark (2007). "The Current State of Military History," *Historical Journal*, 50:1 (March), 225–40.
- OAH [Organization of American Historians] (2008). "Military History," *Magazine of American History*, 22:4 (October).
- Reardon, Carol (1990). *Soldiers and Scholars: The U.S. Army and the Uses of Military History, 1865–1920*. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press.
- Reardon, Carol (1997). *Pickett's Charge in History and Memory*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Reardon, Carol (2008). "View from the Ranks: Social and Cultural History of the American Armed Forces," *Magazine of American History*, 22:4 (October), 11–16.
- Rosenberg, Emily S. (2003). *A Date Which Will Live: Pearl Harbor in American Memory*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Round Table (2007). "'Round Table' American Military History," *Journal of American History*, 93:4 (March), 1116–62, [seven essays by six participants].
- Shy, John (1993). "The Cultural Approach to the History of War," *Journal of Military History*, 57:5 (October), 13–26.
- Weigley, Russell F., ed. (1975). *New Dimensions in Military History: An Anthology*. Darby, PA: Diane Publishing Co.

## Part III

# FOREIGN MILITARY OPERATIONS SHORT OF DECLARED WAR

## Chapter Thirty-two

# EXPANDING AND DEFENDING A MARITIME REPUBLIC, 1816–95

*John H. Schroeder*

Although the nation's basic naval policy did not change after 1815, the role of the US Navy changed dramatically because the United States had entered an era of extended peace. Nearly two decades of undeclared and declared naval wars against France, Great Britain and the Barbary States had ended. Ahead stretched eight decades of peacetime operations punctuated only by six years of conventional war. The US Navy played a significant role in both the Mexican War (1846–8) and the American Civil War (1861–5), but both conflicts were fought primarily on land by land forces. Neither Mexico nor the Confederacy had a conventional, blue water navy. As a result, the US Navy's primary role in each conflict was to blockade the enemy, to engage in amphibious operations, to attack enemy forces on inland waterways, and, during the Civil War, to attempt, without great success, to destroy Confederate commerce raiders overseas. There were no major naval battles and few engagements between conventional warships as there had been during the War of 1812.

Between 1815 and 1890, naval advocates pressed sporadically for the republic to establish a large European-style navy, but they failed to redefine the nation's traditional defense and naval policies which remained in place for the next 75 years. Accordingly, the wartime navy would help defend the nation's coastlines while employing fast naval cruisers to attack the enemy's merchant ships overseas. In peacetime, the nation's small navy would be divided and stationed on distant stations which were established over time in the Mediterranean, the Caribbean, the South Atlantic, the Pacific, the East Indies, and west Africa. On these stations, naval forces were ordered to protect American commerce overseas by "showing the flag," defending American neutral rights, fighting pirates, responding to attacks on American citizens and trade, filing scientific and geographic reports, and performing various diplomatic functions.

For the peacetime navy, the years from 1815 to 1895 do not constitute a single, coherent chronological period, but are best divided into three periods broken respectively by the Mexican War and the American Civil War; that is, separate periods of activity from 1815 to 1846, from 1848 to 1861 and from 1865 to



1895. The primary role of the US Navy in each of these periods was the protection of American commerce overseas, but the operational definition of that responsibility evolved and shifted as American political conditions and commercial demands changed.

Between 1815 and 1846, the navy's peacetime commercial role grew slowly and unevenly as the United States remained preoccupied with its territorial expansion in North America. Since American overseas trade grew steadily but slowly, demands for protection of that commerce also grew slowly. In the United States, well organized special interest groups and modern political lobbies did not yet exist. Instead only small groups of merchants and whalers as well as individual promoters and entrepreneurs periodically pressured the government for occasional naval support or special projects. Likewise, from overseas, American commercial activities created only minimal demands for active naval support. In fact, some Americans in their activities overseas preferred to avoid the navy altogether. For example, American whaling and sealing captains were typically secretive about the location of their favorite hunting and fishing grounds. In Canton, China, the small community of American merchants was ambivalent about the wisdom of a continuous US naval presence there as were American missionaries in the Hawaiian Islands.

In the 15 years after 1815, the wars of national liberation created the primary focus of American naval activity. In the Caribbean, the navy fought a difficult but successful battle against rampant piracy. Along the Pacific and Atlantic coasts of South America, revolutionary wars required constant naval presence to protect American neutral rights. In the Mediterranean, the American squadron guarded the neutral rights of American merchants during the Greek War for Independence.

After 1829, President Andrew Jackson began to use the navy more aggressively and expansively to protect the nation's commerce. He dispatched naval forces to retaliate against attacks on American lives and property in the Falkland Islands and at Kuala Batu on the coast of Sumatra. Jackson's Secretary of Navy Levi Woodbury also sent naval missions to the Middle East and East Indies to negotiate formal commercial agreements with rulers there. In addition, Jackson endorsed and then strongly supported legislation to send a large and unprecedented naval expedition to the South Seas and Pacific Ocean.

During his brief tenure as Secretary of Navy from 1841 to 1843, Abel P. Upshur further enlarged the navy's role by pressing with some success to modernize and increase the size of the navy and to employ it more aggressively overseas. Three of Upshur's actions as Secretary illustrated the peacetime navy's changing role. First, he created a model which was copied verbatim for years by his successors by rewriting the standard instructions for squadron commanders to stress the primary importance of using their forces to protect American commerce. Second, Upshur created the Naval Observatory and appointed Lieutenant Matthew F. Maury as its director. Under his leadership, the observatory collected and distributed to merchant and whaling captains vital information about the winds and currents of the oceans as well as the reported location of whales in the Pacific Ocean. Maury was also instrumental in the launching of several naval exploring expeditions. Third, Upshur sent Captain Thomas ap Catesby Jones to command the Pacific Squadron and instructed

him to protect American interests in California in the midst of the unsettled political situation there. Once along the California coast, Jones misinterpreted conditions there when he assumed that the United States was at war with Mexico. In October, 1842, Jones briefly seized Monterey for the United States. Government officials in Washington disavowed this action and recalled Jones, but the peacetime navy was clearly being used in a more aggressive manner than it had previously.

Between 1848 and 1861, the navy's peacetime role grew dramatically as it assumed additional commercial, scientific, and diplomatic duties. The Oregon settlement with England in 1846 and the Mexican War which ended in 1848 added 1,300 miles of coastline and three magnificent harbors on the Pacific Ocean. The victories of the war joined with the excitement of the California Gold Rush to produce the exuberant nationalism known as "Young America" in the early 1850s. The United States now seemed poised on the verge of a "new commercial era" in which it would expand its influence and trade not only in the Mediterranean and Latin America but into the untapped markets in China and the East Indies as well (Tate 1971).

In fact, between 1848 and 1860 American total exports jumped from \$138 million to \$333 million and total foreign trade rocketed from \$286 million to \$687 million. Admittedly, most of this dramatic trade increase occurred in the traditional markets of Europe, the Mediterranean, and the Caribbean, but dozens of expansive politicians, newspaper editors, promoters, and businessmen believed that the time was now at hand to reap the untold commercial riches of China and the East Indies. As they stood in the vanguard of this advance into Latin American and the far reaches of the Pacific, whalers, entrepreneurs, merchants, and clipper ship captains expected to be supported by the resources and officers of the US Navy.

In the 1850s, with very mixed results, two Presidents promoted expansive, but different, foreign policy agendas both of which required a very proactive role for the navy. Whig President Millard Fillmore (1850–3) was primarily interested in promoting American commercial ties to South America and the East Indies. Accordingly, the Fillmore Administration dispatched expeditions to explore and record the commercial potential of the Amazon and La Plata River basins as well as two naval expeditions to Japan and the North Pacific. The Perry Expedition of 1853–4 (Walworth 1948) is best known because of its size and diplomatic importance, but it was closely followed by the North Pacific Exploring Expedition which among its other activities surveyed several hundred miles of the Japanese coastline. Democratic President Franklin Pierce (1853–7) hoped to acquire Cuba and expand American influence in Central America. Although his efforts ended in disarray, he nevertheless expanded both the size and operational role of the peacetime navy.

The coming of the Civil War abruptly ended most of the navy's peacetime activities, but the demands of the war transformed the US Navy into a large and formidable wartime force. In 1865, the navy listed 671 ships, 4,610 guns, and more than 58,000 officers and men. Steam powered most of its ships and it had become a leader in armament and armor technology. Unfortunately those who wanted to maintain a large navy after the war and use it to expand American political and economic interests overseas failed to carry the day. After acquiring

Alaska and tiny Midway Island in the late 1860s, the postwar expansionist movement stalled. The navy also fell out of favor with congressional majorities who saw no reason to maintain a large, European-style navy. Instead, congressional leaders insisted on a small "American navy" sufficient only to protect American interests abroad. As a result, the scope of the navy's peacetime role shrank and it declined steadily from its wartime position to that of a third- or fourth-rate naval power. By 1875, the navy totaled only 147 vessels, many of which were technologically backward and inactive.

This decline mirrored an era of profound maritime eclipse for the United States between 1860 and 1900. The tonnage of American merchant marine engaged in foreign trade fell steadily from 2,546,000 in 1860 to 827,000 in 1900. In the 1850s, about 70 percent of the value of the nation's imports and exports had been carried in American ships, but that figure had dropped to less than 10 percent by 1900. The American whaling industry suffered a similar catastrophic fate. After dominating the whaling industry in the 1850s, Confederate raiders devastated the American fleet during the Civil War. The decline continued unabated after the war until American whaling had ceased to be a major American industry by the 1870s.

At home the American economy industrialized and grew tremendously in the decades after 1865. For example, the gross national product quadrupled from \$9.1 billion in 1869–73 to \$37.1 for 1897–1901. The manufacturing index and the gross farm product enjoyed similar increases. So too did American overseas trade with gross exports increasing from \$281 million in 1865 to \$1.4 billion in 1900. But the great majority of this trade increase occurred with Canada, Cuba or European countries that were stable, peaceful and did not require either the presence or the active intervention of the American navy. American trade in the Pacific basin accounted for only a tiny fraction of the total. For example, exports to China rose from only \$2.67 million in 1865 to \$15.25 million by 1900 and exports to Japan grew only from a infinitesimal \$41,913 in 1865 to a modest \$29 million in 1900.

These political and economic factors combined to diminish the need for a large modern peacetime navy between roughly 1865 and 1890. Ironically, although the US Navy had declined in force and prestige, it was still able to perform its primary peacetime function of supporting and protecting American commerce overseas. In the 1840s and 1850s, the "protection of commerce" had required a larger navy and one that engaged in an increased range of commercial and diplomatic responsibilities. In the decades after the Civil War, that range of duties stabilized and even declined. With a few notable exceptions, the navy was not asked to "open" isolated lands to American commerce. Nor was the navy required to undertake large scientific and geographic expeditions into unexplored areas of the Pacific. And while there were occasional confrontations and even "war-scares" with nations whose navies might have embarrassed the American navy if hostilities occurred, all of those confrontations were averted peacefully. In 1873 in the aftermath of the *Virginius* affair in Cuba, effective diplomacy avoided possible hostilities with Spain. In 1879–80 during the War of the Pacific, the skill of naval officers and good fortune averted hostilities. And in 1889 in Samoa, a destructive hurricane wrecked

havoc on the American, German, and British fleets there and thus prevented a likely naval exchange.

Between 1865 and 1890, then, as modern American naval historians have observed, the US Navy performed its peacetime functions successfully and effectively in spite of its inferior size and strength. The navy continued to engage in various scientific activities, to conduct dramatic rescue operations, and to intervene to protect American lives and property in the Caribbean and the Pacific from time to time. But it was rarely used in a proactive or aggressive manner. The striking exception to this generalization were the activities of Rear Admiral Robert Shufeldt who forcefully intervened in Korea in 1871, then in 1878 began a two-year around the world cruise in the *Ticonderoga* to foster American commerce, and finally, in 1882, returned to Korea and negotiated a treaty similar to the one that Commodore Perry had reached with Japan in 1854.

By the late 1880s, the end of the "old navy" was at hand. New international, domestic, and technological developments combined to force the rethinking of traditional American naval strategy and the creation of a modern new American navy. A new age of European imperialism threatened to close markets previously open to Americans overseas and by 1890 Germany had begun a naval race with Great Britain. In the United States, various economic and political factors joined to produce the rise of a "new expansionism" which stressed the importance of overseas colonies and building a large, modern European-style navy.

One factor was the influence of group of naval historians whose research on naval history led them to emphasize the formidable influence of naval (or sea) power in history. Led by Admiral A.T. Mahan, these historians dominated the writing of American naval history from the late 1880s until well into the twentieth century. Mahan (1890) and his proponents argued that it was essential for any nation which hoped to be secure during war and prosperous in peace to maintain a large and formidable navy. A prerequisite for such a modern, steam navy was the acquisition of secure coaling stations around the globe, but particularly in undeveloped regions such as the western Pacific Ocean and East Indies. Robert Seager (1977, 1990) summarizes the ideas presented by Mahan and explores the forces which influenced the navalist.

As historians who mined lessons from the past to build their case for a twentieth-century American navy, the navalists subjected traditional nineteenth-century American naval policy to sharp criticism. Among the most influential in the twentieth century were Harold and Margaret Sprout who wrote *The Rise of American Naval Power, 1776–1918* (1939) and Dudley W. Knox, *A History of the United States Navy* (1936). In essence, the navalist school argued that nineteenth-century American naval policy should have relied on a fleet of large warships comparable in size and character to the leading navies of Europe and capable of attacking the enemy in coordinated fleet operations far from the continental United States. These historians forcefully championed the type of large modern fleets, dominated by battleships, which the United States built in the 1890s and after.

The navalists maintained that the United States unwisely limited the size and role of its navy during the nineteenth century and thus prevented the navy from

asserting the kind of military and diplomatic force that the fast-growing American republic warranted. Allegedly, only as a result of luck, circumstance, the shield of the British navy, and the resourcefulness of individual naval officers and diplomats did the United States avoid serious commercial and diplomatic setbacks overseas, particularly in the Pacific Ocean.

Beginning in the 1970s, a new generation of historians began to challenge the predominant navalist position. Of particular significance was Lance C. Buhl (1984) who disputed the navalist assertion that the "navy was inadequate for its purpose and those responsible for its condition unfaithful, to the national interest." If the standard to be applied was the size of the "American Civil War navy or European navies or the 'modern' twentieth-century navy, then surely the American navy between 1865 and 1890 fell far short." But Congress and the nation wanted no such modern, European-style navy. Instead, they wanted a uniquely "American navy" that could protect American commercial interests overseas and this is precisely the navy they got. Judged by this standard, Buhl cited a number of "new studies of the 'old' navy" in this period and concluded that the navy "both conceptually and operationally, was a perfectly viable and adequate arm of the national government in the twenty-five years following the Civil War."

In fact, the question that Buhl posed for the period from 1865 to 1890 is pertinent for the entire period from 1815 until 1890. The central historical question is whether the nineteenth-century peacetime navy effectively protected the nation's needs before the 1890s, not whether the "old" navy could have met the changing challenges and demands faced by the "new" navy of the 1890s and after. To a considerable extent, historians have been addressing this issue through well researched articles, monographs, biographies, and general histories since the 1970s. While detailing the American navy's many deficiencies and the shortcomings of its leaders during the nineteenth century, these historians have collectively built a compelling case that the navy served its country efficiently and effectively prior to the 1890s.

Among excellent general histories which challenge aspects of the navalist view are Kenneth J. Hagan (1991) and Robert W. Love (1992). Among the thematic studies are various themes such as David F. Long, *Gold Braid and Foreign Relations: Diplomatic Activities of U.S. Naval Officers, 1798-1883* (1988) which replaces Charles O. Paullin's (1912) early classic study. For the navy's ante-bellum commercial and diplomatic role, see John H. Schroeder, *Shaping a Maritime Empire* (1985) and Clayton Barrow, *America Spreads Her Sails* (1973).

In recent decades, modern naval history has moved beyond naval hagiography and benefited from many biographies, too numerous to list here, which place naval leaders in a historical context that examines both their strengths and their deficiencies. An excellent point of departure is offered by three biographical collections edited by James C. Bradford, *Command Under Sail* (1985), *Captains of the Old Steam Navy* (1986), and *Admirals of the New Steel Navy* (1990). Upshur's brief but important term as naval secretary is covered in Claude P. Hall's (1964) biography. Among the leading naval officers who played major commercial and diplomatic roles, a number have benefited from balanced, well-written, and extensive

researched biographies. David Long has written studies of three officers involved in Pacific affairs: James Biddle (1983), David Porter (1970), and John Percival (1993). James H. Ellis's (2002) biography of Percival adds information on the captain's tempestuous relations with American missionaries in Hawaii in the 1820s. Gene Smith (2000) surveys the career of Thomas ap Catesby Jones, who served extensively in the Pacific, commanded the Pacific Squadron twice in the 1840s, and is best remembered for his "premature" capture of Monterey, California in 1842. Samuel Eliot Morison's (1967) biography of Matthew C. Perry, famed for his dramatic expedition to Japan 1853–4, remains highly readable but has been superseded by more recent scholarship including Peter Booth Wiley (1990) and John Schroeder's (2001) prize-winning work. The aggressive naval diplomacy of one of the navy's most colorful post-Civil War figures is chronicled in Frederick C. Drake's (1984) superb biography of Robert W. Shufeldt.

To perform its peacetime duties, the navy was organized into a series of squadrons, each established when American interests demanded attention in a particular region. Robert Albion (1954) sketches the development of those squadrons serving on "Distant Stations." Most of the squadrons and their activities have been the subject of book-length study. James A. Field, Jr., *America and the Mediterranean World, 1776–1882* (1969), is superb because it places the navy's role within the context of America's diplomatic, economic, and religious interests in the region. Two other works discuss American relations in the Mediterranean and the navy's role in overlapping eras: Thomas A. Bryson (1980) covers the period from 1800 to 1879 and William N. Still (1980) covers the period between 1865 and 1917. For the southeastern Pacific, Edward B. Billingsley (1967) focuses on the navy's defense of American neutral rights during Chile's and Peru's wars for independence.

Early American naval voyages to the Pacific have been described by Paullin (1972 reprint). For the Pacific squadron, see Robert E. Johnson, *Thence Round Cape Horn* (1963). The East India Squadron is treated in Johnson, *The Far China Station* (1979) and Curtis Henson, *Commissioners and Commodores* (1982). For Matthew Perry's actions during the Taiping Rebellion, see Chester A. Bain (1951), and for Andrew Foote's 1856 destruction of the barrier forts on the Pearl River near Canton see Long (1981) and Spencer Tucker's (2000) biography of Foote. George M. Brooke (1961) and Donald Caney (2006) examine the African Squadron, Donald Griffin (1959) the South Atlantic Squadron on the Brazil Station, Harold F. Peterson (1964) that squadron during the Falkland Islands dispute of the 1830s, and Raymond Shoemaker (1976) the West Indies Squadron.

Posing a challenge for the antebellum navy periodically on different stations, piracy threatened US commerce in the Caribbean between 1815 and 1830 as various Latin American nations fought for independence from Spain. Naval efforts to combat piracy have been treated by Richard Wheeler (1969), Gardner W. Allen (1929), Francis B. C. Bradlee (1922), and Michael J. Birkner (1982). Prominent naval officers including Porter, Biddle, and Perry attempted to combat the problem. Uriah Levy's role is covered by Ira Dye (2006). Although less serious, piracy occasionally threatened American trade in the East Indies and China. James Duncan Phillips (1949), Long (1973), and Belohlavek (1977) deal with the navy



and piracy and the pepper trade in Sumatran waters while John K. Fairbank (1969) examines piracy along the China coast during the 1840s and 1850s.

The Civil War led temporarily to the recall of all the navy's squadrons save one, the Africa Squadron which had been mandated by the 1842 Webster–Ashburton Treaty with Great Britain to police the slave trade. Once the war ended, US Navy ships returned to patrolling the oceans of the world. Although long ignored or de-emphasized by historians, the navy played an active and effective role in protecting American interests in Africa, the Indian Ocean, China, the eastern Pacific, and Central America during the 1870s and 1880s. This activity has been carefully researched and detailed by Kenneth J. Hagan's *American Gunboat Diplomacy and the Old Navy, 1877–1889* (1973) which demonstrates that the so-called "gunboat navy" did exactly what the American government asked it to do in this era. The 1873 crisis with Spain is treated in Richard H. Bradford, *The Virginius Affair* (1980). For American naval activity in Hawaii, see Ralph S. Kuykendall (1938), and for American involvement and intervention in Samoa, see Paul M. Kennedy, *The Samoan Tangle* (1974).

The navy's place in nineteenth-century American exploration activities is treated in William Goetzman, *New Lands, New Men: America and the Second Great Age of Discovery* (1986). The navy's particular role in antebellum science and exploration is surveyed in Geoffrey Smith's, "The Navy Before Darwinism: Science, Exploration, and Diplomacy in Antebellum America" (1976), and Vincent Ponko, Jr., *Ships, Seas, and Scientists* (1974). The life of Matthew Fontaine Maury, the foremost naval scientist of the era and so-called "Pathfinder of the Sea," is the subject of Francis Williams's (1963) superb biography. The US Exploring Expedition has been the subject of excellent studies by David B. Tyler (1968), William Stanton (1975), and Nathaniel Philbrick (2003). For the US Navy expeditions to Latin America, including the 1851 expedition to explore the Amazon River, see John P. Harrison (1955). Andrew C. A. Jampoler (2005) narrates the story of the navy's Dead Sea Expedition of 1848, and Allan B. Cole (1947a, b) describes expeditions to Japan and the North Pacific in the 1850s.

Post War of 1812, nineteenth-century American naval history was something of a wasteland of scholarship prior to 1970, but the quality and extent of scholarship has been impressive since then. The titles mentioned in this chapter describe only a fraction of the excellent essays, articles, and books which are available in addition to the many journals, reports, letters, and other primary source materials which have been published in recent decades. As a result, the once quiet and often forgotten period of American naval history, 1816 to 1895, has now emerged as a very rich and multi-faceted field of study.

#### BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Albion, Robert (1954). "Distant Stations," *Naval Institute Proceedings*, 80 (March), 265–73.
- Allen, Gardner W. (1929). *Our Navy and the West Indian Pirates*. Salem, MA: Essex Institute.

- Bain, Chester A. (1951). "Commodore Matthew Perry, Humphrey Marshall, and the Taiping Rebellion," *Far Eastern Quarterly*, 10:3 (May), 258–70.
- Barrow, Clayton R., ed. (1973). *America Spreads Her Sails: U.S. Seapower in the 19th Century*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Belohlavek, John (1977). "Andrew Jackson and the Malaysian Pirates: A Question of Diplomacy and Politics," *Tennessee Historical Review*, 36:1 (Spring): 19–29.
- Billingsley, Edward B. (1967). *In Defense of Neutral Rights: The United States and the Wars of Independence in Chile and Peru*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Birkner, Michael J. (1982). "The 'Foxardo Affair' Revisited: Porter, Pirates and the Problem of Civilian Authority in the Early Republic," *American Neptune*, 42:3 (July), 165–78.
- Bradlee, Francis B. C. (1922). *The Suppression of Piracy in the West Indies, 1820–1832*. Salem, MA: Essex Institute.
- Brooke, George M., Jr. (1961). "The Role of the United States Navy in the Suppression of the African Slave Trade," *American Neptune*, 21:1 (Winter), 28–41.
- Bradford, James C., ed. (1985). *Command Under Sail: Makers of the American Naval Tradition, 1775–1840*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Bradford, James C., ed. (1986). *Captains of the Old Steam Navy: Makers of the American Naval Tradition, 1840–1880*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Bradford, James C., ed. (1990). *Admirals of the New Steel Navy: Makers of the American Naval Tradition, 1880–1930*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Bradford, Richard (1980). *The Virginius Affair*. Boulder: Colorado Associated University Press.
- Bryson, Thomas (1980). *Tars, Turks, and Tankers: The Role of the United States Navy in the Middle East, 1800–1879*. Metuchen, NJ: Scarecrow Press.
- Buhl, Lance C. (1984). "Maintaining 'An American Navy,' 1865–1889," in Kenneth J. Hagan, *In Peace and War: Interpretations of American Naval History, 1775–1984*, 2nd edn. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 145–73.
- Caney, Donald (2006). *The Africa Squadron*. Washington: Potomac Books.
- Cole, Allan B. (1947a). "The Ringgold-Rodgers-Brooke Expedition to Japan and the North Pacific, 1853–1859," *Pacific Historical Review*, 16:2 (May), 152–62.
- Cole, Allan B., ed. (1947b). *Yankee Surveyors in the Shogun's Seas; Records of the United States Surveying Expedition to the North Pacific Ocean, 1853–1856*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Drake, Frederick C. (1984). *The Empire of the Seas: A Biography of Rear Admiral Robert Wilson Shufeldt, USN*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.
- Dye, Ira (2006). *Urian Levy: Reformer of the Antebellum Navy*. Gainesville: University Press of Florida.
- Ellis, James H. (2002). *Mad Jack Percival: Legend of the Old Navy*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Fairbank, John K. (1969). *Trade and Diplomacy on the China Coast: The Opening of the Treaty Ports, 1842–1854*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Field, James A., Jr. (1969). *America and the Mediterranean World, 1776–1882*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Goetzman, William (1986). *New Lands, New Men: America and the Second Age of Discovery*. New York: Viking.
- Griffin, Donald W. (1959). "The American Navy at Work on Brazil Station, 1827–1860," *American Neptune*, 19:4 (October), 239–56.

- Hagan, Kenneth J. (1973). *American Gunboat Diplomacy and the Old Navy, 1877–1889*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
- Hagan, Kenneth J. (1991). *This People's Navy: The Making of American Sea Power*. New York: Free Press.
- Hall, Claude H. (1964). *Abel Parker Upshur: Conservative Virginian, 1790–1844*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
- Harrison, John P. (1955). "Science and Politics: Origins and Objectives of Mid-Nineteenth Century Government Expeditions to Latin America," *Hispanic American Historical Review*, 35:2 (May), 175–202.
- Henson, Curtis T. (1982). *Commissioners and Commodores: The East India Squadron and American Diplomacy in China*. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press.
- Jampoler, Andrew C. A. (2005). *Sailors in the Holy Land: The 1848 Expedition to the Dead Sea and the Search for Sodom and Gomorrah*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Johnson, Robert E. (1963). *Thence Round Cape Horn: The Story of United States Naval Forces on Pacific Station, 1818–1923*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Johnson, Robert E. (1979). *The Far China Station: The U.S. Navy in Asian Waters, 1800–1898*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Kennedy, Paul M. (1974). *The Samoan Tangle*. New York: Barnes and Noble.
- Knox, Dudley W. (1936). *A History of the United States Navy*. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons.
- Kuykendall, Ralph S. (1938). *The Hawaiian Kingdom*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii.
- Long, David F. (1970). *Nothing Too Daring: A Biography of Commodore David Porter, 1780–1843*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Long, David F. (1973). "'Martial Thunder': The First Official American Armed Intervention in Asia," *Pacific Historical Review*, 42:2 (May), 143–62.
- Long, David F. (1981). "A Case of Intervention: Armstrong, Foote, and the Destruction of the Barrier Forts, Canton, China, 1856," in Craig L. Symonds, ed., *New Aspects of Naval History*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 220–37.
- Long, David F. (1983). *Sailor-Diplomat: A Biography of Commodore James Biddle, 1783–1848*. Boston: Northeastern University Press.
- Long, David F. (1988). *Gold Braid and Foreign Relations: Diplomatic Activities of U.S. Naval Officers, 1798–1883*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Long, David F. (1993). *"Mad Jack": The Biography of Captain John Percival, USN, 1779–1862*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
- Love, Robert W. (1992). *History of the U.S. Navy*, 2 vols. Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books.
- Mahan, Alfred Thayer (1890). *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660–1783*. Boston: Little, Brown.
- Merrill, James M. (1969). "The Asiatic Squadron, 1835–1907," *American Neptune*, 29:2 (April), 106–17.
- Morison, Samuel Eliot (1967). *"Old Bruin": Commodore Matthew Calbraith Perry, 1794–1858*. Boston: Little, Brown.
- Paullin, Charles O. (1912). *Diplomatic Negotiations of American Naval Officers, 1778–1883*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Paullin, Charles O. (1972). *American Voyages to the Orient, 1690–1865: An Account of Merchant and Naval Activities in China, Japan and the Various Pacific Islands*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Peterson, Harold F. (1964). *Argentina and the United States, 1810–1960*. Albany: State University of New York.

- Philbrick, Nathaniel. (2003). *Sea of Glory: America's Voyage of Discovery, The U.S. Exploring Expedition, 1838–1842*. New York: Viking.
- Phillips, James Duncan (1949). *Pepper and Pirates; Adventures in the Sumatra Pepper Trade of Salem*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
- Ponko, Vincent, Jr. (1974). *Ships, Seas, and Scientists: U.S. Naval Exploration and Discovery in the Nineteenth Century*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Schroeder, John H. (1985). *Shaping a Maritime Empire: The Commercial and Diplomatic Role of the American Navy, 1829–1861*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
- Schroeder, John H. (2001). *Matthew Calbraith Perry: Antebellum Sailor and Diplomat*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Seager, Robert II. (1977). *Alfred Thayer Mahan*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press.
- Seager, Robert II. (1990). "Alfred Thayer Mahan: Christian Expansionist, Navalist, and Historian," in James C. Bradford, ed., *Admirals of the New Steel Navy: Makers of the American Naval Tradition, 1880–1930*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 24–72.
- Shoemaker, Raymond (1976). "Diplomacy from the Quarterdeck: The United States Navy in the Caribbean, 1815–1830," PhD dissertation, Indiana University.
- Shoemaker, Raymond L. (1980). "Diplomacy from the Quarterdeck: The United States Navy in the Caribbean, 1815–1830," in Robert W. Love, Jr., ed., *Changing Interpretations and New Sources in Naval History*. New York: Garland Publishers.
- Smith, Gene A. (2000). *Thomas ap Catesby Jones: Commodore of Manifest Destiny*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Smith, Geoffrey S. (1976). "The Navy Before Darwinism: Science, Exploration, and Diplomacy in Antebellum America," *American Quarterly*, 28:1 (Spring), 41–55.
- Sprout, Harold, and Margaret Sprout (1939). *The Rise of American Naval Power, 1776–1918*, rev. edn. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Stanton, William (1975). *The Great United States Exploring Expedition of 1838–1842*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Still, William N., Jr. (1980). *American Sea Power in the Old World: The United States Navy in European and Near Eastern Waters, 1865–1917*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
- Tate, E. Mowbray (1971). "American Merchant and Naval Contacts with China, 1784–1859," *American Neptune*, 30:3 (July), 171–91.
- Tucker, Spencer C. (2000). *Andrew Foote: Civil War Admiral on Western Waters*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Tyler, David B. (1968). *The Wilkes Expedition: The First United States Exploring Expedition (1838–1842)*. Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society.
- Walworth, Arthur (1948). *Black Ships Off Japan: The Story of Commodore Perry's Expedition*. New York Knopf.
- Wheeler, Richard (1969). *In Pirate Waters*. New York: Crowell.
- Wiley, Peter Booth (1990). *Yankees in the Land of the Gods: Commodore Perry and the Opening of Japan*. New York: Viking.
- Williams, Frances L. (1963). *Matthew Fontaine Maury: Scientist of the Sea*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.

## Chapter Thirty-three

# INTERVENTIONS IN CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN, 1900–30

*Anne Cipriano Venzon*

The first third of the twentieth century was a period of tremendous international flux. It saw the disintegration of ancient empires, the rise of new states, the collapse of the world economy, and a burst of technological advances. It was during these years that the United States became a major participant in world affairs, a position achieved by its overwhelming defeat of Spain in the Spanish–American War.

Not only did the United States defeat an Old World Power, but it also assumed control of the former Spanish colonies of Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines; annexed Hawaii; and established a special relationship with Cuba. This seemingly new, robust attitude and power actually was the culmination of two centuries of growth. The key difference between early US expansion and that of the major colonial powers in the nineteenth century was that while European nations took control of territories overseas, the United States expanded across the continent. From the first fragile settlements at Jamestown and Plymouth, “Americans” inched their way westward, gradually at first, then in droves. The idea that the country should span the continent was viewed by some as the nation’s Manifest Destiny. By the middle of the nineteenth century, Horace Greeley was popularizing the phrase “go west young man and grow with the country.” Some expansionists also added the so-called White Man’s Burden – the moral duty to uplift lesser societies – to their justifications for expansion.

As the country’s economic engine shifted into high gear after the Civil War, business began to look toward foreign markets, stimulating a discussion of whether commerce followed the flag or vice versa. Added to that debate came Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan, USN, and his pivotal book, *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660–1783* (1890) followed by a series of journal articles (Mahan 1897) in which he argued that the US Navy needed to develop coaling stations across the globe to support commercial shipping. His theories dovetailed nicely with those of the noted historian, Frederick Jackson Turner who espoused a “frontier theory” which his disciples took to mean that the nation needed to expand or it would wither. Such outward looking attitudes culminated with the Spanish–American War. Ostensibly fought to help free Cuba from Spanish oppression and

atrocities, the war marked both the end of the Spanish empire and the beginning of US insular expansion.

The combination of a national proclivity for outward growth, a concern for the protection of naval commerce, and a belief in a moral imperative to assist underdeveloped nations pushed the United States toward active engagement in the Caribbean (Weinberg 1935). To that mix, Theodore Roosevelt added his famous Corollary stating that the United States would not tolerate European intervention in the Western hemisphere, nor would it allow nations in the New World to hide behind the Monroe Doctrine (Beale 1973, Holmes 2006). The United States would see to it that Latin American nations met their obligations, even if that meant US intervention. Over the course of the next 30 years Washington sent troops to Nicaragua, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Panama, and Haiti. Each action rested on a different motivation, but in the end the rationale for the United States was the need for security. Max Boot (2002) and Thomas Schoonover (1991) provide outstanding surveys of the military interventions, large and small, launched by America's political leaders to achieve that goal.

Initially little was written on the interventions. Contemporary accounts tended to be news reports or editorials providing interesting details, but little in the way of extensive background or analysis. When scholars began to study US involvement in Central America they were generally supportive of intervention. After World War I the naive exuberance of the turn of the century gave way to a more critical examination. Authors questioned the motivations for the various interventions and their political, fiscal and social impact on the occupied nations. In the late 1920s there was a noticeable shift in attitudes in Washington. Occupations or protectorates were to be a thing of the past. Just as officials in Washington took a less engaged approach to the Caribbean, scholars turned their attention to the crisis of the Great Depression, looming threats in Europe, and the Cold War. That changed when the Batista regime in Cuba fell to Castro and the United States became involved in Vietnam. Those two cataclysms prompted scholars to take renewed interest in the history of US overseas involvements. At the same time the Civil Rights movement in the United States brought a new perspective to paternalistic interventions of the past. It was the period of William Appleman Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* (1959) and the revisionist school which focused on the economic motivation of US interventions. The return of upheaval in the Caribbean Basin including the fall of the Duvaliers in Haiti, the rebirth of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, and the turnover of the Panama Canal led to renewed, and critical, examinations of the history of the United States in the Caribbean. Each nation in which the United States was involved presented a unique set of circumstances and challenges and should be reviewed individually, but it is important first to examine the general studies dealing with US foreign policy in the Caribbean to understand the development of relations prior to World War II.

The prolific historian Julius W. Pratt carefully examined the idea that empire was a logical outcome of US development. Three of his works, "The Large Policy of 1898" (1932), "The Ideology of American Expansion" (1935), and *Expansionists of 1898* (1936), are thoughtful examinations of the foundations of American



empire. Pratt, a contemporary of many of America's interventions, reflected the beliefs of his day, emphasizing the importance of Mahan's theories along with the commonly held view of the United States as a cultural, religious, and eventually economic missionary to the world.

While Pratt paid close attention to some of the motivations behind US expansion, one of the first scholars to chronicle actual events was Samuel Flaggs Bemis in his book *The Latin American Policy of the United States* (1943). He concurred with Pratt's analysis and pointed out that the United States' interest in expansion and intervention rested on two centuries of North American growth. Despite the idealism of Manifest Destiny, White Man's Burden, etcetera, expansion into Central America was rooted in a perceived need for security.

There were some legitimate concerns that European nations might try to take military action in the western hemisphere in the event a nation defaulted on loans, and Bemis suggests that many of the American interventions were preemptive. He traces the continuum of US-Latin American relations in great detail and his book remains one of the outstanding overviews on the topic. A similar volume, T. Lloyd Mecham, *The United States and Inter-American Security, 1889-1960* (1961), gives more attention to the economic aspects of intervention, but is a balanced approach, emphasizing Washington's understanding of its security needs.

Just 3 years later Dana Gardner Munro, formerly with the US State Department and a key official involved in US Caribbean policy, published the first of two extremely important works, *Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy in the Caribbean, 1900-1921* (1964), followed 10 years later by *The United States and the Caribbean Republics, 1821-1933* (1974). Munro brought an insider's perspective in addition to extensive research to events in the Caribbean Basin. Security and a drive for stability remained center stage. Though they are among the last accounts by an actual participant, these volumes are not apologia, but honest discussions of US policy in the Caribbean in which Munro explains his understanding of motivations and events.

Joseph Tulchin's *The Aftermath of War: World War I and the U.S. Policy toward Latin America* (1971) is an interesting study reflecting the shift toward economic analysis of US policy. It begins with the premise that Europe's preoccupation with World War I gave the United States an opportunity for significant expansion into Central American markets that had been dominated by Great Britain, Germany, France, and even Italy. Interestingly, Tulchin concludes that contrary to conventional wisdom, the Republican administrations that followed the war only supported business interests in sectors that impacted US security, particularly oil, international cables, and some loans. While economics played a role in the continued US presence in Central America, it was not the dominant one.

In *The Banana Wars* (1983), Lester Langley points to chaos in Central America and the fear that it would affect US security as the motivation for US involvement. There was no lack of upheaval for the United States to find disturbing. Near anarchy in Haiti, intermittent revolts in the Dominican Republic, civil war in Nicaragua, and riots in the Canal Zone seemed to justify an American presence to protect US interests in the region. In most cases the interventions created at

least a semblance of order, but when the time came to disengage, any existing resistance came bubbling back to the surface. Often the only option was to support the least objectionable government of several poor choices. Frequently this meant leaving the country in a condition similar to that which prompted the initial intervention.

In the aftermath of the Watergate scandal, with its attendant constitutional issues, and the furor created by the Gulf of Tonkin Resolutions, Walter LaFeber examined some of the constitutional issues surrounding US development as a colonial nation. In “‘The Lion in the Path:’ The U.S. Emergence as a World Power” (1986), he suggested that the Constitution was the “lion in the path” of overseas expansion, a theme he developed further in “The Constitution and United States Foreign Policy: An Interpretation” (1987). LaFeber focused on the phrase “for the common defense” suggesting that there was a shift in the interpretation of that phrase after the Spanish–American War. He noted a growth of presidential power in the conduct of foreign policy and an increased use of executive agreements instead of actual treaties. A prime example of an executive agreement was Theodore Roosevelt’s famous *modus vivendi* with the Dominican Republic which established an American-administered customs receivership. LaFeber contended that this went hand in hand with a diminution of Congressional power and the traditional concept that the Constitution follows the flag.

While many authors have characterized Central American nations as victims of US imperialism, in “Central America and the United States: Overlooked Foreign Policy Objectives,” Thomas M. Leonard (1993) points to evidence that Central American governments were not always innocent victims, helplessly acquiescing to the Northern behemoth. Resistance to US involvement could be very effective. Certainly the Punitive Expedition in Mexico never succeeded in capturing Francisco (Pancho) Villa (Mason 1970), nor did Woodrow Wilson’s embargo and subsequent landing at Vera Cruz achieve his goal of teaching the Mexicans to elect good men. In many cases local elites, though opposing the occupation, aligned themselves with the structure imposed by the occupation forces thus maintaining their positions and guaranteeing a continuation of their privileged status when the occupiers inevitably left (Hill 1974).

There are also interesting studies of the impact individual presidents had on Washington’s Central American policy. Theodore Roosevelt, a great admirer of Alfred T. Mahan and his theory of sea power, had a major and long-term impact on American policy. It began with his tenure as Assistant Secretary of the Navy during which he set the stage for George Dewey to expand the Spanish–American War to the Philippines, thus setting the United States off on its imperial path. Of course, TR went on to gain fame with the Rough Riders in Cuba. He brought all that dynamism with him to the White House when he succeeded to the presidency upon McKinley’s assassination. However, his arrival at the White House seemed to bring out a more mature side of the man. Frequently characterized as a bellicose expansionist eager to use the bully pulpit to further American interests abroad, it is sometimes forgotten that he brokered the Treaty of Portsmouth ending the Russo–Japanese War, was reluctant to intervene in Cuba in 1906, and that the

Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine was actually geared to promote stability in the Western Hemisphere by limiting European intervention.

Both Howard K. Beale in *Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of America to World Power* (1973) and Richard Collin's *Theodore Roosevelt's Caribbean* (1990) are valuable studies of the man. Beale suggests that as a man of his times, TR saw international relations in terms of power. That being the case, it made sense that he would support a large military, particularly a large navy, to project US power where necessary. But having the means did not mean he was anxious to use them. Roosevelt was surprisingly cautious. His main objective was to create stability without war. Collins and Beale concur that far from favoring interventions, TR could be viewed as an anti-imperialist simply acting for the security of his nation.

These two evaluations, separated by almost 20 years, do have merit. The number of interventions jumped after Roosevelt left office, as did their intensity. William H. Taft, who himself had been a "proconsul" in the Philippines and Cuba as well as TR's Secretary of War, sent troops to Cuba and Nicaragua though he preferred to use so-called Dollar Diplomacy as an alternative to military force. In his epic biography of Woodrow Wilson and his study of *Wilson the Diplomatist* (1957), Arthur Link details one of history's ironies, for it was Woodrow Wilson, the idealistic scholar, who invaded Mexico twice, sent troops to Cuba, and occupied Haiti.

Interestingly, Kenneth Greib, *The Latin American Policy of Warren G. Harding* (1976) makes a convincing argument that the inept and corrupt Warren G. Harding directed a more measured, sensitive policy toward Central America than his erudite and morally upright predecessor, Wilson. For his part, Alexander DeConde (1951) suggests that starting with his pre-inauguration trip to Latin America, Herbert Hoover laid the foundation for Franklin Roosevelt's Good Neighbor Policy. Unquestionably the impact of the Great Depression on the US budget forced Hoover's administration to retrench, but he had already made the first moves in that direction.

An overview of US involvement in Central America is a valuable starting point for a closer examination of the bilateral relations between the United States and the individual nations. On the southern border, relations with Mexico had a long, tense history. Early in the nineteenth century large numbers of Americans migrated to the Mexican-owned territory of Texas. In 1836 they, and Mexicans who opposed General Antonio Lopez de Santa Ana, rebelled and defeated him at the Battle of San Jacinto. The peace treaty he signed recognized Texas' independence, but the Mexican government refused to accept the treaty. Though the United States annexed Texas in 1845, Mexico still regarded the area as its territory. The two nations went to war the following year. After two years of fighting, General Winfield Scott landed at Vera Cruz and occupied Mexico City. The two nations finally signed the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in which Mexico recognized Texas as part of the United States and ceded large portions of what is now California, Colorado, Arizona, New Mexico, and Wyoming to its northern neighbor.

The border remained relatively calm until the revolution of 1910 threw Mexico into turmoil. The duly elected president, Francisco Madero, was incapable of dealing with the strongmen and political factions jockeying for power. One of

those strongmen, General Victoriano Huerta, seized power and executed Madero. Woodrow Wilson, scholarly, idealistic president of the United States, refused to tolerate such behavior on his back door and placed an arms embargo on the Huerta regime. The following year he ordered Marines to land at Vera Cruz to prevent the importation of weapons and ammunition. Finally in 1916 Wilson responded to Pancho Villa's raid on Columbus, New Mexico, by sending Gen. John J. Pershing and a Punitive Expedition into Mexico. Eventually another strongman, Venustiano Carranza, emerged and formed a government which seemed somewhat committed to reform at home and peace with its neighbors. It was a noble goal but one that was complicated when the German Foreign Minister Arthur Zimmermann sent the infamous Zimmermann telegram requesting Mexico's aid against the United States in return for restoration of all the lands ceded or sold to the United States in the nineteenth century. Just as that furor abetted, the Mexican government adopted a stringent law governing oil interests which caused serious inter-government tension, but no further military action.

There was little substantive literature on US-Mexican relations for the period under discussion for some time. In 1934, Col. Frank Tompkins provided a factual account of the Punitive Expedition in which he was a key participant. He focused on conditions of the cavalry and on the various operations. Tompkins included some background information on diplomatic, political and military conditions prior to the Expedition, but offered no analysis of those issues. One of the first analytical studies, Howard F. Cline, *The United States and Mexico* (1953), presented a comprehensive examination of relations between the two nations, taking a balanced and ultimately optimistic point of view. It is still an excellent starting point for a dispassionate discussion.

Pancho Villa and the Punitive Expedition, and the landing at Vera Cruz are the two focal points for many historians. The premier Villa scholar is Friedrich Katz. His essay "Pancho Villa and the Attack on Columbus, New Mexico" (1978) and his exhaustive volume *The Life and Times of Pancho Villa* (1998) use Villa as the basis for a discussion of the Mexican condition and relations between the two countries. Ultimately, Katz concludes that Villa was a skilled general, in many respects a real reformer and true nationalist, who turned to banditry when he believed that Carranza had betrayed him. His raid on Columbus, New Mexico, turned Villa into a symbol of nationalism though his popularity in Mexico declined once the Punitive Expedition retreated.

Hand in hand with studies of Pancho Villa go works on the Punitive Expedition, Wilson's response to his raid. Haldeen Brady actually walked the ground covered by the expedition and his book *Pershing's Mission to Mexico* (1966) tells the story well. Clarence Clendenen expands on Brady's work with *Blood on the Border* (1969). Though they never did capture Villa, Clendenen still considers the operation a success since Pershing drove Villa to ground, caused significant Mexican losses, kept Villa's forces off balance, and calmed the border areas.

In his excellent study *Intervention!* John D. Eisenhower (1993) cuts through the labyrinthine details of the Mexican revolution to conclude that Wilson's main concern was to keep the situation on the border from exploding. Despite events

at Parral and Carrizal, Pershing succeeded in containing the unrest and Wilson finally ordered their withdrawal when he felt the Mexican situation would remain calm. Nevertheless, Mexico was on its own trajectory, and all US attempts to control events were ultimately futile.

The other notable intervention was the landing at Vera Cruz. Americans on blockade duty off the Mexican coast had been on edge for some time. Admiral Frank F. Fletcher was so concerned that they might have to land and proceed to Mexico City, that he sent an officer incognito to reconnoiter the route to the capital. In early April, a boat from USS *Dolphin* went ashore to collect mail and purchase gasoline. Local officials arrested the sailors, and though they were released quite promptly, with an apology, Admiral Henry T. Mayo demanded a 21-gun salute to the American flag (Bradford 1990). While the so-called Tampico Incident festered, the German merchantman *Tpiranga* approached Vera Cruz loaded with machine guns and ammunition for Huerta's forces (Meyer 1970). To prevent them from reaching Huerta, on April 21, 1914, Wilson ordered Marines from the ships in the harbor to land. They overcame a spirited Mexican resistance and seized the city. In *An Affair of Honor*, Robert E. Quirk (1962) describes the landing and occupation, emphasizes the difficulties in communication, and discusses Wilson's personal motivations that led to the landing, and Jack Sweetman, *The Landing at Veracruz* (1968), focuses on the details of the military and naval operation.

There also are valuable works on the foreign policies of several administrations besides that of the reluctant interventionist Wilson. First is P. Edward Haley's *Revolution and Intervention* (1970). Haley contrasts Wilson's insistence on teaching democracy – at the point of a bayonet if need be – to Taft's belief that commerce was a key to regional security and that trade would preclude a need for intervention.

People often overlook the Harding administration for anything other than scandal and corruption, but George D. Beelen (1984) offers one of the few thoughtful examinations of its foreign policy in "The Harding Administration and Mexico." Although non-recognition of the Mexican government continued, it was largely due to inertia at the State Department. The Harding administration made noticeable movement toward recognizing de facto governments, including Mexico. Much of the credit for such movement is due to the Secretary of Commerce, Herbert Hoover, who carried the shift further in his own administration.

Further south, the United States developed a different relationship with Nicaragua, a nation that had suffered for years while the two centers of power – Granada and León – struggled to control the country. In 1855 the elites of León asked the American adventurer/mercenary William Walker for assistance. He succeeded in conquering Granada but then seized control of the entire country. That gave Granada and León the incentive to put aside their differences and rid themselves of the Americans (May 2002).

Interest in Nicaragua grew in Washington as the desire for a trans-isthmian canal mounted. In 1901 the Nicaraguan dictator José Zelaya listed certain constraints on foreign rights during negotiations for a proposed canal zone. At that, the United States shifted its interest to Panama. Relations between Washington

and Managua continued to deteriorate, although investment in Nicaragua grew. The Nicaraguan population finally rose against Zelaya in 1909, prompting concern for the safety of US citizens and investments and resulting in the arrival of US Marines off Corinto. The following year there was further civil unrest to which Washington responded by landing Marines at Bluefields. In 1912 the new Díaz government came under attack and requested American assistance. This time Marines didn't just land and show the flag on the coast. They moved inland, suppressed the revolt and established order. A small contingent of Marines remained in Nicaragua until 1933. It was a relatively uneventful tenure until 1916 when the president of Nicaragua, who had the backing of the United States, appeared likely to lose the election. The US minister called for help, and Admiral William B. Caperton, who had previously commanded US forces in Haiti and the Dominican Republic, was dispatched to Corinto with a squadron of the Pacific fleet. While the ships stood by in the harbor, Caperton traveled to the capital where the opponent of the US-backed president was convinced to withdraw from the election (Healy 1976). Relative calm returned for a decade after the election, until 1927 when Augusto Sandino led a rebel army against US forces from his base in the mountains and along the Honduran border. The Marine-trained Guardia Nacional supported the Americans, and by 1933 they were finally able to withdraw.

One of the first serious examinations of Nicaraguan-US relations, Anna Powell, "Relations Between the United States and Nicaragua, 1898-1916" (1929), is a thorough, factual discussion of the American relationship with Zelaya and the successor Madriz and Díaz governments which, Powell concludes were incapable of maintaining order and needed the guidance of their neighbor to the north.

Nicaragua fell off the radar of most historians in the following decades. It was a quiet little country, kept so by the Guardia answerable to powerful elites led by the Somoza family. The next useful scholarship came from Dana Gardner Munro, a former State Department officer who had held a number of posts in the Caribbean. In his essay "Dollar Diplomacy in Nicaragua, 1909-1913" (1958) he describes how the State Department really did try to guarantee that contracts and loans to Nicaragua were fair to both parties. There was no attempt to skew negotiations in favor of foreign interests. Munro expanded on his observations in his other books (Munro 1964, 1974).

Picking up where Munro left off, George W. Baker examined "The Wilson Administration and Nicaragua, 1913-1921" (1966). While Wilson began his administration ready to engage in affairs in Central America, events in Mexico and Haiti overshadowed his interest in Nicaragua, and it fell even further behind as the United States became increasingly involved in World War I. The neglect actually had a benign effect and by the time Wilson left office, conditions in Nicaragua had improved, and relations between the two countries were more cordial than they had been in some time.

If the Americans and local elites were satisfied with the situation, other segments of society were not. In 1927 Augusto Sandino began a guerilla campaign against the occupation and became a folk hero in Central America. One of the best studies of this period is Neil Macaulay's book *The Sandino Affair* (1967). He cuts through



the legend and takes a fair look at Sandino's motives as well as the Guardia and Marine's reactions to guerilla activities. William Kamman's book *A Search for Stability* (1968) goes hand in hand with Macaulay's work.

With the rise of the Sandinista movement in the 1980s interest in the earlier period waned. One of the only volumes to appear on the subject since then is George Clark's *With the Old Corps in Nicaragua* (2001) which focuses solely on the role of the US Marine Corps in Nicaragua. That, however, is not necessarily a bad thing, because it reminds us what it was like in those pre-Internet, pre-satellite, pre-cell phone days when the military had a much freer hand to pursue its objectives. But with that freedom came great responsibility, for the way a local detachment behaved could have a profound impact on relations at the highest levels.

Nicaragua's loss of the trans-isthmian canal route was Panama's gain. Long a province of Colombia, the isthmus of Panama became important to the United States after the 1848 gold rush when, by sailing to Panama, crossing the isthmus and sailing to California, the '49ers could save the weeks it took to sail around Cape Horn. In 1855 a railroad financed by American businessmen shortened the trip further.

The next logical move was to build a canal linking the Atlantic and Pacific. Ferdinand de Lesseps, famed builder of the Suez Canal, began construction of a canal across Panama in 1882, but graft, mismanagement and disease doomed the project. Various groups of American businessmen and investors were interested in the project but it wasn't until the USS *Oregon's* 13,000-mile dash from San Francisco to Cuba during the Spanish-American War that the US government decided that a canal was crucial to American security.

Complex negotiations between the French company, the government of Colombia and Washington culminated in the Hay-Herrán Treaty which allowed the US to rent a Panamanian Canal Zone. When the government in Bogotá refused to accept the treaty, a cabal in Panama, fearful that they would lose the economic benefits of a trans-isthmian canal, took matters into their own hands. With tacit approval from Washington, the Panamanians revolted against Colombia on November 3, 1903. On November 4, USS *Nashville* landed troops to "keep order." The United States recognized the new Panamanian government on November 6. Two weeks later they concluded the Hay-Bunau Varilla Treaty which gave the US control over a 10-mile-wide canal zone. Work began within months and the canal was open for business on April 15, 1914. From that point until it was returned to Panama in 1979 almost all of the interaction between Panama and the United States centered on the safety of the canal. Dwight Miner (1940) provides an early account of what he dubs "the fight for the Panama Canal," a work superseded by David McCullough's magisterial *The Path Between the Seas* (1977).

Richard W. Turk, "The United States Navy and the 'Taking' of Panama, 1901-1903" (1974), downplays the idea that the "taking" of Panama was part of a well-crafted policy. He contends that Philippe Bunau Varilla skillfully took full advantage of the opportunities which presented themselves, and the plot fell into place with record speed. Turk also believes that after the Spanish-American War issues of national security lay at the heart of US interest in Panama. Trade, treaties,

and Manifest Destiny were secondary concerns. Walter LaFeber supports Turks's premise in his book *The Panama Canal* (1978). He provided a thorough discussion of Panama's economic and political history and agrees that Panama was created by Panamanians. Initial US involvement was clearly based on an opportunity to further national security. One of the most impartial examinations of US–Panamanian relations is John Major's *Prize Possession* (1993). He carefully traces the security and commercial issues as well as political developments which led to Panamanian independence and construction of the canal and concludes that the United States and Panama eventually developed a symbiotic relationship.

As discussed earlier, serious US intervention in the Caribbean began with the Spanish–American War in Cuba. The Pearl of the Antilles had been a Spanish colony since Columbus claimed it for the crown in 1492. The first revolt against Spain began in 1821 and was followed by a series of abortive efforts, including invasion by expatriates and freedom fighters, a bloody slave revolt, and periodic discussions of annexing Cuba to the United States. Among the most serious of the independence movements was the Ten Years' War which began in 1868 and ended in 1878 with the promise of political reform and the incremental abolition of slavery (Perez 1995).

Despite gradual changes another revolt broke out in 1895. Led by José Martí it was one of the most violent outbursts yet. Thousands were killed. Part of Spain's response was a *reconcentrado* policy imposed by General Valeriano Weyler. The policy was an attempt to clear the countryside of possible supporters for the insurgents but it had devastating effects on large segments of the population. It also provided a wealth of material for the infamous feud between dueling yellow-journalists of the day, William Randolph Hearst and Joseph Pulitzer. It did not help matters when a telegram sent by Spain's ambassador Enrique Dupuy DeLôme, in which he called President McKinley a weak bidder for popularity, became public. Spain immediately moved to defuse the situation, but six days later the USS *Maine* exploded in Havana. Regardless of the fact that it made no sense for Spain to further antagonize the United States, and investigators reported that the explosion was not due to Spanish actions, "Remember the Maine, to Hell With Spain" became the rallying cry as troops marched off for embarkation camps, impatient to fight the Dons.

The war proved a wake-up call for the US military. Mobilization and supply became a logistician's nightmare. Inter-service rivalries proved to be serious impediments. Despite wool uniforms in the tropics, "embalmed beef," the Spaniard's use of smokeless powder, and supply snafus, the Americans destroyed Admiral Pascual Cervera's fleet at Santiago and drove General José Toral to surrender after the Siege of Santiago. But victory in Cuba did not mean instant independence for the island. Only after a four-year occupation, and passage of the Platt Amendment which allowed the United States to send troops to Cuba in case of trouble, was the country finally given its independence.

No one expected the Platt Amendment to be employed so soon, but in 1906 President Roosevelt reluctantly dispatched troops after a contested election. Three years later a larger contingent returned for a three-year stay, and US troops

returned briefly in 1917. Cuba was a free nation, but under the sway of its northern neighbor until the 1959 takeover by Fidel Castro.

Though clearly dated, Charles E. Chapman's *A History of the Cuban Republic* (1927) remains an excellent source for the history of Cuba and its post-Spanish-American War interaction with the United States. After reviewing the first 25 years of Cuban independence Chapman remained convinced that the country was not ready for democracy. He believed that there was no realistic hope for responsible popular government until a strong executive made serious reforms. Leland Jenks presaged the revisionist school when he made a careful examination of the Cuban economy in his volume *Our Cuban Colony: A Study in Sugar* (1928) and concluded that though technically independent Cuba was in fact a protectorate of the United States because of economic interdependence. Fifty years later, Jules R. Benjamin focused on US economic and political involvement in Cuba in *The United States and Cuba* (1977), finding evidence that because of deep economic penetration which had a significant impact on political issues, even moderate Cubans were driven to support the US presence.

In an excellent case-study of economic penetration, Juan C. Santamarina, "The Cuban Company and the Expansion of American Business in Cuba, 1898–1915" (2000), goes into great detail in his description of the growth of the Cuban Company, which was the largest foreign investor in Cuba well into the 1920s. The firm's directors employed an intricate system of commercial networks to expand its holdings ultimately having a significant impact on the Cuban government.

There is no question that economic interdependence developed between the US and Cuba, particularly in the sugar, coffee, and mining industries. The other consideration which prompted continued US involvement on the island was strategic. Washington was concerned with Cuban security since the island bordered the Windward Passage on the eastern approach to the Panama Canal.

David F. Healy examined the earliest intervention in his book *The United States in Cuba, 1898–1902* (1963) in which he describes how Cuban self-government under US protection/guidance became the paradigm for most interventions. He does give credit to the McKinley administration for taking Cuban wishes into consideration, but at the end of the day US military government and business decisions were generally geared to maintain a stable Cuba.

After the Spanish-American War, the United States had no desire to stay on the island since yellow fever remained a scourge. But some type of force was necessary to keep order so the Americans established the Guardia Rurale. Unfortunately it proved to be inept and was replaced by the permanent Army. Louis A. Perez, Jr. (1972) does an excellent job of describing the development of both in "Supervision of a Protectorate: The United States and the Cuban Army, 1898–1908." Unfortunately there were some cases which the new Cuban Army was incapable of handling, so under the provisions of the Platt Amendment US troops returned (Gillette 1973, Cosmas 1974, Perez 1986a, 1986b).

The first intervention occurred in 1906 when President Tomás Estrada Palma walked away from office rather than agree to give duly elected members of the Liberal Party their seats. Allan R. Millett does a masterful job of laying out the

issues in *The Politics of Intervention* (1968). President Theodore Roosevelt was not eager to intervene – going so far as to order Marines who had already landed at Havana to reembark, only to send them ashore again when it was clear that someone had to fill the rapidly expanding power vacuum. Along with the intervention came a Civil Governor in the form of William Howard Taft. In “William H. Taft and the United States Intervention in Cuba in 1906,” Ralph Minger (1961) takes a thoughtful look at Taft’s tenure in Cuba. A born jurist and eventual developer of the theory of Dollar Diplomacy, Taft viewed the occupation the way he would the temporary receivership of a business. He believed that the occupation was justified because of the threat of instability, potential violence and its consequent impact on commerce. To Taft stability equaled national security. In the short time he was there he saw little improvement and he left the island with a bleak view of Cuba’s future. Charles E. Magoon replaced Taft. David Lockmiller’s (1938) book *Magoon in Cuba* is a dispassionate, well-researched examination of his tenure on the island. Arriving with a mandate to guide the development of the nation to the point where it would be ready for free, fair elections, he was largely successful. He oversaw the establishment of a civil service and viable infrastructure, and history has shown Magoon to have been an effective proconsul despite the negative press he garnered and his implication in a minor scandal.

The other island that borders the Windward Passage is Hispaniola, also discovered by Columbus and also a focus of American concern. Less valuable than nearby territories, Spain relinquished the western third of the island to France in 1697. By using African slaves, France developed an extremely profitable agricultural colony. In a gruesome revolt against their French masters in 1791 Toussaint L’Ouverture established a viable Haitian government which lasted until Napoleon Bonaparte sent an army to Haiti. French troops captured L’Ouverture and transported him to France to prison, but the genie was out of the bottle. Rebellion continued, aided by yellow fever. In 1803 Jean Jacques Dessalines proclaimed Haiti independent of France and became its first president. Two years later he was assassinated, starting a pattern which has marred Haitian history ever since, with coups d’état being the prevalent mode of transition from one administration to the next. There was some discussion of annexation or purchase of rights to Môle St. Nicolas during the Grant administration, but that came to nothing. By 1915 the once prosperous country verged on anarchy and its model infrastructure had crumbled. When a mob in Port-au-Prince violated the sovereignty of the French embassy to attack another ill-fated president, European nations screamed for action. Following the tenets of the Roosevelt Corollary, the United States landed troops in Haiti to preclude European action, beginning a 19-year occupation of that side of Hispaniola. One of the earliest studies of US–Haitian relations is Ludwell L. Montague’s *Haiti and the United States 1714–1938* (1940). He spends considerable time on the early annexation question and US intervention. Interestingly, just six years after the end of the occupation Montague held little hope for a peaceful, prosperous future for Haiti because even a foreign occupation could not change the attitudes and behaviors of the ruling elite. Sadly it is a view which has been born out by history.

The occupation had the dual goals of bringing peace and stability to Haiti and rebuilding the economy by constructing a modern infrastructure. After the initial landing and suppression of the *cacos* (rural bandits/mercenaries) by US Marines, they set about establishing a Gendarmerie to keep the peace (Healy 1976b). Manned by Haitians and officered by Marines it was reasonably successful at maintaining law and order, although the elites refused to let their sons serve and it never became the equalizing institution originally hoped for. Marines were forced to take part in suppressing a second *caco* revolt in the early 1920s.

In 1916 the Treaty Services assumed responsibility for the work started by the Marines on roads, communication networks, and sanitation. It turned into one of the most successful programs in the Caribbean. Roads, telephones, telegraphs, port services, postal services, sanitation projects, hospitals and health clinics, and agricultural stations all flourished. But, as Montague predicted, it didn't last. Under the surface little had changed in the attitude of the Haitians, particularly the elites.

Hans Schmidt's book *The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915–1934* (1971) offers a revisionist approach to US involvement in Haiti. Schmidt believes that US policy was largely driven by racism and an interest in protecting US investments from the constant violence in Haiti. Reiterating Montague's pessimism, Schmidt concludes that despite the United States' professed desire to bring peace and prosperity, Haiti actually got nothing out of the occupation. The conclusion of hopelessness is shared by most scholars. Brenda Gayle Plummer has written a well-balanced survey in *Haiti and the United States: The Psychological Moment* (1992) in which she concludes that regardless of the methods employed by the US – non-recognition, occupation, cooperation with the elites – Haiti could not be controlled by an outside power. The best that could be hoped for was a tense symbiosis. Even a recent cultural and gender history of the subject concurs with that general conclusion. Mary Renda, *Taking Haiti* (2001), uncovers a basically paternalistic occupation which failed because, to differing degrees, all levels of Haitian society preferred their own messy governance to outside influence.

Haiti was not the only nation on the island of Hispaniola to undergo upheaval and occupation. After Columbus' discovery, the island languished, far from the treasure troves of Peru or Mexico. In 1821 Haiti seized control of its eastern neighbor, Santo Domingo, now known as the Dominican Republic, and held it until 1844. The country was in such dire straits that it briefly requested Spanish oversight in the 1860s. In 1882, after a series of dictators, strongman Ulises Hereaux installed himself as head of the government and remained in office until 1899, by which time the country was drowning in debt to European lenders. By 1905 foreign governments were on the verge of intervening. It was this imminent outside involvement that prompted Theodore Roosevelt first to develop a customs receivership to rationalize the Dominican Republic's finances, and more importantly, to formulate the Roosevelt Corollary. He expected it would obviate the need for foreign intervention in the western hemisphere while guaranteeing that nations would meet their obligations. The Receivership went well under President Ramón Cáceres, but after his assassination in 1911 the government teetered from one unstable regime to another. Finally in 1916 the Jimenez administration

collapsed under the threat of a revolt led by the Minister of War. With both the Customs Receivership and national stability in jeopardy, Washington ordered Marines to Santo Domingo. US Navy Captain William B. Caperton, who commanded the initial landing in Haiti and acted as *de facto* ruler of that end of the island for almost a year, commanded the forces sent into the Dominican Republic during their first two months in that country (Healy 1976a).

When the revolt spread beyond the capital, more troops were sent to suppress the rebellion and occupy much of the country. By the spring of 1917 the crisis seemed to be over and Washington supported the formation of another paramilitary Guardia Nacional to keep the peace. Though there were periodic outbursts from so-called bandits, it was possible to hold elections. Relative order was achieved by 1924 when American troops withdrew, bowing to pressure both at home and in the Dominican Republic (Fuller and Cosmas 1974).

The "bible" on the history of the Dominican Republic is Sumner Welles, *Naboth's Vineyard* (1928). It remains the definitive history of the Dominican Republic from its independence to the American withdrawal. Welles was Acting Chief of the Latin American Division from 1920 to 1922 and later served as Commissioner to the Dominican Republic to negotiate a plan for withdrawal of the occupying forces. Based on many then-sensitive documents he focused primarily on political and security issues. Far from being a fan of interventions Welles believed that hemispheric security would be better served by a kind of preemptive intervention that fostered genuine prosperity and true development in Central America more along the lines of Taft's policies than Wilson's. He applauded recent, gradual shifts in US policy and was actually giving an early voice to Franklin Roosevelt's approach to Latin America.

The other classic study, Bruce Calder's *The Impact of Intervention: The Dominican Republic during the U.S. Occupation of 1916-1924* (1984), is clearly critical of the occupation and goes into great detail in some areas. He suggests that the United States did not recognize the struggle as a war because there was no clear leader like a Sandino or Peralte. That basic misconception led to abuses and mismanagement.

The main goal of American foreign policy in Central America from the Spanish American War until World War II was security which, in turn, required stability. Clearly the military interventions, which were considered acceptable means of implementing foreign policy during those years, were undertaken to achieve stability/security in the Caribbean Basin, and they did attain that goal. Typical of the era, troops were not deeply concerned with the internal politics or local culture and traditions except as they impacted their mission. The fact that calm and order were short-lived was due precisely to those local internal factors which were not part of the mission, but which resurfaced and presented even greater challenges in the postwar world.

The historiography of US interventions in Latin America during the first four decades of the twentieth century is extensive and varied, but numerous opportunities exist for additional studies of specific interventions and occupations, comparative studies of multiple operations, and particularly of the experiences of the



soldiers, sailors, and marines who participated in the operations and in the people of the areas involved.

#### BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Baker, George W., Jr. (1966). "The Wilson Administration and Nicaragua, 1913–1921," *The Americas*, 22:4 (April), 339–76.
- Beale, Howard K. (1973). *Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of America to World Power*. New York: Collier Books.
- Beelen, George D. (1984). "The Harding Administration and Mexico: Diplomacy by Economic Persuasion," *The Americas*, 41:2 (October), 177–89.
- Bemis, Samuel Flagg (1943). *The Latin American Policy of the United States*. New York: W. W. Norton & Co.
- Benjamin, Jules R. (1977). *The United States and Cuba: Hegemony and Dependent Development, 1880–1934*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
- Benjamin, Jules R. (1990). *The United States and the Origins of the Cuban Revolution: An Empire of Liberty in an Age of National Liberation*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Boot, Max. (2002). *The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power*. New York: Basic Books.
- Bradford, James C. (1990). "Henry T. Mayo: Last of the Independent Naval Diplomats," in James C. Bradford, ed., *Admirals of the New Steel Navy: Makers of the American Naval Tradition, 1880–1930*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 253–81.
- Brady, Haldeen (1966). *Pershing's Mission in Mexico*. El Paso, TX: Western Press.
- Calder, Bruce J. (1984). *The Impact of Intervention: The Dominican Republic during the U.S. Occupation of 1916–1924*. Austin: University of Texas Press.
- Chapman, Charles E. (1927) *A History of the Cuban Republic. A Study in Hispanic American Politics*. New York: Macmillan.
- Clark, George B. (2001). *With the Old Corps in Nicaragua*. Novato, CA: Presidio Press.
- Cledenlen, Clarence C. (1961). *The United States and Pancho Villa: A Study in Unconventional Diplomacy*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Cledenlen, Clarence C. (1969). *Blood on the Border: The United States Army and the Mexican Irregulars*. New York: Macmillan.
- Cline, Howard Francis (1953). *The United States and Mexico*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Collin, Richard H. (1990). *Theodore Roosevelt's Caribbean: The Panama Canal, the Monroe Doctrine and the Latin American Context*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.
- Cosmas, Graham A. (1974). "Securing the Fruits of Victory: The U.S. Army Occupies Cuba, 1898–1899," *Military Affairs*, 38:3 (October), 85–91.
- DeConde, Alexander (1951). *Herbert Hoover's Latin American Policy*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Dur, Philip, and Christopher Gilchrease (2002). "U.S. Diplomacy and the Downfall of a Cuban Dictator: Machado, 1933," *Journal of Latin American Studies*, 34:2 (May), 255–82.
- Eisenhower, John S. D. (1993). *Intervention! The United States and the Mexican Revolution, 1913–1917*. New York: W. W. Norton.
- Fuller, Stephen M., and Graham A. Cosmas (1974). *Marines in the Dominican Republic, 1916–1924*. Washington: History and Museums Division, US Marine Corps.

- Gillette, Howard, Jr. (1973). "The Military Occupation of Cuba, 1899–1902: Workshop for American Progressivism," *American Quarterly*, 25:4 (October), 410–25.
- Greib, Kenneth J. (1976). *The Latin American Policy of Warren G. Harding*. Fort Worth, TX: Texas Christian University.
- Haley, P. Edward (1970). *Revolution and Intervention: The Diplomacy of Taft and Wilson with Mexico, 1910–1917*. Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press.
- Healy, David F. (1963). *The United States in Cuba, 1898–1902: Generals, Politicians, and the Search for Policy*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
- Healy, David F. (1976a). "Admiral William B. Caperton and United States Naval Diplomacy in South America, 1917–1919," *Journal of Latin American Studies*, 8:2 (November), 297–323.
- Healy, David F. (1976b). *Gunboat Diplomacy in the Wilson Era: The U.S. Navy in Haiti, 1915–1916*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
- Healy, David F. (1988). *Drive to Hegemony: The United States in the Caribbean, 1898–1917*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
- Hill, Larry D. (1974). *Emissaries to a Revolution: Woodrow Wilson's Executive Agents in Mexico*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.
- Holmes, James R. (2006). *Theodore Roosevelt and World Order: Police Power in International Relations*. Washington: Potomac Books.
- Jenks, Leland H. (1928). *Our Cuban Colony: A Study in Sugar*. New York: Vanguard Press.
- Lockmiller, David A. (1938). *Magoon in Cuba: A History of the Second Intervention, 1906–1909*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Kamman, William (1968). *A Search for Stability: United States Diplomacy toward Nicaragua, 1925–1933*. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.
- Katz, Friederich (1978). "Pancho Villa and the Attack on Columbus, New Mexico," *American Historical Review*, 83:1 (February), 101–30.
- Katz, Friederich (1981). *The Secret War in Mexico: Europe, the United States and the Mexican Revolution*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Katz, Friederich (1998). *The Life and Times of Pancho Villa*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- LaFeber, Walter (1978). *The Panama Canal: The Crisis in Historical Perspective*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- LaFeber, Walter (1986). "The 'Lion in the Path': The U.S. Emergence as a World Power," *Political Science Quarterly*, 101:5: 705–18.
- LaFeber, Walter (1987). "The Constitution and United States Foreign Policy: An Interpretation," *Journal of American History*, 74:3 (December), 695–717.
- Langley, Lester D. (1983). *The Banana Wars: An Inner History of American Empire, 1900–1934*. Lexington: University of Kentucky Press.
- Langley, Lester D., and Thomas D. Schoonover (1993). *The Banana Men: American Mercenaries and Entrepreneurs in Central America, 1880–1930*. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky.
- Leonard, Thomas M. (1991). *Central America and the United States: The Search for Stability*. Athens: University of Georgia Press.
- Leonard, Thomas M. (1993). "Central America and the United States: Overlooked Foreign Policy Objectives," *The Americas*, 50:1 (June), 1–30.
- Link, Arthur S. (1957). *Wilson the Diplomatist: A Look at his Major Foreign Policies*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Lowell, A. Laurence (1899). "Colonial Expansion of the United States," *Atlantic Monthly*, 83:496 (February), 145–55.

- Macaulay, Neill (1967). *The Sandino Affair*. Chicago: Quadrangle Books.
- Mahan, Alfred Thayer (1890). *The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783*. Boston: Little, Brown.
- Mahan, Alfred Thayer (1897). *The Interest of America in Sea Power, Present, and Future*. Boston: Little, Brown [Collected Essays].
- Major, John (1993). *Prize Possession: The United States and the Panama Canal, 1903–1979*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Mason, Herbert M. (1970). *The Great Pursuit: Pershing's Expedition to Destroy Pancho Villa*. New York: Random House.
- May, Robert E. (2002). *The Southern Dream of a Caribbean Empire*. Gainesville: University Press of Florida.
- McCullough, David (1977). *The Path Between the Seas: The Creation of the Panama Canal, 1870–1914*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Mecham, T. Lloyd (1961). *The United States and Inter-American Security, 1889–1960*. Austin: University of Texas Press.
- Meyer, Michael C. (1970). "The Arms of the Ypiranga," *The Hispanic American Historical Review*, 50:3 (August), 543–56.
- Millett, Allan R. (1968). *The Politics of Intervention: The Military Occupation of Cuba, 1906–1909*. Columbus: Ohio State University Press.
- Miner, Dwight C. (1940). *The Fight for the Panama Canal*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Minger, Ralph E. (1961). "William H. Taft and the United States Intervention in Cuba in 1906," *Hispanic American Historical Review*, 41:1 (February), 75–89.
- Montague, Ludwell L. (1940). *Haiti and the United States, 1714–1938*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Munro, Dana Gardner (1958). "Dollar Diplomacy in Nicaragua, 1909–1913," *Hispanic American Historical Review*, 38:2 (May), 209–34.
- Munro, Dana Gardner (1964). *Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy in the Caribbean, 1900–1921*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Munro, Dana Gardner (1974). *The United States and the Caribbean Republics, 1921–1933*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Perez, Louis A., Jr. (1972). "Supervision of a Protectorate: The United States and the Cuban Army, 1898–1908," *Hispanic American Historical Review*, 52:2 (May), 250–71.
- Perez, Louis A., Jr. (1986a). "The Pursuit of Pacification: Banditry and the United States' Occupation of Cuba, 1889–1902," *Journal of Latin American Studies*, 18:2 (November), 313–32.
- Perez, Louis A., Jr. (1986b). *Cuba under the Platt Amendment, 1902–1934*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
- Perez, Louis A., Jr. (1995). *Cuba Between Reform and Revolution*, 2nd edn. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Plummer, Brenda G. (1992). *Haiti and the United States: The Psychological Moment*. Athens: University of Georgia Press.
- Powell, Anna I. (1929). "Relations Between the United States and Nicaragua, 1898–1916," *Hispanic American Historical Review*, 8:1 (February), 43–64.
- Pratt, Julius W. (1932). "The Large Policy of 1898," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, 19:2 (September): 219–42.
- Pratt, Julius W. (1935). "The Ideology of American Expansion," in Avery O. Craven, ed., *Essays in Honor of William E. Dodd*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 335–53.

- Pratt, Julius W. (1936). *Expansionists of 1898: Acquisition of Hawaii and the Spanish Islands*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Quirk, Robert E. (1962). *An Affair of Honor: Woodrow Wilson and the Occupation of Vera Cruz*. Lexington: University of Kentucky Press.
- Renda, Mary A. (2001). *Taking Haiti: Military Occupation and the Culture of U.S. Imperialism, 1915–1940*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Santamarina, Juan C. (2000). "The Cuban Company and the Expansion of American Business in Cuba, 1898–1915," *Business History Review*, 74:1 (Spring), 41–83.
- Schmidt, Hans (1971). *The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915–1934*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.
- Schoonover, Thomas D. (1991). *The United States in Central America, 1860–1911: Episodes of Social Imperialism and Imperial Rivalry in the World System*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Sweetman, Jack (1968). *The Landing at Veracruz: 1914*, Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Tompkins, Frank (1934). *Chasing Villa: The Story Behind the Story of Pershing's Expedition into Mexico*. Harrisburg, PA: Military Service Publishing Co.
- Tulchin, Joseph S. (1971). *The Aftermath of War: World War I and the U.S. Policy toward Latin America*. New York: New York University Press.
- Turk, Richard W. (1974). "The United States Navy and the 'Taking' of Panama, 1901–1903," *Military Affairs*, 38:1 (October), 92–6.
- Weinberg, Albert K. (1935). *Manifest Destiny: A Study of Nationalist Expansionism in American History*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Welles, Sumner (1928). *Naboth's Vineyard*. London: Payson and Clarke, Ltd.
- Williams, William Appleman (1959). *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*. Cleveland: World Publishing Co.

## Chapter Thirty-four

# MILITARY INTERVENTIONS IN ASIA, 1899–1927

*Stephen K. Stein*

The Spanish–American War affirmed the emergence of the United States as an imperial power with interests in both the Caribbean and the Pacific Ocean and Asia. Yet, the American presence and military interventions in Asia have sparked considerably less scholarship than American military interventions and imperialism in the Caribbean and Central America. While the United States was clearly the paramount power in the Caribbean, this was far from the case in Asia and the Pacific. American forces there confronted a complex interplay of local peoples, states, and European powers that both required military force to preserve American interests and yet mitigated against applying that force, particularly in China. The large commitment of American troops to China during the Boxer Rebellion of 1900 and Russia in 1918 are anomalies. Between the Philippine War and the Nanking Incident of 1927, American military and naval forces in the region remained small, and their commanders preferred to achieve their goals without force. This is reflected in the scholarship, which has generally focused on large events and crises rather than broad assessments of the American military presence in Asia in these years.

### **The Philippine War**

The United States acquired the Philippines and Guam in the Spanish–American War and cemented its control over several other Pacific Islands and their peoples during and immediately after the war. Of these, only the Filipinos offered significant armed resistance, though it was only after the United States found itself mired in the Vietnam War that American scholarship on the Philippine War flourished. Earlier scholarship had often emphasized the brutality of American troops. In *Schoolbooks and Krag's* (1973), John Morgan Gates presented a balanced assessment that emphasized the role domestic progressivism played in shaping the military's effort to conquer and transform the Philippines along American middle class values. Americans used military force to pursue guerillas, while simultaneously

implementing progressive reforms and building schools, roads, and sanitation systems to win over Filipinos with benevolence. A decade later, Stuart Miller (1982) resuscitated the harsh portrayal of the war. Highlighting the frequent absence of benevolence, Miller notes the use of torture and other atrocities by American troops – a subject examined in more detail by Richard E. Welch, Jr. (1974).

Recent works have explored the war in more detail and nuance, and have tended toward Gates' assessment. Brian Linn (2000), for example, frequently takes Miller to task and emphasizes that the war, and American benevolence, varied from province to province. The Philippine War was a succession of decentralized regional campaigns in which American commanders responded differently to varying local situations, which Glenn Anthony May (1991) examines in his study of Batangas Province. Robert Ramsey (2007a, b) describes several campaigns, analyzes Brigadier General J. Franklin Bell's controversial counter-guerrilla campaign in south-western Luzon, 1901–2, and reprints the messages issued to subordinates during the operations.

The United States' other Pacific acquisitions have received considerably less attention. Don Farrell (1994) has explored the acquisition of Guam, and the resultant partition of the Marianas Islands, while Dirk Spennemann (1998), has examined the annexation of Wake.

### US Policy in the Pacific

The acquisition of this Pacific empire forced political and military leaders to craft a coherent policy for Asia and the Pacific. As Richard W. Turk (1984) and Seward Livermore (1944) note, Japan's victory over Russia in 1905, disputes over immigration, and Japan's expansionist efforts increasingly focused American attention on the Pacific, yet American planners focused mostly on Germany until its defeat in World War I. Only then, did planners focus on Japan as the nation's most likely enemy. Yet, limited budgets minimized the American presence in East Asia.

William Braisted (1971), the preeminent scholar of the subject, argues that American policymakers worked to protect American interests, limit European expansion, and generally maintain the status quo in these years. They wished to avoid entangling alliances and limit Asian immigration to the United States, while maintaining Chinese independence and an Open Door to its markets. In sharp contrast to the Caribbean, Americans sought to achieve these goals through careful negotiation rather than force, and Braisted points to the Root–Takahira Agreement that limited Japanese immigration, and the Nine-Power Pact of the Washington Treaty, which preserved China's integrity and independence and acknowledged the Open Door, as successful examples.

Richard D. Challener (1973) explores the influence of army and navy officers on national policy in more detail. Echoing Braisted, he argues that officers stationed in Asia often had a better sense of the situation than politicians and State Department officials. While they were generally successful at communicating their views, their influence on policy, particularly for the Pacific, proved limited. Gerald



Wheeler (1963) argues that unresolved disputes between realists who viewed commitments to China as futile and wished to abandon the Philippines and die-hard imperialists who wished to shore up and even expand the nation's Asian commitments produced an inconsistent and vacillating policy. In the absence of agreement, Congress's refusal to fund either bases or naval expansion determined the United States' policy in Asia.

Stretched thin to garrison possessions and protect American interests, contemporary officers debated Pacific defense regularly. Gerald E. Wheeler (1957) chronicles the emergence of Japan as their primary threat as they became convinced of its aggressive intent. Yet, as Edward Miller (1991) demonstrates, this focus on Japan did not produce consensus on defense. Over the next 20 years, war plans vacillated between abandoning the Philippines and other Pacific outposts or rushing to their defense. Brian Linn (1997) offers the most detailed treatment of how the Army approached Pacific defense, and argues that inter- and intra-service dissension, inadequate resources, political indifference, and the army's failure to mobilize local peoples hindered the development of an effective defense of these territories. All these debates accelerated when, after the Russo-Japanese War, President Theodore Roosevelt sent the nation's battleships on a round the world voyage, an event that Turk argues rekindled the navy's confidence to fight a Pacific war.

### **The Great White Fleet**

The 16 battleships of the Atlantic Fleet sailed from Hampton Roads, Virginia, in December 1907 and arrived in San Francisco in February 1909 where more than a million people welcomed them. In its circumnavigation of the globe, the fleet steamed 46,000 miles in 434 days and called at 20 ports on six continents where virtually every account agrees that its sailors received friendly receptions. Navy leaders considered it an operational success. Contemporary accounts, such as those of Franklin Matthews (1908, 1909), a journalist who accompanied the fleet, lauded the voyage as a diplomatic triumph that demonstrated the United States' emergence as a naval power and its engagement in foreign affairs.

Historians have proved more critical. Thomas A. Bailey (1932, 1934), for example, argues that the voyage stimulated Japanese navalism, a sentiment echoed by Braisted (1958) and Howard K. Beale (1956) who adds that the voyage also fostered anti-Americanism in Japan. Particularly critical is Robert A. Hart (1965), who revisits these critiques and adds that contrary to expectations, the voyage actually demonstrated the obsolescence of the American fleet. Rather than a diplomatic triumph, it was a study in "sound and fury" and a failure as an instrument of diplomacy that hurt the United States' reputation in China and Japan as much as it helped it in Australia and other western states. On the later, G. P. Taylor (1969) argues that New Zealand's leaders welcomed the fleet's arrival because it would create the appearance of an Anglo-American alliance to deter Japan, and because they believed they could use the visit to pressure Britain into greater military commitments in the Pacific.

James Reckner (1988), in the most important recent study, argues that historians have overemphasized the fleet's diplomatic mission. Instead, technical and administrative issues, the need to test the fleet, proved the overriding reasons for the cruise. It tested plans for war with Japan, improved the ability of crews to repair and maintain ships at sea, and demonstrated the fleet's ability to fight after a long voyage. Yet, he argues that it did not fuel the naval arms race, which was driven by Anglo–German tensions. Still, its success and popular acclaim encouraged American navalists like William S. Sims to lobby for new battleship construction, overseas bases, and continued administrative reform within the navy.

Kenneth Wimmel (2000), whose work concentrates on the modernization and expansion of the American navy during Theodore Roosevelt's presidency, explores how Roosevelt employed this growing naval power as an instrument of foreign policy. Mirroring older accounts, he portrays the Great White Fleet's voyage as a diplomatic success.

### The US Military in China

Anti-foreign sentiment grew steadily in late nineteenth-century China and fueled the growth of the *I Ho Ch'uan* (Righteous Harmonious Fists) organization. Called Boxers by Westerners, their increasingly violent attacks on foreigners provoked the leaders of the foreign legations in Peking to ask for additional troops. American gunboats had patrolled China's waterways since the mid-nineteenth century, and the captains of the *Newark* and *Oregon* landed sailors and marines to protect Peking's Legation Quarter from the Boxers. In cooperation with troops from six European nations and Japan, they defended the Legation Quarter, which endured a 55-day siege, before a 20,000-man multinational force fought its way from the coast to Tientsin, and then north along the railway into Peking.

Recent scholarship has focused more on the Boxers than the foreign military response to them. In the first book to exploit newly released Chinese government documents, Chester Tan (1955) presents a broad overview of the rebellion and argues that the Manchu regime's incoherent response, which mixed suppression and appeasement, encouraged the rebellion to spread. In contrast, Victor Purcell (1974) argues that foreign intervention inflamed the Boxers and produced the full-scale rebellion that foreign powers hoped to prevent. Joseph Esherick (1987) explores the origins of the Boxers as an amalgam of martial arts and spiritual traditions that spread among peasants provoked by arrogant missionaries and foreign imperialism.

William Braisted (1958) surveys the American response to the crisis and argues that American forces helped localize the conflict and encourage international cooperation that limited foreign aggrandizement. Richard Challener (1973) supports this position and notes that American naval officers, who were generally more perceptive in their assessments of Chinese affairs than either foreign officers or US State Department officials, helped mediate disputes among the foreign military contingents.

Apart from Braisted, accounts of American military participation in the rebellion are generally brief, matter-of-fact accounts in larger surveys, such as Allan R. Millett (1991). Peter Fleming (1959) surveys the siege from a British perspective, and blames the legation ministers for failing to anticipate or prepare for the crisis. He leaves unanswered the causes of the rebellion and the reasons the Boxers failed to overwhelm the Legation Quarter, a question addressed in Diana Preston's (2000) lively account of the siege. She argues that the Boxers failed to capture the city, because their commanders did not wish the slaughter that would surely follow this success. William J. Duiker (1978) offers a brief account of the siege and relief expedition. Trevor Plante (1999) does the same with a focus on the role played by US Marines. Michael Hunt (1979) examines the entire July 1900 to May 1921 period US Army troops were in China finding them unprepared for the duty but largely successful because the Chinese were cooperative, a fact never understood by Lieutenant General Anda Chafee, commander of the troops. Among the more useful participant accounts are those of Aaron Simon Daggett (1903), who commanded the 14th Infantry Regiment, and J. K. Taussig (1927), a midshipman who fought with the naval contingent. Paolo Coletta (1979) covers Bowman H. McCalla, the captain of the *Newark* who led 112 American sailors and Marines in the first international effort to relieve Peking, and Hans Schmidt (1987) the service of Smedley Butler who was wounded in battles at Tientsin and San Tan Pating.

Along with the other colonial powers, the United States received the right to station troops in China in the 1901 peace protocols. American forces, which included navy gunboats and small garrisons in Peking, Tientsin, and later Shanghai, grew slowly over the next generation. In these years, Braisted (1958, 1971) argues that foreign powers sought to exploit opportunities in China cooperatively rather than through dismemberment, a concept enunciated in the Open Door Notes and eventually enshrined in the Nine-Power Pact of the 1922 Washington Naval Treaty. American policy emphasized noninterference in internal Chinese affairs and preserving the territorial integrity of China and the Open Door (McKee 1977). American commanders worked to avoid inflaming anti-foreign sentiment, landed troops only when absolutely necessary, and generally acted independently of other colonial powers. The US Navy became the primary instrument of America's China policy (Braisted 2009), and Rear Admiral Kemp Tolley (1971), a veteran of the Yangtze Patrol, traces the history of the navy in China with an entertaining collection of vignettes that captures the personalities and attitudes of the patrol's officers. Unfortunately, he offers little analysis of the complex interplay between China, the Chinese people, and the various foreign warships that plied its waterways.

When the Chinese Revolution ensued in 1911, the United States sent the 15th infantry regiment to North China to reinforce its 19 warships and Marine garrisons. Their activities are described in Edward Coffman (1994) who argues that this show of force prevented a repeat of the depredations of the Boxer Rebellion. George B. Clark's (2001) social history of the Marines in China emphasizes the contrast between long periods of inactivity and boredom and

sudden mobilizations for emergencies. As Chinese nationalism strengthened, American armed interventions became rare, a change also noted in Kenneth W. Condit and Edwin T. Turnbladh's (1960) official history of the 4th Marine Regiment. By 1925, these 500 Marines were Peking's largest foreign garrison, while the army maintained 900 soldiers in Tientsin to the south. Louis Morton (1960) examines the relations and rivalries of these forces, a topic explored in more detail by Dennis Noble (1990) whose social history of American soldiers, sailors, and marines in China covers the daily routine, social composition, perceptions and treatment of Chinese. He discusses the interplay of diplomacy and force in detail and includes a brief overview of operations, most of which featured little or no violence. William Braisted (2009) focuses on the diplomatic role played by US naval commanders in China; their relations with officials in Washington, American diplomats in China, and officers of other foreign navies in Chinese waters, and their attempts to protect American missionaries and commercial interests during times of unrest.

As Nationalist armies extended their control over China in the 1920s, the era of unequal treaties came to an end. The best discussions of American policy toward China in these years remain Dorothy Borg (1947) and Akira Iriye (1965) who both argue that the United States remained cautious in its commitments to China despite its declarations at the Washington Naval Conference. Bernard D. Cole (1983) examines how the Asiatic Fleet dealt with these changes and the intensification of fighting between Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang forces and assorted warlord armies. Cole argues that American commanders and State Department officials recognized the end of the era of gunboat diplomacy and worked to relinquish outdated treaty rights and act separately from the more imperialistic British and Japanese. They wanted to protect American interests, but avoid involvement in internal Chinese matters. These policies, one moral, one legal, conflicted regularly, yet American officers generally avoided violence and successfully evacuated American civilians in the path of fighting. Only during the Nanking Incident of March 1927 did American warships fire on Chinese.

After liberating Nanking, Chiang's victorious troops looted foreign establishments. British and American warships opened fire to halt the looting and the Chinese returned fire. The United States also reinforced its Chinese garrisons and dispatched 1,200 troops to Shanghai to defend its foreign residents. Cole offers the most detailed discussion of the Nanking Crises, though the contemporary accounts of Glenn Howell (1928) and Roy C. Smith, Jr. (1928), who commanded the gunboat *Noa* in the fighting, are also useful. Evans F. Carlson (1936) presents a contemporary assessment of the legal issues of this intervention.

Cole lauds the conduct of the senior American officers during the crisis: Admiral Mark L. Bristol and Brigadier General Smedley D. Butler. Their biographers repeat this assessment. Hans Schmidt (1987) describes Butler as a masterful peacekeeper who valued lives over property and successfully evacuated American civilians with limited force, while Braisted (1990) presents Bristol as a far-sighted diplomat who proved more accommodating to Chinese nationalism than any of his foreign or American counterparts.

### Vladivostok and Siberia

President Woodrow Wilson's decision to support Allied intervention in Russia following the Russian Revolution remains debated, though scholarship on these soldiers and their operations remains sparse. In addition to the better-known commitment of American troops to Archangel, Wilson ordered troops to Siberia. Commanded by Major General William S. Graves, their missions included helping the 50,000 troops of the Czech Legion escape from Russia, protecting 600,000 tons of Allied military supplies in Vladivostok, and encouraging anti-Bolshevik forces while somehow avoiding involvement in internal Russian affairs. Roughly 8,400 American soldiers, many of them transferred from the Philippines, landed at Vladivostok in August 1918. Japan dispatched 74,000 troops, while Britain and France, each transferred several hundred soldiers from their Asian possessions to Siberia. Almost as disunited as the Russians who greeted them, these soldiers' efforts to execute their governments' conflicting orders are ably described by John Albert White (1950).

Scholarship on Wilson's decision to intervene is typified by George Kennan (1958) who emphasizes the confused situation in Siberia and the mission's inherent difficulties, and condemns it as ill-considered. Betty Miller Unterberger (1956) emphasizes Wilson's reluctance and argues that he only dispatched troops because he believed the Allies would intervene regardless of American participation. American troops, he thought, would exercise a moderating influence on the Allies, particularly the Japanese. Conversely, James Robert Maddox (1977) argues that Wilson intervened because he believed the Bolsheviks, who had just made peace with Germany, would undermine the Fourteen Points and his plans for world peace. More recently David S. Foglesong (1995) has placed the intervention in the wider context of Wilsonian diplomacy linking it to his intervention in Mexico and argues that Wilson attempted to keep secret much of what he did.

George C. Guins (1969) examines the complex situation the Americans encountered upon landing in Vladivostok and their first operations. General Graves (1931) describes his experiences and the problems he faced, which ranged from scheming Russian commanders, white army atrocities, and Japanese intrigues to assorted partisans and drunken Cossacks, and condemns the State Department and Allied military commanders for embroiling US forces in the Russian Civil War for no good purpose. Braisted (1971) notes that despite these problems, Graves managed to carry out his mission without being drawn into Russian affairs. Descriptions of the intervention as a fiasco, doomed to failure are almost unanimous. A rare dissenter is Victor M. Fic (1995) who condemns Wilson's limited commitment of troops and argues that larger forces would have accomplished much. Instead, Wilson abandoned the Russian people to the Bolsheviks when the last American soldiers departed in April 1920.

Implicitly or explicitly, many of the general works on this era are written with Pearl Harbor and World War II in mind. Studies of the United States' Pacific empire and military presence remain few, and much of this work is Amerocentric.

Particularly lacking are comparative studies of the various colonial armies in China and the Pacific and assessments of the relationships between these military forces and local peoples. More detailed examinations of military operations in the fractured and weakened states of China and Russia in these years would also be welcome.

#### BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Bailey, Thomas A. (1932). "The World Cruise of the American Battleship Fleet, 1907–1909," *Pacific Historical Review*, 1:4 (December), 389–423.
- Bailey, Thomas A. (1934). *Theodore Roosevelt and the Japanese–American Crises*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Beale, Howard K. (1956). *Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of America to World Power*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Borg, Dorothy (1947). *American Policy and the Chinese Revolution, 1925–1928*. New York: Macmillan.
- Braisted, William Reynolds (1958). *The United States Navy in the Pacific, 1897–1909*. Austin: University of Texas Press.
- Braisted, William Reynolds (1971). *The United States Navy in the Pacific, 1909–1922*. Austin: University of Texas Press.
- Braisted, William Reynolds (1990). "Mark Lambert Bristol: Naval Diplomat Extraordinary of the Battleship Age," in James C. Bradford, *Admirals of the New Steel Navy: Makers of the American Naval Tradition, 1880–1930*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 331–73.
- Braisted, William Reynolds (2009). *Diplomats in Blue: U.S. Naval Officers in China, 1922–1933*. Gainesville: University Press of Florida.
- Carlson, Evans F. (1936). "Legal Bases for the Use of Foreign Armed Forces in China," U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings*, 62:11 (November), 1546–9.
- Challener, Richard D. (1973). *Admirals, Generals and American Foreign Policy: 1898–1914*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Clark, George B. (2001). *Treading Softly: U.S. Marines in China, 1819–1949*. Westport, CT: Praeger.
- Coffman, Edward M. (1994). "The American 15th Infantry Regiment in China, 1912–1938: A Vignette in Social History," *Journal of Military History*, 58:1 (January), 57–74.
- Cole, Bernard D. (1983). *Gunboats and Marines: The United States Navy in China, 1925–1928*. Newark: University of Delaware Press.
- Coletta, Paolo E. (1979). *Bowman Hendy McCalla: A Fighting Sailor*. Washington: University Press of America.
- Condit, Kenneth W., and Edwin T. Turnbladh (1960). *Hold High the Torch: A History of the 4th Marines*. Washington: Marine Corps History Branch.
- Daggett, Aaron Simon (1903). *America in the China Relief Expedition*. Kansas City, MO: Hudson-Kimberly.
- Duiker, William J. (1978). *Cultures in Collision: The Boxer Rebellion*. San Rafael, CA: Presidio Press.
- Esherick, Joseph (1987). *The Origins of the Boxer Uprising*. Berkeley: University of California Press.



- Farrell, Don A. (1994). "The Partition of the Marianas: A Diplomatic History, 1898–1919," *Isla: A Journal of Micronesian Studies*, 2:2 (Dry Season), 273–301.
- Fic, Victor M. (1995). *The Collapse of American Policy in Russia and Siberia, 1918: Wilson's Decision Not to Intervene (March–October, 1919)*. Boulder, CO: East European Monographs.
- Fleming, Peter (1959). *The Siege at Peking*. New York: Harper and Brothers.
- Foglesong, David S. (1995). *America's Secret War against Bolshevism: U.S. Intervention in the Russian Civil War, 1917–1920*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Gates, John Morgan (1973). *Schoolbooks and Kraggs: The United States Army in the Philippines, 1898–1902*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
- Graves, William S. (1931). *America's Siberian Adventure, 1918–1920*. New York: Peter Smith.
- Guins, George C. (1969). "The Siberian Intervention, 1918–1919," *Russian Review*, 28:4 (October), 428–40.
- Hart, Robert A. (1965). *The Great White Fleet: Its Voyage Around the World, 1907–1909*. Boston: Little, Brown and Co.
- Howell, Glenn (1928). "Operations of the United States Navy on the Yangtze River – September, 1926 to June, 1927," U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings*, 54:4 (April), 273–86.
- Hunt, Michael H. (1979). "The Forgotten Occupation: Peking, 1900–1901," *Pacific Historical Review*, 48:4, 501–29.
- Iriye, Akira (1965). *After Imperialism: The Search for a New Order in the Far East, 1921–1931*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Kennan, George F. (1958). *Soviet–American Relations, 1917–1920: The Decision to Intervene*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Linn, Brian McAllister (1997). *Guardians of Empire: The Army and the Pacific, 1902–1940*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Linn, Brian McAllister (2000). *The Philippine War, 1899–1902*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
- Livmore, Seward W. (1944). "American Naval-Base Policy in the Far East, 1850–1914," *Pacific Historical Review*, 13:2 (June), 113–35.
- Maddox, James Robert (1977). *The Unknown War with Russia: Wilson's Siberian Intervention*. San Rafael, CA: Presidio Press.
- Matthews, Franklin (1908). *With the Battle Fleet: Cruise of the Sixteen Battleships of the United States Atlantic Fleet From Hampton Roads to the Golden Gate, December 1907–May 1908*. New York: B. W. Huebsch.
- Matthews, Franklin (1909). *Back to Hampton Roads: Cruise of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet From San Francisco to Hampton Roads, July 7, 1908–February 22, 1909*. New York: B. W. Huebsch.
- May, Glenn Anthony (1991). *Battle for Batangas: A Philippine Province at War*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- McKee, Delber (1977). *Chinese Exclusion Versus the Open Door Policy, 1900–1906: Clashes over China Policy in the Roosevelt Era*. Detroit: Wayne State University Press.
- Miller, Edward S. (1991). *War Plan Orange: U.S. Strategy to Defeat Japan, 1897–1945*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Miller, Stuart C. (1982). *"Benevolent Assimilation": the American Conquest of the Philippines, 1899–1903*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Millett, Allan R. (1991). *Semper Fidelis: The History of the United States Marine Corps*. New York: Free Press.

- Morton, Louis (1960). "Army and Marines on the China Station: A Study in Military and Political Rivalry," *Pacific Historical Review*, 29:1 (February), 51–73.
- Noble, Dennis L. (1990). *The Eagle and the Dragon: The United States Military in China, 1901–1937*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
- Plante, Trevor K. (1999). "U.S. Marines in the Boxer Rebellion," *Prologue*, 31:4 (Winter), 284–9.
- Preston, Diana (2000). *The Boxer Rebellion: The Dramatic Story of China's War on Foreigners That Shook the World in the Summer of 1900*. New York: Walker & Co.
- Purcell, Victor (1974). *The Boxer Uprising: A Background Study*. Hamden, CT: Archon Books.
- Ramsey, Robert D., III (2007a). *A Masterpiece of Counterinsurgency Warfare: BG J. Franklin Bell in the Philippines, 1901–1902*. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press.
- Ramsey, Robert D., III (2007b). *Savage Wars of Peace: Case Studies of Pacification in the Philippines, 1900–1902*. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press.
- Reckner, James R. (1988). *Teddy Roosevelt's Great White Fleet*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Schmidt, Hans (1987). *Maverick Marine: General Smedley D. Butler and the Contradictions of American Military History*. Lexington: University of Kentucky Press.
- Smith, Roy C., Jr. (1928). "Nanking, March 24, 1927," U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings* 54:1 (January), 1–21.
- Spennemann, Dirk H. R. (1998). "The United States Annexation of Wake Atoll," *Journal of Pacific History*, 33 (September), 239–47.
- Tan, Chester (1955). *The Boxer Catastrophe*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Taussig, J. K. (1927). "Experiences during the Boxer Rebellion," United States Naval Institute *Proceedings*, 53:4 (April), 403–20.
- Taylor, G. P. (1969). "New Zealand, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the 1908 Visit of the American Fleet," *Australian Journal of Politics and History*, 15:1 (April), 55–76.
- Tolley, Kemp (1971). *Yangtze Patrol: The U.S. Navy in China*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Turk, Richard W. (1984). "Defending the New Empire," in Kenneth J. Hagan, *In Peace and War: Interpretations of American Naval History, 1775–1984*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 186–204.
- Unterberger, Betty Miller (1956). *America's Siberian Expedition, 1918–1920: A Study of National Policy*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Welch, Richard E., Jr. (1974). "American Atrocities in the Philippines: The Indictment and the Response," *Pacific Historical Review*, 43:2 (May), 233–53.
- Wheeler, Gerald E. (1957). "The United States Navy and the Japanese 'Enemy': 1919–1931," *Military Affairs*, 21:2 (Summer), 61–74.
- Wheeler, Gerald E. (1963). *Prelude to Pearl Harbor: The U.S. Navy in the Pacific, 1921–1931*. Columbia: University of Missouri Press.
- White, John Albert (1950). *The Siberian Intervention*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Wimmell, Kenneth (2000). *Theodore Roosevelt and the Great White Fleet: American Sea Power Comes of Age*. Washington: Brassey's.

## Chapter Thirty-five

# THE OCCUPATION OF GERMANY, AUSTRIA, TRIESTE, JAPAN, OKINAWA, AND KOREA

*James Jay Carafano*

Few military history subjects have received less treatment than postwar occupations. Remarkably, this trend even holds true for the military governments established in Europe and Asia after World War II, operations that did much to shape the character of modern life in the second half of the twentieth century. For the most part, the few serious works that addressed the battle for peace after the war mirrored the evolving character of Cold War scholarship in the United States. In the post-Cold War era, military and diplomatic historians have demonstrated renewed interest in the subject as they have sought to offer insights into the difficult contemporary challenges of dealing with failed states, post-conflict operations, and the trials of nation-building.

### **The Fight for Peace**

The absence of scholarship on the post-World War II occupations is understandable given that the topic of post-conflict operations has almost no place in the literature of Western military history. As Erwin A. Schmidl, points out in an important recent essay, “The Evolution of Peace Operations from the Nineteenth Century” (2000), arguably, the task of victors playing a role in reestablishing independent governance, civil society, and the economy of defeated states emerged with the rise of the modern nation-state and the need to reestablish order in Western Europe after the Napoleonic Wars.

From the start, however, warriors and their historians paid scant attention. The military’s reluctance to think deeply about the place of peace operations in military affairs derived from a rich tradition of Western military theory, typified by the nineteenth century Prussian thinker Carl von Clausewitz, who emphasized the primacy of winning battles and destroying the enemy’s conventional troops. Clausewitz, a veteran of the Napoleonic Wars, could perhaps be forgiven for not even mentioning peace operations in his classic treatise *On War*. After all, these kinds of occupation operations were something new and novel in his time.

Americans closely followed the tradition of focusing on warfighting and forgetting about the imperative of fighting for peace after the war as soon as an occupation ended. The US military had a history of conducting occupations going back to the American Revolution, yet at the outbreak of World War II, the armed forces had no doctrine, troops, or plans for how to conduct these kinds of missions. Indeed, even after the outbreak of global war, the War Department staff fiercely debated whether the army needed official guidance or special training and formal staffs for occupation duties. Not until 1940 did the service produce its first field manual on the subject. Military schools to train occupation administrators were not established until 1942. A Civil Affairs Division in the Pentagon, responsible for overseeing preparations for occupation duties was not stood up until 1943.

### Midnight's Children

When the firing stopped at midnight on 8 May 1945, the US military found itself responsible for administering the lands of its defeated foes. These included major portions of Germany, Austria, and Trieste. The justification for each mission varied. Germany was a defeated power. Austria, on the other hand, was considered a liberated state. The joint US, British, Soviet declaration at the Moscow Conference of November 1, 1943 ruled the *Anschluss* that merged Germany and Austria an act of Nazi aggression and Austria was to be reestablished by the allies as an independent state. Though Italy had become a cobelligerent of the Allies in October 1943, Trieste was also claimed by Yugoslavia and remained under Allied occupation.

In the Asian theater, the US military occupied Japan after its unconditional surrender on 14 August 1945. American forces also governed Okinawa which Japan had incorporated along with the rest of the Ryuku Islands, as a prefecture in 1879. Nevertheless, the Joint Chiefs of Staff hoped to adjure Japan's claim to sovereignty and annex the island as a naval base. Instead, Washington opted to establish a trusteeship and a separate occupation authority to oversee the island chain. The United States also agreed to participate in the occupation of Korea which had been under Japanese control since 1910.

### The Disease and Unrest Formula

Despite its paucity of staff, organizations, and doctrine at the start of the war, the Americans spent many months planning for postwar occupation. The guiding principle of the planners was called the "disease and unrest" formula, establishing order and stability in the occupied lands. These tasks included disarming and demobilizing enemy forces and purging the government of totalitarian elements. From the outset, the military planned that civilian agencies would handle the tasks of managing civilians including dealing with displaced persons.

Most of the American planning had little impact on the conduct of the occupations. The armed forces never deployed the number of planners or Civil Affairs officers required. Policy disagreements in Washington and debates among the

Allies also slowed preparations. This history is described well in Michael Beschloss's *The Conquerors: Roosevelt, Truman and the Destruction of Hitler's Germany*. Finally, civilian agencies lacked the capacity to deal with postwar humanitarian crises. The United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), which was supposed to handle refugees and emergency economic aid was woefully understaffed. The challenges faced government and non-governmental agencies and the lack of adequate coordination is illustrated well in Michael Marrus' *The Unwanted: European Refugees in the Twentieth Century*.

In organization, the major US occupation operations had much in common. In each case, a senior Army general served as the Military High Commissioner, who reported both to the State Department and the War Department (later the Department of the Army) as the senior military and political representative. In practice, each occupation was unique with commanders on the scene having significant autonomy in how they handled US policies. Implementation varied greatly. The occupations of Germany and Japan received significant attention at the highest-levels of government, included much detailed planning, and received significant resources. In contrast, Austria, Trieste, Korea, and Okinawa were much more ad hoc operations.

While major occupations in Europe were expected to last only a few years, in practice missions proved far more intractable. In Germany, the Americans jointly occupied the country with France, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union. The western portion was later consolidated under a single occupation zone and then governed as the independent Federal Republic of Germany. Following elections in the West, the Soviet Union established an East German Democratic Government on October 7, 1949. Even though formal occupation operations ended, Allied military forces remained in Germany throughout the Cold War in tense stand-off along the inter-German border. Austria was also occupied jointly by the United States, Britain, France, and the Soviet Union and remained so until the State Treaty was signed in 1955. After the treaty signing, all Allied forces withdrew. American, British, and Yugoslav forces jointly occupied Trieste until Italy and Yugoslavia resolved their border dispute in 1954.

In Asia, the United States, under its military authority as Supreme Allied Commander Pacific (SCAP) formally occupied Japan until 1952. The United States did not return the prefecture of Okinawa to Japan until 1972. The United States and the Soviet Union divided responsibility for the occupation of Korea at the 38th parallel. The United States continued the occupation until an independent Republic of Korean government was established in the south in 1948 (MacDonald 1948, Meade 1951, Caldwell 1952, Ottoboni 1997, Oh 2002). That same year the Soviet Union established an independent government, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, in the North. US forces withdrew from South Korea until they returned to combat the invasion from North Korea in 1950 and remain to this day.

### History of Occupation History

Much as the initial combat histories of World War II, the first postwar occupation scholarship was dominated by official history sources and memoirs of senior

officials, though there was much less material available on postwar operations. The US Army's Center of Military History had intended to produce a series of official histories similar to its "green books" on combat operations in World War II. The project never came to fruition. In 1964, the center published *Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors* (Coles and Weinberg 1964). Rather than a conventional history, this volume offered a collection of key declassified documents on Anglo-American planning for dealing with civilians in both liberated and conquered countries. The only major occupation history published by the center was Earl F. Ziemke's *The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany, 1944–1946*, not published until 1974. The center only produced short pamphlets on the occupation of the Ryuku Islands and Korea. No satisfactory treatments of Trieste or Austria were ever published by any branch of the government. SCAP published its own official history of the Japanese occupation. The major memoir of note was Lucius Clay's 1950 recollections of his tenure as military governor and High Commissioner for Germany.

Where the occupations were discussed in the first wave of postwar scholarship they drew heavily on the published record (including documents in the multi-volume State Department series *Foreign Relations of the United States*), and portrayed military operations in the traditional Cold War narrative as a component of the super power struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union. The US military was a force for good spreading freedom, democratic institutions and free markets as a bulwark against Soviet expansion and Communist subversion. Harold Zink, *American Military Government in Germany* (1947) offers excellent example of the early writings on how Americans viewed their occupation efforts as a force for good. Walt Sheldon, *Honorable Conquerors: The Occupation of Japan 1945–1952* (1965), and John Curtis Perry, *Beneath the Eagle's Wings: Americans in Occupied Japan* (1980) follow in this tradition as well.

The second generation of Cold War histories proved more skeptical. Fueled less by the availability of new evidence and more by the growing dominance of progressive scholars at major American universities and their dissatisfaction with the Korean and Vietnam War experiences, revisionist historians rearticulated postwar history. The real root cause of postwar international tension they contended was America's expansionist tendencies. William Appleman Williams argued in *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* (1959) that occupations were part of "Open Door Imperialism," a US quest for economic dominance and the establishment of an informal empire designed to sustain American prosperity and prevent revolutionary agitation against the US postwar global economic system overseas. Williams fathered the "Wisconsin School" of economic diplomacy that remained highly influential into the 1990s. An example of its influence is Carolyn Eisenberg's *Drawing the Line: The American Decision to Divide Germany, 1944–1949* (1996), which emphasizes the US role in the events that led from postwar occupation to Cold War confrontation. Likewise, Bruce Cumings, *The Origins of the Korean War: Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes, 1945–1947* (1981) offers a deeply skeptical view of American intentions in Asia.

Post-revisionist historians, particularly John Lewis Gaddis's *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History* (1997) offered a spirited critique of Cold War



revisionism, believing the approach overemphasizes economic considerations and belittles valid concerns about the Soviets' postwar intentions. Armed with batches of freshly declassified US government documents and access to the first materials from the archives of the Warsaw Pact countries, they challenged the notion that US occupation efforts were wholly self-serving instruments of global domination. Two significant examples of occupation histories of the post-revisionist school, James Jay Carafano's *Waltzing into the Cold War: The Struggle for Occupied Austria* (2002) and Nicholas Evan Sarantakes, *Keystone: The American Occupation of Okinawa and U.S. – Japanese Relations* (2000), painted a more nuanced picture of US military efforts. They found that the influence of adaptation, innovation, happenstance, and interagency government rivalry played a greater role in determining the conduct of the occupations than grand postwar American strategy.

The American understanding of the Soviet Union's joint occupation of Germany and Austria and its impact on US occupations was ambiguous and misunderstood by both practitioners and historians throughout the course of the Cold War. William Lloyd Stearman's *The Soviet Union and the Occupation of Austria* (1961) is typical of the western view of Soviet occupations written during the Cold War. Far better is Tony Judt's *Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945* (2005) which draws on much recently declassified material to persuasively argue that Soviet intentions were not as aggressive as Americans feared during the decade of postwar occupations. Nor, on the other hand, were they benign. Stalin concentrated on consolidating his power over Eastern Europe. In the West, Stalin ordered Communist parties to join in with and co-op other socialist groups and to expand their political base. Stalin's strategy largely explains that while the US forces faced significant security challenges from crime and displaced persons, they only faced a modicum of organized armed opposition. Rather than providing sanctuaries and support, Stalin, in fact, discouraged insurgencies in Trieste and Greece. It was only with the outbreak of the Korean War that Stalin revised his policy against encouraging armed confrontations with the West.

In addition, as more balanced and nuanced views of the occupation era emerged it appears that many factors, in addition to superpower rivalries, impacted on how activities were conducted and the results of US efforts. *Remaking Japan: The American Occupation as New Deal* (1987), the recollections of Theodore Cohen, who served on MacArthur's staff, makes the case that the general was far less independent and authoritarian in imposing a new postwar order than the legend of the "American Caesar" suggests. Günter Bischof in *Austria in the First Cold War, 1945–55: The Leverage of the Weak* (1999) illustrates how the fledgling government was able to manipulate Allied policies and play the great powers off against each others to the advantage of the occupied. S. Jonathan Wiesen in *West German Industry & the Challenge of the Nazi Past* (2001) explains how German industrialists contributed to undermining Allied denazification policies.

Despite the more intriguing and complex description of occupation operations that began to emerge as superpower confrontation cooled, in the closing years of the Cold War, conventional military histories showed even less interest in the

postwar era. The occupations seemed no longer relevant to understanding the competition between East and West. Post-conflict activities, however, did receive renewed interest from scholars concerned with “new military history,” studies on non-traditional subjects such as gender, ethnic, and cultural studies. For example, Reinhold Wagnleitner’s *Coca-Colonization and the Cold War: The Cultural Mission of the United States in Austria after the Second World War* (1994) and John Dower’s *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II* (1998) focused on the unintended influence of the American consumer culture on occupied peoples, and Petra Goedde (2002) argues convincingly that fraternization between American soldiers and German citizens played an important role in both transforming German society and in changing American perceptions of Germany that laid the basis for friendship between the two nations even before the Cold War. Despite the interest in history of ordinary GIs and civilians, there are few detailed studies of the impact of occupation forces on local communities. One of the rare exceptions was Boyd L. Dastrup’s (1985) study on the occupation of Nuremberg.

Rare as well are published personnel remembrances of occupation operations. Notable contributions include memoirs by Jacob Van Staaveren (1994), a civilian education officer in Japan, William S. Triplet (2001), a senior army officer in occupied Okinawa, James Milano (Milano and Brogan 1995), an army intelligence officer who served in post-war Vienna; and Arthur D. Kahn (2004), an OSS operative who was Chief Editor of Intelligence of the Information Control Division in the American Occupation Zone of Germany in 1945 and 1946. All of these testify to how the initiative of individuals on the ground shaped both the conduct of occupations and how occupiers were perceived by the occupied.

Views of the occupation from the perspective of residents of the areas are equally rare. Kasuo Kawai (1960) assesses how the Japanese people responded to SCAP’s program of political, social, and economic reform. In a broader study Michael S. Molasky (1999) analyzes Japanese literature to explore how the people of Japan viewed their American occupiers and how the people of Okinawa have viewed both the Japanese and Americans who have occupied their island since 1879. Focusing on cultural interaction, Yokiko Koshiro (1999) argues that the mutual racism that marked the war in the Pacific virtually disappeared during the US occupation of Japan.

After the fall of the Berlin Wall, historians found new relevance in the subject of postwar occupations. In the new world disorder, following the collapse of the Soviet Union the United States found itself frequently involved in operations involving humanitarian crises, post-conflict operations, and failed states. To post-Cold War scholars, the occupations of the postwar period offered a historical perspective for understanding what seemed to be new and unprecedented challenges for US forces. James Dobbins *et al.*’s, *America’s Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq* (2003), for example, used the postwar occupations to estimate appropriate force levels that should have been employed to Iraq after US troops deposed the regime of Saddam Hussein. Kendall D. Gott, *Mobility, Vigilance, and Justice: The US Army Constabulary in Germany, 1946–1953* (2005) examined the Army’s postwar effort to organize and employ military troops

specifically designed for occupation duties. Constabulary troops were quasi-military police units trained to conduct law enforcement duties, but organized along the lines of mounted cavalry units. Some argue units similarly organized would be better suited for missions the US Army has conducted in the post-Cold War era in Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan.

Indeed, a serious study of occupation operations reveals many of the problems that habitually plague US operations. The military lacked organizations, institution, doctrine, and forces to sustain the competencies required to perform these missions well. Preparations for the post-conflict period were inadequate. Troops were poorly trained and organized for the task, the various government agencies in charge of coordinating relief didn't work well together, and priorities weren't always settled. It seems the strongest American tradition with regards to occupation duties is a tradition of forgetting how to do them and learning the task on the job.

Despite a half-century of scholarship, much of the postwar occupation period remains undiscovered for contemporary historians. There are few courses taught on the subject either at American universities or professional military schools. There is no comprehensive modern treatment of the occupation of Trieste. The war for peace is history that is still largely unwritten.

#### BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Beschloss, Michael (2002). *The Conquerors: Roosevelt, Truman and the Destruction of Hitler's Germany*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Bischof, Günter (1999). *Austria in the First Cold War, 1945–55: The Leverage of the Weak*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Caldwell, John C. (1952). *The Korea Story*. Chicago: Henry Regnery.
- Carafano, James Jay (2002). *Waltzing into the Cold War: The Struggle for Occupied Austria*. College Station: Texas A&M University Press.
- Clay, Lucius (1950). *Decision in Germany*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday.
- Cohen, Theodore (1987). *Remaking Japan: The American Occupation as New Deal*, ed. by Herbert Passin. New York: Free Press.
- Coles, Henry, and Albert Weinberg (1964). *Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors*. Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History.
- Cumings, Bruce (1981). *The Origins of the Korean War*, vol. 1: *Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes, 1945–1947*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Dastrup, Boyd L. (1985). *Crusade in Nuremberg: Military Occupation, 1945–1949*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
- Dobbins, James *et al.* (2003). *America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq*. Santa Monica, CA: Rand.
- Dower, John (1998). *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II*. New York: W. W. Norton.
- Eisenberg, Carolyn (1996). *Drawing the Line: The American Decision to Divide Germany, 1944–1949*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Gaddis, John Lewis (1997). *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Goedde, Petra (2002). *GIs and Germans: Culture, Gender and Foreign Relations, 1945–1949*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

- Gott, Kendall D. (2005). *Mobility, Vigilance, and Justice: The US Army Constabulary in Germany, 1946–1953*. Fort Leavenworth, KA: Combat Studies Institute Press.
- Judt, Tony (2005). *Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945*. London: Penguin Books.
- Kahn, Arthur D. (2004). *Experiment in Occupation: Witness to the Turnabout, Anti-Nazi War to Cold War, 1944–1946*. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.
- Kawai, Kazuo (1960). *Japan's American Interlude: The American Occupation of Okinawa and U.S.–Japanese Relations*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Koshiro, Yukiko (1999). *Trans-Pacific Racisms and the U.S. Occupation of Japan*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- MacDonald, Donald S. (1948). “Field Experience in Military Government: Cholla Namdo Province, 1945–1946,” in Carl J. Friedrich and Associates, *American Experience in Military Government in World War II*. New York: Rinehart and Co., 364–77.
- Marrus, Michael (1985). *The Unwanted: European Refugees in the Twentieth Century*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Meade, E. Grant (1951). *American Military Government in Korea*. New York: King's Crown Press.
- Milano, James, and Patrick Brogan (1995). *Soldiers, Spies and the Rat Line: America's Undeclared War against the Soviets*. Washington: Brassey's.
- Molasky, Micheal S. (1999). *The American Occupation of Japan and Okinawa: Literature and Memory*. New York: Routledge.
- Oh, Bonnie B. C., ed. (2002). *Korea under the American Military Government, 1945–1948*. Westport, CT: Praeger.
- Ottoboni, Fred (1997). *Korea Between the Wars: A Soldier's Story*. Sparks, NV: Vincente Books.
- Perry, John Curtis (1980). *Beneath the Eagle's Wings: Americans in Occupied Japan*. New York: Dodd, Mead.
- Sarantakes, Nicholas Evans (2000). *Keystone: The America Occupation of Okinawa and U.S.–Japanese Relations*. College Station: Texas A&M University Press.
- Schmidl, Erwin A., ed. (2000). *Peace Operations: Between War and Peace*. London: Frank Cass.
- Sheldon, Walt (1965). *Honorable Conquerors: The Occupation of Japan, 1945–1952*. New York: Macmillan.
- Stearman, William Lloyd (1961). *The Soviet Union and the Occupation of Austria: An Analysis of Soviet Policy in Austria, 1945–1955*. Bonn: Siegler.
- Triplet, William S. (2001). *In the Philippines and Okinawa: A Memoir, 1945–1948*, ed. by Robert H. Ferrell. Columbia: University of Missouri Press.
- Van Staaveren, Jacob (1994). *An American in Japan, 1945–1948: A Civilian View of the Occupation*. Seattle: University of Washington Press.
- Wagnleitner, Reinhold (1994). *Coca-Colonization and the Cold War: The Cultural Mission of the United States in Austria after the Second World War*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Wiesen, S. Jonathan (2001). *West German Industry & the Challenge of the Nazi Past*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Williams, William Appleman (1959). *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*. New York: W. W. Norton.
- Ziemke, Earl F. (1974). *The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany, 1944–1946*. Washington: Center of Military History.
- Zink, Harold (1947). *American Military Government in Germany*. New York: Macmillan.

## Chapter Thirty-six

# MILITARY OPERATIONS IN LATIN AMERICA, 1961–2001

*Lawrence Yates*

From its earliest days as an independent republic, the United States has demonstrated an abiding interest in events and developments in the Western Hemisphere, particularly in the Caribbean area, which encompasses not just the island countries, but also Central America, Mexico, and northern South America. Circumstance would dictate specific US concerns and policies at any given time, but, in general, Washington has sought to protect American lives, economic interests, and property; to secure the country's southern flank by keeping other powers from establishing military bases in the area; and, after 1903, to defend the Panama Canal. The means by which policymakers sought to achieve these objectives ranged from bilateral treaties and regional conferences to economic and political pressure, naval patrols and implied military threats, and, on occasion, the short-term landing of American sailors or marines – a practice Alan Millett terms *interposition* – to resolve some problem threatening US interests. Beginning with the Spanish–American War, the United States also resorted to armed intervention, which between 1898 and 1934 included Cuba, Mexico, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Nicaragua (Yates 2006). To some contemporaries and historians (Nearing and Freeman 1925, Williams 1959) “dollar diplomacy” and “gunboat diplomacy” served primarily to preserve America's economic hegemony in the region, while to others, stability was the principal motive, with the Marines, sailors, and soldiers involved in the interventions imbued with the values of Main Street not Wall Street (Langley 1983) as they sought to remake the occupied countries in America's image (Munro 1964, 1974). Most of these attempts failed, and in the early 1930s, the impact of the Great Depression played a major role in closing the era of the “banana wars.” Replacing it was the Good Neighbor Policy, with its adherence to the principle of nonintervention.

With the end of World War II and the advent of the Cold War in the mid-1940s, the United States enacted policies in Latin America designed to preserve stability by containing communism, the appeal of which would prove potent, American leaders feared, in countries with underdeveloped economies and repressive dictatorships. During the administration of President Harry Truman, the United States engineered the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance of

1947 (commonly known the Rio Treaty or Rio Pact), which declared that an attack on one American republic would be regarded by the signatories as an attack on them all, and, a year later, the Charter of the Organization of American States (OAS), which strengthened hemispheric solidarity while providing an instrument for the enactment of military measures under the collective security clauses of the Rio Treaty. In 1951, with war raging in Korea, Congress voted to extend military assistance to Latin America. When combined with other measures, this initiative grew into a comprehensive program for protecting the hemisphere from possible, if improbable, incursions by the Soviet Union.

During the first 20 years of the Cold War, the United States avoided open military intervention in Latin America, relying in part on clandestine operations by the young Central Intelligence Agency to deal with any serious communist threat to the south. In 1954, for example, the Agency engineered a successful coup d'état against an elected government in Guatemala that Washington believed – incorrectly, in the opinion of some (Immerman 1982, Schlesinger and Kinzer 2005) – to be on the verge of going communist. Five years later, when Fidel Castro seized power in Cuba and began moving the island into the Soviet camp, President Eisenhower turned to the CIA to remove the dictator, calling for Castro to be “sawed off at the knees” (Rabe 1988). While President John Kennedy inherited and approved the Agency’s plan to have Cuban exiles invade and free their homeland, he insisted that the operation be executed without overt American military involvement. For this and numerous other reasons, the invasion at the Bay of Pigs in April 1961 turned into a fiasco: the exiles were defeated, Castro moved even closer to the Soviet Union, and his regime vowed to continue exporting revolution throughout the region (Wyden 1979, Kornbluh 1998, Grow 2008). CIA operations were more successful in British Guiana (which became Guyana upon its independence from Britain in 1966). There the CIA, working through the AFL-CIO, generated unrest and opposition that toppled the Marxist Cheddi Jagan and in 1964 placed Forbes Burnham in power (Rabe 2005).

By then, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev was already on record as supporting “wars of national liberation” in Latin America. While Kennedy responded with economic and social programs designed to strengthen nationalist and reformist (as opposed to revolutionary) elements in the region, he also directed the US military, especially the Army, to bolster its counterinsurgency capabilities (Birtle 2006). According to some analysts, including Douglas Blaufarb (1977) and Andrew Krepinevich (1986), the Army resisted the directive, seeing Kennedy’s emphasis on unconventional warfare as undermining the service’s more traditional roles. The president, though, enjoyed some success, particularly in increasing the number of Special Forces, or Green Berets, and reorienting their mission from one of fomenting insurgencies behind Soviet lines in the event of World War III to one emphasizing counterinsurgency. Throughout the 1960s, Green Berets in the 7th Special Forces Group at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and with the Special Action Force located in the Panama Canal Zone, organized Mobile Training Teams for deployment to various Latin American countries, where they performed both military and nonmilitary missions. Besides the Special Forces, US military advisers and Military



Assistance Advisory Groups also helped train Latin American armed forces in the arts of counterinsurgency (Yates 1988a).

While preparing for a series of “small wars,” the Kennedy administration was confronted in late 1962 with evidence that the Soviet Union had placed nuclear missiles in Cuba capable of reaching most of the continental United States. Thus, in violation of over a century of US policy proclamations against outside intervention in the Western Hemisphere, an island 90 miles off America’s coast had become a military base for a hostile foreign power. After nearly a week of debate, most of which was captured on tape (May and Zelikow 1997), Kennedy’s initial response was to “quarantine” the island through the use of US naval forces, thereby preventing further missiles from reaching Cuba. He also permitted the Pentagon to plan for air strikes and, as a last resort, an invasion of the island, two scenarios that required the mobilization of some military units in the United States for combat. Before the scheduled invasion could be launched, however, the Kremlin agreed to dismantle and remove the missiles in return for both an American promise never to invade the island and an unpublicized commitment to remove obsolete Jupiter missiles from Turkey. While some observers criticized Kennedy for making the “no invasion” pledge, others praised his crisis-management skills (one exception being Dean Acheson who argued that the president simply benefited from “pure dumb luck”). Critics also argued that the danger of nuclear war during the crisis was overplayed, although knowledge acquired two decades later that Soviet commanders in Cuba possessed tactical nuclear missiles and the willingness to use them if the Americans came ashore has largely discredited that supposition (House 1991, Stern 2003, Polmar and Gresham 2006, Dobbs 2008).

With Castro firmly entrenched in power, US policy in the region gave even greater emphasis to preventing a “second Cuba.” Within a year and a half after John F. Kennedy was assassinated and Lyndon B. Johnson became president adherence to this goal compelled Johnson to mount the first overt US military intervention in Latin America since the 1930s. The location was the Dominican Republic on the island of Hispaniola in the Caribbean. In May 1961, the country’s strongman, Rafael Trujillo, had been gunned down by a group of his domestic opponents. The assassins had received support from the CIA, part of both Eisenhower’s and Kennedy’s efforts to remove right-wing dictatorships, which they had come to believe only encouraged communist agitation, and, when possible, to support reformist governments in Latin America (Rabe 1999). Under US pressure, elections took place in December 1962, with Juan Bosch being elected the new Dominican president. While applauding the democratic process, Washington policymakers looked upon Bosch as a naive, left-leaning leader who would be swayed by communist groups in the country. Thus, when the Dominican military overthrew his government in September 1963, neither Kennedy nor his successor protested. The civilian Triumvirate that replaced Bosch received US recognition, but could not sustain its initial popularity. In April 1965, armed protesters mainly confined to the streets of the Santo Domingo, the capital city, overthrew the regime and set up a provisional government calling for Bosch’s return from exile. When conservative sectors in the Dominican armed forces challenged this arrangement,

the capital became the site of a virtual civil war pitting the rebel “Constitutionalists” against the military “Loyalists” and their supporters. Observing the crisis, US policymakers feared that a rebel victory would lead to a communist takeover, with the country becoming the dreaded “second Cuba” (Lowenthal 1972).

In the first days of the conflict, the Johnson administration proclaimed its neutrality, even though behind the scenes it was assisting the Loyalists who seemed at first to be winning. When the rebels reversed this trend and gained the upper hand, Johnson ordered US forces to intervene. So urgent did the president consider the situation that he believed he could not wait for an OAS resolution to legitimize his actions. Instead, while the OAS debated, the first contingent of Marines landed in southwestern Santo Domingo. Two days later, a brigade from the 82nd Airborne Division landed at the Loyalist stronghold of San Isidro, 10 miles northeast of the city, and quickly moved on the capital. The Marines and the airborne soldiers both encountered armed resistance in which they inflicted and suffered casualties. A few days later, the paratroopers linked up with the Marines, in the process establishing a Line of Communication (LOC) across the city that isolated the bulk of the rebel forces in southeastern Santo Domingo. After Loyalist forces defeated pockets of rebel fighters north of the LOC in mid-May, the Johnson administration actually assumed the neutral position it had claimed all along and worked to achieve a political solution to the crisis. In the meantime, the Marines were redeployed, and US paratroopers became part of an Inter-American Peace Force approved by the OAS and commanded by a Brazilian general. Although the troops experienced almost daily sniper fire, there was, with one exception in mid-June, no real combat but rather a myriad of tasks best described by the term *stability operations* that aimed at restoring order and functioning services to the capital. In September, a new provisional government supported by all but the most extreme elements on both sides was sworn in, and the following July, after a much heralded election campaign, a new Dominican president, Joaquín Balaguer, took office (Palmer 1989, Yates 1988a).

In September 1966, the American forces still in the country were withdrawn. At its peak, the intervention had involved nearly 24,000 US troops, 27 of whom had been killed and 172 wounded. In that law and order had been restored, elections held, and a communist takeover avoided, the Johnson administration viewed the intervention as a success. Throughout Latin America, however, support for the stability operation was tempered with concern over the willingness of the United States to resume unilateral military intervention in the Caribbean area. Critics of the intervention, such as Senator William Fulbright (1966), expressed outrage over the “abuse of executive power,” while reporters like Tad Szulc (1965) complained of the “credibility gap” the White House had created with its demonstrably false proclamations of neutrality early in the crisis and with its questionable insistence that the rebel leaders were predominantly communist. Similar sentiments about the Johnson administration would be expressed much more vehemently during the Vietnam War.

That war in Southeast Asia preoccupied the American people for the remainder of the 1960s and the first three years of the 1970s, eclipsing Cold War challenges

still present in Latin America, mainly in the form of the communist-led insurgencies that had so troubled Kennedy's forecast for the region. Throughout the 1960s, several insurgent groups were active in the hemisphere: some of the groups antedated Castro's coming to power, others began in response to his success. The most dangerous of these were considered to be operating in Guatemala, Colombia, Venezuela, Peru, and Bolivia. Each of the groups was different in terms of organization, membership, tactics, appeals, and degrees of initial success (Wickham-Crowley 1992). The Guatemala insurgency, for example, began in the early 1960s with a split in the country's armed forces, with a number of younger officers breaking away and embracing some form of communist-oriented armed resistance because of their government's "subservience" to the United States or because of their military's own internal politics (Yates 1988b). In Bolivia, in contrast, outsiders led by Ernesto "Che" Guevara, a prominent leader in Cuba's successful guerrilla war and a symbol of that country's commitment to revolution, naively tried to transpose the Cuban revolutionary model, which many experts (Waghelstein 1979) regarded as irrelevant to Bolivia, onto an Indian population that spoke little or no Spanish, and who had already experienced a "revolution" of sorts initiated by the government in La Paz in 1952. In all five of the worst cases, a variety of counterinsurgency approaches, generally combining political reform, civic action projects, and military action (the latter often carried out by local forces trained and often accompanied by US advisers) appeared to have defeated the insurgent groups by the late 1960s and early 1970s. Of these "victories," the most spectacular was the capture of Che by US-trained Bolivian rangers and his subsequent execution in the field on orders of the Bolivian government (Ryan 1998).

With communist-led insurgencies driven underground or minimized in most Latin American countries by the early 1970s, the administration of President Richard Nixon gave lip service to democratic reform but in reality paid scant attention to the region so long as it was relatively stable and did not impinge on larger issues of global Cold War politics. One exception to this relative inattention occurred with the election of Salvador Allende, a Marxist, as Chile's president in 1970. That country's importance to the United States was less strategic – "the dagger pointed at the heart of Antarctica," Henry Kissinger once quipped – than economic and symbolic. During the 1960s, Chile had been heralded by US policymakers as a model of a reformist state charting a democratic and economically progressive "middle path" between the destructive forces of reactionary dictatorships on the right and communist revolution on the left. By late in the decade, however, the model had been tarnished, thus paving the way for the success of the radical left in 1970. Troubled by Allende's ideology and plans to nationalize many American corporate holdings in the country, Nixon had tried to prevent his election. When that failed, the administration changed tactics, taking advantage of growing resentment within the Chilean business community and military against Allende to encourage a coup d'état against him. On September 11, 1973, the Chilean armed forces moved against their president, who was killed – either by his own hand or by the military – during the fighting. In the aftermath, thousands of Allende's followers were rounded up and either imprisoned or executed.

The United States denied all involvement in the bloody coup, but investigators have insisted that CIA and US military personnel in Chile were active participants in the conspiracy (Davis 1985, Dinges 2004, Haslam 2005, Dallek 2007, Gustafson 2007).

From the White House's perspective, the Allende affair posed only a modest distraction from Nixon's foreign policy initiatives toward the Soviet Union and the Peoples Republic of China, the Middle East, and Vietnam, and in the area of strategic arms limitations. Nor did Latin America play much of an issue in the election campaign between President Gerald Ford and Governor Jimmy Carter in 1976, despite the debate that erupted over whether the United States should sign a treaty – the product of negotiations since the mid-1960s by Republican and Democratic administrations alike – that would turn the US-controlled Panama Canal over to the Panamanian government in the year 2000. Ford said he would sign the treaty but was defeated; Carter said he “would not relinquish practical control of the Panama Canal Zone any time in the foreseeable future,” then, soon after becoming president, signed the treaty that did just that. After a highly contentious debate in the United States, the treaty was ratified. Near the end of his one term in office, Carter, in October 1980, had to deal with another Caribbean problem, the Mariel boatlift from Cuba, the mishandling of which became a scandal in the United States (Larzelere 1988). In between the Panama treaty and the boatlift, in a much more serious development for the administration, the communist-led insurgencies in Latin America resurfaced with a vengeance.

Many if not most of the “defeated” guerrilla groups from the 1960s had simply gone underground, where between the early and late 1970s, they had regrouped, reexamined their ideological tenets, and increased their membership by denouncing the political abuses and socioeconomic inequities of the regimes they opposed. In most cases, the insurgents had learned from their previous setbacks and had adjusted their tactics and appeals accordingly. In the opinion of one US Army counterinsurgency expert, three new elements in the insurgents' approach were especially deserving of attention. One was Liberation Theology, which combined Marxism and religion in such a way as to persuade the rural poor in many countries that they were the victims of Western imperialism and, as such, had the right to take up arms against the local elites – generally portrayed as puppets of the United States – who exploited them. A second initiative embodied a lesson the insurgents had learned from observing the Vietnam War, namely, that they could use the mass media to sway American public opinion to their side. By expressing their cause in moral certainties, as a black and white struggle involving the virtuous victims of right-wing violence, greed, and oppression, the insurgents hoped for a repeat of the Vietnam experience in which many Americans actively opposed the anticommunist policies of their government. The brutal tactics of reactionary regimes such as those in Guatemala and El Salvador only served to reinforce the effectiveness of this tactic. The final new element grew out of the realization that most insurgencies would enjoy a greater chance of success if they ended their intolerance of other, noncommunist opposition movements, at least in public, and combined their efforts with groups seeking to oust the regime in power in any

given country. This broad-front approach had worked in Cuba and, 20 years later, in 1979, it proved effective in toppling the dictatorship of Anastasio Somoza Debayle in Nicaragua. Although the communist Sandinistas were only one part of the movement that overthrew the dictator, they were the best armed and, within a year, had taken over the government. The “second Cuba” so feared by US presidents from Kennedy to Carter had, this time, become a reality (Waghelstein 1985, Pastor 1987, Lake 1990).

As insurgencies in the late 1970s and 1980s reemerged in several Latin American countries, the ones of greatest concern to Washington following the Sandinistas success in Nicaragua were in Guatemala and El Salvador. In the former country, excessive military violence in which entire villages suspected of supporting the guerrillas would simply disappear caused Carter to withhold overt US military aid (but not covert assistance), even after his hemispheric policies began to emphasize US security over human rights issues (Pastor 1987). The change in emphasis could be seen in El Salvador, where, after communist guerrillas of the FMLN launched their “final offensive” in January 1981, he restored military aid that he himself had canceled. When Ronald Reagan became president later in the month, he, too, was determined to reverse the recent successes of the communist insurgents in Central America. In 1983, he restored military assistance to Guatemala and gave his tacit support to the excessive counterinsurgency tactics of its armed forces. With respect to Nicaragua, he authorized CIA efforts to mount an insurgency – the Contras – against the Sandinista regime (Cruz 1989, Kagan 1996) which he accused of receiving Soviet and Cuban military aid, much of which was finding its way to guerrilla forces in neighboring El Salvador. In that country, US Special Forces and a Military Advisory Group helped train the Salvadoran army in counter-guerrilla tactics (Bacevich *et al* 1988, Manwaring and Prisk 1988, Schwarz 1991). Yet, despite an emphasis on civic action and other reform programs designed to build popular support for the government, the fighting in the cities and countryside tended to be brutal, with atrocities committed by right-wing death squads, the Salvadoran army, and the guerrillas themselves. In pursuing his Salvadoran policies, Reagan found himself restrained by the legacy of Vietnam in two ways. First, a sizeable segment of public opinion in the United States saw Vietnam and Central America in analogous terms and charged that the administration’s policies in the latter area were propping up dictatorial regimes. Second, concerns about becoming bogged down in another regional war – “no more Vietnams” – limited the number of Green Berets and other US troops deployed in El Salvador to just over 100 at any given time.

Restricted on what he could do to combat communism in Central America, Reagan enjoyed better fortune in removing a Marxist regime from the eastern Caribbean island of Grenada in October 1983. There, the leftist New Jewel Movement had seized power in 1979 and was receiving arms and other aid from the Soviet Union and Cuba. Cuban technicians, in fact, were helping to build a large runway in the southwest corner of the island, for commercial airlines the Grenadan government claimed, even though the facility’s dimensions would also accommodate military transports, including those carrying Cuban troops to fight in

Angola. When an internecine power struggle within the New Jewel Movement led to the murder of Grenada's prime minister by the opposing faction, the violence and instability that followed provided a pretext for Reagan to order a US invasion, ostensibly to evacuate American medical students on the island, but also to overthrow the communist regime. Once US Marines, Special Operations Forces, and combat elements from the 82nd Airborne Division began the assault on October 25, the outcome of Operation Urgent Fury was never in doubt. Although suffering a number of casualties (19 deaths and 116 wounded, many from friendly fire), the US military achieved its objectives within four days, after which stability operations took precedence over combat. As in the Dominican Republic nearly two decades earlier, the US fighting units redeployed leaving behind a pro-American, anticommunist government. Reagan was charged with invading Grenada to deflect public attention from the bombing of US Marines in Beirut just two days before, but documented studies (Cole 1997) show that, for all practical purposes, the decision for intervention had been made the day before Beirut. On the whole, the invasion was regarded as a success, even though the American forces were plagued by a variety of interservice problems (Adkin 1989).

Nearly five years later, in spring 1988, Reagan found himself under pressure from the State Department to use military force to remove the dictatorship of General Antonio Noriega in Panama. Panamanians had begun demonstrating against the regime the previous July, and the crisis had gradually escalated into a confrontation with the United States, especially after two federal grand juries in Florida indicted Noriega on drug-trafficking charges in February 1988. The Pentagon and US military commanders in Panama opposed intervention and persuaded the president to pursue a diplomatic solution to the problem. In the meantime, the US Southern Command headquartered in Panama began drafting contingency plans, including one for the kind of all-out invasion it opposed, just in case the regime forced the White House to act. The command also brought in additional troops and established a joint task force to manage the crisis on a day-to-day basis, a necessary move considering the thousands of US forces based in the country and the tens of thousands of American citizens living there (Yates 2008).

The crisis came to a head in 1989 when, after Noriega annulled the May presidential elections and had the regime's victorious opponents beaten, President George H.W. Bush, Reagan's successor, deployed even more US forces in Operation Nimrod Dancer to protect American lives, rights, and property. Then, in early October, after a number of soldiers in the Panamanian military paid with their lives for mounting an unsuccessful coup against their commander, many US officers came to regard intervention as inevitable. In mid-December, after Panamanian guards at a roadblock killed a US Marine, Bush ordered military action, Operation Just Cause. Twenty-seven thousand troops based in Panama and from the United States took part in the surprise attack, and as in the Dominican Republic and Grenada interventions, the fighting was over in a matter of a few days, at the loss of 24 US servicemen. The opposition leaders denied office in May now formed a new government, Noriega eventually surrendered to stand trial in the United States, and under Operation Promote Liberty, a US Military Support Group



helped in the reconstruction of Panama over the course of 1990 (Donnelly, Roth, and Baker 1991, Woodward 1991, Fishel 1992, Flanagan 1993, Cole 1995).

The Panama crisis began during the Cold War but ended as that international conflict was coming to an unexpected close. The fall of the Berlin Wall, the new courses charted by Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin from the Kremlin, and the dissolution of the Soviet Union itself had their impact on Latin America. As Soviet aid to Cuba dried up, the Cold War trouble spots in Central America saw a wave of political accommodations. The Sandinistas relinquished power in Nicaragua after elections, and the insurgencies in Guatemala and El Salvador gave way to tentative efforts at reconciliation. Castro remained in power, but unable to project whatever remained of his revolutionary fervor beyond his borders. At one point, President Bush forecast a New World Order, in which Cold War antagonisms would be replaced by a wide range of cooperative endeavors and greater international stability.

Many experts in international relations disputed this sanguine forecast, arguing instead that many of the regional, local, racial, tribal, religious, and various other conflicts that the Cold War had actually helped to mute would now resurface or be exacerbated. The world was about to become a more, not less dangerous place. In Latin America, drug trafficking continued to pose a long-term, possibly unsolvable regional issue for the United States. In terms of specific countries, extreme poverty and a brutal dictatorship in Haiti caused many in that country between 1992 and 1994 to flee in boats, heading for the United States. Some drowned en route; of those who made it, many were forcefully repatriated. With nightly news programs showing footage of the humanitarian tragedy, pressure mounted on President Bill Clinton, Bush's successor, to take action. When US and OAS economic sanctions and several negotiated agreements failed to halt the violence, and when in early October 1993 – around the same time as the “Black Hawk Down” incident in Somalia – an American naval vessel, the USS *Harlan County*, was forced by Haitian mob to depart the harbor at Port-au-Prince, the crisis seemed far from over.

Nearly a year later, in September 1994, the situation became so acute that Clinton ordered US military action in Haiti, code-named Operation Uphold Democracy. At Pope Air Force Base adjoining Fort Bragg, paratroopers from the 82nd Airborne Division boarded transports for the country anticipating what could be a difficult but inevitably winnable fight with the Haitian armed forces. In mid-air, however, the transports turned around and returned to Pope after the pilots received word that, in Haiti, a delegation led by former President Carter and including General Colin Powell and Senator Sam Nunn had persuaded the Haitian strongman, Raoul Cédras, to step down (he left the country for Panama). US troops from the 10th Mountain Division replaced the paratroopers in a peaceful landing that also included US Marines and Special Operations Forces (Shacochis 1999). Over the ensuing weeks and months, the troops worked as part of a multinational force to reorganize and train the Haitian armed forces, to assist the government of returning president, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, and to help arrange for elections the following year. A US troop drawdown began in December, and elements of the US 25th Infantry Division (Light) replaced the 10th Mountain

troops. By 1995, the situation, while far from ideal, had been stabilized to where the last American forces could leave. Within years of the intervention, however, violence and instability had once again reached unacceptable levels, and in March 2004, the UN Security Council authorized deployment of another multinational force, including a small number of US troops, to the country (Ballard 1998, Kretchik, Baumann, and Fishel 1998).

After September 11, 2001, the attention of American policymakers shifted away from Latin America and to the Middle East and Central Asia. Looking back on the results of US military operations in Latin America during the Cold War and immediate post-Cold War period, the record is mixed. Interventions in the Dominican Republic, Grenada, and Panama resolved certain problems and left fairly stable governments in power (Crandall 2006). Haiti stands as an exception to that outcome. As for counterinsurgency programs, they worked more to contain communist-led guerrillas than to defeat them, and even this beneficial result did not come without a high cost in human misery and domestic protest. The United States survived the threats perceived to emanate from communist regimes in Cuba and Nicaragua, but the failure of communism in the region did not necessarily mean a better life for hundreds of thousands Latin Americans; nor did it end the appeal of Castroism and left-of-center approaches to the area's socioeconomic woes. Meanwhile, old problems festered – the narco-insurgents in Colombia, for example – and new problems have emerged, such as the contentious relationship between the United States and the Chavez government in Venezuela. For the foreseeable future, however, these will be regarded by the American people as sideshows to the war against terrorism.

#### BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Adkin, Mark (1989). *Urgent Fury: The Battle for Grenada*. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky.
- Bacevich, Andrew, James Hallums, Richard White, and Thomas Young (1988). *American Military Policy in Small Wars: The Case of El Salvador*. Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's.
- Ballard, John R. (1998). *Upholding Democracy: The United States Military Campaign in Haiti, 1994–1997*. Westport, CT: Praeger.
- Birtle, Andrew J. (2006). *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1942–1976*. Washington: US Army Center of Military History.
- Blaufarb, Douglas (1977). *The Counterinsurgency Era: U.S. Doctrine and Performance, 1950 to the Present*. New York: Free Press.
- Cole, Ronald H. (1995). *Operation Just Cause: The Planning and Execution of Joint Operations in Panama, February 1988–January 1990*. Washington: Joint History Office.
- Cole, Ronald H. (1997). *Operation Urgent Fury: The Planning and Execution of Joint Operations in Grenada, 12 October–2 November 1983*. Washington: Joint History Office.
- Crandall, Russell (2006). *Gunboat Democracy: U.S. Intervention in the Dominican Republic, Grenada, and Panama*. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
- Cruz, Arturo, Jr. (1989). *Memoirs of a Counter-Revolutionary*. New York: Doubleday.
- Dallek, Robert (2007). *Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power*. New York: Harper Collins.
- Davis, Nathaniel (1985). *The Last Two Years of Salvador Allende*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

- Dinges, John (2004). *The Condor Years: How Pinochet and His Allies Brought Terrorism to Three Continents*. New York: New Press.
- Dobbs, Michael (2008). *One Minute to Midnight: Kennedy, Khrushchev, and Castro on the Brink of Nuclear War*. New York: Knopf.
- Donnelly, Thomas, Margaret Roth, and Caleb Baker (1991). *Operation Just Cause: The Storming of Panama*. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky.
- Fishel, John T. (1992). *The Fog of Peace: Planning and Executing the Restoration of Panama*. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute.
- Flanagan, Edward M., Jr. (1993). *Battle for Panama: Inside Operation Just Cause*. Washington: Brassey's.
- Fulbright, William J. (1966). *The Arrogance of Power*. New York: Random House.
- Grow, Michael (2008). *U.S. Presidents and Latin American Interventions*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
- Gustafson, Kristian (2007). *Hostile Intent: U.S. Covert Operations in Chile, 1964–1974*. Washington: Potomac Books.
- Haslam, Jonathan (2005). *The Nixon Administration and the Death of Allende's Chile: A Case of Assisted Suicide*. New York: Verso.
- House, Jonathan M. (1991). "Joint Operational Problems in the Cuban Missile Crisis," *Parameters*, 21:1 (Spring), 92–102.
- Immerman, Richard H. (1982). *The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention*. Austin: University of Texas Press.
- Kagan, Robert (1996). *A Twilight Struggle: American Power and Nicaragua, 1977–1990*. New York: Free Press.
- Kornbluh, Peter, ed. (1998). *Bay of Pigs Declassified: The Secret CIA Report on the Invasion of Cuba*. New York: W. W. Norton.
- Krepinevich, Andrew (1986). *The Army and Vietnam*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Kretchik, Walter E., Robert F. Baumann, and John T. Fishel (1998). *Invasion, Intervention, "Intervention": A Concise History of the U.S. Army in Operation Uphold Democracy*. Fort Leavenworth, KA: US Army Command and General Staff College Press.
- Lake, Anthony (1990). *Somoza Falling: A Case Study of Washington at Work*. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press.
- Langley, Lester D. (1983). *The Banana Wars: An Inner History of American Empire, 1900–1934*. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky.
- Larzeler, Alex (1966). *The 1980 Cuban Boatlift*. Washington: National Defense University Press.
- Lowenthal, Abraham F. (1972). *The Dominican Intervention*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Manwaring, Max G., and Court Prisk (1988). *El Salvador at War: An Oral History*. Washington: National Defense University Press.
- May, Ernest R., and Philip D. Zelikow (1997). *The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House during the Cuban Missile Crisis*. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
- Munro, Dana G. (1964). *Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy in the Caribbean, 1900–1921*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Munro, Dana G. (1974). *The United States and the Caribbean Republics, 1921–1933*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Nearing, Scott, and Joseph Freeman (1925). *Dollar Diplomacy: A Study in American Imperialism*. New York: Viking.

- Palmer, Bruce, Jr. (1989). *Intervention in the Caribbean: The Dominican Crisis of 1965*. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky.
- Pastor, Robert (1987). *Condemned to Repetition: The United States and Nicaragua*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Polmar, Norman, and John Gresham (2006). *Defcon-2: Standing on the Brink of Nuclear War during the Cuban Missile Crisis*. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.
- Rabe, Stephen G. (1988). *Eisenhower and Latin America: The Foreign Policy of Anticommunism*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Rabe, Stephen G. (1999). *The Most Dangerous Area in the World: John F. Kennedy Confronts Communist Revolution in Latin America*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Rabe, Stephen G. (2005). *U.S. Intervention in British Guiana: A Cold War Story*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Ryan, Henry Butterfield (1998). *The Fall of Che Guevara*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Schlesinger, Stephen, and Stephen Kinzer (2005). *Bitter Fruit: The Untold Story of the American Coup in Guatemala*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Schwarz, Benjamin C. (1991) *American Counterinsurgency Doctrine and El Salvador*. Santa Monica, CA: Rand.
- Shacochis, Bob (1999). *The Immaculate Invasion*. New York: Viking.
- Stern, Sheldon M. (2003). *Averting "the Final Failure": John F. Kennedy and the Secret Cuban Missile Crisis Meetings*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Szule, Tad (1965). *Dominican Diary*. New York: Delacorte Press.
- Waghelstein, John D. (1979). "Che's Bolivian Adventure," *Military Review*, 59:8 (August), 39–48.
- Waghelstein, John D. (1985). *El Salvador: Observations and Experiences in Counterinsurgency*. Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College.
- Wickham-Crowley, Timothy P. (1992). *Guerrillas and Revolution in Latin America: A Comparative Study of Insurgents and Regimes since 1956*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Williams, William Appleman (1959). *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*. New York: Dell Publishing Co.
- Woodward, Bob (1991). *The Commanders*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Wyden, Peter (1979). *Bay of Pigs: The Untold Story*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Yates, Lawrence A. (1988a). *Power Pack: U.S. Intervention in the Dominican Republic, 1965–1966*. Fort Leavenworth, KA: Combat Studies Institute.
- Yates, Lawrence A. (1988b). "The United States and Rural Insurgency in Guatemala, 1960–1970: An Inter-American 'Success Story?'" in Ralph Lee Woodward, Jr., ed., *Central America: Historical Perspectives on the Contemporary Crises*. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 47–66.
- Yates, Lawrence A. (2006). *The U.S. Military's Experience in Stability Operations, 1789–2005*. Fort Leavenworth, KA: Combat Studies Institute.
- Yates, Lawrence A. (2008). *The U.S. Military Intervention in Panama: Origins, Planning, and Crisis Management, June 1987–December 1989*. Washington: US Army Center of Military History.

## Chapter Thirty-seven

# MILITARY INTERVENTIONS SHORT OF WAR IN THE POST 1975 ERA

*James Meernik*

In the aftermath of US involvement in the war in Vietnam, scholars, pundits, and politicians took away many lessons from that conflict to guide decision-making regarding future US military interventions. Among the many “lessons learned” were that there should, of course, be no more Vietnams; that if the United States were to become involved in other conflicts, politicians should not constrain the US military to fight with one arm tied behind its back; and that the United States should avoid involvement in protracted civil wars. Tying these various threads of arguments together was the notion that the Vietnam War had been politicized and that by avoiding the messy intrusion of politics into the conduct of war, future outcomes would be better. Better still that presidents avoid altogether any conflict that did not allow the United States to capitalize on its strengths and settle for less than all-out victory. Subsequent administrations have certainly remembered these lessons as evidenced by the continual reference made to them by politicians and generals alike. Yet, the central lesson that the Vietnam War should have taught American foreign policy makers is that politics pervades all forms of conflict. The political purposes and consequences of using military force to achieve any foreign policy goal, large or small, cannot be divorced from the military action itself. To plan, deploy and execute military interventions requires an awareness of one’s own political purposes and of the political lens through which all other crisis participants view US actions.

The United States has executed “shows of force,” used limited force, or threatened to use such force to defend its citizens and their interests in foreign lands virtually since its founding. Such actions were usually executed by the Navy and its Marine Corps, hence the origins of the term “Gunboat Diplomacy.” John Schroeder (1985) describes numerous operations during the nineteenth century; James Cable (1986) describes the navy’s execution of them in the period 1919–79, and Robert Mandel has analyzed 133 incidents of their use in the decades between 1946 and 1978 in “The Effectiveness of Gunboat Diplomacy” (1986). In recent years the execution of such operations and the motives behind them have expanded and the term “Military Operations Other than War” has come into use to describe a wider variety of phenomena. These are analyzed in this chapter which surveys

the purposes behind major US military interventions short of war in the post 1975 era as “political uses of military force” (Blechman and Kaplan 1978: 12) to understand more clearly these political events. This framework of analysis is utilized because at their core these military operations short of war involve timeless and fundamental debates about the relationship between military force and politics. And it is this fundamental misunderstanding of the political purposes and consequences of all uses of force that has shaped the nature of US military interventions since 1975.

Military interventions short of war are examples of what Blechman and Kaplan (1978: 12) refer to as “political uses of military force.” They are defined as occurring:

when physical actions are taken by one or more components of the uniformed military services as part of a deliberate attempt by the national authorities to influence, or to be prepared to influence, specific behavior of individuals in another nation without engaging in a continuing contest of violence.

Key to this definition and to a broader understanding of the use of the military as a foreign policy tool is that all these endeavors involve attempts to achieve political goals without imposing one’s will on the other side through force of arms. Thus, no matter what the specific operational objective – aerial bombardment of selected targets, naval quarantines, or merely a military presence – their goals are political aims determined by civilian policy makers. To persist in believing otherwise is to delude oneself about the true nature of the role of military force in foreign policy. The political aspect of the use of military force short of war can be seen in every type of military operation, but this analysis will focus on the more prominent types of military operations in the post-1975 period to demonstrate the pervasiveness of politics in the use of force. The end of the Cold War did not bring to an end to US military interventions as is demonstrated in Richard Haass, *Intervention* (1994), an examination of 12 cases of its utilization in the immediate aftermath of the implosion of the Soviet Union. It will examine military operations involving non-combatant evacuations; the maintenance of peace and stability; and the promotion of democracy.

Non-combatant evacuations are among the most frequent types of uses of force short of war, while peacekeeping operations and interventions to promote democracy occur far less often, but their size, scope of goals and consequences are deep and wide. Presidents rarely justify any of these three types of operations as driven by US political self-interest. Rather, evacuation operations are generally characterized as humanitarian rescue missions; peacekeeping interventions are portrayed as neutral efforts to provide security and stability for civilian populations; and attempts at democracy promotion are advertised as endeavors to bring good governance and peace to the world. That policy makers may still harbor more expressly political objectives, such as preserving access to vital resources, maintaining spheres of influence, and protecting important allies, is to be expected. That policymakers persist in behaving as though foreign actors do not recognize these US



self-interests or assume that the US is acting solely on the basis of its self-interests is risky and the cause of many unfortunate consequences during these operations. But it may explain why administrations frequently misunderstand the nature of the conflicts into which US forces are introduced and the effects its actions have on the strategic, political calculations of foreign actors.

### **Rescuing American Citizens**

The United States government has throughout its history organized numerous military operations to rescue US citizens who were in harm's way overseas (to say nothing of the many missions designed to punish those who have injured or killed Americans). Such Non-combatant Evacuation Operations (NEOs) as they are typically referred to have their origins in foreign countries experiencing political unrest. Americans have been directly threatened or targeted by various factions in these disputes, while sometimes they have merely been unfortunate enough to be residing in some foreign capital when violence breaks out. Whether US citizens are threatened in Cambodia (1975), Iran (1980), Grenada (1983), Panama (1989), Iraq (1990), Liberia (1990, 1992, 1996, 2003), Rwanda (1994), or any number of other nations in turmoil, the protection of American lives is often the first and foremost objective of a use of force. Research has shown that international crises involving threats or attacks on Americans significantly increase the probability that the President will authorize the use of military force (Meernik 1994, 2004). American forces may disembark from US naval vessels floating offshore, or they may fly or use ground transportation in-country to rescue US citizens. In most of these interventions (albeit with some notable exceptions), the rules of engagement American forces adhere to significantly limit their involvement in any other activity beyond rescuing US citizens. But while the operational objectives and the rules of engagement of these forces may be strictly limited, nonetheless these events carry important political overtones.

Groups and governments that deliberately threaten American citizens generally are seeking to achieve a political objective vis-à-vis other local actors. Americans have often become pawns in larger power struggles that may be part of an internal power struggle with external consequences in which the capture of Americans is intended to force some accommodation in US foreign policy (Iran 1979–81, Iraq 1990). Indeed, Americans are rarely simply “caught in the crossfire” – threats and attacks against US citizens are usually designed to elicit an American response that, crisis actors hope, will undermine adversaries, strengthen their own position, and tip the balance of power. Whatever the nature of the US response (for example, a covert rescue operation as in Iran, 1980; a military assault as in the Mayaguez incident, 1975; threats of retribution backed by military force as in Iraq, 1990), US military actions are part of the political-strategic crisis interactions. As such, the use of military force works on two levels. On the one hand such operations are designed and authorized to rescue American citizens, and have usually been quite successful (albeit with some notable exceptions). On the other hand, the

introduction of US forces into unstable and violent situations makes them part of the crisis, no matter how much US officials may insist their purposes are entirely humanitarian. That US policymakers have often used the threat or actual use of violence against Americans as a pretext for launching a major military operation (Grenada 1983, Panama 1989) tends to undermine such claims of neutrality. Ultimately, a hegemon's actions are rarely if ever viewed as entirely devoid of political content. For example, in the case of the multiple NEO's in Liberia in the 1990s, local citizens did not always appreciate that US forces bristling with armaments and disembarking from the navy of the world's only superpower were not supposed to protect them from the violence raging in their nation.

Presidents will almost always use or threaten to use force to protect American citizens overseas. That is one of the near constants of military interventions. Another constant of such operations is the politicization of American lives that takes place during such crises. Foreign actors see US citizens as high-value targets whose capture or death can call attention to their causes; mobilize supporters; and affect the local balance of political power. If anything, the end of the Cold War, which has removed the constraints that used to keep many a foreign government allied with the Soviet Union from attacking American citizens, and the rise of Islamic fundamentalism has made the political value of American lives even greater. The present world is especially dangerous for Americans, made more so by the fact that many terrorist groups see little to gain in sparing US citizens' lives. The decision to use force in any of these circumstances is thus fraught with more peril than foreign policy makers may appreciate.

Several of these NEOs have been the subject of books written for the popular market, often in the period immediately following the operation. Such works include accounts of Grenada by Hugh O'Shaughnessy (1984) and William C. Gilmore (1984); Panama by Thomas Donnelly, Margaret Roth, and Caleb Baker (1990); and Roy Rowan (1975) on the Mayaguez Incident. In later years, historians and military analysts have provided accounts of the same operations, some with more analysis, such as Mark Adkin's *Urgent Fury* (1989) on Grenada; Edward M. Flanagan, Jr.'s *Battle for Panama* (1993); and John Guilmartin (1995) and Ralph Wetterhahn (2001) on the Mayaguez Incident. Comparative works include Russell Crandall's *Gunboat Democracy* (2006) on interventions in the Caribbean and Robert DiPrizio's *Armed Humanitarians* (2002). Works with a more narrow focus include Ronald H. Coles' (1995, 1997) studies of operations in Grenada and Panama which focus on planning and inter-service cooperation.

### Peacekeeping Missions

But if presidents are willing and able frequently to utilize military force to protect American citizens abroad, they have authorized fewer large-scale emplacements of ground and other forces to expressly contain or influence conflicts overseas. While presidents have embarked on major, military interventions in Lebanon (1983), Somalia (1992), Bosnia (1995), and Kosovo (1999) in this period of time, they

have opted for lower-level, logistical or no involvement in many, similar cases, such as in Liberia (since 1990); East Timor (1999); Sierra Leone (late 1990s); Congo (since 1994); Lebanon (since 2005), or to forego intervention altogether as in the case of Rwanda (DiPrizio 2002). The post-Vietnam reluctance to be drawn into such conflicts and Cold War constraints against such involvement outside traditional spheres of influence sharply limited such interventions (Klare 1981). With the end of the Cold War, presidents have authorized several prominent interventions, although the “demand” for actions will always outstrip the supply and willingness of the United States to serve as the world’s policeman. The present problems in Iraq will likely put a further brake on such massive military interventions.

Presidents typically limit such interventions to nations in which there has been a past history of involvement. The US involvement in Lebanon in 1983 had a precursor in a prior, major intervention in 1958 and numerous, other smaller operations during the Cold War (Hammel 1985). The US intervened militarily in Haiti and Panama numerous times during the twentieth century. But while presidents had authorized some rather, discrete uses of military force during Yugoslav crises in the 1950s, most had their origins in Cold War politics. Yet, by the time the US began its military commitments in Bosnia in 1995 and Kosovo in 1999, it had been involved in numerous military operations designed to influence political events in the Balkans earlier in the decade (Burg and Shoup 1999). The United States used force in the Horn of Africa in the late 1970s and early 1980s in response to the conflicts between Somalia and Ethiopia and its contest for regional dominance with the Soviet Union. The invasion of Grenada, while it occurred in a US sphere of influence, was somewhat unexpected given the obscurity of the tiny, island nation in global politics. In both the Grenada and Panama cases, American lives were at risk although the size of the operation would seem to indicate that other objectives were of greater import and that considerable planning for the invasions had occurred prior to any threats against Americans.

The US role as a neutral force is strained, often to the breaking point, when the American military are introduced into such situations where the avowed objective is ostensibly peacekeeping designed to maintain separation between combatants, supervise weapons disposal, and troop demobilization among other such objectives. Realizing the political aims of keeping the peace and insuring stability while at the same time remaining “apolitical” by not manifestly favoring one side over another is never easy. Doing so in a post-conflict environment awash in weapons and factional rivalries probably requires too much or too little action, especially for a superpower with considerable political and military baggage. Local factions in these conflicts do not always appreciate that US forces are supposed to be neutral, and may instead view the US forces as aligned with a particular side (it hardly matters what the US government might say – if one side feels aggrieved, it is likely to believe the United States is playing favorites). Furthermore, there is often much to be gained from drawing US forces into the local violence in order to further a group’s political aims. Having the United States as an ally can often bring significant resources and support from the United States, while proclaiming

the United States as an enemy can also generate tremendous benefits from those opposed to American interests. In either case, virtually all sides in any conflict that might result in an American-led intervention have substantial incentives to implicate the United States in their struggles. Thus, US forces were drawn into the various political and military conflicts in Lebanon and Somalia, which resulted first in increased violence against US forces, and ultimately their premature departure (Hammel 1985, Frank 1987, Bowden 1999, Poole 2005). One lesson the US military did take away from Lebanon, and especially Somalia, was to avoid “mission creep,” or the gradual expansion of duties, that are often more intractable and liable to precipitate or involve US forces in violent confrontations with local actors. Thus, US forces largely succeeded in remaining above the fray in Bosnia and Kosovo in large measure by mostly avoiding any actions that might provoke a reaction, such as arresting indicted war criminals (Shawcross 2000). Indeed, Dag Henriksen (2007) demonstrates that the employment of air power, rather than ground forces, as the main instrument to exert pressure on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia limited the likelihood of American casualties during the Kosovo crisis of 1998–9.

### The Promotion of Democracy

American forces have been involved in the democracy promotion business for quite some time (Smith and Leone 1995, Tures 2005). Peceny (1999a, 1999b) finds that in 33 of 93 twentieth-century interventions, the United States has sought to advance liberal idealism. Meernik (1996) concludes that most US military interventions do not lead to changes in the level of a state’s democratization. In a comparison of nations where the United States has intervened militarily with those where such interventions did not occur, however, he finds that the former set of states is more likely to experience democratic growth, and Tures (2005) finds that “longer military missions are generally more conducive toward democratic outcomes” (106). In their examination of US military interventions, Hermann and Kegley (1998: 97) show that such actions generally lead to increasing levels of democratization, and that the United States is more likely to “protect” regimes that are more democratic, and more likely to “promote” liberalization in less democratic states. Other researchers, however, have concluded that the use of military force to promote democracy rarely works (Bueno de Mesquita and Downes 2006, Pickering and Peceny 2006). Nonetheless, given the striking evidence that democratic nations do not make war upon one another, presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush made the promotion of democracy one of the central, if not *the* central goal of their foreign policies. As Peceny (1999a) points out, such efforts have been undertaken since the early twentieth century, but it is not until the end of the Cold War that this goal assumes such prominence with major military interventions in Panama (1989); Haiti (1994); Bosnia (1995), and, of course, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, whose level of operations place them outside the scope of this chapter. In some of these instances

the promotion of democracy was the driving factor behind the intervention (for example, Haiti 1994), while in most others it has been one of several US foreign policy goals. Yet, regardless of the relative importance attached to this particular goal in any of these interventions, it is almost certainly the case that whenever the President authorizes a major military intervention with ground forces, neither he nor the public and Congress would tolerate the continued existence of a dictatorship in the target state, let alone the establishment of a dictatorship by US forces. Given both American ideological and strategic interests, the promotion of democracy, however crude and imperfect, is virtually obligatory. To do otherwise would cause considerable skepticism regarding US intentions and likely undermine other foreign policy goals.

Now, given the destruction and violence in Iraq in the wake of the US intervention that began as an effort to rid the world of Saddam Hussein and his WMD capabilities and later morphed into an exercise in democracy building, the popularity and legitimacy of such interventions has suffered a significant blow. It would seem doubtful that American presidents would embark on such missions in the future in the absence of a clear and present danger to US security. Indeed, the relative frequency with which the United States and its allies have engaged in these missions has raised a number of issues regarding the morality and feasibility of regime imposition; the universality of Western-style democracy; and the extent to which such operations may be a cover for the political self-interests of the sponsors. Further, the evidence in favor of the effectiveness of such operations is not overwhelming. While Grenada and Panama can legitimately be characterized as success stories. Others, such as Haiti, Bosnia and Kosovo are still rather unstable and riven with factional rivalries. Though successful in military terms, Haiti (Ballard 1998) receives some of the lowest possible democracy scores in the widely used Polity IV classification system. Bosnia (still considered an "interrupted" regime in Polity IV) and Kosovo (Serbia and Montenegro qualify as a "6" on the 1–10 Polity IV Democracy scale) remain under the supervision of international military forces. Whether there will be a pause in US willingness to promote democracy through military force or an extended halt remains to be seen, but may well depend on political developments in Afghanistan and Iraq.

In American military interventions, like all others, politics pervades everything. The decision to use force is political, the goals are political, the limits placed on the operations are political, and the reactions of all parties are political. A failure to take cognizance of this and plan accordingly especially in the postwar period, however, has been a hallmark of American uses of force short of war and war itself as many scholars have pointed out (Boot 2002, Kagan 2006). Indeed, presidents seem to believe they can best assist the military in the achievement of its objectives by staying out of the way and confining political calculations to only those elements of the military operation where they are expressly needed. The failure to recognize and plan for the evolution of political events has reached something of a nadir with US policy in Afghanistan and Iraq. Thus, we must wonder, will the phrase "no more Iraqs" become like "no more Vietnams"? Will these large scale interventions dampen US willingness to use military force in small or large doses

in other global hot spots? It is too soon to make that determination. Yet it is entirely possible that events in those countries, coupled with the rise of global military and economic competitors, like China, will force a greater appreciation for the political impact of US military actions.

#### BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Adkin, Mark (1989). *Urgent Fury: The Battle for Grenada*. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books.
- Ballard, John R. (1998). *Upholding Democracy: The United States Military Campaign in Haiti, 1994–1997*. Westport, CT: Praeger.
- Blechman, Barry, and Stephen Kaplan (1978). *Force Without War*. Washington: Brookings Institution.
- Boot, Max (2002). *The Savage Wars of Peace*. New York: Basic Books.
- Bowden, Mark (1999). *Black Hawk Down: A Story of Modern War*. New York: Atlantic Monthly Press.
- Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, and George Downes (2006). “Intervention and Democracy,” *International Organization*, 60:3 (July), 627–49.
- Burg, Steven L, and Paul S. Shoup (1999). *The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention*. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe.
- Cable, James (1986). *Gunboat Diplomacy, 1919–1979: Political Applications of Limited Naval Force*, 2nd edn. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Cole, Ronald H. (1995). *Operation Just Cause: The Planning and Execution of Joint Operations in Panama, February 1988–January 1990*. Washington: Joint History Office, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- Cole, Ronald H. (1997). *Operation Urgent Fury: The Planning and Execution of Joint Operations in Grenada, 12 October–2 November 1983*. Washington: Joint History Office, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- Crandall, Russell (2006). *Gunboat Democracy: U.S. Interventions in the Dominican Republic, Grenada, and Panama*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
- DiPrizio, Robert C. (2002). *Armed Humanitarians: U.S. Interventions from Northern Iraq to Kosovo*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Donnelly, Thomas, Margaret Roth, and Caleb Baker (1990). *Operation Just Cause: The Storming of Panama*. New York: Lexington Books.
- Flanagan, Edward M., Jr. (1993). *Battle for Panama: Inside Operation Just Cause*. Washington: Brassey’s.
- Frank, Benis M. (1987). *U.S. Marines in Lebanon, 1982–1984*. Washington: History and Museums Division, Headquarters, US Marine Corps.
- Gilmore, William C. (1984). *The Grenada Intervention: Analysis and Documentation*. New York: Facts on File.
- Guilmartin, John Francis, Jr. (1995). *A Very Short War: The Mayaguez and the Battle of Koh Tang*. College Station: Texas A&M University Press.
- Haass, Richard N. (1994). *Intervention: The Use of American Military Force in the Post-Cold War World*. Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
- Hammel, Eric M. (1985). *The Root: The Marines in Beirut, August 1982–February 1984*. San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
- Henriksen, Dag (2007). *NATO’s Gamble: Combining Diplomacy and Airpower in the Kosovo Crisis, 1998–1999*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.



- Hermann, Margaret, and Charles Kegley (1998). "The Use of U.S. Military Intervention to Promote Democracy: Evaluating the Record," *International Interactions*, 24:2 (April–June), 91–114.
- Kagan, Robert (2006). *Dangerous Nation*. New York: Knopf.
- Klare, Michael T. (1981). *Beyond the Vietnam Syndrome*. Amsterdam, The Netherlands: Institute for Policy Studies.
- Mandel, Robert (1986). "The Effectiveness of Gunboat Diplomacy," *International Studies Quarterly*, 30:1 (March), 59–76.
- Meernik, James (1994). "Presidential Decision Making and the Political Use of Military Force," *International Studies Quarterly*, 38:1 (March): 121–38.
- Meernik, James (1996). "U.S. Military Intervention and the Promotion of Democracy," *Journal of Peace Research*, 33:4 (November), 391–402.
- Meernik, James (2000). "Modeling International Crises and the Political Use of Military Force by the United States," *Journal of Peace Research*, 37:5 (September), 547–62.
- Meernik, James David (2004). *The Political Use of Military Force in US Foreign Policy*. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate.
- O'Shaughnessy, Hugh (1984). *Grenada: Revolution, Invasion, and Aftermath*. London: H. Hamilton with *The Observer*.
- Peceny, Mark (1999a). *Democracy at the Point of Bayonets*. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.
- Peceny, Mark (1999b). "Forcing Them to Be Free," *Political Research Quarterly*, 52:3 (September), 549–82.
- Pickering, Jeffrey, and Mark Peceny (2006). "Forging Democracy at Gunpoint," *International Studies Quarterly*, 50:3 (September), 539–60.
- Poole, Walter S. (2005). *The Effort to Save Somalia, August 1992–March 1994*. Washington: Joint History Office, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- Rowan, Roy (1975). *The Four Days of Mayaguez*. New York: Norton.
- Schroeder, John H. (1985). *Shaping a Maritime Empire: The Commercial and Diplomatic Role of the American Navy, 1829–1861*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
- Shawcross, William (2000). *Deliver Us from Evil: Peacekeepers, Warlords and a World of Endless Conflict*. New York: Touchstone Books.
- Smith, Tony, and Richard C. Leone (1995). *America's Mission: The United States and the World Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Tures, John A. (2005). "Operation Exporting Freedom: The Quest for Democratization via United States Military Operations," *Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations*, 5:1 (Winter/Spring). 97–111.
- Wetterhahn, Ralph (2001). *The Last Battle: The Mayaguez Incident and the End of the Vietnam War*. New York: Carroll & Graf.

## Chapter Thirty-eight

# ALLIANCES AND COALITIONS IN US HISTORY

*T. Michael Ruddy*

In his 1796 “Farewell Address,” George Washington cautioned the American people to “steer clear of permanent alliances,” although he did not object to “temporary alliances for extraordinary emergencies.” Felix Gilbert, in his classic study *To the Farewell Address* (1961), attributed this warning not just to the immediate international predicament the United States faced, but also to Enlightenment ideals that eschewed Europe’s old corrupt balance of power politics. Whether born of principle or necessity, Washington’s admonition framed much of the historical thinking on the role of alliances and coalitions throughout American history. Alliances addressed short-term defensive needs and served as instruments to achieve long-term goals. While a military alliance played an integral part in America’s successful revolt from Great Britain, nineteenth-century continentalism replaced any consideration of forming alliances with unilateralism. But as America emerged as a world power at the turn of the century, alliances again assumed a role in its international relations, culminating with a return to entangling alliances during the Cold War struggle to contain the Soviet Union.

The 1778 Franco–American Treaty was the first of America’s military alliances. Despite associating alliances with the archaic and corrupt power politics of Europe, Americans of the revolutionary period understood the need for allies to insure independence from England. According to historians such as Edward S. Corwin (1970 [1916]) and Samuel Flagg Bemis (1957 [1935]), realistic American diplomats took the initiative to negotiate this necessary agreement. Bemis’s nationalistic account traced how American diplomats adeptly exploited France’s interest in redressing Europe’s balance of power by reducing English dominance and restoring French glory. The colonies’ 1778 victory at Saratoga, “that great stroke on the Hudson” (58), finally persuaded France to conclude not only a military alliance, but also a Treaty of Amity and Commerce embodying the principles in John Adams’ 1776 Model Treaty. William Stinchcombe’s *The American Revolution and the French Alliance* (1969) expanded the theme of the alliance’s American roots. American public opinion – especially influenced by the press and Protestant clergy – recognized the necessity of the alliance and suspended anti-French and anti-Catholic biases.

Jonathan Dull's *Diplomatic History of the American Revolution* (1985), in contrast, attributed the alliance to the machinations of French Foreign Minister Charles Gravier, comte de Vergennes, who early on understood that the American revolt potentially could weaken British power. Vergennes schemed to arrange an alliance long before the Battle of Saratoga, but he delayed finalizing the agreements until the French navy, and particularly that of its ally Spain, were prepared to challenge the British.

Coalition warfare is difficult to conduct even by closely allied nations. The record was mixed for Franco-American forces during the War for American Independence. When France sent a fleet to North American waters in 1778, Washington was unable to convince its commander, Comte D'Estaing, to press an attack on the British fleet at New York. When D'Estaing, proposed instead a joint attack on the British garrison at Newport, Washington accepted the plan and dispatched General John Sullivan northward with a portion of his army (Dearden 1980). The campaign proved a failure as did a second joint operation, the siege of Savannah the following year (Lawrence 1951). So too did the plan for launching a joint attack on Liverpool in 1779 that called for John Paul Jones to command the naval forces and the Marquis de Lafayette the landing force (Dull 1975). The Yorktown campaign that insured Franco-American victory stood in sharp contrast to these failures (Larrabee 1964).

Undoubtedly the alliance promoted the immediate interests of both America and France. But while it was pivotal in America's quest for independence, once that was achieved the provision in the treaty committing America to defend French possessions in the western hemisphere threatened to trap the young nation in European affairs during Washington's presidency (Horsman 1985). In *Entangling Alliance* (1958), Alexander DeConde chronicled how diplomacy and politics intertwined. As the nation confronted the French Revolution and the subsequent war between France and England, the political split between Federalists sympathetic to Britain and Republicans sympathetic to France intensified. Convinced by the Federalist argument that America's commercial interests would be served by closer relations with England and eager to avoid being involved in a European war, Washington declared neutrality rather than honor alliance commitments. Jay's Treaty of 1795, which economically aligned America with Great Britain by accepting the Rule of 1756, further complicated relations with France.

Washington's successor, John Adams, sent representatives to France to negotiate an end to the troublesome pact with Foreign Minister Talleyrand, but French officials demanded bribes in return for a meeting. Labeled the XYZ Affair, this incident led to a maritime conflict with France. In *The Quasi-War* (1966), DeConde recounted France's response to America's refusal to honor its alliance obligations. America found itself informally allied with England, and open war with France threatened. But, according to DeConde, both sides ultimately determined that war was not advantageous to their interests. Surprised by the bellicose response of the Federalists, Talleyrand moderated his stance. Adams at first wavered in the face of Federalist calls for war, but ultimately pursued negotiations leading to the Convention of Mortefontaine in 1800 ending the alliance (Hill 1971).

Lawrence S. Kaplan (1987) offered an alternative explanation. He downplayed the ideological divide between Federalists and Republicans. By the time of the quasi-war, Thomas Jefferson, the leader of the Republicans, recognized the dangers of entanglement with France. All he wanted was a commercial relationship. According to Kaplan, events surrounding the Treaty of Alliance were leading to isolationism. In a retrospective comparison of the 1778 alliance with the North Atlantic Treaty, Kaplan (1981) noted how "Repugnance for political connections with Europe became a vital part of the American isolationist tradition, a fundamental code that made alliances un-American propositions, even into the twentieth century" (176).

Heeding Washington's warning to avoid entangling alliances, the United States effectively isolated itself from binding political and military commitments during the nineteenth century. The nation turned inward and concentrated on internal expansion and development. Alliances were unnecessary, and US leaders assiduously maintained independence in foreign and military policy. Motivated by the desire to avoid any commitment to joint action, US leaders rejected British proposals for a joint Anglo-American statement opposing French and Russian intervention in Latin America to assist Spain in reestablishing control over its rebelling colonies, and instead unilaterally issued the Monroe Doctrine, which joined Washington's Farewell Address as a basic statement of American diplomatic principles (Lawson 1922, Bemis 1949, May 1975). Gaddis Smith (1994) argues that the Monroe Doctrine remained an important component of American foreign policy until it was rendered irrelevant by the end of the Cold War.

Three quarters of a century later Britain again approached American diplomats seeking a joint statement opposing a partition of China. Secretary of State John Hay rejected the approach, but issued what became known as the Open Door Notes in late 1899, unilaterally committing the United States to support the principle of equality of opportunity for trade and investment in China (Kennan 1985 [1951], McCormick 1967).

By the end of the century, the Industrial Revolution had catapulted the United States into a major industrial power. The Spanish-American War had given it a far-flung empire, and it was poised to engage in world affairs more actively than ever before. But still America remained wary of entanglement.

World War I was the first deviation from nineteenth-century unilateralism. When war broke out in 1914, the United States declared its neutrality. But a combination of factors, including violations of neutral rights, especially those inflicted by German submarines, economic considerations, and President Woodrow Wilson's desire for a place at the peace table to craft a lasting peace led to a declaration of war in April 1917. Still, Wilson's administration chose only to associate with Great Britain, France, and Italy, creating a coalition to win the war and secure the peace without binding commitments.

The American Expeditionary Force (AEF) reinforced its wartime partners, as American manpower and material helped secure allied victory. At the operational level, AEF commander General John J. Pershing's insistence that American units remain independent and not be integrated with British and French units mirrored the president's insistence on an independent role for the United States (Trask 1993).

Wilson's leadership and his relationship with his coalition partners in pursuit of a just peace based on his Fourteen Points, especially his call for a League of Nations, which would replace alliances and coalitions as instruments for conducting relations between nations, has received substantial historical attention. Arthur S. Link (1979) praised Wilson's leadership and effort to end the war quickly and build a just and peaceful postwar order, judging his policies effective and responsive to the situation. In contrast George F. Kennan, a prominent member of the realist school of historians, assailed Wilson for his lack of realism, judging his approach symptomatic of a legalistic-moralistic strain that had often plagued US relations with other nations. Lloyd Ambrosius (1991) essentially agreed with Kennan, contending that Wilson's utopian liberal internationalism failed to understand the realities of balance of power politics.

Other historians have debated Wilson's true postwar intentions, which they suspected in reality were intended to accomplish more than a collective security alternative to the old balance of power political structure. To N. Gordon Levin (1968), Wilson sought a postwar order based on liberal capitalist internationalism to counter both the traditional European imperialism and the revolutionary socialism that had surfaced at the end of World War I. In his study of the close wartime relationship between Great Britain and the United States, Lloyd Gardner (1984) asserted that Wilson promoted liberal democracy in response to leftist revolutions in Russia, Mexico, and China. Thomas Knock (1992) argued that Wilson's progressive internationalist agenda aimed to replace the national security state with collective security.

Wilson's venture into alliance politics contributed to military victory, but because his coalition partners did not share his zeal for changing the international system and because the US Senate rejected the treaty, he failed to achieve his long-range goals. Consequently, the United States in the postwar period charted an independent course in international relations, cautious of commitments that would limit its actions. It refrained from membership in the League of Nations as Europe slipped back into its old ways. Admiral Mark L. Bristol, commander of US naval forces in the eastern Mediterranean and American High Commissioner in Constantinople, refused to act jointly with European officials in Turkey, 1919–27, but on the other side of the world US naval commanders coordinated their operations with those of European nations (and the Japanese until 1931) in strife-torn China during the 1920s and 1930s (Braisted 1990, 2008). Such cooperation was informal and American leaders continued to shy away from international obligations. When French Foreign Minister Aristide Briand attempted to lure the United States into a defense agreement, US Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg deftly avoided making a commitment to France by proposing a multilateral pact whose signers renounced war as an instrument of national policy and pledged to abstain from offensive wars. Known as the Kellogg–Briand Pact, it was initially signed by 15 nations (in 1928), a number that grew to 62 (Ferrell 1952).

However, in less than a decade, war once again loomed on the horizon. Faced with the growing power of Hitler's Germany in Europe and Japanese expansion in the Pacific, the United States once again proclaimed its neutrality. And again,

events, culminating with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, ultimately drew the United States into a world conflict.

The “Grand Alliance” of World War II was a coalition created by necessity, its members committed to the principles of the 1942 Declaration of the United Nations, a set of wartime goals first articulated by Winston Churchill and Franklin Roosevelt in the 1941 Atlantic Charter (Brinkley and Facey-Crowther 1994). Yet the relationship between the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain from the beginning was tenuous at best, but as was the case in World War I impacted both the successful prosecution of the war and the postwar situation. Disagreements about the dispersal of lend-lease aid, the creation of a second front, and other issues divided the Big Three. But these obstacles were ultimately overcome. Maurice Matloff and Edwin M. Snell (1953, 1959), in an important official US Army history of Anglo–American coalition building before the Normandy invasion, recounted how General George C. Marshall’s demand for unity of command, the Combined Joint Chiefs, a contrast to the situation in World War I, contributed coordination and consistency especially to Anglo–American planning.

However, ideological differences between the Communist Soviet Union and the West were a major obstacle to allied cohesion and threatened long-term survival. In this context, Franklin Roosevelt’s relationship to Joseph Stalin has particularly interested historians. To William H. McNeill (1970 [1953]), the alliance was based purely on military necessity, with no common political purpose. Thus with Hitler’s demise, the alliance was destined to unravel. McNeill accused Roosevelt of misunderstanding Stalin. Gaddis Smith, in his *American Diplomacy during the Second World War* (1965), likewise, took a critical view of Roosevelt’s diplomacy. Suggesting that differences with the USSR were fundamental issues, he criticized Roosevelt while he praised the more realistic Winston Churchill. “[Roosevelt’s] means were questionable and the results worse” (10).

Other historians have looked more favorably on Roosevelt’s wartime efforts. Herbert Feis, a member of the realist school of World War II historians, in *Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin* (1957), portrayed the president as a true pragmatist. Utilizing both western and Soviet archives, Robin Edmonds (1991) probed the relationship that developed between the wartime leaders and the success of the alliance they forged. A series of essays in Warren Kimball’s *The Juggler* (1991) traced Roosevelt’s role in shaping the alliance. Roosevelt, in Kimball’s judgment, was a capable leader with clear objectives. He had a vision for the postwar world that included bringing the Soviet Union into the family of nations, dismantling the colonial empires, and continuing allied cooperation. In *Forged in War* (1997), Kimball expanded on this theme with an analysis of the relationship between Roosevelt and Churchill and how they guided the alliance to win the war and fashion postwar institutions.

The wartime alliance and its relationship to the Cold War captured the attention of other historians. Gabriel Kolko (1968) accused Britain and America of trying to restore the old order in Europe. The United States, he argued, was more intent on the “creation of a world economy modeled after the ideal American image” (323) than achieving military objectives. This contributed to the collapse of allied cooperation. Vojtech Mastny had a different perspective. His *Russia’s Road to the*



*Cold War* (1979) recounted how the United States and Great Britain yielded to Stalin on many points over the course of the war. Their uncoordinated policies failed to restrain Stalin and encouraged him to pursue his ends. John Gaddis (2000 [1972]) examined how the actions of Stalin and Roosevelt, and later Harry Truman, laid the foundation for the Cold War by 1947. Domestic pressures influenced and inhibited both Soviet and American leaders. But, in Gaddis's judgment, Stalin, a dictator unconstrained by democratic forces, was in a better position than Roosevelt or Truman to make concessions and prevent the Cold War.

With the collapse of the wartime coalition, former allies found themselves Cold War adversaries. In 1947, President Harry Truman proclaimed the containment policy to deter Soviet expansion. Consistent with Article 51 of the 1945 United Nations Charter, which sanctioned regional security arrangements, the United States abandoned its aversion to entangling alliances and made them an integral part of the containment effort. In 1947, the United States negotiated the Rio Pact with 20 Latin American nations. This treaty not only extended the cooperation of the 1930s Good Neighbor Policy, but also became an early example of the implementation of containment (Trask 1977). A clause in the treaty declaring that an attack upon one would be considered an attack upon all would be the forerunner to the all important Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty (NAT).

Historians have offered different explanations for the original purpose of this North Atlantic Treaty, the paramount entangling alliance of the Cold War era. In an early study, Robert Osgood (1962) maintained that the alliance was intended to integrate the United States with the interests and defense of Europe to minimize the chances of US withdrawal from European affairs. Lawrence S. Kaplan (1984) attributed the alliance to European initiative. The threat of potential Soviet aggression brought the alliance into existence, but Kaplan argued that the threat was exaggerated, that there was little chance of Soviet attack in the early postwar years. From a different perspective, Timothy P. Ireland, in *Creating the Entangling Alliance* (1981), contended that the European fear of a revived Germany was at least as important in the creation of the treaty as was the Soviet threat.

What originated as a mutual defense treaty in 1949 was transformed in 1950 with the outbreak of the Korean War. In an attempt to reassure the Europeans of America's continued commitment to Europe's defense, despite its expanded role in the Korean conflict, and also intending to dissuade the USSR from exploiting the situation, the alliance military structure, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), came into being. Beginning in 1951, the United States committed additional divisions to the defense of Europe. And a command structure was put in place with an American, Dwight D. Eisenhower, as Supreme Allied Commander.

Korea had an even wider impact on America's alliance policy. A speech by Secretary of State Dean Acheson to the American Press Club in January 1950, which excluded Korea from America's defense perimeter in Asia, prompted speculation that this omission encouraged Stalin to "unleash" his North Korean ally. The Truman administration's response, as well as that of the successor Eisenhower administration, in part was to negotiate alliances to contain the Soviet threat in Asia and elsewhere. Bilateral agreements were concluded with Japan, Taiwan,

Korea, and the Philippines. The 1951 ANZUS Treaty guaranteed Australia and New Zealand protection against a resurgent Japan at the same time that it made them part of a defense perimeter strategy in the Pacific (Brands 1987). In 1955, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) was formed under the leadership of the United States after France withdrew from Southeast Asia. The organization never developed a unified military command like that of NATO, but it did contribute to regional containment and served as a justification for US intervention in Vietnam (Buszynski 1983). Pactomania expanded to the Middle East as well with the creation of the Baghdad Pact, which formed the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) in 1955. The United States never formally adhered to this agreement, but it did join its military committee (Hadley 1971).

In *Strategies of Containment* (2005 [1982]), John L. Gaddis described how containment endured and shifted from the time of Truman to that of Ronald Reagan. Alliances were an important component of this evolution. “[US strategists] worked hard to maintain multilateral consent for United States leadership in waging the Cold War,” Gaddis concluded, “without at the same time allowing the need for consultation to paralyze the alliance” (389). In a study of the Eisenhower administration’s New Look policy, Saki Dockrill (1996) showed how, although most historical studies accentuated the New Look’s increased reliance on nuclear deterrence, alliances, particularly NATO, were also an important element of this defense strategy.

But as Dockrill’s research also revealed, the evolution of NATO was not always smooth, beginning with the failure of the European Defense Community and America’s effort to introduce tactical nuclear weapons and redeploy troops during the Eisenhower years. In 1964, Henry Kissinger, who would later be instrumental in shaping US foreign policy under President Richard Nixon, entitled his work on NATO *The Troubled Partnership* (1964). He attributed frictions among treaty members to the changing nature of the alliance as American hegemony was coming to an end and Europe recovered from World War II and regained its strength. Richard Barnet (1983), writing early in the Reagan years, emphasized how the alliance was born out of the mutual conviction that the United States had to be a hegemonic power within Europe to prevent continental domination by Russia or Germany, but how the Europeans became unhappy with their role and dissatisfied with the United States.

Indeed, as NATO matured and endured, many issues divided its members. Besides the effort to integrate German military forces, Charles de Gaulle’s decision to withdraw from the integrated command, the effect of the Vietnam War on the alliance, the effort to deploy cruise and Pershing II missiles in Europe beginning in the late 1970s, and other issues tested allied cohesion. Kaplan (1984, 1991, 1999), the most prolific historical commentator on NATO, has chronicled the controversies and changes that the alliance endured. He concluded that NATO not only successfully contained the Soviet threat, but also provided an environment for the unification of Europe.

But NATO was a Cold War construct. With the end of the Cold War, historians like Ted Galen Carpenter (1992) began to question the need for alliances such as

NATO. The demise of the USSR, he argued, eliminated the reason for their existence. They were unnecessary and costly. To the contrary, in *The Long Entanglement* (1999), Kaplan maintained that NATO endured as an effective institution in post-Cold War Europe with a changed mission and role as evidenced by the peacekeeping role NATO forces played in parts of the former Yugoslavia. But while he argued for the alliance's continued existence, he questioned the controversial decision to enlarge NATO in the 1990s, describing it as precipitate. James Goldgeier, in *Not Whether But When* (1999), also doubted the wisdom of this decision. He suggested that the emotional appeals of the Polish and Czech presidents, combined with the influence of a few individuals in President Bill Clinton's administration, led to support for expansion, even though the circumstances indicated that NATO should have been dissolved with the collapse of the USSR.

Despite NATO's survival, the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, and the subsequent US responses in Afghanistan and Iraq foreshadowed a potential new direction in American alliance policy. NATO responded to these attacks by invoking for the first time the provisions of Article Five of the treaty and supported George W. Bush's decision to go to war against the Taliban in Afghanistan. But even many of America's closest allies rebuffed Bush's call for a war against Iraq in 2003. He failed to secure a broad global coalition like his father, George H. W. Bush, had constructed in the first Iraq war in 1991, and ultimately settled for what he described as a "coalition of the willing." Thomas E. Ricks (2006), comparing this 2003 coalition with the 1991 coalition, noted that "the son's wasn't a solid alliance based on common interests, as the father's had been, but rather a jerry-rigged series of deals that couldn't survive much pressure" (346). However, Robert J. Pauly and Tom Lansford (2005), in their study of the Iraq War, doubted that the lack of a strong coalition bothered the Bush administration. They suggested that the preponderance of US military power combined with negative experience with coalition-building in the 1990s diminished the administration's enthusiasm for a broader coalition, "even though a more inclusive group would have elevated the legitimacy of the campaign among the international community" (84).

President Bush justified his actions against Iraq with his Bush Doctrine – a declaration that the United States would act preemptively, and unilaterally if need be, against terrorists and states that harbored or supported terrorists. John Gaddis, in *Surprise, Security, and the American Experience* (2004) maintained that Bush's decisions marked a departure from America's Cold War policy and a return to approaches that predominated in the nineteenth century when isolationism defined America's relation to the rest of the world. His viewpoint received support from Rajan Menon, whose work *The End of Alliances* (2007), contended that alliances had become irrelevant to America's twenty-first-century challenges. Unilateralism was once again gaining precedence over alliances and coalitions as an instrument of American policy.

In operational terms the two Iraq Wars also differed. In the first, the forces of all coalition members operated in close coordination (Strock 1993), while in the second those of the United States and Great Britain were assigned responsibility for separate regions of Iraq with the smaller units contributed by other allies

fighting along side either the British or the Americans. NATO forces operating in Afghanistan were more closely integrated.

Roger H. Palin discussed the difficulties of conducting coalition warfare in *Multinational Military Forces: Problems and Prospects* (1995). Overcoming the challenges of such warfare will severely test US military leaders for the foreseeable future since American national strategy has for some time called for conducting future wars, not unilaterally, but jointly in cooperation with allies.

#### BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Ambrosius, Lloyd E. (1991). *Wilsonian Statecraft: Theory and Practice of Liberal Internationalism during World War I*. Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources.
- Barnet, Richard J. (1983). *The Alliance: America-Europe-Japan, Makers of the Postwar World*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Bemis, Samuel Flagg (1949). *John Quincy Adams and the Foundations of American Foreign Policy*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Bemis, Samuel Flagg (1957 [1935]). *The Diplomacy of the American Revolution*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Braisted, William R. (1990). "Mark Lambert Bristol: Naval Diplomat Extraordinary of the Battleship Age," in James C. Bradford, ed., *Admirals of the New Steel Navy: Makers of the American Naval Tradition, 1880–1930*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 331–74.
- Braisted, William R. (2008). *Diplomats in Blue: U.S. Naval Officers in China, 1922–1933*. Gainesville: University Press of Florida.
- Brands, H. W. (1987). "From ANZUS to SEATO: United States Strategic Policy towards Australia and New Zealand, 1952–1954." *International History Review*, 9:2 (May): 250–70.
- Brinkley, Douglas and David Richard Facey-Crowther, eds. (1994). *The Atlantic Charter*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Buszynski, Leszek (1983). *SEATO: The Failure of an Alliance Strategy*. Singapore: Singapore University Press.
- Carpenter, Ted Galen (1992). *A Search for Enemies: America's Alliances after the Cold War*. Washington: CATO Institute.
- Corwin, Edward S. (1970 [1916]). *French Policy and the American Alliance of 1778*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Dearden, Paul F. (1980). *The Rhode Island Campaign of 1778: Inauspicious Dawn of Alliance*. Providence: Rhode Island Bicentennial Foundation.
- DeConde, Alexander (1958). *Entangling Alliance: Politics and Diplomacy under George Washington*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- DeConde, Alexander (1966). *The Quasi-War: The Politics and Diplomacy of the Undeclared War with France, 1797–1801*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons.
- Dockrill, Saki (1996). *Eisenhower's New Look National Security Policy, 1953–61*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Dull, Jonathan R. (1975). *The French Navy and American Independence: A Study of Arms and Diplomacy, 1774–1787*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Dull, Jonathan R. (1985). *Diplomatic History of the American Revolution*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Edmonds, Robin (1991). *The Big Three: Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin in Peace and War*. New York: W. W. Norton.

- Feis, Herbert (1957). *Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin: The War They Waged and the Peace They Sought*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Ferrell, Robert H. (1952). *Peace in Their Time: The Origins of the Kellogg-Briand Pact*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Gaddis, John L. (2000 [1972]). *The United States and the Cold War, 1941–1947*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Gaddis, John L. (2004). *Surprise, Security, and the American Experience*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Gaddis, John L. (2005 [1982]). *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the Cold War*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Gardner, Lloyd C. (1984). *Safe for Democracy: The Anglo-American Response to Revolution, 1913–1923*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Gilbert, Felix (1961). *To the Farewell Address: Ideas of Early American Foreign Policy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Goldgeier, James M. (1999). *Not Whether But When: The U.S. Decision to Enlarge NATO*. Washington: Brookings Institution Press.
- Hadley, Guy (1971). *CENTO: The Forgotten Alliance*. Brighton, UK: Institute for the Study of International Organization Monographs, University of Sussex.
- Hill, Peter P. (1971). *William Vans Murray, Federalist Diplomat: The Shaping of Peace with France, 1797–1801*. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press.
- Horsman, Reginald (1985). *The Diplomacy of the New Republic, 1776–1815*. Arlington Heights, IL: Harlan Davidson.
- Ireland, Timothy P. (1981). *Creating the Entangling Alliance: The Origins of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
- Kaplan, Lawrence S. (1981). “The Treaties of Paris and Washington, 1778 and 1949: Reflections on Entangling Alliances,” in Ronald Hoffman and Peter J. Albert, eds., *Diplomacy and Revolution: The Franco-American Alliance of 1778*. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 151–94.
- Kaplan, Lawrence S. (1984). *The United States and NATO: The Formative Years*. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky.
- Kaplan, Lawrence S. (1987). “Toward Isolationism: The Rise and Fall of the Franco-American Alliance, 1775–1801,” in Lawrence S. Kaplan, ed., *Entangling Alliances with None: American Foreign Policy in the Age of Jefferson*. Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 79–95.
- Kaplan, Lawrence S. (1988). *NATO and the United States: The Enduring Alliance*. Boston: Twayne Publishers.
- Kaplan, Lawrence S., ed. (1991). *American Historians and the Atlantic Alliance*. Kent, OH: Kent State University Press.
- Kaplan, Lawrence S. (1999). *The Long Entanglement: NATO’s First Fifty Years*. Westport, CT: Praeger.
- Kennan, George F. (1985 [1951]). *American Diplomacy, 1900–1950*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Kimball, Warren F. (1991). *The Juggler: Franklin Roosevelt as Wartime Statesman*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Kimball, Warren F. (1997). *Forged in War: Roosevelt, Churchill, and the Second World War*. New York: Morrow.
- Kissinger, Henry A. (1964). *The Troubled Partnership: The Atlantic Alliance*. New York: McGraw-Hill.

- Knock, Thomas J. (1992). *To End All Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the Quest for a New World Order*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Kolko, Gabriel (1968). *The Politics of War: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1943–1945*. New York: Random House.
- Larrabee, Harold A. (1964). *Decision at the Chesapeake*. New York: Bramhall House.
- Lawrence, Alexander A. (1951). *Storm over Savannah: The Story of Count d’Estaing and the Siege of the Town in 1779*. Athens: University of Georgia Press.
- Lawson, Leonard Axel (1922). *The Relation of British Policy to the Declaration of the Monroe Doctrine*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Levin, N. Gordon (1968). *Woodrow Wilson and World Politics: America’s Response to War and Revolution*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Link, Arthur S. (1979). *Woodrow Wilson: Revolution, War, and Peace*. Arlington Heights, IL: Harlan Davidson.
- Mastny, Vojtech (1979). *Russia’s Road to the Cold War*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Matloff, Maurice, and Edwin M. Snell (1953). *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare: 1941–1942*. Washington: Government Printing Office.
- Matloff, Maurice, and Edwin M. Snell (1959). *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare: 1943–1944*. Washington: Government Printing Office.
- May, Ernest R. (1975). *The Making of the Monroe Doctrine*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- McCormick, Thomas J. (1967). *China Market: America’s Quest for Informal Empire*. Chicago: Quadrangle Books.
- McNeill, William H. (1970 [1953]). *America, Britain, and Russia: Their Co-Operation and Conflict, 1941–1946*. London: Oxford University Press.
- Menon, Rajan (2007). *The End of Alliances*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Neilson, Keith, and Roy A. Prete (1983). *Coalition Warfare: An Uneasy Accord*. Waterloo, Ontario: Wilfrid Laurier University Press.
- Osgood, Robert E. (1962). *NATO: The Entangling Alliance*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Palin, Roger H. (1995). *Multinational Military Forces: Problems and Prospects*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Pauly, Robert J., Jr., and Tom Lansford (2005). *Strategic Preemption: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Second Iraq War*. Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishers.
- Ricks, Thomas E. (2006). *Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq*. New York: Penguin Press.
- Smith, Gaddis (1965). *American Diplomacy during the Second World War, 1941–1945*. New York: John Wiley and Sons.
- Smith, Gaddis (1994). *The Last Years of the Monroe Doctrine*. New York: Hill and Wang.
- Stinchcombe, William C. (1969). *The American Revolution and the French Alliance*. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press.
- Strock, Carl A. (1993). *War in the Gulf: The Politics of Coalition Warfare*. Washington: National War College.
- Trask, David F. (1993). *The AEF and Coalition Warming, 1917–1918*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
- Trask, Roger R. (1977). “The Impact of the Cold War on United States–Latin American Relations, 1945–1949,” *Diplomatic History*, 1:3 (Summer): 271–84.



## Chapter Thirty-nine

# ATTACHÉS, MAAGs, AND MACs

*Brian Tyrone Crumley*

Military attachés and advisors both deal with the transference of knowledge. Attachés gather information concerning foreign military services, technology, and a variety of potentially useful subjects. Military advisors seek to “export” their nation’s knowledge and equipment and to build closer relationships with other nations. In the broadest sense of the term, advisors include private individuals, as well as service personnel, who work with foreign governments and military but this chapter will focus on individuals and groups who are members of one of the American armed forces and whose actions are sponsored by the US government. Although government sanctioned, activities such as the Civil War veterans who served abroad after the war, in Egypt, for example; General Douglas MacArthur’s service as advisor to Philippine president Manuel Quezon; Colonel Claire Chennault’s Flying Tigers; and Colonel Edward G. Lansdale’s work in the Philippines and with South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem will not be discussed. Nor will the activities of foreign citizens in the United States such as those of Thaddeus Kosciuszko and Friedrich von Steuben during the American Revolution.

The use of military officers in a quasi-diplomatic role has existed in some form since Roman times when officers accompanied diplomatic missions to foreign countries under various guises to obtain information of military value. After the fall of the Roman Empire, the chaotic nature of medieval warfare caused this practice to fade into obscurity. Attachés, in the modern sense, have only existed for approximately 200 years, since Napoleon realized the potential value of systematically stationing military officers in other nations during peacetime so that they could gather information of military value in time of war (Vagts 1967).

By the mid-nineteenth century, the practice of assigning military officers to diplomatic legations in foreign nations began to gain popular acceptance throughout Europe. The establishment of national armies during the Napoleonic Era along with the complexity of both warfare and technological innovations mandated that every avenue for increasing the effectiveness of a nation’s military forces be explored. Accredited diplomats had neither the military expertise nor the inclination to delve into matters beyond the scope of their normal diplomatic functions.

Prussia began posting military officers in foreign nations in 1816 and 15 years later the attaché posted to Paris was the first to receive formal diplomatic accreditation. During succeeding decades England, Russia, and Austria emulated Prussia's lead.

Dozens of US naval officers served in diplomatic roles during the first three quarters of the nineteenth century, but none was accredited as an attaché (Long 1988). The American practice of stationing officers abroad on a permanent basis began with the establishment of the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) in 1882 (Dorwart 1979). Naval attachés gathered, collated, and reported information about naval technology, administration, training and maneuvers; ports and trade routes; submarine cables; and other maritime affairs that might have military implications. During the same year that ONI was established, three naval officers made an extensive trip through Japan, Korea, and Siberia, but they did not have diplomatic accreditation as attachés (Buckingham, Foulk, and McLean 1883). Lieutenant Commander French Ensor Chadwick was the first American to be diplomatically accredited as an attaché. During his service in London, 1882–9, Chadwick traveled extensively throughout the Continent (Coletta 1979, Crumley 2002). Two years later Ensign George Foulk became the first American attaché accredited to an Asian nation when the Navy dispatched him to Korea where he served 1884–7 (Kyriakau 1999, Prout 2005).

The US Army sent out its first military observers overseas in the decade before the Civil War (Floyd 1979). During the Crimean War, 1853–6, West Point graduates George B. McClellan and Philip St. George Cooke, traveled to the Black Sea to observe operations around Sevastopol (McClellan 1861), and in 1877 observers were sent to Russia, Austria, and Turkey to report upon the Russo–Turkish War, but the Army did not have an attaché system until 1888 when Congress appropriated funds for the stationing of army officers abroad. Like their naval counterparts, military officers sent to Europe were to obtain information concerning the latest technological developments while officers assigned to Latin American nations were sent primarily to monitor the activities of other nations, especially Germany and Great Britain, and to assess the impact of events in Latin America on US interests in the region (Prout 2002). During the Spanish–American War, US naval and military attachés undertook clandestine work for the first time. The four naval attachés in Europe purchased warships and supplies for the United States, monitored attempts by Spanish agents to do the same for their government, reported on the attitudes of foreign governments and public opinion toward the war, and hired spies to gather information about the status and operations of the Spanish navy. In reports sent to Washington, the naval attachés tended to overstate the capabilities of the Spanish (Cooper 1993, Crumley 2002). However, Tasker Bliss, military attaché in Madrid at the outbreak of the war was far more accurate in his description of Spain's capabilities. Using newspaper articles and a variety of reports, he cabled Washington very accurate assessments of Spanish military strength in Cuba.

During the first decade of the twentieth century the foreign influence and interests of the United States grew exponentially, although the number of attachés posted abroad did not go up significantly until the outbreak of World War I in 1914. Those posted overseas reported regularly on technological advancements

made in ships, aircraft, machine guns, and artillery. Their work has been surveyed briefly for most of the twentieth century (O'Toole 1991, Packard 1996), but not in the detail accorded naval attachés prior to 1914 (Crumley 2002) or army attachés prior to 1919 (Votaw 1991). The work of Henry T. Allen, US military attaché to Russia, 1890–5, and to Germany, 1897–8, has been studied (Twitchell 1974), and biographers have concluded that John (“Black Jack”) Pershing gained an understanding of the ineffectiveness of light artillery against well-constructed field fortifications from his observations of the Russo–Japanese War (while an attaché to Japan) that influenced his conduct as commander of the American Expeditionary Force in France during World War I. When serving on the Western Front, Pershing selected Peyton C. March, another former attaché with experience in Tokyo, to command the AEF artillery (Vandiver 1977).

On the eve of that conflict, in 1914, the United States had more military attachés – 15 officers accredited to 19 embassies and legations – than any other country. Both the Central Powers and the Allies courted US favor by providing US attachés with unprecedented access to information, much of it intended to impress the Americans with the sophistication of their military technologies. As a result, America's service attachés harvested a plethora of valuable military and naval information.

Of these Newton McCully, the naval attaché stationed in Russia, occupied a unique position. While assistant naval attaché to Russia during the Russo–Japanese War McCully submitted one of the longest and most incisive reports by a naval officer ever published (McCully 1977). Fluent in Russian, McCully possessed a genuine understanding of both the Russian people and their politics. Returning to Russia as naval attaché, 1914–18, he provided insightful observations during both the First World War and the Russian Revolution (Weeks 1993). Conversely, the pro-Japanese sympathies of T. Bentley Mott (1937) who served as military attaché in St. Petersburg lessened his effectiveness as an American representative. This perception that an attaché was partisan in his sympathies could influence how he was viewed in Washington, as well as in the country to which he was posted. Canadian-born William S. Sims, commander of the US Naval Forces European Waters and naval attaché to Great Britain, 1917–19, worked so assiduously to foster close Anglo–American relations that some officials in Washington came to believe that he identified more with British interests than those of the United States. On balance Sims' dual appointment served both himself and the United States well (Sims 1920, Trask 1972).

By the end of the war the number of attachés reached a high of 111, but following the Treaty of Versailles the number dropped as attachés were recalled from Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Ecuador, Egypt, Hungary, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, and other posts. The 36 remaining (including 6 from the Air Corps) and 14 naval attachés each monitored developments in several countries. While there were fewer attachés, the number of countries that they were accredited to rose from 25 in 1918 to 55 in 1922. That number dropped to 44 between 1933 and 1937 because Congress capped the total number of military attachés at 32. During the next four years, as war loomed the number began to rise again (Angevine 1992, Mahnken 2002).

The inner workings of attachés can be followed in books and articles on individual officers or in their published papers and memoirs. Sources are particularly good for the work of attachés in Russia and Germany prior to the Cold War. Newton McCully, was in Russia at the epicenter of historic events. When the Bolsheviks took control of most of European Russia, McCully joined the Volunteer Army of White General Anton D. Denikin in southern Russia. As resistance to revolutionaries collapsed, McCully arranged for the escape of 150,000 refugees to Constantinople (Weeks 1993). The United States did not recognize the new Soviet government and for over a decade did not have attachés in Moscow. Thus, it was forced to depend on reports from Riga, Berlin, and Warsaw for information concerning the Soviet army and navy (Weeks 1993). Shortly after the United States reestablished diplomatic relations with Russia in 1933, Major Philip Ries Faymonville was dispatched to Moscow as military attaché. Faymonville had been a military observer in Siberia, 1923–4, and assistant military attaché in Tokyo, 1924–6. From 1934 to 1943 he served first as military attaché to Russia then as a Lend-Lease administrator reporting directly to the White House. His assessments of the Soviet capability and view that Moscow would not fall to the Germans were accurate (Herndon and Baylen 1975, Glanz 2008). In his memoir of the era, a colleague, Admiral Kemp Tolley, Assistant Naval Attaché to the Soviet Union during the war, provides a negative view of Faymonville, even unfairly suggesting that he was a Communist sympathizer (Tolley 1983). Faymonville's unvarnished assessments and perceived pro-Soviet bias caused Brigadier General Joseph A. Michela to make allegations to the FBI stating that Faymonville was a homosexual. His position in the Lend-Lease program made his situation untenable (Langer 1976).

The selection, training, and work of army attachés during the inner war period is surveyed in Scott A. Koch, "The Role of U.S. Army Military Attachés between the Wars" (1995) which is drawn from his unpublished dissertation (Koch 1990). He believes that the officers were better prepared for their work than does David Glantz (1991) who says that attachés received little more than "superficial instruction in codes and finance," but, like Glantz, concludes that the reports of Army attachés in Europe during the 1930s were largely ignored in Washington and had no influence on war plans or the development of new weapons. In a more focused study, Kenneth J. Campbell (1998) concurs with this general assessment showing that analysts in Washington discounted reports by Truman Smith, attaché to Germany from 1935 to 1939, that the Nazi regime was rapidly rearming the Third Reich (Hessen 1984). George Hofmann, "The Tactical and Strategic Use of Attaché Intelligence: The Spanish Civil War and the U.S. Army's Misguided Quest for a Modern Tank Doctrine" (1998) argues that attachés assigned to Madrid, Paris, and London misunderstood tank operations during the Spanish Civil War, and sent to Washington reports that directly influenced the adoption of faulty armor doctrine by the US Army. The generally negative assessment of the work of attachés and the view that officials in the United States basically ignored the reports the attachés submitted are challenged by Thomas Mahnken, *Uncovering Ways of War: U.S. Intelligence and Foreign Military Innovation, 1918–1941* (2002) who contends that officials in the United States valued the technical information

sent by attachés and that their reports influenced positively the development of American weapons systems and doctrine. Mahnken also argues that far from being the career backwater it is often (and still is) depicted to be, the American attaché corps was larger and better funded than those of other nations and that it attracted leading officers in both services including Peyton C. March, Raymond Spruance, and William “Bull” Halsey. The published memoirs of John A. Gade (1942), naval attaché to Belgium, the Netherlands, and Portugal during the 1930s provides a perspective of the work of an officer assigned to smaller nations during the period.

In 1945, US military attachés were accredited to 45 nations with army officers accredited to 38 of the 45 nations and naval officers accredited to 28. Three years later the number had increased to 258 Army and Air Force attachés assigned to 59 countries and 120 naval officers to 43 countries. In 1949, as the Cold War intensified, the number of attachés rose to 378 and number of personnel assigned to staff attaché offices to 2,049 with a Senior Attaché being designated for each nation. Alarmed by this growth, government leaders eliminated 36 posts and cut the total number of attaché personnel to 1,458.

When the US military was reorganized with the establishment of the Department of Defense a unified Defense Intelligence Agency was established to coordinate the work of attachés assigned by each of the three services, though attachés continued to report to the ambassador to the country to which they were assigned. In 1964, the Defense Attaché System was established to coordinate more efficiently the collection of intelligence for the various components of the Department of Defense.

The proliferation of defense treaties in the wake of the Korean War led to the assignment of attachés to a total of 71 countries. The Army was represented in the capitals of 68 of these nations, the Air Force in 53, and the Navy in 45. That same year 60 foreign countries stationed 121 attachés in Washington, 57 military, 32 navy, and 32 air attachés. By 1960, the United States added three nations to those in which American attachés served. A decade after the breakup of the Soviet Union, at the start of the twenty-first century, the United States assigned attachés to 127 nations.

The work of these Cold War individuals has received relatively little attention from historians. The main exception is Robert Kirkland, *Observing Our Hermanos de Armas* (2003). Kirkland outlines the duties and training of attachés between 1945 and 1964 then analyzes the work they conducted in Guatemala, 1950–4; Cuba, 1952–8; and Bolivia, 1958–64. In *Silent Missions* Vernon Walters (1978) describes his service as an attaché in Italy, 1960–2; Brazil, 1962–7; and France, 1967–72. During his service in Paris, Walters established contacts with his counterparts from the People’s Republic of China and facilitated secret discussions with North Vietnam. Previously, while in Brazil, he was accused by Soviets of working with Brazilian military officers to topple Joao Goulart from power in 1964, an accusation he denied. Later that year, the US Air Force attaché to Bolivia was accused of complicity in the coup that ousted President Victor Paz from power, a charged rejected by Robert Kirkland in “Colonel Edward Fox and the 1964 Bolivian Coup” (2005). Roy Peterson, *American Attaché in the Moscow Maelstrom*

(2005), describes his work as an Assistant Army Attaché, 1983–5, and in shorter works, Ruth Anderson (1992) provides an account of her work as air attaché to Hungary, 1988–91, and Chris Bott (2006) his experiences in Moscow between 1994 and 1996. Peter A. Huchthausen, who served as the senior US naval attaché in Yugoslavia, Rumania, and the Soviet Union and headed the Defense Intelligence Agency attaché and human intelligence collection operations in Western Europe, co-authored a history of Cold War naval intelligence that provides significant information of the work of naval attachés (Huchthausen and Sheldon-Duplaix 2009). The Coast Guard assigned “attachés” to eight nations. “Liaison Officers” are assigned to 13 nations and the “USCG Adviser” assigned to Azerbaijan all fill roles similar to those of military, naval, and air attachés.

### Military Advisors

The work of individual military advisors has received scattered attention from historians. As a group they have not been the focus of a single monograph, though Donald Stoker (2008) briefly traces their work in an essay introducing a dozen case studies from the past two centuries. Prior to the Civil War a handful of Americans served in foreign military services, for example, David Porter commanded the Mexican navy, 1826–9, and several US veterans served in the army and navy of the republic of Texas, but none can be considered “military advisors” in the modern sense of the term. The initial case of American military personnel serving as advisors to a foreign military commenced in 1869 when Civil War veterans Thaddeus Mott became military advisor to Ismail Pasha, Khedive of Egypt. General William T. Sherman approved leaves of absence for US Army officers who wished to join him, and during the following decade, the 50 officers of the unofficial advisory mission directed the construction of public works projects and established schools for training Egyptian officers before they returned to the United States in 1878. In 1875, Sherman and Secretary of War William S. Belknap dispatched Major General Emory Upton on an around-the-world mission to observe foreign military practices and gave him orders to report on the activities of the French military officers who were advising Japan on the modernization of its army. After signing its first treaty with a Western nation, the Korean–US Treaty of 1882, the Korean government asked the United States to send a team of US Army advisors. The War Department was reluctant to send serving officers so, in 1888, the Korean government hired four former officers, including William McEntyre Dye who had served in Egypt, 1873–8. The Americans trained the Korean palace guard before their place was taken by a larger, official group of Russian military men in 1896 (Bishop 1983).

When US Marines intervened in the internal affairs of Caribbean nations during the early twentieth century, one of their activities was organizing and training the local police and military forces in the hope they could maintain peace and order once the Americans withdrew. In May 1926, Congress authorized the sending of US military advisors to the Philippines and Latin America in place of the occupation forces, the last of which was withdrawn from Haiti in 1934 (Pearce 1982,



Langley 1983). Following the outbreak of World War II in 1939, the United States began sending arms to Latin American countries in the hope that should they be attacked they could defend themselves until help arrived from the United States. There were 12 military advisory teams operating in Latin America by December 1941; a number that increased in 1942 as the size of each was enlarged.

Following the passage of the Tydings–McDuffie Act (1934) providing for Philippine independence (in 1944), plans were laid for the formation of a Philippine army and navy. Upon his retirement as Army Chief of Staff, Douglas MacArthur oversaw the buildup with the assistance of individuals assigned from the Army War College. When Japan took control of Indo-China in July 1941, MacArthur was recalled to active duty and made commander of US Army Forces Far East. The nascent Philippine Army was placed under his command, and US Army officers were assigned to advise Filipino commanders of each of the Filipino divisions. Their efforts were supported by approximately 40 US officer instructors in each division. Following the surrender of Corregidor, many of these officers fled into the mountains and jungles of Luzon and Mindanao to organize guerilla resistance groups. Supplied by submarines and aircraft, these groups sabotaged bridges and other installations and inflicted heavy casualties upon the Japanese occupation forces.

During World War II, the United States sent advisors into Nazi-occupied France, Italy, Yugoslavia, and, in the largest numbers, to China where literally thousands of Americans assisted in the training of Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist forces. General Joseph Stilwell was charged not only to serve as Chiang's chief of staff, but also to direct the work of American advisors, to administer the Lend-Lease materiel being sent to China, and to command the 100,000 US forces dispatched to the China-Burma-India Theater (Tuchman 1971).

In the immediate aftermath of World War II, US troops sent to Korea made the training of local police to maintain order following the repatriation of Japanese forces a major priority. Once it became clear that the peninsula would not be united, they shifted their focus to using these constabulary forces as a nucleus around which to build the new Republic of Korea Army (Millett 2005, Brazinsky 2007, Gibby 2008). When the United States withdrew its occupation forces, American service personnel remaining in Korea became the Military Advisory Group, Korea (K MAG) on July 1, 1949 (Millett 1997, Clemens 2002). Then, when less than a year later, North Korean forces invaded the South in June 1950, US advisors remained with their South Korean units as they withdrew toward Japan. Many of these advisors assumed direct command of the Korean troops they accompanied. Once the front stabilized around Pusan, the advisors began rebuilding, reorganizing, and retraining the South Korean army. US advisors remained with Korean units through the entire war (Hausrath 1957, Sawyer 1962).

### **Military Assistance Advisory Groups (MAAGs)**

As the Cold War deepened, US military assistance programs were expanded rapidly. While military, air, and naval attachés continued their traditional work,

they were joined in foreign nations by other officers who were part of Military Assistance Advisory Groups (MAAGs), that is, small groups of American military advisors assigned to assist in the training of the military forces of Third World nations, usually to equip them to fight conventional, not guerilla, forces (Spearin 2008). Most MAAGs operated in Southeast Asia and Latin America (Pach 1991).

In September 1950, a MAAG was established in Vietnam but the French were reluctant to allow the Americans to work directly with Vietnamese troops until 1954, at which time French General Henri Navarre permitted US liaison officers to operate directly with Vietnamese units for the first time. When the French withdrew from Southeast Asia, the US increased its MAAG, Vietnam, to 740 men, but President Diem was as reluctant as the French to authorize Americans to work with Vietnamese forces on a tactical level. Between 1957 and 1960 MAAG members focused upon training the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) Special Forces and Ranger units, then expanded in 1961 to working with the South Vietnamese Air Force (Westermann 2008) and with the ARVN on the Strategic Hamlet Program, by which time there were 692 in the MAAG assigned to Vietnam (Collins 1975). Much smaller groups from the Air Force, Marines, and Navy worked with their counterparts in similar ways (Hooper and Allard 1976, Whitlow, Shulminson, and Teller 1977, Futrell and Bluemenson 1981, Marolda and Fitzgerald 1986, Martin 2001).

Following France's departure from Indochina, the United States established MAAG Cambodia, which operated from 1955 to 1964, and a Program Evaluation Office (PEO) in Laos in 1955. The latter was staffed by retired officers or individuals placed in reserve status. They wore civilian clothing and trained men from the Laotian police and Royal Lao Army. The PEO was replaced by a MAAG in 1961, by which time there were 300 Green Berets in Laos. That number rose to 433, who not only trained the Royal Laos Army forces, but also, a 40,000-man force of Hmong. To comply with the Geneva Protocol, MAAG Laos, was, in theory, withdrawn the following year, but, in fact, its personnel were simply reassigned to a new "Requirements Office" and continued their work until the last left the country in 1973. The CIA maintained a separate presence in Laos during this time and established Air America and Continental Air Services to support US forces and their allies in the country.

In 1964, MAAG Vietnam became part of Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV). The military attaché position in Saigon was eliminated and its functions were added to MACV as it continued to grow geometrically in size. Initially, administrative and logistics roles were added to MACV, followed by air defense and other combat arms, until ground combat troops were placed within its purview. At its zenith, there were approximately 550,000 American servicemen in Vietnam which is a force far larger than the entire United States Army possessed at the start of the twenty-first century.

The commander who led MACV for the greatest portion of the war was Army General William C. Westmoreland, the military officer who will be forever identified with America's failure to obtain a victory in Vietnam. Westmoreland was plagued by not only the Viet Cong [VC] and later North Vietnamese Army [NVA]

units in the field but also by inter-service rivalries within the command itself which hampered its effectiveness. As more and more of the key billets in MACV were filled by Army officers – as officials in the Pentagon came to see the conflict primarily as a “ground conflict” – officers in other services, many of whom did not agree with the strategy pursued by the Army, resented the control by Army officers. MACV controlled the direction of America’s military effort until the United States disengaged itself from Vietnam in 1973, a move that paved the way for the eventual defeat of South Vietnam by the North. The size and scope of MACV led to internal problems which were difficult to overcome and were compounded by intra-service rivalry (Cosmas 2006, 2007).

Other than in Vietnam, no MAAG has been the subject of a focused study, thus leaving wide areas for future historians and other analysts. The work of MAAG Nicaragua is sketched in Michael D. Gambone’s *Eisenhower, Somoza, and the Cold War in Nicaragua, 1953–1961* (1997), that of the MAAG in El Salvador in Robert Ramsey’s comparative *Advising Indigenous Forces: American Advisors in Korea, Vietnam, and El Salvador* (2006) and in A. J. Bacevich, *American Military Policy in Small Wars: The Case of El Salvador* (1988); the training of El Salvador’s airborne troops (Briscoe 2008), and the work of advisors in Columbia in Douglas Porch and Christopher Muller’s “‘Imperial Grunts’ Revisited: The US Advisory Effort in Columbia” (2008), but, in general, it is difficult to ferret out information concerning MAAGs and other similar military assistance and liaison groups and offices even though the US military operated an extensive system of such groups in the second half of the twentieth century and continues to do so today. For example, in 2008, the US Southern Command directed the work of *Military Groups* (MILGPs) in Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Columbia, Ecuador, and Venezuela; *Military Liaison Offices* (MLO) in Barbados, Bahamas, Belize, Brazil, Haiti, Jamaica, Mexico, and Trinidad and Tobago and temporarily Nicaragua; *Offices of Defense Cooperation* (ODCs) in Costa Rica, Panama, Paraguay, and Uruguay; *Military Assistance Advisory Groups* (MAAGs) in the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Peru; and *Defense Assistance Offices* (DAOs) in Barbados and Surinam. Regardless of their name, these are usually joint service groups that administer US military aid and assist in training the military of the host country. In time historians will be able to consult memoirs by veterans of such service, but to date only one has been published. In a short essay, John Waghelstein (2008), former member of a Special Action Force that trained Cuban exiles, Panamians, Dominican Republicans, South Vietnamese and Chinese (in Vietnam), Bolivians, Koreans, Salvadorans, and Hondurans between 1962 and 1987, outlines the lessons he learned in a series of “ruminations.”

While not MAAGs, US Special Forces served in such a capacity in Vietnam (Ives 2006) and the Army’s 8th Special Forces Group, based in the Panama Canal Zone, 1963–77, operated like one in Bolivia. In 1967 30 of its members organized and trained a Bolivian Ranger Battalion, trained nine infantry rifle companies in small unit tactics and counterinsurgency operations (COIN Ops), advised the Bolivia Airborne Battalion, and instructed junior officers in COIN Ops at the Combat Arms School in Cochabamba (*Veritas* 2008).

Military personnel serving as attachés will continue to play a role in military planning and information gathering in the twenty-first century, and those assigned to Military Assistance Advisory Groups to administer aid and provide training and assistance to the armed forces of other nations appear likely to expand in number and responsibilities. Historians have not accorded the work of these individuals and organizations the attention that they deserve, and, given the security classification of many of their records, research will continue to remain exceptionally challenging.

#### BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Anderson, Ruth. (1992). "Witness to an Evolutionary Revolution," *American Intelligence Journal*, 13:3 (Summer), 63–70.
- Angevine, Robert G. (1992). "Gentlemen Do Read Each Other's Mail: American Intelligence in the Interwar Era," *Intelligence and National Security*, 7:2 (April), 1–29.
- Bacevich, A. J. (1988). *American Military Policy in Small Wars: The Case of El Salvador*. Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's.
- Bell, Ronald K. (1983). *An Examination and Evaluation of the Defense Attaché Personnel System*. Washington: National War College.
- Bishop, Donald M. (1983). "Shared Failure: American Military Advisors in Korea, 1888–1896," *Transactions of the Royal Asiatic Society*, Korea branch, 58:1, 53–76.
- Bott, Chris (2006). "In Principle, Da: An Introduction to the Life of an Attaché in Moscow (1994–96)," *Naval Intelligence Professionals Quarterly*, 22:1 (January), 35–8.
- Brazinsky, Gregg (2007). *Nation Building in South Korea: Koreans, Americans, and the Making of Democracy*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Briscoe, Charles H. (2008). "Building El Salvador's Airborne," part 1. *Veritas*, 4:1, 64–73.
- Buckingham, Benjamin H, George G. Foulk, and Walter McLean (1883). "Observations Upon the Korean Coast, Japanese–Korean Ports and Siberia, Made during a Journey from the Asiatic Station to the United States through Siberia and Europe, June 3 to September 8, 1882," *Information from Abroad*, General Information Series Number 1. Washington: Office of Naval Intelligence.
- Campbell, Kenneth J. (1998). "Truman Smith: American Military Attaché," *Intelligencer*, 9:3 (October): 16–17.
- Chan, Sheng, ed. (1994). *Hmong Means Free: Life in Laos and America*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- Clemens, Peter (2002). "Captain James Hausman, U.S. Army Military Advisor to Korea, 1946–1948: The Intelligent Man on the Spot," *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 25:1 (March), 163–98.
- Coletta, Paolo E. (1979). "French Ensor Chadwick: The First American Naval Attaché, 1882–1889," *American Neptune*, 39:2 (April), 126–41.
- Collins, James L. (1975). *The Development and Training of the South Vietnamese Army, 1950–1972*. Washington: Department of the Army.
- Cooke, P. St. G. (1857). *Scenes and Adventures in the Army; or Romance of Military Life*. Philadelphia: Lindsay & Blakiston.
- Cooper, Diane E. (1993). "Diplomat and Naval Intelligence Officer: The Duties of Lt. George L. Dyer, U.S. Naval Attaché to Spain," in James C. Bradford, ed., *Crucible of Empire: The Spanish–American War and Its Aftermath*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1–22.

- Cosmas, Graham A. (2006). *MACV: The Joint Command in the Years of Escalation, 1962–1967*. Washington: Center of Military History.
- Cosmas, Graham A. (2007). *The Joint Command in the Years of Withdrawal, 1968–1973*. Washington: Center of Military History.
- Crumley, Brian T. (2002). “The Naval Attaché System of the United States, 1882–1914,” PhD dissertation, Texas A & M University.
- Davidann, Jon (2003). “U.S. and German Military and Naval Attachés in Japan, 1931–1939,” *Trans-Pacific Relations: America, Europe, and Asia in the Twentieth Century*. Westport, CT: Praeger.
- Dorwart, Jeffery (1979). *The Office of Naval Intelligence: The Birth of America’s First Intelligence Agency, 1865–1918*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Floyd, Dale E. (1979). “U.S. Army Officers in Europe, 1815–61,” in *Proceedings of the Citadel Conference on War and Diplomacy, 1977*. Charleston, SC: Citadel, 26–30.
- Futrell, Robert F., and Martin Blumenson (1981). *The United States Air Force in Southeast Asia: The Advisory Years to 1965*. Washington: Office of Air Force History.
- Gade, John A. (1942). *All My Born Days: Experiences of a Naval Intelligence Officer in Europe*. New York: Scribner’s.
- Gambone, Michael D. (1997). *Eisenhower, Somoza, and the Cold War in Nicaragua, 1953–1961*. Westport, CT: Praeger.
- Gibby, Bryan (2008). “American Advisors to the Republic of Korea: America’s First Commitment in the Cold War, 1946–1950,” in Donald Stoker, ed., *Military Advising and Assistance: From Mercenaries to Privatization, 1815–2007*. New York: Routledge, 81–110.
- Glantz, David M. (1991). *Observing the Soviets: Army Attachés in Eastern Europe during the 1930s*. Fort Leavenworth, KA: Soviet Army Studies Office.
- Glanz, Mary (2008). “An Officer and a Diplomat? The Ambiguous Position of Philip R. Faymonville and United States–Soviet Relations, 1941–1943,” *Journal of Military History*, 72:1 (January), 141–78.
- Hart, John N. (1985). *The Making of an Army “Old China Hand”: A Memoir of Colonel David D. Barrett*. Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, Berkeley, Center for Chinese Studies.
- Hausrath, Alfred H. (1957). *The KMAG Advisor: Role and Problems in Developing an Indigenous Army for Combat Operations in Korea*. Chevy Chase, MD: Operations Research Office, Johns Hopkins.
- Herndon, James S., and Joseph O. Baylen (1975). “Col. Philip R. Faymonville and the Red Army, 1934–43,” *Slavic Review*, 34:3 (September), 483–505.
- Hessen, Robert, ed. (1984). *Berlin Alert: The Memoirs and Reports of Truman Smith*. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press.
- Hofmann, George F. (1998). “The Tactical and Strategic Use of Attaché Intelligence: The Spanish Civil War and the U.S. Army’s Misguided Quest for a Modern Tank Doctrine,” *Journal of Military History*, 62:1 (January), 101–33.
- Hooper, Edwin B., and Dean Allard (1976). *The United States Navy and the Vietnam Conflict*, vol. 1: *The Setting of the Stage to 1959*. Washington: Department of the Navy, Navy History Division.
- Huchthausen, Peter A., and Alexandre Sheldon-Duplaix (2009). *Hide and Seek: The Untold Story of Cold War Espionage at Sea*. Hoboken, NJ: J. Wiley & Sons.
- Ives, Christopher K. (2006). *US Special Forces and Counterinsurgency in Vietnam: Military Innovation and Institutional Failure, 1961–63*. New York: Routledge.
- Kirkland, Robert O. (2003). *Observing Our Hermanos De Armas: U.S. Military Attachés in Guatemala, Cuba, and Bolivia, 1950–1964*. New York: Routledge.



- Kirkland, Robert O. (2005). "Colonel Edward Fox and the 1964 Bolivian Coup," *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*, 18:3 (Fall), 473–82.
- KMAG [Korean Military Advisory Group] ed. (1955). *The United States Military Advisory Group to the Republic of Korea*. Korea: PIO.
- Koch, Scott A. (1990). "Watching the Rhine: U.S. Army Attaché Reports and the Resurgence of the German Army, 1933–1941," PhD dissertation, Duke University.
- Koch, Scott A. (1995). "The Role of US Army Military Attachés between the World Wars: Selection and Training," *Studies in Intelligence*, 38:5, 111–15.
- Kyriakau, John (1999). *The Origins of the Service Attaché: France, Great Britain and the United States*. Leicester, UK: Centre for the Study of Diplomacy, University of Leicester.
- Langer, John D. (1976). *The Formulation of American Aid Policy Toward the Soviet Union, 1940–43*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Langley, Lester D. (1983). *The Banana Wars: An Inner History of American Empire, 1900–34*. Lexington: University of Kentucky Press.
- Long, David F. (1988). *Gold Braid and Foreign Relations: Diplomatic Activities of U.S. Naval Officers, 1798–1883*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Mahnken, Thomas G. (2002). *Uncovering Ways of War: U.S. Intelligence and Foreign Military Innovation, 1918–1941*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Marolda, Edward, and Oscar P. Fitzgerald (1986). *From Military Assistance to Combat: 1959–1965*. Washington: Naval Historical Center.
- Martin, Michael N. (2001). *Warriors of the Sea: Marines of the Second Indochina War, Sea Tigers: Elite Vietnamese Marines and Their American Advisors*. Paducah, KY: Turner.
- McClellan, George B. (1861). *The Armies of Europe: Comprising Descriptions in Detail of the Military Systems of England, France, Russia, Prussia, Austria, and Sardinia ...* Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott [a revised version of *The Report of Captain George B. McClellan, One of the Officers Sent to the Seat of War in Europe, in 1855 and 1856* (1857)].
- McCully, Newton A. (1977). *The McCully Report: The Russo–Japanese War, 1904–05*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Millett, Allan R. (1997). "Captain James H. Hausman and the Formation of the Korean Army, 1945–1950," *Armed Forces and Society*, 23:4 (Summer), 503–39.
- Millett, Allan R. (2005). *The War for Korea, 1945–1950: A House Burning*. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press.
- Mott, Thomas Bentley (1937). *Twenty Years as a Military Attaché*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- O'Toole, G. J. A. (1991). *Honorable Treachery: A History of U.S. Intelligence, Espionage, and Covert Action from the American Revolution to the CIA*. New York: Atlantic Press.
- Packard, Wyman H. (1996). *A Century of Intelligence*. Washington: Department of the Navy.
- Pach, Chester J., Jr. (1991). *Arming the Free World: The Origins of the United States Military Assistance Program, 1945–1950*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Pearce, Jenny (1982). *Under the Eagle: U.S. Intervention in Central America and the Caribbean*. Boston: South End Press.
- Peterson, Roy E. (2005). *American Attaché in the Moscow Maelstrom: Attaché Duty and the Craft of Intelligence*. Bloomington, IN: Author House.
- Porch, Douglas, and Christopher Muller (2008). "'Imperial Grunts' Revisited: The US Advisory Effort in Columbia," in Donald Stoker, ed., *Military Advising and Assistance: From Mercenaries to Privatization, 1815–2007*. New York: Routledge, 168–191.
- Prout, John F. (2002). "The Origins of the Military Attaché Corps," *American Intelligence Journal*, 21:1–2 (Spring), 47–55.



- Prout, John F. (2005). "George Foulk, HUMINT Pioneer: The First US Naval Attaché to Korea," *Studies in Intelligence*, 49:1 (March), 33–9.
- Ramsey, Robert D., III (2006). *Advising Indigenous Forces: American Advisors in Korea, Vietnam, and El Salvador*. Fort Leavenworth, KA: Combat Studies Institute.
- Sawyer, Robert K. (1962). *Military Advisors in Korea: KMAG in Peace and War*. Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History.
- Shields, Henry Seward (1970). "A Historical Survey of United States Naval Attachés in Russia, 1904–1941," MA thesis, Defense Intelligence School.
- Sims, William Snowden (1920). *Victory at Sea*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, Page & Co.
- Spearin, Christopher (2008). "A Justified Heaping of the Blame? An Assessment of Privately Supplied Security Sector Training and Reform in Iraq – 2003–2005 and Beyond," in Donald Stoker, ed., *Military Advising and Assistance: From Mercenaries to Privatization, 1815–2007*. New York: Routledge, 224–38.
- Stoker, Donald (2008). "The History and Evolution of Foreign Military Advising and Assistance, 1815–2007," in Donald Stoker, ed., *Military Advising and Assistance: From Mercenaries to Privatization, 1815–2007*. New York: Routledge, 1–10.
- Tolley, Kemp (1983). *Caviar and Commissars: The Experiences of a U.S. Naval Officer in Stalin's Russia*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Trask, David F. (1972). *Captains and Cabinets: Anglo-American Naval Relations, 1917–1918*. Columbia: University of Missouri Press.
- Tuchman, Barbara (1971). *Stilwell and the American Experience in China, 1911–45*. New York: Macmillan.
- Twitichell, Heath, Jr. (1974). *Allen: Biography of an Army Officer, 1859–1930*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.
- Vagts, Alfred (1967). *The Military Attaché*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Vandiver, Frank E. (1977). *Black Jack: The Life and Times of John J. Pershing*, 2 vols. College Station: Texas A&M University Press.
- Veritas (2008). "Special Edition: Special Forces in Bolivia," *Veritas*, 4:4.
- Voss, William D. (2004). "Watching the Rising Sun: German and American Military Attaché Reports and Intelligence Failure in Japan, 1931–1939," PhD dissertation, Kansas State University.
- Votaw, John F. (1991). "United States Military Attachés, 1885–1919: The American Army Matures in the International Arena," PhD dissertation, Temple University.
- Waghelstein, John D. (2008). "Ruminations of a Woolly Mammoth, or Training and Advising in Counterinsurgency and Elsewhere during the Cold War," in Donald Stoker, ed., *Military Advising and Assistance: From Mercenaries to Privatization, 1815–2007*. New York: Routledge, 151–67.
- Walters, Vernon A. (1978). *Silent Missions*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday.
- Weeks, Charles J., Jr. (1993). *An American Diplomat in Revolutionary Russia: The Life and Times of Vice Admiral Newton McCully, 1867–1951*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Whitlow, Robert H., Jack Shulminson, and Gary L. Teller (1977). *The U.S. Marines in Vietnam*. Washington: United States Marine Corps, History and Museums Division.
- Westermann, Edward B. (2008). "Relegated to the Backseat: Farm Gate and the Failure of the Air Advisory Effort in South Vietnam, 1961–1963," in Donald Stoker, ed., *Military Advising and Assistance: From Mercenaries to Privatization, 1815–2007*. New York: Routledge.

## Part IV

# HOMELAND SECURITY

## Chapter Forty

# EARLY AMERICAN INSURRECTIONS

*William Hogeland*

The American insurrections that occurred before the Civil War raise provocative issues for military history. Many such insurrections were so brief and easily suppressed (or, in one case, so easily successful) that they involved little application of military theory and practice and engage only glancingly with larger themes of American military history. Others, however, connect in complex ways to a host of military issues, from the purposes and effectiveness of militias, to the strategies and tactics of slavery resisters, to the proper limits of executive force on a populace – issues to which historians have given a wide and often revealing range of responses.

For purposes of this discussion, then, early American insurrections are divided in four groups. Those in the first group – Coode’s, Culpeper’s, Leisler’s, and Bacon’s rebellions – were led by white freemen in the period of instability that accompanied the economic and political reordering of the British empire in the late seventeenth-century. Those of the second group – episodes involving the so-called Paxton Boys and Black Boys of Pennsylvania and the North Carolina Regulators – reflected tensions between frontier settlers and their governments in the period between the French and Indian War and the Revolutionary crisis. These two groups embrace insurrections whose military significance is slight, as well as those involving military issues passed over by some historians and emphasized by others, with illuminating results.

The third group, slave rebellions, includes the Stono, Gabriel Prosser’s, Denmark Vesey’s, and Nat Turner’s Rebellions, the supposed New York City slave conspiracy of 1741, and John Brown’s raid on Harper’s Ferry. Such incidents share a stark, single cause – the outrageous suffering inflicted on African slaves – and occurred from early in the history of American slavery until shortly before the Civil War. Their central historiographical issue has largely to do with the military preparedness and sophistication of the slaves themselves, an issue complicated both by the frequent unreliability of evidence given at trials of slave rebels and historians’ changing attitudes toward such evidence.

The final group includes Shays’s Rebellion, the Whiskey Rebellion, and Fries’s Rebellion, which occurred in the post-Revolutionary context of a struggle over

national definition. Historians have explored military aspects of these insurrections largely for the contributions that rebellion and suppression made to the founding and development of the early United States, its military establishments, and the appropriate role of military force in policing the public.

### Seventeenth-Century Rebellions

Of seventeenth-century insurrections, Bacon's and Leisler's enjoy far greater historiographical presence – in both general and military senses – than Coode's and Culpeper's, which were alike in being almost free of military incident. In 1689, John Coode of Maryland led 700 Protestants against the Catholic government of the province, making fewer than 200 men surrender without a shot: his was the successful American insurrection, part of the "Glorious Revolution." Edward Neill's *Terra Mariae* (1867), an impressionistic history of Maryland overtly hostile to Coode himself, says nothing about military matters in the rebellion; the main modern source on Coode's Rebellion, Lois Green Carr and David William Jordan's *Maryland's Revolution of Government* (1974), has not been superseded, and aside from glancing references in the contexts of colonial religion, law, and politics – not of military history – few of its themes have been developed in journal articles. Carr and Jordan do give, in their almost purely political book, a few details about cannon and troop numbers, but they also complain about the paucity of primary records (perhaps one reason no purely military history of the incident has ever been written).

Culpeper's Rebellion was like the later Shays's and Whiskey Rebellion in being inspired at least in part by tax resistance. In 1679, a chaotic series of events involving the personal antipathy of the planter John Culpeper for a royal tax inspector led to a self-appointed government's being erected in Albemarle County, North Carolina. No battles ensued; the rebels made their case in England, and Culpeper himself, after repeated arrest and release, was finally acquitted on the grounds that the episode was a feud among planters. Hugh F. Rankin, whose *Upheaval in Albemarle* (1962) relies in part on Hugh Lefler and Albert Newsome's general history of North Carolina (1942), and on an early account of the rebellion in Charles Andrews, ed., *Narratives of the Insurrections, 1675–1690* (1915), noted that other information on the rebellion was then known to exist in English archives – and Bernard Bailyn (1953) stated that Culpeper's Rebellion was significant to the introduction of English officialdom in America. But while various articles on colonial finance, race, and class have given Culpeper passing mention, historians interested in strategy and tactics, or in broader military-related themes in American history, have naturally tended to look elsewhere than Culpeper's and Coode's rebellions.

Leisler's Rebellion, linked thematically to Coode's by its religious background, differs from both Coode's and Culpeper's for having generated a relatively rich primary and secondary record, with a detailed military narrative involving descriptions of an outright militia takeover of the fort in New York, as well as themes bearing on longer-range issues of effective military organization in the American

colonies. In 1689, while the Glorious Revolution was underway in Britain, Jacob Leisler, a Calvinist immigrant from Germany, ousted Lieutenant Governor Francis Nicholson, ostensibly because Nicholson was loyal to James II, and in large part because Leisler and his supporters opposed the Dominion of New England to which New York had been attached three years earlier. When Leisler refused to submit to the governor sent by the new monarchs, William and Mary, English troops took control of the city and executed Leisler. Serious scholarly work on Leisler's Rebellion began relatively late. Bailyn, in the 1953 article cited above, said that there was not then a full account of the rebellion, though two unpublished works had in fact covered the rebellion: Lawrence H. Leder's master's thesis, "Jacob Leisler and the New York Rebellion of 1689–1691" (1950) and Beverly McAnear's doctoral dissertation "Politics in Provincial New York, 1689–1761" (1935). Also, in the year Bailyn's article appeared, Jerome Reich's *Leisler's Rebellion* (1953) was published.

Those sources are cited by Charles McCormick, who synthesizes them in *Leisler's Rebellion* (1989) while building his own analysis from the primary record. Leisler's Rebellion is generally seen – rightly, says McCormick – as a democratic attack on elites, in this case Anglican merchants. It thus raises two key issues in early American military history, which McCormick addresses: authorities' ineffectual protection of ordinary people from attack by natives and foreign powers; and the value of militias, both sanctioned and unofficial, versus that of regular troops. Both issues were sources of friction in pre- and post-Revolutionary politics as well.

McCormick places the salient issue of military protection in a broad, imperial context, noting that seventeenth-century elites brought skills to colonial government better suited to mercantile affairs than to military protection; describing the royal military contingent in New York as a small and decrepit garrison; and stating that "in none of these mutations [New Netherland, New York, ad hoc defense against Indian attacks, etc.] had the existing government shown the power or will to defend the colony" (McCormick 1989: 11). He describes the Iroquois as the colony's only defensive shield against the French and places New York's problems within a geopolitical strategic framework. He delineates the efforts of Governor Edmund Andros and his masters in England to use the colony to guard the coast and block the routes to New France and the interior. And he finds immediate causes of Leisler's Rebellion in tax hikes made at a time when militiamen were not being paid for service on the frontier.

When it comes to the militia takeover of the fort in New York, McCormick describes it as "essentially a breach of the peace supported overwhelmingly by the burghers and freemen. . . ." (McCormick 1989: 198). Yet regarding the effectiveness of militias, he deems feasible Leisler's plan to use militia to drive the French from Canada and thinks Leisler might have conquered Montreal. He concludes that the rebellion was at once a political and a military crisis; he sees its crucial factor as England's having effectively delegated both military power and financial responsibility to the colonists.

Perhaps the best known of the insurrections in this group is Bacon's Rebellion, whose story is replete, in both primary and secondary history, with military detail,

largely because suppressing the rebellion became a project of British military administration, subject to the detailed recordkeeping of the Admiralty and other departments. Too, the rebellion pitted Bacon's followers, black and white, both against Governor of Virginia William Berkely's troops and against natives whose war practices inspired comment by eyewitnesses and later writers. And Bacon's Rebellion went on for several months, involving full-scale military maneuvers and tactics. Lists and abstracts for primary documents microfilmed by and for the Virginia Colonial Records Project are compiled by John Davenport Neville in *Bacon's Rebellion: Abstracts of Materials in the Colonial Records Project* (1976). Letters there from the Navy Board to Secretary Samuel Pepys contain a trove of military minutiae: evaluating, refitting, staffing, budgeting, and provisioning ships bound for Virginia; deployment and recall of troops; reports on incidents en route; complaints; discussion of the aftermath. State papers cover, with a degree of specificity rare in histories of early American insurrections, regimental organization down to exact numbers of men and ranking officers in each unit; requisitions for biscuits and cheese; numbers of muskets, pikes, field pieces, etc.

Much real-time military narrative and speculation can be gleaned from those official papers. The Captain's Log of the *Bristol*, advance ship for the suppression, reports that Bacon had burned Jamestown. Board minutes give such information as the King's decision to send a man of war to Virginia should disorder continue, as well as detailed news of the conflicts. A book of record housed in the Pepysian Library contains detailed narratives by Sir John Berry and Francis Moryson, who commanded troops aboard the *Bristol*. Berry's and Moryson's biased yet detailed accounts, on which many later versions rely, contain much military information, including references to Indians' "inforting" (Neville 1976: 291); the Indians' small number of fighters yet remarkable promptness at firing arms; and times and places for Bacon's and various natives' maneuvers, as well as those of royal troops against the rebels. The authors evaluate tactics, including Bacon's entrenchment to nullify the effects of ships' firing at his palisades. Fog of war is frankly evidenced in a description of the royal troops' confused retreat.

Yet for all of that primary military detail (its scope is barely sketched above), historians dealing with Bacon's Rebellion tended for many years to find questions of cause and significance more compelling than questions of war. The major subject of Bacon studies, according to a thorough historiographical essay by John Frantz, which serves as the introduction to his edited volume *Bacon's Rebellion* (1969), devolves on whether the rebellion was an early expression of innate American tendencies toward liberty, as argued by Thomas Jefferson Wertenbaker in *Torchbearer of the Revolution* (1940). Certain proponents of the proto-Revolution theory of Bacon's Rebellion do address military matters, though in a revealingly poetic way. As seen in a selection included by Frantz, George Bancroft's narratives make every Bacon victory seem foreordained, the cowardice of Berkely's men a mark of un-American decadence, royal naval superiority unfair, and Bacon's followers a people fervently eager for liberty.

Writers skeptical of the proto-Revolutionary view of Bacon's Rebellion focus more closely on analysis of cause and effect than on military narrative or



ramifications. Wilcomb E. Washburn (1957) depicts the frontiersmen of the 1670s not as liberty-loving republicans but as hair-trigger belligerents and briefly discusses Bacon's recruiting, which involved promising ordinary people social equality. Frantz includes Berkely's fervid account of his own strategy and tactics; accuracy is hard to judge, as the account wallows in self-pitying description of the mutiny and cowardice of the author's own troops. Other writers included in Frantz, from John Fiske to Bailyn, focus on the economic, not the military, power struggle in Virginia.

Stephen Saunders Webb (1984) explicitly links Bacon's Rebellion to the biggest military issues confronting the empires of the day (including what Webb persuasively calls an Anglo-Iroquois empire), and remains radical for reconfiguring the entire discussion of seventeenth-century colonial politics in a military context. Like McCormick on Leisler, Webb places events of the year in which, as his subtitle has it, American independence ended, in the largest context of European geopolitics. But Webb goes much farther than McCormick in defining those politics as focused most revealingly on war, in which Webb integrates the mercantile, religious, and social themes on which other historians have focused.

Webb thus devotes many pages to Bacon's Rebellion – all of "Book One" in his three-book work – and focuses minutely on military narrative, not, as in Bancroft, to sentimental effect but with the goal of at once analyzing and bringing to life the military preoccupation of all parties involved. *Tours de force* of military detail include four dense pages devoted solely to a description of the *Concord*; a 125-page narration of the rebellion's climax in the York River Campaigns; birds-eye views of the many and multiple fronts on which the rebellion, to Webb, became at once a civil war and a war among separate powers; intimate portraits of sea captains, soldiers, and rebels. Webb's discussion of Bacon's Rebellion is at once a genuine military history and a comprehensive view of a remarkable time.

As a whole, Webb's work ranges far beyond the insurrectionary military history that is the subject of this chapter. Yet in revamping the entire colonial experience partly in light of Bacon's Rebellion, Webb may be unique among historians of the first group of early American insurrections for acknowledging and dramatizing the overwhelming importance of the military aspects of rebellions and their suppressions.

### Frontier Insurrections

Near the end of the colonial era, residents of western frontier areas rose against government officials, both local and eastern, objecting to rampant corruption and unfairness and accusing government of neglecting frontier needs. Of these frontier rebellions, two occurred in Pennsylvania: the rioting, murdering, and marching of the Paxton Boys; and the raids of James Smith and his "Black Boys." Both episodes had sources in opposition to government military policy regarding frontier defense.

The Paxton Boys – so named because most members lived near Paxton Church in what is now Dauphin County, Pennsylvania – organized in response to news of native atrocities against whites. They called upon the government in Philadelphia for protection; and, receiving none, they formed a militia that committed its

own atrocities. Accusing peaceful local Indians of being in league with Pontiac's forces further west, the Paxton Boys attacked an Indian village in December 1763, killed six Indians, and burned a cabin; when the proprietary governor placed a group of natives in protective custody in Lancaster, the Paxtons raided the site and slaughtered those natives. In early 1764, possibly as many as 500 Paxton Boys marched on Philadelphia with the stated intent of killing Indians who had taken refuge there. As they approached the city, British troops and Philadelphia militia mustered, forcing them back; Benjamin Franklin led the officials who negotiated with the Paxtons to end the episode.

While military detail regarding the raids and march is necessarily slight, the Paxtons' threatening Philadelphia played into longstanding conflicts in provincial government regarding military appropriations. When the proprietary governor was still committed to Indian protection, a remnant of strict Quaker influence in the assembly opposed both the proprietary and violence; the Paxtons' western constituents, for their part, wanted complete Indian removal. Franklin's party in the assembly at once abominated violence against Indians and staked its political future on opposing the proprietary (which soon shifted its position on Indian policy and allied with the westerners) while ensuring that the assembly enabled military preparedness on the frontier. It was largely around these issues that the Franklin party consolidated power in Pennsylvania, and the story of the Paxton Boys has thus served to join military issues in the colonial Indian wars to fateful struggles between various royal, proprietary, eastern, and western interests in a keystone province.

Francis Parkman devoted two vivid chapters of his *Conspiracy of Pontiac* (1851) to the Paxton episode, evincing a strong bias for the settlers and against both the natives and the anti-proprietary party; he also depicts the Paxton Boys as lawless and bloodthirsty. The major modern source for the episode remains Brooke Hindle's essay "The March of the Paxton Boys" (1946), which may be usefully accompanied by John R. Dunbar's introduction to *The Paxton Papers* (1957), a primary collection of the essays, poems, and other documents through which Pennsylvanians aired feelings about the episode in the press. Like Parkman's, both works describe the military movements of both the rioters and the militia; both quote and paraphrase eyewitness accounts of the grotesque murders committed by the vigilantes. More important, however, from the military-history point of view, may be the authors' discussions of frontier defense, Indian protection, and the provincial government's inner divisions over military appropriations, which Dunbar places in the context of westerners' class grievances, focusing on growing sectional unity in western Pennsylvania. Dunbar's view may be seen as connecting the Paxtons to the neo-progressive analyses of later insurrections by such scholars as Woody Holton (2007) and Terry Bouton (2007), who view pre-and post-revolutionary frontier insurrections as a single, ongoing struggle against elite authority; as well as to Thomas Slaughter's passages on the Paxton Boys, which serve as background to Slaughter's sectionally oriented study of the Whiskey Rebellion (1986). Hindle too addresses defense issues. His focus is mainly on the impact those issues had on the politics and politicians of Philadelphia who would soon play important roles in Stamp Act protests and the independence movement.

Gregory Evans Dowd, in *War Under Heaven* (2002), placing both the Paxton Boys and the Black Boys in the context of imperial and provincial Indian policies during Pontiac's War, draws sharp contrasts between the Black Boys and the Paxtons. In 1765, the Black Boys – like other rioters and vigilantes, they often blackened their faces and dressed as Indians (they were also known as the “Brave Fellows” and the “Loyal Volunteers”) – began raiding the army supply trains that traveled mountainous routes between Forts Loudoun and Pitt. Objecting to the presence in those supplies of guns and powder to be used as gifts in Indian negotiations, the Blacks dispersed and arrested drovers and soldiers, destroyed valuable government property, forced officers to agree to resign their commissions, and captured a British garrison. Dowd criticizes Parkman and others for reflexively conflating the Blacks with the Paxtons, noting that the Blacks directed their hostility not toward the natives themselves – they admired Indians as worthy opponents – but toward established white authority. The Blacks are also unlike the Paxton Boys, Dowd argues, for being genuinely brave. He thus argues that the Black Boys were precursors of Stamp Act protestors in Boston and minutemen at Lexington and Concord. Progressive scholars like Bouton, Holton, and Fennell (1981) also discuss the Black Boys' exploits – more explicitly than those of the Paxtons (perhaps because the Blacks refrained from committing atrocities) – as examples of the ongoing resistance to elite authority that such scholars see as persisting throughout the US founding period.

The third rebellion in this group, the North Carolina Regulation, involved at its climax in the Battle of Alamance what many historians have called the most significant single military engagement on the American continent between the French and Indian and Revolutionary Wars. During the late 1760s, settlers in western North Carolina turned to violence to express their resentment of local colonial officials and the eastern interests to whom those officials owed appointments and patronage. Inspired in part by Stamp Act protests in the east, yet turning their ire against the finance class that was largely leading that resistance, Regulators engaged in classic court rioting and house destruction, casting their own activities at once in a military light – they deployed in militia formation, under officers – and as an expression of the more acceptable kind of localized rioting that in England had long marked struggles over corruption and outside intrusions.

The definitive study of the Regulation is Marjoleine Kars's *Breaking Loose Together: The Regulator Rebellion in Pre-Revolutionary North Carolina* (2002). Kars delves into military issues especially when showing how court riots and other protests grew not only violent but also organized – noting, for example, that Governor William Tryon, when recruiting militias to intimidate the Regulators, hewed strictly to voluntarism and avoided a draft. Kars also gives details on the government militia's movements, describes deployments during the governor's defense of the town of Hillsborough, and explicitly calls the upshot a “war.” Marvin L. M. Kay (1976), in an important essay on the Regulation, attacks the prevailing idea that the conflict was primarily sectional, associating that interpretation with the glossing-over of class conflict that Kay associates with “consensus” readings of founding American history. While he thus provides data tables to

support a thorough class analysis of the Regulation (also expressed in his collaboration with Lorin Lee Cary (1978)) with few specifically military ramifications, Kay does argue that at Albemarle the Regulators didn't expect a suppression but stumbled into, rather than deliberately incited, the full-scale military engagement they could not possibly win.

Paul David Nelson's (1990) biography of Tryon presents the episode from its subject's point of view, emphasizing Tryon's attempts to relieve backcountry distress. Nelson provides ample detail on Tryon's military strategy in the suppression, presenting the governor as spending six weeks immersed in planning, keeping detailed track of military disbursements, carefully considering his selections for officers, and asking British General Thomas Gage for materiel.

Wayne E. Lee, in *Crowds and Soldiers in Revolutionary North Carolina* (2001), places the Regulation in a broader context of public violence. Explicitly avoiding the exploration of causes, Lee looks instead at how both the authorities and the rebels viewed crucial differences between riot and war; he places the Regulation in the former category, with the governor's decision to use force at Alamance serving as his transition to a discussion of the latter; he agrees with Kay that the Regulators remained always in what Lee calls "careful riot" mode. He provides close detail on Tryon's recruiting and its challenges, the motivations of volunteers in the suppression, the uses of military show and discipline, troop numbers, and issues on the march; he reviews the Regulators' tactics and military ideology, which he sees as fatally dissonant, inspiring them to mobilize as an army even as they expected to be treated as mere rioters. That dissonance, as identified by Lee in the North Carolina Regulation, has suggestive resonance for the independence movement of the 1770s, as well as for all later American insurrections.

### Slave Revolts

Slavery raises special and perhaps incommensurable problems in the military history of early American insurrections. The classic historiographical issue of whether slaves remained essentially passive or had a highly developed capacity for active resistance bears directly on military matters: by and large, one would be right to expect historians who see slaves as essentially passive to describe slave revolts in less than genuinely military terms, and expect historians who see slaves as active resisters, while perhaps not always delving deeply into military theory, to acknowledge military legitimacy in the uprisings. That pattern becomes complicated, however, by ongoing disputes over how the histories of people as thoroughly oppressed as African slaves in America can ever truly be known.

The once-prevailing "passive slave" view, which often cast uprisings in non-military terms, involved degrees of patronizing racism that must startle today's reader – in part because of just how recently the view prevailed. As John H. Bracey points out to caustic effect in his "Foreword" to the fortieth-anniversary edition of Herbert Aptheker's benchmark study *American Negro Slave Revolts* (1983 [1943]), the notion of passivity was connected to the idea that slaves were more

or less happy – that slavery, while a bad thing, served as a nice transition into civilization for barbaric Africans. That idea, Bracey says, was still passing for responsible history in surprisingly recent standard texts.

It was in direct response to such extreme degrees of complacency about the effects of bondage on slaves themselves that Aptheker wrote his 1937 master's thesis on Nat Turner's Rebellion; *American Negro Slave Revolts* (1983 [1943]) was originally Aptheker's doctoral thesis. Thirty years later, Eugene Genovese, in his chapter on slave revolts in *Roll, Jordan, Roll* (1974), could say that Aptheker and his successors had utterly overcome the idea – which Genovese ascribed specifically to the work of Ulrich B. Phillips (though as even Genovese notes, not all of Phillips's work bears out the description) – that slaves were generally contented. Still, slave docility versus slave rebelliousness has swirled around succeeding revisions of the histories of each key slave rebellion, affecting as recently as 2001 and 2002, as we shall see, a monsoon of dispute in *The William and Mary Quarterly* over interpretations of Denmark Vesey's Rebellion.

These disputes have military significance, and military issues have significance for these disputes, largely because they rely on how genuinely disciplined and strategic slave uprisings may or may not have been – but also because features of certain slaves' rebellions may gain clarity from a larger military context. Aptheker (1983 [1943]), for example, notes that any kind of military threat, from any source, enlarged white worries of slave revolt. He traces that theme from seventeenth-century fears of Indian attack to the fighting between Texas and Mexico; he describes the 1819 annexation of Florida and 1854 augments for making Cuba an American property as rooted in part on fear of slave revolt. Phillips, too, in "Racial Problems, Adjustments, and Disturbances" (1909), looks to larger strategic issues in analyzing causes of slave revolts, averring that rights-of-man rhetoric, first American, then French, then Haitian, inspired American slaves to rebel. In acknowledging and exploring these more general military considerations, adherents of both "passive" and "active" characterizations of slave resisters have managed to find some common ground.

It is mainly in monographs and articles on specific rebellions that the murky question arises of how we know what we think we know about the military discipline and strategic sophistication of slave resisters. The Stono Rebellion of 1739 has offered especially fertile ground for intriguing military scholarship. The rebellion is rare not only for involving what has been described, both at the time and later, as an army – Nat Turner's did too – but also for climaxing in a pitched gun battle, in a field, with an opposing force of militia. The more general military context, too, does exist for Stono: selections edited and included by Mark Smith in *Stono: Documenting and Interpreting a Southern Slave Revolt* (2005), an admirably comprehensive collection of reprints and excerpts, shows Spain playing a role in fomenting the rebellion; and South Carolina Governor William Bull, in a report to superiors in the Board of Trade, wondered rhetorically if something like the Stono Rebellion could occur in peacetime, what he might expect in the event of foreign invasion.

To some writers, the Stono Rebellion remains a one-day rampage, with a strategic object that remains unclear. Edward Pearson (1996) concludes that the goal was

to inflict damage on the way to freedom. Eyewitness accounts, also collected in Smith (2005), said the Stono rebels were drunk in the field where they were found by the militia; some witnesses nevertheless describe them as firing rounds in good order and being beaten in a fair gun battle. Alexander Hewatt's (1779) early historical account of the rebellion, included in Smith (who calls it the work of a gentleman scholar, not a trained historian), describes the rebels' electing one of their number captain and marching in discipline, with drums beating and flag flying. (Peter Wood's *Black Majority* (1974) mentions drums as intended only to call others toward the rebelling slaves – but Wood's work, groundbreaking in many important ways, engages only slightly with military matters.) A romantic account by the fervent white abolitionist Edmund Quincy (Brown and Quincy 1847) follows Hewatt on martial discipline; an example of black folk tradition, also in Smith, makes the rebel leader an educated Negro who argued with his men over their ill-discipline.

It is left to John K. Thornton, in "African Dimensions of the Stono Rebellion" (1991), to use tools of military history and theory to analyze Stono. He identifies a trained military background for the rebels, perhaps through service in the colonial militia, but more probably, he thinks, from military service in Africa. Thornton identifies at least some of the rebels as Congolese soldiers captured in wars. He focuses with persuasive effect on the fact that the rebels danced in the field where they made their stand. Witnesses assumed the rebels were drunk, but Thornton connects their dancing to African military dancing – as important to African warfare, he argues, as drill was to European.

Thornton also explores the rebels' tactics, which may have seemed less than soldierly to some early historians. According to Thornton, those tactics followed an African model that eschewed European-style close order, preferring random firing from covered positions, then dispersing to fight again another day. Thornton is thus able to reject the "one-day rampage" characterization of Stono: he sees the later captures of smaller groups not as mop-up but as a series of battles on the dispersed African model.

Another rare case of advanced military analysis, in this case applied to Gabriel Prosser's Rebellion of 1800, can be found in Gerry Mullin's "Religion, Acculturation, and the American Negro" (1971). Mullin's analysis of Prosser's Rebellion – in keeping with larger themes of his book *Flight and Rebellion* (1972), where he argues that acculturation created slaves well-equipped to challenge authority – focuses tightly on such military issues as inaccurate estimates of recruitment and materiel; the wisdom of Gabriel's strategy of making a sudden, hard strike (which, Mullin says, was understood by Governor James Monroe, too, in specifically military terms); the weakness of what Mullin judges Gabriel's overly elaborate tactics; and a failure of proper planning for in-field leadership. To support that argument, Mullin closely reviews the tactics employed by Gabriel. He shows them to have involved three wings: 1). Diversionary arson; 2). Seizure of the capital and an arms cache, capture of the Governor, and fortification of the city of Richmond; and 3). Signals to outlying slaves to join the rebellion. Prosser also had fallback plans, Mullin says, involving Hanover town and Yorktown. Phillips (1909), too, gives Gabriel Prosser's Rebellion special credit for being a well-organized and genuinely



military operation, with 1,000 men ready to strike on a well-timed signal. Richmond, Phillips believes, would have been doomed but for the flooding rivers that gave the militia time to ready itself.

Yet since this rebellion never came off, both Mullin and Phillips, in focusing so closely on its military elements, are engaging in a military-historiographic irony. Prosser's strategy may have been sound and his tactics weak, as Mullins would have it – but that analysis is applied to a plan, not to an event that, had it occurred, might have provoked a far different analysis. Douglas R. Egerton (1993), in what is probably the definitive work on Prosser's Rebellion, combines a strong narrative element with detailed analysis of causes, effects, and characters, but he wisely wraps up the rebellion itself in the fourth of 11 chapters, devoting much discussion to the ensuing trials, as well as to the development of Sancho's Rebellion (also known as the Easter Plot because it was planned for either Good Friday or Easter Monday, 1802), another abortive attempt at revolt in Virginia, which grew in part out of Prosser's plans. Egerton reserves judgment about the probable success or failure of the Prosser plan, focusing instead on the significance of the impression held by many blacks and whites at the time that its success would have been almost certain. Whether telling a broad and complex story, as Egerton does, or arguing closely for Prosser's strategic seriousness and tactical weakness, as Mullin does, scholars considering military issues in Prosser's Rebellion must rely on informants' confessions of what those informants alleged Prosser said he was going to do.

Precisely that kind of evidence about advance military planning has recently become an explosive issue in the scholarship of yet another slave rebellion – better known than Gabriel's – Denmark Vesey's, of 1822, in Charleston, South Carolina. For many years, Vesey's Rebellion was seen as the most important and well-organized of all the slave rebellions, despite the fact that having been betrayed and pre-empted, it too never happened. Denmark Vesey himself has appeared to be a distinctively powerful character: biographies are many, from children's literature to popular history to scholarly work, and Vesey's appeal began early. The abolitionist Thomas Wentworth Higginson, in *Travellers and Outlaws* (1889) and elsewhere, claimed that had the Vesey uprising happened, it would have been big, elaborate, and effective. Genovese endorsed what had long been the prevailing view of Vesey's plot when he called it perhaps more "impressive" than Nat Turner's (Genovese 1974: 593), which actually occurred.

Michael P. Johnson, in a major article on Vesey's Rebellion (2001: 919), calls Richard C. Wade (1964) the "lone dissenter" in Vesey studies because Wade believes that the entire Vesey plot, far from having any military legitimacy, was little more than a rumor, and that scholars had relied gullibly on the trial record and added their own wishful thinking; Wade argued that historians had followed the white fears of Vesey's day and turned mere rumor into a full-blown conspiracy. To those of the burgeoning mainstream view that slaves were eminently capable of resistance, however, Wade's claims seemed to recall the old racist paternalism; his skepticism was widely dismissed. Typical of the criticism is Robert S. Starobin (1971). The subject was generally considered closed, until Johnson re-opened it in 2001.

In the meantime, a larger military context had been connected to Vesey's Rebellion: "lighting the fuse to Fort Sumter," as the subtitle to John Lofton's *Denmark Vesey's Revolt* (1983) has it. Drawing on William Freehling's *Prelude to the Civil War* (1966) – which Johnson describes as the benchmark book for anti-Wade consensus – and Stephen A. Channing's *Crisis of Fear* (1970), Lofton shows that in response to the Vesey trials, South Carolina adopted the Negro Seaman Act, enforced it in defiance of federal law, and thus voided a United States treaty: nullification in defense of slavery thus became the state's guiding philosophy. In that context, Lofton relates in detail, and without qualification, Vesey's supposed tactics, describing Vesey's choosing five officers and meeting with them and others to develop strategy; estimating enlistment at up to 9,000 men; asserting that arms were laid up in quantity, horses and boats readied, and disguises prepared. Seven companies were to be deployed, Lofton says, each with clear objectives and tactics embraced in the grand strategy. He thus joins others going back to Higginson in relying almost exclusively on the extraordinary detail regarding military planning given in testimony during Vesey's trial.

Johnson's powerful, exhaustively documented essay questions that very evidence. Johnson levels criticism at David Robertson's *Denmark Vesey* (1999), Douglas R. Egerton's *He Shall Go Out Free* (1999), and Pearson's editing of the trial record of the Vesey case in *Designs against Charleston* (1999), for presenting Vesey in what Johnson describes as fanciful terms. Johnson asks the larger question of how we can think we know what transpired when we must rely solely on oppressors' documents, in this case the transcripts and evidence that he sees as manufactured to play into the fear of a slave revolt and to railroad Denmark Vesey.

Johnson thus revives Wade's questions. His work may be seen, too, as tying the Vesey Rebellion, in a new way, to the supposed 1741 New York City slave conspiracy covered in Thomas J. Davis's *A Rumour of Revolt* (1985) and Jill Lepore's *New York Burning* (2005), which shows that evidence of a real conspiracy as weak, with white fear and titillation guiding the episode's prevailing narratives. Johnson criticizes Genovese, Freehling, Robertson, and Egerton; most effectively, he minutely dissects Pearson's transcription of the trial manuscript, showing the "Official Report" of that trial to have been deliberately distorted by authorities at the time, and carelessly distorted by Pearson years later. Johnson views witnesses who described military planning as having lied or been coached or both. The conspiracy, Johnson concludes, was conjured by white fear and rage, with Vesey the classic fall guy.

Not surprisingly, scholarly reaction was intense. Johnson's research is voluminous, and his language is tough; he arraigns Vesey scholars and the entire profession. The argument went on in major portions of two issues of *The William and Mary Quarterly* (Gross 2001–2). Pearson responded by admitting to have failed to make accurate use of the trial record; still, he vigorously defended his interpretation (Pearson 2002). Others saw Johnson as outrageously tendentious; Philip Morgan (2002), defending Johnson, engaged in outright mockery of Johnson's attackers.

While the dispute may go on, the student of military history who examines Denmark Vesey's Rebellion must confront the fact that details of Vesey's tactics

rely on descriptions of things that were planned and never executed, and that those descriptions have now been thoroughly and effectively questioned.

Still, as scholarship on the Stono Rebellion shows, slaves' agency in carrying out resistance, on which Aptheker insisted in his pioneering work, need not necessarily be undermined by Johnson's legitimate questions about the Vesey trial. Nat Turner's Rebellion, which took place in 1831 in Virginia, is unlike Vesey's and like the Stono Rebellion for having actually occurred. It is also probably is the best-known slave uprising, partly thanks to William Styron's controversial novel *The Confessions of Nat Turner* (1967), which sparked public disputes about the Turner historiography in popular and scholarly circles (Clarke 1968, Gross and Bender 1971). Part of that dispute devolved on whether the rebellion had already been well-known among African-Americans, or whether Styron had rescued it from obscurity.

When it comes to Nat Turner's military capabilities, goals, and tactics, the primary record is unclear, and it has been easy to see the rebellion as merely a series of awful murders. Yet Turner, in his own "Confession," included by editors John B. Duff and Peter M. Mitchell in *The Nat Turner Rebellion* (1971), describes his forming his men "in a line as soldiers, and after carrying them through all the maneuvers I was master of marched them off. ..." Responding to confrontation from a party of whites, Turner says, "I ordered my men to halt and form. ..." (21–3). Deployment was carefully considered: as the force went from house to house, Turner placed the best-armed and mounted men in front, arriving himself only after each family had been killed. According to an anonymous contemporary letter (Anonymous 1831), also reprinted in Duff and Mitchell, he may also have had the territorial goal of seizing the town of Jerusalem. Higginson, in "Slave Insurrection in Virginia, 1831" (1860, reprinted Higginson 1969), generally considered the first history of the Turner Rebellion deems Turner's plan of campaign practical and presents the rebellion as a military action – not a serial killing – that was justifiable in light of the horrors of slavery. Higginson plays up Turner's hunger for military conflict, linking it to tales of George Washington and local militias in the Revolution, and presents Turner's men as acting with discipline, citing the absence of rape as a sign of restraint.

In later reflections on Turner bearing on military matters, interesting ironies abound. Stephen B. Weeks's antiquated article "The Slave Insurrection in Virginia 1831" (1891) tries to show that slavery in Virginia was not so bad, yet it is Weeks who declines to dismiss Nat Turner as a military campaigner; Aptheker (1983 [1943]), while using Turner's Rebellion as the leading edge of his campaign to restore activity and agency to slave rebels, makes little of Turner as a military planner. Genovese, a frequent proponent of slave agency, explicitly says in "The Nat Turner Case" (1968) that the General Nat of folk tradition is a fiction and that Turner engaged in no real military planning. Unlike the Vesey scholars criticized by Johnson, modern Turner scholars promoting slave agency have not, by and large, felt called upon to vest that issue in any supposed military expertise on the part of Turner himself.

In the flap over the Styron novel, the most significant dispute, from the point of view of military history, may be over the arming of slaves by white masters to

put down the Turner rebellion, as depicted by Styron. Aptheker insists with ferocity, in an article for *The Nation* (1967) that such a thing literally never happened at any point in history – and could not have. Yet Higginson's early account describes the arming of slaves to attack the Turner rebels, and Genovese, in a *New York Review of Books* article (1968) calls Aptheker's assertion "nonsense," pointing to incidents of masters' arming slaves in Brazil and the Caribbean. For the most part, however, the Styron controversy raged over matters other than military.

Thomas Wentworth Higginson's (1969) unusual role as an early historian of slave uprisings may serve as a kind of postscript to this group of insurrections, with special reference to John Brown's raid on the federal armory at Harper's Ferry, Virginia. Such an enormous volume of writing exists on John Brown that making a general statement about the military historiography specifically of the Harper's Ferry raid would be a daunting prospect; still, it may be fairly safe to say that, for a number of obvious reasons, little about that brief and failed raid has attracted the particular attention of military historians. Yet Higginson's assessments of other slave uprisings should be read with a keen awareness of Higginson's active role in John Brown's raid. As a member of "the secret six," Higginson helped plan the raid itself and shaped conceptions of Brown and the raid after its failure: his attempts to overthrow slavery make him an interested participant in the history of this especially painful and problematic set of early American insurrections. Higginson's involvement in the history he covered may have few parallels in the work of historians writing today. Still, as ambiguities in Higginson's writing remind us, Johnson's question about how we know what we know about slave uprisings remains a resonant and challenging one.

### Rebellions in the Early Republic

Insurrections in the final set, Shays's Rebellion, the Whiskey Rebellion, and Fries's Rebellion, have direct connections to the founding of the first United States military establishment, and two overarching works, Robert W. Coakley's *The Role of Federal Military Forces in Domestic Disorders* (1988), and Richard Kohn's *Eagle and Sword* (1975), delve in varying degrees into all three; both authors see insurrection as key to the founding military history of the nation. Coakley, a US Army officer and historian, sought to fill a gap he experienced as staff historian to the Pentagon office in control of troops at Little Rock in 1957. His book is an overlooked work of pure military history, focusing on the use of federal force in uprisings and unrest. Richard Kohn's benchmark book studies the founding of the United States military, seeking to ascertain whether Federalist administrations crossed a line into outright militarism.

Given that context, Shays's Rebellion may be more important for how it was suppressed than for anything it accomplished. The earliest important book on Shays's Rebellion, George Richards Minot's *The History of the Insurrections, in Massachusetts* (1788), does place the climactic events at the federal arsenal at Springfield in a military, not merely a rioting, light. Leonard L. Richards (2002)

criticizes Minot as disingenuously “balanced” and secretly pro-government, but he too presents events in Springfield as genuinely military, discussing officers’ Revolutionary experience, describing a planned three-pronged assault, reviewing tactical issues that made the assault, in the event, two-pronged. Marion E. Starkey’s narrative history (1955), well grounded in primary sources, also describes the conflict as a series of battles, and not as a riot.

Larger military questions of jurisdictional conflict and federal weakness are laid out by most writers on Shays’s Rebellion, and most effectively by Coakley (who also provides extraordinary detail on minute-to-minute maneuvers). Describing Congress’s disguising, in a false claim that it was enlisting troops for frontier protection, its illegitimate deployment of men to help suppress the Shaysites, Coakley draws a line straight from the rebellion to Edmund Randolph’s opening the Constitutional Convention with a plea for giving the federal government power to put down insurrections; in that context, Coakley analyzes various military provisions of the Constitution. Jurisdictional issues arise for Richards (2002), too, with Secretary of War Henry Knox’s tacitly encouraging Massachusetts militia General William Sheperd to ignore the absence of any state jurisdiction over the federal arsenal.

In a chapter on suppression of the rebellion, David P. Szatmary (1980) focuses on militia politics and closely reviews other insurrections of the late 1780s in Maryland, South Carolina, New Jersey, Virginia, and Pennsylvania, presenting Shays’s Rebellion as but one incident in western populist unrest – which he too sees as leading directly to debates over federal military power at Constitutional Convention. In stark contrast, Robert A. Feer’s *Shays’s Rebellion* (1988), a dissertation originally submitted in 1958, plays down the impact of Shays’s Rebellion on the Constitutional Convention, counting only nine direct references to the rebellion in convention debate. Kohn would strongly disagree; he insists that Shays’s “sent shock waves” (Kohn 1975: 74) and, like Coakley, delineates Knox’s compromised activities in the suppression as leading to national government. While Kohn gives only three paragraphs to Shays’s Rebellion, with no military narrative or theory, he dramatically juxtaposes the suppression of Shays’s Rebellion with Randolph’s opening remarks at the Constitutional Convention, setting up his more detailed study of the Whiskey Rebellion of 1794.

The Whiskey Rebellion, too, raised dire issues of military jurisdiction – despite its occurring when national government was accomplished fact. When turning to the Whiskey Rebellion, both Coakley and Kohn review bitter arguments between Pennsylvania Governor Thomas Mifflin and President Washington regarding which of their governments had the right to police the rebels near Pittsburgh; for both writers, the rebellion’s major context has to do with militias as a national force, debates in Congress over improvements to the militia system, and the controversial idea of creating a regular army.

A number of other, related issues gather around the Whiskey Rebellion, connecting founding finance with military development. Especially salient is the old “military protection” issue, seen in the earlier Leisler’s Rebellion and the riots of Paxton Boys, which appears on most historians’ list of whiskey rebels’ grievances:

vulnerable to native attack, western Pennsylvanians resented taxes that, like the Shaysites, they saw as for the benefit of eastern finance elites who were neglecting settlers' protection. Also like the Shaysites, the whiskey rebels were virtually all Revolutionary veterans; when they formed their own militias, they operated under officers, with discipline. The question of the proper role of such militias was answered by the whiskey rebels by their dramatic takeover, from within, of the sanctioned state militias. Government mistrust of its own militias to suppress insurrectionists – also a problem in Shays's Rebellion, as Coakley points out – played into Washington's conflicts with Mifflin over jurisdiction and into arguments in Congress over the need for a better militia law and even for regular troops.

Key military issues arise as well in the Whiskey Rebellion's suppression. A presidential commission negotiated with the rebels for peace while the executive branch secretly readied troops. Federalizing four state militias raised important questions about the appropriate size and structure of federal armies. Draft rioting, dodging, and deserting resulted in forming companies made up of overprivileged volunteer officers and poor and often immigrant footsoldiers, raising new questions about how a federal force should operate as to class. The suppression had a decidedly martial-law cast, with the judicial branch subordinated to the executive branch and the army making mass, warrantless roundups and holding detainees without charge – raising, for the new country, questions about where it would draw the lines for military policing of a civilian population.

Yet outside the few books written solely on the rebellion, and a very few other sources, including unpublished dissertations, general historians of the Federalist period have had little or no regard for the Whiskey Rebellion as a crucible of founding military issues. Aside from those of Coakley and Kohn, one of the few general works from which the military story can be gleaned is James McClure's dissertation "The Ends of the American Earth" (1983), which gives precise analysis of how the whiskey rebels subverted sanctioned militias to their own ends. Whiskey Rebellion monographs have varied in addressing military issues. Where Leland Baldwin's *Whiskey Rebels* (1939) is weak on military themes, Thomas Slaughter's *The Whiskey Rebellion* (1986) is unique in its detailed presentation of the author's research on the federalized troops that suppressed the rebellion and the draft riots. (Coakley is also a detailed source on the expedition to suppress.) Dorothy Fennell's dissertation "From Rebelliousness to Insurrection: A Social History of the Whiskey Rebellion, 1765–1802" (1981) explores rural militia politics, partly in the context of E. P. Thompson's ideas about communal regulation. Terry Bouton's *Taming Democracy* (2007) places the rebels' militia takeover in a long tradition of autonomous military action in western Pennsylvania. Wythe Holt's extended essay "The Whiskey Rebellion of 1794" (undated) gives close critical attention to the subordination of judicial authority to the military during the suppression – and goes farther than Kohn in calling the peace commission a "sham" (a conclusion in which Coakley and Slaughter concur). William Hogeland's *The Whiskey Rebellion* (2006) uses primary sources to correct errors in Baldwin's and Slaughter's chronologies, bearing on the rebels' move toward organized militia violence, and draws on sources mentioned above, and especially



on Kohn and Bouton, to place Alexander Hamilton's founding finance theories in a military context, beginning with Hamilton's involvement in the Newburgh Crisis of the 1780s and climaxing with his accompanying Washington and Henry Lee in leading the suppression of the rebellion.

By contrast to the Whiskey Rebellion, the Fries Rebellion involved little military action yet this episode too bears on what were rapidly unfolding developments in military geopolitics. Because Fries's was less dramatic, and less dramatically suppressed, than the Whiskey Rebellion, there are even fewer monographs on it than on the earlier event; one of very few is Paul Douglas Newman's *Fries's Rebellion* (2004), which defines the rebellion as more riot than rebellion, hyped by Hamilton and other Federalists to justify a display of federal power. For Newman, important military issues in the Fries's Rebellion belong to the aftermath, when military-establishment politics devolved on a flap among President John Adams, Secretary of State Timothy Pickering, Hamilton, and Washington over ranks in the army of 1798; struggles erupted between Hamilton and Adams over war or peace with France; and Adams demanded Pickering's and Secretary of War James McHenry's resignations and then had to fire Pickering. Newman places those events in the context of Adams's decision to pardon Fries and Hamiltonian demands for Fries's head. Like Newman, Coakley believes that Hamilton sought to use Fries's Rebellion, as he had the Whiskey Rebellion, to expand the powers of the central government, and discusses Fries's Rebellion in the context of the political struggle over the provisional army and compares Adams's military passivity in the Fries episode unfavorably with Washington's decisiveness in the Whiskey Rebellion. To Coakley, Hamiltonians falsely linked the Fries's Rebellion to a developing conflict with France to try and justify raising an enormous army. From a close examination of federal troop movements, Coakley concludes that Hamilton's "Herculean force" was more a demonstration than a necessity.

Kohn uses Fries's Rebellion to ask and answer the ultimate question of his book: Were High Federalists prepared, literally, to destroy their Republican opponents with military force? In 1799, with the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions a "tocsin of insurrection," as John Quincy Adams called it, and even Jefferson fearing insurrection in Pennsylvania, Fries's Rebellion, though minor, did justify Federalist worries, argues Kohn, who sees the army that squashed Fries's rebellion as overbearing yet concludes that Hamilton's ensuing dream of bringing an army into Virginia was only for purposes of parading power, quashing unrest, and overawing Virginia's own preparation for war. While specific threats to federal power existed, Kohn insists, the response to them, while harsh, was not in the end true militarism.

The categories into which the military historiography of early American insurrections have been divided here, while relevant and convenient, are hardly the only logical or significant means by which to glean historians' wide-ranging responses to the host of military issues prevailing in rebellions before the Civil War. Close studies of historians' approaches to Fries's and Turner's rebellions, say, on issues as granular as recruiting, might open new and intriguing questions, as might other

closely considered contrasts and connections among apparently dissimilar rebellions. As the topics and themes sketched above should make clear, these insurrections have long had important and lively relationships to the most salient issues in American history.

#### BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Andrews, Charles M., ed. (1915). *Narratives of the Insurrections, 1675–1690*. New York: Scribner.
- Anonymous (1831). "Communication to a Richmond Whig," in John B. Duff and Peter M. Mitchell, eds. (1971). *The Nat Turner Rebellion: the Historical Event and the Modern Controversy*. New York: Harper & Row, 34–6.
- Aptheker, Herbert (1968). *Nat Turner's Slave Rebellion*. New York: Grove Press.
- Aptheker, Herbert (1983 [1943]). *American Negro Slave Revolts*. New York: Columbia University Press [reprinted New York: International Publishers, 1983].
- Aptheker, Herbert, and William Styron (1967). "Truth and Nat Turner: An Exchange," *The Nation*, 206 (April 22), 543–47, [reprinted in John B. Duff and Peter M. Mitchell, eds. (1971). *The Nat Turner Rebellion: the Historical Event and the Modern Controversy*. New York: Harper & Row, 195–202].
- Bailyn, Bernard (1953). "Communications and Trade: The Atlantic in the Seventeenth Century," *Journal of Economic History*, 13:4 (Autumn), 378–87.
- Baldwin, Leland D. (1939; revised 1968). *Whiskey Rebels: the Story of a Frontier Uprising*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
- Bouton, Terry (2007). *Taming Democracy: The "People," the Founders, and the Troubled Ending of the American Revolution*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Bracey, John H. Jr., August Meier, and Elliott Rudwick, eds. (1971). *American Slavery: the Question of Resistance*. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing.
- Brown, William W., and Edmund Quincy (1847). *Narrative of William W. Brown, a Fugitive Slave*. Boston: Anti-Slavery Office.
- Carr, Lois Green, and David William Jordan (1974). *Maryland's Revolution of Government, 1689–1692*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Channing, Steven A. (1970). *Crisis of Fear: Secession in South Carolina*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Clarke, John Henrik, ed. (1968). *William Styron's Nat Turner: Ten Black Writers Respond*. Boston: Beacon Press.
- Coakley, Robert W. (1988). *The Role of Federal Military Forces in Domestic Disorders, 1789–1878*. Washington: Center of Military History.
- Davis, Thomas J. (1985). *A Rumour of Revolt: The "Great Negro Plot" in Colonial New York*. New York: Free Press.
- Dowd, Gregory Evans (2002). *War Under Heaven: Pontiac, The Indian Nations, and The British Empire*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Duff, John B., and Peter M. Mitchell, eds. (1971). *The Nat Turner Rebellion: the Historical Event and the Modern Controversy*. New York: Harper & Row.
- Dunbar, John R., ed. (1957). *The Paxton Papers*. The Hague: M. Nijhoff.
- Egerton, Douglas R. (1993). *Gabriel's Rebellion: The Virginia Slave Conspiracies of 1800 and 1802*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Egerton, Douglas R. (1999). *He Shall Go Out Free: The Lives of Denmark Vesey*. Madison, WI: Madison House.
- Feer, Robert A. (1988). *Shays's Rebellion*. New York: Garland.

- Fennell, Dorothy E. (1981) "From Rebelliousness to Insurrection: A Social History of the Whiskey Rebellion, 1765–1802," PhD dissertation, University of Pittsburgh.
- Frantz, John B., ed. (1969). *Bacon's Rebellion: Prologue to the Revolution?* Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath.
- Freehling, William W. (1966). *Prelude to Civil War: The Nullification Controversy in South Carolina, 1816–1836*. New York: Harper & Row.
- Genovese, Eugene D. (1968). "The Nat Turner Case," *New York Review of Books*, 11:4 (September 12), 34–7 [reprinted in John B. Duff and Peter M. Mitchell, eds. (1971)]. *The Nat Turner Rebellion: the Historical Event and the Modern Controversy*. New York: Harper & Row, 203–16].
- Genovese, Eugene D. (1974). *Roll, Jordan, Roll: The World the Slaves Made*. New York: Pantheon Books.
- Gross, Robert A., ed. (2001–2). "Forum: The Making of a Slave Conspiracy," *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3rd ser. 58:4 (October), 913–76; 59:1 (January), 135–202.
- Gross, Seymour L., and Eileen Bender (1971). "History, Politics and Literature: The Myths of Nat Turner," *American Quarterly*, 23:4 (October), 487–518.
- Hewatt, Alexander (1779). *A Historical Account of the Rise and Progress of the Colonies of South Carolina and Georgia*, 2 vols. London: A. Donaldson.
- Higginson, Thomas Wentworth (1889). *Travellers and Outlaws: Episodes in American History*. Boston: Lee and Shepard.
- Higginson, Thomas Wentworth (1969). *Black Rebellion: Five Slave Revolts*. New York: Arno Press.
- Hindle, Brooke (1946). "The March of the Paxton Boys," *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3rd ser., 3:4 (October), 461–86.
- Hogeland, William (2006). *The Whiskey Rebellion: George Washington, Alexander Hamilton, and the Frontier Rebels Who Challenged America's Newfound Sovereignty*. New York: Scribner.
- Holt, Wythe (in progress). "The Whiskey Rebellion of 1794: A Democratic Working-Class Insurrection," on line at: <http://www.uga.edu/colonialseminar/pastevents.htm> (accessed April 21, 2009).
- Holton, Woody (2007). *Unruly Americans and the Origins of the Constitution*. New York: Hill and Wang.
- Johnson, Michael P. (2001). "Denmark Vesey and His Co-Conspirators," *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3rd ser., 58:4 (October), 915–76.
- Kars, Marjoleine (2002). *Breaking Loose Together: The Regulator Rebellion in Pre-Revolutionary North Carolina*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Kay, Marvin L. M. (1976), "The North Carolina Regulation, 1766–1776: A Class Conflict," in Alfred F. Young, ed., *The American Revolution: Explorations in the History of American Radicalism*. DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 71–123.
- Kay, Marvin L. M., and Lorin Lee Cary (1978). "Class, Mobility, and Conflict in North Carolina on the Eve of the Revolution," in Jeffrey J. Crow and Larry E. Tise, eds., *The Southern Experience in the American Revolution*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 109–51.
- Kohn, Richard H. (1975). *Eagle and Sword: the Federalists and the Creation of the Military Establishment in America, 1783–1802*. New York: Free Press.
- Leder, Lawrence H. (1950). "Jacob Leisler and the New York Rebellion of 1689–1691," MA thesis, New York University.
- Lee, Wayne E. (2001). *Crowds and Soldiers in Revolutionary North Carolina: The Culture of Violence in Riot and War*. Gainesville: University Press of Florida.

- Lefler, Hugh Talmage, and Albert Ray Newsome (1942). *The Growth of North Carolina*. Yonkers-on-Hudson, NY: World Book Co.
- Lepore, Jill (2005). *New York Burning: Liberty, Slavery, and Conspiracy in Eighteenth-Century Manhattan*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Lofton, John (1983). *Denmark Vesey's Revolt: The Slave Plot that Lit a Fuse to Fort Sumter*. Kent, OH: Kent State University Press.
- McAnear, Beverly (1935). "Politics in Provincial New York, 1689–1761," PhD dissertation, Stanford University.
- McClure, James Patrick (1983). "The Ends of the American Earth: Pittsburgh and the Upper Ohio Valley to 1795," PhD dissertation, University of Michigan.
- McCormick, Charles Howard (1989). *Leisler's Rebellion*. New York: Garland Publishing.
- Minot, George Richards (1788). *The History of the Insurrections, in Massachusetts, in the Year MDCCCLXXXVI, and the Rebellion Consequent Thereon*. Worcester, MA: Isaiah Thomas.
- Morgan, Philip (2002). "Conspiracy Scares," *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3rd ser., 59:1 (January), 159–66.
- Mullin, Gerald W. (1971). "Religion, Acculturation, and the American Negro," in John, H. Bracey, Jr., August Maier, and Elliott Rudwick, eds., *American Slavery: The Question of Resistance*. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 160–78.
- Mullin, Gerald W. (1972). *Flight and Rebellion: Slave Resistance in Eighteenth-Century Virginia*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Neill, Edward D. (1867). *Terra Mariae or, Threads of Maryland Colonial History*. Philadelphia: Lippincott.
- Nelson, Paul David (1990). *William Tryon and the Course of Empire: A Life in British Imperial Service*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Neville, John Davenport, comp. (1976). *Bacon's Rebellion: Abstracts of Materials in the Colonial Records Project*. Jamestown, VA: Jamestown Foundation.
- Newman, Paul Douglas (2004). *Fries's Rebellion: The Enduring Struggle for the American Revolution*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Parkman, Francis (1851). *The Conspiracy of Pontiac and the Indian War after the Conquest of Canada*. Boston: Little, Brown and Co.
- Pearson, Edward A. (1996). "'A Countryside Full of Flames': A Reconsideration of the Stono Rebellion and Slave Rebelliousness in the Early Eighteenth-Century South Carolina Lowcountry," *Slavery & Abolition*, 17:2 (August), 22–50.
- Pearson, Edward A., ed. (1999). *Designs against Charleston: The Trial Record of the Denmark Vesey Slave Conspiracy of 1822*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Pearson, Edward A., (2002). "Trials and Errors: Denmark Vesey and His Historians," *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3rd Ser., 59:1 (January), 137–43.
- Phillips, Ulrich Bonnell (1909). "Racial Problems, Adjustment, and Disturbances," in J. A. C. Chandler, et al, eds. (1909–13). *The South in the Building of the Nation*, 13 vols. Richmond, VA: Southern Historical Publication Society, 6: 194–241.
- Rankin, Hugh F. (1962). *Upheaval in Albemarle: the Story of Culpeper's Rebellion, 1675–1689*. Raleigh, NC: Carolina Charter Tercentenary Commission.
- Reich, Jerome R. (1953). *Leisler's Rebellion: A Study of Democracy in New York, 1664–1720*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Richards, Leonard L. (2002). *Shay's Rebellion: the American Revolution's Final Battle*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Robertson, David (1999). *Denmark Vesey*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

- Slaughter, Thomas P. (1986). *The Whiskey Rebellion: Frontier Epilogue to the American Revolution*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Smith, Mark M., ed. (2005). *Stono: Documenting and Interpreting a Southern Slave Revolt*. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.
- Starkey, Marion L. (1955). *A Little Rebellion*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Starobin, Robert S. (1971). "Denmark Vesey's Slave Conspiracy of 1822: A Study in Rebellion and Repression," in John H. Bracey, Jr., August Maier, and Elliott Rudwick, eds., *American Slavery: the Question of Resistance*. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing, 142–57.
- Styron, William (1967). *The Confessions of Nat Turner*. New York: Random House.
- Szatmary, David P. (1980). *Shays's Rebellion: The Making of an Agrarian Insurrection*. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press.
- Thornton, John K. (1991). "African Dimensions of the Stono Rebellion," *American Historical Review*, 96:5 (December), 1101–13.
- Wade, Richard C. (1964). "The Vesey Plot: A Reconsideration," *Journal of Southern History*, 30:2 (May), 143–61.
- Washburn, Wilcomb (1957). *The Governor and the Rebel: A History of Bacon's Rebellion in Virginia*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Webb, Stephen Saunders (1984). *1676: the End of American Independence*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Weeks, Stephen B. (1891). "The Slave Insurrection in Virginia," *Magazine of American History*, 25 (June), 448–58.
- Wertenbaker, Thomas Jefferson (1940). *Torchbearer of the Revolution: The Story of Bacon's Rebellion and its Leader*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Wood, Peter H. (1974). *Black Majority: Negroes in Colonial South Carolina from 1670 through the Stono Rebellion*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Young, Alfred F., ed. (1976). *The American Revolution: Explorations in the History of American Radicalism*. DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press.

# Chapter Forty-one

## THE MILITARY AND RECONSTRUCTION, 1862–77

*Margaret M. Storey*

The military's role in the reconstruction of the former Confederacy actually began during the war in those areas of the South occupied by Union soldiers – in cities (including New Orleans, Memphis, and Nashville), and large swaths of countryside throughout the region, but particularly in Tennessee, northern Alabama, Mississippi, and Georgia. The behavior of federal troops in these areas was regulated by “General Order No. 100,” later published as the *Instructions for the Government of the Armies of the United States in the Field* (1863), a field manual drafted by Francis Lieber, a German immigrant who had sons in both the Union and Confederate armies (Friedel 1947, Grimsley 1995). The *Instructions* provided a code of conduct for troops, but not guidelines for governing civilians – particularly resistant civilians – guidelines which became necessary when civilian governments collapsed as Union troops advanced into southern states. The resulting ambiguity left much to the discretion of local commanders, and as a consequence, great variability marked the methods and organization of federal occupation during the war (Capers 1965, Blassingame 1973, Maslowski 1978). Most army commanders met the situation by ordering provost marshals to expand their police functions to include the civilian population. Provost marshals arrested civilians who refused to swear allegiance to the United States, regulated travel and trade, and in some cases supervised former slaves who entered Union lines. Federal military authority was even more expansive in the courts established by the army. These courts were convened and staffed by a range of authorities, including provost marshals, military commissions, and Union army officers, to hear matters as minor as public drunkenness and as serious as murder. Simultaneously, however, independent municipal government continued to wield varying degrees of authority alongside military courts and provost guards throughout the occupied South (Futrell 1951, Ash 1995, Grimsley 1995). In addition, a new military entity came into being during the last month of the war: the Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen and Abandoned Lands, created on March 3, 1865 as a part of the War Department. Congress charged the Bureau with, in part, providing food, medical care, and education for former slaves and white refugees in areas under occupation. Headed by General



Oliver O. Howard, the Freedmen's Bureau, as it was commonly called, operated across the South until it was disbanded by President Andrew Johnson in December 1868 (Bentley 1955, Cimbala 1997, McFeely 1994).

The onset of presidential reconstruction, as the period from 1865 to 1867 is known, saw a general diminution of this military presence in the South, though the Freedmen's Bureau's role expanded notably. These years were dominated by the political struggle between President Andrew Johnson (who succeeded Lincoln after he was assassinated in April 1865) and the Republican-controlled Congress, a struggle that revolved around two main issues: Johnson's disinterest in supporting wartime and postwar efforts to safeguard the rights of freed people, and his decision to pardon large numbers of leading former Confederates who had encouraged the re-establishment of "rebel rule" in the South. In 1866 and 1867, the role of the military in the South again underwent a significant change when legislators passed, over Johnson's veto, a series of reconstruction measures that limited presidential power over military matters in the region. The Reconstruction Acts of March 2, March 23, and July 19, 1867 abolished state governments in all but one of the former Confederate states (Tennessee, which by virtue of having ratified the 14th Amendment, escaped the purview of the Acts), divided the ten states into five military districts, and placed each district under the command of an army general. The Army Appropriations Act of 12 March 1867 directed that all orders to these generals be issued by the general-in-chief of the army who was to maintain his headquarters in Washington. Known variously by contemporaries and historians as "military reconstruction," "congressional reconstruction," and "radical reconstruction," this process required that the military supervise the registration of voters (including black men); enforce Congressional legislation dictating the disfranchisement of certain classes of former rebels; call for elections for delegates to constitutional conventions in each southern state; oversee elections for state and local offices under the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment; and provide protection from violence for freedmen. Once each state had ratified a new constitution that established universal manhood suffrage and had ratified the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, it was readmitted to Congress, at which time military government ended and self government resumed. In June 1868, military rule ended for Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, North Carolina, and South Carolina. Within two years it also ended in Mississippi, Texas, Virginia, and Georgia, where it had been briefly reestablished after black members had been expelled from the state legislature. Although no longer overseeing government, federal troops remained in much of the South to protect voters against violence and intimidation and to maintain law and order until they were finally withdrawn as part of the Compromise of 1877 (DeSantis 1982).

Given the central role played by the army between 1867 and 1877, the lack of coverage accorded it in most histories of Reconstruction is remarkable. For instance, in the introduction to *Reconstruction: America's Unfinished Revolution* (1988), Eric Foner explained that he had tried to "view the period as a whole, integrating the social, political, and economic aspects of Reconstruction into a coherent, analytical narrative," but notably overlooked the category of "military" in his conception of an integrated narrative of the period (xxvii). And indeed,

though the events of Foner's study are shaped in fundamental ways by military actors, he largely ignored the idea of "military history" *per se*. The omission neither undermines the great importance of Foner's work, which remains the central text in the field, nor does it mark Foner's study as particularly unusual. As William Blair noted in a recent essay, "The central role of the military has been underappreciated in the histories of Reconstruction. Studies duly note the use of military force and announce that the South experienced 'military rule,' but scholars rarely give the army its due as the central agents for social and political change" (Blair 2005: 390). Military historians have not been much better than their colleagues at assimilating Reconstruction's social, political, and economic features to those of armed conflict. As historian James K. Hogue has recently pointed out, "From the standpoint of many generals within the army at the time (and most military historians since), Reconstruction represented a unique and never-to-be-repeated problem that departed from a proper focus on the fighting of big battles and the winning of extensive campaigns" (Hogue 2006: 10).

The two substantial studies to have grappled directly with the role of the military in Reconstruction since the mid-twentieth century are James Sefton's *The United States Army and Reconstruction* (1967) and Joseph G. Dawson's *Army Generals and Reconstruction: Louisiana, 1862–1877* (1982). Both explore the role played by the military in enforcing Reconstruction policies, and both agree that the army did the job it was assigned in good faith. The problem, they conclude, was that the policy was a failure. According to Sefton, by the 1870s, "people gradually came to realize that the application of military force was a doubtful method of working transformations in a people, no matter how desirable the changes might have been" (253–4). Dawson largely concurs in his study of the byzantine and bitterly violent reconstruction of Louisiana, placing the full responsibility for the failure not at the feet of the army, but at the politics of Reconstruction. "It had not been the army's responsibility to guarantee the success of Reconstruction," he avers, "[but] only to carry out the policy, which changed from year to year, with the tools and men at its disposal" (Dawson 1982: 262).

Later studies incorporated this question of the military's role in Reconstruction as a subordinate part of larger studies of the politics of the period. William Gillette's important *Retreat from Reconstruction* (1979), for instance, identifies the president, Congress, and the army as jointly responsible for failing to enforce voting rights and Republican policy. "With the slashing of army appropriations, consequent troop reductions, and the reassignment of available soldiers to duty in the West, there were not enough troops in the South to serve as a deterrent to crime," he asserts. Noting the paucity of garrisons in the South at the precise moment that paramilitary action by resistant whites increased – "Except for Texas, between 1869–1876, no southern state in a single year had more than ten army posts, and each usually had five posts or less" (385n21) – he concludes, "The truth was stark: there simply was no federal force large enough to give heart to black Republicans or to bridle southern white violence ... But there were just enough troops to antagonize southern whites and add to their sense of common grievance" (35).

Subsequent scholars have tested the implication at the center of such an analysis by wrestling with counterfactual scenarios in which they question whether a larger or longer Union occupation might have changed the dismal outcome of events. One of the most searching such analyses came from LaWanda Cox in a chapter in *Lincoln and Black Freedom* (1981) in which she explores “the limits of the possible” in the post-emancipation years. Cox wondered about the role of a standing army in republican government, as did many contemporary Americans (Generals Sherman and Grant included). “Force and consent, how to achieve the one by use of the other, posed a dilemma which by the 1870s strained the bounds of the possible. The outcome would have been only a little less problematic had [military] Reconstruction been formulated in early 1865 and backed by force, i.e., force alone.” Even if such a course had prevailed, she concludes, the project would have failed. “Neither national institutions nor public opinion could be expected to have sustained a military intervention of indefinite length and of sufficient strength to crush all local resistance” (166–7). More recently, William Blair has echoed and expanded upon Cox’s analysis, noting that extended military occupation was not only an unpopular idea among people who had suffered through four years of warfare, but simply incompatible with dominant ideas about peacetime republican government. He concludes that the instances in which the military was used effectively during the 1860s clearly demonstrates that substantial numbers of troops – probably something around 10,000 to 20,000 men – would have been necessary to adequately put down white resistance to Reconstruction. Such numbers contrast sharply with the 3,000 to 5,000 who were deployed, often rather thinly, in the South during much of Reconstruction (Blair 2005: 261–2). Blair concludes that such a program was “unthinkable for practical, economic, and political-ideological reasons.... Various people expressed a strong belief, held among many nineteenth-century Americans at the time, that self-determination – achieved through the rule by the ballot – provided the best form of government.... Intervention by soldiers discredited the Republican governments that remained in the South as existing because of force, not the choice of people exercising free will through the ballot” (398–9).

Another feature of the military history of Reconstruction is the role played by the United States Colored Troops (USCTs) in the occupation of the South. Though discussed in a number of studies, including Sefton’s, the black troops who served in the occupation army are even less likely to be a subject of direct inquiry than is the army as a whole. This is so despite the fact that immediately following the war’s close and well-into 1866, the ratio of black to white troops was as high as 3 to 1 in certain parts of the South (Louisiana, Tennessee, and Mississippi, for instance). Most general studies of Reconstruction agree that white Southerners, with the concurrence of white Union army commanders, pressured the federal government to remove black soldiers from the South at a rapid pace, often because of what was understood – both by officers and civilians – to be the USCT’s “bad influence” on local freedpeople. For instance, in South Carolina, “where out of 14,000 troops only 2,500 were white,” the commanding general of the department, Quincy Adams Gillmore, argued to his superiors, “In many instances nearly all the laborers on large plantations under extensive cultivation have violated their

contracts and suspended their work in consequence of the pernicious influence of a few bad colored soldiers, who were formerly slaves in the neighborhood” (Sefton 1967: 52). As a consequence of both white animosity and Union military leadership doubts, by 1870 no black Union soldiers were stationed in the South outside the frontier areas of Texas, though state and local black militias maintained a presence in some areas through the end of Reconstruction.

Where historians have focused particularly on the place of black soldiers in Reconstruction, they have done so in rather truncated form. Joseph Glathaar, in his 1990 study of the United States Colored Troops (USCT) in the Civil War, devotes a chapter to their occupation of the South, in which he reminds us not only that the Freedmen’s Bureau was a part of the Union army, but that it had a particularly close relationship to the USCT. The ties occurred at the highest levels of the army – “the head of the Freedmen’s Bureau, Maj. Gen. Oliver Otis Howard, had links to the USCT. His own brother and several members of his staff during the war held commissions in the USCT.” It was thus not surprising that Howard should pull heavily from the ranks of the USCT when appointing agents for the Freedmen’s Bureau. Moreover, the “bulk of the black troops, as former slaves, had a vested interest in any sort of program that supported and uplifted Southern blacks. Northern black soldiers, too, benefited indirectly from such a program. Many of their relatives had won freedom during the war, and improvements among Southern blacks helped to elevate the stature of the entire black population” (Glathaar 1990: 210). Even more important was the role the army of occupation played as the enforcer of Freedmen’s Bureau’s decisions in local conflicts. As “Southern whites were not about to accept the decrees of Freedmen’s Bureau agents voluntarily,” the army stood ready to ensure that those decisions were honored. In the event that black soldiers enforced a northern white officers’ decision, particularly a decision in which a freedperson was awarded a claim against a local white person, the overlapping lines of power between blacks, the Union army, and Reconstruction policy were all to apparent to resistant whites (Glathaar 1990: 212).

Recently, as part of a larger study of black politics during the nineteenth-century, Steven Hahn (2003) has drawn an even more active connection between the presence of black soldiers as occupiers during Reconstruction and the political – and paramilitary – empowerment of freedpeople. Arguing that “the presence of black troops and of black veterans mustered out of service helped to advance the local organization of rural freed communities,” Hahn demonstrates the central role black soldiers played in teaching their families and political allies how to mobilize themselves for self-defense and self-determination (133). Among the issues that many black soldiers and veterans came to be associated with was land redistribution, and in the first year after the war, white Southerners complained regularly to Union army officials that black soldiers were making up stories and causing black laborers to become “demoralized.” Hahn sees the rumors of land redistribution, and the authority of black soldiers in encouraging those rumors, as the essence of political activism for the still-disfranchised freedmen in 1865–6. “Given the freedpeople’s exclusions from the official arenas of political negotiation and the risks they faced in publicly expressing their aspirations and wills, the rumors

could have served them as vital points of political contact, conversations, and identification; as safer ways in which to introduce themselves as political actors; and as potent means for shaping – and advancing – the terrain of political debate” (Hahn 2003: 135).

Another aspect of the military presence in the Reconstruction South were state militias. In Tennessee, where Reconstruction began during the war and where political control was maintained by Radical Republicans only until 1868, there was no period of “military Reconstruction,” as with the other former states of the Confederacy. Because Tennessee ratified the Fourteenth Amendment in 1866, and was thereby readmitted to the Union, it escaped the dictates of the Military Reconstruction Acts of 1867. However, under the governorship of unconditional unionist and Radical Republican William G. Brownlow, Tennessee pursued a particularly punitive course *vis-à-vis* former Confederates, as well as a unusually progressive path toward state-mandated black franchise, legalized in January 1867. This generated deep animosity and early resistance, so much so that the state legislature passed “An Act to Organize and Equip a State Guard” in 1867, in an effort to create a local force to contend with opponents to the new franchise laws. This was a loyalist militia – composed only of seven companies with a total of 1,800 men, including African-Americans (some of these black men served in mixed units, in contrast to US Army practice), as well as veterans of Tennessee Union regiments (Severance 2005). Historians have long noted the anomaly of this “governor’s army” in Reconstruction history, and some have cast it as a tyrannical and vengeful force. The militia’s latest historian, Ben H. Severance, revises this interpretation aggressively, insisting that, while Radical, the army was nonetheless disciplined and acted within the law to enforce voting laws. Indeed, “the Tennessee State Guard was remarkably effective at enforcing the Reconstruction policies of the Radical Republican government. ... When it was used, in 1867 and 1869, it successfully thwarted ex-Confederate resistance and ensured Radical success and safety.” This state military force, however, was deployed inconsistently, and, according to Severance, the consequence was to encourage violent resistance among the white population. During the great year of Klan activity in Tennessee (as elsewhere in the South), 1868, the State Guard was never employed. “By not maintaining an active State Guard presence throughout the Reconstruction period,” Severance concludes, “the Radical Republicans forfeited perhaps the best means for preserving their hold on the state and completing their plans for a new Tennessee” (Severance 2005: xvii). By 1870, once Tennessee had been “redeemed,” white Conservatives instituted a disfranchising poll tax in 1870; this followed the state’s refusal to ratify the Fifteenth Amendment in 1869.

The one volume dedicated to the formal organization of black militias during Reconstruction, Otis Singletary’s *The Negro Militia and Reconstruction* (1957), has unfortunately not been revised or updated. This is significant, for it is quite clear that even though the Union army removed black soldiers from its occupation, a number of southern states – most notably Tennessee, Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, and North Carolina – recruited black men into the state militia and used them in both segregated and mixed units to enforce peace at polls and

Reconstruction measures generally. The question of informal black militias has been highlighted in other, more recent studies as an adjunct to other questions, however. Paul Cimbala, in his important study of the Freedmen's Bureau in Georgia, comments less on the formally organized militia than on those local groups organized for self defense, particularly in 1866 and 1867, when they formed "militia units and openly drilled with shouldered arms (Cimbala 1997: 209). The significance of both the formal and informal military organization among blacks during presidential reconstruction is great, for it helps to contextualize better the ferocity of the backlash against Military Reconstruction and black franchise in 1868 and 1869, the years most terribly marked by violence against blacks by white leagues and paramilitaries. Steven Hahn (2003) has recently encouraged us to take the evidence of black paramilitary organization – particularly as an adjunct to Union League political organizing – seriously, though for many years scholars allowed this fact to be eclipsed in their efforts to revise the early twentieth-century historians who had focused so heavily on the "tyranny" of armed blacks and the threat of "negro rule" as the evidence for the supposed wickedness of Reconstruction. Hahn suggests that we might better conclude that whites were justifiably anxious at the level of organization among blacks, and that blacks were perfectly cognizant of the importance of paramilitary action for their future in the South. "Paramilitary organization had been fundamental to the social and political order of slavery," he argues. African-Americans understood that "it remained fundamental to the social and political order of freedom" (Hahn 2003: 266). Consequently, black men embraced the possibility of violent resistance to white terrorism, and the Union League, as well as independent and frequently unsanctioned black militias, became the site for this form of militant organizing (280–1).

The investigation into this "informal" side of military conflict during Reconstruction is particularly notable among scholars investigating white resistance to Republican control. The general trend has been to cast postwar conflict as partisan or paramilitary in nature and to highlight the commonalities between the Civil War's guerrilla warfare and the highly local and uncoordinated – though ideologically unified – conflict that was a major feature of most Southern communities during the postwar period. In addition, most recent scholarship has emphasized the ways that white resistance changed and evolved over the course of Reconstruction. As Richard Zuczek argues for the case of South Carolina:

Over the years violence grew more coherent, political and widespread, and so did conservative politics and political opposition. White Carolinians grew more unified and deliberate, and their resistance became more organized, directed, and effective. By 1876 resistance had evolved into war.

Zuczek is careful to define war as "organized, coherent, and self-aware, based in force, and designed to bring about political change." It had, in South Carolina, a distinctly paramilitary and guerrilla quality for most of the 1870s, and it was extremely effective (Zuczek 1996: 5). Similar arguments shape James Hogue's discussion of the "five street battles" of New Orleans between 1866 and 1876, in



which he argues against the tendency to collapse all armed conflict during Reconstruction into undifferentiated “violence.” “When lawlessness and violence periodically swept across the ex-Confederacy after 1865, it appeared to many, both at the time and later, to be simply repeating patterns present during the Civil War itself.” Hogue continues to make clear that, while the experience of war and occupation clearly shaped the enmities of black and white Louisianans, Confederates and Unionists, the way that enmity was expressed during Reconstruction was not static. Instead, Hogue seeks to “reconceptualize both the fighting and roles that different types of military forces played in its origins, development and outcome.” His study carefully demonstrates that white resistance to Reconstruction transformed over time, moving from vigilantism to paramilitary action and finally to counterrevolution (Hogue 2006: 11–12).

A similar desire to highlight the dynamic and context-specific character of violent white resistance has shaped recent analyses of the Ku Klux Klan. Scholars, influenced by Allen Trelease’s study of the Klan, *White Terror* (1971), have long argued that the movement was rooted in the Confederate military experience, but was highly decentralized, united more by general objectives than by bureaucracy. More recent scholarship has begun to focus more effectively than did Trelease on the local elements of Klan history, tracing the development of the anti-Reconstruction counterrevolution to particular local interactions between former rebels, freedpeople, and white unionists. This is helpful because it examines violence and armed conflict at the site of the political and social change Reconstruction wrought – at the site where the meaning of the Civil War would ultimately be determined. Like slave networks in the antebellum period, and white unionist resistance during the Civil War, the Klan built on southern social relations to become exceedingly effective as a militant arm of political protest. As Steven Hahn has argued, this fact points to the “locally inflected compass of political conflict in the rural South ... Loosely constituted as it may have been, the Ku Klux Klan (and allied organizations) almost everywhere built on traditions of enforcing dominion and submission, on grids of kinship and political patronage, and on generational legacies of military defeat” (Hahn 2003: 268). And, like the guerrilla warfare that permeated much of the contested areas of the South, violent white resistance was clearly nurtured in communities and protected by strong bonds of sympathy among like-minded citizens, a fact that made it very difficult for blacks and white Republicans to fight (Hahn 2003: 269; Storey 2004: 170–235). A leading example of this methodological approach is Edward John Harcourt’s article, “Who Were the Pale Faces” (2005), which attempts to reexamine in a systematic way the roots of the Klan in Tennessee and to generalize from that specificity about the nature of white resistance in the South. Harcourt’s contention is two-fold: first, historians have not adequately questioned the long-standing assertion that the Klan in Tennessee was first a “social club” for Confederate veterans that only mutated into a paramilitary resistance organization in the wake of black enfranchisement; second, the failure to understand the essentially militaristic origins of the group fails to appreciate the wartime roots of postwar white resistance.

It seems clear that, though Reconstruction was at all times a military affair to one extent or another, historians have rarely directly addressed this feature of the period. This is so despite the fact that historians generally agree that enforcement of policy was one of the most difficult aspects of Reconstruction and that political authority was located in military leaders for at least some part of every reconstructed state's history. Moreover, the lack of scholarship on the question does not arise from a dearth of sources, for the Freedmen's Bureau and the US Army generated copious documents. Indeed, scholars of paramilitary and other informal military activity have been able to unearth source material sufficient to give us a good sense of the nature of white resistance to Reconstruction. Nonetheless, scholars have some way to go to explain fully the details of the relationship between political and military authority in the South after the Civil War.

#### BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Ash, Steven (1995). *When the Yankees Came: Conflict and Chaos in the Occupied South, 1861-1865*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Bentley, George R. (1955). *A History of the Freedmen's Bureau*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Blair, William (2005). "The Use of Military Force to Protect the Gains of Reconstruction," *Civil War History*, 51:4 (December), 388-402.
- Blassingame, John W. (1973). *Black New Orleans, 1860-1880*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Capers, Gerald M., Jr. (1965). *Occupied City: New Orleans Under the Federals*. Lexington: University of Kentucky Press.
- Cimbala, Paul A. (1997). *Under the Guardianship of the Nation: The Freedmen's Bureau and the Reconstruction of Georgia, 1865-1870*. Athens: University of Georgia Press.
- Cox, LaWanda (1981). *Lincoln and Black Freedom: A Study in Presidential Leadership*. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.
- Dawson, Joseph G., III (1982). *Army Generals and Reconstruction: Louisiana, 1862-1877*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.
- DeSantis, Vincent P. (1982). "Rutherford B. Hayes and the Removal of the Troops and the End of Reconstruction," in Morgan Kousser and James McPherson, eds., *Region, Race and Reconstruction*. New York: Oxford University Press, 417-50.
- Foner, Eric (1988). *Reconstruction: America's Unfinished Revolution*. New York: Harper & Row.
- Friedel, L. M. (1947) *The Bible and the Negro Spirituals*. Bay St. Louis, MS: St. Augustine Seminary.
- Futrell, Robert J. (1951). "Federal Military Government in the South, 1861-1865," *Military Affairs*, 15:4 (Winter): 181-91.
- Gillette, William (1979). *Retreat from Reconstruction, 1869-1879*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.
- Glathaar, Joseph T. (1990). *Forged in Battle: The Civil War Alliance of Black Soldiers and White Officers*. New York: Meridian.
- Grimsley, Mark (1995). *The Hard Hand of War: Union Military Policy Toward Southern Civilians, 1861-1865*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Hahn, Steven (2003). *A Nation Under Our Feet: Black Political Struggles in the Rural South from Slavery to the Great Migration*. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
- Harcourt, Edward John (2005). "Who Were the Pale Faces? New Perspectives on the Tennessee Ku Klux," *Civil War History*, 51:1 (March), 23–66.
- Hogue, James K. (2006). *Uncivil War: Five New Orleans Street Battles and the Rise and Fall of Radical Reconstruction*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.
- Maslowski, Peter (1978). *Treason Must Be Made Odious: Military Occupation and Wartime Reconstruction in Nashville, Tennessee, 1862–1865*. Millwood, NY: KTO Press.
- McFeely, William S. (1994). *Yankee Stepfather: General O. O. Howard and the Freedmen*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Sefton, James E. (1967). *The United States Army and Reconstruction, 1865–1877*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.
- Sefton, James E. (1980). *Andrew Johnson and the Uses of Constitutional Power*. Boston: Little, Brown.
- Severance, Ben H. (2005). *Tennessee's Radical Army: The State Guard and Its Role in Reconstruction, 1867–1869*. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press.
- Singletary, Otis A. (1957). *The Negro Militia and Reconstruction*. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Storey, Margaret M. (2004). *Loyalty and Loss: Alabama's Unionists in the Civil War and Reconstruction*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.
- Sutherland, Daniel E. (2000). "Sideshow No Longer: A Historiographical Review of the Guerrilla War," *Civil War History*, 46:1 (March), 5–23.
- Sutherland, Daniel E. (2002). "Guerrilla Warfare, Democracy, and the Fate of the Confederacy," *Journal of Southern History*, 68:2 (May), 259–92.
- Trelease, Allen W. (1971). *White Terror: The Ku Klux Klan Conspiracy and Southern Reconstruction*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.
- Zuczek, Richard (1996). *State of Rebellion: Reconstruction in South Carolina*. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.

## Chapter Forty-two

# THE MILITARY, CIVIL DISORDER, AND NATURAL DISASTERS, 1877–2007

*Charles A. Byler*

Militaries exist primarily to fight wars, but the historical record is filled with examples of the military serving other purposes as well. A significant aspect of the American military's experience from the late nineteenth century onward involved efforts to re-establish order in cases of civil unrest or to relieve the distress caused by natural disasters. The military's responsibility for helping to maintain domestic order and aid disaster victims meant that soldiers have played an important part in momentous events in the nation's past, including such human-instigated actions as strikes, race riots, and antiwar protests and such acts of nature as floods, earthquakes, and hurricanes. Considering the importance of the military's role in responding to civil disturbances and natural calamities, surprisingly few scholars have written works that focus on the subject of military intervention. Books on specific episodes of disorder and disaster are more common, but many of them merely describe the actions of the troops and offer little analysis of the legal, political, and operational issues that have arisen when soldiers appear on the streets to restore order or assist the victims of disaster.

### The Issues

Although the scholarship on military intervention in cases of domestic disorder is not extensive, enough exists to help define some key issues regarding the subject. One issue concerns the decision of civilian leaders – the president in the case of the federal military and state governors in the case of the National Guard – to deploy military forces when local authorities were unable to cope with civil unrest or natural disasters. The decision to send troops sometimes entailed political risk. On occasion civilian leaders avoided using the military for reasons that included a reluctance to become entangled in local disputes and a realization that the intervention would anger those who sympathized with the strikers, protestors, or whoever else was creating the disturbance. On the other hand, leaders suffered political damage if the public perceived them as moving too slowly in responding

to a request for military assistance, as President George W. Bush learned in the case of Hurricane Katrina in 2005.

Related to the decision to use military force is the issue of the constitutional and legal authority to do so, particularly when federal troops are involved. The Constitution charges the federal government with protecting the United States against invasion and “domestic violence” and grants Congress the power to call upon the militia “to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions.” Building on those provisions, Congress passed legislation giving the president the authority to use the nation’s military forces to protect federal property and ensure the enforcement of federal laws or to suppress domestic disturbances when called upon for help by a state. At times the presidential exercise of those powers stirred controversy, as when President Grover Cleveland ended the Pullman Strike of 1894 by sending 12,000 soldiers to enforce a court injunction against the American Railway Union (Broesamle and Arthur 2006). The legal authority exercised by the troops themselves has also been a matter of contention at times. Congress intended the Posse Comitatus Act, passed in 1878, to discourage the army from engaging in law enforcement. The act was passed in reaction to the extensive use of US soldiers to enforce Reconstruction measures after the Civil War and forbids federal troops from serving as posse members in support of law officers unless expressly authorized to do so by the Constitution or by act of Congress. Generally soldiers have adhered to the act, but there have been exceptions. During World War I, for example, federal troops ignored the law in arresting citizens suspected of subversion. According to Matt Matthews (2006), the vaguely worded act has often created uncertainty about the circumstances in which federal soldiers can legitimately serve in a police role. As a case in point Matthews cites the reluctance of army commanders to allow their troops to participate in enforcing the laws during the rioting in Los Angeles that followed the verdict in the Rodney King trial in 1992.

Once military forces intervened in a civil disorder or natural disaster, the issue of command and control arose. The different levels of authority in the federal system – local, state, and national – complicated the lines of command and made coordinated action difficult. Given the tradition of civilian control of the military, civilian leaders hesitated to hand complete control of operations over to military officers, but at the same time state and national leaders resisted allowing local civilian officials to direct military units. The result quite often was the sort of confusion among federal, state, and local authorities that characterized the response to the nationwide railroad strike of 1877 or to Hurricane Katrina in 2005.

Another significant issue involves the effectiveness of military intervention. The military itself measured effectiveness by considering how rapidly it was able to restore stability and whether it did so without having to use excessive force. Most scholarship on the subject praises the federal military for its success in subduing disorder with a minimum of bloodshed. Assessments of the performance of the National Guard, as we shall see, are more mixed, and a number of scholars criticize the Guard in specific cases of civil unrest for failing to act firmly against strikers and rioters or, at the other extreme, for being too willing to use deadly force.

Some scholars have also posed questions about the consequences of military involvement in civil disorders. The military invariably succeeded in putting down domestic unrest, but was order sometimes preserved at the expense of justice? Did military intervention serve particular economic or political interests? Did it stifle dissent and hinder the growth of labor unions? Such questions have arisen most often in the scholarship that examines the military's role in the labor disputes of the late nineteenth century and in the campaign against radical unionism during World War I.

### **Military Intervention in Civil Disorders**

The use of troops in cases of domestic disorder has occurred in almost every decade since the founding of the Republic, but military interventions reached a peak in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The rapid industrialization and urbanization of the period sparked increasing labor unrest and racial conflict. At the same time the expanding role of government in American life led the public to expect state and federal officials to take action when disorders occurred. By the 1920s domestic disturbances became less common, and so did military interventions. In the 1960s, however, a volatile mix of issues – including the campaign for civil rights, opposition to the Vietnam War, and the growing frustration of African Americans in the nation's cities – inspired a fresh wave of protests and riots and, in response, the deployment of record numbers of state and federal troops in urban neighborhoods and on university campuses across the nation. By the mid-1970s the turmoil had largely abated, and military interventions became relatively infrequent.

The best overview of the part played by federal troops in instances of civil unrest in the American past is contained in a two-volume series on the subject published by the US Army's Center of Military History. One of the volumes, Clayton D. Laurie and Ronald H. Cole's *The Role of Federal Military Forces in Domestic Disorders, 1877–1945* (1997), covers the frequent participation of federal soldiers in the labor and racial conflicts of the period from the end of Reconstruction to the end of World War II. Laurie and Cole note that civilian and military leaders were slow to create clear guidelines on the use of federal forces in domestic disturbances. Despite the lack of clear policies, the authors argue, the army succeeded in restoring order whenever leaders used it for that purpose, and despite regulations that permitted the army to employ the methods of war to subdue crowds, it rarely used force to do so. Laurie and Cole recognize that military intervention in cases of labor and racial unrest usually had the effect of upholding the status quo. The army itself, they write, mostly acted as a neutral instrument of public policy; if military intervention benefitted the political and economic elite, it was because civilian leaders chose to use the army as they did. The most conspicuous exception to this record of civilian control, according to Laurie and Cole, occurred during World War I, when the administration of President Woodrow Wilson essentially abandoned oversight of the military's operations inside the United States and local



army commanders, in cooperation with company managers, used their troops to break up radical labor unions.

The second volume in the Center of Military History's series, Paul J. Scheips's *The Role of Federal Military Forces in Domestic Disorders, 1945–1992* (2005) continues the story from the end of World War II to the Los Angeles race riot of 1992. Like Laurie and Cole, Scheips generally commends the conduct of federal forces in civil disorders. Their discipline and sense of restraint, he writes, enabled them to follow what had become the army's chief goal regarding civil disorder – the restoration of stability with a minimal use of force. Command and control remained a problem in military interventions, but by the 1960s an improved working relationship between the army and civilian agencies such as the Justice Department helped alleviate some of the difficulties.

Taken together, the two volumes portray the federal military's role in civil disorders in a positive light. Federal forces inflicted very few casualties in responding to domestic unrest, the authors note, a fact that they attribute to the army's professionalism and its dedication to the principle of civilian control of the military. Both books highlight a less favorable side of the army's past, however, in discussing how military intelligence officials used the military's need to prepare for possible outbreaks of civil unrest to justify extensive spying on individuals and organizations inside the United States. Such surveillance became especially common during World War I and the 1960s.

Jerry M. Cooper's *The Army and Civil Disorder: Federal Military Intervention in Labor Disputes, 1877–1900* (1980) is an earlier work that also gives the army credit for quelling unrest without having to use much violence. Cooper contrasts the army's record during the period with that of the National Guard, some units of which failed to act against unruly crowds in the 1877 and 1894 strikes and which, when it did take action, was more likely than the army to open fire on rioters. Cooper emphasizes the anti-union ideology of army leaders and the harmful consequences of military intervention for labor more than Laurie and Cole do in their book. The political conservatism of many army officers, Cooper writes, led them to sympathize with management in its struggle with labor. He notes that some officers readily accommodated mine and factory owners by using troops to clear away strikers so that the employers could replace them with strikebreakers. Such actions, Cooper writes, dealt the union movement a damaging blow.

A number of works on specific labor disputes of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries present useful accounts of the role of the military in the strikes and violence that the labor–management conflict so often generated. Like Cooper, they assert that military intervention usually had the effect of undercutting the labor movement. Philip S. Foner's *The Great Labor Uprising of 1877* (1977) questions the necessity of President Rutherford B. Hayes's decision to intervene with federal troops in the widespread railroad workers' strike that began in Martinsburg, West Virginia, in July 1877 following the announcement by the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad that employee wages would be cut for a second time within a year. When workers blocked the tracks, West Virginia Governor Henry M. Mathews activated militia units and ordered them to evict the workers from railroad

property. The strike quickly spread to Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Illinois where governors called out units of their state militias. When West Virginia militiamen refused to use force to evict the workers and fighting broke out in the streets of Baltimore, Pittsburgh, and Philadelphia, the governors called for assistance and President Hayes sent federal troops to restore order. Paul Krause's *The Battle for Homestead* (1992) describes how the intervention of the Pennsylvania National Guard in the struggle between steel workers and management at Andrew Carnegie's Homestead plant in 1892 destroyed the union and set back labor organization of the steel industry for 40 years. Two years after the Homestead Strike, 8,000 coal miners struck the Tennessee Coal, Iron and Railway Company in Birmingham, Alabama. Governor Thomas Jones ordered state troops to the city to protect strikebreakers from violence at the hands of striking miners, an action that contributed to the failure of the strike. Unlike at Homestead, here the union, the United Mine Workers of Alabama, survived the strike (Ward and Rogers 1965).

George G. Suggs, Jr.'s *Colorado's War on Militant Unionism* (1972) discusses how Governor James H. Peabody used the Colorado National Guard (whose service was secretly financed by the Cripple Creek Mine Owners Association) to break the power of the Western Federation of Miners by taking control of Teller County from local officials who had been elected with union support. The Colorado National Guard also comes under scrutiny in Scott Martelle's *Blood Passion: The Ludlow Massacre and Class War in the American West* (2007). Martelle recounts the developments that led to a bloody conflict between striking coal miners and the Colorado Guardsmen, some of whom were on the mining company payroll. The Wilson administration, Martelle notes, was slow to react to the situation, but it eventually succeeded in stopping the violence by using federal troops to separate the warring groups.

William Preston, Jr.'s *Aliens and Dissenters: Federal Suppression of Radicals, 1903–1933* (1963) has a valuable chapter on the army's aggressive campaign against radical labor unions during World War I. Preston criticizes the army's lack of neutrality in dealing with clashes between labor and management, citing cases in which officers ordered their troops to guard company property and billeted soldiers in company buildings. Robert Shogan's *The Battle of Blair Mountain: The Story of the Nation's Largest Labor Uprising* (2004) also describes an intervention by the army, in this instance one that halted the brutal fighting between coal miners and company guards in West Virginia in 1921. Shogan notes that while the involvement of federal troops brought peace, it also caused the collapse of the strike.

Two biographies of army officers who commanded federal military interventions in major strikes provide insights into many of the political and operational difficulties that the army encountered in such events. David M. Jordan (1988) examines Winfield Scott Hancock's supervision of the federal military's intervention in the railroad strike of 1877 and his frustration with the confused command structure that left some of the army's units under the direction of state governors. Donald B. Connelly (2006) explains how John M. Schofield, as the army's commanding general, managed the army's operations during the Pullman Strike of 1894 in a way that preserved centralized control over the troops and kept casualties low.

Although its experiences in handling strikes are better known, the military also had the task of suppressing disorder on the western frontier. When lawlessness swept San Francisco during the early stages of the Gold Rush, for example, naval officers on the scene used sailors to impose a form of unofficial martial law on the city in 1848 and 1849 (Delgado 1990). Federal marshals and local sheriffs, responsible for upholding the law across vast areas, often called upon soldiers to help them in apprehending wrongdoers. Michael L. Tate (1999) considers the army's record in such activities and notes that some army officers continued to assist lawmen in making arrests even after the passage of the Posse Comitatus Act. Robert M. Utley (1987) investigates the Lincoln County War of 1878, in which gunmen hired by rival groups of businessmen battled for supremacy in frontier New Mexico, and the often clumsy efforts of the army to quash the fighting.

Several books address the role of the military in the racial conflicts that arose during and immediately after World War I. Studies of the East St. Louis Race Riot of 1917 by Elliott Rudwick (1972 [1964]) and Malcolm McLaughlin (2005) condemn the performance of the Illinois National Guard in the outbreak of racial violence. Both accounts portray the Illinois Guard units as poorly disciplined and abysmally led and describe guardsmen who, apparently sharing the hostility of the white rioters toward African Americans, stood by as gangs of whites attacked black citizens. William M. Tuttle, Jr. (1970) finds the Illinois Guard more proficient and evenhanded in its response to the rioting in Chicago two years later.

Few military interventions have drawn more scholarly attention than the army's action against the Bonus Army during the Great Depression. Composed of veterans of World War I, the Bonus Army descended on Washington, DC in 1932 to pressure Congress to approve the early disbursement of the bonus payments that, in 1924, veterans had been promised they would receive in 1945. When an attempt by the city police to evict veterans from some abandoned buildings resulted in violence, President Herbert Hoover ordered the army to intervene. The federal troops moved vigorously to drive the Bonus Army out of the city. No one was killed, but the images of bayonet and saber-wielding soldiers rousting the veterans and burning their shacks and tents shocked the public. Several books evaluate the army's conduct in the affair as well as Hoover's decision to send in troops. Roger Daniels (1971) faults the army for using excessive force in removing the veterans. The blame for this, Daniels maintains, rests with General Douglas MacArthur, who, in commanding the operation, deliberately disobeyed the president's orders and failed to cooperate with the police. Donald J. Lisio (1974) defends Hoover's handling of the situation and joins Daniels in blaming MacArthur. In his biography of MacArthur, Geoffrey Perret (1996) contends that the general acted within his orders and that he did not learn of Hoover's instructions not to send his forces into the Bonus Army's main camp until it was too late to stop the troops.

The civil rights crusade of the 1950s and 1960s produced the next major round of military intervention in civil disorders. David A. Nichols's revisionist look at President Dwight Eisenhower's civil rights policies, *A Matter of Justice* (2007), credits the president with a cautious but determined approach to civil rights that advanced the cause of racial equality. The book contains an insightful discussion of

the legal and political considerations that influenced Eisenhower's decision to dispatch army troops to Little Rock to enforce a federal court order for the desegregation of the city's Central High School in 1957. William Doyle's *An American Insurrection: The Battle of Oxford, Mississippi, 1962* (2001) provides a detailed study of the participation of the army and the Mississippi National Guard in the effort to enforce the court-ordered admission of a black student, James Meredith, to the University of Mississippi. President John F. Kennedy hoped to avoid using the military, Doyle writes, but felt compelled to send in troops when a crowd of angry whites attacked the federal marshals escorting Meredith onto campus. Doyle criticizes the Kennedy administration's management of the matter. Poor planning and hasty decision-making, he says, meant that the intervention went forward with a confused command structure and inadequate coordination between army leaders and the Justice Department. Doyle has only praise, however, for the professionalism and deportment of US soldiers and federalized Mississippi Guardsmen. They stayed calm and refrained from using violence, he writes, and the Mississippi Guard obeyed orders even though many of its members strongly opposed Meredith's admission.

Apart from Paul Scheips's *The Role of Federal Military Forces in Domestic Disorders, 1945–1992*, mentioned above, few scholars have written extensively on the military's record in the violent racial conflicts that overwhelmed many of the nation's cities during the 1960s. Two works that do consider the military's role are Gerald Horne's (1995) study of the 1965 Watts riot and Sidney Fine's (1989) of the 1967 riot in Detroit. Both authors find fault with the National Guard's handling of the respective riots. Horne portrays the California Guard as poorly prepared, racially insensitive, and overly inclined to shoot during the Watts riot. Fine observes similar problems in the Michigan National Guard's response in Detroit. Fine's book also examines the deliberations within the Johnson administration as it considered whether to send federal troops and the tensions that arose between army and National Guard commanders after the army arrived in the city. John J. Peterson's *Into the Cauldron* (1973) offers a more sympathetic account of the National Guard's actions in the racial unrest of the era. Focusing on the Maryland National Guard during the Baltimore riot of 1968, Peterson commends the guardsmen for acting with restraint in spite of the provocations of the rioters. Michael W. Flamm (2005) explores the political aspects of the decision to deploy the federal military in cases of urban unrest and argues that the army's intervention in Detroit and other cities helped to transform the riots into national rather than local problems.

The military's role in countering the disorder that accompanied some of the antiwar protests of the Vietnam War era has also failed to attract the scrutiny of many scholars, although one event stemming from the protests – the Kent State shootings of 1970 – has received some attention. An antiwar demonstration at Kent State University ended tragically when a group of Ohio National Guardsmen opened fire on a crowd of student protestors, killing four of them. William A. Gordon (1995) provides the most thoroughly researched account of the shootings and the numerous court trials that followed. Gordon rejects the guardsmen's defense that they fired because they were endangered by rock-throwing students; the shootings, he argues, were unjustified and contrary to the Guard's rules of

engagement. Philip Caputo (2005) describes the political climate that led to the protest and reflects on the public response to the killings.

The era of Vietnam and the Watergate scandal produced revelations about the military's efforts over the decades to carry out surveillance inside the United States on groups and individuals that intelligence officials deemed to be subversive. With the rationale that the military had to be ready to handle the unrest that radicals might foment, intelligence agents spied on pacifist groups, unions, civil rights organizations, and university professors. Most of the scholarship that examines this activity censures intelligence officials for abusing civil liberties and civilian leaders for failing to rein in the spying. Joan M. Jensen's *Army Surveillance in America, 1775–1980* (1991) provides a good overview. Roy Talbert, Jr.'s *Negative Intelligence: The Army and the American Left, 1917–1941* (1991) explains the origins of the army's Military Intelligence Division and describes the raids and arrests that it initiated during the World War I era. Jeffery Dowart (1979, 1983) traces the early history of the Office of Naval Intelligence and discusses the surveillance it conducted and actions taken in defense of American factories during World War I, its activities during the postwar Red Scare, and the use Franklin Roosevelt made of the organization to monitor individuals he considered dangerous enemies of his administration.

The military has occasionally been called upon to act in what are normally civilian capacities. A lack of civilian authority in much of Alaska in the late nineteenth century, for example, meant that the Revenue Cutter Service, forerunner to the Coast Guard, assumed the roles of distributing mail, enforcing fishing and sealing regulations, and dispensing justice on the western and northern coasts of the thinly populated territory (Strobridge and Noble 1999).

In 1934 an investigation into the awarding of airmail contracts led President Franklin Roosevelt to void all domestic contracts and to instruct the army to place at the disposal of the Post Office "such airplanes, landing fields, pilots ... and equipment of the Army ... required for the transportation of mail during the present emergency." Army Air Corps leaders spoke confidently of the ability of the service to transport the mail, but the Air Corps was in fact ill-prepared for such a job. Between February and June 1934 air mail service had to be severely curtailed as 66 accidents resulted in the deaths of 12 pilots before the carrying of air mail was returned to commercial airline companies. The Air Corps' failures led to much negative publicity and ultimately to needed reforms (Borden 1968, Glines 1968, Tate 1998).

### The Role of the Military in Natural Disasters

The military has a long history of providing assistance to the victims of natural disasters, but little scholarship on the subject exists. Two books that give the topic some attention are Gaines M. Foster's *The Demands of Humanity: Army Medical Disaster Relief* (1983) and Michael L. Tate's *The Frontier Army in the Settlement of the West* (1999). Both authors consider the question of how Americans came to

accept the idea of federal troops as agents of relief. Foster argues that the expectation that military personnel would take action in the aftermath of natural disasters increased in the early twentieth century as the army became more involved in promoting public health in the nation's new colonial possessions. Tate discusses how the army's experience first in operating the Freedman's Bureau during Reconstruction and then in assisting civilians on the frontier in the nineteenth century contributed to the development of a role of offering relief in cases of disaster. The frontier army helped in a number of ways, including supplying food and clothing to the victims of floods, prairie fires, and swarming locusts. Over time Americans came to see the military, with its disciplined personnel, logistical capacity, and ability to improvise, as an essential part of the government's response to natural disasters. B. Franklin Cooling's (1975) article surveying the army's efforts in response to floods, hurricanes, and other disasters notes that by the 1920s the army considered disaster relief a routine part of its duties and developed regulations to guide its work.

Several books on specific disasters include some analysis of the military's participation in the events. Dennis Smith (2005) and Philip L. Fradkin (2006) note that the army and the California National Guard received national acclaim for dealing promptly with the aftereffects of the devastating San Francisco earthquake of 1906 but observe that some San Franciscans criticized the soldiers for being too quick to shoot suspected looters. John M. Barry's *Rising Tide: The Great Mississippi Flood of 1927 and How It Changed America* (1997) provides an account of how local elites used the Mississippi National Guard to preserve the supply of cheap agricultural labor in the Mississippi River delta. The Guard blocked African Americans displaced by the flood from leaving the refugee camps, thereby preventing them from migrating to northern cities.

The role of the military in a more recent disaster – the destruction brought to New Orleans and much of the Gulf Coast by Hurricane Katrina in 2005 – also generated controversy. Christopher Cooper and Robert Block's *Disaster: Hurricane Katrina and the Failure of Homeland Security* (2006) explains the decision-making process that led President George W. Bush and his administration to delay sending large numbers of federal troops into the disaster area despite the requests of state officials for more help. The book also notes the disagreement that arose over the administration's proposal to federalize the Louisiana and Mississippi National Guards, something that the governors of both states refused to permit. A study by Lynn E. Davis *et al.*, *Hurricane Katrina: Lessons for Army Planning and Operations* (2007), analyzes the reasons for the delayed arrival of the federal military and the problems caused by the lack of a unified system of command and control.

Although there has been a considerable amount of writing on the many natural disasters and civil disorders that have taken place in the American past, little of it deals directly with the main issues related to military intervention. Most works focus on explaining the reasons behind particular disorders and disasters or simply offer a narrative of events. Much room remains for scholarship that closely examines issues such as the constitutional and legal authority to use military forces, the problems of command and control, and the tactical and operational decisions that determined the outcome of an intervention.



## BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Barry, John M. (1997). *Rising Tide: The Great Mississippi Flood of 1927 and How It Changed America*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Borden, Norman E., Jr. (1968). *Air Mail Emergency 1934: An Account of 78 Days in the Winter of 1934 When the Army Flew the United States Mail*. Freeport, ME: Bond Wheelwright Co.
- Broesamle, John, and Anthony Arthur (2006). "A Dance of Skeletons Bathed in Human Tears: George Pullman, Eugene Debs, and the Railway Strike of 1894," in *Clashes of Will: Twelve Great Clashes that Shaped Modern America: From Geronimo to George W. Bush*. New York: Pearson/Longman, 27–50.
- Bruce, Robert V. (1987 [1959]). *1877: Year of Violence*. Chicago: Ivan R. Dee.
- Caputo, Philip (2005). *13 Seconds: A Look Back at the Kent State Shootings*. New York: Chamberlain Brothers.
- Connelly, Donald B. (2006). *John M. Schofield and the Politics of Generalship*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Cooling, B. Franklin (1975). "The Army and Flood and Disaster Relief," in Robin Higham and Carol Brandt, eds., *The United States Army in Peacetime*, Manhattan, KA: Military Affairs/Aerospace Historian Publishing, 61–81.
- Cooper, Christopher, and Robert Block (2006). *Disaster: Hurricane Katrina and the Failure of Homeland Security*. New York: Times Books.
- Cooper, Jerry M. (1980). *The Army and Civil Disorder: Federal Military Intervention in Labor Disputes, 1877–1900*. Westport, CT: Greenwood.
- Cooper, Jerry M. (1997). *The Rise of the National Guard: The Evolution of the American Militia, 1865–1920*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
- Daniels, Roger (1971). *The Bonus March: An Episode of the Great Depression*. Westport, CT: Greenwood.
- Davis, Lynn E., Jill Rough, Gary Cecchine, Agnes Goreben Schaefer, and Laurinda L. Zeman (2007). *Hurricane Katrina: Lessons for Army Planning and Operations*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation.
- Delgado, James P. (1990). *To California by Sea: A Maritime History of the California Gold Rush*. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.
- Dickson, Paul, and Thomas B. Allen (2004). *The Bonus Army: An American Epic*. New York: Walker and Co.
- Dowart, Jeffery M. (1979). *The Office of Naval Intelligence: The Birth of America's First Intelligence Agency, 1865–1918*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Dowart, Jeffery M. (1983). *Conflict of Duty: The U.S. Navy's Intelligence Dilemma, 1919–1945*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Doyle, William (2001). *An American Insurrection: The Battle of Oxford, Mississippi, 1962*. New York: Doubleday.
- Fine, Sidney (1989). *Violence in the Model City: The Cavanagh Administration, Race Relations, and the Detroit Riot of 1967*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Flamm, Michael W. (2005). *Law and Order: Street Crime, Civil Unrest, and the Crisis of Liberalism in the 1960s*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Foner, Philip S. (1977). *The Great Labor Uprising of 1877*. New York: Monad Press.
- Foster, Gaines M. (1983). *The Demands of Humanity: Army Medical Disaster Relief*. Washington: Center of Military History.

- Fradkin, Philip L. (2006). *The Great Earthquake and Firestorms of 1906*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Glines, Carroll V. (1968). *The Saga of the Air Mail*. Princeton, NJ: Van Nostrand.
- Gordon, William A. (1995). *Four Dead in Ohio: Was There a Conspiracy at Kent State?* Lake Forest, CA: North Ridge Books.
- Higham, Robin, ed. (1989 [1969]). *Bayonets in the Streets: The Use of Troops in Civil Disturbances*. Manhattan, KA: Sunflower University Press.
- Horne, Gerald (1995). *Fire This Time: The Watts Uprising and the 1960s*. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia.
- Jensen, Joan M. (1991). *Army Surveillance in America, 1775–1980*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Jordan, David M. (1988). *Winfield Scott Hancock: A Soldier's Life*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Krause, Paul (1992). *The Battle for Homestead, 1880–1892: Politics, Culture, and Steel*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
- Laurie, Clayton D., and Ronald H. Cole (1997). *The Role of Federal Military Forces in Domestic Disorders, 1877–1945*. Washington: Center of Military History.
- Lisio, Donald J. (1974). *The President and Protest: Hoover, Conspiracy, and the Bonus Riot*. Columbia: University of Missouri Press.
- Martelle, Scott (2007). *Blood Passion: The Ludlow Massacre and Class War in the American West*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.
- Matthews, Matt (2006). *The Posse Comitatus Act and the United States Army: A Historical Perspective*. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press.
- McLaughlin, Malcolm (2005). *Power, Community, and Racial Killing in East St. Louis*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Nichols, David A. (2007). *A Matter of Justice: Eisenhower and the Beginning of the Civil Rights Revolution*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Perret, Geoffrey (1996). *Old Soldiers Never Die: The Life of Douglas MacArthur*. New York: Random House.
- Peterson, John J. (1973). *Into the Cauldron*. Clinton, Maryland: Clavier House.
- Preston, William, Jr. (1963). *Aliens and Dissenters: Federal Suppression of Radicals, 1903–1933*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Rudwick, Elliott (1972 [1964]). *Race Riot at East St. Louis: July 2, 1917*. New York: Atheneum.
- Scheips, Paul J. (2005). *The Role of Federal Military Forces in Domestic Disorders, 1945–1992*. Washington: Center of Military History.
- Shogan, Robert (2004). *The Battle of Blair Mountain: The Story of America's Largest Labor Uprising*. Boulder, CO: Westview.
- Shogan, Robert, and Tom Craig (1976 [1964]). *The Detroit Race Riot: A Study in Violence*. New York: Da Capo Press.
- Smith, Dennis (2005). *San Francisco is Burning: The Untold Story of the 1906 Earthquake and Fires*. New York: Penguin.
- Strobridge, Truman R., and Dennis L. Noble (1999). *Alaska and the U.S. Revenue-Cutter Service 1867–1915*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Suggs, George G., Jr. (1972). *Colorado's War on Militant Unionism: James H. Peabody and the Western Federation of Miners*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Talbert, Roy, Jr. (1991). *Negative Intelligence: The Army and the American Left, 1917–1941*. Jackson: University Press of Mississippi.

- Tate, James P. (1998). *The Army and Its Air Corps: Army Policy Toward Aviation, 1919–1941*. Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press.
- Tate, Michael L. (1999). *The Frontier Army in the Settlement of the West*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Tuttle, William M., Jr. (1970). *Race Riot: Chicago in the Red Summer of 1919*. New York: Atheneum.
- Utley, Robert M. (1987). *High Noon in Lincoln: Violence on the Western Frontier*. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press.
- Ward, Robert David, and William Warren Rogers (1965). *Labor Revolt in Alabama: The Great Strike of 1894*. University: University of Alabama Press.

# Chapter Forty-three

---

## COASTAL DEFENSES

*Dale E. Floyd*

Early civilizations often established settlements on oceans and seas where the same waters that facilitated trade and travel by the residents also made them vulnerable to enemy raids and attacks. To protect themselves, the residents erected fortifications. Thus coastal defense has existed throughout recorded history. Despite this fact, there exists no general history of coastal defense, although exemplary studies cover the history of several allied topics, for example, Merrill Bartlett (1983) traces the development of amphibious warfare from ancient times to the war in the Falklands and Theodore Gatchel (1996) discusses defending against such amphibious attacks. James Hughes (1991) surveys the history of fortifications, including coastal fortifications, Joseph Jobe's (1971) history of artillery contains coverage of the coastal artillery mounted in those fortifications, and James George (1998) chronicles the development of warships which were often employed to attack the fortifications. Other valuable publications that cover specific time periods are Roger Sarty (1988) on the development of coast artillery, 1815–1914; Christopher Duffy (1996 [1965]) on the science of fortress warfare, 1660–1860; and Alex Roland (1978) on underwater warfare in the Age of Sail. Chris Ware (1994) describes the design of warships designed specifically to bombard coastal fortifications.

As settlers arrived in the Western Hemisphere, they virtually always settled along a coast. In what is now the Continental United States, Englishmen settled at Jamestown and Plymouth, Spaniards at St. Augustine, the Dutch at New Amsterdam, Frenchmen at Mobile and Biloxi. Residents at all these locations constructed some sort of fort, often earthworks, as protection not only against Indians, but also from pirate raids and foreign incursions. While coastal defense was the priority in the New World from the beginning, few of the fortifications involved have received scholarly study, an exception being Larry Ivers' (1970) fine study of the colonial fortifications of South Carolina.

When the American Revolution began in 1775, many coastal fortifications already dotted the Atlantic coast and the Gulf of Mexico. Indeed they played an important role in the opening phases of that conflict. In December 1775 Patriots in Portsmouth, New Hampshire, stormed Fort William and Mary, seized the

gunpowder stored there, and forced the British garrison to abandon it and flee to Boston, Massachusetts, in whose harbor Castle William had provided refuge for crown officials driven from the city by mobs. Soon after its establishment the Continental Army was authorized to appoint engineers who were formed into a distinct Corps of Engineers in March 1779. From the beginning the duties of these engineers included the erection of coastal fortifications (Walker 1981). Lacking native-born military engineers, Americans turned to foreign-born volunteers, most notably, Thaddeus Kosciuszko who supervised construction of defenses on the Delaware and Hudson Rivers (Kajencki 1998). Many of the defensive works were simple earthworks, usually constructed to meet specific threats. Only one, Fort Mifflin on the Delaware River has received solid historical treatment. Jeffrey Dowart (1998) traces the development of defense works on Delaware Bay from its settlement in 1626 through the American Revolution, describes those erected between 1774 and 1778 in detail, then surveys the evolution of fortifications on the Delaware River over the next century closing with a description of their fate during the twentieth century. John Jackson (1977) describes the defenses constructed during the Revolution in detail and explains how they combined with naval forces in the doomed defense of river approaches to Philadelphia in 1778 (Jackson 1974). None of the other fortifications constructed by the Americans, for example, Fort Sullivan at Charleston, South Carolina; Fort Whetstone, on the present site of Fort McHenry, at Baltimore, Maryland; Fort Mercer, New Jersey, on the Delaware River; or Fort Washington at New York City, have received similar sophisticated publications.

After the war, the government abolished the Corps of Engineers and allowed the fortifications to deteriorate for a decade before the outbreak of war between Britain and Revolutionary France led Congress to authorize the nation's first systematic fortification program in 1794. For the next century and a half coastal defense would constitute a basic military mission of the nation's armed services. Emanuel Raymond Lewis, *Seacoast Fortifications of the United States* (1970) provides an excellent overview describing the works constructed, but is too short to address many important topics. J. E. Kaufmann and H. W. Kaufmann, *Fortress America* (2004) provides a good general study of all US fortifications, including those along its coasts. Robert S. Browning (1983) is an excellent study of "American coastal defense policy" in the nineteenth century. Terrance McGovern and Bolling Smith (2006) describe the design, construction, and weaponry of American coastal defenses from 1885 to 1950. Charles H. Bogart (1985) has provided a short general history of the country's use of controlled mines in harbor defense. There are several studies of the defense of particular forts or areas during the nineteenth and early twentieth century: The best is Richard P. Weinert and Robert Arthur's (1978) study of Fort Monroe near the mouth of Chesapeake Bay. Other studies include ones by Erwin N. Thompson (1979) of San Francisco's harbor; Marshall Hanft (1973) of the mouth of the Columbia River and Vladimir J. Gregory (1976) of Puget Sound. Jerome A. Greene's (1982) study of defenses at New Orleans includes brief coverage of eighteenth-century fortifications, and James C. Coleman and Irene S. Coleman (1982) trace the fate of installations at Pensacola during the first three-quarters of the twentieth century.

On March 20, 1794, Congress initiated the "First System" of fortifications, calling for the erection of works at 21 locations (Wesley 1927). The Secretary of War directed that these defenses consist of timber batteries, barracks and magazines but many of the fortifications erected were actually small open earth-works. Each state was to approve plans of the defenses and provide construction materials and armaments for what was in effect a joint federal-state project. This design varied greatly from one site to another. Few fortifications were completed before negotiation of the Jay Treaty, 1794–6, and realization that France's navy was too weak to threaten America led to a cessation of work on the system (Floyd 1993).

The War Department hired "temporary engineers," mostly Frenchmen, to plan and oversee the construction of the defenses. These temporary engineers, including Charles l'Enfant (who adopted the name Pierre and was known for his design of the new capital at Washington) and Stephen Rochefontaine who was commissioned a lieutenant colonel and made head of the Corps of Artillerists and Engineers when the group was formed in 1795, the same year in which he established a military school at West Point on the Hudson River.

In 1798, in response to the Quasi-War with France, the federal government launched a program to rehabilitate and complete existing works and erect new ones. Some masonry construction occurred at sites such as Fort McHenry at Baltimore and Fort Mifflin at Philadelphia.

In 1799, Congress created the position of Inspector of Fortifications to report on the state of the works. Two years later Jonathan Williams, an officer in the Corps of Artillerists and Engineers, who had already published a treatise on fortifications, assumed the position and when Congress established the Corps of Engineers in 1802 became its commander. The same legislation assigned the Corps to West Point, New York, and stipulated that it would constitute a military academy.

In October 1802, the new Corps of Engineers reached its authorized complement of seven officers, all of whom were assigned to West Point. Soon, though, the Secretary of War began ordering Corps officers to fortification duty. Although Congress appropriated only paltry sums for this work until 1807, the engineers did accomplish some construction at Norfolk, Virginia; New York Harbor; Portsmouth, New Hampshire; Smithville, North Carolina; and New Orleans, Louisiana.

Then, in 1807, the renewed threat of war with Britain, whipped into hysteria by the *Chesapeake* Incident, rekindled interest in coastal defense. Congress quickly passed a large appropriation bill for fortifications. This, then, was the impetus to the erection of "Second System" fortifications, differing considerably from earlier coastal defenses in that they consisted of larger "open batteries, masonry-faced earth forts," and more permanent "all-masonry" ones. Thanks to the Military Academy, which then provided a rudimentary military engineering education, the United States had American military engineers available to plan and supervise fortification construction. Therefore, the Secretary of War ordered Williams to Washington to prepare a system of defenses. Soon afterward, Williams dispatched Corps officers to various areas where they directed fortification rehabilitation and construction. Some of the most elaborate fortifications were the "castles" such as



Castle Williams on Governor's Island, New York City, and Castle Pinckney, in Charleston Harbor.

During the nineteenth century the Navy shared responsibility for coastal defense with the Army. The prevalent belief was that the Navy would be the first line of defense, stopping enemy ships at sea, and the Army's coastal defenses would be the second line of defense, destroying any enemy ships that got past the Navy. Actually, the Navy never had enough ships to be the first line of defense and, after all as most thought, a good fort could stop any enemy ship. (A.B.C. Whipple 1991, Charles Oscar Paullin 1968, Marshall Smelser 1959). Federalists believed that the best way for the Navy to fulfill its role was to employ sloops, frigates, and ships of the line to engage enemy warships and attack its commerce at sea, but Jeffersonian Republicans advocated construction of gunboats designed to provide coastal and harbor defense. Craig L. Symonds, *Navalists and Anti-Navalists* (1980) analyzes the naval policy debate. Spencer Tucker describes the design, construction, and employment of *The Jeffersonian Gunboat Navy* (1993) built for coastal defense while Gene A. Smith (1995) focuses more on the policy and political facets of the program. Donald Hickey (1981) summarizes the ideas presented by Federalists who opposed the gunboat program in Congress.

New England components of the First and Second Systems have received significant study, in particular those at Portsmouth harbor, New Hampshire (Wade 1978), at Salem, Massachusetts (Thompson 1985), and at Narragansett Bay where Willard B. Robinson's (1977) stellar study of one fort, Fort Adams, delineates the French influence that was quite evident during this period. Further south, William P. Gaines (2000) aptly covers Second System fortification construction in the Savannah, Georgia area.

During the War of 1812, these new forts deterred the British from attacking most US ports and harbors. Walker (1978) shows that in the few instances that the British did attack, such as at Baltimore, ably described in Whitehorne (1996), they were thwarted. In fact, the British captured none of the fortifications erected by the new Corps of Engineers. The war was a stimulus to additional fortification construction at sites such as Portsmouth, New Hampshire, and New Orleans, Louisiana. At New York City, Chief Engineer Brigadier General Joseph G. Swift used volunteer laborers in the construction of an extensive system of batteries, towers, and redoubts that supplemented the more permanent works. The wartime record of the forts was at best mixed. Fort Warburton may have deterred a British attack on Washington via the Potomac River before it was destroyed by its own garrison to prevent its capture from the rear by British troops, and Fort McHenry fulfilled its intended role, but at best the Army fortifications and Navy gunboats designed to protect New Orleans only slowed the British attack on that city.

This mixed record led the War Department to create a Board of Engineers, in 1816, to study coastal defenses and recommend changes. A French military engineer, Simon Bernard, who had formerly served under Napoleon, accepted a commission in the US Army as an assistant engineer and served as head of the board. This "Bernard Board," which included a Navy officer and three Corps of Engineers officers, visited numerous sites and developed plans for new defenses. With site

surveys conducted by the Army's Topographical Engineers, the board designed fortifications based on the specific requirements of each site. The board also established priority lists of fortifications that should be constructed first and those that could be completed later, based on the military and commercial importance of the sites they would protect. Early on, the board decided that the Navy should be the first line of defense but since it would, most likely, remain small, it required support including coastal defenses, a regular army, a well-organized militia and an interior communications system. Its first substantive report, released in 1821, established the "Third System" of fortifications, an ambitious program that remained the basis of US coastal defense planning until after the Civil War. The Third System fortifications were never fully completed but many of its results still dot the landscape along all the US coasts.

Moore (1981) is the best study of work of the "Bernard Board" itself. Price (1999) and Weaver (2001) are useful studies of the Third System in general, but a thorough work is still needed. Joseph M. Schweninger (1998) argues that the fortifications erected along the Canadian Border, although seemingly the same as Third System fortifications, including those on the Great Lakes, differed enough in concept and execution to constitute a separate program. *The Big Guns: Civil War Siege, Seacoast, and Naval Cannon* (Olmstead, Stark, and Tucker 1997) is a superb reference work on the type of artillery used in the forts and on the ships attacking them during this time period.

The amount of construction at each location varied according to each site's requirements and its priority position. These fortifications ranged from the massive Fort Knox, Maine; Fort Monroe, Virginia; and Fort Jefferson, Florida; to the tiny Tower Dupre, on Lake Borgne, Louisiana, and the tower at Tybee Island, Georgia. The Army Engineers erected only one fortification at some sites while in other locations, such as New York City and New Orleans, they constructed numerous works of varying sizes and designs. In many cases, auxiliary structures were also necessary, including barracks, quarters, stables, magazines, wharves, storehouses, guard houses, blacksmith shops, administrative buildings, hot shot ovens, and, at some locations, hospitals, chapels and cemeteries. The board intended that the new fortifications, large and small, would provide adequate, permanent security for the entire country.

Fort Macon, on a barrier island along the coast off North Carolina, has been the subject of one of the best histories of a Third System fort (Branch 1999). Broader in his focus, Ernest F. Dibble (1974) has written an important community study of Pensacola, Florida, and its relations with the military, including the erection of coastal defenses and the military use of slaves to work on military projects including fortifications. Dibble has also written a biography of longtime "Fort Builder" William H. Chase who designed fortifications constructed on the south Atlantic and Gulf Coasts (Dibble n.d.). William Strobridge (1972) reproduces correspondence of Army Engineer Major James B. McPherson who worked on the fortifications at New York City, the Delaware River, and at Alcatraz in San Francisco Bay. Two Army engineers, Sylvanus Thayer and P. G. T. Beauregard, who were quite involved in Third System fortification construction but are better

known for other phases of their careers have received lengthy biographies (Williams 1955, Kershner 1976).

The American Civil War spelled the end for Third System fortifications. Weapons technology was rendering these fortifications obsolete. During the Civil War, heavy rifled guns with newly developed ammunition partially reduced Fort Sumter in Charleston Harbor, Fort Pulaski downriver from Savannah, and Fort Morgan on Mobile Bay, to rubble. During the rest of the war, both the Union and the Confederacy constructed most new coastal defenses of earth and sand which under bombardment did not fall apart but actually absorbed the artillery shells. In many of the Third System forts, best illustrated at Fort Sumter, the garrison piled up earth or sand where masonry had once existed, making the fort impervious to enemy shelling. James R. Hinds (1981) aptly chronicles this technological change in "Stone Walls and Iron Guns: Effectiveness of Civil War Forts" and Quincey A. Gillmore (1862) details the damage inflicted on Fort Pulaski, Georgia.

The Civil War saw the use of the underwater mine as a supplementary coastal defense measure. The Confederacy, without a large navy to protect its harbors and rivers, employed these weapons, often called torpedoes, to protect its waters from attacks by Union ships (Perry 1965, Schafer 1996). Matthew Fontaine Maury, first chief of the Confederate Torpedo Bureau, used mostly contact mines, which exploded upon impact with a vessel, but experimented with other types. This defensive measure inspired David G. Farragut's often-quoted statement, "Damn the torpedoes, full steam ahead," uttered during his attack at Mobile Bay.

The only general study of Confederate coastal defense (Bright 1964) requires updating. Only three locations: Charleston Harbor (Johnson 1889, Wise 1994), Galveston, Texas (Frazier 1996), and Fort Fisher at Wilmington, North Carolina (Fonvielle 1997, McCaslin 2003) have received adequate study. Rowena Reed (1978) analyzes joint operations against the Confederacy by the US Army and Navy during the war and Stephen Wise (1994) describes "The Campaign for Charleston Harbor, 1863," from the Union perspective, while Richard Sauer (1996) focuses on the Confederate response to Union campaigns led by Ambrose Burnside against coastal North Carolina in 1861 and 1862.

A revolution in naval technology occurred during the Civil War as the Confederacy constructed ironclad rams to defend its coasts against attack (Daly 1957, Still 1985) and the Union countered with ironclads designed to counter the Confederate ships and to hammer Confederate fortifications into submission (Hackemer 2001). One of the first of these, the USS *Monitor* gave its name to a class of warships that the United States employed for coastal defense for the next four decades. Other navies, including Great Britain, Japan, Peru, and Sweden constructed similar vessels for the same purpose, some remaining in service well into the twentieth century (George 1998).

At the end of the war, the US military establishment was in a quandary over what type of fortifications to build. In some instances, the Army repaired and completed the Third System fortifications but in others it experimented with gun batteries protected by works constructed of sand, earth, wood, iron, and, in New England, marble (Williford 2005).

When Congress abrogated the Corps of Engineers' supervision of the US Military Academy at West Point in 1866, the Corps established its new home at Fort Totten, in New York Harbor, where it created an Engineer School of Application. Some of the school's staff, especially Major Henry Larcom Abbot, began experimenting with submarine mines (Abbot 1881). Disregarding contact mines, the engineers attempted to develop a reliable electrically detonated device. As an outgrowth of this work, the War Department established the School of Submarine Defense and Torpedo School at Fort Totten in 1901 when it transferred responsibility for submarine mines to the Coast Artillery Corps (Abbot 1880, Harman 1985).

Meanwhile, President Grover Cleveland, in 1885, established a new board to study coastal defenses and make recommendations. Under the chairmanship of Secretary of War William Endicott, the board's combined Army, Navy, and civilian membership analyzed the coastal defense requirements of the nation and released its findings and proposals the following year (US Board on Fortifications or Other Defenses 1886, Ranson 1967, Reed 1979).

Based on the recommendations of the Endicott Board, the United States would, from that point on, erect concrete gun batteries emplaced with coastal defense guns of varying caliber mounted on disappearing carriages and rapid fire guns on pedestal mounts. An important aspect of these gun batteries was the disappearing carriage that used recoil energy to depress the gun into a covered position where crews could reload in safety. At first, The Corps erected numerous concrete gun batteries in or near former coastal forts, such as Battery Huger in the center of Fort Sumter but later chose new coastal defense locations. One of the new emplacements, Battery Jasper on Sullivan's Island just north of Fort Sumter has been studied and described in detail (Bearss 1968).

In addition, most coastal defenses included mortars emplaced in concrete pits. Submarine mines also aided in controlling the movement of enemy vessels. Along with this new "Endicott System" defenses, many auxiliary structures, from stables to mine casemates, were necessary. George W. Goethals, "Electricity in Permanent Seacoast Defenses" (1902); and Edwin C. Bearss, "Exterior Electric Lighting System, 1897–1945" (1982); and Bolling W. Smith, "Radio and Coast Defense" (1997) describe the adoption of these new technologies at coastal fortifications. Emanuel Raymond Lewis (1970) notes that the Endicott Program departed from earlier ones because it emphasized weapons over structures. Appropriations for coastal defense after 1886 were minimal at first because Congress considered the Endicott Board's ambitious program too costly. Most coastal defense construction, however, conformed to the Board's recommendations, albeit on a smaller scale than the War Department desired until the Spanish–American War spurred Congress to appropriate significantly larger expenditures. Increased funding continued after the war, causing the Corps of Engineers to step up its construction program (Haskins 1900, Bell 1902). The popular periodical *Scientific American* (1898) is a treasure trove of information on coastal defense at the time of the Spanish–American War with numerous informative illustrations.

Along with the Army, the Navy began to modernize in the 1880s. Alfred Thayer Mahan, a professor at the Naval War College, published *The Influence of Seapower*

on *History, 1660–1783* in 1890, which led the way in changing views of the navy's mission. The Navy changed its main purview from continental protection to explicit seapower or, in simple terms, from isolation to imperialism, which demanded overseas coaling stations and overseas involvement.

During this era the Navy altered its strategy for coastal defense. The USS *Texas* and *Maine*, laid down in 1888 and 1889, were designed to extend coastal defense 200 miles out to sea, beyond the range of the monitors that first entered service during the Civil War. Beginning with the *Indiana*-class battleships (commissioned 1895–7), the Navy assigned all subsequent battleships to squadrons and fleets rather than to defend particular coastal locations (George 1998).

In 1905, President William Howard Taft convened a new board to consider the Endicott defenses and the effect of new technology. This Taft Board did not substantially change the battery structures and weapons but stimulated the addition of accessories that the Endicott Board had recommended, including searchlights, electric lighting, communications, projectile handling, and more sophisticated aiming systems.

The board also considered the defense of important Navy coaling stations in a variety of overseas locations (US National Coast Defense Board 1906).

In addition, the acquisition of new territories during the period required defenses at overseas sites. The Corps of Engineers, therefore, began fortifying the Panama Canal Zone (McGovern 1999), Hawaii (Clark 1973, Williford and McGovern 2003), Cuba (Floyd 1990), Puerto Rico (Bearss 1984), and the Philippines (McGovern and Berhow 2003). The American defense of Corregidor, the island fortress at the mouth of Manila Bay, in 1941–2 and its recapture from the Japanese in 1945 has received extensive treatment (Belote and Belote 1967, Flanagan 1988).

New developments in warship design and armaments determined, in part, the types and numbers of coastal defenses. As new guns appeared on foreign ships, the United States upgraded its defenses. In the twentieth century, the caliber and ranges of guns continued to increase. Likewise, new types of vessels, especially the submarine, created new hazards for coastal defense. In both world wars, the United States used submarine nets along with submarine mines to prevent the penetration of harbors and anchorages by submarines. Coordination between the Army and the Navy became increasingly important.

Since the beginning of coastal defense, artillerymen had been stationed at the forts to man the guns. In 1901, in accordance with a Congressional act, the artillery arm of the Army was constituted an Artillery Corps, under a Chief of Artillery, composed of two branches, the Coast Artillery and Field Artillery. In 1901 the Coast Artillery started with 82 companies assigned to man the guns in the forts as well as perform the duties involved with submarine mines and torpedo defense. Before the end of the year, the Army added 44 companies to the Coast Artillery making the total 126. In 1907, Congress again expanded the number of companies, this time to 170, completely separated the Coast Artillery and Field Artillery, and made the Chief of Artillery the Chief of Coast Artillery (Addington 1976). A solid contemporary account of the Coast Artillery (Hines and Ward 1910) has

been supplemented by brief histories of its development over the next four decades (Azoy 1941, Weinert 1978) and by studies of two of its subordinate components, Mine Planters (Cole 1992) and National Guard Coast Artillery units (Cole 1994), but a comprehensive history of the organization is badly needed.

In 1900, the War Department established the Artillery Board, at Fort Monroe, as the investigative body for matters relating to artillery equipment and practice from which the Commanding General of the Army could receive opinions and recommendations. The commandant and departmental heads of the Artillery School (established at Fort Monroe in 1824; its name was changed to the Coast Artillery School 1907) served as the Board until 1905 when other artillery officers were allowed on the board. In 1909, the name of the Artillery Board was changed to the Coast Artillery Board to more accurately reflect the focus of its work (Hatch 1924, US Coast Artillery School 1945). The Joint Army and Navy Board, composed of four officers from each service, was established, on July 17, 1903, to create joint standards and procedures for inter-service operations.

To insure the accuracy of the guns, the War Department developed an elaborate system. At various distances from the batteries were base-end stations, observation towers, where personnel could watch enemy movements, assess the effect of artillery fire, and furnish coordinates to the plotting room. Spotters in these base-end stations sighted an enemy vessel using depression position finders and pairs of base-end stations in horizontal-base systems determined enemy coordinates by triangulation. These stations then reported this information to the centrally located plotting room where personnel plotted the vessel's location and directed the aiming of the guns accordingly. After the guns fired, the spotters in the base-end stations observed the results and forwarded corrections to the plotting room. The plotting room personnel furnished the new information to the gun crews, who adjusted the aim of guns based on the new data. Eventually, but hopefully sooner than later, the guns would hit and destroy the enemy vessel, preventing it from landing troops or bombarding the harbor being protected (*Scientific American* 1908, 1912, Morse 1913).

As the construction of batteries continued and the range of guns increased, the Corps began placing batteries where their weapons could best cover the harbor, decreasing the number of guns and fortification sites (Dorrance 1996). A good example of this is the Chesapeake Bay where, early on, there were coastal defenses at Norfolk and Hampton, Virginia; on the Potomac River below Washington, and at Annapolis and Baltimore, Maryland. By the interwar period these defenses were unnecessary because guns with high range could cover the mouth of the Bay to prevent ships from coming in.

When World War I began, some Americans felt insecure about United States coastal defense. Many weapons were outdated as the guns on European naval vessels outranged those of the US Coast Artillery Corps, and submarines could enter harbors undetected. To remedy this situation, the Navy and Army installed submarine nets in various harbors, the Coast Artillery Corps laid submarine mines, the Corps of Engineers erected new batteries, and Congress provided for an increase in the armed forces. As more and more men embarked for Europe and



fears of an enemy attack on American shores abated, personnel and funds for coastal defense declined. Platt (1916) details Coast Artillery materiel of the period. Winslow (1920) offers detailed information about almost every aspect of the gun batteries erected up to this time. Hamilton (1920) provides a good account of the use of the submarine net at Fort Monroe during World War I.

Major changes occurred following the war. Congress was reluctant to fund construction of coastal defenses so the Coast Artillery Corps accelerated its conversion to less costly mobile artillery, drawn by rail or tractor. Also, the War Department began mounting large guns on fixed defense, high-angle, barbette carriages that allowed 360-degree rotation. The Corps of Engineers scattered these uncovered guns, usually in batteries of two, over a coastal site to keep enemy ships and aircraft from finding and destroying all of them. Such protective dispersion was their only security (US Ordnance Department 1923, US Coast Artillery School 1927).

During the same era technological change not directly linked to the military had a profound influence on US coastal defense. The development of automobiles and trucks made transportation and supply much easier, radio aided communications, and radar more efficiently detected the enemy.

Perhaps most significant were advances made in aviation. In 1917 the Navy developed plans for a system of bases from which dirigibles and airplanes could patrol sea approaches to the United States (*New York Times* 1917), two years later the Army formed coastal defense squadrons, and in 1922 the Army Air Service and Coast Artillery Corps held joint maneuvers to improve gunfire direction (*New York Times* 1922). Both the Army and the Navy established airfields from which to operate patrol craft. The Air Service championed the necessity of long-range large aircraft for coastal defense.

After a decade of inter-service rivalry focused on duplicate operations in the Panama Canal Zone and on Oahu in Hawaii, the Army Chief of Staff Douglas MacArthur and Chief of Naval Operations William V. Pratt reached a compromise allowing the Navy to operate landbased aircraft in "support of naval operations," with the stipulation that the Navy's land-based aircraft could not be armed, thus reserving for the Army responsibility for operating land-based bombers that would attack any enemy vessels that eluded Navy warships, a division of responsibility that remained in effect for 50 years (Shiner 1981).

As World War II approached, Congress provided larger appropriations for fortification construction. Fixed positions once again became the primary defense, relegating mobile artillery to a secondary role. The Corps of Engineers began erecting a standard, casemated, two-gun, concrete battery. Between the guns, the battery encased the magazine, power plant, and sometimes the plotting room and gun crew quarters under a reinforced concrete shield covered by many feet of earth. The big guns, 16- and 12-inch, were mounted within the casemate with only part of their tubes protruding. Mounted outside the battery, the smaller 6-inch guns had an armored shield. There were a few variations in design and gun sizes and experimentation with turrets. For a discussion of one turret experiment see *The Oahu Turrets* (Kirchner and Lewis 1963). Mark A. Berhow, "United States Seacoast Batteries" (1994a), and "America's Last Seacoast Defenses" (1994b)

provide an overview of World War II coastal defense program in general and Walter K. Schroder, *Defenses of Narragansett Bay in World War II* (1980) and Charles C. Robbins, "World War II Delaware Coastal Defense Sites" (1976) focus on the defense of particular regions. Contemporary War Department manuals provide information on Coast Artillery weapons, materiel and ammunition on the eve of World War II (US War Department 1940a, b).

When war came the challenge to coastal defense came not from surface ships that could be countered by batteries but from submarines which focused on attacking shipping. German U-boats operating along the Atlantic Coast and in the Gulf of Mexico posed the greatest threat (Hickan 1989), but fears of Japanese attacks on the West Coast (Reynolds 1964) stimulated counter measures there as well. Most important were the installation of submarine nets and the installation of anti-submarine mines to protect harbors and anchorages (US War Department 1942). The Army Corps of Engineers oversaw construction of defenses both in the United States and abroad (Fine and Remington 1972). The threat posed by submarine activity also led to greater intra- and inter-service coordination than during prior eras. Within the Army the Coast Artillery and Corps of Engineers worked with the Signal, Quartermaster, and Air Corps. Marine Corps Defense Battalions (Melson 1996) and Coast Guard beach patrols (Bishop 1989) and civilian members of its Coastal Beach Patrol provided beach security.

What was built and installed and how the weapons were used changed as technological developments, spurred by extensive research and development, were integrated into coastal defense. The increased range of aircraft and the development of aircraft carriers led the army to conceal military installations, especially ammunition storage areas, and military equipment assembly plant with camouflage paint and nets, to plant trees and shrubs to mask locations, and to erect fake structures to mislead enemy air units. Coast Artillery weapons changed (*Infantry Journal* 1943, US War Department 1944a, Eastman 1999) and so did methods of fire control as computers were developed and employed to calculate more accurate targeting solutions (US War Department 1944b, Holbrook and Emling 1982).

As the possibility of enemy invasion and attack in the US homeland subsided, some coastal defense sites closed and the garrisons left for service abroad. But, many coastal defense sites in the possessions remained manned including those guarding the Panama Canal, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and Alaska (Conn, Engelman, and Fairchild 1964). Some Coast Artillery units went to Canada, the Caribbean and South America to man coast artillery for allies (Conn and Fairchild 1960).

At the end of the war, the Army still considered the coastal defenses necessary in spite of the advent of the missile and atomic bomb. The Corps of Engineers completed some of the batteries begun in wartime, halting construction only in 1948. Within a year the country scrapped most of the coastal defense guns and, by 1950, the Army gave up its coastal defense mission and disbanded the Coast Artillery Corps, consolidating it with the Field Artillery and the new Air Defense Artillery units (Berhow and Loop 1992).

When the Government began choosing missile sites for the installation of the newly developed missiles, it picked many of the former coastal defense installations

(Schaffel 1990, Morgan and Berhow 2002). After all, the Armed forces already owned the land on Marin Heights, California, and Nihant, New Jersey, and numerous other sites and had auxiliary services and functions in place. In other instances, coastal defense installations took on new functions such as Fort Monroe, Virginia, which became the headquarters for the Continental Army Command and later the Army's Training and Doctrine Command. Other coastal defenses survived for other reasons, for example, Fort Story, Virginia, as a training facility and Fort Rosecrans, California, as a Navy base, military cemetery and recreation area. The preservation, maintenance, and interpretation of coastal fortifications present challenges to their owners as public interest and visitation has mushroomed in recent decades (Freeman 1999; Hansen, Keegle, and Rehn 2003). The often massive installations stand in testament to another age, that of Continental America and coastal defense.

Many important aspects of that era have been addressed, but an even greater number deserve scholarly attention, a fact evident from an examination of Mark A. Berhow's *American Seacoast Defenses: A Reference Guide* (2004) and especially Dale E. Floyd's *Defending America's Coasts, 1775–1950: A Bibliography* (1997) which is particularly strong on contemporary journal literature as well as a comprehensive listing of what has been accomplished prior to its publication.

#### BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Abbot, Henry Larcom (1880). "The School of Submarine Mining at Willet's Point," *Journal of the Military Service Institution of the United States*, 1:2, 203–24.
- Abbot, Henry Larcom (1881). *Report Upon Experiments and Investigations to Develop a System of Submarine Mines for Defending the Harbors of the United State, Professional Paper of the Corps of Engineers No. 23*. Washington: The Government Printing Office.
- Addington, Larry H. (1976). "The U.S. Coast Artillery and the Problem of Artillery Organization, 1907–1954," *Military Affairs*, 40:1 (February), 1–6.
- Azoy, Anastasio Carlos Mariano (1941). "Great Guns: A History of the Coast Artillery Corps," *Coast Artillery Journal*, 84 (September–October, 426–34, (November–December), 573–8.
- Bartlett, Merrill L. (1983). *Assault from the Sea: Essays on the History of Amphibious Warfare*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Bearss, Edwin C. (1968). *Battery Jasper, Fort Sumter National Monument, Sullivan's Island, South Carolina*. Washington: Division of History, Office of Archaeology & Historic Preservation, National Park Service.
- Bearss, Edwin C. (1982). *Historic Structure Report, Exterior Electric Lighting System, 1897–1945, Historical Data, Gateway National Recreation Area, New York and New Jersey*. Denver, CO: Denver Service Center, National Park Service.
- Bearss, Edwin C. (1984). *Historic Structure Report, Historical Data Section: San Juan Fortifications, 1898–1958, San Juan National Historic Site, Puerto Rico*. Denver, CO: Denver Service Center, National Park Service.
- Bell, Louis (1902). "Emergency Engineering for Harbor Defense, and Discussion," *Transactions of the American Institute of Electrical Engineers*, 19 (January–June), 725–42.
- Belote, James H., and William M. Belote (1967). *Corregidor: The Saga of a Fortress*. New York: Harper & Row.

- Berhow, Mark A. (1994a). "United States Seacoast Batteries Built or Modified During the Years 1935–1945," *CDSG Journal: The Quarterly Publication of the Coast Defense Study Group*, 8 (November), 34–8.
- Berhow, Mark A. (1994b). "America's Last Seacoast Defenses: The World War II-Era Construction Programs," *CDSG Journal: The Quarterly Publication of the Coast Defense Study Group*, 8 (August), 32–48.
- Berhow, Mark A., ed. (2004). *American Seacoast Defenses: A Reference Guide*, 2nd edn. Belair, MD: The Coast Defense Study Group, Inc.
- Berhow, Mark A., and James W. Loop (1992). "Bridging the Gap: American Continental Defenses 1942–1957, The Transformation of Coast Artillery to Air Defense Artillery," *Fort MacArthur Alert: Official Publication of the Fort MacArthur Museum Association and the Harbor Defenses of Los Angeles*, 4 (Fall), 11–14.
- Berhow, Mark A., and Terrance C. McGovern (2003). *American Defenses of Corregidor and Manila Bay, 1898–1945. Fortress Series 4*. Oxford: Osprey Publishing.
- Bishop, Eleanor C. (1989). *Prints in the Sand: The U.S. Coast Guard Beach Patrol during World War II*. Missoula, MT: Pictorial Histories Publishing Co.
- Bogart, Charles H. (1985). *Controlled Mines: A History of Their Use by the United States, Weapons and Warfare Monographs No. 50*. Bennington, VT: Weapons and Warfare Press.
- Branch, Paul (1999). *Fort Macon: A History*. Charleston, SC: The Nautical & Aviation Publishing Company of America.
- Bright, Samuel R. (1964). "Confederate Coast Defense," PhD dissertation, Duke University.
- Browning, Robert S., III. (1979). "Providing for the Common Defense: Military Attitudes Toward U.S. Fortifications, 1794–1812," in Charles J. Balesi, ed., *United States Commission on Military History. Colloquium on Military History Proceedings*. Chicago, IL: 85–98.
- Browning, Robert S., III. (1983). *Two If By The Sea: The Development of American Coastal Defense Policy*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
- Chartrand, René (2005). *French Fortresses in North America, 1535–1763: Québec, Montréal, Louisbourg and New Orleans. Fortress Series 27*. Oxford: Osprey Publishing.
- Clark, Robert N. S. (1973). "Coastal Defenses of Hawaii," *Periodical: The Journal of the Council on America's Military Past*, 5 (Summer), 15–17, 19–20.
- Cole, Merle T. (1992). "The U.S. Army Mine Planter Service, 1901–1929," *CDSG Journal: The Quarterly Publication of the Coast Defense Study Group*, 6 (November), 56–8.
- Cole, Merle T. (1994). "National Guard Coast Artillery, 1908–1925," *CDSG Journal: The Quarterly Publication of the Coast Defense Study Group*, 8 (February), 47–50.
- Coleman, James C., and Irene S. Coleman (1982). *Pensacola Fortifications, 1698–1980: Guardians on the Gulf*. Pensacola, FL: Pensacola Historical Society.
- Conn, Stetson, and Byron Fairchild (1960). *The Framework of Hemisphere Defense*. Washington: Government Printing Office.
- Conn, Stetson, Rose C. Engelman, and Byron Fairchild (1964). *Guarding the United States and Its Outposts*. Washington: Government Printing Office.
- Daly, Robert W. (1957). *How the Merrimac Won: The Strategic Story of the C.S.S. Virginia*. New York: Crowell.
- Dibble, Ernest F. (1974). *Antebellum Pensacola and the Military Presence*. Pensacola, FL: Pensacola Bicentennial Series.
- Dibble, Ernest F. (n.d.). *William H. Chase: Gulf Coast Fort Builder*. Wilmington, DE: The Gulf Coast Collection.
- Dickman, William J. (1980). *Battery Rodgers at Alexandria, Virginia*. Manhattan, KS: MA/AH Publishing.

- Dorrance, William H. (1992). "Army Air Service/Air Corps Coastal Defense 1919–1941," *CDSG Journal: The Quarterly Publication of the Coast Defense Study Group*, 6 (August), 31–6.
- Dorrance, William H. (1996). "Evolution of Major Caliber U.S. Coastal Defense Guns, 1886–1945," *Periodical: Journal of America's Military Past*, 23 (Summer), 3–14.
- Dowart, Jeffery M. (1998). *Fort Mifflin of Philadelphia: An Illustrated History*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Duffy, Christopher (1996 [1965]). *Fire & Stone: The Science of Fortress Warfare, 1660–1860*. rev. edn. Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books.
- Eastman, Joel (1999). "Last Bastion of Isolation: The U.S. Coast Artillery During World War II," *Periodical: Journal of America's Military Past*, 26 (Spring-Summer), 52–63.
- Fine, Lenore, and Jesse A. Remington. (1972). *The Corps of Engineers: Construction in the United States*. Washington: Government Printing Office.
- Flanagan, E. M. (1988). *Corregidor: The Rock Force Assault, 1945*. Navoto, CA: Presidio Press.
- Floyd, Dale E. (1990). "Guantanamo Bay's Army Fortifications, 1898–1917," *Fortress: The Castles and Fortifications Quarterly*, 6 (August), 37–44.
- Floyd, Dale E. (1993). "Supervision of Fortification Construction, 1794–1820," *Periodical: The Journal of the Council on America's Military Past*, 20 (Summer), 23–33.
- Floyd, Dale E. (1997). *Defending America's Coasts, 1775–1950: A Bibliography*, rev. edn. Washington: Government Printing Office.
- Fonvielle, Chris E., Jr. (1997). *The Wilmington Campaign: Last Rays of Departing Hope*. Campbell, CA: Savas Publishing Co.
- Frazier, Donald S. (1996). *Cottonclads! The Battle of Galveston and the Defense of the Texas Coast*. Fort Worth, TX: Ryan Place Publishers.
- Freeman, Joe C. (1999). *Seacoast Fortifications Preservation Manual*. Golden Gate National Recreation Area, San Francisco: National Park Service and KEA Environment, Golden Gate National Recreation Area.
- Gaines, William P. (2000). "Second System Construction at Savannah, Georgia, 1807–1815," *Periodical: Journal of America's Military Past*, 27 (Fall), 19–39.
- Gatchel, Theodore L. (1996). *At the Water's Edge: Defending Against the Modern Amphibious Assault*. Annapolis, MD: United States Naval Institute Press.
- George, James L. (1998). *History of Warships from Ancient Times to the Twenty-First Century*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Gillmore, Quincy A. (1862). *Official Report to the United States Engineer Department, of the Siege and Reduction of Fort Pulaski, Georgia, February, March, and April, 1862, Papers on Practical Engineering No. 8*. New York: D. Van Nostrand.
- Goethals, George W. (1902). "Electricity in Permanent Seacoast Defenses," *Transactions of the American Institute of Electrical Engineers*, 19 (October), 1355–73.
- Greene, Jerome A. (1982). *Special History Study, The Defense of New Orleans, 1718–1900, Jean Lafitte National Historical Park, Louisiana*. Denver, CO: Denver Service Center, National Park Service.
- Gregory, Vladimir J. (1976). *Keepers at the Gates*. Port Townsend, WA: Port Townsend Publishing Co.
- Hackemer, Kurt (2001). *The U.S. Navy and the Origins of the Military-Industrial Complex, 1847–1883*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Hamilton, Stuart A. (1920). "The Fort Monroe Submarine Net," *Journal of the United States Artillery*, 52 (June), 528–52.
- Hanft, Marshall (1973). *The Cape Forts: Guardians of the Columbia*. Portland: Oregon Historical Society.



- Hanft, Marshall (1980). *Fort Stevens: Oregon's Defender at the River of the West*. Salem: Oregon State Parks and Recreation Branch.
- Hansen, David M., Kimberly Keegle, and Deborah Rehn (2003). *Historic Fortification Preservation Handbook*. Olympia: Washington State Parks and Recreation Commission.
- Harman, Michael Murrin (1985). "The Formation of the Engineer School of Application and Its Early History, 1866–1898," MA thesis, George Washington University.
- Haskins, Caryl D. (1900). "Coast and Harbor Defense with Some Notes on the Spanish War," *Journal of the Worcester Polytechnic Institute*, 3 (May), 267–81.
- Hatch, H. J. (1924). "A History of the Coast Artillery Board and Its Work," *Coast Artillery Journal*, 60 (June), 453–69.
- Hickam, Homer H., Jr. (1989). *Torpedo Junction: U-Boat War Off America's East Coast, 1942*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Hickey, Donald R. (1981). "Federalist Defense Policy in the Age of Jefferson, 1801–1812," *Military Affairs*, 45 (April), 63–70.
- Hinds, James R. (1981), "Stone Walls and Iron Guns: Effectiveness of Civil War Forts," *Periodical: The Journal of the Council on America's Military Past*, 12 (January), 36–47.
- Hines, Frank Thomas, and Franklin W. Ward (1910). *The Service of Coast Artillery*. New York: Goodenough & Woglom Co.
- Holbrook, B. D., and J. W. Emling (1982). "Electrical Computers for Fire Control," *Annals of the History of Computing*, 4 (July), 218–36.
- Hughes, James Quentin (1991). *Military Architecture*. 2nd edn. Liphook, UK: Beaufort Publishing.
- Infantry Journal (1943). *The Coast Artillery Corps of the United States Army*. Chicago: Rand McNally & Co. and Infantry Journal, Inc.
- Ivers, Larry E. (1970). *Colonial Forts of South Carolina 1670–1775. Tricentennial Booklet No. 3*. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.
- Jackson, John (1974). *The Pennsylvania Navy, 1775–1781: The Defense of the Delaware*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.
- Jackson, John (1977). *The Delaware Bay and River Defenses of Philadelphia 1775–1777*. Philadelphia: Philadelphia Maritime Museum.
- Jobe, Joseph, ed. (1971). *Guns: An Illustrated History of Artillery*. New York: Crescent Books.
- Johnson, John (1889). *The Defense of Charleston Harbor, Including Fort Sumter and the Adjacent Islands, 1863–1865*. Charleston, SC: Walker, Evans and Cogswell.
- Kajencki, Francis C. (1998). *Thaddeus Kosciuszko: Military Engineer of the American Revolution*. El Paso, TX: Southwest Polonia Press.
- Kaufmann, J. E., and H. W. Kaufmann (2004). *Fortress America: The Forts that Defended America, 1600 to the Present*. Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press.
- Kershner, James W. (1976). "Sylvanus Thayer: A Biography," PhD dissertation, West Virginia University.
- Kirchner, David P., and Emanuel Raymond Lewis (1963). *The Oahu Turrets: A Study of Coastal Defenses on Oahu Prior to and During World War II. Monograph No. 1*. US Coast Artillery Historical Association.
- Lewis, Emanuel Raymond (1970). *Seacoast Fortifications of the United States: An Introductory History*. Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press.
- Mahan, Alfred Thayer (1890). *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660–1783*. Boston: Little, Brown and Co.
- McCaslin, Richard B. (2003). *The Last Stronghold: The Campaign for Fort Fisher*. Abilene, TX: McWhiney Foundation Press.



- McGovern, Terrance (1999). *The American Defences of the Panama Canal*. Athanassios Migos, ed. Wirral, UK: Nearhos Publications.
- McGovern, T., and B. Smith (2006). *American Coastal Defenses, 1885–1950. Fortress Series 44*. Oxford, UK: Osprey Publishing.
- McGovern, Terrance C., and Mark A. Berhow. (2003) *American Defenses of Corregidor and Manila Bay, 1898–1945. Fortress 4*. Oxford: Osprey Publishing.
- Melson, Charles D. (1996). *Condition Red: Marine Defense Battalions in World War II. Marines in World War II Commemorative Series*. Washington: The Government Printing Office, 1996.
- Moore, Jamie W. (1981). *The Fortifications Board, 1816–1828, and the Definition of National Security, The Citadel Monograph Series No. 16*. Charleston, SC: The Citadel.
- Morgan, Mark L., and Mark A. Berhow (2002). *Rings of Supersonic Steel: Air Defenses of the United States Army 1950–1979: An Introductory History and Site Guide*, 2nd edn. Bodega, CA: Fort MacArthur Military Press.
- Morse, Harry L. (1913). “The Evolution of Our System of Position Finding and Fire Control,” *The Journal of the United States Artillery*, 39 (March–April), 137–90.
- New York Times (1917). “[Rear Admiral Nathaniel R.] Usher Submits Outline of Navy’s Needs in the Fifteen Districts,” (22 April), 19.
- New York Times (1922). “Manoeuvres in Progress to Determine the Best Use of Airplanes [for Coastal] Gunfire Direction Methods,” (2 November), 15.
- Olmstead, Edwin, Wayne E. Stark, and Spencer C. Tucker (1997). *The Big Guns: Civil War Siege, Seacoast, and Naval Cannon*. Alexandria Bay, NY: Museum Restoration Service.
- Paullin, Charles Oscar (1968), *Paullin’s History of Navy Administration, 1775–1911: A Collection of Articles from the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings by Charles Oscar Paullin*. Annapolis, MD: US Naval Institute.
- Perry, Milton F. (1965). *Infernal Machines: The Story of Confederate Submarine and Mine Warfare*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.
- Platt, William P. (1916). *Coast Artillery Materiel Description, Adjustment, and Operation in Drill and Target Practice*. Kansas City, MO: Franklin Hudson Publishing Co.
- Price, Russell R. (1999). “American Coastal Defense: The Third System of Fortification,” PhD dissertation, Mississippi State University.
- Ranson, Edward (1967). “The Endicott Board of 1885–1886, and the Coast Defenses,” *Military Affairs*, 31 (Summer), 74–84.
- Reed, Rowena A. (1978). *Combined Operations in the Civil War*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Reed, Rowena A. (1979). “The Endicott Board – Vision and Reality,” *Periodical: The Journal of the Council on America’s Military Past*, 11 (Summer), 3–17.
- Reynolds, Clark G. (1964). “Submarine Attacks on the Pacific Coast, 1942,” *Pacific Historical Review*, 33 (May), 183–93.
- Robbins, Charles B. (1976). “World War II Delaware Coast Defense Sites,” *Periodical: The Journal of the Council on America’s Military Past*, 8 (Fall), 42–6.
- Robinson, Willard B. (1977). “The Rock on Which the Storm Shall Beat! [Fort Adams, RI],” *Periodical: The Journal of the Council on America’s Military Past*, 9 (Spring), 3–16.
- Roland, Alex (1978). *Underwater Warfare in the Age of Sail*. Bloomington: University of Indiana Press.
- Sarty, Roger F. (1988). *Coast Artillery, 1815–1914*. Alexandria Bay, NY: Museum Restoration Service.

- Sauers, Richard A. (1996). *"A Succession of Honorable Victories": The Burnside Expedition in North Carolina*. Dayton, OH: Morningside House, Inc.
- Schafer, Louis S. (1996). *Confederate Underwater Warfare: An Illustrated History*. Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Co.
- Schaffel, Kenneth (1990). *The Emerging Shield: The Air Force and the Evolution of Continental Air Defense 1945–1960*. Washington: Government Printing Office.
- Schroder, Walter K. (1980). *Defenses of Narragansett Bay in World War II*. Providence: Rhode Island Bicentennial Foundation.
- Schweninger, Joseph M. (1998). "A Lingering War Must Be Prevented: The Defense of the Northern Frontier, 1812–1871," PhD dissertation, The Ohio State University.
- Scientific American* (1898). "Scientific American Supplement, American Army and Coast Defense Supplement ... Guns, Armor, and Fortification," *Scientific American*, 46 (9 July), 1175.
- Scientific American* (1908). "Range and Position Finders for Coast Artillery Fire Control," *The Scientific American*, 98 (16 May), 349–50.
- Scientific American* (1912). "Coast-defenses of the United States: The System Range-finding by Which the Great Accuracy of Coast-defense Gun-fire Is Secured," *Scientific American*, 106 (May 18), 438–9, 460–1.
- Smelser, Marshall (1959). *The Congress Founds the Navy, 1787–1798*. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.
- Shiner, John F. (1981). "The Air Corps, the Navy, and Coast Defense, 1919–1941," *Military Affairs*, 45:2 (October), 113–20.
- Smith, Bolling W. (1997). "Radio and Coast Defense in the Endicott-Taft Era, 1899–1916," *CDSG Journal: The Quarterly Publication of the Coast Defense Study Group*, 11 (May), 31–8.
- Smith, Gene A. (1995). *For the Purposes of Defense: The Politics of the Jeffersonian Gunboat Program*. Newark: University of Delaware Press.
- Still, William N., Jr. (1985). *Iron Afloat: The Story of the Confederate Armorclads*. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.
- Strobridge, William, ed. (1972). "California Letters of Major James McPherson, 1858–1860," *Ohio History*, 81 (Winter), 38–50.
- Symonds, Craig L. (1980). *Navalists and Anti-Navalists: The Naval Policy Debate in the United States, 1785–1827*. Newark: University of Delaware Press.
- Thompson, Erwin N. (1979). *Historic Resource Study, Seacoast Fortifications, San Francisco Harbor, Golden Gate National Recreation Area, California*. Denver, CO: National Park Service.
- Thompson, Kenneth E., Jr. (1985). "Federal Fort Construction in Essex County, 1794–1809," *The Essex Institute Historical Collection*, 121 (October), 245–56.
- Trussell, John B. B., Jr. (1953). "The Spirit of the Corps – A Guide for the Future," *Antiaircraft Journal*, 96 (March–April), 11–14.
- Tucker, Spencer C. (1993). *The Jeffersonian Gunboat Navy*. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.
- US Board on Fortifications or Other Defenses (1886). *Report of the Board on Fortifications or Other Defenses Appointed by the President of the United States Under the Provisions of the Act of Congress Approved March 3, 1886* 2 vols. Washington: Government Printing Office.
- US Coast Artillery School (1927). *Fire Control and Position Finding for Seacoast Artillery*. Fort Monroe, VA: The Coast Artillery School.

- US Coast Artillery School (1945). *History of the Coast Artillery School, 1824–1945*. Fort Monroe, VA: Coast Artillery School.
- US National Coast Defense Board (1906). *Report of the National Coast Defense Board ... on the Coast Defenses of the United States and the Insular Possessions, Senate Document No. 248, 59th Congress, 1st Session*. Washington: Government Printing Office.
- US Ordnance Department (1923). *American Coast Artillery Materiel, June, 1922, Ordnance Document No. 2042*. Washington: Government Printing Office.
- US Signal Corps (1906). *Apparatus Supplied by the Signal Corps to Coast Artillery Posts for Fire Control and Direction, Manual No. 8*. Washington: Government Printing Office.
- US War Department (1940a). *Coast Artillery Weapons and Materiel, Technical Manual 4-210*. Washington: Government Printing Office.
- US War Department (1940b). *Coast Artillery Ammunition, Technical Manual 4-205*. Washington: Government Printing Office.
- US War Department (1942). *Controlled Submarine Mine Materiel, Technical Manual 4-220*. Washington: Government Printing Office.
- US War Department (1944a). *Seacoast Artillery Weapons, Technical Manual 4-210*. Fort Monroe, VA: Army Field Printing Plant, Coast Artillery School.
- US War Department (1944b). *Standard Artillery and Fire Control Materiel, Technical Manual 9-2300*. Metuchen, NJ: Raritan Arsenal.
- Wade, Arthur P. (1977). "Artillerists and Engineers: The Beginnings of American Seacoast Fortifications, 1794–1815," PhD dissertation, Kansas State University.
- Wade, Arthur P. (1978). "The Defenses of Portsmouth Harbor, 1794–1821: The First and Second Systems of Seacoast Fortification," *Historical New Hampshire*, 33 (Spring), 25–51.
- Walker, Charles Emerson (1978). "The Other Good Guys: Army Engineers in the War of 1812," *The Military Engineer*, 70 (May–June), 178–83.
- Walker, Paul K. (1981). *Engineers of Independence: A Documentary History of the Army Engineers in the American Revolution, 1775–1783*. Washington: Government Printing Office.
- Ware, Chris (1994). *The Bomb Vessel: Shore Bombardment Ships of the Age of Sail*. London: Conway Maritime Press.
- Weaver, John R., II. (2001). *A Legacy in Brick and Stone: American Coastal Defense Forts of the Third System, 1816–1867*. McLean, VA: Redoubt Press.
- Weinert, Richard P., Jr. (1978). "So the Coast Artillery Is Gone – But Not Forgotten," *Periodical: The Journal of the Council on America's Military Past*, 10 (Fall), 21–31.
- Weinert, Richard P., Jr., and Robert Arthur (1978). *Defender of the Chesapeake: The Story of Fort Monroe*. Annapolis, MD: Leeward Publications, Inc.
- Wesley, Edgar B. (1927). "The Beginnings of Coastal Fortifications," *Coast Artillery Journal*, 67 (October), 281–5.
- Whipple, A. B. C. (1991). *To the Shores of Tripoli: The Birth of the U.S. Navy and Marines*. New York: William Morrow.
- Whitehorne, Joseph W. A. (1996). *The Battle for Baltimore: The War of 1812 in the Chesapeake Bay*. Baltimore, MD: Nautical & Aviation Publishing Company of America.
- Williams, Thomas Harry (1955). *P. G. T. Beauregard: Napoleon in Gray*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.
- Williford, Glen M. (2005). *The Transitional Coast Defense Generation, American Seacoast Defenses of the 1870s*. Zionsville, IN: Published by the Author.

- Williford, Glen, and Terrance McGovern (2003). *Defenses of Pearl Harbor and Oahu, 1907–50. Fortress 8*. Oxford, UK: Osprey Publishing Limited.
- Winslow, Eben Eveleth (1920). *Notes on Seacoast Fortification Construction. Engineer School Occasional Paper No. 61*. Washington: Government Printing Office.
- Wise, Stephen (1994). *Gate of Hell: Campaign for Charleston Harbor, 1863*. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.

## Chapter Forty-four

---

### AIR DEFENSE

*Edward B. Westermann*

In a recent essay, Robert Citino (2007) describes the “curious position” enjoyed by military history which remains “extremely popular with the American public at large” but “relatively marginalized within professional academic circles.” If military history remains the bastard child of the Academy, then certainly the subject of air defense constitutes one of the most arcane topics within a field known for eclecticism. As a field of research, official histories, government studies, and articles in military and technical journals dominated discussions of early US air defense efforts. Later, scholarly examinations of the subject appeared in the 1960s focusing on the topic of air defense as it related to the larger issue of deterrence theory. The issue of air defense gained renewed public and academic attention in the 1980s with President Ronald Reagan’s announcement of the Strategic Defense Initiative; catalyzing a heated debate on the pros and cons of “Star Wars” defenses. The end of the Cold War, however, once again relegated the issue to tertiary importance until the Clinton administration introduced the concept of National Missile Defense to counter potential attacks by “rogue states.” The events of September 11, 2001 and the appearance of combat air patrols over major US cities briefly raised awareness of air defense within the public consciousness, but the subject has once again receded from headlines and the arena of academic discourse.

The issue of air defense has presented US military planners with a dilemma. On the one hand, the military’s penchant for offensive doctrine and weapons systems conflicts with the widespread antipathy to any expressions of a “Maginot mentality.” On the other hand, an overriding concern associated with the creation and maintenance of an air defense system across the vast expanse of the continental United States involved the issues of cost and affordability versus effectiveness. In the preface to the paperback edition of his seminal, *Strategy in the Missile Age* (1965), Bernard Brodie perfectly articulates these competing priorities: “Though everyone agrees that producing a highly effective anti-missile defense would be of the first order of strategic importance ... nobody expects anything like an impenetrable umbrella ... It is the old story of ingenuity in defense having to reckon with ingenuity in offense, with the latter having a large margin of advantage.” Although

focused on anti-missile defense, Brodie's observation equally applies to the issues of air defense facing US political and military planners after World War II.

### The End of Free Security

The historian C. Vann Woodward (1960) described a key strategic advantage enjoyed by the United States in the nineteenth century as the age of "free security." Indeed the geographical benefit offered by two oceans and the absence of "any other power that might constitute a serious menace to its safety" provided the United States a relative sanctuary until the attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941 shattered this illusion of invulnerability. The rise of air power had done little to alter this strategic balance. During the inter-war period Army leaders believed the nation was virtually impervious to air attack and thought of aviation's role in coastal defense largely in terms of attacking enemy warships or spotting for gunfire from coastal artillery (Shiner 1981). The attack against the Pacific fleet may have caught the US Navy – and the US Army which had responsibility for the air defense of Hawaii – unprepared, but it certainly was not unexpected. Already in 1925, General William "Billy" Mitchell had warned of the growing susceptibility of the United States to foreign attack in his polemical *Winged Defense*. An airpower advocate who argued for the creation of an independent air force and a strategic bombing capability, Mitchell's title was cleverly chosen to emphasize the defensive nature of airpower and its cost effectiveness relative to the Navy; a strategy aimed at an American public influenced by widespread pacifistic sentiment and a historical antipathy to military spending.

The start of World War II and the emergence of carrier-based aircraft and strategic bombers heralded the end to the age of free security and initiated a frantic effort to protect American shores from attack. Two days after the Japanese attack, the army scrambled to shift undermanned and ill-equipped anti-aircraft regiments and fighter units to the West Coast. After the initial hysteria related to a potential Japanese invasion receded from popular imagination, it soon became apparent that the war would be fought across the Pacific and the Atlantic and not on US soil. As a result, the army moved home-based air and ground defenses into the fighting theaters and the war on the home front became one of rationing and service. The abbreviated discussions of homeland air defense in the official histories of the war provide the clearest indication of the marginal importance of the topic. Kent Greenfield, Robert Palmer, and Bell Wiley provide an organizational overview of the Army Defense Commands with the continental United States (CONUS) in *The Army Ground Forces* (1947) while William Goss (1948) examines the organizational and technical developments of air defenses in the Western Hemisphere in *The Army Air Forces in World War II*.

The Allied victory over Germany and Japan in 1945 and specifically some of the means used to achieve it opened a new chapter concerning homeland air defense. The marriage of the strategic bomber and the atomic bomb initiated a new era of strategic vulnerability. The Soviet detonation of an atomic bomb in



1949 and their acquisition of a long range bomber force revealed the vulnerability of North America to nuclear attack.

### Building an Air Defense Organization

The National Security Act of 1947 and the Key West Agreement of 1948 laid the framework for the organization of US air defenses throughout the Cold War. The former established the US Air Force as a separate service while the latter vested primary responsibility for continental air defense with the fledgling service. In contrast to the establishment of the moribund Air Defense Command at Mitchell Field, New York, on March 27, 1946, the creation of the Continental Air Defense Command (CONAD) in 1948 marked a milestone in the development of credible US air defenses. It was not until September 1, 1954, however, that CONAD became a joint command encompassing the USAF Air Defense Command (ADC), the US Army Air Defense Command (USARADCOM) and the Naval Forces CONAD (NAVFORCONAD). Under the 1954 agreement, the Air Force became the executive agency for CONAD and received command of the joint headquarters. The Unified Command Plan in 1956 gave responsibility to the Commander-in-Chief CONAD (CINCCONAD) for the air defense of the continental US and Alaska and operational control of all army and naval forces under his command. In addition, CINCCONAD was responsible for “assisting in the air defense of Canada and Mexico.” James Eglin, *Air Defense in the Nuclear Age* (1988), provides a useful comparative overview of the development of US air defenses in the postwar period from 1946 to 1966 that includes a discussion of the role of domestic perception, technical developments, political considerations, and the Soviet response.

### Finding an Ally

The decade of the 1950s witnessed the high water mark of US air defenses and the formulation of two guiding concepts for air defense that defined US strategy throughout the remainder of the Cold War. The first guiding concept involved the emphasis on a “polar orientation” or defenses facing northward while the second focused on creating a defense in depth aimed at meeting the Soviet threat as far north as possible. Both of these concepts required the cooperation and support of the Canadian government in the creation of an integrated system of North American air defense. Already in 1949, the Canadian–US Military Cooperation Committee (MCC) drafted joint emergency defense plans. In 1956, the MCC approved a plan “based upon the concept that the air defense of Canada and the United States is a single problem [and] must be developed on a combined basis so as to provide the most effective defense possible for agreed vital targets.”

In one respect, the plan merely formalized a relationship that began during World War II and included a 1951 cost-sharing agreement to build 33 radar stations along the southern Canadian border and in the northeast United States, the PINETREE

Plan. In order to increase warning time and meet the requirement for defense in depth, the US and Canada agreed in 1954 to the construction of a line of radar stations along the 69th parallel, the Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line. A series of some 60 radar stations, the DEW Line stretched across more than 3,000 miles from the northwest tip of Alaska to Greenland with later extensions into the Aleutians and achieved limited operational capability in August 1957. In addition to the DEW Line, the Canadian government began construction of the Mid Canada Line further south along the 55th parallel consisting of additional sector control sections and approximately 90 unmanned radar sites operating on the Doppler principle; a system that became fully operational in January 1958 (Schaffel 1991).

In response to the limitations of early radar technology, the USAF augmented this coverage by creating a civilian observer system for detecting low flying aircraft. Approved in June 1950, the Ground Observer Corps (GOC) consisted of 26 filter centers and their associated observation posts, but it was the creation of SKY-WATCH in April 1952 that heralded the start of 24-hour operations in spite of strong opposition from many of the states charged with running the program. By 1954, the GOC was operational throughout the entire US and two years later manned some 18,000 observation posts. As Denys Volan notes in *The History of the Ground Observer Corps* (1968) the completion of the Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line and the rise of the ballistic missile threat essentially made the GOC irrelevant and the organization was disbanded in early 1959.

The establishment of the North American Air Defense Command (NORAD) in 1957 and the creation of a joint US–Canadian Combat Operations Center in Colorado Springs, Colorado, represented an important organizational initiative designed to strengthen the overall air defense structure by facilitating the exchange of flight information between civil and military authorities as well as the transfer of military technology. Joseph Jockel's *No Boundaries Upstairs* (1987) examines the growth of the political and military relationship with respect to North American air defense between Canada and the United States. He concludes that despite Canadian hopes this cooperative relationship did not extend beyond air defense and that US expectations of a "limited" defense partnership remained unchanged in the period between 1945 and 1958 (Jockel 2007). In a related matter, John Clearwater's *Canadian Nuclear Weapons* (1998) details the Canadian government's role in the acquisition of nuclear capable BOMARC SAM and the Genie air-to-air missile from the United States and the integration of these weapons into Canada's air defense architecture.

### The Shield and the Sword

In the wake of the Korean War (1950–3), the administration of President Dwight D. Eisenhower adopted a policy of massive retaliation designed to prevent the US from experiencing the death of a thousand cuts in limited wars that threatened to sap American blood and treasure in a myriad of conflicts around the globe. The Strategic Air Command (SAC) emerged as the primary beneficiary of a policy aimed

at threatening US adversaries with nuclear annihilation. In fact, the lion's share of US defense expenditures were destined for the USAF's strategic bomber force, reinforcing an air force institutional bias in favor of offensive versus defensive weapons systems. Poor intelligence procedures resulted in an overestimation of the size of the Soviet Strategic Bomber Force in the mid-1950s leading to reports of a disparity in Soviet and US force strength that threatened the existing state of deterrence between the two superpowers. The perception of a "bomber gap" in favor of the Soviet Union that emerged after the Russians flew the same Bear and Bison aircraft past American observers at Tushino Airfield multiple times in July 1955, a fear that appeared to be confirmed by U-2 flights the following year, however, spurred the buildup of the North American air defense network (Pedlow and Welzenbach 1998). In truth, no such bomber gap existed, but public perception trumped reality resulting in political pressure to respond to the supposed threat.

From an operational standpoint, an effective air defense network to defend against Soviet bombers required sufficient early warning in order to intercept these aircraft before they reached their target areas. The DEW Line and the MCL provided the critical elements for ensuring early detection and identification of potential threats. However, CONAD supplemented the system with airborne radar aircraft, naval picket ships, and sea-based radar platforms. Two wings of USAF Airborne Early Warning and Control aircraft and a naval airship squadron provided supplemental coverage of the Arctic approaches to the continental United States via the Pacific and Atlantic coasts. Additionally, NAVFORCONAD maintained 24-hour coverage at five naval picket stations off each coast by mid-1957. Finally, three platform-based radar stations (Texas Towers) provided additional coverage along the US northeast coast.

Although critical, the lines and linked chain of early warning radar only provided the means for identifying potential attackers. The "sword" of air defense included the interceptor aircraft, surface-to-air missiles (SAM), and anti-aircraft guns needed to shoot down enemy bombers. Fighter aircraft provided the best option based on their ability to intercept the bombers before they reached their intended targets while surface-to-air missiles offered an added layer of area defense protection. Finally, anti-aircraft guns provided a final line of defense for protecting point targets such as air bases and key government and military facilities (Berhow 2005).

By mid-1957, the USAF ADC operated almost 70 all weather interceptor squadrons with 1,500 aircraft. The locations of these squadrons complemented the principle of polar orientation with the majority located at bases in the northeast United States and the Pacific Northwest with a only handful of squadrons located in the southern United States. These aircraft relied primarily on air-to-air missiles including the conventionally armed GAR-1 (Falcon) and the unguided nuclear armed MB-1 (Genie). The introduction in 1957 of the latter with its 1.5 kiloton warhead demonstrated the importance placed by US military planners in destroying the bombers before they could hit their targets. In addition to the USAF interceptor squadrons, USARADCOM controlled 236 batteries of Nike Ajax SAMs and 84 anti-aircraft gun batteries in June 1957. In 1958, the army began converting the conventionally armed Nike Ajax missiles to nuclear armed Nike Hercules missiles,

a process that led to the complete conversion of all regular army Nike systems to nuclear capability three years later (Morgan and Berhow 2002). In addition to the Nike Hercules, the USAF and US Army fielded the nuclear capable BOMARC SAM. The question of anti-aircraft guns became a major point of contention with the USAF. In a 1956 memorandum, General Thomas D. White described these defenses as “wholly deficient to cope with the threat” and the cost of maintaining them as “disproportionate to the air defense obtained.” Subsequently, the Army retired over 90 percent of its active gun batteries in the last half of 1957 signaling the end to the era of anti-aircraft guns for strategic air defense (McKenney 1985).

Ultimately, the critical component for creating a viable air defense network rested on the ability to integrate the various warning and engagement systems in response to an attack. Radar inputs from the DEW Line, the MCL, Early Warning aircraft, picket ships, and the Texas Towers were fed to Semi-Automated Ground Environment (SAGE) control sites located in Canada and the United States. The SAGE concept was the brainchild of scientists at MIT’s Lincoln Laboratories and allowed for the automatic versus the manual plotting of the air defense picture. These SAGE control sites, the first of which was installed in the New York Air Defense Sector in 1958, incorporated state of the art computer technology for the time and were key for coordinating the interceptor and ground-based air defenses. SAGE essentially served as the brain for coordinating the entire defense system; a function eventually performed at NORAD’s combat operations center (COC) within Cheyenne Mountain (Redmond and Smith 2000). The addition of SAGE provided a major upgrade for integrating diverse inputs and rapidly responding to potential threats; however, the development and maintenance of all these assets proved expensive. In fact, the authors of *Atomic Audit* (Schwartz 1998) estimate that almost \$200 billion was expended on “strategic air defense” between 1945 and 1961; a massive investment for a system that could not guarantee a leak-proof defense.

### The Changing Threat

By the late 1950s, the threat posed by ballistic and cruise missiles, not bombers, emerged as the major threat to the air defense of North America. In March 1957, CONAD notified the JCS that “an adequate and timely defense system against the intercontinental ballistic missile was the most urgent future CONAD requirement” and urged the development of an anti-missile system capable of detecting and destroying incoming surface and sub-surface ballistic missiles (Command History Division 1970). The launch of Sputnik in October underlined the emerging vulnerability of the United States to ballistic missile attack. In testimony to the Congress in 1965, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara called attention to the diminishing Soviet bomber threat: “This threat did not develop as estimated. Instead the major threat confronting the United States consists of ICBM and submarine-launched ballistic missile forces.” The changed threat environment in the early 1960s led to the end of US Navy picket ship patrols in 1960, closure of 28 DEW Line intermediate stations in 1963, and the deactivation of the MCL in March

1965. Additionally, the number of USAF interceptor squadrons fell to 42 by the end of 1964 and BOMARC SAM strength fell from a forecast 29 to eight squadrons in the same period. Throughout the 1960s, the focus of the NORAD effort shifted from active air defense measures to providing early warning of a missile attack; typified by the construction of three Ballistic Missile Early Warning Sites (BMEWS) and a missile defense alarm satellite system (MIDAS) by 1963.

As the threat of missiles replaced that of aircraft, the Air Defense Command was renamed the Aerospace Defense Command in January 1968. During the next decade many ADC units were consolidated and much of the responsibility for air defense was shifted to Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard units. In 1979 most ADC units were assigned to Tactical Air Command and the ADC was deactivated in March 1980.

### Tactical Air Defense

If strategic air defense became a periodic issue of national importance, such was not the case for tactical air defense. In the words of one historian, anti-aircraft weapons were “grossly neglected” at the outbreak of World War II and the Chief of Staff of the Army, General George C. Marshall, observed in 1945 that “The consequent cost in time, life, and money of this failure ... has been appalling” (Greenwald 2003). Despite the important role played by anti-aircraft artillery during the war, the general US postwar demobilization resulted in a major draw-down of tactical air defenses with only two battalions of antiaircraft artillery available to the US Army by late 1947. According to Kenneth Werrell (2005), “The postwar story of antiaircraft guns is primarily that of phase out and false starts.” The exemplar of this trend was the ill-fated Sergeant York self-propelled air defense gun system which proved a colossal failure and cost the American taxpayer \$1.8 billion before its eventual cancellation in 1985 (Koropecy 1993).

By the 1970s and 1980s, the major investment in tactical air defense focused on surface-to-air missiles rather than gun systems. During this period, the Soviet Union became the key player in the development of SAM systems and was producing three-quarters of the world's SAMs by 1989 (Zaloga 1989). From an American perspective, the development of the manportable (MANPAD) Stinger and the Patriot missile emerged as the two most widely known US systems of the Cold War period. In the case of the former, the Stinger became a symbol of the Afghan mujahideen's success during Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan (1979–89). In contrast to some reports crediting the missile with the Soviet decision to withdrawal from Afghanistan, Alan Kuperman in “The Stinger Missile and U.S. Intervention in Afghanistan” (1999) identifies a “Stinger myth” and argues that earlier policy decisions to suspend détente and to cut off access to trade and technology proved more important in influencing the Soviet decision to leave the country despite the very real operational success of the missile.

The supposed success of the Patriot missile in intercepting Iraqi SCUD missiles during the 1991 Gulf War resulted in the creation of another air defense “myth.”

Initial US Army estimates claimed a successful intercept of 80 percent of missile attacks against Saudi Arabia and 50 percent against Israel. These claims were subsequently lowered to 70 percent and 40 percent respectively with some studies claiming a less than 10 percent rate of success. If the success of the Patriot system in 1991 remains debatable, such does not appear to be the case for Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003. According to a report by the Defense Science Board Task Force (2005), Patriot missiles engaged nine enemy tactical missiles during the conflict with eight engagements being declared successful and the ninth engagement judged as “a probable success.” While the Patriot PAC 3 (Patriot ATBM Capable, level 3) system constitutes the backbone of current US theater level air defenses, the US Army and US Marine Corps have adopted the Avenger air defense system consisting of two turrets of four Stinger missiles mounted on a High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV or Hummer) chassis for point defense on the battlefield. For an army that has not been exposed to air attack since 1945, this system offers an insurance policy should the US Air Force fail to achieve and maintain air superiority over the battlespace.

### **The Other Side of Air Defense: Civil Defense**

The scare over the “bomber gap” and later the “missile gap” revealed the key role of public opinion and popular perception. The belief that the Soviet bomber force might have the ability to inflict a crippling “first blow” on the US strategic bomber force was not only destabilizing, but led to demands for improved air defenses. Likewise, the realization that no defense, no matter how sophisticated, could prevent every Soviet bomber (or missile) from reaching its target resulted in an increased discussion of civil defense; passive air defense measures including the construction of bomb shelters, urban evacuation plans, and mass casualty contingency planning. The creation of the Federal Civil Defense Administration (FCDA) under the Truman administration with its motto “Survive, Recover, and Win” constituted an initial step to coordinate federal, state, and local responses to a Soviet attack. Stephen Weart, “History of American Attitudes to Civil Defense” (1987), describes the physical and social factors that influenced American attitudes towards this subject, including the conduct of “Operation Alert” exercises such as the one in 1954 involving 50 US and Canadian cities, which involved millions of persons seeking shelter upon the sounding of warning sirens. Likewise, the “Duck and Cover” campaign aimed at schoolchildren left a lasting impression upon a generation of youth who practiced hiding under their desks and covering their face and necks at the sound of an alarm (Rose 2001).

The issue of effective civil defense measures to supplement active air defenses essentially rested on three factors: cost, effectiveness, and public commitment. The price for a comprehensive civil defense system was not cheap. In his seminal, *On Thermonuclear War*, the deterrence theorist Herman Kahn (1960) advocated the expenditure of \$500 million in 1960 to support civil defense measures including “the creation of feasible *evacuation measures, improvisation of fallout protection,*



*provision for control of damage, and modest preparations for recuperation.*” Kahn argued that even inexpensive measures might save between 20 and 50 million lives. The Kennedy administration agreed and in a “Special Message on Urgent National Needs” President John F. Kennedy told Congress that existing civil defense plans had been either too “far reaching or unrealistic” resulting in public “apathy, indifference, and skepticism.” Kennedy noted the high cost of such a program, but warned “It is insurance we trust will never be needed – but insurance we could never forgive ourselves for foregoing in the event of catastrophe.”

The Cuban missile crisis in October 1962 and the threat of war and a nuclear exchange between the two superpowers provided the high watermark for civil defense awareness as scores of Americans experienced the “fallout shelter crisis.” The gradual but steady growth of the Soviet nuclear arsenal in the 1960s and 1970s combined with the expense of civil defense programs, especially related to shelter construction, resulted in a situation where rhetoric, not action, typified the American approach. In his comparative study, *The Limits of Civil Defence in the U.S.A, Switzerland, Britain, and the Soviet Union*, Lawrence Vale (1987) argues, with the exception of Kennedy’s commitment in 1961:

At all times, the evolution of civil defence policy was affected by shifts in nuclear strategy and weapons developments which made civil defence seem both doctrinally inconsistent and technically unachievable. Debate over civil defence extended to the general population in both the early 1960s and the early 1980s; in each case, adverse public reaction helped to stifle presidential support for new programmes.

While the construction of fallout shelters to protect a significant portion of society during a nuclear attack was deemed unfeasible, Nick McCamley, *Cold War Secret Nuclear Bunkers* (2000) describes those built to shelter senior military and government leaders, for example, at Greenbrier for congressional leaders, Raven Rock Underground Command Center for communications equipment and senior Pentagon officials, and Canada’s Diefenbunker.

### The Strategic Defense Initiative

The issue of *active* air defense experienced a brief renaissance with McNamara’s approval for the development of the Sentinel Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) system in 1967 to counter the nascent Chinese missile threat and protect the United States in a “thin area defense.” Under the Nixon administration, the Sentinel system became the Safeguard system designed to protect SAC’s ICBM missile fields from Soviet attack. The US-Soviet signing of an ABM treaty in 1972 prohibited the construction of a national missile defense system and limited each country to two ABM sites. The number of approved sites was later lowered to one with the Soviets choosing to protect Moscow and the United States electing to protect an ICBM field near Grand Forks, North Dakota; a site subsequently closed in 1976. Donald Baucom’s *The Origins of SDI, 1944–1983* (1992) provides a detailed historical overview of the development and debate associated with anti-missile defenses.

Ultimately, the US decision to close its only ABM site reflected doubts about the overall effectiveness of these defenses and concerns about the high costs of maintaining them. In short, the question of efficacy and cost once again highlighted the fundamental question surrounding air defenses especially in the age of ICBMs, including some with multiple independently retargeted warheads.

The question of defense against the ballistic missile threat, however, gained renewed attention in the wake of a speech by President Ronald Reagan in March 1983, the so-called “Star Wars” speech. President Reagan’s vision of a system that could detect, intercept, and destroy incoming missiles catalyzed a research and development effort known as the Strategic Defense Initiative and evoked a major national debate concerning the technological feasibility and the diplomatic, economic, and military implications of such a defensive system (Handberg 2001). In a *Foreign Affairs* article in 1984, William Burrows described SDI as “a dangerous hoax and a cruel and potentially expensive exercise in self-deception.” Once again the financial cost of such a defensive system came to the fore. In his article, “Rhetoric and Realities in the Star Wars Debate,” former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger (1985) estimated that the total cost of such a system would be an astounding one trillion dollars and emphasized “there is no leak-proof defense.” In addition to cost and efficacy, Schlesinger also worried about the potential effects of such a defense on the concept of mutually assured destruction and the maintenance of deterrence. Even the historian, Michael Sherry criticized the concept of SDI as another manifestation of “technological fanaticism” in his award-winning *The Rise of American Air Power* (1987). There are several edited volumes that present an excellent overview of the various aspects of the SDI debate, including Stephen Cimbala’s *The Technology, Strategy, and Politics of SDI* (1987) and Stephen Miller’s and Stephen Van Evera’s *The Star Wars Controversy* (1986).

If SDI proved to be a star-crossed endeavor, the concept of missile defense returned to the public and political arena almost two decades later with President William Clinton’s signing of the National Missile Defense Act in 1999 calling for the deployment of a National Missile Defense (NMD) system as soon as technologically feasible to defend the United States from “limited ballistic missile attack.” Interestingly, NMD has not engendered the level of acrimony and debate aroused by Reagan’s SDI proposal, an issue examined by James Wirtz and Jeffrey Larsen in *Rocket’s Red Glare* (2001). The end of the Cold War, the proliferation of nuclear and ballistic missile technologies, the emergence of “rogue states” which appear willing to test and perhaps employ these weapons, and the promise of improved anti-missile technologies have combined to renew efforts to restore the hope of a viable and effective defense. The age of free security may have passed, but the hopes of finding it again remain remarkably resilient.

#### BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Baucom, Donald R. (1992). *The Origins of SDI, 1944–1983*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
- Berhow, Mark (2005). *U.S. Strategic and Defensive Missile Systems, 1950–2004*. Fortress Series 36. Oxford: Osprey Publishing.

- Brodie, Bernard (1965). *Strategy in the Missile Age*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Burrows, William E. (1984). "The Star Wars Debate: Ballistic Missile Defense: The Illusion of Security," *Foreign Affairs*, 61:4 (Spring): 843–56.
- Chun, Clayton K. S. (2006). *Defending Space: U.S. Anti-Satellite Warfare and Space Weaponry*. Fortress Series 53. Oxford: Osprey Publishing.
- Cimbala, Stephen J., ed. (1987). *The Technology, Strategy, and Politics of SDI*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Citino, Robert M. (2007). "Military Histories Old and New: A Reintroduction," *American Historical Review*, 112:4 (October), 1070–90.
- Clearwater, John (1998). *Canadian Nuclear Weapons: The Untold Story of Canada's Cold War Arsenal*. Toronto: Dundurn Press.
- Command History Division (1970). *Historical Review of North American Aerospace Defense, 1946–1970*. Colorado Springs, CO: Secretary Joint Staff HQ NORAD.
- Dawson, William L. (1961). *New Civil Defense Program, Ninth Report by the Committee on Government Operations*. Washington: Government Printing Office.
- Defense Science Board Task Force. (2005). *Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Patriot System Performance*. Washington: Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics.
- Eglin, James E. (1988). *Air Defense in the Nuclear Age: The Post-War Development of American and Soviet Strategic Defense Systems*. New York: Garland Publishing.
- Goss, William A. (1948). "Air Defense of the Western Hemisphere," in Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, eds., *The Army Air Forces in World War II*, vol.1: *Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Greenfield, Kent R., Robert R. Palmer, and Bell I. Wiley (1947). *The Army Ground Forces: The Organization of Ground Combat Troops. United States Army in World War II*. Washington: Center of Military History.
- Greenwald, Bryon. (2003). "Understanding Change: U.S. Army Antiaircraft Artillery and the Battle for Legitimacy, 1917–1945," PhD dissertation, The Ohio State University.
- Handberg, Roger (2001). *Ballistic Missile Defense and the Future of American Security: Agendas, Perceptions, Technology, and Policy*. Westport, CT: Greenwood.
- Jockel, Joseph T. (1987). *No Boundaries Upstairs: Canada, the United States, and the Origins of North American Air Defence, 1945–1958*. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press.
- Jockel, Joseph T. (2007). *Canada in NORAD, 1957–2007*. Montreal: McGill University Press.
- Kahn, Herman (1960). *On Thermonuclear War*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Koropey, O. B. (1993). *It Seemed Like a Great Idea at the Time: The Sergeant York Air Defense Gun*. Alexandria, VA: Historical Office, US Army Material Command.
- Kuperman, Alan (1999). "The Stinger and U.S. Intervention in Afghanistan," *Political Science Quarterly*, 114:2 (Summer), 219–63.
- McCamley, Nick (2000). *Cold War Secret Nuclear Bunkers: The Passive Defence of the Western World during the Cold War*. London: Leo Cooper.
- McKenney, Janice E. (1985). *Air Defense Artillery*. Washington: Center of Military History.
- Miller, Steven E., and Stephen Van Evera, eds. (1986). *The Star Wars Controversy: Contending Points of View*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Mitchell, William (1925). *Winged Defense: The Development and Possibilities of Modern Air Power-Economic and Military*. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons.

- Morgan, Mark L., and Mark A. Berhow (2002). *Rings of Supersonic Steel: Air Defenses of the United States Army, 1950–1979: An Introductory History and Site Guide*, 2nd edn. San Pedro, CA: Fort MacArthur Press.
- Pedlow, Gregory W., and Donald E. Welzenbach (1998). *The CIA and the U-2 Program, 1954–1974*. Washington: CIA Center for the Study of Intelligence.
- Redmond, Kent C., and Thomas M. Smith (2000). *From Whirlwind to MITRE: The R&D Story of the SAGE Air Defense Computer*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Rose, Kenneth D. (2001). *One Nation Underground: The Fallout Shelter in American Culture*. New York: New York University Press.
- Schaffel, Kenneth (1991). *The Emerging Shield: The Air Force and the Evolution of Continental Air Defense, 1945–1960*. Washington: Office of Air Force History.
- Schlesinger, James R. (1985). “Rhetoric and Realities in the Star Wars Debate,” *International Security Studies*, 10:1 (Summer), 3–12.
- Schwartz, Stephen, ed. (1998). *Atomic Audit: The Costs and Consequences of U.S. Nuclear Weapons since 1940*. Washington: Brookings Institution Press.
- Sherry, Michael S. (1987). *The Rise of American Air Power: The Creation of Armageddon*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Shiner, John F. (1981). “The Air Corps, the Navy, and Coast Defense, 1919–1941,” *Military Affairs*, 45:3 (October), 113–20.
- Vale, Lawrence J. (1987). *The Limits of Civil Defence in the U.S.A, Switzerland, Britain and the Soviet Union: The Evolution of Policies since 1945*. New York: St. Martin’s Press.
- Volan, Denys (1968). *The History of the Ground Observer Corps*. Colorado Springs, CO: Air Defense Command Historical Division.
- Weart, Stephen (1987). “History of American Attitudes to Civil Defense,” in John Dowling and Evans Harrell, eds., *Civil Defense: A Choice of Disasters*. New York: American Institute of Physics, 11–32.
- Werrell, Kenneth (2005). *Archie to SAM: A Short Operational History of Ground-Based Air Defense*. Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press.
- Wirtz, James J., and Jeffrey A. Larsen, eds. (2001). *Rocket’s Red Glare: Missile Defenses and the Future of World Politics*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Woodward, C. Vann (1960). “The Age of Reinterpretation,” *American Historical Review*, 66:1 (October), 1–19.
- Zaloga, Steven (1989). *Soviet Air Defence Missiles: Design, Development and Tactics*. Coulsdon, UK: Jane’s Information Group.

## Part V

---

# MILITARY SPECIALTIES

# Chapter Forty-five

---

## MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

*David F. Trask*

Military intelligence involves “the gathering, analysis, protection, and dissemination of information about the enemy, terrain, and weather in an area of operations or area of interest ... during peacetime and in war.” It develops “evaluated information concerning the strength, activities, and probable courses of action of foreign countries or nonstate actors that are usually, though not always, enemies or opponents.” “Counterintelligence” is a significant aspect of the field. Also, according to the *Encyclopedia Britannica*, this activity aims “at protecting and maintaining the secrecy of a country’s intelligence operations.” It identifies, understands, establishes priorities, and counteracts intelligence that other nations, both, enemies and friends, may conduct to penetrate or mislead the intelligence services of the United States, collectively called the United States Intelligence Community.

Of the several surveys of the history of American intelligence gathering and its utilization three stand out: G. J. O’Toole’s *Honorable Treachery* (1991) provides a useful introduction to the subject covering the period between 1775 and 1963. In addition to tracing the development of American intelligence agencies, Christopher Andrew, *For the President’s Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from Washington to Bush* (1996) assesses the use made of intelligence by each president. He considers many of them, including Woodrow Wilson, to have been naive, but concludes that Franklin Roosevelt, Dwight Eisenhower, John Kennedy, and George H. W. Bush understood its value and used it productively. Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones’s provocative *Cloak and Dollar* (2002) presents a far more negative assessment of American intelligence agencies and operatives. He casts them as “con men,” who trumpet their successes and seek to hide their failures while seeking to obtain greater resources and promote their own bureaucratic and personal interests. Jeffrey Richelson’s *A Century of Spies: Intelligence in the Twentieth Century* (1995) provides the most complete history of modern intelligence. Covering British, French, German, Israeli, Chinese, Russian, and American intelligence operations and all types of spying from the use of balloons to observe enemy activities at the front during World War I to electronic surveillance in the First Gulf War and moles to covert military operations, it provides an excellent context for the study of US intelligence.



Modern military intelligence began to emerge late in the eighteenth century, appearing mostly at the level of local commands and emphasizing reconnaissance. During the American Revolution George Washington made extensive use of spies to identify the British order of battle (organizations and locations) and the intentions of enemy commanders. Espionage was, along with the examination of open sources, the most important form of military intelligence. The spies he employed, the most famous of whom was Nathan Hale, were untrained amateurs. They reported directly to Washington who often acted upon their information (Augur 1955). Mobile cavalry conducted scouting expeditions along with other forms of reconnaissance. When the British occupied New York City the Culper Ring of spies supplied information about their strength and activities (Pennypacker 1939, Rose 2006). The Continental Congress also received information from secret agents, as did Benjamin Franklin while representing Congress in France (Currey 1972, Sellers 1976). The British returned the favor by spying on the Patriots both in America and Europe. Dr. Benjamin Church, director of the Continental Army's hospitals, passed information to the British, and Benedict Arnold plotted to turn control of the key fortress at West Point over to his British conspirators. John Jay conducted extensive counterintelligence, investigating Loyalists. In Europe, unknown to Benjamin Franklin, his secretary, Edward Bancroft, passed on copies of his correspondence and reported activities of Continental Navy forces, to officials in London (French 1932, Van Doren 1941, Flexner 1953, Bakeless 1959, Vaillancourt 1961, Ford 1965, Thompson 1991, Walsh 2001). Both sides spied on the other but neither institutionalized the practice. They considered military intelligence a wartime necessity only and abandoned it when the Treaty of Paris ended the war in 1783.

In *Federalist No. 64* John Jay argued that the executive branch of government should direct intelligence gathering. Congress signaled its approval, appropriating funds for a secret "Contingent Fund for Foreign Intercourse." This action set the precedent for what became the "Secret Service Fund" – monies made available to finance intelligence operations.

There is little record of intelligence activity during the first half of the nineteenth century. No record of military intelligence gathering during the War of 1812 exists, although both sides undoubtedly collected information on a local basis. During the Mexican War military commanders dispatched agents to acquire information about the Mexican forces but did not create a structured system to collect, evaluate, and distribute military intelligence. Indeed, the army lacked maps of the theater of operations and relied on scouting parties to reconnoiter in advance of troop movements (Caruso 1991). Following the capture of Mexico City, President James K. Polk sent secret emissaries to Mexico to help arrange a peace settlement (Nelson 1988).

This *ad hoc* system of collecting military intelligence during wartime and neglecting it during peacetime generally prevailed during the early years of the Republic, reflecting the absence of significant international threats during an age of "free security" without critical challenges from other nations.

The Union and the Confederacy conducted similar intelligence operations during the Civil War (Stern 1990, Markle 1994, Fishel 1996). Spies on both sides

provided important information to military commanders. The Topographical Bureau in the US War Department provided maps to Federal forces. Northern commanders typically engaged their own intelligence operatives. In the West Edward M. Kern headed John C. Frémont's intelligence operations, including the sending of mounted spies behind enemy lines wearing Confederate uniforms. U. S. Grant, who served under Frémont during the first months of the war, learned from him the value of intelligence. When he received an independent command Grant established his own network of spies under the leadership of Grenville M. Dodge. Grant employed even more intelligence when he took command in the east in 1864 (Feis 2002). In the east Union Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan employed a civilian detective, Allan Pinkerton, to obtain information, but he often supplied misleading data (Morn 1982). Another officer, Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker, set up a special intelligence group that provided accurate order-of-battle information. Named the Bureau of Military Information, it expanded as the war went on until it was providing information not only on the Confederate army but on virtually everything that happened in the Confederate capital at Richmond (Stuart 1981, Allen 2006).

On the other side General Robert E. Lee leaned heavily on spies and his cavalry. The cavalry commander, Major General J. E. B. Stuart, often gathered highly useful information but at critical times sometimes failed to provide essential information, as during the Gettysburg campaign, a misstep that contributed greatly to the Confederate defeat.

Technological innovations improved collection and dissemination of intelligence. Among them were free balloons, tethered balloons, and wigwag flags. The availability of telegraphy increased the use of codes and ciphers, which protected wired information that was susceptible of interception, but its use led to interception of signals, deception, and then to the employment of rudimentary codes and ciphers. A counterintelligence organization functioned in the War Department. The Union conducted espionage activities beyond its borders. Thomas Haines Dudley developed a network of informants in England to report on the construction and fitting out of Confederate ships in Liverpool (Milton 2003). To date little has been written about the direct impact of intelligence on operations, the single exception being Jay Luvaas, "The Role of Intelligence in the Chancellorsville Campaign, April–May, 1863" (1990). The influence of intelligence during the Civil War still presents opportunities for researchers.

When the war ended, however, the military failed to maintain its intelligence services (Finnegan 1998). The absence of foreign threats slowed modernization of the armed forces. The first permanent American intelligence service, the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), was established in 1882 to gather, analyze, and distribute information about naval technology, ports, submarine cables, maps, and about foreign navies. Naval attachés stationed abroad conducted their work in the open until the eve of the Spanish–American War, when they first began clandestine activities (Dorwart 1979, Packard 1996, Crumley 2002).

The Army followed suit, creating a Division of Military Information in 1885, soon renamed the Military Information Division (MID). In 1892 MID was

separated from the Military Reservation Division and placed directly under the Adjutant General of the Army. It was subdivided into five sections – militia, military progress, frontier, map, and Latin America (a photographic section was added in 1897), an organization which lasted until 1903. This organization expanded its duties and personnel, collecting and distributing information and assisting mobilization. It also managed a system of military attachés; in 1889 the Army sent military attachés to five European powers, five years later it assigned them to Mexico, Japan, and two additional European capitals, and, by 1900 to six more. These officers produced useful information, mostly from open sources, concerning military organization, tactics, and weaponry (Bethel 1947).

During the brief War with Spain in 1898 MID dispatched agents to Cuba and Puerto Rico, but Maj. Gen. William R. Shafter, commanding the expedition to Santiago de Cuba, failed to organize an intelligence unit. After the war, when an insurgency broke out in the Philippine Islands to challenge the American occupation, the local command set up a Bureau of Information that collected insurgent records and conducted some counterintelligence (Wagner 1903).

In 1903 the Army finally established a General Staff, the “Second Division” of which was assigned several crucial missions, including collection and dissemination of intelligence, direction of attachés and liaison with foreign attachés, supervision of mapping, and maintenance of a reference collection. It did not have any organizations in the field. The Second Division of the General Staff was later united with the Third Division (operations), which became the War College Division. Its intelligence functions fell to a Military Intelligence Committee (MIC), which was burdened with many duties unrelated to intelligence.

In 1897, Ralph Van Deman, sometimes referred to as the “Father of Army Intelligence,” joined MID. For 20 years he alternated between intelligence and more conventional duties. During the Spanish–American War Van Deman collated information about the Spanish army. After the war he visited the Caribbean area to collect cartographic data about Cuba and Puerto Rico. He then was transferred to the Philippines to organize a counterintelligence organization of Filipino agents. He also made two covert trips to China to gather information about routes between Tientsin and Beijing. On the eve of World War I, Van Deman convinced Secretary of War Newton D. Baker to establish the Military Intelligence Section (MIS) of the Army War College, becoming its first head in May 1917 (Van Deman 1988). In 1918, when a new Chief of Staff, Gen. Peyton March, reorganized the Army Staff, he created a new intelligence group modeled after that of the American Expeditionary Forces, designated the “Military Intelligence Division.”

The Army entered World War I without a sound intelligence organization. The intelligence personnel of the General Staff consisted of two officers and two clerks. To meet pressing needs the Signal Corps developed a number of services, including intelligence about communications, security of communications, and aerial reconnaissance. The American Expeditionary Forces established intelligence units, but the war ended before they developed efficient capabilities. About 1,200 military personnel carried out intelligence functions, but most of them lacked professional qualifications and made limited contributions.

Wartime experience increased the nation's awareness of the need for improved intelligence, but little was done to develop the field during the interwar years (1919–41). Budgetary constraints and preoccupation with domestic developments, particularly the Great Depression, interfered with attempts to apply the lessons learned during World War I. Thomas Mahnken, *Uncovering Ways of War* (2002) argues that US military intelligence overcame these handicaps to identify innovations in equipment and weapons systems correctly and to assess accurately the doctrinal implications they contained. Yet, it missed the importance of some technological developments, specifically British advances in radar, German development of rocketry, and Japan's development of nocturnal warfare tactics. In more focused studies, Charles Christensen (2002) traces the gathering of technical intelligence by the Army Air Corps, David Kahn (2004) the early successes of American code-breaking operations, and Jeffrey Dorwart (1983) the work of ONI during the interwar years.

Joseph Persico, *Roosevelt's Secret War* (2002) believes that FDR began developing American intelligence capabilities prior to the war and that he successfully incorporated intelligence data into strategic and operational planning, though Brian Sullivan (1991) discounts the significance and success of the mission Roosevelt sent William Donovan on to Italy in the mid-1930s. In 1942 FDR established a centralized agency, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) to conduct intelligence (Troy 1973, Katz 1989). To provide interagency coordination, the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) brought together representatives of the leading intelligence groups, including the Army, the Navy, the Board of Economic Warfare, and eventually the Army Air Forces. Rivalry with the MID deprived the OSS of important communications intelligence, a serious handicap.

The US Army reduced its intelligence staff in Washington, which concentrated on planning and supervising overseas activity, but subdivided it into three major sections, the Army Ground Forces, the Army Air Forces, and the Army Services forces, to direct operations on land and in the air and to supply combat organizations. MID remained in existence, along with two new organizations; the Military Intelligence Service, was set up to administer intelligence operations throughout the Army, and an Intelligence Group with representation from the several theaters of war was formed to receive information, primarily from attachés. Other centralized organizations included the Signal Security Agency and the Counterintelligence Agency.

Operational activities were conducted in the various theaters of war. Europe received priority over the Pacific in part because of language difficulties. Theater commands organized military intelligence, signals intelligence, and counterintelligence. Teams provided interrogation of prisoners, language interpretation, photo interpretation, and identification of the enemy order of battle. The field armies created teams to provide technical intelligence. Inter-Allied organizations predominated in the Pacific except for counterintelligence, which functioned under the theater Staff G-2 for intelligence. Stephen Ambrose, *Ike's Spies* (1981), argues that intelligence on Germany's order of battle and preparations for operations combined with Allied deception campaigns were vital to success in Western Europe.

There is no similar study for Army operations in the Pacific, Allison Ind's *Allied Intelligence Bureau* (1958) having been written while most documents remained closed to researchers.

The acquisition of intelligence from code-breaking, MAGIC and ULTRA, led to information of high quality. MAGIC provided intercepts obtained after the Navy broke the Japanese diplomatic code, which allowed it to achieve surprise in operations such as the battle of Midway (Layton 1985, Prados 1995, Drea 1992). The British constructed a copy of a German device, the Enigma machine, which transmitted messages to and from commanders on both land and sea. It read German communication with U-boats, an invaluable body of information employed to safeguard maritime shipping and troop transfers (Gardner 2000). By 1943 the Allies were sharing intelligence, exchanging ULTRA intercepts for information obtained through MAGIC (Smith 1993, Soybel 2005). The western Allies were not as forthcoming in supplying intelligence to the Soviet Union, which was equally circumspect in its dealings with Britain and the United States (Smith 1996).

On balance the intelligence services enjoyed significant successes, for example, Alan Bath (1998) and Christopher Ford, David Rosenberg, and Randy Balano (2005) judge Anglo-American naval intelligence to have been a major contributor to victory at sea, and John F. Kreis (1996) argues that it certainly helped win the air war. At the same time the intelligence services also made some notable errors including their failure to detect the Japanese plan to attack Pearl Harbor; to acquire information needed to avoid the American defeat at the Kasserine Pass in North Africa; and to develop sufficient information about the German preparations for what became the Battle of the Bulge. Counterintelligence operations in particular suffered from institutional opposition of various kinds. A devastating report from the inspector general led to the Army's loss of its role in domestic surveillance, but its accomplishments overseas allowed it to resume its earlier activities on the home front. Analytical assessments remain to be done in many fields, including some for which collections of documents have been published, for example, Jürgen Heideking and Christof Mauch, eds. *American Intelligence and the German Resistance to Hitler* (1996); James Gilbert and John Finnegan, *U.S. Army Signals Intelligence in World War II* (1993). Many other documents remained to be declassified and studied half a century after the end of the war. When more are declassified, new studies will appear, such as those by Richard Breitman, Norman J. W. Goda, and Timothy Naftali (2005) concerning what exactly the intelligence services knew about the Holocaust and how Allied intelligence services worked with former Nazis during the immediate postwar era.

The intelligence services emerged from World War II in considerable confusion and without a record of achievement that clearly justified the expenditure of the resources committed to them during the war (Smith 1983). The early postwar development of new intelligence organizations complicated efforts to clarify the appropriate functions of military intelligence in changed circumstances and to improve its quality. Intelligence received more attention than in earlier eras because of the need for much more and better information about the Soviet bloc during the Cold War (1945–90). The activities, for example, of the Committee for State

Security (KGB) in the Soviet Union, MI6 in Great Britain, and Mossad in Israel drew increasing public notice.

The principal challenge to the US intelligence community was to redefine its mission in the light of burgeoning expansion of intelligence activity throughout the national security community. Much of this development occurred elsewhere than in the traditional armed services. The most striking institutional innovation was the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) created in 1947, a part of a general reorganization of the armed forces and national security departments. The National Security Agency (NSA) in the Department of Defense was established in 1952 to collect, process, and report signals intelligence (Bamford 2001).

An attempt in 1958 to improve the functions of the national security agencies, the Defense Reorganization Act, did not succeed in breaking up undue parochialism, inadequate coordination, and duplication of effort. To continue the effort, President Dwight Eisenhower appointed a Joint Study Group in 1960 to recommend further changes in the structure of the American intelligence community. Acting on recommendations from that group, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara spearheaded the creation of a new organization to foster improvements the following year. The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) came into existence within the Department of Defense to assume the mission of producing and managing intelligence for the armed services. After overcoming early resistance from the various services, DIA became increasingly active and made important contributions. This organization advises both the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Scanlon 2002, Allen and Shellum 2002).

At virtually the same period a series of revolutionary events took place that transformed the intelligence capabilities of the United States. In August 1958 an Air Force C-119 aircraft retrieved a packet of film dropped from a reconnaissance satellite. David Christopher Arnold, *Spying from Space* (2005) traces the development of the Air Force Satellite Control Facility (AFSCF) and the construction and operation of its worldwide system of tracking stations and recovery operations. So secret was the AFSCF that its existence did not become known to the public for three decades. The dawn of the Space Age opened an entirely new area from which to collect intelligence.

The first intelligence satellite, code-named GRAB (Galactic Radiation Background) was launched in June 1960 and a second followed in 1962 (Van Keuren 2001). GRAB used its capabilities as an astronomical observatory as cover; it included equipment that captured radar signals from the Soviet Union reflected off the moon from which the precise location of the radar station could be determined. A quarter of a century after the launch of the first satellite, studies of their use began to appear, but the continued classification of most documents concerning their use hampered distribution (Burrows 1985; Richelson 1990, 2001; Day, Logsdon, and Latell 1998).

The end of the Cold War also brought the first publicity to intelligence gathering activities of Navy submarines, including the shadowing of Soviet submarines, reconnaissance of Soviet territorial waters, eavesdropping on Soviet communications, including tapping underwater cables in the Sea of Okhotsk, and retrieving



lost Soviet equipment (Sontag and Drew 1999). The range of such operations remains classified a decade after the end of the Cold War. Better known is the work, mostly the monitoring of electronic communications, conducted by surface vessels such as the USS *Liberty*, which Israeli aircraft strafed as it monitored Arab and Israeli radio transmission during the Six Day War in January 1967 (Cristol 2002) and the USS *Pueblo*, which North Korean forces seized while it operated in international waters in January 1968 (Liston 1988, Mobley 2003). A decade later the Hughes Corporation's *Glomar Explorer*, attempted to raise a sunken Soviet submarine and captured world headlines (Varner 1978).

The emergence of new challenges to national security, including the Cuban missile crisis, the conflict in Vietnam, and the rise of the Chinese Peoples Republic, led to intensive investigations in 1975–6 of intelligence operations, among them a Congressional inquiry and the influential report of the Rockefeller Commission. These efforts stimulated changes. Of particular importance were reforms included in the Goldwater–Nichols Act of 1986. A similar burst of reform occurred in response to difficulties in the Middle East, particularly the Iranian crisis of 1979–82, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the First Gulf War of 1990, and the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.

The most important recent change in the intelligence community is the creation of a Director of National Intelligence (DNI) to provide overall leadership. This appointment resulted from growing recognition of the need to minimize interagency disputes and to ensure adequate cooperation among the various components. The DNI also serves as “the principal advisor to the President, the National Security Council, and the Homeland Security Council for intelligence matters related to national security and oversees and directs the implementation of the National Intelligence Program.” This official is required to coordinate with the Department of Defense on intelligence matters of interest through the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USDI) providing “oversight and policy guidance for all DOD intelligence activities,” which, among other things, includes the various forms of military intelligence (US Government 2009). The effectiveness of this reform has not, as yet, been fully tested in practice.

The Department of Defense controls three important intelligence agencies that contribute information to the Intelligence Community. The National Security Agency (NSA) makes use of cryptology to protect US intelligence and to obtain information on “foreign signals intelligence information.” The National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) designs, builds, and operates satellites used to collect intelligence data. More recently the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) was formed with “the primary mission of collection, analysis, and distribution of geospatial intelligence (GEOINT).” It has absorbed the defense mapping facilities and related functions such as photo interpretation.

The growth of intelligence agencies led to a measurably reduced range of activities in some organizations to avoid duplication. At the present time, for example, the US Army confines itself to programs of direct relevance to its mission. These include human intelligence (HUMINT), geographic intelligence (GEOINT), measurement and signature intelligence from machines and other sources

(MASINT), open-source intelligence (OSINT), strategic or national intelligence (STRINT), and technical intelligence (TECHINT).

Military attachés continue to provide extensive information. They report to the Deputy chief of Staff for intelligence (DCSI), the uniformed official responsible for Army intelligence activities. The Army draws upon other agencies for necessary information that it does not generate itself. The materials it finds most useful are traditional order-of-battle data about military organization and equipment, in other words, the procedures and formations of other armies, their units, and their personnel.

The US Air Force established the Air Force Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Agency (AFISRA) in 2007, the successor of the Air Intelligence Agency. Located at Lackland Air Force Base in Texas, it directs the activities of 12,000 people at 72 locations around the world who gather and analyze intelligence using methods similar to those employed by Army intelligence. AFISRA falls within the purview of the Air Force's Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance, as does the National Air and Space Intelligence Center at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Ohio. Other services, including the US Marine Corps and the US Coast Guard, maintain internal intelligence organizations.

For much essential information the armed forces must rely on other agencies, especially the CIA. Inadequate means of fostering enhanced cooperation between the expanded numbers of intelligence services continue to interfere with efficiency. Congress and the White House have addressed this problem, as have some *ad hoc* organizations, sponsoring investigations, and commissions to encourage exchange of information and enhance collaboration on all levels.

The intelligence community is naturally preoccupied with the task of protecting its sources and methods. Some critics believe that the extent of this policing sometimes goes beyond the requirements of national security, giving rise to controversies over release of intelligence information to the public. In other words, the intelligence community has sometimes conflated its definitions of sources and methods to include material that many reasonable people might deem eligible for declassification. The task of balancing the public's right to know with the requirements of national security is a baffling exercise that is bound to stimulate disagreements as long as threats to national security remain at a significant level. At present the principal dangers are associated with terrorism, but other difficulties will no doubt materialize in the future. The intelligence community must redouble its efforts to declassify information that loses sensitivity, reviewing procedures to ensure as much "openness" as possible, a means of informing the public and retaining its confidence.

Extensive classification of sensitive information makes it difficult to comment on the successes and failures of military intelligence in recent years, but enough has become known to indicate that many difficulties still preclude the most desirable level of effectiveness. Significant intelligence failures include the inability to anticipate North Korea's invasion of South Korea in 1950 – Matthew Aid (1999) argues that the American intelligence organizations failed to collect, analyze, and disseminate information adequately in East Asia in 1950 – or Chinese military

intervention that followed (Unsinger 1989); early warning about the Cuban missile crisis of 1962; accurate evaluation of developments in Southeast Asia that led to the Vietnam War; the fall of the Shah of Iran and its consequences; various terrorist successes, including the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon in 2001; and apparently the proliferation of nuclear capability. The spottiness and unreliability of the scattered information that comes to light continues to prevent the public from gaining adequate insight into the requirements of national security. Nevertheless, Richard Aldrich, *The Hidden Hand: Britain, America and Cold War Secret Intelligence* (2002) calculates that despite differences Anglo-American intelligence agencies cooperated quite effectively during the 1945–63 period and enjoyed a number of successes, a judgment that Christopher A. Ford, David Alan Rosenberg, and Randy Carol Balano (2005) also rendered in their study of British-American naval intelligence. Stephen Ambrose (1981) analyzes intelligence operations in Iran, Guatemala, Hungary, Vietnam, and Indonesia, plus the U-2 incident and preparations for the Bay of Pigs concluding that, despite some “ignominious failures,” President Eisenhower directed the “most efficient intelligence establishment in world.”

The extreme importance of achieving the highest possible levels of competency in the most exacting fields of military intelligence continues to exist. The demand persists for due diligence despite the many barriers to success that will probably continue to trouble the intelligence community for the foreseeable future. One such problem is a trend toward budgetary cuts that reduce resources while expenses increase. Recent reduction in the oversight of DoD intelligence agencies has aroused concern. Some critics have proposed a granting authority to the Government Accountability Office to assume increased oversight. A significant dispute continues about the degree to which the intelligence community should participate in national security decisions in addition to providing useful information. Critics often argue that intelligence officials exercised undue influence on decisions during the interventions in Vietnam and Iraq. Some also question the legality and morality of operations such as the overthrow of antagonistic regimes, the murder of political enemies, and the alleged use of inhumane techniques, including torture, to facilitate interrogation of terrorists.

In recent years the intelligence community has concentrated on collection of information, especially imagery and signals intelligence. Some experts believe that more attention should be directed to understanding the meaning of intelligence. They argue that the intelligence community should strengthen its analysis of acquired data and produce improved intelligence. This reform might help to identify policy options and permit arriving at the best choices more effectively than in the past, including the compiling of the National Intelligence Estimates of the CIA. Fascination with the potential of the computer might lessen attention to the study of the computer's product. Debate over this question and other aspects of intelligence, including military intelligence, seems likely to intensify, especially if serious intelligence breakdowns continue to occur.

Failed intelligence adversely affects the operations of the entire intelligence community, although a given lapse may involve only one agency. The intelligence

functions of the nation have probably drawn more criticism for ineffectiveness than for malpractice, but growing public scrutiny and efforts to reform various aspects of the intelligence function might well lead to constructive gains in the future. These desirable improvements include strengthened national security and adequate public information about the intelligence community and its activities.

Twenty-first-century historians have come to analyze and appreciate the role that intelligence, including military intelligence, plays in both war and peace. The sophistication of their work has grown exponentially in recent years, but there remains much work to be done in the field. The nature of the activity and national security concerns have kept many sources secret for over half a century. The expansion in the number of organizations conducting intelligence activities has complicated the study of the intelligence community's performance during the Cold War and post-Cold War Era. Jeffrey Richelson's *The US Intelligence Community* (2007) provides a primer on what modern intelligence entails, including the organizations that conduct it (CIA, NSA, NRO, NGA, DIA, the intelligence agencies of each of the armed services and unified commands, and other civilian agencies); signals intelligence; imagery collection, interpretation, and dissemination; and a variety of other topics. As more and more documentation becomes public, historians will gain increasingly rich opportunities for research and analysis.

#### ACKNOWLEDGMENT

James C. Bradford contributed extensively to both the form and substance of this chapter. It is a pleasure to acknowledge this excellent support.

#### BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Aid, Matthew M. (1999). "US HUMINT and COMINT in the Korean War: From the Approach to War to the Chinese Intervention," *Intelligence and National Security*, 14:1 (Winter), 17–63.
- Aldrich, Richard J. (2002). *The Hidden Hand: Britain, America and Cold War Secret Intelligence*. London: John Murray.
- Allen, Deane J., and Brian Shellum, eds. (2002). *At the Creation, 1961–1965: Origination Documents of the Defense Intelligence Agency*. Washington: DIA History Office.
- Allen, Thomas. (2006). *Intelligence in the Civil War*. Washington: Central Intelligence Agency.
- Ambrose, Stephen (1981). *Ike's Spies: Eisenhower and the Espionage Establishment*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday.
- Andrew, Christopher (1996). *For the President's Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from Washington to Bush*. New York: Harper.
- Arnold, David Christopher (2005). *Spying from Space: Constructing America's Satellite Command and Control System*. College Station: Texas A&M University Press.
- Augur, Helen (1955). *The Secret War of Independence*. New York: Duell.
- Bakeless, John E. (1959). *Turncoats, Traitors, and Heroes: Espionage in the American Revolution*. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott.
- Bakeless, John E. (1970). *Spies of the Confederacy*. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott.
- Bamford, James (2001). *Body of Secrets: Anatomy of the Ultra-Secret National Security Agency from the Cold War through the Dawn of a New Century*. New York: Doubleday.

- Bath, Alan Harris (1998). *Tracking the Axis Enemy: The Triumph of Anglo-American Naval Intelligence*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
- Bethel, Elizabeth (1947), "The Military Information Division: Origin of the Intelligence Division," *Military Affairs*, 11:1, 17–24.
- Breitman, Richard, Norman J. W. Goda, and Timothy Naftali (2005). *U.S. Intelligence and the Nazis*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Burrows, William E. (1985). *Deep Black: Space Espionage and National Security*. New York: Random House.
- Caruso, A. Brooke (1991). *The Mexican Spy Company: United States Covert Operations in Mexico, 1845–1848*. Jefferson, NC: McFarland Publishing.
- Christensen, Charles R. (2002). *A History of the Development of Technical Intelligence in the Air Force, 1917–1947: Operation Lusty*. Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen.
- Cristol, Jay (2002). *The Liberty Incident: The Israeli Attack on the U.S. Navy Spy Ship*. Washington: Brassey's.
- Crumley, Brian Tyrone (2002). "The Naval Attaché System of the United States, 1882–1914," PhD dissertation, Texas A&M University.
- Currey, Cecil B. (1972). *Code Number 72/Ben Franklin: Patriot or Spy*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
- Day, Dwayne A., John M. Logsdon, and Brian Latell, eds. (1998). *Eye in the Sky: The Story of the Corona Spy Satellites*. Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press.
- Dorwart, Jeffery M. (1979). *Office of Naval Intelligence: The Birth of America's First Intelligence Agency, 1865–1918*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Dorwart, Jeffery M. (1983). *Conflict of Duty: The U.S. Navy's Intelligence Dilemma, 1919–1945*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Drea, Edward J. (1992). *MacArthur's Ultra: Codebreaking and the War against Japan, 1942–1945*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
- Durning, Marvin B. (2007). *World Turned Upside Down: U.S. Naval Intelligence and the Early Cold War Struggle for Germany*. Washington: Potomac Books.
- Feis, William N. (2002). *Grant's Secret Service: The Intelligence War from Belmont to Appomattox*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
- Finnegan, James P. (1998). *Military Intelligence*. Washington: US Army Center of Military History.
- Fishel, Edwin C. (1996). *The Secret War for the Union: The Untold Story of Military Intelligence in the Civil War*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co.
- Flexner, James Thomas (1953). *The Traitor and the Spy: Benedict Arnold and John André*. New York, Harcourt, Brace.
- Ford, Christopher A., David Alan Rosenberg, and Randy Carol Balano (2005). *The Admiral's Advantage: U.S. Navy Operational Intelligence in World War II and the Cold War*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Ford, Corey (1965). *A Peculiar Service*. Boston: Little, Brown.
- French, Allen (1932). *General Gage's Informers: New Material upon Lexington & Concord, Benjamin Thompson as Loyalist & the Treachery of Benjamin Church, Jr.*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Gardner, W. J. R. (2000). *Decoding History: The Battle of the Atlantic and Ultra*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Gilbert, James L., and John Patrick Finnegan (1993). *U.S. Army Signals Intelligence in World War II: A Documentary History*. Washington: Center of Military History.
- Heideking, Jürgen, and Christof Mauch, eds. (1996). *American Intelligence and the German Resistance to Hitler: A Documentary History*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

- Ind, Allison (1958). *Allied Intelligence Bureau: Our Secret Weapon in the War against Japan*. New York: McKay Co.
- Jeffreys-Jones, Rhodri (2002). *Cloak and Dollar: A History of American Secret Intelligence*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Kahn, David (2004). *The Reader of Gentlemen's Mail: Herbert O. Yardley and the Birth of American Codebreaking*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Katz, Barry (1989). *Foreign Intelligence: Research & Analysis in the Office of Strategic Services, 1942–1945*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Kreis, John F. (1996). *Piercing the Fog: Intelligence and the Army Air Forces Operations during World War II*. Washington: Office of Air Force History.
- Layton, Edwin T., with Roger Pineau and John Costello (1985). *"And I Was There": Pearl Harbor and Midway – Breaking the Secrets*. New York: William Morrow.
- Liston, Robert A. (1988). *The Pueblo Surrender: A Covert Action by the National Security Agency*. New York: M. Evans.
- Luvaas, Jay (1990) "The Role of Intelligence in the Chancellorsville Campaign, April–May, 1863," *Intelligence and National Security*, 5:2 (April), 99–115.
- Mahnken, Thomas G. (2002). *Uncovering Ways of War: U.S. Intelligence and Foreign Military Innovation, 1918–1941*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Markle, Donald E. (1994). *Spies and Spymasters of the Civil War*. New York: Hippocrene Books.
- Miller, Nathan (1989). *Spying for America: The Hidden History of U.S. Intelligence*. New York: Pargon House.
- Milton, David Hepburn (2003). *Lincoln's Spymaster: Thomas Haines Dudley and the Liverpool Network*. Mechanicsville, PA: Stackpole Books.
- Mobley, Richard A. (2003). *Flash Point North Korea: The Pueblo and EC-121 Crises*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Morn, Frank (1982). *The Eye That Never Sleeps: A History of the Pinkerton National Detective Agency*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Nelson, Anna Kasten (1988). *Secret Agents: President Polk and the Search for Peace with Mexico*. New York: Garland.
- O'Toole, G. J. (1991) *Honorable Treachery: A History of U.S. Intelligence, Espionage, and Covert Action from the American Revolution to the CIA*. New York: Atlantic Monthly Press.
- Packard, Wyman H. (1996). *Century of Naval Intelligence*. Washington: Office of Naval Intelligence/Office of Naval History.
- Pennypacker, Morton (1939). *General Washington's Spies on Long Island and in New York*. Brooklyn, NY: Long Island Historical Society.
- Persico, Joseph E. (2002). *Roosevelt's Secret War: FDR and World War II Espionage*. New York: Random House.
- Prados, John (1995). *Combined Fleet Decoded: The Secret History of American Intelligence and the Japanese Navy in World War II*. New York: Random House.
- Richelson, Jeffrey T. (1990). *America's Secret Eyes in Space: The U.S. Keyhole Spy Satellite Program*. New York: HarperCollins.
- Richelson, Jeffrey T. (1995). *A Century of Spies: Intelligence in the Twentieth Century*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Richelson, Jeffrey T. (2001). *America's Space Sentinels: DSP Satellites and National Security*. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press.
- Richelson, Jeffrey T. (2007). *The U.S. Intelligence Community*, 5th ed. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.



- Rose, Alexander (2006). *Washington's Spies: The Story of America's First Spy Ring*. New York: Bantam.
- Scanlon, Charles Francis (2002). *In Defense of the Nation: DIA at Forty Years*. Washington: Defense Intelligence Agency.
- Sellers, Charles Coleman (1976). *Patience Wright: American Artist and Spy in George III's London*. Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press.
- Smith, Bradley F. (1983). *The Shadow Warriors: O.S.S. and the Origins of the C.I.A.* New York: Basic Books.
- Smith, Bradley F. (1993). *The Ultra-Magic Deals and the Most Secret Special Relationship, 1940–1946*. Novato, CA: Presidio Press.
- Smith, Bradley F. (1996). *Sharing Secrets with Stalin: How the Allies Traded Intelligence, 1941–1945*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
- Sontag, Sherry, and Christopher Drew (1999). *Blind Man's Bluff: The Untold Story of American Submarine Espionage*. New York: HarperTorch.
- Soybel, Phyllis L. (2005). *A Necessary Relationship: The Development of Anglo-American Cooperation in Naval Intelligence*. Westport, CT: Praeger.
- Stern, Philip Van Doren (1990). *Secret Missions of the Civil War*. New York: Wings Books.
- Stuart, Meriwether (1981). "Of Spies and Borrowed Names: The Identity of Union Operatives in Richmond Known as 'The Phillipses' Discovered," *Virginia Magazine of History and Biography*, 89:3 (July), 308–27.
- Sullivan, Brian R. (1991). "'A Highly Commendable Action': William J. Donovan's Intelligence Mission for Mussolini and Roosevelt, December 1935–February 1936," *Intelligence and National Security*, 6:2 (April), 344–66.
- Thompson, Edmund R. (1991). *Secret New England: Spies of the American Revolution*. Kennebunk, ME: New England Chapter, Association of Former Intelligence Officers.
- Troy, Thomas F. (1973). "Donovan's Original Marching Orders," *Studies in Intelligence*, 17:2 (Summer), 39–69.
- Unsinger, Peter C. (1989). "Three Intelligence Blunders in Korea," *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*, 3:4 (Winter), 549–61.
- US Government (2009). "United States Intelligence Community – Who We Are." <http://www.intelligence.gov/1-members.shtml> (accessed May 6, 2009).
- Vaillancourt, John P. (1961). "Edward Bancroft (@Edwd. Edwards), Estimable Spy," *Studies in Intelligence*, 5:1 (Winter), 53–67.
- Van Deman, Ralph. H., and Ralph Edward Weber (1988). *The Final Memoranda: Major General Ralph H. Van Deman, USA Ret., 1865–1952: Father of U.S. Military Intelligence*. Wilmington, DE: SR Books.
- Van Doren, Carl (1941). *Secret History of the American Revolution: An Account of the Conspiracies of Benedict Arnold and Numerous Others, Drawn from the Secret Service Papers of the British Headquarters in North America, Now for the First Time Examined and Made Public*. New York: Viking Press.
- Van Keuren, David K. (2001). "Cold War Science in Black and White: US Intelligence Gathering and Its Scientific Cover at the Naval Research Laboratory, 1948–62," *Social Studies of Science*, 31:2 (April), 207–29.
- Varner, Roy D. (1978). *A Matter of Risk: The Incredible Inside Story of the CIA's Hughes Glomar Explorer Mission to Raise a Russian Submarine*. New York: Random House.
- Wagner, Arthur L. (1903). *The Service of Security and Information*. Kansas City, MO: Hudson-Kimberly.
- Walsh, John Evangelist (2001). *The Execution of Major André*. New York: Palgrave.

# Chapter Forty-six

## MILITARY EDUCATION AND TRAINING

*Jennifer L. Speelman*

Throughout American military history, commanders have used military education and training to mold their fighting force. Although often used interchangeably, the terms have two very different definitions. I. B. Holley (1998) points out these distinctions in *Forging the Sword: Selecting, Educating, and Training Cadets and Junior Officers in the Modern World* (Converse 1998). By training soldiers, the service attempts to teach “proficiency ... the best way to perform a task,” while education attempts to “develop perspective, values and the ability to cope with change, novelty, and uncertainty” (Converse 1998: 26). Within the military, ongoing debates focused on what kind of education would best serve its officers and what shape training exercises should take for enlisted personnel. These methods are shaped by historical context, articulate reformers, technological change on the battlefield, and trends in mainstream American education. The consistent theme is that investment in educational tools can produce concrete results in military performance.

The individual most responsible for defining the parameters of military education and training is Samuel P. Huntington in *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil–Military Relations* (1957). Huntington defines a profession as a vocation with clearly defined expertise, responsibility, and corporateness. Although this process was a gradual one, the development of a professional officer corps went through three distinct phases. First, aristocratic birth as a requirement for officership was abolished, a basic level of training was required, and a minimum amount of educational competency attained. For Huntington, these criteria refer to the officer corps and not to the enlisted personnel. The difference is that the officers are expected to specialize in the management of violence and the enlisted personnel specialize in the application of violence.

Prior to the eighteenth century, most soldiers equated courage, honor, and physical stamina as the defining attributes for successful soldiers, not intelligence. But the development of military academies in Britain, France, and Prussia provided the model for the United States. Founded in 1802 by Thomas Jefferson, the United States Military Academy at West Point attempted to give future officers rudimentary

knowledge of mathematics, engineering, and military science. Most histories credit the survival of the military academy to Sylvanus Thayer, its third Superintendent (Ambrose 1966, Ellis and Moore 1974, Pappas 1993). Thayer had spent time in France and was particularly impressed with the French engineering school, L'École Polytechnique, in Paris. James L. Morrison argues that Thayer, who served as Superintendent from 1817 to 1833, borrowed heavily from the French model and selected faculty who supported such a curriculum (Morrison 1986: 23), though Theodore Crackel (2002), traces many of the changes made by Thayer to the faculty who he asked for suggestions, especially regarding curriculum.

In addition to engineering skills, West Point also sought to instill character education in its future officers. John P. Lovell (1979) argues that in Thayer's seminary-academy, all elements of a young man's education were significant: the intellectual, the physical, and the spiritual. Lori Bogle (2002) believes this moral and ethical emphasis outweighs the engineering curriculum as the most important contribution of the Thayer System. To instill these ideals in cadets, he used mandatory chapel attendance and formal courses in morality and ethics to create "a military ethos that placed ethical behavior as a primary goal of officer education" (Bogle 2002: 64). In 1824 the Army established its first postgraduate school, one for artillery officers at Fortress Monroe, Virginia. Three years later an informal Infantry School of Practice was established at Jefferson Barracks, Missouri. Neither school flourished when Andrew Jackson became president in 1829 because he and his followers feared that such education might produce an aristocratic officer corps.

Prior to 1845 the United States Navy relied on apprentice style training for its young midshipmen on board active naval vessels, where they mastered skills in seamanship, navigation, and ordnance. At-sea training was considered so important that officers resisted a shore-based academy comparable to West Point. But the advent of steam engineering coupled with an attempted mutiny onboard a midshipmen training cruise in 1842 spurred educational reform. Secretary of the Navy George Bancroft opened the Naval School at Annapolis in 1845 (Sweetman 1979). Under the direction of Superintendent Cornelius K. Stribling from 1850 to 1853, the academy became a national educational institution with a 4-year curriculum of mathematics, modern languages, English, and natural philosophy taught by a mix of civilian and military faculty (Todorich 1984). In 1851 the Naval Academy instituted the first summer practice cruise that allowed midshipmen to gain the necessary skills in practical seamanship, naval tactics, and navigation while under the direct supervision of naval officers (Hunter 2006). Todorich (1984) credits the academy with instilling a deep and abiding sense of nationalism that served them well in the Civil War. The quality of midshipmen so impressed Confederate Secretary of the Navy Stephen R. Mallory that he sought the establishment of the Confederate Naval School in 1863. Thomas R. Campbell's *Academy on the James* (1998) argues that the training they received on board the schoolship *Patrick Henry* as well as their military service in the James River Squadron during the spring of 1864 produced valuable officers for the Confederate Navy.

Peter Karsten *The Naval Aristocracy* (1972) studied the background of the midshipmen who attended the academy and found that they "were drawn from

the commercial, industrial, and professional elite of the nation" (10). He believes that the school went beyond just instilling pride and patriotism in midshipmen, but subjected them to an educational experience filled with indoctrination that resulted in careerism. As the academy remained the sole supplier of naval officers until 1925, these men figured prominently in shaping the policy of the New Navy.

The professionalization of the United States Army officer corps is a central theme of William B. Skelton's *An American Profession of Arms* (1992). Skelton argues this change occurred during the antebellum period following the War of 1812. Among other criteria, Skelton suggests the Army developed "a regular system for the recruitment and professional training of officers; a high degree of regularity in internal military administration; an extensive, though disparate, body of thought on professional topics, and most importantly, the separation of the officer corps from the civilian political mainstream and its commitment to apolitical service" (Skelton 1996: 338). As standards of military education and training are most often judged by the performance of officers during military conflicts, the Mexican War (1846–8) served as a favorable barometer for the army officer corps as a whole.

There are also a number of scholars who date the professionalization of the officer corps somewhat later. Included in this camp is Samuel Huntington, who believes that military professionalism blossomed in the Gilded Era (1865–1914) as a result of increased isolation of a conservative officer corps from liberal civilian society and the efforts of a group of educational reformers (Huntington 1957). Edward M. Coffman in *The Old Army* (1986) agrees with Huntington that professionalization occurred in the latter half of the nineteenth century, but he sees this as a process that stemmed from the fact the army was connected to, not isolated from, mainstream America and new managerial trends.

The post-bellum period also saw the creation of a new service academy. Sumner Kimball, chief of the Treasury Department's Revenue Marine Bureau, recognized the value of training for its young officers. As a result of his lobbying, Congress created the Revenue School of Instruction on July 31, 1876. Irving H. King (1996) examines the formative years of what would become the United States Coast Guard Academy. Unlike the Naval Academy, which acquired shore facilities, the Revenue School of Instruction operated on the schoolship USRC *Dobbin* until it transferred in 1878 to the USRC *Salmon P. Chase*. The vessels served as classrooms, dormitories, and training ships for a 2-year course of instruction that focused primarily on practical seamanship. King admits that "there was a tremendous dissonance between the demanding academic admissions examination required of all cadets and a curriculum that was heavily weighted in professional subjects taught in a most practical manner" (190). The Revenue Cutter Service expected its cadets to have already completed their liberal education and used these two years to prepare them for their jobs as Third Lieutenants. A third year was added to the curriculum in 1903 just after the school acquired its first shore facility at Arundel Cove in Maryland. In 1910 it moved to its permanent location at Fort Trumbull in New London, Connecticut.

Naval education and training also underwent a transformation during the late nineteenth century. Naval officer Stephen B. Luce led this reform at all levels of

the navy. While no full-length modern biography exists, John D. Hayes and John B. Hattendorf's *The Writings of Stephen B. Luce* (1975) gives an overview of his career and publications. Luce's time in the service, 1841–89, spanned the technological transformation from sail to steam to steel. Hayes and Hattendorf (1975: 3) argue that:

Stephen B. Luce was able to perceive that the individuals who controlled and directed the new technology were far more important than the weapons and machines themselves. This perception provided the basis of his approach and contributed to the growing professionalism of the service.

Believing that senior officers must understand the political implications of the use of force, Luce emphasized the study of policy and strategy rather than tactics and operations (Hattendorf 1990).

For over a century, the United States did not establish facilities for training enlisted personnel. The sailing navy drew on the merchant marine for its sailors and the army inducted recruits or draftees into regular units where commissioned and non-commissioned officers “whipped them into shape.” Historians have traditionally asserted that during the winter at Valley Forge, Freidrich Wilhelm Steuben drilled soldiers of the Continental Army transforming them from “rabble in arms” into a more effective and “professional force” (Buchanan 2004, Fleming 2005), a view recently challenged by Wayne Bodle (2004) suggesting the need for further study. Whatever the immediate impact of Steuben's *Regulations for the Order and Discipline of the Troops of the United States* (1779), no system of basic training would be established until the twentieth century.

By that time the Navy had begun training prospective sailors, in part because the American merchant marine had so declined during and after the Civil War that it could no longer provide a pool of experienced mariners. To meet the needs of the Navy, Stephen Luce advocated the apprentice system, convinced that training enlisted men before they joined their ship would result in a career-enlisted force. In 1875 he won Congressional approval to train 750 boys between the ages of 16 and 18 on USS *Minnesota*. Facilities were established ashore at Coasters Harbor Island, Rhode Island, and at Yerba Buena Island in San Francisco Bay. Apprentices learned traditional sail handling skills, music, and seamanship (Hayes and Hattendorf 1975). The program, which would become the Naval Training System, failed to produce the long-term enlisted personnel envisioned by Luce. More immediately successful was the establishment of a gunnery class at the Washington Navy Yard followed by a similar program in Newport two years later.

The modern steel ships constructed in the 1890s required the navy to reevaluate its training program. Frederick S. Harrod's *Manning the New Navy* (1978) argues that after the Spanish–American War, the navy revised its recruiting and training to attract a new breed of “sailor-technicians.” These enlisted men were recruited from across the country, not just in traditional seaports, and given training in electronics, machinery, and gunnery on shore prior to being assigned to their ships. Unlike naval apprentice training, these programs succeeded in producing high

re-enlistment rates, low desertion rates, and a marked improvement in the status of sailors. In 1899 the Navy opened electricity schools to train enlisted men in Boston and New York.

At the senior levels of the United States Navy, Luce's educational reforms were also present. Founded in 1884, the Naval War College, the world's first institution for senior officer education, was designed to provide senior officers with a broad knowledge of military science, international affairs, and naval history (Hattendorf, Simpson, and Wadleigh 1984). To justify the school's existence, Lieutenant William McCarty Little introduced the concept of war-gaming to the War College curriculum in 1893. Initially a way for officers to practice the art of war during peacetime, this exercise expanded into fleet exercises and then full-fledged war planning with the General Board (est. 1900) until the outbreak of World War I (Spector 1977). Not all naval officers or politicians approved of the new Naval War College and it took the widespread popularity of Alfred Thayer Mahan's *The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783* (1890) coupled with the Navy's success in the Spanish–American War to win it widespread support and imitators, including the Army War College, established in 1901.

Although closely associated with the United States Navy, the Marine Corps went through its own growing pains at the end of the nineteenth century (Shulimson 1993). With the creation of the New Navy, the Marine Corps' traditional role as ships' guards seemed obsolete. In 1891 Marine Corps Commandant Charles Heywood responded with attempts to improve officer professionalism such as the creation the School of Application in the Washington Navy yard where new lieutenants and selected noncommissioned officers received training in infantry tactics, naval gunnery, and electricity. The Spanish–American War helped the Marine Corps articulate an advance base mission linking it with the twentieth-century Navy and continuing to justify its existence as a separate force.

Nor was the Army left out of the renewed interest in professional development at the end of the nineteenth century. In 1881 Commanding General of the Army William T. Sherman founded the School of Application for Cavalry and Infantry at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. This would be the first of many army schools at that location. Timothy Nenninger's *The Leavenworth Schools and the Old Army: Education, Professionalism, and the Officer Corps of the United States Army, 1881–1918* (1978) traces the growth and development of postgraduate schools at Fort Leavenworth. "Other than war," Nenninger notes, "schooling is among the principal means by which officers can develop professional expertise" (Nenninger 1978: 6). Although skeptics remained unconvinced of how much a school could impart to soldiers about tactics, the Leavenworth Schools brought about new and innovative methods of instruction. The use of map exercises and tactical exercises as well as the adoption of a standard form for field orders emphasized a more analytical approach. The Spanish–American War demonstrated just how inexperienced the United States Army was in mobilization and planning and the role of Leavenworth became even more important to the army. Secretary of the Army Elihu Root inaugurated a series of reforms that included the founding of the Army War College (1901) for strategy and planning (Pappas 1967) and the General Service



and Staff College (1902) with an emphasis on general staff duties. Although Leavenworth did not always include new technology, such as tactical airpower or mechanized warfare, in its curriculum, Nenninger contends that it did prepare officers for the organizational challenges of the First World War. "Leavenworth graduates were among the best qualified officers to plan, organize, train, and staff a large expeditionary force. Pershing recognized this and placed Leavenworth men in important positions (Nenninger 1978: 103–7, 134).

On the eve of World War I the National Defense Act of 1916 provided for the establishment of 16 camps to train officers and once the United States entered the war the army established schools for each branch of the service in France. The Navy met its need for more officers by setting up a 10- and later a 16-week course at the Naval Academy for reserve officers most of whom were professionals and businessmen who had graduated from Ivy League colleges.

The challenges brought about by mass conscription during World War I were not confined to the army. The problem of training enlisted personnel on a large-scale is examined in Michael D. Besch's *A Navy Second to None* (2002). Besch credits Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels with a number of educational reforms that "resulted in a better-trained force, capable of learning the sophisticated new technologies" (Besch 2002: 207). However, the Navy failed to anticipate the vast need for training facilities for enlisted personnel and the naval reserve force when the Naval Act of 1916 allowed for the expansion of the fleet by 46 percent. While the Navy's personnel were not as prepared as they might have liked when the US entered World War I, they succeeded in planning and implementing the training of 478,755 enlisted men at training stations, camps, and specialty schools across the country.

By the outbreak of World War I, aspects of military education and training had also spread to the civilian sector. Prior to the Civil War, state colleges such as Norwich University (1819), Virginia Military Institute (1839), and The Citadel (1842) all incorporated aspects of military education into their curriculum. According to Rod Andrew in *Long Grey Lines* (2001), it was the postwar period that saw a proliferation of southern military colleges. The Morrill Land Grant Act of 1862 gave states the financial means to create colleges with an emphasis on agricultural, mechanical, scientific courses, and military science. Unlike northern schools that incorporated a minimal amount of military training, southern colleges made military training their centerpiece with the student body organized as a corps of cadets (Andrew 2001). These included Arkansas (1871), Auburn (1872), Virginia Tech (1872), Texas A&M (1876), Mississippi State (1878), North Carolina State (1887), and Clemson (1889). For southerners, the use of military education was an ideal way of preparing young men not for military careers, but civilian ones.

The belief that military training was beneficial for citizens-soldiers was also evidenced by the advent of the Plattsburg Training Movement. John Garry Clifford explores the preparedness campaign and its most ardent spokesmen Major General Leonard Wood in *The Citizen-Soldiers: The Plattsburg Training Camp Movement, 1913–1920* (1972). Initiated in 1913 at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, and Monterey, California, the training camps gave college students several weeks of

military training without requiring them to enlist. The sinking of the *Lusitania* in May 1915 dramatically increased the number of student participants and resulted in a new training camp for businessmen in Plattsburg, New York. Twelve hundred businessmen showed up, including the mayor of New York, for four weeks of drill, marching, marksmanship, and specialized instruction from cavalry, signal corps, engineering, and artillery officers (Clifford 1972). The National Defense Act of 1916 brought the Plattsburg Camps under federal supervision and used them as a model to create the Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC) on college campuses (Clifford 1972). All of these lessons were put into effect to conduct training on a massive scale for the American Expeditionary Force of World War I.

The interwar years brought calls for a new service academy. Long considered a significant naval auxiliary, the merchant marine had played a significant role in transporting the AEF to France. Merchant marine officers were required to pass Coast Guard licensing examinations, but few had any formalized training. New York, Pennsylvania, and Massachusetts operated two-year academies, but many in the shipping industry argued that maritime academies should be a federal, not state, responsibility. C. Bradford Mitchell (1977) traces the tumultuous first years of the United States Merchant Marine Academy. The Merchant Marine Act of 1936 established the Merchant Marine Cadet Corps and in March 1938 the Maritime Commission took control of the program and placed Richard McNulty as Supervisor of Cadet Training. In March 1942 Cadet Headquarters moved to the former Chrysler Estate at Kings Point, New York, but retained its two branch campuses at San Mateo, California, and Pass Christian, Mississippi. During World War II, cadets studied naval science, engineering, seamanship, and navigation in addition to acquiring six months practical experience at sea. This requirement exacted a high cost as 142 Merchant Marine cadets died when their ships came under attack in combat zones. After the war, the United States Merchant Marine Academy achieved accreditation for its four-year degree program and gained permanent legislative status on February 20, 1956.

World War II caused the military to implement various wartime programs to train civilian draftees. Faced with a tremendous increase in ships, a draft age of 18, and the prospect of a long-term conflict, the Navy was deeply concerned about creating a pool of qualified future officers. James G. Schneider outlines the Navy's V-12 program in *The Navy V-12 Program: Leadership for a Lifetime* (1993 [1987]) which operated between July 1, 1943 and June 30, 1946. In all, 131 colleges and universities collaborated with the navy in a unique educational program for naval officers. The implementation of the V-12 program allowed 125,000 prospective officers to enlist in the navy, but continue an intensive year-long course of study at civilian colleges before entering active service. Its success was due to the fact that while naval personnel handled the disciplinary aspects and physical training, the academic side of the equation was left to the colleges.

The Cold War brought new world-wide responsibilities, the complexity of modern warfare, and the largest peacetime military in American history. Military education and training became even more critical in preparing soldiers, sailors, and especially aviators to meet those challenges. The Army's earliest effort to educate

airmen was at the Air Corps Tactical School, established in 1926. Robert T. Finney's *History of the Air Corps Tactical School, 1920–1940* (1992 [1955]) examines the army's efforts to teach aerial reconnaissance, pursuit, attack, and bombardment. The school moved to Maxwell Field, Alabama, in July 1931 and became the de facto Air Corps Doctrinal Center. With the National Defense Act of 1947, an independent Air Force called for a separate academy. This occurred in March 1954, but it would not be until 1958 that the Air Force Academy moved to its permanent location in Colorado Springs. John P. Lovell's *Neither Athens nor Sparta? The American Service Academies in Transition* (1979) argues that the Air Force Academy led the way for reform and change in military education. Academic Dean Brigadier General Rover McDermott wanted to see a curriculum more in line with mainstream colleges. The Air Force Academy adopted academic majors, faculty with advanced degrees, and increased exposure to the humanities and social sciences in order to better education its officers (Lovell 1979). The independence of the Air Force also led to the establishment of the Air War College (Grandstaff 2002).

The Air Force also worked diligently to create professional noncommissioned officers (NCO). Mark R. Grandstaff's *Foundation of the Force: Air Force Enlisted Personnel Policy, 1907–1956* (1997) details the changes ongoing at enlisted levels. Electronic applications played a more important role in communications, weapons systems, radar, and weather detection, so the Air Force placed greater emphasis on those technical skills for enlisted personnel. The service emphasized the belief that "airmen were technicians first, and soldiers, a distant second." Grandstaff argues that by 1955 this mindset had fostered a sense of professionalism among Air Force NCOs as "managers of military resources" that was not found in the other services. As a way to ascertain whether this program was working, the Air Force also "civilianized" and began to address issues such as promotion, housing, pay, and marriage to retain those NCOS. By 1956, the high reenlistment rates suggested that the Air Force has succeeded in that regard.

The influence of the military academies declined during the Cold War era as ROTC Programs and Officer Candidate Schools began producing more active-duty officers. Gene M. Lyons and John W. Masland examine the postwar relationship between the military and colleges in *Education and Military Leadership: A Study of the ROTC* (1959). The authors found ROTC programs varied widely from school to school, lacked adequate federal funding, and needed to incorporate more regular college courses (such as American history, mathematics, and engineering) into the military science curriculum (Lyons and Masland 1959). Michael S. Neiberg in *Making Citizen-Soldiers: ROTC and the Ideology of American Military Service* (2000) argues that by 1980 the ROTC program had been successfully transformed from one of technical training to professional education. Despite the student protests and anti-war demonstrations of the 1960s, educators remained staunch advocates of ROTC programs believing that educating officers at civilian colleges was "consistent with fundamental American values and ideas about the place of the military in American society" (8).

In 1986 the US Army created an independent Cadet Command under the US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). Arthur T. Coumbe and Lee

S. Harford outline the organizational changes of these pre-commissioning programs in *U.S. Army Cadet Command: The 10 Year History* (1996). The new command structure allowed unified control over all ROTC programs. Combined with an increased number of scholarships and tougher training, such as the Ranger Challenge, Coumbe and Harford argue that its success contributed to the outstanding performance of junior officers during the Persian Gulf War. In 2003 the Navy established the unified Naval Service Training Command to direct all education and training for that service.

The Selective Service Act of 1948 not only instituted a larger military, but also a more diverse one and military schools grappled with the admission of minority cadets. During Reconstruction Henry O. Flipper became the first African-American graduate from West Point, but the Navy adamantly refused to allow any African-Americans to become midshipmen. Robert J. Schneller, *Breaking the Color Barrier: The U.S. Naval Academy's First Black Midshipmen and the Struggle for Racial Equality* (2005), highlights the challenges faced by Wesley A. Brown between 1945 and 1949 to become the first African-American graduate. Schneller argues that pressure from politicians and civil rights advocates finally caused a dramatic shift in naval policy from exclusion to the commissioning of the Navy's first black officers (Schneller 2005). H. Michael Gelfand's *Sea Change at Annapolis: The United States Naval Academy, 1949–2000* (2006) continues the story of minority midshipmen and their struggle to gain acceptance at the naval academy as well as the controversy over the admission of women. On October 7, 1975, President Gerald Ford made the service academies coeducational institutions and the Class of 1980 would be the first to have female midshipmen. Although a difficult transition, Gelfand argues that female midshipmen benefited greatly from the support group of female athletic teams and have succeeded in all areas (Gelfand 2006).

In the post Vietnam Era, reforms in military education and training sought to solve the poor performance of the Vietnam Conflict as well as meet the needs of the All Volunteer Force. At the enlisted level, Harold G. Moore and Jeff M. Tuten's *Building a Volunteer Army: The Fort Ord Contribution* (1975) highlights the Army's field experiments to improve the Army's basic and advanced training systems. The training center at Fort Ord, California conducted many of these experimental changes as part of the Experimental Volunteer Army Training Program, such as a merit reward system and performance oriented assessment, and evaluated them prior to their adoption at other basic training centers. While Moore and Tuten see these reforms as bringing about an improved fighting force, William Darryl Henderson's *The Hollow Army: How the U.S. Army is Oversold and Undermanned* (1990) is more critical. Henderson argues that the primary responsibility of an army is to create high performance combat units consisting of infantry, artillery, and armor. Despite the adoption of the All Volunteer Force, these units have only been able to achieve mediocre performance ratings despite the utilization of Combat Training Centers. Henderson argues that the army has reduced the number of "trigger pullers" and handicapped its training of those units by assigning the best NCOs to noncombat units (Henderson 1990). Martin van Creveld's *The Training of Officers* (1990) also sees the American military moving away from its

combat mission. Using comparative examples from Israel and Vietnam, van Creveld questions the requirement for officers to have college degrees in the American system. There is “some scattered evidence,” he notes, “that an early college education with its heavy emphasis on theoretical and written skill, can actually be harmful to junior commanders whose job, after all, is to lead men in combat” (4).

Even with the increased importance attached to coalition warfare and peace keeping operations in the 21st century, military education is still seen as the best way to prepare officers for those complex tasks. Thomas A. Keaney (2002) argues that reforms at the senior schools in the 1980s offered the best way to “develop joint doctrine, improve inter-service coordination, and better prepare officers for joint duty” (148). Changes in the curriculum at the Army War College, Naval War College, National War College, Air University, Marine Corps War College, and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces have all reflected this trend. A quarter century after the war colleges began implementing reforms, including the adoption of new curriculum, critics, including historian Williamson Murray (1987), persisted in arguing that the institutions of professional military education continued to fail to fulfill their mission of preparing officers for the challenges of the post-Cold War world (Holder and Murray 1998).

Volker Franke’s *Preparing for Peace* (1999) examines the attitudes of West Point cadets regarding combat and non-combat missions. The Future Officer Survey opinions conducted by Franke in 1995–6 were “consistent with the claims that involvement in peace operations may undermine the military’s effectiveness to conduct combat missions” (Franke 1999: 163). Franke is of the opinion that the United States Military Academy could change the attitude of future officers in peacekeeping operations by bringing “Operations Other Than War” (OOTW) into the curriculum, discussing the morale and ethical challenges which occur during peace operations, and emphasizing the importance of joint operations and multinational coalitions.

Americans rely on military education and training to prepare soldiers for the complexities of modern war. Kennedy and Neilson in *Military Education* (2002) believe in the importance of education for soldiers in what ever mission they face. They argue that “war fighting is the greatest challenge to a student’s capacity for dealing with the unknown, and those trained, as opposed to educated have seldom managed to muster the wherewithal to cope with that environment” (xi). No doubt the debates over military education and training will continue as long as soldiers prepare for war. In terms of historical scholarship, much attention has been paid to military education, but very little to the training of enlisted personnel.

#### BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Ambrose, Stephen E. (1966). *Duty, Honor, Country: A History of West Point*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Andrew, Rod Jr. (2001). *Long Gray Lines: The Southern Military School Tradition, 1838–1915*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Besch, Michael D. (2002). *A Navy Second to None: The History of U.S. Naval Training in World War I*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.



- Bodle, Wayne K. (2004). *The Valley Forge Winter: Civilians and Soldiers in War*. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.
- Bogle, Lori (2002). "Sylvanus Thayer and the Ethical Education of Nineteenth-Century Military Officers in the United States," in Gregory C. Kennedy and Keith Neilson, eds., *Military Education: Past, Present, and Future*. Westport, CT: Praeger, 63–82.
- Buchanan, John (2004). *The Road to Valley Forge: How Washington Built the Army that Won the Revolution*. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons.
- Burr, Henry L. (1939). "Education in the Early Navy," EdD dissertation, Temple University Philadelphia.
- Campbell, R. Thomas (1998). *Academy on the James: The Confederate Naval School*. Shippensburg, PA: Burd Street Press.
- Clifford, John Garry (1972). *The Citizen Soldiers: The Plattsburg Training Camp Movement, 1913–1920*. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky.
- Coffman, Edward M. (1986). *The Old Army: A Portrait of the American Army in Peacetime, 1784–1898*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Converse, Elliott V., III, ed. (1998). *Forging the Sword: Selecting, Educating, and Training Cadets and Junior Officers in the Modern World*. Chicago: Imprint Publications.
- Coumbe, Arthur T., and Lee S. Harford (1996). *U.S. Army Cadet Command: The 10 Year History*. Fort Monroe, VA: Office of the Command Historian US Army Cadet Command.
- Crackel, Theodore J. (2002). *West Point: A Bicentennial History*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
- Crevelde, Martin van (1990). *The Training of Officers: From Military Professionalism to Irrelevance*. New York: Free Press.
- Cruikshank, Jeffrey L., and Chloe G. Kline (2007). *In Peace and War: A History of the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy at Kings Point*. New York: John Wiley.
- Ellis, Joseph, and Robert Moore (1974). *School for Soldiers: West Point and the Profession of Arms*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Finney, Robert T. (1992 [1955]). *History of the Air Corps Tactical School, 1920–1940*. Washington: Center for Air Force History.
- Fleming, Thomas (2005). *Washington's Secret War: The Hidden History of Valley Forge*. New York: Smithsonian Books/Collins.
- Forney, Todd A. (2004). *The Midshipman Culture and Educational Reform: The U.S. Naval Academy, 1946–1976*. Newark: University of Delaware Press.
- Franke, Volker (1999). *Preparing for Peace: Military Identity, Value Orientations, and Professional Military Education*. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers.
- Gelfand, H. Michael (2006). *Sea Change at Annapolis: The United States Naval Academy, 1949–2000*. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press.
- Grandstaff, Mark R. (1997). *Foundation of the Force: Air Force Enlisted Personnel Policy, 1907–1956*. Washington: Center for Air Force History and Museums.
- Grandstaff, Mark R. (2002). "To Make the Men for the Next Crisis: The USAF Air War College and the Education of Senior Military leaders, 1945–93," in Greg Kennedy and Keith Neilson, eds., *Military Education: Past, Present, and Future*. Westport, CT: Praeger, 129–48.
- Harrod, Frederick S. (1978). *Manning the New Navy: The Development of a Modern Naval Enlisted Force, 1899–1940*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
- Hattendorf, John B. (1990). "Stephen B. Luce: Intellectual Leader of the New Navy," in James C. Bradford, ed., *Admirals of the New Empire: Makers of the American Naval Tradition, 1880–1930*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2–23.



- Hattendorf, John B., R. Mitchell Simpson III, and John R. Wadleigh (1984). *Sailors and Scholars: The Centennial History of the U.S. Naval War College*. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press.
- Hayes, John D., and John B. Hattendorf, eds. (1975). *The Writings of Stephen B. Luce*. Newport, RI: Naval War College.
- Holder, Leonard D., Jr., and Williamson Murray (1998). "Prospects for Military Education," *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Spring, 81–90.
- Holley, I. B., Jr. (1998). "Training and Educating Pre-World War I United States Army Officers," in Elliott V. Converse, III, ed., *Forging the Sword: Selecting, Educating, and Training Cadets and Junior Officers in the Modern World*. Chicago: Imprint, 26–31.
- Henderson, William Darryl (1990). *The Hollow Army: How the U.S. Army is Oversold and Undermanned*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
- Hunter, Mark C. (2000). "Youth, Law, and Discipline at the U.S. Naval Academy, 1845–1861," *The Northern Mariner/Le Marin du nord*, 10:1 (April), 24, 30–1.
- Hunter, Mark C. (2006). "The U.S. Naval Academy and Its Summer Cruises: Professionalization in the Antebellum U.S. Navy, 1845–1861," *Journal of Military History*, 70:4 (October), 963–94.
- Huntington, Samuel P. (1957). *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
- Karsten, Peter (1972). *The Naval Aristocracy: The Golden Age of Annapolis and the Emergence of Modern American Navalism*. New York: Free Press.
- Keaney, Thomas A. (2002). "The War Colleges and Joint Education in the United States," in Greg Kennedy and Keith Neilson, eds., *Military Education: Past, Present, and Future*. Westport, CT: Praeger, 149–66.
- Kennedy, Greg, and Keith Neilson, eds. (2002). *Military Education: Past, Present, and Future*. Westport, CT: Praeger.
- King, Irving H. (1996). *The Coast Guard Expands, 1865–1915: New Roles, New Frontiers*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Lovell, John P. (1979). *Neither Athens nor Sparta?: The American Service Academies in Transition*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Lyons, Gene M., and John W. Masland (1959). *Education and Military Leadership: A Study of the R.O.T.C.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Mahan, Alfred Thayer (1890). *The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783*. Boston: Little, Brown and Co.
- Mitchell, C. Bradford (1977). *We'll Deliver: Early History of the United States Merchant Marine Academy, 1938–1956*. Kings Point, NY: US Merchant Marine Academy Alumni Association.
- Moore, Harold G., and Jeff M. Tuten (1975). *Building A Volunteer Army: The Fort Ord Contribution*. Washington: Department of the Army.
- Morrison, James L. (1986). *"The Best School in the World": West Point and the Pre-Civil War Years, 1833–1866*. Kent, OH: Kent State University Press.
- Murray, Williamson (1987). "Grading the War Colleges," *The National Interest*, 6 (Winter), 12–19.
- Neiberg, Michael S. (2000). *Making Citizen-Soldiers: ROTC and the Ideology of American Military Service*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Nenninger, Timothy K. (1978). *The Leavenworth Schools and the Old Army: Education, Professionalism, and the Officer Corps of the United States Army, 1881–1918*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.

- Pappas, George S. (1967). *Prudens Futuri: The U.S. Army War College, 1901–1967*. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Alumni Association of the US Army War College.
- Pappas, George S. (1993). *To the Point: The United States Military Academy, 1802–1902*. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers.
- Schneider, James G. (1993 [1987]). *The Navy V-12 Program: Leadership for a Lifetime*. Champaign, IL: Marlow Books.
- Schneller, Robert J., Jr. (2005). *Breaking the Color Barrier: The U.S. Naval Academy's First Black Midshipmen and the Struggle for Racial Equality*. New York: New York University Press.
- Shulimson, Jack (1993). *The Marine Corps' Search for a Mission, 1880–1898*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
- Skelton, William B. (1992). *An American Profession of Arms: The Army Officer Corps, 1784–1861*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
- Spector, Ronald (1977). *Professors of War: The Naval War College and the Development of the Naval Profession*. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press.
- Sweetman, Jack (1979). *The U.S. Naval Academy: An Illustrated History*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Todorich, Charles (1984). *The Spirited Years: A History of the Antebellum Naval Academy*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.

## Chapter Forty-seven

---

### US MILITARY CHAPLAINS

*John W. Brinsfield Jr., Tierian Cash, and  
Thomas Malek-Jones*

For more than 230 years, chaplains and other religious leaders have provided a source of strength and faith for the 55 million Americans who have served in the military forces of the United States. The rigorous demands of military duties – separation from home and family, training in remote locations, and serving in combat with the possibility of violent death – have mandated religious support for those who risk their lives for their country. Despite their importance, chaplains and the chaplain corps of the various services have received relatively little attention from academic historians. Clifford Drury compiled the two-volume *History of the Chaplain Corps, United States Navy* (1983), Roy J. Honeywell wrote *The Chaplains of the United States Army* (1958); C. Douglas Kroll authored the brief *A History of Navy Chaplains Serving with the U.S. Coast Guard* (1983); Withers M. Moore wrote *Navy Chaplains in Vietnam, 1954–1964* (1968), and co-authored Withers M. Moore, Herbert L. Bergsma, Timothy J. Demy, *Chaplains with U.S. Naval Units in Vietnam, 1954–1975* (1985); and Herbert Bergsma, *Chaplains with Marines in Vietnam, 1962–1971* (1985). All of these were government publications in limited editions by commercial standards. The Air Force Chaplain Service history is partially captured in period summaries, beginning with Daniel B. Jorgensen's *The Service of Chaplains to Army Air Units, 1917–1946* (1961a), that is, for the period during which the Air Force was part of the Army. The Air Force chaplain story was continued for 1947–60 (Jorgenson, 1961a), 1961–70 (Scharlemann 1975), 1971–80 (Groh 1986), 1981–90 (Groh, 1991), and 1991–2000 (Nickelson 2007).

The roots of the chaplaincy predate the European settlement of North America (Bergen 2004), but in the American military establishment, the initial involvement of chaplains came as voluntary religious leaders responded to the pressing needs of commanders and soldiers for religious support. Religion provided moral direction and spiritual assurance to those who bore the burden of the nation's wars.

During the colonial era the chaplains who served with militia units were selected in a variety of ways. In Connecticut, for example, they were appointed by the governor, in New York and Pennsylvania by the legislature, and in Rhode Island

and Virginia by brigade and regimental commanders. Militia chaplains played a significant role in rallying support for independence in the decade before resistance turned to open rebellion (Perry 1987), which may help explain why there were four ministers among the Minutemen who faced British regulars on Lexington Green in April 1775. When General George Washington assumed command of the Continental Army on July 2, 1775, he found 23 regiments of soldiers, with 15 chaplains among them. Believing that the blessing of Providence was essential to military success, Washington encouraged his chaplains to lead weekly worship services for the soldiers and their officers. Washington set a precedent for pluralistic religious support in the Army by admitting chaplains of eight different denominations. He also urged his subordinate commanders to facilitate the free exercise of religion among the troops and the civilian populations under their control.

On July 29, 1775 the Continental Congress formally recognized chaplains as a distinct branch within the army authorizing one chaplain for every two regiments, and set the pay of chaplains at \$20 per month, the same amount received by captains. A year later the number was increased to a chaplain for each regiment, then in 1777 reduced to one for each brigade. Congress also appointed chaplains to serve in hospitals and at garrisons separated from the main army (Headley 1864, Dickens 1998). Chaplains received no military training, were not eligible for regular promotion above their rank as captains, had no authorized uniforms, and were endorsed by no particular agency except by their own civilian congregations and the officers and soldiers they served.

Regulations adopted on November 28, 1775 for the Continental Navy, included provisions for divine services on board ships. The Rev. Benjamin Balch, a graduate of Harvard, and a Congregational minister, became the first chaplain known to have served in the Continental Navy. He had previously fought as one of the Minute Men in the Battle of Lexington in April of 1775 and served thereafter as an Army chaplain in the siege of Boston.

From the eventual service of the 220 Army and Navy chaplains during the Revolutionary War to the 5,000 Army, Navy, and Air Force chaplains who in 2008 performed pluralistic ministries at US bases in 65 countries around the world, religion has been a traditional support and a guaranteed right for American military personnel and their family members.

After the Revolution the chaplain service declined in both the Army and the Navy. There was no statutory provision for Army chaplains until 1791 when Congress authorized the appointment of a single chaplain for the Army. The first man to hold this position, John Hurt, was a friend of George Washington, the second, David Jones, a friend of Anthony Wayne thus reflecting the personal nature of most appointments down to the Civil War. When the Jeffersonian Republicans came to power, the Act of March 16, 1801 that they passed to reorganize the Army made no provision for a chaplain, though the legislation they passed two years later to regulate the militia provided for a chaplain for each regiment. In 1808 similar provision was made for chaplains in the US Army; and during the War of 1812 11 chaplains served the US Army, each assigned to a brigade. In 1818 Congress eliminated brigade chaplains reducing the number of Army

chaplains to the one assigned to West Point since 1813 where he taught courses in history, geography, and ethics (Brinsfield 1987). He was the only US Army chaplain for the next seven years though chaplains continued to serve state militia units (a total of 210 in 1818, for example). Most of the 20 chaplains who served during the Mexican War were attached to volunteer regiments. In 1838 Congress provided for the appointment of contract civilians to serve as chaplains at military posts, and in 1847 authorized them to accompany units from their post to the war zone. During the antebellum period chaplains did not have formal ranks other than “chaplain,” but were generally treated like junior officers in terms of pay and privileges. They reported only to their unit or post commander, and there was no hierarchy for chaplains within the Army or the Navy. Most nineteenth-century chaplains were Episcopalians, including 40 percent of all Navy chaplains during the century, and 60 percent of Army chaplains between 1838 and 1857. Congregationalists, Presbyterians, and Unitarians were also common.

The position of chaplains in the Navy was similar. Each warship was authorized a chaplain, but many sailed without one. The chaplain usually doubled as a secretary for the captain and as schoolmaster for midshipmen, the latter until the establishment of the Naval Academy in 1845. An 1842 law limited the Navy to 24 chaplains, a number that remained constant for a quarter century despite a twelve-fold increase in the number of ships in the service, to over 600 by the end of the Civil War. One of those chaplains was assigned to the Naval Academy for the first time in 1850 and a chapel was constructed there four years later. The chaplain at West Point continued to teach classes until 1896, but the one at the Naval Academy did not have classroom duties. There was no requirement that Navy chaplains be ordained until 1841, though it had been the practice to accept only ordained clergymen since 1823.

In 1850 a step was taken toward professionalizing the chaplaincy when a “Board of Clergymen,” whose members were a mix of chaplains and civilian clergymen, was formed to screen candidates for the chaplaincy in both the Army and Navy. The chaplaincy of the period between the Revolution and the Civil War has received little attention from historians except in general surveys (Norton 1977, Hedrick 1992), though the service of chaplains in the Seminole War has been examined (Lawson 2006b), and the professional development of the chaplaincy during the era is surveyed in an introductory essay by Richard M. Budd, *Serving Two Masters: The Development of the American Military Chaplaincy, 1860–1920* (2002).

With the advent of the Civil War in 1861, ministry in the military expanded to include nearly 4,000 chaplains of 12 different denominations and multiple ethnic backgrounds (Wiley 1950, Mole 1977, Weddle 1999). In 1862 the US Congress authorized commissions for the first Jewish chaplains (Barish 1962, Slomovitz 1999), the first African-American chaplains, and the first hospital chaplains. One female, Mrs Ella Gibson Hobart, served as the chaplain of the 1st Wisconsin Heavy Artillery with pay but without commission. In his examination of the roles played by Union chaplains, Warren Armstrong (1998) concludes that in addition to trying to meet the spiritual needs of the troops, chaplains, as a group, stressed that slavery

was the fundamental cause of the war and advocated abolitionism. Among the 1,300 chaplains in the Confederate Army (Pitts 1957), there was also the first Native American chaplain, Unaguskee, who served by election but without commission in the Cherokee Battalion from North Carolina (Brinsfield *et al.* 1983). Two years after the war began, the first manual for military chaplains was published (Brown 1863). Authors who trace the history of the chaplaincy in the Confederate Army find that Confederate chaplains (like their Union counterparts described by Armstrong 1998) adapted their presentation of scripture to support the war aims of their section of the country. Chaplains on both sides served as unofficial morale officers and often helped care for the wounded (Pitts 1957, Norton 1961, Romero 1983, Angell 1992, Brinsfield and Baktis 2005).

An understanding of the work of chaplains both North and South can be gained by reading collections of their memoirs (Brinsfield 2006, Maryniak and Brinsfield 2007) plus the book-length memoirs and correspondence of Francis Springer (Furry 2001), Henry White (Jervy 1990), and Father William Corby (1992) in the Union Army and James B. Sheeran (Durkin 1960), Basil Manly (Fuller 2000), Charles Quintard (Elliot 2003), Robert Benting (Cutrer 2006), Joseph Twichell (Messent and Courtney 2006), Nicholas A. Davis (Everett 1962), and Father Louis-Hippolyte Gache (Buckley 1981), Peter Whelan (Meaney 1987), and John B. Bannon (Tucker 1992, Faherty 2002) in the Confederate Army. Steven W. Woodworth (2003) plumbs *The Religious World of Civil War Soldiers* on both sides, but the role of religion among Confederate soldiers (Bennett 1877, Jones 1887, Wilson 1980, Shattuck 1987, Dollar 2005), has received significantly more attention than that of their counterparts in blue.

During the half century between the Civil War and World War I military and naval chaplains sought to develop the attributes of a profession and to build an institutional structure for themselves within the Army and Navy. Richard M. Budd (2002) examines this struggle to “serve two masters.” While other historians have traced the origins of the modern chaplaincy to the Civil War, Budd argues convincingly that the service went through a period of decline after the Civil War and did not become fully professionalized and develop its own semi-autonomous bureaucratic structure within the Army and Navy until the first two decades of the twentieth century, a view shared by William Hourihan (1988) who emphasizes the importance of the formation of the Board of Chaplains in 1902 and the training of 1,042 clergymen by the Chaplain School in 1918 and 1919. Operation of the school was suspended in 1928, but it was reactivated in 1942 and has operated ever since.

The first Roman Catholic to serve as a Navy chaplain, Charles H. Parks, was commissioned in 1888 (Germain 2002 [1929]). The first Jewish chaplain in the Navy, David Goldberg, was appointed in 1917, and the first African-American, James Brown, joined the ranks in 1944. Over many years, African-American chaplain participation continued and culminated in 1990 with the Army naming Chaplain (Major General) Matthew A. Zimmerman and the Navy naming Rear Admiral Barry C. Black, CHC, in 1999 as their first African-American Chiefs of Chaplains.



In 1863 the Navy adopted the Latin cross as the insignia for Christian chaplains, the first chaplain branch insignia approved for wear in the US armed forces. The Army followed suit in 1899 with Latin crosses for Christian chaplains and, in 1918, with tablets representing the Ten Commandments for Jewish chaplains. The Navy first authorized the shepherd's crook for Jewish chaplains in 1917 and the tablets in 1932. By the twenty-first century, chaplains representing the Islamic and the Buddhist faiths wore the crescent and the wheel respectively (Nickelson 2007).

When 2,300 Army chaplains volunteered for duty during the early months of World War I (Schweitzer 2003), it became clear to General John J. Pershing and to Congress that a large chaplaincy in a world conflict required more centralized direction than could be provided by unit commanders alone, but no formal action was taken until after the Armistice. The National Defense Act of 1920 reorganized the armed forces and provided for the office of Chiefs of Chaplains to direct ministries in each of the services. Charles W. Hedrick, "The Emergence of the Chaplaincy as a Professional Army Branch" (1990) argues that this action marked the beginning of the modern military chaplaincy.

President Woodrow Wilson selected Chaplain John T. Axton as the first Army chief of chaplains. Two years prior, the Navy selected Chaplain John B. Frazier as the first Navy chief of chaplains. Although three chaplains had performed duty in the Air Service in 1918, it was not until after World War II that Congress established the Air Force chaplaincy as a separate service. President Harry S. Truman appointed Chaplain Charles I. Carpenter as the first Air Force Chief of Chaplains in 1948, a position he held until 1958. Another, significant early chaplain hero was Chaplain Robert P. Taylor. Serving in the Army in the Philippines at the start of World War II, Chaplain Taylor earned a Silver Star for gallantry during the Battle of Bataan and survived the Bataan Death March, years of POW imprisonment, and transport to Japan via one of the "hellships" bombed by our own forces. After his liberation in China, he continued serving as an Air Force chaplain to become the third Air Force Chief of Chaplains in 1962 (Keith 1973). The service of Taylor and his fellow chaplains is told in Richard Roper, *Brothers of Paul: Activities of Prisoner of War Chaplains in the Philippines during World War II* (2003).

World War II brought the largest mobilization of military service personnel in American history. The religious needs of the over 16 million men and women in uniform were served by over 12,000 chaplains serving in all branches of the armed forces at home and abroad. The only published study of World War II chaplains to date focuses on Roman Catholic priests. Donald F. Crosby, *Battlefield Chaplains: Catholic Priests in World War II* (1994), believes that their experiences generally reflected those of all chaplains as they shared the dangers and discomforts of military life with those they served. He finds that, with the exception of their attitudes toward sexual behavior, the chaplains held views similar to those of the people they lived with and served.

In order to protect security by projecting force, tens of thousands of Americans have continued to serve overseas since World War II. Chaplains follow these soldiers, sailors, and airmen to their worldwide, forward-based assignments. Chaplains serve as "visible reminders of the Holy" to provide for the free exercise of

religion, many times in areas where there is no civilian-based option to support this right. While institutional histories of the chaplain corps of each service have been written, to date the work of chaplains in the field during the late twentieth and early twenty-first century has only been the subject of a single monograph, Kenneth E. Lawson's *Faith and Hope in a War-Torn Land: The US Army Chaplaincy in the Balkans, 1995–2005* (2006a). As is the case with the Civil War, one of the best ways to gain an understanding of the work of modern chaplains is through their published memoirs. James Johnson (2001) and Claude Newby (2003) relate their experiences in Vietnam, and 11 chaplains have reflected briefly on their service during the Gulf War of 1991 (Myers *et al.* 1991).

As the Air Force has been actively engaged in deployed flying missions since 1991, chaplains have provided spiritual support throughout the battle rhythm. Through visitation and Airmen Ministry Centers, chaplains and chaplain assistants offer flexible opportunities for airmen to express their spiritual needs. Meanwhile, stateside-based ministries continue to serve airmen and their families, as well as retirees (Malek-Jones 2007). The Air Force Chaplain Corps organization mirrors that of the rest of the Air Force. The Office of the Chief of Chaplains is responsible for evaluating and generating a *strategic* direction. Major Command chaplains ensure *operational* effectiveness by implementing and managing Chaplain Service objectives. The tactical aspect of strategic planning for ministry occurs at the wing level. Wing chaplains manage the bulk of assigned chaplains and their ministries, where people meet people.

Historically, American soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines have reflected about the same degree of religious commitment as the civilian communities from which they come. Units that were recruited in areas characterized by strong civilian religious institutions tended to include larger numbers of religious service members. In a US Army survey taken in 1994, some 80 percent of the soldiers polled stated that they believed in God and had a specific religious preference. More than 100 religious denominations and faith groups were represented in the survey, with Protestants and Roman Catholics constituting 85 percent of the total number.

Religious life in the military centers on opportunities for voluntary worship, counseling, religious education, pastoral support, religious retreats, child and youth ministries, and sacred holiday observances. Religious activities for military personnel, on posts, bases, on board ship, or in the field, are approved by the commander of the unit involved. The chaplain serves as a staff officer, qualified by education, ordination, and endorsement to implement the command religious program for the welfare of service members and their families, and to facilitate the free exercise of religion guaranteed to them by the first amendment to the US Constitution. Federal courts have recognized the constitutionality and legal standing of the military chaplaincies based on the first amendment rights of service members and the voluntary, pluralistic nature of the religious support provided for them.

Worship services are held in a wide variety of settings. Chaplains frequently utilize military chapels, mess halls, classrooms, decks of ships, aircraft hangers, tents, and open field assembly areas for worship activities. Chaplains encourage

service members to participate as lay readers, choir members, Eucharistic ministers, cantors, and ushers, as well as in other roles. In combat zones, chaplains may conduct services in small groups with abbreviated orders of worship. Most chaplains have combat kits available that contain worship supplies suitable for field services. Enlisted chaplain assistants in the Army and the Air Force, and Religious Program Specialists in the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard assist chaplains in performing their duties. Additionally, in today's highly dispersed environment, chaplains of one branch often work jointly with members of other services.

With global responsibilities, all three branches rely heavily on Reserve and National Guard chaplains to fulfill their mission. Guard and Reserve units deploy overseas with their chaplains, who like them, leave civilian responsibilities to answer their nation's call. Reserve chaplains are also called upon to augment the stateside chaplaincies as resources are stretched by worldwide vigilance. For example, in Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom 40 percent of personnel were citizens in uniform from the National Guard or Reserve (Cuevas 2004).

Ministries at tentside, runway, or on deck have unique training needs. Yet there are human need topics in which they can be trained together. Therefore, by 2010 the three chaplain schools will be located at the Armed Forces Chaplaincy Center at Fort Jackson, South Carolina (Malek-Jones 2007).

Since 1973, when the Navy commissioned Lt Dianna Pohlman as its first female chaplain, women have provided increasing religious leadership in the military. By 1993, 30 female chaplains were serving on active duty in the Army, Navy, and Air Force. In fact, Chaplain, Major General Lorraine K. Potter, who became the first female Air Force Chaplain, rose to the pinnacle of leadership as the first female Air Force Chief of Chaplains in 2001.

Chaplains work closely with volunteers both at home and abroad. In a majority male organization, spouses of military members have often performed chapel-based volunteer work. According to some estimates, women perform as much as 65 percent of the volunteer religious work accomplished on military installations.

More than 400 chaplains have given their lives for their country since 1775. Eight have been awarded the Medal of Honor, and hundreds of others have been decorated for valor and outstanding service. Recent interest by former Warsaw Pact countries in developing military chaplaincies based on the US model may be evidence of the respect other nations have for the way chaplains serve in the American military establishment.

#### BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Ackermann, Henry. (1989). *He Was Always There: The U.S. Army Chaplain Ministry in the Vietnam Conflict*. Washington: Office of the Army Chief of Chaplains.
- Angell, Stephen Ward (1992). *Bishop Henry McNeal Turner and African-American Religion in the South*. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press. [Turner helped raise the First Regiment of US Colored Troops in 1863 and served as the unit's chaplain.]
- Armstrong, Warren B. (1998). *For Courageous Fighting and Confident Dying: Union Chaplains in the Civil War*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.

- Barish, Louis (1962). *Rabbis in Uniform: The Story of the American Jewish Military Chaplain*. New York: Jonathan David.
- Bennett, William W. (1877). *The Great Revival in the Southern Armies*. Philadelphia: Claxton, Remser and Haffelfinger.
- Bergen, Doris L., ed. (2004). *The Sword of the Lord: Military Chaplains from the First to the Twenty-First Century*. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.
- Bergsma, Herbert L. (1985). *Chaplains with Marines in Vietnam, 1962–1971*. Washington: History and Museums Division, Headquarters Marine Corps.
- Brinsfield, John W. (1987). "The Chaplain as Professor at West Point," *Military Chaplains' Review*, (Fall/November), 63–76.
- Brinsfield, John W. (1997). *Encouraging Faith, Supporting Soldiers: A History of the Army Chaplain Corps, 1975–1995*. Washington: Office of the Chief of Chaplains.
- Brinsfield, John W., ed. (2006). *The Spirit Divided: Memoirs of Civil War Chaplains – The Confederacy*. Macon, GA: Mercer University Press.
- Brinsfield, John W., and Peter A. Baktis (2005). "The Human, Spiritual, and Ethical Dimensions of Leadership in Preparation for Combat," in Lloyd J. Matthews, ed., *The Future of the Army Profession*, 2nd edn. Boston: McGraw Hill, 463–90.
- Brinsfield, John W., and Kenneth E. Lawson (2007). *A History of the United States Army Chaplaincy: The Hicks Years, 2003–2007*. Washington: Office of the Army Chief of Chaplains.
- Brinsfield, John W., William C. Davis, Benedict R. Maryniak, and James I. Robertson, Jr. (2003). *Faith in the Fight: Civil War Chaplains*. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books.
- Brown, W. Y. (1863). *The Army Chaplain: His Office, Duties and Responsibilities, and the Means of Aiding Him*. Philadelphia: William S. & Alfred Martien.
- Buckley, Cornelius, ed. (1981). *A Frenchman, A Chaplain, A Rebel: The War Letters of Pere Louis-Hippolyte Gachue, SJ*. Chicago: Loyola University Press.
- Budd, Richard M. (2002). *Serving Two Masters: The Development of American Military Chaplaincy, 1860–1920*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
- Corby, William (1992). *Memoirs of Chaplain Life: Three Years with the Irish Brigade in the Army of the Potomac*, ed. Lawrence Frederick Kohl. New York: Fordham University Press.
- Crosby, Donald F. (1994). *Battlefield Chaplains: Catholic Priests in World War II*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
- Cuevas, R., (2004). "Six Month Summary of the Office of the Chief of Chaplains, January–June 2004," unpublished report. Washington: Office of the Chief of Chaplains, Headquarters, United States Air Force, Bolling AFB.
- Cutrer, Thomas W., ed. (2006). *Our Trust is in the God of Battles: The Civil War Letters of Robert Franklin Bunting, Chaplain, Terry's Texas Rangers, C.S.A.* Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press.
- Dickens, William E., Jr. (1998). "Answering the Call: The Story of the U.S. Military Chaplaincy from the Revolution through the Civil War," PhD dissertation, Southern Baptist Theological Seminary.
- Dollar, Kent T. (2005). *Soldiers of the Cross: Confederate Soldier-Christians and the Impact of War on Their Faith*. Macon, GA: Mercer University Press.
- Drury, Clifford M., comp. (1983). *The History of the Chaplain Corps, United States Navy*, 2 vols. Washington: US Government Printing Office.
- Duram, James C., and Eleanor A. Duram (1979). *Soldiers of the Cross: The Civil War Diary and Correspondence of Rev. Andrew Jackson Hartsock*. Manhattan, KS: Sunflower University Press.

- Durkin, Joseph T., ed. (1960). *Confederate Chaplain: A War Journal of Rev. James B. Sheeran, C.Ss.R., 14th Louisiana, C.S.A.* Milwaukee, WI: Bruce Publishing.
- Elliott, Sam Davis (2003). *Doctor Quintard, Chaplain C.S.A. and Second Bishop of Tennessee: The Memoir and Civil War Diary of Charles Todd Quintard*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.
- Everett, Donald E., ed. (1962). *Chaplain Davis and Hood's Texas Brigade*. San Antonio, TX: Principia Press of Trinity University.
- Faherty, William B. (2002). *Exile in Erin: A Confederate Chaplain's Story: The Life of Father John B. Bannon*. Columbia: University of Missouri Press.
- Fuller, James (2000). *Chaplain to the Confederacy: Basil Manly and Baptist Life in the Old South*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.
- Furry, William (2001). *The Preacher's Tale: The Civil War Journal of Rev. Francis Springer, Chaplain, U.S. Army of the Frontier*. Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press.
- Germain, Aidan H. (2002, 1929). *Catholic Military and Naval Chaplains, 1776–1917*. Westminster, MD: Willow Bend Books.
- Groh, John E. (1986). *Air Force Chaplains, 1971–1980*, vol. 4: *Air Force Chaplains*. USAF Chaplain Service. Washington: Office, Chief of Air Force Chaplains.
- Groh, John E. (1990). "Lively Experiment: A Summary History of the Air Force Chaplaincy," *Military Chaplains' Review*, (Winter/February), 67–114.
- Groh, John E. (1991). *Facilitators of the Free Exercise of Religion: Air Force Chaplains, 1981–1990*, vol. 5: *Air Force Chaplains*. USAF Chaplain Service. Washington: Office, Chief of Air Force Chaplains.
- Gushwa, Robert L. (1977). *The Best and the Worst of Times: The United States Army Chaplaincy, 1920–1945*. Washington: Office of the Army Chief of Chaplains.
- Headley, J. T. (1864). *The Chaplains and Clergy of the Revolution*. New York: C. Scribner.
- Hedrick, Charles W. (1990). "The Emergence of the Chaplaincy as a Professional Army Branch: A Survey and Summary of Selected Issues," *Military Chaplains' Review*, (Winter/February), 19–50.
- Hedrick, Charles W. (1992). "On Foreign Soil: The Tragedy of a Civilianized Chaplaincy in the Mexican–American War (1846–1848)," *Military Chaplains' Review*, (Winter/February), 61–86.
- Honeywell, Roy J. (1958). *The Chaplains of the United States Army*. Washington: Office of the Chief of Chaplains.
- Hourihan, William J. (1988). "Chaplain Alfred A. Pruden and the Professionalization of the United States Army Chaplaincy, 1899–1920," *Military Chaplains' Review*, (Fall/November), 11–15.
- Hutcheson, Richard G., Jr. (1975). *The Churches and the Chaplaincy*. Atlanta: John Knox Press.
- Jervey, Edward D. (1990). *Prison Life among the Rebels: Recollections of a Union Chaplain* [Henry S. White]. Kent, OH: Kent State University Press.
- Johnson, James D. (2001). *Combat Chaplain: A Thirty-Year Vietnam Battle*. Denton: University of North Texas Press.
- Jones, J. William (1887). *Christ in the Camp: Religion in Lee's Army*. Richmond, VA: B. F. Johnson.
- Jorgensen, Daniel B. (1961a). *The Service of Chaplains to Army Air Units, 1917–1946*, vol. 1: *Air Force Chaplains*. USAF Chaplain Service. Washington: Office, Chief of Air Force Chaplains.
- Jorgensen, Daniel B. (1961b). *Air Force Chaplains, 1947–1960*, vol. 2: *Air Force Chaplains*. USAF Chaplain Service. Washington: Office, Chief of Air Force Chaplains.



- Keith, Billy (1973) *Days of Anguish, Days of Hope*. London: Hodder and Stoughton.
- Kroll, C. Douglas (1983). *A History of Navy Chaplains Serving with the U.S. Coast Guard*. Washington: Chaplain Corps of the US Navy.
- Kurzman, Dan (2004). *No Greater Glory: The Four Immortal Chaplains and the Sinking of the Dorchester in World War II*. New York: Random House.
- Lamm, Alan K. (1998). *Five Black Preachers in Army Blue, 1884–1901*. Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press.
- Lawson, Kenneth E. (2006a). *Faith and Hope in a War-Torn Land: The US Army Chaplaincy in the Balkans, 1995–2005*. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute.
- Lawson, Kenneth E. (2006b). *Religion and the U.S. Army Chaplaincy in the Florida Seminole Wars, 1817–1858*. Columbia, SC: Eastside Printing.
- Maher, William L. (1997). *A Shepherd in Combat Boots: Chaplain Emil Kapaun of the 1st Cavalry Division*. Shippensburg, PA: Burd Street Press.
- Malek-Jones, Thomas A. (2004). “Six Month Summary of the Office of the Chief of Chaplains USAF, July–December 2004,” unpublished report. Washington: Office of the Chief of Chaplains, Headquarters, United States Air Force, Bolling AFB.
- Malek-Jones, Thomas A. (2007). “Six Month Summary of the Office of the Chief of Chaplains USAF, July–December 2007,” unpublished report. Washington: Office of the Chief of Chaplains, Headquarters, United States Air Force, Bolling AFB.
- Maryniak, Benedict R., and John W. Brinsfield, eds. (2007). *The Spirit Divided: Memoirs of Civil War Chaplains—The Union*. Macon, GA: Mercer University Press.
- Meanly, Peter J. (1987). “The Prison Ministry of Father Peter Whelan: Georgia Priest and Confederate Chaplain,” *Georgia Historical Quarterly*, 71:1 (Spring), 1–24.
- Messent, Peter, and Steve Courtney, eds. (2006). *The Civil War Letters of Joseph Hopkins Twichell: A Chaplain’s Story*. Athens: University of Georgia Press.
- Mole, Robert L. (1977). *God Also Loves Military People: A Brief Story of the Seventh-Day Adventist Church and the American Military Chaplaincy, 1860–1976*. Washington: General Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists.
- Moore, Withers M. (1968). *Navy Chaplains in Vietnam, 1954–1964*. Washington: Chief of Chaplains, Department of the Navy.
- Moore, Withers M., Herbert L. Bergsma, and Timothy J. Demy (1985). *Chaplains with U.S. Naval Units in Vietnam, 1954–1975*. Washington: History Branch, Office of the Chief of Chaplains.
- Myers, Donald W., et al. (1991). “Chaplains Tell Their Stories,” *Military Chaplain’s Review*, (Summer), 21–41.
- Newby, Claude D. (2003). *Cavalry Chaplain: A Memoir of Vietnam*. Novato, CA: Presidio.
- Nickelson, Ronald (2007). *Air Force Chaplains, 1990–2000*. vol. 6: *Air Force Chaplains*. USAF Chaplain Service. Washington: Office, Chief of Air Force Chaplains.
- Norton, Herman A. (1961). *Rebel Religion: The Story of the Confederate Chaplains*. St. Louis: Bethany Press.
- Norton, Herman A. (1977). *Struggling for Recognition: The United States Army Chaplaincy, 1791–1865*. Washington: Office of the Chief of Chaplains.
- Perry, Edwin M. (1987). “Before the Troops: Sermons to Militias, 1763–1775,” *Military Chaplains’ Review*, (Fall/November), 9–22.
- Pitts, Charles F. (1957). *Chaplains in Grey: The Confederate Chaplains Story*. Nashville: Broadman Press.
- Romero, Sydney J. (1983). *Religion in the Rebel Ranks*. Lanham, MD: University Press of America.



- Roper, Richard S. (2003). *Brothers of Paul: Activities of Prisoner of War Chaplains in the Philippines during World War II*. Odenton, MD: Revere Printing.
- Rose, Milton J. (2004). *An American Rabbi in Korea: A Chaplain's Journey in the Forgotten War*. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press.
- Scharlemann, Martin H. (1975). *Air Force Chaplains, 1961–1970*, vol. 3: *Air Force Chaplains*. USAF Chaplain Service. Washington: Office, Chief of Air Force Chaplains.
- Schweitzer, Richard (2003). *The Cross and the Trenches: Religious Faith and Doubt among British and American Great War Soldiers*. Westport, CT: Praeger.
- Shattuck, Gardiner H., Jr. (1987). *A Shield and Hiding Place: The Religious Life of the Civil War Armies*. Macon, GA: Mercer University Press.
- Slomovitz, Albert Isaac (1999). *The Fighting Rabbis: Jewish Military Chaplains and American History*. New York: New York University Press.
- Stover, Earl F. (1977). *Up From Handymen: The United States Army Chaplaincy, 1865–1920*. Washington: Office of the Army Chief of Chaplains.
- Suekin, Joseph T., ed. (1960). *Confederate Chaplain: A War Journal of Rev. James B. Sheeran, C.S.S. r. 14th Louisiana, C.S.A.* Milwaukee, WI: Bruce Publishing Company.
- Thompson, Parker C. (1978). *From Its European Antecedents to 1791: The United States Army Chaplaincy*. Washington: Office of the Army Chief of Chaplains.
- Thornton, Francil Beauchesne (1953). *Sea of Glory: The Magnificent Story of the Four Chaplains*. New York: Prentice Hall.
- Tucker, Phillip T. (1992). *The Confederacy's Fighting Chaplain: Father John B. Bannon*. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press.
- Venzke, Rodger R. (1977). *Confidence in Battle, Inspiration in Peace: The United States Army Chaplaincy, 1945–1975*. Washington: Office of the Army Chief of Chaplains.
- Waite, Alex L. (1994). *Confederate Chaplain: William Edward Waite: An Annotated Diary*. Lynchburg, VA: H. E. Howard.
- Waring, George J. (1924). *United States Catholic Chaplains in the World War*. New York: Ordinariat, Army and Navy Chaplains.
- Weddle, Donna C. (1999). "The Lord's Will Be Done": *A Study of Organization in the U.S. Army Chaplaincy during the Civil War*. Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College.
- Wiley, Bell Irvin (1950). "'Holy Joes' of the Sixties: A Study of Civil War Chaplains," *Huntington Library Quarterly*, 16:3 (May), 287–304.
- Wilson, Charles Reagan (1980). *Baptized in Blood: The Religion of the Lost Cause*. Athens: University of Georgia Press.
- Woodworth, Steven E. (2003). *While God is Marching On: The Religious World of Civil War Soldiers*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
- Yee, James (2005). *For God and Country: Faith and Patriotism Under Fire*. New York: Public Affairs.
- Yost, Israel A. A. (2006). *Combat Chaplain: The Personal Story of the World War II Chaplain of the Japanese American 100th Battalion*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.

## Chapter Forty-eight

# MILITARY COMMUNICATIONS

*Jonathan Reed Winkler*

Military communications is a topic that, for all of its significance, has received comparatively little attention from historians of United States military affairs. Part of the reason for this situation is that the subject itself is difficult to pin down. It can be a distinct field, an element of tactical, operational or organizational histories, or even a subset of other fields such as diplomacy and strategy, maritime or military social history, technology or communications history. Regardless of the way scholars approach the subject, it is clear that over the past century and a half the transformation of communications technology has substantially and significantly altered the relationship between communications and military affairs. By the beginning of the twenty-first century, the volume and speed of information has increased to levels unimaginable just a generation before. More so than ever before, protection of one's own communications systems and destruction of the enemy's have become important military objectives. Consequently, the subject will remain a central one for US military history.

Until the nineteenth century, military communications had remained relatively similar across the centuries. Information traveled as fast and as far as the eye could see, noise reach, animals move, or ships sail. Given their very different command and control problems, the army and the navy of the United States in the early republic gave separate attention to military communications. The Army relied upon traditional methods, including musical instruments for tactical control on the battlefield and written communications carried by messenger. For the Navy, successive developments in tactical communications using flags and other signals occurred throughout the antebellum period. Captain Thomas Truxton developed the first American system for communication at sea in 1797. It employed a series of pennants for daylight signaling, musket and gunfire during fog, and gunfire and lanterns at night. Commodore John Barry and Captain Samuel Barron modified the system to make it more efficient in 1802. Flags of different shapes were substituted for pennants in 1813. Subsequent revisions occurred at the time of the Mexican War and on the eve of the Civil War. All of these, however, were useful only for tactical communications between ships or when close to the shore. Once

naval officers took their ships away from the United States, communications with Washington became sporadic and limited. Consequently, deployed naval officers exercised a great deal of autonomy and were expected to use their own initiative rather than wait for instructions that would be months in arriving. This could lead to serious problems, such as Commodore Thomas ap Catesby Jones's preemptive seizure of Monterey, California, (to prevent a British capture) on simply rumor of war with Mexico in October 1842. By the 1850s, the commercial development of the land telegraph system began to affect how Washington could remain in touch with frontier forts or naval yards, but it was not until the Civil War that the electrical telegraph system played a decisive role (Woods 1974, 1980).

In the latter half of the nineteenth century, the US military increased its attention to communications and began to formalize its administration. The father of the Signal Corps in the US Army was Albert J. Myer, a US Army doctor whose adroit maneuvering led by 1860 to the acceptance of his single-flag system (known as "wigwag"), the creation of a signal officer position on the Army staff, and his promotion to fill that slot. When the Civil War erupted, the Army gradually trained and deployed signal personnel equipped with flags, torches and later a portable electrical telegraph system, while Myer lobbied to formalize the Signal Corps, its place and its procedures. A rivalry developed, however, with the parallel US Military Telegraph, the fixed system of commercial long-haul telegraph lines brought under US government control for the duration (Bates 1907, Scheips 1966). Established by Secretary of War Edwin Stanton from whose office its lines ran to all major commands, it was staffed with civilians, and specifically not under the control of Myer and his signal corps, which operated a more extensive system that was used on a tactical basis (Scheips 1963). Out of necessity, the Confederate Army and Navy developed their own communications systems as well (Andrews 1964). Historical treatment of this has remained relatively limited, but Paul J. Scheips's dissertation on Myer (1966) and edited reprints of nineteenth century signal corps works are key (Plum 1974 [1882], Brown 1996 [1896], Scheips 1980), as is the official branch overview of the Signal Corps by Rebecca Raines (1996), and Tom Wheeler's (2006) account of President Abraham Lincoln's use of the telegraph to monitor operations and send commands to the field. In the end, the Civil War was the first conflict for the United States where military communications became critical on multiple levels. Tactical control of the comparatively immense forces, strategic direction of the multiple armies, and the management of logistics (especially the railroad) meant rapid and reliable communications were essential.

Following the Civil War, military communications continued to develop institutionally and encompass new technological developments. Rather than be disbanded after the war, the Signal Corps remained a part of the army. In 1867 it gained control of all Army telegraph lines and by 1880 operated a network of approximately 5,000 miles of wire. The organization experimented with new methods of signaling, and gained a new role in communicating national weather data by telegraph. This would eventually turn into what is now known as the National Weather Service when the Department of Agriculture acquired the role

from the Army in 1891 (Hughes 1970). Signal Corps personnel also played an important role in Alaska, from leading scientific expeditions to managing the lines that linked the new territory to the lower states. In 1906 the Army developed a successful “portable” radio – it took three mules to transport a set – and began field tests.

With the electrification of the navy during the 1870s came new ways of communicating. Experimentation with electrical lighting led to the use of lights for visual signaling in 1875. Lieutenant W. N. Wood developed a system for using lights to transmit Morse Code and flash lamps to send it. After the declaration of war against Spain in 1898, the Navy established the Coast Signal Service, a network of 34 central stations with 2,300 observers at lighthouses and life-saving stations linked by telegraph to Washington, to watch for Spanish naval activity along the coastline from Maine to Texas (*New York Times* 1898). Wireless signal transmission attracted attention during the 1890s from Bradley Fiske and other naval officers, and in the years following the Spanish–American War the Navy monitored the progress of Guglielmo Marconi and others. In 1898 the Navy began experimenting with using homing pigeons to communicate between ships and shore stations, but decided in 1901 to discontinue the program because advances in wireless transmission made that system more practical. In 1902 the Navy established two radio stations, in Washington and Annapolis, to conduct comparative tests on US and European equipment. Following the installation of radio sets on the battleships of the North Atlantic Fleet in 1903, the summer maneuvers that year included radio communications in the exercises. In the years that followed the Navy installed sets on all warships and developed a network of shore stations. As the number of radio sets in the United States grew, the specially-convened Inter-Departmental Board of Wireless Telegraphy (the “Roosevelt Board”) acknowledged the Navy’s vital interest in radio and assigned to it primary responsibility for the government’s use of radio in 1904. But the Navy had not yet identified an optimal supplier, and by 1906 eight different manufacturers were providing sets of varying quality for use on ship and shore. By 1908 the US Navy Radio Laboratory, precursor to the Naval Research Laboratory, was established to investigate this new medium. With World War I came much more rapid and striking organizational, technical, and operational changes (Howeth 1963).

The proliferation of telegraph lines and submarine telegraph cables across the globe meant that the Navy’s warships, even on distant stations, were increasingly in regular contact with the Navy Department in Washington (Headrick 1991). As a result, officers began to grumble that their previous autonomy and discretion was diminishing, and that they were becoming tethered by the telegraph (Long 1988). During the Tampico Incident (1914) Admiral Henry T. Mayo acted with only minimal consultation with officials in Washington though he was in intermittent radio contact with them via Key West. The following year Secretary of the Navy Joseph Daniels ordered Navy regulations altered to bar a naval officer from issuing “an ultimatum to the representative of any foreign Government ... within a limited time, without first communicating with the Navy Department” except when such action was deemed necessary to save lives (Bradford 1990). By the time

it entered World War I the Navy had nearly finished coastal ship-to-shore, medium-range, and long-distance networks that would enable all US warships to remain in contact with Washington anywhere in the North Atlantic and Caribbean Sea, and across the Pacific Ocean to the Philippines (Winkler 2008).

The experience of World War I was a powerful catalyst for the Navy to organize radio in the United States. From the outbreak of the war in 1914 the Navy was responsible for monitoring radio stations in the United States to ensure neutrality. The day after the United States declared war on the Central Powers, all radio stations came under complete Navy control where they would remain until February 1920. During the three years that it controlled all radio in the United States, the Navy significantly affected the technological and corporate development of the industry. Using its control of radio sets on nationalized US shipping, the Navy converted all commercial and military ship-shore operations to the same standard for the very first time. It drove several firms, including the American subsidiary of the British Marconi company, out of commercial traffic handling, bought their stations, and encouraged them to become simply manufacturers for the Navy. By suppressing patent restrictions during the war it was able to create the first reliable and continuous transatlantic radio communications system. Once the war was over, fears about limited number of long distance wavelengths for strategic communications led the Navy to pressure General Electric (GE) into forming the Radio Corporation of America (RCA). The purpose of RCA was to have a single entity own the most advanced international radio stations in the United States and the patents needed to operate them; to create an American corporation that could purchase from GE the most advanced transmitters in the world ahead of everyone else, to prevent British Marconi and others from taking the limited number of wavelengths for international communications, and thereby ensure an alternative to the British control of worldwide cable communications, and, finally, to create a US company that the Navy could count upon in a crisis while offering the radio equipment it needed. Though the company eventually grew beyond the control of the Navy, its formation was a critical development in both military and civilian radio (Rosen 1980, Aitken 1985, Winkler 2008).

During the war the Army also gained valuable experience with wired and wireless communications. The American Expeditionary Force (AEF) in France relied primarily on submarine telegraph cables for contact with the United States. As the cable capacity filled, and the danger of German attacks on the cables grew, the Army arranged for the Navy to provide a transatlantic radio network as well that ultimately handled about 10 percent of the wartime traffic (Winkler 2008). Tactically the AEF relied to a great extent on flags and homing pigeons for communications despite the artillery's use of field telephones for over a decade and the Pershing Expedition's use of radios in Mexico. Shortages of equipment and personnel impeded the shift to telephone lines and radio. At the start of the war the Signal Corps had only 42 officers and 1,212 enlisted men (excluding personnel assigned to aviation units). By 1918 the number increased to 1,463 officers and 33,038 enlisted men. Communications security became an issue, especially with the use of radio, and US forces relied primarily on British codes when they used

them. Very little work has been done on US tactical communications in France and signals intelligence in Europe (Raines 1996, Morgan 1987).

By the interwar period, the integration of radio with aviation, both army and naval, fundamentally altered the importance of land-based aircraft and the striking power of the US Navy. The changing technology and increasing volume of information presented to commanders forced the services to develop new information processing systems and bureaucratic structures to manage communications. The expanding overseas commitments of the United States influenced how the Army, Navy, and civilian leaders thought about the importance of communications and evaluated technological innovations. The explosion of civilian interest radio and the number of commercial stations from 80 in 1922 to over 800 in 1941 led to the need for organization which resulted in congressional passage of the Radio Act of 1927. This rationalized the radio spectrum and created the Federal Radio Commission (FRC), chaired by Rear Admiral W. H. G. Bullard, a former director of naval communications, to execute powers formerly assigned to the Department of Commerce and Labor by the Radio Act of 1912 and the Navy during the war (Barnouw 1966, Rosen 1980). Much scholarly work has been done on how this occurred and the role of key individuals such as Stanford C. Hooper (Howeth 1963, Aitken 1985, Raines 1996, Wolters 2003, Winkler 2008), but much remains to be done.

By 1939 American military communications units had obsolete equipment, much of it two decades old and having been ordered during World War I. During World War II, the rapid development of the electromagnetic spectrum made by allied and then US scientists, had profound implications for military communications in all forms from portable radios to radar detection. On a basic level, the sheer requirements for communicating at all levels, tactical to strategic, with deployed naval, air and ground forces placed enormous logistical, organizational and manufacturing pressures on the United States government and armed forces. The best account of this, as well as of the myriad forms of communications during the ground and air war, remains the three volumes of the United States Army's official history of the Signal Corps during the war years (Terrett 1956, Thompson, Harris, Oakes, and Terrett 1957, Thompson and Harris 1966) which has been well summarized by Raines (1996). The Navy's official administrative account, not published, also provides an overview of both the organizational changes within the Navy as well as the methods for solving the new command and control problems posed by joint air-amphibious operations and the post-invasion movement ashore (Office of the CNO 1948). Samuel Elliot Morison's (1947-62) 15-volume history of naval operations in World War II also discusses to some extent the role of changing military communications, such as the Talk-Between-Ships (TBS) system or the adoption of radar for fire control and fleet air defense. An adequate accounting, however, of the development of communications for navy command and control of amphibious operations during the war awaits a proper historical treatment. Aside from memoirs of serving communications personnel, such as that of Lovern Nauss (2005) about his time in the 1st Infantry Division, most discussions about the operational or tactical significance of communications is to be found (often obliquely) within literature about particular battles or campaigns. For



communications in other forms, such as the incredibly complicated process of tracking all personnel in the armed services so as to deliver them mail from home, the scholarly work here is piecemeal at best.

Just as important as the actual communications devices and their uses is the processing of the information that they delivered. The US Navy paid particular attention to this through the development of the Combat Information Center (CIC) aboard warships. Timothy Wolters (2003) explored the development of the CIC through World War II, while David Boslaugh's *When Computers Went to Sea* (1999) focused on how the Navy integrated digital computers with communications (from sensors like radar) and the CIC in the form of the Navy Tactical Data System to handle problems relating to fleet defense and coordination in the 1950s and 1960s. The subsequent expansion of these Link communications networks to Allied and NATO navies in hopes of creating large multinational entities remains an unexplored but deeply significant part of Cold War military history.

By far the greatest scholarly attention to communications and military affairs during World War II has been on two matters: radar and signals intelligence, each of which contributed substantially in its own way to the outcome of the war. The interest in radar has been particularly pronounced. Much of the historical work has focused first on the development of radar as part of the system of air defense constructed by both Germany and Great Britain before and during the war. To this end, the important elements are not just the radar detection installations themselves but the larger system of air defense, integrating the ground control network, the air fields and antiaircraft emplacements; the successive electronic countermeasures each side deployed to offset detection; and the adaptation of communications devices (including aircraft-mounted radar) for night-fighting. The historical attraction to the strategic bombing campaign has helped draw significant attention to the role of radar in the eventual success of the Allies over German air defenses. Consequently, the scholarly coverage of radar has been extensive (Price 1977, Buderer 1998, Brown 1999). Not limited only to its role in the air war in Europe, radar was important for fire control on warships and for shaping the air war in the Pacific. On the Navy's role in the development of radar, the critical text is David K. Allison's *New Eye for the Navy* (1981), while David Boslaugh (1999) shows how the World War II experience influenced Cold War innovation in information management and communications. S. E. Morison's work and other accounts of particular engagements in the Pacific provide the context for the tactical and operational impact of communications.

The other major topic is signals intelligence, and here the quantity of material is vast and reaches quickly beyond the subject simply of military communications. Interception, decryption, and analysis of German and Japanese wartime communications were of deep significance, but their utility was only as good as the larger system that could process the information and distribute it to commanders in the field. In the Atlantic, for example, the Allies defeated the U-boats by merging ULTRA intelligence together with the high frequency direction finding (HF/DF or "huff-duff") stations, sea and air-based detectors, and shore-based communications systems to centralize U-boat intelligence and then vector forces to intercept.

Scholarly attention to this has grown considerably. See, for example, David Syrett's *The Defeat of the U-boats: The Battle of the Atlantic* (1994), Kathleen Broome Williams's *Secret Weapon: U.S. High Frequency Direction Finding in the Battle of the Atlantic* (1996), and Kenneth Poolman's *The Winning Edge: Naval Technology in Action, 1939–1945* (1997). The efforts of the US government to construct its own processing devices to handle signals intelligence data are particularly important. The story of the US Navy's construction of a device to break German ULTRA encryption is most recently told in Jim DeBrosse and Colin Burke, *The Secret in Building 26* (2004). Colin Burke's *Information and Secrecy: Vannevar Bush, ULTRA and the Other Memex* (1994) discusses the development of information handling tools to cope with the volume of information generated by military communications and signals intercepts. Signals intelligence was just as important in the Pacific theater as well, as Edward Drea's *MacArthur's Ultra* (1992) and John Prados's *Combined Fleet Decoded* (2001) illustrate, from the Battle of Midway (1942) until the close of the war.

From the integration of the radio into mechanized warfare to the development of the CIC and the coordination of tactical air support, military communications became essential to the way in which modern warfare occurred. As communications technology developed in the years after World War II, the situation continued to transform rapidly and substantially.

On communications during times of crisis, particularly during the Korean and Vietnam conflicts and other, smaller, operations, what has been written has been done in the form of official histories or within larger studies about the conflict of which communications was but one element. The individual services have assembled their own internal histories on some of the conflicts. On Vietnam, for example, Thomas Rienzi (1972), John Lane (1981), Charles Myer (1982) and John Berger (1986) have written on the tactical, operational, administrative, and logistical elements associated with Army communications in South East Asia. Larry Morrison (1997) and Thomas S. Snyder's (1991) team of historians with the Air Force Communications Command sketched out the general framework of communications for air power. Significantly, their accounts take note of the other forms of communications, including air traffic control, meteorology, air defense, and worldwide command and control, that are often overlooked. Specific works on electronic warfare include those by Alfred Price (1984, 2001) as well as articles by Daniel Kuehl (1992) and Merle Pribbeneouw (2003), but as with World War II such topics are frequently integrated into larger accounts of tactical and operational matters. For classification or technical reasons historians are limited in what materials they can draw upon, but the attention that the military itself gives to the significance of changes in communications can be seen through the professional journals and technical assessments written by officers. The evaluation of several 1980s operations with communications in mind by Stephen E. Anno and William E. Einspahr (1988) is one example of this. One should also not overlook parallel but critical developments in communications between weapons delivery systems and the weapons themselves, for which one recent account is Paul Gillespie, *Weapons of Choice: The Development of Precision Guided Munitions* (2006).

Of particular note was the role of military communications in the Cold War defense of the United States, which played a large role in driving the integration of computers with sensor systems and force deployment. Much like David Boslaugh's work (1999), Kent Redmond and Thomas M. Smith's *From Whirlwind to MITRE: The R&D Story of the SAGE Air Defense Computer* (2000) shows how the Air Force adopted computers to connect the air defense radar systems of North America, process the results, and solve related data management problems. The best brief overview of the air defense radar network is David Winkler, *Searching the Skies: The Legacy of the United States Cold War Defense Radar Program* (1997). A similar detection system based at sea, the Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS) allowed the Navy to track submarines and integrate the results with surface and air surveillance (R.F. Cross Associates 1978, Weir 2006).

More complicated is the development of military communications systems for administrating the global deployment of air, ground and sea forces during the Cold War. As the Department of Defense reorganized in 1958 and then in 1960, concentrated attention on the developing effects of electronics and computers on military communications led to the creation of the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) in 1958 (adding Defense in front, to become DARPA, in 1972) and of the Defense Communications Agency (DCA) in 1960. The DCA, later consolidated with other agencies in 1991 to form the Defense Information Systems Agency, was nominally charged with integrating electrical communications in the separate services and overseeing, among other things, the consolidated Defense Communications System (DCS). The best account of one part of this, the World Wide Military Command and Control System, is David E. Pearson's (2000) historical treatment, but there is much that needs to be done on the development of the entire system and its key nodal points. These included the AUTOVON and AUTODIN automatic voice and data networks developed in the 1960s and used until replaced by the Defense Switching Network or DSN in the late 1980s. Processing the data carried by the military communications systems was an equally complex task, one that drew the attention of DARPA, as Arthur L. Norberg and Judy E. O'Neill have recounted in *Transforming Computer Technology: Information Processing for the Pentagon* (1996). One of the most significant long-term effects of DARPA's research into computer networking for command and control has been the Internet.

Historical attention to the spread of military communications into space is also a rich area of research. While much has been written about space generally and about communications satellites in particular, the military's use of space for communicating is a much larger realm than commonly understood but has only recently begun to attract scholarly attention (Whalen 2000). In December 1958 an Atlas rocket lifted the first communications satellite, SCORE (Signal Communications by Orbiting Relay Equipment) into orbit around the earth. SCORE received transmissions from a ground transmission, stored them on a tape recorder, and then retransmitted them back to earth. Subsequent military communications experiments included Courier, Advent, West Ford, and the Lincoln Experimental Satellites. In 1966 an Initial Defense Communications Satellite

Program began to handle strategic communications between fixed points using some 28 satellites. Between 1968 and 1989 a second generation of satellites, more powerful than the first, came into service, and these were replaced by a third set of 12 initial satellites beginning in 1982. Aside from this wideband service, the Department of Defense also created a series of satellite systems to serve worldwide mobile and tactical needs. For example, in 1978 the Navy established the Fleet Satellite Communications System (FLTSATCOM), and the Air Force piggybacked part of its satellite communication system (AFSATCOM) through these vehicles. By the 1990s, a new generation secure satellite system known as MILSTAR began to come online.

Besides the defense communications satellites developed in the late 1960s for voice and data transmission, the Defense Department utilized satellites in other ways for military purposes. Norman Friedman's *Seapower and Space* (2000) covers the integration of space-based communications systems with missiles (for detecting as well as controlling them), and how this transformed US (and Soviet) naval warfare in the later Cold War. Protecting the United States against missile attack required having the earliest notification possible that a missile had been launched, and the sensors aboard the Defense Support Program (DSP) satellites were designed to communicate that information, as Jeffrey Richelson details in his 2001 work on the DSP. Control of the satellites once in space was essential, as David Arnold has clarified in *Spying from Space* (2005), and the parallel ability of military forces to orient themselves using the satellite-based global positioning system is also a matter for military historians to consider carefully.

The intelligence side of military communications has also attracted much popular and scholarly attention. The ability of the United States to "see" into the Soviet Union by satellite dispelled the myths of Soviet nuclear weapons superiority in the early 1960s and arguably helped to stabilize the Cold War after the Cuban Missile Crisis. The role of the NRL's Galactic Radiation and Background (GRAB) project utilizing the first operational signals intelligence satellites (1960–2), by the National Intelligence Office, and the CIA's Corona program of Keyhole imagery satellites, are still difficult to assess fully (Richelson 1990, McDonald and Moreno 2005, Deac 2008), but the release of preliminary archival material about them has led to several important works including the edited collection by Dwayne Day, John Logsdon, and Brian Latell (1999). At the same time, limited information has trickled out about Cold War-era operations to tap Soviet communications on land and at sea but little of this is based on archival research. Historians can expect that much of this will remain classified, but what does come out serves to remind scholars that military communications, in all of its facets, is a critical if somewhat overlooked part of military history.

As communications devices grew smaller and digitalization proliferated in the latter quarter of the twentieth century, new ideas about the effects of communications on warfighting itself developed. Indeed, proponents of "Net-Centric Warfare" argued for using advantages in superior networked digital communications to distribute forces farther apart, increase their combat power and achieve decisive

results on all manner of battlefields. A controversial idea, it nonetheless indicated that ever-more powerful communications would remain at the center of US military affairs in the years to come.

Historical attention to the role of communications in US military affairs has yielded some important scholarly work in recent years, but the subject remains open for much more to be done (Sterling 2007). This will not be easy, but it will be necessary. The problem is two-fold. First, the increasing complexity of the subject has raised the threshold for historians, who must understand now only the larger context of military affairs but also how the technological systems worked, their limitations, and the way in which those at the time perceived the equipment's utility. Second, the great importance of communications systems to all manner of military affairs, particularly tactical operations and intelligence matters, has meant that detailed information about them (or their predecessors) is much more likely to be security classified and therefore off-limits to scholars. But the deep and growing importance of military communications means that scholars will have to come to grips with how the various services constructed communications systems, used them, developed new ones, perceived their advantages and disadvantages, and altered their tactics, operations and strategies around what the communications systems could and could not do.

#### BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Aitken, Hugh G. J. (1985). *The Continuous Wave: Technology and American Radio, 1900–1932*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Allison, David K. (1981). *New Eye for the Navy: The Origin of Radar at the Naval Research Laboratory*. Washington: Naval Research Laboratory.
- Andrews, J. Cutler (1964). "The Southern Telegraph Company, 1861–1865: A Chapter in the History of Wartime Communication," *Journal of Southern History*, 30:3 (August), 319–44.
- Anno, Stephen E., and William E. Einspahr (1988). *Command and Control and Communications Lessons Learned: Iranian Rescue, Falklands Conflict, Grenada Invasion, Libya Raid*. Maxwell AFB, AL: Air War College, Air University.
- Arnold, David Christopher (2005). *Spying from Space: Constructing America's Satellite Command and Control Systems*. College Station: Texas A&M University Press.
- Barnouw, Erik (1966). *A Tower in Babel: A History of Broadcasting in the United States*, vol. 1: *To 1933*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Bates, David Homer (1907). *Lincoln in the Telegraph Office: Recollections of the United States Military Telegraph Corps during the Civil War*. New York: Century Co.
- Berger, John D. (1986). *Military Communications: A Test for Technology: The U.S. Army in Vietnam*. Washington: Center of Military History.
- Boslaugh, David L. (1999). *When Computers Went to Sea: The Digitization of the United States Navy*. Los Alamitos, CA: IEEE Computer Society.
- Bradford, James C. (1990). "Henry T. Mayo: Last of the Independent Naval Diplomats," in James C. Bradford, ed., *Admirals of the New Steel Navy: Makers of the American Naval Tradition, 1880–1930*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 253–81.
- Brown, J. Willard. (1996 [1896]). *The Signal Corps, U.S.A., in the War of the Rebellion*. Reprint, ed. Walter F. Mathers, Glen Burnie, MD: Signal Corps Association.

- Brown, Louis. (1999). *A Radar History of World War II: Technical and Military Imperatives*. London: Taylor and Francis.
- Buderi, Robert (1998). *The Invention that Changed the World*. New York: Touchstone.
- Burke, Colin (1994). *Information and Secrecy: Vannevar Bush, ULTRA and the Other Memex*. Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press.
- Campen, Alan D., ed. (1992). *The First Information War: The Story of Communications, Computers, and Intelligence Systems in the Persian Gulf War*. Fairfax, VA: AFCEA International Press.
- Cebrowski, Arthur K., and John J. Garstka (1998). "Network-Centric Warfare: Its Origin and Future," United States Naval Institute *Proceedings*, 123:1 (January), 28–35.
- Day, Dwayne A., John M. Logsdon, and Brian Latell, eds. (1999). *Eye in the Sky: The Story of the Corona Spy Satellites*. Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press.
- Deac, Wilfred P. (2008). "The Navy's Spy Missions in Space," *Naval History*, 22:2 (April), 52–9.
- DeBrosse, Jim, and Colin Burke (2004). *The Secret in Building 26: The Untold Story of America's Ultra War against the U-Boat Enigma*. New York: Random House.
- Drea, Edward J. (1992). *MacArthur's Ultra: Codebreaking and the War against Japan, 1942–1945*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
- Friedman, Norman (2000). *Seapower and Space: From the Dawn of the Missile Age to Net-Centric Warfare*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Gebhard, Louis A. (1979). *Evolution of Naval Radio: Electronics and Contributions of the Naval Research Laboratory*. Washington: Naval Research Laboratory.
- Gillespie, Paul G. (2006). *Weapons of Choice: The Development of Precision Guided Munitions*. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press.
- Hancock, Harry E. (1950). *Wireless at Sea: The First Fifty Years*. Chelmsford, UK: Marconi International Marine Communication Co.
- Headrick, Daniel (1991). *The Invisible Weapon: Telecommunications and International Politics, 1851–1945*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Howeth, Linwood S. (1963) *A History of Communication Electronics in the United States Navy*. Washington: Government Printing Office.
- Hughes, Patrick (1970). *A Century of Weather Service: A History of the Birth and Growth of the National Weather Service, 1870–1970*. New York: Gordon and Breach.
- Kuehl, Daniel T. (1992). "Refighting the Last War: Electronic Warfare and U.S. Air Force B-29 Operations in the Korean War, 1950–1953," *Journal of Military History*, 56:1 (January), 87–112.
- Lane, John J., Jr. (1981). *Command and Control and Communications Structures in South-east Asia*. Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University, Air War College.
- Long, David F. (1988). *Gold Braid and Foreign Relations: Diplomatic Activities of U.S. Naval Officers, 1798–1883*. Annapolis, MD: United States Naval Institute Press.
- McDonald, Robert A., and Sharon K. Moreno (2005). *Raising the Periscope ... Grab and Poppy: America's Early ELINT Satellites*. Chantilly, VA: National Reconnaissance Office.
- Morgan, William A. (1987). "Invasion on the Ether: Radio Intelligence at the Battle of St. Mihiel, September 1918," *Military Affairs*, 51:2 (April), 57–61.
- Morison, Samuel Elliot (1947–62). *The History of United States Military Operations in World War II*, 15 vols. Boston: Little, Brown and Co.
- Morison, Larry R. (1997). *From Flares to Satellites: A Brief History of Air Force Communications*. Scott Air Force Base, IL: Air Force Communications Agency Office of History.
- Myer, Charles R. (1982). *Division-Level Communications, 1962–1970*. Washington: Department of the Army.



- Nauss, Lovern (2005). *Troubleshooting All the Way: A Memoir of the 1st Signal Company and Combat Telephone Communications in the 1st Infantry Division, 1944–1945*. Wheaton, IL: Cantigny First Division Foundation.
- New York Times (1898). "A Coastal Signal Service," *New York Times*, 24 May, page 2.
- Norberg, Arthur L., and Judy E. O'Neill (1996). *Transforming Computer Technology: Information Processing for the Pentagon, 1962–1986*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- O'Connell, J. D., A. L. Pachynski, and L. S. Howeth (1962). "A Summary of Military Communications in the United States – 1860–1962," *Proceedings of the Institute of Radio Engineers*, 50:5 (May), 1241–51.
- Office of the CNO (1948). *Naval Communications* [unpublished manuscript]. Washington: Operational Records Branch, Naval History and Heritage Command.
- Pearson, David E. (2000). *The World Wide Military Command and Control System: Evolution and Effectiveness*. Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press.
- Plum, William R. (1974 [1882]). *The Military Telegraph During the Civil War*, reprint, ed. by Paul J. Scheips. New York: Arno Press.
- Poolman, Kenneth (1997). *The Winning Edge: Naval Technology in Action, 1939–1945*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Prados, John (2001). *Combined Fleet Decoded: The Secret History of American Intelligence and the Japanese Navy in World War II*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Pribbeneouw, Merle (2003). "The 'ology War: Technology and Ideology in the Vietnamese Defense of Hanoi, 1967," *Journal of Military History*, 67:1 (January), 175–200.
- Price, Alfred (1977). *Instruments of Darkness: The History of Electronic Warfare*. New York: Charles Scribner.
- Price, Alfred (1984). *History of U.S. Electronic Warfare*. Arlington, VA: Association of Old Crows.
- Price, Alfred (2001). *War in the Fourth Dimension: U.S. Electronic Warfare from the Vietnam War to the Present*. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books.
- Raines, Rebecca R. (1996). *Getting the Message Through: A Branch History of the U.S. Army Signal Corps*. Washington: Center of Military History.
- Redmond, Kent C., and Thomas M. Smith (2000). *From Whirlwind to MITRE: The R&D Story of the SAGE Air Defense Computer History of Computing*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- R. F. Cross Associates; author unknown. (1978). *Sea-based Anti-Submarine Warfare, 1940–1977*, 3 vols. Alexandria, VA: R. F. Cross Associates.
- Richelson, Jeffrey T. (1990). *America's Secret Eyes in Space: The U.S. Keyhole Spy Satellite Program*. New York: Harper & Row.
- Richelson, Jeffrey T. (2001). *America's Space Sentinels: DSP Satellites and National Security*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
- Rienzi, Thomas M. (1972). *Communications – Electronics, 1962–1970*. Washington: Department of the Army.
- Rosen, Philip T. (1980). *The Modern Stentors: Radio Broadcasters and the Federal Government, 1920–1934*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
- Scheips, Paul J. (1963). "Union Signal Communications: Innovations and Conflict," *Civil War History*, 9:4 (December), 399–421.
- Scheips, Paul J. (1966). "Albert J. Myer, Founder of the Signal Corps: A Biographical Study," PhD dissertation, American University.
- Scheips, Paul J., ed. (1980). *Military Signals Communications*, 2 vols. New York: Arno Press.

- Sontag Sherry, Christopher Drew, with Annette L. Drew. (1998). *Blind Man's Bluff: The Untold Story of American Submarine Espionage*, New York: Public Affairs.
- Snyder, Thomas S., et al., eds. (1991). *Air Force Communications Command, 1938–1991: An Illustrated History*. Scott Air Force Base, IL: Air Force Communications Agency Office of History.
- Sterling, Christopher (2007). *Military Communications: From Ancient Times to the 21st Century*. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO.
- Syrett, David. (1994). *The Defeat of the U-boats: The Battle of the Atlantic*. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.
- Terrett, Dulany (1956). *The Signal Corps: The Emergency (To December 1941)*. Washington: Center of Military History.
- Thompson, George R., Dixie R. Harris, Pauline M. Oakes, and Dulany Terrett (1957). *The Signal Corps: The Test (December 1941 to July 1943)*. Washington: Center of Military History.
- Thompson, George R., and Dixie R. Harris (1966). *The Signal Corps: The Outcome (Mid-1943 – Through 1945)*. Washington: Center of Military History.
- Weir, Gary E. (2006) "The American Sound Surveillance System: Using the Ocean to Hunt Soviet Submarines, 1950–1961," *International Journal of Naval History*, online at: [http://www.ijnhonline.org/volume5\\_number2\\_august06/article\\_weir\\_sosus\\_aug06.htm](http://www.ijnhonline.org/volume5_number2_august06/article_weir_sosus_aug06.htm), accessed April 22, 2009.
- Whalen, David Joseph (2000). *Space Policies, Space Commerce, and Satellite Communications: The Origins of Communications Satellite Technology (1945–1965)*. Washington: Smithsonian Institution.
- Wheeler, Tom (2006). *Mr. Lincoln's T-Mails: The Untold Story of How Abraham Lincoln Used the Telegraph to Win the Civil War*. New York: HarperCollins.
- Williams, Kathleen Broome (1996). *Secret Weapon: U.S. High Frequency Direction Finding in the Battle of the Atlantic*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Winkler, David F. (1997). *Searching the Skies: The Legacy of the United States Cold War Defense Radar Program*. Langley AFB, VA: Air Combat Command.
- Winkler, Jonathan Reed (2008). *Nexus: Strategic Communications and American Security in World War I*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Wolters, Timothy S. (2003). "Managing a Sea of Information: Shipboard Command and Control in the United States Navy, 1899–1945," PhD dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
- Woods, David L. (1974 [1965]). *A History of Tactical Communications Techniques*. New York: Arno Press.
- Woods, David L., ed. (1980). *Signaling and Communicating at Sea*, 2 vols. New York: Arno Press.

# Chapter Forty-nine

## MILITARY ORDER AND DISCIPLINE

*Benjamin R. Beede*

Discipline “implies ... the adherence to rules or policies intended for the orderly coordination of effort” (US Navy 1944: 39). It depends primarily upon training and morale, although it involves sanctions for failure to follow regulations and instructions. There are two major strands in the application of discipline in the United States forces. The first strand is the strict discipline inherited from European armies and navies and later exemplified by the service academies, which are standards for the armed forces. In the “European” tradition, enlisted personnel required harsh restraints and merited severe punishment for the slightest transgressions. The early development of disciplinary concepts in Europe has been skillfully surveyed by Drake (2002) and usefully, but more briefly, by Feld (1977). The other strand involves the modifications of disciplinary methods made necessary by the democratic, individualistic nature of United States society. Samet (2004) has provided a sophisticated discussion of the issues of military authority and discipline in a democratic context during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Although rigid class distinctions may have been accepted as late as the Revolutionary War (Cox 2004, but compare Royster 1979), continued social leveling impeded the imposition of discipline from the War of 1812 through the end of the draftee army. Even at the start of the Civil War, militia and volunteer officers were elected by their own men, thereby limiting the officers’ ability to impose their will on subordinates (Shannon 1928, Brooks 2001).

Temporary service members during large-scale wars have found “caste” differences between officers and the enlisted ranks difficult to accept, but despite tensions, discipline seems to have become more rather than less stringent during the era of the world wars. Even during World War II, however, frequently “it was failure to enforce discipline that led to the ineffective performance of many soldiers” (Ginzberg *et al.* 1959: 2:72), because transfers or even discharges were viewed as easier to implement than legal procedures. Rapid assembly of large armies often limited training for both officers and enlisted personnel and caused the sometimes hasty selection of officers, some of whom emphasized their

privileges while providing only poor leadership, thereby intensifying the worst features of a perceived "caste" system.

The armed forces use the word "discipline" in many ways. *The US Air Force Dictionary* (Heflin 1956) defines it as the "faculty or quality of the mind or will that compels or enables a person to recognize and accept his responsibilities, to use his intelligence and knowledge in accordance with tested criteria and procedures for the solution of problems, and [to] adhere to an accepted code of ethics or behavior." Two other useful definitions from the same source are the "special training given officers and men to develop and strengthen this faculty of mind and will (sense 1)", and "the meting out of punishment in the process of training, with the object of correcting an attitude considered wrong, or with the object of emphasizing the importance of a rule or principle that has not been observed." Finally, at a different level, discipline can be the "systematic rules and procedures adopted for a specific operation or action, as in 'air discipline' or 'security discipline'" (Heflin 1956).

Discipline in combat and non-combat situations has varied considerably. Outside combat zones, military courtesy and proper wearing of the uniform are emphasized and punishments given for minor offenses. The situation changes in combat. Obedience to orders is more necessary than ever in order to achieve military objectives, but many of the minor irritations of military life largely disappear or are ignored. Indeed, during wartime, the strict discipline in training camps may be designed to make garrison life so unpleasant that movement into a combat zone is preferable to remaining in an oppressive environment.

Proper training is an important element in establishing and maintaining discipline, but various factors have worked against effective military education. At one time, new soldiers and sailors were simply put into existing military organizations for on-the-job training. Later, "basic training" and "boot camp" were designed "to produce individuals who are useful to and work well within the military, and this necessarily implies a certain amount of indoctrination" (Barber 1972: 161). As the armed services began to use more technology and to apply more sophisticated administrative procedures, more structured education was required (Harrod 1978). Specialized training has become ever more important as the composition of the armed forces has changed. All the armed forces have an increasing number of specialists in contrast to traditional land forces, which had many people who were virtually interchangeable at low skills levels. The transformation of skills and duty assignments has necessitated new forms of discipline. Rather than "domination," that is, traditional disciplinary measures, there is a need for "manipulation" in a positive sense, which "involves influencing an individual's behavior less by giving explicit instructions and more by indirect techniques of group persuasion and by an emphasis on group goals" (Janowitz and Little 1974: 59). Radine (1977) also used the word "manipulation" but in a way that was highly critical of military practices during the last years of the draftee force.

Key figures in providing training and maintaining discipline have been and continue to be army, air force, and marine noncommissioned officers, called petty officers in the navy and coast guard. Fulfilling functions like those of foremen/

forewomen in industry, they have an influence that permeates the lives of lower ranking enlisted personnel. They must announce, interpret, and enforce orders, and, therefore, they must have a "command presence," which discourages subordinates from resisting authority. Despite their importance, noncommissioned/petty officers have received relatively little attention from military historians and sociologists. Those in the navy have been the subject of a single book (Leahy 2004); those in the army two (Fisher 2001, Hogan, Fisch, and Wright 2003). The duties of the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Navy and the Sergeant Major of the Army include serving as an ombudsman of sorts between enlisted personnel and senior leaders (Crist 1992, Elder 2003).

The office of inspector general ensures that service members are given proper training and appropriate care by carrying out detailed inspections of all types of military organizations. The inspector general system emphasizes the needs of enlisted personnel and also provides a complaint structure outside the chain of command. Histories of the inspectors general includes important material about discipline (Clary and Whitehorne 1987, Whitehorne 1998), as do the reports of Colonel George Croghan, written in the mid-nineteenth century (Pucha 1958).

Enlisted complaints have included poor housing; insufficient or indifferent food; low pay or even the temporary absence of pay; inappropriate work assignments; and strict accountability that seemed to extend beyond military necessity. Non-military assignments have diminished considerably within recent decades, but during much of the nineteenth century soldiers often spent more time on building and maintaining military posts than on training. Perhaps understandably, many soldiers deserted because they were carrying out "civilian" tasks at a lower pay than civilians. A somewhat similar problem arose in the 1930s when army privates earned less than Civilian Conservation Corps members whom military personnel were supervising (Whitehorne 1998).

The armed forces have been relatively lenient toward many transgressions, such as drunkenness and some forms of sexual misbehavior. Indeed, various military leaders have asserted that servicemen who do not drink and engage actively in sex cannot fight. Ingraham (1984) argued that alcohol and drugs fostered social relationships without doing much damage to military efficiency. His observations were limited to the period when draftees gave way to career soldiers in the 1970s, and they may not apply fully today.

Service personnel have demonstrated dissatisfaction in various ways. As Coffman's authoritative studies demonstrate, there was considerable continuity in disciplinary problems in the army throughout the period between the end of the American Revolution and the nation's entry into World War II (Coffman 1986, 2004). The most common problem has been the tendency of enlisted personnel to perform a minimal amount of work at a marginally acceptable level, thereby creating constant tension between leaders and led. A more serious form of indiscipline is AWOL (absence without official leave), that is, a temporary absence from one's post. A more drastic step has been desertion, which was a serious problem for the army and the navy during the nineteenth century. There were desertions during the world wars; in fact, the desertion rate during the unpopular Vietnam

conflict never equaled the level reached during World War II. Desertion to the enemy is the most serious form of the offense. Some Irish-Americans deserters joined the Mexican Army during the Mexican-American War (Miller 1989, Hogan 1997). During the Civil War several thousand Confederate soldiers were released from prisons camps to enter the Union army, and some Union soldiers joined the Confederate Army (Brown 1963, Current 1992).

There were only a few defectors in World War II, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War. Nonetheless, the decision of 21 United States servicemen to refuse repatriation at the end of the Korean War caused much concern in the military and resulted in the establishment of a Code of Conduct for service members (Pasley 1955) that emphasized the need to maintain military cohesion, even within a prisoner-of-war camp (Manes 1965). An earnest effort was made to examine the conduct of United States prisoners returning from communist prison camps following the Korean War, but not many court-martials were instituted. Some of those suspected of misconduct were not formally charged with violating the code of conduct, but were simply released from the army; although certain persons were given less than honorable discharges (Biderman 1963, Hillman 2005, Kinkad 1959). A somewhat similar pattern occurred as the Vietnam War ended. Concern was expressed about what was called "prisoner misconduct," but few former prisoners suffered much for their activities while prisoners. The notable exception was Robert R. Garwood, who rejected repatriation and who was tried years after the ending of fighting in Vietnam, but even he escaped serious sanctions. (Davis 2000, Groom and Spencer 1983, Rochester and Kiley 1999, Solis 1989, 1997).

Mutiny is the ultimate expression of indiscipline, but "mutiny" in the United States armed forces has virtually always taken the form of refusal to perform certain types of work or to register dissatisfaction with specific policies rather than an organized rebellion against officers or an attack on the government. There have never been mutinies comparable to those in the German Navy in 1918 that helped end World War I. Though it is difficult to determine what precisely constituted mutiny in a legal sense during the American Revolution, John Nagy, *Rebellion in the Ranks* (2008) shows that most "mutinies" in the Continental Army arose from pay and length of enlistment problems. The most serious were the Mutiny of the Pennsylvania Line in 1781 (Van Doren 1943) and the Newburgh Conspiracy of 1783 (Skeen 1974). After World War II, widespread demonstrations occurred because of seemingly slow progress in returning military personnel home. They were confined largely to the army and were only belatedly infiltrated by political activists. As repatriation and demobilization moved more quickly, morale problems dissipated. The Marine Corps meanwhile reacted sternly to protests within its ranks (Lee 1966). During the Vietnam War, there were refusals to undertake particular types of duty, such as unusually dangerous patrols. Attempts were made to unionize service personnel in the last years of the Vietnam conflict, but the coming of an all-volunteer force with higher pay and better living conditions ended the effort (Krendel and Samoff 1977, Sabrosky 1977, Taylor, Aranago, and Lockwood 1977).

Another form of indiscipline is the commission of what are now termed "war crimes," by issuing or carrying out illegal orders that involve killing or assaulting



prisoners of war or civilians or by murdering or attacking prisoners of war or civilians without orders. Even before the coming of the Geneva Convention, disciplined soldiers presumably had some training or at least instructions about the treatment of prisoners. Nevertheless, seemingly almost every conflict in which the United States has been involved has given rise to atrocities or at least to assertions that atrocities have been committed. Moreover, the incidents that attracted attention are almost surely only a part of the story. Violations, such as killing prisoners of war who were considered a burden for one reason or another, have probably been detected in only a few cases.

Frequently, distinguishing between offenses committed with or without orders is difficult, and, in any event, the Nuremberg doctrine holds that persons executing clearly illegal orders are subject to punishment. The emphasis here is upon individual or small group actions which seem to have gone beyond military orders, whether legal or illegal. An important strand in colonial and later United States military history has been counter-guerrilla warfare, usually aimed at non-white groups, which has frequently involved warring on civilians as well as combatants (Grenier 2005). Perhaps inevitably, such methods led to many atrocities, not only on the frontier but in later periods as well.

Such occurrences were by no means always approved or even ignored. As early as the middle of the nineteenth century, official inquiries were made of some of the most shocking lapses, such as the attack on Native Americans at Sand Creek in 1864, although nothing was done directly to prevent events of this kind in the future (Hoig 1961, Svaldi 1989). An equally barbaric, but largely forgotten, attack was made on the Shoshoni a year earlier, which included many killings and a large number of rapes (Fleisher 2004). Atrocities during the Philippine-American War that began in 1899 and continued for years after the war ended officially in 1902 produced inquiries and even some courts-martial, but, again, the public response was not enough to effect real changes in United States fighting methods in that conflict or influence behavior in future wars (Welch 1974, Miller 1982, Gates 2001).

One of the United States' major enemies in World War II was a non-European power, and given the ferocity of Japanese soldiers and the racism of United States personnel the Pacific campaigns were characterized by many brutal actions, including executions of prisoners of war (Dower 1986, Ferguson 2004). At the same time, United States conduct was not comparable to the racial and ethnic warfare practiced by Germany in the Soviet Union (Weingartner 1996), or of the scale of the atrocities perpetrated against civilians by Japanese troops in Asia. Atrocities by United States military personnel were not entirely limited to the Pacific. In Sicily, instances occurred in which Italian civilians who were thought to be looters and Italian prisoners of war were shot by United States soldiers. An officer and an NCO who were charged in separate cases of the killing of prisoners of war were, respectively, either not punished at all or simply dismissed from the army (Weingartner 1989). When the concentration camp at Dachau, Germany, was liberated in 1945, a number of SS men were killed by United States troops and former camp inmates were allowed to kill their former guards (Abzug 1985, Marcuse 2001).

During the Korean War, United States service personnel killed numerous Korean civilians at various locations, most notably at No Gun Ri, to prevent their crossing the fighting line, owing to fears of infiltration by enemy troops. These events have been highly controversial, but there seems to be little doubt but that United States military policy was to shoot refugees if there seemed to be no other way to stem the tide of people (Hanley, Choe, and Mendoza 2001, Bateman 2002, Conway-Lanz 2006).

The most notable United States atrocities of the Vietnam conflict were killings at Son Thang (by marines) and at My Lai (by army troops), which resulted in inquiries and, eventually, in courts-martial. The My Lai trials occurred despite extensive efforts in the army to cover up the incident, but the marines tackled their major atrocity challenge openly and relatively quickly. Nevertheless, punishments were generally not administered, and, if there were sanctions, they were lenient in view of the crimes perpetrated (Goldstein, Marshall, and Schwartz 1976, Solis 1997, Belknap 2002, Oliver 2005, Allison 2007, Nelson 2008). Currently, in Iraq there have been charges of atrocities and civil crimes by United States military personnel. Perhaps the most dramatic was the extensive use of torture at Abu Ghraib prison (Danner 2004, Greenberg and Dratel 2005, Meštrović 2007).

Permanent bodies of law enforcement personnel within the armed forces have only existed since World War II. The army established a Military Police Corps in 1941 (Wright 1992), and the air force instituted an Air Police after its separation from the army in 1947. The general practice through most of United States military history has been the detailing of ordinary companies, battalions, regiments, or individuals to police military personnel and, sometimes, civilians. Washington strongly favored a stable military police structure, but during the Revolutionary War he had to depend upon a variety of forces to maintain order. The closest approach to a modern military police force was the relatively small *Maréchaussée* Corps, modeled on the French *Gendarmerie* (Ward 2006). Radley (1989) demonstrated that the Provost Guard of the Confederate States Army was a unique structure in United States military history. Because it regulated conduct within the army; attempted to protect the civilian population from soldiers' misdeeds, especially pillaging; and controlled significant areas of civilian life, especially travel through the imposition of passports, the Provost Guard resembled the *gendarmerie* found in continental European countries more than it did police organizations within the United States armed forces. During the age of sail the navy depended on contingents of marines to maintain discipline on board ships, a role gradually assumed by certain petty officers who served as police aboard ship. As onshore leaves became more common, an *ad hoc* organization, the "shore patrol," was established. The navy shore patrol is respected. Its strength and composition in various ports depends on navy operations. Over the years, some naval writers have expressed a need for the kind of highly structured police force the army employs (Nelson 1944), but the navy continues to depend primarily on personnel temporarily assigned to the shore patrol.

The armed forces have used and continue to use various forms of punishment short of imprisonment (Robertson 1988, Cox 2004, Ward 2006). Flogging was

a major sanction for offenses in the army and navy until the mid-nineteenth century, when it was finally abolished after a long struggle (Glenn 1984), but other very cruel forms of punishment existed, and some of them continued in use through the late nineteenth century. Reformers hoped to substitute incentives, such as the introduction of more paygrades within the enlisted ranks with promotion to the next highest being dependent on good behavior. In 1869 the Navy authorized granting of the "Good Conduct Medal" to deserving personnel, the Marine Corps began issuing the medal in 1896, the Coast Guard in 1923, the Army in 1941, and the Air Force in 1963 (the Air Force discontinued issuance of the medal in 2006).

There is a significant literature dealing with military prisons, but it consists primarily of specialized periodical articles, many of which are cited in Brodsky's and Eggleston's dated, but still valuable, overview, *The Military Prison* (1970). Most discussions of military prisons emphasize the efforts made to return prisoners to normal military duty, but the focus within prisons often seems to have been punishment rather than rehabilitation. Descriptions of particular prisons (Crowell 1974, Gieck 1997, Currey 1999) contain useful material, but they must be used with the caution generally required for dealing with case studies.

Discipline and training have been intimately linked throughout history, though the emphasis given the two has shifted over time. Training seems to have been relatively haphazard in the Continental Army until Baron von Steuben introduced a modified European style of discipline during the winter at Valley Forge. Although discipline among the Continentals seems to have been lighter than among the British, it nevertheless appears to have been harsh by present-day standards. George Washington favored the application of sanctions quickly without formal legal proceedings and approved of the use of flogging on a large scale. His policy regarding capital punishment was milder, and he often saved soldiers who had been sentenced to death (Bernath 1967, Cox 2004, Ward 2006). Despite improving morale during the war, the army had difficulty retaining its enlisted men. Desertion ran to between 20 and 25 percent of its total strength.

A new army had to be reestablished after the Revolutionary War, but it remained poorly supported and trained, on the one hand, and very severely disciplined, on the other hand. Even the establishment of a military academy had little impact for some time. Anthony Wayne was able to improve training and performance of the troops under his command, but, unfortunately, he died early in his post-Revolutionary War service (Jacobs 1947).

The War of 1812 was fought largely by militia forces, whose members were largely untrained and underequipped, and, consequently, were undisciplined (Quimby 1997, Skeen 1999). Despite efforts after the war to continue the legend of the "citizen soldier" inherited from the Revolutionary War, the militia had proved itself generally ineffective. Militia structure decayed significantly from the 1820s through the 1850s, contributing to a confused mobilization on both sides at the beginning of the Civil War (Mahon 1983).

Although a number of volunteers entered the army for service in Mexico, the small regular army largely carried the burden of fighting. Distinctions between the discipline of regulars and volunteers have been briefly discussed by Winders (1997).

Volunteers were of limited military value owing generally to their unruly behavior and their unwillingness to undertake the most necessary duties, such as camp sanitation. "Within the volunteer regiments the terms of service were worked out on a daily basis ... with food, drill, training, obedience, and discipline very much in the realm of negotiation" (Foos 2002: 89–90). Desertion rates were strikingly different for regulars and volunteers, with regulars being almost twice as prone to desert. This difference presumably reflected the harsh discipline of the regulars. Some regular army deserters were not unwilling to fight, and they joined volunteer organizations.

Navy discipline in the nineteenth century was severe. With literally hundreds of men confined aboard relatively small ships, it was thought necessary to regulate virtually every aspect of life. A man could be struck with a petty officer's knotted rope if he did not react to an order quickly enough or for spitting on the deck, wearing soiled clothing, saving one's rum ration until he got enough to get drunk, or urinating out a gunport a man could be flogged. Repeated offenders could be placed in irons, exposed to the elements, and given only bread and water (Valle 1980). Indeed, discipline may have been as strict as it was owing to concerns that democratic principles might impair the ability of the navy to function as a fighting force. Nevertheless, influences from the larger society could not be ignored, and, therefore, changes did occur even before the Civil War (Langley 1967).

Disciplinary issues in the Union and Confederate armies were similar (Robertson 1988), but differences emerged as the conflict continued. Discipline in the Union Army was weak during the first two years, but gradually it improved, as the importance of having competent commissioned officers and of accepting military life became more apparent to the enlisted personnel. Desertion, nevertheless, was a constant problem, amounting to nearly a tenth of the number of enlistments (Shannon 1928, Wiley 1943, 1952). Overuse of alcohol and malingering in the Union Army have been explored by Lande (2003). The disorganization of the Union Army was fully matched or even exceeded in the Confederate States Army where individualism and concomitant reluctance to submit to military discipline were stronger than in the North (Wiley 1943). While the Union Army was able to increase its fighting ability, the Confederates continued to suffer from indiscipline. Indeed, by 1863 desertion severely limited the fighting effectiveness of the Confederate Army and by 1864 bands of deserters preyed on Confederate civilians across much of the South (Radley 1989, Weitz 2000, 2005). Numerous mutinies occurred on both sides (Garrison 2001).

During World War I, a large army was assembled and sent to France rather quickly. For many, training was limited. Although an effort was made to provide further training tailored specifically to trench warfare by British and French veterans, the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) leadership generally believed that this training was overly defensive and was poorly suited to the offensives that would be undertaken once the trench lines had been breached. Only gradually did senior United States officers understand the realities of warfare that was dominated by machine guns and artillery. Early on, General John J. Pershing, commander of the AEF, decided that members of his force were to be held to the high standards of

the United States Military Academy rather than to a reduced level of discipline that some might think more appropriate to the army of a democracy (Farwell 1999). Although a campaign against venereal disease, which included courts-martial for those infected, was largely successful, the performance of the AEF troops at the front was mixed. AEF casualties were heavy, and some opportunities were lost, at least in part as the result of limited or uneven training (Grotelueschen 2007). As in other conflicts, some poorly-trained junior officers, who were more intent on maintaining their privileges than giving appropriate leadership, caused suffering and discontent among enlisted personnel.

World War II generally provided longer periods of military education for United States forces, although for many service members there was insufficient training, including combat skills, for their ultimate assignments. Perhaps because most people were in the armed forces longer than during World War I, dissatisfaction with military life seems to have been voiced more openly than in the earlier conflict (Stouffer *et al.* 1949). Criticisms of the army, in particular, reached such a level that a special study was undertaken to examine the problems. The "Doolittle Commission," named for its chair, Lieutenant General James H. Doolittle, recommended many changes (Doolittle *et al.* 1946), but only a few token adjustments were put into force.

Despite the obvious differences in the nature of the two conflicts, the Korean War can be seen as a continuation of World War II. A number of World War II veterans were recalled to active duty, and training and disciplinary procedures did not change radically, though a new code of military justice was implemented (Generous 1973). As the Vietnam War became more unpopular and as many army policies proved counterproductive, morale and discipline declined considerably. Various forms of indiscipline increased, and incidents of "fraggings," that is, killing or wounding officers and noncommissioned officers with fragmentation grenades by enlisted personnel, began to be reported more frequently in Vietnam. Gradually, the armed forces came to terms with changes in society and within their own ranks. Had they not done so, the deterioration in discipline would probably have been much worse than actually occurred (Moskos 1970, Barnes 1972, King 1972, Hauser 1973). Radine (1977) described the army's program to counteract anti-war organizers in its ranks, although the army accepted some freedom of expression, even the publication of dissident newspapers.

As the armed forces became an all All-Volunteer Force, training intensified and improved, and inducements for men and women to enlist were increased significantly (Bradford and Brown 1973, Brown 1993). Dissent decreased, although critics in uniform emerged once more during the Gulf and Iraq conflicts (Griffin 2003, 2007, Solomon 2005, Mirra 2006).

Many African-Americans had served in the United States armed forces in earlier conflicts, but the Civil War brought them into the services in much larger numbers than ever before. Overall, African-Americans adapted to military life well, although some men recently freed from slavery objected at times to the restraints of discipline because they seemed like the regulations enforced in a slave society. Sympathetic white officers, coming from abolitionist environments, often punished

indiscipline lightly, because they wanted to encourage African-American troops to move from servility to personal independence. Other white officers were inclined to be harsh with them. During much of the war African-American soldiers were paid less than whites, but, led by their noncommissioned officers, they won pay equity. They were also given a disproportionate number of labor assignments, a pattern that persisted into the world wars. "Mutinies" were generally peaceful and were intended only to have grievances redressed (Glatthaar 1990, Wilson 2002). The most recent research suggests that African-Americans fared much better in the navy than in the army (Ramold 2002).

During the post-Civil War years, African-American soldiers gave faithful service on the frontier, and their level of discipline remained higher than that of white troops. The desertion rate for African-Americans was lower than that for whites, for example. (Fowler 1971, Leckie and Leckie 2003, Adams 2009). Unfortunately, late in the nineteenth century, racism in the United States increased significantly, which led to episodes like the "Brownsville affair" in 1907 when many African-American soldiers were unfairly dismissed in the wake of what was said to have been a riot at Brownsville, Texas (Weaver 1970, Lane 1971).

When the United States entered World War I, only limited support was given to African-American participation. There were doubts about African-Americans' ability to contribute usefully, especially as combat soldiers, and there was resistance, especially in the South, to arming them at all. Most African-Americans were assigned to labor units. Such units were necessary components of the army, but deploying the majority of African-American soldiers in support roles indicated a lack of confidence in them. Several regiments of African-Americans fought well as elements of the French Army, disproving prejudiced assumptions (Barbeau and Henri 1974, Patton 1981).

Pre-World War II army planning for the employment of African-Americans included segregation, and more positive policies that were part of these plans were not fully implemented. Despite the formation of some air and ground combat organizations, the army continued to deploy many African-Americans in support roles. There were instances of indiscipline, some of them serious (Lee 1963). There were cases of indiscipline stemming directly from discriminatory practices. The best known episode occurred in 1944 when African-American sailors refused to load ammunition under unsafe conditions after an explosion at Port Chicago, California, in which hundreds of men, most of them African-Americans, died. The navy dealt severely with these men, but it soon reviewed the cases and returned the "mutineers" to active duty (Nelson 1951, Allen 1989).

Only late in the war did the army take a few steps toward integration. The navy, after having banned the enlistment of African-Americans between 1919 and 1932, started serious recruiting as it began expanding in 1940 and by 1944 began to eliminate unequal treatment. During the war the destroyer escort USS *Mason* and the submarine chaser USS *PC-1264* operated with African-American crews (Kelly 1999).

Despite the splendid combat record of Japanese-Americans in Europe, there was an almost complete collapse in discipline among one group of Japanese-



American soldiers in the face of blatant discrimination. They did not move from indiscipline until they were given assignments as language specialists in Japan (Shibutani 1978).

In 1972, near the end of the Vietnam War there were racial incidents onboard two US aircraft carriers. Groups of Blacks armed with clubs and wrenches roamed sections of the USS *Kitty Hawk* terrorizing the crew and beating dozens of white sailors, before the ship's marine detachment and senior officers calmed the situation. Three weeks later dissident sailors, the majority of whom were black, participated in a "sit-in" on board the USS *Constellation* refusing to follow orders during a training exercise for which they were removed from the ship and discharged from the service (US Congress 1973, Sherwood 2007).

There is no overall examination of order and discipline, or the related topics of training and morale, in the United States armed forces or in the individual services, and, thus, numerous sources have to be examined to understand their roles through time. Relevant material is to be found scattered in administrative histories of the services and in numerous studies of the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps during various conflicts, but there is a need for comparisons between wars and between services. Order and discipline in the Coast Guard, Air Force, and National Guard have received very little attention. The large bodies of research materials relating to discipline, such as inspectors general reports and records of court proceedings have not been fully utilized. Comparative studies between one or more of the United States armed forces and those of foreign countries would also be worthwhile. Overall, "order and discipline" is a fruitful area for research.

#### BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Abzug, Robert H. (1985). *Inside the Vicious Heart: Americans and the Liberation of Nazi Concentration Camps*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Adams, Kevin (2009). *Class and Race in the Frontier Army: Military Life in the West, 1870–1890*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Allen, Robert L. (1989). *The Port Chicago Mutiny*. New York: Warner Books.
- Allison, William Thomas (2007). *Military Justice in Vietnam: The Rule of Law in an American War*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
- Barbeau, Arthur E., and Florette Henri (1974). *The Unknown Soldiers: Black American Troops in World War I*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- Barber, James Alden, Jr. (1972). "The Social Effects of Military Service," in Stephen E. Ambrose and James A. Barber, Jr., eds., *The Military and American Society*. New York: Free Press, 151–65.
- Barnes, Peter (1972). *Pawns: The Plight of the Citizen-Soldier*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Bateman, Robert (2002). *No Gun Ri: A Military History of the Korean War Incident*. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books.
- Belknap, Michael R. (2002). *The Vietnam War on Trial: The My Lai Massacre and the Court-Martial of Lieutenant Calley*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
- Bernath, Stuart L. (1967). "George Washington and the Genesis of American Military Discipline," *Mid-America*, 49:1 (April), 83–100.
- Biderman, Albert D. (1963). *March to Calumny: The Story of American POWs in the Korean War*. New York: Macmillan.

- Bradford, Zeb B., Jr., and Frederic J. Brown (1973). *The United States Army in Transition*. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications.
- Brodsky, Stanley J., and Norman E. Eggleston, eds. (1970). *The Military Prison: Theory, Research, and Practice*. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press.
- Brooks, Charles E. (2001). "The Social and Cultural Dynamics of Soldiering in Hood's Texas Brigade," *Journal of Southern History*, 67:3 (August), 535–72.
- Brown, Dee Alexander (1963). *The Galvanized Yankees*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
- Brown, Frederic J. (1993). *The U.S. Army in Transition II: Landpower in the Information Age*. Washington: Brassey's.
- Clary, David A., and Joseph W. A. Whitehorne (1987). *The Inspectors General of the United States Army 1777–1903*. Washington: Office of the Inspector General and Center of Military History.
- Coffman, Edward M. (1986). *The Old Army: A Portrait of the American Army in Peacetime, 1784–1898*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Coffman, Edward M. (2004). *The Regulars: The American Army, 1898–1941*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Conway-Lanz, Sahr (2006). *Collateral Damage: Noncombatant Immunity, and Atrocity after World War II*. New York: Routledge.
- Cox, Caroline (2004). *A Proper Sense of Honor: Service and Sacrifice in George Washington's Army*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Crist, Charlotte D. (1992). *Winds of Change: The History of the Office of the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Navy, 1967–1992*. Washington: Naval Historical Center.
- Crowell, Joan (1974). *Fort Dix Stockade: Our Prison Camp Next Door*. New York: Links.
- Current, Richard Nelson (1992). *Lincoln's Loyalists: Union Soldiers from the Confederacy*. Boston: Northeastern University Press.
- Currey, Cecil B. (1999). *Long Binh Jail: An Oral History of Vietnam's Notorious U.S. Military Prison*. Washington: Brassey's.
- Danner, Mark (2004). *Torture and Truth: America, Abu Ghraib, and the War on Terror*. New York: New York Review Books.
- Davis, Vernon E. (2000). *The Long Road Home: U.S. Prisoner of War Policy and Planning in Southeast Asia*. Washington: Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense.
- Doolittle, James H., et al. (1946). *Officer–Enlisted Man Relationships*. United States. Senate. Senate Report No. 196, 79th Congress, 2nd Session. Washington: Government Printing Office.
- Dower, John W. (1986). *War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War*. New York: Pantheon Books.
- Drake, Michael S. (2002). *Problematics of Military Power: Government, Discipline and the Subject of Violence*. London: Frank Cass.
- Elder, Daniel, et al., eds. (2003). *The Sergeants Major of the Army*, rev. ed. Washington: Center of Military History.
- Farwell, Byron (1999). *Over There: The United States in the Great War, 1917–1918*. New York: W. W. Norton & Co.
- Feld, Maury D. (1977). "Military Discipline as a Social Force," in Maury D. Feld. *The Structure of Violence: Armed Forces as Social Systems*. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 13–30.
- Ferguson, Niall (2004). "Prisoner Taking and Prisoner Killing in the Age of Total War: Towards a Political Economy of Military Defeat," *War in History*, 11:2 (April): 148–92.

- Fisher, Ernest F., Jr. (2001). *Guardians of the Republic: A History of the Noncommissioned Officer Corps of the U.S. Army*. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books.
- Fleisher, Kass (2004). *The Bear River Massacre and the Making of History*. Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Foos, Paul (2002). *A Short, Offhand, Killing Affair: Soldiers and Social Conflict During the Mexican–American War*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Fowler, Arlen L. (1971). *The Black Infantry in the West, 1869–1891*. Westport, CT: Greenwood.
- Garrison, Webb B. (2001). *Mutiny in the Civil War*. Shippensburg, PA: White Mane Books.
- Gates, John M. (2001). “Two American Wars in Asia: Successful Colonial Warfare in the Philippines and Cold War Failure in Vietnam,” *War in History*, 8:1 (January), 47–71.
- Generous, William T. (1973) *Swords and Scales: The Development of the Uniform Code of Military Justice*. Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press.
- Gieck, Jack (1997). *Lichfield: the U.S. Army on Trial*. Akron, OH: University of Akron Press.
- Ginzberg, Eli, *et al.* (1959). *The Ineffective Soldier*, 3 vols. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Glatthaar, Joseph T. (1990). *Forged in Battle: The Civil War Alliance of Black Soldiers and White Officers*. New York: Free Press.
- Glenn, Myra C. (1984). *Campaigns Against Corporal Punishment: Prisoners, Sailors, Women and Children in Antebellum America*. Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Goldstein, Joseph, Burke Marshall, and Jack Schwartz (1976). *The My Lai Massacre and Its Cover-up: Beyond the Reach of Law? The Peers Report with a Supplement and Introductory Essay on the Limits of Law*. New York: Free Press.
- Greenberg, Karen J., and Joshua L. Dratel (2005). *The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Grenier, John (2005). *The First Way of War: American War Making on the Frontier, 1607–1814*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Griffin, Michael (2003). “The Soldiers Came Asking,” *America*, 188 (June 23–30), 8–10.
- Griffin, Michael (2007). “A Soldier’s Decision,” *America*, 196 (January 29), 10–13.
- Groom, Winston, and Duncan Spencer (1983). *Conversations with the Enemy: The Story of P. F. C. Robert Garwood*. New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons.
- Grotelueschen, Mark Ethan (2007). *The AEF Way of War: The American Army and Combat in World War I*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Hanley, Charles J., Sang-Hun Choe, and Martha Mendoza (2001). *The Bridge at No-Gun Ri: A Hidden Nightmare from the Korean War*. New York: Henry Holt & Co.
- Harrod, Frederick S. (1978). *Manning the New Navy: The Development of a Modern Naval Enlisted Force, 1899–1940*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
- Hauser, William L. (1973). *America’s Army in Crisis: A Study in Civil–Military Relations*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Heflin, Woodford Agee, ed. (1956). *The United States Air Force Dictionary*. Princeton, NJ: Van Nostrand.
- Hillman, Elizabeth Lutes (2005). *Defending America: Military Culture and the Cold War Court-Martial*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Hogan, David W., Jr., Arnold G. Fisch, Jr., and Robert K. Wright, Jr., eds. (2003). *The Story of the Noncommissioned Officer Corps: The Backbone of the Army*. Washington: United States Army Center of Military History.
- Hogan, Michael (1997). *The Irish Soldiers of Mexico*. Guadalajara, Mexico: Fondo Editorial Universitario.

- Hoig, Stan (1961). *The Sand Creek Massacre*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Ingraham, Larry H. (1984). *The Boys in the Barracks: Observations on American Military Life*. Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues.
- Jacobs, James Ripley (1947). *The Beginning of the U.S. Army, 1783–1812*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Janowitz, Morris, with Roger W. Little (1974). *Sociology and the Military Establishment*. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications.
- Kelly, Mary Pat (1999). *Proudly We Served: The Men of the USS Mason*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- King, Edward L. (1972). *The Death of the Army: A Pre-Mortem*. New York: Saturday Review Press.
- Kinkead, Eugene (1959). *In Every War But One*. New York: W. W. Norton.
- Krendel, Ezra S., and Bernard Samoff, eds. (1977). *Unionizing the Armed Forces*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Lande, R. Gregory (2003). *Madness, Malingering, and Malfeasance: The Transformation of Psychiatry and the Law in the Civil War Era*. Washington: Brassey's.
- Lane, Ann J. (1971). *The Brownsville Affair: National Crisis and Black Reaction*. Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press.
- Langley, Harold D. (1967). *Social Reform in the United States Navy, 1798–1862*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
- Leahy, J. F. (2004). *Ask the Chief: Backbone of the Navy*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Leckie, William H., with Shirley A. Leckie (2003). *The Buffalo Soldiers: A Narrative of the Negro Cavalry in the West*, rev. edn. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Lee, R. Alton (1966). "The Army 'Mutiny' of 1946," *Journal of American History*, 53 (December), 555–71.
- Lee, Ulysses (1963). *The Employment of Negro Troops: United States Army in World War II Special Studies*. Washington: Center of Military History.
- Mahon, John K. (1983). *History of the Militia and the National Guard*. New York: Macmillan.
- Manes, Donald L., Jr. (1965). "Barbed Wire Command: The Legal Nature of the Command Responsibilities of the Senior Prisoner in a Prisoner of War Camp," *Military Law Review – Selected Reprint* (October), 561–606.
- Marcuse, Harold (2001). *Legacies of Dachau: The Uses and Abuses of a Concentration Camp, 1933–2001*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Meštrović, S. G. (2007). *The Trials of Abu Ghraib: An Expert Witness Account of Shame and Honor*. Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers.
- Miller, Robert Ryal (1989). *Shamrock and Sword: The Saint Patrick's Battalion in the U.S.–Mexican War*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Miller, Stuart Creighton (1982). "Benevolent Assimilation": *The American Conquest of the Philippines, 1899–1903*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Mirra, Carl (2006). "Conscientious Objection in Operation Desert Storm," *Peace Review*, 18 (April–June), 199–205.
- Moskos, Charles C., Jr. (1970). *The American Enlisted Man: The Rank and File in Today's Military*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- Nagy, John A. (2008). *Rebellion in the Ranks: Mutinies of the American Revolution*. Yardley, PA: Westholme.
- Nelson, Deborah (2008). *The War Behind Me: Vietnam Veterans Confront the Truth About U.S. War Crimes*. New York: Basic Books.

- Nelson, Dennis D. (1951). *The Integration of the Negro into the Navy*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Young.
- Nelson, Frederick I. (1944). "Shore Patrol," United States Naval Institute *Proceedings*, 70 (January), 145–9.
- Oliver, Kendrick (2005). *The My Lai Massacre in American History and Memory*. Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press.
- Pasley, Virginia (1955). *21 Stayed: The Story of the American GIs Who Chose Communist China*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Cudahy.
- Patton, Gerald W. (1981). *War and Race: The Black Officer in the American Military, 1915–1941*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
- Prucha, Francis Paul, ed. (1958). *Army Life on the Western Frontier: Selections from the Official Reports Made Between 1826 and 1845 by Colonel George Croghan*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Quimby, Robert S. (1997). *The U.S. Army in the War of 1812: An Operational and Command Study*. East Lansing: Michigan State University Press.
- Radine, Lawrence B. (1977). *The Taming of the Troops: Social Control in the United States Army*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
- Radley, Kenneth (1989). *Rebel Watchdog: The Confederate States Army Provost Guard*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.
- Ramold, Steven J. (2002). *Slaves, Sailors, Citizens: African Americans in the Union Navy*. DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press.
- Robertson, James I. (1988). *Soldiers Blue and Gray*. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.
- Rochester, Stuart I., and Frederick Kiley (1999). *Honor Bound: American Prisoners of War in Southeast Asia, 1961–1973*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Royster, Charles (1979). *A Revolutionary People at War: The Continental Army and American Character, 1775–1783*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Sabrosky, Alan Ned, ed. (1977). *Blue-Collar Soldiers? Unionization and the U.S. Military*. Philadelphia: Foreign Policy Research Institute.
- Samet, Elizabeth D. (2004). *Willing Obedience: Citizens, Soldiers, and the Progress of Consent in America, 1776–1898*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Shannon, Fred Albert (1928). *The Organization and Administration of the Union Army 1861–1865*, vol. 1. Cleveland, OH: Arthur H. Clarke Co.
- Sherwood, John Darrell (2007). *Black Sailor, White Navy: Racial Unrest in the Fleet During the Vietnam Era*. New York: New York University Press.
- Shibutani, Tamotsu (1978). *The Derelicts of Company K: A Sociological Study of Demoralization*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Skeen, C. Edward (1974). "The Newburgh Conspiracy Reconsidered," with a rebuttal by Richard H. Kohn, *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3rd ser. 31:4 (April), 273–98.
- Skeen, C. Edward (1999). *Citizen Soldiers in the War of 1812*. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky.
- Solis, Gary D. (1989). *Marines and Military Law in Vietnam: Trial by Fire*. Washington: Headquarters, US Marine Corps, History and Museums Division.
- Solis, Gary D. (1997). *Son Thang: An American War Crime*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Solomon, Alisa (2005). "War Resisters Go North," *Nation*, 280 (January 3), 4–6.
- Stouffer, Samuel A., et al. (1949). *The American Soldier: Adjustment during Army Life*, 2 vols. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.



- Svaldi, David (1989). *Sand Creek and the Rhetoric of Extermination: A Case Study in Indian-White Relations*. Lanham, MD: University Press of America.
- Taylor, William J., Roger J. Aranago, and Robert S. Lockwood, eds. (1977). *Military Unions: U.S. Trends and Issues*. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications.
- United States Congress (1973). House Committee on Armed Forces. *Report by the Special Subcommittee on Disciplinary Problems in the US Navy*. 92nd Cong., 2nd sess., 1973, HASC 92-81. Washington: Government Printing Office.
- United States Navy (1944). *Naval Orientation*. Washington: US Navy Bureau of Naval Personnel, Standards and Curriculum Division Training.
- Valle, James E. (1980). *Rocks & Shoals: Order and Discipline in the Old Navy, 1800-1861*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Van Doren, Carl C. (1943). *Mutiny in January*. New York: Viking.
- Ward, Harry M. (2006). *George Washington's Enforcers: Policing the Continental Army*. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press.
- Weaver, John Downing (1970). *The Brownsville Raid*. New York: W. W. Norton.
- Weingartner, James (1989). "Massacre at Biscari: Patton and an American War Crime," *The Historian*, 50:1 (November), 24-39.
- Weingartner, James (1996). "War Against Subhumans: Comparisons between the German War Against the Soviet Union and the American War Against Japan, 1941-1945," *The Historian*, 58:3, 557-73.
- Weitz, Mark A. (2000). *A Higher Duty: Desertion among Georgia Troops during the Civil War*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
- Weitz, Mark A. (2005). *More Damning than Slaughter: Desertion in the Confederate Army*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
- Welch, Richard E., Jr. (1974). "American Atrocities in the Philippines: The Indictment and the Response," *Pacific Historical Review*, 43:2 (May), 233-53.
- Whitehorne, Joseph W. A. (1998). *The Inspectors General of the United States Army 1903-1939*. Washington: Office of the Inspector General and Center of Military History United States Army.
- Wiley, Bell Irvin (1943). *The Life of Johnny Reb: The Common Soldier of the Confederacy*. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Company.
- Wiley, Bell Irvin (1952). *The Life of Billy Yank: The Common Soldier of the Union*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company.
- Winders, Richard Bruce (1997). *Mr. Polk's Army: The American Military Experience in the Mexican War*. College Station: Texas A&M University Press.
- Wilson, Keith P. (2002). *Campfires of Freedom: The Camp Life of Black Soldiers during the Civil War*. Kent, OH: Kent State University Press.
- Wright, Robert K., Jr., comp. (1992). *Military Police*. Washington: Center of Military History.



# Chapter Fifty

## COVERT WARFARE AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

*Bob Seals*

“Any good soldier can handle a guerrilla.” (Army Chief of Staff George H. Decker to President Kennedy when asked about the Army’s counterinsurgency capability, 1962 [cited in Krepinevich 1986])

Special Operations Forces (SOF) date back to the dawn of history. The seventh chapter of the Old Testament book *Judges* in the Bible tells how the warrior Gideon, with considerable assistance from God, conducted an ad hoc selection and assessment course to hand pick 300 men from the 32,000 thousand assembled in order to save Israel from the Midianites. Thus formed, this elite force conducted a subsequent illuminated night attack on the sleeping enemy camp routing the invaders. This biblical account is but one illustrative example of the value and utility of Special Operations Forces. Unfortunately, unlike Gideon, for the majority of America’s history our armed forces have not appreciated the value of highly motivated, specially trained and equipped forces such as those led by the Biblical Gideon to victory. While there were units with specialized capabilities since Roger’s Rangers (Loescher 1946–9) and John Glover’s regiment of Marblehead mariners (Billias 1960) of the eighteenth century, Special Operations Forces have, in the modern sense of the term, only existed since the mid-twentieth century. Since World War II, for the United States SOF have become the weapon of choice on numerous occasions but the journey has been a rocky one.

### Definitions

Special Operations Forces consist of units specifically organized, trained and equipped to accomplish nine core tasks: direct action (DA), special reconnaissance (SR), foreign internal defense (FID), unconventional warfare (UW), counterterrorism (CT), counter proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (CP), civil affairs (CA) operations, psychological operations, and information operations (IO). Designated SOF include: Army Special Forces (SF), Ranger, Special Operations Avia-

tion (SOA), and Active Duty Psychological Operations (PSYOP), and civil affairs (CA). Navy units include: Sea-air-land (SEAL) teams, SEAL delivery teams, and special boat units. Air Force units include: Special Operations Flying, Combat Controllers (CCT), Pararescuemen (PJs), Special Operations Weathermen, and Combat Aviation Advisors. Marine Corps units include SO Battalions and the Foreign Military Training Unit (USSOCOM 2007). Since their inception SOF have been guided by the beliefs that humans are more important than hardware, with quality always better than quantity. In SOF the individual is the weapon.

## Background

World War II was a watershed event in the history of Special Operations units in the United States Armed Forces. Prior to the war, one would be hard pressed to point to an American unit in any of the services and label it as “special.” There existed a long standing and almost visceral reaction in American culture, and the military, to anything that suggested elitism; witness the early Republic’s aversion to labeling horse mounted soldiers “cavalry,” and use of the more egalitarian terms “dragoons” or “mounted rifles.” Some service branches, such as the Army Corp of Engineers, or units, such as Major Ringgold’s Flying Artillery in the Mexican War, or the Union Army’s Civil War Iron Brigade achieved an enviable reputation during the nineteenth century; however, these were all conventional, general purpose forces (GPF), not specially selected, organized and trained units in the true sense of SOF. This anti-elitist or specialist prejudice would die hard and continued well into the twentieth century. All this would begin to change with World War II, though prejudice against SOF would remain fairly constant. Some would argue, as Roger Beaumont does in *Military Elites* (1974), that such forces were, and by implication continue to represent, a waste of resources with personnel better used elsewhere and that many SOF units bordered upon “encapsulated delinquency.”

## 1941–5: A New Age Dawns

The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941 dramatically highlighted the nation’s unpreparedness for war. Additionally, the war would also demonstrate the United States Armed Forces total lack of capability to conduct Special Operations (SO) against the Axis Powers in either the European or Pacific Theater of Operations. But, as is so often the case in American military history, strong-willed leaders arose and overcame such difficulties. In the Philippines, officers such as Ed Ramsey, Bob Lapham, Donald Blackburn, and Russell Volckmann refused to surrender in the spring of 1942 and thereafter went on to lead extremely effective resistance forces against the occupying Imperial Japanese forces. The memoirs of Volckmann (1954), Blackburn (Harkins 1955), Ramsey (Ramsey and Rivele 1990), and Lapham (Lapham and Norling 1996) provide vivid first hand accounts of what it was like to “make the rules up” behind enemy lines for three

long years, as does John Keats, *They Fought Alone* (1963), an account of the work of Wendell W. Fertig on the island of Mindanao in the Philippines.

It is also interesting to note that FDR was directly involved, due to personal relationships with Medal of Honor recipient “Wild Bill” Donovan and Marine Officer Evans Carlson, in forming both the OSS and Marine Raider Battalions. It would take another Democratic president and another war years later to rebuild SOF.

The USMC, with considerable unconventional warfare experience from the “Banana Wars” in the 1920s and 1930s, stood up the 1st Raider Battalion, against beliefs that “an elite was not needed within an elite,” under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Carlson (Blankfort 1947, Smith 2001). The Marines eventually formed four Raider Battalions, one commanded by FDR’s son, before they were disbanded in 1944 (Updegraph 1972, Hoffman 1995, Alexander 2000, Wiles 2007).

After the disaster at Tarawa, the US Navy also began to value SOF, forming Amphibious Scouts and Raiders, Underwater Demolition Teams (UDT), and Naval Combat Demolition Units (Kelly 1992, Dwyer 1993, O’Dell 2000). In the China-Burma-India (CBI) Theater, Army Air Corps “Air Commando” groups were formed to support such long range Ranger units as “Merrill’s Marauders” and OSS Detachment 101 operating behind Japanese lines (Dunlop 1979). Hilsman’s *American Guerrilla: My War Behind Japanese Lines* (1990), is an account of one of those operators fighting in that most difficult theater. In the Southwest Pacific Theater of Operations, the Alamo Scouts (Sixth Army Special Reconnaissance Unit) were formed to reconnoiter and raid enemy-held areas (Zedric 1995). The Scouts rescued 197 POWs in New Guinea and joined Philippine guerrillas and the Sixth Ranger Battalion on a raid that freed 500 from a POW camp near Cabanatuan in Luzon (Johnson 1978, Breuer 1994, Sides 2001).

Over in the European theatre, 1942 would also be a year of beginnings as the Office of Strategic Studies (OSS) was created from the Office of the Coordinator of Information (Chalou 1992), the Army’s 1st Ranger Battalion (Ladd 1978, Lock 1998, Hogan 1992a) and the Canadian-US First Special Service Force (FSSF) (Springer 2001), all began. *Darby’s Rangers: We Led the Way* by Colonel William O. Darby and William H. Baumer (1980) provides an excellent account of the challenges in building an elite unit from scratch. In March 1943 the first Navy Beach Jumper unit was formed. By war’s end there were nine such units whose men were trained to go ashore away from the area targeted for an amphibious landing and deceive the enemy into believing theirs was the true landing site. Though highly successful in Sicily, Salerno, Southern France, and the Philippines, the groups were disbanded at war’s end but reformed in 1951 evolving into Fleet Tactical Deception Groups in 1986 (Dwyer 1992). Robert Black, *The Battalion: The Dramatic Story of the 2nd Ranger Battalion in World War II* (2006) details the training and operations of “Rudders’s Rangers” who scaled the cliffs at Pointe du Hoc in Normandy and fought eastward from Brest to the Hürtgen Forest and across the Rhine.

In many respects the OSS in Europe set the standard for SOF, with many of the tactics, techniques and procedures just as valid now as in World War II

(O'Donnell 2004). Jerry Sage, *Sage: The Man They Called "Dagger" of the OSS* (1985), is a superb account of an OSS agent who was the real life "Cooler King" portrayed in the motion picture *The Great Escape*. Jerry Sage would go on to a very distinguished postwar career in Special Forces.

SOF operations rose in intensity to support the D-Day landings in France with highly trained three-man OSS "Jedburgh" teams parachuting into occupied Europe in order to train, assist, and advise the resistance in support of the advancing Allied armies (Singlaub 1993). Special tactics and procedures had to be developed by the Army Air Corps to support such units as the OSS in occupied Europe. Special units such as the 801st Bombardment Group, "Carpetbaggers," were formed to fly specially modified B-24s in support of SOF missions behind Axis lines. This air support was vital, and technically speaking, SOF could not be maintained as an effective force behind enemy lines if long range transport aircraft, the parachute and reliable radios all had not been available during the war.

Thus, by the end of the war, the US Armed Forces possessed many specially selected, highly trained and capable SOF units. None of these celebrated units would survive the war's end in 1945 with the exception of two Navy UDT teams, one on each coast of the US. It would take another shock to the American body politic, the Korean War, before senior leadership would again acknowledge the usefulness of SOF and establish permanent forces and organizations.

### 1946–51: Dark Struggle for Existence

In the immediate postwar era, atomic warfare was the order of the day. The newly created Air Force clashed with the Navy over control of nuclear weapons and ultimately relevance. Visionaries attempting to convince the new Department of Defense of the importance of Special Operations fought a losing battle.

It was the same old story of US lack of readiness when North Korean forces crossed the 38th parallel in the summer of 1950. The United States had virtually no SOF trained and available to take the field against Communist North Korean and Chinese forces on the Korean peninsula. All service branches had to play catch up as forces fought up and down the peninsula. The Army brought the Ranger concept back in 1951 as Ranger Companies were formed, trained and attached to each infantry division fighting in Korea (Black 1989, Channon 1993, Evanhoe 1995). Additionally, psychological warfare units such as the 1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company (Wolfegeher n.d.), and civil affairs units also came back into being in 1951 as the Army struggled to fill that capability gap. Navy UDT greatly expanded during Korea and played key roles during operations such as the Inchon amphibious landing, with small scale raids conducted all along the enemy coastline against targets. As the Korean War stalemated, SOF was seen as a way to raise anti-communist Korean guerrillas in the north and possibly open a "second front." Ben Malcom, *White Tigers: My Secret War in North Korea* (1999) is a rarely told account by one of the leaders of a UN Partisan Infantry Battalion that operated in the dangerous area north of the 38th parallel. Many units such as the Ranger

Companies did not survive the Korean War but important lessons were learned and personnel trained, which, later, would be put to good use in Southeast Asia and elsewhere.

### 1952–62: Rebirth of the Concept

Back in the US, officers with hard-won unconventional warfare experience had been attempting for years to convince the Pentagon of the need for SOF on the Cold War battlefield. One of these lonely visionaries, Colonel Aaron Bank, had been an OSS agent in France and Indochina during WWII. He and others such as Wendell Fertig, Russell Volckmann, and Robert McClure were finally able to convince the Army that a Special Forces capability was needed in order to lead resistance movements against the inevitable USSR invasion of Western Europe. *From OSS to Green Berets: The Birth of Special Forces* is Aaron Bank's (1986) account of that successful bureaucratic battle. That success would culminate with him commanding the first Army SF unit formed in 1952, the 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne) (SFGA) at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Soon afterwards a second group, the 77th SFGA, was formed after the 10th SFGA rotated forward to Germany to enable it to react more quickly to the expected Soviet invasion (Sutherland 1990). Special Forces, as with all SOF, tended to attract unique personnel such as Lodge Act enlistees, non-US citizens, from Eastern Europe eager to fight communism, but more conventionally-minded general officers were less enthusiastic. One commented that these troops "tended to be nonconformists, couldn't quite get along in a straight military system ..." (Sandler 1994: 65), a trend that many, including the author, believe continues to the present day, and is unlikely to end.

In 1961 Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev pledged support for "wars of national liberation" throughout the world, a communist challenge to the free world that would not go unanswered. That same year President John F. Kennedy visited the Special Warfare Center at Fort Bragg for an orientation on Special Forces by then Brigadier General William P. Yarborough, who was wearing an unauthorized headgear, the Green Beret. Much to the chagrin of the Army and Department of Defense, JFK came away so impressed with SF that he authorized the wearing of the beret, calling it "a symbol of excellence, a badge of courage, a mark of distinction in the fight for freedom" (Simpson 1983). The new president developed a keen interest in SOF as an answer to the communist challenge. It did not take long for the Navy and Air Force to join in. Soon afterwards SEAL Teams One and Two were formed from UDT personnel. USAF Chief of Staff General Curtis LeMay established the 4400th Combat Crew Training Squadron, nicknamed "Jungle Jim" to begin building an Air Force counterinsurgency capability. It was the dawn of a new age for United States Special Operations Forces. In 1963 the Army established the 8th Special Forces Group, Special Action Force (SAF), Latin America, at Fort Gulick, Panama Canal Zone. The Army's only full SAF, it included intelligence, medical, military police, engineer, security, and psychological operations detachments to support its "teams" of operators.

### 1963–72: To Bear Any Price

SOF would not have to wait long before the test would come. In Southeast Asia, SF Detachments, SEAL advisors, and Air Commandos all began deploying in support of friendly governments. It would be unconventional warfare conducted by SOF in Vietnam during the 1960s that would forever capture the public's imagination, a legacy that continues. Forces expanded throughout the decade to include: SF Groups, a Psychological Operations Group, Civil Affairs Companies, SEAL platoons, and Air Force Special Operations Squadrons. Darryl Young, *The Element of Surprise: Navy SEALs in Vietnam* (1990) is but one raw account of the gritty, small unit actions that SOF excelled at during the war. Space precludes a detailed examination of SOF operations in Vietnam but Benjamin Schlemmer, *The Raid* (1976) offers an overview of the Son Tay POW rescue attempt in 1970, a textbook operation studied to this day. The war was often a frustrating one and SOF worked closely with various government agencies to carry the unconventional warfare fight to the North Vietnamese (Shultz 1999, Ives 2006).

SOF performed heroically throughout the conflict (Donlon 1966, Lanning 1988, Plaster 1997). This is attested to by the fact that 18 soldiers, 5 airmen, and 2 sailors of SOF were awarded the Medal of Honor for their actions in Vietnam, a record unmatched for any comparably sized force.

Ranger companies once again were brought back in 1969 from units performing long range patrol missions in country. As the decade came to an end, SOF units began to redeploy from Vietnam with the gradual drawdown of forces; however, SOF advisors, including SEALs, would remain in country until 1973.

Meanwhile, in Panama, the 8th Special Forces Group, operated an NCO Academy and Underwater Operations School and supported the Jungle Warfare School (renamed the Jungle Operations Training Center) at Fort Sherman. Some of this unit's most extensive operations prior to its deactivation in 1972, were conducted in Bolivia where members organized and trained a Bolivian Ranger Battalion, trained nine infantry rifle companies in small unit tactics and counter-insurgency operations (COIN Ops), advised Bolivia's Airborne Battalion, and instructed junior officers in COIN Ops at the Combat Arms School in Cochabamba (Veritas 2008).

### 1973–80: Decline and “Malaise”

The “Me Decade” proved to be unkind to the American armed forces in general and SOF in particular. Unconventional warfare became a dirty word within the Defense Department as services re-focused upon the now traditional threat, a Soviet-led Warsaw Pact “blitzkreig” through Europe. SOF was now a dead-end occupation or career field as units were disbanded and the remainder threatened with extinction. Invaluable experience and expertise were lost during these years as cutbacks went through the force like a scythe. In the midst of this another visionary fought to establish a new counterterrorist capability within SOF. Charlie Beckwith



and Donald Knox, in *Delta Force* (1983) tell the familiar tale of the struggle against bureaucracy to establish a much needed capability. The other bright spot was the Army standing up, once again, Ranger battalions in 1974 (Hogan 1992b).

On July 15, 1979, President Jimmy Carter gave a nationally televised address in which he identified what he believed to be a “crisis of confidence” among the American people. This came to be known as his “malaise” speech, although the word never appeared in it. Soon afterwards that same year the Iranian Hostage Crisis began. The failure of Operation Eagle Claw, led by 1st Special Forces Detachment-Delta the following year, was illustrative of the low ebb of SOF, although no fault of those troops. An original member of Delta Force and veteran of that operation, Command Sergeant-Major Eric Haney (2002) published an account of the failed rescue attempt in which he is highly critical of the CIA and Navy which participated in the operation.

### **1981–present: Expansion and Golden Age**

With the beginning of a new decade and administration, the outlook for SOF improved considerably. The failure of the Iranian Hostage rescue attempt and growth of communist regimes across the globe, including the Western Hemisphere, underscored the need to rebuild forces and capabilities. Rebuilding would be done with a vengeance. The 1st Special Operations Command was established at Fort Bragg in 1983 to command and control all Army SOF worldwide. That same year also saw the Grenada operation, led by SOF, again demonstrating their capabilities on the battlefield. Forces began growing to include the reactivation of the 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne) at Fort Lewis, Washington, with a regional orientation on Asia. A third Ranger Battalion and Ranger Regimental Headquarters were also formed at Fort Benning in Georgia. Unconventional warfare was no longer a dirty word, and SOF operators performed magnificently in such advisory missions as El Salvador throughout the 1980s. Congress supported the rebuilding process (Collins 1994) and in 1986 passed the Goldwater–Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act, which among other things, prescribed a new four-star unified command, the present day United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) at Tampa, Florida. The following year the Army recognized a new branch for officers and enlisted, Special Forces, with an insignia of crossed arrows, that had its origins in the old nineteenth-century Indian Scouts. SOF once again proved their worth in Panama in 1989 (Robinson 2005). With the beginning of a new decade in 1990, the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment and an additional SF Group, the 3rd, were formed. Other unique organizations formed during this period would exist in the shadows and are little written about or understood (Smith 2007).

Desert Shield/Storm proved the wisdom of the Reagan era expansion as SOF became the “eyes and ears” for the Coalition Forces that swept quickly through the Iraqi Army. From that time forward the operations tempo has steadily increased. Operations would be conducted in such diverse countries as Honduras, El

Salvador, Lebanon, Libya, Philippines, Panama, Liberia, Turkey, Bangladesh, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, Yugoslavia, Haiti, Rwanda, Bosnia, Croatia, Albania, Congo, Kosovo, Mozambique, and half a hundred other locations. The 1993 tragedy in Somalia (Bowden 1999), depicted in the motion picture *Blackhawk Down*, was one of the few SOF operations to receive significant publicity. After the terrorist attacks of 9/11, SOF became the weapon of choice across the globe in detecting, tracking, and eliminating terrorists wherever they could be found. Once again SOF captured the imagination of the public as burly, bearded, heavily armed men, occasionally on horseback, were seen in the wilds of Afghanistan and Iraq pursuing their foes. Charles Briscoe, Kenneth Finlayson, et al. *Weapon of Choice: ARSOF in Afghanistan* (2003) and *All Roads Lead to Baghdad: Army Special Operations Forces in Iraq* (2006) describe in vivid detail SOF operations in the early twenty-first century. First person accounts of the often frustrating efforts to bring the architects of 9/11 to justice are only recently being written (Fury 2008). Excellent work has also been done on a little studied aspect of SOF, the vital selection, assessment, and training process before employment (Couch 2003, 2007).

### Challenges Ahead

In many respects, since the horrific events of 9/11 US SOF have been enjoying a “Golden Age.” It has been an unprecedented time of modernization and growth across the board: personnel, budget, training, equipment, operations, and education. The 2006 Department of Defense Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) directed growth and expansion in almost all SOF: an additional battalion added to Army SF Groups, an additional rifle company to Army Ranger Battalions, increases in Army Special Operations Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations and Aviation forces; additional growth in Navy SEAL Teams (Couch 2006), Air Force Special Operations Groups, the establishment of the MARSOC as a USMC component, and most interestingly, the formation of an SOF unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) squadron (USSOCOM 2007), SOF strength is projected to be almost 48,000, with the break out by service being Army 47 percent, Navy 15 percent, Air Force 26 percent, Marines 3 percent, and civilian personnel 9 percent of the total. During the next five years SOCOM must add some 4,000 more SOF personnel.

Ultimately the challenge will be how to maintain quality over quantity, a ying/yang battle that has existed since SOF began. For example, in the primitive days of the 1980s, when the author stumbled through Army SF training in and around Fort Bragg, North Carolina, some 300–400 officers and enlisted men would survive assessment and training to finally graduate and move onto a Group each year. Now the number of graduates has doubled presently in an Active Duty Army that is roughly half the size of our Cold War era force of the 1980s. Maintaining “quality over quantity” will remain a concern. Retention of the force will continue to be emphasized as highly trained and experienced SOF operators can leave the military and earn as much as \$1,000 a day for comparable duty. Additionally, the introduction of aviation platforms such as the V-22 Osprey, a small fleet of highly

capable long range nuclear submarines with Tomahawk missiles, and a UAV Squadron are but a few of the equipment modernization innovations that will pose challenges but at the same time give SOF commanders a deadly capability never seen before. “By, with, and through” is the current SOF mantra as all forces attempt to focus more and more on foreign internal defense missions training indigenous forces as an efficient force multiplier.

SOF has come a long way since the technical innovations of transport aircraft, the parachute, and long range radios made extended operations behind the lines feasible during World War II. It has been a struggle for existence for US SOF since World War II. In many respects SOF’s struggle for existence is over with a four-star Special Operations Joint Headquarters and funding, resources, and real world missions that make older SOF veterans green with envy. For the foreseeable future US SOF will continue to be the weapon of choice in the Global War on Terror. Today’s highly capable and battle hardened forces are worthy successors to legendary units of the past. They stand guard on ramparts around the world so the rest of us may sleep soundly at night. Discussion continues; however, concerning how best to utilize SOF (Tucker and Lamb 2007). The analysis of past successes and failures by SOF will play an important role in that discussion (Tierney 2006).

#### BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Alexander, Joseph H. (2000). *Edson’s Raiders: The 1st Marine Raider Battalion in World War II*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Bank, Aaron (1986). *From OSS to Green Berets: The Birth of Special Forces*. Novato, CA: Presidio Press.
- Beaumont, Roger A. (1974). *Military Elites*. New York: Bobbs-Merrill Company.
- Beckwith, Charlie A., and Donald Knox (1983). *Delta Force: The U.S. Counter-Terrorist Unit and the Iran Hostage Rescue Mission*. New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich.
- Billias, George Athan (1960). *General John Glover and his Marblehead Mariners*. New York: Holt.
- Black, Robert W. (1989). *Rangers in Korea*. New York: Ballantine Books.
- Black, Robert W. (2006). *The Battalion: The Dramatic Story of the 2nd Ranger Battalion in World War II*. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books.
- Blankfort, Michadel (1947). *The Big Yankee: The Life of Carlson of the Raiders*. Boston: Little, Brown and Co.
- Bowden, Mark. (1999). *Black Hawk Down: A Story of Modern War*. New York: Atlantic Monthly Press.
- Breuer, William B. (1994). *The Great Raid on Cabanatuan*. New York: J. Wiley & Sons.
- Briscoe, Charles H., Kenneth Finlayson, et al. (2003). *Weapon of Choice: ARSOF in Afghanistan*. Washington: Department of the Army.
- Briscoe, Charles H., Kenneth Finlayson, et al. (2006). *All Roads Lead to Baghdad: Army Special Operations Forces in Iraq*. Washington: Department of the Army.
- Chalou, George C., ed. (1992). *The Secrets War: The Office of Strategic Services in World War II*. Washington: National Archives and Records Service.
- Channon, Bob (1993). *The Cold Steel Third: 3rd Airborne Ranger Company, Korea War, 1950–1951*. Franklin, NC: Genealogy Publishing Service.

- Collins, John M. (1994). *Special Operations Forces: An Assessment*. Washington: National Defense University Press.
- Couch, Dick (2003). *The Warrior Elite: The Forging of SEAL Class 228*. New York: Three Rivers Press.
- Couch, Dick (2006). *Down Range: Navy SEALs in the War on Terrorism*. New York: Three Rivers Press.
- Couch, Dick (2007). *Chosen Soldier: The Making of a Special Forces Warrior*. New York: Crown Books.
- Darby, William O., and William H. Baumer (1980). *Darby's Rangers: We Led the Way*. San Rafael, CA: Presidio Press.
- Donlon, Roger H. C. (1966). *Outpost of Freedom*. New York: Avon Books.
- Dunlop, Richard (1979). *Behind Japanese Lines: With the OSS in Burma*. New York: Rand McNally & Co.
- Dwyer, John B. (1992). *Seaborne Deception: The History of the U.S. Navy Beach Jumpers*. New York: Praeger.
- Dwyer, John B. (1993). *Scouts and Raiders: The Navy's First Special Warfare Commandos*. Westport, CT: Praeger.
- Evanhoe, Ed (1995). *Darkmoon: Eighth Army Special Operations in the Korean War*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Fury, Dalton (2008). *Kill Bin Laden: A Delta Force Commander's Account of the Hunt for the World's Most Wanted Men*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Haney, Eric L. (2002). *Inside Delta Force: The Story of America's Elite Counterterrorist Unit*. New York: Delacorte Press.
- Harkins, Philip (1955). *Blackburn's Headhunters*. New York: W. W. Norton.
- Hilsman, Roger (1990). *American Guerrilla: My War Behind Japanese Lines*. Washington: Brassey's, Inc.
- Hoffman, Jon T. (1995). *From Makin to Bougainville: Marine Raiders in the Pacific War*. Washington: Marine Corps Historical Center.
- Hogan, David W., Jr. (1992a). *U.S. Army Special Operations in World War II*. Washington: Department of the Army.
- Hogan, David W., Jr. (1992b). *Raiders or Elite infantry? The Changing Role of the U.S. Army Rangers from Dieppe to Grenada*. Middletown, CT: Greenwood Press.
- Ives, Christopher K. (2006). *US Special Forces and Counterinsurgency in Vietnam*. New York: Routledge.
- Joint Staff (2003). *Doctrine for Joint Special Operations*, Joint Publication 3-05, Washington: Joint Staff.
- Johnson, Forrest Bryant (1978). *Hour of Redemption: The Heroic WW II Saga of America's Most Daring POW Rescue*. New York: Manor Books.
- Krepinevich, Andrew F. (1986). *The Army and Vietnam*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Keats, John (1963). *They Fought Alone*. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott.
- Kelly, Orr (1992). *Brave Men – Dark Waters: The Untold Story of the Navy SEALs*. Novato, CA: Presidio Press.
- Ladd, James (1978). *Commandos and Rangers of World War II*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Lanning, Michael Lee (1988). *Inside the LRRPS: Rangers in Vietnam*. New York: Ballantine.
- Lapham, Robert, and Bernard Norling (1996). *Lapham's Raiders: Guerrillas in the Philippines, 1942–1945*. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky.

- Lock, John D. (1998). *To Fight With Intrepidity: The Complete History of the U.S. Army Rangers, 1622 to Present*. New York: Pocket Books.
- Loescher, Burt Garfield (1946–9). *The History of Rogers' Rangers*, 4 vols. San Francisco: Privately published.
- Malcom, Ben S. (1999). *White Tigers: My Secret War in North Korea*. Washington: Brassey's.
- Plaster, John L. (1997). *SOG: The Secret Wars of America's Commandos in Vietnam*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- O'Dell, James Douglas (2000). *The Water is Never Cold: The Origins of the U.S. Navy's Combat Demolition Units, UDTs, and SEALs*. Dulles, VA: Brassey's.
- O'Donnell, Patrick K. (2004). *Operatives, Spies and Saboteurs: The Unknown Story of WWII's OSS*. New York: Citadel Press Books.
- Ramsey, Edwin Price, and Stephen J. Rivele (1990). *Lieutenant Ramsey's War*. New York: Knightsbridge Publishing Co.
- Robinson, Linda. (2005). *Masters of Chaos: The Secret History of the Special Forces*. New York: Public Affairs Books.
- Ross, Robert Todd (2000). *The Supercommandos: First Special Service Force 1942–1944*. Atglen, PA: Schiffer Military History.
- Rothstein, Hy S. (2006). *Afghanistan & the Troubled Future of Unconventional Warfare*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Sage, Jerry (1985). *Sage: The Man They Called "Dagger" of the OSS*. Wayne, PA: Tobey Publishing.
- Sandler, Stanley (1994). *To Free From Oppression: A Concise History of U.S. Army Special Forces, Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations, and the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School*. Fort Bragg, NC: US Army Special Operations Command.
- Schlemmer, Benjamin (1976). *The Raid*. New York: Harper & Row.
- Shultz, Jr., Richard H. (1999). *The Secret War Against Hanoi: Kennedy's and Johnson's Use of Spies, Saboteurs, and Covert Warriors in North Vietnam*. New York: Harper & Collins.
- Sides, Hampton (2001). *Ghost Soldiers: The Forgotten Epic Story of World War II's Most Dramatic Mission*. New York: Doubleday.
- Simpson, Charles M. (1983). *Inside the Green Berets: The First Thirty Years, a History of the U.S. Army Special Forces*. Novato, CA: Presidio Press.
- Smith, George W. (2001). *Carlson's Raid: The Daring Marine Assault on Makin*. Novato, CA: Presidio.
- Smith, Michael (2007). *Killer Elite: The Inside Story of America's Most Secret Special Operations Team*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Singlaub, John K. (1993). *Hazardous Duty*. New York: Random House.
- Springer, Joseph A. (2001). *The Black Devil Brigade: The True Story of the First Special Service Force, An Oral History*. Pacifica, CA: Pacifica Military History.
- Sutherland, Ian. (1990). *Special Forces of the United States Army, 1952–82*. San Jose, CA: R. James Bender Publishing.
- Tierney, John J., Jr. (2006). *Chasing Ghosts: Unconventional Warfare in American History*. Dulles, VA: Potomac Books.
- Tucker, David, and Lamb, Christopher J. (2007). *United States Special Operations Forces*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Updegraph, Charles L. (1972). *U.S. Marine Corps Special Units of World War II*. Washington: Historical Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps.
- USSOCOM (2007). Posture Statement 2007. Tampa: USSOCOM.
- Veritas (2008). "Special Edition: Special Forces in Bolivia," 4:4.

- Volckmann, Russell (1954). *We Remained: Three Years Behind the Enemy Lines in the Philippines*. New York: Harper & Row.
- Wolfgeher, Paul A. (n.d.). "Loudspeaker & Leaflet [Company]," in "Korean War Education, Topics – Support Units" website: [http://www.koreanwar-educator.org/topics/support\\_units/index.htm#Loudspeaker](http://www.koreanwar-educator.org/topics/support_units/index.htm#Loudspeaker), accessed October 8, 2008.
- Wiles, Tripp (2007) *Forgotten Raiders of '42: The Fate of the Marines Left Behind on Makin*. Washington: Potomac Books.
- Young, Darryl (1990). *The Element of Surprise: Navy SEALs in Vietnam*. New York: Ivy Books.
- Zedric, Lance Q. (1995). *Silent Warriors of World War II: The Alamo Scouts behind the Japanese Lines*. Ventura, CA: Pathfinder Publishers of California.



## Chapter Fifty-one

# US WAR PLANNING: CHANGING PREFERENCES AND THE EVOLUTION OF CAPABILITIES

*Donald Chisholm*

Plan. 3. A formulated or organized method according to which something is to be done; a scheme of action, project, design; the way in which it is proposed to carry out some proceeding. (*Oxford English Dictionary*)

Throughout the entire planning phase and during the execution phase, a military situation remains fluid – never static. Open-mindedness on the part of military planners is therefore indispensable. Changing conditions will often require reversal or revision of previous decisions. Instead of striving to justify questionable decisions, the successful commander must be quick to recognize and correct their weaknesses. In war there is no second prize; there is seldom a second chance. (*Naval Manual of Operational Planning* 1948)

In war planning can be discerned the history of a military; its successes and failures; its professional development; the strength of its organization; the nature of its opponents; its collective understanding of and vernacular for warfare; its concomitant preferred form of warfare; the education of its officers through its cumulated experiences; and the fundamental character of the larger society which it serves and in which it resides. From war planning also typically flows force structure and composition.

Systematically planning operations and campaigns by the United States military is today so much taken as a matter of course that it is difficult to imagine a time when it was not so. Indeed, the contemporary military, through its joint geographic and functional combatant commanders, is formally required to develop and maintain an elaborate array of interrelated contingency plans with extensive annexes and appendices (the format and general content of which are doctrinally determined) which are in turn coordinated with a similarly complex set of theater security cooperation plans. Such plans, which attempt to anticipate the requirements for successful action across a broad range of possibilities, are created and updated through formally delineated deliberate planning processes and turned into actionable plans through crisis-action planning processes. These plans are by law

and practice all joint plans, that is, they anticipate the integrated employment of Army, Navy, Marine, and Air Force capabilities in their execution. Increasingly, they also involve US civilian agencies (the so-called “interagency”) in their formulation and execution in explicit recognition that success, especially in conflicts described as complex irregular war or hybrid war, will hinge upon expertise and capabilities residing outside the military (Hoffman 2006, Kilcullen 2007).

### Value of War Planning

It is now generally accepted that regressive planning – working backwards from a strategic objective to devise a linked series of courses of action aimed at its attainment – can take place at the strategic and operational levels of war, manifested as operations and campaigns. At the tactical level actions remain largely reactive as events unfold. Absent strategic and operational plans, wartime decision making remains largely reactive, often if not always thereby passing the initiative to the enemy (Wilmott 1996).

However, war planning, as it is presently understood, is scarcely more than a century old in the United States. Notwithstanding its prosecution of the Revolutionary War, the Quasi-War with France, the War of 1812, the Mexican War, and the Civil War, very little of what might today generously be called war planning can be discerned. To be sure, once amidst those conflicts decisions were taken on courses of action to pursue, but not until the years immediately preceding the Spanish–American War were plans laid resembling the modern form. In this, the United States was little different from the European states, which were themselves only just beginning to plan as well, with the Germans in the vanguard (Bucholz 1991).

In this sense, the history of war planning in the United States has been written as the episodic conversion of decision making from an almost entirely reactive and, hence, ad hoc endeavor, to one far more proactive, disposed to gaining and keeping the initiative. Concomitantly, it may be usefully viewed as the extension of such decision making over time from the broadest strategic levels down to the lowest operational levels, from single service to joint endeavors, from a pure focus on major combat operations to those actions necessary after such operations, from those actions requiring solely military action to those effected through interagency coordination, and increasingly, taking into account the roles of intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations.

Far from an ineluctable historical trend, however, investing scarce resources in war planning endeavors has constituted a series of self-conscious choices by both the broader American polity and its military, usually as after the fact reactions to significant events. Those decisions have been predicated on the assumptions that so doing will at the strategic level serve to promote a closer match between national policy and the strategy intended to further that policy and further the match between strategy and military force structure.

At the operational level, war planning is assumed to increase the effectiveness of operations and campaigns by reducing uncertainty and surprise by both nature

and the enemy and improving the coordination of forces in time and space and in relation to the objective(s), thereby minimizing the opportunity costs of extraneous actions unrelated to the strategic and operational objective and reducing the danger of working at cross purposes. It allows of greater speed in execution, especially in those cases in which logistics loom large, because it lays the prior foundation required to support and sustain large military forces.

Given the scale and complexity of military operations, which typically comprise problems of organized complexity (Weaver 1948) – and now, increasingly wicked, rarely simple, problems – harder problems than virtually any others confronted by any polity, prior planning has proven essential to their effective solution (Rittel and Webber 1973). Three other developments reinforce this requirement. As weaponry has become increasingly sophisticated and complex, lead time for design, construction, and integration has lengthened accordingly. Similarly, greater specialization and division of labor within military organizations has produced more effectiveness but has also increased the challenges of effectively coordinating them. The American way of conventional war has also come to rely upon a vast and complicated system of logistics, which has proven especially challenging in those conflicts requiring the projection of force at great remove from the United States. The American military has proven adept at mastering these challenges (Carter 1953, Leighton and Coakley 1956).

Although war plans, like any plans, are made in the future tense, and their validity is only known (if then) after the event, even if wrong, their cardinal values lie in: (1) the intellectual process of working through the problem systematically, that is, to impose a structure on what at first blush usually presents itself as ill-structured; which then (2) establishes a foundation from which to depart as history unfolds (Simon 1973). A primary challenge then, is to move that cognitive map from ill-structured to well-structured. In fact, one of the striking aspects of war plans is the degree to which they have historically erred in assumptions and projections about enemy intent, capabilities, and plans. In 1950, for example, MacArthur's Far East Command had no plans for defending South Korea, only for evacuating American civilians, and for defending Japan against Soviet air attack (Chisholm 2000). Fortunately, this has been as true of US opponents as it has been of the United States.

It is not that the value of prior planning has been validated and legitimated absolutely; rather, it has been warranted by experience demonstrating that success is more likely when one plans *relatively* better than one's opponent (Manstein, Powell, Liddel Hart, and Blemenson 2004). Valuing planning rests also on a deeper American cultural code that positively assesses planning as a component integral to success in any endeavor.

Running counter to those factors positively disposing the United States toward the development of institutions and processes for war planning and substantive plans have been two concerns deeply embedded in the political culture of the nation from the very outset. Civilian control of the military has remained paramount. Empowering the military to devise war plans has stimulated the reasonable concern that such will diminish civilian control. There has also been the belief that preparing war plans in and of itself increases the probability of actual military

conflict (Downey and Metz 1988). European nations were perceived as under too much influence from their militaries and that war decisions were not infrequently impelled by the exigencies of military planning (Maurer 1995).

### Concept of War

Quite apart from recognizing the relative advantage afforded those who have planned for military action, in the US case, protected as it believed, by the Atlantic and Pacific oceans from the persistent threats of conflict that attended European states, historically little requirement was seen for a standing army or to maintain a navy beyond that required to protect maritime commerce. Absent such continuing threats, there was also no need to prepare for war until it might, improbably, occur, and in such an event military action would principally be defensive. Fortunately, with certain key exceptions, history more or less validated that belief, until at least the late nineteenth century.

However, the dual threats posed by European states such as England and Germany on the one hand, and, following the 1895 Sino-Japanese War, by the Japanese, put paid to it. Simultaneously, Alfred Thayer Mahan's theory of navalism persuaded many within and without the military that the inevitability of conflict among states over maritime trade required not only a powerful fleet but careful forethought about its employment. Equally important, Mahan's theory provided a cognitive framework within which war planning might be made meaningful.

Beyond beliefs about the nature and likelihood of threats, its prevailing image of war, generally, has also conditioned whether and how the United States has planned and prepared for war. Notwithstanding events that would seem to contravene their validity, the American "Way of War" has long had several fundamental components: wars have definite beginnings and endings; wars are conventional actions between similarly constituted states; wars are conducted by deterrence, defense, mobilization, swift counteroffensive through overwhelming firepower, victory parades, and demobilization (Weigley 1973). American preference for conventional war has survived, oddly, in the face of a long history of engagement in unconventional conflicts, leaving planning, doctrine, and force structure for the most part focused on the conventional. This is no recent phenomenon; for example, in the post-Civil War period, even while its primary efforts were for decades countering guerrilla actions by the Indians, the Army's educational and doctrinal focus continued to be on conventional war after the western European fashion (Waghelestein 1999). This preference has manifested itself, particularly, in the military's doctrinal concept of military operations other than war (MOOTW) and its variants, indicating that there is "war" and then as a residual, everything else, and deserving of less systematic attention than "war." The present Range of Military Operations (ROMO) goes some distance to recognize that the military engages regularly in a wide spectrum of endeavors, most of which fall short of conventional war, but which require planning in order to be conducted successfully – albeit with different sensibilities for each kind of operation.

### Institutional Capabilities

As is true for any behavior, however, motivation alone was insufficient to generate war planning. There also had to be the capability to plan and the opportunity to do so. With increased longevity and cumulated incremental adaptations to their environments formal organizations tend to elaborate their rules and procedures and differentiate their functions ever more finely, with greater specialization of function enhancing effectiveness (Stinchcombe 1965, Chisholm 1995, 2001). The American military has been no exception. The development of capability has included specialized expertise and vernacular, processes, institutions, and personnel in sufficient numbers dedicated to the endeavor. Most fundamentally, there had to be established and sustained a permanent military organization, allowing its officers to develop careers and to professionalize (McKee 1991, Chisholm 2001). If bureaucracies live and die by written records, war plans are the linchpins of military organizations, providing continuity of purpose and of thought, even with the inevitable turnover of personnel.

Both the Army and Navy went through painful decades following the War of 1812 to emerge at last as professional entities, with recognized standards for recruitment, education, training, and discipline of officers, along with stable reasonably effective organizational arrangements.

Institutions in any given epoch tend to resemble other extant institutions. In the American context, the manifold health problems of rapidly growing cities in the mid-nineteenth century precipitated planning for physical infrastructure, especially water and sewerage (Cohen 1969, Peterson 1979, 2003). The Progressives ultimately based their urban reform programs on empirically-based theoretically-informed planning processes, which efforts were remarkably successful, and which, along with the development of planning degree programs and a professional association did much to legitimate planning as a practically useful activity. Later, social planning, given urgency and legitimacy during the Great Depression, reinforced the positive valence given planning in the larger American political culture (Simon 1980, 1995).

At the same time, the American military was assiduously studying – and had been since the Civil War – the weaponry, organization, personnel processes, and other institutional aspects of leading European militaries, especially the German states and the French, and their nascent war planning efforts, in the dual beliefs that they were doing things likely worth emulating and might in the not so distant future present themselves as actual enemies (Upton 1878, 1917; Chisholm 2001). And, of course, the Army had by the post-Civil War period engaged for several decades in planning and constructing coastal defenses, which gave credence to the value of planning, at least for physical infrastructure.

In the Navy's case, the early 1880s saw a reversal of the doldrums into which it had fallen during the post-Civil War period, with establishment of the Naval War College and the Office of Naval Intelligence, combined with construction of its first modern steel warships, all of which followed the founding of the Naval

Institute in 1874 (Herrick 1966; Spector 1977; Vlahos 1980; Hattendorf, Simpson, and Wadleigh 1984, Bradford 1990). The Institute provided a forum in which officers might consider professional problems, generally. The Naval War College facilitated reflective study of the profession of naval arms, and gave Mahan a bully pulpit from which to advance his theories. It also performed, informally, some of the functions of a general staff – especially those related to limning out potential future conflicts. The Office of Naval Intelligence and its system of naval attachés posted to the capitals of Europe, for the first time provided a dedicated mechanism for collecting intelligence about all manner of subjects (Dorwart 1979, Crumley 2002). These changes were in turn supported by willingness to support enough officers for a shore establishment – Congress for some time had struggled to understand the rationale for supporting more officers than the minimums required for sea duty, finally accepting the requirement by the mid-nineteenth century (Chisholm 2001). The Army established the Military Information Division in 1885 and sent its first attachés abroad four years later (Bethel 1947).

Beyond building institutional capabilities conducive to planning, the development of operational art, initially in Germany and the Soviet Union, and latterly in the United States, has provided a technical language adapted to the peculiar requirements of war planning. Operational art has both conditioned the manner in which the military has structured its problems and served as a *lingua franca* from which most surplus meaning has been eliminated, allowing relatively precise communication about a bounded set of problems. Officers today are expected to be and typically are fluent in levels of war, center of gravity, critical capabilities, strengths, weaknesses, and vulnerabilities; operational factors; operational functions; principles of war; and branches and sequels (Vego 2008). Notably, even before the arrival in the United States of the formal corpus of operational art, its concepts (perhaps unnamed) are abundantly evident in American war plans.

### The Spanish–American War and its Aftermath

Development of the capability for war planning has been inextricably bound with the substance of war plans. For both the Navy and the Army, the Spanish–American War proved *the* watershed event for establishing the importance and utility of war planning – although for widely divergent reasons.

Naval planning for a possible conflict with Spain over its colony, Cuba, a surprisingly cogent issue for the American public (Dana 1966), began in the early 1890s in the form of student papers at the Naval War College. Following the strategic concepts of Alfred Thayer Mahan, the focus was destruction of the Spanish fleet. An 1896 effort, whose concept of operations included a fleet deployment to Manila to prevent the Spanish from concentrating their forces in Cuba, provided the foundation for the plans in the actual event, which were further worked in the Office of Naval Intelligence (Hayes 1998). Naval War College students and faculty also discussed US options if Japan joined Spain in a war against the United States. The solution was to deal with Spain first in the Caribbean while



staying on the defense in the Pacific. Thus was the nascence of what would become World War II's "Two-Ocean Strategy." To flesh out the plans and to provide practical strategic and operational advice, in April 1898, Navy Secretary John Long established a "War Board" of officers (Mahan 1906). The boundaries of the board's responsibilities proved controversial and Long was compelled to mount a defense in the newspapers, disclaiming any intent for it to direct the fleet commanders' decisions beyond very general orders such as "Capture or destroy enemy's fleet" (*New York Times* May 24 and 30, August 25, 1898).

The Army had not been planning for a war with Spain and certainly not in the Philippines. But now that the Navy had defeated the Spanish, essentially terminating its influence in the Pacific, to leave the Philippines would leave the entire area open to German designs – over which the United States had nearly come to blows two decades before in Samoa and again during the blockade of Manila when a German squadron had appeared (Kennedy 1974), and the United States found itself obliged to remain. The Filipinos were less than enthusiastic about that prospect and the insurrection begun against the Spanish was turned toward their new colonial masters. Consequently, in August 1898 the first major Army units found themselves in the Philippines, the United States found itself prosecuting a counterinsurgency for nearly 15 years, and for the first time in its history maintaining an Army thousands of miles away.

Successful prosecution of the naval aspects of the Spanish–American War not only gave credence to Mahan's theories, it also legitimated the planning endeavor. The Army learned a different lesson from the war, but one that ultimately conduced toward the same institutional changes as the Navy. In response to both the Army's weak planning efforts relative to those of the Navy prior to and during the Spanish–American War, and what were perceived as poorly executed operations, the several major reforms of Secretary of War Elihu Root profoundly increased American war planning capabilities, both directly and indirectly. In 1901, as an interim step, Root appointed a so-called War College Board to advance Army education and to study "war policy." At the same time, Root established a "comprehensive system of officer education in which the Military Academy, post schools, five special service schools, and the General Service and Staff College at Fort Leavenworth would train officers in combined arms and staff positions in large units" (Webb 2001). Prior to these reforms the Army had provided little professional military education for its officers after commissioning. The new American role on the international stage and consequent increased probability of military action overseas highlighted this lacuna. Root also reworked curriculum at West Point and his efforts in 1916 resulted in establishment of a reserve officers corps and a reserve officers training corps (ROTC) program (Barr 1998).

At the same time, in 1903 Congress established an Army General Staff Corps headed by a Chief of Staff, along with the Army War College, which would serve as the senior venue for education, especially the "practical application of military knowledge," supervise the Army's system of schools, and perform some of the planning functions of a general staff. Emory Upton's recommendations from decades previous had finally come to fruition in this flood of institutional

initiatives. However, Army bureau chiefs and some senior officers remained hostile to a general staff and chief of staff. Such reforms were consistent with a greater burgeoning of national, state, and local government given prominence by Teddy Roosevelt and pursued by the Progressive wings of both political parties in response to industrial capitalism, urbanization, and immigration.

Now the Navy lagged the Army institutionally, notwithstanding Congressional willingness to support a world-class fleet and Roosevelt's mounting of the Great White Fleet's 1907–8 circumnavigation (Rechner 1988). Efforts by Stephen Luce, Henry Taylor, Bradley Fiske, and William Sims to establish a general staff for the Navy with a chief of staff function repeatedly met both executive and legislative resistance, hinging largely on concerns about civilian control and the dangers of "Prussianizing" the Navy. The Navy's bureau chiefs, who stood to lose power under such a system, also opposed these efforts (Coletta 1980).

There was movement toward increased institutional capability, however. In 1900, Secretary of the Navy John Long established the General Board by executive order (it therefore had no independent legal standing) and vested it with only advisory responsibilities. However, it gained currency by the appointment of Admiral George Dewey as its chair, remaining there until his death in 1917 (Spector 1974). The General Board studied and produced recommendations on strategy, technology, and other professional matters. It prepared war plans, supported by information from the Office of Naval Intelligence, and tested at the Naval War College, which had begun war gaming in earnest shortly after its establishment.

Secretary of the Navy George Meyer launched the Aide system in December 1909 (again, without legal status), with four flag officers as Aides for Operations, Personnel, Material, and Inspections to advise him. In his final report at secretary of the navy, Meyer stated that it was the job of the Aide for Operations to devote: "his entire attention and study to the operations of the fleet [to make him] prepared to advise promptly as to the movements of ships and to submit such order as are necessary to carry into effect campaign plans recommended by the General Board and approved by the Secretary" in any emergency.

Amidst this institutional ferment, in 1903 another strategic consideration was added – the United States secured from Panama a treaty granting it the right to construct a canal across the isthmus. Columbia was not amused and in late December that year threatened Panama with a land invasion. By 1905 the Naval War College had prepared a plan for war against Colombia, and the Joint Board was working out plans for defense of the Canal at both ends (Godin 2006). As part of securing the Caribbean generally, the Navy's General Board also addressed planning for naval bases in Cuba and the importance of Santo Domingo for protecting Puerto Rico. Germany was deemed the principal threat to US interests, specifically the possibility that it would acquire naval bases in the Caribbean. The Army's General Staff reached similar conclusions. By 1905 the Naval War College had prepared an initial War Plan Black to address a possible German offensive campaign and in 1910 the General Board completed a revised and elaborated War Plan Black (which it revisited and renewed in 1915 and 1916). These plans

included sophisticated statements of US strategic interests, assumptions based on German capabilities and past history, and complex scenarios of action and reaction. In these aspects, they represented exponential improvements over the plans developed in the 1890s for war with Spain.

Events south of the US border also stimulated Army and Navy planning 1910–14 for a massive invasion of Mexico, which looked much like its nineteenth-century venture – occupying Veracruz and Tampico, marching on Mexico City, while crossing the Rio Grande and heading for Monterrey. The possibility of a threat from Mexico turning into military conflict was addressed in War Plan Green – in 1913 Japan had provided arms to Mexico (Schmidt 1992, Carlson 1998). Both services increased intelligence gathering and preparation of studies of ports and fortifications. Similarly, in 1910, working together, the General Board and the Army War College prepared plans for invading Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, and Costa Rica to deny their possible use by Germany as bases of operation; and in 1912 drew up plans for a military expedition to Cuba. In the event, however, President Wilson's focus on Europe and preference for a more limited war caused these plans largely to be ignored.

For the first time, there was impetus for collaborative planning efforts across the services. The Navy had both transported the Army to Cuba and the Philippines and supported its operations (Goldstein 2000). In 1903 the Joint Army and Navy Board was established, with four officers from each service (including the presidents of their war colleges), and headed by Admiral George Dewey (Carlson 1998). At the prompting of Army Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Adna Chaffee, it was shortly put to work by Secretary of War William Howard Taft to identify and prioritize a set of practical problems on which the Army and Navy would work jointly to solve. The Board's efforts would lead to the first deliberate war plans in US history (Godin 2005). In short, US acquisition of the Philippines and other territory put it at risk of European powers attempting to seize them; direct attack on the United States proper was deemed much less likely. The assumption was that no European power would risk weakening its forces in Europe in order to attack the United States and that in any case the European powers were too pre-occupied with issues internal to their continent to focus on the United States. Nonetheless, Germany was deemed the most likely and most dangerous European opponent, leading in 1906 to War Plan Black, targeted on preventing a German occupation of Brazil.

Acquisition of the Philippines and the Marianas from Spain, combined with US participation in suppressing the Boxer rebellion, and the emphatic Japanese success against Russia in their 1904–5 conflict, especially in the great naval battle at Tsushima, apparent Japanese adoption of Mahan's theory, and its aggressive fleet modernization and expansion caused senior US naval officers and others to turn their service's attention to the Pacific, where it would remain focused until World War II's conclusion (Lea 1909). Early on this caused consideration of defense of the Philippines, locating and the development of naval bases, and the Naval War College, Office of Naval Intelligence, and General Board drew plans for seizing ports in China.

The Pacific was also by dint of its geography peculiarly well-suited to a maritime strategy, and it fit very well the image of the war the Navy would prefer to fight. By 1906, Japan had become the primary focus of war gaming and planning in Newport. Not surprisingly, perhaps, soon after the Russo–Japanese War, the Japanese military was laying plans for the possible capture of the Philippines. The Army too was interested in Japan and produced the first version of its War Plan Orange in 1907, while the Naval War College forwarded its Orange Plan to the General Board in 1911. The plan gradually evolved from a purely defensive approach to one that contemplated control of the entire western Pacific (Miller 1991).

Partly in response to Great Britain's 1902 treaty with Japan, and because its fleet made it the most dangerous possible opponent, the defensive War Plan Red was developed against a range of possible war scenarios with Great Britain, which planning was mostly, but not entirely, suspended after World War I when that treaty ran out and other events suggested the improbability of war with Britain (Rudmin 1993).

Out of concern that the United States could not counter an enemy assault on the west coast, the Joint Board ordered naval forces to both the Philippines and Hawaii in mid-1913, that any such invasion force might be intercepted at sea. In this, the Board sounded its own death knell, and President Wilson forbade it to meet (Godin 2005). Perhaps the Joint Board had thought it might reprise Roosevelt's initiative ordering Dewey to Manila. However, Roosevelt was acting in his capacity as the civilian secretary while the Joint Board comprised commissioned officers.

Secretary Josephus Daniels continued the strong opposition to a general staff; did not much use the Aide system; and the General Board remained advisory only. However, given the press of events in Europe, Congress in 1914 established a Chief of Naval Operations, who, under the direction of the Secretary would be responsible for operations of the fleet and for war planning (Klachko and Trask 1987).

Nonetheless, by the start of World War I, the basic military institutional structure for effective war planning was in place in both services, along with the rudiments of a joint planning mechanism (Maurer 1995). The military had largely developed a strategy for defending US interests at home and across the globe. It remained to establish closer integration of military planning with civilian determination of policy and strategy, and to ground the plans in practical international political realities. The several color plans would ultimately become pieces of the foundation for the so-called Rainbow Plans in the late 1930s, which in turn formed the basis of much of what the United States executed in World War II, especially in the Central Pacific. Although these plans would not be executed, working through them established planning processes, precedents for interservice cooperation, and officers with the appropriate discipline of mind to conduct planning in actual war. These also provided, as would such plans in the future, systematic consideration of force and logistics requirements from which other plans might be derived. Meanwhile, they did not, however, provide much grist for the impending US contribution to World War I, proving essentially irrelevant to the requirements imposed by the event.

## World War I

President Wilson's decision to enter World War I on the side of the Allies, although presaged by the *Lusitania* and the dramatic fleet expansion begun in August 1916, nevertheless caught the Army without plans for coalition warfare on the Continent. The Navy had, by late 1914, begun making both offensive and defensive plans, but in the event, cast in a supporting role to the British, its capital ships, sent to join the British fleet, never fired a shot in anger. More important, it transported millions of soldiers and Marines to Europe; its destroyers and other lesser vessels engaged actively in Atlantic convoying and antisubmarine operations, and it materially assisted in laying the vast North Sea mine barrage (Still 2006). Thus, the war the Navy wanted to fight, what the Spanish–American War had reinforced in its collective mind, and the war it was planning and preparing to fight – the Mahanian decisive battle at sea – was not the one it got.

The Army's situation was different. It was still hampered, much as the Navy was, by strong bureau chiefs and a weak General Staff – the 1916 National Defense Act forbade more than 20 officers from being assigned to the General Staff in Washington, DC, and limited the General Staff to war planning only. However, once the United States entered the war in 1917, the General Staff was rehabilitated and its size increased.

The Army had not planned for an expeditionary force to Europe and it had to mobilize, equip, and train that rapidly expanding force. General Pershing was compelled to begin planning for the employment of his force while en route to France and to organize his own staff – and was permitted to pick his own staff, many of whom were plucked from the General Staff. De facto, the Army War College, organized into several specialized committees, performed the planning functions. Its Military Operations Committee was given responsibility for operational planning, including defense of the continental United States and its territories. It devised plans for deploying troops to Europe, studied shipping requirements, and published troop movement schedules. The General Staff had no control, administrative or otherwise, over the bureaus, which would have to practically support any plans made.

Ultimately, however, the major decisions about military operations in Europe were made by the British and the French. The French sought perhaps a single US division initially as symbolic assistance to bolster morale, and if the war continued, believed the United States should field an army of its own. The British proposed integrating smaller US units into the British army and under its command. Either way, US forces were largely to provide cadre to and operate under the command of their Allies, and had no independent operational planning function. Had the war continued, that situation likely would have changed, but its November 1918 conclusion ensured that the United States did not further develop its practical planning ability. Quite apart from operational planning, neither the United States nor its Allies prepared adequate plans for military occupation of their opponents, or for rehabilitating the war-ravaged sections of France and the Low Countries

– which lacuna would necessitate heroic relief efforts in the face of the postwar famine and flu epidemic.

### **The Interwar Period**

The United States had more than two decades between the November 1918 armistice and the changed strategic world it wrought and America's December 1941 entry into World War II to assess likely threats and to devise war plans against them, also taking into account the possibilities of revolutionary technological innovations such as airpower and armor, among others. Although the interwar period represented lean times for the operating forces, a small, experienced cadre of planning officers developed in both services, and in both services' staffs and war colleges considerable attention was devoted to future conflicts (Ross 2002). The Washington Naval Treaty established well-defined limits to forces within which naval planners would have to work until near to World War II.

The Joint Board found new life, being reestablished in 1919, with both service chiefs, their deputies, and their principal planners as members – supported by a staff (the Joint Planning Committee) comprised of planners from both services. It was authorized to initiate recommendations, but in the end had no more real power than its predecessor. It did not prove practically effective past the 1920s, in part because the services jealously guarded their prerogatives, and did not materially influence plans for World War II (although it was not disbanded until the 1947 defense reorganization).

However, it did press for clarification of national policy about priorities in the Pacific in particular, without which it would be difficult to lay realistic war plans. No such guidance was forthcoming, however, and the military planners had to proceed as best they could (Morton 1959).

From the Navy's perspective, at once the most likely and most dangerous future US opponent was Japan. Having acquired former German territories in the Pacific as part of the post World War I mandates and continuing its industrial expansion in a small area with few of the natural resources required, Japan was positioned and motivated to expand her influence and control to her south: the Philippines, Dutch East Indies, and British Malaya. War Plan Orange was accordingly worked over in multiple iterations, all assuming, based on factors of space and time that the Army would have to hold the Philippines while the Navy mounted its forces from the United States in a trans-Pacific campaign (Miller 1991). By 1922, Navy planners already had concluded that the Japanese would be able to capture the Philippines before the Navy could arrive; an assertion contradicted by the Army until it came to the same conclusion in 1935.

Naval planning was informed by an annual series of Fleet Problems that considered logistics requirements, lines of communications, the capture and development of advanced operating bases, defense of the Panama Canal, and attacks on the Hawaiian Islands (Hone and Mandeles 1987, Felker 2007). The Naval War College provided corresponding war games, faculty lectures, and student papers, while the



Marine Corps developed and refined amphibious doctrine to support Plan Orange (Isley and Crowl 1951). Simultaneously, the Navy was vigorously experimenting with designs for ships and aircraft to execute such an offensive campaign, while the fleet was reorganized to support the plan. There was also a series of Joint Exercises begun in the early 1920s and running into the 1930s that compelled attention to problems of interservice cooperation in support of war plans.

Meanwhile, the National Defense Act of June 4, 1920 returned the Army to its pre-war system of divided authority. The General Staff was retained as a permanent agency, but only to plan for mobilization and war, and without any administrative or command authority. Basic power was again exercised by virtually autonomous bureau chiefs. The Army's War Plans Division prepared a generic War Plan Blue for the defense of the continental United States, but with no enemy specified, was forced to concede that it was really only a mobilization plan. By 1928 the Army produced the detailed General Mobilization Plan for generating an expanded force structure (6 armies and 19 corps), but the onset of the Great Depression rendered much of it unrealistic.

By 1936 the Army had essentially abandoned plans to reinforce the Philippines garrison against Japanese attack, favoring either complete withdrawal, or, improbably, greatly strengthening forces and fortifications there. By 1937, perhaps thinking of its potential role in the war about to consume Europe, the Army had revised its plans to defend only along the outermost limits of the Hawaiian chain in support of a defense of the United States (Linn 1997). Thus, it contemplated a defensive plan, assuming that a naval campaign by itself would be insufficient to defeat Japan, while the Navy continued to plan for an offensive campaign (Miller 1991). In this disagreement is revealed the institutional weakness of the Joint War Board: it could not compel a resolution of an interservice conflict; it provided only a forum for discussion. Consequently, the 1938 version of War Plan Orange, the last before World War II, contained both services' essential points with a series of compromises, leaving its intentions unclear.

Both services also continued to contemplate war with Great Britain, which retained large armed forces and had bases distributed along most of the world's principal trade routes, including a scenario in which Britain conducted offensive operations against the United States, staging through Canada (Preston 1977). Between 1920 and 1930, the possible Britain-Japan coalition scenario was revived in War Plan Red-Orange. It did not, of course, come to pass, but the scenario compelled the United States to consider the problems attendant to fighting simultaneously in the Atlantic and Pacific.

There were, of course, other lesser plans developed by both the Joint Board and the services' planning organs: Special Plan Brown, against a possible Philippine insurrection; Yellow, to support a military expedition to China (given the ferment of the Chinese Revolution); Violet, for military intervention in Latin America; Purple, for interventions in South America; Gray, for military intervention, to include occupation, in Central America and the Caribbean; and Tan, specifically for intervention in Cuba. Perhaps surprisingly, the military continued to work on Plan Green for invading Mexico. It is also noteworthy that during the interwar

years the Army returned to its nineteenth-century concern with domestic civil unrest, especially that associated with labor strikes and developed plans (code named White) for addressing the radical threat (read communist) in the industrial Midwest.

Given the events of what became the most cataclysmic war in history, the problems created by the absence of planning for US participation in World War I, and the post-World War II US international role, it may seem odd to the contemporary reader that among the various war plans developed during the interwar period none contemplated employment of US ground forces in Europe. But US entry into war in Europe was by no means assured even as late as 1941 given both popular and elite opinion on the matter.

However, in the wake of Japanese expansion in Asia (including the *Panay* incident), German actions in Europe, and Italian adventures in Africa, in November 1938 The Joint War Board directed its Joint Planning Committee to consider US reaction to simultaneous, coordinated German and Italian moves in violation of the Monroe Doctrine and Japanese action against the Philippines, which study was completed in April 1939. The Committee concluded that the most likely scenario was a loosely coordinated endeavor, involving a Japanese offensive in the Pacific, followed by German-Italian intervention in the Western Atlantic. Having taken the Philippines, Japan would establish lines of communications to the Home Islands, protected by bases in the Marshalls and Carolines, and seek to attrite the US fleet before coming out for a Mahanian decisive battle.

Concerning the Japanese, the Committee considered four possible courses of action for the United States: an advance through the Aleutians to northern Japan; a direct move to Luzon; a deliberate step-by-step advance to Luzon through the Central Pacific; and an assault on the southern Philippines via the South Pacific and New Guinea. It preferred the Central Pacific option, with Luzon as the objective. The Committee departed from Plan Orange by focusing on recapturing the Philippines on the belief that such would defeat Japan's primary war objectives. Unlimited war against Japan was considered, but only barely.

Regarding the Germans and Italians, it was believed that they would attempt to establish friendly regimes in Argentina, Uruguay, and Brazil – the states with the largest German and Italian émigré populations and the most developed infrastructure in South America, along with bases in the Western Atlantic island groups and in North Africa. Such would facilitate control of Atlantic maritime lines of communication and threaten US interests in Latin America. Should such events occur in time with Japanese moves in the Pacific, the Committee proposed that the United States first conduct offensive operations in the Atlantic to protect its interests in the Caribbean, mobilize, and then go on the offensive in the Pacific.

In the end, the Joint Planning Committee could not reach a consensus. From the Army planners' perspective, the major challenge was to figure out the type of war the United States should fight – defending only the Western Hemisphere would necessarily limit the Pacific war to a defensive one, and it was impossible to know ahead of time which of the Axis powers the United States would fight, and what forces would be available. The Navy's planners stood fast on the

objective of defeating the Pacific enemy, supported by massive mobilization. Consequently, the Army and Navy planners tendered separate reports to the Joint War Board, which deftly refused to endorse either concept and issued new instructions to its planners. On February 1938 a new Orange Plan directed that in the event of war with Japan, the United States first mobilize and build up its forces at home while awaiting developments in Europe. If no additional threat materialized there, the Navy would initiate an offensive thorough the Central Pacific which, combined with an economic blockade, would bring Japan to the negotiating table.

Thus was introduced an important element of contingency into plans at the highest level. In consequence, in 1939 the planners proposed the preparation of a series of plans to address the various serious possibilities, resulting in five different plans collectively known as Rainbow, thereby differentiating them from the sundry single color plans. Rainbow Five came closest to anticipating the events of the war, assuming the United States to be acting together with Britain and France; deploying forces to the eastern Atlantic to defend the Western hemisphere; conducting an offensive with allies to defeat Germany, Italy, or both in the European and African continents; maintaining a strategic defensive in the Pacific until European conditions allowed the United States to swing forces west for an offensive to defeat Japan. However, before formal US entry into the war, the planners would continue working on other versions of Rainbow which seemed as events unfolded to fit better. In fact, by the end of 1940 despite a new Japanese offensive in Indochina, the eastern Atlantic threat was deemed the greater. Moreover, the fate of the United States was deemed inextricably tied to that of Britain. The Navy came around to supporting the approach embodied in Rainbow Five, which position was favorably endorsed by the Army (Gole 2002).

Out of a US–British staff conference in January 1941 came ABC-1, containing the several strategic objectives that would ultimately guide planning for the war: early defeat of Germany, with Europe as the decisive theater, operations elsewhere to support the main effort; maintenance of British and allied positions in the Mediterranean area; and strategic defensive in the Far East, the US fleet to operate offensively to weaken the Japanese economy, and the Malay barrier to be maintained. These objectives would be accomplished by economic pressure, sustained air offensive against Germany, early elimination of Italy from the war, raids and minor offensives, and support for resistance in Axis-occupied areas, followed, ultimately, by a final (probably land) offensive against Germany, which would require securing bases on the Continent from which to operate. The service chiefs, Joint Board, and service secretaries approved these recommendations, which were essentially in accord with Rainbow Five, in May 1941. President Roosevelt withheld final approval pending adoption of ABC-1 by the British, but the stage was now set, and both Army and Navy proceeded with planning for operations (Stoler 2000). In the space of only a few years, world events had driven US planners to overhaul a Pacific-focused plan to one that addressed the primacy of Europe. Nonetheless, prewar planning provided the United States with the realization that the war would be long and hard and that victory would require alliance solidarity and a focus on Germany first.

## World War II

World War II constituted the second great watershed event for US war planning. The war was big. It was long. It was life and death. It was coalition warfare. No single major operation, or even major campaign, was sufficient to bring the war to a conclusion. Integration of strategic objectives with tactical events through effective planning could not assure victory, but in the end victory could not be had without it. The labyrinthine complexities of modern conventional warfare, especially executed over vast distances, demanded close attention to all manner of logistic support and the timing of movement. The disparate interests of the Allies and divergent methods of planning and conducting operations meant at the national strategic level that planning was about resolving objectives through coercion, compromise, and log rolling. In this, plans at the highest levels represented the most practical agreement among the Allies that could be achieved at any given point – and, as the end of the war became apparent, differences intensified (Matloff and Snell 1953; Morison 1958).

US institutional capability for war planning was largely in place at the outset, commanded and initially staffed by a nucleus of skilled war planners who had typically both attended as students and later taught as faculty at the Naval War College or Army War College. The war's most important institutional innovation was the informal creation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff – suggested in his 1930 Naval War College thesis by then Commander Richmond Kelley Turner, and precipitated by early meetings with the British Chiefs of Staff – which served to advise President Roosevelt; speak with one voice in dealings with allies; and coordinate and direct the military services which sometimes entertained very different views on priorities and courses of action (Turner 1930, Dyer 1972). In the Pacific, for example, the JCS made the key decisions in disputes between Admiral Nimitz as Commander Pacific Ocean Areas and General MacArthur as Commander Southwest Pacific Area, who, for much of the war planned and operated independently. Episodic meetings of the Combined Chiefs of Staff of Britain and the United States set the war's broader strategic direction and the timing of major events, and as the end neared, with the Soviets, initial post-war policy (Hayes 1982).

Also important was the compressed evolution of command structures and planning staffs which were the guts of operational planning. The Navy's driving force and integrating mechanism was Admiral Ernest J. King. He wore two hats – as Chief of Naval Operations and as Commander-in-Chief of the fleet – for the first and only time one man commanded both shore establishment, including the planning organ, and operating fleet and King was up the task, directing at once two different staffs (Buell 1980). Plans were formulated in the Navy's War Plans Office, Admiral Chester Nimitz's Pacific Ocean Areas staff, Admiral Spruance's 5th Fleet and Admiral Halsey's 3rd Fleet staffs, and in Admiral Turner's amphibious forces staffs. Planning proceeded at all levels, at once consecutively, simultaneously, and iteratively in a complex choreography.

George C. Marshall's 1939 appointment as Chief of Staff began the Army reorganization which provided its warfighting machinery for World War II. The structure he inherited, a loose confederation of organizations was suitable for peacetime activities but lacked the central direction necessary in war (Watson 1991). He believed that the General Staff had become bloated, ponderous, and inefficient. Marshall initially relied on his personal service standing to meld the various pieces together, but soon found the span of control overwhelming and added several deputies. After Pearl Harbor, following the corporate model of centralizing executive control and decentralizing operational responsibility, Marshall streamlined the administrative structure and processes. The War Plans Division, renamed the Operations Division, became his general headquarters, placing the planning function at last directly adjacent to the seat of executive power. It served admirably (Cline 1951, Pogue 1973).

The Navy and Marines were afforded the chance to fight the war they wanted to fight and had planned against for decades. Campaign Plan Granite, the operational manifestation of the fundamentals of the earlier Navy Plan Orange, was exemplary for its clarity, brevity, and recognition of the need to adjust its specifics to changing circumstances and opportunities. Amphibious operations against a hostile shore, by their essential nature, are probably the most complex, technically and organizationally, of all military undertakings, involving sea, air, and land elements that must be knit into a virtually seamless whole if an amphibious operation is to succeed (Isley and Crowl 1951). The amphibious forces, Navy, Marine, and Army, thus came to develop in their staffs the greatest concentrations of operational planning expertise anywhere in the military. Operations were politically simpler than in Europe, because excepting the early desperate defensive against the Japanese, and the spring 1945 arrival of elements of the British fleet, the Pacific war was almost entirely a US show.

MacArthur's parallel advance through the Solomons and New Guinea and thence into the Philippines (although directly to Leyte, rather than Mindanao), although not contemplated in Rainbow Five, was made possible because of delays in mounting the invasion of Europe and the availability of sufficient forces. In contrast to Granite, although from the first aimed at retaking the Philippines, MacArthur's campaigns were more ad hoc and opportunistic (Barbey 1977). Two lines of advance against the Japanese rendered it nearly impossible for them to know where the US would come next; indeed, decisions about the next move at each stage were rarely settled far in advance.

In the European theater, the planning challenges were greater. Not only did they need to account for such inevitable problems of force readiness and logistics, from the highest strategic levels down to the details of specific operations, coalition concerns were paramount – even when attending to them contravened well-thought out plans and reduced military effectiveness. General Eisenhower properly understood that the political was always as important as the military for his planning, and often more so (Eisenhower 1948). The primacy of land and air in the war in Europe left the Navy in a supporting role: amphibious operations, convoy and anti-submarine operations to support the great logistics chain. For the air, as

in the Pacific, as per Army Air Force preference, strategic bombing was centrally planned and controlled, with General Hap Arnold acting as the executive agent for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and coordinated with the theater commander. Eisenhower's Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) planning staff developed the theater strategic plans and concepts of operation in concert with Marshall's Operations Division and in consultation with the British; army and corps headquarters produced the operational-level plans. The learning curve was steep for American planners and commanders: November 1942's Torch and follow-on operations in North Africa though revealed their relative experience in actual combat (Atkinson 2002, Morison 1947).

Finally, it must be remarked that the planners of World War II greatly surpassed their Great War predecessors by their extensive planning for postwar occupations of Germany and Japan – though not for reconstructing the war-torn societies and economies of the occupied nations – in order to consolidate the hard-won military gains (Possony 1943, Watkins 1943, Ziemke 1990, Coles and Weinberg 1992, MacArthur 1994, McCreedy 2001, Spector 2005). Planning and organizing began in 1942, and though by no means was occupation rendered a well-structured problem it was executed tolerably well, even by today's standards.

### The Cold War Era

Initial rapid demobilization of personnel, ships, and aircraft following World War II was predicated on the tenets of the American Way of War and the dual beliefs that the world was now unipolar and international conflicts would be settled principally through a Western-dominated United Nations, or at least that the Soviet Union would demobilize to conduct economic reconstruction. The Joint War Plans Committee did not believe that the Soviet's would pursue their aims through general war or that conflict was likely (Ross 1988).

Soviet acquisition of atomic weapons and its behavior in occupied Germany and Eastern Europe soon disabused senior decision makers of those optimistic notions. The broader strategic policy of containment produced in consequence set the parameters for military planning. War plans were also conditioned by the intense debate over the reorganization of the armed forces under a single Department of Defense (Barlow 1994, Keiser 1996), which occurred as part of a larger national discussion about the rationalization and consolidation of the federal executive bureaucracy after several decades of extraordinary growth.

Unification was intimately tied to service differences over what war could and should look like in the atomic age. The Air Force, consistent with the earliest expressed views of its chief proponents, argued for strategic bombing from bases in the continental United States. With atomic weapons under manufacture and the B-52 Stratofortress design and construction underway, strategic air advocates at last had the technical tools to execute their vision (Mandeles 1998), improved further by the advent of ballistic missiles, which ultimately rendered possible the strategy of nuclear deterrence, or Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). Some air



advocates confidently stated that conventional warfare was finished, which would obviate the need to deploy troops and render the Navy superfluous. From their perspective, war planning became rather less dynamic than had obtained during World War II. Rather, planning involved developing intelligence on strategic targets, prioritizing, matching weapons to targets, and delivering the weapons. Its ultimate expression would be the Single Integrated Operation Plan (SIOP) for atomic attack on the Soviet Union (Brown and MacDonald 1977, Brown 1978, Herken 1985, Sagan 1987).

In early 1946 the Joint War Plans Committee (JWPC) produced the concept plan "Pincher" based on a scenario in which a local incident – presumably in the Middle East – accelerated into full-scale hostilities between the United States and the Soviet Union in Western Europe. Prepared without civilian guidance, US political objectives were not included, but it did set strategic assumptions that shaped ensuing plans in the Pincher series: Gridle (Turkey), Cauldron (Middle East), Drumbeat (Iberian Peninsula), Moonrise (Asia), and Deerland (North America). Subsequently, the JWPC elaborated the scenario for war, still focused on Soviet expansion in the Middle East, including Turkey. A major difficulty was assessing the Soviet order of battle, about which there was considerable disagreement. The plans emphasized the strengths of the United States and its allies; thus, initially, Allied sea and air power would operate from well-defended bases to confront invading Soviet land forces, followed, as in World War II, by mobilization and counterattack (Ross 1988).

Additional concepts evolved during 1947–50 as plans Broiler, Frolic, Charioteer, Bushwhacker, Halfmoon, Fleetwood, Cogwheel, Straightedge, Trojan, Offtackle, Dropshot, and Reaper. They gradually shifted emphasis from the Middle East to Western Europe, but all assumed, essentially, that the conflict would be global and total and that atomic weapons would be delivered by strategic bombers against Soviet cities in order to degrade their war industry and popular morale. Atomic weapons would also substantially reduce American conventional force requirements – essential given the apparently permanent limits on defense spending. The Soviets were assumed as of 1952 not to have atomic bombs. All attempted to devise means for addressing a poorly defined Soviet threat, but assumed that defending Western Europe was an essential strategic task. Every plan developed also demonstrated the delta between requirements and actual forces available.

During the late 1940s Navy leaders questioned relying on the strategy of "massive retaliation" advocated by the newly independent Air Force. They believed that American possession of atomic weapons would deter additional Soviet aggression in Europe, that confrontation was more likely in Asia where the use of atomic weapons might not be a viable choice, and instead called for a strategy of "flexible response" that would require the United States to be prepared to meet any Soviet threat, anywhere in the world, at any level of warfare, but they were unable to convince civilian officials that they were correct (Palmer 1988).

The Korean War ended any residual illusion that conventional and limited war had been made obsolete by atomic weapons and Soviet designs. Amphibious operations, shortly before deemed by some as impossible in the atomic age, proved

the key element in regaining the initiative for United Nations forces. That operational planning capacity was still vital and remained robust in the military was made manifest by its conduct of four successful major amphibious operations in less than five months. Written by veterans of World War II's Pacific campaign, the organization and content of those plans remain models for operations today (Field 1962, Chisholm 2000).

Apart from all-out atomic war and limited interventions, in the 1960s the United States also developed plans for the defense of Western Europe against a Soviet conventional invasion, perhaps involving limited use of nuclear weapons. These plans were refined repeatedly, assuming outnumbered western forces and a Soviet Union/Warsaw Pact thrust through the Fulda Gap, with a NATO combined arms response, likely employing tactical nuclear weapons; or possibly, with adequate warning, a preemptive strategic attack against the Soviet Union. The United States and NATO assumed a decisive fleet action in the North Atlantic would accompany the land war and developed naval plans, forces, command structures and the like, accordingly, again anticipating a larger Soviet force.

The Cold War decades also witnessed further evolutionary elaboration and institutionalization of command structures and the formalization of planning mechanisms and processes, culminating in the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act, which reconstructed and rationalized those institutions. Precipitated by problems in planning and executing the rescue of US hostages in Iran in 1980 and the 1982 Operation Just Cause in Panama, the system resulting from Goldwater-Nichols and ensuing legislation and executive orders clearly defined civilian-military responsibilities and authorities: a Joint Chiefs of Staff as principal military advisors to the President and Secretary of Defense; geographic and functional combatant commanders with clearly defined areas of responsibility (Unified Command Plan or UCP), supported by the military services as force providers; long-range force planning and programming achieved through the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS); combined with highly detailed planning requirements for every combatant commander (Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan or JSCP), including ongoing Theater Engagement Plans (TEP) (later Theater Security Cooperation Plans (TSCP)); an extensive array of joint doctrines; a system of joint education and development for officers (JPME) to create knowledgeable and experienced planners and commanders; a formal system for developing and executing plans and orders (Joint Operational Planning and Execution System or JOPES); and a highly refined formal military planning process (Joint Operational Planning Process or JOPP) (Lederman 1999, Locher 2002). Integrated with a formalized National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, and National Military Strategy, these highly evolved institutions bid fair to squeeze almost all uncertainty out of strategic and operational planning, to reduce systemic vertical and horizontal inconsistencies and opportunity costs, and to retain for the United States the ability to maintain or attain the initiative in virtually all military actions. Indeed, they represented the acme of war planning not only for the United States but for any state, anytime in history – at least for dealing with more or less conventional conflicts with other states disposed to war

after the Western fashion. In Simon's terms, what had once been ill-structured problems were believed rendered largely well structured and susceptible of effective solution by what seven decades ago Garsia (1940) referred to as a "planning machine."

### **Post-Cold War**

The Soviet Union's fall initially prompted optimism about a "New World Order" unambiguously dominated by the West and a "Peace Dividend." Although no end of history was declared, US joint commands were reorganized, military forces drawn down dramatically, and standing overseas deployments greatly reduced. Plans and forces were postured to fight, and win rapidly, regional contingencies anywhere on the globe. Advances in operating environment awareness, communications, weaponry and targeting, and the increased effectiveness of the all volunteer military made possible the planning and execution of complex simultaneously executed operations at which the World War II German General Staff would only marvel. Dramatic success in the First Gulf War seemed to validate these advances. However, history has an infernal way of presenting the military with new ill-structured problems just as it masters the old ones.

Increasing instability in so-called "weak" and "failing" states – the inheritance of European colonialization, decolonialization, ill-conceived Western aid, and the Cold War – precipitated US military involvement in a heterogeneous series of intra-state conflicts for which the US military had not seriously planned, organized, equipped, or trained. And, compared to assessing a relatively stable, conventional state foe, the timing and character of these conflicts lends itself rather less to prediction. The largely unanticipated attacks of September 11, 2001 and similarly unanticipated long-term involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq following the initial dramatic conventional successes in those countries raised questions about both the substance of existing plans and the processes by which those plans were laid. In particular, the enduring requirements for systematic post-conflict (or stability operations) to consolidate the gains from military operations and integration of other government agencies into operational planning and execution were dramatically reinforced (Woodward 2002, 2004, 2006, Packer 2005, Ricks 2006, Gordon and Trainor 2006).

### **Now and into the Future**

The United States has developed a facility for planning and executing state-on-state conventional military operations exceeding that of every other state's militaries, so much so that at this point it seems improbable that any will choose to challenge the United States conventionally any time soon. This capacity, combined with the development of new technologies, especially those related to information, the increasing interdependence of states along many dimensions, and the rise of

well-resourced, non-state, transnational actors, have led some military theorists to rethink the manner in which conflict will be played out in the future, variously called hybrid warfare, fourth generation warfare, unrestricted warfare, and complex irregular warfare (Lind, Nightengale, Schmitt, Sutton, and Wilson 1989, Liang and Xiangsui 1999, Mattis 2005, Hoffman 2006). Simultaneously, the continuing weakening and failures of states, their associated ethnic conflicts, and the expansion of ungoverned areas suggest that intra-state violence may present more frequent and profound challenges than the state-on-state conventional conflicts with which the United States has become relatively comfortable. However, even non-state opponents have been careful to emulate at least portions of American planning concepts and processes – because they work (Bin-Ladin 1998). The present conflict promises to endure for many years longer than the US military has historically been arranged to prosecute, and in contrast to the past, its associated campaigns will likely require direct linkage of tactical actions to strategic objectives, without the connective tissue of major operations. In all ways the “Long War” is bound to prove especially challenging, both with respect to the substance of plans and to the institutions and processes by which those plans are developed.

### **The Dearth of War Planning Histories**

In this context, understanding the historical substance of war plans and their associated processes looms very important. However, war planning has received but limited attention from historians. Although executing actual operations (and their study) carry more excitement and commanders are usually more intriguing than staff planners, absent appreciation and understanding of the virtues and limitations of war planning, such execution has over time become virtually impossible.

The general topic of war planning has been addressed and pre-World War II and immediately postwar plans have received broad coverage and detailed narrative history (Ross 1988, 1997, 2002). Only one specific plan, Plan Orange for a potential conflict with Japan, has received the requisite scholarly analysis (Miller 1991). What emerges from these studies are both the constants that affect war planning in any era – the process of planning as an attempt to convert an ill structured, typically wicked problem to a well-structured problem susceptible of effective solution when required, the inescapable opacity of enemy intentions, the inevitability of surprise and the unreality of assumptions, the challenges of matching military plans to national strategic objectives, and the requirement for nearly constant refinement of plans; and the differences that attend effective planning for different sorts of conflicts and operations.

In some measure, this lacuna derives from the difficulty inherent in studying what are essentially the thoughts of actors about events that might never have happened, a problem also attendant to tracing the development of legislation. We know in the end what was produced, but tend to lose sight of the false starts and dead ends that conditioned the thinking that produced that final result. We can

learn as much about war planning from those rejected as those adopted. However we might yearn for the simplicity of a linear narrative, such rarely describes the development of war plans. Put differently, there is little efficiency in the preparation of war plans. Attempts to structure problems are subverted by ongoing changes in the structures of those problems; what was defined as a problem at one point in time may be rendered obsolete by events. Worse, perhaps, some problems will be wicked problems, which will have no stopping rule for their solution. Thus, the history of war planning is also necessarily the history of the processes by which they were devised and the institutions that conducted those processes as much as it is about the substance of those plans.

None of the institutions responsible for developing the plans addressed in this chapter, except the Naval War College, has been the subject of a book-length treatment. Thus, there remain numerous opportunities for historical research and analysis, which ought to be informed by reasoned theoretical frameworks if they are to have practical value for both historians and those commanders and their staffs who must today devise and execute war plans. As Cold War documents are declassified the opportunities available for the 1890–1945 era will mirrored by those for the past 60 years.

J. F. C. Fuller's observation on the eve of US entry into World War II remains cogent today: "planning, to prove effective, must be in constant motion – rhythmic, like the pendulum – and never be allowed to become static" (Fuller 1940).

#### BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Atkinson, Rick (2002). *An Army at Dawn: The War in North Africa, 1942–1943*. New York: Henry Holt.
- Barbey, Daniel (1977). *MacArthur's Amphibious Navy*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Barlow, Jeffrey G. (1994). *Revolt of the Admirals: The Fight for Naval Aviation, 1945–1950*. Washington: Naval Historical Center.
- Barr, Ronald J. (1998). *The Progressive Army: U.S. Army Command and Administration, 1870–1914*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Bethel, Elizabeth (1947). "The Military Information Division: Origin of the Intelligence Division," *Military Affairs*, 11:1, 17–24.
- Bin-Ladin, Shaykh Usama Bin-Muhammad, *et al.* (1998). "Jihad against Jews and Crusaders," World Islamic Front Statement, February 23.
- Bradford, James C., ed. (1990). *Admirals of the New Steel Navy: Makers of the American Naval Tradition, 1880–1930*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Bradford, James C., ed. (1993). *Crucible of Empire: The Spanish–American War and Its Aftermath*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Brown, Anthony Cave, ed. (1978). *Drop Shot: The U.S. Plan for War with the Soviet Union in 1957*. New York: Dial Press/James Wade.
- Brown, Anthony Cave, and Charles B. Macdonald, eds. (1977). *The Secret History of the Atomic Bomb*. New York: Dial Press/James Wade.
- Bucholz, Arden (1991). *Moltke, Schlieffen, and Prussian War Planning*. New York: Berg.
- Buell, Thomas B. (1980). *Master of Sea Power: A Biography of Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King*. Boston: Little, Brown.

- Carlson, Adolf (1998). *Joint U.S. Army–Navy War Planning on the Eve of the First World War: Its Origins and Its Legacy*. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College.
- Carter, Worrall Reed (1953). *Beans, Bullets, and Black Oil: The Story of Fleet Logistics Afloat in the Pacific during World War II*. Washington: Government Printing Office.
- Chisholm, Donald (1995). "Problem Solving and Institutional Design: The Decision as Iceberg," *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, 5:4 (October), 451–91.
- Chisholm, Donald (2000). "Negotiated Joint Command Relationships: Korean War Amphibious Operations, 1950," *Naval War College Review*, 53 (Spring), 65–124.
- Chisholm, Donald (2001). *Waiting for Dead Men's Shoes: Origins and Development of the U.S. Navy's Officer Personnel System, 1793–1941*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Cline, Ray S. (1951). *United States Army in World War II: Washington Command Post: The Operations Division*. Washington: Center of Military History.
- Cohen, Henry (1969). "Planning Rationally for the City," *Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science*, 29:4, 179–92.
- Coletta Paolo E., ed. (1980). *American Secretaries of the Navy*, 2 vols. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Coles, Harry L., and Albert K. Weinberg (1992). *Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors*. Washington: Center of Military History.
- Crumley, Brian Tyrone (2002). "The Naval Attaché System of the United States, 1882–1914," PhD dissertation, Texas A&M University.
- Dana, Richard Henry, Jr. (1966). *To Havana and Back*, ed. with an intro. by C. Harvey Gardiner. Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press.
- Dorwart, Jeffery M. (1979). *Office of Naval Intelligence: The Birth of America's First Intelligence Agency, 1865–1918*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Downey, Frederick M., and Steven Metz (1988). "The American Political Culture and Strategic Planning," *Parameters*, 18 (September), 34–42.
- Dyer, George Carroll (1972). *The Amphibians Came to Conquer: The Story of Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner*. 2 vols. Washington: Government Printing Office.
- Eisenhower, Dwight D. (1948). "Problems of Combined Command," Unpublished paper presented at the National War College, Washington: Fort Leslie McNair (June 1).
- Felker, Craig C. (2007). *Testing American Sea Power: U.S. Navy Strategic Exercises, 1923–1940*. College Station: Texas A&M University Press.
- Field, James A. (1962). *History of United States Naval Operations – Korea*. Washington: Government Printing Office.
- Fuller, J. F. C. (1940). "Review of *A Key to Victory: A Study in War Planning* by Clive Garsia," *International Affairs Review Supplement*, 19:2 (October), 117.
- Garsia, Clive (1940). *A Key to Victory: A Study in War Planning*. London: Eyre & Spottiswoode.
- Godin, Jason R. (2005). "Coordinating Rooks and Bishops: An Institutional History of the Joint Army and Navy Board, 1903–1919," MA thesis, Texas A&M University.
- Godin, Jason R (2006). "The Unfulfilled Hope: The Joint Board and the Panama Canal, 1903–1919," *Joint Force Quarterly*, 42 (3rd Quarter), 86–91.
- Goldstein, Jonas L. (2000). "Cuba Libre! Army–Navy Cooperation in 1898," *Joint Force Quarterly*, 25 (Summer), 116–21.
- Gole, Henry G. (2002). *The Road to Rainbow: Army Planning for Global War, 1934–1940*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.



- Gordon, Michael R., and Bernard E. Trainor (2006). *Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq*. New York: Pantheon Books.
- Hattendorf, John B., B. Mitchell Simpson, and John R. Wadleigh (1984). *Sailors and Scholars: The Centennial History of the U.S. Naval War College*. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press.
- Hayes, Grace P. (1982). *The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in World War II: The War Against Japan*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Hayes, Mark L. (1998). "War Plans and Preparations and Their Impact on U.S. Naval Operations in the Spanish-American War." Paper presented at Congreso Internacional Ejército y Armada en El 98: Cuba, Puerto Rico y Filipinas, March 23.
- Herken, Gregg (1985). *Counsels of War*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Herrick, Walter R., Jr. (1966). *The American Naval Revolution*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.
- Hoffman, Frank G. (2006). "Complex Irregular Warfare: The Next Revolution in Military Affairs," *Orbis*, 50:3 (Summer), 395–411.
- Hone, Thomas C., and Mark D. Mandeles (1987). "Interwar Innovation in Three Navies: U.S. Navy, Royal Navy, Imperial Japanese Navy," *Naval War College Review*, 40:2 (Spring), 197–212.
- Isley, Jeter A., and Philip A. Crowl (1951). *The U.S. Marines and Amphibious War: Its Theory, and Its Practice in the Pacific*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Keiser, Gordon W. (1996). *The U.S. Marine Corps and Defense Unification, 1944–1947*. Baltimore, MD: Nautical and Aviation Publishing Company of America.
- Kennedy, Paul M. (1974). *The Samoan Tangle: A Study in Anglo-German-American Relations, 1878–1900*. New York: Barnes and Noble.
- Kennedy, Paul M. (1979). *The War Plans of the Great Powers, 1880–1914*. London: George Allen and Unwin.
- Kilcullen, David C. (2007). "New Paradigms for 21st Century Warfare," Small Wars Journal Blog (June 23) online at <http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itps/0507/ijpe/kilculle.htm>, accessed June 26, 2008.
- Klachko, Mary, and David F. Trask (1987). *Admiral William Shepherd Benson, First Chief of Naval Operations*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Lea, Homer (1909). *The Valor of Ignorance*. New York: Harper and Brothers.
- Lederman, Gordon Nathaniel (1999). *Reorganizing the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
- Leighton, Robert M., and Robert W. Coakley (1956). *Global Logistics and Strategy, 1940–1943*. Washington: Center of Military History.
- Liang, Qiao, and Wang Xiangsui (1999). *Unrestricted Warfare*. Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House.
- Lind, William S., Keith Nightengale, John F. Schmitt, Joseph W. Sutton, and Gary I. Wilson (1989). "The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation," *Marine Corps Gazette*, 73:10 (October), 22–6.
- Linn, Brian McAllister (1997). *Guardians of Empire: The U.S. Army and the Pacific, 1902–1940*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Locher, James R., III (2002). *Victory on the Potomac: The Goldwater–Nichols Act Unifies the Pentagon*. College Station: Texas A&M University Press.
- MacArthur, Douglas (1994). *Reports: MacArthur in Japan: The Occupation: Military Phase*. Prepared by his General Staff. [Facsimile Reprint]. Washington: Center of Military History.
- Mahan, Alfred Thayer (1906). "Narrative Account of the Work of the Naval War Board of 1898," [October 29, 1906], in Robert Seager II and Doris D. Maguire, eds., *Letters*

- and *Papers of Alfred Thayer Mahan*, 3 vols. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 3:627–43.
- McCreedy, Kenneth O. (2001). "Planning the Peace: Operation Eclipse and the Occupation of Germany," *Journal of Military History*, 65:3 (July), 713–39.
- McKee, Christopher (1991). *A Gentlemanly and Honorable Profession: Creation of the U.S. Naval Officer Corps, 1794–1815*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Mandeles, Mark D. (1998). *The Development of the B-52 and Jet Propulsion: A Case Study in Organizational Innovation*. Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press.
- Manstein, Erich von (2004). *Lost Victories: War Memoirs of Hitler's Most Brilliant General*, ed. and trans. Anthony G. Powell. Osceola, WI: Zenith Press.
- Matloff, Maurice, and Edwin N. Snell (1953). *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare*, 2 vols. Washington: Center of Military History.
- Mattis, James N. (2005). "Future Warfare: The Rise of Hybrid Wars," *US Naval Institute Proceedings*, 131 (November), 18–19.
- Maurer, John H. (1995). *The Outbreak of the First World War: Strategic Planning, Crisis Decision Making, and Deterrence Failure*. Westport, CT: Praeger.
- Miller, Edward S. (1991). *War Plan Orange: The U.S. Strategy to Defeat Japan, 1887–1945*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Morison, Samuel Eliot (1947). *History of U.S. Naval Operations in World War II*, vol. 2: *Operations in North African Waters, October 1942–June 1943*. Boston: Little, Brown.
- Morison, Samuel Eliot (1958). *Strategy and Compromise*. Boston: Little, Brown.
- Morton, Louis (1959). "War Plan Orange: Evolution of a Strategy," *World Politics*, 11:2 (January), 221–50.
- Morton, Louis (1960). "Germany First: The Basic Concept of Allied Strategy in World War II," in Kent Roberts Greenfield, ed., *Command Decisions*. Washington: Center of Military History, 11–47.
- Packer, George (2005). *The Assassin's Gate: America in Iraq*. New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux.
- Palmer, Michael A. (1988). *Origins of the Maritime Strategy: American Naval Strategy in the First Postwar Decade*. Washington: Naval Historical Center.
- Peterson, Jon A. (1979). "The Impact of Sanitary Reform upon American Urban Planning, 1840–1890," *Journal of Social History*, 13:1 (Autumn), 83–103.
- Peterson, Jon A. (2003). *The Birth of City Planning in the United States, 1840–1917*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Pogue, Forrest C. (1973). *George C. Marshall: Organizer of Victory, 1943–1945*. New York: Viking.
- Possony, Stefan T. (1943). "The Limits of Post-War Planning," *Review of Politics*, 5:1 (January), 103–19.
- Preston, Richard A. (1977). *The Defence of the Undefended Border: Planning for War in North America, 1867–1939*. Montreal: McGill–Queen's University Press.
- Rechner, James R. (1988). *Teddy Roosevelt's Great White Fleet*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Ricks, Thomas E. (2006). *Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq*. New York: Penguin.
- Rittel, Horst, and Melvin B. Webber (1973). "Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning," *Policy Sciences*, 4:2 (June), 155–69.
- Ross, Stephen A. (1988). *American War Plans, 1945–1950*. New York: Garland.
- Ross, Stephen A. (1997). *American War Plans: The Test of Battle*. London: Frank Cass.
- Ross, Stephen A. (2002). *American War Plans: 1890–1939*. London: Frank Cass.

- Rudmin, Floyd W. (1993). *Bordering on Aggression: Evidence of U.S. Military Preparations Against Canada*. Hull, Quebec: Voyageur Publishing.
- Sagan, Scott D. (1987). "SIOP-62: The Nuclear War Plan Briefing to President Kennedy," *International Security*, 12:1 (Summer), 22–51.
- Schmidt, Steven Jon (1992). "United States Navy Basic Plan Green-One: An Analysis of the U.S. Navy's Strategic War Plan against Mexico," MA thesis, Texas A&M University.
- Simon, Herbert A. (1973). "The Structure of Ill Structured Problems," *Artificial Intelligence*, 4:3 (September), 181–201.
- Simon, Herbert A. (1980). "*Social Planning: Designing the Evolving Artifact*," C. I. P. Working Paper No. 416. Carnegie-Mellon University.
- Simon, Herbert A. (1995). "Problem Forming, Problem Finding, and Problem Solving in Design," in Arne Collen and Wojciech W. Gasparski, eds., *Design and Systems, General Applications of Methodology. Praxiology: The International Annual of Practical Philosophy and Methodology*, vol. 3. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 245–58.
- Spector, Ronald H. (1974). *Admiral of the New Empire: The Life and Career of George Dewey*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.
- Spector, Ronald H. (1977). *Professors of War: The Naval War College and the Development of the Naval Profession*. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press.
- Spector, Ronald (2005). "After Hiroshima: Allied Military Occupations and the Fate of Japan's Empire, 1945–1947," *Journal of Military History*, 69:4 (October), 1121–36.
- Still, William N. (2006). *Crisis at Sea: The United States Navy in European Waters in World War I*. Gainesville: University Press of Florida.
- Stinchcombe, Arthur L. (1965). "Social Structure in Organizations," in James G. March, ed., *Handbook of Organizations*. Chicago: Rand-McNally, 142–93.
- Stoler, Mark A. (2000). *Allies and Adversaries: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Grand Alliance, and U.S. Strategy in World War II*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Trask, David F. (1981). *The War with Spain in 1898*. New York: Macmillan.
- Tunstall, Graydon A. Jr. (1993). *Planning for War against Russia and Serbia: Austro-Hungarian and German Military Strategies, 1871–1914*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Turner, Richmond Kelly (1930). "The Foreign Relations of the United States." Thesis, Newport, RI: Naval War College, March 30.
- United States Army (2008). TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5-500, Commander's Appreciation and Operational Design. Version 1.0. January.
- Upton, Emory (1878). *The Armies of Asia and Europe*. New York: D. Appleton and Co.
- Upton, Emory (1917). *The Military Policy of the United States*. Washington: Government Printing Office.
- Vego, Milan (2008). *Operational Warfare: Theory and Practice*. 3rd edn. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press.
- Vlahos, Michael (1980). *The Blue Sword: The Naval War College and the American Mission, 1919–1941*. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press.
- Waghelstein, John D. (1999). "Preparing the US Army for the Wrong War: Educational and Doctrinal Failure, 1865–1891," *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, 10:1 (Spring), 1–33.
- Watkins, Myron W. (1943). "Post-War Plan and Program," *Journal of Political Economy*, 51:5 (October), 397–414.
- Watson, Mark Skinner (1991). *Chief Of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations*. Washington: Center of Military History.

- 
- Weaver, Warren (1948). "Science and Complexity," *American Scientist*, 36, 536–44.
- Webb, William J. (2001). "The Root Reforms and Army Schools and Branches," [www.history.army.mil/documents/1901/Root-Schools.htm](http://www.history.army.mil/documents/1901/Root-Schools.htm), accessed June 26, 2008.
- Weigley, Russell (1973). *The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy*. New York: Macmillan.
- Wilmott, H. P. (1996). *Grave of a Dozen Schemes: British Naval Planning and the War against Japan, 1943–1945*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Woodward, Bob (2002). *Bush at War*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Woodward, Bob (2004). *Plan of Attack*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Woodward, Bob (2006). *State of Denial*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Ziemke, Earl (1990). *The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany, 1944–1946*. Washington: Center of Military History.

# Chapter Fifty-two

## MILITARY JUSTICE

*Mark Weitz*

The need to control troops has existed from the inception of organized armies. Over the centuries the necessity of maintaining order in the ranks, whether on land or at sea, has taken precedence over insuring that discipline was meted out fairly. US Supreme Court Justice Hugo Black (1955) conceded this subordination of fairness to the need for military discipline in *Toth v. Quarles* (1955) when he wrote:

Unlike courts, it is the primary business of armies and navies to fight or be ready to fight wars should the occasion arise. But trial of soldiers to maintain discipline is merely incidental to an army's primary fighting function.

Civil courts recognized this harsh reality long before Black restated it and have rarely intervened in the military justice system (Henderson 1957, Wiener 1958).

Military justice, the process and structure by which military discipline is maintained is not only a distinct aspect of the armed forces, but for most of military history has been far from just, reflecting an emphasis on rigid, summary disposition of punishment. The history of military justice then is the development and evolution of rules, regulations, and processes that facilitate the exercise of discipline, and over time has sought to afford some protection for soldiers within a system that has always viewed their rights as subordinate to the need to maintain absolute obedience to authority. From verbal reprimand and other forms of non-judicial punishment, to formal courts martial for more serious offenses, the military justice system provides the rules of conduct and the methods of enforcing those rules for all members of the military. In certain instances, most notably during Civil War and Reconstruction, and in post-World War II Europe, Japan, and the Philippines, the American military justice system governed the conduct of civilians under martial law.

The American military system traces its roots to the seventeenth century when American colonists fought against native Americans. However, a military justice system did not begin to develop until the eighteenth century when the colonies joined the fight against Great Britain's imperial rivals. The colonial military justice system was based in great part on notions of contract and the civilian relationships

that existed prior to going to war, in stark contrast to the rigid, and often brutal British system. The differences between the American and British military justice systems did not go unnoticed by either army when the two fought side by side and Fred Anderson's *A People's Army* (1984), illustrates how the harshness of the British system contrasted with colonial notions of fairness and limitations on military leadership. Anderson argues it is these differences that made the colonials "American" and began the process of division that culminated 20 years later in the American Revolution.

The beginnings of a formal American military justice system came with George Washington's appointment of the first Judge Advocate General. Initially charged with legal services and advice to all levels of the Continental Army, over time the Judge Advocate's office became the backbone of the United States military justice system providing judges, attorneys, and an entire administrative structure for implementing justice throughout the army. *The Army Lawyer: A History of the Judge Advocates General's Corps, 1775–1995* (US Army 2005) traces the evolution and expansion of the Judge Advocate General's office. In comparing discipline in the Continental Army with that of the British, Harry M. Ward, *George Washington's Enforcers* (2006), found treatment was harsh in both services and the "justice" meted out to enlisted personnel and officers was unequal in both organizations, yet, consistent with Anderson's findings for colonial provincial armies, Ward concludes that the Continentals received more humane treatment than their British counterparts.

In November 1775 the Continental Congress adopted the new nation's first code of conduct for an armed service. *The Rules for the Regulation of the Navy of the United Colonies*, provided that ships and sailors should be administered "according to the laws and customs in such cases at sea." Thus began the practice of leaving the enforcement of regulations in the US Navy to the commanders of warships and to panels of officers formed on an ad hoc basis to conduct courts martial. Congress enacted a naval code in 1802 that assigned enforcement of that code to commanding officers who held "captain's mast" to adjudicate minor infractions and empanelled courts martial to try more serious offenses. A subsequent act in 1844 provided for the convening of "summary courts martial" to try enlisted men for cases involving charges between those handled by captain's mast and courts martial. The Navy did not develop its own JAG Corps until 1862 when Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles appointed a Solicitor and Judge Advocate General to represent the Navy in complicated court-martial cases. The position became permanent in 1870 as part of the newly formed Justice Department. Like its Army counterpart, this position evolved into a complex legal and administrative branch of the Navy culminating in the Judge Advocate General of the Navy in 1967. Both the Marines and the Air Force developed their own Judge Advocate's divisions, but aside from James Valle's *Rocks and Shoals* (1987) which analyzes discipline in the early nineteenth-century US Navy, only the Army provides an institutional history of its military justice system.

On April 10, 1806 Congress enacted *101 Articles of War* which replaced the *69 Articles of War* passed by the Continental Congress in June 1775. The *101*



articles remained on the books in some form until the enactment of the *Uniform Code of Military Justice* in 1951, and were read to every member of the Army and Navy. The British influence on American military justice continued well into the nineteenth century. For example, when the Confederacy developed the framework for its armed forces in February 1861, many of its judicial foundations were drawn from the 1765 British Articles of War. During the Civil War the Union Army took a step toward developing rules for combatants and created the world's first effort to codify the rules of war for enlisted personnel, *Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field* (1863). This became the forerunner of the US Military Code of Conduct and Donald A. Wells, *The Laws of Land Warfare* (1992) chronicles the evolution of the code including major changes in 1874, 1916, 1920, 1950, and 1968. The Naval equivalent of the Army's code is the *Blue Jacket's Manual* which first appeared in 1902.

As America spread out across the globe in the early twentieth century, the United States military moved with it. The short conflict with Spain in 1898 put American forces in Cuba briefly, and in the Philippines for an extended period. World War I not only brought America into a major war for the first time since the Civil War, but cast light on a growing dissatisfaction with the military justice system that continued through World War II.

In 1909 the Navy revamped its system by creating "deck courts." Presided over by a single officer, these courts addressed minor infractions if the enlisted man waived his right to a more formal captain's mast. In the same year Congress provided for the review of courts martial proceedings by the Secretary of the Navy. Eight years later the Navy issued its first comprehensive guide to judicial procedures, *Naval Codes and Boards* (1917).

John M. Lindley, *A Soldier is Also a Citizen: The Controversy over Military Justice: 1917–1920* (1990), chronicles two incidents, the Houston Riots and the Fort Bliss Mutiny, that fueled the debate over fundamental fairness in the military and led to the most important modification in the Army's justice system since its establishment during the Revolution. The 1920 Articles of War provide for boards of review within the JAG department that were empowered to set aside judgments and alter punishments. Other provisions guaranteed the accused legal representation for the first time, a right not seen in the civilian world until the US Supreme Court's ruling in *Powell v. Alabama* in 1932 (Horne 1997). Even then the right to an attorney was only guaranteed in a capital case. The new articles of war called for the appointment of a JAG "official," but not necessarily an attorney, to every general court martial and empowered that attorney to render judgment on the admissibility of evidence and other procedural matters. These reforms ushered in the beginning of an adversarial system that allowed a defendant to confront his accusers on a more equal basis.

The 1920 reforms laid the basis for significant change that culminated in 1951 with the enactment of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). While the UCMJ greatly improved the American military justice system and added significant substantive and procedural safeguards for military personnel, the military continued to come under fire for the manner in which it applied justice (Generous 1973).

Despite a colorful military history and a long tradition of fielding armies dating back before nationhood into the eighteenth century, the historical attention given to formal military law, courts martial, and the military's enforcement of its own rules and regulations is sketchy at best, at least until the latter part of the twentieth century. It is not until the post-World War II era that any significant historical work on military justice appeared, much of it driven by events of the Cold War and Vietnam. However, for the researcher looking to master the area there are valuable works, one simply must know where to look.

### Nineteenth Century

Deeply rooted in the colonial experience and based in large part on the British system, the American military justice system of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries exists in virtual obscurity. Unfortunately, most of the book length studies and periodical literature in the nineteenth century is geared almost exclusively for the practitioner. Necessity drove much of the literature on American military justice in the first century following the American Revolution. Most prominent are lengthy treatises designed to help both lawyers and soldiers navigate their way through the justice system. The period from the Revolution to the Civil War is dimly lit by an array of primary documents, and two main treatises. Isaac Maltby's *A Treatise on Courts Martial and Military Law* (1813) and William DeHart's *Observations* (1869 [1846, 1862–4]) published before and during the Civil War provide the best sources to get a handle on pre-Civil War military justice.

Military justice appears to have been of little interest to civilians in the early nineteenth century. Periodical literature on military justice is almost non-existent, but there are a few exceptions. As early as 1839 an article entitled "The Military Justice System" appeared in *The Army and Navy Chronicle* (Vargas 1991) and challenged the military's treatment of convicted soldiers, providing an early indication that the civilian world saw limits to the ability of the military to punish its own. Originally published in *The Detroit Morning News*, the article recounted two deserters whose heads were shaved and bodies branded and whipped. The piece condemned the whipping as "disgraceful." Imprisonment and even death seemed acceptable but whipping and branding stuck civilians as cruel and unusual punishment under the 8th amendment (Glenn 1984). With little real choice, soldiers tolerated the unfair enforcement of an unjust system, but there is evidence that most of the desertion from the US Army during the antebellum era stemmed from the inequities of the military justice system (Vargas 1991).

In 1840 Richard Henry Dana published *Two Years Before the Mast* (2005 [1840]), drawing newspaper attention to military discipline and raising public opposition to flogging in the Navy. In 1799 Congress limited the number of lashes a naval commander could administer without a formal court martial to 12, but Dana's novel and Herman Melville's, *White Jacket: or, the World in a Man-of-War* (1970 [1850]) a decade later brought the issue back to life. In the 1850 Naval Appropriations Act Congress placed further limits on flogging and it disappeared

completely by 1862 with both Union and Confederate Congresses final abolishing the practice. Harold D. Langley describes the anti-flogging movement in a chapter of *Social Reform in the U.S. Navy* (1967). In 1842 Commander Alexander S. Mackenzie discovered what he believed to be a mutinous plot on board the USS *Somers*, a ship en route from Africa to America with several young trainees among its crew. Mackenzie presided over the court martial that sentenced three individuals, including the 19-year-old son of Secretary of War John C. Spencer, to death. The execution of the three caused a scandal and contributed to the 1845 decision to establish the Naval Academy to train cadets ashore (Buckner 2003).

With the Civil War, military justice received new attention. Perhaps the most significant work is Brigadier General Stephen Vincent Benét, *A Treatise on Military Law and the Practice of Courts Martial* (1862). A career military officer, Benet fought in the Civil War and rose through the ranks to become Chief of United States Army Ordnance. While serving as a professor of history and ethics at West Point he wrote the first thorough essay on military justice and practice. Undoubtedly motivated by the war and the two million plus soldiers under arms for the Union, Benét's work takes the reader through the process from jurisdiction and courts martial procedure to conviction and punishment. Revised five times by 1868, Benét's work served as the most comprehensive guide on military justice until the twentieth century. John F. Callan, *The Military Laws of the United States* (1863) focused more on the application of military law to soldiers and less on the procedural aspects of courts martial that characterized Benét's work. Both Benét's and Callan's work evidenced a need to cope with an explosion of military legal issues brought on by the Civil War. In July 1862 Congress replaced regimental courts martial with courts conducted by field officers. The law was not widely implemented, but Joseph Fitzharris (2004) argues that when such courts were used they usually rendered more deliberate, consistent, and compassionate justice and that this raised the morale of the men in the ranks. Ella Lonn, *Desertion in the Civil War* (1997 [1966, 1928]), offers the first purely historical treatment of an aspect of military justice with her study of desertion in both armies during the Civil War. Lonn examines the efforts of Union and Confederate officials to impose a rigid system of military law and punishment on armies composed predominately of citizen soldiers. While pure military justice occupies but a small part of the book, Lonn's work provides a good primer on desertion as a crime. Four years later, another woman, Bessie Martin, *Desertion by Alabama Soldiers from the Confederate Army* (2003 [1932]), added to Lonn's work with an excellent study of desertion by soldiers from one state. Martin's work devotes even less coverage to purely military justice matters, instead seeking to come to some understanding of why soldiers from Alabama deserted and whether the geographical location of their homes in the state influenced their decision. Read together, Lonn and Martin provide a good start to understanding the application of military law to America's citizen soldiers.

After the Civil War, military justice finally received additional attention as the Army grappled with desertion in peace time. In 1889, Lt William McAnaney's prize-winning essay at the US Infantry and Cavalry School, "Desertion in the United States Army," became the first non-traditional topic to win the award.

McAnaney's short piece focused on causation and not procedural military justice, but he provides a decent bibliography of the limited periodical literature on the topic (Weitz 2005).

### 1900–50

During the early decades of the twentieth century the same trend prevailed as in the nineteenth: works designed predominately for the practitioner or the soldier. Horace G. Ball and George B. Davis, *Digest of Davis' Military Law of the United States and the Manual for Courts-Martial* (1917) provides the same type of coverage for the twentieth-century practitioner as Benét did for those in the nineteenth. In an early example of the application of military law to civilians outside of the United States, Brigadier General William E. Birkhimer, *Military Government and Martial Law* (1904) added to the traditional studies of military law by providing his insight as to how civilians fell under the umbrella of military justice. Birkhimer served 40 years in the Army, including the Judge Advocates division and served as an Associated Justice on the Supreme Court (Audiencal) Manila, Philippines. With material that applies to both soldier and civilian, Birkhimer draws on his experience in the Philippines and applied aspects of military justice to America's growing expansion across the globe.

World War II brought a dramatic increase of military personnel, to over 1,700,000, and another installment of the military justice treatise. John A. McComsey and Morris O. Edwards, *The Soldier and the Law* (1941), provided a detailed supplement to the military's *Manual of Courts-Martial*. Its professed two-part goal was to prevent military delinquency and provide practical assistance to those concerned with the application of military justice. Revised twice by Colonel Charles E. Cheever of the Judge Advocate General's Department, the exhaustive work re-emphasized that military justice remained something to be practiced rather than to be studied and scrutinized.

### Post World War II: The 1950s

While military justice as a topic of historical inquiry continued to lag in the decade following World War II, there is an increased attention to the field even if it was still directed toward the practitioner. The United States as an occupying power administered justice in both Germany and Japan through its military, both as to its own soldiers and for a time the occupied civilian population. This trend continued during the Cold War as the US military presence spread to virtually every corner of the globe. Perhaps more important, on May 31, 1951 the Uniform Code of Military Justice took effect. Drafted in 1949 and approved a year later, the UCMJ provided the most widespread change to military justice in American history. As one might expect the first works are for the practitioner and soldier as the literature tried to come to grips with the UCMJ and how it affected both lawyers and soldiers.

Everett O. Robinson, *Military Justice in the Armed Forces of the United States* (1956), is the most respected of the 1950s' work. A former commissioner on the United States Court of Military Appeals and a law professor at Duke, Robinson's work is perhaps the first effort to address military justice as in a historical context outside of the two Civil War desertion studies. Although his historical treatment is brief and mainly introductory, a theme that underlies the literature on military justice of this period is the notion that the military justice system is necessary, even if different, and the unique needs of the military justify any apparent harshness. Robinson almost sees a "paternal" quality to the system:

Today's armies, unlike many of the past, are composed to a great extent of youngsters ... Many of them have never before left the shelter and stabilizing influences of home and hometown ... having taken those youths into a more dangerous environment, the Armed Forces have incurred a responsibility to shield them as much as possible from temptations.

William Aycock and Seymour W. Wurfel's *Military Law under the Uniform Code of Military Justice* (1955) is another worthwhile study, but like Robinson's, there is no real effort to question whether the system is fair, whether it actually works, and to what extent, if any, it should be questioned. That would come with Vietnam in the 1960s and 1970s.

### Vietnam Era: 1960s and 1970s

As the stability of the 1950s disappeared into the turbulence of the 1960s, and America's commitment to the Vietnam conflict split the nation, the literature on military justice not only increased dramatically, but the emphasis was no longer practitioner based. Rather than merely tracing the history of the topic, the literature confronted a perceived conflict: a citizen becomes a soldier, risking both life and limb in the process, and yet becomes subject to a system of justice that is far inferior to that which he left as a civilian. While some of the literature is directed at the soldier, particularly material published during the war, that material has an underlying message that the justice system is flawed and provides insight into how to protect one's self. A good example is Robert S. Rivken's *Rights of Servicemen* (1972). Dedicated to "all the victims of the Vietnam War, of whom it can be said, few volunteered," the short paperback is a "how to" on surviving the military justice system. From the prosecutors' perspective the Vietnam Era has its own treatise. Edward M. Byrne, *Military Law* (1981 [1971, 1977]), is not only an excellent guide to practical military justice, but has withstood the test of time and is a frequent text for college law and history courses on US military justice.

The Vietnam Era literature moves beyond the pragmatics of the system and directly confronts the issue of fundamental fairness, and consistent with the general sense of rebellion in the 1960s, finds military justice far from "just." Robert Sherrill's *Military Justice is to Justice as Military Music is to Music* (1969) takes its title from a George Clemenceau quote that points out that both music and justice have

narrower aims in the military: music peps the boys up and justice keeps them down. Sherrill's theme is clear: "it is one of the great ironies of patriotism that a man who is called to the military service of his country may anticipate not only the possibility of giving up his life but also the certainty of giving up his liberty." Sherrill saw the Bill of Rights as irrelevant to military justice, and the 20 years following the adoption of the UCMJ raised critical questions in his mind as to whether the military could safely be left to hold this kind of power over a largely conscript army. The focus is on Vietnam legal events, specifically the Howard Levy case, the Presidio 27, and the Fort Jackson Eight, and argues for an application of the US Constitution to American servicemen. James Finn, *Conscience and Command* (1971), consists of a collection of essays along the lines of Sherrill's book. It stresses the notion of two societies, one civilian one military, and questions the fundamental fairness of the legal system applied by the military. Joseph W. Bishop's, *Justice Under Fire* (1974), echos Sherrill and Finn and is a worthy addition for any researcher looking to understand the debate.

Luther C. West, *They Call it Justice* (1977), delves deeper into the perceived injustice of military tribunals. West, a former judge advocate general from 1951 through 1971, covers the major cases under the UCMJ, and sees the underlying problem as an improper influence by commanding officers over the system. West admits that "my active duty career totaled twenty years and eleven days, It was a career that gave me pause to drink," and he questions the harshness of the controls commanders have over the modern day "Billy Budd." He points to the violent upheavals on US aircraft carriers in 1972–3 to support his position. Aside from the detailed scrutiny of the first 20 years of the UCMJ, West provides good historical background on military justice in both world wars, in part to define what he called the agency concept of courts martial. In his opinion, military courts served as agents of the unit commander, doing his bidding, and while the commander did not control outcome, he had a voice in sentencing, and through his influence on punishment played what West deemed an improper role in the process.

### Post Vietnam: The 1980s and Beyond

As Vietnam began to pass from a "current event" into "history," military justice finally finds its place within the field of military history, both in works devoted to the Vietnam War and perhaps more importantly, in the willingness of historians to go back and reconstruct the history of American military justice.

### General Histories

In the post-Vietnam Era military justice finally takes its place in the larger field of military history. Consistent with this new status the field has been blessed with a group of comprehensive historical studies. Some works go back to the American Revolution, while others focus on a specific era. With Jonathan Lurie's, *Arming Military Justice* (1992), and *Pursuing Military Justice*, vol. 2: *The History of the*



*United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, 1951–1980* (1997), the field finally has a comprehensive history. The heavily annotated and detailed work traces the evolution of the American military justice system from the Revolution to modern times. Lurie's *Military Justice in America: The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces* (2001), revised and abridged his two-volume work into a more usable text.

An excellent compliment to Lurie's work, Eugene R. Fidell and Dwight H. Sullivan, *Evolving Military Justice* (2002), draws on the expertise and experience of former lawmakers like Senator Sam Nunn and former members of the military justice system to not only tell the history of military justice, but to analyze its present day application. For the researcher looking to place America's system in a comparative perspective, this work compares America with several other common law nations.

Elizabeth Hillman, *Defending America: Military Culture and the Cold War Court Martial* (2007), narrows her focus to the Cold War Era when US military justice underwent some of its most fundamental changes. Hillman fills a noticeable void in the literature by showing how the huge postwar standing army of volunteers and draftees forced the justice system to cope. Hillman depicts a system that went beyond punishment of traditional crimes like AWOL and insubordination, to dictating accepted political, social, and sexual norms. In effect, as America fought communism abroad, its military justice system severely curtailed among its military, the very rights it advocated abroad. Hillman shows that homosexuals, non-whites, and the lowest ranking service personnel were more harshly treated by the justice system than white heterosexual officers. Among the strengths of this work is a strong argument for the importance of military justice within any discussion of military history.

Two other works merit mention for those seeking to apply historical experience to contemporary issues. Marouf Hasian, Jr., *In the Name of Necessity: Military Tribunals and the Loss of American Civil Liberties* (2005), expands the critical analysis of American military justice through an examination of seven separate instances from the Major John Andre affair during the American Revolution through the World War II trial of Japanese war criminal General Yamashita. His goal is to examine the notion of how "military necessity" served as a justification for the use of military tribunals, sometimes to try civilians. Hasian's study is grounded in the aftermath of 9/11 and scrutinizes historical examples to question the Bush Administration's necessity justification for the treatment of enemy combatants at Guantanamo Bay. Louis Fisher, *American Military Tribunals and Presidential Power* (2005) takes a more narrative approach than Hasian, and provides more coverage of the evolution of military justice and law as he examines how the executive office used its war power to apply military justice to soldiers and civilians from the American Revolution to the present day war on terror.

### American Civil War

Perhaps no specific historical era has benefited more from the attention to military justice in the last 30 years than the American Civil War. Military justice began to

creep into the literature as part of broader works, most notably Bell Irvin Wiley's *The Life of Johnny Reb* (2007 [1943]) and *The Life of Bill Yank* (2008 [1952]). In recent years the area has added works devoted solely to issues of military justice. Although more factual than analytical, Jack Bunch, *Military Justice in the Confederate Army* (2000a) and its companion, *Roster of Courts-Martial in the Confederate States Armies* (2000b) provide a good starting place for research in the area with a detailed overview of the Confederate system and an exhaustive list of its officially recorded courts martial. On the Union side, Robert I. Alotta's *Civil War Justice: Union Army Executions Under Lincoln* (1989) provides the same painstaking research into the Union justice system as does Bunch for the Confederacy. Like Bunch however, Alotta's work is more a detailed compilation of what happened than an exhaustive analysis of why. Using both Lonn and Martin as a starting point, Mark Weitz's *A Higher Duty* (2000) and *More Damning than Slaughter* (2005) examine the Confederate justice system as both the military and lawmakers struggled to cope with desertion. While causation and effect on the war effort garner much attention in each work, the efforts of the military and its courts is examined in detail for the first time. Finally, for the researcher looking to draw comparisons to the present day military justice issues, Mark Neely's *Southern Rights* (1999) offers an intriguing look into the use of military courts to apply martial law and suppress political dissent in the Confederacy. Using previously untapped sources on Confederate political prisoners, Neely argues that the Confederacy's claim to be the protector of liberty has a false ring in light of how it used its military courts to maintain order during the war.

### Vietnam

Time and distance affords the historian with a more retrospective look at military justice during Vietnam. William T. Allison, *Military Justice in Vietnam* (2007), offers a unique look at the Vietnam experience and the lessons to be gleaned. Allison sees the Vietnam military justice experience coming at a crucial point in the life of the UCMJ. Designed to maintain discipline and raise efficiency, the US military under the UCMJ suffered from an almost total breakdown of discipline. Yet Allison argues military justice helped keep the machine running in the difficult and unprecedented environment of a limited war. Military justice was therefore both a big success and a huge failure, but beyond just trying to control soldiers, Allison sees US military justice as part of US nation building efforts in Vietnam and his analysis provides food for thought as America struggles to reconstruct Iraq. Michael Belknap, *The Vietnam War on Trial: The My Lai Massacre and Court Martial of Lieutenant Calley* (2002), provides a detailed analysis of the mechanics of the military justice system in the context of one of the most public trials in US history. Contrary to the work of the late 1960s and 1970s, Belknap argues that the system worked. This work is essential for anyone trying to place the military justice system in Vietnam in a broader perspective. It also lays a basis for understanding changes taking place in the post-Cold War era (Borsch 2001).

## Conclusion

It took almost 200 years for military justice to find its place as a viable component of American military history. Nineteenth- and early twentieth-century literature provides very little in terms of historical narrative or analysis, but these works are nevertheless important for any student or researcher in the field. They serve as a primary source of the birth, development, and evolution of American military justice and provide a useful foundation in the field. With the coming of the UCMJ and the Vietnam War that followed shortly thereafter, the field of military justice came into its own, though, even with the proliferation of work over the last three decades, there is still much work to be done.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Allison, William T. (2007). *Military Justice in Vietnam*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
- Alotta, Robert I. (1989). *Civil War Justice: Union Army Executions under Lincoln*. Shippensburg, PA: White Mane Publishing Co.
- Anderson, Fred (1984). *A People's Army: Massachusetts Soldiers and Society in the Seven Years War*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Aycock, William B., and Seymour W. Wurfel (1955). *Military Law under the Uniform Code of Military Justice*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Ball, Horace G., and George B. Davis (1917). *Digest of Davis' Military Law of the United States and the Manual for Courts-Martial Including the Articles of War*. Kansas City, MO: Franklin Hudson.
- Belknap, Michael (2002). *The Vietnam War on Trial: The My Lai Massacre and Court Martial of Lieutenant Calley*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
- Benét, Stephen Vincent (1862). *A Treatise on Military Law and the Practice of Courts Martial*. New York: D. Van Nostrand.
- Birkhimer, William E. (1904). *Military Government and Martial Law*, 2nd edn. Kansas City, MO: Franklin Hudson Publishing Company; London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Company.
- Bishop, Joseph W. (1974). *Justice Under Fire: A Study of Military Law*. New York: Charterhouse.
- Black, Hugo L. (1955). In *Toth v. Quarles*, 350 U.S. 11, 18–19.
- Borch, Frederic L., III (2001). *Judge Advocates in Combat: Army Lawyers in Military Operations from Vietnam to Haiti*. Washington: Office of the Judge Advocate General and Center of Military History.
- Buckner, Melton F. (2003). *A Hanging Offense: The Strange Affair of the Warship Somers*. New York: Free Press.
- Bunch, Jack (2000a). *Military Justice in the Confederate Army*. Shippensburg, PA: White Mane Publishing Company.
- Bunch, Jack (2000b). *Roster of Courts-Martial in the Confederate States Armies*. Shippensburg, PA: White Mane Publishing Co.
- Byrne, Edward M. (1981 [1971, 1977]). *Military Law*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Callan, John F. (1863). *The Military Laws of the United States, Relating to the Army, Volunteers, Militia, and to Bounty Lands and Pensions, from the Foundation*. Philadelphia: G. W. Childs.

- Dana, Richard Henry (2005 [1840]). *Two Years Before the Mast and Other Voyages*. New York: Library of America.
- DeHart, William C. (1869 [1846, 1862, 1863, 1864]). *Observations on Military Law and the Constitution and Practice of Courts Martial with a Summary of the Law of Evidence*. New York: D. Appleton.
- Fidell, Eugene R., and Dwight H. Sullivan, eds. (2002). *Evolving Military Justice*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Finn, James, ed. (1971). *Conscience and Command*. New York: Vintage Books.
- Fisher, Louis. (2005). *American Military Tribunals & Presidential Power: American Revolution to the War on Terror*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
- Fitzharris, Joseph C. (2004). "Field Officer Courts and U.S. Civil War Military Justice," *The Journal of Military History*, 68:1 (January), 47–72.
- Generous, William T., Jr. (1973). *Swords and Scales: The Development of the Uniform Code of Military Justice*. Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press.
- Glenn, Myra C. (1984). *Campaigns against Corporal Punishment: Prisoners, Sailors, Women, and Children in Antebellum America*. Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Hasian, Marouf, Jr. (2005). *In the Name of Necessity: Military Tribunals and the Loss of American Civil Liberties*. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press.
- Henderson, Gordon D. (1957). "Courts-Martial and the Constitution: The Original Understanding," *Harvard Law Review*, 71:2 (December), 293–324.
- Hillman, Elizabeth L. (2007). *Defending America: Military Culture and the Cold War Court Martial*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
- Horne, Gerald (1997). *Powell v. Alabama: The Scottsboro Boys and American Justice*. New York: Franklin Watts.
- Langley, Harold D. (1967). *Social Reform in the U.S. Navy, 1978–1862*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
- Lindley, John M. (1991 [1990]). *A Soldier is Also a Citizen: The Controversy over Military Justice: 1917–1920*. New York: Taylor & Francis.
- Lonn, Ella (1997 [1966, 1928]). *Desertion in the Civil War*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
- Lurie, Jonathan (1992). *Arming Military Justice*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Lurie, Jonathan (1997). *Pursuing Military Justice*, vol. 2: *The History of the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, 1951–1980*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Lurie, Jonathan (2001). *Military Justice in America: The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces*. Lawrence, University Press of Kansas.
- McComsey, John A., and Morris Oswald Edwards (1941). *The Soldier and the Law*. Harrisburg, PA: The Military Service Publishing Co., [revised by Charles Cheevers 1943–4].
- Maltby, Isaac (1813). *A Treatise on Courts Martial and Military Law*. Boston: T. B. Wait.
- Martin, Bessie (2003 [1932]). *Rich Man's War, Poor Man's Fight, Desertion by Alabama Soldiers from the Confederate Army: A Study in Sectionalism*. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press.
- Melville, Herman (1970 [1850]). *White Jacket: or, the World in a Man-of-War*. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.
- Neely, Mark E., Jr. (1999). *Southern Rights: Political Prisoners and the Myth of Confederate Nationalism*. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press.
- Rivken, Robert S. (1972). *Rights of Servicemen, Basic ACLU Guide to Servicemen's Rights*. New York: Discus Books.

- Robinson, Everett O. (1956). *Military Justice in the Armed Forces of the United States*. Harrisburg, PA: Military Service Publishing Company.
- Schug, Willis E., ed. (1972). *United States Law and the Armed Forces: Cases and Materials on Constitutional Law, Courts-Martial, and the Rights of Servicemen*. New York: Praeger.
- Sherrill, Robert (1969). *Military Justice is to Justice as Military Music is to Music*. New York: Harper & Row.
- US Army (2005). *The Army Lawyer: A History of the Judge Advocate General's Corps, 1775–1995*. Honolulu: University Press of the Pacific.
- Valle, James E. (1996). *Rocks & Shoals: Naval Discipline in the Age of Fighting Sail*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Vargas, Mark A. (1991). "The Military Justice System and the Use of Illegal Punishments as Causes of Desertion in the U.S. Army, 1821–1835," *Journal of Military History*, 55:1 (January), 1–19.
- Ward, Harry M. (2006). *George Washington's Enforcers: Policing the Continental Army*. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press.
- Weitz, Mark (2000). *A Higher Duty: Desertion among Georgia Troops during the Civil War*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
- Weitz, Mark (2005). *More Damning than Slaughter*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
- Wells, Donald A. (1992). *The Laws of Land Warfare: A Guide to the U.S. Army Manuals*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
- West, Luther C. (1977). *They Call it Justice, Command Influence and the Court Martial System*. New York: Viking Press.
- Wiener, Frederick Bernays (1958). "Courts-Martial and the Bill of Rights: The Original Practice," 2 pts. *Harvard Law Review*, 72:1–2 (November and December), 1–49, 266–304.
- Wiley, Bell Irvin (2007 [1943]). *The Life of Johnny Reb: The Common Soldier of the Confederacy*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.
- Wiley, Bell Irvin (2008 [1952]). *The Life of Bill Yank: The Common Soldier of the Union*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.

## Chapter Fifty-three

# PHOTOGRAPHY AND THE AMERICAN MILITARY

*Frank J. Wetta*

Photography today is an integral part of the calculus of American warfare because of its great power to inform and to persuade – it is a continuation of war by other means. Military commanders must now consider how photographic images have expanded the space in which their troops operate. As a result, the United States Army, Navy, and Air Force have embraced photography as a way to advocate their role in society, explain their place in the structure of the nation's armed forces, record their activities, and train their personnel. Such purposes are reflected in the slogan of the Air Force's 1st Combat Camera Squadron: "Global Reach, Global Images."

The connection of the American military to photographic technology can be understood through an examination of six broad categories: the origins of military photography; combat photography; photographic services, photo reconnaissance; photographic archives; and the digital revolution.

### **The Origins of Military Photography**

The military's relationship to the camera dates from the beginnings of photography. Because of the limits of technology (photographers could not yet capture movement) military photography in the mid-nineteenth century was necessarily static. A daguerreotype of 1846, for example, pictures American soldiers of the Exeter, New Hampshire, Volunteer Militia in Fort Worth, Texas, preparing to march on Mexico – 23 men dressed in frock coats and shakos, swords at the marching position, preceded by drummers. Another photograph shows a general and his staff seated on their horses in the city square in Saltillo, Mexico. These images of soldiers on parade and others pictures of the Mexican War (1846–8) are unique. Now preserved at the Amon Carter Museum in Fort Worth, Texas, and the Beinecke Rare Book and Museum Library at Yale University, these marked the beginning of photojournalism – war photography as a specialized field. The Mexican War (1846–8) photographs also reflect the fascination which members of the United States military had with the camera and their eagerness to have



themselves photographed in uniform. In time, photography would move out of the studio to “become central to our understanding and recollection of recent wars allowing us to ‘remember’ events we never experienced through the searing images of pain and heroism branded upon our collective memory” (Sandweiss, Stewart, and Huseman 1989: 65).

If the Mexican War was the first to be photographed, the American Civil War (1861–5) was the first war to be viewed extensively through the lens: “The Camera never stopped. Wherever the armies went, the Cyclops eye followed. To the battlefield, to the home front, at sea, on the march, the photographers turned their instruments toward whatever caught their interest, and that interest was ecumenical indeed” (Davis 2002: 9). Unable to record combat action, photographers focused on soldiers at attention or at rest, encampments, fortifications, artillery parks, military railroads and bridges, ironclad warships, cityscapes and cities ravaged by war, military prisons, hospitals and their patients, artillery batteries, pontoon bridges, trenches, dockyards, government buildings, command staffs, civilian leaders, the home front, and studio portraits of officers and lesser ranks – all that stood still for the photographer. In the beginning, Civil War photographs were, like the Mexican War images, largely heroic in tone and manner, following the approach of war prints and paintings, but as the war progressed photographers began to record other images, including, by 1862, the dead and wounded. This marked the beginning of modern “combat photojournalism.”

As the Civil War foreshadowed things to come in military technology – real-time electronic communications, magazine loading weapons, machine guns, trench warfare, the strategic use of railroads, wire entanglements, canned rations, among other innovations – photographic technology was, in the 1860s, still novel and its greater potentialities yet unrealized. Soldiers referred to a photographer’s laboratory wagon with its strange equipment as a “Whatsit.” But the daguerreotype soon created a mass market for photographs and like the introduction of digital cameras in the 1990s, it transformed the way people see and experience war vicariously.

The most famous and influential photographer to emerge during the war was Mathew Brady – the father of American military photography. The American Photographic Society first approached Edwin M. Stanton, the Secretary of War, for permission to take pictures of the Union armies but the request was denied. Brady, however, with a similar vision of a comprehensive record of the conflict, won the favor of Generals Winfield Scott and Irvin McDowell (Thompson 1960). Brady took relatively few photographs himself. He was more of a publisher or director of photography than a photographer and supervised a company of some 25 photographic assistants or “operators.” Brady considered himself the official government photographer – having, he claimed, the personal endorsement of Abraham Lincoln. He and his assistants also had the help and protection of detective Alan Pinkerton’s Army Secret Service agents. Brady’s men took photographs later used by Pinkerton to help identify Confederate agents. He even gave photographs of the wounded to Army surgeons for their research. In return, officers provided Brady’s photographic campaign with extensive help. The quartermasters supplied feed for his transport horses and allowed his men to use military railroads.

Other officers issued passes so that photographers could move freely through the lines. Thus, his “Whasit,” traveled to the various theaters of operation with Brady serving as the grand manager of the endeavor with the cooperation and permission of army officials (Horan 1955, Panzer 2004). So extensive were these embedded activities, that Brady was justified in later advertising his completed work as “the most complete Collection of Incidents of War in the Country, together with Portraits of all the Distinguished Generals of the Army.”

Brady, however, was not the only name associated with Civil War era photography; it was just the most well known. Others significant photographers were Alexander Gardner (Gardner 1865), an early Brady apprentice (Katz 1991), and Timothy O’Sullivan, who learned the trade under both Brady and Gardner (Horan 1966). Civil War photography also included panoramic images of terrain and fortifications taken by George N. Barnard for the Union Army. Less well known is the work of Andrew J. Russell. An engineering officer, he photographed operations of Union General Herman Haupt’s US Military Railroad Construction Corps and other Civil War scenes – images of Fredericksburg, Petersburg, Appomattox, and the burning of Richmond.

Timothy Sweet (1990) has placed Civil War photography in a broader context. He saw a connection to Walt Whitman’s poetry, for example, asserting that the photographs by Brady and others served to support the Northern war effort: These “poetic and photographic representations of the war aided political discourse in the project of legitimating the violent conservation of the Union” (Sweet 1990: 2). Thus, war photography can have meaning beyond mere reportage.

### Combat Photography

War photographs, in time, would largely replace the other graphic arts (drawing, painting, and printmaking) as the most common way to depict military events, especially combat, and at the same time contribute to make other illustrative media more accurate. Before the Civil War, for example, horses in military prints and paintings were depicted in the so-called “flying gallop”: Artists showed them “with the fore legs stretched out in front, the two hind legs to the rear.” But Civil War photographs proved “that a running horse never took such a position; rather, at all times one or more legs are curved under or are on the way forward” (Thompson 1960: 192).

More importantly, war photographs created a unique category of understanding – a concept explored by Susan Sontag in *Regarding the Pain of Others* (2003) a study in which she investigates the ways in which photographs of war and other acts of violence effected the way we see human misery and the complexity of that visual experience. Combat photography occurs in close proximity to the battlefield. Thus,

there was a shattering of intelligibility in war that photographs captured in ways that traditional paintings didn’t. Painters turned battle scenes into adventures. [Artists]

dreamed up neat moralizing stories from the safety of their studios. They made war coherent. However, photographers replaced grand synthetic historical pictures with more faithful views of what was actually happening on the ground. (Sontag 2007).

Photographic images of combat moved viewers beyond romanticism. They revealed a unique landscape remote from civilian life. It was not yet true combat photography but it was near to it. Photography of this type began when Mathew Brady opened a display of photographs entitled “The Dead of Antietam” at his New York City studio (Frassanito 1978). Alexander Gardner had taken the photographs the week following the battle, and the pictures of gaping wounds and bloated bodies began to erode the romantic image of war (Zeller 2005). Here was a vivid image of the experience of war and a new way of interpreting that experience. It gave viewers a sense of immediacy that transcended traditional forms of expression. Photographers were not yet quite able to take action shots but photographs in the exhibit entitled “The Dead of Antietam” revealed the results of combat in graphic detail. As the *New York Times* put it on October 20, 1862: “If [Brady] has not brought the bodies and laid them in our door-yards and along the streets, he has done something very like it.” Timothy O’Sullivan’s “Harvest of Death” photographs of the dead on the battlefield of Gettysburg were just as shocking and served as well to undermine the civilian’s image of war. The photographs were similar in effect to *Life Magazine*’s June 1969 cover story and publication of portraits of 242 servicemen who died in a single week that brought home the reality and cost of the war to those civilians who were, up to that time, still largely disengaged from the war in Vietnam. *The New York Times* would later run a similar series of photographs of the dead during the fight against the insurgency in Iraq.

The Spanish–American War (1898) saw two important innovations – the use of hand-held cameras and moving pictures. Jimmy Hare (1856–1946) was one of the first news photographers to use such cameras, giving his pictures a spontaneity that was normally lacking in the press at the time. His coverage of events in Cuba greatly increased the circulation of *Collier’s* and led other magazine publishers to take photography seriously (Gould 1977). While US troops continued to occupy Cuba, 1899–1902, Charles E. Doty served as the official photographer of the Office of the Chief Engineer on the island and recorded both civilian and military subjects (Bretos 1996). A photograph survives from the period showing American soldiers using the “water torture” method during the Philippine insurrection in 1901 on a prisoner – foreshadowing the controversy surrounding the Abu Ghraib prison images over a century later (Kramer 2008).

The Library of Congress’s Prints and Photographs Division holds a series of panoramic still photographs of the Spanish–American War that includes images of the wreck of the *USS Maine* taken in 1911 by the American Photo Company. More important than still photography in terms of the development of war photography, however, are the short documentary films of the war by two early film companies – Edison Manufacturing and American Mutoscope & Biograph. Housed today in the library’s division of Motion Picture, Broadcasting, and Recorded Sound, these images include films of the wreck of the *Maine* and the burial of its

dead sailors, Teddy Roosevelt's Rough Riders, black troopers of the 2nd Battalion of the 10th US Cavalry, the 9th Infantry on parade in Washington, DC, camp life, and soldiers training cavalry horses, among others.

The Army experimented with the use of photography after Brigadier General Adolphus W. Greeley became Chief Signal Officer of the Army in 1887, but did not employ it systematically. Later, privately employed photographers accompanied the Mexican Punitive Expedition when it pursued Pancho Villa in 1916. Brigadier General John J. Pershing, commander of the incursion into Mexico, provided them with logistical assistance but imposed strict censorship on their operations, a practice he continued when he commanded the American Expeditionary Force in France during World War I. During that war all the Allied armies barred commercial photographers from the war zone. The development of small cameras made it impossible to prevent individual service personnel from taking photographs, but measures were taken to see that none of these were published during the war. Thus, "the war photographs published between 1914 and 1918, nearly all anonymous ... , were usually depictions of an aftermath: the corpse-strewn or lunar landscapes left by trench warfare; [or] the gutted French villages the war had passed through" (Sontag 2003: 20–1). The main use made of photography by the military, however, was for intelligence purposes and at the end of the war the commander of the Army Air Service reported that its pilots and aerial observers had taken 18,000 photographs of enemy positions (Patrick 1918, Reeves 1927). For its part, the Navy created a Photographic Section and a School of Aerial Photography in Miami, Florida, in 1918 (Carroll 1991). While the photographs that the American public saw were propagandistic in nature, selected military and civilian officials saw the real thing at secret screenings – "uncensored on celluloid" (Maslowski 1993).

World War II revived the relationship of the military to photography. Hundreds of official photographers covered every front and nearly every battle of the war using light-weight, hand-held single-reflex cameras using 35 mm film. Thus, the photography of the war, though still subject to censorship, was extensive and the distribution of still photographs in books and magazines enormous. Pioneering documentary films and newsreels began appearing between the wars and the military officers worked to influence their producers to present the military services in positive terms. During World War II newsreels rivaled newspapers as sources of war information for average Americans.

The work of World War II combat cameramen (largely un-credited), enlisted men, and civilian photojournalists has received significant study. Peter Maslowski's *Armed with Cameras* (1993) provides a comprehensive study of the military photographers in both the European and Pacific theaters, The Army Signal Photographic Companies and Signal Service Battalions, the Army Air Forces Combat Camera Units, the Navy Combat Photography Units, and the Marine Corps divisional Photography Sections. He examines the experiences of some 90 military photographers and their work in the areas such as identification of enemy camouflage techniques and tactical use of terrain, low-level aerial reconnaissance, staged and genuine combat photographs, and "brass" pictures. Of particular importance were photographs that celebrated the common soldier:

The armed forces strove to reduce the anonymity, to make the war personal. Confronted by World War II's dehumanizing aspects – its sheer massiveness, the reliance on sophisticated technologies, the importance of overwhelming numbers of machines, the capricious nature of death and maiming – those directing the photographic effort emphasized the individual. (Maslowski 1993: 147)

James Gallagher's *With the Fifth Army Air Force* (2001) recounts his experiences as an Air Force photographer. Bill Gibson, *No Film in My Camera* (2000) records his experiences on board the aircraft carrier *Hornet* during operations in the South Pacific. Famed photographer Edward Steichen (Niven 1997) served as director of the Naval Photographic Institute during the war. "Fighting Lady," his documentary on the USS *Lexington*, winner of the Academy Award for Best Documentary in 1945, describes combat operations aboard that carrier (Streichen 1947).

The most famous photograph of the Pacific war is Joe Rosenthal's picture of the raising of the flag on Iwo Jima. The story of the photograph of the placement of the flag atop Mt Suribachi on Iwo Jima is told by James Bradley in *Flags of Our Fathers* (2000). Tedd Thomey (1996), a veteran of the battle, demonstrates that charges that Joe Rosenthal staged the event are false. Craig M. Cameron (1994) puts the story of the flag and its meaning in the context of the image of the Marine Corps during the Pacific War and in the immediate postwar years.

Using Marine, Navy, Air Force, and Coast Guard photographs available through the National Archives II in College Park, Maryland, L. Douglas Keeney and William S. Butler produced *This is Guadalcanal: The Original Combat Photography* (1998), a book that combines 170 pictures with oral histories, to chronicle four engagements in the jungles ashore (Tenaru, Edison's Ridge, Henderson Field, and Guadalcanal) and five actions at sea (Savo Island, Eastern Solomons, Cape Esperance, Guadalcanal, and Tassafaronga). Thayer Soule (2000) describes the work of World War II Marine combat photographers as a group, but no similar work examines photographers of another service as a group.

The European Theater of Operations is equally well represented. Ralph Butterfield tells the story of the 166th Signal Photo Company in *Patton's Photographers* (1992). Jerry J. Joswick (1961) describes strategic bombing missions, including the attack on Ploesti, Romania, as experienced by the crew of a B-24 bomber. Photojournalists covered the war for *Collier's*, *Life*, and even *Vogue*. Among the most notable were Robert Capa who covered the Spanish Civil War, operations in Italy, and the landings in Normandy (Whelan 1985, Kershaw 2002), Carl Mydans was captured by the Japanese when Manila fell and held prisoner in the Philippines and in Shanghai before being exchanged and covering action in Italy and France (Harris 1994), and John Bushemi who photographed training at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and battles in the South Pacific before being killed while covering the landings on Eniwetok in the Marshall Islands (Boomhower 2004). Joe O'Donnell, serving as a Marine sergeant, was one of the first military photographers to record the aftermath of the atomic bombing of the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. "The photos proved striking. One was of a boy

carrying his dead brother to a crematorium. Another showed a classroom of children sitting at their desks, all burned to cinders" (*New York Times* 2007).

Nancy Caldwell Sorel's *The Women Who Wrote the War* (1999) is based on extensive interviews with women reporters and photographers who worked in both Europe and the Pacific. Two of these photojournalists have received book-length studies: Lee Miller covered the Blitz in London, the invasion of France, and the liberation of Austria (Prose 2002). Antony Penrose presents the work of his mother in *Lee Miller's War* (1992) which contains particularly poignant photographs of combat at St. Malo and in Alsace. Margaret Bourke-White photographed World War II on the Eastern Front and in North Africa, flew with American bombers during the strategic bombing campaign, and accompanied General George S. Patton's Third Army in Germany. Her images of the Nazi death camps were particularly important (Goldberg 1986).

Not all photographs published, even in reputable magazines and newspapers, were authentic. Eliot Elisofon, a professional photographer attached to both the US Army and Navy in World War II, warned of faked combat photography, including "Stuka bombing" explosions set off by "friendly engineers," captured enemy vehicles set on fire after the battle, simulated combat action shot behind the front lines, and, in one infamous case, an elaborate scene of medics aiding a "wounded" soldier while in the background two controlled explosions were detonated. Elisofon, who spent significant time at the front, declared that no one within one hundred yards ever stood up to get the best camera angle on bombs exploding (Maloney 1943). But honesty largely prevailed and civilian photojournalists competed with official service photographers whose pictures were distributed to the media and used by the military for a variety of purposes.

David Douglas Duncan was the best-known photojournalist of the Korea War (1950–3). His photographs of American Marines went beyond simple reportage to become classics of the combat genre. He eventually put some of his work into one of the best collections of combat photography: *This is War* (1951). It is divided into three chapters, each an example of how great photojournalism reports the experience of combat: "The Hill" records an attack by Baker Company, 1st Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment on a Chinese Communist position; "The City" pictures urban warfare following the amphibious landing at Inchon; and "Retreat Hell" is the story in pictures of the Marine's epic fighting retreat from the Changjin/Chosin Reservoir.

By the 1960s the production of newsreels had ceased, their place taken by television. If the Civil War was truly the first photographer's war, Vietnam was the first television war. Television for the most part provided the most memorable images for Americans, not still photography.

During the early years of the war in Vietnam, both print and broadcast media discouraged gruesome or horrific photography, but with the Tet Offensive in 1968 American public opinion began turning against the war. As photojournalists produced more realistic images, notably Eddie Adams' photograph of General Nguyen Ngoc Loan executing a Vietcong prisoner, many military leaders came to believe that photojournalists were contributing to the rising opposition to the war (Mills



1983). Pulitzer Prize winning photographer Horst Faas, the chief photographer in Southeast Asia for the Associated Press, was assigned to Saigon, from 1962 until 1974. With fellow photojournalist Tim Page, David Halberstam, and Peter Arnett, he coauthored *Requiem: By the Photographers Who Died in Vietnam and Indochina* (1997) which reproduces the photographs and some of the writings of the photographers, including Robert Capa and Sean Flynn (Meyers 2002), who died covering the war.

During the Gulf Wars U.S. photojournalists were imbedded with military units as they conducted operations. Using digital cameras and satellite phones, they provided virtually instant coverage to newspapers and television networks far from the theater of war.

Peter Howe (2002), who photographed violence in El Salvador and Northern Ireland, reproduces photographs by 10 photo-journalists, including Patrick Chauvel, James Nachwey, Ron Haviv, Maggie Steber, and Susan Meiselas, who covered wars from Vietnam through Iraq. Howe accompanies 150 of their photographs with the thoughts of those who took them and through these relates the underreported story of the skill, creativity, anxiety, and frequent bravery of the individuals.

### Photographic Services

The American military employed photography for a variety of support services. During the Civil War, Dr. William Hammond, the Surgeon General in 1862, ordered medical officers to collect "all specimens of morbid anatomy, surgical or medical, which may be regarded of value ... to military medicine." One result of the order was the employment of William H. Bell, a Philadelphian, as the chief photographer for the Army Medical Museum (established 1862) to record a variety of subjects, including the effects of the gunshot wounds and other medical conditions resulting from the war. J. T. H. Connor and Michael G. Rhode of the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology provide an in-depth discussion of these early military medical photographs in "Shooting Soldiers: Civil War Medical Images, Memory, and Identity in America" (Connor and Rhode 2003). Army photographers also went to the western frontier on an anthropological and anatomical mission to photograph American Indians. One result was the collection of specimens resulting from a militia attack on a Cheyenne and Arapaho village at Sand Creek, Colorado, in November 1864. An 1871 report noted that the collection of photographs included images of Indian crania showing "multiple gunshot perforations." The Army Medical Museum continued its photography activities during the First World War and, along with the Signal Corps, produced some 10,000 photographs. The Museum continued to collect photographs during World War II through the Museum and Medical Arts Service unit.

Medical photography, however, was only one reflection of the military's interest in recording its activities. The Army incorporated photography into its signal training system at Fort Riley Kansas in 1894 and two years later published its first

*Manual of Photography* (US Army 1896). Later, it moved these operations to the Signal Corps School at Camp Alfred Vail, later Fort Monmouth, New Jersey. The Army introduced the use of training films in August of 1917 and in less than a year there were 55 reels in use. With bombing still in its infancy, reconnaissance proved the most valuable service provided by the airplane in World War I. Although the United States did not enter the war until 1917, the American army outfitted 18 squadrons that supported the ground commanders with mapping, artillery spotting, and photographs. Pilots flew the French Spad XI scout and British/American DH-4 day bomber, the so-called “Flaming Coffin” for its tendency to catch on fire when hit by German machine guns. In 1916 it printed what may be the first manual to train personnel in the techniques of “Aero Photography,” including mapping (Carlock 1916). In all, the US Army deployed 366 observation aircraft by 1918.

From 1919 until 1976, the Army included photography along with programs in radio, electronics, meteorology, and other technical studies for enlisted personnel. For a brief time, photography training was the responsibility of the Army War College (1930–6). During World War II, the Photographic Division of the Office of the Chief Signal Corps Officer was reorganized as the Army Pictorial Service (June 17, 1942). At that time, the Army also purchased the Paramount Pictures studio at Astoria on Long Island, New York, to provide facilities for the development of motion pictures. The Army created the Signal Corps Photographic Center in May 1942. This unit included the Signal Corps Photographic School that, in turn, replaced photographic training at Fort Monmouth. In 1976, photographic training moved to Fort Gordon, Georgia (Photography at Fort Monmouth 2008). During the twenty-first century, the Army makes sophisticated and extensive use of photography: The 55th Signal Company at Fort Meade, Maryland, for example, trains Combat Camera (COMCAM) soldiers whose job it is to provide “still and motion pictures in support of air, sea, and ground operations” for military decision makers, including the Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff and the Unified Combatant Commands. Since 1995, the unit has been deployed to Europe, including the Balkans, and to Iraq and Afghanistan.

Training and documentary film are a critical part of the story of the relationship between the military and photographic technology. The Army photographic services, for example, had a special relationship with Hollywood during World War II. The Army Pictorial Service produced approximately 1,600 training films on a variety of subjects during the conflict, including the features and operation of the Garand rifle, sex hygiene, military tradition, prevention of malaria, vehicle maintenance, expectations of combat, and many others. The Walt Disney Company, in cooperation with private industry and the military services, produced two hundred films that combined animation and live-action photography in producing training and propaganda films on topics such as flush riveting, the anti-tank rifle, aircraft wood repair, and aircraft autopilot systems. Actors Ronald Reagan and William Holden served with the Army Air Forces’ First Motion Picture Unit. The film unit used the former Hal Roach Studios (“Fort Roach”) in Culver City, California: “Often referred to as the Culver City Cowboys, members of the unit made sophisticated training and propaganda films using the talents of artists and film-

makers in uniform” (Wise and Wilderson 2000). One training film Reagan starred in was entitled *Recognition of the Japanese Zero*, a live-action and animated short. Clark Gable, one of the greatest Hollywood stars of the era, received photographic training and was assigned to the 351st Bomb Group along with scriptwriters, cameramen, soundmen, and other film support personnel. Glenn Ford became a Marine sergeant and served as a photographic specialist and radio broadcaster. Gene Kelly, a Navy lieutenant with the Naval Photographic Science Laboratory Branch, Photographic Division of the Bureau of Aeronautics in Washington, carried out a variety of assignments which included filming the effects of fire-dousing foam on aircraft. Later he directed a film about the aircraft carrier *Franklin* (CV-13) following a Japanese kamikaze attack that nearly sank the vessel. Aldo Ray was a Navy “frogman,” a member of Underwater Demolition Team 17, that conducted a hydrographic and photographic survey of the beaches near Osaka, Japan (Wise and Rehill 1997).

Director John Ford, holding the rank of lieutenant commander, was Chief of the Field Photographic Branch for the Navy. In that capacity, he made *Torpedo Squadron* (1942) and *We Sail at Midnight* (1943). He won the Academy Award for Best Documentary Film for *The Battle of Midway* (1942) and *December 7th* (1943). Ford filmed the Midway documentary during the actual battle. *Pearl Harbor* “is a curious blend of actual footage and re-enactments, including actors portraying servicemen and civilians and other studio shots of miniature ships being blown up” (Langman and Borg 1989). Other important World War II documentary films by prominent American directors working for the armed forces include Frank Capra’s *Why We Fight* series (Army 1942–5), John Huston’s *The Battle of San Pietro* (Army 1945), William Wyler’s *Memphis Belle* (Army Air Forces 1944), and Louis de Rochemont’s *The Fighting Lady* (Navy 1944).

The Navy showed an early interest in photography. In 1911, Walter L. Richardson, the first “true U.S. Navy photographer,” began photographing Naval aviation activities in Florida. Between 1917 and 1918 the Navy trained about 90 photographers. During World War II, Edward Steichen led a unit of professional photographers that produced millions of photographs and moving images that were processed primarily at the Naval Photographic Science Laboratory. Mame Warren, “Focal Point of the Fleet” (2005), describes the programs and facilities developed by the Navy to support hundreds of photographers serving around the world and to process and store their work, as well as the uses made of the hundreds of thousands of stills and miles of motion pictures (Warren 2005). There exists no similar study for the Army.

The uses of photography for propaganda purposes is evident in the photographs selected by Steichen for *The U.S.A. at War* (Maloney 1943) which includes, for example, a photograph of three bare-chested, bearded marines labeled “Jap Busting Brothers” (Maloney: 71). The use of photography for such purposes, as well as the imposition of censorship on photographers has generated controversy that continues to the present. A variety of ethical issues faced by combat photographers are explored by Paul Lester (1994). Should a photograph be withheld from publication until the dead soldier’s family receives the news? What are the limits of

military censorship? What should be the focus of the photographer's loyalty – the profession or the nation's cause?

### Photo Reconnaissance

The United States Army took enthusiastically to the uses of photo reconnaissance pioneered during World War I (Finnegan 2006). During World War II (Staerck 1998), the armed forces expanded reconnaissance photography to include: damage assessment; bomb impact photography; mapping and charting photography for support for naval bombardment (e.g., identification of enemy gun emplacements and pill boxes) and amphibious landings; location of antitank defenses and supply depots; verification of intelligence gathered through interrogation of prisoners; location of mine fields; and other operational purposes. Indeed, in 1945 Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner, commander of US. amphibious forces in the Pacific, stated that "Photographic reconnaissance has been our main source of intelligence in the Pacific. Its importance cannot be overemphasized" (Dyer 1972). In Europe, the Allied Central Interpretation Unit in Britain analyzed aerial reconnaissance photographs to identify strategic targets and based on them created detailed three-dimensional terrain models to aid in the planning and execution of the bombing of submarine pens, dams, and other structures (Babington Smith 1957, Pearson 2002). To counter this "eye-in-the-sky" technology opposing forces each developed elaborate and effective camouflage techniques to counter aerial reconnaissance, including the camouflage of entire airfields and industrial plants (Stanley 1998).

The use of aerial photography for reconnaissance and spying also featured significantly during the Cold War (c.1947–91). The difficulty of determining the capabilities and activities of the Soviet Union led to the development of a supersonic jet-propelled glider, the famous U-2, for aerial surveillance which entered service in 1956 (Polmar 2001). The plane, the result of a secret development program of Lockheed Aircraft and the Central Intelligence Agency, carried a 36-inch focal length camera designed by James Baker of such exceptional capability that it could photograph with "such fine resolution that a person looking at a picture of a golf course taken from an altitude of 10 miles was said to be able to detect individual golf balls on a putting green" (Pedlow and Welzenbach 1992). The expansion of aerial reconnaissance was reflected in the increase in number of photo interpreters employed by the CIA from 20 in the early 1950s to over 2,000 by 1960. Later, space satellites would serve the same purposes (Nalty 1997).

Photoreconnaissance played a key role in the Cuban Missile Crisis, and rendered important information used in planning US interventions in Grenada, Panama, and elsewhere during the 1970s and 1980s, as well as in the Gulf Wars of 1991 and 2003. Indeed, the employment of Global Positioning Systems (GPS) to target specific buildings as well as weapons and troop concentrations combined with the use of photographic images to guide Precision Guided Munitions to the their targets represented a major change in how combat could be conducted. The

deployment of such systems and the processing and employment of the intelligence they gather by the National Photo Intelligence Center (NPIC) and its successor, the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA), established in 1996, which was renamed the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) in 2003, remain shrouded in secrecy.

Technological advances have also enabled the Air Force to develop the RQ-1 Predator a small unmanned aircraft designed for surveillance and reconnaissance missions. According to the Air Force technology website, the system uses radar, video cameras, and missiles for photo reconnaissance and armed interdiction to aid the ground forces ([airforcetechnology.com](http://airforcetechnology.com)).

### Photographic Archives

Extensive public and private collections testify to the military's interest in photography as it relates to its mission, its history, and its public image. There are, for example, over one and a half million photographs stored at the United States Army Heritage and Education Center at Carlisle, Pennsylvania. The Naval History and Heritage Command Photographic Section (NHC-PS) holds a large collection of images and is the "principal source of photographs ... of U.S. Navy subjects" taken prior to 1930. Its wide-ranging collections include, among many other image formats and subjects, stereoscopic photographs of ships and Navy life taken from 1862 (*USS Monitor*) to 1919 (troops returning to the United States from France.). Seen through a special viewer, stereoscopic photographs generally present three-dimensional images of their subjects. For later eras its collections supplement those of the National Archives and the Department of Defense.

The Still Picture Branch of the US National Archives & Records Administration contains hundreds of thousands of photographs of World War II from the Army Signal Corps, the Department of the Navy, the Coast Guard, the Marine Corps, and the Office of War Information. The collection includes photographs available to the public and listed by category (labeled according to various categories, for example, leaders, the home front, supply and support, rest and relaxation, navy and naval battles, aviation, aid and comfort, and death and destruction), with the images accompanied by brief descriptions such as "Medics helping an injured soldier" and "American soldiers, stripped of all equipment, lie dead, face down in the slush of a crossroads somewhere on the western front." The National Archives has approximately 250,000 photographs of the Vietnam war era (1962–75) taken by Army, Navy, Marine, and Air Force photographers, including the Department of the Army Special Photo Office, the 221st Signal Company, and the Navy's Combat Camera Group-Pacific, among other military photographic units. The collection houses images of ground combat, aerial reconnaissance, bombing missions, Navy SEAL operations, counter-guerilla actions, hospital intensive care activities, and other war images ([www.archives.gov](http://www.archives.gov)).

The New-York Historical Society is also a repository of World War II photographs of Army and Army Air Force, Navy, and Coast Guard activities. The

resources include photographs from the US Signal Corps (aircraft, combat scenes, and air personnel – both men and women). The Navy photographs, many from the Navy Public Relations Office, illustrate battles and after combat activities (the Makin Island Raid, the Battle of the Coral Sea, the Battle of Santa Cruz Island, and others), and the New York Navy Ship Yard in Brooklyn. The collection also pictures weapons and technology, various naval vessels, and naval airplanes (“Hell-divers” and “Avenger” torpedo planes and “Hellcat” fighter planes). Especially interesting are the many photographs of WAVES (the Navy’s women’s auxiliary) and women at work at the shipyards.

The Defense Visual Information Center maintains a photographic archive on the Department of Defense website that features various military operations and activities. Typical images include, for example, photographs of an American soldier greeting an Iraqi child or a sailor kissing his wife goodbye – the men identified by name, unit, and home town.

The Magnum photographic cooperative, a professional and commercial association, is the most famous group of photojournalists. Its collection includes work by David “Chim” Seymour (one of its founders) who served with the 12th Army Corps in Europe during World War II as an aerial photograph interpreter, W. Eugene Smith (Korea), Philip Jones Griffiths (Vietnam), Paolo Pellegrin (Iraq), and Thomas Dworzak (Afghanistan).

The George Eastman House, the oldest and most important photography museum in the world, holds an extensive collection of photographs related to war. The nineteenth-century collection includes Alexander Gardner’s *Photographic Sketchbook of the War*, George N. Barnard’s *Photographic Views of Sherman’s Campaign* as well as photographs produced by E. & H. T. Anthony, Taylor & Huntington, William H. Tipton, and the War Photograph and Exhibition Co. The museum also holds the largest collection of Edward Steichen’s work. The George Eastman House World War II American combat photography holdings include Navy, Marine, and Coast Guard images as well as Air Force aerial reconnaissance photographs of the European theater.

### The Digital Revolution

The digital revolution in photography is the latest technological development in the 160-year relationship between the military and the camera. The military in the twenty-first century has no monopoly on providing combat photographs or war photographs with this relatively inexpensive technology available to anyone not just to professional photographers. According to Mark Edward Harris (2007), the advent of digital technology changed the nature of photojournalism: “high-resolution D-SLRs, fast laptop computers with high-capacity hard disks and satellite links with sufficient bandwidth are the key elements that made turnaround for the combat photojournalists practically instantaneous.” He contrasts, by example, the problems that Robert Capa had in 1944 in sending photographs back from Omaha Beach during the Normandy invasion. The lab technicians who received



the undeveloped film damaged the negatives giving the photographs a blurry, if dramatic, quality. Today almost no battlefield photograph is lost or damaged: "Digital photojournalism's finest hour came in the spring of 2003. The need to get images from the battlefield in Iraq to the pages of newspapers and the screens of 24-hour news services as quickly as possible called for the ultimate state-of-the-art photo gear and transmission equipment during the First Gulf War (August 1990–February 1991).

In 1945, Murray Leff, then serving with the 35th Infantry Division, carried a concealed compact folding camera under his uniform jacket. Against regulations, he photographed various scenes – a dead German soldier and the dismembered leg of a fellow soldier, among more mundane pictures (Leff 2007). Today, the military might try to control the new technology as they did during World War II, but to no avail – as is testified to by the images of the inmate abuse at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq by military policemen. The military is now full of Sergeant Leffs. It does not take professionals or any elaborate deceit to record and to send combat images back home any longer. Because of technological convergence (camera phones) and the advent of digital cameras and mini digital camcorders, the ability to record and transmit still and moving pictures has profoundly changed the image of war. The control of the images of war for public consumption by the military has become virtually impossible. Witness the failed attempt to prevent the publication of photographs of the return of the flag-draped coffins of fallen soldiers from Iraq in 2003.

Now, gruesome images (not just the heartbreaking ones) are easily available on video blogs transmitted by camera phone – the severed torso of a suicide bomber, "his head and shoulders ... perfectly intact and ... set perfectly upright on the ground." In the correspondent Richard Engle's term, this is the new "pornography of war" (Engle 2006).

"For thousands of years most of the human race had never seen a battlefield, had been spared the eyewitness knowledge of the ugly indignities that war inflicted on those engaged in combat," writes Peter Maslowski (1993: 3) The invention of the camera changed all that. Today during the campaign to suppress the insurgency in Iraq following the Second Gulf War, Marines and soldiers began sending back digital video clips of firefights and by using "YouTube: Broadcast Yourself," an Internet video sharing website. Now everyman can be his own photojournalist. The sound and pictures have a raw, immediacy that enlarges the virtual experience of war far beyond what began in the age of Mathew Brady.

Duncan Anderson (2005) and Norman Moyes (1966a, b) survey combat journalism from the Crimean War through the work of Mathew Brady and turn of the century pioneering photojournalists to the present, but there exists no similar broad survey of the military's use of photography. The work of individual photographers has been studied as has their work in World War II and wars of the past six decades. The utilization of photography by the military to train troops, analyze operations, or produce maps has received far less attention. Harvey Curtis examines the early use of the *Camera for Studying Projectiles in Flight* (1924) and more recent authors have analyzed the role of photo reconnaissance since the 1950s, but there are no similar studies of the employment of gun-sight cameras to confirm victory in aerial

combat that began in World War II, cameras with infrared film to monitor enemy operations, for example, along the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Southeast Asia, or the Navy's use of underwater photography to assist in salvage. In short, many opportunities exist for studying the military's use of photography.

#### BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Anderson, Duncan (2005). *Glass Warriors: The Camera at War*. London: Collins.
- Babington Smith, Constance (1957). *Air Spy: The Story of Photo Intelligence in World War II*. New York: Harper [reissued as *Evidence in Camera: The Story of Photographic Intelligence in the Second World War*. London: David & Charles, 1974].
- Boomhower, Ray E. (2004). *One Shot: The World War II Photography of John A. Bushemi*. Indianapolis: Indiana Historical Society.
- Bradley, James, with Ron Powers (2000). *Flags of Our Fathers*. New York: Bantam Books.
- Bretos, Miguel A. (1996). "Imaging Cuba under the American Flag: Charles Edward Doty in Havana, 1899–1902," *The Journal of Decorative and Propaganda Arts*, 22:1 (Cuba Theme Issue), 82–103.
- Brothers, Caroline (1997). *War and Photography: A Cultural History*. New York: Routledge.
- Butterfield, Ralph, ed. (1992). *Patton's Photographers*. Ames: Iowa State University Press.
- Cameron, Craig M. (1994). *American Samurai: Myth, Imagination, and the Conduct of Battle in the First Marine Division, 1941–1951*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Carlock, Floyd D. (1916). *Military Topography and Photography*. Menasha, WI: George Banta Publishing Co. [2nd edn. in 1918]. Digitized 1918 ed., Internet Archives, 2007.
- Carroll, George. (1991) *Eyes of the Navy: A History of Naval Photography*. On line: <http://www.navyphoto.org/Carol/contents.html>, accessed April 24, 2009.
- Connor, J. T. H., and Michael G. Rhode (2003). "Shooting Soldiers: Civil War Medical Images, Memory, and Identity in America," *Invisible Culture: An Electronic Journal for Visual Culture*, online: [www.rochester.edu](http://www.rochester.edu), accessed April 24, 2009.
- Curtis, Harvey L. (1924). *A Camera for Studying Projectiles in Flight*. Washington: Government Printing Office.
- Davis, William C. (2002). *The Image of the War: 1861–1865*, vol. 3: *The Embattled Confederacy*. New York: Doubleday.
- Duncan, David Douglas (1951). *This is War!: A Photonarrative in Three Parts*. New York: Harper.
- Dyer, George C. (1972). *The Amphibians Came to Conquer: The Story of Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner*, 2 vols. Washington: Department of the Navy.
- Engle, Richard (2006). "Blogging Bagdad: The Untold Story," (April 21). Online [http://onthescene.msnbc.com/baghdad/2006/04/war\\_and\\_pornogr.html](http://onthescene.msnbc.com/baghdad/2006/04/war_and_pornogr.html), accessed April 24, 2009.
- Faas, Horst, Tim Page, David Halberstamn, and Peter Arnett (1997). *Requiem: By the Photographers Who Died in Vietnam and Indochina*. New York: Random House.
- Finnegan, Terrence J. (2006). *Shooting the Front: Allied Aerial Reconnaissance and Photographic Interpretation on the Western Front [during] World War I*. Washington: Center for Strategic Intelligence Research, National Defense Intelligence College.
- Fralin, Francis (1985). *The Indelible Image: Photographs of War, 1846 to the Present*. New York: Henry N. Abrams.
- Frassanito, William (1978). *America's Bloodiest Day: the Battle of Antietam 1862*. New York: Scribners.

- Gallagher, James (2001). *With the Fifth Army Air Force*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Gardner, Alexander (1865). *Gardner's Photographic Sketch Book of the War*. Washington: Philp & Solomons.
- Gibson, Bill (2000). *No Film in My Camera*. Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press.
- Goldberg, Vickie (1986). *Margaret Bourke White: A Biography*. New York: Harper & Row.
- Gould, Lewis L. (1977). *Photojournalist: The Career of Jimmy Hare*. Austin: University of Texas Press.
- Hood, Robert E. (1967). *12 at War: Great Photographers under Fire*. New York: Putnam.
- Harris, Mark Edward (1994). "Carl Mydans: A Life Goes to War," *Camera & Darkroom*, 16:6 (June), 22–31.
- Harris, Mark Edward (2007). "War Photography: From the Field to the Cover," online <http://www.digitalphotopro.com/art/war-photography-from-the-field-to-the-cover.html>, accessed April 24, 2009.
- Horan, James D. (1955). *Mathew Brady: Historian with a Camera*. New York: Crown Publishing Co.
- Horan, James D. (1966). *Timothy O'Sullivan: America's Forgotten Photographer*. New York: Bonanza.
- Howe, Peter (2002). *Shooting Under Fire: The World of the War Photographer*. New York: Artisan.
- Joswick, Jerry J. (1961). *Combat Cameraman*. Philadelphia: Chilton.
- Katz, Mark (1991). *Witness to an Era: The Life and Photographs of Alexander Gardner*. New York: Viking.
- Keeney, L. Douglas, and William S. Butler (1998). *This is Guadalcanal: The Original Combat Photography*. New York: William Morrow.
- Kershaw, Alex (2002). *Blood and Champagne: The Life and Times of Robert Capa*. New York: Thomas Dunne.
- Kramer, Paul. (2008) "The Water Cure: Debating Torture and Counterinsurgency – A Century Ago," *The New Yorker*, (February 25), 38–43.
- Langman, Larry, and Ed Borg (1989). *Encyclopedia of American War Films*. New York: Garland Publishing, Inc.
- Leff, Murray (2007). *Lens of an Infantryman: A World War II Memoir with Photographs from a Hidden Camera*. Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company.
- Lester, Paul Martin (1994). "Military Censorship of Photographs," in Philip Patterson and Lee C. Wilkins, eds., *Media Ethic: Issues and Cases*, 2nd edn. Madison, WI: Brown & Benchmark, 212–15.
- Lewinski, Jorge (1978). *The Camera at War: A History of War Photography*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Life* (1969). "The Faces of the American Dead in Vietnam: One Week's Toll: 28 May–3 June 1969," *Life Magazine*, (27 June), 20–31.
- Maloney, Tom (1943). *The U.S.A. at War: U.S. Camera 1944. Photographs selected by Commander Edward Setichen, U.S.N.R.* New York: Duell, Sloan, and Pearce.
- Maslowski, Peter (1993). *Armed with Cameras: the American Military and Photographers of World War II*. New York: Free Press.
- Mills, Nick (1983). *The Vietnam Experience: Combat Photographer*. Boston: Boston Publishing Co.
- Moeller, Susan D. (1989). *Shooting War: Photography and the American Experience of Combat*. New York: Basic Books.

- Meyers, Jeffrey (2002). *Inherited Risk: Errol Flynn and Sean Flynn in Hollywood and Vietnam*. New York: Simon & Schuster.
- Moyes, Norman B. (1966a). *Major Photographers and the Development of Still Photography in Major American Wars*. New York: MetroBooks.
- Moyes, Norman B. (1996b). *American Combat Photography from the Civil War to the Gulf War*. New York: MetroBooks.
- Nalty, Bernard C., ed. (1997) *Winged Shield, Winged Sword: A History of the United States Air Force*, 2 vols. Bolling AFB, DC: Air Force History and Museum Program.
- Niven, Penelope (1997). *Steichen: A Biography*. New York: Clarkson Potter.
- Panzer, Mary (2004) *Matthew Brady and the Image of History*. Washington: Smithsonian Press.
- Patrick, Mason M. (1918). *History of the Air Service, Service of Supply, American Expeditionary Forces*. Washington: Government Printing Office.
- Pearson, Alastair (2002). "Allied Military Model Making during World War II," *Cartography and Geographic Information Science*, 29:3 (July), 227–41.
- Pedlow, Gregory W., and Donald E. Welzenbach (1992). *The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance: The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954–1974*. Washington: Central Intelligence Agency.
- Penrose, Antony (1992). *Lee Miller's War: Photographer and Correspondent with the Allies in Europe, 1944–45*. Boston: Little, Brown.
- Photography at Fort Monmouth (2008). Online <http://www.monmouth.army.mil/historian/pubupdates/Photography.doc>, accessed April 24, 2009.
- Polmar, Norman (2001). *Spyplane: The U-2 History Declassified*. Osceola, WI: Zenith Press.
- "Predator RQ-1 / MQ-1 / MQ-9 Reaper – Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV)", USA (2008). Online <http://www.airforce-technology.com/projects/predator>. Accessed 24 April 2009.
- Prose, Francine (2002). "Lee Miller," in *The Lives of the Muses: Nine Women and the Artists They Inspired*. New York: HarperCollins, 227–68.
- Reeves, Dache McC. (1927). *Aerial Photographs: Characteristics and Military Applications*. New York: Ronald Press Co.
- Sandweiss, Martha A., Rick Stewart, and Ben W. Huseman (1989). *Eyewitness to War: Prints & Daguerreotypes of the Mexican War, 1846–1848*. Fort Worth, TX: Amon Carter Museum/Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press.
- Sontag, Susan (2003). *Regarding the Pain of Others*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
- Sontag, Susan (2007). "The Event and the Image: Fused by the Viewfinder," *New York Times* (March 25).
- Sorel, Nancy Caldwell (1999). *The Women Who Wrote the War*. New York: Arcade Publishers.
- Soule, Thayer (2000). *Shooting the Pacific War: Marine Corps Combat Photography in World War II*. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky.
- Staerck, Chris, ed. (1998). *Allied Photo Reconnaissance of World War II*. San Diego, CA: Thunder Bay Press.
- Stanley, Roy M. (1998). *To Fool a Glass Eye: Camouflage versus Photoreconnaissance in World War II*. Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press.
- Steichen, Edward (1947). *The Blue Ghost: A Photographic Log and Personal Narrative of the Aircraft Carrier USS Lexington in Combat Operations*. New York: Harcourt, Brace.
- Sweet, Timothy (1990). *Traces of War: Poetry, Photography and the Crisis of the Union*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.

- Thomey, Tedd (1996). *Immortal Images: A Personal History of Two Photographers and the Flag Raising at Iwo Jima*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Thompson, W. Fletcher, Jr. (1960). *The Image of War: The Pictorial Reporting of the American Civil War*. New York: Thomas Yoseloff.
- US Army Signal Corps (1896). *Manual of Photography*. Washington: Government Printing Office.
- Warren, Mame (2005). "Focal Point of the Fleet: U.S. Navy Photographic Activities in World War II," *Journal of Military History*, 69:4 (October), 1045–79.
- Whelan, Richard (1985). *Robert Capa: A Biography*. New York: Knopf.
- Wise, James E., and Anne Collier Rehill (1997). *Stars in Blue: Movie Actors in America's Sea Services*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Wise, James E., and Paul W. Wilderson (2000). *Stars in Khaki: Movie Actors in the Army and the Air Services*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Zeller, Bob (2005). *The Blue and Gray in Black and White: A History of Civil War Photography*. Westport, CT: Praeger.

## Chapter Fifty-four

# MUSIC IN THE MILITARY

*Edward H. McKinley*

The most current Army regulation on bands (AR 220–90, 2000) declares that the mission of military bands is to “provide music to enhance unit cohesion and morale, to musically support military operations, and to promote patriotism and enhance awareness of the Army through public performances.” Allowing for changing phraseology, the fundamental purpose of military music has never changed.

American military music has its official origin in the fife and drum corps established on July 14, 1775 by General George Washington. Three years later Lieutenant John Hiwill was appointed Inspector (or Superintendent) of Music for the whole Continental Army. The early terminology was imprecise: three or four players together were “drums and fifes,” a group as large as 10 or 15 was a “band.” The instrumentation was the same in every case. The fife provided such melody as it might, but the drum carried the work load in Washington’s Army: “By the drum it rose in the morning, assembled, paraded, saluted, marched off, ceased work and retired for the night” (Fitzpatrick 1923). On the march fifes helped keep the beat, and in battle, drum beats signaled the time and pace of an attack, and when to fall back and reform. Fifes and field drums continued to play much the same role in military life until more reliable means of communication left it with only drill and ceremonial duties.

The Continental Navy did not officially have musicians, but the drummers attached to Marine units assigned to ships beat crewmen to quarters when danger threatened (Smith 1975). The Continental Navy and Marine Corps were disbanded following victory in the Revolution.

Troops with fifes and drums were first stationed at West Point, New York, in 1778. After the Revolutionary War, a small force was kept in service there, including at least one fifer and one drummer. On this basis, today’s US Military Academy Band has the distinction of being the oldest band in continuous American service.

Gradually a distinction developed in military music. The fifes and drums came to be called the “Field Music,” and the “Band of Music” referred either to a separate group of additional instruments, or the fifers and drummers playing together with the additional players. The advantages of additional instrumentation were



clear: a band was as useful as field music for drill and order, but it could also play a larger range of music, suitable for ceremonies, morale-building, serenades, and recruitment. During the first third of the nineteenth century, military units supplemented the field music with additional instrumentation as they could. Beginning in 1821 official regulations authorized separate regimental bands, and provided financing from government funds, replacing unsteady voluntary officers' subscriptions. At first the lead instruments in such bands were woodwinds, but by the 1830s the use of valved brass instruments, first used in Prussia, had spread to the United States. On the eve of the Mexican War the conical Saxhorn (named after its Belgian designer Adolphe Sax) with piston or rotary valves became available (Kappey 1894).

These instruments were popular and quickly adopted. They were encouragingly easy to play, sturdy enough for outdoor work and could be kept reliably tuned. These instruments became standard in American military bands. Adaptable and playable, the same horns were welcomed among civilians as well, taken up in a country filled with active, neighborly people starved for entertainment and filled with a zeal for volunteerism. By the Civil War not only regular military units but every small town, fraternal organization, and volunteer militia unit had its own band as well.

The first references to musicians aboard a US Navy vessel dates from May 11, 1798, when Captain Richard Dale of USS *Ganges* ordered the Marine lieutenant to enlist "two musicians, to serve as Marines, in the Navy of the United States" among his new recruits. Navy music did not receive official endorsement, however, for several more years. The first musician was not listed as part of a ship's company until 1825, yet only a year later USS *Constellation* carried a 20-piece band of "excellent musicians," which suggests music developed aboard ship before it was formally recognized with appropriate ratings. Drums were used for drill and giving orders, while the full band was used to relieve the tedium of long sailing voyages and ceremonial duties in foreign ports.

Both the Army and Navy recruited musicians from existing personnel. No training was provided within the military. Most naval bandsmen were Europeans who enlisted in foreign ports in the hope of eventually reaching the United States. The Naval Academy band dates from 1852.

Although officially a part of the US Navy, the US Marines deserve special notice for the enduring fame of their premier service band. The Marines were created in 1798. A portion of their field music was meant from the start to serve as an embryo military band. When the nation's capital moved from Philadelphia to Washington in 1800, the Marines were already called the "Presidential Troops." The first public concert of the band was in August, 1800, its first recorded duty for the President was at John Adams' New Year's Day reception in 1801, and it first played for the Inauguration in March 1801 for Thomas Jefferson – who named the band the "President's Own" (Ressler 1998).

Lincoln's call for volunteers in April 1861 brought forth hundreds of eager volunteer regiments, many of which mustered a band. A War Department survey in January 1861 showed that 26 of the Army's 30 regular regiments had bands,

as did 213 of 465 volunteer regiments. This privilege was confirmed in an official Army order in July 1861, which also set limits to band size. These ensembles varied widely in quality from bands who could play nothing recognizable to complete ensembles of men who were trained professionals in civilian life. Regiments often brought the local town band into service. Community banding activity was less widespread in the South, but band music was popular. Lee was famously quoted that there could not be an army without music.

The number of musicians in the Civil War was extraordinary (Olsen 1981). Live music played a more prominent role in this conflict than in any other war in American history. Union and Confederate soldiers heard music often on the march or in camp, and often enough in actual combat that letters and diaries are full of such accounts. Although Union commanders were concerned that excessive resources were being used in what was supposedly only a support function, official efforts to reduce band personnel were ineffective. A less generous Army regulation in July 1862 abolished bands in volunteer regiments, replacing these with brigade bands. The order had less than the desired effect. The order did not apply to regular units, or to post bands or the Navy – and volunteer officers regularly ignored it by assigning bandmen to their old musical duties after they had re-enlisted as regular soldiers.

Music was often arduous duty during the Civil War. Bandmen were expected to play on route marches and for guard mounts (ceremonies at which medals were awarded, officers welcomed, promoted, assigned, etc.), funerals, camp meetings and regular religious services, to play for the officers at dinner, to welcome visiting dignitaries – and to serenade comrades in camp, dressing station and hospital. During combat, bandmen were stretcher-bearers and had nursing duties – unless the unit commander preferred to employ them “to support military operations” more directly, by ordering their bands to play in or very near the front lines, to cheer the men forward or rally them in retreat. Accounts of such instances are frequent enough to suggest at least that band music in combat occasioned no surprise. The field music remained the ordinary means for order and communication in combat. Many musicians showed great gallantry as players or rescuers of wounded comrades. Whole bands were taken together as prisoners by both sides. Of the 38 US Army bandmen who have been awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor, 20 were awarded in the Civil War.

After the Civil War military forces were reduced to garrison and coast defense duties. Recruitment for enlisted ranks was no longer buoyed by wartime zeal. There was competition from an expanding industrial and farming economy glowing with opportunity. Army pay was low, and musicians were expected to perform all regular military duty on top of time-consuming musical activities that came up several times daily. Few capable native-born musicians were attracted. Military musicianship in the Army came to rely as it did in the Navy upon skilled German and Italian immigrants. The Army made concessions in the 1880s: Army bands and individual musicians were allowed to accept off-duty paid engagements. Regimental commanders could recruit “suitable men for regimental bands” directly at recruiting depots (Railsback and Langellier 1987).

Whatever their musical qualifications, these bands played a large role in maintaining morale and unit cohesion in desolate and lonely Western posts. The four regiments of African American soldiers – the famous “Buffalo Soldiers” – took particular pride in their bands, which were among the finest in the regular service. The drum major of the 25th Infantry probably introduced the flamboyant gestures now expected of the person in that jaunty role. Army bands were usually the only source of musical entertainment for local communities, which helped to improve relations between Western civilian and soldier populations. Nor had band duty become a sinecure since the Civil War: bandsmen and field musicians in frontier posts faced risk often enough during the “Indian Wars” to be awarded 10 Congressional Medals of Honor. In 1880 the Marine Band acquired its most famous leader, John Philip Sousa, who raised it to its enduring position as the premier military band in the country (Bierley 2006).

Another great rush of volunteers, from both the North and the South, along with regular Army and National Guard units came together to fight the Spanish–American War in 1898. Forty-one bands served in the expanded US Army. As in the Civil War, these units served as hospital corpsmen in combat or had other military duties, but some brought their instruments with them into the lines, and played encouraging tunes from the trenches.

Navy bands were active as well – exceptionally so on occasion: the band of the USS *Oregon* even played on deck during the Battle of Santiago in July 1898 (Freidel 1958). Because every capital ship in the Navy was authorized to carry a band, the demand for players outran the supply. In 1902 the Navy began a training program to insure a regular supply of bands for sea duty. The Army established its first school of military music in 1911, to train promising Army musicians as band leaders.

American military music was bolstered by World War I, which one historian calls the last conflict in US history in which music “would hold strong sway” (Downey 1971). General John J. Pershing’s lifelong devotion to martial music was stimulated when he observed the superiority of the bands of his European allies to his own. Often acting on his own authority, Pershing substantially increased the size and raised the musicianship and military status of bands. He arranged for additional bands for duty in Europe, increased the size and instrumentation of unit bands, created a second Army school of music in France, raised the rank of band leader to that of a commissioned officer, and relieved bandsmen from all non-musical duties for the duration. Finally, he created a permanent premier Army ceremonial band – genesis of the US Army Band, still proudly called “Pershing’s Own.”

The Navy’s premier band developed in stages. In 1916 a seagoing band was combined with the small band of the Presidential yacht *Mayflower* to form the Washington Navy Yard Band. An immense increase in the need for high-quality martial music to stir enthusiasm for the war effort in 1917 brought a number of notable professional musicians into service. The Navy profited in particular from the fame of John Philip Sousa, who supervised a national recruitment drive for Navy bands which brought in 600 enlistments. His own Battalion Band toured the country to support a Liberty Loan drive. Sousa was so proud of his naval rank

of Lieutenant Commander and uniform that he used both for the rest of his active life. After the Armistice Bandmaster Charles Benter, a shipboard bandmaster in wartime, was sent to lead the Washington Navy Yard Band. His efforts at recruitment and professionalism brought success: in 1925 the Navy Yard Band was officially named the United States Navy Band. The US Coast Guard stationed a “premier” band in Washington in that year as well. After the war, Navy Bands continued their public relations work with concerts by an orchestra formed from the band stationed in Washington being broadcast over the radio beginning in 1920, and beginning in 1922 the band began performing Monday evening concerts at the Capitol Plaza.

During the same period another Navy band received significant accolades. When the United States purchased the Virgin Islands from Denmark in 1917 they were placed under the governance of the Navy. A local band so impressed the Navy governor that he arranged for its members to enlist as a unit and for the formation of two similar bands on St. Croix. In 1921 Luis Miranda, director of the military band in Puerto Rico called the St. Thomas group “the best band of the US Navy.” Three years later, Alton Augustus Adams led the all-black “Navy Band of the Virgin Islands” on a tour of the east coast of the United States during which time radio stations in New York, Boston, and Washington broadcast some of its performances. Bandsmen played an important liaison role between the Navy and blacks in the islands. When government of the Virgin Islands was transferred to civilian control in 1931, the three 22-piece bands were transferred to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, where, within a decade its black members were replaced by whites (Floyd 1977, Clague 1988, Adams 2008). During World War II the Navy trained 5,000 black bandsmen at Great Lakes Naval Training Center (Floyd 1975).

The establishment of the premier service bands was part of expanded intentional recruiting and training of qualified Army and Navy musicians in the interwar years. The need in every service became much greater in 1940, when preparedness and the first peacetime draft led to massive military expansion. By the end of World War II more than 500 bands served in the Army alone. The Navy training program was expanded to train men together as a unit, along with the bandleader who would remain with them on active duty. This was intended to place “complete bands of music” at the disposal of naval authorities, and was highly commended by officers for the high quality of the product and for its efficiency in producing unit bands for warships. US Navy Band 22, which was killed in action at once on USS *Arizona* on December 7, 1941, was one such unit (Kent 1996).

Service of military musicians was diversified in World War II. New media demands had to be accommodated, and new musical tastes (Helbig 1966, Arnold 1988) –although there was nothing new about military bands providing dance music for service personnel in addition to performing official music. Bands had done this since before the Civil War. The difference was that after the Spanish War, martial music changed much more slowly than music with popular appeal – during the Civil War there was no distinction between the types.

During World War II US Army Air Force bands were attached to bases rather than units. When the Air Force became a separate service in 1947, these base bands

were assigned to the new service. The Bolling Army Air Forces Band became the US Air Force Band – the fifth and last premier service band for the capital. (The Military and Naval Academy Bands also enjoy premier rank.) The 14th Army Band (Women's Army Corps) was reconstituted in 1948 as the only US Army band open to women before 1975.

In the last half of the twentieth century American military music was consistent in both commitment to the bedrock mission of support for morale, unit cohesion and military operations, and adaptability. Considerations of budget and the changed role of capital ships led the Navy to end the assignment of bands to capital ships, over protest from serving personnel. The combined Armed Forces School of Music was established in 1964. "Split-based" operations – playing both as a complete unit and as smaller ensembles – became standard procedure. Jazz, contemporary and rock bands were regarded as indispensable in supporting morale, especially when dispatched to service personnel in remote areas. Guitar, keyboard and percussion skills and sophisticated sound systems became essential resources for the new jazz ensembles, country music and vocal groups. In 1976 a special Bicentennial Band, made up of players from the premier service bands, made a national tour as part of the celebration.

Secondary duties were stabilized, and given adequate training and support. When conditions precluded the primary musical mission, musicians – now called "band soldiers" – were assigned to assist the military police in perimeter defense or guarding enemy prisoners, and were expected to maintain the same skill in weapons, physical training, and readiness drills as other soldiers.

By long practice, American military bands exist on three levels, whose names periodically change. *National* units are the premier service bands stationed in Washington. *Theater* units are assigned to "echelons above division" level, attached to large parent units with "high protocol visibility," such as major military commands. *Tactical* bands are divisional and post bands, whether stationed in the United States or "forward deployed." Bands at the top two levels retain the duty to "musically support military operations." Tactical bands retain the traditional role of "combat multipliers" serving with deployed forces by building morale, unit spirit and the "will-to-win" of troops. Bands at all levels are heavily employed, although even at tactical level they are protected at least officially from playing in combat, or even in bad weather.

Ten tactical bands served in the Korean War, of which seven earned unit commendations. Eight were stationed in Vietnam in 1969; eight in the Gulf War in 1991, and three in Bosnia. At least three bands are regularly assigned to duty in Iraq and Afghanistan in 2007. Band soldiers in those theaters have 20–30 musical missions per week, on top of the full requirements of regular soldiers – and all of this in an atmosphere of constant menace (TRADOC 1998).

Although general histories of military music appeared at the turn of the last century (Kappey 1894, Farmer 1912), and a three-volume history of British military bands has appeared (Turner and Turner 1994–7), only two studies have been published on American military bands. The first, by William Carter White, a former Director of the US Army Music School in Washington, DC, appeared in 1945.

The second, Fairfax Downey, *Fife, Drum & Bugle* (1971) covers only army bands, and is descriptive rather than analytical. In addition there are special histories in bands in the American Revolution (Camus 1976), the Civil War (Olsen 1981), the Frontier Wars (Railsback and Langellier, 1987), and World War II (Helbig 1966, Kent 1996). For the most part, however, articles and references are scattered among many kinds of publications (Arnold 1988). The Internet is an invaluable source for information on service bands, official publications, and military field manuals.

#### BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Adams, Alton A. (2008). *The Memoirs of Alton Augustus Adams, Sr.: First Black Bandmaster of the United States Navy*, ed. by Mark Clague. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Arnold, Benjamin (1988). "The Role of Music in the U.S.S.R., the U.S.A. and Germany during World War II," *Emory Journal of International Affairs*, 5:1 (Spring). 37–43.
- Arnold, Benjamin (1993). *Music and War: A Research and Information Guide*. New York: Garland.
- Baines, Anthony (1976). *Brass Instruments: Their History and Development*. New York: Scribner.
- Bierley, Paul Edmund (2006). *The Incredible Band of John Philip Sousa*. Urbana University of Illinois Press.
- Camus, Raoul F. (1976). *Military Music of the American Revolution*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Clague, Mark (1988). "Instruments of Identity: Alton Augustus Adams, Sr., the Navy Band of the Virgin Islands, and the Sounds of Social Change," *Black Music Research Journal*, 18:1/2 (Spring/Autumn), 21–65.
- Downey, Fairfax (1971). *Fife, Drum & Bugle*. Fort Collins, CO: Old Army Press.
- Farmer, Henry George (1912). *The Rise and Development of Military Music*. London: W. Reeves, [reprinted Freeport, NY: Books for Libraries, 1970].
- Fitzpatrick, John C. (1923). "The Bands of the Continental Army," *Daughters of the American Revolution Magazine*, 57:4 (April), 187–97.
- Floyd, Samuel A. (1975). "The Great Lakes Experience: 1941–1945," *Black Perspective in Music*, 3:2 (Spring), 17–24.
- Floyd, Samuel A. (1977). "Alton Augustus Adams: The First Black Bandmaster in the U.S. Navy," *Black Perspective in Music*, 5:2 (Autumn), 173–87.
- Freidel, Frank. (1958). *A Splendid Little War*. New York: Bramhall House.
- Helbig, Otto H. (1966). *A History of Music in the U.S. Armed Forces during World War II*. Philadelphia: M. W. Laws.
- Kaphey, J. A. (1894). *Military Music: A History of Wind-Instrumental Bands*. New York: Boosey, [reprinted (2003). Honolulu: University of the Pacific Press].
- Kent, Molly (1996). *USS Arizona's Last Band: The History of U.S. Navy Band Number 22*. Kansas City, MO: Silent Song Publishing.
- Olsen, Kenneth E. (1981). *Music and Musket: Bands and Bandsmen of the American Civil War*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
- Railsback, Thomas C., and John P. Langellier (1987). *The Drums Would Roll: A Pictorial History of U.S. Army Bands on the American Frontier, 1866–1900*. Poole, UK: Armour Press.



- Ressler, D. Michael (1998) *Historical Perspective on the President's Own U.S. Marine Band: 200th Anniversary*. Washington: Government Printing Office.
- Smith, Charles R. (1975), *Marines in the Revolution: A History of the Continental Marines in the American Revolution, 1775–1783*. Washington: Headquarters, US Marine Corps.
- Turner, Gordon, and Alwyn W. Turner (1994–7). *The History of British Military Bands*, 3 vols. Stapleton, UK: Spellmount.
- US Army Field Manual 12–50 (1999). *U.S. Army Bands* (15 October).
- US Army Regulations 220–90 (2000). *Army Bands* (November 27).
- US Army Training and Doctrine Command [TRADOC] (1998). *Military Operations: Operational Concepts for Army Bands. FM 525–13*. Fort Monroe, VA, January 2.
- White, William Carter (1945). *A History of Military Music in America*. New York: Exposition Press, [reprinted Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1975].

## Part VI

# THE MILITARY, AMERICAN SOCIETY, AND CULTURE

## Chapter Fifty-five

# THE AMERICAN WAY OF WAR

*Antulio J. Echevarria II*

Although the late Russell Weigley's classic, *The American Way of War*, was published more than 30 years ago, it remains the point of departure for any serious discussion of the American approach to armed conflict. Weigley examined how war was thought about and practiced by key US military and political figures from George Washington to Robert McNamara and concluded that, except in the early days of the nation's existence, the American way of war was characterized primarily by the desire to achieve military victory, either through a strategy of attrition or one of annihilation (Weigley 1973: 475). Typically, the destruction of an opponent's armed might and the occupation of his capital marked the end of war and the beginning of postwar negotiations. Weigley's book provides the reader enough evidence to conclude, though he himself did not, that the American concept of war rarely extended beyond the winning of battles and campaigns to the gritty work of turning military victory into strategic success.

Since the publication of *The American Way of War*, work on the subject has raised a number of important questions, the most salient of which will be touched upon in this chapter. The first of these questions is whether Weigley's analysis, which concentrated on America's major wars, truly captured the nature of the American way of war. Other historians, such as Max Boot (2002b), have argued that the United States actually fought many more small wars than big ones; consequently, analyzing little wars might provide a better basis for understanding the American way of war. Brian Linn (2007) presents an alternative model in which he argues that American military leaders have been guided by a tripartite conception of their role as being that of "guardians" (who follow defensive doctrines), "heroic leaders" (who win battles through courage and inspiring their subordinates), and "managers" (who win battles by applying principles learned from the study of their profession and military history). A second question is whether the so-called American way of war is in any significant way uniquely American. Perhaps, it is just a reflection of a larger Western approach to war that has been modified by Americans to accommodate the United States' unique geographic and economic circumstances? The third question is whether a "new" American way of war

has emerged as part of the information revolution that seemed to gain momentum in the last decade or so of the twentieth century. If so, in what ways did this “new” way of war differ from the “old” one? Finally, the question was raised recently as to whether the American way of war was really about war at all; perhaps, as this author believes, it is – and has been – more a way of battle than a way of war?

The phrase “way of war” requires at least a working definition. Most authors use the phrase to refer to persistent patterns in how Americans have thought about and practiced war. More precisely, one might say it is the sum of the prevailing ideas and expectations that military and political leaders have had about war, and their respective roles in it. These ideas and expectations, in turn, contribute to the assumptions that inform political and military decision makers in strategic planning, budgeting, and the development of operational concepts and doctrine. So, the issue of the American way of war has interest to both academics and policymakers.

### Problems with the Point of Departure

Scholarly reviews of Weigley’s *American Way of War* were by and large favorable, proclaiming it a seminal, possibly even a definitive work (Snell 1973; Coffman 1974). Still, a penetrating critique by historian Brian Linn (2002) pointed out a few shortcomings in Weigley’s argument – specifically, its errors with military terminology and its tendency to oversimplify the complexities of American military thinking. Linn criticized Weigley for misusing the terms annihilation and attrition, for not discussing the American tradition of deterrence, for overstating the influence of annihilationist thought in US military thinking since the Civil War, and for omitting the “propensity for improvisation and practicality” seemingly evident in the American practice of war. A recent work by Linn (2007) has dissected the major intellectual traditions influencing the American way of war even further, at least as regards the US Army’s view of it. Linn argues with some persuasion that three distinct, though not mutually exclusive, intellectual traditions – Guardian, Hero, and Manager – have shaped how the US Army has viewed, and continues to view, war. The traditions are essentially just as their names suggest, and thus do not require definition. However, whether they, or similar traditions, could also be found within the US Navy or the US Air Force, and thus our understanding of the extent to which the Army’s view might differ from those of the other services, will have to await further research.

In truth, as Linn pointed out in 2002, Weigley did confuse the terms annihilation and attrition, describing the former as seeking the complete “overthrow of the enemy’s military power” and the latter as pursuing lesser objectives by means of an “indirect approach.” Military terminology frequently changes, and not always for the best. The military art course books in use at the US Military Academy in the 1970s and 1980s define a strategy of annihilation as seeking the “complete destruction of the enemy army,” while a strategy of attrition connotes that the enemy force is “slowly being destroyed,” and a strategy of exhaustion aims not at the enemy’s force, but “gradually to destroy his will and capacity to resist” (US

Military Academy 1979: 8). In contrast, a more recent edition inserts the term “combat power” into the definitions and does not even approach the strategies at the same level: it defines a strategy of annihilation as the “complete and immediate destruction of the enemy’s combat power,” while a strategy of attrition is the “gradual erosion of the combat power of the enemy’s army,” and a strategy of exhaustion seeks the “gradual erosion of the enemy nation’s will or means to resist” (US Military Academy 2001: 8).

Hence, Weigley’s error might go unmentioned except that it obscured his argument to a certain extent, as some of his readers took him to mean that the American approach to warfare was characterized by the use of overwhelming “mass and concentration” in a slow, grinding strategy of attrition as General Ulysses S. Grant did in the Civil War (Owens 2003a). However, this was but one phase of the American way of war Weigley attempted to describe. In point of fact, the primary difference between a strategy of annihilation and one of attrition lies not in the aims that are sought, but the methods of achieving them. Typically, the former attempts to achieve victory rapidly, ideally in one or two major battles; the latter is associated with a more gradual, but not necessarily less destructive, approach. One can use either a strategy of annihilation or of attrition to accomplish the complete overthrow of an opponent, *or* any lesser objectives. One could well argue, for instance, that the Allies in World War II followed an overall strategy of attrition (epitomized by the strategic bombing campaigns) – aimed at the complete overthrow of the Axis powers – even though that strategy included a number of major battles, or battles of annihilation, such as Midway, Stalingrad, El Alamein, and the breakout from Normandy.

It is equally true that Weigley overlooked the considerable amount and variety of American thinking concerning the importance of deterring an invasion of the continent, which played a key role in the development of US coastal artillery and provided a rationale for the long-range bomber, and which both reflected and reinforced US attitudes toward isolationism into the early twentieth century. For his part, Weigley essentially conceded these points in his “Response to Brian McAllister Linn” (2002). Yet, these criticisms, while significant, do not substantively undermine Weigley’s thesis that Americans saw the primary object of war as the destruction of an opponent’s armed might rather than as the furtherance of political objectives through violent means.

Since the 1980s, historians have given more attention to the period Weigley did not address, the era before the Revolutionary War. In the process, they discovered some interesting things about “Early American Ways of War” (Lee 2001). For one, it is clear that Native American ways of fighting influenced the American way of war, though just how much is uncertain. The early colonists apparently did not adopt Indian fighting methods as readily as once believed; however, they did change their ways of fighting over time, and for different enemies, which was also the case before the settlers left Europe. Second, Native American fighting was not always just a ritualized affair with few casualties, but was at times quite bloody and extirpative. Third, early Americans apparently had few qualms about fighting an “unlimited and irregular” form of warfare that involved attacking and killing

noncombatants, and laying waste villages and crops (Grenier 2005). In many respects, this practice seems to have been a carry-over from Europe's Thirty Years War and other such devastating conflicts of the seventeenth century. The upshot of all this is that there may well have been several American "ways" of war in evidence at any one time and Weigley's analysis, while skillful, may be more limited in scope than scholars initially realized.

### An "American" or "Western" Way of War?

If these shortcomings and oversights were not enough, Linn's critique also went one step farther, questioning whether there was a uniquely American way of war at all. Linn suggested that if indeed there is an American way of war, it lies in a utilitarian blend of operational considerations, national strategy, and military theory as it is understood historically. As a matter of fact, much of what Weigley said about the American approach to warfare could apply just as well to the German, French, or British methods of warfare. The German way of war as thought about and practiced by the elder Helmuth von Moltke, Chief of the Prusso-German General Staff from 1857 to 1888, for example, had much in common with the American approach described by Weigley. In brief, Moltke (Hughes 1993) equated grand strategy with policy – which he considered the discrete province of statesmen – and insisted that while policy had the right to establish the goals of a conflict, even changing them when it saw fit, it had no right to interfere with the conduct of military operations. In Clausewitzian terms, then, Moltke acknowledged the initial importance of the logic of war, but insisted that its grammar took precedence during the actual fighting. This kind of reasoning is also abundantly evident in French and British military writings published during Moltke's time, and even into the late twentieth century.

So, while one might expect to see more differences than similarities when comparing the American style of waging war to those of its European counterparts, we find the opposite is true. American, British, French, and German military writers all studied the campaigns of Napoleon, and later of Moltke, drawing many of the same lessons from those studies. They saw battles and campaigns in a similar light, believing, for instance, that winning wars meant winning battles, and that doing so would accomplish most, if not all, of one's wartime objectives. They also faced many of the same fiscal, personnel, and organizational challenges, nurtured similar traditions regarding the warrior spirit, and kept comparably abreast of new developments in military technology, tactics, and operational concepts. While Western military establishments occasionally adopted different strategies, tactics, or operational models, particularly in the period of reorganization before World War II, they did so mainly in response to the specific challenges of their geo-strategic and socio-political situations (Posen 1984). In terms of the fundamental aim of war, however, they were largely of one mind.

Such common denominators would seem to support the case for the existence of a larger Western way of war. Noted authors, such as Victor Davis Hanson, have,



in fact, made such an argument. In *Carnage and Cultures* (2001), Hanson argued that some of the underlying values of Western culture, namely, its traditions of rationalism, individualism, and civic duty, led not only to a decided technological dominance, as eminent historians such as Geoffrey Parker have concluded, but also to significant, even decisive, advantages in military “organization, discipline, morale, initiative, flexibility, and command” (Parker 1996). These advantages, it would seem, have made Western armies and navies more successful in combat than their counterparts in other cultures.

To his credit, Hanson did not insist that Western values have survived unadulterated over the years or that military cultures perfectly mirror the cultures of their parent civil societies. Rather, he maintained only that in each of the clash of cultures he examined – such as Cortés’s conquistadors versus Cuauhtémoc’s Aztecs in the battles that took place for the city of Tenochtitlán (1520–1) – those values were more evident in the Western force than in any of its adversaries. Argument by case-study is, of course, a selective approach. One should not forget also that Western military cultures often campaigned vigorously against the spread of individualism and other attitudes which were thought to undermine a soldier’s corporate identity and his will to fight (Echevarria 1995). Still, one could make the case that US and European military institutions were influenced more by such ideas than were others.

Hanson also attempted to demonstrate the predominance of the concept of annihilation, which he defined broadly as a “head-to-head battle that destroys the enemy,” in each of the clashes of arms he examined and, by extension, in Western military thinking writ large. Like Weigley, he also underscored the view that Westerners saw war principally as a means of “doing what politics cannot” (Hanson 2001: 22). Hanson thus agreed with Weigley’s observation that, in most of Western strategic thought, politics brought war into being, but war existed as a violent alternative to politics, rather than as its logical extension. Hence, the American style of warfare certainly would appear to share a number of qualities with what one might call a larger Western way of war.

For the renowned scholar of strategic thinking, Colin Gray, none of this was enough to undermine the idea that there was, in fact, a unique and discernable American way of war. In the essay, “The American Way of War: Critique and Implications” (Gray 2005), he argued that an American way of war does exist, and that it has 12 distinctive characteristics. First, it is apolitical: it pays little heed to how military operations will affect the peace that follows. Second, it is astrategic: it rarely concerns itself with strategy. Third, it is ahistorical, learning little from history. Fourth, it is underpinned by faith in the idea that all conditions or crises are problems to be solved, and that all such problems *can* be solved. Fifth, it is culturally ignorant: it lacks genuine knowledge of other cultures and is insufficiently self-critical. Sixth, it is technologically dependent, seeking technology-based solutions. Seventh, it relies more on firepower than maneuver or other techniques. Eighth, it believes in fighting wars in a “big way.” Ninth, it is too focused on regular as opposed to irregular warfare. Tenth, it is impatient, wanting results in record time. Eleventh, it is “logistically excellent,” in that American

troops have generally been well supplied wherever they have gone. Last, it is sensitive to casualties, perhaps too much so.

Gray's exhaustive listing of the principal characteristics of the American way of war does, however, leave open the question as to how many of them might also be found in European styles of warfare, and to what degree. Certainly, one can make a case for all of them, with perhaps the last two being the most difficult to prove, but clearly not impossible. To use the fifth characteristic as an illustration, one should not forget just how profound and pervasive the effects were of the technological revolution that gripped Western society during the quarter-century or so before the Great War. The British, in fact, are credited with having invented the tank, and of course all the major powers searched frenetically for technological (and other) solutions to the deadlock of trench warfare. Plus, strategic bombing theory, which is undeniably technology based, had its roots in Europe, as did modern mechanized warfare. What's more, one should not forget that throughout the twentieth century much of Western popular literature portrayed scientists and inventors as heroes and villains, along with their inventions which had the potential either to help or harm humanity. All of this evidence suggests the cultural affinity for technology is hardly limited to the United States.

### Big or Small Wars?

While the search for what is uniquely American about the American way of war continues, another historian has questioned whether the analytical basis for Weigley's book was broad enough. Max Boot's *Savage Wars of Peace* (2002b) contends that, historically, Americans have practiced more than one way of war. The involvement of the United States in "small wars" (such as the Boxer Rebellion, the Philippine Insurrection, and contemporary interventions in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Somalia) actually outnumbers its participation in major conflicts and is, therefore, deserving of inclusion in any description of the American style of warfare. Between 1800 and 1934, for instance, US Marines made 180 landings on foreign shores, more than one per year. During roughly the same period, the US Army deployed numerous small contingents in actions virtually all over the globe. Likewise, the US Navy, though small, was involved in many actions at sea over the same time span that, both directly and indirectly, assisted Britain's Royal Navy in keeping the oceans open for commerce.

Boot also maintains that the US military became involved in such small-scale actions not to protect or advance vital interests, but for lesser reasons which included inflicting punishment, ensuring protection, achieving pacification, and benefiting from profit-making. For example, the armed expedition launched in 1916 by President Woodrow Wilson to capture Mexican revolutionary Pancho Villa was clearly punitive in nature. The US Navy's involvement in the Barbary Wars (1801–5, and 1815) provides an illustration of wars fought for protection, in this case to ensure the protection of American merchantmen sailing along the coast of North Africa. US interventions in Haiti (1915–34) and the Dominican

Republic (1916–24) represent attempts at pacification, or modern-day nation building, but they also furthered America's policy of dollar diplomacy, the early twentieth-century policy of making loans to countries whose resulting indebtedness could then be used to promote US interests. Finally, American participation in the multinational expedition to Peking during the Boxer Uprising (1900) was as much about liberating captive emissaries as it was about protecting America's small, but growing, economic interests in China from European colonial ambitions.

Furthermore, Boot maintains with some justification that these small-scale conflicts, which he refers to as “imperial wars,” contributed significantly to the rise of the United States as a world power, even though they did not directly involve vital interests. Hence, he not only calls for the recognition of a hitherto uncelebrated small-war tradition in US military history, he insists that the American military embrace this tradition in an effort to prepare for the wars of the present, and of the future. In so doing, Boot opens himself up to the criticism (Schwartz 2002) that he produced a “potted history” designed merely to advance his own political views. In sum, Boot's *Savage Wars of Peace* rounds out the picture of the American way of war; thus, his view augments rather than supplants Weigley's.

When we place these interpretations side-by-side, we see that Weigley's big-war analysis helps explain the intellectual background that ultimately gave rise to the contemporary American preference for seeking decisive victory through the application of overwhelming force. Ten years ago, one perceptive analyst (Hoffman 1996) noted that the bias toward big wars would leave America one-handed in the newly emerging security environment, a view that Weigley (1999) also supported.

Conversely, Boot pointed out that America's involvement in the smaller “savage wars of peace” rarely concerned vital interests, clear political goals, popular support, or overwhelming force, and routinely required committing US troops abroad for extended periods of time. Unfortunately, the track record of such interventions – despite Boot's attempt to prove otherwise – is not encouraging. The United States had to occupy the Philippines, Haiti, Nicaragua, and the Dominican Republic many times, and for many years at a time, in order to impose any kind of lasting stability. Sometimes, even after long occupations as in Haiti (1915–34) and the Dominican Republic (1916–24), stability quickly collapsed after US forces departed. Thus, while the US military's preference for fighting major wars may have compromised its ability to succeed in small ones, it is also clear that the nation-building tasks it was typically asked to perform tended to prove too complex for the military tool alone.

### A “New” American Way of War?

While Boot's work clearly challenges, even as it complements, that of Weigley, his writings go farther than uncovering an unsung aspect of the American way of war. In the summer of 2003, some months after President Bush had declared the end of major combat operations in Iraq, he announced the arrival of “The New

American Way of War,” and expounded upon its virtues. This new way of war was based on “precision firepower, special forces, psychological operations, and jointness,” capabilities which were to enhance the “speed, maneuver, flexibility, and surprise” of US forces and free them of their traditional dependence on overwhelming force, mass, and concentration (Boot 2003). Accordingly, the United States would now be able to wage the “savage wars of peace” more effectively and more efficiently (Boot 2002b).

This new American way of war had actually been in the works for some time before Boot’s announcement of it in 2003. By January 2003, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) had already officially embraced it as the basis for transforming the US military into a force capable of meeting the challenges of the twenty-first century (Cebrowski and Barnett 2003). It was then heralded by Vice President Cheney, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Richard Myers, and the Defense Department’s Chief of Transformation Adm. (Ret.) Arthur Cebrowski in the spring of 2003 (Cheney 2003, Myers 2003a, b, Scott 2003, Cebrowski 2003, Anon (2003). It was even briefed to Congress by Secretary Rumsfeld and General Franks in the summer of 2003 (Rumsfeld and Franks 2003). The model appeared to rely heavily on American primacy in airpower and promised quick results with minimal cost in friendly casualties and collateral damage. Still, it was not entirely clear how the new set of capabilities was supposed to expand the nation’s strategic options, despite an abundance of lofty claims (Owens and Offley 2001).

As early as 1994, noted defense analyst Eliot Cohen pointed out that the potency of contemporary US air power gave the American way of war a certain “mystique” that US diplomacy would do well to cultivate; he warned, though, that air power was hardly the answer to every strategic problem (Cohen 1994). His warning did little to curb the enthusiasm of air-power zealots, however. Air-power historian Richard Hallion (1992) claimed that the results of Desert Storm proved that US air power had literally – and almost single-handedly – revolutionized warfare. Some briefings circulating in the Pentagon at the time even asserted that air power was both America’s asymmetric advantage and the future of warfare. Thus, for a time, the new American way of war seemed to involve only one service.

A decade after Desert Storm, Cohen summed up the salient impressions circulating among defense intellectuals about the so-called new American way of war (Cohen 2001). With views similar to those of Weigley and Boot, Cohen saw the traditional US approach to war as characterized by a certain aggressiveness or desire to take the fight to the enemy, by the quest for a decisive battle, by an explicit dislike of diplomatic interference, and by a low tolerance for anything but clear political objectives. In contrast, the new style of warfare reflected a decided aversion to casualties, typified by a greater preference for precision bombing and greater standoff, and seemed willing to step away from the restrictive Powell doctrine and to participate more in coalitions, even those created only to address humanitarian concerns. The reduced risk of US casualties, in turn, made such wars for less-than-vital interests more palatable.

In the following year, historian Jeffery Record warned that this new way of war may well prove irresistible to American political leaders, who might see it as a quick

and relatively risk-free solution to any number of strategic problems (Record 2002). He cautioned that the success of this approach, as Kosovo and Afghanistan had shown, had depended greatly upon the availability of local ground forces willing and able to fight as a complement to US airpower. By implication, if such forces were not at hand, the United States would find its strategic options very limited indeed.

At about the same time, defense analyst Stephen Biddle argued that the so-called new style of war was already passé, being applied in a world where its strategic premises were “no longer valid” (Biddle 2002). In light of the thousands of lives lost on September 11, 2001, Americans seemed willing to return to an aggressive style of warfare and to bear whatever costs were necessary, even in terms of significant US casualties. Plus, the US military’s campaigns in Afghanistan proved that a capable ground force, even if built more around precision than mass, remained indispensable for achieving favorable combat outcomes. Others wondered not whether Americans had the mettle to “abide body bags,” which surely they have already demonstrated, but rather why “hesitancy at the decisive moment” appears more frequently in the history of the American way of war than does “decisiveness.” (Bartley 2002). Other authors have since taken a more extreme view, arguing that the American way of war must set aside political correctness and get back to the business of killing, and the swifter it executes this business the better (Peters 2005).

### Way of “War” or Way of “Battle”?

The unexpectedly swift success of military operations in Afghanistan, combined with striking achievements in the initial phases of the campaign in Iraq, seemed to validate the notion that a “new” American way of war had arrived. During the blitz to Baghdad, even accomplished authors who should have known better gave in to an almost palpable hubris. During this time, Victor Davis Hanson hastily sketched out 10 observations regarding the American way of war. The most significant of these was his assertion that there was “no typical ‘American Way of War’ anymore, in the textbook sense of traditional armored drives supported by overwhelming firepower” (Hanson 2003: 10). Instead of the “typical” approach, Hanson continued:

George Patton would smile on our current ride northward, as would Ulysses S. Grant admire the hammer and tongs that batter Baghdad. The Swamp Fox would praise the special forces in Kurdistan, but then so would Hap Arnold like the bombing campaign, Adm. King the naval blockades, and Adm. Nimitz our marvelous carriers.

It is doubtful that “traditional armored drives supported by overwhelming firepower” ever described the American way of war. However, Hanson’s point was really that America’s new way of fighting had become, in his eyes at least, truly remarkable. Unfortunately, the campaign in Iraq was all too typical in perhaps the most important respect: it was about battle, or fighting, taking down one’s

opponent, rather than establishing the necessary conditions for achieving one's political objectives.

As subsequent stages of the campaign in Iraq unfolded, it became clear that pronouncements concerning a new way of war were decidedly premature. In fact, Max Boot, one of the original heralds of this new way of war, retracted his claim (Boot 2005). By the autumn of 2003, Major General (Ret.) Edward Atkeson advised that it was high time to include security operations in the long-touted new American way of war; after all, a war is not over until "it is *over*" (Atkeson 2003). His call was not alone, nor did it fall on deaf ears. The Defense Department's transformation office commissioned a study to look into the possibility of creating a force dedicated to security and stabilization operations, though the practicality of its recommendations soon came under fire (Binnendijk and Johnson 2003).

As the author of the present chapter pointed out in the spring of 2004, the so-called new American way of war turned out *not* to be a way of war at all, but a way of battle (Echevarria 2004). A way of war implies a war-focus, a holistic view of conflict, one that considers how political, social, economic, and military activities may contribute to, or detract from, the accomplishment of preferred ends. Under this view, the purpose of conflict is to achieve a policy aim beyond the implied task of defeating an opponent. In other words, a war-focus considers the defeat of the enemy as merely a means to an end; the way in which, and the extent to which, an adversary is to be overcome must facilitate achieving the desired political ends.

A battle-focus, by comparison, concentrates primarily on defeating an opponent militarily. It employs tactics and stratagems that will destroy an opponent's physical and psychological capabilities to resist in the most efficient way. With the military defeat of an adversary, the task of "war" is done. The attainment of larger policy objectives, while clearly important, does not fall within the scope of "war," even though their realization might require the continued use of military force. Put simply, the difference between a war-focus and a battle-focus is whether one approaches conflict, and thus so arranges one's doctrine and organizations, with an eye to achieving policy success or military victory.

To be sure, a battle-focus is important. Defeating an opponent in combat is far from easy. In actuality, a holistic view of war must include a commensurate eye for defeating an opponent; otherwise it would not be holistic in the first place, and not likely to enjoy much success in the long run. A battle-focus is, therefore, not incorrect. It just does not go far enough, especially if the previous 10 to 15 years are any indication of things to come; the recent past suggests that contemporary conflicts, particularly those falling under the category of the war on terror, may require political, economic, and social reconstruction, in a word, nation-building.

Readers will find a way of battle reflected in the traditional principles of war and in most of the doctrine of the US military (Echevarria 2005). Some authors blame the US Army for this particular focus, and for shaping American strategic culture toward conventional warfare, rather than in directions purportedly more in tune with the times (Lock-Pullen 2006). However, this view is untenable. The US Army had little if any influence over the US Navy or US Air Force, and it was



largely air-power concepts, in any case, which shaped the “new” American way of war (Hammond 2005). Rather, America’s current battle-focus extends across the services, and indeed one would find it in evidence in most Western militaries.

Within the United States, moreover, the tradition of preserving civilian authority over the military has at least partly perpetuated this battle-focus by separating diplomacy and the conduct of war into different spheres. In short, policy-makers focused on the diplomatic struggles preceding and issuing from the fighting, while commanders concentrated on winning battles and campaigns. Moving from a battle- to a war-focus would require at least two things to happen. First, civilian expertise (not just authority) must extend into the operational sphere, and communication between policy-makers and military commanders must remain open and continuous. Policy-makers must increase their knowledge of, and comfort with, the vast array of military operations. Second, military commanders must study more deliberately the kinds of political objectives the art of war has had to accomplish over the years, and then build military science around those objectives. The goal would be to establish a habit of thought that readily links political objectives to military ones.

If or when these things happen, a new category in the study of the American way of war might just emerge, one exploring the extent to which the American method of waging war overlaps with and complements, or not, the American way of strategy (Lind 2006). Until then, readers will have to wait and see whether the American way of battle can actually mature into a genuine way of war.

#### BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Anon (2003). “Champion of ‘A New American Way of War,’” *Sea Power*, 46:6 (June), 15–16.
- Atkeson, Edward B. (2003). “Adapting to the New American Way of War: Postmaneuver Security Operations,” *Army*, 53:9 (September), 8–11.
- Bartley, Robert L. (2002) “Thinking Things Over: On the American Way of War,” *Wall Street Journal*, July 15, A13.
- Biddle, Stephen (2002). “The New Way of War?” *Foreign Affairs*, 81:3 (May–June), 138–44.
- Binnendijk, Hans, and Stuart Johnson, eds. (2003). *Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations*. Washington: National Defense University.
- Boot, Max (2002a). “Everything You Think You Know About the American Way of War Is Wrong,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, *E-notes*, September 12.
- Boot, Max (2002b). *Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power*. New York: Basic Books.
- Boot, Max (2003). “The New American Way of War,” *Foreign Affairs*, 82:4 (July–August), 41–58.
- Boot, Max (2005). “The Struggle to Transform the Military,” *Foreign Affairs*, 84:2 (March–April), 103–18.
- Cebrowski, Arthur (2003). Speech to the Heritage Foundation, delivered May 13, reprinted in *Transformation Trends*, May 27.
- Cebrowski, Arthur K., and Thomas P. M. Barnett (2003). “The American Way of War,” *Transformation Trends*, January 13.

- Cheney, Dick (2003). "A New American Way of War," Speech to the Heritage Foundation, May 1. <http://www.acronym.org.uk/docs/0305/doc02.htm>, accessed April 24, 2009.
- Cohen, Eliot A. (1994). "The Mystique of U.S. Air Power," *Foreign Affairs*, 73:1 (January–February), 109–24.
- Cohen, Eliot A. (2001). "Kosovo and the New American Way of War," in Andrew J. Bacevich and Eliot A. Cohen, eds. *War Over Kosovo: Politics and Strategy in a Global Age*. New York: Columbia University Press, 38–62.
- Coffman, E. M. (1974). "A Review of *The American Way of War*," *Journal of American History*, 60:4 (March), 1090–1.
- Echevarria II, Antulio J. (1995). "On the Brink of the Abyss: The Warrior Identity before the Great War," *War & Society*, 13:2 (October), 23–40.
- Echevarria II, Antulio J. (2004). *Toward an American Way of War*. Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute.
- Echevarria II, Antulio J. (2005). "Principles of War or Principles of Battle?" in Anthony D. McIvor, ed., *Rethinking the Principles of War*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 58–78.
- Gray, Colin S. (2005). "The American Way of War: Critique and Implications," in Anthony D. McIvor, ed., *Rethinking the Principles of War*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 13–40.
- Grenier, John (2005). *The First Way of War: American War Making on the Frontier, 1607–1814*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Hallion, Richard P. (1992). *Storm Over Iraq: Air Power and the Gulf War*. Washington: Smithsonian Press.
- Hallion, Richard P. (1997–8). "Airpower and the Changing Nature of Warfare," *Joint Forces Quarterly*, 7 (Autumn–Winter): 39–46.
- Hammond, Grant T. (2005). "The U.S. Air Force and the American Way of War," in Anthony D. McIvor, ed. *Rethinking the Principles of War*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 109–26.
- Hanson, Victor Davis (2001). *Carnage and Cultures: Landmark Battles in the Rise of Western Power*. New York: Doubleday. This work expands his earlier (1989) study, *The Western Way of War: The Infantry Battle in Classical Greece*. New York: Knopf.
- Hanson, Victor Davis (2003). "The American Way of War," *National Review*, 55:7 (April 21), 10.
- Hoffman, F. G. (1996). *Decisive Force: The New American Way of War*. Westport, CT: Praeger.
- Hughes, Daniel (1993). *Moltke on the Art of War: Selected Writings*. Novato, CA: Presidio, provides a useful condensation in English of Helmuth von Moltke, "Über Strategie (1871)," whose discussion of the connection between strategy and policy can be found in Großer Generalstab (ed.) (1892–1912). *Moltkes Militärisches Werke*, 14 vols. Berlin: E. S. Mittler, 4:2, pp. 287–93.
- Lee, Wayne E. (2001). "Early American Ways of War: A New Reconnaissance, 1600–1815," *Historical Journal*, 44:1 (March), 269–89.
- Lind, Michael (2006). *The American Way of Strategy: U.S. Foreign Policy and the American Way of Life*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Linn, Brian McAllister (2002). "The American Way of War Revisited," *Journal of Military History*, 66:2 (April), 501–30.
- Linn, Brian McAllister (2007). *The Echo of Battle: The Army's Way of War*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

- Lock-Pullen, Richard (2006). "The U.S. Way of War and the 'War on Terror,'" *Politics & Policy*, 34:2 (June) 374–99.
- McIvor, Anthony D., ed. (2005). *Rethinking the Principles of War*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Myers, Richard B. (2003a). "The New American Way of War," *Military Technology*, 27:6 (June), 64–74.
- Myers, Richard B. (2003b) "The New American Way of War: Keeping the Legacy Alive," Speech delivered at the Navy League Air Space Exposition, Washington, April 16.
- Owens, Christopher S. (2003). "Unlikely Partners: Preemption and the American Way of War," in *Essays 2003*. Washington: National Defense University, 1–16.
- Owens, Mackubin T. (2003a). "The American Way of War," (Editorial) *Jerusalem Post*, December.
- Owens, William A., and Edward Offley. (2001). *Lifting the Fog of War*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Parker, Geoffrey (1996). *Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500–1800*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Peters, Ralph (2005). "Speed the Kill: Updating the American Way of War," in Anthony D. McIvor, ed., *Rethinking the Principles of War*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 95–108.
- Posen, Barry (1984). *The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Germany, and Britain between the World Wars*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Record, Jeffery (2002). "Collapsed Countries, Casualty Dread, and the New American Way of War," *Parameters*, 32:2 (Summer), 4–23.
- Rumsfeld, Donald H., and Tommy R. Franks (2003). "Summary of Lessons Learned, Prepared Testimony presented to the Senate Armed Services Committee, July 9," [http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/congress/rumsfeld\\_09july03.pdf](http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/congress/rumsfeld_09july03.pdf), accessed April 24, 2009.
- Schwartz, Benjamin (2002). "The Post-Powell Doctrine: Two conservative analysts argue that the American military has become too cautious about waging war," *New York Times Book Review*, July 21, 11–12.
- Scott, William B. (2003). "New Way of War: Strategies Based on 'Annihilation and Attrition' are Relegated to History," *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, 158:19 (May 12), 38–9.
- Snell, J. C. (1973). "A Review of *The American Way of War*," *Annals of the American Academy*, 410 (November), 224.
- US Military Academy (1979). *Definitions and Doctrine of the Military Art*. West Point, NY: US Military Academy.
- US Military Academy (2001). *History of the Military Art Course Book*. West Point, NY: US Military Academy.
- Weigley, Russell F. (1973). *The American Way of War: A History of U.S. Military Strategy and Policy*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Weigley, Russell F. (1999). "'A New Way of War?' Review of F. G. Hoffman, *Decisive Force: The New American Way of War*," *Naval War College Review*, 52:1 (Winter), 130.
- Weigley, Russell F. (2002). "Response to Brian McAllister Linn," *Journal of Military History*, 66:2 (April), 531–3.

# Chapter Fifty-six

## CIVIL–MILITARY RELATIONS

*Charles A. Stevenson*

The study of US civil–military relations must begin with the revolutionary war. The patriots were in revolt in part because, as the Declaration of Independence proclaimed, King George III “has affected to render the Military independent of and superior to the Civil Power.” Many leaders of the new nation were profoundly distrustful of armies, even armies of their own neighbors. Samuel Adams said, “A Standing Army, however necessary it may be at some times, is always dangerous to the Liberties of the People.” Tensions between General George Washington and the Continental Congress were reflected in George Washington’s complaint that the Congress “think it but to say Presto begone, and everything is done,” and in John Adams’ admonition to Horatio Gates, “We don’t choose to trust you Generals, with too much Power, for too Long Time.” One of the first ironies of American history is that, as Walter Millis (1956) notes, “The United States was born in an act of violence,” yet embraced an anti-military tradition. Marcus Cunliffe, *Soldiers and Civilians: The Martial Spirit in America, 1775–1865* (1968), argues that despite early Americans’ mistrust of a professional military, their society, both in the North and South, was infused with a martial spirit. Don Higginbotham (1971) and Charles Royster (1979) explore relations between the Continental Army, the Continental Congress, and American civilians in the era 1763 to 1783.

The Framers of the Constitution sought to balance the conflicting demands for a central government strong enough to protect the new nation from foreign attack and domestic insurrection – but not so strong as to threaten basic liberties. Many of the delegates to the convention in Philadelphia in 1787 expressed their concerns about the dangers of standing armies – and some of the most notable patriots refused to support the Constitution largely on those grounds. Indeed, several of the state conventions that ratified the document nevertheless insisted that amendments be adopted to reduce the military threat. To understand the role of civil–military issues in the debate on the Constitution, one should compare Alexander Hamilton’s defense in *The Federalist Papers* numbers 24 to 29 (Hamilton, Madison, and Jay 2003) with the *Anti-Federalist Papers*, especially the papers numbered 23 to 25 (Borden 1965).

Richard Kohn has written the definitive history of this period, particularly in *Eagle and Sword* (1975), but also in his chapter on “American Generals of the Revolution: Subordination and Restraint” (1978) and in his chapter on the Constitution (1991). Kohn led the way in describing the origins of the American tradition of military self-restraint and deference toward civilian authority and in explaining the significance of national security concerns in shaping the Constitution. More than other historians who study the last quarter of the eighteenth century, he stressed that although these issues were rarely primary in public attention, “the debates over the military nonetheless lay at the very heart of American political life during this era.”

Readers interested in seeing the cut and thrust of these debates in original sources now have numerous on-line sites that contain documents from this period. Most comprehensive is the Library of Congress’ American Memory collection with US Congressional Documents and Debates for *A Century of Law-making for a New Nation* (<http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/amlaw/lawhome.html>). In this single place are the texts, pdf copies of the book pages, and indices for the Journals of the Continental Congress and the records of the Constitutional Convention, as well as most congressional materials from 1789 through the Civil War. For Executive Branch materials, there are all the “American State Papers” from 1789 through 1838. Another site with a wide-ranging selection of documents in law, history, and diplomacy is the Avalon Project at Yale (<http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/>), which covers the whole span of American history.

Through much of the nineteenth century American civilians and military personnel lived in virtually separate spheres. William Skelton, *An American Profession of Arms: The Army Officer Corps, 1784–1861* (1992), argues that by 1860 a distinctly military subculture had evolved among officers who spent most of their lives serving in semi-isolated garrison communities along the frontier and in coastal fortifications. Edward M. Coffman, *The Old Army* (1986) and *The Regulars* (2004), shows that the sense of separation from mainstream American society persisted to the eve of World War II with service in the Philippine and Hawaiian Islands having an impact similar to that of scattered frontier outposts of the West. Peter Karsten, *The Naval Aristocracy* (1972), identifies a similar sense of separation among members of the naval officer corps of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Given this division between civil and military society, it is perhaps surprising that the disconnect did not lead to the development of military challenge to civilian control.

### Historians

There are three main channels for understanding US civil–military relations: military historians who have chronicled America’s wars; participants and journalists who have described the interactions between warriors and politicians with first-hand accounts; and social scientists who have focused on the topic analytically.

There are few authors providing a grand sweep of US civil–military relations. Indeed, many of the best books are collections of essays or chapters on particular leaders or conflicts. Military historians tend to rush to cover the great battles, pausing only briefly to consider the political factors that led civilian leaders to order troops into combat. Diplomatic and political historians concentrate on grand strategy and civilian decisions, with only occasional discussion of civil–military interactions. Civil–military relations are rarely part of the story of war unless there are sharp disagreements between the warriors and politicians. Besides the American Civil War, those clashes have been relatively infrequent.

In the decade after World War II the first comprehensive studies of American civil–military relations appeared. While showing the steady progress made by the US armed forces, culminating in the great victories over Germany and Japan, they cautioned that nuclear weapons and the Soviet threat posed unprecedented challenges for US institutions. Louis Smith, in *American Democracy and Military Power* (1951), was concerned with threats to civilian control posed by the large standing army required in the Cold War. He described the various ways the president, the congress, and the courts achieved civilian control throughout US history. At the request of Speaker of the House John W. McCormack, Dorothy Schaffter and Dorothy M. Mathews produced a study delineating precisely *The Powers of the President as the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States* (1956). In the decades that followed the war-making powers of the president expanded (Eagleton 1974) until Congress passed the War Powers Act in 1973 to limit the ability of the chief executive to commit American military forces to combat without congressional approval (Ely 1993). In *Arms and Men*, Walter Millis (1956) depicted the course of civil–military relations against the background of broad socio-economic changes – “the democratization of war,” “the industrial revolution,” “the mechanization of war,” and “the scientific revolution.” By contrast, Arthur A. Ekirch, Jr. (1956) used a chronological framework in *The Civilian and the Military* to portray the recurring challenges to America’s antimilitary tradition, which he viewed as a bulwark against the militarism unleashed in the recent world wars.

One scholar who artfully blends civil–military issues into his history is Russell F. Weigley. His comprehensive *History of the United States Army* (1967, enlarged in 1984) describes developments in Washington and on the battlefields. He also wrote an influential article, “The American Military and the Principle of Civilian Control from McClellan to Powell” (1993) that argued, “The principle of civil control over the military in the United States faces an uncertain future.”

Michael D. Pearlman uses *Warmaking and American Democracy* (1999) to organize the historical record in terms of the process of formulating grand strategy for America’s military operations. He highlights several recurring tensions of civil–military relations and their political consequences.

Several authors have used the prism of the presidency, the role of the commander-in-chief in wartime, to explore issues of civil–military relations. Ernest R. May’s collection of essays, *The Ultimate Decision* (1960), covered the wars from Madison through Truman. Joseph G. Dawson, III (1993) covers the wartime presidents from McKinley through Nixon. More recently and more thoroughly,



Dale R. Herspring (2005) covers the full spectrum of civil-military relations in the presidencies from Franklin Roosevelt until the early years of George W. Bush.

Challenging the traditional views regarding the antimilitary beliefs of Thomas Jefferson is Theodore J. Crackel's *Mr. Jefferson's Army* (1987). Crackel contends that "Jefferson, far from ignoring or shunning the regular military establishment, undertook a social and political reformation of it in an effort to insure its loyalty to the new regime." Those reforms, including the establishment of the US Military Academy at West Point, created a "citizen army," a "Republican solution" to his earlier concerns. Craig Symonds, *Navalists and Anti-Navalists* (1980), similarly challenges historians who have depicted the Jeffersonians as being opposed to maintaining a peacetime navy, showing through an analysis of congressional debates that they supported a coastal defense force.

Historians of various American wars have mixed coverage of civil-military relations issues during those conflicts. Of the many books on the War of 1812, two in particular admirably blend civilian and military narratives: Donald R. Hickey, *The War of 1812* (1989) and J. C. A. Stagg, *Mr. Madison's War* (1983). Hickey sought to rescue the conflict from obscurity with vivid discussions of both the politics and military operations of the war. Stagg explores the workings of the War Department as an important means of explaining what James Madison later acknowledged was "a mismanaged execution" of the war.

The war with Mexico (1846–8) was rife with civil-military conflicts, with President Polk distrusting his senior generals and trying to install a sitting US Senator as senior military commander. There were reasons for the distrust, since those officers were politically ambitious members of the opposition political party, and one of them, Zachary Taylor, succeeded Polk in the White House. Early in the war, General Winfield Scott famously complained to the Secretary of War, "I do not desire to place myself in the most perilous of all positions – a fire upon my rear from Washington, and a fire in front from the Mexicans." The war was also politically controversial, with the opposition Whig Party at one point passing a resolution in the House of Representatives declaring that the war was "unnecessarily and unconstitutionally begun by the President of the United States." These issues were succinctly explained by Otis A. Singletary (1960), probed more deeply by John H. Schroeder (1973), and ably covered in a broader narrative by John S. D. Eisenhower (1989).

The American Civil War was also marked by significant civil-military clashes. British Major General Sir Frederick Maurice, *Soldiers and Statesmen of the Civil War* (1926) provides an early analysis of the complexities of civil-military relations both North and South. Jefferson Davis's relations with Confederate commanders and Abraham Lincoln's dissatisfaction with a succession of senior commanders have attracted numerous authors. One of the most insightful was T. Harry Williams (1952) who made Lincoln's relations with his generals a central focus. Largely neglected until recently was the significant role played by the congressional Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, which performed a valuable service for historians by compiling reports with contemporaneous documents and eyewitness testimony by senior commanders as part of their oversight investigations.

Bruce Tap (1998) rescued the committee from obscurity and gave a more balanced assessment of its performance than earlier critics.

Most historians have treated the war with Spain in 1898 as an imperialist adventure leading to a great domestic debate over America's role in the world. The conflict itself seemed to match John Hay's phrase, "a splendid little war." One recent author analyzes the foreign policy and civil-military issues in terms of five of the individuals who were most influential in the conflict and its aftermath: Theodore Roosevelt, Alfred Thayer Mahan, Elihu Root, Henry Cabot Lodge, and John Hay (Zimmerman 2002). Another author, Matthew Oyos (1996, 2000), concentrates specifically on Theodore Roosevelt and vividly describes how he sought to control and transform the US military in numerous ways, from weapons and strategy to physical training requirements. William Howard Taft led the five-man commission sent to the Philippines to organize a government for the islands. The poorly structured transition plan, combined with the personalities involved, inevitably led to a clash between Major General Arthur MacArthur, Military Governor of the territory, and Taft, who would become Civil Governor in July 1901 (Berthoff 1953). Leaders in Washington paid little attention to the conflict, but it clearly influenced Taft's attitude toward the military when he became president.

The literature on civil-military relations in the United States during World War I is surprisingly thin, perhaps because President Woodrow Wilson cared most about the nature of the peace that would follow the war and left the military issues to the professionals. Early on Secretary of War Newton D. Baker told General John Pershing, "I will give you only two orders – one to go to France and the other to come home. In the meantime, your authority in France will be supreme." There are chapters on Wilson in May (1960) and Kohn (1991), but they are necessarily brief. Nor do the memoirs or biographies of major military leaders have much to say about civil-military issues.

A recent broad survey subtitled *Civil Military Relations during World War I* (Ford 2008) includes chapters on the preparedness movement, conscription, and the training of the army; mobilization of public opinion and the stifling of dissent; the mobilization of medical and physical science in support of the war effort; and programs designed to find jobs for soldiers leaving the service at the end of the war, but does not always link the topics directly to civil-military relations and thus serves more as an introduction to these individual topics than an analysis of civil-military relations in general.

By contrast, writers on World War II have the out-sized figures of Franklin Roosevelt, Douglas MacArthur, and George Marshall to contend with, as well as other four- and five-star officers. The most comprehensive study of US civil-military relations in the war is Eric Larrabee's *Commander in Chief* (1987). Forrest C. Pogue (1963, 1966, 1973) covers Marshall's rise to power and dedicated professionalism in spite of personal and political pressures. He also has a short essay specifically on Marshall and civil-military relations in Kohn (1991).

In the early years of the Cold War, there were several areas of civil-military tension – over the creation of a Department of Defense, the assignment of roles and missions to the services, the impact and role of nuclear weapons, and how to deal with

the Soviet Union. The early 1960s saw several landmark studies by Hammond (1961), Schilling, Hammond, and Snyder (1962), and the book of case studies by Stein (1963). A quarter-century later came the early postwar history by Boettcher (1992) and the comprehensive biography of James Forrestal by Hoopes and Brinkley (1992). Covering the Joint Chiefs of Staff from the Truman years through the Reagan presidency is Mark Perry's *Four Stars* (1989), an excellent journalistic account of how the Chiefs interacted with their civilian bosses. There is now a full-length biography of America's controversial second Secretary of Defense, Louis Johnson, by McFarland and Roll (2005). The most profound civil–military conflict in modern US history was that between Harry Truman and his commander in Korea, General Douglas MacArthur (Spanier 1959, Pearlman 2008).

The advent of nuclear weapons spawned a civil–military clash that lasted through most of the Cold War. Congress insisted on creating a civilian Atomic Energy Commission to develop the weapons, and President Harry Truman refused to turn over physical custody of the warheads to the military until the Korean War broke out. Subsequent disclosure that military commanders like General Curtis LeMay intended and expected to fight nuclear war preemptively and until the enemy was a “smoking, radiating ruin at the end of two hours” – in contrast to official doctrine that called for phased retaliatory strikes – only confirmed civilian suspicions about the military. The classic confrontation between the two cultures came in the 1960s when Pentagon systems analyst Alain Enthoven told a senior officer, “General, I’ve fought just as many nuclear wars as you have.” This history is ably chronicled by Fred Kaplan in *The Wizards of Armageddon* (1983), but the civil–military animosities also permeated popular culture through movies like Stanley Kubrick’s 1964 film, *Dr. Strangelove or: How I learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb*, and *Seven Days in May*, a 1962 novel and subsequent film by Fletcher Knebel and Charles W. Bailey (1962) about an attempted military coup against a pro-disarmament president. By the end of the century with new strategic debates about how to deal with nuclear proliferation and terrorism, the fault lines no longer ran between civilians and the military.

Many authors have written about Lyndon Johnson and Robert McNamara’s relations with their military subordinates during the Vietnam War (Halberstam 1972). Far fewer have written about the Nixon Administration. One of the most influential studies in terms of civil–military relations has been H. R. McMaster’s *Dereliction of Duty* (1997), perhaps because the author is a military officer who argues that the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff failed to stand up to Johnson’s misguided policy. Mark Clodfelter (1989) provides insights into the debates and strategies involving air power. Other recent works with chapters on civil–military aspects of the war include Herspring (2005), and Stevenson, *SecDef* (2006a) and *Warriors & Politicians* (2006b).

### Participants and Journalists

More recent conflicts have been covered only in journalistic accounts based largely on interviews with key officials. The Gulf War of 1990–1 spawned at least two

valuable books that will probably remain the standard works until the archives open. Bob Woodward's *The Commanders* (1991) and Gordon and Trainor's *The Generals' War* (1995) both recount the planning and execution of the first American war against Saddam Hussein. Tensions between Bill Clinton, considered by many to have been a draft-evader, and his senior military officers are the recurring theme in David Halberstam's *War in a Time of Peace* (2001) which analyzes the interaction of civilian and uniformed leaders during the several American military interventions of the 1990s. NATO's war in Kosovo and the sharp disagreements between the senior military commander and some of his colleagues in Washington are analyzed by Ivo Daalder and Michael O'Hanlon (2000) in their insider account. Andrew Bacevich concentrates on the civil-military aspects of American involvement in the Kosovo war in his chapter in *War over Kosovo* (Bacevich and Cohen 2001).

The Iraq war starting in 2003 has produced at least three well-researched accounts with heavy emphasis in civil-military relations. Gordon and Trainor (2006) draw upon interviews with military planners and cover mainly the initial months of the conflict. Tom Ricks (2006), a reporter long interested in civil-military issues, covers the first two years of the war on the basis of numerous interviews, especially with military officers, and his own reporting from Iraq. Of Bob Woodward's three books on the George W. Bush administration, the one with the broadest coverage and the most recent interviews and documents is *State of Denial* (2006). Most of his key sources are anonymous, but many officials believe it is in their interest to tell him their side of the story.

Military memoirs tend to focus on the usually bold and heroic commander and his battles with foreign enemies, with only occasional mention of any battles with his superiors. The insights available on civil-military relations are usually few and far between. That is the case with the nineteenth-century memoirs by Generals Winfield Scott, Ulysses S. Grant, and William T. Sherman and those of senior US generals in World War I, though some insights about World War I can be gleaned from Admiral William Sims' *The Victory at Sea* (1920). The most extensive World War II era memoir on civil-military relations matters is the book by General Omar M. Bradley (1983), but it was completed posthumously by his collaborator and is heavily footnoted, and thus its vivid language might go beyond what the general himself might have intended.

General Maxwell Taylor (1972) wrote a detailed account of his extensive service both in uniform and as ambassador to war-torn South Vietnam. Taylor was a dissident Army Chief of Staff under President Dwight D. Eisenhower and an uncomfortable intermediary between President John F. Kennedy and the sitting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff until Kennedy formally gave him the top military post. Admiral Elmo Zumwalt's memoir (1976) provides insights into how the naval warfare communities worked to gain congressional and presidential support for weapons systems and personnel. Twenty years later Secretary of the Navy John Lehman had strong support from President Ronald Reagan when he conducted similar campaigns in Congress and the Pentagon and engineered the retirement of Admiral Hyman Rickover, head of the Navy's nuclear power community who had formidable backing in Congress (Lehman 1988).

Colin Powell's memoir, *My American Journey* (1995), is a valuable source for insights into civil–military relations because Powell served both as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and as President Ronald Reagan's National Security Adviser, and thus was deeply involved in national security issues both in uniform and in a normally civilian position. His predecessor in the Pentagon, Admiral William Crowe (1993), also wrote an insightful book explaining the civil–military relations when he was Chairman of the JCS. Both of them made use of the broader powers granted the Chairman by the Goldwater–Nichols Act of 1986, the law strongly resisted by many in the Pentagon but imposed by Congress in order to create more effective joint fighting forces. The story of this landmark legislation – and one of the rare cases where Congress played a transformative role in civil–military relations – is vividly told by Jim Locher (2002). Another memoir with lively descriptions of civil–military disputes is Wesley Clark's *Waging Modern War* (2001), a day-by-day account of NATO's conflict with Serbia over Kosovo.

### Social Scientists

Other scholars have studied US civil–military relations using the tools of the social sciences, particularly sociology and political science. They have turned the history into data sets and tried to build models to explain the interactions. Most start with the belief that civilian control of the military is a good thing and they then try to explain what mechanisms of such control are best.

Allan R. Millett (1979) gave the clearest test of civilian control, starting with the principle that “the armed forces do not dominate government or impose their unique (however functional) values upon civilian institutions and organizations.” An additional test was that “the armed forces have no independent access to [military] resources....”

Only a few analysts have worried that the US military is too powerful, or that military requirements threaten American society. One of the earliest and most influential was Harold Lasswell (1997), who began arguing in the late 1930s that the technological and bureaucratic requirements of modern warfare would lead to the emergence of “garrison states,” controlled by “specialists in violence.” In the 1950s the sociologist C. Wright Mills (1956) contended that the US military had reached “ascendancy.” That claim seemed to be confirmed when General Dwight D. Eisenhower, in his farewell address as President, warned that America “must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military–industrial complex.”

Efforts to limit and control the numbers of nuclear weapons and reductions in the share of the US economy devoted to defense mitigated some of these concerns in subsequent decades. In the 1990s and early 2000s, however, new works appeared with variations on the older argument. A prize-winning reporter, Dana Priest (2003), described the growing military influence on US foreign policy by the powerful regional military commanders who functioned as “proconsuls.” A retired Army colonel, Andrew J. Bacevich (2005) concluded that *The New American*

*Militarism* had emerged. And an Air Force officer, Charles J. Dunlap (1992–3, 1996) wrote hypothetical articles – fiction but densely footnoted – warning of the “erosion” and “collapse” of civilian control, culminating in “the American military coup of 2012,” largely because of new missions imposed upon the military by civilians. He also wrote (1994) a nonfiction explanation of his concerns.

These writings coincided with a major research effort involving many scholars that explored the apparent “gap” between US civilians and the American military. The various explanations of the causes and consequences of civil–military differences were compiled in the Feaver and Kohn (2001) volume. Different authors examined opinion surveys and demographic data to buttress their arguments. The editors concluded that the civil–military gap was real, different from the past, and significant, and they noted “troubling trends” that needed to be addressed in the future.

Sociologists have made major contributions to the understanding of US civil–military relations, starting with the landmark work by Morris Janowitz (1960). He foresaw the transformation of the US military into a constabulary force that “is continuously prepared to act, committed to the minimum use of force, and seeks viable international relations, rather than victory, because it has incorporated a protective military posture.” His intellectual disciples like Charles C. Moskos (Moskos, Williams, and Segal 2000) have described a “postmodern military” with new missions like peacekeeping, greater integration of women and acceptance of homosexuals, and “soldier-scholars” as the dominant military professional.

While the Janowitz school of sociologists has seen civilian control being assured by greater integration of the military into the civilian world, the school of political scientists starting with Samuel Huntington (1957) has recommended instead strong military professionalism that separates itself from civilian attitudes and activities. *The Soldier and the State* has probably been the single most influential work on US civil–military relations throughout the half century since its publication. Huntington contrasts America’s “liberal society” and “business pacifism” with the “conservative realism” of the military profession. He traces the rise of professionalism in the military and bemoans the “structural constant” of the separation of powers for forcing the military to engage in politics.

Several notable efforts have been made to refine Huntington’s model. Peter Feaver (1992) analyzed efforts to maintain civilian control of nuclear weapons and added notions of “assertive” and “delegative” control. Eliot Cohen (2002) described what he called the “normal theory” of civilian control from Huntington and, citing the actions of several wartime leaders, argued instead for an “unequal dialogue” in which civilian leaders feel free to ask tough questions and impose their own views of military strategy. Michael C. Desch (1999) linked the forms of civilian control to the strategic threat environment faced by different nations in different periods.

Richard K. Betts (1991) surveyed US civil–military relations during numerous cold war crises and debunked the widespread view that military leaders were both aggressive and dominant in setting policy. Peter Feaver (2003) rigorously applied agency theory to civil–military relations and concluded that civilian preferences generally prevailed during the Cold War, but that the 1990s saw more conflictual



civil-military relations, driven by “intrusive monitoring” by civilians and military resistance. Feaver argues for civilian control and even asserts “civilians have a right to be wrong.”

The history of American civil-military relations is a story of recurring conflict and tension, embedded within a system of, mostly, mutual trust. Successive generations of warriors and politicians have struggled with issues still unresolved because they are inherent in the American constitutional system. The problems have been manageable, at least so far, because of a higher allegiance by participants to the principle of democratic control of the armed forces than to the interests of their particular institution. The authors cited here have given special emphasis to the civil-military relationships in the matters they analyze.

#### BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Avalon Project at Yale, <http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon>
- Bacevich, Andrew J. (2005). *The New American Militarism*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Bacevich, Andrew J., and Eliot A. Cohen, eds. (2001). *War over Kosovo*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Berthoff, Rowland T. (1953). “Taft and MacArthur, 1900–1901: A Study in Civil-Military Relations,” *World Politics*, 5:2 (January), 196–213.
- Betts, Richard K. (1991). *Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Boettcher, Thomas D. (1992). *First Call: The Making of the Modern U.S. Military, 1945–1953*. Boston: Little, Brown.
- Borden, Morton, ed. (1965). *The Antifederalist Papers*. East Lansing: Michigan State University Press.
- Bradley, Omar N., and Clay Blair (1983). *A General's Life*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Clark, General Wesley K. (2001). *Waging Modern War*. New York: Public Affairs.
- Clodfelter, Mark (1989). *The Limits of Air Power: The American Bombing of North Vietnam*. New York: Free Press.
- Coffman, Edward M. (1986). *The Old Army: A Portrait of the American Army in Peacetime, 1784–1898*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Coffman, Edward M. (2004). *The Regulars: The American Army, 1898–1941*. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
- Cohen, Eliot A. (2002). *Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime*. New York: Free Press.
- Crackel, Theodore J. (1987). *Mr. Jefferson's Army: Political and Social Reform of the Military Establishment, 1801–1809*. New York: New York University Press.
- Crowe, Admiral William J., Jr., with David Chanoff (1993). *The Line of Fire: From Washington to the Gulf, the Politics and Battles of the New Military War*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Cunliffe, Marcus (1968). *Soldiers and Civilians: The Martial Spirit in America, 1775–1865*. Boston: Little, Brown.
- Daalder, Ivo H., and Michael E. O'Hanlon (2000). *Winning Ugly: NATO's War to Save Kosovo*. Washington: Brookings.

- Dawson, Joseph G., III, ed. (1993). *Commanders in Chief: Presidential Leadership in Modern Wars*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
- Desch, Michael C. (1999). *Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Dunlap, Charles J., Jr. (1992–3). "The Origins of the Military Coup of 2012," *Parameters*, Winter, 2–20.
- Dunlap, Charles J., Jr. (1994). "Welcome to the Junta: The Erosion of Civilian Control of the U.S. Military," *Wake Forest Law Review*, 29:2 (Summer), 341–92.
- Dunlap, Charles J., Jr. (1996). "Melancholy Reunion: A Report from the Future on the Collapse of Civil–Military Relations in the United States," US Air Force Academy, USAF Institute for National Security Studies, Occasional Paper 11.
- Eagleton, Thomas F. (1974). *War and Presidential Power: A Chronicle of Congressional Surrender*. New York: Liveright.
- Eisenhower, John S. D. (1989). *So Far From God: The U.S. War with Mexico, 1846–1848*. New York: Random House.
- Ekirch, Arthur A., Jr. (1956). *The Civilian and the Military*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Ely, John H. (1993). *War and Responsibility: Constitutional Lessons of Vietnam and its Aftermath*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Feaver, Peter D. (1992). *Guarding the Guardians: Civilian Control of Nuclear Weapons in the United States*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Feaver, Peter D. (2003). *Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil–Military Relations*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Feaver, Peter D., and Richard H. Kohn, eds. (2001). *Soldiers and Civilians: The Civil–Military Gap and American National Security*. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- Ford, Nancy Gentile (2008). *The Great War and America: Civil–Military Relations during World War I*. Westport, CT: Praeger Security International.
- Gordon, Michael R., and General Bernard E. Trainor (1995). *The Generals' War*. Boston: Little, Brown.
- Gordon, Michael R., and General Bernard E. Trainor (2006). *Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq*. New York: Pantheon Books.
- Halberstam, David (1972). *The Best and the Brightest*. New York, Random House.
- Halberstam, David (2001). *War in a Time of Peace: Bush, Clinton, and the Generals*. New York: Scribner.
- Hamilton, Alexander, James Madison, and John Jay (2003). *The Federalist Papers*, ed. Clinton Rossiter, intro. Charles R. Kesler. New York: Signet Classic.
- Hammond, Paul Y. (1961). *Organizing for Defense*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Herspring, Dale R. (2005). *The Pentagon and the Presidency: Civil–Military Relations from FDR to George W. Bush*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
- Hickey, Donald R. (1989). *The War of 1812*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
- Higginbotham, Don (1971). *The War of American Independence: Military Attitudes, Policies, and Practice, 1763–1789*. New York: Macmillan.
- Hoopes, Townsend, & Douglas Brinkley (1992). *Driven Patriot: The Life and Times of James Forrestal*. New York: Knopf.
- Huntington, Samuel P. (1957). *The Soldier and the State*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Janowitz, Morris (1960). *The Professional Soldier*. Glencoe: Free Press.

- Kaplan, Fred (1983). *The Wizards of Armageddon*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Karsten, Peter (1972). *The Naval Aristocracy: The Golden Age of Annapolis and the Emergence of Modern American Navalism*. New York: Free Press.
- Knebel, Fletcher, and Charles W. Bailey (1962). *Seven Days in May*. New York: Harper & Row.
- Kohn, Richard H. (1975) *Eagle and Sword: The Beginnings of the Military Establishment in America*. New York: Free Press.
- Kohn, Richard H. (1978) "American Generals of the Revolution: Subordination and Restraint," in Don Higginbotham (ed.), *Reconsiderations on the Revolutionary War*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 104–23.
- Kohn, Richard H., ed. (1991). *The U.S. Military under the Constitution, 1789–1989*. New York: New York University Press.
- Larrabee, Eric (1987). *Commander in Chief*. New York: Harper & Row.
- Lasswell, Harold (1997). *Essays on the Garrison State*, ed. and with an intro. by Jay Stanley. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.
- Lehman, John. F. (1988). *Command of the Sea*. New York: Scribner's.
- Library of Congress, U.S Congressional Documents and Debates for *A Century of Lawmaking for a New Nation*, <http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/amlaw/lawhome.html>
- Locher, James R. III (2002). *Victory on the Potomac: The Goldwater–Nichols Act Unifies the Pentagon*. College Station: Texas A&M University Press.
- Maurice, Frederick (1926). *Soldiers and Statesmen of the Civil War*. Boston: Little Brown.
- May, Ernest R., ed. (1960). *The Ultimate Decision: The President as Commander in Chief*. New York: George Braziller.
- McFarland, Keith D., and David L. Roll (2005). *Louis Johnson and the Arming of America*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- McMaster, H. R. (1997). *Dereliction of Duty*. New York: HarperCollins.
- Millett, Allan R. (1979). "The American Political System and Civilian Control of the Military: A Historical Perspective," Mershon Center Position Papers in the Policy Sciences, Number 4, (April).
- Millis, Walter (1956). *Arms and Men*. New York: New American Library.
- Mills, C. Wright (1956). *The Power Elite*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Moskos, Charles C., John Allen Williams, and David R. Segal, eds. (2000). *The Postmodern Military*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Oyos, Matthew M. (1996). "Theodore Roosevelt and the Implements of War," *Journal of Military History*, 60:4 (October), 631–56.
- Oyos, Matthew M. (2000). "Theodore Roosevelt, Congress, and the Military: U.S. Civil–Military Relations in the Early Twentieth Century," *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, 30:2 (June), 312–30.
- Pearlman, Michael D. (1999). *Warmaking and American Democracy*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
- Pearlman, Michael D. (2008). *Truman and MacArthur: Policy, Politics, and the Hunger for Honor and Renown*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Perry, Mark (1989). *Four Stars*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
- Pogue, Forrest C. (1963) *George C. Marshall: Education of a General, 1880–1939*. New York: Viking.
- Pogue, Forrest C. (1966). *George C. Marshall: Ordeal and Hope, 1939–1942*. New York: Viking.

- Pogue, Forrest C. (1973). *George C. Marshall: Organizer of Victory, 1943–1945*. New York: Viking.
- Powell, Colin, with Joseph E. Persico (1995). *My American Journey*. New York: Random House.
- Priest, Dana (2003). *The Mission*. New York: W. W. Norton.
- Ricks, Thomas E. (2006). *Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq*. New York: Penguin Press.
- Royster, Charles (1979). *A Revolutionary People at War: The Continental Army and American Character, 1775–1783*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Schaffter, Dorothy, and Dorothy M. Mathews (1956). *The Powers of the President as Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States*. Washington: Government Printing Office.
- Schilling, Warner R., Paul Y. Hammond, and Glenn H. Snyder (1962). *Strategy, Politics, and Defense Budgets*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Schroeder, John H. (1973). *Mr. Polk's War: American Opposition and Dissent, 1846–1848*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
- Sims, William S. (1920). *The Victory at Sea*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, Page & Co.
- Singletary, Otis A. (1960). *The Mexican War*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Skelton, William B. (1992). *An American Profession of Arms: The Army Officer Corps, 1784–1861*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
- Smith, Louis. (1951). *American Democracy and Military Power*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Spanier, John W. (1965). *The Truman–MacArthur Controversy and the Korean War*. New York: Norton.
- Stagg, J. C. A. (1983). *Mr. Madison's War: Politics, Diplomacy, and Warfare in the Early American Republic, 1783–1830*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Stein, Harold ed. (1963). *American Civil–Military Decisions: A Book of Case Studies*. Birmingham: University of Alabama Press.
- Stevenson, Charles A. (2006a). *SecDef: The Nearly Impossible Job of Secretary of Defense*. Washington: Potomac Books.
- Stevenson, Charles A. (2006b). *Warriors and Politicians: U.S. Civil–Military Relations under Stress*. London: Routledge.
- Symonds, Craig L. (1980). *Navalists and Antinavalists: The Naval Policy Debate in the United States, 1785–1827*. Newark: University of Delaware Press.
- Tap, Bruce (1998). *Over Lincoln's Shoulder: The Committee on the Conduct of the War*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
- Taylor, Maxwell D. (1972). *Swords and Plowshares*. New York: W. W. Norton.
- Weigley, Russell F. (1984). *History of the United States Army*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, enlarged edition.
- Weigley, Russell F. (1993). "The American Military and the Principle of Civilian Control from McClellan to Powell," *Journal of Military History*, Special Issue 57 (October), 27–58.
- Williams, T. Harry (1952). *Lincoln and His Generals*. New York: Knopf.
- Woodward, Bob (1991). *The Commanders*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Woodward, Bob (2006). *State of Denial*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Zimmerman, Warren (2002). *First Great Triumph: How Five Americans Made Their Country a World Power*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
- Zumwalt, Elmo R., Jr. (1976). *On Watch: A Memoir*. New York: Quadrangle.

## Chapter Fifty-seven

# WOMEN IN THE AMERICAN MILITARY

*D'Ann Campbell*

American women have always participated in wars. Sometimes they have held official roles, sometimes unofficial ones, and over decades and centuries these roles have changed. A recurring theme is that the American military forgets what essential roles women played in earlier wars. It starts all over trying to decide what roles, if any, women should play. Consequently, a major emphasis in the study of women in the American military is to discover and define these changing roles for which war is the catalyst. This chapter provides a historiographical overview of the changing roles of women in the United States military.

During the colonial era women followed militia units to provide logistical support, and perhaps even fought, but the historical record is thin (Mayer 2006). The best-documented evidence of their contributions comes from the American Revolution. Tens of thousands of women were part of George Washington's Continental Army officially or unofficially. The term *camp followers* had a derogatory connotation, especially in the nineteenth century when it was used to refer to women prostitutes who followed the troops. While there have always been some women practicing that trade, those who did were routinely thrown out of army camps, especially in the eighteenth century. In actuality, most of the women following the soldiers were wives. The wives of European officers often traveled with the armies and took care of their husbands while on campaigns. Fewer American officers' wives did so, but would often visit their husbands once they were settled in camp. The letters that Catherine Greene wrote while in winter quarters with her husband, General Nathaniel Greene, in 1777–8 form the basis for a biography (Stegeman and Stegeman 1977). Several European wives commented on how poorly clothed and generally unkempt the American soldiers appeared. Baroness Friederike de Riedesel, the wife of the German army commander during the Saratoga Campaign kept an extensive diary in which she recorded observations of various aspects of military life (Riedesel 1965). Early published versions of her diary formed the foundation for a biography of the Baroness (Tharp 1962), and excerpts from them have been reproduced, along with those of the writings of over a hundred women who participated in the Revolution, several in ways directly

connected to the military (Ellet 1848). Each Continental Army unit was allowed a certain percentage of wives to help with the various service tasks. The women then were following their husbands; they were not there to fight the enemy. As Berkin (2005) points out there were clear class distinctions; it was the soldiers' wives who did the work. While George Washington often complained about his long logistical tail, he realized that some women were essential for cooking, cleaning, sewing, and even for boosting morale. Considered official members of the Continental Army, these women received half rations in return for their services. Their children were also allowed to accompany their mothers. Another role played by wives was as sutlers selling goods to the troops including liquor. Technically the licenses usually went to the male soldiers, but it was their wives who were able to leave camp to bargain for the goods that were in turn sold to the troops. Linda Grant De Pauw (1981) was the first to explore these "Women in the Army." More recently Holly Mayer (1996, 2007) argues that together these women provided a wide range of services and created a community that was essential for the American soldiers to continue fighting the war.

A handful of women gained the spotlight when they stepped forward in combat. The most famous example is Margaret Corbin whose husband was killed while commanding an artillery unit at Fort Mifflin in 1776. Margaret was one of many women bringing water to cool the cannons when they overheated from being fired. When her husband was killed she took his spot, and was wounded in action; years later she became the first woman to receive a pension. Corbin is buried at the US Military Academy cemetery. Mary Ludwig Hays, another of these "Molly Pitchers," performed a similar feat at Monmouth in 1778. The last general category, and the smallest, was women cross-dressers who fought as men. Deborah Sampson, the most widely known of these women, enlisted as Robert Shurtleff (Young 2004). Once wounded and her female identity discovered, she and the others were routinely sent home. They never received a pension or compensation for any injuries for their "unwomanly" actions. The service of women in the War of 1812 is the focus of only one monograph (Graves 2007).

The centerpiece of all American military historiography has been the Civil War, and historians have been active in recent years tracking down the roles of women. Unlike the Revolutionary War, few women served as "Women of the Army" providing logistical support. In the 1860s the term "camp followers" was highly suggestive of prostitution. There were women sutlers as well as women spies. Elizabeth D. Leonard (1999) describes the women in both armies demonstrating that they enlisted not simply to be near their brothers, sweethearts, and husbands, but because military service offered opportunities for economic advancement, adventure, and independence. There were also women who served as cross-dressers. DeAnne Blanton and Lauren Cook (2002) describe the lives of 250 cross-dressers. Like the American Revolutionary War, they were drummed out when discovered. Two women of the estimated 400 women who served in the Union Army have left written records which have been published: Sarah Wakeman (1994) served in the New York Volunteers for two years before she died of dysentery; Sarah Emma Edmonds enlisted in a Michigan unit as Frank Tompkins, escaped expulsion from



the army, and later wrote a memoir of her experiences as a soldier, nurse, and mail courier (Edmonds 1999) that formed the basis for a biography (Gansler 2005).

In many respects the Civil War was the first American “total war” (at least for the South) which means that all men, women, and children were mobilized and played essential roles throughout the conflict. Historians have focused on women’s roles on the homefront as well as in the military. Women, who had never paid attention to the business side of plantations, now found themselves in charge. Most slaves in the South remained on plantations and farms. The Southern mistress took charge of organizing, feeding, and caring for dozens of workers. When forced away from home these women had to organize their extended families and plant roots elsewhere. Catherine Clinton (1995, 2006) began and continues the documentation. Drew Faust (1996) explored the complexity of the roles of the southern women. In a parallel study, Nina Silber (2005) details the roles assumed by northern women and finds in the civic roles they played during the war the roots of their suffrage and temperance activism later in the century. Jeanie Attie (1998), Judith Ann Giesberg (2000), and Wendy Hamand Venet (2005) argue that women’s work in the US Sanitary Commission formed an important link between their participation in pre-and post-Civil War reform movements. Historians have explored the emergence of systematic nursing roles, for example through the auspices of the US Sanitation Commission. American women had always tended the wounded soldiers, usually at home after the able-bodied troops had left the battlefield. Yet the norm remained that proper women did not tend to non-family men and see them in such uncovered and compromising positions. Jane Schultz (2004) estimates that 20,000 women worked in hospitals North and South and, drawing heavily on first person narratives, tells their stories. Catholic nuns were often given such nursing tasks, and over 600 sisters from 12 orders served Confederate and Union soldiers on battlefields (Maher 1989). Elizabeth D. Leonard *Yankee Women* (1994), describes the service of Mary E. Walker, the only woman doctor in the Union army; Sophronia Bucklin, a battlefield nurse; and Annie Wittenmyer who organized medical supplies and kitchens for wounded soldiers, then showed how the work of these and other women was “interpreted” after the war to make it and them fit traditional middle-class gender stereotypes. Stephen Oates (1994) traces how Clara Barton moved from organizing the collection of supplies by women’s groups to caring for wounded on the battlefield and went on to found the American Red Cross in 1881. Regardless of the contributions of women during the Civil War, nursing became systematized and medical doctors became professionalized, that is, masculinized. Women administrators, such as Dorothy Dix (who served as superintendent of nurses in the Union army), were in charge of hospitals and bore the rank of officers (Brown 1998).

During the next half century the military did not officially have roles for women, though the unofficial roles of women in the western army, especially those of officers’ wives, have been explored first by Myers (1982) and most recently by Nacy (2000) to show these women participated in the rituals and customs and became part of the regiment. Meanwhile some senior enlisted men had wives who did laundry work and maintained morality in the ranks.

The nation's first overseas war, that with Spain in 1898, demonstrated the need for a permanent cadre of nursing experts that could be expanded in wartime as needed. For the creation of the Army Nurse Corps in 1901 see Sarnecky (1999), and for the Navy Nurse Corps in 1908 see Godsen (2001). By the early twentieth century, then, women nurses were officially serving in the military. However, gone were the women sutlers, the seamstresses, and cooks.

It was World War I that led to the expansion of official women's service in the armed forces and both the army and navy sought female recruits to do jobs previously done by men. Zeiger (2000) provides the first comprehensive overview of women working with army troops in the expeditionary force sent to Europe. The largest number (350), dubbed "Hello Girls," served as telephone operators. As members of the Army Signal Corps, they wore uniforms and were subject to military discipline, though they did not receive military status and benefits until 1977. In the Navy, 11,500 women handled clerical duties while serving as "Yeoman (F)" (Ebbert and Hall 2002). In addition, over 25,000 women served overseas in non-military units as civilian volunteers recruited by colleges and the Red Cross (Schneider and Schneider 1988). Having women in uniform, even as nurses, shocked gender sensibilities; those who recoiled assigned the women to a well-established category and spread rumors of sexual promiscuity. The nurses fought to show their usefulness and maintain their respectability and were generally successful in countering the negative rumors.

At war's end women were mustered out of the service and not readmitted to the armed forces until World War II once more resulted in "manpower" shortages and leaders again turned to women to, in the words of the Marine Corps, "free a man to fight." On May 15, 1942 Congress enacted legislation accepting women volunteers for non-combatant service in the Women's Auxiliary Army Corps (WAAC) (Treadwell 1954). Two and a half months later, on July 30, it authorized the formation of the Women Accepted for Volunteer Emergency Service (WAVES). "Auxiliary" was dropped from the title of the Army group, but in both services the organizations were officially "reserve" units, as were those in the other services. On November 7, the Marine Corps Women's Reserve (MCWR) was formed by executive action (Stremlow 1994), and two weeks later, November 23, 1942, Congress established the "Women's Reserve of the United States Coast Guard," whose members were soon called SPARs, a contraction of the Coast Guard's motto, "Semper Paratus, Always Ready" (Lyne and Arthur 1946). The shortage of male pilots led to the establishment of the Women's Auxiliary Ferry Squadron (WAFS) on September 10, 1942. Under the command of Nancy Love, members were to deliver aircraft from factories to training fields and to bases from which they would deploy overseas. Five days later the Women's Flying Training Detachment (WFTP) was formed. In addition to ferrying aircraft, its members, led by Jacqueline Cochran (Rich 2007), towed targets for aerial gunnery practice, flew check flights for repaired aircraft, and served as flight instructors. In August 1943 the two groups were merged into a single organization, the Women Airforce Service Pilots (WASPS). When deactivation of the group was announced in December 1944, Cochran asked for a one-day militarization for the unit before its demise so that its members would qualify for veterans' benefit, but her request

was denied and its members continued to be considered civil service workers until being reclassified as military personnel a quarter century after the war (Rickman 2008). Between 1942 and 1945 140,000 women served in the WACs, 100,000 in the WAVES, 23,000 in the Marines, 13,000 in the SPARS, and 74,000 in the Army and Navy Nurse Corps (Campbell 1984).

During the war women in the military again were subjected to slander, sparked not by German propagandists but by male American soldiers threatened in their gender roles, and perhaps also threatened in their non-combat jobs by women who could replace them in those roles as the men were sent to combat. Mattie Treadwell's (1954) history of the WAC examined these issues, generally denying loose sexuality and lesbianism. Despite Treadwell's thorough research and breadth of coverage, the feminist movement of the 1960s and 1970s ignored it. D'Ann Campbell (1984) followed her with a book and a dozen articles including women's roles in combat. A decade later Leisa Meyer's (1996) history of WACs of World War II shows how female leaders of the group sought to defend the image of their members by recruiting "respectable" middle-class women, by limiting the number of Blacks accepted, and by screening out suspected lesbians. Members of the latter two groups formed communities within the service and pressed for wider acceptance. Most scholarly studies have included WWII as part of a larger study (Godsen 2001, Ebbert and Hall 2002) or have focused on a segment of women such as Putney's (1992) study of Black WACs and Moore's (1996, 2003) studies of African-American and Japanese-American women soldiers. In addition, military nursing, which came of age in World War II, has now been given scholarly treatment (Tomblin 1996, Monahan and Neidel-Greenlee 2003a, b).

The WASPS seemed to fly higher than anyone as the 1,074 civilian women who tested and flew planes for the AAF received disproportionate attention because they were not filing paper but flying bombers (in non combat situations), performing a core role for airmen (Keil 1979, Merryman 1998). The published self-awareness was thin for World War I, but grew rapidly as the women veterans of World War II took their GI Bill money and gained an education that enabled them to write their memoirs. Joy Bright Hancock, for example, entered the navy as a yeoman during World War I, worked as a civilian in the Bureau of Aeronautics in the 1920s and 1930s, and was commissioned in the WAVES in 1942, rising to command the WAVES, 1946–53. Her memoirs (Hancock 1972) provide significant insights into the difficulties women faced in the Navy in the first half of the twentieth century. Marie Alsmeyer, a pharmacist's mate, published a memoir, *The Way of the WAVES* (1981), that led other former WAVES to send her letters, a selection of which Alsmeyer published in *Old WAVES' Tales* (1982).

Many stateside military leaders advocated the deactivation of women's units after the war, but on June 12, 1948 Congress passed the Women's Armed Services Integration Act granting permanent military status to women. Generals Dwight Eisenhower and Omar Bradley led the integration efforts by teaming up with Senator Margaret Chase Smith (Sherman 2000).

Service by women in the Korean and Vietnam Wars has also received serious historical treatments as materials became declassified. The best overview of Korea

is by Witt, Bellafaire, Granrud, and Binker (2005). Morden (1990) has provided the best overall treatment of the WAC until it was disbanded and its members integrated into the Army as a whole. Norman (1990) has documented the roles of 50 nurses in Vietnam but, as yet, a monograph on women serving in other roles during Vietnam does not exist. In fact, there are only guesstimates on how many American women served in country.

The Air Force experimented with commissioning women through its ROTC program, 1956–60, at four of its programs in 1969, and in all programs from 1970 onward; the Navy authorized women to enroll in four of its programs in 1972, and soon opened all programs to women; the Army opened all its programs to women in 1973. When women were allowed entrance to the service academies in 1976 a series of scholarly works and first hand accounts flooded the market. The best include the Janda and Newell (2002) study of the US Military Academy, West Point's own Project Athena which is now available online through the USMA Library website, and Strum's (2002) study of VMI. The best autobiographies are Barkalow (1990) and Disher (1998). Those charged with admitting the first classes of women had to struggle with whether the service academies only trained officers for combat (as those who wanted women excluded claimed) and what should be the physical requirements for "females." The academies actually adopted different approaches to women's physical and military training.

Once women were admitted to ROTC programs and the service academies, the next question became what jobs should they be trained to do? The US Coast Guard had the most flexibility since it is under the Navy only in times of war and thus not subject to the congressional combat exclusion clauses. Thus, its women soon served in and even commanded ships that meant it became difficult to try to exclude women from service in wartime. The other services struggled internally and externally with the issue of women serving in combat roles. Indeed many attribute the defeat of the ERA amendment to the fear that if it passed women would be drafted and even sent to the front lines (Mansbridge 1986). Yet the roles of "females," often a derogatory word in military circles continued to change and expand. Many basic restrictions such as those on women married to servicemen or barring pregnant women serving, or limiting the number of women allowed to serve to only 2 percent or 5 percent of the armed forces, were removed. By the 1990s, the American public had watched 40,000 women serve in the Persian Gulf and better understood that lines between combat, combat support, and combat service support could no longer be drawn clearly and completely. Thus congressmen began introducing legislation to remove the restrictions on women serving in combat roles. In 1992, President George H. W. Bush established a commission to make recommendations assigning women's roles. By then, American policy makers could also have learned from what other nations had adopted. Sociologist Mady Segal (1995) has written extensively on the role of women in NATO countries.

Today servicewomen find most combat positions open to them, but they still cannot serve on submarines, in the infantry and armor, and in some engineering units. Currently over 155,000 women have served in Iraq since 2003, 430 have been wounded, and over 70 have already made the ultimate sacrifice (Holmstedt

2007). Basing their work on a series of interviews with women veterans, James E. Wise and Scott Baron, *Women at War Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Conflicts* (2006) provide a broad perspective at a time when some public policy watchers continued to demand that Congress review Army procedures which have been putting too many women in forward units and thus in harm's way. In her memoir, *One Woman's Army* (2005), General Janis Karpinski, who became famous as commander of the Abu Ghraib prison, recalls her long military career, much of it in the reserves, including service in the first Gulf War for which she was awarded a Bronze Star, describing the challenges she faced both as a reservist and a woman. Much of the recent discussion has focused on sexual harassment and sexual assault both in the service academies and in the armed forces in general. The military is a product of the American culture and can often regulate behavior, but it has a difficult time changing attitudes. The bugaboo about promiscuity continues to surface in the media. Many fear that men and women serving in close proximity is a recipe for sexual misconduct. It has now been documented that some women can do what many men can. For example, there may be no physical reason for banning women who can meet the requirements for the infantry. However, there seem to be psychological ones for some of the men. Fighting hand to hand – up close and personal – is still seen as a masculine duty and privilege. There is no evidence that these final barriers for servicewomen will ever collapse.

Women's roles in the decades since World War II have been the focus of sociologists, political scientists, and journalists. The research has focused on key events such as the opening of the service academies to women and the resulting integration of the military with the demise of the women's corps. The first woman fighter pilot, the first woman to serve on a combat ship, and then the first woman killed by enemy action have been carefully documented. *Minerva: Quarterly Report on Women and the Military*, a newsletter and a journal edited by Linda Grant DePauw, has kept scholars abreast of the latest round of firsts and the latest research. It languished for a decade but has just been resurrected as *Minerva: Journal of Women and War* (April 2007). A few semi-popular works survey the roles and experiences of women in the military, including retired Air Force Major General Jeanne Holm, *Women in the Military* (1982), June Willenz, *Women Veterans* (1983), and Jesse Johnson, *Black Women in the Armed Forces: 1942–1974* (1974), but women in military history have not received as much scholarly attention as many allied topics. Stiehm (1989) is one of the few scholarly works focusing on the roles that have opened to women in the enlisted ranks. Friedl (1996) has compiled 857 entries on women's roles in the American military in a research guide. Although much has been written, most of it in the last 20 years, much remains to be done before the topic will be as comprehensively dealt with as many other facets of military history.

#### BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Alsmeyer, Marie Bennett (1981). *The Way of the WAVES*. Conway, AR: Hamba Books.  
Alsmeyer, Marie Bennett (1982). *Old WAVES' Tales*. Conway, AR: Hamba Books.

- Alvah, Donna (2007). *Unofficial Ambassadors: American Military Families Overseas and the Cold War, 1946–1965*. New York: New York University Press.
- Attie, Jeanie (1998). *Patriotic Toil: Northern Women and the American Civil War*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Barkalow, Carol, with Andrew Raab (1990). *In the Men's House: An Inside Account of Life in the Army by One of West Point's First Female Graduates*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Berkin, Carol (2005). *Revolutionary Mothers: Women in the Struggle for America's Independence*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Blanton, DeAnne, and Lauren M. Cook (2002). *They Fought Like Demons: Women Soldiers in the American Civil War*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.
- Brown, Thomas J. (1998). *Dorothea Dix: New England Reformer*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Campbell, D'Ann (1984). *Women at War with America: Private Lives in a Patriotic Era*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Clinton, Catherine (1995). *Tara Revisited: Women, War & the Plantation Legend*. New York: Abbeville Press.
- Clinton, Catherine, and Nina Silber (2006). *Battle Scars: Gender and Sexuality in the American Civil War*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- De Pauw, Linda Grant (1981). "Women in Combat: The Revolutionary War Experience," *Armed Forces and Society*, 7:2 (Winter), 209–26.
- De Pauw, Linda Grant (1998). *Battle Cries and Lullabies: Women in War from Prehistory to the Present*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Disher, Sharon Hanley (1998). *First Class: Women Join the Ranks at the Naval Academy*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Ebbert, Jean, and Marie-Beth Hall (1999). *Crossed Currents: Navy Women in the Century of Changes*. 3rd edn. Washington: Brassey's.
- Ebbert, Jean, and Marie-Beth Hall. (2002). *The First, The Few, The Forgotten: Navy and Marine Corps Women in World War I*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Edmonds, Sara Emma (1999). *Memoirs of a Soldier, Nurse and Spy: A Woman's Adventures in the Union Army*, intro. and annotations by Elizabeth D. Leonard. Dekalb: Northern Illinois University Press.
- Ellet, E. F. (1848). *The Women of the American Revolution*, 2 vols. New York: Baker and Scribner [subsequently reprinted in several editions].
- Enloe, Cynthia. (1983). *Does Khaki Become You? The Militarization of Women's Lives*. Cambridge, MA: South End Press.
- Faust, Drew (1996). *Mothers of Invention: Women of the Slaveholding South in the American Civil War*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Friedl, Vicki L., comp. (1996). *Women in the United States Military 1901–1995: A Research Guide and Annotated Bibliography*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
- Gansler, Laura Leedy (2005). *The Mysterious Private Thompson: The Double Life of Sarah Emma Edmonds, Civil War Soldier*. New York: Free Press.
- Giesberg, Judith Ann (2000). *Civil War Sisterhood: The Sanitary Commission. Women's Politics in Transition*. Boston: Northeastern University Press.
- Godsen, Susan (2001). *Serving Proudly: A History of Women in the U.S. Navy*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Graves, Dianne (2007). *In the Midst of Alarms: Women in the War of 1812*. Toronto: Robin Bass Studio.
- Hancock, Joy Bright (1972). *Lady in the Navy: A Personal Reminiscence*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.



- Hegarty, Marilyn E. (2007). *Victory Girls, Khaki-Wackies, and Patriotutes: The Regulation of Female Sexuality during World War II*. New York: New York University Press.
- Holm, Jeanne (1982). *Women in the Military: An Unfinished Revolution*. Novato, CA: Presidio.
- Holmstedt, Kirsten A. (2007). *Band of Sisters: American Women at War in Iraq*. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books.
- Janda, Lance, and Donna Alesch Newell (2002). *Stronger than Custom: West Point and the Admission of Women*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
- Johnson, Jesse (1974). *Black Women in the Armed Forces: 1942–1974* [A Pictorial History]. Hampton, VA: Johnson.
- Karpinski, Janis L. (2005). *One Woman's Army: The Commanding General of Abu Ghraib Tells Her Story*. New York: Miramax.
- Keil, Sally Van Wegener (1979). *Those Wonderful Women in Their Flying Machines: The Unknown Heroines of World War II*. New York: Rawson, Wade.
- Leonard, Elizabeth D. (1994). *Yankee Women: Gender Battles in the Civil War*. New York: W. W. Norton.
- Leonard Elizabeth D. (1999). *All the Daring of the Soldier: Women of the Civil War Armies*. New York: W. W. Norton.
- Lyne, Mary C., and Kay Arthur (1946). *Three Years Behind the Mast: The Story of the United States Coast Guard SPARS*. Washington: US Coast Guard.
- Maher, Mary Denis (1989). *To Bind Up the Wounds: Catholic Sister Nurses in the U.S. Civil War*. New York: Greenwood Press.
- Mansbridge, Jane J. (1986). *Why We Lost the ERA*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Mayer, Holly A. (1996). *Belonging to the Army: Camp Followers and Community during the American Revolution*. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.
- Mayer, Holly A. (2006). "From Forts to Families: Following the Army into Western Pennsylvania, 1758–1766," *Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography*, 130:1 (January), 5–43.
- Mayer, Holly A. (2007). "Wives, Concubines, and Community: Following the Army," in John Resch and Walter Sargent, (eds.), *War and Society in the American Revolution: Mobilization and Home Fronts*. DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 235–62.
- Merryman, Molly (1998). *Clipped Wings: The Rise and Fall of the Women Airforce Service Pilots (WASPs) of World War II*. New York: New York University Press.
- Meyer, Leisa (1996). *Creating G.I. Jane: Sexuality and Power in the Women's Army Corps During World War II*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Monahan, Evelyn M., and Rosemary Neidel-Greenlee (2003a). *And if I Perish: Frontline U.S. Army Nurses in World War II*. New York: Knopf.
- Monahan, Evelyn, and Rosemary Neidel-Greenlee (2003b). *All This Hell: U.S. Nurses Imprisoned by the Japanese*. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky.
- Moore, Brenda (1996). *To Serve My Country, To Serve My Race: The Story of the Only African American WACs Stationed Overseas during World War II*. New York: New York University Press.
- Moore, Brenda (2003). *Serving Our Country: Japanese American Women in the Military during World War II*. Newark, NJ: Rutgers University Press.
- Morden, Bettie J. (1990). *Women's Army Corps 1945–1978*. Washington: Government Printing Office.
- Myers, Sandra L. (1982). "Romance and Reality on the American Frontier: Views of Army Wives," *Western Historical Quarterly*, 13:4 (October), 409–27.

- Nacy, Michele J. (2000). *Members of the Regiment: Army Officers' Wives on the Western Frontier, 1965–1890*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
- Norman, Elizabeth M. (1990). *Women at War: The Story of Fifty Military Nurses Who Served in Vietnam*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Oates, Stephen B. (1994). *Woman of Valor: Clara Barton and the Civil War*. New York: Free Press.
- Putney, Martha S. (1992). *When the Nation Was in Need: Blacks in the Women's Army Corps during World War II*. New York: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Rich, Doris L. (2007). *Jackie Cochran: Pilot in the Fastest Lane*. Gainesville: University Press of Florida.
- Rickman, Sarah Byrn (2008). *Nancy Love and the WASP Ferry Pilots of World War II*. Denton: University of North Texas Press.
- Riedesel, Baron [Friederike] de (1965). *Baroness von Riedesel and the American Revolution: Journal and Correspondence of a Tour of Duty, 1776–1783*, ed. and trans. by Marvin Luther. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Sarnecky, Mary T. (1999). *History of the U.S. Army Nurse Corps University*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Schneider, Dorothy, and Carl Schneider (1988). *Into the Breach: American Women Overseas in World War I*. New York: E. P. Dutton.
- Schultz, Jane E. (2004). *Women at the Front: Hospital Workers in Civil War America*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Segal, Mady Wechsler (1995). "Women's Military Roles Cross-Nationally: Past, Present and Future," *Gender & Society*, 9:6 (December), 757–73.
- Sherman, Janann (2000). *No Place for a Woman: A Life of Senator Margaret Chase Smith*. Newark: Rutgers University Press.
- Silber, Nina (2005). *Daughters of the Union: Northern Women Fight the Civil War*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Stegeman, John F. and Janet A. Stegeman (1977). *Caty: A Biography of Catharine Littlefield Greene*. Athens: University of Georgia Press.
- Stremlow, Mary V. (1986). *A History of the Women Marines, 1946–1977*. Washington: History and Museums Division, Headquarters, US Marine Corps.
- Stremlow, Mary V. (1994). *Free a Marine to Fight: Women Marines in World War II*. Washington: History and Museums Division, Headquarters, US Marine Corps.
- Stiehm, Judith Hicks (1989). *Arms and the Enlisted Woman*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- Strum, Philippa (2002). *Women in the Barracks: The VMI Case and Equal Rights*. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press.
- Tharp, Louise Hall (1962). *The Baroness and the General*. Boston: Little, Brown and Co.
- Treadwell, Mattie E. (1954). *The United States Army in World War II, Special Studies, The Women's Army Corps*. Washington: Government Printing Office.
- Tomblin, Barbara (1996). *G.I. Nightingales: The Army Nurse Corps in World War II*. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky.
- Venet, Wendy Hamand (2005). *A Strong-Minded Woman: The Life of Mary A Livermore*. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press.
- Wakeman, Sarah Rosetta (1994). *An Uncommon Soldier: The Civil War Letters of Sarah Rosetta Wakeman, Alias Private Lyons Wakeman, 153rd Regiment, New York State Volunteers*, ed. by Lauren Cook Burgess. Pasadena, MD: The Minerva Center.
- Willenz, June A. (1983). *Women Veterans: America's Forgotten Heroines*. New York: Continuum.

- 
- Wise, James E., and Scott Baron (2006). *Women at War: Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Conflicts*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Witt, Linda, Judith Bellafaire, Britta Granrud, and Mary Jo Binker (2005). *A Defense Weapon Known to Be of Value: Service Women of the Korean War Era*. Hanover, NH: University Press of New England.
- Young, Alfred F. (2004). *Masquerade: The Life and Times of Deborah Sampson, Continental Soldier*. New York: Knopf.
- Zeiger, Susan (2000). In *Uncle Sam's Service: Women Workers with the American Expeditionary Force 1917–1919*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

## Chapter Fifty-eight

# MINORITIES IN THE MILITARY

*Thomas A. Bruscino, Jr.*

One factor above all is essential to understanding the story of minorities in the United States military: the definition of what constitutes a minority in America has changed drastically over the years. At various times Germans, Italians, Poles, Hungarians, Armenians, Chinese, Quakers, Mexicans, Scotch-Irish, Puerto Ricans, Filipinos, Jews, Catholics, Irish, Cajuns, blacks, Japanese, and homosexuals, have been called “minorities.” For some, blacks in particular, the label has stuck. Most of the others have over time joined the equally ambiguous “majority,” a group founded and consistently peopled by one group: straight, white, mainstream Protestants of English heritage. (This taxonomy excludes women – who are the focus of another chapter in this volume.) This issue concerns much more than semantics, and indeed gets at the heart of minority participation in the military. Out of war and military service have come the very definitions of American identity and American citizenship. Military service became the most important path for minorities who wished to have a role in forging that identity and earning that citizenship (Herrera 2001).

These dual themes of identity and citizenship provide coherence in tracing the threads of minority participation through America’s military past. Those threads begin dimly, in the militias of the various British colonies from which would emerge the United States. There, in those far-flung corners of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Great Britain, local citizens fought the battles of empire against Spain, France, their Indian proxies, and independent Indian tribes and bands. Jill Lepore’s argument in *The Name of War* (1998), a study of King Philip’s War, resonates throughout the conflicts fought by the colonists prior to the Revolution. Out of these wars came a particular definition of Englishness, one that very much set the colonists apart from the native Indians, friend and foe alike.

At the same time, the makeup of the colonial militias and expeditionary forces reflected the more-than-just-English ethnic and religious diversity of the colony or local region. For example, in *A People’s Army*, a key work on Massachusetts in the Seven Years’ War, historian Fred Anderson (1984) notes that the Massachusetts military included Germans, Dutch, Irish, and Portuguese fighting alongside the

majority English. James Titus (1991) similarly found soldiers of German, Scotch-Irish, Irish, French, Scottish, Dutch, Welsh, Swiss, and Swedish descent in the Virginia military. The efforts of such individuals likely put them on a path of recognition by the majority, at least locally, that they had earned rights as citizens. But unfortunately, no study to date has tracked the full effects of service by ethnic groups in the colonial militaries. Likewise, while various individual Indians and Indian tribes participated as allies, paid scouts, and, in a much more limited sense, fighting members of the militias, the precise relationships of all Indians to all of the colonial militaries is probably too complex for any one study. At best it can be said that the degree to which the colonial militaries assimilated individual Indians was usually, but not always, proportional to the degree to which those individuals jettisoned their native heritage (Dowd 1992, White 1991).

The colonial period had set the precedent for substantial ethnic and Indian minority participation in the American military, with that participation serving as a gateway to joining and amending the majority. The same did not hold true for race. From the very beginning, black participation in the American military remained categorically different from the participation of other minority groups – a point made evident in the seminal works on the subject by Jack D. Foner (1974) and Bernard C. Nalty (1986). The origins of this difference are not hard to divine. All of the New World colonies, to varying degrees, exploited black slavery. Those colonies with the highest proportion of black slaves, primarily in the South, opposed the idea of arming blacks for two reasons: first, the potential for armed insurrection; and second, the implicit right to citizenship that went along with military service. Individual blacks did fight in the colonial militaries, especially in the North, but even along the brutal frontier their path to the identity and rights of the majority remained by and large blocked.

The unifying effort of the Revolution began to solidify these issues of military service, identity, and citizenship. Participation in the Seven Years War accelerated the process of the colonials forging a new American identity, in large part defined by its differences from what it meant to be English (Anderson 2000). The War of Independence and early national period culminated that earlier process, and set the standards for minorities in the military until the Civil War. In the Revolution, Indian tribes fought as allies and scouts, and no doubt some individuals of Indian descent enlisted in the militias and Continental Army, but they generally were not recognized as such, so their numbers are difficult to track (Calloway 1995, Glatthaar and Martin 2006). As in the colonial wars, white ethnic minorities could and did serve in state militias, but they also joined in great numbers that foremost symbol of the Revolution, George Washington's Continental Army. According to Charles Neimeyer (1996), Irish immigrants (mostly Presbyterians) made up as much as one-quarter of the Continental Army. German Lutherans accounted for roughly 12 percent. What is more, specific European individuals from non-English backgrounds became household names in the fight, most prominently the French Marquis de Lafayette, German Friedrich Wilhelm von Steuben, and Polish Thaddeus Kosciuszko. The extent to which homosexuals participated in the war is unknown – some latter day advocates have argued that von Steuben was gay (Shilts

1993) – but what is known is that official policy excluded homosexuals if and when they were found out.

As pointed out by Benjamin Quarles' seminal study *The Negro in the American Revolution* (1961), the majority of black participation in the Revolution came when blacks fled to the British, as the empire promised freedom to those slaves who fought against the rebellion or ran from revolutionary slaveholders. In response to British efforts and the desperate need for troops, the Americans eventually made similar overtures of freedom in exchange for service, and blacks served here and there in the state forces and in larger numbers in the Continental Army (Frey 1991, Lanning 2000, Knoblock 2003). The small revolutionary navy could afford to be even less picky than the army, therefore minorities, including blacks, served alongside anyone who was willing to endure the harsh conditions aboard an eighteenth-century fighting ship. Yet even the Revolution, fought on the principle that all men were created equal, could not find a way to include blacks in the military in a lasting way. The war changed little for African-Americans, and those roughly 5,000 who served became individual exceptions, not harbingers for an emerging rule of racial inclusion.

The years of the early republic did little to change these trends. Blacks served in greater numbers in the navy and marine corps than in the army, and though an attempt was made to ban the recruitment of "Negroes or Mulatoes" there was no systematic expulsion of those who did manage to enter the sea services (Farr 1989). In the War of 1812 manpower shortages led Congress to pass a law allowing the enlistment of "persons of color, natives of the U. States," but little action was taken under the legislation, and that came late in the war, when, for example, in 1814 the New York legislature authorized the raising of two regiments of blacks (Wilson 1888). Although few blacks served in the army during the war, a "Battalion of Free Men of Color" fought with distinction alongside Andrew Jackson at New Orleans (McConnell 1968, Nalty 1986). And blacks constituted 15 to 20 percent of enlisted sailors and played a significant role in the defeat of the British at the Battle of Lake Erie (Altoff 1996).

This service did not stop the government from again officially excluding blacks from military service in 1820 (although some served on an individual and state-by-state basis, and naval forces could not maintain racial restrictions in practice), and Indians continued to fall into ever-shifting categories of allies, scouts, and assimilated troops – which left immigrants to pick up the slack. The Revolution had introduced a long-lasting trend to American military history, wherein American citizens struggled between their liberal belief in individual freedom and their republican duty to the larger society (Herrera 2001). Majority Americans – again, an ever-expanding group – resolved this dilemma by serving in the militia in time of peace or the military in times of duress, but not for extended periods. This solution worked in the short term, but did not account for the fact that prolonged conflicts and peacetime standing armies required longer enlistments. As it turned out, new arrivals to the United States tended to be willing to serve in the military for longer durations. This truth held for the Continental Army in the Revolution, and it continued on in the standing army once it was rebuilt after the War of 1812.



However, immigration changed in those years, as Irish Catholics moved to the United States in increasing numbers. In the midst of recurring nativist and anti-Catholic movements and various official restrictions on foreign participation in the military in the antebellum period, Irish Catholic and German immigrants made up somewhere between one-half and two-thirds of the Regular Army between the 1830s and 1850s (Prucha 1969, Coffman 1986). At the same time, the United States expanded toward the southwest, and Mexicans as a minority group began to come into the mix. Long left out of the story of Texas independence, recent scholarship has emphasized the Tejano contributions to the fight against Mexico, most famously in the defense of the Alamo (Roberts and Olson 2001). That said, during the subsequent Mexican–American War, Mexican Americans played a much smaller and less visible role as individual volunteers, and Mexicans on both sides of the border faced intense discrimination from American regular and volunteer forces fighting in the region. Entrenched restrictions on black involvement in the army and navy limited the bulk of African-American efforts in the war to labor duties. Among the minorities of the era, only European immigrants participated in any significant numbers, and even their proportion of the total forces in the war declined when Anglo Protestants joined for short term enlistments in the heady early days of the fight. In fact, minority participation in the Mexican–American War is most notorious for the few hundred soldiers who deserted the American army and fought for the Mexicans as the so-called San Patricio Battalion, because Americans at the time believed Irish Catholics made up the vast majority of the deserters. More recent studies have found that the group included plenty of American-, British-, and German-born, but the Irish label stuck, and fed into the wave of nativism of the 1850s (Miller 1989, McCaffrey 1992, Foos 2002).

As in most areas of American life, the Civil War represented a watershed in minority participation in the military. The war drew nearly three million men into the Federal Army alone, and offered a chance at greater citizenship for immigrant minority groups, expansion of roles for Indians, and the first great opportunity for military service for African-Americans. Thousands of first and second generation Irish, Germans, and newly arrived Scandinavians also served in the Civil War (at least one-fifth of the total soldiers and sailors on the Union side), mostly in units with no ties to nativity. But northern politicians who recognized an opportunity to garner ethnic bloc votes by appealing to ethnic pride saw to it that a portion of these men served in specifically ethnic units, including the famous Irish Brigade (Tucker 2008) and the German regiments of the Eleventh Corps. Because of Irish contributions in the war, and despite the nastiness of the heavily Irish draft riots of 1863, Irish Catholics generally came off well in the war and began to secure themselves a place in the majority (Lonn 1951, Burton 1998, Bruce 2005). Historians have long argued that the war similarly led to the assimilation of Germans, but Christian Keller (2007) has convincingly challenged this view. The Germans of the Eleventh Corps took an unmerited beating from Northern generals and in the Northern press for their performance at Chancellorsville, the vitriol of which created long-lasting resentment and hesitance to assimilate among the German-American population. In their studies of German regiments, the 15th Missouri

Volunteer Infantry and the 32nd Indiana Infantry, Donald Allendorf (2006) and Joseph R. Reinhart (2006) argue that Germans sought to preserve their ethnic identity by serving in German-language units whose members viewed themselves as superior to other soldiers. Writing to family members in Europe, German immigrants, both the north and south, both soldiers and civilians, emphasized their ethnic solidarity and superior bravery (Kamphoefner and Helbich 2006). Despite the sense of social isolation conveyed in the letters, Irish and German immigrants continued to serve in large numbers after the war, and made up as much as one-half of the Army's enlisted corps in the 1870s. Except for the Irish (Tucker 2006, O'Brien 2007), members of minority groups serving in the Confederacy have not received scholarly attention similar to that accorded their counterparts in Union service (Lonn 1940).

Indians who had sacrificed their own cultural history and more readily assimilated into American society fought alongside white (and sometimes black) soldiers in the larger army. A variety of tribes fought on both sides in the conflict, but, as historian Laurence Hauptman (1995) has argued, the tribes gained no greater respect or less interference from the federal government for their service. That said, when it came to participation in the military, Indian service in the war led directly to the 1866 formation of the formal Indian scouts, where members of tribes like the Crow and Pawnee served with distinction in fighting other tribes in the Indian Wars (Dunlay 1982).

Army officers who worked with Indian troops in the postwar years saw an opportunity for military service that would become vitally important in the years to come. After the war, few in American society were as frustrated with the ongoing struggles with Indians as the soldiers who had to police the frontiers. Even as responsibility for Indian issues went from the War Department to the woefully ineffective Bureau of Indian Affairs in the Department of the Interior, many Army officers honestly wanted to find a peaceful way to end the Indian wars of the west, and believed accelerated assimilation offered the best chance short of genocide. They saw the military as the driving force behind assimilation, and this ideal manifested itself in a way that was key for Indian participation in the military; namely, the integration of Indian scout units into the regular force by the end of the nineteenth century (Dunlay 1982, Tate 1986). At least one historian, Bruce White (1968), has lamented this integration, arguing that segregated units would have represented a point of pride for Indian tribes that had been degraded by the wars of the late nineteenth century. Regardless, the trend had been set, Indians would be integrated in the American military for the twentieth century.

White's model for racial pride came from the experiences of blacks in the military from the Civil War until the outbreak of World War I. Black participation in the military, long limited by official restrictions to menial tasks in the navy and in support of the army, got off to a slow start in the war. Union leaders who sought a fast national reconciliation knew that black soldiers in blue would preclude a peaceable settlement, but events overtook them. The issues of black slavery and black citizenship were at the heart of the war, and the brutal violence of the conflict made it perfectly clear that these issues were the touchstone for what had become

a people's war. Black leaders and white advocates for civil rights recognized that military service in the war represented a real opportunity for African-Americans to show that they deserved full rights as citizens. Their relentless efforts, coupled with the pragmatic consideration that the Union needed able-bodied men, led to the formation of the United States Colored Troops in 1863. These black units remained segregated, blacks were not allowed to become officers, and the army preferred using the men as laborers rather than in combat. But for all that, black units did see some combat, and they distinguished themselves for bravery. Besides, no one could diminish the importance of the roughly 185,000 black troops who served in the Union army during the war (Trudeau 1998, Washington 1999, Wilson 2002, Ofele 2004). Likewise, the service of the blacks in the navy, where approximately 8 percent of enlisted men were black, had some effect. (Valuska 1993, Reidy 2001). Steven Ramold (2002) argues that service by blacks in the Union navy constituted "a unique experiment in social equality" (182). As a result of their service, African-Americans received citizenship (Cornish 1956, Glatthaar 1990, Smith 2002), but the full benefits of citizens were often denied them. Donald R. Shaffer, *After the Glory: The Struggles of Black Civil War Veterans* (2004), contends that African-Americans fought not just for freedom and citizenship, but also "to actualize that freedom by gaining for black men the same opportunities, rights, and status as white men" (203). Achievement in these areas was limited. Indeed, African-Americans Army veterans had to struggle to gain benefits granted white veterans – and African-American Navy veterans – and even recognition for their services. Even the Grand Army of the Potomac, the principle veterans' organization of the Civil War, relegated them to segregated posts.

On the other hand, although southern slaves worked in military support roles and occasionally picked up arms in battle against the Union, the abortive and very limited Confederate efforts to arm blacks near the end of the war reflected desperation at catastrophic troop shortages, and did not signal a happier picture of race relations in the slaveholding South, as some Lost Cause advocates have long maintained (Jordan 1995, Levine 2006).

As with the Indian scouts, the war led directly to the formation of four segregated permanent black regiments after the war, still led by white officers only. These regiments, the famous Buffalo Soldiers, had complex internal racial relations and fascinating external contacts with white civilians in the west, but became especially renowned for their performance in the Indian Wars and the Spanish-American War, and became a source of pride for African-Americans suffering through the era of Jim Crow (Leckie 1967, Christian 1995, Kenner 1999, Dobak and Phillips 2001). There was no official move to purge the navy of blacks, though President Benjamin Harrison's General Order No. 409 limited most new recruits to serving as messmen and stewards after 1893 (Harrod 1978, Williams 2008).

The Civil War and postwar period solidified the standards for minorities in the military, with some notable additions. Minorities, especially white immigrant groups, could still earn citizenship and the right to help define what it meant to be an American through military service. Indians still served in a variety of roles, but military service became less about individual or collective tribal rights and more

about assimilation (much like the immigrants). Blacks finally had a permanent role in the army, but under the very clear conditions that they would be segregated from white troops and would serve under white officers. These conditions guaranteed that the degree to which military service would be a path toward African-Americans joining and shaping the majority remained limited. They had become citizens and they continued to contribute, but postwar America had sacrificed reconstruction based on racial equality to accelerate sectional reconciliation, and it was not about to threaten that reconciliation by integrating blacks in the military, or even allowing them anything like equal treatment (Fletcher 1974).

The turn of the twentieth century presented new challenges. Immigration, heretofore limited mainly to the British Isles and Germany, now became centered around southern and eastern Europe (with Asians also arriving in increasing numbers). The military began to reflect that change, but many in the officer corps felt the influence of the so-called Social Darwinist impulses of the era, and put restrictions on service by foreigners in 1890 to prevent the mongrelization of the force. Other officers saw an opportunity to assimilate these newcomers, and immigrants who could speak English and declared their intent to become citizens continued to serve in significant numbers, making up 12 to 15 percent of the Army in the years after the Spanish–American War (Bendersky 2000, Coffman 2004). As the navy incorporated new technology it discarded antiquated personnel policies and looked beyond ports to the interior to recruit men for the new steel navy, and this shift – along with continued hostility toward blacks within the service and the passage of Jim Crow laws – resulted in the departure of black sailors, except messmen and stewards, from the navy; a policy that was codified in 1919 when the service suspended first enlistments of messmen. Since navy policy limited blacks to serving as messmen and stewards this virtually ended new black enlistments, a policy that would not be changed until 1930 (Harrod 1978, 1979b, Williams 2008).

American entry into World War I, the need for millions of well-trained soldiers to fight a modern war, and the subsequent mass mobilization brought debates over immigrant status and race relations to the forefront. No war before or since served as such a direct conduit between minority service and citizenship. Over two and a half million men served in the US Army in the First World War, many of them drafted through Selective Service. Historian Nancy Gentile Ford (2001) has calculated that of these men, roughly half a million, or 18 percent, were foreign-born immigrants. And that number does not account for the second and third generation Americans who still lived in ethnic enclaves and still represented European minority groups more than old line Anglo Protestants. Though Brigadier General Harvey Jervey stated that “It is not the policy of the United States Army to encourage or permit the formation of distinctive brigades, regiments, battalions or other organizations composed exclusively or primarily of members of any race, creed, political or social group,” some ethnically monolithic units did serve (Sterba 2001). These soldiers, to include many thousands of eastern European Jews, represented a new challenge to a modern industrialized military because many of them lacked basic skills and even a working knowledge of English. The military had enough troubles organizing and training for modern war without having to

translate for immigrant Polish, Italian, and Hungarian troops. But that was the reality, so the Army set up special camps to teach English to non-speakers. More than primers in language, these camps became heavy-handed schoolhouses for Americanism, as the law dictated that immigrants who served in the military would be fast-tracked for citizenship. Over 150,000 troops took advantage of these provision and became American citizens directly through their wartime service. This bargaining between majority and minority to expand the definition of American carried on for a short while after war's end, but the military shrank in the peace, strong nativism returned in the 1920s and 1930s, and the importance of ethnic participation became minimal (White 1968, Chambers 1987, Ford 2001, Sterba 2003, Slotkin 2005).

Indians followed a similar course in the war, as lingering treaties and policies meant that roughly one-half of all Native Americans were not technically US citizens. Those non-citizens, like European immigrants, were exempt from the draft, but could gain citizenship through voluntary service. Thousands did so, and along with Indians who could be drafted, accounted for some 12,000 troops in the war. Their service was used in the debates to garner all Indians living in the United States citizenship in 1924 (White 1968, Britten 1997). Between 1919 and 1926, Joseph Dixon interviewed 1,672 Indian veterans about their service and found that most were disappointed when they did not receive citizenship (Krouse 2007). Likewise, Asian immigrants and their children, most of whom began arriving after the Civil War, were by law exempted from American citizenship right up through World War I. Several thousand individuals of Chinese, Japanese, Korean, Vietnamese, and Filipino descent fought for the American military in the war, many with great distinction. As historian Lucy Salyer has pointed out, their service came in an era of aggressive military nationalism balanced against rabid nativism. Something had to give, and in the end military service (along with strong support from the American Legion) led directly to Asian veterans becoming citizens after the war (Salyer 2004).

Of all of the ethnic and racial minority groups that served in World War I, only African-Americans did not have to use military service as a path to citizenship – on the most basic level, they already were citizens. But that technical right meant very little in the era of Jim Crow, and service in the war seemed to offer blacks an opportunity to get past superficial recognition and earn true equality as citizens. Yet the war showed that the unequal treatment of segregated units had begun to offset whatever value that could be gained from the brave example of independent black forces fighting for their country. The Army organized, trained, and equipped several regiments and divisions for service, but it hesitated to put black units in combat. Several of the black units that did get into the fight were loaned to Allied forces, particularly the French, who had much less of a problem with racist sentiments. Not surprisingly, these men, unconstrained by the prejudices of their leaders, fought better than their counterparts in American commands. When black units did fight in American forces their record was mixed, which the military portrayed as proof of the inferiority of African-Americans. Pressure from black leaders and the black press forced the War Department to begin training black officers,

639 of which graduated from Fort Des Moines in 1917, many of whom led units of the 92nd Infantry Division in France in 1918 and in Italy during World War II (Patton 1981). Following the end of the war, entrenched prejudices made it difficult for blacks to parlay their efforts in the war into better treatment at home, and made apparent to civil rights leaders the need to integrate the armed forces (Barbeau and Henri 1974).

Mass mobilization in the industrial age made military participation by homosexuals an official issue for the first time. Prior to World War I, homosexuals served in all of America's wars on an individual and anecdotal basis. Almost always, those homosexuals who were discovered were run out of the service, but they were only dealt with as the need arose. The World War I era changed all of that, as developing personnel policies led to a perceived need to codify homosexual acts as crimes. The resulting wartime Articles of War defined assault with intent to commit sodomy and then sodomy itself as a felony. That basic policy carried on into the interwar years, but changed again in World War II in response to a growing trend to define homosexual tendencies, as opposed to acts, as a psychological affliction that ran counter to effective military service. For most of the war, selective service could and did disqualify potential service members for homosexuality. That said, recruitment boards and military doctors could only go so far in determining the sexual orientation of enlistees who did not commit overt acts, and so thousands of homosexuals served in all branches and in all theaters. The same pattern of official exclusion and *de facto* service continued into the postwar years, and defined gay and lesbian participation in the military throughout the Cold War (Bérubé 1990, Shilts 1993).

World War II, like the Civil War and World War I, dramatically affected minority participation in the military and the meanings of American citizenship. The vast scale of the conflict pulled nearly 16 million Americans, 12 percent of the total population, into the armed forces, most of them through Selective Service. Building on the experiences of World War I, and concerned with maintaining efficiency while ameliorating the regional, religious, and ethnic divisions among the recruits from a diverse society, the architects of the American military actively sought to distribute most of the population evenly into their roles as soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen. In part, changes to society allowed for this policy. Most notably, immigration had been all but shut down by restrictions in the 1920s, which left only a handful of recruits who could not speak English when they entered the service. The end result was that the vast majority of European ethnic and religious groups, most non-Japanese Asian Americans, and most Native Americans, excluding Navajo and other Indian code talkers (Aaseng 1992, Franco 1999, Meadows 2002), served in integrated services throughout the conflict (although some National Guard units carried a flavor of regional cultures into the early part of the war). This service in this structure led ethnic minorities to gain a heightened sense of belonging and agency as Americans, and, especially in regard to the white ethnic groups, the feeling was reciprocated by the majority. A number of scholars have argued that World War II service and the subsequent GI Bill helped lead to an increase in tolerance at home among white ethnic and religious groups after the war, and set some



Indian and Asian groups on a similar, albeit longer, path (Bernstein 1991, Takaki 2000, Moore 2004, Bruscino 2010, Wong 2005).

As a result of this almost relentlessly fair system, the exceptions to the rule stand out all the more. Japanese-Americans, long-reviled in America as racial inferiors, came under even more opprobrium in the aftermath of Pearl Harbor. The government forcibly removed roughly 115,000 individuals of Japanese descent from the west coast and interred them in camps, while Japanese-Americans on Hawaii lived under a constant veil of suspicion. Given the extreme reactions against the Japanese, it should come as no surprise that the military kept Japanese-American service members in segregated units (with the exception of translators for the Pacific theater). Even in the face of such discrimination, or perhaps because of it, Japanese-American troops, especially the vast majority in the 442nd Regimental Combat Team, served with high distinction and gained a lasting sense of pride in the knowledge that they had proven themselves as Americans (Takaki 2000, Asahina 2006, Yenne 2007).

African-Americans remained the other key exception to the inclusive World War II military, at least for most of the war. As in previous conflicts, the African-American community saw military participation as a path to improved conditions at home (Gibson 2005). This time, however, the war led to key changes. The black vote had become a more important bloc during the 1930s, and civil rights leaders like A. Philip Randolph used that power to fight for better treatment during the war (Garfinkel 1959). President Franklin Roosevelt responded with an executive order creating the Fair Employment Practice Committee to fight discrimination in defense industries and with the promotion of Benjamin O. Davis to become America's first black general, but integration of the military was still for many Americans a step too far (Kryder 2000, Wynn 1975, Buchanan 1977, Osur 1977, McGuire 1983, Fletcher 1989). So the over one million blacks who served in the war did so in segregated units in the Army and Army Air Force (Moore 2005), for example, in transport units such as "the Red Ball Express" (Colley 2000), doing heavy labor such as in the 449th Signal Construction Battalion of the Army Air Corps (Copeland 2006), as stewards and cooks in the Navy (Allen 1989, Miller 2004), and only in small numbers in the segregated Marines (Shaw and Donnelly 1975, Nalty 1995). Some individuals and units stood out in this system, for example Navy cook Doris Miller became famous for manning a machine gun on the *West Virginia* during the attack on Pearl Harbor (Parker 2003), members of the 761st Tank Battalion who fought with George Patton's Third Army in Europe (Abdul-Jabbar and Walton 2004, Sasser 2005), and the "Tuskegee Airmen" of the 99th Pursuit Squadron and later 332nd Fighter Group who distinguished themselves in action over Europe (Francis 1955, Percy 2003). But the most prominent black unit, the 92nd Infantry Division, had a less-than-stellar combat record fighting in Italy (Gibran 2001). The unit never could overcome low morale caused by divisions between the black soldiers and junior officers (most of whom came from the South based on the popular theory that southern officers knew better how to handle black troops), and the division commander, General Edward M. Almond, generally held African-Americans in contempt (Wilson 1992). The

Navy judged its experiment of assigning all-black crews to two vessels, the destroyer escort *Mason* and subchaser *1264*, a solid success but made no move to integrate the crews of any warships (Mueller 1945, Purdon 1972, Kelly 1995). In 1945 a severe shortage of infantry replacements led General Eisenhower to order the integration of combat divisions. David P. Colley (2003) interviewed veterans of the 5th Platoon, K Company, 394th Regiment, 99th Infantry Division to relate experiences of the first such unit to enter combat in Germany. By the end of the war, primarily in response to personnel shortages, the Army and Navy experimented with quasi-integrated units and ships. Both experiments enjoyed great, if quiet, success (Lee 1966, Nalty 1986, Kelly 1995, Knoblock 2005, Moore 1996). Daniel Kryder (2000) concludes that more was not achieved because white leaders were not fully committed to integration. Instead their "policy was essentially the result of statesmen's attempts to retain public office and maximize the manpower and economic product of an uneasy collaboration with race organizations pursuing new rights and privileges" (Kryder 2000: 26).

After the war, the services returned to old policies of segregation and exclusion, but the increasingly publicized plight of black veterans returning to racism at home, the efforts of civil rights leaders, and sympathetic politicians like President Harry S. Truman led to a series of boards and committees to investigate the role of African-Americans in the armed forces. Despite resistance from services that wanted to maintain the status quo, the evidence gathered by these boards about World War II indicated once and for all that whatever the benefit of independent black units in the past, racial segregation had become woefully inefficient and morally bankrupt. Truman issued Executive Order 9981 in July 1948, ordering the eventual desegregation of the military. The services dragged their feet in enacting the order until the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950. Then the exigencies of the war, the perceived subpar performance of the segregated 24th Infantry Regiment, the perfectly capable performance of Marine and Army units that experimented with true integration, and ongoing pressure for desegregation from civil rights leaders led to widespread integration throughout the fighting forces (Blair 1987, Bowers, Hammond, and Macgarrigle 1996). At the time, and in large part to try to mollify foes of desegregation, the services emphasized that matters of efficiency drove integration, but that only tells part of the story (Nelson 1951, Gropman 1978). The idealistic efforts of civil rights advocates and like-minded political and military leaders accelerated the process, though the 1950 Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services, commonly referred to as the Fahy Committee, did not propose "the immediate and complete abandonment of all racial units [it did recommend] that qualified Negroes shall be sent to school and assigned where they are needed and qualified without regard to race" (Billington 1966, Dalfiume 1969). In 1951, the Army contracted with the Operations Research Office of Johns Hopkins University to conduct a study of racial integration in the service. Later that year Project Clear, as it became known, reported that the integration of the Army had been a success during World War II and the years that followed (Bogart 1969), and by 1954, there were no more segregated units in the US Armed Forces (Nichols 1954, MacGregor 1981).

Racial integration led to another reframing of the issue of minority participation in the military. African-Americans joined and were drafted into the post-Korea military at rates that began to reflect their proportion of the larger population, but black officers lagged behind in these numbers (Stillwell 1993). The institutional racism that had been explicit in segregation became refocused into ongoing battles over issues of fair housing and personal acts of resistance to equal treatment. By the 1960s, discontent with the slow pace of civil rights in the wider country led to more militant activism from the black community. When draft and personnel policies kept many white college students from the military, and left black troops serving in combat and dying in disproportionately high numbers in the early years of the Vietnam War, the troops and the activists took notice. Racial relations became strained but tolerable at the frontlines, contentious away from the combat zones, and downright hostile on the homefront (Moskos 1966), leading the Department of Defense to establish the Defense Race Relations Institute. Over time the Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute (as it was renamed in 1979), also addressed issues of gender, ethnicity, and religion. Success was not immediate. Toward the end of US involvement in the Vietnam War, for example, three navy ships experienced outbreaks of racial violence (Graham 2001). These tensions led to an evening out of the effort and sacrifice in proportion to the population, but not before the image had been created that the American military would willfully use minority troops as cannon fodder (Nalty 1986, Westheider 1997, Graham 2003).

The close of the Vietnam era, the end of the draft, and the advent of the All-Volunteer Force led to several broad changes in the issues of minority service. After World War II, most white ethnic groups all but disappeared as recognizable minorities. The late 1960s saw an emergence of various ethnic pride movements in wider America that continues in one form or another to this day, but those movements have not materially changed the status of white ethnic groups in the military. (Although these movements did lead to the creation of a quasi-racial category for Hispanic-Americans, who now serve in numbers roughly proportionate to the population.) Native Americans continued to serve in high numbers in the All-Volunteer Force, and have also been fully integrated as a group. Nor have any of the various Asian-American groups faced particularly unique issues as minorities in the military since Vietnam. Despite the racially driven incidents in the 1970s especially, the status of African-Americans has also stabilized. In the last three decades of the twentieth century, blacks joined in high numbers as enlisted men – by 1982 blacks formed 20 per cent of the military, twice their proportion of American society as a whole – and over that time the number of black officers slowly crept up (Binkin and Eitelberg 1982, Moskos and Butler 1996). Since the mid-1990s, and accelerating since September 11, 2001, minority participation as both officers and enlisted troops has moved toward a closer balance with the minority proportion in the overall population of the country, with the exception of Indians and Pacific islanders, who serve at higher rates. It remains to be seen what effect the Global War on Terrorism will ultimately have on minority participation, but until the term “minority” is redefined once again, it seems as though

the current crop of minorities have a solid place in a fully integrated force (Segal and Segal 2004, Kane 2005).

The primary challenge to the current paradigm comes from the ongoing issue of homosexuals in the military. From World War II on, the military actively sought to exclude homosexuals from the services. However, after a brief spike in investigations in the late 1940s and early 1950s, the system grew lax in actively searching for homosexuals in most of the years until the end of the Vietnam War. The Department of Defense cracked down again in the early 1980s, after gay and lesbian troops began to use the courts to have the restrictions against homosexuality lifted. President Bill Clinton attempted to assist the lifting of restrictions in the 1990s, only to have his efforts rerouted into the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell, Don't Pursue" policy. That tenuous compromise pleased neither the groups who wish to see all gays and lesbians excluded from the military nor the activists who argue for homosexual inclusion. Change may or may not be in the offing, but the policy has remained in place for over a decade, and the issue is politically charged enough that most politicians are hesitant to get involved (Shilts 1993, Herek, Jobe, and Carney 1996, Belkin and Bateman 2003, Estes 2007).

It is unclear at this time if American society or the US military will consider gays and lesbians "minorities" in the traditional sense, but it is obvious why it is in the interest of gay rights advocates that they do. Military service as a recognized minority group has long been a direct path to American citizenship in its fullest meaning, to include all the rights and privileges American citizens enjoy (Karst 1991, Gerstle 2001) That so many have struggled just for the chance to make the sacrifice that the country demands to grant citizenship is an ongoing testament to the power of those rights and privileges – and a powerful reminder of why Americans have guarded that chance so closely, oftentimes even to a fault.

#### BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Aaseng, Nathan (1992). *Navajo Code Talkers: America's Secret Weapon in World War II*. New York: Walker & Co.
- Abdul-Jabbar, Kareem, and Anthony Walton (2004). *Brothers in Arms: The Epic Story of the 761st Tank Battalion, WWII's Forgotten Heroes*. New York: Broadway Books.
- Allen, Robert L. (1989). *The Port Chicago Mutiny*. New York: Warner Books.
- Allendorf, Donald (2006). *The Odyssey of a German Regiment in the Yankee Army: The 15th Missouri Volunteer Infantry*. Kent, OH: Kent State University Press.
- Altoff, Gerald T. (1996). *Amongst My Best Men: Africans and the War of 1812*. Put-in-Bay, OH: Perry Group.
- Anderson, Fred (1984). *A People's Army: Massachusetts Soldiers and Society in the Seven Years War*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Anderson, Fred (2000). *Crucible of War: The Seven Years' War and the Fate of Empire in British North America, 1754–1766*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Asahina, Robert (2006). *Just Americans: How Japanese Americans Won a War at Home and Abroad*. New York: Gotham.
- Barbeau, Arthur E., and Florette Henri (1974). *The Unknown Soldiers: African-American Troops in World War I*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

- Belkin, Aaron, and Geoffrey Bateman, eds. (2003). *Don't Ask, Don't Tell: Debating the Gay Ban in the Military*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
- Bendersky, Joseph W. (2000). *The "Jewish Threat": Anti-Semitic Politics of the U.S. Army*. New York: Basic Books.
- Bernstein, Alison R. (1991). *American Indians and World War II: Toward a New Era in Indian Affairs*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Bérubé, Allan (1990). *Coming Out Under Fire: The History of Gay Men and Women in World War Two*. New York: Free Press.
- Billington, Monroe (1966). "Freedom to Serve: The President's Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Forces, 1949–1950," *Journal of Negro History*, 51:4 (October), 262–74.
- Binkin, Martin, and Mark J. Eitelberg (1982). *Blacks and the Military*. Washington: Brookings Institution Press.
- Blair, Clay (1987). *The Forgotten War: America in Korea, 1950–1953*. New York: Times Books.
- Bogart, Leo, ed. (1969). *Social Research and the Desegregation of the U.S. Army Project Clear*. Chicago: Markham Publishing Co.
- Bowers, William T., William M. Hammond, and George L. Macgarrigle (1996). *Black Soldier, White Army: The 24th Infantry Regiment in Korea*. Washington: US Army Center of Military History.
- Britten, Thomas A. (1997). *American Indians in World War I: At Home and At War*. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press.
- Bruce, Susannah Ural (2005). "'Remember Your Country and Keep up Its Credit': Irish Volunteers and the Union Army, 1861–1865," *The Journal of Military History*, 69:2 (April), 331–59.
- Bruscino, Thomas (2010). *A Nation Forged in War: How World War II Taught Americans to Get Along*. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press.
- Buchanan, A. Russell (1977). *Black Americans in World War II*. Santa Barbara, CA: Clio Books.
- Burton, William L. (1998). *Melting Pot Soldiers: The Union's Ethnic Regiments*, 2nd edn. New York: Fordham University Press.
- Calloway, Colin G. (1995). *The American Revolution in Indian Country: Crisis and Diversity in Native American Communities*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Canaday, Margot (2001). *U.S. Military Integration of Religious, Ethnic, and Racial Minorities in the Twentieth Century*, Center for the Study of Sexual Minorities in the Military, University of California Santa Barbara. Downloadable copy at: <http://www.gaymilitary.ucsb.edu/Publications/canaday.htm>, accessed April 25, 2009.
- Chambers, John Whiteclay II (1987). *To Raise an Army: The Draft Comes to Modern America*. New York: Free Press.
- Coffman, Edward M. (1986). *The Old Army: A Portrait of the American Army in Peacetime*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Coffman, Edward M. (2004). *The Regulars: The American Army, 1898–1941*. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
- Colley, David P. (2000). *The Road to Victory: The Untold Story of World War II's Red Ball Express*. Washington: Brassey's.
- Colley, David P. (2003). *Blood for Dignity: The Story of the First Integrated Combat Unit in the U.S. Army*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Copeland, Jeffrey (2006). *Inman's War: A Soldier's Story of Life in a Colored Battalion in WWII*. St. Paul, MN: Paragon House.

- Cornish, Dudley Taylor (1956). *The Sable Arm: Black Troops in the Union Army, 1861–1865*. New York: Longman.
- Christian, Garna L. (1995). *Black Soldiers in Jim Crow Texas, 1899–1917*. College Station: Texas A&M University Press.
- Dalfiume, Richard M. (1969). *Desegregation of the U.S. Armed Forces: Fighting on Two Fronts, 1939–1953*. Columbia: University of Missouri Press.
- Dobak, William A., and Thomas D. Phillips (2001). *The Black Regulars, 1866–1898*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Dowd, Gregory Evans (1992). *A Spirited Resistance: The North American Indian Struggle for Unity, 1745–1815*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Dunlay, Thomas W. (1982). *Wolves for the Blue Soldiers: Indian Scouts and Auxiliaries with the United States Army, 1860–90*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
- Estes, Steve (2007). *Ask and Tell: Gay and Lesbian Veterans Speak Out*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Farr, James Baker (1989). *Black Odyssey: The Seafaring Traditions of Afro-Americans*. New York: Peter Lang.
- Fletcher, Marvin (1974). *The Black Soldier and Officer in the United States Army, 1890–1917*. Columbia: University of Missouri Press.
- Fletcher, Marvin (1989). *America's First Black General: Benjamin O. Davis, Sr., 1880–1970*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
- Foner, Jack D. (1974). *Blacks and the Military in American History: A New Perspective*. New York: Praeger.
- Foos, Paul (2002). *A Short, Offhand, Killing Affair: Soldiers and Social Conflict during the Mexican–American War*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Ford, Nancy Gentile (2001). *Americans All!: Foreign-born Soldiers in World War I*. College Station: Texas A&M University Press.
- Francis, Charles E. (1955). *The Tuskegee Airmen: The Story of the Negro in the U.S. Air Force*. Boston: Bruce Humphries.
- Franco, Bishop (1999). *Crossing the Pond: The Native American Effort in World War II*. Denton, TX: University of North Texas Press.
- Frey, Silvia R. (1991). *Water from the Rock: Black Resistance in a Revolutionary Age*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Garfinkel, Herbert (1959). *When Negroes March: The March on Washington Movement in the Organizational Politics for FEPC*. Glencoe, IL: Free Press.
- Gerstle, Gary (2001). *American Crucible: Race and Nation in the Twentieth Century*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Gibran, Daniel K. (2001). *The 92nd Infantry Division and the Italian Campaign in World War II*. Jefferson, NC: McFarland.
- Gibson, Thuman K. (2005). *Knocking Down Barriers: My Fight for Black America*. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.
- Glatthaar, Joseph T. (1990). *Forged in Battle: The Civil War Alliance of Black Soldiers and White Officers*. New York: Free Press.
- Glatthaar, Joseph T., and James Kirby Martin (2006). *Forgotten Allies: The Oneida Indians and the American Revolution*. New York: Hill and Wang.
- Graham, Herman (2001). “Black, and Navy Too: How Vietnam Era African-American Sailors Asserted Manhood through Black Power Militancy,” *Journal of Men's Studies*, 9:2 (Winter), 227–41.
- Graham, Herman (2003). *The Brothers' Vietnam War: Black Power, Manhood, and the Military Experience*. Gainesville: University Press of Florida.



- Gropman, Alan (1978). *Air Force Integrates, 1945–1964*. Washington: Office of Air Force History.
- Harrod, Frederick S. (1978). *Manning the New Navy: The Development of a Modern Naval Enlisted Force, 1899–1940*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
- Harrod, Frederick S. (1979a). "Integration of the Navy (1941–1978)," United States Naval Institute *Proceedings*, 105:10 (October), 40–7.
- Harrod, Frederick S. (1979b). "Jim Crow in the Navy, 1798–1941," United States Naval Institute *Proceedings*, 105:9 (September 1979), 46–53.
- Hauptman, Laurence M. (1995). *Between Two Fires: American Indians in the Civil War*. New York: Free Press.
- Herek, Gregory M., Jared B. Jobe, and Ralph M. Carney, eds. (1996). *Out in Force: Sexual Orientation and the Military*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Herrera, Ricardo A. (2001). "Self-Governance and the American Citizen as Soldier, 1775–1861," *Journal of Military History*, 65:1 (January), 21–52.
- Jordan, Ervin L., Jr. (1995). *Confederates and Afro-Yankees in Civil War Virginia*. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia.
- Kamphoefner, Walter D., and Wolfgang Helbich, eds. (2006). *Germans in the Civil War: The Letters They Wrote Home*, trans by Susan Carter Vogel. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Kane, Tim (2005). "Who Bears the Burden?: Demographic Characteristics of U.S. Military Recruits Before and After 9/11," A Report of the Heritage Center for Data Analysis, CDA05–08. Washington: Heritage Foundation, November.
- Karst, Kenneth L. (1991). "The Pursuit of Manhood and the Desegregation of the Armed Forces," *UCLA Law Review*, 38 (February), 499–581.
- Keller, Christian (2007). *Chancellorsville and the Germans: Nativism, Ethnicity, and Civil War Memory*. New York: Fordham University Press.
- Kelly, Mary Pat (1995). *Proudly We Served: The Men of the USS Mason*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Kenner, Charles L. (1999). *Buffalo Soldiers and Officers of the Ninth Cavalry, 1867–1898: Black and White Together*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Knoblock, Glenn A. (2003). *"Strong Brave Fellows": New Hampshire's Black Soldiers and Sailors of the Revolution, 1775–1784*. Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Co.
- Knoblock, Glenn A. (2005). *Black Submariners in the United States Navy, 1940–1975*. Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Co.
- Krouse, Susan Applegate (2007). *North American Indians in the Great War*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
- Kryder, Daniel (2000). *Divided Arsenal: Race and the American State during World War II*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Lanning, Michael Lee (2000). *Defenders of Liberty: African Americans in the Revolutionary War*. New York: Citadel.
- Leckie, William H. (1967). *Buffalo Soldiers: A Narrative of the Negro Soldiers in the West*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Lee, Ulysses (1966). *The Employment of Negro Troops*. Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, US Army.
- Lepore, Jill (1998). *The Name of War: King Philip's War and the Origins of American Identity*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Levine, Bruce (2006). *Confederate Emancipation: Southern Plans to Free and Arm Slaves in the Civil War*. New York: Oxford University Press.

- Lonn, Ella (1940). *Foreigners in the Confederacy*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Lonn, Ella (1951). *Foreigners in the Union Army and Navy*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.
- MacGregor, Morris J. (1981). *Integration of the Armed Forces, 1940–1965*. Washington: US Army Center of Military History.
- McGuire, Phillip (1983), “Desegregation of the Armed Forces: Black Leadership, Protest and World War II,” *Journal of Negro History*, 68:1 (Spring), 147–58.
- McCaffrey, James M. (1992). *Army of Manifest Destiny: The American Soldier in the Mexican War, 1846–1848*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- McConnell, Roland C. (1968). *Negro Troops of Ante-Bellum Louisiana: A History of the Battalion of Free Men of Color*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.
- Meadows, William C. (2002). *The Comanche Code Talkers of World War II*. Austin: University of Texas Press.
- Miller, Richard E. (2004). *The Messmen Chronicles: African-Americans in the U.S. Navy, 1932–1942*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Miller, Robert R. (1989). *Shamrock and Sword: The Saint Patrick’s Battalion in the U.S.–Mexican War*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Moore, Brenda L. (1996). *To Serve My Country, To Save My Race: The Story of the Only African American WACS Stationed Overseas during World War II*. New York: New York University Press.
- Moore, Christopher Paul (2005). *Fighting for America: Black Soldiers – The Unsung Heroes of World War II*. New York: One World.
- Moore, Deborah Dash (2004). *GI Jews: How World War II Changed a Generation*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Moskos, Charles C. Jr. (1966). “Racial Integration in the Armed Forces,” *American Journal of Sociology*, 72:2 (September), 133–48.
- Moskos, Charles C., and John Sibley Butler (1996). *All That We Can Be: Black Leadership and Racial Integration the Army Way*. New York: Basic Books.
- Mueller, William R. (1945). “The Negro in the Navy,” *Social Forces*, 24:1 (October), 110–15.
- Nalty, Bernard C. (1986). *Strength for the Fight: A History of Black Americans in the Military*. New York: Free Press.
- Nalty, Bernard C. (1995). *The Right to Fight: African-American Marines in World War II*. Washington: Marine Corps Historical Center.
- Neimeyer, Charles Patrick (1996). *America Goes to War: A Social History of the Continental Army*. New York: New York University Press.
- Nelson, Dennis D. (1951). *The Integration of the Negro into the U.S. Navy*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Young.
- Nichols, Lee (1954). *Breakthrough on the Color Front*. New York: Random House.
- O’Brien, Sean Michael (2007). *Irish Americans in the Confederate Army*. Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Co.
- Ofele, Martin W. (2004). *German-Speaking Officers in the U.S. Colored Troops, 1863–1867*. Gainesville: University Press of Florida.
- Osur, Alan M. (1977). *Blacks in the Army Air Forces during World War II: The Problem of Race Relations*. Washington: Office of Air Force History.
- Parker, Juliette (2003). *A Man Named Doris*. Longwood, FL: Xulon Press.

- Patton, Gerald W. (1981). *War and Race: The Black Officer in the American Military, 1915–1941*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
- Percy, William Alexander (2003). “Jim Crow and Uncle Sam: The Tuskegee Flying Units and the U.S. Army Air Forces in Europe during World War II,” *Journal of Military History*, 67:3 (July), 773–810.
- Prucha, Francis Paul (1969). *The Sword of the Republic: The United States Army on the Frontier, 1783–1846*. New York: Macmillan.
- Purdon, Eric (1972). *Black Company: The Story of Subchaser 1264*. Washington: R. B. Luce.
- Quarles, Benjamin (1961). *The Negro in the American Revolution*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Ramold, Steven J. (2002). *Slaves, Sailors, Citizens: African Americans in the Union Navy*. DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press.
- Reidy, Joseph (2001). “Black Men in Navy Blue during the Civil War,” *Prologue: The Quarterly of the National Archives and Records Administration*, 33:3 (Fall), 154–67.
- Reinhart, Joseph R., trans and ed. (2006). *August Willich’s German Dutchmen: Civil War Letters from the 32nd Indiana Infantry*. Kent, OH: Kent State University Press.
- Roberts, Randy, and James S. Olson (2001). *A Line in the Sand: The Alamo in Blood and Memory*. New York: Free Press.
- Salter, Lucy E. (2004). “Baptism by Fire: Race, Military Service, and U.S. Citizenship Policy, 1918–1935,” *Journal of American History*, 91:3 (December), 847–76.
- Sasser, Charles W. (2005). *Patton’s Panthers: The African-American 761st Tank Battalion in World War II*. New York: Pocket Books.
- Segal, David R., and Mady Wechsler Segal (2004). “America’s Military Population,” *Population Bulletin*, 59:4 (December), 3–40.
- Shaffer, Donald R. (2004). *After the Glory: The Struggles of Black Civil War Veterans*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
- Shaw, Henry I., Jr., and Ralph W. Donnelly (1975). *The Blacks in the Marine Corps*. Washington: Headquarters, US Marine Corps.
- Shilts, Randy (1993). *Conduct Unbecoming: Lesbians and Gays in the U.S. Military, Vietnam to the Persian Gulf*. New York: St. Martin’s Press.
- Slotkin, Richard (2005). *Lost Battalions: The Great War and the Crisis of American Nationality*. New York: Henry Holt.
- Smith, John David, ed. (2002). *Black Soldiers in Blue: African American Troops in the Civil War Era*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Sterba, Christopher M. (2001). “Your Country Wants You”: New Haven’s Italian Machine Gun Company Enters World War I,” *New England Quarterly*, 74:2 (June), 179–209.
- Sterba, Christopher M. (2003). *Good Americans: Italian and Jewish Immigrants during the First World War*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Stillwell, Paul (1993). *The Golden Thirteen: Recollections of the First Black Naval Officers*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Takaki, Ronald T. (2000). *Double Victory: A Multicultural History of America in World War II*. Boston: Little, Brown.
- Tate, Michael L. (1986). “From Scout to Doughboy: The National Debate over Integrating American Indians into the Military, 1891–1914,” *Western Historical Quarterly*, 17:4 (October), 417–37.
- Tucker, Phillip Thomas (2006). *Irish Confederates: The Civil War’s Forgotten Soldiers*. Abilene, TX: McWhiney Foundation Press.

- Tucker, Phillip Thomas (2008). *"God Help the Irish!": The History of the Irish Brigade*. Abilene, TX: McWhiney Foundation Press.
- Titus, James (1991). *The Old Dominion at War: Society, Politics, and Warfare in Late Colonial Virginia*. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.
- Trudeau, Noah Andre (1998). *Like Men of War: Black Troops in the Civil War, 1862–1865*. Boston: Little Brown.
- Valuska, David L. (1993). *The African American in the Union Navy, 1861–1865*. New York: Garland.
- Washington, Versalle F. (1999). *Eagles on Their Buttons: A Black Infantry Regiment in the Civil War*. Columbia: University of Missouri Press.
- Westheider, James E. (1997). *Fighting on Two Fronts: African Americans and the Vietnam War*. New York: New York University Press.
- White, Richard (1991). *The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650–1815*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- White, William Bruce (1968). "The Military and the Melting Pot: The American Army and Minority Groups, 1865–1924," PhD dissertation, University of Wisconsin.
- Williams, Charles Hughes III (2008). "'We Have ... Kept the Negroes' Goodwill and Sent Them Away': Black Sailors, White Dominion in the New Navy, 1893–1942," MA thesis, Texas A&M University.
- Wilson, Dale E. (1992). "Recipe for Failure: Major General Edward M. Almond and Preparation of the U.S. 92nd Infantry Division for Combat in World War II," *Journal of Military History*, 56: 3 (July), 473–88.
- Wilson, Keith P. (2002). *Campfires of Freedom: The Camp Life of Black Soldiers during the Civil War*. Kent, OH: Kent State University Press.
- Wilson, Joseph T. (1888). *The Black Phalanx: African American Soldiers in the War of 1775–1812, 1861–'65*. Hartford, CT: American Publishing Co. [Reprinted with an introduction by Dudley T. Cornish as *The Black Phalanx: African American Soldiers in the War of Independence, the War of 1812, and the Civil War*. New York: Da Capo Press, 1984].
- Wong, K. Scott (2005). *Americans First: Chinese Americans and the Second World War*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Wynn, Neil A. (1975). *The Afro-American and the Second World War*. New York: Holmes and Meier.
- Yenne, Bill (2007). *Rising Sons: The Japanese American GIs Who Fought for the United States in World War II*. New York: Thomas Dunne.

# Chapter Fifty-nine

## MEDALS AND DECORATIONS

*David T. Zabecki*

Decorations are symbolic awards that military organizations use to recognize gallantry, valor, distinguished service, or meritorious achievement. Medals, which rank below decorations in precedence, recognize service in a war, a campaign, a battle, periods of long peacetime service, or simply good conduct. Most American decorations and medals consist of a metal badge suspended from a ribbon that has a color scheme unique to that specific award. The badge of the medal generally consists of a round, bronze medallion. Decorations generally, but not always, tend to have badges in some shape, with stars and crosses being the most common. The badges of some of the higher decorations have enameled portions. The full award of a decoration or a medal, consisting of the suspension ribbon and the badge, is worn only on special occasions and on the dress uniform. For normal occasions the award is represented by a ribbon bar worn on the service uniform. Some of the lower level service awards exist only in the form of a ribbon bar. Many American awards, including the Medal of Honor, Distinguished Service Medal, the Bronze Star Medal, and the Meritorious Service Medal, are actually decorations, despite having the word “medal” in their official names.

### **The Early Years of the Republic**

Modern military decorations evolved from the system of chivalric and noble orders that existed in Europe for hundreds of years (Werlich 1965). In most European armies the system of military decorations at the higher levels merged with the system of orders. Such orders were always awarded only to officers. Some countries, like Great Britain, had until only very recently a dual system of decorations, one for officers and one for enlisted personnel. The United States, of course, had no tradition of chivalric or noble orders, and for that reason there was widespread resistance to the introduction of permanent military decorations and medals until as late as the Civil War period. Nonetheless, from the very beginning of the republic the US Congress recognized exceptional service by presenting high ranking

military officers with the Congressional Gold Medal, the highest award bestowed by the Congress. Quite often the Congressional Gold Medal is confused with or mistakenly equated to the Medal of Honor.

Rather than being a military decoration for wear on the uniform, the Congressional Gold Medal is relatively large and intended for display in a case or on a table top. Each individual medal is passed by an act of Congress and uniquely designed for the person being honored. The recipient of the first Congressional Gold Medal was General George Washington in March 1776. The Continental Congress honored six other individuals with gold medals (Horatio Gates, Anthony Wayne, Henry Lee, Daniel Morgan, Nathaniel Greene, and John Paul Jones) for actions during the Revolution. Although not exclusively intended to honor military achievement, all 34 individual (and the one group, the "Rescuers of the Officers and Crew of the U.S. Brig Somers" in 1847) recipients of the Congressional Gold Medal were military officers until 1864, when Cornelius Vanderbilt became the first civilian so honored. As the military awards system evolved during the years after the Civil War, civilians have become the majority of the recipients of the Congressional Gold Medal, although military officers still receive the honor occasionally. Immediately following World War II, in 1946, General of the Army George C. Marshall, Fleet Admiral Ernest King, General of the Armies John J. Pershing and William Mitchell received Congressional Gold Medals, as did Admiral Hyman Rickover, twice (1958 and 1982), General of the Army Douglas MacArthur (1962), Generals Matthew B. Ridgeway (1990), Ira E. Eaker (1978), and Colin Powell and Norman Schwarzkopf following the first Gulf War in 1991. The most recent military officer to receive the Congressional Gold Medal was former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Henry Shelton, in January 2002. The Navajo Code Talkers (2000) and Tuskegee Airmen (2006) have also received Congressional Gold Medals.

The United States was the first nation to confer military awards on common soldiers. In 1780 the Continental Congress authorized decorations for three New York militiamen to recognize their roles in capturing British intelligence officer Major John Andre, who was Benedict Arnold's contact. The so-called Andre Medals were one-time creations. The first standing American military decoration was the Badge of Military Merit, established by Washington in 1782. The badge consisted of a purple cloth heart and was awarded only three known times. Sergeant Elijah Churchill of the 2nd Regiment Light Dragoons was the first to receive the badge. After the Revolution the award fell into disuse, until it was re-established in its modern form in 1932 as the Purple Heart, awarded for wounds (including mortal wounds) received in combat. The Purple Heart was made retroactive to service in World War I. Prior to that, World War I wounds were indicated by a small inverted chevron (point down) for each wound received, worn on the soldier's lower right sleeve. The same type of chevron worn on the lower left sleeve indicated six months overseas service in World War I.

In 1847 the US Army established the Certificate of Merit to be awarded to Army privates and noncommissioned officers for acts of heroism in the presence of the enemy. 539 Certificates of Merit were awarded for service in the Mexican War



before the award was discontinued. Reinstated in 1874 to recognize gallantry in action in the presence of the enemy and in 1892 broadened to include “distinguished service whether in action or otherwise, of valuable character to the United States.” Before the award became obsolete in 1918, 462 were awarded for gallantry in action, and 205 under the broadened criteria. Originally the award consisted only of a certificate, an entry in the soldier’s record, and an extra \$2.00 per month in pay. In 1905 a medal was authorized for all holders of the certificate. The Certificate of Merit became obsolete in 1918. Initially, all holders of the Certificate were authorized to convert their award to the newly established Distinguished Service Medal. Later, that was changed to the Distinguished Service Cross.

America’s first permanent military decoration, the Medal of Honor – often erroneously called the “Congressional Medal of Honor” – was established during the early days of the Civil War. The idea of Lieutenant Colonel Edward Townsend, Adjutant General of the Army, who wanted a way to motivate and inspire soldiers following setbacks for the Union, it was officially established for the US Navy on December 12, 1861 and for the US Army on July 12, 1862 (Owens 2004, Broadwater 2007). Eligibility for the award was extended to the start of the Civil War. The first Medals of Honor awarded were presented to the six survivors of the April 1862 Andrews Raid, popularly known as “The Great Locomotive Chase” (Bonds 2007). The first Medal of Honor action occurred in the Arizona Territory on April 13, 1861, when Army assistant surgeon Bernard J. D. Irwin took command of a detachment of troops and led a mission to relieve a force of infantrymen trapped by a band of Chiricahua Apaches under Cochise, though Congress did not award Irwin the medal until 1894. Indeed, a high proportion of the 1,520 medals awarded for action during the Civil War were not authorized by Congress until long after Appomattox.

The highest American military decoration for battlefield heroism, the Medal of Honor today is awarded by the President in the name of Congress to those members of the US Armed Forces who distinguish themselves by gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of their lives above and beyond the call of duty while engaged in combat against an armed enemy of the United States (Burrelli 2006). Originally authorized only for enlisted men, officers became eligible for the Army Medal of Honor in 1863, and for the Navy Medal of Honor in 1915. The Army and Navy Medals of Honor also differed in that the Army Medal of Honor from the start could be awarded only for acts of combat valor. The Navy Medal of Honor could be awarded for peacetime acts of heroism until 1942. Between 1917 and 1942 the Navy actually had two different designs for the Medal of Honor, one for combat and one for non-combat. The suspension ribbon was the same for both Navy versions (Borch and McDowell 2009).

Nineteen American soldiers, sailors, or Marines have received the Medal of Honor twice. The first was Captain Thomas Custer, who died at the battle of the Little Bighorn along with his brother, Lt. Col. George Armstrong Custer. Of the eight Navy double recipients, two received the Medal of Honor both times for combat actions; two received it once for combat heroism and once for non-combat heroism; and four received it both times for non-combat heroism. During World

War I five Marines received both the Army and the Navy Medal of Honor for the same action. All Marines who served in France during the war came under the operational control of the Army, and therefore initially were awarded Army decorations. After the war the Navy Department for some reason made the decision to give them all the Navy versions of the same award, but the Army Awards were never revoked. Marine Sergeant Major Dan Daly received his first Medal of Honor during the Boxer Rebellion in 1900, and his second in Haiti in 1915. During World War I he was nominated for a third Medal of Honor, but the Army downgraded the award to the Distinguished Service Cross. After the war he also was awarded the Navy Cross for the same action.

For almost 60 years the Medal of Honor was virtually America's only military decoration and the criteria for its award was sometimes far less stringent than it is today. In 1916 a special board convened to review all of the Army's awards and rescind those found to be inappropriate. On February 15, 1917 the Army struck 911 names from the list of 2,625 on the Medal of Honor Rolls. Included were the 29 members of President Abraham Lincoln's funeral escort detail and all 864 members of the 27th Maine Volunteer Infantry Regiment, who were given the award as an incentive to re-enlist just prior to the battle of Gettysburg, though the unit was never actually committed in that battle (Pullen 2007). Among the most famous of those losing their medals in the 'Purge of 1917' were Dr. Mary Walker, America's only female Medal of Honor recipient, and William F. "Buffalo Bill" Cody. Walker, Cody, and four other frontier scouts were stripped of their medals because as civilians they should have been ineligible to receive them in the first place. Dr. Walker's Medal of Honor was restored in 1977 (Spiegel and Spiegel 1994), and Cody and the other scouts had theirs restored in 1989 (Buffalo Bill 1989). Of the numerous books that contain list of recipients of the Medal of Honor, the two most authoritative are *Decorations United States Army: 1862-1926* (Anon. 1927) and *Medal of Honor Recipients and their Official Citations* (Anon. 1997).

Although the US Coast Guard is one of America's armed and military services, it has never been part of the Department of Defense. Originally established in 1790 as the Revenue Cutter Service, the Coast Guard has at various times been part of the Treasury Department, the Transportation Department, and most recently the Department of Homeland Security. In 1900 Congress established the Cardenas Medal of Honor for presentation to crewmen of the cutter *Hudson* in recognition of their gallantry during the War with Spain (King 1996). Three years later Congress awarded gold medals to three Revenue Cutter Service officers for their role in the Pt Barrow Overland Relief Expedition of 1897-8 (Kroll 2002). Another precursor to the Coast Guard, the Life-Saving Service, established the Gold Lifesaving Medal and Silver Lifesaving Medal in 1874 making them among America's oldest standing military awards. In 1915 the Revenue Cutter Service and US Life-Saving Service were merged to form the Coast Guard which has its own decorations for service and achievement. In wartime, the Coast Guard comes under operational control of the Navy, and thus it uses the Navy's decorations to recognize combat valor. The only Coast Guardsman to receive the Medal of

Honor was Douglas Munroe, during World War II. In March 2006 the number of Medal of Honor recipients was 3,442 (Burrelli 2006).

All modern decorations and medals authorized for wear on American military uniforms fall into the following categories by order of precedence: US Military Decorations; US Unit Awards; US Non-Military Decorations; US Campaign Medals and Service Ribbons; US Merchant Marine Awards; and Foreign Decorations, Unit Awards, and Service Awards.

### **US Military Decorations**

The modern system of American military decorations came into being during World War I. With the establishment in 1918 and 1919 of the Distinguished Service Cross, the Navy Cross, and the Distinguished Service Medal, the Congress created the concept of the Pyramid of Honor. For the first time in American history degrees of military service to the nation were established, each worthy of its own level of recognition. In the years following World War I, more than a dozen lower level decorations for valor, distinguished service, and achievement have been added to the American Pyramid of Honor (see Table 59.1).

Some levels of the Pyramid have more than one decoration because the Army and the Navy each have their own unique awards. Through the end of World War II the Air Force was a part of the Army. Even after it was established as a separate service in 1947, it was not until 1960 that the Air Force created its own unique designs for the Medal of Honor and other awards. The Marine Corps, which is part of the Department of the Navy, uses with a few exceptions all of the Navy's medals and decorations.

The Medal of Honor is at the apex of the Pyramid of Honor. The Army, the Navy and the Air Force all have unique designs for the badge of the Medal of Honor, but all use the same ribbon. The now obsolete Marine Corps Brevet Medal ranks either on the same level, or immediately below it and above all other American decorations. (There remains today considerable debate on this issue.) Throughout the nineteenth century, brevet promotions were a widely used method to reward officers for combat heroism. Since Marine officers were not eligible for the Medal of Honor until 1915, such promotions were often considered to have been in lieu of the Medal of Honor. In 1921 the Secretary of the Navy authorized the creation of the Brevet Medal for Marine officers who had received brevet promotions that had been confirmed by the US Senate. Only 23 of the medals were ever awarded, covering the period from the Civil War to the Philippine Insurrection. The design of the Brevet Medal's ribbon is almost identical to that of the Medal of Honor, except that is red rather than blue. One of the 23 recipients, Major General Smedley Butler, received his for actions during the Boxer Rebellion when he was a lieutenant. Butler later earned a Medal of Honor at Vera Cruz in 1914, and a second one in Haiti the following year.

At the second level of the Pyramid of Honor the decorations have slightly different names and completely different designs and ribbons, but the Distinguished

**Table 59.1** The American Pyramid of Honor

Level	Criteria	Army	Air Force	Navy	Marines	Coast Guard	Department of Defense / Joint Service
1	Valor	Medal of Honor (Army) (1862)	Medal of Honor (Air Force) (1960)	Medal of Honor (Navy) (1861)	Medal of Honor (Navy) (1861) Brevet Medal (1921) (Obsolete)	Medal of Honor (Navy) (1861)	
2	Valor	Certificate of Merit (1847–1918) (Obsolete) Distinguished Service Cross (1918)	Air Force Cross (1960)	Navy Cross (1919)	Navy Cross (1919)	Navy Cross (1919)	
3	Distinguished Service	Distinguished Service Medal (Army) (1918)	Distinguished Service Medal (Air Force) (1960)	Distinguished Service Medal (Navy) (1919)	Distinguished Service Medal (Navy) (1919)	Distinguished Service Medal (Coast Guard) (1949)	Defense Distinguished Service Medal (1970)
4	Valor	Silver Star (1918)	Silver Star (1918)	Silver Star (1918)	Silver Star (1918)	Silver Star (1918)	
5	Distinguished Service	Legion of Merit (1942)	Legion of Merit (1942)	Legion of Merit (1942)	Legion of Merit (1942)	Legion of Merit (1942)	Defense Superior Service Medal (1976)

6	Heroism or Achievement	Distinguished Flying Cross (1926)	Distinguished Flying Cross (1926)	Distinguished Flying Cross (1926)	Distinguished Flying Cross (1926)
7	Non-Combat Heroism	Soldier's Medal (1926)	Airman's Medal (1960)	Navy and Marine Corps Medal (1942)	Coast Guard Medal (1951)
8	Life-saving				Gold Lifesaving Medal (1874)
9	Valor or Meritorious Service	Bronze Star Medal (1944)	Bronze Star Medal (1944)	Bronze Star Medal (1944)	Bronze Star Medal (1944)
10	Combat Wounds	Purple Heart (1932)	Purple Heart (1932)	Purple Heart (1932)	Purple Heart (1932)
11	Meritorious Service	Meritorious Service Medal (1969)	Meritorious Service Medal (1969)	Meritorious Service Medal (1969)	Meritorious Service Medal (1969)
12	Valor or Meritorious Achievement	Air Medal (1942)	Air Medal (1942)	Air Medal (1942)	Air Medal (1942)
13	Life-saving				Silver Lifesaving Medal (1874)
14	Meritorious Achievement		Aerial Achievement Medal (1988)		
					Defense Meritorious Service Medal (1977)

Table 59.1 Continued

Level	Criteria	Army	Air Force	Navy	Marines	Coast Guard	Department of Defense/ Joint Service
15	Meritorious Achievement	Army Commendation Medal (1945)	Air Force Commendation Medal (1958)	Navy Commendation Medal (1944)	Navy Commendation Medal (1944)	Coast Guard Commendation Medal (1947)	Joint Service Commendation Medal (1963)
16	Meritorious Achievement	Army Achievement Medal (1981)	Air Force Achievement Medal (1980)	Navy Achievement Medal (1962)	Navy Achievement Medal (1962)	Coast Guard Achievement Medal (1964)	Joint Service Achievement Medal (1983)
17	Combat Action		Air Force Combat Action Medal (2007)	Combat Action Ribbon (1969)	Combat Action Ribbon (1969)	Combat Action Ribbon (1969)	
18	Honorable Conduct as a POW	Prisoner of War Medal (1986)	Prisoner of War Medal (1986)	Prisoner of War Medal (1986)	Prisoner of War Medal (1986)	Prisoner of War Medal (1986)	
19	Good Conduct	Good Conduct Medal (Army) (1941)	Air Force Good Conduct Medal (1960–2006) (Obsolete)	Good Conduct Medal (Navy) (1869)	Marine Corps Good Conduct Medal (1896)	Coast Guard Good Conduct Medal (1921)	
20	Good Conduct	Army Reserve Components Achievement Medal (1971)	Air Reserve Forces Meritorious Service Medal (1964)	Naval Reserve Meritorious Service Medal (1959)	Selected Marine Corps Reserve Medal (1925)	Coast Guard Reserve Good Conduct Medal (1963)	



Service Cross, the Navy Cross, and the Air Force Cross are equivalent as America's second highest combat decorations. Unlike the Medal of Honor, American civilians and soldiers of other nations are eligible for the Distinguished Service Cross and the other awards on this level. Virginia Hall, who was an Office of Strategic Services agent in France during World War II and later worked for the early Central Intelligence Agency, was the only woman ever awarded the Distinguished Service Cross. James Wise and Scott Baron (2007) profile the 21 individuals awarded the Navy Cross in Iraq and Afghanistan describing the actions for which each received the honor.

At the third level, the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Coast Guard Distinguished Service Medals have the same names, but completely different designs and ribbons. The Distinguished Service Medal is the highest American military award for non-combat service. In 1970 the Defense Department established the Defense Distinguished Service Medal to recognize outstanding service while assigned to the Joint Staff in Washington or to one of the joint (multi-service) unified military commands. Although on the same level as the Distinguished Service Medals of the individual services, the Defense Distinguished Service Medal takes precedence over the others.

On the fourth level of the Pyramid the Silver Star is awarded by all five of the military services. America's third highest decoration for combat valor was first authorized in 1918 as the Citation Star, a small silver star device affixed to the ribbon of the World War I Victory Medal to recognize soldiers who had distinguished themselves in combat as documented in official reports. It was an American equivalent to the British Mentioned in Dispatches award. In 1932 the United States converted the Citation Star to the Silver Star, a decoration in its own right.

The Legion of Merit, the second highest award for distinguished service, was established in 1942. Originally it was intended as an award only for citizens of other nations, but eligibility was quickly extended to American military personnel. It is the only American decoration that has different degrees that equate to the level of service. The highest level, Chief Commander of the Legion of Merit, is the only American award in the form of a breast star. It is generally awarded only to foreign officials at the most senior levels. The second level, Commander of the Legion of Merit, is reserved for national chiefs of staff and other senior flag officers. It is the only American military decoration besides the Medal of Honor that has a suspension ribbon worn around the neck. The two lower levels, Officer of the Legion of Merit and Legion of Merit, Legionnaire, have traditional suspension ribbons. The Legionnaire level is the only one for which Americans are eligible. Actor David Niven received the Legion of Merit for his service as a British liaison officer with the US 1st Infantry Division during World War II. Although all five of the services award the Legion of Merit, the Department of Defense in 1976 established the Defense Superior Service Medal to recognize an equal level of distinguished service while serving on the Joint Staff or assigned to a unified command. Although it is on the same level as the Legion of Merit, the Defense Superior Service Medal takes precedence.

The Distinguished Flying Cross was established in 1926 to recognize either heroism or extraordinary achievement in aerial flight. It is awarded by all five

services. The first recipient was Charles A. Lindbergh, a reserve officer, for his solo flight across the Atlantic. The Soldier's Medal, Airman's Medal, Navy and Marine Corps Medal, and the Coast Guard Medal are the respective services' highest decorations for non-combat heroism. The Bronze Star Medal was established during World War II to recognize combat heroism or meritorious service in wartime, not at the level that would justify a Silver Star or a Legion of Merit. Awarded by all five of the services, the Bronze Star Medal for heroism is indicated by a small bronze V Device (which stands for valor) attached to the medal's suspension ribbon and to the ribbon bar. The Bronze Star Medal for meritorious service is a wartime award only. The Meritorious Service Medal, established in 1969, is considered the peacetime service equivalent. Although all five of the services award the Meritorious Service Medal, the Defense Meritorious Service Medal was established in 1977 specifically to recognize outstanding peacetime service on the Joint Staff or one of the unified commands.

The Air Medal, also established during World War II, can be awarded for both heroism and meritorious achievement in aerial flight, in both war and peacetime. An award for a specific act of combat heroism is indicated by the addition of a V Device. Air Medals are generally awarded to both pilots and air crew for flying a certain number of combat missions. All five services award the Air Medal.

The lowest levels of achievement on the Pyramid of Honor are represented by the Commendation Medals and the Achievement Medals of each of the five services and the Department of Defense. As with the other joint awards, the Joint Service Commendation Medal and the Joint Service Achievement Medal take precedence over the commendation and achievement medals of the respective services.

In some countries, most notably Russia, soldiers wear multiple medals or ribbons for subsequent awards of the same decoration. Each subsequent award of a US Army or US Air Force decoration is indicated by a Bronze Oak Leaf Cluster device attached to the suspension ribbon or to the ribbon bar. A Silver Oak Leaf Cluster represents five subsequent awards. The US Navy, US Marine Corps, and US Coast Guard use a Gold Star Device to represent subsequent awards, and a Silver Star Device (not to be confused with the World War I era silver Citation Star) for five subsequent awards.

### **US Unit Awards**

Unit awards recognize outstanding heroism or achievement of entire units. All members of a given unit during the time of the action for which the award is made are authorized to wear the awards permanently, and the award is recorded in their personnel files. Direct participation in the action is not a requirement. Individuals who join the unit later are authorized to wear the awards only so long as they are assigned to the unit, and no entry is made in their personnel records. Unit awards only exist as ribbon bars. The Navy, Marines, and Air Force wear the unit awards over the left breast uniform pocket, immediately after the individual decorations and before the US non-military decorations and the US service and campaign

medals. The Army wears the unit awards over the right breast pocket, completely separate from the individual awards, which are worn on the left side. The ribbon bar of all of the Army and some of the Air Force unit awards is surrounded by a gold colored metal frame. All of the Navy, Marine, Coast Guard, and most of the Air Force unit awards are standard ribbon bars.

The Presidential Unit Citation (PUC) is the highest unit award, often considered the equivalent of a Distinguished Service Cross, Navy Cross, or Air Force Cross for an entire unit. The Army and Air Force versions are a solid blue ribbon with the gold frame. The Navy and Marine version is a standard ribbon bar with red, gold, and blue horizontal stripes. It is one of the few American ribbons in which the stripes run horizontally rather than vertically. Both versions were established in February 1942, and retroactive for actions back to December 7, 1941. The submarine USS *Parche* is the most decorated unit in American history. During the period of the Cold War the *Parche* received nine PUCs for conducting hazardous missions in Soviet waters, including placing taps on undersea cables. Both the 442nd Regimental Combat Team and the 47th Infantry Regiment are next. The near legendary 442nd, which was composed of Japanese Americans, received eight PUCs for service in Europe during World War II. The 47th Infantry received seven PUCs during World War II, and an eighth during Vietnam. The first peacetime award of a PUC went to the submarine USS *Nautilus*, for making the first voyage under the North Pole in July–August 1958. On March 5, 2003 the Secretary of Homeland Security was authorized to award the PUC to Coast Guard units, and three years later the entire Coast Guard, including the Coast Guard Auxiliary, was awarded the PUC for service in response to Hurricane Katrina. Foreign units also are eligible for the PUC. During the Korean War members of the British Army's 1st Battalion, The Gloucestershire Regiment, received the PUC for their gallant battle at the Imjin River in April 1951. During Vietnam the 6th Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment and The Royal New Zealand Artillery's 161 Battery both received the US Army PUC. More recently, the Navy and Marine Corps PUC was awarded to *Kommando Spezialkräfte* (KSK) of the German Bundeswehr on December 7, 2004 for their actions in Afghanistan. This marked the first time that a German unit or individual soldier received an award for combat heroism since 1945.

In 1944 the Navy established the Navy Unit Commendation which could be awarded for action since December 6, 1941 to any Navy or Marine ship, aircraft, detachment, or other unit which distinguished itself in action. The Coast Guard Unit Commendation in 1963, the same year that the Army established the Valorous Unit Citation, and the Air Force established the Gallant Unit Citation in 2004 for units which displayed extraordinary heroism in armed combat on or after September 11, 2001. The VUC is the unit equivalent of a Silver Star. In 1981 the Department of Defense established the Joint Meritorious Unit Award to recognize joint units or single service units supporting a joint mission. The services have established other, lower ranking unit commendation awards to recognize various levels of achievement or service: Next in precedence are the Army (Navy and Coast Guard) Meritorious Unit Commendation and Air Force Meritorious Unit Award,

followed by the Army Superior Unit Award, the Air Force Outstanding Unit Award, and the Coast Guard Meritorious Unit Commendations (for which the Navy has no equivalent), then the Navy “E” Ribbon and Coast Guard “E” Ribbon [for efficiency] and the Organizational Excellence Award (Air Force). The Army has no equivalent of these “efficiency awards.”

### **US Non-Military Decorations**

All of the military services and the Department of Defense have systems of decorations to recognize distinguished and meritorious service and achievement by members of their civilian work forces. Many other branches of government, including the State Department, the Public Health Service, and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration also have their own decorations. Military personnel attached to these different branches of government often receive such awards. The original seven astronauts, for example, were all active duty military officers, and military personnel continue to make up a significant portion of the astronaut corps. Many of these US non-military decorations are authorized for wear on American military uniforms. They rank in precedence directly after US military unit awards, and ahead of US campaign and service medals.

The Presidential Medal of Freedom is America’s highest civilian decoration. Originally established in 1945 as the Medal of Freedom to recognize distinguished service in support of the war effort, it was awarded only nine times by President Harry S. Truman. President Dwight D. Eisenhower conferred only 13 awards. President John F. Kennedy changed the award’s name and design – converting it to a neck order – and expanded the award program significantly. Foreigners are eligible for the Presidential Medal of Freedom. Although not intended as a military award, American military officers have received it on occasion. Brigadier General Andrew Goodpaster was the first in 1961. Admiral Hyman Rickover, General Matthew B. Ridgway, and General Colin Powell have been recipients of both the Presidential Medal of Freedom and the Congressional Gold Medal. Legendary Vietnam War advisor John Paul Vann was posthumously awarded the Presidential Medal of Freedom. Vann also received the Distinguished Service Cross, the only such award to a civilian during the Vietnam War. Although the Presidential Medal of Freedom is one of America’s most prestigious decorations, it ironically is worn in a relatively low position of precedence on military uniforms because of its classification as a US non-military decoration.

### **US Campaign Medals and Service Ribbons**

The Prisoner of War Medal was established by the Department of Defense in 1986 to recognize honorable conduct in captivity during any period after April 5, 1917. Next in precedence are the Good Conduct Medals of the five services which were established to recognize good conduct and exemplary service for a fixed period of

time. The Good Conduct Medals for the active duty components are awarded only to enlisted personnel and noncommissioned officers, although officers who received the Good Conduct Medal for prior enlisted service may continue to wear the award. Curiously, the reserve component versions of the Good Conduct Medals, which are completely different designs, are awarded to officers below the flag officer level. Established in 1869 and 1896 respectively, the Navy and Marine Corps Good Conduct Medals are among the oldest of America's military awards. The Marine Corps Good Conduct Medal is one of the few cases where the Marines have their own unique medal design. The Air Force, which continued to use Army awards for several years after it became a separate service, was authorized by Congress to award the Air Force Good Conduct Medal in 1960 but did not act on that authorization and create the award until 1963. In 2006 the Air Force discontinued the award under the rationale that good conduct is the expected standard of all airmen. The other four services continue to award their Good Conduct Medals.

Campaign medals are awarded to American military personnel for participation in a war or campaign (Emering 1998). The first official campaign medals were established in the first years of the twentieth century, but in the years following the Civil War various non-governmental organizations created a number of unofficial campaign medals. The Civil War veterans' organization, the Grand Army of the Republic (GAR), created a medal for its members that looked conspicuously similar to the Medal of Honor. Nonetheless, Army Regulations until just before World War I authorized the GAR Medal for wear on the uniform. The GAR Medal can be seen clearly in the official portraits of two Chiefs of Staff of the US Army, Lt Gen. Samuel B. M. Young and Lt Gen. John Coalter Bates.

President Theodore Roosevelt is the father of the modern American campaign medal. For many years the Congress had steadfastly refused to authorize campaign medals. Roosevelt decided to bypass the Congress by declaring that campaign medals were badges, and as Commander-in-Chief he had the authority to designate which badges could be worn on military uniforms. In 1905 the Secretary of War issued General Order Number 4, establishing a medal for the Certificate of Merit and campaign medals for the Civil War, the Indian Wars, the Spanish-American War, the Philippine Insurrection, and the China Relief Expedition. The Navy and Marine Corps followed suite in 1908.

Rather than an actual campaign medal, Americans who served in World War I received the World War I Victory Medal. It was a unique award because the same design was used by the armies of all the allied powers. Participation in specific battles and campaigns was indicated by a bar with the campaign name affixed to the suspension ribbon. In 1919 the Marine Corps Expeditionary Medal was created for presentation to personnel who engaged hostile forces on foreign soil in operations which did not qualify for a campaign medal. The Navy followed suit with the Navy Expeditionary Medal in 1936 and made it retroactive to the landing in Honolulu, Hawaii, in 1874. Neither the Army or Air Force had a comparable award until the Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal was created in 1961.

World War II was so large in scope that three different campaign medals were established to recognize service in the different global regions. Virtually all

American military personnel received the American Campaign Medal. Those who deployed overseas to fight against Germany received the European-African-Middle Eastern Campaign Medal. Those who deployed overseas to fight against Japan received the Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal. Participation in a designated battle or campaign is indicated by the attachment of a small Bronze Star Device to the suspension ribbon or the ribbon bar of the appropriate campaign medal. Five campaigns are represented by a small Silver Star Device. Participation in the initial assault of an amphibious or an airborne landing is designated by a bronze Arrow-head Device. At the conclusion of the war all Americans in the military also received the World War II Victory Medal. Although it was similar in design to its World War I predecessor, it was a US-only award.

In the years following World War II the United States established campaign medals for the wars in Korea, Vietnam, the Persian Gulf (1991), and Kosovo. In 1961 the Department of Defense introduced the Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal to recognize service in smaller scale hostile actions that do not rate their own campaign medals. In 1953 the National Defense Service Medal was established to recognize honorable military service during periods of national emergency. Neither overseas deployment nor engagement with hostile forces are criteria. Since 1953, there have been four periods of qualification for the NDSM. When the United States sent forces into Bosnia in 1995, the Armed Forces Service Medal was established to recognize service in overseas peacekeeping operations.

The so-called Global War on Terrorism has so far produced four campaign medals. The Global War on Terrorism Service Medal is awarded to anyone directly supporting military operations against terrorist groups or infrastructure. The Iraq Campaign Medal and the Afghanistan Campaign Medal recognize military personnel who deploy to those countries. The Global War on Terrorism Expeditionary Medal recognizes military personnel who to deploy to any of 43 designated countries (not including Iraq or Afghanistan) or ten designated maritime zones to conduct anti-terrorism operations.

At the lower levels of the campaign and service awards, most exist only in the form of a ribbon bar. All of the services have Overseas Service Ribbons to recognize peacetime service outside the United States that would not be covered by a campaign medal or the Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal. The Navy and Marine Corps also have a Sea Service Deployment Ribbon. Several of the services have ribbons to indicate completion of professional development training courses for noncommissioned officers. Officers who earned such awards during periods of prior service as an NCO are authorized to continue wearing the ribbons.

### **US Merchant Marine Awards**

Although not a military service, the Merchant Marine is a vital element of national power in time of war, and many merchant mariners have been killed or seriously wounded in the line of duty. During World War II most military transport ships were operated by merchant seaman, merchant convoys operated under US Navy



protection, and many merchant seamen served in the Navy or Coast Guard for various periods of time. For all these reasons, military personnel who earned awards while serving as merchant mariners are authorized to wear those awards. Decorations such as the Merchant Marine Distinguished Service Medal, Merchant Marine Meritorious Service Medal, and the Mariner's Medal rank in precedence below US campaign medals, but ahead of all foreign decorations and awards (Cruikshank and Kline 2007).

### Foreign Decorations, Unit Awards, and Service Awards

Subject to very strict criteria, American military personnel are authorized to wear decorations, unit awards, or service awards conferred by friendly foreign governments or by international organizations. All such awards rank in precedence behind all US awards, with the awards of international organizations, such as the United Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization taking precedence over those of individual foreign nations.

During the American Revolution, Louis XVI of France invested John Paul Jones with the Ordre du Mérite Militaire for his capture of the *Serapis* in the Battle of Flamborough Head. Jones set a precedence by seeking approval from the Continental Congress before accepting the foreign decoration (Morison 1958). World War I was the first war in which large numbers of American troops received awards from allies, particularly France and Britain. A fair number of soldiers received the French Croix de Guerre, and a few, such as Sergeant Alvin York, received the *Médaille Militaire*, France's highest combat decoration. At the conclusion of the war many senior officers received high foreign awards, such as the *Légion d'Honneur* from France or the Distinguished Service Order from Britain.

Some American soldiers who served with the British or the French during World War II also received those same awards, and several American pilots received the British Distinguished Flying Cross. At some point early in World War II the British offered to award American soldiers serving in the various theaters the appropriate British campaign medal, but the Americans declined the offer. At the end of the war countries such as Poland, China, and the Soviet Union conferred many of their highest awards on senior American military commanders. In 1975 the Republic of China (now known as Taiwan) conferred the China War Memorial Medal on all American veterans who had served in China or Burma. In 1998 the French government awarded the *Légion d'Honneur* to all surviving American World War I veterans who had served on French soil, and on June 6, 2004 the French awarded the *Légion d'Honneur* to 100 selected D-Day veterans.

The Korean War was fought under the auspices of the United Nations, and it was the first war in which Americans received military awards from an international organization. The United Nations Service Medal was awarded to the soldiers of all nations who fought under UN command in Korea. American soldiers also received the US Korean Service Medal. All American soldiers who served in Vietnam received the Vietnam Service Medal from the US government, and the Vietnam

Campaign Medal from the Vietnamese government. Many Americans who served in Vietnam received decorations from the Vietnamese government, most notably the Republic of Vietnam Cross of Gallantry, which existed as both an individual and a unit award. The unit award is the ribbon bar of the individual award, with the gold colored metallic frame characteristic of most US Army unit awards.

Americans who served in the first Gulf War received the US Southwest Asia Service Medal, as well as the Kuwait Liberation Medal from Kuwait and the Kuwait Liberation Medal from Saudi Arabia – two completely different awards with the same name. In 1992 NATO established its first service medal, the NATO Medal, for service in Former Yugoslavia. It was awarded to large numbers of Americans who served in the peacekeeping force in Bosnia and Croatia between 1995 and 1998. The NATO Medal for Kosovo was established in 1998. There are currently nine different versions of the NATO Medal. As an award from an international organization, it takes precedence over all other foreign awards.

### **Combat Badges**

All of the services have extensive systems of skill and qualification badges, ranging from pilot's and parachutist's wings, to badges for missile operators, air traffic controllers, mechanics, and medics. In almost all cases these badges are earned by taking a qualification test or by successfully completing a required course of instruction. A very small number of military badges are awarded only for direct combat service, and they therefore carry a level of prestige equivalent to a military decoration.

The Army's Combat Infantryman Badge (CIB) is the premier American combat badge. The distinctive blue badge with a silver wreath was established in 1943 to recognize service as an infantryman in ground combat in the rank of colonel and below. The eligibility period was retroactive to December 7, 1941. Additional service as a combat infantryman in a subsequent war is indicated by the addition of a star at the opening of the wreath. There have been four distinct periods for which award of the CIB has been authorized: World War II; Korea; Vietnam and the First Gulf War; and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Only about 250 American soldiers have ever received the CIB for service in three wars, virtually all of them for World War II, Korea, and Vietnam. The CIB can only be awarded to soldiers who are trained as infantrymen and who are assigned to infantry units that engage in combat operations. Since the Vietnam War Special Forces soldiers also have been eligible for the CIB.

The Army's Combat Medic Badge (CMB) was established in March 1945 and made retroactive to December 7, 1941 to recognize medics who serve with infantry units in combat. Service as a combat medic in subsequent wars is indicated by adding stars to the basic badge. The additional war periods are exactly the same as for the Combat Infantryman Badge. Only two American soldiers, Sergeant First Class Wayne Slagel and Master Sergeant Henry Jenkins, received the CMB for service in three wars. In 1991 the criteria for the Combat Medic Badge was expanded to include medics assigned to armored and armored cavalry units.

During the first Gulf War of 1991 the Combat Medic Badge was awarded to female medics for the first time.

Parachute jumps in combat are among the most hazardous of all military operations. Since World War II soldiers in airborne units have been attaching a small bronze star device to their parachutist wings to designate each combat jump they made. The device is identical to the campaign service stars worn on the campaign medals. The practice was finally officially recognized and authorized by the Army in 1983.

In the years following World War II there were continuous efforts to establish combat badges for the other combat arms branches of the Army. During the Korean War especially many units produced and awarded various versions of a Combat Artillery Badge, Combat Armor Badge, and others. Despite widespread support from various quarters, such awards were never authorized or officially adopted. The pressure to establish some method of formal recognition for direct combat service other than infantryman, medics, and Special Forces soldiers never really abated. The issue again came to a head during the early days of the Second Iraq War. In May 2005 the Army finally established the Combat Action Badge (CAB), with eligibility dating from September 18, 2001. The CIB and CMB still retain their positions as the Army's most prestigious combat awards, but the CAB is awarded to all other soldiers who come under fire during ground combat operations. Unlike the CIB and CMB, general officers are eligible to receive the CAB.

The Navy and Marine Corps established an award to recognize participation in ground or surface combat in February 1969, with eligibility for service in Vietnam retroactive to March 1961. Rather than a badge, the Combat Action Ribbon is a ribbon bar that ranks in order of precedence behind the Achievement Medals of the four services, and ahead of the Prisoner of War Medal. In March 2007 the Air Force established its own award to recognize participation in either ground or aerial combat, with eligibility retroactive to September 11, 2001. Neither a badge nor solely a ribbon bar, the Air Force Combat Action Medal is a full decoration. In order of precedence, however, it is equal to the Department of the Navy's Combat Action Ribbon. General officers are not eligible for the Air Force award.

### **The Most Decorated American**

Who, then, was the most decorated American? Audie L. Murphy is widely believed to be the most decorated American ever, or at least the most decorated of World War II. Neither, however, is the case. Although it is impossible to designate the most decorated American with mathematical precision, strong candidates for that distinction include double Medal of Honor Marines Dan Daly and Smedley Butler, and World War I ace Edward V. Rickenbacker, who in addition to the Medal of Honor received eight Distinguished Service Crosses. General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, who over the course of his long career received the Medal of Honor, three Distinguished Service Crosses, six Silver Stars, and two Purple Hearts, would be another top contender. The most decorated American of World War II would be a toss-up between submarine commanders Eugene B. Flukey and Samuel Dealy.

Both received the Medal of Honor and four Navy Crosses. Dealy, who was killed in action during the war, also received the Silver Star and the Purple Heart.

### Unofficial Medals

Several organizations have established and awarded medals to military personnel. In 1779 the Continental Congress presented one of the first examples of such an award, a silver medal, to Colonel Francois Louis de Fleury for bravery exhibited at Stony Point. Two centuries later the Engineer Regiment Association began awarding three levels of de Fleury medals to recognize a variety of accomplishments linked to military engineering. Other unofficial association awards include the US Field Artillery Association's Order of St. Barbara (presented to members of both the Army and Marine Corps) and the Military Intelligence Corps Association's Knowlton Medal. Individuals frequently wear these medals on special occasions, but they are not officially recognized and the practice is not officially sanctioned.

While hundreds of books have been published concerning US decorations and medals, there has never been a scholarly study of even a significantly large portion of the subject.

### BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Amos, Preston E. (1974). *Above and Beyond in the West: Black Medals of Honor Winners, 1870–1890*. Washington: Potomac Corral, the Westerners.
- Anon. (1927). *Decorations United States Army: 1862–1926*. Washington: Government Printing Office.
- Anon. (1989). “‘Buffalo Bill’ Regains Medal of Honor,” *Washington Post*, July 9, A5.
- Anon. (1997). *Medal of Honor Recipients and their Official Citations*. Columbia Heights, MN: Highland House.
- Army Regulation 670-1 (2005). *Wear and Appearance of Army Uniforms and Insignia*. (February 3).
- Beyer, W. F., and O. F. Keydel, eds. (1992 [1907]). *Deeds of Valor: How America's Civil War Heroes Won the Medal of Honor*. Stamford, CT: Longmeadow Press.
- Bonds, Russell S. (2007). *Stealing the General: The Great Locomotive Chase and the First Medal of Honor*. Yardley, PA: Westholme Publishing.
- Borch, Fred L., and Charles P. McDowell (2009). *Sea Service Medals: Military Awards and Decorations of the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Borthick, David, and Jack Britton (1984). *Medals, Military and Civilian of the United States*. Tulsa, OK: MCN Press.
- Broadwater, Robert P. (2007). *Civil War Medal of Honor Recipients: A Complete Illustrated Record*. Jefferson, NC: MacFarland.
- Burrelli, David F. (2006). *Medal of Honor: History and Issues* (CRS Report for Congress, Updated March 30, 2006). Washington: Library of Congress. Available on line at <http://digital.library.unt.edu/govdocs/crs/permalink/meta-crs-8940:1>, accessed April 27, 2009.
- Cerasini, Marc (2002). *Heroes: U.S. Marine Corps Medal of Honor Winners*. New York: Berkley. (293 Marines had won the Medal of Honor by 2002.)

- Collier, Peter (2006). *Medal of Honor: Portraits of Valor beyond the Call of Duty*. New York: Artisan.
- Cooke, Donald E. (1966). *For Conspicuous Gallantry: Winners of the Medal of Honor*. Maplewood, NJ: C. S. Hammond.
- Cruikshank, Jeffrey L., and Chloe G. Kline (2007). *In Peace and in War: A History of the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy at Kings Point*. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons.
- Emering, Edward J. (1998). *U.S. Navy and Marine Corps Campaign and Commemorative Medals*. Atglen, PA: Schiffer Publications.
- Foster, Franks, and Lawrence Borts (2000). *A Complete Guide to all United States Military Metals 1939 to Present*, 5th edn. Fountain Inn, SC: Metals of America Press.
- Grosvenor, Gilbert, et al. (1944). *Insignia and Decorations of the U.S. Armed Forces*. Washington: National Geographic Society.
- Jason, Alexander (1979). *Heroes: The True Account of the Medal of Honor Winners, Southeast Asia, 1964–1975*. Pinole, CA: Anite Press.
- Jordan, Kenneth N., Sr (1995). *Forgotten Heroes: 131 Men of the Korean War Awarded the Medal of Honor, 1950–53*. Atglen, PA: Schiffer Publishing. [Reproduces the citations.]
- Kerrigan, Evans E. (1990). *American Medals and Decorations*. London: The Apple Press.
- King, Irving H. (1996). *The Coast Guard Expands, 1865–1915: New Roles, New Frontiers*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Kroll, C. Douglas (2002). *Commodore Ellsworth P. Bertholf: First Commandant of the Coast Guard*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Lang, George, Raymond L. Collins, and Gerard F. White, comps. (1995). *Medal of Honor Recipients, 1863–1994*, 2 vols. New York: Facts on File.
- Lee, Irvin H. (1969). *Negro Medal of Honor Men*. New York: Dodd, Mead.
- Mikaelian, Allen (2002). *Medal of Honor: Profiles of America's Military Heroes from the Civil War to the Present*. New York: Hyperion.
- Morison, Samuel Eliot (1958). "The Arms and Seals of John Paul Jones," *American Neptune*, 18:4 (October), 301–5.
- Murphy, Edward F. (1992). *Korean War Heroes*. Novato, CA: Presidio.
- Owens, Ron (2004). *Medal of Honor: Historical Facts and Figures*. Nashville, TN: Turner.
- Pullen, John J. (2007). *A Shower of Stars: The Medal of Honor and the 27th Maine*. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole.
- Robles, Philip K. (1971). *United States Military Medals and Ribbons*. Rutland, VT: C. E. Tuttle.
- Schneider, Donald K. (1979). *Air Force Heroes in Vietnam*. Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Airpower Research Institute.
- Schubert, Frank N. (1997). *Black Valor: Buffalo Soldiers and the Medal of Honor, 1870–1898*. Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources.
- Smith, Larry (2003). *Beyond Glory: Medal of Honor Heroes in Their Own Words*. New York: W. W. Norton.
- Spiegel, Allen D., and Andrea M. Speigel (1994). "Civil War Doctress Mary: Only Woman to Win Congressional Medal of Honor," *Minerva*, 13:3 (Fall), 24–35.
- Tillman, Barrett (2002). *Above and Beyond: The Aviation Medals of Honor*. Washington: Smithsonian.
- Werlich, Robert (1965). *Orders and Decorations of All Nations*. Washington: Quaker Press.
- Wise, James E., Jr., and Scott Baron (2007). *The Navy Cross: Extraordinary Heroism in Iraq, Afghanistan and Other Conflicts*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.

## Chapter Sixty

# THE MILITARY, THE CINEMA, AND TELEVISION

*Joseph G. Dawson III*

Since J. Stuart Blackton's 90-second movie, *Tearing Down the Spanish Flag* (1898), films have provided civilians with much of their information about military matters, especially images of wars fought between the United States and other nations. Michael Isenberg (1981) describes how Blackton had his hand photographed removing a Spanish flag from a pole, then putting a US flag in its place. The film left the impression with audiences that they watched a historical event. Blackton's film appears to have been popular (Musser 1990), even inspirational, among Americans, and since 1898 cinematographers have sought to capture on film the range of human emotions pertaining to war, among the most intense of human activities. For over half a century considerations of taste combined with censorship meant that audiences rarely saw actual or restaged explicit depictions of combat or the more base behavior of military personnel. Censorship began slipping during the 1960s and by the second half of the twentieth century films, viewed in theaters or on television, came to provide most Americans with a significant portion of what they knew about war and shaped their opinions about the military services. The proportion of Americans dependent on film and television news for their knowledge of war increased after the US Congress abandoned the draft in 1973 and shifted to all-volunteer military forces, as fewer and fewer Americans gained first-hand experience of serving in the military.

### **Feature Films and Television**

Feature films made to entertain are often based on historical events, but because their purposes are profit and drama, they are under no obligation to adhere to facts. In a comprehensive study on American military films, Lawrence Suid (2002 [1978]) notes that while some movies have been made with War Department or Defense Department assistance, such assistance never guarantees that details and facts will be correct. While critics writing for newspapers or magazines are more likely to evaluate acting, cinematography, and direction – the elements of art and



entertainment – some viewers' expectations may rise when films take war and the military as their subjects, especially if they portray real leaders and battles. Knowledgeable viewers tend to find fault with war dramas if directors, producers, and scriptwriters change chronological sequence to heighten dramatic effect, film at inappropriate locations, employ composite characters, and fail to equip the actors with dialogue, weapons, vehicles, airplanes, ships, and uniforms appropriate to the events being depicted. Selective audiences can criticize filmmakers when they do not instill verisimilitude or realism in their movies and they obviously stray from the facts, but most filmmakers are seeking to produce artful, dramatic, and profitable entertainment rather than realistic or accurate movies, whether they choose real events or a fictional war story.

Film director Samuel Fuller (2002), a World War II veteran, contended that in a movie it was not possible to "portray war realistically." Directors, Fuller indicated, can tell realistic love stories or detective yarns or develop accurate films about the ills of society, including alcoholism or unemployment. Fuller concluded that war defies being shown to a theater audience realistically or accurately – short of "shoot[ing] at them every so often from either side of the screen." Nevertheless, Fuller directed war dramas, notably *The Steel Helmet* (1951), *Merrill's Marauders* (1962), and *The Big Red One* (1980), the latter reflecting some of his wartime experiences.

### Early American Wars

Most Hollywood features films about American military events from 1776 to 1861 fail to achieve accuracy or effectively create the ambiance of the times depicted. Films with aspects of verisimilitude include *Northwest Passage* (1940), based on Kenneth Roberts' novel about an expedition of Robert Rogers' Rangers against the Abenaki Indians during the French and Indian War. As is the case with most Hollywood films, *Northwest Passage* carries a negative view of Native Americans. *April Morning* (1987), taken from Howard Fast's novel, renders a good impression of America's colonial militia confronting British Redcoats outside Boston at the beginning of the War for Independence in 1775. Of several presentations of events about the Texas Revolution of 1836, *The Alamo* (2004) contains realistic battle scenes and allocates appropriate attention to Hispanic figures, such as Mexican General Santa Anna and *Tejano* leader Juan Seguin, but much of the legend remains intact.

While many movies are set during the years 1861 to 1865, Chadwick (2001) indicates that few offer serious studies of Civil War soldiers or officers. An exception is *Gettysburg* (1993), drawn from Michael Shaara's novel *The Killer Angels* (1974). Despite various faults, *Gettysburg* creates a vivid impression of the battle that many later decided was the Civil War's turning point. The film's center is the desperate Federal defense against a spirited Confederate attack on the hill named Little Round Top. *Glory* (1989) effectively describes the raising, training, and employment in combat of the African-American 54th Massachusetts Infantry

Regiment. *Glory* underscores the matters of slavery, race, patriotism, and national service. As James McPherson (1995) notes, it also informed many viewers that African-Americans fought as soldiers for the Union. *The Red Badge of Courage* (1951), based on Stephen Crane's novel, reveals motivations and actions of Union soldiers in combat. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer studio leaders disagreed with director John Huston about how the film should be edited, resulting in a final cut less intense than Huston wanted.

Hollywood has produced numerous films about the US Army fighting Native Americans but few successfully recreate the atmosphere of 1865–90. Frank Wetta and Martin Novelli (2006) discuss important exceptions, John Ford's "Cavalry Trilogy" about the post-Civil War army. The trilogy, *Fort Apache* (1948), *She Wore a Yellow Ribbon* (1949), and *Rio Grande* (1950), lays out Ford's sentimental views on the army, heroism, duty, loyalty, and the army post as a community. This trilogy conveys a sense of the ambiance of the dull routine of work and the social life endured by the men and women of the frontier army in the 1870s. While Ford and his scriptwriters usually present a jaundiced view of Indians, they also show how the failure of Lieutenant Colonel Owen Thursday, the West Point-trained commander of *Fort Apache*, to understand that the Indians were worthy opponents led to defeat by the Indians and how the press falsely depicted him as a hero. *Uzana's Raid* (1972) focuses on an army patrol led by an inexperienced lieutenant tracking down Apache raiders, giving the Apache their due as tough, resourceful opponents. An energetic and appealing film about George A. Custer and the Battle of the Little Big Horn, *They Died with Their Boots On* (1941) typifies Hollywood and history. Alvin Josephy (1995) emphasizes how badly the film distorts its subjects, rejecting facts, providing negative views of Indians, and producing a legendary, unrealistic Custer.

### World War I

American filmmakers have made war stories about the Great War of 1914–18 since the days of silent movies. Some early productions achieved distinction. Portraying American military pilots in World War I and gaining compliments for using period aircraft, *Wings* (1927) received the first Academy Award for Best Picture. *All Quiet on the Western Front* (1930) is based on the antiwar novel by Erich Maria Remarque, a German veteran. An important early production of the sound era, *All Quiet* won the Best Picture Academy Award in 1931. Both of these movies had the advantage of not portraying specific battles involving historical figures, but successfully dramatized fictional events. Both gave realistic impressions of dangerous situations and distressing circumstances for flyers and infantrymen. Filmmakers assembled appropriate uniforms, weapons, equipment, vehicles, and airplanes to achieve verisimilitude. Michael Isenberg (1981) concludes that some other silent films, such as *The Big Parade* (1925) and *What Price Glory?* (1926) also contain impressive scenes. As a second world war threatened to entangle the United States, moviemakers turned to American experiences in the Great War to inspire Americans with

propagandistic productions. These included *The Fighting 69th* (1940), about a New York infantry regiment, and *Sergeant York* (1941), describing the reluctant Tennessee pacifist who became a patriotic hero.

Significant limitations confronted American filmmakers before the 1960s. Expectations of good taste, influenced by the Catholic Legion of Decency, limited what could be shown or said in public. Deemed unacceptable were actors cursing or speaking scatological language and scenes showing details of sexual relations and the physical effects of violence. When movies pressed the boundaries of acceptability, the American film industry imposed the Motion Picture Production Code. It applied practical censorship on dialogue, nudity, and violence in American movies from 1930 until the 1960s, when social tastes changed and graphic films challenged the code. Industry leaders replaced the code with a flexible ratings system.

During World War II and the Korean War the Production Code affected movies in many ways. Although they employed creative camera angles, alternate words, and symbolic images, movies could not show aspects of sexual encounters and graphic violence, and it was rare for characters to curse. Of course, audiences should have understood that projectiles fired from weapons caused severe bodily trauma, and movie scenes pretended to show actors wounded, crippled, or killed on screen, but with little blood, disfigurement or dismemberment. Therefore, even if they were filmed on well-chosen locations, employed period uniforms, weapons, and equipment, and touched audiences with dramatic and poignant scenes, war movies of the 1940s and 1950s lack realism about military life, personal relationships, and the effects of violence. Moreover, American filmmakers were expected or required to cooperate with government officials and recognize how their movie might affect civilian and military morale. Moviemakers' prime goal was to produce an entertaining, profitable drama, but some films, especially in the 1940s, contained elements of propaganda.

## World War II

During World War II, the attitude of most Americans and the influence of the federal government's Office of War Information, analyzed by Clayton Koppes and Gregory Black (1987), meant that movies made by US companies supported America and the Allies. Patriotism and a pro-America approach is evident in important examples of wartime features including *Wake Island* (1942), *Sahara* (1943), *Air Force* (1943), *Guadalcanal Diary* (1943), and *Thirty Seconds Over Tokyo* (1944). No group of servicemen or theater of operations was neglected, ranging from merchant seamen in *Action in the North Atlantic* (1943) to army paratroopers in *Objective Burma!* (1945). Attending two or three movies per week, Americans also kept current concerning the war's events by watching theatrical newsreels, censored and pitched with pro-American and pro-Allied viewpoints. Throughout the war Hollywood added to a departure from reality by producing popular musicals showcasing actors and military personnel dancing and singing patriotic and

nostalgic songs. Allen Woll (1983) discusses examples including *You're in the Army Now* (1941), *Holiday Inn* (1942), *This is the Army* (1943), *Hollywood Canteen* (1944), *Here Come the Waves* (1944), and *Anchors Aweigh* (1945).

By contrast, in the war's final months newsreels, though still censored, contained more distressing and graphic images of battle and Hollywood released hard-edged, more realistic feature films, as Jeanine Basinger (1986) emphasizes. Based on Harry Brown's novel, *A Walk in the Sun* (1945) follows a dangerous infantry patrol in Italy. Receiving high marks for its grim and gritty images, *The Story of GI Joe* (1945) shows war correspondent Ernie Pyle (played by actor Burgess Meredith) with American infantry in Italy – though it soft-pedals the death of the captain commanding the infantry company. *They Were Expendable* (1945) keenly dramatizes the desperate actions of US Navy patrol-torpedo boats operating in the Philippines in the opening months of the war.

In 1949 Hollywood attracted Americans to theaters with exceptional war dramas. Two combined fine scripts, excellent acting, and effective ambiance. Depicting the Battle of the Bulge, *Battleground* takes audiences to soldiers' snowy foxholes in Belgium as they block the German offensive of 1944. *Twelve O'Clock High*, drawn from the novel by Bierne Lay and Sy Bartlett, became the hallmark movie about the pressures of aerial combat on officers and crews in strategic bombers. A third move, *The Sands of Iwo Jima*, stands as one of the most influential war movies. In it actor John Wayne plays the fictional Sergeant Stryker, who trains Marine recruits and leads them in battles at Tarawa and Iwo Jima. Within the limits imposed by the Production Code, audiences hear Marines in battle and see Marines killed, including Sergeant Stryker. Just the opposite of creating an invulnerable hero, *Sands of Iwo Jima* trenchantly illustrates the hazards of combat even for the best of leaders – though the film's tone remains heroic.

During the 1950s movies began to focus on subjects other than combat. *Go for Broke!* (1951) subtly examines racism against Japanese-Americans and reminds audiences that Nisei served in the US Army and campaigned in Italy. Adapted from James Jones' novel filled with earthy language and skirt-chasing soldiers, *From Here to Eternity* (1953) presented a remarkable challenge to moviemakers. A creative script and exceptional actors bring the novel's characters to life, transporting audiences to Hawaii in the weeks leading up to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Based on Herman Wouk's novel, *The Caine Mutiny* (1954) focuses on the antagonisms and misunderstandings between a ship's distraught veteran captain and his freshly minted officers in the Pacific. Drawn from Audie Murphy's autobiography and using dramatic license, *To Hell and Back* (1955) portrays the exploits of World War II's most highly decorated American combat infantrymen, played by himself.

In the 1960s and 1970s, Hollywood turned out several World War II epics with mixed results. One of the most successful at the box office and effective in dramatizing events, as Suid (2002 [1978]) discusses, is *The Longest Day* (1962), taken from the book by Irish-born journalist Cornelius Ryan. Although the film contains inaccuracies and faulty scenes, *Longest Day* presents audiences with the sweep, pace, and significance of the risky Allied amphibious landings in Normandy

in 1944, while identifying historical figures by name. As Roger Spiller (1999) maintains, *The Bridge at Remagen* (1969) emphasizes the importance of Americans capturing an intact bridge across the Rhine River to invade Germany. However, it lets down audiences by depending on composite characters and adding fictional events. Falling flat as drama while sometimes trying to uphold historical accuracy, *Tora! Tora! Tora!* (1970) represents the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, including about half of the movie from the Japanese viewpoint. In *Patton* (1970), actor George C. Scott convincingly personifies one of America's most controversial generals in a film that focuses as much on its subject's idiosyncrasies as his military leadership. Minor historical mistakes cannot undercut the impressive rendering of a failed Allied offensive, Operation Market-Garden, in *A Bridge Too Far* (1977), based on another book by Cornelius Ryan. The film does a remarkable job of relating complex events and characterizing accurately the military leaders involved. In contrast with the epics, *Hell is for Heroes* (1962) put viewers at a personal level and capitalizes on an intense performance by actor Steve McQueen as a fictional army squad leader leading his soldiers across the Siegfried Line into Germany. The same can be said of *Von Ryan's Express* (1965) in which the strong performance by Frank Sinatra drew audiences to a character who died attempting to escape a prisoner of war camp.

After 1995, films took on the appearance of greater realism. The right combination of support came together for Home Box Office (HBO) to film *The Tuskegee Airmen* (1995). Overcoming faults and errors, the movie demonstrates how African-American pilots trained, flew combat missions, earned respect from their fellow airmen, and dealt with racism by their countrymen at home and from the American military abroad (Sandler 1996). Few movies acquired the prerelease attention of producer-director Steven Spielberg's *Saving Private Ryan* (1998). Benefiting from the end of the Production Code and touted as the most realistic war drama ever made, Spielberg tells a fictional story using stunning special effects to show combat deaths and wounds. Hailed by some veterans and reviewers for the ghastly 28-minute opening segment on Omaha Beach, *Saving Private Ryan* disappointed others. Critics point out that after the D-Day scenes, Spielberg depends on genre formulae, such as the small unit patrol, and relies on Hollywood stereotypes for characters. Carrying claims of heightened realism and accurate details, Spielberg's production contains its share of errors, improbable events, and a melodramatic conclusion. Nevertheless, Spielberg drew upon exceptional special effects to create a violent drama, prompting Americans to reflect on World War II. On the heels of *Saving Private Ryan*, Spielberg cooperated with others to produce the much more realistic HBO series, *Band of Brothers* (2001, 10 hours), dramatizing the experiences of paratroopers in the 101st Airborne Division. Employing graphic special effects, director Clint Eastwood's *Flags of Our Fathers* (2006) crystallizes the constant danger of the battlefield as Marines fought to seize the island of Iwo Jima from Japan. It also portrays racist attitudes toward Native Americans and how American society treats veterans – praised one day and ignored the next. Adapted from James Bradley's book, Eastwood's film is an elegy to World War II Marines.

### Prisoners of War

Films have shown varied images of Americans held as prisoners of war (POWs) by enemy nations, picturing them as heroes or villains. Perhaps the primary example of a POW film is *Stalag 17* (1953). In a dreary and barren prison compound, a self-serving prisoner is suspected of collusion with the Germans. By contrast, *The Great Escape* (1963) depicts tolerable conditions in a German prison camp holding Allied aircrews that execute a massive escape. Emphasizing brutal conditions of confinement in a Japanese-run POW camp, *King Rat* (1965) shows how some American prisoners only looked out for themselves. Prisoners held by the North Koreans and Chinese in Korea came in for close examination, with a focus on “brainwashing” by the communists. An important example is *The Manchurian Candidate* (1962), from the novel by Richard Condon, in which a soldier touted as an American hero is actually a brainwashed assassin waiting for orders. Others showing abuse of POWs in Korea and concern over treason include *Prisoner of War* (1954) and *The Rack* (1956). Some scenes of Americans held prisoner by the Viet Cong in *The Deer Hunter* (1978), while intense, appear far-fetched.

### Veterans

In *The War Veteran in Film* (2003), Emmett Early demonstrates that numerous movies about the return of veterans to civilian life constitute a separate genre. Several represent how veterans, especially those with wounds, adjusted to civilian life. The benchmark is *The Best Years of Our Lives* (1946), drawn loosely from McKinley Kantor’s novel *Glory for Me*. The story concerns three men, a sailor (played by a wounded veteran) who lost both hands, an army infantry sergeant, and an Army Air Force bombardier. All are psychologically and physically affected by the war. Evocative and sentimental, *Best Years* captures the tone of postwar America. Adapted from Niven Busch’s novel *They Dream of Home*, *Till the End of Time* (1946) tells the story of three Marines, including one whose wounds required amputating both legs below the knee. *Till the End of Time* is a vehicle addressing racism as well as veterans’ physical and mental healing. Building considerable tension, *The Men* (1950) illustrates severely wounded veterans, including those in wheelchairs, recovering in a Veterans Administration hospital. *The Men* deals with veterans’ psychological recovery as well as the difficulties of physical therapy. Although some scenes were quite direct for 1950 audiences, not all of the veterans’ problems could be depicted due to the Production Code. Drawn from the novel *Lights Out* by Baynard Kendrick, *Bright Victory* (1951) focuses on a southern sergeant who is blinded in combat. Rehabilitated in a well-scrubbed army hospital in Pennsylvania, the sergeant’s racism is evident but he gradually changes his attitude and adjusts to America’s postwar society.



### Korean War

Robert Lentz (2003) indicates that few of the large number of movies depicting the military during the Korean War, 1950–3, achieved verisimilitude. *Pork Chop Hill* (1959) is distinctive. Adapted from S. L. A. Marshall's book, *Pork Chop Hill* depicts riveting images of close combat. A US Army infantry company is ordered to take and hold an incidental hill where hundreds died on both sides as leaders sought to demonstrate their determination and thereby influence armistice negotiations. *Retreat Hell!* (1952) effectively portrays Korean winter weather and desperate circumstances during the Marines' fighting retreat from the Chosin Reservoir to the coast. Lawrence Suid (1996) discusses how *The Bridges at Toko-Ri* (1955), drawn from James Michener's novel about aircraft carrier pilots, showcases excellent special effects and ranks among the best air combat movies. More substantive than later films, such as *Top Gun* (1986), *Bridges at Toko Ri* addresses such matters as wartime skepticism by citizen-soldiers (or, in this case, navy pilots), patriotism, duty, and comradeship, as Rayner (2007) effectively describes.

### Cold War

Some films portray aspects of the American military during the Cold War (1946–89) in situations not involving combat. *Strategic Air Command* (1955) and *A Gathering of Eagles* (1962) present positive views of air force bases, where officers and jet bombers are defenders of America. *Toward the Unknown* (1956) favorably describes the capabilities of air force test pilots. On the other hand, *The Bedford Incident* (1965) shows how a navy officer might precipitate war with the Soviet Union by accidentally firing on a Russian submarine, and *Soldier in the Rain* (1963) renders a derogatory picture of army noncommissioned officers. Ostensibly about the naval hero of the War for Independence, director John Farrow's *John Paul Jones* (1959) opens and closes with film clips of modern ships in the Cold War and depicts Russians in unflattering terms, making the point that American defense depends on a modern navy built on actions of previous leaders. *The D.I.* (1957), a fictional story shows a hard-nosed Marine drill instructor turning weak recruits into fighting men during harsh basic training. In a thoughtful and disturbing film, *Seven Days in May* (1964) dramatizes the unlikely steps leading toward a fictional US military coup, based on the novel by Fletcher Knebel and Charles Bailey.

### Vietnam War

In contrast to making many movies about World War II, Hollywood cautiously approached the controversial Vietnam War. As Jeremy Devine (1995) indicates, eventually hundreds of films connected with Vietnam in one way or another were made. John Wayne's *Green Berets* (1968) takes the World War II movie formula and overlays it on Vietnam. A weak script, pale characters, anachronisms, and

various errors cripple the film about a war growing unpopular with Americans. Ostensibly an outrageous comedy about doctors and nurses in a Mobile Army Surgical Hospital during the Korean War, *M\*A\*S\*H* (1970) was interpreted by many as an antiwar film targeting America's involvement in Vietnam. Although it won the Academy Award for Best Picture, *Deer Hunter* (1978) better portrays the attitude of men before serving as soldiers than the unrealistic scenes set in Vietnam. *Coming Home* (1978) provides stark, believable scenes in a Veterans Administration Hospital. Overshadowed by *Deer Hunter* and *Coming Home*, *Go Tell the Spartans* (1978), based on Daniel Ford's novel *Incident at Muc Wa*, tells the story of US Army advisors in 1964, early in the war. They abandon their camp and Vietnamese allies, making an analogy to America's withdrawal from the war. *Apocalypse Now* (1979) delivers a notable representation of an airmobile attack on a Vietnamese village but a murky script and incredible characters sour the movie.

In the 1980s and later, other filmmakers took on America's most controversial war. *First Blood* (1982) and *Rambo* (1985) are distorted fantasies concerning a Vietnam veteran's inability to return to mainstream American society. Based on Philip Caputo's memoir, *Rumor of War* (1986), the films may lead audiences to question Caputo's understanding of military organizations. In *Platoon* (1986) director Oliver Stone, a Vietnam War veteran, depicts a fictional unit riven by internecine antagonism that jolted viewers with its graphic violence, sociopathic soldiers, and coarse language. *Platoon* won the Academy Award for "Best Picture" and much larger audiences than the next year's *Hamburger Hill* (1987), a film that exudes authenticity in its description of the major battle in the A Shau Valley in 1969, subtly displaying young American paratroopers' courage, unit pride, and sacrifice and also their uncertainty toward a misguided war. That same year, two strongly anti-war films appeared. Adapted from Gustav Hasford's novel *Short Timers*, *Full Metal Jacket* (1987) intensely portrays Marine training, then follows a single individual through the Tet Offensive. Drawn from Nicholas Proffitt's novel, *Gardens of Stone* (1987) may be one of Hollywood's most expressive antiwar films, focusing on the army's unit that conducts funerals at Arlington National Cemetery. *Born on the Fourth of July* (1989), based on Ron Kovic's memoir, sharply divides into two parts, Kovic's service as a Marine in Vietnam and his return home a paraplegic confined to a wheelchair. Letting audiences understand Kovic's transition to antiwar protester, scenes in a Veterans Administration hospital are heart-rending and graphic, in contrast to some scenes in *The Men* (1950) and *Bright Victory* (1951). *We Were Soldiers* (2002), adapted from the book by Harold Moore and Joseph Gallaway, heroically recounts one of the battles in the Ia Drang Valley in 1965, but fictional events added toward the end weaken the film.

### Post-Vietnam

*Top Gun* (1986) relates the fictional rivalry of hotshot navy pilots competing in the elite "Top Gun" training program before being assigned to carrier duty. Containing exciting scenes of aerial combat, *Top Gun* refurbished the image of the navy but its

cartoonish characters are distracted by an unlikely love story. In sharp contrast, two other movies deal creditably with substantive topics. One of the best edited of all war films, *Black Hawk Down* (2002), is based on Mark Bowden's book. As Robert Niemi (2006) explains, it graphically illustrates the American intervention into Somalia in 1993 and the resulting battle fought by army Rangers in Mogadishu. *Tears of the Sun* (2003) depicts the insertion of a navy SEAL team into Nigeria to rescue an American doctor. Dangerous complications involving rebels and a tribal leader force the SEAL team leader to adjust the goals of his mission.

In the post-Vietnam years, filmmakers produced what might be called "classic war films," such as *Saving Private Ryan*, *We Were Soldiers*, and Mel Gibson's *The Patriot* (2000), loosely portraying Francis Marion in the American War for Independence, but a contrasting trend became evident, with more films depicting American soldiers in negative terms, by turns vicious, selfish, or demented. American society and culture appeared crass, grasping, self-absorbed, and having no appreciation or understanding of other people and their culture, sometimes shown more positively than America's. The concept of a "good war" is called into question and a "necessary war" is virtually non-existent. *Apocalypse Now* and *Platoon* fit this trend, but such treatment is not limited to the Vietnam War. In *Catch-22* (1970), based on Joseph Heller's notable bestseller, World War II is reduced to meaninglessness. In *Revolution* (1985), the British appear in a more positive light than America's rebels of 1776, while in *Dances with Wolves* (1990) an officer abandons the US Army to live with the Dakota, whose tribal society is depicted as superior to that of Anglo-America. *Cold Mountain* (2002), drawn from Charles Frazier's novel, depicts the Civil War as pointless, a far cry from *Glory* made about 15 years before. Set in the Korean War, *M\*A\*S\*H* (1970) drew a direct line of criticism to the ongoing war in Vietnam. The First Gulf War attracted similar treatment. *Courage Under Fire* (1996) exposes a cover-up of a fictional friendly fire incident; *Three Kings* (1999) focuses on corruption in the US military when four soldiers intend to steal a stash of gold but are confronted by Iraqi civilians who had suffered at the hands of Saddam Hussein's soldiers. Based on a memoir of a Marine veteran, *Jarhead* (2005) was released during the Second Gulf War. It portrays the Americans as coarse, almost animalistic brutes and their actions in Iraq as devoid of meaning. Films such as *A Few Good Men* (1992) and *The General's Daughter* (1999) take social injustice and deviant officers as their subjects. When not showing leaders as self-absorbed or demented, other films picture officers as rebels against the military establishment (*Top Gun*) or who defy orders from their superiors (*Behind Enemy Lines*, 2001).

Stanley Rothman, David Rothman, and Stephen Powers (1996) analyze the shift in the treatment of the military, relating it to the Vietnam War. On the other hand, Michael Medved (2005) argues that it is more a product of the post-draft separation of the armed forces from American society, especially the lack of any military experience by most leaders of film and television companies. James Wise and his coauthors (1997, 1999, 2000) demonstrate that a significant percentage of film stars from 1940 through 1960 served in the military, but very few of those of the post-Vietnam era shared that experience.

### Military Comedies

Satire and humor can be fired in any direction, even at some of society's revered institutions, including the military services. Released a few weeks before the Great War's armistice, Charlie Chaplin's *Shoulder Arms* (1918) uses the vehicle of a dreaming soldier, who projects himself heroically to the Western Front. In his dream, the doughboy endures exaggerated conditions of the trenches (intended to be humorous), goes on a secret mission behind enemy lines, rescues a French *mademoiselle*, takes the Kaiser prisoner, and commiserates with captured German infantrymen. Other attempts at comedy in the trenches, such as Laurel and Hardy's *Pack Up Your Troubles* (1932) and the Ritz Brothers' film of the same title (1939), could not create Chaplin's combination of humor and pathos. Not directly about the United States, *Duck Soup* (1933) recounts the stupidity of hostilities between two mythical nations, "Freedonia" and "Sylvania," as the zany Marx Brothers ridicule armies, generals' fancy uniforms, and war itself.

By 1940, after hostilities started between nations in Asia and in Europe, many Americans realized that the United States was poorly prepared for war. Using humor, several movies lampooned America's inadequate military forces, calling attention to the need for rearmament. One plot convention contrived to have comedians accidentally enlist in the army, with silliness resulting. This theme carried *Boobs in Arms* (1940), a Three Stooges short, and movies including *Buck Privates* (1941) with Bud Abbott and Lou Costello, and *Caught in the Draft* (1941) with Bob Hope. Before the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor, Abbott and Costello burlesqued the air corps and the navy in *Keep 'Em Flying* (1941) and *In the Navy* (1941). Thereafter a flood of movies provided send ups of America's military, putting comedians such as Jackie Gleason (*Tramp, Tramp, Tramp*, 1942), Red Skelton (*Ship Ahoy*, 1942), and Danny Kaye (*Up in Arms*, 1944) in absurd circumstances, or pointing out how absurd military matters could be. During the war, films let audiences laugh at otherwise serious issues – the foibles of army life (*See Here, Private Hargrove*, 1944), a soldier's apparent responsibility for getting a civilian woman pregnant (*Miracle of Morgan's Creek*, 1944), and misplaced public accolades for someone mistaken for a combat veteran (*Hail the Conquering Hero*, 1944).

In the decades after the war, movie studios released military comedies making fun of the military or ridiculing it while Americans faced serious postwar matters. The Cold War intensified, the Korean War ended Harry S Truman's presidency, high military costs strained national budgets, and thousands of men were drafted into the army. A Three Stooges short, *GI Wanna Go Home* (1946), shows returning veterans having trouble finding housing – a universal postwar problem. The comedy team of Dean Martin and Jerry Lewis put themselves in ridiculous situations in the army (*At War with the Army*, 1950; and *Jumping Jacks*, 1952) and the navy (*Sailor Beware*, 1951). On his own, Lewis became George Baker's woeful comic strip character, *The Sad Sack* (1957). Taking unrealistic comedic situations to the extreme, *Francis [the Talking Mule]* (1949) and a string of sequels, *Francis Goes to West Point* (1952), *Francis Joins the Wacs* (1954), and *Francis in the Navy*

(1955), develop story lines about the military “service” of a talking mule. *Don’t Go Near the Water* (1957), based on William Brinkley’s novel about naval personnel on a small island in the Pacific, is ostensibly a comedy but also delves into how men deal with responsibility. Actor Andy Griffith caused a sensation as a hick draftee in the air force (*No Time for Sergeants*, 1958). In a story adapted from a real event of World War II, a naval officer transports women nurses in a pink submarine in *Operation Petticoat* (1959). Several other movies provided comedic highjinks in the military, including *Honeymoon Machine* (1961), *Private Benjamin* (1980), *McHale’s Navy* (1997), and *Sgt. Bilko* (1996), the last two being based on long-running television series.

This was a reversal of the usual relationship in which feature films formed the basis for television programs, both comedies and dramas. Most producers selected topics that simplified the subject and could be handled in 30 minutes or an hour, and the National Association of Broadcasters’ Code Review Board censored all television programs. The comedies had no pretense for accuracy or credibility. The dramas usually paid little attention to the facts, often failed to obtain proper uniforms or equipment, and typically offered weak melodrama.

Television dramas sometimes sprang from successful films or books about World War II, listed in Suid and Haverstick (2005) and described in Tim Brooks and Earle Marsh (2003 [1979]). These include *Twelve O’Clock High* (1964–7), *From Here to Eternity* (1979–80), and *Baa Baa Black Sheep* (1976–8), about Marine pilots in the Pacific, adapted from Gregory Boyington’s book. *The Rat Patrol* (1966–8) offers fanciful accounts of the Allies’ Long Range Desert Patrols in North Africa. An evocative series, *Combat!* (1962–7) appeared to treat the war and its issues more seriously than most dramas. The contemporary navy and its jets led producers to search for a winning formula in *Emerald Point, N.A.S.* (1983–4), *Supercarrier* (1988), and *Pensacola – Wings of Gold* (1997–2000). Two series on Vietnam drew mixed reviews from veterans and critics. *Tour of Duty* (1987–90) shows an army platoon in combat and *China Beach* (1988–91) focuses on army nurses at a coastal base. The longest running series with a military theme, *JAG* (1995–2005) dealt with navy lawyers who traveled extensively to deal with their cases. *JAG* was used to introduce *NCIS*, (2003–9+) a drama with elements of humor involving a forensic investigative unit, the Naval Criminal Investigative Service, in a military setting. Iraq and the war on terror generated dramas such as *Over There* (2005) on army soldiers in Iraq and *The Unit* (2005–9+) about assignments of a Delta Force unit.

The rise of the television “mini-series” in the 1970s led to the development of several with military themes (Marill 2005). Among notable productions, two were adapted from Herman Wouk’s novels about World War II, *Winds of War* (1983) and *War and Remembrance* (1988). Another, based on Anton Myrer’s splendid novel, *Once an Eagle* (1976), was disappointing.

Television comedies typically carried less biting satire than feature films. An exception was *M\*A\*S\*H* (1972–83), a remarkably popular series derived from the movie. A television anomaly that effectively combined comedy and drama, *M\*A\*S\*H* derided the Korean War, and by extension the Vietnam War.

Comedy series lampooned the military as an institution by routinely depicting their subjects in a light-hearted or silly fashion. Series seeking humorous situations in World War II included *McHale's Navy* (1962–6) and *Operation Petticoat* (1977–9), the last based on successful motion pictures. Taking a grim subject of World War II (dramatized in the movie *Stalag 17*) and stretching to reach for laughs, *Hogan's Heroes* (1965–71) made dolts of Nazi soldiers guarding clever Allied pilots and aircrew in a German prisoner of war camp. Other series made light of aspects of the contemporary military, including the army in the *Phil Silvers Show* (originally titled *You'll Never Get Rich*, and commonly called *Sgt. Bilko*, it aired 1955–9), the Marines in *Gomer Pyle, USMC* (1964–70), notable as a program televised during the Vietnam War but seldom referring to that conflict, and women in the army in *Private Benjamin* (1981–3). Set in a post-Civil War western army post, *F-Troop* (1965–7) created some of television's most foolish characters who could be interpreted as ridiculing the twentieth-century army.

### Women in Films and Television

More than 30,000 women had served in uniform in nursing and administrative assignments during World War I, and over 300,000 women entered America's military branches during World War II, freeing up men to serve overseas. In the postwar years, pressure increased through the 1980s for women to be given more diverse military assignments, including those in combat units, and hold higher ranks, including general and admiral. Incrementally, Hollywood films and programs may be seen as helping to prepare the way for these changes.

During World War II and after, several films indicated the multiple roles of women, but stressed nurses in particular. Brave and dedicated military nurses venture to the front lines in *So Proudly We Hail* and *Cry Havoc* (both 1943). Women also make medical contributions in *Parachute Nurse* (1942) and *Corregidor* (1943). *Keep Your Powder Dry* (1945) shows lovely members of the Women's Army Corps (WACs), played by actresses Lana Turner and Laraine Day, training as capable mechanics to repair trucks and jeeps. *Ladies Courageous* (1944) describes how women pilots ferried airplanes from one airbase to another. WACs continued in the army after 1945, as portrayed in *Never Wave at a WAC* (1952) and *The Lieutenant Wore Skirts* (1956). A significant departure came in *M\*A\*S\*H* (1970), a film demonstrating that army nurses and doctors could behave promiscuously in wartime Korea.

Television movies and programs maintained some images but also marked new milestones. *Women of Valor* (1986) basically maintained the standard image of army nurses in World War II. The series *China Beach* (1988–91) portrays competent women army doctors and nurses during the Vietnam War who are far more independent than their colleagues in 1940s films. The series *M\*A\*S\*H* (1972–83) reconfirms the sexual freedom of army nurses found in the theatrical film. Audiences could watch female cadets deal with problems and succeed at the US Military Academy in *Women at West Point* (1979). Women navy officers endure sexual



harassment and embarrassing situations at a convention of navy pilots in *She Stood Alone: The Tailhook Scandal* (1995), events resulting in a series of investigations and lingering controversies. Correcting some confusing misinformation, *Saving Jessica Lynch* (2003) deals with the capture and survival of a woman army private taken prisoner in the Iraq War. From 1995 to 2005 women actors in the popular television series *JAG* demonstrate their courtroom competence portraying military lawyers, furthering the equal image of military women.

In the 1980s and 1990s, theatrical movies featuring women in the military grew more adventuresome. The comedy *Private Benjamin* (1980) indicates that women in the army's enlisted ranks can change themselves by undergoing their own formative "rite of passage" experience, though the portrayal of the important authority figure of the company commander (a woman captain) is unfavorable or, at best, ambiguous. Feeding continuing controversy, *G.I. Jane* (1997) postulates that women can compete with men and are capable of completing demanding training for elite military units if given a fair chance. Although containing implausible episodes, *Courage Under Fire* (1996) can be interpreted as a serious film demonstrating how a woman can hold her own in combat as a commissioned officer and helicopter pilot.

### Documentaries

Causes of wars, acts of war, and military issues are volatile subjects, and films about those subjects can inspire supporters, gain adherents, or provoke opponents. A documentary's effects on audiences may depend on when it is shown – before war starts, during the fighting, or after conflict ends. No matter how persuasive a documentary may be, the attitudes and goals of the filmmaker should be understood: Is the film's purpose didactic and a sincere effort to fairly portray the subject, or is it propaganda?

In contrast to feature films, documentaries challenge audiences with the prospect that what is on the screen may be accurate, factual, and authentic. Richard Barsam (1976, 1992) and Kevin Brownlow (1979) discuss how documentaries seek to influence audiences by recreating a version of events or interpreting policies. To make their points, documentary filmmakers edit films, transpose film images, and reenact events with actors or restage events with participants, then decide how to match music and narration with images on the screen. Added to those procedures since 1990 are the amazing capabilities of computers to enhance, change, or create the appearance of realistic photographic images. Believability and persuasion can accompany or override fairness and accuracy as the goals of documentaries.

Due to the inherent dangers involved, films and photographs of battles underway are fewer than images of military and naval forces training and maneuvering prior to combat, but that has not stopped documentary filmmakers. Before motion pictures, photographers used their own initiative or gained permission to travel with military combat units. Photographers snapped pictures of battlefields after the

guns stopped firing. By the time of World War I, governments and their leaders exercised control over military photography, designating or approving the photographers who filmed troops, airplanes, and ships during training and deployment. Government officials selected filmmakers to march with troops near the front lines, mount cameras on airplanes or fly with aircrews, and sail in warships. Brownlow (1979) shows that government agencies prepared or authorized films shown in commercial movie theaters to inspire loyalty for one's side while creating antipathy toward one's enemies. By World War II, all nations knew how important photographs and motion pictures were to represent national views of war, no matter if the images were taken in war zones or not. Aware that photography could be manipulated to the advantage of one side or another, civilians and military personnel could watch documentaries assuming that they could contain authentic images or relay accurate information, according to Carl Hovland and his coauthors (1949).

### Wars before 1917

In the United States important documentaries have appeared on television, and since 1970 television has replaced theaters as the main venue for showing documentary films. The Public Broadcasting Service (PBS) has provided an outlet on television for documentaries about all American wars, including ones fought before motion pictures. One of the most significant of all American documentaries is Ken Burns' ambitious 13-hour series, *The Civil War* (1990), shown on PBS. Stressing the causes and conduct of the war, but devoting little attention to the postwar, Burns' production appealed to thousands of viewers in multiple airings on television and on videos shown in colleges and schools. Burns identifies slavery as the war's main cause and brings together an array of images, such as still photographs, paintings, drawings, newspapers, documents, and modern motion picture photography of rivers, buildings, and battle sites. Enlisting historians to give analysis and narrators to read the words of representative Union and Confederate politicians, civilians, military officers and enlisted men, Burns created dynamic programs complemented by evocative music. He intended to persuade Americans that the war was the watershed event in American history, abolished slavery, and produced the modern American nation (Toplin 1999).

PBS has also shown documentaries treating various American wars. Employing the same techniques that Burns used in his landmark series, two series about the War for Independence, *The American Revolution* (1994, 8 hours) and *Liberty!* (1997, 6 hours) analyze the conflict that gave birth to the United States. A careful documentary about the Mexican–American War of 1846–8 is *The US War with Mexico* (1998, 4 hours). The evenhanded production draws upon historians from both nations to provide analysis while using Burns' production procedures. *Cruelty of Empire* (1999, 2 hours) addresses the Spanish–American War of 1898, the conflict that marked the emergence of modern America.

During or soon after the War with Spain, moviemakers fabricated short, pro-American documentary productions for theaters. J. Stuart Blackton, an

enterprising Briton residing in America, prepared brief documentary-style films, including *The Battle of Manila Bay* and *The Battle of Santiago Bay*. Noted inventor Thomas A. Edison made another short film, *The Battle of San Juan Hill*. All three relied on using models, recent photography, and reenacted events.

### World War I

Several documentaries examine the Great War of 1914–18. Michael Isenberg (1981) delineates how J. Stuart Blackton supervised a film more drama than documentary, *Battle Cry of Peace* (1915, 2 hours), an anti-German production touting the need for US military preparedness. During the war, the US government set up the Committee on Public Information, with its Division of Films. Also known as the Creel Committee, after its chairman, George Creel, it sent out speakers to give patriotic lectures and arranged for many documentary films to inspire Americans to support the war. In his well-illustrated study, Larry Ward (1985) emphasizes that the Creel Committee's pro-American films were shown in theaters across the nation. Craig Campbell (1985) discusses two of the most widely seen of these films, *Pershing's Crusaders* (1918, 90 minutes), and *America's Answer* (1918, 90 minutes), picturing the American Expeditionary Force training in the States and then deployed in France. The Committee also arranged for *Our Bridge of Ships* (1918, 30 minutes), touting the remarkable array of vessels manufactured by America's shipping companies and laborers.

Years later, *The Guns of August* (1964), a 99-minute film, was based partly on Barbara Tuchman's non-fiction book. The film goes beyond the war's background, to cover its conduct and conclusion from a pro-Allied viewpoint. During the war, President Woodrow Wilson ordered that African-Americans be both enlisted and drafted to serve in other than regular army units. *Men of Bronze* (1977, 50 minutes) combines contemporary photographs, films, and interviews with veterans to illustrate one of these units, the 369th New York Infantry Regiment. *Men of Bronze* shows how that regiment of black soldiers led by white officers contributed to the Allies despite enduring racism at home and discrimination from American officers in France. Television documentaries include the wide-ranging, pro-Allied *World War I: The Complete Story* (1964–5, 10 hours), 26 programs narrated by actor Robert Ryan and produced by the Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS), and PBS's nuanced *The Great War and the Shaping of the 20th Century* (1996, 4 hours), with historian Jay Winter as a leading contributor.

### World War II

By 1940 motion pictures rivaled print media in popularity, and, recognizing this, the US Government marshaled propaganda films produced by professional moviemakers far more systematically during World War II (Short 1983). Viewed by millions of Americans in theaters and service personnel across the country was

director Frank Capra's series, *Why We Fight* (1942–5), seven films of about 60 minutes each. Roger Manvell (1976 [1973]) and Peter Rollins (1996) analyze how the propagandistic powers of the programs had a significant impact on public opinion. For instance, *Prelude to War* (1942) was designed to convince Americans to leave isolationism behind and back the Allies against Germany, Japan, and Italy, the Axis nations pictured as representing evil. *The Nazis Strike* (1943) asserted that Germany displayed a "passion for conquest" and *The Battle of Britain* (1943) showed the Nazis' willingness to initiate air bombardment as a method of terrorizing civilians – but also depicted the indomitable spirit of the Allies under attack. For Germany to commence such warfare appeared to justify the Allies responding in kind and redoubling the damage. *War Comes to America* (1945) represented the nation at its best – diverse and freedom loving.

Other notable Hollywood directors supervised wartime, pro-American productions. John Ford put together *December 7th* (1943, 34 minutes) and *The Battle of Midway* (1942, 18 minutes), intended to inspire Americans and galvanize them for the sacrifices to come. As James Skinner (1991) outlines, *December 7th* blended well-staged reenactments of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor with other film taken before and after the attack. Clips of Ford's reenactments were incorporated in other movies as if they were genuine. *Battle of Midway* aimed to boost morale with convincing, heroic images. Both documentaries won Academy Awards.

John Huston produced two powerful documentaries, *The Battle of San Pietro* (1944, 33 minutes) and *Let There Be Light* (1945, released in 1981; 60 minutes). Purporting to present genuine photography of Americans in combat in Italy, *San Pietro* impressed audiences who were convinced they saw authentic battle footage. Huston never said otherwise, but Peter Maslowski (1993) details how Huston staged reenactments and creatively rearranged film footage, making a convincing documentary but not the authentic film that many believed they had watched. *Let There Be Light*, addressing the heart-rending physical and mental conditions of US veterans, was deemed so distressing by government officials that public showings did not take place until decades later.

Many other Hollywood moviemakers took government assignments as well (Doherty 1997). William Wyler's *Memphis Belle* (1944, 43 minutes) heroically recreated an American bomber crew's last mission over Germany. *Memphis Belle* contended that strategic bombardment established a "second front" – an "air front" – during 1943. To make his film Wyler edited photography taken from several aircraft, not just one airplane's twenty-fifth mission. Frank Capra made other films for the government, including *The Negro Soldier* (1944, 40 minutes), intended to show all Americans that 500,000 African American citizens in uniform had made significant contributions to the war and deserved equal treatment (Rollins 1996). Walt Disney drew on his mastery of animation for a documentary, *Victory Through Air Power* (1943, 68 minutes), based on Alexander de Seversky's book, promoting a positive view of the powers of strategic bombing. Two documentaries, *With the Marines at Tarawa* (1944, 20 minutes) and *To the Shores of Iwo Jima* (1945, 20 minutes), were the product of many cameramen who took exceptional footage of Marines while the battles raged. These productions stressed

the need to press the war to a victorious conclusion. Both films showed dead American Marines and the bitter combat necessary to take the islands – the kinds of sacrifices that would be needed if there were an Allied invasion of Japan itself. Clips from these two productions appeared in other movies.

In the postwar years, numerous documentaries were released. *Thunderbolt* (1945, 43 minutes), a joint project of directors William Wyler and Preston Sturges, puts viewers into the cockpits of P-47 fighter-bombers. The result of a joint American-British production, *The True Glory* (1945, 81 minutes) movingly documented the Allied troops' campaigns in their drive from Normandy to Berlin. With the advent of television that medium soon replaced the motion picture theater as the venue for most documentaries. *Victory at Sea* (1952), a television series, covers the US Navy in its campaigns around the world. Drawing from thousands of hours of training films, recreations, and wartime footage, 26 30-minute programs aired on the National Broadcasting Company (NBC), welded together by Richard Rodgers' stunning musical score. Also edited into one 98-minute movie, *Victory at Sea* reached vast audiences with its pro-navy and pro-USA message. The series became a staple on television from the 1950s into the 1970s, driving home its message of America fighting for democracy against the Axis and, by extension, also defending against communism (Rollins 1972). Televised by the American Broadcasting Company (ABC), *The Big Picture* (1951–9), presented an extensive series of 30-minute programs favorably covering the US Army before, during, and after World War II. *Air Power* (1956–8), a series shown on the Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS), conveying a positive approach to the international development of aeronautics (Bluem 1965). *Hiroshima-Nagasaki, August 1945* (1970, 18 minutes) was drawn from nearly three hours of film taken by Japanese cameramen after the United States atomic bombs devastated the cities. As Erik Barnouw explains (1988), eventually the film was rediscovered and edited by American filmmakers (including Barnouw), creating strong antiwar reactions in the United States, Japan, and elsewhere. Evocative and bolstered by interviews with several veterans, a PBS production, *Fly Girls* (1999, 55 minutes), details the underappreciated contributions of the WAFS (Women Auxiliary Ferry Service) and Jacqueline Cochran and the WASPs (Women Airforce Service Pilots).

Creating a treatment of America during 1941–5 to rival his stunning success of *The Civil War*, Ken Burns and his production team at Florentine Films prepared *The War* (2007). Taking 17 hours across a week in its first release on PBS, Burns' wide-ranging series reached a huge audience and dealt with numerous aspects of the United States during World War II. Linking the programs was Burns' decision to show how the war touched residents of four American communities, Luverne, Minnesota; Mobile, Alabama; Waterbury, Connecticut; and Sacramento, California. In contrast to *The Civil War*, Burns chose not to depend upon interviews with scholars and instead incorporated only the words of participants, including more than three-dozen veterans and civilians from the homefront. He utilized film footage seldom seen in the United States. The reception was not all positive. Hispanics and Native Americans criticized Burns arguing that his focus on Anglos, blacks, and Japanese-Americans did not do justice to their contributions. A few

critics contended that the programs were too reverential or overly patriotic. The total effect, however, allowed viewers to see Americans at their best and worst – worried about loved-ones overseas while dealing with societal tensions at home, and veterans brutalized by combat experiences yet trying to reflect on how the war had brought down fascism. No matter the critics' remarks, the series was a tour-de-force.

### Korean War

Although the genre appeared to have been nearly perfected during World War II, far fewer documentaries were produced during the Korean War, but particularly noteworthy is one released during the war's opening months, John Ford's *This is Korea!* (1951, 50 minutes), chronicling the actions of the Seventh Fleet and the 1st Marine Division. Ford's viewpoint strongly supported US defense of South Korea from the "Red scourge" of communism. The Army Signal Corps assembled *The First Forty Days* (1950, 30 minutes) putting a positive spin on the retreat to the Pusan perimeter. Each service arranged for a series of documentaries to be shown to recruits, draftees, and personnel already on duty. For example, the army produced 13 "Korean War Combat Bulletins" of about 20 minutes each during 1950–2. It was over three decades before production of a major documentary on Korea. Perhaps prodded in part by claims by Korean War veterans that their sacrifices were ignored, Congress authorized the Korean War Veterans Memorial in 1986 and CBS aired *Korea – Forgotten War* (1987), a one-hour overview with narration by actor Robert Stack clearly conveying a pro-US and pro-United Nations perspective. Thames Television in Britain produced and PBS aired *Korea – The Unknown War* (1990) a six-hour series with an anti-American tone. A decade later PBS televised *Battle for Korea* (2001, 2 hours), a shorter but more even-handed treatment.

### Vietnam War

Controversy accompanies documentaries about the Vietnam War. Patterned after Capra's *Why We Fight* series, the US Government produced *Why Vietnam?* (1965, 32 minutes). Shown to military recruits and draftees, it presents a strong pro-American viewpoint and compares containing communism in Indochina with blocking the Axis powers during World War II. *Why Vietnam?* also put President Lyndon Johnson in a favorable light. The government also drew upon a variety of sources for *Know Your Enemy – The Viet Cong* (1966, 22 minutes), a film primarily shown to enlistees and draftees.

Wartime documentaries allowed audiences to gain an impression of American infantry in Vietnam. Made by Pierre Schoendoerffer and his French film crew, Academy Award-winning *The Anderson Platoon* (1967, 64 minutes) presents in stark detail the daily hazards facing Lieutenant Joseph Anderson's US Army



soldiers (Rollins 2003). *A Face of War* (1967, 70 minutes), produced and directed by Eugene Jones, follows a Marine company in its violent encounters with the Viet Cong. Slater (1991) explains that Jones depicts the Marines trying to defend South Vietnam and gives a generally favorable impression of America's racially integrated military. In contrast, director Emile de Antonio's *In the Year of the Pig* (1969, 103 minutes) employs several interviews with notable US intellectuals and policymakers and develops a clear attitude opposing American policy in Indochina and supporting the Vietnamese communists (Niemi 2006).

After the war, Peter Davis' controversial Academy Award-winning *Hearts and Minds* (1974, 110 minutes) took a strong anti-American stance. Released by Columbia, a major commercial company, Davis' film skewers an arrogant America mired in anticommunism and condemns the nation's reliance on high technology warfare, especially dropping napalm and resorting to high altitude bombing of civilians. Juxtaposing film clips, Davis scorches principal US leaders, including General William Westmoreland and President Richard Nixon (Grosser 1990).

Television developed lengthy documentaries during the 1980s. *Vietnam: The 10,000 Day War* (1980, 8 hours) relies on a script by controversial journalist Peter Arnett while including on-camera interviews with many US officials. Generating considerable response from supporters and critics, the documentary *Vietnam: A Television History* (1983, 9 hours), and its companion book, *Vietnam: A History* by journalist Stanley Karnow, attracted a large audience when aired on PBS and afterward was widely shown to students in schools and colleges despite the contention by critics that the series contained numerous errors or distortions, including some pointed out before the programs were televised (Slater 1991).

## Conclusions

Directors of features who were veterans, such as Samuel Fuller (2002), indicated that they made war films to demonstrate the brutal complexities of battle and the harsh emotional and physical toll that war takes on veterans. Such qualities usually can be portrayed best in movies about small units, such as *Saving Private Ryan* (1998), in contrast to grand epics such as *Tora! Tora! Tora!* (1970). But filmmakers have found it difficult, even in an antiwar movie like *All Quiet on the Western Front* (1930), to cancel the attractive impression of camaraderie among the soldiers in the story.

The influence of US government agencies during World War II and assistance of the Defense Department after 1945 led to American films with patriotic or pro-American themes, but that has not been the case for some features made without government assistance such as *Apocalypse Now* (1979) and for independent documentaries (Westwell 2006). For feature films made between 1940 and 1970, it was impossible to expect any American filmmakers to make movies that favored Japanese imperial expansion or Germany's conquest of Europe. As more information surfaced about the Holocaust, starkly dramatized in *Schindler's List* (1993) and an episode of *Band of Brothers* (2001), and Japanese brutality toward Allied prisoners

forced to work as slave labor, effectively dramatized in *Bridge on the River Kwai* (1957), it is less likely that any American movie would present a pro-Axis viewpoint. Nevertheless, an American film company (Universal) brought *All Quiet on the Western Front* (1930) to the screen, letting audiences identify with the appealing main character, a German infantryman, empathetically played by American actor Lew Ayres. Also, in *The Young Lions* (1958) an American actor, Marlon Brando, sympathetically portrayed a World War II German officer. Notably, an American director, Clint Eastwood, produced *Letters from Iwo Jima* (2007), showing the brutal struggle for control of that island from the Japanese soldier's point of view, a companion piece to Eastwood's *Flags of Our Fathers* (2006).

Of course, the public's perception and historians' analysis of wars change over time. Therefore movies made about wars at or near the time of a war may later gain or fall in favor, depending on subsequent interpretations of the war being dramatized or analyzed in a documentary. Documentaries or feature films made to convince civilians to enlist or accept being drafted, or to convince the public to support or oppose a war may seem misguided or ring false many years later. Or a film may be seen as a valuable contribution to a war effort that was necessary for its time. Films have reaffirmed or undermined the reputations of heroes and leaders, and questioned or approved national causes. Movies may cast doubt on the reasons for one war or confirm that another war was justified. Films are malleable products that can be shown and televised countless times to new audiences who may be impressed or dismayed, informed or repulsed. Movie-goers may see reasons for war or find reasons to oppose it.

#### BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Barnouw, Erik (1988). "Hiroshima-Nagasaki: The Case of the A-Bomb Footage," in Alan Rosenthal, ed., *New Challenges for Documentary*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 581–91.
- Barsam, Richard M., ed. (1976). *Nonfiction Film: Theory and Criticism*. New York: Dutton.
- Barsam, Richard M., ed. (1992). *Nonfiction Film: A Critical History*. rev. edn. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Basinger, Jeanine (1986). *The World War II Combat Film: Anatomy of a Genre*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Bluem, A. William (1965). *Documentary in American Television: Form, Function, Method*. New York: Hastings House.
- Brooks, Tim, and Earle Marsh (2003 [1979]). *The Complete Directory to Prime Time Network and Cable TV Shows*, 8th edn. New York: Ballantine.
- Brownlow, Kevin (1979). *The War, the West, and the Wilderness*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Campbell, Craig W. (1985). *Reel America and World War I: A Comprehensive Filmography and History of Motion Pictures in the United States, 1914–1920*. Jefferson, NC: McFarland.
- Chadwick, Bruce (2001). *The Reel Civil War: Mythmaking in American Film*. New York: Knopf.
- Devine, Jeremy M. (1995). *Vietnam at 24 Frames a Second: A Critical and Thematic Analysis of Over 400 Films about the Vietnam War*. Jefferson, NC: McFarland.

- Dick, Bernard (1985). *Star-Spangled Screen: The American World War II Film*. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky.
- Doherty, Thomas (1997). "Documenting the 1940s," in Thomas Schatz, *Boom and Bust: American Cinema in the 1940s*, vol. 6 of Charles Harpole, ed. *History of the American Cinema*, New York: Charles Scribner's, 397–421.
- Early, Emmett (2003). *The War Veteran in Film*. Jefferson, NC: McFarland.
- Fuller, Samuel (2002). *A Third Face*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Grosser, David (1990). "We Aren't on the Wrong Side, We Are the Wrong Side": Peter Davis Targets (American) Hearts and Minds," in Linda Dittmar and Gene Michaud, eds., *From Hanoi to Hollywood: The Vietnam War in American Film*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 269–82.
- Hovland, Carl I., Arthur A. Lumsdaine, and Fred D. Sheffield (1949). *Studies in Social Psychology in World War II*, vol. 3: *Experiments on Mass Communications*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Isenberg, Michael T. (1981). *War on Film: The American Cinema and World War I, 1914–41*. East Brunswick, NJ: Associated University Presses/Fairleigh Dickinson University Press.
- Joseph, Alvin M. (1995). "They Died with Their Boots On," in Mark C. Carnes, ed., *Past Imperfect: History According to the Movies*. New York: Henry Holt, 146–9.
- Koppes, Clayton R., and Gregory D. Black (1987). *Hollywood Goes to War: How Politics, Profits and Propaganda Shaped World War II Movies*. New York: Free Press.
- Lentz, Robert J. (2003). *Korean War Filmography*. Jefferson, NC: McFarland.
- Manvell, Roger (1976 [1973]). *Films and the Second World War*. New York: Dell.
- Marill, Alvin H. (2005). *Movies Made for Television*, 5 vols. Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press.
- Maslowski, Peter (1993). *Armed with Cameras: The American Military Photographers of World War II*. New York: Free Press.
- McPherson, James M. (1995). "Glory," in Mark C. Carnes, ed., *Past Imperfect: History According to the Movies*. New York: Henry Holt, 128–30.
- Medved, Michael (2005). "War Films, Hollywood and Popular Culture," *Imprimis* (March 9), 1–5.
- Musser, Charles (1990). *History of the American Cinema*, vol. 1: *The Emergence of Cinema: The American Screen to 1907*. New York: Charles Scribner's.
- Niemi, Robert (2006). *History in the Media: Film and Television*. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC Clio.
- Rayner, Jonathan. (2007). *The Naval War Film: Genre, History, and National Cinema*. Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press.
- Rollins, Peter C. (1972). "Victory at Sea: Cold War Epic," *Journal of Popular Culture*, 6: 463–82.
- Rollins, Peter C., ed. (1983). *Hollywood as Historian: American Film in a Cultural Context*. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky.
- Rollins, Peter C. (1996). "Frank Capra's *Why We Fight* Series and Our American Dream," *Journal of American Culture*, 19:5 (Winter), 81–6.
- Rollins, Peter C., ed. (2003). *Columbia Companion to American History on Film*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Rollins, Peter C., and John E. O'Connor (2008). *Why We Fought: America's Wars in Film and History*. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky.
- Rothman, Stanley, David J. Rothman, and Stephen P. Powers. (1996). "Hollywood Views the Military," in *Hollywood's America: Social and Political Themes in Motion Pictures*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 81–101.

- Rubin, Steven J. (1981). *Combat Films: American Realism, 1945–1970*. Jefferson, NC: McFarland.
- Sandler, Stanley (1996). “The Tuskegee Airmen,” *American Historical Review*, 101:4 (October), 1171–3.
- Shaara, Michael (1974). *The Killer Angels: A Novel*. New York: McKay.
- Short, K. R. M., ed. (1983). *Film and Propaganda in World War II*. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press.
- Skinner, James M. (1991). “December 7: Filmic Myth Masquerading as Historical Fact,” *Journal of Military History*, 55:4 (October), 507–16.
- Slater, Thomas J. (1991). “Teaching Vietnam: The Politics of Documentary,” in Michael Anderegg, ed., *Inventing Vietnam: The War in Film and Television*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 269–90.
- Spiller, Roger J. (1999). “War in the Dark,” *American Heritage*, 50:1 (February 1999), 41–51.
- Suid, Lawrence H. (1996). *Sailing on the Silver Screen*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Suid, Lawrence H. (2002 [1978]). *Guts & Glory: The Making of the American Military Image in Film*, rev. ed. Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky.
- Suid, Lawrence H., and Dolores A. Haverstick (2005). *Stars and Stripes on Screen: A Comprehensive Guide to Portrayals of American Military on Film*. Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press.
- Toplin, Robert B. (1999). *Ken Burns’s The Civil War: Historians Respond*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Ward, Larry W. (1985). *The Motion Picture Goes to War: The U.S. Government Film Effort during World War I*. Ann Arbor, MI: UMI Research Press.
- Westwell, Guy (2006). *War Cinema*. London: Wallflower.
- Wetta, Frank J., and Martin A. Novelli (2006). “‘Romantic isn’t it, Miss Dandridge?’: Sources and Meanings of John Ford’s Cavalry Trilogy,” *American Nineteenth Century History*, 7:2, 299–321.
- Wise, James E., Jr. and Anne Collier Rehill (1997). *Stars in Blue: Movie Actors in America’s Sea Services*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Wise, James E., Jr. and Anne Collier Rehill (1999). *Stars in the Corps: Movie Actors in the United States Marines*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Wise, James E., Jr., and Paul W. Wilderson (2000). *Stars in Khaki: Movie Actors in the Army and Air Services*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Woll, Allen L. (1983). *The Hollywood Musical Goes to War*. Chicago: Nelson-Hall.

## Chapter Sixty-one

# THE MILITARY, THE NEWS MEDIA, AND CENSORSHIP

*Edward L. Walraven*

For as long as humans have been able to communicate through writing and illustrations, they have discussed conflict with other humans. These expressions grew to encompass wars, generals, and soldiering – in some cases describing their own exploits (or paying others to do so) in self-serving attempts to retain power or to influence their legacy. From antiquity, rulers and military commanders, or individuals serving in both roles, have commissioned songs, paintings, other images, and poetry to commemorate victories. With the advent of printing, ordinary tradesmen – not just members of the royal court – became involved in describing such exploits. The “wartime press” of the New World is a more recent development, dating from about three centuries ago with the printing of broadsides and periodicals designed to distribute news, much of it weeks or months old.

Printing in the United States had largely been religious and religiously contentious in nature until the appearance, in 1704, of the first continuously published newspaper, the *Boston News-Letter*, a weekly publication that emphasized commerce and advertising. Within 70 years, publications had expanded to include material on warfare in the colonies. Carole Sue Humphrey’s *“This Popular Engine”* (1992) and Carl Berger’s *Broadsides and Bayonets* (1976) usefully sketch the way in which engravers and printers of the Revolutionary Era produced works designed to describe military events after the fact, bolster support for the war effort, and even single out by name those opposed to the cause. They also printed official communiqués and, to the chagrin of Continental commanders, occasionally reported troop movements. In *Ranks and Columns* (1993), Alfred Emile Cornébie notes that such publications were also among the first in America to print letters written by the soldiers themselves, foreshadowing contemporary discussion of whether combatants should share their uncensored military experiences in documentary films, on the Internet, or on the editorial pages of daily newspapers. At the time no “reporters” followed the armies and sent back news. Revolutionary-era publications recognized the need to keep up morale on the home front, with the troops, and to serve as a source of propaganda. This would become an expectation of the military, and a source of debate for news organizations, even into

the twenty-first century. Statistics in William David Sloan's *The Media in America* (2005) reveal that by the end of the war with Britain, about 35 colonial newspapers had been in print, nine of them with circulations of about 1,000. A few were royalist publications, especially in Southern colonies, but Tory news and views on the war soon disappeared when those areas came under Continental control. News of the war and its participants, usually old by the time it appeared in print, was sometimes obtained from witnesses, often repeated stories others had heard, or reprinted stories from other broadsides or bulletins.

Individuals who observed and described wartime events firsthand, or who interviewed participants to relay news back to their publications, did not exist until the mid-1800s. Such reporters were often called "(foreign) correspondents" because they covered stories that local newsroom reporters did not. Unlike editors and reporters whose essays and stories could simply be turned over to the typesetters, correspondents had to rely on sending their stories back to the newspaper as packets of "correspondence" borne by traditional means of transportation. Much content in American newspapers was derived from travelers, other publications, or copies of publications that arrived in the latest mail packet. Improvements in communication helped quicken the pace and reduce dependence on ships, coaches, trains, or special couriers, but the term "correspondent" grew in use to include reporters sent to cover military operations.

Such "correspondents" were often eager for assignment to cover a military conflict, as were their editors. Aside from major natural disasters, little could compare in news value with armed conflict, the most inhumane of all human endeavors – one that appealed to journalists because of its drama, scope, spectacle, impact, and emotion. The traits by which news organizations define "news" were not codified until the early twentieth-century rise of professional training and journalism schools, but reporters and editors alike knew that stories involving drama and conflict helped boost circulation and advertising income. The most notable early war correspondents to travel with an army and routinely file reports worked during the 1840s and 1850s. New Orleans reporter George Wilkins Kendall, who would do much to advance the speed of war reporting during the Mexican–American conflict, accompanied the Republic of Texas army on its ill-fated march to Santa Fe in 1841, was taken captive by Mexican authorities, and was imprisoned for about nine months. Still, he sent letters to his newspaper which published them in his absence. Press coverage of the Mexican–American War has been the subject of only limited study but new works have recently been published or republished: Fayette Copeland's *Kendall of the Picayune* (1997 [1943]) and Lawrence Cress's editing in *Dispatches from the Mexican War* (1999). The dispatches of Kendall reflect the standards of the day: a looser regard for accuracy and varying levels of objectivity (Reilly 1998). Kendall, reflecting the press' allegiance of the times, not only covered American operations, but also reportedly carried dispatches for American commanders and even rushed forward to help capture a Mexican banner. This sort of correspondent loyalty to the cause would steadily fade. Reporters on occasion faulted individual commanders for decisions, but none questioned their nation's justification for invading Mexico. Jane McManus



Storm Cazneau, the only woman correspondent to cover the Mexican War, has been credited with coining the term “manifest destiny” in her writing (Hudson 2001). Relations between the military and journalists were generally cordial during the war with Mexico, unlike the more contentious Civil War era, when the number and size of newspapers had grown rapidly, as had their staffs and the variety and volume of their opinions. Placing the Mexican War correspondents in a context of those of the Crimean War is Philip Knightley’s *The First Casualty* (2000), a comprehensive treatment of war reporting from its inception to the late 1990s.

During the first half of the nineteenth century innovations in printing and marketing altered the economics of newspaper publishing. The owners of newspapers, no longer always the printer, came to depend more on advertising revenues and less on printing legal notices and contracts controlled by government officials. When advertising rates became linked to circulation, publishers recognized the value of assigning correspondents to follow armies and produce “copy” which would increase readership.

John M. Perry’s *A Bohemian Brigade: The Civil War Correspondents* (2000) argues that the rise of full-time war correspondents in the Crimean War and American Civil War led the public to demand more of reporters than simply passing along official government views. With the additional aspect of crude photojournalism and first-hand accounts, citizens not in harm’s way began seeing, for the first time, some of the conditions endured by soldiers in the field and how poor military tactics could cost thousands of lives. J. Cutler Andrews’ (1955, 1970) detailed description of newspaper coverage of the Civil War from both Union and Confederate perspectives remains valuable, but it does not contain the incisive analysis provided by later books such as Brayton Harris’s *Blue & Gray in Black & White* (1999), or Harry J. Maihafer’s *War of Words: Abraham Lincoln and the Civil War Press* (2001), and *The General and the Journalists* (1998). Harris, who examined the stories of 350 Northern and 150 Southern war correspondents, concluded that, while accurate, their writing style was designed to appeal to readers.

Quintus Wilson’s groundbreaking scholarly work (1945) suggests that many reporters acceded to military censorship, but other writers assert that reporting on the Civil War brought the press into conflict with political and military leaders on both sides. The new efficiency with which improved artillery and rifles could inflict massive casualties also prompted reporters to question commanders’ decisions. Examining Abraham Lincoln’s relations with the press, Maihafer (2001) found the president had a facility for manipulating reporters and editors to project the desired image, lauding himself as an ardent supporter of the press while approving censorship on a regular basis. Union General Ulysses Grant denied reporters use of the government telegraph system for sending dispatches and imposed a news blackout in early 1862. So complete was the blackout imposed by Grant and limited were his own reports to Lincoln that the president dispatched journalist Charles Dana to report on events at the front. At the same time reporters often found individual commanders who could be flattered into granting information and other favors.

John F. Marszalek (1999) writes that Union General William T. Sherman despised the press and believed that reporters not only were biased against him and his army, but that their stories leaked valuable information to the enemy. Peter Andrews (1991) traces Sherman's hatred of the press to his experiences as a banker in California during the 1850s. Andrews reports that when Sherman ordered Florus Plumptre to leave his camp in Kentucky in 1861, the Cincinnati *Commercial* correspondence protested that he had come to learn and report the truth, to which Sherman replied, "We don't want the truth told about things here.... We don't want the enemy any better informed than he is." Nor did this concern lessen as the war progressed. Works by James Randall (1918) and Michael Sweeney (2006) lend some credence to commanders' concerns about the security of their operations. Sweeney notes that Confederate General Robert E. Lee said he often searched Northern newspapers for scraps of military information suggesting possible troop movements, objectives, or strategies. Sometimes, war correspondents were reminded their presence near the battle had consequences: a *New York Tribune* reporter was captured at Vicksburg and spent more than a year in a Confederate prison before escaping.

Unlike some European powers whose armies continued to consolidate and expand colonial holdings in the second half of the nineteenth century, American soldiers were engaged in few major military operations between the Civil War and the Spanish-American War except for campaigns against the native tribes of the West. During the 1880s the "new journalism" of the post Civil War era evolved into "yellow journalism" characterized by the desire to boost circulation by ferreting out and emphasizing sensational if often inaccurate local stories (Sloan 2005). One of the iconic images of this circulation war is that of newsboys hawking "extra" editions with screaming, large-type headlines and strong, often lurid, artwork. At the fore were the competitors Joseph Pulitzer of the *New York World* and William Randolph Hearst of the *New York Journal*. Their publications brutalized each other when possible as their newspapers reported inaccurate or false information printed by their opponents while carrying out crusades of their own which often contained half-truths and innuendos.

Both expanded their coverage of sensational events by dispatching reporters to Cuba to cover the insurrection of island residents against Spanish rule. Sensational tales of Spanish mistreatment of interned Cubans and other atrocities were splashed across the pages of New York papers from which they spread across the nation as other papers printed the stories without an attempt to collaborate their authenticity. Emotional editorializing by leading newspapers helped persuade Congress to declare war on Spain although other newspapers of the city and in the heartland deplored the sensationalistic clamoring of the *Journal* and *World*.

In his study of yellow journalism, David R. Spencer (2007) notes that the press of the day was the unabashed cheerleader for American military operations and nationalistic intentions. Few stories questioned the competence of the commanders or the price paid by troops for poor decision-making. After *New York World* correspondent Stephen Crane described the confusion of the New York 71st Infantry Regiment as it hesitated at San Juan Hill because of heavy sniper fire, the

*New York Journal* attacked Crane's patriotism and loyalty, then printed a mostly fictional account of the 71st's attack. Other correspondents wrote dubious or even fictional accounts of Spanish atrocities, frequently highlighting US military and moral superiority. Sometimes they abandoned their role of observers. James Creelman, another of Pulitzer's correspondents, accompanied American troops in their advance at New Caney, then surged forward to grab the Spanish colors as correspondent George W. Kendall had done during the Mexican-American War. As Creelman waved the captured standard, he was wounded by a Spanish rifleman. The flowery, biased language of Creelman, Richard Harding Davis, and Sylvester "Harry" Scovel represents the bulk of the yellow press coverage of the Spanish-American War. Such reporting was only occasionally contradicted by critical reports from Hearst columnist Ambrose Bierce (Sloan 2005). Neither the military commanders in Cuba and the Philippines nor their political leaders in Washington had much to fear from the American press, and the public little to learn of a factual nature. Coverage of the war featured an increased use of illustrators to convey emotionally powerful messages and stories, even to the illiterate. All these elements worked in concert to increase sales and advertising revenues for the publishers as they promoted the widespread belief that the United States, now a major world power, should expand its influence whenever possible.

In a decade or so, the posturing of various world powers led to World War I, during which news organizations and correspondents were expected to become part of the elaborate new governmental propaganda machinery for keeping up morale and support on the home front (and often did so willingly). Patterns were established during the three and a half years of war prior to US entry in April 1917. Knightley's *First Casualty* (2000), one of the most detailed surveys of the period, reveals not only the sophisticated program of the British government to control the press, but the level to which editors and publishers became willing participants, often because they earned social rewards. Correspondents were allowed to roam about in rear areas but none were permitted to approach the front in the British sector. If they did so, reporters were subject to arrest, taking photographs could mean the firing squad, and information sources were evasive. "Say what you like, old man. But don't mention any places or people," the British chief of intelligence once told a reporter (Knightley 2000: 101). Censors and editors made sure the commanders were sheltered from criticism and that the harsh life in the trenches was not revealed to families at home. As a result, one of the first major campaigns of the war – the Battle of the Frontiers, part of the famed "Guns of August" reference – killed or wounded 260,000 French soldiers in a month but went unreported in Britain until after the war. Official communiqués were the primary source for many correspondents, some of whom simply stayed in Paris to write from the materials provided by the government. For the first time, uniforms were issued to correspondents, underscoring the military's view that the press was part of the war effort.

A new form of visual reporting – newsreels shown in movie theaters – was tightly controlled and footage shot by the military was edited for propaganda purposes before going to newsreel companies. Few of these images, especially American

ones, survived, say historians, placing World War I as an “under-reported war” in stark comparison to the volume of photos and images that contributed to World War II’s reputation – accurate or not – as the “best covered war.”

German and French military commanders placed few limits on their press at first, and the Germans invited reporters from other nations in order to curry world opinion. But as the situations at the front worsened, all nations at war imposed stiffer censorship that included prohibition against criticisms of the war or its commanders. When the truth began to emerge as troops returned home, British citizens became distrustful of their press and the German people, told for so long how well the war was going, were in shock at their nation’s surrender (Knightley 2000).

The entry of American into World War I expanded the same level of censorship and restrictions to the correspondents of yet another major world power. Propaganda was important to increase American will to provide ever increasing support for the European war. Americans were seen as more aggressive news gatherers, but restrictions prevented correspondents from writing about dismal conditions, poor supplies, or even the early deaths in what would become the worldwide Spanish Flu Epidemic of 1918. General John Pershing, commander of the American Expeditionary Force, approved accreditation for only 31 war correspondents, each of whom had to post a \$10,000 bond to ensure proper behavior, and none of whom was permitted to travel to the front lines. While in Europe their dispatches had to be vetted by Army censors whose work was directed by Frederick Palmer, a former war correspondence who had reported on the Spanish–American War, the Philippine Insurrection, Boxer Rebellion, Russo–Japanese War, and the expedition Pershing led into Mexico in pursuit of Pancho Villa. Palmer complained that overseeing the American press corps was as challenging as the war itself (Haverstock 1996). When Westbrook Pegler, a 23-year-old correspondent for the United Press, tried to report on the number of American soldiers dying from pneumonia as a result of poor clothing and lack of heat, Pershing demanded his recall and the UP did so (Andrews 1991). The first twentieth-century American woman war correspondent, Peggy Hull, a friend of Pershing, was accredited by the war department – a few women writers covered the Spanish–American War but they did so without military sanction – and she respected the rules established by army censors (Smith and Bogart 1991).

Some scholars believe that as a result of the widespread deception of the press and public during World War I, a new approach to wartime reporting began to form, one that emphasized telling the public about all aspects of war including its impact on individual soldiers and the hardships they and their families at home faced. During World War II, two reporters who practiced this approach are the most recognizable American war correspondents: Edward R. Murrow of CBS and print columnist Ernie Pyle of the Scripps–Howard newspaper syndicate (Tobin 1997). Herbert Foerstel’s *Killing the Messenger* (2006) compares the work of Murrow, Pyle, Martha Gellhorn, Walter Cronkite, and Andy Rooney with those of the twenty-first century finding similarities in the challenges they faced both on the battlefield and from their corporate employers. Dozens of servicemen who had been journalists prior to the war became “combat correspondents,” sent reports

to the Office of War Information for distribution in the United States, and wrote for servicemen in the newspaper *Stars and Stripes* and the magazine *Yank*. Both publications included human interest stories, cartoons, and news from the home-front and were designed to build morale, but comparisons of their war coverage with that of the general media shows that the military publications were equally accurate (McGurn 2004).

The new and powerful medium of radio provided another medium through which journalists could tell audiences about war's impact on civilians and soldiers. Murrow and other broadcast and print journalists had already begun limited coverage of World War II in Europe even as German correspondents advanced with the troops or flew in bombers to report the successes of German military might (Bernstein and Lubertozi 2003). Some of the most dramatic events – French capitulation to the Nazis, the rescue of the British army at Dunkirk, the Battle of Britain, and the bombing of British cities – occurred before America's entry into the war and only a handful of American news organizations had yet committed significant resources to its coverage. Eventually, some 1,600 correspondents would cover World War II, including famed photojournalists Robert Capa and Margaret Bourke-White, possibly the first female photojournalist. Newsreels continued to provide visual information for Western audiences, utilizing graphic but edited images selected for propaganda value. Murrow's broadcasts from London were particularly powerful for audiences around the world as he described German bombing of the city as explosions could be heard in the background. The newscasts were hardly unbiased, however, often presenting the civilian population as besieged but courageously holding on (Edwards 2004, Seib 2007).

The Japanese attack on British and American forces in the Pacific and Asia unified Americans and resulted in a sense of common national purpose that resulted in what was probably the closest cooperation between the military and media in US history. To obtain accreditation, newsmen agreed to abide by "press codes," and no one protested when US General Douglas MacArthur, the top commander in the Pacific (the sole theater of operations for Americans at first), imposed some of the tightest censorship ever, including courts-martial for soldiers and officers caught talking to reporters. MacArthur's policy in the Southwest Pacific was similar to that imposed by British authorities who dismissed war correspondents from Burma, Hong Kong, and Southeast Asia to prevent their reporting on the apparent fall of the Empire.

The spirit of cooperation among Americans was enhanced by General George C. Marshall's policy of briefing leading Washington newsmen on the war. He stipulated that the sessions were "for background only" and newsmen reciprocated with a self-censorship on what they reported. Nor did the 30 reporters whom General Dwight Eisenhower briefed on plans for the July 1943 invasion of Sicily ten days before it began violate his request that they hold all reporting until it took place. Their relationship with Eisenhower led them to honor his request that they not report on General George Patton's slapping of a soldier hospitalized for shell shock, a story that was later broken by Drew Pearson, a columnist in Washington, not a war correspondent.

During the spring of 1942, pool systems were devised so that some reporters could accompany units into combat. Even as the war progressed and the tide of battle turned in favor of the Allies, reporting stayed focus on blood and bravery instead of larger, more meaningful stories: the scope and impact of the Battle of Leyte Gulf, the new kamikaze initiative, as well as the importance and success of Allied submarine warfare in drying up the Japanese war machine's fuel and oil.

In the European Theater of Operations, reporters were freer to report even discouraging news, though they usually put a positive spin on their stories, as in the case of the failed British/Canadian raid on Dieppe. After the war, reports circulated saying that correspondents cooperated with military officials in covering up the losses suffered during Operation/Exercise Tiger off Slapton Sands in Lyme Bay, Devon, on the south coast of England on the night of April 26/27, 1944 (Small and Rogerson 1988). Charles MacDonald, in "Slapton Sands: The 'Cover up' that Never Was" (1988) shows that while news of the losses was withheld until after the landings in Normandy six weeks later, newsmen were free to report on the exercise after that. Indeed, the events were briefly described in *Stars and Stripes* (1944) and all documents concerning it were released by the 1970s (Greene and Allen 1985). The retrospective studies suggest that war reporters were caught up in the flood of news surrounding the invasion of Normandy, and the magnitude and loss of life off Devon were smaller in comparison, so little was written at the time.

Twenty-seven reporters landed with US troops in Normandy on June 6, 1944. These and other correspondents tended to emphasize Allied sacrifice and courage, glossing over operational details. The policy of government officials, one adhered to by war correspondents, was designed to keep important military information from the enemy while keeping up morale back home for more sacrifice to come. Both Supreme Allied Commander Dwight Eisenhower and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill agreed that public opinion helped war efforts. And most of their top ground commanders realized the advantage of war news about winning. In other subtle attempts to co-opt the press into a "war effort" mode, Eisenhower ordered military commanders to provide correspondents food, lodging, transportation, and use of military communications facilities when possible. Correspondents were able to move about from unit to unit if they wished, unlike the "embedding" of the latest conflicts in which reporters are assigned to a specific unit. Correspondents were again provided uniforms to indicate their position as "quasi-soldiers" and part of the war effort. The general acceptance of the censor system led Eisenhower and other top officers to talk more freely to reporters because the correspondents would self-edit as part of the war effort, and because military censors would catch and delete any sensitive material included in their reports. Ernie Pyle flourished in this atmosphere, becoming the most popular American war correspondent ever because of his emphasis on writing about the average infantry soldier, his hometown and family, and what it was like to be in combat. Pyle's focus on the common foot soldier meant he rarely wrote of strategies or major battles, but he described many grisly scenes for readers back home that left no doubt as to the impact of war on individual soldiers. Such was Pyle's perceived value to the war effort that when killed by a Japanese machine gun near



war's end, it was a blow to the entire nation. A photograph of Pyle's body was suppressed by the government at first, ostensibly to spare his ailing widow but with the added benefit of blunting public reaction to casualties. The photo was almost forgotten for three decades before its publication in a newspaper (Burlington [North Carolina] *Daily Times-News*, December 14, 1979) and in the memoir of Associated Press photographer Rudy Faircloth (1982). Even then, the photograph had been so rarely seen that the Associated Press and other news outlets incorrectly reported it had never been published when a rare set of prints resurfaced in February 2008.

The same system of self-editing and censorship did allow for some major gaps in reporting, such as Allied bombing of civilians – especially at Dresden where perhaps more died than at Hiroshima – and the disappointing but propaganda-rich “dam busters” raid on German hydroelectric sources. Correspondents for the Allied forces were enthusiastic in their desire to cover events in person, often going with the first troops into a newly captured town and riding along on bombing runs, sometimes without permission. The need to refine the system emerged with such incidents as the Associated Press correspondent Edward Kennedy's breaking of the news embargo on the end of German hostilities in Europe, and the *Chicago Tribune's* reporting of the pivotal American air and naval triumph at Midway. The accuracy of the latter story caused military intelligence officers to fear that the front-page account would suggest to the Japanese the truth that their secret code had been broken (Knightley 2000).

Coverage of World War II involved more photojournalists, combat photographers, and correspondents, as well as radio reports that could reach overseas instantly. The work of numerous World War II correspondents is described by Frederick Voss in *Reporting the War* (1994) and the experiences of women war correspondents are covered by Lilya Wagner (1989). The public, not told or shown everything, was exposed to war information on an unprecedented level, and that war is often described as “the best reported war ever” – even though censorship and poor reporting kept major stories from being reported until much later or ignored.

Five years after the end of World War II, the outbreak of warfare between South and North Korea drew Western allies and their war correspondents into a new sort of geopolitical operation that would to some degree foreshadow the even longer conflict in Vietnam. The official labeling of the war in Korea as a police action against communist aggressors was to deteriorate rapidly under the eyes of war correspondents, who, with no official censorship guidelines, watched and reported military debacles. Early stories of American and other Allied setbacks described exhausted, scared, poorly equipped troops in stark contrast to the positive coverage of just a few years before. Still, reporters briefed on plans for the landing at Inchon maintained secrecy until the operation was launched. Although historiography of the Korean War has increased as interest in the conflict has grown, reviews of the mass media's coverage of the Korean War have been sparse. Much of the discussion comes indirectly from the memoirs of correspondents themselves – Marguerite Higgins (1951); I. F. Stone (1952); Dan Levin (1995); and Herbert Mitgang

(2004), a *Stars and Stripes* reporter in the Mediterranean Theater among them – as well as James Aronson's *The Press and the Cold War* (1970). Korea would become the first war fought in the presence of television news cameras – although black-and-white images, strong self-censorship, and the infancy of the evening network news programs limited what footage was broadcast and its impact.

Just enough time had passed since World War II for a new group of reporters with no wartime experience to yearn for frontline assignments. Many were poor at their new assignments. Some carried weapons and openly remarked that they wanted to kill a Korean while carrying out their reporting duties. General Douglas MacArthur, as military commander, resorted to familiar ways and issued blanket censorship on all images and reports after the voluntary system of self-censorship made both reporters and soldiers uncomfortable. Correspondents baffled by the scope and mission of the Korean conflict soon began to grumble among themselves that the Korean War was one that Americans “can’t win, can’t lose, can’t quit.” Battles seemed to have more political importance than military value, and reporters remarked that they found few clear answers other than the oft-repeated need to “stop communist aggression.” Even Murrow filed reports on the confusion and poor conditions, but CBS News chose not to run those stories as political pressure from the Red Scare increased at home (Knightley 2000). Other news organizations stateside tended to bend under government pressure to support the war effort and carried “managed” news from Washington briefings rather than reports from their own correspondents in Korea. The military grew angry that some reporters would not be cheerleaders as they had previously, while a few correspondents fumed about official falsehoods. Even so, stories continued to praise the courage of the soldiers and only occasionally asked whether the conflict was justified to save a corrupt South Korea – a question that would arise among the media and public 15 years later in Vietnam. British correspondent James Cameron said it was a time of “mass-produced war correspondents, a prep-school for Vietnam” (Knightley 2000: 380). Korea left the Western military puzzled as to how its public affairs and censorship efforts had failed to convince either the public or the soldiers of Korea’s importance.

The Korean experience had revealed that the Cold War geopolitical world was ever more complex. The Vietnam experience changed the face of war coverage far beyond what radio, visual reporting, and confused doubts had done in the previous wars (Hallin 1986). For both the media and the military, the war in Vietnam became a major watershed when early supportive coverage eventually turned more critical and public support began to fade. The conflict represented the lowest point in media–military relations, a body of experiences that cemented for many future military leaders the idea that an unfettered wartime media was a disloyal media that would ultimately lose a war by undermining public support. In the Vietnam conflict, political considerations weighed as heavily as military ones, no battle lines existed, and the “enemy” was essentially invisible except when uniformed North Vietnamese regulars appeared. Correspondents were a broader variety than ever before, coming not only from traditional print and broadcast news organizations, but also from college newspapers and religious magazines.

Except for the French, few Western reporters had heard of Indochina or its relationship to European governments. Thus media coverage of Vietnam started slowly, and few restrictions were imposed by American military or diplomatic officials. Indeed, in an undeclared war, the legal basis for censorship was murky at best. American officials attempted rather to use finesse in making reporters part of the US missions in South Vietnam, which necessitated lies be told to reporters even when the reporters knew about the untruths. Eventually, the apparent disconnect between official daily media briefings and reporters' own observations of how events were unfolding led correspondents to refer to the briefings as the "Five O'Clock Follies." William Prochnau (2005) offers an analysis of these efforts, and an interesting if dated opposing view appears in John Martin Mecklin's *Mission in Torment* (1965). Mecklin, the chief information officer in Vietnam from 1962 to 1964, notes that the official view of South Vietnamese president Diem was one of an uncompromising figure who would not match American goals, contributing to the difficulty of a public relations campaign to persuade reporters otherwise.

Sloan (2005) notes that American news media reports had three main focuses – one on soldiers and commanders in Vietnam, another on officials in Washington, and a third on the increasingly divided public. Little coverage was seen of Vietnamese civilians or Vietnamese social structures as the war unfolded.

If US officials stopped short of censoring reporters, the government of South Vietnam could and did apply pressure on American officials to restrict reporters while simultaneously threatening expulsion of correspondents from the country. South Vietnamese officials also tapped correspondents' phones and spied in other ways, continuously raising suspicions and negative attitudes among reporters. Rather than censorship, the new American approach in Vietnam was public relations, including full access to any area or aspect by all war correspondents.

The American government and military officials wondered why the patriotism exhibited by war correspondents of World War II and Korea did not exhibit itself. The Kennedy and Johnson administrations pressured editors and publishers stateside, as well as adopting a goal of fooling the press without deceiving it. Knightley's analysis concludes that much of the negative reporting in the early years of American involvement was generated as correspondents covered the effectiveness of the US mission, not whether there should even be a mission, so the coverage was fairly positive toward American efforts overall. Prochnau's writings also portray the Western reporters as "hawks," including the New York Times' David Halberstam, so often proffered as the example of a leftist, defeatist press.

The Vietnam conflict occurred at a time when women were entering the national media in a much wider role than previously. Joyce Hoffman (2008) profiles 15 female war correspondents probing how they covered the war and how the experience changed them. Her subjects include Pulitzer Prize winner Frankie Fitzgerald, photojournalist Dicky Chapelle who died in battle, and Liz Trotta, the first female war correspondent on network television.

The 1960s were also a time when communications and travel had improved to the point that reporters working from their offices stateside could cover the war's story as well as war correspondents who sometimes found official sources

unavailable or were given answers in conflict with known events. Vietnam, although not the first war reported on television, was the first American war reported on television daily, in color, during the dinner hour, with disturbing images that the self-censorship of a decade earlier would have prevented. Uncensored TV footage replaced censored World War II newsreels and brief Korean War scenes. Content changed as well. Broadcasts showed American troops burning villages, bombing civilians, and the aftermath of a civilian massacre. At home, newscasts showed thousands of opponents to the war, and such strong images were being reinforced by investigative reporting of administration policies aimed at deceiving Americans about the Vietnam War. Similar activities and civilian deaths had taken place in World War II and Korea, but had been either censored or withheld as a matter of course. More of the Vietnam stories would become public as American civilian and institutional support for the involvement waned. The correspondents themselves and other writers were airing their views outside of balanced news articles by producing books, such as David Halberstam's *The Making of a Quagmire* (1965), Edward Jay Epstein's *News from Nowhere* (1973), and Don Oberdorfer's *Tet!* (1971). The latter, a detailed account of the North Vietnamese/Viet Cong Offensive of 1968, argues that the real success of the attack was how it appeared in Western television news, newspapers, and the court of world opinion. While Vietnam now supplanted World War II as the "best reported" in many ways – especially original reporting – freedom of the media still failed in reporting major events such as hostilities in Laos and Cambodia. The legacy of an uncensored war in an age of rapid television communication was an abyss of deep distrust between media and military that continued in newsrooms for decades and is still present in military circles today.

Only six of the more than 2,000 individuals issued press credentials during the Vietnam War had them revoked. The most famous case involved John S. Carroll, a reporter for the Baltimore *Sun*, who "broke the story" on the abandonment of Khe Sanh by describing how Marines were bulldozing facilities there prior to their departure. That activity was done in full view of enemy forces surrounding the base, but Carroll lost his accreditation for six weeks after reporting on it (Hallin 1986).

A myth that "the press lost Vietnam" developed within the military and, to a lesser degree, the general American public. It held that while the media may not have compromised military operations, biased reporting by its members painted a false picture of the war which undermined public confidence in the military and sapped support for continuing the war until complete success was achieved. Some works by media scholars – including William M. Hammond's *Reporting Vietnam* (1998), Daniel C. Hallin's *"Uncensored War"* (1986), and Clarence R. Wyatt's *Paper Soldiers* (1995) – argue that changing coverage did not erode public support for the war on the home front. Instead, they conclude, the loss of public support reflected civilian frustrations when the public perceived that generals who never visited the field were badly disconnected from the conduct of the war and its impacts. Wyatt's book has been criticized for inadequately addressing television news. Television critic Michael Arlen (1969) argues that public expectations that

television would convey an accurate account soon turned to doubt, and he comments that the limits of television technology in fact made the realities of combat less real to viewers. Others in the military, media, and academia disagree with such conclusions, saying the role of negative coverage was vital in failure of the American intervention.

Philip M. Seib's *Beyond the Front Lines* (2004) make a strong argument that many young military officers still believe that the news coverage directly contributed to or caused the inability to attain strategic goals in Vietnam. Thus, training for military officers includes techniques for dealing with reporters and controlling, when possible, public perceptions of military operations via public relations. Proper training for correspondents – and the poor results from lack of proper training – are a common theme for Seib as well as in Michael S. Sweeney's *The Military and the Press* (2006), William V. Kennedy's *The Military and the Media: Why the Press Cannot Be Trusted to Cover a War* (1993), and Philip M. Taylor's *War and the Media* (1998).

Numerous reporters have published memoirs of their service in Vietnam. Among the best are those of: William Tuohy (1987) and Malcolm Browne (1993) who also discuss their experiences in the first Gulf War; Philip Caputo (2001), whose memoir also covers his reporting in Afghanistan; John MacVane (1979); Liz Trotta (1991), which also traces the changing role of female reporters; Virginia Elwood-Akers (1998); and Ron Steinman (2002), NBC bureau chief in Saigon, from 1966–8 and 1969–72.

Robert B. Sims notes in *The Pentagon Reporters* (1983) that in a post-Vietnam, Cold War climate, correspondents covering the military transitioned to a new stage. Known as “defense reporters” and assigned to the Pentagon beat, their ranks included a growing number of technical writers for aviation or defense industry-related trade publications. Reflecting on the Vietnam experience, the military and defense establishment now focused on teaching its members about reporters so that the writers could be both tolerated and manipulated. A new appreciation for the potential of using television for rallying public support began to emerge. Positive results could be seen in the military's use of television combat photographers and images from weapons strikes as an integral part of both Persian Gulf Wars.

During the 1980s US leaders studied the methods employed by their counterparts in Britain to control reporting on the 1982 Falklands campaign against Argentina: a return to tightly controlled credentialing, limitations on access, and censorship (Harris 1983, Foster 1991). The system did not always work smoothly. Media relations were assigned to “public affairs” specialists who played no role in planning the Grenada intervention of 1983. As a result no arrangements were made for transporting newsmen into the country and more than 600 of them were forced to “cover” operations from Barbados. The result was what Washington correspondent Haynes Johnson calls the first military operation in US history “produced, filmed and reported by the Pentagon” (Metcalf 1991).

A commission chaired by Major General Winant Sidle investigated the situation and as a result of its report the Department of Defense National Media Pool (NMP) was formed in 1985. Composed of journalists who agreed in advance to follow

security regulations and share their information with non-pool journalists, its members were promised rapid transportation and access to any area of American military operations. The NMP functioned fairly smoothly when it was first mobilized to cover the “Tanker War” of 1987–8, but virtually disintegrated the following year when the United States intervened in Panama. When Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney delayed in activating the NMP many reporters traveled to Panama on their own. Once 169 members of the media reached the area they were confined to Howard Air Force Base and many of them returned to the United States before having the chance to join military units in the field (Aukofer and Lawrence 1995).

Perhaps in reaction to criticism of his handling of the NMP in Panama, Cheney activated the 17-member group at the onset of Operation Desert Shield in 1990, only to have the Saudi Arabian government refuse to grant visas to members of the media. Reporters reacted by flying into Bahrain and entering Saudi Arabia illegally. When CNN began broadcasting from Baghdad, the Saudis lifted their ban and within a month more than 1,600 reporters arrived in the country. Central Command responded by forming ad hoc pools of reporters, the 186 members of which were allowed to travel to the front. Other members of the media were forced to depend on daily briefings and video and still photography supplied by the military (Aukofer and Lawrence 1995).

During the 1994 intervention in Haiti, the “embedding” of journalists, previously used on a limited basis, was revived with the intention of preventing the sort of free roaming seen in Vietnam. In addition, a Joint Information Bureau was established, and 1,300 journalists received virtually free access to all parts of the nation. Relations between the military and the media improved briefly, but soon soured when newsmen concluded that their coverage of events in Kosovo and Bosnia was being manipulated (Strobel 1997, Porch 2002).

The 1991 and 2003 operations against Iraq and then Iraq and Afghanistan rebels brought the role of modern mass media – especially the capability of around-the-clock television broadcasts – to the foreground again. Correspondents who were “embedded” could report their narrow view of the war practically 24 hours a day through CNN, whose reports were often picked up by other outlets. Allied operations planners took advantage of the knowledge that members of the Iraqi military were watching CNN to plant reports in the media that were intended to mislead their opponents. Retired Air Force Major General Perry Smith examines the situation for the reporters in *How CNN Fought the War* (1991) as does Judith Raine Baroody in *Media Access and the Military* (1998). The role of media as influencers of government policy is examined by W. Lance Bennett and David L. Paletz in *Taken by Storm* (1994).

Both conflicts contributed correspondent memoirs of the “I-was-there” variety such as had been written since the 1800s. The news corps of 1990 had become significantly more self-focused, with an emphasis on the reporter becoming part of the story. The opportunity to expand descriptions of events into a book was now encouraged as part of the competitive media landscape. Correspondents could seek publishing contracts for books about their experiences, books which often acted as added value corporate branding for the news organizations which employed



them. As a result, the number of such memoirs and photographic essays exploded – usually with an emotional and personal edge to increase readership. Thus, these could do little as in-depth, objective historiography that expands understanding of the conflicts or its players. Examples include Jackie and Jenny Spinner, *Tell Them I Didn't Cry* (2006); Martha Raddatz, *The Long Road Home* (2007); Molly Moore, *A Woman at War in Kuwait with the U.S. Marines* (1993); Ashley Gilbertson, *Whiskey Tango Foxtrot: A Photographer's Chronicle of the Iraq War* (2007), and John J. Fialka, *Hotel Warriors* (1991).

Media observers also suggest that the media were sensitive to negative coverage about the 2003 operations because editors and reporters did not wish to be perceived as a Vietnam-era “defeatist” media, especially in a war begun at a time in which conservative, anti-media leaders ruled much of the nation's capital, and public opinion of news media was at one of its lowest points. Ownership of many news media outlets increasingly resided with corporations sensitive that appearing “unpatriotic” could affect profits. Politicians and the public had earlier criticized correspondents who interviewed those on “the other side” to attain balanced reporting: from the visit of the New York Times' Harrison Salisbury to Hanoi during the Vietnam War to the reports of CNN correspondents Peter Arnett and Christiane Amanpour during 1991 hostilities with Iraq.

Other major differences in modern war reporting compared to that of the late nineteenth century include the changes in technology which raise various issues regarding quality and quantity of coverage; the military's declining censorship but increasing manipulation of news organizations; and the increased danger to correspondents in war zones, including their intentional assassination by enemy fighters. An emerging issue of conflicts has been combatants disguising themselves as television news crews to gain closer access to the enemy, both eroding the idea of journalists as “neutral” and further legitimizing them as military targets. Technology also allows news organizations or groups generating propaganda to post or broadcast competing versions of war news, complete with imagery and believable news anchors. In previous conflicts, the voice of the “other side” frequently was restricted to internal consumption by its own citizens, but now its stories could attain much of the same audience as the Western news programs.

Since communications theorists and scholars introduced the concept of “mass media” to refer to entities that project messages to various mass audiences, the press has become more popularly known as “news media,” a more inclusive term than “press,” which limited itself to the two primary print outlets: newspapers and magazines. The newer term broadened the reference to the three key electronic forms of reporting: radio, television, and the Internet. The Internet is particularly popular among non-traditional “reporters” who have little professional training, who have never been to a combat zone, and who value the freer reporting limits of the Internet. The Internet is open not only to news and information, but also to opinionated insights and news as entertainment, much of it interactive. Soldiers can themselves contribute descriptions of specific battles or campaigns, adding a real-time new dimension – the unfiltered voices and views of soldiers from the trenches. The accounts of Internet reporters and soldiers have a potential audience

of millions, require little investment in technology, little if any journalistic training, and are almost censor-proof. In addition to the Internet, several television programs (“Band of Bloggers,” “The War Tapes,” “Combat Diary,” and “Over There,” among others) emerged during the Iraqi conflict that centered on soldiers’ own words and experiences to present the combat experience as entertainment. Even as the war itself was still under way such so-called “infotainment” expanded the way in which mass media describe war. While an innovation in bringing one person’s alleged combat perspective to millions, the Internet also has the drawback of being subject to fraud, as evidenced in mid-2007 when reporters and Internet writers began to question the accounts written by an Internet diarist claiming to be a soldier using a pseudonym for protection. Some of the events reported seemed almost as dubious as early World War I accounts of German atrocities, yet appeared on-line with little skepticism by editors of the site where the stories appeared.

The ease by which information can be gathered and published with minimal input from censors increases anxiety among military and government leaders that secret or sensitive military information might be revealed or, inadvertently, might identify specific military units, their strength and targets, or speculate on specific actions and overall strategy. Leaders also worry that news accounts might erode morale among troops or on the home front. As British Prime Minister David Lloyd George once said to a reporter during World War I, “If people really knew, the war would be stopped tomorrow. But of course they don’t know and can’t know” (Knightley 2000: 116–17). This concern was underscored in mid-2007 when the US military restricted soldiers’ ability to use military networks in accessing several popular Internet websites to prevent their posting personal entries, accounts, or opinions that could then be viewed by anyone.

It has been only in the past 30 years that Western scholars have examined how news organizations cover war news and how their relationship with the military is affected as they do so. The comments to date are far from comforting to journalists or news organizations, and seem to indicate that the current system of military and governmental influence over wartime news coverage – from “embedding” reporters to being the source of unquestioned “gee-whiz” video that has a video-game like quality – will continue. This situation seems exacerbated by the news media’s own self-imposed approach to coverage that leads them to accept or even depend on “information with a spin” during a time period when, ironically, news and images can be gathered, written, spoken, produced, published, and critiqued around the globe, instantly, with few constraints.

The competitiveness of current communications has resulted in some fundamental changes in the way war news is covered, who covers it, and why they report it as they do. Policies adopted since the Falkland Islands War, the American intervention in Grenada, fighting in Bosnia and Kosovo, the 1991 Gulf War, and the 2003 American-led intervention into Iraq have produced increasing controls on news media. Reflective of these changes in the news outlets themselves and the military’s approach to handling news media, is the number of books, monographs, and articles discussing the military, news media, censorship, and role of war reporters, sources which have mushroomed since 1980.

The arguably “romantic” image of the war correspondent has long been addressed by filmmakers, from the 1898 fictional account *War Correspondents* produced in the Thomas Edison studios to nonfiction dramas (*Live from Baghdad*, *We Were Soldiers*, *The Killing Fields*, and *G.I. Joe*) to fictional tales (*Green Berets*, *Objective Burma*, *Anzio*, *Harrison’s Flowers*, *Foreign Correspondent*, and *War Stories*) – the latter, as usual, containing grains of truth buried among unrealistic plot devices. But until the watershed in military/government/news media relations of the Vietnam War, little serious examination of war reporting had taken place. One of the first and still widely considered one of the most methodical and detailed approaches to the evolution and issues of war reporting is Philip Knightley’s *The First Casualty: The War Correspondent as Hero and Myth-Maker* expanded in 2000 to include coverage of the war in Kosovo. The title of his book is taken from a 1917 quote by US Senator Hiram Johnson (“The first casualty when war comes, is truth”). Knightley, from his British perspective, alternately indicts and lionizes war correspondents for either meekly accepting official sanitized accounts, thus misleading the public about successes and military competency, or for courageously discovering facts that allow the public to examine the leaders, policies, and impacts of armed conflict. David Plotz (2001), the Washington bureau chief for the online magazine *Slate*, agrees more with the latter, calling correspondents hardworking idealists who feel an obligation to bear witness for others.

Few university textbooks for journalism students deal with the skill sets needed as a war correspondent. This is not surprising as journalism schools primarily train students in the culture, ethics, and skills of the news media but with expectations that most, if they enter the journalism profession, will do so at the entry-level career rung. Covering wars is reserved for mid-level or senior-level reporters, and is often tied to the desire for career advancement. This is especially true in network and cable television coverage where high value is placed on celebrity journalism in which reporters often try – awkwardly sometimes – to become part of the story rather than merely reporting it. Vital to this approach, especially in a competitive atmosphere, is persuading viewers of a personal connection to the reporters, thus boosting both ratings and the perception of credibility.

However, newspapers, television, and Internet outlets all strain under a lack of special training for reporters who might be sent to cover armed conflicts. Newspapers sometimes vacillate between assigning war stories to experienced reporters whose specialty includes the military, or falling back on the “city room” model in which any trained, experienced reporter is expected to be able to cover any type of story. Both journalists and media critics emphasize the need for additional training for wartime reporters. Roy Gutman, a Pulitzer Prize-winning editor for *Newsday*, argues in the foreword to Michael Sweeney’s *The Military and the Press* (2006) that war correspondents need not only traditional journalism skills sets, but should also be a student of war philosophy, foreign policy aims that lead to or result from conflict, international laws pertaining to warfare, and so forth. Another professional journalist and ex-military man, William Kennedy (1993), goes further. He states that many of the restrictions on the news media – being banned altogether during the Grenada action and restricted to reporting pools

during the 1991 Gulf War – came about because American journalism institutions do not adequately train specialists in wartime and military reporting. While faulting the news organizations to a large degree, Kennedy recognizes that letting military leaders shape and control how journalism reports on military affairs is undesirable in a democratic setting, and the news media should respond to the challenge. The lack of commitment to training war correspondents is also seen as a tremendous weakness in the institution of journalism by others: Philip Seib (2004) states that American news media's reluctance to commit to long-term, in-depth international reporting will leave news audiences lacking the context needed to understand the conflicts. Philip Taylor (1998) recalls news media errors that grew from a lack of training, including the inability of reporters to translate for the public much of the military jargon surrounding operations, leaving both reporters and the public with unanswered questions.

Warfare with its scope, scale, drama, and spectacle appeals to news media – and the way in which the conduct of war is conveyed to the public is of strong interest to the military. For commanders, relatively positive news may have an impact on perceived mission success, increased defense funding, and career advancement. In a competitive atmosphere, numerous news organizations may see that cooperating with the military also garners good will, access, and a high public profile that influences career advancement. If news stories are less cooperative and more questioning, news organizations can benefit from the appearance of being the public's eyes, ears, and watchdog, possibly increasing credibility if harming popularity (a difficult tradeoff in a competitive market).

Analysts and scholars have addressed the evolving relationship between the military/government and the news media, and have examined the current compromise known as "embedding" of reporters within specific military units. William Prochnau, "The Military and the Media" (2005) presents a summary of war reporting similar to Knightley's but expands it to include coverage of the American-led conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. He finds that reporting in Afghanistan presents unique problems. Embedding was initialized some weeks after operations started, but this did not ensure reporters access to operations because many such missions continue to be carried out as commando-style patrols or covert raids. In these instances reporters have not been allowed to follow the troops to the field, or to interview the troops immediately upon their return, due to the secrecy of their various missions.

Further, correspondents in Afghanistan soon discovered they, like many of their colleagues around the globe since the 1980s, had become legitimate targets of attack by enemy fighters. The ideal that war correspondents would be allowed to cross lines unmolested because of their non-combatant, observer-only role, as uncertain as it had always been, seemed to disappear altogether in the newest conflicts. The Committee To Protect Journalists reports that in Iraq, at least 130 journalists were killed covering the conflict between March 2003 and August 2008, the vast majority of them Iraqi and the vast majority murdered as opposed to being killed as a result of military crossfire or bombings. Worldwide in the same time span, another 150 reporters died while covering civil strife and crime: notably

in Algeria, Russia, Colombia, and the Philippines. The issue prompted major powers in late 2007 to swear allegiance to a Geneva Conventions-style agreement to ensure the safety of war correspondents.

To most civilians in the West, the idea of intentionally targeting journalists has been slow in arriving. Most American citizens and many journalists were shocked in 1985 when Associated Press bureau chief Terry Anderson was kidnapped in Lebanon and held captive for almost seven years. Americans' awareness of the hostile atmosphere for journalists was raised in Iraq when high-profile journalists were wounded by bombs (CBS' Kimberly Dozier and ABC's Bob Woodruff), CBS and ABC cameramen and a CBS sound technician were killed or wounded in the same attacks. NBC's David Bloom died of natural causes while on assignment in Iraq, and in early 2007, a prominent BBC reporter, Alan Johnston, was kidnapped in the Gaza Strip and held for almost four months. Some of the most shocking murders of journalists were in Afghanistan at the start of US-led operations there: the execution of *Wall Street Journal* reporter Daniel Pearl was filmed and four other journalists were killed when ambushed.

With a rise in world conflicts driven by religious or ethnic motives, more war reporters are being killed or wounded intentionally. Herbert N. Foerstel's *Killing the Messenger: Journalists at Risk in Modern Warfare* (2006) details how Western and even indigenous correspondents have become intentional targets by fighters who perceive such reporters as enemies and occupiers in the same vein as Western soldiers. Combatants see war reporters as "corporate" soldiers whose role is to attack the religion, leaders, or cause in the court of world opinion in the same way soldiers attack with weapons. BBC executive Nik Gowling (2003) raises the specter of whether the United States has even done the same, bombing the Al-Jazeera Arab television network offices in Kabul, Afghanistan, in November 2001 because of suspected military activity. Gowling claims that such acts from Western forces erode claims to the high moral ground about not targeting non-combatants and make it easier for enemy fighters to focus on anyone who performs the act of pulling out a camera. In the United States, news organizations began sending correspondents to "boot camps" to prepare them for the rigors of being embedded in a combat zone and for their possible kidnapping or capture by an enemy.

While the technological ease of covering a conflict such as Afghanistan, Iraq, or the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian fights has increased, safety factors encourage news organizations to accept the embedding of correspondents within specific military units whence coverage becomes relatively safe but myopic. One ABC reporter was quoted as saying it was fun to ride around in a tank, "but you don't know \*% about what's going on." Critics also note that embedding journalists eventually leads to some loss of detachment. This has long been a difficult issue in life-threatening situations. A newspaper reporter accompanying General George Custer is believed to have fought back before being killed. Walter Cronkite, Peter Arnett, Joe Galloway, and Ernest Hemingway all took up weapons on the field of battle at some moment.

Regardless of impacts on objectivity, a Rand Corporation-published study of embedding suggests the compromise will the new model for military-media

relations during wartime because of its success and its usefulness to the military in defining or framing coverage. Christopher Paul and James J. Kim, *Reporters on the Battlefield: The Embedded Press System* (2004), suggest that the military also finds the framing of coverage useful in counteracting enemy claims made for psychological advantage, as well as “telegraphing” to enemy combatants what lies ahead for them.

Of the historiography relating to the military and the news media, much is written by journalists and media critics. One of the few to originate from a school of journalism is Michael Sweeney’s *The Military and the Press* (2006) published by the highly regarded Medill School of Journalism at Northwestern University. Like a number of similar works, Sweeney presents a history of the development of military–press relations in America, noting that the first embedded correspondents were those which attached themselves to US military units invading Mexico. Sweeney concludes that the modern system of embedding, for its faults, presents real-time war coverage not previously available to audiences but that Americans cannot expect to be fully informed by relying only on reports from embedded correspondents. Audiences must seek information from reporters interviewing civilian officials and experts in Washington, reporters in the various headquarters, and from non-embedded reporters (often international) called “unilaterals,” who roam freely among civilians and enemy combatants in search of information, but who also account for a high proportion of all journalist deaths in Iraq.

Daya Kishan Thussu and Des Freedman (2003) believe that the rise of round-the-clock television news coverage has led to sensational and trivial coverage dependent upon constantly changing graphics, satellite images, “smart bomb” views, and other almost bloodless coverage that can desensitize viewers to the carnage of armed conflict. Commercial networks are also sensitive to negative audience reactions to graphic images or critical comments, and thus television producers succumb to intense self-censorship when not busy adopting the language and images provided by the Pentagon. Likewise, the commercial motives of networks encourage them to find stories that are more entertaining and of human interest and that draw more viewers rather than complex public affairs reporting, and do not demand a high level of literacy. As a result, fewer stories are broadcast that explain why there are conflicts and what impacts they have, and more stories are broadcast that utilize visually interesting maps, graphics, and satellite images (usually provided by the military) accompanied by one or more analysts whose speculations may be set one against the other to induce exciting “conflict” programming. This formula would be changed only to allow updated stories with fresh footage – often of burning buildings, bomb craters, discharging of weapons, and wounded bystanders. One result, say critics, is that the self-imposed superficiality of television results in the inability to differentiate between various types of conflict and their causes, merging all images and coverage into a similarity that goes on, but individual parts fade. This approach was once described as full of close-ups in dire need of context and explanation. Philip Seib (2004) remarks that news consumers are under-served and frustrated by the parade of vivid and dramatic images that go unanalyzed or analyzed incorrectly. Such simplistic approaches



to presenting television news play as much to the goals of the military as the news media. In 2002, published studies from the US War College indicated a shift from blocking the news media (especially television) to exploiting the news media as part of overall strategic objectives and raising the issue of whether the government and military can justify the “right to lie” through the news media to serve a larger purpose (Prochnau 2005: 323). Competition for ratings has led to the introduction of “warheads” – retired officers, to analyze military events. Critics argue that their background often clouds their objectivity and that the corporate connections of many of them pose concerns of conflict of interest when they comment on Pentagon policy (Allard 2006).

The rise of technological advances (the Internet, camera-phones, text-messaging, satellite video transmission, etc.) provided new ways for reporters to set their own work apart from that of others in ways which have bothered military officials. A freelance photographer in Iraq who posted images of dead Marines on his personal website was banned from Marine-controlled areas by Marine commander Major General John Kelly. Other American units also refused to accept the photographer with the argument that the photos he posted had given Iraqi insurgents an “after-action report” on the suicide attack, and were insensitive to families and friends of the Marine casualties (Kamber and Arango 2008). In contrast, graphic photos of enemy dead were published in American outlets during World War II, but Americans did not witness pictures of American dead until midway through the war, and then only because officials sensed the need to revitalize the public’s emotional investment in the war (Roeder 1993).

Tensions are consistent with the complex history of military–media relations in the United States. The relationship between correspondents and members of the armed forces remains as symbiotic as in past centuries. News organizations will continue to operate on the ingrained values of transparency, accountability of public leaders, and the balancing of the public’s “right to know.” Similarly, the military’s desire for flexibility and success in military operations will continue to be influenced by its ingrained values of secrecy, security, loyalty, and self-policing. These views will continue to feed discussions of each institution’s appropriate role among historians, academics, military scholars, and senior news executives. While many of the issues are as old as the Republic, new technological developments have given rise to discussions of new topics, including the ethical issues arising from live coverage of battlefields, correspondents becoming part of the story they cover, and the means to provide context to an informed public as audiences seeking news from nontraditional media sources grow. Researchers and observers will continue to examine the murky region between the military’s goal of manipulation and the media’s willingness to trade accuracy and insight for access and images. Historians of military–media relations have, in the past, focused on periods of war (Hammond 1988, 1996, Young and Jesser 1997, Knightley 2000). But as the line between war and peace, which became blurred during the Cold War, has been further obscured during the twenty-first century of “war in peacetime” represented by operations in the Balkans, Iraq, and Afghanistan, interest in the relationship between the media and the military during “peacetimes” is certain to increase.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Allard, C. Kenneth (2006). *Warheads: Cable News and the Fog of War*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Andrews, J. Cutler (1955). *The North Reports the Civil War*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
- Andrews, J. Cutler (1970). *The South Reports the Civil War*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Andrews, Peter (1991). "The Media and the Military," *American Heritage*, 42:4 (July–August), 78–85.
- Arlen, Michael (1969). *The Living-Room War*. New York: Viking Press.
- Aronson, James (1970). *The Press and the Cold War*. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill.
- Aukofer, Frank A., and William P. Lawrence (1995). *America's Team: The Odd Couple – A Report on the Relationship between the Military and the Media*. Nashville, TN: Freedom Forum First Amendment Center.
- Baroody, Judith Raine (1998). *Media Access and the Military: The Case of the Gulf War*. Lanham, MD: University Press of America.
- Bennett, W. Lance, and David L. Paletz (1994). *Taken by Storm: The Media, Public Opinion, and U.S. Foreign Policy in the Gulf War*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Berger, Carl (1976). *Broadsides and Bayonets: The Propaganda War of the American Revolution*, rev. edn. San Rafael, CA: Presidio Press.
- Bernstein, Mark, and Alex Lubertozzi (2003). *World War II on the Air: Edward R. Murrow and the Broadcasts that Riveted a Nation*. Naperville, IL: Sourcebooks MediaFusion.
- Browne, Malcolm W. (1993). *Muddy Boots and Red Socks: A Reporter's Life*. New York: Times Books.
- Caputo, Philip (2001). *Means of Escape: A War Correspondent's Memoir of Life and Death in Afghanistan, the Middle East, and Vietnam*. New York: HarperCollins.
- Copeland, Fayette (1997 [1943]). *Kendall of the Picayune: Being his Adventures in New Orleans, on the Texan Santa Fe Expedition, in the Mexican War, and in the Colonization of the Texas Frontier*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press [rev. edn, 1997].
- Corneise, Alfred Emile (1993). *Ranks and Columns: Armed Forces Newspapers in American Wars*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
- Cress, Lawrence Delbert, ed. (1999). *Dispatches from the Mexican War by George Wilkins Kendall*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Edwards, Bob (2004). *Edward R. Murrow and the Birth of Broadcast Journalism*. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons.
- Elwood-Akers, Virginia (1998). *Woman War Correspondents in the Vietnam War, 1961–1975*. Metuchen, NJ: Scarecrow Press, Inc.
- Epstein, Edward Jay (1973). *News from Nowhere: Television and the News*. New York: Vintage Books.
- Faircloth, Rudy, and W. Horace Carter (1982). *Buddy Ernie Pyle: World War II's Most Beloved Typewriter Soldier*. Tabor City, NC: Atlantic Publishing Co.
- Fialka, John J. (1991). *Hotel Warriors: Covering the Gulf War*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Foerstel, Herbert N. (2006). *Killing the Messenger: Journalists at Risk in Modern Warfare*. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers.
- Foster, Kevin (1991). "The Falklands War: A Critical View of Information Policy," in Peter Young, ed., "Defence and the Media in Time of Limited War," *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, 2:3 (December), 155–67.

- Gilbertson, Ashley (2007). *Whiskey Tango Foxtrot: A Photographer's Chronicle of the Iraq War*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Gowling, Nik (2003). "Journalists and War: The Troubling New Tensions Post 9/11," in Daya Kishan Thussu and Des Freedman, eds., *War and the Media: Reporting Conflict 24/7*. London: Sage, 231–40.
- Greene, Ralph C., and Oliver E. Allen (1985), "What Happened off Devon," *American Heritage*, 36:2 (February–March), 26–34.
- Halberstam, David (1965). *The Making of a Quagmire: America and Vietnam during the Kennedy Era*. New York: Knopf.
- Hallin, Daniel C. (1986). *The "Uncensored War": The Media and Vietnam*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Hammond, William M. (1988). *Public Affairs: The Military and the Media, 1962–1968*. Washington: Center of Military History.
- Hammond, William M. (1996). *Public Affairs: The Military and the Media, 1968–1973*. Washington: Center of Military History.
- Hammond, William M. (1998). *Reporting Vietnam: Media and Military at War*. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press.
- Harris, Brayton (1999). *Blue & Gray in Black & White: Newspapers in the Civil War*. Washington: Brassey's.
- Harris, Robert (1983). *Gotcha! The Media, the Government and the Falklands Crisis*. Boston: Faber & Faber.
- Haverstock, Nathan A. (1996). *Fifty Years at the Front: The Life of War Correspondent Frederick Palmer*. Washington: Brassey's.
- Higgins, Marguerite (1951). *War in Korea: The Report of a Woman Combat Correspondent*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday.
- Hoffman, Joyce (2008). *On Their Own: Women Journalists and the American Experience in Vietnam*. Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press.
- Hudson, Linda S. (2001). *Mistress of Manifest Destiny: A Biography of Jane McManus Storm Cazneau*. Austin: Texas State Historical Association.
- Humphrey, Carol Sue (1992). *"This Popular Engine": New England Newspapers during the American Revolution, 1775–1789*. Newark: University of Delaware Press.
- Kamber, Michael, and Tim Arango (2008). "A Sanitized View of the Iraq War?" *International Herald Tribune* (European edn), July 25, 1.
- Kennedy, William V. (1993). *The Military and the Media: Why the Press Cannot be Trusted to Cover a War*. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers.
- Knightley, Phillip (2000). *The First Casualty: The War Correspondent as Hero and Myth-Maker from the Crimea to Kosovo*, 2nd edn. London: Prion Books, Ltd.
- Levin, Dan (1995). *From the Battlefield: Dispatches of a World War II Marine*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- MacDonald, Charles B. (1988). "Slapton Sands: The 'Cover up' that Never Was," *Army*, 38:6 (June), 64–7.
- MacVane, John (1979). *On the Air in World War II*. New York: Morrow.
- Maihafer, Harry J. (1998). *The General and the Journalists: Ulysses S. Grant, Horace Greeley, and Charles Dana*. Washington: Brassey's.
- Maihafer, Harry J. (2001). *War of Words: Abraham Lincoln and the Civil War Press*. Washington: Brassey's.
- Marszalek, John. F. (1999). *Sherman's Other War: The General and the Civil War Press*, rev. edn. Kent, OH: Kent State University Press.

- McGurn, Barrett (2004). *Yank, the Army Weekly: Reporting the Greatest Generation*. Golden, CO: Fulcrum Publishers.
- Mecklin, John Martin (1965). *Mission in Torment: An Intimate Account of the U.S. Role in Vietnam*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday.
- Metcalf, Joseph III (1991). "The Press and Grenada: 1983," in Peter Young, ed., "Defence and the Media in Time of Limited War," *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, 2:3 (December), 168–74.
- Mitgang, Herbert (2004). *Newsmen in Khaki: Tales of a World War II Soldier Correspondent*. Lanham, MD: Taylor Trade Publishing.
- Moore, Molly (1993). *A Woman at War: Storming Kuwait with the U.S. Marines*. New York: Scribner's.
- Oberdorfer, Don (1971). *Tet!: The Turning Point in the Vietnam War*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday.
- Paul, Christopher, and James J. Kim (2004). *Reporters on the Battlefield: The Embedded Press System in Historical Context*. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corp.
- Perry, James M. (2000). *A Bohemian Brigade: The Civil War Correspondents, Mostly Rough, Sometimes Ready*. New York: John Wiley & Sons.
- Plotz, David (2001). "War Correspondents: Their Dirty Little Secrets," *Slate Magazine*, 2 November, <http://www.slate.com>, Accessed April 24, 2009.
- Porch, Douglas (2002). "'No Bad Stories': The American Media–Military Relationship," *Naval War College Review*, 55:1 (Winter), 85–107.
- Prochnau, William W. (1996). *Once Upon a Distant War*. New York: Vintage Books.
- Prochnau, William W. (2005). "The Military and the Media," in Geneva Overholser and Kathleen Hall Jamieson, eds., *The Press*. New York: Oxford University Press, 310–31.
- Raddatz, Martha (2007). *The Long Road Home: A Story of War and Family*. New York: G. P. Putnam & Sons.
- Randall, James G. (1918). "The Newspaper Problem in Its Bearing upon Military Secrecy during the Civil War," *The American Historical Review*, 23:2 (January), 303–23.
- Reilly, Tom (1998). "Newspapers: U.S. Press," in Donald S. Frazier, ed., *The United States and Mexico at War: Nineteenth-Century Expansionism and Conflict*. New York: Macmillan, 294–6.
- Roeder, George H. (1993). *The Censored War: American Visual Experience during World War II*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Seib, Philip M. (2004). *Beyond the Front Lines: How the News Media Cover a World Shaped by War*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Seib, Philip M. (2007). *Broadcasts from the Blitz: How Edward R. Murrow Helped Lead Americans into War*. Dulles, VA: Potomac Books.
- Sims, Robert B. (1983). *The Pentagon Reporters*. Washington: National Defense University Press.
- Sloan, William David (2005). *The Media in America: A History*, 6th edn. London: Vision Press.
- Small, Ken, and Mark Rogerson (1988). *The Forgotten Dead: Why 946 American Servicemen Died off the Coast of Devon in 1944 and the Man Who Discovered Their True Story*. London: Bloomsbury.
- Smith, Perry M. (1991). *How CNN Fought the War: A View from the Inside*. New York: Carol Publishing Group.
- Smith, Wilda M., and Eleanor A. Bogart (1991). *The Wars of Peggy Hull: The Life and Times of a War Correspondent*. El Paso: Texas Western Press, University of Texas at El Paso.

- Spencer, David (2007) *The Yellow Journalism: The Press and America's Emergence as a World Power*. Chicago: Medill School of Journalism, Northwestern University.
- Spinner, Jackie, and Jenny Spinner (2006). *Tell Them I Didn't Cry: A Young Journalist's Story of Joy, Loss, and Survival in Iraq*. New York: Scribner's.
- Steinman, Ron (2002). *Inside Television's First War: A Saigon Journal*. Columbia: University of Missouri Press.
- Stone, I. F. (1952). *The Hidden History of the Korean War, 1950–1952: A Nonconformist History of our Times*. New York: Monthly Press Review.
- Strobel, Warren P. (1997). *Late-Breaking Foreign Policy: The News Media's Influence on Peace Operations*. Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press.
- Sweeney, Michael S. (2006). *The Military and the Press: An Uneasy Truce*. Chicago: Medill School of Journalism, Northwestern University.
- Taylor, Philip M. (1998). *War and the Media: Propaganda and Persuasion in the Gulf War*. Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press.
- Thussu, Daya Kishan, and Des Freedman, eds. (2003). *War and Media: Reporting Conflict 24/7*. London: Sage.
- Tobin, James (1997). *Ernie Pyle's War: America's Eyewitness to World War II*. New York: Free Press.
- Trotta, Liz (1991). *Fighting for Air: In the Trenches with Television News*. New York: Simon & Schuster.
- Tuohy, William (1987). *Dangerous Company: Inside the World's Hottest Trouble Spot with a Pulitzer Prize-Winning Correspondent*. New York: Morrow.
- Voss, Frederick S. (1994). *Reporting the War: The Journalistic Coverage of World War II*. Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press.
- Wagner, Lilya (1989). *Women War Correspondents in World War II*. New York: Greenwood Press.
- Wilson, Quintus Charles (1945). "A Study and Evaluation of the Military Censorship in the Civil War," MA thesis, University of Minnesota.
- Wyatt, Clarence R. (1995). *Paper Soldiers: The American Press and the Vietnam War*, 2nd edn. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Young, Peter, and Peter Jesser (1997). *The Media and the Military: From the Crimea to Desert Strike*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

## Chapter Sixty-two

# THE MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX

*Benjamin Franklin Cooling*

It seems almost obligatory to begin any discussion of “the military-industrial complex” (MIC) by referencing President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s farewell address that made this term public on January 17, 1961. Section IV of the speech started with a customary genuflection to “our military establishment” as vital to keeping the peace. Then Ike got down to what he really wanted to focus upon when he suggested (somewhat erroneously) that “until the latest of our world conflicts [the Cold War], the United States had no armaments industry.” American makers of plowshares could convert them to swords “with time and as required.” Now, he noted, the country could no longer risk emergency improvisation but had been compelled to create a “permanent armaments industry of vast proportions” to go along with the 3.5 million men and women directly engaged in the defense establishment. “We annually spend on military security more than the net income of all United States corporations,” he claimed (Eisenhower 1961, Fallows 2002).

As we move closer to the fiftieth anniversary of this speech, who in the United States of the early twenty-first century remembers Ike’s warning or, for that matter, even cares? A case might be made that the intervening five decades have so changed America, its institutions and people, and the climate of world affairs that a national security state embracing what Ike warned about, has indeed inevitably and worse, irretrievably, come into being. If so, then how did this happen? Moreover, how has the MIC of Eisenhower’s day transformed into the “securitization” of today’s republic based on a private arsenal system and private security companies? In short, is there any reason to doubt the validity of the way one group in 1984 defined the MIC as military decision-makers, corporations producing primarily for the defense sector, and political representatives of locales with high concentrations of defense spending so as to “exert pressure for levels of defense expenditure in excess of legitimate national needs?” And, for that matter, what are those needs in the twenty-first century (Olvey, Golden, and Kelly 1984)?

Writing a pamphlet for the American Historical Association and Society for the History of Technology, Alex Roland (2001) concluded that “the military-industrial complex ... appears more normal than it did in the early years of the



Cold War” and that “public alarm over the military-industrial complex appears to have subsided after the 1970s.” Roland is surely correct on the latter point. Had his topic been addressed by a business, national security, or even political historian – even a peace activist – rather than a historian of technology, the view might have been different. Admittedly, science and technology have always been a *sine qua non* for the military-industrial production base. Technology historian Barton Hacker affirms as much, suggesting that from the beginning, “American military, engineering, and scientific institutions have interacted with each other in manifold ways, with consequences reaching far beyond the institutions themselves” (Hacker and Vining 2006). But, it is the base itself that commands persistent attention as “resourcing” national security has evolved over two centuries from an arsenal system to a military-industrial complex, thence to defense industrial base and now to security service provider-complex. As major time frames have evolved from industrial to information age and from national to globalized economies, revolutions in military affairs have promoted more of a “global security establishment” and internationalization of the phenomenon (Guay 2007).

In truth, the old defined paradigm of government (national military establishment) and private producers (industry/business) has morphed to a matrix embracing governments (branches, agencies, and facilities), private systems integrators, and private security service providers not merely for defense and homeland security per se but as today’s baseline of nation state survival. Notwithstanding Roland’s cheery interpretation, today the US may have become Lasswell’s “garrison state,” or perhaps more contemporaneously, “national security state” (Lasswell 1941). The pivotal or watershed event might well have been the series of al-Qaeda terrorist bombings in various countries, but primarily in the United States on September 11, 2001. The terrorist catalyst reinvigorated a drifting, even de-militarizing, America after the end of the Cold War. The military downsizing and demobilization of the 1990s had not been near the size of the retrenchment traditionally experienced after major wars (cold or hot) and certainly inspired no new anti-war activism, in part because of the continued nascent power of the Iron Triangle – the nexus of key congressmen and their committee staffers, Department of Defense bureaucrats, and defense contractors (Adams 1981). The entry into office of George W. Bush, a crusading president who embarked on democracy-projection campaigns in the first decade of the new century reinvigorated the MIC. Indeed, the American public acquiesced to expansion of the military as its leaders used the pretext of a global war on terror (GWOT) for employing the strategic synthesis from the Cold War to evolve an American “security state” firmly rooted in the transformed military-industrial complex of that earlier period.

### Focal Points on Resourcing Security

The history of “resourcing” America’s defense or security is a story reflecting changes in size and scope, the nature of military technology and the political, business/industrial base and labor supply of the nation. It parallels the

transformation of American political philosophy and the nation's economic system, indeed, the evolution of the modern nation state itself, now in a competing world of globalization. The story particularly reflects the changing nature of warfare in general – and America's in particular. It begins with the arsenal system of the typical nation state emerging from the Age of the Enlightenment and expands in size and influence through Industrial Age global conflict (two world wars plus a not-always quiescent “cold war”). It temporarily recedes in a demobilization of sorts in the early Information Age before reemerging as today's government–contractor partnership accommodating all parties confronting security challenges as presented by the Pentagon's “Quad Chart” of warfare – irregular, traditional, catastrophic, and disruptive.

Questions of acquisition, mobilization and industrial base form a two-century constant. Even as successive periods of peace and war provide the backdrop for understanding this evolution from artisan, industrial to postindustrial (or information or knowledge) age government–business arrangements, new definitions and interpretations must be applied to those traditional terms. In this regard, a pioneering but little known study by Canadian Andrew Latham (1997) provides a convenient backdrop for understanding government–business arrangements. He used industrial divides in American arms production as a convenient method for understanding business involvement with national government for defense. That involvement, of course, is as old as the nation. However, Latham's paradigm differentiated between (a) the armory system of the nineteenth century, (b) the mass production of military equipment (military-Fordism) of the early to mid-twentieth century, and (c) agile manufacturing of the late twentieth century which he carefully married to changing modes of warfare, production methods and modes of regulation.

Thus, the armory system approach paired with Napoleonic *levée en masse*, military enlightenment, uniform weapons, and interchangeable parts deriving from a primitive mechanization, specialization, and a rudimentary factory system with only rudimentary bureaucratic control emphasizing mechanization and interchangeability. Similarly, military-Fordism married technological complexity of total war's mass destruction and military-Keynesianism deriving from low-cost production gained from vertical integration and scale economics with long-run production costs, thus permitting the warfare state's emphasis on performance criteria which increasingly emphasized quality over quantity. Finally, agile manufacturing tied together contemporary precision warfare and the information revolution or “micro-electronicization” of war and knowledge-intensive military technology with Post-fordism of low-cost high quality, custom production through flexible automation and concurrent engineering, thus suggesting the post-military state which emphasizes perpetual innovation and affordable technological superiority captured by such buzz-phrases as “lean aircraft initiative,” “agile manufacturing,” etc.

The key ingredient in all these transformational paradigms has always been the state which played a central role in the process of industrial transformation. The establishment of arsenals by the national government in the United States promoted the evolution of uniform production of interchangeable parts, a necessary

precondition for Fordist mass production which served the nation so well in two global conflicts. The Cold War military-industrial arm of the state “nurtured and promoted” many of the production systems that eventually provided a foundation for the lean manufacturing paradigm of today. Since the end of the Cold War, Latham suggests, the state has been “encouraging the diffusion of its vision of agile manufacturing” through commercial and military sectors of the industrial base. Thus, he rejected economists (and, by implication all other traditional skeptics of the military-industrial complex) who “would have us believe, the pursuit of wealth” provided the motivation for such phenomena. Rather, he proclaimed, “state initiatives were driven primarily by the pursuit of power and/or victory-in-war.” Going further, Latham saw “the importance of military organization, the pursuit of power, and resource mobilization as driving forces in human history.”

A multi-volume study of the political economy of American warfare by Paul A.C. Koistinen (1996, 1997, 1998, 2004) complements Latham’s paradigms. Koistinen expands upon Latham’s state-centrist model, in his study of the economic dimensions of American wars from the founding of the English colonies in 1607 to 1945. In each of his volumes, Koistinen stresses four factors essential in determining the method of mobilization – economic (level of national state economy), political (size, strength and scope of national government), military (character and structure) and, technology – the state of military technology in particular. He then applies patterns of economic mobilization for war as passing through three major stages over the course of American history – much as Latham has done. Koistinen labels them preindustrial (the Revolutionary War), transitional (the Civil War), and twentieth-century industrial warfare (World Wars I and II). Just where he will alight in the Cold War remains to be seen but he stresses that altering the four factors modifies each stage of mobilization. While the factors have seldom changed at the same time or pace, he advances, each has had to keep up with the others so that variable patterns of economic mobilization could be maintained.

Such mobilization has been carried out principally by elites – political, economic, and military – he contends. The first two categories changed from merchants, planters, and large landowners as well as professional elements of the preindustrial age, to people involved with banks, railroads, and manufacturing and ultimately corporate and financial communities of the industrial period. “Military elites as a distinct group,” observes Koistinen, “did not work in close association with economic and political elites until the industrial stage.” Here, military leaders – as another elite group – necessarily had to team with their political and economic counterparts to successfully mobilize the economy for war. It is of course here, in the industrial age that resourcing national defense or national security truly cemented the symbiotic relationship between government, business and industry with which we are most familiar today.

Koistinen touches upon inherent conflict in all of this far more than either Latham or Roland, pointing to “the nation’s most basic contradiction: an elitist reality in the context of a democratic ideology.” A close correlation between antiwar and anti-elite attitudes paralleled strong, long-held Anglo-American

antimilitary (to which Aaron Friedberg and others would add “antistatism”), strains that magnified elitist economic mobilization patterns particularly during the intervals between wars (Friedberg 2000).

David Rothkopf's (2008) discussion of the power and influence of today's military-industrial elites continues the paradigm set up by Koistenen and so subtly explored *ad interim* in depth by Friedberg. In fact, it is Friedberg who explains in breadth the strategic synthesis, as well as subsectors of money, supporting industries, arms, and technology that undergird the Cold War response that he saw expressing “an outward-directed force posture and military strategy, and a supporting set of inward-directed power-creating mechanisms.” Such an offensive-defensive posture was strongly shaped by antistatist influences, in his view, but remained fixed for the remainder of the Cold War (Friedberg 2000). Just how that paradigm might evolve after the end of that period or epoch was only weakly suggested in Friedberg's final conclusions. After all, he was writing in the context of the millennial change, not post-9/11 and the globalized anarchy of today.

### **Forging an American Armaments Industry**

MIC's primal beginnings perhaps trace to the proverbial turning of plowshares into swords. Sovereigns and their contracts with artisans eventually progressed to an arsenal arrangement (the precursor to so-called GOGOs or government owned, government operated facilities) that permitted centrist control over resources and production. In the New World, evolving technology affected acquisition of weapons and ships during the American Revolution and Early Republic, as the new nation endured the Shay's Whiskey and Fries Rebellion, Native American uprisings, and the continued threat of conflicts with both Great Britain and France.

The procurement of military supplies of all kinds was far from organized during the colonial period. American militiamen were expected to provide their own firearms during the seventeenth and early eighteenth century though some colonial governments would provide arms in time of war. During the American Revolution an *ad hoc* system of procurement by state governments, the Continental Congress, and what evolved into the Quartermaster Corps of the Continental Army met the minimal needs of American forces, mostly through foreign purchase since the young nation lacked facilities to produce arms and munitions in the quantity needed. Thus, there existed no military industrial complex prior to the establishment of the new government in 1789 (Buel 1980, Carp 1990, Horgan 2002).

Article 2 of the new Constitution empowered Congress to raise money and “provide for the common Defence and general Welfare” with other clauses authorizing the raising and supporting armies and navies, and the “organizing, arming, and disciplining the Militia” of the states leading directly to the resourcing issue. In a sense, the American MIC began right there.

Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Hamilton's concern that private arms suppliers would prove unreliable led to the establishment of national armories at

Springfield, Massachusetts, in 1795 and Harpers Ferry, Virginia, in 1799 (Deyrup 1948, Smith 1977, Whisker 1997). Before these manufactories could be set up, war threatened with France in 1798, and the government let contracts to the entrepreneur Eli Whitney and other private gun makers. Whitney contracted to produce 10,000 muskets and constructed a factory to produce them at Mill Rock, Connecticut, laying a basis for what became a major industry in the region (Deyrup 1948). It took Whitney nine years to complete his contract, thus introducing, perhaps, discordant delivery delays into government-industry relations for armaments in the future (Fuller 1946, Green 1956). Further stimulus to a domestic arms industry came with the militia act of 1808 that called for annual appropriations of \$200,000 for arms and military equipment, either for manufacture by the government arsenals at Springfield and Harper's Ferry or for purchase from private corporations which submitted bids for their production. Thus, duality of armaments' procurement came early in the history of the young republic.

While firearms production incorporated the duality principle and new technology themes, such as interchangeable parts, into the American military-industrial equation almost from the beginning, heavier military systems depended almost exclusively upon contracts with the private sector. Since America was both a maritime and a land nation, protection of trade and coastline/harbors also forced national defense to embrace the sea. The first six frigates (*United States*, *President*, *Congress*, *Constitution*, *Constellation*, and *Chesapeake*) were constructed in private shipyards under the supervision of government agents Joshua Humphreys and Josiah Fox as were the so-called "subscription warships" of 1798 (Leiner 2000, Westlake 2004, Eddy 2005, Toll 2006). During the Quasi War land was purchased for the establishment of navy yards near Portsmouth, New Hampshire; Boston; New York City; Philadelphia; Norfolk; and Charleston, South Carolina. Additional navy yards were added over the next century. Prior to the Civil War most US warships were constructed and repaired in those yards, but with the advent of steel ship construction after the Civil War, production of large warships again became a partnership of public money and oversight with private risk and enterprise when the Navy turned to private yards to construct steel vessels. Later, the service would experiment with both public and private construction as a competitive tool to control quality and cost. A similar evolving private and public partnership developed for the production of cannon for both the army and the navy (Tucker 1989).

The so-called industrial revolution changed the playing field. Arguments about the precise origins of the modern military-industrial complex probably matter mostly to historians. Kurt Hackemer (2001) traces it to the navy's experience with procuring the *Merrimack*-class frigates of 1854, others suggest the larger, more complex steel and steam technology of the 1880s spawned symbiotic business-military ties befitting the later twentieth-century leviathan (Cooling 1979, Baack and Ray 1985, Heinrich 1997). Yet, such hypotheses situate the origins in peacetime, when in fact, conflict has much to do with size and dimensions of the relationship. There can be little doubt that the most important roots of America's military-industrial complex lie in the nation's first "total war," the Civil War, and the following decades which were characterized by the rise of industrialization and

acquisition of the first American empire at the turn of the twentieth century. Mark Wilson (2006) demonstrates how the Civil War wedded the ardor of public crusade with the appropriate tools of business, industry (and sanctuary) to produce northern victory and introduce what historian Russell Weigley (1973) termed “the American way of war.” Moreover, the late nineteenth century also continued the pacification strains of “little wars” – colonial wars of insurgency advanced by Max Boot (2002) and others – where distinct tones of attrition and annihilation (even absent industrially-provided weapons of mass destruction) teamed the realities of messianic zealotry coupled to sufficiency of resources to secure the ends of policy. In the end, however, ties between government and business in nineteenth-century wartime were always temporary, accommodating immediate need and never permanency (Winslow 1995).

America’s industrialization in the late nineteenth century meant that there were simply too many economic opportunities for commerce and industry outside the government world of national security. Besides, nobody in Washington necessarily saw much need for great amounts of war tools when there was surplus left over from the previous war. Internationally, the deterrents of battle fleet and coastal defense in a subsequent imperial age were defined by new technology (steel armored, steam-powered battle fleets and long-range rifled artillery) and heavy industry production that demanded technical proficiency, management and fiscal skills, and a political will commensurate with major nations’ perceived places in the sun. Whether trade followed flag or the reverse, the industrial/commercial base paid for its own protection with a marriage of convenience with armies and navies. The United States differed little from Great Britain, France, Germany, Russia, Italy, or Japan in that regard. During the age of sail and wood, most warships were constructed in yards owned and operated by the navy (Lott 1954, Winslow 2000, Dowart 2001, Perry 2002) but with the advent of steam and steel, a new symbiotic relationship was forged with private industry – with moguls at Bethlehem, Carnegie, and Midvale steel companies; Newport News Shipbuilding and Drydock Company, Union Iron Works, and William Cramp & Sons Shipbuilding Company (Bethlehem Steel Co 1949, Heinrich 1997).

Once forged, the alliance between business and defense procurement expanded though relations were often strained by disagreements concerning procedures and processes, price of product, sustainability of contracts, business pacifism versus strategic expansionism, and congressional oversight. The massive mobilizations of two world wars shaped the partnership as did criticism from pacifists, fiscal conservatives, and foes of big government as well as by the healthy suspicions nurtured between mufti and uniform. But, the days of cabinet wars and militia defense economies no longer sufficed when the United States chose to seize a prominent place on the world scene and wrest economic reins from others, eventually supplanting all others in productivity if not the size of her military.

American intervention in World War I was a training ground, a testing of the ability of people, government and economy to respond to crisis, utilizing the productive base of the industrial age already at play in the conflict. The National Defense Act of 1916 authorized the formation of a board of three military officers



and two civilians to study the problems of military production and supply. Known as the Kernan Board, it recommended appointment of a Council of National Defense with a subordinate National Defense Advisory Commission. The formation of these bodies established a new, more formalized government-industry partnership (Koistinen 1967). When the new organizations began functioning in March 1917 and the United States entered the war in April 1917, it was clear that the military's six ordnance arsenals and two quartermaster manufacturing depots could not supply the needs of the expanding army. Within three months that service placed over 60,000 orders and the War Department during the war let 30,000 orders for war supplies worth \$7.5 billion (Nagle 1992). Nor could the navy's seven shipbuilding yards or Naval Gun Factory in Washington supply its needs (Peck 1949, Winslow 2000, Dowart 2001, Perry 2002). The United States Shipping Board was established to regulate maritime commerce and in April 1917 formed the Emergency Fleet Corporation under whose direction American shipbuilding facilities grew from 61 yards with 215 launching ways to 169 yards with over 500 launching ways to meet the need for ocean transport (Mattox 1920). The War Industries Board was established in July 1917 to coordinate production by allocating raw materials, setting production quotas, and mediating labor-management disputes. Despite the work of these and other organizations, American conversion from a peacetime economy to one capable of meeting wartime production did not proceed smoothly and production goals were rarely achieved. America's vaunted industrial power proved embarrassing as her expeditionary forces used European weaponry and equipment, producing only its own unique items mainly after the armistice. Still, both government and industry learned lessons from their first truly modern industrial and military mobilization (Koistinen 1967, Borden 1989).

From World War I sprang peacetime industrial planning for war as never before seen in this country, nurturing connections between government and business and a cadre-like arrangement that provided ramp-up once national emergency appeared on the horizon, as was the case by the end of the 1930s. Still, it was a matter of scale as normal procurement and acquisition requirements of peacetime hardly tested capacity in either money, equipment and supplies, or people and interwar politics curtailed development with "Merchants of Death" hearings on Capitol Hill commanding more attention than preparations for some future threat after "the war to end all wars" (Coulter 1997). Preparedness for American defense and what became participation in World War II eventually provided the full flowering of modern industrial mobilization of a nation under arms, business tied to war-making, big government controls and central management, and the pinnacle of an American way of war built upon technology.

During the interwar era the nation grappled with how to deal with the development and testing of new technologies of aircraft and submarines, how to procure the new weapons systems, and how to integrate them into the services. The process was made more difficult by the limited funding allocated by a Congress determined to "return to normalcy" and infatuated with the "outlawry of war" during the 1920s while grappling with the depression during the 1930s. The Army and Navy both emerged from World War I with more equipment than required by their

reduced peacetime numbers. Much of it became technologically obsolete quickly. The limited number of potential contracts made it uneconomical for civilian industry to invest in facilities to produce new types of aircraft and submarines for the military. Industry leaders also complained of “unfair” competition from government manufacturing facilities, especially the Naval Aircraft Factory which had been established in Philadelphia in 1917 to help meet the Navy’s need for large flying boats. The situation was improved when Congress, acting on the recommendation of the Morrow Board of 1925, authorized a plan under which the Army and Navy would each procure one thousand planes over a five-year period. The result was a dual system of aircraft procurement. The Naval Aircraft Factory focused on the design, development, and testing of aircraft with most being produced in private factories. During the mid-1930s the Navy decided to build one-tenth of its aircraft at the Philadelphia facility for quality and cost accounting purposes (Trimble 1990). A similar dual procurement system was developed for submarines with the Navy focusing on research and development and producing a limited number at the Portsmouth (New Hampshire) Navy Yard (Winslow 1985, Weir 1991, 1993).

The enormity of the production effort of World War II transformed relations between the government and industry and forms the starting point for the “garrison” or “national security” state (Lasswell 1941). Attrition and annihilation both appeared together as grand strategies. In a sense the Atomic Bomb, the carrier fleet, Detroit’s wartime industrial economy, and airpower all symbolized much of an American way of war and business that emerged from the national experience of a second global conflict. Of course, similar phenomena arose in the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the defeated powers, Germany and Japan. World War II, therefore, was an international orgasm of the military-industrial age, the likes of which may not soon be seen again (Lane 1951, Davis 1971, Hooks 1991, Abrahamson 1983, Gropman 1996).

### **Flowering of a Military-Industrial State**

Even more than that, perhaps, World War II represented the wartime flowering of the centrist, nation-state at war. From controlling the wartime economy to resource allocation and building of infrastructure; from economic to political and social consequences of total war, this experience conditioned liberal reform, state intrusion and control, and outlays for both guns and butter. The world wars were all about logistics and provide a statistical encyclopedia for studying state mobilization of an economy. Any chest-thumping rendition or litany of aircraft, landing craft and tanks (much less trucks and firearms) becomes both a testament to the Arsenal of Democracy and irrelevant in the post-industrial age at one and the same time. The two world wars provided a continuum of experience, mind-sets, instruments, bureaucracy, and infrastructural arrangements for crisis conflict management behind the shield of geographical sanctuary which provided time to work out cooperation, labor issues, and even external markets. The economic feature of two conflicts separated by a world-wide depression could not be discounted.

By a quirk of fate perhaps, not necessarily by design, post-World War II demobilization proved short-lived. The so-called “Fifty Years War” or Cold War ensured that the conventional cycles of war and peace, mobilization and demobilization became blurred, and ever-advancing military technology would not soon again relegate business/industry and government relationships to any traditional sectorized dimensions. The world’s fate was sealed when the United States, in particular, enunciated a specific strategic synthesis for confrontation with the Soviet Union. The embracing of the garrison state or national security state meant an end to America’s traditional antistatism (already in evidence from the earlier paradigm for coping with economic depression and world war). The military-industrial complex was reality and it became merely a matter of how well it was managed, controlled, exploited – but constrained it would be in the spirit of President Eisenhower’s concern (Friedberg 2000).

Wilbur Jones (1999) defined the Cold War as “deadly boxing at arm’s length between the Western Allies and the Soviet Bloc, often utilizing surrogate belligerents.” Thus was implied a world armed to the teeth, largely by the two superpowers with different versions of command economies and military-industrial behemoths. They came together after 1950 under various rubrics with Fred J. Cook’s term the “warfare state” synonymous with Ike’s “military-industrial complex” (Cook 1962). Foreign arms sales became an integral component of the military-industrial complex and the marketing of US-produced weapons quickly began to influence the formation of foreign policy (Suton and Kemp 1966, Carey 1969, Thayer 1969, Raan, Pfaltzgraff, and Kemp 1978; Green 1995; Hartung 2000).

That such would be the future was not clear in 1945. Demobilization followed World War II as it had previous wars, but within five years the Cold War was a reality and had manifested itself in combat operations in Korea that required rapid rearmament. Little matter that 37 of the top 100 defense suppliers of World War II were not on the list for the Korean conflict or that 41 of the top 100 Korean War contractors had disappeared by 1960. Similarly, the 1944 wartime largesse of \$80 billion per year for defense had shrunk to \$10.9 billion in 1948 but then vaulted to \$318 billion worth of contracts in the 1960s. More importantly as Ethan Kapstein (1992) suggests, 38,000 firms provided goods and services to the US Department of Defense, in 1987, and the complex or “iron triangle” (that included Congress) had become “bigger and more influential than even President Eisenhower could have imagined.” The fact of technology cost, public buy-in to a strategic synthesis of threat and the subtle sophistication of peacetime defense economics based on a mobilizable industrial base still capable of providing both “guns and butter” leading to pervasiveness and power (implied by Ike’s warning) might be sensed in Friedberg’s rather than Roland’s treatment.

Perhaps the main point is that a seeming permanence of the Cold War placed the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (if not their alliance blocks) on a permanent war footing. In this regard, not unlike World War II (both part of the same industrial age epoch), it was not merely a matter of statistics (production, cost, infrastructure, etc.) but the implications of a permanent military-

industrial mobilization for the future. Business historians Keith Bryant and Henry Dethloff (1983) have cited the customary statistical benchmark of declining percentages of military and defense spending in relationship to the Gross National Product (given periodic buildups and draw downs) through the period and described stimuli for new industries (aviation, aerospace, electronics) provided by defense procurement, the ending of certain monopolies (such as in the production of aluminum), and the mixed consequences of these changes, such as the introduction of instability into the defense business sector with negative consequences.

To a student of war profiteering, Stuart Brandes (1997), while the period evidenced many instances of fraud, waste, and abuse, the MIC was not some mysterious, clandestine war-mongering conspiracy against the public purse to fatten profits. Generally echoing the tack of Roland (2001), Friedberg (2000), Kapstein (1992), and others, Brandes concluded that the Cold War “devoured wealth in previously unimaginable amounts,” but methods of control worked out over 200 years “were at last able to keep profiteering substantially in check.” While charges of profiteering, fraud, and incompetence were not uncommon (Rice 1971, Thompson 1990, Brandes 1997, Weber 2001), profits of defense contractors were no more outlandish than those in the civilian economy. MIC became mainstream in American culture, way of war, and business (Brandes 1997).

Several distinctions characterized the Cold War business/industrial-military phenomenon. For one thing, Congress abandoned its traditional intermediary role for containing costs and keeping competition in play and became more a dispenser of largesse to companies and communities hooked onto national defense for jobs and dollars (Lapp 1970). Statistics in 1981 and 1982 suggest that 60 percent of prime defense contracts went to just 10 states to be spent in the aircraft, electronics/communication equipment, missile/space systems, construction, petroleum, vehicles, and textiles/clothing/equipment sectors. The top ten defense contractors became American household names, including General Dynamics (jet fighters, missiles, nuclear submarines, research), McDonnell Douglas (jet fighters, cargo aircraft, missiles, and space systems), United Technologies (helicopters, jet aircraft engines), General Electric (nuclear submarines, jet-aircraft engines, missile components, electronic and communication equipment, research), Lockheed (missiles, cargo aircraft, space vehicles, research), Hughes Aircraft (missiles, radar, helicopters, research for missile and space systems, navigational aids), Boeing (bomber and cargo aircraft, helicopters, missiles, research), Grumman (jet aircraft, electronics), Raytheon (missiles, electronic and communication equipment), Chrysler (tanks, research), Tenneco (warships), and Litton Industries (missiles, electronic and communication equipment). Contracts to these providers ranged in the millions as President Ronald Reagan, for example, provided a late-Cold War buildup that eventually helped cause the fall of the Soviet Union.

The title of a *Newsweek* article, “Defense Dollars Save Many a City,” reflected the attitude of many congressmen and much of the public toward defense spending (Defense Dollars 1981–2). Such dependency over the nearly five-decade long Cold War boded ill for any thoughts of downsizing or demobilization. And, by the end of the period, an annual bleat went up from providers and customers that “the

lifeline is still in danger,” a restyled “defense industrial base” was losing jobs, capacity, and surgeability for mobilization and that competition from foreign sources threatened to undermine self-sufficiency. In short, general neglect and declining capacity/capability plagued the nation’s weapons industrial sector by the late 1980s. But, for the immediate time, Department of Defense sought to control the monster through the eternal verities of acquisition reform – centralization, laws, and regulations. And, the Pentagon slowly shifted away from the duality of government facilities to relying on the private sector for weapons, equipment, supplies, and research and development (Lapp 1970, Berry 1989, McNaugher 1989).

This second late Cold War distinction stemmed in part from the emergence of the concept of these big defense firms as “primes” for integration of systems (as platforms came to be styled). Development and procurement was deemed “a management function that many large industrial firms are uniquely equipped to perform well” to the tune of cost savings, streamlining of bureaucracy, and feathering the nests of a defense industrial base eventually thought of under the snappy rubric “private arsenal system.” Moreover, yet a third distinction was demographic and geographic – a distinct shift of contract awards away from the old industrial “smokestack” states of northeast and Midwest to the Sun Belt high-technology sectors of California and Texas. Silicon Valley in the Golden State as well as the Dallas/Fort Worth area profited from such a shift with attendant power migration in political terms (Bolton 1966; Lotchin 1979, 1992; Markusen, Hall, Campbell, and Deitrick 1991; Hooks and Bloomquist 1992). Again, money and jobs – a sort of military “pork-barrel” became part of the Missile Age – an age not merely of conventional military goods or things, but the vast arsenal and defense production programs of the Atomic Energy Commission/Department of Energy, the space activities of NASA as well as defense, even the intelligence community with tertiary benefits of something so innocuous as Eisenhower’s Interstate Highway system (done in the name of national defense). It would be fair to postulate that no major industrial or business sector of the country was off-limits or did not feel the not-so-gentle but persuasive touch of national security (Hitch and McKean 1963).

Periodic exposés of over-pricing, shoddy workmanship, and unethical practices (matters that had plagued business–government relationships from colonial times), became periodic staples of congressional shock and displeasure, public disgust, and bureaucratic acquisition reform through new regulations and oversight by secretaries like Robert MacNamara and others (Roherty 1970). Six hundred dollar hammers, \$5,000 coffeepots, and \$400 toilet seats spoke to one part of public perception of fraud, waste, and abuse. The huge cost overruns and controversy surrounding the TFX aircraft bespoke yet another dimension (Art 1968). Only AEC/DOE production of a super-secret nuclear arsenal or an ancillary intelligence agency programs or so-called “black projects” seemed to escape transparency. The public had a right to know, but not too much right, and not to know too much! Still, the ability of the United States to sustain, modernize and hatch ever-newer high technology programs like Star Wars, much less field sufficient weapons systems for conventional conflicts stretching from Korea through Vietnam to the Persian Gulf while maintaining a reasonably healthy non-military domestic economy

(“guns and butter”), eventually spoke to the military-industrial complex’s success. Then, suddenly, the pejorative concept of MIC morphed in public acceptance to a defense industrial base or DIB. With the gradual eclipse of theories of national mobilization, national stockpile of raw materials, and national manpower conscription as resourcing mechanisms, scarce budgetary resources and recognition that a government could not protect all industries led to a new expression – “strategic industries.” Such industries seemed best positioned to foster technological development across civilian as well as military sectors or even countries with social benefit surpassing merely private benefit.

### **Defense Industrial Base and Private Arsenal System**

Happily for all, the nuclear-tipped confrontation between East and West ended in a whimper not a bang. America took a victory lap around Iraqi forces with superior late-Cold War technology in Desert Storm and looked to peace dividends from spending reductions, a smaller military establishment, weapons program stretch-outs, and defense industry consolidations in the decade that followed. The questions facing the Defense Department at the end of the Cold War included: Would the MIC be reduced to mere residue in the pattern of traditional demobilization? Or would a higher percentage of military spending be maintained in defiance of tradition? And, just what might that percentage actually look like? Some of the most perceptive study of such questions came from Jacques Gansler (1980, 1989, 1995) as both an insider and outside observer of the Pentagon and business. The decade of the nineties proved traumatic both for the Pentagon and its new “private arsenal system,” but the new MIC more than survived, morphing in size, composition, health, and influence of government-industry partnerships (Correll and Nash 1991, Markusen and Yudkin 1992).

Demobilization never quite occurred, though a sorting out by market-forces did, followed by government realization that it could not allow shrinkage or merger beyond a certain point. True, US defense spending as a percentage of gross domestic product when pegged to defense-related milestones since the late 1940s showed a decrease back to 1947 levels at around 3 per cent by 1999. But, could the insidious questions raised by Eisenhower only be measured in percentage of GDP? Questions of how much was enough, should there be an industrial strategy or at least policy, how to ensure profitability, how to continue acquisition reform, and how to accomplish revolutions in military as well as business affairs became tactical issues that pervaded the rhetoric and literature of bringing the defense industry into the mainstream of Wall Street and globalization by the end of the twentieth century.

The new defense industry base grappled with big problems accruing from reduced military spending. Major contracts were canceled or development schedules projected indefinitely. Consolidation and partnership were all the talk, and fear of acquisition czars and business moguls ran rampant. Consolidation of defense giants brought heavy debt loads. By 1997, 51 major defense firms had merged to become five “giants” or systems integrators – Boeing [McDonnell



Douglas], Raytheon Hughes, Litton Industries, Lockheed Martin, and Northrop Grumman (Markusen and Costigan 1999). High technology companies exiting the direct defense market included California Microwaves, GTE, Hughes Electronics, IBM, Lucent, Magnavox, Phillips, and Texas Instruments. Similar industrial companies included Allegheny Teledyne, Chrysler, Eaton, Emerson, Ford, General Electric (excepting jet engines), Tenneco, and Westinghouse. By the time of the millennium, the whole situation of MIC had shaken out to the point that US Industry Platform competitors in key industrial sectors had markedly shrunk from the situation in 1990. Fixed-Wing aircraft companies had gone from eight to three; helicopters from four to three; satellite integrators from eight to six; space launch vehicles from six to three; strategic missiles from three to two; submarines remained stable at two but large surface ships producers went from eight to two providers; tactical missiles from thirteen to three; tactical wheeled vehicles from six to three, and tracked combat vehicles from three to two (ODUSDIP 2003–8).

The shake-out enabled the largest firms to become more vertically integrated. Firms that provided platforms could now also build major systems, subsystems and components in a chain from raw material to part to component (supplied by third tier subcontractors) to subsystem (by second tier suppliers) to major component/system (first tier suppliers) to the final platform provided to the DoD by the prime contractor. But this was a decade-long rationalization resulting from “demobilization” and, suddenly, in the process, skilled engineers and software and computer specialists had often left the sector taking years of knowledge and experience with them. High-tech start-ups lured workers with lucrative stock options and signing bonuses for younger talent. For a time, the defense industry became unattractive largely because the business no longer provided attractive cash flows and a company could no longer secure cash to front large projects – in short, money and the fact that one could not take patriotism to the bank (ODUSDIP 2002)!

America was not unique. Europe downsized and consolidated its defense supply bases and even the former Soviet Union’s military-industrial complex melted and rusted. The Pentagon and the rest of government tried to ensure an orderly transition from MIC to DIB through some sort of re-training and touted dual-use technologies while acquisition chiefs held regular meetings with top industry leaders to ensure the health of the sector. Whatever remained from this transformed defense sector was sufficient to guard the peace (that unexpectedly came unglued in the Balkans and Africa) while so-called “military revolutions” danced like sugar plums and defense industries faced an uncertain future. Meanwhile, corporate executives streamlined and reoriented their companies, proclaiming that they would indeed be able to better deliver value to the customer – the monopolistic DoD (Kapstein 1992, Moran 2003, Kinsey 2006).

### **National-Security State and Gun-Show Nation**

“What would peace do to an economy that prospered on the military dollars that created high technology and the jobs and equipment to go with it,” asked William

H. Gregory (1993) as US troops returned from the first Gulf War. Within the next decade, America found out that peace was not to be as the Islamic terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 were followed by a “War on Terror” and military action in Afghanistan and Iraq. Defense spending quickly rose to fund those operations as well as homeland security, but it was not without its critics, many of whom worried about inefficiencies, high costs, and “war profiteering” (Weidenbaum 1992, Barnes 2002, Knickerbocker 2002, Owens and Weiss 2002, Rothkopf 2008). Even at the height of the spending, executives of major defense contractors remained cautious concerning the future because they remembered the defense spending retrenchment of President Bill Clinton’s administration that followed the surge in spending under Presidents Ronald Reagan and George H. W. Bush.

All the issues attending the traditional MIC – accountability, controversial projects, bureaucracy creep, and cost – reemerged and became attached to this new endeavor as, in fact, the mission, programs, monies of the Department of Homeland Security might be seen as an extension of Department of Defense points of the Iron Triangle. In many cases the providers (industry and business) were the same, in others they were different tending to gravitate to small start-up or high technology companies rather than the traditional giants.

Perhaps the most significant development on the Post 9/11 era is the practice of contracting out logistical and support services. Privatizing and contracting-out became stimulants to a counter-point to traditional production industry – a military service industry of private providers that reflected a general American economic shift from goods to service generally and streamlining of personnel costs. The firm of Brown and Root had been around in Vietnam, building bases in the jungle, but the phenomenon surfaced with a vengeance by the time of Bosnia in the late nineties as firms like Kellogg, Brown and Root (a subsidiary of Halliburton Company) handled traditional “GI” duties in mess halls, latrines, and other vital support services. It was not so much that 9/11 changed anything in this regard. But the conveyance of GWOT to Afghanistan and Iraq combat zones meant “contractors on the battlefield” was the next extension of contracting out, privatizing, and the service industry moving into newer areas of interest and profit. And, the United States was not alone, the phenomenon moved across the globe (Avant 2005, Tyner 2006, Krishnan 2008).

Halliburton, Bechtel, DynCorp, Blackwater, and other so-called private security companies received large Defense department contracts as expeditionary warfare (and, eventually, stabilization and reconstruction, or nation-building) joined “providing for the common defense” in the middle years of the new century’s first decade. Many of these were awarded without competitive bidding – a 2004 study by the Center for Public Integrity found that only 40 per cent of Pentagon contracts awarded to 737 prime contractors between October 1, 1997 and September 30, 2003 were let under full competition while sole sourcing dropped the percentage further (Makinson 2004). The number of private contractors rose from 9,200 during the First Gulf War to 100,000 by 2005 (Avant 2005). Critics argue that “outsourcing” has entangled the Pentagon in an unhealthy relationship with contractors so that, in the words of the title of an assessment of the practice the United

States “Can’t Win With ‘Em Can’t Go To War Without’ Em” (Singer 2003, 2007a, b, Scahill 2007, Verkuil 2007).

From a detached perspective, the military-industrial complex or defense industry base had become hydra-headed by the first few years of the twenty-first century. The DoD by this time had begun to think more sophisticatedly about its industrial product base on the one hand, observing in 2003 that “competitive pressures” had shaped a more concentrated defense industrial base, with “industry giants” well-positioned “to provide [a] transformational network-centric system-of-system solutions.”

### **A New Military-Industrial Complex for an Age of Permanent War**

Stan Crock proclaimed in 2003 that “while hardly anyone was watching, the infamous American military-industrial complex died.” He admitted that defense spending was soaring and military forces deployed in “globe-girdling operations.” But, most of the upsurge in spending went for operations and maintenance and improving quality of life for the forces – not for purchasing hardware so that “a close look reveals that America’s arms merchants are in a long-term downward spiral.” Aerospace/defense employment stood at its lowest level in 50 years, the number of major weapons programs had shriveled to a handful. Despite nuclear threats from North Korea and Iran, weapons procurement budgets (adjusted for inflation), were half that of Reagan-era highs. In Crock’s mind, the Soviets’ collapse, technological advances, “and what passes for fiscal responsibility in Washington conspire against future industry revival.” Whatever one’s politics, Crock warned, “it’s clear that the nation needs a new paradigm to organize the defense industrial base to ensure that it could provide whatever arms were needed in a still-fractious world” (Crock 2003).

That new paradigm has surfaced in the next half-decade. Not, perhaps as Crock envisioned – “a streamlined industry – one that eliminates duplicative facilities that decreased demand can no longer support.” Crock’s narrow definition of MIC obviously failed to see the generation of a new more diversified even internationalized military-industrial complex for securitization of the state (Grapin 2002, Guay 2007). Indeed, the new paradigm exists in part due to adjustment to new threats, economic realities of the marketplace, the migration of technology and labor, and the globalization of the defense industry. Moreover, thanks also go to homeland security/defense and the advent of contract service business added to (although not necessarily superimposed upon) the traditional mega-business of industrial giants for tanks, ships, and warplanes. For instance, do Private Military Companies/Private Security Companies (that have inserted themselves into this updated MIC) “represent the new vanguard of international security, able and willing to impose order and security where state actors now fear to tread,” as suggested in some circles of security studies? Clive Jones (2006a) answered affirmatively; citing “one statistic alone” as bearing out this observation – PMCs collectively had more personnel engaged in Iraq on a variety of missions than did Great Britain,

“supposedly the second largest contributor of troops.” The industry also is diversifying into the commercial market, particularly as private companies seek to do business in unstable areas of the world. And, of course, the growth industry that is homeland defense/security, the high-tech underpinnings of intelligence gathering and analysis, proliferation into what used to be styled law enforcement endeavor of low tech as well and applied especially to border security has produced a cottage industry responsive to the frenetic post 9/11 climate of fear-mongering, spasmodic alerts, as constant reminders of disaster and tragedy have broadened what is labeled “national security” far beyond traditional concepts of national defense (Avant 2005, Jones 2006a, b, Krishnan 2008).

Concerns about a “warfare state” and links between businessmen, governments, and war have a long history. Keith Nelson (1971) traces the history of anti-militarism and fears of a “Warfare State” to ancient times when Aristophanes prayed, “If any merchant, selling spears or shields would fain have battles to improve his trade, may he be seized by thieves and eat raw barley.” Nelson posits that what he calls the “three constituent traditions, which hold ruler, soldier, and merchant responsible for war [merged] into a fear that such men may combine against peace dates back at least as far as 1910.” That date coincides with the emergence of the modern military-industrial complex in the United States, though James Huston (1994) believes that concerns predated that by over a century. He concluded, that out of even the earliest public perception that some military forces were needed for the common defense – and, in turn, would depend upon some kind of military industry – there arose “the great dilemma of US military-industrial policy.” Could security be better served and could the economic health of the country flourish more; could the attending evils of arms manufacture be better reduced or avoided by either government manufacture or by private manufacture of munitions? “Leaders have confronted this question from the early days of the Republic,” concluded Huston. Over time, successive generations of the merchants of death and their tools of war have passed to the dustbins of history – museums, scrapping, or the so-called “bone yard” of warplanes in the western American desert. So long as the nation-state has not similarly gone that way, to provide for the common defense will muster new strength, create new markets and generate more expenditure of national wealth for production of goods and services for security.

James Fallows (2002) noted how Eisenhower’s fear of “economic, political, even spiritual problems” attending the power of a military-industrial complex remained ever-present 40 years later. A government no longer having “enough money to throw around without a plan,” political engineering via distortion of process of public choice (“to describe the parceling out of defense subcontracts to the districts of influential members of Congress” thus corrupting independent judgment) and the unhealthy or corrupting effect on the military by their alliance with contractors all struck Fallows as placing the country “back where Eisenhower started.” Yet, even Fallows, in the wake of 9/11, reflected traditional acceptance that “eternal vigilance is the price of liberty” by concluding that the country now held “a renewed appreciation of the problem posed by a military-industrial complex” and Eisenhower’s recognition that only “an alert and knowledgeable

citizenry could bring it under control.” Yet, it is no more apparent in 2008 than in 1961 that this was possible or even desired by the body politic.

Indeed, important as the Military-Industrial Complex is to American history, the topic has not particularly captured the fancy of either publishers or the public for solid, critical analysis. Sensationalist muckraking or agenda-prone works have long abounded in this field (Lapp 1968, Barnet 1970, Melman 1974, Kaldor 1981, McNaugher 1989, Wheeler 2004). But, the business history sector as well as the military history community has deferred to technology historians in approaching the topic in such fashion. The works of Jones (1999) or Shiman (1997) are obviously dated and like Brown (2005) part of official or government history that reflects a perspective more attractive to policymakers and their advisers – if they consult them – than to academics or the general public. Casting a critical, analytical eye upon both sides of business-military relationships has always been a sensitive task. Perhaps the task itself is too daunting. Several collections of essays include valuable studies of narrowly focused topics (Cooling 1977, Koistinen 1980, Roland 2001), but an up-to-date synthetic narrative seems badly needed. In addition, countless subtopics deserve attention, including administrative histories of the bureaus that manufactured or procured weapons for the Navy for over a century. And, corporate histories (Goodwin 1985, perhaps excepted), if existent, often remain paeans to their institution. The business history community needs to step to the front on this crucial phenomenon of our age – securitization, economics, and corporate endeavor. Much work remains to be done lest Pogo’s famous contention – we have met the enemy and it is us – remains untested. Or, perhaps it is more primordial as Joan Burbick (2006) suggests with her study of the origins and ramifications of a national gun culture.

#### BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Abrahamson, James L. (1983) *The American Home Front; Revolutionary War, Civil War, World War I, World War II*. Washington: National Defense University Press.
- Adams, Gordon (1981). *The Iron Triangle: The Politics of Defense Contracting*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.
- Art, Robert J. (1968). *The TFX Decision: McNamara and the Military*. Boston: Little, Brown.
- Avant, Deborah D. (2005). *The Market for Force: The Consequences of Privatizing Security*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Baack, Ben, and Edward Ray (1985). “The Political Economy of the Origins of the Military-Industrial Complex in the United States,” *The Journal of Economic History*, 45:2 (June), 369–75.
- Barnes, Julian E. (2002). “War Profiteering: Cashing in on the Post-9/11 Defense Build-Up,” *U.S. News and World Report*, (May 13), 20–4.
- Barnet, Richard J. (1970). *The Economy of Death: A Hard Look at the Defense Budget, the Military-Industrial Complex, and What You Can Do About Them*. New York: Atheneum.
- Berry, F. Clifton, Jr. (1989). “The Lifeline is Still in Danger,” *Air Force Magazine*, (November), 108–10.

- Bethlehem Steel Co (1949). *A Century of Progress, 1849–1949: San Francisco Yard, Bethlehem Steel Company, Shipbuilding Division*. San Francisco: Bethlehem Steel Co.
- Bolton, Roger E. (1966). *Defense Purchases and Regional Growth [1951–1962]*. Washington: Brookings Institution.
- Boot, Max (2002). *The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power*. New York: Basic Books.
- Borden, Penn (1989). *Civilian Indoctrination of the Military: World War I and Future Implications for the Military–Industrial Complex*. New York: Greenwood Press.
- Brandes, Stuart D. (1997). *Warhogs: A History of War Profits in America*. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky.
- Brown, Shannon, ed. (2005) *Providing the Means of War; Perspectives on Defense Acquisition 1945–2000*. Washington: United States Army Center of Military History and Industrial College of the Armed Forces.
- Bryant, Keith L. Jr., and Henry C. Dethloff (1983). *A History of American Business*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
- Buel, Richard, Jr. (1980). *Dear Liberty: Connecticut's Mobilization for the Revolutionary War*. Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press.
- Burbick, Joan (2006). *Gun Show Nation: Gun Culture and American Democracy*. New York: New Press.
- Carey, Omer L., ed. (1969). *The Military–Industrial Complex and United States Foreign Policy*. Pullman: Washington State University Press.
- Carp, E. Wayne (1990). *To Starve the Army at Pleasure: Continental Army Administration and American Political Culture, 1775–1783*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Cook, Fred J. (1962). *The Warfare State*. New York: Macmillan.
- Cooling, Benjamin Franklin, ed. (1977). *War, Business, and American Society: Historical Perspectives on the Military–Industrial Complex*. Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press.
- Cooling, Benjamin Franklin (1979). *Gray Steel and Blue Water Navy: The Formative Years of America's Military–Industrial Complex, 1881–1917*. Hamden, CT: Archon Books.
- Correll, John T., and Colleen A. Nash (1991). *Lifeline Adrift: The Defense Industrial Base in the 1990s*. Arlington, VA: The Aerospace Education Foundation.
- Coulter, Matthew Ware (1997). *The Senate Munitions Inquiry of the 1930s: Beyond the Merchants of Death*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
- Crock, Stan (2003). "An Arms Industry Too Big For the Task at Hand," *Washington Post*, (August 31).
- Davis, Kenneth S., ed. (1971). *Arms, Industry and America*. New York: H. W. Wilson.
- Deyrup, Felicia J. (1948). *Arms Makers of the Connecticut Valley: A Regional Study of the Economic Development of the Small Arms Industry, 1798–1870*. Northampton, MA: Smith College Studies in History.
- Dowart, Jeffery M. (2001). *The Philadelphia Navy Yard: From the Birth of the U.S. Navy to the Nuclear Age*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Eddy, Richard. (2005). *Joshua Humphreys: His Life and Times: A Biographical Study*. New York: Vantage.
- Editors, *U.S. News and World Report* (1981–2). "Businesses that Gain Most in Defense Boom," (March 23, 1981), 43, 46; "Defense Dollars Save Many a City," (May 10, 1982), 77.
- Eisenhower, Dwight (1961). "Farewell Radio and Television Address to the American People," *Public Papers of the Presidents: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1960–61*. Washington: Office of the Federal Register, 1035–40.



- Fallows, James (2002). "The Dustbin of History: The Military-Industrial Complex," *Foreign Policy*, 133 (November-December), 46-8.
- Friedberg, Aaron L. (2000). *In the Shadow of the Garrison State: America's Anti-Statism and its Cold War Grand Strategy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Fuller, Claude E. (1946). *The Whitney Firearms*. Huntington, WV: Standard Publications.
- Gansler, Jacques S. (1980). *The Defense Industry*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Gansler, Jacques S. (1989). *Affording Defense*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Gansler, Jacques S. (1995). *Defense Conversion: Transforming the Arsenal of Democracy*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Goodwin, Jacob (1985). *Brotherhood of Arms: General Dynamics and the Business of Defending America*. New York: Times Books.
- Gottlieb, Sanford. (1997). *Defense Addiction: Can America Kick the Habit?* Boulder, CO: Westview.
- Grapin, Jacquelin, ed. (2002). *Transatlantic Interoperability in Defense Industries; How the US and Europe Could Better Cooperate in Coalition Military Operations*. Washington: European Institute.
- Green, Constance McLaughlin (1956). *Eli Whitney and the Birth of American Technology*. Boston: Little, Brown.
- Green, Michael J. (1995). *Arming Japan: Defense Production, Alliance Politics, and the Postwar Search for Autonomy*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Gregory, William H. (1993). *The Price of Peace; The Future of Defense Industry and High Technology in a Post-Cold War World*. New York: Macmillan.
- Gropman, Alan L (1996). *Mobilizing U.S. Industry in World War II: Myth and Reality*. Washington: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University.
- Guay, Terrence R. (2007). *Globalization and Its Implications for the Defense Industrial Base*. Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute.
- Hackemer, Kurt (2001). *The U.S. Navy and the Origins of the Military-Industrial Complex, 1847-1883*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Hacker, Barton, and Margaret Vining (2006). *American Military Technology: The Life Story of a Technology*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Hartung, William D. (2000). "Military-Industrial Complex Revisited: How Weapons Makers are Shaping U.S. Foreign and Military Policies," in Martha Honey and Tom Barry, eds., *Global Focus: U.S. Foreign Policy at the Turn of the Century*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 21-43.
- Heinrich, Thomas R. (1997). *Ships for the Seven Seas: Philadelphia Shipbuilding in the Age of Industrial Capitalism*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Hitch, Charles J., and Roland N. McKean (1963). *The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Holland, Lauren. (1997). *Weapons Under Fire*. New York: Garland.
- Hooks, Gregory (1991). *Forging the Military-Industrial Complex: World War II's Battle of the Potomac*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
- Hooks, Gregory, and Leonard E. Bloomquist (1992). "The Legacy of World War II for Regional Growth and Decline: The Cumulative Effects of Wartime Investments on U.S. Manufacturing, 1947-1972," *Social Forces*, 71:2 (December), 303-37.
- Horgan, Lucille E. (2002). *Forged in War: The Continental Congress and the Origin of Military Supply and Acquisition Policy*. Westport, CT: Greenwood.
- Huston, James A. (1966). *The Sinews of War: Army Logistics, 1775-1953*. Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History.

- Huston, James A. (1994). "The Military-Industrial Complex," in John E. Jessup and Louise B. Ketz, eds., *Encyclopedia of the American Military*, 3 vols. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 3, 1673-708.
- Jones, Clive (2006a). "Private Military Companies as 'Epistemic Communities,'" *Civil Wars*, 8:3-4 (September-December), 355-72.
- Jones, Clive (2006b). "Emerging Technologies in the Context of 'Security,'" *Connections: The Quarterly Journal*, 5:2 (Fall), 121-53.
- Jones, Wilbur D. (1999). *Arming the Eagle: A History of U.S. Weapons Acquisition since 1775*. Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Systems Management College Press.
- Kaldor, Mary (1981). *The Baroque Arsenal*. New York: Hill and Wang.
- Kapstein, Ethan Barnaby (1992). *The Political Economy of National Security: A Global Perspective*. New York: McGraw Hill.
- Kinsey, Christopher (2006). *Corporate Soldiers and International Security: The Rise of Private Military Companies*. New York: Routledge.
- Knickerbocker, Brad (2002). "Return of the 'Military-Industrial Complex?'" *Christian Science Monitor*, (February 13).
- Koistinen, Paul A. C. (1967). "The 'Industrial-Military Complex' in Historical Perspective: World War I," *Business History Review*, 41:4 (Winter), 378-403.
- Koistinen, Paul A. C. (1970). "The Military-Industrial Complex in Historical Perspective: The Inter-War Years," *Journal of American History*, 56:4 (March), 819-39.
- Koistinen, Paul A. C. (1980). *The Military-Industrial Complex: A Historical Perspective*. New York: Praeger.
- Koistinen, Paul A. C. (1996). *Beating Plowshares into Swords: The Political Economy of American Warfare, 1606-1865*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
- Koistinen, Paul A. C. (1997). *Mobilizing for Modern War: The Political Economy of American Warfare, 1865-1919*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
- Koistinen, Paul A. C. (1998). *Planning War, Pursuing Peace: The Political Economy of American Warfare, 1920-1939*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
- Koistinen, Paul A. C. (2004). *Arsenal of World War II: The Political Economy of American Warfare, 1940-1945*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
- Krishnan, Armin. (2008). *War as Business: Technological Change and Military Service Contracting*. Burlington, VT: Ashgate.
- Lane, Frederic C. (1951). *Ships for Victory: A History of Shipbuilding under the U.S. Maritime Commission in World War II*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Lapp, Ralph E. (1968). *The Weapons Culture*. New York: W. W. Norton.
- Lapp, Ralph E. (1970). *Arms Beyond Doubt: The Tyranny of Weapons Technology*. New York: Cowles.
- Lasswell, Harold (1941). "The Garrison State," *American Journal of Sociology*, 46:4 (January), 455-68.
- Latham, Andrew (1997). "From the 'Armoury System' to 'Agile Manufacturing': Industrial Divides in the History of American Arms Production," PhD dissertation, York University (Canada).
- Leiner, Frederick C. (2000). *Millions for Defense: The Subscription Warships of 1798*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Lotchin, Roger W. (1979). "The City and the Sword: San Francisco and the Rise of the Metropolitan-Military Complex, 1919-1941," *Journal of American History*, 65:4 (March), 996-1020.
- Lotchin, Roger W. (1992). *Fortress California, 1910-1961: From Warfare to Welfare*. New York: Oxford University Press.

- Lott, Arnold S. (1954). *A Long Line of Ships: Mare Island's Century of Naval Activity in California*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Makinson, Larry (2004). "Outsourcing the Pentagon: Who benefits from the Politics and Economics of National Security?" *Center for Public Integrity*, (29 September), <http://projects.publicintegrity.org/pns/report.aspx?aid=385>, accessed April 29, 2009.
- Markusen, Ann R., and Sean S. Costigan, eds. (1999). *Arming the Future: A Defense Industry for the 21st Century*. New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press.
- Markusen, Ann, and Joel Yudkin (1992). *Dismantling the Cold War Economy*. New York: Basic Books.
- Markusen, Ann R., Peter Hall, Scott Campbell, and Sabina Deitrick (1991). *The Rise of the Gunbelt: The Military Remapping of Industrial America*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Mattox, William Courtney (1920). *Building the Emergency Fleet: A Historical Narrative of the Problems and Achievements of the United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation*. Cleveland: Penton Publishing Co.
- McNaugher, Thomas (1989). *New Weapons, Old Politics: America's Military Procurement*. Washington: Brookings Institution Press.
- Melman, Seymour (1974). *The Permanent War Economy: American Capitalism in Decline*. [rev. edn. 1985]. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Moran, Theodore (2003). "Defense Economics and Security," in Michael E. Brown, ed., *Grave New World: Security Challenges in the 21st Century*. Washington: Georgetown University Press, 133–56.
- Nagle, James F. (1992). *A History of Government Contracting*. Washington: George Washington University.
- Nelson, Keith L. (1971). "The 'Warfare State': History of a Concept," *Pacific Historical Review*, 40:2 (May), 127–43.
- ODUSDIP Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Industrial Policy (2003–8). "Annual Industrial Assessment to Report to Congress," [http://www.acq.osd.mil/ip/docs/annual\\_ind\\_cap\\_rpt\\_to\\_congress-2009.pdf](http://www.acq.osd.mil/ip/docs/annual_ind_cap_rpt_to_congress-2009.pdf) [insert year of report before. pdf].
- Olvey, Lee D., James R. Golden, and Robert C. Kelly (1984). *The Economics of National Security*. Wayne, NJ: Avery Publishing Group.
- Owens, William A., and Stanley A. Weiss (2002). "An Indefensible Military Budget," *New York Times* (February 7).
- Peck, Taylor (1949). *Round-Shot to Rockets: A History of the Washington Navy Yard and Naval Gun Factory*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Perry, Fred (2002). *Bremerton and Puget Sound Navy Yard*. Bremerton, WA: Perry Pub.
- Raan, Uri, Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., and Geoffrey Kemp, eds. (1978). *Arms Transfers to the Third World: The Military Buildup in Less Industrial Countries*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Rice, Berkeley (1971). *The C-5A Scandal: An Inside Story of the Military-Industrial Complex*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
- Roherty, James Michael (1970). *Decisions of Robert S. McNamara: A Study of the Role of the Secretary of Defense*. Miami: University of Miami Press.
- Roland, Alex (2001). *The Military-Industrial Complex*. Bloomington, IN: American Historical Association.
- Rothkopf, David (2008). *Superclass: The Global Power Elite and the World They are Making*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
- Scahill, Jeremy (2007). *Blackwater: The Rise of the World's Most Powerful Mercenary Army*. New York: Nation Books.

- Shiman, Philip (1997). *Forging the Sword: Defense Production during the Cold War*. Washington: United States Air Force Air Combat Command and Department of Defense Legacy Program, Cold War Project.
- Singer, Peter W. (2003). *Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Singer, Peter W. (2007a). "Not That You Asked; Sure, He's Got Guns For Hire, But They're Just Not Worth It," *Washington Post* (October 7).
- Singer, Peter W. (2007b). "Can't Win With 'Em, Can't Go To War Without 'Em': Private Military Contractors and Counterinsurgency," *Policy Paper No. 4, September 2007*. Washington: Brookings Institution, <http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2007/0927militarycontractors.aspx>, accessed April 29, 2009.
- Smith, Merritt Roe (1977). *Harpers Ferry Armory and the New Technology: The Challenge of Change*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Suton, John L., and Geoffrey Kemp (1966). "Arms to Developing Countries," *Adelphia Papers*, No. 28. London: International Institute for Strategic Studies.
- Thayer, George (1969). *The War Business: The International Trade in Armaments*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Thompson, Marilyn W. (1990). *Feeding the Beast: How Wedtech Became the Most Corrupt Little Company in America*. New York: Scribner.
- Toll, Ian. (2006). *The Six Frigates: The Epic History of the Founding of the U.S. Navy*. New York: W. W. Norton.
- Trimble, William F. (1990). *Wings for the Navy: A History of the Naval Aircraft Factory, 1917–1956*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Tucker, Spencer (1989). *Arming the Fleet: U.S. Navy Ordnance in the Muzzle-Loading Era*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Tyner, James A. (2006). *The Business of War: Workers, Warriors and Hostages in Occupied Iraq*. Burlington, VT: Ashgate.
- Verkuil, Paul R. (2007). *Outsourcing Sovereignty: Why Privatization of Government Functions Threatens Democracy and What We Can Do About It*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Weber, Rachel Nicole (2001). *Swords into Dow Shares: Governing the Decline of the Military–Industrial Complex*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Weidenbaum, Murray (1992). *Small Wars, Big Defense: Paying for the Military After the Cold War*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Weigley, Russell (1973). *The American War of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy*. New York: Macmillan.
- Weir, Gary E. (1991). *Building American Submarines, 1914–1940*. Washington: Naval Historical Center.
- Weir, Gary E. (1993). *Forged in War: The Naval–Industrial Complex and American Submarine Construction, 1940–1961*. Washington: Naval Historical Center.
- Westlake, Merle (2004). *Josiah Fox*. Philadelphia: Xlibris Corp.
- Whisker, James B. (1997). *The United States Armory at Springfield, 1795–1865*. Lewiston, NY: E. Mellen Press.
- Wheeler, Winslow T. (2004). *The Wastrels of Defense; How Congress Sabotages U.S. Security*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Wilson, Mark R. (2006). *The Business of Civil War; Military Mobilization and the State, 1861–1865*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Winslow, Richard E. (1985). *Portsmouth-Built: Submarines of the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard*. Portsmouth, NH: Portsmouth Marine Society/P. E. Randall.

- 
- Winslow, Richard E. (1995). *Constructing Munitions of War: The Portsmouth Navy Yard Confronts the Confederacy*. Portsmouth, NH: Portsmouth Marine Society/Peter E. Randall.
- Winslow, Richard E. (2000). *"Do Your Job!": An Illustrated Bicentennial History of the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, 1800-2000*. Portsmouth, NH: Portsmouth Marine Society/Peter Randall.

## Chapter Sixty-three

# THE MILITARY, WAR, AND MEMORY

*G. Kurt Piehler*

As a field of scholarly inquiry, only recently have historians joined scholars from the social sciences in trying to understand the role rituals, commemorative sites, monuments, and popular culture play in shaping the memory of the past. Although scholars differ on a precise definition of the concept of memory, they generally view it as distinct from historical scholarship that depends on a rigorous weighing of written and oral sources to reconstruct the past. Memory is diffuse and in the case of war is often shaped by the recollection of veterans, those mourning the war dead, as well as cemeteries, monuments, holidays, literature, and film (Ashplant, Dawson, and Roper 2004). Samuel Hynes, who wrote a memoir of his service as a Marine aviator in World War II (Hynes 1988) and an analysis of the impact of World War I on British society (Hynes 1991), analyzes diaries, memoirs, collections of correspondence, reports, and novels published by veterans of World War I, World War II, and the Vietnam War reflecting on how these individual authors, virtually none of whom were “professional soldiers,” were affected by their wartime experiences and remembered them. Haynes believes Americans related to the Vietnam War the way Britons did to World War I, as “a war of national disillusionment that changed the way a generation thought about its country, its leaders, and war itself” (Haynes 1997).

George Mosse in *Nationalization of the Masses* (1975) stressed the pivotal role of ritual and commemoration in forging the modern nation state beginning with the French Revolutionary state in the 1790s. Among the most influential concepts is the notion of “invented traditions” a phrase coined by Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger in their pathbreaking anthology on rituals and traditions aptly titled *The Invention of Tradition* (1983). Far from annihilating tradition or ritual, Hobsbawm’s and Ranger’s anthology suggested how modern societies have an uncanny ability to create, as well as alter time honored rituals and traditions. There is extensive literature by European historians of the First World War that underscores how the massive disruptions of this conflict, especially the staggering loss of life, would be reflected in memory and commemoration in Europe (Winter 1995). In *Fallen Soldiers* George Mosse (1990) asks whether the experience of



World War I (which he sees as a turning point in European historical consciousness), and the myths that developed during the 1920s and 1930s led to an indifference to loss of lives. Focusing his analysis on the design of monuments and cemeteries in Germany and argues that the “cult of the fallen soldier” fueled the rise of nationalism after World War I which contributed to the resumption of war a generation later. Paul Fussell (1975, 1989) devotes greater analysis to literature in probing the “memory” of both World Wars.

Scholarship dealing with the American memory of war has focused less on World War I and more on the impact of the Civil War and the Vietnam War. Even before the boom in memory studies, historians have recognized the invented character of American nationhood. In contrast to many countries that forge creation myths that stress nationalism based on a timeless people rooted in the distant past – the United States began as a colony of Great Britain and was born as a young nation when it fought a war of independence against the “mother country.” In considering the formation of memory, private groups, as well as local and state governments played a crucial role in commemorative activities. Only after the Civil War did the federal government take a more activist role in sponsoring national memorials and promoting the observances of holidays commemorating past wars (Curti 1946, Bodnar 1992).

Rituals played an important role in forging public support for the eventual break with Great Britain (Shaw 1981). Even the tarring and feathering of tax collectors or the destruction of British property during the Boston Tea Party (1773) were often carried out in a highly ritualized fashion (Zobel 1970). When the United States formally broke with Great Britain it spawned the first national holiday – Independence Day, better known as the Fourth of July. This holiday would be commemorated by orations, but also by parades, festive dinners, toasts, and often fireworks. Peter De Bolla, *The Fourth of July and the Founding of America* (2007) explores the origins of the myths and rituals associated with celebrations of the Declaration and American independence showing how they have united Americans of diverse backgrounds over the centuries. In addition to celebrating Independence Day, Americans memorialized other key events in the war itself and a mythic air developed around them. Most notable in this regard was the ride of Paul Revere immortalized in the poem by Henry Wadsworth Longfellow (Fischer 1994), Washington’s crossing of the Delaware River to defeat the British at Princeton (Fischer 2004), and the winter that the Continental Army endured at Valley Forge (Treese 1995).

Even before the fighting ended, Americans were to be divided over the legacy of the Revolution and these differences increased after the adoption of a new Constitution in 1787. In many communities, Federalists and Jeffersonian Republicans held competing celebrations complete with separate events. During the antebellum era, dissenters such as the black abolitionist Frederick Douglass made use of the Fourth of July oration to critique the failures of American society to live up to the ideals of the Declaration of Independence (Travers 1997).

Veterans have often asserted a major role as custodians of the memory of war, but these claims would be hotly contested in the early Republic and after many later conflicts. Those who served in the Continental Army or state militias never

created a broad-based organization open to both enlisted men and officers. The Society of Cincinnati, the only significant veteran's organization established by Revolutionary War veterans, restricted membership to officers. The Cincinnati aroused significant public opposition partly because of the organization's decision to make membership hereditary and to maintain an official policy of secrecy (Hünemörder 2006). Although the Cincinnati organized public programs on Independence Day in several communities, it never dominated the observance of this holiday nationally (Myers 1983).

Fears about the anti-republican character of the Cincinnati would be mirrored in many quarters with misgivings over building war memorials. After the death of George Washington, many Jeffersonian Republicans rejected efforts to build a federally financed memorial to his memory. Despite the acknowledgement of the preeminent status of George Washington as war leader and the nation's first president, Congress waited several decades before empowering a private organization to build a national monument to his memory (Piehler 1995).

Attitudes toward the American Revolution underwent a shift in the immediate aftermath of the War of 1812. Growing nationalist sentiment prompted President James Monroe and the US Congress to bestow pensions on Revolutionary War veterans as a tribute to their national service. Revolutionary veterans were hailed by Monroe and other national leaders as repositories of civic virtue that should be recognized with pensions. Although the cost of the program exceeded expectations and the program was reduced to supporting only veterans who could demonstrate extreme need – it established an important precedent for the federal government in caring for veterans (Resch 1999).

The brief flurry of nationalist sentiment that occurred during the Era of Good Feelings faded as sectionalism increased as a result of the growing debates over slavery. As a result, Congress provided little support for building war memorials or preserving historic sites associated with the Revolution or War of 1812. Although the War of 1812 created a major national hero – Andrew Jackson – he remained a highly contested figure who engendered both adulation, and antipathy. In contrast, when the Marquis de Lafayette toured the United States in 1824–5, he was everywhere acclaimed a hero (Somkin 1967, Idzerda, Loveland, and Miller 1989). The Mexican–American War fostered antiwar opposition by those Americans who viewed the war as an immoral affair intended to bolster slavery. On several occasions, antiwar opponents even questioned whether officers killed in the war and brought back to the United States for burial should receive elaborate funerals praising their service in Mexico. Despite the repatriation of some of the war dead – usually officers – most of the fallen received only hasty burials in cemeteries that would be abandoned by the United States. After the conflict ended, the federal government purchased the site in Mexico City that held the remains of Americans killed in the battle for this city and created a permanent cemetery (Piehler 1995).

The American Civil War led to a dramatic shift in the American pattern of commemorating war. In contrast to previous wars, the federal government built a permanent network of national cemeteries for those who fought for the Union. Work on several graveyards began even before the Confederate States surrendered

at Appomattox. President Abraham Lincoln delivered one of his most famous addresses at the Gettysburg Battlefield Cemetery where he evoked the war dead as an enduring symbol of the ultimate goals of the war (Linenthal 1991, Wills 1992). In defeat, white Southerners, through private Ladies Memorial Associations, sought to locate and inter the Confederate war dead in permanent cemeteries (Foster 1987, Mills and Simpson 2003, Blair 2004).

In both the North and South, veterans organizations – the Grand Army of the Republic and the United Confederate Veterans, succeeded in gaining the allegiance of a significant plurality of veterans who fought in this conflict. Although a majority of veterans in the Civil War (or any war) never joined a veteran's organization, these organizations, especially in the case of the GAR gained significant political clout, and Union veterans eventually achieved a generous pension system provided by the federal government. At the same time, these veterans' organization provided an important outlet for fostering comradeship among former soldiers and promoted remembrance of the war through rituals conducted by local posts, as well as sponsoring national meetings (Foster 1987, McConnell 1992).

Far from fostering reconciliation or avoiding partisan politics, early efforts to commemorate the Civil War sought to keep alive the sectional and partisan differences. Cemeteries became important sites of memory, and mourning the Civil War dead served as one of the main purposes of a new holiday – Memorial Day. General John A. Logan and the Grand Army of the Republic played a crucial role in promoting observance of May 30 as the official Memorial Day to decorate the graves of fallen Union soldiers with flowers and American flags. For several generations, Memorial Day would principally be observed in the North and West – white southerners generally refused to participate in the holiday and many southern states established an alternative holiday – Confederate Memorial Day. Only with the fading of the Civil War generation in the twentieth century would this holiday be recast to memorialize the war dead of all of America's wars (McConnell 1992, Blair 2004).

The Civil War spawned a wave of memorial building that has not been matched by any other American war. Veteran's organizations, state governments, and the federal government placed thousands of war memorials on Civil War battlefields. Although a significant number of monuments honor hero generals of the conflict, there existed a movement to build monuments commemorating the service of the enlisted ranks, especially in town squares across America – many communities dedicated statues depicting either a Union or Confederate soldier (Piehler 1995).

Growing reconciliation between the North and South following the end of Reconstruction in 1877 did not diminish interest in memorialization, but in fact spurred even greater interest in preserving the memory of this conflict. In the 1890s, the federal government began preserving several Civil War battlefields as national military parks, beginning with Chickamauga and Chattanooga. Administering the national military parks came under the jurisdiction of the War Department and remained a responsibility of the US Army until President Franklin D. Roosevelt transferred authority over them to the National Park Service. Not only were Civil War battlefields seen as sites to commemorate the memory of the past, but they were seen as a place to train future army officers (Piehler 1995).

One of the most important contributions to the rich literature on Civil War commemoration takes into account the cost of reconciliation on the question of race. Recent scholarship, especially the work of David Blight (2001) and Kirk Savage (1997), have noted the growing marginalization of the service of African American soldiers in the Civil War and their virtual absence on most war memorials. The sentiment for reconciliation often minimized the crucial role slavery played in triggering the Civil War and instead emphasized commemorating the bravery of white Union and Confederate veterans. Carol Reardon's (1997) analysis of the myths surrounding Pickett's Charge at Gettysburg, traces how views that primarily served the purposes of proponents of "The Lost Cause," evolved to eventually provided support for the advocates of national reconciliation.

The memorialization of the Civil War remained part of a growing movement, lead by established white Protestant elites to forge a series of national symbols and rituals – with many of them centered around the commemoration of war. For instance, the Centennial of the United States spurred the creation of new hereditary societies dedicated to preserving the memory of the American Revolution, such as the Sons of the American Revolution, as well as the Daughters of the American Revolution. Efforts were undertaken by both state and local governments, as well as private organizations, to preserve historic sites and battlefields associated with the war of independence and other American wars. At the same time, this era witnessed an interest in developing rituals to honor the American flag and to stress its display, especially in public schools (Piehler 1995, O'Leary 1999).

The Spanish–American War spurred the movement for reconciliation of the North and South. In the aftermath of this conflict, a number of communities built soldier monuments commemorating the service of those who fought the Spanish. Veterans of this conflict formed several organizations, including the United Spanish War Veterans and the Veterans of Foreign Wars. This latter organization evolved over the course of the twentieth century into one of the major organizations for veterans who served in overseas wars. In contrast to the Mexican–American War, the federal government established the precedent of repatriating the war dead for burial in either a national cemetery in the US or private graveyard (Piehler 1995).

World War I provoked enormous divisions within Americans and significant antiwar opposition continued even after formal declaration of war. The conflict marked an unprecedented mobilization of American society that included the adoption of conscription, limitations of freedom of speech and press, and the control of key sectors of the economy. To shape the memorialization of this conflict, the federal government undertook a concerted effort to build overseas cemeteries and memorials in Europe through a new independent agency, the American Battle Monuments Commission. In contrast to the pattern following the Civil War, the ABMC placed strict limits on the number and type of monuments private organizations or state governments could build on American battlefields and cemeteries in Europe. The World War I memorials and cemeteries created by the AMBC witnessed an increased use of religious imagery – for instance, chapels were built in each of the overseas cemeteries and the Cross became the principal grave marker in them (with a Star of David gravestone used for Jewish soldiers) (Piehler 1995).

Controversy marked virtually every effort to commemorate World War I. When the War Department wavered after the conflict ended on an earlier commitment to repatriate the war dead for burial in the United States protests erupted from the families of the deceased. In the end, the War Department permitted the family the right of repatriation and while 30 percent of the war dead were interned in the overseas cemeteries created and administered by the AMBC – the majority were buried in either national or private cemeteries within the United States (Knapp and Potter 1991, Budreau 2008).

A new custom emerged in the United States that drew upon European precedents – the selection and burial of a representative “Unknown Soldier” to signify the sacrifice of all soldiers killed in the war. The Unknown Soldier, buried after a state funeral on the third anniversary of the war’s end, November 11, 1921, was intended to signify the sacrifice of all Americans who died in this conflict. Since the Unknown Soldier lacked any identity, President Warren G. Harding and other national leaders declared that he remained representative of all Americans who served in this conflict (Piehler 1995).

Despite a more activist role for the federal government, most war memorials were built by private organizations and local governments. Many communities erected monuments featuring images of the prototypical American soldier – the doughboy– who served in Europe. Professional artists and sculptures bemoaned the decision by many communities to purchase mass produced commercially made monuments. They expressed similar dismay at the growing adoption by many communities of living memorials – parks, community centers, stadiums, and other utilitarian structures designated to commemorate the war (Piehler 1995).

Even before demobilization had been completed, veterans of World War I formed the American Legion. Founded with the support of the US Army, this organization became the largest organization for veterans of this conflict and viewed itself as a guardian of the principles of Americanism. The American Legion would take a central role in prompting the observance of a new national holiday – Armistice Day (November 11) to commemorate the end of World War I.

Aside from William Pencak’s (1989) study of the American Legion during the interwar years, there are few scholarly works examining this important organization and even less attention has been devoted to other veteran’s organizations that emerged in the twentieth century. The controversy over the demand by World War I veterans for a bonus, most notably the encampment of the Bonus Expeditionary Force in Washington, DC, in 1932 has been the subject of several monographs. But the Veterans of Foreign Wars has been almost completely ignored by historians, despite this organization’s important role in marshalling opposition to Roosevelt’s early New Deal policies, especially the Economy Act of 1933 that drastically cut veteran’s pensions (Daniels 1971, Lisio 1994, Keene 2001, Dickson and Allen 2004).

World War II did not initially spark much interest in traditional patterns of memorialization. Compared with either World War I or the Civil War, relatively few war memorials were dedicated to World War II aside from the monuments and overseas cemeteries created by the ABMC. In many communities, World War

I monuments were modified to include the names of those who died in World War II. Moreover, most memorials dedicated in the immediate aftermath of the war tended to be living memorials. Efforts to make V-E Day or V-J Day into national holidays faded and only two states (Arkansas and Rhode Island) dedicated the later as state holidays. Instead Congress renamed Armistice Day Veteran's Day and recast it as day to remember veterans of World War II and all other wars. The American Legion recast itself as an organization open to all veterans and actively courted World War II veterans to join. Efforts to create a liberal alternative to the more conservative Legion, the American Veterans Committee, faded in the late 1940s as a result of growing anti-Communist sentiment stemming from the Cold War (Van Ells 2001, Gambone 2005, Saxe 2007).

During the 1990s, as veterans of World War II reached retirement age, newsman Tom Brokaw (1998) paid tribute to them in *The Greatest Generation*, which was published the same year that *Saving Private Ryan* (1998) appeared on movie screens. James Bradley (2000) soon followed with an account of the men behind the famous photo of Marines raising the flag on Iwo Jima. Emily Rosenberg (2003) explored *Pearl Harbor in American Memory*, Douglas Brinkley (2005) analyzed how President Ronald Reagan invoked the memory of D-Day and *The Boys of Pointe du Hoc* to enlist support for his crusade against Soviet Russia. All these works differed significantly from previous studies of World War II both in their tone and in their impact on the general public.

The indecisive outcome of the Korean War contributed to the lackluster interest in building war memorials to it. In contrast to the two world wars, the United States did not build permanent overseas cemeteries in Korea and most monuments commemorating America's role in the conflict would be built by the South Korean Government (Mayo 1988). The Cold War did not diminish interest in commemorating earlier American wars with Congress creating federal agencies to commemorate the Centennial of the Civil War and later bicentennial of the American Revolution.

The Vietnam War rekindled a renewed interest in war memorials and fostered intense debates within society and among scholars over questions of memory and commemoration. Many Americans and scholars saw this conflict as representing a critical shift in America's attitudes toward war and veterans, while others stressed continuity (Dean 1997, Hass 1998). For instance, Jeffrey Lembcke (1998) called into question the widely held view that Vietnam Veterans were mistreated or spat upon when they returned home.

Scholars have stressed the distinctive character of the national Vietnam Veterans Memorial and a widely held interpretation portrays it as an anti-monument. The Vietnam Veterans Memorial has a distinctly modernist design that initially incorporated few of the traditional symbols often used on memorials. Opponents of the national Vietnam Veterans Memorial forced the inclusion both of a flagpole in order to display the American flag as well as a statue portraying realistic imagery of a trio of soldiers (women veterans successfully argued for including an additional statue commemorating the service of women). The Vietnam Memorial had an



unprecedented impact on the commemoration of this conflict. Few war memorials have received as much praise, even from some who initially criticized the design. Moreover, this monument influenced many local and state memorial designs in the late 1980s and 1990s.

The wave of memorials built to the Vietnam War certainly contributed to a growing interest to building war memorials commemorating the Korean and World War II. Moreover, the end of the Cold War, as well as the aging of the World War II generation witnessed a renewed interest on the part of veterans, families, and wider society to memorialize their war-time service. The terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon in Arlington, Virginia, on September 11, 2001 promoted a wave of monument building, especially in communities in the Greater New York areas. The indeterminate nature of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq suggest it will be some time before either conflict is memorialized in monuments.

#### BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Ashplant, Timothy G., Graham Dawson, and Michael Roper, eds. (2004). *Commemorating War: The Politics of Memory*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transactions.
- Blair, William A. (2004). *Cities of the Dead: Contesting the Memory of the Civil War in the South, 1865–1914*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Blight, David W. (2001). *Race and Reunion: The Civil War in American Memory*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Bodnar, John (1992). *Remaking America: Public Memory, Commemoration, and Patriotism in the Twentieth Century*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Bradley, James, with Ron Powers (2000). *Flags of our Fathers*. New York: Bantam Books.
- Brinkley, Douglas (2005). *The Boys of Pointe du Hoc: Ronald Reagan, D-Day and the U.S. Army 2nd Ranger Battalion*. New York: William Morrow.
- Brokaw, Tom (1998). *The Greatest Generation*. New York: Random House.
- Budreau, Lisa M. (2008). "The Politics of Remembrance: The Gold Star Mothers' Pilgrimage and America's Fading Memory of the Great War," *Journal of Military History*, 72:1 (April), 11–41.
- Curti, Merle (1946). *The Roots of American Loyalty*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Daniels, Roger (1971). *The Bonus March: An Episode of the Great Depression*. Westport, CT: Greenwood.
- Dean, Eric T., Jr. (1997). *Shook Over Hell, Post-Traumatic Stress, Vietnam, and the Civil War*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- De Bolla, Peter (2007). *The Fourth of July and the Founding of America*. London: Profile.
- Dickson, Paul, and Thomas B. Allen (2004). *The Bonus Army: An American Epic*. New York: Walker and Co.
- Fischer, David Hackett (1994). *Paul Revere's Ride*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Fischer, David Hackett (2004). *Washington's Crossing*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Foster, Gaines M. (1987). *Ghosts of the Confederacy: Defeat, the Lost Cause, and the Emergence of the New South, 1865–1913*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Fussell, Paul (1975). *The Great War and Modern Memory*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Fussell, Paul (1989). *Wartime: Understanding and Behavior in the Second World War*. New York: Oxford University Press.

- Gambone, Michael D. (2005). *The Greatest Generation Comes Home: The Veteran in American Society*. College Station: Texas A&M University Press.
- Hass, Kristin Ann (1998). *Carried to the Wall: American Memory and the Vietnam Veterans Memorial*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Hobsbawm, Eric, and Terence Ranger, eds. (1983). *The Invention of Tradition*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Hünemörder, Markus (2006). *The Society of the Cincinnati: Conspiracy and Distrust in Early America*. New York: Berghahn.
- Hynes, Samuel (1988). *Flights of Passage: Reflections of a World War II Aviator*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Hynes, Samuel (1991). *A War Imagined: The First World War and English Culture*. New York: Atheneum.
- Hynes, Samuel (1997). *The Soldiers' Tale: Bearing Witness to Modern War*. New York: Allen Lane/Penguin.
- Idzerda, Stanley J., Anne C. Loveland, and Marc H. Miller (1989). *Lafayette, Hero of Two Worlds: The Art and Pageantry of his Farewell Tour of America, 1824–1825*. Flushing, NY: Queens Museum.
- Keene, Jennifer D. (2001). *Doughboys, the Great War, and the Remaking of America*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Knapp, Michael G., and Constance Potter (1991). "Here Rests in Honored Glory: World War I Graves Registration," *Prologue*, 23:2, 190–3.
- Linenthal, Edward Tabor (1991). *Sacred Ground: Americans and their Battlefields*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
- Lisio, Donald J. (1994). *The President and Protest: Hoover, MacArthur, and the Bonus Riot*. New York: Fordham University Press.
- Lembcke, Jerry (1998). *The Spitting Image: Myth, Memory and the Legacy of Vietnam*. New York: New York University Press.
- Mayo, James M. (1988). *War Memorials as Political Landscape: The American Experience and Beyond*. New York: Praeger.
- McConnell, Stuart (1992). *Glorious Contentment: The Grand Army of the Republic, 1865–1900*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Mills, Cynthia, and Pamela H. Simpson (2003). *Monuments to the Lost Cause: Women, Art, and the Landscapes of Southern Memory*. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press.
- Mosse, George L. (1975). *The Nationalization of the Masses: Political Symbolism and Mass Movements in Germany from the Napoleonic Wars through the Third Reich*. New York: H. Fertig.
- Mosse, George L. (1990). *Fallen Soldiers: Reshaping the Memory of the World Wars*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Myers, Minor, Jr. (1983). *Liberty Without Anarchy: A History of the Society of the Cincinnati*. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press.
- O'Leary, Cecilia Elizabeth (1999). *To Die For: The Paradox of American Patriotism*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Pencak, William (1989). *For God and Country: The American Legion, 1919–1941*. Boston: Northeastern University Press.
- Piehl, G. Kurt (1995). *Remembering War the American Way*. Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press.
- Purcell, Sarah J. (2002). *Sealed with Blood: War, Sacrifice, and Memory in Revolutionary America*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

- Reardon, Carol (1997). *Pickett's Charge in History and Memory*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Resch, John (1999). *Suffering Soldiers: Revolutionary War Veterans, Moral Sentiment, and Political Culture in the Early Republic*. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press.
- Rosenberg, Emily S. (2003). *A Date Which Will Live: Pearl Harbor in American Memory*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Savage, Kirk (1997). *Standing Soldiers, Kneeling Slaves: Race, War, and Monument in Nineteenth-Century America*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Saxe, Robert Francis (2007). *Settling Down: World War II Veterans' Challenge to the Postwar Consensus*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Shaw, Peter (1981). *American Patriots and the Rituals of Revolution*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Somkin, Fred (1967). *Unquiet Eagle: Memory and Desire in the Idea of American Freedom, 1815–1860*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Travers, Len (1997). *Celebrating the Fourth: Independence Day and the Rites of Nationalism in the Early Republic*. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press.
- Treese, Loretta (1995). *Valley Forge: Making and Remaking a National Symbol*. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.
- Van Ells, Mark D. (2001). *To Hear Only Thunder Again: America's World War II Veterans Come Home*. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.
- Waldstreicher, David (1997). *In the Midst of Perpetual Fetes: The Making of American Nationalism, 1776–1820*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Wills, Garry (1992). *Lincoln at Gettysburg: The Words That Remade America*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Winter, Jay (1995). *Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning: The Great War in European Cultural History*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Zobel, Hiller (1970). *The Boston Massacre*. New York: W. W. Norton.

# Chapter Sixty-four

## AMERICAN MILITARY ETHICS

*Thomas B. Grassey*

Understanding a nation's military ethics is no less complex than understanding its history. Many disciplines are woven through the fabric: philosophical ethics, theology, and law, obviously; strategy, tactics, related technologies and engineering, diplomatic history, politics, and psychology, of course; but economics, geography, sociology, art, and literature cannot be overlooked. These are the major strands to examine to understand military ethics.

The implications of such breadth are that military ethics is vast, diverse, and connected with many other fields. No comprehensive understanding is attainable; growth in our knowledge of any component improves our understanding of the whole, while also forcing the possibility of a significant reconsideration of much we had thought settled. Consequently, anyone claiming – or seeking – to be an “expert” in the field of military ethics must know a great deal from many disciplines.

It should be noted at the outset that professional ethics sometimes is meant to refer to *minimal standards*, which the failure to meet deserves punishment or at least opprobrium. Often, however, professional ethics is an exhortatory expression of *ideal behavior*, toward which all should aspire but which none can achieve. Commonly, the two conceptions are intermingled, with predictable lack of clarity and practical confusion.

This chapter reviews American military ethics in historical terms, identifying topics that were prominent in successive eras. While the contending ideas sometimes can be sketched, no attempt is made to indicate how the arguments should be settled. Descriptive rather than prescriptive, this effort fundamentally sees professional ethics in terms of minimal standards that all in uniform must meet.

### Fundamentals

Wars, other armed conflicts, and threats of organized violence against groups such as tribes, peoples, and states, and sub-groups within those groups, antedate written history. Today, “military ethics” involves three broad questions. When (if ever)

may organized violence rightly be employed, or threatened, and for which state purposes? What is prohibited, permitted, or required in armed conflict? And how should the institution of an armed force be organized and function? Almost timeless, these questions recur in every era.

Basically, three ethical stances are possible. One may hold that the use (or threat of use) of organized violence by the state is never ethically permissible; this is “pacifism.” Or one may think that the state is not subject to ethical evaluation, so any use or threat of use of organized violence by the state is neither ethical nor unethical; this is “realism” or “positivism.” Or one may claim that there are ethically justified reasons for a state to use or to threaten to use organized violence (for example, self-defense against unprovoked aggression). American history is filled with adherents of all three stances, in many variants, from early Quakers to contemporary “neo-conservatives.” On the whole, most Americans have been neither pacifist nor “realist/positivist.”

Through 400 years, the great majority of Americans have believed that the state ethically may employ organized violence in the pursuit of just ends. They have then been required to define when, how, and with what limits it may do so. These are referred to as the *jus ad bellum* considerations of when armed conflict is ethical.

“The state” may wage war, but people actually fight. Since the state faces ethical limits on its use of, or threat to use, organized violence, it would appear that those who do the fighting also face ethical limits on what they rightly may do in armed conflicts. If this is so, what are those limits, and how are they ascertained? These are termed *jus in bello* topics.

Finally, ethical questions arise about the establishment and functioning of the institutions created to exercise organized violence on behalf of the state. How shall they be staffed and arranged, trained and controlled, funded and maintained? Such questions arose in the earliest years of the colonies; the poor answers that were found nearly doomed the revolution for independence of “these United States,” and only with the Constitution of 1789 was a satisfactory beginning made.

As they are for any nation, these issues have been present throughout American history. The wide variety of opinions that mark American self-governance means that many perspectives have been offered on almost every question of military ethics, and nearly every imaginable argument has been advanced for any contested issue.

### Founding and Colonial Eras

“They fell upon their knees and blessed the God of heaven, who had brought them over the vast and furious ocean. ...”

(Governor William Bradford, on the *Mayflower* landing)

Those who established the American colonies – from New England to Georgia – were largely men and women of Christian conviction, schooled in Biblical tradition and with a consciousness shaped by the concept of a personal God to whom

each believer is responsible. Ideas of right and wrong behavior were thought to be self-evident by all God-fearing people (at least among one's co-religionists), and the importance of personal salvation was prominent in most men's minds.

Except for slaves (first imported to Virginia in 1619), nearly all colonists also placed a high value on "freedom" and "equality of men." These were, predictably, great impediments to military discipline in American armed forces, whether colonial militias, volunteers in British regular units, or the Continental Army.

The earliest questions of military ethics arose from dealings with native Americans. Ideologies ranged from an assumption of shared human nature, "all God's creatures," and the inherent goodness of man to a derogation of "heathen," sub-human (or at least unsaintly), undisciplined creatures (Boorstin 1958). Any theoretical ruminations were quickly set upon by the reality of frontier conflict: murder, scalping, and destruction (Axtell 2001).

The pre-Revolutionary period found the aims of colonists, Indians, British, and French repeatedly colliding, sometimes in battles on the edges of empires. Armed Americans had to decide whether to fight on behalf of the British king, and how to do so, in King William's, Queen Anne's, King George's, and the French and Indian wars (Leach 1973). Colonial militias were raised, electing their officers, and employing tactics of dispersion and ambush rather than massing and formation maneuver. A typical, but important, moral question they faced was: if a group of warriors from one tribe fought on the side of the French, may the Americans attack and slaughter all the inhabitants of one of that tribe's encampments (Selesky 1994, Grenier 2005)?

By the beginning of the War for Independence, ethical challenges were obvious and numerous: the need to justify armed revolt against the King; the right to attack both the King's soldiers and those neighbors who remained loyal to the King; and the treatment of surrendering enemies ("quarter") (Shy 1976). Insurgency tactics (for example, "Minutemen," local militia) and the treatment of spies (both, given the nature of the conflict, playing prominent roles) forced clergymen, leaders, soldiers, and average Americans to think about right and wrong in the fight for independence (Higginbotham 1971). How ought the revolutionaries treat their foes, whether in redcoat uniform, Tory communities, Indian war-paint, or mercenary formations (for example, the Hessians)? What ethical principles applied at sea and in raids ashore, by warships commanded by officers with commissions and by privateers with letters of marque (Hattendorf 1994)?

The 1781 victory at Yorktown marked the end of major combat, but until a peace treaty could be concluded with His Majesty's government, Congress was reluctant to disband the Continental Army, which grew restive when its pay was not forthcoming. Learning that some of his officers were meeting to discuss refusing to disband the army until pay due them was paid, General George Washington entered the March 15, 1783 meeting in Newburgh, New York, and convinced the officers to adhere to the orders of Congress, firmly establishing the principle of military subordination to democratically chosen government (Kohn 1970).

The Constitution of 1789 clarified civil-military relations, though many Americans, especially members of the new Jeffersonian-Republican Party, expressed



continued fears of a standing military and that the Army might be used to stifle political dissent (Buel 1972, Kohn 1975). In 1812 the United States argued that violations of its neutral rights, the impressment of its citizens, and interference with Indians residing in US territory necessitated a second war with Great Britain. Less noble reasons were found for war against the Seminole Indians and with Mexico during the 1830s and 1840s (Schroeder 1973). In each case the military followed the orders issued by civilian leaders though there was much opposition to the War of 1812 and the War with Mexico (Morison, Merk, and Friedel 1970).

### **The Civil War and Western Frontier Eras**

Moral arguments were at the forefront of the reasons for the Civil War: state's rights and the right of secession put forward by the Confederates, restriction or abolition of slavery and the necessity for national government presented by the Union. Other issues undoubtedly were at play as well, but such a terrible conflict required motivation on the deepest grounds for both sides.

The very nature of civil war compounded the ethical problems. Fellow citizens as noncombatants; looting; blockade; the treatment of prisoners; and activities by groups like Quantrill's Raiders generated questions. In response, at the request of Abraham Lincoln, Francis Lieber (a German emigre who had taught at South Carolina before becoming a professor at Columbia College) and four Union generals prepared "General Orders 100." The 157 articles were issued in May 1863 and adopted by both Union and Confederate forces, the first legal regulation of armed forces' conduct in war. The most striking provision outlawed refusing to allow surrender, except by units unable to take prisoners while completing their missions (Lieber 1863, US Army 1863).

Yet war remained hell, as General William Sherman argued and tried to demonstrate from Chattanooga to Savannah via Atlanta, consciously seeking to destroy the economic infrastructure of the Confederacy. On the other hand, general compliance with – and quite strict enforcement of – ideas of lawful behavior and respect for adversaries' humanity, subsequently amplified by the chivalry at Appomattox, the civil reinstatement of former Confederate soldiers, and the war crimes prosecution of Henry Wirz, strengthened the legitimacy of General Orders 100 and the concept of ethical limits in war. If the prosecution of the Civil War presented soldiers on either side with moral dilemmas, they were remarkably silent about them in their writings. Those who took up arms believed that God was on their side and there are no recorded cases of individuals refusing to follow orders on moral grounds.

Nor did many in the military comment on the morality of the forced removal of Indians from the southeast to west of the Mississippi prior to the Civil War, or to the treatment accorded the Plains Indians in the two decades following the war. With regard to the Indians, the attitude of military men matched that of the majority of Americans (Coffman 1986, Smith 1990).

### The Involvement Era

During the latter nineteenth century the customs of war, which provided a basis for a code of ethical conduct, developed into a corpus of standards. In 1859 Swiss businessman Henri Dunant initiated a movement that evolved into the International Committee of the Red Cross. Drawing from the Lieber Code, the Geneva Conventions of 1864, 1868, and 1906; the St. Petersburg Declaration of 1868; and the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 sought to establish the acceptable limits of warfare, to define the rights of prisoners of war, and to minimize mistreatment of civilians (Choate 1913, American Red Cross 1929, Best 1980). Though not always a signatory, the United States nevertheless took note of and sought to adhere to the standards established by these treaties (Davis 1962, 1975). World opinion thus helped shape national values on military ethics, as the Civil War had contributed to formation of the international law of war.

The Spanish–American War of 1898 routinely is taken as America’s leap into world empire. The victories in Cuba and Manila Bay soon were followed by guerrilla war in the Philippines, fought with even fewer inhibitions than the Indian wars, partly because existing international conventions did not apply to insurrections. American activities in China, Cuba, Hawaii, the new Republic of Panama, and Mexico all involved American military forces performing various missions, with organizational and operational consequences (Boot 2002). Functions of military forces grew, and with that growth came additional issues of ethical concern, such as assisting civilian populations during and after military missions.

Military professionalism was promoted when Stephen B. Luce inaugurated the Naval War College in 1884, the Army Staff College was organized at Fort Leavenworth in 1901, and Elihu Root established the Army Chief of Staff and formed the Army War College in 1903; all these developments expanded the officer corps’ understanding of its responsibilities. In 1914 a new Army manual on the law of land warfare succeeded General Orders 100.

Technological changes advanced military capabilities at a remarkable pace. Machine guns, radio, the internal combustion engine, dreadnoughts, submarines, chemical weapons, and airplanes were the most visible changes, accompanied by less notable but matching organizational and military culture changes, with moral implications.

World War I brought many of these factors together. The ethics of war was thoroughly wrung out by unrestricted submarine warfare, aerial bombardment of cities, chemical attacks, defensive superiority, trench warfare, advanced artillery, primitive tanks, cryptography, and national mobilization. The Regular US Army went from 5,000 officers and 123,000 enlisted men in 1916 to 3,700,000 men in uniform two years later; the training effort was nearly inconceivable, with accompanying levels of administrative, health, housing, nutritional, and transportation efforts.

### “The Good War” Era

Though called a “World War,” the 1914–18 conflict principally was fought in Europe. While geographically limited, it raised (at least in rudimentary form) many of the moral questions that the greatest armed conflict in history would pose a generation later (Roberts 1994).

World War II, however, established some new precedents. Technology had made possible horrific destruction from the air and even space (Germany’s V-2 rockets). Strategic air power theorists such as Giulio Douhet had argued (1983 [1921]) that terrorizing civilian populations in urban areas would win wars; politicians believed “the bomber will always get through”; and Picasso’s “Guernica,” a huge mural painted for Spain’s exhibit at the 1937 New York World’s Fair, presaged what was to befall many of the world’s great cities.

German, British, and American airmen gave various answers to the moral questions they faced, from the 1939 bombing of Warsaw to the 1945 bombings of Tokyo, Hiroshima, and Nagasaki. Few voices were raised in protest, either in military circles or among ethicists; American Jesuit John Ford (1944) published “The Morality of Obliteration Bombing,” but his was an exception, with most churchmen endorsing war practices.

The Allied policy requiring the enemy’s “unconditional surrender” – normally morally prohibited in war – also drew little criticism from ethicists. Yet it complicated and prolonged combat in Italy, Germany, and against Japan; for that reason, Generals Dwight Eisenhower and Douglas MacArthur unsuccessfully requested its relaxation by Presidents Franklin Roosevelt and Harry Truman.

What did get attention from military and political leaders was “obedience to orders,” supposedly the basis of military discipline. In anticipation of prosecuting German and Japanese senior officers after the war, in 1944 the United States Army issued a new field manual in which Article 509, while acknowledging the importance of obedience to “lawful” superior orders, and excusing soldiers from legal scrupulousness, asserted that compliance with a superior’s order that violated “the laws of war” is *not* a defense against prosecution for “war crimes.”

Other significant moral questions arose for American forces in World War II but were not adequately addressed at the time. Women entered American military service in large numbers, but in separate formations, the Women’s Army Corps (WACs), Women Accepted for Volunteer Emergency Service (WAVES), etc. While these women pushed beyond “traditional female” roles of the time – those of nurses, office staff, teachers – into some men’s armed forces activities, they were not allowed to serve in combat roles and were never treated as equals by male soldiers, sailors, and airmen (Holm 1992). These attitudes in the services again reflected those of American society as a whole, as did the military’s view of blacks and Japanese (the military remained segregated, though it formed and deployed all-minority units, African-American and Japanese-American). The confinement of more than 100,000 Japanese-Americans – most living in California – was requested by General John DeWitt, 1942 commander of Army units in the western United

States, and approved by President Roosevelt. But by far the worst racism was evident in combat against Japanese troops, as both sides in Pacific battles often committed atrocities and seldom gave quarter (Dower 1986). Battles in the European theater were not so marked.

Finally, World War II raised classic questions of ethical judgment and command responsibility. From the American treatment of Admiral Husband Kimmel and General Walter Short after Pearl Harbor, to the war-crimes trials of defeated enemies such as General Tomoyuki Yamashita and Admiral Karl Doenitz after their surrender, to the historians' examination of President Truman's decision to use atomic bombs, accountability was underscored as a theme of military ethics. Richard Overly (2006) discusses in broad terms the question of whether at bottom "The Second World War [was] A Barbarous Conflict."

### The Nuclear Era

In 1949 the four Geneva Conventions were updated in light of what had been learned in World War II to guide treatment of wounded in land warfare (Pictet 1952), sea warfare (Pictet 1960), prisoners of war (Pictet 1949), and expanded to include non-combatants, that is, civilians in war – estimates were that civilians accounted for at least 80 percent of that war's casualties (Pictet and Uhler 1958). The Hague Convention of 1954 provided for the "Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict" and that of 1970 addressed the "Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft" (Toman 1996).

Development of nuclear weapons (atomic weapons in the 20-kiloton range in 1945, thermonuclear warheads a decade later in the 20-megaton range), delivery systems (long-range jet aircraft, intercontinental ballistic missiles, missile-armed nuclear submarines), formidable force structure, and employment doctrine raised a host of moral questions: the ethics of deterrence and of use; "launch on warning"; "massive retaliation" (the announced Eisenhower doctrine of using many nuclear weapons even in a non-nuclear conflict); Kennedy's "flexible response" replacement, soon followed by "mutual assured destruction" when Soviet strategic nuclear forces achieved at least parity; "counterforce" (targeting enemy launch facilities) versus "countervalue" (attacking cities); reliability of an American assurance of nuclear retaliation against a Soviet attack on NATO allies ("the nuclear umbrella"); the possibility of "limited" nuclear war, "nuclear winter" and the effective annihilation of human society as the conceivable alternative (Brodie 1946). European in origin, "Better Red than dead" had some American adherents; "Better dead than Red" had more (George and Smoke 1974, Lee 1993, Palmer-Fernandez 1996, Gusterson 2004, Lebow 2007).

But the Nuclear Era was not purely nuclear, as the United States and its allies opposed communist political and military power around the world, often using military force. Though these activities were almost innumerable, they raised many problems for military ethicists, ranging from counterinsurgency scenarios through support of corrupt but pro-Western regimes. Two full-scale "limited

conventional wars” were fought during the Cold War: Korea, 1950–3, and Vietnam, 1963–75.

Korea brought a significant test of military subordination to civil authority when Douglas MacArthur defied administration policy guidance and called for the use of nuclear weapons, air attacks on the People’s Republic of China, and supporting an invasion of the mainland by Nationalist forces on Taiwan. President Truman, with the unanimous support of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, relieved MacArthur of command. Returning to the United States, MacArthur received a hero’s welcome, but the principle of civilian command of the armed forces was upheld (Spanier 1965, James 1981, Pearlman 2008).

In 1950 Congress updated and made uniform for all the services the military criminal regulations by 10 US Code 801-946, the Uniform Code of Military Justice, and the accompanying (often updated by presidential executive order) *Manual for Courts Martial*. Courts martial verdicts could be appealed to a service’s Court of Military Criminal Appeals, then to five civilian judges on the Court of Appeals for the Armed Services, and ultimately to the nine-member Supreme Court (Generous 1973, Hillman 2005).

Also in 1950, the Defense Department first issued a 250-page official instruction, *The Armed Forces Officer*, which socialized the Cold War officer corps into a common ethical framework. From “The Meaning of Your Commission” to “Americans in Combat,” this book, greatly influenced by S. L. A. Marshall, voiced the expectations of how young officers of all services were to think about authority, responsibility, and leadership (US Department of Defense 1950).

After the Korean conflict, when it was judged that many American service members taken prisoner had not behaved as well as desired, President Eisenhower in 1955 issued the six-article Code of Conduct (modified to gender-neutral language by President Ronald Reagan in Executive Order 12633 in 1988 and renamed “Code of the U.S. Fighting Force”), an ethical guide principally for captured Americans but widely applicable.

Intellectually, Samuel Huntington (1957) and Morris Janowitz (1960) argued that American career military officers are professionals, with ethical implications arising from the professional’s hallmarks of expertise, responsibility, and corporateness. One of those implications is what Alan Goldman (1980) identified as “role differentiation”: that a professional’s ethical obligations may be different from, even contrary to, those of “a good person.”

During the 1960s US involvement in Vietnam grew from an “advisors-only” function to more than half-a-million American military personnel fighting North Vietnamese and Viet Cong soldiers on the ground, at sea, and in the air. “We had to destroy the village to save it” became a famous phrase in counterinsurgency warfare; “free-fire zones,” artillery and aerial attacks, frequent killing of Vietnamese civilians (intentional or not), culminating in the 1968 My Lai massacre (Allison 2005, Oliver 2007); “body count” of Vietnamese as a measure of effectiveness of an operation; “fragging” (deliberate killing of American commissioned or non-commissioned officers by their own troops) (Baritz 1998, Regan 2002); and

widespread drug use by American troops all were combat-related ethical problems (Allison 2005, Buzzanco 1997).

Non-combat-related ethical issues included: the fairness of the draft (Selective Service deferments and exemptions were easily obtained by middle- and upper-class men, leaving the poor and less-educated to face a higher chance of combat duty); the percentage of minority Americans assigned to ground combat units in Vietnam; and open racial conflict in the military as the civil rights movement affected America. The transmission of combat-footage on the evening television news also made this America's first "living-room war," and military ethics had to adjust to that new reality (Buzzanco 1997, Baritz 1998).

Vietnam prompted a landmark work on the ethics of war, Michael Walzer's *Just and Unjust Wars* (1977). Contending that war remains bound by moral limitations, Walzer nevertheless (controversially) allowed suspension of those limits in a "supreme emergency." Walzer's was the most prominent of many academic studies of military ethics and the ethics of war as lawyers (Taylor 1970, Schindler and Toman 1973), philosophers (Wasserstrom 1970; Nagel 1971; Cohen, Nagel, and Scanlon 1974; Johnson 1981; O'Brien 1981), sociologists (Moskos 1970, Sarkesian 1975, 1981), theologians (Murray 1959, Ramsey 1961, Childress 1982), and military professionals (US Army War College 1970, Gabriel and Savage 1978, Galligan 1979, Wakin 1979, Brown and Collins 1981, Hackett 1983) turned to "applied ethics." In 1979, what became the Joint Services Conference on Professional Ethics (JSCOPE, now the International Society for Military Ethics), led by Malham Wakin, met for the first time at Quantico, Virginia.

In 1983 the United States National Conference of Catholic Bishops issued a pastoral letter on war in the nuclear age, "The Challenge of Peace," that defended individual pacifism but affirmed the just war requirement of state defense, though with severe strictures on nuclear armaments (United States Catholic Conference 1983). Because Catholics are a sizable group in the American population and in the armed forces, the pastoral letter's arguments received considerable attention, even from non-Catholics; nuclear deterrence required renewed moral scrutiny (George and Smoke 1974; Kavka 1987; Finnis, Boyle, and Grisez 1987).

The final Cold War-era event that should be mentioned was the development of the "Weinberger Doctrine," with a strong adherent in General Colin Powell. Construed by many military officers as expressing an ethical imperative, the 1984 speech by Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger argued that American military forces should not be committed except for vital national interests, with the intention to win, achieving clear objectives, using overwhelming force, with the support of the American people, and as a last resort (Weinberger 1984).

### Contemporary Period

With the end of the Cold War and the 1991 Gulf War victory, a "New World Order" was predicted, marked by human rights, democratization, and economic globalization (Bush and Scowcroft 1998). Military ethicists began to focus on the



practical implications of the 1948 United Nations “Universal Declaration of Human Rights”; on humanitarian intervention operations necessitated by natural disasters, failed Third World states, or genocide; and on peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions (Best 1994). For various reasons, the United States military tried to avoid these assignments, but no other armed forces had comparable capabilities.

Ethnic wars in Somalia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Yugoslavia, Chechnya, Liberia, and Angola raised numerous issues, including child soldiers, the duty of peacekeepers to protect minorities (the 1995 failure of 400 armed Dutch soldiers to prevent the Serb slaughter of 8,000 Bosnian men at Srebrenica embarrassed all NATO nations), and the unavoidable political impact of “no good guys” interventions (Johnson 1999, Ceulemans 2005).

Barely had such topics begun to receive study when non-state-sponsored terrorism – for years quietly growing in radical Islamist circles, with a history of anti-American attacks – exploded on September 11, 2001. Immediately, for American intelligence organizations and armed forces, the “Global War on Terror” and “defense of the homeland” became highest priorities.

A series of ethical questions arose about fighting “asymmetric” enemies, who had no uniformed armies, air force planes, navy ships, or even national borders (Smit 2005). How should the US military defeat suicide bombers without violating principles thought fundamental to a free society? What moral restraints should be kept in place on American armed forces when they are fighting enemies who seem to recognize no moral limits? James Turner Johnson had posed the question, *Can Modern War Be Just?* (1984). Jean Elshtain, *Just War against Terror* (2003), answered in the affirmative, arguing that US military action against terrorists is not only ethical because the use of force to end evil and punish its perpetrators is sanctioned by Just War doctrine, but because it should lead to a more peaceful world. Not an American apologist, she criticizes the slowness of US response to genocide in Rwanda, Bosnia, and Kosovo (Elshtain 2003).

Since the Taliban government of Afghanistan was providing an operational haven for al-Qaeda, international law permitted an American attack on, and elimination of, that government. Subsidiary ethical and legal questions soon arose, particularly about CIA and Special Forces compliance with international law, treatment of enemy combatants by allied Afghan groups, the status of captured fighters, and “discrimination” (distinction) between civilian and enemy forces. In a mountain village serving as an enemy base, who may be targeted? Hugo Slim (2008) expands analysis of the military impact on civilians beyond direct action by defining “seven spheres of civilian suffering” – direct violence (death and injury resulting from targeted attack, genocide, and collateral damage), sexual violence (including rape), forced confinement and movement, impoverishment, famine and disease, psychological and emotional suffering, and postwar suffering – and explores ways to minimize these.

Simultaneously, President George W. Bush announced a policy purposely termed “pre-emptive war” (which is permitted by international law and the Just War tradition), even though many ethicists considered the policy to describe

“preventative war” (generally prohibited, legally and morally). Bush (2002) argued that proliferation of extraordinarily deadly “weapons of mass destruction” (specifically, nuclear or biological weapons that could be used before the US government could defend against them) necessitated an American policy of attacking any nation that credibly posed such a threat (Shue and Rodin 2007).

Barely had the debate among lawyers and moralists begun when the US government, declaring that Saddam Hussein’s Iraq had such a capability and the intention to use it against America, began “Operation Iraqi Freedom” to depose Saddam and occupy (“liberate”) Iraq. Victory coming fairly easily to an invading force deliberately kept to a minimum by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, the post-invasion occupation offered too many challenges to the American forces, and soon a robust insurgency had arisen in Iraq (Gordon and Trainor 2006).

Military ethicists found themselves dealing with classic questions of counterinsurgency warfare, such as the treatment of detained persons, the lure of torture to extract crucial information, and the consequences of cultural clashes with the population. These were thrust into world view when the mistreatment of Iraqi prisoners in Abu Ghraib prison was revealed in scores of photographs quickly circulated on the Internet’s World Wide Web (Danner 2004, Germain and Lounsbury 2007). Reports of abuse of prisoners held at the American base of Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and legal challenges to the detainees’ status, also arose.

In Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as in earlier operations in former Yugoslavia, markedly improved military capabilities generated new questions for military ethicists. Technological developments had made possible “the precision revolution” by which American weapons could be guided to very specific aim points, thereby often minimizing “collateral damage” – the death of civilians – that had marked wars of the twentieth century. But were such (expensive) weapons morally required at all times, or could “dumb bombs” still be dropped? Was it somehow ethically objectionable to attack an enemy who could not counter such weapons, or to protect one’s own airmen by operating above anti-aircraft weapons range, with some loss of target recognition ability? Was the use of unmanned weapons systems (such as cruise missiles and drone reconnaissance aircraft) to identify, designate, and destroy targets (killing enemies with impunity) immoral? What is the status of non-uniformed personnel who are supporting combatants (Cook 2004)?

These questions, and the rise in prominence of both international law and ubiquitous news reporting, led to the practice of having military lawyers review (in advance by policy or “in real time,” before weapons release) virtually every US air and missile attack, if not in specifics at least in advising commanders on all “rules of engagement” (standing or particular orders for how military forces are to operate and when they may employ deadly force) (Sagan 1991). Prominent figures reportedly “got away” from US air strikes that had to loiter while successive command judge advocates reviewed, or disapproved, urgent requests for permission to attack.

“Targeted killings” (assassinations) of prominent enemy leaders and attacks on “dual use facilities” (for example, power stations that supply military communications centers and civilian hospitals) became controversial issues for military

ethicists. And new rules have had to be devised for new situations, from corporate “tech reps” attached to US forces, to armed contractors employed by government agencies or non-government organizations, to children functioning as lookouts or messengers or fighters in insurgent groups.

Civil-military relations received renewed interest when Democratic administrations led by Lyndon Johnson, Jimmy Carter, and Bill Clinton were contrasted to the pro-military Republican administrations of Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford, Ronald Reagan, and George H. W. Bush, and career military officers overwhelmingly identified themselves as Republicans. Dislike reaching disrespect marked many service members’ feelings toward President Clinton, although respect for the office of the Presidency never wavered (Kohn 1994, 2002).

Popular culture as well as scholarly journals took note of the phenomenon; books such as H. R. McMaster’s *Dereliction of Duty* (1997) and Eliot Cohen’s *Supreme Command* (2002) widened the gulf between military officers and their “civilian masters,” recorded by Peter Feaver and Richard Kohn’s studies of political attitudes in the US officer corps (Feaver and Kohn 2001). A consequence was the 2007 “Generals’ Revolt,” in which several recently-retired senior Army and Marine Corps generals publicly denounced the decisions and leadership style of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. In “Revolt of the Generals,” Martin Cook (2008) provides a summary of the actions and motivations of the generals and of published material concerning relations between uniformed personnel and members of the Bush administration. Cook goes on to insist it is a legitimate professional responsibility of retired senior officers to publicly dissent from policies with which they gravely disagree.

Ethicists also have had to address numerous social issues that affected American armed forces in the post-Cold War era: domestic violence in military families; service personnel suicide rates; physical hazing; assignment of women to positions that traditionally or legally had been male-only, including many that led to women being killed in combat and “coming home in body bags” (Elshtain 1987, Holm 1992); claims by homosexual men and women to be entitled to serve openly in the armed forces (rejecting the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” compromise reached by Congress and the Clinton administration in the early 1990s) (Shilts 1993); and problems associated with sexual behavior, from exploitation of junior women (for example, at Aberdeen Proving Grounds, described in *New York Times* 1996) to consensual but prohibited fraternization (the Kelly Flinn case, described in Flinn 1997) to public lasciviousness (the 1991 Tailhook scandal, described in McMichael 1997).

Senior officers and non-commissioned officers frequently lamented the mores of “Generation-X” and “Generation-Y” recruits who came into service from “broken homes, broken schools, and a broken society,” and they regularly called for “character development” programs, seemingly oblivious to the serious ethical failings of many in their own generation (Ficarotta 1997).

Two organizational outcomes of such concerns were the establishment of military ethics centers (located at the three service academies, but ostensibly serving the larger organization) and the expansion of professional ethics courses in officer training programs from pre-commissioning through senior service (war college,

i.e., colonel) levels. Also, professional journals (notably the Army War College's *Parameters*) regularly usefully addressed ethical issues, and a new international journal, *The Journal of Military Ethics*, was founded.

### Anticipating the Future

Near the beginning of the twenty-first century, American military ethics is addressing some issues that are quite old and a few that are new. *Jus post bellum* topics – moral responsibilities of the “victors” after conflict – are receiving sufficient attention to join the traditional *ad bellum* and *in bello* topics in the Just War tradition. Insurgencies and guerrilla warfare, particularly in urban settings, and terrorism – especially with unprecedentedly lethal weapons – are at the forefront of operational concerns. So, too, however, for most Western nations, is the concern with “force protection” – minimizing casualties among one's own troops, even at the expense of accomplishing the unit's mission (Snider, Nagl, and Pfaff 1999).

Even if limited to national militaries, the proliferation of nuclear and biological weapons threatens to make tomorrow's wars nightmarish. The prospect of non-state nihilist or terrorist groups (for example, Japan's Aum Shinrikyo, radical Islamist al-Qaeda, or even extremist domestic affiliations) acquiring such capabilities poses additional concerns for national military forces because virtually no other organization could usefully respond to those kinds of attacks.

Warfare in space and, more pressing, in “cyberspace” are concerns as modern societies grow increasingly dependent on technologies in both domains. And the ubiquity of communication (miniaturized electronics, mobile systems, worldwide Internet, personal “blogging”) revolutionizes society's, and the world's, awareness of events, including warfare in all its forms.

Finally, the overall world situation – particularly population demographics, demands on specific natural resources, and environmental concerns – raises distributive justice questions that military ethicists rarely had considered, but now must (Reichberg and Syse 2007).

American military ethics will be greatly influenced by developments in three fields. The first will be the evolution of international law and the law of armed conflict. Plainly, the post-Westphalian *legal* approach must expand to address the numerous non-state agents (from individual suicide bombers to multinational corporations' security forces) along with new dimensions of conflict (mass murder, environmental and resource hostilities, nanotechnology sensors and weapons, and cyber warfare). Second, the Just War tradition – broadly understood as the multi-cultural acceptance of the moral use of organized violence to protect group rights – must develop nuanced and technically-informed *ethical* guidance on these and other issues arising in twenty-first-century armed conflicts. Third, the American military must self-consciously reflect on its *professional* ethic and function, to guide its own development in an ever-changing world. The efforts made in recent years by John Brinsfield (1998), Anthony Hartle (2004), Martin Cook (2004), Don Snider and Lloyd Matthews (2005), Rick Rubel and George Lucas (2005), and

Paul Robinson (2007) to help officers meet new ethical challenges in the military profession are crucial.

Yet it remains to be seen – notwithstanding any developments in all three of these fields – whether humanity will destroy itself or, through ethical restraint, survive.

#### BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Allison, William Thomas (2005). *Military Justice in Vietnam: The Rule of Law in an American War*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
- American Red Cross (1929). *International Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War*. Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross.
- Axtell, James (2001). *Natives and Newcomers: The Cultural Origins of North America*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Baritz, Loren (1998). *Backfire: A History of How American Culture Led Us into Vietnam and Made Us Fight the Way We Did*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Best, Geoffrey (1980). *Humanity in Warfare*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Best, Geoffrey (1994). *War and Law since 1945*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Boorstin, Daniel J. (1958). *The Americans: The Colonial Experience*. New York: Random House.
- Boot, Max (2002). *The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power*. New York: Basic Books.
- Brinsfield, John W. (1998). "Army Values and Ethics: A Search for Consistency and Relevance," *Parameters*, 28:3 (Autumn), 69–84.
- Brodie, Bernard (1946). *The Absolute Weapon*. New York: Harcourt Brace.
- Brown, James, and Michael J. Collins, eds. (1981). *Military Ethics and Professionalism: A Collection of Essays*. Washington: National Defense University Press.
- Buel, Richard (1972). *Securing the Revolution: Ideology in American Politics, 1789–1815*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Bush, George, and Brent Scowcroft (1998). *A World Transformed*. New York: Knopf.
- Bush, George W. (2002). "Graduation Speech at United States Military Academy," (June 1), <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/06/#>, accessed April 29, 2009; and <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020601-3.v.html>, accessed April 29, 2009.
- Buzzanco, Robert (1997). *Masters of War: Military Dissent and Politics in the Vietnam Era*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Ceulemans, Carl (2005). *Reluctant Justice: A Just-War Analysis of the International Use of Force in the Former Yugoslavia (1991–1995)*. Brussels: VUB Brussels University Press.
- Childress, James F. (1982). *Moral Responsibility in Conflicts*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.
- Choate, Joseph H. (1913). *The Two Hague Conferences*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Coffman, Edward M. (1986). *The Old Army: A Portrait of the American Army in Peacetime, 1784–1898*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Cohen, Eliot (2002). *Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime*. New York: Free Press.
- Cohen, Marshall, Thomas Nagel, and Thomas Scanlon, eds. (1974). *War and Moral Responsibility*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

- Cook, Martin L. (2004). *The Moral Warrior: Ethics and Service in the U.S. Military*. Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Cook, Martin L. (2008). "Revolt of the Generals: A Case Study in Professional Ethics," *Parameters*, 38:1 (Spring), 4–15.
- Danner, Mark (2004). *Torture and Truth: America, Abu Ghraib, and the War on Terror*. New York: New York Review Books.
- Davis, Calvin DeArmond (1962). *The United States and the First Hague Peace Conference*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Davis, Calvin DeArmond (1975). *The United States and the Second Hague Peace Conference*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Douhet, Giulio (1983 [1921]). *The Command of the Air*, trans. by Dino Ferrari, 1942; reprinted 1983. Washington: Office of Air Force History.
- Dower, John W. (1986). *War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War*. New York: Pantheon.
- Elshtain, Jean Bethke (1987). *Women and War*. New York: Basic Books.
- Elshtain, Jean Bethke (2003). *Just War Against Terror: The Burden of American Power in a Violent World*. New York: Basic Books.
- Feaver, Peter D., and Richard H. Kohn, eds. (2001). *Soldiers and Civilians: The Civil-Military Gap and American National Security*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Ficarotta, J. Carl (1997). "Are Military Professionals Bound by a Higher Moral Standard?" *Armed Forces and Society*, 24:1 (Fall), 59–75.
- Finnis, John, Joseph M. Boyle, Jr., and Germain Grisez (1987). *Nuclear Deterrence, Morality and Realism*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Flynn, Kelly (1997). *Proud to Be: My Life, the Air Force, the Controversy*. New York: Random House.
- Ford, John C. (1944). "The Morality of Obliteration Bombing," *Theological Studies*, 5, 261–309.
- Gabriel, Richard A., and Paul L. Savage (1978). *Crisis in Command: Mismanagement in the Army*. New York: Hill and Wang.
- Galligan, Francis B. (1979). *Military Professionalism and Ethics*. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press.
- Generous, William T., Jr. (1973). *Swords and Scales: The Development of the Uniform Code of Military Justice*. Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press.
- George, Alexander L., and Richard Smoke (1974). *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Germain, Deanna, and Connie Lounsbury (2007). *Reaching Past the Wire: A Nurse at Abu Ghraib*. St. Paul, MN: Borealis Books.
- Goldman, Alan (1980). *The Moral Foundations of Professional Ethics*. Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield.
- Gordon, Michael R., and Bernard E. Trainor (2006). *Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq*. New York: Pantheon.
- Grenier, John (2005). *The First Way of War: American War Making on the Frontier, 1607–1814*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Gusterson, Hugh (2004). *People of the Bomb: Portraits of America's Nuclear Complex*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Hackett, General Sir John (1983). *The Profession of Arms*. New York: Macmillan.
- Hartle, Anthony E. (2004). *Moral Issues in Military Decision Making*, 2nd edn. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press.



- Hattendorf, John (1994). "Maritime Conflict," in Michael Howard, George J. Andreopoulos, and Mark R. Shulman, eds., *The Laws of War: Constraints on Warfare in the Western World*, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 98–115.
- Higginbotham, Don (1971). *The War of American Independence: Military Attitudes, Policies and Practice, 1763–1789*. New York: Macmillan.
- Hillman, Elizabeth L. (2005). *Defending America: Military Culture and the Cold War Court-Martial*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Holm, Jeanne (1992). *Women in the Military: An Unfinished Revolution*, rev. edn. Novato, CA: Presidio.
- Huntington, Samuel P. (1957). *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil–Military Relations*. New York: Random House.
- James, D. Clayton (1981). "Command Crisis: MacArthur and the Korean War," in Harry R. Borowski, ed., *The Harmon Memorial Lectures in Military History, 1959–1987 (1988)*, Washington: Office of Air Force History, 217–31.
- Janowitz, Morris (1960). *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait*. New York: Free Press.
- Johnson, James Turner (1981). *The Just War Tradition and the Restraint of War: A Moral and Historical Inquiry*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Johnson, James T. (1984). *Can Modern War Be Just?* New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Johnson, James T. (1999). *Morality & Contemporary Warfare*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Kavka, Gregory S. (1987). *Moral Paradoxes of Nuclear Deterrence*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Kohn, Richard H. (1970). "The Inside History of the Newburgh Conspiracy: America and the Coup d'Etat," *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3rd ser., 27:2 (April), 188–220.
- Kohn, Richard H. (1975). *Eagle and Sword: The Federalists and the Creation of the Military Establishment in America, 1783–1802*. New York: Free Press.
- Kohn, Richard H. (1994). "Out of Control: The Crisis in Civil–Military Relations," *The National Interest*, 35 (Spring), 3–17.
- Kohn, Richard H. (2002). "The Erosion of Civilian Control of the Military in the United States Today," *Naval War College Review*, 55:3 (Summer), 9–60.
- Leach, Douglas Edward (1973). *Arms for Empire: A Military History of the British Colonies in North America, 1607–1763*. New York: Macmillan.
- Lebow, Richard N. (2007). *Coercion, Cooperation, and Ethics in International Relations*. New York: Routledge.
- Lee, Steven P. (1993). *Morality, Prudence, and Nuclear Weapons*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Lieber, Francis (1863). "Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field," in Dietrich Schindler and Jiri Toman, eds., *The Laws of Armed Conflicts: A Collection of Conventions, Resolutions, and Other Documents*, 3rd rev. edn. (1988), Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 3–23.
- McMaster, H. R. (1997). *Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies that Led to Vietnam*. New York: HarperCollins.
- McMichael, William (1997). *The Mother of All Hooks: The Story of the U.S. Navy's Tailhook Scandal*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction.
- Morison, Samuel Eliot, Frederick Merk, and Frank Friedel (1970). *Dissent in Three American Wars*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Moskos, Charles (1970). *The American Enlisted Man: The Rank and File in Today's Military*. New York: Sage.

- Murray, John Courtney (1959). *Morality and Modern War*. New York: Council on Religion and International Affairs.
- Nagel, Thomas L. (1971). "War and Massacre," *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 1:2 (Winter), 123–43.
- New York Times* (1996). "2 Are Charged with Rapes at Army Training Center." November 8.
- O'Brien, William V. (1981). *The Conduct of Just and Limited War*. New York: Praeger.
- Oliver, Kendrick (2007). *The My Lai Massacre in American History and Memory*. Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press.
- Overly, Richard (2006). "The Second World War: A Barbarous Conflict?" in George Kassimeris, ed., *The Barbarization of Warfare*. New York: New York University Press.
- Palmer-Fernandez, Gabriel (1996). *Deterrence and the Crisis in Moral Theory: An Analysis of the Moral Literature on the Nuclear Arms Debate*. New York: Peter Lang.
- Pearlman, Michael D. (2008). *Truman and MacArthur: Policy, Politics, and the Hunger for Honor and Renown*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Pictet, Jean S. (1949). *The New Geneva Conventions: Retention of Members of the Army Medical Services Fallen into Enemy Hands*. Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross.
- Pictet, Jean S. (1952). *Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field*. Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross.
- Pictet, Jean S. (1960). *Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea*. Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross.
- Pictet, Jean S., and Oscar M. Uhler (1958). *Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War*. Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross.
- Ramsey, Paul (1961). *War and the Christian Conscience: How Shall Modern War Be Conducted Justly?* Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Regan, Geoffrey (2002). *Backfire: A History of Friendly Fire from Ancient Warfare to the Present Day*. London: Robson Books.
- Reichberg, Gregory M., and Henrik Syse (2007). "Protecting the Natural Environment in Wartime: Ethical Considerations from the Just War Tradition," in Henrik Syse and Gregory M. Reichberg, eds., *Ethics, Nationalism, and Just War: Medieval and Contemporary Perspectives*. Washington: Catholic University of America Press.
- Roberts, Adam (1994). "Land Warfare: From Hague to Nuremberg," in Michael Howard, George J. Andreopoulos, and Mark R. Shulman, eds., *The Laws of War: Constraints on Warfare in the Western World*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 116–39.
- Robinson, Paul (2007). "Ethics Training and Development in the Military," *Parameters*, 37:1 (Spring), 23–36.
- Rubel, W. Rick, and George R. Lucas, Jr., eds. (2005). *Case Studies in Military Ethics*. Boston: Pearson.
- Sagan, Scott (1991). "Rules of Engagement," in Alexander L. George, ed., *Avoiding War: Problems of Crisis Management*. Boulder, CO: Westview, 443–70.
- Sarkesian, Sam C. (1975). *The Professional Army Officer in a Changing Society*. Chicago: Nelson-Hall.
- Sarkesian, Sam C. (1981). *Beyond the Battlefield: The New Military Professionalism*. New York: Pergamon-Brassey's.
- Schindler, Dietrich, and Jiri Toman, eds. (1973). *The Laws of Armed Conflicts: A Collection of Conventions, Resolutions, and Other Documents*. Geneva: Henri Dunant Institute.

- Schindler, Dietrich, and Jiri Toman, eds. (1988). *The Laws of Armed Conflicts: A Collection of Conventions, Resolutions, and Other Documents*, 3rd rev. edn. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff.
- Schroeder, John H. (1973). *Mr. Polk's War: American Opposition and Dissent, 1846–1848*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
- Selesky, Harold E. (1994). "Colonial America," in Michael Howard, George J. Andreopoulos, and Mark R. Shulman, eds., *The Laws of War: Constraints on Warfare in the Western World*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 59–85.
- Shilts, Randy (1993). *Conduct Unbecoming: Gays and Lesbians in the U.S. Military*. New York: St. Martin's.
- Shue, Henry, and David Rodin, eds. (2007). *Preemption: Military Action and Moral Justification*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Shy, John (1976). *A People Numerous and Armed: Reflections on the Military Struggle for American Independence*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Slim, Hugo (2008). *Killing Civilians: Method, Madness, and Morality in War*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Smit, W., ed. (2005). *Just War and Terrorism: The End of the Just War Concept?* Dudley, MA: Peeters.
- Smith, Sherry L. (1990). *The View from Officers' Row: Army Perceptions of Western Indians*. Tucson: University of Arizona Press.
- Snider, Don M., and Lloyd J. Matthews, eds. (2005). *The Future of the Army Profession*, 2nd edn. New York: McGraw-Hill Custom.
- Snider, Don M., John A. Nagl, and Tony Pfaff (1999). *Army Professionalism, the Military Ethic, and Officership in the 21st Century*. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War College Press.
- Spanier, John W. (1965). *Truman–MacArthur Controversy and the Korean War*. New York: Norton.
- Taylor, Telford (1970). *Nuremberg and Vietnam: An American Tragedy*. Chicago: Quadrangle Books.
- Toman, Jiri (1996). *The Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict: Commentary on the Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict and its Protocol, signed on 14 May 1954 in the Hague, and on Other Instruments of International Law Concerning Such Protection*. Paris: UNESCO.
- United States Catholic Conference [of Bishops] (1983). "The Challenge of Peace: God's Promise and Our Response." Final version, *Origins*, 13 (May 19), 1–32.
- US Army (2005 [1863]). *The 1863 Laws Of War: Articles of War, General Orders 100, General Orders 49 and Extracts of Revised Army Regulations of 1861*. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books.
- US Army War College (1970). *Study on Military Professionalism*. Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College Press.
- US Department of Defense (1950). *The Armed Forces Officer*. Washington: Government Printing Office.
- Wakin, Malham M., ed. (1979). *War, Morality, and the Military Profession*. Boulder, CO: Westview.
- Walzer, Michael (1977). *Just and Unjust Wars*. New York: Basic Books.
- Wasserstrom, Richard, ed. (1970). *War and Morality*. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.
- Weinberger, Caspar (1984). "The Uses of Military Power." Speech to the National Press Club, Washington, accessed April 29, 2009; and <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/military/force/weinberger.html>. accessed April 29, 2009.

## Chapter Sixty-five

# THE MILITARY AND SPORTS

*Wanda Ellen Wakefield*

Shortly after the beginning of the War in Iraq *Sports Illustrated* published a series of photographs and articles about the recreational activities of the soldiers in-country. In the eyes of the *SI* editors, it was clearly important to let Americans know that the soldiers and Marines they had sent into battle were still able to play golf and baseball despite the rugged conditions they faced. Given the long history of the military's sports programs and commanders' desire to keep the troops entertained, it should not be surprising that *Sports Illustrated* was able to find many examples of soldiers building baseball fields as well as barracks and mess halls in the months after the removal of Saddam Hussein. But until the end of the nineteenth century men serving in the US military had to create sporting opportunities without the involvement of higher command – just as they often had to pay for their own uniforms and buy their own chow from unregulated civilian suppliers.

As little children we learn that General George Washington was himself an athlete with the story of how he threw a coin across a river. And as adults we know that Washington tried to encourage his troops to maintain their fitness levels while in winter quarters at Valley Forge through constant drill. But neither Washington, nor his soldiers, would have recognized the military's sports programs as they evolved across the nineteenth century, just as they would have been amazed to see the wide variety of professional and recreational sporting opportunities available to both civilians and those in uniforms today. Consider, at the time of the American War for Independence there was no baseball as we know it, no games of football following formal rules, no basketball, no volleyball, no softball. People swam, people hit each other, and people ran short races to see who was fastest, but the formal organization of sport in the United States was far in the future.

Today, most historians date the beginning of organized sport to the period of the Civil War. Although there were many iterations of baseball being enjoyed in cities and towns before the 1860s, it was only with the coming together of hundreds of thousands of men for combat that they themselves recognized a need to develop a common game, with common rules as George B. Kirsch (2003) has

demonstrated. Thus, as young men settled down into their encampments they struggled to find ways in which they could play together, eventually creating a game that would be recognizable to us today. Although the troops were actively involved in creating their own sports and recreation programs, as Stephen W. Pope (1995) has shown, the high command of the armies on either side did not specifically encourage their development. Nor did they sanction the regular boxing matches which Elliott Gorn (1986) has described as a “fleeting alternative to the ghastliness of battle.”

After the Civil War, the Army of the United States quickly shrank in size, and the men remaining in service were assigned to remote posts in the West where they could concentrate on fighting those Native Americans who continued to resist settlement in their traditional hunting grounds and worship space. Meanwhile, entrepreneurs met in 1876 to establish the National League of Professional Baseball, even as colleges and social service organizations such as the YMCA began to experiment with the establishment of recreational sports on a more formal basis. Yet there was very little effort by the Army to adopt the new model of recreation being developed in the civilian world and members of the cavalry and infantry stationed on the frontier were left to engage in non-sanctioned, informal sports in their spare time.

When Civil War hero David Dixon Porter became superintendent of the Naval Academy in 1869 he encouraged athletics and ordered the construction of a gymnasium, shooting galleries, and bowling alleys. Classes organized baseball and rugby teams for intramural competition. Porter challenged civilian boat clubs to crew competition, but after his departure athletic programs languished at the Naval Academy except for football which midshipmen organized a team to play Johns Hopkins in 1882. Five years later the Navy team played a six game season. In 1890 the Naval Academy began issuing “N” athletic letters. That same year a cadet at West Point, which to that time did not have a team, asked a midshipman to challenge the Army to a football match and for three years the service academies played one another. Spirits ran so high that games between the two academies were suspended for five years, 1894–9. During that decade interest in athletics surged at both academics, alumni associations were formed to support them, and each began fielding intercollegiate teams. By World War I each service academy fielded teams in over a dozen intercollegiate and intramural events (Sweetman 1979, Clary 2000, Crackel 2002).

The Spanish–American War led to fundamental changes in the armed forces, including the role athletics played in training and morale. Commanders such as General Leonard Wood, who had played football while stationed at the Presidio, and future President Theodore Roosevelt were convinced that it was important for soldier morale and discipline that sports be a part of military training. In the Philippines, representatives of the YMCA came from China to organize track meets between units left there to deal with the Insurgency. And by 1914 General Wood published a book for Army instructors detailing various “setting-up” exercises and encouraging them to concentrate on the development of fitness within the armed forces, outside of military drill (Wood 1914).

Nevertheless, as pointed out by Wanda Ellen Wakefield (1997), when the United States began its involvement in World War I, neither the Navy nor the Army was prepared to meet the recreational needs of their troops using in-house resources. Instead, they turned to the Knights of Columbus, the Jewish Welfare Board, and the YMCA and asked those agencies to organize sports programs for training camps in the United States and overseas. Shortly thereafter, thousands of men were boxing in organized tournaments from the lowest level up through regimental championships. Similarly, military baseball teams began to play games against Major League teams during their spring training in 1917 and 1918. Meanwhile, in Europe the YMCA and other agencies organized baseball leagues in Paris and other cities, provided sports equipment to be distributed within Army divisions and encouraged the sense that sports could be used to demonstrate the superiority of the American way of life for which the troops were presumably fighting.

After the War, American representatives organized a great athletic competition to be held in Paris, during the summer of 1919. The purpose of that competition, as was also occurring among troops occupying the Rhineland after the end of the conflict, was to keep troops entertained and to show the allies and the defeated peoples of Germany that sports on the American model provided the best example of cooperation and competition and should be adopted by non-Americans in the future. The Inter-Allied Games of 1919 continued that process. The organizers of the Games invited representatives of all of the armies which had fought on the winning side to compete, and encouraged athletes from countries newly established by the Versailles Treaty to participate as well (Daniels 2000).

When the Olympic Games were revived the following year, the American Olympic team sent to Antwerp, Belgium, included separate Army, Navy, and civilian contingents. The practice was continued four years later in Paris. At Antwerp the Naval Academy's eight-oared crew won the gold medal for the United States, a feat it would repeat in 1952. Military leaders have consistently supported service personnel training for and participating in the Olympics (Shenk 2008).

Although most people considered the military's World War I sports programs a success, some critics argued that a lack of organization and competition among the various social service agencies providing equipment to the troops meant that while some divisions were well-supplied, other divisions on the Western Front never were allocated the balls, bats and athletic trainers they needed to conduct a truly comprehensive sports program. Furthermore, during the 1920s Dr. Raymond Fosdick, the head of the YMCA's program in France, and various other interested parties, suggested to young officers at the Army War College that in the future sports programs should be governed by uniformed personnel rather than civilian employees or volunteers. Therefore, Army regulations enacted in 1924 gave the Adjutant General overall responsibility for soldier welfare, including recreation. Although there was no immediate change in the military's sports structure, as athlete/commanders such as Douglas MacArthur, Dwight Eisenhower, George Patton, and Omar Bradley rose through the ranks, they remained convinced that in the future the welfare needs of the troops should be met with sports. These commanders also believed that valuable qualities such as cooperation, discipline,



and creativity could best be learned by participation in athletic contests. Meanwhile, the much smaller forces left on active duty during the 1920s and 1930s continued to engage in sports where their commanders made time for those activities. Most important among those was boxing, as readers of James Jones' novel *From Here to Eternity* know.

With the huge growth in numbers necessitated by the outbreak of World War II the Army's special services began offering courses to future recreational officers at Fort Meade in Maryland. Some of those completing the course had civilian sports experience, while others were recruited from among officers who had worked in previous decades in university ROTC programs. One issue that needed to be resolved with the reinstatement of the military draft in 1940 was what should be done about professional athletes. During World War I those athletes had been subjected to the draft or required to serve in necessary civilian pursuits, even as the major baseball leagues shortened their seasons to reduce criticism from those who felt that professional sports in wartime were frivolous. When World War II began, Franklin Roosevelt called on professional baseball to continue in operation, but made no special provision for professional stars. Thus, men such as Joe Dimaggio, Bob Feller, Ralph Kiner, and others served in the armed forces during World War II, while lesser known, less skilled athletes filled the ranks of baseball's professional teams. Meanwhile, Joe Louis, the world's heavyweight champion and a major star in the 1940s, went into the Army and used his prestige to work for more equitable treatment for African-American soldiers while conducting boxing exhibitions in the United States and in Europe. Gary L. Bloomfield (2003) describes the role played by athletes both at home and in campaigns overseas. Steven Bullock (2004) analyzes the role played by baseball in military training and morale, describes how the sport was organized in the armed forces, and explores the effect of wartime service on major league players.

The vast sports program undertaken by the special services during World War II affected soldiers both in the United States and all over the world. During training men (and women) were required to participate in various group exercise activities, including the newly imagined obstacle course drills. On posts, bases and naval stations all over the country the troops were provided with swimming pools, running tracks, boxing rings, and ball fields as commanders sought to identify the most expert athletes to represent their units in competitions up to the regimental level. Overseas recreation officers devised programs to create a sense of "normality" wherever they were stationed. These efforts led to the series of famous football "Bowl" games played from Bermuda to North Africa to Italy to France. Meanwhile, even American prisoners of war occasionally received shipments of sports equipment – although men being held captive in the Philippines said after the war that they would have preferred that their guards NOT have access to wooden baseball bats which were used to punish the prisoners rather than for play (Wolter 2002). Since General Eisenhower had long believed that former football players made the best general officers, even those men uninterested or inept at sports found themselves involved in these athletic programs. And those men who did not want to play football or baseball were offered alternatives in non-professional

sports such as badminton, table tennis, ice skating and judo. The departure for military service altered professional sports. During the war the National Football League dropped its team in Cleveland and merged the Philadelphia and Pittsburgh teams into one (the Steagles), and struggled to fill rosters with draft rejects, older players, and servicemen given weekend passes to play in games (Algeo 2006).

Reflecting the penetration of sports into all facets of military life, in the years after World War II a series of movies explored the wartime experience through the medium of sport. For example, the 1948 film *Battleground* began by showing members of the 101st Airborne practicing for an upcoming football game (the ultimately canceled Champagne Bowl) before being deployed to Bastogne. Later films such as *M.A.S.H.* reflected the importance placed on athletic success by military commanders as in the notorious football sequence ending with Major Houlihan screaming, "My God, they've shot him," in response to the referee's gun at the end of the period. Just as military phrases such as "the trench" and "the blitz" have bled over into football parlance, sports language had already begun to influence military discourse as early as World War I. It was no accident that *Stars and Stripes* relied upon sports metaphor to explain the progress of the war to doughboys during World War I, nor should it be surprising that armored tactics were explained to the GIs at Fort Knox in the language of sports.

At the end of World War II troops remaining in Europe and Asia, waiting for demobilization, needed to be entertained. Rather than dismantle the Special Services sports and recreation programs, the Army determined to continue offering a wide variety of those activities to those still overseas. By continuing the sports and recreation programs the military accomplished several things. They kept the troops busy and out of trouble. They helped the GIs maintain their physical fitness. They provided examples for local people of how Americans entertained themselves while off duty. And they maintained the morale of those soldiers who soon found themselves in a confrontation with a new enemy.

Within a few short years, those American men who had fought to defeat the Nazis and the Japanese Empire found themselves stationed throughout the world on a new mission – countering the influence of the Soviet Union as the United States and its former ally settled into a Cold War. With the postwar reorganization of the armed services and the establishment of the Air Force as an independent department, the Secretary of the Army determined that it would be good policy and good practice to begin providing inter-service athletic competitions. Accordingly, in late 1947, the Army, Navy and Air Force agreed to participate in an Inter-Service Council that would conduct annual championships in a wide variety of sports. These Armed Forces Championships began in 1948 with golf and tennis tournaments and continue today.

Outside the United States many nations began calling for a series of international military sports competitions on the model which had been established after World War I by General John J Pershing when he created the Allied Sports Council which organized the 1919 Inter-allied Games. Under the auspices of the Conseil International du Sports Militaire (CISM) troops from both Eastern and Western Europe played sports with little political interference before 1948.

Meanwhile, the United States reorganized the Allied Sports Council and conducted international championships under its auspices as well. However, as the Cold War grew in intensity the Soviet Union (which had entered the Olympic movement and would concentrate its attentions on success in Helsinki in 1952) withdrew from the Allied Sports Council and that organization fell apart. Thereafter all international military competitions would be organized by the CISM, which the United States joined in 1951.

Within a few years the Olympic Games became an important site for contesting the relative merits of the Soviet and Western systems of government (Riordan 1990, Mangan 2003). As the USSR invested heavily in its “amateur” athletic program and provided safe billets for athletes in its armed forces, many in the United States began to call for direct government support for amateur athletics. In 1955 the United States Congress responded by calling on members of the American armed forces to train for, attend and participate in upcoming Pan-American and Olympic games. However, Congress initially authorized only \$800,000 over a four-year period to support this effort, which was grossly inadequate to the task of ensuring that members of the military would be trained to the point where they could compete on an equal basis with the much more heavily subsidized athletes from Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Although Congress eventually increased its allocation to the Defense Department’s sports programs, both the DoD and other American sports organizations such as the NCAA and the AAU remained paralyzed by a basic lack of organization in the country’s amateur athletics system (Slear and McGill 1993).

Therefore, after an especially dismal performance by American athletes at Munich in 1972, Congress authorized a Presidential Commission to study the reasons why Eastern European athletes were so successful and devise new solutions to support US amateur athletes more effectively. After several years of collecting testimony and supporting materials the President’s Commission on Olympic Sports called for a revision of US law regarding the organization of amateur sports, which were enacted in the Amateur Sports Act of 1978. This legislation, which basically reorganized the United States Olympic Committee, included a commitment to the support of military sports as part of the country’s long-term effort to demonstrate, through athletic achievement, the superiority of the American system.

Even before the reorganization of amateur sports, the US military was challenged by the opposition to the draft engendered by the war in Vietnam. As the war dragged on, during the 1960s, the number of complaints directed at how the draft was administered began to have an impact on the relationship between the military and professional athletes. Although a few professional football players did fulfill their military obligation through service in Vietnam (most notably the Pittsburgh Steeler Rocky Bleier), most football and baseball players took advantage of the several relatively safe billets traditionally reserved for them in state National Guard and Reserve units. A series of articles in *Life* and *Sports Illustrated* magazines during the debate about reauthorization of the draft in 1967 revealed that, for example, many members of the Green Bay Packers spent summer camp

drilling with the Wisconsin National Guard. Similarly, the National Guard made arrangements for the Detroit Tigers pitcher Mickey Lolich to throw a “mock” game to his bullpen catcher while he was serving his time with the Guard. The reality that professional athletes had many routes to avoiding combat led some to question the fairness of the reservation of these “safe” billets for athletes. Moreover, during the controversy over Muhammad Ali’s refusal to submit to the draft, several men interested in Ali’s career stepped forward to offer the heavy-weight champion places in various Guard and Reserve units where he would not have had to serve in combat. Most probably, even had he been inducted into the Army, Ali would have worked as a boxing instructor or good will ambassador anyhow, but the efforts to create a solution to his dilemma said much about the reality that avoiding the shooting war in Vietnam was relatively easy for those with power or influence.

Because of the large numbers of troops mobilized for the Vietnam War the military’s sports programs for the non-professional grew as well (Zang 2001). The need to provide for the morale and welfare of the soldiers necessitated the construction of ball fields and other outdoor facilities both within the United States and overseas. To ensure that there was uniformity in design and construction the Corps of Engineers published basic plans in TM 5-803-10. These plans were then adopted by both the Air Force and Navy. Later in the decade, with the all-volunteer forces in mind, indoor fitness centers were designed as well. Finally, in an effort to ensure that athletes within the military have the time and support for their training, the Army established the World Class Athlete Program in 1978. This program has supported the efforts of a number of Olympians over the years.

As previously mentioned, in 1948 the International Military Sports Council/Conseil International du Sport Militaire (CISM) was organized to sponsor competition between military personnel in 15 to 20 sports. In 1995 CISM sponsored the first World Military Games at which service personnel from 93 nations competed. The games, including track and field, basketball, boxing, cycling, fencing, horsemanship, soccer, judo, wrestling, swimming, parachuting, modern pentathlon, military pentathlon, naval pentathlon, shooting, triathlon, and volleyball, have been held every four years since then, in the year before the Olympic Games. The number of participating nations has varied from 79 (in 2003) to 101 (in 2007). US athletes representing all the services participate in the games under the auspices of DoD’s Armed Forces Sports Council (Sarty 1999). In 2008 the CISM had 131 members whose service personnel competed in regional tournaments.

Although there has been much work on the early years of military athletics, more research is needed to understand the post-World War II decisions that maintained various sports programs and encouraged continued participation by soldiers and sailors. This is particularly true for the period of the Vietnam War where there is only limited information about the size and scope of recreation programs for soldiers serving in-country. Given the on-going conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq provisions for soldier welfare through sport also deserve more study, as does the development of adaptive sport for disabled troops.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Algeo, Matthew (2006). *Last Team Standing: How the Steelers and the Eagles – “The Steagles” – Saved Pro Football during World War II*. Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press.
- Bedingfield, Gary (2000). *Baseball in World War Two Europe (Images of Sports)*. Columbia, SC: Arcadia Publishing.
- Bloomfield, Gary L. (2003). *Duty, Honor, Victory: America’s Athletes in World War II*. Guildford, CT: Lyons Press.
- Bullock, Steven R. (2004). *Playing for Their Nation: Baseball and the American Military During World War II*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
- Clary, Jack T. (2000). *An American Classic: Army vs. Navy, the First 100 Games*. Syracuse, NY: Signature Publications.
- Crackel, Theodore J. (2002). *West Point: A Bicentennial History*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
- Daniels, George G. (2000). *The V & VI Olympiads: Stockholm 1912, Inter-Allied Games, 1919*. Los Angeles: World Sport Research & Publications.
- Gorn, Elliott J. (1986). *Manly Art: Bare-Knuckle Prize Fighting in America*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Kirsch, George B. (2003). *Baseball in Blue and Gray: The National Pastime during the Civil War*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Mangan, J. A. (2003). *Militarism, Sport, Europe: War Without Weapons*. London: Frank Cass.
- Pope, Steven W. (1995). “An Army of Athletes: Playing Fields, Battlefields and the American Sporting Experience, 1890–1920,” *Journal of Military History*, 59:3 (July), 435–56.
- Riordan, Jim (1990). “Playing to New Rules: Soviet Sport and Perestroika,” *Soviet Studies*, 42:1 (January), 133–45.
- Rominger, Donald William (1976). “The Impact of the United States Government’s Sports and Physical Training Policy on Organized Athletics during World War II,” PhD dissertation, Oklahoma State University.
- Sarty, Suba (1999). “U.S. Athletes Prepare for World Military Games,” <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=42988>, accessed April 29, 2009.
- Shenk, Robert, ed. (2008). *Playships of the World: The Naval Diaries of Admiral Dan Gallery, 1920–1924*. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.
- Slear, Tom, and Steve McGill (1993). *Achieving Excellence: The Military’s Olympic Story*. Alexandria, VA: Armed Forces Sports Committee.
- Sweetman, Jack (1979). *The U.S. Naval Academy: An Illustrated History*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Wakefield, Wanda Ellen (1997). *Playing to Win: Sports and the American Military, 1898–1945*. Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Wolter, Tim (2002). *POW Baseball in World War II: The National Pastime Behind Barbed Wire*. Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Co.
- Wood, General Leonard (1914). *Manual of Physical Training for Use in the United States Army*. Washington: Government Printing Office.
- Zang, David W. (2001). *Sports Wars: Athletes in the Age of Aquarius*. Little Rock: University of Arkansas Press.

## Chapter Sixty-six

# AMERICAN VETERANS' MOVEMENTS

*William Pencak*

Memories of military conflicts have been a major, if not the major, focus of American national identity and unity, and veterans' organizations have played a major role in keeping these memories alive (Karsten 1978). Veterans have usually formed their organizations for a combination of three major reasons. Former soldiers wanted to perpetuate the comradeship they had developed during the greatest experience of their lives, they believed that their sacrifices deserved compensation, and they sought to promote the patriotic values for which they had fought.

First to appear was the Society of the Cincinnati in 1783 at the end of the American Revolution. Named for the heroic Roman general who left his plow to fight and then returned to it immediately after a war, they hoped to confirm their continued commitment to the republic and dispel rumors that an aristocratic society had emerged. Composed only of officers, to be perpetuated by their eldest surviving male heirs, it seemed to many Americans that the Revolution's leaders were intent on forming a political lobby that would give them both power and pensions or on establishing a hereditary aristocracy such as existed in Europe. But George Washington, elected their president – a post he held for the remainder of his life – warned the Cincinnati that while he was not opposed to commemorating the officers' heroism, he would have nothing to do with any political schemes. Washington's firm stand and a public outcry meant that the Cincinnati would confine itself, even to the present day, mostly to the role Washington desired. The Order has, however, lent its name to political causes espoused and begun by other veterans' groups such as anti-Communism and aid to disabled veterans (Myers 1983).

Revolutionary War veterans never formed a general organization open to enlisted men and officers alike, nor did veterans of the War of 1812. Officer veterans of the War with Mexico formed the Aztec Club in Philadelphia but appear to have done nothing except sponsor an annual dinner. No other veterans groups were organized until after the Civil War. The National Association of Mexican War Veterans (NAMWV), which traced its roots to a meeting of Mexican War veterans in San Francisco in 1866, held its first national convention in 1874 when delegates from 33 states met in Washington. While announcing that their mission was “for the



promotion of social intercourse, good-fellowship, and all proper assistance," their primary goal was to obtain government pensions for Mexican war veterans (*National View* 1887). Taking the number of applications for the organization's badge as a measure, one-third of the number of veterans seeking pensions for their service during the Mexican War expressed an interest in the organization. This compared favorably with the Grand Army of the Republic (GAR) which, according to its leaders' estimates, captured the interest of one-fifth to one-half of Union veterans. Beginning in 1879 NAMWV published *The Vedette*, which it distributed to 10,000 veterans each month. The organization's activities, including lobbying efforts, mirrored those of the much larger GAR, and like the GAR, the NAMWV died as an organization when its members died, indeed the NAMWV ceased most activities when its founder, Alexander Kenady, died in 1897 (Davies 1948).

In the decades following the Civil War dozens of veterans organizations were founded (Wylie 1966, Kirkland 1991, Toomey 2004), but most important by far was the Grand Army of the Republic (GAR) formed by union veterans a year after the Civil War ended. Veterans of that conflict formed a higher proportion of American society than did those following any other war (McConnell 1992). Improvements in communication and travel facilitated the establishment and conduct of nationwide organizations, among which were veterans groups (Wecter 1944, Logue 2007). The GAR and the American Legion became the two most powerful and controversial veterans' societies in US history. The GAR began slowly – founded in 1866, it had barely 50,000 members by 1880 – but by 1890 some 400,000 Union veterans, about 40 percent of those living, had signed up. Under its first leader, Dr. Benjamin F. Stephenson, GAR members formed local "posts" which combined in state-wide "departments." The GAR openly supported the Republican party and expected its members to be supported by it (Dearing 1952). U. S. Grant was first unofficially nominated for president at the Soldiers and Sailors Convention in Chicago in 1868 and units of the GAR organized torchlight parades during the ensuing campaign. In 1868 the GAR designated May 30 "Decoration Day" laying the basis for modern Memorial Day (Decoration Day, which soon became a national holiday, was first referred to as Memorial Day in 1882, a designation made official in 1968). The GAR's first substantive political victory had been in 1870, to reduce the amount of time veterans needed to spend on land, according to the Homestead Act of 1862, to secure full title. Its greatest triumph occurred in 1890, when it obtained a pension for every veteran who had served the Union for at least three months. The resulting pension system, combined with the network of veterans' homes (Kelly 1997) established what amounted to a forerunner of the welfare state, but only for soldiers and their dependents, the United States spent a quarter of the federal budget on veterans between the 1890s and the start of World War I. Republican presidents (which meant all of them between 1865 and 1913 with the exception of Grover Cleveland) handed out the many patronage jobs available – customs clerks, postmasters, etc. – largely to veterans, as did state governors and city officials.

But the GAR was more than a pension-grabbing scheme as its critics charged. It built or persuaded the various levels of government to build rest homes, orphanages,

and hospitals for their comrades and families and led the nation in celebrating the war, participating in innumerable parades and theatrical pageants, and lobbying for the erection of monuments. The GAR was also the most prominent supporter of Black rights in America from the end of Reconstruction (1877) to the early twentieth century (Gannon 2005). Many posts were integrated, and Black comrades were treated with respect and equally entitled to benefits. In publications and speeches GAR officials insisted the Civil War was about ending the evil of slavery and obtaining citizenship for Black Americans during an era when most historians were claiming the South fought a noble battle in defense of states' rights.

The GAR also supported conservative American values. It condemned strikes, favored immigration restrictions, launched crusades in schools to "Teach Patriotism" by supervising the content of history books, sending flags to schoolrooms, and making sure they were saluted with the Pledge of Allegiance now used today. It also prevented Confederate veterans from obtaining any federal benefits. The principal Southern organization, the United Confederate Veterans (UCV), was not founded until 1889. Its success was largely due to former general John Brown Gordon, who served as president until 1904. Memorializing their bravery, aiding widows, orphans, and the disabled to the best of their abilities, they were hampered by the South's general poverty. Ultimately only about 20 percent of all Confederate veterans and their families received assistance from the states, at about a quarter of the rate paid Union veterans. When GAR and UCV members refused to admit non-veterans to membership the Sons of Union Veterans of the Civil War (formed 1881) and Sons of Confederate Veterans (formed 1889) were established; they became heir to the GAR and UCV during the twentieth century.

In 1890 the Naval Order of the United States (NOUS) was formed with membership open to veterans of "any of the wars or in any battle in which the United States Navy or Marine Corps has participated, or who served as above in connection with the Revenue or Privateer Services." The NOUS was the prime mover in establishment of the Navy League of the United States in 1902, but did not directly involve itself in lobbying government officials on policy matters. Instead, in addition to its fraternal activities, it focuses on its mission "to preserve and promote sea history" by establishing naval memorials and presenting awards to midshipmen and cadets at service and maritime academies, authors, and flag rank officers in the sea services (Rice 2003).

The Spanish–American War of 1898 brought the North and South together in a common cause, a fact reflected in the two major veterans' organizations to emerge. More than a dozen veterans' organizations were formed in the immediate aftermath of the Spanish–American War. The three largest groups, the Spanish War Veterans, the United Spanish American War Veterans, and the Servicemen of the Spanish War united to form the United Spanish War Veterans (USWV) whose officers included Robert E. Lee's nephew General Fitzhugh Lee, Black Colonel Hamilton Blount, and Union veteran General Nelson Miles to emphasize its national scope. The second major veterans' organization formed near the turn of the twentieth century, the Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW), traced its roots to the 1899 organization of the American Veterans of Foreign Service (formed in

Ohio) and the Colorado Society of the Army of the Philippines which united with three other groups to form the VFW in 1914. This group subsequently admitted all men (and later women) who went overseas to serve the United States in combat. From veterans of the Latin American interventions and Boxer Rebellion to the Iraq War of today, the VFW has survived and remains a powerful lobby for veterans' benefits and conservative political causes (Bottoms 1991, Mason 1999).

The VFW soon faced a rival, the American Legion, founded in 1919 immediately after World War I, although they frequently work together for the same causes. The main difference is the Legion admits any service man (and from the very beginning, service woman) who served in the armed forces during a period of conflict, whether or not that service was overseas or in actual combat. Especially between the two world wars, as half the Allied Expeditionary Force of World War I never made it to Europe, the Legion was able to far outpace the VFW. As of 2008, it had about three million members, roughly equivalent to its highest previous total at the end of World War II. The VFW, however, has nearly 2.5 million members. Since most veterans since Vietnam have not served in wartime theaters, the fact that the VFW nearly equals the Legion in membership suggests that the ties of comradeship under fire and the feeling of belonging to the "elite" group – as the VFW website stresses – who actually saw combat is a very strong incentive for joining.

At the end of World War I, the Legion (and VFW to a lesser extent) received tremendous publicity for attacking radical meetings, putting down strikes, and leading crusades to purge schools of radical professors and ideas. Most notorious was the Centralia, Washington, incident of 1919, when Legionnaires attacked the local headquarters of the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) and several people were killed. State and local governments called on the Legion to assist with strikebreaking on many occasions – notably in 1920, when Calvin Coolidge used members to do the work of the Boston police force.

Neither the Legion nor VFW leadership ever endorsed extra-legal action by local posts: however, they did not discipline or admonish them either, usually responding to criticism by stating that they could not control thousands of local entities across the country. During the Great Depression, the Legion had a "top secret" plan to restore order in cities throughout the United States if radical activities led to disorder or insurrection (it did not have a plan to overthrow the United States government, as its more extreme critics charged, with a coup to be led by General Smedley Butler). While by the 1940s the leadership discouraged violence and censorship as they made more enemies than friends, occasional local violence continued. A wave erupted against the Jehovah's Witnesses when they opposed entry into World War II, and 1949 witnessed the infamous Legion assault on Paul Robeson's concert in Peekskill, New York (Pencak 1989, Rumer 1990).

Besides "100% Americanism" (the Legion's motto), the Legion and the VFW have both lobbied strongly for veterans benefits. Here, the Legion was more effective during the period before World War II simply because of its much larger membership.

The veterans' hospitals were first set up thanks to the veterans' pressure following World War I: specifically, so many veterans suffered from neuro-psychological

disorder (shell shock, as it was commonly called) and tuberculosis from poison gas that the nation's civilian institutions were not equipped to handle them. The hospitals' construction was delayed several years, with few opening before 1924, because President Warren Harding selected his personal physician Charles Forbes to run them, and he and his friends stole millions of dollars of supplies and construction materials while padding the bills. With the advent of the Veterans Bureau in 1921 (a cabinet department since 1989) under General Frank Hines (1924–45), things improved tremendously. Until Vietnam, the veterans' hospitals did their jobs without much criticism, but in recent decades, both the Legion and VFW have fought for more funding and better care for veterans of later wars suffering from diseases such as Agent Orange contracted in Vietnam and Gulf War Syndrome.

During the 1920s and 1930s, veterans' benefits was among the most important public issues, especially the Bonus. Arguing that they had been poorly paid in the army while wages skyrocketed at home, World War I veterans insisted they deserved "adjusted compensation" averaging \$500 per person. The VFW endorsed the Bonus from the start, the Legion only reluctantly after grass-roots pressure on the leadership. Passed in 1924 over President Coolidge's veto, Congress agreed to pay the Bonus but only in 1945, although then with interest, amounting to about \$1,000 per head. When the Great Depression struck, however, veterans demanded immediate payment. The Bonus March on Washington of 1932 ended in tragedy as General Douglas MacArthur interpreted President Hoover's order to remove veterans who had set up a tent city as meaning to launch an armed attack on them. President Roosevelt not only opposed paying the Bonus, but funded early New Deal programs by slashing the veterans benefits by over a third. Mostly disability pensions, they had had comprised a quarter of the federal budget. In 1936, Congress, over Roosevelt's veto, finally approved immediate payment of the Bonus.

There was no question about benefits for World War II veterans, who had devoted up to six years of their lives to the nation – many enlisted or were drafted in 1940 and not discharged until 1946. The Legion put together a package of benefits that were incorporated in the Servicemen's Readjustment Act, commonly called GI Bill which passed Congress in 1944. It supported veterans with full tuition and living expenses while they went to college or took vocational training programs as well as providing generous disability benefits and medical care. Veterans of subsequent wars never received anything remotely close (Ross 1974).

After the war the Veterans Administration officially recognized 24 separate veterans' organizations and provided office space for 3,600 of their staff members in Washington. Their enlarged memberships allowed both the VFW and Legion to maintain full-time lobbying offices in most state capitals as well. Representatives of both groups campaigned for better treatment for wounded veterans and for improvements in VA hospitals. They also clashed with leaders of organized labor over issues of veterans' preference in the workplace. The American Legion Community Development Corporation worked with all levels of government to deal with the postwar housing shortage. Black, female, and Latino veterans sometimes formed separate American Legion posts, but more often established independent organizations of their own. The VFW formed all-Nisei posts in Sacramento, San Francisco, and Los

Angeles, and the Legion organized similar posts in Chicago, Cleveland, Minneapolis, and Portland, Oregon, though, they too organized separate groups such as the Nisei Veterans Committee and the 442nd Veterans Club (Gambone 2005).

In many communities, the local Legion or VFW post is an important part of everyday life. Legion Baseball, begun in 1925, was originally intended to divert boys from Communist and left-wing rallies and youth programs. Children write essays on patriotic themes and receive prizes from the Legion and VFW. Members can avail themselves of local, and then county, state, and national service officers who assist in the sometimes complicated process of obtaining benefits. Local politicians invariably belong to both the Legion and VFW in their districts (as do congressmen and presidents) if they have served in the military. Although neither the Legion nor VFW officially endorse candidates, they can praise or condemn them for their positions on policies they care about. Both organizations have tended to avoid controversial issues that might decrease membership. For instance, the Legion took no stand on Prohibition (until 1932, when it finally opposed it when it was nearly finished) and allowed states to decide whether to admit Black members, and, if so, in segregated or integrated posts. The Legion and VFW have also done heroic work in times of emergencies, assisting during fires, floods, tornadoes, and other disasters.

The Legion and VFW supported the military actions in Afghanistan and Iraq at the start, but as these became controversial they have stressed instead that they support the troops, rather than the war, and that they are the best organizations for veterans to join (about 10 percent of the membership belongs to both groups) simply to receive practical assistance with benefits.

In the aftermath of World War II, several organizations were formed by veterans of particular units and branches of the services, for example, The United States Submarine Veterans (United States Submarine Veterans 2006), and one new pan-service organization, the AMVETS drew more college educated veterans with liberal ideas than either of the senior organizations. It did not, for instance, endorse the House Un-American Activities Committee and supported integration of the armed forces (which neither the Legion or VFW did). But much of its practical work for veterans' benefits is the same as the Legion and VFW (American Veterans... 1994). The Legion and the VFW also engage in extensive community and welfare work, such as sponsoring Boy Scout troops, and the previously mentioned youth baseball teams, and essay-writing contests on patriotic topics for high school students.

The publications and speakers sponsored by the VFW, American Legion, and AMVETS praise candidates who support veterans' programs such as enhanced benefits and conservative political causes and condemn those who do not, but they refrain from officially endorsing candidates to avoid offending members with opposite views (Rumer 1990, Mason 1999). All three organizations are assisted by a Ladies' Auxiliary, composed of wives, mothers, and sisters of veterans, who do much of the welfare work, such as visiting veterans, of the organizations.

The vast majority of veterans of Korea, Vietnam, and the recent Middle East Wars have joined one of the three above organizations (Gambone 2005). However,

the Vietnam Veterans Against the War, which still continues and opposes the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, has had an important national impact despite its small numbers (25,000 is a very generous maximum estimate) (Hunt 1997). Combat veterans, frequently disabled, have spoken to community groups, appeared on television, and testified before Congressional committees concerning the futility and brutality of their operations. The most notable member was future presidential candidate John Kerry, who testified in the "Winter Soldier" investigation before Congress concerning atrocities committed during Vietnam.

Numerous other veterans' societies exist: Jewish and Catholic War Veterans; organizations for the Navy, Army, Air Force, Coast Guard, and Merchant Marine. As with AMVETS, the Legion, and the VFW, they promote commemoration of their deeds, benefits for members, and camaraderie at local meetings and state or national conventions.

American nationalism is cemented in a considerable measure by memories of heroic struggles in past wars. Veterans associations have been an essential component in keeping both the memory and the nationalism alive. Despite the availability of extensive documentation, very few have received the attention from scholars that they merit.

#### BIBLIOGRAPHY

- American Veterans of World War II, Korea, and Vietnam (1994). *AMVETS: Fifty Years of Proud Service to America's Veterans*. Lanham, MD: AMVETS National Headquarters.
- Bottoms, Bill (1991). *An Illustrated History of the Veterans of Foreign Wars*. Bethesda, MD: Woodbine House.
- Davies, Wallace E. (1948). "The Mexican War Veterans as an Organized Group," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, 35:2 (September), 221–38.
- Davies, Wallace E. (1955). *Patriotism on Parade: The Story of Veterans' and Hereditary Organizations in America, 1783–1900*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Dearing, Mary (1952). *Veterans in Politics: The Story of the G.A.R.* Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.
- Gambone, Michael D. (2005). *The Greatest Generation Comes Home: The Veteran in American Society*. College Station: Texas A&M University Press.
- Gannon, Barbara A. (2005). "The Won Cause: Black and White Comradeship in the Grand Army of the Republic," PhD thesis, Penn State University.
- Hunt, Andrew E. (1997). *The Turning: A History of Vietnam Veterans Against the War*. New York: New York University Press.
- Karsten, Peter (1978). *Soldiers and Society: The Effects of Military Service and War on American Life*. Westport, CT: Greenwood.
- Kelly, Patrick J. (1997). *Creating a National Home: Building the Veterans Welfare State, 1860–1900*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Kirkland, Turner Edward (1991). *Civil War Veterans Organizations, Reunions, and Badges*. Union City, TN: Pioneer Press.
- Logue, Larry A. (2007). *The Civil War Veteran: A History and a Reader*. New York: New York University Press.
- Mason, Herbert Molloy, Jr. (1999). *VFW: Our First Century*, Lenexa, KS: Addax Publishing Group.



- McConnell, Stuart (1992). *Glorious Contentment: The Grand Army of the Republic, 1865–1900*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Myers, Minor (1983). *Liberty Without Anarchy: A History of the Society of the Cincinnati*. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia.
- National View (1887). “Origin and Progress of the National Association of Veterans of the Mexican War,” *The National View* (February 12), 1–8.
- Pencak, William (1989). *The American Legion, 1919–1941*. Boston: Northeastern University Press.
- Rice, John C., Jr. (2003). *Naval Order of the United States: Past, Present, Future*. Paducah, KY: Turner Publishing Co.
- Ross, Davis, R. B. (1974). *Preparing for Ulysses: Politics and Veterans during World War II*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Rumer, Thomas A. (1990). *The American Legion: An Official History, 1919–1989*. New York: M. Evans.
- Toomey, Daniel Carroll (2004). *Union Civil War Veterans’ Organizations in Maryland*. Linthicum, MD: Toomey Press.
- United States Submarine Veterans (2006). *United States Submarine Veterans, Inc.: The First 40 years*. Nashville, TN: Turner Publishing Co.
- Wecter, Dixon (1944). *When Johnny Comes Marching Home*. Boston, Houghton Mifflin.
- Wylie, Alexander E. (1966). *Veteran and Affiliated Organizations Arising from the Civil War*. Mendota, IL: *Mendota Reporter*.

## Chapter Sixty-seven

# CARE FOR THE MILITARY DEAD

*Constance Potter and John Deeben*

To say that two thousand or twenty thousand men are killed in a great battle, or that a thousand of the dead are buried in one great trench, produces only a vague impression on the mind. ... But to know one man who is shot. ... and to aid in burying him. ... is a more real matter to you than the larger piece of astounding information....

(H. Clay Trumbell, quoted in Faust 2008: 78–9)

Although written more than 30 years after the Civil War by Connecticut Chaplain H. Clay Trumbell, this statement could pertain to any war. How do you care for the bodies of the battle dead? Before the Civil War, the United States War Department had no formal program to recover, identify, bury, or repatriate the dead. Soldiers assigned to the task or well-meaning comrades carried out the burials as quickly as possible. At the conclusion of the Seminole War in 1842, veterans of the conflict raised a fund to bury the remains of their deceased comrades in the post cemetery at St. Augustine, Florida. During the Mexican–American War, soldiers were buried where they had fallen, although in some instances the War Department arranged for the repatriation of some officers.

From its establishment during the Revolutionary War through World War II, the Navy traditionally buried at sea those officers and enlisted personnel who died while the ship was away from port. The lack of space aboard ship to keep the bodies dictated rapid disposal of the remains. Before developing its own regulations and accompanying ceremonies, the US Navy followed the traditions of Britain's Royal Navy (Mack and Connell 1980). Burial at sea remains an option for former naval personnel and can be arranged through the US Navy Mortuary Affairs office.

Since the military issued no identification to soldiers, the War Department had no effective, formal procedures for notifying families of a death. The ubiquitous dog tag did not become standard until World War I. Some men carried letters or Bibles with their name inscribed in them; some wrote their name on a piece of paper before going into battle; and some arranged for comrades to notify their families not only of their death, but to describe how they died (Faust 2008). The War Department might report where the soldier died, but not necessarily the precise burial site.

Not until the Civil War, did the military begin procedures to identify and bury the dead, first for the Union and later for Confederates. Shortly after the outbreak of the war in April 1861, the War Department ordered Union commanders to establish cemeteries near every battlefield and to oversee the burial of the dead. The Quartermaster Department became responsible for the care of those cemeteries. The following year, Congress enacted legislation providing for the establishment of national military cemeteries, but it was 1865 before the Quartermaster Department developed policies and procedures to exhume and relocate bodies from “distant or isolated graves” to concentrated cemeteries (White 1930). Best known among the cemeteries established under this authorization is Arlington National Cemetery across the Potomac River from Washington, DC (Bigler 2005). Identification of bodies, however, continued to be difficult and it is estimated that only roughly 59 per cent of those who died during the Civil War were positively identified (Anders 1988).

With the Spanish–American War in 1898 and the Philippine Insurrection (1899–1902) – the first foreign wars since the Mexican–American War 50 years before – the War Department repatriated the bodies of both officers and enlisted men whether they died in battle or of disease. In August 1898, D. H. Rhodes, an administrator of the national military cemeteries, established the Quartermaster Burial Corps. He staffed it with civilian morticians, and began work in Cuba. By June 30, 1899 the casketed remains of 1,222 dead were returned to the United States from Cuba and Puerto Rico. The Burial Corps identified 86 percent of the dead. That done, Rhodes sailed for Manila where the commanding general had detailed Chaplain Charles C. Pierce to establish an Army morgue and Office of Identification. Pierce’s military-staffed organizations worked alongside the civilian-staffed Burial Corps in the Philippines. They cared for the bodies of the dead and transported the bodies that were returned. On April 6, 1899, 356 of the returned bodies were laid to rest at Arlington National Cemetery. Between 1899 and 1902 the remains of approximately 5,931 who died during the Spanish-American War, Philippine Insurrection, and Boxer Rebellion (China Relief Expedition) were returned to the United States.

Pierce recommended the inclusion of an “identity disc” in each soldier’s combat field kit. The War Department failed to act on his recommendation. As a result, the names of only 70 percent of those buried were known. For the rest, only their place of death or the unit in which they served was known. Over a decade later, Army Regulations of 1913 mandated identification tags and during World War I (1917–18) all combat soldiers wore circular aluminum discs on chains around their necks. It was also during World War I that the War Department developed standard procedures for re-interring the dead, and after the war, repatriating their remains (Wooley 1988).

### World War I

The problem of burying the dead expanded with US entry into World War I on April 6, 1917. The first contingents of the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) landed

in France in June; on August, 7 the War Department issued General Order 104 that authorized the organization of a Graves Registration Service (GRS) under the office of the Quartermaster General. Pierce, who had retired in 1908, was recalled to active duty to head the new GRS, the first unit of which reached France in October.

Although it sometimes took a week or longer, individual combat units, rather than the GRS, had the initial responsibility of burying the dead as soon as possible, usually within 24 hours. Battlefield conditions made immediate and proper burial difficult after the troops advanced, but burial details took great care to ensure that the graves were marked properly.

The duty of graves registration frequently fell to chaplains. The GRS documented the graves and located "hasty and scattered" burials (Piehler 1995). Some men were buried or reburied in as many as three different places. In the end, the GRS sought to consolidate the graves in a few cemeteries. Shortly after the war, 19 Quartermaster graves registration companies operated in European combat zones as the GRS grew to include 350 officers and 18,000 enlisted men. These units created files for each man who died overseas during World War I even if his remains were returned later to the United States. Nearly 30,000 American soldiers were buried in France, Belgium, and England, and another 46,520 were returned to the United States (Office of the Quartermaster General 1946). Less than 2.5 percent of the bodies were unidentified.

With the end of the war, France declared that no bodies – French or foreign – could be moved between January 1919 and January 1922. Bereft of man-power, material, or transportation facilities, France, after five years of war, could do little to move 75,000 American dead. Until France could piece itself together, the bodies of American soldiers remained there. Indeed, the carnage had been so pervasive that farmers frequently found corpses buried on their land after the war. Although the War Department notified each family of a deceased American soldier that the body could be repatriated, some families decided that the remains should stay on French soil.

The United States was the only country to offer repatriation; the British traditionally left their dead overseas. On September 15, 1920, almost two years earlier than planned, France authorized the removal of remains from the Zone of the Armies, where most of the bodies lay. By October, Graves Registration began moving the bodies and completed this grim work on March 30, 1922, when the last of the designated bodies arrived in New York on the transport *Cambria* (Risch 1962).

### American Battle Monuments Commission

Immediately after World War I, the US government recognized the need to assume primary responsibility for commemorating the role played by American armed forces on European battlefields and regulating the construction of appropriate monuments and markers. A few American army divisions had erected such monuments in France before departing for the United States. They proved temporary, architecturally unappealing, and lacking in historical accuracy. In many instances

they were constructed with inferior building materials and erected on private lands without formal permission or approval. Mounting inquiries from private societies, individuals, and even state governments regarding the erection of additional monuments finally prompted the War Department to establish the Battle Monuments Board on June 11, 1921, to regulate plans for marking American battlefields in Europe (US Congress, House of Representatives Report 1504 1923a).

The Battle Monuments Board followed several specific guidelines. The Board sought to institute a uniform commemoration effort that acknowledged all American military operations in proper perspective. All memorials and markers, for example, had to be dignified in taste and design as well as identify important events in the military operations of the US Army. Historical information had to be presented in a readily understandable manner, principally for the benefit of casual tourists uneducated in military history or terminology. To achieve these goals, the Board authorized the use of several types of commemorative markers, including relief maps (to show how natural terrains affected American military operations); outline sketch maps (to indicate front lines of American forces in particular sectors); special monuments to mark additional places of historical importance (such as the location where the first American soldier was killed in Europe); and bronze tablets to mark buildings of interest in connection with the operations of the American Expeditionary Forces.

An act of Congress on 4 March 1923 (42 Stat. 1509) replaced the Battle Monuments Board with the American Battle Monuments Commission (ABMC). As an independent executive agency, the Commission expanded upon the work of the Board to include oversight of permanent US military cemeteries and memorials in all foreign countries. Composed of seven (and eventually expanded to 11) appointed members, Gen. John J. Pershing chaired the Commission from its founding until his death in 1948. It assumed responsibility for planning, designing, and constructing suitable memorials to American military service, including works of architecture and art located within the military cemeteries. All proposed designs and building materials required further approval by the National Commission of Fine Arts. In addition, the ABMC sought to compile for the War Department a complete photographic record of all European battlefields where American forces operated [42 Stat. 1509].

By 1934 the ABMC assumed direct control of eight permanent American burial grounds established by the War Department in northern France, Belgium, and England, including sites at Flanders Field, Meuse-Argonne, St. Mihiel, and the Somme. These locations, the use of which was granted to the United States in perpetuity by the host nation, held the remains of 30,921 US servicemen from World War I. To honor and maintain the sites, the Commission developed a commemorative program that not only included landscaping designs and the construction of nonsectarian chapels at each cemetery, but also the placing of additional monuments and tablets at other battlefield locations in Europe, and construction of a memorial to the American Expeditionary Forces in Washington, DC.

Following the end of World War II, the ABMC in 1947 established 14 additional cemeteries in Europe, North Africa and Asia, which eventually received the

remains of 93,242 American dead, relocated from hundreds of temporary battlefield burial sites. In addition to landscaping and chapel construction, the ABMC included appropriate sculpture, educational displays including battle maps and narratives, and visitor reception areas at the new cemeteries.

### **Gold Star Mothers**

Established June 4, 1928, in Washington, DC, the Gold Star Mothers originally was organized to comfort mothers whose sons had died in the war and provide care for hospitalized veterans away from home. In less than a year, however, the Gold Star Mothers Association began lobbying Congress to allow mothers of deceased soldiers to visit their son's graves in Europe. Many of the women had already done so privately and knew how much such a trip had meant to them. They also knew many women could not afford to go and, therefore, they argued that the Federal government should pay for the trip.

Although the Gold Star Mothers restricted membership to women who had lost a son or daughter in the war, the legislative debates included discussions of who else would be eligible to go on the pilgrimage. After much deliberation, widows became eligible, but not fathers. It was assumed men could not possess the same intensity of parental bonding as mothers who had given birth to their sons. If another family member accompanied the mother or widow, the family paid for the other person.

Colonel Richard T. Ellis, officer in charge of the pilgrimage, and the Quartermaster staff carefully planned the trips both logistically and psychologically. Each woman received a detailed schedule including which train she was on, the time the train left each station, and her seat number; a list of items she needed to pack; and a detailed daily agenda for her time in Europe. Because of the age of some of the women, medical staff attended them throughout the pilgrimage. Of the 17,389 eligible women contacted by the government, 6,693 chose to go on the pilgrimage (Potter 1999a, b).

Although the Association was established for white women only, black women also went on the pilgrimage, but in segregated parties. The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) started a letter-writing campaign to halt the segregation of the pilgrimage and many black mothers and widows chose not to participate. It appears that the facilities were separate, but not equal when under US control, but once the women arrived in France they went to the same restaurants, attended similar programs, and may have stayed in the same hotels. They found life in Paris and France much freer than in the United States – much as their husbands and sons had.

### **The Modern Era**

During World War II, 405,400 Americans died while serving in North Africa, Europe, East Asia, Australia, and the Pacific Islands. Following procedures



established during World War I, the Graves Registration companies of World War II recovered and buried the remains in 359 temporary American military cemeteries overseas.

Between 1941 and 1945, the GRS, renamed the American Graves Registration Service in September 1943, deployed dozens of Graves Registration units worldwide. These units buried the dead the first time unlike their WWI counterparts. They also collected “remains from the combat units at designated points” behind the front. Finally, they removed the bodies to a series of temporary military cemeteries. Following the advice of the Quartermaster, Adjutant General Emory S. Adams issued instructions to all commanding generals that “During the period that the United States is at war, the shipment home of remains from foreign possessions and other stations outside the continental limits of the United States is suspended.” The Secretary of the Navy issued similar instructions (Sledge 2005). After the war, the AGRS repatriated the bodies (Coleman 2008). Between 1945 and 1951 the AGRS developed 14 permanent cemeteries overseas and after completing most burials transferred the cemeteries to the ABMC.

In February 1942 the War Department established the Army Effects Bureau at the Kansas City Quartermaster Depot to receive, inventory, clean, and store the personal effects of deceased service personnel prior to their delivery to heirs (Office of the Quartermaster General 1946, Anders 1988). By April 1946, less than a year after the end of the war, the remains of only 21,826 servicemen out of the 405,400 dead remained to be identified.

When Communist forces launched their unexpected invasion of South Korea in June 1950, only two Quartermaster American Graves Registration Service units were on active duty, the 30-man 108th QMGR Platoon at Yokahama, Japan, and the 565th QMGR Company at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. After the withdrawal of the Eighth Army south of the 38th parallel, the Supreme Commander, United Nations Forces, directed the evacuation of all United Nations temporary cemeteries. The bodies of all United States dead were to be shipped to Japan, and the remains of the other Allied soldiers concentrated in a centralized UN cemetery in Tanggok, a suburb of Pusan, Korea.

This decision led to dramatic new procedures for the identification of bodies and their repatriation. In 1951 the Department of the Army developed the first Central Identification Laboratory (CIL) in Kokura, Japan. Here, using forensic anthropology, the AGRS identified the bodies and prepared them for shipment home. The commingling of remains in such deaths as plane crashes made identification even more difficult (Coleman 2008). Because of the problems inherent in identifying bodies through identification tags, jewelry, and letters the military turned to forensic anthropology. From Kokura, the bodies were repatriated marking the first mass wartime return of combat dead to the United States (Anders 1988). In March 1951 the Military Sea Transport Service began transferring the bodies to the United States.

In 1955 the Department of Defense constructed a mortuary at Dover Air Force Base in Delaware (replaced in 2003 by a new facility) that became the

federal government's only military mortuary. Bodies arrived in ice-laden metal transfer cases, their identities confirmed, after which they were autopsied, embalmed, and clothed in dress uniforms before being escorted by military personnel to their final resting place selected by the family. The procedures and policies established during Korea changed the public's expectations of identification and repatriation (Coleman 2008). People came to expect immediate repatriation and consistently accurate identification. During the Korean War, the percentage of recovered American dead that were identified rose to 97 percent (Cannon 1952, Cook 1953, Anders 1988).

In Vietnam, the Department of Defense followed the procedures developed in Korea although the bodies were rarely buried even temporarily in South Vietnam, but airlifted immediately home for burial (Piehler 1995). Although the military at first shipped the Korean War dead home by ship, they later flew the bodies home. Since Vietnam, air transport remains the primary way of returning bodies to the United States.

Between January 1961 and July 1965, bodies of dead American servicemen were prepared for return to the United States in a two-room mortuary at Ton son Nhut Air Base near Saigon. In July 1966 responsibility for the identification of American dead and the return of their bodies home was transferred to the Army. In 1967 the Army established a second mortuary at Da Nang to process remains recovered from I Corps in northern South Vietnam. The bodies of 96 percent of Americans killed in action were recovered and identified, compared with 78 percent in World War II and Korea. The average time between the time of death and return of the body to next of kin was one week (Anders 1988).

Following American withdrawal from Vietnam in 1973, the responsibility to search for, recover, and identify the remains of servicemen lost in Southeast Asia was transferred to the Central Identification Laboratory at Camp Samae San, Thailand. In 1976, the Army moved the functions to the US Army Central Identification Laboratory (CILHI) at Hickham Air Force Base, Hawaii, which became a permanent operational element of the US Army Military Personnel Center in 1985 (Mortuary Affairs Center 2000).

In 1992 Congress mandated the fullest possible accounting of remains of servicemen killed during the Vietnam War. Since then the CILHI has, under the operational control of the Joint Task Force-Full Accounting, maintained offices in Hanoi. From there teams investigated credible reports of American remains in Southeast Asia and sent teams into the countryside of Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam to investigate potential sites of American burials (Heussner and Holland 1999).

In World War I, the GRS relied primarily on dental records and identifying items such as dog tags. In World War II, medical records were more complete. But the rates of identification remained too low. With Korea, the military began using forensic anthropology to identify remains. The CILHI employed the largest group of forensic anthropologists in the world (Sledge 2005). Since the early 1990s, DNA has been used when possible. Despite these scientific advances, identification is often based on the "preponderance of evidence" (Sledge 2005).

The recovery, identification, and care for American war dead have received very little historical attention. *Remembering War the American Way* by G. Kurt Piehler (1995) has become a basic text for the study of the handling of military dead as well as the way we remember the dead. Drew Gilpin Faust's *This Republic of Suffering* (2008) and Mark S. Schantz's *Awaiting the Heavenly Country* (2008) discuss death and memory in the Civil War.

Michael Sledge's, *Soldier Dead: How We Recover, Identify, Bury, and Honor Our Military Fallen* (2005) traces the development in recovery, identification, and burials beginning with the Civil War through the War in Iraq. He also writes that the return of bodies "requires extensive advance planning, and support and approval from nations in whose soil the soldiers are buried." In some cases, the remains essentially are held hostage until demands are met (Sledge 2005).

Between 1991 and 2009, the Department of Defense forbade photographs of the dead, including transfer cases; the dead were returned quickly and either singly or in small groups making it difficult to realize the impact of their deaths. As of February 2009, the revised policy on media coverage allowed each family to decide if the casket could be photographed.

Jim Sheeler's *Final Salute: A Story of Unfinished Lives* (2008) tells the story of Major Steve Beck, a Marine "casualty assistance calls officer," and of the families he must notify about the deaths of sons and husbands. These books remind us that each death is the death of a person not just a statistic.

There has been no comprehensive study of American military cemeteries. Dean W. Holt, *American Military Cemeteries* (1992) provides basic information on those administrated by the National Cemetery System, a branch of the Department of Veterans Affairs since 1973, as does Elizabeth Nishiura (1989) for overseas cemeteries.

In short, numerous opportunities exist for research in American care for its military dead.

#### BIBLIOGRAPHY

- American Battle Monuments Commission website, historical background information, [www.abmc.gov/commission/history.php](http://www.abmc.gov/commission/history.php).
- Anders, Dr. Steven E. (1988). "With All Due Honors: A History of the Quartermaster Graves Registration Mission," *Quartermaster Professional Bulletin*, (September), online at [www.qmfound.com/grave.htm](http://www.qmfound.com/grave.htm).
- Bigler, Philip (2005). *In Honored Glory: Arlington National Cemetery: The Final Post*, 4th edn. St. Petersburg, FL: Vandamere Press.
- Bodnar, John (1992). *Remaking America: Public Memory, Commemoration, and Patriotism in the Twentieth Century*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Budreau, Lisa M. (2008). "The Politics of Remembrances: The Gold Star Mothers' Pilgrimage and America's Fading Memory of the Great War," *Journal of Military History*, 72:2 (April), 371–411.
- Cannon, Florence (1952) "Our Honored Dead," *The Quartermaster Review*, 32:1 (May–June), online at [www.qmmuseum.lee.army.mil/mortuair/Honored\\_Dead.htm](http://www.qmmuseum.lee.army.mil/mortuair/Honored_Dead.htm).

- Coleman, Bradley Lynn (2008). "Recovering the Korean War Dead, 1950–1958: Graves Registration, Forensic Anthropology, and Wartime Memorialization," *Journal of Military History*, 72:1 (January), 179–222.
- Cook, John C. (1953). "Graves Registration in the Korean Conflict," *Quartermaster Review*, 33:5 (March–April), online at [http://www.qmmuseum.lee.army.mil/korea/gr\\_korea.htm](http://www.qmmuseum.lee.army.mil/korea/gr_korea.htm).
- Faust, Drew Gilpin (2008). *This Republic of Suffering: Death and the American Civil War*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Frie, Arnd, Thomas Moody, Garth Yarnall, Jamie Kiessling, Benett Sunds, Gerald L. McCool, and Robert Uppenda (1998). "Fallen Comrades: Mortuary Affairs in the US Army," *Quartermaster Professional Bulletin*, (Winter), online at <http://www.qmfound.com/fallen.htm>.
- Fussell, Paul (1975). *The Great War and Modern Memory*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Heussner, Todd, and Thomas Holland (1999). "Worldwide CILHI Mission to Bring Home Missing Heroes," *Quartermaster Professional Bulletin*, (Summer), online at [http://www.qmmuseum.lee.army.mil/mortuary/worldwide\\_cilhi\\_mission.htm](http://www.qmmuseum.lee.army.mil/mortuary/worldwide_cilhi_mission.htm).
- History of the American Graves Registration Service: QMC in Europe*, 3 vol. typescript. Washington: Library Office of the Quartermaster General.
- Holt, Dean W. (1992). *American Military Cemeteries: A Comprehensive Illustrated Guide to the Hallowed Grounds of the United States, Including Cemeteries Overseas*. Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company.
- Knapp, Michael G., and Constance Potter (1991). "Here Rests in Honored Glory: World War I Graves Registration," *Prologue: Quarterly of the National Archives and Records Administration*, 23:2 (Summer), 190–3.
- Mack, William P., and Royal W. Connell (1980). *Naval Ceremonies, Customs, and Traditions*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Martz, John D., Jr. (1954). "Homeward Bound: Graves Registration and Recovery in the Korean War," *Quartermaster Review*, (May–June), online at [http://www.qmfound.com/homeward\\_bound\\_Korea.htm](http://www.qmfound.com/homeward_bound_Korea.htm).
- Mortuary Affairs Center, comp. (2000). "Memorial Affairs Activities, Republic of Vietnam," Fort Lee, VA: Army Quartermaster Museum. (March), online at <http://www.qmmuseum.lee.army.mil/mortuary/MA-Vietnam.htm>.
- Nishiura, Elizabeth, ed. (1989). *American Battle Monuments A Guide to Military Cemeteries and Monuments Maintained by the American Battle Monuments Commission*. Detroit: Omnigraphics.
- Office of the Quartermaster General (1946). "Graves Registration search and recovery operations after World War II," *Quartermaster Review*, (May–June), online at [www.qmfound.com/graves\\_registration.htm](http://www.qmfound.com/graves_registration.htm).
- Piehler, G. Kurt (1995). *Remembering War the American Way*. Washington: Smithsonian Books.
- Potter, Constance (1999a). "World War I Gold Star Mothers Pilgrimages, Part 1." *Prologue: Quarterly of the National Archives and Records Administration*, 31:2 (Summer), 140–5.
- Potter, Constance (1999b). "World War I Gold Star Mothers Pilgrimages, Part 2." *Prologue: Quarterly of the National Archives and Records Administration*, 31:3 (Fall), 140–5.
- Quartermaster General (under the direction of the War Department Public Relations Division) (1946) *Tell Me About My Boy* [1946 pamphlet produced by the Quartermaster

- Corps for next of kin of deceased service personnel from World War II], online at [http://www.qmfound.com/about\\_my\\_boy.htm](http://www.qmfound.com/about_my_boy.htm).
- Records of the Office of the Quartermaster General, Record Group 92, Entry 1942, Correspondence, reports, telegrams, applications, and other papers relating to the burial of service personnel ("burial case files"), 1915–1939, 2,270 feet. The records are arranged alphabetically by the name of the deceased person. College Park, MD: National Archives and Records Administration.
- Risch, Erna (1962). *Quartermaster Support of the Army: A History of the Corps, 1775–1939*. Washington: Quartermaster Historians Office, Office of the Quartermaster General.
- Schantz, Mark S. (2008) *Awaiting the Heavenly Country: The Civil War and America's Culture of Death*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Sheeler, Jim. (2008) *Final Salute: A Story of Unfinished Lives*. New York: Penguin Press.
- Sledge, Michael (2005). *Soldier Dead: How We Recover, Identify, Bury, & Honor Our Military Fallen*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Steere, Edward. (1951) *The Graves Registration Service in World War II*. QMG. Historical Studies No. 21. Washington: Government Printing Office.
- The Effort to Account for US Servicemen Missing from the Korean War*. Washington: Defense Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Office, November 11, 2000.
- US Congress. House of Representatives (1920). Select Committee on Expenditures in the War Department, *War Expenditures: Hearings before Subcommittee No. 3 (Foreign Expenditures) of the Select Committee on Expenditures in the War Department*, House of Representatives, 66 Cong., 2d sess., vol. 3. Washington: Government Printing Office.
- US Congress, House of Representatives (1923a). *Report 1504: American Battle Monuments Commission*, John W. Weeks, Secretary of War, to Charles G. Dawes, Director of the Bureau of the Budget, February 18, 1922, H. rp. No. 1504, 67 Cong., 4th Sess.
- US Congress, House of Representatives (1923b). *American Battle Monuments Commission, "Proposed Battle Monument Project,"* June 11, 1921, H. rp. No. 1504, 67 Cong., 4th Sess.
- US Congress, House of Representatives (1924a). *To Authorize Mothers of Deceased World War Veterans Buried in Europe to Visit the Graves (proposed amendments to the law)*, Supplement containing War Department Study of proposed legislation, Hearings before the Committee on Military Affairs, House of Representatives, 68 Cong., 1st Sess., Saturday, May 3, 1924. Washington: Government Printing Office.
- US Congress, House of Representatives (1924b). *To Authorize Mothers of Deceased World War Veterans Buried in Europe to Visit the Graves (proposed amendments to the law)*, Statement of Hon. Samuel Dickstein, of New York, Other members of the House of Representatives, and Representatives of the Gold Star Mothers' Association, Hearings before the Committee on Military Affairs, House of Representatives, 71 Cong., 2d Sess., Tuesday, Feb. 19, 1924. Washington: Government Printing Office.
- US Congress. House of Representatives (1928). *To Authorize Mothers of Deceased World War Veterans Buried in Europe to Visit the Graves (proposed amendments to the law)*, Hearings before the Committee on Military Affairs, House of Representatives, 70 Cong., 1st Sess., January 27, 1928. Washington: Government Printing Office.
- US Congress. House of Representatives (1930). *To Authorize Mothers of Deceased World War Veterans Buried in Europe to Visit the Graves (proposed amendments to the law)*, Hearings before the Committee on Military Affairs, House of Representatives, 71 Cong., 2d Sess., Tuesday, Dec. 17, 1929. Washington: Government Printing Office.

- Van Duyne, Frederick W. (1930). "Erection of Permanent Headstones in the American Military Cemeteries in Europe," *Quartermaster Review*, (January–February), online at [www.qmfound.com/stone.htm](http://www.qmfound.com/stone.htm).
- White, Major William R., QMC (1930). "Our Soldier Dead," *Quartermaster Review*, 10:6 (May–June), online at [www.qmfound.com/soldier\\_dead.htm](http://www.qmfound.com/soldier_dead.htm).
- Wooley, Richard W. (1988). "A Short History of Identification Tags," *Quartermaster Professional Bulletin*, (December), online at [http://www.qmfound.com/short\\_history\\_of\\_identification\\_tags.htm](http://www.qmfound.com/short_history_of_identification_tags.htm).



# Index

Page locators in **bold** type indicate substantive content, those in regular type indicate brief mention only.

- Abel, Francis, 35
- Aberdeen Proving Grounds Scandal, 1011
- Adams, Alton Augustus, 837
- Adams, Eddie, 821
- Adams, Emory, 1039
- Adams, George Rollie, 68
- Adams, Gordon, 967
- Adams, Henry, 348
- Adams, John, 43–4, 593–4, 477, 635, 834, 856
- Adams, John Quincy, 65, 635
- Adams, Kevin, 130, 755
- Adams, Mary, 41
- Adams, Michael C. C., 106–7
- Adams, Samuel, 856
- Adams, Thomas, 513–14
- advisors, **604, 609–13**
- Afghanistan, military action in, 301–2, 304, 306, 307–9, 312, 372
  - alliances and coalitions, 600
  - American way of war, 851
  - ethics, 1009, 1010
  - medals and decorations, 907, 912, 914
  - military–industrial complex, 980
  - news media, 954–5, 958, 959
  - private military contractors, 513, 980
  - Stinger missile, 687
  - veterans' movements, 1031, 1032
  - war planning, 794
  - see also* Taliban
- Africa Squadron, 531–2
- African-Americans, 881–91
  - chaplains, 724–5
  - Civil War, 115, 480, 481, 754–5, 883, 884–5, 994, 1028: Reconstruction, 643–7, 754–5
  - Cold War, 276–7, 279–80
  - colonial wars, 881
  - education and training, 717
  - in films, 919–20, 923, 933, 934
  - Indian Wars, 130, 885
  - Korean War, 231, 890
  - memory, 994
  - music, 836
  - order and discipline, 754–5
  - Project 100,000, 276–7
  - race conflicts, 652, 655–6
  - racial segregation and desegregation, 276, 279–80, 382, 402, 418, 480, 487, 655–6, 717, 890, 1005
  - slavery, *see* slavery
  - Spanish–American War, 144, 885
  - sports, 1021
  - US Marine Corps, 418, 889, 890
  - US Navy, 382, 402, 717, 755, 756, 882, 885, 886, 889–90
  - veterans' movements, 1028
  - Vietnam War, 277, 280, 891
  - War of 1812, 52,

- African-Americans (*cont'd*)  
 War of American Independence, 324, 882  
 women in the military, 873, 875  
 WWI, 155, 158, 165, 755, 887–8, 933, 1038  
 WWII, 755, 873, 889–90
- Africa, insurgencies, 511
- Aguinaldo, Emilio, 147, 148, 149
- Air Corps, 445–6, 657, 716
- air defense, **681–90**, 738, 740
- Air Medal, 905, 908
- Air Service, 163–4, 166, 365, 444–5, 671
- air war  
   air–ground coordination, 372, 449  
   Gulf, 287  
   Reserves, 483, 490  
   Vietnam, 263, 264  
   WWI, 163–4, 166, 365  
   WWII: in Asia/Pacific, 202, **207–8**, 213, 416; in Europe, 177, **180–1**, 183–4, **184–5**, **187**  
   *see also* US Air Force
- aircraft carriers, 400–1, 403, 500, 672, 682, 974
- Airforce Service Pilots, Women (WASPS), 872–3
- Alamo, battle of, 74–6, 91, 883, 919
- Alamo Scouts, 764
- Aleutians campaign, WWII, 202, 206
- Alexander, Harold, 178, 179
- Alexander, Joseph, 203, 414, 415–16
- Alger, Russell A., 144, 146
- Algerine War, **45**, **48**
- Allen, Gardner W., 44, 45, 332
- Allen, Henry T., 606
- Allende, Salvador, 576–7
- alliances, **593–601**, 572–3  
   Australia-New Zealand-US (ANZUS), 599  
   Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), 1955, 599  
   Franco-American, 1778, 28, 43  
   Rio Pact, 1947, 573, 598  
   Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, 1955, 599  
   US air defense, 683–4  
   *see also* North Atlantic Treaty Organization
- Allison, William T., 811
- Almond, Edward M., 236, 889–90
- al-Qaeda, 298, 299, 302–3, 306, 307–9, 311, 312, 372
- American citizens, rescuing, 559, 579, **586–7**
- American Expeditionary Force (AEF), **158–66**, 167, 362, 363–4, 484  
   alliances, 595  
   care for the dead, 1035–7  
   communications, 736  
   order and discipline, 753–4  
   war planning, 784  
   women, 158, 165, 872
- American Indians, *see* Native Americans
- American Legion, 995, 996, 1027, 1029–31
- American Revolution, *see* War of American Independence
- American way of war, **843–53**, 972
- Ampudia, Pedro, 80, 81
- Anderson, Fred, 13, 16
- Anderson, Robert, 90
- annihilation strategy, 843, 844–5
- anti-communism, 224, 260, **278–9**, 996, 1026  
   war on terrorism, 300, 301  
   post-war Latin American operations, *see under* Latin America
- anti-imperialists, 148
- antiwar movements, 80, 259, 281, 367, 487, 656–7, 716, 754, 926, 967
- Appleman, Roy E., 226, 237–8, 241, 368
- Arab-Israeli Wars, 371, 404
- Archer, J. J., 90
- Ardennes, campaign of, **186–7**, 366
- Arista, Mariano, 79
- armies  
   and civil authorities, *see* civil–military relations  
   Indian Wars, 351–2, 884  
   Indian Wars in the east, 59–60, 61, 69, 339  
   Indian Wars of trans-Mississippi west, 123, 124–5, 130, 131–2, 133–4  
   Texas War for Independence, 74–7, 479, 883  
   *see also* Confederate Army; Continental Army; US Army

- armistice talks, Korean War, 242–3, 244–5  
*see also* peace talks
- armor, *see* tanks
- arms industry, *see* military–industrial complex
- arms race, 275, 399
- Arnold, Benedict, 331, 696, 900
- Arnold, David, 701, 741
- Arnold, Henry (“Hap”), 203, 444, 446, 791, 851
- artwork, 321
- Asada, Sadao, 197
- Asia  
     military advisors, 609, 610, 611  
     post-WWII: alliances, 598–9;  
         occupations, 565, 566; US Navy, 404, 405  
     US policy 1899–1927, **554–61**  
     WWII in, **194–213**, 367–9, 401–2, 415–16, 420, 422–4, 446  
     *see also* Japan; Korean War; Philippines; Vietnam War
- assassinations  
     ethics, 1010–11  
     Ford’s banning of, 301, 308
- Atkinson, Henry, 67
- Atkinson, Rick, 173, 177–9, 287, 366, 372, 791
- Atlantic  
     19thC naval policy, 531  
     WWI, 160  
     WWII, **175–6**, **180**, 182, 402, 437, 738–9
- Atlantic, battle of the, *see* World War II
- atomic weapons, *see* nuclear weapons
- atrocities, *see* war crimes
- attachés, **604–8**, 613, 703
- attrition strategy, 843, 844–5
- Augustine, William, 90
- Austria, 565, 566, 568, 569
- Axton, John T., 726
- Bacon’s Rebellion, 472, 619, 620, 621–3
- Bailey, Charles W., 861, 925
- Bailey, Sydney D., 242
- Bailey, Thomas, 175, 402
- Bainbridge, William, 46, 47
- Baker, Newton, 363
- Baker–Hamilton Report, 312
- Ballard, John R., 580, 590
- Ball, Durwood, 346–7
- Ball, Horace G., 807
- Ball, T. H., 63
- Ballendorf, Dirk, 422
- Ballentine, George, 90
- ballistic missiles, 404–5, 407, 447–8, 684, 686–7, 689–90, 791
- balloons, observation, 163, 444, 695, 697
- Banana Wars, *see* Caribbean, early 20thC  
     interventions; Central America, early 20thC interventions; Spanish–American War
- Bank, Aaron, 766
- Banks, Nathaniel P., 128
- Bannon, John R., 725
- Barbary Wars, **45–8**, 509: *see also* Tripolitan Wars
- Barbey, Daniel, 212, 790
- Barrington, Lord, 25
- Barron, Samuel, 47, 733
- Bartholomees, J. Boone, 456
- Bartlett, Merrill, 421–2, 622
- Bartlett, Sy, 922
- Barton, Clara, 871
- Bastogne, 186–7, 366
- Bataan Death March, 198, 726
- battle-focused conflict, 851–3
- Bauer, K. Jack, 68, 82, 89, 92
- Beale, Howard K., 537, 540, 556
- Beauregard, P. G. T., 88, 90, 666
- Beaver, Daniel, 363
- Beckwith, Charlie, 767–8
- Belkin, Aaron, 892
- Belknap, Michael, 751, 811
- Belknap, William S., 609
- Bell, Alfred, 26
- Bell, John, 463
- Bell, Louis, 668
- Bell, William H., 822
- Belleau Wood, 158–9, 163, 165, 414
- Bemis, Samuel Flagg, 538, 593, 595
- Benét, Stephen Vincent, 806
- Bennett, Edward M., 273
- Bennett, Michael J., 382, 390
- Bennett, Ralph, 181, 184
- Bennett, Robert F., 433
- Bennett, W. Lance, 287, 954
- Benting, Robert, 725
- Benton, Thomas Hart, 82, 89

- Berebitsky, William, 230, 485  
 Beringer, William, 111–13, 117, 464  
 Berkely, William, 472, 622, 623  
 Berman, Larry, 266  
 Bernard Board, 665–6  
 Bertholf, Ellsworth, 436  
 Bickel, Keith, 420–1  
 Biddle, James, 531  
 Biddle, Nicholas, 332  
 Biddle, Stephen, 851  
 Biddle, Tami Davis, 166, 180  
 Bigelow, John Jr., 146  
 Bin Laden, Osama, 302, 306, 372  
 Bird, Harrison, 30, 329  
 Birkhimer, William E., 807  
 Birtle, Andrew J., 129, 148  
 Black Boys, 625  
 Black Hawk War, 66–7, 479  
 black people, *see* African-Americans  
 Blackburn, Donald, 763–4  
 Blair, Clair, 175, 178, 180, 183 207, 222, 228, 369–70, 890  
 Blair, William, 642, 643, 993  
 Blount, Hamilton, 1028  
 Blumenson, Martin, 179, 366  
 Bodle, Wayne, 30, 323, 712  
 Bolander, Louis, 383  
 Bolivia, 576, 608, 612, 767  
 Bolster, Jeffrey, 382  
 Bonus Army, 655, 995, 1030  
 Boose, Donald W. Jr., 223, 242  
 Boot, Max, 509, 537, 590, 843, 848–50, 852, 972, 1004  
 Bosnia, 588, 589, 590, 914, 954  
 Bourke-White, Margaret, 821, 947  
 Bowers, William T., 230, 231  
 Bowlegs, Billy (Holata Micco), 69  
 Boxer Rebellion, 557–8, 782, 848–9, 902, 903, 946, 1029, 1035  
 Boyington, Gregory (“Pappy”), 423  
 Braddock, Edward, 475  
 Bradford, Alfred, 265  
 Bradford, James, 146, 333–4, 390, 394, 405, 463, 530, 543, 735, 779  
 Bradford, Richard, 532  
 Bradford, William, 1001  
 Bradford, Zeb, 754  
 Bradley, James, 204, 820, 923, 996  
 Bradley, James E., 24  
 Bradley, Omar, 161, 183–5, 188–9, 227, 502, 862, 873, 1020  
 Brady, Haldeen, 541  
 Brady, Mathew, 816–17, 818  
 Braim, Paul F., 162, 244  
 Braisted, William R., 197, 400, 555–60, 596  
 Brandes, Stuart, 976  
 Bristol, Mark L., 400, 559, 596  
 Bristow, Nancy K., 156–7  
 Britain  
     alliances, 593–4, 595, 596, 597–8, 600–1  
     Civil War, 102, 106, 465, 697  
     colonial insurrections, 620, 621, 622, 624  
     colonial wars, 10–17, 472–5, 880–1  
     Indian Wars, 61, 62, 63, 64–5  
     intelligence, 181, 700, 704  
     medals, 913  
     news media, 945, 947, 948, 953, 956  
     US Navy since 1920, 399  
     US war planning, 783, 784, 786, 788, 789  
     War of 1812, 48–53, 63, 64–5, 478, 665  
     War of American Independence, 22–35, 321, 323, 325, 329–31, 475, 593–5, 696, 991  
     wars of the early Republic, 39, 43, 48–53, 63, 64–5, 478, 665  
 WWI, 159, 160, 399, 595, 596, 597, 784, 945  
 WWII: in Asia/Pacific, 194, 200, 947; command structure, 498; in Europe, 174–5, 176–7, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182–3, 402  
 Brock, Isaac, 49, 63  
 Brodie, Bernard, 240, 681–2, 1006  
 Bronze Star Medal, 905, 908  
 Brown, John, 632  
 Brown, Robert K., 507, 509–12  
 Brown, Russell K., 510  
 Brown, Wesley, 402, 717  
 Browning, Robert S., 663  
 Bruce, Robert B., 159–60  
 Brzezinski, Zbigniew, 302  
 Buckner, Simon Bolivar, Jr., 369  
 Buell, Thomas B., 212, 789  
 Buena Vista, battle of, 81, 83, 87

- Buhl, Lance C., 391, 530  
 Bulge, battle of, 186–7, 366  
 Bureau of Marine Inspection and Navigation, 434–5, 438  
 Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen and Abandoned Lands, 640–1, 644, 646  
 bureau system, 344, 379, 389–90, 393  
 bureaucracy, 276, 299  
 Burgoyne, John, 26, 27, 331  
 Burke, Arleigh, 212, 501  
 Burke, Colin, 739  
 Burma, WWII, *see* China–Burma–India (CBI) theater  
 Burne, A. H., 104  
 Burns, Ken, 932, 935–6  
 Burnside, Ambrose, 667  
 Burr Conspiracy, 347  
 Burrell, Robert S., 416  
 Burrelli, Robert, 901, 903  
 Bush, George H. W.  
     First Gulf War, 286, 288, 308, 600  
     Latin America, 579, 580  
 Bush, George W.  
     American way of war, 850  
     civil–military relations, 862  
     democracy promotion, 589  
     global war on terrorism, 298, 303–9, 310, 311–12, 600, 1009  
     Hurricane Katrina, 658  
     military–industrial complex, 967  
     Second Gulf War, 289, 290, 293, 308–9, 312, 600, 1009–10  
 Bush, Vannevar, 739  
 Bushemi, John, 820  
 Bussey, Charles M., 231  
 Butler, Smedley D., 422, 559, 903  
  
 Calhoun, Fredrick S., 155  
 Calhoun, John C., 340, 348, 478, 507–8  
 California, 79, 80–2  
 Calingaert, Daniel, 244  
 Callan, John F., 806  
 Cambodia, 264, 586, 611, 952, 1040  
 Cameron, Craig, 420, 820  
 Cameron, James, 950  
 Campbell, Craig, 933  
 Campbell, Jacqueline Glass, 116  
 Campbell, Kenneth J., 607  
 Campbell, R. Thomas, 460, 463, 466  
  
 Campbell, Randolph B., 77  
 Canada, 478–9, 510, 528, 621, 786  
     air defense, 448, 683–4, 686  
     coastal defense, 672  
     Cold War, 448  
     Indian Wars, 61, 63, 133  
     War of 1812, 49, 50–1, 52–3, 478  
     War of American Independence, 23, 24, 26, 27, 31, 331  
 Canney, Donald L., 380, 388, 390, 430  
 Capa, Robert, 820, 827–8, 947  
 Caperton, William B., 543, 549  
 Carpenter, Charles I., 726  
 Carpenter, Ted Galen, 599  
 Capra, Frank, 934  
 Capron, Walter, 430, 433, 434, 435–6, 437, 438  
 Caribbean  
     Cuba, *see* Cuba  
     early 20thC interventions, 536–40, 545–9, 609–10, 781  
     Grenada, 418, 578–9, 581, 953  
     late 20thC interventions, 574–5, 578–9, 580–1, 590  
     military advisors, 612  
     military music, 837  
     Quasi-War, 43–4  
     War of American Independence, 28, 29–30, 31, 34, 330  
 Carl D. Bradley, 441  
 Carlisle Peace Commission, 28, 29  
 Caroline Islands, 787  
 Caron, George R., 210  
 Carr, Caleb, 510  
 Carr, Lois Green, 620  
 Carranza, Venustiano, 541–2  
 Carroll, George, 819  
 Carroll, James, 273, 265  
 Carroll, John S., 952  
 Carroll, Peter, 511  
 Carter, Jimmy, 301, 302, 577, 578, 768  
 Cary, Lorin Lee, 626  
 Casey, Robert J., 196  
 Castro, Fidel, 573, 580  
 Catton, Bruce, 107  
 cavalry, 78, 87, 111, 127, 128, 130, 144, 166, 236, 264, 268, 365, 485, 541, 570, 696, 697, 713, 715, 763, 819

- cemeteries, 992–3, 994, 995, 996, 1035, 1036, 1037–9, 1041
- censorship, 100, **941–61**
- Central America
- early 20thC interventions, **536–45**, **549–50**
  - late 20thC interventions, 577, 578, 579–80, 581
  - military advisors, 612
  - news media, 954
- Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
- creation, 701
  - Korean War, 235, 237
  - Latin America, 573, 574, 577, 578
  - Vietnam War, 512
  - war on terrorism, 298, 299, 301, 302, 309
- Certificate of Merit, 900–1, 904
- Cervera, Pascual, 144, 145, 545
- Chambers, John Whiteclay, 2, 154, 156, 362, 887
- Chambers, Washington Irving, 394
- Campbell, Thomas R., 710
- Chandrasekaran, Rajiv, 291
- Changgin Reservoir, *see* Chosin Reservoir
- Chapelle, Dicky, 951
- Chapelle, Howard I., 332–3, 380, 429
- chaplains, **722–8**
- Chappell, John D., 209
- chemical weapons, 164–5, 243
- Cheney, Richard, 288, 488, 850, 954
- Cheever, Charles E., 807
- Chiang Kai-Shek, 200, 367, 368, 559, 610
- Chile, 301, 531, 576–7, 612
- China
- 19thC alliances, 595
  - 19thC naval policy, 531–2
  - Korean War, 226, 229, 234, 237–8, 240–3, 244–5, 274, 369
  - post-WWI US Navy, 400
  - US policy 1899–1927, 555, **557–9**
  - WWII, *see* China–Burma–India (CBI)
  - theater
- China–Burma–India (CBI) theater, 194, 196, 197, **200–1**, 367–8, 610, 764
- Chosin Reservoir, 227, 238–9, 925
- Churchill, Winston, 177, 179, 182, 187, 597
- Cincinatti, Society of, 992, 1026
- cinema, **918–38**, 957, 1022
- citizen soldiers, **472–90**, 714–15
- see also* militia; National Guard
- citizenship, 887, 892
- civil defense, 688–9
- civil disorders, 351, 481, 487–8, **650–7**, 1029
- civil–military relations, **856–65**
- Civil War, 107–9, 349, 859–60
  - ethics, 1002–3, 1011
  - Indian Wars of the trans-Mississippi west, 131–2
  - Korean War, 1007
  - Philippine–American War, 148–9, 352
  - Reconstruction, 640
  - US Army to 1900, 338, 345–7, 349–52
  - WWI, 158, 860, 862
- civil rights movement, 279, 280, 301, 655–6, 890
- Civil War, **99–118**
- armies, 100, 102–5, 106–7, 109–12, 113–15, 348–9, **454–8**, 883–5
  - care for the dead, 992–3, 1035
  - civil–military relations, 107–9, 349, 859–60
  - coastal defenses, 667
  - communications, 734
  - ethics, 1003
  - in films, 919–20, 927, 932
  - Indian Wars and, 128–9
  - intelligence, 696–7
  - medals and decorations, 901, 902, 911
  - memory, 991, 992–4
  - mercenaries, 508, 510–11
  - military justice, 806, 810–11
  - military–industrial complex, 971–2
  - militia, 480–1
  - minorities, 115, 458, 480, 481, 754–5, 883–5, 994, 1028
  - music, 834–5
  - navies, 116–17, 382, 389–90, **460–8**, 525, 527–8, 885
  - news media, 943–4
  - order and discipline, 749, 751, 753, 754–5
  - photography, 816–17, 818, 822
  - sports, 1018–19
  - US Marine Corps, 413
  - veterans' movements, 1026–8



- war on terrorism, 299–300  
 women, 116, 870–1  
*see also* Reconstruction
- Clark, Ezra, 431–2  
 Clark, George B., 414, 544, 558  
 Clark, George Rogers, 30  
 Clark, Mark W., 179, 188, 227, 244  
 Clark, Robert N. S., 669  
 Clark, Wesley, 863  
 Clark, William Bell, 329, 330, 332, 333, 509  
 Clarke, Dwight, 80  
 Clarke, Jeffrey J., 185, 366  
 Clarke, Robert, 303, 308, 447  
 class relations, 351, 653  
 Clifford, Clark, 258  
 Clifford, Kenneth, 420  
 Clinch, Duncan, 68  
 Clinton, Bill, 302–3, 307–8, 580, 589, 690, 862, 1011  
 Clinton, Henry, 26, 28, 30–1, 32, 33  
 Coakley, Robert W., 632, 633, 635  
 coalitions, **593–601**  
 coastal defenses, **662–73**  
   early Republic, 42, 43, 340–1, 663, 664–6  
   post-WWI, 400, 671  
   War of American Independence, 329–30, 662–3  
 Cochran, Henry Clay, 414  
 Cochran, Jacqueline, 872–3  
 Cochrane, Alexander F. I., 51, 52  
 code-breaking, **181–2**, 208–9, 700, 738–9  
 Coffman, Edward M., 59, 130, 159, 160–1, 343, 349–50, 363, 364, 558, 595, 711, 748, 844, 857, 883, 886, 1003  
 Cohen, Eliot A., 237, 287, 293, 488, 850, 862, 111  
 Cohen, Henry, 778  
 Cohen, Theodore, 568  
 Cold War, 189, **272–81**, 403–7, 447–50, 487  
   air defense, 682–90, 740  
   alliances, 597–600  
   civil–military relations, 858, 860–1  
   communications, 740–1  
   ethics, 1006–8  
   in films, **925**, 928–9  
   intelligence, 279, 700–2, 703–4, 741, 825  
   Latin America, 572–80, 581, 598  
   medals and decorations, 909  
   mercenaries, 511–12  
   military advisors, 610–13  
   military attachés, 608–9  
   military–industrial complex, 275, 966, 969, 970, 975–8  
   post-WWII occupations, 567–9  
   Special Operations Forces, 766  
   sports, 1022–3  
   war planning, **791–4**  
   *see also* Korean War; Vietnam War
- Cole, Allan B., 532  
 Cole, Bernard D., 400, 559  
 Cole, Charles F., 235  
 Cole, Hugh M., 366  
 Cole, Merle T., 670  
 Cole, Robert A., 236  
 Cole, Ronald H., 393, 397, 503, 579–80, 587, 652–3 68  
 Coleman, Bradley Lynn, 1039–40  
 Coleman, James C. and Irene S., 663  
 Coles, Harry L., 368, 791  
 Coles, Henry, 567  
 Coletta, Paolo E., 372, 39, 394, 403, 500, 558, 605, 781  
 Collins, J. Lawton, 183–4, 186, 227  
 colonial era  
   chaplains, 722–3  
   coastal defense, 662  
   ethics, 1001–2  
   imperial wars, **9–17**, 472–5, 508, 880–1  
   insurrections, **620–6**  
   military justice, 802–3  
   minorities, 880–1  
   ways of war, 845–6  
   women, 869  
 combat badges, 914–15  
 commemoration, 990–7, 1036–8  
 communications, 184, 237, 733–42, 948, 1012  
 communications, sea lines, 177, 402, 785, 787  
 communism  
   Cold War, 259, 261, 272–4, **278–9**, 281, 404, 417, 766, 768, 787, 924, 935–6, 950, 1006

- communism (*cont'd*)  
 global war on terrorism, 300, 301  
 Latin America, 572–3, 574–6, 577–9, 580, 581  
 post-WWII occupations, 182, 567–8  
 Special Operations Forces, 766, 768  
 WWII, 182, 200
- Condit, Doris M., 226
- Confederacy, 100–4, 109–17, 348–9, 389, 667  
 intelligence, 696–7  
 memory, 993  
*see also* Reconstruction
- Confederate Army, **454–8**, 510–11  
 chaplains, 725  
 communications, 734  
 leadership, 102–4, 107, 109–13, 348–9, 456, 457  
 military justice, 806, 811  
 minorities, 885  
 music, 835  
 order and discipline, 751, 753  
 soldiers' experiences, 113–14, 115, 455, 456, 457
- Confederate Navy, **460–8**, 510, 710, 734
- Confederate States Marine Corps, 460, **466–7**
- Confederation of New England, 472
- Congressional Gold Medal, 900
- Connelly, Thomas L., 109, 110, 457
- Conner, David, 82
- conscription, *see* Draft
- constabulary army  
 to 1900, 342, 345, 347, 350, 352  
 post-WWII, 569–70, 610
- Containment Policy, 228, 274, 307, 598–9, 791
- Continental Air Defense Command (CONAD), 683, 685
- Continental Army, **321–6**, 331, 338–9, 475–6, 508–9  
 chaplains, 723  
 coastal defenses, 663  
 intelligence, 696  
 military justice, 803  
 minorities, 881–2  
 music, 833  
 mutinies, 749  
 training, 712, 752  
 women, 869–70
- Continental Marines, 330, 331, 333, 334, 413
- Continental Navy, 42, **329–34**, 723, 882
- Coode's Rebellion, 610–20
- Cooke, James J., 161, 162, 163, 445
- Cooke, Philip St. George, 346–7, 605
- Cooper, Christopher, 685
- Cooper, James Fenimore, 44
- Cooper, Jerry M., 143, 350–1, 481–2, 487, 489–90, 653
- Cooper, Norman, 423
- Coral Sea, WWII, 205, 827
- Corbin, Margaret, 870
- Corby, William, 725
- Cordesman, Anthony H., 289, 293, 451
- Corregidor, 198, 367, 610, 669,
- Cornwallis, Charles, 2nd Earl, 26, 32–3
- Corson, William R., 261
- Costello, John, 194, 196
- Coumbe, Arthur T., 716–17
- counterinsurgency  
 Indian Wars, 129  
 Latin America, 573–4, 577, 578, 581  
 McNamara's policy, 370  
 mercenaries, 511  
 order and discipline, 750  
 Philippine–American War, 148–9, 780  
 Second Gulf War, 293, 1010  
 US Marine Corps, 418, 420–1
- counterintelligence, 695, 700
- counterterrorism, US Army, 310
- covert warfare, **762–70**  
 Korean War, 235, 765  
 Latin America, 573, 576–7, 578, 767, 768
- Cox, Caroline, 325, 746, 751, 752
- Cox, LaWanda, 643
- Crackel, Theodore J., 41, 347, 349, 476, 710, 859, 1019
- Crane, Conrad C., 187, 233, 241, 243, 447
- Crane, Verner, 11
- Creek War, 52, **63–5**
- Creveld, Martin van, 717–18
- Crock, Stan, 981
- Crockett, Davy, 75–6
- Crook, George, 126
- Crosby, Donald F., 726
- Crowe, Joan, 752
- Crowe, William J., 504, 863

- Crowl, Philip, 195, 388, 391, 415, 786, 790
- Cuba, 527–8, 612, 627, 669
- 20thC US interventions, 414–15, 528, 540, 545–7, 573, 804
- Cold War, 580, 608: *see also* Cuban Missile Crisis
- Cuban Revolution, 511
- Cuban–Spanish War, 139–42, 944, 945
- photography, 818
- Spanish–American War, 144–5, 149, 414, 482, 536–7, 545, 605, 698, 779, 818, 1004, 1035
- and Grenada, 578–9
- Mariel boatlift, 577
- war plans, 781, 786
- Cuban Missile Crisis, 404–5, 448, 574, 689, 702, 704, 741, 825
- Culpeper's Rebellion, 620
- Cunliffe, Marcus, 106, 342–3, 346, 347, 476, 856
- Curry, Cecil B., 262–3
- Curtis, Samuel Ryan, 90
- Custer, George A., 125–6, 127–8, 920
- Cutler, Thomas, 207
- cyberwarfare, 311
- D-Day landings, *see* Normandy campaign
- Dade, Francis L., 68
- Dale, Richard, 46, 834
- Dana, Napoleon Jackson Tecumseh, 90
- Daniel, Larry J., 457
- Daniels, George C., 1020
- Daniels, Josephus, 393, 714, 735, 783
- Daniels, Roger, 655, 995
- Dannenmaier, William D., 230
- Darlan, Jean Francois, 177
- Davis, Benjamin O., 889
- Davis, Burke, 207, 495
- Davis, Forrest, 196
- Davis, George B., 807
- Davis, Richard Harding, 945
- Davis, Jefferson, 81, 87, 110, 113, 456, 463, 859
- Davis, Nicholas A., 725
- Davis, Peter, 937
- Davis, Vernon E., 749
- Davis, William C., 76, 389, 509, 816
- Daws, Gavan, 210
- Dawson, David, 419
- Dawson, Joseph G., 82, 116, 349, 642, 858
- De Pauw, Linda Grant, 324, 870, 875
- dead, the, *see* war dead
- Dean, William F., 243
- Decatur, Stephen, 47, 48
- DeConde, Alexander, 44–5, 540, 594
- decorations and medals, **899–916**
- defense industry, *see* military–industrial complex
- defense unification, **497–504**
- defensive-mindedness, 109–12
- democracy promotion, 585, **589–91**
- demographic shifts, 275–7
- Denikin, Anton D., 607
- Denmark Vesey's Rebellion, 629–31
- D'Estaing, Charles-Hector, 31–2, 594
- Devers, Jacob, 185, 188, 189
- Dick, Charles W., 482
- Diem, Bui, 266
- Diem, Ngo Dinh, 267, 370–1
- discipline, *see* order and discipline
- disease, *see* sickness
- dissidents, military, 278–9
- Distinguished Flying Cross, 905, 907–8
- Distinguished Service Cross, 901, 903, 907
- Distinguished Service Medal, 901, 903, 904, 907
- Dobak, William A., 130, 131 885
- documentaries, **931–7**
- Dodge, Grenville M., 697
- Dodge, Richard Irving, 126–7
- Dollar Diplomacy, 540, 543, 547, 572
- Dominican Republic, 155, 538–9, 543, 548–9, 574–5, 581, 612, 848–9
- Domino Theory, 267
- Doniphan, Alexander W., 81–2
- Donnelly, Ralph, 413, 418, 466, 467, 889
- Donnelly, William M., 230–1, 485, 486
- Doolittle, James H., 181, 196, 754
- Doty, Charles E., 818
- Doubleday, Abner, 90
- Douglas, David Duncan, 881
- Dowd, Gregory Evans, 16, 62, 64, 625, 881
- Dower, John W., 212, 446, 569, 750, 1006
- Doyle, William, 656

- Draft, 211, 231, 299, 362, 365, 473, 479, 480, 485, 487, 625, 634, 712, 715, 746–8, 837, 874, 883, 887, 891, 1008, 1021, 1023–4, 1030  
     Vietnam War, 277, 281, 371, 1023–4  
     WWI, 156, 158, 362–3, 364  
 Drummer's War, 10  
 Dudley, Thomas Haines, 697  
 Dudley, Wade, 50  
 Duff, John B., 631  
 Dulles, John Foster, 244  
 Dunbar, John R., 624  
 Duncan, David Douglas, 821  
 Duncan, Stephen M., 488  
 Durkin, Joseph, 463  
 Dye, Ira, 382, 385  
 Dyess, Aquilla James, 424  
  
 early Republic  
     civil–military relations, 856–7  
     coastal defenses, 42, 43, 340–1, 663, 664–6  
     ethics, 1002–3  
     foreign wars, **39–53**, 476–9, 509, 664–5, 882  
     Indian Wars, 52, **59–70**, 339, 477, 479  
     medals and decorations, 899–900  
     memory, 991–2  
     military justice, 803–4, 805  
     military music, 833–4  
     military–industrial complex, 970–1  
     minorities, 882–3  
     news media, 944  
     rebellions in, 509, **632–5**, 970  
     women, 871  
     *see also* US Army to 1900; US Navy 1794–1860  
 Eastern Solomons, battle of, 206  
 Eastwood, Clint, 923  
 Eaton, William, 46, 47–8, 509  
 Edson, Merritt A. (“Red Mike”), 422  
 education and training, **709–18**  
     ethics, 1011–12  
     order and discipline, 747–8, 752, 753–4  
     reservists, 484, 486–7, 715  
     sports, 1019  
     war planning, 780–1  
     women, 717, 874  
  
 Edwards, Morris O., 807  
 Egerton, Douglas R., 629, 630  
 Eicher, David J., 112  
 1812, war of, *see* War of 1812  
 Eisenhower, Dwight  
     air defense, 684–5  
     alliance policy, 599  
     civil rights, 655–6  
     defense unification, 501  
     intelligence, 701  
     Korean War, 244–5, 370  
     military–industrial complex, 966, 982–3  
     National Guard, 487  
     news media, 947, 948  
     operations in Latin America, 573  
     sports, 1020–1  
     WWII, 174, 177–8, 181, 182, 183, 185, 186, 189, 366–7, 790  
 Eisenhower, John S. D., 92, 159, 541–2, 859  
 Ekelund, Robert H., 117  
 El Salvador, 578, 580, 768–9, 782, 822  
 Elisofon, Eliot, 821  
 Elliot, Richard Smith, 90  
 Ellis, Earl H. (“Pete”), 422  
 Elshtain, Jean, 1009  
 embedded correspondents, 958–60  
 Endicott fortifications, 668, 669  
 Eniwetok, 820  
 Ent, Uzal W., 236  
 Estes, Kenneth, 421  
 ethics, **1000–13**  
 ethnohistory, 14–15  
 Ettinger, Albert, 163  
 Europe  
     Civil War legacy, 106  
     Cold War planning, 792, 793  
     colonial wars, 9–17, 474–5, 880–1  
     global war on terrorism, 303–4  
     Monroe Doctrine, 595  
     post-WWII defense, 598, 599–600  
     US security needs and, 529, 537, 538  
     War of American Independence in, 30, 34–5, 330–1  
     WWI, 153, 158–66, 483–4, 784  
     WWII, 178–89, 365–7, 368–9, 402, 437, 446: advisors, 610; intelligence, 181–2, 699, 700; photography, 820, 821, 825;

- special operations, 764–5; war  
 planning, 788, 790–1  
*see also specific countries*  
 evacuation operations, 585, 586–7  
 Evans, Steven, 430, 431, 432, 435  
 exploration, 532  
  
 Faas, Horst, 822  
 Falkland Islands, 526, 531, 953, 956  
 Fall, Bernard, 259–60  
 Fallows, James, 982–3  
 Fannin, James Walker, 76  
 Faust, Drew Gilpin, 115, 871, 1034,  
 1041  
 Faymonville, Philip Ries, 607  
 Feaver, Peter, 864–5, 1011  
 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI),  
 298, 299, 301  
 Federalist–Republican divide, 40–3, 347,  
 477–8, 594–5, 665, 991–2  
 Feifer, George, 205, 209  
 Ferrell, Robert, 90, 162, 167, 363, 596  
 Fidell, Eugene R., 810  
 Field Service Regulations (FSR), 167  
 filibusters, 507, 510, 511  
 Fillmore, Millard, 527  
 film, **918–38**, 957, 1022  
 First World War, *see* World War I  
 Fischer, David Hackett, 322, 325, 475,  
 991  
 Fiske, Bradley, 394, 735, 781  
 Fitzgerald, F. Scott, 168  
 Fleek, Sherman L., 81, 82  
 Fletcher, Frank F., 542  
 Fletcher, Frank Jack, 205  
 Flexible Response policy, 370  
 Flinn, Kelly, case, 1011  
 Florida, Seminole Wars, 65–6, 67–9  
 Foner, Philip S., 140, 653–4  
 Ford, Daniel, 200, 515  
 Ford, Gerald, 301, 308, 577, 717, 1011  
 Ford, John, 824, 920, 934, 936  
 Ford, Nancy Gentile, 157–8, 860, 886  
 Forrestal, James V., 403, 500, 861  
 fortifications, coastal, 662–8, 673  
 Foster, Gaines M., 657–8  
 Fowler, William, 116, 330, 331, 333,  
 386  
 Fox, Gustavus, 117, 389–90  
  
 France  
 alliances, 593–5, 596, 599  
 colonial rebellions, 621  
 colonial wars, 10–17, 474, 475  
 Haiti, 547  
 medals and decorations, 913  
 Quasi-War, **43–5**, 299  
 sports, 1020  
 Vietnam War, 260, 265–6, 611  
 War of American Independence, 22, 25,  
 27–9, 30–4, 593–5  
 WWI, **158–66**, 435, 483–4, 595, 784,  
 1036, 1037, 1038  
 WWII, 177, 182–5, 366, 437, 765  
 Frank, Richard B., 202, 209–10, 368, 415  
 Franke, Volker, 718  
 Franklin, Benjamin, 624, 696  
 Frazier, John B., 726  
 free security, 696, 682  
 Freedmen's Bureau, 640–1, 644, 646  
 Freehling, William, 113  
 Freeman, Douglas S., 102, 103, 104, 174,  
 456–7  
 Frémont, John Charles, 80, 82, 697  
 French, Samuel Gibbs, 90  
 Friedberg, Aaron, 970  
 Fries's Rebellion, 635  
 frontier insurrections, **623–6**  
 Fuller, J. F. C., 103–5, 796  
 Fuller, Samuel, 919  
  
 Gabriel Prosser's Rebellion, 628–9  
 Gabriel, Richard A., 262, 371, 1008  
 Gache, Louis-Hippolyte, 725  
 Gaddis, John L., 273, 567, 598, 599, 600  
 Gage, Thomas, 23, 24  
 Gaines, Edmund P., 340–1  
 Gallagher, Gary, 113, 114  
 Gallagher, James, 820  
 Galloway, Joe, 264, 959  
 Gansler, Laura Leedy, 871  
 Gardner, Alexander, 817, 818, 827  
 Garner, Jay, 288–9  
 Gates, Horatio, 27, 30, 508–9, 856, 900  
 Gates, John M., 129, 148, 350, 361,  
 554–5, 750  
 Gates, Robert, 295  
 Gates, Thomas, 501  
 Gavin, Lettie, 158

- gays, 278, 881–2, 888, 889: *see also*  
homosexuals
- Geiger, Roy S., 423
- Gelfand, H. Michael, 403, 717
- George III, 23–4, 34, 329, 856
- Germain, Lord George, 25, 26, 28, 31
- German-Americans, 883–4
- Germany  
Berlin airlift, 447  
military attachés, 607  
news media, 946  
post-WWII occupation, 368, 565, 566,  
567, 568, 569–70, 795  
US interventions in Mexico, 541, 542  
US war planning, 780, 781–2, 787, 788  
war crimes, 750  
WWII intelligence, 181–2, 700  
*see also* World War I; World War II
- Ghent, Treaty of, 52, 65
- Gilbert Islands, 202–3, 416, 423
- Gilje, Paul, 382
- Gillette, William, 642
- Gillmore, Quincy Adams, 634
- Glathar, Joseph, 644
- Glenn, Myra, 383, 752, 905
- global war on terrorism, **298–313**, 372  
alliances and coalitions, 600  
American way of war, 851  
ethics, 1009  
medals and decorations, 907, 912, 914  
military–industrial complex, 967, 980–1  
minorities, 891–2  
Philippine–American War, 149  
private military contractors, 513, 980  
Second Gulf War, 289, 306, 308–9  
Special Operations Forces, 769  
in television, 929  
US Coast Guard, 310, 441  
US Navy, 309, 310, 407  
war planning, 794
- Gold Star Mothers, **1038**
- Goldwater–Nichols Act, 406, 413, 503,  
504, 702, 768, 793, 863
- Goliad massacre, 76, 91
- Good Conduct Medal, 906, 910–11
- Gordon, Michael R., 286–7, 288, 290,  
372, 794, 862, 1010
- Gorshkov, Sergei, 405
- Gowling, Nik, 959
- Grand Army of the Republic (GAR), 993,  
1027–8
- Grandstaff, Mark, 349, 716
- Grant, Susan-Mary, 115
- Grant, Ulysses S., 643, 845, 851, 862,  
1027  
Civil War, 103, 104, 105, 107, 110,  
111–12  
intelligence, 697  
Mexican War, 78, 79, 80, 85, 88  
news censorship, 943
- Graves, Dianne, 870
- Graves, Donald G., 49, 51
- Graves, Ralph, 139
- Graves, Thomas, 33
- Graves, William S., 560
- Gray, Colin, 847–8
- Great Britain, *see* Britain
- Great War, *see* World War I
- Great War for Empire, *see* Seven Years War
- Great White Fleet, 393, 395, **556–7**
- Greene, Jerome A., 129, 132, 663
- Greene, Nathaniel, 32, 59, 869, 900
- Grenada, 418, 578–9, 581, 953
- Grimsley, Mark, 116, 344, 640
- Grotelueschen, Mark, 161, 164, 167, 754
- Groves, Leslie, 209
- Guadalcanal, 201–2, 206, 367, 402, 415,  
422, 437, 820, 921
- Guadalupe Hidalgo, Treaty of, 85, 540
- Guam  
Spanish–American War, 145, 436  
WWII, 203, 204
- Guantanamo Bay, 837, 1010
- Guatemala, 301, 503, 576, 578, 580, 581,  
608, 612, 704, 785
- Guevara, Che, 576
- Gulf Wars, *see* Iraq, Gulf Wars
- Guttridge, Leonard, 47, 50, 381
- Haas, Michael E., 235
- Haegeli, Evan, 16
- Hagerman, Edward, 111, 243, 345, 348
- Hahn, Steven, 644–5, 646, 647
- Haig, Alexander, 302
- Haiti, 155, 407, 415, 537–8, 540, 547–8,  
572, 580–1, 589–90, 609, 612,  
627, 769, 848–9, 954
- Halben, H. S., 63



- Halberstam, David, 258, 267, 273, 274, 822, 861–2, 951–2
- Haley, P. Edward, 542
- Halleck, Henry, 340
- Hallion, Richard P., 233, 287, 850
- Halsey, William, 196, 201, 206, 207, 209, 212, 608, 789
- Hamburger Hill, 260–1 926, 937
- Hamburger, Kenneth E., 241
- Hamilton, Alexander, 40–1, 340, 348, 635, 856, 970–1
- Hamilton, Charles S., 86–7, 88
- Hamilton, Lee H., 312
- Hancock, Joy Bright, 873
- Hancock, Winfield Scott, 654
- Haney, Eric, 768
- Hanson, Victor Davis, 846–7, 851
- Harcourt, John, 647
- Harding, Seth, 332
- Harding, Warren G., 167, 540, 542, 995, 1030
- Hare, Jimmy, 818
- Harford, Lee S., 717
- Harmar, Josiah, 60, 61
- Harney, William S., 68, 346
- Harper's Ferry raid, 632
- Harris, Mark Edward, 827–8
- Harris, Steven L., 165
- Harrison, Benjamin, 885
- Harrison, William Henry, 50, 62, 63, 478–9
- Hashim, Ahmed, 290
- Hasian, Marouf Jr., 810
- Hattaway, Herman, 111–12
- Hattendorf, John B., 144, 391, 712–13, 779, 1002
- Haughton, Andrew R., 114, 457
- Hauser, William L., 261, 758
- Hay, John, 146, 595, 860
- Hay-Bunau Varilla Treaty, 544
- Hay-Herrin Treaty, 544
- Hayde, Thomas, 292
- Hayes, Grace P. 28, 498, 789
- Hayes, Ira, 423–4
- Hayes, John Coffee, 87
- Hayes, John D., 712
- Hayes, Mark, 779
- Hayes, Rutherford B., 481, 653, 654
- Haynes, Robert F., 500
- Hayward, William, 165
- Headrick, Daniel, 735
- health care, *see* medical care
- Healy, David F., 149, 543, 546, 548
- Hearst, William Randolph, 545, 944, 945
- Heinl, Robert Jr., 236, 412, 417
- Henderson, Archibald, 467
- Henderson, G. F. R., 102–3
- Henderson, William Darryl, 717
- Hennessey, Michael A., 417–18
- Herr, Michael, 265
- Herring, George, 258
- Hersey, John, 201, 209
- Hess, Earl J., 114
- Hessian troops, 322–3, 508, 514, 1002
- Heywood, Charles, 713
- Hickey, Donald, 48, 49, 52, 63, 665, 859
- Higgins, Marguerite, 232, 239
- Higginson, Thomas Wentworth, 629, 631, 632
- Hill 937, *see* Hamburger Hill
- Hill, Daniel Harvey, 90
- Hill, Jim Dan, 78, 390, 473, 489,
- Hillman, Elizabeth L., 749, 810, 1007
- Hillman, Rolfe L., 162–3
- Hindle, Brooke, 624
- Hispaniola, *see* Dominican Republic; Haiti
- Hitchcock, Ethan Allen, 90
- Hitler, Adolf, 175, 184, 185, 186, 187
- Hobsbawm, Eric, 990
- Hodge, Courtney, 184, 185, 188, 189
- Hodge, John R., 223–4
- Hoffman, Frank G., 775, 795, 849
- Hoffman, Jon, 764
- Hofmann, George F., 607
- Hogue, James K., 349, 642, 646–7
- Holloway, James L. III, 403–4
- Holmes, Linda Goetz, 211
- home front, WWI, 157–8
- homeland security
- air defense, 681–90, 740
  - civil disorders, 650–7
  - coastal defenses, 310, 662–73: *see also* US Coast Guard
  - early American insurrections, 619–36
  - natural disasters, 650, 651, 657–8
  - Reconstruction, 640–8
  - war on terrorism, 298–301, 302, 303, 307–8, 310

- homosexuals, 278, 873, 881–2, 888, 892, 1011
- Hone, Thomas, 401
- Hone, Trent, 401
- Hooker, Joseph, 697
- Hoover, Herbert, 540, 542, 655, 1030
- Hoover, J. Edgar, 299
- Hopkins, Ezek, 330, 332
- Houston, Sam, 76–7, 78
- Houston riots, 804
- Howard, Oliver O., 641, 644
- Howe, Peter, 822
- Howe, William, 26, 27, 30
- Huchthausen, Peter A., 609
- Hudson, James J., 163–4
- Hughes, Daniel, 846
- humanitarian operations
- Gulf Wars and, 288–9
  - post-WWII, 566, 569
  - rescuing US citizens, **586–7**
  - see also* natural disasters
- Huntington, Robert W., 414
- Huntington, Samuel P., 341–2, 343, 344, 351, 709, 711, 864, 1007
- Hurricane Katrina, 441, 658
- Huston, James A., 232, 982
- Huston, John, 824, 920, 934
- Hutton, Paul Andrew, 126, 351
- Hynes, Samuel, 990
- Ia Drang valley, battle of, 264
- identity studies, 15
- immigrant soldiers, WWI, 157–8
- imperial wars, *see under* colonial era
- imperialism
- Philippine–American War, 148–9
  - WWI, 153, 154
  - see also* Central America
- Inchon Landing, 222, 236–7, 239, 274, 369, 403, 765, 821, 949
- India, WWII, *see* China–Burma–India (CBI) theater
- Indians, *see* Native Americans
- industrialization, 971–2
- industry, *see* military–industrial complex
- insurgency, Second Gulf War, 290, 291, 292, 293
- intelligence, **695–705**
- Cold War, 279, 700–2, 703–4, 741, 825
  - Korean War, 235, 237
  - military attachés, 608, 703
  - photography, 819, 825–6
  - satellites, 701, 741
  - Second Gulf War, 289, 290, 309
  - signals, 738–9
  - surveillance on civilians, 657
  - war on terrorism, 298–9, 301, 309
  - WWII, **181–2**, **208–9**, 699–700, 738–9
- Internet
- digital photography, 828
  - global war on terrorism, 311
  - reporting via, 955–6, 957, 961
  - “invented traditions”, 990
- Iran
- global war on terrorism, 301, 302, 312
  - Gulf Wars and, **285**, 286
  - hostage crisis, 768
- Iraq, Gulf Wars, **284–93**, 371–2
- air defense, 687–8
  - alliances, 600–1
  - American way of war, 849–50, 851
  - civil–military relations, 861–2
  - democracy promotion, 590–1
  - ethics, 1009–10
  - in films, 927, 931
  - medals and decorations, 907, 912, 914, 915
  - military–industrial complex, 978, 980
  - nation-building, 569
  - National Guard/reservists, 488–9
  - news media, 287, 292, 953, 954–5, 958, 959, 960, 961
  - photography, 822, 828
  - private military contractors, 513, 980–2
  - Special Operations Forces, 768, 769
  - sports, 1018
  - television, 929, 953
  - US Coastguard, 440–1
  - veterans’ movements, 1031, 1032
  - war crimes, 751
  - war planning, 794
  - war on terrorism, 289, 306, 308–9, 311, 312, 372, 407
  - women, 292, 874–5

- Irish soldiers, 883  
     Civil War, 458, 883, 884  
     Mexican War, 90–1, 509, 749, 883  
     War for Independence, 324  
     WWI, 163
- Islamic extremism, Barbary Wars, 45
- Islamist groups, war on terrorism, 301, 302, 303, 305
- Isley, Jeter A., 415, 786, 790
- isolation thesis, 350–1
- isolationism, 595, 600
- Israel, 300, 304, 308, 511, 688, 695, 702, 718, 959
- Italy  
     post-war occupation of Trieste, 565, 566, 568  
     US war planning, 787  
     WWII, 177, **178–9**, **187–8**, 437, 750
- Iwo Jima, 202, 204, 416, 423–4, 820
- Jackson, Andrew, 52, 64–8, 80, 89, 340, 343, 526, 992
- Jackson, T. J. (“Stonewall”), 88, 102–3, 116
- Jamieson, Perry D., 109–10, 143, 146
- Janowitz, Morris, 747, 864, 1007
- Japan  
     “opening” of, 537  
     post-WWI US Navy, 399, 400, 785  
     post-WWII: alliances, 598–9;  
         occupation, 368, 565, 566, 568, 569, 795  
     US policy 1899–1927, 555, 556, 557  
     US war planning, 783, 785, 786, 787, 788, 790  
     WWII, 182, 194–213, 223, 367–8, 401–2, 415–16, 420, 922–3:  
         advisors, 610; air defense, 682;  
         ethics, 1006; intelligence, 208–9,  
         700; nuclear weapons, 209–10,  
         368, 446, 820–1; special  
         operations, 764; war crimes, 750,  
         1005
- Japanese-Americans, 755–6, 889, 909, 922, 1005–6
- Java Sea, 205
- Jay, John, 696, 856
- Jefferson, Thomas, 41, 42–3, 46, 62, 339, 347, 380, 477–8, 709, 834, 859
- Jesup, Thomas S., 68
- Johnson, Andrew, 641
- Johnson, David K., 166, 276
- Johnson, Douglas V., 162–3, 285
- Johnson, Hiram, 957
- Johnson, Louis, 861
- Johnson, Lyndon B., 263, 275, 371, 487, 574, 575, 656, 861, 936, 951, 1011
- Johnson, Michael P., 629, 630
- Johnson, Robert Erwin, 390, 435, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 531
- Johnson, Shoshana, 292
- Johnson, Timothy, 51, 85, 88, 352
- Johnston, Albert Sidney, 81, 457
- Johnston, Henry Phelps, 322
- Johnston, Joseph E., 88, 109–10, 457
- joint commands, **497–9**, 502, **503–4**, 793
- joint operations, 497, 498–9, 502–3, 504
- Jones, Archer, 109, 110, 111–12, 117, 372
- Jones, Clive, 981–2
- Jones, Jerry W., 164, 394
- Jones, John Paul, 330–1, 332, 333, 334, 509, 913
- Jones, Thomas ap Catesby, 52, 82, 526–7, 531, 734
- Jordan, David William, 620
- Joseph, Alvin M. Jr., 128, 204, 920
- journalists, *see* war correspondents
- Joy, C. Turner, 242
- justice, military, **802–12**  
     Cold War, 278–9, 280  
     ethics, 1007  
     US Marine Corps, 419  
     *see also* order and discipline
- Kahn, Herman, 688–9
- kamikaze forces, 204
- Kaplan, Laurence F., 308
- Kaplan, Lawrence S., 595, 598, 599, 600
- Karpinski, Janis, 875
- Kars, Marjoleine, 625
- Karsh, Efraim, 285
- Karsten, Peter, 143, 231, 352, 381, 391, 394, 587, 710, 1026
- Katcher, Philip, 456
- Katz, Friedrich, 541
- Katz, Barry, 699

- Katz, Mark, 817
- Kay, Marvin L. M., 625–6
- Kearny, Stephen Watts, 80, 81, 82, 87
- Keene, Jennifer D., 156, 995
- Keiser, Gordon W., 417, 500, 798
- Kellogg–Briand Pact, 596
- Kendall, George Wilkins, 78, 92, 942
- Kennedy, David M., 154, 155–6, 157
- Kennedy, Edward (Ted), 261, 949
- Kennedy, Greg, 286, 718
- Kennedy, John F., 263, 279, 370, 371, 695, 862, 910, 951, 1006
- civil defense, 689
  - civil rights, 656
  - Cuba, 448, 573, 574
  - Latin America, 448, 573–4
  - Special Operations Forces, 766
- Kennedy, Paul, 391, 532, 780
- Kennedy, William V., 953, 957–8
- Kennett, Lee, 211, 446
- Karr, Ronald Dale, 12
- Kerr, E. Bartlett, 210, 446
- Kerry, John, 309, 1032
- Kesselring, Albert, 188
- Keyes, Erasmus D., 90
- Khaled bin Sultan, 288
- Kim Il Sung, 225
- Kimball, Jeffrey, 266, 371
- Kimball, Sumner, 431, 432, 711
- Kimball, Warren, 597
- Kimmell, Huisband, 1006
- Kindsvatter, Peter S., 163, 264
- King, Charles, 123–4
- King, Edward L., 260–1
- King, Ernest, 212, 789, 851, 900
- King, Irving H., 429, 430, 431, 432, 711, 902
- King, Rodney, 651
- King George's War, 475, 1002
- King Phillip's War, 10, 472, 473, 880
- King William's War, 10, 1002
- King's Mountain, 476
- Kinkaid, Thomas, 207
- Kinnard, Douglas, 261–2 503
- Kirkham, Ralph W., 90
- Kissinger, Henry, 266, 599
- Knebel, Fletcher, 861, 925
- Knightley, Philip, 943, 945, 951, 957
- Knox, Donald, 229, 768
- Knox, Dudley, 226, 529
- Knox, Henry, 60, 477, 633
- Kohn, Richard H., 40, 60, 347, 476, 632–5, 857, 860, 864, 1002, 1003, 1011
- Koistinen, Paul, 155, 157, 389, 392, 394, 969–70
- Kolko, Gabriel, 258–9, 597
- Korea
- 19thC naval policy, 529
  - military advisors, 609, 610
  - post-WWII occupation, 565, 566, 610
- Korea-US Treaty of 1882, 609
- Korean War, **222–45**, 273, 274, 369–70
- alliances and coalitions, 598–9
  - care for the dead, 1039–40
  - civil–military relations, 861
  - communications, 739
  - ethics, 1007
  - in films, **925**, 928, 930, **936**, 1022
  - medals and decorations, 913, 914, 915
  - memory, 996, 997
  - military advisors, 610
  - military–industrial complex, 975
  - minorities, 231, 890
  - National Guard, 230–1, 485
  - news media, 239, 949–50
  - order and discipline, 749, 754
  - photography, 821
  - post-WWII occupation, 566
  - prisoners of war, 243, 245, 749, 1007
  - Reserves, 485–6
  - Special Operations Forces, 765–6
  - in television, 929, 936
  - US Air Force, 233–4, 447
  - US Coast Guard, 438
  - US Marine Corps, 227, 233, 234, 236, 238–9, 245, 417
  - US Navy, 226, 233, 234–5, 403–4
  - war crimes, 232–3, 751
  - women, 232, 277, 873–4
- Kosovo, 588, 589, 590, 862, 863, 914, 954
- Kristol, William, 308
- Kryder, Daniel, 890
- Krulak, Victor H., 263, 267, 412–13, 418, 500
- Ku Klux Klan, 647
- Kurds, 288–9
- Kurita, Takeo, 207

- Kuwait  
     First Gulf War, 286, 371–2, 488  
     private military contractors, 513  
 Kwajalein, 203
- labor disputes, 351, 481, 487–8, 651, 652–4, 1029
- Laidley, Theodore, 90
- Latour, Arsène Lacarrière, 52
- LaFayette, Marquis de, 480, 509, 511, 594, 881, 992
- LaFeber, Walter, 141, 154, 237, 539, 545
- Lamar, Mirabeau B., 77
- Lambert, Frank, 45–6, 48
- Langer, John D., 615
- Langer, William L., 165
- Langley, Harold, 383, 384, 753
- Langley, Lester, 511, 538, 572, 610
- Langley, Michael, 237
- Lanning, Michael Lee, 265, 895
- Lansdale, Edward G., 604
- Laos, military advisors, 611, 952, 1040
- Lapham, Bob, 763–4
- Larrabee, Eric, 175, 213, 860
- Larrabee, Harold, 594
- Latham, Andrew, 968, 969
- Latin America  
     military advisors, 609–10, 612  
     military attachés, 608  
     news media, 577, 953, 954  
     operations in, 1900–30, **536–50**, 781–2  
     operations in, 1961–2001, **572–81**, 590, 767, 768  
     US war planning, 781–2, 787  
     *see also* Caribbean
- Laurie, Clayton D., 652–3
- Laver, Harry, 479
- Lay, Bieme, 922
- Layton, Edwin T., 208, 700
- Leach, Douglas Edward, 11, 472, 474, 475, 1002
- leadership  
     Civil War, 102–5, 106–7, 109–13, 348–9, 456, 457, 462–3  
     US Marine Corps, 419–20  
     US Navy, 1794–1860, 381–2  
     Vietnam War, 260, 262–4  
     WWI, 160–1, 162, 166–7
- Lebanon, 302, 418, 587–8, 589, 769, 959
- League of Nations, 596
- Leckie, Robert, 227, 376
- Leckie, William H. and Shirley A., 127, 145, 744, 885
- Lee, Charles, 30, 509
- Lee, Fitzhugh, 1028
- Lee, Henry (“Light Horse Harry”), 635, 900
- Lee, Robert E., 461  
     Civil War, 100, 102, 103, 104, 105, 107, 109, 110, 456, 480, 697  
     intelligence, 697  
     Mexican War, 83, 88, 89  
     music, 835  
     news media, 944
- Lee, Samuel Phelps, 390
- Lee, Steven P., 1006
- Lee, Ulysses, 890
- Lee, Wayne E., 12, 485, 626, 845
- Leech, Margaret, 144, 146
- Legion of Merit, 904, 907
- Lehman, John, 406, 862
- Leisler’s Rebellion, 620–1
- Lejeune, John A., 421–2, 424
- LeMay, Curtis, 208, 213, 766, 861
- Lembcke, Jeffrey, 268, 996
- Lend-Lease Act, 175, 402, 442, 597, 607, 619
- Lengel, Edward, 162
- lesbians, 873, 892: *see also* homosexuals
- Levy, Howard, 809
- Levy, Uriah P., 385, 531
- Lewy, Guenter, 262
- Leyte landings, 374, 790
- Leyte Gulf, battle, 206–7, 948
- Libya, 177, 302, 404, 769
- Liddell Hart, Basil, 103–4, 106, 776
- life-saving medals, 905
- Life-Saving Service, 430, **432–3**, 902
- Lighthouse Service, 430, **433–4**
- Lincoln, Abraham, 1003  
     civil–military relations, 859  
     Civil War, 99, 104–5, 108–9, 117, 299, 390, 480, 734, 816  
     news media, 943  
     war dead, 902, 993  
     war with Mexico, 80
- Lincoln Brigade, 511
- Lincoln County War of 1878, 655

- Lincoln Laboratories, 686  
 Lind, Michael, 267, 853  
 Lind, William S., 798  
 Lindberg, Charles, 445, 908  
 Lindeman, Gerald F., 114, 211  
 Lindley, Ernest K., 196  
 Lindsay, James M., 306  
 Linn, Brian M., 148–9, 341, 348, 350, 352, 360, 361, 364, 400, 555, 556, 786, 843, 844, 845, 846  
 Little, Thomas D., 90  
 Little, William McCarty, 713  
 Little Bighorn, battle of, 125–6, **127–8**, 133, 901, 920  
 Little Rock Schools, 487, 632, 656  
 Little Round Top, battle of, 919  
 Little Turtle, 60, 61  
 Lodge, Henry Cabot, 147, 860  
 Lodge Act, 1950, 511–12, 766  
 Lofton, John, 630  
 London Treaty, 401  
 Long, David F., 44, 46, 50, 509, 530, 531, 605, 735  
 Long, Jeff, 76  
 Long, John, 780, 781  
 Long Island, battle of, 26, 329  
 Longstreet, James, 88  
 Lonn, Ella, 457–8, 508, 510, 806, 811, 883  
 LORAN navigation system, 438, 439  
 Lost Cause, idea of, 100, 101–2, 110, 113  
 Luce, Stephen B., 711–12, 781, 1004  
 Lukas, John, 179  
 Lukas, Richard C., 446  
 Luraghi, Raimundo, 461–2, 464  
 Luvaas, Jay, 106, 697  
 Lynch, Jessica, 292  
  
 MacArthur, Arthur, 149, 860  
 MacArthur, Douglas, 366, 610, 1020  
   Bonus Army, 655, 1030  
   civil–military relations, 860–1, 1007  
   coastal defenses, 671  
   Korean War, 226, 227, 236–8, 239–40, 274, 369, 370, 403, 417, 776, 1007  
   medals and decorations, 900, 915  
   news censorship, 947, 950  
   occupation of Japan, 368, 568  
   Philippines, 604  
   sports, 1020–1  
   WWI, 161–2  
   WWII, 199, 203, 208, 212–13, 274, 367, 498, 610, 789, 790, 1005  
 Mackenzie, Alexander S., 47, 806  
 Mackenzie, Ranald S. (“Bad Hand”), 126, 133  
 Mackin, Elton E., 163  
 Mackinder, Halford, 391  
 Maga, Tim, 210–11  
 MAGIC, 208, 700  
 Magoon, Charles E., 547  
 Mahan, Alfred Thayer, 43, 50, 142–3, 164, 197, 332, 388, 391–4, 529, 536, 538–9, 668–9, 713, 777, 779–80, 782, 784, 787, 860  
 Mahan, Dennis Hart, 340–1  
 Mahnken, Thomas, 607–8, 699  
 Mahon, John K., 49, 68, 477, 478, 489, 752  
 Makin Island, 827  
 Makiya, Kanan, 285  
 Malcolm, Ben, 235, 765  
 Malcomson, Robert, 51  
 Maloney, Linda M., 379, 384  
 Mallory, Stephen R., 460, 462, 463, 465, 710  
 maneuver theory, 287  
 Manhattan Project, 209  
 Manly, Basil, 725  
 March, Peyton C., 363, 364, 606, 698  
 Marianas Islands, 203, 204, 368, 416, 423  
   *see also* Guam; Saipan; Tinian  
 marines, 411–24, 466–7: *see also*  
   Confederate States Marine Corps;  
   US Marine Corps  
 Markel, Matthew, 419–20  
 Marshall, George C., 174, 176–7, 226, 276–7, 366, 597, 687, 790, 860, 900, 947  
 Marshall, S. L. A., 183, 238, 244, 925, 1007  
 Marshall Islands, WWII, 203, 368, 620, 787: *see also* Eniwetok; Kwajalein  
 Marszalek, John F., 107, 126, 944  
 martial law, 91–2, 655, 802, 811  
 Martin, Bessie, 806, 811  
 Martin, James Kirby, 323, 324, 881



- Martin, Joel W., 64  
 Maslowski, Peter, 365, 369, 640, 819–20, 828, 934  
 Matloff, Maurice, 175, 176, 177, 182, 365, 597, 789  
 Maurice, Frederick, 103, 859  
 Maury, Dabney Herndon, 90  
 Maury, Matthew, 463, 526, 532, 667  
 May, Charles A., 79  
 May, Ernest, 141, 154, 225, 574, 595  
 May, Glenn, 148–9  
 May, Robert E., 89, 510, 542  
 Mayo, Henry T., 542, 735  
 McAnaney, William, 806–7  
 McCaffrey, James M., 86  
 McClellan, George B., 88, 90, 91, 105, 106, 108, 605, 697  
 McComsey, John A., 807  
 McCormick, Charles, 621  
 McCormack, John, 858  
 McCully, Newton, 606, 607  
 McCulloch, Ben, 92  
 McCullough, David, 325, 544  
 McKee, Christopher, 42, 44, 47, 379, 381, 382, 383, 384, 778  
 McKinley, William, 140, 141, 142, 144, 145, 146, 147, 149, 545, 858  
 McManus, John C., 211  
 McMaster, H. R., 268, 503  
 McMurry, Richard, 457  
 McNamara, Robert  
     air defense, 686, 689  
     defense unification, 501–2, 503  
     Flexible Response policy, 370  
     intelligence, 701  
     Project 100,000, 276, 419  
     Reserves, 487  
 McPherson, James B., 666  
 McPherson, James M., 99, 100, 106, 114–15, 116, 455, 920  
 McWhiney, Grady, 90, 109, 110  
 Meade, George Gordon, 90  
 Medal of Honor, 126, 144, 231, 437, 728, 835, 901–3, 904  
 medals and decorations, **899–916**  
 medical care  
     Gulf Wars, 292–3  
     US Army to 1900, 147  
     US Army since 1900, 232  
     US Navy 1794–1860, **384**  
         *see also* sickness  
 medical personnel, combat badges, 914–15  
 medical photography, 822  
 Mediterranean  
     19thC naval policy, 531  
     Barbary Wars, 46–8  
     post-WWII US Navy, 404  
     US Coast Guard, 435, 437  
     WWII, 176–7, 178–9, 182, 437  
 memory, **990–7**, 1036–8  
 mercenaries, **507–14**  
 merchant marine, 715, 912–13  
 Meritorious Service Medal, 905, 908  
 Merli, Frank, 464–5  
 Merrell, James, 14  
 Merrill, Frank D., 200  
 Mexican War, 53, **73–92**, 341, 342, 352, 479–80, 509–10, 540  
     civil–military relations, 859  
     ethics, 1003  
     in films, 932  
     intelligence, 696  
     medals and decorations, 900–1  
     memory, 992  
     minorities, 883  
     news media, 92, 942–3  
     opposition to, 80  
     order and discipline, 752–3  
     photography, 92, 815–16  
     veterans' movements, 1026–7  
 Mexico, US interventions, 540–2, 782  
     Punitive Expedition, 361–2, 483, 539, 541, 819  
         *see also* Mexican War  
 Meyer, George, 781  
 Meyer, Leisa, 873  
 Meyerson, Harvey, 349  
 Midway, Battle of, 205–6, 208, 402, 700, 739, 949  
 Midway Island, 438, 528  
 Miles, Nelson A., 126, 132, 145, 146, 1028  
 militarism, 347  
 Military Assistance Advisor Groups (MAAGs), **610–13**  
 military–industrial complex, **966–83**  
     Cold War, 275, 966, 969, 970, 975–8  
     WWI, 154, 155, 157, 158, 972–4

- military operations other than war, *see*  
operations other than war
- militia, 339–41, **472–90**  
Civil War Reconstruction, 645–6  
colonial era, 13, 472–5, 621, 623–4,  
625, 880–1  
early Republic foreign wars, 39, 40–3,  
49, 52, 476–9, 752, 882  
early Republic rebellions, 477, 634  
in films, 919  
Indian Wars, 59–60, 64–5, 67, 69, 339,  
477, 479  
Mexican War, 81–2, 83–4, 86, 91, 341,  
479–80, 752–3  
minorities, 880–1  
order and discipline, 752–3  
Texas War for Independence, 74,  
479  
War of American Independence, 24, 30,  
32, 321, 339, 475–6  
*see also* National Guard
- Miller, Edward G., 185  
Miller, Edward S., 197, 201, 400, 556  
Miller, Lee, 821  
Miller, Stuart, 555  
Millett, Allan R., 2–3, 174, 222, 224,  
228, 365, 367, 379, 342, 343,  
412, 421, 422, 460, 546, 558,  
572, 610, 863  
Millis, Walter, 2, 140, 342, 856, 858  
minorities, **880–92**, 1005–6  
*see also* African-Americans; women
- Mitchell, Joseph B., 323  
Mitchell, Margaret, 100  
Mitchell, Peter M., 631  
Mitchell, Reid, 114  
Mitchell, Robert, 202  
Mitchell, William (“Billy”), 163–4, 166,  
365, 400, 445, 682, 900
- mobilization  
military–industrial complex, 969  
WWI, **155–8**, 362–3
- Model, Walter, 187, 188  
Moffett, William, 400  
Moltke, Helmuth von, 846  
Monahan, Evelyn, 83  
Monroe, James, 628, 992  
Monroe Doctrine, 537, 540, 595, 787  
Monterrey, 80–1, 82, 87
- Montgomery, Bernard, 177, 178, 184,  
185, 186  
Moore, Brenda, 873, 890  
Moore, Edwin W., 78  
Moore, Harold G. (“Hal”), 264, 371,  
710, 717, 926  
Moore, John, 234  
Moore’s Creek Bridge, 476  
Morgan, Daniel, 59, 476  
Morison, Samuel Eliot, 82, 104, 175,  
178, 180, 195, 205, 333, 394,  
402, 531, 738, 789, 791, 913,  
1003  
Mormon Battalion, 81, 82, 509–10  
Morris, Richard V., 46  
Morris, Robert, 330  
Morrison, James, 344, 346, 348, 710  
Mortain, 184  
Mossad, 701  
Mosse, George, 990–1  
Mossman, Billy C., 226  
Mott, T. Bentley, 606  
Mott, Thaddeus, 609  
movies, **918–38**, 957, 1022  
Moyar, Mark, 3, 267  
Moynihan, Daniel Patrick, 276  
Mullin, Gerald W., 628, 629  
Munro, Dana Gardner, 538, 543, 572  
Munro, Douglas, 437, 903  
Murray, Williamson, 174, 289, 365,  
718  
Murrow, Edward R., 946, 947, 950  
Murtha, John, 309  
music, 165, **833–9**  
Musicant, Ivan, 414  
mutiny, 325, 623, 719, 749, 755, 804  
My Lai massacre, 260, 261, 262–3, 419,  
751, 811  
Mydans, Carl, 820  
Myer, Albert J., 734  
Myers, John, 75  
Myers, John Twiggs, 414  
Myers, Richard, 850
- Nat Turner’s Rebellion, 627, 631–2
- nation-building  
the army and, **131–2**  
global war on terrorism, 306, 311  
post-WWII occupations, 569

- National Guard, **481–90**  
 chaplains, 728  
 civil disorders, 487–8, 651, 653, 654, 655, 656–7  
 global war on terrorism, 310–11, 372  
 Korean War, 230–1, 485  
 Mexican Punitive Expedition, 362, 483  
 natural disasters, 658  
 sports, 1023–4  
 post-WWII, 369  
 WWI, 362, 364, 483–4
- Native Americans, 351–2  
 American way of war, 845–6  
 colonial era, 9–17, 472, 473, 474, 475, 624, 625  
 ethics, 1003  
 in films, 919, 920, 927  
 in the military, 881, 883, 884, 885–6, 887, 888, 891  
 military ethics, 1002, 1003  
 as a minority, 130, 880–1, 884, 885  
 order and discipline, 750  
 photography, 822  
 Texas War for Independence, 479  
 wars in the east, 52, **59–70**, 339, 477, 479, 1003  
 wars of the trans-Mississippi west, **123–34**
- natural disasters, 441, 650, 651, **657–8**
- navalism, 529–30, 556
- navies and naval war  
 citizen sailors, 481–2, 483, 484, 485, 490  
 Civil War, 116–17, 382, 389–90, **460–8**, 525, 527–8, 667  
 colonial era, 17  
 early republic, 42–3  
 Mexican War, 80, 82  
 Republic of Texas, 78  
 War of American Independence, 24–6, 28, 29, 30–2, 33, 34–5, **329–34**, 594  
*see also* Continental Navy; Royal Navy; US Navy
- Navigation Acts, 17thC, 24–5, 29
- Neely, Mark E., 108, 115–16, 349, 811
- Neiberg, Michael S., 163, 486–7, 716
- Neidel-Greenlee, Rosemary, 873
- Neilson, Keith, 603, 718
- Neimeyer, Charles, 324, 881
- Nelson, Keith L., 982
- Nelson, Paul David, 22, 61, 347, 626
- Nenninger, Timothy, 161, 349, 361, 363, 364, 484, 713, 714
- Netherlands, The, 28, 606, 608
- Nevins, Allan, 105–6
- New Guinea, 199, 367, 764, 787, 790
- New Mexico, 79, 80, 81, 128, 483, 540, 541, 655
- New Orleans  
 Hurricane Katrina, 441, 658  
 War of 1812, 52, 509
- Newman, Paul Douglas, 635
- news media, **941–61**  
 Gulf Wars, 287, 292, 953, 954–5, 958  
 Korean War, 239, 949–50  
 Latin America, 577, 953  
 Mexican War, 92, 942–3
- Nicaragua, 301, 510, 537, 538, 540, 542–4, 572, 578, 580, 581, 612, 849
- Nichols, James L., 454
- Nimitz, Chester, 212, 266, 275, 367, 400, 498, 851, 789
- Nine Power Pact, *see* Washington Treaty
- Nixon, Richard M., 266, 275, 300, 371, 405, 487, 501, 576–7, 599, 689, 1011
- No Gun Ri, 232–3, 751
- Noble, Dennis L., 430, 433, 434, 441, 559
- non-combatant evacuation operations (NEOs), 585, 586–7
- Noriega, Antonio, 579
- Norman, Elizabeth, 199
- Normandy campaign, 177, **182–4**, 366, 437, 597, 764, 765, 820, 827–8, 861, 922, 935, 937, 948
- North, Frederick, 2nd Earl of Guilford (“Lord North”), 23, 25, 27, 29
- North Africa  
 Barbary Wars, **45–8**, 509, 848  
 cemetery, 1037  
 WWII, 176, **177–8**, 366, 367, 442, 700, 787, 791, 821, 929
- North American Air Defense Command (NORAD), 684

- North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 370, 598, 599–600, 793, 1006, 1009
- Afghanistan, 601
- global war on terrorism, 304, 306, 312, 600
- Korean War, 245
- Kosovo, 862, 863
- medals and decorations, 913, 914
- US Navy, 404, 738, 793
- see also under* women
- North Carolina Regulation, 625–6
- North Korea
- global war on terrorism, 306, 981
- Korean War, 222–45, 273, 274, 369–70, 403, 438, 447, 485, 566, 598–9, 610, 703, 765, 949
- Pueblo* Incident, 487, 702
- nuclear power, 404–5, 406, 862
- nuclear weapons
- air defense, 682–7, 689–90
- civil–military relations, 861, 863
- Cold War, 273–4, 448, 451, 574, 741, 791–3, 861
- ethics, 1005, 1006, 1007, 1008
- Korean War, 240, 241, 243, 244–5, 370, 861, 1007
- post-WWII alliance policy, 599
- WWII, 209–10, 368, 369, 446, 820–1
- Nunnallee, Stephen F. 90
- nurses, 158, 165, 199, 232, 871, 872, 873, 874, 926, 929, 930
- Army Nurse Corps, 872–3, 926
- Navy Nurse Corps, 403, 872–3
- Obama, Barack, 293, 312
- occupations
- Civil War Reconstruction, 640–5
- post-WWI, 784–5
- post-WWII, 368, 564–70, 791
- Odom, William O., 61, 167, 364, 365
- O’Grady, Kelly, 458
- O’Kane, Richard H., 207
- Okinawa
- post-WWII occupation, 565, 566, 569
- WWII, 202, 204–5, 209, 211, 223, 368
- Olympic Games, 300, 1020, 1023, 1024
- Operation Dragoon, 182, 185
- Operation Just Cause, *see under* Panama
- operations other than war (OOTW)
- 19thC naval, 525–32
- advisors, 604, 609–13
- alliances and coalitions, 593–601
- American way of war, 848–9
- Asia, 554–61
- attachés, 604–8, 613
- education and training, 718
- ethics, 1009
- Latin America, 536–50, 572–81, 590, 598, 767, 781
- medals and decorations, 912
- political uses, 584–91
- post-WWII occupations, 368, 564–70, 791
- order and discipline, 325, 383, 746–56, 1005
- see also* justice, military
- O’Rourke, G. G., 234
- Osceola, 68
- Osirak bombing, 308
- O’Sullivan, Timothy, 817, 818
- Owsley, Frank L., 52, 64–5, 465
- Pacific
- 1899–1927 US policy, 555–6
- 19thC naval policy, 526–7, 528–9, 531–2
- Korean War, 438
- photography, 819, 820, 824, 825
- post-WWI US Navy, 400
- post-WWII: alliances, 598–9; US Navy, 404
- US war planning, 780, 782–3, 785, 787–8, 790
- WWII, 194–213, 367–8, 401–2, 415–16, 420, 422–4, 437, 764
- see also* Philippines
- Pakistan, 312
- Palmer, Bruce, 575
- Palmer, Frederick, 946
- Palmer, John McAuley, 364
- Palmer, Michael A., 44, 274, 285, 331, 378, 404, 407, 792
- Palmer, David R., 30

- Panama, 544–5, 577, 579–80, 581, 612, 669, 671, 672, 767, 781, 954, 1004  
 1903 Independence, 393, 542  
 1989 Operation Just Cause, 371, 414, 586–7, 590
- Paris, Treaty of, 1783, 34
- Parish, Peter J., 102, 107
- Parkman, Francis, 10–11, 624, 25
- Parshall, Jonathan, 206
- Paschall, Rod, 228
- Patriot Act 2001, 298, 299
- Patton, George S., 851, 923  
 sports, 1020–1  
 WWI, 161, 164, 166  
 WWII, 178, 181, 184, 185, 186, 188, 366, 820, 821, 889, 947
- Patton, Robert H., 330, 509
- Paullin, Charles Oscar, 44, 332, 378, 390, 530, 531, 665
- Paxton Boys, 623–4, 625
- peace, savage wars of, 848–9, 850
- peace operations, 585, **587–9**  
 education and training, 718  
 post-WWII occupations, **564–70**, 791
- peace talks, Vietnam War, 265–6  
*see also* armistice talks
- peacetime planning, WWII, **174–5**
- Peckham, Howard, 11
- Pearl Harbor, 175, 196, 197–8, 208, 201, 208, 303, 305, 365, 401–2, 498, 682, 700, 763, 790
- Pearlman, Michael D., 240
- Pearson, Edward, 627–8, 630
- Peleliu, 204, 416
- Penobscot Bay, fiasco, 331, 476
- Pequot War, 10, 12, 16, 47, 1037
- Percival, John, 531
- Perkins, Bradford, 49, 53
- Perry, Matthew C., 82, 527, 529, 531
- Perry, Milton, 464, 667
- Perry, Oliver Hazard, 47, 50 378
- Pershing, John J., 365, 606, 714, 836, 900  
 civil–military relations, 860  
 Mexican Punitive Expedition, 362, 483, 541, 542, 736, 819  
 order and discipline, 753–4  
 photography, 819  
 war correspondents, 946  
 WWI, 159, 160–1, 162, 163, 164, 166–7, 363–4, 595, 726, 763, 784, 860
- Pershing Missiles, 599
- Persian Gulf, US interests in, **285–6**  
*see also* Iraq, Gulf Wars
- personnel policy  
 Cold War, 275–80, 487  
 US Marine Corps, 419–20  
 US Navy, 402–3  
*see also* education and training; order and discipline
- Philippine Sea Battle, 206, 207
- Philippines  
 Philippine–American War, 139, 147–9, 352, 360–1, **554–5**, 698, 1035  
 post-WWI US Navy, 400, 785  
 Spanish–American War, 139, 144, 145, 147, 482, 536, 860  
 US war planning, 780, 782, 783, 785, 786, 787  
 WWII, 198–9, 204, 206, 208–9, 367, 610, 726, 763–4
- Phillips, Thomas D., 130, 885
- photography, 92, **815–29**, 931–2, 1041
- Pierce, Charles C., 1035
- Pierce, Franklin, 89, 101, 527
- Pierpaoli, Paul G. Jr., 222
- Pillow, Gideon, 83, 89
- piracy  
 19thC naval policy, 525, 531–2  
 Barbary Wars, 45–8  
 politicization, US Army, 346–7
- politics, post-1975 operations, 584–91  
*see also* civil–military relations
- Polk, James K., 79–80, 81, 83, 85, 89, 90, 346, 479, 696, 859
- Porter, David, 44, 50, 509, 531, 609
- Porter, David Dixon, 390, 1019
- Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), 268
- Potter, David, 101
- Potter, E. B., 212
- Potter, Lorraine K., 728
- Powell, Colin, 263, 304, 308, 504, 580, 863, 900, 910, 1008
- Powell doctrine, 308–9, 850
- Power, J. Tracy, 456

- Prados, John, 208–9, 259, 265, 700, 739  
 Pratt, Fletcher, 47  
 Pratt, Julius W., 49, 537–8  
 Pratt, William V., 671  
 Preble, Edward, 44, 46–7  
 pre-emption doctrine, **307–8**, 1009–10  
 Presidential Medal of Freedom, 910  
 Presidential Unit Citation (PUC), 909  
 press, *see* news media  
 prisoners of war  
   defection, 749  
   ethics, 1007, 1010  
   in films, **924**  
   Korean War, 243, 245, 749, 1007  
   medals and decorations, 906, 910  
   sports, 1021  
   Vietnam War, 749, 767  
   War of American Independence, 34–5  
   war crimes against, 750  
   WWII, **210–11**, 764, 1021  
 private military contractors (PMCs),  
   **507–14**, 980–2  
 privateers, 34, 50, 52, 330–4, 460, 475,  
   509, 1002  
 Prochnau, William, 951, 958  
 professionalism, 41–2, 340–6, 349–50,  
   711, 864, 1004, 1007  
 Project 100,000, 276–7, 419  
 propaganda  
   news media, 945, 946  
   photography for, 824–5  
   WWI, 157, 945–6  
   WWII documentaries, 933–4  
 Prosser's Rebellion, 628–9  
 Prucha, Francis Paul, 59, 63, 342, 345–7,  
   748, 883  
 public opinion, WWI, 157–8  
 Puerto Rico, 139, 145, 300, 536, 669,  
   672, 698, 781, 837, 1035  
 Pulitzer, Joseph, 944, 954  
 Puller, Lewis B. ("Chesty"), 423  
 Purple Heart, 900, 905  
 Pyle, Ernie, 211, 946, 948–9  
  
 Quasi-War, **43–5**, 299  
 Queen Anne's War, 10, 1002  
 Queenston Heights, battle of, 51  
 Quezon, Manuel, 604  
 Quintard, Charles, 725  
  
 racial conflicts, 652, 655–6  
 racial desegregation, 276, 279–80, 418,  
   487, 655–6, 717, 890  
 racism  
   Cold War, 280  
   ethics, 1005–6  
   Indian Wars, 125, 130  
   Korean War, 229–30, 231  
   post-Civil War, 755  
   post-Korea, 891  
   US Marine Corps, 418  
   WWI, 165, 1038  
   WWII, 212, 750, 755, 756  
 radar, 187, 235, 406, 448, 449, 683–4,  
   685, 686, 699, 701, 738, 740  
 radicals, post-Civil War, 108  
 Radley, Kenneth, 454–5, 751, 753  
 Rainey, James W., 156, 161  
 Ramsay, David, 321–2  
 Ramsey, Edwin Price, 763–4  
 Rangers, 11, 230, 339, 473, 576, 611,  
   612, 762, 764, 765, 767–9, 919,  
   927  
 Reagan, Ronald, 278, 302, 404, 406, 488,  
   578–9, 599, 681, 690, 768,  
   823–4, 861, 862, 863, 976, 980,  
   996, 1007, 1011  
 Reardon, Carol, 2, 161, 349, 994  
 Reconcentration, Cuba, 140  
 Reconstruction, 107–8, 349, 480–1,  
   **640–8**, 993  
 Record, Jeffery, 850–1  
 recruitment, *see* personnel policy  
 Red Ball Express, 889  
 Redstick War, 63–5  
 Rees, Laurence, 211  
 Reeves, Joseph Mason, 401  
 Reid, Samuel, 91  
 religion  
   chaplains, **722–8**  
   Indian Wars in the east, 62, 64  
 Remini, Robert V., 66  
 Rennel Island, battle of, 206  
 reporters, *see* war correspondents  
 Republican–Federalist divide, 40–3, 347,  
   477–8, 594–5, 665, 991–2  
 Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC),  
   261, 281, 402, 403, 485–6, 715,  
   716, 717, 780, 874, 1021



- Reserves, **482–90**, 728, 906, 1023–4
- Revenue Cutter Service, 429, **430–2**, 657, 711, 902
- Revenue Marine, 711, 429–31
- revisionists
- Civil War, 101, 108, 112
  - Vietnam War, 267, 268
- Revolutionary War, *see* War of American Independence
- Reynolds, Clark G., 401
- Reynolds, John, 67
- Rhodes, D. H., 1035
- Richardson, Walter L., 824
- Richelson, Jeffrey, 695, 705
- Richter, Daniel, 14, 15
- Rickover, Hyman G., 405, 406, 862
- Ricks, Thomas E., 290
- Ridgway, Matthew B., 179, 227, 241–2, 243–4, 369–70
- Riedesel, Friederike de, 869
- Rio Grande River, 77, 78–80
- Rio Pact (Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance of 1947), 572–3
- rituals, 990, 991, 994
- Robertson, James I. Jr., 455
- Robertson, Linda R., 164
- Robinson, Charles M., III, 126
- Robinson, Everett O., 808
- Robinson, Fayette, 341
- Robinson, Linda, 768
- Robinson, Willard B., 665
- Rodgers, John, 44, 379, 380, 390, 391
- Rogers, Robert, 11–12, 919
- Rommel, Erwin, 177–8
- Roosevelt, Franklin D., 657, 789, 993, 995, 1005
- airmail, 657
  - alliances and coalitions, 446, 597–8
  - Bonus Army, 1030
  - Civil rights, 889
  - intelligence, 695, 699
  - minorities, 889
  - National Guard, 485
  - Special Operations Forces, 764
  - sports, 1021
  - US Coast Guard, 434, 436
  - war planning and preparations, 657, 788
  - WWII: in Asia/Pacific, 197, 402; in Europe, 174, 175, 176, 177, 196, 213, 402, 485
- Roosevelt, Theodore, 49–50, 146, 147, 332, 394, 781
- Asia/Pacific policy, 556–7
  - civil–military relations, 860
  - history writings, 43, 50, 332, 348
  - Latin American interventions, 537, 539–40, 545–6, 547, 548
  - medals and decorations, 911
  - Navy and naval policy, 393–4, 556–7, 781, 783
  - Spanish-American War, 144
- Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, 537
- Root, Elihu, 361, 780, 860, 1004
- Root Reforms of the Army, 344, 361, 362, 477, 482, 713–14
- Rosen, Nir, 291
- Rosen, Robert N., 458
- Rosenthal, Joe, 423, 820
- Rothenberg, Gunther, 123–4
- Royal Air Force, 180, 181
- Royal Navy
- colonial rebellions, 622
  - colonial wars, 17
  - War of American Independence, 24–6, 28, 31, 330–1, 333–4
  - War of 1812, 47, 51
  - WWI, 160
- Rudd, Gordon W., 288–9
- Rumsfeld, Donald, 304, 306, 311, 312, 850, 1010, 1011
- Russ, Martin, 238, 244
- Russell, Andrew J., 817
- Russia
- military attachés, 606, 607
  - post-Revolution US policy, **560**
  - see also* Soviet Union
- Ryan, Paul B., 175, 402
- sacrifice, Civil War, 115
- Saddam Hussein, 284, 285, 286, 289, 308, 309
- Sage, Jerry, 765
- St. Clair, Arthur, 60–1
- Saipan, 203, 211, 416, 423
- Salerno, 179, 764

- Saltonstall, Dudley, 331  
 Samoa, 528–9, 532, 780  
 Sampson, Deborah, 870  
 Sampson, William T., 145, 146  
 San Antonio, 74–6, 77, 78  
 San Diego, 80, 82  
 San Jacinto Battle, 76, 77, 78  
 Sandino, Augusto, 543–4  
 Santa Anna, Antonio López de, 74–5, 76–7, 81, 83–5, 86, 91, 540  
 Santa Cruz Islands, battle of, 206, 827  
 Sargent, Chauncey Forward, 90  
 satellite systems, 701, 740–1  
 Savage, Paul L., 262  
 Salvo Island, battle of, 202, 206, 820  
 Schantz, Mark S., 115, 1041  
 Scharf, John Thomas, 461, 466  
 Scheips, Paul J., 653, 734  
 Schlesinger, James, 690  
 Schmidt, Hans, 422, 548, 558, 559  
 Schnabel, James F., 226, 503  
 Schneller, Robert J., 390, 402, 403, 407, 717  
 Schofield, John M., 143, 351, 654  
 Schom, Alan, 196  
 Scribner, Benjamin F., 90  
 science, 526, 532  
 Scott, George C., 923  
 Scott, Sylvester, 945  
 Scott, Winfield, 68, 81, 83–5, 88–9, 91–2, 342, 540, 859  
 Second World War, *see* World War II  
 Sefton, James, 349, 642, 643, 644  
 Seib, Philip M., 953, 958, 960–1  
 Seminole Wars, 65–6, 67–70, 340, 431, 479, 724, 1003, 1034  
 Semmes, Raphael, 90, 463, 465  
 September 11, 2001, attacks, 298, 303, 304, 305, 372, 441, 980  
 service people's experiences  
   Civil War, 113–15, 455, 456, 457  
   colonial wars, 13, 14  
   Gulf Wars, 290–1  
   Indian Wars, 124–5, 129–30  
   Korean War, 229–30  
   post-WWII occupations, 569  
   US Navy from 1794–1860, 382  
   WWI, 163  
   WWII, 210, 211–12  
   Seven Years War, 10–14, 16, 17, 31  
   Severance, Ben H., 481, 645  
   sexual behavior  
     Cold War, 278–9  
     ethics, 1011  
     women in the military, 873, 875  
 Shafter, William R., 144, 145, 146, 698  
 Shay, Jonathan, 268  
 Shay's Rebellion, 476, 509, 619, 620, 632–3  
 Sheehan, Neil, 259, 267  
 Sheeran, James B., 725  
 Sheldon, Walt, 236–7, 567  
 Shenandoah Valley, 103, 112  
 Shepard, Leonard, 431–2  
 Shepard, William, 633  
 Sheridan, Phil, 126, 351  
 Sherman, William T., 643, 1003  
   army education and training, 713  
   Civil War, 103, 104, 105, 107, 111, 115, 116, 456  
   Indian Wars, 126  
   military advisors, 609  
   nation-building, 131  
   news media, 944  
 Sherrill, Robert, 808–9  
 Sherrod, Robert, 202–3, 416  
 ships  
   Civil War, 388–9, 460–1, 462, 463–4, 527–8, 667  
   coastal defenses, 667, 669  
   Confederate commerce raiders, 465  
   Continental Navy, 331  
   military–industrial complex, 971, 972, 973  
   US Coast Guard, 438, 439, 440  
   US Navy 1794–1860, 380–1, 971  
   US Navy 1860–1920, 388–9, 390–4, 527–8  
   US Navy since 1920, 399–402, 403, 404–6  
 Shoemaker, Charles, 432  
 Shoup, David M., 421, 422  
 Shufeldt, Robert, 391, 529, 531  
 Shulimson, Jack, 143, 413–14, 421, 713  
 Siberia, US policy 1899–1927, 560  
 Sicily, WWII, 178–9, 366, 437, 750, 764, 947

- sickness  
 Philippine–American War, 148  
 Spanish–American War, 146–7  
 US Navy 1794–1860, 384
- Silver Star, 904, 907
- Simmons, Edwin, 412, 414
- Simmons, Robert R., 225
- Sims, William, 160, 394, 606, 862
- Sioux people, 133
- Sioux War, 129–30
- Sitting Bull, 125, 126
- Skeen, C. Edward, 41, 347, 478, 752
- Skelton, William B., 41, 49, 342–4, 346, 348, 351, 711, 857
- slavery  
 19thC naval policy, 532  
 Civil War, 99, 100, 101, 106, 108–9, 114, 115, 884–5: freedmen, 640–1, 643–5, 646, 647, 754–5  
 colonial era, 474, 627–8, 881  
 Haiti, 547  
 memory, 992, 994  
 rebellions against, **626–32**  
 Seminole Wars, 65, 68  
 Texas War for Independence, 73, 78  
 War of American Independence, 324, 882
- Sledge, Eugene B., 204, 211
- Sledge, Michael, 1039, 1040, 1041
- Smelser, Marshall, 379, 665
- Smith, Gaddis, 595, 597
- Smith, Ephraim K., 147
- Smith, Holland M., 203, 416, 423
- Smith, E. Kirby, 90
- Smith, Oliver P., 236, 423
- Smith, Paul David, 128
- Smith, Perry, 287, 424, 954
- Smith, Ralph C., 203, 416
- Smith, S. Compton, 90
- Smith, Sherry, 126, 129–30, 133
- Smith, Thomas T., 131, 133–4
- Smith, Truman, 607
- Smythe, Donald, 160, 162
- soldier–civilian relations, *see* civil–military relations
- soldiers' experiences, *see* service people's experiences
- soldiers of fortune, **507–14**
- Solis, Gary D., 419, 749, 751
- Solomon Islands, 201–2, 206, 212, 415, 422, 437, 769 790, 820
- Somalia, 372, 451, 589, 769, 927
- Somers* mutiny, 802
- Sontag, Susan, 817–18
- Sorley, Lewis, 266–7, 487, 488
- Sousa, John Philip, 836–7
- Soviet Union  
 Cold War, 272–81, 403–7, 447–50, 511: alliances and coalitions, 597–8, 599–600; intelligence, 700–2, 741, 825; Korean War, 223, 225, 229, 234, 243, 244, 369, 370; Latin America, 448, 573, 574, 580; military–industrial complex, 975–6; post-WWII occupations, 566, 567–8; Special Operations Forces, 766; sports, 1023; war planning, 791–4  
 military attachés, 607, 608–9  
 US air defense, 683–5, 686, 687, 688, 689  
 war on terrorism, 301, 302  
 WWII, 182, 189, 273, 366–7, 402, 597–8
- Spain  
 Cuban–Spanish War, 139–42, 944  
 mercenaries, 511  
 War of American Independence, 28, 30, 31, 34  
 wars of the early Republic and, 39, 52  
 War of Jenkin's Ear, 474–5
- Spanish–American War, **139–47**, 149, 352, 414, 481–2, 536–7, 545  
 care for the dead, 994, 1035  
 civil–military relations, 860  
 ethics, 1004  
 in films, 932–3  
 intelligence, 698  
 memory, 994  
 military attachés, 605  
 minorities, 144, 885  
 music, 836  
 news media, 944–5  
 photography, 818–19  
 sports, 1019  
 veterans' movements, 1028  
 war planning, 779–80  
 women, 872

- Special Operations Forces (SOF), **762–70**, 927
- Spector, Ronald H., 142, 196, 208, 263–4, 393, 394, 418, 713, 779, 781
- Spielberg, Steven, 923
- sports, **1018–24**
- Springer, Francis, 725
- Spruance, Raymond A., 206, 212, 608, 789
- spying, *see* intelligence
- Stalin, Joseph, 182, 225, 244, 568, 597–8
- Stanton, Edwin M., 106, 734, 816
- Stanton, Shelby L., 236, 238, 263
- Stark, Harold, 174
- Steichen, Edward, 820, 824, 827
- Steuben, Wilhelm Freidrich, 323, 508, 604, 712, 752, 881–2
- Still, William N. Jr., 111–12, 154, 164, 329, 389, 394, 462, 463, 531, 667, 784
- Stilwell, Joseph W., 200, 365, 367–8, 610
- Stillwell, Paul, 402, 891
- Stimson, Henry, 175, 361, 388
- Stinchcomb, William, 593
- Stockton, Robert F., 80, 82
- Stoddert, Benjamin, 44
- Stono Rebellion, 627–8, 631
- strategic air attack, WWII, **180–1**, **187**
- Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), **690**
- strikes, 351, 481, 487–8, 651, 652, 653–4, 1029
- Stryker, William S., 322
- Stubbe, Ray, 265
- Stueck, William, 225, 228, 245
- submarines, 163, 164, 207, 275, 401, 404, 405, 407, 463, 464, 468, 610, 669, 701–2, 740, 770, 874, 948, 973–4, 1004
- see also* World War II
- Sudan, 302–3, 308
- suicide bombers, 291
- Sullivan, Brian, 699
- Sullivan, David, 413
- Sullivan, Dwight H., 810
- Sullivan, John, 594
- Sullivan, John A., 230
- Summers, Harry, 223, 267–8, 287, 288, 370, 371
- Sweeney, Kevin, 16
- Sweeney, Michael S., 944, 953, 960
- Sweet, Timothy, 817
- Sweetman, Jack, 542, 710, 1019
- Symonds, Craig, 42, 46, 106, 109, 117, 349, 367, 379, 390, 463, 665, 859
- Taaffè, Stephen R., 27, 117, 199, 390
- Taft, William H., 149, 540, 547, 669, 782, 860
- Tailhook Incident, 931, 1011
- Taiping Rebellion, 507, 510, 531
- Taliban, 302, 306, 308–9, 312, 372, 407, 600, 1009
- “Tanker War,” 286
- tanks, 167, 485, 607, 974, 981
- Korea, 225, 229, 369
- US Marine Corps, 421
- WWI, 166, 364–5, 1004
- WWII, 178
- Tarawa, battle of, 195, 202–3, 416, 423, 764
- Tassafaronga, battle of, 206
- Tate, Michael L., 135, 131, 347, 665, 884
- Taylor, Henry, 781
- Taylor, Maxwell D., 240, 862
- Taylor, Philip, 953, 958
- Taylor, Robert P., 726
- Taylor, Zachary, 68, 79, 80–1, 88–9, 509, 859
- technology
- Air Corps, 445
- air defense, 685–6, 687–8, 689–90
- ballistic missiles, 407, 447–8, 686–7, 689–90
- coastal defenses, 662–73
- Cold War, 275, 447–8, 449–50
- communications, 733–42
- ethics, 1010
- global war on terrorism, 311
- intelligence, 697, 699, 701
- Little Bighorn, 128
- Mexican War, 87–8
- news media, 955–6, 961
- nuclear propulsion, 404–5
- US Marine Corps, 421
- WWI, 156, 164–5, 166, 363, 364–5, 399
- see also* military–industrial complex;
- nuclear weapons; ships

- Tecumseh, 61–3, 64  
 television, 923, 929–31, 932, 935–6, 937  
     news, 950, 951–3, 954, 957, 959–61  
 Temple, Herbert, Jr., 230  
 Tenskawatawa (Shawnee Prophet), 62, 64  
 terrorism, 45, 298–303  
     *see also* global war on terrorism  
 Texas, Indian wars, 133–4, 479  
 Texas Mounted Rifles, 91  
 Texas Rangers, 76, 87, 91, 131, 473  
 Texas War for Independence, 53, 73–9,  
     479, 540, 883, 919  
 Thayer, Sylvanus, 710  
 Thomas, Gerald C., 422  
 Thompson, Warren E., 233–4  
 Thornton, John K., 628  
 Thornton, Mark, 117  
 Tibbetts, Paul, 210  
 Tinian, 203  
 Toland, John, 196, 197, 198–9, 228  
 Tompkins, Frank, 541  
 Tone, John Lawrence, 140, 146  
 total war, Civil War, 115–17, 129  
 Toomey, Daniel Carroll, 1033  
 trade  
     19thC naval policy, 526, 527, 528, 529,  
         531–2, 536  
     Caribbean interventions, 546, 547  
     early Republic, 39, 45–6, 48  
     War of American Independence, 24,  
         29–30  
 traditions, *see* “invented traditions”  
 training, *see* education and training  
 Trainor, Bernard E., 286–7, 288, 290,  
     372, 794, 862, 1010  
 Trask, David F., 159, 160, 164, 393, 394,  
     595, 598, 606, 783  
 Trask, Roger R., 500, 503  
 Trefousse, Hans L., 108  
 Tregaskis, Richard, 201  
 Trieste, 182, 187, 565, 566, 568  
 Tripolitan War 1801–5, 45–8, 509  
 Trist, Nicholas P., 84, 85  
 Trotta, Elizabeth, 951  
 Troup, George, 65  
 Truman, Harry S., 260, 300, 368, 500,  
     572, 688, 726  
     alliance policy, 598–9  
     civil–military relations, 861, 1007  
     Cold War, 274, 276, 279, 572–3  
     defense unification, 499  
     Korean War, 224, 225, 226, 227, 237,  
         240–1, 242, 243, 244, 369, 370  
     racial desegregation, 890  
     WWII, 368, 1005, 1006  
 Trumbull, John, 321  
 Truxtun, Thomas, 44, 733  
 Tryon, William, 625, 626  
 Tulchin, Joseph S., 538  
 Tully, Anthony, 206  
 Turk, Richard W., 544–5  
 Turkey, 399–400, 574, 596, 605, 769,  
     792  
 Tunis, 46, 48, 177–8, 366, 509  
 Turner, Nat, 627, 631–2  
 Tuten, Jeff M., 717  
 Twigg, David E., 83  
 Twichell, Joseph, 725  
  
 ULTRA, 181–2, 184, 208, 700, 738–9  
 Underwood, Rodney, 463  
 Unified Command Plan (UCP), 497, 498,  
     500, 502  
 Union war effort, 101, 104–7, 113–18  
     army chaplains, 724–5  
     army discipline, 753  
     army leadership, 103, 104–5, 106–7,  
         110, 111–12, 348–9  
     coastal defenses, 667  
     intelligence, 696–7  
     memory, 993  
     mercenaries, 510–11  
     military justice, 806, 811  
     militia, 480  
     minorities, 883–5  
     music, 835  
     navy, 116–17, 389–90  
     soldiers’ experiences, 113–15  
     women, 870–1  
     *see also* Reconstruction  
 United Confederate Veterans, 993, 1028  
 United Nations (UN), 598, 791, 1009  
     Gulf Wars, 288  
     Korean War, 242, 274, 369–70, 793,  
         1039  
     medals and decorations, 913  
     post-WWII occupations, 566  
 Upshur, Abel P., 526–7, 530

- Upton, Emory, 341, 350–1, 361, 609, 778, 780
- Urrea, José de, 76
- US Air Force, **444–51**  
     air defense, 683, 684, 685–6, 687  
     chaplains, 722, 726–8  
     Cold War, 273–4, 275–7, 447–50, 791–2  
     communications, 740, 741  
     creation, 369, 447  
     defense unification, 498–504  
     education and training, 716  
     global war on terrorism, 309–10  
     intelligence, 703, 826  
     joint commands, 498, 502, 503–4  
     joint operations, 502–3, 504  
     Korean War, 233–4, 447  
     medals and decorations, 903, 904–6, 907–12, 915  
     military attachés, 608, 609  
     music, 837–8  
     order and discipline, 747, 751, 752  
     Reserves, 488  
     sports, 1022, 1024  
     women, 874  
     *see also* Air Corps; Air Service; Special Operations Forces; US Army Air Forces
- US Air Force Academy, 448, 716
- US Army to 1900, **338–53**  
     care for the dead, 1034, 1035  
     chaplains, 723–5, 726  
     civil disorders, 351, 651, 652, 653–4, 655  
     Civil War leadership, 103, 104–5, 106–7, 110, 111–12, 348–9  
     Civil War Reconstruction, 640–5, 648  
     Civil War soldiers' experiences, 113–15  
     coastal defenses, 663–8  
     communications, 733, 734–5  
     early Republic, 39, 40–3, 49, 52–3, 339–40, 476–9, 509, 856–7  
     education and training, 709–10, 711, 712, 713  
     *see also* US Military Academy  
     intelligence, 697–8  
     Mexican War, 85–92, 341, 342, 352  
     military attachés, 605  
     military justice, 803–4, 805  
     minorities, 882, 883–6  
     music, 833–6  
     natural disasters, 657–8  
     photography, 819, 822–3  
     Spanish–American War, 143, 144–5, 146–7, 352, 780, 836  
     sports, 1019  
     war planning, 778, 780  
     *see also* armies
- US Army since 1900, **360–73**  
     air defense, 682, 683, 687–8: *see also* US Army Air Forces  
     care for the dead, 1034, 1035–41  
     chaplains, 725, 726–8  
     civil disorders, 651, 652–3, 654, 655–6  
     civil surveillance, 657  
     coastal defenses, 669–73  
     Cold War, 273, 275–7  
     communications, 736–8, 739  
     defense unification, 497–504  
     education and training, 713–14, 715–18, 780–1  
     global war on terrorism, 309–10, 372  
     intelligence, 698–700, 702–3  
     joint commands, 497–8, 502, 503–4  
     joint operations, 502–3, 504  
     Korean War, 226, 227, 228, 229–33, 235–9, 241–2, 243–4, 369–70  
     medals and decorations, 901, 902, 903, 904–6, 907–12, 914–15  
     military advisors, 609, 610, 611–12  
     military attachés, 607, 608–9, 703  
     military–industrial complex, 973–4  
     military justice, 804, 807–12  
     minorities, 886–90  
     music, 833, 837, 838  
     natural disasters, 657–8  
     order and discipline, 750, 751, 752, 753–4, 755–6  
     Philippine–American War, 148, 360–1, 780  
     photography, 819–20, 821, 823–4, 826–7  
     post-WWII occupations, 564–70, 791  
     Siberian intervention, 560  
     sports, 1019–24  
     Vietnam War, 260–4, 370–1  
     war planning, 780–91



- women, 158, 165, 872, 873, 874, 875  
 WWI, 155–67, 362–5, 483–4, 595, 736, 753–4, 784  
 WWII: in Asia/Pacific, 198–201, 203, 211, 212–13, 367–9; in Europe, 174, 177–9, 182–4, 185–9, 365–7, 368–9; histories by, 195, 199, 200  
*see also* Special Operations Forces
- US Army Air Forces, 444, 446–7  
 chaplains, 722  
 defense unification, 499  
 joint commands, 498  
 minorities, 889  
 photography, 823–4, 826–7  
 women, 872–3  
 WWII in Asia/Pacific, 203, 210, 213, 446; in Europe, 177, 180–1, 183–4, 186, 187, 446; histories by, 195  
*see also* Air Service
- US Army Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK), 223–4
- US Central Intelligence Agency, *see* Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
- US citizens, rescuing, **586–7**
- US Coast Guard, **429–41**  
 global war on terrorism, 310, 441  
 medals and decorations, 902–3, 904–6, 907–12  
 military attachés, 609  
 women, 440, 872, 873, 874
- US Coast Guard Auxillary, 436, 437, 439, 441
- US Coast Guard Academy, 430–1, 437, 440, 711
- US Colored Troops (USCTs), 643–4
- US Marine Corps, **411–24**  
 Cold War, 275–7  
 Continental Marines, 330, 331, 333, 334, 413  
 defense unification, 499, 500, 502  
 education and training, 713, 718  
 joint commands, 502, 503–4  
 joint operations, 502–3, 504  
 Korean War, 227, 233, 234, 236, 238–9, 245, 417  
 medals and decorations, 902, 903, 904–6, 907–12, 915  
 minorities, 418, 889, 890  
 music, 834  
 photography, 820, 821, 826  
 Spanish–American War, 143  
 Vietnam War, 263, 417–18, 419  
 Women's Reserve, 872, 873  
 WWII, 195, 201, 202–4, 208, 211, 415–17, 418–19, 420, 422–4  
*see also* Special Operations Forces
- US Merchant Marine Academy, 715
- US Military Academy, 709–10, 718  
 Civil War, 348  
 creation, 41, 340, 347, 709  
 Mexican War, 88  
 women, 874
- US Naval Academy, 381, 402–3, 432, 710–11, 714, 717
- US Navy 1794–1860, 42–3, **378–85**  
 Barbary Wars, 45–8  
 chaplains, 724  
 civil disorders, 655  
 coastal defense, 665–6  
 communications, 733–4  
 education and training, 710  
 military attachés, 605  
 military justice, 803–4, 805–6  
 military–industrial complex, 971  
 minorities, 382, 882  
 music, 834  
 order and discipline, **383**, 751–2, 753  
 policy, **525–8**, **530–2**  
 Quasi-War, 44–5  
 War of 1812, 50, 51–2
- US Navy 1860–1920, **388–95**  
 chaplains, 725, 726  
 Civil War, 116–17, 382, 389–90, 525, 527–8, 667, 885  
 coastal defense, 667, 668–9  
 communications, 735–6  
 education and training, 710–13, 714  
 Great White Fleet, **556–7**  
 intelligence, 697  
 medals and decorations, 901  
 military attachés, 605, 606  
 military justice, 804  
 minorities, 885, 886  
 music, 836–7  
 photography, 819, 826  
 policy, **527–30**, **532**, 536, 556–7, 558

- US Navy 1860–1920 (*cont'd*)  
     Spanish–American War, 141–3, 144–6, 605, 779–80  
     sports, 1019, 1020  
     US Marine Corps and, 413–14  
     veterans' movements, 1028  
     war planning, 778–80, 781–3, 784  
     WWI, 155, 156, 158, 160, 164, 394, 399, 784, 973
- US Navy since 1920, **399–407**  
     air defense, 683, 685, 686  
     alliances and coalitions, 596  
     care for the dead, 1034  
     chaplains, 726–8  
     coastal defenses, 400, 671  
     Cold War, 273–4, 275–7, 403–7, 701–2, 792, 909  
     communications, 737–9, 740, 741  
     defense unification, 497–504  
     education and training, 715, 717, 718  
     global war on terrorism, 309, 310, 407  
     intelligence, 700, 701–2  
     joint commands, 497–8, 502, 503–4  
     joint operations, 502–3, 504  
     Korean War, 226, 233, 234–5, 403–4  
     medals and decorations, 903, 904–6, 907–12, 915  
     military attachés, 607, 608, 609  
     military–industrial complex, 973–4  
     minorities, 402, 717, 755, 756, 889–90  
     music, 837, 838  
     order and discipline, 755, 756  
     photography, 821, 824, 826–7  
     Reserves, 485, 488, 490  
     sports, 1022, 1024  
     war planning, 785–91, 792  
     women, 402, 407, 717, 872, 873, 874  
     WWII, 195, 401, 755: in Asia/Pacific, 197–8, 199, 204, 205–7, 208–9, 212, 367, 401–2; in Europe, 174, 175, 402  
     *see also* Special Operations Forces
- USSR, *see* Soviet Union
- Utley, Robert M., **124–6**, 127–8, 350, 351, 352, 479, 655
- Vale, Lawrence, 689
- Valencia, Gabriel, 84
- Valle, James, 383, 753, 803
- Valley Forge, 323, 712, 752, 991, 1018
- Van Deman, Ralph, 698
- Van Fleet, James A., 243–4
- Vandegrift, Alexander A., 417, 422, 424
- Vandenberg, Hoyt, 184
- Vann, John Paul, 259, 910
- Velasco, Treaty of, 77, 78
- Vera Cruz, 81, 82, 83, 85, 91, 539, 540, 541, 903  
     *The Landing at Veracruz* (Sweetman), 542
- Vesey's Rebellion, 629–31
- veterans  
     Bonus Army, 655, 995, 1030  
     in films, **924**  
     memory, 990–7  
     movements, 992, 993, 994, 995, 996, **1026–32**  
     Vietnam War, 268, 1032
- Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW), 1028–31
- Vietnam War, **257–68**, 274–5, 370–1  
     African-American soldiers, 277, 280  
     care for the dead, 1040  
     civil–military relations, 861, 862  
     Civil War historiography, 109–12, 114  
     communications, 739  
     ethics, 1007–8  
     in films, **925–7**, **936–7**  
     Korean War and, 245  
     lessons from, 584  
     medals and decorations, 913–14, 915  
     memory, 990, 991, 996–7  
     mercenaries, 512  
     military advisors, 611–12  
     military justice, 808–9, 811  
     minorities, 277, 280, 891  
     National Guard, 487  
     news media, 950–3  
     order and discipline, 749, 754, 756  
     Philippine War historiography, 148  
     photography, 818, 821–2, 826  
     popular culture and, 281  
     prisoners of war, 749, 767  
     protests against, 656–7  
     Reserves, 487  
     service-women, 277  
     Special Operations Forces, 767  
     sports, 1023–4

- in television programs, 929, 930, 937  
 US Air Force, 448–9  
 US Coast Guard, 439–40  
 US Marine Corps, 263, 417–18, 419  
 veterans, 268, 1032  
 war crimes, 260, 261, 262–3, 419, 751  
 Villa, Francisco (“Pancho”), 362, 539,  
     541, 819, 848, 946  
*Virginius* Affair, 391, 528, 532  
 Vladivostok, intervention, 560  
 Volckmann, Russell, 763–4
- Wade, Benjamin F., 108  
 Wade, Nathaniel, 323  
 Wade, Richard C., 629, 630  
 Wainwright, Jonathan M., 199  
 Wake Island, 198, 415, 921  
 Walker, Mary, 902  
 Walker, Samuel, 78  
 Walker, Walton H., 236, 238, 241  
 Walker, William, 510, 542  
 Walters, Vernon A., 608  
 Walzer, Michael, 1008  
 war, American way of, **843–53**, 972  
 war, concept of, 777  
 War of 1812, **48–53**  
     civil–military relations, 859  
     coastal defenses, 665  
     ethics, 1003  
     Indian Wars in the east and, **61–3**,  
         64–5  
     memory, 992  
     mercenaries, 509  
     militia, 49, 52, 478, 752  
     minorities, 882  
     navies, 42, 43, 50, 51–2  
 War of American Independence 1775–83,  
     **22–35**  
     alliances and coalitions, 593–5  
     chaplains, 723  
     civil–military relations, 856–7  
     coastal defenses, 329–30, 662–3  
     Continental Army, 321–6, 331, 338–9,  
         475–6  
     Continental Marines, 330, 331, 334  
     Continental Navy, 329–34  
     ethics, 1002–3  
     in films, 927, 932  
     intelligence, 696  
     medals and decorations, 900  
     memory, 991–2  
     mercenaries, 508–9  
     militia, 24, 30, 32, 321, 339, 475–6  
     minorities, 324, 881–2  
     news media, 941–2  
     order and discipline, 325, 751, 752  
     sports, 1018  
     veterans, 992, 1026  
     women, 869–70  
 war correspondents, 92, 239, 292,  
     942–55, 957–60  
 war crimes, 749–51  
     Korean War, 232–3, 751  
     Vietnam War, 260, 261, 262–3, 419,  
         751, 811  
     WWII, 210–11, 1005  
 war dead, care for, 992–3, 994–5,  
     **1034–41**  
     *see also* memory  
 war memorials, 992, 993, 994, 995–7,  
     1036–7  
 war planning, **774–96**  
 Ward, Frederick Townsend, 507, 510  
 Ward, Harry W., 325, 751, 752, 803  
 Ward, Matthew, 17, 475  
 Warden, John, 286, 451  
 Warren, Joseph, 321  
 Washington, George  
     chaplains, 723  
     civil–military relations, 856, 1002  
     foreign wars, 40, 42, 43  
     Indian Wars in the east, 61  
     intelligence, 696  
     memorials to, 992  
     military justice, 803  
     militia, 477  
     music, 833  
     order and discipline, 751, 752  
     veterans’ movements, 1026  
     War of American Independence, 322,  
         323, 329, 508–9, 594  
     women, 870  
 Washington Brigade, 511  
 Washington Treaty 1922, 399, 400–1,  
     555, 558, 559  
 Watson, Robert J., 226, 501  
 Watson, Mark S., 499, 790  
 Watson, Samuel, 345–6

- Wayne, Anthony, 61, 752  
 weaponry, *see* technology  
 weapons of mass destruction  
   Iraq, 289, 290, 309, 372, 1010  
   pre-emption doctrine, 307–8  
   US Navy's role in interdicting, 310  
 Webb, James, 406  
 Webb, Stephen Saunders, 623  
 Webster, Lucien, 90  
 Webster–Ashburton Treaty, 532  
 Wedemeyer, Albert C., 175  
 Weigley, Russell  
   American way of war, 843–6, 847, 849, 972  
   civil–military relations, 858  
   Civil War, 107, 112  
   colonial wars, 10  
   US Army, 341–2, 349–50, 360  
   WWI, 161, 166–7  
   WWII, 174  
 Weinberg, Gerhard, 173–4, 182, 187, 194  
 Weinberger Doctrine, 1008  
 Weinert, Richard P., 454  
 Weitz, Mark A., 455  
 Welles, Gideon, 117, 389, 390, 803  
 Welles, Sumner, 549  
 Werrell, Kenneth P., 234, 447, 449, 687  
 West Indies, *see* Caribbean  
 West, Luther C., 809  
 West Point, *see* US Military Academy  
 Western way of war, 846–8  
 Westmoreland, William, 417–18, 611–12, 937  
 Weyler y Nicolau, Valeriano, 140, 545  
 Wheeler, Gerald E., 197, 399, 556  
 Wheeler, Keith, 201  
 Wheeler, Richard, 201, 204, 531  
 Wheeler, Tom, 734  
 Whelan, Peter, 725  
 Whelan, Richard, 228  
 Whipple, Abraham, 332  
 Whiskey Rebellion, 477, 633–5  
 White, Bruce, 881  
 White, Henry, 725  
 White, Richard, 14, 50  
 White, Thomas D., 686  
 White, William Carter, 838  
 White Cloud, 67  
 Wickes, Lambert, 330  
 Wiest, Andrew, 160  
 Wiley, Peter Booth, 531  
 Willbanks, James, 266  
 Williams, Jonathan, 664  
 Williams, Kenneth P., 105  
 Williams, T. Harry, 104–5, 108, 342, 667, 859  
 Williams, William Appleman, 141, 537, 567, 572  
 Wilson, Charles, 403  
 Wilson, Dale E., 164, 364, 890  
 Wilson, Mark R., 345, 348, 352, 389, 972  
 Wilson, Woodrow, 141, 654, 695, 726, 783, 933  
   Central America policy, 540, 543, 549, 782  
   civil–military relations, 860  
   intervention in Mexico, 539, 540, 541–2, 848  
   intervention in Russia, 560  
   WWI, 153, 154, 155, 157, 159, 362, 363, 483, 595–6, 652, 784  
 Winton, John, 208  
 Wise, Harold Lee, 286, 404  
 women, **869–75**  
   chaplains, 728  
   Civil War, 116, 870–1  
   Cold War, 276, 277–8  
   ethics, 1005, 1011  
   in films and television, 930–1  
   gender desegregation, 276, 717, 874  
   Gulf Wars, 292, 874–5  
   Indian Wars, 127  
   Korean War, 232, 277, 873–4  
   National Guard, 488  
     in NATO countries, 874  
   US Army, 158, 165, 872, 873, 874, 875  
   US Coast Guard, 440, 872, 873, 874  
   US Marine Corps, 418–19  
   US Navy, 402, 407, 717, 872, 873, 874  
   war correspondents, 946, 947, 949, 951  
 WWI, 158, 165, 872  
 WWII, 199, 402, 418–19, 872–3, 1005

- Wood, John Taylor, 463, 465  
 Wood, Leonard, 714, 1019  
 Woodward, Bob, 286, 289, 293  
 Woodward, C. Vann, 206, 682  
 Woodward, David R., 160  
 Woodworth, Steven E., 102, 113, 456, 725  
 Wooster, Robert, 126, 129, 130, 131, 351  
 World War I, **153–68**, 362–5  
   alliances and coalitions, 595–6  
   care for the dead, 994–5, 1035–7, 1038  
   Civil War historiography, 103–4  
   civil–military relations, 158, 860, 862  
   coastal defenses, 670–1  
   communications, 736  
   ethics, 1004–5  
   in films, **920–1**, 928, **933**, 938  
   homeland security, 300  
   intelligence, 698  
   medals and decorations, 900, 902, 903, 911, 913, 915  
   memory, 990–1, 994–5, 1036–7  
   mercenaries, 511  
   military attachés, 606  
   military–industrial complex, 154, 155, 157, 158, 972–4  
   minorities, 158, 165, 755, 886–8, 933, 1038  
   music, 165, 836  
   National Guard, 362, 364, 483–4  
   news media, 945–6  
   order and discipline, 753–4, 755  
   photography, 819, 823, 825  
   planning, 783, **784–5**  
   sports, 1019–20  
   US Air Service, 163–4, 166, 365, 444–5  
   US Coast Guard, 435–6  
   US Marine Corps, 414  
   US Navy, 155, 156, 158, 160, 164, 394, 399, 784, 973  
   veterans' movements, 1029–30  
   women, 158, 165, 872  
 World War II, **173–89**  
   air defense, 682–3, 738  
   alliances and coalitions, 596–8  
   in Asia/Pacific, **194–213**, 367–9, 401–2, 415–16, 420, 422–4, 437, 446, 610  
   Atlantic, battle of the, **175–6**, 180, 402, 437, 738–9  
   care for the dead, 1037–9  
   civil–military relations, 860  
   Civil War historiography, 104–5, 106, 107  
   coastal defenses, 671–2  
   Cold War, 273, 597–8  
   communications, 737–9  
   ethics, 1005–6  
   in Europe, **178–89**, 365–7, 368–9, 402, 437, 446, 610  
   in films, **921–3**, 927, 928, 929, 930, **933–6**, 937–8  
   homeland security, 300  
   intelligence, **181–2**, **208–9**, 699–700, 738–9  
   joint commands, 498  
   medals and decorations, 908, 909, 911–13, 914, 915–16  
   memory, 990, 995–6, 997, 1037–8  
   mercenaries, 511  
   military advisors, 610  
   military attachés, 607  
   military justice, 807  
   military–industrial complex, 974  
   minorities, 755, 873, 888–90  
   music, 837–8  
   National Guard, 485  
   news media, 946–9  
   in North Africa, 176, **177–8**, 700  
   occupations after, 368, **564–70**, 791  
   order and discipline, 750, 754, 755  
   photography, 819–21, 823–4, 825, 826  
   Special Operations Forces, 763–5  
   sports, 1021–2  
   in television programs, 929, 930  
   US Coast Guard, 437–8  
   US Marine Corps, 195, 201, 202–4, 208, 211, 415–17, 418–19, 420, 422–4  
   US Navy, 195, 401–2: in Asia/Pacific, 197–8, 199, 204, 205–7, 208–9, 212, 367, 401–2; in Europe, 174, 175, 402  
   war planning, 787–8, **789–91**  
   women, 199, 402, 418–19, 872–3, 1005  
 Worth, William J., 80–1, 84

- Wounded Knee disaster, 124, 132  
Wright, J. Leith, Jr., 65, 66, 68 69  
Wright, William M., 162  
Wyler, William, 934, 935
- X Corps, Korean War, 236–7, 238–9, 241
- Y’Blood, William T., 180, 206, 227  
yellow journalism, 944–5  
Yockelson, Mitchell, 160  
Yosuk-Sunchon Rebellion, 224
- Yugoslavia, former, 588, 589, 590, 862, 863, 914, 954
- Zais, Melvin, 260–1  
Zatarain, Lee Allen, 286  
Zeiger, Susan, 165, 872  
Zimmerman, Matthew A., 725  
Zimmermann, Arthur, 541  
Zuczek, Richard, 646  
Zulus, 133  
Zumwalt, Elmo R. Jr., 405–6, 862