



THE CULTURED THUG HANDBOOK

A GUIDE TO RADICAL RIGHT-WING THOUGHT





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THE CULTURED THUG HANDBOOK

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DEDICATION

This book is dedicated to two Daves: one who asked me to write it and one who will now never get to read it.

Acknowledgement is owed to Victor, whose counsel and feedback has immensely informed this book, both in the writing of it and during our discussions. Much of what's in here bears his stamp.

NOTE ON THE TEXT

Over years of publishing dissident literature, I have noticed online resources referenced in our books disappear when they become embarrassing to powerful people. Even over the course of writing this book, several of the links have gone dead. As such, an attempt has been made to archive all websites referenced in this book, in order to prevent the material from being hidden. However, this has not been possible in all cases, such as when citing Twitter threads, YouTube videos, now-dead links, and so forth.

Where we have been able to archive these resources, the archived link has been referenced. The original links have been compiled, and in the event that the archive itself goes down, they will be made available. The fact that such measures have been necessary is evidence that liberalism feels itself to be fragile, vulnerable, and threatened by the very openness it claims to value.

Because this book is aimed at a general audience, several appendixes have been included for those not familiar with the radical right, including a short bibliography of books relevant to each chapter, and a glossary of terms which may not be familiar to those encountering these ideas for the first time.

THE CULTURED THUG HANDBOOK

PROLOGUE

THE CULTURED THUG

Ludwig Wittgenstein—perhaps the most famous 20th century philosopher—began his greatest book with a quote:

...and whatever a man knows, whatever is not mere rumbling and roaring that he has heard, can be said in three words.¹

This was probably not a wise choice, because the rest of the book could only go downhill from there. I say this as a fan of Wittgenstein, and as a great fan of the *Tractatus*. We're told that Einstein said something like this about scientific theories, but then, all kinds of liberal bullshit gets put into Einstein's mouth that he never said, so we can take that with a grain of salt.

This is just to say something we all know in our gut—that if something is true, and if you really know it, you should be able to explain it briefly and in plain language. That's the approach taken in this book. This book is not meant for the academic philosopher, nor is it meant for the degenerate thug—it's meant for what Jonathan Bowden called the *cultured thug*:

Truthfully, in this age, those with intellect have no courage and those with some modicum of physical courage have no intellect. If things are to alter during the next fifty years, then we must re-embrace Byron's ideal: the cultured thug.²

The goal of this book is to foster the cultured thug. The goal is to take the man who *looks* and *acts* like a man and to give him back his own intellectual tradition—to help him *think* like a man. Liberals and the left have taught him that to think like a man is to be a retard, and not to care about ideas. But these people only think this because they don't actually read very much and are not very curious. As it turns out, the cultured thug has a long tradition behind him, and this tradition includes the greatest thinkers who ever lived.

So, if this book has made even one more cultured thug, it will have succeeded. Like Byron, the cultured thug is the man who can fight *and*

think. Robert Heinlein gives us a picture of this when he talks about the “human being”:

A human being should be able to change a diaper, plan an invasion, butcher a hog, conn a ship, design a building, write a sonnet, balance accounts, build a wall, set a bone, comfort the dying, take orders, give orders, cooperate, act alone, solve equations, analyze a new problem, pitch manure, program a computer, cook a tasty meal, fight efficiently, die gallantly. Specialization is for insects.³

For insects indeed. He might as well be talking about the rootless cosmopolitan bugman, the man without a tie to any particular place, a hothouse flower who can live anywhere as long as it looks exactly like everywhere else, Homer’s “wretch without a tie of kin”.⁴ Our bugman can’t butcher a hog—he’s vegan. He couldn’t set a bone because he would pass out. He’s never changed a diaper because he has no children. His poetry is weak. He can’t give orders, and he sure as hell can’t take orders, because that would be hierarchy and hierarchy hurts his feelings because he’s only ever been at the bottom of one. He talks about diversity, but the only places he’s been are other megatropolises that look the same as his. He’s only ever learned one thing, and he knows all there is to know about that one thing, and none of what there is to know about anything else. He’s the specialist—truly, an insect.

The cultured thug is none of that. The cultured thug can bench 225. He can cook a decent steak. He knows at least one martial art. He owns and can handle a weapon. He can give orders because people will listen, and he can take orders because he doesn’t have a chip on his shoulder. He has a family—or at least, he wants a family, and not just weekend trips to Bali until he dies alone and unwept amid his collection of Marvel action figures. What the cultured thug doesn’t have, however, is the time to read 1,000 pages just to understand Spengler (although he should do that). That’s where this book comes in.

The cultured thug is not a new thing—it’s something very old. In fact, the further back you go, the more often you meet him. That’s why they’re afraid of him, why they’re afraid of you embracing your tradition. Aeschylus, the father of Greek tragedy, first had his *Oresteia* performed 2,600 years ago. His name will live forever wherever

people still read great, manly poetry. What was the epitaph written on his tomb?

Beneath this stone lies Aeschylus, son of Euphorion, the Athenian,
Who died in the wheat-bearing land of Gela;
The grove of Marathon can speak of his noble prowess,
And the long-haired Persian knows it well.

He wanted to be remembered as a war veteran first, poet second.
Ladies and gentlemen, I give you the cultured thug.

ENDNOTES

1 Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, 1921. The quote is attributed to Ferdinand Kürnberger.

2 Jonathan Bowden, “Why I Write”, *The Jonathan Bowden Archive*, 2010. Available at: <https://archive.ph/Vwp52>.

3 Robert A. Heinlein, *Time Enough for Love* (New York: Ace Books, 1988). p. 248.

4 *Iliad* IX, 73.

PART I:
THE 10-STEP PROGRAM

The cultured thug is the heir to the greatest thinkers of all time. Part of the problem the cultured thug faces is that the culture today is hostile to these greatest thinkers, partly because they're dead white men, but also because these greatest thinkers challenge most of the "traditional wisdom" of the past few centuries—which is radically opposed to everything that came before. What we call our liberal "tradition" is not only cringey and stupid as we shall see throughout this book, but more importantly, it is *just as revolutionary as Bolshevik communism*. We live in a culture where your two options are woke nonsense on the one hand, and yesterday's woke nonsense on the other hand—there are no genuine alternatives on offer.

This book offers a genuine alternative. Today this alternative is called the *radical right*, but in reality it is anything but radical. What you're about to discover in these pages is rather the null hypothesis, the default position of all history up until the day before yesterday. It is what all healthy societies have always lived and breathed, and it has created everything we now take for granted. It only looks radical because liberalism is the most extreme ideology that has ever existed in the history of the world. When you live at the North Pole, everything looks like the Deep South.

This genuine alternative that we're presenting should not be thought of as the radical right, but as the *deep centre*. Nevertheless, we shall use the term *radical right* throughout this book to avoid confusion with milquetoast centrism, which is only slightly less radical than wokeness.

But before we can take up this genuine alternative, we need to wean ourselves off the fake conservatism that poses as the wisdom of the ages—there's no one redpill that will get us there in one shot. So, we offer ten of them as first steps down the path to recovery.

ONE

THE STATE OF EXCEPTION

Suppose for a moment that there *is* one ultimate redpill, one piece of information that would explain our real problems so clearly that they'd already be half-solved. If you could give this redpill only to one person, who would it be? For most of us until 2020 that was probably Trump. He was the man who (at least at first) both seemed to know what had to be done and was in charge. But was he really in charge? Clearly not, or you'd have a wall, millions of deportations, and an actual country. Was George W. Bush in charge? Was Joe Biden in charge? Put it this way, if Joe Biden had wanted to nuke Britain or Israel, would he have been allowed to?

If you're a foreign diplomat sitting down with a Joe Biden, you know you're not talking to the man who calls the shots—he's just there to smile and pretend he doesn't have Alzheimer's. If you want to talk to someone in charge, you'd be better off talking to the board of directors at Goldman Sachs. Or the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Or the Secretary of State, etc. Now, if you sit down with Vladimir Putin, that's a different story—you know you're talking to the man who calls the shots. That's because Russia is a real country, with a real chain of command and real leadership. Contrary to what the New York Times says, *this* is what a transparent society looks like.¹ America is not transparent. Even by the standards of history it's highly opaque—more opaque than imperial China, more opaque than pharaonic Egypt, because at least China had an emperor and Egypt had a pharaoh. This “man in charge” has a name, and that name sounds a bit quaint these days, mostly because we don't like anyone being in charge anymore. That man in charge is called the *sovereign*.

We don't like anyone being in charge, but someone always *is* in charge. There always is a sovereign, and ultimately it's always one man. What makes Vladimir Putin the sovereign, and Joe Biden not?

What makes Putin the sovereign is that the buck stops with him. When he decides that something is going to be this way and not that, nobody in Russia stands above him and nobody can check him, not even the law. A better way of putting this is that Putin decides when there will be an exception to the rule. If the law, or the Supreme Court, or the Federal Assembly² says one thing and Putin says another, no question about it—Putin wins, they lose. This is what having a real country looks like: having a clear sovereign. Putin decides when the normal rules do and don't apply, so in effect he *is* the rules. We call this deciding the *state of exception*.

When you want to find out who calls the shots, don't ask who makes the rules—anyone can make a rule—ask yourself *who is allowed to break the rules*. Especially ask yourself *who decides when the rules can be broken* (this is a sort of master-rule that stands above all the other rules). If you find out who decides this—the state of exception—then you've put your finger on who calls the shots. You've found the sovereign.

Did Trump call the shots? As president he was commander-in-chief, which means he was head of the military, and under the Insurrection Act he could have deployed it to start deporting people. When the “head of the military” gets thwarted at every turn and de-platformed by Twitter, he is not calling the shots. Trump didn't make the rules, and he sure as hell wasn't deciding when they could be broken. Someone else was deciding that for him—the sovereign. Now, in the United States formally “the people” are sovereign, but the people elect congress, the people elect the president, and through the president the people elect the Supreme Court—the people determine all three branches of government. Are the people getting what they want?

The people are not sovereign.³ Someone else is. This situation is so old it has a Latin name: *imperium in imperio*—a state within a state. That state within the state calls the shots because it decides when the rules do and don't apply—it wields the state of exception.

Let's take a closer look at this state within a state.

SUMMARY

The buck always stops somewhere—the sovereign.

The sovereign is who decides when the rules can be broken.

The people are not sovereign.

ENDNOTES

[1](#) We'll come back to this transparency when we talk about the *Rectification of Names* in chapter 30.

[2](#) The Russian equivalent of Congress or Parliament.

[3](#) In chapter 13 we'll show why the people *can't* be sovereign, even in principle.

TWO

THE DEEP STATE

All societies have had a state within a state at some point. It starts out as something quite harmless, but eventually grows out of control and starts to reproduce for its own sake at the expense of the whole, like a societal cancer cell. This seems to be a sort of historical law. We're not special: we have one too.

First, let's say what the Deep State is not. The Deep State is not a conspiracy theory. "Conspiracy theories" are what people who reject the Great Man view of history¹ call everything they don't like. The charge of "conspiracy theory" is just the attempt to banish human agency from the world by people that have little agency themselves. These people will then turn around and approvingly quote feminist Margaret Mead,

Never doubt that a small group of thoughtful, committed citizens can change the world; indeed, it's the only thing that ever has.

...and not for a second think about the implications of this statement for their worldview.

We might do better to think of the Deep State as the "permanent government". Put this way, it's clear that the Deep State is just the civil service, or some part of it—that part of the state apparatus that's unaccountable and can't be removed no matter how hard you vote. If you're still not comfortable with this and the Deep State still rings like a conspiracy in your ears, I want you to swap in "permanent government" for that term every time you hear it and see if it doesn't match up perfectly.

Properly understood, the Deep State is something that can't be doubted. We obviously have a civil service, and a basic principle of democratic government is that it continues more or less unchanged no matter who gets elected; this supposedly is one of its virtues—that a "tyrant" can't replace it.² No wonder so much energy has gone into

ensuring that we understand it *im*-properly.

The Deep State has a long history. There have been Deep States in all societies, and the closer a society is to dying, the more power its Deep State has. For example, the Roman senate held no official sovereignty and had no delegated powers but was in effect a co-sovereign along with the consulship.³ The Roman senate came to dominate the consulship by open violence and threats, and this was the spark that eventually caused the Roman republic to go up in smoke. The Deep State did the same in the Egyptian Old Kingdom too. In the Sixth Dynasty, the power of the priesthood and administrative service⁴ grew at the expense of the executive power. The end of this dynasty was marked by a senile ruler who looked more like an ornament than a pharaoh—Pepi II reigned for an astounding 94 years—and afterward Egypt collapsed into the chaos and warlordism of the First Intermediate Period. The view that the Deep State is a conspiracy or a new idea is held only by historically illiterate midwits who *don't* know any better, or by malicious actors who *do* know better—dangerous either way, these people have no business in the public square.

Let's look at an example of a modern Deep State in action. One of the most obvious centres of unofficial power is in the intelligence community since it controls the flow of information. Intelligence agencies such as the CIA and NSA work together with law enforcement, mainstream media, and other “trusted sources” to effectively shape public opinion and what counts as fact. A typical example goes something like this: the intelligence community releases a report that tells the mainstream media something it wants to hear, like *white supremacist terrorism is the #1 national security threat*,⁵ or *Antifa is an idea, not an organization*,⁶ or damaging allegations against a political enemy.⁷ The mainstream media will repeat it, lending weight and credibility to misleading, unverifiable, or outright false information. This will then be picked up by anonymous Wikipedia editors who cite only these mainstream sources, which they call “reliable”. The media knows how this works, and so it selectively omits important details that could damage the narrative it and the Wikipedia subculture want to spin.⁸ These omitted details are reported

only by people doing actual journalism, i.e. outside of the mainstream, but anything outside of the mainstream is considered “original research” by Wikipedia—no matter how factual and verifiable—and is excluded. Wikipedia is then taken as fact by most people.⁹

Intelligence agencies manage information flows in many other ways—let’s give another example. Traditional media was a chokepoint for shaping public opinion, but since the rise of social media the Deep State has had to work hard to regain control over what people think. Social media was just too open and inclusive. Intelligence agencies can’t openly censor say Twitter,¹⁰ but what they can do is to decide what counts as “hate speech”, “disinformation”, “conspiracy theories”, “foreign influence campaigns”, etc., at least for the purposes of law enforcement. Because these things are vague, they need to be defined. And because they’re illegal, who defines them defines what you can and can’t see on the internet. Facebook is not going to take a stand and police hate speech only to the letter of the law because this is risky—the law could change any time because the law is defined by the one who wields it.¹¹ Hence in 2018 the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence tried to pressure Facebook to make its hate speech policies “go beyond the legal classifications”, only to find that they already did.¹²

In these ways, intelligence agencies can damage anyone in a position to rein them in. This is typical of elements in the Deep State, who want to remain autonomous and unchecked. This is not just a bug in liberalism that can be fixed, but a feature called *separation of powers*. This separation is accomplished formally by splitting the government into three branches,¹³ but is much better accomplished informally by departments (like the CIA) and “advisory bodies” (like the SPLC, or the Roman senate). The power of the Deep State lies in *obscuring* what we called in the last chapter *the sovereign*. The goal is to create the illusion that no one is really in charge, and that everyone acts as “checks and balances” on everyone else. In this worldview there is no oversight or actual governance, only a vast bureaucracy that spontaneously marches in ideological lockstep, held together usually by a mystical force like “progress” or “the arc of history” bending toward whatever is not in the best interests of normal people.

People are much easier to rule when they believe that they're not being ruled. There are countless examples of this—the *Daodejing* advises as much:

The highest type of ruler is one of whose existence the people are barely aware.

Next comes one whom they love and praise.

Next comes one whom they fear.

Next comes one whom they despise and defy.^{[14](#)}

The Thebans called their own “popular” government *oligarkhia isonomos*, meaning something like “constitutional oligarchy”—this term is probably the closest we have to honestly describe America today. You're supposed to believe that your vote matters, whereas the real decisions that will shape your children's and grandchildren's future are being made without your being consulted. The Deep State prefers not to consult you, because it's afraid you'll elect someone who will put it in its place.

But it's not only the Deep State that runs the show—the true sovereign bleeds into the private sphere. In the next chapter we'll look at who else decides the exception on your behalf.

SUMMARY

The Deep State is the permanent government.

Every society has had a Deep State.

The Deep State's power lies in concealing who is in charge.

ENDNOTES

1 The obvious fact that the course of history is determined by particular men over and above being determined by abstract forces.

2 In fact, the mainstream media was triggered severely by Republicans' revival in January 2017 of the Holman Rule, a rule that lets a simple congressional majority reduce the annual salary of any civil servant to \$1, effectively firing them without oversight. A perfect illustration of the equivalence of the Deep State and civil service.

3 The Roman equivalent to the presidency.

4 The *nomarchs*, provincial governors.

5 See *Domestic Terrorism Prevention Act of 2019*. Right wing domestic terrorism killed 49 people in the US in 2018; lightning strikes average 51 deaths per year in the US. Omar Mateen alone killed 49 and wounded 53 after swearing allegiance to the leader of ISIS.

6 Falsely claimed by FBI Director Christopher Wray on Sept. 17, 2020. Take for example TORCH Antifa Network, whom the William McKinley Institute describes as “an unincorporated national syndicate of anarchist extremist organizations [which] acts as the coalition’s centralized networking hub and committee. It was created by the *Anti-Racist Action Network*, an organization with ties to known terrorists such as the *Weather Underground*.” See John T. Kelly, “The TORCH Antifa Network: The Anarcho-Terrorist Syndicate”, The William McKinley Institute, April 4, 2022. Available at: <https://archive.ph/68a1i>.

7 For example, the Steele dossier, a fabricated piece of “opposition research” on Donald Trump written in 2016 and used in his political persecution by the Deep State. John Durham, in his probe into the endless Deep State investigations into Trump, concluded that “There is not a single substantive piece of information in the dossier that has ever been corroborated by the FBI, or to my knowledge anyone else.”

8 The newspaper *Austin American-Statesman*, in reporting on a shooting on June 12, 2021, refused to include the police description “as it is too vague at this time to be useful in identifying the shooter and such publication could be harmful in perpetuating stereotypes,” instantly calling to mind a particular stereotype which turned out to be warranted.

9 We will provide more examples of how the formal US government works with “private” companies to silence dissent in the next chapter, but a simple example is that government intelligence agencies tell Big Tech companies what to censor via the Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism database. See Elizabeth Culliford, “Facebook and tech giants to target attacker manifestos, far-right militias in database”, *Reuters*, July 26, 2021. Available at <https://archive.ph/i2E0U>.

10 Although the Twitter Files have exposed the degree to which intelligence agencies have infiltrated Big Tech firms like Twitter. Cf. Matt Taibbi (@mtaibbi), “Thread: THE TWITTER FILES”, Twitter, December 2, 2022. Available at: <https://twitter.com/mtaibbi/status/1598822959866683394> [accessed 04/10/2023].

11 We will return to this in ch. 13 on sovereignty.

12 See U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Hearings, Wednesday, September 5, 2018 – 9:30am. Available at: <https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/hearings/open-hearing-foreign-influence-operations%E2%80%99-use-social-media-platforms-company-witnesses#>.

13 The legislative, the executive, and judicial branches.

14 *Daodejing* ch. 17. Cf. also ch. 58.

THREE

THE CATHEDRAL

The Deep State has far more effect on your children's and grandchildren's future than your elected officials do, but it doesn't act alone. As our Wikipedia example in the last chapter shows, the Deep State works hand-in-hand with so-called "private" organizations to accomplish its goals. This grey area between public and private governance has a name—*the Cathedral*.

There have been men in power who have challenged the Cathedral—Joseph McCarthy,¹ Enoch Powell,² George Wallace,³ Huey Long,⁴ Richard Nixon,⁵ and many others. These men share many things in common, but the main thing they share is that polite society tells you to hate them. Maybe you have reasons to hate them—that isn't the point. The point is that these men and what they stood for had *deep and overwhelming popular support*⁶ in their day, and this popular support made not a bit of difference. What made the difference? The support of the Cathedral.

Let's spell out the Cathedral a little more precisely. The Cathedral is what you get when you think of universities, the mainstream media, NGOs, and big business as informal branches of government. What the Cathedral is *not* is "the Illuminati"—it's not a cabal of people who meet in smoke-filled rooms and hatch nefarious schemes. The Cathedral is simply the consensus-building mechanism of modern society. But every society in history has had a consensus-building mechanism—what makes the Cathedral a useful concept is the recognition that our own mechanism is the same as it was for the 15th century Catholic or the ancient Egyptian. It just wears a mask now that makes it look like a set of private institutions and not an extension of government. It's the modern church to the modern state. Hence, the *Cathedral*.

This consensus-building mechanism works in two ways, a fast and a

slow way. The fast way is by the “art of persuasion”. This is when the Cathedral paints the Nixons and McCarthys of the world as sick, twisted, and corrupt, whether they are or not. The slow way is by top-down social engineering. Opposition to these Nixons and McCarthys is made an explicit tenet of the faith in elite training institutions. Universities indoctrinate bright but impressionable young people into hating all that these men stood for; these young people become future elites; elites repeat these points of doctrine as articles of faith; elites dictate popular tastes.

These men who have challenged the Cathedral have all failed spectacularly, but there is one who has done it serious damage, and who is hated more than any of them: Donald Trump. Trump failed to enact every point of his campaign—immigration reform, America-first trade policy, and ending war in the Middle East—but he bypassed the normal channels controlled by the Cathedral and spoke directly to his democratic base. This may not seem like much, but it has broken the hegemony of one part of the Cathedral: the mainstream media. The whole apparatus reacted allergically to this, spasming uncontrollably to expel what it deems a foreign and dangerous virus. The mask has now slipped. These fits have shown normal people that the Cathedral is very real, is very connected to the Deep State, and very much hates them. Normal people have seen the Cathedral—this is unforgivable, and Trump will never be forgiven for forcing its hand.

The blur between public and private is not limited to the press, to universities, nor to “private” companies like Wikipedia—you’ll find it perhaps most glaringly in non-governmental organizations, or NGOs. A good example of how the Cathedral works can be found in the Black Lives Matter movement.⁷ Popular opinion takes BLM to be grassroots activism by private citizens. In reality, BLM is a top-down movement funded by NGOs to carry out government initiatives as though they were grassroots activism by private citizens. In an Open Society Foundations board meeting soon after the death of Freddie Gray, the government is cited as seeking philanthropic support for its initiatives around the supposedly unjust treatment of the black population by police.⁸ The Open Society Foundations discuss “how best to ensure effective implementation [of these initiatives] given the

federal government's limited authority to dictate reform at the local level."⁹ This is a "private" organization bypassing safeguards against government overreach, attempting to enact police reforms that are democratically unpopular. In a later meeting, these same people agonize over how to square BLM's total dependence on NGO and government funding with their mythology of grassroots activism:

Does philanthropy undermine the field when it advocates directly in spheres of political influence instead of empowering grantees to do the same? Are there times when philanthropy can use its levers of influence to expedite change as institutional actors mature?¹⁰

During WWI and WWII, the US government effectively deputized journalists, making them civil servants.¹¹ There is no reason to think the situation has changed, except the formality.¹² Mainstream media outlets behave as though they have access to classified information, because they do.¹³ Nothing is different today than in WWII, nor is it different than in the ancient world. Oswald Spengler said in 1928, "the Classical forum, the Western press, are, essentially, intellectual engines of the ruling City,"¹⁴ and this is as true now as it was then. The Cathedral is not something new, because societies have always been *totalizing*, meaning that all aspects of life are an organic whole, with no distinction between sacred and secular, church and state, public and private. Far from a conspiracy, the Cathedral is just us noticing what everyone else has always known: that the distinction between public and private is not real.

Hostile elements in the public and private spheres work together to disenfranchise normal people until they can elect a new and less "problematic" people. But how do they do it? After all, Harvard, CNN, the SPLC, and Twitter aren't a military: they wield only soft power. How do they turn it into hard power?

We'll take this up in the next chapter.

SUMMARY

There is no public-private distinction.

Every state has its church.

The Cathedral are the informal branches of government.

ENDNOTES

- 1 Senator of Wisconsin who led a campaign against communist operatives within the US government. He was dismissed as a crank in his time but proven right much later, after the ship had sailed and this ideology had taken root in American government.
- 2 Conservative Member of UK Parliament, infamous for his “Rivers of Blood” speech in 1968 where he warned of the violent results of multiculturalism, forced integration, and demographic change that have since come to pass. He described the situation at the time as “like watching a nation busily engaged in heaping up its own funeral pyre”.
- 3 Governor of Alabama, longest-serving governor in US history who championed states’ rights, industrial and economic development for his state, and segregation.
- 4 Governor of Louisiana and lawyer who prosecuted Standard Oil (of the Rockefeller and Bush families), arguing that it and Wall Street determined US foreign policy. He also advocated massive redistribution of elite wealth.
- 5 Voted worst president in US history in a Gallup poll, February 2011.
- 6 We should note here that “populism” and “democracy” are not different things. Like water and H₂O, they may be defined differently, but point to exactly the same thing in the world—both are democracy; only one is “democracy when I don’t like it”.
- 7 This example is taken from Chris Bond’s *Nemesis: The Jouvenelian vs. the Liberal Model of Human Orders* (Perth: Imperium Press, 2019).
- 8 *Open Society U.S. Programs Board Meeting, May 7–8, 2015*. This document was originally cited in Bond’s *Nemesis* along with others, many of which have now been removed from the internet. This document is now preserved at <https://www.mintpressnews.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/usp-may-2015-board-book.pdf>.
- 9 Ibid.
- 10 *Open Society U.S. Programs Board Meeting, October 1–2, 2015*.
- 11 Journalists were given GS ranks (were made personnel of the federal government) by the Committee on Public Information in WWI, and by the United States Office of War Information in WWII.
- 12 Not only journalists, but Antifa are formal parts of the state apparatus. Case in point, in March 2021 the German government introduced draft legislation making it illegal to publish “enemy lists” naming people as potential targets for “intimidation”. Journalists and Antifa are exempted from the ban. See “Germany plans legislation to ban so-called ‘enemy lists’”, *The Times of India*, March 17, 2021. Available at: <https://archive.ph/GJ0o2>.
- 13 In a news segment on July 7th 2021, Tucker Carlson revealed “yesterday we learned that sources in the so-called ‘intelligence community’ told at least one reporter in Washington what was in those emails, *my* emails [...] I learned from a whistle-blower the NSA planned to leak the contents of those emails to media outlets”. This despite that by law the NSA is required to keep secret the identities of American citizens caught up in its domestic spying operations. Wasting an opportunity to break his viewers out

of this caducean dynamic (see chapter 17), Carlson goes on to state that “we cannot have intelligence agencies used as instruments of political control; both parties used to agree on that”, as though that is not the main use of these agencies, and as though there was ever a time when Democrat or Republican party top brass were unaware of it.

[14](#) Oswald Spengler, *Decline of the West Vol. II*, ch. IV, Cities and Peoples, (A) The Soul of the City, 1928.

FOUR

HIGH-LOW VS. MIDDLE

The thread common to the past three chapters is that modern liberal societies hold their unstable elements together by *obscuring who is in charge*. They obscure the continuity between public and private; they obscure who makes decisions in government; they obscure the sovereign—but above all, they obscure how power dynamics work. Liberalism is built on this—a society that’s honest with itself about how power works ceases to be liberal.

Most views on power dynamics break society into three categories:

High – official power, usually government, or a part of it.

Middle – unofficial power, such as industry, prominent families, clans, unions, the church, cultural heroes, etc.

Low – everyone else.

This is not a class theory like Marxism—these are not quite classes, more like functions in the society.¹ There’s a lot more to say about it, but this gives us a clear enough picture. The basic bitch view of power since the Enlightenment is that the high and the middle team up to stomp on the low.² Liberalism says the king and the church team up to fuck over the peasant. Communism says the capitalist and bourgeois team up to fuck the worker. High–middle vs. low. This all sounds really redpilled to your average Chomsky reader and will get you a tenure-track position at Princeton, but unfortunately reality doesn’t care about tenure. A deeper reading of history paints a different picture: *high–low vs. middle*.

The king isn’t afraid of a peasant revolt—he’s afraid of *his nobles organizing* a peasant revolt. He’s afraid of the church trying to turn his neat and tidy monarchy into a theocracy. But the high has a problem: it *needs* the middle, because the middle is all the unofficial powers in society. Think of these as moral authorities. The high is always insecure about the middle because the middle is the only game

in town that can challenge it. But the middle is always challenging the high because it wants to get free of the king's power. So, the king and his nobles have an uneasy relationship—the king is fine with them as long as they don't get too powerful, but of course the nobles always want to increase their power. So, when one of them gets too powerful, what does the king do? He says to the man in the street, “Fuck this baron, what has he ever done for you? All he ever does is put his boot on your neck. You need me, *the king*, to put down this petty tyrant.”

So, the high allies with the low to beat on the middle. This is, of course, exactly what's happening today, and we all know it in our gut—official power is allying with the underclass to displace old-stock American institutions and elect a new people that can be more easily ruled.³ In normal times, the high wields the low like a club to beat the middle—this is when official power is consolidating itself. Eventually, the middle fights back, takes hold of normal people, and overturns official power. We call these overturnings *revolutions*.

Forget kings and peasants—let's bring it back to the present. The Deep State, the unaccountable power brokers in government, don't want to be hindered by unions, or the church, or by anyone else. So, they wield the lowest of the low—the people who will always be at the bottom of the status hierarchy in a healthy society—as a club against those unofficial powers that make up the middle. And you get:

Bake the cake, bigot
Take a knee
#MeToo
Stay woke

2020 and on has made this all painfully clear. The “fiery but mostly peaceful” riots after the death of George Floyd saw astroturf as far as the eye can see, with *FBI reports themselves* detailing paid activism:

As of 2 June 2020, unidentified individuals discussed various websites for payment to agitate and commit violent acts. Money was transferred to the individuals anonymously via Bitcoin. The payments were rumored to be managed by members of Antifa. Targets and locations were also discussed on the websites (NFI).⁴

One of these websites was Crowds on Demand, a firm that brazenly rents astroturf protestors to anyone. They're not alone:

Crowds on Demand isn't the only outfit that hires paid protesters, though it is perhaps the most open about what it does, said Edward Walker, a UCLA sociology professor

who wrote a book on astroturfing, “Grassroots for Hire: Public Affairs Consultants in American Democracy.”

“There are hundreds of lobbying firms and public affairs firms that do this work, though not all in the same way,” he said. “Some only do a little bit of this grassroots-for-hire, but things adjacent to this are not uncommon today.”⁵

Bitcoin is not anonymous, and these payments to Crowds on Demand were, unsurprisingly, never followed up on. This turning a blind eye is just one way that the Deep State puts its finger on the scale to disempower its critics.⁶ The cottage industry of fake protestors (Antifa being the biggest) is another. Both are part of a strategy to turn soft power into hard power.

With a sober view of power dynamics, it’s clear that social change is not bottom-up. If normal people are to get what they want, they’ll need to attach themselves to a particular man—probably a disaffected elite—with perfect loyalty on both sides of the relationship. There are highly vilified cases of this through the 20th century, and these are the best examples of success so far. Trump was a very imperfect example, and his failed revolution was an attempt at middle-low vs. high. It’s not just that he damaged the Cathedral as we pointed out, what he represented was the *complete overthrow of the present order*. We can see why the allergic reaction.

These revolutions have happened all throughout history,⁷ and there’s no reason why they can’t again. High-low vs. middle thrives on concealment—again, this is not new. Indo-European peoples held it at bay by the formal relationship of clientship,⁸ and something like this may be required.⁹ For any major social change in modern times, you can trace it back to a patron that cleared the way for it long before people ever took to the streets.¹⁰ We are reminded of the old Sunzi maxim, “every battle is won or lost before it is ever fought”. High-low vs. middle forecloses on any hope of grassroots change, but knowledge of this is power, because to abandon grassroots change is to abandon liberalism, and liberalism is the problem. Everything is either dictated by a centre, or is authorized by a centre, or is dictated or authorized by a power in a position to challenge the centre.

But does it have to be destructive? Does the centre—the high—have to be so hostile to normal people as to run society into the ground?

No.

There is hope, friends.

SUMMARY

The king allies with the peasant, not the baron.

Official power must either capture unofficial powers or destroy them.

There is no grassroots social change.

ENDNOTES

1 Most of the “middle class” belongs to the “low” in this picture, the people who are ruled.

2 Liberalism and communism agree here, and not for the last time.

3 This is, of course, happening all throughout the West and not just in America.

4 Situational Information Report, Federal Bureau of Investigation Potential Activity Alert,

San Antonio Division, June 3 2020. Available at: <https://archive.ph/vIuR6>.

5 James Rufus Koren, “Paid protesters? They’re real — and a Beverly Hills firm that hires them stands accused of extortion in a lawsuit”, *LA Times*, October 21, 2018. Available at: <https://archive.ph/kuAnn>.

6 Easier still for the Deep State to just target its critics. “Judicial Watch, a government watchdog, has released documents obtained from the Department of Justice and the IRS that reveal a plot to pursue criminal charges against opponents of the Obama administration. The documents showcase the extensive collaboration between the IRS, DOJ, and FBI in targeting conservative organizations.” From Raven Clabough, Obama Administration’s DOJ, FBI Also Involved in IRS Scandal, *New American*, July 9, 2015. Available at: <https://archive.ph/FnpzB>.

7 Such as the Solonian reforms, the rise of the Roman republic, Amarna Egypt, the English Civil War, the French Revolution, the late Shang dynasty, the revolt of Arminius, etc.

8 A relation of mutual obligation where a powerful patron helps a client in exchange for services; a modern example is in the Sicilian *Cosa Nostra*, made famous in *The Godfather* movies.

9 There are other approaches. For example, Vedic peoples held it off through *varna*, the caste system. By a rigorous and formal system of social functions, a kind of “class collaboration” comes about—all members of society understand that their role in society is important and divine. Even if some are higher or lower on the totem pole, each caste has a place in the sun.

10 See the Open Society meetings cited in the last chapter.

FIVE

NOBLESSE OBLIGE

The last four chapters have been negative—we’ve spent most of the space critiquing what’s wrong with liberalism. From here on we offer a positive vision, which is something liberalism doesn’t do.¹

The problem with our top-down view of power is that normal people are left out of the picture. This makes it sound like the man in the street has all the duties and the elite have all the rights. And the lower classes *have* always had obligations to the upper classes—today more than ever. But in former times elites had duties to those below them. This idea had a name: *noblesse oblige*.²

First, we should clarify that noblesse oblige doesn’t mean “duties to all mankind”: it means *legitimate duties*. This doesn’t include everyone who happens to be taking up space in your country; a country is not a zip code, and just setting foot into one doesn’t automatically bestow rights.³ Nor does it mean something like the *white man’s burden*. The white man’s burden, while similar in some ways to noblesse oblige, just is a duty to all mankind. It sounds based but is dependent on the sort of universalism that always, in time, breaks down into liberal egalitarian nonsense, usually tinged with a quasi-progressivism (“civilize the savages”) and ethnic inessentialism (“am I not a man and a brother?”). Under the white man’s burden, we’re still justifying our self-assertion by how it benefits the “other”. This isn’t an argument against imperialism—the Roman empire was obviously imperialist but felt no need to civilize its “savages”. In fact, it sometimes took them as moral examples.⁴

At its core, noblesse oblige is the assurance that both commoners *and* elites have skin in the game, meaning that any decision elites make affects them too. Just think of elites who are insulated from the costs of their actions—the celebrity who advocates for limitless immigration but lives in a gated community, or the Citibank trader

who profits off capitalism's upside but gets bailed out in the downside.⁵ Noblesse oblige is the bulwark against elite parasitism—the idea that you should have as much rank as you do scars.

In the past, this skin in the game was guaranteed by the ethnically homogenous society. J. B. S. Haldane once joked that he wouldn't lay down his life for his brother, but "I would lay down my life for two brothers or eight cousins," because two brothers or eight cousins have a better chance than him of perpetuating the same genes.⁶ This is now known as "kin selection" and presents a scary and uncomfortable reality for evolutionary biologists, who are often politically retarded.⁷ If your society consists of all 7th cousins then Haldane's math says you'll lay your life down for 33,000 of them—much fewer if some are closer relatives. Genetic proximity to the man in the street gives the elite an investment in the welfare of his neighbour.⁸

Another form that noblesse oblige has taken is primogeniture, where all property is passed down to the eldest son. This was the norm in archaic Indo-European societies,⁹ but was as much a burden as a boon. The eldest male—the *paterfamilias*, or House Father—had duties to the rest of the family that were as binding as a religious duty, because they *were* religious duties. These included maintaining the domestic religion,¹⁰ arbitrating fairly in disputes, assuming responsibility for the family's livelihood, and personally leading the family into war in times of conflict. And because most of the property was inalienable—meaning he couldn't sell it—being the heir to the family fortune meant little in material terms. Contrast this sacred bond between the Aryan patriarch and his family with the nearly unlimited demands made by the modern state on its citizens.

Noblesse oblige is another word for something socialists love but can never have—*solidarity*. This is because socialists tend to massacre those to whom they owe legitimate obligations.¹¹ Noblesse oblige is based on the idea of corporatism,¹² which is not the idea that Walmart and McDonalds should rule, but that society is a body whose parts must work together. This idea is best embodied today in right wing authoritarianism,¹³ which has no problem reconciling rank with duty to inferiors:

Differences there must be [among men], though these differences need not find their

expression in snobbery or in those social distinctions which rest upon such obscure titles as a Knighthood created to rid some constituency of an incumbent, when his seat is desired by a more technically useful member of the Prime Minister's party. The Fascist is opposed to many of the inequalities of our present system. He opposes these inequalities, however, not because they are inequalities but because they are in no wise correlated with the only true criterion of discrimination—the standard of service to the state.¹⁴

Wikipedia takes the phrase “with great power comes great responsibility” as a guideline for its editors, tracing the phrase back to the French Revolution.¹⁵ In truth, *noblesse oblige* is a term coined by the 3rd Duke of Lévis, Pierre-Marc-Gaston de Lévis, whose family was guillotined in the Revolution. So much for “great responsibility”. The Duke knew it well though, and described it this way:

When one comes from an illustrious family, one must teach one's children that if the public is willing to honour in them the merit of their parents, it expects to find traces of it in their descendants; the respect that is generally accorded to birth is far from being free.¹⁶

The French Revolution was not entirely undeserved. The European monarchies had deteriorated from earlier ages to where they had become corrupt and decadent. Still, much of value was lost in the move from traditional societies to the modern world. In many cases, the baby did get thrown out with the bathwater. *Noblesse oblige* is one of those cases.

The Duke of Lévis may have coined the term, but the idea behind it is not new. It goes back at least 5,000 years, to the time when the different European peoples lived together in Central Asia, to the earliest time when we could call ourselves a people. It goes back to the time when the state and the family overlapped—when the state *was* a family. Pre-modern social bonds were all permanent, obligatory, and unchosen; then the Enlightenment swept this all away. The great chain of being, social corporatism, the fascies, all this was thrown over in one giant inferno. But the oldest, the *paterfamilias*, will always be with us. Even Gandhi—libtard extraordinaire—was called *Rastrapita*, *father of the nation*.

Noblesse oblige is very old, and old things hold sway for good reason. Liberalism wants to do away with those things, but it can't do away with the reasons they were put there. Perhaps we deserve better

reasons than *liberté*, *égalité*, and *fraternité*. Perhaps we can find a more secure footing for our lives than “fuck you Dad”.

SUMMARY

You should have as much rank as you do scars.

Elites have never had more rights, and commoners more duties, than today.

Duties to the people don't mean duties to *all* people.

ENDNOTES

- 1 We will spell out why this is in chapter 10, answering the question “what is liberalism?”
- 2 French for “nobility obligates”.
- 3 In healthier times someone could be deprived of all rights if needed. This is where we get the concept of the *outlaw*—someone who is literally “outside the law”, able to be killed with impunity. Older societies tended to solve problems with simple and effective means that we’re too delicate for today.
- 4 Such as in Tacitus’ *Germania* and parts of Caesar’s *Gallic Wars*.
- 5 The technical term for this asymmetry of risk vs. reward is *moral hazard*—the classic example being someone who is willing to drive recklessly because they’re wearing a seatbelt. The pedestrian on the sidewalk bears all the risk and none of the reward.
- 6 This idea is expressed quantitatively by Hamilton’s rule, a mathematical formula that underlies the concept of inclusive fitness, where altruism is evolved to preserve genes and therefore is limited to kin. It’s the same kind of cost-benefit analysis for altruism that Haldane is doing.
- 7 A cardinal example being Richard Dawkins, who was so afraid of group selection that he invented the concept of the selfish gene because in his view individualism wasn’t autistic enough. Haldane himself was no better, being a Marxist, but at least a clever one.
- 8 Genetic proximity also promotes family cohesion—up to a certain point. Research from Iceland suggests that the ideal proximity for a long lasting, fertile, and loving marriage is third cousin, or a non-relative with the same genetic proximity by chance as a third cousin. Closer or more distant consanguinity produces less successful unions (Helgasson et al., 2008).
- 9 Germanic and Celtic societies excepted, although the home (the seat of the ancestral line) and political offices usually passed to the eldest son.
- 10 A time consuming and burdensome task. All religion was domestic among Aryan peoples, unlike in later universalist religions. We will return to this in ch. 33.
- 11 Socialists insist on society being arranged according to class, a trivial distinction.
- 12 See ch. 18.
- 13 With one possible exception: Stalinist Russia. A. James Gregor makes a strong case in *The Faces of Janus* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000) that Stalinism and fascism are closer than is often thought.
- 14 William Joyce, *Dictatorship*, 1933.
- 15 See Wikipedia, “With great power comes great responsibility”. Available at: <https://archive.ph/vXG0g> [accessed September 2023].
- 16 *Maximes et réflexions sur différents sujets de morale et de politique*, Vol. I, 1812. Maxim LXXII.

SIX

CHESTERTON'S FENCE

In some sense, the right-wing worldview is just refusing to ignore obvious truths we all learned at five and which are now considered boring and old. In fact, just about every old proverb you learned when you were five is incredibly subversive to liberalism, which is why liberalism wants to destroy old things. One such proverb is “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it”—liberalism hates this kind of thing.

All reformism is based on the idea that *times have changed*, but in truth pretty much nothing fundamental has changed in terms of what makes a society successful since humans became anatomically modern. Sure, we now have Netflix subscriptions and iPads with rounded corners, but societies still need the same things they needed when we were living in bands of 30 people: a centre to gather around, a way to perpetuate themselves, and a connection to the past. None of this is in any way mediated or changed by technology or the “progress” of ideas.

Nobody is advocating stagnation or do-nothingism, but most of the time reformers throw the baby out with the bathwater. This is because reformers usually don’t know—and don’t *want* to know—the purpose of the thing they’re reforming. G. K. Chesterton had a great metaphor for this:

There exists in such a case a certain institution or law; let us say, for the sake of simplicity, a fence or gate erected across a road. The more modern type of reformer goes gaily up to it and says, “I don’t see the use of this; let us clear it away.” To which the more intelligent type of reformer will do well to answer: “If you don’t see the use of it, I certainly won’t let you clear it away. Go away and think. Then, when you can come back and tell me that you do see the use of it, I may allow you to destroy it.”¹

When the reformer starts changing things because he thinks they serve no purpose, he risks destroying things he never even knew were there. This is especially the case with complex systems. Take for example the cane toad. In 1935, a research organization introduced 102 cane toads

into a remote part of Australia to control a native beetle. Today there are 200 million of them, they cover about half the continent, and they've caused untold damage to Australia's environment and biodiversity.

Things that have been around forever are never without a purpose. For centuries, the appendix was thought to be a useless organ, an evolutionary afterthought that would eventually wither away as we evolve.² Here's a perfectly useless fence just waiting to be ripped down—in fact, worse than useless, the appendix can sometimes prove fatal if not removed. 80 million years is long enough, the appendix must go, progress can't wait anymore. Unfortunately for our reformer, the appendix not only serves a purpose, but has evolved 29 separate times to serve that purpose.³ It turns out that this “useless” sac stores bacteria that repopulate your gut after a stomach flu, and not only that, but those fatal appendix ruptures are actually caused by “progress” itself.⁴

Conservatism—and here I want you to think Cato the Elder and not Charlie Kirk—is at bottom just an expression of epistemic humility. It's admitting that people in the past knew things, maybe even things we don't. We're not smarter than our ancestors. In fact, quite the opposite. Biologist Gerald Crabtree published a paper in 2012 that sent a screech mounting up to the heavens from evolutionary biologists everywhere:

I would be willing to wager that if an average citizen from Athens of 1000 BC were to appear suddenly among us, he or she would be among the brightest and most intellectually alive of our colleagues and companions. We would be surprised by our time-visitor's memory, broad range of ideas and clear-sighted view of important issues. I would also guess that he or she would be among the most emotionally stable of our friends and colleagues.⁵

These people built the greatest civilizations of all time with the equivalent of an abacus and a slide rule. Maybe we should take them seriously. On the other hand, liberalism has only been a thing for about as long as the Egyptian Intermediate Periods, the time *between everything that matters* in Egyptian history—impressive as our civilization is, it's still young and history is not over. A little humility is probably in order.

Roger Scruton has called conservatives “people who love something actual and want to maintain it”. The liberal and his cousin the communist are men who love something hypothetical and want to impose it on you. It’s easier to destroy than to build, and what’s *truly* important—cultural production—is easy to lose, almost impossible to regain. It’s just this love of the hypothetical, of what doesn’t and can’t exist, that makes the liberal anti-nature. He may talk about climate change, he may shop at Whole Foods, and he may teach yoga out of Big Sur, but he loves nature only in the abstract and distrusts empiricism, hence his anti-science scientism.⁶

Overturing the apple cart is almost always a dumb idea, but this isn’t incompatible with creativity. If you want to see bad art, look at the freest artforms. Compare free verse or slam poetry to Milton’s *On the Late Massacre in Piedmont*. Tradition—like great art—is not stagnation, but *freedom within constraint*. The liberal comes across Chesterton’s fence and asks “why is this here? I don’t know” and rips it down, then is gored by an angry bull. “I don’t see why not” is the worst reason to do anything because the dumber you are, the more often it applies. If our reformer can’t see why the fence is there, the problem is almost certainly him and not the fence.

Liberalism offers quackery and fortune cookie paradoxes in place of real solutions, solutions that cost our forefathers rivers of blood, sweat, and tears to arrive at through hard and cruel experience—experience which is in no way irrelevant. Tradition is just the experience of billions of man-hours distilled into priceless gems that we have inherited. This is the way the world ends: not with a bang, but with the slow buildup of immediately rational trade-offs against ancient social technology that we’re too short-sighted to understand.

Tradition is arbitrary in inverse proportion to its age. The older the fence, the less likely you should tear it down. Patriarchy, hierarchy, authoritarianism, ethnocentrism—all of these have stood the test of time, and not for no reason. If only we had a rule of thumb that could help us in judging these things.

SUMMARY

Conservatism is epistemic humility.

To reform something, you must first know why it's there.

"I don't see why not" applies more often the dumber you are.

ENDNOTES

1 G. K. Chesterton, *The Thing: Why I Am a Catholic*, 1929.

2 You'll notice that the progressive constantly talks about being "evolved" as though it's a linear process from low to high—as though a Starbucks barista is "more evolved" than a cockroach. There's an inverse relationship between how much a person knows about science and how much for him "evolved" is a term of approval.

3 Heather F. Smith et al, *Morphological evolution of the mammalian cecum and cecal appendix*, *Comptes Rendus Palevol* Volume 16, Issue 1, January–February 2017.

4 "[...] appendicitis, or inflammation of the appendix, is not due to a faulty appendix, but rather due to cultural changes associated with industrialized society and improved sanitation." See "The Appendix – Why we Need It", *Clinical Education*, 2011. Available at: <https://archive.ph/OR40n>.

5 Gerald Crabtree, *Our Fragile Intellect*, *Trends in Genetics*, Vol. 29, Issue 1.

6 "Scientism" is a naïve worship of science without any understanding of its foundations, history, or proper bounds. Liberals love the idea of science but often recoil from the reality, which tends to confirm radical right-wing views and disconfirm progressive views. For example, liberals reject the obvious track record of safety and viability of nuclear power, and are viscerally repulsed by the facts of biology, such as that there are only two sexes and that race is a biologically valid category with predictive value.

SEVEN

THE LINDY EFFECT

Conservatism is just humility. It's hard for mere mortals to know what will work at first glance. Even the greatest genius can't hold a candle to thousands of years of trial and error—it would be like going up against a supercomputer in a chess match. The world is complicated, and even a Newton or an Aristotle has only seen so much of it. A rule of thumb would be handy.

Thankfully, there is such a rule of thumb: *the Lindy effect*. For most things, life expectancy decreases with age—people, cars, solar systems, civilizations, almost everything you can point to is like this. If you're 2 years old, you probably have about 75 years left to live; if you're 80, not so much. For other things though, life expectancy *increases* with age. This was noticed by a group of comedians who gathered at a diner called Lindy, who observed that a comedian who had been around for a while was more likely to outlast one who hadn't. Later, people noticed the same thing about Broadway shows—if a show had run for 100 days, it was likely to run for 100 more; if it had run for 500 days, it would probably last 500 more.¹ This is the Lindy effect.

The Lindy effect doesn't apply to your lifespan, but it does apply to certain things. The nail has been around for something like 5,500 years and is not going anywhere anytime soon. The iPhone 16 has just come out and will be utterly forgotten in 20 years. So will smartphones themselves. The Lindy effect applies to technology, companies, ideas, art, and most importantly, *traditions*.

It also applies to evolutionary adaptations. Jordan Peterson has rightly been chastised by the radical right, but he does have some good insights that he unfortunately doesn't follow to their logical conclusions. One of his good insights is the example of the lobster's neurological system, which we share:

We separated from those creatures on the evolutionary timescale somewhere between

350–600 million years ago, and the damn neurochemistry is the same. *And so that's another indication of just how important hierarchies of authority are.* I mean, they've been conserved since the time of lobsters, right? There weren't *trees* around when lobsters first manifested themselves on the planet. And so, what that means is these hierarchies that I've been talking about, those things are older than trees. And so, one of the truisms for what constitutes real, from a Darwinian perspective, is that which has been around the longest period of time.²

We can say the same about *good* from a Darwinian perspective—what's adaptive is good because it promotes survival, and what's old is adaptive according to the Lindy effect. We want things that work not just since last week, not just on Tuesdays, but every day for the last 5,500 years, and 350 million years is even better. We want something so secure *that we can't even remember a time when it wasn't around.* The longer something has been around, the more likely it has weathered every imaginable storm, under every imaginable condition, for every imaginable subject, at every imaginable point in the historical cycle. *Times have changed* isn't a serious argument here. To say that "*times have changed*" *for the first time in 350 million years* is so absurd that just to say it out loud is enough to laugh it out of court. What's true of evolutionary adaptations is true of traditions, because traditions just are evolutionary adaptations for societies. What's been around forever at the very least *works*, and that is the final measure of truth.

This is what's called the *pragmatic theory of truth*. A thing is *true* because of its *consequences*, whether they be practical consequences, consequences for other beliefs, or logical consequences—all other theories of truth are special cases of this one.³ What's *true* is just a special case of what's *good*, of what *can be relied on*. This is not a new idea, it's embedded in the word *true*, whose ancient Proto-Germanic root **triwwiz* means "reliable"—this is the original sense of the word that you get in the old saying "tried and true", or "true as a spirit level".⁴ Nassim Nicholas Taleb, the foremost exponent of the Lindy effect, explains it this way:

Note that I am here modifying Popper's idea; we can replace "true" (rather, not false) with "useful", even "not harmful", even "protective to its users". So I will diverge from Popper in the following. For things to survive, they necessarily need to fare well in the risk dimension, that is be good at not dying, surviving, that type of thing. By the Lindy Effect, if an idea has skin in the game, it is not in the truth game, but in the

harm game. An idea survives if it is a good risk manager, that is, not only doesn't harm its holders, but favors their survival—this also affects superstitions that have crossed centuries because they led to some protective actions.⁵

What are called “superstitions”⁶ are often highly archaic survivals that offer an adaptive advantage. For example, burial of the dead is ubiquitous and offers hygienic benefits. Similarly, authoritarianism is now thought to be an adaptation to the threat of parasites.⁷ Pragmatic truth (“what’s true is what’s good to believe”) agrees with our best science: a recent study found that “our perceptual systems have evolved to provide a species-specific interface to guide adaptive behavior, and not to provide a veridical representation of objective reality.”⁸

No civilization better grasped pragmatic truth and the Lindy effect than the Romans. For them, the highest authority was not science, but the *mos maiorum*, the “way of the ancestors”, often translated as “tradition”. But the word *maiorum*, the genitive of “elders”, carried for the Romans the connotation “betters”. For them, what was old simply *was* good—no people ever rejected the cult of youth quite as completely. To question the *mos maiorum* was, literally, to question the experts, something unthinkable—even the modern bugman can question science when it conflicts with liberal ideology. But the Roman intuitively grasped the Lindy effect, and so his people went from a tiny, insignificant tribe on the edge of the known world to conquering that world within just a few centuries.

And perhaps no civilization was ever as anti-utopian.⁹ This is maybe the most striking thing about the Lindy effect: it’s ideologically agnostic. It doesn’t care what the content of the belief is. All it needs to know to conclude that a belief is useful, stabilizing, adaptive, and productive, is how long it’s been around. There is no way to forecast what’s rational. Only by brute, repetitive, painful *experience*, by what *works*, can you know what’s rational—and only after the fact. Wittgenstein said that “in philosophy the winner is the one who finishes last”, and we know what he meant. The individual, reasoning abstractly from his own “self-evident” premises that he cooked up five minutes ago, pales in comparison to the deep pre-historical memory of a people, of a species, of a whole family tree of living beings reaching

back 350 million years. Even Einstein, as close to an oracle of timeless wisdom as liberalism will allow, conceded that:

As a human being, one has been endowed with just enough intelligence to be able to see clearly how utterly inadequate that intelligence is when confronted with what exists.^{[10](#)}

Even an Einstein is struck dumb by some problems. Lindy is not. But where does this leave rationality? Do we need to abandon all attempts to ground our beliefs in reasons? Is there no solid footing we can put them on?

SUMMARY

The longer something has been around, the longer it will be around.

What's true is what's good to believe.

Tradition is arbitrary in inverse proportion to its age.

ENDNOTES

1 Physicist Richard Gott tested this Broadway show theory and found that it was 95% accurate, an astoundingly high batting average for any non-trivial social science prediction.

2 Jordan Peterson, *Biblical Series III: God and the Hierarchy of Authority*. Emphasis added.

3 Goethe summed it up when he said, “that which is fruitful alone is true” (Was fruchtbar ist, allein ist wahr). *Vermächtnis*, 1829.

4 We have known that *true* means *reliable* since prehistoric times. If you ignored the “etymological fallacy” completely, 90% of philosophical problems would be resolved.

5 Nassim Nicholas Taleb, “An Expert Called Lindy”, *Medium*, January 9, 2017. Available at: <https://archive.ph/9XaMc>.

6 From the Latin *superstes*, “survivor” or “witness”.

7 Damian R. Murray, Mark Schaller, Peter Suedfeld, *Pathogens and Politics: Further Evidence That Parasite Prevalence Predicts Authoritarianism*, PLOS One, May 1, 2013.

8 Chetan Prakash et al, “Fitness Beats Truth in the Evolution of Perception”, *Acta Biotheor.* 69, no. 3 (September 2021): pp. 319-341. Available at: <https://archive.ph/N6nAW>.

9 Even the Roman maxim *salus populi suprema lex esto* [“let the welfare of the people be the supreme law”] speaks to their pragmatism—what is right is just what’s good for the people. This law was already ancient by the time the Twelve Tables were codified.

10 From a letter to Queen Elisabeth of Belgium, according to *The Yale Book of Quotations*.

EIGHT

ENDOXIA

We're going to put our beliefs on a firm foundation, but let's distinguish this from *reason*. Liberals can't distinguish "reason" from "giving reasons" and will try to argue that just giving reasons at all is playing their game, as though everyone for 99.98% of human history did things at random. Reason—the fetish of the Enlightenment—is not "knowing things" or "having thoughts" or "doing things because of other things"; drawing conclusions from facts is not in itself granting liberal assumptions.

The Enlightenment approach to truth can be summed up in two quotes. One, *nullius in verba* ["on the word of no one"], is the motto of the Royal Society.¹ In other words, don't blindly take the word of any authority—one man thinking for himself is better than a thousand men in funny hats pointing to a Book known for Reasons to be Authoritative. The other, *sapere aude* ["dare to know"], was used by Immanuel Kant to describe the Enlightenment spirit.² Again, we have the maverick individual daring like a wounded bull to buck tradition and plant his hooves square in the face of those thousand men, sending a volley of funny hats into the air. The common denominator here is the Rational Individual as the highest authority on truth. And really, put in those terms, who would argue? Who else would you want? The *irrational* individual?

The Rational Individual sounds impressive but he hasn't been around very long. Oh, we had an Aristotle or two, but according to the liberal this breed died out and we had 1,500 years of darkness. Why did rationality not win? This question makes our liberal uncomfortable.

The thing about the Rational Individual is that he's human, and so, fallible. He's reasoning from fallible assumptions, and your conclusions are only as good your assumptions.³ In computer science

lingo it's GIGO—*garbage in, garbage out*. So where do we get our assumptions from? By definition, you just *assume* them—that is, you get them irrationally. The philosopher Bertrand Russell had trouble swallowing this idea. When he was being taught geometry, he found that he had to assume certain unproven axioms in order to do geometry at all in the first place, and he refused to accept that they couldn't be proven. He wanted to make sure that garbage wasn't coming out, so his magnum opus, the *Principia Mathematica*, was dedicated to making sure that there wasn't garbage going in—he wanted to prove that the assumptions of formal logic were complete and consistent (he failed).

So, how do we know that our assumptions aren't garbage going in? This is where the Rational Individual is no better off than the man in the funny hat, and probably worse.

The short answer is that you get your assumptions from hard, cruel, bitter *experience*. You can't tell if your assumptions are good until you test them in real life, until you collect some data. If you agree, you're an empiricist, like our friends in the Royal Society. So even if we have an Aristotle working on a problem, his ideas are, at best, only as good as his assumptions—assumptions he came up with himself, if he's a liberal.⁴ This doesn't mean we can't know anything, only that we need as much experience as possible. In fact, no matter how smart our Rational Individual is, one lifetime is not enough. He doesn't have enough time—he's not, say, a vampire.⁵

What makes the vampire so terrifying is that he's *old*. He's seen it all. He's been through historical cycles, cycles of cycles, and more. He's lived through large-scale historical trends that the Rational Individual can't conceive of—even an Aristotle. He's fad-proof. He doesn't give a shit about clickbait. He laughs at your public “education”, and yes, your PhD too.⁶ He just sits in his castle and reads for centuries. If you came to the vampire with your “one weird tip” for a flat belly he might listen but would be really skeptical. He's seen billions of weird tips before and has heard “we're living in unprecedented times” every day of his eternal life. Almost none of those times were special, and *none* of these tips worked. We should aim to be like the vampire.

It turns out we do have something like this. Your grandpa can hand

down a lifetime of experience to you if you don't call him "out of touch" or ask how it's "relevant" but rather shut the fuck up and listen. This is how we transmit experience over multiple human lifetimes—by *tradition*. This is how we arrive at our foundational assumptions, and it's *exactly what the "Enlightenment" rejects*. Tradition gives us ideal starting points, which Aristotle himself—maybe the smartest Rational Individual of all time—once called *endoxa*:

Endoxa are those opinions accepted by everyone, or by the majority, or by the wise—and among the wise, by all or most of them, or by those who are the most notable and having the highest reputation.⁷

Tradition is a sort of super-empiricism—experience extended beyond a single lifetime. The older the tradition, the more fads it has seen, and the better our assumptions derived from it, as per the Lindy effect. Endoxa are the crystallizations of trillions of man-hours of experience. This is, after all, exactly how science works: it's a communal enterprise carried on over many generations.⁸

Sometimes tradition isn't the best option. When a domain of knowledge changes too fast and is linear, a different approach may be needed. But cases like this are usually trivial, like the study of the respiratory system of the gnat. Often even scientific knowledge is cyclical or fashion-prone, especially when it matters to politics.⁹ But when change is slow or only apparent, or when systems failure happens over many generations, tradition really shines. A few years ago, everyone was talking about "big data". If "big data" isn't just a fetishization of technology, then the biggest of big data is tradition, and where massive empirical studies are done properly in social science, they start to point toward traditional ideas, such as the work of Peter Turchin pointing to cyclical history.¹⁰

We're not smarter than our forefathers, as Gerald Crabtree has pointed out. The basic elements of social orders haven't changed since the lower Palaeolithic. And your personal experience doesn't compare to tens or hundreds of thousands of years of human prehistory. If you disagree, then you clearly have the sort of insight that comes around only a few times in human history, and we welcome your earth-shattering contribution. But if you agree, then tradition is for you, and

the men in the funny hats are not just pointing to any book, but the Book that has created stable, productive societies for countless human lifetimes. Nothing has changed, and the Book reads just as well today as the day it was written.

So, our Royal Society friends have it wrong. One of them, Isaac Newton, said *hypotheses non fingo* (“I frame no hypotheses”), and this is as good an account of tradition as you’ll find—the traditionalist doesn’t even need *theory* at all, because he has *praxis*^{[11](#)} born out of deep history. No rationalistic plan is needed, only enough time and natural selection. Tradition just *is* an evolutionary adaptation, but of groups and not of individuals. In the next chapter, as we near the end of our 10-step program and bid farewell to liberalism forever, we’ll spell this out a bit more formally.

SUMMARY

Your conclusions are only as good as your assumptions.

Your assumptions come from experience.

Tradition is the aggregated experience of many human lifetimes.

ENDNOTES

- [1](#) A society of learned men in 17th century England, established in 1660, that was basically the Academy of Sciences in its day.
- [2](#) Immanuel Kant, *Answering the Question: What Is Enlightenment?* 1784.
- [3](#) In symbolic logic we call failures in reasoning due to bad premises *informal fallacies*. You'll hear the liberal talk about fallacies a lot, but rarely does he ask himself where his premises come from.
- [4](#) The liberal will often try to tell you his premises are "self-evident". No premise is ever self-evident but instead depends on things that aren't timeless or universal, especially language and culture. We'll revisit this in chapter 44 on MacIntyre.
- [5](#) This analogy stolen shamelessly from Raymond Brannen's *Inference with The Vampire*.
- [6](#) Academics are no less prone to fashion than runway models. For example, see "Front, side, back: The full 360 degrees of changing baby sleeping advice", *news.com.au*, May 28, 2014. This article cites anecdotal evidence as inadmissible, whereas liberalism just *is* anecdotal evidence made into an ideology. Fashion-driven academic trends are the rule and not the exception, see also: *One egg a day 'LOWERS' your risk of type 2 diabetes* (Daily Mail, January 4, 2019) and *Eating just ONE egg a day increases your risk of diabetes by 60 per cent* (Daily Mail, November 17, 2020); *Everyone wore masks during the 1918 flu pandemic. They were useless*. (Washington Post, April 2, 2020) and *Abandoning masks now is a terrible idea. The 1918 pandemic shows why*. (Washington Post, March 12, 2021); *Bad news for chocoholics: Dark chocolate isn't so healthy for you after all* (Daily Mail, January 25, 2020) and *Eating dark chocolate really is good for your heart* (Daily Mail, April 25, 2020).
- [7](#) Aristotle, *Topics*, 100b21–23.
- [8](#) See the work of Thomas Kuhn, especially *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962)
- [9](#) Take for example group selection in evolution, which was considered obvious in the 19th century, then mysteriously fell out of favour right after WWII taught us that *racism is bad*, and is now returning to respectability. See *Group Selection, A Theory Whose Time Has Come ... Again*, November 29, 2007, University of Chicago Press Journals.
- [10](#) Turchin denies that his *cliodynamics* is cyclical history but what he means is that cliodynamics aspires to scientific status and cyclical history doesn't—he wants to avoid guilt by association with something problematic in the eyes of his peers. See Peter Turchin and Sergey A. Nefedov, *Secular Cycles*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009).
- [11](#) Just the act of practical doing. We use this slightly arcane word because it has been appropriated by Marxists. Sorry—it's ours.

NINE

DARWIN AND THE WORK OF CIRCUMSTANCES

In the last three chapters we've noted the connection between a thing's age and its merit. Edmund Burke summed this up in his *Reflections*:

Old establishments are tried by their effects. If the people are happy, united, wealthy, and powerful, we presume the rest. We conclude that to be good from whence good is derived. In old establishments various correctives have been found for their aberrations from theory. Indeed, they are the results of various necessities and expediciencies. They are not often constructed after any theory; theories are rather drawn from them. In them we often see the end best obtained where the means seem not perfectly reconcilable to what we may fancy was the original scheme. The means taught by experience may be better suited to political ends than those contrived in the original project. They again react upon the primitive constitution, and sometimes improve the design itself, from which they seem to have departed.¹

Here we have design without a designer, we have a sort of theory of natural selection, but for institutions, not organisms.

Darwin is often taken as the enemy of tradition, but traditions are just those social institutions that have weathered selective pressures. The longer a thing has survived, the more likely that it serves an adaptive purpose; “racism” is held up as the cardinal modern sin, but ethnocentrism is deeply rooted in our brain structure, therefore ancient.² Natural selection is anything but the liberal's friend.

The liberal may not have digested the significance of natural selection, but we have. It's not just organisms—ideas undergo selection too.³ Even those things that seem irrational and baseless—paranoia,⁴ neuroticism,⁵ authoritarianism,⁶ ethnocentrism,⁷ homophobia,⁸ patriarchy⁹—are adaptive, and the older they are, the more adaptive. Our liberal would have done away with them, which is why he isn't allowed within sniffing distance of Chesterton's Fence. Take patriarchy. Wherever male-headed households aren't socially guaranteed, divorce and delinquency rates are high. Moral crusaders have it backwards: the naturally strong mother-child biological tie doesn't need legal support; the naturally weak father-child tie does, or

else couplings are fleeting, the integrity of the family suffers, and we're left with the female-led reproductive arrangements of the ghetto, the barnyard, and the rainforest.

Darwinism is the nail in the coffin of the Enlightenment, which is why you're not allowed to apply it to anything except bees and cuttlefish. But Darwinism is not enough. Burke's justification of tradition comes from outside tradition, and also Burke was a Whig.¹⁰ We need stronger meat.

Patriarchy could hardly have been designed purposefully—base your society on the *weakest* relationship? Nor could something like hereditary monarchy, which appears at first glance as the dumbest idea ever concocted.¹¹ Joseph de Maistre explains:

To begin at the foundation, if we had never heard of governments, and men were called to deliberate, for example, on hereditary or elective monarchy, we would justly regard one who should decide for the former as a fool. The arguments against it appear so naturally to reason that it is useless to recount them.

History, however, which is experimental politics, demonstrates that hereditary monarchy is the government most stable, most happy, and most natural to man, and elective monarchy, on the contrary, the worst kind of government known.¹²

Maistre is pointing out something we all learned on our mother's knee—you *actually have to look*. And when you actually look, you find that despite what our galaxy-brained liberal thinks about something like patriarchy, he runs up against a brute fact: patriarchy *works*. History is experimental politics the way that prehistory is experimental biology—there's no way you'll invent a better bird's wing, or social order, than time plus circumstances. In fact, natural selection is what Maistre calls *the work of circumstances*, which he characterizes this way:

Crescit occulto velut arbor aevo ["it grows like a tree with the silent lapse of time"]; this is the eternal motto of every great institution; hence the fact that every false institution writes much because it feels its weakness, and seeks for support. From the truth just stated follows the unswerving consequence that no great and real institution can be founded on a written law, since the men themselves, the successive instruments of its establishment, do not know what it is to become, and since imperceptible growth is the true sign of durability in all possible orders of things.¹³

Maistre tells us that God is "explained by His prime minister: *time*". By this he means that the only thing that needs to—in fact the only thing that *can*—legitimize something is long usage. This is akin to the

idea of Providence, the Hand of God directly intervening in the world, but Maistre holds up the background instead of the men acting on it. For him, God—we could just as well say *nature*—does it all, and the men who write the constitutions, build the empires, even those who incite the revolutions, are just circumstances, the raw material worked on and selected for.

We can go deeper still. Time as the prime minister of the gods, of nature—time as what legitimizes all things—is an ancient idea. The Norse high god Odin goes by several names stressing his age: *Forni* [“Ancient One”], *Fornölvir* [“Ancient Ölvir”], *Algingautr* [“the aged Gautr”]. The German title *Herr* (cognate with English *hoar*) descends from Old High German *hēr*, meaning both “grey-haired, old” and “noble, venerable”. Even more explicitly than the Germanics, the Romans used the word “ancient” as synonymous with good. If a Roman wanted to say something was dear to him, he would use the word ancient, as in *antiquior ei fuit laus et gloria quam regnum* [“praise and glory were dearer (lit. ‘more ancient’) to him than power”].¹⁴ But nowhere does the concept of legitimacy dovetail so closely with the impersonal force of time than in the concept of *fas*, the divine law.

Fas is a Latin word with deep Indo-European roots. It means “divine law” and is like the Hindu concept of *rta* (cognate to the word “rite”), meaning “what has moved in a fitting manner”. The IE root **bha-* (cf. “ban”, “fate”, “fame”, “prophet”) implies speech, but speech independent of the speaker, something not so much said *by* someone as *through* them, a thing both said and written across the face of reality.¹⁵ We get something like this in *vox populi, vox dei* [“voice of the people, voice of the god”], the divine word as spoken *through* a people. The particular men are only circumstances, the impersonal speech is the prime mover—design without a designer. The constitution, at least the one that lasts, can’t be written by human hands. It can’t even be the work of conscious deliberation, because it’s the expression of impersonal forces—of divine will—working through a people. A constitution, a society, a tradition—all these things are not *made*, but *found*, sanctioned by long use, stamped with authority by weathering the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune. They don’t

work because they're true, they're true because they work. What has survived is not rational, but supra-rational. Strength is the prerequisite of rationality,¹⁶ even of goodness. Nothing can be *good* that does not *exist*, and nothing can long exist that is not *strong*.

Plato once asked a question that has bedevilled the liberal ever since:¹⁷ *who will guard the guardians?* Who will judge the judges? In other words, where does the buck stop? What is the ultimate arbiter of all that is right, true, and good? The answer, quite simply, is *divine law*, which is just to say *the work of circumstances*, which is just to say *survival*. The oldest, strongest, and most consequential things—patriarchy, ethnocentrism, traditional sexual roles, the family, authoritarianism, and above all, hierarchy—must be deferred to. Not because they're good, but because they're the source of all good, because without them we don't even have a society in the first place—because a thing can't be *good* unless it first *is*.

SUMMARY

We don't draw practice from theory; we draw theory from what works.

Traditions are group evolutionary strategies.

Nothing can be good that does not exist.

ENDNOTES

- [1](#) Edmund Burke, *Reflections on the Revolution in France*, 1790.
- [2](#) One of the most ancient brain structures, the amygdala, governs the production of oxytocin, which promotes human ethnocentrism. “As a well-replicated finding, if the face rapidly displayed is that of an other-race individual, there is typically activation in a fraction of a second of the amygdala, an archetypal limbic structure.” Robert M. Sapolsky, *Doubled-Edged Swords in the Biology of Conflict*, *Frontiers in Psychology*, Dec. 2018. We develop ethnocentrism at a stage far too early to be environmentally conditioned, See David J. Kelly et al, *Three-month-olds, but not newborns, prefer own-race faces*, *Developmental Science*, Nov. 2005.
- [3](#) Darwin himself seemed to admit this. “My theory [of natural selection] would give zest to recent & Fossil Comparative Anatomy, & it would lead to study of instincts, hereditary & mind hereditary, *whole metaphysics*.” Notebook B, 1837.
- [4](#) Nichola J. Raihani and Vaughan Bell, *An evolutionary perspective on paranoia*, *Nature Human Behaviour*, 3, (2019): pp. 114–121
- [5](#) Alexandra Alvergne et al, *Personality and reproductive success in a high-fertility human population*, *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, June 2010.
- [6](#) Brad M. Hastings and Barbara Schaffer, *Authoritarianism: The Role of Threat, Evolutionary Psychology, and the Will to Power*, *Sage Journals*, June 2008.
- [7](#) Edward Dutton, *Race Differences in Ethnocentrism*, (London: Arktos, 2019).
- [8](#) J. D. Unwin, *Sex and Culture*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1934). Unwin notes that once a society’s traditional sexual codes and customs break down, the society quickly collapses. On homosexuality specifically, see K. Freund and R. J. Watson, *The proportions of heterosexual and homosexual pedophiles among sex offenders against children: an exploratory study*, *Journal of Sex & Marital Therapy*, 1992, which notes that pedophiles are 11x more likely to be homosexual than heterosexual.
- [9](#) For a wealth of articles on this topic, see “Annex to Chapter I” in Daniel Amneus, *The Garbage Generation*, (Primrose Press, 1990). Available to read at <https://archive.ph/viHVM>.
- [10](#) The Whigs were a political faction in England which developed out of the parliamentary faction in the English Civil War (1642-1651). In general they stood for individual rights, the rule of law, and an increase in the independence and power of parliament from the Crown.
- [11](#) Except for Rawls’ “original position”, of course.
- [12](#) Joseph de Maistre, *Essay on the Generative Principle of Political Constitutions and Other Human Institutions*, 1809, Preface.
- [13](#) Maistre, *Essay on the Generative Principle*, §XXIII.
- [14](#) Cicero, *Epistulae ad Atticum*.
- [15](#) cf. John 1:1, “In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God.”

[16](#) Recall here from chapter 7 on the Lindy effect that the word “true” ultimately means “reliable”.

[17](#) Plato comes at the end and not the beginning of Greek civilization, fetishizes reason, radically critiques tradition, undermines the family, and his doctrine of *anamnesis* (evil as ignorance) implies a radical inessentialism. He may have championed the authoritarian state, but at a deeper level he was the liberal of his day.

TEN

WHAT LIBERALISM IS

We've come a long way in our 10-step program. We started by noticing that the man in charge doesn't seem to call the shots and then worked our way step by step to recognizing that the "traditional" wisdom of the past few centuries is anything but traditional. Our so-called "conservative" can't seem to conserve anything because the tradition he's conserving is liberalism and liberalism is a philosophy of revolution. He's called the "cuckservative" because he looks the other way while his tradition gets railed by his enemy—he even gets off on it, which is why he's so overjoyed when the left acknowledges his existence. His only job is to consolidate the earlier victories of liberalism and enable the future ones.

It's clear by now that rejecting liberalism does not mean rejecting science. Liberalism claims to be the application of reason and science to politics, but as we've seen, the most profound scientific paradigm, Darwinism, justifies tradition, and reason itself is grounded in the sort of pragmatism that forms the bedrock of tradition. Add to this that science is itself a tradition,¹ and it becomes clear that liberalism is just an incoherent form of scientism.

Taking science seriously actually points us *away* from liberalism, hence its denial of "race science," whose facts geneticists and psychometricians are busy recovering after a century-long interlude of the equivalent of Lysenkoism.² This is a grave problem for liberalism, because if old science trumps new science,³ its mythology of "progress" falls apart. This is why the radical right is the sworn enemy of liberalism—it has as much respect for the future as for the past.

Flat worship of the past is no threat to liberalism—the radical right *is*. But then, this is much more in keeping with the spirit of tradition. Our Indo-European ancestor in the Bronze Age was the ideal

traditionalist and the ideal futurist. He kept his hearth fire and forged his arms by it. He didn't shy away from technology because he had no reason to fear it. He saw no distinction between his ancestors and his descendants, past and future. He and they formed an indivisible whole—we call this *corporatism*.⁴ The radical right, which so often celebrates our Indo-European past, doesn't fetishize technology, but uses it to full effect. And so, unlike traditionalism and communism which are technologically retarded, one on purpose and one unwittingly, it is feared.

The radical right is modern but doesn't worship modernity. Liberalism, on the other hand, is *a love of novelty*—it loves what's new not because it's good, but because it's new.⁵ It is, at bottom, a “*one weird tip*” ideology—“one weird tip”, not for a flat belly, but for a functional society. This is why everything liberalism holds dear sounds like something you'd hear in a TEDx Talk: “everything you thought you knew about X is totally wrong.” It offers quackery in place of wisdom—*the child should govern the parent; leniency is the cure for crime; indulgence is oversight; squandering is good economics; appeasement is diplomacy; diversity is our strength*. This last oxymoron is the foil to the cardinal liberal bogeyman—nationalism. And it is in its opposition to nationalism that we learn something important about liberalism: it is *an entirely negative philosophy*.

By nationalism we don't mean pledging allegiance to the flag and then forgetting about it 5 minutes later, but rather what Ferdinand Tönnies called *gemeinschaft*.⁶ This is a community united by common history, culture, and blood, where social ties are *inherited* and *permanent*. It's here that we find nationalism. The other side of the coin is *gesellschaft*, a group of individuals held together by economic relations, where social bonds are *voluntary* and *revokable*. It's here that we find liberalism, and its cardinal value—freedom.

All of liberalism's “positive” values turn out to be negative—freedom is just a lack of constraint; openness and tolerance are just a lack of judgement; inclusion is a lack of discrimination; diversity is a lack of identity. Even the individual, the centre of the liberal social order, is just man shorn of all context. Here is a faceless, exchangeable

unit without an identity. At the centre of liberalism is the beating heart of darkness, a void where an identity should be. It can offer only “thou shalt nots”, and no community was ever truly united in what it was not.

What’s the alternative to freedom? Is it slavery, as liberals would have it? No—the alternative to freedom is *heritage*. You’re thrown into a world, you’re born into a house, unable to choose your ancestors, your time and place, your kin, your genes.⁷ All these things are radically *un*-free. They are your heritage. And they’re also what makes you genuinely *you*. Not your choices, which are the result of, and radically bounded by, your heritage. Heritage and freedom can never coincide—liberalism wants to emphasize one; we want to emphasize the other. Which way, Western man?⁸ It really is that simple. Heritage is a *fait accompli*; it has to do with what is fixed and unchangeable, and ultimately with that most unchosen thing of all—the past.

If you could rank the most underrated, underappreciated things today, surely that list would be topped by *the past*. This was not always the case.⁹ For liberalism, the past is the prime enemy—for years now, anti-whites have been toppling statues of anyone at all,¹⁰ as long as they represent white history. Above all, liberalism wants to be free of the past, the one thing it can never do, because there is no real distinction to be made between past, present, and future.¹¹ And so, it will settle for the next best thing—forgetting the past. Thus, we learn another important truth about liberalism, it is *amnesia*. Put another way, we could say that liberalism is *presentism raised to the power of an ideology*.

Respect for the past need not mean fear of the future. Conservatives are generally less anxious about the future than liberals,¹² and especially so in recent years since liberalism has begun its death spiral. Liberalism now fears the future because it has no future—it is well aware that it’s negotiating its decline. We are nearing the end of a civilizational cycle, and the future belongs to those whose worldview has worked not just under the specific conditions of industrial capitalism, of post-modern, post-national, post-truth technocracy, but every day for the past 350 million years—the future belongs to *us*.

But we have to give the devil his due. Liberalism has won for a reason, and that reason is because it's good at what it does. Victor Van Brandt summarizes it as follows:

Liberalism must be in some way effective, but there is obviously something drastically wrong with most of its assumptions. Its efficacy lies in its being able to convince people that its nature is the complete opposite of what it actually is, in a way which is very difficult to disentangle. Liberalism is great at centralising power in a way that doesn't look like centralising power. Firstly, it says that centralisation of power is a characteristic of other systems, not itself. Secondly, it creates the private/public distinction so that it can offload a number of political functions to private industry and masquerade them as an autonomous, bottom-up process. This is a sort of smokescreen behind which power operates.

Liberalism centralizes power by the high–low vs. middle process, but this centralization can go on only so long. Anything too top-heavy falls over, and the process of power centralization is costly and eventually exhausts a civilization. Liberalism is not simply “freedom”, “human rights”, or *sapere aude* per Kant. In fact, it is not even an idea at all. Liberalism is, most fundamentally, a symptom. Liberalism is *a civilization in its dotage*.

We should give the devil something else he's due. Many great things have happened since the birth of liberalism in the 18th century. None of them are due to liberalism, but the devil has at least been at the helm. The art of the romantic period, the re-birth of nationalism, the British empire, the unmatched scholarship and technical innovations of the “long 19th century”¹³—Western civilization peaked under liberalism. Though—and we can't underline this strongly enough—not *because* of liberalism.

This has happened before, many times. Look at Periclean Greece; then look at it a few centuries later under the Roman yoke. Look at Rome itself under Augustus; then look at it a few centuries later under Odoacer. Look at the Chinese Spring and Autumn period, the time of Confucius; then look at its immediate aftermath, the Warring States period. Look at the 19th dynasty of Egypt, the time of Ramesses the Great, the height of Egyptian power, learning, and culture; then look at the 20th dynasty and the final sunset of Egypt. The plant grows, flowers—and dies. But the flowering of a civilization is not a spontaneous miracle, it is the product of deep history, of the growth

phase.¹⁴ And the flowering heralds the end. A Confucius, an Aristotle, a Darwin, is not full born from the brow of Zeus. He is long in coming—350 million years in coming, in fact.

Steven Pinker thinks the flower is a miracle:

Why did the Enlightenment happen when it did?

Because it only happened once, we don't really know and we can't test hypotheses. But some plausible explanations are that it grew out of the scientific revolution of the 17th century, which showed that our intuitions and the traditional view of reality could be profoundly mistaken, and that by applying reason, we can overturn our understanding of the world.¹⁵

Pinker doesn't seem to care at all about where our Enlightenment came from, why it happened, nor the motivations behind it, so his radical ignorance of the Enlightenments of Greece, Rome, China, and Egypt comes as no surprise.¹⁶ Enlightenment, and the liberalism that accompanies it, are not finally ideas, they are symptoms. Offering Enlightenment¹⁷ as the cure for civilization is like prescribing "health" as a cure for sickness. What is it that made science possible? What made our civilization coherent? What laid the groundwork for all high culture? Where did the flower come from? Pinker doesn't know, and doesn't want to know, because if he did, he could no longer be a liberal.

He's right about one thing though: we have a choice. We can go one of two ways. We can accept the fortune cookie paradox of "freedom is our tradition"; we can put our hopes in the tautology of "we need Enlightenment"; we can use the liberal recipe that has been followed to the letter, unchallenged now for two centuries, and has given us a radioactive nightmare of social decline, family decay, ethnic and religious conflict *within* rather than *between* societies,¹⁸ and looming civil war.

Or we can accept that things are done a certain way for centuries, millennia, or geological ages, not for no reason at all. We can accept that people used to know things too. We can accept that we, as rational, abstracted individuals taking the view from nowhere, do not know better than trillions of man-hours of aggregated experience. We can accept that to think illiberally is just to think like adults.

Which way, Western man?

SUMMARY

Liberalism is “one weird tip” ideology.

Liberalism is amnesia.

Liberalism is a civilization in its dotage.

ENDNOTES

1 See Karl Popper's "Towards a Rational Theory of Tradition" in *Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge* (New York: Routledge, 1963), pp. 161–182.

2 This book will not sketch out "race science", which is just another word for genetics; the reader is referred to www.humanbiologicaldiversity.com for a sample of scientific literature on this topic. For definitive accounts of hereditarianism, see Robert Plomin, *Blueprint: How DNA Makes Us Who We Are* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2019); Charles Murray and Richard Herrnstein, *The Bell Curve: Intelligence and Class Structure in American Life* (New York: The Free Press, 1994); and Nicholas Wade, *A Troublesome Inheritance: Genes, Race and Human History* (New York: The Penguin Press, 2014).

3 It's not just genetics either, physiognomy, cyclical history, group selection, and many other paradigms once thought to be obsolete are being reconfirmed by our best science.

4 See ch. 18.

5 Compare this with the Lindy effect, where a love of what's old almost always corresponds to a love of what's good.

6 We will return to this in chapter 12 on the proposition nation.

7 We will expand on this in chapter 41 on thrownness.

8 We should note that freedom is etymologically related to "friend" and originally referred to membership in a kin group (via PIE **preyH-*). The same is true of "liberty", whose own etymological root (PIE **h₁lewd^h-*) is that of a common stock or breed. To be a free man just meant to be well-born, and the "individual" (such as there was) owed not only his status but his very own self to the group, realizing himself only in the inter-self. Ultimately, there is not even a choice between freedom and heritage because freedom of the modern kind is fake. You either have a heritage or you are nothing. Roman patricians reproached plebeians with having no ancestors, and this is what they meant.

9 See our discussion of *mos maiorum* in chapter 7 on the Lindy effect.

10 On June 23rd, 2020, "protestors" tore down, decapitated, and dragged into a lake the statue of Hans Christian Heg, an abolitionist colonel who led a militia targeting slave-catchers and was killed by Confederate troops in the American Civil War.

11 A conclusion reached, in essence, by the most influential modern philosopher of time, J. M. E. McTaggart. His B-series of time agrees with our best physics but cannot provide a satisfactory account of change. Consider Red Ice TV's slogan "the future is the past" in this light.

12 For many years, academic psychology has struggled to explain why conservatives are happier than liberals despite being supposedly "fearful, defensive, and low in self-esteem". In 2012 Schlenker et al explained these differences instead by "personality differences associated with positive adjustment and mental health" (*Conservatives are happier than liberals but why? Personality, Political ideology and life satisfaction*, in

Journal of Research in Personality). In 2020 Flagbenu discovered that “conservatives are no more fearful or threat-sensitive than liberals” (*Of deadly beans and risky stocks: Political ideology and attitude formation via exploration depend on the nature of the attitude stimuli*, in British Journal of Psychology).

[13](#) Roughly, from the French Revolution to WWI.

[14](#) We will return to this organic metaphor in chapter 40 on cyclical history.

[15](#) Nick Gillespie, “Steven Pinker Loves the Enlightenment”, *Reason Magazine*, June 2018. Available at: <https://archive.ph/L0HII>.

[16](#) He is at least right to distinguish the Enlightenment from the Scientific Revolution.

[17](#) Or “science”, or “progress”, etc.

[18](#) For a good overview of why liberalism does not solve religious violence, see William T. Cavanaugh, *The Myth of Religious Violence: Secular Ideology and the Roots of Modern Conflict*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).

PART II:
ILLIBERAL CONCEPTS

ELEVEN

PARTICULARISM VS. UNIVERSALISM

The venn overlap of people who repudiate globalism but demand universalism is far bigger than it needs to be. — Michael Malice

We said in our discussion of Chesterton's Fence that the proverbs you learned when you were five are more trustworthy than pretty much anything you learned since, and one of those proverbs is *different strokes for different folks*. Joseph de Maistre sums it up even better:

[T]here is no such thing as *man* in the world. In my life, I have seen Frenchmen, Italians, Russians, etc.; thanks to Montesquieu, I know even *that one can be Persian*, but as for *man* I declare that I have never met him in my life; if he exists, he is unbeknownst to me.¹

What Maistre is getting at here is what we call *moral particularism*. In a nutshell, particularism is the idea that what matters most is not what makes us the same, but what makes us different. Now, this doesn't mean that there are *no* moral imperatives shared between humanity as a whole—a Chinaman and a Zulu can agree that “don't light babies on fire for no reason” is good advice, it's just not much to base a society on. The particularist agrees that there are shared moral imperatives, but they're the *least* important, *least* rich, and *least* relevant to how we should conduct ourselves. The universalist disagrees—he says that globally shared values are the *most* important, *most* rich, and *most* relevant. But when you look at how we relate to others in practice, it becomes clear that particular customs are doing all the heavy lifting in shaping our conduct.²

The problem with universalism is that it's void of content. The more universal the moral injunction, the more sterile it is—the less it tells you to do in this or that real life situation. This is because moral problems are contextual—they depend on circumstances. What's good for the goose isn't always good for the gander, because the goose and gander are different kinds of agent, and their distinct agency is itself a moral circumstance. You can't swap one kind of agent for another without changing the context. You can't swap the father and the son

and hold the circumstances constant, because changing the identities changes the circumstances. Maybe we can generalize this and say that “fathers should behave as fathers, sons as sons etc.”,³ but all this is saying is that particularism should be universal, that the general moral principle is the least important. There certainly is a human nature, but it’s not the key to morality simply because we’re human any more than mammal nature or animal nature is the key to morality because we’re warm-blooded and we breathe oxygen.

We should not confuse particularism with subjectivism. A moral fact can be objective and yet agent-relative; it can be the case that the father owes the son a roof over his head and the son owes the father obedience but not vice versa. It can also be objectively the case that a Chinese father’s duties to his son are different than an English father’s. This can’t be generalized without losing the moral content—it becomes something like “do your duty” which is the moral equivalent of “shit happens”. Not very helpful.

Particularism also doesn’t imply total war. The code of hospitality was an important force which bound Indo-European societies together, as embodied in the Greek myth of *Baucis and Philemon*, the Irish myth of *Togail Bruidne Dá Derga*, and the Norse myth of *Grímnismál*. In fact, the *Odyssey* can be read as an extended meditation on proper and improper modes of hospitality. The institution of clientship was another such force binding together people who otherwise had nothing to do with each other, practiced most famously by the Romans. All these societies were strongly particularist; none descended into a war of all against all, and some cooperated well enough to build world-circling empires. But there’s no limiting principle in the horizon of care⁴ under universalism, and so this promiscuity tends to trivialize the differences between moral agents—the logical endpoint of moral universalism is the sort of pathological altruism that we see in the most committed liberals.⁵ In fact, a 2019 study found that liberals’ horizon of care tends to centre around “all living things in the universe including plants and trees”.⁶ The liberal gives as much moral consideration to a pine cone as to his own mother—this is what happens when you take universalism seriously enough.

Illiberals think very differently. Paul Gottfried, quoting Leo Strauss, explains that the radical right “‘regard the universal and homogeneous state as either undesirable, though possible, or as both undesirable and impossible.’ Moreover, ‘conservatives look with greater sympathy than liberals on the particular or particularist and the heterogeneous.’”⁷

This makes sense because the right loves hierarchy and the very notion of hierarchy is particularist—the ultimate universalism is equality. Hierarchy (therefore, the particular) is also important to the traditionalist. The Hindu caste system is one of the purest social expressions of the particular, and the *Volsungasaga* gives us another example, where Sigmund and Sinfrjötli owe vagabonds no moral consideration at all because they’re completely outside of tribal bounds.

By contrast, when the liberal demands equal rights, he’s saying “there’s some substantial sense in which we’re all the same”. Mill, Spencer, and other 19th century liberals were “based” on the question of race, but incoherent in defending liberalism which must flatten human difference in order to challenge traditional authority. We have become more, not less liberal over time. All the imperatives of Western civilization for a long time now have commanded our attention toward a) the superficiality of human difference, and b) the nobility of the downtrodden. “We are all X” is either the highest value or not. If it is, then particularized identities and human difference—including difference in quality and rank—are subordinate to it. These are left-wing values.⁸ If “we are all X” is not the highest value, then universal identity and human equality are subordinate, and we have right-wing values.⁹ The left has never been about equality, anti-authoritarianism, or anti-hierarchy in any but a secondary sense. The left is first and foremost about universalism and entropy,¹⁰ individuating man by subordinating distinctions among men to a “higher” unity.

To get an idea of how closely entropy and liberalism are entwined, we can look at a foundational statement of third-wave feminism, the preamble to Sadie Plant’s *Zeroes + Ones*, where she traces the paradisiac state of universal sisterhood back to—are you ready for this? The primordial soup.

Those were the days, when we were all at sea. It seems like yesterday to me. Species,

sex, race, class: in those days none of this meant anything at all. No parents, no children, just ourselves, strings of inseparable sisters, warm and wet, indistinguishable one from the other, gloriously indiscriminate, promiscuous and fused. No generations. No future, no past. An endless geographic plane of micromeshing pulsing quanta, limitless webs of interacting blendings, leakings, mergings, weaving through ourselves, running rings around each other, heedless, needless, aimless, careless, thoughtless, amok. Folds and foldings, plying and multiplying, plicating and replicating. We had no definition, no meaning, no way of telling each other apart. We were whatever we were up to at the time. Free exchanges, microprocesses finely tuned, polymorphous transfers without regard for borders and boundaries. There was nothing to hang on to, nothing to be grasped, nothing to protect or be protected from. Insides and outsides did not count. We gave no thought to any such things. We gave no thought to anything at all. Everything was there for the taking then. We paid no attention: it was all for free. It had been this way for tens, thousands, millions, billions of what were later defined as years. If we had thought about it, we would have said it would go on forever, this fluent, fluid world.^{[11](#)}

This is the world the left wants. But then, like a fall from paradise, came the Great Oxidation Event which imposed authoritarian structures on all life:

And then something occurred to us. The climate changed. We couldn't breathe. It grew terribly cold. Far too cold for us. Everything we touched was poisonous. Noxious gases and thin toxic airs flooded our oceanic zone. Some said we had brought it on ourselves, that all our activity had backfired, that we had destroyed our environment by an accident we had provoked. There were rumors of betrayal and sabotage, whisperings of alien invasion and mutant beings from another ship.

Only a few of us survived the break. Conditions were so terrible that many of those who did pull through wished they had died. We mutated to such an extent that we were unrecognizable to ourselves, banding together in units of a kind which, like everything, had been unthinkable before. We found ourselves working as slave components of systems whose scales and complexities we could not comprehend. Were we their parasites? Were they ours? Either way we became components of our own imprisonment. To all intents and purposes, we disappeared.^{[12](#)}

We have quoted this jeremiad at length not to make your eyes bleed, but to underscore the deep connection between entropy, liberalism, and universalism. "All humans are fundamentally X" is structurally equivalent to "we are all individuals"—precisely what Plant is saying. George Soros can only do what he does under the pretence of these universalizing and entropic imperatives. Universalism is the firmware that allows individualism, liberalism, feminism, Marxism, and wokeism to engage in constant revolution against authority.

To say that what's common to us is what's most important is to downplay human difference, and this assault on difference is a form of

entropy. No wonder that Justin Trudeau said, with obvious delight, that “the world is moving towards more diversity, not less diversity. It’s a form of entropy (laughs)”. He’s not wrong. When a cold ice cube meets warm water, the ice cube gets warmer and the water gets colder—the difference between them is eliminated, which is just to say that disorder increases. So it is with universalism. When what makes us the same matters more than what makes us different, what makes us different becomes less real. And this is highly counterintuitive to us anyway. The rights and duties of the father are not the rights and duties of the son. Morals differ based on who you are, based on what role you play within society—we all know this. How much truer is this moral particularism *between* societies than *within*?

Tradition is unity across time, difference across space; liberalism is difference across time, unity across space. One of the weaknesses of moral universalism is that it can’t account for the success of other traditions. And nearly all traditions worth a damn have been moral particularist—in fact a recent study found that societies advance the fastest when their morality is particularizing.¹³ Herodotus sums up the archaic Greek view in saying that a nation shares

the same blood (ὁμαϊμόν), same language (ὁμόγλωσσον), same religion, gods, and sacrifices (θεῶν ἰδρύματά τε κοινὰ καὶ θυσία), and same “ways” or habits (ὁμότροπα).¹⁴

This couldn’t be further from anemic liberal civic nationalism, where the nation is a common *belief*, which anyone can take up or drop at any time, irrespective of time or place. Herodotus’ is, instead, an anti-entropic view that respects boundaries between peoples. Speaking of traditions worth a damn, you will see in most of them the persistence of caste, and at the bottom of caste you will find something like dharma. Often translated simply as “duty”, the Vedic concept of dharma is different for different people. If you’re born into the priestly caste, your dharma is to become a priest; if into the warrior caste, to become a warrior. Not only this, but your dharma as a child is different than as a householder, and still different than as an elder. For the priest to do the warrior’s duty is to fail; for the child to do the householder’s duty is to fail—that’s not your duty. This is no different for ancient Germanic society with its own caste system of *jarl*, *karl*,

and *thrall*, because all these venerable traditions have a common root—particularism simply is Aryan morality, and to reject it is to reject who we are as a people.

The most dangerous word is not something banned on Twitter. It is not a racial slur, or a “bigoted” name for something repulsive—the most dangerous word is *this*. *This* people at *this* time for *this* purpose—this is what the liberal cannot tolerate because the liberal can brook no essential distinctions between people. We started with Maistre—a good Catholic—and we will end with him, summing things up admirably as usual:

But a constitution which is made for all nations is made for none: it is a pure abstraction, an academic work made to impress upon the mind a hypothetical ideal, and which must be addressed to man in the imaginary realm he inhabits.^{[15](#)}

SUMMARY

What matters most is not what makes us the same, but what makes us different.

The more universal the command, the less it commands.

Universalism is a form of entropy.

ENDNOTES

1 Maistre, “Considerations on France” in *Major Works, Vol. I*, (Perth: Imperium Press, 2021), p. 97.

2 Just one example of this is in the concept of *legal equity*—courts meant to grant exceptions to the law based on circumstances, e.g. bankruptcy law. The legal theorist Grotius defined equity as *correctio eius in quo lex propter universalitatem deficit* —“the remedy for those cases in which the law, *on account of its universality*, is deficient.” It’s a strike against universalism that such courts are needed, to say nothing of their growth over time to where in the United States, courts of law and of equity merged under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

3 See Confucius, *Analects*, 12.11.

4 At least, care when it comes to the things that matter most.

5 A prime example being David Pearce, a transhumanist so traumatized over the existence of suffering that his horizon of care spills over into the non-human—he considers it our duty to end predation in the wild. See Manon Verchot, “Meet the People Who Want to Turn Predators into Herbivores”, *Treehugger*, November 27, 2020. Available at: <https://archive.ph/PBY67>.

6 Adam Waytz et al, “Ideological differences in the expanse of the moral circle”, *Nature Communications*, 10, (September 2019). Available at: <https://archive.ph/AXk4f>.

7 Paul E. Gottfried, *Fascism: The Career of a Concept*, (Northern Illinois University Press, 2016).

8 As seen in Plato (for his proto-liberalism, see footnote on p. 68), Kant (who, in trying to universalize morality, imports foreign terminology into German and pretends like it means something), and Rawls (whose whole system of thought is simply an elaborated tautology in that he strips man of any particularity and derives liberal universalism from it).

9 As seen in Hamann, Maistre, Vico, Haller, and Savigny, not to mention Homer, Eddas, Vedas, etc.

10 An increase of disorder in a closed system.

11 Sadie Plant, *Zeroes + Ones: Digital Women + The New Technoculture*, “Preamble” (London: Fourth Estate, 1997), pp. 7–8.

12 Ibid.

13 See Harvey Whitehouse et al, “Testing the Big Gods hypothesis with global historical data: a review and ‘retake’”, *Religion, Brain & Behaviour* 13, no. 2, (2023): pp. 124–166. Available at: <https://archive.ph/4KP46>.

14 Herodotus, *Histories*, 8.144.2.

15 Maistre, “Considerations on France”, p. 97.

TWELVE

THE PROPOSITION NATION

Our city has so far surpassed other men in thought and speech that students of Athens have become the teachers of others, and the city has made the name “Greek” seem to be not that of a people but of a way of thinking, and people are called Greeks because they share in our education rather than in our birth. — Isocrates¹

We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. — US Declaration of Independence

The term “proposition nation” typically calls to mind patriotic images of men with muskets and tri-corner hats—something fairly modern—but it has been with us since ancient times. The concept is taken for granted today: *that a nation is held together by a belief rather than something else*. When Obama says “we are the first nation to be founded for the sake of an idea—the idea that each of us deserves the chance to shape our own destiny”,² he’s repeating what we all learned in high school civics class.

The idea behind the proposition nation is that if immigrants come into America (or Britain, or Periclean Greece for that matter), then to become one of us all they need to do is learn “our values”. In recent years this idea—that a nation is held together by an idea—has come under attack as *magic dirt theory*. If our foundational identity is a belief, then being replaced by other peoples is, as long as they hold that belief, simply being replaced by ourselves. Magic dirt theory assumes a kind of radical inessentialism, that men are basically interchangeable, empty vessels that can be filled with any values at all. The implication is that it’s just *being here, among us*, that makes a person one of us, as though by some magical operation the simple fact of standing on American soil for a while makes someone American—worse still is the idea that being American is a matter of having citizenship. But a nation is not a zip code, and you are not American simply because your passport says so. An African born in Germany is

“German” the same way that someone born with a penis is a “woman” after legally changing their gender.

Ferdinand Tönnies wrote extensively on the proposition nation, which he called *Gesellschaft*,³ and he opposed to it the term *Gemeinschaft*.⁴ *Gemeinschaft* is the natural and default state of society, where social cohesion happens automatically due to a genetic, historical, and cultural identity shared by all members—today this is called “blood and soil”, and is something you’re just not allowed to have. The opposite of this, the proposition nation or *Gesellschaft*, is not held together by shared history, biology, or culture, but by an idea. *Gemeinschaft* societies are organic; *Gesellschaft* societies are basically a kind of algorithm.

The difference between these two is made clear by an encounter between Enoch Powell and Margaret Thatcher:

Early in her premiership, Mrs T paid a visit to the Conservative Philosophy Group and got into an unexpected row with the original tribune of the New Right. Posed a problem—whether one owed first loyalty to country or values—the divergence of Thatcherism and Powellism was stark. Powell said:

‘I would fight for this country even if it had a Communist government.’

Thatcher was horrified:

‘Nonsense, Enoch. If I send British troops abroad, it will be to defend our values.’

But the Tory nationalist was to have the last word over the Gladstonian Liberal:

‘No, Prime Minister, values exist in a transcendental realm, beyond space and time.

They can neither be fought for, nor destroyed.’

We could add to this Enoch quote, “nor can they hold a society together”.

Recounting the exchange years later in the *Spectator*, John Casey remarked: “Mrs Thatcher looked utterly baffled. She had just been presented with the difference between Toryism and American Republicanism.”⁵

The problem with propositional identity is not that it’s *wrong* (how can an identity be wrong?) but that it’s *weak*. No argument, however convincing, will ever change who your parents are or the colour of your skin. Any identity you can be argued out of is fundamentally weak—in fact, it is an ideology in disguise. A far stronger basis for the social order is personal loyalty. Yes, men have through history fought for ideas, but far more often, and far more fiercely, they have fought for their families.

The proposition nation as a term is also an oxymoron. We call

nationalism founded on it “civic nationalism”, and it’s fake nationalism because it’s just an intermediate stage in the march toward globalism. If your national identity is based on affirming a set of propositions, your national identity is an ideology. If you ask most people today what “American values” are, they will just rattle off the tenets of liberalism. When you ask people in Britain, Canada, Australia, New Zealand etc., they will do the same, so the civic “nationalist” can point to no difference between these “nations”. What’s more, if you list the propositions affirmed by civic nationalists and globalists,⁶ you will come up with two nearly identical lists. This being so, the globalist will simply point out that there’s no compelling reason why the civic nationalist should not be globalist, and that we have no serious basis for separating the administration of these different propositional “nations”.

The globalist is right, at least according to the logic of propositional identity, which is an identity based on values. Propositional identity as an expression of “I value this” is not, ultimately, far removed from identity on the basis of favourite ice cream flavour—it’s a form of emotivism.⁷ What’s worse, this propositional identity is the perfect staging for a transition to consumption-based identity—think of people whose identity is, quite passionately, bound up with collections of Funko pops, or with their favourite Netflix shows, celebrities, or music genre. This is a kind of identity that Hans-Georg Moeller calls *proficiency*,⁸ where the real self is not, as in traditional societies, a sincere commitment to an unchosen role like monk, warrior, or tradesman, nor is it even a true “authentic” self behind the everyday self (“reveal your inner goddess!”), but your identity is a profile that you create out of nothing, much like a Facebook profile picture or a character you play at the renaissance fair—who you are is just what you consume. Even political identities don’t escape being packaged into stupid little “profiles”; contrast this with the traditional mode of identity, so aptly described by Dave Martel:

You are your father’s son. That’s your identity.

This mercantile, consumerist identity is part of the *Gesellschaft* (“inorganic, algorithmic, propositional”) societies described by

Tönnies, which “were not united by any common set of values or historical identity, [in which] collaboration was only maintained due to the need to exchange goods and services”.⁹

It becomes hard to think coherently about nationalism when nationalism is an idea or a profile pic rather than an organic, lived reality. This can be made concrete by looking at the Russia–Ukraine war in 2022. Nationalists were divided on the issue in ways that make no ideological sense—some ethnonationalists supported Ukraine, others Russia; the same was true of post-liberals, traditionalists, populists, reactionaries, and so on. Looking at loyalty to an *idea*, the situation seems chaotic, but looking at loyalty to a *people*, things make far more sense. For the most part, pro-Russia or pro-Ukraine views broke down according to where people live, which is to say, how much of a threat Russia might be to them and their folk. It’s not at all inconsistent for ethnonationalists in Ukraine to be anti-Russia and ethnonationalists in America to be pro-Russia because at the end of the day you’re not an ethnonationalist but a Ukrainian or American—your identity is not a function of belief, but of birth and lineage. It looks confusing, but seen through an illiberal lens it’s very simple: different peoples, different loyalties. If nationalism is anything, it’s the understanding that folk comes before creed; the creed grows out of the folk. We can live and let live alongside other nations, but the reality of war is that we have to pick a side, and that side will have more to do with the interests of our folk than any universal principle. To abandon national interests would be to abandon nationalism.

The proposition nation is not a nation in any real sense, but at best a kind of creed or catechism. A proposition is something that is true or false, a statement of fact, and no nation has ever been bound together for long by “I agree”.¹⁰ Nations are bound together by what is permanent, embodied, and unchosen, which is to say, things that you can’t be argued out of. This is the basis for nationalism, and anything less is liberalism in embryo.

SUMMARY

If you can be argued into or out of your identity, your identity is weak.

A nation is not a zip code.

Civic nationalism is a waystation on the way to globalism.

ENDNOTES

[1](#) Panegyricus 50.

[2](#) 2011 State of the Union Address. Joe Biden echoed this sentiment at the 2022 United We Stand Summit, saying “Every other nation is based on ethnicity, geography. In America, we’re based on an idea—literally, not figuratively—an idea. ‘We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all women and men are created equal... endowed by their Creator...’ etc.”

[3](#) Literally, “fellow-ship”, like a kind of country club.

[4](#) Literally, “common-hood”, a community.

[5](#) See Stephen Daisley, “Nothing can justify a vote for Jeremy Corbyn”, *The Spectator*, June 8, 2017. Available at: <https://archive.ph/Zv7eV>.

[6](#) Typically, methodological individualism, a rights-based ethics, anti-racism, secularism or a very tepid religious identity, liberty, utilitarianism of some kind, etc.

[7](#) The philosophical position that moral judgments are not statements of fact but expressions of feelings. It was pioneered by A. J. Ayer in his 1936 book *Language, Truth and Logic*, and developed further by C. L. Stevenson. We will return to this in ch. 44.

[8](#) Hans-Georg Moeller and Paul J. D’Ambrosio, *You and Your Profile: Identity After Authenticity* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2021).

[9](#) Alain de Benoist, “‘*Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft*’: A Sociological View of the Decay of Modern Society”, *Mankind Quarterly* 34, no. 3, (1994).

[10](#) The mercantile nature of considering the nation as a kind of *agreement* is obvious.

THIRTEEN

SOVEREIGNTY

In his Gettysburg address, Abraham Lincoln urged the audience to fight so that “government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth.” We will show that a government “of the people” and “by the people” can’t perish because no such thing has ever existed, nor *can* exist, but we will not question the ideal of a government *for* the people, which is quite a different thing. We can’t emphasize this strongly enough, and will come back to it at the end.¹

How many times have you heard someone say, “people won’t tolerate this”? Probably more times than you can count. And yet, every single time, they *did* tolerate it until someone solved it for them, or they accepted it. This is a hard pill to swallow. But suppose you could talk to a British nationalist in 1960, and could tell them that grooming gangs would rape 19,000 British girls in a year,² the police would cover it up for fear of looking racist,³ and this would later be revealed to the public who would demand no structural change at all. This British nationalist wouldn’t believe you—“surely people wouldn’t tolerate that.” You’re not alone in having trouble choking this pill down.

This is just to say that *the people* have basically no input into how their society is run. This was proven empirically by a study that found that “average citizens and mass-based interest groups have little or no independent influence” on government policy.⁴ So if the people aren’t sovereign, who is? We discussed this in chapter 1: if you want to find out who’s in charge, find out who dictates the state of exception—who decides when the rules have been broken.

Carl Schmitt is the legal scholar who gave us the term “state of exception”, and he traces his intellectual lineage back through Joseph de Maistre, Robert Filmer, and ultimately to Jean Bodin, the original legal theorist of absolutism. Far from being an outdated model of

government, absolutism is how all governments work by necessity, and have done from the beginning of time to now. The basic idea behind absolutism is that a) sovereignty is indivisible, and b) the sovereign is necessarily above the law.

This was made painfully obvious during the US 2020 election. When states relaxed mail-in voting requirements despite a track record of fraud,⁵ then on election night poll watchers were denied access⁶ and massive vote swings were seen,⁷ the state of Texas brought a lawsuit to the Supreme Court challenging what looked like manufactured election results in four other states. Astonishingly, rather than hearing the evidence, the Supreme Court simply refused to issue a ruling, stating that Texas had “no standing” to bring this lawsuit. The purpose of the Supreme Court is not to interpret the law impartially, it’s to rule on cases the left can plausibly win, and to decline to rule on those it can’t—until the time comes when it can. The purpose of law is to formalize custom, and custom is dictated from above. This is one of the hard lessons of the US 2020 election: rule of law just isn’t a thing.

Robert Filmer understood this 400 years ago:

It is not the law that is the “minister of God”, or that “carries the sword”, but the ruler or magistrate. So they that say the law governs the kingdom may as well say that the carpenter’s rule builds the house and not the carpenter, for the law is but the rule or instrument of the ruler.⁸

Filmer is making the same argument that conservatives make when they say that *guns don’t kill people, people kill people*. The law can’t be sovereign because a sovereign is an agent, and a piece of paper does not have agency—only men have agency. A piece of paper is a tool, and it can no more rule by itself than a gun can kill by itself. The sovereign can’t be bound by law because the sovereign *makes* the law, and can unmake it. This spells trouble for popular sovereignty, rule by the people, as Maistre underlines when he says, “They say that the people are sovereign; but over whom? Over themselves, apparently. The people are, therefore, subject.”² If the people make law, how can they be bound by it? Only an external force can give the law the force that it exerts on those under it. Maistre makes this clear:

no power can possess coercive force over itself, any power amenable to another power is necessarily subject to this power, since this latter makes laws that dominate the

former. And if it has been able to make these laws, what shall prevent it from making others, from multiplying the cases of felony and supposed abdication, from creating crimes according to need, and finally, from judging without laws?¹⁰

Modern politics is based on this confusion between sovereign and subject, but there was no such confusion before the advent of liberal democracy. In Roman times, sovereignty was called *maiestas*, literally “greatness”, and we can see in this term the unequal relationship between the sovereign who makes the law and is not bound by it,¹¹ and the subject who is.

Rome is often cited as an example of an early democracy, but was nothing of the sort. When “the people” were assembled together, they were grouped into 193 “centuries”, which fell into six “classes”. The first class (of the richest and fewest) had 98 centuries, so more than half, and the sixth class (of the poorest, the majority) had *one* century. Each class voted in order, and each century got one vote. It happened very often that enough centuries in the first class agreed with each other that there was no need for the rest of the classes to vote—needless to say, the sixth class’s vote pretty much never mattered.

Athens is thought of as the crown jewel of ancient democracy, but was nothing like what that word calls to mind for the Rachel Maddows of the world. When a question was put to the people, it was first discussed by the senate, who would draft a bill and present it to the people with no further discussion, just a “yes or no” vote. This is called a *plebiscite*, and was a favourite tool of fascist dictators—such federal plebiscites have been outlawed in Germany since WWII. What’s more, the work of government was extremely time-consuming; being a voter in Athens was basically a full-time job,¹² and could only be done by those who otherwise did not have to work, limiting the franchise to rich landowners, just as in America for much of its history.

Very often people retcon democracy into their mythic past, as though all of recorded history is a detour from that primordial state.¹³ The English *witenagemot* is often given as an example of early democracy. It grew out of more ancient Germanic assemblies such as the *thing*, and was composed of nobles, aldermen, and thanes. Its main purpose was to advise the king, but it is cited as an example of

consent of the governed because the king was elected at this assembly. However the king was chosen only from the royal family, and until the 11th century at least, royal succession followed the system of primogeniture, suggesting this was less a “choice” than a formality endorsing a king who had the right by tradition.¹⁴ Consent didn’t matter because for the assembly to not consent to rightful kingship was treason, and to consent to a king who lacked the right was illegitimacy.¹⁵ Popular sovereignty is an artifice that conceals the actual sovereign—no society ever worked that way.

It’s clear that self-rule is impossible based both on historical evidence and on reason. A man can decide to do this or that, but he can’t *legislate* for himself because he can always overrule himself. Self-rule destroys the concept of law altogether; Bodin says,¹⁶ citing Pomponius, that the hand cannot bind itself any more than the sovereign, or anyone at all for that matter, can give commands to himself. The nature of a command, or a law, is that it’s *binding*, and the force that binds comes from outside. So if the people are subject to the law, as they obviously are, they can’t be the source of law—they can’t be sovereign.

So this is a bit of a drag. It just sounds like the people can’t rule and so they have to get stomped on by tyrants forever. This is based on the idea that “absolute power corrupts absolutely”.¹⁷ But is this true? Historically, it hasn’t been. You could point to a huge number of absolute kings who were a blessing for their people,¹⁸ and very few who were the opposite. It also doesn’t square with common sense. If absolute power corrupts absolutely, it would stand to reason that some power corrupts somewhat. Think about your own father; when you were three years old, he was probably the most powerful person in your life. Did it corrupt him? Did he tyrannize you? Probably quite the opposite—he probably had your best interests at heart. Yes, of course there are bad fathers, but in matters of governance and law we need to look at trends—we’ll come back to this in ch. 29 on stereotypes.

In fact, when seen through the model of fatherhood, sovereignty makes a lot more sense.¹⁹ First, sovereignty is not representative. The ruler doesn’t represent the people any more than the father

“represents” his son. The father rules for the benefit of the son, not in his place. Second, sovereignty is not delegated. The people are no more sovereign because the ruler rules for their benefit than the son is sovereign because the father puts a roof over his head.

“Absolute power corrupts absolutely” is nonsense repeated by people with no experience of power and no sense of history. Government *by* the people may not be possible, but government *for* the people absolutely is. But government for the people is impossible under conditions of civil war, which is what you get when *who decides the exception* is constantly up for grabs. And that’s worse than any bad king could ever be.

SUMMARY

Government *for* the people is good; government *by* the people is impossible.

Men are ruled by men, not a piece of paper.

“Absolute power corrupts absolutely” is said by people with no experience of power.

ENDNOTES

- [1](#) See also chapter 5 on noblesse oblige and ch. 33 on patriarchy.
- [2](#) See Lizzie Dearden, “Grooming ‘epidemic’ as almost 19,000 children identified as sexual exploitation victims in England”, *Independent*, December 28, 2019. Available at: <https://archive.ph/GslPI>.
- [3](#) UKIP Spokesman Alan Craig, characterizing the findings of a successful prosecution of a British grooming gang, said “the Home Office knew about rape gangs’ sexual crimes against underage girls across the country and wilfully instructed the police not to investigate the claims.” See Jordan James, “LABOUR’S COVER UP: Gordon Brown’s Government ‘Urged’ Police not to Investigate Grooming Gangs”, *Politicalite*, November 13, 2018. Available at: <https://archive.ph/y0W9g>.
Whistleblower Jayne Senior was told by police when passing intelligence, “I was going against perpetrators’ human rights, I was rocking the multicultural boat, I was being racist.”
See BBC, “Rotherham whistleblower’s horror at police treatment of CSE allegations”, March 21, 2022. Available at: <https://archive.ph/1NqUo>.
- [4](#) See Martin Gilens and Benjamin I. Page, “Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens”, *Perspectives on Politics* 12, (2014): pp. 564-581. Available at: <https://archive.ph/JoR23>.
- [5](#) John R. Lott, “Why Do Most Countries Ban Mail-In Ballots?: They Have Seen Massive Vote Fraud Problems”, SSRN, (August 2020). Available at: <https://archive.ph/PQo6C>.
- [6](#) See Jordan Boyd, “Reports of Election Interference Surface at Philadelphia Polling Locations”, *The Federalist*, November 3, 2020. Available at: <https://archive.ph/Oi8d8>.
- [7](#) To give just one example, Decision Desk HQ showed a nearly 400,000 (5%) vote lead for Trump in Michigan with 80% of votes counted. Trump later lost this state. See Decision Desk HQ (@DecisionDeskHQ), “PA Presidential Election Results”, *Twitter*, November 4, 2020. Available at: <https://twitter.com/DecisionDeskHQ/status/1323839618706493440>.
- [8](#) Robert Filmer, *Patriarcha*. For this, and other important texts, see *Patriarcha: The Complete Political Works*, (Perth: Imperium Press, 2021). *Patriarcha* is perhaps the most brutal demolition of popular sovereignty and rule of law ever written.
- [9](#) Maistre, “Study on Sovereignty” in *Major Works, Vol. I* (Imperium Press: Perth, 2021), p. 165.
- [10](#) *Ibid.*, p. 230.
- [11](#) The term *absolute* comes from Latin *absolutus*, meaning “unbound”.
- [12](#) Fustel de Coulanges. *The Ancient City*, (Perth: Imperium Press, 2020), pp. 273–274.
- [13](#) Rousseau does this with his “state of nature”, and Marx does it with his “primitive communism”.
- [14](#) H. M. Chadwick, *Studies on Anglo-Saxon Institutions*, pp. 357–58.
- [15](#) Germanic “elective monarchy” is falsified in Tacitus’ *Germania* 7, where he says the

ancient Germans “choose their kings by birth”. This is further falsified by *Annals* xi, 16 where he describes the Germanic Cherusci tribe sending all the way to Italy for a Romanized Cheruscan to fill the office of king after the whole royal line at home had been wiped out. If Germanic kingship was elective, why look half a continent away for a king who held the kingship by right?

[16](#) Jean Bodin, *Six Books of the Republic*, book I, ch. VIII.

[17](#) A line made famous by Lord Acton.

[18](#) Cyrus the Great, Augustus, Sneferu, Rameses the Great, Charlemagne, The Duke of Zhou, Ashoka, Hammurabi, Peter the Great, Suleiman The Magnificent, Alexander the Great, Amenhotep III, Darius the Great, Catherine the Great, Qin Shi Huang, Taizong of Tang, Louis XIV, Genghis Khan, Trajan, Chandragupta Maurya, Alfred the Great, Kublai Khan, Shivaji, Jimmu, Meiji, Henri IV, etc.

[19](#) This is the basic thesis of Filmer’s *Patriarcha*.

FOURTEEN

BIOLENINISM

Anyone who isn't a complete moron knows by now that politics in the West is moving to the left and has been for a very long time. Historian Robert Conquest formalized this into his 2nd law of politics: *any organization not explicitly right-wing sooner or later becomes left-wing*. Accounting for Conquest's 2nd law has been a critical task for the right, arguably its main theoretical task since the French Revolution. In 2017, the answer was provided in an article written by a commentator known as Spandrell,¹ where he identified a phenomenon he called "Biological Leninism", or *bioleninism*—in short, bioleninism is how the *high-low vs. middle* mechanism² becomes wokeness.

Organizations need competence, but the lifeblood of organizations is loyalty. If you have a lot of competence and a little bit of loyalty, you have a herd of cats who will go their separate ways after an argument about what colour to paint the office; if you have a little bit of competence and a lot of loyalty, you'll rule the herd of cats 100 times out of 100.³ Feudalism is basically the structure of a Germanic war band mapped on to government, and is great at fostering loyalty. Liberalism is a formula for producing coordination problems,⁴ and is great at dissolving loyalty, so after liberalism became widespread in the 19th century there were a hundred splinter parties in every country and revolutions every 15 minutes. Vladimir Lenin attempted to solve these coordination problems without really abolishing liberalism, and he did so by drawing on the power of status.

Humans care about status, often more than life itself; people will die rather than suffer too much shame. Humans have evolved to be highly sensitive to status, and can perform a kind of social calculus to establish rank with great reliability. We're social animals, which means status-seeking animals; everything—from mating to resource

access to privilege, you name it—depends on where we sit in the pecking order. Leninism solves coordination problems by hacking this evolved social calculus—it promises status to people who know in their gut that they don't deserve it:

What did Lenin do? Exterminate the natural aristocracy of Russia, and build a ruling class with a bunch of low-status people. Workers, peasants, Jews, Latvians, Ukrainians. Lenin went out of his way to recruit everyone who had a grudge against Imperial Russian society. And it worked, brilliantly. The Bolsheviks, a small party with little popular support, won the civil war, and became the awesome Soviet Union. The early Soviet Union promoted minorities, women, sexual deviants, atheists, cultists and every kind of weirdo. Everybody but intelligent, conservative Russians of good families.

[...] the genius of Leninism was in building a ruling class from scratch and making it cohesive by explicitly choosing people from low-status groups, ensuring they would be loyal to the party given they had much to lose.⁵

In Soviet Russia, serf own you!

Pedigree was not only worthless to Lenin's Communist party, it was distrusted. Why? Because the Communist party trafficked in loyalty, and people with good genes don't need to be loyal—they'll succeed no matter what. But if you're the dregs of society, you're doomed to low status forever, and there's nothing you can do about it. That's where the Communist party comes in—they can do something about it. And if they do something about it, you'll be loyal to them unto death, because you owe them everything; if the party falls, it's back to picking cotton or hiding in the closet or starving in the shtetl for you.

Russia was a very different place than America though. Poverty, deep class divisions, serfdom, feudalism—America had none of this at the time of its social revolution; it was a wealthy, middle-class, modern nation. This couldn't work in America, right?

Meanwhile, what was the West doing? The West, that diehard enemy of worldwide Communism, led by the United States. What has been the American response to Leninism? Look around you. Read Vox. Put on TV. Ok, that's enough. Who is high status in the West today? Women. Homosexuals. Transsexuals. Muslims. Blacks. There's even movements propping up disabled and fat people. What Progressivism is running is hyper Leninism. Biological Leninism.⁶

Bioleninism is just Leninism with a new firmware update: promote the dregs not of class but of biology.

In some ways, America is better suited to Leninism than Russia. Sure, it's a meritocracy of sorts, but unlike Russia's leadership,

America's WASP leadership was never very cohesive. White men, in absence of tribal religion, make for a shitty ruling class, because their natural excellence is such that they'll do fine as individuals, with little need of the group. They're not loyal because they don't need to be. But in politics just as in war, you can beat a herd of cats with mediocre talent and iron discipline—which is forged by loyalty. This is why meritocracy is such a joke: solidarity is the ultimate merit. The irony of meritocracy is that any society that's anything more than a historical footnote was based on ruthless and consistent nepotism.

As it turns out, for an obedient, loyal party, you want a “coalition of the ascendant”.⁷ You want people who are at the bottom of the pecking order not only due to social realities like class, but biological realities. In principle, a talented serf could make something of himself, but he will never change his genes. Even better, you need people who are pathological, like pedophiles and rapists, or who would have been called pathological until yesterday, like homosexuals and transsexuals. You want people whose status goes down as the health of the society goes up—you want people who belong in an asylum. Hence, NGOs, woke HR departments, and the government are glutted with stupid, bitchy, fat women that are considered unfuckable even by low-status men. They are fully dependent on left patronage to have any status at all, and the more repulsive they are, the more loyal, and so, the better a party member.⁸ But there's a whole world of freaks and ghouls out there. Unlike Soviet Russia, in our borderless world, every country has access to every single minority on the planet. Why patronize your own stupid ugly harpies when you can just import them from the third world? It's one thing to be rescued from a life of eating Ben & Jerry's with your 18 cats until you die of type II diabetes at 50; it's quite another thing to be rescued from actual starvation.

Your organization will thrive if it has an army of servile, unquestioning, obedient, loyal foot soldiers. It also helps to pathologize healthy defense mechanisms like slut shaming and xenophobia, and to promote things like homosexuality and multiculturalism that undermine social trust,⁹ as this raises the status of loser identities—thus securing loyalty. If you get the formula right, you don't even need to enfranchise every single freak; they will accept

symbolic victories. As long as the people on TV are shitting on their enemies, life will be bearable and they'll vote the way they're supposed to.

As long as your organization meets a certain minimal threshold of competent leadership, bioleninism is a foolproof recipe for gaining power. It's obvious why competent psychopaths start Leninist parties—but why do intellectuals join? Wouldn't they do well enough in society? Well *enough*, yes, but status is not about your absolute position in the pecking order, but your relative position. Even if you're not at the bottom, if you feel like your inferiors are above you, you might as well be. Intellectuals under capitalism find themselves below the merchant, whom they look down on. Under traditional (e.g. feudal) societies, they find themselves below the strongman, whom they resent—this is the guy who shoved them in a locker and fucked their girlfriend in high school, and they have never forgotten. This is absolutely intolerable, especially for midwit academics who have no real skills other than writing, so they will gladly dress up the bioleninist party as something other than what it is. If they're dumb enough, they'll even come to believe it like the rank and file.

Real Leninism is by no means a good thing, but it at least has limits. China and Russia eventually disbanded their Untermensch idiocracies after a few decades because once they had achieved a one-party state, they were no longer needed. On paper, China is still Marxist-Leninist-Maoist; in reality, it is now a quasi-fascist state:

today the CPC is by no means a peasants and workers party. It's a best-guy-of-the-class party. Loyalty is not ensured by the threat of landowners coming back to enserf them and their children; it's ensured with a next-gen surveillance and propaganda apparatus.^{[10](#)}

This is why the American foreign policy establishment gives a platform to people who love Tibetans and Uyghurs etc. America has given up selling the middle-class Chinese capitalism, and now wants to destabilize its main geopolitical competitor by reviving bioleninism.^{[11](#)}

Bioleninism is Leninism adapted to the multicultural, liberal West, and has been wildly successful. Real Leninism is formal and united in a single party; eventually the leftward ratchet stops, and after a period of insane social engineering, society goes back to being conservative.

Russian Leninism never fully succeeded in deputizing ethnic minorities either—because they always had ethnic homelands within Russia, independence could offer them status too, not just the Communist party. Leninism is destructive, but not fatal. Bioleninism, however, is another story. Bioleninism is informal and distributed across not only government, but the media, universities, NGOs, and big business.¹² It's all the more dangerous because it's invisible. Worse, the leftward ratchet never stops. There can never be enough “progress”—it multiplies out of control like an ideological cancer, and will eventually kill its host. And unlike Russian Leninism, there's no limiting principle to how much it can favour ethnic minorities. Perhaps, if there's hope on the horizon, it's that once the founding stock becomes the minority it will be forced to re-tribalize, or die. One would hope that it might act sooner than that.

SUMMARY

Loyalty, not merit, is the lifeblood of organizations.

Men would rather die than suffer low status.

The most loyal are those with chronically low status.

ENDNOTES

- [1](https://spandrell.com/2017/11/14/biological-leninism/) <https://spandrell.com/2017/11/14/biological-leninism/>.
- [2](#) Really, it's a middle-low vs. high—a revolution. See p. 31.
- [3](#) There are parallels with Asabiyyah here, see ch. 32.
- [4](#) Barriers to people working together.
- [5](#) Spandrell, “Biological Leninism”, *Bloody Shovel*, Nov. 13, 2017.
- [6](#) Spandrell, “Biological Leninism”.
- [7](#) See Ronald Brownstein, “How Obama Won: Marrying Old and New Democratic Coalitions”, *The Atlantic*, November 7, 2012. Available at: <https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/11/how-obama-won-marrying-old-and-new-democratic-coalitions/264884/>.
- [8](#) Psychologist Andrzej Lobaczewski has dubbed these people *pathocrats*. These are maladapted in the Deep State, driven by biological imperatives to destroy the normal and healthy. Exposure of normal people to the pathocrat twists their worldview and involves them in the pathocrat's dysfunction. Over time normal people become dysfunctional, and the society more and more extreme.
- [9](#) Putnam 2007; Delhey & Newton 2005; Alesina & La Ferrara 2002; Zak & Knack 2001; Knack & Keefer 1997.
- [10](#) Spandrell, “Biological Leninism”.
- [11](#) The CCP circulated a document (“Document No. 9”) in 2013 warning party members of exactly this problem.
- [12](#) The Cathedral, from ch. 2.

FIFTEEN

THE PROGRESSIVE STACK

This concept stands out from the others in this book because it's not actually an illiberal concept but a woke concept. And yet it serves as a first redpill for a lot of people because, like crime statistics, it's so abhorrent and yet liberals are willing to die on this particular hill.

The progressive stack first came to public attention during the Occupy Wall Street “movement” of 2011. At the time it was limited just to group discussions; the idea is that who gets to speak first is governed by how “oppressed” you are, specifically concerning things you're stuck with, like sex, race, and sexual orientation. If you're a woman you get to speak first, but not before the black, who has to give place to the homosexual, who presumably has to take a knee before schizophrenics with AIDS, and so on.

The stack is not rigorously defined—the actual order is quite subjective, but you can get a pretty good idea by measuring how tightly your teeth clench when you post that off-colour joke about one of these people on Facebook. The details are a bit vague, but the idea is crystal clear: to never give whites, and specifically white males, and especially straight white males, a chance to speak. Steve Sailer explains:

The progressive stack is basically a measure of how much you aren't like, say, James Watt, the developer of the modern steam engine, the key invention of the Industrial Revolution. Watt was white, male, Protestant, straight, rich, mechanically skilled, and a scientific genius, so you'd better not be.¹

This is related to the concept of “punching up”, according to which it's acceptable to do violence—figuratively and literally—to people who are better than you. It's the “logic” behind UK police running cover for “Asian” rape gangs: the tens of thousands of English women raped² by Pakistani gangs sit higher on the ladder of privilege than their rapists, and therefore this was simply a case of punching up and

properly bringing these rapists to justice would be a case of punching down, which was deemed unacceptable.³ Similarly, when James Damore defended Google by pointing out that biological realities and not sexism governed Google's discriminatory hiring policies,⁴ billionaire CEO Sundar Pichai responded by punching up against the rank-and-file coder, firing him for invoking such white male concepts as abstract logic and empirical evidence. It's also why 69% of people with perfect SAT scores get rejected but those with lower scores and the right skin colour get accepted.⁵ This is how the stack goes from a speaking order to a kind of reverse hierarchy meant to turn the social order upside down.

We defined liberalism in a few different ways in chapter 10, and the progressive stack is just another instance of the hatred of all that is native and familiar.⁶ The basic move of liberalism is to replace the social centre (normal people) with the margin (foreigners, minorities, deviants) forever. The stack does that by shielding these marginal identities from any criticism ever, and it is an especially clear example of the monstrous principle of equity at work. If you assume that there are fundamentally no differences between people, any difference in outcomes must be evidence of secret, hidden oppression. The obese, HIV+ otherkin with 80 IQ isn't ignored because she's creepy and stupid, it's because of "systemic bias", and she needs to be platformed for you to hear her wonderful ideas.

It all sounds insane when laid out in plain language, but the same principle is at work in something that many decent and well-adjusted people would defend: civil rights law. "Disparate impact", which is part of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,⁷ makes different outcomes for different kinds of people illegal, and the assumption is the same as it is in the progressive stack—that differences on the basis of sex, race, disability etc., are imaginary. There's an old story about King Cnut sitting on his throne on the seashore, commanding the tide to retreat. This is what disparate impact is doing: trying to change reality by making reality illegal. It decrees that any difference on the basis of brute facts of biology must be "corrected", trying to shoehorn the world into a shape dictated by the reality-detached ideology that we call *wokeness*. Good people with their hearts in the right place will

defend the one while knowing full well that the other is wrong, when wokeness is just civil rights taken to its logical conclusions.⁸

As mentioned before, the progressive stack is a great way to redpill normal people, especially white women. Women are taught from a young age that they're oppressed, so when white women get sent straight to the back of the bus, they become confused and angry. And they're right to be angry. Because trans > woman, a straight white man can go from the bottom of the stack right to the top just by throwing on a dress and calling himself a trans lesbian, which seems a bit unfair to Karen, who is really a good person and in a healthy society would be the upholder of the social order rather than a racial slur.

Even so-called “allies” can get the worst of it if they don't enjoy enough oppression. In June 2020, social justice nag and children's author J. K. Rowling learned what it means to be insufficiently progressive when she wrote an essay that questioned giving trans “women” (men in drag) access to women-only spaces like bathrooms, explaining that it “offer[s] cover to predators”.⁹ Instead of handling the criticism like adults, progressives decided to light themselves on fire, proclaiming her a TERF—a “trans-exclusionary radical feminist”. Rowling has run up against the hard fact that women's liberation is simply less important than trans liberation; she feels that 2nd wave feminism got it right but 3rd wave somehow goes too far. But unlike the rest of us when faced with the logical conclusions of a bad idea, she responded not by abandoning it but with copes and rationalizations for how the stack should be reordered rather than discarded.

But the wokeness that pushes normal people to the back of the bus is based on the same principle as Rowling's feminism or MLK's civil rights. The principle is this: *every person is a unique, special case*,¹⁰ and his biology has nothing to do with who he is—he is to be judged on the content of his character, not the colour of his skin. The unspoken assumption is that skin colour is in no way a marker of character, which is just another way of saying that race (or sex, etc.) isn't real. The hectoring woke harpy believes the same thing as the James Lindsays or Jordan Petersons of the world, but is just more

consistent, and concludes quite logically—at least when starting from liberal individualist premises—that the one-armed retarded obese wheelchair-bound trans dwarf with Alzheimer’s is just as likely to have valuable things to say as James Watt.

But most of us are inclined to disagree. Most of us understand that biology is real and that different kinds of people will have different outcomes because of it—and above all, that this is not unjust, whereas the fruits of “social justice” are. Real justice, as opposed to social justice, is at the end of the day pretty fucking simple: girls shouldn’t be gang raped, women shouldn’t have sexual predators in their bathrooms, people shouldn’t be shot for drawing cartoons, whole city blocks shouldn’t be burnt to the ground, and people shouldn’t be fired for telling the truth.

SUMMARY

Liberalism is replacing the centre with the margin, forever.

“Punching up” is when it’s acceptable to do violence to people better than you.

Wokeness is the logical conclusion of civil rights law.

ENDNOTES

[1](#) Steve Sailer, “The Unhappiness Explosion”, *Taki’s Magazine*, December 19, 2018. Available at: <https://archive.ph/nJirT>.

[2](#) Lizzie Dearden, Grooming ‘epidemic’ as almost 19,000 children identified as sexual exploitation victims in England, *Independent*, December 28, 2019.

[3](#) See previous note. Justifying the rape of white women by migrants is not limited to England. In 2023, nine migrant men in Germany raped a 15-year-old girl and eight received no prison time. Psychiatrist Nahlah Saimeh stated “that the gang rape may have been a way to vent ‘frustration’ due to ‘migration experiences and sociocultural homelessness’. [...] Sex is also a means of venting frustration and anger, a means of warding off sadness and emptiness, and in a group of men with the same fate it also creates identity and strengthens the group feeling.” <https://archive.is/NycHa>

[4](#) Neither of these governs Google’s hiring anymore, which is why even the main thing it does—the search engine—no longer works properly, and Google’s business model has transitioned from delivering services to being a CIA dragnet. See Charlie Warzel, “The Open Secret of Google Search”, *The Atlantic*, June 20, 2022. Available at: <https://archive.ph/Fcq5u>.

[5](#) Even if you’re a progressive darling like David Hogg, the pencil-necked Tiktok-boy gun-control ‘activist’. “I’m Changing the World ... BUT UC SCHOOLS STILL REJECTED ME.” See Julia Prodis Sulek, “Perfect ACT, SAT scores don’t mean admission to top universities”, *The Mercury News*, April 2, 2018. Available at: <https://archive.ph/o7HzZ>.

[6](#) See p. 70, and also ch. 26 on oikophobia.

[7](#) Such as in Title VII of the Act.

[8](#) For more on this, see Richard Hanania, “Woke Institutions is Just Civil Rights Law”, *Substack*, June 1, 2021. (available at <https://archive.ph/Zxjfb>), and Christopher Caldwell’s *Age of Entitlement* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2020).

[9](#) J. K. Rowling, “J.K. Rowling Writes about Her Reasons for Speaking out on Sex and Gender Issues”, *jkrowling.com*, June 10, 2020. Available at: <https://archive.ph/t8tP9>.

[10](#) See ch. 29 on *hos epi to polu*.

SIXTEEN

FRAME

Including the concept of *frame* in a survey of radical right-wing thought will be controversial because the concept was popularized among the Manosphere, which has always had an uneasy relationship to the political right. The Manosphere, AKA “The Red Pill” (TRP), was part of—or at least, adjacent to—the alt-right back when the alt-right was a big tent movement, ca. 2015–2016. It was essentially a self-help movement for self-described “betas”,¹ offering practical advice for how to trick women into pump & dump situations. In this it is perfectly liberal, but it also represented a vector by which at least some men exited liberalism for good: TRP attempted to look the reality of relationships square in the face, and especially, to view female psychology through the lens of evolution.² It was perhaps only an embryonic illiberal worldview, but moving toward illiberalism nonetheless, which is why it was roundly vilified by the mainstream. “Frame” is its most fundamental concept.

Frame was not born in the Manosphere, but has earlier antecedents in Neuro Linguistic Programming, itself a kind of self-help paradigm attempting to “hack” human psychology. This was not unlike TRP, but it had more conventional aims. The basic insight of frame is that meaning is contextual. If you see a urinal in a men’s bathroom, you infer certain things about it; if you see it in a display case in an art gallery, you infer others. Marcel Duchamp’s “art piece” *Fountain* did just this, and earned the distinction of being named the most influential modern art work of all time.³ Frame matters.

Put clearly, frame is the implied context that sets the rules of a social interaction. But frame, as used in TRP, is more than a set of rules: it’s the authority to set those rules. This authority is what these “betas” are aiming at. The one who has frame determines what’s “in bounds” and what’s “out of bounds” for the topic of discussion, the stakes, the

terms—in a word, the *meaning*. Frame is not simply the obvious fact that there are default assumptions, but the ability to set those assumptions. To “hold frame” is to be the senior partner in a relationship of epistemic dependency. This goes far beyond sexual dynamics, which is why it’s interesting; frame applies to family, work, politics—ultimately, to every social situation that matters at all.

A simple example will help to illustrate. A friend of mine was once on a date with a woman where he took her to a concert. He was not really interested in the music, but he took her there because she was, and he was interested in her. They had a great time, but after the third encore and before the performance had ended, he decided that it was time to leave. She pled with him to stay till the end, but he was ready to go. She pled even harder, and he politely bid her good night, at which point she decided to come with him. Just after they left the venue, she told him that refusing her was the hottest thing she had ever seen, but added that he “had better not do it again”. At each stage of the interaction, we can see the attempt to hold frame. He didn’t care for the performer but took her anyway—her frame. But he dictated the conditions under which the night would be allowed to continue—his frame. The strength of attraction of her female psychology to his frame led her to a moment of total honesty, and yet she still tried at the end to regain control of the frame.

Patriot Front offers an example of how to hold frame in the political sphere, but also how to hold it against a greater power. The basic idea behind Patriot Front is to organize flash mobs of fit, uniformed, and disciplined men marching in lockstep to project strength. When dozens of men do this to a group of ghouls exposing themselves to children,⁴ it can quickly take the wind out of their sails. This is exactly what happened on June 11, 2022, in Coeur d’Alene, Idaho. Patriot Front had done this many times before, but this time someone tipped off the police who quickly rushed in to allow the child abuse to continue—what’s more, the police tried to make Patriot Front look weak by arresting them at gunpoint, putting them down on their knees, and publicly unmasking them in front of antifa journalists. The subtext is the state saying “you want to project strength? we’ll show you strength.” The next day, after the members got out of jail, they

went back to Coeur d'Alene and were warmly welcomed by the community, with locals saying “you guys ought to come to town more often”, “we’re glad you guys are out”, and offering to take the members out for a beer. This is a perfect example of holding frame—Patriot Front forced the police to choose between looking strong and being hated. Had the police allowed them to march, the police would have looked weak. But Coeur d'Alene hated what happened to Patriot Front, and now hate their own police force. This is the basic play that nationalists can make against the liberal state: force them to choose between being feared and being hated. They will almost always choose to be hated.

One can see how *not* to hold frame by the conservative slogan “the Democrats are the real racists” (DR3). When accused of “racism” by the left, your garden variety conservative will stand up and, like a 5-year-old, bravely retort “no *you*” by accusing their accuser of harbouring some secret racism. “Racist” is simply an ethnic slur against whites and whites alone, and rather than respond to it as a black would to an ethnic slur against himself, the conservative cedes frame by granting legitimacy to the idea of “racism” as a real thing that is allowed to matter and be mentioned without getting kicked in the teeth. This rhetorical own goal is embodied in law by the so-called “Stop WOKE Act” put forth by Ron DeSantis. Floated as a win against critical race theory,⁵ it simply stamps with the force of law the idea

that subjecting a person [...] to training, instruction, or any other required activity that espouses, promotes, advances, inculcates, or compels such individual to believe any of the following concepts constitutes discrimination based on race, color, sex, or national origin under the Florida Civil Rights Act.⁶

In other words, the act accuses anti-racism of being racist, thereby a) banning all forms of discrimination, and b) enshrining the moral categories of “civil rights” that produced wokeness in the first place, as discussed in ch. 15. Such laughably bad framing can only be described as containment or controlled opposition.

In the original TRP context, frame was interpreted as something inherently inegalitarian, and thus at odds with liberalism. Frame is granted by default to women, at least in the modern West, and yet

women are attracted to men whose frame is strong, often older men. Rollo Tomassi notes a strange tension here:

And, once again, we also see evidence of yet another conflict between egalitarianism vs. complementarity. Because, in an egalitarian utopia, all things should be equalized; equalism espouses that this age preference should make no difference in attraction, yet the influence of this natural complementary attraction becomes a source of internal conflict for women who buy into equalism.

[...]

It's an interesting paradox. On one hand she expects a Hypergamously better-than-equitable pairing with a self-made man who will magically appreciate her for her self-perceptions of her own personal worth, but also to be, as Sheryl Sandberg puts it, "someone who wants an equal partner. Someone who thinks women should be smart, opinionated and ambitious. Someone who values fairness and expects or, even better, wants to do his share in the home."⁷

Frame is an illiberal social fact, not least because it emphasizes the relationships between things rather than the things themselves. This focus on relationships is sometimes taken to be a "feminine" phenomenon in contrast to the "masculine" phenomenon of abstracting objects away from their background. However, this abstraction and decontextualization is something you see less the more patriarchal a culture is. Men in the feminized West when asked to complete the sentence "I am..." will usually respond with trivia like a belief ("a liberal") or a job title ("a bricklayer"); men in traditional cultures usually respond with a relationship like "a father", "the son of so-and-so", etc. This was especially true when men weren't pussies, like in Germanic or Homeric cultures.

But above all, frame is an illiberal concept, and deserves to be cited in the same space as other illiberal concepts, because it emphasizes our thrownness.⁸ Again, the burden of frame is not just that there are default assumptions in social life, but that the default assumptions come *from somewhere* and are given *by something*—this runs counter to the liberal belief that assumptions are "self-evident" or arrived at by abstract reason. Your tradition holds the ultimate frame, and the terms of your thought are largely, maybe *altogether* received, unchosen, and given prior to reason, which depends on them.

The very project that the radical right is engaging in, and has been since at least the French Revolution, is regaining frame—it's what the whole "epistemic divorce"⁹ is all about. It's about understanding that

the facts¹⁰ are given *to a worldview*, and there is no fact absent the worldview. Just to have epistemic categories in the first place is to rely on a culture to command you to take those categories as given. Frame is not fundamentally a set of propositions describing reality but the authority to issue commands to *take this and that as given*. Recognizing that the commands are upstream of the propositions makes it clear that there is someone doing the commanding. In the narrow world of sexual dynamics, the particular man aims to be the one issuing the commands and holding the frame. In the broader world of power and politics—which dictates that man's sexual life—the radical right aims at the same.

SUMMARY

Who sets the rules of a social interaction, has frame.

Default assumptions are not self-evident, but come from somewhere.

There is no fact independent of a worldview.

ENDNOTES

1 Dave Martel ably critiques the alpha/beta conceptual framework: “Among men, the ‘beta’ is the number two, the right-hand man, the consigliere and the counsellor. A role absolutely necessary for the leader to succeed. A position of honor and status. The sociosexual hierarchy theory is an amateur expression of liberalism and corrosive individualism. It has done nothing but sow distrust among masculine groups. Now everyone fancies themselves an ‘alpha’ when there can only be one alpha. But now alphas can’t succeed because no men are willing to take the honor of a supporting role, lending their skillsets and talents to the victory of a group.”

2 As we established in ch. 9, natural selection is corrosive to liberal categories of thought.

3 “Duchamp’s urinal tops art survey”, *BBC News*, December 1, 2004. Available at <https://archive.ph/UGKOh>.

4 See <https://www.kxly.com/coeur-dalene-police-investigating-report-of-someone-exposing-themselves-during-pride-in-the-park/>.

5 Critical race theory is the idea that whites are uniquely evil due to their original sin of racism—circularly defined as something like *failing to repent of being white*—and so whites must be systematically disenfranchised.

6 “Florida’s “Stop Woke” Act Limits the Topics Employers Can Discuss in D&I Training”, *National Law Review*, March 28, 2022. Available at <https://archive.ph/wsgte>.

7 Rollo Tomassi. *The Rational Male: Positive Masculinity*, ch. I, “The Red Pill Parent”.

8 See ch. 41.

9 The emerging fact that different people—even within the same culture—inhabit different epistemic worlds. This is what all the yelling about a “post-truth” era was about at the height of Trump Derangement Syndrome, when liberals realized this divorce was irreversible. See p. 133, and see also Jonathan Haidt, *The Righteous Mind: Why Good People Are Divided by Politics and Religion* (New York: Pantheon Books, 2012).

10 “Fact”, from the Latin *factum*, is literally “a thing given, done”.

SEVENTEEN

THE KOSHER SANDWICH

The best way to control the opposition is to lead it ourselves. — Lenin

We said earlier that we live in a culture where your two options are woke bullshit on the one hand, and yesterday's woke bullshit on the other hand. The radical right has a term for this: the kosher sandwich.

It sounds just like what it is, a dichotomy where each side is kosher—it meets some standard, in this case, of political correctness. It's closely related to the Overton window, a metaphor for the range of acceptable political opinions. In Stalinist Russia, that window was pretty damn small, but nobody thought it was small—not just because they'd get shot for it, but because there was plenty of room to level critiques at the Party as long as they were the right critiques. Scott Alexander explains:

Suppose you went back to Stalinist Russia and you said “You know, people just don't respect Comrade Stalin enough. There isn't enough Stalinism in this country! I say we need two Stalins! No, fifty Stalins!”

Congratulations. You have found a way to criticize the government in Stalinist Russia and totally get away with it. Who knows, you might even get that cushy professorship.

If you “criticize” society by telling it to keep doing exactly what it's doing only much much more so, society recognizes you as an ally and rewards you for being a “bold iconoclast” or “having brave and revolutionary new ideas” or whatever. It's only when you tell them something they actually don't want to hear that you get in trouble.¹

This is precisely the situation we face in the West today. The only way to criticize the regime without losing your bank account and getting your skull caved in by a “protestor” is with a *Fifty Stalins* critique. This is the kosher sandwich. I hope you like schmaltz.

Most people do not understand how the basic version of this dynamic works and are forever trapped in the false dichotomies of red team vs. blue team, right vs. left, conservative vs. liberal—the political Punch and Judy show. Getting oneself unglued from that is often a major step forward on the road to political enlightenment.²

The Cathedral, which we discussed in chapter 3, is the main set of institutions whose job it is to hold this sandwich together and

maintain the illusion of opposition. This is no real opposition though, no real debate, but a family quibble over whether to paint the den brown or off-brown. The basic way of maintaining this fake opposition involves narrowing the Overton window as much as possible so that the only acceptable opinions are those you can barely fit a cigarette paper between. Over time you can shift this window one way or another, usually leftward,³ but it's important that it remain as narrow as possible otherwise people might start getting normal and healthy ideas.

One other important strategy is to get people to focus on trivia, and the more trivial, the better. Gay marriage becomes a life-or-death matter; you're expected to pick a hill to die on regarding transgender bathrooms; your opinion on abortion defines your moral worth, etc. The higher you can raise the stakes on these trivial disputes, the more kosher the sandwich. Best of all is collapsing an issue down to a single position, and fighting over who actually occupies that position. An example is genocide, which is taken as the absolute, axiomatic evil. Things that stop genocide are good; things that promote it are bad. On the one side you have the position that racism/nationalism is bad because it causes genocide, and on the other you have the position that socialism/collectivism is bad because it causes genocide. This is playing kosher sandwich on God-mode.

We can see a kosher sandwich being made this way in real time by looking at the rhetoric coming out of the West and Russia simultaneously during the Ukraine war in 2022. On the one hand we have the headline *Ukraine leader urges citizens to take up arms as Russia invades 'like Nazi Germany'*,⁴ and on the other we have the headline *Putin Authorizes 'Special Military Operation' to 'Denazify' Ukraine*.⁵ These people are professionals.

There are a few takeaways from the good cop/bad cop dynamic here. First, obviously the two are on the same team and not meaningfully opposed. Second, it's really the good cop you need to be worried about. He's not your friend—in fact, he's the one who holds the whole charade together. In 2018, with Trump Derangement Syndrome raging unchecked, a paper was published by Gidron and Ziblatt which concluded that the health of liberalism is measured not by how well

the left is doing, but by the health of the centre-right.⁶ Trump was a convenient boogeyman, but as it turns out the problem for liberalism was not Trump, but decades of empowering the left to “punch Nazis”, and by Nazis we mean guys like Charlie Kirk who are pro-Israel and pro-gay marriage. This was a fatal mistake and led to the rise of the radical right—the centrist occupies the ground between actual ideas, and when you remove him, a vacuum opens up that will be flooded by men with actual ideas. The centre-right is not about ideas though, it’s about being a punching bag.

The regular, excruciating, soul-crushing humiliation of conservatism on the race issue should come as no surprise to anybody. After all, the principal role of conservatism in modern politics is to be humiliated. That is what a perpetual loyal opposition, or court jester, is for.⁷

It’s crucial to understand that mainstream conservatism is the most immediate problem, because mainstream conservatism is how all serious criticism is digested, sanitized, and made harmless.⁸ Conservatism is an off-ramp for dissident thinking, a funnel into the gay progressivism so dear to Charlie Kirk and the GOP. The radical right has never done anything more effective than to popularize the term *cuckservative*, because this hit the nail on the head, the nail holding together the ugly ship that’s plowing us all under.

But there is hope. The kosher sandwich is as powerful as the Overton window is narrow, and the past several years have seen this window explode with the beginning of something that has been called the *epistemic divorce*. After 2016, but especially during the US “election” of 2020, you saw the explosion of “fact checkers” on both sides of politics who somehow could not agree on the facts—neither side trusts the other’s experts.⁹ We live in completely different epistemic and linguistic worlds—we don’t start from the same assumptions, and increasingly, we don’t even speak the same language. Intellectual authority is starting to splinter and move away from official power, and toward something that has not held sway since we lived in tribal society: gossip. Far more of us now get our news, facts, and opinions from friends on social media than from CNN or Fox News, and this is a very good thing considering that official channels hate people like you and want you dead.

The Overton window is being exploded and the kosher sandwich is flying apart, sending horseradish everywhere. The ascent of wokeness is one symptom, but then, so is the radical right-wing renaissance. Anything can happen, and that's the most dangerous situation of all for the forces of evil.

SUMMARY

If the range of acceptable opinion is narrow enough, power can shift it in any direction.

Real debate is avoided by making the most trivial issues the important ones.

The centre-right, not the left, is the pillar that holds up liberalism.

ENDNOTES

1 Scott Alexander, “Reactionary Philosophy in an Enormous, Planet-Sized Nutshell”, *Slate Star Codex*, March 3, 2013. Available at <https://archive.ph/pshX1>.

2 Dissident Mag. *Fink Me Once*.

3 See p. 107.

4 See “Ukraine leader urges citizens to take up arms as Russia invades ‘like Nazi Germany’”, *The Times of Israel*, February 24, 2022. Available at: <https://archive.ph/9Cqyv>.

5 See “Putin Authorizes ‘Special Military Operation’ to ‘Denazify’ Ukraine”, *Haaretz*, February 24, 2022. Available at: <https://archive.ph/bxvja>.

6 Noam Gidron and Daniel Ziblatt, “Center-Right Political Parties in Advanced Democracies”, *Annual Review of Political Science* 22, (2019): pp. 17–35.

7 Nick Land. *The Dark Enlightenment*, part 4a: ‘A multi-part sub-digression into racial terror’ (Perth: Imperium Press, 2022).

8 For example, on June 4, 2021, Fox News ran a segment by Ben Domenech entitled *Exposing the Cathedral*, where they tried to co-opt even an illiberal concept. This will not last—the Cathedral will not become a mainstream conservative talking point because it shines a light on what both sides of the kosher sandwich want to remain hidden—but they have to at least try.

9 “Fact checkers” are not independent or objective authorities and this has been admitted in court by Big Tech platforms such as Facebook. See “Facebook admits the truth: ‘Fact checks’ are really just (lefty) opinion”, *New York Post*, December 14, 2021. Available at: <https://archive.ph/AiYI3>.

EIGHTEEN

CORPORATISM

One of the greatest tricks liberalism ever pulled was making the term *corporatism* call to mind McDonalds and Walmart. Nothing could be less appropriate.

Corporatism derives from the Latin term *corpus* which means “body”. It’s an idea as old as the hills. There’s an ancient story about the Scythian king Scylurus that has been repeated about Genghis Khan and many others. It illustrates perfectly what corporatism means:

Scylurus on his death-bed, being about to leave fourscore sons surviving, offered a bundle of [arrows] to each of them, and bade them break them. When all refused, drawing out one by one, he easily broke them; thus teaching them that, if they held together, they would continue strong, but if they fell out and were divided, they would become weak.¹

Corporatism is just the idea that society is like a body—it’s more than the sum of its parts. If you cut apart the body, it dies. Man is not to society what the tree is to the forest. Man is to society what the limb is to the body—posterior, derivative, embedded, an outgrowth and result, not a building block. He and society are congenital.

The idea that society is a unified whole goes back a long way. In the Middle Ages you probably belonged to a *guild*, the ancient version of a trade union. These guilds would protect their members just like a union today,² but the guild would also have a say in what gets made, how much, and for what price. The guild was an organ, like a limb or a heart, that served the body and couldn’t exist apart from it. Society had shared goals and a sense of solidarity. Today it’s every man for himself. Freud put his finger on the problem when he said that the problem of modernity is “the struggle between the claim of the individual and the cultural claims of the group.”

This all sounds like *collectivism*—and it is. But isn’t collectivism an ugly word? Isn’t it the same as communism? Not at all.

Communism and corporatism are mortal enemies. Communism (and

Marxism) is class *conflict*, corporatism is class *collaboration*. The two could hardly be more different. Under corporatism, the whole comes before the part. For Marx, the part comes first—the class is above all. In fact, with Marx the part aspires to *become* the whole through the dictatorship of the proletariat. It's the same with liberalism—for John Locke, it's the individual above all. This relationship between part and whole has been called “social ontology”. Liberalism and communism are cousins because they share the same social ontology—the part comes first. Corporatism puts the whole first:

Corporatism is not an internal reform to satisfy the selfish interests of each of us [...] it represents the end of civic and economic individualism, the coming of a new social and economic regime, and the revelation of an organized nation made up of mutually supporting bodies.³

You've heard of “rugged individualism”—corporatism is *rugged collectivism*. It's the alternative to individualism that communism is not. It rejects Adam Smith's “invisible hand” of the free market, which is not spontaneous order, but spontaneous chaos. Corporatism reimposes order on a rudderless society where everyone is out for himself.

Ironically given its name, the first thing corporatism does is to put a leash on *corporations* like Google and BlackRock, no matter how much money they have. A lot of people want to get money out of politics, and this is coming from a good place. But it's also a bit naïve. Money and politics are always entangled—you can't separate them, it's a matter of which calls the shots. Today, it's money. The Federal Reserve chair at the time of writing, Jerome Powell, traded millions of dollars⁴ while obstructing legal disclosures about those trades for years.⁵ He made trades during the blackout period during QE operations,⁶ and the Fed bought municipal bonds to the direct advantage of his own holdings,⁷ both clear violations of federal conflict of interest law.⁸ He will not be punished, because under capitalism, money has a leash on politics. Under corporatism, politics has a leash on money. You know you live under capitalism because unless you're someone like Jerome Powell, your opinion has a near-zero effect on law.⁹

Corporatism works differently. Because society is treated as a body,

it creates a natural bond between the head and the rest—we called this *noblesse oblige* in ch. 5. The ruler has skin in the game because he understands that society stands or falls as a unity, and he's part of that too. Although it's far from perfect, modern China is a good example. It's understood in this society that China is for the Han Chinese and everyone else is along for the ride. There are no wasteful struggles over who the real people are, whether they're getting what they want, and who's in charge. This is why China can build a hospital in 10 days like it's nothing,¹⁰ and in the UK the NHS is strained to the breaking point by the flu.¹¹

This *corpus* or body has a natural limit though—the nation. The family is defenceless against a clan, a clan against a tribe, and a tribe against a nation. But beyond the level of the nation, what is there? Perhaps a loose military or trade alliance, but nothing with any real unity. At every level of social organization, the higher-order structures empower the lower-order ones. The principle of corporatism and the principle of nationalism are the same—you can't properly be a nationalist without being a corporatist.

Not only is corporatism *useful* for creating a strong society, but it's also *moral*—in fact, it's at the basis of our whole idea of morality. The Latin term for our word “should” is *debeo*, cognate with our word “debt”, and in Latin it also means “to owe”. The two ideas are the same. Why *should* you do anything? Because you *owe a debt*. Here, the radically social, embedded, and corporate character of morality becomes clear—you're morally obligated to do certain things because you owe a debt to society, without which you couldn't even exist. This indebtedness becomes still clearer on the Germanic side of the ledger, where our word *guilt* grows out of Old English *gielðan* (cognate with the words *gild* and *yield*), meaning “to pay for”. Our whole conception of morality from prehistoric times until yesterday has been based on the idea of the individual indebted to the group.

The group-centred nature of morality is made clear by anthropology too. During WWII, the American government asked anthropologist Ruth Benedict to make sense of Japanese culture, especially its militarism and patriotism.¹² What the Japanese valued most in life is honour. Honour sounds abstract to us today but it means something

very definite: honour is what other people think of you. When they think little of you, what you feel is shame. Shame is an inherently social phenomenon; it's the result of a collective and corporative culture, where the centre of moral authority is outside the individual—this is *shame culture*. When the centre of moral authority is within the individual, he feels guilt, and a *guilt culture* is one where each man judges himself. He may judge according to a standard, but he decides whether the standard has been met.

Guilt culture is something rather new. We in the modern West are a guilt culture, and liberalism—and its inevitable result, wokeness—are its product. Shame culture, by contrast, is the default state of human life. We're evolved to live in groups, which is why healthy and normal people give a damn about what others think—collective moral foundations are right-wing foundations.

Jonathan Haidt and other psychologists have identified the “Big Five” moral foundations,¹³ basically things that matter to people. Of the five, two are mostly concerned with the individual (care and fairness), and three are mostly concerned with the group (loyalty, authority, and sanctity). They've found that whereas conservatives are well-balanced between all five foundations, liberals tend to be deficient in all the group-oriented foundations, almost exclusively focused on harm avoidance, not unlike the bugman we will meet in our chapter on utilitarianism. In fact, corporatism critiques the modern liberal economy on the same basis that we will critique the utilitarian: it's hedonistic, it can't tell higher from lower values, and it tries to quantify what's unquantifiable. When the whole is more than the sum of its parts, we're not dealing with something that we can work out using a calculator.

Americans may be wondering whether *rugged collectivism* is really compatible with America as an idea. For a long time, we've been told that America is the land of individual enterprise, where everyone is free to go his own way.¹⁴ But corporatism has a long history in America and goes back to its founding. If you look at the Great Seal of the United States, you'll see thirteen arrows in the eagle's talon, representing the thirteen original states—our Scythian king Scylurus would have understood the meaning of this perfectly well. This

resembles the fasces seen all throughout American iconography such as on the Supreme Court, the US House of Representatives, statuary of George Washington, the Lincoln Memorial, and framing the Declaration of Independence. You'll also see on the Great Seal the words E PLURIBUS UNUM, meaning "out of many, one"—precisely the meaning of corporatism. Lastly, we should consider the famous decree of Ben Franklin for the thirteen colonies to *Join or Die* for the cause of American independence.¹⁵ America owes its existence as a nation to corporatism.

This makes sense, because ultimately the principle of corporatism is the same as the principle of nationalism: that society is an organic whole and can't be reduced to the sum of its parts—if it could, it would just be multiple nations. But the nation is a living, breathing *body*, with organs and a unity, and which can't be dissected without killing it, like any other body. It's impossible to be a nationalist without also being a corporatist. The principle is exactly the same.

Corporatism is so natural and historically normal that all our evolved intuitions cry out for it. And like the desert wanderer, when the man in the street drinks he will drink deep. This is what keeps your enemies up at night.

SUMMARY

Man and society are congenital.

The whole is more than the sum of its parts.

You'll never get money out of politics, but politics can put a leash on money.

ENDNOTES

- [1](#) Plutarch, *The Morals*, vol. 1, tr. E. Hinton (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1878).
- [2](#) That is, if unions still protected their members. Instead, they collude with employers to enrich union bosses, and because they do nothing to help you, they need to import foreign labour to keep union dues flowing in.
- [3](#) Georges Valois, “La Coordination des forces nationales”.
- [4](#) Robert Kuttner, “Jerome Powell Sold More Than a Million Dollars of Stock as the Market Was Tanking”, *The American Prospect*, October 18, 2021. Available at: <https://archive.ph/APkl2>.
- [5](#) Courtenay Brown, “The Fed takes on its own rules amid stock trading controversy”, *Axios*, September 17, 2021. Available at: <https://archive.ph/QMZpP>.
- [6](#) Available at [https://extapps2.oge.gov/201/presiden.nsf/PAS+Index/06F79374D20480FD852586D9002EC767/\\$FILE/Jerome-H-Powell-2021-278.pdf](https://extapps2.oge.gov/201/presiden.nsf/PAS+Index/06F79374D20480FD852586D9002EC767/$FILE/Jerome-H-Powell-2021-278.pdf).
- [7](#) Steve Liesman, “Fed Chief Powell, other officials owned securities central bank bought during Covid pandemic”, *CNBC*, September 17, 2021. Available at: <https://archive.ph/SiKbs>.
- [8](#) “18 USC § 208 - Acts affecting a personal financial interest”, *Legal Information Institute*. Available at: <https://archive.ph/OBi0g>.
- [9](#) See Martin Gilens and Benjamin I. Page, “Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens”, *Perspectives on Politics* 12, (2014): pp. 564-581. Available at: <https://archive.ph/YBO6u>.
- [10](#) Tasha Wibawa, “China completes coronavirus hospital in Wuhan in 10 days, with a second hospital almost finished”, *ABC News*, February 3, 2020. Available at: <https://archive.ph/OvEEC>.
- [11](#) See “‘We cannot go on like this’: NHS ‘under unbearable strain’ as at least seven health trusts deal with critical incidents”, *Sky News*, January 2, 2023. Available at: <https://archive.ph/>.
- [12](#) Ruth Benedict, *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of Japanese Culture* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin: 1946).
- [13](#) Jonathan Haidt, *The Righteous Mind: Why Good People are Divided by Politics and Religion* (New York: Penguin, 2013).
- [14](#) Except, somehow, the Confederacy.
- [15](#) See “The story behind the Join or Die snake cartoon”, *National Constitution Center*, May 9, 2023. Available at: <https://archive.ph/RvXV4>.

NINETEEN

LOCALISM

After COVID lockdowns were imposed, something strange started happening, something that few predicted, and that was certainly not intended:

According to research firm Kantar, COVID-19 has driven a surge in “localism” around the world, with two-thirds (65%) of consumers now preferring to buy goods and services from their own country.¹

This was not just temporary. 500 days after the virus was first identified,

We saw that localism continues to be important. Half (52%) of all respondents pay more attention to product origins than they did pre-pandemic. 68% prefer supermarkets close to home while 64% think local stores are important for the community.²

When lockdowns started, the knee-jerk reaction was very clear, and broke down along political lines: the left was against them and the right was for them. The left was, as always, obsessively worried about racism,³ but the right’s response was driven by our evolved defenses against disease. In a nutshell, the natural and healthy response of communities to disease threats is to become more right-wing and authoritarian.⁴

It wasn’t long though before the two sides switched, with the left becoming pro-lockdown and the right anti. Why? Quite simply, because the left used the legitimate power of the state to crack down on the right—the result was that the state carved out for itself a permanent state of exception that could justify any amount of tyranny.⁵ Lockdowns brought out our natural instincts: we love localism and hate centralization. And yet, granting liberal governments authority brought more centralization than ever. In this chapter, we’ll explain how this centralization is an artifact of liberalism, not of authoritarianism, and how the illiberal right owns

localism.

In chapter 13 on sovereignty, we showed that the people can't be sovereign (the highest authority) because the people can't be both bound by law and the source of law, anymore than a hand can hold itself down. A sovereign can't be restrained except by a superior, who is then the real sovereign. By definition there always is a real sovereign or highest authority, just as there is always a tallest person. Another way of saying this is that *sovereignty is conserved*. Liberalism, by saying that the people is sovereign, tries to do away with the concept of sovereignty altogether. But because sovereignty is conserved—there is always a sovereign—all this does is to conceal who the highest authority is. And when power is concealed, it has a tendency to act badly. Because of this, capitalism—the systematic concealment of state sovereignty—leads to runaway centralization:

The centralizing effects of free trade alone would be sufficient to condemn it. The decline of civilization under the Roman Empire was owing solely to centralization. If political science has at all advanced since the earliest annals of history, that advance is the discovery that each small section knows best its own interests and should be endowed with the most of the functions of government.⁶

To repeat a metaphor used earlier, laissez-faire capitalism is not the way to bring about “freedom”—which always means localism—any more than prescribing “health” is the cure for sickness. Freedom is the *result* of good governance, not the recipe. As a result, political philosophies that start from freedom not only fail to secure it, but destroy it. If you want to be left to your own affairs, you need a functional society. For a functional society, you need a functional government. And for a functional government, you need a sovereign that regards itself as sovereign. One such arrangement is absolutism.

To the man in the street, and even to lesser scholars, absolutism is almost the opposite of localism and is synonymous with despotism. This makes no sense unless by despotism we mean “having full authority over something”. Absolutism simply demands that the head man—the sovereign—have full authority in his local context, that he truly be “king of his castle”. Absolute kings were not bound by nothing—they were bound by God who, according to the divine right of kings, grants the king the widest freedom in managing his local

affairs, and the king does the same for his dukes, and so on down the chain of command. At each level, boundaries are respected from above and orders are respected from below, and this minimizes the sort of chronic conflict that would call for micromanagement.

Louis XIV is taken to be the most “despotic” absolutist king, the most hostile to localism. In *The Myth of Absolutism*, Nicholas Henshall shows us how he related to the local dukes and lords vs. the supposedly “limited” English kings:

He treated them as agencies of consultation and consent—showing that his regime was not autocratic. He treated them as guardians of corporate rights and liberties—showing that it was not despotic. And he treated them as agencies of administration—showing that it was not bureaucratic. It is true that he [...] confirmed that never again would feudal lords share prerogative rights with the king. Is that all “absolutism” means? If so, we have another problem. For the king of England did the same.⁷

One might think that corporatism from the last chapter is inherently in tension with localism. But Ugo Spirito, one of the foremost theorists of corporatism, describes “programmatic” (top-down) economics as not only compatible with, but *enhancing* individual initiative. Under liberalism, the “program” (the mandate of the business) is dictated purely by market forces.

But for corporatism, instead, the program is not a given premise [i.e. given by the market], rather postulated by the individuals, whose liberty emerges in its very formulation. Then it is clear that liberty is not only respected, but empowered to infinity. In the liberal or privatistic economy the initiative of each person is conditioned by the limited nature of the environment, by the energies and the instruments which it can muster. In the programmatic economy, to the realization of an idea there is no limit other than the implicit one which lays in the intellectual and practical capacity of who proposes it.⁸

Under corporatism, the state dictates what is to be achieved, but not how it is to be achieved—it does not micromanage. If anything, the individual under corporatism, by his participation in the corporations (trades unions), has far more say in his affairs than under liberalism, which gerrymanders election laws to engineer a result, and when that result is wrong, simply annuls it by procedural tinkering.

Localism has not just a political basis, but a religious basis. The Catholic idea of *subsidiarity*, another word for localism, is taken from St. Aquinas. Political and economic decisions should be made at the most local level possible to best serve the needs of the people there,

and because even the largest social orders are built out of smaller structures like cities, villages, and families, Aquinas saw that this principle of “decision at the most local level” applies to states and empires too. This has been an important part of Catholic social teaching ever since. Later, the Protestant Reformation extended this from politics and economics even to religion itself with the concept of *cuius regio, eius religio*, “whose realm, his religion”—the idea being that even religion is subject to the principle of localism.

Feudalism was an even stronger and earlier expression of localism, and grows out of a native Germanic culture with its complex system of land ownership and personal loyalties.⁹ These localist social orders ultimately grow out of the Indo-European ancestor cult, where each family and clan worshipped its own ancestors and traced its lineage through them to the high gods. The rule among our Bronze Age forefathers was *suo quisque ritu sacrificia faciat*—“let each man make the sacrifices according to his own rite”. The House Father, the head of the family, was a little absolute monarch. He was the high priest of the family worship, the supreme magistrate over his family, and the sole proprietor who held the family property that truly belonged to the ancestors. Under *suo quisque*, no one could tell him how to perform his rites, judge his family, or use his property. Localism was so strong among our forefathers that even when the wife committed a crime against the state, it was left up to the husband to punish her.¹⁰

How far away from all this is liberalism? Liberalism doesn’t care about localism. It promises freedom, first from tradition, then from the state, and so on—and ends by locking you in your home for two years, by forcing you to get vaccinated against a disease with a median age of death of 86,¹¹ and by criminalizing private conversations at your dinner table.¹² This is not a bug, but a feature, from classical liberalism to wokeness. Liberalism pathologizes social technology—religion, state power, stereotypes, gender norms, etc.—and offers itself as the solution to the problem it has created. This can only go in one direction: cancerous growth and centralization of power. Historically this is exactly what has happened.

SUMMARY

Freedom is not the recipe for good governance, but the result of good governance.

To have local autonomy, you must have local authority.

Liberalism destroys localism by destroying local authority.

ENDNOTES

- 1 “‘Localism’ is forecast to be a major post-pandemic trend”, WARC, May 15, 2020. Available at: <https://archive.ph/ne08R>.
- 2 “COVID-19 Barometer: Consumer attitudes, habits and expectations revisited”, Kantar, May 14, 2021. Available at: <https://archive.ph/tkJWi>.
- 3 Delan Devakumar et al, “Racism and discrimination in COVID-19 responses”, *Lancet* 395, (April 2020): 1194. Available at: <https://archive.ph/gLPsT>.
- 4 Damian R. Murray, Mark Schaller, Peter Suedfeld, “Pathogens and Politics: Further Evidence That Parasite Prevalence Predicts Authoritarianism”, *Plos One* 8, no. 5, (May 2013). Available at: <https://archive.ph/1Es56>.
- 5 Specifically, under the exception of “public health emergency”. “Public health” was distorted so wildly that it was often said that “racism is the real public health emergency”—by racism the left just means thinking normal things and using your eyes. Hence mass BLM “protests” were permitted during a “pandemic”. For more on the state of exception see ch. 1.
- 6 Fitzhugh, *Sociology for the South*, ch. 1, “Free Trade”.
- 7 Nicholas Henshall, *The Myth of Absolutism*, ch. 2 “Louis XIV Reassessed”, (New York: Routledge, 1996) pp. 58–59.
- 8 Ugo Spirito, *The Programmatic Corporatist Economy*.
- 9 For more on the Germanic character of feudalism, see Carl Stephenson, *Mediaeval Feudalism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1942).
- 10 See Livy 39, 18.4.
- 11 Keep in mind, this was in 2020, when COVID was more virulent. On this, see “Causes of Death, Australia”, *Australian Bureau of Statistics*, September 27, 2023. Available at: <https://archive.ph/FZ1Aj>.
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TWENTY

ANTI-UTILITARIANISM

“What is love? What is creation? What is longing? What is a star?”—so asketh the last man and blinketh.

The earth hath then become small, and on it there hoppeth the last man who maketh everything small. His species is ineradicable like that of the ground-flea; the last man liveth longest.

“We have discovered happiness”—say the last men, and blink thereby.¹

In Friedrich Nietzsche’s masterpiece *Thus Spake Zarathustra*, he introduces the *Übermensch*, the superior man whose very existence gives meaning to humanity. The *Übermensch* is so far above a normal human being in quality that he is himself a goal to strive for, and after the death of God and the birth of nihilism, he becomes the source of mankind’s highest values. In contrast to the *Übermensch* Nietzsche set the *last man*, his total opposite. The last man lives for pleasure.

The utilitarian also lives for pleasure—he is a hedonist. The roots of utilitarianism can be found in ancient hedonism, especially Epicureanism. “Epicurean” today means someone who can’t get enough wine and caviar, but this is not the same as the original philosophy of Epicurus, which was more about minimizing pain than maximizing pleasure. It’s still a bugman philosophy, but at least not a disgusting one. Utilitarianism is the philosophy of maximizing pleasure—it’s the ethic of the chronic masturbator.

Utilitarians like J. S. Mill do of course make a distinction between higher and lower pleasures. Mill tells us that people would prefer the higher pleasures if they had experienced both high and low.² This is nonsense. Most people have been introduced at some point to Shakespeare, Bach, family obligations, heroic sacrifice, etc. They simply don’t prefer these to Justin Bieber, McDonalds, watching Netflix, and cowardice. To say they would prefer higher pleasures is either obviously false or conceals some further qualification, like “if they were totally different people”. Jeremy Bentham thinks all

pleasures are equal,³ but then he ends up having to say that a dog licking his balls is just as fulfilled as the men who stood and died at Thermopylae. Mill doesn't fare any better. Attempts to dress up utilitarianism as something more than getting your rocks off fail *even in principle*, because the idea of higher vs. lower pleasures already presupposes something more fundamental than pleasure as a moral principle i.e., some criterion for determining the relative worth of pleasures.

Even if we admit that higher pleasures like dying for your country are worth more than lower pleasures like glutting yourself with cheeseburgers, this sounds like a quantitative claim—that pleasure is something you can measure objectively with some sort of fancy ruler. If so, then apparently this ruler (or the utilitarian himself) is in a better position to judge your pleasure than you are; it can tell you whether you have a toothache better than you can. This doesn't sound like any pleasure most of us are familiar with. Pleasure—especially higher pleasure—is something subjective, which is why some people prefer Jersey Shore to Shakespeare. If our principle is pleasure, we're all the supreme judge of our own “highest principle”—the masochist has a different pleasure than the saint. Even averaged out to what's pleasurable to most people, this either fails to produce a robust morality because a Tibetan goatherd has almost nothing in common with a New York real estate agent, or it flattens out human difference to where we're all basically human grey goo. Utilitarians almost all opt for the latter.

The simple problem with utilitarianism is that it tries to capture in quantitative terms what is, at the end of the day, qualitative. It's dehumanizing, and submits everyone to a debased notion of “pleasure”. Whose pleasure it is and how it's distributed is of no consequence to the utilitarian—all that matters is the aggregate quantity. Human beings are just receptacles for pleasure, and are valuable as nothing else.

The commitment to quantity can be seen in a debate over pornography between E. Michael Jones and internet celebrity Vaush:

EMJ: Back in the '60s when people were talking about [porn] as something new, everyone had to accept that as a matter, an act of principle, or an article of faith; now

it has empirically been shown that it is completely destructive to the social order. And so if ISIS agrees with me—fine. That’s great. Anyone who agrees with me, I’m happy to be agreed with.

Vaush: ...if only that empiricism could be demonstrated.

EMJ: Wait a minute, just to bring that up, every time it does get demonstrated, you’d simply reject it. So the guy comes in, gives his personal testimony and you dismiss that as not existing.

Vaush: Personal testimony is not evidence of civilisational corruption. You need strong sociological data with regress of control analysis, which I brought to you with rape rates and you dismissed, so if anyone, the person ignoring reality here is you.⁴

Vaush is not making an unreasonable demand—that quantitative claims require empirical evidence—although there is considerable empirical evidence of the harmful effects of pornography.⁵ However, the stronger, implicit claim is that what can’t be quantified is not real. In about 2010 you couldn’t take a step without tripping over some New Atheist saying things like “anything real can be measured”, which any psychometrician (whose job it is to measure things) can tell you is plainly wrong.

In other words, Vaush can’t see the decline that porn brings on because he can’t measure it. Even though you can in this case, there are some causes and effects of decline that are not measurable because they’re qualitative.⁶ One empirical analysis you can do though is to study the dataset that is all history and see what happens when sexual mores change. This was done by a sociologist in the 1930s named J. D. Unwin, and the upshot of his exhaustive study *Sex and Culture* is that when these things change, the society goes into a death spiral within about three generations. There are no exceptions to this rule. As it turns out, some of the social facts most critical to the life of a society—like sexual mores—can’t be measured.

The real tragedy of the utilitarian is that his philosophy fails by its own metric: the greatest good for the greatest number. But it fails for a very interesting reason, one that nullifies any ethic that submits to the reign of quantity—Goodhart’s law, which states that *when a measure becomes a target, it ceases to be a good measure*.

Everyone who wants to be taken seriously cites evidence. We have evidence-based medicine, evidence-based management, evidence-based policing—you name it, and someone has claimed to base it on evidence. But in 2006, researchers published a paper analyzing so-

called “evidence-based policy” in government.⁷ They found that despite the government’s best efforts at not being retarded, the very act of basing policy on purely quantitative measures ended up distorting the data, because government “seeks to capture and control the knowledge producing processes to the point where this type of ‘research’ might best be described as ‘policy-based evidence’.” The term for this fudging is *selection bias*, and anyone who looked too deeply into the data on COVID vaccines saw it.⁸ Invariably, when the measure of success is X, people will find reasons why what they already want to do achieves X—they will shoot the arrow first, paint the target around it later. Upton Sinclair once said that “it is difficult to get a man to understand something, when his salary depends on his not understanding it”,⁹ and herein lies the whole of Goodhart’s law. Utilitarianism succeeds on paper; in practice, it is bound to fail. This is a problem not just for utilitarianism, but for any purely quantitative approach to what we *should* do. But utilitarianism especially suffers from it because unlike in economics, in ethics there are much more intuitive options than using a calculator.

But in the end, utilitarianism fails because it is responsible for the modern world. Most people, especially in positions of power and influence, think in utilitarian terms. Utilitarianism built the world you live in. Are you happy?

SUMMARY

Utilitarianism is the ethic of the chronic masturbator.

To speak of higher and lower pleasures is already to admit something deeper than pleasure.

Utilitarianism fails by its own standard.

ENDNOTES

[1](#) Friedrich Nietzsche, *Thus Spake Zarathustra*, “Zarathustra’s Prologue”.

[2](#) J. S. Mill, *Utilitarianism*, II. 5.

[3](#) Jeremy Bentham, *The Rationale of Reward*, III. 1.

[4](#) Available at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fRUkkgV4E8>.

[5](#) On this, see the following sources:

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“New Study: Porn is Harmful”, *The Interim*, September 15, 1985. Available at: <https://archive.ph/L9Pw7>.

“Watching too much porn may be bad for your brain, study finds”, *Reuters*, May 30, 2014 (updated October 27, 2015). Available at: <https://archive.ph/Qaeja>.

“Porn Kills Grades: Research Shows XXX Content’s Effect on Academics”, *Fight the New Drug*, January 19, 2018. Available at: <https://archive.ph/um3o8>.

“Study Proves ‘Pornography is Harmful’”, *Life Site News*, January 18, 2013. Available at: <https://archive.ph/vnWWJ>.

[6](#) Joseph Tainter, whose work is otherwise valuable, nevertheless adopts this autistic position and calls qualitative social facts “mystical”.

[7](#) Boden, Rebecca; Epstein, Debbie, “Managing the research imagination? Globalisation and research in higher education”. *Globalisation, Societies and Education* 4, no. 2 (2006): 223–236.

[8](#) Hence in 2021, the Australian Medical Association announced that experts agree: vaccines work because if you disagree you lose your expert license. See “Giving, receiving, sharing – advice for healthcare workers”, *AMA*, March 11, 2021. Available at: <https://archive.ph/SLH3Y>.

[9](#) Upton Sinclair, “I, Candidate for Governor and How I Got Licked”, *Oakland Tribune*, December 11, 1934, Column 3, Oakland, California, Quote Page 19.

TWENTY-ONE

ACCELERATIONISM

O my brethren, am I then cruel? But I say: What falleth, that shall one also push!¹

Few ideas provoke more bitter debate than acceleration—the idea that before things get better they have to get worse, and so the accelerationist wants to make them worse.² Within the radical right, it's highly controversial.

The accelerationist says that what seems to be a dick move at first can, in the fullness of time, actually turn out to be an act of greater compassion. Machiavelli gives some interesting examples in *The Prince*, but if you want a modern example, think of the nuking of Japan. Could anything be more inhumane? As it turns out, yes. 70,000 people died at Hiroshima, but 225,000 died in Tokyo with just two conventional firebomb raids.³ What Hiroshima did was to bring war in the Pacific theatre to an abrupt close and end the firebombing. Would it have been better to let it continue?

Of course not. But does that mean we should make our own problems worse? It sounds insane, but the accelerationist is willing to go there.

We've devoted a lot of space in this book to correcting the naive populist view that “people will only tolerate so much before rising up”⁴—no one is seriously saying that acceleration will cause a popular uprising. History is driven by the will of a few men, but those men need opportunities. What acceleration does is to create instability, and it does this by creating a situation of general discontent that must be managed by elites. This management is expensive and imposes opportunity costs;⁵ it's also complicated and opens up vulnerabilities which can be exploited by people outside the system—the crucial opportunity needed for revolution.

One way this unstable, revolutionary environment comes about is through what has been called *stochastic terrorism* (*stochastic* meaning

“random”). The term was coined by an anonymous blogger:

Stochastic terrorism is the use of mass communications to incite random actors to carry out violent or terrorist acts that are statistically predictable but individually unpredictable. [...] This is stochastic terrorism: you heat up the waters and stir the pot, knowing full well that sooner or later a lone wolf will pop up and do the deed. The fact that it will happen is as predictable as the fact that a heated pot of water will eventually boil. But the exact time and place of each incident will remain as random as the appearance of the first bubbles in the boiling pot.⁶

Elites apply this term to influencers who are insufficiently progressive, but it applies much more to the entire mainstream progressive media apparatus itself, which uses this technique to stir up anti-white violence on a much vaster scale than anything Glenn Beck could ever do. This anti-white stochastic terrorism has been a mixed blessing for the liberal establishment—it has harmed normal people as intended, but it has also made them distrust their government more than ever before.⁷ We do not condone this elite-driven stochastic terrorism—or any terrorism—but no doubt it has driven trust down and enforcement costs up, opening up exploitable vulnerabilities. COVID tyranny was politically necessary both for the 2020 US election and to mask a looming economic crash,⁸ but has effectively broken the American electoral system and exposed severe structural weaknesses in all Western governments.⁹

Making things worse on purpose is monstrous, but accelerationists like Lenin take the long view. When Russia suffered under famine in the late 19th century, Lenin’s comrades wanted to help out the peasants, but he saw that their suffering would only increase their revolutionary potential, so he refused to help.

Acceleration is not simply masochism, but the attempt to hit the reset button before long term damage is done. If you were a conservative Russian in 1917, the Russian Revolution looked monstrous indeed. Within two generations, your society went from feudalism to being infected with communism, feminism, and sexual deviancy—this is not just acceleration, this is whiplash. America in 1917 was surely in a much better position. And yet, look at Russia vs. America today; the two are hardly even comparable. What’s the difference? It certainly isn’t religion—both were piously Christian. It’s not culture—if anything the Slavs surrendered to insane social

engineering earlier. The main difference is that the move from based to cringe happened in America slowly, but in Russia at a breakneck pace. Terrible as Leninism was, what followed it—Stalinism—acted as a kind of permafrost that covered the whole Eastern Bloc, and below which liberalism could not penetrate. By the time the Iron Curtain was lifted these societies remained relatively untouched by liberalism, and this is the main reason they're culturally in better shape today. Our conservative Russian in 1917, had he lived to see the Current Year, might have seen his society's acceleration in a different light in the fullness of time. To this example we could add many others such as the Quiet Revolution which birthed Quebecois nationalism, and the Amarna heresy which reaffirmed Egyptian conservatism and led to Egypt's apex of power and glory. Whiplash revolution is bad; boiling the frog alive is worse.

Acceleration is not “just giving up” as it's often said to be—it's a deliberate strategy. If it's true not only that *bad men create hard times* but also that *hard times create good men*,^{[10](#)} then acceleration makes for harder times in order to create good men sooner. Riding the tiger^{[11](#)} is not cost-free. As men become weaker, as society degenerates, our genetic stock degenerates with it. If a reset is inevitable, should it happen before the genotype deteriorates too far, before our people can no longer even produce a great man who can restore society? We asked the same question about the Japanese firebombing that we now ask about genetic decline—would it be better to let it continue?

Accelerationism is not giving up; it's going down swinging. Everything dies—cattle die, people die, even whole civilizations die. What never dies is the heroic last stand. What's leaning, the accelerationist says, *push*.

SUMMARY

What seems like cruelty can, in the fullness of time, be compassion.

Is it better to let suffering continue?

What's leaning ought to be pushed.

ENDNOTES

- 1 Friedrich Nietzsche, *Thus Spake Zarathustra*, “Zarathustra’s Prologue”.
- 2 In any discussion of acceleration we must mention Nick Land. However his concept is not of right-wing acceleration (r/acc: “push to the left, rebound to the right”), nor of left-wing acceleration (l/acc: “push to the right, rebound to the left”), but of *unconditional acceleration* (u/acc, “we’re all fucked”) is idiosyncratic, and doesn’t really have currency in the radical right the way acceleration as laid out in this chapter (r/acc) does. For Land’s concept, see his article *A Quick-and-Dirty Introduction to Accelerationism*, originally published in Jacobite Mag.
- 3 Gwynne Dyer, *War*, (New York, Crown Publishers, 1985), p. 3.
- 4 See p. 98.
- 5 Every dollar spent managing public opinion is one less dollar for, say, training your police force.
- 6 See “Stochastic Terrorism: Part 1, triggering the shooters”, *Stochastic Terrorism*, January 26, 2011. Available at: <https://archive.ph/53Xo7>.
- 7 See “Public Trust in Government: 1958-2023”, *Pew Research Center*, September 19, 2023. Available at: <https://archive.ph/Cb1zy>.
- 8 See Maggie Fitzgerald, “Here’s a list of recession signals that are flashing red”, *CNBC*, September 2, 2019. Available at: <https://archive.ph/dTYvf>.
- 9 For example, despite the US federal government’s best efforts, vaccine mandates were effectively unenforceable. See John M. Donnelly, “Federal contractors see risks in unclear vaccine mandate”, *Roll Call*, November 5, 2021. Available at: <https://archive.ph/LbpCa>.
- 10 See ch. 40 on cyclical history.
- 11 See ch. 43.

TWENTY-TWO

ANARCHO-TYRANNY

The universe is 14 billion years old and you got to be alive when the greatest superpower in all that time inflicted its own death wound.

This death wound was 2020, when normal people finally got the memo that something was terribly wrong. There they were, locked inside their homes, terrified of a potentially civilization-ending pandemic. Enter George Floyd—criminal, aspiring rapper, and amateur porn actor—who passed off a counterfeit bill and was killed in police custody after resisting arrest.¹ This kind of squalid criminality is par for the course in America's inner cities, and ordinarily nobody would care. But 2020 was no ordinary year—it was the year that the Deep State intended to remove Trump from office. And so despite a plague spreading like wildfire, mass gatherings were allowed, even encouraged. Why? Because the real public health emergency was not the literal virus that required global lockdowns—the real public health emergency was—are you ready for it?

“Racism.”

This blatant criminalization of normality (going to church, visiting friends) and normalization of criminality (looting, rioting) has a name: *anarcho-tyranny*. Once the man in the street has seen it, he can never un-see it.

The term anarcho-tyranny seems like a plain contradiction. Sam Francis, who coined it, explains:

What we have in this country today, then, is both anarchy (the failure of the state to enforce the laws) and, at the same time, tyranny—the enforcement of laws by the state for oppressive purposes; the criminalization of the law-abiding and innocent through exorbitant taxation, bureaucratic regulation, the invasion of privacy, and the engineering of social institutions, such as the family and local schools; the imposition of thought control through “sensitivity training” and multiculturalist curricula, “hate crime” laws, gun-control laws that punish or disarm otherwise law-abiding citizens but have no impact on violent criminals who get guns illegally, and a vast labyrinth of other measures. In a word, anarcho-tyranny.²

It's sobering to think that he coined this term in 1992.

As always, conservatives are no opposition to anarcho-tyranny at all. They regard it as a “failure” of the system, the result of “weakness of will”. Nothing could be further from the truth.

Anarcho-tyranny is entirely deliberate, a calculated transformation of the function of the state from one committed to protecting the law-abiding citizenry to a state that treats the law-abiding citizen as, at best, a social pathology and, at worst, an enemy. Having captured the state apparatus, the anarcho-tyrants are the real hegemonic class in contemporary society, and their function is to formulate and construct the new “culture” of the new order they envision, a culture that rejects as repressive and pathological the traditional culture and civilization.³

Imagine to yourself someone who knows there's a global pedophile blackmail cabal, but also thinks “I can just vote them out”—you have imagined the conservative politician. These people are less than useless, they are an obstacle, and probably worse: complicit. This point cannot be underlined strongly enough.

It's worth emphasizing that anarcho-tyranny is not the lack of rule of law, as is sometimes said,⁴ because rule of law is not a thing.⁵ Rather, anarcho-tyranny is about punishing the innocent and protecting the guilty. *Anarchy* is where government neglects its proper functions (keeping order, punishing criminals); *tyranny* is where government performs illegitimate functions (punishing “hate crimes”, inciting disorder). Anarcho-tyranny is the synthesis of the two—it's both negligence *and* malice.

Some examples of anarcho-tyranny will help to clarify. FBI director Chris Wray testified at a congressional hearing that Antifa is an ideology, not an organization,⁶ despite that Antifa “protestors” have been paid to loot and riot,⁷ suggesting an organizational structure. The head of a federal law enforcement department running cover for a genuine terrorist organization should be a first clue that this is no “failure of will”, but quite wilful and systemic. Another clue that Antifa (and journalists) are part of the state apparatus is that Germany introduced legislation to ban “enemy lists”, but made an exception for journalists and Antifa, who were allowed to circulate “lists naming people as potential targets for intimidation or violent action.”⁸ What's “activism” for me is “terrorism” for thee.

Anarcho-tyranny is not confined to Antifa. In 2021, Canada's

Liberal government announced legislation whereby criticism of Muslims and gays earns you a \$20,000 fine,² while in the same country, advocating for the ending of *whiteness* (meaning white people) earns you a tenured position at a university doing “social science”.¹⁰ Another example: a genuine health crisis, unlike racism, was caused by the Sackler family, owners of Purdue Pharma, who contributed significantly and knowingly to the opioid epidemic that overwhelmingly affects poor white communities to this day. They were later given legal immunity to lawsuits by a federal court.¹¹ Yet another: so-called “right-wing” domestic terrorism killed 38 people in 2019.¹² To put the threat into perspective, champagne corks kill 24 annually.¹³ The taxpayer cost of counter-terrorism over 17 years was \$2.8 trillion.¹⁴ Terrorism laws facilitate anarcho-tyranny by providing the legal excuse to ban the right, which is the only bulwark against anarchy. You’ll notice there’s no such thing as anarchist terrorism, BLM terrorism, or Antifa terrorism—to say nothing of liberal terrorism. This is because these groups are the system’s antibodies, and the state deputizes them to enforce unwritten laws that would otherwise be unconstitutional.¹⁵ Finally, in perhaps the most blatant example, in 2023 a felon admitted to stealing more than half a million rounds of ammunition and selling them to known gangbangers. The DOJ later dropped all charges against her and instead pursued charges against the business she stole them from,¹⁶ because the problem isn’t gangs getting ammo—this is actually desired. The problem is that businesses are still allowed to sell ammo to law-abiding citizens.

This strategy of punishing the innocent and protecting the guilty is carried out in many ways beyond simple corruption—one of the most effective ways is by having a huge number of vague, obscure, and sometimes even contradictory laws and regulations. An unclear law is not a law, but a blank cheque.

In a move that could have been taken straight from a Kafka novel, the state ensures that you are always guilty of something no matter what you do. Ignorance of the hyper-complex structure of e.g. tax law is no excuse, so the state always reserves the right to punish you. But because everyone has committed some infraction and there are only so many IRS agents, the state must decide who to punish, which it does

with great reliability in targeting the only people who realistically challenge it—the right. This was seen most recently in 2013 when the IRS targeted right-wing groups,¹⁷ but the use of the IRS as a political weapon dates back at least to FDR.¹⁸

The reason anarcho-tyranny is carried out by haphazard application of law is not just for political reasons—it's done to force people to police themselves. The principle was developed by Jeremy Bentham in the 18th century in his *panopticon*,¹⁹ a design for a prison where every prisoner can be observed by a single guard, but no prisoner can tell if he's being watched. Think of the last time your boss walked in the room; you probably sat up, turned off your phone, and started working harder. Now, imagine if your boss was in the room constantly—you'd work harder still. Now, imagine that you couldn't tell if your boss was looking over your shoulder or not—you'd be smashing out those reports in record time. This is the use of the panopticon: if you're always guilty and never sure who's watching, you'll behave. The principle is diabolical in its genius.

Sometimes anarcho-tyranny is carried out in the open, and is simply undisguised tyranny. It became clear to everyone with any sense around the time of the Floyd riots that COVID was not a serious health threat because if it were, those riots would have been shut down immediately as the super-spreader events they were. What's more, even before a vaccine had been deployed, it became clear that the drug Ivermectin, a cheap and readily available anti-parasitic drug, could reduce the duration of COVID illness, as was noted in reputable journals at the time.²⁰ Shortly after, a report was submitted to the UK government by the Evidence-based Medicine Consultancy firm showing that not only the duration, but the morbidity and mortality of COVID could be reduced by Ivermectin.²¹ This report along with the rest of the scientific literature was effectively ignored in favour of late, ineffective,²² and unsafe²³ vaccines which enriched Big Pharma companies who spent tens of millions of dollars lobbying Western governments.²⁴ The unwarranted fear campaign was later admitted to be outright totalitarianism:

Scientists on a committee that encouraged the use of fear to control people's behaviour during the Covid pandemic have admitted its work was "unethical" and

“totalitarian”.

Members of the Scientific Pandemic Influenza Group on Behaviour (SPI-B) expressed regret about the tactics in a new book about the role of psychology in the Government’s Covid-19 response.

SPI-B warned in March last year that ministers needed to increase “the perceived level of personal threat” from Covid-19 because “a substantial number of people still do not feel sufficiently personally threatened”.

[...] Ministers have faced repeated accusations that they ramped up the threat from the pandemic to justify lockdowns and coerce the public into abiding by them – a claim that will be examined by the forthcoming public inquiry into the pandemic response.^{[25](#)}

A much more subtle way that anarcho-tyranny criminalizes normality and normalizes criminality is by what Paul Gottfried calls the *therapeutic state*. The idea is that the state’s legitimate duty of care can be beaten into any shape that will serve the cause of progressive social engineering. Even the most tyrannical governments are limited in what they can inflict on their citizens, with one exception: when public welfare is at risk—then the government can do what it must. In the therapeutic state, the definitions of “harm” and “public welfare” are expanded so far that they cover basically anything, enabling these states to wield power to a degree that would make Kim Jong-un blush.

We saw this with the idea that “racism is a public health emergency”, where a real plague was less of a public health concern than the fever dream of “systemic racism”. But it doesn’t stop there. This pathologization of dissent makes a medical issue out of wrongthink, which we can see by the use of the medical term *phobia* to describe default conditions like ethnocentrism (“xenophobia”), traditional sexual mores (“homophobia”), patriarchy (“misogyny”), and gender norms (“transphobia”). The right-winger has been redefined as not simply wrong, but mentally ill, and no amount of force is too much to save society from him, even to save him from himself. Because these aren’t really phobias, public perception must be carefully managed so people continue to believe in them. From this we get an “expert consensus” which has always already been reached before any investigation of the facts, hence the paranoia surrounding “disinformation” and the need to manage information flows by any means necessary—those means usually involving capturing supposedly private institutions like the media, universities, and big tech,^{[26](#)} in order

to make seeing reality illegal. For example, here's how Aristotle, who actually knew about politics, defines different governments:

- Rule by one: *monarchy*
- Rule by few: *aristocracy*
- Rule by many: *democracy*

Now, by contrast, the New York Times:

- Rule by one: *dictatorship*
- Rule by few: *democracy*
- Rule by many: *populism*

There's no better proof that democracy can't work than that people distinguish it from populism. Loving one and hating the other is like loving water but hating H₂O. If democracy is anything at all, it's the idea that the people should be able to hold their government accountable, usually by elections. And yet, the New York Times ran an article entitled "Elections Are Bad for Democracy" in 2023, provoking outrage from people with basic reasoning skills.²⁷ This is nothing new—the Guardian wrote an almost identically titled article in 2016 after Brexit.²⁸ Saying that an unelected, unaccountable bureaucracy is democratic but elections are not, is as good as saying 2+2=5. This is why you noticing any shenanigans at all is "disinformation" and a threat to national security. Anarcho-tyranny doesn't just punish the innocent and protect the guilty, it *tyrannizes our categories of thought*.

It's also nothing new. It was noted a long time ago—as early as 1850 when Thomas Carlyle called it "anarchy plus a street-constable". So what is the solution to not just lawlessness, but *purposeful lawlessness*? Carlyle gives us the answer here as well:

[...] anterior to all written laws and first making written laws possible, there must have been, and is, and will be, coeval with Human Society, from its first beginnings to its ultimate end, an actual Martial Law, of more validity than any other law whatever.²⁹

That is, the solution to anarcho-tyranny is simply to impose military dictatorship. This is, after all, how the Romans did it. It's also the only way that lieutenant general Michael Flynn thought order could be restored after the US "election" of 2020. He tweeted out a press

release stating that,

When the legislators, courts and/or Congress fail to do their duty under the 12th Amendment, you must be ready Mr. President to immediately declare a limited form of Martial Law, and temporarily suspend the Constitution and civilian control of these federal elections, for the sole purpose of having the military oversee a national re-vote [...]^{[30](#)}

Flynn later responded to an audience question why a Myanmar-style military coup couldn't happen in the US by saying "No reason. I mean, it should happen here. No reason."

We leave it to the reader to judge whether there is such a reason.

SUMMARY

Anarcho-Tyranny is the criminalization of normality and the normalization of criminality.

The less clear the law, the more people police themselves.

If they can call it “harm”, they can use force against it.

ENDNOTES

- 1 See Andrew C. McCarthy, “Powerful Evidence That George Floyd Resisted Arrest”, *National Review*, April 1, 2021. Available at: <https://archive.ph/h87bw>.
- 2 Samuel Francis, *Synthesizing Tyranny*.
- 3 Ibid.
- 4 See Llewellyn H. Rockwell, “Anarcho-Tyranny in Baghdad”, *LewRockwell.com*, April 12, 2003. Available at: <https://archive.ph/05ELF>.
- 5 We have to distinguish between “law and order”—which is possible but opposed by anarcho-tyranny—and “rule of law”—which is the impossible idea that the law is above the sovereign. See ch. 13 for more on this point.
- 6 See Eric Tucker and Ben Fox, “FBI director says antifa is an ideology, not an organization”, *Associated Press*, September 18, 2020. Available at: <https://archive.ph/lRipo>.
- 7 See Debra Heine, “Who Is Funding and Organizing the Antifa Insurrection?”, *American Greatness*, June 2, 2020. Available at: <https://archive.ph/VSZkm>.
- 8 “Germany plans legislation to ban so-called ‘enemy lists’”, *The Times of India*, March 17, 2021. Available at: <https://archive.ph/GJ0o2>.
- 9 Matt Novak, “Canada to Make Online Hate Speech a Crime Punishable by \$16,000 Fine”, *Gizmodo*, June 24, 2021. Available at: <https://archive.ph/zmyVy>.
- 10 See “‘Anti-white(ness)’ Canadian university event mired in controversy”, *canoe.com*, March 1, 2018. Available at: <https://archive.ph/jHXjA>.
- 11 For the Sacklers to get this immunity, Purdue Pharma had to declare bankruptcy. Before it did, the Sacklers withdrew \$10 billion from it. None of the Sackler family members themselves had to declare bankruptcy. See Marie Feyche, “Federal court grants Sackler family immunity from all future opioid lawsuits”, *Jurist*, September 4, 2021. Available at: <https://archive.ph/vCrjc>.
- 12 The report states 90% of 42 murders were linked to “right-wing extremists”. Over half these murders occurred in a single incident. On this, see “Murder and Extremism in the United States in 2019”, *ADL*, February 25, 2020. Available at <https://archive.ph/xoRps>.
- 13 See Pooja Bale, “14 things that kill more people than sharks”, *The Daily Californian*, June 30, 2017. Available at: <https://archive.ph/c7uHY>.
- 14 See Julia Donheiser, “The United States has spent at least \$2.8 trillion on counterterrorism since 9/11”, *The Center for Public Integrity*, May 18, 2018. Available at: <https://archive.ph/gnXxG>.
- 15 Such as criminalizing free speech and gun ownership. See also p. 24 for a similar example of legal bypassing.
- 16 Cam Edwards, “Delaware DOJ targets victim of ammo theft, while cutting the perp a break”, *Bearing Arms*, July 13, 2023. Available at: <https://archive.ph/Km8Qa>.
- 17 Peter Overby, “IRS Apologizes For Aggressive Scrutiny Of Conservative Groups”,

NPR, October 27, 2017. Available at: <https://archive.ph/B6aeg>.

[18](#) Burton W. Folsom, “FDR and the IRS”, *Hillsdale College*. Available at: <https://archive.ph/Bv9mO>.

[19](#) You will remember Bentham and his insane social engineering from ch 20 on utilitarianism.

[20](#) Sabeena Ahmed et al, “A five-day course of ivermectin for the treatment of COVID-19 may reduce the duration of illness”, *International Journal of Infectious Diseases*, (February 2021): pp. 214-216. Available at: <https://archive.ph/lQLvm>.

[21](#) <https://committees.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/36858/pdf/>

[22](#) S. V. Subramanian and Akhil Kumar, “Increases in COVID-19 are unrelated to levels of vaccination across 68 countries and 2947 counties in the United States”, *European Journal of Epidemiology* 36, (2021): pp. 1237-1240. Available at: <https://archive.ph/eKYgg>.
<https://www.ft.com/content/58cfd452-a85e-4235-8849-0f4a3c89ffc8>

[23](#) It was clear that the vaccines rushed out in the wake of COVID were dangerous, but were sold as safe. A young Australian was left blinded because of it, and “two renowned eye surgeons, Professor Peter McCluskey from the Royal Prince Alfred Hospital in Sydney and Dr Peter Davies from Hunter Eye Surgeons in Newcastle, both agreed that [his] condition was caused by the Moderna vaccine.” Frank Chung, “‘My life is on hold’: Young tradie blinded after Moderna vaccine denied compensation”, *news.com.au*, May 12, 2023. Available at: <https://archive.ph/GHpLl>.

[24](#) “Pfizer Inc: Top Affiliates”, *Open Secrets*. Available at: <https://archive.ph/S0rej>.

[25](#) Gordon Rayner, “Use of fear to control behaviour in Covid crisis was ‘totalitarian’, admit scientists”, *The Telegraph*, May 14, 2021. Available at: <https://archive.md/6yGBb>.

[26](#) See ch. 3 on the Cathedral.

[27](#) Adam Grant, “Elections are Bad for Democracy”, *The New York Times*, August 21, 2023. Available at: <https://archive.is/JGzhs>.

[28](#) David Van Rebrouck, “Why Elections are Bad for Democracy”, *The Guardian*, June 29, 2016. Available at: <https://archive.ph/2Sjel>.

[29](#) Thomas Carlyle, *Shooting Niagara: and After?*, III.

[30](#) Ken Meyer, “Michael Flynn, Newly Pardoned, Calls for Trump to ‘Temporarily Suspend the Constitution’ and Impose Martial Law”, *Mediaite*, December 2, 2020. Available at: <https://archive.ph/L7nyu>.

TWENTY-THREE

ENVIRONMENTALISM

I think the only thing scarier than a far-right movement that denies the reality of climate change is a far-right movement that doesn't deny the reality of climate change.¹

In the 19th century, after a long hiatus, man again became acutely aware that in the relationship between himself and nature, he is the junior partner. During roughly the first half of its life so far, environmentalism was something recognizably right-wing, as typified by this quote from a seminal environmentalist text:

We must preserve the forest, not only so that our stove does not get cold in winter, but also so that the pulses of national life continue to beat warmly and happily, so that Germany remains German.²

Only later did this change.

No question about it: there is an ecological crisis today. The climate is changing,³ our soils are degrading,⁴ biodiversity is cratering, and resources are being depleted unsustainably. Humans are at least partly responsible for all of this.

We have never been less connected to nature, and this is a big part of the problem—especially in the first world, where our ecological footprint is the greatest. If you wanted to destroy the environment as fast as possible, the best way to do that would be to swell the number of first worlders, and the fastest way to do that is to import a metric ton of third worlders, who are proportionally more materialistic.⁵ This is not an observation confined to the political right—renowned deep ecologist Bill Devall, who was not right-wing, critiqued those who would “justify large-scale in-migration to Western Europe and North America from Latin America and Africa” as guilty of “misplaced humanism,”⁶ and he does this for exactly the same reason. Humanism is certainly part of the problem. Progressives who would not limit first world immigration are not really environmentalists—progressive “environmentalism” is not about ecology, but about resentment and

enforcing equity globally.⁷

Progressive humanism has its roots in Enlightenment humanism. Progressivism has no business with environmentalism because environmentalism critiques anthropocentric humanism, and this critique goes hand-in-hand with a critique of Enlightenment humanism. The Enlightenment is anything but friendly to nature. Kant, Hegel, and other Enlightenment idealists took a transcendental view where the ultimate stakes and meaning of the world is beyond the immanent reality of nature. Apart from Rousseau, who never quite fit comfortably alongside Voltaire and the rest, the Enlightenment saw man as the master of nature rather than subordinate to it.

The human effort to master nature must finally end up in the human effort to erase nature. We can see this in a modern metaphysical confusion which says that any social arrangement at all is natural simply by virtue of existing—a skyscraper is as “natural” as a termite mound. These are the same people who want to tell you that the desire to mutilate your own penis is as “natural” as the desire to eat food or seek shelter. What they are really saying is that *there is no nature*, because what they call “nature” is a category that doesn’t exclude anything. In trying to master nature, man has convinced himself that anything he does is “natural”. So environmentalism, which opposes the attempt to master nature, is inherently anti-woke and illiberal.

In fact, “environmentalism” is the wrong term. Until the 1970s, the term “environmentalist” was rare—we used to call caring about the natural world *conservationism*. But this sounded too much like *conservatism*, so in order to shoehorn left-wing politics into the conversation, a new term had to be invented, and the term conservationism has been forced down by academic pressure over the past two generations.⁸ But environmentalism is inherently reactionary—it seeks to preserve and even to roll back the impact of humans on the environment. And so, you see strong reactionary impulses among environmentalists:

- Localism/oikophilia
- Communalism/anti-individualism

- Anti-alienation (connection to the soil)
- Anti-urbanism/agrarianism
- Authenticity
- Rootedness
- Organicism/corporativism
- Purity
- Physical health
- Anti-emancipatory (back to the land) movements
- Anti-humanism

Take these away, and you have lost environmentalism; take any of them seriously enough, and you are a “fascist”.

There’s an inherent connection between environmentalism and nationalism, too. Most ecological problems are now so big that they require the intervention of government. And because governance is most effective at the national level, that’s the right level to deal with most ecological problems—the local level is ineffective because the problems are too big, and the transnational level is ineffective because there’s a natural limit to how much one body can govern. We have to put our own house in order. People care first and foremost about their own backyard—NIMBY maximalism would solve most of our global environmental problems. If you own something, you take better care of it.⁹ If a man owns his own land, if he is connected to the soil, he has more reason to care about it. It’s simply assumed that these issues must be dealt with transnationally, but if man has no connection to a homeland, he can always go somewhere else. The fact is, *illiberal environmentalist* is simply a redundant term—all proper environmentalism is illiberal.

When the rubber hits the road, the right has done more for the environment by far than the left, whose contribution to it has mostly been to produce astroturfed protest and reams of paper rather than concrete policy. Richard Nixon created the Environmental Protection Agency, signed the Clean Air Act, made the first presidential statement on the need for clean energy, and established development budgets for energy technology. Teddy Roosevelt created the United States Forest Service and protected about 230 million acres of land, along with being a rabid nationalist, modernizer, champion of property rights, and passing sweeping regulations to restrict capitalism. This sounds an

awful lot like another political movement that was inherently environmentalist: fascism. The left has wrung its hands for nearly a century about fascism's supposed backwardness, but nevertheless,

national parks, ruralism, reforestation, reclamation, implementation of hydroelectric power plants, colonisation, autarchic policies and new urban planning were all part of Fascist politics and culture.^{[10](#)}

Within months of the March on Rome, the Italian Fascist government had set up two national parks.^{[11](#)}

Right-wing environmentalism is a redundant term, because the right both gave birth to environmentalism and is its natural heir, but sometimes right-wing environmentalism gets called *eco-fascism* by malicious actors who are globalist first, environmentalist second. *Eco-fascism* began as a term of abuse in the 1980s, used by Reaganites to tar environmentalism, but it was eventually seized upon by the left. Environmentalism, along with Social Darwinism, is simply the recognition that humans are subject to the same laws of nature as anything else. A Social Darwinist is simply a consistent Darwinist. Ernst Haeckel, one of the most important of all naturalists, expressed this simply when he said that “civilization and the life of nations are governed by the same laws as prevail throughout nature and organic life.”^{[12](#)} You'd have to be insane to disagree with him. As we said before,^{[13](#)} conservatism is a kind of humility, and contra the Enlightenment, environmentalism is just the recognition that you're nothing special, just a link in the living chain of nature like any other animal.

Because the social is a special case of the biological, throwing the *biological* ecosystem out of balance is not morally different than throwing the *social* ecosystem out of balance—the destruction of indigenous species is no different than the destruction of indigenous races. There's an anti-imperialist streak to eco-fascism, a respect for indigenous cultures. The destruction of nationalities and the destruction of the environment have a common root: globalism and capitalism. Just as modernity produces ecological monocultures, so modernity eliminates ethnic and national cultures in favour of a homogenized, universalized, mongrelized, global monoculture.

Globalism and capitalism also destroy the spirit, and they do this by

instrumentalizing both the natural world and the cultural world—exactly what the Enlightenment did in trying to master nature. Culture is always “for” something, the environment is always “for” something: neither exist for their own sake. This was captured well in an article by the anonymous reviewer Morgoth on the gradual disappearance of the Rhine. He points out the absurdity of the progressive mindset which sees the river only as a giant conveyor belt for goods and material. He then contrasts this with the illiberal take:

What does the prospect of the river Rhine drying-up actually mean? to my mind it symbolizes the end of Germany, German people and German culture with the rest of Europe following shortly after. It is a cataclysmic event which would have dumbfounded and terrified Europeans of an earlier age, all of whom would have understood the profound existential and spiritual ramifications of Europe without one of its major rivers.¹⁴

When nature is drained of meaning, we lose a source of authenticity—we lose a piece of ourselves. The protection of native fauna—or for that matter, the protection of native rivers—is the same project as the protection of a native people.

A people and a landscape depend on one another, and when the people are separated from their native landscape, they suffer. Urbanism causes decay—moral decay,¹⁵ intellectual decay,¹⁶ genotypic decay,¹⁷ etc. Industrialism causes it too.¹⁸ Of course, the remedy is ruralism, which progressives hate, so they offer all sorts of ridiculous copes as they crowd into spaces that push both their IQs and their birth rates down. But as their intellectual superiors have noted from the beginning of time, there is a feedback loop between people and landscape—not only does the people transform the land, but the land transforms the people.¹⁹

At the end of the day, every true progressive will abandon environmentalism as soon as it conflicts with the imagined problems of intersectionality, which it ultimately always does. When forced to choose between solving ecological problems and chasing emancipatory fever dreams, the leftist will always choose the latter. And sooner or later, he will be *forced* to choose, because democracy always runs into the problem of the commons where property owned by nobody is taken care of by nobody. Nothing short of a dictatorship will fix the

ecological crisis, but the left would sooner see the planet die. This was admitted frankly by Murray Bookchin, an anarchist who pretended to be an environmentalist. When confronted by actual environmentalist Rudolf Bahro saying that maybe letting everyone shit wherever they want will not be enough to deal with ecological catastrophe, Bookchin replied:

an “ecological” dictatorship would not be ecological—it would finally finish off the planet altogether. It would be the glorification, the hypostatization, of social control, of manipulation, the objectification of human beings, the denial of human freedom and self-consciousness, in the name of ecological problems.^{[20](#)}

Revealingly, when push comes to shove, Bookchin cares more about human caprice than ecological problems.

There is an inherent and inevitable connection between ecological issues and right-wing politics. This is especially so in the right’s love of the natural order, which the left denies even exists. Strange environmentalism, that. And environmentalism fits especially with the *radical* right, with the attempt to *reform* society—not according to human whim, but according to nature. The marriage of revolution with conservation is just that explosive mix that characterizes the radical right, and this is the only formula that can solve our ecological problems. The attempt to throw up a barrier between the social and the ecological is the hallmark of liberalism, which wants to put the social before ecology. But these are not two different things, and taking ecology seriously demands a particular politics—that of the radical right.

SUMMARY

The fastest way to destroy the environment is immigration.

A Social Darwinist is just a consistent Darwinist.

The progressive will always choose equity over ecology.

ENDNOTES

- 1 Democracy Now!, “Ecofascism: Naomi Klein Warns the Far Right’s Embrace of White Supremacy Is Tied to Climate Crisis”, *YouTube*. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PqUUTP5i_nU.
- 2 Wilhelm Heinrich Riehl, *Feld und Wald*, p. 52 (Stuttgart, 1857).
- 3 Although, importantly, climate change is not new—“the magnitudes of ancient changes were often substantially greater than those established in recent history.” Cf. David B. Kemp, Kilian Eichenseer and Wolfgang Kiessling, “Maximum rates of climate change are systematically underestimated in the geological record”, *Nature Communications* 6, (November 2015). Available at: <https://archive.ph/d6heC>.
- 4 Kraamwinkel, C.T., Beaulieu, A., Dias, T. et al. Planetary limits to soil degradation. *Communications Earth & Environment* 2, 249 (2021).
- 5 Since “materialism is neither unique to the West nor directly related to affluence”. See Güliz Ger and Russell W. Belk, “Cross-cultural differences in materialism”, *Journal of Economic Psychology* 17, no. 1, (February 1996): pp. 55-77. Available at: <https://archive.ph/mBOAT>. See also Mark Cleveland, Michel Laroche and Nicolas Papadopoulos, “Ethnic Identity’s Relationship to Materialism and Consumer Ethnocentrism: Contrasting Consumers in Developed and Emerging Economies”, *Journal of Global Academy of Marketing Science* 21, no. 2, (2011). Available at: <https://archive.ph/gTLJf>. This latter article concludes that despite access to lower levels of material culture, the third world manages to be as materialistic as the first world, and that ethnocentrism (which is much higher in the third world) correlates with materialism. Consider also a 2008 study by Roussanov et al.: “Blacks and Hispanics spend up to 30% more than whites of comparable income on visible goods like clothing, cars and jewelry, the researchers found. This meant that, compared to white households of similar income, the typical black and Hispanic household spent \$2,300 more per year on visible items”. See information on Nikolai Roussanov, available here: <https://archive.ph/kBrqW>. See also Jeremy Williams, “The materialism of developing countries”, *The Earthbound Report*, February 14, 2014 (available at: <https://archive.ph/qZTiJ>) for a very clear international ethnic trend of success self-measured by wealth, weighted toward the developing world.
- 6 Bill Devall, *Simple in Means, Rich in Ends: Practicing Deep Ecology* (Layton, UT: Gibbs Smith, 1988), p. 189.
- 7 For example, the *Green New Deal* of 2019 allegedly seeks to fight climate change but is really just a wealth transfer from rural, exurban, and suburban areas to urban ones, attempting to shift populations into the cities. Cf. Benjamin Zycher, *The Green New Deal: Economics and Policy Analysis* (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 2019), which is available at the following link: <https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/RPT-The-Green-New-Deal-5.5x8.5-FINAL.pdf>. The Paris Climate Accords were just a thinly-disguised wealth transfer from the first to the third world to the tune of \$100 billion per year. Cf. <https://apnews.com/article/41fd19e43715428ca5d33dec47fac29d>.
- 8 See “Conservationist, Environmentalist” search on Google Books Ngram Viewer.

Available at: <https://archive.ph/cN4xU>.

[9](#) Anyone who has used a public toilet understands this.

[10](#) Marco Armiero, “Green Rhetoric in Blackshirts: Italian Fascism and the Environment”, *Environment and History* 19, no. 3 (August 2013): pp. 283–311.

[11](#) German fascists were even more impressive in their environmentalism. For a balanced account, see Anna Bramwell’s *Blood and Soil: Richard Walther Darré and Hitler’s ‘Green Party’* (Bourne End: The Kensal Press, 1985).

[12](#) Quoted in Gasman, *The Scientific Origins of National Socialism*, (New York: Routledge, 2017), p. 34

[13](#) Cf. p. 44.

[14](#) Morgoth’s Review, “The Disenchantment Of The Rhine (And Europe)”, *Substack*, August 13, 2022. Available at: <https://archive.ph/bfsdM>

[15](#) This is noted as far back as Cato the Elder and Hesiod, who preferred simple, rural living to urbanism. We would expect literacy to favour the city, but since the dawn of writing, the city has been looked down upon.

[16](#) Spandrell, whom we met in ch. 14 on bioleninism, explains this with his mechanism of the IQ shredder. Cities attract high IQ talent and then suppress their birth rates. Essentially, cities are where IQ goes to die. Cf. “IQ Shredders”, Isegoria, July 24, 2014. Available at: <https://archive.ph/GBtPH>. Also see <https://spandrell.com/2013/03/26/lee-kuan-yew-drains-your-brains-for-short-term-gain/>.

[17](#) For example, grip strength (which is correlated with IQ) has declined strikingly in the past generation. Cf. Christopher Ingraham, “Today’s men are nowhere near as strong as their dads were, researchers say”, *The Washington Post*, August 15, 2016. Available at: <https://archive.ph/BvBY0>. Simple reaction times have also declined—see Michael A. Woodley, Jan te Nihenjuis and Raegan Murphy, “Were the Victorians cleverer than us? The decline in general intelligence estimated from a meta-analysis of the slowing of simple reaction time”, *Intelligence* 41, no. 6, (December 2013): pp. 843–850. Available at: <https://archive.ph/sWBnD>. Reaction times are such a reliable proxy for intelligence that eminent intelligence researchers have suggested them as alternatives to IQ tests.

[18](#) See ch. 1, “The Decline of Intelligence” in Dutton, Woodley of Menie, *At Our Wits’ End: Why We’re Becoming Less Intelligent and What it Means for the Future* (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2018).

[19](#) Cf. the very first work of history, Herodotus’ *Histories*, which ends with the idea that *soft lands make for soft men*.

[20](#) Humboldt seminar on November 21, 1990.

TWENTY-FOUR

PHYSIOGNOMY

When you throw away liberal ideology, the world becomes a much less mysterious place. As a liberal, you're forced to conclude that we evolved to do many things for no good reason—this is mysterious indeed. One of those things we evolved to do is to judge people by how they look.¹

This is what's called *physiognomy*, the idea that appearance and behaviour are both caused by the same things. Liberalism has told you for centuries that this is mean and wrong, that “you can't judge a book by its cover”. But if you understand what a stereotype is, you understand that *by definition it's usually correct*.² But aren't stereotypes sometimes wrong? Let's look at an example. Take a stereotype that liberals like using—the fat white trash guy.

“White trash” here just means poor and white. Why are poor people often also fat? The liberal will tell you he's fat *because* he's poor. That's just wrong. The real explanation is that what makes him fat also makes him poor.

Poverty isn't something that just happens to people at random like getting struck by lightning. It can be predicted by several factors: low intelligence, low conscientiousness, high extraversion, and low neuroticism (Nettle, 2007; Jensen, 1998; Kanazawa, 2014).³ People who are less intelligent can't delay gratification,⁴ so can't help stuffing their face. People who are extraverted enjoy the “good things in life” more, like food (Wimmelmann et al., 2018)—the stereotype of the jolly fat man is based in solid science. People who are neurotic tend to be thinner, and the reverse is true (Wimmelmann et al., 2018)—less neurotic people tend to be fatter. Jews, who are higher than average in neuroticism, are also thinner on average (Gilman, 2016), and have higher incomes⁵—this is an ethnic stereotype with a basis in biology. So, we should expect people who are poor to also be fat, and we

should expect people who are fat to also be poor, because being stupid, impulsive, outgoing, and too relaxed tends to lead to both.

As mentioned already, we're evolved to judge people by appearances because appearances tell us things about them. Science confirms this too. People mostly agree in their judgements of others' personalities by their appearance, and their judgements are generally accurate (Highfield et al., 2009). When students had to judge the Big Five personality traits in others, they could detect most of these traits by appearance alone (Passini & Warren, 1966).

Let's take another stereotype—the aggressive, selfish, oversexed muscle man. The main factor that makes someone a muscle-bound mesomorph (V-shaped body) is high testosterone, and high-T men tend to be low in impulse control (Nieschlag & Behre, 2013, p. 323) and low in altruism (Mazur & Booth, 1998). So, we can predict that a well-built man will tend to be both aggressive and selfish for the same reason.

Now, before you read on, close your eyes and picture our muscle man. Are you back? OK, now what did he look like? What colour was his hair and skin? Probably both on the darker side. This is confirmed experimentally, because high testosterone levels are associated with high levels of melanin, meaning darker skin and hair (Thornhill & Gangestad, 2008). This is so primeval that it's the case even for animals—among animal sub-species a darker pigmentation usually means more aggression and sexual activity (Rushton and Templer, 2012). Now picture your muscle man's hair a bit more clearly. Does he have a robust hairline? He may very well not have any at all, because hair loss is associated with higher levels of testosterone (Batrinos, 2014). Does he seem like a nice guy? Probably not, because experiments have shown that testosterone supplements make men less trusting and more concerned about being cuckolded, so he's more likely to be jealous and controlling (Bird et al., 2016). Everything we know about testosterone tends to confirm our stereotype of this guy.

Let's take another stereotype, the muscle man's female counterpart: the overbearing tramp. We even have a name for this woman—a Jezebel. From two conference presentations by psychologist Nancy Hirshberg:

In these studies, the 144 subjects were female students at the University of Illinois. Large breast size was found to be significantly positively correlated with being “undersocialized” (that is, antisocial), undependable, impulsive, “psychologically minded” (that is introspective), flexible and adventurous. So, to some extent, the larger a woman’s breasts are the lower in Conscientiousness she is, the higher in Extraversion she is and the less Agreeable she is.⁶

This explains why some men are “breast men” but not all. It would make sense that *all* men would want pronounced secondary sex characteristics (large breasts) in their mate, but as it turns out the Jezebel has personality traits that make her more likely to cuck you, so hitching your wagon to her presents a risk that you won’t pass on your genes even if you think you have. A less curvy woman would be a safer bet because her personality is on average more loyal and less adventurous. We judge large-breasted women as tramps because we’re evolved to do so.

For our last stereotype, let’s examine the gay drama queen. Mutation is a natural part of reproduction—you’re not a carbon copy of your father; there’s some variation between his Y-chromosome and yours. But too much mutation (“high mutational load”) is evidence of poor genetic fitness, which is why we instinctively recoil from people who look weird.

Homosexuality is a counter-selective (evolutionarily disadvantageous) trait. It’s associated with many mutations, including mental instability (Blanchard, 2008). Homosexual men are also often low in testosterone (Lippa, 2005), as we might expect. They’re also high in neuroticism (Peixot & Nobre, 2016). So the stereotype of the gay drama queen—which is mostly just a very neurotic gay man—is born out by the scientific literature. He is on average less mentally stable—because he’s deficient in testosterone, he’s more anxious and depressed, and has greater mood swings (Berglund et al., 2011).

Positive stereotypes have a genetic basis too. Men and women are different, so they want different things in each other. Men want women with a low mutational load, which means an optimum waist to hip ratio (about 0.7), average sized but firm breasts, and a feminine face (Furnham & Swami, 2007). Women want men with a low mutational load, which means a man who’s tall, muscular, with a masculine face (wide face, muscular neck, square jaw, furrowed brow)

(Weinbauer et al., 2013, p.54).

This doesn't describe many liberal men, so why do women still find them attractive? At a different historical time, these men would have been genetic losers,² but liberality is a status signal and women select for status, which is why women prefer slightly older men since age is a proxy for status (Buss, 1989). What's more, liberalism is what biologists call an *ornament*, like a peacock's tail. The peacock's tail is useless, even a handicap, and that's the point. Having the tail signals that you're so fit that you can thrive in spite of it, so fit that instead of investing genetic resources in staying alive you can invest them in some useless bullshit—the tail is something you can “afford”. So it is with counter-selective traits like charity to the out-group, importing refugees, etc. These ornaments come to be associated with genetic fitness, which is why men with more benign ornaments like beards (which require maintenance) and tattoos (which suggest pain tolerance) appeal to women.

Our bodies advertise mental qualities by their physical qualities—this is what stereotypes are all about. We have a strange dualistic idea, inherited partly from philosophy, partly from theology, that the body and mind are distinct things. But evolution applies from the neck up too—approximately 84% of our genes relate to the brain (Woodley of Menie et al., 2017), so there are many correlations between our mental and physical qualities.

Facial structure is correlated with IQ (Kleisner et al., 2014). Researchers showed photos of 80 biology students to 160 viewers who rated their IQ. It was found that these viewers could accurately judge the intelligence of men's faces, but not so much in women. This is likely because men's quality as a mate is strongly bound up with being a provider, and income is correlated to IQ. So men signal their intelligence by their facial structure to gain a sexual advantage.

Facial structure is also correlated with sexual orientation (Kosinski and Wang, 2017). Similar to the above study, 35,326 facial images were entered into a database along with the sexual orientation of each person. It was found that AI could predict sexual orientation with 81% accuracy in men and 74% in women, with human accuracy somewhat lower.

Facial structure is also correlated with criminality (Wu and Zhang, 2016). The facial images of 1,856 people were considered, and AI could again predict criminality consistently. Interesting here is that “the variation among criminal faces is significantly greater than that of the non-criminal faces”, suggesting higher mutational load in criminals, as we would expect since genes play a large part in determining criminality. Anyone who has looked at the mugshots of Antifa has seen the grotesque variation displayed among these criminal types.⁸ Genetic diversity signals the collapse of natural selection due to relaxed selection pressures since the Industrial Revolution (Woodley of Menie et al., 2017), before which these genetic misfits would simply have died.

On a related note, beauty is correlated with IQ (Kanazawa, 2011). Facial symmetry signals intelligence, again due to low mutational load—on average, attractive people are more intelligent. Beauty is also correlated with agreeableness (Dunkel et al., 2016). *General Factor Personality* (basically the combination of all the desirable versions of the Big Five traits) positively correlates with attractiveness. Beauty is also correlated with religiousness (Peterson & Palmer, 2017; Berggren et al., 2017). Both Republican voters and politicians are rated more attractive than Democrat voters and politicians respectively.

So, there’s no question that you *can* accurately judge people by how they look. But *should* you?

The only objection that’s remotely plausible is that you can judge groups as groups but you can’t judge individuals as members of groups. But even this is stupid when you think about it for two seconds—of course you can, because *this is the whole point of pattern recognition*. Most men can be stronger than most women without every man being stronger than every woman. If you want to see how insane the results of considering men and women equally strong are, look at how transgender “women” (mutilated men) dominate real women in sports.⁹

What about the fact that these correlations aren’t perfect? Correlations don’t need to be perfect to call for action. In fact, it’s rare for correlations in psychology to be much above 0.3, but this is often enough to change legal policy. If so, it’s enough to judge people by

their appearance too. And most of the time we're not even considering a single trait, we're considering a cluster of traits, and when they all point to the same conclusion, we have a strong correlation. If someone is fat *and* ugly *and* has a nose piercing *and* has bizarrely coloured hair, we can infer with great reliability that they're also poor and not very pleasant.

We should address why physiognomy is an illiberal concept beyond it just being valid—liberals hate it for very good reason. As we discussed in ch. 10, the liberal hates anything fixed and unchangeable, and your genes are some of the most fixed and unchangeable things around. The best coping mechanism the liberal can come up with is to say *your genes don't define you*. But they do, and this is exactly why physiognomy works—to reject physiognomy is just to reject biology. Physiognomy is as old as the hills. In folktales, an ugly person is always a bad person. In Greece, being ugly was as good as a refutation. Classical liberals in the 19th century may have accepted physiognomy early on, but as liberal ideology became more consistent it was dropped like a hot potato.

Physiognomy has been retconned as pseudo-science but is in fact deeply evolved and useful. As with other evolved behaviours, it points us toward something real in the world, which is to say, it points us away from liberalism, which can't even stop you from being fat, much less form the basis of a real society. We can suppress our instinctual revulsion toward the ugly, we can ignore the data of our senses, but ignoring the world doesn't change it—reality has an illiberal bias. So, when Oscar Wilde says “it is only shallow people who do not judge by appearances,”^{[10](#)} we can't help but agree with him.

SUMMARY

If you understand what a stereotype is, you understand that it's usually right, by definition.

What causes bodily deformities also causes mental deformities.

Stereotypes are just pattern recognition.

ENDNOTES

1 This chapter is indebted to Edward Dutton's *How to Judge People by What They Look Like* (Thomas Edward Press, 2018), which provides a wealth of empirical support for physiognomy. Since this chapter is heavy on citations, a bibliography will be provided in a special appendix for all the studies.

2 We will revisit this in ch. 29 on *hos epi to polu*.

3 We will encounter the Big Five personality traits over and over throughout this chapter: *openness*, *conscientiousness*, *extraversion*, *agreeableness*, and *neuroticism*.

4 A famous study called the *Stanford Marshmallow Experiment* tested children for impulse control. Children were offered one treat now or two treats 15 minutes from now. The children who delayed gratification had better outcomes later in life, including lower BMI (body-mass index).

5 "Jewish Americans in 2020, 11: Economics and well-being among US Jews", *Pew Research Center*, May 11, 2021. Available at: <https://archive.ph/ZIPb7>.

6 Dutton, *How to Judge People*, pp. 27–28.

7 Even today, they still are genetic losers because liberalism depresses fertility. Cf. Joshua A. Krisch, "If Democrats Want To Win, They Best Start Having Babies", *Fatherly*, October 25, 2017. Available at: <https://archive.ph/ePRC6>.

8 Since the relationship between genetic deterioration and the far left is so obvious, Oregon Democrat lawmakers pushed through a bill banning the release of mugshots starting on January 1, 2022. Cf. Andy Ngô (@MrAndyNgo), *Twitter*, January 3, 2022. Available at:

<https://archive.ph/bYQch>.

9 For this reason, swimming's world governing body, Fina, very sensibly banned mutilated men from female competitions. Cf. Sean Ingle, "Transgender women swimmers barred from female competitions by Fina", *The Guardian*, June 19, 2022. Available at: <https://archive.ph/rgiXY>.

10 Oscar Wilde, *The Picture of Dorian Gray* (1890).

TWENTY-FIVE

NATIONALISM VS. GLOBALISM

The stupidity of people on the left who believe that you can fight capitalism in the name of ‘progress’ is matched by the stupidity of people on the right who want to defend both ‘traditional values’ and the market that undermines them.¹

Part II of this book has introduced you to a number of illiberal concepts. But it’s worth taking a step back and asking *why* concepts matter, and the answer is that they matter because our concepts colour our world. For example, English doesn’t have gendered words, but many languages do. For a German a bridge is something feminine and so he’s likely to say it’s beautiful or elegant, whereas for a Spaniard a bridge is something masculine and so he’ll probably say it’s strong or sturdy—our categories shape our thought.²

So, when our categories are retarded, they retard our thought, and this is exactly what the left-right political spectrum does. Think of someone who’s *right-wing*. Who came to mind? It might have been a libertarian; it might have been a reactionary; it might have been a fascist. But these people have very little in common—when a single category covers Ron Paul, Louis XIV, and Mussolini, that category does not carve reality at the joints. If our concepts don’t carve up the world in ways that make sense, we’re not going to be able to make sense of the world. Most people can’t make heads or tails of politics, and the left-right distinction is a big part of why. But what’s the alternative?

In 2017, journalist David Goodhart wrote a book called *The Road to Somewhere*, where he tried to figure out how Brexit had happened, since he had voted against it. Unlike most journalism, the book was objective and balanced, and in it, Goodhart notes two basic kinds of people: the *somewheres*, and the *anywheres*:

The old distinctions of class and economic interest have not disappeared but are increasingly over-laid by a larger and looser one—between the people who see the world from Anywhere and the people who see it from Somewhere.

Anywheres dominate our culture and society. They tend to do well at school—Vernon Bogdanor calls them the “exam-passing classes”—then usually move from home to a residential university in their late teens and on to a career in the professions that might take them to London or even abroad for a year or two. Such people have portable “achieved” identities, based on educational and career success which makes them generally comfortable and confident with new places and people.

Somewheres are more rooted and usually have “ascribed” identities—Scottish farmer, working class Geordie, Cornish housewife—based on group belonging and particular places, which is why they often find rapid change more unsettling. One core group of Somewheres have been called the “left behind”—mainly older white working class men with little education. They have lost economically with the decline of well-paid jobs for people without qualifications and culturally, too, with the disappearance of a distinct working-class culture and the marginalisation of their views in the public conversation.³

What Goodhart has identified as *anywheres vs. somewheres* has come to be known as *globalism vs. nationalism*. The globalist-nationalist distinction cuts across left vs. right, and makes politics much clearer. The people who voted for Trump and Brexit had voted both for the left and the right. Why? Because *left* and *right* are not coherent things. Breaking society down along *equality* (left) vs. *hierarchy* (right) makes only slightly more sense than breaking it down according to shoe size. Brexit voters wanted their fair share of what their forefathers built for them, but they were supposedly right-wing; those who voted against Brexit wanted to enshrine the values of the elite, but they were supposedly left-wing. Confused? You should be.

The left-right distinction was born out of the French Revolution. Those who supported the power of the king sat to the right of the president of the National Assembly, and those who opposed it sat to the left. At the time, “left vs. right” basically meant *liberal* vs. *conservative*—these are social positions. That’s still what it means today, but now *left* also means “socialist” and *right* means “capitalist”—these are economic positions. Libertarians describe themselves as “socially liberal but fiscally conservative”, which sounds like trying to have it both ways. But around the French Revolution *left* meant “capitalist” and *right* meant “anti-capitalist”, so to be a libertarian back then was just to be a consistent leftist and to be a worker on strike was just to be a consistent rightist. Are you having trouble keeping all this straight? You’re not alone. *Left* and *right* mean different things at different times—imagine if a triangle meant “a

shape with three sides” or “a shape with four sides” depending on whether it’s the 90s or the 2000s. Far better to use categories that don’t depend on what day of the week it is. *Globalist-nationalist* is one of those.

Nationalism is ancient, the default state of human life. This is not the academic consensus, but the idea that nationalism was born in the 19th century is so insane that only an academic could hold it. For the Greek, the Roman, the Germanic, the Celt, to pass beyond his country was to leave his folk, his laws, and his ancestral gods. When the Roman wanted to be patriotic, he said *pro aris et focis*—“for altars and hearths”, because if these were destroyed it meant that his immortal soul would not receive the offerings after death and so he would become a hungry ghost forever.⁴ For him, exile was a far worse punishment than death, because at least death didn’t bring on what amounts to damnation. If nationalism was born in the 19th century, this is only true in the sense that the “birth” of nationalism is rather a *rebirth* of something even stronger and more patriotic, and all the Marxist word games in the world don’t make it any less ancient.

Nations are ancient, but the modern nation-state was born with the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, and after that nation-states were sovereign. We discussed sovereignty in chapter 13, but sovereignty in a nutshell is the ability of a state to tell other states to fuck off; we decide what the law is, we decide how power is going to be delegated in our society and so forth. Since the Nuremberg trials in 1946 though, there has been a legal framework above and beyond whatever your king or your constitution says, and you have to abide by this framework or else the “international community” is going to come in there and start wrecking your shit. We call this framework the UN’s *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*. Globalism is obviously older than the UN,⁵ but this is where globalism was formalized, and nationalism has been fighting on the back foot ever since.

Left-right makes all history even since liberalism into a game of word jugglery that causes cognitive dissonance until you have a nervous breakdown. Fascists are economically left but socially right, except that they were futurists so also progressive, which is left. Early 20th century progressives were socially left, except they believed in

eugenics which is “literally Hitler”, so they were socially left and also far-right. America was a protectionist nation from about the period 1850–1950, so economically left, but didn’t even have an income tax until 1892, so far-right laissez-faire... socialists. Have you had enough?

Left-right is more trouble than help. Globalist-nationalist isn’t perfect, but far more useful. The somewheres vs. anywheres break down along natural lines, which can often be predicted genetically.⁶ But the strongest globalist-nationalist divide is between city and country. Rural man’s love of place makes him a born nationalist. His home is for him very much alive; he cleaves to it like a wife—it’s the centre of his religious life.⁷ So it is that in Germanic languages *hof* means *house*, *farm*, and *sanctuary*. This love of place is part of rural man’s essentially pragmatic, rooted, and anti-theoretical worldview. His opposite is the rootless cosmopolitan bugman with no tie to kith or kin—a born globalist.

We started part II of this book by talking about universalism vs. particularism, and this maps neatly on to globalist vs. nationalist. The globalist is just a kind of universalist, someone who is pro-entropy: he wants to dissolve boundaries and increase disorder. We also talked about the proposition nation, and the concept of *gesellschaft* (where social bonds are voluntary and revokable) vs. *gemeinschaft* (where social bonds are permanent and inherited). This, too, maps on to globalist vs. nationalist—think of the “achieved” vs. “ascribed” identities of Goodhart we mentioned earlier.

The ultimate reason why globalist-nationalist is superior to left-right is that it makes the battle lines absolutely clear. Benjamin Disraeli once said “my politics can be described in one word and that word is England.” Here is a nationalist, not just because he loves his country, but because he dissolves any civic nationalist “community of values” nonsense. People are not united around ideas or beliefs, but around blood and soil. Anyone who doesn’t understand that—whatever he may think about tax rates or equality—is on the wrong side.

SUMMARY

Left and right depend on time—globalist and nationalist don't.

Nationalism is the view from somewhere; globalism is the view from nowhere.

Globalism and universalism are both forms of entropy.

ENDNOTES

1 Alain de Benoist, *Le Moment Populiste – Droite/Gauche C'est Fini!* (PG DE ROUX, 2017).

2 Arturs Semenuks et al, “Effects of Grammatical Gender on Object Description”, *Cognitive Science*, (2017). Available at: <https://archive.ph/gbYxG>.

3 David Goodhart, *The Road to Somewhere: The Populist Revolt and the Future of Politics*, ch. 1, “The Great Divide” (Hurst Publishers, 2017).

4 Numa Denis Fustel de Coulanges, *The Ancient City* (Perth: Imperium Press, 2020).

5 Globalism can be seen in ancient imperialism, such as the Roman Empire, Christendom, the Islamic Caliphate, and even the palace economies of the late Bronze Age. But modern globalism is something a bit different.

6 G. J. Lewis, C. Kandler and R. Riemann, “Distinct heritable influences underpin in-group love and out-group derogation”, *Social Psychological and Personality Science* 5, no. 4, (2014): pp. 407-413. Available at: <https://archive.ph/7Grbp>.

7 For more on this topic, see Claude Lecouteux, *The Tradition of Household Spirits: Ancestral Lore and Practices* (Vermont: Inner Traditions, 2014).

PART III:
THE BIG IDEAS

TWENTY-SIX

HOMER:

OIKOPHILIA, OR LOVE OF THE FAMILIAR

In 2019, the scientific journal *Nature* published a shocking article. It may not have seemed shocking at the time, but its implications were far-reaching and might well have put our finger on the core problem of modernity. The article was called *Ideological differences in the expanse of the moral circle*,¹ and it told us something we already know from our discussion in chapter 11: that liberals are universalist. Whereas the conservative's *moral circle* (what he cares most about) centres on family, the liberal's moral circle falls somewhere between “all living things in the universe including plants and trees” and “all natural things in the universe including inert entities such as rocks”.² The liberal cares more about rocks and trees than his own mother.

This is because he's more mentally ill than his conservative counterpart.³ But the liberal isn't *strictly* universalist, just much more so. If he were strictly universalist, he would love his mother *just as much* as a pine cone, but he doesn't—he actively dislikes her. And he dislikes her not just because she forced him to eat his Brussel sprouts or go to church on Sundays. He dislikes her because of a deep psychopathology—because he hates what's familiar.

We have a name for this pathology: *oikophobia*, from Greek *oikos* (“home”) + *phobia*. Because oikophobia was simply considered “madness” from the beginning of time, no specific word for it existed until the 21st century, when Roger Scruton coined it. He explains:

No adequate word exists for this attitude, though its symptoms are instantly recognised: namely, the disposition, in any conflict, to side with “them” against “us”, and the felt need to denigrate the customs, culture and institutions that are identifiably “ours”. Being the opposite of xenophobia I propose to call this state of mind oikophobia, by which I mean (stretching the Greek a little) the repudiation of inheritance and home. Oikophobia is a stage through which the adolescent mind normally passes. But it is a stage in which some people—intellectuals especially—tend to become arrested. As George Orwell pointed out, intellectuals on the Left are especially prone to it, and this has often made them willing agents of foreign powers.⁴

The opposite of oikophobia (“hatred of the familiar”) is *oikophilia*, love of the familiar. Since the time that humans were apes living in trees, we have just considered this “being normal”—we’re evolved to feel this way.⁵ Naturally, it’s there at the dawn of culture too. Go back as far as you can in the Western Canon, right to the very beginning, to Homer, and you will find oikophilia.

In Homer’s *Odyssey*, Odysseus (Latinized as “Ulysses”) has spent ten years at war, only for the Greeks to finally win by his famous Trojan Horse trick. But this isn’t the end of the story—not nearly. On the way back from Troy, he meets with every obstacle imaginable, both good and bad, trying to steer him off course. His protector god Athena begs Zeus to let him come home:

But I am grieved
For sage Ulysses, that most wretched man,
So long detained, repining, and afar
From those he loves, upon a distant isle
Girt by the waters of the central deep—
A forest isle, where dwells a deity
The daughter of wise Atlas, him who knows
The ocean to its utmost depths, and holds
Upright the lofty columns which divide
The earth from heaven. The daughter there detains
The unhappy chieftain, and with flattering words
Would win him to forget his Ithaca.
Meanwhile, impatient to behold the smokes
That rise from hearths in his own land, he pines
And willingly would die. Is not thy heart,
Olympius, touched by this? And did he not
Pay grateful sacrifice to thee beside
The Argive fleet in the broad realm of Troy?⁶

People in the Middle Ages didn’t have the text of the *Odyssey* handy; they mostly knew it by rumour as the story of a man who goes on adventures, so the word *odyssey* to us just means a long series of adventures. This makes it seem like Odysseus is out there jerking off and having a ball, when nothing could be further from the truth. Coulanges, in his monumental work *The Ancient City*, tells us otherwise:

It will perhaps appear strange to find love of home counted among the virtues; but it was so counted among the ancients. This sentiment had a deep and powerful hold upon their minds. Anchises, when he sees Troy in flames, is still unwilling to leave his

old home. Ulysses, when countless treasures, and immortality itself, are offered him, wishes only again to see the flame of his own hearth-fire. Let us come down to Cicero's time; it is no longer a poet, but a statesman, who speaks: "Here is my religion, here is my race, here are the traces of my forefathers. I cannot express the charm which I find here, and which penetrates my heart and my senses."⁷

Odysseus wants nothing to do with adventure. Well into middle age, he hasn't seen his wife since she was a young woman. He's been to hell and back (literally). Defied gods. Had sex. Lost all his men. Barely escaped an opioid epidemic. Missed his son's whole life. Had more sex. He's even turned down immortality. All he wants is to get back to his home, see his hearth-fire, sacrifice a few hecatombs of oxen to the ancestors, and get on with his life.

The tale goes on. He finally gets home! And what does he find? What greets him on his triumphant return? A mob of suitors. A gaggle of ungrateful intruders glutting themselves on his food and trying to fuck his wife.

Well.

Is there any story that better describes the modern West, 2,700 years later? Such is the power of the Western Canon. Read the *Odyssey* and pay very close attention to what Odysseus does next.

Odysseus' healthy love of the familiar is less and less common every day—today, oikophobia is the rule. The more time goes on, the more it seems that our whole problem in the West can be boiled down to oikophobia in its various forms.

The logic of liberalism is hatred of the social centre—liberalism is essentially a novelty-seeking formula that forever replaces the centre with the margin. The king is the centre of society. But because we hate the centre, we have to replace him with something slightly more marginal—the aristocracy becomes the new centre. But because we hate the centre, we have to replace the aristocracy with something slightly more marginal—the bourgeoisie becomes the new centre. This process of hollowing out the centre continues until foreigners, minorities, and deviants are at the centre, as in wokeness. Eventually even that is too familiar, and we have to replace the human altogether—we have arrived at transhumanism. Liberalism is a fundamentally entropic force, hence its obsession with change and negative values

(freedom, openness, tolerance, inclusion, diversity, etc.) It breaks down borders, whether political or conceptual.⁸ The key here is that classical liberalism is just oikophobia in its early stages—the continuum from classical liberalism to wokeness and transhumanism is clear.

This love of the margin and hatred of the centre is exactly what was found in the *Nature* study we discussed earlier. In a ghoulish inversion of the Bedouin proverb,⁹ the liberal says “my cousin before my brother, the stranger before my cousin, the animal before the stranger, and the lifeless waves before the animal.” But even those of us who are not mentally ill sometimes surrender to oikophobia. Most of us have gone on an intellectual journey—you wouldn’t be holding this book otherwise. But many people who have awakened to the problems with liberalism look back on their old selves—and those who are where they once were—with contempt. This is just another form of oikophobia, evidence of not having discarded liberalism completely. If you can no longer understand—even *love*—what you once were, then you are an oikophobe, which is just to say, a liberal. The wise man not only has understood the truth, but can retrace his path to it.

There’s a tragedy at the heart of oikophobia: when it becomes our tradition, as liberalism has, we get caught in a liar’s paradox, a kind of double bind. In our culture, rebellion and an aversion to the Lindy rule¹⁰ are held up as good and moral. Our tradition is rebellion: you’re expected to say “fuck you Dad”, like your Dad did before you. If you rebel, you’re following our tradition—you’re a liberal. But if you try to reject oikophobia, if you try to restore real traditions, you’re the ultimate challenge to the system; Paul Joseph Watson captured this when he said “conservatism is the new punk rock”.¹¹ But by challenging the system, you’re saying “fuck you Dad”—you’re a liberal. Oikophobia makes both tradition *and* revolution incoherent; it contaminates our categories to where it becomes logically impossible to affirm or reject either. This is the paradox of our time, and the fruit of oikophobia.

The desire to humble the great, the slave revolt that wants to flatten out human difference, is the ultimate expression of oikophobia—it

wants to invert the centre and margin. This is an ancient problem. In the war between the Roman patricians and the plebeians, the patricians spoke in the name of sacred custom (love of the familiar), but the plebeians spoke in the name of the “law of nature” (oikophobia).¹² The patricians loved what was particular to them; the plebeians loved what was particular to no one, the ancient equivalent of “human rights”. The marginal plebeian set himself at the centre, and expected the high priest to kiss his foot. 2,500 years later, and the centre is again kissing the foot of the margin, but the names have changed to *Pope* and *refugee*.¹³ The more things change, the more they stay the same.

Love of the outsider, “revenge of the nerd”, trait openness, liberalism, the desire to replace the centre with the margin: all are forms of oikophobia. Love of the familiar is health; love of the foreign is sickness. The core problem of modernity is normalizing the sickness and “otherizing” health. It can seem odd that the *radical* right would embrace love of the familiar—what could be less radical and more conventional? But in an age where our categories are contaminated by paradox, in an age where our tradition just is revolution, affirming conventionality is the most revolutionary act imaginable.

Love of the familiar is against something else sometimes called “right-wing”—Faustianism. You’ll hear a lot that sounds vaguely “Faustian” in the following pages, but the Faustian is not what makes Europeans great. What makes Europeans great is the dynamic between their revolutionary spirit and their inherent traditionalism—the two are not opposites but complements, and one without the other is freakish and defective. The Faustian is not dynamism, but the revolutionary spirit grotesquely unconstrained by any tradition at all—it’s transgressing boundaries for the sake of transgressing boundaries. Hence Faust is not a hero but a devil-worshipper that God has to bail out, and hence his Greek counterpart Prometheus is doomed to have his guts ripped out day after day forever. These are not heroic, but pitiful characters. If you want a heroic character, look no further than Odysseus.

The radical right is not just about the big things, big ideas. It’s just as much about the small things—the things that live in the woods near

your house, the wee folk who live behind the fireplace, or above the doorway. We're reviving our people, but we're also reviving the love of home, the love of the small, the close, and the familiar. Any movement that can't accommodate that, any movement that can't carve out a space that can be *lived in* by people who "just wanna grill", is finished even before it's started. If you could boil our civilizational problems down to one thing, it would probably be oikophobia. Everyone with healthy instincts is at heart a localist who loves their native soil, and every localist belongs to the radical right, whether they've realized it yet or not.

SUMMARY

Hatred of the familiar is the deepest modern pathology.

When our tradition becomes revolution, you can neither affirm nor reject tradition.

Faustianism is not dynamism, but runaway transgression.

ENDNOTES

- [1](#) Adam Waytz et al, “Ideological differences in the expanse of the moral circle”, *Nature Communications* 10, (2019). Available at: <https://archive.ph/RolLK>.
- [2](#) Fig. 5, op. cit.
- [3](#) Emil O. W. Kirkegaard, “Mental Illness and the Left”, *Mankind Quarterly* 60, no. 4, (May 2020). Available at: <https://archive.ph/ggJ1V>.
- [4](#) Scruton, *England and the Need for Nations*, (Civitas, 2004), p. 36.
- [5](#) “From an evolutionary perspective, it makes sense that familiarity breeds liking. Generally speaking, things that are familiar are likely to be safer than things that are not. If something is familiar, we have clearly survived exposure to it, and our brain, recognizing this, steers us towards it.” See Raj Raghunathan, “Familiarity Breeds Enjoyment”, *Psychology Today*, January 17, 2012. Available at: <https://archive.ph/0l2Ds>.
- [6](#) *Odyssey*, I, 68.
- [7](#) Coulanges, *The Ancient City*, p. 78.
- [8](#) We will return to this in ch. 28 on differential ontology.
- [9](#) The Bedouins have a saying: “I against my brothers. I and my brothers against my cousins. I and my brothers and my cousins against the world.”
- [10](#) Ch. 7.
- [11](#) Paul Joseph Watson, “Conservatism is the NEW Counter-Culture”, *YouTube*. Available at: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=avb8cwOgVQ8>.
- [12](#) The tension between tradition and natural law will become clear in ch. 36.
- [13](#) Hardeep Matharu, “Pope Francis washes and kisses feet of Muslim, Hindu and Christian refugees”, *Independent*, March 25, 2016. Available at: <https://archive.ph/K9NBI>.

TWENTY-SEVEN

JOB:

HUMILITY BEFORE THE DIVINE

If the flowering tree crown wanted to analytically examine its root, it would pay for it with its life.¹

In 399 BC, Socrates was accused of impiety by the Athenian state for going around and questioning important people. He went before a jury of his peers and basically told them to eat shit,² and was promptly executed. On the modern account, Socrates is painted as the patron saint of philosophy and the Greeks are painted as corrupt retards who hate reason and just want to believe nonsense. But is this really a serious view?

A very serious philosopher, the German G. W. F. Hegel, didn't think so—he thought that the Greeks were right to put Socrates to death. Hegel also has a pithy quote (unusual for him), that “the owl of Minerva flies at dusk”. Minerva is the goddess of wisdom, and what he means is that wisdom comes late. Not just that hindsight is 20/20, but that when a society gets a hard-on for reason, you can be sure that it's near the end of its life.³ The reason why, in a nutshell, is that some things are and should be beyond questioning.

To understand why that is, we can turn to another German thinker whom we met in chapter 1 on the *state of exception*. Carl Schmitt tells us that the most basic question of sovereignty is *quis interpretabitur*—who interprets? The sovereign is the one who gets to interpret the law. It's one thing to ask why the law is what it is as an idle curiosity; it's quite another to seriously question its validity. But when Socrates goes around asking what justice is and why we should obey the gods, he's not just doing it for fun, he's putting himself in a position to interpret. He's setting himself up in a position to judge the gods, which means a position of sovereignty over them. In deciding for himself what's

lawful, Socrates becomes the lawgiver. Who interprets? He does. What's worse, he empowers everyone else to decide the law for themselves too.

This problem is made especially clear in the biblical book of Job. In the story, God and Satan enter into a kind of wager over the rich and pious man Job, where Satan bets that Job will curse God if he loses everything, and God bets that he won't. God lets Satan strike down Job's family and wealth, and then his very body with painful boils and ulcers. Finally, Job curses the day he was born and questions God's justice, saying that he was innocent. The response from God is stark:

Then the Lord answered Job out of the whirlwind, and said, who is this that darkeneth counsel by words without knowledge? Gird up now thy loins like a man; for I will demand of thee, and answer thou me. Where wast thou when I laid the foundations of the earth? declare, if thou hast understanding. [...] Shall he that contendeth with the Almighty instruct him? He that reproveth God, let him answer it.⁴

We might have expected God to produce some sort of an overarching principle of justice that his actions fit into, or even just *some* reason, or at the very least to explain the wager with Satan. But God doesn't do any of that. God tells Job to sit down and stop asking questions. We're told to obey God not because what he does is intelligible or right, but because *where were you when I laid the foundation of the world?* This may seem harsh, but when we scratch a bit below the surface, we can see that this is a much deeper answer than some ratiocinative circlejerking over justice could ever be.

Reducing God's will to an abstract principle makes God's will redundant. Morality demands action, which means that at its most basic, morality is a series of commands—and this series has to start from a *will* that is a brute fact. And by *brute fact* we mean *arbitrary*. This is the old Euthyphro dilemma: *do the gods love it because it's good, or is it good because the gods love it?* In other words, either God commands an action because it's right, or the action is right because God commands it.

Neither of these are very satisfying. In one case, God's commands are arbitrary; in the other case, God has no choice in the matter. The obvious move here is to try and say that God's will and goodness are the same thing, that it's a false dilemma. But this doesn't make sense.

Either there are some things God can't will or not. If there are, God is stripped of agency and doesn't have will at all but is essentially a kind of NPC that just spits out commands automatically; if there aren't, his will is again arbitrary. This just brings us back to the Euthyphro dilemma—everyone affirms one side of it or the other. If you're really confused, you'll think that you've resolved it. The author of the book of Job affirms one side—*it's good because God wills it*. To say “God is telling Job to trust him” is saying “don't worry, God will make it alright in the end,” which is saying that God will be justified by the consequences.

But justifying divinity is retarded. God is the ground of all justification; to ask for a justification of him is to dare to judge him—to judge the king is to put yourself in his place. Could anything be more arrogant, more *impious*? Whoever wrote this book knew what he was doing. All the autism over whether God is the necessary existent, all the babble about whether the divinity lives up to this or that moral evaluation, even its own—all this falls away in the face of the naked, terrible, awful majesty of *The Deep*, and if you have ever looked upon that, even a shadow of a shadow of that, you know what I'm talking about. The author of Job knew what I'm talking about. God in the book of Job looks the Euthyphro dilemma square in the face and cuts through it with a simple question: who the hell are *you* to judge *me*? No answer is possible; the very demand for a reason is an offense, that is all ye know, and that is all ye need to know. If you deem God worthy of worship because he is the most just, or the most glorious, or the ground of reason, then your god *is* justice, or glory, or reason, or whatever other thing you want to subordinate God to.

The utter mystery of the divine is by no means confined to Abrahamic religions like Judaism and Christianity. Chaos is the arch-principle of pagan creation myths like those of the Greeks and Norse, as well as non-Europeans like the Egyptians and Chinese. The ultimate is a mystery—that's the way it is, and that's the way it ought to be. It's under no obligation to justify itself to us, to make sense to us, or at the end of the day, to be rational at all. In fact, if you understand what it is for chain of reasoning to come to rest in an axiom, what it is for a series of commands to terminate in a will, you understand that

reason must at some point break down into something that's just given as a brute fact—in other words, in something arbitrary. When you're a child you're told to trust and obey your parents. When you get older, you're told to question them. Part of attaining wisdom, though, is having some *humility*, especially before the divine, and accepting that you're not meant to understand some things.

Our forefathers knew that there are limits to inquiry. They understood that for a social order to hold, its centre must be dark, mysterious, forbidding, unapproachable, and inscrutable, otherwise the acid of universal reason will dissolve it. The Enlightenment introduced this acid, and set man up as the abstract individual inquiring into everything with no limit. The individual has become his own highest authority, the sovereign; he decides for himself what is legitimate, and so authority is impossible, because every man is “the father of himself, and his own son”, as Baudelaire put it.

So it was with the Greeks, at least late in their history,⁵ and a few centuries after Socrates, they found themselves vassals of Rome—this is not a coincidence. We can now begin to understand that traditional wisdom might have known better than even the old philosopher, and that maybe he got what he deserved. We are told elsewhere in the Bible not to look upon the face of God, that “Thou canst not see my face: for there shall no man see me, and live.”⁶ Many other religions have said the same—perhaps a little humility is due.

SUMMARY

To judge the king is to put yourself on his throne.

Morality comes down to a will, and that will is necessarily arbitrary.

The ultimate is under no obligation to justify itself.

ENDNOTES

[1](#) Houston Stewart Chamberlain, *Aryan Worldview*.

[2](#) Plato, *Apology*.

[3](#) For a deep and systematic treatment of this idea, see Giambattista Vico's *The New Science*, one of the most important illiberal works ever written.

[4](#) Job 38:1–40:2.

[5](#) For an interesting account of the Greeks as something other than philosophers, see Eric R. Dodds' classic, *The Greeks and the Irrational* (University of California Press, 1973).

[6](#) Exodus 33:20.

TWENTY-EIGHT

HERACLITUS:

DIFFERENTIAL ONTOLOGY

But the concept of an “inside” doesn’t merely presuppose an “outside”—*it conjures one*. – Parallax Optics

This chapter will be a bit different from the rest in that it’s about metaphysics. Metaphysics is a discipline that normal and healthy people look sideways at for the same reason they look sideways at the three-year-old who asks why the dog is a dog and not something else. The question is retarded but it’s not immediately obvious why.

The basic question of metaphysics is similarly retarded, and was formulated by logician W. V. O. Quine using three simple words: *what is there?*¹ Not “what is there behind the door” or “what is there to be afraid of” or anything like that, but just “what is there”, as in, *what exists, really?* And the answer is obvious: there are lots of things. There are tables and chairs and cats and dogs and fear and justice and nations and duties and all kinds of things. But metaphysics isn’t about listing everything there is, it’s about what basic thing you need to account for everything that exists. Of course there are tables and people and justice. But what do all these have in common?

Well obviously, they’re made up of atoms and protons and electrons and quarks and so on—they’re made of *matter*. Even something complicated like a law or a constitution is made up of norms and propositions. These things depend on brains which are ultimately made of matter. Good, problem solved.

But what *is* matter? What can you say about it? Not much, it turns out, other than that it’s... material. So, it happens that the basic “stuff” of reality is something you can’t really say anything about. That’s a *bit* of a problem. Let’s try something else. Suppose that everything is just made up of *ideas*. We’re all good empiricists, right?

We like science, don't we? It turns out the simple idea of "only trust experience" spells trouble for "matter", whatever that is. When I eat pizza, the only thing I experience are pizza-like ideas: the stringy cheese, the tangy sauce, the crispy pepperoni, etc. There's no room for anything here like "matter"—that's just a shorthand for a constellation of pizza-like ideas that I can't get rid of, like a bad habit. I don't actually *need* matter to account for anything; it's something extra. I just need my mind and the ideas in my mind.

So... what? There's no outside world? Just my mind? That's even worse. Take as another possible answer to the question "what is there" something like *relations*. We all like science, and science is committed to materialism. But what counts as "matter" has changed a lot through time. It started out as something pretty concrete and "underfoot", like earth, air, fire, and water—the four classical elements. Then Newton said it was corpuscles, whatever the hell they are. Then it was the luminiferous ether (same question applies). Then it was matter-energy. Where does it stop? It obviously never will. It looks like everything that science has ever told us exists, turns out not to exist at all. But is there anything that *hasn't* changed? Sure there is: the mathematical structure of our understanding. We still use math and numbers to understand the world, just like Newton or Pythagoras. Could it be that what really exists is just the relations between things?

So, it turns out that the question "what is there" isn't at all simple. But it *is* completely autistic. Why should there be only *one* final, basic thing? And even if there is, even if there's one ground of all being,² we'll never be able to say anything about it because it won't have properties—after all, every property will be grounded in it, will ultimately just be an expression of matter (or ideas or whatever).

The question "what is there" is set up to fail. The way it's asked guarantees that the answer will be a single thing (it's not "what *are* there", it's "what *is* there"), and it guarantees that the answer will be empty and void of content. What a stupid question.

Maybe we could ask a better question. We could put it better by asking *what can we say about existence?* This doesn't commit us to monism,³ and it offers much richer answers. Instead of *metaphysics*,

let's call this “saying something about existence” business, *ontology*.⁴ One answer that has been given since the dawn of time—but also by modern philosophers—is that “to be is to be *other than*”. This is much more interesting than “there's matter”, but it requires a bit of unpacking. Alan Watts explains:

It is, for example, difficult to see a hand unless there is a contrasting background. Were there no background to the hand, the hand itself would vanish.⁵

This is not just a matter of *seeing* the hand against the background. This is an ontological principle—there quite literally *is no hand* unless there is something else that the hand is not. To have anything—a hand, a table, a cup of coffee—you have to have something different from it. If you're not sure, just try to think of an example of anything—a hand, a table, etc.—that doesn't differ from any other thing at all. You can't think of an example, because it's a contradiction.

It works for abstractions too. Think of something like greatness, or redness. How can you have colour at all with just red? Or greatness without smallness? What would it look like if there was just greatness? It would look like Lake Wobegone, where “all the children are above average”, or it would look like Lemmy Kilmister's ideal record, where “everything is louder than everything else.” These are of course jokes, but the monist, who rejects difference as essential to being, doesn't get the joke—he says it with a straight face. The idea that there is or could be only one thing at the end of the day, is nonsensical. This is because difference is fundamental to existence—this is the basic idea of *differential ontology*.

It's also an ancient idea, going back to the very beginning of Western thought. 2,500 years ago, the sage Heraclitus put forth the same idea, saying “all things come about through opposition, and everything flows like a river”.⁶

Heraclitus is a hard man to pin down. For one, none of his writing survives; we only know his thought by people quoting him later, so we only have fragments. He also clearly puts forward differential ontology, but he contradicts himself at every turn, saying things like “the path up and down are one and the same” [B 60].⁷ In one place he says “everything flows”, meaning “there is only change”, but also in

another place that “it is wise to agree that all things are one” [B 50]. How can *things* (in the plural) be one? How can everything be one, but there’s also change? Doesn’t change at least mean moving from one thing to another? Is he a monist? He says “all things are one”, but in the next breath he talks about difference as the ground of being. Is reality one or many? For Heraclitus, it seems to be both one *and* many:

God [the principle of being] is day and dusk, winter and summer, war and peace, satiety and famine (Laertius: “all the contraries, that is his meaning”); but he changes like olive oil which, when it is mixed with perfumes, gets its name from the scent of each. [B 67]

In every breath, we get contradictions. He uses an especially vivid metaphor of the Greek barley-drink to illustrate the idea that things are only one when they’re in motion:

Things which have this movement by nature are preserved and stay together because of it—if indeed, as Heraclitus says, the barley-drink separates if it is not moving. [B 125]

Think of something like a vinaigrette salad dressing. When you go to use it, you shake the bottle. It only becomes a vinaigrette when you shake it up, otherwise it’s just a heap of random stuff layered one on top of the other. A thing is only one when it’s moving and changing, the vinaigrette only has a unity as long as it participates in change, difference, and contradiction. Clearly for Heraclitus the contradiction is primary, and the oneness is something like a mere linguistic necessity. We need a name for “difference”, but this doesn’t make difference a kind of unity (obviously, by definition). But why does he talk like this? Why is he so obscure?

Heraclitus is doing something different and more interesting than any other Western metaphysician until the 20th century—he speaks in riddles. This is more significant than it seems. Philosophy, and metaphysics especially, tries to reduce everything to propositions,⁸ in fact to paraphrase Eric Gans, metaphysics is the idea that propositions exhaust the world. But the riddle explodes propositions, which are true-false statements. The riddle is *both* true and false, and *neither*—it totally contaminates and undermines truth value. It is and it isn’t.

The riddle is also dialectical, meaning it draws you into the conversation. Unlike the people who came just before and long after

him, Heraclitus doesn't just so much *tell* you something as involve you. By saying something contradictory he forces a response, and his metaphysics becomes something more like a dance than a description, and you have a part in it. He's the closest thing in the Western tradition to Zen, where the student asks the master a question and gets a stick over the head and "not enlightened" or "chop wood, carry water" in response. In his riddling and performative style, Heraclitus also hearkens back to archaic Indo-European approaches to the ultimate—you could think of the whole literature of Anglo-Saxon riddles, and the riddles in Norse myths like *Vafthruthnir* or Greek myths like *Oedipus*.

But Heraclitus' differential ontology doesn't shed monism altogether—he does say "it is wise to agree that all things are one" [B 50] after all. But then, he was a product of his time, a Greek world that was already old and had departed in many ways from the native Indo-European religious spirit.² Heraclitus' ontology, however imperfect, was a throwback to something truly archaic, something seen in all European mythologies, and even in others like the Chinese and Egyptian.¹⁰ But to see what that looked like we have to go back further.

The Greek poet Hesiod tells us that the world was born out of Chaos (emptiness) which then produced Earth (fullness), followed by Tartarus (coldness, pain, suffering) and then Eros (heat, pleasure, passion). The play of opposites goes on like this with Erebus and Night, Bright Air and Day, Heaven and mountains, etc. For the Greeks the world itself was born out of opposites. The earliest known Celtic creation myth is not well known, but displays all the hallmarks of differential ontology:

Long ago, this person said, there were two gods who were brothers, twins born together from the same womb of a great mother goddess of the sea. When these brothers grew up, they left the ocean behind and came to dwell among the people who lived near the sea.¹¹

Like in Hesiod, we have a sort of pre-dawn primordial chaos that produces differentiation, we have the divine twins as the first existent things born out of that chaos at the beginning of time, we have the crossing of the threshold that marks the beginning of an age. The

Norse creation myth similarly has pairs of opposites in the world of fire (Muspelheim) and the world of ice (Niflheim) and between them a gap (the literal meaning of Greek “Chaos”), the primordial void Ginnungagap. The interaction between these pairs of opposites creates everything in the world.

The idea that existence is connected to difference can even be found in Indo-European languages themselves. Our word “exist” comes from Latin *existere*, which literally means “to stand apart from”. Just to be a thing at all is to stand out from some other thing. Our notion of existence is also connected to flux and change. The word *being*, which in philosophy means static, unchanging existence, comes from a Proto-Indo-European root **b^húHt*, meaning “to grow; become; come into being”, and is cognate with Latin *fiō*, meaning “to become”. So our idea of being (constancy) has, at its root, becoming (change). When we talk about existence, at the root of all this is the notion of becoming, and ideas of changelessness come later. Likewise, difference is the kernel of our ancestral worldview—to be is just to be *separate from*.

Indo-European peoples took keeping things separate very seriously indeed. To just *touch* the boundary stone of a man’s property (much less move it) carried with it the penalty of burning to death. They were not playing:

He who shall have touched or displaced a bound shall be condemned by the gods; his house shall disappear; his race shall be extinguished; his land shall no longer produce fruits; hail, rust, and the fires of the dog-star shall destroy his harvests; the limbs of the guilty one shall become covered with ulcers, and shall waste away.¹²

Families were separate, gods were separate, cities were separate, peoples were separate—there was an impassable gulf between all these things, and the more primitive the Indo-European society, the more impassable it was. The resonances with nationalism are clear. Even the way that these peoples referred to themselves as a group (what we call an “endonym”) usually just meant “man”, suggesting that those outside the tribe were something less than men.

This leads us to another important idea under the surface of differential ontology, namely that life is struggle. Heraclitus has of course beat us to the punch:

War is father of all, king of all: some it has shown as gods, some as men; some it has made slaves, some free. [B 53]

Life as struggle is connected closely to life as change, what we call *process metaphysics*. Heraclitus tells us we can't step into the same river twice, because both we and the river are different each time we step into it. Parmenides who comes after him will totally reverse course and deny change, leading us down the path to where we can now take seriously a dumb question like "what is there" and conclude monism. Cratylus leans into Heraclitus' process metaphysics and says we can't even step into the river *once*, and like a true Chad he refutes the Virgin change-denier Parmenides by just moving his finger.¹³

So what does all this have to do with nationalism and right-wing thought? As it turns out, everything. Monism is the ultimate egalitarianism. Difference and its logical corollary of inequality are key to the right-wing worldview—you can't even have hierarchy without difference. Taking difference, change, and struggle as foundational leads you to basically every conclusion that a bonafide nationalist ever reached:

Of the opposites, that which leads to generation is called war and strife, and that which leads to conflagration is called agreement and peace.¹⁴

This is remarkably close to the idea that "bad times make for strong men, etc."¹⁵ We could note other right-wing ideas too. As discussed already, the very idea of nations depends on keeping things separate. The English are only the English in that they aren't the French or the Chinese. And recognition of difference goes hand-in-hand with pattern recognition, stereotypes, and generalizations, which we'll discuss in the next chapter. Difference is a more masculine worldview, because men are better at seeing differences and generalizing, and women at seeing similarity and individual empathy.¹⁶ And as we noted in ch. 8 on tradition, empiricism is the proper right-wing orientation—and Heraclitus predictably says that "the things which are learned by sight and hearing I honour more" [B 55]. It makes sense that he would care about the actual world since he was a process metaphysician. Adjusting for his qualified monism, Heraclitus is very much the radical right's intellectual forefather.

Heraclitus tells us what people have known since time immemorial—that difference is the very “stuff” of reality. And like with other ideas long out of fashion such as race realism (which depends on the metaphysics of difference), we in the 21st century are rediscovering it. In the second half of the last century we saw two important differential ontologists emerge at the centre of Western thought: Gilles Deleuze and Jacques Derrida.

Deleuze wants to think of difference as primary, not just a negation, so for him difference is pure relation: *this in the context of that*, instead of *this, not that*. As long as we’re using the metaphysics of identity, we can’t say what makes *this thing* a dog and not something else, because there’s no way to move from the abstract idea of *a barking long-nosed four-legged mammal* to the concrete thing *Rover over here*. Derrida says that difference penetrates all things because there’s a trace of each thing in each other thing. The words *pig* and *peg* mean what they do just because of changing one letter. For *pig* to mean anything at all, the “e” in *peg* has to be absent, so the “i” depends on it for its meaning—what meaning would arise from an alphabet of one letter? Each letter only is a letter at all in differing from some other letter; each letter carries *the trace* of the others.

In the 21st century we got an even more impressive figure in Markus Gabriel. Gabriel says the same that we’ve been saying about how for a thing to exist (Latin *exsistere*: “to stand out”) it must *stand out* from some background. For something to be, it must be in a context. It must be contained in what Gabriel calls a “field of sense”—each thing is only in relation to something else. Witches only exist in relation to literature; a hand only exists in relation to biology; the number 8 only exists in relation to quantity. Where things get interesting is that this means there’s no final background or context for all things—what we know as “the world”. Metaphysics (as a theory of everything) is the attempt to shoehorn messy reality into a rational box, something Heraclitus rejects in favour of looking reality in the eye as a dynamic flux.

And this is how we in the radical right view reality too. Ours is not the static, barren world of standard conservatism, but an “ever-living fire” based on opposition and discord. This is what makes us

dangerous and gets us deplatformed—unlike cowardly cuckservatives we're not afraid of conflict: we'll stand and fight, we love dynamism and war and growth and overcoming. In privileging difference over sameness and the dynamic over the static, the radical right distinguishes itself from the conventional right and provides the only coherent basis for ethnicity over the indistinct mush of "humanity". We're here to burn your effeminate, overripe liberal humanism to the ground—we're here to inaugurate a new age, we don't balk at impermanence and disorder and antagonism, and we don't back down.

You should know that war is comprehensive, that justice is strife, that all things come about in accordance with strife and with what must be. [B 80]

SUMMARY

A thing only is, insofar as it stands apart from something else.

At the root of being is becoming.

Life is struggle.

ENDNOTES

- 1 This is Quine's famous formulation of ontology, rather than metaphysics. We will distinguish between them shortly. To read the source for this quote, see Quine, *On What There Is*, in: *From a Logical Point of View* (New York: Harper & Row, 1961).
- 2 In this chapter we will use the terms *being* and *existence* interchangeably.
- 3 The thesis that there is fundamentally only one basic kind of thing.
- 4 This is close to how the philosopher Martin Heidegger used the term *ontology*; what we're calling metaphysics he called *ontotheology*. He was a bit unusual in doing this, but the rest of philosophy that disagrees with him sucks, so who cares about them.
- 5 Alan Watts, *Eastern Wisdom and Modern Life*, undated episode (1959–1961). Available at: <https://youtu.be/dLrMVous0Ac?t=238>.
- 6 Quoted by Diogenes Laertius in *Lives of the Philosophers IX*, 2–3, in Jonathan Barnes, *Early Greek Philosophy* (London: Penguin, 2001).
- 7 All quotes from Heraclitus are taken from the Jonathan Barnes translation of *Early Greek Philosophy*. The numbers in brackets are the traditional way of denoting his fragments.
- 8 For the problems with propositionality, see ch. 12 on the proposition nation.
- 9 See Coulanges, *The Ancient City*, book v, ch. i (Perth: Imperium Press, 2020).
- 10 Consider the dualism of the Chinese *Yijing* and the Egyptian Hermopolis cosmogony.
- 11 Philip Freeman, *Celtic Mythology*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), p. ix.
- 12 *Scriptores Rei Agrariae*.
- 13 Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, book 4, 1010a.
- 14 Diogenes Laertius, paraphrasing Heraclitus in *Lives of the Philosophers IX*, 7.
- 15 We'll come back to this in chapter 40 on cyclical history.
- 16 Curt Doolittle, *The Natural Law*, Part I, "Man – Sex Gender Differences" (Imaginary Press, 2019).

TWENTY-NINE

ARISTOTLE:

HOS EPI TO POLU, OR STEREOTYPES

If you're unlucky enough to be arguing with the liberal bugman, at some point he'll pull the ace out of his sleeve. You won't have to wait long—he's been itching to use it. You might be saying something obvious like that humans have two legs. The liberal will then smile and say "ah, but my cousin Isaac has only one leg!" and then look at you like he's put you in checkmate.

In healthier times you'd handle this by calling him an ineducable retard and then walking away. Unfortunately, today there's nowhere you can walk away to, because in every nook and cranny of our world you will meet the NAXALT argument—*Not All X Are Like That*.

"You're just generalizing", the bugman will say when you tell him humans have two legs, "that's a harmful stereotype". This says a lot more about him than about you or the stereotype. We call people like him *special snowflakes* for good reason. He's a snowflake because he's fragile and finds facts about the world mean and scary. When he calls your factual statement a "trope", a "canard", or a "harmful stereotype", he's telling you something about himself—I *don't like reality*. And despite his emotional weakness, he thinks he's great and special. He can't be put into a box—he's an "individual".

We're swimming in a world of individualism—we can't get away from it. We have a term for what the bugman is complaining about: the *hasty generalization fallacy*. But we don't have a term for the *tardy generalization fallacy*,¹ which you'll see far more often. This tells you something about society's priorities. Everywhere you go you'll find people who don't want you to put them in a box. It's not that they don't fit into one, but that they're just terribly embarrassed of the box they do fit into. But this doesn't change the box or whether they're in

it.

This inability to handle concepts reaches absurd levels in the “trans community”. We find a typical example in Matt Walsh fielding questions from a transvestite paramedic:

You said you’re an EMT. OK, if you’re responding to a health emergency—biological male, somebody with a penis, is having a medical emergency. And they say to you, “I think I’m having a miscarriage.” Would you check them to see if they’re having a miscarriage? Would you consider that a possibility for them?²

The paramedic sputters for a moment, then raises the question as to how Walsh knows that a woman who can’t get pregnant is still a woman:

For the same reason that I can rightly say that human beings have two legs. And if a person is born with only one leg, that doesn’t call into question the statement that human beings have two legs. A person being born with one leg doesn’t mean that now legs are “on a spectrum”, and we can’t say anything at all about how many legs a person has—who knows, they could be a centipede! They could have a hundred legs!

Obviously the idea that a man can get pregnant is false and repulsive. But behind the bugman’s retarded epistemology there’s a real question: can a stereotype really be rigorous and scientific?

We can get a bit more precise and call a stereotype a *probabilistic truth*. These are facts that hold *in general*, and whose truth isn’t called into question by one or two exceptions. Jean-François Gariépy explains this in the context of Tim Pool interviewing Kanye West just after he had ended his own career by criticizing Jewish people. In the interview, West stumbles and says that race was just invented to keep us apart, to which Pool responds that maybe he shouldn’t be making generalizations about Jews in Hollywood. West was unable to explain himself, but Gariépy illustrates his point with the example of a coin flip.

It’s true that if you flip a coin, it has a 50/50 chance of landing on either heads or tails. But if you flip a coin three times, it’s going to land on one side either 66% or 100% of the time. Does this call into question the 50/50 probability? Of course not. If you flip the coin 300 times, it’s going to get closer and closer to the 50/50 rule.³ You can only *not* see the probabilistic truth if you have a small sample size, and if your sample size is small enough—i.e. if you’re ignorant enough—you’re going to be absolutely convinced that the probability is

wrong, and maybe convinced that *all* probabilistic truths are wrong. Gariépy explains:

The questions of race are very often leading to probabilistic truths. [...] The leftist will often present things that do not undermine the probabilistic statement, and they think that they've got something. Like if the leftist would come and say "I know this one black guy, he's very intelligent, what about him?" And it's like, I know this coin flip that landed on heads—what about this coin flip? Well, my meta-statement about coin flips in general and how many [sic] percentage of the time they land on one or the other is till true. Just like my judgement of a group of human beings remains true, even if you talk about a stand-out observation of yours.⁴

So, is Gariépy's probabilistic truth genuinely scientific? 2,400 years ago, someone who knew an awful lot about science thought so.

Aristotle is maybe the most consequential thinker who ever lived and the best candidate for the title *father of science*. He loved cutting things apart into categories, and he distinguishes between what we might call *hard and soft sciences*,⁵ although his bar for a hard science was much higher than ours. For Aristotle, hard sciences are abstract sciences whose truths are necessary, like how in geometry a triangle has three sides. Only things like math and logic are hard sciences because they're disembodied and don't depend on material reality—every truth they tell you is true 100% of the time and can never be false. And for him, soft sciences are natural sciences that tell you things that can turn out not to be true in every imaginable case. Because they're embodied and do depend on material reality, something like biology or even physics are soft sciences for him. They can tell you things that are true only *in general*, like that disorder tends to increase over time. Aristotle had a term for this: something is true *hos epi to polu*—on the whole, for the most part, in general. For Aristotle, biology is true *hos epi to polu*, and so is ethics.

The important takeaway from this is that something being true *in general* doesn't make it any less true, it doesn't make its subject (like ethics, biology, economics) any less scientific, and it doesn't make your women's studies professor clever for pointing out the exception. In fact, Aristotle tells us that if we demand more precision of a subject than we have any right to ask for, we need to shut the hell up and get out of the way of people who actually know what they're doing.

Now our treatment of [ethics] will be adequate, if it achieves that amount of precision

which belongs to its subject matter. The same exactness must not be expected in all departments of philosophy alike, any more than in all the products of the arts and crafts. The subjects studied by political science are Moral Nobility and Justice; but these conceptions involve much difference of opinion and uncertainty, so that they are sometimes believed to be mere conventions and to have no real existence in the nature of things. And a similar uncertainty surrounds the conception of the Good, because it frequently occurs that good things have harmful consequences: people have before now been ruined by wealth, and in other cases courage has cost men their lives. We must therefore be content if, in dealing with subjects and starting from premises thus uncertain, we succeed in presenting a broad outline of the truth: when our subjects and our premises are merely generalities, it is enough if we arrive at generally valid conclusions. Accordingly we may ask the student also to accept the various views we put forward in the same spirit; for it is the mark of an educated mind to expect that amount of exactness in each kind which the nature of the particular subject admits. It is equally unreasonable to accept merely probable conclusions from a mathematician and to demand strict demonstration from an orator.⁶

Aristotle doesn't mean that biology or ethics is all wishy washy "I'm speaking like, *my truth*" nonsense. He would say unconditionally that the point of human activity is flourishing, that stealing is wrong, and that too much or too little of a good thing is bad. But there are also "ought" statements that are true *hos epi to polu*, in general, without being true in 100% of cases, like that "you shouldn't cross the street blindfolded". Sometimes you might make it, but that doesn't negate the generalization.

Probabilistic truths are fine when we're talking about heat transfer in physics, or even about animals in nature, but even normal and healthy people have learned to think that generalizations are scary and evil when we start talking about people. But there's no difference at all—at least in terms of truth—between a stereotype about animals and a stereotype about humans. John Derbyshire makes this as easy as possible for the liberal:

As with any population of such a size, there is great variation among blacks in every human trait (except, obviously, the trait of identifying oneself as black). They come fat, thin, tall, short, dumb, smart, introverted, extroverted, honest, crooked, athletic, sedentary, fastidious, sloppy, amiable, and obnoxious. There are black geniuses and black morons. There are black saints and black psychopaths. In a population of forty million, you will find almost any human type. Only at the far, far extremes of certain traits are there absences. There are, for example, no black Fields Medal winners. While this is civilizationally consequential, it will not likely ever be important to you personally. Most people live and die without ever meeting (or wishing to meet) a Fields Medal winner.⁷

The reason why this is civilizationally consequential, as Derbyshire puts it, is that all the important things are happening at the far extremes of the Bell Curve of human achievement, especially at the top end. This is more significant than it seems.

In the past century human IQ has declined by about 10 points—a 10% drop.⁸ But because of the way normal distributions work, that 10% drop in IQ means about a 96% drop in people with genius-level IQ, so 96% fewer scientific, innovative, and creative geniuses. Now, consider that some groups of people have an average IQ far more than 10 points below the norm. Group averages matter to group outcomes—anyone who denies the validity of stereotypes can never hope to understand the world except as an inexplicable jumble of unfair outcomes. No wonder these people believe total nonsense about “racial injustice”.

Anyone who has to build a complex system that actually works can’t afford to ignore generalizations. No one builds a car with no brakes, seatbelts, or speedometer on the assumption that everyone is going to be a perfect driver. Drivers who don’t need any of those things are the exception and not the rule. And yet in the human world these generalizations, which we call stereotypes, are systematically ignored by liberals, who think everything is unique and exceptional. In fact, this is a good way to describe liberalism—Joseph de Maistre said of the liberal Rousseau that he builds his whole system on exceptions.⁹ The law is one such complex system that only works if you don’t ignore stereotypes: there’s a saying in Roman law that “the law must be founded on what happens most often, not on the unexpected”.¹⁰ Even in modern liberal societies, the law is forced to admit for example that women are more vulnerable than men, and so the standard of evidence for rape accusations is much lower than for criminal trials.¹¹

It’s often said by the same liberals that say “believe all women” that stereotypes don’t matter because you don’t meet groups, only individuals. You don’t, but still, group membership matters greatly to your encounters with the individuals in that group. You only meet individuals, yes—but every interaction is mediated through both their group membership and yours, whether the group be race, sex,

nationality, or what have you. Even if you're a straight white man with little attachment to being straight, white, or male, when you interact with a black, a woman, or a homosexual, their identities colour the interaction because they identify strongly with their race, sex, or sexual orientation—even if you don't. You might say “that's irrational” but we're built to identify that way, and if you ignore it, you're the irrational one. Even one-on-one, your interactions with others are filtered through a background of assumptions, values, and perspectives that neither of you chose or can escape.

We're built to see race, sex, and so forth, because evolution has built us that way. Stereotypes are just patterns in people, and the ability to recognize patterns has proven useful for survival and is a mark of intelligence. The Raven's Progressive Matrices IQ test is mostly pattern matching and is considered a reliable measure of intelligence.¹² If you can't make generalizations you can't see patterns, and if you can't see patterns you're less likely to survive and flourish. Evolution favours stereotyping—it's why we're hardwired to recoil from things that look diseased and to instinctively run from predators. Once in a while you may meet a tame Bengal tiger offering you a hen that lays golden eggs, but is it really worth it? The same is true of humans—the difference between the predator and the hostile outsider is a difference of degree and not of kind.

Maistre once said that there's nothing so important to man as his prejudices.¹³ This sounds ugly and bigoted until we think a little harder about what a prejudice actually is—a prejudice is not a false or stupid belief, but a belief adopted before any examination. These prejudices are the axioms we start from and which are so basic that we can't escape them or even reason at all without them. *Pain is bad* is just such a prejudice, and so is *there's a world outside my mind*. Perhaps only slightly less foundational is the prejudice that *you can tell something about someone by their sex or race*. We have these prejudices for very good reason—they've stood the test of time,¹⁴ and have been accepted by virtually everyone in history who wasn't a moron.

The thing about stereotypes is that they're almost always valid, *by definition*—if you understand what's being said.¹⁵ If you don't, you'll

say something like “but I know a woman firefighter” and then sensible people will just smile and nod while discounting everything else that comes out of your mouth.

SUMMARY

Things that are true on average, are still true.

Group averages matter to group outcomes.

The liberal bases his whole worldview on exceptions.

ENDNOTES

- [1](#) The *cherrypicking fallacy* captures some of it.
- [2](#) Matt Walsh (@MattWalshBlog), Twitter, April 5, 2023, 2:45. Available at: <https://twitter.com/MattWalshBlog/status/1643450523235028995>.
- [3](#) This is called the *law of large numbers*.
- [4](#) JFG Tonight (@JFGTonight), “The Ye Walkout From Timcast”, *Odysee*, November 30, 2022, 57:11. Available at: <https://odysee.com/@JFGTonight:0/jfgt703:5>.
- [5](#) Aristotle calls them *episteme haplos* and *endechomena* respectively.
- [6](#) Aristotle, *Nichomachean Ethics*, 1094b1, tr. by H. Rackham. (See Loeb Classical Library edition.)
- [7](#) John Derbyshire, “The Talk: Nonblack Version”, *Taki’s Magazine*, April 5, 2012. Available at: <https://archive.ph/N7rMP>.
- [8](#) Edward Dutton, *Breeding the Human Herd: Eugenics, Dysgenics and the Future of the Species* (Perth: Imperium Press, 2023), p. 92.
- [9](#) Joseph de Maistre, *Major Works, Volume I* (Perth: Imperium Press, 2021), p. 188.
- [10](#) Pomponius, *Digest*, 1, 3, 3: “Jura constitui oportet, ut dixit Theophrastus, in his quae (...) plurimum accidunt, non quae (...) ex inopinato.”
- [11](#) John Villasenor and Nancy Chi Cantalupo, “Is a Higher Standard Needed for Campus Sexual Assault Cases?”, *The New York Times*, January 4, 2017. Available at: <https://archive.ph/5YM5O>.
- [12](#) Daniela Smirni, “The Raven’s Coloured Progressive Matrices in Healthy Children: A Qualitative Approach”, *Brain Sci* 10, no. 11, (November 2020). Available at: <https://archive.ph/xxcfP>.
- [13](#) Maistre, *Major Works Vol. I*, p. 204.
- [14](#) See ch. 7 on the Lindy Effect.
- [15](#) Psychologist Lee Jussim sums it up: “The weight of the evidence—including some of the most classic research widely interpreted as testifying to the power of biased and self-fulfilling processes—is that interpersonal expectations relate to social reality primarily because they reflect rather than cause social reality.” See Lee Jussim, “Précis of Social Perception and Social Reality: Why accuracy dominates bias and self-fulfilling prophecy”, *Behavioural and Brain Science* 40, (2017). Available at: <https://archive.ph/TSimn>.

THIRTY

CONFUCIUS:

THE RECTIFICATION OF NAMES

The idea that words shape our reality is often thought of as a left-wing view, a sort of cultural relativism. But two things should give us pause before accepting that this really is a left-wing view—first, that cultural relativism has been cynically abandoned by the left for universal principles like human rights and democracy; and second, the idea that words shape reality was championed by one of the most conservative thinkers who ever lived: Confucius.

In the Western mind, Confucius is the very image of the Eastern sage. And yet his thought is so difficult that any English translation of him needs commentary if you want to understand him. Without the background to his thought, he's either totally obscure or it seems like he's telling you the most obvious things imaginable, like to “be courteous in private life; reverent in private life; loyal in personal relations.”¹ No kidding. But when you understand exactly what he's saying and why, what seems obvious becomes profound. This is the same with his most famous idea:

Zilu asked: “If the ruler of Wei were to entrust you with the government of the country, what would be your first initiative?” The Master said: “It would certainly be to rectify the names.” Zilu said: “Really? Isn't this a little farfetched? What is this rectification for?” The Master said: “How boorish can you get! Whereupon a gentleman is incompetent, thereupon he should remain silent. If the names are not correct, language is without an object. When language is without an object, no affair can be effected. When no affair can be effected, rites and music wither. When rites and music wither, punishments and penalties miss their target. When punishments and penalties miss their target, the people do not know where they stand. Therefore, whatever a gentleman conceives of, he must be able to say; and whatever he says, he must be able to do. In the matter of language, a gentleman leaves nothing to chance.”²

This passage is usually paraphrased as *the beginning of wisdom is to call things by their proper name*, which doesn't seem any less obvious.

We have an English expression “to call a spade a spade” that means the same thing. What Confucius is getting at is that no matter how clever you are, if your conceptual framework doesn’t carve reality at the joints, you’ll be systematically deceived—he called this *zhengming*, the *rectification of names*. If it still seems obvious, just take a look around today.

The world is chock full of retarded framing that obscures rather than clarifies reality. For example, we have a word *hate* that means both “everything that isn’t left-wing progressivism” and also “mindless spite toward something”. And yet if you find a spiteful, belligerent ignoramus on the street he’s more likely than not a progressive, because being a progressive is the only socially acceptable way to be an opinionated ignoramus. “Hate” as a political category turns out to be the total opposite of its plain meaning—not a very useful concept.

Words have power, sometimes even the power to invent something out of thin air. The term *gender dysphoria* for all intents and purposes did not exist until about 2008, after which use of the term skyrockets.³ With a lag of about a year, you see the exact same skyrocketing in diagnoses of “gender dysphoria”—in about 2009, suddenly everyone discovers that they’re really supposed to be the other sex, and an avalanche of clinical diagnoses follows.⁴ The *phenomenon* of gender dysphoria wasn’t invented until the *word* for it was invented, because except among a vanishingly small micro-fraction of people, it’s not a real thing. It wasn’t a real thing for the first 99.998% of human history, but “science” has now “discovered” that nearly 10% of high school students have it.⁵

Even names we all know can fail to point to anything real. The most common definition of *capitalism* is something like “private ownership of property”, but property has been private since the first tree monkey urinated on the first tree, meaning we’ve been capitalists since before we could walk upright. If everything is capitalism, nothing is capitalism. The point is to make “capitalism” the default so that opposition to it becomes unthinkable. Marxism raises this conceptual confusion to the level of an art. By playing shell games with words,⁶ the Marxist concludes that only labour can have value, which

smuggles into the conversation the idea that owning things you're not using right now is "exploitation". Economics—both liberal and communist—is so riddled with conceptual stupidity that it's basically useless.⁷ The term *capitalism* and all the principal Marxian terms unite what's really divided and divide what's really united. The effect of these concepts is to obscure rather than clarify reality.

Sowing this confusion is usually purposeful, especially in politics. As Confucius says, "when language is without an object, no affair can be effected"—*when concepts don't answer to any real thing, people can't think straight*. "When no affair can be effected, rites and music wither"—*when people can't think straight, things start falling apart*. "When rites and music wither, punishments and penalties miss their target"—*when things start falling apart, bad people win and good people lose*. "When punishments and penalties miss their target, the people do not know where they stand"—*when bad people win and good people lose, nobody can tell his ass from his elbow*. When you can't tell your ass from your elbow, when you can't tell when the rules will be enforced, or even what the rules are, you can't fight back. We call this anarcho-tyranny,⁸ and anarcho-tyranny is exactly what's intended. But unfortunately for the Deep State, this tyranny can't be maintained forever. At some point it becomes obvious to normal people what's going on, which is exactly what happened during the 2020 US election when every normal American saw blatant massaging of procedural outcomes and months of harvesting unauthenticated ballots. Joe Biden may have won the "election", but the true winner was the rectification of names—now we know what "democracy" means in practice.

Obscuring reality may not work forever, but the Deep State will still try. There are a few ways it will do this. The Deep State wins by uniting what's naturally divided—a hodgepodge of "oppressed" minorities. This is why propositional identity is so useful: it unites a mishmash of people who share nothing but a belief.⁹ The Deep State also wins by keeping any group that can challenge it weak, which means dividing what's naturally united—races and ethnicities—and it does this by telling you that in fact there *are* no races, that whiteness is only a construct, and other nonsense that can be dispelled by a basic

understanding of biology.¹⁰ A group can only organize if it sees itself as a coherent group, which depends on uniting under one name. Herodotus says the Thracians would have been the most powerful nation on earth if they were united, but because they lacked a single name, this union was impossible.¹¹

This “unmaking” of a thing by questioning its name sometimes works the other way around—naming something can actually make it vulnerable. The Egyptians understood this; they believed that to work a magic spell on someone you needed to know his name, meaning that without a name there simply was no thing that the spell was aimed at—to know the name of a thing was to have power over it. The pharaoh would be given a *true name* known only to himself and his parents so that he was protected against curses. If this sounds esoteric, consider that we have a name for “racism”¹² and so “racism” can be undermined. What’s the opposite of “racism”? The opposite of racism has no name; it’s *the default*, and so unopposable. To recap, the deliberate attempt to confuse names works in a few ways:

- Inverting reality — as in “hate”
- Uniting what’s divided — as in “capitalism”
- Conjuring something out of nothing — as in “racism”
- Trying to define something real out of existence — as in *whiteness*

Evil things don’t want to be named—this is what Steve Sailer has called the “war on noticing”. When you name the *Great Replacement*—the deliberate demographic replacement of ethnic Europeans in their own nations—you’re telling others to notice this replacement. When you call something a “conspiracy theory”, you’re telling others to feel a certain way about it. Politics is a battle over who gets to name things, over who gets to say what counts as terrorism, disinformation, violence, justice, “democracy”, and ultimately who *we* are and what *we* stand for. The whole arc of politics since Trump has been the establishment starting to lose that battle to the radical right. We are the rectifiers of names, it’s our concepts that carve reality at the joints, and this is why we’re hated by an establishment that hates reality. Lord Halifax might as well have been talking about the radical right when he said that “a man that should call everything by its right name

would hardly pass the streets without being knocked down as a Common Enemy.”

Whereas older and better peoples like the Greeks or the Norse understood themselves honestly, modern liberalism calls itself the opposite of what it is. It calls for a balance of powers, but constantly centralizes power. America pretends not to be an empire, yet as the “international community” it is the most powerful empire in human history. Liberalism calls itself open, secular, and tolerant, but the state cult of progressivism is totalizing and inescapable. Lying to ourselves about what really is so, can only go on for so long. Eventually reality will catch up to us, and we’ll be forced to call things by their proper name whether we like it or not.

SUMMARY

Words must carve reality at the joints.

The Deep State wins by uniting what's divided, and by dividing what's naturally united.

Politics is a battle over who gets to name things.

ENDNOTES

- [1](#) Confucius, *Analects* tr. Simon Leys (W. W. Norton, 1997), 13.19.
- [2](#) Confucius, *Analects*, 13.3.
- [3](#) “Gender dysphoria”, Google Books Ngram Viewer. Available at: <https://archive.ph/XzX34>.
- [4](#) Malin Indremo et al, “Validity of the Gender Dysphoria diagnosis and incidence trends in Sweden: a nationwide register study”, *Scientific Reports* 11, no. 1, (August 2021). Available at: <https://archive.ph/Iq7xK>. See figure 2A.
- [5](#) Kacie Kidd, “Nearly 10% of youth in one urban school district identify as gender-diverse, new study finds”, *The Conversation*, June 3, 2021. Available at: <https://archive.ph/qa2eM>.
- [6](#) The Marxist redefines basically every important economic term to force the conclusion he wants. “Value” doesn’t mean value, it means *only exchange value*, and only for “commodities”. But “commodities” doesn’t mean commodities, it excludes land or raw materials, which everyone else recognizes as commodities. So when the Marxist says that only labour can have “value”, he means only “value” as he’s defined it. The point is not to clarify how labour relates to value, it’s to obscure it.
- [7](#) Computers with no economic model at all are better at forecasting than professional economists. See Hsu Ming-Wei et al, “Bridging the divide in financial market forecasting: machine learners vs. financial economists”, *Expert Systems with Applications* 61, (November 2016): pp. 215-234. Available at: <https://archive.ph/vwO5S>.
- [8](#) See ch. 22.
- [9](#) See ch. 12 on the proposition nation.
- [10](#) Race plays an important role in clinical diagnosis and decision—any doctor who ignored it would be sued for malpractice. For example, sickle-cell anemia affects black people more than white, because “black people” and “white people” are valid biological categories. See Gina Lynem-Walker, “Sickle Cell Disease and its Disproportionate Effect on African Americans in the U.S.”, *MI Blues Perspectives*, February 16, 2023. Available at: <https://archive.ph/2JKbl>
- [11](#) Herodotus, 5.3.
- [12](#) “Racism” just means white people having a sense of their own identity. Any other race doing this, preferring its own company, or having its own interests, is acceptable. “Racist” is really an ethnic slur against white people.

THIRTY-ONE

BEOWULF:

THE GOOD KING

We left off in the last chapter saying that evil things don't want to be named. Why? *Because their power lies in being hidden.* You've been told over and over that the Deep State doesn't exist and is just a "conspiracy theory", because an unaccountable oligarchy who hates you thrives on you not noticing it. Authority, when it's malignant, wants to be invisible.

This is the whole point of popular sovereignty too—to make the actual sovereign invisible. It does this by creating conceptual confusion: it tells us that the *real* ruler is the people who are ruled,¹ which just means that there is no ruler—which is impossible, so the actual ruler remains invisible. The only thing that can defeat informal power is formal power, so formal power is put "out of bounds". The very idea of a king is hated—this is a common thread that runs from the French Revolution to modern wokeness. Jordan Peterson and Stephen Pinker are no defense against wokeness. They're actively aiding it by telling you that you can't have the one weapon that could crush it in a single blow.

The words *king* and *tyrant* are basically synonymous today. A good king is thought to be rare, and if you believe that "absolute power corrupts absolutely", a good king is impossible. We will show that this is nonsense.

First of all, what is a king? A king is not just a dictator, although the two do share some things. The word *king* derives from the Proto-Germanic **kuningaz*, meaning "one who belongs to the family". It's cognate with the word *kin*—the ruler is bound to his people by a tie stronger than mere election or "social contract". The ancient Goths had another name for the king: they called him *reiks*, which is cognate

to Latin *rex* and to our English word *royal*. The Roman *rex* was the absolute ruler and high priest of his people, and this kingship comes down to the Romans from much more ancient Proto-Indo-European times, when the king had the religious authority to determine the rules of law—when the king was above the law.² And so it was that in times of trouble, the Gothic *reiks* would become a *kindins* (again, related to *kin*), a supreme, super-royal judge with dictatorial powers.³

Kingship has changed throughout history, but the aboriginal kingship amongst Indo-Europeans is both ethnic and absolute. Still, definitions are only so helpful, and when it comes down to it, you define anything by pointing to examples. So let's do just that—liberals conflate “absolute monarch” with “tyrant”, so what does a good king actually look like in practice?

The Old English poem *Beowulf* tells us in no uncertain terms what a good king looks like. While slaying the dragon that menaces his folk, Beowulf is fatally wounded. As he lies dying, he speaks to his retainer Wiglaf:

No folk-king was there,
None at all, of the neighboring clans
Who war would wage me with “warriors’-friends”
And threat me with horrors. At home I bided
What fate might come, and I cared for mine own;
Feuds I sought not, nor falsely swore
Ever on oath.⁴

There's a lot packed into this short passage. “Warriors’-friends” is a kenning for *swords*, meaning that Beowulf protected his folk against threats—the first and most important role of a father.⁵ He “bided what fate might come”, meaning that he placed his personal well-being below that of his folk. He cared for his own: the Germanic king, as “one who belongs to the family”, is concerned with the welfare of the in-group. The king's proper horizon of care is bounded; we can have duties to the out-group, but they're always trumped by duties to the in-group.⁶ And also Beowulf points out that he always kept his word. Among Germanic peoples, the force of your word was ironclad—it would be better to die than to lie to your kinsman.

The Germanic king was also bound to be generous. Earlier in the poem, after Beowulf slays the monster Grendel for the Danes, he

returns to his native land and recounts the generosity of the Danish king Hrothgar:

So held this king to the customs old,
That I wanted for nought in the wage I gained,
The meed of my might; he made me gifts,
Healfdene's heir, for my own disposal.
Now to thee, my prince, I proffer them all,
Gladly give them.⁷

The custom of kingly generosity was so strong that it was common for poets to use the kenning (a poetic description in place of a name) of “ring-breaker” for *king*. The king

would not enter his treasury and count out what he deems to be a suitable reward for service in coin, but would snap off gold from the very torque on his arm as a gift, in a spontaneous display of gratitude.⁸

These ideals of selfless kingship seem naïve to us in the age of “absolute power; absolute corruption”. And today these ideals really are unthinkable, but we live in a very different time. In former times we lived in a *shame culture*, which we touched on in the chapter on corporatism.⁹ In a shame culture, your worth as a person doesn't depend on what you think of yourself, but what others think of you—the total opposite of today's *guilt culture*, where everyone is the judge of himself. If a king had all the women and money in the world but was a scumbag in the eyes of other men, this was worse than being dead. What others think of you, and especially what others think of you after you're dead,¹⁰ is what matters. This is the only way to make sense of basically everything men cared about until the day before yesterday. When Hector faces down Achilles, he knows that he will die and that his people will be destroyed:

My hour at last is come;
Yet not ingloriously or passively
I die, but first will do some valiant deed,
Of which mankind shall hear in after time.

But he also knows that men will tell of his heroism after he dies, so he goes out with his head held high—this is the difference between a man and a worm. The Germanics were the same. It was disgraceful to die a cowardly death, “by falling backward” (i.e. retreating) as they said.¹¹ Dying like a worm meant losing your place in Valhalla, which is why

they would fight to the bitter end for their folk, and why kings would fight for their folk to the bitter end too. When the *king* is *kin* to his people, their fate is his fate. When Alexander the Great was crossing the Gedrosian desert, his whole army was dying of starvation and thirst. A soldier named Zephyrus offered him a helmet full of water, which he received with thanks before pouring it on the ground, announcing that he would face whatever burden his men faced.¹²

But a king is not just someone who acts selflessly and follows the rules—sometimes he needs to exercise judgement. Leonidas, king and general of the 300 Spartans who faced down the Persians, furnishes us with a good example.

As with all proper kingship, Leonidas was not only king but high priest, and when the Persians marched on Greece, Sparta was celebrating the religious festival of the Carneia, the holiest festival of all. Since religious festivals were times of peace, it was illegal for the Spartan army to march out on campaign since this would not let him perform the rites. A council of Spartan elders insisted that he stay in Sparta and honour the Carneia rather than march out to meet the Persians—Leonidas had to choose between his religious duty and his duty as protector and *father* of his country. Rather than save his own skin, he decided to act as father and march out with men from his royal bodyguard.

While Leonidas' bravery is praiseworthy, the important point to note here is that he acted *as a real sovereign*. Surely his instinct for self-preservation told him to stay. All the wise men of Sparta told him to stay. All the laws of Sparta told him to stay. But the law does not and cannot rule—only a man can rule.¹³ As a real sovereign, Leonidas is not bound by the law, but like our Indo-European *rex*, he is above the law. If Leonidas does not march, there is no Sparta; if there is no Sparta, there is no law. Leonidas acted in the interest of law, but not subordinate to it, just like the father acting in the interest of his child doesn't mean that the child is sovereign over the father. Leonidas is not merely the executor of law, like a computer that runs a piece of code and spits out a decision automatically. He can listen to his advisors. He can listen to the elders. But ultimate decision rests with him—he must exercise judgement. Liberalism says that whereas “in

absolute governments the King is law, so in free countries the law ought to be King”,¹⁴ meaning that under liberalism judgement is impossible.

The Romans were a bit embarrassed about kingship, although—like liberalism with totalitarianism—during the Empire they had it but insisted they didn’t and lost their minds if you said they did. Even when in full denial over their kingship, the Romans brought it back in their times of greatest need: we call this by the familiar name of *dictator*. Germanic peoples had the same thing.¹⁵ In fact, necessity makes pretty much any society into an absolute monarchy when it needs to put its big boy pants on, but the mark of the good king is to know when to wield his power and when to put his dick back in his pants. As the Roman republic was falling apart, the consul Lucius Cornelius Sulla took matters into his own hands and heads started rolling. He ruled as absolute dictator for three years, destroyed all his enemies, and pushed through legal reforms to fix the problems of the republic and stop anyone from ever doing what he did again. True to his word, he then gave up power willingly to retire to a country estate for the rest of his life.¹⁶ So much for “absolute power corrupts absolutely”. Rome continued as a superpower for five more centuries.

What these examples have in common is that the good king, as opposed to the mere executor, exercises personal power. In the transition to liberalism, we have replaced loyalty to men with loyalty to abstract principles and institutions. Feminist Carol Hanisch said that “the personal is political”, but she had it backwards: *the political is personal*. The replacement of loyalty to men with loyalty to ideas has been a disaster for the human race—we call this *ideology*. Ideological loyalty is divisive and creates bitter disagreement over minor doctrinal points; personal loyalty only needs agreement on who the leader is. Trump, for all his flaws, represents the return of personal loyalty, which is why no one has been able to challenge his popularity on the left or the right. While ideologically vacuous, Trump is the closest of any man in the West to having what the Romans called *auctoritas*.

We get a very clear picture of what *auctoritas* looks like in Muammar Gaddafi. After overthrowing the Western-backed

government of Libya, he deported foreigners, imposed *sharia* law, and nationalized the oil industry that had attracted foreign meddling in the first place. He resigned as prime minister in 1972 and didn't hold an official position of power for the rest of his life, but as the man who recaptured Libya's sovereignty, his word was effectively the law and he ruled by decree. During the Libyan civil war in 2011, the "international community" demanded that he step down, but he replied that he couldn't because there was nothing to step down from. He was assassinated later that year.

Auctoritas gives us the English word *authority*, but the Latin term means much more than that. The essence of auctoritas is informal power that comes from prestige. This informal power is the mark of kingship, and wins for a man the personal loyalty that makes him sovereign. Hrothgar wins informal power by his generosity, Alexander by his solidarity, Leonidas by his bravery and judgement, and Sulla by his integrity. When formal power is put in the hands of a man with this informal power, that is the stuff of legends. That is what great kings are made of.

You're not supposed to believe in great kings today. All monarchs are supposed to be like Elizabeth II who stood by and failed to act as a moral counterweight to the replacement of Britain's native stock. And we do get some terrible kings. Caracalla, the half-African Roman emperor, granted Roman citizenship to every free man in the Empire—a case study in what happens when the *king* is not *kin* to his folk. The main liberal objection against kingship is that it's not meritocratic.¹⁷ But liberalism has resulted in a Deep State stocked with people who have no tie—often not even an ethnic tie—to the people they govern. Sometimes even the head of state is not one of the people, such as Rishi Sunak in the UK. "But at least he's qualified", the liberal will say. Rishi Sunak can never, even in principle, be "qualified" to rule over a people he does not belong to, however competent he may be—after all, this is precisely the argument against British colonial rule in India. If this is the fruit of liberalism, and if history is filled with great kings, perhaps kingship is not the problem, but the solution.

SUMMARY

The Deep State fears a king more than anything.

The essence of kingship is personal power.

When a society needs to put its big boy pants on, it becomes a dictatorship.

ENDNOTES

- [1](#) See ch. 13 on sovereignty.
- [2](#) Beneviste, *Dictionary of Indo-European Concepts and Society*, (Chicago: HAU Books, 2016), p. 312.
- [3](#) Herwig Wolfram, *History of the Goths* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), p. 94.
- [4](#) *Beowulf* (Perth: Imperium Press, 2021), lines 2733–2739.
- [5](#) The word *father* comes from Proto-Indo-European **ph₂tér*, which breaks down to **peh₂-* (“protect”) and *-tér* (“-or”). The father is first and foremost a protector. We will discuss in ch. 33 how the king is related to the father.
- [6](#) Germanic peoples were radically particularist in their horizon of care. For a rather extreme example of this, take the episode of Sigmund and Sinfjotli hunting travellers for booty.
- [7](#) *Beowulf*, lines 2144–2149.
- [8](#) Aidan Maclear, introduction to *Beowulf*, p. xi. See the episode in *Beowulf* concerning Heremod for the anti-type of kingly generosity, lines 1709–1722.
- [9](#) See p. 140.
- [10](#) See *Havamal* stanzas 77–78 in *Poetic Edda* (Perth: Imperium Press, 2022).
- [11](#) See proverb 118 in *Havamal and Norse Proverbs* (Perth: Imperium Press, 2022).
- [12](#) *Epistola Alexandri ad Aristotelem*, 14.
- [13](#) Cf. pp. 99–100.
- [14](#) Thomas Paine, *Common Sense* (1776).
- [15](#) Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, book 6, ch. 23.
- [16](#) His tombstone reads “no friend ever served me, and no enemy ever wronged me, whom I have not repaid in full.” This is 90% of kingship in one quote.
- [17](#) See the discussion of meritocracy on p. 110.

THIRTY-TWO

IBN KHALDUN: ASABIYYAH

A power can be overthrown only by another power, not by a principle, and only one power that can confront money is left. Money is overthrown and abolished by blood.
— Spengler¹

Milton Friedman is about as liberal as it gets, but in his *Freedom to Choose* series he said that “this is really a family society and not an individual society”,² the idea being that the basic unit of society is not the atomized individual but the family. It’s a truth so basic that not even a liberal can deny it. But it’s ironic that the sovereignty of the family would come up in a talk called “freedom to choose”, because the family is about the least free thing you can imagine.

Even so, the family has changed over time. When conservatives talk about “family values”, they mean the nuclear family: a Mom, Dad, two-and-a-half kids, and a dog. But rewind back even a few centuries, and the family was an *extended family*—grandparents, aunts, uncles, cousins, and more distant relatives living in close quarters. This extended family was like a little society, and the further back you go, the more it became your whole world. This was your heritage—you couldn’t leave it and nor would you ever think to. If someone messed with you, that meant they messed with your Dad, your uncles, and all your cousins too, so people were a lot more polite. This is what we call the *clan*.

For most of human history you lived in a clan, but some time in the Middle Ages, things started happening that moved us away from the clan and toward the nuclear family.³ When the clan came up against new kinds of society, people started to notice how it worked and what made it useful. One of the first to do this was Ibn Khaldun.

Abdurahman bin Muhammad bin Muhammad bin Muhammad bin

Al-Hasan bin Jabir bin Muhammad bin Ibrahim bin Abdurahman bin Ibn Khaldun al-Hadrami—also known as Ibn Khaldun—was born in North Africa in 1332. At this time, the Mongols were putting the torch to large swathes of the Islamic world, which came as a bit of a surprise to the Muslims since they regarded the Mongols as braindead savages with a crude and primitive way of life. And yet they were running roughshod over civilization, with the full Mandate of Heaven. How could this have happened? This prompted deep reflection in Muslims, and produced one of the towering works of human genius—Khaldun’s *Muqaddimah*.

This very long book, whose title means “introduction”, ranges over a huge number of topics and invented several fields of inquiry. But Khaldun is best known for his concept of *asabiyyah*, which means “nationalism”, “prejudice”, “group feeling”, “solidarity”, and more—all at the same time. Asabiyyah is the cohesive force of the group, its understanding of itself and its goals, and the motive force that drives it to conquer other groups. In a word, asabiyyah is *clannishness*. The idea is summed up in the Arab Bedouin saying “I am against my brother, my brother and I are against my cousin, my cousin and I are against the stranger.”⁴ Wikipedia says that “Asabiyya is neither necessarily nomadic nor based on blood relations; rather, it resembles a philosophy of classical republicanism.”⁵ Khaldun himself says “Asabiyyah results only from blood relationship or something corresponding to it”.⁶ Here is the value of Wikipedia in a nutshell.

Wikipedia’s confusion over tribalism is mirrored by Lululemon-wearing cat ladies who say things like that white people shouldn’t say they “found their tribe” because the word was appropriated from Native Americans.⁷ *Tribe* is of course a Latin term which meant exactly the same thing to Marcus Porcius Cato as it does to you. And yet, we think of Europeans as having never been tribal peoples, but for most of our history we were tribal peoples in just the way Jessica at Whole Foods conceives of them. Until only very recently most Europeans lived in a clan, which formed an indivisible unit; if you fucked with any member of the clan, you fucked with the whole clan. Revenge was not just a moral duty but a religious duty—the word the Romans used for their religion was *parentare*, which meant “to

avenge one's father".⁸

So what can this clannishness actually do? Probably the most clannish nationalism today is Hindu nationalism, which is the only one able to stand against Islam in its own backyard. How does it stack up against woke capital? Facebook refuses to ban hate speech in India, nor to deplatform nationalist groups like the Bajrang Dal, because it fears for the safety of its staff.⁹ Hinduism—the only religion to maintain Indo-European clan lineages unbroken since the Bronze age—can put multinational corporations in their place, and maintain spaces into which capitalism cannot meaningfully penetrate. Narendra Modi, Prime Minister of India and leader of the nationalist BJP, currently holds power over credit lines in India, subordinating all financial corporate bodies to himself.¹⁰ Ladies and gentlemen, the power of the clan.

Asabiyyah is not only the glue binding society together, but also its source of cultural vitality. Asabiyyah gives us what Spengler calls *Kultur*, a society's rough-hewn and barbaric youth, when its folk-soul is being born out of the hinterlands; he contrasts this with the cosmopolitan anthill of *Zivilisation*, when the organism reaches maturity and soon after, dies. The first generations bring forth the great men of legend; the next generations bring men of lesser character but with cultural memory of greatness; and the last generations have been softened by ease and luxury. We have a saying for this in the West: *shirtsleeves to shirtsleeves in three generations*. Khaldun explains this same phenomenon:

We have stated that the life of a dynasty does not as a rule extend beyond three generations. The first generation retains the desert qualities, desert toughness, and desert savagery. (Its members are used to) privation and to sharing their glory (with each other); they are brave and rapacious. Therefore, the strength of group feeling continues to be preserved among them. They are sharp and greatly feared. People submit to them.

Under the influence of royal authority and a life of ease, the second generation changes from the desert attitude to sedentary culture, from privation to luxury and plenty, from a state in which everybody shared in the glory to one in which one man claims all the glory for himself while the others are too lazy to strive for glory, and from proud superiority to humble subservience. Thus, the vigour of group feeling is broken to some extent. [...]

The third generation, then, has (completely) forgotten the period of desert life and toughness, as if it had never existed. They have lost (the taste for) the sweetness of

fame and for group feeling, because they are dominated by force. Luxury reaches its peak among them, because they are so much given to a life of prosperity and ease. They become dependent on the dynasty and are like women and children who need to be defended. Group feeling disappears completely. [...] The ruler, then, has need of other, brave people to support him. He takes many clients and followers. They help the dynasty to some degree, until God permits it to be destroyed, and it goes with everything it stands for.¹¹

Clearly asabiyyah is part of a natural cycle. We once had it in the form of ancestor worship, and Indo-Europeans had it so strongly, and they conquered the earth so completely, that two in five people alive today speak a dialect of their language. But how did we lose it?

Asabiyyah has been under siege for a long time. We met Aeschylus back in the epilogue,¹² the Greek warrior poet whose epitaph immortalized him as a warrior rather than a poet. Aeschylus' great work the *Oresteia* is all about replacing asabiyyah with the government. In man's virile and natural state, the government is the family—this is all he knows. Whatever justice he needs is carried out by the family. In the *Oresteia*, the title character Orestes is faced with an impossible choice: he must take revenge against his father's killer, but this killer is his mother. He does this, but his act is considered outrageous even to the gods, who put him on trial. The *Oresteia* was written at a time when Greece was changing from a clannish society to Khaldun's "second generation" where asabiyyah's localism is questioned in favour of centralization. This happens by the familiar *high-low vs. middle* mechanism,¹³ where the high is the king, the middle are the clans, and the low are those who don't have a clan, or a weak one. This *high-low vs. middle* mechanism was kicked into high gear in Rome too in her old age, when politicians needed to break the power of the clans to do massive social engineering.¹⁴ Hatred of asabiyyah (nationalism) has happened in every society ever, and it's happening to us now. And history is absolutely clear—whenever you see it, the end is not far off.

So how does a healthy society work? What does a people in its full youth and vigor look like?

A healthy society looks like *blood over principle*. Rather than deriving family duties from justice, it derives justice from family duties. We get this sentiment in the phrase *my country right or wrong*,

the bugbear of all libtards. In fact, this phrase is really just a slander against nationalism. Your country can be at odds with itself, its elites can betray it, it can fail to live up to its original standards—but there’s no “view from nowhere” from which to conclude that your country is fundamentally wrong. So when novelist Patrick O’Brien concludes that “*my country is always right* is imbecile”, he concludes this strictly from assumptions he inherited from his country. “My country is always right” may seem narrow-minded, but our whole world stands on top of what “narrow-minded” men built.

Khaldun is a bit of a problematic figure for Muslims because he took a term which was considered by Islamic tradition as a “disease of the soul” and made it something good—in Islamic thought, *asabiyyah* is usually translated as “prejudice”.¹⁵ Muslims have tried to square this circle ever since, but what Khaldun says is good and Islam says is bad are exactly the same thing. And so he stands in relation to Islam like Nietzsche does to the West—it can neither ignore him nor fully accept him. As Khaldun tells us, *asabiyyah* results only from blood or a proxy for blood. When Islam was the religion of Arab tribesmen, it served as a proxy for blood. But Islam can’t be both universal and tribal, and past a certain point its effect has always been to collapse *asabiyyah*. *Asabiyyah* and *Ummah* are at odds,¹⁶ as the Hadith repeatedly says—among the Tawhid and the Five Pillars of Islam you will not find blood. The idea of a “tribalism of belief” is only a few steps removed from the liberal cat lady’s idea of finding her “tribe” in a knitting club.

A healthy society looks like *localism*. Homer says that “a clanless, lawless, hearthless man is he that loveth dread strife among his own folk”.¹⁷ “Clanless” is sometimes translated as “stateless”. There is great wisdom here. This is not some half-baked anti-statism, but simply the idea that people should be governed at the most local level possible, which is in almost every case the clan. *Asabiyyah* is not the alternative to government, it’s the *source* of government. When the government ceases to serve the blood, *asabiyyah* comes roaring back. The only question is *from within, or from without?*

A healthy society looks like *collectivism*. We won’t rehearse the justifications for it that we touched on in ch. 18 on corporatism, but

even from the standpoint of individual good, collectivism is essential. The “rugged individualist” lives a shorter and more anxious life.¹⁸ Man is not born into the world as an individual, but as a son, a brother, a cousin, and many other things—and he is to be judged by where he comes from. The Norse have a proverb that illustrates this well: “you shall not marry a girl who is the only fine one in her clan; know that you do not marry a person but a family.”

A healthy society looks *respectful*. Robert E. Howard put it best:

Civilized men are more discourteous than savages because they know they can be impolite without having their skulls split, as a general thing.¹⁹

Societies with asabiyyah usually consider guilt something collective, so a whole family is responsible for the actions of any of its members. These societies are often called “savage”, which calls to mind an out-of-control hooligan who does whatever he wants. The reality is that someone living in these societies is far more likely to observe standards of politeness and respect, because if you don’t, your family is on the hook for it. Imagine for a moment how you’d conduct yourself if your family all the way up to your 7th cousins were on the hook for your dust-up at White Castle. The stakes of your poor behaviour are much higher, and the result has historically been a very orderly arrangement—much more so than the racial grievance riots of 2020.

A healthy society looks like *nativism*. Ethnocentric societies tend to win,²⁰ which is the whole reason why asabiyyah exists in the first place. When Donald Trump said “if you don’t have borders you don’t have a country”, he was expressing the same point in his own distorted and civic nationalist way. To see how a real (i.e. tribal) nation deals with immigration, look at Athens in the 4th century BC. In order to grant citizenship to one stranger, the following had to take place:

1. The entire city’s citizenry is assembled. A secret ballot is cast.
2. Nine days later a second assembly has to confirm the vote. 6,000 ayes are required. Almost no assembly of the time ever comprises 6,000 citizens.
3. A vote is taken in the senate. The decision of this double assembly has to be confirmed.
4. At any stage, any citizen can veto the procedure as contrary to the laws. So

three unanimous votes are required involving what is effectively the whole of the largest association of men known at the time.

By contrast, in order to gain citizenship in most European countries today, the stranger must do the following:

1. Arrive in a boat.

If having borders is the requirement for having a country, you be the judge of which of these is a real country and which is just an economic zone.

Unless we like getting our cities burned down, we need something like the clan system. Any violent woke activism that happens to me also happens to my cousins and their cousins. Your enemies are fundamentally mercantile—they will fold like a cheap suit as soon as things get uncomfortable. They thrive on being beyond reach. They're purely instrumental in their reasoning. They count on you to back down from confrontation because of the immense power of the state to punish you for it. But ultimately the state is mercantile too. It's essentially a large business. Its main concern is its balance sheet, and whatever woke activism it can do within that is icing on the cake. But as Spengler says, "money is abolished by blood". Let's see how this works.

In the Punic Wars, a military aristocracy (Rome) went up against a trading, merchant society (Carthage). Rome won—and then burnt Carthage to the ground and salted the earth around it—because Rome was willing to spend more blood and treasure. The Romans lost 70% of their fleet in one afternoon, then they rebuilt the whole thing. Carthage, who was the stronger power to start with, was more concerned with the Iron Age equivalent of its portfolio. The Romans won from sheer willpower and a much stronger sense of identity. The Deep State can do a lot, but it can't do this. It's just not in them.

But is tribalism really viable today? The arguments against it are that a) we've outgrown it, and b) it's just not who we are anymore.

There have been other times in history that we thought we'd outgrown tribalism.²¹ But growth is not inevitable, and all signs indicate that we're due for a civilizational downgrade. Systems can

only get so complex before they become fragile, and eventually an unforeseen event pushes them over. But because they've destroyed all their tribal structures by *high-low vs. middle*, without a strong state they find themselves unable to manage anything at the local level.²² If we had finally outgrown the need for these tribal structures, it would be a historical first. Don't bet the farm on it. And we have had these tribal structures very recently in our history too.

In the opening scene of *The Godfather*, Don Corleone grants an audience to someone under his protection. The man asks for justice for his daughter that the law won't provide. Corleone points out that the man never really wanted his friendship, and the man says he was afraid to be in his debt. Corleone says:

I understand. You found paradise in America, had a good trade, made a good living. The police protected you; and there were courts of law. And you didn't need a friend like me. But now you come to me and you say "Don Corleone, give me justice."

If the *Oresteia* tells us the story of a clannish society moving toward a state society, *The Godfather* gives us the other side of the coin—when the state is falling apart. Corleone then agrees to help and tells the man, "some day, and that day may never come, I'll call upon you to do a service for me." And they enter into a very ancient bond: the *client-patron relationship*. Clientship like this allows clan society to grow beyond the family and to challenge the power of centralized bureaucracies; the ancient Germanics did this with oath-based kinship.²³ The Mafia is just one example of asabiyyah challenging states in the modern world—most families had no more than about a hundred "made men" but were able to act with something approaching sovereignty in their local area for decades. The war in Afghanistan teaches us that illiterate men in sandals can defeat the most powerful military the world has ever known with high birth rates, martial spirit, and tribalism. And we were clannish not that long ago—only a few centuries ago the Scottish clans were in their full vigor. Anyone who tells you tribalism can't be revived is lying either to you or to themselves.

History is not written by the winners; history is written by nerds—exactly the kind of people who find asabiyyah icky and scary. And so you've been taught that the clan can only produce low-level society,

but it produced arguably the greatest empire the world has ever known: Rome. And even Rome didn't last forever—nothing does. Tribalism is not only a civilization-building mechanism, but a fail-safe mechanism that guarantees continuity after disaster. But most of all, the clan—that most ancient social technology of all—is your last defense against a tyrannical Deep State that hates you and wants to replace you. No wonder it's doing all it can to snuff out your nationalism.

SUMMARY

- Justice derives from family duty, not the other way around.
- The clan is not an alternative to government, it is the source of government.
- Ethnocentric societies always win in the long run.

ENDNOTES

- [1](#) Spengler, *Decline of the West*.
- [2](#) Milton Friedman, “Milton Friedman – Distribution of Wealth”, *YouTube*, 2:15. Available at: <https://youtu.be/MRpEV2tmYz4?t=137>.
- [3](#) For a good overview, see “Big summary post on the hajnal line”, *HBD Chick*, March 10, 2014. Available at: <https://archive.ph/JjaDb>.
- [4](#) *The Nomadic alternative: modes and models of interaction in the African-Asian deserts and steppes*, ed. Wolfgang Weissleder (The Hague: Mouton, 1978), p. 59.
- [5](#) Wikipedia, “Asabiyyah”. Available at: <https://archive.ph/TGHGU> [accessed 11/05/2023].
- [6](#) Ibn Khaldun, *The Muqaddimah*, tr. Franz Rosenthal (Princeton University Press, 2015), p. 173. The cited edition translates *asabiyyah* here as “group feeling”.
- [7](#) Elena Sheppard, “From ‘tribes’ to ‘powwows’: summer camps finally reckon with abuse of Indigenous traditions”, *The Guardian*, April 5, 2022. Available at: <https://archive.ph/kKFNV>.
- [8](#) Charlton T. Lewis, Charles Short, *A Latin Dictionary* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1879), s.v. “parento”.
- [9](#) Anam Ajmal, “Facebook refused to classify Bajrang Dal as ‘dangerous’: WSJ report”, *The Times of India*, December 15, 2020. Available at: <https://archive.ph/0Uk7E>.
- [10](#) Dinesh Unnikrishnan, “Banking Central | 51 years of bank nationalisation: Indira Gandhi’s ‘drama’ or India’s biggest banking reform?”, *Moneycontrol*, July 20, 2020. Available at: <https://archive.ph/rp5gY>.
- [11](#) Ibn Khaldun, *Muqaddimah*, pp. 228–229.
- [12](#) See p. 5.
- [13](#) See ch. 4.
- [14](#) See Jack Goody, “Strategies of Heirship”, *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 15, no. 1, (January 1973): pp. 3-20.
- [15](#) “Diseases of the Soul: Prejudice (asabiyyah)”, *Al-Islam.org*. Available at: <https://archive.ph/sBd5i>.
- [16](#) *Ummah* being the Islamic community.
- [17](#) Homer, *Iliad*, IX, 64–65 (Perth: Imperium Press, 2019).
- [18](#) Julianne Holt-Lunstad et al, “Loneliness and social isolation as risk factors for mortality: a meta-analytic review”, *Perspectives on Psychological Science* 10, no. 2, (March 2015): 227-237. Available at: <https://archive.ph/YkjJN>.
- [19](#) Robert E. Howard, *The Tower of the Elephant*.
- [20](#) Max Hartshorn, Artem Kaznatcheev and Thomas Schultz, “The Evolutionary Dominance of Ethnocentric Cooperation”, *Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation* 16, no. 3, (June 2013). Available at: <https://archive.ph/VooCZ>.
- [21](#) The late Bronze Age palace economies, late antiquity, the Spring & Autumn period,

Sixth Egyptian Dynasty, etc.

[22](#) We will go over this in more detail in ch. 40 on cyclical history.

[23](#) See David Herlihy, *Medieval Households*, ch. 2 “The Household in Late Barbarian Antiquity” (Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1985).

THIRTY-THREE

FILMER:

PATRIARCHY

Most men don't understand women. This isn't just something women say: it's true, even of redpilled men. Too often men say that women want you to dominate them. Sort of—any man who's halfway healthy can dominate a woman, this isn't especially attractive. Women don't want men who are dominant around women, they want men who are dominant around other men. This is an echo of living in a *shame culture* for most of our history, where what matters is what others think of you—specifically, what other *men* think of you.

The error runs one of two ways. On the one side are any number of Manosphere influencers. They've fashioned themselves into exactly what losers think an alpha male would be—selfish, abrasive, and completely enslaved to materialism. They're not patriarchs because they're not fathers, even in the extended sense we'll explore shortly. Their opinions on masculinity and patriarchy don't count, because patriarchy is not the rule of mere men, but of *fathers*.

Progressive losers' opinions don't count either. For them, masculinity is being so secure in your manhood that you can discard all masculinity and just be gay. Would they say the same thing about wokeness? that the true progressive is so secure in her wokeness that she can throw up a Roman salute and go burn some crosses? No, because her opinions on masculinity are in bad faith—she's never met a masculinity she didn't think was toxic. For her, heroism is having the right beliefs;¹ for her, heroism is getting behind your whole society and pretending to push it in the direction it's already going—progressivism is leading from behind. Heroism and masculinity are active; this is passive. The left has nothing to do with masculinity or patriarchy, and none of its opinions on it are relevant.

In our last chapter we went over what it took to immigrate to Athens in the 4th century BC vs. what it takes to immigrate to the West today—the first basically never succeeded, and the second basically never fails. There’s clearly a difference in which of these is a serious society. Although Athens had already become a democracy, this strict immigration policy was the afterglow of a long period of patriarchy. Democracy didn’t take long to dissolve this—by the end of that same century, foreigners could enjoy rights of citizenship, and if they wanted, they could just buy their way in.²

This democratic decay into a quasi-feminized anarchy is basically a historical law, and the king, or as the Greeks called him the *basileus*, is the last line of defense against such anarchy. As we have seen in the chapters on sovereignty and on the good king, the law turns out to be powerless to stop a man from turning your city into a dump—you need another man for that. The sovereign is necessarily above the law. This is an ancient fact, and we find it recognized in Archytas, who distinguishes between the sovereign (*basileus*) who is the living law (*nomos empsukhos*), and the mere magistrate (*arkhon*) who is under that law.³ The king’s authority is not granted to him from below; it comes from his person, not his office—like we saw with Gaddafi in ch. 31.

What makes the king a king, is that he is the protector of his people. Xenophon compares the king to a shepherd,⁴ which is a great analogy and makes clear the relationship between sovereignty and authority. The shepherd is protector of his sheep, but he’s not the “servant” of the sheep. He’s not the “first minister” to them. The sheep are not his boss—they’re not sovereign over him. The protector is the sovereign.

Shepherd is a good analogy for the king, but a better one is *father*. The word “father” derives from the Proto-Indo-European root **peh₂-*, which means “protect”. This same root also gives us “apparent”, i.e. something seen, and “imperative”, a command. The father is the one who *watches over* the helpless, who *commands* them; but above all, he *protects* them. Paternity is a genetic relationship, but it’s much more than that—it’s also a relationship of duty. Think about Bridger Walker. You may remember him as the boy who jumped in front of his

sister to protect her from a dog attack that would probably have killed her. When asked why he did it, he answered, “if someone was going to die, I thought it should be me.”⁵ That sums up what it is to be a father, and also what it is to be a king. Bridger Walker is ten times the patriarch these Manosphere posers will ever be.

In the earliest times, the family father literally *was* a king to his family. To give this little absolute monarchy a name, let’s call it *microstalinism*.

In the beginning, each family was made up of a House Father—the eldest male—his wife and children, and their extended family; and their little world was governed by a religion. When a man died, the soul was not parted from the body, so the dead man stayed where he was buried, and still had his old bodily needs. And so, the family continued to make offerings to the dead and to worship their ancestors, whose line they traced back to the gods themselves. The House Father was the high priest of this little church, leading them in the proper rites. He was also its supreme magistrate—he alone judged his family, and the law was the law of family custom. No one could intrude upon his sovereignty; he had *ius vitae necisque*, the power of life and death. What’s more, he held the family property in trust—it was really held by the dead who lived there. The House Father was the sole proprietor; no one in the family owned anything but through him. He was Pope, supreme judge, and commander-in-chief, all rolled into one, a little absolute monarch ruling over a little society, that needed nothing outside itself.

For most of our history we lived under this microstalinism. As the family became too big to live together, the younger branches would become House Fathers in turn, with the House Father of the eldest branch being supreme above the others. This “Father of Fathers” would leave his cousins to their own family worship, but led them in special rites as the House Father would have led the primitive family. We have here the clan, with its chieftain. We have moved from the House Father—the king of his own castle—to the king.⁶

Originally, god, king, and country were not separate things—they were united in the father and the line of ancestors. Sovereignty was clear and indivisible. Kingship was sacred, because everything was

sacred. But as new ideas came in, things changed. We got the division between sacred and secular in the “City of Man” (the domain of kings) vs. the “City of God” (the domain of priests). Since the Emperor could no longer be high priest, there arose a power struggle between him and the Pope.⁷ Those who backed the Emperor wanted to see the Pope humbled, so they argued for divine right of kings. Those who backed the Pope wanted to see kings humbled, so they argued for divine right of the people—so-called “consent of the governed”. It’s here that Robert Filmer steps on to the stage in defense of kingship.

Filmer sees that the governed are never governed by consent because of the unequal relationship between leader and led.⁸ Genghis Khan needs his followers, but there are millions of good followers and only one Genghis Khan—each follower needs him more than he needs them. This is about as “consensual” as a philosophy graduate working at Starbucks—he doesn’t do it because he wants to, he does it because he has to. Filmer then observes that the leader-led relationship just is the father-child relationship—he points to the natural dependence of children on fathers, and notes that this dependence is the same for sovereign and subjects as it is for father and children. It’s not that these relationships are alike, it’s that they’re *exactly the same*.

If we compare the natural duties of a father with those of a king, we find them all one, without any difference at all but only in the latitude or extent of them. As the father over one family, so the king, as father over many families, extends his care to preserve, feed, clothe, instruct and defend the whole commonwealth. His wars, his peace, his courts of justice, and all his acts of sovereignty tend only to preserve and distribute to every subordinate and inferior father, and to their children, their rights and privileges, so that all the duties of a king are summed up in an universal fatherly care of his people.⁹

Filmer is recovering something very ancient here, something that has stood the test of time. Something that has been around much longer than liberalism—that has been around since before men even walked upright—and that will be around long after liberalism has been forgotten. This “universal fatherly care of his people” is just the king carrying out his duty as a *protector*, just as the Indo-Europeans understood the father.

Others understood this too. The paradigm of authority is the father.

In chapter 27 on the book of *Job*, we looked at how God’s authority came just from having fathered the world itself. When God asked “where were you when I laid the foundation of the world”, the implication is that Job had no authority to challenge him, simply because Job was in the position of child and God was in the position of father. This relationship of authority between father and child is so natural and obvious that to argue against it is to make use of it. Even to challenge the authority of fathers is done by reason, meaning by appeal to assumptions we’ve all inherited. These assumptions aren’t just floating in space waiting for you to grasp them, they were handed to you by your tradition, and your tradition is authoritative because *it made you and sheltered you*—like a father.¹⁰

But tradition can’t rule by itself in the abstract, it must be borne by a concrete man—a patriarch. This is the lesson of Leonidas:¹¹ the law is a sword that must be taken up by a man. That man is the king, and as the father of his people, he wields the law to protect his children. The sword can’t wield itself. As Filmer said, the hammer can’t build a house without the carpenter. The law can’t be sovereign, only a king can, so we naturally back the strong horse just because he’ll dump on our enemies—this is really all Trump was good for in the end: “finally, someone who can humiliate *them*”. All these things are natural to us, and liberalism has to spend so much time keeping nature out and pushing water uphill with a rake—telling us the law can rule, personal power is corrupt, the people are in charge—that the whole structure is left to fall apart.

This is the result of a revolution in thinking. But not just one revolution—it’s a revolution that has been going on for a long time. The French Revolution overthrew kingship in general and put “the people” in its place, which was really just a mask for an invisible and unaccountable elite. Kingship was overthrown in Greece. It was overthrown in Rome too, but it couldn’t be kept out, and eventually we got a king named Caesar, and a line of great kings after him. But before any of that, we had the Indo-European House Father, who was called **dems potis*. This archaic word gives us our word “despot”, so what was once the centre of our world was, at some point, rebranded as the worst thing imaginable.

But still, the patriarch—the *father as king*—has never quite left us. The courts of colonial Virginia regarded the killing of the House Father not as murder, but as treason, as a crime against the state. The penalty was to be burnt to death.¹² The law also required that House Fathers hold within their custody the crops and shares of all freemen within their families. Here is the archaic Indo-European household, 5,000 years later.

This patriarch, this *king as father* is on the horizon, and liberalism is terrified of him—it calls him “tyrant”, “fascist”, “the worst evil in history”. The war today is between the law and the man who wields it. This same war was waged in Rome and produced the greatest empire in history. The executive has so far only been absolute to the degree the modern priests in the judiciary allow (FDR). Anyone else is bound by the tradition (Trump). But a man will one day be placed to override the judiciary permanently.

Mainstream conservatives say they don’t need that man, we don’t need a *protector*, a father. They’re “rugged individualists”. But these individualists have been getting run over by a bunch of frumpy, dickless men in military uniforms. Mainstream conservatives are the weakest and most powerless people on Earth, the most in need of a protector. Don’t listen to them—we don’t need a written constitution, but a man with *will* and *judgment*. Trump was not that man, but that man is coming as sure as spring comes after winter. And he will bring *fire*.

SUMMARY

One sheep needs the shepherd more than the shepherd needs one sheep.

The leader-led relationship is just the father-child relationship.

Authority comes not from an office, but from one's person.

ENDNOTES

- 1 Progressives are a prime example of the *proposition nation*, where beliefs are your identity.
- 2 *Encyclopedia of Ancient Greece*, Nigel Guy Wilson (ed.), s.v. “Metics”, p. 470.
- 3 See Archytas, *On Justice and Law*, fragment 1. Quoted in *Early Greek Ethics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p. 461.
- 4 Xenophon, *Cyropaideia*, viii.2.14.
- 5 Saman Javed, “Heroic boy who saved his sister from dog attack feels ‘proud’ of his scars”, *Independent*, July 31, 2021. Available at: <https://archive.ph/OL4U7>.
- 6 This quick overview of thousands of years is spelled out in detail in W. E. Hearn, *The Indo-European Household* (Perth: Imperium Press, 2023).
- 7 The Early Middle Ages, from the Byzantine Papacy to about the 11th century, is the story of sacred and secular struggling for dominion one over the other.
- 8 Karl Ludwig von Haller would pick this up centuries later and run with it.
- 9 Robert Filmer, *Patriarcha*. From *Patriarcha: The Complete Political Works* (Perth: Imperium Press, 2023), pp. 11–12.
- 10 We will come back to this epistemic dependence on tradition in ch. 44.
- 11 See p. 263.
- 12 David Hackett Fischer, *Albion’s Seed*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 280.

THIRTY-FOUR

MAISTRE:

THE TRUE CONSTITUTION

In every society, you'll find a war waged over something unexpected—not over resources or status, but over *the past*. This seems like a strange thing to fight over, but as we've seen, even liberalism is obsessed with the past, and specifically with undermining it. But liberalism wants to *own* the past too. It constantly tries to retcon the past, to tell us that even at our origins *we were liberal*. You might have heard of the “state of nature” argument by people like Locke and Rousseau, which says that we were all free individuals until we voluntarily entered into a social contract. You might have heard that primitive England was a kind of parliamentary democracy. You might have heard that before man was, there was matriarchy. All of this is of course illiteracy strutting around in an Oxford cap.

The reason liberalism has to push itself back beyond memory is that otherwise it has a birthdate, and what has a birthdate is weak. If it has a birthdate, it has a father. If it has a father, it has a master. If it has a master, its authority is borrowed. The elegant solution is to kill the father, bury his body, and hope no one ever digs it up. The cultured thug is the master reanimator though, which is why you're told you can never be him—it's why you're told that thinking is for nerds and fighting is for retards.

What has a birthdate is weak, but the 18th century didn't get the memo. It was the century of founding things very noisily and conspicuously. After the French Revolution had hit the reset button and started us off at Year Zero,¹ it made a great fanfare of rewriting the French constitution. Quite naturally, people started writing their own just to see if they could. Writing constitutions became a national pastime. It got to where we were so choked with constitutions pulled

out of thin air, that you basically had to turn in your doctorate if you didn't have a constitution of your own in your little pocket. In fact, Thomas Paine said that a constitution didn't even *exist* until it could fit in someone's pocket—the Yankee Doodle version of a Pokémon.² But none of these French constitutions lasted—we're now up to number 14.

But there's a constitution of a very different kind, a constitution that each of the “gotta catch 'em all” constitutions depends on. Joseph de Maistre describes it:

It has often been thought that it would make an excellent joke at the expense of the French to ask them in what book was the Salic law written? but Jérôme Bignon answered very aptly, and probably without knowing how right he was, that it was written *in* the hearts of the French.³

A more familiar constitution of this kind is the English constitution.⁴ Maybe you can name the framers of the American constitution, but can you name the author of the English constitution? You can't, because it doesn't have an author, and it doesn't have an author because it was never codified. What kind of constitution is that? An *organic constitution*, one that grew up “with the silent lapse of time”, as we mentioned in ch. 9.⁵ One that's as much a part of England as the rolling hills and ancient barrows—it wasn't born and it will never die, it was just always there. Maistre says that the less one writes into the constitution the stronger it is, and the strongest constitution of all is unwritten.

The British Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli said as much himself in his *Vindication of the English Constitution*:

Charles the Tenth struggled with the futility of the Charter; he passed years in an impracticable attempt and fruitless effort to govern thirty-two millions of people with a silly piece of paper. With good intentions but no talents, surrounded by creatures destitute of every quality of statesmen, the king at length attempted to rid himself, and the nation, of an imposture which only supplied a faction with a pretext. Charles failed, but even Charles the Tenth nearly succeeded. Louis Philippe at the head of a mob crying “Vive la Republique!” established a despotism. Is there no moral in this rapid catastrophe? Are we to be ever deaf and ever blind? Are we never to learn that a constitution, a real constitution, is the creation of ages, not of a day, and that when we destroy such a constitution, we in fact destroy a nation.⁶

The English constitution is an expression of the English folk-soul, or as Friedrich Carl von Savigny called it, the *volksgeist*.⁷ The English

people can no more alter or change it than a man can become a woman by cutting off his own penis—the result would be something unnatural. There was no man who brought into existence the body of English positive law; this was the work of “the spirit of a people living and working in common in all the individuals”.⁸ Savigny notes that this is the case for many things other than law in the life of a people,

which have in like manner an origin invisible and reaching beyond authentic history, for example, social life and above all speech. In this is found the same independence of accident and free individual choice, the same generation from the activity of the spirit of the people working in common in each individual; in speech too from its sensible nature, all this is more evident and recognizable than in law.⁹

Mere accident and human choice have nothing to do with our language—the very words we use are the historical expressions of who we are as a folk. What could be more English than a medieval knight? And yet the word *knight* is spelled oddly. This is because it descends from Old English *cniht* (sounds like *k-nichht* with a guttural sound), retaining a Germanic flavour. That Old English word is in turn derived from Proto-Germanic **kunja*, meaning “clan”. To be a knight was just to be of a certain ethnic stock. There’s nothing accidental about being your father’s son, nor is there anything accidental about this archaic spelling. Nor is there anything accidental in the English constitution.

This process of a thing being shaped by long usage, and especially the people who bring about that thing being instruments of some larger force—this recalls our discussion in ch. 9 of *fas*, the divine law. *Fas* is speech without a speaker, *vox populi*, *vox dei* [“voice of the people, voice of the god”]. The people, grown up organically over time, are guided by the hand of fate. Even the king himself is a tool in the hand of divine law. And no matter how hard they try, no matter what laws they give themselves, the people will only ever be what their *volksgeist* lets them be—you can’t legislate that a fish walk or that a ground sloth do calculus.

Take France after the French Revolution. In 1789, liberalism had truly had its own way. France’s confidence? Limitless. Her ancient government? Extinguished. Her every enemy? Paralyzed. Her affairs? Undisturbed. Now, let this perfectly tuned revolutionary state run its

course, and what do you get? You get the *Terror*—a notorious scene of butchery and human sacrifice brought on by the government trying to pound the square peg of liberalism into the round hole of reality. But that's not the end of it. In a cruel twist of fate, the ideals of the Enlightenment which spent so much blood to do away with the absolute personal rule of the king ended up putting in its place the absolute personal rule of Napoleon Bonaparte. Today France is not ruled by a man in a tri-corner hat with his hand in his jacket, but by managerial oligarchs—and no less absolutely than under Louis XIV, who at least cared about it.

Maistre's *true constitution* arises spontaneously in the breast of every man governed by it. It is not the will of particular men, not even the king. How can we square this with the idea that the sovereign is above the law? After all, Maistre was himself an absolutist. His point is that the sovereign is *himself* a tool of fate. Whole peoples can't be constituted by debate and human will: they can be constituted only by fate, which works itself through a divine lawgiver. When Lycurgus appeared as lawgiver to the Spartans, he didn't engage in a debate club but spoke on behalf of the Oracle at Delphi. What laws he pronounced were pronounced *through* him.

It's truly a paradox that great things have humble and obscure beginnings, whereas ostentatious beginnings usually attach to insignificant things. The French Constitution of 1791—announced with a great trumpeting forth of praise, long deliberations, longer revisions, made for all time—lasted less than a year.¹⁰ It's the thing that dignifies the name, not the other way around.¹¹ We began this book talking about Aeschylus, the great tragedian of Greece. His art is one of the most elevated expressions man has ever produced. The very word *tragedy* brings to mind such titans as Sophocles and Shakespeare, and yet the word comes from a root that means “goat song”. Where tragedy would go could not have been planned by the first tragedian, only brought about by *fas*, by the work of circumstances. How much more the constitution of a whole people? The very idea of cooking something like that up from scratch is absurd, it offends even the most basic common sense.

Still more offensive is the idea of a law for all men. A constitution is

not written for “man” because for all political and even moral purposes, “man” is not a thing at all. A constitution is like a prescription—the doctor writes it for *this* patient, and not every patient. A constitution is an expression of *this* people, of its folk-soul. A people can be no more governed by an alien constitution, or one pulled out of thin air, than a car can be governed by the laws of biology, or an ecosystem by the laws of grammar. This kind of ethnic particularism is often criticized by throne and altar traditionalists who otherwise agree with Maistre. This is very strange because arguably his greatest work¹² is dedicated to explaining how the French constitution is written on the hearts of the French—that is, how it’s an ethnic expression. About a century before, another throne and altar thinker, Boulainvilliers, predicted the French Revolution as a war between the Estates on the basis that the Third Estate was overwhelmingly Celtic stock and First and Second were Germanic.¹³ As always, demographics is destiny, and the original throne and altar traditionalists understood that.

To trace the origin of a thing is to rob it of its power—this was understood by the Egyptians as the “power of naming”,¹⁴ and is understood by liberalism in its attempts to insert itself into the distant past. Maistre says that a government should be like to a religion: “it has its dogmas, its mysteries, and its ministers; to annihilate it or to subject it to the discussion of each individual is the same thing.”¹⁵ A people’s folk-soul gives it its “prejudices”—its assumptions, orientation, and values—and also its basic constitution. Such a thing should not be inquired into, but must remain dark, mysterious, foreboding, and off-limits, if a people is to survive.

SUMMARY

What has a birthdate is weak.

Any true constitution is written on the hearts of a people.

There is no constitution for “man” because there are only different peoples.

ENDNOTES

- [1](#) Insanely, this actually happened. See Wikipedia, “French Republican Calendar”. Available at: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French_Republican_calendar [accessed 03/10/2023].
- [2](#) Joseph de Maistre, *Major Works, Volume I* (Perth: Imperium Press, 2021), p. 12.
- [3](#) Ibid, p. 9.
- [4](#) Before we consider what a sorry state modern Britain is in, consider that the American constitution is heavily indebted to the English constitution.
- [5](#) See p. 63.
- [6](#) Benjamin Disraeli, *Vindication of the English Constitution in a Letter to a Noble and Learned Lord* (London: Saunders and Otley), pp. 37–38.
- [7](#) This translates to “folk-spirit”, but the sense is close enough.
- [8](#) Friedrich Carl von Savigny, *System of the Modern Roman Law*, ch. ii, §V.
- [9](#) Ibid.
- [10](#) “Constitution of 1791: French history”, *Encyclopedia Britannica*. Available at: <https://archive.ph/M268G> [accessed 06/10/2023].
- [11](#) And a poor thing will tarnish a name. This is the engine that drives the euphemism treadmill. See for example the etymology of the English word *bad* stemming from Old English *bæddel*.
- [12](#) Joseph de Maistre, *Essay on the Generative Principle of Political Constitutions and Other Human Institutions*.
- [13](#) Henri de Boulainvilliers, *Essai sur la noblesse de France* (1732).
- [14](#) See p. 255.
- [15](#) Joseph de Maistre, *Major Works, Volume I* (Perth, Imperium Press, 2021), p. 204.

THIRTY-FIVE LIST: KICKING AWAY THE LADDER

When Donald Trump won the US presidency in 2016, it struck the political establishment like a thunderbolt, not only in America, but everywhere in the world. Before this, there was a gentleman's agreement in politics that there were some things you were just not supposed to talk about, especially not together. In Trump's case, those things were a) stopping immigration, b) no more war for other countries, and c) economic protectionism. The fact that Trump didn't achieve any of these is beside the point; the point is that he made it OK to talk about them. You being allowed to advocate for yourself has been a huge blow to people who hate you—maybe a fatal blow.

Economic protectionism—the idea that a country should be able to act in its own economic interests—has for a long time been considered anti-American. We're told that America is and has always been about free trade, especially during the so-called “robber baron” age in the late 19th century. But nothing could be further from the truth. From the time of the first US Congress to the end of WWII (1789–1945), America had a consistent policy of protectionism and import tariffs, and it was during this time that America became the greatest superpower in the history of the world.¹

So what changed? Why did America start whistling a different tune after 1945? What changed was America's interests, and to understand why, we have to understand how economies grow.

The lowest stage of economic development is the agricultural economy. Primitive economies are purely agricultural—they depend completely on farming. At this point, it's in the interest of the nation to adopt and promote free trade, because it gets much needed manufactured goods like farming tools and it can export its

agricultural produce. But this doesn't last forever. Nationalist economist Friedrich List explains:

The experience of all nations in all times teaches us that nations, so long as they remain in a state of barbarism, derive enormous benefit from free and unrestricted trade [...] But experience also shows that those very nations, the farther advances that they make for themselves in culture and in industry, regard such a system of trade with a less favourable eye, and that at last they come to regard it as injurious and as a hindrance to their further progress.²

Once a nation has built up a manufacturing base of its own, its interests change. Now free trade becomes a hindrance, because until its industry grows, foreign goods will be cheaper, which will strangle its infant manufacturing base in the crib. In a manufacturing or industrial economy, free trade is a disastrous policy—it's in the national interest to impose tariffs and become protectionist.³

So far, so good. But what happens when a nation builds itself up beyond an industrial economy? What comes next is a commercial economy, i.e. an economy based not on making things, but on facilitating trade. An economy based on facilitating trade will, of course, benefit from free trade. And what's more, it will benefit from *other* economies having free trade—global free trade enables the commercial power to maintain its commercial hegemony. We have the engine driving globalism here in a nutshell.

So free trade is good at the extremes—at the lowest stage of development (agricultural) and at the highest stage of development (commercial)—but it's bad in the middle stage of development (industrial). So it follows that if you're a commercial power and you want to protect your status as world hegemon, it's in your interest to promote free trade for *everyone*, whether their economy is agricultural, industrial, or commercial. This will kill off the infant manufacturing bases of industrial economies, preventing them from developing into commercial economies—or as Friedrich List puts it, the commercial nation will “kick away the ladder” that it climbed up, denying this development to other nations. After exhaustively showing that England built up its commercial power by protectionist policies, List gives us the punchline:

It is a very common clever device that when anyone has attained the summit of greatness, he kicks away the ladder by which he has climbed up, in order to deprive

others of the means of climbing up after him. In this lies the secret of the cosmopolitical⁴ doctrine of Adam Smith, and of the cosmopolitical tendencies of his great contemporary William Pitt, and of all his successors in the British Government administrations.

Any nation which by means of protective duties and restrictions on navigation has raised her manufacturing power and her navigation to such a degree of development that no other nation can sustain free competition with her, can do nothing wiser than to throw away these ladders of her greatness, to preach to other nations the benefits of free trade, and to declare in penitent tones that she has hitherto wandered in the paths of error, and has now for the first time succeeded in discovering the truth.⁵

So there's a kind of *high-low vs. middle* dynamic even in economics. The highly developed commercial nations and the primitive agricultural nations have a common interest—the commercial nations want to wreck the competition and the agricultural nations want to grow, so free trade is the natural way for them to destroy industrial economies. Sometimes this strategy isn't cynical at all: often the ideologues of free trade genuinely believe in it. But that doesn't make it any less destructive to the world's industrial capacity—since 1997, world manufacturing output as a percentage of world GDP has been mostly on a downward trend,⁶ and that trend has only started to flatten out since China has become strong enough to push back against free trade.

It's important to understand *kicking away the ladder* to understand why free trade has nothing to do with prosperity. But kicking away the ladder as a broader strategy is much more common than you'd think, and when you see it one place, you start to see it everywhere.

We saw in ch. 4 that social change is always top-down, never bottom-up. The mythology of the plucky activists fighting the system in the 1960s is total nonsense—by the time people like Martin Luther King and Rosa Parks were marching in the streets, the battle had already been won by the securing of patronage, political alliances, and legislative victories.⁷ And yet, this mythology is an important pillar holding up the system, because it tells you that revolution happens *only* from the bottom up. In other words, by lying to you about how social change happens, it ensures that you will never be able to achieve it. Liberalism has kicked away the ladder by which it has attained power—it's *revolution from the top for me, revolution from the*

*bottom for thee.*⁸

Kicking away the ladder is perhaps most blatant in racial politics. The history of the 20th century, especially the second half, has been the history of racial minorities organizing and acting in their own racial interests, with great success. As of 2022, about 76% of Americans were white,⁹ but as of that same year, only 41% of Ivy League students were white;¹⁰ this disparity is mainly driven by diversity quotas,¹¹ which mandate that minority students with lower aptitude and SAT scores be accepted over white students with higher scores.¹² The traditional way of fixing the problem would be for white people to organize in their own interest, but doing so is absolutely forbidden. Whereas Jewish people have their own advocacy group (the ADL) that is tied institutionally to the Deep State, whereas blacks have their own congressional caucus, and whereas Latinos have their own advocacy group (UnidosUS, formerly known as National Council of La Raza, “La Raza” meaning “the race”), whites alone are denied such advocacy, which is called “white supremacy” and met with lawfare, deplatforming, and violence. If this were aimed at any other racial group, it would be in violation of article 19 of the UN’s *Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples*.¹³ It’s “ethnocentrism for me, diversity for thee.”

So far we’ve drawn attention to those situations where kicking away the ladder is bad, but it isn’t always bad—not every space should be accessible to everyone. After all, “different rules for different people” is the basis of morality, as we found in ch. 11. Sovereignty is an example of kicking away the ladder and is absolutely justified—without a sovereign, you don’t have a nation at all. The state of exception itself, which we discussed in ch. 1, is a kind of kicking away of the ladder where the sovereign explicitly reserves for itself powers that can’t be invoked by anyone else. Any sovereign that does not explicitly cut off all paths to usurping its sovereignty is negligent and is putting its people at risk. Kicking away the ladder is not bad in itself, but it becomes pathological when done dishonestly and then pretending that it’s not happening. Liberal governments function as absolutist governments in that they reserve to themselves emergency military powers, powers to suspend the law, eminent domain, etc., but

liberal governments do this under the colour of popular sovereignty and rule of law. Neither of these are real things, so liberalism rules in a deceptive and opaque way, rather than out in the open.

Kicking away the ladder, at its worst, is based on the same principle as anarcho-tyranny—formal equality, but *de facto* inequality. Ironically, the left has been screeching about this for years when it yells about “institutional racism” and so forth. The problem is not the inequality, but the formal equality. A sovereign that calls itself a sovereign is much more likely to act as a real sovereign—i.e. in the interests of its people, with noblesse oblige.¹⁴ But dishonesty is the point. Ruling in the open is hard and requires genius; ruling behind a fog of ideology is much easier, especially for parasites.

In economic terms, kicking away the ladder is no different. Free trade, far from making us all better off, systematically destroys industry, the capacity to produce everything we depend on—and it does so using high-flown language about freedom and prosperity. So it’s no wonder that every nation that adopts free trade sooner or later becomes a “post-industrial” economy, which is to say, a parasitical economy. But the economic lesson of the 20th century is that nations that ignore beautiful lies about free trade eventually come into their own as world powers, such as Russia and China, just as Britain and America did before them. And it’s these countries, not the husk that is the West, that the future belongs to. If the West has any hope of revitalizing itself, it will need to adopt in its broad outlines Trump’s three-part 2016 campaign, and that means re-thinking free trade.

SUMMARY

America was a protectionist nation while it was becoming a superpower.

When someone has climbed to the top, he kicks away the ladder.

Kicking away the ladder is formal equality but de facto inequality.

ENDNOTES

1 For an overview of this, see Ha-Joon Chang's *Kicking Away the Ladder*, (London: Anthem Press, 2002), pp. 24–32.

2 Friedrich List, *The National System of Political Economy* (Perth: Imperium Press, 2022), p. 16.

3 Not across the board, mind you. It's in the interest of a manufacturing nation to maximize its importation of whatever raw materials it needs, for example.

4 By “cosmopolitical” List means *globalist*.

5 List, *National System*, pp. 313–314.

6 “World Manufacturing Output 1997-2023”, *Macrotrends*. Available at: <https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/WLD/world/manufacturing-output>.

7 For detail on this, see Chris Bond's *Nemesis: The Jouvenelian vs. the Liberal Model of Human Orders* (Perth: Imperium Press, 2019), ch. IX, “The Left and Right of Politics”.

8 A similar top-down revolution occurred in the American revolution itself. For more on this, see Charles A. Beard's *An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States* (1913). For a similar account of the English civil wars, see the Earl of Clarendon's *The History of the Rebellion* (1704).

9 “Population Estimates, July 1, 2022”, *United States Census Bureau*. Available at: <https://archive.ph/gnjJ9>.

10 Eric Kaufmann, “Diverse and Divided: A Political Demography of American Elite Students”, *Center for the Study of Partisanship and Ideology*, October 3, 2022. Available at: <https://archive.ph/vDl3e>.

11 J. Scott Turner, “The dangerous rise of academic diversity quotas”, *Spectator Australia*, May 3, 2022. Available at: <https://archive.ph/LqGXN>.

12 Natalie Silver, “Why It's OK for Colleges to Accept Minorities With Lower SAT Scores”, *Mic*, April 11, 2012. Available at: <https://archive.is/kM7z4>.

13 “States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous peoples concerned through their own representative institutions in order to obtain their free, prior and informed consent before adopting and implementing legislative or administrative measures that may affect them.” This of course can't be done for white people since they alone are not allowed to have any representative institutions. See “UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples”, *Australian Human Rights Commission*. Available at: <https://archive.ph/axIJf>.

14 See ch. 5.

THIRTY-SIX

CARLYLE:

NATURAL LAW

You can drive out nature with a pitchfork, but she always comes back. — Horace¹

In my hometown I spent a fair bit of time at a nature reserve just outside the city. It was a beautiful woodland where a river wound its way toward the sea, sure of itself, in no real hurry to get there. One summer day, my brother and I took our dog for a run through the woods along with a few friends. We stumbled upon a stream running down to the river, cutting a little swath across our path. Who knows how long it had been there? Someone pointed out how awkwardly the stream seemed to snake down to the river, swinging this way and that almost comically. We had a lot of time on our hands in those days, so we decided to save it some trouble and make it flow more directly into the river.

What started out on a whim grew into an obsession. We worked all day on our little stream, knocking down a barrier that caused it to swing wildly in one direction, using fallen branches and creating makeshift tools for digging and hilling. Occasionally the stream would break down a wall or go skirting off in an unexpected direction, thwarting our plans but giving us an excuse to keep going. This went on for many hours. By sunset we had quite an achievement on our hands—the stream now ran in a more or less straight course from the thick brush down to the river, with steep reinforced banks. We took one last look at our construction project, and I thought to myself that whatever else I might do from then on, here was something I'd done, however small, that would last a thousand years. With that, we left the darkening swale for civilization.

A few weeks later we came back to the reserve and set off for our stream. Under canopy, through the wilds, and along the pathways we

searched, but couldn't find it. We doubled back many times, searching again and again for it, until we finally found our stream—it had reverted back to its former convoluted course, with the whole scene just as it was before. Apparently the stream knew something we didn't.

“Law” is a very odd metaphor to apply to nature. A law is a kind of command, the prescription of a course of conduct by an authority.² A law is something that carries a punishment if broken, but the “laws” of nature can't be broken. As David Hume says, natural laws are not so much laws as systematic descriptions of reality.³ Let's give a simple example.

The second law of thermodynamics states that the entropy (or disorder) of a closed system will always tend to increase over time. If you put an ice cube in a glass of water, the system tends to become more disordered, meaning the ice cube gets warmer and the water gets colder. On the molecular level, you might be able to find a tiny part of the water that gets warmer for a moment after the ice cube is dropped into it, but *on average* the second law can't be violated. You might be able to fool yourself into thinking it's been violated, and if your perspective is narrow enough (say, limited to a handful of molecules for one billionth of a second), you'll think it's definitely been violated. But the second law is a law of nature, and in the end, the law always holds.

Natural laws like this aren't limited to physics—there are natural laws of human behaviour too, like that *birds of a feather flock together*. Sure, you might be able to find a multicultural society that “works” for a few generations, just like our stream held its course perhaps for a day or two, but it won't be long before it fails. We also mentioned in chapter 20 J. D. Unwin, whose exhaustive anthropological study found that a society that deviates from traditional sexual norms tends to break down in about three generations.⁴ There are laws of human politics too. No society has ever been able to successfully run on the principle of democracy. All have quickly reverted to some form of oligarchy,⁵ or else collapsed. Nature simply will not permit the people to rule. It's in violation of natural law, but there's nothing magical or mystical about such a law

—it’s just the way things work. The Victorian intellectual giant Thomas Carlyle illustrates this by the metaphor of a ship trying to round Cape Horn:

Your ship cannot double Cape Horn by its excellent plans of voting. The ship may vote this and that, above decks and below, in the most harmonious exquisitely constitutional manner: the ship, to get round Cape Horn, will find a set of conditions already voted for, and fixed with adamantine rigour by the ancient Elemental Powers, who are entirely careless how you vote.⁶

If you can’t sail a ship with a crew of twenty people by democratic principles, how on earth are you going to democratically sail the ship of state with 20 million? You can vote how you like, but nature will not be stood on her head.

Natural law is just the way things work, no more and no less. Humans think they can change this, that they have changed it many times, but this is like the gambler who goes to the casino and beats the odds. Sure, it might happen once or twice. You might even have a lucky run. But in the long run, the house always wins. The idea that the left is somehow pro-nature has been memed into reality, but this is just a meme. The “xenofeminist” Laboria Cuboniks aptly summarizes the left-wing approach to nature when she says “if nature is unjust, change nature!”⁷ The left is the chronic gambler who sees someone that once won a few bucks, extrapolates this exception to a whole worldview,⁸ and then yells about “structural inequality” when their stupidity runs aground on reality—they are in fact at war with reality. But reality is their master, and was here long before them. Just because you can think it up, doesn’t make it so. Sam Hyde makes this point with another analogy:

I worked with this guy once who was a big tech nerd type guy. [...] And he said “I wish I could go into outer space once day and see all kinds of all the different life forms that would evolve, and they would have all kinds of blue, a blue-skinned guy with six arms...”

If there is life on other planets, it’s not going to look that different—if it’s a similar planet, you’re not going to have six-legged people walking around. If you tried to design a six-wheeled race car, like the Tyrrell Formula 1 six-wheeled race car, you would quickly discover that six wheels is not the optimal configuration for a race car.

Things just sort of fall into the slot where there’s nowhere lower for it to go.⁹

Hyde is talking about convergent evolution, which exemplifies natural law. A whale and a salmon have taken very different evolutionary

paths—one started out as a four-legged land dweller and one has been in the ocean since it was pond scum—but both have ended up with a tail fin, because having a tail fin is just the best way for a vertebrate to get around in water. Things tend to shake out in a certain way just by necessity. Sorry for the six-legged polysexual dwarf, but it’s baked into the nature of things that certain ways of being are superior, and others are freakish blunders that nature abhors and eliminates at the earliest opportunity.

In this way, natural law might seem like something weighty, ponderous, and uncompromising—totally “based”. It’s a sort of law written across the face of the cosmos, not dependent on time, place, custom, or anything but pure disembodied reason. And this is exactly why natural law has a troubled relationship to tradition. Natural law poses itself as a kind of Archimedean point where if you just get the principle right you can move the world—you can create a society as good as possible, as fair as possible, and as successful as possible. And this is why history is so important: when you actually *look* at the real-world impact of natural law, when you look at how natural law has been used historically, in real societies, you may come away with quite a different view of it than you started. As it turns out, natural law has often been used to challenge positive law and divine law, and has proven a very useful tool for those who want to challenge tradition.

As we saw in ch. 33,¹⁰ sovereignty began as indivisible and obvious, traditionally vested in kings who were also high-priests. As ideas changed, this national sovereignty had to be defended against the claims of the international sovereignty of the Pope. National sovereignty was defended by what came to be called *divine right of kings*, culminating in James I’s treatise *The True Law of Free Monarchies*, which essentially put the issue to bed. At this point, natural law gets brought in to attack the concept of sovereignty altogether, and a legal theorist named Suarez wrote a treatise saying that that *well actually authority doesn’t rest with the king, it rests with the people*.¹¹ This was picked up by Hugo Grotius in his *De Jure Belli ac Pacis*, and at this stage we get all the business about “consent of the governed” and social contract theory that led straight to liberalism, and which we’ve dealt with in chs. 13 and 33.

The logical conclusion of consensual and social contract theories is what today we call “human rights”. Like these earlier theories, “human rights” aren’t really a thing, but a malleable jellyfish that takes the shape of whatever container powerful forces want to pour it into in order to serve their purposes. All these later aberrations are rooted in natural law theory.

There *is* a natural law as surely as there is a nature, but the problem is determining what that law is. On the one hand—and through much of the intellectual history of the West—we have motivated reasoning about natural law in the abstract, which is only accepted as far as it justifies whatever power wants to do on a given day. On the other hand, we have the slow, organic growth of traditional folkways, what we called the *work of circumstances* in ch. 9, where the natural law is the result of natural selection working over immense spans of time on human institutions, just as it works on everything else in nature. One of these is just an intellectual gloss given by our leftist gambler who wants to deny reality; the other is the emergent order of reality itself as expressed through a whole people, rather than by a fallible man.

As long as we’ve been peoples, we’ve had an idea of natural law, whether we called it *ørlog*, *rta*, *córus*, or by any other name, and this law has always been seen as handed down by the gods. Natural law, where it’s not something subversive, must conform itself to divine law and not the other way around; a mere man, however brilliant, is in no position to judge the divine law of a whole people. Today, mere men—and not vey impressive men at that—judge our ancient positive law, our folkways, and our divine laws according to “natural law”, and they’ve been doing this for a long time now. What do they have to show for it?

After getting tamped down for a few generations, a genuine radical right is starting to become a cultural force again. Importing minorities was supposed to beat white people into submission but it has done just the opposite. White ethnic consciousness is again on the rise and the cat lady left is terrified to find out that it didn’t depend on Trump. What’s more, the ethnic consciousness of minorities is dwindling along with their birth rates. Fertility in the third world is starting to crater, and minorities at home are seeing their own ethnic self-expression

increasingly married to sexual deviancy—no wonder they don't want to have sex.

At the same time, the ever more complex system of international trade and geopolitics is becoming unmanageable. The global economic system is too complex and is severely fragile. Many have already forgotten, but the global economy almost tipped over because of lockdowns, as supply chains nearly collapsed over what was not even a real crisis.

And so, the Western managerial class is increasingly unable to govern at home and win abroad. The West used to be easily able to win wars by colour revolution alone—e.g. against the Soviet Union. Now it can't make a long-term dent in the Russian economy, even using the combined might of international sanctions. America can't even win wars against illiterate tribesmen with 20-year-old technology, such as in Afghanistan.

The West is weak because it has been at war with reality for a long time—and it knows it. It's hysterical because however strong it seems, it's fighting a war of attrition against nature—what it calls “the far right”—and it's losing. You can drive out nature with a pitchfork, you can stand her on her head for a while, but she won't be inverted forever. The wave of unreality is cresting and is about to roll back for another thousand years. When it does, it will leave many crushed bodies in its wake, and nature will not weep for them.

SUMMARY

In the long run, nature will not be stood on her head.

Natural law has often been used as a weapon against tradition.

Natural law must conform itself to divine law, not the other way around.

ENDNOTES

[1](#) Horace, *Epistles*, I, 10, line 24.

[2](#) For an extended discussion of the law as a species of command, see W. E. Hearn's *Indo-European Household* (Perth: Imperium Press, 2023), ch. xvii, §1.

[3](#) See Hume, *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding* (1748), ch. x, §12.

[4](#) J. D. Unwin, *Sex and Culture* (Perth: Imperium Press, 2024).

[5](#) See ch. 2 on the Deep State.

[6](#) Thomas Carlyle, *The Present Time* (Perth: Imperium Press, 2023), p. 15.

[7](#) Laboria Cuboniks, *Xenofeminism: A Politics for Alienation* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2018).

[8](#) As we've quoted Maistre before, they "build their whole worldview on exceptions".

[9](#) Sam Hyde, "Sam Hyde Rant on the Corruption of Entertainment", *YouTube*. Available at: <https://youtu.be/vqmmnCnuZVo?t=105>.

[10](#) See p. 286.

[11](#) Francisco Suarez, *Defensio Fidei Catholicae* (1613).

THIRTY-SEVEN

NIETZSCHE:

MASTER AND SLAVE MORALITY

After WWII, Julius Evola was put on trial for being a fascist. He denied the charge, calling himself a “superfascist”. When asked what on earth that meant, he said that “my principles are only those that, before the French Revolution, every well-born person considered sane and normal,” and this is a pretty good description of the radical right in general. Since the French Revolution there has indeed been a revolution in morality.

But what did people consider sane and normal before? One thing that people used to believe is *different strokes for different folks*—they used to be a lot less universalist than they are now. For example, *cuius rego eius religio* [“whose realm, his religion”] was an important political principle for centuries, and going back further, *suo quisque*,¹ the purest expression of localism, was our default state since forever. A universal morality like liberalism comes in very late, and stands on a historical foundation of particularism, the kind that says

that what is right for someone absolutely *cannot* be right for someone else; that the requirement that there be a single morality is harmful precisely to the higher men; in short, that there is an order of rank between people, and between moralities as well.²

The illiberal view is that what’s good for the tick is not what’s good for the dog. This is the view of grown men, and more specifically, of warrior types—hard-nosed realists who don’t give a damn about the tick’s feelings.

The liberal is, on the other hand, a priestly type. This may seem odd because liberalism is sold as irreligious, but nothing could be further from the truth. If a religion involves belief in the supernatural (e.g. progress, equality, human rights), intolerance of blasphemy (political correctness), emphasis on sin (white privilege), expiation of that sin

(checking white privilege), intolerance of heresy (denial of biological essentialism, human biodiversity, and inequality), theodicy³ (being oppressed is a sign of elect status), apocalypticism (class or race war), and eschatology⁴ (post-war establishment of full communism or multicultural utopia)—then liberalism fits the description of a religion better than many actual religions. And this is borne out in practice. Once the criminal George Floyd died after resisting arrest, amid the riots and arson there was a noticeable religious flavour to the “protests”.⁵ Liberalism is a religion and committed liberals are all priestly types—in previous lives they would have been monks and eunuchs. Absolutism was far more pragmatic, militarist, and realist, even if it was old and frail by the time liberalism replaced it. Liberalism is highly idealist and impractical, which is why after the French Revolution it fell apart basically right away,⁶ and was replaced by... the absolute rule of Napoleon. Liberalism is a religion, and its priests are exactly the same kind of people that have always been priests throughout history—nerds.

In our day of flimsy, ideological narratives, nerds are heroic characters: the savvy technical experts we all depend on, overlooked because they have glasses or braces or something. Today, the “revenge of the nerds” has in fact been accomplished—it’s cool to be one of these people and low class to be athletic or charismatic. The 1984 film of the same name came out when this revenge was still a fantasy, and it paints these people a bit more realistically, as awkward, ugly, and sexually desperate—even a bit rapey. Even though the film is fun and sympathetic to the nerds, they still come off as a bit botched, resentful, and emotionally fragile. Friedrich Nietzsche offers a description of the priestly type that might well have been about Poindexter himself:

From the very beginning there has been something unhealthy about these priestly aristocracies and in the customs dominant there, which are turned away from action and are partly brooding and partly emotionally explosive, resulting in the almost inevitable bowel complaints and neurasthenia which have plagued the clergy down the ages.⁷

The nerd-priest is sickly, and the more priestly (in our day, the more liberal), the more sickly he is. Liberals are prone to depression and seeing life as meaningless⁸—more than 50% of young females

considered “far left” have been diagnosed with a mental illness.⁹ Even the much-talked about “cognitive advantage” of liberals more or less vanishes when you take into account where they live.¹⁰ Liberals rank higher on neuroticism than their less liberal counterparts.¹¹ They have worse overall health.¹² They even tend to be uglier.¹³ These trends hold across genders and age groups.¹⁴ All this is because the kind of person who gets shoved in a locker in high school and grows up to construct an elaborate ideology to excuse their inferiority, is higher in what geneticists call “mutational load”—they are genetically less fit than normal, and this is reflected in observable traits like ugliness, anti-social personality, and emotional instability.¹⁵ Our instincts pick up on “creepiness” and punish it with low status and sexual frustration. Let’s not mince words here—the nerd and the liberal, and especially the ideologically committed liberal, are genetically inferior specimens.

And yet through this whole book you might have been wondering: if liberalism is so bad, how did it win? If the tick is so inferior, how did it become master over the dog? Seeing the revenge of the nerds a century in advance, Friedrich Nietzsche answered this question simply and clearly—the tick convinces the dog that to scratch is *immoral*.

The priest-nerd’s revenge on the warrior-jock is something to behold. Liberals accuse the right of being hateful, but this is pure projection. The priest, being the weaker, burns with white-hot hatred and seeks revenge by turning the warrior’s values upside down. Nietzsche calls this *master and slave morality*. Let’s unpack these.

The master morality of the warrior says that everything the warrior stands for is *good*, as you might expect. The important point is that the positive term (good) is basic, unspoken, the default. The priest is an afterthought, whatever he values is, for the master, not only inferior, but secondary and derivative, the opposite of the master—the master calls this *bad*. Master morality is good/bad, where good defines bad.

The slave morality of the priest doesn’t start with the priest, but again with the warrior. Everything the warrior stands for is *evil*. The master’s values are still the basic, default position—they’re just wrong. The slave, by contrast, is the opposite of the master, and for the slave, the opposite of the master is *good*. Slave morality is good/evil, where

evil defines good.

How different are the two words “bad” and “evil”, although both seem to be the opposite for the same concept, “good”? But it is *not* the same concept “good”; on the contrary, one should ask *who* is actually evil in the sense of the morality of *ressentiment*. The stern reply is: *precisely* the “good” person of the other morality, the noble, powerful, dominating one, but re-touched, re-interpreted, and reviewed through the poisonous eye of *ressentiment*.¹⁶

Whether master or slave morality, the master’s values still govern the slave’s—it’s just that one is the affirmative, noble morality of the superior and the other the negative, resentful morality of the inferior. And this resentment can reach truly ghoulish depths. Many people growing up hate their parents for taking their phone away or making them clean their room or something. This makes them resentful enough, sometimes to the point of violence or even killing—but at least their parents care about them, at least their parents have their interests at heart. Imagine the towering inferno of resentment in you if you’re an actual *slave*. Thinking about the condition of the slave helps us understand his morality.

Just to survive, a slave has to suppress his own nature. He has to be meek—if the master strikes him, he can’t strike back. He has to be patient—if the master tells him to wait, he waits. He has to be humble—if the master tells him he’s garbage, he has to agree. To be a slave is to restrain and suppress all your natural instincts, and over generations, these natural instincts get bred out of the slave. Eventually the slave comes to think that he *has* no nature. Maybe he even comes to think that nature is actively bad. But he can’t call it “bad” because *bad* is the word the master uses for him—he has to invent a new term—*evil*.¹⁷

There is nothing strange about the fact that lambs bear a grudge towards large birds of prey: but that is no reason to blame the large birds of prey for carrying off the little lambs. And if the lambs say to each other: “These birds of prey are evil; and whoever is least like a bird of prey and most like it’s opposite—a lamb, is good, isn’t he?”¹⁸

Master morality is good vs. bad—potent vs. impotent, capable vs. incapable, free vs. unfree.¹⁹ Slave morality is good vs. evil—kind vs. unkind, humble vs. proud, chaste vs. erotic, love vs. hate.

Most people are quite happy being subordinate as long as they’re provided for;²⁰ they love their masters. But the sense of pride can

never be fully bred out of the slave. Some aren't happy even with a fat belly, a full wallet, and a soft pillow—they hate the master. And yet they also hate *themselves* for obeying him, and this is the origin of what Nietzsche calls *bad conscience*, where the slave's resentment turns inward. Humans are predatory animals, and when they can't bite others, they will turn around and bite themselves—hence our term “the bite of conscience”. The slaves who most strongly feel this bite and this resentment become their leaders, their priests.

We can take Marx as a case study. Marx felt this bad conscience strongly, which is why he was a self-hating Jew. We around here are no fans of capitalism, but Marx resented the Protestant work ethic almost genocidally, and from this resentment cooked up an elaborate revenge fantasy—the communist revolution. This is no straightforward heroic triumph, but a typically slavish revolt, something mercantile, ideological, indirect, and impersonal. It's not carried out by people like him who are lazy and unproductive, nor by slaves who are incompetent—it's an *automatic* triumph carried out by material conditions themselves. This is the war of the slave who can't meet the master in open combat, but instead tries to convince the master to give up, that he “can't win”. Slave moralists can't oppose the master directly, with force—they're inherently inferior. So they develop “Morality”.

We have to distinguish between slave morality—“Morality” with a capital-M—and morality, what we might call normativity: having rules and norms, which are different for different classes of people. Nietzsche is calling for us to go beyond good and evil; he explicitly says “this does *not* mean ‘Beyond Good and Bad’”.²¹ Morality with a capital-M looks *universalist*—it's everyone under the same rubric, all souls equal before some ultimate moral force. It looks *pacifist*—it hates violence and strength, celebrates meekness. It looks *anti-natural*—nature is icky, evil, or secondary; for the slave, man is distinct from the world; in the hereafter is our *true* self, where the slave can call himself a king. Morality with a capital-M looks *anti-traditional*—it's revolutionary, it's TEDx-talk-tier contrarianism, it's basically “fuck you Dad” the ideology. And it looks like *linear history*—capital-M morality wants to make a fresh start, hit the reset button back to Year

Zero; it's progressive and supersessionist: everything we believed until the day before yesterday is now old and stupid.

Again, this kind of "Morality" is not *morality full stop*. It's not "obeying commands" or "having rules" or "doing things"; it's only a very specific kind of morality. The key to understanding slave morality is that this capital-M Morality gets memed into being "the only kind of morality". This matches up hip and thigh with liberalism—we have here a universalist morality that can leave no stone unturned; a pacifist morality focused on harm avoidance; an anti-natural morality always ready to invoke the "appeal to nature" fallacy; an anti-traditional morality that believes custom is arbitrary; and a progressive morality constantly rebelling against its own father, the witless "conservative", every generation. Liberalism is not the triumphant morality of the great man but the morality of the insect who has convinced the great man to lie down and be quiet. What it calls "evil" is master morality, which is exactly what Google has in mind when it tells itself, absurdly and ironically, "don't be evil".²²

What does all this matter, this genealogy of morality? The problem with the morality of resentful nerds, even beyond it being vulgar and gross, is that it has radically inhibited our culture and flourishing. Even the left has noticed that cultural production has effectively stopped.²³ From the period of about 1850–1950 we went from burning whale oil to splitting the atom; since then, technological advance has slowed to a crawl in almost every field.²⁴ Nerds make fine bean counters and researchers, but terrible masters.

Nietzsche aims his critique of slave morality at Christianity, but it makes an even better critique of liberalism. As things have got more liberal, we have lost the ability to produce greatness. There's a sort of cultural lag between an idea and its full consequences—as we noted in ch. 10, the West peaked under liberalism, but not because of it, no more than Kurt Cobain's success after becoming a junkie can be attributed to heroin. Slave morality is the systematic production of human failure, and turns weakness into an accomplishment. In its liberal form, it becomes a set of luxury beliefs whereby the present lives at the expense of the future, genetically as well as culturally. Belief in "progress" has a dubious, even an *inverse* relationship to

greatness—every culture that was vital and creative thought it was worse than its fathers; every culture that was weak and sterile thought it was better than them.

Nietzsche was eventually appropriated by the left, but tellingly, they wouldn't touch his concept of master and slave morality with a ten-foot pole. The left did take up his "genealogical method" of undermining something by saying where it came from. Now that it's won, the left is trying to retcon itself into the past, to put itself at the start—hence the 1619 project, "primitive communism", and Rousseau's "state of nature"—because the left knows that what has a birthdate is weak. Nietzsche is radical, but a philosopher of the right, especially of the *radical right*—he believes in distinction, difference, particularism, nature, and instinct. The left has only appropriated him as a destroyer, but now the sword of radicalism has turned against its wielder. The sword was picked up by the slave, wielded clumsily, and then thrown away. Now it has come back into the hands of the master moralist, and the slave again fears it.

Liberals accuse the right of hate, but you will never find someone more angry, spiteful, and hateful than a feminist or an anti-racist. The slave hates to an uncanny degree—hate drives him, fuels his whole worldview, because he suffers simply by virtue of being what he is. Slave morality tries to give meaning and purpose to his suffering. Suffering because someone else caused it is one thing; it gives you something to fight for, or at least, against. But the worst suffering of all is suffering just because you are what you are. The slave's moral preening over "systemic inequality" is one gigantic cope shielding him from the fact that nature has botched him.

Every great civilization was one where nerds got shoved into lockers—this is the way it is, and the way it ought to be. All high civilizations are built atop a foundation of chad energy, and when that energy dissipates, the civilization is not long for this world. Slave morality is so strong in us that we might even prefer extinction to the strong ruling the weak, and this in itself tells us how far we've fallen.

SUMMARY

The master asserts moral foundations; the slave inverts those foundations.

The slave convinces the master that to assert himself is immoral.

Slave morality forecloses on high culture.

ENDNOTES

[1](#) See p. 149.

[2](#) Friedrich Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 119.

[3](#) Theodicy, or the *problem of evil*, is explaining how evil can exist if God (or in the liberal's case, progress) is all-good, all-powerful, and all-knowing.

[4](#) Eschatology is concern with the end of the world or history.

[5](#) See Leonardo Blair, "Baptisms, miracles taking place in revival at site where George Floyd died, Christian groups say", *The Christian Post*, June 12, 2020. Available at: <https://archive.ph/ZNsxC>. See also Ruth Graham, "The Street Corner Where George Floyd Was Killed Has Become a Christian Revivalist Site", *Slate*, June 29, 2020. Available at: <https://archive.ph/WScCk>.

[6](#) What historians call *The Terror*.

[7](#) Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 119.

[8](#) David B. Newman et al, "Conservatives Report Greater Meaning in Life than Liberals", *Social Psychological and Personality Science* 10, no. 4, (May 2019): pp. 494-503. Available at: <https://archive.ph/43fq9>.

[9](#) Edward Dutton, *Breeding the Human Herd: Eugenics, Dysgenics and the Future of the Species* (Perth: Imperium Press, 2023), p. 126.

[10](#) Markus Kemmelmeier, "Is there a relationship between political orientation and cognitive ability? A test of three hypotheses in two studies", *Personality and Individual Differences* 45, no. 8, (December 2008): pp. 767-772. Available at: <https://archive.ph/iKknN>.

[11](#) Matthias Fatke, "Personality Traits and Political Ideology: A First Global Assessment", *Political Psychology* 38, no. 5, (October 2017): pp. 881-899. Available at: <https://archive.ph/wrpkr>.

[12](#) Eugene Y. Chan, "Political orientation and physical health: the role of personal responsibility", *Personality and Individual Differences* 141, (April 2019): pp. 117-122. Available at: <https://archive.ph/hnaPE>.

[13](#) Ana Swanson, "Conservatives really are better looking, research says", *The Washington Post*, January 10, 2017. Available at: <https://archive.ph/evU2z>.

[14](#) Jon Haidt, "Why the Mental Health of Liberal Girls Sank First and Fastest", *Substack*, March 9, 2023. Available at: <https://archive.ph/T6IPq>.

[15](#) Cf. p. 193. The work of Edward Dutton greatly illuminates the link between mutational load and liberalism, especially his books *How to Judge People by What They Look Like* (Thomas Edward Press, 2018) and *Breeding the Human Herd*, op. cit.

[16](#) Nietzsche, *Genealogy of Morality*, p. 22.

[17](#) Strictly, the term was not invented but appropriated because the slave revolt post-dates the etymology of the term *evil*. This word traces back to Proto-Indo-European

**h₂up(h₁)élos*, a derivative of a verb meaning “to treat badly”, a natural fit for a term applied to someone who “mistreats” the slave. The German term Nietzsche uses is *böse*, from PIE **b^hew-* (“to blow, swell, inflate”), meaning “puffed up, swollen”, as in “a swollen head”. The term is cognate to English *boast*, and the connotation of scale or greatness is clear.

[18](#) Ibid. pp. 25–26.

[19](#) There is a *good vs. bad breeding dimension* to this idea of freedom too. See also note p. 76.

[20](#) This is the disposition of the utilitarian, whom we discussed in ch. 20.

[21](#) Nietzsche, *Genealogy of Morality*, p. 33.

[22](#) Kate Conger, “Google Removes ‘Don’t Be Evil’ Clause From Its Code of Conduct”, *Gizmodo*, May 18, 2018. Available at: <https://archive.ph/ahTwl>.

[23](#) Best exemplified by Mark Fisher’s *Ghosts of My Life: Writings on Depression, Hauntology and Lost Futures* (Washington: Zero Books, 2014).

[24](#) “Technological decay”, *Jim’s Blog*. Available at: <https://archive.ph/bwEan>.

THIRTY-EIGHT

REDBEARD:

MIGHT IS RIGHT

Necessity knows no law. — Cromwell

In our last chapter we looked at two kinds of morality: the warrior-jock's morality of power, and the nerd-priest's morality of equality. We live in the nerd-priest's world, so we tend to find power a poor basis for morality. And we're not without our reasons—if the superior man stands “beyond good and evil”, if he creates moral values from nothing, purely out of his will, does this not mean that there are no values beyond man? Are we not just making things up? These are hard questions. Harder still, as we'll see, is facing the fact that even universal morality tends to resolve into power.

After all, a morality that can't be enforced is no morality at all. Maybe we want to say that right isn't *based on* force, but surely it must *have* force. Order doesn't just arise spontaneously from people all agreeing—if it did, there wouldn't be any war. Rules aren't imposed by moral force, but by physical force.

We found in ch. 9 that “a thing can't be *good* unless it first *is*”. This might seem obvious, but it has radical implications. To exist in the first place is to *be able* to exist, and to be able to exist is to be tough, durable, and strong—to be anything more than a fart in the wind is to be *powerful*. This need not be the power of the sword; it could be intelligence, charisma, or even deceit. Nietzsche had a certain admiration for slave morality in that he thought it was the will-to-power of the weak turning creative—but it's still will-to-power. The idea that all morality ultimately cashes out to some kind of power is what we call *might is right*. This idea is most memorably laid out in a book of the same name by an unknown author named “Ragnar Redbeard”.¹

Statute books and golden rules, were made to fetter slaves and fools. Very useful are they, for controlling the herds of sentenced convicts, who fill the factories, and cultivate the fields. All moral principles, therefore, are the servitors, not the masters of the strong. Power made moral codes, and Power abrogates them.²

For Redbeard, power is upstream of moral principles. We're inclined to dismiss this today, but when we try to get to the bedrock of morality, it becomes less easy to dismiss.

Morality must surely cash out to *something*. There is no self-evident moral proposition. The only genuinely self-evident propositions, truths that rest on no assumptions whatsoever, are true by definition or tautologies—neither of these can generate anything like rules for conduct. So morality must trace back to something. What is that something? If we look back in history, we find that it has always been something like strength or power or authorship. As we discovered in ch. 27, the foundational reason why Job is expected to obey God, is God's superior force as creator and author of the universe.

This idea is not confined to the Old Testament. After the Greeks united to defeat the Persians, the two great powers Athens and Sparta each tried to become master of all Greece, leading to the Peloponnesian war. The cities that bore the brunt of this war were the small ones who tried to stay out of it. Melos was a Spartan colony but still neutral, and the Athenians couldn't accept this neutrality, so they conquered it. Before putting Melos to the sword, the Athenians gave them a chance to surrender:

We hope that you [...] will aim at what is feasible, holding in view the real sentiments of us both; since you know as well as we do that right, as the world goes, is only in question between equals in power, while the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.³

The Melians responded to this in a way that sounds awfully modern to our ears—they invoked something like “human rights”, which the Romans called *ius gentium* or the “law of nations”, saying “you should not destroy what is our common protection, the privilege of being allowed in danger to invoke what is fair and right”.⁴ The Melians then appealed to the Athenians' self-interest, but the Athenians responded that it was in their interest to not let tiny nothing colonies tell them what to do or else they might face rebellion at home. The Melians responded essentially by saying “that's not fair”,

and the Athenians' reply is as cold as steel:

Of the gods we believe, and of men we know, that by a necessary law of their nature they rule wherever they can. And it is not as if we were the first to make this law, or to act upon it when made: we found it existing before us, and shall leave it to exist for ever after us; all we do is to make use of it, knowing that you and everybody else, having the same power as we have, would do the same as we do.⁵

When the chips were down, even Athens—cradle of justice, birthplace of democracy, home of the great humanism of Pericles, Socrates, and Plato—was prepared to put aside “right” in favour of might. History nerds will cope that this “right of the stronger” turned out not to be right at all because Athens lost the war, forgetting that the Spartans were victorious because they were essentially a breeding colony for soldiers.

Another way to formulate *might is right* would be to say that there is no *ius gentium*, no human rights. This “law of nations” is essentially window dressing for the strong: ever-changing, hammered into whatever shape power needs in order to do what it already wants to do. This was the case in the Treaty of Versailles,⁶ which re-wrote the implicit laws of war—which were understood to be that countries were allowed to do what’s necessary to defend themselves—and did so *retroactively* in order to secure global governance. Proponents of *might is right* would say that there is no higher court than that of war, and the Entente, in trying to dispute this, could only do so by winning a war. “Human rights” or “war crimes” are only ever what power says they are, whether in the modern West or in ancient Greece. Redbeard summarizes it poetically:

In nature the wages of sin is ALWAYS death. Nature does not love the wrong-doer, but endeavors in every possible way to destroy him. Her curse is on the brow of the “meek and lowly.” Her blessing is on the very heart’s blood, of the strong and the brave.⁷

This is not a pagan thing, nor a liberal thing, but a human thing. The Catholic Karl Ludwig von Haller takes the *rule of the stronger* to be the basic principle upon which political legitimacy is founded, and what’s more, a law of nature:

Throughout the entire extent of those kingdoms of nature we call inanimate or inorganic, is it not an invariable law that stronger substances hunt down those that are weaker, defeat them, and neutralize or destroy their action? Consider the animals of the field, and the birds in the air, from the eagle to the elephant, to the insect and the

worm that slithers on the soil: all around you'll see the stronger species exercising dominion over those that are weaker, the males lording over the females, the large over the small, the brave over the timid, etc.⁸

Earlier in the book,⁹ Haller says that he's explicating more than *might is right*, what he calls "*right of the strongest*". He contrasts this to the "*rule of the strongest*"—he traces it back to God and natural law. But then again, so did the Athenians,¹⁰ and so does everyone who believes that might is right. And here we discover something unexpected about it: *might is right* is perhaps the ultimate conservative principle. Does this sound counterintuitive?

The Chinese were another religious people who believed that might is right, except they didn't call it that—they called it the *Mandate of Heaven*. For the Chinese, the Mandate of Heaven is the ultimate moral and political principle of reality. Not unlike the divine right of kings, it's the idea that imperial authority is divinely sanctioned by Heaven. The Chinese word for Heaven means sky, head, father, god, king, and also, *nature*. The emperor only ever rules at the pleasure of Heaven, which can and often does revoke its mandate at any time.

This means that to rebel against the emperor is to rebel against nature, against Heaven itself, the ultimate metaphysical principle of the world. The very fact that the emperor sits on the imperial throne means that he has this mandate—who are you to rebel against Heaven? If being the emperor is evidence of right, what moral grounds do you have to revolt against him? We can see clear parallels here with Haller, for whom strength and independence were evidence of the right to rule. If being strong *ipso facto* gives one legitimacy, then being ruled means you owe obedience.

This principle might be useful to the Chinese emperor or Davos Man, but it doesn't give us much of a basis for opposing liberalism today, does it? Does this mean we just have to eat the bugs, live in the pod, take the vax, and live with the palsy that comes with it? Perhaps not.

Under the Mandate of Heaven, any rebellion is illegitimate—until it wins. After the emperor has been overthrown though, the Mandate immediately justifies it, because if the revolution succeeds, this means that Heaven has transferred its mandate.

If the king doesn't rule well, Heaven will revoke its mandate, which means we need an idea of what counts as ruling "well". This idea stands over and above the king, makes him less than sovereign—he's now bound by some external standard. And this raises questions like "what is the standard?" and "does he meet it?" This constant war over the standard of legitimacy is what Dennis Bouvard has called "super-sovereignty",¹¹ and this war is the mechanism that has given us wokeness and transhumanism—it's up to you to judge whether this has been a good thing. In any case, we have a strange situation where the very same principle of *might is right* can be used to justify both revolution and restoration, progressivism and conservatism; it can justify X on Tuesday, and Y on Wednesday. This weapon is too dangerous—perhaps it would be better if we just put it away. But can we?

This book is full of controversial ideas, but *might is right* is probably the most controversial. It seems inhuman, ugly, and corrosive to any system of morals. And yet if we were honest with ourselves, we would see that every major moral system implicitly rests on it—it's the final place of refuge for any worldview, and sooner or later, they all fly to it. No matter how many "Ben Shapiro DESTROYS feminist libtard" videos he sees, the feminist libtard says "if wokeness wasn't right, it wouldn't have crushed old white male classical liberalism." When all other arguments against the Christian have failed, the liberal says "if liberalism weren't right, it wouldn't have crushed Christianity." When all Christian arguments against the pagan have failed, the Catholic says "if Christianity weren't right, it wouldn't have crushed paganism."

As we saw with the Athenians, the pagan is a bit more open about it. True to his name, the heathen crudely says the quiet part out loud and embarrasses everyone by taking off his fig leaf. When the Celtic chieftain Brennus conquered Rome and demanded a gold ransom, the Romans complained that the scales were rigged; *vae victis* he shouted, "woe to the conquered", and threw his sword on to the scale, adding to the ransom. In Lucan's epic poem *Pharsalia*, he has Caesar say to his men "this is the day witnessed by fate that will decide which of us was right to take up arms; this battle will pronounce the defeated

guilty.”¹² Not just defeated, but *guilty*. Here is Nietzsche’s master morality on full display.

What could be further from heathenry than Puritan Calvinism? The Calvinist believes that you can’t be saved from damnation by your own efforts, but only by the grace of God. But although your efforts don’t *cause* you to be saved, if by your efforts you become a man of great influence and authority, this is a good sign that you *will* be saved. This is the basis of the celebrated “Protestant work ethic”, and it’s clearly a throwback to the old Germanic belief that wealth and power are a sign of divine favour. If might is not right, might is at least *evidence* of right. And so it is for the liberal—at the bottom of every justification for modern liberalism is “well, we won WWII, didn’t we?”

However monstrous and inhuman *might is right* appears to us, we just can’t seem to escape it. We don’t have to accept it—or maybe we do. These questions aren’t easy. But one thing is clear: if we reject it out of hand as obviously bad and stupid, it means we simply haven’t thought about the matter very deeply.

SUMMARY

A morality without force is no morality at all.

There is no *ius gentium*, no right for all men.

The final refuge of every worldview is “we won, didn’t we?”

ENDNOTES

- [1](#) Redbeard is often thought to be poet and author Arthur Desmond.
- [2](#) Ragnar Redbeard, *Might is Right* (Chicago, 1896). p. 9.
- [3](#) Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War* (London: J. M. Dent and Sons, 1914), p. 394.
- [4](#) Ibid.
- [5](#) Ibid, p. 397.
- [6](#) Specifically, article 231 of the treaty.
- [7](#) Redbeard, *Might is Right*, p. 7.
- [8](#) Karl Ludwig von Haller, *Restoration of Political Science, Vol. I* (Perth: Imperium Press, 2023), p. 176.
- [9](#) Ibid., p. lxiv.
- [10](#) In the excerpt above they say “of the gods we believe” (in the same idea as Haller). Others invoke the “laws of nature”, but the result is the same.
- [11](#) Dennis Bouvard, *Anthropomorphics: An Originary Grammar of the Center* (Perth: Imperium Press, 2020), p. 41.
- [12](#) Lucan, *Pharsalia*, vii, 259–260.

THIRTY-NINE

VEBLEN:

RULE OF THE MERCHANT

Our thinking about capitalism has been muddled for a long time, and blame is to be found both on the left and on the “right”. On the one side you have the free market champions,¹ who think of capitalism as simply being allowed to own things, and as a Darwinian struggle where the best products survive. If so, why are almost all products getting worse and more expensive?

The other side has an explanation. According to the communist, private property is “theft” and you’re getting fleeced by fat guys in top hats with monocles. Tim Robbins in *Team America: World Police* puts the case in the typical manner of a reddit socialist:

Let me explain to you how this works. You see, the corporations finance Team America. And then Team America goes out, and the corporations sit there in their... in their corporation buildings, and, and, and see that, they’re all corporationy, and they make money. Mhm.

This is not all that far from real communist theory, which conceives of private property as essentially the ability to rent things out. This is, of course, what it means to own something at all, so the communist has basically no answer for “what’s the alternative?” beyond “mhm”.

Both sides believe that capitalism is simply owning things.² But this doesn’t explain why capitalism arrived so late in human history, nor how it revolutionized society so radically. Capitalism as “private property” is idiotic, and we can do better. Being steeped in almost two centuries of left-socialist thought, we think that capitalism means stocks, bonds, industry, corporations, businessmen, handshakes, power-lunches—all of these things mashed together. Thankfully, economist Thorstein Veblen has offered a much deeper and more useful critique of capitalism than Marx, giving us the tools to

disentangle these.

To critique capitalism as simply owning things is too blunt of an instrument. Henry Ford was a capitalist and revolutionized the industrial process by his genius. He's not the same as a guy who uses an algorithm to shift around money to make more money. Veblen gives us the *business/industry distinction* to distinguish between them when he says "the material framework of modern civilization is the industrial system, and the directing force which animates this framework is business enterprise".³ There's an enormous amount packed into this statement, and we'll see just how much as we unpack it.

The essence of industry is the machine process—automation, basically. It does away with handicraft, and standardizes everything from the process to the materials to the measurements.⁴ While the loss of handicraft is not to be trivialized, there's no doubt that this has made things more efficient. The essence of business, on the other hand, is investment for profit. This funnels resources from less profitable ventures to more profitable, and when "profitable" maps on to "efficient", we have a winning formula. The problem is that sometimes it doesn't, and scaled up to a whole economy, it often doesn't.

Business and industry are fundamentally opposed in their goals. The goal of industry is greater efficiency, which means lower prices—the same things made with less energy. The goal of business, on the other hand, is profit, which means higher prices wherever possible. After all, this is the goal of advertising, and gives us planned obsolescence and many other wonderful effects of the free market. The merchant's dictum of "buy low, sell high" is in direct conflict with the industrialist's goal of more for less.

The merchant and the businessman are not quite the same. Veblen distinguishes between them, but he admits that the one is the continuation of the other, has the same interests and motivations, and behaves similarly. If anything, the businessman is an even purer expression of the mercantile spirit than the merchant:

But instead of investing in the goods as they pass between producer and consumer, as the merchant does, the business man now invests in the processes of industry; and

instead of staking his values on the dimly foreseen conjunctures of the seasons and the act of God, he turns to the conjunctures arising from the interplay of the industrial processes, which are in great measure under the control of business men.⁵

The businessman's efforts mostly concern other businessmen, whereas the older merchant of Adam Smith's time at least had customers to satisfy. Before the triumph of finance capitalism, producers and consumers were much closer to each other; their interests were more mutual, leading to less fraud, greater efficiency, and more loyalty.

The pragmatic goal of the businessman—or as we should call him, today's merchant—is satisfying customers, but his ultimate goal is price fixing and rent seeking, and the best way to do this is to become an auxiliary to the state. Here again the industrialist is different from the merchant. Industry—as a power in and of itself, not dependent on the state, productive in its own right—is a castle that the state needs to capture, the middle in the *high-low vs. middle* dynamic.⁶

As a concrete example, take Elon Musk as the paradigm of the industrialist,⁷ and George Soros as the paradigm of the merchant. Most of the time, the Soros calls the shots. A Musk is beholden to a Soros, until he's not—until he creates something undeniably useful. A Musk has value beyond the simple act of administration; hence the Musk is always a threat to the managerial capitalist system whereas the Soros is a creature of that system. The industrial tycoon is the great man: disruptive, sovereign, imperious, essentially free. The business magnate is none of those things. The genius industrialist is creative; his value depends on nothing but himself. The genius businessman is managerial; his value is in apportioning and managing the world the industrialist has created.

So there's an inherent inequality between the industrialist and the merchant—the industrialist is the natural sovereign. And so if the merchant gains sovereignty, he's jealous of it and insecure in it. A Musk acquiring an opinion-shaping institution like Twitter⁸ is a threat to the Soros because the Musk has (relative) independence where the Soros does not.⁹ The Soros can only bring him to heel by wielding the system, so the Musk capturing a castle of the system is an existential threat to the Soros.

Since the industrialist is the natural sovereign, we'd expect him to be

in charge most of the time. But as we found in ch. 37, this isn't always the case. Veblen explains how this happened, using the term “pecuniary” to mean a combination of what we mean when we say “mercantile” and “managerial”:

In proportion as the machine industry gained ground, and as the modern concatenation of industrial processes and of markets developed, the conjunctures of business grew more varied and of larger scope at the same time that they became more amenable to shrewd manipulation. The pecuniary side of the enterprise came to require more unremitting attention, as the chances for gain or loss through business relations simply, aside from mere industrial efficiency, grew greater in number and magnitude.¹⁰

Since Veblen wrote, this has gotten worse than he could have ever dreamed, leading to large scale offshoring of industry to China and the rise of the FIRE economy (Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate), mostly unproductive and often outright parasitical ventures.

It has also led to instability through the dominance of credit. Most financial crises are brought about not by careless investment, but by predatory creditors.¹¹ This is not to say that there weren't booms and busts before the FIRE economy or even before capitalism, but the hyper-financialization of the economy amplifies them to absurd and dangerous levels. At a stroke Veblen has explained the volatility of modern markets. It's not just a question of quantity (that the world is more complex and interdependent); it's a question of quality (capital isn't what it was in Smith's time). In fact, volatility is *actually good* for the merchant:

The outcome of this management of industrial affairs through pecuniary transactions, therefore, has been to dissociate the interests of those men who exercise the discretion from the interests of the community. [...] Broadly, this class of business men, in so far as they have no ulterior strategic ends to serve, have an interest in making the disturbances of the system large and frequent, since it is in the conjunctures of change that their gain emerges.¹²

What's more, this mercantile class *does* have strategic ends to serve—ideological ends, even. Capitalism, by divorcing ownership from efficiency or service, by divorcing property rights from institutional control, corrodes noblesse oblige. The point of business shifts from serving consumers to shaping them, hence the rise of woke capital, ESG,¹³ and activist investing. For today's merchant, the goal is not to serve society but to change it. Divorcing ownership from service also

gave rise to the ability of investors to profit off of a loss,¹⁴ and when this incentivized inefficiency goes on long enough, we get a financial crisis where society has to bail out the investor class—“privatized profits, socialized losses”.

When business becomes sovereign over industry, the goal is no longer good products but profitable ones. Aren't the best products the most profitable? McDonalds has a market cap of \$216 billion at present. Is a Big Mac better than a tenderloin steak? The merchant is properly the handmaiden of the industrialist. When the roles are reversed, the merchant is parasitical on him. Finance becomes an end instead of a means, and industry is carried on for the sake of business, not the other way around.¹⁵

All of this grates against our gut feeling because Indo-Europeans have understood intuitively forever that the Third Estate—the class of farmers and merchants—can't be sovereign over the first two—the warriors and priests.¹⁶ The revolt of the merchant against the industrialist is the triumph of slave morality that we saw in ch. 37, where it becomes creative and the inferior take on an active role in shaping society. Could this result in anything but wokeness? The move from rule-by-merchant (capitalism) to rule-by-plebeian (mass democracy) to rule-by-freak (wokeness) is clear—we have here nature turned on her ear, where the leader is led, the student instructs the master, and the child governs the father.

Whereas the engineer, the scientist, and the industrialist are kept in check by the brute, material facts of reality, the merchant can ignore all these... for a time, anyway. The merchant is not inherently bad in his proper, subordinate place—only in ascending the throne does he become parasitical. And because this rule of the merchant is not tied to reality, his parasitism can be carried to extremely high levels before society tips over.¹⁷ That is, unless another society steps on to the scene—one that puts the merchant in his proper place. Then reality comes crashing back in.

The only competitor against runaway mercantile interests is what Veblen calls “national politics”, essentially a form of dynastic militarism:

In this direction, evidently, lies the hope of a corrective for “social unrest” and similar

disorders of civilized life. There can, indeed, be no serious question but that a consistent return to the ancient virtues of allegiance, piety, servility, graded dignity, class prerogative, and prescriptive authority would greatly conduce to popular content and to the facile management of affairs. Such is the promise held out by a strenuous national policy. [...]

The barbarian virtues of fealty and patriotism run on national or dynastic exploit and aggrandizement, and these archaic virtues are not dead. In those modern communities whose hearts beat with the pulsations of the world-market they find expression in an enthusiasm for the commercial aggrandizement of the nation's business men. But when once the policy of warlike enterprise has been entered upon for business ends, these loyal affections gradually shift from the business interests to the warlike and dynastic interests, as witness the history of imperialism in Germany and England. The eventual outcome should be a rehabilitation of the ancient patriotic animosity and dynastic loyalty, to the relative neglect of business interests. This may easily be carried so far as to sacrifice the profits of the business men to the exigencies of the higher politics.¹⁸

The history of the 20th century is the history of the clash between the financier class and national politics, and the financier class won. Much blood and treasure was spilled trying to contain the alternative to rule by merchant, and you are now required to think of that alternative as “the worst evil in history”.

There are good businessmen and there are bad industrialists. But *hos epi to polu*—on the whole—they behave as we have described when in power. The world of the businessman is the world you live in today. His world is the world where middle-aged men parade in bondage gear in front of children. His world is the world where the rape and torture of a white girl by a migrant can spark virtually no outcry,¹⁹ but the shooting of an Algerian rugby player for resisting arrest can spark weeks of riots and billions of dollars in damage.²⁰ His world of hyper-financialization is one where most of the richest men of history have lived in the past 200 years.²¹ And that has only gotten worse with the colossal post-COVID wealth transfer. His world is the world where you were locked in your house for two years, for what amounted to nothing. His world is the world where men can make billions of dollars using nothing more than computer algorithms that trade stocks thousands of times a second.

The merchant tells you that you don't have a choice, but you do. Is his world the world you want to live in?

SUMMARY

The industrialist wants to make more for less; the merchant wants to sell less for more.

The merchant is not inherently bad, only when he rules.

The cure for rule by merchant is national politics.

ENDNOTES

[1](#) These people aren't really on the right. As we discovered in ch. 25, they were on the left during the French Revolution.

[2](#) For the Marxist, private property is non-usufruct property, meaning property that you own even when you're not using it. This is, of course, redundant—that's just what everyone has always called "owning things".

[3](#) Thorstein Veblen, *The Theory of Business Enterprise* (Charles Scribner's Sons: New York, 1904), p.1.

[4](#) Ibid. pp. 9–10.

[5](#) Ibid. p. 22.

[6](#) See ch. 4.

[7](#) Musk is not quite an industrialist, but as we shall see, capitalism tends to hollow out its industry so there really aren't any Henry Fords today for us to point to. Musk is close enough for illustrative purposes.

[8](#) Elon Musk became the owner and CEO of Twitter on October 27, 2022, after acquiring it for 44 billion.

[9](#) Haller, whom we introduced in ch. 38, defines sovereignty basically just as this kind of independence.

[10](#) Veblen, p. 24.

[11](#) The 2008 financial crisis being the typical case, where in order to boost home ownership by racial minorities, banks systematically extended credit to people who were obviously bad debtors.

[12](#) Veblen, p. 29.

[13](#) ESG is a benchmark for effectively how "woke" a company is, along the metrics of Environment, Social impact, and Governance. Firms are rated according to their ESG score, and this plays into how "investable" they are. For a full explanation, see Imperium Press, "Why Capital is Woke", *YouTube*, available at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=c3FSLzjmHX8>.

[14](#) Such as in short-selling stocks. See Veblen, p. 34.

[15](#) Veblen, pp. 26–27.

[16](#) The "war of the functions"—where the first two estates make war on the third and then subordinate it—is a mythic complex carried across many Indo-European branches. See Georges Dumézil, *Gods of the Ancient Northmen* (University of California Press, 1973), ch. 1.

[17](#) Veblen, p. 64–65.

[18](#) Veblen, p. 392–395.

[19](#) Yaron Steinbuch, "Woman charged in murder of Paris girl boasted about 'selling body parts'", *New York Post*, October 18, 2022. Available at: <https://archive.ph/LEgxi>. The girl's killer was released from prison 10 months later. This was not reported in the

English-speaking media. See also

https://twitter.com/MSLive_aut/status/1680263337618161666.

[20](#) Jessica McBride, “Nahel Merzouk: 5 Fast Facts You Need to Know”, *heavy.com*, July 2, 2022. Available at: <https://archive.ph/I0wQ6>.

[21](#) Bhupinder Singh, “Not Jeff Bezos Or Elon Musk, These 11 People Are The Richest People In Human History”, *India Times*, November 29, 2021. Available at: <https://archive.ph/68dUG>.

FORTY

SPENGLER:

CYCLICAL HISTORY

Hard times create strong men. Strong men create good times. Good times create weak men. And, weak men create hard times.¹

Since at least 2020, it's been clear that science has become politicized. Where science really matters, where it informs our politics, we no longer have evidence-based policy, but policy-based evidence—we have evidence retrofitted to serve politics.² But history is even worse than science on this count. Not only is history much less cut-and-dried, but the stakes are higher. Our history is our mythos—it tells us who we are, where we're going, and what we stand for. History is a battleground.

There are two kinds of history considered authoritative today. The first is Whig history, or the history of progress. We'll call this *linear history*. The idea is that men's affairs move in a particular direction toward the present. Even if that line on the graph is a bit jagged, even if there are ups and downs, when you zoom out it's really only moving one way—toward more equality, more complexity, and fewer boundaries. This is liberal history—earlier we called liberalism “presentism raised to the power of an ideology” and presentism is the liberal historical method par excellence. The other main kind of history is “shit happens” history. This is much less serious and always resolves into linear history, but let's examine it.

You see “shit happens” history most often when talking about why a civilization fell, especially Rome. Historians have offered many explanations for the fall of Rome, such as economic factors, climate change, abuse of power, and that very pinnacle of modern scholarship, “it's complicated”, also known as systemic collapse, or the multivariate explanation. This idea that Rome fell because of many

factors is just a thin veil covering a frank admission of perplexity: “I don’t know, a bunch of shit I guess?” As though a man dying from a shotgun wound is undergoing a systemic collapse, with the cause of death reaching back no further than shock, cardiac arrest, and the brain denied a blood supply—you know, it’s complicated.

You’ll notice that “economic factors, climate change, and abuse of power” sounds awfully familiar, something that could have been ripped straight out of a communist redditor’s estrogen-fuelled textwall. Here’s a historical law for you: as the “bunch of shit” historical explanation grows longer, the “shit” in question tends to approximate progressive apologia.

We used to think of history in very different terms. The ancient writer Polybius had the idea of *Anacyclosis*, where societies move from monarchy to aristocracy to democracy, with each stage having a healthy and a sick phase, and finally at the end you get collapse and reversion to monarchy again. Instead of a line moving in a direction, we have a thing coming full circle. Moving back into the mythic past, we have the Hindu cosmic cycle of ages (Yugas), moving from a golden age to a silver, to a bronze, and finally to the Kali Yuga where we live today—only for the whole thing to start again after an apocalypse. We get this in Norse mythology too where *Ragnarök*, the war of the gods, gives way to a new age of order and peace. For as long as man has thought about the past, history has been *cyclical history*.

This is scary and also somehow racist to your modern “scholar” and he prefers linear history, but this counter-current has always run parallel to the liberal progressive view. Starting even before the Enlightenment, philosopher of history Giambattista Vico forged another path with his magnum opus *The New Science*, which told us that mankind moves from a barbaric “age of gods” to a pragmatic “age of heroes” to a reflective and enlightened “age of men”. This last is supposed by most historians to be the whole point, but Vico tells us this is actually society growing old and weak. Soon it gives way to a “barbarism of reflection” where too much pointless navel-gazing causes the society to tip over and we go back to the age of gods. Later still we get Vilfredo Pareto who takes this up from a much more

scientific angle. In Pareto, we get “lions”, pragmatic men who seize and wield open power, but who then must rely on managerial “foxes” to administer their dominions. Over time the foxes gain sovereignty and rule by cleverness and deception, until the foxes become so decadent that the lions again take over by force.³

Into this lineage of cyclical historians stepped Oswald Spengler. A high-school mathematics teacher, Spengler burst on to the scene with his book *Decline of the West* just after WWI. The sheer scope and breadth of his historical view is still unmatched today apart from perhaps his successor Toynbee, but what made Spengler an intellectual rockstar in his time was his method.

Scholarship in Spengler’s time was highly specialized. Historians tended to think of their discipline as on a continuum with science, and the trend for centuries had been away from the broad sweep of someone like Vico and toward getting all the details right. Spengler bucked this trend by looking at history as a generalist, and he tended to de-emphasize things like material and economic conditions. For him, quality was much more important than quantity. The way a civilization thought was upstream of its technical achievements—the exact opposite of a Marx.⁴ But most worryingly for liberal academia, Spengler told us that history has a shape,⁵ and the only shape academics allowed history to have was a line—Spengler tells us it’s a cycle.

I see, in place of that empty figment of *one* linear history which can be kept up only by shutting one’s eyes to the overwhelming multitude of facts, the drama of *a number* of mighty Cultures, each springing with primitive strength from the soil of a mother-region to which it remains firmly bound throughout its whole life-cycle; each stamping its material, its mankind, in *its own* image; each having *its own* idea, *its own* passions, *its own* life, will and feelings, *its own* death. Here indeed are colours, lights, movements, that no intellectual eye has yet discovered. Here the Cultures, peoples, languages, truths, gods, landscapes bloom and age as the oaks and the pines, the blossoms, twigs and leaves—but there is no ageing “Mankind.” Each Culture has its own new possibilities of self-expression which arise, ripen, decay and never return. There is not *one* sculpture, *one* painting, *one* mathematics, *one* physics, but many, each in the deepest essence different from the others, each limited in duration and self-contained, just as each species of plant has its peculiar blossom or fruit, its special type of growth and decline.⁶

Spengler also differs in that he favours organic metaphors—

civilizations go through the same cycles as organisms, of birth, growth, maturity, and decay. Each civilization has an ur-idea, an animating principle. This principle is born in a people's infancy and as it develops, the idea is realized. For example, the ur-idea of the Greco-Roman civilization is *the body*, hence its obsession with the male form. The ur-idea of Magian (Judeo-Christian-Islamic) civilization is *the world as cavern*, hence the column and arch, and the mosque. The idea of the Faustian civilization, our civilization, is *infinite space*, hence our striving into the unknown.

He uses the terms *Kultur* and *Zivilization*, which mean something quite different in German. For us, culture and civilization are basically synonyms. For the German, *Kultur* is a people in its youth and strength, the vegetative phase, striving to actualize its ur-idea. *Zivilization* is the people having totally actualized its ur-idea, the fruiting phase when "high culture" is born. For Spengler, just like for Vico, this high culture phase is not the whole point, but just one stage—and a very late stage at that, just before the plant decays. To illustrate, he brings in another metaphor—the metaphor of the seasons.

The springtime of a people is the age of myth. Here a people is barbaric and vitalistic. It's essentially rural, bursting forth in a great volcanic blast out of the hinterlands in unreflective spontaneity. It has no history, only epic. It's dream-heavy and god-fearing; its cult and ritual are strong, but its theology is weak; the essential form of its religion is the death cult and ancestor worship. This unique religious form creates *asabiyyah*,⁷ the strongest imaginable "social glue" welding the people together into a tribe, with its own particular traditions and hyper-masculine creative force. Out of this primitive unity comes the first development: the differentiation of the first two of the Estates—warrior and priest. Here the warrior is supreme, the great man, what Georges Dumézil called the "magician-king". For our civilization, this springtime was the early Middle Ages to about the high Middle Ages.

The summer of a people is the age of reformation. Here the primitive constitution of a people comes to be completed, and in this completion there's always a contradiction. This leads to religious

reform, which is inflamed by growing urbanism. Here theology comes to overshadow rite, metaphysics comes to subvert myth, orthodoxy comes to supplant cult. Here the priest becomes sovereign over the warrior, what Dumézil called the “jurist-priest”. The traditionalist, earthbound genius of the springtime gives way to abstraction, and we get the rise of philosophy and mathematics. Tradition must now answer to natural law, must be justified in its terms rather than the other way around. The tension between tradition and an abstract good throws stark light on the contradictions in a people’s primitive constitution. Coupled with the rise of urbanism, trade, and a need for managerialism, this produces a new and explosive element: the Third Estate—the bourgeoisie. For us, this summer was the high Middle Ages to about the Renaissance.

The autumn of a people is the age of “enlightenment”. Here the plant has grown to full maturity and its cultural fruits have ripened—we have left *Kultur* and have arrived at *Zivilization*. This ripening is accompanied by an age of great political and intellectual revolution. The mercantile Third Estate sees itself as the goal and fulfilment of the civilization, the rightful sovereign, and moves to put itself on the throne. This is the age of full-blown self-critique, where not only the primitive constitution of a people comes under attack, but even its reformation, as a set of inadequate half-measures. This is the birth of liberalism, the cult of reason, where skepticism metastasizes, metaphysical idealism comes to dominate, and atheism is the result. And yet, this is also the age of high culture. Here artistic technique attains its peak along with systematization—philosophy reaches new heights with the great system builders, as a people’s ur-idea becomes fully actualized and all creative possibilities are exhausted. No more internal development is possible, and so the civilization turns outward toward empire. To do this it must invoke the latent potential of the fourth and final Estate—the masses. For us, this was the Renaissance to about the middle of the 19th century.

The winter of a people is the age of Caesarism. Here almost all the juice has been squeezed out of the fruit and what remains is drying up quickly. No longer exporting culture, or exporting McCulture, a people turns toward empire, and we get the great age of science and

technics, of professionalization and bureaucratization. In order to bend the masses toward its imperial ambitions, society must appeal to humanistic and sentimental ideals like socialism and utilitarianism.⁸ The twin pillars of bureaucracy and mass politics demand the vast growth of the state, now an end in itself. The law must be increasingly formalized and becomes ossified, no longer subject to the will of the sovereign, but a tumor that grows for its own sake. This produces gridlock, with checks and balances increasingly coming into conflict and resulting in stalemate just as the complexity of the world demands action—meanwhile the revolutionary and self-critical spirit of the autumn has only grown worse, and now threatens to tear society apart. At some stage the gridlock is so paralyzing, the unrest so great, that a Caesar strides on to the scene and breaks through these with sheer force and violence. We have returned to the politics of the personal, but not the gravitas of the springtime’s magician-king—rather the personal power of pure faction and self-interest. You are here now. In fact, you are quite late in this period. You’re not going to like what comes next.

Spengler’s thesis is grand in its sweep, but it’s also highly intuitive and realistic—this is how the lifecycle of a business works too. First, you start out with the founders: risk-taking visionaries, hard and lean men willing to work long hours and who have high camaraderie. As the business grows, morale is high, but the original vision comes in for reform and you get “scope creep”—the business’ mandate grows to include irrelevant things that don’t serve its interest.⁹ Bureaucratic elements like administration and unions gain power and turn themselves into the point of the operation. The whole thing starts to bloat as administrative costs rise but revenues stall, and office politics takes over—people start stabbing each other in the back. The original mission is effectively abandoned and the new mission is “protect your sinecure”. Competent people jump ship, vitality is exhausted, and the name of the game is simply fraud and dividing up what’s left of a lifeless corpse before it gets liquidated. This is the lifecycle of every business and the only two ways to escape it are to stay a small fish forever, or to become integrated into the Deep State.

Cyclical history doesn’t end with Spengler either—others have

followed him and, since we're in the winter stage, they've made cyclical history more technical and scientific. One is Joseph Tainter whose book *The Collapse of Complex Societies* spends some time examining Spengler himself.¹⁰ Tainter focuses on exactly those material conditions that Spengler doesn't, especially complexity. As societies grow, they become more complex, and this allows them to do more—to extract resources, to administer territory, to produce technology, etc.—and this results in energy returns.¹¹ But as complexity increases, the energy returns diminish, putting a ceiling on how complex a society can get. The thing is, complexity is “sticky”; like wages, it doesn't scale downward very easily, and too great a downgrade can collapse the system. But eventually something will force a large downgrade—whether a war, environmental disaster, revolution, etc.—and the collapse takes place.

Another cyclical theory with scientific application comes from William Strauss and Neil Howe,¹² which points out a sequence of four kinds of “moods” a generation can have which have appeared over and over in history. The first is the *High*, where collectives and institutions are strong and individualism is weak—in the West, think WWII to the early 1960s. The next is the *Awakening*, where collective values are attacked in the name of individualism and authenticity—think the mid-1960s to early 1980s. This is followed by the *Unraveling*, where collectives are weak and only the strong survive—think of the Gen X era of “latchkey kids” to about the Obama era. Finally we get the *Crisis*, revolutionary times when great men emerge to forge new collectives. What's interesting about this is that this is not just cultural but biological; animal populations undergo a similar “boom and bust” cycle that affects their hormonal composition in the same way as the Strauss–Howe theory. Sex hormones, growth hormones, stress hormones, and dopamine all fluctuate cyclically in animals just as in humans.¹³ A deer population will cyclically produce high testosterone and growth hormones where stags are huge and aggressive, and at other times, lower-T deer with more cortisol. It's “good times create weak men”, but for deer. So the frail, curly-mop Zoomer with social anxiety isn't just a meme—men are actually weaker than their fathers and have lower sperm counts,¹⁴ and this is

because of where they are in the generational cycle.

This is not exactly a cheerful picture, which is probably why the liberal doesn't like it. Rather than face up to the harsh reality of life, this man-child-scholar would rather hide under the blankie of social progress while his layman counterpart plays video games and collects Star Wars action figures. Both are really just doing the same thing as the three-year-old who sucks his thumb—retreating into a coping mechanism. Spengler, like Pareto and Vico before him, looks reality in the eye and refuses to flinch. Nothing lasts forever, and your civilization is no exception. To come to this realization is not a “blackpill” but freeing. It frees us up to look ahead, to a fresh start, and to plant the seeds of the future.

The first step is to recognize where we are. We're not better than we've ever been. We're sure as hell not at the beginning of a golden age. We're not even just starting into the decline—we're well into it. Even among those who understand these things, the question is constantly raised, “when will the republic collapse” like in Rome, as though we've got a long way to go. We're well past that—we were past that stage in the time of our great-great-great-grandfathers. We're well into the empire stage, maybe into the “Crisis of the Third Century” part of the cycle, maybe further. So what if we call what we have a republic and not an empire? Recall, the Romans called what they had a republic basically to the bitter end.

So a big downgrade, in the manner of Tainter, is coming.¹⁵ A people who prepares for it will find themselves in a position to win. What would that preparation involve? What would a well-designed society look like?

We can take an example from engineering called “fault tolerance”. Part of good design is designing for elegant—or at least not runaway—failure. This runaway failure happened in the case of Rome, which by the time of the 5th century had hollowed out all its own feudal (tribal) structures. For a contrast, look at post-revolutionary France. This is a different case, not because it was better designed, but because it was simply less far along in the Spenglerian cycle—after the revolution, France still had enough of its local alliances and affiliations intact to form the regimental backbone of the Grande Armée, which

Napoleon then used to take over Europe. Another illustrative case is post-Soviet Russia, which was outside of the Faustian West and in a different position. When the West pushed over communism, enough of Russia's feudal (oligarchic) elements remained to put a floor under the headlong collapse it could have suffered.

So cultivating these intermediary (“feudal”) structures, the *middle* in the *high–low vs. middle* dynamic, is essential.¹⁶ These feudal structures are the seeds out of which spring the next cycle of civilization, as they did after Rome. We could bring in another natural metaphor of the forest, which can replenish itself after a fire. The eventuality of the fire is built into the forest's evolutionary strategy.¹⁷ No forest actually gains anything from a fire, but it does provision for it—the forest is fault tolerant. Complex systems are naturally fault *intolerant*, such as the Bronze Age palace economy which was highly complex. One shock could—and likely did—send it into a tailspin. The redundancy needed to offset this risk makes it expensive, and so weak.

An example of a fault tolerant social system is the Indo-European clan that we examined in ch. 33 and called *microstalinism*. This is an extremely simple system which can survive near total collapse, and can live within modern society with no problems—if the state doesn't try to capture and destroy it (a big if, to be fair). The relevance for modernity is plain: centralization is inevitable, until it's not. Our economy is orders of magnitude more complex than the late Bronze Age, and our family structure is weak. If the great storm of 2024 doesn't tank our society, the gentle breeze of 2025 might.

It's not just about complexity. As Spengler tells us, we move through these stages of birth, growth, maturity, and decay because this is how nature works. A civilization has an ur-idea that becomes exhausted, and it makes no more sense to try to revive it than to put on a crop top and go clubbing in your 70s. The world we've known for a thousand years is not coming back any time soon. Every nation will look radically different by the end of the century, and many won't exist at all. We need to fight, but we also need to learn to live as peoples in exile in our own countries. We're the children of winter, but the children of winter are the fathers of spring.

Humanity is undergoing a bottleneck not seen since the late Bronze

Age collapse—this is the scale of reorganization on the horizon. Will you and your grandchildren survive it? To answer this question is to answer the question: are you clannish?

SUMMARY

Civilizations are living organisms—they're born, they grow, flower, and die.

Well-designed structures are built to fail elegantly.

When we understand that nothing lasts forever, we're free to look ahead to a fresh start.

ENDNOTES

- [1](#) G. Michael Hopf, *Those Who Remain* (Independently Published, 2016).
- [2](#) Take for example the unsafe COVID vaccines, see note p. 178.
- [3](#) This lion and fox dynamic will recall ch. 37; the master and slave morality paradigm fits very neatly on to Pareto's framework.
- [4](#) Marx's base-superstructure model says that things like technology and the means of production inform ideology more than the other way around.
- [5](#) His word is "morphology".
- [6](#) Oswald Spengler, *The Decline of the West* (Allen and Unwin: London, 1932), p. 21.
- [7](#) See ch. 32.
- [8](#) See ch. 20.
- [9](#) This is especially the case today with the advent of ESG, where the point of business is no longer profitability but social reform.
- [10](#) Tainter doesn't like anything that focuses on quality over quantity; he calls this "mystical", though stripped of the emotional language it's not clear what's wrong with qualitative analysis.
- [11](#) The energy might take the form of calories, information, efficiency, etc.
- [12](#) William Strauss, Neil Howe, *The Fourth Turning: An American Prophecy* (Bantam Doubleday, 1997).
- [13](#) Janne Miettinen, "Cyclical Metapopulation Mechanism Hypothesis: Animal Population Cycles Are Created By A Multiannual Population-Wide Hormone Cycle", October 3, 2023. Available at: <https://archive.ph/TCNRS>.
- [14](#) Harriet Alexander, "Millennial men are significantly weaker than their fathers, study shows", *Telegraph*, August 15, 2016. Available at: <https://archive.ph/Zcnd1>.
- [15](#) John Michael Greer, following Tainter, has the useful concept of a *catabolic collapse*, where there isn't a catastrophic collapse, but a series of small downgrades into a lower level of complexity and then stabilizations, like a staircase going down. This is much closer to what the historical record actually shows than "the big one".
- [16](#) For more how to build "feudal" structures today, see the introduction to W. E. Hearn, *The Indo-European Household* (Perth: Imperium Press, 2023).
- [17](#) Yes, the forest—as a super-organism—does have an evolutionary strategy. See note on p. 60.

FORTY-ONE

HEIDEGGER: THROWNNESS

“I wish it need not have happened in my time,” said Frodo.

“So do I,” said Gandalf, “and so do all who live to see such times. But that is not for them to decide. All we have to decide is what to do with the time that is given us.”

Gen X is the generation of existential angst. But existentialism is more than wearing a black trench coat and reading bad slam poetry to 11 people. Existentialism has deep philosophical roots, and those roots go back to the beginning of philosophy itself, and perhaps the most important existentialist was Martin Heidegger.

Heidegger is a philosophical Rorschach test. Many people have projected many things on to him: fascism, communism, milquetoast liberal self-discovery. This is partly his fault—he’s one of the least clear writers in history—but it’s also a testament to his depth. Existentialism is not left-wing, nor is it right-wing. Sartre ended up with Mao. Kierkegaard ended up with Abraham. Nietzsche ended up with Achilles. Heidegger pulls together many of the threads running through this book, continuing to the radical right today. He’ll tell us some things that sound almost rustic, things that we’ve long forgotten.

His main project was to the man in the street something almost incomprehensible—he wanted to investigate the *question of being*. This is a very old question, and we brought it up in ch. 28 when we talked about metaphysics. From the time of the Greeks, people have asked “what is there?”, as in “what do I need to account for the whole of reality?” Heidegger wants to ask a better question: “what can we say about existence?” He thinks that the whole of philosophy since the Greeks has been on the wrong track.

But first, why even investigate the question of being at all? Isn’t it the most obvious thing imaginable? Do we even need to ask about it?

While it may seem like an idle question, we'll find that it has radical implications for what we ought to do.

The Greeks didn't think it was idle at all, which means we've lost our puzzlement at Being.¹ In our lives we experience all kinds of problems, but we don't experience existence itself as a problem. But once in a while we marvel that a collection of meat and sinews can even experience anything at all. Our own selves are a mystery to us. Just ask yourself—where are *you*? Where is the seat of your personhood, your experience? Is it in the brain? Where? What exact spot? These kinds of questions usually pass like a bad case of indigestion, but they never really go away. The question of being is the closest question of all—maybe too close. Heidegger says “We are ourselves the entities to be analyzed. The Being of any such entity is *in each case mine*.”²

In strange moments, a wonder over the fact that you're a thing at all comes into focus—and then disappears. This strangeness discloses itself to you, and just as quickly, it covers itself over again. What is it like to experience anything at all? Could you explain the taste of a pineapple to someone who'd never tasted one? Could you explain the sensation of colour to a blind man? Can you explain to a deaf man what it's like to have a song running through your head? Philosophy has asked for a long time about “beings”—*what* there is—but has forgotten “Being”—*that* something is. We can say *what a thing is* (say, a hammer); we can say *what it's like* (say, solid, heavy, in the toolbox); but we can also say *that it is*. And this last is the most mysterious. Being isn't grounded in anything else. We can't say it's a thing, because all things are grounded in it. We can't say it has this or that property, because all properties are grounded in it. Being isn't a thing, nor is it a property. But it's not *nothing* either. So what is it?

The essence of Dasein lies in its existence. Accordingly those characteristics which can be exhibited in this entity are not “properties” present-at-hand of some entity which “looks” so and so and is itself present-at-hand; they are in each case possible ways for it to be, and no more than that.³

This is the core Heideggerian insight, and it's also totally impenetrable. We need to go back to the start.

Plato and Aristotle both said that philosophy begins in wonder.⁴ If

so, then it's no mystery that they missed the boat on the question of Being. Wonder begins after our practical coming to grips with the world, and this practical, everyday experience is where Being reveals itself most immediately. As it turns out, all of philosophy has *harmed* our understanding of Being—we were better off before. Any cultured thug will appreciate this. Plato is the fish swimming in water; Heidegger wants to show the fish the water he's swimming in.

The whole project of philosophy has been to tell us what we can know, and this forces us into a framework where subjects (like you) consciously relate to objects (like that hammer over there). Heidegger reacts against this. Most of how we relate to the world isn't conscious at all—it's pre-conscious. This is all transparent to us like the water is to the fish. The world discloses itself most fully in the mundane, the useful, the common: our engaged, everyday experience. Our concepts often get in the way of it. This practical coping is what Heidegger called *readiness-to-hand*.

He liked to give the example of a hammer. When the carpenter is using the hammer, the hammer becomes invisible; there's only the situation of hammering. If he's a master of his craft, he can completely forget about the hammer. He could think five moves ahead; he could think about playing cards with the boys later; he could think about what it is to be a thing at all. It's only when the situation of hammering breaks down that the hammer becomes "a thing" for him—say if the shaft breaks. Then it becomes *unready-to-hand*, and comes into his view for the first time. He might look at it and wonder how he's going to fix it, as an object now just "there", with no practical use. Now it's *present-at-hand*, and he can look at it with some detachment.

At no point does the carpenter's "mind" or his "subjectivity" or the "world" enter into the picture. Any philosophical problems these raise are not real problems but armchair problems.⁵ Thomas Reid said of Hume that his philosophy was like a little hobby-horse toy that he could ride in the comfort of his own home, but if he brought it out with him in public his friends would empanel a jury and seize his estate for his own good. Wittgenstein said much the same thing but from a totally different angle.⁶

We're always already embedded in a situation—we have what Heidegger calls *thrownness*.⁷ Everything is foregrounded before we even come to it. Rationality comes late to the party, only after the ready-to-hand breaks down; then the things in front of us become present-at-hand. As young children almost everything is *present-at-hand*, and we see it as for the first time, because we *are* seeing it for the first time. When you learned to ride a bike, it was totally unready-to-hand, and you needed training wheels. Your Dad had to tell you to get up a head of steam, keep pedalling, look ahead, don't turn the handlebars, etc. You had to keep all this in your head and it was hard as hell. You needed training wheels. But eventually they came off and you forgot about them.

You live almost all your life riding the bike without thinking about how. It's only when the ready-to-hand becomes an object of detached contemplation that we get philosophy—two steps after nearly everything that matters. Philosophy is only the tip of a huge iceberg, and this iceberg is a mode of being in the world that Heidegger calls *Dasein*.

Dasein is an untranslatable German word that literally means “being there”. This is you—you are just *there*. You aren't a thing or a state, but a process—you just *are* the situation.⁸ But you aren't quite the same kind of being as a hammer or a bike. *Dasein* is distinct from all other beings in that Being is an issue for it. It has a disposition toward Being, toward its situation. Things matter; they have significance; they're important to us in some way; they're desirable or useful or threatening, etc. It's hard to get a hold of this if our whole orientation toward the world is one of *knowledge*, because knowledge concerns what's true or false, and what *matters* concerns what does or doesn't command our attention—these are two completely different things.

The crucial insight here is that what matters to *Dasein* is not determined by *Dasein*, but is received. We're always thrown into a situation, and the significance is always there before we ever got there. Value is always handed to us. We're thrown into a world where liberalism is just the default position. There are hundreds of available political ideologies but the vast majority of people have hit upon exactly that ideology that society demands they believe—by sheer

coincidence, apparently. This is our *thrownness* into the world, and the simple fact of recognizing that we didn't choose what to be, how to act, or most importantly, *what matters to us*, is perhaps the deepest redpill of all, and the beginning of the end of liberalism.

This view of existence seems like a very confusing way to say what we already know. And in a way, it's exactly that—an artificial language to tell us homespun truths that even an illiterate peasant understands. But Heidegger's point is that the way we've been looking at existence for thousands of years is what's artificial—in terms of subjects, objects, minds, persons, goals, etc. He wants to give us a better vocabulary and to show us that our rational, deliberate, and conscious ways of coming to grips with the world are downstream of something more ontologically basic. We're always already thrown into the world, into a situation not of our choosing.

This characteristic of Dasein's Being—this “that it is”—is veiled in its “whence” and “whither”, yet disclosed in itself all the more unveiledly; we call it the “*thrownness*” of this entity into its “there”; indeed, it is thrown in such a way that, as Being-in-the-world, it is the “there”.²

We're thrown into a narrow and particular set of instincts, attitudes, roles, assumptions, circumstances, traditions, and expectations. All these things are inherited—they are your *heritage*. And as we found in ch. 10, heritage is fundamentally opposed to *freedom*. But today we have a problem, and it's not just an armchair problem either, it runs through every thread of our lives: *our tradition is freedom*.

This may not seem like a problem at first, but it forces us into a paradox. Liberalism says you're free to choose—free to choose your friends, your wife, your neighbourhood, your career, your religion. Hell, apparently you can even choose to be a man or a woman. Above all, you can choose what to believe, which means you can choose not to believe in liberalism. But even in choosing to reject liberalism, you're still exercising your freedom. Checkmate, “fascists”.

And you can choose to lean into liberalism too. You're free to do and think and say and value exactly what society says you should. You're free to be bound by the tradition you were born into, the one you didn't choose. You're free to choose your heritage over freedom. The liberal, in affirming his native tradition, is really asserting the

basic premise of what he calls “fascism”. The “fascist”, in rejecting what he was born into, is granting the premise of liberalism. Liberalism, as freedom, was perfectly suited to attacking tradition in the 18th century. But once it won, it could never become a bona fide tradition, not even in principle.¹⁰ *Liberalism is freedom but gives us commands, which bind us*. Sooner or later every liberation theology runs into the paradox of tolerance—freedom to choose my thing, unfreedom to deny it. But this is never anything but a brute contradiction, and eventually every single one of these liberation theologies breaks down into incoherence. It can neither tolerate nor not tolerate, on pain of being what it’s not. Liberalism can crush the radical right with force, but this only legitimizes a counter-force moving against it, and de-legitimizes its myth of freedom. Hence it relies on soft power and convulses when its hard power is revealed, which it almost fully is now.

There’s an irony to Heidegger, at least for us in the West today. He tells us we’re *thrown into the world*, we’re of a piece with our background and context. And he calls for us to overcome that context to become a more authentic self. But our context, our tradition, our inherited commands, tell us precisely to reject our background and context. Wouldn’t rejecting our context then be *inauthentic*?

How to break the paradox?

Real authenticity just *is* thrownness. You are your instincts, your attitudes, your roles, your assumptions, your circumstances, your traditions—you *are* the commands of your forefathers. The individual shorn of all context is not only inauthentic, *he is nothing*. It’s precisely thrownness that gives our lives meaning and purpose. We should lean into it.

Later Heidegger comes much closer to this view. In his early work *Being and Time*, his view of Dasein is universalist. He says “we’re all thrown into particular circumstances” but strips us of that particularity and gives one way of being for all humans everywhere and at every time. Later in his career he began to take a much more historical view, coming to see that Dasein has not always been the same in each era—he takes his own idea of thrownness even more seriously. The Greeks understood what we’ve said about leaning into

thrownness and so for them Being was something familiar. For the Christian it was something different, and for us moderns it's something yet different from that. It turns out that anxiety is native to modernity, Heidegger says, because of technological society.

In a roundabout way, Heidegger started out making universal proclamations and ended up emphasizing our contingency—precisely what we were supposed to overcome. And the story of philosophy is just a much larger version of the same story. From Plato on, philosophy has tried to see Being as an absolute, to get behind the mundane and the everyday, but neither Plato nor any of the philosophical moves after him have ever satisfactorily done this. In Heidegger we've exhausted all of these moves and come back to a pre-philosophical way of being—precisely what philosophy was supposed to get behind.

Heidegger's project is a thorough demolition of Western metaphysics since Plato. He's pushing us back to the immediate and pragmatic worldview of the primitive Germanic peasant, to what James Joyce called "the dreams and visions in a peasant's heart on the hillside". He's dragging us kicking and screaming back to an engagement with Being unmediated by any metaphysical accretions. As we discovered with Spengler, metaphysical idealism comes not at the beginning, but as a kind of sickness later. Heidegger is pushing us back to the springtime of peoples, to the rural, the practical, the undogmatic.

The left says that man finds himself the victim of circumstances and the goal is to change them. Heidegger says no, man is thrown into the world and he has to deal with it. This is much better, but we can do better still. We say that man is thrown into the world and *that is beautiful*. Liberalism recoils from all that is fixed, embedded, unchosen, closed off, partial, conditioned, and contextual—but this is what gives life its richness. For the liberal, thrownness is a catastrophe. For Heidegger, thrownness is a fact, but something to be overcome. For the man of the future, thrownness is a gift.

Universalism and thrownness are the main axes along which you meaningfully dissent from the system—or not. Different rules for different people—or no? Your foundational identities were inherited—or no? We say *yes*. You're thrown into a family, a history, a tradition,

an inheritance—*celebrate it*. You are what you can't change. This is the tragic view of life, something Heidegger prized.^{[11](#)} You are your heritage. Lean into it.

SUMMARY

Reflection comes late, long after practical understanding.

We're always already thrown into the world.

The meaning and purpose of our lives just is our thrownness.

ENDNOTES

- 1 In this chapter we'll capitalize *Being* as in “existence as such”, as against *being* as in “a living thing”.
- 2 Martin, Heidegger, *Being and Time*, tr. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (Blackwell Publishers: Hoboken, 1962), p. 67.
- 3 Ibid., p. 67.
- 4 Plato, *Theaetetus*, 155d; Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 982b.
- 5 Like the problem of solipsism, the problem of other minds, or the problem of subjectivity.
- 6 “We feel that even if *all possible* scientific questions be answered, the problems of life have still not been touched at all.” *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, 6.52.
- 7 The German term he uses is *Geworfenheit*.
- 8 This is very similar to Heraclitus, from ch. 28.
- 9 Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 174.
- 10 We will come back to this in ch. 44 on Alasdair MacIntyre.
- 11 Jonathan Bowden, “Heidegger and Death’s Ontology”, *The Jonathan Bowden Archive*, February 18, 2006. Available at: <https://archive.ph/sLPop>.

FORTY-TWO SCHMITT: FRIEND-ENEMY DISTINCTION

Us
And them
And after all, we're only ordinary men
— Pink Floyd, *Us and Them*

Homo homini lupus
[“Man is a wolf to man”]
— Latin proverb

It's often said that we're living in extraordinary times. “After Trump's attempted fascist coup”, the yoga-pants left tells us, “politics has gotten out of control”. In reality, the rebirth of tribalism and nationalism is anything but extraordinary: it's a return to historical normality—to the political. To paraphrase Moldbug,¹ if the word “democracy” sounds shiny and bright but the word “politics” sounds ugly and mean, ask yourself what democracy is if not a kind of politics. The keen observer will notice that “politics” is what only one side does—when Democrats block Trump's wall it's stunning and brave; when Republicans block tax reform it's “political”.

No doubt things have become more polarized though. In the 1970s, hardly any liberals objected to their child marrying a conservative and vice versa,² but today this breaks up families. It's polarized at the top too—the US government hasn't been able to pass any major legislation since the PATRIOT Act in 2001, and even that was done under an emergency. The *us vs. them* divide has become much sharper and deeper, and this is because liberalism itself is dying.

We make all kinds of distinctions—between good and evil, beautiful and ugly, useful and useless—but the essential distinction in politics is between the in-group and the out-group. The left makes this distinction: non-natives are in and you're out. The radical right makes

it too: the reverse. But the centrist and classical liberal make no such distinction—can't we all just get along? So they lose. The greatest jurist of the 20th century, Carl Schmitt, calls this the friend–enemy distinction, and it just *is* politics.

The specific political distinction to which political actions and motives can be reduced is that between friend and enemy. This provides a definition in the sense of a criterion and not as an exhaustive definition or one indicative of substantial content. Insofar as it is not derived from other criteria, the antithesis of friend and enemy corresponds to the relatively independent criteria of other antitheses: good and evil in the moral sphere, beautiful and ugly in the aesthetic sphere, and so on. In any event it is independent, not in the sense of a distinct new domain, but in that it can neither be based on any one antithesis or any combination of other antitheses, nor can it be traced to these.³

The difference between friend and enemy can't be reduced to aesthetics—the enemy may not be ugly. Nor can it be reduced to utility—trading with the enemy may be useful. It can't even be reduced to good and evil—we'll come back to this. The enemy is simply the stranger, something radically, existentially, ontologically *other*.⁴ The liberal can't stand this sort of talk, which is why he yells in your face for “othering” people and for teaching your kids not to take candy from the stranger in the windowless van.⁵

The liberal doesn't like “othering” because he has no concept of the political, no understanding of the difference between friend and enemy. He wants to do away with politics and force:

The negation of the political, which is inherent in every consistent individualism, leads necessarily to a political practice of distrust toward all conceivable political forces and forms of state and government, but never produces on its own a positive theory of state, government, and politics. As a result, there exists a liberal policy in the form of a polemical antithesis against state, church, or other institutions which restrict individual freedom. There exists a liberal policy of trade, church, and education, but absolutely no liberal politics, only a liberal critique of politics.⁶

The liberal wants to replace force with freedom, but he only ends up recreating force in a much stronger form. In the last chapter we introduced the paradox of tolerance, which is the idea that we must be intolerant of intolerance. This idea is so plainly incoherent that simply to assert it is to stand in the presence of the Hegelian Absolute as reason itself completely dissolves into a unity of opposites. Tolerance and intolerance become indistinguishable, all concepts are vaporized,

and only power can settle disputes. In this house of mirrors, a “scholar” can draw a line between us and the fascist *other* in a polemic called *How Fascism Works: The Politics of Us and Them*,⁷ while arguing on the basis of “freedom” for a state that eavesdrops on everything you say, carefully curates everything you watch and read, and wields more force than any other state in history.

So the liberal can’t escape politics and force, but he’ll try, and his strategy is to say that disputes can be resolved by money and tort—as long as we’re free from force, things will work themselves out. This is a fundamentally mercantile view of the world, one that holds up negotiation above struggle, which is why liberalism has always been tied to the merchant classes.⁸ Like the merchant, liberalism traffics in money and words. It says that truth alone can govern man, that command and force are unnecessary because there are no enemies, only friends and customers you haven’t met yet.

This reached its height in 19th century Manchester liberalism which privileged the individual above the state. But moving into the 20th century we saw the rise of what Schmitt calls “democracy”,⁹ which uses the state to empower the masses. Schmitt’s democrat stands for a kind of equality, but for him equality no longer means equal opportunity, nor even equal outcomes, but equal status as members of an in-group to the exclusion of others. This isn’t really democracy—groups have always put their own people first—but it does overtly distinguish between friend and enemy. Liberalism prefers to make that distinction invisible.

When we understand politics as making the friend–enemy distinction explicit, we can see that Trump is the West’s first truly *political* figure in living memory. In putting “America First”, in saying “if you don’t have borders you don’t have a country”, in putting some on the inside and others on the outside, Trump was crossing a line. Even though Trump turned out to be toothless and incompetent, it’s what he stood for that’s intolerable—his three-part platform (anti-immigration, tariffs, isolationism) was a repudiation of liberalism itself, and so an existential threat. He had to be put down and the system can’t rest until he’s finished. Limited disagreement is fine—you’re allowed to debate how many millions of third world migrants to take in per year.

But if disagreement is unlimited—say debating the need for third world immigration at all—this is politics: unlimited and total conflict.

Liberalism doesn't do away with politics, this total conflict between friend and enemy: it just hides it. In erasing the friend-enemy distinction, in forcing together what's properly separate, we don't get rid of conflict. For a time, war just becomes proxy war—we talk about immigrants' legality, qualifications, birthright, or amnesty because we can't talk about things like race. War is simply sublimated, made polite, but for all that, is no less total, and no less about race. Debating "social justice" is not simply a question of morality, you're "questioning someone's right to exist", this is "violence", and he can now act in "self-defense". The liberal idea of a neutral point of view where pure abstract concepts have no polemical value is itself a polemic—what *you're* doing is "politics" and what the liberal is doing is just normal, self-evident, and non-ideological, and he's justified in using force to stop you. It's "politics" for thee but not for me.¹⁰

To escape politics, the friend-enemy distinction, the liberal will tell you he's against war and "for all humanity". But to be against war is to be against those who make war, and presumably willing to wage war against them—again his ideology founders on the paradox of tolerance, which is not a paradox but a brute contradiction. Schmitt quotes Proudhon as saying "whoever says humanity wants to cheat",¹¹ meaning that the "enemy of humanity" (the non-liberal) puts himself outside of humanity and isn't even a moral agent at all. The humanism of the liberal is such that the man who questions the "human right" of asylum seekers to colonize his country can be disposed of like a cockroach. "Racists have no human rights," our liberal will say, and in the next breath, "all white people are racist." You draw the conclusion.

Politics has never been more bitter, but this is only because it's been swept under the rug and allowed to fester. Politics hasn't really "returned"—it never left us. Liberalism managed to maintain the illusion of "all friends/no enemies" through most of the 19th century, but the crisis came in the first half of the 20th with the rise of organized labour, fascism, and socialism. This is when the open discussion and negotiation that the liberal says he wants, actually got

going. It wasn't just different flavours of the same thing anymore; there were actual alternatives, actual discourse. This spelled the beginning of the end for liberalism, and two world wars and hundreds of millions of lives were spent foreclosing on this debate.

The friend–enemy distinction re-appeared at the end of WWII, when the laws of war were decided in retrospect and the formula of enemy = wrong = illegal = “terrorist” was brought in to criminalize losing the war. Schmitt was again vindicated by 9/11 and the rise of nationalism. The Bush/Clinton/Bush “global village” was supposed to be the triumph of liberalism over the friend–enemy distinction, reducing all life to economics. 9/11 forced liberalism to confront its enemy, but this enemy could be assimilated since Islam is a propositional identity.¹² However, the rise of ethnic nationalism in the 21st century brought liberalism face to face with its mortal enemy, a worldview based on thrownness and heritage, not belief. This forced liberalism's sublimated politics back into the open, robbing it of the illusion of no friend–enemy distinction.

Since the illusion of non-political social life can no longer be maintained, it seems to the naïve and childish worldview of the liberal that conflict has burst on the scene from out of nowhere, rather than just being unmasked. If you liked the body count in a century where we couldn't keep groups apart *effectively*, get excited for a century where we can't keep them apart *at all* because they “don't exist”. It's said that *diversity + proximity = war*,¹³ and this formula describes what happens when we try to do away with politics, when we force together natural enemies in the service of ideology. If a zookeeper puts a tiger and a bear in a cage together, “systemic racism” is not to blame for the bloodbath, but the zookeeper.

If the political divide becomes deep enough, the state will become two states, each with its own highest authority who wields the power of decision. A state is not just a monopoly of violence but a monopoly of decision, and where decision is not respected, you have another state—liberalism hates this. In fact, liberalism is allergic to decision, especially classical liberalism. It wants to defer sovereign decision indefinitely. It wants decision never to be final, always up for debate—this is the essence of parliamentary democracy.

Schmitt pointed out that this is the political equivalent of *deism*, the clockwork, rule-governed universe set in motion by a creator who then steps away and no longer interferes.¹⁴ But decision can't be deferred indefinitely. There always is a decision, it's just not made by congress or parliament—they become the mere tools of special interests. So the decision becomes hidden, not made public, and unaccountable in a way that would make any absolutist monarch blush. The decision is not made by congress, nor the president, nor the judiciary, but by the most powerful—however much liberalism tries to be pluralistic, decision becomes *singular*. All liberalism tends toward a single, universal decision, hence its hatred of borders: the ultimate end point of all liberalism from classical liberalism to now, is one world government.

Schmitt revived serious talk in the 20th century about *sovereignty*, which liberalism had abstracted away with its clockwork constitutionalism. Schmitt's focus on personal decision and the exceptional pushes us back to absolutism, which revives the sovereign who decides the exception to the law. We began our journey toward purging ourselves of liberalism with this concept in ch. 1. Schmitt begins his book *Political Theology* by saying "sovereign is he who decides on the exception,"¹⁵ and what he means here is that the key feature of sovereignty is deciding when the law doesn't apply. This means standing above the law, and in effect, to *be* the law. America claims the right to override the internal decision of countries in the Western Hemisphere—the so-called *Monroe Doctrine*—and it has repeatedly overridden it by toppling regimes in Latin America. Russia claims the same power over Ukraine, and the war in Ukraine is being fought not over Ukraine's self-determination, but over who decides the exception in Ukraine: America or Russia. This war, like all wars, is being waged over sovereignty. War is not "politics by other means",¹⁶ but *war is the essence of politics*. There is always a sovereign, which is another way of saying that absolutism is the only form that politics can ever take.

This is a hard pill to swallow, especially for us who have been raised to believe in liberal democracy. And yet, the mature, realistic, and consistent view is that the essential feature of governance is

dictatorship, or as Schmitt puts it, the state is “in the decisive case the ultimate authority”,¹⁷ because if it’s not, then whatever *is* the ultimate authority is *de facto* the state.

Sometimes differences are just too deep to be resolved by words, by negotiation, by parliaments, by debate. At this point the question arises, *quis interpretabitur*—who interprets? Your constitution is worth no more than the man interpreting it. Serious disagreement *requires* dictatorship. When actual lives are on the line Rome creates a dictator, America invokes the national security exception, Napoleon declares “I am the revolution”—even the most limp-wristed HR managerialism, when pushed to justify itself, takes refuge in the paradox of tolerance.¹⁸ These are all forms of absolutism, which is just sovereignty with its big boy pants on, saying *the buck stops here*. This is the most ancient form of governance, going back to the **dems potis*: master of the house.¹⁹ Even liberalism stands and falls on this basic foundation, however much it pretends otherwise. The dictator is the protector; without the protector, no Lord Protector;²⁰ without the Lord Protector, no liberalism. He is always lurking in the background. He is the power behind the throne, and the throne behind the parliament.

Schmitt’s case for the necessity of politics and absolute sovereignty is so clear and forceful that to argue against it is virtually a contradiction. He is the one “fascist” that academia has not been able to cancel, simply because he puts the entire edifice of liberal jurisprudence to shame. And yet, liberalism has tried to push back against him.

Where Schmitt says that the political (*friend vs. enemy*) can’t be reduced to morality (*good vs. evil*), Leo Strauss says this is wrong. Schmitt says at one point with a disapproving tone that in a world without politics “there would not be a meaningful antithesis whereby men could be required to sacrifice life, authorized to shed blood, and kill other human beings”,²¹ in other words, that a world without politics is a world of no real conviction, i.e. a world lacking in the highest *good*. It would seem that for Schmitt, politics can be reduced to good vs. evil after all, and that Schmitt has not escaped liberalism.

Strauss is not wrong here about Schmitt, but we can defend the

autonomy of politics in another way. Strauss' own argument relies upon the assumption that what makes a friend or an enemy just is the question of what's right, of the right way of life, or of "the good". For him, our friends are just those who share our beliefs, they could be anyone at all—as always, the liberal argument against the illiberal comes down to civic nationalism. But if you have a friend in this world, presumably it's your own brother. Is he your brother because you both believe in some abstract good? "Ah", the liberal will say, "but is your brother not *good*?" He is, but this is not to reduce politics to morality but the other way around—our brother is not our brother because he's good, but rather he's good because he's our brother. Liberalism says "what's ours is ours because it's good"; we say *what's good is good because it's ours*.²²

The conservative Strauss at least offers a substantial if not a fatal criticism of the friend–enemy distinction, but the left has been powerless to argue against Schmitt with any real substance.²³ And so, the left has tried to appropriate him, to make "left-Schmittians" a thing, with even less success. From the time that Marxism had become theoretically exhausted in the early 20th century, the left has tried to appropriate elements indigestible to it—elitism with Lenin, authoritarianism with Stalin, sovereignty with Schmitt—and has failed. At every turn, the "radical" left has been folded into liberalism, because at the end of the day it's just more liberalism.²⁴

Small government, laissez-faire, and classical liberalism is leading to civil war not because it was abandoned, not because it was done wrong—but because it was done *right*. The time has come to fight back. This means the revival of overt, unapologetic politics. It means naming the enemy.

SUMMARY

The basic distinction in politics is between friend and enemy.

Liberalism has no concept of friend vs. enemy; it tries to hide politics.

By hiding politics, you guarantee civil war.

ENDNOTES

- 1 Mencius Moldbug, “Coda”, *Unqualified Reservations*, April 18, 2016. Available at: <https://archive.ph/4PyAa>.
- 2 Taylor McNeil, “The Politics of Division”, *Tufts Now*, November 4, 2020. Available at: <https://archive.ph/vxfRc>.
- 3 Carl Schmitt, *The Concept of the Political* (University of Chicago Press, 1996), p. 26.
- 4 Again, differential ontology shows up as an essential feature of illiberal thinking.
- 5 If you want a clear illustration, look no further than the Wikipedia entry on *Stranger Danger*, which is not an encyclopaedia entry but an extended rebuttal of the idea. See Wikipedia, “Stranger Danger”. Available at: <https://archive.ph/9UkdT> [accessed 02/10/2023].
- 6 Schmitt, *Concept of the Political*, p. 70.
- 7 Jason Stanley, *How Fascism Works: The Politics of Us and Them* (New York: Random House, 2018).
- 8 We explained in ch. 39 the relationship between the merchant and the businessman. For more on the connection between liberalism and the merchant classes, see: https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w23606/w23606.pdf
- 9 This choice of word is unfortunate because it neither means what democracy meant at its birth (an artificial form of government designed to break up the clans), nor what it has meant traditionally (rule by the many), nor what it means today (whatever the state says is good).
- 10 Cf. ch. 39 on kicking away the ladder.
- 11 Schmitt, *Concept of the Political*, p. 54.
- 12 Cf. ch. 12 on the proposition nation. Islam seemed strong only 20 years ago, but is now finding itself outmatched by a stronger propositional force—liberalism.
- 13 For a list of scientific studies supporting this formula, see “Diversity + Proximity = War: The Reference List”, *Chateau Heartiste*, May 19, 2019. Available at: <https://archive.ph/jrGJa>.
- 14 Carl Schmitt, *Political Theology* (MIT Press, 1985), p. 36.
- 15 Ibid. p. 5.
- 16 From the famous saying of Carl von Clausewitz, in *On War*, Volume I (Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co.: London, 1908), p. xxiii.
- 17 Schmitt, *Concept of the Political*, p. 20.
- 18 This just goes to show that the paradox of tolerance is so vague that in practice it ends up becoming a blank cheque that power can write to itself to muzzle any dissent at all.
- 19 Cf. p. 289.
- 20 Cromwell.
- 21 Schmitt, *Concept of the Political*, p. 35.

[22](#) Cf. the discussion of “my country right or wrong” on p. 274.

[23](#) The model argument against Schmitt is found in social democrat Hermann Heller’s *Probleme der Demokratie* (1928), which merely asserts the need for a *Rechtstaat* or constitutional state, precisely the kind that Schmitt six years earlier had said “makes of law a mere mode of operation of a state bureaucracy”, *Political Theology*, p. 3.

[24](#) This is stated at length in Hans Freyer’s *Revolution from the Right*, which develops an actual alternative to left-revolution.

FORTY-THREE

EVOLA:

RIDE THE TIGER

As we near the end of our survey of radical right-wing thought, you've noticed that this thought matches up hand in glove with what the greatest thinkers of all time have always told us. The radical right owns the history of ideas, because what it stands for is just what great men have always said.

You've also noticed that everyone in any position of power today regards these ideas as demonic. Every law, every moral imperative of polite society, every structural incentive has been carefully crafted to hold these things at bay and even to erase them. At this point, lesser men become "blackpilled" and then go home and catch the game. We saw this with the Manosphere, which correctly assesses male-female relations and rather than trying to fix them, sells you snake oil that doesn't even work.

But greater men are not so easily discouraged. They keep fighting. One strategy is accelerationism, which we discussed in ch. 21. The worst thing of all is that the system continues on, just barely holding together, slowly boiling the frog alive. It needs to tip over and only then can radical surgery be done to remove the cancer. This is no guarantee though—it might not work.

What if it doesn't? The system may be able to right itself and carry on for a while, but not indefinitely. Nature will not be stood on her head forever, and at some point the thing will fall over. When it does, competent men of sturdy character must be ready to put the pieces back together. For now, they have to find a way to live in the dark age. This is what Julius Evola called *riding the tiger*:

When a cycle of civilization is reaching its end, it is difficult to achieve anything by resisting it and by directly opposing the forces in motion. The current is too strong;

one would be overwhelmed. The essential thing is not to let oneself be impressed by the omnipotence and apparent triumph of the forces of the epoch. These forces, devoid of connection with any higher principle, are in fact on a short chain. One should not become fixated on the present and on things at hand, but keep in view the conditions that may come about in the future. Thus the principle to follow could be that of letting the forces and processes of this epoch take their own course, while keeping oneself firm and ready to intervene when “the tiger, which cannot leap on the person riding it, is tired of running.”¹

In a world hostile to tradition, we might think that the way forward is to find a living tradition as a shelter from the storm and to throw ourselves wholeheartedly into that. This was the solution hit upon by Evola’s spiritual forefather René Guénon, but Evola disagrees—there is no unpolluted exoteric tradition available today; all have been hopelessly compromised by modernity. Instead, the “man against time” must take up self-initiation, must take refuge in the hidden, esoteric knowledge behind the exoteric ritual of today’s fallen traditions:

The two spheres—the exoteric sphere and the esoteric—Guenon suggested, ought to be complementary: so that an individual who is incapable of following “exoteric” norms aimed at investing life with order and sacredness ought not attempt to pursue a higher path. The basic premise of *Ride the Tiger*, however, was precisely my realistic acknowledgement of the fact that it is impossible to follow such exoteric norms in the present day: for no positive, meaningful and truly legitimate institutions exist to provide a support for the individual. A “consecration”, therefore, of external, active life today can only derive from a free and genuine inner drive towards transcendence, rather than from given moral or religious norms.²

What does this look like? Being esoteric and self-initiatory, Evola doesn’t give much detail, but we can sketch out a few broad outlines. One aspect of this retreat of the higher man is *xeniteia*, or self-exile. This was an important part of the ascetic-monastic tradition of late antiquity, where “leaving one’s country of birth, family and possessions and setting off on a journey to a foreign land where one is a total stranger came to be considered the essential starting point for the new spiritual orientation.”³ If we’re going to live in a world hostile to the higher and deeper things in life, we have to adopt an attitude of living in exile within that world.

Another aspect of the new monasticism Evola advocates is *apoliteia*, total disinterest and abstention from the politics of the day. Given the cyclical nature of history, the attempt to reverse broader civilizational

currents by mere politics is insanity—it would be like trying to protest against the sun setting. Such a thing is fruitless at best, and at worst it may attract the eye of Sauron to snuff out the fires of genuine tradition that burn in places unseen. The higher man should turn his efforts to preserving that fire.

The last and most crucial aspect of Evola's vision for the self-exiled "aristocrat of the soul" is *autarkeia*, or self-sufficiency, and forms the basis of Evola's ethical worldview. Autarky for Evola means a radical self-legislation (from *aut-*, "self-" + *arkho*, "to rule"), where one is commanded by nothing outside of oneself, but not by the lower instincts and appetites—Evola wants us to cultivate our higher will:

According to Evola the human condition cannot and should not be embraced, but rather overcome. The cure does not consist in more money, more education, or moral uprightness, but in a radical and consistent commitment to pursue spiritual liberation.⁴

Evola has some interesting forerunners to his philosophy of inner liberation. The first is Nietzsche, whom he examines in detail in his book *Ride the Tiger*. Nietzsche is one of the great philosophers of liberation, and Evola quotes him as saying "we must liberate ourselves from morality so that we can live morally".⁵ This is not a simple paradox—by "morality" Nietzsche means the slave morality we discussed in ch. 37, and it's necessary for the great man to overcome that in order to become a law unto himself: a free, creative spirit who will become the source of values.⁶ Evola agrees with Nietzsche here, but he doesn't like Nietzsche's focus on life as self-justifying. He doesn't think life justifies itself at all—he thinks greatness is only possible "when 'life' is 'more than life,' that is, through transcendence."⁷

"Transcendence" is the watchword for Evola's higher man of Tradition,⁸ his improvement on Nietzsche's great man. In ch. 8 of *Ride the Tiger*, Evola lays out a number of principles that make up the spirit of that higher man, but they all ultimately refer back to his first: "the power to make a law for oneself, the 'power to refuse and not to act, when one is pressed to affirmation by a prodigious force and an enormous tension'".⁹

Making a law for oneself sounds like what Enlightenment philosopher Immanuel Kant called *autonomy*—being the author of the

law that binds oneself. For Kant, this was universal moral law, something like objective morality, and autonomy consists in rationally willing what's objectively moral. In Nietzsche the law is a law of one's own making, and originates purely from the will of the individual. In Kant the law originates from within the individual but is also "rational" in that it's universal moral law, so this boils down to affirming what's objectively right and bringing one's will into line with that. This is not miles away from Evola's idea that we must have the "power to refuse" whatever forces—whether external social forces or internal baser forces—push us away from what our higher nature would have us do.^{[10](#)}

Unlike Kant though, Evola sees the fully realized moral agent—his man of Tradition—as something exceptionally rare in the modern world. Evola's path is not the path for all, but only for a select few. Historical cycles have brought us to the Kali Yuga, the dark age, and only the higher man can keep the flame burning in that darkness. But is this not cowardice? Should the higher man just scurry into hidden corners when the going gets tough? Should he not take an open stand? How does this square with the heroism of say, the Norse or the Greek, who would fight to the bitter end no matter how doomed?^{[11](#)}

To understand his thinking here we have to understand his orientalism, especially the influence of Daoism. The Daoists have a concept called *wu-wei*, literally "non-doing", which can be thought of as effortless action. When one aligns oneself with the *Dao* (the way of things), one swims with the current rather than against it, and can achieve things with the greatest possible efficiency. Actively opposing the titanic forces of nature—or history—is for Evola not heroic but evidence of a base nature with no sense of the transcendent. Evola offers us neither fantasy nor despair. Spengler goes too far when he says "Time does not suffer itself to be halted; there is no question of prudent retreat or wise renunciation. Optimism is cowardice."^{[12](#)} Evola thinks retreat is possible. You must be in the world, but not of it; the aristocrat of the soul must hide his power level. Forcing change is not possible, and total despair is not necessary—Evola charts a third way.

Evola may be right that revolution and acceleration are half-baked pipe dreams. Maybe not. The one thing that *is* clear is that

incremental reform of the system is delusional to anyone with a robust understanding of power, which this book has equipped the reader with. Social change is always and everywhere top-down; there's an unelected, permanent government to whom "rule of law" does not apply; this unelected government bleeds into the private sphere while pretending not to; this continuum of hostile elites deputizes an imported underclass to use real violence against the native stock; and this is all made legal and opposition to it illegal by haphazard and nakedly political application of the law. Do you really think you're going to vote that out?

Of course you're not. And so, barring a Genghis Khan striding on to the scene, the answer is something like a combination of vanguardism and riding the tiger. These are complementary strategies and both have value. One can reinforce the other—the vanguard can push things along while the monastic order of "men among the ruins" supports it morally and spiritually. It's not an either/or question.

Evola provides little advice on what decoupling from compromised modern society looks like beyond the individual level, but we can perhaps flesh that out a little.

Our folkhood needs to be reconstituted. We must come to terms with living in exile in our own countries. This doesn't mean completely detaching from broader society, but it does at least mean becoming self-sufficient communities. This means materially self-sufficient—buying from, selling to, and hiring from within one's local in-group. But it also means culturally self-sufficient—maintaining unique local traditions, patterns of speech, and neighbourhoods, and marrying within the in-group. This is what immigrants do when they come to Western countries, but with each generation rates of endogamy (marriage inside the in-group) fall as they become modernized.¹³ This is not inevitable, as Amish and Mennonite communities have maintained high rates of endogamy for centuries to this day.

This can be done even under significant oppression. Armenians, Assyrians, Jews, Copts, Zoroastrians, and Sikhs all maintained their in-group integrity under Islam, some for over a millennium. All these have taken the same approach: depending not at all on the state but

on themselves for recognition of their existence as a coherent group. This kind of apolitical self-exile, this kind of autonomy, is what will foster a group of men who can rebuild when liberalism self-immolates.

This may take many generations—we may be riding the tiger for quite some time, but it will eventually tire, and a vanguard of higher men must be ready when it does. Those men, when they're old and grey, will tell their children of life in the Kali Yuga.

I'm going to tell them that there was a time when the future looked bleak. Where those who believed in truth and justice were mocked and persecuted.

I'm going to tell them how there were men that grabbed their meager tools and began to lay bricks as the storm poured down upon their heads. At the time those men didn't know it, but they were giants in their own right.

And those humble bricks over time became the foundations of immovable institutions for our folk. Institutions of power and longevity.¹⁴

Sri Dharma Pravartaka Acharya said that “We are no longer going to just ride the tiger. We are going to subdue it.” This is what that looks like.

SUMMARY

We have to find a way to live in the dark age.

Our attitude must be that of exiles in our own lands.

The time to build is now.

ENDNOTES

- [1](#) Julius Evola, *Ride the Tiger: A Survival Manual for the Aristocrats of the Soul* (Inner Traditions, 2003), p. 11.
- [2](#) Julius Evola, *The Path of Cinnabar* (Integral Tradition Publishing, 2009), p. 224.
- [3](#) K.M. George, *The Silent Roots: Orthodox Perspectives on Christian Spirituality* (WCC Publications: Geneva, 1994) p. 49.
- [4](#) Aleksandr Dugin, “The Legacy of a European Traditionalist: Julius Evola in Perspective”, *The Fourth Political Theory*. Available at: <https://archive.ph/WeFcu>.
- [5](#) Evola, *Ride the Tiger*, p. 41.
- [6](#) What Nietzsche calls the *Übermensch*.
- [7](#) Ibid., p. 50.
- [8](#) Evola capitalizes “Tradition” to distinguish the abstract form of tradition from any of the merely conventional traditions that accumulate over time, like family traditions, national traditions, etc.
- [9](#) Evola, *Ride the Tiger*, pp. 48–49.
- [10](#) The reader may note a tension with illiberal thinking (see p. 102) for which self-rule is paradoxical. Evola tries to differentiate himself from Kant (*Ride the Tiger*, p. 41) but it’s not clear how successfully. He most clearly states his moral vision as “the principle of purely being oneself” (p. 41) which is Nietzschean, but also striving for transcendence (which is universal), and so we are back to willing the universal—in this case transcendent—moral law, which Kant would agree manifests in different duties for different qualities of people.
- [11](#) Cf. p. 262.
- [12](#) Oswald Spengler, *Man and Technics: A Contribution to a Philosophy of Life* (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1963), p. 104.
- [13](#) https://etd.ohiolink.edu/apexprod/rws_etd/send_file/send?accession=bgsu1616669220568585&disposition=inline
- [14](#) Dave Martel.

FORTY-FOUR MACINTYRE: TRADITION AND REASON

In June 2023,¹ a former US president who represents (however imperfectly) the main current of political dissent in the West was arrested in an obvious attempt to cancel his presidential campaign. He was charged with 37 counts of what amounts to procedural offences, the most “serious” of which even the sitting US president had committed.² Mainstream cheerleaders have called this “democracy in action”, but only in that democracy is a fig leaf covering naked aggression—we are entering into full banana republic territory.

Everyone knows that politics has become bitter and divided, and this is only going to get worse. Each side accuses the other of being irrational, and neither is speaking the language of the other.³ How do we work this out?

This... *disagreement*, to put it mildly, can only be resolved the same way as any other: by starting from a point of agreement. The lion eating the gazelle is not a disagreement—there’s nothing in common, just force. If we’re not to descend into eating each other, we need to find a point of agreement, some unquestionable bedrock assumption, some first principle, from which we can work out how to live together. In a word, we need *reason*.

But there’s a problem with reason. It may seem like an academic problem at first, but properly understood, this problem has led us to where we’re on the verge of eating each other. The problem is that *reason can’t be the starting point*. Reason itself tells us that to accept something with no justification is irrational. Reason also tells us that a thing can’t be the justification of itself—this is circular, therefore irrational too. Reason can neither go unjustified, nor can it justify itself. We simply have to start *somewhere*, from unjustified first

principles, in order to reason at all.

Where do we get these first principles? The Enlightenment, following René Descartes, thought it could tell us. For Descartes, first principles were self-evident truths that any rational person would accept as certain. These self-evident first principles were supposed to provide the basis for all further knowledge, but Descartes had a problem—the more self-evident your first principles, the less they tell you, to the point where something true by definition tells you nothing at all. It's self-evident that *the moon is either made of green cheese or it's not*, but that doesn't tell you whether or not the moon is made of green cheese—you have to *look*, and that means assuming some things that could be wrong, i.e. that aren't self-evident.

Descartes tried to ground all of philosophy in absolute certainty, which he did by his most basic first principle, *cogito ergo sum*, “I think therefore I am”. But this first principle had within it the seed of destruction: the effect was to make the rational individual—the subject abstracted away from all context—into the highest authority. For Descartes, tradition had to be justified by reason, which he thought he achieved.⁴ Later thinkers only pushed this thinking in the same direction—not only was the abstract individual the *highest* authority, but the *only* authority. Inevitably the Enlightenment project failed, and when it did, it had to come crawling back to where it started with its tail between its legs. Philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre explains:

Liberalism, beginning as a repudiation of tradition in the name of abstract, universal principles of reason, turned itself into a politically embodied power, whose inability to bring its debates on the nature and context of those universal principles to a conclusion has had the unintended effect of transforming liberalism into a tradition.⁵

By making each man his own highest authority, liberalism hurled a grenade into our social lives. When it exploded, it became impossible to put the pieces back together. To illustrate this, MacIntyre begins his book *After Virtue* with a thought experiment.⁶

Imagine that after some apocalyptic event the remnants of humanity see science as the cause of the destruction. They gather together to finally say *never again* to science; libraries are burned, scientific instruments are destroyed, and all scientists are sent to the gallows. Then suppose later humanity decides to revive science, but all

scientific knowledge has been lost apart from a few pages torn out of some old textbooks. The new “scientists” take the bits and pieces of scientific theory and terminology left to them, and start doing science as though nothing ever happened. They debate the fragments of quantum mechanics alongside flat earth theory; they use terms like “mass” and “force” without really knowing what they mean; they learn the periodic table and the axioms of Euclid by heart as though they’re magic formulae. Would such a people, who have lost so much, really be able to do science?

This is what we’re doing with morality after the “age of reason”, AKA the “Enlightenment”. We’re like an illiterate cargo cult going through the motions and using the language of morality (like “good” and “bad”) from a superior past when they made sense. But now our moral life has been emptied out of meaning because the Enlightenment has done away with something crucial, MacIntyre says—teleology.

Normally when we want to “explain” something, that means giving an account of what caused it. If we want to explain what an acorn is, we typically explain what it’s made of and where it comes from. There’s another kind of explanation: we can say what the acorn is *for*, what purpose it serves. Explaining in terms of purpose—or in Greek, *telos*—is a teleological explanation.

Teleological explanations are perfectly fine when it comes to man-made things like a watch. We all know what a watch should do—it should tell the time accurately and be easy to carry around—and this is because watches are made with a purpose in mind. We can say a watch is good or bad depending on whether it serves the purpose of a watch. Teleological explanations get a bit dicier when we’re talking about social life, like economics, but they can still work because social phenomena ultimately serve human purposes. The purpose of a farmer is to grow food. When we talk about something being good or bad, whether a watch or a farmer, this means asking a) “what is it for?” and b) “does it serve its purpose?”

But it seems alien to us to ask this about an individual person. What is Jimmy *for*? Since the Enlightenment, human beings have been stripped of any intrinsic purposes, but in the past this question about Jimmy would have made total sense. Human beings have certain basic

purposes, and people are good or bad just as far as they fulfil those purposes. The purpose of an acorn is to become an oak tree—this is just one of many facts about the acorn. Under teleology, the prescription (“man, do *this*”) is just part of a thing’s description (“the purpose of a man is X”).

When the Enlightenment got rid of the purpose of a human being, it opened up a gap between describing things and prescribing things. When we want to say something is morally *right* or *wrong*, normally we start by making claims about the way things are, but at some point we move from statements of fact (“is”) to statements of value (“ought”), with nothing to connect the two. This was pointed out by David Hume, and has come to be called the *is-ought gap*.⁷ Alasdair MacIntyre says that this problem is the result of getting rid of teleology.

In explaining the nature of an acorn, it’s not enough to describe its anatomy, or to say it’s made up of this or that chemical, or is produced by this or that biological process—if you don’t explain what it’s for, you can’t say whether it’s good or bad *as an acorn*. The Enlightenment tried to come up with a view of human nature, but when it got rid of intrinsic purposes, it made morality impossible. The purpose of an acorn is to become an oak tree, and one that doesn’t do that fails on a very basic level. The Enlightenment view that nothing has intrinsic purposes is captured well by Spinoza when he says “there is no need to show at length that nature has no particular goal in view, and that final causes are mere human figments.”⁸ So prescription becomes a matter of “human figments”, which means a matter of self-legislation. Without purposes beyond individual whim, prescriptions lose their force, and we have to agree with Hamlet that “there is nothing either good or bad, but thinking makes it so.”

This self-legislation recalls our discussions in ch. 13 on self-legislation and in ch. 43 on Immanuel Kant’s idea of autonomy. Kant says the opposite of MacIntyre—that morality is impossible through *heteronomy*, moral reasoning legislated from outside. As Kant would have it, morality requires *autonomy*, being bound only by universal laws of reason that we give ourselves. But this fails because “universal laws of reason” can never actually come up with purposes, so all

that's left is your own choice of purposes. In this way, supposedly "objective" morality leads unwittingly to the most radical subjective morality. The path from Kant to Kierkegaard's existential choice to Nietzsche's free spirit to Sartre's radical freedom is a one-way street—and at the end of it is a man cutting his own penis off to spite his father.

It should surprise no one that the Enlightenment's repudiation of tradition should end in total self-legislation. Every man is his own high-priest: he can decide that he's a woman on Monday, a man on Tuesday, and a pansexual dolphin on Wednesday. The only morality, we're told, consists in securing this radical freedom. The only enforceable rule is "don't judge my fetish", unless your fetish happens to be having a coherent morality, in which case you'll get the paradox of tolerance upside the head as liberalism shows itself to be tolerant of everything as long as it is also liberalism.

The logical consequence of the Enlightenment has been that morality has been completely emptied of content, and we have finally arrived at *emotivism*. This is the idea that moral propositions don't express something true or false, but rather an attitude of approval or disapproval. This is actually an improvement on the Enlightenment idea that moral judgements finally cash out to propositions, and not as far away from MacIntyre as it may seem. The chief difference is that for MacIntyre moral judgements cash out to purposes given from without, and emotivism cashes out to people yelling their own preferences in each other's faces—to self-chosen purposes.

Morality was hard enough when we disagreed about *how to achieve* purposes; now we disagree on *the purposes themselves*, and because they're just preferences, they're always up for debate—moral discourse has completely broken down. And it can't be put back together even in principle because morals are just commands, and as we saw earlier, a man can't command himself because he can always overrule himself. Wittgenstein, whom we started this book with, said much the same thing in his famous *private language argument*, that a word depends on a rule of use, and a rule depends on a community to enforce it. "Could a solitary man follow a rule?"² Clearly not, and nor can a rule be self-chosen. "When I obey a rule, I do not choose. I obey the rule

blindly.”^{[10](#)}

MacIntyre has put his finger on a serious problem with modernity: our moral language fails to refer to anything at all. Morality without external commands is like a cheque written to a bank account that’s now closed—all our moral terminology finally denotes nothing.

He also tells us that to understand morality we have to look at its history; liberals, on the other hand, believe that morality is something floating free of context—yes, classical liberals too, if they only held their own beliefs consistently. We began our 10-step program at the beginning of this book by saying that our “tradition” of the past few centuries is just as revolutionary as Bolshevik communism, and this is what we mean. The road from Kant to Kendi,^{[11](#)} once embarked upon, can’t be reversed, only abandoned.

The Enlightenment has it backwards. All morality is heteronomous—subject to an external standard. Whether it’s the man who commands himself or the society that gives itself laws, the result is the same: a snake that eats its tail. Man cannot be his own lawgiver any more than he can be his own father. Law, if it really is to be binding, must be given from without, and we could say the same even about reason. Tradition furnishes us with those first principles that reason needs just to gain a foothold in the first place—authority comes even before reason.

What the Enlightenment made us for the most part blind to and what we now need to recover is, so I shall argue, a conception of rational enquiry as embodied in a tradition, a conception according to which the standards of rational justification themselves emerge from and are part of a history in which they are vindicated by the way in which they transcend the limitations of and provide remedies for the defects of their predecessors within the history of that same tradition.^{[12](#)}

Received authority is the axiomatic ground not only for morality, but even for *reasoning itself*. Liberalism claims the right to pronounce judgement on the tradition—to determine its worth. But the worth of the tradition is the *beginning* of reasoning, not a conclusion. Liberalism has arrogantly set itself on the throne of the high god, and it will not be long before it is cast down.

SUMMARY

Without commands issued from outside, morality is empty.

A man can't command himself because he can always overrule himself.

Ultimate authority, whether epistemic or moral, is always received.

ENDNOTES

- 1 Margaret Sullivan, “Donald Trump’s arrest is ugly but it’s also democracy in action”, *The Guardian*, June 14, 2023. Available at: <https://archive.ph/PbBUm>.
- 2 Sam Cabral, “Top secret documents reportedly found in Biden cache”, *BBC*, January 14, 2023. Available at: <https://archive.ph/6se4C>.
- 3 Cf. p. 133.
- 4 René Descartes, *Meditations on First Philosophy*, V, where he tries to prove the existence of God based on the meaning of words alone.
- 5 Alasdair MacIntyre, *Whose Justice? Which Rationality?* (University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), p. 349.
- 6 Alasdair MacIntyre, *After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory* (University of Notre Dame Press, 1981).
- 7 Hume lays this problem out in *A Treatise of Human Nature* (1739), book III, part I, §1.
- 8 Baruch Spinoza, *Ethics* (1677), part I, appendix.
- 9 Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics* (MIT Press: Cambridge, 1974), p. 349.
- 10 Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations* (Blackwell: Oxford, 1958), §219.
- 11 Ibram X. Kendi, noted anti-white activist and writer.
- 12 MacIntyre, *Whose Justice*, p. 7.

EPILOGUE

THE CULTURED THUG (REDUX)

This book contains the seed of the cultured thug—the man who can fight *and* think. He brings fire to raze the forest choked with dead and rotting wood. His is the seed that will burst forth out of the ashes of the old world. To the men of his time, he is a nightmare; to posterity, he is a god. The Chinese have a saying: *the great man is a public misfortune*. The man of the future is always hated by the present—the cultured thug unites past, present, and future.

But if he sets out to change the world, he will fail. Great things often have small beginnings. Frodo set out on his quest not to save the world, but to save the Shire. The cultured thug must begin from where he is—alone, besieged, hated—and change what is within his grasp.

There was once a man who was at home, busy with his work. His son came to him and wanted to help; the father just wanted to get on with the job, but the boy wouldn't take no for an answer. Finally the father took a map of the world, cut it into tiny pieces, and told the boy to put it back together, reckoning that this would keep him busy for hours. Within a few minutes, the son came to his father and showed him the map, good as new. The father asked how he had done it so quickly, and the son told him that he couldn't put the world back together, so he looked at the picture of a man he had found on the other side and put that back together instead.

The cultured thug can't fix the world until he fixes himself. He must first get in shape, fix his relationships, build his clan, and read the classics. Gandhi was a braindead libtoad, but when he said that you need to be the change you want to see in the world, he wasn't wrong.

If your loser ideology can't stop you from being fat, poor, and disgusting, it's worth nothing—look no further than the degenerate subhumans who call themselves communists. The worldview in this book has improved men since we lived in trees.

We began this book with a quote from Wittgenstein, and we will end with one:

My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who understands me eventually recognizes them as nonsensical, when he has used them—as steps—to climb beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it.)

He must transcend these propositions, and then he will see the world aright.¹

Anyone who has read this book and properly understood it can throw it away. It's a set of training wheels, and when it has been understood, it's no longer needed.

Because it's not enough that it be understood.

It must be lived.

¹ Wittgenstein, *Tractatus*, proposition 6.54.

GLOSSARY OF TERMS

Absolutism – A political theory that states that the sovereign is necessarily above the law, and that final decision rests in a person rather than in a constitution or an idea.

Accelerationism – The idea that what is leaning must be pushed, that society cannot be fixed but must be rebuilt from the ground up, which necessitates it being destroyed.

Anarcho-tyranny – The haphazard application of anarchy (no government) and tyranny (intrusive government) depending on the needs of the sovereign, always to the harm of the folk.

Asabiyyah – The strong natural bond of a people living an organic form of life. Basically, clannishness.

Auctoritas – Latin term for “authority”, but with the specific meaning of unofficial authority. The power of prestige.

Autarkeia – The radical self-legislation of Evola’s “aristocrat of the soul”.

Bioleninism – The application of Leninism (deputization of the inferior as loyal foot soldiers), not to inferior classes but to the biologically inferior.

Blackpill – A fact or idea that promotes nihilism or extreme discouragement. Also used verbally: “to blackpill”, “blackpilled”.

Cathedral, the – The grey area between the government and supposedly “private” or “independent” institutions such as the mainstream media, the university system, and NGOs.

Collectivism – An ideological or moral commitment to the primacy of the group over the individual.

Corporatism – Society is first and foremost a wholeness or unity, with the individual elements being derivative or secondary. An analogy from the Latin *corpus* (“body”), where the body can’t exist as separate parts.

Cuckservative – The mushy centre-rightist who accepts the conceptual

and moral frame of his enemies, analogous to a cuckold who accepts his wife's infidelity.

Cultured Thug – The man who looks and acts like a traditional man (“toxic masculinity”) but who is also knowledgeable in the history of ideas. The subject of this book.

Dasein – The unique “way of being” that characterizes human life. The way in which we're different from any other creature, including heightened self-awareness, orientation toward things in time, and the capacity to reflect on our own existence.

Deep State – The permanent and unelected governance apparatus in Western societies. Mostly synonymous with the “civil service”. “Deep” because it downplays its power, “state” because it is sovereign over the elected part of the government.

Dems potis – The Aryan or Indo-European “House Father” who held supreme authority over his household, and whose influence comes down to all Indo-European cultures. Literally, the “master of the house”, and the source of our term “despot”. See also *paterfamilias*.

Differential ontology – A form of ontology (inquiry into existence-as-such) wherein difference is primary over sameness.

Endonym – The name by which a people calls itself. “Deutschland” is what the Germans call their country. “Germany” is the opposite—an exonym, what others call it.

Endoxa – Widely held or reputable opinions that form the basis for inquiry or discussion. Also known as traditional wisdom, common sense, or less often, expert opinion.

Environmentalism – A critique of human-centred worldviews. Environmentalism values nature highly, seeing it as the precondition of human flourishing, sometimes an end in itself.

Essentialism – The idea that things have an innate “essence” that cannot be deviated from without becoming something else entirely.

Fas – The Roman concept of divine law, but with an emphasis on law without a lawgiver, an impersonal force that works through a people.

Folk – A people, but “folk” differs from a people in that it's

sometimes narrower, encompassing a nation, a tribe, or even a clan. Your folk are those who matter.

Folkhood – The state of belonging to a folk.

Frame – The default assumptions that determine the rules of a social interaction, what’s “in bounds” and “out of bounds”. Also the authority to set those rules.

Gemeinschaft - A community united by common history, culture, and blood, where social ties are inherited and permanent.

Gesellschaft - A group of individuals held together by economic relations, where social bonds are voluntary and revokable.

Globalism – The view that our world ought to be interconnected across economies, cultures, and political systems worldwide.

Guilt culture – A culture where the centre of moral authority is within the person, where the main moral motivation is a sense of guilt, an internal feeling of moral inadequacy judged by the individual.

Hos epi to polu – Aristotle’s stipulation that different bodies of knowledge have different levels of precision that are appropriate. Literally, “for the most part”.

Imperium in imperio – Latin term for a “state within a state”. This is a little node or bubble of supreme decision existing within another, larger body such as a society, and which plays by its own rules.

Inessentialism - The idea that things lack an innate “essence”, either having no essence at all, or a handful of features not all of which need be present for a thing to be what it is.

Kosher sandwich – A fake dichotomy. Two sides of a coin that give the impression of difference but which are really intended to foreclose on an alternative. Also known as “containment” or “controlled opposition”.

Kultur – A folk or a people in its unformed youth and strength, in its vitalistic early days when it is energetic, unreflective, and often violent.

Liberalism – A political ideology that makes the abstract individual the supreme authority over morality and knowledge. Often takes the form of a negative philosophy (defined in terms of what it is *not*

about) which is uneasy about what can never be changed, especially the past.

Lindy effect – A rule of thumb that predicts how durable something will be based on how long it has been around. Has important applications for morality and theories of knowledge, especially knowledge under conditions of uncertainty.

Localism – A moral commitment to what is local over what is distant.

Manosphere – A movement arising in the late 2000s in reaction to feminism. The manosphere is a kind of self-help movement for men, which views sexual relations in rigorously biological terms.

Metaphysics – A philosophical answer to the question “what is there?” Distinguished from ontology in that it almost always tries to bring all of reality under one heading or category (such as “matter” or ideas”), whereas ontology usually tries to say something about what it is to exist.

Microstalinism – The primordial structure of the Aryan or Indo-European household, where the family father had supreme authority in all matters. A kind of absolute monarchy in the home. See also *dems potis*.

Mos maiorum – Tradition. The highest authority in morality and knowledge among the Romans, and their starting point for any reasoning. Literally, “the custom of the elders/betters”. See also *endoxa*.

Nationalism – An emphasis on the interests, culture, and identity of a particular people or nation, always above that of others. Sometimes confused with “civic nationalism” which is the idea that a nation can be constituted by beliefs alone.

Nativism – Related to *nationalism*, this is the strong favouritism of local and native interests over foreign ones, often with an emphasis on tradition.

Noblesse oblige – The idea that nobility or higher class carries with it obligations to others within the folk. A protection against the upper classes exploiting the lower. Literally, “nobility obligates”.

Oikophilia – A love of what is close and familiar. The opposite of oikophobia, which is a love of the non-native, unfamiliar, and unusual. Related to *nativism*.

Ontology – Inquiry into the nature of existence, of what it is to be a thing. Distinguished from metaphysics in that metaphysics is usually concerned to determine what sort of thing every other thing is made of.

Parentare – The name the Romans gave to their own religion of ancestor worship, focused on a cult of the dead and the worship of the hearth in the home. Comes from a Latin verb meaning “to avenge one’s father”.

Particularism – The idea that what makes us different is more important than what makes us the same. Different strokes for different folks.

Paterfamilias – The Roman family father who held supreme authority in the household. See also *microstalinism*.

Patriarchy – The default system of sexual relations where men hold primary power and authority over women, especially in domestic affairs.

Physiognomy – The fact that physical and mental traits are both caused by the same things, resulting in an ability to predict and infer mental traits from physical ones.

Pragmatism – A philosophical school that emphasizes experience and the practical consequences of concepts. It evaluates concepts in terms of what they can do rather than more abstract principles.

Presence-at-hand – The state of a thing being open to contemplation. In Heideggerian terms, a thing is present-to-hand when it has broken down, or when it is no longer “ready-to-hand”.

Profilicity – An identity which is based not on an unchosen role, nor even on authenticity, but a completely self-made identity which is conjured out of thin air, like a profile picture.

Progressive stack – The hierarchy of inherited identities loved by political progressivism, which is roughly the inverse of the hierarchy

of competence.

Proposition nation – The nation based on belief rather than heredity, where anyone at all can be included if they affirm the right propositions. Also known as “civic nationalism”. See also *gesellschaft*.

Readiness-to-hand – The state of a thing before it enters into human reflection. A thing is ready-to-hand when it is serving its usual function and is transparent to the situation, like a pen while writing.

Redpill – A fact or idea that breaks one out of one’s ordinary frame of reference, showing one a whole new reality. Taken from the movie *The Matrix*. Also used verbally: “to redpill”, “redpilled”.

Shame culture – A culture where the centre of moral authority is outside the person, where the main moral motivation is a sense of shame, an external source of moral inadequacy judged by the group.

Sovereignty – The state of having supreme authority or jurisdiction over something.

State of exception – A situation, often a crisis, where the normal rules of government are suspended by the sovereign, and extraordinary powers are exercised.

Thrownness – The condition of being born into a specific time and place, but also the realization that we are always already embedded in a web of relationships that govern our ideas.

True constitution – The constitution of a people that is the product of historical development rather than the result of written codes generated out of nothing.

Universalism – The idea that what makes us the same is more important than what makes us the different. What’s good for the goose is good for the gander.

Wu-wei – The Daoist concept of “action without action”, where rather than striving against the current of reality, one instead swims with it, and gains immense power from it.

Zivilisation – A folk or a people that has grown up into a mature and decadent society, when it has completely actualized its basic idea and all its cultural fruits have ripened.

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