The Routledge Handbook of the History of Settler Colonialism

Edited by Edward Cavanagh and Lorenzo Veracini

THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF THE HISTORY OF SETTLER COLONIALISM

The Routledge Handbook of the History of Settler Colonialism examines the global history of settler colonialism as a distinct mode of domination from ancient times to the present day. It explores the ways in which new polities were established in freshly discovered 'New Worlds' and covers the history of many countries, including Australia, New Zealand, Israel, Japan, South Africa, Liberia, Algeria, Canada and the USA.

Chronologically as well as geographically wide-reaching, this volume focuses on an extensive array of topics and regions ranging from settler colonialism in the Neo-Assyrian and Roman empires to relationships between indigenes and newcomers in New Spain and the early Mexican Republic to the settler-dominated polities of Africa during the twentieth century. Its 29 interdisciplinary chapters focus on single colonies or on regional developments that straddle the borders of present-day states, on successful settlements that would go on to become powerful settler nations, on failed settler colonies and on the historiographies of these experiences.

Taking a fundamentally international approach to the topic, this book analyses the varied experiences of settler colonialism in countries around the world. With a synthesizing yet original introduction, this is a landmark contribution to the emerging field of settler colonial studies and will be a valuable resource for anyone interested in the global history of imperialism and colonialism.

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INTRODUCTION

Settler colonialism as a distinct mode of domination

Lorenzo Veracini

Oceanic perspectives have transformed the ways in which we look at the histories of community formation and displacement in the 'New Worlds'. There is by now a large literature constituting a veritable 'oceanic turn', especially with regards to the Atlantic Ocean.[1] These perspectives enabled us to look beyond traditional historiographical approaches and to appraise a variety of foundational and ongoing links that had been actively repressed. Conversely, the organising framework informing the ways in which the following chapters are grouped is continental (the partial exception to this pattern is this volume's first part and its relation to the following ones, a relationship that is premised on a chronological distinction between 'old' and 'new'). While a continent-by-continent approach is aimed at emphasising regional histories that exceed the contemporary limits of internationally recognised states, we believe that this framework is especially suited to the topic at hand: settlers traverse seas, plains and mountain chains, but they typically claim macroregions and continents.

Settler colonialism as a mode of domination thinks geopolitically. It is significant that William Gilpin, the 'inventor' of modern geopolitics should be a committed and prominent settler colonialist of the nineteenth century and that Carl Schmitt should have developed his theory of 'large spaces' with reference to US President Monroe's enunciation of the ultimate incompatibility between colonial and settler colonial forms.[2] Epitomising a continental approach, in *The Winning of the West*, future US President Theodore Roosevelt wrote in 1889: 'It is of incalculable importance that America, Australia, and Siberia should pass out of the hands of their red, black, and yellow aboriginal owners, and become the heritage of the dominant world races'.[3] But this global continent-shaped vision had significant antecedents and would have important successors. The rebelling settlers of what would become the US built a 'continental' army, their representatives met in a 'continental' congress, the settlers of South Africa met undifferentiated 'Africans' and self-defined their collective and language as 'Afrikaner', US President James Monroe developed his doctrine to fence off clearly defined *continental* limits, Australian Federation united an 'island-continent' and Canada was built around a 'continental' railroad from 'sea to sea'. There are probably more examples of these 'continents of the mind'.[4]

Coherently, when it comes to decolonisation, settlers generally prefer that a 'blue water' definition be adopted: the latter does not apply to them and the ways in which the boundaries of their polities are drawn.[5] Quite tellingly, the US insisted in the 1960s on a 'blue water' definition of colonialism in order to exempt its ongoing settler colonialism from the purview of developing

international law on decolonisation. UN General Assembly Resolution 1541 (passed after the 'Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples') was premised on this definition of colonialism.[6] When the UN finally caught up with settler colonialism as a mode of domination in 2007 and 'declared' the inherent rights of the world's indigenous peoples, the settler polities were unsurprisingly sceptical.[7]

The 'blue water' definition of colonialism does not hold for settler colonialism as a specific mode of domination, and it is significant that profound decolonising moments in the US and Australia, two crucial settler polities covered in this *Handbook*, involved islands. When a body of water is involved, the settler polities see more clearly. Alcatraz Island in San Francisco Bay was occupied between November 1969 and June 1971 by the 'Indians of All Tribes' in their fight for political sovereignty, cultural survival and land. Even if that specific occupation did not produce ostensible results, it was a most visible part of an ultimately successful struggle aimed at renegotiation of indigenous collective prerogatives in the US. The fateful Mabo decision by the Australian High Court in 1992 similarly involved an island in the Torres Strait. Indigenous title originally detected there was then recognised in the continent as well.[8] Nonetheless, the study of settler colonialism is necessarily premised on the realisation that colonialism does not always arrive on boats and that settlers typically act on their own behalf, not as agents of distant metropoles. Settlers characteristically arrive in their wagon trains, and the study of *their* colonialism is premised on the parallel realisation that they rarely sail away (even if, as a few of the chapters we have collected remind us, they sometimes do). Settler colonialism is an ongoing phenomenon; writing its history is charged with a presentist preoccupation.

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Volumes like this *Handbook* are typically edited for two reasons: either because there is a substantial literature on a general topic and some interpretative order is needed or because there is a scattered (if growing) scholarly literature on a particular topic and some coherence is needed. We face the second task. This *Handbook* results from the consolidation of settler colonial studies in the last two decades, a process that we have contributed to with our scholarly activity and with the founding of *Settler Colonial Studies* in 2010.[9]

Of course, even if settler colonial studies has consolidated in the last two decades as a distinct scholarly subfield, the study of colonial phenomena is much older. After the initial inception of colonial studies during the 'age of decolonization' in the 1950s and 1960s, the study of colonialism fragmented in a variety of discourses, methodological approaches and associated terminologies.[10] 'Neocolonialism' emerged almost immediately to denounce relations that ostensibly acknowledged the equality of former coloniser and former colonised but did not actually affect structuring inequalities.[11] 'Internal colonialism' emerged in the 1970s, focusing on the resilience of colonial relationships *within* a specific polity – a predicament that could not be approached by envisaging the ultimate sovereign independence of the colonised.[12] It was eventually applied to a remarkable variety of polities and realities, including Apartheid South Africa, Appalachia, the position of African Americans and the Celtic 'fringe'. 'Postcolonialism', or 'post-colonialism', emerged as a scholarly approach in the 1980s to emphasise the enduring legacy of colonial regimes and the ways in which these legacies continue to inform relationships and representational strategies after the end of formal colonial subjection.[13] The 'new imperial history' followed in the 1990s; today, the study of imperial and colonial formations is a lively and remarkable scholarly field.[14]

All of these methodological approaches centred on what historian Partha Chatterjee insightfully defined as 'the colonial rule of difference'.[15] As such, they all related to colonialism as a set of social phenomena that is characterised by the ability to reproduce itself by maintaining

difference and inequality between coloniser and colonised. Conversely, analyses that adopted 'settler colonialism' as paradigm emphasised circumstances primarily characterised by a determination to erase colonised subjectivities rather than reproduce their subordination.[16] Unlike the other colonial formations, settler colonialism supersedes rather than *reproduces* the colonial rule of difference; settlers win by *discontinuing* unequal relationships rather than maintaining them. Settler colonial studies was a relative newcomer in this genealogy and only consolidated in the 1990s and 2000s to designate the 'settler societies' and the fraught relations they entertained with colonised indigenous minorities.

The consolidation of settler colonial studies as a scholarly subfield relied crucially on Patrick Wolfe's seminal theorisation of settler colonialism:

> But what if the colonizers are not dependent on native labour? – indeed, what if the natives themselves have been reduced to a small minority whose survival can hardly be seen to furnish the colonizing society with more than remission from ideological embarrassment? [. . .] In contrast to the kind of colonial formation that Cabral or Fanon confronted [i.e.: 'franchise' or 'dependent'], settler colonies were not primarily established to extract surplus value from indigenous labour.[17]

A focus on land and a relative neglect of the labour of the colonised set settler colonialism as a mode of domination apart. Like the scholars of internal colonialism, the scholars contributing to settler colonial studies have emphasised the *continuing* operation of an unchanged set of unequal relations. Settler colonialism as a mode of domination, it was often noted, has typically resisted formal decolonisation. As a result, postcolonial approaches were deemed unsuitable to the analysis of the settler societies and the ongoing subjection of indigenous collectives. Australian Aboriginal poet and militant Bobby Sikes ironically captured this incongruity: 'What? Postcolonialism? Have they left?'[18]

The distinction between colonial and settler colonial formations, however, is much older. Karl Marx, for example (who had an ongoing interest in colonial questions and even pondered as a young man whether he should emigrate as a settler to the US), defined them as the only 'real colonies, virgin soils colonised by free labour'.[19] Similarly, Friederich Engels defined in a letter to Karl Kautsky the settler colonies as the 'colonies proper'. They were the opposite of what he defined as 'the countries inhabited by a native population, which are simply subjugated – India, Algeria, the Dutch, the Portuguese, and Spanish possessions'.[20] Marx was responding to the theory of 'systematic colonisation' advanced by Edward Gibbon Wakefield, who had originally 'discovered' primitive accumulation while noting the ways in which the presence of 'free lands' in settler colonial peripheries enabled servants to abscond and rely independently on a subsistence economy that undid their previous subjugation.[21] But liberalism as a set of political traditions was also fundamentally shaped by ongoing and sustained reflection on settler colonial issues.[22] The scholars of the evolution of socialism and liberalism ignore settler colonialism at their peril.

Indeed, during the nineteenth century, the difference between what we now define as colonialism and settler colonialism as distinct modes of domination was clear to most observers.[23] Influential British historian J. R. Seeley aptly encapsulated this socio-political distinction: the settler 'colonies' and 'India' are 'in opposite extremes'. He concluded: 'Whatever political maxims are most applicable to one, are most inapplicable to the other'.[24] The distinction was also abundantly clear in the US, as epitomised by the distinct ways in which different conquered areas were dealt with during the Mexican War of 1846–1848: temporary 'occupation' south of the Rio Grande, organic incorporation north of it. The turn of the century US anti-imperialists

based their opposition to the prospect of further expansion on this distinction.[25] For a very long time one could approve of one mode of domination and *precisely for that reason* dislike the other. John A. Hobson, for example, approved of 'settlement' as much as he disliked 'imperialism'.[26] His ideas about 'imperialism' would transform the world; his ideas about settler colonialism were commonplace.

These interpretative traditions developed in the context of what James Belich has called the global 'settler revolution'.[27] The ideology that accompanied and propelled this 'revolution' in the nineteenth century comprehensively reformed the generalised perception of settlers and their societies. From places where 'rebarbarised' demi-savage Europeans lived at the margins of civilisation, the 'frontiers' of settlement eventually became sites of political experimentation and, typically, 'manly' regeneration. Many of the chapters we collect in this handbook tell the localised history of this shift.

As a specific term, 'settler colonialism' was first used in the 1920s to indicate a particular type of British colonialism in an Australian context, to distinguish it from convict colonialism and to differentiate between South Australia and New South Wales.[28] The former had been originally settled by 'free' settlers. As a compound term, however, it had originally developed in relation to what were generally called '*bona fide*' or 'actual' settlers. In the US and in parts of the British Empire during the nineteenth century, these widely used expressions identified a particular constituency of 'migrants' or 'colonists': those who, unlike mere colonial sojourners, had displaced with an intention to remain in a particular locality or colony.

During the 1970s, and in the presence of bitter anticolonial insurgencies in Africa, 'settler colonialism' was used to identify a type of 'ultra-colonialism' whereby settlers held power without a demographic majority.[29] However, beginning with Donald Denoon's seminal work on the settler economies of the southern hemisphere, 'settler colonialism' eventually became associated (again) with the polities where settlers and their descendants were in power *and* a normalised majority.[30] Thereafter, settler colonial studies progressively expanded its geographical scope. An inherently comparative approach defied recurring claims pertaining to local national exceptionalisms. While the US and Israel were for some time not included within the bounds of settler colonial studies as an emerging transnational field, they eventually became important sites for the exploration of settler colonialism as a specific mode of domination.[31] Today, the concept is applied to analyse a vast variety of locales, including postcolonial African nations, Latin America, Taiwan, and even Pakistan.[32] As a scholarly field and as paradigm for analysis, settler colonial studies has gone global.

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Settler colonialism is a relationship. It is related to colonialism but also inherently distinct from it. As a system defined by unequal relationships (like colonialism) where an exogenous collective aims to locally and permanently replace indigenous ones (unlike colonialism), settler colonialism has no geographical, cultural or chronological bounds. It is culturally nonspecific (indeed, a few of the chapters we collect outline the history of settler colonial projects promoted by non-Europeans). It can happen at any time, and everyone is a settler if they are part of a collective and sovereign displacement that moves to stay, that moves to establish a permanent homeland by way of displacement. This is why we have commissioned chapters surveying settler colonial phenomena in ancient as well as in modern and contemporary times. These are intentionally flexible definitional boundaries. The chapters we have collected focus on macro-regions rather than states, and their authors are free to define settler colonialism as they see fit.

And yet, as the structuring framework we have chosen for this *Handbook* demonstrates, we recognise that settler colonialism emanates primarily from a particular geographic core (the 'Old World', the dialectical counterpart of the recently discovered or presumed 'New' ones,

even though we place an emphasis on the inverted commas), and that the onset of modernity, a particular period, and the onset of globalising processes (i.e., the Europe-led discoveries and the 'transport revolution') eventually produced a qualitative shift (i.e., the 'settler revolution').[33] Within each part, the chapters are organised chronologically.

As instances of settler colonialism involving these sites occur before and after the onset of modernity, Israel and Ireland constitute a conceptual problem for this *Handbook*'s structure. Ireland and the Atlantic Islands also join the Japanese Hokkaidō and Aotearoa New Zealand cases in providing other exceptions to our interpretative framework: settler colonialism happens in islands too. Hawaii is also missing from this collection – we have tried but could not commission a chapter, which is unfortunate because there is a growing literature on settler colonialism in Hawaii.[34] We would have wanted to include yet more examples, but we had to draw the line at some point. In any case, we believe that the chapters included in this collection demonstrate that settler colonialism was/is indeed a global phenomenon.

These inconsistencies, however, may also be interpretative advantages. Including chapters on ancient and contemporary 'Israel' in different parts of this *Handbook* allows us to emphasise discontinuity (insisting on continuity would reproduce a crucial tenet of Zionist ideology). The actual site has not moved, of course, but the geopolitical boundaries did, and the colonial relation had by the late nineteenth century cleaved the Mediterranean world between a fundamentally separate northern and a southern shore. As for Ireland, we may argue the opposite and highlight continuities. The presence of settler colonialism as a mode of domination before and after the onset of modernity (and, as Stephen Howe's article outlines, its hybrid revitalisation during the twentieth century in Northern Ireland) suggests that Ireland was indeed a long-lasting laboratory of settler colonial practices (as well as of colonial ones, of course).[35] Another crucial nexus in this transition was 'Atlantic Islands'. Colonised by the Iberian powers since the beginning of the fifteenth century, as Patrick O'Flanagan's chapter demonstrates, these archipelagos enabled Europeans to test a variety of foundational technologies of dispossession and elimination. In some cases, they enacted projects of population replacement.

Nonetheless, we believe that these geographic-chronological categories are mainly useful as heuristic devices and that they should be interpreted loosely, first, because colonialism and settler colonialism are inevitably interwoven, and, second, because settler colonialism is in many ways an exercise in the deliberate alteration of time and space. Triumphant settler colonialism is, after all, a violent act against geography: settler colonialism turns someone else's place into space and then into place again. The latter place looks like the one the settlers left behind, or should. When it doesn't, the settler project needs to compensate.[36] Settlers exchange countries but also change countries; they literally transform them, aiming for greater productivity and recognisable patterns of land use. They often dream of other locations, places as they could be and places that are other. Settler structures of feelings are in many ways defined by what Australian historian Geoffrey Blainey called the 'tyranny of distance'. That was the negative definition; more positively, but underwritten by the same determination to disavow distance, Australian arch-settler Prime Minister Robert Menzies famously proclaimed a sense of Britishness stretching from 'Cape York to Invercargill'.[37] Settlers often wish their places were somewhere else: modern-day Israel, for example, is in 'Asia', not in 'the West'. It is one side of Suez and not the other, one side of Istanbul and not the other, one side of the sea and not the other.

Settlers see both time and space as inherently malleable. The image we have chosen for this volume's cover, a text that narrates powerfully a displacement that is simultaneously temporal and spatial, aptly conveys this transformative disposition. Indeed, even if settlers often represent their activities in a 'new' land as absolute beginnings (this is why they often call the peoples they encounter 'Aborigines' – people that were there *ab origine*, at the beginning),

they do not begin from scratch. They are endowed with what Patrick Wolfe has called, talk-ing about the Zionist conquest of Palestine, as 'preaccumulation'.[38] The settlers of the global history narrated by these chapters travelled with their preaccumulated social, technical and other capital with them. Resulting from a specifically settler colonial type of uneven and combined development, during the high tide of the settler revolution, their polities were immediately autonomous and ultra-modern. John Stuart Mill was enthusiastic about their collective capacity for social experimentation.[39]

But settlers also manipulate time in the other direction: they often move to return – return to a pristine social order disturbed by modernity, return to appropriate social mores disturbed by gender and other revolutions, return to the land and return to the ability of genuinely owning it, an ability disturbed by enclosures and other dispossessions. There are other returns.[40] These chapters narrate the stories of these returns by way of forward movement. They also narrate what happens to the indigenous peoples that are invested by these displacements.

Notes

1 See, for recent examples, J. Weaver, *The Red Atlantic: American Indigenes and the Making of the Modern World, 1000–1927*, Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2014; and P. Gilroy, *The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double-Consciousness*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015 [1993].

2 On W. Gilpin, see T. L. Karnes, *William Gilpin: Western Nationalist*, Austin: University of Texas Press, 2014; on his theorisation of geopolitics, see ibid., pp. 341–43, citing B. Devoto, 'Geopolitics with the dew on it', *Harper's Magazine* 183, 1944, 313–23. On Schmitt's theory of 'large spaces', see S. Legg (ed.), *Spatiality, Sovereignty and Carl Schmitt: Geographies of the Nomos*, London: Routledge, 2011; especially Chapter 3, C. Schmitt, 'Großraum versus universalism: The international legal struggle over the Monroe Doctrine [1939]', and Chapter 6, S. Elden, 'Reading Schmitt geopolitically: Nomos, territory and Großraum'. On the basis of the distinction between 'Europe' and 'America' and their 'essentially different [. . .] systems', Monroe had proclaimed to Congress: 'the occasion has been judged proper for asserting, as a principle [. . .] that the American continents [. . .] are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers [. . .]'. 'Monroe Doctrine; 2 December 1823'. Available at: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/monroe.asp (accessed 17/01/2016).

3 T. Roosevelt, *The Winning of the West*, Vol. 3, New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1889, p. 45.

4 This is a play on another geographical feature of the mind. See J. R. Gillis, *Islands of the Mind: How the Human Imagination Created the Atlantic World*, Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004. And yet, it seems important to note that the settler colonial imagination took shape beginning with islands, as Patrick O'Flanagan's chapter in this volume demonstrates.

5 Considering the similarities and differences of British and American imperialisms, Bernard Porter commented that to 'exclude the colonisation of the American West from the rubric "imperialism" simply because it didn't involve getting into boats is tendentious, to say the least'. B. Porter, 'British and American "imperialisms" compared', *History News Network*, 26/06/06.

6 See A. Goldstein, 'Introduction: Toward a Genealogy of the U.S. Colonial Present', in A. Goldstein (ed.), *Formations of United States Colonialism*, Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2014, pp. 1–30, at p. 13.

7 There is a large literature on the settler polities' extraordinary convergence in this instance. See, for example, F. Merlan, 'Indigeneity: Global and Local', *Current Anthropology* 50, 3, 2009, 303–33.

8 For the former, see, for example, T. Johnson, *The Occupation of Alcatraz Island: Indian Self-Determination and the Rise of Indian Activism*, Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1997; for the latter, see, for example, T. Rowse, *After Mabo: Interpreting Indigenous Traditions*, Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1993.

9 We have also established and took turns in managing the settler colonial studies blog. See E. Cavanagh, L. Veracini, 'Settler Colonial Studies Blog'. Available at: www.settlercolonialstudies.org, and *Settler Colonial Studies* (Taylor and Francis). Available at: http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/rset20/current (both accessed 18/12/2015).

10 For founding statements, see A. Memmi, *The Colonizer and the Colonized*, London: Earthscan, 2003 [1957]; and F. Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1967 [1961].

11 K. Nkrumah, *Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism*, London: Thomas Nelson & Sons, 1965; and J.-P. Sartre, *Colonialism and Neocolonialism*, London: Routledge, 2001 [1964].

12 See P. G. Casanova, 'Internal colonialism and national development', *Studies in Comparative International Development* 1, 4, 1965, 27–37; and M. Hechter, *Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development*, 1536–1966, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975.

13 On Orientalism as discourse, see E. Said, *Orientalism*, London: Vintage, 1978; on 'othering' as the inevitable outcome of colonial relationships, see G. C. Spivak, 'The Rani of Sirmur: An essay in reading the archives', *History and Theory* 24, 3, 1985, 247–72; on 'hybridity', 'ambivalence' and 'mimicry' as subversive strategies, see H. K. Bhabha, *The Location of Culture*, London: Routledge, 1994.

14 See, for example, this *Handbook*'s companion: R. Aldrich and K. McKenzie (eds.) *The Routledge History of Western Empires*, London: Routledge, 2014; and S. Howe, *The New Imperial Histories Reader*, London: Routledge, 2009.

15 P. Chatterjee, *The Nation and Its Fragments*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993, pp. 19, 33.

16 L. Veracini, *Settler Colonialism: A Theoretical Overview*, Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.

17 P. Wolfe, *Settler Colonialism and the Transformation of Anthropology: The Politics and Poetics of an Ethnographic Event*, London: Cassell, 1999, p. 1.

18 Cited in L. T. Smith, *Decolonizing Methodologies: Research and Indigenous Peoples*, London: Zed Books, 1999, p. 24.

19 K. Marx, *Capital*, London: Pelican, 1976 [1867], p. 931.

20 F. Engels, 'Letter to Karl Kautsky', 1882. Available at: https://www.marxists.org/archive/kautsky/1907/colonial/appendix.htm (accessed 17/03/2015).

21 G. Piterberg, and L. Veracini, 'Wakefield, Marx and the world turned inside out', *Journal of Global History* 10, 3, 2015, 457–78.

22 See D. Bell, *Remaking the World*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2016.

23 See T. Foley, '"An Unknown and Feeble Body": How settler colonialism was theorized in the nineteenth century', in F. Bateman and L. Pilkington (eds.) *Studies in Settler Colonialism*, Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011, pp. 10–27.

24 Cited in D. Bell, *The Idea of Greater Britain: Empire and the Future of World Order, 1860–1900*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009, p. 8.

25 See, for example, P. A. Kramer, 'Empires, exceptions, and anglo-saxons: Race and rule between the British and United States Empires, 1880–1910', *The Journal of American History* 88, 4, 2002, 1315–53, and M. P. Cullinane, *Liberty and American Anti-Imperialism 1898–1909*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012.

26 See D. Bell, *Remaking the World*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2016, especially pp. 341–62.

27 J. Belich, *Replenishing the Earth: The Settler Revolution and the Rise of the Anglo-World, 1783–1939*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.

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32 See L. Veracini, *The Settler Colonial Present*, Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015.

33 On the 'transport' and subsequent 'settler' revolutions, see J. Belich, *Replenishing the Earth: The Settler Revolution and the Rise of the Anglo-World, 1783–1939*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.

34 On settler colonialism in Hawaii, see C. Fujikane, 'Introduction: Asian settler colonialism in the U.S. Colony of Hawai'i', in C. Fujikane and J. Y. Okamura (eds.) *Asian Settler Colonialism: From Local Governance to the Habits of Everyday Life in Hawai'i*, Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2008, pp. 1–42; J. K. Kauanui, *Hawaiian Blood: Colonialism and the Politics of Sovereignty and Indigeneity*, Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2008; D. I. Saranillio, 'Why Asian settler colonialism matters: A thought piece on critiques, debates, and indigenous difference', *Settler Colonial Studies* 3, 3–4, 2013, 280–94; and J. Rohrer, *Staking Claim: Settler Colonialism and Racialization in Hawai'i*, Tucson, AR: University of Arizona Press, 2016.

35 See, for a foundational statement, N. P. Canny, 'The ideology of English colonization: From Ireland to America', *William and Mary Quarterly* 30, 4, 1973, 575–98.

36 See, for example, T. Lynch, 'Strange lands: The lexicon of settler–colonial landscapes in Charles Fletcher Lummis's and Arthur Groom's portrayals of the American West and the Australian outback', *Interdisciplinary Studies in Literature and Environment*, 22, 4, 2015, 1–20.

37 For an entry point to the profound ecological transformation associated with settler colonialism, see, for example, W. Cronon, *Changes in the Land: Indians, Colonists, and the Ecology of New England*, New York: Hill and Wang, 1983; and T. Griffiths and L. Robin (eds.) *Ecology and Empire: Environmental History of Settler Societies*, Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1997. Cronon talks about 'Europeanization'. On R. Menzies, see J. Brett, *Robert Menzies' Forgotten People*, Sydney: Sun Australia, 1993. On the 'Tyranny of Distance', see G. Blainey, *The Tyranny of Distance*, Sydney: Macmillan, 2011 [1966].

38 P. Wolfe, 'Purchase by other means: The Palestine Nakba and Zionism's conquest of economics', *Settler Colonial Studies* 2, 1, 2012, 133–71.

39 See D. Bell, *Remaking the World*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2016, especially pp. 211–36.

40 See G. Piterberg, *The Returns of Zionism*, London: Verso, 2008.

PART I

Settler colonialism in the 'Old World'

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INTRODUCTION TO PART I

Edward Cavanagh

Introduction

The chapters collected in this first section demonstrate that many of the expanding polities of the ancient world relied on settler colonialism as a mode of domination. This part opens with the contribution of Mark W. Graham, which tracks the movement of Phoenicians, Greeks and Romans across the Near East and Mediterranean. Multiple sites of settler colonialism are identified here, and the picture is far from simple. As Graham reveals, the settler polities of the ancient world came in all shapes and sizes, and they were connected to central governments, and often each other, in complex ways. These are the contexts that provide us with so much of the modern language of imperialism, though it remains telling that no political qualification equivalent to 'settler' is straightforwardly detectable in Greek or Latin. That we do not speak of a 'settler *polis*' or a 'settler *colonia*' suggests, perhaps, that ancient settler colonialism often went without saying.

Even if a similar absence is characteristic of the language of early biblical texts, Pekka Pitkänen suggests in his chapter that several settler colonial narratives can be detected from Genesis to Joshua. These texts depict the history of human interaction in this period of early Judaism as an epic of conquest, annexation, enslavement and possibly genocide. Above all, Pitkänen shows, Ancient Israel presents an example of settler colonialism. Incoming settlers erased indigenous identities and those of their gods and replaced them with their own identity (the Israelites) and their own god (Yahweh).

After the fall of the Roman Empire, fixed European communities gradually came to be organised in a variety of feudal formats. It can be argued that two of the most significant migrations of this period – the Barbarian *völkerwanderung* and the Islamic occupation of the Iberian peninsula – are instances of settler colonialism, but it is in the wake of these developments that the next chapter resumes the global history of settler colonialism. In his chapter, Patrick O'Flanagan follows the trajectory of 'the *Reconquista*' from what would become Spain and Portugal into the peopled and unpeopled archipelagos of nearby Atlantic Islands during the fifteenth century. O'Flanagan, a historical geographer, argues that the cultural landscapes of settler colonialism in these regions developed in a characteristically Iberian way, which barely resembled the simultaneous movements of settlers from greater England into Ireland.

Ireland is the specific concern of the following chapter by Sean Connolly. English plantations got underway during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in Munster, Connacht, Leinster and

Ulster, and particularly the latter of these plantations is most exemplary of settler colonialism. Connolly reminds us, however, that this story cannot be told without an understanding of the earlier intrusions, during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, by those who became known as the 'Old English'. It is significant, as Connolly points out, that the specific political environment which led to the emergence of this ethnic identifier began to disappear after 1660, as new settlers moved into Ireland seemingly without any need to distinguish between 'Gaelic' and 'Old English' populations.

It is equally significant that these distinctions became important again in the twentieth-century political context. Engaging both with history and politics and encroaching upon the present day, Stephen Howe's chapter ties off the 'Old World' section of the *Handbook* by revealing some of the ongoing and unresolved dilemmas that continue to emerge well after the medieval and early modern periods of expansive settlement in Ireland. Ultimately, Howe leaves it up to the reader to decide whether a unique hybrid form of settler colonialism can be identified in Northern Ireland or if there are better ways to explain its twentieth-century history.

1

SETTLER COLONIALISM FROM THE NEO-ASSYRIANS TO THE ROMANS

Mark W. Graham

> Now off their harbor there lies a wooded and fertile island not quite close to the land of the Cyclopes, but still not far. It is overrun with wild goats, that breed there in great numbers and are never disturbed by foot of man; for sportsmen – who as a rule will suffer so much hardship in forest or among mountain precipices – do not go there, nor yet again is it ever ploughed or fed down, but it lies a wilderness untilled and unsown from year to year, and has no living thing upon it but only goats. . . . There is level land for ploughing, and it would always yield heavily at harvest time, for the soil is deep.
>
> Homer, *The Odyssey*, Book Nine[1]

The ancient world – if only through the words we use – informs all modern discussion of colonialism in one way or another. The cognates of colonialism itself and most related terms – empire, imperialism, province, hegemony, govern, etc. – have their ultimate origins in ancient discourse, even if the nineteenth century has shaped our understanding of many of these terms.[2] A diachronic overview of the ancient world can provide case studies across a particularly large swath of time, revealing a long history to the ways in which two modes of domination, colonialism and settler colonialism, interpenetrate and overlap. This chapter offers a thematic analytical narrative spanning approximately 1,200 years of Near Eastern and Mediterranean history, highlighting major examples of colonialism, settler colonialism and other settler dynamics which should help sharpen distinctions and definitions of the basic framework of this collection. The extent to which various ancient settler communities exhibited specific characteristics of settler colonialism is a major analytical question driving the narrative. Conclusions are often preliminary and even tentative, and the goal is to provoke further study, analysis and discussion within the framework of settler colonial studies.

Settler colonialism is taken here to describe the dynamic by which communities of settlers move out of their original polity and eventually establish a new one elsewhere. For the ancient communities we will encounter in this chapter, large and small, defining original polity can be difficult, as the polities we will encounter are sometimes themselves expansive and come to include and/or engulf communities which had originally been separate or distinct from themselves, even those founded from imperial centers. Amidst the expansive logic of ancient imperialisms, as we will see, experiments in what might be called settler colonialism appear from time to time, and in perhaps unexpected places.[3]

While empire, as such, can be traced much earlier in Mesopotamia and the Near East, a solid and more or less continuous succession of ancient empires began in the ninth century BC.[4] By the middle of that century, the Neo-Assyrians had expanded beyond their traditional Assyrian heartland in Mesopotamia to launch what Paul-Alain Beaulieu calls a new sort of 'imperial idea.' This idea was expressed in the 'irreversible fact' of empire; empire became entrenched 'so deeply in the political culture of the Near East that no alternative model could successfully challenge it, in fact almost up to the modern era.'[5] The age of specifically ancient empires arguably stretched into the seventh and eighth centuries AD.[6] During this long age, some of the world's most enduring ideas, value systems and institutions arose among those building and, just as importantly if not more so, among those responding to ancient Near Eastern and Mediterranean empires. Some of the earliest and most striking examples of colonialism and settler colonialism will, in fact, emerge in direct and indirect response to the formation of large empires rather than, as might be expected, emanate from the imperial centers themselves.

The Neo-Assyrians and the land of Ashur: empire and response

Although they are often remembered simply for cruelty and brutality ('The Assyrian came down like a wolf on the fold . . .'), the Neo-Assyrians were impressive innovators in many areas – offensive military technology, urban beautification, libraries. They were also apparently one of the first groups in history to deploy a systematic process of settlement and resettlement designed to further an imperial program. Their practice developed alongside a system of 'elite replacement', in which the highest level of conquered elites was simply replaced by Neo-Assyrian elites upon conquest. The Neo-Assyrian political dynamic was fairly complex in its outworking, but can be explained briefly for our purposes here.[7] Below the Assyrian king, who served as the high priest of the chief god Ashur, were elite administrators known as *Mâr Banûti* or 'sons of creation'. These elite administrators received from the king conquered lands to administer as royal estates, whose size depended on how much the king wished to honor the specific administrator. The land itself belonged to the king, who was tasked with building Ashur's kingdom on earth: 'men and women were invited from every part of my land', declared the Assyrian king Ashurnasirpal II (r. 883–859 BC) concerning a large banquet he hosted.[8]

As conquered elites were simply replaced with native Neo-Assyrian elites, their land *became* Assyria, the Land of Ashur. The colonizers, as often, named the land. The large estates on which the elite Assyrians were settled would supply Assyrian troops and laborers. The most successful administrators received further rewards of land and the possibility of attracting and amassing more settlers and soldiers. Nonelite Assyrian settlers (such as farmers, craftsmen, merchants) were attracted to the estates of the upper-level elites as well. The local inhabitants likely continued as an agricultural labor force, as in many later colonial situations.

One innovative Neo-Assyrian method of 'colonization' indelibly shaped demographic and settlement patterns of the Near East. The Neo-Assyrians invented a system of deportation and reportation in which a local conquered population would be taken *en toto* and forcibly settled far from its home, or two distant populations would simply be switched and settled. A recent estimation holds that, in a little over a century toward the end of the Neo-Assyrian Empire, as many as 4.5 million people were thus displaced; 470,000 during the reign of a single king, Sennacherib.[9] Deportation and reportation settlement underscored the fact that the land no longer belonged to any previous inhabitants; it was Assyria, the Land of Ashur. Practically speaking, this was surely an effective way of keeping revolts down by preventing local groups from defending ancestral lands. It likely functioned as a way of replenishing depopulated lands in order to regularize the imperial food supply. Assyrian families also moved into new areas to take up various administrative and

social positions in support of the system – a distinct form of colonialism and settlement, but not settler colonialism as such.

The influence of the Neo-Assyrians within their own context and well beyond was deep and both direct and indirect. One contemporary polity, the Urartian Empire of the ninth through seventh centuries BC, competed with the Neo-Assyrians by essentially adopting many of their techniques.[10] From their own heartland in what is today eastern Turkey, northwestern Iran and Armenia, the Urartians expanded, contracted and expanded once again, their high points generally corresponding to Neo-Assyrian weak moments and vice versa. They instituted a similar system of land distribution among their own nobles as well as a system of deportation, furthering this innovative form of colonialism.

Often the responses to empire in the ancient world were longer-lasting and more significant than the direct actions of the empires themselves. The Neo-Assyrians may have unwittingly helped to provoke the first straightforward example of settler colonialism in history. While many smaller entities and kingdoms simply collapsed or disappeared in the face of the Neo-Assyrian rise – polities such as Syria and Israel, for example – one set of city-states from the eastern Mediterranean reacted in a decidedly different and far-reaching way. Phoenicians of the Levant never formed an actual empire, and yet they were arguably the first and certainly one of the most extensive long-distance settler colonizers in history.

The first settler colonists? Phoenicians and Greeks

Long distinguished as sailors and traders during the latter half of the Near Eastern Dark Age (roughly 1200–900 BC) and then into the age of ancient empires to follow, Phoenicians from Levantine city-states such as Tyre, Sidon and Byblos responded in part to Neo-Assyrians conquest by forming far-flung colonies and settler colonies throughout the Mediterranean. Their particular motivations were various and seem to have evolved over time.[11] The earliest Phoenician colonies (in Cyprus, Cilicia and Crete) seem to have been founded simply for acquiring iron to meet the demands of the growing Neo-Assyrian Empire. Other factors, however, soon came to play critical roles in what appears to be the earliest historical instance of settler colonialism. Colonization intensified as the Neo-Assyrians reached their zenith of power in the Near East, and many Phoenicians simply desired to move beyond the reach of Assyrian armies and tax collectors. As will be seen in many later settler colonial settings, settlers were escaping consolidating sovereigns. Internally, related twin forces of land-hunger and overpopulation likewise fueled Phoenician settler colonialism, both prompted by a major climate change in the tenth and ninth centuries BC which resulted in higher agricultural yields.

Phoenician settler colonialism intensified as settlers escaped Neo-Assyrian imperialism and took advantage of opportunities to help meet Neo-Assyrian demands for raw materials. Importantly, for our purposes, as they moved out from the Levant, the Phoenicians were intent on forming permanent settler colonies. As Aubet has shown in her foundational study of Phoenician colonies in the western Mediterranean, all the Phoenician colonies 'show signs of permanence from the outset, which reflects a firm determination to develop into populous colonies'.[12] Many of those who founded them were indeed settlers who left home to form their own polities, a basic criterion of settler colonialism within this chapter. The historical impact of these colonies was far-reaching – they spread Near Eastern urban culture westward; they served as the direct models for the important Greek settler colonies we will discuss later in the chapter; they even spread the idea of the alphabet, directly and indirectly, westward to Greeks, Latins, Etruscans and others. These settler colonies were founded in modern-day Spain, France, Italy and across North Africa. The most famous Phoenician

settler colony, Carthage, would take on a famous life of its own as a western Mediterranean empire centered in modern-day Tunisia.

The Near Eastern empires which succeeded the Neo-Assyrian collapse continued to experiment with forms of colonialism and helped to prompt further colonialism and settler colonialism. The Neo-Babylonian (c. 620–539) and the Achaemenid Persian (539–333) both would, to varying degrees, deport and report populations, always moving families of their own settlers into place as the key local administrators, elites, and various types of craftsmen and tradesmen. The Neo-Babylonian Empire expanded to include essentially all of the Neo-Assyrian Empire and then Egypt. The Achaemenid Persian Empire expanded even farther to the west to include most of Anatolia (modern-day Turkey) and to the east into central Asia and even parts of the northern Indian subcontinent.

To the west, the Phoenicians, in turn, inspired Greek settler colonialism, beginning in the early eighth century BC. By their very nature, as we will see, the Greek settlements were necessarily independent and designed to remain permanently as settler colonies. The famous Homeric poem, *The Odyssey*, written in the mid-eighth century, might well be the first text to reveal assumptions behind settler colonialism, as cited at this chapter's outset. In Book Nine, the ill-starred wanderer Odysseus lands on the inhospitable shores of the Cyclopes' land, where he and his men meet the brutish Polyphemus, among others. In his narrative, while criticizing the general character of the Cyclopes (we are told that they have no plowing, no institutions, no council meetings, no real community, etc.), Odysseus is further intrigued when he sees nearby a wooded island with a fine harbor and fertile soil. Indeed, he remarks with disdain, the Cyclopes live so near such an area ('unplowed, unsown forever – empty of humankind')[13] and yet none of their number had ever attempted to seize the 'empty' land and colonize it – shocking indeed to Greeks just caught up in their own first great age of colonization. As often, Homer lays bare some assumptions of his own age – to be civilized (i.e., the antithesis of the Cyclopes) implied colonizing and settling habitable land wherever possible. Phoenician settler colonialism had indeed helped revolutionize Greek life. But, as almost always in human history, borrowed ideas would be reconfigured in a new context.

Debates over Greek motivations for colonizing are long-standing. The literary sources generally present population growth and concomitant subsistence problems on the Greek mainland and need for land as prompts to their great age of colonization. Many archaeological studies tend to corroborate by showing that a climate shift of the tenth and ninth centuries resulted in longer and more productive growing seasons throughout the eastern Mediterranean, furthering population expansion (as throughout the Near East, as noted earlier). Archaeological studies continue to give more nuance to the picture and suggest other important motivations, but the desire for new land was, no doubt, paramount. As Anthony Snodgrass argues,

> All this emphasis on land becomes intelligible when we reflect that it was the only significant medium of wealth; that it was itself on occasion the personified object of worship and offerings; that a new political system was being widely introduced in which it was the only qualification for citizenship; and that (if I am right) its full fruitfulness was only now in the process of being rediscovered after centuries of neglect. Competition for land was at its most intense in the newly-arising polis. There is little doubt that, as Thucydides held, of the manifold causes and facets of colonization this one is the most fundamental.[14]

The most salient feature of the new Greek settler colonialism is the founding of new *poleis* (plural of polis) from modern-day Syria to Turkey, to France, Spain, North Africa and along the shores of the Black Sea.[15] In the Aegean world and beyond, some 750 poleis are known. If, according to

Veracini's framework, settlers move to establish polities, as opposed to migrants who move into polities already established, then polis-founding emerges as an unambiguous early example of settler colonialism.[16]

The polis was, for Greeks, the very core of their identity and citizenship. Often translated as 'city-state', some scholars prefer the translation 'citizen-state.'[17] The ancient world had long known city-states, as such, but the older city-states of the Ancient Near East and Levant (e.g., Ur, Uruk, Byblos) necessarily had consisted of two basic entities – rulers and subjects. The Greek polis, by contrast, was not made up of rulers and subjects but rather citizens. This was true regardless of what specific form of government the polis took, whether monarchy, aristocracy, oligarchy or (extremely rarely) democracy. By definition, each new polis was not a part of a larger entity such as a kingdom, empire or federation, or even an extension of the government of a metropolis (literally, 'mother polis') but rather was autonomous, a new political foundation. Everywhere that these Greek poleis spread, as they famously did between the eighth and sixth centuries BC, the citizen-state model went with them – to southern Italy and Sicily, the western coast of Asia Minor, North Africa and even modern-day southern France and Spain. A basic touchstone of Greek citizenship in all poleis was exclusion. Greeks did not encourage the inclusion of outsiders, nor were there any mechanisms in place for incorporating them. If one were a founding member of a new polis, one was a citizen of it; if one were born to a citizen, one was a citizen. There were virtually no other avenues toward citizenship in the Greek poleis.

Once established, the colonial polis might maintain some level of cultural connection with its sending metropolis, but it was necessarily a polity unto itself.[18] Scattered poleis helped facilitate trade between the Mediterranean and the Near East (following Phoenician models), they helped relieve population pressures at home and, as suggested earlier, they provided land for settlers. Without a doubt, many provided new homelands and opportunities for whole communities who moved to take advantage of them, and thus many provide unambiguous models of the varieties of settler colonialism being explored in the current volume. The success of settler colonies in southern Italy was such that that area came to be known in antiquity as Magna Graecia, or Greater Greece. Modern cities such as Naples (Neopolis, i.e, new polis) continue to attest to the impact of settler colonialism; these were, literally, new polities. The results throughout the Mediterranean and beyond were extensive: 'it is no exaggeration to say that by 580 [BC] all the most obvious areas' in the Mediterranean and beyond 'had been occupied to at least some extent by Greeks'.[19]

Political independence and a certain level of cultural and intellectual experimentation in some far-flung poleis, incidentally, contributed to some of the most far-reaching cultural and intellectual experiments in human history. The settler colonies which bordered on the Near East found themselves wrestling with Near Eastern ideas in a different sort of political and social institution, and a new type of rational thought emerged. In poleis/settler colonies like Miletus, Samos and Halicarnassus on the eastern coast of Anatolia, Greeks began to think about the physical world in unprecedented and profound ways. An entire movement emerged known as the Ionian Revolution or Enlightenment (named after a large section of western Anatolia which Greeks extensively colonized). Famous historical examples such as Thales of Miletus predicting an eclipse and Herodotus of Halicarnassus pioneering the rational thought experiment that would become known as history point to a far-reaching moment of intellectual fervor.[20] To the west in Magna Graecia, Pythagoras experimented famously with mathematical and musical theory. The romantic trope of the settler frontier as a place where humans can question, challenge and debate has been rightfully challenged and appropriately deconstructed. But the temptation remains to see in these peripheral areas examples of humans questioning traditional explanations of reality, ranging from some of history's earliest debates on the nature of political power to speculations on the origins of the universe. The cultural significance of such settler colonies, in comparative study

across time and space, is a topic which might still yield good insights, with appropriate caution against outmoded romanticism.

Greek settler colonists of western Anatolia played a key historical role in the outbreak of the Greco-Persian Wars. Attempts in the late sixth and early fifth centuries BC to assimilate the Greek settler colonists of Anatolia into, first, the western Anatolian kingdom of Lydia and then the expanding Achaemenid Persian Empire were met with stiff resistance, which in time would pull poleis from the Greek mainland into this pivotal conflict. In the end, Greek settler colonists, many of their families in place for as many as two centuries by that point, retained their holdings, even under attack from the largest empire the world had yet seen.

The Hellenistic synthesis and settlements

By the early sixth century BC, Greeks had largely stopped forming new colonies, even as Greek settler colonies persisted as autonomous entities all over the Mediterranean. A new age of Aegean colonialism began, though, in the middle of the fourth century BC, with the conquests of Philip II of Macedon and then his son Alexander III ('The Great'). Colonialism was now demonstrably different than before and lacked some of the key ingredients of settler colonialism. The Macedonian and then Hellenistic examples of colonialism serve as instructive comparative models with earlier settler colonialism of the Greeks. Macedonia, importantly, was always a kingdom, never a polis, and its colonial foundations simply brought new subjects under their king's rule. Macedonian colonies were an extension of Macedonian rule. Macedonian monarchs followed something of a tradition of founding cities and peopling them with Macedonians as settlers. The city of Philippi is an obvious example, although it was not the only city which Philip II founded.

After his first military victory as a military officer at the age of 16, Alexander would found and name a city after himself, Alexandropolis (much to the chagrin of Philip, who was still alive at the time and protested that only the reigning monarch could do this). Alexandropolis, in Illyria, was allowed to stand, and it became a magnet for Greek and Macedonian settlers, who mixed with the local population. This was only the beginning for Alexander, who went on to found many cities (the exact number is debated), naming a fair number after himself. Greeks and Macedonians were encouraged to settle in these cities, bringing with them the accoutrements of Greek culture. Few if any of these new city foundations, however, functioned with the independence of the polis.

At Alexander's death (in 323 BC), his highest officers were left with the task of organizing and administering an empire which stretched from Libya to the Hindu Kush and from the central Balkans to the Sudan. No single individual was up to the task, and Alexander's empire was immediately divided and would continue to be divided and subdivided during the ensuing Hellenistic age, as that era is known. The Hellenistic world saw Greek and Macedonian settlers dispersed through the Near East and beyond into central Asia.[21] New cities continued to be founded all along – several hundred in all during the Hellenistic period. The emigration of Greeks and Macedonians to these areas continued in subsequent centuries, furthering major demographic and social transformations throughout a large portion of the world. This was a major and significant moment.

The widespread cultural dynamic scholars have termed 'Hellenization' would not have been possible without the presence and steady flow of settlers from the Aegean which continued throughout the entirety of the Hellenistic era. These cities brought the basics of Hellenic civic culture with them, along with temples, baths, gymnasia, theaters, etc., and the Greek dialect known as *koiné*. Hellenization was not, though, simply a one-way process. One telling example of the nuances of Hellenization is Ai Khanoum in eastern Bactria (modern Afghanistan). This city of the Hellenistic Seleucid Empire was constructed directly over a previous Achaemenid Persian site.

Excavations of the site have revealed all the major amenities and accoutrements of a Greek city along with a Persian-style palace and Mesopotamian-style temples.

The extent to which these Macedonian and Greek migrants remained separate from the diverse indigenous populations they encountered is a serious question among scholars of Hellenistic history.[22] While most now would see variety from place to place, it is fairly clear that even where there was some blending between colonists and indigenous populations, the relationship was not equal. Even amidst the famous syncretism of the Hellenistic age, the cultural interaction between Greek and indigenous tended to be colonial and imperialist. Excavations of the site of Ai Khanoum have revealed some strong hints of segregation between Greek and Macedonian migrant and indigenous populations.

Patterns of administration in these colonies varied, but there are enough similarities among them to show at least the idea of a heroic or status-distributive economy at play.[23] As a general rule, the land belonged to the Hellenistic monarch, and he in turn gave out land grant parcels to his favorites, who administered it for him. In practice, the system far more resembles Neo-Assyrian patterns of land distribution than anything like the Greek polis. The populations of these land parcels would have been mixed, but colonists from the Aegean participated at all levels and in all capacities, across the Near East and into central Asia. These colonists were always themselves subjects of Hellenistic monarchs; they did not form independent political entities as did/do settler colonists, except in the instances where they occasionally rebelled and calved away sections of the Hellenistic empires.

Imperium, provincia, colonia: the Romans

Thus far in our study, the western Mediterranean world has appeared necessarily (if misleadingly) as a blank space where Phoenicians and Greeks carved out settler colonies. Not isolated from these settlers from the east, a small town on the Tiber in central Italy slowly began to consolidate and then expand to include surrounding communities, and from there the whole of the Italian peninsula and beyond. From an early period in its history, Rome was in contact with the Phoenician and Greek settler colonists.[24]

Romans experimented in both colonialism and settler colonialism over time, with much flux. Any clear examples of settler colonies we might trace were subsequently absorbed into the expanding Roman polity, and so the case is not as clear here as for Phoenicians and Greeks. Stories from the early history of Rome (the debates over any authentic element remain alive and well) generally show the Romans expanding to include/incorporate other surrounding communities via treaties and/or conquest. Perhaps the most famous of these is the story of the Sabine Women, which purports an eighth-century BC event, but there are many others in the famous history of early Rome written by the first-century BC historian Livy. After the conclusion of the peace between the Romans and the Sabines, 'indeed, they went further: the two states were united under a single government with Rome as the seat of power. Thus the population of Rome was doubled'. Describing a later event, Livy tells us that 'a result of the fall of Alba was an increase in the size of Rome. The population was doubled'.[25] Many of these stories point to an apparent Roman tendency to incorporate and even assimilate outsiders as Romans expanded to nearby communities. When they did so, they tended to consider them, as does Livy, part of Rome itself.

In a certain sense, early Roman practice reflected basic elements of settler colonialism from the beginning. As their hegemony expanded, local populations did, in fact 'go away' by being 'absorbed' and 'assimilated', and they become Roman as their land becomes Rome. Nothing quite like this had been seen before in antiquity. In time, the identities of many local peoples throughout the Italian peninsula would largely be forgotten as they become Romans through a process now

known as 'Romanization'.[26] Romanization brought about a certain level of social, cultural and economic unity throughout Italy and, ultimately, the Mediterranean and beyond. It likely would stretch the definition of settler colonialism too far to apply it outright to the Roman experiment here, but it does bear mentioning that there are interesting parallels.

One important difference between Roman imperialism and that of other ancient empires was critical to Romanization. The Romans did not practice elite replacement in their administration, as did the Neo-Assyrians, Babylonians and Achaemenid Persians. They successfully experimented with a type of elite co-option in which they attracted foreign elites into their own administrative structure by giving them real political power; the elites then 'became Roman'. In notable cases, whole communities could be brought under growing Roman hegemony in this way. Co-opted and even conquered elites and their own subjects could be received into the Roman polity with citizenship or various semi-citizen statuses. In contrast to the Greeks, the Romans were fairly open and inclusive with their citizenship. All of this contributed to as well as emerged from a Roman notion of *imperium* 'without an end', an ideology of an imperial power which would continue to grow, unbounded by space or time. As Jupiter promised Aeneas – 'I set no limits to their fortunes and no time; I give them *imperium sine fine*'.[27]

In order to situate the Roman experiment comparatively here, several key terms need to be explained. All of these terms show similar patterns of transitions in meaning over time. The transfer in concept from the limits of one's rule or hegemony to a definite spatial area was perfectly natural for the Romans.[28] 'Empire', from the Latin *imperium*, originally denoted the command, order, mastery, power and sovereignty of a Roman magistrate, usually a consul. Originally, then, denoting simply a sphere of command, it only gradually came to mean a territory or literal space of land. A similar semantic shift occurred for the term 'province', from the Latin *provincia*. At first, it simply denoted a general sphere of action and duty for an official, even one outside of an area of Roman holding. Gradually, over the course of the Roman Republic, it came to define a specific geographic or territorial area as a unit of imperial control. By the second century BC, the term referred primarily to a specific geographic unit along the lines of the current primary meaning of the term province. The term colony (*colonia*) also shifted in meaning across the late Roman Republic as it came to define several types of communities over time – at first made up of citizens, but in time coming to include noncitizens as well. Sometimes the colonies would be within areas of direct Roman control and sometimes beyond, as we will see later.

Conquest and forced assimilation were not, of course, the only means of Romanization. Roman settlers, migrants and colonies beyond Roman *imperium* played a vital contributing role. The earliest examples of Roman colonization date to the later fourth century BC and coincide, at least in time, with the beginnings of Hellenistic colonization toward the east. The dynamic of Roman colonization seems to have been constantly changing in the manner in which it was carried out as well as the scale at which it was attempted. Up until the second century BC, anything we might call Roman colonization, strictly speaking, was limited to the Italian peninsula.

From the middle to the late Roman Republic, the Latin term *colonia* designated a type of settlement which was itself 'essentially an extension of Rome', even if only culturally.[29] The earliest of these citizen colonies (dating to the fourth century BC) functioned in part as a means of Romanizing Italian areas outside of the political grip of Rome. Such settlements, whose inhabitants were known as *coloni*, were independent communities of Roman citizens. The size of these varied from the earliest communities of 300 or so families to, eventually, several thousands of inhabitants in each community. As with the Greeks, the motivations varied, but available sources are clear that land was a key motivating factor. There the similarities largely end.

Settlement of Romans on land was a major issue throughout the history of the Roman Republic and was central to the famous late Roman Republican political struggle which began with the

second century BC reforms attempted by the Gracchi brothers. Amidst the debates at that time, a new style of colonization emerged. While the object of the Gracchi proposals seems to have been getting landless Romans onto land, the results went well beyond that. The initial proposal was to redistribute the *ager publicus*, the Roman 'public land' to the landless (who were known as *proletarii*). A land commission was established to help facilitate this. Precisely at the moment Romans were debating the land reform measures in 133 BC, news suddenly arrived that King Attalus of the Hellenistic kingdom of Pergamum had bequeathed his kingdom to Rome. The older of the two brothers and a tribune of the plebs at the time, Tiberius, proposed that proceeds from the land of the kingdom of Pergamum be used to fund start-up land grants for landless Roman veterans. Tiberius Gracchus was subsequently assassinated by Senate-backed mobs, but the work of the land commission continued apace, and it proposed a variety of controversial measures for getting landless Romans to either lease or own land. A decade later, under Tiberius' younger brother Gaius, himself now a tribune of the plebs, Rome's first overseas colony was founded on the site of Carthage, the old Phoenician settler colony. Just a bit over two decades earlier, in the Third Punic War (ended in 146 BC), the Romans had destroyed and depopulated Carthage. Now, Gaius proposed an overseas colony there for Romans. This would be the beginning of extensive Roman overseas colonization and official settlement by Roman citizens.

The means of establishing colonies, especially for veterans, would be an ongoing concern for the Romans. The process was standardized under Julius Caesar and his adopted son Octavian, later known as Augustus. In the aftermath of the victory which established him as the sole ruler of the Roman world (31 BC), Octavian continued to settle soldiers on land throughout the Mediterranean world and its northern hinterlands. Addressing the land issue in this way was a critical moment in the transition from what historians call the Roman Republic to the Roman Empire.

Yet all along, Romans as well as surrounding Latins and Italians continued to move out and settle in regions throughout the Mediterranean. They settled privately as artisans, craftsmen, traders, farmers and the like, and in significant numbers. Settling beyond Roman frontiers did carry its own risks. Relations with local inhabitants could turn hostile, and quickly. A famous example of indigenous resistance occurred in 88 BC in the Hellenistic kingdom of Pontus on the Black Sea. Here a king named Mithridates encouraged inhabitants of Anatolia to massacre Roman settlers; his call resulted in the death of approximately 88,000 Roman settlers.

By the first century BC, many Roman settlers grouped themselves together for defense, for the administration of justice and to maintain a Roman identity when surrounded by indigenous populations. Those who were Roman citizens retained these ties of citizenship, and thus these settlers were not settler colonists in that they did not aim to establish independent polities. These groups, known as *conventus civium romanorum* (roughly, 'gathering of/for Roman citizens'), could both preserve Roman customs in their settlements as well as further Romanization. The *conventus civium romanorum* (note that *conventus* is a fourth declension noun and thus its form is the same in the singular and the plural) tended to spring up in major towns outside of Roman holdings and helped define powerful Roman communities in their own right. Roman legal officials would visit these areas as they travelled on an assize circuit, administering Roman justice for them. In time, the term underwent a transition much like *provincia* and *imperium*, and *conventus* became a designation of geographic space within what were becoming official Roman provinces (*provinciae*). The areas where *conventus* came to define a space tended to be places where there was an established tradition of Romans settling as minorities among indigenous majorities. The five provinces where *conventus* are most clearly attested are among the earliest of Roman provinces and point to a continuity from *conventus civium romanorum* settled as Roman communities – in Sicily, Ulterior Spain, Citerior Spain, Dalmatia, Asia and Cilicia. In Rome's first province, Sicily, Romans had settled initially among a predominantly Greek population and established at least four *conventus*

civium romanorum.[30] Since Romans settling in such areas lacked a developed social, defensive or jurisdictional system, it was a natural step for them to form *conventus civium romanorum*. These, in turn, owing to the convenience offered by centralized administration, gradually developed into *conventus* divisions within provinces.

*C*onventus civium romanorum* for emigrants and settlers (albeit not settler colonists) tended to survive long as geographical *conventus* divisions only in the frontier provinces of the western and eastern parts of the empire where Romanization fell far short of complete. One such region, Spain, saw much resistance to Romanization. Beginning in the late second century BC, Romans and Italians had moved into Spain in large numbers, forming *conventus civium romanorum*. These Romans and Italians more often than not found themselves surrounded by strong indigenous traditions. As the Roman historian Livy would famously declare,

> Spain by the nature of the country and the character of its people was better adapted than any other place in the world to making losses good for a renewal of hostilities. This is the reason why Spain, though it was the first mainland province to be entered by the Romans, was the last to be completely subdued, and held out till our own times, when it was finally conquered under the leadership and auspices of Augustus Caesar.[31]

In the years to follow their movement into the peninsula, and even as Spain would be divided (and further divided) into Roman provinces, many Romans settled there remained decidedly foreigners. The *conventus* played a more prominent role here long-term than in any other area of the Roman world.

During the final two centuries BC, Roman provincial holdings came to encircle the Mediter-ranean and beyond.[32] The Roman system of provinces emerged without any discernible plan. As noted earlier, the term *provincia* simply underwent a transfer of meaning until it came to denote a geographic unit under imperial control. This process came into its own by the second century BC. The number of provinces would grow over the course of Roman history. At the beginning of the Roman Empire there were 13, 45 in the early second century AD, and about 100 by the later Roman Empire.

With essentially full provincialization of the Mediterranean world, there were fewer areas where colonizing as such could even be a real possibility. Beyond Rome's provincial network and its outer frontiers, though, some areas continued to be open to settlers, particularly in kingdoms with which Romans held special alliances of friendship. During the late Roman Republic and throughout the early years of the Empire, Rome cultivated a particular type of relationship with leaders outside of the Roman *imperium*, each under a 'Client King' or 'King, Ally and Friend' (*Rex sociusque amicus*), as the Romans termed them. The client kingdoms held an ambiguous position which could be, as needs on both sides demanded, either inside or outside of Roman *imperium*. In such kingdoms – Britain, Armenia and Judaea are major examples – Romans continued to settle; the relationship could prove problematic even if, at times, mutually advantageous.

The reception of these Roman settlers varied widely. In the first century AD, the emperor Claudius conquered peoples and territories in Britain and established client kingships there. With the establishment of client kingdoms, many thousands of Roman settlers moved into Britain to take advantage of opportunities, ostensibly under protection by a Roman friend (Client King) and, indirectly, Rome itself. Their presence, as with settlers elsewhere, could play an important role in Romanization outside of areas specifically administered by Rome. Romanization, likewise, helped pave the way for eventual Roman rule in a variety of regions. Such a situation is summa-rized by the famously cynical Roman historian Tacitus as he describes, essentially, Romanization

among the Britons exposed to Roman culture after the campaigns of Claudius. Tacitus' own critical stance toward the Roman system is readily apparent in his tone:

> The result was that those who just lately had been rejecting the Roman tongue now conceived a desire for eloquence. Thus even our style of dress came into favour and the toga was everywhere to be seen. Gradually, too, they went astray into the allurements of evil ways, colonnades and warm baths and elegant banquets. The Britons, who had had no experience of this, called it 'civilization', although it was part of their enslavement.[33]

To be sure, Romans were not always so welcome, here or elsewhere. One particular client kingdom in Britain, that of the Iceni, suffered outrages at the hands of Romans settled there. The Iceni then famously moved against the Roman settlers and, under the leadership of their Queen Boudicca, sacked Roman settlements and killed as many as 80,000 Roman settlers. While this episode might help indicate the size and scale of such Roman settlements beyond Roman territory, strictly speaking, this was one of the last major such moments of resistance to Roman assimilation during the so-called *Pax Romana*.

While Roman settlers had for centuries moved beyond Roman frontiers, the period between the third century BC and the first century AD saw most of them settling into areas with established civic traditions (such as in Sicily, the Hellenistic east and some areas of Spain) or recognized as client kingdoms (such as Britain). By the first century AD, most areas beyond the existing frontiers of the Empire, especially to the north, were considered *barbaricum*, the abode of the 'barbarians'. Even if the Romans proclaimed inclusion more so than any other ancient empire, they clearly recognized limits, both real and pragmatic. Romans became loathe to settle and/or incorporate particularly wild areas, absent any municipal culture, Roman protection or even Client Kings. Imperial ideologies of *imperium sine fine* had long competed with very real and pragmatic attempts to define imperial frontiers. By the second and third centuries, Romans had come to define their world more clearly as a territorial unit, with a clear 'frontier consciousness' of what lay within their world and what lay beyond.[34] Echoes of a 'civilizing mission' which can be heard in earlier Roman history begin to fade as Romans come to define parts of the world and their inhabitants as not worthy of their efforts. This shift contrasts markedly with modern justifications of subordination in which the more extreme and/or different the people, the stronger the supposed reason to subordinate them.

Since the Roman expansion had largely stopped by the time of Augustus (the conquest of Britain being a notable exception), the frontiers of the Empire were generally stabilized and the *Pax Romana* was largely in place. At the height of the *Pax Romana*, the Greek orator Aelius Aristides (and himself a co-opted Roman elite) would praise Rome in glowing panegyric: 'Beyond the outermost ring of the civilized world, you drew a second line, quite as one does in walling a town. . . . An encamped army like a rampart encloses the civilized world in a ring'.[35] In the following century, the Roman historian Herodian would refer to Rome as an army camp surrounded by 'the wall of the Roman empire'.[36] What Roman would want to settle beyond that protective wall if beyond it lay *barbaricum*? It is difficult to find Roman settlers or colonists venturing out much after the first century AD. Beginning around the third century AD and continuing into the next two centuries, the process is clearly reversed, as Romans settled barbarians within the northern frontiers of their Empire as *foederati*, federated peoples. In time, the barbarians were largely Romanized even as the Roman Empire itself was irreversibly transformed. The barbarian settlers would in time carve out their own kingdoms from the western half of the Empire.

Conclusion

The long age of ancient empires featured a variety of strands of colonialism and settler colonialism, along with many different types of settler dynamics. The examples offered here invite further reflection on a host of issues central to settler colonial studies. As this is the first foray into settler colonialism across the ancient world, some conclusions remain necessarily preliminary and even tentative. Open questions remain, such as the extent to which the early Romans could be said to have practiced a type of settler colonialism, or even the extent to which any given growing polity intent on either annihilation or assimilation of a population (as was the case with most ancient empires) may be said to exhibit settler colonialism. In many cases here, the locals (to be eradicated, sent away, assimilated, etc.) are virtually invisible in ancient sources, and so definitive answers to some basic questions raised by settler colonial studies remain elusive, although archaeological studies have contributed much. Two particular issues, almost asides in this chapter, invite further analysis across time and space. First, as often with empires, the examples here suggest that resisters to empire had as much as, if not more, long-term significance than those actually forming empires. Settler colonialism seems to have emerged first among the nonimperialist Phoenicians as a function, at least in part, of responding to Neo-Assyrian imperialism. Their response, in turn, strongly influenced the Greeks, who carried on settler colonialism with their distinct and radically independent form of civic organization. Second, examples here suggest the deep cultural and intellectual significance of settler colonies to global history. Among many other important roles, settler colonies, especially those distant from their erstwhile centers, served as places of radical experimentation, creative synthesis and long-distance cultural mediation. Perhaps in spite of its overarching desire to eradicate and displace, settler colonialism has been as well a dynamic and creative force in human history. The ancient record at least suggests as much.

Notes

1 S. Butler trans., available at: http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=urn:cts: greekLit: tlg0012.tlg002.perseus-eng2:9.2–9.2 (accessed 11/01/2016). Special thanks to Benjamin Leavitt for his help as my research assistant.

2 See M. E. Aubet, *Commerce and Colonization in the Ancient Near East*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, pp. 41–50.

3 Studies of ancient imperialism include P. D. A. Garnsey and C. R. Whittaker (eds.), *Imperialism in the Ancient World*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978; M. T. Larsen (ed.), *Power and Propaganda: A Symposium on Ancient Empires*, Copenhagen: Akademisk, 1979; M. J. Rowlands, M. Larsen and K. Kristiansen (eds.) *Center and Periphery in the Ancient World*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987; F. Joannès, *The Age of Empires: Mesopotamia in the First Millennium B.C.*, trans. A. Nevill, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2005; I. Morris and W. Scheidel, *The Dynamics of Ancient Empires: State Power from Assyria to Byzantium*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009; and E. H. Cline and M. W. Graham, *Ancient Empires: From Mesopotamia to the Rise of Islam*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011. Note that much included here follows from the final item in this list.

4 This chapter assumes the definition of empire given in M. W. Doyle, *Empires*, Ithaca: Cornell, 1986, p. 5 – 'A system of interaction between two political entities, one of which, the dominant metropole, exerts political control over the internal and external policy – the effective sovereignty – of the other, subordinate periphery'.

5 'World Hegemony, 900–300 BCE', in D. Snell (ed.) *The Companion to the Ancient Near East*, Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2005, p. 49.

6 Cline and Graham, *Ancient Empires*.

7 Major studies of the Neo-Assyrian Empire and the practices discussed here include B. Oded, *Mass Deportation and Deportees in the Neo-Assyrian Empire*, Wiesbaden: Reichert, 1979; H. Saggs, *The Might That Was Assyria*, London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1984; Steven W. Holloway, *Aššur Is King! Aššur Is King! Religion in the Exercise of Power in the Neo-Assyrian Empire*, Leiden: Brill, 2002; G. Galil, *The Lower Stratum Families in the Neo-Assyrian Period*, Leiden: Brill, 2007.

8 Cited from A. K. Grayson, *Assyrian Rulers of the Early First Millennium B.C. I (1114–859 B.C.), The Royal Inscriptions of Mesopotamia*, Vol. 2, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991, p. 275.

9 Joannès, *Age of Empires*, p. 59.

10 The major study remains P. E. Zimansky, *Ecology and Empire: The Structure of the Urartian State*, Chicago: Oriental Institute, 1985.

11 See Aubet, *Commerce and Colonization* as well as her *The Phoenicians and the West: Politics, Colonies, and Trade*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993.

12 Aubet, *Phoenicians and the West*, p. 217.

13 Homer, *The Odyssey*, trans. R. Fagles, New York: Penguin, 1996, p. 215.

14 A. Snodgrass, *Archaic Greece: The Age of Experiment*, London: J.M. Dent & Sons, 1980, p. 40.

15 Studies of the Greek colonization include J. Boardman, *The Greeks Overseas*, 3rd ed., London: Thames and Hudson, 1980; A. J. Graham, *Colony and Mother City in Ancient Greece*, 2nd ed., Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983; J. P. Descoeudres (ed.), *Greek Colonists and Native Populations*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990; G. Tsetskhladze and F. De Angelis (eds.) *The Archaeology of Greek Colonization*, Oxford: Oxford School of Archaeology, 1994.

16 See Veracini's *Settler Colonial Studies: A Theoretical Overview*, Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan, 2010.

17 Key studies of the polis include Snodgrass, *Archaic Greece*; O. Murray and S. Price (eds.), *The Greek City: From Homer to Alexander*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1990; W. Burkert, *The Orientalizing Revolution: Near Eastern Influence on Greek Culture in the Early Archaic Age*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992; M. Herman-Hansen, *The Ancient Greek City-State*, Copenhagen: University of Denmark, 1993; F. de Polignac, *Cults, Territories, and the Origin of the Greek City-State*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995.

18 A special sort of Greek colony, the cleruchy, did not form a completely independent community; all others did. The exception of the cleruchy proves the rule that the Greek poleis colonies were settler colonies from the start.

19 D. W. R. Ridgway, 'Colonization: Greek', in S. Hornblower and A. Spawforth (eds.) *The Oxford English Dictionary*, 3rd ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 363.

20 See C. J. Emlyn-Jones, *The Ionians and Hellenism: A Study of the Cultural Achievements of the Early Greek Inhabitants of Asia Minor*, London: Routledge, 1980; V. B. Gorman, *Miletos. The Ornament of Ionia: A History of the City to 400 B.C.E.*, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2001; P. F. O'Grady, *Thales of Miletus: The Beginnings of Western Science and Philosophy*, Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2002.

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2

SETTLER COLONIALISM IN ANCIENT ISRAEL

Pekka Pitkänen

> When the Lord your God brings you into the land that you are about to enter and occupy, and he clears away many nations before you – the Hittites, the Girgashites, the Amorites, the Canaanites, the Perizzites, the Hivites, and the Jebusites, seven nations mightier and more numerous than you – 2 and when the Lord your God gives them over to you and you defeat them, then you must utterly destroy them. Make no covenant with them and show them no mercy. 3 Do not intermarry with them, giving your daughters to their sons or taking their daughters for your sons.
>
> (Deuteronomy 7:1–3, NRSV)

By the Late Bronze Age (ca. 1550–1200 BCE), the ancient Near East (roughly today's Middle East) could already boast of a long tradition of civilization and more than 1,500 years of writing. The world of the late Bronze Age was an era of internationalism, attested by commerce and international diplomacy.[1] Major powers included Egypt, Assyria, Hatti (ancient Anatolia) and Mycenae (ancient Greece). This era of internationalism came to an abrupt end around 1200 BCE.[2] The causes of the collapse are still disputed, but it is well known that it was accompanied by migrations of peoples and a birth of a number of new political entities in the area. Migrations include the Arameans, who spread across large areas of the ancient Near East and established a number of independent kingdoms across the area covered by northern Iraq and Syria today between ca. 1200–900 BCE.[3] Another migration involved the so-called sea peoples, who migrated from Mycenea and Anatolia into the coastal areas of the western Levant. Many of these kingdoms were transitory, but one of the sea peoples, the Philistines, were established in the southwestern Levantine area.[4] After the collapse of the Hittite kingdom, a number of so-called neo-Hittite kingdoms arose in parts of northern Syria and southeast Anatolia. Egypt and Assyria continued as unbroken entities through the period, even if Egypt entered its third intermediate period in the eleventh century BCE and Assyrian power receded towards the end of the Middle Assyrian period. In the southern Levant, a new entity called Israel arose during the Late Bronze-Early Iron Age transition.[5] In the process, indigenous societies in the land were replaced by an Israelite polity that was initially tribal but was formed into a kingdom around 1000 BCE that divided into two soon after the initial unification. The divided kingdoms themselves were conquered and destroyed by the Assyrians and the Babylonians in the eighth and sixth centuries BCE.

The birth of ancient Israel can thus be set against large-scale changes in the area from ca. 1200–900 BCE. Due to the dearth of contemporary written sources from the period,[6] historians must consult biblical texts, especially the books of Genesis, Exodus, Leviticus, Numbers, Deuteronomy, Joshua, Judges, 1 and 2 Samuel, Ruth and the beginning of the books of Kings, which purport to describe history in ancient Israel in the time between 1300 and 1000 BCE. With a few very limited exceptions, these texts are the only written sources from the area that relate to the period in question. However, the texts are different from modern historiography in that they consist of a unique mixture of historical, mythological, cultic and legal materials. The texts therefore should be read appropriately in terms of their genres and their unique combination. In addition, they naturally include only a limited amount of material and have been written from the perspective of the ancient Israelites. These texts in their present form are not contemporaneous to the events but are available in manuscripts that date from some 1,000 years or even more after the events portrayed in them. Through the transmission of manuscripts,[7] they also found their way into ancient Judaism and then Christianity and on to the present. Otherwise, excavations from the ancient Near East since the late nineteenth century have produced considerable amounts of archaeological evidence from the area of ancient Israel that can be used in support of historical reconstruction. This notwithstanding, the evidence is ultimately limited and also contested, and any reconstructions can only suggest plausibilities rather than certainties.[8] Constructing a detailed chronology for early Israel is particularly challenging.[9] Instead, one may concentrate on elucidating broad developments and ideological accompaniments that pertain to specific periods. A better footing in chronological terms can only be achieved from ca. 1000 BCE on, when kingship appears in Israel.

The settler colonial invasion of ancient Israel

The books from Genesis to Joshua are particularly interesting for the study of settler colonialism in ancient Israel. Keeping in mind that both religious and nonreligious aspects were tightly integrated in the lives and ideologies of ancient Near Eastern peoples, Genesis starts from the creation of the world. The origins not only of culture but also of humans are discussed. Then, after a cataclysmic flood, Yahweh, the god of the Israelites, tells a man called Abraham who lives in Mesopotamia to migrate to the land of Canaan and promises this land to him and his descendants. A famine causes Abraham's descendants to move to Egypt, and in the course of time they become slaves to the Egyptians. Yahweh, however, appears to Moses in a revelation and tells him to lead the Israelites out of Egypt. Helped with plagues that Yahweh sends on Egypt, the Israelites leave Egypt and congregate at Mount Horeb, where Yahweh appears to them and gives them laws that are to act as a foundation of their new society that is to be established in the land of Canaan, which Yahweh had already promised to their forefather Abraham. Departing from the mountain, the people traverse through the desert of Sinai towards Canaan, encountering some difficulties along the way. The book of Deuteronomy ends with Moses making a final sermon in the land of Moab at the edge of the promised land, providing further laws for the Israelites to keep in the new land. The book of Joshua continues the story and describes how the Israelites conquer and settle the land after the death of Moses, essentially fulfilling the divine promises.

This is colonising migration and settler colonialism.[10] The Israelites, having left Egypt and entered the land of Canaan, were part of an autonomous collective that claimed both a special sovereign charge and a regenerative capacity. Also, they vied for a piece of land to claim for themselves under their sovereign charge, where they would establish a new society.[11] According to ancient Israelite thinking, the indigenous peoples were to be eliminated. This was to be achieved either by killing them or by physical displacement (see esp. Dt 7; Ex 23:23–31). But

the documents indicate that there were also more subtle ways to destroy the indigenous soci-eties. Indigenous people could be assimilated. Such people included Rahab (Josh 2, 6) and the Gibeonites (Josh 9).[12] People coming from outside could also join the settler collective. Such people included the mixed multitude (ʿerev rav) that went out of Egypt in the Exodus (according to Ex 12:38) and Caleb the Kenizzite (Josh 14:6). And the Israelites legislated for a foreigner (ger) in a number of places in the Pentateuchal legal materials (e.g. Lev 17–25; Dt 14:1–21). These people were then transferred into the settler collective, whether initially as indigenous or exogenous others. There could also be abject others, those permanently excluded from the settler polity, having lost their indigenous or exogenous status.[13] In the Israelite society, according to the biblical texts, these included people who had been subject to the *karat* punishment of being cut off from the people (Lev 7:20–27; 17:4–14; 18:29 etc.) and the Ammonites and Moabites who could not be uplifted into the Israelite community, even when an Edomite and Egyptian could be included in the third generation (see Dt 23:1–7). These processes went on for centuries in the Israelite society after the initial invasion reflected in Joshua and resulted in transforming the Late Bronze societies into the later Iron Age and, ultimately, also the postexilic Israelite societies.

The Israelite documents attest a variety of intertwined ideological and practical features that accompany the overall settler colonial process. The travels of Abraham, the first forefather of Israel, according to the biblical documents, in the land of Canaan and building of altars there can be seen as staking a legal claim to the land (see Gen 12:1–9; 13:14–17).[14] This ideological aspect holds true regardless of whether he, or the other biblical patriarchs, is an actual or a purely eponymous figure. Interestingly, the place for the first recorded altar is Shechem, and the Israelites are later instructed to build an altar on mount Ebal in Dt 27, and the act of building, together with the accompanying ceremony prescribed by Dt 27:9–26, is described as having taken place in Josh 8:30–35. This event is portrayed to have taken place at the initial stages of the conquest, even if the biblical text itself merely gives a temporal marker of 'then', 'at that time' (az) for the event (Josh 8:30). This ceremony of conquest and supplanting by a new society harks back to the patriarchal promises in Genesis and also reinforces the interrelatedness of Genesis, Deuteronomy and Joshua, and arguably Genesis–Joshua as a whole.

Abraham's travels (Gen 12ff) can also be seen as part of 'knowing the land' and thus asserting a claim over it, even if the matter only remains at a level of a promise to the patriarchs themselves. The promises begin to be fulfilled several centuries later in the books of Numbers and Joshua. According to Num 13:1, Yahweh commands Moses to send out men to explore the land of Canaan. The men do this and bring back a description of the land. The book of Joshua then describes the successful conquest. Joshua 18:3–10 describes a mapping process as part of dividing the land to the Israelite tribes. This mapping process is part of Josh 13–21 that in a larger sense describe the tribal allotments. These allotments could be entirely programmatic.[15] While such a programmatic vision could have arisen at any time in Israel's history, based on comparative par-allels from conquests in world history, the vision would fit particularly well in a period of early Israel when these territories were not yet (fully) in the control of the Israelites but were desired to be so, also keeping in mind that Josh 13–21 (esp. Josh 13:1–7) and other biblical documents (e.g. Judg 1) and archaeological evidence indicate that the Israelite settlement and control started from central, eastern and northern highlands and expanded out from there to include lowlands in the later course of Israel's history (cf. also Judg 1).[16]

It appears that there are, according to the biblical documents, some occasions when the con-quering and settling Israelites rename places. This is the case with Gilgal (Josh 14:15), Hill of Foreskins (Josh 5:2–3), Valley of Achor (Josh 7:26), Hebron (Josh 14:15; 15:13; Judg 1:10), Debir (Josh 15:15), Jerusalem (Judg 19:10), Bethel (Judg 1:23), Dan (Josh 19:47; Judg 18:29), Havvoth Jair (Num 32:31) and Nobah (Num 32:42). By way of comparison and contrast, interestingly, in

the explicitly religious sphere, the Israelites are commanded to erase even the name of the gods of the previous inhabitants (Dt 12:3). Instead, the name of Yahweh is to be established in the land and in a 'chosen place' in particular (Dt 12:4–31).

As regards foundation stories that new societies often use to legitimate their presence, clearly the Bible indicates, in the book of Genesis in particular, that the land was promised to the patriarchs, and this theme runs through the whole of Genesis–Joshua one way or another (see e.g. Ex 3:16–17; 4:5; Dt 1:8; 6:10; 9:5; 29:13; 30:20; cf. e.g. Num 13:2; Josh 1:2, 12). The exodus and liberation provide another powerful foundation story, and the occasions of lawgiving at Sinai (Ex), in the wilderness (Leviticus-Numbers) and at the edge of the promised land (Deuteronomy) add further strands to the set of foundation stories. The genealogies (see especially Gen 10) serve to establish Israel's place among the nations,[17] in the context of creation and the land Israel now occupies, and the patriarchal stories define Israel's relations with its close neighbours (e.g. the Edomites, Gen 26–27, 32–33).

As for supplanting 'the savages' and the genocidal imperative that typically accompanies settler colonial processes, the idea of the lower worth of the inhabitants is already grounded in Gen 9:25–27 where Canaan, the eponymous forefather of the Canaanites, is cursed. In a manner typical of the narratives of Genesis, Canaan's father Ham happens to behave in a bad manner when his father Noah, the sole survivor of the cataclysmic flood, gets drunk. Noah then curses Ham, but blesses his other sons, Shem and Japhet, of whom the former is an eponymous distant ancestor of the Israelites. As already discussed, such texts as Dt 7, ostensibly pertaining to the later time when the conquest took place, indicate that the inhabitants of Canaan are to be obliterated. This settler colonial transfer corresponds to a genocidal imperative.

According to the biblical documents, lands could also belong to the Israelites by right of conquest.[18] An example of this is the lands of the kings Sihon and Og (see e.g. Num 21:21–35; Dt 2:24–3:11). These kings ruled in the area east of the River Jordan that was not as explicitly part of the promised land as was land west of the Jordan. The biblical materials present the engagement in battle by the Israelites with them as a result of the aggression of those kings, thereby legitimating the Israelite conquest (see Num 21:21–23). This said, it is also true that such conquest and dispossession had to be sanctioned by Yahweh (see Dt 2:24–25). Yahweh did not allow the Israelites to conquer the Edomites even when they refused Israel passage through their lands (see Num 20:14–21; Dt 2:2–9). This was because the Edomites were seen as closely related to the Israelites, as expressed through the narratives in Genesis (see Gen 25–27; 32–33). Lands might apparently belong to the Israelites even by virtue of treading on them (see e.g. Josh 1:3; 14:9),[19] even if this again, in the minds of the ancient Israelites, ultimately stemmed from the divine will of Yahweh that had already been largely predetermined. In this context, it would seem that ancient battles already provided legitimation for Jacob, according to Gen 48:22. All in all, divine will and familial relationships played a significant part in the ancient Israelite worldview from which legitimate and potentially illegitimate actions could follow.

With early Israel, in terms of developing its new land and peopling it, we can see how the population explosion, as it has been called,[20] in the highlands was followed by an expansion out from there in the ensuing centuries. In general, settler colonial processes may include periods of apparently peaceful coexistence, then extensions of the process that may include further fighting and may also include transfers by assimilating indigenous peoples.[21] While the Israelite narrative in the book of Joshua can be read to emphasise aspects of war and sudden conquest, it does also indicate a continuing settlement process that took a lot of time. Conversely, the narrative of Judges does emphasise the gradual settlement and coexistence aspect, without, however, denying that there was also violence (esp. Judg 1). Again, importantly, archaeological evidence attests a settlement process in the highlands. It also on the whole indicates a basic highland culture that

expands towards the lowlands between the twelfth and tenth centuries.[22] It thus does support the idea of a settler colonial process, even when it is generally not easy to verify individual conquests described in the Bible.[23]

While it is typical for societies, including new societies, to fortify their territory, with early Israel, there seems to be a relative lack of mention of fortifications and fortifying in Genesis–Joshua. But Num 32 does indicate that the Israelites fortified and possessed fortified towns in Transjordan, and Dt 3:5 suggests fortified towns with 'many' unfortified villages in Transjordan, which would also fit with the large number of unfortified settlements in the Cisjordanian highlands in Iron Age I. It would appear that the Israelites would have taken over fortified towns where they existed and where they could conquer them (cf. Josh 10:20; 14:12; 1 Sam 6:18, 20:6, 15). David and Solomon and later kings are described as taking over fortified towns or fortifying themselves (e.g. 2 Sam 5:6–10; 1 Ki 9:15; 1 Ki 12:25). The fact that one had to labour to reach the highlands from the coasts may in itself already have helped to form a naturally defendable border for the early Israelite settlers, even if such a border would be somewhat vague and ultimately quite porous, if a sufficient effort would be exercised by a potential conqueror.

The legal materials in Genesis–Joshua can be seen as providing a blueprint for the new Israelite society, even when it is not certain how much this was a theoretical rather than a practical construct, in line with legal materials in the ancient Near East.[24] These materials include two main differing strands of tradition. The priestly tradition (Exodus-Numbers) pertains to ritual and cultic materials largely targeted for priests but also includes injunctions for life in the land as a community (esp. the so-called Holiness Code in Lev 17–26). The tradition in Deuteronomy, with precursors in Ex 20–23 and 34, is also of priestly origin but has been targeted at lay people. Land is clearly a *leitmotif* in Deuteronomy. The legal materials have been placed in a framework of two covenants, one at Sinai (Ex 20—Lev 26, with additions in Exodus and Numbers) and one at Moab (Dt 5–28), forming a complex and unique hermeneutical entity. The legal materials are nevertheless based on an already well-established ancient Near Eastern tradition that demonstrably dates back to the third millennium BCE.[25] As was already noted, the legal materials both establish a new community and stipulate the removal of the native societies, with the land at their centre.[26]

Reconstructing the ethnic and political mix before the arrival of the Israelites is not easy. There are two main sources for such an endeavour. The first is the Amarna letters, which are a set of interregional diplomatic correspondence between the pharaoh of Egypt and a set of ancient Near Eastern political entities.[27] The letters date from the fourteenth century BCE, and a number of them are sent to or by Canaanite rulers which also were vassals to Egypt at the time. What the texts reveal is that Canaan was at the time divided into small political entities, and this picture is confirmed by the biblical texts, the second main source for reconstructing the pre-Israelite era. The Israelites referred to the indigenous nations as 'seven nations' (e.g. in Dt 7:1). This designation is formulaic and can be compared to the so-called nine bows as traditional foes of Egypt in ancient Egyptian documents.[28] On the whole, the Israelites were not modern ethnographers in terms of their interest in preserving full details about the indigenous peoples, and therefore the designation is likely to give us a representative picture at best.[29] The relatively small area where ancient Israel was based had a varying environment with a set of differing microclimates and thus was conducive to a number of political organisations.[30] It would appear that Genesis–Joshua, with its emphasis on the unity of the various tribes across this geographical area, was designed to help towards forging a cultural and political unity in the land and foster an ethnogenesis. The tribes were seen as originating from common forefathers, according to Genesis. They were imagined to have been tightly camped around a central sanctuary in the wilderness on their way from Egypt (Num 2–4) and were then seen as having dispersed into the land (Josh 13–21).[31] It would appear

that the authors of Genesis–Joshua played on traditions stemming from the putative Moses group and reworked them further into an all-encompassing scheme in order to include all geographical regions that they envisaged as the territory of emerging Israel. Interestingly, the Deuteronomic vision of the Israelite society in particular also attests relative democratic features.[32] And archaeological evidence from the highlands attests a relatively homogenous set of dwellings, speaking for a lack of stratification. Stratification was to come after the onset of monarchy in the late eleventh–early tenth century.[33]

Ancient Israel as a settler colonial society

The biblical documents present a vision of a 'rest' that Israel achieved in the land that Yahweh promised to their forefathers. This is accompanied with Yahweh dwelling in the midst of the people. The vision was seen to come to fruition at the end of the book of Joshua. Divine presence was considered vital in the ancient Near East for the benefit and well-being of people, and its absence could lead to disaster and destruction. The narrative of Genesis–Joshua starts with the creation of the world and the placement of the first man in the Garden of Eden (Gen 2). God himself is present there with Adam. After the fall and expulsion from the garden, man is in many ways left alone in this respect. With ancient Israel, at Sinai, with the making of the covenant (Ex 19ff), Yahweh establishes his presence with Israel through the ark of the covenant and the tent of meeting (Ex 25–40). The tent of meeting was equivalent to an ancient Near Eastern temple, where gods were present with the people and the ark was a specific artefact where Yahweh's presence was manifested.[34] The tent of meeting was then set up at Shiloh as part of a successful completion of the conquest (Josh 18:1), restoring paradise through god's presence in the new land (cf. Josh 21:43–45). In this, importantly, in Israel, there was to be only one place where Israel's god dwelt (Dt 12; and in the wilderness camp in Lev 17), in contrast to most other ancient Near Eastern societies, which typically had multiple temples at multiple locations. A main issue is that the narrative attests the desire of settler societies to imagine an idyllic new society, even when this is likely to not quite correspond to an actual state of affairs (e.g. Josh 13:1–7).[35] Genesis–Joshua thus has to do with production, legitimation and potential actualisation of this idyllic imagery.

After the initial settlement, which is usually dated to the thirteenth–twelfth centuries BCE,[36] the Israelite society consisted of a number of continually settling tribes that operated without a political or administrative centre, even if Shiloh, at roughly the centre of the land, came to exert a centralising religious claim (see Josh 18:1–2; 22:9–34). For the first 150–200 years, the various Israelite tribes also experienced various vicissitudes and conflicts with their neighbouring peoples. The book of Judges, which describes the period, lacks a firm chronology, but we can see from it that the tribes often acted independently from each other, even if there was also sometimes at least partially united action (see Judg 4–5). Towards the end of this period, in the late eleventh century BCE, the mood amongst the tribes started to gravitate towards kingship. The biblical materials describe how the Israelites felt that they should have a king like other surrounding nations who would also help lead them collectively in battles against threatening neighbours (see esp. 1 Sam 8), amongst whom the Philistines were particularly prominent. The first king, Saul, could not establish a permanent dynasty. His place was taken by David, who then established a hereditary monarchy in Israel (see esp. 2 Sam 7). His son Solomon further consolidated the political and religious situation (see 1 Ki 1–10). In terms of settler colonialism, idealised imagery is repeated in the depiction of the time of Solomon, in 1 Ki 4:20–34 and apparently 1 Ki 10.[37] At the same time, this contrasts with 1 Ki 11, where a cognitive dissonance appears to take place. But, all in all, it would seem that the narrative of Kings sees another high point associated with Solomon. This is attested by the choice of Jerusalem and the building of the temple there after the rejection

of Shiloh (and the tent of meeting) in mid-eleventh century BCE and the wider conquests of especially David and the then-resulting peace under Solomon (cf. Ps 78:54–72). The description of the time of Solomon even fits with a second settler colonial peak in the territory of Israel itself through the enslavement of the remnants of the nations by Solomon (see 1 Ki 9:20–21), even if the cognitive dissonance is now primarily Solomon's idolatry. That said, except for the idolatry, the nondestruction of the indigenous elements may also have been seen as more or less problematic in the mind of the author(s) of the narrative. The portrayal of the treatment of the natives at this time would also seem to fit with an apparent tendency of settler colonial societies to particularly focus on assimilation after main territorial conquests have been completed.[38]

In sum, we can see that the overall ancient Israelite strategy and message attested in Genesis-Joshua and Judges, the thrust of events portrayed in them and the broad contours of archaeological data point towards a settler colonial transformation in ancient Canaan at the end of the second millennium BCE that continued well into the time of the monarchy as depicted in Samuel and the first chapters of Kings. It should be noted that, for example, importantly, this historical reconstruction does not intend to return to such conquest models that were proposed and were for a time prominent in the twentieth century.[39] Instead, we are speaking in terms of an overall process that involved violent events together with other more peaceful processes, with the mapping of their presentation with the biblical materials not necessarily being straightforward, especially in Genesis–Joshua.[40] As part of such mapping, one should consider the narratives as a mixture of fact and fiction. The biblical authors told what in their view might plausibly have happened. Many of the stories were thus told in an embellished manner.[41] However, one may think that there is a kernel of truth in the materials. Even though Gen 1–11, which includes a description of the creation of the world, should be seen as mythical protohistory, and even though there is no direct evidence even for the existence of the patriarchs and no direct evidence about the Exodus from Egypt, we do know that there were Semites in Egypt in the Middle Bronze Age, and some of them rose to high positions in the Egyptian society. After the expulsion of the Hyksos at about the end of the Middle Bronze Age, it is possible that the societal position of Asiatics would have deteriorated as a whole, with some possibly ending up in a position of slavery. It is then, for example, possible that a Semite did actually wander in the Sinai area and felt an experience of the divine and a political consciousness to help an enslaved group of his countrymen leave Egypt. Others could also have followed in such a migration, even at least partially separately from this group. The people spent some time in the wilderness, perhaps passing through the place where the leader had experienced his divine call. The group experienced some hardship and diseases in their harsh desert environment and was initially afraid to attempt a conquest of the land, but eventually had the courage to do so and also succeeded in making a bridgehead that expanded in the following centuries.

In the wider context, as already implied earlier, there are indications that ancient Israel was only one of several settler societies at the time in its own immediate surroundings and even in the wider Near East. The migrations of the Philistines and the Arameans in the late second millennium BCE are explicitly referred to in the Bible itself (see Amos 9:7; Dt 2:23), and extrabiblical evidence also supports a settler colonial related interpretation.[42] In addition to these peoples, according to the biblical materials, the Moabites, Edomites and Ammonites had also settled in and displaced previous inhabitants of their respective areas by the time the Israelites appeared on the scene (see Dt 2:8b-12, 16–22).

Thus, the emergence of ancient Israel, together with other political entities in the area after the collapse of the Late Bronze international era in the late second millennium BCE, can be considered to have been accompanied by migration and settler colonialism, and such processes continued into the first millennium, where they are also attested in other societies (see Graham

in this volume, but cf. also comments in the conclusion to this chapter). This reconstruction pushes the attestation of settler colonialism further back in time than previously suggested. And yet there are indications that such processes may have been in existence even earlier. Already the Uruk culture in the area of Susiana in the fourth millennium BCE may have been intrusive and a result of settler colonialism.[43] If so, we are truly speaking of a human phenomenon that dates back to the earliest times.[44]

Conclusion

The united ancient Israelite kingdom set up by David and Solomon divided into two after the death of Solomon in the latter part of the tenth century (see 1 Ki 12). Since the ninth century BCE, the Israelites started to be under increasing pressure from external societies, with a tendency towards territorial losses. According to 2 Ki 10:32–33, Yahweh started to 'reduce the size of Israel' at that time. Both the Arameans (see ibid.) and the Moabites (cf. 2 Ki 1:1; 3:4–5) were specific culprits in this. Some of the Moabite incursion is recorded in the so-called Mesha stele unearthed from the ninth century BCE, according to which (lines 8–15):

> (Now) Omri had occupied the land of Medeba, and (Israel) had dwelt there in his time, and half the time of his son (Ahab), forty years; but Chemosh dwelt there in my time. And I built Baal-meon, making a reservoir in it, and I built Qaryaten. Now the men of Gad had always dwelt in the land of Ataroth, and the king of Israel had built Ataroth for them; but I fought against the town and took it, and slew all the people of the town as satiation (intoxication) for Chemosh and Moab. And I brought back from there Arel (or Orel), its chieftain, dragging him before Chemosh in Kerioth; and I settled there the men of Sharon and men of Maharith.[45]

This indicates the existence of 'reverse' settler colonialism by the Moabites in the process of annexing Israelite territory. The Northern kingdom then fell to the Assyrians in the eighth century. The accompanying Assyrian population transfers changed the composition of the population (see 2 Ki 17). It was only the southern kingdom of Judah that survived the onslaught, with the famous siege of Jerusalem by Sennacherib attested both in biblical (see 2 Ki 18–19; Isa 36–37) and Assyrian records (see Annals of Sennacherib, Col iii:18–31). While 1 Chr 4:38–43, which portrays the time of Hezekiah in the eighth century BCE, suggests that the Judahites of the Southern kingdom could still revert to settler colonial approaches at the time (in this case in the southern, largely semiarid part of the kingdom of Judah), towards the end of the monarchical period, at the time of Josiah in the late seventh century BCE, when the law code of Deuteronomy had been rediscovered, the focus of the Israelite society seems to have been more inwardly. Josiah's famous Deuteronomic reforms seem to have been about the destruction of idolatry rather than a continuing settler colonial transformation and its associated genocidal imperative (see 2 Ki 22–24). Genesis–Joshua itself may at this time have been going through some changes in both its form and in how it was being understood.[46] Importantly, a first version of the books of Kings may have been written in this period and connected with Genesis–Joshua, Judges and Samuel to form a first version of Genesis–Kings as a unified historical work, which would as a whole have a different focus than Genesis–Joshua on its own.

Once the Israelite monarchy had been extinguished by the Babylonian conquests at the beginning of the sixth century BCE, the interpretation of Genesis–Joshua, and already the books of Samuel–Kings, regardless of whether the first edition of the books of Kings originates from the exile to Babylonia or before it, would now focus on reflection on and interpretation of the documents

based on the great catastrophe.[47] If there was a further exilic redaction of the materials, or in case of an exilic composition of Kings *mutatis mutandis*, it could then have added the final chapters of Kings and inserted or retouched at least some of the materials that are linked to the exile in their present form in Genesis–Joshua.[48] It is also very possible that the exile acted as a(nother) major watershed in terms of how Genesis–Joshua *per se* was being read. As suggested by Sanders,[49] the loss of immediate connection to the land for the exiles (who were in Babylonia) meant that the fulfilment of its conquest was now less important than before. Nor would the returnees under the Persians, who conquered the Babylonians as a small community within the Persian empire (see 2 Chr 36; Ezra, Nehemiah), be likely to have had the means to launch a settler colonial programme.[50] Instead, the *torah* of Moses, a document that looked forward to the land, became a reference point for the now emerging early Judaism, securing the identity of the early Jews, many of whom were and even would increasingly be scattered throughout the Mediterranean world and, in practice, could only hope to return to the land someday, rather in an 'eschatological' sense.[51] This identity did also have an increasingly individualising aspect.[52] Accordingly, Ezra would read the Pentateuch as *torah* in postexilic times and Nehemiah would focus on separation from foreigners rather than their extermination. It is then very possible that, in terms of the canonical process for the emerging early Judaism, the separation of the Pentateuch from what follows took place during this era.[53] After this development, it was largely only Joshua that was left on its own as an ostensible conquest text. In the Graeco-Roman environment, New Testament readings detached the document even more from its original message. Readings based on the original settler colonial vision came back in vogue in the Western colonial period in particular, although perhaps in a somewhat mutated form. They coexisted with more or less explicit religious readings that were increasingly put on the texts after the fall of the kingdom of Judah in the sixth century BCE. In this way, the texts pertaining to ancient Israelite settler colonialism survived, and even thrived, through the vicissitudes of history. Through this, they continued to influence religious and political communities and have left a significant and lasting legacy to the world, even when early Israel and the ancient Israelite kingdoms themselves completely vanished in the mist of history.

Notes

1 See the Amarna letters, conveniently presented in English translation in W. L. Moran, *The Amarna Letters*, Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992.
2 For the era of internationalism and its collapse, see E. H. Cline, *1177 B.C.: The Year Civilization Collapsed (Turning Points in Ancient History)*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014.
3 See later in the chapter for further details.
4 Ibid.
5 An entity called Israel is first attested in the so-called Merneptah stele, dated to ca. 1205 BCE.
6 Cf. G. Galil, A. Gilboa, A. M. Maeir and D. Kahn (eds.) *The Ancient Near East in the 12th–10th Centuries BCE: Culture and History*, AOAT 392, Münster: Ugarit-Verlag, 2012, p. ix, according to whom the history of the ancient Near East in the twelfth–tenth centuries BCE can currently still be considered to be "an unsolved riddle" as a whole.
7 Note that this transmission already has involved some demonstrable modifications in the texts, with scholars debating the extent and character of these and other potential modifications, even if not empirically attested in manuscripts, and their meaning and significance; see e.g. E. Tov, *Textual Criticism of the Hebrew Bible*, 3rd ed., Revised and Expanded, Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2012; cf. e.g. J. Tigay, *The Evolution of the Gilgamesh Epic*, Wauconda, IL: Bolchazy-Carducci Publishers, 2002; a reprint of 1982 edition published by Philadelpia: University of Pennsylvania Press; D. M. Carr, *The Formation of the Hebrew Bible: A New Reconstruction*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2011, esp. pp. 3–149.
8 For so-called maximalist interpretations of the history of ancient Israel, see e.g. K. Kitchen, *On the Reliability of the Old Testament*, Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2003; I. Provan, V. Philips Long and T. Longman, *A Biblical History of Israel*, Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2003. For mainstream

reconstructions, see e.g. J. Maxwell Miller and J. H. Hayes, *History of Ancient Israel and Judah*, 2nd revised ed., London: SCM Press, 2006; W. G. Dever, *Who Were the Early Israelites and Where Did They Come From?*, Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2003. For the so-called minimalist interpretations, see e.g. N. P. Lemche, *The Israelites in History and Tradition*, London: SPCK/Louisville, Kentucky: Westminster John Knox Press, 1998; T. L. Thompson, *Early History of the Israelite People: From the Written and Archaeological Sources*, Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1992; P. R. Davies, *In Search of 'Ancient Israel'*, JSOTSS 148, Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1992; M. Liverani, *Israel's History and the History of Israel*, London, Equinox, 2005; Italian original 2003.

9   It is not even clear when the Israelite settlement started. The biblical note in 1 Kings 6:1 points to the (late) fifteenth century BCE, but archaeological evidence suggests the thirteenth century BCE. As far as it is known, no annalistic records that could be used towards counting overall time were kept before the Israelite monarchy, and the biblical writer would therefore not need to be expected to have had a full sense of time that had passed before the monarchy.

10 On colonising migration as a category of migration, see e.g. P. Manning, *Migration in World History*, 2nd ed., Themes in World History, Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2013, esp. pp. 4–6.

11 It should be noted here also that the so-called Holiness Code (Leviticus 17–26) and Deuteronomic laws particularly focus on land.

12 Cf. these with charts in L. Veracini, *Settler Colonialism: A Theoretical Overview*, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2010, pp. 25–29.

13 Cf. Veracini, *Settler Colonialism*, pp. 27–28.

14 I.e. it legitimates the conquest in the eyes of the conquerors themselves, and this legitimation could also serve as argumentation to be presented to the indigenous peoples and others. For much of the next few paragraphs in this section, cf. D. Day, *Conquest: How Societies Overwhelm Others*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.

15 Cf. G. Beckman, *Hittite Diplomatic Texts*, Writings from the Ancient World 7, Atlanta: SBL, pp. 109–11, for an example of Hittite border descriptions (in a treaty context). Cf. K. A. Kitchen and P. J. N. Lawrence, *Treaty, Law and Covenant in the Ancient Near East*, 3 Vols., Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2012, Vol. 1, pp. 2–15, *passim*, for territorial issues in mid-third millennium BCE Lagash, and *passim* within the whole volume for centuries and millennia thereafter.

16 See e.g. A. Faust, *Israel's Ethnogenesis: Settlement, Interaction, Expansion and Resistance*, London: Equinox, 2006, esp. pp. 159–66, 221–26; I. Finkelstein, *The Archaeology of the Israelite Settlement*, Jerusalem: Israel Exploration Society, 1988, pp. 324–30; and a summary in E. Junkkaala, *Three Conquests of Canaan: A Comparative Study of Two Egyptian Military Campaigns and Joshua 10–12 in the Light of Recent Archaeological Evidence*, Turku: Åbo Akademi University Press, 2006; PDF version available for download from https://oa.doria.fi/handle/10024/4162 (accessed 13/10/2012), esp. pp. 308–9.

17 Such expressions of relations appear to go back to the Late Bronze Age in ancient Greek traditions; see M. Finkelberg, *Greeks and Pre-Greeks: Aegean Prehistory and Greek Heroic Tradition*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005, pp. 24–41.

18 Cf. also D. Day, *Conquest: How Societies Overwhelm Others*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, pp. 96–97.

19 Day, *Conquest*, p. 96.

20 See Dever, *Who Were the Early Israelites and Where Did They Come From?*, p. 98.

21 Cf. C. P. Kakel, *The American West and the Nazi East: A Comparative and Interpretive Perspective*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011.

22 Cf. Faust, *Israel's Ethnogenesis*, esp. pp. 159–66, 221–26; Finkelstein, *The Archaeology of the Israelite Settlement*, pp. 324–30; Junkkaala, *Three Conquests of Canaan*, esp. pp. 308–9.

23 On the difficulties with the relationship between text and archaeology in respect to the particularly difficult sites of Jericho, Ai and Arad, see e.g. P. M. A. Pitkänen, *Joshua*, Apollos Old Testament Commentary, Leicester: IVP, 2010, *passim* and R. K. Hawkins, *How Israel Became a People*, Nashville: Abingdon Press, 2013, pp. 91–120 and *passim*.

24 See e.g. F. R. Kraus, *Königliche Verfügungen in altbabylonischer Zeit*, Studia et documenta ad iura Orientis antiqui pertinentia 11, Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1984; Kitchen and Lawrence, *Treaty, Law and Covenant*.

25 See e.g. E. Otto, *Deuteronomium* 1, 1–4, 43, HTKAT, Freiburg: Herder, 2012, for the hermeneutics; Kitchen and Lawrence, *Treaty, Law and Covenant* for the ancient Near Eastern legal tradition.

26 Cf. Wolfe, 'Structure and event: Settler colonialism, time and the question of genocide', in A. D. Moses (ed.) *Empire, Colony, Genocide: Conquest, Occupation and Subaltern Resistance in World History*, Oxford/New York: Bergahn Books, p. 130n71. The 'positive' aspect of establishing a new society, as it pertains

to the book of Deuteronomy, comes through particularly interestingly and in considerable detail in C. Parker, *Deuteronomy's Place: A Philosophical Analysis of Place in Deuteronomy*, PhD Thesis, University of Gloucestershire, 2015.

27 See e.g. W. L. Moran, *The Amarna Letters*, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992; J. A. Knudtzon, *Die El-Amarna Tafeln: Mit Einleitung und Erläuterungen*, Vol. 2, Aalen: Otto Zeller Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1964, reprint of 1915 edition, for the Amarna letters, which were a set of diplomatic correspondence (some 350 letters) between the Egyptian pharaoh Akhenaten and the ancient Near East in the fourteenth century BCE written in Akkadian, the diplomatic *lingua franca* of the day, uncovered at Tell El-Amarna in Egypt.

28 Cf. Mu-chou Poo, *Enemies of Civilization: Attitudes Toward Foreigners in Ancient Mesopotamia, Egypt and China*, Albany: State University of New York Press, 2005, p. 21; Poo also (ibid., pp. 46–47) mentions that such 'lumping' took place in China and that 'The numbers nine, or eight, seven, six, for that matter, are obviously numerical metaphors for "many"'.

29 Cf. P. Wolfe, *Settler Colonialism and the Transformation of Anthropology: The Politics and Poetics of an Ethnographic Event*, Writing Past Colonialism, London: Cassell, 1999, p. 208, according to which colonialism is not interested in historical indigeneity but replaces it with its own that is conveniently mythical. Note also the comments in M. Dietler, *Archaeologies of Colonialism: Consumption, Entanglement and Violence in Ancient Mediterranean France*, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2010, pp. 85–86 about the ancients as ethnographers.

30 See e.g. Parker, *Deuteronomy's Place*.

31 For eponymous ancestors in Greek traditions, see Finkelberg, *Greeks and Pre-Greeks*, pp. 24–41.

32 See J. Berman, *Created Equal: How the Bible Broke with Ancient Political Thought*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.

33 See Dever, *Who Were the Early Israelites and Where Did They Come From?*

34 See P. Pitkänen, *Central Sanctuary and Centralization of Worship in Ancient Israel: From the Settlement to the Building of Solomon's Temple*, reissue with a new introduction by the author, Piscataway, NJ: Gorgias Press, 2014, 1st ed. 2003; M. B. Hundley, *Gods in Dwellings: Temples and Divine Presence in the Ancient Near East*, Writings from the Ancient World Supplement Series 3, Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2013.

35 Cf. Veracini, *Settler Colonialism*, pp. 88–89.

36 Cf. note 9, above.

37 Cf. J. A. Sanders, *Torah and Canon*, 2nd ed., Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2005, p. 26.

38 Cf. Wolfe, 'Structure and event', esp. pp. 117–19, 130n71; cf. P. Pitkänen, 'Pentateuch–Joshua: A settler-colonial document of a supplanting society', *Settler Colonial Studies*, 4.3, 2014, pp. 245–76 (273n182). Note also 1 Chronicles 5:10 and 18–22 and potentially 1 Samuel 7:14, which relate to time just a bit before Solomon.

39 For a summary of these, see e.g. P. Pitkänen, *Joshua*, Apollos Old Testament Commentary, Leicester: IVP, 2010, pp. 29–31.

40 See Pitkänen, *Joshua*, for one possible way of reading the texts.

41 Cf. this with the range between fact and fiction in T. Longman, *Fictional Akkadian Autobiography: A Generic and Comparative Study*, Winona Lake: Eisenbrauns, 1991, incl. 209–10; cf. also Kitchen and Lawrence, *Treaty, Law and Covenant*, Vol. 2, pp. 60–61 on the preservation of 'reminiscences' from earlier times in later stories about those times in Egypt and Greece. The large numbers in Genesis–Joshua (see e.g. Numbers 1) may simply be intentional exaggeration.

42 Cf. P. Pitkänen, 'Ancient Israel and Philistia: Settler colonialism and ethnocultural interaction', *Ugarit Forschungen* 45, 2014, pp. 233–63 for the Philistines; cf. R. Zadok, 'The Aramean infiltration and diffusion in the upper Jazira, ca. 1150–930 BCE', in Galil, Gilboa, Maeir and Kahn (eds.), *The Ancient Near East in the 12th–10th Centuries BCE*, 2012, pp. 569–79; K. Lawson Younger, Jr., 'The late Bronze Age I Iron Age transition and the origins of the Arameans', in *idem.*, ed. *Ugarit at Seventy-Five*, Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 2007, pp. 131–74. Cf. also e.g. E. Lipinski, *The Arameans: Their Ancient History, Culture, Religion*, Leuven: Peeters, 2000; H. Niehr (ed.), *The Arameans in Ancient Syria*, Leiden: E.J. Brill, 2014.

43 Cf. M. E. Aubet, *Commerce and Colonization in the Ancient Near East*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, Spanish original 2007, pp. 163–7.

44 See Manning, *Migration in World History*, p. 16; P. Bellwood, *First Migrants: Ancient Migration in Global Perspective*, Chichester: Wiley Blackwell, 2013, *passim*.

45 Translation from J. B. Pritchard, *Ancient Near Eastern Texts Relating to the Old Testament*, 3rd ed., with Supplement, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969, p. 320.

46 Cf. e.g. Carr, *The Formation of the Hebrew Bible*.

47 See esp. 2 Kings 25 for the conquest of Jerusalem and the fall and exile of the Southern kingdom.
48 Cf. F. Moore Cross, Jr., *Canaanite Myth and Hebrew Epic: Essays in the History of the Religion of Israel*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1973, pp. 285–89.
49 See Sanders, *Torah and Canon*, pp. 51–3, 102–4; cf. *idem.*, *The Monotheizing Process: Its Origins and Development*, with a contribution from Paul E. Capetz, Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2014, pp. 23–4.
50 Cf. Sanders, *Torah and Canon*, p. 52.
51 Cf. Sanders, *Torah and Canon*, pp. 48–9; *idem.*, *The Monotheizing Process*, pp. 23–4.
52 Sanders, *Torah and Canon*, p. 108.
53 Cf. Sanders, *Torah and Canon*, pp. 51–3.

Further reading

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3

MEDITERRANEAN AND ATLANTIC SETTLER COLONIALISM FROM THE LATE FOURTEENTH TO THE EARLY SEVENTEENTH CENTURIES

Patrick O'Flanagan

Settler colonization carries intensive geographical implications. Over time, some population movements have been planned by governments with particular geo-visions, and such actions can be titled as being prescribed. By way of contrast, others can be described as permissive, in that population movements have been more haphazard in their motivation and have come 'from below' and from within communities. Irrespective of their origins, some settler movements have been so robust that they have smothered pre-existing territorial structures, as apparently did the Arab and Berber conquest of many parts of Iberia.

What did settlers bring to their new locales? Most importantly, what new ideas in relation to economic and spatial organization were transferred by newcomers? How effective were they at transferring and inaugurating cultural landscapes in areas that were heretofore empty or establishing them in areas already settled? What new elements and instruments of landesque capital were they able to institute so as to exploit their new surroundings, and what ones, already in place, were they able to efficiently utilize, and which ones did they discard?[1] These are some of the questions that historical geographers might pose in relation to the Iberian Peninsula, North Africa and Ireland. This chapter explores some of these issues, placing emphasis on the materiality of settler colonialism and specifically on the cultural landscapes newcomer settlers introduced and/or imposed on previously settled or empty areas.[2]

Reconquest

One of the most significant settler colonial movements in medieval Western Europe was the so-called Reconquest of Iberia, beginning in *c.* 711 and continuing until 1492.[3] It was a turbulent period of Iberian history, and it helped to shape Portuguese and Spanish geo-visions down to our own day. It was a prescribed process with profound spatial implications, and the cultural landscapes of the peninsula today are deeply inscribed with the legacies of this long-drawn-out movement. It was a process that involved displacement and development, and its nature, in any region, was dependent upon a number of key factors, for instance the agents and actors involved, such

as the monastic orders and the military orders, the role of the crown, the density of pre-existing settlement and the prospects for development and enrichment. The outcomes of the interplay between these players and the nature and number of settler newcomers facilitated the crystallization of a mosaic of cultural and economic regions throughout the peninsula still evident today.

To start, I will consider the final years of the peninsular process. The Reconquest did not run out of steam. As García de Cortázar noted, the social attribution of space was realized through legal formulas regulating rights to land occupation, acquisition and settlement: distinctive formulas were applied in different areas.[4] Legal confirmation of settlement was available through different procedures; for example, the *presura*, tantamount to a charter for squatters common in the Duero Valley, the *carta pueblo* town charter in Extremadura, and *repartimiento* in Andalusia.

During the period of its reconquest, Andalusia was a zone of immense wealth and resource endowments.[5] Its spatial extent was much more limited than the area formerly known as *Al Andalus*, the ancient name of the Islamic kingdom of the peninsula. It waxed and waned in size depending on the military strength of its rulers and their ability to defend it against 'Christian' encroachment. It was the most culturally sophisticated zone with the most populous cities on the peninsula. Prized also for its bountiful agricultural output, it was the jewel of the peninsula.[6]

Most of Andalusia was occupied by Christians during the thirteenth century. The *capitulaciones*, 'terms of surrender', left towns emptied of Moors, or they were confined to a particular district(s) known as *morería*s. Over the course of only two generations, there transpired an almost total regional transformation in land ownership. Large *almohade* estates were carved up, often into much smaller holdings. The great military orders had been very active in the area between the Tagus and Guadiana rivers, and they played prominent roles initially in the settlement of this zone; later leading protagonists were some major secular groups. The *repoblación*, 're-peopling', strengthened the role of towns, as their planned growth gave them enhanced military prominence. The *Mesta*, a stock breeders cartel, and several military orders were the principal beneficiaries of these land grants in the provinces of Jaén and Córdoba during the reigns of Fernando III and Alfonso I.[7]

To what extent, then, were Islamic and pre-Islamic structures obliterated or incorporated into Iberian regional outcomes of this process? By the start of the fourteenth century, Andalusian regional output had fallen far below its productive potential, and it supported lower demographic thresholds, as González in García de Cortázar has contended. The same author noted that a tenurial revolution that transformed Andalusia was the slow and relentless emergence of large estates known as *latifundios* or holdings of 200-plus hectares.[8] A variety of processes obliged many smaller and medium-sized holders to sell lands received in the *repartos*. Others left later for the Americas. The buyers were the usual suspects: major convents and other ecclesiastical institutions, merchants and several landed families. The social outcome of this retrenchment was the emergence of a strata of wealthy landed families such as the Medina Sidonias and a vast mass of landless people, most living in 'formless new settlements' on the edges of the landed properties, providing them with an accessible and cheap labour pool. Many landless people rented minifundist holdings of less than five hectares on the edges of these settlements. This kind of tenurial dichotomy between the landed and the landless has lasted to our own days and is the outcome of this process.

The Canary Islands

It might be cogently argued that this investigation of settler colonialism should start on this archipelago, as it was the first one to be 'discovered' by Europeans. Its occupation and settlement was a more protracted affair, as Iberian involvement on the island was resented and resisted by its indigenous residents.[9] Unlike most of the other island worlds considered by this chapter, it was the only major region to have been inhabited, and for that reason, its occupation was an

intensely contested activity as well as translating into a long-drawn-out process of subjugation. Of all adjacent island worlds, it was the most strategically located from an Iberian perspective. Ships on the outward journeys either to cross the Atlantic or to move south and break into the Pacific had to pass them.[10] The islands quickly began to function as a paramount victualing station. Their initial occupation, starting at the beginning of the fifteenth century, was haphazard, driven by a number of merchant ventures of different national backgrounds lacking the resources to settle all the islands. The first crown-appointed governor of the islands was instrumental in the attraction of non-Castilian settlers, principally of Genoese and Portuguese origins. Portuguese settlers arrived early and soon developed a thriving sugar sector. Most came from Madeira and were already well versed in the sugar-production skills, from farming practices to the technology of sugar mill building and sugar refining. The diffusion of sugar production as a cash crop from the Mediterranean via these archipelagos to the plantations of the Caribbean forms a study in itself. Verlinden has suggested that it spread from the Eastern Mediterranean to this archipelago via Sicily and the Algarve, buttressed by Genoese capital. Unlike Genoese society on the islands, exclusively consisting of merchants, Portuguese settler society was more diverse; several members were important famers and sugar producers, others were small farmers and labourers, and finally, there were the so-called sugar masters. Occupying such pivotal roles in island society, they drew much envy and jealousy on themselves.

Constant disputes between Portugal and Spain culminated in an agreement between the two states in 1479 that finally assigned the islands to Castilian jurisdiction. The treaty of Alcáçovas granted Portugal all other near Atlantic archipelagos and any lands to their south yet to be discovered. Soon afterwards, Castilian occupation and settlement began in earnest. For many years, the islands had a poor reputation as being the haunt of criminals and fraudsters, Jews and *Moriscos*, a kind of far 'West' where law and order still was an aspiration rather than a reality. This kind of tarnished reputation did not deter Castilian authorities from deriving schemes to attract potential settlers and formulate instruments to facilitate their occupation.

These early years seem to have been a series of hit-and-miss opportunities. For instance, sources from Portugal confirm that economic development was constrained, as settler families returned northwards to Madeira, where a transplanted sugar sector rapidly prospered on the back of significant exports to mainland Europe. By the end of the sixteenth century, some 3,000 slaves represented nearly one tenth of the islands' population. Many of the slaves were black Africans, most worked in sugar-related production activities and there were many *Guanches* – the native population of the Canaries, who were enslaved and exterminated.

Historian Fernández Armesto, in his excellent study, claims that the crown was deeply anxious to stabilize control by means of establishing settled communities of farmers on the islands through the bequeathing of settlement rights '. . . contingent upon married residence in a household'.[11] Castilian was of course an ethnonym then understood as a constellation of nations and ethnic groups that settled on the archipelago. It comprised Basques, *Moriscos*, Jews, Galicians, Cantabricans or *Montañeses* and Andalusians, with the majority from a region then known as Castile. Most of these settlers were active in agriculture; they were farming in very different contexts, and for them, the Canaries must have presented major new challenges. This is an aspect that does not seem to have been fully considered by scholars of these islands. So different to bountiful Andalusia, drought stricken, with a prevalence of high winds and widespread poor soils, amongst many handicaps, the Canaries must have precluded certain farming systems from being established. It may be that some felt these challenges to be too daunting, and rapid departure to America then offered easier pickings. Settler instability was a recurring problem during the Reconquest; the potential of greater riches lured many settlers to pack up and move further southwards.[12] What is clear is that as early as 1520, immigration had been reduced to a trickle, and this situation was

maintained almost up to the twentieth century. By contrast, the allure of the New World and the relative ease of departing, compared with the mainland, swept many people across the Atlantic.

Is it possible, then, to consider the occupation and settlement of the Canary Islands as the finale of the Reconquest process which had moved down across the peninsula, culminating at Granada in 1492? The Castilian crowns' involvement in the capture, occupation and settlement was underpinned by a geo-vision ranking a putative Ottoman take-over of the archipelago as intolerable. Besides, Andalusia was perceived as the Reconquest's greatest prize; the Canaries never offered such potential riches. Consequently, some of the actors deeply involved for so long in the Andalusian enterprise simply did not figure on the Canaries. This is certainly the case with the church and the great military orders. Even the peninsular nobility were not central players. Only the Guzman family from Medina Sidonia was a major exception. The crown then was obliged to fill the void left by the failure of the usual suspects to participate in enterprise. Andalusia was portioned off by the imposition of *repartimientos*; these were usually extensive land grants awarded to the victors. According to Fernández Armesto, these were commissions of local men known as *repartidores* in the Canary Islands who were charged to measure the lands and determined allotment limits.[13] Many differences existed between the *repartimientos* there and in Andalusia: on the islands, they were smaller and far less ambitious. It was one of the many devices to be transferred to the Americas, where it was transformed into bequests of people for work rather than a straightforward grant of land.

Portuguese expansion and settler colonization

An analysis of the Portolan charts made by, or for, Portuguese authorities and/or their sea captains provides us with a space–time chronology of the early attempts of Portugal to break out of Europe and the Mediterranean.[14] Rounding the Sahara and tapping into the diverse and varied resources of the Gulf of Guinea and beyond exercised many of the early voyagers in their quest for slaves, spices, bullion, ivory and sugar. The Portuguese endeavour was multi-national: Genoese money and cartographic skills, Basque seamanship, Castilian organization and Portuguese seamen and ships were decisive parts of the mix. To achieve their goals, the occupation and settlement of pre-existing settlements and empty zones were requisites.

During the fifteenth century, seaborne expansion led to early settlement on the Portuguese, Majorcan and Genoese elements on the Canary Islands. Merchants from Portugal soon established sugar growing and refining. Their acquisition of the archipelago was contested by Castile, and the latter's control was confirmed by the 1479 Treaty of Alcáçovas. Portugal was now at liberty to carve out her maritime destiny south of the Canaries. An analysis of the sequential appearance of Portolan charts offers a crude chronology to Portugal's move southwards and westwards.

To understand Portugal's early colonial abilities, its geographical reach and the nature of its overseas settlements over the period concerned, it is pertinent to rehearse some key ingredients of Portugal's national fabric: it had a small population and was almost at constant war with Castile, besides being undercapitalized.[15] These were some key negative features. On the positive side, Portugal had established military supremacy over the Moors and had managed to keep Castilian incursions in check. Portugal was a homogeneous nation whose elites were eager to participate in overseas capitalist adventures.

It is difficult to establish what, if any, lessons the Portuguese were able to deploy from past experiences of their reconquest to bear on the occupation and settlement of the islands their sailors discovered to the south and west of the Canary Islands. Madeira was discovered in 1419 and was settled in 1420; the Azores were discovered in the 1420s and settled in 1444; they constituted a western

group of islands. Cape Verde, settled from *c.* 1460; São Tomé and Príncipe, *c.* 1470; Annobom, 1473; and Bioko (or Fernando Po, its former Spanish title), *c.* 1472 made up a more southern group. All of these islands were uninhabited, with the exception of Bioko. The resources of the Guinea coast attracted a gaggle of Portuguese merchants and slavers, and a constellation of forts were constructed; six alone were built on the Cape Verdes and more on the African mainland. Many were taken over by the Dutch or again reverted to Portuguese control. Portuguese settler colonialism south of the Canaries tended to peter out during the sixteenth century. Several of the islands and archipelagos brought under its control were uninhabited, such as the Cape Verdes. Others, such as Bioko, were inhabited and did not experience substantial in-migration from Portugal. By the end of the fifteenth century, Portugal seemingly had run out of potential settler-migrants, and construction of small, often imposing, forts was that nation's response to its pool of fewer potential migrants. This network of forts and settlements sustained the emergence and maturing of Portugal's seaborne empire and facilitated its extension further from the Atlantic into the Pacific, as far as Japan.

Portugal's early overseas expansion began in Morocco at Ceuta and Tetuan and spread slowly down its Atlantic coastline in the form of forts initially constructed at, or within, existing settlements. This is how Portugal enacted a strategy to break the stranglehold of the Sahara and to deal with the problem of its collision with an array of vast empty spaces. One study asserts that between the fifteenth and the seventeenth centuries, some 244 forts were erected as the Portuguese extended their reach to India, China and Japan. Within many forts were *feitorias*, acting effectively as small trading stations under the surveillance of the crown and manned by royal officials. The office of *feitor* was another Portuguese innovation designed to foster commerce and trade. In the late fifteenth century, Portugal also captured, occupied and fortified a number of North African existing port towns such as Ceuta, Safi, Salé and Tangiers in an effort to neutralize any threat to its maritime ambitions. Forts were erected at Arguim, now in Mauritania; Mazagan (Mazagão), now called El Jadida, in Morocco; Axim and Elmina in Ghana; and Santiago on Cape Verde. Some of these forts were built beside existing settlements; others were erected and soon attracted settlements beside them. They were amongst the most impressive structures sustaining Portugal's seaborne empire, and they represented a further step in the construction and intensification of Portugal's growing maritime commerce. A representation of Elmina (El Mina) in Braun's Atlas of 1572 depicts the castle and the settlement of St. George.[16] Built in 1482, but lacking, however, any detailed description in this atlas, it was captured by the Dutch in 1637. It acted as the pivotal Portuguese gold trading post on the African coast.

Portugal's colonial superstructure was managed by the *Casa de Guiné e Mina* from 1482 to 1483 and was later incorporated in the *Casa da India*, which was overseen by one director and three treasurers. These *Casas* were further subdivided into *Mesas* tasked to administer many different aspects of Portugal's colonial enterprise, such as the *Casa de Escravos*. Without an exhaustive study of their actions, an understanding of Portugal's early political economy has to remain obscure, as will the design and operation of Portugal's early maritime economy.

Madeira and Azores

Both archipelagos were unoccupied and were settled first by Portuguese. The Azores were sited on the return sea route from the New World. They were easily settled, attractive and not unlike regions of the mainland, hence their allure for settlers experienced at operating within similar contexts in Portugal proper. The Portuguese devised a power structure to facilitate and promote the occupation of these islands. At first they were granted to the *'Ordem de Cristo'*, one of the great military orders. It is unclear what, if any, role military orders discharged in the management of settler occupation of these islands. The crown acted as first *donatário* in the case of the Azores, and

it granted a territory to a person with a stipulation to populate, exploit and manage these lands. It also formulated the office of *capitão*, which embodied both an individual and land; they were at once hereditary lordships and administrative divisions. They were also instruments and structures devised to ensure the success of the occupation of these island worlds. The *capitães* represented the interests of the *donatário* within their respective landed *capitanias*: Madeira was divided into two, and on the Azores, there were some eight *capitães*; most Azorean islands counted only one, some few had more.[17] These individuals held wide sweeping administrative, fiscal and legal functions, reporting directly to the *donatário*. With these functions came a raft of responsibilities: they were charged with attracting settlers, the creation of holdings, placing of settlers and promoting prosperity, besides maintaining order. They were also awarded exclusive trading privileges in relation to the commercialization of certain goods like salt.

So all in all, the *capitães* could make or break the fortunes of any island. The Portuguese applied this model to a series of uninhabited island contexts. Considered successful, subsequently, this device travelled across the Atlantic, to be instituted by 1533 in Brazil, and their putative dimensions were represented on an exquisite 1574 map of Brazil by cartographer Luis Teixeira.

Gonçalo Velho Cabral was an early example: he was a knight of the *Ordem de Cristo* and was appointed *Capitão-donatário* of Santa María and São Miguel; a statue of him proudly occupies a prominent location today at Ponta Delgada, capital of the last-mentioned island. In 1444, for example, Velho Cabral introduced the first settlers to São Miguel by allocating significant holdings to numbers of his followers. Despite elaborate management organization, no archipelago could boast of a resident *donatário*: their interests were discharged by their *capitães*.

By way of contrast, many of the early settlers on Madeira were Portuguese nobles and foreign merchants. The *donatários* endowed them with extensive holdings *en regime de sesmaria* with obligations of clearing the land and erecting houses, and if, within the space of five years, no action had been taken, the holding reverted to the original donor. The *sesmaria* was an internal colonization device already in vogue amongst the *charnecas* of the south of Portugal, and it was modified and applied to the islands. Soon these lands were producing bumper crops of wheat, oats and sugar, and many pastures had been cleared for cattle; the fields were often irrigated by erecting the now famous *levadas*, or complex gravity irrigation channels. Even at this early stage, many of these products were exported, especially to the Canary Islands. In return, these islands sent enslaved *guanches* northwards.

Sugar soon developed as a cash crop, and its cultivations spread northwards and southwards to other archipelagos; Madeira acted briefly as Europe's principal supply zone. Sugar production was to sustain the early settlement and attract more and more in-migrants and slaves. By 1452, the first sugar mill went into production, and by the end of the century, Madeira could boast of more than eight mills in production, managed by Italian sugar-masters. At that time, most of the sugar was exported, two-thirds going to Italy and one-third of the trade handled by Flemish merchants. It was to be a short-lived boom, with Brazilian and Caribbean sugar soon to flood Europe's markets.[18]

Madeira, according to geographer Ribeiro, escaped the worst excesses of a cash-crop monoculture later to be the scourge of many Caribbean islands. It also quickly developed a unique reputation as a wine-producing centre, and here some highly distinctive viticultural landscapes emerged.[19]

Property, holdings and landscapes

Minifundios are at present the order of the day on both archipelagos. Ribeiro noted that in the 1970s on Madeira, there were some 257 holdings per square kilometre, making the average holding size some 3,900 metres square.[20] How did this situation evolve, and how old is this

property pulverization? Madeira's size, location and sugar output made many of its early settlers very wealthy, and a testament to this was the presence of some 56 foreign families – Italian, French and Spanish – from a total of some 170 noble ones in the early sixteenth century. The free population of Madeira was almost entirely of Portuguese origins. The earliest newcomers seem to have arrived from the Algarve, and another, though later, settler wave originated in the Minho region of northern mainland Portugal. Most were rentiers of the larger holders and formed a labour pool for the sugar producers at harvest time. They lived near the production sites on the lower coastal fringes, while enjoying access to more upland pastures for cattle grazing. A small but significant class of artisans was also represented, as was a larger group of slaves of various origins. Most of the new settlements hugged the coastline, and Funchal soon counted 10,000 residents, making it a major early Atlantic port city.

Within a short period, the zone between sea level and *c.* 700 metres on the island's southern side was transformed by the early settlers into a vast stepped zone of thin *socalcos*, or terraces, watered by irrigation, permitting their intensive cultivation in almost tropical conditions. The northern island edge was distinctive; here, a more fragmented topography prevailed, only allowing cultivation in discontinuous plots etched out in tiers of minute terraces cascading down the mountain sides. In the upland interior, by way of contrast, escaped slaves and criminals lived out their lives in relative security.

On the larger Azorean islands, early colonists burned and cleared the lands with fire, employing charred vegetation remains as dividing lines for their new fields, soon to be replaced by planted shrubs serving as boundaries and protecting their tiny plots from often violent winds. Soeiro de Brito, in her early path-breaking study of São Miguel of 1955, claimed that this process of land taking is best represented on the island of São Jorge, where a landscape of box hedges set in a quadrangular landscape evokes comparisons with cultural landscapes of Entre Douro and Minho of northern Portugal. Wheat, barley and vegetables were grown hugging the lower lands, as today at Povoacão, the earliest settlement, and also at Vila Franca. The southern lowland coastal zone boasted of a more varied crop mosaic, countered by a more restricted range of crops in northern zones. Even so, these fertile soils soon showed signs of early exhaustion. Soon to become sites for cash crops, namely sugar and woad – a plant producing dyes for the fabric-manufacturing zones of northern Atlantic Europe such as Holland, England and some towns in Ireland such as Bandon – the Azorean islands of São Miguel, Faial and Terceira were leading producers, and the turn of the sixteenth century marked an output crest. Like sugar, woad producers soon reduced output, as cheaper indigo from Mexico became the principal competitor and the ultimate winner.

More distant from Portugal were the Cape Verde Islands, settled from *c.* 1460, and their occupation was quite distinctive to what has already been described. It was part of a much more tentative process to extend Portugal's colonial activities south into the Gulf of Guinea. Forts and *feitorias* were erected along Guinea's coastline.[21] Few settlements outside these kinds of contexts transpired. Cape Verde's islands were unoccupied, and they presented a more secure opportunity to sustain the trades of the West African coast besides acting as staging stations for Portugal's African and Atlantic endeavours. This archipelago, however, presented a series of new challenges: they were semi-arid and quite distant from the Portuguese metropole. Their occupation followed precedents already established to the north. Commerce based on ivory, slaves, spices and sugar was critical, as was the victualing of ships, as it was these activities that made a small number of merchants rich. Barley, wheat and other crops which grew so well to the northern islands were not successful and soon had to be jettisoned by early farmers to make way for more traditional African crops, whose surpluses were traded around the gulf of Guinea. Stock raising, goat meat production and salt, sugar and cotton were also important cash crops for export. Slaves were an early economic mainstay. As Duncan's work stresses, early documentation of the origin of the

slaves and the African ports where they began their travails were often referred to as Cape Verde.[22] Over the sixteenth century, Cape Verde meant the Guinea of Cape Verde, which extended from the Cape Verde peninsula to the Sierra Leone River and covered an area called Rios de Guiné by the Portuguese. Tools, metals, alcohol, textiles and weapons were exchanged for slaves and ivory, and these were the lynchpins of the Cape Verdean Atlantic economy; the blossoming of Guinea's trade during the seventeenth century provided some islands with fortunes and others with misery.

Andre Alvares de Almada wrote a critical report on the islands' commerce in 1594 stating that the Portuguese exchanged wines, silver coins, metals, beads, horses and paper in exchange for gold, African textiles, slaves, wax, hides, amber and musk from the Gulf of Guinea. Middlemen from Cape Verde were active in trading on the coast of the African mainland. These people, known as *lancados* and *tangomaos*, were few in number and mulatto. They formed an Afro-Portuguese trading class, speaking local and creole languages, part of African society and yet separate from it. A measure of their commercial integration was the exclusive dedication of some of their numbers to African trade only. So despite the minute settler numbers on the Cape Verdes and their fragile agricultural practices, the islands functioned as a significant entrepot for a series of trades, namely the redistribution of goods to the Gulf of Guinea; textiles occupied a predominance position in these exchanges. Goods from Portugal, Europe and Spanish America all flowed in and out of the islands. A measure of the slow rate of in-migration is a crude estimate of the population of the islands, totalling only some 8,000 by 1572, and the largest settlement, Ribeira Grande, counted 1,500 residents in the same year, an infinitesimal number compared to Funchal.

Portuguese settlement was also established during the 1470s on São Tomé, Príncipe and Bioko. The first two were uninhabited. Bioko was only brought under European control by being effectively settled after 1778, due to the fierce resistance of the island's residents to the Portuguese from the fifteenth century and the fact that it was so distant and unknown to offer any attractions to Portuguese settlers, whose potential pool was increasingly tenuous. An impressive fort known as Fort Sebastião was built there between 1566 and 1575. In spite of its dimensions, it was a weak link in a defensive ring of forts on the island erected to protect Portuguese sugar and slaving interests. Their erection marked the final stage in the settlement of the Guinea coast. There were few colonists, and they never played an important part in the initial phase of the Portuguese seaborne empire.

The *Moriscos*

This ethnic group consisted largely of Muslims converted to Christianity, and the vast majority were expelled from Spain between 1609 and 1613. The extent of their conversion, however, remained under deep official and popular suspicion. The Duke of Lerma (1553–1625) and some religious associates are credited with the execution of their expulsion. Its rationale is much more complex and can be traced back to the formulation of the so-called statutes for the *limpieza de sangre*, the Counter-Reformation, the Inquisition and Spanish geo-political considerations of the day. At the local level, covetousness, jealousy and pure racism were often all too evident.

A recent study asserts that the expulsion of the *Moriscos* from Spain, mainly to the Maghreb, between 1609 and 1614 represents one of the largest forced human movements in Europe up to that date.[23] In a sense, their removal symbolizes the last act of the Reconquest beginning centuries before. The dates in question, however, mask the fact that between 1492 and the early years of the seventeenth century, several *Morisco* communities were evicted from their localities and dispatched abroad.[24] The *Moriscos* were not the only community excluded; there were others, the Jews being the most significant, and many of their numbers were to settle in the United Provinces, Portugal and Ottoman Turkey. In an article in the widely read Spanish newspaper, *ABC*, of

17 February 2014, some *Moriscos* in Morocco are reported to have claimed equality of treatment with descendants of the expelled Sephardis, who recently were given to believe that their Spanish nationality would be returned to them by Spain's premier, Rajoy.

Valencia, Aragon and parts of Castile held different types of *Morisco* communities. The presence of substantial crypto-Islamic Muslims 'converted' to Christianity and residual Islamic communities in discrete zones of the peninsula meant that, in the perceptions of some elements of the then-Spanish ruling elite, a potent fifth column was present in the event of any foreign invasion of the peninsula. The Turks presented an immediate foe, as potentially did the Huguenots to the north.

Unlike many of the settler movements already under the microscope, this population movement is an outstanding instance of a prescribed re-settlement programme. Yet many aspects of this massive transfer remain poorly understood. Under consideration here are the following issues. Where did they resettle? Whom did this movement 'disturb' in their new surroundings? And how rapidly were the *Moriscos* assimilated by their new hosts, especially in North Africa? In addition, how were the technical details of their expulsion considered, elaborated and implemented? How were their assets on the peninsula to be 'redistributed'? How were the general cultural and economic repercussions of their removal assessed prior to and after their removal? How were substitute settlers chosen and settled? However, the political background leading to their movement and to decisions to extirpate them are well known and are not discussed here. Their expulsion is rarely discussed in contemporary Spain.

Aragon, Castile and Valencia were the principal zones of origin where the most numerous *Morisco* communities lived. Departure took place from ports on the Spanish Mediterranean coast. Most *Moriscos* were given the choice of conversion or expulsion. Most opted for resettlement in North Africa; some travelled even as far as Ottoman Turkey. Scholarship has begun to shed light on their dilemmas both from inside their communities and from abroad, though much more remains to be achieved. Wide disparities exist in relation to the number of *Moriscos* expelled from Spain, and estimates range from 100,000 to some half a million.

Recent work on this forced migration identifies the ports of North Africa where they landed and settled. Regrettably, it is short on detail, and it mentions, for instance, that in many of these Maghrebian ports, refugees settled in central locations, where many already had relations with those who had fled earlier in the sixteenth century. This was the case at Tlemcen, where a majority of the dispossessed refugees moved to villages in its suburbs. If Aragon is taken as an example of *Morisco* expulsion, we can rely on the observations of Juan Bautista Labaña, who describes himself as *cosmógrafo y cronista mayor de Portugal* and who, in spite of being hired by Spanish masters, provides a chilling description of the 'emptiness' of sections of the Kingdom of Aragon in his now famous work, *Itinerario del Reino de Aragón*, compiled as a field and background survey for his outstanding map of that region. Collected during the final months of 1610 and the early months of the following year, his notes describe the demographic haemorrhage of those parts of the kingdom densely settled by *Moriscos*, such as the Huerva, Jalón and Jiloca valleys, and sections of the Ebro just below Zaragoza stand out in Lapeyre's interesting maps of Aragon in his excellent work, *Geografía de España morisca*, 2014. *Morisco* communities in Aragon totalled some 71,000 people inhabiting some 14,000 houses and represented almost 20 per cent of the regional population total. His data were based on contemporary census material. The loss of so many people must have been economically disastrous, given that they were concentrated in restricted, though rich, often irrigated, zones of the Ebro Basin. One can easily imagine why they might have been ejected from these areas. Labaña provides graphic accounts of many settlements just after *Moriscos* were removed; for instance, Alfamén was '. . . *despoblado porque todo era de moriscos . . . vivían los moriscos del ganado y del comercio'*. Dealing with Almonacid de la Sierra, he writes '*Fue*

población de moriscos y fueron los últimos que salieron de este reino, había 300 vecinos y ahora no hay más de cincuenta'. At Muel, only 30 of some 300 houses remained occupied. The evidence strongly suggests that the process of ejection was teased out with much precision. The potential and real consequences of their loss do not appear to have been carefully addressed, nor was the process of their replacement. The impression given by Labaña and other contemporary visitors is of a landscape which has experienced loss and decay.[25]

Conclusion

Many of the settler enterprises described here were executed by powerful institutions, such as the church, major military orders or powerful secular lords and, ultimately, were designed by Iberia's monarchs. Most of these initiatives can be regarded as prescribed; the nuts and bolts of their implementation were assigned to influential agents. Iberian monarchies were effectively working together with private interests to secure successful settler colonial outcomes.

It is instructive, by way of a conclusion, to compare Iberian settler colonial projects along the North African and Guinea coasts and the Atlantic archipelagos with those implemented by the English crown two centuries later on another, already occupied, Atlantic island, namely Ireland. By the late sixteenth century, the English crown saw the need to fasten its grip on Ireland by initiating the first of a series of region-based settler colonial projects after the lacklustre performance of a series of earlier, more localized schemes. Plantations were the device employed to achieve these goals, and their rationale is elaborated by Connolly in Chapter 4. English elites had already familiarized themselves with many aspects of Ireland's reality through the output of a cadre of cartographers who produced more than 200 maps of Ireland, at various scales, towards the end of the sixteenth century. Some few illustrations of Gaelic – more pastoral – cultural landscapes were turned out.[26] One of the first depictions of a settler colonial cultural landscape in Ireland was drawn, by an unknown cartographer, for lands acquired by Walter Raleigh at Mogeely in east County Cork. It shows a small section of a holding divided into closes and meadows where arable and pastoral farming was practised bounded by bocage-like enclosures. Its appearance marks a new departure as a very early example of a settler colonial landscape.[27]

The overall plantation schemes were ratified by the English monarchy. The nuts and bolts of these schemes were meticulously set out in the leases allotted to the settlers in both rural and urban settings by the lead tenants. These documents were even more detailed in urban situations, as requirements for house building, economic activities and defensive obligations were set out in great detail.

These kinds of early estate or property maps do not exist for the Iberian settler context described here. Nor are details available of the leases granted by lead tenants to attract settlers. In these Iberian settler colonial contexts, urban morphologies and building structures such as forts are central to understanding their peninsular provenance. On the Azores and Madeira, rural vernacular housing and modes of enclosure confirm the peninsular origins of the settlers. In Aragon, the hydraulic infrastructures designed by the predecessors of the *Moriscos* are still in place, while a silence still surrounds the origins of the people who replaced them and how they came to occupy their holdings and houses. The materiality of settler colonialism in these landscapes has a character of its own.

Notes

1 Landesque capital is a fruitful concept to explore aspects the materialities of settler colonialism; it refers to the nuts and bolts of cultural landscapes. The transfer of Arab/Berber hydraulic technology to the Iberian Peninsula is a good example. An early definition is given by P. Blaikie and H. Brookfield, *Land Degradation and Society*, London: Methuen, 1987, and, for a more up-to-date view, see M. Widgren,

'Pre-colonial landesque capital', in A. J. Hornborg, J. Martínez Allier and J. R. Macneil (eds.) *Rethinking Environmental History: World Systems History and Global Environmental Change*, Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press, 2007, pp. 61–77.

2   For a distinction between newcomers and settlers, see N. Loizides, 'Contested migration and settler policies in Cyprus', *Political Geography* 30, 2012, 391–401.

3   There is a voluminous literature dealing with the Reconquest. The work of J. A. García de Cortázar et al. on this theme is very relevant, especially their *Organización social del espacio en la España medieval. La corona de Castilla en los siglos VIII a XV*, Ariel, Barcelona, 1985; also, T. F. Glick, *Islamic and Christian Spain in the Early Middle Ages*, The Medieval and Early Modern Iberian World, 27, Leiden, Princeton: Brill, 2005.

4   J. A. García de Cortázar et al., *Organización social del espacio en la España medieval. La corona de Castilla en los siglos VIII a XV*, Ariel, Barcelona, 1985, p. 18.

5   The section on Andalusia in M. Guàrdia, F. J. Monclús and J. L. Oyón, *Atlas histórico de ciudades europeas, Vol. I, Península Ibérica*, Salvat, Barcelona, 1995 and C. Mazzoli-Guintard, *Ciudades de Al Andalus. España y Portugal en la época musulmana, VIII–XV*, Almed, Granada, 2000.

6   M. González Jiménez, *En torno de los orígenes de Andalucía. La repoblación del siglo XIII*, Universidad de Sevilla, Seville, 1988, deals with the cultural formation of this macro-region.

7   This stock breeders cartel played a fundamental and long-lasting role in the formation of many regional cultural landscapes, as the following classic monograph confirms: J. Klein, *The Mesta, a Study in Spanish Economic History*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1920.

8   P. Carrión, *Los latifundios en España. Su importancia, origen, consecuencias y solución*, Barcelona: Madrid, Gráficas Unidas, 1975 is the fundamental work. See also J. A. Allier, *Labourers and Landowners in Southern Spain*, London: Allen and Unwin, 1977.

9   E. Aznar Vallejo, *La integración de las Islas Canarias en la corona de Castilla (1478–1520)*, Universidad de La Laguna: Santa Cruz de Tenerife, 1983.

10 P. Chaunu, *Seville and the Atlantic*, Universidad de Sevilla: Seville, 1987.

11 F. Fernández Armesto, *The Canary Islands after the Conquest: The Making of a Colonial Society in the Early Sixteenth Century*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1983, p. 42.

12 For a view of the Mediterranean Atlantic world, see P. Butel, *The Atlantic*, London: Routledge, 2000.

13 Fernández Armesto, 1983, p. 49.

14 M. Alegría, S. Daveau, J. García and J. Relano, 'Portuguese cartography in the renaissance', D. Woodward (ed.), *History of Cartography*, Vol. 3, Chicago: University of Chicago, 2007, pp. 975, 1067 is the most up-to-date statement on this topic.

15 J. Mattoso, *Historia de Portugal*, Círculo de Leitores, Lisbon, 1992-4; J. Mattoso, *A Identidade Nacional*, Lisbon: Fundação Mário Soares Gradiva Publicações, 1998; A. H. Oliveira Marques, *Nova História da Expansão Portuguesa, Vol. 2, A expansão quatrocentista*, Lisbon: Estampa, 1998.

16 S. Fussel, *Cities of the World*, by G. Braun and F. Hogenberg, Cologne: Taschen, 2011, for a representation of Elmina see p. 129.

17 A. Saldanha de Vasconcelos, *As capitanias e o regime senhorial na expansão ultramarina portuguesa*, Funchal: Centro de Estudos de História do Atlântico, 1992; see also V. Campos, *Sobre o descobrimento e povoamento dos Açores*, Lisbon: Europress, 1983.

18 R. Carita, 'The Sugar route – Madeira, Atlantic Islands and Brazil', in M. Varela Gomes and T. Casimiro Manuel (eds.) *On the Worlds Routes Portuguese Faience (16th–17th Centuries)*, Lisbon: IAP, 2013, pp. 149–51.

19 We are fortunate in that the process of peopling, settlement and formatting of their cultural landscapes has been the subject of attention for a number of geography scholars: R. Soeiro de Brito, *A ilha de São Miguel*, Lisbon: Centro de Estudos Geográficos, 1955; A. de Brum Ferreira, *Graciosa*, Lisbon: Centro de Estudos Geograficos, 1968; J. de Medeiros Constância, 'A ilha de Santa Maria – Evolução dos principais aspectos de sua paisagem huminizada (sécs. XV a XIX)', *Arquipélago*, IV, 1982, pp. 225–44; C. A. Madeiros, *Corvo*, Lisbon: Horizonte, 1987; and the outstanding though dated study of O. Ribeiro, *A ilha de Madeira até meados do século XX*, Lisbon: Instituto de Cultura e Língua Portuguesa, 1985.

20 Ribeiro, *A ilha de Madeira até meados do século XX*, p. 70. For a discussion on the negative consequences of their occupation see S. Halikowski-Smith, 'The Mid Atlantic Islands. A theatre for early modern ecocide', in P. Broomgaard and M. Hart (eds.) *Globalization, Environmental Change and Social History*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011, Part of International Review of Social History Supplements, pp. 51–71.

21 The work of M. Newitt, *A History of Portuguese Overseas Expansion, 1400–1668*, London: Routledge, 2005 is relevant, as is his *The Portuguese in West Africa, 1415–1670*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.

22 I. Amaral, 'Cabo Verde: Introdução geográfica', in *História Geral de Cabo Verde*, Vol. I, 2ª edição, coord. Luís de Albuquerque e Maria Emília Madeira Santos, Lisboa, Centro do Estudos e Cartografia Antiga; Instituto de Investigação Cientifica Tropical, Praia, Direcção Geral do Património de Cabo Verde, Lisboa, 2001.

23 N. Benosman, *La Primera Deportación Masiva Humana en la Epoca Moderna. Estudio del caso de los moriscos y de sus migraciones hacia el Magreb Central 1609–1614*, 2012, Despace.univ-llemcen.dz/bitstream/112/3247/1Benosman-%20nacira%20DOC%20esp.pdf (accessed 21/01/2015). This thesis is a relevant statement from the other side of the Mediterranean.

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4

SETTLER COLONIALISM IN IRELAND FROM THE ENGLISH CONQUEST TO THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

S. J. Connolly

Modern Ireland is a society formed by colonization. Twice, in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries and again in the sixteenth and seventeenth, military conquest and the planting of foreign settlers changed forever the demographic makeup of the population, and with it the language, the culture, the religion and the social and political structure. At the same time, there were features that set Ireland apart from other examples of settler colonialism. The settlers traversed a short distance, so their movement could be credibly presented either as the establishment of a colony or as the reclamation and integration of an underdeveloped periphery. The indigenous population among whom they settled, in contrast to those encountered by other colonists, was both white and Christian. Most important of all, the second major colonization coincided with the partition of Europe along confessional lines. In Ireland, this came to mean a society in which two deep lines of division, between settler and native and between Catholic and Protestant, were partially but imperfectly aligned, creating the context for repeated shifts in identity and allegiance.

'The English born in Ireland': the rise and fall of an ethnic identity

The conquerors who established themselves across a large part of Ireland in the decades after 1169 were a mixed body of English, Welsh and Flemish.[1] Their leaders were descendants of the Normans who had seized Anglo-Saxon England a century earlier. By this time, however, they had begun to refer to themselves as 'English', and this is the least misleading term for historians to use.[2] The establishment of this English settlement was part of a wider European process which saw adventurers from the lands of the former Carolingian empire, located in modern France and Germany, push outwards in all directions: from the Germanic lands to Slav territory east of the Elbe; from Normandy into England and Scotland, as well as south to Sicily and southern Italy; from the Christian enclaves in northern Spain to reclaim lands earlier lost to the Arabs; and eastwards across the Mediterranean to establish Christian statelets in the Middle East.[3] It was an expansion enabled by superior military technology – the crossbow, the castle, and the armoured horseman – but also driven by the pressure of rising population. Hence, expansion into Ireland was not just the imposition by force of a new ruling class on an indigenous population. Instead, conquest cleared the way for a substantial inward movement of craftsmen, peasants and labourers.[4] The density of settlement varied. In Connacht and Ulster, English lords created a network of small towns but

otherwise extracted rents from a countryside still inhabited by a native Irish population. Here the English presence did not survive the crisis of the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, when the lordship suffered a series of military reversals, followed by a demographic crisis culminating in the Black Death of 1348–9. Irish lords recovered much of the conquered territory, and the few remaining English magnates, like the de Burgos of Connacht or the Savages of the Ards peninsula in east Ulster, became almost wholly absorbed into their Gaelic environment. In the east and parts of the south, however, a core of English territory survived. In the four counties adjacent to the city of Dublin, the area that came to be known as the English Pale, surviving records indicate that half or more of the head tenants on landed estates bore English surnames, that a slightly archaic dialect of English remained in widespread use, and that laws were administered and taxes collected under the jurisdiction of royal officials based in Dublin. Beyond lay a frontier region still ruled by English lords but largely Irish in language and custom. In addition, the towns and cities, including such outposts as Carrickfergus in eastern Ulster and Galway on the west coast, remained solid bastions of English culture and political allegiance (see Map 4.1, p. 62).[5]

If the English colonization of Ireland was part of a wider European process, the political form it took was distinctive. Elsewhere, expansion was by means of what has been described as 'a kind of cellular multiplication'.[6] Conquest was the work of independent entrepreneurs, not states, and the outcome was the creation of autonomous new units, like the kingdom of Jerusalem, rather than the subordination of one territory to another. The initial intervention in Ireland was likewise a freelance venture. But the scale of the English military success and the consequent possibility of the emergence of a rival state on his western flank led Henry II of England to take control of the process. From 1172, Ireland was designated as a lordship, a possession of the English crown governed by officials acting in the name of the monarch.

The legal code of this new political unit distinguished formally between settlers and natives. Irishmen could not own land, sue in the king's courts, hold office in central or local government, or be admitted to any ecclesiastical benefice in the territories under English control. In addition, the killing of an Irish man or woman was not a felony in English law; at most, the killer might owe compensation to the dead person's lord. This last provision did not, as is sometimes assumed, imply murderous intent. The point was that Irishmen, as aliens rather than subjects, were outside the protection of the law. But the implications of that principle, where settler and native shared the same territory, were far reaching. Ethnic divisions were also enshrined in the by-laws of the major towns. Civic ordinances penalized the wearing of Irish dress, imposed restrictions on Irishmen entering the municipality and, on occasion, as in Dublin in 1454, attempted the mass expulsion of Irishmen living within the city limits.

The institutional status thus given to ethnic difference was not unique to Ireland. Similar differential codes existed east of the Elbe, where German overlords ruled over conquered Slav populations, and as between Arab and Christian in the Spain of the *Reconquista*. As in these other cases, moreover, legal assumptions based on strict separation were undercut by the multiple pragmatic accommodations required by life on a frontier of settlement. In practice, by the fifteenth century, individuals with recognizably Irish names regularly appear in English administrative records as holders of land, as litigants and jurors before the royal courts, as members of urban guilds. Some of these would have availed of the legal procedure that allowed Irish natives to obtain charters conferring on them the status of English subjects. But the small number of such charters recorded makes clear that most simply slipped informally into the status of respectable citizens. Indeed, apparently discriminatory urban ordinances, like that of the city council of Limerick in 1512 restricting the franchise to those who showed a good knowledge of English and wore English clothing, acknowledged that the ethnic frontier was one regularly crossed. The aim was not to prevent Irishmen entering English society but to control the terms on which they did so.[7]

If the urban authorities demonstrated a continued commitment to upholding the external marks of English identity, moreover, the practice in the outer provinces of the lordship was very different. There were repeated complaints, from at least the late fourteenth century, that the culture of the English conqueror was being diluted by that of the Gaelic natives. The degree of interaction varied with region and status. Some of the lesser English gentry, and those furthest from the Dublin-centred English core, became virtually indistinguishable, in dress and lifestyle, from the Gaelic lords alongside whom they lived. The greater magnates, such as the Butlers of Ormond or the Fitzgeralds of Kildare, and the gentry of the inner frontier retained more of their English heritage. But they too presided over households in which Irish was the normal language, patronized the work of Gaelic poets and musicians and administered their estates by a mixture of Irish and Gaelic law, in some cases employing Gaelic judges or *brehons* to do so. They also regularly entered into marriage alliances with leading native families, drawing them into a network of alliances and feuds in the patchwork of lordships that made up the decentralized Gaelic polity.

Modern interpretations of this process of 'gaelicization' vary sharply. Some would see the selective adoption of aspects of native law and custom as no more than a pragmatic adaptation to local circumstances. Others suggest a more far-reaching shift in values and self-image.[8] Similar uncertainties attach to the wider question of the political identity of this culturally hybrid community of the English in Ireland. The passage of time opened up a predictable distance between the settlers and their former homeland. Visitors to England, despite their English blood, could find themselves treated as foreigners. In 1440, for example, they were included in a poll tax levied on aliens. Within Ireland itself, there were recurrent conflicts between long-established and more newly arrived settlers or between the settlers and English-born office holders sent to impose unwelcome restrictions or demands. Ireland's status as a lordship, with its own parliament and legal system, provided the institutional basis for a sense of separate corporate identity, to be defended if necessary from unwarranted intrusion. Yet all this must be seen in context. Medieval Europe was everywhere a society of competing and overlapping jurisdictions and liberties, sectional and territorial, over which central governments struggled to exert control. If magnates on the frontiers of the Irish lordship were frequently unruly, their behaviour was not necessarily all that different to that of their counterparts on the Scottish or Welsh borders, or on the peripheries of other European states.[9] Even the high point of Irish-English self-assertion, the declaration in 1460 that Ireland was a land 'corporate of itself', not bound by any laws made in England, was not a rejection of English identity. Rather it was an assertion of the sectional rights claimed by the English of Ireland in return for their status as loyal subjects of the crown and their long-standing role as defenders of its Irish possessions.[10]

By the end of the sixteenth century, this self-image was coming under novel challenge. The gradual extension by the Tudor state of its direct control over Ireland had created new opportunities for soldiers, administrators and private entrepreneurs attracted by the profits to be made on a moving frontier and in a land market where a jumble of conflicting titles, the detritus left by the ebb and flow over the centuries of English and Irish power, created endless opportunities for speculation. Tension between recent arrivals and longer established colonists was nothing new. As far back as 1366, an act of parliament had forbidden recriminations between 'the English born in Ireland and the English born in England by calling them "English hobbe" or "Irish dog"'. In this case, however, the newcomers came from an England that was now solidly committed to the Reformation, whereas the descendants of the medieval settlers, like the Gaelic Irish, had remained faithful to Rome. As confessional divisions deepened, contemporaries began to talk of two clearly differentiated groups, the Protestant New English and the Catholic Old English. The Old English, still insisting on their traditional role as the crown's Irish servants, now found themselves attacked both for their allegedly disloyal adherence to the papacy and for the cultural

degeneracy reflected in their intermarriage with the Gaelic Irish and their adoption of aspects of Irish custom.[11]

The crisis of the Old English became acute after 1603, when the destruction of the last Gaelic Irish power base in Ulster meant that their political loyalty became of much lesser significance and the handicap of their Catholicism became correspondingly more so. By this time too their New English rivals were numerous enough to provide an alternative elite. Over the next four decades the Old English found themselves squeezed out of office at the central and local levels and penalized for refusing to attend the state church. By the 1630s, even their estates were coming under attack, as the crown launched a major enquiry into land titles in Connacht. In 1641, as the British Isles slipped into a multi-sided civil war, the Old English joined with the Gaelic Irish in a defensive league. They did so insisting that, while acting to protect the Catholic interest, they remained loyal to the crown. The victorious English republican regime of the 1650s, however, used the myth of a concerted Catholic conspiracy to exterminate the island's Protestants to legit-imize the dispossession of Gaelic Irish and Old English landowners alike.[12] During 1688–91, both Catholic groups once again joined forces to support the deposed James II in what was even more clearly a religious civil war and once again paid the same price for defeat, in the form of further confiscations of landed estates and the enactment of a comprehensive body of penal legislation directed at Catholic property and political rights.

The shifting relationship between religious and ethnic lines of division was reflected in con-temporary language. The rise from the late sixteenth century of the term 'Old English' had already signaled a dangerous change in status: the descendants of the medieval settlers could no longer claim to be *the* English of Ireland. Now, after 1660, the term 'Old English' disappeared. Instead the dominant Protestant elite used 'Irish' to refer to the whole Catholic population, regardless of ancestry, while referring to themselves as simply 'the English'. What had taken place was not just a transfer of power and property from one group to another but the obliteration of a long-standing ethnic identity.

The rise of the New English and the policy of plantation

The separate legal status of Irish and English, in practice of diminishing relevance, had remained in force into the early sixteenth century. During the 1530s and 1540s, however, the constitutional position of the island and of its inhabitants was radically redefined. From June 1541, Ireland was redesignated as a kingdom attached to the English crown. The mass of legislation distinguishing between Irish and English was not formally repealed; indeed, it continued to be occasionally invoked. But the implication was that all inhabitants were now subjects of the king. The central plank of the new policy was the procedure known as surrender and regrant, whereby the rulers of Gaelic lordships submitted to the king and received a new grant of their territory as proprietors under English law, in some cases with a title of nobility appropriate to their status. By this means, for example, Conn Bacach ('the lame') O'Neill became the largest landowner in Ulster, with the title earl of Tyrone. These reforms coincided with other measures designed to strengthen the Tudor state, notably the final union of Wales with England. And it was Wales, seen as an example of the successful reform and integration of an unruly and backward periphery, that now became the implicit model for the government of Ireland.

The reasons for the long-term failure of this project of reform and integration continue to be debated. Different analyses emphasize the failure of successive monarchs to provide the financial and military resources necessary to impose and sustain the new social and political order, the influence on English perceptions of Gaelic Ireland of fresh anthropological perspectives derived from the emerging literature of European encounters in the Americas, and the structural

problems inherent in government by viceroys whose power base lay in the faction-ridden Tudor court.[13] One central development, however, underlay everything else. This was the failure of either of the two main ethnic communities in Tudor Ireland to accept the Reformation. Instead, both the Gaelic Irish and the descendants of the medieval settlers remained loyal to Rome. The consequence was that the predictable conflicts that arose as a centralizing state attempted to impose its authority on unruly localities and magnates long used to substantial autonomy took on a dangerous additional significance. In particular, the major military conflict of 1595–1603, initially an attempt by local lords in Ulster, the area of greatest remaining Gaelic Irish strength, to fend off the intrusive power of central government, developed over time into a far more radical challenge to the crown, as its leaders called on Catholics throughout the island to join them in a crusade against a heretical ruler. The threat was enhanced by England's isolation within what was still a predominantly Catholic Europe. In 1580, a Spanish and Italian force financed by the pope landed in Munster to support a revolt headed by one of the greatest English families in Ireland, the Fitzgerald earls of Desmond. Two decades later, the Ulster lords received Spanish military aid, culminating in a major expedition in 1601.

As the Tudor programme of reform degenerated into a war of conquest, given fresh urgency by the threat of foreign intervention, the government turned to a new strategy: the creation of plantations of New English settlers, who would replace both the backsliding natives and the unreliable Old English as the guarantors of security and political order, the agents of social and economic development, and the standard bearers of the reformed faith. The first such ventures, in the midland counties of Leix and Offaly from the 1550s and at Newry in south Ulster, were limited in scale. Their aim was partly to secure vulnerable frontier districts and partly to speed up the dissemination in their Gaelic hinterland of English language, manners and economic practices. The suppression of the Desmond Rebellion in 1583 inspired a more ambitious scheme, the settlement of some 11,000 settlers on 90 estates created out of confiscated rebel lands. The proprietors of the new estates were to be English born, and they were to accept as tenants only those 'descended of an English name and ancestor'. The explicit exclusion of the native Irish, though applying only to a specific and relatively small block of territory, represented a significant retreat from the vision of a unified body of subjects adopted just a few decades earlier. In the event, the plantation failed to live up to expectations: the total number of settlers was no more than about 4,000, and the whole venture collapsed when the Ulster revolt spread to Munster in 1596–7. After 1603, however, migration resumed. The English population of the province rose to around 14,000 in 1622 and to around 22,000 by 1641.[14]

By this time a second, more ambitious exercise in plantation had been implemented further north. Ulster presented particular problems, both as the main remaining site of Gaelic political and military power and because of its proximity to Highland Scotland. The solution was to establish a British population across six counties deemed forfeit through the treason of the leading Gaelic proprietors. As in the case of Munster, but more systematically, the whole venture was structured along explicitly ethnic lines. Just over two-fifths of the area was granted to English and Scottish 'undertakers', along with a consortium of London-chartered companies, who were to settle their estates exclusively with British tenants. Another 12 per cent was granted to 'servitors', soldiers and officials rewarded for their service in the recent war. The Irish were not wholly excluded: roughly one-fifth of the planted land went to native grantees, and Irishmen could also be tenants on the estates of the servitors. The lands they received, however, were deliberately sited at a distance from the traditional power base of their families. The physical layout of the plantation, with the undertakers and the London companies occupying a central block of territory while the servitors and natives shared space on the periphery, further confirmed the dominance of ethnic considerations. Two other Ulster counties, Antrim and Down, were not included in

the plantation, because the greater part of these lands had already been granted to new proprietors who were actively engaged in importing English and Scottish settlers. As in Munster, settler numbers fell short of expectations. But by 1641 there may have been as many as 40,000 British settlers in Antrim, Down and the six planted counties, amounting to perhaps one-fifth of the total population of Ulster.[15]

The plantations in Munster and Ulster coincided closely with the beginnings of English colonization on the other side of the Atlantic: the famous lost colony at Roanoke, North Carolina, established in 1584, and the more successful Jamestown, from 1607. The precise connection between the two sets of developments remains the subject of debate. Contemporaries occasionally drew rhetorical connections between the two ventures. Ireland, one wrote, was 'this famous island in the Virginian sea'. Individual career histories confirm that the same restless energy and spirit of entrepreneurship were active in both cases. Walter Raleigh and Richard Grenville, founders of the Jamestown colony, also received grants in Munster; the Norfolk-born Stanley Flowerdew established Flowerdew Hundred in Virginia at just the same time that his younger brother began developing his undertaker's estate in County Fermanagh. Against this background, it would be surprising if there were not some interchange of ideas and assumptions. In practice, however, the working out of the two colonial settlements was quite different. In particular, the native elite, despite the massive dispossession that had taken place, retained a place in Ulster society that would have been inconceivable for their counterparts on the other side of the Atlantic, not only holding land but serving as sheriffs, justices of the peace and members of parliament. At a lower social level, equally, evidence from the 1630s and 1640s indicates that settler and native everywhere in Ulster lived side by side, linked to one another by ties of neighbourhood and economic interchange. In Virginia, by contrast, interaction with the indigenous population was always more limited and was curtailed sharply following the bloody insurrection of 1622.[16]

The Ulster and Munster plantations represented the high point of colonizing ideology in Ireland. Other, smaller plantation ventures, in Wexford in 1610 and in Longford and Leitrim in 1619–20, involved the imposition of a new landed elite but no substantial immigration of tenants. The last major influx of newcomers had a different basis. Following the civil war of 1641–53, the Cromwellian government used Irish land to repay loans raised early in the conflict from what were known as the 'adventurers' and also to meet massive arrears of pay due to veterans of the parliamentary army. In practice, many new proprietors sold their entitlement for the best price they could get, often to already established Irish Protestants, rather than make the move to Ireland. But some 200 adventurers became owners of landed estates, and some 7,500 soldiers took possession of smaller holdings.[17] There was, however, no requirement to stock any of these lands with British tenants. For a time, in the first half of the 1650s, parliamentary radicals pushed for a more far-reaching scheme, whereby the entire Catholic population would be transplanted west of the river Shannon, leaving the remaining three-quarters of the country to be repopulated from England. In the end, however, it was only the former Catholic elite and their households who were required to transplant; the mass of the population remained where they were, as an essential labour force for the new Protestant ruling elite. With this surrender to pragmatism, the idea of significantly changing Ireland's ethnic composition died away forever.

Even during their heyday, between the 1580s and the 1650s, the impact of government plantation schemes must be put in a broader context. Formal plantation accounted for only a small part of the massive immigration of British settlers that took place across the early modern period. The resettlement of a British population in Munster after 1603 involved not just the rebuilding of the plantation estates but a wider movement by landlords across the province to settle English tenants on their estates, as a means both of promoting economic improvement and of strengthening the Protestant interest. In Ulster, the informal settlement programme in Antrim

and Down was at least as important, in terms of numbers, as the formal scheme operated in the six plantation counties put together. In the longer term, the British character of Ulster owed more to subsequent spontaneous migration than to any government initiative. Following the war of 1641–53, the province was restocked by a new wave of settlement, mainly from Scotland. Analysis of population listings from the 1630s and the 1660s reveals strikingly little continuity in terms of surnames. Later, in the 1690s, grim economic conditions in Scotland led to the migration to Ulster of a further 40,000 Scots.[18] The importance of geography and economics, as opposed to government policy, is evident in the case of County Londonderry, designated as a site of English settlement but, in the event, colonized mainly by Scots flooding into the region through the growing port of Londonderry. It is this coexistence of two separate processes – formal plantation schemes, with clear echoes of what was happening on the other side of the Atlantic, and spontaneous migration into an adjacent territory, thinly populated and only recently opened up to settlement and development – that gives Ireland's status within the developing first British empire its ambiguous character.

Eighteenth-century Ireland: the confessional state and the rise of creole nationalism

At the beginning of the eighteenth century, following more than a century of religious conflict, Ireland was a society divided along explicitly confessional lines. In 1641, Catholics, either Gaelic Irish or Old English, had owned 59 per cent of profitable land. By 1703, their share had been reduced to 14 per cent and was to be further whittled down in the decades that followed by restrictive laws on inheritance, marriage and purchase. Catholics were also formally excluded from holding office in central or local government, from sitting in parliament, from voting and from the legal profession and armed forces. Protestants, making up around one quarter of the population, also controlled the great bulk of both professional and commercial wealth and, in most towns, dominated the skilled trades.

The line thus drawn between Protestant citizens and disenfranchised Catholics did not coincide exactly with the society's ethnic divisions. A handful of Gaelic families had retained their position by means of an opportune change of religion. Members of the O'Hara family survived as major landowners in County Sligo and even as MPs for the county. In County Clare, a branch of the O'Briens retained both their lands and their title as earls of Inchiquin. A Gaelic ancestry, in such cases, did nothing to obstruct or qualify entry into the upper levels of Irish society. A somewhat larger number of Old English families had likewise crossed the confessional divide. Of the 669 men who sat in the Irish parliament between 1727 and 1760, 10 per cent were descendants of Old English families. For the most part, however, the line between Protestant citizen and disenfranchised Catholic was also the line between more recent settler and native. Thus 21 per cent of the same cohort of parliamentarians were members of families established in Ireland during the sixteenth century, and a further 57 per cent had come to Ireland under either the Stuarts or the Commonwealth. The legacy of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century settlement was also evident in the religious geography of the country. The long-term traces of seventeenth-century plantation schemes could be detected in the presence of small but generally prosperous populations of Protestant farmers and artisans in parts of Munster and Leinster. In Ulster, by the time of the first religious census, in 1861, Protestants made up a majority of the population in two of the six plantation counties, Londonderry and Armagh. At the same time the limitations of the formal plantation scheme were evident in the contrast between the four other planted counties, with Catholic populations of between 55 and 81 per cent, and substantial Protestant majorities – three-quarters and two-thirds, respectively, of total population – in Antrim and Down. At the

beginning of the eighteenth century, their preponderance of non-landed wealth, as well as the legacy of purges of the urban population in the 1650s, meant that Protestants were disproportion- ately represented in the towns and cities. In 1732–3, around half the population of Dublin and more than one-third of the population of Cork were Protestant, although these proportions were to fall as urban growth and the inescapable demographic deficit of early modern towns sucked in migrants from a mainly Catholic hinterland.[19]

The legacy of seventeenth-century settlement patterns was also evident in the division within the Ulster Protestant population. In the eighteenth century, the Scots who had made up some 60 per cent of British settlers in the northern counties were still distinguishable from their English neighbours by their customs, by their dialect of English and also by their Presbyterian religion, which consigned them to the status of dissenters, subject to a range of civil disabilities. These disabilities meant that most of the Scottish landowners installed at the plantation conformed over time to the established church. At other social levels, however, Ulster Presbyterians, descended mainly from independent Scottish migrants, were on average significantly more prosperous than members of the Church of Ireland, whose ancestors were more likely to have arrived as depend- ents imported to stock the new estates of English grantees.[20]

At the same time that they constituted an important part of the ethnic map of post-plantation Ireland, Scottish settlers and their descendants also contributed to the creation, on the other side of the Atlantic, of a second hybrid identity. In the six decades prior to the Revolution, an estimated 250,000 migrants, most of them Presbyterians of Scottish descent, left Ulster ports for the north American colonies. The motives for their departure in such numbers were primarily economic: the first wave of migration, from 1717, coincided with the expiry of the favourable leases that had been needed to attract tenants in the troubled aftermath of the Williamite revolution, and subsequent peaks in emigration closely matched fluctuations in harvests and prices. Yet it does not seem too far-fetched to suggest that such a high level of mobility also reflected the restless, entre- preneurial mentality that had brought these same Presbyterians or their ancestors to Ulster during the seventeenth century. In America, certainly, migrants from Ulster became part of the cutting edge of white settlement, pushing on from Pennsylvania into west Virginia and the Carolinas and across the mountains into what would become Kentucky. They also distinguished themselves, in a way that once again had echoes of their Ulster background, by their ruthless commitment to the extirpation of native resistance to their westward expansion. Yet if these 'Ulster Scots' were in part moulded by their experience as British settlers on an Irish frontier, in America they were initially willing to describe themselves simply as 'Irish'. It was only later that they turned to the label 'Scotch Irish'. As first used, in the late eighteenth century, the term appears to have been an attempt by the more prosperous and assimilated descendants of the Ulster migrants to escape the taint of association with the rougher elements within their own community, whom Anglo-Americans were quick to condemn as 'wild Irish'. In the longer term, its use became a means by which American Protestants of Ulster descent set themselves apart from the mainly poor Irish Catholic migrants that arrived in growing numbers from the 1830s.[21]

In Ireland itself, meanwhile, the colonial origins of the now dominant Protestant elite were likewise reflected in its social and political attitudes. The first detailed English-language history of Ireland, *Hibernia Anglicana*, published during 1689–90 by Sir Richard Cox, was a straightforward apologia for conquest. English rule, Cox insisted, had brought order and civility to a backward and anarchic society, whose culture had been a mixture of debased borrowings from other coun- tries and whose rulers had been more akin to the chiefs of native tribes in Virginia than to Euro- pean kings. The resistance to this transformation of both the Old English and the native Irish, reflected in their stubborn adherence to Catholicism, justified their continued subjection.[22] In political terms, the New English, as a minority settler population in an often hostile environment,

were primarily concerned to have the support of a strong and stable English government. Thus they initially sought to avoid being drawn into the conflict between Charles I and his parliament but later gave wholehearted support to Cromwell's personal rule before rallying to the crown as the Commonwealth fell apart following his death. The same revulsion against weakness at the centre led some, especially outside the predominantly Protestant north, to continue for what at first sight seems a surprisingly long time to give their loyalty to James II. Once the Revolution was complete, on the other hand, Irish Protestants became among its most committed supporters.[23]

Over time, however, Protestant politics became more complex. By the mid-eighteenth century, a growing body of patriot opinion articulated a range of grievances: restrictions on Irish trade introduced to protect English commercial interests; the liberal use of appointments in the Irish church, judiciary and army for the purposes of English political patronage, reducing the opportunities open to sons of the Irish political elite; the limited legislative powers allowed to the Irish House of Commons; and the overriding jurisdiction over the island claimed by the London parliament. As with their counterparts in North America, the first response of many to what they saw as metropolitan encroachments on their rights was to appeal to their status as Englishmen and as heirs to the Revolution of 1688. When Jonathan Swift in the 1720s produced what is often seen as one of the founding texts of the Irish patriot tradition, the *Drapier's Letters*, a central part of his argument was that he spoke, not on behalf of 'the Irish', but rather for 'the true English people of Ireland'.[24] But as these appeals to a common ancestry turned out to awaken no response with British governments or with British public opinion, alternative political strategies emerged. For the white population of the American colonies, this meant an appeal to a universal and self-evident human right to self-government. Irish patriots, on the other hand, took the less radical route of an appeal to specific historic entitlements, appealing to Ireland's status as a kingdom rather than a colony and ransacking the medieval past for precedents allegedly establishing the exclusive power of Ireland's parliament to make laws binding on its inhabitants.[25]

These constitutional conflicts were in part a consequence of the Revolution. After 1688, Ireland's dependency was no longer mediated through the person of a shared monarch; instead, effective power now lay in the hands of an English parliament in which its people had no representation. But the rise of patriotism also reflected a change in self-image, as families once composed of settlers and their immediate heirs came instead to look back over three or more generations of residence in Ireland. By the second half of the eighteenth century, the use of 'Irish' and 'English' to mean, respectively, Catholic and Protestant was obsolete; instead Irish Protestants had come, after some initial hesitation, to describe themselves simply as Irish. By 1782, when Irish patriots seized the opportunity presented by the American crisis to force the removal of the main formal restrictions on the legislative powers of their parliament, their leader, Henry Grattan, hailed the result with the claim that 'Ireland is now a nation'. By this time, too, many had come to embrace a more positive vision of the Gaelic past. Where Cox and others had presented the English conquest of Ireland as a triumph of civilization over barbarity, historians and antiquaries now sought to promote pre-conquest Ireland as a highly developed society, literate, rationally ordered, an equal partner with the cultures of the ancient Mediterranean.[26]

This adoption by the descendants of the New English of an idealized image of the Gaelic past seems at first sight to mark the point when their thinking and rhetoric burst the confines of a purely settler political outlook. There is a clear contrast, for example, with North America, where no similar idealization of the native inhabitants took place. There are, however, parallels elsewhere, notably in Mexico, where creole patriots, in a similar act of imaginative appropriation, came to take vicarious pride in the glories of the pre-conquest Aztec empire.[27] As in Mexico, equally, the colonists' developing appreciation of pre-conquest culture in no way weakened their claims to a monopoly of political power. Instead, the parliament and electorate whose triumph Grattan

hailed in 1782 were still both exclusively Protestant. Most Irish patriots took it for granted that the three quarters of the population who were Catholics, as subjects of a foreign power, could not be safely admitted to the Irish liberties they so vigorously defended. Over the next two decades, however, a more radical transformation of political life took place. By now it was becoming clear that the supposed national triumph of 1782 had been an illusion. The Irish parliament was theoretically sovereign, but in the absence of the electoral reform that would make it answerable to any substantial body of Irish opinion, it was in practice the instrument of what remained a British-appointed executive in Dublin Castle. Yet further political change, it was equally clear, would require more than the efforts of the Protestant minority. To this pragmatic argument for an alliance with Catholics was added the impact, from 1798, of events in France. These contributed both a new rhetoric of human rights and political liberation and the intoxicating spectacle of a Catholic nation casting off the fetters of tyranny and superstition alike. Against this background, radicals in Belfast and Dublin launched the Society of United Irishmen, explicitly calling on Protestants and Catholics to move beyond a past of ethnic and religious conflict and instead unite in a campaign for a secular and democratic Irish republic free of British control.

The call to Protestants to abandon their traditional enmities and allegiances met with a mixed response.[28] The United Irish movement had strong support in the predominantly Protestant northeastern counties, particularly among Presbyterians. Their religious grievances as dissenters still subject to a range of disabilities, as well as high levels of literacy and the strong connections with North America forged by trade and migration, all predisposed them to a vigorous radicalism. Other Protestants, however, particularly in the more religiously mixed counties of west and central Ulster, remained determined to uphold traditional religious distinctions and rallied to the defence of the state through a new loyalist movement, the Orange Order. Catholics too were divided. Large numbers enlisted either in the United Irish movement or in the allied, but exclusively Catholic, Defenders. Yet the government forces that eventually crushed the revolutionary movement included not just a mainly Protestant yeomanry but a predominantly Catholic militia, and the United Irishmen and Defenders were denounced by the Catholic bishops and the majority of their clergy. Among those Catholics who supported the revolutionary movement, meanwhile, commitment to a union of Irishmen behind common political goals sat uneasily beside resentments born of their long subordination to a privileged Protestant minority; French-inspired ideas of political and social equality interacted with older visions of the destruction of a foreign and heretical oppressor. When the United Irish insurrection finally came, in the summer of 1798, it quickly degenerated, in some areas, into a vicious onslaught on the Protestant population. In this, the experience of the Protestant United Irishmen can once again be compared to that of creole patriots in Latin America, who were likewise impelled by a combination of ideology and expediency to reconsider their relationship with previously feared native and black populations, whose efforts created a similar kaleidoscope of often unstable and transitory alliances, and who found themselves at times unable to control the violent forces they unleashed.[29]

Becoming the Anglo-Irish

In 1856, in a letter written during a tour of Ireland, Friedrich Engels offered a pen picture of the Irish landed class. His comments have been much quoted, but less frequently analyzed: 'These fellows are droll enough to make your sides burst with laughing. Of mixed blood, mostly tall, strong, handsome chaps, they all wear enormous moustaches under colossal Roman noses, give themselves the false military airs of retired colonels [. . .]'.[30] What is striking is the internal contradiction. Engels, despite the detailed reading on Irish history he had made in connection with his trip, made no effort to categorize the Irish landed elite in ethnic terms; they were 'of

mixed blood'. Yet he nevertheless presented them as a caste apart, distinct from the surrounding population in build, physiognomy and manner. It was an appropriate characterization of the ambiguities created by the interplay of nationality, class and religion in the changing Ireland of the nineteenth century.

Where politics is concerned, the 1790s were the highpoint of Protestant patriotism. When the British government followed up the defeat of the insurrection by an act of union incorporating Ireland into a new United Kingdom, a substantial section of the Protestant elite fiercely resisted the abolition of their separate institutions. Even at this point, however, one main reason for their opposition was the fear that a British parliament could not be trusted to resist Catholic claims to political rights with sufficient resolution.[31] Brutal incidents of sectarian violence during the rebellion of 1798 had already highlighted the vulnerable position of the Protestant minority within Ireland. Over the next four decades, the admission of Catholics to full political rights, along with electoral reform and the birth of a new style of mass politics, rammed the message home. Grattan and his supporters could confidently assume that the parliament whose rights they defended would be an exclusively Protestant assembly. Now there could be little doubt that any restored Irish legislature would be Catholic dominated. Nationalism, from the 1840s onwards, was to be overwhelmingly a Catholic movement, while the great majority of Irish Protestants looked to the union their recent ancestors had opposed as their only security.

At the same time that nineteenth-century Irish Protestants retreated from the patriotism of their grandfathers, the rising nationalism of the period developed in ways that increasingly excluded them. A succession of movements, commencing with the campaign during the 1830s and 1840s for repeal of the act of union, explicitly linked the issue of Irish self-government to the sectional interests of the Catholic church on issues such as education. Later, in the 1880s and 1890s, what had previously been a narrowly political movement for self-government acquired a new cultural dimension focused on the revival of Irish as a spoken and literary language and on the development of distinctively 'Gaelic' sports. In place of the civic patriotism and republicanism of the eighteenth century, built on ideas of citizenship and on the supposed historic rights of the kingdom of Ireland, what was now taking shape was an essentialist nationalism that defined itself, implicitly and sometimes explicitly, in ethnic and religious terms, as speaking for a Gaelic, Catholic nation. The change was reflected in the rise of a new ethnic description, 'Anglo-Irish'. Its use was complex, once again highlighting the complementary processes of withdrawal and exclusion now at work within Irish society. As a self-description, 'Anglo-Irish' could – like 'Scotch Irish' in the United States – become a willingly assumed badge of identity, setting the wearer apart from the plebeian Catholic masses. As used by others, however, the implication was that those referred to were not wholly part of the nation. What was emphasized in this negative usage, moreover, was not just the unionist politics and privileged status of the Protestant population, but their assumed British ancestry. Catholics deemed to neglect their native traditions in favour of an attempt to ape British manners and English accents did not thereby become 'Anglo-Irish' but rather 'west Britons' or 'shoneens' [literally, little Seans].[32]

A further reason for the new emphasis on the settler origins of Irish Protestants was the incorporation into the nationalist political programme, from 1879 onwards, of a campaign against landlordism. The underlying issue was purely economic: a collapse in prices following the invasion of European markets by American and Antipodean meat and grain required that either farmers or landlords should suffer a drastic fall in income. But the decision of key figures both in the Home Rule party and in the extra-parliamentary Fenian movement to harness the resulting movement of tenant protest for their own purposes made it necessary to present this straightforward conflict of interest as something more. In the propaganda of the Land League, the root cause of the crisis of the 1880s lay in the Tudor and Stuart confiscations, through which control of Irish land had

supposedly passed to a predatory foreign elite devoted to the ruthless exploitation of their ten-
ants. The connection thus drawn between the landed class of the 1880s and the plantations of
three centuries earlier was largely bogus. The intervening period had seen significant transfers of
property, particularly in the aftermath of the social and economic crisis precipitated by repeated
failures of the potato crop during 1845–50, when about one-quarter of all agricultural land had
passed into the hands of new proprietors. By 1861, just over two-fifths of those returned in the
census as landowners were in fact Catholics, and so probably of 'native' descent.[33] In nationalist
political rhetoric, however, the notion of a fundamental conflict between settler and native had
acquired a new and highly emotive dimension.

At the same time that Protestants faced growing isolation within an Ireland dominated by an
assertive Catholic nationalism, they also found themselves abandoned by the British government.
Already in the late eighteenth century, successive ministries, partly anxious to tap the huge reserve of
potential military manpower within Catholic Ireland, partly concerned to promote internal stability
as the shockwaves of the French Revolution spread outwards across Europe, had pushed through the
first Catholic relief acts. As early as 1793, a Home Secretary had loftily pronounced that Great Brit-
ain had no direct interest in the 'mere question of whether one description of Irishmen or another
are to enjoy a monopoly of pre-eminence'.[34] The crisis of the late 1790s saw this policy of even-
handedness temporarily abandoned. Later, in the similarly tense year 1848, the Irish executive was
again to flirt briefly with arming the Orangemen of Ulster. But the main thrust of policy, from the
early nineteenth century onwards, was in the other direction. The last major legal disability affecting
Catholics disappeared in 1829, when they became eligible to take seats in parliament. The Church
of Ireland's privileges as an establishment were drastically pruned in the 1830s and abolished in
1870. Catholic education at every level received increasingly generous official funding, culminating
in the creation in 1908 of what was in effect a Catholic University. Meanwhile the proportion of
Catholics appointed to official positions rose steadily. At the very highest levels, continuing political
distrust of the rising Catholic middle classes, combined with snobbery, educational disadvantage
and the operation of closed patronage networks, meant that even in the early twentieth century
Protestants were still disproportionately represented. But Catholics now made up a clear majority
of the police force, the judiciary and the much-expanded state bureaucracy.[35]

Viewed from the outside, then, the political development of Irish Protestantism during the
nineteenth century saw its adherents progress from one classical colonial role to another. For-
merly patriots in revolt against the metropolitan centre, they had now become defenders of the
imperial link against an indigenous liberation movement while discovering, as they did so, that
such loyalism was not necessarily reciprocated once broader imperial interests dictated other-
wise. Their response to this new role and to their changing position within Irish society varied.
Already by the early twentieth century, as Ulster emerged as the main powerbase of resistance
to nationalism, unionist spokesmen there had begun to develop their own sectional narrative of
origins and identity in which the arrival in the seventeenth century of a hardy and industrious
settler population had created a distinctive civilization, Protestant rather than Catholic, industrial
rather than pastoral, and British rather than Irish.[36] It was in this context that the image of the
Ulster Scots as a separate ethnic group, already familiar in North America, entered Irish political
rhetoric. Other unionists, however, continued to argue in different terms. The physical proximity
of Ireland to Great Britain had always given settlement there a character different from that of
long-distance colonization. The act of union, however imperfect the assimilation of Ireland into
a wider British state, had likewise reframed the subsequent debate: in legal terms, the issue was
secession rather than decolonization. Against this background, opponents of Home Rule, both
within and outside Ulster, made their case in terms, not of British settler and Irish native, but
of loyal Irish subjects seeking protection against their disloyal fellow countrymen.[37] Nor, at this

stage, did a rejection of political nationalism necessarily mean a retreat from cultural patriotism. On the contrary, the exploration of Gaelic language, history and antiquities, at both popular and academic level, continued throughout the nineteenth century to depend heavily on the work of Protestant writers, many of them determinedly conservative and unionist in their politics. As late as the 1890s, the Gaelic League, founded by the son of a Church of Irish clergyman, attracted initial Protestant support, until a calculated strategy of penetration by political activists turned it into a vehicle for militant nationalism. Irish Protestants may have been redefined by their opponents in terms of their supposed or actual settler origins. But it was to be only later, in the polarizing context of revolution and civil war, that the idea of a Catholic and Gaelic nation came to be matched by the equally narrow and exclusive perspectives of a unionism now firmly centered on its northern heartland.

A European colony?

Settler colonialism has twice had a major impact on the structure of Irish society. The English incursion of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries was part of a much wider process, the expansion of a particular political and military culture, affecting territories as far apart as Palestine and Scotland. The hybrid culture it produced in Ireland, among those who were to become the Old English, persisted for four centuries before it was obliterated by the alternative, confessionally based, dichotomy imposed by the European religious wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The second great colonization venture, in early seventeenth-century Ulster, was, by contrast, unique. There were faint echoes in Bohemia, where the Habsburgs assigned confiscated Protestant estates to new Catholic grantees (some of them Irish), and in Hungary, where the same dynasty tried, with less success, to encourage German migration. But nowhere in early modern Europe was there any real parallel to the expropriation on this scale of native landowners and the sponsored migration of British settlers. And in this case the consequences have lingered to the present day, in the conflict between a relatively privileged Protestant population and a disadvantaged Catholic minority, the first being mainly (though by no means exclusively) of British and the second of native Irish descent.

Does this mean that Ireland can be seen as a colonial, and then a post-colonial, society? Here it becomes necessary to pay attention also to the facts of history and geography. The plantation schemes of the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries present undeniable parallels with developments on the other side of the Atlantic. But in all other respects, Ireland's experience as a territory dominated by a larger and closely adjacent neighbour points instead to European parallels – with the Spanish Netherlands in the sixteenth century, or nineteenth-century Poland under Russian rule, or perhaps with Sicily and southern Italy, subjected after 1859 to the rule of a distant Turin. It is true that the Irish, like the inhabitants of these other subordinate territories, or indeed like their Scottish and Welsh neighbours within the British state, were consistently the subject of negative ethnic stereotypes, whether openly hostile or merely condescending.[38] Yet to present such stereotyping, however offensive, as amounting to a 'racialization' of the Irish serves only to trivialize through the implied comparison the manifold forms of institutionalized inequality and abuse endured by the indigenous victims of European expansion in Asia, Africa and America.[39] And in any case the language of ethnicity, of settler and native, was in reality a proxy for the real line of division that, regardless of ancestry, separated Catholic and Protestant. To debate whether early modern or modern Ireland was a colony is thus arguably to miss the real point: that what gives the Irish experience its unique character is precisely that the mechanisms of settler colonization were applied in a European society where the line between settler and native was buttressed by no visible racial markers.

Map 4.1

Notes

1 The most comprehensive overview of medieval Irish society is A. Cosgrove (ed.), *A New History of Ireland, II: Medieval Ireland 1169–1534*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987. The points developed in this paper are discussed in more detail, with fuller bibliographical references, in S. J. Connolly, *Contested Island: Ireland 1460–1630*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007, chap. 2.

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3 R. Bartlett, *The Making of Europe: Conquest, Colonization and Cultural Change 950–1350*, London: Allen Lane, 1993.

4 The extent to which the English conquest involved settlement as well as colonization was first emphasized in C. A. Empey, 'Conquest and settlement: Patterns of Anglo-Norman settlement in North Munster and South Leinster', *Irish Economic & Social History* 13, 1986, 5–31; see also B. Smith, *Colonization and conquest in medieval Ireland: The English in Louth 1170–1330*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

5 S. G. Ellis, *Reform and Revival: English Government in Ireland 1470–1534*, London: Royal Historical Society, 1986.

6 Bartlett, *Making of Europe*, p. 306.

7 S. G. Ellis, 'Racial discrimination in late medieval Ireland', in G. Halfdanarson (ed.) *Racial Discrimination and Ethnicity in European History*, Pisa: Pisa University Press, 2003, pp. 21–32.

8 For differing assessments see S. G. Ellis, *Tudor Frontiers and Noble Power: The Making of the British state*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995, pp. 57–68; V. Carey, 'Bilingualism and identity formation in sixteenth-century Ireland', in H. Morgan (ed.) *Political Ideology in Ireland 1541–1641*, Dublin: Four Courts Press, 1999, pp. 45–61; K. Simms, 'Bards and Barons: The Anglo-Irish aristocracy and the native culture', in R. Bartlett and A. MacKay (eds.) *Medieval Frontier Societies*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989, pp. 177–97.

9 This is the central argument of Ellis, *Tudor Frontiers and Noble Power*.

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12 M. Ó Siochru, *Confederate Ireland 1642–1649: A Political and Constitutional Analysis*, Dublin: Four Courts Press, 1999; idem, *God's Executioner: Oliver Cromwell and the Conquest of Ireland*, London: Faber and Faber, 2008.

13 See in particular the contrasting interpretations of N. Canny, *The Elizabethan Conquest of Ireland: A Pattern Established*, Hassocks: Harvester Press, 1976, and C. Brady, *The Chief Governors: The Rise and Fall of Reform Government in Ireland 1536–88*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994. For a more recent, less schematic, overview C. Lennon, *Sixteenth-Century Ireland: The Incomplete Conquest*, Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 2005.

14 M. MacCarthy-Morrogh, *The Munster Plantation: English Migration to Southern Ireland, 1583–1641*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986.

15 P. Robinson, *The Plantation of Ulster: British Settlement in an Irish Landscape 1600–1670*, Belfast: Ulster Historical Foundation, 2000; Canny, *Making Ireland British*, chap. 4; J. S. Curl, *The Londonderry Plantation 1609–1914*, Chichester: Phillimore and Co., 1986.

16 A. Horning, *Ireland in the Virginian Sea: Colonialism in the British Atlantic*, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2013.

17 K. Bottigheimer, *English Money and Irish Land: The Adventurers in the Cromwellian Settlement of Ireland*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971.

18 W. Macafee and V. Morgan, 'Population in Ulster 1660–1760', in P. Roebuck (ed.) *Plantation to Partition: Essays in Ulster History*, Belfast: Blackstaff Press, 1981, p. 47; P. Fitzgerald, ' "Black '97": Reconsidering Scottish migration to Ireland in the seventeenth century and the Scotch-Irish in America', in W. Kelly and J. R. Young (eds.) *Scotland and Ireland 1600–2000*, Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2004, pp. 71–84. The primacy of environmental forces over formal planning is a central theme of Robinson, *Ulster Plantation*.

19 For a fuller discussion, see S. J. Connolly, *Religion, Law and Power: The Making of Protestant Ireland 1660–1760*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992, chap. 5.

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22 R. Cox, *Hibernia Anglicana, or the History of Ireland*, Vol. 2, London: H. Clark, 1689–90.

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5

NORTHERN IRELAND AND SETTLER COLONIALISM TO THE GOOD FRIDAY AGREEMENT OF 1998

Stephen Howe

This essay lurks at the intersection of several quite diverse historiographies, political debates and theoretical conceits. Equally, its author comes to it from a (wished-for) confluence of several near-lifelong intellectual preoccupations or enthusiasms, both Irish and global-imperial ones. It has felt repeatedly necessary to resist temptation, here, to stray into extended discussion of any number of these: from reflection on the current global state of historians' debate on empire and colonialism in general, through analysis and critique of the 'settler colonial paradigm', again on a global scale, or of the ever-proliferating literatures on empire's place in Irish history and vice versa, to close discussion of numerous issues in contemporary Northern Irish politics. I have engaged or am engaging with most of these in other places. Even resisting such temptation, however, this chapter must necessarily range rather widely.

The chapter has five themes. First, it offers a brief overview of the history and historiography of English and Scottish settlement in Ulster.[1] Second, it asks: how far did its patterns conform to or depart from those of settlement – especially British-colonial settlement – elsewhere? Third, it asks: how well did it fit models – whether older, or 'new settler colonial studies' ones – of 'the' settler colony? Fourth, it asks: did or does a settler–native distinction persist in Northern Ireland, or has it mostly disappeared? This necessarily includes a very brief overview of debates on identity in Northern Ireland today. Fifth, it addresses the politics of historiography, both in Ireland itself and in relation to the global or comparative perspectives which relate or are relevant to Northern Ireland.

I start, though, with the last task. One of the historians whose work and example I have always most admired is the late Tim Mason. He once wrote:

> All good history writing begins at the end. However artfully it may be disguised, how-ever unthinkingly it may be assumed, the end of the story is there at the beginning. Where the end is judged to lie in time, what its character is, how it is defined – in taking these decisions about any piece of work, historians necessarily make their judgement about the general significance of their particular theme or period. And this judgement in turn determines where they start.[2]

Let us begin, then, at the end. Since at least 1998 and its 'Good Friday' agreement, it had seemed possible if not imperative to disentangle thinking about Irish history from stances towards violence

in Northern Ireland. In particular, it had seemed that writing and talking about Ireland, empire, settlement and colonialism need not necessarily run immediately, uncontrollably into thoughts about who killed whom, and why, on some North Belfast backstreet or South Armagh country lane between the 1970s and the present. Constructive and usually quite amicable discussions on such ideas as imperialism and colonialism in Irish history could be held with and among many a political activist, indeed many a 'retired terrorist', from all sides of the recent conflict. What some have long called 'post-revisionism' in Irish historiography seemed to march happily, even naturally, arm in arm with peacemaking and reconciliation.

Some – not all – applications of settler colonial models to Northern Ireland seem well (if sometimes unintentionally) suited to endangering or trying to reverse all that. Analysis of the region's historical development or persisting divisions in these terms may appear to identify strongly, whether by intent or otherwise, with one side in those conflicts and validate an Irish Republican worldview or even the violent methods used historically (and by a few in the present) to pursue it. Equally, it may seem to validate the fears expressed by a local Protestant to Irish novelist Colm Toibin in South Fermanagh in 1986:

> They want us off the land, out of business, they want us gone. We're the planters. That's the way we're made to feel. We're like the Rhodesians, we're like the Israelis. But we've been here for hundreds of years. There are plenty of deserted Protestant farms down in Fermanagh. We're not going to be intimidated. We're going to fight.[3]

Moreover, this approach may tend to imply a view of divisions in Northern Ireland as permanently fixed, insoluble except perhaps either by total transformation in the identity of at least one party to the conflicts or by that community's flight or expulsion from the disputed territory. As Adrian Guelke notes in one of the most penetrating recent analyses of the subject, it is therefore unsurprising that a settler-native dichotomy has played very little if any part in debate over Northern Ireland's peace process or conflict resolution, since it is a framework inherently better suited to explaining the intractability of conflict than its transformation or termination.[4]

It is, however, not only the 'peace process literature' that makes little reference to settler colonialism. As the present author has sought in some detail elsewhere to trace, Northern Ireland as such has had strikingly little presence almost anywhere in the vast global literatures on imperialism and colonialism.[5] This includes the recent years' 'explosion' in analysis of settler colonialism as a distinct historical formation. The journal *Settler Colonial Studies* has not thus far, at the time of writing (late 2015) carried any substantive discussion of Northern Ireland, even in the form of relevant book reviews. The pioneering and influential books by Patrick Wolfe and Lorenzo Veracini also have no such coverage, while Wolfe's numerous and important related articles include only a very small clutch of passing (and not always accurate) allusions to Ulster.[6] A recent attempt to construct a global bibliographical guide to the scholarly literature on the subject, by Tate A. LeFevre in the fast-growing *Oxford Bibliographies* series, lists no works on Ireland and includes just one collaborative volume (edited by Fiona Bateman and Lionel Pilkington) which includes substantial Irish themes.[7]

Conversely, and although (as this author has also sought elsewhere to survey) there has been a fast-expanding literature on many aspects of Ireland's historical relationships with the British empire, very few scholarly works have specifically addressed Northern Ireland as a settler-colonial formation. Most of these few, moreover, have been highly partisan and polemical, as is the case with the three most extended such analyses, by Pamela Clayton, Michael McDonald and

Tom Mitchell.[8] Far more nuanced analysis of the issue, however, is evident in the work of Frank Wright, to which the present author is considerably indebted and which is further discussed later in this chapter.[9]

Old/new settlement histories

On any global comparison, Irish history is extremely short. No traces of human presence on the island have been found more than nine to ten thousand years old. Everyone there is a new-comer, descended from comparatively very recent arrivants and settlers, and this includes not just humans but many of modern Ireland's animal and plant species. If any Irish historical episodes are to 'qualify' as colonialist and/or settler-colonial, however, then (by widespread consent) these are the successive waves of migration – mostly, though never exclusively, from England, Wales and Scotland – of the past 900 years, and especially that which began in the twelfth century CE and that which commenced in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. This is so partly because they were relatively recent and large-scale and partly because of their association – albeit never a simple correspondence or symbiosis – with English, then British state projects. For Ulster specifically, it was (by equally common consent) the second of these waves which had the greater significance.

Yet A.T.Q. Stewart was far from wholly wrong when, adapting Alfred Cobban on the French revolution, he said of the Ulster Plantation: 'most people know only three things about it, and not one of them is true'.[10] Rather similarly, Éamonn Ó Ciardha and Micheál Ó Siochrú suggest that this 'crucial event remains much talked about but little studied or understood'.[11] The body of relevant modern scholarly research on this topic is, even now, in some respects remarkably slim.[12] Considerable disagreement persists, for instance, on basic questions of demography and even over whether the 'plantation' process was a success or failure from the colonists' or the state's point of view.

From the twelfth century onward, the English Crown attempted to control parts of Ireland by allowing or encouraging English settlers to move there and be ruled and protected by English overlords, soldiers and laws. Ulster, however, played little part in these plans and processes: and although there was, roughly simultaneously, some migration there from Scotland (its scale and chronology being, again, unclear and disputed), this was only very weakly associated with any activities or plans by the Scottish Crown. In the sixteenth century, both the scale of migration and the degree of state involvement intensified, prompted by the Protestant Reformation, by fear of Spain and by resistance in Ireland itself. After the latter's strongest manifestation, centred on Ulster, was defeated in the 'Nine Years War' (1594–1603) and 'rebel' aristocrats' lands subsequently seized, state-sponsored 'plantation' was proposed across the six counties of Armagh, Cavan, Coleraine, Donegal, Fermanagh and Tyrone. The Crown – now newly and rather precariously 'British' under James VI and I – persuaded mostly London-based merchants to support the project and rewarded them with land grants in the freshly created and suitably named County Londonderry. At the same time, English-British settlement efforts were just beginning in parts of the Americas: the relationship between these and what was happening in Ulster has been much debated ever since.

Further transformation in demography, political economy and state forms was unleashed roughly half a century later, with the complex of wars and rebellions which Anglocentric histo-rians long mislabeled the English Civil War, and then from 1688 onward their dramatic epilogue, the events which were in England often called the Glorious Revolution, in Ireland the Williamite Wars. These events – and particular episodes in them such as the 1641 'Ulster Rebellion', Oliver Cromwell's Irish campaigns of 1649–50, the 1689 Siege of (London)Derry and 1690 battle at the Boyne – have remained key reference points in popular historical 'memory', commemoration

and conflict ever since, though with their supposed meanings constantly reshaped to suit chang-ing times and ideologies.[13] The net result of the whole complex, though, is clear for those who would analyse modern Northern Ireland as a settler-colonial society. It was the creation, largely through state-sponsored settlement, ethnic cleansing, expropriation and war, of a starkly divided society where (quite unlike the rest of Ireland) Anglo-Scottish, Protestant settlers came to form a majority. They seized the best land, jobs and economic opportunities, dispossessed and oppressed the mostly Catholic indigenes, and effectively monopolized state power. However, few readers will be surprised that it will now be suggested here that modern historical research suggests a rather more complex picture than that.

First, none of the periods and processes identified as (trans)formative in the scale and charac-ter of settlement was unequivocally or uniquely so. All the evidence we have, going back to the very earliest archaeological traces, indicates that migration, like trade, between as well as within what were to become England, Ireland, Wales and Scotland (as well as, of course, some to and from other bits of 'Atlantic Europe') was always both significant and multidirectional. Eras of conquest and/or of intensified population movement may in some respects have made a quali-tative difference, but not one really comparable in most regards to the European arrivals in the Americas or Australasia. It remains possible – indeed it remains a powerful historical case – to see the expansion of originally English state power in Ireland, and movement of populations between England and Ireland, as resembling patterns elsewhere in the archipelago more than having a wholly distinct, colonial character.[14] Equally, if we wish to speak, over a very long historical span, of a unique 'identity of Ireland' (following Estyn Evans), then it is plausible, albeit naturally much contested, to view this as embracing rather than being wholly transfigured by any of the mod-ern tides of conquest or settlement: Evans himself was inclined to do so.[15] And even arguments for the radical distinctiveness of Ulster's 'character' (however that entity is map-imaged) may persuasively see its peculiarity as long preceding, subtending and surviving all modern changes in the region's demography.[16] It may be – though it seems too soon to tell, especially for the nonspecialist – that genetic researchers' findings on ancestry will provide some fresh ammunition for such assertions.[17]

Second, state-sponsored settlement made up only a small portion of English–Scottish–British migration into Ulster from the sixteenth century onward. Antrim and Down's 'freelance' settlers probably outnumbered those who moved on state initiative to the whole six plantation counties. County Londonderry, meanwhile, had been decreed a location for English settlement but was actually populated far more by Scots. Large-scale Scottish migration, there and elsewhere, included at least two major subsequent waves, in the 1650s and 1690s, well after the demise of the official plantation project itself. For both waves, violent political instability and harsh economic conditions in Scotland were crucial 'push' factors for emigration.[18] And there was throughout, and long after-ward, both significant reverse migration and important onward journeys, especially to the Americas.

There has been unended disagreement among historians as to how far a coherent, power-ful and purposeful English/British, or specifically Protestant, ideology of colonisation came to operate in and in relation to Ireland. Equally under dispute has always been how far attitudes to the 'native Irish' came to resemble those towards Native Americans and (mostly later) other non-white subject peoples. It may fairly be said, however, that only a minority of specialists has tended to view dominant 'settler' ideologies in Ulster as becoming fully racialised in form in ways parallel to those which formed in the Americas or Australasia. The latter have often been viewed as defining features of the settler colonial situation as such.[19] At one point, in the 1650s, schemes were mooted in London for a wholesale transportation of Ireland's Catholic or 'native' population west of the Shannon (or in a phrase of enduring notoriety, to send them 'to Hell or to Connaught'). This was never implemented nor even seriously attempted – though certain Irish

nationalist publicists have ever since written as if it were. We may add that almost no serious scholar has sought to argue that any subsequent phase in Ireland's conflicts has involved any major party to these pursuing aims of genocide or ethnic cleansing in relation to any other, though a few polemical writers have made poorly evidenced claims in relation to various episodes, from the 1798 rebellion through the 1840s Famine to the guerrilla wars of the 1920s and 1970s–90s. (The supposed would-be *genocidaires*, in these polemics, have ranged from United Irish revolutionaries through British state dignitaries to actors on all sides of Northern Ireland's modern conflicts.)[20]

Perhaps the boldest and most increasingly influential recent global analysis of Anglophone colonial expansion and of the centrality of 'settlerdom' to modern world history is that found in James Belich's *Replenishing the Earth*.[21] It may thus be relevant – albeit, to the specialist, almost self-evident – to note that British colonisation in Ireland does not fit Belich's schemata at all, in either character or chronology. It never really left what he calls the incremental form of settlement, never took off into his 'explosive' stage. Rates of growth were, in comparative perspective, very slow, and unlike almost anywhere else in what he calls the 'Angloworld'. Growth occurred across numerous, temporally widely separated, periods and was virtually throughout accompanied by major patterns of emigration. Only nineteenth-century Belfast saw anything close to 'explosive' population growth. The 'boom and bust' model which Belich finds characteristic of Angloworld settler colonies is also very hard to apply plausibly to Irish history – Ireland was, perhaps, just too closely tied to Britain, never a separate enough economic space for the paradigm to fit well.

The influx of migrants from England and Scotland thus enduringly disappointed the expectations of its projectors. Indeed, time and again, land intended for new settlers was overwhelmingly bought instead by those already long resident.[22] Although the Land League, in the late nineteenth century, asserted a powerful link between nationalism and agrarian reform – seeing the roots of rural inequality, especially in land ownership, as lying in the Tudor and Stuart plantations – and although indeed some later nationalists, including the twentieth-century IRA in parts of rural Northern Ireland, revived this association, the links were in reality not at all strong or direct. Over 40 per cent of landowners recorded in the 1861 census were Catholic, while strikingly few of the remainder bore the same family names as those who had owned the same lands 150 years earlier.[23]

On almost every level, of settlement, administration and culture, the influences of successive waves of incomers – including those who thought of themselves or were thought of as 'native' – intermingled. For instance, as Mallory and McNeill point out:

> It is actually quite difficult to point to a building of the Plantation or its period in Ulster which is very similar to one built for a man of the same class in Britain; all show some admixture of styles and adaptation to the local conditions. The same is true of the churches that they erected.[24]

Neighbourhoods, farmlands, livelihoods and folkways all intermingled to a vastly greater extent than obtained in the New World settlements or almost anywhere later in African, Asian or Australasian settlement colonies. Again, almost every student of Irish and of Ulster history concurs. And bodies mixed too. We have, unsurprisingly, no reliable data on the incidence of intermarriage, religious conversion, sexual liaisons or other forms of mixing, but more impressionistic kinds of evidence suggest that almost everyone who can trace multigenerational Northern Irish ancestry has what one especially eloquent memoirist and family historian aptly calls 'twisted' and 'tangled' roots.[25]

We might also – albeit all too abruptly – say that by comparison with settler-colonial politics elsewhere, Irish Protestant and later Ulster unionist ideologies have been marked by the absence or weakness of themes which in such contexts as southern Africa and North America

have been central to settler self-perceptions.[26] There is no fully articulated racial ideology: the discourse of race, although it gained a certain presence in the late nineteenth century (at a time when it was becoming ubiquitous in the Anglophone world) failed to sustain itself, and it is not clear that it was ever more salient in Irish Unionist discourses than it was either in metropolitan British or in Irish nationalist ones. Even weaker, perhaps, was a specific frontier ideology: it is questionable whether one can speak at any stage in Irish history of a definable 'frontier of colonial settlement' on the North American or southern African model (neither the borders of the early modern Pale nor those of the Ulster plantations really fit the bill). Certainly no 'frontier tradition' of historiography can be discerned in Ireland comparable to that famously proposed by Frederick Jackson Turner for the USA and revisited for Africa by Martin Legassick and others.[27]

Wherever the position of a society as 'settler' or not has itself been contentious, the literature has invariably been highly polarised. This is, as has already been intimated here, eminently the case for Northern Ireland. Yet we might add that only a minority even of Irish nationalist and Republican writers or publicists has fully embraced a settler-colonial model for the region, especially in relation to the political present or recent past. It may be the case that some nationalists in Northern Ireland privately harbour the beliefs conventionally described as those of ethnic nationalism, in which membership of the nation derives from ancestry or even 'race': only the descendants of the 'original' inhabitants are truly Irish, and Protestants can never qualify. Yet insofar as the logical conclusion of such claims that Ulster Protestants are *colons* is that their only future options are assimilation to a Catholic-Irish culture or forced emigration on the 'Algerian model', few even among extreme Republicans have publicly drawn that conclusion. Far more typical is the view that Ulster Protestants are a part of the Irish nation: that all who live in the island of Ireland belong to the Irish nationality. The supposed historic failure of many among them to recognise their 'true' nationhood (though in fact much evidence, both historical and from contemporary poll data, indicates that Unionism has *not* at all always been incompatible with self-identification as Irish) is ordinarily explained in terms of manipulation by the British state and/or Unionist elites, of relative economic advantage, or of specifically religious antagonisms.

Moreover, there are strong historical arguments for thinking that, however well or badly we may think a settler-colonial framework of analysis 'fits' aspects of the Ulster past (from, or in, the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries), it has subsequently ceased to do so. Formerly settler-colonial societies may cease to be so, as the conditions of dominance and/or other characteristic structural features decay or are severed. If a society that was originally the product of colonial settlement has subsequently undergone the substantial erosion or dismantling of the formal structures which once separated 'settlers' from 'natives' and privileged the former, and if moreover there has been increasing dissociation and even conflict between the settlers' descendants and their erstwhile sponsor state, then arguably that society can no longer meaningfully be called settler-colonial.[28] In Ireland, Frank Wright suggests that this was substantially the case even by the early nineteenth century, with the extension of the franchise and the abolition of the Penal Laws. Wright further argues that in those settler societies where the native is not eliminated, control over native labour became the central economic, social and indeed political question. The single most crucial defining feature of a settler-colonial society of this type, in his view, is the existence of separate labour codes; a separation of status between the settler and the native which permits the subordination of the native to a special labour regime and creates areas of economic life which are reserved to the settler. This, he argues, eroded well before Partition – though he does not, naturally, ignore the continued salience of sectarian job discrimination in some spheres.

Hybrid settlement

The decay of colonial structures, however, might not have liberating effects. Rather, it might mean that conflict simply becomes more reciprocal and ambient. Manipulative paternalism may be replaced by relationships of mutual threat and communal deterrence. A sense of shared nationality, civic rather than ethnic, which was in any case precarious, may be destroyed altogether. Something like this may have happened in Ulster from the 1880s and taken a new, more intense form from the 1970s.[29]

For Wright, attitudes and social structures inherited from Ulster's settlement colonial era remained important, but it is misleading to attribute the character of twentieth-century conflict to them. Certain intervening conjunctures might temporarily revive perceptions of a 'settler-native' dichotomy: the late-Victorian 'Land War', the Gaelic Revival (which, although many of its early enthusiasts were Protestant, came to be seen as largely excluding and alienating northern non-Catholics), Partition, and the outbreak of violence in the late twentieth century. It remains to be seen how far the divisive effects of the last will persist. More broadly, in Ireland as elsewhere in western Europe, the decades following the French Revolution have often been seen as inaugurating a shift in the understanding of nationhood, from geographical to politico-cultural: what many historians have seen as the birth of modern political nationalism as such. Insofar as Irishness came increasingly to be seen as a matter of cultural affiliation rather than geographical location or citizenship, sometimes to the point of seeing Catholicism and Irishness as synonyms, then a weakening or shrinkage in northern Protestant self-description as Irish might be viewed (not least in their own eyes) not so much as their abandoning that nationality-claim as of *it* abandoning *them*. As one notably reflective commentator from their ranks, former leading Ulster Volunteer Force militant Billy Mitchell, argued:

> As I see it there are four spheres of cultural identity operating in the Province today: – The Indigenous Irish Gaelic culture, The Anglo-Irish culture, The Ulster-Scots culture, and, the cultures of those ethnic groups from other nations who have settled in the Province in more recent times.
>
> Both the Anglo-Irish and the Ulster-Scots cultures have been in Ireland long enough to have assimilated elements of the Irish-Gaelic culture and of each other's culture. The same is true for the Irish-Gaelic culture. It has embraced elements of both the Anglo-Irish and the Ulster-Scots cultures. For many of us within the Unionist community the terms Anglo-Irish and Ulster-Scots have been replaced by the term British and it is in this sense that we regard ourselves as the British presence in Ireland. We have been in Ireland long enough to have acknowledged our Irishness but without rejecting our inherited British cultural traits or our inherent sense of Britishness.
>
> However, thirty years of violent conflict have caused most Unionists to either reject the designation Irish or to become extremely wary of it. They feel that the term has been so politicised by Nationalists and Republicans that it has become synonymous with the Republican Movement's 'Brits out' programme to eradicate the practice and memory of the Ulster-Scots and Anglo-Irish culture from the Province.[30]

Despite the general ascendancy of culturalist (or ethnic) nationalism across Europe, then beyond, from the later eighteenth century onwards, in Ireland rejection of political nationalism did not ever necessarily mean abandonment of cultural patriotism. Moreover, contemporary evidence including the 2011 census suggests a considerable recent re-weakening of correlation between religious background and national identity. As Paul Nolan argues, 'no single national identity is

shared by a majority of the population; instead in terms of national identity, Northern Ireland is now home to a number of minority populations, of different sizes'.[31]

There has been, and is, much transnational debate over whether there exist distinctive settler-colonial ideologies, shared across a wide range of cases, including specific kinds or degrees of imperial consciousness and attitudes towards a 'mother country' and towards indigenes. In Northern Ireland, too, historians have differed sharply over how far, if at all, Unionist popular consciousness saw itself as colonial, identified with the British Empire or with 'settler' populations elsewhere, let alone how far (if at all) a distinctive attitudinal profile on such issues remains in the twenty-first century. Many analysts have believed that, amidst the complex and changing configuration of Ulster Protestant ideologies and allegiances, identifiable, distinguishing 'imperial' or 'settler' traits have played a rather small and diminishing part. Indeed, some interpreters of Unionism have argued that it is (or should be!) not a doctrine about nationality at all but one pertaining to citizenship.[32] Even uniquely 'Ulster' formulations of a distinctive cultural modernity were, I have argued extensively elsewhere, relatively few and thin. This was because the work they had to do was fairly restricted: it did not have to go 'all the way across' the terrain of identity-formation or of the modern. Part of that terrain was occupied by cultural forms and self-understandings which were not specifically 'Ulster Protestant' but generically Irish, though the extent of that shared cultural territory was steadily eroded through the first Home Rule crises, Partition and the post-1969 conflicts.[33] Some of the terrain was held by trans-communal conceptions of a regional identity. Various writers have at different times sought to emphasise and build on this portion of the cultural landscape, following the influential example of John Hewitt, seeking here a way of desectarianising the idea of Ulster and linking it to a renewed sense of place, of physical environment and of trans-communal, largely rural folkways.[34] Yet another district of northern Protestant cultural territory – one which, again, has been the site of strenuous recent efforts at revival – was closely affiliated to Scottishness. Surely more nearly ambient than any of these, however, were forms of cultural modernity which were first mainly English, then British, then increasingly North Atlantic. Thus – as, again, I have sought to suggest elsewhere – significant parts of contemporary Northern Irish politico-cultural conflict may perhaps usefully be apprehended through the idea of 'multiple (or alternative) modernities'.

It has been noted throughout this paper that, on one view at least, a 'settler colonial model' for understanding Northern Ireland is weakened by both the seeming paucity of participants in local debate, who explicitly adopt that model as a mode of self-understanding, and the relative scarcity of analysts who have employed it (except sometimes in starkly partisan ways). We know, most of us, not to treat the discourses and self-perceptions of actors as a reliable guide to analysis of disputed situations. But when so very few of the relevant actors or 'on the spot' analysts, whatever their political persuasion or methodological disposition, use a particular framework of interpretation and its associated vocabulary, that must surely give us pause.

Perhaps, however, we might advantageously further question the very terms of debate. It has been argued elsewhere that 'Was Ireland a colony or not?' is, simply, a badly posed question which would better be reformulated to enquire about varying forms, experiences and degrees of coloniality.[35] Similarly, we might usefully think, more specifically for Northern Ireland, in terms of graduations and degrees of settler-coloniality.[36] We might – as has been implied here throughout – find then that the historic province of Ulster and modern Northern Ireland would, on comparative perspective and certainly when 'measured' against the characteristics and criteria proposed by analysts of settler colonialism like Veracini and Wolfe, exhibit a relatively low and declining degree of settlerness. Somewhat similarly, we might ask about degrees of 'frontierity', adapting the model of a (settler-)frontier society so fruitfully used for Northern Ireland by Frank Wright and, for instance, for Israel-Palestine by Baruch Kimmerling.[37] We might, one suspects,

then find the society as a whole, historically, to have had a comparatively low (and again, on the whole declining) level of frontierity – though we would also find multiple, intensely localised 'micro-frontiers', especially in poorer urban areas of Northern Ireland, ones which the 'peace process' has apparently so far done little to permeate. And employing (critically) Donald L. Horowitz's global model of ethnic conflict, with its categories of 'ranked' and 'unranked' division, we might identify Northern Irish society as (increasingly) 'weakly ranked'. We would also find a comparatively low degree of separateness between communities, especially culturally.[38]

A closely related alternative perspective would be to seek to place Ulster history in relation not to one single pattern or model of settler colonialism but rather to multiple forms of settler expansion. We might suggest that across modern global history at least two broad patterns of settlerdom may be identified. One is naturally that which has mainly preoccupied contemporary settler colonial studies: long-distance, especially Anglophone movement, following or accompanying colonial conquest, heavily dependent on metropolitan state power and often largely state-sponsored, and typically resulting in a starkly divided, strongly ethnically ranked society characterised by (according to viewpoint) either the elimination or the complete marginalisation of the 'native'. The other has been widespread across Eurasia (though naturally not only there) and has been characteristic of much settlement by people defined as ethnic Russians, Germans and on a smaller scale numerous other peoples. It has typically involved shorter-distance and landward rather than seaborne migrations, has not always or even mostly followed military conquest or depended fully and directly on state sponsorship (though of course it has sometimes done so, as most notoriously under Hitler and Stalin), and has usually resulted in societies where ethnic ranking is less acute and ethnic-cultural frontiers more blurred than in the 'classic' extra-European settler colonies. This has not, should it need saying, at all necessarily meant that this latter pattern has involved less collective violence than the former; horribly often, indeed, quite the reverse, especially during the twentieth-century 'unmixings of the peoples' across central-eastern Europe. On that view, we would surely find Northern Ireland's settler-society experience to be – rather like the colonial experiences of Ireland as a whole – a hybrid, partaking of important elements of both patterns. Some commentators might add that the Ulster-Scots historical experience was on the whole closer to the second form, while *some* English settlement shared more with the first.

Conclusion

Pursuing such more complex, 'blurred genre' visions in relation to Northern Irish history might have the further advantage of offering avenues out from the intensely polemical, indeed often explicitly or in implication moralistic, tone which, here as elsewhere, has so often marred even scholarly debate. The notion that to label something settler-colonial is to make it wholly illegitimate, even intrinsically evil, has gathered strength in numerous geopolitical contexts in the recent past. This explosive growth in the concept's polemical uses has clearly been influenced by the advent of more academic settler colonial studies – though practitioners of the latter are not naturally responsible for the excesses of the political rhetorics. To pluck out one especially – though far from unusually – strident example among literally hundreds I have recently encountered, take this from Avigail Abarbanel:

> If Israel behaved more 'morally', American and other Western Jews would have an easier time supporting it. But how can Israel behave 'morally' when it is a settler-colonial state? When have any settler-colonial societies behaved morally? It is an oxymoron. Settler-colonialism is a crime against humanity. A crime can't behave morally [. . .].[39]

Dispute over whether national, ethnic, religious or other conflict originates in a settler-colonial situation cannot, in the Northern Irish as in numerous other cases, fully be resolved by available historical evidence – neither in ways that would satisfy professional historians nor ones that would satisfy the contending parties or their organic intellectuals. As this author has (again) elsewhere sought to argue, claims that, say, some particular pattern of voting behaviour in north Belfast, or of farm ownership in Armagh, derives from seventeenth-century dispossession, have neither democratic legitimacy nor indeed any valid entailments whatever for the living.

Notes

1 'Ulster' properly denotes an historic region roughly corresponding to nine present-day counties in the north of Ireland. 'Northern Ireland' is the post-partition semi-state, part of the United Kingdom, encompassing six of these counties. To use the terms interchangeably is not only imprecise but partisan, since such usage is in the main employed by Unionists and Loyalists. Henceforth, and to avoid repetitive definitional asides, it is hoped that this chapter's relevant terminologies are in each case clear from their context.

2 T. Mason, *Social Policy in the Third Reich: The Working Class and the "National Community", 1918–1939*, Oxford: Berg, 1993, p. 1. Mason never, before his own tragically early death, resolved to his own satisfaction the dilemmas thus posed for his work on Nazi Germany.

3 C. Toibin, *Walking Along the Border*, London: Queen Anne Press, 1987, p. 9.

4 A. Guelke, 'Northern Ireland's flags crisis and the enduring legacy of the settler-native divide', *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 20, 1, 2014, 133–51.

5 Mainly in the following works, where fuller exposition of some other arguments alluded to here may also be found: S. Howe, *Ireland and Empire: Colonial Legacies in Irish History and Culture*, Oxford University Press, 2000, (pb. with new Introduction March 2002); 'The politics of historical "Revisionism": comparing Ireland and Israel/Palestine', *Past and Present* 168, August 2000, 227–53; 'Historiography', in K. Kenny (ed.) *Ireland and the British Empire*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004, pp. 220–50; 'Mad Dogs and Ulstermen: The crisis of loyalism', Pts. 1 & 2, *OpenDemocracy* 28 & 30 September 2005; 'On questioning the question: Was Ireland a colony', *Irish Historical Studies*, XXXVI, 142, 2008, 138–52; 'Minding the gaps: New directions in the study of Ireland and empire', *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 37, 1, 2009, 135–49; 'Memory and history in Northern Ireland', *History Workshop Journal* 71, Spring 2011, 219–31; 'The Cruiser and the colonist: Conor Cruise O'Brien's writings on colonialism', *Irish Political Studies* 28, 4, 2013, 487–514; and 'Coloniser and colonised', in A. Jackson (ed.) *The Oxford Handbook of Modern Irish History*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014, pp. 65–82.

6 L. Veracini, *Settler Colonialism: A Theoretical Overview*, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010. idem. *The Settler Colonial Present*, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015; Wolfe, *Settler Colonialism and the Transformation of Anthropology: The Politics and Poetics of an Ethnographic Event*, London: Cassel, 1999.

7 See http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199766567 (accessed 06/06/2016). The book concerned is F. Bateman and L. Pilkington (eds.) *Studies in Settler Colonialism: Politics, Identity and Culture*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011.

8 P. Clayton, *Enemies and Passing Friends: Settler Ideologies in Twentieth Century Ulster*, London: Pluto Press, 1996; M. McDonald, *Children of Wrath: Political Violence in Northern Ireland*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1986; and T. G. Mitchell, *Native vs. Settler: Ethnic Conflict in Israel/Palestine, Northern Ireland and South Africa*, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2000. See also R. Weitzer, *Transforming Settler States: Communal Conflict and Internal Security in Northern Ireland and Zimbabwe*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990.

9 F. Wright, *Northern Ireland: A Comparative Analysis*, Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1987; F. Wright, *Two Lands on One Soil: Ulster Politics Before Home Rule*, Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1996.

10 A. T. Q. Stewart, *The Shape of Irish History*, Belfast: Blackstaff, 2001, p. 77.

11 É. Ó Ciardha and M. Ó Siochrú (eds.) *The Plantation of Ulster: Ideology and Practice*, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2012, p. 1.

12 It is nonetheless too large for adequate referencing here. For an excellent recent overview, see T. Ó hAnnracháin, 'Plantation, 1580–1641', in Jackson (ed.) *Oxford Handbook* op. cit., pp. 291–314.

13 For some of this, see I. McBride (ed.), *History and Memory in Modern Ireland*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.

14 For the latest (at the time of writing) detailed exemplification of such a case see S. G. Ellis, *Defending English Ground: War and Peace in Meath and Northumberland, 1460–1542*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015.

15 E. E. Evans, *The Personality of Ireland: Habitat, Heritage and History*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973; *Ireland and the Atlantic Heritage: Selected Writings*, Dublin: Lilliput, 1996.

16 For instance J. P. Mallory and T. E. McNeill, *The Archaeology of Ulster: From Colonization to Plantation*, Belfast: Institute for Irish Studies, 1991. See also A. J. Horning, 'Archaeology, conflict and contemporary identity in the North of Ireland: Implications for theory and practice in comparative archaeologies of colonialism', *Archaeological Dialogues* 13, 2, 2006, 183–200.

17 See for instance S. Leslie et al., 'The fine-scale genetic structure of the British population', *Nature* 519, 19 March 2015, plus 'Supplementary Note' online at: http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v519/n7543/full/nature14230.html#supplementary-information. This suggests two strong though overlapping genetic 'clusters' in contemporary Northern Ireland, each strongly linked to different regions of Scotland!

18 See for instance P. Fitzgerald, ' "Black '97": Reconsidering Scottish Migration to Ireland in the Seventeenth Century and the Scotch-Irish in America', in W. Kelly and J. R. Young (eds.) *Scotland and Ireland 1600–2000*, Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2004, pp. 71–84.

19 For some of the most thoughtful recent dissent, see E. Cavanagh, 'Kingdom or Colony? English or British? Early modern Ireland and the colonialism question', *Journal of Colonialism and Colonial History* 14, 2, 2013; B. O'Leary, 'The Shackles of the state and hereditary animosities: Colonialism in the interpretation of Irish history', *Field Day Review* 10, 2014, 150–87; and perhaps above all the latter's forthcoming *Understanding Northern Ireland: colonialism, control and consociation* – though a distinctive settler colonial model is not O'Leary's main focus here. I am indebted to both Ed and Brendan for their aid.

20 Ireland thus surely does not fit the 'eliminationist' model of settler colonialism so powerfully and influentially proposed by Wolfe: almost nobody of importance on any side ever held a vision of an ethnically cleansed land. For the most recent (at the time of writing) debates on 'ethnic cleansing' in modern Irish history, see P. Hart, *The IRA and Its Enemies: Violence and Community in Cork, 1916–1923*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998; and H. Patterson, *Ireland's Violent Frontier: The Border and Anglo-Irish Relations During the Troubles*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013, with the large ensuing literature of controversy which both books have generated. It is – as an aside – notable that the language of ethnic cleansing has very rarely been used in relation to nationalist attacks on settler communities, as opposed to the reverse, in any part of the world.

21 J. Belich, *Replenishing the Earth: The Settler Revolution and the Rise of the Angloworld*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.

22 T. C. Barnard, 'New opportunities for British settlement: Ireland', in N. Canny (ed.) *The Origins of Empire*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998, 314.

23 F. Campbell, *The Irish Establishment 1879–1914*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009, pp. 20–1.

24 Mallory and McNeill, *Archaeology of Ulster*, p. 321.

25 P. Craig, *A Twisted Root: Ancestral Entanglements in Ireland*, Belfast: Blackstaff, 2012. O'Leary suggests that 'Acculturation in Ulster occurred in language, clothing, material culture and consumption but not significantly in religion.' B. O'Leary, 'Shackles', 154. However, even this 'exception' is contested by other authorities. See for instance T. Claydon and I. McBride (eds.) *Protestantism and National Identity: Britain and Ireland, c.1650–c.1850*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

26 Such ideologies, in all their complexity, naturally cannot receive even cursory examination here. This writer's view on the subject is elaborated, inter alia, in *Ireland and Empire*, 'Questioning', and 'Mad Dogs' op.cit. Amidst a huge literature see especially J. Ruane and J. Todd, *The Dynamics of Conflict in Northern Ireland: Power, Conflict and Emancipation*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996; G. McIntosh, *The Force of Culture: Unionist Identities in Twentieth-Century Ireland*, Cork: Cork University Press, 1998.

27 Legassick, 'The frontier tradition in South African historiography', in S. Marks and A. Atmore (eds.) *Economy and Society in Pre-Industrial South Africa*, London: Longman, 1980, pp. 44–79.

28 I am naturally aware how closely such bald claims as this interact with debate over what 'decolonisation' means in and in relation to settler societies – debate to which Veracini has made a notable contribution – but this cannot be pursued here.

29 F. Wright, *Northern Ireland: A Comparative Analysis*, Dublin: Gill & Macmillan, 1987; idem. *Two Lands on One Soil: Ulster Politics Before Home Rule*, Dublin: Gill & Macmillan, 1996.

30 'Culture and identity', *The Blanket* (February 2002). Available at: http://indiamond6.ulib.iupui.edu:81/culture.html (accessed 30/04/2016). On the kinds of rethinking by former Loyalist paramilitaries which

Mitchell exemplified, see especially P. Shirlow, *The End of Ulster Loyalism?* Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2012.

31 P. Nolan, *Northern Ireland Peace Monitoring Report: Number Two*, Belfast: Community Relations Council, 2013, p. 5.

32 See above all N. Porter, *Rethinking Unionism: An Alternative Vision for Northern Ireland*, Belfast: Blackstaff, 1996.

33 This dwindling sense of shared 'Irish' cultural space – to which the post-Partition cultural policies of both Dublin and Stormont governments actively contributed – has been well traced by historians like D. Kennedy, *The Widening Gulf: Northern Attitudes to the Independent Irish State 1919–1949*, Belfast: Blackstaff, 1988; and G. McIntosh, *Force of Culture* op. cit.

34 See W. J. McCormack, *Northman: John Hewitt (1907–87): An Irish Writer, His World, and His Times*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015. A major more recent effort in this direction is Marianne Elliott's attempt historically to trace an Ulster identity which once embraced the region's Catholics and, in her eyes, could and should do so again: *The Catholics of Ulster: A History*, London: Allen Lane, 2000.

35 In Howe, 'Questioning the question' op. cit.

36 A key reference point here is of course A. Laura Stoler, 'On degrees of imperial sovereignty', *Public Culture* 18, 1, 2006, 125–46.

37 Wright, *Comparative Analysis*; Kimmerling, *The Israeli State and Society: Boundaries and Frontiers I*, Ithaca: State University of New York Press, 1989.

38 See D. L. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, 2nd ed., Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2000. A. Guelke, in his 'Flags crisis' and elsewhere, is among those who have made fruitful use of Horowitz in analyzing Northern Ireland. The wider critical literature debating the usefulness or otherwise of 'ethnic conflict' models for Ireland is of course substantial.

39 A. Abarbanel, 'It's time for American Jews to recognize they have been duped', *Mondoweiss*, 25 July 2015.

Further reading

N. Canny, *Making Ireland British 1580–1650*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001.

M. Elliott, *The Catholics of Ulster: A History*, London: Allen Lane, 2000.

S. Howe, *Ireland and Empire: Colonial Legacies in Irish History and Culture*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.

É. Ó Ciardha and M. Ó Siochrú (eds.), *The Plantation of Ulster: Ideology and Practice*, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2012.

P. Robinson, *The Plantation of Ulster: British Settlement in an Irish Landscape 1600–1670*, Belfast: Ulster Historical Foundation, 2000.

J. Ruane and J. Todd, *The Dynamics of Conflict in Northern Ireland: Power, Conflict and Emancipation*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

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PART II

The Americas

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INTRODUCTION TO PART II

Edward Cavanagh

Introduction

This section of the *Handbook* presents a number of regional analyses of settler colonialism in the Americas, which was the first 'New World'. John G. Reid and Thomas Peace begin this story in the northeast. By disaggregating this region from the rest of North America (a move that prompts Reid and Peace to integrate the northern parts of New England within their analysis, but not southern New England), this chapter argues that settler colonialism as a mode of domination was initially sidelined as other economic concerns were prioritised. Cod, first of all, attracted Europeans to Ktaqmkuk in the fifteenth century, which was henceforth known as the 'Newfoundland'; furs drew Europeans down the St. Lawrence River over the next two centuries, leading to the creation of 'New France'. Settler colonialism was relatively benign, the authors argue, until the mid-eighteenth century, as the English began to take control of New France, and the balance of power tilted against the indigenous communities. Settler colonialism, 'manifested through settler sovereignty and territorial control', in the words of the authors, irreversibly got underway at this moment in the northeast.

Settler colonial relationships developed more rapidly in the rest of Atlantic North America, from New England in the north to Virginia in the south, and 'westward'. In his chapter, Matthew Crow argues that distinctly American identities and political traditions have long been defined in relation to the experience of settler colonialism. Crow sees the seventeenth century as the foundational moment of settler colonialism. It was in this period that settlers established their own governments and came repeatedly into conflict with indigenous communities; it was in this period that America began to redefine itself as separate from England. Observing some of the nuances and idiosyncrasies of developing English–American political thought, Crow stresses the importance of the democratic ideologies of Thomas Jefferson and Andrew Jackson in the development of the American identity.

Heading further south, the following chapter presents the history of New Spain and its northern extension. Here, Ignacio Martínez argues that settler colonialism was an 'experiment in syncretism'. During the colonial period and the subsequent Mexican period, New Spain was a hybrid society, ethnically, socially and politically. This makes settler colonialism as a mode of domination less identifiable but still present. As Martínez explains, settler colonialism reveals itself both in the erosion of traditional indigenous identities and communities as well as in the conflict

that developed between *Criollos* (settlers born in America) and *Penninsulares* (colonists born in Spain). The dominance of the United States ultimately circumscribed the reach of New Spain.

The same mid-nineteenth-century period saw the transformation of the northwest of North America into a settler colony too, as Laura Ishiguro explains in the following chapter. Before this period, beginning with the founding of the Hudson's Bay Company in 1670, the Canadian West had remained unaffected by settler colonial relationships. In 1811, however, the first significant white settlement in the region, Assiniboia, was installed. In 1870, Rupert's Land was transferred to the Dominion of Canada, and in 1885 the Canadian Pacific Railway was completed. As the last significant indigenous resistance movement was quelled by state police forces, a settler colonial mode of domination was definitively established in the region.

The history of settler colonialism in America south of the equator is more fragmented, regionally diverse and demographically inconsistent with parts of the rest of the Americas. Michael Goebel argues in his chapter that these and other historical conditions have challenged those who wish to contemplate comparatively the history of settler colonialism in Latin America. Issuing a call for historians to look more closely at settler-indigenous dynamics from the period of first contact to the independence movements of the nineteenth century, Goebel presents a global and economic history of migration to the region for the period after 1870. Goebel suggests that settler colonialism may be a valuable way to understand the often-contradictory experiences of postcolonial states such as Brazil, Uruguay and Argentina.

Adam J. Barker, Toby Rollo and Emma Battell Lowman outline the reorientation of the Canadian settler state from assimilation towards recognition during the twentieth century. This transition saw Canada move away from the Indian Residential School system and towards the development of judicial and constitutional practices to identify and award rights based on indigeneity. As these 'politics of recognition' gained traction, new forms of political mobilisation and protest have been adopted by indigenous Canadians, with mixed results.

The final chapter of this part, by Walter L. Hixson, focuses on state and non-state actors in the twentieth-century history of settler colonialism in the United States. Hixson argues that the appropriation of indigenous names and imagery by military and sporting organisations reveals the ongoing persistence of 'settler mentalities'. In response, indigenous communities have developed an increasingly resistant stance towards settler sovereignty. This may be exemplified by the attempts of some communities to affirm and reaffirm their own sovereignty in the latter parts of the twentieth century.

6

COLONIES OF SETTLEMENT AND SETTLER COLONIALISM IN NORTHEASTERN NORTH AMERICA, 1450–1850

John G. Reid and Thomas Peace

In northeastern North America, the imposition of early colonial settlement onto Indigenous territory took four distinct forms.[1] In Newfoundland, it followed the contours of the dry salt–cod fishery; planned settlements, such as English Ferryland and French Plaisance, co–existed with less formal communities elsewhere. To establish Maine, initial fishing and fur trading posts were overlaid by agriculturally based settlements extending from southern New England. Despite being repeatedly expelled by the Wabanaki, English settlers used deeds and treaties to slowly establish themselves on Wabanaki land.[2] In Acadie/Nova Scotia, settlement was largely in enclaves. Acadian households were spread along kilometres of coastal marshlands on the Bay of Fundy. Towns were rare and primarily limited to the fortified centres of Port Royal (under the French until 1710)/Annapolis Royal (under the British from 1710), Louisbourg (1713) and Halifax (1749). More pervasive colonial settlement did not occur until after the American Revolution. Canada – meaning the St. Lawrence region and contiguous areas – was considerably different. There, much as in Acadie, settlement was slow and, though the French later defined the region, initial migration was mixed between French and Indigenous settlers during the 1640s, '50s and '60s. Here more than anywhere else, French and Indigenous legal traditions interacted in complex ways. Although these four Euro-American societies may be described as colonies of settlement and made a significant impact on nearby Indigenous peoples, it was not until after the recurrent warfare of the mid-to-late eighteenth century that settler colonialism – manifested through settler sovereignty and territorial control – became suffusive, shaping the region's overall development and subsequent nature.

Generally, historians of the northeast have dated the development of settler sovereignty with the emergence of the nation-state.[3] Earlier concepts of imperial sovereignty, as Ken MacMillan has shown, drew on diverse bodies of national and transnational legal understandings. For the British, this involved 'reciprocal sovereignty', through which the imperial crown's presence in North America was contingent on political alliances with Indigenous peoples.[4] Settler sovereignty emerged later as this pluralism was modified to recognize settlers' territorial control, self-governance and sovereign jurisdiction. Theorizing settler sovereignty on a more comparative scale, Lisa Ford argues that in New South Wales and Georgia, it was not until the 1820s and 1830s that notions of sovereignty, jurisdiction and territory became fully aligned, asserting the legitimacy of settlement and dispossessing Indigenous societies that posed an implicit or, in places, armed and explicit challenge to the settler

project.[5] Making this argument, however, Ford suggests that 'the colonial American northeast' was exceptional, in that the processes she identifies occurred much earlier.[6]

If the northeast were equated with southern New England, we would agree. However, there was a larger and more northeastern northeast in which the path from pluralistic imperial-colonial-Indigenous relations towards the establishment of settler sovereignty was considerably more variable, complex and, with hindsight, better aligned with global patterns of developing settler colonialism. The power dynamics that resulted from these early colonies of settlement – Newfoundland, Acadie/Nova Scotia, northern New England and Canada – demonstrate that, although some settler colonial practices gained traction over time, there were many variations. It was not until the end of the 'long' eighteenth century that settler colonialism emerged as hegemonic.

By distinguishing between colonies of settlement and settler colonialism, we follow Lorenzo Veracini in differentiating settler colonialism from other imperial and colonial processes. More specifically, we agree with a definition of settler colonialism based not only upon the permanent arrival of settling peoples but rather by the ability of those settlers to 'carry their sovereignty with them' and, as a society, exert that sovereignty over Indigenous peoples or settlers of other origins.[7] In places defined by settler colonialism, *imperium* and external sovereignty may still theoretically pertain to the crown – though obviously not in the case of northern New England after 1783 – but internal sovereignty lies with settler society. Settler colonialism therefore involves more than mercantile relationships developed through resource extraction or trading; it is more than the cartographic imperialism that sought to redefine and rename Indigenous territory; it is more even than the settlement of European farmers on Indigenous land. Each of these imperial or colonial actions could contribute to settler colonial regimes, but, in and of themselves, they are at most preludes to the discrete development of settler colonialism. Rather, settler colonialism is shaped through the creation, imposition and extension of power through processes of settlement. Ultimately, as Patrick Wolfe has noted, settler colonialism is about territorial homogenization and the normalization of settler power and control.[8] As a set of processes, it is often marked first by violence and then by the extension of law and institutional governance over Indigenous peoples.

Although settler colonialism tends towards homogenization, its processes are diverse and varied. Veracini argues that settler sovereignty itself has inherently pluralistic elements. In settler societies, power relationships exist in association with, and sometimes in contradiction to, alternative (imperial, colonial, state and postcolonial) sovereignties.[9] The intersection of these alternative sovereignties is particularly apparent in the northeast, where European and Indigenous interests were diverse and often unaligned. To explain how power was manifest in the early modern northeast, Elizabeth Mancke argues for historians to embrace the concept of 'spaces of power' in order to understand and examine more fully 'systems of social power; whether economic, political, cultural or military, that we can describe functionally and spatially'. Much like Veracini, for Mancke, this 'social power has multiple forms that frequently operate at variance with one another'.[10] Taking into consideration broader imperial and Indigenous interests, searching for 'spaces of power' is a useful approach specifically because it does not presuppose the existence of settlements with local government structures.[11] From this imperial and plural perspective, settler colonies in the northeast are seen 'as just one kind of space that Europeans created overseas'.[12]

From this perspective, alternative complementary or competing Indigenous and metropolitan influences are as important in shaping the dynamics of settler societies as the wills, goals and desires of the settlers themselves. In approaching power through this lens, we can better examine the diverse processes shaping initial European settlement and how, over time and through imperial warfare, settlers shaped their desire for, and gradual achievement of, sovereignty in the northeast. This plural perspective on sovereignty and power contributes to exploring and

discussing divergent imperial and colonial interests as well as comparing the tactics of differing Indigenous peoples and competing European empires: empire, colony and Indigenous engagement interacted continuously in complex and variable patterns.[13] Somewhat counter-intuitively, then, it is because a focus upon 'spaces of power' does not privilege the place of settlers in North America that it is useful in discerning processes of settler colonialism.

Before exploring each colony's specific history of settlement, it is important to acknowledge the broader themes underpinning early modern European imperialism. With few exceptions, both the English and French placed their early North American experiences within pre-existing intellectual frameworks. As Edward Cavanagh has argued for early New France, when it came to settlement, Europeans almost exclusively treated this land as if it were *terra nullius*.[14] They created new places, using new names, and, in the absence of obvious Indigenous settlements, they occupied land without considering its meaning and role within local Indigenous societies. This context, however, forms a mere prelude to the processes through which settler sovereignty was achieved. In the northeast, settler colonialism as a distinct, pervasive and hegemonic process dates to a later period. What Jerry Bannister has appropriately termed 'the Forty Years' War', beginning in 1744, signalled and expedited the extension of settler sovereignty over Indigenous territories, a process that took another three to four decades to secure.[15] Though the transition took place in the late eighteenth century, the hegemonic nature of settler colonialism in the northeast can only be fully understood by first considering the diverse origins of colonial settlement and the local relationships between Indigenous peoples and Euro-American settlers.

English migration and its results

English settler migration during the seventeenth century took place in two distinct ways. In Ktaqmkuk (Newfoundland), settlements developed in an ad hoc manner as extensions of the Atlantic fisheries and transoceanic trade.[16] Coastal areas of Wabanakia (present-day states of Maine, New Hampshire and Vermont) and Mi'kma'ki/Wulstukwik (present-day provinces of New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island and Nova Scotia) had similar influences. In Wabanakia, however, mid-seventeenth-century migration from southern New England introduced a more deliberate settlement pattern modelled on Massachusetts's governance and spatial practices. English settlement in this place – in what would become Maine – formed a second distinct path to colonization, blending resource and agricultural motivations for colonization. Despite their differences, though, the results of English settlement took a similar toll on Indigenous peoples. Just as the Beothuk in Ktaqmkuk long safeguarded their societal and cultural integrity by maintaining a distance from colonial settlement, in Wabanakia, Indigenous peoples maintained ample military and diplomatic might to ward off English expansion.[17] Ultimately, however, by the early nineteenth century, Indigenous societies were devastated by disease, violence and hunger – in the case of the Beothuk, reaching extinction as a people.

Cupids Cove was England's first planned settlement in Ktaqmkuk. It began in 1610, when 39 colonists settled on the island under royal charter by the Newfoundland Company, a joint stock company charged with protecting the English fishery. Though initially successful, the colony soon faltered. Ktaqmkuk's harsh environment prevented colonists from harvesting enough food to support their animals through the winter. Harassment from pirates, who required that the colonists pay for protection, and poor leadership compounded their problems. The colony quickly dissolved. Some of the settlers, however, moved on to other, less formal settlements on the Avalon Peninsula.

From this point on, informal English settlement continued relatively unabated. Operating under mercantilist economic principles, which funnelled wealth back to England, a trade

imbalance in the migratory fishery encouraged people to stay over the winter. Ships that set out to fish off Ktaqmkuk's shores required ballast on their westward voyage – normally rocks – in order to account for the weight of their cargo on the return voyage. Replacing rocks with supplies for settlement allowed for immigration to what the English increasingly considered Newfoundland, while merchants yielded additional profit from the outgoing voyage. Other developing colonies such as New England also required fish. They too sent ships to Newfoundland to purchase cod. Taken together, this fish-based trade established the longstanding truck system, anchored in 'credit and trust' and forming the backbone of Newfoundland's economy until well into the nineteenth century.[18] These Atlantic relationships, particularly with England's colonies further southwest, have encouraged historians to envision Newfoundland as part of a 'greater New England'.[19] By 1677 – when a census was taken of the colony – there were 163 households comprising about 1,900 full-year residents. In addition to these people, there were some 4,600 seasonal fishers who came over each spring.[20] This informal type of settlement, argues historian and archaeologist Peter Pope, formed the basis of Newfoundland's early colonization. With little agricultural potential and therefore limited need for immigration, there were few possibilities for burgeoning colonies like those developed elsewhere in the region. For the most part, Newfoundland was an English fishing colony of separate and diverse fishing settlements.[21]

With few exceptions, English interaction with the Beothuk was limited from the start and declined over time. As the English inshore fisheries grew on the Avalon Peninsula, the Beothuk kept their distance. With the seasonal abandonment of fishing sites, however, they moved into the area to harvest metal and other goods left behind. Expanding English settlements coordinated more than just fishing, though, involving intrusion into Beothuk territory. With limited potential for farming, settlers fished inland rivers, trapped and traded furs, and harvested the forest.[22] As English settlement reached northwest into Notre Dame Bay during the eighteenth century, the Beothuk spent more time inland, only coming to coastal areas where there were few Europeans. The long-term consequence of this decision was drastic population decline. The last known Beothuk died in 1829, although, for the Mi'kmaq, Ktaqmkuk continued to be occupied as an important part of Mi'kma'ki.[23]

Partly because of distinct Indigenous strategies of resistance but also because of the contrasts in methods of settlement and the influence of southern New England expansion, the pattern in Wabanakia was different. Colonial efforts, whether having religious or – increasingly – commercial motivations, prompted rapid population growth, expanding quickly from the initial settlements at Plymouth and Massachusetts Bay (Boston). As Indigenous cultural and physical landscapes were destroyed, so the lands of the Wampanoag and other Indigenous groups were transformed into farms, workshops, mills, churches, schools and – in some places – urban space. The process radically reshaped the region's human geography, especially coming soon after deadly epidemics that affected the Massachusett, Pokanoket and Wampanoag peoples. Although not fully destroying these populations (for we find their descendants continuing to live in this space today), this wave of disease created a pretext for the notion that land was free for the taking.[24] Within a few decades, the English population grew to over 30,000 people. Across New England, new villages and towns were granted considerable power and control over their local jurisdiction. Power located at the town level was crucial to a process of expansion that David Jaffee has described as 'serial town settlement'.[25] As New Englanders moved and spread, they created new colonial jurisdictions of Connecticut, Rhode Island and New Hampshire that replicated earlier efforts.[26] The colonies of southern New England, unlike more northeasterly neighbours, quickly made settler sovereignty a key aspect of their identities.

In southern New England, the overwhelming force of settler migration spreading outwards from Massachusetts Bay extended more quickly than in the north onto Indigenous land. Partially

through the Pequot and Metacom's Wars, settler society in the south grew rapidly, defeating Indigenous resistance and further reducing their population and influence. The more northerly Wabanaki peoples were better situated to oppose these encroachments, threatening English interests and restricting their expansion well into the eighteenth century.[27] Partially as a consequence of this resistance, but also as a function of their own desire for authority and legitimacy, the English sought from Indigenous peoples some legal acknowledgement of their presence on the land. They did this in two related ways: they directly purchased land and they negotiated treaties. In both processes, English officials sometimes developed relationships with recognized Indigenous leaders, while at other times they made agreements with anyone willing to support their territorial claims. As well as minimizing conflict with powerful Indigenous neighbours at a time when it was politic for the colonizers to do so, such agreements anchored English approaches to settlement in a notion of private property that emphasized cultivating and inhabiting clearly demarcated territory.[28]

The first deeds from Wabanakia were agreed to around the somewhat misleadingly named 'Merrymeeting Bay'. At the confluence of two major river systems (the Androscoggin and Kennebec), this coastal location was the heart of the New England fur trade. As such, much of the bay's shore was negotiated before the 1670s. There are over seventy seventeenth-century deeds from this region. Unlike the broader patterns further south, where a process Francis Jennings has called 'the deed game' used deceit and violence to alienate Indigenous land, the terms in these northern deeds were generally agreed and adhered to by both the Wabanaki and the English.[29] The difference between deeds in southern and northern New England reflects the limited agricultural possibilities further north, the importance of the fur trade, greater Wabanaki military strength and (relatedly) the nearby presence of French settlements and military posts.

Whereas deeds served as a local tool through which settlers could claim legal authority over the land, treaties reflected broader relationships and, over time, were used to expand claims of English sovereignty. Unlike later nineteenth- and twentieth-century treaties, which are explicitly territorial, those made during the seventeenth and eighteenth century – known as peace and friendship treaties – responded to the frequent violence brought about by English expansion. Given Wabanaki military strength, these agreements therefore focused instead on mutual understanding and peace building. As such, early treaties often reflected Indigenous rather than English primacy. The 1678 treaty that brought an end to the northern front of Metacom's War, for example, called for reciprocal forms of justice, whereby infractions would be prosecuted using the legal traditions of the victim's society, and for English settlers on Wabanaki lands to pay tribute.[30] Although similar provisions were not mentioned explicitly in later treaty texts, English imperial officials engaged in a 'double diplomacy' through which they routinely made written records of one version of events while hewing more closely to the spirit of the 1678 treaty in oral negotiations.[31] As with deeds, the content of treaty negotiations reflected the continuity of Wabanaki power. Yet, while this diplomatic approach could mitigate tensions in the short term, it ultimately only postponed conflict over land and resources. Following rekindled hostilities during the early 1720s, a further treaty in 1725 proved unable to forestall British fort-building in Wabanakia and the new thrusts of settlement that accompanied it.

Though the process of establishing English settlements varied between Ktaqmkuk and Wabanakia, the results were similar. In Ktaqmkuk, European encroachments along the coastline pushed the Beothuk into a sparse inland space, causing a drastic and ultimately devastating reorientation of the Indigenous economy. In southern New England, disease and rapid settler expansion had similar consequences. In Wabanakia, however, the process and timing differed. There, geopolitical and economic realities created conditions where England's legal apparatus for claiming sovereignty was only selectively deployed. English/British officials carefully negotiated their

relationships with Wabanaki leaders and the Board of Trade in order to avoid eliciting either's anger. There, Wabanaki military power kept New England settlers at bay. Nonetheless, although the processes and the timing of English settlement differed, dispossession and the widespread decimation of Indigenous societies formed the invariable result.

Creating a New France: the myth of French settler colonialism

French colonialism was different. Although Cavanagh's work points to similarities with New-foundland's and New England's corporate settlement schemes and their tendency to conceive of Indigenous territory as *terra nullius*, aside from a brief foray in the 1660s and 1670s, French efforts to settle North America were considerably muted when considered alongside English colonies.[32] Indeed, James Pritchard suggests that historians are misguided to frame France's overseas travels as ventures in empire.[33] Allan Greer and Catherine Desbarats have pushed in a different but related direction. By asking, 'Où est la Nouvelle-France?' they imply that France had difficulty locating its sovereignty within a concrete geography.[34] Given the ambiguity of France's interest in North America, it is reasonable to pose a similar question: is settler colonialism the appropriate frame-work for understanding French settlements in North America?

Of all the colonies examined here, New France best demonstrates the ambiguity of early modern sovereignty. French dominion – settler or otherwise – was never perfectly aligned with territorial goals. Although agricultural settlements existed in Canada and Acadie, the boundaries of New France were mostly determined through maps and surveys drafted in Europe rather than by any direct extension of imperial power through settlement or military occupation.[35] While cartographic imperialism was not unique to New France, the immense geographic reach of French claims gave it exceptional scope.[36] At the same time, although on the peripheries French settlers could exert power beyond the official reach of imperial officials, the hierarchical nature of society in New France meant that much interaction with Indigenous peoples was mediated through metropolitan officials, specifically priests, military officials and fur traders. These men represented military and religious goals that often aligned poorly with the colonies' farming and, to a lesser extent, mercantile interests. As a result of France's plural interests and extensive geo-graphic claims, settler-Indigenous relationships during this period provided latitude for legal and territorial co-existence and the development of a heterogenous culture within France's colonies of settlement.

Superseding Indigenous territorial control was never an overriding goal. Though settlements were built on Indigenous land, with the exception of the Haudenosaunee Confederacy (People of the Longhouse/Five Nations Iroquois), violence with settlers was minimal. What conflict occurred diminished over the course of the seventeenth century as France's imperial strategy focused on building alliances rather than trying to legitimate territorial occupation. The logic of alliance was such that French imperial officials drew on a rhetoric that recognized, at least by implication, Indigenous territorial sovereignty.[37] In Wabanakia, for example, as English settlers expanded into river valleys that led into France's Laurentian colony, French officials – without any real settler presence – claimed quasi-sovereignty over this space through their alliances with Wabanaki peoples.[38] During the early years of corporate administration, the French generally paid little attention to Indigenous concepts of territory,[39] but after the crown took control they were increasingly steadfast in protecting the lands of military allies.[40] The primarily economic and military needs of the metropolitan government – supported as they were by Indigenous territorial sovereignty – trumped any desire for expansion.

Although imperial officials put more weight on military, economic and religious goals, nev-ertheless, Acadie and Canada were essentially colonies of settlement.[41] Farm by farm, settlers

extended the French presence into Indigenous territories, requiring both Indigenous and French communities to grapple with the implementation of these new colonial institutions. Villages and towns developed and, alongside them, a colonial infrastructure that established French law. The colony's central institutions were the seigneury – a semi-feudal structure granting territorial rights to the crown, landlord (seigneur) and peasant farmer (habitant) – and the Catholic parish, which shared a similar hierarchal structure of bishop, parish priest and parishioner (habitant). In some cases, notably around Indigenous villages in Canada and the foundation of new Acadian communities during the second half of the seventeenth century, people living within these colonies tested the limits of the seigneurial system. In most places, though, the officially designated landscape retained significance,[42] even as settlers in both Canada and Acadie adopted identities separate from those held by their immigrant ancestors.

A key characteristic of the Canadien colonial world was the presence of Indigenous people living within seigneurial spaces. Mohawk, Algonquin, Abenaki and Wendat villages developed simultaneously with the extension of French settlement. Importantly, each village was built on territory used prior to French colonization. These were distinct places that did not conform to French legal practices. At the same time, Laurentian Indigenous peoples were deeply intertwined with France's seigneurial and religious systems. The structures of French society surrounded those peoples allied to Catholic mission stations. Parish and seigneurial boundaries redefined the Indigenous landscape and – at least for the Wendat – by the eighteenth century, these people began to employ such institutional structures towards their own purposes.[43] More than any other outside influence, it was the presence of French farmers and French civil law – the Coutume de Paris – that shaped daily life.

Yet, though influential, the structure of French society did not define these communities. French officials recognized that the villages, even as Catholic missions, remained self-governing communities. As such, they were treated differently than French colonists.[44] Always nourishing the hope that village residents would convert and acculturate,[45] French officials and missionaries rarely sought direct control. The extension of French law was particularly weak. At Kahnawake, a primarily Mohawk village near Montreal, residents openly pursued trade with New York merchants in Albany.[46] In the Quebec region, 69 laws were passed to regulate Indigenous use of alcohol. None focused solely on regulating Indigenous behaviour. Instead, French officials sought to prevent settlers from providing Indigenous people with drink.[47] Not until the 1790s did colonial officials begin to apply criminal law to Indigenous peoples.[48] Until that time, the colony of New France and, after the British conquest, the colony of Quebec, pursued a policy of legal pluralism.[49] Legal pluralism was not a result of French benevolence. Laurentian Indigenous peoples fiercely guarded their independence. In 1713, for example, French officials questioned how to interact with the communities around Montreal who continued to claim independence from French laws and jurisdiction.[50] Three decades later, Wendat leaders told captive William Pote that 'they was In Subjection to no king nor prince In the Universe'.[51] Claims like these echo throughout the colonial record. Despite French imperial denials, legal practices demonstrate that the Indigenous demand for autonomy was respected in practice if not in rhetoric.

French military, economic and religious interests were best served by clear separation of Indigenous and settler communities.[52] Militarily, Laurentian Indigenous peoples served as France's primary fighting force, forestalling New England's northward encroachment.[53] Rather than serving as mere mercenaries, however, warriors from these communities practiced parallel warfare, fighting for their own reasons and requiring distinct status and tribute from military officials.[54] Relatedly, they supplied the French with much-needed resources and supplies that could not be produced by the settler population. Laurentian Indigenous peoples were key suppliers of furs, canoes, paddles and sleds, the production of which benefited by their having separate status

within the colony.[55] Finally, religious interest in conversion encouraged missionaries to endorse Indigenous distinctness, deeming French settlers a corrupting influence.[56] In New France, therefore, imperial influences offset any emergence of settler sovereignty. Indigenous inhabitants lived separate lives, as metropolitan and Indigenous power structures became entangled.

And yet, settler colonial processes should not be dismissed. On a local level, in both Acadie and Canada, the extension of French settlement onto Indigenous lands mattered. Though historians debate when (and if) Acadians and Canadiens emerged as settler identities distinct from those in France, by the mid-eighteenth century, people in both places increasingly assumed unique collective identities, situating themselves as indigenous to the territory they and their ancestors had cultivated for a mere handful of generations.[57] Identity formation in New France was shaped by the nature of French immigration. Unlike New England's rapid growth, French immigration was quite limited. Though 27,000 people immigrated to Canada from France, as many as two-thirds returned to Europe; the Canadian population, which had only reached about 70,000 by the end of the French regime in 1760, developed from about 10,000 immigrants.[58] Early numbers for Acadie are imprecise, but the pattern is similar. Immigration effectively ceased following the British capture of Port Royal in 1710, with natural increase carrying the total to some 14,000 on the eve of the *Grand dérangement*.[59] In both places, the colonial population remained relatively small and, by the mid-eighteenth century, comprised mostly second-generation or greater North American-born settlers.

There was a marked difference, however, in the nature and weight of settlement in these two places. In Acadie, the impact of settlement was relatively small. Although Gregory Kennedy rightly notes how Acadian society (and identity formation) paralleled equivalents in France,[60] without a strong imperial presence, issues of territorial control, access to land and resources and the extension of the law were bound to the enclave settlements dotting the Bay of Fundy coast. For the territory as a whole, imperial institutions were more fictional than real. With the exception of the larger clusters of Acadian communities (at Port Royal, Les Mines and Beaubassin), French settlers only made a small impact on local Mi'kmaw communities. The small numbers of the Acadians and their penchant for cultivating reclaimed salt marshes minimized conflict. Autonomy from direct metropolitan rule – if not from its institutions – characterized life in Acadie almost as clearly as it did their Indigenous neighbours.[61] In Canada, French institutional structures were more extensive. Although their relative significance has been debated, the legal apparatus underpinning both the church and the seigneury were far more entrenched. By the beginning of the eighteenth century, most of the St. Lawrence Valley – from the Ottawa River to the Saguenay – had been divided into seigneuries and parishes. It was impossible for anyone to avoid this imposed geography.

Settler power, then, in the form of fields and fences, was felt directly. Although the literature on localized settler-Indigenous interactions is sparse, circumstances surrounding the Wendat community at Lorette demonstrate the potential for dispossession and conflict. There, as the Wendat themselves began to acquire seigneurial lands during the late 1740s and early 1750s,[62] they and nearby habitants fought over tree-felling on Wendat land and attacks by Wendat dogs on French-owned livestock.[63] These conflicts represent the incremental but arrant extension of settler power and the local level of dispossession that occurred wherever settlers intruded on Indigenous territory. Although we have only a handful of examples from the French regime, by 1767 – very soon after the conquest – almost every Indigenous community in the St. Lawrence Valley had complained to British officials about French settler encroachment, suggesting that these complaints pre-date the British Conquest.[64]

By New France's twilight years, French settlement had transformed North American spaces into a patchwork of seigneurial farms and forests. Algonquin, Innu, Wabanaki, Wendat and

Haudenosaunee land use in the St. Lawrence Valley had been circumscribed and limited.[65] Similarly, in places now considered as part of Acadie/Nova Scotia, the Mi'kmaw world had been changed not only by a new British presence but also by Acadian expansion.[66] The settler presence could no longer be accommodated so readily. And yet, unlike the serial town settlement pattern that drove English expansion, the workings of the seigneurial and parochial systems bound the French to limited geographies. Though small fishing hamlets dotted the Atlantic coast, until 1755, most Acadians continued to live in geographically restricted settlements around the Bay of Fundy. Similarly, though its population was much larger, the French presence in Canada had not expanded much beyond the St. Lawrence lowlands or further west than Montreal. Certainly, seigneurial and parochial structures had become rooted within and around prominent fur trading posts, including Detroit and Kaskaskia, but none of these settlements involved an extension of settler sovereignty over Indigenous territory.[67] Even in the St. Lawrence Valley – the heart of French America – settler and Indigenous jurisdictions co-existed. The manifestations of empire continued to be porous and heterogeneous well into the eighteenth century.

The great transformation: forty years of war

Colonial settler society became the defining spatial practice throughout the northeast with the outbreak of the 'Forty Years' War.[68] This broad term, advanced by Jerry Bannister, draws together a series of conflicts that caused widespread and recurrent violence between 1744 and 1783. Though the War of Austrian Succession, the Seven Years' War and the Revolutionary War each had unique goals and purposes and involved varying groups, taken together, they mark an era of increased metropolitan interest in North American affairs. The resulting tensions tended to enable and confirm Anglo-settler dominance (albeit with linguistic irregularities along the St. Lawrence River and Acadian settlements further east). Through these conflicts, a new period emerged, where centuries-old Indigenous spatial definitions gave way to new colonial geographies and practices. Although Indigenous peoples occupied an important role in economic, political and military spheres until the early nineteenth century, after this period, British or British-descended migration and settlement slowly became pervasive.

The transformation began as both Britain and France took unusual and unique interest in North America in the 1740s. The thirty years preceding the War of Austrian Succession had been marked by peace between European empires and considerable metropolitan flexibility within their colonies. With the renewal of warfare, however, imperial involvement – seen most clearly in the presence of European rather than colonial troops – increased markedly.[69] French military spending grew dramatically between 1730 and 1750.[70] Though Indigenous peoples and settlers continued to play important roles, as the conflict continued, the arrival of officials and officers with little North American experience reshaped these relationships.[71] Less willing to respect the authority of spoken diplomacy or the value of Indigenous warriors on the battlefield, European officials – especially the French – often succeeded in alienating Indigenous allies.

Changes to the British presence in Mi'kma'ki presaged events to come. Although France's construction of the fortified town of Louisbourg in the 1710s and 1720s had marked the start of this increasing imperial interest, it was not until the 1740s that Britain made real strides to entrench its presence along the Atlantic coast. Over the 1740s, promoters of Nova Scotian settlement and military reinforcement created maps and surveys bolstering their arguments for the colony's development.[72] Their calls were heeded in 1749 and 1753, when the British established the garrison town of Halifax – which soon became the colony's administrative capital – and Lunenburg. Both settlements involved the migration into Mi'kma'ki of thousands of settlers.

The establishment of Halifax and Lunenburg marked a significant geopolitical change. Although the British had long laid claim to Nova Scotia, their overall presence had remained small. They exerted limited authority beyond the palisades of their garrison at Annapolis Royal. In this context, officials accepted a more fluid and plural colonial world, allowing for Mi'kmaq, Acadian and British co-existence. Though few saw the situation as ideal, most officials had enough North American experience to recognize that imperial and settler interests needed to be balanced with those of the people whose land they sought to claim and control. From 1749, however, the new Halifax regime had the resources to extend its authority over nearby Acadian settlements. In early summer 1755, amid growing conflict with France, British officials in Halifax, in consultation with New England officials, decided to expel the Acadians.[73] Similarly, in their interactions with the Mi'kmaq, British officials increasingly mistrusted oral diplomacy, interpreting past treaties literally and assigning value based on the written word. Although Indigenous forces continued to wield enough power to inflict damage on settlements, British officials had fewer incentives to respect earlier agreements. They were increasingly inclined to see treaties as marking submission to the crown rather than enshrining peace and friendship.[74] Greater military, metropolitan and settler interests in Nova Scotia tipped this balance in favour of a more obdurate political practice that heralded the way towards settler sovereignty.

With growing colonial settlements, an established military presence and the Acadian population effectively removed, the British focused on creating a colony that looked and felt British. In 1758, after some years of petitioning, Nova Scotia formed a representative assembly, giving settlers greater say in the colony's administration. Less than two weeks later, the government began formally soliciting settlers from New England. Importantly, though anchored in British traditions, the increasing oversight and imperial control that redefined Nova Scotia also restricted local power. The authority of the New England town would not be replicated.[75] The Planter migration that followed was numerically insufficient even to replace the deported Acadians. Nonetheless, Nova Scotia had begun the transformation from a colony of Indigenous peoples and non-British colonists to a British settler colonial society.

While British officials focused on establishing patterns of settlement in Nova Scotia, elsewhere, imperial interests demanded that settlement be curbed. Necessarily concerned with managing Indigenous alliances during the Seven Years' war, in early 1756, the British commissioned Sir William Johnson – a senior military officer with longstanding ties to the Mohawk – as Superintendent of Indian Affairs for the northern colonies. The Indian Department aimed to standardize Britain's relationship with Indigenous peoples and ensure that settler goals did not interfere with the empire's broader military alliances. In 1761, a circular from the crown to colonial governors restricted the alienation of Indigenous land. This was a prelude to the issuance of the Royal Proclamation of 1763, which, as part of the broader realignment of colonial affairs following the fall of New France, sought to standardized British practices vis-à-vis Indigenous peoples. These efforts established a framework through which settler colonialism would eventually develop in the northeast. The Proclamation defined the way in which British law would recognize the transfer of Indigenous lands to the crown. Likewise, through the Indian Department, the crown could navigate its relationships with Indigenous peoples living within a settler colonial context. Thus, while purportedly distinguishing and separating Indigenous and settler interests, these policies simultaneously established a process through which settler hegemony could be achieved.

Though setting the stage upon which settler colonialism could be enacted, both British innovations were more structural, reflecting the immediate needs of empire in the 1760s, than they were dictates that would foster rapid colonial settlement. For that, two related historical conjunctures – neither of which can be easily disentangled from the development of the Indian Department or the Royal Proclamation – led directly to the creation of a specific type of settler society. The

first and more influential was the Conquest of Quebec; the second and more substantive was the American Revolution. These events would give the northeast a long-lasting character and lineage steeped in notions of settler sovereignty.

The Conquest of New France determined the nature of northeastern settler colonialism in three ways. First, it set imperial warfare on a new trajectory, ending its central focus on French–British conflict while privileging settler interests. Conflict between New England and New France had allowed Indigenous peoples to capitalize on colonial rivalries in order to resist imperial incursions. With the French removed and British settlers looking westward, Indigenous peoples lost this strategic advantage, weakening their political and military power. Second, with less fear of attack, New Englanders quickly expanded into the former borderlands between the French and British colonies. This wave of migrants moved into areas formerly occupied by the Acadians in Nova Scotia, as well as spreading inexorably into the upper reaches of Wabanakia's central waterways. Between 1760 and 1776, nearly 300 new towns were created as part of this 'great migration'. The central difference between those who travelled to Nova Scotia and those who moved onto Wabanaki territory was one of colonial administration. Northern New England extended the south's political culture of serial town settlement, while Nova Scotia embodied a newer, more metropolitan-focused colonial structure. These differences resulted in greater settlement on Wabanaki territory than along the Atlantic coast.[76] Finally, dealing with a population much larger than the Acadians, the British did not attempt a Canadien removal. Keeping the French population in place, the British pursued a policy of 'indirect rule' whereby – especially following the 1774 Quebec Act – they retained many French institutions.[77] Through this policy, the British maintained their authority while minimizing the likelihood of violence and conflict. By the mid-1770s, the roots of northeastern settler society were established. Northern New England continued to follow patterns of settlement established further south; Nova Scotia had similarities, although as yet the new Planter population was small and characterised by more metropolitan and less local control; and – by way of the Conquest – the Canadien population increasingly came to see itself as indigenous to the region.

If the first half of this forty-year period (1744–1764) established the jurisdictional structures underpinning the extension of settler sovereignty, its latter half (1764–1783) saw the extension and intensification of British settlement onto Indigenous territories. In addition to the northward migration of New England settlers during the 1760s, two additional waves of migration redefined the region. First, in the early 1770s, Scots began to arrive on the Island of St. John (later Prince Edward Island) and in Nova Scotia. Though thousands more came during the nineteenth century, by 1800, the Scottish population was well into the thousands.[78] The next wave followed the American Revolution, when more than 40,000 people migrated into Britain's retained colonies. Though these people reflected diverse cultural, class and economic interests, as the largest wave of immigrants in the region's history, the Loyalist-era migration made a collective impact: it prompted the creation of three new colonies (New Brunswick and Cape Breton Island, split from Nova Scotia, and Upper Canada along Lake Ontario's north shore), each established as a colony of settlement rather than meeting other imperial needs or desires.

By 1800, there were more people living in northeastern North America than ever before. The population of the St. Lawrence Valley had more than doubled, from about 70,000 people in 1760 to over 160,000 by 1800. Northern New England had a still-expanding population twice this size. More than 75,000 people lived in the colonies that once comprised Nova Scotia. Newfoundland and Upper Canada's populations were much smaller; neither colony had much more than twenty thousand people at the turn of the century.[79] As the nineteenth century progressed, however, these colonies continued to expand. Fuelled mostly by immigration from the British Isles, the region's overall population grew to nearly three million by 1850.

The rapid increase in immigration following the American Revolution put unremitting pressure on northeastern Indigenous peoples. Accelerating settlement created the conditions for near-wholesale dispossession. Although the Indian Department and the Royal Proclamation established a framework for Indigenous-British relations, their application was haphazard. In Nova Scotia and its neighbours, treaties and the Proclamation were essentially ignored as settlement encroached on even meagre reserve lands. With diminishing access to land and resources, Indigenous populations declined.[80] Wabanaki groups in northern New England faced similar pressures. By 1800, most of those who had lived in what became Vermont and New Hampshire through to the 1770s had moved to Odanak in Lower Canada.[81] Along the St. Lawrence Valley, the situation was not much better. Although the Proclamation had been posted in Laurentian Indigenous communities, negotiations and treaties were not applied in Quebec/Lower Canada.[82] Rather, land was unilaterally expropriated using both French and British precedents as justification. Uniquely, imperial officials developed a policy of compensation without treaty.[83] Despite earlier precedents for ceding land through deeds and peace and friendship treaties, formal diplomacy was essentially abandoned. Only in Upper Canada was the Royal Proclamation seriously put into effect.

Ktaqmkuk, meanwhile, followed a different chronology, and yet here too settler colonialism ultimately prevailed. Over the eighteenth century, settlements anchored in the residential fishery expanded as naval and privateering warfare made the migratory fishery vulnerable. Within these communities, governance and jurisdiction were exercised through the Royal Navy and anchored in an eclectic but coherent body of customary law.[84] With time, settlements encroached into Notre Dame Bay, prompting the Beothuk to move into the environmentally unsustainable confines of the Exploits river valley, leading eventually to their extinction. Intensified settlement brought demands for settler institutions such as an elected assembly in 1832. Though still heavily anchored to an Atlantic economy and the whims of the Colonial Office, by 1845, the colony had a population of nearly 100,000 people. Despite the continuing Mi'kmaw presence, Ktaqmkuk had become a place defined by longstanding European settlements reinforced by migration from the British Isles and an increasing territorial reach by settlers.[85] The existence of the 'French Shore', a large stretch of western coastline reserved during the fishing season for the use of French vessels, survived as an affront to hegemonic settler sovereignty. It would do so until the early twentieth century. Even here, though, increasing west-coast settlement presaged the 1904 formal settlement of the region.

By the early decades of the nineteenth century, the northeast had undergone a three-fold transformation that enabled settler sovereignty to thrive. In 1600, the region comprised the territories of the Beothuk, Mi'kmaq, Wabanaki and related peoples, as well as those of Laurentian Indigenous peoples and the Haudenosaunee Confederacy. Within a matter of decades, English and French colonies of settlement began to impact daily life. Though disruptive everywhere, the impact of European colonization was varied and uneven. It would be misleading to place these early processes – unlike those in southern New England – fully within the conceptual framework of settler colonialism. Colonies certainly played a role in extending settler sovereignty, but before 1740 the application of power was normally heterogeneous and wielded by a variety of interest groups. Only with the Forty Years' War and its aftermath, connected with increasing metropolitan control and influence, did a more homogeneous extension of settler sovereignty emerge. Despite the national division that spawned from this series of conflicts, after the 1780s, the region came to be defined primarily (though not exclusively) as Anglophone, agricultural and anchored in the key tenets of English law. Even the most evident exception – the St. Lawrence Valley – shared key elements of this pattern. Though earlier characteristics of French settlement persisted and authority would continue to be negotiated – and at times contested along linguistic and religious

lines far into the future – it was through the removal of France's broader imperial interests that *habitant* hegemony could be achieved.

More broadly, although each colony interacted differently with Indigenous peoples, the end result was similar. By the early decades of the nineteenth century, whether through treaty, outright expropriation or (in the case of the Beothuk) extinction, settlers had come to rule in all of these territories. Reflecting this new reality, official interaction with Indigenous peoples and the management of the Indian Department itself were transferred from metropolitan to colonial administration. Over the course of two and a half centuries, governance and jurisdiction of much of the territorial northeast (though not always local communities) had successfully transferred first from diverse Indigenous societies to the French and English/British empires and then to settler society itself. By the early 1850s, settler sovereignty had been achieved, setting the stage for the further development of the modern North American nation-state, as both the United States and, from 1867, the Dominion of Canada extended westwards their arrogation of Indigenous resources and lands.

Notes

1 In this essay, we define 'northeastern North America' to include Beothuk territory, known today as Newfoundland; the territories of Mi'kmaq, Maliseet, Passamaquoddy and Wabanaki, otherwise known as northern New England and Canada's Maritime Provinces; and the St. Lawrence valley and adjoining areas, later known as Lower Canada and the province of Quebec. Both authors have contributed equally to this chapter.

2 Because of considerable ambiguity in the archival documents, we define Wabanaki to be inclusive of Penobscot, Kennebec, Pigwacket, Sokoki, Cowasuck and Mississquoi peoples (who in the past have been categorized as the Eastern and Western Abenaki). This grouping should not be confused with the Wabanaki Confederacy, which also extended to the Passamaquoddy, Maliseet and (as allies) Mi'kmaw peoples.

3 L. Ford, *Settler Sovereignty: Jurisdiction and Indigenous People in America and Australia, 1788–1836*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010. On the extension of settler sovereignty within the narrative of state-formation, see A. Greer and I. Radforth (eds.) *Colonial Leviathan: State Formation in Mid-nineteenth Century Canada*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992.

4 See K. MacMillan, 'Imperial constitutions: Sovereignty and law in the British Atlantic', in H. V. Bowen, E. Mancke and J. G. Reid (eds.) *Britain's Oceanic Empire: Atlantic and Indian Ocean Worlds, c. 1550–1850*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012, pp. 69–97.

5 Ford, *Settler Sovereignty*, pp. 2–5.

6 Ibid., p. 19.

7 L. Veracini, *Settler Colonialism: A Theoretical Overview*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, p. 3.

8 P. Wolfe, *Settler Colonialism and the Transformation of Anthropology*, p. 163 (as cited in Veracini, *Settler Colonialism*).

9 Veracini, *Settler Colonialism*, p. 54.

10 E. Mancke, 'Spaces of power in the early modern Northeast', in S. J. Hornsby and J. G. Reid (eds.) *New England and the Maritime Provinces: Connections and Comparisons*, Kingston and Montreal: McGill-Queen's Press, 2005, p. 32.

11 Mancke, 'Spaces of power', p. 33.

12 Ibid., p. 49.

13 See J. G. Reid, *Essays on Northeastern North America: Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008.

14 E. Cavanagh, 'Possession and dispossession in corporate new France, 1600–1663: Debunking a "Juridical History" and revisiting Terra Nullius', *Law & History Review* 32, 1, 2014, 97–125.

15 J. Bannister, 'Atlantic Canada in an Atlantic world? Northeastern North America in the long 18th century', *Acadiensis* 43, 2, 2014, 3–30.

16 In an effort to acknowledge Newfoundland as Indigenous territory, we have chosen to follow Trudy Sable and Bernie Francis in using the Mi'kmaw name Ktaqmkuk ('across the waves/water') in our discussion of the island's pre- and early colonial history. Although the island was also home to the Beothuk,

their name for the island is unknown. See T. Sable and B. Francis, *The Language of This Land, Mi'kma'ki*, Sydney: Cape Breton University Press, 2012, pp. 21–2.

17 E. W. Baker and J. G. Reid, 'Amerindian power in the early modern Northeast: A reappraisal', *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3rd Series, 61, 1, January 2004, 77–106.

18 A. Dwyer, 'Atlantic borderland: Natives, Fishers, planters, and merchants in Notre Dame Bay, 1713–1802', PhD diss., Memorial University of Newfoundland, 2012, p. 153.

19 See P. Pope, *Fish into Wine: The Newfoundland Plantation in the Seventeenth Century*, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004; and Dwyer, 'Atlantic borderland', pp. 105–6.

20 Pope, *Fish into Wine*, pp. 207–9.

21 Dwyer uses the evocative phrase 'commitment to place' to describe the English occupation of Beothuk territory. Dwyer, 'Atlantic borderland', p. 195; see also pp. 69–70.

22 See ibid., chap. 3.

23 R. T. Pastore, *The Newfoundland Micmacs*, St. John's: Newfoundland Historical Society, 1978, pp. 20–3.

24 W. Cronon, *Changes in the Land: Indians, Colonists, and the Ecology of New England*, New York: Hill and Wang, 2003, chap. 5.

25 D. Jaffee, *People of the Wachusett: Greater New England in History and Memory, 1630–1860*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999, pp. 1–2.

26 A. Taylor, *American Colonies: The Settling of North America*, Toronto: Penguin, 2001, pp. 165–6.

27 Baker and Reid, 'Amerindian power'.

28 See P. Seed, *Ceremonies of Possession in Europe's Conquest of the New World, 1492–1640*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995, chap. 1.

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31 Reid, *Essays on Northeastern North America*, pp. 112–13.

32 Cavanagh, 'Possession and dispossession'.

33 J. Pritchard, *In Search of Empire: The French in the Americas, 1670 to 1730*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004.

34 C. Desbarats and A. Greer, 'Où est la Nouvelle-France?' *Revue d'Histoire de l'Amérique Française* 64, 3–4, 2011, 31–62.

35 Ibid., 41.

36 On cartography and its eighteenth-century role, see J. Lennox, 'Nova Scotia lost and found: The Acadian boundary negotiation and imperial envisioning, 1750–1755', *Acadiensis* 40, 2011, 3–31.

37 M. Morin, *L'Usurpation de la souveraineté autochtone: Le cas des peuples de la Nouvelle-France et des colonies anglaises de l'Amérique du Nord*, Montréal: Boréal, 1997.

38 Morin, *L'Usurpation de la souveraineté autochtone*, pp. 100–4.

39 Cavanagh, 'Possession and dispossession'.

40 Morin, *L'Usurpation de la souveraineté autochtone*, p. 261.

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42 G. M. W. Kennedy, *Something of a Peasant Paradise? Comparing Rural Societies in Acadie and the Loudunais, 1604–1755*, Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2014.

43 T. Peace, 'Two conquests: Aboriginal experiences of the fall of new France and Acadia', PhD diss., York University, Toronto, 2011, appendix.

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49 Delâge and Gilbert, 'Les Amérindiens face à la justice coloniale française dans le gouvernement de Québec, 1663–1759: II –', 41.

50 Delâge and Gilbert, 'Les Amérindiens face à la justice coloniale française dans le gouvernement de Québec, 1663–1759: I – Les crimes capitaux et leurs châtiments', *Recherches Amérindiennes au Québec* 33, 3, 2003, 81.

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52 Morin, *L'Usurpation de la souveraineté autochtone.*

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7

ATLANTIC NORTH AMERICA FROM CONTACT TO THE LATE NINETEENTH CENTURY

Matthew Crow

The need to think about the history of the United States in the context of a global history of settler colonialism seems obvious, but to do so poses challenging questions to public and scholarly narratives of national history alike. The United States, not uniquely but nevertheless importantly, is at once a settler society and a postcolonial one. The particular circumstances of the founding of the republic bestowed on the historical self-understanding of the nation several governing ideas and tropes, not the least of which has been a tendency to narrate national history as that of not only a colonial but a colonized people, resisting the reach of an imperial central state. There is a basic paradox here that has been widely noted: the particular ideological grounds on which the United States constitutes itself as a nation are taken to be anti-imperial but are actually very amenable to projects of empire. But there is a deeper paradox, closely related to the first, that scholars are only now starting to appreciate in light of the centrality of settler colonialism and settler concepts of liberty to early modern Atlantic and early American history, and that is that the first paradox mentioned earlier is not really a paradox. It was precisely the radically democratic aspects of revolutionary republicanism that proved to be inherently exclusionary and foundational to the extension of United States sovereignty over the North American continent. The populist economic and political promise of the movements that put presidents Thomas Jefferson and Andrew Jackson in the White House, from 1801–1809 and 1829–1837, respectively, was predicated on removal of Native title and the forced removal of Natives themselves. Just as importantly, the arguments, assumptions and practices that were appropriate to the settler basis of republican empire created a powerful historical vision that in many respects continues in force today. The peculiar ideological potency and long life of settler colonialism and settler liberty in the political history of the United States rests on a series of elisions of settler colonialism from constructed images of the past. Settler colonialism matters to any understanding of the history of the United States simply because, in the American context, settler colonialism has worked by allowing the predominant settler population to not recognize itself as one.

This disavowal of settler history has been perhaps the defining characteristic of settler colonialism in North America. Vast literatures on the origins of American thought, culture and politics trace complex genealogies of European inheritances and compare state structures and constitutions to their trans-Atlantic antecedents.[1] Looking at the origins of the United States from the perspective of a wider, global history of settler colonialism, we can see that a great deal of the imagining of American politics comes in response to contradictions and challenges posed

by the continued presence of people, ideas and peoples to the image of the past constructed by an expanding republic. Just as settler ideas of liberty were articulated and measured against varying degrees of the lack of liberty to be observed in others, so Native Americans and African Americans, enslaved and free, posed problems to the security of those ideas and many of the subjects who held them. As practiced by Thomas Jefferson and Andrew Jackson, one who made his name as a talented legal mind amidst the powerful Virginia gentry of the late colonial period and the other a popular war hero and veteran officer of the Indian conflicts of the War of 1812, the settler ideology of expansion rested on assumptions of the inevitability and natural laws of progress and linear development across time and on ideas of natural racial inferiority; indeed, both men were slave-owners themselves and represented men of similar means. But that ideology also rested on a presumption that through the vehicle of commercial exchange carried out amongst independent cultivators, the classical historical problems confronting republics and the present problems of plurality could be ameliorated. Their operating assumption was that labor and exchange of the fruits of labor integrated the nation, establishing consent to have one's history wrapped up into a larger uniform project, and those histories that did not fit or could not be safely made part of the legitimating narrative of American expansion needed to be transformed, exercised or eliminated.

Fusing elements of Spanish and English justifications of empire in the Americas, leaders of American expansion arrived at a new and powerful articulation of modern settler colonialism as the imperialism of a commercial republic. Theorists inquiring into the legality of Spanish conquest at Salamanca, most notably Francesco de Vitoria and his student Bernard de Soto, had stipulated that the only possible legitimate basis for not acknowledging Native rights and title was effectively communicative. The *ius gentium*, as elaborated by early modern theorists in the wake of late medieval and Renaissance recoveries and re-readings of Roman law, stipulated open trade and communication with travelers as an ethical imperative of natural law. The refusal of indigenous Americans to agree to economic relationships with representatives of other nations could, Vitoria suggested, be a basis for acknowledging the peoples of the Americas as having removed themselves from the responsibilities and protections of the law of nature.[2] On a variety of fronts, scholars often contrast this approach with the labor theory of property elaborated by John Locke in his *Second Treatise on Government*, where only appropriation and cultivation of the land was sufficient to establish legally recognizable possession.[3] While both Vitoria and Locke are concerned with theorizing the origins of lawful title, Vitoria and the Spanish theorists concerned themselves with nations and peoples, with collectives, while Locke enshrined an Anglo-American prioritization of individual labor and property in a good deal of subsequent thought and practice, whether it was his intention to do so or not. Still, it is equally important to note that, in both cases, theories of the origins of title and the legality of possession concerned themselves not with property or goods as such but with accessing the adequacy of their use, either in initial cultivation or in exchange of the fruits of that cultivation. What we see in the practices and justifications of legal conquest in the case of the expansion of the United States into the western territory of North America is a contested amalgamation of these theoretical imperatives: to take stock of the forms of life encountered in the peoples who shared continental space with settler populations and to find them lacking.

This brief chapter will trace settler colonialism as a fundamental building block of thought, law and politics in the British North American colonies and later United States, from early modern English beginnings to the end of the nineteenth century. At the turn of the twentieth century, settler colonialism as a form of life would be further elaborated, theorized and even mourned by historians of the American West such as President Theodore Roosevelt and the historian Frederick Jackson Turner in the face of the urbanization, industrialization and mass immigration that characterized the making of the modern United Sates. The argument here is twofold: first,

that far from simply taking up and imposing some inherited European imperial project, the expansion of settler society in the United Sates was forged in response to various challenges in the form of the presence of peoples who either stood in the way of or could potentially threaten the security of the idealized settler subject configured by American political thought and in the form of the inseparability of expansion policy from the partisan politics of the antebellum period and the political economy of slavery. Settler colonialism in the United States was and perhaps still is characterized by a nervous series of attempts to situate, define and secure a racialized and gendered self-governing, self-possessive and self-cultivating settler subject against the always anxiously asserted failures of government, possession and cultivation on the part of others. Needless to say, evidence to the contrary asserted directly by subject peoples could prove unsettling to the settler mind, and violently so. Second, in the face of these particular challenges and contradictions, the fusions of previous theories of empire in American settler colonialism created something new in the wider history of imperialism, and that is a liberal and commercial argument for conquest where forced participation in the networked avenues of exchange established not only legitimacy but a perverse kind of consent, and with this particular tool of empire, the rights, sovereignties and even the very histories of subaltern peoples within and outside the territorial limits of the United States could be seen to be overrun. The particularity of settler colonialism in the United States cannot be fully understood without appreciating its singular focus on the making, managing and mastering of the plurality of histories through and against which a settler society would come to constitute itself in time.

British North America and the idea of settlement

Colonization of North America carried promises of wealth, power, the amelioration of social ills and salvation for early modern Britons. Far behind imperial Spain and Portugal in the race to exploit the world's resources of labor and raw materials, England would only venture across the Atlantic in attempts to settle at the end of the sixteenth century, after the Tudor consolidation of governmental authority and state power, the expulsion and repossession of the Catholic monasteries under Henry VIII and the legal enclosures of the commons that resulted from these processes. England only succeeded in establishing permanent settlements in North America at the beginning the seventeenth century, when the Virginia Company landed at the mouth of Chesapeake Bay in 1607, carrying the chartering letter of James I, the first Stuart monarch. By this point in time, Spain had been operating successful slave colonies in the Americas for the previous century, colonies which were dependent on the forced labor of the native population and dominated by a small group of creole planter elites coexisting, at times uneasily, with the manifold presences of the Church. Where Spain pursued an extractive American empire of planter oversight, with profound implications for subsequent history, England initially pursued an empire of contractual settlement and labor. First and foremost, while England played catch-up in the game of American empire and the expected generation of wealth that would result, the promise of settler colonies for England resided in the potential to vent the largely agrarian population of laborers who had been customarily attached in various ways to manorial lands. They found themselves literally shut out as owners sought to monetize production in pursuit of profit and the capital with which to pay newly and regularly assessed taxes to support the projection of power on the part of the early modern absolutist state. The enthusiastic literature of colonization, led by Richard Hakluyt in the late sixteenth century, painted a lurid picture of the Catholic tyrannies visited upon the poor Natives of Spanish colonies in America and held out the promise of profits to investors and planters, and of security and independence to laborers willing to take on a contract of indentured servitude in Virginia.[4] Here the native population would not need to

be pressed into slavery, the English told themselves and the world, because such abuse of power was beneath the dignity of a Protestant and free people, and more directly because natives would hopefully not be needed as a labor force.

The potential and importance of settlement as an imperial strategy, even an imperative, had been a long time in the making. Thomas More's *Utopia*, published in 1516, brought up the destitution created by enclosures of the estates and contrasted with the habits of Utopia those of an England where people were valued less than the profitable sheep replacing both them and their customary rights to the land. The Utopians strictly regulated their island population and its ability to maintain equal distributions of common property by sending settlers out into the seas, exporting enough people to stave off the otherwise inevitable rise of inequality and the corrupting influences of entrenched economic power.[5] More's *Utopia* was a text of settler colonialism, and in that it was not alone. In his own contribution to early modern utopian literature, *The New Atlantis*, published nearly a century later in 1627, Francis Bacon depicted the mythical island of Bensalem as a settled colony that had developed into the model of an enlightened modern state. It collected knowledge from around the world through trade and communication, archived and studied that knowledge, and even sought out lost contact with its ancient trading partners in America.[6] The image of America hinted at here was also of a piece with discourses of colonization. Recognizing the evidence of civilization in the histories of language and culture among aboriginal populations in North and South America alike, the image of Native Americans having possessed complex societies at some point but having lost that complexity long ago and devolved back into a state of barbarism, or even savagery, was itself a trope of imperial narratives of European conquest of the Americas. Such an image allowed for the considerable evidence of complex cultures and histories to be acknowledged while discounting its relevance to the contemporary project of empire – even if the land had been occupied, possessed, cultivated and traded from at some point in the past, so the argument would go, that was no longer the case, and whatever title might have been said to have existed had been surrendered. Finally, the conjunction of the utopian with the colonial carried providential overtones as well. James Harrington's *The Commonwealth of Oceana*, published in 1656 during the protectorate of Oliver Cromwell, depicted an egalitarian commonwealth of local governance and participation, and stipulated that it was Oceana's divinely sanctioned duty to teach to the rest of humanity, living up to its name by taking to the seas for the empire of the world.[7]

These visions of the utopian promise of settler empire in the Atlantic world were powerful combinations of reason-of-state concerns for the instability created by proto-capitalist population increase and the geopolitical necessity of accumulating public wealth and state power at a level competitive with European rivals, the desire on the part of desperate laborers for achieving a longed-for economic independence and security at whatever the cost, and the conjunction of these imperial goals with an increasingly assertive Protestant national identity. Needless to say, what actually happened was far from utopian. Death from starvation, disease and violence with both the native Powhatan confederacy and fellow settlers came to well over half of those who settled in the Jamestown colony in Virginia during its first decade, leading first to draconian disciplinary measures to save the colony and ultimately the replacement of the Virginia Company's letters patent with a royal charter for the colony in 1624. Periodic violence broke out between settlers in Virginia and warriors of the Powhatan peoples during the first several decades of the colony's existence; indeed, in 1622, a Native revolt against settler expansion led by the brother of the deceased Powhatan himself, Opechancanough, nearly wiped out the colony and ultimately led to the decision bringing colonial governance and protection under royal and ministerial control.[8] In New England, pilgrim separatists arrived at Plymouth in what is today Connecticut in 1620 and would be followed shortly by the chartering of the Massachusetts Bay Colony and the

arrival of Puritans to what is today Boston, Massachusetts, in 1630. Over the following decade, in what historians call the Great Migration, thirty thousand settlers would arrive in New England, finding a more disparate collection of Native tribes whom colonial officials planned with some success to divide, conquer and supplant. In 1637, during the Pequot War, military leaders of the Plymouth colony allied with Massachusetts Bay and warriors of the by-then subdued Narragansett and Mohegan tribes attacked a Pequot Village by setting fire to its perimeter and shooting those who tried to escape the flames.[9] Revolting even to their Native allies, settler commanders congratulated themselves for doing the Lord's work. In New England in particular, the intensity of the theological identification of the colonial project and the powerful sense of divine mission into the wilderness that resulted fed what even by the standards of the history of settler colonialism was an extraordinarily violent rage against the presence of people found to be by their very existence obstacles to security of the settler project.

By the middle of the seventeenth century, Native populations in New England and Virginia had been substantially reduced by violent conflict and disease, and survivors had either been incorporated into settler colonial life to varying degrees, left at its margins or pushed so far west as to be, at least for a time, safely out of regular contact with settler populations. In Virginia in 1676, exactly a hundred years before the formally declared outbreak of the American Revolution, the tensions in the settler vision of empire and the continued presence of Native peoples on desired land in western Virginia exploded in Bacon's Rebellion. After a series of violent exchanges between frontier settlers and Native villages in western Virginia and parts of Maryland, and after settler pleas for greater protection from and military efforts against Native Americans on the part of the government led by William Berkeley, planter Nathaniel Bacon led a popular revolt of settlers, mostly formerly indentured servants, first against Native groups in proximity and then turning on the colonial government itself, attacking Jamestown. The governing elites had been reluctant to risk the cost of open warfare, but, as historian Edmund Morgan showed in his classic account of colonial Virginia, Tidewater governing elites also learned a terribly important lesson about the volatility of a disappointed white settler population and the threat that importing more and being able to give them even less would pose to the security of their own property. It was then, Morgan argues persuasively, that planters began the importation of enslaved African labor in earnest. And it was then, historian Kathleen Brown argues more recently, that a particular kind of racialized as well as gendered paternalism came to predominate legal and political culture in Virginia and beyond. Colonial settler identity cohered along class and racial lines and did so on the basis of an emerging consensus that it was the right and responsibility of all men with freehold to be able to count on the security and ensure the governability of his possessions and the people that lived on them.[10] Perhaps more than any other event, Bacon's Rebellion crystallized the power of settler colonialism to drive colonial history, and in particular it demonstrates the potency of settler liberty as an emerging ideological framework organized around the security, self-governance and self-possession of the common white male freeholder.

The explosive potential of class antagonism within the English settler population, to say nothing of violence between poor frontier settlers and various Native American groups, became as apparent to metropolitan officials and ultimately Parliament as it had been to the provincial rulers of Virginia. At the end of the seventeenth century, the Crown moved on several fronts throughout the British North American colonies to consolidate imperial authority, enforce Parliamentary regulations and restore order to colonial governance in the wake of successive disturbances from the English Civil War and the restoration of the Stuart monarchy in 1660 to the 'Glorious Revolution' against James II in 1688. Indeed, James II appointed Edmund Andros to oversee the Dominion of England in 1686, bringing the colonies of New England, later New York and what is today New Jersey, under the administrative rule of Andros, acting directly in the name

of the Crown. The instituting of the Dominion, the effort bring colonies more directly under metropolitan control, and the wider cultural process of Anglicization of which these political developments were examples all drove widespread popular resentment. In New York, which had been a Dutch possession but became a British colony in 1664, particularly acute resentment amongst the significant non-English white settler population drove a rebellion against royal colonial authority led by Jacob Leisler, a German colonist, and royal authority was not fully restored in the colony until 1691. By then, Parliament had successfully supplanted James II with the invited rule of William and Mary, under whose direction the Dominion of New England was taken apart, Andros recalled, and the colonies brought back within the imperial fold as distinct colonial polities. Lessons, however, were learned. A more powerful and assertive Parliament acting in consort with a newly popular Protestant monarchy was as uninterested in colonial disorder and claims of colonial rights as the Stuarts had been. Massachusetts was issued a royal charter in 1691, bringing it under the oversight of a colonial governor appointed by and acting directly in the name of the Crown. In the eighteenth century, the rapidly increasing settler population of the British North American colonies would find itself inhabiting a confused and at times violently contested legal space between confederated independence and being subject to direct rule from Westminster.[11] The development of national self-consciousness among colonists emerged in the face of the implications of this contestation and confusion.

Debates about the emergence of an American national identity or at least historical self-awareness have always troubled historians of the colonial, revolutionary and early national periods in United States history. Recently, historians have recovered two sets of early twentieth century analyses, one neo-progressive and focused on the failures of elites to fully control bustling popular radicalism from the end of the Seven Years War and through to the ratification of the US Constitution, if not beyond, and a second neo-imperial and focused on the development of governing institutions and ideas across the early modern period. Both constitute efforts to move past the impasses of debates about the relative power of liberal or republican ideas that characterized a good deal of the work on the ideological characteristics of the American founding in the last decades of the twentieth century.[12] The multiple possible perspectives of settler colonialism as a historiographical framework, particularly on legal and intellectual history, together with borderland studies and women's history, are promising points of contact between social, economic, and legal, political, and intellectual history.[13] At least one thing seems clear. Race, or, more particularly, the growing need on the part of settlers to define civic identity within the British empire, not only territorially and denominationally but racially, was to be found at the center of these historical processes.

The intractability of race as a crucial part of the emergence of settler liberty played an important role in the imperial crisis that would lead to the Declaration of Independence in 1776. Founded as a proprietary colony in 1681, William Penn and the Quaker elite that presided over the colony in his stead sought out better relations with Native Americans compared to the violent histories of Virginia and New England from the beginning. But it was Pennsylvania where some of the most notable violence between increasing settler populations and Native people under duress occurred in the middle of the eighteenth century, as a burgeoning multinational white settler population swelled beyond the Philadelphia area and into the possessions of Delaware peoples living on the southern outskirts of Iroquois territory. Violent conflict in the western territories of mid-Atlantic states increased before, during and after the Seven Years War (1756–1763) as eager-to-expand settlers pressed further west and as Native groups rediscovered their own power to respond in kind, targeting settler homesteads in conscious efforts to intimidate others thinking about moving west. Indeed, the pages of newspapers that made up the vibrant print culture of late colonial cities and towns like Philadelphia became filled with frightful tales of Indian violence

visited upon German and Scots-Irish frontier settlers, whose severed limbs, heads and scalps capti-vated and terrorized the largely British American audience in coastal population centers.

As Peter Silver has demonstrated, the experience of the idea of frontier violence turned out to be as historically significant as the violence itself, for it was in the power of circulating images and stories of racial violence that a polyglot and fractious settler population would start to think of itself as a distinct people.[14] In 1763, in the aftermath of British victory in the war, when newly allied Native groups from several tribes retaliated against energetic settler expansion into the Ohio River Valley, groups of settlers like the Paxton Boys in western Pennsylvania responded with populist violence against what Natives they could find. As with Bacon's Rebellion, the Paxton Boys turned east toward governing elites after their combat with Natives, claiming that governments were not doing enough to protect them from their collective enemies and asserting their authority to enforce their superior rights as settlers if the sitting government would not. As they did so, they were participating in a much wider contestation of the nature of their rights as settlers and of whom precisely Native Americans, taken brazenly as a group, could be said to be the collective enemies.

A revolutionary settlement

In response to the outbreak of renewed violence between Native Americans and settlers and renewed fears of costly continental warfare in the interior of the North American continent, Par-liament issued the Proclamation of 1763, limiting settler expansion to the Appalachian mountains and promising protection to loyal Native groups living west of the proclamation line. In addition to interfering with settler expectations of support in their desire for western land on which to pursue their own independence, Parliament succinctly expressed for the first of many times in the following decade the legal theory on which it exercised authority over the colonies, and it was a theoretical structure at the center of the coming of the revolutionary war and the founding of the republic. William Blackstone, in his celebrated *Commentaries on the Laws of England*, delineated a basic distinction between types of imperial legal authority. There were under British rule abroad, Blackstone summarized, two types of territory. In what he called a conquered territory, agents of the government or settlers encountered a population and either violently conquered them or could claim superior title to the land. In such a case, the subject people retained their own laws for themselves, but those laws had no standing before English legal authority, and their laws and actions could be changed, cancelled or vetoed by the sovereign at any time. And in the case of territory acquired from non-Christian people, the native laws were null and void. Having been conquered from the original inhabitants, the American possessions, Blackstone argued, were an example of just such a territory.[15] Peoples living in territory acquired by conquest enjoyed the status of 'distinct but dependent dominions', exercising some powers of self-government but within a limited scope presided over by the law-making power of the sovereign (effectively, the conjoined institutions of the king in parliament and the king in council, the authority of which was embodied in the Privy Council). Settlement territories, on the other hand, described those instances where settlers happened upon empty space, in which case they naturally carried the full body of English law and liberties with them as they went, and the new territory became effec-tively England writ large. The British North American colonies, colonists asserted, collectively formed an example of such a territory.[16]

In notes given to members of the Continental Congress meeting in Philadelphia in 1774, published as *A Summary View of the Rights of British America*, Thomas Jefferson provided the most sustained and, from the standpoint of settler colonialism, ideologically significant response to parliamentary sovereignty and the historical assumptions and legal ideas that supported it.

Dismissing the idea that parliament could regulate the internal affairs of the colonies, and moving beyond the earlier colonial arguments that parliament could regulate the empire as a whole but not make law for specific colonies within it, Jefferson argues that, on historical grounds, parliament had no authority in British America at all. The history to which he pointed was one of settler sovereignty and liberty: the Saxon migrants to the British isles, Jefferson asserted, had not been bound by legal ties to their homelands on the continent, and just so, American colonists were bound only to what legal ties they had consented to. True enough, Jefferson argued, conquest established sovereignty, but if such sovereignty existed in British America, it was with the colonists themselves: 'America was conquered, and her settlements made, and firmly established, at the expense of individuals, and not the British public. Their own blood was spilt in acquiring lands for their settlement, their own fortunes expended in making those settlements effectual; for themselves they fought, for themselves they conquered, and for themselves alone they have right to hold'.[17] Conveniently sidestepping the recent war and the British public debt that had been required to win it, Jefferson gave voice to the settler force of colonial protest against British rule. The Crown presided over an empire of confederated free polities, settler societies all, by Jefferson's lights, and what authority existed there existed only by direct consent, a consent that could be actively withdrawn in short order.

Notably, Jefferson was not only unabashed about the violent settler origins of American politics but he was quite comfortable placing those origins in a legitimating global history of settler colonialism. That he referred to the Angles and Saxons as 'our ancestors' suggests the degree to which race and nation were intertwined in American revolutionary ideology and the degree to which both race and nation were taking on ideological force as constructions in the context of a renewed project of settler colonialism. In the face of Parliamentary efforts to govern the boisterous plurality of peoples and jurisdictions on the North American continent, colonial settlers asserted a fundamental right of settlement in western territory and expected acknowledgment of that right on the grounds of both common racial bonds and claims of superior cultivation of valuable land. When colonists discovered that they were not simply transplanted Englishmen, but in fact shared juridical space and legal subjectivity with a host of others, including Native American allies and enemies and French Catholics in Quebec, many revolted, fighting a revolution and founding a republic largely in the name of settler colonialism. Significantly, arguments made for the legitimacy of expansion during the nineteenth century would both build on and depart from Jefferson's framework, and in this Jefferson himself would play a leading role. Settler colonialism became all the more powerful an ideological force in the United States when its adherents began to describe it as not predicated on conquest.

Democracy and settlement were inseparable in the Jeffersonian and Jacksonian periods of antebellum history. As early as the Washington administration, the federal government created by the newly ratified US Constitution implemented a civilization program that encouraged various Native groups to adopt settler models for property organization and even family structure, incorporating them into smaller tracts of land and attempting to make fellow settlers of them. The Northwest Ordinance of 1784 had stipulated the constitutional processes for bringing new states into the union. Clearly, as Jefferson himself recognized, the United States was set up for continental expansion from a very early stage in its political development. The ideological pressures of Jeffersonian politics and political economy would intensify that process considerably.[18] Against Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Hamilton's vision of emulating the British model of industrialization, Jefferson and James Madison argued for an agrarian commercial republic spread out over vast amounts of territory.[19] Promising land for economic security to newly politically empowered white working men of the new republic, Jeffersonian democracy and the administration at its head pursued Indian removal as a top priority at all levels of the government.

Continuing the civilization program, Jefferson pursued an aggressive policy of trading for and purchasing Indian land; indeed, Jefferson instructed his agents to do what they could to grant credit to Native trading partners in the northwestern territory, because their indebtedness would only make them that much more desperate to sell land cheaply and in large quantities. Commerce, in theory, not conquest, becomes the instrument of empire. Jefferson, Madison and others formulated and defended the possibility of an extended republic bound not by force but by networks of commercial exchange. In doing so, they found themselves abandoning centuries-old historical axioms on the incompatibility of democracy and republicanism with government of an extended territory. The distance between constituent parts of the body politic and the distant state and standing army traditionally thought necessary to govern such an extended territory flew in the face of received civic humanist wisdom on the limits of republics.[20] That the United States purportedly proved such wisdom wrong was just another sign to ideologists of expansion that the nation represented the arrival in history of a new ordering of politics and society and that Native Americans could either accept the force of the historical inevitability of that order's triumph or be trampled by it. That such exchange could be interpreted as acceptance was an important outgrowth of these developments. Conquest and empire still preceded settlement, but it was carried out through and discussed only as benevolent commerce, even as a kind of protection.

The unique blend of previous practices and assumptions of empire in the Americas that constituted settler colonialism in the United States reached its apotheosis in the figure of Andrew Jackson, himself a veteran of Indian wars in the southwest and a hero amongst the burgeoning white settler population of newly forming western territories. In his presidency, which began in 1829, Jackson moved to replace previous combinations of purchase and acculturation with disappearance or removal. Extending and radicalizing the theory of settlement expressed by Jefferson in his retort to the implications of Blackstone's framework, the Jackson administration and Jacksonian ideologists of expansion asserted the right of settlers to contest at will and the right of the government to remove Native groups organized collectively. In his address to Congress on the Indian Removal Act of 1830, Jackson argued that Native Americans not assimilated as individuals into American society were better off being collectively removed further west. Here, he ran into a problem of federal power, settler rights and recognition of collective legal identity. While in the earlier Supreme Court case of *Johnson v. M'Intosh* in 1823, Chief Justice John Marshall had ruled that Native Americans did not have standing to sue in federal court, in 1832, Marshall had the chance to throw a wrench in Jackson's vision, and he took it. Setting free a missionary who had been arrested by the state of Georgia for violating state law in entering federally designated Cherokee territory within state boundaries, in *Worcester v. Georgia*, Marshall ruled that not only did Georgia lack possession of the authority to regulate Indian affairs, even within their own boundaries, he went on to suggest that only the federal government could have any legal relation with them at all. He did so by reasserting the theory of conquest against the claims of settlement, articulating the sovereign responsibilities inherited by the federal government from the British state after American independence.[21] By Marshall's findings, the federal government had exclusive rights and vaguely defined albeit real responsibilities toward Native groups with whom it had a legal relationship. For Jackson and his successor, Martin van Buren, Marshall's decision was a gross mistake, and they went on to ignore it, using a treaty signed with unofficial representatives of the tribes in question to authorize the forced removal of various Native peoples from the southeast to the Oklahoma territory. Needless to say, advocates of removal could understand the ideological poles as reenactments of the American Revolution itself. Pressed settlers seeking the chance to live independent lives found their rights to settle western land challenged by centralized constitutional power. In measuring

conflicting claims of possession and legal standing, that power at the very least implied a basic legal personhood adhering in Native Americans and in doing so violated fundamental tenets of settler colonialism, where rights of civic participation and legal identification were racially exclusive in the first place and proceeded from the activities of developmental white settler cultivation. The importance of this measuring of civic identity to the broad impact of settler colonialism on American politics would only increase, and violently and dramatically so, as the nineteenth century wore on.

The union of settlements

Settler colonialism proved to be such a pervasive aspect of nineteenth-century politics that it is impossible to understand the origins of the American Civil War without understanding the significance of the intertwined issues of expansion, cultivation and possession. If the divide between Jackson's Democrats and Whigs in the 1820s, '30s and '40s, like the original divide between Jeffersonian Republicans and Federalists, had a great deal to do with the limits, if any, of expansion, it is possible to understand the American Civil War as a war over two very different visions of expansion, or two different settler colonialisms. Sure enough, over the course of the antebellum period there were partisans of expansion on all sides, like William Henry Harrison, who served as a military leader in campaigns against Native Americans following the leader Tecumseh during the War of 1812, as a territorial governor and very briefly as the president of the United States, elected as a Whig, or Henry Clay, a Whig who favored both expansion and national political and economic development of the long-settled United States. That being said, the issue of slavery and its impact on discussions of expansion drove political conflict further onto the shoals of tensions within settler visions of the nation's future. Constitutional crises like the Missouri Crisis of 1819–1820, when Missouri eventually entered the nation as a slaveholding state in a compromise brokered by Clay, showed the perils of the intensifying national divide. The Nullification Crisis of 1832, when leaders of South Carolina declared their right to veto tariffs that threatened the global security of plantation political economy, further demonstrated how precariously situated the politics of expansion was on the politics of slavery, and so how the politics of both were implicated in particular forms of settler colonialism. While Northern leaders grew increasingly anxious about the further expansion of slavery into western territory, holding out a vision of the promise of the west as a land for independent proprietors that had no room for massive plantations, Southern leaders grew even more anxious about the balance of economic and political power within the Union. Southern leaders demanded federal protection of their rights of property in the bodies and lives of escaped slaves and consideration of the need of the slave system to expand to remain both politically and economically viable within the Union and a profitable cotton-producing region for domestic and international markets.

When President James Polk's ambitious expansion agenda embraced the United States going to war with Mexico in 1846 for the right to annex Texas, the tension building between the interlocking politics of slavery and expansion exploded. It was clear to young Whigs like Congressman Abraham Lincoln from Illinois that the war was nothing but a public venture for the sake of private enterprise, specifically that of expanding the empire of slave production further west and, possibly, as Southern theorists of the benefits of slaveholding societies dreamed, further south into Central and even South America.[22] The signing of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo and the end of the Mexican-American War in 1848 brought most of what is today the western United States into the territorial control of the United States government, and it required the compromising skills of Henry Clay and others once again to stave off the growing threat of disunion. California was only allowed to enter the Union as a free state on the condition of the

passage of a newly strengthened Fugitive Slave Act and the tabling of the Wilmot proviso, a bill proposed by Democrat David Wilmot of Pennsylvania to ban slavery from any newly acquired territory. That northern Democrats increasingly found themselves allies with the faltering Whig party would play a crucial role in the construction of the Republican Party in the 1850s, and the party's eventual figurehead, Abraham Lincoln, was perfectly suited to play the role of articulating anew the project of settler colonialism for the sake of the federal Union. In his famous campaign against Senator Stephen Douglas in 1858 for a Senate seat and through to his successful run at the presidency in 1860, Lincoln articulated what was a stake in the conflict over slavery as a threat to the future of independent labor and proprietorship in western territory. Combined with increasing popular weariness of the power that slaveholding states exercised over national policy, Lincoln and his fellow Republicans were able to develop a critique of what they called 'the Slave Power' into the basis of a political organization that would combine traditional coastal bases of the Federalist and Whig parties with common white northern and southern electoral components of Jacksonian democracy. When farmers and their sons went to battle for the Union after the breakout of the Civil War in 1861, they did so to save the democratic promise of settler colonialism from the equally powerful colonialism of plantation-owning settlers. The goal of policy in a democratic country, Lincoln told an audience at the Wisconsin Agricultural Society in 1859, should be to nurture the mutually reinforcing relationship between the farmer's cultivation of the land with his body and his capacity for cultivation of himself with his mind and body.[23] The Homestead Act of 1862 and the Morrill Act of the same year, after all, provided for the supply of federal land tracts to settlers and for new colleges and universities to educate them and their children. This project of building an ideal laboring, self-possessing and so self-governing citizen was one that prefigured the citizen as a kind of settler and the venture of American politics as a kind of colonialism.

As racialized and gendered as this project was, it had implications that could challenge such boundaries even as it did so on the project's terms. Proponents of women's rights would marshal a rhetoric of embodied and intellectual self-possession and capacity for self-direction that purposefully played on the implicit promises of the settler identity at the heart of American politics. When radical Republicans attempted to push their agenda for Reconstruction after the Civil War, they did so by advocating that plantations be broken up and distributed to formerly enslaved, newly enfranchised men. Rallying behind the slogan of '40 acres and a mule', these Republicans were pushing the promise of a particular vision of gendered proprietorship appropriate to settler colonialism. The power of this settler understanding of citizenship would long outlive the age of Lincoln. As always, in new and different forms, historical actors picked up the legacy of the inseparability of American democracy from the facts of settler history and put them to both new and old ends. For decades after the close of combat in the war, federal troops were mobilized in western territories to forcefully negotiate with or downright force remaining Native groups off of desired land and onto reservations, committing some of the most violent acts of aggression against the presence of Natives in the long history of settler colonialism and its role in the creation and maintaining of the United States. What historians William Appleman Williams and Jackson Lears discuss as the ascension in American political culture of 'empire as a way of life' in the late nineteenth century established conditions where the alleged complexity and superiority of American cultivated self-governance justified its growing mission in the world to make that world safe for a very particular vision of liberty.[24] Theodore Roosevelt, after all, would make a political name for himself and build a career on using fears of losing what had made the nation great as obvious space to do the manly work of conquest and settlement disappeared, extolling the regenerative promise of overseas adventures and greater self-assertion on the world stage. At the end of the nineteenth century, those fears and ideas would be given

even more currency by historian Frederick Jackson Turner, who argued in his famous paper on the frontier in American history that the closing of the frontier, or the Anglo settlement of the west coast of the continent, brought an uncertain end to the social forces that had defined the progress of American democracy up to that point. Democracy and civilization had always worked in the United States, Turner argued, because the continent provided space to vent or dissipate social and class antagonisms and the inevitable corruptions of developed politics. Ever like More's Utopians, Americans had always been able to go further and regenerate the national strength in the activity of settlement. For Turner, Americans now had to face the frightful prospect that their experiment in self-government would either come to an end or change beyond recognition with the arrival of their incapacity for perpetual expansion.[25]

Conclusion

While Turner's frontier thesis is mightily problematic, it bears witness to the fundamental importance of settler colonialism to United States history. If there can be said to be such a thing as American character, or an American mind, or perhaps an American experience, it has been forged in large part by the experiences of settlement and conquest that have characterized social and institutional development since European contact. Seeking a security carved out of an environment that very few actually mistook as empty, the white settler population of the United States that drove the politics of Jeffersonian and Jacksonian democracy pursued an imperfectly conceived, fleeting, contradictory and inherently exclusionary concept of settler liberty, a liberty rooted in the anxious policing of gendered and racialized boundaries of civic identity and the nervous measurement of capacities for self-possession and self-government. For Tocqueville, and for Turner, what we can recognize as a specific crystallization of settler colonialism was and we might say is at the center of democracy in America. American democracy, indeed, is both sustained and undermined by its anchoring in a history of contestations of colonialism. For Tuner in particular, the uncertainties and contingencies of western settlement and what he does not hesitate to call conquest was part of a linear process of democratization, national formation, and social and economic progress, one that nevertheless he feared could be coming to an end. In this, he brilliantly captures the character of settler colonialism in the United States: a confident narrative of historical development that marginalizes and subdues while not altogether erasing other histories confronts and seeks to move beyond a sharp awareness of its own historicity. Such have been the tensions and challenges of this particular settler society.

Rather than think progressively, then, it seems appropriate to follow the lead of legal scholar Aziz Rana and think dialectically.[26] In an authoritative history of settler liberty and settler colonialism in American law and politics, aptly titled *The Two Faces of American Freedom*, Rana has argued that the power and importance of settler ideology to American history lies in its dual character, in the coexistence of a substantively democratic constitutional language and practice that is periodically tapped to confront, critique and at times undo the rigid and exclusionary implications of its own history. To fulfill the promise of social justice and substantively democratic politics alive in peculiar ways and places in the histories of settler societies, Rana suggests, the goal should be to universalize settler liberty. And, we should add, carrying this analysis forward, to be universal, settler colonialism would have to stop being colonial. To be universal, settler liberty would have to stop being settler liberty. Hopefully, a good place to start is in restoring histories of settler colonialism to their rightful place as central to ongoing debates and struggles in United States history.

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8

SETTLER COLONIALISM IN NEW SPAIN AND THE EARLY MEXICAN REPUBLIC

Ignacio Martínez

Irving Leonard has likened the historical evolution of settler society in colonial New Spain to a high medieval drama. For Leonard, the 'strange ethnic conglomerate of almost kaleidoscopic diversity' and the elaborate societal façade of 'intricately ornate design' that made up New Spain were best encapsulated by the artistic sensibilities of the Baroque.[1] This was a flamboyant society; on the one hand, it was rigidly structured and hierarchical, on the other, it was turbulent and full of contradictions. It was a society that developed sixteen different racial categorizations in order to preserve what historians have called a pigmentocracy, rule by the light-skinned, and yet allowed those with darker skin to purchase certificates of whiteness (*cédulas de gracias al sacar*), granting them access to status, honor and prestige – crucial elements in a society obsessed with all three.[2]

Spain's intellectual, cultural, economic and political experiment in New Spain lasted 300 years, almost a full century longer than its French and English rivals in the New World. Spain made its influence felt in this period, often through interventions unwanted by settlers. Striving to sustain the loyalty of its most prosperous colony, the Crown nevertheless stole its wealth and infantilized its population, driving a wedge between *La Madre Patria* (mother country) and the settlers of New Spain. 'Obedezco pero no cumplo' (I obey but I do not comply) became a common adage of the period, which is aptly characteristic of the relationship between the settler polity and the metropole.[3]

What occurred in New Spain was an experiment in syncretism. With the help of enslaved Africans, local Amerindians, and European flora and fauna, New Spain's settler population radically restructured the social and physical landscape. Scholars have identified this extreme reorganization of society as 'one of the most profound transformations in human history'.[4] Within this environment, Spaniards planned their cities in the European style, developed fruitful relationships with an indigenous nobility, marrying into an already established social hierarchy, all the while killing and enslaving tens of thousands of lesser status. This chapter examines how the settler colonial society originated, developed and flourished amid these paradoxes. It traces this phenomenon from the densely populated urban centers of New Spain to the far-flung and sparsely populated northern fringes of the Spanish frontier and the Mexican Republic.

Distinguished twentieth-century Mexican historian Edmundo O'Gorman has argued that the origins of settler colonialism in New Spain reside in the Spanish imagination. For him, it was an observable truth that America was not so much discovered by Europe as it was invented by Europeans.[5] During the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, Spaniards remained enthralled in the

drama of *La Reconquista* (The Reconquest).[6] For close to 800 years, the defenders of Christendom had fought off and on against the Islamic armies of North Africa in a struggle for land, faith and political unity, striking the final victorious blow in Al-Andalus on January 2, 1492. That same year, nine months after Muhammad XII, Abu Abu Allah Bobadilla capitulated at Granada, Columbus set foot in the Americas. Castilians interpreted this momentous discovery as a divine offering to the recently unified Spanish Crown, gifted by God to the Catholic monarchs for their victory over the Moors and so that they may continue converting infidels over to the one true religion. Sixteenth-century historian Francisco López de Gómara called the discovery of the New World 'the greatest event since the creation of the world (excluding the incarnation and death of Him who created it)'.[7]

Settler colonialism in New Spain

Sustained efforts by colonists at bringing America under the fold of a Universal Monarchy began in central Mexico. Following the conquest of Tenochtitlán in 1521, Spanish conquistadores radiated to the north and south of the Indian capital harboring fanciful dreams of replicating Hernán Cortés's great success.[8] These men had fought with Cortés, but most had received little or no remuneration for their efforts. Disgruntled, they demanded payment. Cortés, forced to take their pleas seriously, grudgingly granted them lucrative grants of Indian tribute and labor called *encomiendas*. The Crown, at least initially, saw the *encomienda* as a useful form of recompense for deserving conquistadores and as a way to bring Indians into the embrace of the Holy Catholic Church. In return for a grant of encomienda, for instance, *encomenderos* – generally speaking, a numerically small group – were tasked with protecting and Christianizing their charges; they were also required to maintain good order in their communities.[9] However, New World Spaniards reformulated the encomienda, a long-established medieval Castilian institution dating back to the early years of the *Reconquista*, in an effort to make themselves 'lords of vassals'.[10] The encomienda system thus lent itself to abuse, land theft and outright slavery. Most settlers considered owning land and controlling Indian labor as the most efficient way of acquiring such lordly status. These, after all, were men who came from Spain's lower class, and as such they were anxious to elevate their social standing.[11]

The Spanish king's chief concern was that a feudal aristocratic class in the New World might in time challenge his royal authority. The Spanish monarch felt it was critical for the Indians to remain subjects of the Crown and not of individual men, especially men of inferior pedigree. Thus, from the earliest decades of settlement, the Crown attempted to impose its legal and fiscal might onto its settler population in the hopes of depriving it of any significant degree of local autonomy. For much of the sixteenth century, therefore, there remained an uneasy tension between the Spanish monarchy and its conquistador/settler population. A major blow was dealt to the settlers when in 1542–3 the New Laws of the Indies abolished Indian slavery and endeavoured to abolish individual encomiendas.[12] These policies, championed by the clergy on moral grounds and endorsed by the politically savvy monarchy, were met with widespread scorn by encomenderos. These battle-hardened men, having fought for the Royal Crown and having given her new kingdoms, felt entitled not only to grants of encomienda but to a life of leisure as a New World nobility. They also demanded the right to bequeath their land, wealth and titles to their heirs.

The general feeling of anger and resentment following the announcement of these policies led to open rebellion in Peru and to the assassination of Peru's first viceroy, Blasco Núñez Vela. In New Spain, Don Martín Cortés, son of Hernán Cortés and the second Marquis of the Valley of Oaxaca – a title inherited from his father – headed a movement of encomenderos against the

abolition of encomiendas. An advocate for greater autonomy from Spain, Don Martín was tried in 1566 for attempting to overthrow the monarchy. This embryonic sentiment for autonomy and independence, despite royal efforts to curtail its development, originated with these earliest settlers and slowly matured over the course of the colonial period.

Despite such absolute legislation and the eventual loss of encomienda grants, possessing land and living a life free of menial work remained an important ideal for New Spain's settler population. Given such lofty ideals and penchant for aristocratic living, the Crown proved unsuccessful in enticing Spanish settlers to take up farming.[13] Over the course of the colonial period only a small population of mestizo farmers and ranchers emerged.[14] Labor-intensive agricultural jobs were largely left for Indians, blacks, and other mixed-race peoples.

Obtaining a life of wealth and leisure also required that Spanish settlers dispossess the indigenous population of their land. To a large extent, they were successful, aided in part by the death of millions of indigenous peoples in the century following the arrival of Columbus. Scholars disagree about the exact number of indigenous people in the Americas at contact.[15] For central New Spain alone, scholars have estimated a pre-Columbian indigenous population of at least 25 million. A century after the conquest there remained less than a million, a 95% decline.[16] Part of the reason for such a dramatic drop was due to the devastating impact of European diseases, chiefly smallpox, measles and typhus. Settler abuse, enslavement and overwork of the indigenous population also contributed to its rapid decline. For example, with the decline of the encomienda system and the termination of Indian slavery, Spanish settlers instituted the *repartimiento* (labor draft). Through this system of labor, every adult male Indian was to provide forty-five days of unpaid work a year. While laws were carefully drafted to reduce the potential for abuse, the repartimiento system led to wide-scale exploitation. The source of much protest and legislation, the repartimiento persisted in many places until the end of the colonial period.

Partly because of such brutal labor practices, many indigenous communities and individuals fled their homes and ancestral lands. This migration radically altered New Spain's demographic landscape, consequently granting Spanish settlers access to abandoned land. At the same time, this exodus severely challenged the settlers' ability to live off indigenous labor. To rectify this problem, Spanish settlers and their Indian allies – groups who had found association with Spaniards highly beneficial – organized large campaigns to gather up runaway and isolated Indians, forcefully settling them in towns (*congregaciones*).[17]

While some indigenous communities sought refuge far from centers of European control, others, at least initially, utilized their size, social prominence and centralized location to negotiate structures of power with the settler regime. During the early colonial period, as Spanish colonists endeavored to exploit the land and its native inhabitants, several indigenous groups, mostly from the more strategically valuable communities in the central valley of New Spain, retained a relative degree of power and autonomy. 'Far from being destroyed by the Spanish conquest', writes Rebecca Horn, 'the indigenous state [in the valley of central New Spain] was initially strengthened'.[18] This occurred because the encomienda, rural parishes, Indian municipalities and administrative jurisdictions were initially built upon an already functional *altepetl* (indigenous regional state). This meant that the colonization of New Spain during the early colonial period was chiefly confined to core areas such as mining zones, plantations, major ports and capital cities rather than the rural valley of Mexico. Despite the devastation wrought by the colonization of New Spain, many '"indigenous entities survived throughout the colonial period as corporate bodies and sites of individual and collective identities'.[19] It is important to note that indigenous peoples throughout New Spain never developed a unified identity as 'Indians'. Horn writes: 'indigenous-language sources counter any traditional notion of a homogenous "Indian" identity; Mesoamericans continued to identify themselves primarily by membership in a Native

community (in contrast to a racialized pan-Indian identity) throughout the colonial period and beyond'.[20]

The maintenance of regional autonomy in central New Spain did, however, require indigenous communities to eventually adopt Spanish material practices and cooperate with European governing bodies such as the *cabildo* (town council). In time, the cabildo became the most important site of local autonomy and identity for communities in the central valley. Horn argues that 'the cabildo worked to protect the integrity of community lands, challenge tributes and labor abuses, defend residents in myriad ways, seek privileges for the corporate body, and overall promote the status and well-being of the community'.[21] Within these established communities, indigenous leaders such as Don Juan de Guzmán Itztolinqui, *tlatoani* (ruler) of the altepetl of Coyoacán, occupied prominent positions of influence; he and other high-ranking indigenous officials were able to effectively negotiate relations of power with Spanish settlers.[22] As the colonial era progressed, leaders like Don Guzmán, and the indigenous communities he represented, lost a significant share of their status and influence to a new crop of European settlers unwilling to share power with an Indian elite.

These new European settlers came from various walks of life, each with different dreams, goals and motivations. They arrived from diverse regions of Spain, reflecting uniquely regional temperaments; they were thus monolithic in neither thought nor custom. Leonard writes: 'Spain has long been characterized by a regionalism so pronounced as to endow its inhabitants with striking contrasts of temperament, appearance, and language'.[23] The regionalism present in Spain was then replicated in New Spain, where entire towns or provinces became dominated by Old World regional affinities.[24] They shared, in other words, a similar heterogeneity to their indigenous counterparts, except that Spaniards, unlike the Indians of New Spain, shared a common identity as Europeans, itself infused with a sense of entitlement and superiority.

To ensure that New Spain received settlers best suited for colonizing Spain's newly acquired possessions, the Crown instituted the Council of the Indies in 1524 to oversee the affairs of the New World and to regulate immigration to New Spain. In particular, it placed heavy restrictions on the immigration of Protestants, foreigners, 'Gypsies', and anyone with either Jewish or Moorish blood, requiring certificates of *limpieza de sangre* (purity of blood) for travel to the New World.[25] Regulating immigration based on lineage and blood proved a difficult proposition, and many, despite such heavy restrictions, eventually made their way into New Spain. Official passenger lists of ships bound for the New World identify people of Austrian, German, Italian, Fleming, French, Greek, Irish, Dutch and even English descent. These men and women left Spain for a variety of reasons, including economic, political and social opportunities and in order to escape financial and legal problems.

According to Magnus Mörner, between 1500 and 1700, close to half a million Europeans traveling on Spanish ships arrived on the shores of New Spain.[26] Mexico City, the seat of the viceroyalty and New Spain's most important and populous city, had the largest Spanish population throughout the colonial period. In 1560, four decades after the fall of the Aztec capital, Mexico City harbored a population of about 8,000 Spaniards.[27] By 1810, the year New Spain declared its intention to separate from Spain, Mexico City had a population of 150,000 people, which included Spaniards, Indians, blacks and people of mixed race. This was a sizable population at a time when the whole of New Spain counted about 6 million people.[28] In that same year, New Spain tallied 3,676,000 Indians, 15,000 peninsular Spaniards, 1,092,000 *Criollos* (native born Spaniards), 704,000 *mestizos* (Spanish and Indian mixed people) and 634,000 *pardos* (black and mixed people). Peninsular Spaniards and Criollos, even as late as the mid-nineteenth century, never made up more than 20% of the entire colonial population.[29]

Of the total immigration to New Spain, two groups in particular are worth mention: one for its significant numbers, the other for its lack thereof. With the decline in the native population in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, African slaves were imported en masse as a replacement labor force. Throughout the colonial period, New Spain received approximately 200,000 African slaves.[30] Most of them worked in mines (during the early mining period they represented one-third of the total workforce), sugar plantations, textile factories and as household slaves. Their high cost, however, limited the number of blacks that could be purchased by Spanish settlers. Robert McCaa has argued that slavery slowly declined over the colonial period because it was unable to compete with free wage labor. Additionally, slaves often fled their masters when abuse or mistreatment became unbearable, creating autonomous Cimarrón communities of free people. By 1810, New Spain had the largest population of free blacks in the Western hemisphere, numbering roughly one-half million.[31]

Spanish women were also instrumental in the development of settler society. But prior to the mid-sixteenth century, there were relatively few Spanish women in the Americas. Columbus had brought no women with him on his voyages. In a 1502 voyage to the Caribbean, of 2,500 people on board, only seventy-five were women (they were found accompanying their husbands).[32] Single, marriageable women began to arrive to the Caribbean and later to New Spain in slightly larger numbers when the House of Trade was ordered in 1511 to allow them passage to the New World. Their eventual arrival to New Spain was crucial in two respects, argues Guillermo Cespedes: it helped tame the reckless behavior of single Spanish men (at least theoretically), and it spurred the natural growth of the white population. Up to then, most of the men who had traveled to New Spain were either unmarried or had conveniently left their wives and children back in Spain. Yet despite this slight upsurge in female immigration, 'between 1509 and 1533 they numbered only four hundred and seventy of the forty-six hundred recorded passengers to the Indies . . . at the close of the colonial period, [Alexander von] Humboldt found only two hundred and seventeen European women in Mexico City as against two thousand one hundred and eighteen European men'.[33] Given the relative dearth of Spanish women, and their lack of feminine oversight, Spanish men enjoyed unrestricted sexual freedoms. R. C. Padden has written that 'the primary conquest of Mexico was really more biological than military. . . . Although it cannot be statistically proved or disproved, I would guess that the Spaniards commonly left more pregnancies in their camps than they did causalities on the field of battle'.[34] This type of aggressive sexual behavior – even though the arrival of Spanish women helped curtail its pervasiveness, and in spite of opposition by the Crown to Indian-Spanish unions – continued for much of the colonial period and was the origins of the *mestisaje* (race-mixture) that took firm root throughout all of Spanish America.

Mestisaje was a complex matter for settlers in New Spain. According to Magnus Mörner, during the formative years of New Spain's existence there emerged upwards of sixteen racial classifications, underscoring the importance of race for settler populations.[35] For example, labels such as *tente en el aire* (suspended in the air),[36] the progeny of a mestizo couple, reflected neither a regression nor a progression in one's racial makeup. Others were more derisive, such as *salta atrás* (throwback) and *ahí te estás* (there you stay), and still others reflected a zoological provenance, such as *coyote* (coyote), *lobo* (wolf) and *mula* (mule). During the seventeenth century, the Crown also commissioned a series of *casta* (a generic term meaning of mixed race) paintings to depict the outcomes of different types of inter-racial mixing. Generally speaking, society in New Spain was composed of Spaniards, Indians and blacks. This social hierarchy (*sistema de castas*) permeated colonial society and determined job choice, marriage options and social distinction. It conveniently placed Spaniards at the top, *castas* (those of mixed race) in the middle, and Indians and blacks at the bottom. However, over the years, as racial mixture progressed, the vast majority of colonists were simply considered castas, or too mixed to be able to determine racial provenance.

Given its high concentration of Spanish settlers, Mexico City became New Spain's cultural, economic and political center. Built on the foundations of the Aztec capital, it represented an important site of power for both Spaniards and indigenous peoples throughout the valley of Mexico. 'The preliminary institution of settlement', writes Richard Morse, 'was customarily the chessboard town or city with its spacious central plaza surrounded by substantial buildings for municipal, imperial, and ecclesiastical administration and for worship'.[37] Cities such as Mexico City were purposely designed to bestow the highest level of prestige onto European institutions such as the Church and its main administrative buildings. The most prominent Spanish colonists constructed their residences around these main squares in an effort to highlight their status and social prominence – the closer that one lived to the main square, the more prestige one could boast. It would be a misrepresentation, however, to suggest that European elites physically dominated the center of colonial cities. Quite the opposite. While it was true that they preferred to live closest to the main plaza, the plaza was daily filled with Indians, blacks and mixed raced people who could be seen working, buying goods for themselves or their masters, getting drunk in taverns and engaging in romantic liaisons.

Because this type of ethnic proximity characterized most colonial cities, Spanish settlers developed innovative ways to showcase their superior status. Spanish residents of Mexico City, for example, sought to control symbolic spaces representative of European power, places such as bullrings, theaters and churches. At bullrings, Spaniards occupied the best seats, often under the shaded canopy; in theaters and in churches, they positioned themselves according to their status within the community – those of highest status typically sat closest to the altar. Seating at public events and ceremonies broadcast to the public an important message regarding power and authority.[38] All of Mexico City's various ethnic groups understood the intricate nature of these subtle manipulations of power. The social landscape was in essence read like a text that even the illiterate masses could understand and, in turn, manipulate. Such social posturing represented an intricate and purposeful attempt to normalize structures of power and to convey to the indigenous and casta population their inferior position within the social hierarchy. Space was almost by necessity imbued with a complex hierarchy of meaning.

Perhaps the most important unifying source of influence for settler populations in colonial Mexico was the Catholic Church. New Spain was a deeply religious world. Franciscans, Dominicans, Augustinians, Jesuits and the secular clergy dictated the tenor of life. Their official mandate was to convert, educate and assimilate the natives. This mandate was undergirded by fierce jurisdictional and doctrinal disputes among the various orders. In 1536, in a righteous first step at upholding their directive, the Franciscan leadership, headed by Bernardino de Sahagún, inaugurated the famous College of Santa Cruz de Tlatelolco. The purpose of the school was unique: it was designed to educate the sons of the native aristocracy in order to create a native ruling class capable of governing its own communities. The instruction at the college was of the highest caliber, the curriculum consisting of reading, writing, music, Latin, rhetoric, logic, philosophy and native medicine. There was, however, vehement opposition to the creation of a native intelligentsia, particularly by the Dominicans. Among their more transparent reasons for their opposition to the college was their deep-seated disdain at the idea of a native priesthood, in addition to the not-unfounded concern that the Indians educated at this elite institution would in time become so proficient in their intellect as to detect areas of ignorance by Spanish clerics. By 1560, due to these and a host of other reasons, the college was defunded and soon fell into disrepair.

But while the influence of the Church was significant, especially in its economic, educational and spiritual potential, it did not, as Morse again argues, 'emanate from the settlers as a point of self-definition vis-à-vis the old continent', as it did in the Puritan colonies.[39] In New Spain,

the Church evolved to reflect regional interests and concerns. It became the richest landowner, possessing vast rural and urban properties; it owned Indian and black slaves; and convents and missions often doubled as lucrative businesses. Because of its extreme wealth, the Church also functioned as a bank, lending money and extending credit to wealthy settlers. Certain groups, such as the Jesuits, became so wealthy and influential that the Crown eventually deemed it necessary to expel them in 1767. By the seventeenth century, Mexico City, Puebla, Veracruz and several other colonial cities were teeming with nuns, priests, and friars; at the close of the colonial period, there were roughly 2,000 nuns and around 7,000 priests in New Spain.

Because New Spain was mercantilist Spain's most prosperous colony, it instituted protectionist policies to restrict the natural growth of industry. In most cases, *obrajes* like the one located in Puebla produced unfinished textiles that were then exported to Spain, where they were manufactured, only to be sold back to colonists at a substantial profit. Government monopolies on wine, tobacco, wheat and other daily goods forced New Spain's settler population to purchase these goods at exorbitant prices. Such protectionist policies only frustrated New Spain's settler population who, forced to pay high tariffs on Spanish goods, regularly opted to smuggle cheaper and better-made merchandise from Spain's imperial enemies.[40] By the early seventeenth century, due in part to Spain's inability to effectively regulate trade in its colonies, there had emerged an internal market of American-made foodstuffs and products that circulated throughout the continent. The Crown, predictably enough, frowned on the development of this internal economy, since it weakened its fiscal hold over its colonial subjects, but, alas, there was little it could do. The independent and practical character of New Spain's settler population, reinforced by the vast distance between them and Spain, encouraged and sustained such developments.

In the years to follow, the Crown established a complex system of governance. Because the Crown was unable to effectively administer from across an entire ocean, it was willing to relinquish a significant amount of power to local Spanish elites. Between the viceroy, royal judges, treasury officials, governors, mayors, local town councils, brotherhoods and the like, the Crown received a wide range of input on various fronts regarding the administration of its colony. It was by means of this administrative apparatus that the Crown also sought to foster loyalty and obedience. Secular festivals for the birth of a new royal member or the arrival of a new viceroy, printed coinage, art and religious sermons were all in part designed to reinforce a message of loyalty toward the Crown and to strengthen settler identification with the peninsula.

This message resounded unevenly among European colonists. As colonial society evolved, there developed a profound rift between Penninsulares and *Criollos*. Generally speaking, Penninsulares, by virtue of their close association with the Crown, tended to dominate the best and most influential administrative and clerical positions; they also held the highest social status in New Spain – few Criollos were ever appointed viceroys, archbishops, or judges of the higher tribunals during the colonial period.[41] Penninsulares were of Spain and, as such, were thought to be more loyal and of better stock than those born in the New World. This type of imperial condescension placed them at odds with Criollos, who were deemed physically and mentally inferior and thus incapable of running an efficient government, even though they outnumbered Spanish-born immigrants.[42] Criollo loyalty to the Crown was always under suspicion, so fearful was the Spanish monarch of separatist agitators. Over time, Criollos acquired an acute sense of inferiority as second-class subjects. This sentiment manifested itself in a deep and protracted disdain toward their peninsular counterparts. By the eighteenth century, 'creolism' had become an identifiable and vigorous social identity.

These tensions manifested during the early colonial period. Criollos slowly transformed into staunch defenders of New Spain, which they considered their true homeland. The beautiful poetry of Bernardo de Balbuena best illustrates the growing devotion and admiration Criollos

had for New Spain: 'Although in general the world be such / In this Mexican paradise it is / That verdure has placed its seat and court'.[43] This poem, titled 'Grandeza Mexicana' (Mexico's Grandeur) and published in 1604, conveyed the beauty and majesty of what he considered to be his homeland. Fifty-two years after Balbuena penned his famous 'Grandeza Mexicana', Miguel Sánchez wrote the first account of the miraculous apparition of *La Virgen de Guadalupe* (The Virgin Mary), who appeared at Mount Tepeyac just outside of Mexico City in 1531. The publication of this account lent credence to the idea that Criollos and not Penninsulares were a chosen people, for the mother of Christ now appeared in their very back yards. Her motto, *non fecit taliter omni nationi* ('he has done this for no other nation'), resonated with Criollos for the remainder of the colonial period, for if Criollos were the new chosen people, then Mexico City was the new Jerusalem.[44] But it was probably the work of Jesuit Francisco Javier Clavijero which best illustrates the Criollo love for New Spain. In his *Historia antigua de México* (Ancient History of Mexico), written while in exile in Italy, Clavijero vehemently defended Mexico against 'an incredible mob of modern writers' who disparaged Mexico's grandeur. To the literary slanders of men like Pauw, Buffon, Raynal and Robertson, his *Ancient History of Mexico* proudly averred his patriotism, declaring in the first page of his manuscript that this was the true 'history of Mexico written by a Mexican'.[45] Felipe Fernández-Armesto notes that this distinct mentality, 'a sense of a difference of interests, and perhaps, of nature set the colonists apart from their metropolitan masters and partners and grew markedly in the decade preceding the Declaration of Independence'.[46]

Forced to defend the beauty and dignity of their homeland, Criollos evoked the sacred nature of their ties to the land and its people. They, however, like settlers around the world, struggled to identify themselves as a distinct people. They claimed, for instance, to be descendants of the Aztecs, exalting them as heroic and stoic. This allowed them to trace their ancestry back to the great indigenous civilizations of Mexico of which they considered themselves to be a part. More importantly, it allowed them to celebrate their authenticity as 'true Mexicans' and New Spain their 'true homeland'. At the same time, they disparaged the average Indian of their day as 'lazy', 'useless' and 'inferior'. Conveniently enough, as the era of independence approached, the Criollo found it in his best interest to eliminate Indians from any share of political governance, echoing against them similar claims of inferiority and backwardness that Penninsulares had registered against them.

Settler colonialism in the early Mexican Republic

Life on the far northern frontier of New Spain was vastly different. The harsh environmental conditions and the constant fear of Indian raids and uprisings shaped Spanish settler colonialism in this area. One of the earliest attempts at colonizing this distant and sparsely populated territory took place in 1540. That year Francisco Vásquez de Coronado (1510–1554), a 30-year-old Spanish adventurer and governor of Nueva Galicia, led a group of about 100 Spanish men and 1,000 Tlaxcallan allies into New Mexico in search of the fabled Seven Cities of Cíbola. His expedition ended in dismal failure, for there was no gold to be had. He was equally unsuccessful in his efforts at establishing a permanent Spanish settlement. His failure at colonizing northern New Spain was due in part to the various indigenous communities who vigorously opposed Spanish encroachment onto native land and importunate demands for food and shelter. The indigenous people of this region had good reason to oppose settler incursions, for many of them still remembered the entry of Nuño Beltrán de Guzmán (1490–1558), a conquistador of the worst sort. Accompanied in 1529 by 300 Spanish men and 10,000 Tlaxcallan allies, Guzmán had blazed a trail of destruction through Michoacán, Jalisco, Zacatecas, Nayarit and Sinaloa in his efforts at capturing and enslaving thousands of indigenous peoples. Less interested in colonization than

in slave-hunting, Guzmán nonetheless founded the town of San Miguel de Culiacán along the San Lorenzo River.

It would take another seven decades before another Spanish colonist, Don Juan de Oñate y Salazar (1550–1626), attained a measured level of success in colonizing the northern frontier. In 1598, Oñate, a wealthy aristocrat from the mining town of Zacatecas and husband to Isabel de Tolosa Cortés de Moctezuma, the granddaughter of Hernán Cortés and great granddaughter to the Aztec Emperor Moctezuma Xocoyotzin, was granted permission by the Spanish Crown to colonize the northern frontier. Oñate's initial expedition possibly numbered over 500 colonists and was comprised of soldiers, women, children, servants and slaves. Ten Franciscan missionaries also accompanied the initial group. During his career as governor of New Mexico (1598–1610), Oñate established several Spanish settlements. In 1610, La Villa Real de la Santa Fe de San Francisco de Asís (The Royal Town of the Holy Faith of St. Francis of Assisi), became the first capital city in what would become the continental United States, providing estranged Spanish settlers with a central hub they could call home.

In order to convince colonists to settle among the impoverished Pueblo Indians of New Mexico, Oñate promised ample opportunities for wealth. For most new arrivals it quickly became obvious that Oñate's promises were lacking in substance. As early as the winter of 1598, settler patience had worn dangerously thin, causing many of the Spaniards who had settled places like San Gabriel and other smaller towns to abandon them and return to Mexico City. The lack of mineral wealth, distance from material and cultural centers, the difficult and harsh climate, and the presence of hostile and powerful Indian groups represented common problems for New Mexico's earliest settler population.

The late seventeenth century witnessed the beginnings of the sustained colonization of the northern frontier, incentivized chiefly by the discovery of mineral wealth. In 1546, silver was first discovered in Zacatecas, the first large *real de minas* (mining center) in New Spain. Subsequently known as the 'mother of the frontier', the discovery of silver in Zacatecas was instrumental in the northward advance of the frontier. The discovery of silver led to the rapid growth of the *real* as prospectors, workers and settlers flooded the area. By 1585, Zacatecas was designated a *ciudad* (city). 'The *real de minas*', notes Gilbert Cruz, 'became an administrative entity and, once its metallurgical industry was stabilized, came to be known as a *lugar*, *villa*, *ciudad*, or *alcaldía mayor*, depending on its size and significance'.[47] A little under a century later, silver was discovered in San José de Parral, turning that mining district into a boomtown and eventually the largest city in the province of Nueva Vizcaya. Later, Santa Bárbara's rich silver deposits in the valley of Río Conchos, Chihuahua, drew in Spaniards from all over New Spain. These mining communities were the first permanent settlements in northern New Spain and encompassed all the settlers and miners within a five- to fifteen-mile radius.[48]

The growth of the mining industry in northern New Spain coincided with the rapid destruction of its few forested areas, drastically altering the natural environment. Mining required large amounts of timber for scaffolding and for fuel in its processing plants. It also required large amounts of water. The increased consumption of both surface and underground water sources, partly due to a combination of mining, large-scale farming and animal husbandry, led to protracted conflict with indigenous communities who had had access to reliable sources of water for generations. Jesuit priests encouraged indigenous communities to take settlers to court in order to reclaim rights to their lands and water.[49] In addition to deforesting the northern provinces of New Spain, settlers also altered the human and cultural terrain in several crucial ways. Settlers introduced European pathogens such as smallpox and typhus, leading to the steep decline in the indigenous population. They introduced foreign foodstuffs such as wheat and grapes and alien livestock such as horses, sheep, pigs and cattle. These domesticated animals,

which ate much of the protective natural grasses and shrubs, increased runoff from summer rains and had similarly negative effect on soil erosion. These same animals were also notorious for trampling indigenous gardens and plots. They became a constant source of irritation for Indian communities.

Further altering the demographic makeup of the frontier was the arrival of scores of indigenous settlers from central Mexico, particularly Tlaxcallans. These groups eventually set up their own colonies: San Estéban de Nueva Tlaxcala and Santa María de Parras, Coahuila, among others. In addition to the rapid loss of indigenous populations due to disease and the incorporation of indigenous groups from central Mexico, frontier settlers found it necessary to incorporate local Indian captives into their fledgling societies.[50] At local festivals and fairs, captured Indians, mostly women and children from enemy tribes, were sold to Spanish households to be used as labor. These *criados* (servants) were incorporated into a borderland society and 'blended into the larger Spanish community', adding to the already complex mixture of ethnic and racial groups inhabiting the area.[51]

With sizable Spanish populations residing in dispersed mining regions throughout the far north, and with a modest Spanish population already residing in New Mexico, the colonization of Sonora was an important next step in fortifying Spanish control over the frontier. In 1637, Captain Pedro de Perea arrived with official documentation giving him the authority to found Sonora's first town, thus becoming the first Spanish settler in this region. Perea and the colonists who accompanied him were committed to making their fortune in this barren land. But more than that, these men, who had the full backing of the Crown, 'considered their mission a license to civilize the region, i.e., establish an enclave of Spanish culture, institute European customs and norms to guide the "barbarian" native peoples, and, even more important, extract wealth from the land'.[52] Their desire to make their fortune in mining meant that they would need access not only to the best and most valuable land but to valuable sources of water, again setting up an antagonistic relationship with the various *ranchería* (small hamlet) indigenous communities who inhabited the area.

Unlike central Mexico, where the Crown placed heavy restrictions on the outright theft of indigenous lands, in Sonora, the Crown supported settlers in their acquisition of Indian land because it believed that, once these settlers became landowners, they would seek to protect their property from rival European empires and hostile Indians and thus serve as an alternative to the expensive military units that resided in the province's various *presidios* (forts). As David Yetman explains, granting land to militia led these settlers 'to establish roots and a permanence more reliable than could be expected from mere soldiers'.[53] The use of colonists as soldiers and vice versa formed a part of the strategy of Spanish colonization in this area up to the early nineteenth century.

Sonora's earliest settlers would have to wait until 1736 before a rich outcropping of silver ore was discovered along the Santa Cruz River. The local indigenous people, today known as the O'odham, called this river '*Al şonag*, or 'Place of the Small Spring'. The discovery of silver deposits that year brought in immigrants of diverse ethnic background from all over Mexico. Most of the arrivals were men of mixed blood. These men did not have the financial means to return back to central Mexico if their goal of acquiring financial success did not pan out. Jesuit missionary Ignaz Pfefferkorn noted that 'practically all those who wish to be considered Spanish are really people of mixed blood'.[54] He, like the majority of Jesuits, disdained these new arrivals. They saw them as common vagabonds of the lowest caliber whose presence only jeopardized their own efforts at missionizing among the various indigenous groups in Sonora.

To some extent, both Franciscan and Jesuit missionaries advocated the separation of their Indian charges from the welter of Spanish colonists. Colonists, they argued, only wished to exploit

Indian labor and to corrupt them with their immoral behavior. Indeed, throughout much of the colonial period, settlers, friars and royal administrators were in a constant battle over access to Indian land and labor. Miners sought to exploit Indian labor in the mines; missionaries required Indian labor to work the mission fields, construct and maintain mission buildings, and attend to their priestly needs; soldiers required Indians as military allies and guides in their campaigns against *indios enemigos* (enemy Indians); and administrators required Indians as preservers of peace within their own communities.

But the idea that it was best to separate Indians from colonists, lest they abuse and corrupt them – an idea that had its origins with the *República de Indios* and the *República de Españoles* (Republic of Indians and Spaniards) in the early sixteenth century – eventually lost appeal among Spanish administrators and colonists as the Age of Enlightenment progressed. By the late eighteenth century, Spanish settlers and administrators came to believe that Indians in close proximity to enterprising Spanish colonists would become economically productive. Instead of wasting their economic potential by working and praying at missions, they would instead contribute to the economic development of the frontier. As David Weber has noted, 'Bourbon reformers had argued vigorously that Indians were best acculturated by introducing them to colonists and commerce and limiting missionaries' prerogatives to the care of souls'.[55] This could only work in areas where there were sufficient colonists. In California, the last of New Spain's provinces to be settled, the mission system remained strong and the favored instrument of colonization.

Throughout the borderlands, settlers lived in constant fear of attacks from hostile Indian groups; fear structured their lives in crucial ways. Violence against the European presence was not uncommon along the far northern edges of Spain's American empire; they served as a powerful reminder of the tense ambiguity inherent in Spanish-Indian relations during much of the colonial period. Revolts in 1601, 1610, 1616, 1645, 1648, 1650 and 1652, in addition to a severe drought that began in 1645, caused great hardships among the early settlers, who for much of the colonial period remained relatively few in number. In 1680, the Pueblo Indians of New Mexico unleashed a brutal rebellion against their Spanish overseers, leaving twenty-one Franciscan missionaries and over 400 settlers dead. From the Spanish capital at Santa Fe, the remaining 2,000 settlers narrowly escaped with their lives to the Franciscan mission of El Paso del Norte, 300 miles south. While the seventeenth century witnessed many Indian uprisings, the eighteenth saw the rise of the Apache and the Comanche 'empire'. These two groups alone made the Spanish settlement of that frontier a perilous proposition.[56]

The Apaches were particularly adept at raiding Spanish settlements. Insecurity was a daily part of life and a source of constant complaints from settler communities, as well as from indigenous groups who had historically been enemies of the Apache. It was left up to them to defend their communities by forming militias. It was common for the O'Odham and other indigenous groups to join forces with the Spanish and others of mixed descent.[57] Ongoing war shaped social interaction, as well as notions of honor, masculinity and valor. This ethos of violence and masculinity defined the mental world of frontier settlers, distinguishing them even further from their central Mexican counterparts. Ana Alonso has argued that the cultural development of codes of masculinity and honor on the northern frontier were intimately tied up with a warrior ethos among the Serrano (mountain) settlers who battled constantly against the Apache. 'In 1783', she writes, 'the "most prominent" settlers – hacendados and rancheros – of the Basúchil Valley, the breadbasket of Chihuahua, complained of the "unhappy state in which the Indian enemies have placed those who inhabit this frontier [. . .] with their continual insults – deaths and theft of horses, mules, cattle, and the rest [. . .] and the growing insolvency in which we find ourselves"'.[58]

But even 'friendly' Indians were capable of uprisings of their own, as occurred with the Pima Revolt of 1751. Indigenous leaders along the frontier of New Spain often collaborated with Spanish colonizers, often helping to advance the colonial project while pursuing their specific agendas. Just as, over the span of several centuries, Spaniards developed a keen understanding of their Indian subjects, so too did Indians gain an acute awareness of the Spanish colonial system and of the Spaniards themselves. Indigenous leaders in Sonora, New Mexico and, later, California and Texas functioned in a similar capacity to *kurakas* (native lords) in Peru: both types of native leaders were protective of their local communities while remaining complicit with the colonial superstructure. Settlers were forced to walk a fine line between the exploitation of their indigenous allies and the economic and political development of the frontier.

In an effort to subdue Apache incursions, frontier settlers in New Mexico, Sonora, Chihuahua and Sinaloa made it a policy to exile captured Apaches males to Mexico City, hoping to destroy their leadership and diminish their overall numbers. But when it was discovered that escapees often succeeded in making it all the way back to the frontier, local leaders decided to send captured Apaches to sugar plantations in Cuba. A second and perhaps more productive way of establishing a modus vivendi with the Apache took the form of buying peace by providing Apaches who settled in 'peaceful' settlements (*establecimientos de paz*) rations and other material goods. The Apaches who accepted this way of life were expected to assist Spaniards in their military campaigns. Within a relatively short time, there were fifty establecimientos de paz along the frontier. With such a cautious truce and being 'no longer exposed to constant raids, Sonora's population rose, and Sonorenses accumulated enormous livestock holdings. By 1804, Tucson boasted some 1,000 inhabitants and a herd of 3,500 cattle, 2,500 sheep, and 1,200 horses grazing outside its presidio walls'.[59] But by the mid-nineteenth century, Mexico's ability to fund this peace waned, and many Apache communities returned to their traditional raiding patterns. The northern frontier, noted the Mexican minster of war and navy, was in a perpetual 'state of war'.[60]

Throughout the colonial period (1521–1821) and during the short-lived Mexican period (1821–1848), frontiersmen had been savvy to the goings-on of Spain's rival empires, namely the French and British, and, over time, the Americans. Though the Spanish Crown and the Mexican government tried to limit the influence of foreign powers, for the settlers, the exigencies of day-to-day survival trumped those of loyalty. One of the most overbearing and detrimental ways in which the central government tried to limit settler interaction with rival powers was through the imposition of burdensome trade restrictions. Needless to say, while illegally trading with rival empires did rob Spain and later Mexico of much-needed tariff revenue, settlers frequently ignored these restrictions.

The period of the Mexican Republic represented a very tumultuous time for the northern borderlands and its settler populations. Attempting to consolidate its hold on the northern borderlands the Republic of Mexico allowed Anglo settlers to take up property in Texas under the stipulation that they learn Spanish, become Catholic and pledge allegiance to the Mexican flag. It was hoped that this immigration policy would help protect Mexico from rival empires and from continued Indian incursions. These Anglo settlers, however, would neither obey Mexico's legal directives nor protect it from foreign powers. Instead, they sought to exploit the land and protect *their* rights as slave owners and entrepreneurs. Mexico's proclamation in 1824 to outlaw slavery convinced many Anglo settlers that it was essential to divorce themselves from the fledgling republic in order to preserve their way of life. The Texas Rebellion (1836) signaled a concerted effort by both Anglo and Mexican Texans to assert their allegiance to a federalist form of rule, in essence protecting their rights over the centralizing government of General Antonio López de Santa Anna. Juan Nepomuceno Seguín was representative of many Texas Mexicans who fought against Mexico and alongside the Anglo settlers.

After the Texas Revolution, Seguín was elected to several important political positions (he became the only Mexican to serve in the Texas Senate and in 1840 was elected mayor of San Antonio). But as racial tensions in Texas rose he was eventually accused by Anglo settlers of 'disloyalty'. Later in life he wrote that he felt like 'a foreigner in my native land'. The US-Mexico War (1846–48) fully divested Mexico of one-third of its territory, leaving its Mexican population to fend for itself under a new imperial power.

Notes

1 I. Leonard, *Baroque Times in Old Mexico: Seventeenth-Century Persons, Places, and Practices*, Lansing: The University of Michigan Press, 1959, pp. 37, viii. Leonard also argues that New Spain was at its core a neomedieval society.

2 M. Mörner, *Race Mixture in the History of Latin America*, Boston: Little Brown and Co., 1967, pp. 1–8, 44–45, 54. In August of 1801, King Charles IV, finding himself in serious fiscal need, introduced this curious tax policy (cédulas) to New Spain. Those who could afford the high price that such *cédulas* demanded could change their racial status.

3 For an analysis of how distance from Spain affected settler political realities, see J. Cañizares-Esguerra, '"Enlightened Reform" in the Spanish empire: An overview', in G. Paquette (ed.) *Enlightened Reform in Southern Europe and Its Atlantic Colonies, c. 1750–1830*, Farnham: Ashgate, 2013, pp. 33–7.

4 A. T. Bushnell and J. Green, 'Peripheries, centers, and the construction of early modern American empires', in C. Daniels and M. Kennedy (eds.) *Negotiated Empires: Centers and Peripheries in the Americas, 1500–1820*, New York: Routledge, 2002, p. 1.

5 See E. O'Gorman, *The Invention of America: An Inquiry into the Historical Nature of the New World and the Meaning of Its History*, Westport: Greenwood Press, 1972.

6 See C. A. Truxillo, *By the Sword and the Cross: The Historical Evolution of the Catholic World Monarchy in Spain and the New World, 1492–1825*, Westport: Greenwood Press, 2001, pp. 63–73.

7 F. López de Gómara, *Primera Parte de la Historia General de las Indias*, Biblioteca de Autores Españole, Vol. 22, Madrid, 1852, p. 156. Reprinted in J. H. Elliot, *The Old World and the New, 1492–1650*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970, p. 10.

8 On Spaniards reconnoitering new lands and the influence of the Crown, Richard Morse notes, 'an expeditionary leader might be given a liberal contract for life (or for two or more lives, i.e., generations) to distribute and settle land, found towns, engage in commerce, use Indian labor, and so forth. But his expedition was followed by royal officials and ecclesiastics, representing the broad political, fiscal, and spiritual interests of the crown'. See Morse, 'The heritage of Latin America', in L. Hartz (ed.) *The founding of new societies: Studies in the history of the United States, Latin America, South Africa, Canada, and Australia*, San Diego: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1964, p. 140.

9 At the start of the colonial period there were roughly 800 encomenderos. By the mid-sixteenth century, there were a little over 500; and by the start of the seventeenth century, there were fifty encomenderos left in central Mexico. See M. C. Meyer, W. L. Sherman, and S. M. Deeds, *The Course of Mexican History*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014, p. 126.

10 G. Cespedes, *Latin America: The Early Years*, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1974, pp. 19–20.

11 Cespedes notes that these men were 'recruited mainly from the ranks of commoners and the impoverished lowest echelon of the nobility, [and] lacked the education and training needed for efficient statesmanship'. Cespedes, *Latin America: The Early Years*, p. 21.

12 It was not until 1718–1721 that royal decrees were finally issued which stipulated that encomiendas were to revert to the Crown upon the death of the encomendero. In truth, much of the encomienda's prestige and usefulness had already waned by that time.

13 In 1523, Charles V ordered that 'as many farmers and working people as possible' be sent to New Spain, and in 1565, Phillip II 'authorized passage to Hispañola for 150 Portuguese farmers, at least a third to be married and accompanied by their families'. See Morse, 'The heritage of Latin America', p. 128.

14 Morse, 'The heritage of Latin America', p. 128.

15 This debate can be traced back to the work of Karl Sapper and Herbert Spinden, who in 1920 argued that 40–50 million Indians inhabited the Americas at contact. By 1945, Angel Rosenblat determined that the number was closer to 13,385,000, 4–5 million of which resided in Central Mexico. Some years later, L. B. Simpson, W. Borah and S. F. Cook utilized innovative methods to determine a population

of 100 million inhabitants in the Americas at contact, 25 million for central Mexico alone. Despite Simpson and Borah's latest estimates, there remains serious debate about how many people inhabited the Americas at contact.

16 See S. F. Cook and W. Borah, *The Indian Population of Central Mexico, 1531–610*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1960.

17 For a general overview of indigenous allies during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, see L. E. Matthew and M. R. Oudijk (eds.) *Indian Conquistadors: Indigenous Allies in the Conquest of Mesoamerica*, Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2007.

18 R. Horn, 'Indigenous identities in Mesoamerica after the Spanish conquest', in G. Smithers and B. Newman (eds.) *Native Diasporas: Indigenous Identities and Settler Colonialism*, University of Nebraska Press, 2014, p. 66.

19 Horn, 'Indigenous identities', p. 69.

20 Ibid., p. 59.

21 Ibid., p. 73.

22 Ibid., p. 79.

23 Leonard, *Baroque Times in Old Mexico*, p. 38.

24 For instance, during the early period of exploration and conquest in the sixteenth century the Aragonese dominated the island of Hispaniola, while the majority of men who conquered the Aztec capital reigned from Castile. Later, the Basques, Galicians and Catalans would make their way to seek their fortunes in New Spain. See Leonard, *Baroque Times in Old Mexico*, p. 39.

25 See M. E. Martínez, *Limpieza de Sangre, Religion, and Gender in Colonial Mexico*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008.

26 See M. Mörner, 'Spanish Migration to the New World Prior to 1810: A Report on the State of Research', in F. Chiapelli (ed.) *First Images of America*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976, Vol. 2, pp. 766–67.

27 According to Peter Bakewell, in 1570, the indigenous population of central Mexico comprised 97% of the total population, Spaniards and Criollos 2%, Mestizos 0.1%, and Pardos (people wholly or partially black) 0.08%. P. Bakewell, 'Spanish America: Empire and its outcome', in J. H. Elliott (ed.) *The Spanish World: Civilization and Empire, Europe and the Americas Past and Present*, New York: Harry N. Abrams Publishers, 1991, p. 74.

28 Meyer, Sherman, and Deeds, *The Course of Mexican History*, pp. 167, 234, 311–13.

29 Bakewell, 'Spanish America', p. 74.

30 See H. Bennett, *Africans in Colonial Mexico: Absolutism, Christianity, and Afro-Creole Consciousness, 1570–1640*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003, pp. 14–32.

31 R. McCaa, 'The peopling of Mexico from origins to revolution', in R. Steckel and M. Haines (eds.) *The Population History of North America*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.

32 Morse, 'The Heritage of Latin America', p. 129.

33 Ibid.

34 R. C. Padden, *The Hummingbird and the Hawk: Conquest and Sovereignty in the Valley of Mexico, 1503–1541*, Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1967, p. 230.

35 See M. Mörner, *Race Mixture in the History of Latin America*, Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1967, p. 58.

36 In essence this meant that, being suspended in the air, this person neither advanced the white part of his biological makeup nor regressed in its indigenous blood. A salta atrás (throwback) resulted from the union of a mestizo and an Indian, because such a union meant that the progeny was regressing in its Indianness.

37 Morse, 'The Heritage of Latin America', p. 133.

38 Frances Ramos makes this argument nicely in relation to how space and power were symbiotic in the city of Puebla de los Angeles, Mexico's 'second city'. See F. Ramos, *Identity, Ritual, and Power in Colonial Puebla*, Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2012.

39 Morse, 'The heritage of Latin America', p. 126.

40 On the issue of the economic development of New Spain amid the protectionist policies of Spain, see S. Stein and B. Stein, *The Colonial Heritage of Latin America: Essays on Economic Dependence in Perspective*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970.

41 Leonard, *Baroque Times in Old Mexico*, p. 43. Of all of the viceroys (over 100) who occupied that position in all of Spanish America, only four were Criollos; fourteen of the 602 captains-general, governors and presidents were Criollos; and 105 of the 706 archbishops in the Americas were Criollos. See Morse, 'The heritage of Latin America', p. 136.

42 For the most up-to-date analysis of how the New World climate affected those born in America, see J. Cañizares-Esguerra, 'New world, New stars: Patriotic astrology and the invention of the Amerindian and Creole bodies in colonial Spanish America, 1600–1650', in Cañizares-Esguerra (ed.) *Nature, Empire, and Nation: Exploration of the History of Science in the Iberian World*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006, pp. 64–95.

43 See J. Lafayee, *Quetzalcóatl and Guadalupe: The Formation of Mexican National Consciousness, 1531–1813*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974, pp. 51–59. Bernardo de Balbuena, *Siglo de Oro y Grandeza Mejicana*, Madrid: Real Academia Español, 1831, p. 59. Reprinted in J. Lafayee, *Quetzalcóatl and Guadalupe: The Formation of Mexican National Consciousness, 1531–1813*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974, pp. 51–9.

44 See D. Brading, *Mexican Phoenix, Our Lady of Guadalupe: Image and Tradition Across Five Centuries*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.

45 D. Brading, *The First America: The Spanish Monarchy, Creole Patriots, and the Liberal State, 1492–1867*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, p. 450.

46 F. Fernández-Armesto, *The Americas: A Hemispheric History*, New York: A Modern Library Chronicles, 2003, p. 118.

47 G. R. Cruz, *Let There Be Towns: Spanish Municipal Origins in the American Southwest, 1610–1810*, College Station: Texas A&M Press, 1988, p. 13.

48 Cruz, *Let There Be Towns*, p. 13.

49 See D. Yetman, *Conflict in Colonial Sonora: Indians, Priests, and Settlers*, Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2012.

50 See J. Brooks, *Captives and Cousins: Slavery, Kingship, and Community in the Southwestern Borderlands*, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002.

51 Jacoby, *Shadows at Dawn*, pp. 49–93.

52 D. Yetman, 'Pedro de Perea and the Colonization of Sonora', *The Journal of the Southwest* 53, 1, 2011, p. 33.

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55 D. Weber, *Bárbaros: Spaniards and Their Savages in the Age of Enlightenment*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005, p. 126.

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57 A coalition of Mexican, American and O'Odham warriors massacred a camp of Apaches at Camp Grant, Arizona. See K. Jacoby, *Shadows at Dawn: An Apache Massacre and the Violence of History*, London: Penguin Books, 2008.

58 Alonso, *Thread of Blood*, p. 27.

59 Jacoby, *Shadows at Dawn*, p. 56.

60 See ibid., p. 61.

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9

NORTHWESTERN NORTH AMERICA (CANADIAN WEST) TO 1900

Laura Ishiguro

This chapter investigates the trajectories of settler colonialism across northwestern North America before 1900. This is a vast area that stretches from the Pacific Ocean to the Canadian Shield, encompasses diverse Indigenous territories and is now claimed as the western Canadian provinces of British Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Manitoba. An emerging project of British and Canadian settler colonialism developed across this region through three roughly defined stages before 1900: first, a period between the eighteenth and mid-nineteenth centuries, shaped by relationships between Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples that are generally uncharacteristic of settler colonialism; second, a period between the 1850s and 1885 which was marked by a shift towards settler priorities, although those were often more aspirational than certain; and third, the final fifteen years of the nineteenth century, in which the Canadian settler project consolidated its power and extended its reach across northwestern North America.

This region is often divided historiographically and, to a certain extent, historically into two sections: the Prairie West and British Columbia.[1] However, this division can obscure common and connected histories that crossed the Rocky Mountains and varied and inconsistent histories on either side of them. In developing a chronology of settler colonialism in the region, this chapter traverses the mountains in order to trace widely shared developments while also underscoring specific ways in which a diverse history manifested in local contexts. In so doing, the chapter also seeks to take seriously Adele Perry's suggestion that framing 'these places as colonies of settlement' risks 'accord[ing] their colonizing projects a stability and an eventual outcome that was [. . .] far from clear in the nineteenth century'.[2] The history of settler colonialism in northwestern North America was layered onto other forms of relationship between Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples. Only in the closing years of the nineteenth century did a strengthening Canadian settler project take hold across the region, but even then, it remained contingent and uneven, always grafted onto alternative visions of place, society, power and identity and lived by individuals in a range of ways. Before 1900, in other words, the emerging settler order in northwestern North America could be both powerful and partial, inconsistent in its imposition, complicated in its effects and never inevitable or without resistance.

Northwestern North America, early eighteenth to mid-nineteenth century

In the eighteenth century, European people began to arrive in northwestern North America from the British and French colonies to the east and along the Pacific coast from the north

and south. In so doing, they entered – although often understood little of – a diverse world of Indigenous peoples whose histories in the region were dynamic and extended to time immemorial. Europeans travelling overland from the east were primarily driven by commercial interests linked to the North American fur trade, as company employees and state-sponsored explorers searched for new trading territories, partners and routes. In the mid-eighteenth century, heated competition between the London-based Hudson's Bay Company (HBC) and Montreal-based traders particularly accelerated this westward extension into the prairies. The first confirmed Europeans arriving on the Pacific coast by ocean – Russians travelling across the north Pacific – were in the 1720s, followed by Spanish and British explorers from the south in the 1770s.[3] These oceanic expeditions led to a maritime fur trade in sea otter pelts, which peaked between 1792 and 1812. This trade was rooted at Yuquot (Nootka Sound), where the Mowachaht people operated as powerful middlemen. By the early nineteenth century, explorers working for the Montreal-based North West Company had also reached the Pacific Ocean from the east, thereby extending the land-based fur trade to the westernmost edges of the continent.

In the broadest sense, Indigenous and non-Indigenous people established new relationships through these explorations and extensions of trade in the eighteenth century and came to understand one another through diverse and developing cultural lenses.[4] Until the mid-nineteenth century, non-Indigenous people made few efforts to establish enduring settlements or wield formal claims to sovereignty in northwestern North America. After 1670, when England's Charles II granted the HBC a commercial monopoly in the Hudson's Bay drainage basin (Rupert's Land), the company's ability to trade in this vast area depended on Indigenous people's knowledge, supplies and willingness to interact.[5] As the land-based fur trade took root across the region in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, it gave rise to a distinctive and hybrid political, economic, cultural and social world that blended diverse Indigenous and non-Indigenous traditions. Marriages *à la façon du pays* (in the custom of the country) between Indigenous women and non-Indigenous men were widely practiced and encouraged as foundational to this fur-trade world.[6] A new people, the Métis, also emerged from these relationships.[7]

In this context, non-Indigenous people primarily focused on maintaining their place in fur-trade relationships and cultures across northwestern North America. One key exception came in 1811, when the Earl of Selkirk led a private colonization project in the eastern prairies. Established on a land grant from the HBC, the Red River colony (also called the Selkirk settlement) was located on the Red and Assiniboine rivers in territory he called Assiniboia (now in Manitoba and North Dakota). Selkirk intended the colony to be a new home for Scottish settlers escaping the Highland clearances, but the settlement struggled in its early years. When Governor Miles Macdonell forbade the export of pemmican from the colony in 1814, smouldering conflict between settlers and traders flared. Pemmican was a high-calorie food made primarily from bison; local Métis people produced it as a lucrative exportable commodity, while the North West Company depended on it to feed travelling traders over long distances.[8] Macdonell intended his Pemmican Proclamation to ensure a food supply for struggling settlers, but in so doing, he undermined these Métis producers and company traders. Hostility and occasional violence erupted and continued for two years, culminating in the Seven Oaks Incident in 1816, when Métis people and settlers exchanged fire and 22 people were killed, including then-Governor Robert Semple.[9] As open hostility slowed in the years that followed, the colony increasingly became Métis rather than Scottish. In the mid-1830s, Selkirk's heirs returned Assiniboia to the HBC. Ultimately, it had been a largely failed attempt at agricultural non-Indigenous settlement in a fur trade world.

The HBC also met with resistance during the first decades of the nineteenth century, especially as increasingly confident company policies marginalized the Indigenous partners on whom

they had long relied. For example, Métis residents at Red River posed ongoing challenges to the HBC's claims to control in the region. Some independent Métis traders began to feed a market for buffalo robes across the international border. In 1849, HBC Chief Factor John Ballenden charged Pierre Guillaume Sayer with illegal trading, and the simmering conflict boiled over. Sayer was found guilty but freed, in part because of hundreds of armed Métis people who surrounded the courthouse. This case was interpreted as the effective end of the HBC's monopoly and a key moment in community resistance against company rule.[10]

The relationship between trade, company control and colonization also shifted on the Pacific slope of North America in these years. In the early nineteenth century, HBC and American traders had been based on the Columbia River (now Washington and Oregon), having agreed to joint occupancy and trade with Indigenous people in the absence of formal non-Indigenous claims to sovereignty. By the 1840s, however, the westward expansion of American settlement put increasing pressure on the HBC, and in the context of heated boundary disputes, the company looked to establish forts further north in an attempt to secure the region for British interests. Most significant among these was Fort Victoria, on the southern tip of Vancouver Island, where the HBC moved its main operations in 1843, three years ahead of the final boundary settlement.[11]

In 1849, Vancouver Island was formally declared a British colony, and the HBC was granted proprietary rights for a decade if it acted as a colonizing agent for the British government. During this period, Governor James Douglas looked to extinguish Indigenous title to lands near company and settler interests at Fort Victoria, Nanaimo and Fort Rupert. This led to 14 agreements (often called the Douglas treaties) between 1850 and 1854, which Douglas intended as acts of formal dispossession to 'open' land for non-Indigenous settlement on Vancouver Island.[12] This land was, in turn, made available but unattractively expensive in a settlement system modelled on Edward Gibbon Wakefield's theories. In addition to concerns about price, the success of this settlement project was challenged by the ongoing dominance of commercial rather than agrarian interests and the comparative lack of arable land. As a result, while this period marked the beginning of formal colonization in what is now British Columbia, migration and settlement were comparatively slow during the mid-nineteenth century.[13]

Scholars debate the extent to which this evolving fur trade period in northwestern North America should be termed colonial. In 1977, Robin Fisher argued that at least some Indigenous people empowered and enriched themselves through the trade.[14] Other scholars underscore the violence and unequal power relations of the fur trade. As Cole Harris argues, the fur trade operated through a 'politics of terror, a theatre of power, and complex alignments of Native and white interests. Native and white agency were often reinforcing but, overall, the balance of power tilted towards whites, and the fur trade became a protocolonial presence'.[15] In terms of formal claims to sovereignty, northwestern North America remained of comparatively marginal interest for European empires. Until the mid-nineteenth century, there were also few efforts to establish extensive non-Indigenous settlements, and Red River (1811) and Vancouver Island (1849) stand apart as intentional, if not entirely successful, exceptions.

Overall, this period was not a mere antecedent to what followed, but we might identify some roots of British or Canadian settler colonialism here. Broadly, the fur trade involved complex and changing relationships among Indigenous and non-Indigenous people, and the latter often directly rejected settlement and formal sovereignty. By the first decades of the nineteenth century, however, interactions between Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples were increasingly rooted in unequal relations of power and diverging expectations of the future. By the 1850s, Indigenous and fur trade worlds would begin to be remade by an emerging settler order – but the potential success of the latter in superseding the former would remain far from certain.

The Prairie West, 1857–1885

In the mid-nineteenth century, British metropolitan interest in Hudson's Bay Company governance declined, and Canadian interest in westward expansion grew. Between 1857 and 1885, agricultural white settlement became a predominant British and Canadian goal for the Prairie West, and as a result, new forms of rule and relationship began to overlay the older fur-trade order. Especially as bison herds disappeared in the 1870s and Indigenous communities experienced ensuing starvation and disease, an emerging and increasingly powerful Canadian state project sought to dispossess Indigenous people and resettle white newcomers through treaties, reserves, land acts, immigration agreements and interventions into family life. Even as this project remained largely projection until the end of the century, these developments nonetheless represented the gradual tipping of power towards a settler colonial regime.

Several developments in 1857 marked a turning point towards this new settler order on the prairies. In that year, a Select Committee of the British House of Commons was convened to inquire into the possibilities of settlement and a British 'civilizing mission' in the Prairie West. Two expeditions also started to assess the region's agricultural potential, one a Canadian expedition led by Henry Youle Hind and the other a British expedition led by John Palliser. Both identified vast fertile regions between Red River and the Rocky Mountains. Together, these investigations signalled a broad shift in British and Canadian focus from the fur trade to settlement. They also provided fuel for growing English-Canadian expansionism, as settlers in Canada West (later Ontario) increasingly called for annexation and the 'opening' of prairie land for white agricultural settlement.[16]

In the context of such arguments, the British parliament passed the Rupert's Land Act (1868), which paved the way for the transfer of Rupert's Land from the company to the newly created Dominion of Canada. The residents of Red River – among those most directly affected by the transfer – were not consulted. The following year, Canadian surveyors began to lay out a future land system that would obliterate existing Métis river-lot holdings, prepare for new settlement and symbolize the imposition of Canadian rule. In response, Louis Riel and other Métis people blocked the appointed governor, William McDougall, from entering the territory, declared a provisional government and pursued negotiations for the establishment of a new Canadian province on terms favourable to Métis residents rather than as a colonial extension of English-Canadian settlement. These events, known collectively as the Red River Resistance, formally ended with the Manitoba Act (1870), which created the Dominion's first new province, Manitoba. The Act referred to the need to extinguish Métis title through individualized land grants, but the process of distributing those grants was unclear and problematic. Many Métis families instead moved west or south. To the west, they entered the Northwest Territories (later Saskatchewan and Alberta), which were governed by the Canadian Department of the Interior, essentially as a colony without representative institutions.[17]

Over the next 15 years, Manitoba and the Northwest Territories were shaped by the increasing but still partial extension of Euro-Canadian law, governance and surveillance in the wake of Confederation. In 1873, the Northwest Mounted Police (later Royal Canadian Mounted Police) were established to impose Canadian law and order in the Northwest Territories. There, they focused on controlling the liquor trade in what is now southern Alberta and resisting perceived threats of American encroachment into Canadian-claimed territory. In so doing, they came to symbolize a mythology of a settler state that expanded west through peaceful methods, contrasted to American military conquest.[18]

For many Indigenous people, however, the Canadian state they encountered in these years was not benevolent but rather increasingly sought their dispossession and marginalization. The 1876

Indian Act provided the legal framework for Dominion administration of Indian Affairs, at the same time as many Indigenous communities on the prairies struggled with the disappearance of bison herds (largely gone by 1879) and accompanying starvation, poverty and disease. Together, these changes marked a shifting balance of power towards Canadian state-led dispossession and resettlement. In this context, seven so-called numbered treaties were concluded between the Crown and representatives of the Saulteaux, Cree, Assiniboine and Blackfoot peoples between 1871 and 1877. These treaties, on the surface, ceded formal title to most of the Prairie West to Canada. They also guaranteed reserves for Indigenous people and included other stipulations related to per capita payments, annuities, hunting, medical supplies, agricultural instruction and famine relief. Here, as elsewhere, Canadian intentions in establishing treaties and reserves targeted the extinguishment of Aboriginal title and the opening of non-reserve land for settlers. As testimony from Treaty 7 elders suggests, however, the process was characterized by poor interpretation, deceptive negotiation, misconception and failed state obligations, resulting in 'agreements' that were understood and enacted very differently by the parties involved.[19]

During the mid-nineteenth century, the Canadian government also began to seek to attract white settlers to the Prairie West through immigration promotion and land policies intended to facilitate small-scale agriculture on individual homesteads.[20] However, such efforts were very slow to attract significant numbers of non-Indigenous migrants to the prairies in these years, so the Dominion government also reserved lands for so-called ethnic bloc settlements to induce specific communities to migrate *en masse*. This practice began in the 1870s with Mennonite and Icelandic communities in Manitoba and continued into the twentieth century.[21] The Canadian state also sought to craft a settler society in the Prairie West by intervening into the gendered, familial, sexual and domestic lives of newcomers and Indigenous people. The mid-nineteenth century marked a critical turning point in this, as relationships that crossed racialized boundaries (such as those long practiced in the fur trade) were increasingly disparaged; instead, monogamous, heterosexual, nuclear families were idealized as the basis of an emerging settler order. The Canadian legal system and political policies sought to facilitate, regulate and punish sexual relationships that either met or failed to meet such expectations – as Sarah Carter demonstrates, both among Indigenous people and newcomers, especially Mormon settlers. The reach of such efforts would only expand into the homes of all Prairie West residents over the remainder of the nineteenth century.[22]

British Columbia, 1858–1885

Between 1857 and 1885, major changes in the Prairie West signalled a shift towards the logics of settler colonialism, but this project also remained largely a projection: an increasingly shared Canadian expectation of a settler future, backed by policies, practices and laws which had powerful and often devastating effects but which also had an outcome that was yet uncertain. Similar transitions took place on the Pacific slope of northern North America between 1858 and 1885. However, although they share a rough chronology, the trajectories of settler colonialism also differed in significant ways on either side of the Rockies.

The key turning point on the Pacific slope came just months after the Hind and Palliser expeditions began their investigations of prairie arability. In 1857, rumours spread about gold on the Fraser River in what is now British Columbia, and from the spring of 1858, tens of thousands of newcomers arrived on Vancouver Island and the mainland Pacific slope, sparking what is now called the Fraser River gold rush. By the early 1860s, the pursuit of gold drew non-Indigenous people north up the river canyon into the Cariboo region and beyond. In response to the gold rush and fears of related American incursion into the region, the HBC – still with proprietary

rights to the Vancouver Island colony – took immediate steps to assert British interests on the mainland. By August 1858, the British Colonial Office did the same, declaring the mainland a colony, British Columbia. The following year, the Colonial Office also asserted direct rule on Vancouver Island, following the decade-long grant to the HBC. The neighbouring colonies were united in 1866, then joined Confederation with the Dominion of Canada in 1871.

These geopolitical changes signalled an emerging settler project on the Pacific slope. The colonial and early provincial governments increasingly pursued the dispossession and marginalization of Indigenous people, including, like in the Prairie West, by moving them onto reserves that would not impinge on settler economic or social interests. However, while on the prairies this process was facilitated by treaties, in British Columbia such arrangements were never pursued, except for the 14 agreements on Vancouver Island in the early 1850s. Instead, the colony (and later the province) created reserves through a constantly changing and comparatively chaotic system. In the early 1860s, Governor James Douglas created anticipatory reserves in areas of settler interest. Although without treaties or discussion of title, these reserves were often established on land that Indigenous people selected themselves – albeit not under conditions of their choosing. This system was replaced in 1864 when Joseph Trutch became Chief Commissioner of Lands and Works. Declaring the Douglas reserves to be 'unnecessarily large' and impedimental to settlement, Trutch reduced existing reserves by over 90 per cent. When British Columbia joined Confederation in 1871, reserves covered only 0.012 per cent of the province's land and were typically very small and piecemeal. After 1871, reserves became a federal responsibility, but the province was in charge of lands, and the latter continued to refuse treaties, acknowledgements of Indigenous title and the possibility of larger reserves – a position that it would maintain through the twentieth century.[23]

After 1858, the British Columbian colonial government also developed a framework for the resettlement of newcomers on alienated land, laden with the broader goal of establishing 'British-ness', law, order and sovereignty in British Columbia.[24] In particular, preemption (homesteading) laws enabled settlers to occupy and 'improve' land before surveys and purchase, and – like on the prairies – were intended to make settlement attractive and possible, even for those without much capital.[25] More broadly, preemption laws and settler land practices – in combination with the creation of reserves – were key linchpins in the project of settler colonialism in British Columbia that empowered and enriched settlers while marginalizing Indigenous people. These policies and practices significantly impacted Indigenous people's mobility, undermined ties between communities and the land, and disrupted their social, economic and spiritual worlds. However, at the same time, nascent formations of settler governance and society were also profoundly challenged, with the imagined settler future in British Columbia – like on the prairies – far from guaranteed.

The emerging settler system in British Columbia was limited in its reach and power in a number of ways in the mid-nineteenth century. For one, settler exercises in transforming land were always challenged by Indigenous people's resistance. For example, Indigenous people moved fence posts, crossed reserve boundaries and international borders, and otherwise used the land in ways that resisted settler expectation or attempted regulation.[26] In addition, the arrival of prospectors from California meant the informal imposition of California mining law along the Fraser Canyon – not only shaping relationships between newcomers and Indigenous people but also revealing the significant limitations of the colonial government in British Columbia. In August 1858, for example, the 'Fraser River War' erupted between Nlaka'pamux people and non-Indigenous prospectors after two French miners were killed in retaliation for their alleged rape of an Nlaka'pamux woman. There were only three government officials in the Fraser Canyon, while prospectors already moved in well-armed companies. The latter immediately organized to 'take the law into [their] own hands' and to consider 'a war of extermination'.[27]

Then, in the midst of intermittent violence and uneasy calm, American miners arranged informal 'peace treaties' with Indigenous peoples without official sanction from the colonial government. In such cases, British Columbia's colonial government was revealed to have very limited control or influence over both Indigenous people and newcomers.[28]

Everything about colonial British Columbia's demographics and society also seemed to challenge expectations of an emerging stable, white settler society rooted in nuclear family life and small-scale agriculture in the mid-nineteenth century. For instance, if expectations of a settler future were rooted in the anticipated disappearance of Indigenous people, then their continued survival and significant role in colonial life thwarted such visions. In 1881, for example, Indigenous people still made up well over half of the total population despite years of devastating epidemic disease, while Indigenous labourers remained critical to nascent settler economies.[29] In addition, in 1871, the new province had only about 8,500 people identified as 'white'. British Columbia had limited arable land, few settlers pursued farming or ranching, and resource-extractive industries continued to dominate the economy.[30] In this context, non-Indigenous migrants were not only comparatively small in number but were also far more peripatetic than imagined in idealized visions of a white settler society. British Columbia's newcomers were also very racially diverse, including but not limited to Chinese people, Black people from the United States and Kanaka (Indigenous Hawaiian) people.[31] In this context, the meanings and forms of settler colonialism were made in the complicated interactions among people of colour – not just in binaries between Indigenous and white.[32] And finally, the growing settler project was profoundly challenged by a marked gender imbalance amongst the newcomer population.[33] In British Columbia, as in the Prairie West, marriages between Indigenous women and non-Indigenous men lost widespread acceptance among settlers in mid-century, and the colonial administration increasingly sought to regulate marriage, attract white women as migrants and re-shape gender and family orders. As Adele Perry demonstrates, such efforts had varied but limited effects in British Columbia's colonial years.[34]

Overall, the groundwork was laid in the mid-nineteenth century for a consolidating Canadian settler project that would develop across northwestern North America in the years that followed. This was a period of dislocation: epidemics and starvation, the bison's decline, treaties, the creation (and reduction) of reserves, and the imposition of new laws and policies together signalled shifting power relations and the rise of settler colonial priorities across the region. The emerging settler order had significant effects on the lives of Indigenous people, but expectations of a settler order were also undermined by Indigenous resistance, the limitations of non-Indigenous knowledge and control, and the failures of immigration to produce a stable, white settler population. It would be 1885 before there was a more decisive turn in the Canadian project of settler colonialism.

Consolidating settler visions, 1885–1900

In 1885, a series of events represented the advent of a more confident project of Canadian settler colonialism in northwestern North America. In that year, the trans-continental Canadian Pacific Railway (CPR) was completed – a symbolic project of nation-building, as well as a business enterprise for a company that benefited from a monopoly, land grants, cash subsidies and tax exemptions. Also in 1885, Indigenous people again waged armed resistance against Canadian expansion, this time in what is now Saskatchewan. However, unlike in 1869–70, Canadian forces were able to suppress this resistance. Together, these events spurred intensified projects of dispossession and resettlement supported by accelerated immigration and the meaningful extension of settler tools of governance in the final years of the century.

After the 1870 Manitoba Act, many Métis families moved to the Northwest Territories. By the 1880s, the Canadian government extended its reach into this region too, undertaking surveys

ahead of planned settlement as the railway was laid towards the mountains. In March 1885, Indigenous people's grievances about land, title, and treaty obligations inspired another major instance of armed resistance against Canadian expansion; Louis Riel declared another provisional government and led Métis actions against settlers, police and soldiers, while First Nations (primarily Cree) people participated in other conflicts. Violence continued into the summer, but settler forces were ultimately able to suppress the resistance in part because of the new presence of a telegraph line, the Canadian Pacific Railway and the Northwest Mounted Police. In the wake of these events, collectively known as the North-West Resistance, 14 Métis people were imprisoned; Riel was convicted of treason and executed; 11 First Nations people were hanged; and two dozen other First Nations people were imprisoned, including Cree leader Mistahimaskwa (Big Bear). Although Indigenous resistance never ceased, these events of 1885 signalled a decisive shift in power towards the Canadian state, which had demonstrated its readiness and capacity for armed repression.[35]

The completion of the CPR forged other changes in the settler colonial project, too. It offered easier access to some areas while isolating others; reoriented settlement to the rail line (and later, along branch lines); and forged a trail of industrialization and commercialization that shifted the social, economic, political and cultural nature of the region. For example, Calgary was incorporated as a town shortly after the arrival of the CPR. By the early 1890s, it became a central hub for distribution, trade and economic activity in the Northwest Territories. The controversial decision to end the railway on British Columbia's mainland rather than with a maritime link to Vancouver Island provided the stimulus for a new city, Vancouver, which would overtake Victoria in terms of population and economic importance by the beginning of the twentieth century.[36] Settler economies were reoriented to the rail line too. In the 1880s, for example, a ranching industry took hold in the southwest Prairies (now Alberta) and parts of British Columbia, aided by the railway, which enabled the transport of beef to markets.[37]

While completion of the railway was expected to accelerate settler immigration, its impact in that regard was very slow, especially in comparison to the American west. Between 1815 and 1860, the population of the American west jumped from one million to 15 million people.[38] In contrast, in 1861 the whole of British territory to the north (including British Columbia, the Prairie territories, Canada and Prince Edward Island) had just over three million people in total. The final decades of the nineteenth century only entrenched this demographic difference, particularly as more than a million settlers left Canada for the United States. Indeed, during the final two decades of the nineteenth century, emigration rates from the Canadian to the American west reached what Marvin McInnis calls a 'veritable hemorrhage'.[39] The Prairie West and British Columbia only began to counter this pattern and experienced significant population booms due to migration around the turn of the twentieth century.[40]

While the immigration of white settlers to Canadian territory was comparatively slow, the completion of the railway expanded the presence and visibility of Asian people across the west. Chinese men had lived in British Columbia since the 1850s. They had been especially critical in the construction of the CPR, since they were understood by white employers as readily available and expendable workers who could be paid poorly for dangerous tasks. When the railway was completed, these men were laid off and sought work and community in Chinatowns (and beyond) across the Canadian West.[41] In addition, the CPR chartered vessels and later operated a shipping line across the Pacific.[42] Many of those invested in the settler project celebrated this connection between Canada, Australia and New Zealand – part of an All-Red Route – but trans-Pacific passenger shipping also facilitated better connections between Canada and East Asia. The railway then enabled Chinese people arriving in Vancouver to move east into the Prairie West.[43] Racialized settler anxieties about Chinese and, later, Japanese and South Asian migration

contributed to the consolidation of exclusionary immigration policies and violent racism in the west. Canadian laws like the head tax, applied specifically to Chinese migrants, and the disenfranchisement of Asian people resulted from anti-Asian settler activism in British Columbia, and formed part of a transnational project of making 'white men's countries'.[44]

Railways were also part of a more tangible and intensified settler project that contributed to increased pressures on Indigenous people. Late-nineteenth- and early twentieth-century rail projects involved the removal of land from reserves in British Columbia, for example.[45] More broadly, federal government agents and missionaries increasingly sought to separate Indigenous people from their cultures, communities and families in this period, developing and imposing strategies including bans on significant ceremonies like the potlatch and the sun dance. The residential school system for Indigenous children was also established as a project of cultural dislocation.[46] This intersected with the ongoing work of European and Euro-Canadian missionaries, who largely ran the schools in the late nineteenth century.[47] Federal government failures to meet treaty obligations also contributed to the marginalization of Indigenous people across the west during the late nineteenth century. As Sarah Carter demonstrates, for example, government policies after 1885 'made it virtually impossible for reserve agriculture to succeed', in contravention of treaty obligations and stated policy priorities.[48] Such practices developed as part of a wider imposition of a settler legal system, colonial bureaucracy and the policing of Indigenous people's lives. Legalized discrimination and state coercion operated in complex and often contradictory ways, but were, by the end of the century, wielding intrusive and violent power across the Canadian West.[49]

Indigenous people's responses to settler colonialism were diverse. Adults hid children from Indian Agents in efforts to keep them from residential schools. Others hoped that schooling would provide their children with strategies to navigate the consolidating settler world. In some cases, Indigenous people used the tools of Canadian politics and society in order to protest, resist and maintain senses of identity; this included travels to Ottawa and London to petition for rights and claims, although such efforts rarely gained traction at any level of government in this period.[50] In all these ways and more, resistance, avoidance and adaptation were critical in reshaping and interrupting aspects of settler power – even as the latter had a profoundly destructive effect on Indigenous lives, identities, families, communities, livelihoods and lands.[51] The late nineteenth century was, in other words, a period of resistance and disruption, adaptation and change, as the Canadian settler project strengthened across northwestern North America.

In the early 1900s, more geopolitical changes signalled the next century's shift towards an even more confident and consolidated Canadian settler state. In 1905, two new provinces – Alberta and Saskatchewan – were created from Northwest Territories districts, and, in the process, helped to form an unbroken chain of Canadian provinces from Atlantic to Pacific. While their creation grew primarily from local lobbying, it was also part of a longer process of nineteenth-century province-making, following on the 1870 creation of Manitoba as a negotiated resolution to the Red River resistance and the 1871 creation of British Columbia as a province with the promise of a trans-continental railway. Previously governed as internal colonies, the new provinces of Alberta and Saskatchewan gained more autonomy and representative institutions within the Canadian parliamentary democracy, like their neighbours to the east and the west. In the years that followed, all four western provinces had comparatively little sway in a federal government that remained centered on and dominated by Ontario and Quebec. However, confederation with the Dominion did have a significant impact on the Canadian West, particularly as it lay the groundwork for a state system, an Indian Affairs bureaucracy and aggressive immigration policies that would shape the futures of British Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan and Manitoba.[52]

Through such tools, the settler state project would continue to extend in confidence and strength across northwestern North America in the twentieth century, building on its nineteenth-century foundations.

Conclusion

It was only in the late nineteenth century that changes in state policy, legal parameters and bureaucratic regimes and closer intervention into Indigenous people's lives marked the consolidation of Canadian settler colonialism in a region that had been previously so far out of its control. Until the mid-nineteenth century, northwestern North America was diverse Indigenous territory, with non-Indigenous newcomers reliant on Indigenous knowledge, labour and support through the eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century extension of the fur trade west into the prairies and from the Pacific towards the Rockies. New diseases wreaked devastation on many Indigenous communities, and the fur trade was increasingly inflected with non-Indigenous violence, but overall this fur trade world should not be characterized as settler colonialism. Key changes came in the middle of the nineteenth century as Canadian and British governments looked to extend across the territory by pursuing new forms of sovereignty, settlement, economy, and political and legal control. While far from certain in the mid-nineteenth century, such efforts nonetheless planted the seeds of a new settler order.

In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, those seeds grew into a consolidating settler colonial regime across northwestern North America. By this point, Indigenous people were no longer seen as critical economically or militarily, and, as such, they were increasingly marginalized in state policy and settler practice. A strengthening Canadian settler order was still uneven and challenged in a range of ways and was always met with resistance. However, new technologies, changing priorities, expanded bureaucracies and instruments of settler governance facilitated the extension of a Canadian settler colonial project across the west. By the beginning of the twentieth century, this increasingly assertive settler state and society was better able to enforce its presence and priorities across four western provinces and was more confident in a settler colonial century to come.

Notes

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10

SETTLER COLONIALISM IN POSTCOLONIAL LATIN AMERICA

Michael Goebel

Latin American history since the late nineteenth century has rarely been treated under the rubric of 'settler colonialism'.[1] While historical atlases and popular culture have long bewailed or feted Latin America as the world region of *mestizaje* ('racial mixing'), the label 'settler colonialism' has typically been attached to English-speaking societies of predominantly white European descendants. The reasons for South America's exclusion from the category may seem obvious enough for most of the continent, but they are much less so for the region that elsewhere I have called 'the Western South Atlantic': the land mass stretching down the Atlantic coast line from Southern Brazil to Patagonia, which Alfred Crosby included among his list of 'Neo-Europes'.[2] It is this region that this chapter will concentrate on in order to interrogate the usefulness of the category 'settler colonialism' for its historical study. Rather than focusing on the colonial period, which has received some attention by scholars of 'settler colonialism',[3] I focus on the period since 1870, during which the region has received far more immigrants or settlers than during 300 years of Spanish/Portuguese rule. In José Moya's terms, 'by the eve of World War I there were more Spaniards in the city of Buenos Aires (306,000) than there had been in all of the Spanish colonies at any given time before the Wars of Independence'.[4]

As with most clichés, there is a grain of truth in Latin America's image as a continent of *mestizaje* and some justification for not treating its demographic history as an instance of 'settlement colonialism'. Compared to North America, Spanish colonialism in the Americas was much more about the exploitation of native labour (and African slaves) for extractive purposes and plantations than about European settlement.[5] As a result, interaction between European settlers and native populations tended to be more intense in Spanish than in British America. The focus on labour exploitation also fails to fulfil what the paradigmatic literature on 'settler colonialism' has identified as one of its subject matter's decisive hallmarks, namely the centrality of land and of indigenous dispossession or even genocide over forced native (or African) labour.[6] Even though debates have flared in recent years over whether the so-called conquest of the desert, during which the Argentine army killed thousands of native inhabitants in Patagonia, constituted genocide or not, these discussions have not normally been framed by the literature on 'settler colonialism'.[7]

By contrast, the mass arrival of Europeans in São Paulo, Southern Brazil, Uruguay and Argentina between 1870 and 1930 has normally been dealt with as an instance of 'migration' instead.[8] This mismatch amounts to something more than a terminological quibble: the historiography on 'migration' has privileged different topics and has raised different questions than the scholarship

on settler colonialism. Following a long tradition founded by the Chicago School of Sociology, historians of immigration into Latin America have had much interest in large numbers; they have focused upon urbanites rather than rural settlers; and they have asked questions about immigrant adaptation into the host society. The watchwords 'colonialism' and 'indigenous' have been all but absent in this literature.[9] The only significant historiographical corpus that *has* explicitly treated Southern Brazil and the pampas as examples of white settler societies – to be compared with the standard cases of Canada, Australia and New Zealand – has tellingly been produced by economic historians.[10] Yet, after a boom during the 1980s, the frequency of such publications has long abated. Scholars, at any rate, were far more interested in accounting for the long-term reasons behind Argentina's economic 'failure' than in communicating South America's immigration history with issues of settler colonialism. Hence, James Belich's study on the 'Anglo-world' similarly discusses Argentina in terms of its deficits in economic development.[11]

This chapter seeks to bring together these disparate historiographical strands in order to gauge the potential benefits of including Latin America in the global history of settler colonialism. Highlighting both differences and similarities between the Southern Cone of South America and the more frequently analysed 'Anglo' regions of settler colonialism, the chapter advances two major arguments. First, I maintain that if 'settler colonialism' makes for a useful label in the region's history, it should not be isolated from the broader historical scholarship on 'immigration'. Second, by foraying into the latter decades of the twentieth century, the chapter ponders over the question of whether the historical identification of Southern Brazil, Uruguay and Argentina as a 'Neo-Europe' or as 'white' regions/nations, both discursively and demographically, may gradually be drawing to a close – bettering the prospects for historicizing white settler colonialism as more of a hiatus than a watershed in global history.

'Whitening', imperialism and states

Scholars of settler colonialism rightly stress that powerful white supremacist discourses invariably escorted the age of European outbound migration to other world regions. But this should not seduce students into believing that the racist ideas of white Latin American elites were decisive in attracting large-scale migratory flows in the late nineteenth century. Accounts of European immigration to Latin America from 1870 onwards conventionally, but misleadingly, open with surveys of 'whitening' ideologies in Latin America, suggesting that these were a key engine in driving millions of Europeans to Southern South America.[12] Yet, while elite fantasies of 'whitening' (or *blanqueamiento*) in, say, the Dominican Republic have received their fair share of scholarly attention, they barely bore demographic fruit, if we leave aside the fascinating, but numerically rather inconsequential, story of dictator Rafael Trujillo's settlement program for 750 Jewish refugees from Nazi Germany.[13]

The point can be extended to Latin America as a whole. Based on similarly racist premises, Mexican president Porfirio Díaz (1884–1911) desperately sought to lure (ideally English) immigrants to Mexico but failed miserably in the grand scheme of things.[14] Although the Peruvian ruling class shared the yearning for a 'whitening' of the country's population, Moya has computed that 'Peru attracted in one hundred years [after independence] fewer European immigrants than did Argentina in one month and the United States in one week'.[15] While elite discourses and legislations about European immigration resembled each other across Latin America, only four countries received the lion's share of European settlers/immigrants. Argentina received roughly 6.5 million between 1840 and 1932, Brazil 4.3 million (1821–1932), Cuba 1.4 million (1880–1932) and Uruguay 700,000 (1836–1932), while Mexico (270,000) and Chile (90,000) trailed as a distant fifth and sixth.[16] These absolute figures were not only heavily concentrated

in the years between 1880 and 1914, but they would look even more skewed towards particular destinations if the various countries' population by the mid-nineteenth century were taken into account. The ratio of newcomers to resident population in Argentina and Uruguay, given their small populations by 1850, matched or surpassed that of the United States during the second half of the nineteenth century.

The boom in the River Plate, Southern Brazil and São Paulo shifted Latin America's demographic and socio-economic set-up. Whereas the former colonial centres of mining and agriculture – Mexico, Peru, Northeastern Brazil – turned into economic peripheries increasingly imagined as 'backward', the former backwaters of Buenos Aires and São Paulo transformed into thriving metropolises. No more than a regional town of 92,700 inhabitants by 1855, Buenos Aires became the Spanish-speaking world's largest city by 1914, with a population of 1.58 million, of whom half were born abroad. São Paulo's population, meanwhile, skyrocketed from 20,000 in 1870 to 600,000 in 1920.[17] By World War I, the River Plate region and Southern Brazil had become intimately tied into the Atlantic economy as exporters of agricultural goods, fuelled by largely British capital and infrastructure investments and chiefly Italian and Spanish labour. It was thus immigrants, not indigenous labour (which in Southern Brazil and the pampas had always been very scarce), that lubricated the agro-export economies of the Western South Atlantic. Economic growth, urbanization and incipient industrialization yielded a GDP per person for Argentina well above that of Southern Europe and only slightly below Australia and Canada. Contemporary observers brimmed with optimism about Argentina's future as a 'Neo-Europe'.

The social history of migration – with its characteristic attention to labour markets, transport revolutions, information channels, kinship relations and above all network formation – is much more convincing in explaining these vast-scale shifts than the historiography on elite discourses and policymaking. In some cases, to be sure, state engineering did play a role in triggering settlement that informal networks then sustained upon withdrawal of official subsidies. The program inaugurated by São Paulo after the abolition of slavery 1888 in order to replace slaves with European immigrant farmers on the state's rural coffee *fazendas* is probably the best example. Yet, although it succeeded in bringing thousands of Venetian families, the result diverged sharply from the paragon of the North American democratic yeomen that some Brazilian idealists may have hoped for and, as reports of terribly exploitative conditions spread back home, the Italian state forbade subsidies to Brazil-bound emigrants in 1902.[18] Elsewhere, states were barely involved. In the mid-nineteenth century, when Uruguay received the highest proportion of foreign-born settlers in all of Latin America (relative to its preexisting population), its elites cared little about immigration and at any rate would have been all but unable to incentivize it even if they had wanted to.[19] Conversely, by the 1880s, when immigrants began to arrive in truly massive numbers in Argentina, the same elites who until recently had been enthusiastic advocates of immigration turned hostile to the country's 'Italianization', even though a combination of economic considerations and lack of effective instruments dissuaded them from adopting strident measures against the inflow.[20]

If South American governments neither decisively stimulated nor curbed European immigration, the sending states did even less so. The settler colonialism paradigm does not apply to postcolonial Latin America, if it is taken to imply that a far-flung metropole steered the movement of people.[21] To be sure, German settlements in Southern Brazil stirred the pipe dreams of imperialists manqués back in Berlin, who penned much prose replete with the masculine tropes of colonists who settled 'virgin' lands and 'penetrated' the 'jungle' to let 'civilization' blossom.[22] But the German state had little control over its own overseas settlers, let alone over Brazilian immigration policies. Meanwhile, Italians and Spaniards, who formed the majority of immigrants (roughly two-thirds of the whole in the River Plate between 1880 and 1930), arrived not so much as the

representatives of mighty metropoles but rather as the entrepreneurial surplus of impoverished and powerless states – a key difference between Argentina and Australia, according to Belich.[23] Even though Italians referred to 'their' Argentina-bound emigrants as 'our colony', it was precisely the absurdity of an Italian colonialism in rich and independent Argentina that encouraged imperialists in Rome to turn their eyes to Africa instead.[24] Arguably, the River Plate formed part of Britain's 'informal empire'. But even as British investors had an interest in the availability of labour in Argentina, they could not – or did not have to – tap large numbers of migrants from Britain, while they had little direct influence over the migration choices of Southern Europeans.[25]

Land, frontiers and cities

The other constitutive elements of settler colonialism – indigenous dispossession/elimination and the centrality of land – are easier to discern in postcolonial Latin America. The two of course are linked because land was frequently 'emptied' of its native populations before it became available for white settlers. Before and throughout the colonial period, to be sure, the Amerindian population of Southern Brazil, the River Plate and Patagonia had been much scarcer than elsewhere, which was why settlers in these regions relied much less on indigenous labour than in the colonial heartlands to begin with. Like most of the Atlantic shoreline of South America, their economies were partly driven by African slave labour instead, so that still in 1836 one third of the population of the city of Buenos Aires was classified as black; Rio Grande do Sul had a similar share as late as 1890. In contrast to the largely slave-fuelled plantation economies of the Brazilian Northeast or the Caribbean, many slaves and free blacks worked as domestic servants or small artisans.[26] Although reliable figures of the Amerindian population around the time of independence are hard to come by, they were certainly much lower. Of the 30,885 inhabitants that a 1793 census recorded in the Banda Oriental (today's Uruguay), 7,000 were 'blacks or mulattoes' (*negros o mulatos*) and only 700 'Indians' (*indios*). By 1842, 9,000 of 200,000 inhabitants were considered 'blacks', while the category 'Indian' had disappeared.[27]

This 'disappearance' stemmed not only from a peaceful demographic shift but was flanked by brutal military campaigns to expel or annihilate indigenous groups. New republican legislation enshrining racial equality before the law notwithstanding, expeditions picked up pace in the two decades following independence and then most notoriously in the so-called conquest of the desert in 1878/79 in the southern pampas. Led by General Julio Argentino Roca, who in 1880 would become Argentina's president, the ruthless campaign had the avowed aim of erasing 'barbarism' from the vast plains south of the province of Buenos Aires in order to open them for European settlement and infrastructural integration into the Argentine nation-state. The army dispatched from Buenos Aires killed more than 1,000 and imprisoned another 14,000.[28] If this should indeed be labelled 'genocide', as it often is today, it remains among the most poorly studied mass killings of modern history: much of the scholarship rests on thin primary research and contents itself with citing declarations of intent voiced by the Buenos Aires elite. These statements, however, do make it abundantly clear that the campaign relied on deeply racist beliefs and annihilatory intent.[29] Although the Buenos Aires government had previously attracted small numbers of settlers to Patagonia – most famously a Welsh community engaged in sheep husbandry – Roca's foray also yielded its desired effect in terms of opening the frontier for white settlement expansion.[30]

Intellectually, the campaign was intimately linked to similar drives for dispossession of native peoples in virtually all the countries commonly associated with settler colonialism. Domingo Faustino Sarmiento, one of Argentina's foremost writer-statesmen of the nineteenth century (and president in 1868–74), fervently advocated Northern European immigration to Argentina

in order to 'civilize' the country and 'improve' its 'racial stock' – purposes for which he studied not only the frontier in the United States but also France's 'civilizing mission' in Algeria.[31] A few decades later, the Argentine press took a lively interest in the Second Boer War.[32] Following the war, the Argentine government viewed Afrikaners as settlers, resulting in the settlement of roughly 600 farmers from the Cape in the Patagonian province of Chubut, many of them in a small hamlet baptized Sarmiento, alongside other small ethnically homogenous settlements in the same region.[33] As Charles Maier has stressed, the 'quasi-genocidal Argentine conquest of Patagonia' formed part and parcel of a much more global moment of 'wars of national reconstitution [that] were also wars of tribal destruction', consolidating the territorial reach of nation-states worldwide.[34]

The River Plate countries also developed their own variant of Frederick Jackson Turner's infamous 'frontier thesis'. Sarmiento's contemporary Bartolomé Mitre (president in 1862–68 and the 'father of Argentine historiography') believed that his country's relative lack of exploited non-white groups and the pampas' open frontier had fostered a rough social equality well suited to democratic governance.[35] Early twentieth-century Uruguay assiduously cultivated a myth of the country as 'the Switzerland of South America', backed up by political reforms and an expansion of the welfare state that were indeed remarkably democratic and egalitarian.[36] Empirical research has confirmed that the distribution of wealth in early nineteenth-century Buenos Aires was likely more equal than in Texas or Wisconsin.[37] Although it is tempting to interpret this as the outcome of the same 'inherent link between internal liberty and external subjugation' of indigenous 'others' that Aziz Rana has diagnosed in the United States,[38] a straightforward correlation between ethnic homogeneity based on the strict exclusion of non-whites, social equality and democracy is misleading. Racial boundaries were more fluid on the pampas than on the North American prairies, but this apparently did not boost inequality in Argentina. Political systems and electoral legislations broadly resembled one another across postcolonial Spanish America regardless of the respective countries' ethnic mix. Finally, socio-economic inequality increased sharply in the Rio de la Plata after 1870, precisely at a time when the mass immigration Mitre and Sarmiento had envisaged turned into a reality, effectively 'whitening' the country's population.[39]

Whereas indigenous dispossession and the importance of land in late nineteenth-century Southern South America fit nicely into standard definitions of settler colonialism, the fact that the vast majority of immigrants to Latin America since 1880 went to cities sits uncomfortably with the imagery conjured up by the term 'settler'. To be sure, contrary to the view held by early scholars of immigration to Latin America, land was widely available for immigrants in both the coffee economy of São Paulo and the Argentine littoral until well into the twentieth century – that is, much later than in the United States. Basques and Northern Italians, who on average arrived earlier than Galicians and Southern Italians, were remarkably successful in acquiring rural properties in both Brazil and Argentina, which was one of the main motives of their migration in the first place.[40] However, taking census data as a basis, a very conservative estimate suggests that at least 55 per cent of net immigrants to Argentina between 1869 and 1895 settled in cities rather than in the countryside, and more than 75 per cent did so in 1895–1914. The percentage surely rose further thereafter, while the onset of internal migration to cities brought second-generation rural immigrants to urban centres. The entire vast landmass south of the province of Buenos Aires (roughly a third of the country's territory), which had been opened for settlement through the 'conquest of the desert', accommodated no more than 1.2 per cent of the national population in 1895, rising to a still modest 2.8 per cent in 1914.[41] Demographically speaking, rural settlements were a minor sideshow to the history of immigration in the Rio de la Plata.

The question of return migration is tied to this problem. As much of the scholarship on the topic has highlighted, 'settler-colonists went to stay',[42] whereas mere migrants tended to be

young sojourners intent on accumulating a little wealth to invest and settle down back home. This phenomenon was well known in the turn-of-the-century River Plate countries, taking the extreme form of seasonal harvest workers who spent half the year in Europe and the other half in South America – popularly known as *golondrinas* ('swallows'). Based on a contrast between an 'Anglo return migration' of 25 per cent throughout the 'long nineteenth century' and Argentina's return rate of 55 per cent in 1876–1914, Belich hesitates whether or not to make room for South America in his 'settler revolution'.[43] The gap between the two rates, of course, stems in good part from the different year ranges that Belich applies, leading him to compare a predominantly rural early migration to a mainly urban later one, which contained more people interested in quick money than long-term settlement. The return rate of Italians in 1861–1913 was in fact higher from the US (52 per cent) than from Argentina (47 per cent) and from Brazil (30 per cent), owing to a combination of timing in the migratory flow and the proportion of urban versus rural dwellers.[44]

The crux of the matter is that, whereas in the United States scholars have long been accustomed to distinguish between two waves of immigration – an earlier one with a larger proportion of Northern European 'settlers' who went to rural areas and a second one of Southern and Eastern European urbanites – this separation makes much less sense in South America.[45] Even though certain groups, such as Northern Italians, provided greater numbers in earlier more rural streams, and others, such as Jews, predominantly arrived after WWI and stayed in cities, in both timing and composition there was no clear watershed between 'waves'. In fact, earlier arrivals paved the way for latecomers, who followed in their trail: Agricultural development for export first drove the region's integration into the globalizing world economy and then encouraged the growth of cities that became the crucial nodal points of this integration. Catholic Southern Europeans predominated over the entire century beginning in 1850, and pioneers and latecomers were often related to one another. Due to the cumulative causation inherent in processes of network formation – migrants go where they know someone already – those areas with relatively high absolute numbers of immigrants by 1890 pulled ever more thereafter. Thus, whereas migration to the rural areas of Rio Grande do Sul and Uruguay slowed down, São Paulo and Buenos Aires surged ahead.[46] As a result, these two cities and their respective hinterlands had the highest proportion of foreign-born during the early decades of the twentieth century.

Economies, internal migrations and the politics of scholarship

Numbers alone are therefore a poor yardstick to predict whether any given region found entry or not into the scholarly category of settler colonialism. The province and, after 1889, state of São Paulo exemplifies these problems well in that scholars rarely treat it as a case of settler colonialism, even if at first sight it fulfils all the necessary criteria. Seventeenth-century São Paulo had its own history of indigenous dispossession and displacement at the frontier. Although the region's seventeenth-century adventurers, known as *bandeirantes*, had primarily pursued the capture of indigenous peoples for enslavement rather than land, they made for a powerful myth of hardworking frontier pioneers, which emerged in the early twentieth century. As Barbara Weinstein has shown, in the context of mass immigration, this myth was woven into a discourse of 'whiteness' and 'modernity' with which *paulistas* sought to distinguish themselves from the rest of Brazil.[47] Southern European immigrants arrived in enormous numbers after the abolition of slavery in 1888 – more than half of all immigrants to Brazil went to São Paulo – and many of them settled on coffee *fazendas*, so that *colonos* even became a standard term for them.[48] São Paulo in the 1890s thus had 'some of the hallmarks of explosive colonization' and the state's capital was 'a mushroom city if ever there was one', as Belich concedes.[49] And yet, scholars have rarely made

room for São Paulo in the global history of settler colonialism. Crosby explicitly excludes São Paulo from his South American 'Neo-Europe'.[50] There are far more studies about both 'immigrants' and 'settlers' in Rio Grande do Sul than in São Paulo, even though, numerically, the latter dwarfed the former.

Immigration to São Paulo was unusually concentrated in the 1890–1930 period, but it is mostly a combination of methodological nationalism and economic and racial factors that explains why scholars do not normally treat the state as a settler society. In contrast to the livestock raising and grain growing of Southern Brazil and the Rio de la Plata, São Paulo's economy throve on coffee. Even though that same crop produced an enduring myth of independent yeoman farmers as a basis for an egalitarian democracy in Costa Rica (in some respects resembling Mitre's frontier thesis in Argentina),[51] this did not occur in Brazil, where associations with slavery and 'backwardness' tainted the image of coffee.[52] Unlike the three southern states, economically and discursively, São Paulo was too constitutive a part of Brazil to have escaped the fate of scholarly treatments of the country as a whole, most parts of which of course cannot easily be treated as European settler societies.[53]

'Whiteness' may well be an unspoken criterion in organizing the scholarship on settler colonialism. Both colonial and postcolonial Latin American history had numerous 'frontiers' which ambitious states sought to integrate into consolidating national territories by infrastructural measures and settlement.[54] Much of the Brazilian West remained a frontier until after WWII. The Chaco War of 1932–35 between Bolivia and Paraguay was over a frontier zone, and German-speaking Mennonite settlers, who had recently come from Canada and the Soviet Union, proved a crucial factor in swaying the conflict's outcome in Paraguay's favour.[55] Yet these frontiers have not produced Turner-style theses. The British Latin Americanist Alistair Hennessy even believed that they 'bred a spirit of lawless anarchy and [. . .] pastoral despotism.'[56] Although twentieth-century frontier expansion continued to rest on indigenous dispossession, it was not normally accompanied by a rhetoric of 'whiteness'. As Seth Garfield has shown for mid-twentieth century Brazil, elites sometimes preferred to construe myths of idealized 'Indians' instead.[57]

From the viewpoint of international scholarship, the ethnicity of the settlers themselves may have mattered less than the question of whether the countries or the region as a whole were associated with 'whiteness'. Even Argentina's status is somewhat ambiguous in this respect. Whereas turn-of-the-century nativists in the United States summoned WASP settler-colonist imagery to rail against Southern and Eastern European Catholics and Jews, who were not seen as quite 'white',[58] Argentina's nativist anti-immigrant folklore centred on the *gaucho*, an archetype of racial mixture that was usually seen as 'less white' than the immigrants. Still seen as an 'uncivilized' social outcast in the nineteenth century, the decades after 1900 saw the gradual transformation of the *gaucho* into the prime marker of Argentine national identity – only later followed by the more urban musical genre of the tango.[59] This symbolism, and the fact that Argentina is located in Latin America, has likely been a factor in the country's marginal role in scholarly discussions of settler colonialism.

On the other hand, within Argentina, the notion of the country as 'white' in contradistinction to its neighbours persisted throughout the twentieth century, as historians have highlighted in recent years.[60] Discourse trumps reality: Edward Telles and René Flores have shown that people with 'light brown skin color' are more likely to self-identify as 'white' in those Latin American countries that have long cultivated myths of whiteness – that is, Argentina, Uruguay, Costa Rica and Chile.[61] Official rhetoric during Argentina's military dictatorship of 1976–83 blended whiteness with territorial nationalism, folding both into the systematic glorification of Roca's 'conquest of the desert', which increasingly stood for the country's 'white' past in racist contradistinction

to a 'less white' present. A 1980 issue of *Nuestra Soberanía* ('Our Sovereignty'), a navy magazine, praised Roca's presidency for having allowed into the country only those immigrants 'formed within the patterns of Western and Christian civilisation', contrasting this policy with lament over recent arrivals from 'neighbouring or Asian countries'. According to the magazine, this meant that Argentina 'exports brains and imports illiterates'.[62] The barely disguised racism of such statements bespoke an underlying endurance of Argentina's self-identification as white, especially among the country's political Right.

They were also a rearguard action, however. They fanned a rising counter-discourse that branded Roca's campaign and the human rights violations of the late 1970s alike as 'genocide'.[63] Democratic restoration moreover coincided with a much more general upsurge in interest and awareness of Latin America's indigenous and African roots, picking up especially in 1992, when the region remembered Christopher Columbus's voyage 500 years earlier. Younger people across Latin America, as Telles and Flores also show, are less likely to self-identify as 'white' than older generations.[64] As early as 1945, obstinate reaffirmations of Argentina's whiteness – for instance in the form of the slur *cabecita negra*, 'little black heads', to denote Peronist supporters from the country's interior – stemmed from the anxieties of a white Buenos Aires-based elite over growing internal migration from Argentina's more indigenous Northwest.[65] According to Richard Gott, if Latin America could ever be classified as a 'white settler society', this has been worn away in recent decades, as 'overt racism' against black and indigenous populations has become 'more difficult to sustain'.[66]

As for Buenos Aires and São Paulo, twentieth-century demographic developments have in fact underpinned this shift in perception. In comparison to English-speaking settler societies, Argentina and Brazil performed poorly in economic terms, which in good measure explains why European migration to Latin America dropped considerably after 1930. Whereas post-WWII Australia and Canada continued to attract large numbers of immigrants (albeit with a diminishing share of Europeans), Argentina and Brazil did not. Within their respective countries and the wider region, however, Buenos Aires and São Paulo developed into the dynamic nodal points of outward-looking economies, which attracted growing numbers of internal migrants from their respective countries' poorer regions and, in the last decades of the twentieth century, neighbouring countries and, to a lesser extent, East Asia.[67] Just like the English-speaking settler societies of North America and Australia, Latin America's 'Neo-Europe' has thus become 'less white' in recent decades.

Recent genetic admixture analyses predictably reveal that the participation of Amerindian haplotypes (a set of DNA variations) in the gene pool of a sample from Buenos Aires increased significantly between the 1930s and the 2000s. They have also shown that the Amerindian contribution is greater on the fringes of the city's metropolitan area than in the core, all of which strongly suggests migration from Argentina's interior and neighbouring countries as the chief reason for change.[68] Whereas in the twentieth-century United States the industrial centres of earlier times were increasingly perceived as undesirable places to live in and sub-urbanization was linked to social upward mobility, the opposite held true of Latin American cities. Their socio-geographic structure in fact reproduced in miniature the rural-urban economic gap that characterized their countries as a whole, with wealthier inner city areas and poor outer belts. In short, Latin American cities were historically coded as more European, wealthier and 'whiter' than the countryside – unlike the cities of English-speaking settler societies.

The dwindling discursive traction of Argentine 'white' exceptionalism in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries is likely part and parcel of the Latin America-wide revalorization of indigenous and African heritages that Gott has underscored.[69] Though partly fanned

by the 1992 anniversary of Columbus' voyage, this has taken various forms in different Latin American countries. It ranges from new constitutions, such as that of Colombia of 1991, which expanded the rights of indigenous peoples, to the rising legitimacy of land claims of the Mapuche in Southern Chile.[70] The Zapatistas' worldwide fame after the 1994 uprising is evidence of it as much as the official renaming of Bolivia as a 'plurinational state' in 2009. Historically as reluctant as France to collect national statistics on race, an increasing number of Latin American republics has come around to ask questions about descent in recent censuses, in which a growing number of citizens has self-identified as something other than 'white'.[71] Paralleling the erosion of 'whiteness' in the United States, Latin America too seems to be on a path of attenuating its settler colonist past.

Conclusion

On a demographic level, the historical emergence of a Latin American 'Neo-Europe' paved the way for its later undoing. If nineteenth-century European immigration had co-produced regional inequality, from 1930 onwards it also incentivized new migration streams to the relatively wealthy regions of South America, which in the process became less European. Paradoxically, then, while economic historians have doubted whether Argentina should be treated as a settler colonial society on grounds of its poor economic performance compared to Australia and Canada, it was the relative greater wealth of the area between São Paulo and Buenos Aires that eventually precipitated its 'de-Europeanization' of sorts. From today's perspective, the region's history as a white settler society looks much more like a hiatus than a developmental endpoint. 'Neo-Europe' eventually became a part of Latin America. In Ricardo Salvatore's catchy terms, 'the unsettling location of a settler nation' meant that Argentina lost its status as 'a land of opportunity'.[72] As both Argentina and Southern Brazil internationally fall into the remit of 'Latin American Studies', they have largely escaped treatment by settler colonial studies, a firmly Anglo-dominated field of enquiry.

   Asking the question of whether Latin America fits into the dominant paradigms of 'settler colonialism' can tell us a great deal about these paradigms. As this chapter has shown, the answer to that question will depend on which factors we privilege for a given society to fit the mould. Although economic historians have been best at including parts of Latin America in their comparative analyses of settler societies, paradoxically, it is in this realm where the region perhaps sits least comfortably with the usual cases of comparison. As a result, most comparative histories of settler economies have sought to explain the 'failure' of Argentina in *contrast* to the 'successful' standard of Britain's settler colonies. Other strands of the literature on settler colonialism have neglected Latin America, perhaps because large-scale European settlement only set in long after most countries of the region had become independent. While indigenous dispossession and the centrality of land were thus important hallmarks in the onset of mass migration to the Southern Cone, this movement never radiated out from an imperial centre, as could be said with the British case.

   Finally, the conceptual distinction between settler colonialism and immigration, which has long underwritten English-language scholarship on these topics, never took hold in Latin America. And as this chapter argued, it made little sense historically. In the grand scheme of things, neither Argentina nor Brazil had a 'first wave' of 'white settlers' from the imperial centre who formed a cultural mainstream and a 'second wave' of 'others' – as conventional accounts of US history would have it. In Argentina and Uruguay, Italians arrived earlier on average than the Spanish. In spite of their colonial connections to the receiving countries, Spanish immigrants stayed more often in cities and were residentially more segregated than Italians.[73] If settler colonial

studies have anything to learn at all from Latin American history, it might well be this overlap with 'migration', raising questions about the extent to which settler colonialism should be seen as part and parcel of 'colonialism' or rather of the global history of migration – or what it means that it was always both.

Notes

1 One notable exception is R. Gott, 'Latin America as a White Settler Society', *Bulletin of Latin American Research* 26, 2007, 269–89.

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3 G. D. Smithers and B. N. Newman (eds.) *Native Diasporas: Indigenous Identities and Settler Colonialism in the Americas*, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2014.

4 J. C. Moya, *Cousins and Strangers: Spanish Immigrants in Buenos Aires, 1880–1930*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998, p. 1.

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6 E.g. P. Wolfe, 'Settler colonialism and the elimination of the native', *Journal of Genocide Research* 8, 2006, 387–409, here 388; see also L. Veracini, *Settler Colonialism: A Theoretical Overview*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.

7 W. Delrio et al., 'Discussing indigenous genocide in Argentina: Past, present, and consequences of Argentinean state policies toward native peoples', *Genocide Studies and Prevention* 5, 2010, 138–59. See also R. Carroll, 'Argentinian founding father recast as murderer', *The Guardian*, 13 January 2011.

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10 E.g. B. Dyster, 'Argentine and Australian development compared', *Past and Present* 84, 1979, 91–110; D. Denoon, *Settler Capitalism: The Dynamics of Dependent Development*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983; D. C. M. Platt and G. di Tella, *Argentina, Australia and Canada: Studies in Comparative Development, 1870–1965*, London: Macmillan, 1985; C. E. Solberg, *The Prairies and the Pampas: Agrarian Policy in Canada and Argentina, 1880–1930*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1987; J. Adelman, *Frontier Development: Land, Labour, and Capital on the Wheatlands of Argentina and Canada, 1890–1914*, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1994; and J. Álvarez and L. Bértola, 'So similar, so different: New Zealand and Uruguay in the world economy', in C. Lloyd, J. Metzer and R. Sutch (eds.) *Settler Economies in World History*, Leiden: Brill, 2013, pp. 493–520.

11 J. Belich, *Replenishing the Earth: The Settler Revolution and the Rise of the Anglo-World, 1783–1939*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009, pp. 522–40.

12 E.g. Lesser, *Immigration*, pp. 12–6; and M. E. Bletz, *Immigration and Acculturation in Brazil and Argentina, 1890–1929*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, pp. 12–56.

13 A. Wells, *Tropical Zion: General Trujillo, FDR, and the Jews of Sosúa*, Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2009. On *blanqueamiento* in the Dominican Republic see A. Mayes, *The Mulatto Republic: Class, Race and Dominican National Identity*, Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2014, especially pp. 61–77.

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15 Moya, *Cousins and Strangers*, pp. 50–1.

16 Ibid., p. 46.

17 G. Bourdé, *Urbanisation et immigration en Amérique latine: Buenos Aires (XIXème et XXème siècles)*, Paris: Montaigne, 1974, p. 163; Moya, *Cousins and Strangers*, p. 149.

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20 On public debates about immigration in Argentina, see L. A. Bertoni, *Patriotas, cosmopolitas y nacionalistas: la construcción de la nacionalidad argentina a fines del siglo XIX*, Buenos Aires: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2001.

21 For a similar argument, see Gott, 'Latin America as a White Settler Society', 273.

22 See S. Conrad, *Globalisation and Nation in Imperial Germany*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010, pp. 275–333.

23 Belich, *Replenishing the Earth*, p. 518.

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42   P. Wolfe, *Settler Colonialism and the Transformation of Anthropology: The Politics and Poetics of an Ethnographic Event*, London: Cassell, 1998, p. 29.

43   Belich, *Replenishing the Earth*, p. 127.

44   Baily, *Immigrants*, pp. 60 and 230.

45   On some implications of this difference, see Goebel, 'Gauchos, Gringos and Gallegos', 217.

46   See Goebel, *Overlapping Geographies*, pp. 15–6 for the reasons and results of this process.

47   B. Weinstein, *The Color of Modernity: São Paulo and the Making of Race and Nation in Brazil*, Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2015.

48   T. Holloway, 'Creating the reserve army: The immigration program of São Paulo', *International Migration Review* 12, 1978, 187–209, here 188.

49   Belich, *Replenishing the Earth*, p. 520.

50   Crosby, *Ecological Imperialism*, pp. 3 and 149.

51   The classic English-language statement of this is J. L. Busey, *Notes on Costa Rican Democracy*, Boulder, CO: University of Colorado Press, 1962.

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53   P. Wolfe, 'Land, labor, and difference: Elementary structures of race', *The American Historical Review* 106, 2001, 866–905, thus barely differentiates between Brazil's various regions when he contrasts the country to the United States and Australia in terms of land, labour and race. Belich, *Replenishing the Earth*, pp. 519–22, first gives reasons for why São Paulo may well match the 'settler revolution' but then proceeds to oust it from his case studies on grounds of the economic performance of Brazil as a whole. São Paulo's nineteenth-century history as a heartland of Brazilian slavery and its post-1930 history as a recipient of internal migrants from Brazil's Northeast may well explain why Crosby, *Ecological Imperialism*, p. 3 omits it from his list of 'Neo-Europes', as his ultimate criterion for admission to the category seems to be an 85 per cent 'European' or 'white' population by the late twentieth century

54   See Guy and Sheridan (eds.) *Contested Ground*.

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56   A. Hennessy, *The Frontier in Latin American History*, Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1978, p. 26.

57   S. Garfield, *Indigenous Struggle at the Heart of Brazil: State Policy, Frontier Expansion, and the Xavante Indians, 1937–1988*, Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2001.

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59   J. DeLaney, 'Making sense of modernity: Changing attitudes toward the immigrant and the Gaucho in turn-of-the-century Argentina', *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 38, 1996, 434–59, and Goebel, *Argentina's Partisan Past*, pp. 36–42. On the role of the *gaucho* in Uruguay and Brazil, see Goebel, *Overlapping Geographies*, pp. 26–33.

60   The panel 'Beyond whiteness: Rethinking race in modern Argentina' at the convention of the Latin American Studies Association, San Francisco, 2012, showcased the growing research in this area.

61   E. Telles and R. Flores, 'Not just color: Whiteness, nation, and status in Latin America', *Hispanic American Historical Review* 93, 2013, 411–49, here 439.

62   *Nuestra Soberanía*, March–April 1980, Vol. 9. More generally see Goebel, *Argentina's Partisan Past*, pp. 194–210.

63   The first use of the term 'genocide' in relation to both that I came across was by R. Puiggrós, an exiled left-wing nationalist linked to the guerrilla group Montoneros: *Vencer*, no. 7, March–April 1981, 43. The watershed in public consciousness about Roca was a book by D. Viñas, *Indios, ejército y frontera*, Mexico City: Siglo XXI, 1982.

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66 Gott, 'Latin America as a White Settler Society', 275.

67 A concise overview is T. Bastia and M. vom Hau, 'Migration, race and nationhood in Argentina', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 40, 2014, 475–92.

68 F. R. Carnese et al., 'Gene admixture analysis through genetic markers and genealogical data in a sample from the Buenos Aires Metropolitan Area', in S. Gibbon, M. Sans and R. Ventura Santos (eds.) *Racial Identities, Genetic Ancestry, and Health in South America: Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, and Uruguay*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011, pp. 177–94, 321–477.

69 Gott, 'Latin America as a White Settler Society'.

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72 R. Salvatore, 'The unsettling location of a settler nation: Argentina from settler economy to failed developing nation', *The South Atlantic Quarterly* 107, 2008, 755–89.

73 Moya, *Cousins and Strangers*; Goebel, '*Gauchos, Gringos and Gallegos*'.

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11

SETTLER COLONIALISM AND THE CONSOLIDATION OF CANADA IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

Adam J. Barker, Toby Rollo and Emma Battell Lowman

From the mid-nineteenth century to the present, settler colonialism in Canada has been characterized by the ongoing consolidation of state sovereignty around its assertion of radical underlying title to Indigenous lands. Accordingly, Indigenous resistance to settler colonialism has focused to a significant extent on the state as the central apparatus of colonial imposition and dispossession. From court cases that have challenged the legal basis of Canada's definitions of and justifications for territorial sovereignty to iconic struggles over land between Indigenous people and state policing and military forces, the institutions and apparatus of *the state* have been a major focus of resistance and negotiation. Most Indigenous peoples understand state governments to be a primary source of colonial suffering, giving rise to the question, 'Is the Crown at war with us?'.[1] Likewise, in the face of Indigenous resistance, settler Canadians have traditionally looked to governments to 'fix' what has come to be known as the 'Indian problem'.

While it is undeniable that the Canadian state has been a primary opponent of Indigenous peoples throughout the twentieth century, in this chapter we demonstrate that settler colonisation has been driven co-operatively by non-state actors working in partnership with the state or, in some cases, prefiguring state law and policy by preemptively claiming land and infringing on Indigenous sovereignty and nationhood. We identify and examine three key domains of settler colonialism within Canada: the state, the public and corporate-institutional partnerships. Within these domains, we find three specific processes of settler colonialism: the transition from a state policy of assimilation and erasure to one of multicultural 'recognition' and management of difference, the intensification of resource extraction and emerging narratives of 'development', and state–church partnerships leading to the implementation of the Indian Residential School system.

From sea to sea: Canada at the start of a new century

Canada was in a state of administrative, economic and demographic transition at the dawn of the twentieth century. Although no longer a wholly dependent 'settler colony' of Britain, Canada had not yet been granted full domestic control over legislative and juridical decision making. Canadian culture retained a distinctly British social and cultural sensibility, along with its legal and political traditions, despite increasingly diverse and growing international immigrant populations. The distribution of population and economic growth was uneven. Even as urban centres such as Toronto and Montreal gained prominence as key sites of industrial and financial infrastructure,

the economies of the eastern Maritime Provinces remained largely agricultural and resource-based. Western cities like Vancouver were emerging as boom-towns of the imperial periphery, yet in the late 1800s the interior of British Columbia remained largely outside of administrative reach, only lightly settled and still very much an Indigenous jurisdiction. The same was true of the northern parts of the Prairie Provinces, Ontario, Québec and the Territories. Canada, as a political entity, remained very much a patchwork of jurisdictions and regions, either formally or practically separate. Newfoundland was not yet a province (and would not be until 1949) but rather a British colony and a reminder of Canada's own recent history as an outpost of empire. Despite much political fanfare accompanying the completion of the Canadian transcontinental railway, it was very slow to reorient trade and exchange on an east-west axis and did not immediately unite Canada 'from sea to sea' as had been intended.

The era of Canadian development between 1880 and 1940 can be thought of as the 'foundational interstitial' period, wherein both the national culture and state institutions underwent shifts related to the development of a burgeoning new settler polity.[2] This period featured a transition from early forms of settlement and imperial economics towards private property regimes and the engineering of Settler-Indigenous segregation. It is no coincidence that many of the foundational myths and narratives of Canadian nationalism and identity emerged during this time.

Leading up to this foundational interstitial period, state relations with Indigenous peoples had been fluid and evolving, but the patterns of paternalism, segregation and violence that would characterize twentieth century settler colonialism were beginning to emerge. The colonial relationship was mitigated to some extent by the fact that Canadian claims to sovereignty were both dependent upon and constrained by a regime of treaty-making that preceded Canadian Confederation in 1867. The Douglas Treaties (or Vancouver Island Treaties) of 1850 to 1854 and Upper Canada Treaties (a collection of agreements signed between 1764 and 1862) still had some level of legal standing, as did the Royal Proclamation of 1763 and various 'peace and friendship treaties' between a variety of Indigenous nations and the Crown. At the beginning of the twentieth century, Canada remained in the midst of negotiating the 'numbered treaties' (officially Treaty 1 through Treaty 11), with the first eight – covering much of the southern Prairie Provinces, northern Alberta and northeastern British Columbia – signed between 1871 and 1899. The remaining three, as well as an extension to Treaty 5 covering northern Ontario, northern Manitoba and Saskatchewan, and part of the northern Territories were signed between 1905 and 1930.[3]

Yet at the same time, the federal government was consolidating power over Indigenous peoples and lands, both through underhanded treaty dealings as well as through the development of a suite of far-reaching legislation which would come to be known as the Indian Act. The first iterations of the Indian Act predate Confederation. The legislation it contains is intended both to assimilate Indigenous peoples as well as assert control over their lands and practices. These pieces of legislation include the 'Act for the Better Protection of the Lands and Property of Indians in Lower Canada' (1850); the 'Act to Encourage the Gradual Civilization of Indian Tribes in this Province, and to Amend the Laws Relating to Indians' (1857); and the 'Act for gradual enfranchisement of Indians' (1869). This body of law established the foundations for later legal concepts like 'Indian status', and also served to define and enforce 'reserve lands' for Indian 'tribes' or 'bands', all of which would become enduring legal-political constructs.

In 1876, Canada passed the first comprehensive Indian Act, consolidating and centralizing control of Indian affairs with the federal government. The Indian Act also helped to impose a Western model of governance in the form of elected band councils, which was meant to displace traditional Indigenous forms of governance. The Act also explicitly outlined a vision of assimilation through legal enfranchisement based on expected cultural and physical extermination. The

Act was continuously amended, and some of the amendments around the beginning of the twentieth century give a sense of the goals of the Canadian government: in 1885, religious ceremonies such as the potlatch were banned; power over 'nonstatus' people living on reserves was removed from bands in 1894; reserve lands could be appropriated for roads or railways (1911) or leased as agricultural lands (1918); the government claimed the power to remove Indigenous peoples from reserves located close to towns (1905); and, in 1914, many Indigenous people were effectively banned from wearing traditional clothing or performing dances or cultural ceremonies in public. Clearly, despite an ongoing 'treaty process' that often involved complex and protracted negotiations, Indigenous peoples entered the twentieth century not as equals in the eyes of the Canadian state and settler population but as a nuisance to be managed or, in some cases, disposed of.[4]

A fearful mosaic: multiculturalism, liberalism and national belonging

The Indian Act system became the main legal and political instrument for the implementation of a violent model of social control over Indigenous peoples and their lands. In the nineteenth century, a paramilitary force called the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP; formerly the Northwest Mounted Police) was deployed extensively against Indigenous people who refused to adopt Canadian governance models or give up their lands in the face of expanding settlement. In the twentieth century, the RCMP was made the official police force of the federal government, thereby claiming authority over Indian affairs and, by extension, Indigenous well-being. The RCMP was often called upon to directly intervene in the social and political affairs of Indigenous peoples. This included the infamous break-up of the traditional Six Nations Longhouse (Confederacy) government in order to impose an elected band council in 1924.

The RCMP was joined by a 'nonviolent' bureaucratic face of social control: the 'Indian Agent', a representative of the Canadian state located in or near a reserve community who acted as the government's proxy in all dealings with the community. In many respects, the Indian Agent took over the role previously filled by missionaries. Indigenous people could not leave the reserve, hold a job, pursue education or engage in open forms of cultural expression without formal permission from the Indian Agent, whose consent was rarely given. Strict control over the daily lives of Indigenous peoples was justified as part of the 'civilizing mission' of colonization.

In order for settler colonizers to establish claims of absolute sovereignty over the lands of Canada, it became increasingly necessary to discredit the argument that prior Indigenous occupancy of the land gave rise to legitimate claims to the land. Indigenous presence could not simply be ignored, given that Canada was founded on a treaty system stretching back before Confederation and that Canadians had frequently relied on Indigenous communities as military allies. The idea that settlers and non-indigenous peoples were political and economic partners began to erode when Canada entered the twentieth century under conditions of increasing settler colonial racism and racialization. Indigenous peoples and societies were increasingly portrayed as undeveloped, primitive and incapable of governing their own affairs. This racist, hierarchical understanding of 'civilization' was used to justify the paternalism and civilizing mission of subsequent Canadian governments.

The ban on Indigenous religious ceremonies was explicitly related to this civilizing mission. While Canadians may have considered themselves more 'rough and ready' than their aristocratic British imperial forebears, Canadian social and intellectual culture was heavily informed by Christian Euro-centrism and the standards of English 'gentlemanly' culture and enlightenment. Perhaps the most emblematic case of colonial paternalism is that of Deputy Superintendent of Indian Affairs (1913–1932) Duncan Campbell Scott. As deputy superintendent, Scott wielded extraordinary power over Indigenous peoples and Indian policy, which he used to push an agenda

of civilization through cultural extermination. Scott's philosophy can be summed up in his defense of the Indian Act:

> I want to get rid of the Indian problem. I do not think as a matter of fact, that the country ought to continuously protect a class of people who are able to stand alone . . . Our objective is to continue until there is not a single Indian in Canada that has not been absorbed into the body politic and there is no Indian question, and no Indian Department . . .[5]

It is worth noting that Scott was also an accomplished poet, and widely considered a man of education and cultural sensibility. His poems depicted wild Canadian landscapes emptied of Indigenous presence, or drew portraits of indigeneity in decline, (e.g., 'The Half-Breed Girl'). Scott's work reflected dominance over the land and over Indigenous peoples by a 'superior' man, learned and erudite, with the burden and knowledge of understanding what is best for the incompetent and vulnerable 'Other.' Scott is, in a sense, the paragon of early-twentieth century Canadian paternalism, in stark contrast to the rough and tumble pioneer often associated with earlier Canadian history.

This contrast between the 'civilized' Scott and the perceived 'wildness' or degeneracy of Indigenous peoples was formalized in law as Indigenous peoples were defined as cultural dependents or wards of the state. Indigenous people who demonstrated the capacity for civilization (i.e., achieved university degrees, became members of the clergy or legal societies, or served in the military) were subjected to 'enfranchisement' – formal 'equal' standing with settler Canadians – which also meant that their Indian status was removed and they were banned from living on reserves. However, the primary effect of the 'civilizing mission' and enfranchisement practice was to segregate Indigenous people onto reserves in ever-decreasing numbers, stripping them of status and, consequently, releasing the government of any fiduciary or moral obligations toward Indigenous peoples. Indian reserves were seen as ever-collapsing enclosures, where the diffusion of culture and Christian morality would slowly 'disappear' Indians, just as regimes of property and resource extraction 'disappeared' Indian land.

The middle of the twentieth century brought changes that Scott would have found extraordinary. Indigenous peoples not only survived the enfranchisement era but began to thrive and assert new identities in urban environments through union organizing, academic achievement, political advocacy and artistic endeavours. The last gasp of the *official* assimilation era actually came about through an arrogant and triumphalist move by the government of Prime Minister Pierre Elliot Trudeau in the late 1960s. Still inspired by the civilizing mission, Trudeau's Minister of Indian Affairs – future Prime Minister Jean Chretien – drew up plans for legislation that would fulfill Scott's vision of dismantling the Ministry of Indian Affairs and gradually ending legal recognition of Indian status and reserve territory in Canada. These plans were brought together in a 1969 'White Paper'.[6] The White Paper was a political effort intended to expedite the settler colonial ideal of Canadian society unburdened by the demands of Indigenous peoples but in line with the popularized idea of Canada as a multicultural society. Indigenous people were to be welcomed into the modern, Canadian body politic as equals – that is, stripped of government recognition of Indian status, treaty responsibilities and recognition. Looming large over this move was the threat of Québécois separatism; throughout the 1960s and 1970s, Canada was forced to confront a resurgent Québécois (French Canadian) nationalism that came to a head in the 1970s. During this period, Indigenous peoples were an afterthought for a federal government struggling to find a way to maintain the political integrity of the state while also placating an internal community divided by distinct histories, language, culture and politics. Indigenous peoples became something of a test-case for multicultural assimilation.

For many Indigenous peoples, Indian status is perceived as an imposition of a foreign government, yet status also carries with it some recognition of legally binding obligations on the part of

the government. Paradoxically, because Indian status set aside special provisions in law that *prevent* an explicit move to assimilation, it affords some defence to Indigenous peoples from being politically erased. The White Paper would terminate this protection, and the legal basis of Indigenous difference along with it. Indigenous communities and leadership were aware that the government was preparing to legally and politically exterminate all state obligations to Indigenous peoples, and the result was the galvanization of Indigenous resistance movements and the emergence of new voices raised against Canadian colonialism.

State efforts to erase Indigenous *legal* standing mirrored settler Canadian moves to erase Indigenous physical and cultural presence on the land; Indigenous communities responded by asserting a political and legal visibility that was undeniable. At the same time that the Red Power movement and American Indian Movement (AIM) were taking action in the United States, Indigenous activists in Canada confronted the government through both protests and organized political engagements. The strategies were diverse. George Manuel, a Secwepmc labour organizer, turned the National Indian Brotherhood into a significant political force. Cree scholar, lawyer and writer Harold Cardinal penned 'The Red Paper', an Indigenous response to the White Paper, which would eventually be published as the best seller, *The Unjust Society*. Community protests across the country signaled the emergence of a new militant phase of Indigenous activism. Faced with railway blockades, political discontent and a Canadian public that lacked the stomach for violent engagements with Indigenous protestors, the White Paper was scrapped.

Throughout the 1970s and '80s, the Canadian state worked to reinvent itself as a legal-political entity, in no small part because of the failure of the White Paper to resolve Scott's 'Indian problem'. The patriation of the Canadian Constitution in 1982 and subsequent efforts to amend the Constitution all sought to subsume Indigenous nationhood under the absolute Westphalian sovereignty of Canada. Yet unlike the assimilation agenda of the earlier twentieth century, which was embodied in the legal process of enfranchisement, these new political formulations were based on preserving a limited, state-determined 'aboriginal' status in Canada. Based on what famed Canadian political theorist Charles Taylor referred to as 'the politics of recognition', Canadian state policy shifted from an unstable assimilative agenda to the enshrinement of limited sets of aboriginal rights within the Canadian Constitutional framework.[7] This shift was inspired in part by the Supreme Court decision in the 'Calder' case (1973), which affirmed that 'aboriginal title' to land existed and presented a burden on Canadian sovereignty.[8]

When Prime Minister Trudeau oversaw patriation of the Canadian Constitution in 1982, ending the final remnants of British control over the Canadian government, he achieved both the nationalist dream of establishing a truly independent Canada but also the shift from Canada as imperial colonial dominion to settler state. After 1982, 'aboriginal affairs' in Canada were entirely the responsibility of the federal government.[9] This included alterations to the 'status' rules, the recognition of First Nations, Métis and Inuit peoples (as Indigenous peoples were named in the Constitution) under the law, and broad reorganization of the Department of Indian Affairs. It also coincided with the reorganization of the National Indian Brotherhood as the Assembly of First Nations, no longer an independent political body in contestation with the government, now a government-funded and recognized organ of the state.

These politics of recognition did not stop further legal and political battles. For one, the Canadian Constitution as written in 1982 was refused by the Province of Québec, sparking a pair of attempts to amend the Constitution and incorporate Québec into the Constitutional fold. The first of these, called the Meech Lake Accord, was negotiated in 1987 before passing through complicated ratification procedures at the provincial level. The Accord was nearly set to pass when, in 1990, Elijah Harper (Anishnaabe-Cree), a member of the Manitoba Legislative Assembly, blocked the approval of the Accord because Indigenous peoples had not been

consulted in the redrafting of the Constitution.[10] Legal and political processes were repeatedly implemented to deal with Indigenous peoples' challenges to Canadian state structures as Indigenous protests over land rights increasingly occupied a place of prominence in Canadian media and public discourse. Following from the Calder case, for example, a series of three cases in the 1990s – *R. v. Sparrow* (1990), *R. v. van der Peet* (1996) and *Delgamuukw v. British Columbia* (1997)[11] – continued to test the limits of Canadian claims over Indigenous land. Despite high-profile attention given to the outcomes of these cases, none effectively changed the claim by the Canadian state to underlying title.

Increasingly labyrinthine legal avenues were instead developed through which 'First Nations' (a misleading euphemism for government-recognized 'bands' under the Indian Act) could pursue comprehensive land claims, including the creation of the British Columbia Treaty Process (BCTP). The BCTP, contrary to its name, was never designed to negotiate treaties but to settle land disputes (in the province of British Columbia) under Canadian law so as to secure the extinguishment of aboriginal title. Under the name 'treaty negotiations,' First Nations would surrender claims to land and effectively negotiate individual 'self-government' deals to establish *de facto* municipalities. The Nisga'a Final Agreement – a direct descendent of the Calder decision – the first of this brand of modern 'treaty' to be negotiated (1998), legally ceded Indigenous peoples' claims to land and placed the Nisga'a nation under Crown sovereignty in return for expanded governmental authority over some territory and cash payouts. The Nisga'a Treaty has since been followed by Tsawwassen (2008), Maa-nulth (2009), Yale (2011), and Tla'amin (2011) Final Agreements.[12] The commitment to a politics of land-surrender in BC also continues in the courts, with the 2014 decision in *Tsilhqot'in Nation v. British Columbia*. In this case, the Supreme Court found that the Tsilhqot'in Nation holds title to over 1,750 square kilometers of land because – in a remarkable act of circular logic – the 'honour of the Crown' demands it, but only so long as it is in the best interests of the Canadian state to recognize that title.

In other places, the politics of recognition have played out in the creation of political entities like the Territory of Nunavut. Created in 1999, this jurisdiction took the place of part of the former Northwest Territories and is the 'official' homeland of the Inuit people; Inuktitut is the official language (along with English and French), and the Inuit are recognized as the primary inhabitants of this area.[13] Nunavut also serves as a prime example of the settler colonial nature of Canadian policy at the end of the twentieth century. Despite 'recognizing' the Inuit as a people, Nunavut is an almost-powerless entity within the Canadian state. Sparsely populated, Nunavut is dependent on the federal government to provide infrastructure and economic support and has little political power, as Territories are not equivalent to Provinces under the Constitution. The establishment of Nunavut also served to both erase the claims of Inuit people to their territories outside of Nunavut and to obscure the claims of non-Inuit Indigenous groups – such as the Dene – whose territories overlap with Nunavut. The creation of Nunavut has not slowed the impacts of colonization on Inuit peoples. Today, 93% of the population of Nunavut identifies as Christian, primary employment is in the mining and resource extraction sector and climate change is disproportionately affecting traditional land-based practices, frustrating attempts to keep Inuit cultural practices and knowledge alive.

From the blunt attempts by state authorities at the dawn of the twentieth century to force the end of Indigenous identity and nationhood, the Canadian state has evolved a complex method of assimilation through recognition that, while allowing the preservation of limited aspects of Indigenous cultures and traditions, has proven very effective in securing the land for occupation and exploitation. It is to this exploitation, particularly the role of capitalist resource extraction in Canadian settler colonialism, that we now turn.

Modern dispossession: capitalist extraction, development and usurpation of land

Anishinaabe scholar Leanne Simpson observed that colonisation is always about extraction.[14] The Canadian colonial project is no exception. Despite settlement, urbanization and modernization, Canada remains economically centered on the extraction and exploitation of natural resources. The Canadian state, despite playing a foundational role in the settler colonial initiatives of the twentieth century, has often done so in coordination with capitalist corporate interests, facilitating an ideology of extraction and development that has served to fundamentally transform the land. Such transformations fit neatly into the trajectory of settler colonialism, supported in the first instance by perceptions of *terra nullius* (empty land) and frontier mythologies, all leading toward a sense of finality or transcendence of the colonial form when the land has been developed beyond recognition as something that Indigenous peoples could claim.

The legal basis for most twentieth-century resource extraction in Canada is found in the 1888 Supreme Court decision in *St. Catherine's Milling Co. v. R.*[15] This ruling, which stood as almost the sole legal decision on aboriginal land title for over 80 years, asserted that aboriginal title existed only at the pleasure of the Crown. So it was that St. Catherine's Milling Company was able to pre-empt a vast area of northern Ontario that by rights should have fallen under the control of the Anishinaabe communities who had signed Treaty 3. The Supreme Court was more concerned with negotiating the boundaries of power between the federal and provincial governments than in upholding treaty rights. This legal void legitimated the resource free-for-all that had been the norm in Canada since at least the mid-nineteenth-century gold rushes in British Columbia and kicked off a century of almost unfettered expropriation and exploitation of Indigenous lands.

An area of Canada that has been directly, explicitly and overwhelmingly impacted by resource extraction has been the northern Alberta and northeastern British Columbia 'energy frontier'.[16] This region, in addition to being the homeland of the Dunne-za, Dene, Cree, Nakota, Blackfoot and several other Indigenous nations, features large oil, gas and other subsurface mineral reserves. With the advent of intense fracking technology, along with increased profits to be gained from energy resource development, the northwestern energy frontier has become a site of focused settler colonisation from the 1970s up to the present.[17] Hundreds of thousands of settler Canadians have been drawn to the area because of its energy extraction and transportation activities, from strip mining and hydraulic fracturing wells to the construction of pipelines and secondary industries that support mining activity. Further, the potential for major profits has led government and corporate interests to proceed with development plans despite the open land question in British Columbia and claims under Treaty 8 (signed in 1899). The economic reliance of governments on resource industries has meant that the National Energy Board has become a facilitator for Enbridge and other energy corporations, in many cases rubber stamping approval for pipeline construction even as Supreme Court decisions such as *Tsilhqot'in* complicate the legal bases for this approval and Indigenous communities take increasingly intense and direct action against fracking and pipeline construction.[18]

Pipelines have, in effect, become the new railroads. They connect resource boom towns in the Canadian interior to export points near the coast and are often constructed and maintained by underpaid, migrant labour. Pipelines open Indigenous lands to increasing exploitation as well as playing a key role in the pre-emption of aboriginal title through their construction. They also attract large numbers of settlers along their routes and around their nodal points. Further, just as railroads connected the settler state in a network that allowed resources and populations to be shifted easily from place to place, the network of pipelines that increasingly spans the continent allows corporate profits to evade Indigenous resistance. As Wetsuwet'en and Gitxsan resistance in

British Columbia grows, blocking the construction of pipelines from the Athabasca basin to the Pacific coast near Kitimat, Enbridge and other corporations have responded by turning attention to pipelines running other directions. Here we can include the reversal of Line 9, which runs through Ontario to the port of Montreal, and the infamous Keystone–XL pipeline running south across the Canada-US border to Houston on the Gulf of Mexico.

At the same time as the pursuit of fracking and tar sands development impacts the environment, corporate interests also clash with Indigenous peoples over the maintenance of fisheries which are themselves under threat from climate change and oil spills related to the petro-chemical industry. Some of the most well-known conflicts between Indigenous communities and extractive industries in the twentieth century involve fisheries. In 1981, the Sûreté de Québec (SdQ) (the Québec provincial police) raided Listuguj Mi'kmaq First Nation because of the community's refusal to curb their salmon fishing activities, which the Mi'kmaq argued were guaranteed as aboriginal rights. Then in 1999–2000, the Department of Fisheries and Oceans again violently clashed with Mi'kmaq, though this time over lobster fisheries near Burnt Church, New Brunswick. Around the same time, Cheam First Nation recruited members of the Native Youth Movement to help them fish for salmon in the Fraser River in British Columbia according to their traditional practices but in contravention of Canadian law, a move that led to the formation of the West Coast Warrior Society the next year. In all these cases, objections to Indigenous communities' fishery activities were driven by commercial fishers who argued that Indigenous fisheries threatened the profits of independent and corporate commercial fisheries, notwithstanding their essential role in providing food and economic activity to impoverished communities and their possible protection as aboriginal rights under the Constitution. These objections have often relied on claims that Indigenous fisheries are responsible for declining stocks due to over-fishing, which themselves rely on constructions of Indigenous peoples as primitive and unable to understand sustainability or play to fears of 'wild, uncontrollable Indians' who fish off-season and do not report their catch. Fisheries disputes continue into the present and now include pressure from salmon farmers with corporate interests intent on recruiting Indigenous communities to participate in shellfish cultivation on the west coast, leaving declining stocks of salmon and other lucrative deep-water fish to corporate exploitation.

It is not uncommon for land to be seized from Indigenous nations under the pretence that it serves the national good. For example, the Stoney Point band had a large tract of land seized for a gunnery range during World War II. This expropriation was simple, since reserve land was already Crown land under the law and the War Measures Act granted the federal government extraordinary powers in the national interest. Rather than returning the land after the war, the government 'developed' it into a Provincial Park. Fifty years would pass before it was occupied again by Anishnaabe people from Stoney Point band. The Ipperwash Crisis, as it came to be known, resulted in the shooting and killing of unarmed Anishnaabe protester Dudley George by the Ontario Provincial Police in 1995.[19] But the Ipperwash Crisis is not the most formative or well-known standoff with Indigenous peoples over the development of land in the twentieth century. Rather, that dubious honour belongs to the violent conflict that occurred five years earlier outside of Oka, Québec.

The Oka Crisis of 1990 involved violent clashes between the Mohawks of Kahnawake and Kanesatake, the Québec police and mobs of settler Québécois (mostly from the nearby town of Châteauguay). Confrontations escalated, and the Canadian military was deployed to contain the Mohawk resisters who had set up barricades. The immediate impetus for of the stand-off was a dispute over a piece of land known as 'The Pines', which the Mohawk communities claimed (it included a Christian Mohawk cemetery) but which had been approved for development by a local businessman who was seeking to expand a golf course from 9 to 18 holes. The initial violent clashes

came when Mohawk protesters blocked roads around The Pines but truly spiralled out of control when, following violent raids by the Québec police and riots in Châteauguay where settlers burned effigies of Native people, Mohawk protesters blockaded the Mercier Bridge. This bridge, as one of the main arteries into and out of the island city of Montreal, served as a primary conduit of the Montreal economy. The Mohawk communities were therefore confronting the colonial market system of the Canadian state on two fronts: first by defying the direct usurpation and destruction of their lands in and around The Pines and then by obstructing urban settler economic activity.

The response from both the Canadian public and government was clear. The army was mobilized to take over from the Québec police, government officials walked out of talks with Mohawk leaders and the threat of a violent intervention by troops led one reporter to dryly quip, 'We are about to become a nation that when asked to choose between a massacre and a long drive to work, chose the massacre'.[20] The Oka Crisis was resolved in an uneasy truce after 78 days, when the federal government purchased the land around The Pines and called off the army. However, tensions in the area continue to run high to this day. Ultimately, only two people died as the direct result of the Oka Crisis: during a raid in the early days of the crisis, a Québec police officer was accidentally shot by one of his fellow officers, and an elderly Mohawk man was struck in the chest by a rock thrown by a white settler anti-Mohawk protester, causing him to suffer cardiac arrest.

To be understood, Oka must be interpreted in its historical context. It must be considered alongside the deaths of Dudley George at Ipperwash and the deployment of military and paramilitary forces in defence of land development and appropriation more generally throughout the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. These are modern colonial impositions that exist on an historical continuum with Canada's initial colonial assertions over peoples and lands. The deployment of the Northwest Mounted Police to clear the Red River Valley in 1885 for settlement and agriculture by settler Canadians, despite claims by sovereign Métis communities, exists on the same continuum of events that now includes violent raids by the Ontario Provincial Police on Six Nations protesters seeking to block suburban land development in the nearby town of Caledonia (2005) and the deployment of the RCMP to pacify Mi'kmaq protesters blocking fracking exploration near Elsipogtog (2013). In all of these instances, the violent force of the state has served land speculators, corporate developers and the neo-liberal doctrine that land is only valuable for how it can be exploited or what can be extracted from it.

Indigenous peoples' suffering and deaths have also resulted indirectly from resource extraction and development in Canada. The area around Sarnia, Ontario, is now known as 'Chemical Valley' for the complex of refining and chemical production plants located there, most of them directly adjacent to reserves and economically marginalized communities of off-reserve Indigenous peoples. For years, these communities have complained about poor health and the inability to live traditional lifestyles because of pollution and disruption of the environment. Similar patterns of environmental racism are found with respect to the Cree communities who live near the heart of tar sands development, where pollution from fracking is having major effects on wildlife and where violence from oil workers is increasingly common. Resource extraction and development, the primary drivers of the Canadian economy throughout the twentieth century, now combine in what one community has termed 'a slow industrial genocide'.[21]

The darkest chapter: residential schools, institutional education and assimilation

Alongside the 'slow genocide' of extractive capitalism and development, which is rarely discussed as such, Canadians have been forced to confront more directly at least one transparently genocidal project of the twentieth century: the Indian Residential School system.[22] In media, public

forums, and even the House of Commons, residential schools have become the stalking horse of Canadian settler colonialism. Canadians, while slow to recognize that the residential school system amounted to genocide, have begun to acknowledge the existence of an agenda of forced assimilation, violent separation of Indigenous children from the land and families, intentional generational trauma and institutional abuse.[23] Less discussed, however, is how the moral and political responsibility for residential schools does not simply fall on past governments or out-dated religious views but rather on any Canadian for whom erasure of Indigenous cultures and identities engenders colonial privilege.

The residential school system grew out of the precursor legislation to the Indian Act that sought to 'civilize' Indigenous peoples and on the back of educational establishments created by missionary and church organizations. The residential school system was founded unevenly across several jurisdictions throughout the middle of the nineteenth century; compulsory attendance was written into law in 1884, and many residential schools were built around and just after that time. 'Residential schools' as a term has come to include both day schools, where students were forced to attend but lived with their families, and the much more prevalent boarding schools, or what most people think of as residential schools, where children were removed from their communities for months or years at a time and delivered into the 'care' of school officials. Many of those officials were members of religious orders. The schools were administered through public–private partnerships between the federal government and several major churches, notably the Roman Catholic Church (which operated nearly 60% of residential schools), the Church of England in Canada (later the Anglican Church of Canada) and the United Church of Canada (the successor to the Presbyterian, Congregationalist and Methodist churches after the 1924 ecumenical unification). Many principals and teachers were drawn from the ranks of nuns, priests and missionaries, but, increasingly through the twentieth century, these positions were staffed by lay people, trained and untrained teachers, and various labourers and school staff. From the late nineteenth century, then, the federal government drew the schools into a more tightly controlled system in which control was exercised through federal funding formulas and restrictions, standards of testing and curriculum, and securitization, including close association with the RCMP, who at times coerced parents into handing over their children or pursued children attempting to escape from the schools.

Residential schools were a tool of assimilation designed for cultural erasure and genocide. They became a key mechanism in settler colonial dispossession in that they served as factories for 'disappearing' Indigenous peoples from the land. Canadians today have come to understand the residential school system as a failure for not achieving the 'good intentions' of education, enlightenment and uplifting of Indigenous children. However, Canadians resist acknowledging the deliberately colonial and violent intent of the schools.[24] While the Truth and Reconciliation Commission on the residential school system (2008–2015) provided a forum for many survivors of the schools to tell their stories and share experiences, there is little evidence that this commission has affected a deeper change in Canadian perceptions and beliefs about the schools. Indeed, the many perceived failures of the residential school system are necessary or direct results of the colonizing mission of the schools.

One reason that the colonial mission of the schools remains unacknowledged is the manner in which Indigenous children were conceptually stripped of their Indigeneity. Despite the expressed role of the schools in educating Aboriginal children, they were reconstructed only as 'children' (and, as such, as wards or burdens, without agency), as 'students' (no different than any other child who is shaped by public education) and, in the contemporary sense, as 'victims' (and therefore defined by the abuse that they suffered). In this way, residential schools show up as quotidian, normal and otherwise largely unremarkable were it not for the improprieties of certain individuals.

The assimilation of Indigeneity was already a presumed inevitability when the residential school system was founded, and so, even as Indigenous children were dragged away from their families into the places where they would be assimilated, they were already constructed as inevitably 'not Indian'.

The residential school system has had a profound and complicated affect on Indigenous communities. The incarceration of children for long periods of time had the immediate effect of interrupting vital inter-generational modes of cultural transmission. Not least among these have been language loss and, with it, loss of stories, ceremonies, songs and the ability to communicate with elders or older generations. The school terms often overlapped with crucial ceremonial periods,[25] precluding students from learning both the ceremonies and the social and cultural responsibilities and relationships that they embodied. Often, more direct lessons were missed as a result of the isolation of children from their families. Many children lost not only a loving home but also specific traditional knowledge concerning parenting and caring for children. This loss of intergenerational knowledge left many without specific cultural tools to parent the children they would one day have. The result has been one of disrupted cultural transmission, or what Leroy Little Bear has described as 'cultural blanks',[26] which are often filled by cultural lessons from Christianity or other aspects of settler Canadian culture. Because of the perception in the early twentieth century that Indigenous identity was erased by 'civilizing' processes like education, even students of the schools who were 'successful' in academic terms were seen as already assimilated, regardless of how much cultural knowledge and practice they actually retained.

Residential schools physically separated entire generations of Indigenous people from the land, weakening Indigenous communities' ability to relate to and sustain themselves from the land and destabilizing Indigenous knowledge systems rooted in 'place-thought'.[27] For settler Canadians, this reinforced a perception of the land as 'emptied'. Indigenous communities interacted with the land in accordance with Indigenous ways of being less frequently and less intensely, and many survivors of residential schools joined the numbers of 'off-reserve' or urban Aboriginal populations. One side-effect of this separation was the exacerbation of Indigenous dependence on government, since separation from the land also disrupted or precluded Indigenous economic practices. If young people were not helping with land-based activities around food production or resource governance, Indigenous communities as a whole became weaker as subsistence was replaced by precarity.[28] Many Canadians took the new dependence on government support as a sign of the inability of Indigenous peoples to look after themselves or adapt to modernity.

For the most part, even though residential schools have become an important part of public discourse in Canada, few of these related issues are actually discussed. The focus remains on the horrific physical, psychological and sexual abuse that students suffered at the hands of the staff. Many administrators and teachers are known to have used their positions of almost unquestioned power over the students to abuse and degrade them, preying on the lack of parental oversight within a government-sanctioned system that saw the students as less-than-human. In some cases, this was explicitly tied to the assimilationist practices of the schools: at 'The Mush-hole,' the nickname for the Mohawk Industrial School, there are stories of students having nails driven through their tongues for speaking their own languages rather than English. Many schools 'disciplined' students for the most banal infractions or perceived misconduct with severe beatings, starvation, isolation and enforced labour. While even these acts have apologists – those who argue 'that's just how children were disciplined in those days' – there are also clear patterns of residential school staff sexually abusing and molesting Indigenous children. Many of these cases (that have become public) involve priests and nuns, and there is evidence that various church officials participated in keeping knowledge of these activities suppressed, similar to the 'conspiracy of silence' that has become associated with many church officials around the world, and especially elements of the

Roman Catholic Church, which operated the majority of residential schools. It is unlikely that the full extent of these abuses will ever be known. Many survivors are unable to speak about their experiences, and many others have succumbed to addiction or self-harm and suicide as a result of their experiences.

While it is absolutely necessary to reveal the grotesque abuses that were endemic to the residential school system, at times these abuses have become the overriding narrative of the residential school system and of the schools themselves. The criminality of these abuses provides an easier narrative to incorporate into public discourse than does the assimilation policy that links residential schools to an organized system of settler colonial genocide. And, despite the number of people involved in similar types of abuse across many jurisdictions over many years, these particular crimes are often portrayed as individual wrongdoings – the actions of a few 'bad apples' – rather than the systemic and systematic sociological phenomena of colonial oppression.[29] Here we encounter a classic example of a situation in which, in the words of Lorenzo Veracini, 'the settler hides behind the ethnic cleanser'.[30] The individuals who committed these acts of physical and sexual abuse become proxies of settler Canadian guilt, allowing mainstream Canadians to condemn obvious crimes and deny collective responsibility for the genocidal project of the Indian Residential School system.

It is important to note that Indigenous peoples, in this as in so many other situations throughout the history colonialism in Canada, were not passive victims. Many children actively resisted through repeated escape attempts. Some successfully escaped from the schools, some were tracked down and returned, often to try and escape again later. Some perished in the attempt. Others committed a range of acts of resistance in the schools. In the most extreme cases, students' acts of refusal included committing suicide. Most engaged in tactics and actions well-known to social movements, including stealing and gleaning; 'go-slows' (the schools relied on the forced labour of the students, whether through growing food, maintenance activities or manufacturing crafts for sale), speaking Indigenous languages or sharing stories and cultural knowledge behind the backs of the staff; and 'playing dumb' in lessons. Likewise, many communities and families tried with varying success to resist the school system. For example, some families hid children from Indian Agents and police officers who enforced 'truancy orders'. Ironically, they were sometimes aided in this by a culture of neglect that meant Indigenous band lists were not always up to date, Indigenous child births were not always recorded or were recorded improperly, and racist Indian Agents and other officials frequently could not actually differentiate between individuals in a community.

It should also be noted that some communities willingly sent children to residential schools or requested the founding of schools for their communities, thinking of them as an opportunity for young people to learn how to navigate through settler society. Some former students report having positive experiences in the schools, with caring and committed teachers and administrators and no obvious abuse. There were important differences in the structures of the schools, with 'day schools' not separating students from their parents and communities as cleanly and clearly as residential schools and with different levels of focus on industrial work and labour or scholastics. As we often see in such circumstances, some students actually worked with staff to discipline other students or turned into abusers themselves, taking advantage of less powerful students.

Despite this variety of individual experiences, at greater issue here is the aggregate intent and effect of the residential school system. This intent (assimilation and genocide) and effect (intergenerational cultural trauma and lasting community harm) have, after many years of advocacy and activism by survivors and the families of lost children, been exposed to public scrutiny, forcing the government of Canada to apologize formally and publicly.

The first official apology was issued under the Liberal government of Jean Chretien in 1998, by then-Minister of Indian Affairs Jane Stewart. The apology was viewed by most Indigenous

advocacy organizations as half-hearted and obfuscating, since Stewart apologized only for the obvious sexual and physical abuses that occurred and the apology was not delivered in parliament. The second, more comprehensive apology was delivered by Prime Minister Stephen Harper on the floor of the House of Commons in 2008. This apology recognized the assimilation agenda of the schools and the creation of generational effects that carried over into the lives of the children of survivors who never attended the schools themselves. Calling the residential school system a 'dark chapter' in Canadian history, the apology also came with the promise of funding and organizational support for a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), which was put into place in 2008 and completed its mandate in 2015. And yet despite these apologies, the cross-country work of the TRC and numerous academic studies on the effects of the residential school system, many Canadians have remained in denial with respect to the function of the schools as an organized attempt at assimilation and genocide. In effect, the darkest chapter in Canadian history remains a chapter most Canadians are unwilling to read.

Conclusion: 'No history of colonialism'? Canada in the twenty-first century

The pervasive and popularized narrative of Canada as a peaceful, multicultural state has prompted many to dispute the presence of ongoing colonialism, with many pinning the 'multicultural turn' under Trudeau at the beginning of the 1970s as the historical moment when Canada transcended its settler colonial past. The residential school apologies of the early twenty-first century would seem to cap this transition from once-colony to enlightened multicultural nation state. But the twentieth century represented a change and refinement of settler colonial tactics in Canada rather than a shift away from the broad strategy of settler colonial elimination and disavowal. Through the development of multicultural citizenship and aboriginal rights, investment in court proceedings and treaty processes, and the creation of an entire 'reconciliation industry' following from the residential school system revelations, Canada and Canadians have become extremely effective at preserving limited forms of 'aboriginality' while still separating Indigenous peoples from the land.[31] Canada, in the twentieth century, shifted from attempting to eliminate Indigenous people to eliminating indigeneity.

In the international field, Canada has been much more open about its pursuit of settler colonial ends, as revealed in the federal government's long-standing refusal to endorse the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP). Only four states, all former white settler colonies, refused to ratify the UNDRIP, and though Canada eventually capitulated, Canadian officials made clear that Canada was only agreeing to the document as an 'aspirational' and nonenforceable guideline – certainly not as international law. Canada's sincerity came into further question when, during the September 2009 meetings of the G20 in Pittsburgh, Prime Minister Harper declared that Canada had 'no history of colonialism', particularly surprising – and troubling – given his delivery of the residential school apology in 2008.

At the beginning of the twenty-first century, there are signs that Canada's multicultural politics of recognition have reached their breaking point. Faced with crises over resource extraction, including the use of an omnibus budget bill to deregulate waterways across the country to enable fracking, Indigenous communities rose up in the winter of 2012–2013 as a mass movement under the moniker 'Idle No More'.[32] This diverse, loosely organized movement took a number of direct actions, including shutting down major intersections with round dances and blockading several rail lines. The movement also captured public consciousness with highly visible protests all across the country. Shortly after, in 2014, AFN Grand Chief Shawn Atleo was forced to step down following controversy when he partnered too closely with the Harper government

in drafting new legislation relating to First Nations education, striking a serious blow to the credibility of this organization as 'the' voice of First Nations people. Settler Canadian history and nationhood are still being questioned by Indigenous people, and the delaying, deferring and colonial tactics of the twentieth century no longer seem capable of containing Indigenous resurgence movements.

Notes

1 This is a reference to the title of the 2002 documentary by noted Indigenous filmmaker, Alanis Obom-sawin, detailing the conflict between the Mi'kmaq community of Burnt Church and the Canadian Department of Fisheries and Oceans over control of Mi'kmaq lobster fisheries in the Atlantic Ocean around the province of New Brunswick.

2 E. Battell Lowman, 'Indigenous methodologies, missionary lives', PhD Dissertation, University of Warwick, 2014.

3 J. R. Miller, *Compact, Contract, Covenant: Aboriginal Treaty-Making in Canada*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009.

4 J. S. Milloy, 'The early Indian Acts: Developmental strategy and constitutional change', in I. Getty (ed.) *As Long as the Sun Shines and Water Flows: A Reader in Canadian Native Studies*, Vancouver: UBC Press, 2000 (1983), pp. 56–64.

5 J. R. Miller, *Skyscrapers Hide the Heavens: A History of Indian-White Relations in Canada*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989, p. 207.

6 Statement of the Government of Canada on Indian policy (The White Paper), 1969.

7 On the politics of recognition broadly, see: C. Taylor, 'The Politics of Recognition', in A. Gutmann (ed.) *Multiculturalism*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994, pp. 25–74; on the politics of recognition as a method of assimilating Indigenous peoples in Canada, see: G. Coulthard, *Red Skin, White Masks*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2014.

8 F. Calder, a Nisga'a chief, filed a motion against the British Columbia government in 1969 claiming that the Nisga'a nation retained rights to their traditional lands because the government – in the absence of any kind of treaty – had no legal grounds to claim sovereignty over the Nass Valley and many other areas in central British Columbia. When the case proceeded to the Supreme Court of Canada in 1973, its judges were forced to agree to a limited degree.

9 Earlier in the twentieth century, the British Crown had several times intervened in relations between Canada and Indigenous peoples, most notably when they blocked Haudenosaunee statesman Deskaheh (Cayuga) from speaking at the League of Nations in 1923. Deskaheh had travelled to Geneva to assert that the Haudenosaunee Confederacy should be seen as an independent political entity and to claim that their sovereignty was being illegally infringed upon by Canada. He was sponsored to speak to the assembly of the League by the several states, but the delegates from the British Empire blocked his speech with procedural technicalities by claiming that disputes between the Crown and Indigenous nations in Canada comprised an internal matter.

10 The second attempt to amend the Constitution, the Charlottetown Accord, was soundly defeated by a public referendum in 1992.

11 All of these legal challenges were launched under Section 35 of the Canadian Constitution, which enshrines Aboriginal treaty rights in Canadian law. The most famous of these is the *Delgamuukw* case, which was taken all the way to the Supreme Court of Canada, which ultimately deadlocked and refused to rule whether the Wetsuwet'en – who have never agreed to a treaty with either the British or Canadian states – possess sovereignty over their own lands.

12 Lheidli T'enneh First Nation also negotiated a Final Agreement which was rejected in a vote by community members in 2007.

13 G. White, 'Traditional aboriginal values in a Westminster parliament: The legislative assembly of Nunavut', *Journal of Legislative Studies* 12, 2006, 8–31.

14 L. Simpson, 'Dancing the world into being: A conversation with idle no more's Leanne Simpson', interviewed by Naomi Klein, *Yes! Magazine*, 5 March 2013, online: http://www.yesmagazine.org/peace-justice/dancing-the-world-into-being-a-conversation-with-idle-no-more-leanne-simpson (accessed 25/04/2016).

15 St. Catherine's Milling and Lumber Co. v. the Queen [1888].

16 H. Brody, *Maps and Dreams: Indians and the British Columbia Frontier*, Toronto: Douglas & McIntyre, 1988.

17 Production of bitumen heavy crude (BHC), the product of tar sands extraction, skyrocketed in response to the OAPEC oil embargo and resulting 'oil crisis' in 1973. The massive jump in the price of oil at this time catalyzed a massive increase in BHC production which has grown steadily since.

18 Tsilhqot'in Nation v. British Columbia, 2014 SCC 44; see also: J. Preston, 'Neo-liberal settler colonialism, Canada and the tar sands,' *Race & Class* 55, 2, 2013, 42–59.

19 See: P. Edwards, *One Dead Indian: The Premier, the Police, and the Ipperwash Crisis*, Toronto: Stoddart Publishing, 2003.

20 As relayed in: A. Macleod, *Acts of Defiance* [documentary film], National Film Board of Canada, 1992.

21 J. Huseman and D. Short, ' "A slow industrial genocide": tar sands and the indigenous peoples of northern Alberta', *The International Journal of Human Rights* 16, 1, 2012, 216–37.

22 The residential school system has been the subject of intense scrutiny and scholarship. For general overviews of this system, see: J. R. Miller, *Shingwauk's Vision*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996; J. Milloy, *A National Crime: The Canadian Government and the Residential School System, 1879–1986*, Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press, 1999; P. Regan, *Unsettling the Settler Within: Indian Residential Schools, Truth Telling, and Reconciliation in Canada*, Vancouver, UBC Press, 2010.

23 This includes the efforts by Dr. P. H. Bryce, Chief Medical Inspector for Indian Affairs, to expose an epidemic of student deaths in the IRS in 1907, many due to tuberculosis and other illnesses. His report found that, including students sent home with illness, an average of 42% of students died in the schools, with some individual schools reporting much higher percentages. His report was ignored and Bryce was dismissed from his position. See: P. H. Bryce, *Report on the Indian schools of Manitoba and the North-West Territories*, Ottawa: Government Printing Bureau, 1907.

24 P. Regan, *Unsettling the Settler Within: Indian Residential Schools, Truth Telling, and Reconciliation in Canada*, Vancouver: UBC Press, 2010.

25 In Coast Salish territory, for example, the winter season is the time of Winter Dance, an intensive ceremonial period; this overlapped with much of the prescribed school year.

26 L. Little Bear, 'Jagged worldviews colliding', in M. Battiste (ed.) *Reclaiming Indigenous Voice and Vision*, Vancouver: UBC Press, 2000, pp. 77–85.

27 V. Watts, 'Indigenous place-thought and agency amongst humans and non humans (First Woman and Sky Woman Go On a European World Tour!)', *Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society* 2, 1, 2013, 20–34.

28 G. T. Alfred, 'Colonialism and state dependency', *Journal of Aboriginal Health*, November 2009.

29 This is an intentional reference to a contemporary, analogous situation: the disappearance or murder of thousands of Indigenous women over several decades. In 2014, Prime Minister Stephen Harper, pressed to call in inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women (MMIW), dismissed the need for an inquiry under the reasoning that these disappearances and deaths constituted 'crime, not a sociological phenomena'.

30 L. Veracini, *Settler Colonialism: A Theoretical Overview*, Eastbourne: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2010, p. 14.

31 For further discussion of this, see: E. Battell Lowman and A. Barker, *Settler: Identity and Colonialism in 21st Century Canada*, Halifax: Fernwood Press, 2015.

32 Kino-nda-niimi Collective (eds.) *The Winter We Danced: Voices from the Past, the Future, and the Idle No More Movement*, Winnipeg: ARP Books, 2014.

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12

ADAPTATION, RESISTANCE AND REPRESENTATION IN THE MODERN US SETTLER STATE

Walter L. Hixson

Long after the Conestoga wagons ceased rumbling down the overland trails, after the homesteading, land booms, demographic swamping and massacres, the legacies of American settler colonialism endure. As settler colonialism entails structure rather than contingency, its impact and legacy carry on well past the actual colonization phase.[1] In the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, American *settler colonial society* encompassed myriad formations and frameworks, including indigenous adaptation and resistance as well as ongoing settler appropriation and representation of native peoples.

Settler colonialism links the colonized past, the present and the future. Settler colonialism profoundly shapes and may even be said to create a particular type of society. As the United States is at its core a *settler colonial state*, American history should be conceptualized within that context. However, a thick cloud of nationalist mythology has long obscured identification of the United States as fundamentally a settler society. It has also occluded more complete understanding of the continuities between continental and overseas empire. Denial and elision of the colonial past are thus fundamental to the United States, as with other settler societies.[2]

Essentially a project of dispossession, settler colonization is part of a broader history that encompasses the taking of external colonies as well as internal colonization. As indigenous violent resistance ebbed in the late nineteenth century, the United States instituted internal colonial rule over the tribes, converting native peoples discursively into domesticated minorities. Internal rule over Indians complemented internal colonialism of blacks and Hispanics in the wake of the African diaspora and US expansion into territory formerly claimed by Spain and Mexico.

Dispossession and colonization of indigenous people are related but not analogous to internal colonization of blacks, Hispanics and other minorities. Indigeneity distinguishes Indians from ethnic minorities who migrated or were imported onto the continent. Settler colonialism thus can be analyzed as a singular project, but it can also with appropriate contextualization be linked to the broader American colonial past and present. Indeed, it is important to do so in order to grasp the extent to which colonialism permeates and defines American history in both internal and external projections. However one might parse the terminology of the various colonialisms, their profound implications for American history are strikingly underexplored and undertheorized by historians.

Rich with possibilities, settler colonial studies provide a conceptual framework for diverse approaches to the study of American and other histories. This chapter begins with an extended

discussion of indigenous adaptation and resistance culminating in the rise of the native sovereignty movement. In the latter part of the chapter, the focus shifts to links between settler colonialism and US foreign relations and militarism. Finally, I explore the appropriation of Indian names and sports mascots and the implications of these representations for understanding the persistence of settler mentalities in US society.

The most striking development in the recent history of indigenous people in the United States has been the revival of the native sovereignty movement. Indians not only defied their prescribed historical role as a 'dying race', they flourished through adaptation, resistance, cultural revival and successful legal challenges. 'The Indian revival of the second half of the 20th century deserves to be recognized as a major episode in American history', Charles Wilkinson notes. 'The modern tribal sovereignty movement can fairly be mentioned in the same breath with the abolitionist and suffragists of old and the contemporary civil rights, women's and environmental movements'.[3]

At the beginning of the twentieth century, discourse and representation picked up where demographic swamping and indigenous removal left off. In the United States, as in other settler societies, historical and cultural frameworks represented the colonizer as the redeemer of a pre-modern land in a triumph of civilization and progress over primitivism and savagery. In the most extreme form of representations, the colonizer attempts to displace the indigene altogether and usurp the role of native in historical narratives. More typically, the indigene becomes a 'noble savage' inevitably 'passing' from the scene to make way for a more advanced people. The 'vanishing American', however, refused to vanish: according to the 2010 census, 5.2 million people identified as Indian or as indigenous Alaskan, comprising hundreds of indigenous bands. Another 1.4 million identified as indigenous Hawaiians or Pacific Islanders.[4]

As ethnic cleansing campaigns ebbed in the late nineteenth century, Indians had already assumed 'third spaces' of sovereignty. Throughout the twentieth century, indigenous people took up roles in American society while maintaining their distinctive cultures and traditions. As Kevin Bruyneel explains, 'The colonizer's impositions, be they cultural, economic, or structural, are never fully exhumed from the colonial context, and the so-called colonized are never fully without agency or independent identity'. Thousands of Indians challenged this inherent marginalization as they participated actively in US educational, economic and cultural life. 'Indian people reworked a sense of distinctiveness and difference', Philip Deloria explains, 'fighting off the colonizing ways the United States sought to include them, and demanding a very particular type of inclusion, one based on unique political status'.[5]

Indigenous political activism flourished throughout the twentieth century, variously in pursuit of civil rights, economic opportunity and sovereignty. In 1911, amidst the so-called Progressive Era, a group of 'Red progressives' founded the Society of American Indians. In 1917, with US entry into the Great War in Europe, some 16,000 Indian men joined the armed services to assume a role deeply ensconced in their traditions, that of warrior. Carving out a sovereign third space, the Iroquois Confederation issued a unilateral declaration of war against Germany rather than embracing American intervention. Similarly, when the 1924 immigration law 'gave' Indians voting rights and full citizenship, many of the 300,000 or so indigenes living in the country at the time showed no interest in becoming US citizens.

While often romanticized, the 'Indian New Deal' of the 1930s, spearheaded by the reformer John Collier, brought meaningful change to Indian country. The 1934 Indian Reorganization Act revoked the Dawes Act (1887), bringing an end to Indian assimilation, a project encompassing the seizure of millions of acres of tribal land while seeking to eradicate the indigenous way of life. Despite elements of paternalism, the Indian New Deal provided relief, economic and educational opportunities, and community building. Nonetheless, many bands rejected the initiative, including the Iroquois, the Crows and the Navaho.[6] Condemning ongoing federal supervision

over Indian tribes, Alice Jemison, a Seneca, dismissed the Indian New Deal as 'a very devastating step toward reviving the life of an already overdeveloped, antiquated, autocratic, un–American bureaucracy'.[7]

With the outbreak of World War II, some 25,000 Indians took part, a reflection of their 'hybrid American patriotism'. Indians 'imagined an American nationalism that drew upon rather than destroyed their values', Paul Rosier points out, thus 'defending their right to be both American and Indian'. During the war, more than 40,000 Indians moved from reservations into cities; by 2000, urban Indians comprised more than two-thirds of the US indigenous population. Significantly, the wartime emphasis on freedom and liberation spurred demands for respect and equality on the part of Indians, as it did for women, blacks and Hispanics.[8]

The vicissitudes of American politics forced Indians to adapt, alternatively seizing new opportunities or retrenching against efforts to marginalize or even destroy their cultures. In 1944, D'Arcy McNickle (Salish) spurred the creation of a significant new organization, the National Congress of American Indians (NCAI), which would be at the forefront of efforts to defend Indian rights and cultural autonomy. Within a decade, American Indians confronted an existential threat in the aptly named 'termination policy', which the Eisenhower administration, backed by Republican majorities, put into law in August 1953. Under termination, which one scholar called 'the most extreme Indian program in history', Congress terminated federal oversight over scores of tribes in selected states and communities.[9] Reminiscent of the Dawes Act, termination denied indigenous autonomy, demanded Indians become more like 'real' Americans, and subjected them to the mercies of the legal jurisdiction of individual states. With the removal of federal oversight, thousands of Indians no longer qualified for government assistance and lost land and resources to the states.

Red Power

Termination badly damaged Indian communities yet at the same time spurred indigenous activism, igniting renewed drives for sovereignty and demands for enforcement of legally binding treaty rights. By the 1960s, a new generation of Indian leaders, many college educated, arose on reservations and in cities across the country. Many of these Indians embraced indigenous spirituality, revived traditional ceremonies and took pride in their Indian-ness. Fully aware of the history of violent dispossession, Indian intellectuals researched land claims, hunting and fishing rights, and long-violated US treaty obligations. Capitalizing on President Lyndon Johnson's Great Society reforms, Indians benefited especially from Community Action Programs under the new federal Office of Equal Opportunity.

The 'visionary scholar' Vine Deloria, Jr., played a leading role, as he assumed the presidency of NCAI in 1964. The former US Marine, seminary graduate and later history professor called on Indians to take the offensive. 'Let's propose legislation we want [and] not just fight legislation we do not want', he advised. Insisting that tribes were not 'vestiges of the past but laboratories of the future', Deloria lobbied Congress for 'maximum flexibility in developing their own economic, political, and human resources'. In his popular and acerbic book *Custer Died for Your Sins: An Indian Manifesto* (1969), Deloria declared that rather than paternalistic consolation over their 'plight' Indians would much prefer passage of a 'cultural leave-us-alone law'.[10]

Distinct from but linked with the myriad reform movements of the 1960s and 1970s, Indian 'third space' activism accelerated dramatically during this period. As the 'Red Power' movement evolved, Indians pursued civil rights and treaty rights but also put forward an anticolonial agenda emphasizing self-determination.' "The Red Power movement refused the false choice of either the assimilatory aims of the civil rights movement or the nationalist separatism of Third World

anti-colonialism', Bruyneel explains. Activists demanded 'rights and resources from the liberal democratic settler state while also challenging the imposition of colonial rule on their lives'.[11]

As the civil rights, youth and antiwar movements gained strength, the Red Power movement flourished, educating many Americans for the first time about indigenous cultures, the long history of racism, violent dispossession, violation of indigenous treaty rights and resistance to colonial rule. Dee Brown's *Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee* (1970) and the popular book and film 'Little Big Man' (1970) made vast US audiences more aware of the colonial past, however romanticized. As the political and social movements of the 1960s and 1970s were 'very much intercultural and interracial', a diverse array of non-Indian activists and actors joined in the campaign for indigenous rights.[12]

Beginning in 1969, a nineteen-month occupation of Alcatraz Island, launched primarily by urban Indians in the San Francisco Bay area, vaulted the Red Power movement into national consciousness. The American Indian Movement (AIM), organized in 1968, the Native American Rights Fund (NARF), created in 1970, and other organizations aggressively pursued indigenous rights. In 1970 AIM, NARF and other groups sponsored the 'Trail of Broken Treaties', a march on Washington styled after the massive 1963 civil rights demonstration in the capital. Activists occupied and tore apart the Bureau of Indian Affairs headquarters in Washington, sparking occupations of BIA offices in other cities, including Chicago, Cleveland and Minneapolis.

Not all Indians embraced AIM's style of militancy nor recognized the group as their representative. Deloria criticized prominent Red Power militants such as Russell Means (Lakota) and Dennis Banks (Anishinaabe) as more interested in garnering headlines than doing the nitty-gritty work of carving out third spaces and pursuing land claims and sovereignty. By donning buckskin and striking bare-chested traditional warrior poses, the militants were impeding Indians 'from having a modern identity'.[13] As throughout history, indigenous people were thus often divided in strategies and approach to settler society. Inter-Indian violence roiled the Sioux Pine Ridge reservation, site of the Wounded Knee massacre. The governing faction appealed for federal backing, prompting an overreaction in which Phantom jets and armored personnel carriers descended on the impoverished reservation in the South Dakota badlands. Tension escalated, culminating in 1975 with the shooting deaths of two FBI agents.[14]

By the 1970s, the Red Power movement and indigenous activism had produced changes in public perceptions that carried over into the law. Throughout American history, the law had served as a powerful engine of dispossession, but Indian activists and their allies now began to turn legal agreements against the colonizer. In the early nineteenth century, Supreme Court Chief Justice John Marshall's trilogy of decisions established indigenes as 'domestic dependent nations' subject to federal authority, including most importantly removal and land seizures. In the early twentieth century, in concert with the Insular Cases, which bolstered colonial authority over 'unincorporated territories' seized in the Spanish–American War, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the subjection of indigenous peoples. In *Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock* (1903), sometimes called the Dred Scott decision for Indians, the high court ruled that Congress had complete authority over Indian affairs, including the power to abrogate treaty rights.[15]

While the series of Supreme Court decisions over a *longue durée* subjugated the tribes to federal authority, they also underscored that American settler colonialism operated on the basis of the law as opposed to *terra nullius*, the Australian model in which the continent was deemed to have been originally un-owned. In the 1970s, Indian activists turned the tables by unearthing treaty rights and marshaling legal precedent as a weapon of redress and repossession of land. Thus the quest to disavow the colonizing act by using the law as the primary tool of dispossession boomeranged on the colonizer as the indigenes and their lawyers resurrected old treaties, sued for legal enforcement and variously demanded expanded jurisdiction, exclusive rights, compensation and sovereignty.

In 1974, in the landmark Boldt decision, a federal judge ruled in favor of restoring exclusive indigenous rights to a portion of the Puget Sound salmon fishery, opening the door to a series of legal challenges based on past treaties. NCAI, NARF and other groups now demanded enforcement of treaties no matter how long ago they were signed or how long ignored. In historic legal settlements from Maine to Alaska, indigenous people received compensation and in some cases return of their lands and sovereignty, including control over natural resources located on tribal lands but long exploited for the benefit of settler society. Congress weighed in with a series of legislative reforms, including the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act (1975); the Native American Religious Freedom Act (1978); the Indian Child Welfare Act (1978); the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (1988); the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (1990); the Native American Languages Act (1990); and the Indian Tribal Energy Development and Self Determination Act (2005).

These and other successful indigenous challenges produced a backlash within settler society. By the time of the conservative Rehnquist Court (1986–2001), the Supreme Court and lower courts had begun to turn against tribal jurisdiction and claims to colonized space. 'As the progressive era of Indian law jurisprudence has receded', legal scholars pointed out in 2012, 'the new tendency in the Court's tests, rules, and rhetoric is to define tribal powers according to policies, values, and assumptions prevalent in non-Indian society'.[16] Despite the reactionary turn, indigenous control of land was on the rise from the historic lows of about 50 million acres in the 1960s. Seemingly every tribe had a land acquisition plan and engaged in vigorous pursuit of land, resources, social equality and sovereignty.

Indigenous activism and legal challenges extended to Alaska and Hawai'i. The legacies of settler colonialism remained strongly entrenched in Alaska, where the indigenes were widely viewed as backward people with no legitimate claim to the land. 'They wouldn't use it', Alaska's congressman, Ralph Rivers, declared in 1967. 'It would just lie there'. Despite such widespread contempt, indigenous land claims posed an obstacle to the proposed Alaska oil pipeline project as well as the broader development agenda. The quest to tap Alaska's massive oil deposits lay behind the historic Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA), negotiated in 1971. Under ANCSA, Congress paid $962.5 million in compensation for extinguishing indigenous claims to 330 million acres of land in return for stock in village corporations, enabling completion of the oil pipeline in 1977. ANCSA perpetuated the settler colonial project of dispossession and did little to recognize or preserve native culture, yet indigenous leaders participated meaningfully in the drafting of the agreement and received immediate economic benefits.[17]

By the 1980s, indigenous activism was on the rise in the Hawaiian Islands, where settler colonialism had long been obscured by the illusion of multi-cultural society. The unique feature in postcolonial Hawai'i of a non-white, Asian majority provided the appearance of an immigrant success story thus eliding dispossession and severe marginalization of the indigenous Kanaka Maoli. Like the 'Vanishing American', indigenous Hawaiians had long been depicted as a dying race within a society dominated by Americans and Asian Americans primarily of Japanese and Chinese extraction. Yet the Kanaka Maoli persisted and resisted, sparking a 'resurgence of Hawaiian language and culture'. According to the 2010 census, Hawaiians and other Pacific Islanders comprised about 10% of the population of the islands.[18]

Structural inequality

Legal challenges and activism only marginally improved the dire economic and social conditions that had long prevailed in indigenous communities. Severe structural inequality must be recognized as an inseparable consequence of settler colonization in North America, Hawai'i and settler

colonies worldwide. In the United States, structural inequality also prevails among Hispanics and African-Americans, the targets of internal colonial rule, but has been most severe in indigenous communities.

Structural inequality in indigenous communities has long been noted yet no less persistent. In 1928, the Meriam Report, a major study of conditions in Indian country, documented horrific living conditions on reservations, condemned the allotment program and paved the way for the initiatives of the Indian Reorganization Act. But the Indian New Deal did not prevent the ensuing decades of entrenched poverty, absence of infrastructure and persistent colonial limitations on self-rule that perpetuated deep-seated socioeconomic disparities. Indigenous people in North America and Hawai'i, as in other postcolonial settings, continue to suffer disproportionately from a broad litany of economic and social ills: infant and childhood mortality; sharply lower rates of life expectancy; chronic disease and limited access to health care; high unemployment and lack of educational opportunities; alcohol, tobacco and drug abuse; high rates of suicide; soaring rates of crime and incarceration; homelessness and substandard housing, including overcrowding and lack of indoor plumbing; and myriad other social problems.[19]

Some bands have profited from casino gaming and exploitation of reservation resources, but their impact is typically exaggerated. 'Even with the much-publicized infusion of revenues from tribal government-owned gaming operations on many reservations that began at the end of the 1980s', a study points out, 'legacies of undeveloped organizational capacities and deplorable deficits in health, education, social conditions, and economic opportunity could hardly be expected to be reversed' in the short term.[20]

Reservations and other Indian lands have also been plagued by environmental damage and federal policy mismanagement. Tribal operations in energy, agriculture, forestry and other areas are making economic improvements, but the ability of the tribes to exploit natural resources is often constrained by state and federal policies, lack of capital, management deficiencies and other challenges. In a 2003 report entitled 'A Quiet Crisis', the US Commission on Civil Rights, after documenting the low socioeconomic standing of Indian country, recommended increased funding for health care, infrastructure development and tribal courts.[21] Virtually no follow-up ensued from the conservative US Congress.

Spaces of sovereignty

Recent studies strongly suggest that higher levels of self-determination, the forging of new spaces of sovereignty, offer the most promise for improving the lives of indigenous people. Despite the long colonial history of destruction, dispossession and assimilation, Indian cultures have proven remarkably resilient. Indigenous values, beliefs and languages have been preserved. When able to 'pursue their own priorities and allow tribal governments to respond to the needs of their citizens', indigenous peoples have shown an ability to harness their own nation-building capacities.[22]

In many cases, reassertion of control over native lands and exercise of sovereignty have sparked resurgence and revitalization of indigenous communities. Struggles for sovereignty provide means 'to reverse ongoing experiences of colonialism as well as to signify local efforts at the reclamation of specific territories, resources, governments and cultural knowledge and practices'.[23] Sovereignty struggles vary in place and time, can sometimes divide indigenes among themselves and typically produce a backlash from settler society. In an effort to reassert a sense of authority, the colonizer effects an inversion in which tribes are framed as the colonizers (if not as 'socialists'), demanding special privileges. Under this frame, the ethnic minority becomes the aggressor and the majority population the victims deprived of the rightful prerogatives of 'conquest'.

Indigenous groups can work effectively with governments and foundations but flourish when they are able to determine their own direction. Indigenous self-determination, in contrast to top down paternalism of the colonial state, has spurred economic growth and development and a wide range of advances, from effective community policing to profitable marketing of Indian art. Relations with individual states historically have been problematic, yet some states have recognized indigenous sovereignty and grasped that sustained economic development in Indian country benefits everyone. Problems frequently crop up, however, in contestation over land, resources and other jurisdictional conflicts. Federal funding and assistance can help, and much more is needed, but Congress has proven parsimonious.

Within settler society ignorance of the colonial past, the prevalence of stereotypes and the framing of indigenes as 'minorities' rather than sovereign peoples impede socioeconomic advances. In the politically 'red' state of Alaska, for example, settler society frames indigenous peoples as minorities who have been 'given' enough. Despite such hostilities, indigenous Alaskans are increasing in numbers and assertiveness and still own or control substantial lands and resources either as corporations or tribes. As they reinvigorate their cultures and traditions, indigenous empowerment offers the possibility that, in the twenty-first century, Alaska 'will eventually find a place where the relationships between immigrant and indigenous Americans may enrich each other'.[24]

Especially since the 1990s, indigenous Hawaiians have become assertive in pursuit of equal rights and sovereignty against formidable structural obstacles. With less than 5% of Hawaiian land preserved as indigenous homelands, Kanaka Maoli have a limited base from which to operate. Moreover, blood quantum measures minimize the number of people who can claim indigenous status, which 'undercuts indigenous Hawaiian epistemologies that define identity on the basis of one's kinship and genealogy'. In 1993, the centennial of the US-led overthrow of the Hawaiian monarchy, a 'Peoples' International Tribunal' held hearings over twelve days, visiting five islands, and leveled nine charges of human rights violations against the United States, ranging from illegal annexation to the imposition of restrictions on use of the Hawaiian language. In 1993, the US Congress passed an Apology Resolution signed by President Bill Clinton but tendered no new rights or privileges as Hawai'i remained settler-dominated, ensuring its status as crucial outpost in the militarized US global security regime.[25]

Native Hawaiian resistance to settler society coincided with the global indigenous rights movement, which in turn flourished in the context of the growth of the global human rights campaign. With the UN Human Rights Commission and other nongovernmental organizations providing a forum, the legacies of colonialism within indigenous communities garnered unprecedented international attention. Recognizing the parallels between their own experience and other settler communities worldwide, many North American and Hawaiian indigenes have become active in the global drive for indigenous rights. In September 2007, the movement achieved an important milestone when the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. Denial and reaction remained powerful forces within settler colonial societies, however, including the United States, which has offered only a tepid and carefully qualified endorsement after initially joining Canada, Australia and New Zealand as the only nations on the losing end of a ringing endorsement (143–4) of the Declaration by the UN General Assembly.[26]

Hawaiians, Alaskans and Indian tribes faced difficult decisions about the extent to which they wished to join or maintain distance from capitalist development and mainstream lifestyles. While various Indian tribes have accepted compensation from the United States for illegal land seizures, other tribes have refused to settle for money and demand instead the return of colonized space. As a result of a 1980 Supreme Court decision which ruled that the Black Hills had been seized illegally, the Sioux were offered substantial compensation, which they declined.

The award, held in trust by the Interior Department, now exceeds $1 billion, but its acceptance would require the Sioux to renounce ownership of the sacred Black Hills. Taking the money thus would entail acceptance of the colonizer's claims on colonial space. The Sioux have chosen principle over profit.[27]

Some indigenous people work within settler frameworks whereas others act autonomously, including claiming tribal sovereignty and complete political separation from the United States. The politics of refusal is emerging as an important option in the array of indigenous responses. For example, some indigenes have refused to recite the Pledge of Allegiance, file US or state tax returns, or get a driver's license. Refusal is thus a form of resistance, insisting that American laws and practices are illegitimately applied to indigenous people, whose sovereign loyalties lie elsewhere.

Tribes such as the Iroquois have adopted various forms of 'nested sovereignty', acting as a sovereign nation within a broader colonized space, thus refusing to accept the status of conquered peoples. In 2010, three Mohawks in the midst of their return from an international climate change conference in Bolivia remained in El Salvador for 17 days because they were on Haudenosaunee (Iroquois) passports and refused to accept emergency travel documents from Canada as a condition of return to their homeland. That same year, the Iroquois team pulled out of the world lacrosse league championship tournament in England because the UK refused to recognize the Haudenosaunee passport. Finally, an Iroquois council in Quebec moved to oust non-indigenous settlers from their community, even those married to Haudenosaunee, a decision that divided some members of the community but outraged settler society. After all, the 'cruel Indians' were dispossessing *white people*. Through such assertions of sovereignty, the Haudenosaunee 'insist on being and acting as peoples who belong to a nation other than the United States or Canada', Audra Simpson explains. Their 'political consciousness and actions upend the perception that colonization, elimination, and settlement are situations of the past'.[28]

Connecting imperial histories

The continuous history of dispossession and often-indiscriminate warfare against indigenous people has remained largely disconnected from the broader history of US foreign relations. This arbitrary divide between continental and overseas empire, which is reinforced by research specialization within academic subdivisions, obscures crucial continuities in American imperial history. As I have suggested elsewhere, we cannot adequately comprehend modern US foreign relations as long as it remains severed from the settler colonial past.[29]

Other scholars have called attention to this historical disconnect and its implications. Indians were the 'original enemy combatant' and as such established 'a condition of possibility' for the imperial foreign policy that followed. Yet, adds Jodi Byrd in a recent study, 'All too rarely outside American Indian and indigenous studies are American Indians theorized as the field through which US empire became possible'.[30] Richard White previously called attention to the historical disconnect, noting that scholars have done 'relatively little on what the relentless erosion of Indian land teaches us about the United States in a larger international context'.[31]

Settler colonial studies have the potential to advance the project of illuminating the crucial linkages between centuries of Indian removal and modern US foreign relations. Much more can and should be learned not only about the American past but also about continuities and discontinuities between the United States and other settler societies such as Australia, Canada, New Zealand and South Africa.[32] Beyond these Anglophone states, continuities and discontinuities between the United States and other settler colonies merit exploration. Carroll Kakel, for example, has brilliantly illuminated how the Nazi German leaders Adolf Hitler and

Heinrich Himmler drew inspiration from the violent removal of the 'Red Indians' from the American West.[33]

Despite obvious differences of place and time, the parallels between the US and Israeli settler colonial projects are striking yet little explored. Both reveal a propensity to establish 'facts on the ground' and a willingness to employ repeated and often extreme violence and to invoke tropes of divine authorization on the one hand and terror and savagery on the other to justify and reinforce the settler project. In view of this shared past, as it were, the US-Israeli 'special relationship' should come as no surprise but certainly merits greater scrutiny.[34]

Appropriating Indian identity

American settler colonial mentalities resonate in the appropriation of Indian names, ranging from food and commercial products to automobiles, high tech weaponry and perhaps most visibly sports teams. Land O Lakes butter features a kneeling smiling Indian princess, while Hopi Blue Popcorn appropriates Pueblo Indian imagery yet has no connection with the actual Hopi tribe. Pontiac (an eighteenth-century Ottawa chieftain) and Jeep Cherokee sport Indian names to sell automobiles. The US military has applied Indian names to at least 20 aircraft, helicopters, and missiles.

The Indian names that the US military has appropriated, primarily for Army helicopters, illuminate the connection between continental and overseas empire that contemporary scholarship often overlooks. The Pentagon heavily employs Indian-themed weapons to assault and kill its perceived enemies worldwide. The US military has favored Apaches, depicted as savage villains in many Hollywood Westerns yet in actuality bands that were systematically hunted down and indiscriminately killed across the southwest. The Apache attack helicopter, sometimes described as a 'flying tank', is a lethal and heavily used battlefield weapon. The Pentagon also 'honored' the Apache by selecting Geronimo as the code word for Osama bin Laden, insofar as both long eluded the US grasp. Tomahawk cruise missiles regularly pound enemy targets, while a US drone has been dubbed Gray Eagle, apparently for an Indian collaborator in Plains warfare. The helicopter naming tradition began in the Korean War era with the Sioux and was followed in subsequent years by the Shawnee, Choctaw, Chickasaw, Iroquois, Lakota, Chinook, Cayuse, Creek, Black Hawk and Kiowa, the latter a workhorse in the Iraq and Afghan wars. The Pentagon canceled Cheyenne and Comanche helicopter programs, the latter after the expenditure of nearly $7 billion in development. Military aircraft over the years have included the Huron, Ute, Seminole, Mohawk and Mescalero.[35]

The appropriation of Indian names in the service of overseas aggression is under-explored and under-theorized. By so 'honoring' the nation's 'original enemy combatant' Americans caricature the history and legacies of *centuries* of ethnic cleansing and asymmetric indiscriminate warfare against the tribes. They suggest respect for Indians that Americans in actuality rarely showed. The Indian names hint to the nation's enemies to beware that Americans may strike at any time with 'savage' and 'uncivilized' warfare, suggesting inaccurately that Indians alone engaged in this style of aggression. Heavily gendered and warrior centered, they elide all other aspects of Indian culture and tradition. 'Identifying our powerful weapons and victorious campaigns with those we subjugated serves to lighten the burden of our guilt', Simon Waxman points out. 'In whatever measure it is tribute to the dead, it is in greater measure a boost to our national sense of superiority'.[36]

Long before the US military and automobile manufacturers, American sports franchises adopted Indian names and mascots to accent the fighting spirit of their teams. These team names and icons, even the most blatantly racially charged stereotypes and images, have been and remain to this day aggressively defended. In the nation's capital, the owner of the Washington 'Redskins'

professional football team refuses to change and vigorously defends the palpably racist moniker. Polls show the team's fans, most professional football players, and three-fourths of the American public, support keeping the name.[37]

The term 'Red Skin' emerged about the time of American Independence. Both Indians and whites initially used the term to distinguish their separate 'races', an example of the creation and reification of racial categorizations within the colonial encounter. Today most Americans associate scalping with Indians on the 'frontier'. They generally do not learn in school that American settler society routinely offered scalp bounties and practiced mutilation, sometimes presenting 'red skin' in order to collect a bounty. By the time the Redskins football team was created in 1933, the term was affixed in the lexicon as derogatory slang for indigenous people.[38]

Today, the Washington team owner, Daniel Snyder, and fans claim they are honoring the team's tradition while at the same time insisting that the nickname also honors rather than demeans indigenous people. Yet no one is claiming that the 'Darkies', 'Wetbacks' or 'White Trash' would honor African-Americans, Hispanics or Whites through named association with professional sports teams. Snyder and most fans would not use these derogatory terms, they no doubt deplore use of the term 'nigger' and Snyder, as a Jew, presumably would not like to be called a 'kike', yet he vows to defend the 'Redskins' name regardless of mounting legal, cultural and economic pressures. 'We'll never change the name. It's that simple. NEVER – you can use caps', he told *USA Today* in May 2013.[39]

While there has been some reform on the naming front, especially at the collegiate level, the persistence of indigenous-themed team monikers and mascots is revealing. Throughout the twentieth century, even as Indians pursued legal and civil rights and sovereignty, the team names relegated them exclusively to the symbolic past as a bygone people. In American settler society, Indians functioned not as people but as 'clichéd images rooted in the imperial imagination'.

The representations in sport, promoted through sports marketing, are of a conquered people, proud and tenacious albeit primitive warriors who embodied the fighting spirit desired in an aggressive contemporary sports team. As with the military hardware, the warrior-related names and mascots are highly gendered manifestations of masculinity and male empowerment. Indian 'braves' are appropriated and apotheosized, while indigenous women and children are irrelevant and hence nonexistent. As C. Richard King points out, 'The condensed versions of Indian-ness rendered through signs and spectacles confine Native Americans within the past and typically within the popular image of the Plains warrior'.[40]

Americans have been 'playing Indian', as Philip Deloria has noted, since they first mocked the British by showing up in drag for the Boston Tea Party in 1773. The appearance of faux Indians dressed in warrior garb flourished in the early twentieth century, when Indians, along with blacks, Filipinos and other 'primitive races' were put on display in Wild West shows, world's fairs and minstrel shows. For the other 'races', these shows have been phased out – no one today could expect to escape the repercussions of publicly holding a blackface minstrel show in the United States – only Indians remain subject to such burlesque displays. Settler society thus continues to affirm the trope of conquest and persistently reaffirms its own identity through racial victimization of the Indian other. This persistence reflects a paradox that Deloria has also pointed out: even though Americans sought to remove indigenous people and destroy their cultures, there was nonetheless 'no way to make a complete [American] identity without Indians'.[41]

As the twentieth century evolved, thousands of elementary, middle and high schools, colleges and universities, and professional teams adopted Indian-related mascots and monikers. In the wake of consciousness raised during the civil rights and other movements of the 1960s, some institutions began to change. In 1970, Oklahoma, the state with the largest population of Indians other than Alaska, dropped 'little Red' as the mascot of the University of Oklahoma football

team (nicknamed the Sooners in honor of onrushing settlers who seized land from Indians). In 1973 and 1974, respectively, Stanford and Dartmouth dropped their Indian-themed sports team nicknames. Hundreds of other institutions gradually followed suit at all levels, yet hundreds more hung on to the names and feature them today (in perhaps a typical example, my son played on the high school basketball team for what today remains the 'Copley Indians' in a suburb of Akron, Ohio).

By the 1990s, with Indians and supporters increasingly visible and activist, major battles over mascots erupted, notably at the University of Illinois. Students, alumni and donors who threatened to withhold gifts staunchly defended Chief Illiniwek, the buckskin and head-dressed team mascot, played by a white male student strutting and dancing during halftime of football, basketball and other Illinois games in a ritual dating to 1926. The staunch supporters of Chief Illiniwek held rallies and demonstrations in defense of their treasured mascot.[42]

Supporters of mascots and team names not only cited tradition and thinly supported claims of honoring the tribes, they also asserted that change would infringe on free speech. Attacks on their mascots and team names reflected mindless pursuit of 'political correctness', the stock phrase that emerged in the early nineties and has endured as a standard dismissive framework to discredit progressive advocacy. Calls for changing team names and mascots constituted 'capricious action by the sensitivity police', huffed right-wing columnist George Will on Fox News, 'and they ought to mind their own business'.[43] By this logic, African-Americans should be indifferent if Whites choose to dress in black face and call them 'niggers', yet revealingly for Will and others, only Indians and their supporters have 'no business' protesting racist depictions.

Anthropologists and other scholars have long made clear the significance of rituals and symbols as a reflection of culture, yet defenders of mascots and Indian-themed names refuse to take symbols and identity seriously. Focused exclusively on their own *jouissance*, they are unable or unwilling to perceive the terms and burlesque figures as stereotypical institutionalized reflections of exalted whiteness. That Indians might find the terms offensive is secondary if relevant at all. Queried Suzan Shown Harjo (Cheyenne-Muskogee), 'How would you feel if you had your home taken away from you and then watched as your identity was stolen for profit? It's adding insult to injury'.[44] Barbara R. Munson, an Oneida, declares team names and mascots are 'a mockery of our cultures. We see objects sacred to us – such as the eagle feathers, face painting and traditional dress – being used not in sacred ceremony or any cultural setting but in another culture's *game*'. The exclusive focus on the male warrior, she adds, ignores 'the strength and beauty of our cultures during times of peace'. In 2005, the American Psychological Association called for termination of mascots and symbols, citing their 'negative impact on the self-esteem of American Indian children'.[45] Research by psychology professor Stephanie Fryberg found that 'American Indian mascots are harmful not only because they are often negative, but because they remind American Indians of the limited ways in which others see them. This, in turn, restricts the number of ways American Indians see themselves'.[46]

In 2005, the fans of Chief Illini and many other college and university mascots lost the battle as a result of a decision by the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) to disallow participation in post-season tournaments by teams holding fast to Native American or other demeaning sports team names or mascots. By this time, scores of governing entities, groups and organizations, both Native and non-Native, had come out against the racial stereotyping, including the NCAI, the American Indian Education Association, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, the Center for Study of Sports and Society and the US Commission on Civil Rights, which declared in 2001: 'The stereotyping of any racial, ethnic, religious or other groups, when promoted by our public educational institutions, teach all students that stereotyping of minority groups is acceptable, a dangerous lesson in a diverse society'.[47]

In 2007, the ruling forced Chief Illiniwek into retirement, yet the NCAA granted exceptions in cases in which a college or university was closely associated with or gained approval from a particular tribe. The University of Utah thus remained the Utes and Central Michigan University the Chippewas, but most visible was the perennial football powerhouse (whose games thus were regularly nationally televised) Florida State University. Still the Seminoles, Florida State features a trademarked icon of a blood red Indian face with striped war paint, feather and mouth agape presumably in the midst of a savage war cry. A white male student dressed in stereotypical buckskin garb replete with war paint and appropriating the name of the historic Seminole chieftain Osceola performs a ritual by riding an Appaloosa horse onto the field and driving a lance defiantly into the turf before every home football game. Throughout the games, Florida State fans mimic a supposed Indian chant and perform the 'tomahawk chop' with their arms, a practice taken up by fans of the Atlanta Braves baseball team.[48]

A council of Florida Seminoles gave assent to the FSU mascot, an action that echoes a long history of Indian alliances and collaboration with settler society. Throughout the history of American settler colonialism, indigenes served as 'scouts' allied with the United States in warfare against other bands and otherwise collaborated and assimilated. However, in this case, the majority of Seminoles no longer live in their Florida homeland but rather in Oklahoma, where they were forcibly relocated in the 1830s. In 2013, the Oklahoma tribe passed a resolution that read: 'The Seminole Nation condemns the use of all American Indian sports team mascots in the public school system, by college and university level teams and by professional teams'.[49]

The exceptions notwithstanding, the NCAA decision had a major impact, as scores of colleges and universities changed their names and mascots. In 2012, overwhelming public approval of a statewide referendum led the hold-out University of North Dakota 'Fighting Sioux' to abandon the nickname after a prolonged political struggle. According to estimates, nationwide, some 2,000 colleges, high schools, middle schools and elementary schools have dropped Indian-themed names, leaving about 1,000. Battles continue at the state and local level. In Wisconsin in December 2013, the Republican governor signed legislation making it more difficult to challenge Native American school mascots. When Munson and other Indians and their supporters protested, they were accused of being the aggressors by attempting to 'legislate free speech' and 'playing the race card'.[50]

Unlike colleges and universities, professional sports teams have no NCAA to compel changes in behavior, only their own league offices firmly under the control of owners like Snyder. The NFL, which blundered badly during the 2014 season with a tepid response to sexual assault – marijuana use by players drew ten-game suspensions while a prominent running back was initially ordered to sit for only two games after knocking his girlfriend unconscious – left the decision about the team name up to Snyder. The NFL's feckless (but well compensated, with a $44 million annual salary) Commissioner Roger Goodell lamely declared that the Redskin nickname has been 'presented in a way that honors Native Americans'.[51]

While adamantly refusing to consider changing the team's name, Snyder opted instead for a public relations offensive. He and his staff visited several tribes and, in March 2014, announced a new foundation that began by donating clothing, sporting goods and construction equipment to various bands. Snyder apparently saw no irony in calling his nonprofit organization the 'Washington Redskins Original Americans Foundation'. A spokesperson for the New York-based Oneida Indian Foundation, which has led the indigenous campaign against the Redskins moniker, responded, 'We are glad that after more than a decade of owning the Washington team, Mr. Snyder is finally interested in Native American heritage, and we are hopeful that when his team finally stands on the right side of history and changes its name, he will honor the commitment to Native Americans that he is making today'.[52]

Snyder's actions mirror the gestures made by the four other major US professional sports teams that sport Indian names and logos – the Kansas City Chiefs (football); Chicago Black Hawks (hockey); and Cleveland Indians and Atlanta Braves (baseball). The Chiefs, who play at Arrowhead Stadium and call their end zone 'sacred ground', have initiated dialogue with local Native American bands about making the team's 'traditions' more respectful. The Black Hawks, named for an Indian leader driven violently from the Midwest in a campaign replete with massacre, have created an outreach program with the American Indian Center in Chicago. In the late 1980s, the Atlanta team retired a screaming Indian logo – Chief Noc-a-Homa ('Knock a Homer') – but has weighed bringing it back. In 1995, AIM picketed and protested when the Indians and the Braves squared off in the World Series. 'If this was the Atlanta Negroes or the Atlanta Hispanics, the stadium would be burned down overnight', AIM spokesman Ken Rhyne declared at the time. Cleveland management refuses to abandon the name Indians or give up the glaringly racist smiling, red-faced and buck-toothed 'Chief Wahoo', which is reminiscent of 'Little Black Sambo' or early 'Aunt Jemima' depictions and was created during the same minstrel show era. The NCAI underscored the racism inherent in 'Chief Wahoo' in a public service advertisement juxtaposing the Indians cap with a mock 'New York Hebrews' cap featuring a stereotyped grinning Jewish figure, as well as a 'San Francisco Chinamen' cap with a buck-toothed Asian caricature.[53]

As debate centers on the 'Redskins' in the nation's capital, Snyder is under increasing pressure from Indians, advertisers and some sports figures. The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office recently canceled several of the team's trademark registrations because they were disparaging to indigenous communities. The team promptly appealed. Federal Express, which holds naming rights to the Washington stadium, has been asked by investors to 'respond to reputational damage from its association with the team'. A majority of sports broadcasters and journalists oppose the team name, and some reference only 'the Washington team' and avoid the term Redskins. A former NFL referee acknowledged he asked not to be assigned to officiate Washington games. When the team played at Minneapolis in fall 2014, some 5,000 protesters greeted them at the stadium with a fiery protest. Prominent politicians including President Barack Obama, Hilary Clinton, John McCain and Harry Reid have called for a name change.[54]

The Oneida Nation and the NCAI are keeping the pressure on through CHANGETHEMASCOT.org, which features a moving two-minute YouTube video 'Proud to Be', which has been viewed by millions.[55] In 1997 in the nation's capital, the Washington Bullets, citing an unwanted association with violent gun crimes, changed their name to the Washington Wizards, a move few have regretted. The 'Redskins' could be next, but the campaign to keep the name, and the popular support behind it, illuminates the persistence of settler mentalities.

One might assume that the teams refuse to change their names or mascots for economic reasons, yet a study by two marketing professors suggests just the opposite: that the stubborn resistance to change is actually costing the teams money. Based on their analysis of colleges that changed their names and then launched marketing campaigns behind new team names and logos, Michael Lewis and Manish Tripathi concluded that the change would pay off rather than punish through the generation of new revenue and the removal of obstacles to revenue growth. The Indians and Braves were losing an estimated $2.6 million annually to their Native American mascots, the study found. The researchers also concluded that the two NFL teams with the most negative brand equity were Washington and Kansas City, precisely because the names and logo offended substantial numbers of people and drove away advertisers who did not wish to associate with the name. Their stark conclusion: 'In this case, doing the morally right thing is also the correct business decision'.[56]

Consider that professional teams cling aggressively to their Indian names and mascots *despite losing money* for doing so, and we begin to grasp the extent to which settler mentalities continue

to hold sway in American society. The owners and their supporters cite tradition, but race and power better explain the decision to retain team names and mascots even when they are economically punitive. Settler society both consciously and unconsciously clings to the representation of Indians as conquered peoples relegated to the past. Settler society also seeks to retain exclusive rights to Indian identity, which it is free to appropriate and consume for its own cultural purposes, notably to exalt whiteness and affirm masculine power at the core of national identity.

The defense of the 'Redskins' and other sports teams and mascots illuminates the tensions of a postcolonial society in which 'whites' are a dwindling and threatened majority. Efforts within settler society to retain the power of representation over Indians complement a broader colonial project of containing African-Americans, Hispanics, feminists and what passes for the left in mainstream American society. Settler society strives to reinforce superiority over blacks and Hispanics through various representations but even more directly through police violence, incarceration, economic marginalization, border control and restrictive immigration policies. The clashes over mascots and indigenous sovereignty thus can be viewed within the broader colonial context.

These same settler mentalities seem to underlie the virulent opposition to President Barack Hussein Obama. As a black man with an African parent and a Muslim middle name, Obama is perceived, mostly I think at a subconscious level, as a dark-skinned native who has stepped out of his place. His occupation of the White House poses a threat to colonial society; hence he has been disrespected and opposed at virtually every turn by a hostile, Republican-controlled Congress elected by millions of settler Americans. On issues of national identity and hegemonic power, symbol and imagery are everything. Thus the 'real' Obama – who in actuality glorifies American exceptionalism and willingly wields military power in the service of the imperial state – is obscured.

The need to contain domestic 'minorities' appears to be escalating as the white majority recedes. At the same, however, a growing Hispanic and African-American middle class, broadened support for gay and lesbian marriage, indigenous activism and sovereignty movements, widening roles for women, and various other progressive forces work in opposition to the hegemonic white settler mentalities. Resolution of these dialectical struggles will go a long way toward determining the prospects for the emergence in the United States of a genuinely multicultural society.

Notes

1 The literature on settler colonialism is emerging rapidly. A good place to start is L. Veracini, *Settler Colonialism: A Theoretical Overview*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.
2 See the discussion and references in W. L. Hixson, *American Settler Colonialism: A History*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013, especially pp. 1–22.
3 C. Wilkinson, *Blood Struggle: The Rise of Modern Indian Nations*, New York: W.W. Norton, 2005, xiv.
4 Hixson, *American Settler Colonialism*, pp. 11–13.
5 K. Bruyneel, *The Third Space of Sovereignty: The Post-colonial Politics of US-Indigenous Relations*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2007, p. xviii; Philip J. Deloria, *Indians in Unexpected Places*, Lawrence: University of Kansas, 2004, p. 237.
6 See the discussion and notes in Hixson, *American Settler Colonialism*, pp. 186–89.
7 F. E. Hoxie, *This Indian Country: American Indian Activists and the Place They Made*, New York: Penguin Books, 2012, p. 300.
8 P. C. Rosier, *Serving Their Country: American Indian Politics and Patriotism in the Twentieth Century*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009, pp. 9–11.
9 Wilkinson, *Blood Struggle*, p. xiii.
10 V. Deloria, Jr., *Custer Died for Your Sins: An Indian Manifesto*, New York: Macmillan, 1969; for an excellent assessment of Deloria's contributions, see Hoxie, *This Indian Country*, pp. 337–92.
11 Bruyneel, *The Third Space of Sovereignty* pp. 220, xvii.

12 S. L. Smith, *Hippies, Indians, and the Fight for Red Power*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2012, p. 13.

13 Hoxie, *This Indian Country*, p. 372.

14 For a riveting account of events at Pine Ridge, see P. Matthiessen*, In the Spirit of Crazy Horse*, New York: Viking, 1991.

15 For this and the next two paragraphs, see the discussion and notes in Hixson, *American Settler Colonialism*, pp. 193–95; and Wilkinson, *Blood Struggle*, pp. 241–68.

16 D. S. Case and D. A. Voluck, *Alaska Natives and American Laws*, Anchorage, AK: University of Alaska Press, 1998, pp. 4–5; Hixson, *American Settler Colonialism*, pp. 193–95.

17 On Alaska, see the discussion and notes in Hixson, *American Settler Colonialism*, pp. 160–65.

18 On Hawai'i, see the discussion and notes in Hixson, *American Settler Colonialism*, pp. 146–60.

19 The Harvard Project on American Indian Economic Development, *The State of the Native Nations: Conditions Under US Policies of Self-Determination*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.

20 Harvard Project on American Indian Economic Development, p. 369.

21 US Commission on Civil Rights, 'A Quiet Crisis: Federal Funding and Unmet Needs in Indian Country'. http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/na0703/na0204.pdf (accessed 25/04/2016).

22 Ibid.

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PART III

Africa

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INTRODUCTION TO PART III

Edward Cavanagh

Introduction

The first chapter in the *Handbook* to consider settler colonialism in Africa is Robert Ross's. It narrates the foundation of a number of settler polities in South Africa. Settlers were present from the early years of the corporate occupation of the Cape of Good Hope, but it took until the final decades of the eighteenth century for a politically assertive settler community to emerge in southern Africa. The arrival, after 1806, of British settlers and administrators at the Cape antagonised several communities of Afrikaners, who subsequently trekked into the interior to found new polities for themselves. When Afrikaners pushed the frontier of settlement north, and the British Cape government gradually and haphazardly attempted to follow in their wake, conflict with native populations escalated considerably.

On the other end of the continent, and much closer to Europe, settler colonialism got underway in Algeria from 1830, as Sung Choi explores in the next chapter. The French government directly oversaw the transplantation of French settlers into a region already peopled by a large and predominately Muslim indigenous population. As Choi argues, this population was prevented from achieving the full rights-bearing status of the French subject population. After an insurgence of anti–metropolitan settler nationalism during the 1930s was sidelined by the outbreak of World War II, Algeria too descended into war. French settler colonialism was no longer considered workable in the region after 1962.

Settler colonialism in Liberia took a different form again, as James Ciment explains in his political narrative of the region. Similar to the attempts of the British government to transplant a number of liberated 'Black Poor' to nearby Sierra Leone during the 1780s and 1790s, Liberia was an American colony established for free blacks who were encouraged to settle in the region after 1821. A mostly autonomous 'settler Liberia' had emerged by the mid-nineteenth century, Ciment reveals, where the politics of race developed in confusing and often contradictory ways. Tycoons and ideologues came to dominate Liberian politics, but the government was always fraught. Eventually, as Ciment concludes, a violent coup in 1980 saw it overthrown and the last remnants of 'Congoe' settler colonialism come to an end.

The next chapter, by Will Jackson, explores the Kenyan experiences of British rule. Following the earliest intrusions of the Imperial British East African Company in the late nineteenth century, settlers moved into a region already occupied by pastoralist and agriculturalist indigenous

communities. As Jackson argues, these communities experienced the burdens of settler colonialism in different ways. The myth of a 'white man's country' in 'savage Africa' may have flourished in the 1930s and early 1940s, but the Mau Mau emergency curtailed the realisation of settler nationhood in Kenya. After the withdrawal of metropolitan support for the colony, Kenya was granted independence in 1963.

Like Kenya, the foundations of settler Rhodesia were also laid by a state-sanctioned corporate presence, as Enocent Msindo stresses in his chapter. Between 1890 and 1923, Msindo argues, the policies and administrative procedures of the British South Africa Company, which were developed and implemented largely free of direct imperial supervision, led to indigenous dispossession and unequal accumulation. After settlers achieved 'responsible government' in 1923, the African population of Rhodesia was targeted by a succession of interventionist and segregationist policies over the next four decades. Eventually, a violent resistance movement spread across the country. Zimbabwe in the end replaced Rhodesia.

Emanuele Ertola, in the next chapter of the *Handbook*, focuses on a peculiar case of settler colonialism. The Italian presence in Africa began in the 1890s, and in time Eritrea, Libya, Somalia, and Ethiopia became subject to various degrees of colonial rule. However, Ethiopia, Ertola reveals, was imagined to be a settler 'empire': between 1936 and 1941, an intense effort was expended in an attempt to realise this dream. Ethiopia, it was hoped, would transform into an *impero del lavoro* – a place where hardworking settlers could labour upon the land. No such transformation took place, however. Rhetoric did not translate into reality.

Fernando Tavares Pimenta contributes the following chapter, which explores the rise of settler nationalism in Portuguese Angola between 1945 and 1975. During this period political outfits dominated by Angolan-born whites, often in alliance with *mestiço* and *assimilado* sympathisers, developed into a significant political force. Subscribing to an imagined common cultural identity, which was defined against Portuguese identity (*angolanidade*, or 'Angolanness'), the settler community of Angola defied the political and economic changes which came in the wake of World War II. Portugal ultimately cut and ran in 1975, leaving this settler community with a choice either to leave the country or to remain behind. Most left.

The final chapter in this section of the *Handbook* explores the history of South Africa to the present. Settler colonialism, until 1994, was built upon simultaneous processes of dispossession and exploitation, and it was entrenched through violence. These processes had their origins in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, but they became especially intense during the apartheid period, as state efforts to control land and labour profoundly defined the nature of South African society. However, this chapter argues, land and labour continue to shape society after the introduction of democracy in 1994.

13

SETTLER COLONIALISM IN SOUTH AFRICA, 1652–1899

Robert Ross

Famously, W. K. Hancock, in his *Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs* made a distinction between those areas of the world which were, or had been, colonies of white settlement, and those in which colonialism was primarily concerned with the exploitation of the labour of colonised people, either in plantations or mines, or more often through the encouragement of their production of marketable crops. This was the distinction between the "Settlers'" and the "Traders'" frontiers.[1] South Africa falls into both categories. It would be difficult to imagine a history of South Africa without white settlement. South Africa may no longer be politically dominated by people who can trace their ancestry back to immigrants from Europe, at least in part, though it was until 1994. The modern country is the constitutional continuation of the colonies which came to be dominated by settlers, and their descendants still play a major role in its economic and social life. The *lingua franca* of the country tends to be English, and one of its other official languages, Afrikaans, is a creole tongue based on Dutch. The legal system derives from Roman law, via that of the Dutch Republic, and the main developments of this have been through the encounter with English law. The religion of most South Africans is some form of Christianity, which was imported from Europe, though it has been often much altered in the process of naturalisation in South Africa. The very landscape of much of the country has been greatly altered by the introduction of European crops, and of other plants from across the globe. Of all the countries on the African continent, South Africa has been the most affected by the presence of white settlers in its territory. This chapter will survey how the European settlers conquered the land, and how the societies they founded were constituted.

The founding of the settler community

The process of establishing European settlement in South Africa began in earnest in 1652 with the creation of a small outpost of the Dutch East India Company (*Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie*, usually known as the VOC) on the shores of Table Bay in the far South West of the continent. The Company had come to the conclusion that the ships which it sent from the Netherlands to India and Indonesia, and those returning from the East, would benefit from the presence of a permanent station. From there, they could take on the essentials that were needed for a long ocean voyage, water and firewood in the first instance, of course, and then fresh vegetables and other foodstuffs. Originally, the Dutch hoped that they would be able to acquire

what they needed through trade with the local Khoekhoe. However, it soon became evident that the Khoekhoe could only provide meat, and even that, probably, not in the quantities or with the regularity that the VOC required.[2] In consequence, a number of the employees of the VOC were allowed to leave its service and set themselves up as farmers in the immediate vicinity of the fort. Others came to live in the small town which was developing at the foot of Table Mountain, and which would become known as Cape Town. There they could work as merchants, artisans and lodging-house keepers, profiting not just from the VOC's establishment but also from the increasing number of ships of other European countries that put into Table Bay on their way to and from the East.

This would be the pattern of immigration into South Africa at least until the end of VOC rule in the last years of the eighteenth century, and in many ways until the mineral revolution of the later nineteenth. With two major, and a small number of minor exceptions, the people who came to South Africa did not do so with the prior intention of settling there, but rather in the course of some other career, after which they remained in the country. This is clearest under the VOC. There was always a steady stream of men who had been stationed at the Cape, as soldiers, as artisans, or indeed as clerks, who left the service of the Company and took up *burgher* status. There were also those sailors who had been invalided off their ships and had survived the rigours of the Company's hospital, before remaining at the Cape. As the colony increased in size, they came to work on the farms as *knechts* (servants) in the hope, which was not necessarily ungrounded, that they would be incorporated into *burgher* society.

The initial attempts to build an agricultural basis for the Company's foodstuff needs failed badly. Despite the fertility of the Cape's soil, which had never previously been used for agriculture, no way was found to produce enough. From the end of the seventeenth century, as the settlement was increasing in size, and beginning to include the land at the foot of the mountains, to the north and east of the Cape Flats, the Mediterranean crops – wheat, grapes but surprisingly not olives – began to be produced in reasonable quantities in the Western Cape. Certainly in the wine production the role of Huguenot settlers was of great importance. In the years after the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685, by which Protestant worship in France was forbidden, there was a great migration of Huguenots to the Netherlands. Somewhere between 150 and 200 of them went on to the Cape, in the first significant planned emigration to South Africa. In particular those of them who came from wine-producing regions of France were able to apply their skills, and market significantly more wine than other farmers.[3] The manual labour on these farms, as well as in Cape Town, was largely performed by slaves, who had been imported from Indonesia or India, or later from Madagascar and East Africa.

Approximately twice as many men as women arrived at the Cape as Huguenot refugees.[4] This was only unusual in that the number of women was higher than in the rest of the settler population. A few of the men who had become burghers at the Cape asked for permission to have their wives join them from the Netherlands. Many others, both in the early years and through the rest of the eighteenth century, chose as their partners women of slave origin, and their children, like those of German or Scandinavian men, were unconditionally accepted into the settler community. There was, indeed, a definite policy on the part of the VOC authorities that immigrants should be assimilated into (Dutch) Cape Society. Thus after a few years the holding of church services in French was forbidden, and the language died out, though the Huguenot descendants a century later still knew very well when the last service in French had been held.[5]

The expansion of the farming community was made possible by the steady destruction of the indigenous Khoekhoe tribes of the Western Cape. Colonial pressure led to their impoverishment

and thus to the collapse of what had been a political system in which power was derived almost exclusively from wealth. By 1700, the Khoekhoe of the South West Cape no longer formed a threat to the region's first white farmers.[6] Over the subsequent decades, whites took over large tracts of land across the mountains from Cape Town. These could not be used for the commercial production of crops, because of the difficulties of arranging transport over the passes, but became primarily stock farms, sometimes held in combination with one or more of the wine or wheat farms of the South West. A process including many petty acts of violence ensured the dispossession of the Khoekhoe living along the Southern plains of the continent, and increasingly further into the interior. More organised resistance only occurred from the 1760s onwards, as groups of people whom the colonists called "Bosjesmans" harried the white farmers and drove them, temporarily, out of a number of areas of the Karoo, particularly along the Great Escarpment which marks the edge of the interior plateau. This resistance was not confined to those who had lived a hunter-gatherer life, but also included a number of men who had previously worked on the Cape's farms as labourers. It was repressed by a "commando" – a citizen militia force – with explicitly genocidal brutality.[7]

The speed of the settler expansion into the Cape interior was in part driven by the great demographic growth of the white population, which. Throughout the eighteenth century, was increasing at a rate of 2.6% *per annum*. Primarily this was the consequence of the birth and death rates. The latter seems to have been more or less equivalent to that of England or the Netherlands at the time, which were among the countries with the lowest mortality figures. This meant that the median age at death was around 40, even taking into account the considerable infant and child mortality. Against this, fertility was pushing the possible limits for the human species. For the first 200 years of the Cape Colony, the average number of children born to each man – at least to those who had any – was between eight and nine, often from more than one wife. Put another way, the number of children born to each woman averaged around 6, and to those who did not marry immigrants around 7. This meant that each married woman had around two daughters who themselves married. The population was doubling every generation.[8] And even this was without the steady flow of immigrants, almost entirely male, into the colony, who ensured that the sex ratio remained heavily skewed, with men outnumbering women by up to two to one.[9] As a result there were very few unmarried white women in the colony, and the relations of those men who did not marry a European woman with slaves or Khoekhoe meant that there was a steady, if rarely acknowledged, drift of people not of full European descent into the settler population.

By the late eighteenth century, the settler colony had come to consist of three main parts. First there was Cape Town itself, the seat of Government and of trade, with approximately one third of the total population of the colony. Then there were the farms of the South West, producing mainly wine, up against the mountains, and wheat, in the open hills of the Swartland to the north of Cape Town. Finally, in the interior, stretching all the way from the first mountain passes to the Fish River in the Eastern Cape, and north at least to modern Calvinia, there were farmers living primarily off their stock, both sheep and cattle, with little farming except for the requirements of the individual household. In general they remained in touch with Cape Town, travelling thither every so often by wagon, and also selling their stock to the butchers who with their *knegten* criss-crossed the country buying up stock to sell on the Cape Town market. It was a form of settlement which required vast tracts of land, so that the borders of colonial settlement moved quickly and inexorably east. By the last decades of the century, a number of the settlers came into competition with the amaXhosa for the grazing land in the Fish River valley and on the Zuurveld, where Grahamstown would later be founded, as both groups moved their cattle around in a continual hunt for water and grass.

Settler politics

Throughout almost the whole eighteenth century, the Cape Colony was governed by the appointees of the Dutch East India Company. Most of those who held high rank within the Company administration were immigrants to South Africa, and many eventually retired to the Netherlands.[10] The possibility for settler involvement in the central government was close to nonexistent. Two carefully selected prominent burghers were appointed to the Court of Justice, but they could of course not challenge the basic policy of the Company Officials. At district level prominent local farmers sat as *heemraden* to advise the magistrate and to adjudicate in relatively minor disputes, and others served as *veldcornet*, leading the militias in their occasional campaigns to recapture runaway slaves or to retaliate against San raids brought on by the dispossession of San hunting and gathering lands by the settlers.

On two occasions, some of the burghers did manage to make concerted protest against the actions of the Company. The first was early in the eighteenth century. The reason for their actions was the attempt of the Governor, Willem Adriaan van der Stel, and those close to him, who included several of his relatives, to monopolise the economic life of the Colony by exploiting the advantages political power provided. They could use Company employees on their own farms and buy slaves more cheaply than the burghers. They could also ensure that the Company bought the wine they delivered at, for them, favourable prices. Those who protested, notably the diarist Adam Tas, were thrown into gaol. However, the Directors of the VOC in the Netherlands were not prepared to allow their own officials to act in quite this corrupt fashion, and to so blatantly disregard the regulations against their owning land in the colony. Van der Stel was dismissed, though not put on trial. Many of those around him who had been engaged in similar activities were able to continue in office, but the opportunities for officials to exploit their position as supplier to the Cape market largely disappeared, at least temporarily.[11]

In the absence of significant sanctions against officials exploiting their positions for private gain, such practices were bound to reappear. By the 1770s, a number of the VOC hierarchy, generally in partnership with members of the burgher elite, had once again managed to acquire highly advantageous positions in the Cape economy, essentially because they could buy up commodities which were being imported into the Colony before their potential competitors could approach the sellers. This led to considerable protests from among the Cape burghers, obviously above all those who felt that their own commercial interests were suffering as a consequence. A long letter of complaint, signed by 404 of the Cape burghers was sent to the Board of the VOC in Amsterdam, demanding action against the corrupt officials. These protests have become known as the Cape Patriot movement, and did have some connection with the much more revolutionary Patriot movement in the Netherlands. The protests at the Cape, however, were primarily about the relative economic position of the Cape's burgher merchants and the Company officials. They were not nationalist, although they were later claimed as the forerunners of Afrikaner nationalism. Nor did they envisage a shift from the authoritarianism of VOC rule to a situation in which the burghers had a much greater say in the government of the Colony.[12] Settler democracy was not yet an option.

British rule and the 1820 settlers

During, and in consequence of, the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars, the Cape Colony was transferred from the rule of Dutch East India Company to that of the British Empire. The British first occupied the Cape in 1795, returned it to the (Dutch) Batavian Republic in 1803, following the Treaty of Amiens, and definitively conquered it in 1806. In so doing they

agreed to retain the Roman Dutch legal system, which was the underpinning of Cape society, but inevitably there was a slow drift towards the introduction of English institutions, as well as populations. British rule was not always appreciated. The expression "Als de Kaap weer Hollands is" (when the Cape is again Dutch) was already in use around 1800 to describe a desirable future – and has remained current among Afrikaners.[13]

In the years after the British Occupations of the Cape, there was a steady trickle of British immigrants into the Colony. Many of these had first arrived in the various regiments which formed the garrison or as part of the civil administration. Others came on their way from India. At the beginning they formed a separate group within Cape society, but as time progressed a number married into Cape Dutch Society. Those who straddled the linguistic divide in their family arrangements were very often the most successful of the Cape's merchants. They included Hamilton Ross – who as a young army officer scandalously eloped to Sri Lanka with Catharina van den Berg, and then returned to establish himself in Cape Town – and J.B. Ebden. Also, Joseph Barry and his two nephews, all of whom married women from the Van Reenen family, established the leading merchant firm trading in the region of Swellendam.[14]

In the aftermath of Waterloo and the Congress of Vienna, as it became evident that the Cape would remain in British hands for the foreseeable future, two major processes developed. The first was the attempt to enforce the slow Anglicisation of the Colony. It was laid down that all Government business should be in English. Attempts were made to ensure that the administration of the colony was manned as far as possible by Britons. The Colonial Secretary in London, Earl Bathurst, stipulated that the chairman of the Lombard and Discount Bank should be from "home". Eventually in 1827 the legal system was reformed, though in such a way as to maintain Roman Dutch law at its basis. The beginnings of a regular schooling system were also driven by the ideal that Dutch children should become bilingual. (For Anglophones this was not thought necessary!) Even the Dutch Reformed Church (DRC) was the object of this policy. A major effort was made by the Government, which still paid the salaries of the church's ministers, that new clergymen were to be Anglophone – almost all were Scots whose theological position was compatible with that of the DRC. This was not a particularly successful enterprise, as the ministers were often incorporated into the communities they served, and in any case the church stressed that prayer and communication with God could only take place easily in the native tongue. But this was an exception to the rule that official occasions should be held in English.[15]

The second consequence of the ending of the Napoleonic wars was that the British Government organised what was the most significant wave of immigration in the colonial history of South Africa. The Government's motives were in part the hope that an increased British presence would consolidate the British hold on the colony, particularly with regard to its conflict with the amaXhosa on the Eastern Frontier. More importantly, though, the emigration scheme was seen as way to alleviate the poverty caused by the post-war depression, and in this way to buy off radical protest. The scheme was funded by the British Government, with a grand of £50,000. It was widely advertised and as many as 80,000 Britons applied to emigrate. In the end, just over 4,000 were accepted, 44% of whom were children, 36% men and 20% women. Given that there were at that time around 42,000 whites in the Cape, this represented a very considerable increase of the Cape's colonial population.[16]

The settlers arrived in the Cape in the course of 1820 – hence their designation – and proceeded to the Eastern Districts, above all the Zuurveld of Albany district, between the valleys of the Kowie and the Fish Rivers to the south-east of Grahamstown, and further west to Salem. They were divided into 68 parties, each of which was to receive a piece of ground in the Colony. Most were under the "proprietorship" of a single individual, who financed the rest of the party and expected those who had come with him to work for him for a number of years. The largest

parties, however, were so-called "joint-stock" groups, in which each participant put a sum of money into the common fund, and whose elected leaders negotiated with the Colonial Office. Although the idea behind the Settlement was that the parties would form agricultural units in the coastal regions near Grahamstown, only about 39% of the settlers had agricultural experience, as against 31 % who were skilled labourers or artisans, 11% traders, 5% from the army and navy and 4% from the professions.[17] It was not the basis for a successful farming settlement. Nor was the land which the parties received of a quality that would allow intensive occupation and farming. Though a few made a reasonable go of farming, and others would later become the owners of substantial sheep flocks, most of the settlers abandoned their farms within a very few years.[18] They would become artisans in the small towns of the Eastern Cape, and merchants, many of whom operated across the colonial border into Xhosaland. Their arrival thus gave an impulse to the increasing monetarisation and commercialisation of the Colony.

In the planning of the Settlement, it was decided that the Scots, the Irish and the Welsh should be given locations separate from the main mass of English settlers. Thus Thomas Pringle and his fellow Scots found their habitation in the Baviaans River, well to the north of Grahamstown, and some of the Welsh ended up near Caledon in the Western Cape. The four parties of Irish were sent to the Oliphants River valley, around Clanwilliam, in an area of considerable aridity, not, it could be thought, suitable for immigrants from the Emerald Isle. Indeed, the parties soon broke up in acrimony. Within a couple of years, all the Irish had departed from the valley, some returning to Ireland, and the others joining the English in Albany District.[19]

There were certain restrictions placed on the 1820 settlers. Above all, they were not allowed to own slaves, even though slavery in the Cape was not abolished until 1834. They also, like the rest of the colonists, did not have the right to representation in the organs of state, at least until the Council of Advice was introduced in 1825, and even this body, with just two "unofficial" members, appointed by the Governor, did not have teeth. This did not greatly trouble the Cape Dutch elite in the first instance, since they had no tradition of participation in the central government, were assured of their influence at district level (which was probably most significant anyway), and indeed generally felt content with the treatment they received especially from Governor Lord Charles Somerset (in office 1814–1826), who shared their delight in field sports and horse-racing. The British felt otherwise. Many of them believed that they had a right to be heard and to dominate the world in which they found themselves. It was from among British settlers that the press in South Africa was begun, and the various papers competed with each other, not just for sales but also to propagate their own opinions.[20] By the 1840s, a leading spokesman of the 1820 settlers, and editor of *The Graham's Town Journal*, Robert Godlonton, announced, with a staggering lack of modesty, that "the British race was selected by God himself to colonize" the Eastern Cape.[21] Some of the British officials were very hesitant about the political demands that this sort of claim entailed. One was heard to wonder, for instance, "what tinkers and dealers in soap could know about government."[22]

In time, though, it came to be realised that some sort of Cape Parliament was inevitable, to accommodate the political claims of an increasingly populous, prosperous and vociferous settler elite. The rulers of the Colony came to develop an understanding with the British settlers of the Eastern Cape, based on common experiences in the wars against the amaXhosa, a sense of a common background – certainly with Governor Sir Harry Smith, whose social origins were similar to those of most settlers – and increasingly a feeling of common nationality. As has been written elsewhere, "English nationalism . . . was the prime nationalism of South Africa, against which all the subsequent ones, whether Afrikaner or African, reacted."[23]

The establishment of a Representative Assembly in the Cape was a long process in which ethnicity, and the concealment thereof, was of great importance. Initial attempts to introduce a Parliament were crushed by the British Colonial Secretary, who was wary of the numerical dominance

that Dutch former slave owners might have in such a body, to the detriment of the British.[24] In answer to these sorts of arguments, the Cape Dutch elite applied a remarkably consistent strategy.[25] Aware that they would have a majority in any assembly which reflected the numbers of the white population, they steadfastly proclaimed their loyalty to the British crown as "British adopted subjects".[26] In the first colony wide elections, held for the Legislative Council in 1850, this group, with the addition of John Fairbairn, a Cape Town newspaper editor of Scottish descent, swept the board. However, Sir Harry Smith, as Governor, refused to accept the results in full, and nominated Godlonton, to represent Eastern Cape Britons, instead of J. H. Wicht, who had received many more votes. Together with the agitation to prevent the Cape from becoming a convict settlement, this highhandedness led to a breakdown of the relations between the Cape elite and the Government, which was only alleviated in 1853, with the establishment of a Representative Assembly based on a low qualified franchise, clearly sufficient to give the old settlers numerical pre-eminence over the more recently arrived British. For the rest of the century, this group dominated Cape politics.[27]

Northward expansion: the Great Trek, Natal and the republics

The transfer of the Cape Colony to British rule, and the immigration of a considerable British population did nothing to stem the basic trends of colonial demography and social economy. The white population continued to grow exponentially, and with this there was an unrequited demand for new land, for the sons of the Afrikaner farmers to set up their own establishments. This was only made worse both by the land purchases of the British settlers, and others, who from the late 1820s were beginning to develop the wool industry of the Colony, and by the fact that advances to the East were no longer possible. The clashes with the amaXhosa made this perfectly clear. The result was a steady advance of white settlement to the north. San resistance prevented expansion for much of the last quarter of the eighteenth century, notwithstanding the murderous commandoes sent against them, but after 1800 the expansion to the north could continue. By the 1820s there was again no available land in the colony, and the farmers began to move across the Gariep (Orange) river with their flocks, particularly when drought hit in 1825. Here they came into contact, and conflict, with Griqua under Adam Kok II, a community of mixed Khoekhoe and settler descent who were setting up a small state around the town of Philippolis.[28]

Together with this slow expansion from the northern border of the Colony, the Dutch-speaking farmers of in particular the Eastern Cape were beginning to express their unrest at a number of the measures of the British Government, notably the abolition of slavery, from 1834, and the proclamation of equal rights to all free inhabitants of the colony, thus including the Khoekhoe, by Ordinance 50 of 1828. In addition, they were suffering from the shortage of land for the following generation, since there was little opportunity for any form of agriculture except for extensive pastoralism. On top of this, the war against the amaXhosa, which broke out at Christmas 1834 and lasted just under a year, made them realise again how vulnerable many areas of the Colony could be. Parties of farmers, known as the Voortrekkers, began to move across the Gariep. Their goal was to settle in the Highveld grasslands of what is now Gauteng and the surrounding areas, or to go across the Drakensberg to establish themselves in what became Natal. When the British Government in London ordered the retrocession of the territory conquered from the amaXhosa, by the so-called Glenelg despatch, the combination of socio-economic pressure and political distaste for British rule fuelled the exodus. By 1840 some 6,000 persons, or about a fifth of the white population of the Eastern Cape, had left the colony, and five years later the number had risen to about 15,000, accompanied by about 5,000 servants.[29]

This movement came to be known as the Great Trek. It was long the centrepiece of South African history writing, acquiring a mythical status among Afrikaners, as the Dutch-speaking

part of the white community came to be called. It did not proceed without setbacks. The first two parties, led by Louis Tregardt and Jacobus Janse van Rensburg, were wiped out by a combination of African resistance and malaria, as they moved towards the Limpopo river. The other main groups, led by Hendrik Potgieter, Gert Maritz, Piet Uys and Piet Retief, were more successful. Potgieter and his fellows were able to repel attempts by the amaNdebele, led by Mzilikazi, to eliminate them. The ring of wagons, known as a laager, and the skill with which the Voortrekkers handled their firearms, were sufficient to counter Ndebele attacks. These defeats, following on a series of attacks by Griqua raiders, persuaded Mzilikazi to abandon his territory in what is now North-West Province and move to southern Zimbabwe. This left the Voortrekkers as the dominant force in the southern Highveld.[30]

Those who trekked across the mountains into Natal also had to fight their way through. Negotiations with Dingane, the Zulu king, ended with Piet Retief and his fellows being killed, and in the following days several of the trekker parties were surprised by Zulu forces and slaughtered. However, in the end, the amaZulu had to attack the main laager of the Voortrekkers. At the battle of the Ncome (Blood River), on 16 December 1838, the Zulu attack on the Voortrekker laager was repulsed, and within a couple of years, the Voortrekkers had consolidated their victory by ensuring the replacement of Dingane by his brother, Mpande, who was initially something of puppet. The trekkers then moved down to the small trading station of Port Natal, soon to be renamed Durban, and began to carve out farms for themselves in the richly watered valleys behind the port. This, however, challenged British strategic thinking for Southern Africa, under which no major European power could control a harbour on the coast. As a result the British soon annexed Natal, to prevent possible relations between the trekkers and such competitors. In the subsequent years, a number of schemes were set up to attract the "right" sort of settlers to Natal from Great Britain, and most, but not all, of the erstwhile trekkers returned over the mountains.[31]

On the plains and hills to the West of the Drakensberg, two distinct but closely related societies developed. Between the Vaal and the Gariep rivers, the primarily Afrikaner farmers effectively constituted an extension of Cape society. They developed their commercial economy, primarily based on sheep farming and the sale of wool through Port Elizabeth to the south. To safeguard this, the British annexed the area as the Orange River Sovereignty in 1848, although the viability of the new possession was threatened by the fact that the Sovereignty also included the Kingdom of Lesotho, over which the British had no control. North of the Vaal, in contrast, the Voortrekkers maintained themselves above all by hunting, and by exploiting the African populations among whom they settled, both by raising rent from the peasantries and by raiding for slaves from those who were not fully subjugated.[32]

In the early 1850s, after suffering expensive victories in the wars against the amaXhosa in the Eastern Cape, and after failing to subdue the Basotho, the British government pulled back from its involvement north of the Gariep. First, in 1852, those Afrikaners north of the Vaal were pushed into forming the South African Republic, better known as the Transvaal, which was established by the Sand River Convention. Two years later, the British confirmed their withdrawal from the interior by the Bloemfontein Convention, which left the region in the possession of two, structurally hostile, polities, the (Afrikaner) Orange Free State and the Kingdom of Lesotho.

Diamonds and gold

By the late 1860s, what would later become South Africa was a constellation of two British colonies, two Afrikaner Republics and a number of independent African polities. Dominant among these was the Cape Colony, which still had about 72% of the white population of the region.[33] Immigration continued slowly, though on an individual basis. Attempts to introduce

English children, from the orphanages of London, in the 1830s, and Dutch youngsters from similar backgrounds in the 1850s, were both discontinued because the youths in question too often failed to maintain the racial order that white colonial society thought appropriate.[34] It was not prosperous in comparison to other settler colonies, but it was beginning to develop as the colony had slowly built up its exports, in particular of wool from the Eastern Cape, to give it a certain sufficiency. This was also the case in the Orange Free State, which in 1868 finally defeated the Basotho, to guarantee the safety of its borders. In Natal, both maize and sugar became prominent crops. The Transvaal, in contrast, was still rough frontier country, except in parts of the South, around Pretoria and Rustenburg.

How these various polities would have developed without a radical break in the course of events is a fascinating but entirely unanswerable question. From 1869 onwards, the economies and societies of Southern Africa were turned inside out by the discovery, first, of the diamondiferous pipes around what came to be called Kimberley. These were the first places to be discovered where diamonds had been formed, and the mines were thus very rich. Secondly, from 1886, in the South of the Transvaal, the range of hills known as the Witwatersrand was shown to contain what seemed like inexhaustible quantities of gold, if at a low level of concentration. The growth of urban centres around these mines gave a new impetus to the development of settler society.

Within about two years of the discovery of the diamond fields, there were approximately 50,000 men around the diggings, of whom perhaps 20,000 were white. A majority were probably longer residents of Southern Africa, or had been born there, as the depression which had hit the Cape during the late 1860s meant that many were prepared to risk an adventure in what was seen as a potential bonanza. There were also a fair number of immigrants, most notably from the mining communities of Cornwall and Cumberland. It was not a stable population. By 1874 the population had been reduced by two-thirds, as the difficulties of mining in a geological situation that was previously unknown and the effects on the diamond price of the massive production of the four mines around Kimberley restricted the profitability of the mining operations. In the course of time, two matters became evident. First, the restricted area of the diamond pipes could only be worked through the amalgamation of the various claims, each of which were just under 90 square meters. The pressure towards monopolisation of the diamond industry was very great. Secondly, from the point of view of the mine owners, it was proving far too easy for workers, both black and white, to smuggle stones out of the diggings, and sell them to so-called Illicit Diamond Buyers. To prevent this, mine owners demanded the right to search all their employees when they came off shift, a measure which met with considerable opposition, and significant strikes, but was nevertheless eventually driven through.

It was no coincidence that in the aftermath of the discovery of diamonds, the British attempted to reverse the policy of twenty years earlier and gain control over the whole of Southern Africa. The process would be known as Confederation. Perhaps driven by Natalian demand for labour, and also by the fear that the next mineral bonanza would be out of the British sphere – the mines at Kimberley were a few hundred yards from the border with the Orange Free State, and even this was only after a complicated process to locate the border in such a way as to favour the British – this was a three-pronged strategy. First, there were long negotiations with colonial politicians in the Cape and Natal to ensure sufficient backing from this quarter. Secondly, in 1877 British forces – initially twenty-five members of the Natal police – took over the South African Republic, which was at this stage a barely functioning state with scarcely any money in the treasury. Thirdly, the British launched what has been described as the First British War for South African Unification.[35] This entailed reeling in those African kingdoms which were still independent. The amaXhosa in the Eastern Cape had suffered most from colonial aggression, in a long succession of wars back to the late eighteenth century, but their final submission was only enforced after

1878. The last major war in the region led to the smashing of the Xhosa kingdom and the general acceptance by the amaXhosa of the need to "fire with your pen."[36] Similarly, in the North, the Pedi Kingdom had survived various attacks by the South African Republic, but succumbed to the British army, whose logistic capacity was always going to be decisive.[37]

The most renowned of these conflicts was that which led to the conquest of the Zulu kingdom. Almost certainly erroneously, the British believed that Cetewayo, the Zulu King, was behind the widespread resistance to British rule. They therefore engineered a crisis to justify their invasion. As elsewhere, the British army proved too strong for even the most powerful of the African kingdoms, but only after it had suffered one of its most iconic defeats, at the Battle of Isandlwana (1879).

The most successful resistance to colonial rule, however, came from the mountain kingdom of Lesotho. In 1868, after Sotho defeat at the hands of the Orange Free State, the British had again annexed Lesotho, this time to the Cape Colony. However, the Basotho were not prepared to accept Cape Government interference, in particular when it attempted to disarm them of the guns that they had purchased on the Diamond Fields. The Cape was unable to assert its authority against the Sotho mounted musketeers, with the result that the Kingdom's status within the Empire had to be changed. It was no longer a part of the Cape Colony; instead it became a protectorate of the Crown, on the basis of which it remained independent of South Africa.

In the end, though, British unifying policy failed in the Transvaal. Afrikaner society in the South African Republic was steadily increasing its grip on the African societies of the area. Thereby they extracted more wealth through the imposition of forced labour and the continued exploitation of those who were captured from African groups on the edge of white settlement. These were known as *inboekelinge*, and were theoretically free from the age of twenty-one, but nevertheless they remained largely under white control.[38] At the same time, the privileged access which those who held office within the South African Republic had to such black labour, and also to land, steadily increased the level of stratification within white society. More and more young men were unable to find farms on their own, and were forced to live as *bywoners* (quasi-tenants) on the farms of the rich. These farms were dominated by the man seen as the "patriarch", in a conscious attempt to mirror the lives of the Biblical Israelites.[39] Women came to take on the role of "volksmoeder", theoretically subservient to her husband, but central to the success of the household. In such a structure, there was the opportunity for the young men to hunt. Indeed, it was probably their main contribution to the survival of the household, particularly as there was an aversion to sustained physical labour, which was seen as purely for the Africans. As a result, many were very good shots, and all could ride and had considerable field skills. They made most efficient soldiers, if not necessarily disciplined ones, and had proved their worth in the various campaigns to subdue, and to raid, the African groups in the north of the Republic, although it left to the British army to smash the major independent kingdom, that of the Bapedi.

The British force may have taken over the South African Republic, but this did not mean that they could hold it. The white population of the Transvaal did not easily accept the loss of their independence. Harangued by the then Deputy President, Paul Kruger, a member of the strict *Gereformeerde Kerk*, and a fervent pleader for the survival of the Afrikaner people, which could only be guaranteed by political independence, and encouraged by the Afrikaner womenfolk, by 1880, the men were brought together to expel the British by force of arms. Most crucially, at Majuba hill, just below the passes up from Natal, a British column under General George Pomeroy Colley, was surrounded and wiped out. The British administration in Pretoria was under siege, and forced out. No doubt, if the British had decided to commit the full force of their imperial armies, they could have regained control of the Transvaal. However, a change of Government in Britain brought W.E.G. Gladstone into power as Prime Minister, and he saw no reason to waste

British lives and money on avenging Majuba. Rather, the return of the independence of the South African Republic, and the continued independence of the Orange Free State, was negotiated.[40]

The conflicts between the British and the northern Republics, first with the Orange Free State over the control of the Diamond Fields and Lesotho, and later around the annexation of the Transvaal, strengthened the feeling which the Dutch speakers in the Cape had that they were a separate group, distinct from the Anglophones and too often looked down on by them. This did not lead to ruptures in the Colony, because the calculations which the Cape Dutch had made in the 1840s proved correct. They could dominate the Representative Assembly, even though when Responsible Government was introduced in 1872, the ministers were predominantly English. Even Cecil Rhodes, who had emerged as the victor in the struggles to monopolise diamond production and who was a fervent English nationalist, had to work with the Afrikaner Bond, the loose party of the Dutch, led by "Onze" Jan Hofmeyr, in order to control the Cape Parliament. But a feeling of common ethnicity, though not nationalism, was emerging. It focussed first on the church, with the denominations ranging from the strict *Nederduitsch Gereformeerde Kerk*, in which the proponents of a more liberal theology had been defeated in the 1860s, to the very strict *Gereformeerde* or Dopper churches. Secondly, there were matters of language. What the South Africans call High Dutch was increasingly only a school language, with the mass of the population speaking a creolised version at home. This had developed in the mouths of slaves, Khoekhoe and other non-native speakers, but the simplified version which came to be known as Afrikaans had spread up the social ladder and in the 1870s the first beginnings of a movement to use the *landstaal* as a written language were developing. By this time, of course, a number of distinct Afrikaans dialects had developed, and it would be well into the twentieth century before the version spoken from the Eastern Cape to the Transvaal would be propagated as "correct" Afrikaans.[41]

The consequences of the failure of confederation policy and of the resuscitation of the South African Republic became much more evident when, in 1886, gold was discovered in the Witwatersrand. A dozen years later, the region produced over a quarter of the world's gold, and Johannesburg was a city with around 100,000 inhabitants, many of whom were of course African labourers on short term contracts. Some 75,000 Britons migrated to the region, as did many others from across Europe, and indeed North America. Many moved on to other regions, notably Australia, during periods of economic depression. There had been a significant number of Jews in the country before 1880, perhaps 4000 in all, mainly as small traders and peddlers. A generation later, there were about 40,000, the main increase having come from Lithuania. Equally, men and women from all parts of Southern Africa converged on Johannesburg, for longer or shorter periods. They worked not merely as miners, but in the whole range of service industries which went to keep the mining community thriving, including transport, distilling and prostitution. The city came to be dominated by the mega-rich "Randlords", who owned the mines and whose power derived as much from their connections to the financial markets of Europe as from their presence in South Africa. Nevertheless, they and their engineers and mining experts were responsible for the shift to deep level mining, and the introduction of new techniques for blasting and extracting the gold from the ore, without which the industry would have quickly collapsed. Thus, in a remarkable reversal of fortune, what was once on the fringes of colonial society had become its economic heartland.[42]

The results of this economic transformation were to be seen across the sub-continent. The emergence of such a large urban population vastly increased the demand for foodstuffs and, at least until the railways reached the Witwatersrand in the early 1890s, for ox-wagon transport. It was not all good news. In the Transvaal, the steady commercialisation of agriculture increased the incomes of the landowners, but put extra pressure on their *bywoners*, many of whom ended up

as labourers in Johannesburg. Levels of solidarity within the settler population declined, as the degree of economic stratification within the society increased.

The arrival of so many foreigners in and around Johannesburg obviously unbalanced the existing political structure of the South African Republic. Some of them, known as Kruger's Hollanders, were brought in from the Netherlands to bring a degree of professionalism to the administration of the state. In this they were joined by a number of well-educated young men from the Cape, and there were of course Afrikaners from all over Southern Africa who converged on the Witwatersrand in the hope of finding lucrative employment. But by far the largest group on the Rand were those known as *uitlanders*, mainly British, and mainly employed in the mines. Two-thirds of them were unmarried males. They probably often saw themselves as temporary sojourners, for as long as the boom lasted, and had no desire to renounce their original citizenship for that of the South African Republic. Nevertheless, *uitlander* grievances against a state which they felt drove up the cost of living to the benefit of the Afrikaners and refused to allow the newcomers any say in government, could be exploited by those of the mine-owners who felt that the actions of the government were insufficiently attuned to the needs of capital. In particular, the existence of monopolies on the sale of dynamite, and to a degree on rail transport, which had been instituted to provide the State with an income, were much criticised. The result was an attempted coup d'etat. In 1895, a small force of horsemen, led by Leander Starr Jameson, a close associate of Cecil Rhodes, entered the Transvaal from Bechuanaland, intending to foment an uprising among the *uitlanders*. It was the sort of challenge that the Republican authorities could easily contain. Jameson and his fellows were quickly arrested, as were a number of co-conspirators in and around Johannesburg.

The Jameson raid, as this episode came to be known, was the most dramatic event in the process which led up to the final breakdown of relations between the British Government, spoiling for a fight, and the Afrikaner Republics. What had failed during the attempts to achieve South African Confederation was to be repeated, this time successfully, in what is generally known as the South African War – as if there was only one! – but which more accurately could be called the Second British War for South African Unification.

Notes

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25   This strategy is, to the best of my knowledge, nowhere spelt out, and may have been entirely tacit. If it was formulated in so many words, this was only in conversations, and never put on paper. The likelihood is that those conversations were held above all in the Masonic lodge De Goede Hoop, in Cape Town. See J. C. Visagie, 'Willem Fredrik Hertzog, 1792–1847', *Archives Yearbook for South African History*, 1974.

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32   See the essays in E. A. Eldredge and F. Morton, *Slavery in South Africa: Captive Labor on the Dutch Frontier*, Boulder, San Francisco and Oxford: Westview, 1994. Since slavery was illegal in British-controlled areas, the slaves so captured could not be traded south of the Vaal.

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14

FRENCH ALGERIA, 1830–1962

Sung Choi

Between 1830 and 1962, Algeria came under French colonial rule. Unlike other French colonies, Algeria was annexed and made officially a part of France in 1848. It became a settler colony almost immediately after the wars of conquest, which largely ended in 1847. The French claimed that its laws applied to all of Algeria, but the legal framework in fact privileged European rights over those of the majority Muslim population. Scholarship related to the complexities of France's ostensibly egalitarian legal taxonomy in Algeria has thus grown considerably in the past two decades. But literature on the material structure of Algeria's settler colonial system has remained relatively slim in comparison. This chapter shows that French jurisdiction in Algeria not only resulted in inequities in the regime of rights but that it also ensured that access to land and labor would remain asymmetrical between the European minority and Muslim Algerian majority.

At the time of the French conquest, Algeria or the Regency of Algiers was part of the Ottoman Empire, governed by the local landowning class of *beyliks.* The population was made up largely of Arabs or Berbers, to use the most generic categories, but there were other tribal communities dispersed throughout the provinces and the Sahara, including Khoulouglis, who were of mixed African and Turkman parentage, Tuaregs and M'zabs. Throughout the chapter, I will use the term Muslim Algerians or Algerians to designate the indigenous population as a whole even though, nominally, they were considered 'French' so that no references could be made to an Algeria outside the French framework. Most Algerians were affiliated with a variant of a Sunni Muslim sect. Living amongst these communities were some 10,000 Jews, with origins dating back to Antiquity. The ancestry of Algerian Jews was diverse and included Berber or Arab converts, Levantine and Mediterranean migrants and merchants, and Sephardic Jews who had fled the Inquisition starting in the sixteenth century. Some Jews arrived later from eastern Europe in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Algerian Jews at the time of conquest were Arabic-speaking and followed Arab customs as part of their rituals and daily life.

Eighty-four French ships, among the largest fleet since the Napoleonic Wars, readied for a seaborne invasion of the Ottoman Regency on 14 June 1830. The campaign was launched at the initiative of the Restoration monarch Charles X, who, along with the ultra royalists, hoped to silence the liberal and republican opposition and make gains in the upcoming parliamentary elections.[1] The invasion gained widespread popularity but had no clear objective other than to assert French supremacy. The invasion of 1830 was, as D.K. Fieldhouse explained, the 'initial foothold that escalated into a complete colonization'.[2] Just as the conquest got underway, a

liberal bourgeois uprising overthrew the Restoration government in France and founded the July Monarchy, helmed by Louis-Philippe, Duke of Orléans. The ruling family was only too glad to continue the Algerian conquest and saw in the campaigns opportunity to elevate its own dynastic splendor and French grandeur, as the work of Jennifer Sessions has recently shown. The campaigns of conquest raged on with fervor and brutality but were met with unexpected challenges from fierce Arab armies.[3] In 1834, French forces managed to take large parts of the littoral and declared the territories 'French'. In 1837, the Tafna Treaty was signed with the formidable Arab leader Abd'el Qadir, and France secured sovereignty over the northern territory demarcated as 'Algeria'. Although the Tafna Treaty promised Abd'el Qadir control of the interior in exchange, the treaty, like many others, proved to be a mere stopgap. After a decade of ferocious onslaught, the French seized all territories that were promised to the Arab leader. With the fall of Constantine in 1847, Algeria was configured into three administrative units, or departments, with equal status to the metropole.

As the endgame of conquest was to solidify French command over land, settlement was put forward by the government as a means to stabilize control in confiscated territories. In the thick of military conquest, the young Alexis de Tocqueville, serving as a member of a government commission, maintained that colonization should *precede* domination and *proceed* with war, as it provided a 'solid base for the operation of our armies'.[4] Tocqueville was not alone in stressing the need for civilian colonization over conquered territories. Colonization thus remained integral to the French state's imperial drive in Algeria. French Algeria would grow to become one of the largest and most powerful of European settler societies in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, reaching one million by the end of World War II in 1945.

The history of French Algeria exemplifies and at the same time complicates some of the tenets of current settler colonialism theory. In settler colonialism, foreign migrants arrive on colonized lands with the aim of permanently residing on the land and establishing a new polity. The ultimate goal of settlers is to replace the existing native society by eradicating its peoples and cultures. Settlers are therefore historically distinct from other colonial occupants, such as military and administrative personnel or commercial agents who do not of necessity take up permanent residence in the colony. With the aim of remaining in the colony for life, settlers challenge and even dispose of imperial authority. As Lorenzo Veracini writes, 'colonial and settler colonial forms actually operate in dialectical tension and in specific contradistinction'.[5] But the settler societies that have become prototypes and theoretical models are almost all 'pure' settler societies, as in North America and the Antipodes. These Anglo settler societies largely succeeded in decimating indigenous peoples by way of massacres, deadly pathogens and gradual biological assimilation. In the end, native peoples were unable to reproduce as distinct communities. The elimination of the native and the successful founding of settler nations have thus become key factors in identifying settler colonialism as a distinct historical form. It is not surprising then that most discussions around settler colonialism in journals and academic forums today engage the rights of first nations, displaced native cultures and struggles over land as legacies of this settler colonial past.

In Algeria, the native Muslim population remained resilient in their numbers throughout the colonial period, even with the setbacks of wars and massacres. The Algerian population even surged in the years that followed World War II. Sessions writes that 'Algerian military strength and disease resistance, European settlement patterns, and principled opposition in France combined to prevent the extermination of Algerians for which some colonization advocates called'.[6] The outcome was that white dominance did not prevail in numbers, and settlers were forced to depend on local labor. In that regard, Algeria came to resemble Southern Rhodesia and South Africa.[7] But unlike South Africa or Southern Rhodesia, French Algeria remained intimately tied to an imperial metropole as an integral administrative unit that derived its legitimacy from the metropole.

Having failed to fully extinguish the Muslim population or secede as an independent settler state, the French in Algeria were dependent on the metropole's juridical, military, and political backing. The failure to eliminate native populations did not necessarily indicate a lack of desire to attain this end, however, and the policies to restrict the rights of the majority remained intact throughout the colonial period. Conceptually speaking, the 'fantasizing' by the French about the elimination of the Muslim population placed it well 'within the global settlement movement of the mid-nineteenth century', as Jennifer Sessions writes.[8]

In their emphasis on white *majority* dominance, historians of settler colonialism have under-played the imbalance in numbers between the settler and native populations as a factor in the development of settler politics. In Algeria, however, demography remained a key structuring variable, since Europeans were and remained a dominant minority. French Algeria's entire history could arguably be conceived in terms of its demographic imbalance and the challenges this posed for maintaining dominance. The challenges had to do with more than numbers. The very legitimacy of sovereignty itself lay at stake. Although Algeria was made into a collection of French departments, the jurisdiction imposed on conquered lands in Algeria was not made coextensive with the jurisdiction over the inhabitants living on the territory. While all of Algeria was French, only Europeans were governed under 'common law', which granted full citizenship rights since 1848, while colonized subjects were relegated to a customary local jurisdiction that answered only indirectly to French authorities. These subjects were initially classified as *indigènes*, a category that had no legal definition or identity beyond what it was not: French national with full rights. And although *indigènes* could not benefit from French laws, they were nevertheless subject to French rules and governance if charged with crimes against Europeans.

Algeria's settler colonial history was thus marked by the tension between efforts to achieve consistency in the legal status of its inhabitants on the one hand and the need to maintain a clear hierarchy between French settlers and Muslim Algerians on the other. Tensions also ensued between officials in the metropole who, over time, tried to loosen the restrictions on the rights of native subjects and the intractable settlers who wished to sustain a bifurcated society. The following sections trace the historical development of a settler colonial system which claimed sovereignty and jurisdiction but was beset by a demographic challenge throughout its history. In Algeria, rather than the elimination of the native, it was the prohibition of native ascent to rights, economic as well as political, that became the organizing principle.

French conquest and the conversion of Algerian lands

Pre-colonial Algeria had its own administrative system and legal order through which tribal ownership of public and privately held lands were managed. Accurate censuses are lacking for the inhabitants of Algeria prior to the conquest, and even the best estimates can only relay approximate figures. Historians have surmised upwards of three to five million people in the Ottoman Regency of Algiers at the time of the French invasion.[9] During Algeria's Ottoman era, the greater part of the population was living in rural areas, with only about 5 to 6 per cent gathered in the cities along the coast. A rough 50 per cent of Algerian Muslims were cultivators, with 45 per cent leading a nomadic to semi-nomadic life.[10] Most were tied to large families, patriarchal in structure, common to many nomadic and seminomadic societies. Historian John Ruedy has identified three major categories of Algerian peasants prior to the French invasion: landless peasants, freeholders and those living around desert oases, where irrigation allowed for vegetation and cultivation of date palms or fruit trees. There were also sharecroppers or *khammès*, who might have had rights to a small fraction of the harvest but whose majority lived much like serfs, with very little if any entitlements to the land.[11] Within the interior and near the Sahara,

there were other semi-nomadic tribes, such as the Zmouls, Segnia, the Oulad Derradj, Ouled Sidi Aissa and Oulad Abdallah, Oulad Mokhta and Loulad Sidi Cheikh. In the Sahara were mainly nomads, such as the Oulad Nail.[12]

Land in Algeria was generally divided between those directly belonging to the *beys* and those with various titles, which were classified under Islamic Law according to the various rights of 'occupation, cultivation, right of usufruct, and right to transmit to male heirs, all of which were guaranteed to the tribesmen'.[13] If the conquest of Algeria failed to completely eliminate the Muslim population, the expropriation of land was still carried out in much the same spirit as other settler colonies. where native inhabitants were forcibly removed with treaties and extra-legal transactions intended to make room for colonists. For the French conquerors, land mattered first and foremost for what it represented: French imperial military glory. The French monarchy believed that its supremacy and power in Algeria could only come with actual territorial gains. In principle, only the public domains under the ownership of the routed *beyliks* could be rightfully transferred to the French state as legitimate military gain. This principle was often contorted, however, to serve French interests, so that even lands not really part of public domain were seized with the help of new laws. Although the seizure of privately owned lands was contested by liberals, who saw this as a violation of basic rights to property, the new French laws, with sleight of hand, 'sequestered' lands in the outlying regions of the *beyliks* into public domain 'dependencies' and made them eligible for occupation.[14]

As France began to establish ownership of conquered lands, it became necessary to formalize the procedures of land transactions through the 'proper' transfer and exchange of titles in recognition of France's victory and right to the spoils of land. The structure of land ownership in Ottoman Algiers was highly complex, however, and invading French forces were often at a loss as to how to identify the deeds and titles on the land that could verify its exact status. Frustrated by the difficulty of distinguishing between privately owned land and public domain, French administrators forcibly convened claimants to present their titles at certain times and places, whereby absences would result in the automatic conversion of 'unclaimed' lands into public domain liable to seizure.[15] The disarray caused by the lack of local documentation was compounded by aggressive speculation by European contingents who followed in the tracks of conquering armies during the 1830s to scavenge for land. The sudden rise in the number of speculators generated a land rush during the 1830s and 1840s, slowing down the transfer of lands for official colonization.[16] The French government tried to curtail speculation and encourage the transfer of arable plots to colonists for small-scale farming, an endeavor that only saw partial success.[17] In fits and spurts, early colonization projects got underway.

Fully conscious of the expansive Anglo (and partly Germanic) settler movements that swept into the Americas and the Antipodes during the nineteenth century, the French imagined their own brand of colonization, which would supersede the ignoble slave-owning plantations of previous centuries.[18] Like the nineteenth-century British colonies in Australia, Algeria, too, was at first proposed by some as a penal colony and an ideal repository for the undesirables in the metropole. But a growing voice in government advocated Algeria as a horizon of virtue and a source of rejuvenation in the post-emancipation age, as Sessions explains. Europeans would lead the revitalization of Algeria, supersede the planter-types that had once populated the Caribbean and displace the backward Muslim civilization that had long laid Algeria stagnant and unproductive. Thus, according to Sessions, conceptions of a virtuous Algerian colonization were construed as a response to abolition and the decline of Atlantic world slavery and a desire to establish a new colonial legitimacy after the Haitian revolution.[19] In carrying out colonization, the French also hoped to compensate for the social ills that attended industrialization by relying in principle on honest European labor. In this new type of colonial expansion, or what is often referred to as France's

second colonial empire, agricultural bounty and commercial activity were promoted as the fruits of expansion, while the virtuous yeoman farmer was presented as the diligent practitioner of a soon-to-blossom economic enterprise. With European investments in agriculture and industry, Algeria would become a node of global trade, with a compliant breed of virtuous cultivators and traders who would enrich the soil and radiate civilization from across the seas.

Culturally, the colonization in Algeria was imbued with moral as well as economic significance. The goal of the civilian settlement became the emulation of the French at home and the establishment of French power in the flesh. As Tocqueville put it, Algeria would ideally 'resemble us in everything'.[20] In replicating European civilization in all aspects of culture and economy, settlers would purportedly help displace the backward and stagnant ways of the Arabs. The conception of a virtuous settler transposing French civilization was accompanied by the idea that uncultivated lands were considered uninhabited, much like the concept of *terra nullius* that attended Anglo colonization in Ireland in the seventeenth century. Unplowed lands would no longer be considered property; they would be subject to French colonization.[21] Cultivation was therefore critical to validating colonization. In fact, the very term colonist or *colon* in the early decades of French occupation was a designation for farmers and tillers, so that colonization became synonymous with agrarian colonization.[22] Subsidies and concessions were given to those most willing to farm small plots, while speculators and large estate owners were only considered exempt from heavy fines and taxes if they committed to clearing land.

Although there was a general consensus in the metropole that the ideal colonist should be a farmer, just how to recruit the right candidates was not always evident, as Sessions notes. Not many farmers were willing to settle in Algeria. Besides, expansive road building and construction in Algeria resulted in the migration of 'road navvies, manual laborers, and rural stone, wood, and ironworkers' who sought not virtues and morals but instead better wages and financial opportunities.[23] According to Sessions, the French state continued to aid emigration with the hope of recruiting small farmers, but a large percentage of volunteers for emigration during these first decades of 'assisted emigration' turned out to be urban workers, especially from eastern France, where wages were in decline.[24] Emigration to Algeria grew steadily during the 1840s, and by 1850 the European population already surpassed 483,500, placing Algeria above Australia with respect to the number of settlers.[25] But Algeria drew migrants from the Mediterranean regions of Spain, Italy, Malta and Greece, among others. More than half of the colonists were from countries outside of France at this time. While Algeria was claimed French, its settler population was growing increasingly diverse in composition, a factor that led to metropolitan distrust of and disdain for their North African compatriots.

The draw of urbanization and the rise of a building industry in Algeria were not the only reasons behind the failure of making Algeria a colony of small independent farmers. Agriculture in Algeria was demanding and difficult, for obvious reasons of climatic variation and character of the soil. The difficulties were exacerbated by the inexperience amongst the emigrants and the ill-conceived planning by French officials. The agricultural economy begun by colonization in Algeria differed profoundly from the kind of riches once provided by the Caribbean plantations. The dominant crop in this new colony was not sugar or exotic goods but grain. European soft grains supplanted the rustic grains traditionally cultivated by the Algerian peasantry. But wheat that was cultivated in Europe at this time was not a crop conventionally grown on small farms. The average dimension for wheat fields in France well exceeded the average concessions of four to forty hectares allotted to individual families in Algeria. The blueprint for small villages thus proved counterproductive for wheat production.[26]

Several other factors compounded the challenges faced by small plot farmers. The rise in the trade of American and Asian grains on the global market adversely affected Algeria's exports,

even with its exclusive access to the metropolitan market.[27] In the end, many settlers sold off their plots to soliciting buyers and headed for the urban areas. Moreover, only the capital-rich large estates could sustain the risks of farming in such a dry climate. Financial reserves were critical to sustaining the wait time necessary for the kind of natural drainage and irrigation methods of *sous-solage* most commonly used for the Algerian soil and climate.[28] By the late nineteenth century, even as grain production recovered from the twenty-year-long depression, it was the larger estates that had become the predominant motor behind Algeria's rural economy. Contrary to the idyllic vision of small plot farmers, then, rural Algeria became the domain of an 'oligarchy of large estate owners' dependent on native farmhands.[29]

Along with grain farming in Algeria, viticulture was introduced in the 1880s. Algerians had been known to cultivate grapes, but with French colonization, viticulture expanded into a dominant monoculture, and a series of strong harvests allowed wine growers in Algeria to profit significantly in the late nineteenth century.[30] By 1911, by some accounts, wine production was the principal source of wealth in Algeria, valued at 44 per cent of the total European fortune in the colony.[31] The development of viticulture came with a stratified labor structure so that Europeans would make a better living than the native population. According to Shafir, Algeria developed the same kind of ethnicized hierarchy of labor in its viticulture as nineteenth-century Palestine, so that 'delicate vineyard work' such as grafting, requiring skilled labor, was given to Europeans, 'which always brought them better pay'.[32] Arab workers and other non-European migrant laborers were restricted to the unskilled tasks 'such as breaking the soil, hoeing, and deep plowing, or to seasonal work, such as harvesting the grapes'.[33]

As we will see in the next section, it was vital for Europeans to assert their legitimacy as a dominant minority. To do so, hierarchy was strictly maintained in labor. Colonial economies could not uphold the color-blind logic of capital, nor could they apply an equitable wage system if they wished to maintain a strict separation between the colonizer and the colonized. In his study of Bône, the most important city of Constantine, David Prochaska shows that the hierarchy found in agrarian labor extended to urban industries. Like other parts of Algeria, Bône's industries were often dependent on financial funding and investments from the metropole. In cities where nonagricultural industries burgeoned, the same kind of disparity between Europeans and the Muslim population could be found with regard to capital and ownership. Apart from the large industries such as mining, a variety of significantly smaller urban industries such as cork production, tiles, bricks and pottery were owned primarily by Europeans.[34] If the history of colonial Bône is any indication, Muslim entrepreneurship in the cities was limited at best to local eateries and small shops that sold mainly foodstuffs and daily necessities.[35] In these businesses, capital was negligible. Let us now turn to a different question: How did the economic and political inequities between these two groups translate into the everyday practice of sovereignty in Algeria?

Legal and political binarism in French Algeria

The wars of conquest and the political annexation of Algeria in 1848 did not fully end the process of land expropriation. In the 1860s, systematic efforts were underway to assimilate remaining lands inhabited by Arabs under the French land tenure system. The Sénatus-consultes of 1863 and 1865 were the byproducts of this era. These two laws achieved more than land sequestration, which appeared as the main goal. They also set up new rules about the status of Muslim subjects and their relationship with France. The double-sided aspect of the laws, that is, the continued confiscation of land and the administration of legal identities for Muslim subjects is significant, for it spoke to the dual specificity of Algeria's settler colonialism – the assimilation of land and subjugation of peoples who inhabited the land. The 1863 Sénatus-consulte achieved a major step

in uprooting the Muslim population and detaching them politically and legally from the land. It did this by allowing communal lands previously regarded as indivisible to be fully absorbed under French tenure laws. As historian Patricia Lorcin rightly contends, systematic sequestration began in earnest with the 1863 Sénatus-consulte.[36]

The 1865 Sénatus-consulte, on the other hand, allowed those classified as *indigènes* the eligibility to apply for French civil status on the condition that they renounce their adhesion to religious customs, Qur'anic and otherwise. That is, they were forced to pay allegiance to the French Civil Code if they wished to obtain meaningful legal status and rights. Few complied. According to the 1865 Sénatus-consulte, 'Muslim or Jewish *indigènes* who wish[ed] to possess the rights of French citizenship . . . could submit a request and declare that [they] are willing to be governed by the civil and political laws of France'.[37] Todd Shepard explains this 1865 law as an 'assimilationist' measure which effectively expanded the purview of French jurisdiction by co-opting local customs and Islamic practices related to marriage, divorce and inheritance under French jurisdiction.[38] The law then made congruent the exercise of full citizenship rights on the one hand and the allegiance to France's Civil Code on the other in Algeria.[39] As Laure Blévis has explained, for the colonized, once naturalized, their citizenship entailed the 'paradoxical submission to a set of [French] civil and political laws'.[40]

The 1863 and 1865 Sénatus-consultes radically disassociated Muslim subjects from lands they once inhabited as part of tribal communities, and that were now placed under French jurisdiction. The Sénatus-consulte was therefore a law that allowed ever more land to be confiscated at the same time it softened the barrier that divided the two jurisdictions. Through this process, however, Muslim subjects became increasingly alienated from the land. The Sénatus-consultes were in fact part of the broader policy of *regroupement* (pooling or gathering), a long-term strategy to manage the relationship that Algerians could have with land. As Pierre Bourdieu and Abdelmalek Sayad have explained, civil servants charged with applying the Sénatus-consulte and the officials responsible for regroupement all drew from the same set of laws and regulations to carry out their functions.[41] The general process of regroupement involved first the drawing up of tribal territories then redistributing these newly sliced parcels to the different *douars* or villages of each tribe. These territorial units would include individual holdings and common lands.[42] With the passing of the Sénatus-consulte, Jérôme Napoléon, Minister of Algeria and the Colonies, declared that the idea was to 'expunge the foundations of social organizations. The tribe must disintegrate in order to become assimilated into our organization [. . .]. It is the means, the only means at our disposal to undermine tribal cohesion and to divest it of all political functions, to substitute it with our own municipal order'.[43] The view was held widely as a maxim.

If the Sénatus-consultes began the sequestration of lands in earnest, laws devised during the 1870s under the Third Republic accelerated the process, this time with the forceful intervention of the settlers. With the founding of the Third Republic in 1871, colonist representatives came to wield considerable influence in the Chamber of Deputies. Most had supported the 1848 Second Republic and its official policies of colonization and were thus given broader representation under the new Republic. Settlers from Algeria held six seats altogether in the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies. The settlers had contested the 1865 Sénatus-consulte's granting of rights to Muslims, and in 1873 they lobbied successfully to pass the eponymous Warnier Law, named for the leader of the colonist parliamentary delegation. This law was meant to address the disaffected settlers who had opposed granting to Muslims the right to apply for citizenship by the 1865 Sénatus-consulte. The 1873 Warnier Law redefined the terms of land ownership so that individual families were made the unit of title-bearers and not the traditionally designated tribal leaders. Enormous tracts of land were thus converted into individual property holdings for sale and transfer into settler hands.

In some respects, the Warnier Law, along with the 1865 Sénatus-consulte before it, was not unlike the Dawes Act passed by the United States Congress in 1887, which divided and redistributed allotments to Indian property holders while imposing a sedentary life based on agriculture. The law thus made property owners out of Indians, who were consequently forced to answer to US laws. As an assimilation policy, the Dawes Act made the traditional social ties and ties to the land among Indians weak, even obsolete in some cases. Historian John Ruedy argues that the Warnier Law 'began a process of gallicization of property by subjecting all transactions between Europeans and Muslims to French law, as well as transactions between natives when these took place on lands previously subjected to sequestration or to the inventory of the Sénatus-consulte'.[44] For Ruedy, the Warnier Law precipitated the 'destructuration' of Algerian society. Muslim proprietors and co-proprietors of common lands were forced into transactions under threat of arbitrary confiscation or complete deprivation of what little rights remained to access land. Lands cultivated by Muslim Algerians were thus significantly reduced from 2.5 million hectares to 1,967,955 by the first decade of the twentieth century.[45]

If the Warnier Law resulted in the destructuration of Algerian society, other laws were devised to further the isolation of the Muslim population. In 1870, the Crémieux Decree was passed to make all Algerian Jews north of the Sahara French citizens overnight. The decree was named for Adolphe Crémieux, former Minister of the Seal and head of the French Consistoire, the state's lay organization for Jews. Crémieux spearheaded the movement to naturalize Jews in French Algeria and lift them out of the *indigène* category. The naturalization of Jews did more than ascribe *israélites* automatic French civil status and citizenship rights. It solidified the notion that being French meant being a *non-Muslim*. Jews could now inherit French civil status by birth. This in turn hardened the idea that being Muslim and *indigène* was a matter of heredity and parentage. The extra-legal status of the *indigène* and the ethno-cultural identity of being Muslim were implied as being one and the same.

As Blévis points out, the legal categories of *indigène* and *citoyen* in Algeria were euphemisms for the colonized and the colonizer. The legal categories were, as Blévis argues, coded language used by jurists who saw the colony in terms of 'us and them'.[46] Turning back to the 1870 Crémieux Decree, French jurists faced a conundrum with regard to lifting Jews out of the *indigène* category and classifying them automatically as citizens. By law, naturalization should mean the procedure of taking up one nationality and giving up another. But the only identity Jews had held prior to 1870 was *indigène*, an *extra-legal* category with no positive rights that was not really a nationality. *Indigène* was 'a nationality that was unnamable'.[47] The term *indigène* had emerged with the conquest to refer to those born on Algerian soil prior to its becoming French. The solution to this predicament in French law was to convert Muslims into 'French subjects', and deny them any affiliation with the term Algeria or Algerian. All references to Muslim subjects as 'Algerians' were thus effaced, thereby making it all but impossible to claim a collective identity other than that of being French. Muslim subjects were officially recognized only in relation to French power. French laws meanwhile transcribed the realities of expropriation and exclusion into more tempered language about acquiring citizenship rights and becoming French.

With the end of World War II, France reaffirmed Algeria's integral place in Greater France and granted Muslims the right to apply for citizenship without having to renounce their affiliation with Islam. Settlers saw this as yet another attempt by the metropole to undermine the established social order in Algeria. But the contribution of colonial subjects during World War II made it impossible to ignore the growing demands for more rights amongst Algerians. To continue the exclusion of Muslim subjects, however, legal impediments were set in place to make the acquisition of citizenship highly challenging. Despite the removal of certain restrictions regarding naturalization, political representation between the two populations was left unequal. The 1946

French Union, an entity inaugurated by the Fourth Republic, finally erased the status of *indigène*. But France maintained a dual electoral college in Algeria so that the participation of the majority Muslim population in politics would remain disproportionately low. In the elections of 1946, over 500,000 European and naturalized Muslim citizens voted in the first college, while more than 1,600,800 Muslims of 'local statute', or unnaturalized subjects, voted in the second college. The representation was evidently unequal, as each college elected fifteen members to the National Assembly. The dual electoral college was sustained until 1958, when Fifth Republic leader Charles de Gaulle declared all Algerians French citizens.

Historians have become uncomfortable lately with binary analyses of colonial systems, as Patrick Wolfe has noted, favoring instead notions of hybrid or liminal histories that challenge and defy the logic of categories.[48] This trans-categorical approach no doubt has its merits, for it cautions historians to distinguish between categories used by historical actors and categories of analysis in scholarly work. There were indeed Algerian notables and upper classmen such as the qa'ids, bachaghas or shaykhs who owned land and served the colonial administration. Their adhesion to French power placed them alongside the settlers and concomitantly in a distinct category from the majority Muslim population. Their histories thus defy attempts to see the settler relationship only in binary terms. In a similar vein, impoverished European colons could be seen sharing in the misery experienced by the vast majority of Muslim Algerians. But under French jurisdiction, there was still a stable binarism between colonizer and colonized that persisted through a deterministic framework that divided the European and Muslim populations according to their ethno-cultural affiliation. Todd Shepard's *The Invention of Decolonization*, meanwhile, has recently challenged claims that race was determinate to institutionalizing the understanding of 'individual, universal rights, and democracy'. Unlike the exclusion of women in 1789, Shepard explains that no 'widely embraced principle' existed 'to explain the situation of dramatic inequality in Algeria'.[49] Muslim Algerians were given rights equal to the French when they were on metropolitan soil after 1947, for example, and retain their local civil status. The Algerian War changed the way race played a role in post-1789 understandings of who could be a French citizen. Shepard refers to the 1958 Constitution of the Fifth Republic, which stated that all French nationals, including Muslim Algerians, were 'full citizens who could maintain their civil status in Algeria as well as in the metropole'.[50] Shepard is correct to point out the complexities of the Muslim Algerian affiliation with France from a legal perspective and to make the important argument that such institutional practices spoke volumes about France's own understanding of nationhood. But the debate is not really about whether race played a determinate role in structuring inequalities. It is one between analytic registers. Race or ethno-cultural affiliation can still be held up as valid concepts to analyze how difference was understood and practiced in French Algeria and in the metropole. At the same time, it is important to recognize that, from the perspective of French nation-building practices, such 'organic' categories of race and ethnicity were absent and that universalist principles still intervened to shape the legal institutionalization of difference. Binarism itself cannot be a totalizing analytic framework, but it is still valid in describing the outlook of contemporaries, either colonizing or colonized. Whether Muslims had full French rights or not, the persistent discrimination against Muslim Algerians showed that their actual legal status did not always entail corresponding understandings of their national belonging.

The history of Jews in Algeria might be raised up as a particular example of the kind of complexities that elude a binary perspective. As Joshua Schreier has noted, Jews in Algeria fell on both sides of the divide as colonizer *and* colonized.[51] Although rejected by Europeans and subjected to virulent anti-Semitism, they nevertheless possessed rights that were denied to Muslim subjects since 1870. Mainly Jews had urban origins and held occupations that were not tied to land ownership. They made up a large portion of the commercial class and, in the

twentieth century, engaged in professional work in the cities owing largely to the access they had to French education. Their French citizenship was, however, revoked during the Vichy period in Algeria and only restored with the help of international Jewish organizations after World War II. Historians have yet to discuss the distinction between the fate of the Algerian Jews and that of Muslims in terms of the Jewish relationship to the land. Jewish communities were not organized as tribal communities and did not have the same extensive attachment to the land as the Muslim Algerians. The fate of Jews was also tied to republican politics in the metropole. Elite lay Jewish leaders in Paris insisted on streamlining the status of Jews across all sovereign territories. In that sense, the naturalization of Jews validated both sovereign control in Algeria and a split jurisdiction whose ultimate aim was to alienate Muslim Algerians and remove their connection to the land.

Settler identities, fears and memories of French Algeria

The self-understanding of the French in Algeria emerged with metropole-driven assertions about the supremacy of European civilization and the backwardness of Arab and Islamic cultures. Settlers filtered this perception through the legal binary of French and non-French *indigènes*. The confidence of a dominant minority was offset, however, by intermittent reprisals by Muslim communities. The memory of the great 1871 Kabyle insurrection involving 250 tribes, over 150,000 insurgents, for example, continued to unnerve settler towns in Constantine well into the twentieth century, even though French suppression was brutal, with large gains for the European community and forced extraction of reparations from the rebels.[52] The fact that over 2,000 settlers were killed further vindicated settler anxieties about Muslim violence and inclination toward insurgency. As Martin Evans has recently written, settler identity in Algeria was a merger of feelings of inferiority vis-à-vis the metropole and a siege mentality with regard to the Muslim population.[53] The French in Algeria also embraced anti-Semitism in its extreme form. Political parties built their platform specifically on anti-Jewish propaganda, the most infamous being the Union latine party. The Europeans also promoted an autonomous Latin culture and identity that distinguished them from the *francaoui*, the French of the metropole. This so-called *algérianité* was more than cultural, as it featured in political platforms against metropolitan initiatives to increase Muslim participation in politics.[54] Settler rejection of metropole intervention and *algérianité* reached its apogee during the mid-1930s when Algeria's right-wing constituency repudiated the notion of Greater France and espoused a settler nationalism grounded in the permanent suppression of rights for Jews and Muslims.

As noted in the opening of this chapter, demography was a determinant factor in the decline of settler confidence and the inverse rise of Algerian nationalism after World War II. As Georges Balandier observed, it was the whites in South Africa who were beginning to view their situation as a 'minority problem' in the 1950s, one that saw the cause behind their declining dominance not just in numerical terms but as economically and culturally derived.[55] The same fears pervaded Algeria during the years leading up to the Algerian War of Independence. In 1953, one year prior to the outbreak of the war, the Governor General's Cabinet office commissioned reports by local administrators throughout Algeria on the morale of the local Muslim population. The report reflected settler perceptions of a world in which provocation against Europeans appeared to loom as an incessant threat. One of the anti-colonial reformist movements that had gained traction among Muslim Algerians was the AUMA (Association of Algerian Muslim Ulema), an organization of Islamic scholars who promoted the idea of returning Algeria to its roots in Islam and Arabic. The report revealed the siege mentality and anxieties among settlers with regard to their influence: 'no sooner do the Ulema reformers make contact in the douars than relations automatically chill over between the masses and the

[French] administration. . . . Faithful to the notion of theocracy, the Ulemas try to organize society outside the bounds of French laws, leaving people to turn inward, ultimately to Islam to reject flat out all French influences'.[56] 'The European has the feeling that he is surrounded by a hostile and subversive Ulema network', another respondent wrote. 'Their influence ceaselessly expands – they are the true threat to French sovereignty in Algeria. Their aim is to cultivate a specific kind of Muslim, who will look down on all that is not Islamic'.[57] The Ulema were just one among multiple anti-colonial movements whose presence was keenly felt by settlers in the years between World War II and the Algerian War.

The Algerian War of Independence erupted on 1 November 1954. The main protagonists of the FLN (National Liberation Front) had origins in the rural hinterlands, where poverty and destitution amongst the Muslim rural proletariat had nourished anti-French resentments for decades. The FLN rejected all compromise with settlers and radicalized the anti-colonial movement by setting independence as the one and only goal. The French Fifth Republic's decision to negotiate Algeria's independence with the FLN stunned the settlers, who accused the government of consigning their birthright and homeland. Many lamented the destruction of the society they helped to build and sustain and the loss of the land they had revitalized. If, as Lorenzo Veracini explains, settler identity is characterized by disavowal and denial, then the French in Algeria, by their adamant refusals to acknowledge their own position as conquerors, accord with this conceptualization. Land confiscation was, as they argue, achieved prior to their becoming truly settled in Algeria. They explain their origins on the land as modest colonists tilling the soil or clearing the land to survive the harsh terrain and climate. They insist on a world where settlers and Muslims cohabitated, forgetting that communes were organized according to ethnic groups and that even those communes inhabited predominantly by Muslims were led by those hand-picked by French authorities.

Long after Algerian independence, the French in Algeria expressed a common theme of loss and forced expulsion from *their* land, an ironic endpoint to a history that began with the taking of land from the Algerians. Lyrics by the Jewish 'returnee' from Algeria, singer Enrico Macias, encapsulate the French settler identity after independence: 'the France of my childhood is not a territory of France . . . it is the France where I was born . . . the France of my childhood is a country, a land that bordered the Mediterranean; it is the France where I was born. . . . We had the accent of a far off place, we lost [our land] like we did [Alsace] Lorraine. At school we learned about our differences but it was the same history as France . . . the France of my childhood, I cry again for its absence, [Algeria] was French, we do forget, it is the France where I was born'. In his songs, as in the writings of many former settlers, land and country were interchangeable terms and meanings.

Even in the accounts of the most moderate settlers who supported the rights of Muslim Algerians, the desire for independence was incomprehensible. Jean Pélégri (1920–2003) would write about his childhood in the olive groves, presenting a childhood free of crime and conflict which remained forever untainted in his memory. 'Unfortunately, colonialism went on *outside* our hidden holes, as another history [*un autre histoire*]. Colonialism rendered most unnatural the everyday relations [between people], and determined the politics, faith, and education of people, introducing segregation everywhere'.[58] Colonialism then was aberration, a deviation from the natural naiveté of youth, corrupting its protective shelter: 'I know that under the apparent and official history of Algeria, where injustice and colonial inequalities prevailed, there unfurled another history between Algerians and *pieds noirs* (a popular term for settlers in Algeria), where people interacted every day, a *subterranean* history, as real as the history that lay above it'.[59] Colonialism as an exploitive system remained extraneous to the settler's imaginary about the innocent and carefree life.

Marie Cardinal was another *returnee* from Algeria who made her name known with the award-winning novel *Les Mots pour le dire*, published in 1975. Cardinal also wrote a memoir, *To The Country of My Roots* [*Au pays de mes racines*], in which she writes about a visit to Algeria with her daughter after her divorce. 'Why did I return [to Algeria]?' she asked in the opening pages:

> It was not the houses I lived in that drew me back [to Algeria], nor the places from where the phantoms would reconstitute themselves, piercing my faintest memories to wander around in them. No, it was something that came from the land, the sky, and the sea, which made me want to go--something, which for me could only be found in the precious locales of the terrestrial world. I am actually *incapable of imagining it.*[60]
>
> To live anywhere else but *there* changed for me the meaning of the phrase, *to live.* To live elsewhere has become synonymous with slaving away, organizing my life, structuring my life, with planning my life. *Over there*, to live was to live; it was to indulge in the habitual movements of humanity without suffering, without complaining or rejoicing, but to simply accept things as they were. Since I left Algeria, there were no longer such instances where I was in perfect harmony with the world, free of constraints.[61]

For these former settlers, more than the concrete experiences and material objects they had owned, it was land in the abstract that they resort to as the most important physical and psychological connection with French Algeria. What they remember was the physiology of settler life, the natural environment of the colony that had enabled their existence, but never at anyone's expense. The identity of settlers who could only look back at the settler colony with fear, regret and sadness differs from the identity of those who became the dominant majority, confident and possessive, justified in all that became theirs to keep. What Pélégri, Cardinal and others had lost was their connection to the land that gave their existence political and legal validation as French nationals. What remains striking about their memories and accounts is the utter absence of any reference to the exclusion of the Muslim population as the driving principle of Algeria's settler colonialism.

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15

AMERICO LIBERIA AS A SETTLER SOCIETY

James Ciment

Liberia is an Ohio-sized country (roughly 111,000 square kilometers) with a population of about three million, situated on the coast of West Africa. If one pictures the continent as a pregnant woman's body, Liberia would sit atop her navel. A densely forested land with an equatorial climate (warm wet summers with slightly drier and hotter winters), it has one of the highest rainfall averages of any country on Earth. Plains on the coast give way to low hills in the immediate interior, divided by several river valleys, and up to 1,700 meter-high peaks in the deep interior, near the country's border with Guinea. Its other land borders are with Sierra Leone to the northwest and Ivory Coast to the east; the country also has an approximately 360-mile long Atlantic coastline.

Liberia as a nation-state dates to the mid-nineteenth century, making it Africa's oldest republic, as well as the world's second oldest black-led republic, after Haiti. Its founders were free blacks and emancipated slaves from North America, primarily the slave states of the Upper South and Middle Border. For all of its history, colonizers and their descendants have represented but a small percentage (about 2 to 3 per cent) of the country's total population. Aside from Hawaii, which, of course, became part of the Union in 1959, it is America's only overseas settler colony, though, as will be discussed, it was never formally a territory of the United States.

Liberia was first settled from outside Africa in the early 1820s, under the aegis of the American Colonization Society (ACS), a white-led philanthropic enterprise founded in 1816. In the first decade of colonization, most of the settlers were free blacks from the Upper South and North, many of them mulattoes, or persons of mixed-race backgrounds. Later, most of the ships dispatched by the ACS were filled with recently emancipated black slaves, largely from the Chesapeake region of Virginia and Maryland, but some from the Deep South as well.

Never formally a colony of the United States, Liberia was governed by the ACS board in Washington, through its agents in the local administrative center of Monrovia, from 1822, when the first colonists landed, until 1847, when the country declared its independence from the ACS, though with gradually increasing autonomy and self-rule from the mid-1820s onward.

Upon winning its independence, Liberia was ruled by the settlers and their descendants, though their authority rarely extended beyond the narrow bands of colonial settlements along the coast and up the St. Paul, the country's main river valley, upstream from Monrovia, the main city and capital. Much of the country's territory remained under effective tribal rule into the early twentieth century. Still, a significant portion of the native population came under the rule

of the national government and the settlers – who formally referred to themselves as Americo-Liberians, or Americoes, for short – from the beginning.

While Liberia's social structure was long divided into these two essential components – settler and native – each group had within it several subsets; there was also overlap between the two. Natives were divided into more than a dozen tribes, though these basically broke down into two large subsets of their own – Mel- and Mande-speaking peoples who exhibited a more hierarchical political structure and the less hierarchical Kwa-speaking peoples. The settlers, in turn, were divided by class, previous status of servitude in the United States and skin color, with former free blacks and mulattoes generally enjoying a higher social status and, until the late nineteenth century, a preponderance of influence within the government.

The overlap of natives and settlers was formed in two ways. Liberia not only served as a colony for former slaves and free blacks from the United States but also as a repository for Africans destined for slavery in the United States but set free by the US Navy. The American government had banned the import of slaves in 1808. These so-called recaptives or congoes – though they came from various parts of Africa – generally settled in and around settler colonies and came to identify themselves with the Americoes. (Later, the term 'congoes' would become commonplace shorthand for all settlers, applied first pejoratively by natives and ultimately in a neutral fashion by natives and Americoes alike.) The other major overlap group consisted of 'civilized' natives, those tribal persons who came to live in the settlements and adopted Americo customs, language and culture, many of them adopted as children into settler families or, increasingly from the early twentieth century onward, marrying into settler families. Today, most Liberians who consider themselves descendants of the original settlers have native peoples in their ancestry lines.

But for the first century and a half of Liberia's existence (through both the colonial and national periods) the tiny settler minority – albeit with a handful of 'civilized natives' – maintained a monopoly on political power and controlled most of the country's economic resources, such as they were. For most of Liberia's history, the country was desperately poor and usually deeply indebted to foreign creditors. Nevertheless, the Americoes tried to keep up the appearances of belonging – socially and culturally – to the broader trans-Atlantic and Anglo-Saxon worlds, from the evangelical Christianity of their churches to a formal style of dress.

As noted, much of the hinterland remained beyond the control of the Americoes, who were stymied by climate and forest and forced to fight numerous wars with native tribes. This lack of control gave neighboring British and French colonizers the excuse to grab large chunks of the republic in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (roughly two-thirds of the territory Liberia originally claimed was lost in this way). Nevertheless, Liberians proved themselves diplomatically astute, warding off repeated racist European efforts to establish a mandate over the country. And by World War II, they had extended administrative control over virtually all of its territory.

The immediate post-war era was marked by economic boom, fueled by the Western world's insatiable appetite for the country's rich iron ore deposits and plantation-produced rubber. Ruled through the period by President William Tubman, an autocrat in all but name, the Liberian government extended citizenship to natives and built schools and roads across the republic. But when the post-war boom ended in the 1970s, the government found itself unable to meet the aspirations of newly educated natives, mixed-heritage persons and poorer Americoes.

This led to unrest and, in 1980, a brutal coup by native troops under Master-Sergeant Samuel Doe. At first inviting in reformist intellectuals and promising a new, more democratic era in Liberian history, the new regime proved corrupt and repressive, ultimately triggering a civil war in 1989 which engulfed the country on and off until the early 2000s, resulting in the deaths of more than 100,000 persons and the displacement of hundreds of thousands more. In 2006, Liberia

achieved a degree of stability and good governance under the leadership of Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, the first elected female head of state in African history. But the war, which sent much of the country's elite into exile, put the final nail in the coffin of a distinctive settler Americo-Liberian culture and caste.

Settlement

The origins of the first republic in Africa lay in the revolution that gave rise to the first republic in the Americas. A result of mass escape from slavery and humanitarian-inspired manumission, the free black population in the early United States grew explosively in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, triggering anxiety and even fear among the white population, particularly in the Upper South, home to the largest concentration of free black communities. Liberal-minded planters, such as Thomas Jefferson, grew concerned about the future viability of slavery in the region; they were convinced that blacks and whites could not – and should not – live together on equal civil, let alone social, terms. 'Among the Romans emancipation required but one effort', Jefferson wrote in *Notes on the State of Virginia*. 'The slave [usually of the same race] when made free, might mix with, without staining the blood of his master. But with us a second is necessary, unknown to history. When freed, he is to be removed beyond the reach of mixture'.[1]

Joined by evangelically inspired Northerners, liberal planters formed the American Colonization Society in 1816, with the goal of removing both the free black population and emancipated slaves to West Africa. Its membership included a who's who of capital elites, from Speaker of the House Henry Clay to Supreme Court Justice Bushrod Washington, nephew of the country's 'founding father'. Chairing its founding meeting, Clay declared: 'Can there be a nobler cause, than that which, whilst it proposed to rid our country of a useless and pernicious, if not dangerous portion of its population [i.e. free blacks] contemplates the spreading of the arts of civilized life, and the possible redemption from ignorance of a benighted quarter of the globe!'[2] How 'a useless and pernicious' class of people on one side of the Atlantic would become the harbingers of 'civilized life' on the other, Clay never explained.

To the modern mind, the scheme seems, indeed, pernicious – amounting, essentially, to a form of ethnic cleansing – but also impractical. Where would the society get the ships and money to round up, transport and settle across the wide Atlantic more than 200,000 free blacks, let alone the nearly two million-strong slave population? The obvious source of funds, the federal government, turned down requests, saying America had no stomach for overseas colonies. Ultimately, Congress appropriated $100,000 to the effort but stipulated that it be used exclusively for the settlement of contraband slaves seized by the US Navy on the high seas. For pushing this limited help, President James Monroe, an ACS member, was honored by having the chief settlement – Monrovia – named for him.

Daunting as the logistics were, the ACS faced an even greater hurdle. The vast majority of free blacks were opposed to the very idea of colonization. Most felt they had every right to residence in a country they helped build. Many had family and friends still shackled in slavery whom they did not want to abandon. Others felt a more general solidarity with their enslaved racial brethren. And most, having lived in America for generations, harbored the same perceptions as their white neighbors – of Africa as a 'land of burning sun, tortuous [sic] insects – poisonous exhalations, corrupted water . . . unwholesome food' and savage men.[3] At a meeting of some 3,000 free blacks in Philadelphia called to address the recent formation of the ACS, a vote was held on colonization. While the call for 'ayes' met with a hush, the 'nay' vote 'seemed', according to community leader James Forten, 'as it would bring down the walls of the building'.[4]

Still, there was a tiny minority willing to take their chances. Some were simply fed up with American racism; free blacks existed in civil limbo, neither slave nor citizen, and subject to abuse and discrimination in every aspect of their lives. Others sensed economic opportunity denied to them in the land of their birth. A few were motivated by the same evangelical fervor as many ACS members, to bring Christianity and 'civilization' to a benighted Africa. Later, the outbound ships would be filled mostly with slaves, recently emancipated on condition they leave the States, perhaps the most compelling impetus to go.

In the winter of 1820, the first contingent of about 80 settlers set sail from New York aboard the *Elizabeth*, whose status as Liberia's *Mayflower* is enshrined on the country's official seal. Liberia, of course, did not yet exist, and so the first settlers made for Sierra Leone, Britain's colony for its own free blacks. The colony was also a haven for the slaves confiscated in transit to the Americas after Britain outlawed the trans-Atlantic slave trade in 1807. Situated in a low-lying swamp and meeting with hostility from British officialdom, the colony foundered as settlers succumbed to tropical diseases, leading ACS officials and US government representatives to seek a place of their own elsewhere on the Windward Coast, as the region was known.

Cape Mesurado, about 200 miles to the southeast, was the obvious choice, as it had the only (relatively) safe anchorage in the vicinity. But native leaders proved reluctant to cede the land on and around the cape. Ultimately, an ACS official and a US Navy officer used political maneuvering, bribery and threat of force to win a land concession. In fact, the two sides did not even agree on what the concession meant. The local Africans, hearkening to long tradition, considered the settlers sojourners, guests on land that remained the possession of the native Dey people (a Kwa tribe) The negotiators from America and the settlers who followed saw the deal in Western terms, facilitating the formal transfer of sovereignty from local authorities to the ACS.

This differing conception of who now owned the land sparked two brutal battles after the first settlers arrived in January 1822, precisely two years after they had left America. Prevailing in both – better armaments and military discipline winning out over sheer numbers – the settlers won control of the peninsula and the immediate hinterland.[5]

Over the next quarter century, the settler colony slowly grew until, by the mid-1840s, it included some 20,000 colonists (as well as several thousand recaptured slaves from other parts of Africa). In fact, many more came, but the appalling death rate from malaria and yellow fever thinned the ranks substantially. The colonists established settlements on some 300 miles of coastline to the northwest and southeast of Monrovia, including one founded by the independent Maryland Colonization Society, and along the St. Paul River.

The settlers came from varied backgrounds. For the first decade or so, most were free blacks, some from the North but most from the Chesapeake region. Many of these men and women were mulattoes, some the offspring of planter-slave liaisons. A majority was literate, and many came with skills and modest capital. Some took to farming, but many decided that trade – exchanging products of the African forest for imported goods from Europe and America – was more lucrative. These merchants soon formed a small and inter-married elite in Monrovia, 'an aristocracy of means and education', a white visitor remarked.[6]

One avenue of commerce, however, was strictly shunned – the trade in slaves. Despite British and American bans on the international slave trade, local native leaders – armed and financed by white smugglers – continued the practice, an ancient African business expanded, distorted and brutalized since the 1500s by the trans-Atlantic slave trade. Indeed, many of the skirmishes with the natives in early Liberian history resulted from efforts by the fiercely anti-slavery settlers to shut down the trade, though issues of land, control of other forms of nonslave commerce, and colonial mistreatment and humiliation of natives played their parts as well.

In fact, native Africans had mixed attitudes towards the settlers who, though they looked like them, were so different in outlook, dress and lifestyle. They called them the 'black white men', though the Kwa word, 'kwi', meaning foreigner, was most often employed. Some saw them as a threat, others as an opportunity for (legitimate) trade and still others as people to emulate. Poor as the settlers were, they nevertheless possessed coveted Western goods. They also had useful artisan skills and literacy and seemed to be treated as equals by visiting whites. Thus, many natives – particularly higher ranking ones – sent their children to live with Americo families. The so-called ward system, which would endure into the late twentieth century, fused an Anglo-Saxon legal form with the African custom of establishing alliances through adoption and the survival strategy of North American slaves, who adopted children forcefully separated by masters from their biological parents.

Meanwhile, by the 1830s, a major shift had occurred in immigration patterns. The numbers of free blacks dwindled as reports of the appalling death rate in the colony filtered back to America and as abolitionist opposition to colonization intensified. Abolitionists in the United States, both black and white, not unreasonably viewed the removal of free blacks as a means to prop up the slave regime. In their place came larger numbers of manumitted slaves, as the revolutionary generation of planters began to die off with wills calling for the colonization of their slaves. Most of these new immigrants were illiterate, unskilled and lacking in capital. Poorer than the mulatto merchant class, many ended up as small tradesman and farmers and formed the majority of the population in the smaller settlements. They also tended to be darker-skinned, contributing to the perpetuation, thousands of miles from home, of long-standing tensions between blacks and mulattoes – class and race-based tensions that would nearly tear the republic apart after independence. 'There is Some that hav [sic] come to this place that have got rich', a manumitted slave wrote back to his former master in Virginia, 'and a number that are Sufering [sic]'.[7]

Road to independence

While not all supporters of the ACS were motivated by a desire to prop up the slave regime and rid America of its free black population – a few were genuinely convinced that African Americans were more likely to prosper once free from oppression – the white leadership of the ACS was deeply imbued with the racist attitudes of their day. ACS board members readily conceded that black people were capable of improvement but were still far from ready to receive self-government. Indeed, surrounded by African savages, they were likely to revert to barbarism. They needed white tutelage and guidance, perhaps for generations to come.

Not surprisingly, and from the very beginning, most settlers resented the authority of the ACS agents, some of whom acted benevolently and sought out colonist input on important matters while others ruled in a more authoritarian fashion. Still, they often had no choice but to accept that authority, as the agents controlled the supply of critical, life-sustaining supplies from America and retained the right to decide who got land and where.

Several factors contributed to the decline of ACS influence over the colony: a growing settler population, merchant wealth and power, and polarized sectional politics and abolitionist agitation back home, which dried up ACS donations and ultimately the amount of supplies the ACS was able to provide for Liberia and use as a cudgel for compliance to its authority. Increasingly pressured by settlers who believed their presence in Liberia endowed them with a sovereign capacity, an attitude particularly prevalent among the merchant class, the ACS agreed to a new constitution in 1839, establishing a colonial legislature, though the board in Washington retained a veto over its decisions. Two years later, upon the death of ACS agent Thomas Buchanan, cousin of future

President James Buchanan, the ACS did the previously unthinkable, reluctantly agreeing to make a settler, a wealthy mulatto merchant named Joseph Jenkins Roberts, its agent in Monrovia.

Now largely autonomous, settler Liberia faced a more existential question. What was it legally? Clearly, it was neither a tribal entity in the African tradition but nor was it a formal colony of a Western power. How could a philanthropic organization – the ACS – claim sovereignty? This had practical implications, as European merchants routinely flouted Monrovia's authority – establishing trading posts on territory it claimed, signing treaties with native leaders and refusing to pay taxes and custom duties. Liberia's merchant elite feared becoming economically boxed out of trade in their own backyard.

Tired of ACS condescension and threatened by outside powers, many Liberians – again, primarily the more economically well-heeled – began to agitate for independence. 'The people of Liberia have heretofore allowed the Colonization Society to act as their trustees and guardians', argued Beverly Wilson, one of the 11 founding fathers whose memory would be enshrined in the 11 red and white stripes on the Liberian flag, 'but that they have now become of age, and are determined to manage their own affairs on their own territory'.[8] In this effort, the patriot elites were resisted less by the ACS – which, financially struggling, was happy to rid itself of the obligation of supporting a colony thousands of miles across the Atlantic and focus on its core mission of sending settlers there – but by rank-and-file Liberians, who resented merchant power and saw the ACS as a countervailing force. Ultimately, the better-organized pro-independence faction, led by Roberts, who would become the country's first president, won out in an 1846 referendum. Thus, Liberia, like the country that gave it birth, was founded on causes both noble and venal – racial 'uplift' melded with economic opportunism.

And like America, its founding document – a combination of Declaration of Independence and Constitution – left out large segments of the population; indeed, in Liberia's case, the vast majority of the population – the native Africans. As the ringing words of its preamble declared: "*We, the people of the Republic of Liberia were originally inhabitants of the United States of North America . . . debarred by law all the rights and privileges of men. . . . In coming to the shores of Africa, we indulged the pleasing hope that we would be permitted to exercise and improve those faculties which impart to man his dignity* [. . . emphasis added].[9] It was an omission that would come to haunt the republic for the rest of its days.

Early republic

For a time, perhaps a decade or two, Liberia showed much promise economically, exporting significant quantities of coffee, palm oil and camwood (source of a natural red dye) to Europe and North America. The country even boasted its own small merchant marine. While many poor Americo-Liberians struggled economically, the ruling mercantile elite thrived, often maintaining homes in both Monrovia and on up-country plantations, where most of the field work was done by natives. Many of the well-off were mulattoes, but an increasing number were darker-skinned, though almost all came from the ranks of free black emigrants from the United States.

The merchant elite was a tightly interwoven one, with a small circle of families so intermarried that virtually every member of Liberia's upper reaches was in some way related to another. As in many settler societies, the social elites – with some success – tried to recreate the values, culture and society of the land they had left behind – in Liberia's case, that of middle and upper class antebellum America. Their town homes were built to resemble those of Richmond and Baltimore. Monrovia's main street looked like that of an American country town, extremely wide so that horse-drawn wagons could turn around in them. The irony was that Liberia was virtually devoid of draft animals, since most died of tropical diseases and parasites. Meanwhile,

up-country, elite manses were styled after – though smaller in scale – the plantation 'big houses' of the Chesapeake.

While adopting some of the cuisine of Africa – particularly, a penchant for hotly spiced food, rice and tropical fruits – the settlers also indulged in the dishes from home, especially on special occasions – fried chicken, collard greens, baked pies and Virginia hams, some of it imported from the United States at great expense. They wore Victorian clothing, oftentimes dressing head to toe in the heavy woolens of home, despite the oppressive tropical heat.

They also re-created the institutions of home, one-room schoolhouses (where Latin was emphasized over more practical African languages), Protestant churches (mostly Baptist and Methodist) and the voluntary associations and fraternal societies that de Tocqueville had once remarked were such an important part of antebellum American society. These organizations became the hub of the nation's social and political life. Virtually every male of note in government and among the business class was a member of the Masons, with many political deals struck at society meetings rather than in the legislature. Meanwhile, less economically and politically influential settlers, as well as some acculturated recaptive Africans, tried to emulate mercantile lifestyles, to the extent that they could. All of this culture eventually became frozen in exile time, well into the twentieth century. That is, as with many settler societies, the culture of Liberia became increasingly anachronistic, out of step not just with the native culture surrounding it but the progressing culture of the society the settlers had left behind.

There were several reasons for this slavish following of antebellum culture. It was both familiar and something that blacks in the South could only aspire to. Now that they had the freedom and, for the elite, the economic wherewithal to do so, they adopted the trappings and values of that culture wholeheartedly. But it was more than just familiarity. Americo-Liberians wanted to be – and to be considered by (white) outsiders – a member in good standing of Anglo-Saxon civilization. A common conceit among white Americans, including many members of the ACS, was that, left to their own devices, the Americo-Liberians would revert to 'barbarism'. Americoes were determined to prove their detractors wrong. Thus, they not only adorned themselves with the trappings of 'civilization', they studiously shunned African values, customs and ways of living. The Americoes insisted on speaking standard American English, chastising their native born children who came home speaking the pidgin *kwasai* or 'waterside' English of Monrovia's native-filled streets and docks.

Cultural exchange in Liberia, then, was largely a one-way street, with natives seeking entrée to settler culture dropping the customs of bush and village. Rarely did the settler go native – at least, not completely. As will be discussed later in the chapter, it turned out impossible for Americoes – surrounded as they were by natives who outnumbered them 20 to one – to eschew all African customs, values and ways of life.

Internal problems

Liberia's salad days were brief. By the 1860s, a series of troubles had beset the country. For one thing, the American Civil War had all but cut off migration from the United States (though this decline would be somewhat offset after the war by the arrival of several large shiploads of emigres from the Anglophone West Indies). Second, the country's economic prosperity vanished – its chief exports either displaced by those from other countries (Brazil for coffee; British-controlled Nigeria for palm oil) or by synthetic substitutes (German artificial dyes for camwood). Its sail-based merchant marine was rendered obsolete by foreign steamships, which even Liberia's wealthiest elites could not afford. The country was fast becoming an economic backwater. But so compelled was the country's settler community to maintain the trappings of civilization that they

continued to spend money they did not have, going ever deeper into debt to foreign creditors. This problematic and unsustainable financial situation led to a crisis in the late 1860s and early 1870s, indeed the worst political crisis the country would face until the downfall of the Americo regime in the late twentieth century. But money was only a part of it.

As noted earlier, the Americo community was not just divided by class but by skin color as well, with mulattoes assuming a disproportionate amount of economic and political clout. The color division was, of course, an inheritance from home, as much as the penchant for Virginia hams and Masonic ritual. Mulattoes, while hardly treated decently by whites, were nevertheless considered a step above darker-skinned blacks. This favored position – limited as it was – was resented by many blacks, who never fully trusted mulattoes. For their part, many mulattoes in America accepted white valuations of their worth and looked down on darker-skinned blacks as inferiors.

In Liberia, dark-skinned settler resentment eventually found political expression in the presidential candidacy of Edward Roye, Jr. Though a fully paid-up member of the mercantile elite, Roye, a free black from Ohio, prided himself on his blackness, as did his intellectual mentor and campaign advisor, the West Indian immigrant Edward Blyden. Indeed, Blyden – an early black nationalist thinker and arguably Liberia's most internationally influential intellectual – was known for his vitriolic, often *ad hominem*, attacks on the country's mulatto elite. 'There is more Negro hate in those men than they are aware of', he wrote in 1862.[10]

Of more substance was his critique of Americo culture, which he felt was too slavishly Anglo-Saxon, turning its back on the many virtues and achievements of native African society. Liberia, he felt, had the wonderful opportunity of fusing the best of liberal Western thought and African custom. But the mulatto elites were wasting that opportunity, turning their backs on the cultural assets of the hinterland. Roye won the election of 1869, but only partly because of his views. More pertinent was his argument, highly appealing to poorer and working class Americoes, that it was time black Liberians had a greater say in government. This political triumph and, more importantly, Roye and Blyden's view of Liberia's future was deeply resented by the mulatto merchant class, led by the country's founding father Joseph Roberts. Roberts, who had just one great-grandparent who was black, was, according to one dark-skinned settler, a 'fine gentleman, but . . . more white than black'.[11]

Roye was more politic than Blyden but just as dedicated to the notion that Liberia must not just be *in* Africa but *of* it. To achieve that end, he wanted to extend the nation's very limited transportation infrastructure to the interior and to build schools that would promulgate the idea of an African Liberia to native and settler child alike. To do this, of course, required money, which Liberia had very little of. Roye insisted that Liberia, like any sovereign country, should borrow money abroad for internal development, the economic fruits of which would help to repay the loan. To that end, he dispatched officials to London. But, when it came to finance and negotiating with savvy British bankers, these agents were out of their league. The deal they agreed to – and Roye sailed north to sign – was a terrible one, with deep rebates to the bankers and usurious rates. (Some of the deal's terms resulted from racism; London bankers demanded tough terms because they felt that a black-run government was more likely to default.)

When news of the deal got back to Monrovia, the mercantile elite was outraged and, shortly after Roye's return, they insisted that he was not the legitimate president and so should step aside in favor of Roberts. They based their argument on an obscure constitutional question about presidential tenure. Roye refused, and the two sides armed themselves. In January 1872, it all came to a head, with a battle in Monrovia's streets that culminated in the arrest of Roye and his son, the treasury secretary. Roye escaped from jail but drowned trying to swim to an English steamer off the coast. His critics claimed it was because of the gold strapped to his waist, though no evidence

for this charge ever emerged. Roye's son was re-arrested but eventually fled the country. Blyden went into temporary exile in Sierra Leone.

The mercantile elite, dominated by mulattoes and organized into the Republican Party, had retaken power, but it was a temporary triumph. The lines dividing elite blacks and mulattoes had blurred over the decades through inter-marriage and business deals. The mulatto elite realized that they could not govern Liberian alone and that settler unity was critical, as Liberia faced challenges from both the native majority within and increasingly aggressive European imperialists without.

In 1883, a rising, black-led True Whig Party took power, its unbroken reign in office continuing until the coup of 1980. Its 97 years of continuous rule make it the longest-ruling political party in world history, only to be topped should the North Korean Workers Party survive in power until 2042. While the political triumph of the True Whigs was absolute, their rise to power was something of a compromise; blacks now dominated government but they ruled on the old terms – of Liberia as a nation of 'civilized' values, outwardly looking across the Atlantic and disdainful of native Africans and their culture. But while the Americo-Liberians aspired – and considered themselves – to be an extension of European civilization, few outside their circle shared this view.

External threats

While Europeans profited mightily off Africa from the 1400s onward, particularly through the slave trade, they generally eschewed actually colonizing the continent. Outside coastal outposts and more salubrious South Africa, they did not try to take over the place. Disease, a withering climate and the hostility of tribes (many of them armed by slave traders) kept the white man at bay. But mid- and late nineteenth innovations in technology (better weaponry shifted the balance of power) and public health, which helped make tropical Africa less deadly for whites, made it more possible for whites to lay claims to greater influence over the continent. Those factors, combined with growing imperialist fervor, led various European powers – most notably Britain, Germany and France – to lay claim to and establish sovereignty over all of sub-Saharan Africa (aside from Ethiopia and Liberia).

Moreover, the terms of possession had changed. Where once simply planting your flag was considered enough to establish sovereignty, the colonial powers of Europe now insisted – based on principles reached at a pan-imperial conference in Berlin in the 1880s, to which, incidentally, no Liberian or native African, for that matter, had been invited – that authorities achieve 'pacification' of the natives before sovereignty was assured. To that end, the imperialists began creating police forces and armies – manned by natives but officered by whites – and march them into the interior. The Americo-Liberians, needless to say, did not have the manpower or the resources to launch such expeditions. Indeed, they were going ever deeper in debt to those same imperialist powers, under ever more usurious terms.

Increasingly, European powers – most notably, imperial agents representing France and Germany – began to insist that it would be for the best if this experiment in government by an 'inferior race' come to an end. European diplomats noted that the country was underdeveloped, deeply in debt to foreign creditors and barely able to control the territory outside its settlements, let alone up to its far-flung borders. 'None of [these Liberians] have ever dared adventure more than 10 km [kilometer] from the sea or navigable river', dismissively declared French army captain Henri D'Ollone, sent by Paris to survey the Liberian-Guinea border in the early 1890s, 'for fear of being eaten by natives'.[12] After carving off chunks amounting to two-thirds of the country's claimed territory, European imperialists, particularly the Germans

and French, began hinting that a mandate be established over the country. Even America was coming to the conclusion that it was perhaps best for Liberia to surrender its sovereignty. As one State Department official noted in the late 1880s, 'The only practical question is whether Liberia shall be absorbed by a European power or become a virtual colony of the United States through a treaty of protection'.[13]

Race-proud and zealous of their hard-won sovereignty, the Americo-Liberian regime resisted the mandate idea with every ounce of its energy. Obviously, it did not have the arms to do so militarily. But, if it lacked economic acumen, the Liberian government proved able and dexterous in diplomacy. It played off one imperial power against the other with great aplomb, appealing to Britain, for example, which had mixed feelings about Liberia's sovereignty, seeing it as a useful buffer state between its West African colonies and those of France. And, when things got really dire, the Liberians would reach out to their reluctant patron, the United States, which would issue a sternly worded diplomatic note backing Liberia's independence – though never saying what it would actually do to defend Liberia. Liberia and the United States, the American ambassador explained to the French government during one of its attempted land grabs, were 'bound . . . by special ties . . . [and] this government [i.e. America's] and people could not behold unmoved much less acquiesce in any proceedings on the part of the neighbors of Liberia which might assume to dispose of any territory justly claimed and long admitted to belong to the republic'.[14]

Meanwhile, the Liberian government gradually began to extend its authority over the country's hinterland. Beginning with the turn-of-the-twentieth century administration of President Arthur Barclay – from the West Indian family that would dominate Liberian politics into the 1940s – the government began to strengthen its internal security forces and establish up-country forts. In this, Liberia was mimicking its European colonial neighbors, though, given its more limited resources, not to the same extent. It instituted a much-hated hut tax and imposed native labor corvées for public works projects. And, as in nearby European colonies, the system proved ripe for corruption and abuse. Hinterland administrators were often recruited from the lower ranks of settler society, who believed it their right to profit from their hardship postings in the bush. Using native troops, they would march into villages, stripping resources, demanding locals accommodate them in their homes and humiliating village authorities. In addition, the government began to choose its own paramount chieftains to rule over the interior's various ethnic groups. These were men who, paid by Monrovia, would do its bidding in insuring the payment of taxes and providing the appropriate requisition of men, many of whom did not end up working on public works projects at all but on the plantations of elite Americo-Liberian families.

More benignly, the Americo-Liberians asserted their hegemony over the country's native majority through the ward system. Noted earlier, this entailed the adoption of native children into settler families, where they would be inculcated into 'civilized' culture. Some would even marry into settler families and achieve mid-level positions in the Liberian government. In the bush, elite Americo-Liberian men would often take so-called country wives, native mistresses with whom they would maintain families of half-breed children. The latter, too, would frequently end up part of the Americo-Liberian community. Family meant everything in Liberia's upper social reaches; to get ahead, a native or lower class Americo had to associate themselves with one of the 'pioneer' families. With virtually no new in-migration and tropical diseases continuing to deplete the settler population, these practices helped augment its ranks and help to explain how a tiny minority of Americoes – never more than a few per cent of the population – maintained its hold over the native masses. Then came a new threat to Americo-Liberian rule, not from Europe this time but from across the Atlantic.

Garvey and Firestone

In 1914, a Jamaican printer and political agitator named Marcus Garvey founded the Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA). At first dedicated to working class causes and more autonomy from British rule for the black majority island, Garvey shifted gears after migrating to New York City two years later. He began to play up the black nationalist elements of his cause, arguing that blacks could never achieve equality nor acceptance in the United States. Thousands flocked to his banner. He began to emphasize a back-to-Africa movement, with the goal of trans-porting tens of thousands of diaspora Africans to the continent's only black-ruled republic. There, they would settle in their own communities and establish a thriving business-oriented economy.[15]

At first, the Americo-Liberian elite welcomed the idea of new inflows of 'civilized' immi-grants, bringing their American dollars with them. Officials greeted UNIA envoys with all of the stately pomp and circumstance they could muster. The government offered its cooperation and land grants. The Garveyites, for their part, tried to win over the Americo-Liberians. They even made Monrovia mayor Gabriel Moore Johnson – who also happened to be brother-in-law to Liberian president C.D.B. King – the titular head of the UNIA. But the initial warmth between the two groups soon cooled. UNIA officials who came to Liberia to lay the groundwork for the migration grew frustrated by the lethargy of the Americo-Liberian regime and the venality of its officials. For their part, many high-ranking Americoes disliked what they saw as the conde-scension of the Garveyites.

More worrying to the Liberian elite, however, was the idea that with their numbers and their superior attitudes, the Garveyites might wrest control of the government from the Americoes. 'LIBERIA', the anti-Garveyite *Liberian Commercial*, defensively trumpeted in 1920, 'is ours to maintain, ours to DEFEND, and ours to ENJOY'.[16] The elites grew concerned over speeches by Garvey and other UNIA officials that spoke of an alliance between the newcomers and the native majority, pushing the Americoes to the margins in a country their ancestors had founded and believed they should run. Indeed, Garvey was a kind of intellectual heir of Blyden, who argued that Liberia's future lay in Africa, not in some trans-Atlantic Anglo-Saxon community that would never really welcome it. But perhaps of greatest concern was Garvey's talk of using Liberia as a base for the liberation of Africa from white colonizers. By the 1920s, the Americo-Liberian regime had worked out a tentative *modus vivendi* with its powerful European colonial neighbors, which Garveyite talk of black nationalism might have upset. Thus, as Garvey and the UNIA began to face troubles back home – some of their own making, including cases of fraud, and some part of a US government harassment campaign – the King administration was only too happy to wash its hand of the Garveyists.

Instead, it turned to another, very different kind of American savior – Harvey Firestone, Sr. Among the newest-minted of America's industrial revolution tycoons, Firestone had created the world's largest tire company, literally riding the early twentieth century automobile boom to wealth and power. Firestone, however, did not like the fact that he had to purchase his raw material from a British consortium. Seeking the vertical consolidation of other American indus-trialists, he came to Liberia, which had already proved itself the right environment for growing rubber trees, to create the world's largest rubber plantation. The deal he offered the Liberians, however, proved a Faustian one. He would offer them money to pay off all their outstanding debt but would demand that the government be under his effective control. For his part, President King was of the outward looking faction of Liberian politicians, seeing the country's future not in Africa but in the increasingly US-dominated world economy. And so he accepted the deal.

The irony, of course, was that Liberia had now turned its back on a black man named Garvey, who promised to help make Liberia an autonomous black-run nation, the republic's founding

ideal, in favor of a white man named Harvey, who insisted on white tutelage, the threat of which had led the founders to break from the ACS in the first place. But if irony can be measured, this hardly registered with what was to come.

Slave trade

In 1927, Thomas Faulkner, a successful businessman and recent American immigrant, challenged King for the presidency. As the True Whig Party nominee, King won in a landslide. (Indeed, King's 235,000-to-9,000-vote victory earned the distinction as the world's most corrupt by the editors at the Guinness Book of World Records; it was the turnout, not the margin, that won it the distinction. There were only 15,000 persons registered to vote in the entire republic, as very few natives were qualified to vote, but all somehow got counted.) Typically, in Liberian elections, the loser graciously conceded, usually to accept a high-level position in the new government. But Faulkner was a reformer and a fighter. Two years later, he gave an interview to the black newspaper in his former hometown of Baltimore. While Faulkner complained about the election, his true revelation was that the Americo-Liberian regime was running an international slave ring. A charge against a republic founded by former slaves, and originally dedicating itself to fighting the slave trade at its source, could not have been more damning.

The facts, ultimately corroborated by a League of Nations investigation, were these: Liberian officials, including the vice-president, had profited off the shipping of indentured native laborers to the Spanish-run island of Fernando Po (now Bioko in Equatorial Guinea), where they toiled on cocoa plantations. Many of the laborers had been forced to sign the contracts, which typically ran to two years, either by Liberian officials or by pliant chiefs. Conditions on the island were appalling, with many of the workers dying before their contract was up, and Liberian officials, entrusted with their pay, pocketing the money. The scheme was not technically slave trading under League rules (modified, these are still applied by the organization's heir, the United Nations), but it smelled awfully like it.

Following the investigation, there was renewed talk by European powers of a mandate over Liberia. Ashamed and worried for their sovereignty, the Americo-Liberian community forced out not just the vice-president but President King himself, who was never implicated in the scheme. At the same time, the country's consul to the international organization charged the League with hypocrisy. This practice was not all that different from what occurred in British and French African colonies, he argued. More to the point, why weren't the Spanish put in the dock as well? After all, they profited even more from the sordid business. At least, the consul noted, 'My Government, which has been called a Government of niggers, a Government of savages, *has had the courage to place the matter before an International Commission of Enquiry*'.[17] In truth, they had no choice. Ultimately, Liberia's diplomats once again proved their skill through delay and obfuscation, until the League turned its attention to an even more alarming situation: the Italian invasion of Ethiopia, Africa's other black-led state.

The Tubman and Tolbert eras

In the wake of the League investigation, and amidst the Great Depression, Liberia shrank in upon itself, under the leadership of another Barclay, Edwin, a black nationalist highly suspicious of outside involvement in the country's economy. Liberia's inward turn came to an end with the election of William Tubman in 1943.

Arguably the most influential president in Liberian history – serving until his death in 1971 – Tubman successfully pursued two key policies. One was his 'unification' plan, a campaign to

integrate the native majority into the republic. The interior territories where many natives lived were given county status (the highest sub-jurisdiction in the republic) and their native inhabitants full citizenship in 1964, 117 years after the country's independence. The other policy Tubman dubbed the 'open door', welcoming foreign investment. Blessed with some of the world's richest iron deposits, Liberia, after World War II, enjoyed a resource bonanza of sorts, enjoying in the 1950s and 1960s the world's second fastest GDP growth rate, after Japan. While much of this went to enrich the Americo-Liberian elite, enough of it was spent to retire the nation's foreign debt and improve its infrastructure, including the construction of schools across the country. Tubman's government also paid for college scholarships in the United States for particularly promising students.

Tubman, however, had his less benevolent side. Paranoid and dictatorial, he had the constitution amended so he could rule for life and established no less than six internal security agencies to root out and punish dissidents. He was, in a sense, the model for the African 'big man' leader so prevalent in the continent's immediate post-independence period. A cult grew up around him, his image everywhere, his birthday a quasi-national holiday. To get ahead in the country, everyone – Americo and ambitious native alike – had to win his approval; all favors – the lucrative government contract, the well-paid government sinecure – came from him.

Tubman also seemed to have controlled the timing of his own death, for it came at a most propitious moment. With the economy stalling as the world entered a period of recession in the mid-1970s, the bargain Tubman struck with the Liberian people – economic prosperity in exchange for political subservience – came undone. His successor, William Tolbert, moved to ease some of the political restrictions of the Tubman era but was up against forces he ultimately could not control. All of those newly minted college graduates – frustrated by elite intransigence and a lack of well-paying jobs – grew restless. Many were inspired by the American Civil Rights Movement, while others saw hope in Third World liberation movements, as the last African colonies achieved their independence from Europe. To them, Liberia, with its stuffy formalism and slavish Americanism, seemed a stifling throwback to a quasi-colonial past. Tolbert tried to adjust by Africanizing Liberian culture. Out went the formal clothing favored by Tubman, and in came dashikis and safari suits. National holidays celebrating Americo-Liberian triumphalism over natives were done away with. But it was too little, too late. And then Tolbert blundered.

In 1979, his administration decided to raise the price of rice from $22 a 100-pound sack to $30. (So critical to Liberians' diet was rice that the government had long fixed the price.) There were good reasons for this; it would encourage farmers to grow more, lessening the country's dependence on foreign imports. But what the Liberian people saw was price gouging, as the Tolbert family and other Americo-Liberian elites controlled the rice trade. While various radical organizations tried to use the issue to push for deeper reforms, the people rioted. Tolbert ultimately was forced to bring in foreign troops to quell the violence, leading to the deaths of dozens (by official account) or hundreds (according to the media and the opposition).

1980 coup and aftermath

But there was another force threatening the Tolbert regime – the country's army. Troops, almost all of them natives, were ill-equipped, underpaid and ill-housed. Many were forced to work as servants for government officials or the Americo officer corps. In April 1980, on the one-year anniversary of the rice riots, soldiers led by Master Sergeant Samuel Doe, the highest ranking noncom in the army, broke into the executive mansion and murdered Tolbert in his bed, putting an end to the 133-year old Americo-Liberian-led republic. 'Gone forever are the days of "Who

you know?" and "Do you know who I am?"', Doe pronounced in his first radio broadcast. 'We now enter the time of "What can you do?" This is the people's thing, our people's thing'.[18]

The native masses danced in the streets, many reveling in the summary executions of 13 high-ranking Americo government officials. Barely literate, Doe and the other coup makers brought in the radical intellectuals to help them govern. But as it became clear that the Doe regime was easily as corrupt as the old Tolbert one, but less competent, the intellectuals either dropped out or were forced out.

For roughly the next decade, Doe ruled as an autocrat, winning a fraudulent election in 1985, repressing the opposition, his minions lining their pockets through graft. Then, on Christmas Eve 1989, an American-educated former bureaucrat of mixed native-Americo heritage named Charles Taylor led a rebellion that saw Doe toppled and ultimately murdered within a year. The country then descended into a multi-sided conflict that did not end until 1996. Then, with a gun pointed at the Liberian people's head (he all but said he would return to war if he wasn't elected), Taylor won the 1997 presidential election in a landslide. But Taylor proved, if anything, more corrupt and repressive than Doe, leading to renewed civil war – like its predecessor, often divided along tribal lines – that only ended in 2003, with Taylor's ouster from the country. (Ultimately, Taylor would be convicted of war crimes in The Hague and given a virtual life sentence in a British prison, where he remains today.) Since then, the country has slowly begun to rebuild under the leadership of former World Bank official and soon-to-be Nobel Peace laureate Johnson Sirleaf, who won election in 2005 and re-election in 2011, though long-standing problems of poverty and corruption remain endemic. The Ebola outbreak of 2014 hit the country particularly hard.

As for the Americo-Liberians, most of them fled after the Doe coup for America, many of them ironically settling in the Chesapeake region (specifically, Washington DC and environs) from which their ancestors had fled 150 years before. Though some have returned to reclaim their property, and many have entered government service, their cultural dominance, indeed, their very existence as a caste, is long gone, first watered down by decades of inter-marriage with native elites and then cast to the wind by the violence that befell the country from 1980 through the early 2000s.

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16

SETTLER COLONIALISM IN KENYA, 1880–1963

Will Jackson

Settler colonialism in Kenya was both exemplary and aberrant. Here we encounter several of the defining characteristics of the settler colony as classically defined but encounter no less significant anomalies: a uniquely self-regarding settler culture; an intensely conflicted set of relations linking settlers to the state; a powerful and seemingly pervasive strain of fantasy in settler discourse that worked to conjure not just Kenya but a mythic 'Africa' by extension.[1] While historical research has now largely dispelled the image of Kenya's settlers as picturesque fragments of an English aristocracy resplendent against the exotic backdrop of 'wild Africa', the imagery produced by a certain coterie of white colonials in Kenya has endured. Today, as in the colonial period itself, the controversies generated by settler violence stand well apart from the circulation of an *idea* of Kenya that strives to appear entirely benign.

Politically, Kenya was a paradox: at once a settler colony and an imperial charge. At the same time as Anglophone settlers in Australia, Canada and New Zealand pulled clear of the British metropole, gaining increasing autonomy and eventual independence, settlers in Kenya failed in their endeavours to create a new 'white dominion' in Africa. Governed directly from Westminster through a governor answerable to the Colonial Office, the colonial state was torn between its support for settlers and its civilising responsibility to 'backward races'. The establishment of self-governing settler states elsewhere was achieved, significantly, in the nineteenth century, when racial theories had chimed with imperial ideologies of settlement.[2] In Australasia and North America, Indigenous people were largely eliminated: assimilated, marginalised or physically destroyed.[3] In Kenya, by contrast, indigenous peoples were not eliminated; white settlers were here too few – and they came too late. As the twentieth century wore on, the racial ideologies making sense of settler rule became increasingly unsupportable. Kenya's settlers remained dependent on metropolitan support but were an increasing embarrassment to politicians in Westminster, for whom Kenya represented just one, relatively insignificant, piece in a much wider imperial jigsaw.

It is difficult with hindsight, therefore, to avoid the idea of a 'white man's country' in East Africa as little more than – as John Lonsdale put it – an exotic fantasy.[4] Self-government would never be granted on the settlers' terms. Settler tyranny and imperial trusteeship were irreconcilably opposed. But that basic contradiction should not inhibit recognition of the extent to which settler colonialism came to accommodate imperial rule. The language of trusteeship was highly versatile, and paternalistic-minded settlers were well able to appropriate its benign, civilising spirit as their own. It was precisely their doing so, however, that precluded any conscious awareness of

their looming historical anachronism. And yet, Kenya's settlers did experience a near constant barrage of criticism: from missionary societies in Kenya, from humanitarians in Britain, from members of the colonial administration itself. Is that to explain the particular prolificacy – and, indeed, the substance – of settler writing? Were settlers in denial? Was that quality of enchantment that courses through the settler canon reflective not so much of settlers' overweening self-confidence but, rather, the tenuousness of their claims?

Conquest and settlement

The developing British presence in East Africa during the final two decades of the nineteenth century had nothing to do with any visionary belief in a future settler colony and everything to do with imperial geo-strategy. Above all, it was the need to pre-empt French control of the headwaters of the Nile that prompted London's declaration of a Protectorate over Uganda in 1894. Uganda was fertile, well-watered – and land-locked. Its development, therefore, inevitably meant developing the land separating the Protectorate from the coast. And so, in 1898, construction began on the Uganda railway, the key, it was believed, to opening up the untapped great estate of East Africa for the benefit of the world. Only when the railway neared completion and the full cost of its construction became clear did the idea of a British settler colony emerge.[5]

Before the railway, British activity in the region had been delegated to a commercial enterprise, the Imperial British East African Company (IBEAC). Throughout the 1880s and 1890s, officers of the company, in attempting to appropriate the Swahili caravan trade to Uganda, had established a series of defensive stockades at strategic points along the old trading route from the coast. These would form the embryo geography of the settler state. Fortifications provided the necessary facility for safety and replenishment in the days when it took a month to get from Mombasa to where Nairobi now stands and a full ten weeks to reach Lake Victoria. Building alliances was the necessary partner to building forts, and Company officials drew 'friendly' Africans into the orbit of their patronage at the same time that 'pacification' was achieved with salutary, spectacular force. Where provisions were not forthcoming or resistance was encountered, punitive raids were launched. Villages were burned, livestock confiscated; men, women and children were massacred in their hundreds.[6] Underlying each of these incidents was the conviction on the part of the British that the violence perpetrated by themselves (or their African clients) was of a qualitatively different order to that of their antagonists. Peaceful caravans were set upon by war-like bands; savagery beset civilisation. Underwriting this differentiation in turn was a wider imperial rationale: that Africans predisposed to fight and raid could begin to settle down under the firm but benevolent British hand. Launched at first in reaction to raids on passing caravans but later in response to attacks on protected African communities, the men of the IBEAC came increasingly to see themselves as custodians of law and order. When the Protectorate of British East Africa was declared in 1895, officers of the IBEAC became servants of the new imperial state.

It is important to remember at this stage that, even before construction on the Uganda railway began, East Africa was already well established in the British popular mind. The search to locate the source of the Nile had been one of the most captivating sub-plots in the Victorian exploration of Africa. In the high-imperial 'scramble', explorer discourse articulated national character around a particular ideal of masculine courage. To its readers, the self-sacrifice of the explorers anticipated the 'civilisation' that would follow in their wake. Explorer literature in turn inspired a new phalanx of late nineteenth-century adventurers, traders and big-game hunters. That the region was populated with large numbers of wild animals meant the Uganda railway attracted as many hunters as it did settlers, and not only from Britain – a significant proportion coming from continental Europe and the USA.[7] These were recreational hunters, unlike the independent

hunters who had killed (mostly elephant) for money, who had travelled on foot with African trackers and porters and whose contribution to the reduction of animal populations led to the establishment of the Kenya Game Department in 1906. In 1903, the travel agent Thomas Cook launched its first *Tour of East Africa*, taking visitors from the Nile to Mombasa via the recently completed Uganda railway. Five years later, the company launched its *Highlands of East Africa* tour, its chief attraction being the chance to view the profusion of wild game from the window of the train.[8] At the same time, 'pacification' continued. As each year passed, new military campaigns were launched. Not until 1906 were the Kalenjin-speaking peoples of Western Kenya finally subdued, in part because the railway was able to carry troops as well as tourists.[9] The commodification of primeval East Africa, therefore, was not subsequent to but coincident with the violent suppression of African resistance. Conquest and consumption were intimately entwined.

By 1903, a consensus had begun to cohere that heavily capitalised settlers were the most likely solution to the question of how East Africa was to be developed – and how the £5 million cost of the railway was to be recouped. What complicated the situation in Kenya was the presence of a substantial Indian population.[10] Again, the railway: the one thing that made white settlement possible was itself only made possible by the work of 32,000 indentured Indians – and the deaths of 2,500 of those. At its completion, certain influential figures contemplated encouraging further Indian immigration. Kenya, it was proposed, might feasibly constitute India's westernmost frontier – the 'America of the Hindu', in Sir Harry Johnston's words. At this point, however, two influential ideas came to prominence. The first was that, while Indian settlement might be tolerated in certain low-lying areas, the highlands – that is to say, those areas above 4,000 feet lying predominantly to the north and west of Nairobi – were naturally best suited to European settlement. The second was that Indians lacked the capacity to civilise Africans and that Indian settlement was thus detrimental to 'native' interests. Both ideas endured. At the same time as they wrote of Kenya's enchanting landscape, settlers probed the fragility of their political position with reference to the natural environment.[11] Were the 'white highlands' really white? Did their very elevation, coupled with their exposure to the fierce 'actinic' rays of the equatorial sun, not jeopardise the racial constitution of the white man therein? At the same time, the presence of Indians in Kenya forced the country's European settlers to lay repeated claim to the ideology of trusteeship, most fiercely during the so-called Indian crisis of 1923 when Indians' claims to a common electoral role (and to the right to take up land in the highlands) was rejected only with a parallel commitment that Kenya was 'primarily' African. If white and black interests clashed, the latter would prevail. Maintaining the illusion that they did not would be henceforth the settlers' perennial ideological task.

Their major social task was to redress a demographic imbalance. The presence of Indians in Kenya prevented the kind of large-scale European immigration that anything resembling a future 'white dominion' would require. This fed another settler myth: that there were 'no ordinary chaps' in Kenya; here, it was said, the 'man from the Clapham omnibus did not exist'.[12] In fact, settler leaders paid a great deal of attention to the question of what constituted the ideal settler. Character was a greater priority than capital; because of their (reluctant) imperial role, settlers needed to show their capacity to justly rule 'their natives' whilst overseeing judiciously the transformation of 'their' land. Settlers knew that the maintenance of their supremacy required a constant and significant increase in their numbers but, so long as they remained yoked to Westminster, it also required a credible dissemination of the idea that Africans were benefiting from settler rule. This produced two divergent fantasies: one, in which Africans willingly and gratefully accepted their subordination to the settlers, and another, in which Africans were absented completely. Long, convoluted rationales were rehearsed to justify continued settler rule, invoking the temperament of race, the mutuality of 'partnership' and the exemplary, pedagogic virtue to settler civilisation,

but they ran against the image of a 'white highlands' erased of its African presence. We encounter that image repeatedly, as for example in the vision of Charles Eliot, the East African Protectorate's first Commissioner, recalled by the young Kings African Rifles officer, Richard Meinertzhagen:

> He envisaged a thriving colony of thousands of Europeans with their families, the whole of the country from the Aberdares and Mount Kenya to the German border divided up into farms; the whole of the Rift Valley cultivated or grazed, and the whole country of Lumbwa, Nandi to Elgon and almost to Baringo under white settlement. . . . I said that some day the African would be educated and armed; that would lead to a clash. Eliot thought that that day was so far distant as not to matter and that by that time the European element would be strong enough to look after themselves.[13]

Eliot's thinking did not extend much beyond the encouragement of settlers. Africans would labour for Europeans, he believed, or die off, a prospect he viewed 'with equanimity and a clear conscience'.[14] When race war came – on a day 'so far distant as not to matter' – Eliot's suggestion that Kenya's Europeans 'would look after themselves' hinted at an element of genocidal precognition that in Kenya could never be quite dislodged. It is telling that in his recent exposition of settler psychology, Brett Shadle closed his study in 1928 with the hanging of an African for the rape of a settler woman. 'Black peril', Shadle argued, crystallised settler worries over the fallibility of white prestige. But settlers *needed* black peril to trigger their retaliatory violence. Only with the killing of an African was, in Shadle's words, 'the settler soul at peace'.[15]

The task of 'civilising Africans' was, in any case, fractured by settlers' variegated understanding of African indigeneity. Maasai-speaking peoples, whose grazing lands stretched over large swathes of the Rift Valley and who practiced an itinerant herding culture, were judged beyond civilisation. That theirs was a pastoral and not an agricultural way of life ruled out their incorporation into the settler economy. Sedentary, agricultural peoples, on the other hand, such as the Kikuyu, the Luo and the Kamba, were quickly identified as a labour force for the settlers. Whereas the Maasai were removed *en masse* from land intended for settlement, other groups were incorporated into the settler economy. The fact that the heaviest concentration of Europeans settled in land occupied by the Kikuyu determined that it was they who were bound most closely into the political struggles of the settler-colony. The experiences of the Maasai and the Kikuyu thus narrate the uniquely controversial history of settler colonialism in Kenya – as well as the obduracy of its legacy after Kenya gained independence as a nation state in 1963.[16]

Settler colonialism and the Maasai

It was in the Rift Valley, on the grazing grounds of the Maasai, that the most outlandish grants of land were made to Kenya's settlers. Hugh Cholmondeley, Third Baron Delamere, received 100,000 acres; a syndicate of South African financiers took 320,000 acres; a number of other wealthy and well-connected British notables obtained grants in the tens of thousands of acres. Thus, the first of the major controversies that engulfed the settler colony concerned the Maasai. Eliot's view was that the only future for the Maasai was the break-up of their culture. 'Maasaidom', he wrote, 'is a beastly, bloody system, founded on raiding and immorality [and] the sooner it disappears . . . the better'. The opposing view started from the premise that Maasai culture was impervious to change. Settler farming was simply incompatible with Maasai pasturage and the war-like nature of the tribe. That meant danger – 'so long as turbulent natives are near the white settlers,' read one official minute, 'there is risk of murder and development cannot proceed' – but it chimed also with the romantic tradition of a 'noble savage' immune from corruptive modern

life.[17] According to Elspeth Huxley, it was Delamere himself who arrived at the solution. The genius of his plan was to join the Maasai question with another controversy then exercising Protectorate officials. The popularity of hunting was raising concerns over the destruction of the region's wildlife. Officials worried about the impact of the settler incursion on African societies also agitated over the gratuitous killing of animals. Settlers, unlike professional hunters, lacked a sporting ethos. They shot for the pot and to feed their African workers. They disrupted the natural balance. Rather than encourage unfettered settlement, these men argued that the British should rule the Protectorate as preservationists, maintaining humans and wildlife alike in what was imagined to be their natural condition.[18]

While in principle Delamere was opposed to the segregation of Africans and Europeans – what he referred to as the 'zoological gardens policy' – he was prepared to make an exception for the Maasai, on the basis that they lived harmoniously in nature. Theirs was not a hunting culture, he observed; the Maasai and their stocks lived sustainably amongst wild animals. Moving the Maasai from the Rift would not only solve the Maasai-settler problem, therefore, but the nature-settler problem as well. Game reserves and Maasai reserves could be combined; two seemingly intractable conflicts would be remedied with one single, well-aimed stone. In 1904, therefore, the entire Maasai population was moved from the Rift. Two areas, one to the north of the railway on the Laikipia Plateau and one to the south, on the border with German East Africa, were designated for exclusive Maasai occupation, linked by a corridor half a mile wide. Six years later, despite the earlier pledge that these lands would remain theirs 'as long as the Masai as a race shall exist', Laikipia was given over to white settlement, and those in the north were moved once again to the now-extended southern reserve.[19]

While the Maasai moves appear to illustrate well the settler fantasy of native erasure, they can also be seen as representing the convergence of two distinct bodies of settler-colonial knowledge, both of which sought to protect primitive Africa. The first was the nostalgic appeal of native authenticity; the second was the legal-bureaucratic endeavour to dispense justice to groups oppressed by advancing modernity. Both the 1904 and 1911 evictions, it is important to note, were legally sanctioned. While prominent Maasai contested the notion that they submitted willingly, the invocation of legal treaty nevertheless joined settler colonisation to a developing body of jurisprudence and what would later come to be understood as indigenous rights. In 1913, with the support of prominent critical members of the British colonial administration, the Maasai (unsuccessfully) sued the colonial government in the High Court; subsequent petitions for the restoration of their lands were made at the 1932 Kenya Land Commission and in 1962 on the eve of Kenya's independence. Successive attempts have been made for the restitution of rights to land or for monetary compensation throughout the 50 years of Kenyan independence.[20] All these efforts at legal redress have served to articulate Maasai ethnicity in closed, defensive terms; they have also served to constitute Maasai identity as signifying a deeper or less corrupted form of indigeneity than that enjoyed by other groups in Kenya.[21] At the same time, successive generations of tourists, settlers and expatriates in Kenya have found in the Maasai people a compelling object for their colonial nostalgia. Visitors from Europe and America to Kenya today are often keen to seek out and photograph those they identify as the 'real' or 'true' Maasai (that is to say, Maasai who continue to practice a 'traditional' pastoral lifestyle), typically in the course of excursions into mythic 'Africa' in which the staple activity is the pursuit and photographing of animals.

To officials in London, the Maasai moves represented something of a scandal. It was not the morality of the evictions that worried Colonial Office staff, however, so much as their suspicion that the colonial state was in thrall to the settlers. Despite denying to the Colonial Office that he had done so, evidence was unearthed after his resignation showing that, in April 1910, Governor Percy Girouard had offered 27 settlers almost 200,000 acres in the Laikipia reserve.[22] One of these

settlers was Delamere himself. It is in this light that we should read the passage from Elspeth Huxley's biography in which she describes Delamere's first sighting of the East African highlands on a hunting trip in 1898, arriving on foot from Abyssinia. His first view of the Kenya highlands, Huxley tells us, was of the Laikipia Plateau, its 'open, wind-swept downs running from the green foothills of Kenya's mighty peak to the cedar forested slopes of the Aberares':

> Here indeed [Delamere] must have thought, was a promised land, the realisation of a Rider Haggard dream of a rich and fertile country hidden by impenetrable deserts and mountains. Here was a modern Eldorado, waiting only for recognition.[23]

Much has been made in the critical analysis of settler discourse in Kenya of the importance of Isak Dinesen, the author of the influential lyric memoir, *Out of Africa*. Dinesen's fantasy, however, was one of colonial subordination, in which domesticated Africans gave willing service. Delamere's (and Huxley's) was of a different order, a vision of wide horizons, uninterrupted by human life. Thirty years after Dinesen's *Out of Africa* was remade as a Hollywood film, her farm at Ngong is today a suburb of Nairobi, its romantic allure tainted by the 2013 Al-Shabaab attack at the West-gate mall. Laikipia, by contrast, where over a million acres of land is owned by just a few dozen former settler families, has emerged as the most eligible redoubt for a 'white man's country'. To be sure, large tracts of land in Laikipia are also owned by elite Africans, Asians and expatriates from elsewhere. What is particular about white Kenyans' occupation of Laikipia, however, is their disproportionate role in conservation, some fencing in their land as wildlife sanctuaries, where, as Janet McIntosh explains, 'they host a few well-to-do tourists at a time and protect endangered species'.[24] Delamere's notion of wild animals and wild Africans living sustainably in sync underestimated the value that conservation would provide not only for delimiting private (white-owned) land in Kenya but also in speaking to a deeply embedded, now-global sensibility that desires to encounter wild animals amid vacant space. Picturesque – that is to say, 'traditional' – Maasai complement this scene, but Maasai encountered beyond an economy of service subvert it.[25] Hence the symbolic power generated by Maasai invasions of white-owned Laikipia ranches in 2004 in protest at the displacement of their ancestors a hundred years before.[26]

Settler colonialism and the Kikuyu

A very different story emerges from the Kikuyu experience in what became Kenya's Central Province. It is here that we can see most clearly the contradictory interpenetration of settler-colonialism with African society. As a now-considerable scholarly literature shows, Kikuyu social systems not only survived the settler colony but insinuated themselves into the structures of the state, albeit unevenly and at tremendous human cost. It is here that we can see most clearly the implications of the struggle between black Africans, white settlers and the ideologically and politically fractured colonial state.

During the first two decades of white settlement, the European population in Kenya increased from a few hundred in the early 1900s to around 10,000 20 years later. The centre for settlement was in Kiambu at the southern reaches of Kikuyuland. This was an area into which the Kikuyu had been expanding during the nineteenth century but from which many families had retreated as a result of the disease and famine of 1890s.[27] Prior to colonisation, Kikuyu clans coped with the pressures on land by pioneering new settlements. As clans (known as *mbari*) increased in size, enterprising men broke away to clear and cultivate new land on which they established their own *mbari*. By absorbing landless Kikuyu (*ahoi*) from other clans, these new *mbari* would expand in turn. This is what Tabitha Kanogo has termed the 'Kikuyu expansionist dynamic', a system that

depended entirely on the opportunities it offered young, landless men to gain wealth and status through the work involved in cultivating crops, grazing stock and accumulating dependents.[28] Equally, it rested on the *perception* amongst junior clan members that their labour would, in time, be rewarded and that clan seniors were honouring the reciprocal ties binding those with land to those without it. The arrival of white settlers did not merely block the Kikuyu expansionist dynamic (though it certainly did that); it also offered alternative sources of patronage to Kikuyu men. While the colonial state presented new sets of obligation and reward to those with power, diverting them from the obligations they held to those beneath them, those without power discovered in white settlers alternative patrons of their own. By offering multiple – and conflicting – patrimonial incentives, settler colonialism pulled the Kikuyu social compact apart.

In Kikuyuland, then, there developed a series of intersecting conflicts: between the state and the settlers, the state and their African clients, the settlers and their African subordinates and between Kikuyu themselves. These struggles were engaged principally over the issue of Kikuyu labour, and it was around that issue that (after the Maasai moves) the next great controversy of the settler colony emerged. It is important to note, however, that it was the labour demands of the state as much as it was those of the settlers that alienated Kikuyu. At least until the 1920s, settler farms, especially in the Rift Valley, provided a refuge from the exactions of the state, felt most intensely in Central Province, exactions typically made through the delegated power of appointed Kikuyu chiefs.

From the start, London made it clear that Kenya must be financially self-supporting. Lacking capital, the state relied on the exploitation of African labour to enable the very infrastructure necessary for the colony's development. In the years immediately preceding the First World War, at any one time, some 15,000 Africans (not all of them Kikuyu) were employed on public works, building roads, running up piped water to Nairobi from Mombasa, laying out branch line extensions on the railway – all the infrastructure needed to 'make the colony pay'. To a great extent, the coercive means to 'encourage' native labour was achieved by laws that linked the fortunes of African chiefs to their success in producing men for paid employment. What that meant in practice was never very clear, but considerable evidence exists of chiefs confiscating land and livestock, burning down dwellings and accepting bribes in order to compel their kinsmen out to work.[29]

Settlers also relied on Kikuyu headmen and chiefs for their labour supply, but here the picture was complicated: first, by the fact that settlers and their African workers had a shared investment – psychological as well as economic – in the land; and second, by the intimacy of the relations that existed between employer and employee. Despite Kenya's aristocratic reputation, it is important to remember that most settlers were small men of modest means. What funds these men had were quickly sunk into the initial outlay of reaching, leasing and setting up their farms. On what was judged risky equatorial agriculture, credit at favourable rates was hard to obtain; that left little extra for workers' wages.[30] What settlers could offer as incentive to African labour was land: in Central Province, often, it was the same land that Kikuyu squatters had previously owned; in the Rift Valley, it was the land cleared of the Maasai in 1904.

This was 'squatter farming', a term referencing an arrangement whereby Africans exchanged a certain amount of their labour for the right to cultivate a portion of white-owned land for themselves. A variant on this arrangement, 'kaffir farming', involved African payment not in labour but in cash, livestock or crops. Squatter farming meant that the Kikuyu expansionist dynamic persisted. New land was found for *mbari* to establish themselves; the accumulation of wealth and the earning of Kikuyu honour endured. But the lands these Kikuyu pioneered were, at least notionally, white, and the success of squatter farming was predicated on the weakness of the settlers – on the failure of the idea of a white man's country to convert to reality. As soon as Eliot's vision – of the whole of the highlands under effective *colonial* occupation – came close to

its realisation, then the spaces for Kikuyu to establish their own autonomous social hierarchies within the very boundaries of the white-owned farms began to contract. The absence of effective occupation, the very premise used to justify the colonial take-over in the first place, was itself the thing that allowed Kikuyu to exist as subordinates but also as unknown agents within the settler colony: black blotches on a white conceit.

It was, unsurprisingly, the large-scale settler farms in the Rift Valley that proved most attractive to Kikuyu. Here, many settlers left their farms untouched, banking on the increasing value of their land as the colony developed. Between 1904 and 1920, some 70,000 Kikuyu migrated west from Central Kenya, the attractions of the Rift matched by land hunger and the increasingly stringent labour demands experienced in Kiambu.[31] At least until the later 1920s, squatter farming proved mutually beneficial. Settlers lacked labour; Africans needed land. In its patrimonial nature, squatting had its analogies both in the traditional Kikuyu *ahoi* system of tenure and the neo-feudal sensibilities that many settlers brought with them to Kenya. Squatting, however, was also profoundly subversive. This was because it went on to a great extent informally, within the relationships that developed between squatters and settlers, while the state's attempts to control these relationships remained constrained. In part, that reflected government's own ambivalence. The balance between settlers and squatters needed to tip in the former's favour if a genuine settler colony was to develop, but officials knew that squatters, with their deep psychological roots to the land they worked, conceived of themselves not as labourers but as tenants; over time, it was feared, their occupation of white-owned land would come to constitute *de facto* rights.[32] Yet, until the Second World War, African peasants proved themselves more worthy of support than unproductive settlers; the state could scarcely afford to inhibit progress towards what was the primary purpose of the colony: fiscal self-sufficiency and economic growth.

The state was also constrained in its ability to intervene in settler-squatter relations by its own limited capacity. Taxation, to be sure, combined with Masters and Servants legislation and the introduction in 1919 of the *kipande*, Kenya's own version of apartheid's pass book, did operate to some degree to control African labour. For many Africans and Europeans, however, the colonial state was a distant abstraction. Settlers bemoaned the inadequacies of the police and the need to evidence their claims of workers' misdemeanours. Workers were often afraid to lodge complaints against their employers; some did not understand the legal ramifications of their employment or their rights to judicial recourse. Desertion was often a more effective form of resistance than submitting to the alienating, if not unintelligible, bureaucratic procedures of the courts.

Much depended on the accommodations that individual settlers came to in their relations with individual Africans. In this regard, it is hard to resist seeing violence, or the threat of it, as a key feature of settler control. Violence on the settler farms, as several historians have shown, was perennial and widespread. That only fuelled Kenya's unsavoury reputation in Britain, most notably during the 1920s, when reports of settler brutality offered a compelling target to humanitarian critics already stirred into action by controversies over forced labour in the aftermath of the First World War.[33] Settler writing produced during the colonial period is replete with stories of truculent workers compelled to action by physical assault. As has been well documented, violence had a strong symbolic element in Kenya. In relations characterised by co-dependence and close proximity, violence worked to reinstate fragile hierarchies; hence the value settlers placed on their rights to discipline 'their natives' without accountability to the state. Deeply committed to their own independent, paternalist rule and to their autonomous rights to discharge their racial prowess freely, settlers bridled at the encroachment of government into the domain sketched by their mastery as white men – and, indeed, as white women.[34] Just as Shadle identifies the execution of an African for the rape of a white woman as signifying the highpoint of settler inviolability, he notes also the first execution of a white man in Kenya for the crime of

murdering an African in 1960 as marking the nadir.[35] Let us take one more case. In 1938, when Jack White assaulted one of his employees, Wakahu wa Kihenya, on his Rift Valley farm, Kihenya took a butcher's knife from the farm slaughter house and stabbed White to death. Shadle argues for the exercise of humiliation by settlers as a technology for instating Africans' inferiority. Do we see the implications of that here? Anger has not had its due analytical treatment in the social history of settler colonialism but figures in provocative and unsettling ways in the killing of Jack White.[36] Significantly, at the Supreme Court, Kihenya's sentence was reduced from murder to manslaughter. In the 1910s or '20s, as Clayton and Savage observe, Kihenya would have hanged.[37] Thus, we see the shifting punitive capacity of the state describing the trajectory of the settlers' weakening position. The killing of Jack White taught the same lesson as did the killing in 1990 of four ABW white militia in Bophuthatswana at the end of apartheid. The message to settlers: 'If you take the law into your own hands, Africans will fight back: don't expect state protection'. If Shadle's 1928 rape case showed 'the settler soul at peace', the Jack White case 10 years later shows it enflamed.

Above all, violence points to the depths of settler frustration. Until the Second World War, the settler economy failed emphatically to perform its intended function. Crops failed. Inflation, then depression, wiped out profits. Most settler farmers were heavily indebted. After the Wall Street crash, settler farming had stalled: over a fifth of the settler farms stood abandoned, and almost a third of the so-called White Highlands was under squatter occupation.[38] Plans for federation with Uganda and Tanganyika, the most likely prospect for a settler-dominion, had been abandoned because, again, the British government in London was not prepared to subordinate the principles of trusteeship to the racial supremacy envisaged by Kenya's leading settlers.[39] Nor had the demographic equation improved, with the European population in 1934 standing at just 17,000, only half of whom had been in the colony for more than five years.

It is striking, then, that it is at this time that settler-colonialism's double fantasy, in which the native is both incorporated and absented, emerged. Huxley's *White Man's Country* was published in 1935, Isak Dinesen's *Out of Africa* and Ernest Hemingway's *The Green Hills of Africa* both in 1937.[40] In 1932 The Kenya Association had been formed, its aim being the encouragement both of new settlers and of tourists. Its output was prolific, and it was on its foundations that the construction of Kenya as a settler and a tourist destination in the post-war years was laid.[41] Many of the new post-war arrivals into Kenya had read Huxley, Hemingway or Dinesen; others had read the romantic fiction set in Kenya that was serialised in British newspapers during the interwar years.[42] Almost all would have seen some of the promotional materials produced by the Kenya Association and other publicity organs set up during the post-war period.[43] Only the allure of the settler fantasy explains why Kenya's European population increased dramatically at the same time that news of the Mau Mau Emergency brought lurid stories of 'savage Africa' onto the breakfast tables of Britain's newspaper reading public.[44]

The road to Mau Mau

The Second World War saved Kenya's settler economy.[45] The Ethiopian campaign brought 75,000 service men to Kenya and another 80,000 Italian POWs. All needed feeding. At the same time, the battle of the Atlantic positioned Kenya as the surest source of food supplies to the Mediterranean, while the Japanese occupation of the fibre plantations of the East Indies sent demand for Kenyan sisal soaring.[46] Settler debt decreased; taxation revenues rose. Between 1941 and 1945, maize cultivated on European land increased from 80,000 acres to 132,000; wheat from 103,000 acres to 185,000.[47] At last the settlers could move against the African peasant economy that had, since the conception of the settler colony, been both rival and support.

In 1940, the Colonial Office passed a new Resident Native Labourers Ordinance, placing strict limitations on the number of livestock held by squatters and the amount of land that they could farm. Labour obligations were increased: squatters would now have to work up to 270 days per year in return for their continued rights to land. Increased revenue allowed settlers to mechanise production and renounce their erstwhile dependents, whose plots were quickly and drastically reduced – in most cases to one or two acres per family, while squatter herds were capped at 10 sheep or goats – and zero cattle. Unable to leave the farms for the now-overpopulated Kikuyu reserve in central Kenya, squatters had no option but to accept these new and impoverishing terms, but many settlers in any case simply threw squatters off their land. It was at this point that two prominent features of Mau Mau – the secret oathing of Kikuyu to ensure their loyalty and the maiming of settler cattle – became widespread.

These developments did not merely signal a ramping up of settler oppression. Patronage was the glue of Kikuyu society: the exactions of settler expansion broke the ties binding rich and poor together. Dispossession signalled the failure on the part of wealthy Kikuyu to offer a promise of patronage equal to the costs of loyal service. It also reflected the state's structural inability to perceive the implications of land alienation for African society. By the early 1940s, the social stresses and material miseries engendered by the settler presence had reached an extent uncontainable by either African hierarchy or colonial control. The war had transformed Kenya. 97,000 Africans had given military service, returning with new skills and with fresh experiences of being treated with respect by Europeans.[48] Significant numbers of allied troops passing through the colony eroded away at white prestige. 'It is nowadays a common sight to see a European sailor or soldier arm in arm with a native,' as one correspondent to the *Mombasa Times* complained, 'treating him as a blood brother; I have even seen them smoking the same cigarette and drinking out of the same bottle of beer'.[49] For many, however, the war and its aftermath meant profound alienation. Immigrants to the towns, young men in the main, struggled to find work in precarious circumstances. High rates of unemployment kept wages down, while the European farming boom forced food prices up: between 1939 and 1948, the cost of a bag of maize flour increased by 600%.[50] Housing provision was woefully inadequate. In 1947, the Nairobi Municipal African Affairs Officer acknowledged that over 16,000 Africans in the city were sleeping rough.[51] The city's African locations had been laid out earlier in the century, but Kenya's modern day slum-scape dates to the Second World War.[52]

Worse still was life in the native reserves, with rates of population density well over 500 per square mile. Overgrazing, constant cultivation and the shift from subsistence to market-oriented crop production depleted the soil and caused widespread erosion. Malnutrition was endemic; harvest failure brought famine to the Kamba reserve. Settlers' insistence on the sanctity of their own 'white highlands', however, foreclosed any consideration of making more land available for African use. The state reacted with the same contradictory evasiveness that it had demonstrated 20 years before: African interests, not those of settlers, were paramount, but, as Governor Philip Mitchell declared in 1947, those same African interests were best served by an increase in white settlement. Renewed commitment to the civilising agency of settlers, not their abnegation, would show the way.[53]

During the interwar years, the colonial state had hedged its bets, propping up settler agriculture while promoting African production at the same time to preserve its own fiscal resources.[54] Abandoning the settlers was too great a political risk: it was only a decade since, at the height of the Indian crisis, settlers had drawn up plans to have the governor interned.[55] Maintaining its uneasy combination of peasant and settler production kept Kenya in its limbo state; the prosperity generated by the next world war only deepened a conflict in which both sides then had more to lose. It was a new scientifically endowed project of agricultural reform, however, that enabled the

state to square the circle of contradictory settler and African peasant interest whilst reinstating its own indispensable role. It did so by invoking race, via a theme of disintegrating tradition. As it turned out, this program of reform genuinely did disintegrate tradition: as government continued to delegate the dirty work of coercion to their intermediary chiefs, the capacity of those same chiefs to serve as the buffer between popular grievance and the colonial state broke down.

Throughout the 1930s, research undertaken by the Kenya Agricultural Department had reported a rising ecological crisis in the African reserves. Failing to recognise overpopulation as the cause, administrators blamed African traders and commercial cultivators instead. Greed, it was suggested, and the spread of selfish individualism at the expense of the communal solidarities of pre-colonial Africans had undermined the harmonious balance between Africans and their land.[56] Consonant with a commonly felt antipathy towards the 'detribalised native' (one, significantly, shared by settlers), a campaign was launched at the war's end for conservation and improved land husbandry, implemented through the chiefs.[57] What this meant in practice was a forced revolution in African agriculture, with peasants – and their wives – commandeered into labour gangs to undertake the arduous work of terracing sloping land to save it from erosion. Over 10,000 miles of terracing were constructed but at the cost of antagonising large sections of the Kikuyu population – not only from the colonial state but from the chiefs who, once again, had chosen patronage from above over support from below. With the simultaneous withdrawal of settler patronage, young men lacked direction for the channelling of their loyalty, their service and their energy to work. The moral economy, not just of Kikuyu society nor of the settler-state alliance but of the entire settler-colonial dispensation, was starting to dissolve.

In 1945, Kenya's settlers were in ebullient mood. The war had proved their value. The colony had pulled together. The partnership mantra was renewed, with settlers insisting on their unique and nonnegotiable fitness to lead. But leadership could no longer be staked so unambiguously on race. The founding fracture of Kenya's colonial dispensation – between 'uplift' and subjugation – cleaved the settler-state apart. It did so over Mau Mau, the war that to settlers seemed incontrovertible proof for their belief that it was folly to ask anything but subjugation from people bound in perpetuity to a primitive past. That view could not be entertained by the colonial arm of a metropolitan state busy ideologically re-equipping itself for the post-war world. But the war was suffered by the Kikuyu in entirely local struggles that had deepened and grown intractable in the settler-colony's flawed distributions of patronage and power. The hubris reflected in the forced movement of Africans as if so many checkers on a board produced irreconcilable enmities; the scarcity of land made relations between Africans progressively more embattled through the life of the colony. During Mau Mau, 25,000 Kikuyu died, but these deaths reflected much more than a straightforward struggle against an oppressive colonial regime.[58] As a number of scholars have now shown, Kikuyu social relations depended on the controlled disbursement of access to land, on what John Lonsdale termed 'moral ethnicity', the normative social code by which Kikuyu men laboured to earn wealth and status – and the authority to confer the promise of these things to others. Land-hunger profoundly distorted these relations. As one former fighter stated when asked why he had joined Mau Mau, it was 'to regain the stolen lands and to become an adult'.[59] Insurgency arose only when the path to *wiathi* – self-mastery – appeared to have been blocked.[60]

Conclusion

The colonial state in Kenya pursued ulterior motives. The patronage of African farming and the cultivation of invented traditional authorities was pursued not to appease the aspirations of Africans but to compensate for the weakness both of the state itself and the white settlers to whom state officials felt themselves beholden. Inadvertently, that strategy helped to maintain political

stability within the framework of a British colony. Until the Second World War, the degree of African disenfranchisement was less than the colony's distribution of opportunity and reward. It was the ways by which Africans took up opportunity, however – and created opportunity in places government could not foresee, let alone control – that led to Mau Mau and the end of the settler state in 1963. That also determined the way in which the state itself was inherited by a Kikuyu elite who had found a nexus of new opportunity in the circumstances of the Emergency.[61] For many Europeans in Kenya in the 1950s, however, Mau Mau was an irrelevance. In 1945, the Kenya National Parks Ordinance had been passed, the parks to which the law gave rise established not only for the protection of wildlife but also (in the words of Mungumi Bakari Chongwa) to offer exclusive recreation to settlers.[62] Chongwa is inaccurate in his designation: more tourists came into Kenya during the 1950s than settlers, and it was predominantly they who visited national parks. But the reference to settlers' recreation is striking. How did settlers recreate? What were they doing when they were not suppressing African savagery or pioneering farms? That question returns us to the fantasy of settler colonialism in Kenya and its long afterlives in the commercial product that 'Africa' in Kenya has become. The national parks in 1950s Kenya were exclusive, but they were not for solely settler or tourist usage. Clearly, they were designed only for those with the wealth required to visit them, but they were also delimited by a particular sensibility. The tourist to Kenya was the settler at play. The game reserve was a variant of the settler farm.

Safari parks, farms and settler homesteads were all versions of a kind of curated Africa that was, above all, safe: safe from the debilitating, dangerous Africa that was experienced by many settlers in Kenya – and safe from Mau Mau. While Mau Mau represented the inversion of the settler fantasy, the endurance of that fantasy served as the antidote and the alibi for a constituency of feeling disqualified by decolonisation. It is that same fantasy that is being consumed by tourists on the Laikipia Plateau today, not only by Anglophone settlers and their descendants but by anyone with the inclination (and, of course, the money) to encounter the settler colonial 'Africa' at first hand. Indeed, in no other British settler colony can such a direct lineage be traced between its cultural construction prior to decolonisation and its manufacture as commodity once political independence had been achieved.

What made Kenya distinctive amongst Britain's colonial possessions was its hybrid constitutional status, at once a settler colony and an imperial responsibility. At no point did policy makers in London come close to handing the colony over to its European settlers, though this was precisely the settlers' ultimate aim. The refusal of successive British governments to countenance an independent, settler-led, Kenya reflects their deep commitment to an ideology of benign imperial rule, but it betrays equally the failure of the settlers to convincingly present themselves as credible custodians for African advance. By the mid-1920s, a dominant picture had emerged of the Kenya settler as a man fiercely – and selfishly – committed to the exploitation of African land and labour. A developing imperial ideology, meanwhile, crystallised around the idea of Africans needing protection above all: from themselves, from the forces of the modern world and, as it became increasingly apparent, from English-speaking settlers. Kenya's settler population thus came to emerge in the British imagination as something 'other', exotic at best, tyrannical at worse, altered fundamentally by their experience of settler rule.

The history of settler colonialism in Kenya was determined to a great extent by the struggle between the settlers themselves and the metropolitan state, a struggle mediated (and indeed, complicated) by the interests and ideologies of the colonial administration on the ground. If this was a struggle for power, however, it was also a struggle to control (or attempt to control) the lives of Africans. The great rhetorical myth espoused by both the settlers and the colonial state was that African and settler fortunes could be shown to be compatible. On the question of *how* precisely

they might be reconciled, however, hung deeply incompatible hinterlands of culture and belief. A surface rhetoric of partnership and good intention was nevertheless enough to postpone a decisive commitment by the British state. Only when it was demonstrably proved that the interests of black Africans and white settlers could not cohere did the British government intervene – to suppress African insurgency in the first place but to win the right in doing so to shape Kenya's transition to an independent African state.

A settler colony in East Africa was envisaged only as a solution to the problem that was the Uganda railway and its considerable expense. Its popular appeal, however, was considerable. With its plenitude of wild animals and its elevated topography, the highlands of Kenya became the site for the expression of a deeply nostalgic colonial fantasy. It was a fantasy that both incorporated and absented entirely the presence of African peoples, processes of discursive erasure that are clearly evident in the consumption of Kenya by tourists today. Because white settlers were outnumbered by Africans and Asians throughout the colonial period, and so remained dependent on the British state, the political reality of an East African 'white dominion' was bound to wither in the throes of decolonisation after the Second World War. Fifty years after Kenya's independence, however, the country continues to offer international visitors the very same 'Africa' fantasy that settlers in Kenya strove so ingloriously to achieve.

Notes

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12 R. A. Wilkinson, cited in C. Trench, *The Men Who Ruled Kenya: The Kenya Administration, 1892–1963*, London: Radcliffe, 1993, p. 120. The 'man on the Clapham omnibus' was a term current in nineteenth and early twentieth century Britain, used to refer to an archetypally reasonable but nondescript person.

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32 Kanogo, *Squatters*, p. 16.

33 M. J. Wiener, *An Empire on Trial: Race, Murder and Justice under British Rule, 1870–1935*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008, Chapter 7; D. M. Anderson, 'Punishment, race and the "Raw Native": Settler society and Kenya's Flogging Scandals, 1895–1930', *Journal of Southern African Studies* 37, 3, 2011, 479–97; B. L. Shadle, 'Settlers, Africans and inter-personal violence in Kenya, ca.1900–1920s', *International Journal of African Historical Studies* 45, 1, 2012, 57–80.

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17

SETTLER RULE IN SOUTHERN RHODESIA, 1890–1979

Enocent Msindo

Settler rule in Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) was an experiment that lasted 89 years.[1] This period could be roughly divided into four political phases, namely, the Company era (1890–1923), during which the British South Africa Company (BSACo) was in control; the Responsible Government (1923–1953), whereby settler-run parties governed under the advice of a governor but with a measure of political freedom; the Federal Era (1953–1963), during which Southern Rhodesia became part of a Federation encompassing Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland; before finally the Rhodesian Front (1963–1977) and the Internal Settlement (1978–79) periods, which marked a violent and contested period of transitional government leading to majority rule. In Southern Rhodesia, settler colonialism was imposed violently and was sustained violently, and settler rule ended after a protracted violent armed struggle.

In this chapter, I will examine at length the earlier period up to the 1930s, then summarise the period after 1940. This earlier period set in place various social, economic and political models, processes and traditions that later became associated with Southern Rhodesian politics and white settler identities in general.

A distinctive feature of Rhodesian settler colonialism before the end of company rule is its loosely organised administrative machinery, which failed to ensure sound administration of the Africans yet at the same time seemingly was organised enough to ensure that basic facilities for the white populace were provided. This anomaly was sufficient to attract more white (especially British) migrants to the country while at the same time generating working misunderstandings between the centre (settler power) and the periphery (African subjects).[2] The net effect of this was that the settler political system became, more often than not, violent, reactive and paranoid in its dealings with the restless African subjects. Administrative failures and the attendant disorder worked hand in glove with colonial looting and systematic economic alienation of the subjects. Southern Rhodesia was unlike other settler colonialisms, which were products of direct colonial conquest by an imperial country. Although a Royal charter was obtained for the conquest, the country was first colonised by a corporate concern, the BSACo. Its primary motive was to establish mining and agricultural interests in a 'new' territory. The administration of Africans and anyone else was important only insofar as it helped the company to realise its primary goal. A reforming imperial government in London insisted on keeping its distance from Rhodesian affairs, and its High Commission, situated in Cape Town, played only a nominal role in the colony's administration.[3]

Early settler administration

The occupation of colonial Zimbabwe started in 1890. Initially, the BSACo's 'pioneer column' circumvented the Ndebele kingdom to the south and invaded Mashonaland to the north without notable military resistance, save for the various forms of passive resistance to colonial administration before 1893.[4] Unlike the centralised Ndebele kingdom to the south and the Manyika polity to the east (the latter which grew as a result of trade in firearms with the Portuguese), Mashonaland region generally had weaker, smaller and decentralised polities. The previously strong Shona polities, the Mutapa and the Rozvi, which once dominated parts of Mashonaland and Matabeleland, were crumbling, having been severely weakened by late nineteenth-century political upheavals from the South, by their own politics of secession and also by incessant Portuguese political and economic meddling.[5] The settlers extended to Matabeleland in 1893 violently, ultimately leading to a war from October, which resulted in the overthrow of the Ndebele state in 1894.

Since the late 1850s, there had always been Europeans in the Ndebele kingdom, with missionaries, hunters, traders and also Boer, German and Portuguese adventurers all jostling for the approval of the Ndebele king and Shona chiefs for various interests in the region's resources. The late 1880s, however, saw increased requests for mining concessions. This put Lobengula, the Ndebele king, under immense pressure.[6] Eventually, Cecil John Rhodes' negotiators from South Africa won the intense competition for Lobengula's mineral rights, with the signing in 1888 of the Rudd Concession. This concession provided the BSACo the requisite political leverage to obtain a Royal Charter on 29 October 1889. This charter empowered the BSACo to make treaties, to promulgate laws, to maintain a police force, to preserve peace in the region, to acquire new concessions at the Company's expense and to develop the infrastructure of a new state. It was granted despite Lobengula's concerns that he had been cheated by Rhodes and his men. The Ndebele king denied that he granted exclusive rights to the BSACo, and he repudiated the Rudd Concession. Directing his wrath against the chief architects of the Concession, he protested to the Queen, even sending an official deputation which arrived in London as early as March of 1889. In Britain, however, these concerns were largely ignored. There was heightened pressure from British patriots and business interests to ensure that Britain had at least some stake in the wider region ahead of its European rivals, chiefly the Germans and Portuguese. Certain London interests, including some of the directors of the early BSACo, consistently demanded access to the region and wielded enough political power to be noticeable.[7] Rhodes himself embarked on a propaganda offensive to mobilise support in Britain and in South Africa, amalgamating some companies and fighting off others, ultimately to win the support of the colonial secretary by his appeal to the imperial cause.[8] When the charter was granted, it was anticipated that it would put a stop to this harried speculation and competition, though it granted no automatic BSACo monopoly. Like similar charters offered in the 1880s to the British North Borneo Company, the Royal Niger Company and the Imperial British East Africa Company – companies which did not experiment seriously with settler colonialism – the charter granted to the BSACo awarded, in return for responsibility, specific privileges including the right to allocate or dispose of land, to promote mining, to make taxes and to acquire more concessions.[9]

The BSACo's 'pioneer column' was a team of about 200 militia and 500 BSACo police. These were generally able-bodied Englishmen who were recruited from the Cape.[10] The 200 militia were hastily trained and were promised vast tracts of land in return for service.[11] On their way, the pioneers created a number of forts, initially as defensive units where they rested. These forts became towns dotted along their route from Beitbridge to Harare. On 12 September 1890, they finally arrived in Mashonaland and settled in a place that became Salisbury (now Harare), the locus of a new administrative system.

Initially, the pioneers settled without much resistance in Mashonaland because they signed treaties with some Shona chieftaincies to the East (Manyikaland) who expected the BSACo to protect them from Portuguese political interference. However, the BSACo soon encountered opposition of many forms from the Africans before the 1893–94 wars. Acts of sabotage such as the carting of telegraphic communication systems in parts of Mashonaland, Matabeleland and Midlands were common.[12] Some Africans refused to tender their labour to the emerging settler capitalist concerns. Others opposed BSACo's political interference in their communities. White businessmen were often subjected to violent attacks on their wagons, on themselves and on their African drivers, especially in chief Mangwende's area in Murewa. In some instances, Africans openly defied settler judicial authority, choosing to solve political disputes between themselves.[13] In Manyikaland, the BSACo still had to contend with strong chieftaincies, such as Mutasa, which had political and trading relations with the Portuguese in Mozambique. The BSACo had to negotiate with such kingdoms instead of fighting them.[14] It was clear that settler power was not a given. Their triumphal pioneer entry into and claim to sovereignty over Mashonaland were established on tenuous foundations.

The 'pioneer column' did not bring with itself a full-fledged administrative structure to rule the conquered. Before 1898, their administration remained rudimentary and stop-gap. Archibald Ross Colquhoun, the Administrator of Mashonaland between 1890 and 1891, was the first administrator to be appointed by Rhodes. He had previously served as a senior civil servant in the India office. He was appointed with no clear terms of reference about how he would administer the country and with no paperwork or statutes to help him undertake those responsibilities.[15] Moreover, being no personal friend of Rhodes, Colquhoun often fell victim to interference with his duties from Leander Starr Jameson, a Company official and a personal friend of Rhodes with whom Rhodes chose to communicate directly, circumventing Colquhoun. This bred friction between Colquhoun and Jameson, which resulted in the former resigning barely a year after taking office. Jameson, Colquhoun's nemesis, was immediately appointed the new administrator from 1891 to 1895.[16] Jameson was generally a dictator. He was accused of threatening to deport journalists and those settlers who dared complain about the BSACo's failures to meet their needs.[17] It is no surprise that most of the pioneers became frustrated and returned to South Africa in their first ten years of settlement in the country or at least approached Rhodes and Jameson for assistance to leave the country at a time Rhodes needed them most.[18] Jameson was finally replaced by Justice Joseph Vintcent, who served for a year from November 1895, the year Jameson left the country to organise an attack on the Transvaal Boer Republic of Kruger.[19] This botched Jameson raid, which battered the image of Cecil Rhodes and the Company, led to Jameson's final withdrawal from the country and his relocation to Cape Town (where, between 1904 and 1908, he became the Prime Minister of the Cape Colony, a position previously held by Cecil Rhodes until the failed Jameson raid). From 1897 to 1901, William Henry Milton became the administrator for Mashonaland (with the creation of two posts for administrators – for Mashonaland and Matabeleland). When the two posts were merged into one in 1901, Milton became the sole administrator until his retirement in 1914, after which he was replaced by Drummond Chaplin, who served until the end of Company rule in 1923.[20]

BSACo officials – like many colonial administrators in Africa – had very limited knowledge of African economics and politics. The societies with which they engaged were foreign to them. The easiest approach, so the BSACo believed, was to use force. In turn, however, this bred further resentment among Africans against the settlers. Before 1894, in Company-ruled Matabeleland and Mashonaland, there was no constitution or rulebook set out to guide the BSACo with its African relations. The Company was a law to itself. By the time the BSACo fought against the Ndebele in 1893 in their attempt to invade Matabeleland, the Africans of Mashonaland and

parts of Midlands had already suffered the brunt of settler violence. Between 1893 and 1894, the BSACo fought the various peoples of Matabeleland, most of whom had been under the control of Lobengula, the Ndebele king, either directly via the regimental system or indirectly through the tributary system.[21] After a protracted and costly war, the Ndebele were defeated, with their king, Lobengula, abdicating. To date, Lobengula's place of burial is unknown, but he seems to have committed suicide by poisoning himself sometime after the battle at Pupu, across the Shangani River in Lupane.[22] Following this 'conquest', the settlers, like the company, felt that the whole country was finally subdued. But, as Cobbing argues, the Ndebele state was not destroyed as a result of these wars but was instead merely transformed – even though Cobbing does not explain the nature of this transformation. Ndebele political structures were weakened and compromised by the 1893–94 wars and by the administrative machinery that subsequently replaced them, but they were not totally destroyed before the 1896–97 wars.[23]

Assuming that the Ndebele kingdom was already destroyed, the old pioneers and a growing number of new settlers encouraged more immigration into the yet-unnamed country. They opened up mines and set up Bulawayo as a major railway transport hub linking South Africa, Salisbury and later Northern Rhodesia.[24] By 1895, there were about 1,000 white workers who served in various departments of the BSACo.[25] To this was added the new settlers, many of whom were not in the service of the BSACo. Some of these were speculators and independent business persons who saw opportunities in this new territory. There were also a few women who were mainly wives of the male 'pioneers'. In Bulawayo alone, Plumer (who commanded the Matabeleland Relief Force against the uprisings of 1896) estimated that there were about 2,200 whites in 1896.[26] By 1901, the white population in Southern Rhodesia was about 11,000, further trebling to an estimated 33,000 by 1921[27] and to 55,408 in 1936.[28]

Early settler administration was fraught with disorder, for a number of reasons. One was the challenge of setting up new political systems in the land. Colquhoun and Jameson, the first and second administrators, were overwhelmed by the demands of establishing a settler headquarters in Salisbury, the establishment of postal communication systems, the creation of mining districts with Mining Commissioners, the establishment of health facilities and preparations for the establishment of mining and other regulations, planning for the road networks of the country, the dispatch of deputations to negotiate and sometimes to fight against resistant African chiefs, and so on.[29] Additionally, the predominantly poor mercenaries who had served in the pioneer column with a sense of entitlement also proved to be burdensome to the company, as they kept demanding attention, provisions, money and other assurances.[30] These initial challenges left too little time for the BSACo regime to concentrate on other pressing administrative issues, especially those to do with Africans.

Until after 1894, the BSACo had not yet formulated laws to govern the colony. In the interim, they relied on laws used in the Cape Colony. They also had insufficient administrative personnel to run the country. The whites who were in the country were a small population which was, in the words of Knight, one of the journalists in the country, '. . . still unsettled, scattered over an immense territory [and] yet be trusted with the control of the affairs of the commonwealth'.[31] Consequently, the territory remained under the administration of one man, Dr Jameson, until at least 23 May 1894, when the British Government entered into an agreement with the BSACo that laid out provisions for a model of settler government. This agreement was built on the earlier provisions of the Royal Charter of 1889. An administrative blueprint was laid which stipulated Britain's reserved right to full administrative control of the BSACo's territory, ostensibly to check against possible abuse of power by the BSACo and also to answer to the concerns of the opponents of the BSACo in England – principally the Anti-Slavery and Aborigines Protection Society – who were suspicious of the corporation's capacity to govern an African population.[32]

The abovementioned blueprint was ratified by an imperial Order in Council of 1894. It provided for the appointment of the colonial Administrator by the BSACo with the approval of the British Secretary of State; the appointment of a judge (head of the judiciary) by the Company, with the approval of the Secretary of State; and the appointment of four members of the Council other than the judge by the Secretary of State. The Council would act as the advisory board to the territorial administrator. Additionally, the administrator and the administrative Council, with the approval of the High Commissioner, were empowered to make laws, which could, however, be vetoed by the Secretary of State if considered necessary. The Company was also empowered to appoint magistrates, with the approval of the High Commissioner. The administrator was empowered to impose fines and levies on Africans for any misconduct or rebellion, which fines were to be reported to the High Commissioner. Importantly, a Land Commission was to be appointed to deal with 'all questions as to native settlements in Matabeleland'.[33] There were other provisions, but what is critical is that these 1894 provisions set the stage for the Company to govern legislatively and judicially through its own arms, although the BSACo became answerable to Britain through the High Commissioner in Cape Town as a result of the Order in Council. The High Commissioner had his Resident Commissioner in Salisbury, who worked closely with the colonial administrator. This agreement remained in effect until 1923, when the Company gave way to the Responsible Government. The Responsible Government was answerable directly to the British Secretary of State through its colonial office.

The 1894 Anglo–BSACo agreement had serious repercussions for Africans, especially considering the ways it was interpreted and even abused by the BSACo. First, it legitimised the dispossession of the vanquished through the 1894 Land Commission, which investigated issues of land allocation to Africans. Second, it led to changes in African socio-politics, with the bulk of African administration being put under the shoulders of the newly created posts of native nommissioners (NCs) under a system that combined 'civil' governance with 'traditional' African forms of governance, in which chiefs had limited powers. Interestingly, the 1894 Order in Council did not detail how Africans would be administered. It did not explicitly authorise the creation of the post of NCs; this, the BSACo went ahead and created anyway. In actual fact, this Anglo-BSACo agreement of 1894 put the jurisdiction of African civil cases under the magisterial courts manned by a judge who would judge civil cases '. . . in accordance with native law, in so far as the said law is not repugnant to principles of morality, or to any law or ordinance in force in the said territories . . .' and that, in determining civil cases, the judge '. . . may call to his assistance two native assessors to advise him upon native law and customs', although the final say lay with the judge.[34] Secondly, issues to do with chieftaincy were to be dealt with directly by the administrator. By placing African administration directly under the office of the administrator, who was answerable to the British Secretary of State through the High Commissioner in South Africa, Britain's intention was to protect Africans from extreme abuse by the Company and from an immediate erosion of their social and political systems.[35]

The BSACo did not honour this particular term of the agreement, but they appointed NCs in charge of districts, who, in the absence of clear regulations, were free to work as they saw fit. These new, few and usually untrained NCs had to deal with numerous African communities in the ever-changing and hastily created district boundaries where Africans were constantly migrating due to evictions from their land, overpopulation in some districts and other responses to colonial realities.[36] Some districts remained inaccessible until the late 1940s, when the settler regime finally engaged in some form of infrastructural development to open up new areas so as to depopulate the reserves and also to police the existing native reserves.[37] NCs were also expected to mediate against feuding neighbouring communities and to rule on some African customary issues. In most cases, the NCs were unsuccessful, as they often clashed with alternative socio-political

controls in African communities. These clashes generated negative attitudes towards Company rule. In some cases, however, the failure of some NCs to discharge duties was a result of bureau-cratic interference, lack of support and the belittling that some NCs felt before their senior BSACo administrative officials, who rebuked them in front of the African public.[38]

Most of the early NCs were handpicked either from members of the pioneer column or from patriotic British missionaries, hunters and explorers who had settled in the country earlier. Some were picked from newcomers who had not been part of the pioneers, as over 80 per cent of the pioneers had either died of illness, were killed in battles or left the country within the first 10 to 12 years of colonisation.[39] While some of the NCs were undoubtedly skilled leaders who inter-acted with Africans reasonably well, the majority of the NCs were amateurs who were selected not necessarily by merit but by virtue of whether the administrator, Jameson, liked them or not. In a measured but frank assessment of the BSACo native department, Philip Mason concludes:

> The first Native Commissioners were picked whenever a man who seemed suitable became available. In Nyasaland Johnson met Sharpe over a buck which the one had shot and the other was sketching and made him his right hand man; in the same way, Jameson chose a man he liked from the counter in a store or the desk in a telegraph office. They were sent out with a few instructions and a wide opportunity to create a tradition. In their diaries and letters, one can savour a life that was varied and as a rule leisurely, unhampered by too much correspondence, or by too much formality in what little there was.[40]

These very same NCs were expected to undertake complex administrative responsibilities that required them, *inter alia*, to provide impartial administrative authority, to be accessible, to receive and deal with petitions, to resolve disputes, to collect taxes, and, in the absence of magistrates, to function as one. Essentially, to be an NC was to be the face of the regime. Relations with the chiefs and other pre-existing political structures were not so clearly defined and, at best, contra-dictorily understood. To understand this, we need to first examine the developments of 1898. One was the creation of the Southern Rhodesian Legislative Council in October 1898, and the other was the constitution of the 1898 Order in Council. Before the 1896–97 wars, the political role of ordinary white settlers had been overlooked by the BSACo, which resisted their demands for involvement in government. Facing growing internal opposition after the brutal wars and aware of opposition in Britain which would have led to the revocation of the BSACo Charter (of 1889), Rhodes proposed (to the British Colonial Office) some form of settler representation in a Legislative Council.[41] Believing that settler representation would offer checks against the excesses of Company rule, the British Colonial Office assented to Rhodes' proposal. The Council had four elected members and a further five nominated by the BSACo, meaning that the Company still had a majority in the Council, which started functioning in 1899. Having settler representation had ramifications for governance in the colony. However, their mere presence did not change the plight of the colonised, which was worsened by the 1898 Order in Council.

The 1898 Order in Council became the key governing regulation of the BSACo until 1923, in addition to some amendments following the 1914 Native Reserves Commission and the 1920 Order in Council.[42] It expanded the scope of African administration by creating further levels of authority and chain of command, from the Secretary of Native Affairs at the top, via the two Chief Native Commissioners (CNCs) in charge of Mashonaland and Matabeleland, and then the district NCs and Assistant Native Commissioners. The office of the CNC started functioning in May 1895, with Herbert Taylor as the first CNC for Matabeleland. Taylor had lived in the Natal province of South Africa and was appointed, perhaps, with the view that, since he was conversant

with Zulu culture, he would prove to be a perfect fit for Matabeleland.[43] Little wonder that he approached native administration based on a neo-traditionalist conception of restoration of pre-colonial chiefs into authority. This he tried to do unsuccessfully, because Ndebele socio-politics were very different from those of the Zulu at that point and because claims to Ndebele power had been historically contested since the founding of the Ndebele state in the 1830s.[44] When it was later decided, in 1913, to consolidate the Mashonaland and Matabeleland CNCs' offices, Taylor became the CNC for the whole country, a position he held until his retirement in 1928.

The Order in Council of 1898 remained open to abuse by the NCs, who retained special judicial powers similar to those apportioned to Resident Magistrates in South Africa. They were also empowered to 'control the natives through Tribal Chiefs and Headmen', but their rights extended even further than this. They were authorised to 'assign lands for huts, gardens and grazing grounds for each kraal', to fix the number of huts in every kraal, to register the same huts and to collect hut taxes.[45] The authorisation of the NCs to control Africans down to the miniature details *ipso facto* made the powers of the chiefs and headmen rather nugatory, for how could the NCs control people through the chiefs when those chiefs were denied any real power over those people? This 1898 Order vitiated the spirit of the 1894 Order in Council which, in principle, tried to impose mild safeguards against the possibility of the BSACo turning into a highly interventionist settler regime. However, in this BSACo government's interventionist tendencies lay its failure to manufacture the consent of its African subjects between 1890 and 1923. Once the new government became more settled, there was pressure on the NCs to transact business officially. Apart from undertaking district patrols, briefing chiefs and serving as magistrates, they were now required to write monthly, quarterly and annual reports, which were a vital part of colonial bureaucratic code and intelligence gathering. These demands meant that NCs became more office-bound than before and that they could no longer directly influence African communities to the BSACo's original expectations. They were therefore limited in their capacities to understand the internal socio-political dynamics of African communities, to invent traditions and to enforce community values and colonial statutes.[46]

Africans responded to the exaggerated powers of the NCs in many ways. Some became insubordinate, openly refusing NCs' orders to appear before NC courts, as was the case of Tshwapa in Bubi. Some communities, such as those bordering the Botswana protectorate, relocated to Botswana. Some Kalanga chiefs in Bulilima-Mangwe boycotted some meetings called by the NCs. Other Africans illegally relocated to 'safer' districts to escape the violence of certain NCs and imposed chiefs. Some refused to relocate to reserves and opted to stay on missionary farms, such as those of Epworth and elsewhere. There are many other instances of resistance in both rural and urban areas throughout the history of settler rule in Southern Rhodesia.[47]

Abusive NCs took advantage of the loopholes in the 1898 Order In Council and also the general administrative lapses of the BSACo, knowing that their abuses were rarely reported, let alone investigated. Some abuses were also condoned by the state, as it was felt that the so-called natives '. . . are savages and need an ocular and tangible proof of the power of the Government constantly before them to make them accept its existence'.[48] Official and unofficial evidence suggests sordid abuse of office by the NCs. NCs indiscriminately shot Africans and burnt their villages in the countryside.[49] NCs and other BSACo officials also raped, deflowered and abducted young African girls and women (including those for whom bride price had been paid).[50] In some instances, the NCs and magistrates treated traditional chiefs with utter contempt before their own people. Moreover, the violent, marauding armed 'Native' police were periodically unleashed into African communities to forcibly collect taxes for the Company. Africans also lost cattle to looting new white farmers who were protected by the state. Many other grievances were highlighted by chief Somabulane, a Ndebele spokesperson at the 1897 Matopo *indaba* (political forum) that

Rhodes had called in an attempt to negotiate peace after the 1896–97 wars and by several other African leaders during the colonial era.[51]

After the 1897 *indaba*, peace prevailed in the country, but administrative issues remained to be resolved. Who would be the official chiefs and how would they be appointed? How would the government deal with other forms of political power in African societies? How would the Company regime reward 'the friendlies', their war collaborators, and at the same time placate the rebels who had accepted peace? How would the regime deal with counterclaims to chieftaincy, land and other rights? These were serious questions confronting the BSACo regime and its successor, the Responsible Government. Elsewhere, I make the point that, in the face of all these challenges, the limitations of the BSACo regime were exposed.[52] The settler regime failed to stop the social and political tensions that they created when they imposed their own chiefs. They failed to deal with alternative chiefs who were popular and recognised in some African communities. The settler government could not placate restless Africans, who were forming certain movements in both rural and urban areas to claim back their land and to claim some measure of political power. They had trouble with religious movements like the Watch Tower Movement. They also had trouble with emerging African organisational groups in the mining compounds and the rising urban African elites who claimed voting and economic rights, in addition to demands for decent housing.[53]

In the emerging towns, there was not yet any model to control Africans, who were now outside of conventional rural political structures. The emergence of permanent African urban dwellers had not been contemplated when the 1898 Order in Council was promulgated. The assumption was that Africans were essentially bound rurally to tribes. In response to increasing urbanisation, Superintendents of Natives were later appointed to oversee the administration of Africans in towns, but they were incapable of controlling urban Africans and were in some cases accused of corruption.[54] The Location Superintendents depended on gathering Africans under trees and issuing instructions. In the 1940s, they were using wired radio diffusion service to issue instructions. Like the NCs in rural areas, their administrative style remained the traditional top–down approach that left no room for sufficient feedback from below. They proved incapable of dealing with emerging African leaders in town such as those of ethnic-based societies like the Loyal Amandebele Patriotic Society, emerging African political movements like the Rhodesia Bantu Voters Association and trade unions like the Industrial and Commercial Workers Union. Colonial dictatorship violated conventional African oral information communication cultures and established administrative cultures which thrived because of social and political public spheres, such as the *indaba* or the *dare*, wherein matters were hitherto deliberated upon.

In rural areas, by the 1930s, the institution of chieftaincy had become severely discredited, and efforts to resuscitate their prestige were unsuccessful. The settler regimes had, in many cases, imposed their own chiefs and deposed traditional ones. They also tampered with established chieftaincy succession procedures by imposing their own for administrative convenience. Chiefs were generally used as agents of colonial dictatorship. Moreover, petty squabbles were created between chiefs, especially the 'organic' or historically rooted chieftaincies, who often conflicted with those appointed in accordance with the well-established colonial policy of 'divide and rule', a policy that remained key to settler rule in Southern Rhodesia.[55] This made most chiefs unpopular in their communities.

The new wave of evictions of Africans from their land in the 1930s under the Responsible Government further scattered Africans to new areas which were outside the jurisdiction of their original chiefs. This further redefined conceptions of tribal control, as many chiefs were now presiding over people who were not originally under their domain. Attempts to recognise this social change by redefining chieftaincy via amending the Native Affairs Act in 1927 did not address the root causes of the problem – namely, settler violence and economic alienation.[56]

Economic alienation

We cannot understand settler colonialism without understanding native dispossession. Cecil Rhodes and the London-based BSACo directorate were seeking profit. This explains why the earliest company policies aimed at dispossessing the colonised.[57] In theory, economic alienation guaranteed the settlers a certain level of political acquiescence from the vanquished by increasing their dependence on the state. Economic alienation was therefore an important constituent of the many styles of ruling, one of which we might call governing by poverty. In addition to the governing by poverty motive, there was another motive for economic deprivation in Southern Rhodesia – cheap labour sourcing and labour stabilisation.[58]

Looting and stealing was a major feature of the settler enterprise. It started during the pioneer column march, with members of the column stealing gold from and desecrating the Great Zimbabwe monument. They 'melted down ornaments found in the Ruins in the first year of the Occupation and thus destroyed valuable evidence that might have established the identity of the builders'.[59] The BSACo was aware of this looting and only belatedly issued a notice threatening to banish from Southern Rhodesia all those found stealing from the monument.[60] But this unorganised looting marked the beginning of lawlessness that later affected Africans, as it was followed by direct pillaging of villages for food and cattle by the settlers, including Company officials, between 1890 and 1897, which generated low-intensity fights and murders between the indigenous populations and the settlers.[61] In Mashonaland, habitual looting could be justified by the settlers on the spurious grounds that 'The Mashonas are so long accustomed to have their women and goods taken from them by force, that if a European were to abduct a dusky maiden, her departure would be considered as rather hard lines on her husband'.[62]

But the major issue that incensed Africans, especially in Matabeleland, was the looting of their cattle by ordinary settlers which happened during and after the 1893–94 war.[63] When the Company invaded Matabeleland and destroyed many villages, it proceeded to seize privately owned cattle and redistribute a significant number of them to the volunteer settler militia as spoils of war. Others of them were sold for a pittance. Only a few of those cattle were given to some prominent Ndebele chiefs as a way of appeasing them. The BSACo justified this looting on irresponsibly wrong grounds, arguing that ordinary Ndebele people did not own cattle and that all cattle in Matabeleland were 'King's cattle'. The logic was that if they were Lobengula's cattle, then they were state cattle. Therefore, on conquering Matabeleland, those cattle automatically became Company property.[64]

To understand the implications of this cattle looting, we have to appreciate the value placed on cattle by Africans. Cattle were not only a symbol of status and prestige, but before the introduction of monetary currency, cattle were indeed currency themselves – being an accepted medium of exchange under barter trade. Secondly, cattle were of cultural significance for two reasons: they were used for the payment of *lobola* (bride-price), and they were also of religious significance, for they formed part of the sacrificial offering to the gods. Thirdly, the increased presence of settlers in Matabeleland and Mashonaland led to growing commercialisation of cattle selling through a well-developed regional (Southern African) cattle trading network. Since the 1870s, there had been 'a very well developed trade in cattle . . . between Damaraland, Namaqualand and Ovamboland', and in Matabeleland, Africans also exchanged cattle, sheep and goats to the missionaries for blankets, handkerchiefs and other goods since 1879 or earlier.[65] By 1893, before the conquest of Matabeleland, there was lucrative cattle trading between Matabeleland Africans and white settlers based in Mashonaland, so much so that a number of settlers and Company officials had farms that were well stocked with cattle. Historian Stigger argued that the possibility of getting cheap cattle was one of the inducements to the otherwise poor pioneers, who did not have cash

to start bigger businesses.[66] The cattle business became even more lucrative in the mid-1890s, mainly because of the BSACo's looting of cattle in Matabeleland. This looting resulted in the flooding of the local cattle market, as the Company sold them cheaply with a view to dispose of them and to quickly generate money for the regime. Speculative buyers were in a position to buy them cheap, then sold them later at a profit.

Although the selling of looted cattle at cheaper prices opened up opportunities for some poor Africans to buy cattle from the BSACo regime, those who lost their cattle were severely affected socially, culturally and economically. This loss created political and social tensions not only between the former cattle owners and the Company but also between former owners and the new African buyers.[67] Loss of cattle meant that by the time the Company began to require a raft of taxes, most of the Africans were not in a position to pay these taxes unless they tendered their labour. So there was a relationship between cattle looting, labour sourcing and general political control.

The loss of land added to the growing African misery. Although land had been expropri-ated illegally and haphazardly before 1894, the enactment of the May 1894 Order In Council and its accompanying Land Commission (of June 1894) legalised the seizure of land from the indigenous populations, consequently driving most Africans into Native Reserves such as Gwaai, Shangani and many others which were created afterwards.[68] However, some refused to vacate and remained on the lands as labourers for the new owners or as rent-paying tenants. Some Africans moved into missionary farms, where they were subjected to a raft of missionary laws that included the abolition of beer drinking, polygamy and ancestral worship – themselves very serious demands which resulted in nonconformists being expelled.[69] Others simply stayed put as squatters on the newly designated farms. The net effect of driving Africans to the reserves was to indirectly coerce the landless poor into the labour market, where they would be easier to control, as they contributed directly to the capitalist economy.

By 1906, it was estimated that about 280,000 (almost half) of the estimated total population of 600,000 Southern Rhodesian Africans lived in native reserves, with the rest remaining on private farms. The CNC was worried by this growing concentration of people in the reserves, fearing the possibility of political upheaval. He recommended that it would be politically prudent to slow down the moving of people into reserves and to leave them scattered in small numbers on private farms under the control of the white farmers.[70] This remained the case until the end of the BSACo regime in 1923. So until the early 1930s, some Africans who remained on farms that were close to towns or mining compounds established themselves as successful market gardeners, selling their green produce to the mining compound stores or directly to the labourers. This group of small-scale African commercial farmers did not quickly succumb to capitalist demands for labour, which was needed in the rapidly increasing small mines and labour centres dotted across the country.[71] Reporting of increased African agricultural production in 1910, the NC for Bubi said, 'In many instances, natives sell their mealies to the mines, the actual first purchaser being the storekeeper on or near the mine who passes them to the mines. This bears out in my report of last year that the quantity of mealies grown has improved out of all recognition and compares favourably with that produced by the European farmer'.[72] However, when the Responsible Gov-ernment came in power, they accelerated racial land segregation through their 1925 Carter Land Commission, which gave rise to the Land Apportionment Act of 1930. This act solidified the relationship between race and land ownership in ways that had not been imagined even by the BSACo regime.

Under the Responsible Government regime, the appropriation of African land was followed by other regulations that seemed to have been double-pronged: to squeeze Africans economically and also to answer to the settlers' concerns about miscegenation and other complaints against

co-existing with Africans. The Land Apportionment Act (1930) declared illegal all African hab-itation on 'European' lands, effectively legalising racial segregation. This act triggered widespread evictions of Africans who had dwelt on such lands in whatever capacity, except for farm labour-ers. The result was more overcrowding in the reserves, and, of course, this had other consequences, such as droughts, environmental degradation and ethnic clashes, increasing migration to towns by others for greener pastures, which affected the rural social fabric.

The settler regime tried to exert some control over African agricultural produce marketing to ensure that African farmers did not compete equally with their white counterparts. The Maize Control Act of 1934 was promulgated for this purpose. The act led to the establishment of state-controlled marketing boards which lowered the selling prices of African products on the market. In response, African peasants drastically reduced their supplies to the state market-ing boards, selling instead amongst themselves, only to increase their supplies when the buying prices were increased.[73] In other words, attempts to suppress African economic aspirations were not always successful. Meanwhile, in towns, in the same year, the Industrial Conciliation Act was passed. The act excluded Africans from the definition 'employee'. If the act had defined Africans as employees, it would have made them eligible for protection under the act and for their trade unions to be recognised by the state. By defining only white workers as employees, the act offered white employees bargaining power that made their salaries higher than their black counterparts'.[74] But these pieces of discriminatory legislation came into force because of the fact that the white electorate (chiefly farmers and urban workers) placed incessant demands on Sir Godfrey Huggins' Reform Party for increasing economic protection. Huggins' party won the 1933 elections under an atmosphere of economic gloom due to the long recession that started in the 1920s, which weakened the incumbent regime. His party was a coalition of radicals who believed in exerting firmer control over Africans and offering more protection of the settlers. The party took advantage of the popular settler discontent to defeat the previous regime, the Rhodesia Party of Howard Moffat.[75] Prime Minister Huggins ruled Southern Rhodesia until 1953. He also became the first Prime Minister of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland from 1953 to 1956. Huggins was the longest servicing premier in British Commonwealth history. The 1934 laws that he promulgated must be understood in the context of his desire to be seen to fulfil his election promises so as to placate the restless and politically resolute settlers. During his tenure, the Land Husbandry Act (1951) was also passed.

Settler rule between 1939 and 1962

Between 1939 and 1945, Southern Rhodesia played an important role in the Second World War by providing military forces, food, metal and other resources that the British army required for the war. Although this war effort affected Southern Rhodesia's economy and settler morale at home, in Britain and among the British elsewhere, Southern Rhodesia's image as a settler colony was boosted, and the colony was seen as the ideal place to establish a strong British settler nucleus. British citizens were willing to migrate and permanently settle in Southern Rhodesia after the war due to many reasons. First, Britain experienced a post-war recession that drove some of its citizens to the colonies. Second, Southern Rhodesia engaged in extensive immigration campaigns to attract new settlers. Third, Southern Rhodesia was generally viewed by Britons as the major and politically stable English outpost in Southern Africa, especially after 1948. Some South African English-speaking nationals were willing to relocate to Southern Rhodesia in response to the demise of the Jan Smuts regime and the coming to power of the Afrikaner nationalists in 1948. The same applied to English nationals in Kenya following the nationalist violence of the Mau-Mau. Between 1946 and 1951, Southern Rhodesia's white population increased from

about 82,000 to about 135,000, and most of these were British.[76] The Federal period generally experienced net immigrations gains as the settler government marketed its industrial development strategy.

Increased white immigration put pressure on available job opportunities and on land. When the expected industrial growth failed, some of the new settlers turned to farming. Meanwhile, the African population had increased in size due to the general improvement of health facilities, particularly the availability of malarial drugs and the impact of the federal government's health awareness campaign. Once again, Africans became victims of settler policies as the government accelerated evictions from Crown lands. Government also introduced the Land Husbandry Act (1951), which not only increased colonial control over rural agricultural production but also ensured further environmental and political control of Africans on the native reserves.

The Land Husbandry Act, which was a product of emerging international thinking on agricultural modernisation and land conservation, was foisted on Africans without first ensuring that they understood the rationale behind the espoused measures. The act was a response to the deterioration of the environment, general land shortage and the overall decline in agricultural output in the African reserves which was partly blamed for the 1947 famine. People were forced to dig contour ridges, were urged not to farm downslope and were forced to destock their livestock herd, among others. Urban workers lost security of tenure, as they were considered to be the proletariat. This act and other colonial measures unwittingly spurred the rise of African nationalism. African nationalism arose not only as a result of international ideologies such as pan-Africanism but also as a result of certain conditions in colonial states. In Southern Rhodesia, Africans who had become discontented with settler colonialism united in the 1950s to form a nationalist movement. This merger included the broad coalition of members of the revived labour movement, discontented African veterans who were not properly rewarded after the war, educated African elites, aspirant business persons whose economic and political ambitions were thwarted by the state, general urban dwellers and the rural populace.[77] They formed the Southern Rhodesia African National Congress in 1957 and successive political parties, which were banned under draconian pieces of legislation that were hastily crafted by the United Federal Party.

The Federal regime eventually collapsed in 1962 as a result of the changing stance of Britain towards maintaining formal empire along with the rise of African nationalism, and also due to the growing ideological tensions between white liberals and conservatives in Southern Rhodesia. The Rhodesian Front, a new party made up of radical conservatives, took power in November 1962. Faced with massive emigration of mainly English liberals, the Rhodesian Front attracted many Afrikaners, Belgian-Congo whites and other ultra conservatives from different parts of the world to make up a coalition of settlers who would help the new regime to stay in power in return for economic and political privileges.[78] This regime remained in power until the eventual transition to independence, which was facilitated through a transitional government called the Internal Settlement (1978–79).

Faced with an uncertain future and struggling due to economic sanctions after their Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in 1965, the Rhodesian Front borrowed a number of ideas from the apartheid regime in South Africa. Their information policy, their native policy, which centred on the policy of separate development, and their general philosophy of governance were based on deep-seated segregationist ideals. In this sense, the Rhodesian Front differed markedly from their comparatively moderate predecessors, the United Federal Party, which had advocated, through its 'racial partnership' policy, some limited African participation in its developmental goals. Rhodesian Front land policy which denied Africans individual tenure; their community development ideology, which subjected Africans, regardless of status, to the dictates of chiefs; and their refusal to open windows for Africans' political participation were anachronistic, considering

that most Africans countries were gaining political independence. Their conservatism and unwillingness to concede power led to the armed struggle which eventually led to negotiations, leading to Zimbabwe's independence in 1980.

Conclusion

Settler colonialism in Southern Rhodesia was predatory and had lasting consequences on the colonised. It was initially chaotic. This set precedents for successive regimes. Consecutive governments never fully managed to answer to the vexing question that they called 'the Native problem'. Administering Africans proved challenging because there was no political will to imagine acceptable forms of governance for the Africans. Instead, the settlers relied on various forms of violence to sustain white privilege and to resist political change. The use of force only led to increased African resistance in the early years. It also led to the formation of various political and social movements after World War 1, the rise of powerful labour movements that critiqued the state in the 1940s, the rise of broad-based nationalist movements in the late 1950s and eventually the armed struggle which began in the late 1960s.

In the early years, attempts to negotiate and pacify Africans (such as what happened at the 1897 Matopos *indaba* and others that followed) after years of looting and brutality came too late to inspire Africans' confidence in the BCACo. Second, in the absence of sufficient manpower in the Native Department, the ultimate level of political and social engineering in African communities was limited. This is not to say that the encounter did not at all transform Africans' worldview, but it is to say that there were limits to the settler state's hegemonic project before the 1930s. As the few Native Commissioners bore the brunt of increased bureaucracy, they lost touch with Africans as they became more office bound than before.

Increasing interventionist policies after 1930, through laws such as the Land Apportionment Act (1930), the Maize Control Act (1934), the Land Husbandry Act (1951), the Native (Urban Areas) Accommodation and Registration Act (1951), the Native Affairs (Amendment) Act (1959), the Land Tenure Act (1969) and the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act (1960) generally increased settler control over Africans and entrenched white privilege. However, these met various African responses, some of which have been briefly examined in this chapter.

Regardless of the spate of colonial looting, land alienation and the passing of racially skewed legislation which were meant to increase Africans' dependence on the settler state and also to create a reservoir of cheap labour, Africans had ways of countering settler colonial dictates and settler economic institutions. One way was to refuse to pay taxes by migrating to other districts or to South Africa for work. Others usually skipped their national borders to escape marauding tax collectors and labour recruiters only to return when colonial officials had left. Still other Africans engaged in small-scale commercial farming to raise their revenue levels so that they could pay the required colonial taxes without having to offer themselves to work in dangerous mine shafts. Additionally, some Africans relocated to towns to escape rural controls and to seek alternative sources of income. Yet another African response was the refusal to adhere to instructions from imposed chiefs. Others appealed to African initiated churches that criticised established colonial order. Since the late 1940s, radical trade unions and African nationalist parties opened important political spaces to fight settler power. These various African responses proved challenging to the settler governments, which were not so ready for political change. We conclude that notwithstanding its capacity to use force and the law, settler power met its fair share of challenges that made it difficult to easily manage the Africans of Southern Rhodesia. The institutions and practices of settler colonialism in Zimbabwe have left a lasting legacy, however, which has made it difficult for racial reconciliation.

Notes

1　This work is based on research supported in part by the National Research Foundation of South Africa (Grant Number 90985) and the Rhodes University Research Committee Grant. Unless stated otherwise, all primary sources used are from the National Archives of Zimbabwe (NAZ).

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46 See generally, Msindo, *Ethnicity in Zimbabwe*.

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18

THE ITALIAN FASCIST SETTLER EMPIRE IN ETHIOPIA, 1936–1941

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Neither Italian colonial expansion nor settlement started with the fascist conquest of its 'Empire' in Ethiopia. In 1935, Italy already had its colonies: the little Eritrea and Somalia and the recently 'pacified' – with a brutal military campaign – Libya. Settler colonialism, as a project for the mass settlement of Italian emigrants, was widely present in the political discourse since the beginning of the twentieth century. Its practical application had yet to be implemented, but in Libya the fascist regime would invest a lot – especially in the 1930s – for the realization of ambitious plans such as the rural settlement scheme of 1938–39, which settled in the north African colony about 30,000 Italian farmers. Nevertheless, the fascist 'Empire' was something different and new: here settler colonialism was put in practice in an exceptionally fast and radical way, and its peculiar traits make it an absolutely unique and interesting case study.

Ethiopia was the last colony conquered by a European nation. It was formally ruled by the Italians from May 1936 to May 1941,[1] but the late aggression and ephemeral lifespan should not overshadow the weight that this conquest had in Ethiopian and Italian history and culture, in the international balances of the time and in the lives of the people who lived that experience. If we consider the history of European colonialism as a whole, the conquest of Ethiopia appears as an anomaly: late, occurring in a decade in which the nationalist movements began to take root in the colonial world, against a sovereign state participating to the League of Nations and fought with extraordinary military and propaganda effort. But in the context of Italian colonial history, it was the culmination of a process begun half a century earlier (the first Italian colony, Eritrea, was formally established in 1890), and it represented the moment of maximum financial, political, human and emotional commitment.

This extraordinary effort was a direct consequence of the policy of the fascist regime; it was the symbol of what Italy had 'always' wanted and had never been able to get, from the beginning of its colonial expansion; it was against an enemy who inflicted the most humiliating defeat (Adowa, 1896), the worst ever suffered by a European power in the colonies. Mussolini wanted revenge; he wanted to succeed where others before him had failed. Moreover, he wanted to conquer his own empire, distinct from the colonies inherited from previous Liberal governments. And it was actually new, from all points of view: preceded by a relentless propaganda campaign to mobilize the consciences of Italians; won with a modern war fought by about half a million Italian soldiers; imagined as the new home for millions of Italian emigrants, who would have to form a new fascist society.

On 9 May 1936, Mussolini didn't announce to the masses the conquest of a new colony; he proclaimed the birth of an 'Empire'. This word contained dense symbolic meanings: In his opinion 'Empire' distinguished the fascist conquest from the previous colonial acquisitions, giving it a prestige and a solemnity that placed it in continuity with the Roman past; 'Empire' placed fascist Italy as a great power before the eyes of the world, with all that came in terms of political weight in the international balance and consensus regarding boundaries; 'Empire', above all, marked a milestone in the regeneration of the Italian people that Fascism had as its ultimate goal.[2]

The new fascist conquest should also have had a material impact on the lives of many people. Ethiopia, in the regime's propaganda, was the 'Empire of labour' (*Impero del lavoro*) where the masses of workers could move, fulfilling the dual purpose of eliminating emigration abroad and exploiting the new territories that, following a common trend in colonialist rhetoric, were regarded as 'empty', 'virgin' or at least not adequately exploited by Africans. 'Demographic colonization', the permanent transfer of masses of Italians into the colony, was an old theme that Fascism revived and on which it insisted strongly, painting it as the character that most distinguished the fascist colonial project from that of other European powers. On this point, on the convergence between the rhetorics of the 'Place in the Sun' and the 'virgin land', the colonialist discourse of Fascism insisted with relentless hammering. Italian journals in the late '30s, to cite only some examples, wrote that the demographic colonization of Ethiopia was the 'typical form of colonization, the pride and joy of Italy',[3] through which 'is stated the novelty and originality of the fascist colonial doctrine, inspired and directed by the genius of the Duce'.[4] According to the regime's propaganda, it was new and distinctive: 'In the colonies, nothing like this has ever been done', because 'it is not the old way of colonization (white adventurers left on their own, or exploitation of indigenous energy, etc.) but a new fact in the history of Africa and the world'.[5]

These characteristics should allow the fascist occupation of Ethiopia to be productively interpreted within a settler colonial studies framework. The settler colonial project of the fascist regime, however, was peculiar, since Fascism claimed paternity on its settlerism (it was the Italian way, the 'Roman' way, to colonialism), characterized by a strong nationalist (being dialectically opposite to that of the 'demo-capitalist' nations) and social (having to solve the problem of unemployment and to eliminate the migration of workforce abroad) self-representation. Looking beyond the rhetoric, proclamations and propaganda, this chapter will analyse the 'Empire' as a settler colonial project.

Ethiopia as a settler colony

The first, substantial flow of migrants from Italy to the 'Empire' was that of the workers who, during and after the war with Ethiopia, were charged with the construction of the road network and new buildings. It was a movement of about 201,440 Italian workers in the short time span 1935–39.[6] The movement of labour was run by the regime at the start through a complex system. Jobs offered by companies were allocated to applicants from Italian regions according to the rate of unemployment. In the colony, workers were enrolled into the paramilitary militia of the Party for a six-month contract, which expired upon their return to Italy. They were not, therefore, settlers, but labouring migrants that the regime used massively for a very short period – when urgency to build the infrastructure was great (about half of the arrivals took place, in fact, in 1936) – and then gradually replaced them with the cheaper indigenous labour.

Encouraging the migration of workers for the purpose of encouraging the production and sale of commodities in international circuits of unequal exchange is a colonial practice. However,

in the 'Empire', colonization was not intended for the exploitation of resources but to realize in exceptionally rapid time the industrial and road network and the infrastructure necessary for settlement. It was therefore a short-term nonsettler mode, functional to the long-term settler project.

The construction of the 'Empire' was made urgent by the fact that the settler population – immigrants or soldiers who chose to remain – increased dramatically in a very short period. Just in Addis Ababa, the capital and main city of the 'Empire', the Italian civilian population increased from 1,000 to 40,000 in only three years.[7] Such an impressive growth rate was certainly unique if compared to the trend of other settler colonies in Africa: for example, in the decade 1921–31, Europeans in Kenya increased from 9,651 to 16,812;[8] in Southern Rhodesia from 33,780 to 50,070;[9] the settler population in Algeria was much higher, but the increase in population was also much more gradual.[10]

What is also noteworthy about the fascist settler project in Ethiopia, aside from the sheer scale of the emigration, was the overwhelming preference among new settlers for a life in the city rather than the countryside: in the 'Empire' lived about 80,000 settlers, half of whom lived in the capital and the others distributed in the five major urban centers.[11] The peasants were depicted as true fascist settlers: farmer-soldiers who, after the ideal model of the Roman colonist, would assume the dual role of 'propagators of civilization' and armed guards of the 'Empire'. Nonetheless, according to the most reliable estimates, in 1940, there were no more than 400 Italian farmers, of which only about 150 were joined by the families.[12] Adding in some 200 small- and medium-sized concessionaires,[13] the scale of agrarian colonization was minimal.

In summary, the immigration of settlers in Ethiopia had three immediately identifiable characteristics: a) it was numerically large, considering the growth rate compared to the short amount of time; b) it was directed mainly to the capital; c) it was essentially urban, with a very low degree of dispersion in the inland.[14]

The building of an ideal settler society

This extraordinary influx of civilians and the project of populating the 'Empire' with masses of Italian immigrants were accompanied by a migration policy unique in the settler world. Until the 1930s, the Italian colonies were ruled, concerning immigration, in a manner more or less in line with other European colonies in Africa, namely the establishment of mechanisms to avoid the settlement of poor whites, discouraging all the working-class immigrants who wished to move in search of opportunities. Before the conquest of Ethiopia, only a very small number of Italians chose the Italian colonies as a destination, because the poor work opportunities they offered were sufficient as a deterrent. But when the 'Empire' was born, the hundreds of thousands of workers who moved to Ethiopia – and the millions of settlers who were expected to follow them soon – made another migration policy urgent. The new 'Empire' was meant to be the jewel of the regime, the experimental laboratory of fascist totalitarianism,[15] populated by a new type of Italian:

> The old-style colony, the colony of exploitation designed according to the demo-liberal mentality, had something chaotic and adventurous that is repugnant to our fascist mentality. The colonial life was then a brief period in the life of a man; they grabbed what they could and as much as they could, to return to their country with the purpose of not setting foot in Africa ever again [. . .] Another thing is the Fascist 'Empire' [. . .] The 'colonist' today [. . .] is no longer a carefree swaggerer and begetter of a progeny of mestizos.[16]

According to this particular settler program, the 'Empire' had to be populated by a 'new man' who would have to move permanently to build a new fascist society: a society devoid of all the elements considered unfit for physical, political or moral reasons. This implied the need to regulate migration. No Italian was free to go to seek his fortune in the new colony: the workers were selected by the authorities within specific lists based on the statistics of unemployment and were transferred by the state after being enrolled in military contingents of soldier-workers. Future settlers, the Italians who wished to move to start a new life in Ethiopia, were forced to meet a series of selection criteria. The issuance of passes permitting settlers to relocate to Ethiopia was the shared responsibility of the local colonial governments and the authorities in the mother country, in particular the police stations, which checked criminal records and investigated political conduct.[17] Those filed as 'subversives' could not get a pass. Those who managed to be removed from the list had to wait six months before receiving permission to apply for one. After these tests, and with the authorization of the colonial government, the police would then have been able to release the passport, provided that the candidate had a contract with an Italian company operating in East Africa or, if he was a business owner, had the authorization – obtained through another, even more complex bureaucratic process – to start an economic enterprise in the 'Empire'. If a settler's wife and children wanted to join him in Ethiopia, he would have to apply to the colonial government, stating his qualifications, employer and names of the relatives who wanted to come in the 'Empire' (along with age and family relationship); then he had to attach to the application his family status, the declaration of the mayor of the city of origin certifying that the family was dependent on him, a document proving the possession of adequate housing in the 'Empire', the Health Bureau certificate declaring his accommodation space inhabitable and a statement by the employer that would indicate the settler's pay, position and duration of the job.

The regime therefore planned a series of barriers to select the settlers on departure and discourage adventurers in favour of labouring settlers. To quote a newspaper printed by the fascist Party in Ethiopia, 'You can not say – for our dignity and racial prestige – that an Italian is here "to seek his fortune"'.[18] This selectivity is a peculiar feature of the Italian settler project in Ethiopia.

The barriers seem to have been anything but impenetrable if the Viceroy – the highest rank of the colonial bureaucracy in Italian East Africa – in conversation with a British diplomat, confessed to have to remedy the fact that, of the hundreds of thousands of Italians arrived in Ethiopia, 80% to 90% were 'undesirable'.[19] Indeed, it is interesting to note that the regime's attempt at control had resulted in different ways of circumventing the controls themselves by emigrants, through the corruption of the officials responsible for the selection. It was a clear conflict between the settler colonial program of the regime, based on the selection and the restriction of access, and the will of the emigrants, who would not submit to limitations and barriers and wanted to move – as much as possible, as soon as possible – to chase the mirage of richness.

The settler economy and society

The regime's attempt to build a new settler society also involved the development of mechanisms designed to restrict the kind of economic activities available to settlers. Controls aimed at deterring the speculative activities of large firms in favour of an 'Empire of labour' that would allow Italians to exploit the new land with the short-term goal of achieving self-sufficiency from the motherland and the long-term goal of providing raw materials to Italy.

The instrument through which the regime tried to keep the economic activities under control was the bureaucracy: each firm was regulated by permits and licenses. The regime also maintained

control over the development planning of the 'Empire'. Other measures were soon put in place, such as a careful control on prices and operators to prevent traders (mostly Italian) from taking advantage of the need for imported Western goods, and thereby enriching themselves at the expense of the community. Again, we are talking about a strong colonial government control put in place against the settlers in order to facilitate the settlement itself.

The web of permits from which settlers had to extricate themselves was so thick and the process to get them so slow that the entrepreneurial initiative of many settlers was discouraged. An anonymous report of 1937 poignantly defined the Italian government's policy as 'a love that stifles'.[20] The state thought of the 'Empire' as an extension – if possible, even more 'totalitarian', and therefore with a state presence even more pervasive – of the motherland. It introduced mechanisms of limitation and control of the free enterprise of colonists in view of an overall project of settlement that preferred the common welfare of a stable and self-sufficient settler economy. This vision was increasingly at odds with that of the settlers themselves, who wanted open access to resources, free enterprise, and minimal economic regulation to allow for the exploitation of the entire area, the possibilities of which were just waiting to be seized.

These ambitions were frustrated by state efforts to control all economic activity. But by authorizing specific companies and planning for distinct economic sectors, the state sought to prevent settler bankruptcy. The 'poor white problem' of Africa could find no similar manifestation in Ethiopia. Whereas, in other African colonies, local colonial regimes took steps to ensure the spread of white poverty, the fascist 'Empire' was hoped to be free of poor whites from the beginning. This was only possible because of the authoritarian state, which possessed a series of coercive instruments different from those of democratic governments. Real internment camps were established in Africa, where unemployed Italians were rounded up by the colonial police and kept waiting for their forced repatriation. For their part, those economically marginalized from the new settler societies often tried ardently to avoid deportation and stay in Africa to seek fortune, hid to evade the authorities or, in many well-documented cases, moved clandestinely across the border into the neighboring British or French colonies.

Disciplining the spaces, separating the races

The state of insecurity in the Ethiopian *inland*, where Italian control was always precarious, along with the preference of Italian settlers for economic activities related to urban spaces such as retail trade, catering and lending offices, explains why about 85% of the Italians settled in one of the six largest cities, with approximately 50% concentrated in the capital. The fact that Ehiopia was an 'urban Empire' made the need to control, modify and re-draw the urban spaces central within the fascist settler project. Colonialism in general, including settler colonialism, shaped the surrounding environment, adapting it to its needs;[21] the originality of the fascist 'Empire' resides in the rapid increase of the settler population, which was followed by an equally peculiar speed and radicality in the urbanization projects. Two key concepts informed this urbanization: 'modernization' and segregation.

The regime planned for the settlers an 'Empire' in which they could live in the long term. This project therefore focused on modern urban spaces and on infrastructure and services. Taking the example of the capital, Addis Ababa, which was the city in which this development had far more evident relevance, we see that in 1940 there were five state schools for whites; a hospital with about 700 beds for whites and 500 for natives, as well as other outpatient facilities for soldiers and workers; a taxi service with more than 250 cars and a bus service with 10 lines; six cinemas for whites and one for blacks.[22] State efforts to provide for the installation of this infrastructure within the first five years were significant.

Racial segregation of the urban space was even more important than its 'modernization' in terms of a mass settlement, and it was around the concept of separation that the regime planned the division of existing urban spaces and, especially, the construction of new ones. The 'emptiness' of colonial spaces was present everywhere in the imperial architectural discourse.[23] The old Italian colonial cities in Eritrea, Somalia and Libya were the result of decades of additions, modifications, new foundations or expansions of existing cities with which the newcomers had necessarily to reckon; Ethiopia, on the contrary, was perceived as a blank page on which to draw entirely new cities, with no history, no items to keep or favor, no obstacle to come between planners and their ideas. The indigenous population had to be removed into a specially built new district to make way for the new white city.[24]

Segregation was one of the cardinal principles of the urban planning regulations that disciplined the 'Empire', based on the desire to protect whites aesthetically and 'hygienically', with the aim of making blacks 'as invisible as possible to whites', and whites 'as visible as possible to blacks', in particular from the point of view of the public and monumental architecture, in an exercise of 'cognitive domination'.[25] At the center of this project there was, obviously, Addis Ababa, capital of the 'Empire', which in the eyes of the Italians appeared to be a great city-forest dotted with clusters of huts, so essentially a non-city ready to be razed and re-built according to the new criteria. The project for the new Addis Ababa involved the transfer of 12,000 natives to a brand-new native district, divided along social and ethnic lines.[26] The new Italian city, divided into zones depending on the intended use,[27] would be separated from the 'native district' by a large green belt of villas and parks, a line which, as has been noted by Fuller, reflecting that the social division between the races was 'natural' and impassable, made the physical separation also natural by using environmental obstacles such as rivers and forests.[28]

Prior to 1935–36, Italian colonial authorities pursued an assimilationist policy, encouraging the recognition of mixed-race children so that they automatically acquired Italian citizenship. From 1933, unrecognized 'mestizos' were allowed to gain citizenship.[29] The dividing line between rulers and ruled – and therefore the protection of the 'prestige' of the first – was guaranteed by an informal racism based on discriminatory social practices shared by the small white communities. Everything changed with the invasion of Ethiopia and the subsequent, rapid immigration of large numbers of soldiers, workers and then settlers: the disruption of the social order caused by this migratory movement, exacerbated by the ignorance of these newcomers of all the unwritten rules that made up the colonial *ethos*, by the situation of war and post-war tension between authority and subjects, and by the large numbers of working-class whites who lived and worked in physical proximity and similar material conditions with the natives, made it necessary and urgent to adopt a series of measures to guarantee the separation and to protect the racial 'prestige'.[30]

After the conquest of the 'Empire' in 1936, Italy began the construction in East Africa of an apartheid-like system based on anthropological theories circulating in the country,[31] oriented by a policy of strict separation as a necessary condition to the settlement of the rulers and implemented through a series of decrees and regulations issued locally, with some laws issued directly by the motherland. The local government's decrees were mainly intended to put into practice racial segregation in all aspects of public life, acting in a sense as a necessary regulatory corollary to the physical separation that, as we have seen, urban planners were trying to achieve in public spaces. From the earliest directives in the recently conquered 'Empire', a clear separation was mentioned to distinguish and differentiate the races, with the aim of creating separate residential areas, avoiding any familiarity and excluding the natives from public places frequented by whites. In September 1936, all white taxi drivers, Italians and foreigners, received by notice the order not to 'accept under any circumstances native travelers';[32] and on 17 September 1938 the use of

taxis driven by natives was forbidden to Italians and white foreigners.[33] With Ordinance No. 191 of 21 September 1938, the Municipal Administration of Addis Ababa – officially because 'the prophylaxis of infectious diseases transmitted by arthropods is advisable to reduce to a minimum the relations of Italian citizens and foreigners with the natives' – forbade whites from entering Ethiopian homes and the new native quarter. Those who were required to enter into native areas for work had to obtain a pass issued by the police and undergo a disinfection on alternate days at the public Health Office, which would stamp a visa to the pass after each treatment.[34] Another local decree for the protection of 'racial prestige' forbade whites to attend indigenous shops and bars, except those with a license to sell to whites.[35] Not only space but even time was controlled: indigenous shops had to close at 20:30, and the 'natives' could not circulate in the city after 21:00, except in a specific defined area where the curfew was set at 23:00; after the curfew, only some Africans employed by the Italian authority, in possession of a permit, could circulate.[36] These are just some examples, and the wide range of restrictions on access to public places included a separate school system, limited for the native to the first elementary years.

Besides the local (viceregal, gubernatorial and municipal) decrees regulating the interaction between whites and blacks in the public space, a series of national laws took care to regulate the delicate aspects of interracial interaction in the private space: sexuality, marriage, procreation. Ethiopia had a rate of white women that in 1940 amounted to about 14% of the total Italian presence, and the government, to minimize sexual contact between settler men and African women, imported white prostitutes and gave incentives for the transfer of young unmarried Italian women. The authorities were willing to tolerate interracial contacts, provided that they were only limited to sexual activity, with no elements related to forms of *affectio maritalis*, such as continuity, exclusivity or community of room and board.[37] The main concern was the *madamismo*[38] question, because stable unions, by their very nature – although a detailed investigation reports that these unions were generally anything but equal or immune from racist dynamics[39] – were too dangerous for the line of hierarchical separation between masters and subjects; a line that, in the context of an 'Empire' that was perceived as inherently precarious, must be enforced in order to ensure the rule of the white minority. Concubinage – usually tacitly tolerated even when it was forbidden[40] – was therefore treated with particular harshness. Similarly, in order to preserve 'whiteness' as a category that was exclusive, restricted and the prerogative of the rulers, it was necessary to determine its precise borders and consequently provide for the exclusion of children of mixed blood, the so-called half-breeds (*meticci*).

From this background originated what was another original feature of the Italian settler program: the use not only of decrees issued by the colonial government but also of national criminal law through particularly harsh legislation that disciplined racism. In Southern Rhodesia, for example, to prevent interracial marriages, there wasn't need for criminal law because of the pressure of a conformist society that stigmatized sexual relationships with black women.[41] In the 'Empire', a new settler society grown up in just four or five years, this social pressure was not enough: starting with the Italian conquest,[42] criminal law first punished with imprisonment for a period of between one to five years for those Italians who had 'like-marriage' relations with subjects or 'assimilated',[43] then identified the 'injury of racial prestige' as an independent crime – by abuse or omission if committed by a white, by offense if committed by a subject or assimilated – or as aggravating other offenses.[44] Finally, the climax of the racist legislation forbade the recognition by Italian parents of children of mixed blood, who were irrevocably considered to be colonial subjects.[45] This was a body of legislation that was issued directly from the motherland and that was resented by many among the community of settlers, as evidenced by the frequent violation of the law on concubinage and the many children that Italians had with African women, which numbered about 300 in 1938[46].

Panic, exclusion, violence

The relationship between settlers and natives was therefore regulated by the authorities in terms of physical separation to maintain the 'prestige' and a superiority that had to be set not only militarily but also socially reinforced and psychologically perceived, day after day, in order to protect the rule of the minority. The members of the latter, once they had settled into colonial reality, developed a vision of race relations that in many ways was different from the official one. Among the most visible differences were the frequent violations of the racial laws, particularly regarding relations with African women; however, there is one aspect of the attitude of the Italian settlers against the Africans that seems particularly interesting: fear, and the violence that fear generated.

In Ethiopia at the end of 1939 – although the statistics were very inaccurate – Italians constituted about 0.8% of the population. These demographics are comparable with those of other African settler colonies[47] and may contribute to explaining why panic was constitutive in particular in that kind of settler society – such as those founded by settlers in African colonies – where a tiny white minority ruled the black majority.[48] This complex set of anxieties, with different shades but always associated with a sense of threat and danger, was amplified in Ethiopia by the condition of the perpetual insecurity of the inland – bloodied by the brutal conflict between the indigenous resistance and the colonial repression – particularly in the first years of domination, when the conquerors lived in practice in the barricaded city, listening to the rumors that daily came about white workers massacred in the yards and waiting for the armies of the 'rebels' to re-conquer and take revenge. The Italian settlers were a minority surrounded by an overwhelming number of recently subjugated (*sottomessi)* Africans. Their precarious rule was protected only by the guns of the army.

Settlers often react to a similar sense of threat and paranoia with violence, especially in cases where the authority was perceived as vacant and settlers could then occupy that lawless space.[49] So it was no coincidence when, in Ethiopia, settler violence erupted on a large scale at a time of crisis of authority: on 19 February 1937, the Viceroy Rodolfo Graziani was seriously injured in an attack in Addis Ababa at the hands of Ethiopian patriots,[50] and while he was hospitalized, the secretary of the *Fascio* (the local branch of the Fascist Party) ordered retaliation, literally unleashing the civilians.[51] These then started a *pogrom*[52] during which, for nearly three days and nights, Ethiopian men, women and children were beaten and killed on the streets or burned alive with their homes. This series of gruesome acts of violence that came to an end only when the authorities resumed control of the situation, officially prohibiting other reprisals. It represents a significant episode of large-scale violence.[53]

Settler colonialism by its very nature tends toward the elimination of the indigenous people in order to permanently and totally appropriate the land – within which the indigenous is designated as an intruder[54] – a plan that in Africa had not been realized completely, except for episodical nonorganized and/or individual initiatives, as in the brutal explosions of violence against Africans that followed waves of panic.[55] This violence did not turn into large-scale massacres because of the strong and violent presence of the authorities, which kept racial relations in general, and the indigenous people in particular, under tight control.[56] The sheer level of violence inherent in the Ethiopian settler project implies an eliminationist design.[57]

What made possible the pogrom of Addis Ababa in the 'Empire' and not elsewhere was primarily the tension grown up in the settlers' minds in months of precarious control. Second, the fear resulted in episodes of brutal violence because it had been sown and long fueled by Fascism: the settlers were imbued with a 'manly' culture and propaganda focused on the 'Roman' supremacy of the Italian over the 'barbarian' Africans. The settlers were living in a highly militarized environment and they were themselves mostly veterans of the Ethiopian campaign. Third, the

most basic instincts of a settler society – eliminating the natives to stave off the threat they represented and gain the complete possession of their property and land – could have free rein because of a momentary lapse of the colonial government. In essence, before the emergency, the state temporarily abdicated its role as guardian of order and the settlers took advantage of the power vacuum, encouraged by the party that used them as a weapon to give an exemplary 'lesson' to the indigenous inhabitants of the city.

In the post-pogrom situation, the city was, for the settlers, a place perceived as safer, where white rule was asserted with force and the situation was under complete control. A settler in his memoirs recalled how, after the massacre, 'finally we had the feeling that we were the masters of the "Empire"',[58] thus confirming both the psychological assumptions behind the paroxysmal excess of murderous rage involving the settlers and – more subtly – that the autonomous use of violence was central in the competition between settlers and authorities to extend their respective influence. But soon, the same settler remembered, 'Things went back to the way they were before and the Abyssinians have resumed doing as they please (*fare il loro comodo*) and considering themselves only a little less important than we are (*poco meno che alla nostra stregua*)'.[59] In the period of stability that – at least in urban areas – followed, the settlers did not again have the opportunity to attempt the physical elimination of the natives, who were protected by the state, and several sources witness that this was perceived by the settlers as a limit that the authorities applied to them. Moreover, whatever service was provided to the natives was considered by the settlers an unnecessary luxury; the 'excessive softness' of the indigenous policy was considered detrimental to the interests of the settlers; and the settlers were disillusioned with a government that did not impose in all areas, with force, if necessary, even more rigid racial hierarchies. In the 'Empire' post-February 1937, the fear was therefore still circulating among the settlers that the danger inherent in their position of dominant minority was far from gone, and at the same time that the authorities weren't doing enough to protect them.

It would seem that the main worry of the settlers was their inability to deal freely with the natives in the way that they believed was appropriate – through violence and oppression. It seemed that, without the limits imposed by a strong state, new individual or collective violence, like the events of February 1937, would be more than likely. This was a situation of conflict, common in settler colonies,[60] between the authorities, for which the main purpose of the law was to maintain control through a minimal guarantee of fairness, and the settlers, according to whom the law was to protect them in a hostile environment and guarantee their domination.[61] It was a conflict over who should hold the monopoly on violence – against the natives, of course – that both actors claimed: the monopoly is constitutive of a state, even a colonial one, and the claim of it by the settlers could also indicate the seeds of an autonomistic tendency, an independent will from the regime's colonial project.[62]

Conclusion

Italy's settler projects had been established elsewhere in its colonial possessions – especially in Libya – where settlement had decades to be put in practice. But short-lived Italian Ethiopia remains the most interesting case: here, in its own brand-new colony, Fascism conjugated the need to obtain fast and spectacular results, with the possibility of building its social and biopolitical laboratory from the ground up. The result was an exceptionally radical settler experiment.

From this brief overview, some key aspects of the 'Empire' emerge. First, it was the result of two separate projects, constantly in mutual contrast. At its heart, we can locate what made them divergent in the possibility of 'access' to the 'Empire', to its resources, to the economic possibilities it could offer, its spaces and its indigenous inhabitants: settlers wanted free emigration, free

enterprise, unlimited access to indigenous bodies – as workforce or sexual objects, or just to exact from them respect through violence. Settlers, in short, had a vision of themselves in the new land as a hyper-dominant social body, lead actor – intended to remain the only one in the future – with privileges, guarantees and autonomy.

The authorities in the metropole and in the colonies planned an 'Empire' founded on the denial of access and of the very idea of limitlessness, and on control and on selection: a kind of 'elitist settlerism' that had its roots in the fascist totalitarian project and could be put into practice only thanks to the coercive tools that an authoritarian regime had available. Paradoxically, the regime put into practice a policy that was absolutely colonial – made of limitations, barriers, controls and attempts to bend the logic of settlement to its vision – to produce and contain a settler society. The difference – and often the opposition – between the two projects then led to a continuing contrast in the way of imagining and practising the 'Empire'; and, in this opposition, we can see the seeds of a tendency towards autonomy from the motherland that is a constitutive feature of a settler society.

In some ways, we can define the 'Empire' as a hyper-settler experiment: the material develop-ment and the settlement itself – issues closely linked, since the first was in many ways functional to the second – proceeded with an abnormal rhythm because the regime wanted to reach results in a short amount of time, and this prompted it to forge ahead in five years by inducing changes that elsewhere had required several decades. This rapid growth in population and urban devel-opment, which demanded the separation between settlers and indigenous people, and the same elitism that at least theoretically informed the migration policy, together made the 'Empire' a peculiar case in the settler world.

Despite these original traits, the fascist 'Empire' fits within the comparative settler context. It has been noted that the settler colonies born later were characterized by greater emphasis on the state and resulted in less autonomy of the settlers; at the same time, more privilege and power were institutionally guaranteed to settlers under liberal regimes than authoritarian governments.[63] Ethiopia would then be situated as a telling example of a settler colony founded and managed by an authoritarian state. Moreover, settler colonialism is typically associated with the widespread ownership of agricultural land, and Ethiopia, with less than a thousand white farmers out of a population of 80,000, would therefore constitute an anomaly from this point of view. However, colonies of settlement born or developed in the twentieth century – usually characterized by a demographic balance to the detriment of the colonizers and the lack of land – constituted a category in which the 'Empire' fits, from this point of view, quite well.[64] Finally, if we consider another fundamental aspect of the settler colonies, the autonomous tendencies from the mother-land, we can see how in the 'Empire' this was made impossible by the authoritarian regime that governed it, but the nucleus of this autonomy is clearly notable in the constant conflict between authorities and settlers in almost every area.[65]

The 'Empire' was therefore akin to the other settler colonies that developed in Africa in the twentieth century.[66] Nevertheless, its peculiarities stem from the political idiosyncrasies of its progenitor: Ethiopia was to be a fascist settler society, created and modelled according to the prin-ciples of government planning and control of an authoritarian state with a totalitarian vocation.

Notes

1 Although in 1936 the portions of territory under effective Italian control were limited, and in 1941 the Italians already had lost control of most of the country by April.
2 N. Labanca, *Una guerra per l'impero. Memorie della campagna d'Etiopia 1935–36*, Bologna: il Mulino, 2005.

3 'Le cronache dell'Africa Italiana', *Gli Annali dell'Africa Italiana* 1, 1, 1938, 398.

4 G. M. Sangiorgi, 'La potenza dell'Impero è nella colonizzazione demografica', *Africa Italiana* 1, 1, 1938, 7.

5 C. Curcio, 'Colonizzazione ed Impero', *Rassegna economica dell'Africa Italiana* 26, 2, 1938, 189–91.

6 Considering the whole of Italian East Africa. Presidenza del Consiglio, Commissariato per le migrazioni e la colonizzazione, *Le migrazioni nel Regno e nell'Africa Italiana, Anni 1936–1937*, Roma: Failli, 1937, pp. CXXII–CXXV; *Anni 1938–1939*, Roma: Failli, 1939, pp. XXVIII–XXXI.

7 Excluding the garrison, Italians numbered about 550 in September 1936, 1,508 in January 1937, 27,845 in December 1938, and 35,441 in October 1939. In March 1940, the date of the last survey, they were 40,057.

8 R. R. Kukzynski, *Demographic Survey of the British Colonial Empire*, Vol. 2, Fairfield and Hassocks: Kelley-Harvester, 1977 (1st ed. 1948), p. 147. The number of white immigrants remained, between 1926 and 1936, almost the same: about 6,000 annual immigrants and as many emigrants. D. Kennedy, *Islands of White. Settler Society and Culture in Kenya and Southern Rhodesia 1890–1939*, Durham: Duke University Press, 1987, p. 195.

9 Kennedy, *Islands of White*, p. 197.

10 3,228 Europeans in 1831, 37,374 in 1841, 131,283 in 1851, 192,646 in 1861, 245,117 in 1872, 385,362 in 1881, 485,973 in 1891, 583,844 in 1901. J. Verdès-Leroux, *Les Français d'Algérie de 1830 à aujourd'hui. Une page d'histoire déchirée*, Paris: Fayard, 2001, pp. 193–4.

11 Archivio Storico-Diplomatico del Ministero degli Affari Esteri (ASDMAE), *ASMAI/IV*, b. 54. Dati forniti al Centro Studi di Diritto e Politica Coloniale Fascista. It was a trend common to European colonies in Africa. To give just a few examples, in 1931, 48.6% of the European population of Kenya settled in Nairobi; similarly, in 1960 in Angola, 32% of whites lived in Luanda; and in Mozambique, 50% lived in Lourenço Marques. Kukzynski, Vol. 2, p. 151; M. Newitt, *Portugal in Africa. The Last Hundred Years*, Harlow: Longman, 1981, p. 166.

12 H. Larebo, *The Building of an Empire. Italian Land Policy and Practice in Ethiopia, 1935–1941*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994, p. 285.

13 In 1939, there were 224, of which 136 were on land smaller than 60 hectares; 58 between 61 and 500; 20 between 501 and 2,000; and only 10 with more than 2,000 hectares. Larebo, *The Building of an Empire*, p. 186, fig. 13.

14 Another example of this is Angola, where, in 1950, 57% of the settlers lived in major urban centers, and the figure was expected to grow, 'contradicting the rural view disseminated by official propaganda'. C. Castelo, 'Colonial migrations to Angola and Mozambique: Constraints and illusions', in E. Morier-Genoud and M. Cahen (eds.) *Imperial Migrations. Colonial Communities and Diaspora in the Portuguese World*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, p. 120. In addition to the examples already mentioned, we can point to the case of South Rhodesia, where dealers and landowners had a great political weight, but out of all proportion to their numbers, since the white community was mostly – and increasingly over time – urban. D. Lowry, Rhodesia 1890–1980: 'The lost dominion', in R. Bickers (ed.) *Settlers and Expatriates: Britons Over the Seas*, Oxford–New York: Oxford University Press, 2010, p. 139.

15 G. L. Podestà, *Il mito dell'Impero. Economia, politica e lavoro nelle colonie italiane dell'Africa orientale 1898–1941*, Torino: Giappichelli, 2004, p. 331; G. L. Podestà, 'L'émigration italienne en Afrique Orientale', *Annales de Démographie Historique* 113, 1, 2007, 59–84.

16 Istituto Fascista dell'Africa Italiana, 'Nozioni coloniali per gli iscritti alle organizzazioni del PNF', in L. Goglia and F. Grassi (eds.) *Il colonialismo italiano da Adua all'Impero*, Roma-Bari: Laterza, 2008, p. 324.

17 'Norme per la concessione dei lasciapassare per l'A.O.I.', *Notiziario dell'Africa Italiana* 1, 1938, 9–10; ASDMAE, *ASMAI, Gabinetto, Archivio Segreto*, b. 124, f. 7, Teruzzi a Cerulli, Rome, 23 July 1938.

18 *Corriere dell'Impero*, 22 July 1939.

19 The National Archives (TNA), *FO 371/22021*, British Consulate-General to Foreign Office, Addis Ababa, 16 February 1938.

20 ASDMAE, *ASMAI*, Gabinetto Archivio Segreto, b. 23, f. 4, anonymous report entitled 'Discorsi coloniali', Rome, 22 May 1937.

21 T. Banivanua-Mar and P. Edmonds (eds.) *Making Settler Colonial Space. Perspectives on Race, Place and Identity*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010; J. H. Casid, *Sowing Empire. Landscape and Colonization*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005; G. Hooper (ed.), *Landscape and Empire, 1770–2000*, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005; T. Griffiths and R. Libby (eds.) *Ecology and Empire. Environmental History of Settler Societies*, Edinburgh: Keele University Press, 1997.

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22 *Corriere dell'Impero*, 18 January 1939; 19 April 1940; 16 July 1940; 'I servizi sanitari', *Gli Annali dell'Africa Italiana* 3, 1, 1940, 817–8; 'Industria dello spettacolo in A.O.I.', *Notiziario dell'Africa Italiana* 3, 1940, 124–6.

23 These are the key concepts of the settler's representation of the colonies. L. Veracini, *Settler Colonialism. A Theoretical Overview*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, p. 82.

24 M. Fuller, 'Wherever you go, there you are: Fascist plans for the colonial city of Addis Ababa and the colonizing suburb of Eur '42', *Journal of Contemporary History* 31, 2, 1996, 403.

25 Ibid., p. 405.

26 'All the indigenous population will be distributed in different districts according to race, origin and religion. There will be quarters for the notables, for the Eritreans, for the Somalis, for the Arabs, for the Abyssinians'. The plan included a large mosque near the Muslim quarter, Coptic churches, and a whole range of services such as public offices, schools, hospitals, sewers, electric lighting, cinema and sports fields that were supposed to make the indigenous neighborhood 'a true modern center'. *Africa Orientale Italiana*, Milano: Guida d'Italia della Consociazione Turistica Italiana, 1938, pp. 477–8.

27 Shopping district; area for monuments (with public buildings); a commercial area with two residential blocks on its sides; military center; an industrial area with factories and workers' houses; along the main streets, houses for artisans with apartments above the shops; a hospital area; a spa area; a sports center. Finally, away from the new town, an abattoir and a cemetery.

28 Fuller, 'Wherever you go, there you are', 405–6.

29 G. Barrera, 'Patrilinearity, Race, and Identity: The Upbringing of Italo-Eritreans During Italian Colonialism', in R. Ben-Ghiat and M. Fuller (eds.) *Italian Colonialism*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, pp. 97–108.

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31 B. Sòrgoni, *Parole e corpi. Antropologia, discorso giuridico e politiche sessuali interrazziali nella colonia Eritrea (1890–1941)*, Napoli: Liguori, 1998.

32 Archivio Centrale dello Stato (ACS), *Carte Graziani*, b. 37, telegramma n. 3806, Graziani a Ministro Colonie, Addis Abeba, 20 September 1936.

33 *Corriere dell'Impero*, 18 September 1938; see also 'Un'ordinanza del Governatore di Addis Abeba sulle autopubbliche guidate da indigeni', *Notiziario dell'Africa Italiana* 7, 1938, 332.

34 Ibid., 23 September 1938.

35 Ibid., 22 June 1938.

36 Ibid., 25 July 1939. On the regulation of hours as a form of control and Europeanization of the day through the disciplining of time, see G. Nanni, *The Colonisation of Time. Ritual, Routine and Resistance in the British Empire*, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2012.

37 Sòrgoni, *Parole e corpi*, pp. 234–9.

38 With *madamismo* or *madamato* it was meant the cohabitation with indigenous concubines, whose actual name was *madame* in settler slang. G. Trento, 'Madamato and colonial concubinage in Ethiopia: A comparative perspective', *Aethiopica* 14, 2013, 184–205; R. Iyob, *Madamismo and Beyond: The Construction of Eritrean Women*, in Ben-Ghiat and Fuller (eds.) *Italian Colonialism*.

39 Sòrgoni, *Parole e corpi*, pp. 255–6.

40 A. L. Stoler, *Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power, Race and the Intimate in Colonial Rule*, Berkeley; Los Angeles; London: University of California Press, 2002, pp. 48–9, 76; A. Woollacott, *Gender and Empire*, Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006, p. 95.

41 Kennedy, *Islands of White*, pp. 178–9.

42 The Royal Decree n. 1019 of 1 June 1936, 'Ordinamento e amministrazione dell'Africa Orientale Italiana', repealed the possibility for the unrecognized mixed-race to gain Italian citizenship and confirmed the loss of citizenship for Italian women who married a native, which was already introduced in 1933.

43 Decree n. 880 of 19 April 1937, 'Sanzioni per i rapporti d'indole coniugale tra cittadini e sudditi'. 'Assimilated' was a category that, on vague ethnic and cultural bases, framed the exogenous communities within two main groups: whites (for example, the Greeks) assimilated to the settlers, and blacks assimilated to the Africans (for example, the Indians). About the role of an exogenous community in an Italian colony, see M. Petronoti, 'Greeks in Asmara: Guardians of continuity, agents of change', *Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora* 26, 1, 2000, 7–20.

44 Law n. 1004 of 29 June 1939, 'Sanzioni penali per la difesa del prestigio di razza di fronte ai nativi dell'Africa Italiana'.

45   Law n. 822 of 13 May 1940, 'Norme relative ai meticci'.

46   ASDMAE, *ASMAI/IV*, b. 54, 'Meticci secondo la nazionalità o razza della madre ed il sesso', 1 October 1938; Ibid., Censimento dei meticci in A.O.I. eseguito dal 1° al 20 ottobre 1938.

47   In the 1930s, Europeans were about 0.5% of the population in Kenya and about 1% in Northern Rhodesia. Kukzynski, Vol. 2, pp. 97–8.

48   A. Lester, 'Empire and the Place of Panic', in R. Peckham (ed.) *Empire of Panic. Epidemics and Colonial Anxieties*, Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2015, p. 23; D. Anderson, 'Sexual threat and settler society: 'Black perils' in Kenya, c. 1907–30', *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 38, 1, 2010, 66.

49   J. Carr., 'The lawlessness of law: Lynching and anti-lynching in the contemporary USA', *Settler Colonial Studies* 6, 2, 2005, 155.

50   I. Campbell, *The Plot to Kill Graziani. The Attempted Assassination of Mussolini's Viceroy*, Addis Ababa: Addis Ababa University Press, 2010.

51   A. Del Boca, 'I crimini del colonialismo fascista', in A. Del Boca (ed.) *Le guerre coloniali del fascismo*, Roma-Bari: Laterza, 1991, p. 244.

52   Word already used by G. Rochat, 'L'attentato a Graziani e la repressione italiana in Etiopia, 1936–1937', *Italia contemporanea* 27, 118, 1975, 3–38.

53   For example on 4 February 1961, when the attack on the prison in Luanda by Angolan nationalists caused panic among the settlers, who started a brutal hunt which caused many victims, often killed in their own homes: 'centenas de brancos dispostos a vingar a morete dos seus "irmãos de raça" invadiram as casas das famílias negras e mestiças, matando indiscriminatamente todos os indivíduos "suspeitos" que encontrassem'. F. Tavares Pimenta, *Brancos de Angola. Autonomismo e Nacionalismo (1900–1961)*, Coimbra: MinervaCoimbra, 2005, p. 171.

54   Veracini, *Settler Colonialism*, p. 86; Wolfe, 'Settler colonialism and the elimination of the native', *Journal of Genocide Research* 8, 4, 2006, 387–8.

55   See for example K. O'Donnell, 'Poisonous women: Sexual danger, illicit violence, and domestic work in German Southern Africa, 1904–1915', *Journal of Women's History* 11, 3, 1999, 32–54.

56   I. Evans, 'Racial Violence and the Origins of Segregation in South Africa', in C. Elkins and S. Pedersen (eds.) *Settler Colonialism in the Twentieth Century. Projects, Practices, Legacies*, London; New York: Routledge, 2005, pp. 183–202.

57   It is therefore quite wrong to claim that, unlike the 'pure' settler colonies like the United States and Australia, in Africa, European immigrants 'showed no impulse to eliminate the natives'. Castelo, *Colonial Migrations*, p. 107.

58   P. Camassa, *Etiopia terra dei sogni*, Forlì: Zavatti, 1942, pp. 95–6.

59   Ibid.

60   When in 1923, with the 'Devonshire Declaration', the *Colonial Office* proclaimed Kenya to be 'primarily African' and African interests 'paramount', this was a deterrent for the immigration of new white settlers. See J. Lonsdale, 'Kenya. Home Country and African Frontier', in R. Bickers (ed.) *Settlers and Expatriates: Britons Over the* Seas, Oxford-New York: Oxford University Press, 2010, pp. 74–5; M. Harper and S. Constantine, *Migration and Empire*, Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2010, p. 115. Similarly, in German Southwest Africa, many settlers had an idea of freedom as 'freedom to shoot and beat Africans'. M. Wallace, *A History of Namibia. From the Beginning to 1990*, London: Hurst & Co., 2011, p. 196. See also J. Zimmerer and J. Zeller (eds.) *Genocide in German South-West Africa. The Colonial War (1904–1908) in Namibia and Its Aftermath*, Monmouth: Merlin Press, 2008.

61   M. J. Wiener, *An Empire on Trial. Race, Murder, and Justice Under British Rule*, *1870*–1935, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009, p. 6.

62   G. Barrera, 'Mussolini's Colonial Race Laws and State-Settler Relations in Africa Orientale Italiana (1935–41)', *Journal of Modern Italian Studies* 8, 3, 2003, 434.

63   Elkins and Pedersen, 'Introduction: Settler Colonialism, A Concept and Its Uses', in Elkins and Pedersen (eds.) *Settler Colonialism*.

64   Ibid.

65   Veracini, *Settler Colonialism*, pp. 11, 16–7.

66   'Colonies with settlers', according to a definition recently proposed to distinguish colonies of settlement like the US, Australia and Canada from those – the ones in Africa, for example – where settlers were always a minority. J. Kēhaulani Kauanui and P. Wolfe, 'Settler colonialism then and now: A conversation between J. Kēhaulani Kauanui and P. Wolfe', *Politica & Società* 2, 2012, 235–58.

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19

WHITE SETTLER POLITICS AND EURO-AFRICAN NATIONALISM IN ANGOLA, 1945–1975

Fernando Tavares Pimenta

This chapter deals with the political behaviour of the European settlers in Africa by taking into account the case of the white community in Angola. More precisely, the aim will be to analyze the emergence of a form of Euro-African nationalism among Angolan-born whites between 1945 and 1975. Euro-African nationalism was the political protest carried out by a part of the Angolan white community (and some *mestiços*)[1] whose aim was the acquisition of Angola's independence from Portugal. Euro-African nationalism saw the Angolan nation as a product of a cultural interaction between the European and the African social spheres and believed that whites had a political role in the fight for independence as well as in the formation of a nation state in Angola.[2]

But, first of all, let's take a look at the origins of the white settlement in Angola. Angola's white settler community was one of the oldest and most rooted European communities in Africa, since the Portuguese colonists had settled in the country dating back to the sixteenth century. Indeed, Luanda, the country's capital, was founded by a hundred families of white settlers and 400 soldiers in 1576. Benguela was founded as a fort in 1587, and it developed into a town in 1617.[3]

However, African military resistance to colonial rule was strong, and the hold of Portugal over the interior of Angola was slight up to the end of the nineteenth century. Full Portuguese administrative control of the interior did not occur until the beginning of the twentieth century, when resistance from a number of population groups was overcome. Only in the 1920s was Portugal able to extend its rule to the whole colony.[4] As such, Portuguese demographic colonization of Angola was both slow and difficult. Almost all white settlements established in the interior until 1850 failed because of warfare and tropical diseases that decimated the settlers.[5] But this situation started to change during the second half of the nineteenth century. The Portuguese military conquest of the highlands as well as the progress made by medicine allowed the establishment of new settlements by white colonists, namely Moçâmedes and Lobito on the coast and Lubango, Huambo, Bié and Malange in the highlands.[6] Apart from Luanda and Malange, almost all the other white settlements were situated in Central and Southern Angola (south of the Cuanza river), where the climate favoured European colonization. Yet, the major part of these settlements was created in territories previously inhabited by Africans. Thus, they were populated not only by whites but also by blacks, who formed the majority of the Angolan population.[7]

In this context, the number of settlers in Angola increased steadily, although slowly, until World War II, and then more quickly until 1974. White settlers were 9,000 in 1900, 12,000 in 1910,

20,700 in 1920, 30,000 in 1930, 40,000 in 1940, 78,000 in 1950, 172,000 in 1960 and 290,000 in 1970.[8] In 1974, by the end of colonial rule, Angola had a white population of 335,000, about 5.7% of the entire population, which numbered almost six million. Angola's white minority was the second largest white settler community in Africa, after that of South Africa. It was bigger than the one in Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), which numbered 275,000, bigger than the one in Mozambique (180,000) and much bigger than the one in Kenya (50,000).[9]

Furthermore, white settlers – especially the Angolan-born whites – developed a strong political attachment to Angola.[10] Settlers' deep identification with Angola impressed visitors and foreign observers, such as the British Consul General of Luanda, J. C. Wardrop, who pointed out:

> It is not generally realised how deep are the roots of the European population in Angolan soil. Many were born here; many have come in the present generation with the intention of staying for good. You find them not only in the larger towns and plantations but dotted all over the map in innumerable tiny and remote villages. The majority are humble folk who could not afford to visit Portugal even if they wanted to. They belong here; they know no other home; to them *Angola é nossa* ('Angola is ours')![11]

Politically, the settlers had demanded Angola's political autonomy under white rule since the beginning of the twentieth century. Indeed, white settlers expected to construct a new 'home' in Angola, as they considered Angola a 'white man's country' or, in other words, a place where they would build a new nation, as European settlers had previously done in America, Australia and South Africa. That meant that Portuguese settlers in Angola saw themselves as the builders of a sort of 'second Brazil' or even a 'New Lusitania', which would be part of a larger Portuguese Commonwealth (*Comunidade Lusíada*) made up of Portugal, Brazil, Angola and Mozambique.[12] Thus, white settlers demanded control over the colonial state and the noninterference of the metropolitan government in the internal, political and economic affairs of the colony. They also supported the idea that Angola should evolve into an independent country like Brazil, under the political leadership of the whites but with political participation, in a subordinate role, of the *mestiço* and the *assimilado* ('civilized') black elites.[13]

The *mestiços* were people of mixed heritage (Portuguese and African). Normally, they were the product of the biological cross of white men and black women. They tended to be Portuguese culturally and to have full Portuguese names and, if they were legally recognized by their white fathers, they were socially considered as whites.[14] *Assimilado* was the term given to Africans who had reached a level of 'civilization', according to Portuguese legal standards, that theoretically qualified them for full rights as Portuguese citizens. Indeed, until the abolition of the indigenous status (*Estatuto do Indigenato*)[15] in 1961, the black population was officially divided into 'civilized' (or *assimilados*) and 'uncivilized' (or *indígenas*). The *assimilados* were always a tiny minority of the black population (never more than 1% of the entire population of Angola). 'Uncivilized' blacks, or *indígenas*, were considered merely as colonial subjects, and they could be recruited by the colonial authorities as forced labour. To become citizens, they were obliged to prove their adoption of European civilization. If they were able to do so, they were declared legally *assimilados.*[16]

In spite of the political and economic aspirations of the white settlers, Angola was, however, part of a highly centralized and authoritarian imperial state, the *Estado Novo* ('New State'), 1926–1974, under the dictatorship of António de Oliveira Salazar, which denied settlers any form of internal self-government. In fact, from 1930 onwards, with the promulgation of the Colonial Act (and subsequent legislation), Salazar centralized all the power in the hands of the Lisbon government; he centralized the administration; excluded the settlers from the decision-making process; and repressed the white autonomist political activities in Angola.[17] Salazar also enacted

economic legislation that favoured metropolitan interests as opposed to settlers' interests. The fact was that the economic policy dictated by the Portuguese government was frequently an expression of the needs of the metropolitan bourgeoisie (or even of the interests of foreign capital). However, the needs of the metropolitan bourgeoisie often clashed with the economic interests of settlers. For example, white settlers were obliged to buy almost all items they needed from Portugal alone, and at the same time, they were made to sell their products to Portugal at low cost.[18] Salazar was also instrumental in instigating racial discrimination against Angolan-born whites, who were classified as Euro-Africans[19] and were considered to be second-class citizens.

Salazar's authoritarian and racist government kindled the settlers' political and economic dissatisfaction with the Portuguese colonial rule, and it contributed to the emergence of nationalist feelings among the white settler community. The settlers' elite quickly developed an economic nationalism of their own, whilst the Angolan-born whites felt that they were being victims of the colonial policies of the *Estado Novo* and even felt that they were being colonized by Portugal. As a result, white settlers started to consider themselves as Angolan nationals and not as Portuguese expatriates and thus began to reject the metropolitan colonial rule and support the idea of Angola's independence.[20] This idea was rebuffed by the Portuguese colonial dictatorship, which continued to repress the settlers' political activities throughout the 1930s and 1940s.

Colonialism in Angola after 1945

Yet the victory of the Allied Forces in World War II obliged Salazar to bring about some changes in Portuguese colonial policy and to make some political concessions for the settlers in Angola. Salazar had to allow legislative elections as well as the constitution of an opposition movement in 1945, the Democratic United Movement (MUD). The MUD was based in the motherland, but it had a delegation in Angola, which was formed by several Euro-African nationalists. Indeed, many Euro-African nationalists politically supported the MUD, because they expected to gain self-government if the dictatorship was to be replaced by a democratic regime in the motherland. But a few days before the legislative elections, the MUD decided to withdraw from the ballot because the government did not assure them of a free and democratic election. This was the reason why the elections were won by the National Union, the single party of Salazar, who remained in power until 1968. For the white settlers, this was a tremendous political letdown, which generated a lot of frustration among the younger generation of Angolan-born whites.[21]

Salazar also changed the official status of Angola, which evolved from a colony to an Overseas Province of Portugal, in 1951. But there were no actual substantial political changes – this was part of a strategy to avoid the anti-colonial pressure of the United Nations.[22] Only in 1955 did Lisbon make a first move towards colonial decentralization, but not to self-government, in the sense that Salazar authorized the creation of a Legislative Council. This Legislative Council offered a symbolic political representation to that part of the Angolan population which was officially classified as 'civilized', in other words, the white settlers, the *mestiços* and the tiny minority of the black population known as *assimilados*. But the Legislative Council had only a consultative role, and the degree of political participation of white settlers in the colonial government remained rather low. Thus, for the Euro-African nationalists, the creation of the Angolan Legislative Council was not enough, and their grievances against Portuguese rule continued throughout the 1950s.[23]

From an economic point of view, Salazar authorized the establishment of some industries in Angola and Mozambique that were controlled by metropolitan capital. At the same time, colonial products, mainly coffee, registered a boom in sales, and thousands of new settlers arrived in Northern Angola in search of a piece of land upon which to grow coffee. Salazar also started to support the establishment of new settlers in the rural areas of Central Angola, and many of

them were filled with racial prejudices against the local population, that is, towards blacks as well as *mestiços* and Angolan-born whites. Thus, racial tension between Angolan-born whites and the new settlers worsened, while competition for land and labour between elements of the two groups became harder. Furthermore, and in spite of the growth of the Angolan economy after 1945, restrictive Portuguese economic legislation continued to condition the economic development of Angola and to limit the profits of the white settlers, especially the Euro–African whites. For example, the huge mineral resources of the colony, such as diamonds and, after the 1950s, oil, were directly controlled by metropolitan and foreign capital. This was the source of latent tension between Lisbon and the white settlers in Angola.[24]

In this respect, it should be emphasised that the majority of the white settler elite was centered in Luanda, where there was a strong import-export commercial class. Indeed, Luanda's import-export elite, the big commercial and industrial businessmen and the upper echelon of the colonial administration, formed the top of the Angolan social structure. They shared their social prestige, but not their economic power, together with physicians, lawyers, engineers, high school teachers, other professionals and almost everyone who possessed a university diploma. Yet their hegemony was contested by the new wealthy 'coffee barons' of the northwest and by some very rich merchants, farmers and cattle owners of the central and southern regions.[25]

Settler political protest

How then did white settlers, especially the Euro-African nationalists, react to the political, economic and social changes that took place in Angola after 1945? There were two main reactions. On the one hand, a small part of the new generation of Angolan-born whites engaged in anti-colonial politics, side by side with some *mestiços* and *assimilados*. Almost all of them were left-wing intellectuals, and some were in touch with the clandestine Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) and with nationalists from other Portuguese colonies – Cape Verde, Goa (India), Guinea Bissau, Mozambique and Sao Tome. Many of them were also members of some cultural and academic associations that were formed by Angolans both in the colony – the Angolan Cultural Society (*Sociedade Cultural de Angola*) and the Angolan Natives Association (*Associação dos Naturais de Angola*) – and in the motherland – the Empire Students' House (*Casa dos Estudantes do Império*). In the protected political environment of these associations, Angola's new white (and *mestiço*) generation collaborated for the first time with the black younger generation, by essaying, through literature, an Angolan national identity. They created the idea of *angolanidade* or, in other words, the idea that Angola had an individual cultural identity not only distinct and independent from the Portuguese one but also free from any kind of racial, ethnic or religious prejudices.[26] Politically, they defended the independence of Angola under black majority rule, and they were, in a sense, entirely African (and not Euro–African) nationalists. During the 1950s, these left-wing whites organized themselves into several nationalist groups, the most important of which was the Angolan National Liberation Movement (*Movimento de Libertação Nacional de Angola, MNLA*). The MNLA reunited whites, *mestiços* and some (black) *assimilados* of Luanda, including an engineer and a high school teacher, and some prestigious writers and poets (such as Luandino Vieira) of the *Sociedade Cultural de Angola.* But, in 1959, the Portuguese Political Police (PIDE) crushed Luanda's nationalist groups, namely the MLNA, while a number of African nationalists (whites, *mestiços* and blacks) were arrested and/or deported to Portugal.[27] Subsequently, some of these white nationalists supported the war of independence, which was conducted by the African guerrillas, especially the MPLA.

On the other hand, Euro-African nationalists continued to feed on the dream of a 'new Brazil'. The supporters of this idea were concentrated in the district of Benguela, which included the

cities of Benguela and Lobito, and in the remaining districts of Central and Southern Angola (Bié, Huambo, Huíla and Moçâmedes), where many Angolan-born whites of the second and third generation were. As in 1945, Euro-African nationalists thought Angola could attain self-government or even independence under white settler leadership, only if the Salazar dictatorship was replaced by a democratic regime in Portugal. Thus, Euro-African nationalists sought a political alliance with the (non-communist) Portuguese Democratic Opposition, and they provided full political support for the opposition candidate, General Humberto Delgado, in the Portuguese presidential elections of 1958. The election results were a fraud, and the candidate of the opposition lost to the regime's official candidate, Admiral Américo Tomaz. Nevertheless, Humberto Delgado obtained a significant result in Angola, especially in the Central and Southern districts, and he actually won in the Benguela district, which was the political bastion of Euro-African nationalists. Indeed, Humberto Delgado had 66.7% of the ballot in the Benguela district, whereas Admiral Américo Tomaz only had 33.3%. It was a defeat for Salazar without parallel in the motherland and in the remaining Portuguese Empire. It was also a clear sign of the political strength of Euro-African nationalism in Central and Southern Angola.[28]

The leader of Benguela's Euro-African nationalists was Fernando Falcão, an Angolan-born white (of the second generation) who was an engineer and an important businessman in Lobito. He was also an elected member of the Lobito city council, where he defended the economic interests and the political aspirations of the Euro-African nationalists. During the Portuguese presidential elections of 1958, Falcão led, with success, the political campaign of the opposition candidate in Central and Southern Angola. The elections gave him the opportunity to create a political network involving some of the most influential businessmen and intellectuals of the white settler community (and also some *mestiços*) under his leadership. In 1959, Falcão presented his own candidature to the Angolan Legislative Council. But the Portuguese colonial authorities excluded him from the ballot because they feared a significant victory for Fernando Falcão. He envisaged a political movement capable of unifying all the Euro-African nationalists in Angola. At the beginning of 1961, Falcão founded the Angolan United Front (*Frente de Unidade Angolana*, FUA), which was the most important party in the history of Euro-African nationalism. The FUA was led by a political commission composed of Falcão (who was the movement's president) and several other Euro-African businessmen and intellectuals from Central and Southern Angola, including Socrates Dáskalos, who was a high-school teacher.[29]

The formation of FUA coincided with the beginning of the war of independence, which was pioneered by the African armed movements UPA/FNLA and MPLA, in Northern Angola in February/March 1961. These guerrillas had been founded by some Angolan exiled blacks and *mestiços*: the UPA/FNLA had been formed in 1958 by a group of Angolans from Northern Angola in the Belgian Congo, while the MPLA had been formed in 1960 fundamentally by an intellectual elite of *mestiços* and some blacks from Luanda and from other urban areas who lived in Europe and North Africa.[30] In 1961, after Portugal's categorical refusal to give independence to Angola, UPA/FNLA and MPLA, separately, launched wars of independence, which would last until 1974, when the Portuguese dictatorship was overthrown by a left-wing revolutionary military movement that agreed to negotiate Angola's independence with the Angolan armed movements.[31] Meanwhile, UNITA, a third guerrilla movement, had been formed by some political dissidents from the UPA/FNLA in 1966.[32]

FUA tried to represent an intermediate political position between the Portuguese colonial dictatorship and the African armed movements, in the sense that it condemned the use of violence and demanded a peaceful solution to the armed conflict, as well as Angola's immediate political autonomy, which would prepare the country for independence. This independence would signify the recognition of the participation of the *mestiço* and black population in the governing of the

country, but at the same time, it would assure the political rights and the economic interests of the whites in a future independent Angolan State.

The FUA was able to mobilize the majority of the white settlers, a substantial part of the *mestiços* and some black *assimilados* of Central and Southern Angola. It also seemed that the FUA had the sympathy of the Brazilian authorities, since some contacts were made between FUA's leadership and a delegate of the Brazilian Embassy in Lisbon.[33] It failed, however, in mobilizing the white elites of Northern Angola, especially those in Luanda, who preferred to negotiate a compromise with the Portuguese dictatorship through its new colonial minister, Adriano Moreira. Indeed, Luanda's white elite was frightened by the massacres of settlers carried out by the UPA/FNLA in Northern Angola. This elite group was also afraid of losing their privileges and would not accept a black political leadership. The Portuguese government took advantage of the division among Angolan white settlers and launched a large-scale repressive operation at the beginning of June 1961 by arresting and deporting the leaders of the FUA to Portugal, namely Fernando Falcão and Sócrates Dáskalos.[34]

However, in 1962, some of FUA's members who were deported to Portugal were able to escape to Paris, France, where they re-organised the movement in exile under the leadership of Socrates Dáskalos. Later, in 1963, FUA's exiled committee moved on to Algiers (Algeria). FUA's exiled committee published its own political statutes and programme, as well as a political journal entiled *Kovaso*; it also presented a petition to the United Nations General Assembly and wrote letters to several heads of state in Europe and Africa denouncing the Portuguese colonial repression in Angola.[35] The FUA presented itself as a nonracial nationalist movement, open to the militancy of all the Angolans but giving special attention to the problems and position of the whites in Angola. The FUA also changed its political strategy and accepted the use of violence to defeat colonialism. Consequently, the FUA tried to mobilize the white settlers to fight against Portuguese colonial rule. Indeed, FUA tried to re-establish itself in Angola through some contacts in Brazil. Fernando Falcão was able to return to Angola in December 1962, and several other members of the movement created some clandestine groups in Central and Southern Angola. But in May 1963, the Portuguese Political Police arrested almost all FUA members in Huambo, Lobito and Benguela and the movement was neutralized.[36]

Meanwhile, the FUA had also tried to engage in talks with the Angolan armed movements, the MPLA and the UPA/FNLA. Its aim was to create a vast nationalist front involving all the Angolan nationalist parties and movements. But these movements rejected FUA's proposal. In fact, both the UPA/FNLA and the MPLA denied whites the right to fight for Angola's independence and adopted a hostile attitude in relation to FUA. Indeed, the African guerrillas didn't recognise the rights of the whites to an Angolan citizenship, to the extent that they considered the blacks and *mestiços* the only legitimate Angolan descendants. For example, the MPLA considered that all whites, including those born in Angola, were Portuguese, not Angolan.[37] This meant that the African guerrillas understood the meaning of nation and race as politically equivalent concepts and that independence would probably mean the end of white presence in Angola. As a consequence of its internal failure and of the political hostility by the African guerrillas, FUA's exiled committee was dissolved in August 1963.

Yet the dissolution of FUA didn't mean the end of the settlers' protest. Even without a political organization or party, the white settlers, especially their elites, continued to press the Portuguese government to make some political, economic and social reforms, a demand which was partially accepted by Salazar. Indeed, Salazar had understood that he could not fight concurrently both the African guerrillas and the white settlers. So, Lisbon made some reforms and mapped out a development plan for Angola. In 1962, Portuguese authorities announced the creation of a University in Angola, which started to function a year later. In 1963, the Portuguese government approved of a

new Organic Charter of Angola, which reinforced the role of the Angolan Legislative Council; it created an Economic and Social Council representing the economic interests of the white settler elite and slowly expanded the franchise in the colony. At the same time, Portugal initiated a large-scale investment program in the construction of basic infrastructure in Angola – transport and communications, health services, education, etc. The economic development of the country was directly encouraged by the Portuguese government, mainly the mining industry (diamonds, iron and oil), coffee and cotton products, and cattle farming. Portugal also encouraged the growth of local industries and the establishment of a new industry by opening the Angolan market to foreign capital – American, Belgian, British, French and South African, which already had control over an important part of the colonial economy. These measures contributed to the rapid growth of Angola's economy and an increase in the standard of living of Angolans, particularly that of the urban population. On a military level, the guerrillas were contained by the Portuguese army, and they were gradually pushed back to the other side of the frontier, which borders the two Congos and Zambia.[38]

However, for Angolan whites, those measures were not enough, and their grievances against Portuguese domination remained. Indeed, if it was true that the white settler community had increased in number and in economic and political influence during the 1960s, it was not less true that the control over Angola's governance and economy was ultimately held in the hands of the Portuguese government and its representative in the colony, the Governor General, who was directly appointed by Lisbon. At the same time, Angola benefited only in part from the revenues of its own economic boom, since the majority of the profits did not remain in the country: they went directly to the pockets of the Portuguese, American, European and South African capitalists. Angolan whites, as well as the black and *mestiço* populations, resented the external control of Angola's main economic resources. Portugal's highly centralized and authoritarian rule and the exploitation of the country's economic resources by foreigners, settlers' main grievances, were felt to be a humiliation by the Angolan whites. After 1965, Rhodesia's Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) provided a seductive example to the Angolan white settler community.[39]

Marcelo Caetano's colonial reforms

In 1968, Marcelo Caetano, Portugal's new prime minister and the successor to Salazar, conscious of the danger of a white settler UDI in Angola, promised to introduce some changes in the political administration of Angola. For the first time since 1926, the Portuguese government seemed willing to make some constitutional reforms, which meant giving more autonomy or even self-government to Angola. The Prime Minister's frequent references to Brazil made the white settlers believe that Caetano had a federal state or a community of independent Portuguese-speaking states, a Portuguese Commonwealth, as his objective.[40] Yet Caetano's constitutional changes were introduced gradually, because of the opposition of the Portuguese right wing, which was led by the President of the Republic, Admiral Américo Tomaz. In 1972, despite the strong resistance of the dictatorship's right wing and under increasing political pressure from the white settlers, Caetano finally made some constitutional reforms granting a form of autonomy. Both Angola and Mozambique were accorded the new status of states. Each state had the power to decide on its own budget, local legislation and taxes, but defence and foreign affairs still remained Lisbon's prerogative. A government cabinet was created under the chairmanship of the Governor-General, who would also become a member of the central cabinet in Portugal. The Angolan Legislative Council was transformed into a Legislative Assembly, whose number of directly elected members was increased to 32 with more than 21 members elected by interested groups.[41]

However, for the Angolan white community, Lisbon's reforms were not enough, and they probably came too late. In fact, white settlers expected more 'radical' measures from the Portuguese

government, and their grievances were aggravated during the last years of Caetano's rule. Angolan whites demanded more power in the political and economic administration of the colony, and this meant self-government. Instead, the constitutional reforms of Caetano had only assured a limited form of controlled internal autonomy. As the British Consul General in Luanda pointed out:

> Angola remains above all a part of what is still a highly centralised State. All top level decisions, both civil and military, originate in Lisbon. Whatever conclusions are reached of proposals formulated here in Luanda, account must always be taken of the power structure and rival influences within metropolitan Portugal. Changes there, for good or bad, can dramatically and rapidly cause repercussions on events here. Lisbon both proposes and disposes.[42]

The problem was not only political but also economic. Lisbon's centralized economic control created dissatisfaction among the white elite, which was aggravated by legislation in 1971 concerning foreign and inter-territorial payments, introduced without any consultation with Angola. As a consequence, imports were authorised without sufficient foreign currency being available, and this had a negative impact on the balance of trade between Angola and the motherland. Large-scale import restrictions were imposed on Angola, which led to drastic shortages of basic imported foodstuffs. Increasing dissatisfaction with Lisbon's patriarchal control was coupled by rumours of a unilateral declaration of independence.[43] Yet the central economic problem in the conflict of interests between Lisbon and Angola's white settler elite related to the control of the Angola's huge oil resources, its revenues and its refinement into products. Angola had huge oil resources, particularly in the northern region of the Enclave of Cabinda, which produced, at that time, approximately 15 million tonnes of oil per year. However, Angola's oil was controlled by Gulf Oil, an American company, with the blessing of the Portuguese government.[44] Only a small part of the oil revenue remained in the country. At the same time, Angola had to import its own oil in refined products from Portugal, since Lisbon prevented the increase of Angola's refining capacity. This situation favoured the growth of the metropolitan economy but damaged Angola's economic development and prevented its industrialization and economic independence.[45] The conflict over the control of Angola's oil and its refinement was aggravated by the international oil crisis of 1973. It should be noted that foreign capital also controlled the extraction of other Angolan minerals: Diamang, which was a company formed mostly by South African capital with Portuguese participation, controlled 81% of the extraction of diamonds; the Krupp group, with West German capital, controlled the extraction of iron, with reserves valued at hundreds of millions of tonnes; the Tanganyika Concessions, held by British interests, controlled the Benguela railway, which transported the copper from Zambia's Copper belt to the Atlantic port of Lobito.[46]

In this context, the clash opposing globalizing capital and settler colonialism had become evident by the time colonial rule ended. But, unlike South Africa or Southern Rhodesia, the settlers did not control the state in Angola. This was a direct consequence of the administrative centralization and of the unfair economic policies promoted by the *Estado Novo*, which prevented the formation of an independent economic basis in Angola. Thus, Angola lacked a strong settler bourgeoisie capable of leading the country to independence.

The end of colonialism in Angola

By 1974, it was clear that Caetano had failed in promoting the political autonomy of the colonies under white leadership. Caetano had been unable to change the centralist and authoritarian colonial administration inherited from Salazar: Portugal remained an empire, and Angola was still

a colony. The idea of creating a Portuguese Commonwealth had failed. Caetano had also been unable to put an end to the colonial wars in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea Bissau that had been fought since the beginning of the 1960s. This situation was the cause of dissatisfaction in the lower ranks of the Portuguese armed forces, especially captains and majors, who were fed up with fighting colonial wars, and of some members of the higher ranks of the army, especially Generals António de Spínola and Costa Gomes. On 25 April 1974, a military movement (the *Movimento das Forças Armadas*, MFA) led by Spínola and Gomes toppled Caetano from power by means of a *coup d'état* in Lisbon. The April Revolution put an end to half a century of dictatorship in Portugal and created conditions for the decolonisation of the African colonies. On 27 July 1974, Spínola, the new President of the Republic, officially recognized the rights of the Portuguese colonies to self-determination and independence and, in August 1974, he announced his official decolonisation program for Angola. Spínola's program of decolonisation anticipated the realization of a cease-fire with the African armed movements and the formation of a transitional Angolan government, which would be constituted by representatives of the Angolan (armed and unarmed) political movements and by representatives of the several 'ethnic groups' of the country, including the white population. The provisional government would prepare for free and democratic elections by direct and universal suffrage, which would elect a Constitutional Assembly. The Constitutional Assembly would write the Political Constitution of Angola, which would define the political status of the country: independence or a federal relationship with Portugal.[47]

In Angola, the end of the dictatorship created political conditions for the formation or the legalization of political movements.[48] During the first months after the 25 April military coup, approximately forty political groups were formed or legalized in Angola. The majority of these groups were unarmed nationalist movements which included blacks as well as *mestiços* and whites. For example, the PCDA, which had a conservative political orientation, was formally a multiracial party, but in reality it was dominated by some conservative white settlers. The PCDA supported the achievement of independence by means of a national referendum on Angola's future. In opposition to PCDA was the *Movimento Democrático de Angola* (MDA, 'Angola's Democratic Movement'), which was formed mostly by left-wing whites and *mestiços*, who were known for their democratic political resistance against the Portuguese dictatorship. The MDA supported immediate independence and the transfer of power directly to the African armed movements, especially the MPLA, with whom they politically identified. Yet the most powerful Angolan unarmed movement was FUA, which was re-established by Fernando Falcão after the 25 April coup. As in the 1960s, the FUA was opened to all Angolans, but the majority of its members were whites (and *mestiços*) from Central and Southern Angola. The FUA demanded the participation of all Angolan political movements, armed and unarmed, in the decolonisation process, the formation of a transitional government directly elected by the people in free elections and the establishment of a democratic regime after independence. The FUA appealed to the unity of all Angolans in the hope of attaining the political and economic independence of Angola and thus preventing the danger of a civil war between Angolans. The FUA also appealed to the armed movements, namely the MPLA, the UPA/FNLA and the UNITA, to put aside their differences and to work with the other Angolan nationalist movements for peace and progress in Angola.

However, the fall of Spínola on 30 September 1974 (and his replacement by General Costa Gomes as President of the Republic) caused a radical change in the Portuguese decolonisation policy in Angola.[49] Indeed, the Portuguese colonial authorities decided to negotiate Angola's independence only with the three most important armed movements, the MPLA, the UPA/FNLA and the UNITA. They also considered that 'the political groupings which had sprung up in Angola since 25 April were pseudo-political puppets formed by reactionary elements serving the interests of the fascist–colonialists of the former regime'.[50] Therefore, the fall of Spínola led

to the immediate arrest and/or exile of the leaders of some Angolan political movements, mainly the PCDA, which had previously supported the decolonisation program of the former President of the Republic. During the months of October/November 1974, the Portuguese authorities repressed political dissent and prevented one attempt at the seizure of power by right-wing settlers in Angola. Despite the Portuguese repression, the FUA denounced the repressive, authoritarian and anti-democratic position of the Portuguese authorities and demanded the political participation of all Angolan political movements into the decolonisation process.[51] Fernando Falcão pointed out that the transfer of power directly to the hands of the three armed movements, without the participation of the other political forces, would result in a dictatorship and a civil war between Angolans. He therefore demanded a politically transparent and democratic decolonisation process, to prevent political, social and economic chaos in the country. Falcão's demands were supported by thousands of whites, *mestiços* and even blacks, who attended the meetings promoted by FUA in the main towns of Luanda, Lobito, Huambo, Lubango, Bié, etc.[52]

However, both the Portuguese government and the three African armed movements ignored the warnings of FUA. In October 1974, Portugal signed a cease-fire with the MPLA and the FNLA (UNITA had already signed a cease-fire in June 1974), which permitted the entry of both armed movements into Angola. In November 1974, these three guerrilla movements established their delegations in Luanda. But the establishment of the three armed movements in the capital was accompanied by violent confrontations between their supporters.[53]

On 15 January 1975, Angola's independence agreement was finally signed by the representatives of Portugal and the MPLA, UPA/FNLA and UNITA, at the Alvor (Algarve) conference. The independence agreement neglected the political, social and demographic specificities of the white settler community. Indeed, none of the parties involved in the independence agreement showed interest in protecting the rights of the white minority. Portugal wanted to leave Angola as soon as possible. Thus, the Portuguese government didn't make any diplomatic effort to secure the rights of the whites. In addition, the guerrilla movements feared the political competition of the white elites in the newly independent country. As such, Angolan citizenship was only given to those who had actually been born in the country, a decision which excluded at least half of the white settler community.[54]

The Alvor Agreement also sanctioned the transfer of power only to the three armed movements: the MPLA, the UPA/FNLA and UNITA. The agreement stated that independence would take place on 11 November 1975. Until then, Angola would be ruled by a transitional government formed by representatives of the three movements and Portugal, and its presidency would rotate between the three movements. The transitional cabinet would organize general elections until October 1975, but only candidates supported by the three armed movements would be allowed to participate. Therefore, the independence agreement imposed the political exclusion of the smaller guerrilla movements (FLEC and the MPLA dissident groups Eastern Rebellion and Active Rebellion) and of the unarmed political parties, either formed by blacks (MDIA, Notbako, etc.) or composed mostly of whites (FUA, PCDA, etc.). The fact was that the new legal status of Angola hadn't recognized the existence of minority parties, other than the three armed movements, which meant that the former had to be dissolved or merged into one of the three armed movements.[55] Thus, the white settlers had no other option but to support one of the armed movements or to leave the country. This last option became almost mandatory when a civil war broke out between the three movements in March 1975, resulting in violent confrontations damaging the major urban centres where the whites lived. As a result, the majority of the whites, approximately 300,000 people, hurriedly left the country throughout 1975, with only 30,000 (10%) remaining in Angola. By the end of 1975, Angola had ceased to be a settler society, and Euro-African nationalism ceased to exist.[56]

Notes

1 The *mestiço* minority was primarily of mixed Portuguese and Native African descent. See A. Sarmento, 'Aspectos demográficos da população mestiça de Angola', separata da *Garcia da Orta*, Vol. 8, n.° 1, 1960.

2 F. T. Pimenta, *Angola. Os Brancos e a Independência*, Porto: Afrontamento, 2008, pp. 13–25.

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4 R. Pélissier, *História das campanhas de Angola. Resistências e revoltas 1845–1941*, Lisboa: Estampa, 1986.

5 C. A. Medeiros, *A colonização das Terras Altas da Huíla (Angola)*, Lisboa: Centro de Estudos Geográficos, 1976.

6 I. Amaral, *Ensaio de um estudo geográfico da rede urbana de Angola*, Lisboa: JIU, 1962.

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8 F. T. Pimenta, *Brancos de Angola. Autonomismo e Nacionalismo, 1900–1961*, Coimbra: Minerva, 2005, p. 191.

9 Ibid., pp. 189–98. See also O. Ribeiro, *A colonização de Angola e o seu fracasso*, Lisboa: Imprensa Nacional-Casa da Moeda, 1981.

10 A. C. V. T. Santos, *Angola. Coração do Império*, Lisboa: AGC, 1945, pp. 41–2.

11 PRO (*Public Record Office*, London), FO (Foreign Office): 371/161626 – *Internal Political Situation: Angola*, 1962.

12 See, for example, *Jornal de Benguela*, VIII, 7, 1; XIII, 33, 2; XV, 17, 1–2. Generally, the settlers didn't refer to the other Portuguese colonies (Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde, São Tome, Goa, Timor and Macau), maybe because they were smaller and less populated.

13 J. Macedo, *Autonomia de Angola. Estudo de administração colonial*, Lisboa: Edição do Autor, 1910, pp. 83 and 209–15; A. Moreira, 'As elites das províncias portuguesas de indigenato: Guiné, Angola e Moçambique', separata da revista *Garcia da Orta*, Vol. 4, n.° 2, 1956.

14 M. A. F. Oliveira, *Reler África*, Coimbra: Instituto de Antropologia da Universidade de Coimbra, 1990.

15 M. Colónias, *Estatuto Político, Civil e Criminal dos Indígenas de Angola e Moçambique*, decreto n.° 12.533, de 23 de Outubro de 1926; M. Ultramar, *Estatuto dos Indígenas Portugueses das Províncias da Guiné, Angola e Moçambique*, decreto-lei n.° 39.666, de 20 de Maio de 1954; M. Ultramar, *Revogação do decreto-lei n.° 39666, que promulga o Estatuto dos Indígenas Portugueses das Províncias da Guiné, Angola e Moçambique. Decreto-lei n.° 43893, de 6 de Setembro de 1961*, Lisboa: AGU, 1961.

16 M. Colónias, *Código do Trabalho dos Indígenas nas Colónias Portuguesas de África*, decreto n.° 16.199, de 6 de Dezembro de 1928.

17 M. Colónias, *Acto Colonial*, decreto n.° 18.570, de 8 de Julho de 1930.

18 A. Torres, *O Império Português entre o real e o imaginário*, Lisboa: Escher, 1991; A. J. Telo, *Economia e Império no Portugal Contemporâneo*, Lisboa: Cosmos, 1994.

19 D.S.E.R.E.G.C. Angola, *Censo Geral da população, 1940*, Luanda: Imprensa Nacional, 1947; J. P. Neto, *Angola: meio século de integração*, Lisboa: ISCPU, 1964, p. 241; Lemos, *Nótulas históricas*, 196; F. T. Pimenta, *Angola no percurso de um nacionalista*, pp. 32 and 37–40.

20 F. T. Pimenta, *Brancos de Angola*, pp. 119–36; A. C. V. T. Santos, *Angola. Coração do Império*, p. 54. See also S. Dáskalos, *Um testemunho para a História de Angola. Do huambo ao huambo*, Lisboa: Vega, 2000; A. Carvalho, *Angola. Anos de esperança*, Coimbra: Minerva, 2001.

21 AN/TT (*Arquivos Nacionais/Torre do Tombo*, Lisbon), Arquivo António Oliveira Salazar, AOS/CO/PC – 3I, *Democratas de Angola e as eleições legislativas* (1945); PRO, FO 371/67859 B, *Economic Situation in Angola (1945–1946)*, 1947. See also H. Galvão, *Por Angola (Quatro anos de actividade parlamentar)*, Lisboa: Edição do Autor, 1949.

22 J. C. Magalhães, *Portugal e as Nações Unidas. A Questão Colonial*, Lisboa: Instituto de Estudos Estratégicos e Internacionais, 1996.

23 PRO, FO 371/125894, *Internal Political Situation in Angola*, 1957. See also M. Ultramar, *Nova Legislação Ultramarina*, Lisboa: AGU, 1953; M. Ultramar, *Estatuto da Província de Angola*, Lisboa: AGU, 1955.

24 F. T. Pimenta, *Brancos de Angola*, pp. 41–62.

25 I. C. Henriques, 'A sociedade colonial em África. Ideologias, hierarquias, quotidianos', in F. Bettencourt and K. Chauduri (eds.) *História da Expansão Portuguesa* (vol. V), Navarra: Temas e Debates, 2000, pp. 216–74.

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27 AN/TT, Arquivo PIDE/DGS, Movimento de Libertação Nacional de Angola (MNLA), Processo 3474/59, 2968; AN/TT, Arquivo PIDE/DGS, Casa dos Estudantes do Império, Processo 3529/62, 3352.

28 AN/TT, Arquivo António Oliveira Salazar, AOS/CO/PC – 51^A, Pasta 8, Relatórios sobre a campanha eleitoral na Guiné e em Angola (1958). PRO, FO 371/131637, *Effect on Angola of Election Held in Portuguese Africa on 8 June 1958*, 1958; PRO, FO 371/131635, *Internal Political Situation in Portuguese Africa*, 1958.

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20

SETTLER COLONIALISM IN SOUTH AFRICA

Land, labour and transformation, 1880–2015

Edward Cavanagh

The tug-of-war between imperial Britain and the republican settler Afrikaners that began with the outbreak of the 'First Freedom Fight' in 1880 finally ended with the resolution of the Anglo-Boer War in 1902. There would be no repeat of the American Revolution in South Africa. The Afrikaners lost the fight and, for the moment, gave up on their dreams of complete independence. They remained, as they ever had been, distrustful of British imperial designs. A stopgap colonial administration could only be fickle at the end of the war. In the short term, the government and accommodation of large indigenous and migrant populations would be but a sideshow to the main event of post-war politics. Far more pressing, given the political character of the wartime dispute, was the management of relations between the two different settler blocs – the small, defiant English-speaking community and the embittered, war-ravaged Afrikaners.

The stakes were highest in the Witwatersrand, where the taxable spoils of gold mining had long divided *Uitlanders* (foreigners) and Transvalers. The divisions of the settler polity here ran deeper than language and heritage; in the Rand could be found a clique of controlling industrialists and a slew of disorganised white labourers. Both groups wished to see the ongoing prosperity of the lucrative industry, yet each sought their own assurances from the Cape Town administration. Bold *highveld* politicians, most with interests wrapped up in the industry, proved too hot for the British to handle. If there was going to be progression towards a new peaceful period, the colonial administrators would have to leave it up to a fractured settler body politic to work out for themselves in the local Transvaal political arena.

No framework yet existed for party politics. The settlers of South Africa were segmented into separate governments; the borders of these administrations had been determined during the previous half-century. They were obedient, in the first decade of the twentieth century, to no shared constitution but a royal prerogative exercised through an impatient crown administration desperate to encourage autonomy, preserve loyalty and leave. After Transvaal gained 'responsible government' in 1906 and the Orange River Colony followed in 1907, unification seemed the next appropriate step. The electoral franchise had to be decided. Electorates had to be identified and balanced out across the country. Powers had to be distributed across a new federal system. These were the contentious political questions capturing the attention of settlers in South Africa until, finally, in Cape Town, a bill of unification was tentatively drafted for the British parliament to pass and thus, it was hoped, bring an expensive and bloody period of direct rule to an end. In 1910, the Union of the Cape, Natal, the Orange River Province and the Transvaal was proclaimed.[1]

A great transformation had taken place. Another would take place in 1994. Between these two transformations, the legislating parliament of this federal state laid the statutory foundations of a system of displacement and exploitation for which South Africa would earn notoriety. The operation of this system during the twentieth century was impossible without a strict classificatory regime, a pigmentocracy which finds no parallels to any of the other modes of control implemented by settler states over indigenous and exogenous populations. From the early decades of the twentieth century, the South African state distinguished officially between four separate 'peoples' – 'Whites', 'Asiatics', 'Coloureds' and 'Natives' – with statute and case law formalising a system of racial hierarchy around these distinctions.[2] The foundations of this system were laid in the post-war reconstruction by English-speaking imperialists.[3] Working within this framework, Afrikaans-speaking parliamentarians later formalised the separation of the *blankes* from everyone else in the country in the name of apartheid. Piecemeal, this system was mostly but not entirely dismantled from the mid-1980s to the 2010s. During this latter period of 'transformation', the opportunity to redefine 'indigenous' in a fashion both historically accurate and presently meaningful was not taken by those steering the transition. It was apparently in the interest of few to do so. Instead, after 1994, the government tried to accommodate the country's disadvantaged non-white underclass within a new, de-ethnicised 'black' category. Old identities die hard, though, and popular discourse is as categorically racialised as it ever was during apartheid.[4] Meanwhile, the settlers (descendants of those called 'Europeans' in the old regime) remain in the country, growing more 'African' with every generation.

Modern South African history is impervious to comparative analysis alongside the other white settler dominions of the British Empire. An exceptionalist historiography bears this truth out. During the early 1980s, some historians were prepared to broaden the horizons of the subject, but these scholars were mostly unprepared to experiment with comparisons outside of a few select case studies. None were prepared to contemplate the generality, comparability and continuity of South African settler colonialism into the high apartheid period (ca. 1961–1981).[5] Prior to this, in what remains a neglected if old-fashioned theory of the founding of 'new societies', Louis Hartz proposed in 1964 that South African was a 'two-fragment society' of the same kind as Canada and that its white population was divided between those who settled with a post-Enlightenment mentality (in this case, the British fragment) and the more feudally inclined conservatives who came earlier (the Afrikaner fragment). Furthering the Hartz thesis, L. M. Thompson could conclude in an essay that the triumph of the Afrikaners over the English by the time he wrote – the early 1960s – provided 'a striking illustration of the conservatism which may encrust a fragment of European society after its transplantation to a new environment'. 'Bred in isolation from the main stream of Western thought', Thompson continued, the Afrikaners 'have rejected three of its dynamic modern impulses – liberalism, socialism, and democracy. A fourth – nationalism – they accepted; but they have perverted it because, unlike other nations, they do not form a majority of the inhabitants of their country'.[6]

Thompson indicates in this passage one of the main impediments to comparative historians of settler colonialism approaching South Africa. The presence of a small settler minority – smaller still when split apart into English and Afrikaner segments, a parsing which would be counterproductive to maintain too strictly in this chapter – gives twentieth-century South Africa a demographic make-up altogether different to that of the other settler societies. This chapter will present a way around this interpretative dilemma by focusing on attempts to control land and labour in modern South Africa. As these efforts were balanced against each other, South African settler colonialism developed its particular character. My approach here takes a departure from the recent formulations of Patrick Wolfe, who maintains that we see settler colonialism primarily as a contest over land rather than labour – a social formation

embodying 'a logic of elimination' at its core.[7] If we follow this lead to its logical conclusion, as he and others have, South Africa starts to appear less like a settler colony and more like a classically exploitative colonial formation. Its rancid elements of slavery merely superseded by the mass-proletarianisation of a subordinated population after industrialisation, South Africa was different from other settler societies because its colonisers asked very different things of the colonised: settlers were always a minority dependent on 'native labour'; the 'natives', for their part, were ultimately contained by segregation rather than targeted for destruction, and today they have reached a kind of political independence that settler-colonised peoples elsewhere are unlikely to attain. According to this reading, South Africa was 'just a colony that happens to have settlers in it', but was never a 'settler colony'.[8]

This interpretation is compelling, but it relies upon a simplistic interpretation of the labour regime within modern South Africa. Moreover, it necessitates a homogeneous rendering of the meaning of 'native' which allows little room for any understanding of the erosion of identities engendered by the operation of the state's classificatory regime. This chapter offers a different interpretation. Borrowing and developing the ideas of David Pearson and Lorenzo Veracini, this chapter accepts that a triangular citizenry relationship is just as definitive of the South African regime as it is of other settler colonial regimes.[9] South Africa had, and still has, dominant settlers, suppressed indigenous people and marginalised exogenous people; each were and are allotted their place within South African society in different ways. During the twentieth century, what made the South African version of this triangular arrangement unusual were the state's many attempts to transform the country's African population into separate communities of 'foreigners' and the emergence of an interstitial 'Coloured' population. Coming to terms with these realities allows us to appreciate the resemblance of South Africa to the other white dominions of the British Empire. From this starting point, comparisons might better flow.

This chapter proceeds by beginning at the birth of the Union in 1910, and it carries through into the twenty-first century, enduring beyond the convenient stopping point of 1994 into the 2010s. In order to explain how South African settler colonialism worked, land and labour remain the focus throughout this chapter. An authoritarian state determined who was exogenous and who was indigenous until the late 1980s, during which period mutually requisite processes of dispossession and exploitation were formalised in statute law and performed through acts of state-sanctioned violence. These processes then had to be wound back by democratically elected governments after 1994.

Land and labour (I)

The Union of South Africa was founded upon the dispossession of its indigenous populations. But this reality was felt unevenly. Rural African communities, agro-pastoralist and subsistence-oriented, could still be found in good numbers across the country as squatters, tenants and land-owners. Some were imperiled, but many were yet to be upset by displacement and removal.[10] On the other hand, the country's first people, the hunter-gatherer San, were largely disappearing from sight. This tragedy was visible to remarkably few observers, making exception, however, for Dorothea Bleek and Lucy Lloyd, whose research into the languages and folklore of San across southern Africa provides us with some idea of their unique experience at this time.[11] Meanwhile, Khoekhoe groups, pastoralist relatives of the San, had lost most of their stock by the time of Union. Notwithstanding a few small exceptions, they no longer associated together in discrete communities. Whatever tribal organisation there remained among those generally called 'Bushmen' and 'Hottentots' at the time, little of it endured through the twentieth century. They were melted into the ethnic category of 'Coloured', which requires some explanation.

The opening up of the 'Coloured' umbrella took place between 1902 and the late 1930s. Those identifying as Coloured were accommodated in South Africa much better than 'detribalised' Bantu-speaking 'Natives' and migrant Africans by the end of this period, especially when it came to access to semi-skilled employment, participation in small-scale political activity, provision of education and freedom of movement.[12] In such a context, if one could become Coloured, one probably did. In Cape Town, one probably was. Understandably, there was no talk about being the 'first peoples' or '*inheemse volk*', for to claim as much would be to volunteer as a 'Native' and face up to the most brutal aspects of the regime. Within settler society, Coloured or 'Cape People' represented the bridge between European and African, physically the reminder of the Dutch old days of slavery in the Indies; they were 'the nearest kind to white' in the settler imagination.[13] Correspondingly, the Union's approach to the Coloured population was to see them as an interstitial people, with the term officially embracing any 'person who is not a white person or a native'.[14] Beyond the state's control, however, Colouredness transformed into a kind of franchise, extending beyond the Cape and right across the country, incorporating Khoe-San peoples and all kinds of 'mixed' individuals with any combination of European, African, Indian and Cape Malay heritage. 'Coloured' soon became a collective ethnonational identity for all those who fell between 'European' and 'Bantu', housing a community which, in turn, used the term and its wide reach to develop an influential political project that placed its overarching stress upon unity, not fragmentation.

There was little resistance to this homogenisation, but the exceptional example of Griqua nationalist and entrepreneur A.A.S. Le Fleur, editor of the newspaper *The Griqua and Coloured Peoples' Opinion*, is noteworthy. From 1910 into the early 1920s, Le Fleur developed a utopian land scheme, holding out the promise to his investors that they would become landed Griqua like those of the old days, and therefore no longer 'Coloured' (or '*Kleurling*'). One of Le Fleur's collaborators even went so far as to suggest that there were only three nationalities in South Africa: '*die Bantoe, die Griekwas, en die Witman*'.[15] In the end, Le Fleur's Griqua colony floundered. He was jailed for a time and would remain dogged by accusations of fraud up to his death. Much of the money pledged to him disappeared; that which remained could buy only a pittance of arable land at the Cape. Le Fleur was a visionary, but he was also an anachronism: his 'solution' may have been viable in the mid-nineteenth century but it was impossible in the Union era.[16]

Africans, by contrast, who were given a number of confusing appellations despite their singularly least-enviable place in the state's classificatory regime (as Bantu, Native, Kaffir and more), were easily the most populous group in South Africa, making up at least two-thirds of the census count for 1911.[17] Early on, representatives of the stand-in colonial administration had been perplexed by the reality of a large and growing African population. Yet they lacked both the foresight and the fortitude to establish firm guidelines on dealing with the matter for the Union as they plotted their withdrawal and trip back to England. In a telling observation, Lionel Curtis, who was probably Lord Milner's most important administrator during the reconstruction period, confessed in 1901 that '[i]t would be a blessed thing for us if the negro like the Red Man tended to die out before us, for he acts like decay among teeth'.[18] Union parliamentarians would not have disagreed, of course. But, embracing industrialism as firmly as they did, they came to see an opportunity in the demographic ratio. It became 'desirable from every point of view that the Native should work, and there is therefore nothing improper in persuading him to do so'. That these were the conclusions of a Union enquiry of 1914 commissioned into 'Native Grievances' reveals some of the irony characteristic of official discourse before the adoption of a more matter-of-fact language to rationalise the economy's increasing reliance upon African labour during the apartheid regime.[19]

An insatiable demand for local labour held in store a number of social problems for the South African state, but these were better issues to confront than the only plausible alternative:

the importation of indentured labourers from beyond Africa. The turn of the century saw the failure of a number of experiments with Asian '*koelies*'. Indian workers who arrived to work Natal's plantations from 1860 onwards often remained behind at the end of their terms. They reproduced and founded social enclaves for themselves and made their political presence felt, sometimes as 'Coloured' people when it suited them, from the early twentieth century onwards.[20] This was not an ideal outcome for the settler state. After 1904, labourers indentured from China to work in the mines were treated with a much firmer hand. The regulation of Chinese labourers led to the engineering of an infamous 'colour bar', a powerful political mechanism which worked to restrict the employment of certain identified groups to 'unskilled tasks'. On top of this, the Chinese were prohibited from striking, compounded into closed habitations and guarded to ensure no threat of escape. Upon the completion of their three-year terms, the Chinese workers were not permitted to remain in South Africa. They were repatriated, in large part, by 1910.[21]

These fraught experiments with labourers from elsewhere offer a number of insights into the logic of the developing South African regime, and the Chinese experience in particular may be shown to foreshadow a number of later developments. As it happened, many of the restrictions imposed upon Chinese labourers were subsequently extended to the 263,000 or so 'foreign native labourers' employed in the gold mines over the next decade.[22] These workers, unlike the Chinese, were recruited by agents of the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association, mostly in Mozambique, but also in Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia; potential reservoirs of labour were less successfully identified in Nigeria, Morocco and Egypt too.[23] South of the Limpopo, labourers for the Rand were actively sourced by the Native Recruitment Corporation (NRC) from 1912, mostly from the protectorates of Bechuanaland and Basutoland. 'Native labourers' were really anything but. From all corners of southern Africa they came to the Rand, leaving their families behind. They were housed into compounds and employed at the mines 'as a relatively undifferentiated mass'.[24] After 1911, these were the men targeted doggedly by the statute law of the Union, as its parliamentarians attempted to balance between the interests of the Chamber of Mines and white unionists. The Native Labour Regulation Act curtailed the bargaining power of African labourers and restricted their movement within identified 'labour districts' across the country (16 in Transvaal, four in the Orange River Province, two in Natal and two in Cape); the Mines and Works Act fortified the colour bar by impeding African labourers from acquiring the certification necessary to escape the bottom 'unskilled' rung (a move that was celebrated in Johannesburg for sharing the same spirit of Australian policies towards 'the Chinamen and the Kanakas').[25] These two laws, developed principally for the Rand, were foreboding: the Labour Act was 'amplified and extended' after 1920 to inform the development of a systematic pass system, which buttressed the segregationist provisions of the Urban Areas Act of 1923; the Mines Act was given broader coverage after 1926 and thereafter became the model upon which the national colour bar was developed.[26]

These measures coincided with a number of moves to weaken the position of rural Africans vis-à-vis freeholding settler farmers. At the outset of Union, each province continued to work with its own reservation program and enforced, with mixed successes, its own restrictions upon African tenure.[27] The Natives Land Act of 1913, which prohibited Africans from buying or leasing land outside of scheduled reserve areas of 22 million acres (or about 7% of the country), represented a bold attempt to consolidate a national land policy.[28] It promised to revolutionise overnight the kinds of tenure enjoyed by non-whites in the countryside. 'Awaking on Friday morning, June 20, 1913, the South African Native found himself, not actually a slave, but a pariah in the land of his birth', declared Tswana intellectual Sol Plaatje in 1916.[29] In practice, however, the effects of the Natives Land Act were inconsistent. It did not even apply to the Cape Province. In the Transvaal, informal African syndicates continued to pool their resources in order

to buy land outside the delimited reserve areas.[30] And white farmers everywhere were slow to evict squatters and sharecroppers. The passage of the Native Trust and Land Act in 1936 ironed out these inconsistencies. This reform rolled out a burdensome trust system as one of several patronising conditions for African tenure in the scheduled areas across the country (now including the Cape). Individually and communally, it became next to impossible for the vast majority of Africans to buy land in the reserves. Stockholding therefore became much more difficult than it already was in a settler economy directing its energies towards intensive agriculture. Sharecroppers and wage labourers could still be found residing on settler farms after 1936, but labour tenancy had become the main form of tenure for rural Africans by this time.[31]

African mobility was therefore highly restricted by both the rural and the industrial policies of the Union. Whether stuck on settler farms, stuck in mining compounds or stuck on the fringes of urban society, Africans found it barely possible, by the middle of the century, to escape from deplorable conditions. In the wake of World War II, things would be no better as the winds of change swept across the continent, if in unpredictable swells south of the Zambezi. The fragmentation of southern Africa occurred at the height of the storm of continental decolonisation. Within the Republiek van Suid-Afrika – after 1961 independent of the British Commonwealth – nationalist efforts intensified to realise a paranoid objective of complete racial separation, to the detriment of all who were not white. These developments, put into their context, require an excursion into the apartheid mentality.

Settler society and apartheid

The division of South African settler society lost much of its starkness during the interwar years. By the mid-1930s, the Afrikaner star was outshining the dimming English one. Beyond the realm of politics and in the community at large, a number of Afrikaner organisations took root, none more important than the *Broederbond*.[32] Aside from the occasional moot point among Afrikaans-speakers over politics and economics – developments in Europe ensured that consensus on these points would remain elusive until well after 1945 – Afrikaner nationalism in the 1930s and 1940s was essentially homogeneous. It was modelled upon the concept of the *volk*. Afrikaners were a people with their own distinct *kultuur*, *geskiedenis*, *taal* and *kerk*. This meant, in other words, that petty differences detracted nothing from the singularity of the Afrikaner *volk*, inasmuch as they all distrusted foreign influence, cherished their own autonomy, knew a specific version of their own history, spoke Afrikaans and feared God.[33]

Culturally, there was cause for celebration. The Great Trek, for example, was popularly re-enacted in 1938. Construction of the Voortrekker Monument, spectacularly commemorating the centenary of the Battle of Blood River, also got underway in Pretoria to great ceremony in the same year. Afrikaans, throughout the 1920s and 1930s simplified and standardised, was thereafter nationalised and treated with newfound reverence by poets, academics and novelists.[34] Politically, there was cause for alarm. The spare and modest gestures of their liberal adversaries towards 'equalization' after 1945 made conservative Afrikaners uneasy: equality threatened to take away many hard-made gains. To be sure, this was to be a concern which cut across the marked ethnic divisions of the settler body politic, but the roughshod implementation of integration was particularly feared within Afrikaner society, which had postured itself for some time towards African and Coloured inferiors in the idiosyncratically South African style of *baaskap* (bossship). 'Either you are baas, the equal, or the inferior, one of the three', levelled the straight-talking J. G. Strijdom in parliament during the run-up to the all-important election of 1948. 'If you are not baas, you must be a man's equal [. . .]. If you say that you do not want to dominate the Native it simply means that you stand for a policy of equality'.[35]

Strijdom elaborated crudely the Afrikaner's position on the native question as it stood in the middle of the 1940s. This position would change over the next two decades. The National Party he represented, under the leadership of D. F. Malan, was in this period playing down its republican ambitions and playing up to exaggerated allegations of *gelykstelling* (social levelling) by making repetitive recourse to the imprecise slogan of apartheid (separate-ness), its presumed antithesis. Although the term had been fluid for some time before this, 'apartheid' would thereafter solidify to take a central position in the ideological configuration of the National Party after its rise to political dominance with victory in the 1948 election. Saul Dubow, in his recent intellectual history of apartheid, shows how the word underwent serious rebranding after that victory. During the 1950s, older notions of *baaskapheid* were largely dropped in favour of the new ideal of 'separate development': what the secretary of Bantu Administration and Development, Walter Eiselen, would call 'harmonious multi-community development', or what his colleague Hendrik Verwoerd would later call 'good neighbourliness'.[36]

In this way, apartheid was to become associated with a distinct platform of racial separation. Police and courts would be central to the upkeep of this policy, but its foundation was essentially statutory. Much of this legislation, like the older segregationist measures of the Union, was designed to classify specific peoples and impose restrictions accordingly. Other laws clearly responded to the newly paranoid desire to prevent the dilution of white purity from *rasse-* or *bloed-vermenging* (miscegenation). The Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act (1949) and the Immorality Act (1950), for example, prohibited interracial intimacy in the name of apartheid too.

This idiomatic Afrikaans neologism might lead us to assume that apartheid was purely about protecting the Afrikaner *volk* specifically. To be sure, it did that. But it may be better to see apartheid as the ultimate security blanket for South African settler colonialism more generally. Conservative Afrikaners were not, after all, the only beneficiaries of apartheid, even if it would be the party representing their interests, the Nationalists, which would retain control of the state for over two generations. English-speaking settlers, for their part, refrained from exploring other options and offered lukewarm support for the Afrikaner *status quo.* Most relaxed their progressive political convictions in conformity with those of the Afrikaner majority at whose hands *all* whites fared, socio-economically at least, well. English defiance has been exaggerated by generations of liberal historians writing in English and portraying a simplistic and romantic narrative featuring evil Afrikaners pitted against progressive, white, predominately English-speaking, sympathisers of the oppressed. All settlers were the beneficiaries of apartheid.

Land and labour (II)

Settler society was highly urbanised under the National Party regime, with over three-quarters of classified whites living in cities and towns during the second half of the twentieth century.[37] Policies of segregation were imposed most strongly in these areas. Between 1945 and 1961, old statute law restricting urban movement was amended and hardened, while new 'group areas' for separate racial groups were promulgated in separate legislation. The Coloured and Asian communities, also mostly urban, were confined to specified zones of cities like Cape Town and Durban. This was a privilege that did not extend to Africans though, notwithstanding a few short-lived exceptions, like Johannesburg's Sophiatown before its demolition and the forced removal of its residents between 1955 and 1962.[38] For the most part, African men and women working in manufacturing and domestic jobs were confined to densely populated townships on the fringes of white urban society. There they shaped for themselves urbanised communities of their own. These townships and 'locations', which resembled none of the white cities and were

often far removed from the privileged residential neighbourhoods serviced by African labour, grew at a rapid rate during the middle of the twentieth century and eventually became a source of concern for politicians during high apartheid. The biggest townships flanked the Rand, where their unexpected emergence may be evidenced *prima facie* by their names: Soweto (for the consolidation of 'South Western Townships') and Alexandra (from the female settler whose farmland was swallowed up by the abruptly sprawling township).[39]

Rural Africans, like urban Africans, were also restricted in their movement, but a distinct policy analogous to indirect rule was developed largely for the purpose of preventing their interregional political collaboration in the reserve areas.[40] From as early as 1927, the year in which the Native Administration Act was passed, the Department of Native Affairs had looked to appoint local 'chiefs' and had even endorsed their use of imaginative customary jurisdictions in the reserve areas. The apartheid state, through its revamped Department of Bantu Administration and Development (a name-change of great significance), intensified and bureaucratised these strategies of rural control. The key statute here was the Bantu Authorities Act of 1951, which saw dozens of government ethnologists and African collaborators employed to identify 'ancestral' chieftaincies and encourage small-scale tribal organisation. The work of these 'information officers' culminated in an abundance of accessible state-funded research, often framed within a patronising racial ideology, which bore significantly upon the development of policy superficially designed to explore 'the unknown potential' of 'the Bantu' during the period of Hendrik Verwoerd's tenure as Minister of the Department (1950–58).[41] Africans were 'tribal', not political in any modern sense; they were to be 'administered' and 'developed' but not integrated.[42]

The creation of 'homelands', or 'Bantustans', represented the apogee of this policy, the statutory foundations of which were provided by the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act of 1959. African statelets were installed across the countryside over the next two decades, each with its own salaried chieftaincy, civil service and the requisite bureaucracy to govern ethnically homogenous groups. AmaXhosa were divided between Transkei and the Ciskei. AmaZulu were put into KwaZulu. BaSotho went to QwaQwa. Northern Sotho to Lebowa, vhaVenda to Venda, amaNdebele to KwaNdebele, amaSwati to Kangwane and the Shangaan to Gazankulu. BaTswana found themselves in a spattering of unconnected communities called Bophuthatswana. Functionally, the sophistication of these administrations varied, and the manipulation of authority through patronage and corruption was commonplace. Great expenditure was required for their installation and maintenance, which was only justifiable because they were presumed to be temporary. Each was primed for self-government first, nominal independence second and, eventually, substantive independence akin to that of Lesotho or Botswana. Transkei would be the first to attempt this metamorphosis in 1976, followed over the next five years by Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei. For all the public talk of autonomy and citizenship, however, this was the settler state mimicking decolonisation, not performing it.[43]

Behind Bantustanisation were the twin hopes of amplifying the power of the apartheid state and extinguishing the threat of a national resistance movement spreading across the country. This extensive and deliberately fragmented two-step programme of retribalisation and nation-building was developed to create minorities out of a majority. It was enacted to allow a minority of whites furnished by the apartheid state to assume additional political legitimacy in the wider African region. It was thus a way to elude demographic reality.[44] It may also be useful to identify in Bantustanisation the similarities with the policy thriving decades earlier, which saw 'foreign native labourers' made out of Africans. Essentially the same status was envisaged for the 'citizens' of the homelands. 'It is accepted Government policy', explained a statement of the Department of Bantu Administration and Development in 1967,

that the Bantu are only temporarily resident in the European areas of the Republic for as long as they offer their labour there. As soon as they become, for one reason or another, no longer fit for work or superfluous in the labour market, they are expected to return to their country of origin or the territory of the national unit where they fit ethnically if they were not born and bred in their homeland.[45]

Such would remain the logic of South African settler capitalism for some time longer. It was cyclical, predictable and ultimately unsustainable: dispossession and replacement, exploitation and exclusion. The Bantustans and Group Areas were the spatial outcomes of these cycles. Booming industrialism was the economic result. But it was short-lived: enormous military expenditures after 1975, combined with a series of foreign embargoes, sanctions and debt crises after the OPEC oil boycott of 1973, restrained most areas of growth in the South African economy by the time most major corporations withdrew from the country in the late 1980s. By that time, over 3,500,000 people had been removed by the apartheid state in acts of 'good neighbourliness'.[46]

The collapse of apartheid

Apartheid was an especially violent system which grew more oppressive in response to episodic resistance. The Sharpeville massacre of 1960 is exemplary of this trend, but that event also represents something of a turning point. When location-dwelling Africans marched upon a police station near Johannesburg, the police was brutally unaccommodating: 69 were slain and well over a hundred more were injured. The state's response was not to chastise the policemen but – unambiguously the opposite – to heighten their powers for dealing with social unrest and to restrict African collaboration more generally, in a slew of legislation passed between 1960 and 1967. Serious international condemnation cast down upon the new Republic of South Africa for the first time, setting a pattern for the next three decades whenever reports of police brutality in the townships and locations were picked up by the wider world. Especially scandalous was the state's response to the Soweto Uprising of 1976. This remarkable demonstration of the vibrancy of school politics and the influence of youth gangs in the township saw tens of thousands of young people protest against the imposition of Afrikaans as the language of instruction.[47] Hundreds were killed and over a thousand were injured. The world noticed. As popular unrest spread to other townships, global media outlets took with growing enthusiasm to chiding South Africa for the heartlessness of its police.[48]

From its parochial beginnings, apartheid had acquired global political significance by the start of the 1980s, particularly within the wider English-speaking world. However, the role of international pressure in causing the demise of apartheid can be exaggerated, for South African settler society was highly insulated. National Party voters and the ministers they elected mostly read Afrikaans newspapers; they were unaffected by the sentiment driving boycotts abroad; they entirely disregarded the uninvited comments of Commonwealth political personalities; and they expressed little more than puzzlement, generally, in response to global indignation between 1976 and 1990. What forced the Nationalist hand – what indeed *made* South African politics a global talking point in this period – were the actions of indigenous political movements.

Overcoming heavy restrictions of association, anti-apartheid groups mobilised in secret and often ingenious ways during the 1960s and beyond. The African National Congress (ANC), founded way back in 1912, splintered after 1945; it then reinvented itself, and although forced to operate from headquarters located beyond South Africa's borders after this period, it became a formidable political machine by the end of the 1970s.[49] It was never alone. Also significant was the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), founded in 1959. Both had militant wings: for the

ANC, *uMkhonto weSizwe* ('Spear of the Nation'); for the PAC, *Poqo* ('Pure'). Politically exiled, these organisations covertly devised networks of collaborators, principally within the townships, where political mobilisation was less easily detected and resistance could be plotted with greater proximity to state targets. Domestic anti-apartheid organisations began to emerge locally from 1983 onwards. This was of twofold significance: it revealed both the existence of factions within African politics, and the limits of the state's capacity to restrict those politics from finding expression. Ideologically, by that time, the African resistance movement had become sophisticated. Some committed to the class struggle against capitalism, with many, especially those in the ANC, embracing Marxist thinking and accepting the financial backing of the Soviet Union.[50] Others followed Steve Biko's efforts to recast the struggle discourse in the direction of 'black consciousness', and subscribed to a radical destiny of 'Azania' for the Azanians, among the most militant of whom formed the Azanian People's Liberation Army (APLA).[51]

This is, of course, to simplify and to stereotype. Throughout the 1970s and into the early 1980s, African politics were dynamic, contested and exciting – in those respects, nothing like settler politics. If, as William Beinart writes, this window represented 'the renaissance of black opposition' to apartheid, which 'paved the way for political change' after the mid-1980s, then it is essential to recognise at this stage that African radicalisation was spread unevenly and was least present of all in the homelands, where perceived challenges to 'tradition' were often rejected by established powerbrokers.[52] Bantustanisation appeared to be performing its role well, in other words; and so would it continue, problematically, for a long time to come. This regionalisation gave the struggle a particular character: aside from a few moments of disobedience in the homelands, African resistance to apartheid, for all the importance of its operatives in exile, consisted of the politics of the township creeping into the cities through a number of incisive demonstrations.

Probably no demonstration was more jolting than the Church Street bombing of 1983 in the national capital, Pretoria, though it was merely a sign of things to come. Resistance thereafter spread throughout the townships, locations and informal settlements. The associated violence – much of it in-fighting, some of it manipulated, all of it devastating – spiked in the middle years of the 1980s and remained significant thereafter. Keeping abreast of all this, the state's intelligence and military resources were drained. Equally important, popular support for the regime dwindled too. Some from within the settler body politic grew vocal in opposition to the apartheid state – even if those who did so risked facing a shotgun assassination in front of the family home.[53] More quietly and behind the scenes, average white South Africans committed less to high apartheid and began to accept the inevitability of reform. Public acts of 'terrorism' were taking their toll, as when the APLA bombed and then opened fire upon churchgoers in Cape Town in July 1993 (just one of the more gruesome examples of late-apartheid violence). Meanwhile, as some white South Africans grew disenchanted with apartheid from the mid-1980s onwards, others in the same period resisted the prospect of African majority rule with vehemence, often in association with aggressively nationalistic groups like the *Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging* (Afrikaner Resistance Movement) or the *AfrikanerVolksfront*. Two starkly difference political choices therefore stood out. Settlers could either soften or they could harden.

Behind either decision was often a number of factors, but one in particular deserves reflection. Between 1961 and 1994, 600,000 white men were conscripted for the South African Defence Force. Most of them either took part in the disastrous Border War against communist political movements in northern Namibia and southern Angola between 1975 and 1989 or were otherwise deployed within South Africa in one of many sites of resistance between 1984 and 1994. Some of these servicemen returned to civilian life determined to fight 'communism' and 'terrorism'; a bigger number, however, returned from these conflicts confused, tired and traumatised.[54] If association with armed, far–right militants may have been more attractive to the former,

disengagement from politics was more common for the latter. Neither response was ideal for the National Party.

The apartheid state within the Republic of South Africa – not yet including the semi-emancipated homelands and their governments of mixed legitimacy – gradually disintegrated in the decade following 1984. Anti-miscegenation laws were repealed in 1985, as were the pass laws the following year. Thereafter, the Group Areas Act was no longer firmly enforced within the Republic.[55] In 1991, the Abolition of Racially Based Land Measures Act partially freed the land market. The most consequential announcement of reform, however, was delivered in 1990, when President F. W. de Klerk unbanned the exiled ANC, PAC and Communist Party while relaxing restrictions on two dozen or so other domestic organisations. In the same sitting of parliament, de Klerk also announced the liberation of political prisoners, among them the ANC's Nelson Mandela.[56]

Mandela embraced the heroic portrait of African statesman painted largely by others. He then dissociated from his more radical comrades, many of whom had been training in guerrilla warfare in exile, where their motivations to achieve communism through armed struggle had strengthened during the 1980s. By contrast, Mandela looked to collaborate with the settler state, unlike hard-line activists within the ANC and other anti-apartheid organisations, who sought to overthrow it. 'Interim' constitutions were drafted between December 1991 and November 1993, and after the ANC's victory in the 1994 election, a final constitution was prepared. Mandela's vision of an inclusive democracy, symbolised by the 'rainbow nation', had in 1994 won out over the APLA's catch-cry solution of 'one settler, one bullet'.[57]

Amid all of the reform and negotiation of the 1980s and early 1990s, homelands still represented a viable option in the South African political imagination. In the Bantustans themselves, patriarchal 'traditional authorities' continued to press for greater power and varying degrees of separation from the apartheid state. The founding, in 1987, of the Congress of the Traditional Leaders of South Africa was politically significant; cautiously, this organ lent its support to the ANC, though this support was conditional on certain concessions. This support the ANC was forced to accept as it endeavoured to secure the rural vote in the early 1990s. Politicians in the less powerful homelands became anxious to have their loyalty to the ANC recognised at this time, while some of the 'independent' entities continued to push for something like federal recognition. Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi of KwaZulu, for instance, sought an alternative future for a moderate and independent Zulu kingdom within South Africa. To that end, through his *Inkatha* movement, he manipulated both the National Party and the ANC during the late 1980s and into the 1990s – a posturing that often led to localised violence in the townships.[58]

Others across South Africa sought special treatment similar to that enjoyed by 'traditional' rulers. From the northern Cape and the Free State, a new generation of the disregarded Griqua minority emerged in 1982 to demand greater self-government and land from Pretoria – even going so far as to rehash old requests for a 'Griquastan'. After a commissioned enquiry, however, only journalists entertained the idea before it disappeared off the agenda.[59] Likewise, right-wing nationalists, coming to terms with the inevitability of democracy, proposed to install *volkstaats* in the Cape, Free State and Transvaal for Afrikaners only. Some, like General Constand Viljoen and his *Volksfront*, were regularly engaged in a number of discussions about the development of an ANC-permitted and constitutionally sanctioned *volkstaat* (even insisting upon the *volkstaat* as an 'indigenous' right); others were more radical, among them members of Eugene Terre'Blanche's *Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging*, who avoided diplomacy and threatened to break away from the South African state through violent means.[60] Neither threat was carried out. It would instead be the Afrikaner intellectual Carel Boshoff III who oversaw the creation of the first viable Afrikaner homeland in 1991, masterminding the renovation of a dilapidated town into the *volkstaat* of

Orania (which required, however, the physical removal of many Coloured and African squatters against their wills). A similar Afrikaner *volkstaat*, Kleinfontein, would emerge in the outskirts of Pretoria the following year. Both settler Bantustans remain today, but they accommodate far less than 1% of the total white population of the country.[61]

While a minority of Afrikaners envisaged a future of isolation from the rest of democratic South Africa during the early 1990s, those who *already* enjoyed the fruits of this isolation – the African middle classes and the ruling elites of the 'independent homelands' – remained stubborn to relinquish their special status. During the pivotal years of 1993 and 1994, the presence of homeland chiefs and their 'tribal' institutions proved an irritant to the ANC. In the new constitutional arrangement, nine provinces replaced four Union provinces and ten Bantustans – but these Bantustans had put together 14 legislatures, 151 departments and employed approximately 650,000 officials by that time.[62] To the ANC, Bantustan officialdom provided a ready-made solution to the problem of finding a replacement for a white bureaucracy within the new state. This reality, along with a number of related complexities associated with the incorporation of the homelands into the new South Africa, has seen the government, since 1994, treat the old homeland regions with a combination of ambivalence and kowtowing. Efforts to harmonise their land tenure systems with the rest of the country, moves to incorporate rural governance procedures within the national democratic format and attempts to rationalise the customary jurisdictions of traditional courts remain ongoing.[63]

Land and labour (III)

One of the foremost concerns of the post-apartheid government during its first two decades has been to ameliorate the economic position of Africans within what remains a settler society. Offering cheap labour must no longer be the only option for the majority of the population. Attempts by the ANC to create new middle and upper classes through a statutory program of 'Black Economic Empowerment' have proven controversial. This policy is multifaceted: Africans (generally men, rarely women) should be shareholders, control companies, hold senior management positions and acquire professional skills. While these projects were rolled out at a bad time in the global economy, their contribution to the weakening position of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange and the South African business sector more generally between 1996 and 2002 cannot be overlooked. The only immediate result of the policy was a nouveau-riche 'black elite'. Attempts to provide a 'broader base' to this empowerment are only beginning to be felt in over-crowded townships and informal settlements, where living standards and the rate of employment remain pitiable.[64]

Townships and informal settlements continue to expand, but few neighbourhoods have received much more than a makeover. Township politics may still be dominated by the ANC, but we are not yet enough generations removed from the struggle to imagine otherwise, even if new parties like the 'Economic Freedom Fighters' (with a policy platform as vague as the name portends) have begun to attract attention from disenchanted voters after 2013. Cities are still where business is done, and the suburbs remain where the wealthiest live; the poor work in both but rarely live in either. Mines remain where many of the poor still work in fear of police gunshots, especially after the Marikana massacre of August 2012, which saw 34 strikers killed.[65] Townships are where the poorest live, often alongside economic migrants.

The ongoing attraction of township life to foreigners (mostly sub-Saharan African, some south Asian) is exposing cracks in the post-apartheid framework. When outbreaks of 'xenophobic violence' spread from Alexandra throughout Gauteng and into KwaZulu-Natal in May 2008, South African politicians picked up a new terminology to deal with the country's appeal to foreign

labourers. Police showed little sympathy for the victims. The Department of Home Affairs, for its part, could not process the thousands (probably hundreds of thousands) of outstanding residency applications. Some foreigners were deported, some were 'reintegrated', most slipped through the gaps and many still wait in long queues for the right paperwork. Township hostility towards the new exogenous others continues to flare up in coordinated and localised acts of violence and looting.[66]

Land reform has been another of the foremost concerns of the post-apartheid government. This policy was modelled upon three separate tracks: redistribution (of land by the state for development and settlement projects), tenure reform (principally in order to harmonise the communal landholding of former Bantustans with the rest of the country) and restitution (of land or equivalent compensation for particular victims of dispossession).[67] The last ambition, envisaged in the constitution and the Restitution of Land Rights Act of 1994, is the most idiosyncratic.[68] The land restitution programme identifies a restorable right to those dispossessed 'for the purpose of furthering the objects of any racially based discriminatory law'. However, by establishing 19 June 1913 and 31 December 1998 as cut-off dates, the Act created a small window of dispossession for the special commission and associated court to look through. The first of these is the date of the Natives Land Act, and its rationale is historical; the latter 'sunset clause' was established out of convenience, and it has been extended, reopening the possibility for restitution, from June 2014. Neither cut-off date is easy to understand. Dispossession, after all, occurred before 1913, and the suggestion that it did not penalises those, like self-identifying Khoe-San, who have been agitating for recognition since the late 1990s. No one could argue that dispossession disappeared on New Year's Day, 1999, either – or, for that matter, at the end of 1993. If it is reasonable to equate 'racially based discriminatory laws' with statutes passed only between the Union of 1910 and the election of the ANC in 1994, as the commission has, then no longer can a great elephant in the Land Claims Court escape our attention. Midnight evictions from the crowded city streetscapes of Johannesburg, Durban and Cape Town, from farms and from a number of 'informal settlements' across the country are not called 'forced removals' by the ANC as they were by the National Party, but there is perhaps no better term for them. That the police are generally complicit in these often-random evictions, despite the lack of resettlement options available to the evictees, makes the comparison all the more startling.[69]

In South Africa since 1994, the responsibility for dispossessions considered 'historical' by the terms of the law – technically, those that took place between 1913 and, essentially, 1993 – has been assumed by the government. Restitution was always merely a symbolic gesture on the part of the ANC, as the government has openly admitted. Its resurrection in recent years, on a paltry budget, is but a vote-winner. In the past, its operation was far from perfect. The Commission's investigations were opaque, ministerial influence was extreme and the majority of claims were administratively processed without reliance on the specially put-together court. The redress provided to recipients was mostly cash, and the limits of the programme were laid bare when the growing size of an unwieldy backlog was made public. Thousands of claimants have waited several years. Many remain unsatisfied. Meanwhile, support for the victims of ongoing dispossession has been provided by a handful of advocates prepared to defend *pro bono* and pursue the expensive course of public interest litigation on the ledger books of the NGOs for whom they work. These tend to be the same lawyers taking responsibility for socio-economic rights more generally, or at least those finding some protection in the constitution. A formidable jurisprudence, as a result, emanates from the Constitutional Court, but the steps leading up to it are neither cheap nor quick.

The sustainability of government efforts to reform land and labour in the new South Africa remains to be seen. Great strides have been taken in the right direction, a route which may have gone wayward were it not for an independent judiciary and a progressive constitution. And yet, although the flag has changed its colours, the composition of the state itself has undergone little

alteration. The ANC in 2016 remains just as reliant upon statutory law to enact its social policies as the National Party was to enact its own social policies. The difference today, however, is that the upkeep of ANC policy is maintained by provincial police forces ill-disciplined and amateur in comparison with those of the apartheid era, if just as corrupt. Parliament, where statutes are made, is a very different institution, now a vibrant site of political discussion. For some, the election of several Economic Freedom Fighters, including the party's larger-than-life leader, Julius Malema, represents a good thing for democracy, where the ANC has enjoyed comfortable majority support for over two decades. For others, however, jarred by every occurrence at which parliament descends into farce as a result of Malema's gimmickry, only a troublesome future is foreseeable. If question time increasingly continues to become choked up with enquiries inconsequential to good public policy, then the fabric of South African democracy – however rich its rainbow colouring – will undoubtedly fray, and even greater stress will be placed upon the courts. South Africa will then resemble the rest of the continent even more than it does the other white settler dominions.

Conclusion

A great transformation took place in 1994, which in some respects was similar to the one that took place in 1910. Both represented a necessary compromise. Both took place at the end of much bloodletting. Both took place before a future equally bright and fraught. The regulation of land and labour was the objective of so much legislation in the Union period, as it was in the Republican period following it; in the democratic period, land and labour continued to inform some of the most contentious aspects of the ANC's agenda. There, of course, the likeness ends. The ANC pooled its dwindling revenues from a resource-depleted economy to provide for some of the welfare demands of a massive population. It has fallen short in most but not all respects. A rich settler state, by contrast, divided both its resources and the population more generally to provide for the welfare of white citizens only. Therein lies the key difference between these two unusual South African experiments, apartheid and free-market majoritarian democracy.

Apartheid is a versatile concept, capable of representing the zenith of capitalism or the highest stage of white supremacy.[70] Today the catchy Teutonic word 'continues to exist as a free-floating linguistic grab-handle to characterize systematized racism and inequality', as Saul Dubow points out.[71] Returning apartheid to its originating context, for the purpose of appreciating its specificity, this chapter has also attempted to understand the concept within the comparative framework of settler colonial studies. Apartheid was a word, a policy and an idea, each a very different thing. What occurred in the foreground was an elaborate form of settler colonialism built upon mutually reliant processes of dispossession and exploitation and entrenched through violence by those who had no intention of returning to Europe. The settlers built for themselves a society in South Africa in this way. Some Africans were 'removed' in this process, while others were given the status of 'foreigners'. A triangular relationship between settler, indigenous and exogenous operated in South Africa as it did in Australia, for example, even if in accordance with very different economic and demographic circumstances.

South Africa's 'colonialism of a special type' was just settler colonialism on steroids, though its 'logic of elimination' is less easy to locate. Apartheid 'was never an exterminationist project' because of the regime's reliance upon African labour and because of consequent efforts to preserve populations within distinct regions, it is often alleged.[72] Still, this demands that we ignore three centuries of context, and it more importantly risks overlooking the agency and selectivity with which the apartheid state decided which populations were worthy of preservation and where. African social life was abruptly discontinued in places zoned only for whites. It was reconfigured and allowed to exist in homogeneous rural communities. This was hardly conducive to a high

regard for Africans on the move: as one distressed worker complained of the Bantustan system, '[t]he countryside is pushing you into the cities to survive; the cities are pushing you into the countryside to die'.[73] By contrast, African life accidentally thrived in heterogeneously disorganised townships, sites which became especially prone to violent rebellions from the Soweto Uprising onwards. These were circumstances which demanded that the 'Government's goal should not only be to exterminate insurrectionists but also to eradicate their influence over the people', as a chilling memo from P. W. Botha's presidency (1984–9) made clear.[74] This, of course, the ruling National Party tried to do – heavily dependent on a conscripted settler army – until the walls around apartheid became too bloody and the guns too expensive to import.

This chapter has suggested that state efforts to control resources of land and labour have profoundly defined the nature of South African society. Gallantly, the African National Congress, in power after 1994, has attempted to address the legacies of apartheid on these two heads. Less progress has been made to deconstruct the more resilient system of settler colonialism, the roots of which run deeper than 46 years of history. If democracy and the constitutional prohibition of state-based discrimination have together generated the conditions for the outright liberation of the colonised peoples of South Africa, this has to be considered a remarkable outcome in light of North American and Australasian experiences. Whether or not settler colonialism can be shown definitively to have come to an end in South Africa – that depends on criteria yet to be worked out – historians will continue to find, in this complicated nation, a compelling point of comparison.

Notes

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3 M. Legassick, 'British hegemony and the origins of segregation in South Africa, 1901–14', *Segregation and Apartheid in Twentieth-Century South Africa*, W. Beinart and S. Dubow (eds.) London: Routledge, 1995, pp. 43–59.

4 D. Posel, 'What's in a name? Racial categories under Apartheid and their afterlife', *Transformation* 47, 2001, 59–82.

5 See, however, D. Denoon, *Settler Capitalism: The Dynamics of Dependent Development in the Southern Hemisphere*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983; J. W. Cell, *The Highest Stage of White Supremacy: The Origins of Segregation in South Africa and the American South*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982; G. Fredrickson, *White Supremacy: A Comparative Study in American and South African History*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982; H. Lamar and L. Thompson (eds.) *The Frontier in History: North America and Southern Africa Compared*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981.

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7 For the logic of elimination, see P. Wolfe, 'Settler colonialism and the elimination of the native', *Journal of Genocide Research* 8, 4, 2006, esp. 403–4.

8 J. Kehaulani Kauanui and P. Wolfe, 'Settler colonialism then and now: A conversation between J. Kehaulani Kauanui and Patrick Wolfe', *Politica & Società* 2, 2012, p. 249.

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10 C. Bundy, *The Rise and Fall of the South African Peasantry*, London: Heinemann, 1979.

11   D. Bleek, *Comparative Vocabularies of Bushman Languages*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1929; J. Deacon and P. Skotnes (eds.) *The Courage of ||kabbo: Celebrating the 100th Anniversary of the Publication of Specimens of Bushman Folklore*, Cape Town: UCT Press, 2014.

12   E. Hellmann, *Handbook of Race Relations in South Africa*, London: Oxford University Press, 1949, pp. 275–91; I. Goldin, *Making Race: The Politics and Economics of Coloured Identity in South Africa*, London: Longman Group, 1987, pp. 29–124.

13   S. Gertrude Millin, *The South Africans*, London: Constable & Co., 1926, pp. 196–7.

14   See, for example, Union of South Africa, *Report of the Commission of Inquiry Regarding Cape Coloured Population of the Union*, UG 54, Pretoria: Government Printer, 1937, para. 14.

15   R. Edgar and C. Saunders, 'A. A. S. Le Fleur and the Griqua Trek of 1917: Segregation, self-help, and ethnic identity', *International Journal of African Historical Studies* 15, 2, 1982, 201–20.

16   See E. Cavanagh, *The Griqua Past and the Limits of South African History*, Bern: Peter Lang, 2011.

17   A. Kokayi Khalfani and T. Zuberi, 'Racial classification and the modern census in South Africa, 1911–1996', *Race and Society* 4, 2, 2001, 166.

18   L. Curtis, *With Milner in South Africa*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1951, p. 226.

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PART IV

Asia

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INTRODUCTION TO PART IV

Edward Cavanagh

Introduction

Beginning our exploration into the history of settler colonialism in Asia, Alexander Morrison analyses a number of projects intended to bring a 'New Russia' into existence during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. These projects were conceived as experiments in *pereselenie* ('resettlement'). As a result, Russian settlers moved into the European steppe, Siberia and Central Asia. Focusing, in particular, on the latter of these regions (which had been peopled principally by Kazakhs before the Russian invasion), Morrison reveals how settlers here maintained their patriotic ties to mother Russia.

It was around the same time that the Japanese government during the Meiji period (1868–1911) developed an extensive programme of settler expansion into Hokkaidō, as Katsuya Hirano reveals in his chapter. Japan had previously attempted to assert its control over the indigenous Ainu, but it was not until the last decades of the nineteenth century that traditional Ainu ways of life no longer became sustainable in the face of invasion. Settler colonialism, designed with American experiences in mind, would irreversibly transform the economy and society of Hokkaidō, Hirano explains.

This section of the *Handbook* finally shifts to Israel/Palestine. As Gershon Shafir demonstrates, the idea of a Jewish homeland in Palestine was conceived between 1882 and 1920, but its implementation required significant planning and preparation. Lacking, in these decades, the support of an imperial government, the World Zionist Organization and the Jewish National Fund (among other agencies) became pivotal actors. Even though plans oscillated between *kibush haavoda* (the conquest of labour) and *kibush hakarka* (the conquest of land), during the early decades of the twentieth century, a collaborative frontier society began to emerge in Palestine, Shafir reveals.

Israeli settler colonialism was established upon weak foundations, however, until the period following World War II, which is where Arnon Degani picks up in his chapter. In the postwar period, Israel acquired the population and political support requisite to transform into a settler state. This entailed the widespread dispossession of Palestinians (the *Nakba* or 'catastrophe' of 1948, which saw 700,000 Palestinians transferred elsewhere). Renewed warfare in 1967 transformed relations again. Palestinian nationalism escalated into violence again during the First (1987–1991) and Second (2000–2005) Intifadas, after which, writes Degani, 'a détente between colonizer and colonized, punctured by occasional acts of violence, emerged'. It remains to be seen for how long.

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21

RUSSIAN SETTLER COLONIALISM

Alexander Morrison

While migration to new lands and frontiers is a dominant theme in Russian history, the existence of settler colonialism[1] in Russia is fiercely contested. This chapter will argue that, in the nineteenth century, Imperial Russia developed ideologies and practices of settler colonialism which bore a clear family resemblance to those of other European states and peoples. It will concentrate primarily on migration, resettlement and colonization in Russia before the revolutions of 1917 and the establishment of the USSR. While the movement of Russians into Siberia and the other republics of the USSR continued throughout the Soviet period, this took place within a high modernist nation-building framework quite unlike wider European colonial practice, which distinguishes it from the settler colonialism of the Tsarist period.[2]

In the 1920s and '30s, the first generation of Bolshevik historians to write about the subject, some of whom were Kazakhs or other non-Russians, had a licence to denounce peasant colonization as one of the Tsarist regime's many exploitative policies, publishing fierce critiques which explicitly compared Russian settlement in Asia to other instances of European colonialism.[3] By the outbreak of the Second World War, this could (and did) attract accusations of 'bourgeois nationalism'.[4] From the 1940s, the very terms 'colonization' and 'colonial' were deeply sensitive when applied to Russia, implying as they did parallels with the policies of Western imperialist powers who were the USSR's ideological enemies. Soviet scholarship on the subject became largely confined to platitudes on the 'progressive role' played by Russian settlers in introducing the indigenous peoples of Siberia and the steppe to advanced agricultural techniques and Bolshevism, descriptions of the exploitation of these regions by Russian capitalist entrepreneurs, and explorations of the rise of 'class differentiation' amongst the settlers.[5]

The narrative of growing 'friendship' between settlers and the indigenous populations of Central Asia and Siberia was always one of the least convincing aspects of Soviet historiography, but it has had a long afterlife in modern Russia. Even today, suggestions that Russian colonization policies had anything in common with those of the Western Imperial powers can provoke extremely hostile reactions from Russian scholars.[6] Western historians, meanwhile, were largely restricted to the use of published sources until 1991, and the Cold War agenda of much Western historical writing meant that it paid little attention to agrarian resettlement in the Tsarist period.[7] Twenty-five years on, we now have a small but valuable body of publications based on archival research which analyse this vital question in the history of Imperial Russia in considerable depth and detail.[8] Russian settlement in Siberia, which had already all but erased many

indigenous peoples and cultures even before the heyday of settler expansion in the 'Anglo–World' in the nineteenth century, has probably attracted the most attention, with the work of the late Anatoly Remnev standing out as the most important.[9] Alexander Etkind has suggested that the history of Russian expansion is best understood as a process of 'internal colonization' of different peoples (including the Russians themselves) by a state that was equally alien and remote to all, but this interpretation does not take into account the significant differences which had emerged in the treatment of Russian and non-Russian peoples by the imperial state in the course of the nineteenth century – differences which can be seen most clearly when examining Russian colonization in Central Asia.[10] Here Jeff Sahadeo has given us an excellent account of urban settler society in Tashkent,[11] and there are a number of publications on Russian settlement on the Kazakh steppe[12] and in the rural regions of southern Central Asia (Turkestan).[13] Much has also been written on colonization in Central Asia in Russian, notably an excellent monograph and collection of documents from the Kazakhstani historian S.N. Maltusynov.[14] Unfortunately, some of the other scholarship from Kazakhstan takes a narrowly nationalist view of the question, and that from Russia by and large continues to tip-toe round the more difficult and sensitive questions of inter-ethnic relations, while the idea of Russia's *osobyi put'* ('Special path' or *Sonderweg*) remains persistent.[15] Nevertheless, even looking solely at English-language historiography, there is now enough published scholarship on Russian settler colonialism to allow its integration into the wider narrative of European colonial expansion and settlement.[16]

The prehistory of Russian settler colonialism

Until the late eighteenth century, the Russian Imperial state pursued somewhat contradictory strategies when it came to the settlement of its remoter frontiers. It sought to prevent the haemorrhaging of population beyond its borders to areas where it could not be taxed or controlled and was limited in the authority it could exercise in steppe regions by the existence of militarily formidable nomadic powers such as the Crimean Khanate.[17] The legal imposition of serfdom on the Russian peasantry in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was designed to tie them to the land and secure scarce labour resources for the use of the nobility and the state: peasant migration constituted a flight from serfdom and was accordingly discouraged and strictly regulated by the internal passport system.[18] This did not prevent thousands of peasants migrating beyond the limits of state authority on the fringes of the steppe or deep into Siberia, where by the late seventeenth century Russian migrants probably already outnumbered the indigenous peoples.[19] Many of them were Old Believers (*starovertsy*) fleeing religious persecution in Russia, and the early Siberian settlers came to form a distinctive community of *starozhiltsy* (literally 'old livers') that only grudgingly accepted central state control when it was later imposed, and both then and later would develop a certain cultural hybridity which encompassed indigenous and settler lifeways.[20]

The Russian state also recognised and co-opted the free, semi-nomadic and ethnically mixed Cossack communities which emerged beyond its borders from the mingling and intermarriage of escaped serfs with steppe nomads, granting them land and tax privileges in return for military service. In the Asiatic borderlands, this was true of the Terek, Siberian and Yaiq (Ural) Cossacks, and the latter would form the core of the Pugachev revolt in 1773, which saw Cossacks, Tatars, Bashkirs, Qalmyqs and Kazakhs combine in rebellion against the Russian Empire.[21] Simultaneously with this, Siberia was used as a place of criminal and political exile for those the state considered undesirable. The aftermath of the *Pugachevshchina* saw a growing bureaucratisation of Russian rule in Siberia and the steppe, culminating in the administrative reforms of Mikhail Speranskii in 1822.[22] This included the imposition of much stronger control over the existing Cossack hosts, and the creation of new groupings to defend the steppe frontier in Orenburg

and Western Siberia, to be followed in 1851 by the Trans-Baikal Cossacks and in 1867 by the Semirechie Cossacks. These constituted the earliest form of state-organised Slavic settlement in Central Asia and Siberia.

Russian settlement in Asia before the late eighteenth century, while extensive and often catastrophic for non-Russian peoples, is difficult to consider as an exercise in settler colonialism. While Anglophone, Francophone and Hispanophone settler colonialism also sometimes began with penal colonies and sometimes went through an initial phase of autonomy from or hostility to the metropole, creole identities usually emerged *after* a lengthy period of control from the centre, leading to movements towards independence. In Siberia the pattern was somewhat different; politically and religiously dissident and culturally hybrid communities of *Sibiryaki* emerged on the margins of the Russian state and in some cases entered into alliance with indigenous peoples against it. Hierarchies in these societies depended upon access to power, and to some extent on religious belief, but not on race or the degree of admixture of 'European' blood, as was common in many other colonial or creole societies.[23] It was only after a long period of near-independence that the *Sibiryaki* were then subjected to centralised state control, and only in the late nineteenth century that what we might call a creole Siberian identity began to re-emerge – one that has never succeeded in separating itself from metropolitan Russian control.[24]

The institutional and legal framework of Russian settler colonialism

The resettlement of ordinary state peasants and serfs (as opposed to Cossacks) was a nineteenth-century phenomenon. With the defeat of the Crimean Khanate in 1772, which finally rendered the European steppe safe for peasant colonization, Catherine the Great initially invited a series of foreign colonists, notably Bulgarian and German Mennonite settlers, to occupy the supposedly virgin lands of Tauride or 'New Russia'. Only in the 1830s and '40s was this succeeded by a form of what Willard Sunderland has described as 'bureaucratic colonisation', with a mixture of Russian and Ukrainian state peasants actively resettled by the state on the European steppe.[25] In 1843, a statute was passed which allowed peasants to apply to migrate from regions with a shortage of land to those with a surplus, and which spelled out in very general terms the logic which would continue to inform migration policy (now christened *pereselenie*, or resettlement) for the next eighty years:

> The resettlement [*pereselenie*] of state peasants has twin purposes: a) so that agricultural communities [*sel'skie obshchestva*] which stand in need of land can be granted a sufficient amount for the remaining souls once the settlers have left, and b) so that spare hands in one place can be transferred to others, for the cultivation of areas lying empty.[26]

Although moderate measures were put in place to encourage the migration of peasants from one province to another, the only clause relating specifically to borderland regions detailed the complicated process whereby peasants could apply to become Cossacks in the Caucasus. The statutory procedures for obtaining official permission to migrate were complex and bureaucratic, and in practice most peasant migration 'beyond the Urals', a vague expression used for all the Empire's Asiatic territories including Siberia, the Kazakh steppe and Turkestan, remained unsanctioned and outside government control until the 1880s. Until at least the 1850s, Siberia was viewed primarily as a place of exile, punishment and forced labour rather than as a thriving colony.[27] From the 1830s onwards, Transcaucasia was used in analogous fashion as a dumping-ground for religious schismatics whose beliefs were considered subversive in European Russia but whose ethnicity could turn them into Imperial asset in the borderlands with the Ottoman Empire;[28] meanwhile,

Central Asia was considered too dangerous a frontier zone for anything other than military and Cossack settlement. However, the authorities rarely intervened to prevent migration or to send migrants back, instead periodically passing legislation to recognise the considerable amounts of theoretically illegal settlement which was already taking place, particularly in the Altai, Western Siberia and the northern Kazakh steppe.[29] A central feature of this irregular settlement by *samovol'tsy* ('self-willed' colonists) was the use of scouts, or *khodoki*, who were sent out to Siberia and the steppe from villages in European Russia to reconnoitre and identify likely spots for resettlement, the cost of their travel being defrayed collectively by their fellow-villagers. The report they made on their return would determine whether a village or a group of families within it decided to uproot themselves and make the trek to the new lands the *khodok* had identified – which were not necessarily those which had been set aside for colonization by the state. The networks used by these scouts and the sources of information they used to find suitable spots for colonization were certainly not always in accordance with official priorities.[30]

It was only after much debate and delay that there was any concerted attempt to encourage, direct and control this steady flow of peasant colonists through legislation. In 1892, Senator Petr Semenov Tian-Shanskii, the Vice-President of the Imperial Russian Geographical Society, wrote with satisfaction that after years of trying vainly to stem the flow of migrants, the government had finally decided to place itself at the head of the colonization movement.[31] A statute passed on 13 July 1889 had finally authorised peasant settlement beyond the Urals. The strategic need for settlers to protect vulnerable borderland regions such as Semirechie was retrospectively cited as a key reason for this change, but it also had an economic rationale.[32] The 1889 statute allowed peasants to apply to the Ministry of Internal Affairs for permission to migrate, specifying their preferred region, whereupon the department of State Domains was supposed to identify and allocate them a plot. Settlers in the 'Asiatic' provinces of Tomsk, Tobolsk, Akmolinsk, Semipalatinsk and Semirechie were given their plots on terms of 'permanent use', together with three years' exemption from taxation and military service. While on paper this scheme might have marked the beginnings of a real colonization policy, the fact that only six low-grade civil servants were appointed to administer these new arrangements suggests a lack of real ambition behind it, and, initially, the new statute made little difference.[33] Most migrants continued to take the unauthorised route to Asiatic Russia. It was the establishment of a special 'Resettlement Administration' (*Pereselencheskoe Upravlenie*) within the Ministry of Internal Affairs in 1896 which marked the real turning-point in the politics of colonization and the beginning of a systematic, technocratic, state-driven policy of exporting peasants from the crowded Central Agricultural and Black Earth regions of European Russia to Siberia, the Asian steppe and Turkestan.[34]

Over the next two decades, the system gradually became regularised, and state assistance increased. In a curious echo of the settler voyages of the maritime empires, in 1897, one group of 2,000 settlers journeyed from European Russia to the other side of the world by sea, travelling on the ships of the state-sponsored *Dobroflot*, or Volunteer Fleet, from Odessa via the Suez Canal, Ceylon and China to Vladivostok, where they settled in the so-called Maritime Region of the Russian Far East.[35] The numbers of settlers increased exponentially with the progressive opening of sections of the Transsiberian railway between 1897 and 1904. From 1904, a new statute removed the requirement for settlers to obtain preliminary permission from the *Pereselencheskoe Upravlenie* before setting out, whilst also seeking to encourage settlement in the most vulnerable frontier regions of Turkestan, Transcaucasia and the Far East by extending tax exemption for settlers there from three to five years.[36] The agronomist and leading technical expert on *pereselenie*, A.A. Kaufman, wrote that the genesis of the new law lay in Interior Minister Sergei Witte's journey to Siberia and the Far East in the autumn of 1902, which led him to state that whilst

much of the best soil might already have been taken up, there was still plenty of land available in the taiga – an analysis Kaufman thought much too optimistic.[37]

By the early 1900s, a more comprehensive infrastructure was in place: migrants were entitled to a substantial discount on fares, together with doles of money, food, seed and agricultural equipment. Special guides were prepared for *khodoki* and migrating families warning them of the hardships they would face, but also providing descriptions of the provinces where colonization was permitted and land had been set aside, and of the best routes to follow.[38] Migrant registration points were established at Chelyabinsk and Tomsk where settlers were (at least in theory) allocated plots which had been marked out by surveyors from the Central Administration for agricultural development (*Glavnoe Upravlenie Zemleustroistvo i Zemledelie* or *GuZiZ*). In practice, as Kaufman had predicted, demand for land far outstripped supply. In 1908, the *GuZiZ* reported that, whilst land for approximately 50,000 souls had been set aside, in 1907, the total number of *khodoki* who arrived and registered with the authorities was 145,700, of whom 86,300 returned to European Russia empty-handed, but 59,400 remained and were awaiting an allocation of land. Assuming that each *khodok* represented two or three families, they estimated that land would need to be found for 400,000 people, no more than 15–20% of whom could be accommodated in existing settlements.[39] These were only the official figures, and substantial numbers of *khodoki* and migrating families never alerted the authorities to their presence at all.

Despite brief falls during the Boxer Rebellion in 1900 and the Russo–Japanese War in 1904–5, overall, the number of migrants increased at an astonishing rate. In 1896, 200,000 official migrants came to Siberia, together with an unknown (but probably smaller) number of unofficial migrants. In 1908, according to the official statistics, the annual number of migrants 'across the Urals' reached a peak of 758,812, of which 121,204 returned – with unregistered migrants the total was probably close to a million. Collectively, between 1896 and 1909, 3,629,398 registered migrants crossed the Urals, of which 875,948 returned, and an additional 20% (at a minimum) migrated unofficially.[40] By this stage, migration and resettlement had been transformed from something grudgingly permitted or winked at by Russian officials to the central plank of a policy of rural modernisation. This policy was identified above all with two individuals, Prime Minister P.A. Stolypin and A.V. Krivoshein, from 1908 the ambitious head of the *GuZiZ*. Although the 'Stolypin Reforms' are usually thought of as being directed primarily at undermining the Russian peasant commune or *mir* by dividing its lands into separate peasant smallholdings (*khutor*),[41] resettlement was an integral part of this process, as it was essential to relieve the pressure on land in European Russia before enclosure and consolidation of plots could take place. Meanwhile, the new forms of capitalist agriculture emerging amongst the Siberian settlers could be held up as a model for the rest of Russia to emulate. When Stolypin and Krivoshein went on a joint tour of the main settler regions of Western Siberia in 1910, they enthusiastically advocated private property rights for settlers in Siberia, showing a willingness to sanction illegal private sales which had already taken place whilst urging the abandonment of futile efforts to extend noble privileges in the region.[42] From 1907, the Resettlement Administration published its own house journal, called, significantly enough, *Voprosy Kolonizatsii* ('Questions of Colonization'), replete with articles celebrating its technical and civilizing achievements to date and reporting new statistical and agricultural surveys as blueprints for the future. It would become a key organ of advocacy for ever more aggressive colonization schemes in Asia and the fostering of a technocratic approach to agricultural resettlement.

Resettlement policy was not without its critics. Some of these were on the left – the Social Revolutionaries attacked it for undermining the peasant commune, which they thought would be the foundation of Russian socialism, whilst the Menshevik economist Petr Maslov wrote that *pereselenie* could only be a part of the solution to the wider question of increasing agricultural

productivity in Russia, without which he considered a Malthusian crisis inevitable, as migration flows were insufficient even to absorb the natural increase of population in European Russia.[43] Above all, as we shall see, it was fiercely, if fruitlessly, attacked by the small Kazakh intelligentsia. Despite such criticisms, *pereselenie* continued to be central to late-Tsarist thinking on both agrarian reform and the exploitation of the Empire's Asiatic provinces. In 1914, the *Pereselencheskoe Upravlenie* published a three-volume work called *Aziatskaya Rossiya*, which was intended both to celebrate past achievements and to lay out a bright future for Russian Asia. This would include independent peasant farming, technological innovation (railways and canals) and, above all, relentless *obrusenie* (russification) of the land, filling out what might have been hollow claims to Russian sovereignty with ever-growing numbers of Slavic settlers.

Throughout much of Asiatic Russia there were two main obstacles to the realisation of this goal: one was a lack of water, which would need to be extended through artificial irrigation. The other was the inconvenient fact that whilst in Siberia and the Far East indigenous peoples were so few (and in many cases already so decimated by disease) that the land could be successfully portrayed as 'empty', this was not the case in Central Asia. Here the settlers had to be found land in a territory already populated by millions of 'Sarts', Tajiks, Uzbeks and, above all, given that settlers were overwhelmingly bound for nomadic regions, Kazakhs and Kyrgyz. The fundamental underlying principle of all Russian legislation governing resettlement in these regions was that the land rights of incoming European settlers (usually Russian or Ukrainian) trumped those of the indigenous population.[44] Semantically and practically, *Pereselenie* (resettlement) became *kolonizatsiya* (colonization) once it was applied to Asiatic Russia.[45]

Colonization and inter-ethnic conflict in Central Asia

The local statutes of governance for Central Asia were at least as important as the empire-wide legislation on *pereselenie* in determining patterns of peasant colonization. Turkestan (Syr-Darya, Ferghana and Samarkand provinces) and the steppe region (Semirechie,[46] Akmolinsk, Turghai, Ural'sk and Semipalatinsk provinces) were governed under slightly different statutes. The 1886 Turkestan statute declared that all land in the region was state property but recognised effective occupation and use (*pol'zovanie*) of the land by the sedentary population, with rights of sale and inheritance guaranteed by pre-existing Islamic law and custom.[47] In principle, nomads were granted the same right of '*pol'zovanie*' for pasture, but the implications were different. This was partly because, unless they were settled, they could not point to specific plots that were in individual or family possession, but also because they had recourse to customary law (*'adat*) rather than Muslim law (*shari'a*), and the former gave weaker protection.[48]

The fragility of their claim to the land was revealed in the revised Steppe Statute of 1891: article 120 stated that 'the land, occupied by nomads, remains in indefinite collective use of the nomads, on the basis of custom and the rules of this statute', but a note added that 'land which appears to be surplus to requirements (*izlishki*) for the nomads will come under the direction of the Ministry of State Properties'.[49] The process of determining how much land was 'spare' was outwardly scientific but in reality highly subjective and controversial. In 1896, the Committee for the Transsiberian Railway despatched an expedition led by the statistician F.A. Shcherbina to survey the northern part of the Kazakh steppe and assess both its suitability for agriculture and the likely impact of settlement on the Kazakh economy.[50] After five years' research, the expedition produced a set of 'norms' for the land requirements of Kazakh and Russian settler households, which were then used to calculate how much land was 'spare' and how many settler plots could be laid out on that land.[51] Although the Shcherbina Commission's work concerned only the northern steppe, no survey of comparable thoroughness was ever carried out in Turkestan and

Semirechie, meaning that its conclusions, and the norms for nomadic land use derived from them, were simply applied there without any consideration for local conditions.

The officials of the Resettlement Administration used the Shcherbina Commission's report to argue that the land needs of the Kazakhs were diminishing in *absolute* terms as they turned to settled agriculture, and that therefore the quantity of land identified as *izlishki* could be expanded still more.[52] In fact, the growing sedentarisation of the nomadic population ensured that they would come into direct competition with settlers for the best arable land, whether in the northern steppe or the foothills of the Ala-Tau and other relatively well-watered regions of Semirechie.[53] Many of Shcherbina's conclusions regarding Kazakh land use were contested by one of the commission's erstwhile members, the Kazakh statistician Alikhan Bukeikhanov, while more paternalist Russian administrators also poured scorn on the supposedly 'scientific' nature of 'norms' for land use.[54] Some of the *Pereselencheskoe Upravlenie's* own officials did try to sound a note of caution, writing that exaggerated reports of the quantity of land suitable for settlement would only lead to large numbers of unsatisfied colonists, but even their more modest estimates of available *izlishki* spelled a fundamental change in the Kazakh way of life if all this 'spare' land were to be redistributed. A.A. Kaufman wrote that exhaustive surveys in the Steppe Governor-Generalship had only identified 2,145,000 *desyatinas* of 'spare' land in Akmolinsk province, 702,000 in Turghai and just 100,000 in Semipalatinsk that were suitable for settlement, a small fraction of the total area of these three provinces.[55] However, almost by definition, the land thus identified was amongst the best pasture in the region, and it often lay on important migration routes.[56]

Most in-migration to Central Asia was by *samovol'tsy* ('self-willed' settlers') beyond state control, who were either unaware of the existence of areas supposedly set aside for their use or else ignored them. In Turkestan, the amounts set aside were smaller, but the greater density of the settled and semi-nomadic population meant that the problems caused were even more acute. In Semirechie province alone, the 'resettlement fund' amounted to 2,300,000 *desyatina*s of land by 1908, although much of this was already occupied by Kazakhs and Kyrgyz and little if any had been properly surveyed.[57] However, the pressure of numbers meant that the *Pereselencheskoe Upravlenie* was constantly looking for reasons to expand the area available both to incoming settlers and those currently squatting on what was officially 'Kirgiz' land.

By 1909, there were 640,480 officially registered settlers in the steppe region, the large majority (421,507) in Akmolinsk Province. The equivalent figure for Turkestan was just 24,769, 15,627 of whom were in Semirechie.[58] In both cases, owing to the prevalence of unregistered migration, these figures represent a considerable underestimate of the total number of settlers. By 1912, the *Pereselencheskoe Upravlenie* estimated that, since 1893, 1,428,800 migrants had settled in Western Siberia, 665,500 in Eastern Siberia, 1,206,800 in the steppe region and 119,000 in Turkestan. Although, according to these figures, fewer than 5% of those who 'crossed the Urals' between 1893 and 1912 were bound for Turkestan, the particularly intractable problems of this region – with its reliance on irrigated agriculture, its dense native population and local Russian officials deeply resentful of central meddling – attracted a disproportionate amount of attention from the Resettlement Administration's best and brightest young technocrats.[59] Of the 145 authored articles which appeared in *Voprosy Kolonizatsii* during the seven years of its existence, from 1907–1914, no fewer than 28 were concerned with Turkestan and Semirechie, as opposed to 32 for Siberia and 20 for the steppe region. This was because while Turkestan was troublesome, it was also considered to have enormous economic potential which could be unlocked by peasant resettlement, if only technical problems could be solved and military security assured – this was the message of A.V. Krivoshein's grandiose vision for southern Central Asia, which would have seen it flooded with over a million Russian settlers, incorporating this stubbornly alien, Muslim region into the Russian empire once and for all.[60]

It is no coincidence that it was in Turkestan that the competing claims of Russians and natives for land were most acute and frequently spilled over into inter-ethnic violence in the years leading up to the First World War.[61] In July 1916, Turkestan, Semirechie and parts of Turghai province were shaken by widespread insurrection among the 'native' population. While the initial trigger was an imperial decree conscripting adult male Muslims into labour battalions to serve on the front against Germany and Austria-Hungary, most historians are agreed that the underlying cause was deep resentment over the displacement caused by the resettlement of Europeans and the existential threat this posed to settled and nomadic Central Asian peoples alike.[62]

Kazakh responses to Russian settler colonialism

Within the public sphere opposition to colonization came primarily from Kazakh intellectuals of the Middle and Junior *zhuz*es (hordes) in the northern steppe, which had been exposed to Russian influence for over 200 years by the late 1800s. It was in this milieu that the first stirrings of a Kazakh national consciousness emerged, stimulated at least in part by the challenge posed to the Kazakh way of life by growing Russian settlement.[63] Among the earliest is a series of articles in the Omsk newspaper *Sibirskii Vestnik* in 1889 in response to the new statute regularising resettlement. A. Alimbekov wrote that whilst the Kazakhs had previously regarded *pereselenie* with a certain amount of equanimity as something which did not affect them, now that it was being officially encouraged in the steppe regions, 'their equanimity has been transformed into uneasy worry. And indeed, they have something to worry them! In the Kirgiz [*sic*] language – it means: to be or not to be! To live or not to live on the surface of the earth.'[64]

Some of his criticism was aimed not at European settlers specifically but at the mixed populations of Tatars, Sarts and Russians in the new towns which were emerging on the steppe, who, he claimed, exploited the Kazakhs with the connivance and support of the Russian administration. He was in no doubt as to the eventual outcome: 'the occupation of the steppe by peasants, i.e. the alienation for them of the last suitable places which are more or less irrigated, will lead to the final ruin of the Kirgiz'.[65] The fundamental problem was lack of water, coupled with the fact that the commission despatched by the Ministry of the Interior to identify suitable sites for settlement was relying too heavily on the testimony of corrupt local officials.[66] In a subsequent article (a critical review of a work by a missionary called Ivanovskii about Kazakh weddings), Alimbekov explained that the reason why Christianity had made so little headway amongst the Kazakhs was that they associated it with Russians, with whom they only came into contact in two unpleasant guises: 'firstly, they know the menacing commandant [*nachal'nik*], rebuking them left and right . . . for what reason? – in order to uphold authority on the steppe! . . . Secondly, the Kirgiz [*sic*] know the Russian *kulak*s and hucksters, sucking their blood. . . . ' He added that the situation was particularly bad in areas of extensive Cossack settlement, where the Kazakhs were subjected to spurious claims that their livestock had damaged crops. 'Often the Cossack women [*kazachek*] very naively explain the reason for their lawsuits against the Kirgiz [*sic*]: – "now then, forgive me! How do you imagine a Cossack can live, unless it be at the expense of this *basurman* [musulman=muslim]?"'[67]

The publication of Alimbekov's critiques was aimed at convincing a Russian readership rather than appealing to fellow-Kazakhs, and in this they appear to have failed. Eighteen years later, in 1907, an official of the Resettlement Administration called P. Khvorostanskii wrote that the Russian public were still woefully ignorant of the grievances of the Kazakhs over the occupation of their land, and that this had helped to encourage ever more fantastic schemes for *pereselenie* on a massive scale. However, he added that the Kazakhs themselves were making their opposition known more and more clearly in the Russian press, something which became easier once censorship was relaxed under the October Manifesto of 1905.[68] The real flowering of the Kazakh

public sphere came in this period, when reformist newspapers in Tatar and Kazakh such as *Ai Qap*, *Alash*, *Qazaq*, *Waqt* and *Fekr* began to appear in Orenburg, Troitsk and Semipalatinsk.[69] Of the first generation of Russian-educated Kazakh intellectuals, all at some stage wrote on the subject. The most knowledgeable was Alikhan Bukeikhanov, who published searing critiques of the politics and practical impact of *pereselenie*.[70] He and other Kazakh intellectuals attempted to forge an alliance with the Liberal Kadet Party in order to see the limiting or halting of peasant resettlement on the steppe integrated into its national programme.

However, even liberal opinion in Russia proved hard to convince on this point. Khvorostan-skii referred to a dispute within the pages of the St Petersburg newspaper *Rech'*, the organ of the liberal Constitutional Democratic (Kadet) party, between none other than the agronomist A.A. Kaufman, who was one of the leaders of the Kadet party, and the Kazakh lawyer and reformer Zhihansha Seidalin.[71] Kaufman had poured scorn on the claim made by Seidalin (whom he referred to throughout as a 'sultan') at the second congress of the Kadet party that he was the representative of the 'Kirgiz people' who had set up their own Kadet central committee in Ural'sk and collectively endorsed its programme. Instead, he wrote that Seidalin came from a self-interested aristocratic minority of '*bai*s, *manal*s [*sic* – *manap*, a term for a Kyrgyz leader] and sultans' anxious to preserve their semi-feudal privileges and treated sarcastically the suggestion that so backward a people had suddenly come to understand the ideals of democracy embodied in the party's programme. Most provocatively of all, he wrote that Seidalin's objections to Russian colonization were illegitimate, first because the Kazakhs had no legal claim to steppe lands and second because the interests of the Russian population as a whole were served by *pereselenie*, and this could not be compromised.[72] Seidalin's response was furious, but ultimately futile:

> I venture to assert, that on the land question for the Kirgiz [*sic*] people there is neither a majority nor a 'minority'. Mr A. Kaufman will not find a single Kirgiz, who would not now be conscious of his claim to the land and who had not seen the bacchanalian embezzlement of Kirgiz land. If Mr A. Kaufman speaks the Kirgiz language and is able to read it, then he should read the newspapers 'Fekr', 'Ulfat', the journal 'Novy Vek', where those very 'simple nomadic Kirgiz' are writing; then he would be convinced that the 'voiceless' Kirgiz masses are very clearly aware how cruelly and inhumanly they are scoffed and jeered at by 'statisticians', 'land surveyors', who hide behind 'anxiety for justice' and obtain their various 'materials' through illiterate translators.[73]

Beyond pointing out that Bukeikhanov himself had worked as a statistician on the Shcherbina expedition, Kaufman's condescending reply chose to concentrate on the legal niceties of the Kazakh claim to the land and dismissed as absurd the suggestion that *pereselenie* on the steppe might be brought to a halt.[74] As Peter Holquist has shown, the officials of the Resettlement Administration, proud of their technical education and convinced of the progressiveness of the modern technologies they wished to apply to the Empire's land and water, were generally quite far to the left in their politics, but this did not make them any more sympathetic to native peoples and agricultural techniques which they stigmatised as 'backward'.[75] In this, the most liberal elements of Russian opinion were allied with the most ruthless aims of the late Tsarist state.

Conclusion

This chapter has only been able to give the briefest of overviews of the phenomenon of Russian settler colonialism, but even the evidence presented here should be sufficient to give the lie to Soviet and modern Russian myths of 'voluntary submission', inter-ethnic harmony and

lack of a colonial mentality in the phenomenon of Russian settlement in the European steppe, Siberia and, above all, Central Asia, where cultural and religious differences between settlers and the local population were starkest. Russian colonization in Eurasia had clear specificities, when compared to that of Western European Imperial powers; the absence of a clear moment of departure, where the home country was abandoned; a much less highly developed ideology of racial difference; and, before the nineteenth century at least, a tendency to cultural hybridity and a tradition of opposition to central state authority (though the latter were also common in some other pre-modern European settler colonies). Nevertheless, the nineteenth century saw the development of a fully fledged colonial ideology in Russia; the terms *koloniya* and *kolonizatsiya* were used frequently and with positive connotations of modernity and agricul-tural development. Above all, a legal framework was developed which gave Europeans (mainly Russians and Ukrainians) a pre-eminent right to the use and occupation of the land in the Empire's Asiatic territories, at the direct expense of the indigenous populations, who resisted with both words and (in 1916) with deeds. If race was less often invoked as a justification for this than in Africa, Australia or the Americas, religion, 'culture' and perceived loyalty to the state were equally effective substitutes. The degree to which the settlers themselves shared in this colonial ideology is more difficult to recapture, but many sources comment on their contempt for 'natives'.[76] As one anonymous critic of resettlement noted: 'It suffices to point out that the settlers, especially Cossacks, never refer to the Kirgiz as anything other than dogs. Near and far they plough up Kirgiz land, and in justification they say "the Kirgiz are dogs; the land is not theirs, but the state's; we are state peasants."'[77] If Russian settler colonialism had a distinctive trait, it was precisely this identification with the state, whose favour could transform poor peasants into landholders and employers of native labour once they had colonized the Empire's remoter frontiers.

Notes

1 For a definition of the concept of settler colonialism see L. Veracini, *Settler Colonialism. A Theoretical Overview*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, pp. 53–74; *Idem* 'Introducing', *Settler Colonial Studies* 1, 1, 2011, 1–12.
2 There is now an enormous literature on Soviet nation-building in the non-Russian regions of the USSR; see for instance Y. Slezkine, 'The USSR as a communal apartment, or how a socialist state promoted ethnic particularism', *Slavic Review* 53, 1994, 414–52.
3 See for instance T. Ryskulov, 'Istoriya SSSR. Turkestan i Kazakhstan (1905–1907 gody)' *Bor'ba Klassov*. 5, May 1936, 1–15; P. G. Galuzo, *Vooruzhenie russkikh pereselentsev v Srednei Azii*, Tashkent, Izd. Sr. Az. Komm. Un-ta im. V. I. Lenina, 1926 & idem, *Turkestan-Koloniya*, Moscow: Izd. Komm. Un-ta Trudyash-chikhsya Vostoka, 1929.
4 On the shift in Soviet historiography in this period, see L. Tillett, *The Great Friendship. Soviet Historians on the Non-Russian Nationalities*, Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1969.
5 P. G. Galuzo, *Agrarnye Otnosheniya na Iuge Kazakhstana v 1867–1914gg*, Alma-Ata: Nauka, 1965 is a work of particular interest given how far it contrasts with the same historian's work 30 years earlier; see further B. Suleimenov, *Agrarnyi vopros v Kazakhstane poslednei tretii XIX – nachala XX vv (1867–1907gg)*, Alma-Ata: Izd. AN Kaz. SSR, 1963, 116–26; E. M. Brusnikin, 'Pereselencheskaya Politika Tsarizma v kontse XIX veka' *Voprosy Istorii* 1, 1965, 28–38; for a lively critique of Soviet scholarship on coloniza-tion, see S. N. Maltusynov, *Agrarnyi vopros v Kazakhstane i Gosudarstvennaya Duma Rossii 1906–1917gg. (sotsiokul'turnyi podkhod)*, Almaty: 'Daik-Press', 2006, pp. 21–34.
6 See the review by V. I. Grachev and O. A. Rykin of Willard Sunderland's, *Taming the Wild Field. Colo-nization and Empire on the Russian Steppe*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004, and my response to them in *Antropologicheskii Forum* No. 6, 2007, 414–36; S. V. Timchenko, 'Problema Prisoedinenie Kazakhstana k Rossii v Sovremennoi Kazakhstanskoi Istoriografii', in S. N. Abashin, D. Yu Arapov and N. E. Bekmakhanova (eds.) *Tsentral'naya Aziya v Sostave Rossiiskoi Imperii*, Moscow: Novoe Literaturnoe Obozrenie, 2008, pp. 338–59.

7 Notable exceptions are Donald W. Treadgold, *The Great Siberian Migration. Government and Peasant in Resettlement from Emancipation to the First World War*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957; F.-X. Coquin, *La Sibérie. Peuplement et Immigration Paysanne au XIX Siècle* Paris: Institut d'études Slaves, 1969; George J. Demko, *The Russian Colonisation of Kazakhstan 1896–1916*, Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1969.

8 Apart from the works cited earlier, see in particular D. Moon, 'Peasant migration and the settlement of Russia's frontiers 1550–1897', *The Historical Journal* 40, 1997, 859–93; W. Sunderland, 'Peasant pioneering: Russian peasant settlers describe colonization and the Eastern Frontier, 1880s–1910s' *Journal of Social History* 34, 2001, 895–922; N. Breyfogle, *Heretics and Colonizers. Forging Russia's Empire in the South Caucasus*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005; C. Steinwedel, 'Resettling people, unsettling the empire. Migration and the challenge of governance 1861–1917', in N. Breyfogle, A. Schrader and W. Sunderland (eds.) *Peopling the Russian Periphery. Borderland Colonization in Eurasian History*, London: Routledge, 2007, pp. 128–47; L. Siegelbaum, 'Those Elusive scouts. Pioneering peasants and the Russian state, 1870s–1950s' *Kritika* 14, 2013, 31–58.

9 J. Forsyth, *A History of the Peoples of Siberia. Russia's North Asian Colony 1581–1990*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992; W. Bruce Lincoln, *The Conquest of a Continent. Siberia and the Russians*, London: Jonathan Cape, 1994; A. V. Remnev, 'Sdelat' Sibir' i Dal'nii Vostok russkimi. K voprosu o politicheskoi motivatsii kolonizatsionnykh protsessov XIX – nachala XX veka' *Sibriskaya Zaimka* 3, 2002, http://zaimka.ru/03_2002/remnev_motivation (accessed 03/02/2015); A. V. Remnev et al. (eds.) *Sibir' v sostave Rossiiskoi Imperii*, Moscow: Novoe Literaturnoe Obozrenie, 2007, pp. 42–75; A. V. Remnev and N. G. Suvorova, 'Obrusenie aziatskikh okrain Rossiiskoi Imperii: optimizm i pessimizm russkoi kolonizatsii' *Istoricheskie Zapiski* 129, 2008, 132–79; A. Remnev, 'Vdvinut' Rossiiu v Sibir'. Imperiya i Rossiiskaya Kolonizatsiya Sibirii vtoroi poloviny XIX – nachalo XX veka', in S. Glebov (ed.) *Region v Istorii Imperii. Esse o Sibiri*, Moscow: Novoe Izdatel'stvo, 2013, pp. 47–71.

10 A. Etkind, *Internal Colonization. Russia's Imperial Experience*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2011; see my review in *Ab Imperio* 2013 No. 3, 445–57.

11 J. F. Sahadeo, *Russian Colonial Society in Tashkent, 1865–1923*, Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2007.

12 See V. Martin, *Law and Custom in the Steppe. The Kazakhs of the Middle Horde and Russian Colonialism in the Nineteenth Century*, London: Curzon Press, 2001, Ch. 3; and S. Sabol, *Russian Colonization and the Genesis of Kazakh National Consciousness*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003, pp. 38–52.

13 P. R. Weisensel, 'Russian-Muslim Inter-ethnic relations in Russian Turkestan in the last years of the empire', in J. Morison (ed.) *Ethnic and National Issues in Russian and East European History*, London: Macmillan, 2000, pp. 46–63; G. Kendirbai, *Land and People: The Russian Colonization of the Kazak Steppe*, Berlin: Klaus Schwarz, 2002; N. Pianciola, *Stalinismo di frontiera. Colonizzazione agricola, sterminio dei nomadi e costruzione statale in Asia centrale (1905–1936)*, Rome: Viella, 2009, pp. 62–86; A. Morrison, ' "Sowing the Seed of National Strife in this alien region". The Pahlen report and *Pereselenie* in Turkestan 1908–1910', *Acta Slavica Iaponica* 31, 2012, 1–29; A. Morrison, 'Peasant settlers and the civilizing mission in Russian Turkestan, 1865–1917' *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 43, 2015, 387–417.

14 S. N. Maltusynov, *Agrarnyi vopros v Kazakhstane i Gosudarstvennaya Duma Rossii 1906–1917gg*, Almaty: 'Daik-Press', 2006 and S. N. Maltusynov (ed.), *Agrarnaya Istoriya Kazakhstana (konets XIX – nachalo XXv)*, Almaty: 'Daik-Press', 2006.

15 For an example of the somewhat shrill tone of modern Kazakh historiography on the subject see M. Abdirov, *Zavoevanie Kazakhstana Tsarskoi Rossiei i bor'ba Kazakhskogo Naroda za nezavisimost' (iz istorii voenno-kazach'ei kolonizatsii kraya v kontse XVI – nachale XX vekov)*, Astana: Elorda, 2000; Even the best amongst recent Russian monographs, O. I. Brusina, *Slavyane v Srednei Azii*, Moscow: Vostochnaya Literatura, 2001 is coy on the subject of inter-ethnic tensions.

16 This is done very effectively for Siberia by James Belich in *Replenishing the Earth. The Settler Revolution and the Rise of the Anglo-World 1783–1939*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009, pp. 505–17. Most recently, see L. H. Siegelbaum and L. P. Moch, *Broad Is My Native Land. Repertoires and Regimes of Migration in Russia's Twentieth Century*, Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 2014, pp. 1–65.

17 B. J. Boeck, 'Containment vs. Colonisation: Muscovite approaches to settling the steppe', in Breyfogle, Schrader and Sunderland (eds.) *Peopling the Russian Periphery*, pp. 41–60.

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22

SETTLER COLONIALISM IN THE MAKING OF JAPAN'S HOKKAIDŌ

Katsuya Hirano

> Despite its deceitful and predatory treatment of the Ainu, the Edo government recognized the large part of interior Ezo as 'Ainu's land'. With the emergence of the imperial modern state, this agreement was fundamentally nullified. To be precise, the 'land reform' of 1873 under [the new regime] transformed Ezo into the land without a master and then into the property of the emperor. . . . The Meiji government denied the Ainu their right to existence by seizing their land.
>
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The Ainu, an indigenous group of hunter–gathers, had inhabited most of the northern island called Ainu Mosir ('the peaceful land of the humans') or, in Japanese, Ezo ('the land of the barbarians'), as well as part of Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands, since at least the thirteenth century. By the late 1860s, Ainu Mosir became the site of Japan's first modern settler colonization. It was renamed Hokkaidō by the Japanese government in 1869 and systematically integrated into the country's project of launching the cycle of capitalist accumulation. This chapter provides an overview of late nineteenth-century Japanese settler colonialism in Hokkaidō. Beginning in the seventeenth century, the Japanese had established firm control over the Ainu people – as Ezo, the derogatory name given by the Japanese, indicates – by making them work for their profits through fisheries and unequal trade. Understandably, historians tend to underscore continuities in the Ainu's subordination to the Japanese from the early modern to the modern period, but it is crucial to recognize fundamental shifts in the historical characteristics of the relationship. The new form of subjection that emerged in the modern era deprived the Ainu of their means of sustenance – the land, water and forest – and hunting and gathering way of life. The Japanese in early modern times had neither forcibly separated the Ainu from their natural milieu nor denied their livelihood. And even though their relationship with the Japanese was unequal and their working conditions often deplorable, the Ainu were trading partners and a necessary workforce for the Japanese. In modern times, as this chapter shows, the Ainu became a dispensable – even redundant – population, marking a decisive break from earlier colonial practice. The Japanese government's systematic expropriation of their means of sustenance and livelihood precipitated the Ainu's rapid fall into the state of near 'extinction'.

'Opening' Hokkaidō

The first crucial step that the Meiji government (1868–1911) took toward the colonization of Ainu Mosir was expropriating its entire area in 1869, claiming it as the 'public property' of the emperor and rendering it *terra nullius* or 'masterless land' (*mushu no chi*, 無主の地) in the Hokkaidō Land Regulation of 1872. In 1871, the government identified the colonization of Ainu Mosir's three major objectives: 1) to pacify the former samurai who suffered and resented their loss of privileges in order to contain the ongoing civil war; 2) to assert Japan's sovereignty over this northern island, which Russia had acknowledged in its 1867 treaty with the country, and use it as a military defense against Russia's potential encroachment; and 3) to provide capital and labor necessary for the capitalist development of Japan. Based on its Hokkaidō 10 Year Plan, the Hokkaidō Development Agency, established in 1869, encouraged the impoverished former samurai lords to migrate by distributing the land among them. But only about two thousand samurai, including their family members, had made the move by 1873, since most had no capital to settle and invest in the new land.[1] Some samurai families stayed in Hokkaidō, but many later returned to the mainland of Honshū.

This expropriation of Ainu Mosir occurred in conjunction with the Japanese government's implementation of the land reform (*chiso kaisei*, 地租改正) of 1873, a linchpin of the country's capitalist modernization. During the 1870s and early '80s, the government collected 70 percent of its total revenues from the measure's land tax, aiming to minimize the nation's dependency on foreign capital for capitalist modernization projects. The land reform introduced the system of private property and a new centralized tax system to both the main Japanese islands and Hokkaidō, bringing about substantively different but closely interrelated consequences for Japanese peasants and Ainu people.[2] It engendered massive impoverishment and displacement of Japanese peasants and sharply bifurcated village communities into the wealthy and the poor. This drastic change spurred peasants' migration to new lands such as Hokkaidō as settlers and to cities as the reserve army of labor. In Hokkaidō, the new land reform accelerated the process of expropriating Ainu land – and thus destroyed the culture's traditional means of survival, as neither the concept of private property nor that of farming had existed among the indigenous people.

Many Japanese peasant households were for the first time required to pay taxes in currency, as they were given small properties to farm by the new government. In order to increase the land's productivity enough to pay the stifling taxes, they borrowed from wealthy landlords to purchase fertilizer and modern tools. Many failed to make their payments, fell into heavy debt and eventually lost their land. While landlords amassed more land and capital and ultimately formed a new bourgeois class, the majority of the displaced peasants became tenant farmers working for their local landlord. After the Sino-Japanese war broke out in 1894, many would become wage laborers in factories, but from the 1870s to the early 1890s, the Japanese manufacturing industry was not yet large enough to absorb the surplus labor power generated by the new policies.

A deflation policy implemented from 1882 to 1885 worsened conditions for the Japanese peasantry, ultimately dispossessing 10 percent of all peasant proprietors. The Meiji government implemented the drastic deflation policy under financial minister Masayoshi Matsukata to overcome the rapid decline in government revenue caused by high inflation. The Meiji government had printed an excess of money to cope with its increasing financial burden for the unification and industrialization of Japan. As the inflation cut the tax income's value, the government reduced the amount of paper money by 23 percent between 1881 and 1885 and sold off all of its firms, including a beer factory, a shipping company and coal mines. While the privatization generated a surplus of 40 million yen, the deflation caused by the Matsukata policy displaced peasants and other impoverished common people, such as merchants and artisans. To lessen

their poverty and homelessness, the government established funding to enable displaced people to purchase land in Hokkaidō. The funding spurred a large-scale migration of impoverished peasants to Ainu land. Many ended up becoming wage-laborers for capitalists or working as farmer-soldiers (*tonden hei*, 屯田兵) who assumed the dual duty of cultivation and military defense.

The farming-militia system was originally proposed in 1870 by Kiyotaka Kuroda, a vice-chairman of the Hokkaidō Development Agency, as a measure to further enforce the three main objectives of Japan's colonial policy toward Hokkaidō.[3] But this system initially aimed to recruit former samurai of lower status who were thrown into economic difficulties after losing their status and privileges. It was only in the late 1870s that the system was made available to impoverished farmers and displaced peasants. In 1874, the Meiji government approved Kuroda's proposal and announced the farming-militia system. About six thousand people were initially recruited.[4] By 1899, 25 years later, 7,337 households, totaling nearly forty thousand people, had occupied Hokkaidō under the program.[5] Most settlers came from economically disadvantaged prefectures, such as Toyama, Niigata, Ishikawa, Akita, Miyagi and Aomori. They were provided with all sorts of support and privileges, including start-up funds, traveling expenses and funds for household items, farming implements, seeds and land. Each farm household received 16 acres of arable land and was eligible to purchase up to 80 acres at a bargain price.[6] A three-year free supply of rice, vegetables and medicines was guaranteed.[7]

The leaders of the Meiji government did not believe that the 'development' of Hokkaidō could be achieved simply by occupying the land through expropriation and aggressive migration policies. In fact, they considered it absolutely necessary to hire foreign experts in agronomy, civil engineering, education, geography and mining. In 1870, Kuroda proposed hiring a number of experts who could assist the Meiji government in implementing an effective migration policy, land survey and 'opening' of the land by constructing railways, roads and ports. 'We must recruit the most talented personnel who are experienced in frontier development', wrote Kuroda, since he considered the island's development crucial to 'lifting Japan above all modern nations and making its vitality shine in the world'.[8] He also urged the government to establish a study abroad program to nurture young talents necessary for the development of the colony. In the same year, the Japanese government approved Kuroda's plan. US experts were brought in, and all machines, tools and raw materials necessary to 'open' Hokkaidō were purchased from the United States of America.

In 1871, Kuroda visited the United States looking for a leader in the initial exploration of Hokkaidō. On President Ulysses Grant's recommendation, Kuroda met with Horace Capron, who served in Grant's administration as Commissioner of Agriculture, and successfully persuaded him to accept an appointment as special adviser to the Japanese government.[9] Kuroda hired Capron for $10,000 per year and additional funds for expenses to undertake the mission. It is quite likely that Capron's earlier experience managing the forced removal of Native Americans, including Delawares, Shawnees, Creeks, Comanches, Kickapoos, Wichitaws and others, from Texas to new territories after the Mexican–American War appealed to Kuroda and his government.[10] Capron remained in Japan from 1871 to 1875 with a singular task: 'find a best way to utilize the resources of Yesso [Ezo] for the material enrichment and elevation of imperial Japan'.[11] As soon as Capron arrived, he established a demonstration farm in Tokyo to promote agriculture using American plants, crops and livestock and soon invited more US experts in these fields to visit his facility. In his own travel party, Capron brought American civil engineer A.G. Warfield and chemist and geologist Thomas Anticell to investigate the soil quality and geography of Hokkaidō. Before they embarked on the first expedition to Hokkaidō, Capron and his scientific advisers made an extensive preliminary proposal based on the reports

of the Hokkaidō Development Agency, which later served as the groundwork for the Japanese government's Hokkaidō 10 Year Plan:

1 Hokkaidō's weather is similar to the more northern American States and is thus suitable for extensive farming. It is desirable to bring in more settlers to fully utilize the wealth of natural resources.
2 A thorough land survey should be carried out, and the law of private property should be introduced to settle matters related to land ownership.
3 Sapporo is the ideal place for the capital.
4 A machine factory needs to be built. It will help open a road that connects Ishikari and Muroran, Hakodate, and Sapporo. The machinery shall (also) elevate and increase the value of human labor. This is crucial for the wealth of a country is in proportion to its aggregate labor.
5 Silver and lead in the *yu-rappu* area, sulfur in southern Hokkaidō, and coal in Ishikari are all valuable as an ever-increasing source of wealth. A Bureau of Mines should be established. But private management of the enterprise is more desirable for securing the highest productiveness, as proven in England and America. The government's role is to be limited to enacting and enforcing the necessary laws for the regulation of mining interests and rights of property.
6 Barley, instead of rice, should be grown as the latter does not suit the weather.
7 Foreign farmers should be brought in to educate Japanese settlers about how to cultivate the land.[12]

Based on these projections, in 1872, Capron and his team made a tour of Hokkaidō. During the expedition, Capron wrote, '[Ezo] is a wonderful island. But its true value has not been sufficiently appreciated. It is rich in mineral resources, its fishery is unlimited, lumber has excellent quality, and agriculture has unlimited possibilities. . . . It could easily provide for several million people'.[13] After returning to Tokyo, he advised Meiji leaders to invest in the development of coal mines, railroads, fishing, capital-intensive agriculture (including livestock), orchards and irrigation systems, and to build public schools.[14] He also urged them to hire more foreign experts and bring in foreign (American) farmers and capital to initiate and speed up the process. Kuroda and his government followed most of Capron's advice but chose not to pursue foreign labor and investment, as they feared that they could give the United States a toehold for the virtual colonization and control of Hokkaidō.

Capron himself began introducing capital-intensive farming, with American methods and implements, imported seeds for Western crops and European breeds of livestock, including his favorite Devon and Durham cattle. He established experimental farms on Hokkaidō, had the land surveyed for mineral deposits and farming opportunities, and recommended water, mill and road improvements. In 1876, based on his advice, Sapporo Agricultural College – today, Hokkaidō University – was established to foster new leaders and the skills needed for development.[15]

The Japanese settler-colonization of Hokkaidō was thus outlined and facilitated by the joint forces of the Japanese state and US experts and technology. Japanese leaders focused on the occupation of Hokkaidō through the systematic migration of former samurai lords, samurai retainers and ordinary citizens – in particular, displaced farmers and peasants – from the 1870s to the 1880s by supplying them with 'free' land and financial support, while counting on American experts, who offered various technologies of colonization, to reshape Ainu Mosir into a land suitable for Japan's capitalist modernization.

The reality of settlers' lives in the colony was far from rosy. Settlers did receive subsidies and funds to start their new lives. However, shortages leading to 300 percent inflation and very slow progress building infrastructure such as paved roads and railways inhibited economic production

and aggravated people's lives. The obstacles eventually pushed many settlers to return to their home prefectures. The prospect of the colonial policy's failure posed a major threat to the governmental vision of accelerated commodification of Hokkaidō's land. In 1872, the Meiji government tried to prompt wealthy Japanese landlords to invest their capital in purchasing land at a bargain price.[16] The policy did increase land sales but was most effective as a strong impetus for migration, generating a new wave of peasants and workers looking for employment on the newly purchased lands. In 1873, Japanese settlers numbered about 160,000; that population nearly quadrupled over the next four years.[17] Many of the settlers, however, did not stay in the colony very long due to the harsh winter weather and difficult living conditions.[18] Capital also stopped flowing in, as the real estate brokers often appropriated investors' money.

The Meiji government responded with a new strategy, introducing in 1886 the Regulation for the Sale of Hokkaidō Land. The law shifted the focus from common settlers and wealthy landlords to emergent capitalists and large-scale modern corporations for the development of light and heavy industries. The government sold state-run factories and enterprises on Hokkaidō such as breweries, sugar mills, shipyards and farms to private investors; it opened the ports of Kushiro, Muroran and Otaru; and it offered capitalists and corporations a free 10-year land lease with the additional incentive that if their enterprises succeeded, they could purchase the land at a steep discount. If they failed, they could simply return the land to the government. The new policy did not directly benefit working-class settlers, but the development of infrastructure and commerce and the establishment of banks in 1896 and 1899 stimulated rapid urbanization in the southern part of Hokkaidō and brought a new wave of migration to major settlements such as Hakodate, Sapporo, Otaru and Kushiro. In 1901, a new 10 Year Development Plan announced the construction of more bridges, roads and railway stations. The number of emigrants began to surge after 1900 from 50,000 to 80,000 annually, leading to accelerated colonization of Ainu land. In 1909, the Japanese population of Hokkaidō reached 1.5 million.[19]

The 'dispensable' Ainu

In contrast to the increasing Japanese population, the number of Ainu rapidly shrunk. In 1871, there were 66,618 Ainu people living in Hokkaidō; by 1901, the Ainu population fell below 18,000.[20] In addition to new and devastating illnesses such as smallpox and diphtheria, which Japanese settlers brought with them, the marked drop in the population was caused by laws that banned the Ainu's most basic sustenance practices: hunting and fishing. In 1876, Japanese authorities outlawed the traditional Ainu bow and poison arrows, claiming that they represented barbarism.[21] According to Yamada Shinichi, Capron's view that '[the use of poison] is not only a wasteful but a barbarous practice' influenced the Hokkaidō Development Agency's decision to implement the law.[22] Anticipating that the ban would drive the Ainu into grave difficulties, the law stipulated that the government would lend rifles to the Ainu with the condition that it would receive 20 percent of the deer hide they hunted.[23] Ainu people made several appeals to the Hokkaidō authorities asking them to lift the ban because 'the use of rifles is not familiar, and when only one or two out of 10 people have learned to use them, they cannot supply for the family'.[24] Their appeals were denied with the reason that 'staying consistent in policies is the best way to cleanse old customs'.[25] At the same time, overhunting by Japanese colonists – armed with rifles – contributed to the sharp decline of wild animal populations to such a degree that the agency enacted other laws to regulate hunting in 1878. These laws intended to protect not the Ainu but Japanese hunters, whose reckless overhunting of animals such as deer, bears and raccoon dogs – all major game animals central to the Ainu diet – began as part of the Meiji government's initial policy of extracting capital through predatory colonial development of Hokkaidō. The

Japanese hunters systematically slaughtered more than half a million Ezo deer between 1873 and 1878 alone and sold the resulting venison and deerskin to meet the high demand in China, France and the US.[26] In addition, Benjamin Smith Lyman, an American mining engineer working for Capron and the Meiji government, advised the Hokkaidō Development Agency in 1874 to encourage the extermination of bears and wolves by 'offering bounties, as is done in other countries' because their presence 'in the mountains will perhaps be some hindrance to the introduction of sheep and even larger cattle'.[27] This advice was put into law in 1877.[28] Deforestation for land development and lumber production further aggravated the ecological damage and the displacement of Ainu communities.

Ainu traditional fishnets were the government's next target. While the Japanese state during the early modern era had recognized nocturnal trout and salmon fishing in the Ainu rivers and their tributaries as a legitimate Ainu activity, by the beginning of the Meiji period, this formal endorsement was considered a 'failure to address a long-standing abuse'.[29] The Hokkaidō Development Agency summarily prohibited the nocturnal fishing in 1878.[30] The Meiji government justified this action as a means of transferring the right to fish from Ainu to Japanese while promoting commercial fisheries on a massive scale under the rubric of policies to 'increase production in industrial enterprise' (*shokusan kōgyō*, 殖産興業). Robbed of their livelihood, the Ainu appealed to governmental agencies to delay the nighttime fishing ban, which covered not only the major rivers but smaller tributaries as well. The Hokkaidō Agency denied the appeal on the basis of the 'former natives' illiteracy and ignorance of law'.[31] Japanese pioneers or 'openers of the frontier', with the backing of the Meiji government, legally expropriated and monopolized the fishing industry in Hokkaidō in the same way they had acquired the land.

Faced with the imminent danger of the Ainu vanishing, the Japanese government issued the Hokkaidō Former Natives Protection Law in 1899, which the government claimed was intended to lift the Ainu out of their extreme poverty and ensure their survival by providing them with free land and farming implements. But this measure applied only to those 'engaged in farming' or those who 'wish to engage in farming'.[32] Its implications were clear. The Ainu would have to fundamentally transform their livelihood, their basic means of sustenance, if they wanted to survive. The government's gesture was halfhearted at best: only 538.20 square feet of land was apportioned to each Ainu household, and half of the total acreage was not even arable.[33] Furthermore, because the government established no program to teach the Ainu to farm, their farming efforts led to serious crop failure, or their farms were often left uncultivated for a while – long enough for Japanese migrants to move in.[34] Starvation and illness followed, while appropriation of land through deception and plunder became a common practice in the colony.

Clearly, the Japanese government took advantage of the Ainu's very different conception of the land and their life rooted in hunting and fishing, or what Rosa Luxemburg called 'natural economy' in her vivid description of capital's violent conquest of non-capitalist society.[35] The Ainu called the land Ainu Mosir, meaning a peaceful land given to humans by gods. For them, the land was a divine gift that provided human beings with abundant animals and fish; their role was to live in harmony and thank the gods for their care. Meiji policymakers rewrote this nonmodern, deeply heterogeneous conception of the land and of the life it provided into such familiar colonial idioms as 'no-man's-land', 'new frontier', 'virgin land' or *terra nullius*, as exemplified by the Hokkaidō Land Regulation of 1872. These idioms were clearly borrowed from the US discourse on and policies toward the American West. Capron, for example, proposed in his 1872 report to the Meiji government Japanese versions of his country's Homestead Acts allotment and land redistribution laws for Indian Territory (1862) to hasten the settlement of Hokkaidō by setting in motion a program of public land grants to small farmers. By urging the Meiji government to adopt 'settlement on liberal terms offered by the government of the United

States' as a means to spur the speedy occupation of Hokkaidō, Capron proposed that the new law should enable each settler in the new frontier 'to become the *bona fide* owner of a tract of 160 acres of the public domain without cost, except the payment of $10 to the land officer of the district'.[36] This translation of Ainu's heterogeneous world into the familiar colonial idioms marked the decisive moment when the brute force of appropriation and extraction came to signify the positive value of 'opening' or *kaitaku* (開拓) in the name of supposed development and progress.[37] Once this inscription gained legitimacy in the public discourse during the 1880s and '90s, the colonial logic of the 'civilizing mission' meant that the Ainu's practical and conceptual world soon came to signify backwardness to be effaced from the earth. By the 1900s, the social relations and values that had sustained the Ainu community were commonly rendered as the direct cause of their displacement and deprivation. The Japanese government argued that the Ainu's struggle and poverty were due to their own innate incompetence to understand the concept of private ownership and to learn a way of life beyond primitive hunting and fishing. In the governmental and popular imagination, the Ainu came to be regarded as a weak ethnic group destined to die out according to the universal law of social Darwinism, as they possessed no ability to compete or to develop the frontier. Lastly, Japanese intellectuals, educators and policymakers all agreed that the only means by which the Ainu people could ensure their own survival was cultural assimilation – what historians today consider the final phase of settler-colonialism: cultural genocide.

The relentless rendering of the Ainu people as a vanishing ethnicity worked as the sustained practical and epistemological ground for the further destruction of Ainu communities and their means of sustenance. More than 70 percent of the Ainu population perished between the 1870s and 1920s.[38] Those who happened to survive became wage-laborers in the harshest working conditions imaginable, primarily in the coal mining and fishing industries, or else the objects of exotic curiosity demonstrated most vividly in anthropological study and tourism. Although both outcomes confirm the degree to which Ainu people were objectified under the modern capitalist order, I consider the group's museumization as an *extant* race to be preserved, studied and displayed as the extreme form of reification because the idea of its extant-ness and the desire for displaying it were derived not only from the assumed superiority of the Japanese 'race' but also from the ideological premise that Ainu's imminent 'extinction' was a matter of inevitability, a law of nature.[39]

It is important to clarify here the crucial differences between the Ainu people facing the effects of settler colonialism and Japanese peasants facing the effects of enclosure in the process of primitive accumulation. Marx described the process of primitive accumulation as one of the 'eternal natural laws' of the capitalist mode of production.[40] He meant that it was a historical condition indispensable for transforming the social means of production and subsistence into capital and the mass of the population into wage-laborers: the 'free' laboring poor. In other words, primitive accumulation begins with an enclosure movement designed to expel a resident population from the land by force and law in order to occupy and commodify the land, a corollary of which is the birth of a landless proletariat. It eventually integrates the land into the privatized mainstream of capital accumulation and creates an industrial reserve army of labor or mass of disposable labor to exploit for the maximum production of surplus value. Although Marx's description of enclosure does not perfectly correspond to experiences of Japanese peasants during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when they were squeezed off the land by economic consequences of the land reform of 1873, it offers a comparative perspective on the process by which they were dispossessed and displaced to form a proletarian class. In this regard, settler colonialism in Hokkaidō bore a closer resemblance to Marx's enclosure. By expropriating land, forest and water by law and force, it displaced the Ainu from the conditions of their labor and commodified indigenous means of production and subsistence. Nevertheless, Hokkaidō's settlement sharply differed from enclosure in that the government's colonial program aimed at the systematic erasure and

replacement of the indigenous population with an imported population of wage-laborers. This deliberate policy of supplanting was intended to transform the indigenous people, not into a mass of disposable labor, but into a 'dispensable' population, in Patrick Wolfe's words, fit only to be effaced from the earth.[41] The distinction between disposable labor and a dispensable population is crucial here. The former 'forms an element of the floating surplus population', some of whom emigrate and thus simply follow the flow of capital, or becomes either a 'constant latent surplus population' in the countryside passively waiting to be employed by capitalists in cities or a 'stagnant population' which 'offers capital an inexhaustible reservoir of disposable labor-power'.[42] The last group of disposable labor dwells in the sphere of pauperism, which Marx describes as 'the hospital of the active labor-army and the dead weight of the industrial reserve army'.[43] It consists of those capable (both adults and children) and incapable (the sick and the injured) of working who form, along with the surplus population, an integral condition of capitalist production and accumulation. The most obvious manifestation of capitalist exploitation, as well as charitable works and social reform movements designed to compensate for them, merge in this sphere. In short, the disposability of the industrial reserve army of labor does not point to the workers' sentence to death but to the state in which they are kept alive so that they remain available and functional as a cheap commodity for capitalists to purchase and exploit.

On the contrary, the dispensability of an indigenous population implies its *absolute* redundancy. Settler colonialism's notion that indigenous people are doomed to extinction stems from the assumption that their form of labor is completely unfit for, even counter to, the capitalist mode of production. Deemed as absolutely incapable of adapting to the capitalist form of labor, they are to be replaced by landless emigrant workers – a surplus population of laborers – who are in search of new means of production after losing their own as a result of enclosure. The land belonging to indigenous people will then become available for capitalist expropriation and accumulation. In short, in settler colonialism, capital does not seek to commodify the indigenous people or their labor – only their land.

If primitive accumulation constitutes the precondition for the emergence of capital, as Marx suggests, then the annihilation of indigenous communities in Hokkaidō was the integral condition of primitive accumulation. Settler colonization – the expropriation of land through the annihilation of indigenous people – in Hokkaidō needs to be understood as decisive and indispensible for the production of the socioeconomic arrangement primitive accumulation requires. But it was also a condition that primitive accumulation in Japan's main islands of Honshū, Kyūshū and Shikoku produced. In other words, the processes of settler-colonization and primitive accumulation went hand in hand in making Japan's Hokkaidō in such a way that the settler-colonization was *both the result and a necessary condition* of Japan's drive for capitalist accumulation. When the Meiji government began implementing the policies of extracting capital from the peasantry through the new land reform of 1873, it simultaneously embarked on the settler-colonization of Hokkaidō as a way to absorb the displaced population from the main islands and create the socioeconomic conditions necessary to launch the process of primitive accumulation – to produce free labor, a labor market and thus the capitalist mode of production – *in the colony*. This correlation in the process of capitalist accumulation between displacing superfluous populations and settler-colonization would continue into the twentieth century as Japan's industrialization pushed the surplus population to emigrate to Hokkaidō and other colonies of the Japanese empire, such as Taiwan, Korea and Manchuria. As Luxemburg reminds us, if the so-called primitive accumulation of capital is not limited to a particular historical phase of a country's transition to capitalism but is a constantly unfolding process of violence against and expropriation of the exterior, non-capitalist worlds, then settler-colonization too is an ongoing aggression against the exterior of capital in its most manifest form.

Colonial racism

The crucial element in this ongoing process of violent seizure of land was a unified arrangement of racist ideology and practices that made conquest, deception, plunder and expropriation appear natural, inevitable and even logical. Racism and its epistemology – the social theory of natural selection – rendered the heterogeneity of the non-capitalist Ainu world as negative barbarity and backwardness to be overcome and transformed into conditions conducive to capitalist production. Social Darwinism – survival of the fittest – is a form of modern racism *par excellence*. It enlisted the authority of modern biology to help Japan obscure its own utterly destructive colonial project by categorizing Ezo as a 'new, empty land to which the settlers bring progress and enlightenment' and the indigenous people as lacking the natural aptitude for survival.[44] In this regard, Hokkaidō settlement, which launched the management of the Ainu as a dispensable population, was the inverted and violent manifestation of biopolitical power: thanatopolitics.[45]

A liberal humanist principle using the language of emancipation was at the heart of this biopolitical ideology that assisted in expropriating and commodifying Ainu land. Japanese policymakers claimed that privatizing the land would emancipate the Ainu people from their older mode of production, elevating their culture and way of life from savagery to civilization through acculturation and agricultural production. The important implication of this emancipation discourse was the assumed primitiveness and unsuitability, or even the innate inability, of the Ainu to adapt to the modern world for their own survival. In 1871, judging the Ainu's customs to be emblematic of their deplorable backwardness that posed a serious hindrance to their entry into 'humanity', the Hokkaidō Development Agency carried out a number of self-described reforms, including bans on tattooing female infants and piercing men's ears, both of which carried centuries-old religious and symbolic meanings for the Ainu, and imposed Japanese as the standard language. From the late 1870s to the late 1880s, the government used two means to enforce the reforms and laws: adopting stricter punishments, including a fine, and introducing compulsory education by setting up Ainu primary schools.[46] In both the law and education, Ainu tattooing and piercing and other customs were assertively defined as something 'to be cleansed, for these ill customs inhibit their path to enlightenment and baffle their will to become enlightened people'. By 1900, a mandatory assimilationist education policy meant that all Ainu children were prohibited from speaking their language at school. The new Ainu School's goal was teach students to become 'fine Japanese that nobody could criticize by learning the language and farming'.[47]

The History of Hokkaidō, compiled and published by the Hokkaidō regional authority in 1918, took up this racist epistemology to explain why the Hokkaidō 'frontier' had to be opened by the Japanese (*wajin*) rather than by the Ainu:

> The great majority of the Ainu have not yet managed to escape a savage and uncivilized stage (*yabanmōmai no iki*, 野蛮蒙昧の域). . . . From the very outset, the task of opening the frontier can only be accomplished by an ethnos that has reached a certain cultural level. It is of course impossible to hope that this opening of the frontier could be performed by the people of Ezo themselves, a people that has not yet left behind a period of primitive savagery (*gen'shitekina yaban*, 原始的な野蛮) – the only ethnos among those close to Hokkaidō and the Ezo people which possesses a culture capable of enduring this duty is unquestionably the Japanese.[48]

The hierarchy of civilizations seen in this passage provided the logic that enabled the Japanese state to justify the systematic destruction of Ainu communities in the name of progress. By positing the Japanese as the subjective motor-force behind 'opening the frontier', the logic rendered the

Ainu into a savage ethnicity that needed to be led by the Japanese. An anthology of Hokkaidō history compiled in 1937 further expanded the point that this violent 'opening' made it possible for the Japanese to 'enlighten the Ainu', who had 'for a long time continued their primitive life-style'. It claimed that the imperial assimilationist educational policy (*kōminka kyōiku*, 皇民化教育) brought about a real possibility for the Ainu to 'be granted universal brotherhood, and treated as national citizens'.[49] Thus, in this racist liberal epistemology, Japanese settlers emerged as key agents in the transformational process of development, whereas the Ainu were figured as objects to be managed. It was due to their own ineptitude if they died out literally (physically) or figuratively (culturally) in the process. This racist schema reveals Hokkaidō's *ideological logic* of settler-colonization, the integral condition of the primitive accumulation of capital, which rendered the actual process of plundering and extermination into a historical inevitability by which the Ainu were figured as destined to vanish.

The deadly consequences of this ideology for the Ainu were poignantly expressed by Chiri Yukie, a young Ainu woman who began translating the Ainu's epic songs, called *yukar*, into Japanese with the hope of keeping the poetic form of oral tradition alive.[50] She did not survive the effort. After completing her first and only book of *yukar*, *Ainu Shinyōshū* (*Collection of Ainu Epics of the Gods*), she died of a heart disease in the foreign land of Tokyo in 1922, before she reached age 20. In her preface to the volume, Chiri lamented her people's loss:

> (W)e have lost the beautiful and radiant spirit of the ancient people whose eyes were governed by their religious sentiments as they took in every action, every movement, and now full of anxiety, we burn with distress, growing ever more dull and unable to see with discernment – now we can only depend on the compassion of the outside, oh, the wretched forms of those who are vanishing. . . . This is what we are known as now – vanishing – what a sorrowful name we have come to possess.
>
> Our blessed ancestors of long ago could scarcely have imagined that their native land would end up in such a miserable state. Time constantly flows and the world ceaselessly moves forward. Perhaps the day will come when, even among us, who now face the shame of defeat in this fierce realm of competition, two or three strong ones among our number might emerge, capable of walking in step with the world as it progresses forward. This is our ardent wish, what we pray for continually, day in and day out.
>
> And yet, perhaps the many languages, the old sayings and tales that our dearly loved ancestors used with each other to ascribe meaning to the rhythms of their daily life may disappear along with the timid, vanishing, and weak among us. Oh, this is the most heartbreaking anguish we face.[51]

Liberal humanism as the ideological logic of primitive accumulation relied on a circular dialectic of destruction and protection, discrimination and sympathy: settler-colonization would *both* destroy and rescue Ainu communities from the consequences of colonization's own destructive acts. The 1899 Hokkaidō Former Natives Protection Law, which ironically and perhaps inadvertently recognized the indigeneity of the Ainu people in its enunciation of 'former natives', exemplified this grotesque dialectic. The underlying logic of the law was that Japan must protect the dying Ainu with the same ideological values (the universal conception of humanity grounded in social Darwinism) and method (the forcible imposition of farming and acculturation) that drove the Ainu communities into the state of extinction in the first place. It worked as the discursive mechanism that covered over the devastating consequences of imperial Japan's violence by extending the promises of emancipation and protection through which the colonial violence was in fact enacted and reproduced. To borrow Jean-Paul Sartre's critique of Europe's brand of

liberal humanism: Humanism's 'honeyed words, its affection of sensibility, were only alibis for our aggressions'.[52] This perverse ethic of liberal humanism was the essence of the genocidal racism exercised by the Japanese state against the Ainu.

Notes

 1 R. Okuyama, *Shinkō Hokkaidōshi*, Sapporo: Hoppō Shoin, 1950, 103.
 2 The land tax was set as 3 percent, but was soon reduced to 2.5 percent in 1877 as the government was faced with strong opposition. This benefited landlords, not peasants, for the reasons explained in the text.
 3 Y. Matsushita, *Tondenhei-sei shi*, Tokyo: Satsuki Shobo, 1981, pp. 143–52.
 4 Ibid., p. 165.
 5 Y. Komori, 'Rule in the name of "'Protection": Vocabulary of colonialism', in M. M. Mason and H. J. S. Lee (eds.) *Reading Colonial Japan*, California: Stanford University Press, 2012, p. 68.
 6 H. Asada (ed.), *Hokkaidō kaihatsu seisaku no rekishi, Meiji-hen*, Sapporo: Ishikarigawa Samitto Jikko Iinkai, 2004, pp. 27–9.
 7 H. Ito, *Tondenhei-mura no Hyakunen*, Sapporo: Hokkaidō shinbunsha, 1979, pp. 24–7; Komori, 'Rule in the name of "Protection"', p. 66.
 8 Ito, Ibid., pp. 89–90.
 9 Ibid., p. 109.
10 He often compared the Ainu with Native Americans in a more favorable light. He saw both as uncivilized, but praised the former as polite and refined while complaining about the latter as savages.
11 H. Capron, *Journal of Horace Capron: Expedition to Japan 1871–1875*, Sapporo: Hokkaidō Shinbun, 1985, p. 43.
12 H. Capron, *Reports and Official Letters to Kaitakushi*, California: ULAN Press, 2015, pp. 41–52.
13 Capron, *Journal of Horace Capron: Expedition to Japan 1871–1875*, p. 151.
14 Ibid.
15 Capron, *Reports and Official Letters to Kaitakushi*, pp. 50–1.
16 60 kg of rice cost two yen and 3,300 square meters of fertile land was sold for 1.5 yen. Lesser amounts of land were sold for one yen or half a yen.
17 G. Shinya, *Ainu Minzoku Teikōshi*, Tokyo: Sanichi Shobō, 1977, p. 183.
18 Asada (ed.), *Hokkaidō kaihatsu seisaku no rekishi, Meiji-hen*, pp. 30–1.
19 Ibid., pp. 55 and 145.
20 According to the Survey on the Hokkaidō Ainu Living Conditions conducted in 2006 by the Hokkaidō Government, the Ainu population in Hokkaidō was 23,782. Ainu Association of Hokkaidō, http://www.ainu-assn.or.jp/english/eabout03.html
21 Shinya, *Ainu Minzoku Teikōshi*, p. 189.
22 S. Yamada, *Kindai Hokkaidō to Ainu Minzoku*, Sapporo: Hokkaidō University Press, 2011, p. 27.
23 Ibid., p. 37.
24 Ibid., pp. 42–5.
25 Ibid., p. 45.
26 K. Kaji, M. Miyaki, and H. Uno, *Ezoshika no hozen to kanri*, Sapporo: Hokkaidō daigaku shuppan-kai, 2006, pp. 6–7.
27 S. Yamada, *Kindai Hokkaidō to Ainu Minzoku*, p. 117.
28 Ibid., pp. 123–4.
29 N. Iwasaki, *Rekishi to Ainu: Nihon wa doko e iku no ka*, Tokyo: Kodansha, 2003, p. 209.
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid., p. 211.
32 Komori, 'Rule in the name of "Protection"', p. 69.
33 Shinya, *Ainu Minzoku Teikōshi*, p. 197.
34 Ibid., p. 198.

35 R. Luxemburg, *The Accumulation of Capital*, London: Routledge, 2003, p. 350. See my 'Thanatopolitics in the making of Japan's Hokkaidō: Settler colonialism and primitive accumulation' for a more extensive discussion of how Luxemburg's important revision of Marx's thesis on colonialism helps a rethinking of the colonization of the Ainu land.

36 Capron, *Reports and Official Letters to Kaitakushi*, p. 48.

37 Komori, 'Rule in the name of "Protection"', p. 65.

38 Shinya, *Ainu Minzoku Teikōshi*, p. 201.

39 It is well known that the Meiji government put the Ainu people – along with Taiwanese aborigines, Okinawans and Koreans – on display at the Osaka Expo of 1903 as an extant and 'primitive' people, a categorical Other to Japan's self-image as a modern, civilized nation. Seven Ainu were asked to enact their daily life and rituals in front of Japanese spectators during the exhibition. K. Matsuda, *Teikoku no Shisen*, Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 2003, pp. 119–41. In 1904, the six Ainu people consisting of adults and children were also brought to the Louisiana Purchase International Exposition in St. Louis. They were 'displayed' at the fair together with the Apache of the American Southwest, the Igorot of the Philippines and members of the Southeast Alaskan Tlingit tribe, all of whom were described as 'primitive.' One of the Exposition's purposes was to provide an 'evidence of stages and processes of human evolution'. K. Miyatake, *Umi wo watatta Ainu*, Tokyo: Iwanami, 2010, p. 58.

40 Marx, *Capital Volume 1*, p. 925.

41 P. Wolfe, *Settler Colonialism and the Transformation of Anthropology*, London: Cassel, 1999, p. 163.

42 Marx, *Capital Volume 1*, p. 794.

43 Ibid., p. 797.

44 This was a very common phrase used in official documents and history as well as writings by intellectuals until the 1980s.

45 K. Hirano, "Thanatopolitics in the Making of Japan's Hokkaido: Settler Colonialism and Primitive Accumulation". *Critical Historical Studies* 2, 2, 2015, 191–218; G. Agamben, *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*, California: Stanford University Press, 1998, Chapter 7.

46 M. Ogawa, 'A historical study of "Ainu School" in Hokkaidō' in *Kyōiku gakubu kikō* no. 55, Sapporo: Hokkaidō University, 1991, p. 282. The Ainu school failed, as the school attendance rate was only 9.2 percent in 1886.

47 Ogawa, 'A historical study of "Ainu School" in Hokkaidō', pp. 288–9.

48 *Hokkaidō-shi*, Vol. 1, Sapporo: Hokkaidō-chō, 1918, pp. 3–5.

49 S*hinsen Hokkaidō-shi*, Sapporo: Hokkaidō-chō, 1937, p. 47.

50 For Yukie Chiri, see S. M. Strong, *Ainu Spirits Singing: The Living World of Chiri Yukie's Ainu Shin'yoshu*, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2011; and K. Hirano, 'The politics of colonial translation: On the narratives of the Ainu as a "vanishing" ethnicity', *Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus*, 7, 4, 2009, 1–16.

51 Y. Chiri (ed.), *Ainu Shinyoshū*, Sapporo: Chiri Mashiho o kataru kai, 2002, p. 1.

52 J.–P. Sartre, 'Preface', in F. Fanon (ed.) *The Wretched of the Earth*, New York: Grove Press, 1963, pp. 24–5.

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K. Hirano, 'The Politics of Colonial Translation: On the Narratives of the Ainu as a "Vanishing" Ethnicity', *Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus*, 7, 4, 2009, 1–16.

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23

THEORIZING ZIONIST SETTLER COLONIALISM IN PALESTINE

Gershon Shafir

In this chapter, I will inquire how the leaders and intellectuals of the Zionist movement understood the tasks they faced and, consequently, theorized the efforts to colonize and construct a homeland in Palestine, a task they by and large completed between 1882 and 1920. I will focus, in other words, less on the practical challenges they faced and the institutional solutions they put forth than on the ideological and cultural aspects of their efforts.

Colonization is a project with a distinct aim, the formation of a new society, eventually to become independent of a great power's colonial control. Israel, begotten through colonization, consequently was fashioned as a settler colonial project. In this, Israel is not different from Canada, Argentina, Brazil, the United States or South Africa. What makes Israel unique is that it is a belated settler colony which was launched in the last two decades of the nineteenth century and, even more so, that it continues the colonization through which it was formed into the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. It is Zionism's belated nature, past the heyday of other effective settler colonial movements, that requires us to understand its distinct character and corresponding theories on how to accomplish its goal.

Though the masses of settlers in Palestine hailed from Eastern European Jewry, the Zionist movement's sources of inspiration and models for emulation were drawn, by and large, from central and western Europe, in particular from the UK, Germany and the Habsburg Empire.

Long before vague Jewish messianic aspirations became a concrete Zionist project, it was a Christian venture. It emerged in the UK as Christian Evangelical Restorationism, a movement calling for and willing to sponsor the emigration of masses of Jews to Palestine as a precondition for the Second Coming of Christ while simultaneously seeking to convert them to Christianity. The high tide of Restorationism was the decade of the 1830s, when the Ottomans were driven out of Palestine by an Egyptian ruler, putting the country in play for a decade. Clergymen, officials, military leaders and influential British statesmen expressed their support, which led Prime Minister Palmerston to open the first British consulate in Jerusalem. In 1841, a mission of inquiry sent by the Church of Scotland to Palestine issued a *Memorandum to Protestant Monarchs of Europe for the Restoration of the Jews to Palestine*, and one of its members, a Scottish clergyman named Alexander Keith, reported about "a people without a country; even as their own land [. . .] is in a great measure a country without a people", which eventually came to be transformed into the specious slogan "a land without people for a people without a land."[1]

British proto-Zionism doubled as a justification for the expansion of British power in Palestine at a time when all European Great Powers became involved in the affairs of the 'sick man of Europe', the Ottoman Empire, through a system of capitulations, as protectors of its minorities, even generating a construction boom of churches and hospitals in Jerusalem. A particularly intriguing method for gaining influence was archeological excavation, but since the known Christian sites of Palestine were already under the control of either Orthodox or Catholic Christians, by associating themselves with Jewish ruins, British Protestants were able to tap into a remaining but also the oldest pedigree of the land. Thus, in 1865, the Palestine Exploration Fund (PEF) was established in London with the aim of excavating Palestine's Jewish heritage. In this field, the British could not only sideline other Christian powers but also best the Ottomans, who could not justify their presence in the land with reference to ancient archeology; as an empire, they had ties everywhere and nowhere. Archeology made the Ottomans the occupiers of Palestine and the British, the Protestant inheritors of Jews, its 'rightful' possessors.

There were several decades in which fantastic ideas for making 'common cause' with Jewry were aired; to cite just a single example, Charles Warren, the great excavator of Jerusalem on behalf of the PEF, suggested the formation of a company in the model of the British East India Company and task it with settling in Palestine North African Jews who, in the racialized view of colonial officials, were of sufficient stature to undertake such a task.[2]

But the hook-up between the British imperial claim to speak for Jews and the secular Zionist movement took a long time and, in fact, was hardly a predetermined outcome. It was only in 1917, on the eve of the Jerusalem's conquest and the completion of Palestine's military takeover from the Ottomans that Great Britain issued the Balfour Declaration, in which it committed itself to the facilitation of 'the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people', and it was only after further political jockeying and sorting out its multiple and competing promises to the French and Arabs that it received the newly formed League of Nations' Mandate for Palestine. From that moment until 1948, Britain played the pivotal role, ever more grudgingly, in carrying out its promise by regulating Jewish immigration, land sales and transfers and protecting the nascent Jewish community from recurring violent opposition of Palestinian inhabitants, who had their own national aspirations.

By then, Zionist colonization, which had started in 1882, had been going on for over three decades. It originated in Eastern Europe as one of the many of the Jewish responses to their displacement by belated modernization and the outbreak of pogroms. Colonization in Palestine was carried out under the auspices of Hovevei Zion (Lovers of Zion) but remained a tiny, ineffective, nonpolitical movement. With the linking of Hovevei Zion and the World Zionist Organization – a self-consciously political movement which was established in 1897 mostly by middle-class Jews from Germany and the Habsburg Empire who became disillusioned with the promise of social integration in the face of rising anti-Semitism – the movement expanded and took on a distinctly national character. It was this World Zionist Organization, headquartered in Vienna, Cologne and then in Berlin, which molded the movement's theory of colonization. The Zionist movement's center of gravity shifted to Britain as a result of its conquest of Palestine, and its head office moved to London soon thereafter. By then, Zionists had evolved a workable theory of their colonization project.

Between 1882 and 1920, the Zionist movement struggled to create an effective settler colonial project in Palestine that was motivated by a demographic interest.[3] To attain control of and safety in Palestine, Zionists needed a theory and method of colonization that would produce a Jewish majority. The WZO didn't have the Jewish masses needed to become a majority in the chosen land, since the overwhelming majority of German Zionists neither planned to leave Germany nor expected Zionism to change their lives.[4] In fact, both leaders of Eastern European Hovevei Zion,

such as Pinsker, and of German Zionism, for example Max Nordau, viewed Western Jews only as the economic and cultural benefactors and the leaders and organizers of the emigration of the 'surplus population' of *Ostjuden*.[5] In particular, fearful of rekindled anti-Semitism in Germany, they wished to redirect the multitudes of Jews who streamed into the country, most though not all on the way to destinations in the Americas, to Palestine. German Jews needed Jews from elsewhere, their Eastern European brethren, to provide the man and woman power for the national movement. On their part, Eastern European Jews did not have the resources to purchase land, nor was there a colonial metropole able and willing to provide them with free land, and therefore they were unable to follow the desired trajectory of becoming independent small holders, a problem shared by settler colonialists elsewhere.

The era of the first two *aliyot* (waves of Jewish immigration), between 1882–1903 and 1904–1914, witnessed repeated attempts by the two parties, the WZO and its bodies and the Eastern European immigrants, initially a small and struggling but organized agricultural labor force, to experiment with and theorize Zionist settler colonialism through trial and error. Each developed its own approach, first usually the WZO and then the workers who were dependent on the former's resources, until they found a common ground, which was consolidated shortly after the First World War. This chapter will examine their respective transformations, attempts to reach out to each other and concomitantly evolving theories of settler colonialism respectively and conclude by laying out the method of colonization around which they cemented their alliance.

The settler colonial theory of the World Zionist Organization

The first few decades of Zionism bore the formative mark of its central European, mostly German and Habsburg, incubators. Under the double impact of the stream of Eastern European immigration and rising anti-Semitism, the *Zionistische Vereinigung für Deutschland* (German Zionist Association), though always a tiny group, became the largest Western branch of the Zionist movement. Before the First World War, 'Western Zionism was articulated essentially within the German-speaking cultural world' and 'to a great extent the leadership of the German and the World Zionist Organization was identical'.[6]

The leaders of the WZO, Max Bodenheimer, Otto Warburg, Arthur Ruppin, Franz Oppenheimer, Adolf Böhm, Max Nordau and of course Theodor Herzl, were influenced by the historical conditions of Germany and Austro-Hungary, which served, therefore, as the context for the development of the foundations of Zionist settlement theory in the first decade of this century. Two major crises of German life were of central importance: the upheaval in German agriculture and the bubbling ethnic conflict between the German-speaking and Slavic peoples, especially Poles and Czechs.

One significant consequence of the decline of rural incomes in the last quarter of the nineteenth century relative to industrial and urban incomes was the accelerated flight of agricultural workers from the large grain-growing Junker estates in Prussia.[7] The place of the departing German farm workers was taken over by Eastern European, mostly Polish workers, especially in the province of Poznan (Posen) that accrued to Prussia as a result of Poland's partitions. A significant part of German political life was taken up by the debate over the proper responses to the agricultural crisis. In 1888, the *Deutscher Bund für Bodenbesitzreform* was formed, and Michael Flürscheim, its major theorist, advocated radical measures, among them the nationalization of land and the establishment of colonies on collectively owned land.[8] The Austrian journalist Theodor Hertzka proposed overseas colonization projects in which cultivation and production were to be under the auspices of self-governing associations.[9] A third response to the agrarian crisis was the formation of the cooperative movement which posited as its goal a radical reorganization of

society through the establishment of cooperative bodies, such as consumer, producer and market-ing cooperatives. The movement's most tangible result was the more modest spread of cooperative Credit Societies.[10]

A prominent intellectual figure of these movements was Franz Oppenheimer, whose 1896 *Die Siedlungsgenossenschaft* (The Settlement Cooperative) synthesized land reform with the coopera-tive movement. Oppenheimer worked as a physician in a remote Eastern Prussian province from 1886 to 1896. Facing the poverty and ill health of many of his clients and under the influence of the views of Henry George and the German land reformers Flürscheim and Damaschke, he became a professor of sociology and concluded that the Junkers' monopoly of large estates was the cause of all 'social ills'. In his view the 'pure economy' of competition was corrupted by the 'political economy' of monopolization, and its 'cure' would be public ownership of land and cooperative settlement.[11]

Many of the founders and leaders of the WZO and the German and Austrian Zionist Associa-tions were familiar with and influenced by these reformers.[12] Theodore Herzl, the founder of the WZO, wrote *The Jewish State* to outline a settlement program for Palestine, drawing on the work of Hertzka, while Bodenheimer, another Zionist leader, sought out Flürscheim's advice.[13] On the floor of the Sixth Congress in 1903, Herzl characterized Oppenheimer's affiliation as one of the greatest conquests of Zionism.[14] Though Oppenheimer's program was intended to be implemented in Eastern Germany, he offered it to Herzl and the WZO as a model for overseas colonization.

The land reform movement's radicalism limited its appeal, but the ruling circles of the Prus-sian state, by turning the reformers' ideas in a nationalist direction, were able to put part of their program into effect. In September 1885, the influential National Liberal Party called for the 'internal colonization' (*innere Kolonisation*) of the Eastern Marches by parceling out large Junker estates to small German peasants in order to stem the influx of Polish workers.[15] Bismarck, already committed to resuming the tradition of German colonization in the East, used the National Lib-erals' demands, articulated in the early works of Max Weber,[16] to set up an *Ansiedlungskommission* (Colonization Commission) in 1886. Its stated goal was the purchase of large estates, first Polish and later also German, for 'internal colonization' to achieve 'by means of an active, institution-alized policy . . . a German population majority by encouraging internal migration',[17] namely not to reform land tenure but to alter demography, i.e. to ensure German majority and control of the Ostmark (the Eastern Marches), particularly of the Poznan and West Prussian provinces.[18]

The German Colonization Commission was a protean body which purchased, leased, developed and parceled land as well as provided credit and guidance to German farmers. It offered either tiny plots to provide additional income for urban employees or plots that were too small to require the employment of hired Polish labor.[19] The Colonization Commission preferred to lease the plots to German farmers on a long-term basis, charging rent below the market value, while simultaneously providing the infrastructure such as roads, irrigation and public services necessary to root the new farmers in their land. The record of the Colonization Commission seemed at the time impressive for the German side, but, by the end of its activities at the outbreak of the First World War, it failed to reach its demographic aims and had, at most, compensated for the exodus of German farmers.[20]

The Austro-Hungarian Empire experienced similar national conflicts between the manifold ethnic groups in its eastern regions. The helplessness of the Habsburgs in face of territorially based ethnic strife was not lost on Adolf Böhm, a leader of the Austrian Zionist Association, or on Shlomo Kaplansky and Nathan Gross of the Austrian branch of *Poalei Zion* (Workers of Zion), who were among the earliest supporters of Oppenheimer's 'settlement cooperative', in contrast to the other Zionist workers parties.[21] It was the Central European, mostly the Austro-Hungarian, experience that Böhm, Gross and Kaplansky invoked to justify their support for a new type of Jewish settlement that would turn the demographic table of Palestine in favor of Jews. In 1907,

Gross described to the Eighth Zionist Congress the moshavot of the First Aliya thus: 'every one hundred Jewish families attracts 6,000 Arabs; if things continue thus, we shall fall victim to the same fate as the Germans in certain Slavic lands'.[22] Kaplansky was even more emphatic in demanding:

> Do we have to point to Eastern Galicia where the Polish land owners are the ruling class, nevertheless there is no doubt that the future of the country belongs to those cultivating the land – the Ukrainians? Did Bohemia become a German country solely by virtue of its industrialists being German, while the workers are Czech? [23]

Austrian Zionists saw in state intervention and land purchase a positive process, though one that the Colonization Commission did not take far enough.[24] The experience of Prussian internal colonization was a self-consciously chosen model for Otto Warburg and Arthur Ruppin as well.

The learning stages of the WZO can be established through an examination of the sequence of institutions it established. Already the First Zionist Congress of 1897 decided to set up a Jewish National Fund for the purpose of purchasing land. The creation of such a fund was initially proposed by Hermann Schapira to Hovevei Zion in 1884 but had been transformed under the influence of the European land reform movement. Bodenheimer, in introducing Schapira's proposals, specifically pointed to Flürscheim and Hertzka's influence.[25] Soon after the Congress, Flürscheim himself published a call in the WZO's periodical for public landownership in the New Zion. Its unique aim was the national ownership of land. Article 3 of its Memorandum of Association set clear limits on the allocation of land, once acquired, by stating that the object of the JNF was

> to let any of the land or other immovable property of the Association to any Jews upon any terms: provided that no lessee shall be invested with the right of subletting or assigning (whether by way of sale, transfer, mortgage or charge) any interest in the soil of the prescribed region [. . .].[26]

The Zionist movement was willing to adopt much more radical social principles than the Prussian internal colonizers. Not only did the JNF abolish private ownership of land and replace it by hereditary land leasing but it also simultaneously excluded non-Jews from control of land once acquired by the JNF. Land purchased by the JNF could not be resold, as it was held in trusteeship for the whole nation. Nor could it be sublet, in order to ensure that the usufruct would belong to the actual Jewish cultivator.[27]

The experience of German-Slav ethnic conflict in Central Europe was used to justify the charter of the JNF. Adolf Böhm, a Viennese Zionist and a member of the JNF's board, connected the nationalization of land by the JNF with the intention to combat the denationalization of the land due to its private ownership. In particular, he cited the Czech, Polish East Galician and Italian Dalmatia regions of the Habsburg Empire, which gradually became Czechisized, Ruthenesized and Slavicized, which was to be avoided by the nationalization of land.[28]

The WZO soon discovered that it had to follow the example of the Prussian Colonization Association in setting up a complex and comprehensive settlement framework. The Zionist movement needed to supplant its land-purchasing policy with a settlement method to make possible the land's agricultural exploitation. In 1903, a Palestine Commission of three members – Otto Warburg, Selig Soskin and Franz Oppenheimer – was set up to examine the possibilities of practical work in Palestine. In April 1904, the Greater Action Committee of the WZO called for the foundation of an Oppenheim-type 'settlement-cooperative'. The Eighth Congress resolved to build it on publicly owned, that is, JNF land.[29] Finally, the Ninth Congress' decision of 1909

to establish a dedicated fund, the *Erez Israel Siedlungsgesellschaft*, allowed the implementation of this project.

Oppenheimer's colonization project envisioned three stages. The first called for establishing agricultural training farms under the management of an agronomist, who was to consult an advisory board chosen by the workers. The workers would cultivate the land cooperatively and were to be remunerated individually by wages and share in the profit relative to their effort. As soon as the farm became profitable and began repaying the loans to its founding society, the manager would be removed and the second stage commence. The farm then would become a cooperative society, run by its members or by a manager they appointed. At a third stage, the cooperative would open its doors to nonagricultural members. Additional areas for cooperation might include housing, consumer and credit cooperatives.[30] Soon, it was discovered that the circumstances of the Jewish agricultural workers in Palestine was particularly dire. In Palestine, as we shall see in the next section, these immigrants were mainly agricultural workers who were undercut by the lower wages of Palestinian workers in the existing Jewish *moshavot* (colonies), without hope of earning enough or raising credit to become small-holders. In fact, the last remaining difference between the Colonization Commission and the PLDC concerned the question of agricultural start-up credit. The settlers of the former could be required to earn it; the latter learned that its own agricultural laborers en route to becoming farmers could not.

Another, third, institutional innovation was undertaken by the Eighth Congress in 1907. It was decided to turn the Palestine Commission into the *Palastina-Ressort* – a full-fledged department of the WZO for Palestinian affairs, under Otto Warburg – and to open a *Palastina-Amt* (Palestine Office) in Jaffa. The operative conclusions of Arthur Ruppin's 1907 blueprint for the WZO viewed demography and agricultural work as interconnected in assuring control of land, and upon its submission he was appointed to head the Palestine Office, in 1908.[31] Ruppin demanded the simultaneous setting up of a Palestine Land Development Company (PLDC).[32]

Though the PLDC was created 'to enable [the JNF] to carry out its very aim' by inaugurating 'a purposeful land policy (*eine zielbewusste Landpolitik*) in Palestine',[33] as demonstrated by Shalom Reichman and Shlomo Hasson, the PLDC was modelled by Otto Warburg and Arthur Ruppin after the Prussian government's Colonization Commission in the Ostmark. In a letter from 1908, Warburg noted that in launching the PLDC, 'we do not propose new ways, new experiments whose nature is unknown. We assume instead the Prussian colonization method as it has been practiced in the last ten years by the Colonization Commission'.[34] Ruppin himself was born in the province of Poznan and had experienced in his childhood and youth 'the permanent struggle between the Polish majority living on the land and the dominant, mainly urban, German population'. Ruppin viewed Prussian colonization in the Poznan province as a model to emulate and improve on. Warburg still believed in May 1908 that the PLDC could fill the gap, due to the absence of an effective colonial bank, but by October 1909, Ruppin assigned it different aims. Ruppin pointed out that first it was necessary to undertake the agricultural-technical preparation of small holdings for potential buyers. In Ruppin's words, 'the method of settlement here proposed for Palestine is not an innovation; it is being used wherever latifundia, which were badly cultivated, are divided up and sold to small farmers. It is, in particular, the method used in disposing of Polish latifundia in the East Marches to German farmers'.[35] The German Colonization Commission was attractive as a model, since it offered a method of practical work in preparing land for European-type settlement and cultivation, even in the absence of a colonial bank capable of extending agricultural credit to prospective settlers.

Ruppin was the most attentive to the circumstances of the Eastern European Jews among whom the WZO expected its settler to come. Ruppin was instrumental in starting a series of experiments inspired by Oppenheimer's three-stage blueprint, running the gamut from training

farms to settlements, the most important one of which turned out to be the establishment of a cooperative settlement in Degania at the southern tip of Lake Tiberias, the forerunner of the kibbutz. This experiment brought the agricultural workers into the WZO's camp, which slowly came to be viewed as the successor of the Rothschild and Hirsch settlement efforts.

The foundation of the agricultural workers' new trust for Ruppin and the PLDC was the latter's adoption of the nationalist bent that characterized the Prussian Settlement Commission. The Poznan model was potentially more applicable to Palestine than other models, since:

> the adoption of the Posen model involved something much deeper than a transfer of a specific colonization technique. Essentially, it meant an acceptance of or agreement with a political philosophy that assigned a leading role to the national needs and thus was congruent with the goals of the Zionist movement.[36]

It was in the context of a debate between Ruppin and Hubert Auhagen, an agricultural expert of the *Ansiedlungskommission* who was invited by the WZO to tour Palestine in 1911, that Ruppin crossed a significant hurdle on the way toward allying the PLDC with the Jewish agricultural workers.[37] The PLDC, Ruppin concluded, was not established to undertake economic ventures but to enhance national colonization,[38] and the Jewish agricultural workers in Palestine alone could provide the manpower for this task. National colonization alone was guided by the 'demographic interest' of settler colonialism.

The settler colonial theory of the labor settlement movement

European settlers were attracted to the American continent, Southern Africa, Australia and elsewhere by the social mobility afforded by their ability to take possession of abundant land, and thus the opening of the land for settlement was their foremost priority. Among these settlement societies, Palestine became an exception: while land had to be purchased, the early settlers' access to land remained curbed by their limited resources. The accumulation of Jewish territorial assets in Palestine and the establishment of new colonies came to a halt by the end of the First Aliya in 1903, barely twenty years after their inception, just around the time when the immigrants of the Second Aliya began arriving on its shores. The Zionist movement at the time was at its lowest ebb. The old movement, Hovevei Zion of Odessa, had never been up to the task of colonization on a large scale, while the new World Zionist Organization was not yet ready to engage in colonization. The major patron of the First Aliya, the Baron Edmund de Rothschild, had already withdrawn his direct support of Jewish settlement in 1900. The Jewish Colonization Association, founded in 1891 by the Baron Maurice de Hirsch, the only non-Zionist worldwide colonization society active in Palestine, was already past the peak of its settlement drive of 1900–1903. No privately established colony, however, was able to subsist or be established without the assistance of one or more of these bodies.

Unable to settle, the immigrants of the Second Aliya sought employment in the moshavot (colonies) of the First Aliya, and their attention shifted, consequently, to the labor market. They discovered soon enough after their arrival that they were unable to compete with the lower-paid Palestinian agricultural workers, who only needed seasonal time work. Though they left Europe, Europe didn't leave them. Jews needed a subsidy to attain a European standing of living in Palestine. The decade of the Second Aliya – lasting from 1904 to the outbreak of the First World War – was coterminous with the struggle over the moshava's labor market. This conflict, atypical though it was for a settlement society and short in duration, was nevertheless the central stage for shaping Zionist settler colonial experience and theories.

In 1905, in order to prevent their undercutting and potential displacement, a group of agricultural workers organized the Hapoel Hatzair (Young Worker) Party with the stated goal of *kibush haavoda* (conquest of labor). Hapoel Hatzair chose to decorate its periodical's masthead with the slogan: 'A necessary condition for the realization of Zionism is the conquest of all branches of work in Eretz Israel (Palestine) by Jews'. Hapoel Hatzair shared with white workers in multi-ethnic societies, and especially settler societies, the common aim of excluding, or alternatively caste binding, of local and cheaper workers. Hapoel Hatzair, and ironically the rival Marxist Poalei Zion (Workers of Zion) Party as well, justified their struggle by emphasizing that they were organized, and thus self-consciously socialist, workers, whereas the Palestinians were not. The Jewish agricultural workers, however, had no political or economic power to compel the First Aliya's moshavot, which preferred Arab workers from the surrounding Palestinian villages over Jewish workers seeking above-market wages, to change its labor force. One of the consequences of the failed conquest of labor campaign was that the workers of the Second Aliya became hostile to colonization, since it seemed only to increase the employment opportunities of the Arab workers, who were their competitors, and consequently to exacerbate their plight.

Hapoel Hatzair and Poalei Zion attitude began changing slowly when colonization was linked with a solution to the 'problem of the worker' – that is, when the WZO's initiative of cooperative settlement ended up eliminating wage labor and thus also Palestinian Arab competition and *eo ipso* the Jewish worker. The new settler colonial theory, synthesizing the land reform, cooperative settlement and the national colonization methods of the JNF, PLDC and the Palestine Office with the already ongoing cooperative practices of the organized Eastern European Jewish agricultural workers, became the basis on which the two came to ally with each other. But to cement an alliance with the WZO, the workers first had to evolve their own settler colonial theory.

The clearest and earliest version of a settlement theory for the propertyless and creditless was already offered, in 1907, by Shlomo Kaplansky, a leader of the Austrian wing of Poalei Zion, an early supporter of the Oppenheimer plan. Poalei Zion, on a forced march away from its Marxist convictions, rediscovered in 1912 the writings of an unlikely ideologue. Nachman Syrkin, a moderate socialist Zionist, shared with Poalei Zion the quest for a synthesis of working class nationalism with a universal historical process. But this he found not in class struggle but in the cooperative movement, and his theoretical formulation signals the beginnings of the appropriation of colonization, and the kibbutz in particular, for socialist ideology, but oddly, linking it with 'utopian socialism'. Though Robert Owen's cooperatives had failed, according to Syrkin, due to an unfortunate mixture of communist and cooperative elements, he expected the linking of cooperation and colonization – 'socialist settlement' – to be successful.[39]

The workers' settler colonial theory that evolved on the heels of the PLDSC's cooperative settlement experiments are best described in the form of five transformations of earlier theories of Zionism. The new approach tracked the changes in the WZO's own theory.

The first about-face was the rejection of the moshavot's capitalist path and the conquest of labor strategy which depended on it. Zerubavel, a leader of the Poalei Zion Party, posed the question rhetorically on the pages of *Haachdut*, Poalei Zion's paper, in 1911:

> Which has the advantage? Private property or public property? Experience has now shown us the road to be taken. . . . Only public property, that sets before itself historical ideals and goals and is not pursuing momentary victories, is capable of experiments, trials, and dangers. Only [public property] and no other, therefore, is appropriate for the economic conditions of Eretz Israel, and [capable of] preparing the ground for the activities of the masses of Jewish workers – the true carriers of our ideals [. . .][40]

Though others had already expressed doubts as to the effectiveness of the capitalist path of colonization,[41] the shift and its language in Zerubavel were remarkable. Zerubavel, a prominent leader of Poalei Zion, not only had thrown overboard the path of capitalist development but justified association with 'public property' in terms of the idealism the WZO and the workers shared!

Another step was the transition from *kibush haavoda* (conquest of labor) to *kibush hakarka* (conquest of land), accompanied by the demand to nationalize land. In the words of the agronomist Vilkansky, 'the nationalization of land is a necessary condition for the creation of a laboring settlement'.[42] The Israeli labor movement in Palestine, under the formative influence of the Jewish–Palestinian labor market conflict and in contradistinction from other early twentieth-century socialist movements, demanded the nationalization of land and was by and large oblivious to other means of production. Search for employment rather than for improved working conditions per se turned on nationalization of land, that is, exclusive Jewish land ownership, and not on socialization of means of production in general. The agricultural workers recognized that the guarantees of public ownership of land, hereditary lease to tenants, and proscription of subleasing by the JNF were the best guarantors of workers' colonization.

Though the Jewish agricultural workers organized themselves into many types of *kvutzot* (cooperatives or collectives; *kvutza sing.*) from the time of their arrival in Palestine, they came to associate *avoda atzmit* (autonomous labor) as outside the reach of market dynamics with colonization and thus as the institution exclusively suited for them. Kaplansky listed the reasons for the unique fit of cooperatives for settler colonialism in Palestine:

> the worker has to free himself from being dependent on the private moshava's labor market; he has to learn all the tasks of agricultural work; he has to be credit worthy; finally this settlement method has to be sophisticated in all technical-agricultural aspects in order to raise the profits of Eretz Israeli agriculture and make possible the employment of Jewish workers. The agricultural cooperative fulfills all these requirements.

The most comprehensive and effective cooperative was the kibbutz, since the cultivation of its land by its members eliminated any danger of competition with Arab workers. A great deal of attention was paid, consequently, to adjusting the size of the kibbutz's land holdings to the size of its membership. The kvutza facilitated the immigration of masses of Jews to Palestine and, therefore, Kaplansky argued, 'it is clear to us now that the development of the Yishuv demands of us the widest use of the agricultural cooperatives'.[43]

A corresponding metamorphosis in the self-description of the agricultural workers took place. They gradually stopped referring to themselves as *poalim* (workers*)* and began viewing themselves as *ovdim* (laborers). As long as they were engaged in *kibush haavoda*, a struggle to ensure employment in the labor market, the term 'worker' was appropriate; the new term signaled renewed access to settlement on the JNF's land. Instead of a 'working class', the new self-image became *yishuv oved*, and later *hityashvut ovedet (*laboring settlement). By December 1913, this transition was well understood:

> The laboring settlement will not produce workers per se, but laborers. . . . The laborer of the future will be a blending of the worker and the farmer. And instead of having, as we do now, workers without work and without land, and farmers without work whose land is dropping out from under their feet, we will have in the future a laborer who will be a worker-farmer, in possession of both labor and land.[44]

Israel Kolatt, a prominent historian of the Second Aliya, suggested that 'one of the distinguishing characteristics of the labor movement is its being a settlement movement',[45] but it is doubtful whether one can call a labor movement a settlement movement at the same time. Rather, in the second decade of the twentieth century, the former was transformed into the latter and the laborer became for all practical purposes a settler.

The fifth, and last, component in the agricultural laborers' settler colonial theory signaled a novel ambition – the quest for increased influence of the laboring settlement movement within the WZO and ultimately its domination. Being dependent on the Zionist movement, the source of their subsidies, Hapoel Hatzair and Poalei Zion needed to ensure a measure of influence on the WZO to ensure that it not deviate in the future from the common cause they made.[46] Berl Katzenelson, the most influential ideologue of the Labor Settlement Movement, transformed the 'self-liberation' of the laborers from the labor market and their settlement and the unfolding 'alliance' with the WZO into the moral foundation and conviction of a hegemonic group. He asked rhetorically:

> What are we to the yishuv and what is the yishuv to us? Are we just workers, laborers, machines – in which case we carry no responsibility for general projects . . . or are we participants in the creation who want to become something, some power, and who then carry the moral responsibility for all the projects which we are part of?[47]

The historian Jonathan Frankel locates at this juncture the foundation of the labor movement's successful 'struggle for hegemony' within the Zionist movement.[48]

These five transformations were combined to constitute the settler colonial theory of Labor Zionism and were institutionalized in 1929 in the Israeli-state-in-the-making: the Histadrut. When the Histadrut was established at the end of 1920, the interconnection of the Second Aliya's organizational attempts to bypass the inhospitable labor market – in the political sphere by the establishment of Hapoel Hatzair Party and through the reinterpretation of Poalei Zion's doctrines; in the military sphere by the setting up of guard organizations; and in the economic and social sphere by bringing into existence the organizations of cooperative 'autonomous labor' and above all the kibbutzim – was accomplished. The workers' trade union interests remained, though not without periodical opposition, subjugated to this national goal.[49] The Histadrut's charter, displaying a near-absence of socialist objectives, accurately reflected the national character of the trade union and the radical nationalist legacy of the Second Aliya's settler colonial theory.

The alliance of the World Zionist Organization and the labor settlement movement

On the eve of the First World War, Shprintzak recognized that the WZO had assumed Rothschild and the JCA's role as 'the only body able to create national settlement shaped by autonomous labor, nationalization of land, and Jewish culture – a settlement that carries in it the seeds of real renaissance'. Walking 'the path of simultaneous land and labor redemption', the Palestine Office thus gained the organized agricultural workers' 'trust, recognition, and respect'.[50] As a result, 'the respect for the Berlin school of German Zionism, rose in direct proportion to the decline in the prestige of the Russian Hovevei Zion'.[51]

The WZO, on the basis of the settler colonial theory it had developed, was in the process of allying itself with the labor settlement movement. In July 1920, an interim Zionist Conference was convened in London to put the final touches on its theory. Freed of the illusions of generating mass Jewish colonization in Palestine through capitalist market-based methods, the organs of the

WZO, and especially the JNF, sought to consolidate the lessons they had learned in the previous two decades. This process was not derailed even by the loss of German Jewry's prominent position at the head of the WZO due to Germany's defeat in the First World War and the emergence of the WZO's American branch as a full-scale participant and competitor for the mantle of leadership. The JNF's head office was now transferred to The Hague while the political leadership surrounding Haim Weizmann concentrated in London. Weizmann consolidated his leadership and reaffirmed and expanded the lessons of the 'German period'.

The initial steps were taken by the JNF under the leader of Nechemia de Lieme, who tried to recapture for the JNF that central stage in the WZO which was usurped in the preceding years by Ruppin, the PLDC and the Palestine Office. Pamphlets prepared by de Lieme, Oppenheimer, Böhm and especially the WZO's rising new agronomist Jacob Oettinger extolled the practical benefits of the JNF's hereditary lease of land for facilitating national colonization. The hereditary lease could expedite the immigration of masses who would not need to sink their meager resources into land purchase. The lease would become the tool for ensuring the employment of Jewish workers, rooting the farmer in the land and preventing the danger denationalization observed on privately owned land. It could simultaneously limit the rise of land values due to speculation.[52] Given such an impressive list of benefits, de Lieme, demanded that the JNF be recognized as 'the sole organ of Jewish land policy in Palestine'.[53]

The July 1920 interim Zionist Conference debated and set guidelines for land and colonization policy.[54] Though the representatives of the workers' parties failed to gain approval for their motion, shared by de Lieme, that the JNF alone be permitted to purchase land in Palestine (a demand which had little chance of gaining the support of the British Mandate authorities anyway), the Conference, concerned with the paucity of its resources, agreed to support in addition to cooperative settlement only those private settlers who would 'cultivate the land themselves'. The Conference resolved that the aims of its policy, to be carried out by the JNF, were:

> to use the voluntary contributions received from the Jewish people as a means for making the land of Palestine the common property of the Jewish people; to give out the land exclusively on hereditary leasehold and on hereditary building-right; to assist the settlement on their own farms of Jewish agricultural workers; to see that the ground is worked, and to combat speculation; to safeguard Jewish labor.[55]

In 1920, the WZO also decided 'to cooperate with the workers' institutions in the fields of the provision of employment, cooperation, education, medical aid, mutual credit, and the organization of the immigration of active workers'. A new colonizing body, the *Keren Hayesod* (Foundation Fund) – established by the Conference as a handmaiden to the JNF in order to fund mostly 'permanent national institutions or economic undertakings' – was expected to be a dividend-paying body, though like so many times before this never happened.[56] The alliance of the WZO and the Histadrut was now operative at the highest level. Though the path of capitalist colonization – indirectly advocated by the American delegation headed by Justice Brandeis and beaten back in 1920 – came back to haunt the WZO's deliberations on a number of occasions, the reversals suffered by the cause of the workers were always temporary and persisted to 1948 and thereafter.

The Histadrut and the JNF, operating in the labor and land markets respectively, were the two pillars of the separatist settler colonial method of Jewish state formation around which the practice of Israeli nationalism evolved. Their respective aims were the closing of the labor and land markets (though the JNF's success required the initial openness of the land market while Jewish purchases were effected and its subsequent closing to retain Jewish ownership) so as to ensure

their Jewish control.[57] In the alliance between the organized sectors of the Eastern European agricultural laborers and the WZO, the former were transformed from workers into settlers, while the WZO became a truly popular movement. The cooperative ventures of the Histadrut were 'heavily subsidized' by the WZO and, over time, the workers gained the leadership of the WZO and hegemony over the settler colonial project and the Jewish community in Palestine.[58] The WZO now focused on the facilitation of immigration, absorption and settlement, and in Michael Shalev's telling formulation, its support for the Histadrut represented 'a practical alliance between a settlement movement without settlers and a worker's movement without work'.[59]

Notes

1   See D. Muir, 'A land without a people for a people without a land', *Middle East Quarterly*, 15, 2, 2008, 55.
2   See C. Warren, *The Land of Promise, or Turkey's Guarantee*, London: G. Bell & Sons, 1875.
3   For a detailed analysis see G. Shafir, *Land, Labor, and the Origins of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict 1882–1914*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989.
4   J. Reinharz, *Fatherland or Promised Land: The Dilemma of the German Jew, 1893–1914*, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1975, p. 130.
5   Pinsker wrote: 'The fact that, as it seems, we can mix with the nations only in the smallest proportions, presents a further obstacle to the establishment of amicable relations. Therefore, we must see to it that the *surplus* of Jews, the inassimilable residue, is removed and provided for elsewhere. This duty can be incumbent upon no one but ourselves'. L. Pinsker, 1882, reprinted in A. Hertzberg (ed.) *The Zionist Idea*, Garden City: Doubleday, 1959, p. 193. And Nordau wrote, in an otherwise sympathetic presentation of the *Ostjuden*, that: 'the contempt created by the impudent, crawling beggar in dirty caftan . . . falls back on all of us'. S. E. Aschheim, *Brothers and Strangers: The East European Jew in German and German Jewish Consciousness, 1800–1923*, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1982, p. 88.
6   Reinharz, *Fatherland or Promised Land*, p. 104; Aschheim, *Brothers and Strangers*, p. 81.
7   A. Hussain and K. Tribe, *Marxism and the Agrarian Question, Vol. 1: German Social Democracy and the Peasantry, 1890–1907*, Atlantic Heights: Humanities Press, 1981, p. 25.
8   See J. H. Epstein, 'Michael Flürscheim und die Bodenreform', in *Jahrbuch des Freien Deutschen Hochstifts*, 1912, pp. 254–65.
9   T. Hertzka, *Freeland: A Social Anticipation*, New York: D. Appleton, 1891, pp. 1, 137.
10 W. Wygodzinski and A. Müller, *Das Genossenschaftswesen in Deutschland*, 2nd ed., Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1929, pp. 22–31.
11 For the connection between Oppenheimer and other land reformers's ideas, see A. Böhm, *Der Judische Nationalfonds: Ein Instrument zur Abhilfe der Judennot,* Cologne: Juedischer Verlag, 1910, pp. 32–3; A. Tsiyoni, [Itzhak Vilkansky], 'The Oppenheimer settlement method: Part I', *Hapoel Hatzair* 3, 17, 22 June 1910 (Hebrew).
12 A. Bonne, 'Major aspects of land tenure and rural social structure in Israel', in K. H. Parsons et al. (eds.) *Land Tenure*, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1956, p. 112; E. Orni, *Agrarian Reform and Social Progress in Israel,* Jerusalem: JNF, 1972, pp. 13–8; see also J. Metzer, *National Capital for a National Home*, Jerusalem: Yad Itzhak Ben-Zvi. (Hebrew), 1979, p. 49.
13 H. Bodenheimer, 'The statutes of the *Keren Kayemet*: A study of their origins, based on the known as well as hitherto unpublished sources', *Herzl Year Book* 4, 1965, 165.
14 G. Kressel, 'Vol. 1: History', in N. Agmon (ed.) *The Scroll of Land*, Jerusalem: JNF. (Hebrew), 1951, p. 46.
15 W. W. Hagen, *Germans, Poles, and Jews: The Nationality Conflict in the Prussian East, 1772–1914*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980, p. 134.
16 W. J. Mommsen, *Max Weber and German Politics, 1890–1920*, trs. from German by Steinberg M.S., Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984, pp. 21–34.
17 S. Reichman and S. Hasson, 'A cross-cultural diffusion of colonization: From Posen to Palestine,' *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 74, 1, 1984, 57.
18 H. Bruchhold-Wahl, *Die Krise des Grossgrundbesitzes und die Gueterankaeufe der Ansiedlungskommission in der Provinz Posen, in den Jahren 1886–1898*, PhD Dissertation, Westfaelischen Wilhelms University, 1980, pp. 98,180.
19 Reichman and Hasson, 'A cross-cultural diffusion of colonization', 63–4.
20 Ibid., 58–60.

21 M. Singer, *Shlomo Kaplansky: His Life and Work, Vol. 1,* Jerusalem: Zionist Library. (Hebrew), 1971, pp. 150, 152, 156, 159.

22 J. Frankel, *Prophecy and Politics: Socialism, Nationalism, and the Russian Jews, 1862–1917*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981, p. 400.

23 S. Kaplansky, *Vision and Fulfillment*, Merchavia: Hakibbutz Haartzi, (Hebrew), 1950, p. 30.

24 F. Oppenheimer, *Die Siedlungsgenossenschaft*, 11th ed., Jena: Gustav Fischer, 1913, pp. 249–88.

25 Bodenheimer, 'The Statutes of the *Keren Kayemet*', 179.

26 Memorandum of Association of Jüdische Nationalfonds, Incorporated 8 April 1907, London: Lewis & Yglesias, CZA (Central Zionist Archive, Jerusalem) – Z2:608.

27 Kressel, 'Vol. 1: History,' 45.

28 A. Böhm, *The Jewish National Fund*, The Hague: Head Office of the Jewish National Fund, [c. 1917], pp. 23–5.

29 Frankel, *Prophecy and Politics*, pp. 398, 401.

30 For the features of Oppenheimer's plan see, for example, 'The first steps of cooperative settlement in Eretz-Israel', *Haachdut* 2, 14, 27 January 1911; Kaplansky, 'The agricultural worker and the Kvutza', pp. 432–4; Vilkansky, 'The Oppenheimer settlement method: Part I', *Hapoel Hatzair* 3, 17, 22 June 1910 (Hebrew); and F. Oppenheimer, *Collective Ownership and Private Ownership of Land*, The Hague: The Head Office of the JNF, 1917, p. 17.

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24

FROM REPUBLIC TO EMPIRE

Israel and the Palestinians after 1948

Arnon Degani

There is a degree of consensus among scholars of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Most of them, even bitter ideological foes, tend to view Zionism and Palestinian nationalism as independent and antagonistic historical forces; they see their antagonism as capable of explaining the events that occurred between the Mediterranean and the Jordan River during more than a century. Scholars often differ on issues such as the respective authenticity or morality of Zionism and Palestinian nationalism, yet most construct the two as state-centered movements, more or less unchanged by history.[1] The teleology of the current meta-narrative is apparent: the clash between Zionism and Palestinian nationalism is the cause of the conflict, it is the conflict and it contributes to its exacerbation.

This chapter offers an alternative to the reigning narrative. What follows is a condensed account of the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians since 1948. The scope of this chapter can hardly contain all the events and processes which occurred in Israel/Palestine and the international diplomatic arena; nevertheless, it presents a more productive analytical prism from which to study the conflict. Instead of employing a generic 'Zionism' and 'Palestinian nationalism', this chapter assesses the major turning points of the conflict by pointing at their respective congruency with either colonial or settler colonial modes of human interaction.

One advantage in conceptualizing the conflict as oscillating between colonial and settler colonial conjunctures is that both terms have been sufficiently theorized as modern historical phenomena, contingent on the rise and shifts of global capitalism. Furthermore, both colonial and settler colonial histories assume a relational framework which exposes the constitutive ties between all historical players and their multiple agencies – Israelis and Palestinians in our case – rather than assuming their ontological existence and antagonism.

Colonialism and settler colonialism are understood here as modern historical phenomena which are historically related but analytically distinct. Both colonialism and settler colonialism involve the movement of people from one part of the world to another, primarily from Europe to other places. This is where the two concepts veer in different directions. Colonialism is a form of rule premised on an imagined essential difference and natural hierarchy between groups of human beings, which implicates the exploitation of resources and the transfer of capital from imperial peripheries to the metropole. Unlike colonial empires, settler colonial movements, in their ideal type forms, are not schemes for foreign domination and exploitation of an indigenous population. Rather, settlers seek to populate the land already populated by indigenous; to become

the indigenous themselves.[2] Whereas colonialism is a form of governance materially invested in the existence of indigenous peoples (for if there are none, there is no one to exploit), settler colonialism is premised on their elimination.[3]

Correspondingly, colonial relationships are based on the 'othering' or perpetual reification of difference between colonizer and colonized. For this reason, colonial histories often feature harsh forms of governance which transform disparate indigenous communities into solidified national groups: Indians, Algerians and Vietnamese. In stark contrast, settler colonialists have very little to benefit from any form of relationship with indigenous people, particularly a relationship that would solidify indigenous groups into an antagonistic 'other'. Settler regimes, such as those in North America and Australasia, gradually cleared the territories under their control from almost all indigenous presence. Whatever remnants there remain of indigenous nations who faced settler colonial projects, they are usually organized under forms of autonomy that are completely dependent on the settler state.

Settler societies have violent, even genocidal, tendencies against natives, but they also have a more 'enlightened' bent. A few scholars consider the liberal politics of recognition a form of indigenous elimination through 'assimilation'.[4] This literature has pointed out that the creation of regimes in which the indigenous population gains some sort of political parity with the settlers facilitates the process of settler indigenization, assuages indigenous hostility and frequently opens more land for settler acquisition.

Despite their analytic distinctiveness, colonialism and settler colonialism as modes of domination intertwine and even complement each other. In all historical cases of settler colonialism, the early settlers were backed by a metropole displaying differing levels of commitment to their project. In other cases, the settlers form colonial-like relationships with indigenous people which include heavy labor exploitation and racial segregation regimes. In the American case, where settler colonialism nearly wiped out the native population, a regime of difference and exploitation was enacted until the 1960s over the slave population brought from Africa and their descendants. The entire history of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict features interplays between colonial and settler colonial conjectures;[5] this chapter, however, will focus only on the period after 1948 when Israel, the settler state, was created.

The first Israeli republic, 1948–1967

The Zionist settler colonial movement faced a strong indigenous adversary and less-than-ideal historical and geographic conditions to bring about its demise. In 1948, however, the Zionist settlers managed to expel more than 700,000 Palestinians from a territory over which they created a state.[6] Nevertheless, the Palestinians who were now located just outside of Israel's provisional borders, and in particular the Palestinians not allowed to return to their homes, did not physically cease to exist. With time, this displacement became a major symbolic element in the crystallization of the Palestinians as a nation claiming rightful ownership of Palestine in its entirety.[7] After the Nakba, the Palestinians living in the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and the neighboring Arab states remained a formidable indigenous challenge to the ongoing Zionist settler colonial project.

There was not much that Israel could do to reduce or eliminate this collective. The Palestinian Diaspora remained relatively strong. King Abdallah of Jordan afforded all Palestinians who fell under his control Jordanian citizenship, yet even he and his successors would not actively deny them the right to identify as Palestinians, refugee or not. Other Arab regimes stood up for the national rights of the Palestinians and sponsored Palestinian military formations and cultural organizations dedicated to preserving Palestinian personhood. This they did partially in the context of sustaining their own conflict with Israel but also as propaganda to appease their internal

public opinion, which had been in total solidarity with the Palestinians and detested Israel.[8] Some Arab states inadvertently promoted the Palestinian cause through their inhospitality towards the refugees within their borders, thus closing the possibility of large scale Palestinian assimilation into their own societies.[9] Ultimately, Israel could not fully control the fate of the Palestinians outside its borders and resorted to threatening the Arab states into restraining autonomous Palestinian political and military activity. As will be explained later in the chapter, this policy turned out to have mixed results but for the most part, during almost two decades, the majority of the Palestinians were transformed from a people who posed an existential threat to the Zionist settler colonial project into essentially a border enforcement issue.

There was, however, a second – numerically smaller – constituency of indigenous Palestinians which the settler state had to deal with: the 160,000 or so Palestinians who remained after the war within its borders. In their case, the recently established settler sovereignty afforded more ways to address settler discomfort with the indigenous presence. The overwhelming majority of studies on Israel and its internal population of Palestinians focus on the persecutions and discriminations the latter endured during the earlier decades of the state until present day.[10] Taken together, these studies have proved definitively that, contrary to its self-image, Israel never had a fundamental commitment to upholding basic democratic values and treated the Palestinian Arab minority, at best, as second-class citizens. Without any intention to counter the findings of these studies, here I would like to suggest that the extension of citizenship for Palestinians had immense historical importance for Zionism as a settler project.

Citizenship for the Palestinian Arabs – enshrined in Israel's declaration of independence – had several short-term utilitarian benefits for the settlers: for one, it facilitated the perpetration of the Nakba because it was a powerful administrative tool to discriminate between those Palestinians that were in their own country 'legally' and those who 'illegally infiltrated'.[11] Furthermore, Israel, by granting citizenship, also had a public relations interest to be in good accord with the international community on the eve of its second application for UN membership.[12] Whatever were the short-term and utilitarian Zionist motives for granting citizenship and extending state services to the indigenous community, the longer term effects – from a settler colonial point of view – were perhaps even more beneficial.

The organized Jewish–Zionist settlement of pre-1948 is frequently titled by Israeli historians as 'the state to be' (*ha-medinah shebaderekh*), and for good reason. Under the Yishuv, the pre-state settler community in Palestine, the settlers created highly centralized self-governing institutions and public services which proved vital for its eventual victory in 1948. The Palestinians who came under settler rule as citizens also felt the extension of these institutions in a thrust to capture their bodies, and to a certain extent their minds, on a scale they had not experienced under Ottoman or British rule. They came into contact with a wide array of state organs and their personnel; they were counted, surveyed, received identification documents, were given food stamps, taxed, vaccinated, policed, put to work, thrown in prisons, put in classrooms and placed in the bureaucratic queues. Gradually, in hopes of improving their lot, many Palestinians in Israel chose to work within the category of citizen and used it to engage with the settler state, often in opposition to the government but at the same time in the context of a pragmatic stance that necessitated recognition of the new regime.[13]

The granting of Israeli citizenship and the extension of state services was accompanied by undemocratic and illiberal policies. The most blatant of these was the Military Government – a form of martial law enacted over three geographical regions densely populated by Palestinian citizens. The establishment of the Military Government significantly downgraded the legal and social standing of Palestinian Arabs. Practically, the Military Government provided the Israeli security apparatus unchecked administrative powers within the territories under its control. The

governors were also well involved in nearly every service or policy that the Israeli civic ministries wished to enact within these territories and frequently overruled their decisions. Any decree a military officer made would rarely be subject to any scrutiny from Israel's civilian institutions. Even the Israeli Supreme Court tended to not interfere with the Military Government's 'security considerations'. Within the three jurisdictions of the Military Government, the governor was all-powerful and frequently used his authority to restrict the personal freedoms – particularly the freedom of movement – of individuals and even entire villages and hamlets.[14]

Israel's political and security establishment argued publicly and behind closed doors for the necessity of the Military Government on several accounts. For one, it insisted it had a role in curbing the daily border-crossings of Palestinian Arabs into the state for the purposes of military attacks, repatriation, and, most commonly, theft or retrieval of property. Furthermore, the Military Government, by declaring entire areas closed off to civilians, constricted Palestinian Arab inhabitation and cultivation of land once held by their compatriots and now coveted for Jewish settlement. Another argument in favor of sustaining the Military Government was that through its administrative capacities and its control over government services, it helped the state to keep in check subversive political sentiment and to encourage collaboration with the regime.[15] These last objectives of the Military Government represent arguably the central drive of many settler colonial societies: that of neutralizing possible indigenous threat. The effectiveness of the Military Government in achieving this goal, however, can be questioned.

There were of course many other Israeli institutions which burdened the lives of Palestinians in Israel but the Military Government was undoubtedly the most prominent. Military Government personnel signed off, with hardly any oversight, on orders that determined nearly all aspects of Palestinian daily life: public-service job applications, government bids and concession, work permits, travel requests, the position of *mukhtār* (village head) and more.[16] To be sure, many governors considered themselves as 'fatherly' figures to the population under their control and occasionally intervened on their behalf with the state's civic authorities. In the main, however, the Palestinian denizens and quite a few Jewish Israelis perceived the Military Government and its officers as entirely corrupt.[17] Regardless of its aims, archival evidence and Palestinian sources reveal that the Military Government did not strengthen the power of the state or manufacture a disciplined population. Instead, its policies gave birth to protest and mass demonstrations, some of them violent, with a potential to get out of hand. The Israeli Communist party, which many Zionists thought had constantly crossed the line from opposition to the government to sedition against the state, made much of its political currency from holding an unwavering demand to abolish the Military Government.[18]

Correspondingly, from the early 1950s, leading Zionist politicians and top functionaries were deeply troubled by the effects of arbitrary military rule on the Palestinian minority's political temperament. Especially adamant against the Military Government were the political forces representing the *kibbutzim* and *moshavim* – Zionism's trademark communal agricultural settlements which constituted the Yishuv and the early state's settling spearhead. The committed Zionists who spoke against the Military Government did not only invoke democratic principles and basic human decency; rather, they spoke of the Military Government as a strategic liability, for it nurtured unwanted nationalistic feelings among the Palestinian Arabs. Often they revealed uneasiness with the resemblances between the Military Government and British colonial rule, which was rapidly withdrawing from many of its global territorial possessions. A few key figures in the ruling party even spoke of the need to 'assimilate' the Palestinian Arabs.[19]

The slow downscaling of the Military Government between the years 1948 and 1966 is comparable with other cases in which settler colonialists granted the remnants of the indigenous population rights and a measure of political equality. As mentioned, in all other historical cases

of settler colonialism, these acts of liberalization were part of a historical process of indigenous elimination through 'assimilation'. In the context of the evolution of Zionist settler colonial practice, assimilation took the form of a type of political integration. A thorough assessment on the extent of Palestinian Arab assimilation/integration into the Zionist settler body politic has yet to be written, especially because it was always tentative. Such a study would have to take into consideration that at no time did the early Israeli political leadership ever abolish certain state institutions and policies which unequivocally discriminated against non–Jewish citizens and, furthermore, no mainstream Zionist party ever spoke against sustaining the definition of Israel as a 'Jewish state'. Obviously, in such circumstances, a quick and extensive Palestinian Arab elimination through identification with the state and its institutions could not have occurred. Nevertheless, there is clear evidence that behind the dismantling of the Military Government was a conscious assimilatory drive.[20]

An anecdotal example for the historical impact of Israeli citizenship for Palestinians can be found buried within the protocol of a conversation that took place on 8 October 1966, between David Ben-Gurion, Israel's founding father, and Tewfik Tubi, an Arab Communist Member of Knesset frequently accused by Israeli pundits of being a radical Arab nationalist. The conversation revolved around various aspects of the state's treatment of the Palestinian citizens. It was an opportunity for Tubi to confront the man responsible for many of the injustices the Palestinian constituency was subject to, in particular the Military Government, which Ben-Gurion fiercely upheld for as long as he was in office. After going for some time over the various discriminations Palestinians faced, Tubi uttered his indictment: 'I do not wish to insult [you, Mr. Ben-Gurion], but [we are treated] like "natives". This is the sort of relationship that has been created, Mr. Ben-Gurion'.[21] More fascinating than Tubi's implied accusation that Israel's relationship with the Palestinians was inherently colonial is Tubi's inferred demand to no longer be considered as 'native'. He aimed at settler political rights for his constituency. It would be hard to find a more telling example of settler colonial hegemony.

In the broadest of terms, as the years after 1948 passed, the Palestinians/'Arabs of Israel' became a group mostly preoccupied with political agendas centered on their status as citizens of Israel. Although they harbored bitter feelings towards the state and sustained organic solidarity with the Palestinian Diaspora and the rest of the Arab world, only within a numerically small group did an aggressive nationalist approach develop. Even within this group, there was no willingness for armed insurrection.[22] We cannot say what would have happened if what may be called the first Israeli republic – a state in which all subjects were nominally citizens and where the horizon was that of ultimate political integration – had persevered. In June 1967, this state effectively ceased to exist, and although many of its settler colonial structures endure today, a set of recognizably *colonial* dynamics began to take hold between Israel and a variety of indigenous Palestinian constituencies under its sovereign control.

The first Israeli empire, 1967–1994

After the 1967 War, all the Palestinians in Palestine came under direct Israeli rule. In the Diaspora, the defeat of Arab nationalism in 1967 enabled a revival of a more autonomous Palestinian national movement. This shift was led by the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) now transformed from an Egyptian puppet to an umbrella organization of determined Palestinian combatant groups. The Palestinian leadership established within the Diaspora semi-sovereign territorial bases from which they launched attacks against Israeli civilian and military targets. Nevertheless, the Palestinian inability to challenge the settler project did not fundamentally change. Firstly, the Arab regimes remained, by and large, an inhibiting factor for independent Palestinian

action. In 1970, King Hussein ferociously uprooted a PLO semi-state previously established in Jordan, and then in 1982, an Israeli–Lebanese-Maronite coalition destroyed the PLO's territorial base established in Lebanon. Operating from its headquarters in Tunis thereafter, the PLO's militant operations did not have the same bite.[23] Another major setback for the Palestinian strategy of leading an armed struggle against Israel was Egypt's decision to pursue a peace accord with Israel, thereby taking the most populous and powerful Arab state out of the conflict. Overall, after 1967, the Palestinian national movement continued to make political claims over the entirety of Palestine, yet Israel managed to contain Palestinian diplomacy and organized violence to manageable levels.

It would take two decades for the Palestinians to challenge again settler sovereignty over parts of Palestine, but this change would not come about solely due to the tenacious efforts of the PLO. The Palestinian national movement's 'return' to Palestine was also a result of Israel's very own policies regarding the Palestinians inhabiting the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Whereas, until 1967, Israeli policies towards the Palestinians under its control rendered a putatively hostile indigenous population into a manageable minority community, from 1967 onward, Israel's policies worked – by and large – in the complete opposite direction.

Historically, Zionists always professed an ideological claim to Jerusalem (Zion), the mountainous regions and to Palestine in its entirety.[24] Nevertheless, like many other franchise colonial acquisitions of the modern era, the initial Zionist conquest of the West Bank and Gaza Strip did not begin with an across-the-board intention to claim the entirety of the occupied land.[25] Avi Raz succinctly described the Israeli leadership's initial attitude towards the remnants of Palestine it conquered during the 1967 War as if they were a coveted dowry that came with a most unwanted bride: the Palestinian civilian population inhabiting them. Taken together, Israel's early post-1967 policies fell strictly within these two poles of coveting the land and rejecting its inhabitants, never fully committing to either. On the one hand, Israel annexed Eastern Jerusalem and its adjoining environs, but it would not annex other parts of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. On the other hand, Israel's occupation brought about the expulsion of roughly 300,000 more Palestinians from the territories it occupied, but it did not seal the border between the banks of the Jordan, allowing for the movement of people and goods. Similarly, Israel seemed tentatively willing to discuss – either with Palestinian local leadership or with Jordan – withdrawal from occupied lands, but it preemptively refused at all cost to return to the pre-June 1967 borders, thus condemning diplomacy to failure.[26]

No clear Israeli vision as to the fate of the Territories or its inhabitants emerged during the early post-War Israeli cabinet deliberations; it was a 'decision not to decide'.[27] With no long-term strategy on the table, the personal outlook of individual Israeli functionaries carried monumental historical weight. The highest ranking of those functionaries was Minister of Defense Moshe Dayan – officially the person in charge of administering what we call today the Occupied Territories. The government's inaction together with Dayan's decisiveness paved the way for the emergence and then solidification of an Israeli-Palestinian relationship primarily featuring *colonial* patterns of economy, governance and culture.

Dayan, a former military Chief of Staff (1953–1958) and Minister of Agriculture (1959–1965), held the belief that the Palestinians in Israel should be aggressively even if unequally integrated into Israeli society and political structures.[28] When it came to the Territories, Dayan harbored no maximalist desire for its land and voiced his aversion toward plans that entailed the further permanent absorption of more Palestinian civilians into the Israeli polity. On the other hand, he believed that peaceful coexistence with the Palestinians could and should be reached, a coexistence that would eventually allow Israel to get the best possible future deal with either Jordanian or local Palestinian leadership. To reach this goal of long-term stability, Dayan constantly advocated

for the Palestinians' partial integration with Israel, mainly on an economic basis. This integration would be complemented with an Israeli military administration which would eventually become 'invisible', allowing for the maximal level of Palestinian self-rule, cultural autonomy and freedom of movement into Israel and Jordan.[29]

Subsequent Israeli governments and ministers of defense added their own contributions to this pattern of rule, but the basic structure of the post–1967 Israeli state was thus: one sovereign government residing over two distinct territorial units, each governed by different sets of law, and their populations with vastly different access to influence the actions of said government. Between the two constituencies there was constant movement of goods and manpower which, mirroring the political hierarchy between Israelis and Palestinians, ensured that the economy of the latter would be dependent upon the former. Israel's industrial and agricultural sectors suddenly gained access to a large source of cheap Palestinian labor. The Palestinians in the Occupied Territories were also a nearly perfectly captive and growing market. The political economy of Israel in its expanded borders approximated in some ways that of a nineteenth-century European colonial empire.[30]

To be sure, the economic exploitation of the Occupied Territories and its inhabitants proceeded together with the settler colonial acquisition of land. Many in Israel interpreted the new conquests as the opening of a 'frontier', another nineteenth-century social formation.[31] The government's decision to annex Eastern Jerusalem and parts of the West Bank adjacent to it were based on an Israeli consensus which immediately made a quick agreement with Jordan or the local Palestinian leadership an impossibility.[32] The unilateral annexation also created certain legal precedents and cultural norms that would serve Israeli governments in establishing more settlements throughout the Territories. Leading the way for the settlement of the newly occupied land with Israeli Jews was once again the labor movement, though now only in its more centrist components. Like it was before 1967, Labor Zionist settlement was motivated by nationalist mythologies read into the Bible but also by a more secular, yet vague, notion that Jewish settlement produced tactical and strategic security advantages. Until 1977, Labor governments generally avoided the establishment of settlements on locations densely populated with Palestinians, claiming it could foil a possible agreement with either local Palestinian leadership or the Kingdom of Jordan. After 1977, with the rise of successive Likud-dominated governments, Israel's official policy changed from a tacit willingness to negotiate parts of the Territories to an outright refusal to withdraw from any 'liberated' lands. Concomitantly, the settlement of the Occupied Territories after 1977 became geographically unrestrained.[33]

The very first foot-soldiers of the new settlements were actual soldiers in semi–civilian units whose personnel generally came from the left-wing segments of Israeli society. Gradually, another settlement thrust came from a different segment of the Zionist movement, the religious-nationalists who before the 1967 War were characterized by dovish tendencies. After the 1967 War, and particularly after the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, a more burning messianic sentiment fueled their wish to settle in all parts of the 'Promised Land'.[34] Not unlike their pre-1948 predecessors, the religious nationalists were always an overall minority, yet their pioneering ethos and their physical push into the 'frontier' granted them political power, public funds and cultural capital that far exceeded their actual weight.[35] Another settler group, numerically much larger but not nearly as vocal as the latter, were Israelis who moved to convenient and cheap commuter suburbs within short driving distances of Israel's urban centers.[36]

Frequently, when the term 'settler colonialism' is used as a tool for the study of Zionism, the post–1967 settlement drive is commonly considered as its exemplary.[37] There is some logic to this viewpoint, since settler colonialism can explain major components of the post–1967 Israeli stance. Nevertheless, certain key *consequences* of the post-1967 settlement constitute,

at the very least, an extremely inefficient form of settler colonialism. The fundamental deficiency of the Israeli settlement of the Territories, from a settler-colonial studies perspective, is that this project did very little in terms of indigenous elimination. Simply put, the post–1967 Israeli civilian colonization of the Territories did not entail massive Palestinian depopulation, nor en masse granting of citizenship for Palestinians. In fact, spokesmen of the settler movement often boast that unlike the *kibbutzim*, 'their' settlements were not built on the ruins of Palestinian villages.[38] Furthermore, unlike the early labor-Zionist settlements, many of the post-1967 settlements freely employed Palestinians on their 'property' and contributed to their entrenchment.[39]

The tendency to define the settlement project in the West Bank as an instance of 'settler colonial' practice is also inaccurate, because the settlers who moved their residence from locations within the Green Line into the West Bank or Gaza Strip almost always did so as dedicated Israeli citizens who enjoyed and demanded the full protection of the Israeli authorities. Occasionally, the relationship between the government and the settlers was tense but on the whole, their political motivation, if they had any, mirrored those of the state: to extend Israel's borders without any intention of creating a new settler sovereign entity.[40] Comparatively speaking, the settlers' relationship with the state from which they came from is closer to that of the *pied-noir* in French Algeria than that of, say, the 'Old Three Hundred' who moved from Louisiana to settle in Texas. The latter had no ostensible intention in 1820 to expand the borders of the United States. Therefore, the Jewish settlement in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip fortified Israeli colonial control over these territories. Instead of referring to these settlers as 'settler-colonial', perhaps a better phrasing would be 'colonial-settlers' or just 'colonists'.

In any case, despite the wishes of Israeli statesmen and the colonists, the fate of the Israeli 'empire' was also shaped by those at the bottom of its hierarchy. The Palestinians living in the Territories indeed were not driven out, and unlike the Palestinians in Israel, they were not subject to policies intended to control their daily life and political identification. Their in-betweenness is typical of colonial settings. They remained under the control of the Israeli metropole, were intimately woven into its economy, and yet they were kept in a permanent status of political inferiority, legal discrimination, and economic deprivation.

As with all colonial endeavors, during the very first years of Israeli occupation, the Palestinians in the Territories played the part of the exploited colonial subjects, with the occasional violent flare-up subdued with brutal force. This is quite astonishing considering the fact that the majority of the population in the Occupied Territories were refugees whose grievances against Israel and Zionism had begun decades before. Nevertheless, the Palestinians regarded local political leaders willing to work with the Israeli military authorities as 'collaborators' and displayed an ever-determined sense of loyalty to the exiled PLO leaders. There was, however, not much the PLO could do to effect change, particularly from its exile in Tunisia. The change would come from within the Occupied Territories.

In hindsight, before 1987, the year the First Intifada begun, the possibility of gradual settler colonial incorporation of all the Palestinians of the Territories into an Israeli state was not that far-fetched. Geographically, after 1967, the border between the Israeli and the Territories virtually disappeared. By 1987, 40 per cent of the Palestinian workforce was employed in Israel and had a daily presence in all Israeli civic spaces.[41] Israeli Jews, not to mentioned Palestinian citizens of Israel, frequented Palestinian cities where they could shop at a discount. Some Palestinians gained full Israeli citizenship by marrying 'Israeli Arabs'. In the margins, friendships between employers and employees emerged. In fact, with his ascendance to the Prime ministership, Menachem Begin publicly advocated a path to full Israeli citizenship for willing 'residents' of the Occupied Territories who otherwise would enjoy some form of self-rule under an 'autonomy' (*autonomiah*).[42]

Despite all of this, today we know that other aspects of Israeli control over the Territories had a deeper historical impact.

The defining experiences of the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza Strip after 1967 were not conducive to integration into Israeli society. The Palestinians in the Territories labored in the bustling Israeli urban centers only to be locked for the night in construction sites, or to return at dusk to their homes in squalid refugee camps. They had their muscles examined by construction contractors on the roadsides, were harassed by military authorities and endured collective punishment: mass arrests, curfews and house demolitions. All of this culminated to form popular frustration, like fumes of kerosene waiting for a spark.[43]

That spark came on 9 December 1987, when an Israeli military truck collided with a civilian car in the Jabalia refugee camp in the Gaza Strip, killing four of its passengers. Within weeks, the Palestinians in the Territories established local grassroots resistance organizations guided by a Unified National Leadership capable of sustaining – despite immense Israeli pressures – mass demonstrations, worker strikes, boycotts of the mechanisms of governance, violent attacks on Israeli civilians and soldiers, and the persecution of collaborators. The Palestinians named their uprising the Intifada ('shaking off'), thus denoting that it was the particular situation of occupation at the heart of the uprising. The Intifada demonstrated how 20 years of Israel implementing predominantly colonial policies had made the Palestinians in the Territories a distinct constituency whose immediate interest was an end to the humiliation of colonial rule.

An example of how the conflict since 1967 saw a gradual shift from a settler-colonial dynamic to a colonial one can be found in the PLO's reaction to the Intifada. The exiled PLO leadership was surprised by the independent actions of the Occupied Territories' Unified National Leadership, forcing it to re-orient its politics in order to remain relevant.[44] On 15 November 1988, the PLO took the initiative and declared a Palestinian independent state within the Territories in accordance with UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, explicitly recognizing Israel's pre-1967 borders. Although the declaration mentioned the rights of Palestinians wherever they may be and specifically mentioned the refugees, its central demand was the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Occupied Territories and the subsequent creation of a Palestinian state.

From a colonial perspective, a declaration of intent to form a fully independent state could be considered proof of native confidence and a cause for imperial concern. From a perspective shaped by a settler colonial system of relations, the declaration can be considered Zionism's zenith and the lowest point that the Palestinians ever reached since the beginning of the conflict or, at the very least, second to the Nakba ('catastrophe', the Palestinian name for the ethnic cleansing of 1948). The declaration refuted the legitimacy of the Israeli 'empire' but recognized that of the Israeli Republic. What more could Zionists hope for than the indigenous peoples' recognition of their sovereignty over the majority of the territory of Palestine?

After 1994

The PLO's declaration of independence was only a symbolic act, but it produced a shift in Israeli and, most importantly, American attitudes towards the Palestinian national movement. In 1992, Israelis, fatigued by the Intifada, elected a Labor-led government which did not recognize a Palestinian right for state but agreed to negotiate with the PLO as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, recognizing the PLO and recognizing Palestinian nationhood. In 1994, Israel permitted the return of the exiled leadership from Tunisia and oversaw the formation of the Palestinian Authority (PA), to which it delegated restricted control over parts of the territories. The accords signed between the two sides consistently emphasized their anticipation for a 'final status' agreement. This agreement has not yet been signed.

From the get-go, the 'Oslo Process' was susceptible to the actions of those who desired its demise. On the Palestinian side, it was those who saw in Oslo their indigenous aspirations bargained away for 22 per cent of their homeland upon which a corrupt post-colonial elite would form a puppet statelet.[45] From the Israeli side, the Jewish settlers and their supporters on the Right argued against a Palestinian state, pointing to the strategic liability and ideological betrayal that territorial withdrawal would mean.[46] The two formed a powerful unofficial coalition, their respective popularity rising with every hostile action the other side committed. The Palestinian opposition resisted settler colonial consolidation, and the Jewish settlers opposed decolonization. In this case, they were one and the same.

These two groups challenged the Palestinian and Israeli leaderships' ability to turn their half-hearted goodwill into political action. Add to that the miscalculations of the individual decision makers, and the result was the reigniting in September 2000 of a second Intifada. On the eve of its outbreak, the Palestinians enjoyed international recognition and a measure of self-rule; nevertheless, the second Intifada too was primarily born from the conditions of Israel's continued expansion of settlements and lack of commitment to end colonial control over Palestinians.[47] This time, however, the Palestinians took advantage of their islets of semi-sovereignty and projected violence far more lethal than that of the first Intifada. Israel's crackdown was also harsh and even deadlier. Undoubtedly, some on the Palestinian side wished to prove to Israelis that the continued colonial control was not worth their efforts. Other Palestinian factions claimed that deadly attacks were aimed at disintegrating Israeli society all together.[48] In Israel, there hardly was any distinction between the two, and an all-out 'recolonization' of the Territories ensued.[49] Israel refrained from respecting the Palestinian Authority's territoriality and reinforced its military presence throughout the Occupied Territories. Whereas Moshe Dayan's initial expectation was that the 'Arabs [should] not encounter a single Israeli soldier', during the 2000s, Palestinian freedom of movement within and outside of the Territories was suffocated by dozens of army checkpoints and barricades.[50]

The colonization and recolonization of the Territories also had adverse effects on the previous 'achievements' of the Zionist settler colonial project, particularly with regards to the functional integration of the Palestinian citizens of Israel. The recent re-enforcement of 'Jewishness' in Israel is not merely the implementation of Zionist ideology; it is a discourse forged within nearly five decades of colonial control over the Territories. This emphasis could not but come at the expense of Zionism's practical commitment to universal principles. The onset of the 'Palestinization' of the 'Arabs of Israel' has to be credited, to some extent, not to Zionism per se but to the type of colonialist Zionism that characterized the years following 1967, and more so, the year 2000. Nevertheless, despite 'Palestinization', the Palestinians in Israel, even during the height of the second Intifada, did not produce a violent reaction to Zionism as those living on the other side of the colonial divide. More politically vocal and less acquiescent, the Palestinians in Israel are still an example of the powerful integrationist tendencies characterizing settler colonial movements.

Five years of blood-letting and destruction (far more costly on the Palestinian side in terms of lives and livelihood) convinced the two sides, after they attained some achievements, to show restraint. The Israeli security apparatus succeeded in containing Palestinian ability and willingness to continue deadly suicide bombings in Israel's urban centers. On the other hand, Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon decided in 2004 to ostensibly, even if not substantially, 'decolonize' from the Gaza Strip without demanding anything from the Palestinians in return. This move by an Israeli political figure who devoted his life to the settlement of the Territories was perceived by the Palestinians (and by many Israelis) as a victory of armed resistance.[51]

Since 2005, a détente between colonizer and colonized, punctured by occasional acts of violence, emerged. The Palestinian Authority, though severely weakened, manages to administer and

police parts of the West Bank without posing any significant challenges to Israel's ultimate control and, in fact, enabling it. Israel pays occasional lip service to the prospect of ultimate decolonization (the 'two state solution') without seriously curbing the settler population's growth and general territorial expansion into the West Bank. In the Gaza Strip, the Islamic Resistance Movement, Hamas, has taken all effective control away from the PA. Since Israel's withdrawal, three instances of armed confrontation have occurred in Gaza, but the leaders on both sides are careful not to cross a certain line. For Israelis, maintaining a colonial form of rule over a belligerent population has its price. However, many in Israel, judging from successive election results, seem to be more or less content with the status quo. Ordinary Palestinians, who live under a multi-layered colonial regime which occasionally kills them by the thousands, are less content.

The events and processes surveyed in this brief account of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are not merely a product of the clash between Zionist and Palestinian 'ideology' or 'identity'. Indeed, ideologies and identities make up the prisms through which Israelis and Palestinians understand their situation and justify their actions, yet these were contingent upon dynamic historical circumstances. Contrary to the current historiographic tendency to stress consistent patterns throughout the time-period of the conflict, it is useful to regard 1967 as a turning point, marking the beginning of a gradual yet pivotal decline of settler colonial historical patterns and the ascendancy of predominately colonial ones.[52]

Despite the usefulness of examining the history of the conflict using insights from colonial studies *and* settler colonial studies, neither analytical framework possesses powers of prediction. At the same time, the framing of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in these terms does allow us to make some intelligent guesses about the sustainability of certain structures and institutions. Colonialism has left an indelible mark on humanity, and its implications endure today, yet nowadays there exists no political regime on the face of the planet which officially propagates such severe political and legal hierarchy between two (or more) rigidly defined constituencies such as the one existing in Israel's enlarged borders. It is safe to assume that eventually this regime will end, but the question is: on whose terms?

Since the early 1990s, the international community's vision for decolonization was 'the two state solution': two states, 'Israel' and 'Palestine', living peacefully side by side. Had this vision been implemented through bilateral agreements, Israel might have been compelled to repatriate some refugees and compensate others, withdraw from the entirety of the West Bank, and forfeit its singular rule over Jerusalem. In return, it may then have abstained from propping up a regime which has been, for some time, a fertile breeding ground for a belligerent Palestinian constituency. This would have been the settler colonial route.

Another possible route is represented by a growing nonviolent political movement – particularly popular with Western undergraduates and their professors – calling for political, economic and cultural disassociation from Israel under the umbrella slogan 'Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions' (BDS). This movement forwards a demand that Israel abandons its colonial assets but also that it fundamentally reforms the characteristics of the settler colonial project it sustains within Israel proper. This includes a demand to end all forms of discrimination against the Palestinian citizens and the recognition, and even promotion, of the Palestinian refugees and their descendants' right to repatriate in Israeli territory.

Although nonviolent grassroots tactics have proven capabilities to dislodge powerful regimes based on ethnic hierarchy, it has yet to gain a critical following with the occupied Palestinians, whose leaders still prefer to interact with Israel through either diplomatic wheeling and dealing and/or armed struggle. BDS could perhaps receive some help from unexpected sources, represented by figures such as Israeli Minister of Defense, Moshe Yaalon. Yaalon is known for his wish to 'sear into [the Palestinian] consciousness' the notion that Israel cannot be defeated

through the use of violence.[53] What Yaalon and others might not take into consideration is that if this goal is achieved, and Palestinians realize that Israeli colonialism is uniquely resilient, then it is hard to think of an alternative to the type of struggle waged by BDS. Should this scenario play out, it might follow similar lines to the anti–Apartheid struggle in South Africa, where the African National Congress did not demand an end to the settler presence but rather complete political equality. Although the anti–Apartheid campaign was largely successful, post-Apartheid South Africa could be in many ways understood as a consolidated settler colonial society: the whites remained put and retained to a large extent their material privileges. A fully democratic or bi-national regime in Israel/Palestine may still be considered a settler colonial victory. Nevertheless, it is doubtful this is what Yaalon and other representatives of the Israeli Right have in mind when dreaming of Zionism's 'triumph'.

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PART V

Australasia

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INTRODUCTION TO PART V

Edward Cavanagh

Introduction

Penelope Edmonds and Jane Carey open the final part of this *Handbook* with their chapter on the history of settler colonialism in nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Australia. Violence and disavowal marked the beginnings of British rule after 1788. Yet, as the authors argue, stronger emphasis can be placed on the resistance of indigenous communities during the period of convict society's transformation into settler society in the middle decades of the nineteenth century. This chapter also issues a call to historians of Australia and settler colonialism in general to recognise the profoundly gendered nature of what they call the 'settler revolution'.

Across the Tasman Sea, the British occupation of Aotearoa New Zealand commenced in the early decades of the nineteenth century and intensified in the latter half of that century, as Richard Hill's chapter explains. In the two decades following the Treaty of Waitangi of 1840, large tracts of land were transferred from Maori to a growing population of *pakeha* (settlers). These 'frontiers' became sites of conflict, especially during the 1860s. Following the pacification of Maori rebellions in the North Island and the discovery of gold in the South Island, new schemes were rolled out to develop the country's infrastructure and to attract new settlers. By the end of the nineteenth century, the settlers of New Zealand enjoyed a strong foothold in the country. The Maori population was, as Hill puts it, 'swamped'.

In the next chapter, David Chappell explores the history of French New Caledonia. During the second half of the nineteenth century, a settler society and a convict society coexisted on the mainland. The Algerian–inspired colonial system known as the *Indigenát* was adopted in 1887, which separated indigenous Melanesian communities legally and spatially from Europeans in New Caledonia. The policy would not be repealed until 1946, as part of a series of concessions and reforms overseen by the French government. Ultimately, the partial decolonisation of New Caledonia was sanctioned by the Matignon Accords of 1988. As Chappell reveals, attempts to 'rebalance' relationships between settlers and Kanaks remain ongoing.

Sarah Maddison's chapter focuses on Australian settler colonialism during the second half of the twentieth century. Assimilation and absorption were the defining characteristics of state policies towards indigenous communities since the Federation of 1901. Aboriginal demands for equality, at first, then land rights and ultimately sovereignty profoundly influenced the nature of Australian politics between the late 1960s and the 1990s. The official response of the settler state,

Maddison reveals, was markedly ambivalent, and the embrace of 'reconciliation' has inspired a discourse of apology but not a commitment to reparation.

A telling comparison may be made with contemporary Aotearoa New Zealand and its official commitment to biculturalism. Felicity Barnes provides this perspective in the final chapter of the *Handbook*, as she explores the definition of settler *pakeha* identity against British and Maori identities over the course of the twentieth century. Her chapter unpacks three settler milestones: the creation of the Dominion of New Zealand in 1907, the centennial celebrations of the Treaty of Waitangi and the British Empire in 1940, and the creation and celebration of national 'New Zealand Day' in 1974. These episodes foreground Barnes' analysis of New Zealand settler colonialism.

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AUSTRALIAN SETTLER COLONIALISM OVER THE LONG NINETEENTH CENTURY

Penelope Edmonds and Jane Carey

Australia has been inhabited for at least 50,000 years by diverse groups of Aboriginal peoples. The Dreaming explains that Aboriginal people were created here by powerful ancestral spirits who continue to inhabit the landscape. They are the world's oldest continuous culture.[1] Australia's settler colonial history, commencing in 1788, therefore marks only a tiny fraction of its past. Yet when settlers came to stay in Australia, they did so with devastating impact. Although colonization progressed unevenly across the continent and was met with fierce Aboriginal resistance, over the course of the nineteenth century, the British would lay claim to the vast majority of the land. The widely, if erroneously, cited extinction of Tasmania's Aboriginal people and the apparent vigour of the wealthy 'white/British' colonies which emerged quickly became the twin popular representations of the settler project in Australia.

This history of settler colonization in Australia has produced a rich and diverse scholarship, some of which has been explicitly concerned with understanding settler colonialism as a broader phenomenon. The Australian example – and Australian scholarship – has offered a key paradigm for the field of settler colonial studies. The rapacious tenor of settler invasion and aggressively administered systems of assimilation have contributed to the Australian case being frequently presented as the premier exemplar for settler colonialism, the model against which other racialized settler-colonial enterprises are measured. At the same time, this model has been the subject of critique and controversy since its inception, especially in relation to questions of Aboriginal resistance and agency.[2] The widely cited 'logic of elimination' thesis coined by Patrick Wolfe describes settler ambitions (to first remove Indigenous people from the land and then replace them) that were never entirely realized. The 'elimination of the native' has not occurred, as the continuing strength of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities in 'post-colonial' Australia clearly attests.[3] Nevertheless, the struggle for Indigenous rights, recognition, sovereignty and genuine reconciliatory futures continues in the face of the settler project, the endpoint of which remains remote, a perpetually 'vanishing endpoint'.[4]

In this chapter, we outline the Australian history of settler invasion and establishment of a settler state over the long nineteenth century. We draw on key and new historical work in this field and, at the same time, highlight areas that have received less critical attention. First, in seeking to trace the history of settler colonialism's distinctive operations and effects in Australia, we

highlight how this was confounded by Indigenous resistance, experience and agency. Second, we attend to the scholarship's neglect of women, gender and whiteness in the politics of reproduction in the construction of a white settler polity. The politics of reproduction is a crucial but too often understudied aspect of what James Belich has termed the 'settler revolution'.[5] We explore these vital areas for future work and suggest that Australian settler-colonial histories might be invigorated by greater attention to gender, mixed relations and the questions of settler biopolitics.

Australian histories of settler invasion and Aboriginal resistance

On 13 May 1787, 11 ships set sail from Portsmouth to establish a military penal settlement in what would become New South Wales, the first British colony in Australia. They were carrying some 780 convicts and around 600 military personnel, officials, ships' crews and a small number of their wives and children.[6] The ships, which became known as the First Fleet, arrived at Botany Bay, just south of what is now Sydney Harbour, between 18 January and 20 January 1788. The land on this eastern seaboard had been claimed for Britain by James Cook during his voyage of exploration to the Pacific in 1770.[7] The majority of the people on the First Fleet were British.[8] The convicts had received sentences of transportation for seven years, 14 years or for the term of their natural lives.[9] They were overwhelmingly male – this imbalance would have profound consequences.

The members of the First Fleet were not the first humans to settle in Australia. Best estimates are that between 770,000 and 1.1 million Indigenous Australians occupied the continent just prior to British arrival.[10] They constituted around 250 language groups and 500 nations or clans across the vast continent.[11] Some groups moved around with the seasons and within a set territory. Others were more 'settled'. Rich worlds of contact, exchange, trade and, sometimes, conflict existed between these Aboriginal nations. Contrary to the widespread belief that Australian Aboriginal people were both primitive and isolated, contacts with 'outsiders' were also maintained across the northern coasts of the continent, particularly with Southeast Asia but some also with Pacific islands to the east.[12] From at the least the mid-1600s, and escalating in the eighteenth century, trepangers from Macassar (present-day Sulawesi) visited various sites across the north, developing relationships with communities they returned to annually in their hunt for sea cucumbers. Some Aboriginal men joined the crews of these ships and travelled to Macassar. A few remained there.[13] Along Australia's southern shores, from the early nineteenth century, circuits of sealing and whaling moved east along the coast, past King George's Sound, now Albany in Western Australia, and Victoria to Tasmania and then into the Tasman Sea across to Aotearoa New Zealand, taking with it Aboriginal sealers and whalers, as well as Aboriginal women.[14] These maritime circuits created extended cross-cultural family networks stretching across the southern oceans, trade and contact relationships that predate the hard binary of Aboriginal/British relations that is so often viewed as the starting point for contact relations in Australia.

Aboriginal ways of life were as diverse as the landscape and shaped by the natural environment. The land was also the source of spiritual life and of complex systems of law and lore. Indigenous peoples systematically managed the land in a vast array of different ways in response to radically different environments.[15] Creating what has been described as the 'biggest estate on earth', this management ensured that resources, particularly food, would be 'abundant, convenient and predictable'.[16]

Aboriginal people have never ceded their sovereignty. The British government was well aware of the presence of Aboriginal people when they first set out to establish the colony in 1787, but this did not equate to recognition of any ownership they might hold over the territory.[17] They proceeded as if the land was *terra nullius* – 'land that belongs to no one'. Yet no one – least of all

Arthur Phillip, the first British Governor of the Colony of New Wales – imagined that Australia was in fact uninhabited. To the contrary, the letter Phillip bore from the King explicitly referred to Aboriginal people and gave him instructions about policy towards them. Newcomers to the convict settlement were directed to 'endeavour by every possible means to open an Intercourse with the Savages Natives [*sic*] and to conciliate their affections, enjoining all Our Subjects to live in amity and kindness with them'. Philip was instructed to discipline anyone who contravened this edict and asked to provide advice as to how best to turn negotiations to the 'advantage' of Britain.[18]

Australia was unique in that no treaties were ever formalized by the British with Aboriginal peoples, marking a distinct departure from the longstanding practice of treaty making between European and Indigenous groups in North America.[19] Although there were debates around the question of Aboriginal sovereignty over the land, in practice it was not acknowledged. Some short-lived agreements were made on colonial frontiers, yet there was only one failed attempt at a formal treaty – the Batman 'treaty' of 1835 – and this was conducted by a private association of entrepreneurial colonists. John Batman, head of the entrepreneurial Port Phillip Association (a group of investors in pastoral activities) apparently negotiated with Kulin elders for the purchase of land in the region of what would soon become the greater city of Melbourne.[20] This action contravened the Crown's claim to blanket sovereignty over all land. As a result, the treaty was quickly declared null and void and the Port Phillip settlement deemed to be illegal.

This absence of a treaty reveals the empty promise of colonial intentions for 'honourable colonization' and continues to underscore the illegitimacy of the nominally postcolonial settler state in Australia.[21] Yet even though Britain declared Australia unpeopled and therefore unreservedly open to immigrant populations, its initial efforts at colonization were unsystematic and fiercely resisted by Indigenous people. Australia's future as a site of large-scale British immigration, and the concomitant expropriation of Aboriginal lands, was by no means clear in the early phases of convict colonization. Indeed, the colonists came close to starvation more than once in the first few years of the settlement.[22] By 1800, the non-Indigenous population of the Sydney settlement (Port Jackson) was still only 5,217, and it did not exceed 20,000 until 1818. The second settlement site in at Risdon Cove in Van Diemen's Land (now Tasmania) was founded with a population of just 177 in 1803.[23] Convicts, including those who had completed their terms, made up the overwhelming majority of the early colonial population. By 1830, only 15,700 free migrants had come to Australia.[24] Moreover, British invasion progressed unevenly across the continent, with some Aboriginal communities in far northern, northwestern and central Australia remaining largely untouched until the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Nevertheless, aggressive frontiers of settlement and the occupation of Aboriginal lands moved steadily from the initial military settlement in Sydney. By the close of the nineteenth century, British colonists had claimed the continent and occupied much of the land. Formal British settlement spread to the island of Van Diemen's Land (1803), to the Swan River colony in Western Australia (1829) and then to South Australia (1836). In the 1830s, the colony of New South Wales spread to incorporate the southern Port Phillip region, which would later become the separate colony of Victoria (1851) and north to the regions that would become Queensland (1859).[25]

Extensive settler incursion into Aboriginal lands was met with Aboriginal resistance across the new regions of settlement, frequently resulting in the frontier homicide of many Aboriginal groups.[26] Aboriginal resistance to the British occupation began almost immediately. In December 1790, Pemulwuy, Aboriginal resistance fighter and one of the leaders of the Dharug people, speared Governor Phillip's gamekeeper, who later died of the wound. Pemulwuy led raids against settlers and ambushed exploration and foraging parties, from 1792 until his death in 1802.[27] Dharug attacks were so intense in May 1795 that officials feared the fertile lands of the Hawkesbury

would have to be abandoned. A New South Wales military detachment was deployed there, with orders to shoot any Aboriginal person on site and to hang the bodies from gibbets as a warning to others. Further Aboriginal resistance led officials to place a large military garrison there, second only in size to that in Sydney.[28] On 1 May 1801, Governor King issued a general order that Aborigines near Parramatta, Georges River and Prospect could be shot on sight, and in November a proclamation outlawed Pemulwuy and offered a reward for his death or capture. He was shot dead the following year.

Effective Aboriginal guerrilla fighting continued as settlers progressively appropriated the lands and food sources of Indigenous peoples all around the continent. Aboriginal resistance and violent land wars interrupted the process of settler land acquisition. In early New South Wales, on the pastoral frontier in the surrounding region of Sydney, a brutal frontier war raged. The Eora lands of the Sydney region were bounded by the Kuringai to the north, the Dharug to the west and the Darawhal and Gandangara to the south. Settlers rapidly pushed northwest and southwest into these areas, known to them as the Cumberland plains, in pursuit of more fertile farmlands along the Parramatta and Hawkesbury rivers.[29] Often conducting guerrilla-style warfare, Aboriginal people raided farms and killed sheep and cattle as the growing number of colonists occupied increasing amounts of Aboriginal land.

Many colonists openly described frontier conflict as war. In New South Wales, extensive conflict resumed when the British expanded further inland. As settlers crossed west over the Blue Mountains onto the Bathurst Plains, they were attacked by Wiradjuri warriors, including the Aboriginal resistance fighter Windradyne, who killed or wounded stock-keepers and damaged stock. Governor Thomas Brisbane (1822–1825) proclaimed martial law on 14 August 1824 on the Bathurst Plains after some of the most violent frontier incidents of the period, including the killing of seven stockmen by Aborigines in the ranges north of Bathurst and the murder of Aboriginal women and children by settler-vigilantes in May 1824.[30] The *Sydney Gazette* announced 'Bathurst with its surrounding vicinity is engaged in an exterminating war'.[31]

In Tasmania, the 'Black War' continued for over a decade, and martial law was enacted from 1828 to 1832. In 1828, Lieutenant Governor Arthur referred to this as the 'wretched warfare', and Aboriginal groups used guerrrila tactics including fire to burn settler huts and crops and attacked settlers who had invaded their lands.[32] By November 1828, amid a climate of escalating frontier violence, Arthur declared martial law against the 'Black or Aboriginal natives' within the settled districts of the island due to settler pressure to respond to increasing incidents of Aboriginal attack. Settlers retaliated aggressively, often with firearms.[33] Renewed research has begun to reveal in detail the prevalence of massacres of Aboriginal groups by vigilante settler groups, often in early morning raids, across the island.[34] Settler fear was intense; some sought to give up their land grants.

In 1830, Arthur launched a massive operation known as the 'Black Line', involving around 10 per cent of the colony's population, whereby civilian, police and military detachments moved through the 'settled' areas and drove Aboriginal people out. This 15-month military-style campaign as part of the 'Black War' was the largest force ever assembled against Aboriginal people in Australia.[35] After years of extensive frontier violence and the 'grim success' of this violent line, Aboriginal survivors were effectively incarcerated at a reserve on Flinders Island in the Bass Strait. By 1847, the number of Indigenous people on the island had plummeted to just 47, from an estimated original population of 6,000 to 8,000. The group was relocated again, this time to Oyster Cove on the Tasmanian mainland, but the community continued to decline. Thus, as Lyndall Ryan has noted, the original Tasmanian Aboriginal population was 'nearly wiped off the face of the earth within a generation'.[36] Tasmania quickly became infamous for the extent of this violent destruction. Truganini, often referred to as 'the last' Aboriginal Tasmanian, died in

1876. For much of the late nineteenth and twentieth century, she endured in the settler historical imagination as a symbol of an 'extinct race'. At the time, the Tasmanian 'extermination' was certainly part of a broader phenomenon of extinction narratives and a belief that 'native' races would naturally die out, which pervaded settler societies in this period.[37] Such extinction narratives serve a political purpose in settler societies, to both forget and move on from violence and to nullify current political claims by living Aboriginal people. Since the early twentieth century, however, Aboriginal people have asserted their identity and refuted the powerful narratives of Aboriginal extinction that endured for so long.[38] The case of Tasmania has also produced considerable debate among historians over the question of whether settler colonies are inherently genocidal.[39] For scholar Ann Curthoys, the paradox remains, as she rightly points out, that while a Tasmanian genocide has been internationally accepted, in Australia, such a characterization has rarely been adopted and is the subject of denial and debate.[40]

From the small colony of Tasmania, settlers' eyes soon turned to the abundant lands across Bass Strait. Despite the nullification of the attempted Batman treaty and a proclamation by NSW Governor Richard Bourke to deter land grabbing, it was impossible to stem the tide of settlers to new pastoral lands at Port Phillip, even though it was outside the limits of authorized settlement. By the 1840s, large numbers of settlers had arrived and rapidly outnumbered the Aboriginal population. Again, Aboriginal peoples resisted, and guerrilla warfare reached a peak in the Western Districts in the 1840s. Aboriginal groups disrupted stock routes, broke the legs of sheep and cattle, and made surprise attacks on shepherds' huts and squatters' homes, sometimes burning them and taking goods. They often killed hut keepers, especially those who were known to have abused Aboriginal women. European reprisals were often swift and vicious but carried out covertly.[41]

State-sanctioned retributive violence against Aboriginal peoples served to pacify them and open new lands for settlers. Moreover, the implementation of martial law served to formalize the frontier as a 'legal space of violence' and was thus crucial to the furtherance of the settler project, as Julie Evans has argued.[42] Out of the very many known massacres across Australia, the 1838 Myall creek massacre in northwestern New South Wales of at least 30 Weraerai (Wirrayaraay) Aboriginal people stands out. Unlike many other similar events, this is well documented. These people, mainly women, children and older men, were camping peacefully at the Myall Creek station when they were rounded up by 11 white stockmen and killed, their bodies decapitated and burned. In December 1838, despite intense public outcry, and after a second trial, seven white men were hanged. This was one of the few instances when white men were tried, convicted and hanged for the mass-killing of Aboriginal people.[43] As Tracey Banivanua Mar and Penelope Edmonds have argued elsewhere, the Myall Creek trials highlighted the opposing forces that would govern race relations in the Australian colonies of the remainder of the nineteenth century. While humanitarians emphasized the 'moral imperatives of a humane colonisation, pastoralists and agriculturalists insisted on access to cheap labour and land'.[44] Colonial governors could articulate broad humanitarian precepts yet condone violence and, indeed, effectively outsource it to settlers, militia and other groups.

Frontier violence was not the only cause of the tragic number of Aboriginal deaths. Repeating the familiar pattern experienced by Indigenous peoples of the Americas from the sixteenth century, European disease inevitably accompanied the violent European invasion of Australia. In 1789, for instance, the Aboriginal populations in the Sydney region were devastated by smallpox. Some scholars estimate that up to 80 per cent of the population died, causing major social and cultural disruption. There is considerable debate as to whether this outbreak was the result of deliberate 'germ warfare' on the part of the colonists.[45] However it began, this pattern of devastation via disease was repeated around the coastal fringes of Australia and later the interior.[46]

Gendered violence was also a significant feature of the Australian frontier wars and the spread of European settlement. Sexualized, racist violence impacted many Aboriginal women's daily lives.[47] The widespread sexual abuse of Australian Aboriginal women on the wider colonial pastoral frontier has been extensively explored, and the association between lands to be colonized and Aboriginal women's bodies has long been established.[48] The work of feminist historians has now well established that the study of the colonial frontier, sex, race and fears of miscegenation provides an essential, critical contour of settler-colonial relations in Australia. In settler colonies, such intimate relations were not merely 'reflective of but were constitutive of colonialism'.[49] While affective and intimate relations could also be a site of survival and resistance, they would also become, as Ann Stoler has maintained, formative in the 'making of racial categories and in the management of imperial rule'.[50] Moreover, as Wolfe has noted, the outcomes of this ran counter to the 'logic of elimination' as these relations produced children who were raised by their Aboriginal mothers and increased the Aboriginal population.[51]

While land was certainly the primary objective, at times, Aboriginal labour was also essential to the realization of settler ambitions. In the early pastoral, sheep and cattle industries, this labour was essential to building the foundations that would secure Australia's economic future. The demand for labour in nineteenth-century Queensland was such that, from 1863–1901, around 60,000 men, women and children from diverse islands in the southwestern Pacific were recruited as indentured labourers in the burgeoning sugar industry. Many of these workers were kidnapped or 'blackbirded' from their homes. All experienced exploitative and violent working conditions.[52]

Frontier violence continued across the continent for at least another century. In Queensland in 1845, Dundalli of the Dalla people emerged as a guerrilla leader bringing together the people of Wide Bay and Moreton Bay to fight the spreading settlement. For over a decade, he orchestrated a series of highly successful attacks and evaded capture by continually moving into new regions where he was not known.[53] In north-central Queensland, guerrilla resistance continued into the 1890s, most notably by the Kalkadoon warriors.[54] At the same time, in the Kimberley region in northwest Australia, the Bunuba people mounted a highly organized revolt led by Jandamarra.[55] The last officially acknowledged massacre in Coniston, Northern Territory, occurred from 14 August to 18 October 1928. Historians estimate that at least 60 and possibly as many as 110 Warlpiri, Anmatyerre and Kaytetye men, women and children were killed.[56]

The 'pacification' of Aboriginal peoples in New South Wales in the 1830s, and later in Queensland from the 1860s, was effected, in part, through the formation of mounted police corps. They were joined by the Native Police Force, first formed in the Port Phillip district in 1837. These forces often recruited Aboriginal men from different areas and deployed them in places distant from their own country, so they were not involved in conflicts with their own people. The Native Mounted Police force formed in 1848 by the New South Wales Government in the region of what would become Queensland became by far the largest and most infamous. They were 'notorious throughout Queensland as the blunt instrument of land-clearing settlers', as Banivanua Mar has noted.[57] Jonathon Richards has documented 85 Native Police barracks established across Queensland between 1859 and 1898 as the frontier war advanced.[58] These forces were almost entirely used for punitive actions and commonly performed deadly daybreak attacks on Aboriginal camps. They were one of the key weapons in the Queensland wars. The last Native Police camps were closed in 1905.

Humanitarianism, Christian colonization and responsible government

The rapid invasion and appropriation of Aboriginal lands coincided with the humanitarian turn in British imperial politics. There were increased calls by abolitionist and evangelical humanitarians for a 'humane' or Christian colonization and the protection and civilization of Aboriginal

peoples, especially in the 1830s and 1840s. In 1835, Great Britain's House of Commons estab-lished a Select Committee on Aboriginal Tribes in British Settlements. The Committee's report included recommendations to 'protect' Indigenous peoples in southeastern Australia from 'over-straiters' from Van Diemen's Land and others who had established unauthorized settlements. It was hoped that the establishment of Aboriginal Protectorates would avert the violent clashes that had marked the history of the earlier colonies of New South Wales and Van Diemen's Land. Rec-ommendations for the Australian colonies included the reservation of lands so that Aborigines could continue as huntsmen until tilling the soil ceased to be 'distasteful' to them, education of their children, increased funds for missionaries and protectors and, if necessary, the prosecution of the settlers.[59] Historians who have summarized the report have noted that it was characterized by noble idealism but a lack of appreciation for the realities of frontier life. In general, the report's recommendations were minimal compared to its broad scope of investigation, and over the next century of British expansionism its recommendations regarding the recognition of Indigenous peoples' legal rights were largely ignored. The protectors were to promote the well-being of Aborigines and to represent their interests to the colonial executive or the British government. In addition to physically protecting the Aborigines, they were to civilize them, educate them, convert them to Christianity and instruct them in agriculture and the building of houses.[60]

Alan Lester and Fae Dussart have highlighted the apparent paradox of British humanitarianism being coterminous with aggressively expanding settlement in the Australian colonies.[61] By the 1830s, humanitarian precepts had gained influence throughout the British colonies, resulting in the establishment of the Aborigines' Protection Society in 1837. Yet in both metropolitan and colonial governing circles, humanitarians generally did not oppose colonization but increasingly promoted a benevolent or 'Christian colonization', a civilizing mission of moral enlightenment.[62] Many expatriate Britons challenged this model through an emerging assertion of 'settler' rights and entitlements. The doctrine of supercessionism – the notion that settlers had a right to replace indigenes – was promoted, based on claims of British moral and racial superiority. In 1836, the South Australian Association (the private company set up to establish the colony of South Australia) appointed Aboriginal Protectors and also used humanitarian claims to promote its endeavour, noting that 'far from being an invasion of the rights of Aborigines', South Australia would be settled by 'industrious and virtuous settlers' who would protect Aboriginal people from 'pirates, squatters and runaway convicts'.[63] Ultimately, however, Aboriginal peoples were dispossessed in a similar manner to those in other colonies and their rights disregarded. In 1838, the experimental Port Phillip Protectorate, instigated by Great Britain's House of Lords, was established based on the recommendations from the 1837 report of the Select Committee on the Aboriginal Tribes. By 1849, the Port Phillip Protectorate was closed and was generally con-sidered to be a failure. Suffering from a lack of government support and funds and little or no assistance from the police, the protectors suffered constant frustrations. Opponents described the protectorate as a waste of government funds, and journalists frequently derided the protectors. The *Sydney Morning Herald* described them as 'the whining crew who infest the colony' and noted with disdain that the 'aborigines are not worth saving'.[64]

By the 1850s, humanitarian sentiments had begun to wane, and less radical and more reac-tionary views that did not privilege Aboriginal peoples over settlers prevailed. With increased immigration came settler land hunger and increasingly strident calls of white settlers on their entitlement to take up lands. Strategies of protection could too easily turn to regulation, surveil-lance and the spatial incarceration of Aboriginal peoples. Indeed, scholars have more recently illuminated the ways in which strategies for a benevolent empire were ultimately tied to securing the colonial order and the central goal of colonial state-building. The rhetoric of protection and civilization, along with ideas of reparation, offered Australian settler colonialism a benign face.[65]

By the 1850s, most of the colonies moved towards responsible government, marking a shift from imperial to settler control of colonies and the associated governance and regulation of Indigenous peoples.

In Australia, the rise of self-governing settler states often permitted and enabled new forms of organized legal violence (martial law, native police, child removal) against Aboriginal peoples deemed nonsovereign in their own lands. As historian Ann Curthoys has observed, when the imperial government gave responsible government to the colonies, it was a way to keep 'potentially resistive settler colonies within the realm', but it also served to transfer most of the costs of government 'from the metropole to settlers themselves'.[66] In this way, the colonial office 'surrendered responsibility for the Aborigines to the very colonists whom they had frequently accused of trying to exterminate the tribes they encountered', writes historian Henry Reynolds.[67] Curthoys registers the 'double character' of this shift – a diminution of Indigenous rights and sovereignty was entwined with the expansion of rights to settlers in the consolidation and shoring up of settler sovereignty. In other words, settler democracy denied and came at the expense of Aboriginal agency, liberty and sovereignty.

Legislative regimes: 'protection', segregation and the Stolen Generations

Once they had achieved responsible government, and with the so-called closure of the frontiers, colonial governments turned their attention to controlling Indigenous people by legislation and increasing the level of bureaucracy.[68] Authorities sought to 'protect' Indigenous peoples by either segregating them away from the settler population or by assimilating them into it. Protection Boards and Protection Acts formed the legislative base for ever-increasing control over many aspects of Indigenous lives. Although protection policies differed across the Australian colonies, by the twentieth century, legislation and policy controlled where most Indigenous people could live, what jobs they could have, who they could marry and which family members they could interact with. They also defined who was and was not officially considered to be Aboriginal.

Between 1788 and 1900, the Aboriginal population declined by 90 per cent, although the impact was greater in some areas, particularly the southeastern colonies. By the time of Federation of the Australian colonies in 1901, government estimates put the Aboriginal population at 93,333. The lowest point of official population estimates was in 1921 – at 71,386.[69] As violence, disease and dispossession led to population decline, in the late nineteenth century, Aboriginal people came to be viewed as a 'dying race', and policies were implemented based on the assumption that Indigenous people would soon naturally fade away.[70] These ideas were also justified by the development of scientific thought about human difference and increasingly hardened views of racialized hierarchies to explain such difference. The idea that Aboriginal people were 'rapidly passing away' led to policies that first sought to 'protect' them by moving people to reserves and missions – thus containing any lingering threat they might pose to settler occupation of the land. They could live out their final days in peace, and missionaries and others would 'smooth the dying pillow', as it was commonly expressed. Daisy Bates, a philanthropist and amateur anthropologist who worked amongst Aboriginal people first in Western Australia and later in South Australia, was a leading exponent of this view. In 1907, as part of a lecture delivered to the Australian Governor-General, Bates stated 'it should never be forgotten that we are dealing with a dying race . . . [we should do] all that can be done . . . to render their passing easier'.[71]

Prior to 1860 there was no official legislation dealing with Aboriginal peoples in any of the Australian colonies. In 1860, a Board of Protection was established in Victoria. By 1862, it superintended seven reserves and 23 small camping places. By 1869, about 50 per cent of the Victorian Aboriginal population was living on missions or reserves. After this time, Protection

Acts were introduced colony by colony. The earliest, again, was introduced in Victoria in 1869 as *Act to Provide for the Protection and Management of the Aboriginal Natives of Victoria*. In New South Wales, a Protector of Aborigines was appointed in 1881 and an Aboriginal Protection Board established in 1883. The New South Wales *Aborigines Protection Act* was introduced in 1909 and was not abolished until 1969.

Meanwhile, the Queensland *Aboriginals Protection and Restriction of the Sale of Opium Act 1897* set up a 'system of segregation, surveillance and control' that was to provide the model for later laws that were passed in Western Australia, South Australia and the Northern Territory in the early years of the twentieth century.[72] J. W. Bleakley, Chief Protector and Director of Native Affairs in Queensland from 1913 to 1942, believed firmly in the segregation of Aboriginal people. As he outlined in 1919: 'It is only by complete separation of the two races that we can save him ("the Aborigine") from hopeless contamination and eventual extinction, as well as safeguard the purity of our own blood'.[73] Aboriginal people were forced to live in a series of missions and reserves. These were certainly sites of containment, oppression and control. But, paradoxically, they simultaneously operated as sites of survival and cultural transmission.[74] They could also foster new forms of resistance to the settler state, for example in the form of deputations and petitions.[75] The Victorian Coranderrk Reserve, established in 1863 as a result of Aboriginal activism, is one important example of this. The reserve functioned successfully as an agricultural enterprise for over 20 years. It was also a site of protest – under the leadership of William Barak. The imposition of new legislative controls in 1869 and attempts to close the reserve in 1875 resulted in open rebellion. In 1886, in response to the introduction of a further range of new controls, the Aboriginal people of Coranderrk sent a deputation and petition to the Victorian Government. The petition read:

> Could we get our freedom to go away Shearing and Harvesting and to come home when we wish and also to go for the good of our Health when we need it. . . . We should be free like the White Population there is only few Blacks now rem[a]ining in Victoria, we are all dying away now. . . . Why does the Board seek in these latter days more stronger authority over us Aborigines than it has yet been?[76]

These policies also put in place extensive controls over the employment and wages of Indigenous workers. They permitted, both explicitly and implicitly, the nonpayment of wages to some workers, as well as the diversion of wages into state-managed accounts. Many Indigenous people never received the wages that were supposedly held in 'trust' for them. Often these funds were misappropriated by governments or sometimes taken by corrupt officials.[77]

While policies in Queensland continued to emphasize segregation, other states shifted towards policies of cultural 'assimilation' and 'biological absorption'. Both approaches were aimed at making the 'Aboriginal problem' and Aboriginal people disappear. These policies, in conjunction with segregation, laid the foundation for the subsequent tragic history of the 'Stolen Generations'.[78] Intervening into Aboriginal women's reproduction and maternity was crucial to later policies, which were particularly directed at 'half-caste' women and children. This group, far from dying out, was threatening to expand exponentially, giving rise to the new spectre of the 'half-caste menace'. Legislation from the late nineteenth century particularly sought to combat this new threat. The Victorian *Aborigines Protection Law Amendment Act 1886* was the first statute to legislate for the differential treatment of 'full-blood' and 'half-caste' Aboriginal people. Controls over who Aboriginal people could marry, as well as the removal of 'half-caste' children, became common practices.

After Federation (when the colonies joined together to form the new Australian nation), the states retained control over Aboriginal affairs. This meant each state had different laws and

policies. However, 'Chief Protectors' in most states were given powers to remove children from their families, and the idea of 'absorption' became central to actions of protectors to remove children in many states. It was envisaged that 'half-caste' Aboriginal women would marry white men. The 'Aboriginal problem' would thus be 'bred out' of existence. Aboriginal people would become white.[79] 'Miscegenation' then, became a strategy of elimination, via the removal of 'half-caste' children from their mothers for the purpose of forcibly incorporating them into the settler population. From 1910 to 1970, tens of thousands of Aboriginal children were removed from their families under these policies, becoming what are now known as the Stolen Generations.[80]

Settler consolidation: immigration, women and white Australia

By the mid- to late nineteenth century, Aboriginal peoples in the southern colonies were increasingly sequestered or assimilated by the state. At the same time, immigration increased, yet with restrictions for non-white others in the gradual building of white settler polities. In Australia, immigration was always critical to the task of establishing a community of *white* settlers as a firm foundation of national identity. Immigrants initially came from two main sources: convicts and 'free' settlers, many of whom were given assisted passages. Around 162,000 convicts were transported to the Australian colonies between 1788 and 1868 (when the convict system was abandoned). The overwhelming majority of these, around 80 per cent, were men.[81] The convict nature of early Australia upsets the 'settler paradigm' in some ways; yet the convicts' status as involuntary immigrants did not interfere with their desire to take up land and displace Indigenous peoples. Once 'emancipated', convicts asserted their right to the land as much as any of the increasing numbers of free settlers, and many were given land grants at the end of their sentence. Moreover, the rate of 'free' immigration and settlement increased dramatically from the 1830s, when British and colonial governments introduced assisted immigration schemes. These sought to entice new settlers by paying for their passages. From 1831 to 1850, these schemes assisted 127,000 immigrants, and a further 65,000 free settlers paid their own way to the colonies.[82] The total non-Indigenous population of the Australian colonies thus grew from around 70,000 in 1830 to just over 400,000 by 1850. The gold rushes of the 1850s saw it increase rapidly, to over 1.1 million by 1860. By the time of Federation in 1901, the non-Indigenous population had reached 3.8 million.[83]

In the earliest decades of European migration, there was little clear planning around the terms of 'free settlement'. From the 1830s, however, the pattern of Australian settlement was significantly shaped by new immigration schemes inspired by the writings of Edward Gibbon Wakefield. He was the chief architect of a new model of 'systematic colonization', a response to what he saw as the haphazard nature of emigration from Britain. In order to facilitate the transplanting of 'civilization', Wakefield argued that an ideal colony was possible with careful planning. His proposal was, first, that colonial settlements should be concentrated, rather than dispersed, by limiting the size of land grants and, second, that the money raised by land sales should be used to pay the transportation costs of (specially selected) migrants from Britain.

Wakefield played a key role in the plans to form a colony in South Australia – the only Australian colony formed entirely from 'free settlers'. The establishment of this colony, in theory, marked a significant departure. Modelled on Wakefield's precepts, it sought to encourage productive enterprise while converting British paupers and Indigenous people into compliant colonial labourers and farmers. While Ballantyne notes the centrality of land policies to Wakefield's scheme, he overlooks the other key component of the 'systematic colonization': a focus on the migration of family groups and the need to ensure an equal ratio of male and female settlers. In his *A View of the Art of Colonisation* (1849), Wakefield observed, 'in colonisation, *women have a part*

so important that all depends on their participation in the work. If only a few emigrate in proportion to men, the colonisation is slow and unsatisfactory; an equal emigration of the sexes is one essential condition of the best emigration'.[84] In selecting emigrants, he recommended that young couples and unmarried young people 'in an equal proportion of the sexes' be given the highest preference.[85] This focus on the need for women was directly related to their reproductive potential. It was generally understood that a larger female population would mean a larger natural population increase and a lesser need for expensive immigration schemes. Wakefield warned that colonies like Virginia had almost failed due to the lack of women and speculated that if equal numbers of men and women convicts had been transported to New South Wales, the colonial population in 1849 would be 500,000 instead of only 50,000.[86]

Above all, then, it was white women who were desperately wanted in the new colonies. The cumulative effects of convict transportation meant women were outnumbered four to one. Stopping white men reproducing with Aboriginal women required a substantial influx of white women. They were brought to Australia's shores by the boatload, as all the new colonies encouraged and engineered various immigration schemes to bring white women to their shores to fortify and expand the white settler population.[87] Indeed, the first assisted emigration schemes, set up by the British government in 1831, were aimed at single women. Following Wakefield's ideas, this scheme was funded via colonial land sales. Assisted passages were offered to both New South Wales and Van Diemen's Land. From 1832 to 1836, a total of 3,689 women (along with around 759 men and 1,473 children) emigrated to the colonies under these schemes. Women slightly outnumbered men in the migrants assisted up to 1850. And as Jan Gothard has shown, between 1860 and 1900, nearly 100,000 single working-class women emigrated from Britain to the Australian colonies. They were the largest single category of immigrants to be given colonial government assistance.[88]

Prevailing ideas representing white women as the 'civilizing' sex and notions of family and domesticity made white women especially crucial to the project of sustaining respectable settler 'British' colonies. As Lisa Chilton points out, in Australia and other settler colonies such as Canada, government officials promoted the civilizing and settling effects of white women's integration into male-dominated, frontier communities. Their domestic labour was also highly valued.[89] Much scholarship has explored the development of imperial and colonial masculinity in these worlds without women – measured by white men's capacity to conquer, contain and govern 'natives'.[90] White women's roles in settler colonialism are far less well understood. But they too were clearly invested in the settler colonial project.[91]

Women activists enthusiastically supported schemes for female migration, keen to be able to make their own contribution to the cause of empire. The most famous woman in nineteenth-century Australia, Caroline Chisholm, began her 'career' through her philanthropic work in assisting new immigrant arrivals, particularly young single girls, in the early 1840s. This led her to develop her own colonization scheme – one that directly attacked Wakefield's ideas. In 1849, she founded the Family Colonization Loan Society with a committee of wealthy London merchants. Charles Dickens gave the society considerable support.[92] In the 1850s, feminists in London also began to take an interest in supporting middle-class women's emigration to the colonies.[93]

Immigrating settlers needed to be white and preferably British. Australia was not simply a settler-colonial site, it was a specifically white settler project. This was evident in the racial restrictions that were placed on immigration, even at a time when the colonies were desperately wanting to increase their populations. Restrictions on Chinese immigration and new taxes on Chinese residents were first put in place in Victoria in 1855 and then NSW in 1861. By 1888, all Australian colonies had enacted legislation which excluded all further Chinese immigration. In 1901, when the Australian colonies came together to form the new Australian nation, the very first act

of the first parliament in 1901 was to pass the *Immigration Restriction Act* – the cornerstone of the White Australia Policy. This policy and its successors would define the nation for over 70 years. The first and most notorious provision of the Act was designed as a bar to 'non-white' immigration. Edmund Barton, the Prime Minister, argued in support of the Bill in stridently racist terms: 'The doctrine of the equality of man was never intended to apply to the equality of the Englishman and the Chinaman. There is deep-set difference, and we see no prospect and no promise of its ever being effaced. Nothing in this world can put these two races upon an equality'.[94]

Reproductive regimes and the white settler nation

In this final section we turn to gender, reproduction and biopolitics in settler colonialism generally and in Australia specifically. We particularly contest Belich's economic study of settlers for failing to address what we and other postcolonial feminist scholars would describe as the true settler 'revolution' – one that is biopolitical and dependent on new colonies being made through Indigenous and white women's bodies. Immigration alone was not sufficient to secure the future of the white settler nation. The nation needed to reproduce itself. This was a highly gendered ambition, focussed primarily on white women's reproductive capacities. As Jane Carey has asserted, if the history of settler colonialism was 'driven by the "logic of elimination" in relation to Indigenous populations, then the imperative of vigorous white propagation was its necessary corollary'.[95]

Scholars such as Adele Perry have shown us that 'gender is where the abiding bonds between dispossession and colonisation become most clear'.[96] At the heart of this was the management of white and Indigenous women's bodies and the state's intervention into the both intimate and mixed relations of settler empire. These were in turn linked to the concurrent obsessions with preventing white racial 'degeneracy' or effecting white racial 'improvement'. This reached its apogee, or at least was most explicitly articulated, in settler-colonies where the maintenance of white supremacy was seen to be imperative to national identity and even survival.[97] As Perry has observed:

> Colonies of settlement are distinguished from other kinds of colonies chiefly by their reproductive and gendered character. That colonizers settle implies more than residence. It denotes a reproductive regime dependent on the presence of settler women who literally reproduce the colony. Immigration must therefore provide more than non-Aboriginal bodies. Ideally, it must provide the right kind of bodies, those suited to building a white settler colony.[98]

Founded as it was on the doctrine of the White Australia Policy, Australia is perhaps exemplary of these transnational trends. Once Indigenous peoples had been subordinated to the law and federation officially established Australia as a white settler nation, the reproductive imperative became more important than ever in maintaining white hegemony. By the 1880s, immigration and natural population increase had been effective in greatly reducing the gender imbalance in the colonies. However, a new concern swiftly emerged over the number of children that white Australian women were producing. Like many other Western countries, in the late nineteenth century, Australia was experiencing a declining birth rate. Although Australian (white) women were still having children at a greater rate than their European counterparts, the decline in the birth rate produced a population 'panic'.

These population concerns were far from trivial. Rather, they sat at the very foundation of hopes for the future of Australia as a white settler nation. As Anna Davin noted in 'Imperialism and Motherhood', in late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Britain, the birth rate was a

matter of national and imperial importance: 'Population was power'.[99] From the late nineteenth century, and increasingly after the turn of the century, advocates of what was coming to be known as eugenics, such as Charles Drysdale, endorsed selective population growth to prevent the 'deterioration of the race' and Britain's decline as an imperial nation through the proliferation of those they regarded as 'unfit'. Conversely, others believed that the British race should increase as much and as rapidly as possible – that there was space enough in the empire and the rest of the world for the imperial race to occupy. If the British population did not increase fast enough to fill these empty spaces, others would. On both sides, the threat they perceived was not from the Indigenous populations of these lands but from rival master-races, particularly the white populations of the United States and Germany, but also the new Japanese empire and China, given the procreative capacities which were coming to be associated with the East.

These fears and hopes were powerfully reflected in the new Australian nation. In 1903, the New South Wales Government statistician, T. A. Coghlan, produced a detailed study of the declining birth rate. He noted:

> Australia, with its large and sparsely-populated territory, and with its industries in process of rapid development, might reasonably be pictured as an ideal land, wherein the people might prove fruitful and multiply [. . .]. Present indications, however, give no hope of a teeming population, springing from Australasian parents [. . .]. There appears nothing incongruous in a declining birth-rate in an old civilisation [. . .] [but] to new countries, where population is so much desired, [it] is novel and astonishing and claims the deepest attention.[100]

Coghlan was not alone in his concerns. The same year, a Royal Commission on the Decline in the Birth Rate in New South Wales was established. This was the first such commission ever constituted anywhere in the world.[101] The conclusion to the first volume of their report the following year dwelt on the consequences for 'the continuance of the race in New South Wales' if the 'native-born population' did not reproduce itself more rapidly. It condemned the increasing use of contraception as 'an attack on the race' which would result in 'the loss of all those qualities which have made the British race predominant' and emphasized that this could have severe consequences for 'the possibility of maintaining a White Australia'. The latter depended on 'whether we shall be able to people the vast areas of the continent'.[102]

White Australian women themselves shared these concerns. They also sought to contribute to securing the settler-colonial project of white Australia. From the late nineteenth century, the white women's movement focused on the need for a large and healthy white population to secure the nation's future. While exhibiting little interest in the 'Aboriginal problem', or the 'peril' of Asian immigration, their extensive campaigns around white racial 'betterment' reveal an enthusiastic promotion of eugenics and racialized identifications.[103] From early in the twentieth century 'mental deficiency' in particular was identified as one of the greatest threats to the future of the white race and an issue that needed urgent attention. Women's organizations advocated strong measures to combat this 'menace', including segregating unfit bodies into 'farm colonies' or other institutions, along with sterilization, to prevent their 'propagation'.[104]

Women's activism also focused on infant health, with similar motivations. As a report from the Adelaide School for Mothers put it in 1909: 'In this country the question of infant life is a most vital one, and should be of deep concern to the whole community, for we have need of all our children. Babies are the best immigrants'.[105] Campaigns for kindergartens, domestic science, sex education, public health services and even general hygiene all emphasized the importance of white racial improvement for national progress.

The movement also had a strong interest in issues relating to immigration. It focused on the need for increased white migration from Britain, but also, and even predominantly, on the need for rigorous screening and medical testing to ensure only high quality migrants were admitted.[106] This activism too was directly linked to the White Australia Policy. Although the *Immigration Restriction Act* of 1901 is most infamous for its first provision – designed to prevent non-white immigration – what is less well-known is that five of the Act's other six provisions were actually directed at excluding categories of white migrants who were deemed racially undesirable, including 'idiots', the 'insane', 'prostitutes' and the 'diseased'. The Act was clearly designed to allow for a careful screening of potential white immigrants, something that is perhaps surprising given the overriding drive to 'populate or perish'.[107]

Responding to an enquiry about steps being taken 'to maintain the racial qualities of the Australian in the future', an anonymous correspondent to the *Eugenics Review* in 1916 detailed the racial landscape informing local priorities thus:

> The Emigration Act [*sic*], which is rigidly enforced, prevents ingress into Australia of undesirable aliens, of persons suffering from various disease [. . .] and of indigent persons. As the aboriginals of Australia have nearly disappeared, and do not intermarry save to a very slight extent with whites [. . .] the population may [thus] be considered almost entirely white [. . .] I am of opinion that it is essential to Australia that she should be quickly and efficiently populated so as to maintain her status in the world and prevent possible absorption by a foreign power [. . .] every encouragement should be given to emigration of suitable persons of white races.[108]

This vision would continue to dominate the population imperatives of the settler nation for much of the twentieth century.

Conclusion

In this chapter, we have briefly surveyed key aspects of Australia's settler colonial history of violent dispossession, fleeting attempts at 'honourable' colonization and governmental protection, containment and control of Aboriginal people. In doing so, we have suggested new historical areas of interest. Rather than focus solely on settler intentions and actions, as many studies of settler colonialism tend to do, we have highlighted Indigenous agency and resistance. Moreover, our intervention has emphasized the need to foreground the critical forces of gender, reproduction and biopolitics within the settler colonial history of Australia. We concur with Wolfe, who emphasized the settler project's coterminous forces of 'extraterritorialization' and 'gendered territorialism' and noted: 'Settler-colonialism is an inherently gendered project, the dormant landscape being unequivocally coded female. . . . As a direct articulation to land, which it claims to render productive, settler-colonisation is gendered in a peculiarly thoroughgoing way'.[109] Yet comprehensive examination of the gendered politics and biopolitical contours of Australia's settler colonial history is still wanting. Even in the best-known work, often, gender analysis tends to the schematic, waiting to be filled in. There remains a failed encounter between the recently established 'canon' of settler colonial history and the cutting edge work done by predominantly feminist scholars of empire and colonialism which have centralized issues of reproduction and gender, in terms of both 'native' and settler women. In these formulations, women emerge as foundational rather than marginal actors in the creation of settler states. Attending to these histories is essential if we are to confront the ongoing violence and appropriation that is Australian settler colonialism. Likewise, historical treatments of settler colonialism more broadly have much

to gain from an analysis of gender, mixed relations and the salient questions of settler biopolitics. These are issues that remain with us today, shaping polities and directing identities in our nominally postcolonial settler societies.

Notes

1 We use the term Indigenous to refer to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities in Australia. See P. Veth and S. O'Connor, 'The past 50,000 years: an archaeological view', in A. Bashford and S. Macintyre (eds.) *Cambridge History of Australia*, Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 2013, pp. 17–42. Both authors have contributed equally to the writing of this chapter.
2 For the first of these critiques see E. A. Povinelli, 'Reading ruptures, rupturing readings: Mabo and the cultural politics of activism', *Social Analysis* 41, 2, 1997, 20–8.
3 Wolfe first coined the term 'logic of elimination' in his 'Nation and miscegenation: Discursive continuity in the post-Mabo era', *Social Analysis* 36, 1994, 93–152. See also P. Wolfe, 'Settler colonialism and the elimination of the native', *Journal of Genocide Research* 8, 4, 2006, 387–409.
4 E. Strakosch and A. Macoun, 'The vanishing end point of settler colonialism', *Arena Journal* 37/38, 2012, 40–62.
5 J. Belich, *Replenishing the Earth: The Settler Revolution and the Rise of the Anglo-World, 1783–1939*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.
6 These are the best figures available for the numbers of those who departed from England. The numbers of those who arrived at Botany Bay are much less certain: M. Gillen, *The Founders of Australia: A Biographical Dictionary of the First Fleet*, Sydney: Library of Australian History, 1989.
7 M. Nugent, *Botany Bay: Where Histories Meet*, Crows Nest: Allen & Unwin, 2005.
8 While the vast majority of the convicts to Australia up to 1868 were English and Welsh (70 per cent), Irish (24 per cent) or Scottish (5 per cent), some convicts had been sent from various British outposts such as India and Canada. Also transported were small numbers of non-white convicts such as Khoi from the Cape Colony. There were also Maori, Chinese from Hong Kong and slaves from the Caribbean. See C. Pybus, *Black Founders: The Unknown Story of Australia's First Black Settlers*, Sydney: UNSW Press, 2006.
9 J. Cobley, *The Crimes of the First Fleet Convicts*, 2nd ed., Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1989.
10 A. N. Williams, 'A new population curve for prehistoric Australia', *Proceedings of the Royal Society* 280, 1761, 2013, 1–9.
11 P. Clarke, *Where the Ancestors Walked: Australia as an Aboriginal Landscape*, Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 2003.
12 The appearance of the dingo (~4,000 years BP) and of new kinds of fish hooks and harpoons suggest at least intermittent contacts: Veth and O'Connor, 'The past 50,000 years', 39–41. For a broader discussion of Aboriginal mobility see J. Carey and J. Lydon (eds.) *Indigenous Networks: Mobility, Connections and Exchange*, New York: Routledge, 2014.
13 R. Ganter, J. Martinez and G. Lee, *Mixed Relations: Asian/Aboriginal Contact in North Australia*, Perth: University of Western Australia Press, 2006; M. Clark and S. May (eds.) *Macassan History and Heritage: Journeys, Encounters and Influences*, Canberra: ANU E Press, 2013. For other exchanges along the Northern Coast, see J. Martinez and A. Vickers, *The Pearl Frontier: Indonesian Labor and Indigenous Encounters in Australia's Northern Trading Network*, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2015.
14 See for example L. Russell, *Roving Mariners: Australian Aboriginal Whalers and Sealers and in the Southern Oceans, 1790–1870*, Albany: State University of New York Press, 2012; P. Edmonds, 'Collecting Looerryminer's "testimony": Aboriginal women, sealers, and Quaker humanitarian anti-slavery thought and action in the Bass Strait islands', *Australian Historical Studies* 45, 1, 2014, 13–33.
15 See for example, on the stone houses and complex fish tap systems of Lake Condah, Victoria, G. Wettenhall, *The People of Budj Bim: Engineers of Aquaculture, Builders of Stone House Settlements and Warriors Defending Country*, Ballarat: em PRESS Publishing, 2010; M. Bennet, 'The economics of fishing: Sustainable living in colonial New South Wales', *Aboriginal History* 31, 2007, 85–102.
16 B. Gammage, *The Biggest Estate on Earth*, Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 2011.
17 The term *terra nullius* was not used at the time of the first British colonization of Australia. The term does, however, describe the British attitude at the time. For wider discussions of Indigenous sovereignty, see for example A. Moreton-Robinson, *Sovereign Subjects: Indigenous Sovereignty Matters*, Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 2007.
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26

SETTLER COLONIALISM IN NEW ZEALAND, 1840–1907

Richard S. Hill

New Zealand was the last significant land mass in the world to be settled, less than a thousand years ago. The arrivals were Polynesian, from the eponymous homeland of Hawaiiki in the Pacific Ocean.[1] The land they later called Aotearoa became part of Britain's informal empire after Captain James Cook's 'discovery' in 1769 and, more especially, after the establishment of the penal colony of New South Wales shortly after. In the late eighteenth century, Maori numbered up to 100,000 and were dispersed throughout all parts of Aotearoa, predominantly in the North Island. A 'middle ground engagement' between the tribally organised indigenous leaders and British entrepreneurs of extractive industries (such as timber and whaling) characterised this farthest frontier of Europe, with little intervention by the metropole required.[2]

By the late 1830s, however, the policy of minimum imperial intervention was under strain. Edward Gibbon Wakefield's blueprints for a new land of settler opportunity inspired a private colonisation venture to Aotearoa, which in turn precipitated the official decision to annex.[3] The formal acquisition of New Zealand in 1840, then, sought to regulate not just trade and commerce but also foster an antipodean section of the great global settler explosion of the nineteenth century.[4] Like other colonisation projects, this essentially involved displacing the indigenes from the land and replacing them with white settlers (*pakeha*).[5]

The magnitude of the problems involved in parting indigenes from their land and resources, however, was inherent in the way indigenes referred to themselves – *tangata whenua*, 'people of the land'. Moreover, the land was not only central to the indigenous political economy and cultural identity: Maori were not just *of* the land, they *were* the land. The physical features and natural resources of Aotearoa were the ancestors of the living, who in turn guarded those resources for future generations.[6] The land expropriation project was the more challenging in that the indigenous population was organised collectively in tight socio-political units of considerable fighting capacity.[7]

The foundational colonial state, therefore, needed to take tight control over the twin processes of Maori dispossession and European replacement. Its strongly interventionist racial control measures ranged from the heavily coercive, such as military suppression, through to the ostensibly benign – such as its monopoly on land purchase or the 'civilising mission' that formed an integral part of the colonisation project. While the impediments to this project were daunting, it succeeded extraordinarily well within its own terms of reference. By 1907, when colony became Dominion, Maori had lost most of their land and, in both *pakeha* imagination and official

imagery, New Zealand was a safe and blessed land: socially and racially harmonious, economically prosperous and politically progressive – a paradise on earth.

This chapter's examination of the myths and realities of what was endemically deemed to be an antipodean utopia is organised in four chronological tranches. First, that of the new frontier, in which the state secured order over Maori and *pakeha* and facilitated settler possession of large tracts of land through purchasing from tribes. This period lasted until 1860, when immigrant numbers had overtaken the indigenous population and the ramifications of colonisation were beginning to provoke serious Maori resistance. A decade of turbulence ensued, with Maori rebellion in the North Island and goldfields-generated disorder and wealth in the South, requiring heavy state intervention and pacification.

Some 15 years of state-led expansion of settlement, transitioning from frontier turbulence to post-frontier security, took place after 1870, marked by huge state-led infrastructural and immigration schemes. At the end of this transition, peace and general socio-economic prosperity had been established for settler New Zealand. In 1886, the organisational separation of military and police functions[8] marked the beginning of the late-colonial period of socio-economic stability, the basis for the colony becoming world renowned as an experimental 'social laboratory' for progressive policies.[9] The most visible state presence in people's lives was now the solitary patrolling constable, walking the beats and patrolling the countryside unarmed. It was a colony which mostly policed itself, a far cry from the social and racial tension of only 20 years before. *Pakeha* New Zealand was much self-praised as 'God's Own Country', words later made famous by populist Premier Richard Seddon.[10]

By 1907, Maori had been swamped by Europeans, whose population had almost reached a million. But Maori had always persisted in asserting their *rangatiratanga*, a term with no precise translation but meaning, roughly, the fullest autonomy, or indigenous control over indigenous affairs. In 1840, in the Treaty of Waitangi, which it had signed with the chiefs, the Crown[11] had promised to respect *rangatiratanga*. In the Waitangi Tribunal's words, the 'single thread that most illuminates the historical fabric of Maori and *Pakeha* contact has been the Maori determination to maintain Maori autonomy and the Government's desire to destroy it'.[12] This long saga always complicated the imagined community of settler New Zealand, but by 1907 Maori were largely out of sight, and the settlers were proud of the supposedly 'good intentions' they and the Crown had displayed towards the indigenes who had lost most of their natural resources.

This wishful-thinking metanarrative was complemented by another, that of progressive realisation of the planned paradise which both embodied the best elements of British civilisation and added extra value to them in the farthest colony of all. New Zealand was seen as a place of unparalleled equality, or at least of equality of opportunity.[13] By 1907, the reforms of the populist Liberal government over the previous 17 years had supposedly set about dealing with the remaining serpents which sullied this egalitarian utopia – especially the small number of men who controlled a great deal of its wealth and exploited its workers.[14] The hard-working and enterprising man and his family could now finally set about 'getting on', untrammelled by remaining constraints of status, class, education, accent or anything else, including even colour (that is, for Maori prepared to assimilate).[15] Such a mythology, generally subsumed under the rubric of 'classlessness',[16] now has only a residual presence. But since a strong historiography has yet to emerge on either 'class for itself' or 'class in itself', class-lite interpretations occupy the default position.

The parallel metanarrative cemented into place by 1907, that of the land of 'the best race relations in the world', also dies hard (although it has been much more interrogated than 'classlessness' in recent times). Maori were seen to have swapped their sovereignty for the rights of subjecthood and the benefits of peace and civilisation. Despite mutual misunderstandings, the foundational good intentions supposedly at the core of the settler polity fed into the New Zealand utopian

vision of itself. This part of the national mythology is generally epitomised in founding Lieuten-ant-Governor William Hobson's utterance at the founding of the colony, *he iwi tahi tatou* (we are now one people).[17] One strand of it was recently voiced by the Prime Minister of New Zealand, who opined that it was 'one of the very few countries in the world settled peacefully'.[18] Another was expressed by the capital city's newspaper: there was 'plenty of goodwill on both sides' at the signing of the treaty and thereafter, and 'it is that goodwill that will see all of us through'.[19]

From the late 1960s onwards, a confluence of developments made significant inroads into this complacent self-image of an enlightened South Seas paradise for white and brown alike. These included Maori socio-political reassertion, state and *pakeha* responsiveness thereto,[20] the conse-quences of Britain's turn to Europe and international social justice movements. All the same, and despite considerable revisionist historiography (especially on race relations), popular and official discourse still tends to depict New Zealand as exceptionalist, a utopia – even if a flawed one. New Zealand's foundational impulses remain seen as fundamentally decent and enlightened: a fair deal for all, including its indigenous people, the eschewing of privilege, the empowerment of the hard-working and upright to do well in life. The degree to which colonial New Zealand was a paradisal country of good intentions and their relatively successful implementation is the subject of this chapter.

Frontier and settler

The high-minded wording in the instructions to Hobson for annexing Aotearoa reflected the politico-religious humanitarian movement then at its peak in British governing circles. Public and historiographical discourses that have built on this have tended to overlook the fact that such sentiments rationalised acquisition of territory for British and capitalist rather than indig-enous interests, fundamental motives that are also clearly there in the instructions. While Maori fared less harshly in the foundational years of the colony than many indigenous populations of empire, this reflected such factors as initial abundance of resources and Maori willingness to continue middle-ground engagement with the newcomers. Furthermore, most settlers (whether they knew it or not) saw the world in terms of stadial theory – human progression through stages that culminated in European civilisation, with Maori advanced enough to take up the attributes of civilisation which the state and settlers were offering in return for loss of their land.[21]

Early New Zealand governments attempted to give the supposedly scientific processes of dis-placement of indigeneity a push through a proactive policy of 'amalgamation of the races', a form of assimilation reflective of the relatively high position assigned Maori on the stadial ladder. This did not mean that any permanent kind of governing partnership with the tribes was envisaged, *pace* those historians who have seen de facto recognition of indigenous customs and authority structures as evidence of enlightened intentions. The British worldview, on the contrary, deemed any aspect of indigeneity to be, in the scientific scheme of things, either impermanent or at best of peripheral import.

Thus, while numerous de facto and even de jure devolutions of authority to indigenous authorities were forged on the frontier,[22] the Crown was here motivated by the reality that Maori might and authority still held fast in the vast areas outside its immediate control. The interests of settlement and profitmaking in these lands required such deals, pending the substan-tive imposition of British sovereignty, the 'civilising of the savage' and the acquisition of the land. Good-intention historiography, in conflating short-term colonial necessity with ultimate intent, has ignored the totality of the evidence. That intent might best seen in a politician's summation of the 'object of a good Native policy', which he characterised as 'the Europeanising of the Maori'.[23]

On the early frontier, the nominal sovereignty the British declared in 1840 gradually became substantive as both Crown influence and settler presence moved outwards from the original beachhead enclaves. This movement onto the land in the interior was accompanied by the colonial 'civilising mission', aimed at providing Maori with cultural (and miscegenist) uplift to help them reach the next rung on the stadial ladder – as they moved off their land. While 'native' policies and programmes had different names and characteristics at different times, the ultimate end-point was always the same: the disappearance or absorption of the more 'primitive' race and its culture, except for some residual elements such as skin colour. This required Maori to take up whole new lifestyles and systems of knowledge.[24]

For the Crown, then, the first two decades after annexation involved a focus on imposing order and civilisation upon Maori, coaxing or if necessary coercing them into the social behaviour appropriate for the British world into which they were now incorporated. But while indigenes within contact zones found their political economy, culture and lifestyle under sustained pressure however much they took up English ways, they could also continue to operate within their own collectively based culture and worldview. Thus, the colony began peacefully enough as an expansion of the middle-ground engagement of the pre-1840 period, with Maori providing produce and services to the expanding settlement areas – although significant tribal groupings did rebel in arms in the mid-1840s.[25]

In the first two decades, sufficient land was made available that, despite the locking up of huge areas by a handful of wealthy purchasers and leaseholders, many immigrants had been able to better themselves. While the state forces had to monitor and discipline nonregulated sections of the *pakeha* population as well as Maori, even daily hire labourers felt that their prospects were good in this blessed colony, suffused as it was with an egalitarian spirit. From its very beginning, well-off settlers were complaining that servants were hard to find and tended to be disrespectful and demanding even if they could be retained.

This form of utopia was not that welcomed by the men of wealth and power, who wanted both greater immigration (hence greater choice of employees) and greater freedom from the constraints imposed by the British administration. Encouraged by the imperial wisdom that settler colonies were suited to acquire the instruments of self-government, they sought control of the antipodean utopia. Governor George Grey (1845–53) saw this as premature: imposing order and procuring land were best handled by himself and his bureaucracy, especially because of the need for caution in native policy. Persuading Maori to be 'parties to their own submission' required the delicacy and tact that many settlers, with their cultural assumptions of British superiority, did not possess.

The threat from settler incaution to an orderly acquisition of New Zealand was exemplified in 1843, when Nelson leaders attempted to detain warrior chief Te Rauparaha, a miscalculation which led to the deaths of 22 policemen, officials and colonists in addition to four Maori casualties. In the aftermath, state authorities had to curb settler intentions to launch punitive military action and quite possibly ignite further 'race conflagration'. Extreme coercion should only be employed if absolutely necessary, Grey insisted, and contingent upon the availability of overwhelming numbers of disciplined forces. Only when he had both troop reinforcement and the support of pro-government indigenous forces did the Governor move against what were deemed to be 'rebel' groupings.[26]

Grey's armed police forces spearheaded post-conflict occupation of rebel territory. Elsewhere, they and other state agencies worked assiduously to gain access to indigenous resources and turn formal Crown sovereignty into that degree of actual control which would allow trouble-free settlement. In non-settled areas, constables, magistrates, military officers and other officials informed chiefs of the new colonial order. The message was, as a judge later noted (in the context of armed

invasion of the last effectively autonomous area), 'in every corner of the great Empire to which we belong the King's law can reach anyone who offends against him'.[27]

Strong state interventionism also characterised *pakeha* New Zealand, despite the egalitarianism and personal freedom pervasive in popular and official culture and colonising-agency propaganda. With settlement focused on widely dispersed coastal sites linked essentially by sea routes, centralised coordination was needed to 'tame' (to use imperial language) the terrain and its cover as well as its original inhabitants.[28] This enterprise was firmly directed and monitored by the Governor and his advisers, although much operational control needed to be devolved to Crown representatives and influential settlers. Sometimes the two were the same thing, partly due to central government's attempts to co-opt settler leaders' propensities for de facto rule in 'the six colonies' established in the first decade – the five planned settlements of Wellington, Nelson, New Plymouth, Canterbury and Otago, together with the hinterland of the colonial capital (from 1841) of Auckland.[29]

With rebellion ended and the last planned settlement established in 1850, Grey was no longer able to contain pressure for settler self-governance. The New Zealand Constitution Act of 1852 provided for both a General Assembly to address central concerns and, in view of the fragmented settlement pattern, Provincial Councils to run regional matters.[30] Significant functions were devolved to the Councils, each of which had executives as well as legislatures. But central oversight remained strict. Essentially, the Governor and his General Government now had strong statelets through which they could run land purchasing, policing, immigration and other functions while they concentrated on controlling crucial matters relating to aspects of 'peace and good order', such as internal defence and (relatedly) native policy. The various intrastatal relationships were often fraught, given contestability over the colonisation project and the type of utopia sought. Essentially, while the founding governors had always been tasked with looking after the interests of British capital, at home and in the antipodes, from 1853 they did so with a high input from settler leaders. But with settler authority and aspirations fragmented, they often now had greater cause than ever to mediate within and between settler and indigenous parties, as well as between colonial and imperial interests.

That being said, small numbers of wealthy men, from new-money backgrounds as well as old, increasingly dominated the New Zealand political economy and controlled the state of order which underpinned its progress.[31] Sometimes the various imperatives of colonising coexisted uneasily. Large numbers of young single men moved from farm to farm, town to town, work gang to work gang, seeking employment and seldom stopping long enough to put down social roots.[32] This mobile reserve army of labour was essential for economic development, but its atomised nature and volatility challenged the concept of a paradise characterised by peace, stability and good order, the utopia supposedly in an advanced stage of construction. This tension between means and ends required strong state monitoring of the *pakeha* as well as of the Maori populace and, by extension, the will and capacity for harsh state disciplining of colonists as well as indigenes whenever that proved necessary.[33]

Despite individual and group disorder among mobile workers who had no particular incentive to fit into the broader community in which they were sojourning, social discipline was gradually being achieved within white New Zealand. The major danger to order remained that of potential large-scale Maori resistance, something increasingly probable as tribes adjacent to expansionist settlements came under ever greater pressure from settlers and state to sell their lands. From the mid-1850s, as settler governance consolidated its influence, state land purchase officers adopted increasingly desperate tactics, including transacting 'purchases' with tribal minorities. Resistance to land loss was overarched and reinforced by a growing perception of loss of control over both daily lives and destiny, despite the Crown's Treaty promise to respect *rangatiratanga*.[34]

Indigenous autonomist struggle was conducted in many ways other than opposing land sales, including by organisational restructuring. Many tribes had revived or strengthened their traditional ruling councils (*runanga*), for example, while others instead (or also) investigated new instruments of authority.[35] Just as the Crown had been working to appropriate Maori forms of authority and organisational energies, Maori in turn appropriated *pakeha* modes of exercising power. In particular, the idea of a Maori King gained support, and in 1858, Potatau Te Wherowhero of the Tainui confederation of tribes – guardians of the fertile Waikato – was crowned the first head of *Kingitanga*.

On the other hand, many tribes chose to resist full assimilation and dispossession by cooperating with the Crown and its agents to a greater or lesser degree. Most, moreover, accepted racial intermarriage, if not Crown policies which encompassed it as a means to an 'amalgamated race' culturally and eventually genetically dominated by its European strand. Settlement through civilising processes, the state-preferred (and cheapest) way of securing the new colony, gelled with 'progress' narratives on the building (or even actual attainment of) the white paradise. Some *pakeha* expected that building utopia would be expedited by the physical disappearance of Maori. The humanitarian wing of this perspective was encapsulated in politician Isaac Featherston's words in 1856: 'all we can do is to smooth the pillow of the dying Maori race'.[36]

By the later 1850s, the state's monopoly on land purchase from Maori (at a time when there were willing sellers), its control of the means of coercion and its suasive strategies had all assisted orderly and regulated settlement, especially in the South Island. In many areas, settlers were able to get on with building their 'Better Britain' in the South Seas without impediment, often indeed with Maori help. Ongoing construction of an incipient infrastructure of roads, bridges, harbours and other public works facilitated settler 'taming' of land repurchased from the Crown. Indigenes did not loom large in their visions of paradise. As well as gearing their farms to planting and stocking for local *pakeha* consumption and export, antipodean utopians sought to replicate 'the best' of the old world in their new surroundings – replacing native flora and fauna with that of Britain, for example.

By 1860, the relative peace of the first two decades of the colony, underpinned by a happy balance between immigration volume and land availability, was now palpably under strain. With its determination to hold onto its land in the face of Auckland's expansionist intentions, *Kingitanga* most symbolised the growing threat to a Better Britain in Aotearoa. Its vision of unifying existing Maori polities in common cause was seen as an attempt to establish a rival sovereignty to that of the Crown – a serious provocation for the colonising project. Even many missionaries and other 'humanitarians' believed that the moment had come to teach a harsh lesson to indigenes who refused to appreciate where their best interests lay.

Turbulence and pacification

As it turned out, it was not the *Kingitanga* heartland which first felt the might of the state's coercive forces. Instead, the struggle for power and resources within New Zealand, implicit in the colonising mission itself, became overt in Taranaki. In 1860, anti-landselling Maori at Waitara were attacked by the Crown's forces.[37] This heralded a quarter century of both enormous disruption and rapid development – one which began with a decade of warfare and subjugation of indigenous Aotearoa and of social turbulence and economic growth in settler New Zealand. These twin phenomena set the scene for a final great push to 'open up' the colony, something which even the great depression of the 1880s did not set back in any fundamental way.

The Crown's purchase of lands at Waitara from a minority faction of customary owners, which had led to resistance and war, had amounted to a challenge not only to the *rangatiratanga*

of principal chief Wiremu Kingi and his followers but also, by extension, to that of all tribal communities attempting to curb Crown and settler intrusion into their lives and lands. In symbolic recognition of the broader issues at stake, the King movement sent warriors in support of the rebels. Although the conflict in Taranaki paused in 1861, a showdown with *Kingitanga* loomed.

That year, Grey returned for his second term of governorship and set about to apply his usual mixture of co-option and coercion to the 'native difficulty'. Firstly, he would attempt to 'dig round [the King] till he falls of his own accord',[38] using such means as handing a degree of autonomy to 'friendly' or neutral Maori authorities via the reviving *runanga* movement. He also began preparations to invade the heartland of the King movement, and when his attempts to outflank Kingism failed, imperial troops invaded the Waikato in 1863 and inaugurated the bloodiest phase of the colonial wars of New Zealand. After the defeat of the King's forces, warfare continued elsewhere until the early 1870s.[39]

While the wars postponed settlement in some areas, they also boosted the general economy. Among other things, 18,000 imperial troops (at the time of the Waikato War, 1863–4) needed servicing alongside large numbers of constabulary, militia and volunteer units, and widespread land confiscation following rebel defeat promised economic enhancement.[40] The decade also saw the Crown establish another key mode of land alienation from Maori. Called the Land-Taking Court by Maori, the new Native Land Court's purpose was to decollectivise the ownership of customary lands; once owners' interests were individualised, purchase was facilitated as owners (often the most desperate) were prevailed upon to sell by land purchase agents.[41]

There were other, more proactive ways in which Maori cooperated with the Crown, too. Tribal assertion of *rangatiratanga*, for example, was sometimes effected by a tribe or sub-tribe choosing to fight alongside British and colonial forces against its traditional enemies. In turn, governments built upon this and other 'loyalist' support by devolving some indigenous issues to local or regional Maori committees of various types, and four seats were reserved for Maori representation in Parliament from 1867.[42] Tribal alliance with the Crown, however, could prove ultimately to be as damaging to tribal resources and authority as it had for those who had taken up arms.[43] Essentially, tribes were left to their own devices only where their lands were remote, infertile or otherwise not needed – at least for the time being.

The challenge to the state's ability to control the racial frontier was complemented by another crisis of order, one which injected capital into the economy more directly and in a more immediate fashion than warfare. In 1861, gold was discovered in the South Island's Otago Province, and diggings soon opened elsewhere in the Island, especially along its western coastline. The dividends for host and adjacent regions were huge, with Otago's capital of Dunedin becoming the leading commercial city in New Zealand for the rest of the century. Canterbury's agricultural and pastoral wealth was boosted by gold-related revenue and commerce, and other South Island provinces benefited whether they hosted substantial diggings or not. The downside, however, was that provincial governments faced difficult (and expensive) challenges in imposing order.

The Crown's strategy in the pacification of rebel tribes in the 1840s had borrowed heavily from the paramilitarist Irish constabulary. So too this model was drawn upon for suppressing gold fields-related turbulence (and yet again for the police units sent to occupy the conquered regions of the North Island). The rapid exhaustion of the gold assisted the restoration of order, complemented by other social and economic factors – such as gold fields-associated expansion of the network of South Island service townships in which men, and increasing numbers of female immigrants, were beginning to 'settle down'. This settling down epitomised as much as anything else the taming of the South Island frontier, an easier and quicker process than in the contested areas of the North Island.

In the 'kinds of peace' established in the latter after the wars, constabulary and military settler forces occupied, policed and developed the confiscated lands, and sizeable numbers of armed constables kept close watch over the rest of the country – although some of this was from afar, as a number of Maori zones held out against British authority, including the 'King Country' into which *Kingitanga* had been driven.[44] In interpenetrated areas, Maori sought to survive the transition to *pakeha* settlement as best they could, but increasing numbers were forced off their lands (including lands reserved for them from earlier tribal sales) by the demands of the capitalist economy. Not only were their collectively run enterprises no longer needed, they were also seen as embodying (in the words of a settler leader) a 'beastly communism'[45] that needed to be eradicated. Many had to eke out an existence by hiring out their labour, often seasonally, falling back on the collective assistance of their fellow tribespeople when all else failed.

Assimilationist theory assumed that 'civilisation' would rub off through close contact with *pakeha*. Whatever the validity of this, it was decreasingly testable as Maori moved off the land to live in or near their *marae*, out of the ken of most settlers. In any case, as we have noted, indigeneity showed great resilience against settler pressure, and this complicated the post-conquest task for authorities and immigrants – taming terrain, felling forests, building roads and bridges (and soon enough railways), laying out and constructing new townships, and the myriads of other tasks needed to establish utopian New Zealand. But a start was made. Policemen exemplified the state-directed taming processes, protecting *pakeha* developing farms and building communities and helping open up the countryside, a matter in which they physically participated – parties marched out daily from fortified police stations to drain swamps or build or repair roads.[46] By 1870, the groundwork had been laid for both an escalation in colonial development and an incipient feeling of nationhood in a New Zealand which had pushed Aotearoa to the margins.

Expansion and transition

The state and settlers were ambitious to open up not just the fertile conquered lands but also the often rugged and densely bush-clad interior areas which increasingly became viable sites of settlement in the wake of Native Land Court sittings. Large-scale and systematic expansion of settlement required state-led investment and direction, and in 1870 Colonial Treasurer Julius Vogel inaugurated a vast public works and immigration scheme that was underpinned by loans from the United Kingdom.[47] Its progress was uneven, reliant on the challenges of time and place, but it was central to the transition from instability to security. The 'crew culture' workforce needed for the public works schemes was often, like that of the gold miners, itself socially turbulent.[48] When it threatened public order in any significant way, however, the workers could be subjected to discipline as harsh as that applied to Maori resisting official laws and *pakeha* norms of behaviour. But in their combination, the public works schemes and the rapidly expanding immigrant population in effect joined up the (eventually) 10 provinces into a national whole, further boosting proto-nationalism and establishing modern New Zealand.

The economy grew at a compound annual rate of 7.2 per cent between 1870 and 1880, with population increasing annually by 5.8 per cent. By 1878, the European population stood at 414,412, up from 256,393 in 1871, and it would reach 578,482 by 1886.[49] With the linking of the provinces by new transport routes and communications facilities well advanced by the mid-1870s, devolved provincial governments were seen to be redundant and were disbanded. A unified, centrally directed state would now take the lead in all significant matters of government, supported only by local authorities tasked with specified functions. The provincial police forces, for example, were now absorbed by the centrally controlled constabulary, with a single policing/military organisation firmly in place by 1877.

The constabulary had already been 'demilitarised' in 1869 as result of a government assessment that the rebel tribes had been definitively defeated. Indeed, while it would continue to be 'armed, drilled and disciplined in such a manner as to enable [it] to meet, when necessary, the enemy in the field',[50] it saw little active service after constables fired the last shots of the Anglo-Maori Wars at rebel chief Te Kooti Rikirangi as he escaped into the interior in 1872. With their numbers at 43,595 in 1878 (albeit perhaps under-enumerated), the Maori percentage of the population had fallen in 20 years from just under half to a little over 10 per cent.[51] State measures aimed to speed up assimilationist processes included establishing a Maori schooling system designed specifically to teach English language and Western knowledge, and providing greater powers to Native Department, Resident Magistracy and other officials to intervene in Maori life and coax them into the ways and mores of the West.[52]

All the same, the assertion of *rangatiratanga* continued to dominate Maori aspirations. In Taranaki, especially, a 'passive resistance' movement gained ground as state and settlers pushed into the confiscated lands. In 1881, it too was militarily suppressed, with a constabulary invasion and sacking of its headquarters town of Parihaka.[53] Other modes of resistance to the colonial project to 'disappear' indigeneity included Maori attempts to reorganise their interface with the state. Generally, clusters of extended families (*hapu*, generally translated as sub-tribes) had formed the operational basis of Maori society. Now, many communities sought greater empowerment through larger collective units, especially *iwi* (tribes). More broadly still, some *iwi* groupings, especially those who were uneasy about possible state repercussions from the 'rival sovereignty' dimension of *Kingitanga*, began calling for *Kotahitanga* – an organised unity of purpose among the autonomous entities of the Maori world.[54]

Bonds were forged across tribal boundaries in other ways, too. Maori asserted their Maoriness during Christian observance, both in mainstream denominations and through syncretic religious movements, for example, and thus garnered some support among the predominantly religious *pakeha* population. More broadly, state and settlers often took comfort from the fact that most Maori leaders, including those involved in realignings, regroupings and efforts towards unity, affirmed that indigenous survival was best ensured by engagement with the West, even if that were a selective engagement. From the Crown's point of view, while assimilation processes were uneven, in aggregate they were moving in the right direction.

The receding indigenous security threat, accompanied by declining Maori numbers – down to some 40,000 towards the end of the century – and their disappearance from *pakeha* purview, led to a decreasing official and public focus on 'the native problem'. Moreover, intermarriage and other Maori accommodations to the attributes of 'civilisation' served to affirm the foundational myth of the unity of Maori and *pakeha* as 'one people'. The other great myth, that of a profoundly egalitarian paradise, saw its fortunes rising even faster, despite a number of issues which complicated or challenged it, such as old-world style hierarchies of wealth and power or increasing social distress and ephemeralisation of work with the onset of the depression. New developments encouraged the ethos of equality as well. The rise of factories, for example, led to 'new unions' advancing their class interests in overt fashion, boosting longstanding popular aspirations for fairness – famously exemplified as early as 1840 by agitation in Wellington for a 40-hour working week.[55]

The realities of wealth, power and status had, however, meant that egalitarian aspirations had been modified during the ensuing decades. Increasingly, New Zealand was seen not as an actual utopia for all, a society of equals, but as a colony offering equality of *opportunity* with great rewards for the hard-working and deserving. This egalitarian perception had been sustained by significant numbers of working people having indeed bettered themselves, especially compared to those they had left behind 'at Home'. New Zealand could thus remain a paradisal imagined

community because of the 'exceptional' opportunities it offered. While other parts of Empire similarly prided themselves on the opportunities they offered, New Zealanders saw themselves as *primus inter pares* among societies which had retained their essential Britishness (ensuring their place on the top rung of the stadial ladder) but discarded reactionary old-world impediments to universal 'getting on' (such as accent-bound or other types of class snobbery) and added endless possibilities of upward social mobility.

As we have noted, accompanying these developments, especially after the conquest of indigenous human and natural resources, there had been a move towards a distinctly New Zealand nationalism. The antipodean colony was being seen as not just a Better Britain but a *Greater* Britain in and of itself.[56] Increasing numbers of its leaders wanted the freedom to develop their antipodean utopia unfettered by the constraints imposed by London and re-engineered by the Governor in Wellington, the capital after 1865. The transition from turbulent frontier to stable polity, then, held out the potential of eventual independence from the mother country. This seemed a logical end result of the system of responsible government established in 1856 (soon after representative government) and the withdrawal of British troops in the late 1860s. But while nationalist political aspirations never disappeared, they were overwhelmed by the consequences of a momentous development in 1882.

That year the first shipment of refrigerated meat left the colony for the United Kingdom, holding out the possibility of conquering the 'tyranny of distance' from the major Western markets. Despite setbacks, especially with the long economic depression of the 1880s, fleets of ships were soon ferrying primary produce out from antipodean shores and bringing back manufactured products. London would take as much meat, dairy and other primary produce as the colony could send it. That New Zealand's future prosperity quickly came to depend on this tight economic nexus with the mother country had both political and socio-cultural ramifications. James Belich has called these interconnected phenomena 'recolonisation': an emerging nation had abandoned the move towards a stand-alone utopia. While it would remain paradise, it would brand itself as the most loyal domain of Empire, positively glorifying in all the economic dependence and politico-cultural baggage that went with this. New Zealand's guarantee of an unstinting flow of primary exports to the imperial metropole would all the more enhance the paradisal nature of the Better Britain in the South Seas.[57] This happy arrangement would lead to New Zealanders acquiring one of the highest per capita standards of living in the world.

During the transitional period, politicians had been increasingly confident that, in the words of the Native Minister, 'the people of both races ha[d] become amenable to the law of the land'.[58] In the incipient stages of recolonisation, as a consequence of the relentless taming of the land and its people in the transitional period, the government had become satisfied that the blessings of order had now fully descended upon New Zealand – an assessment capped in 1886 by splitting the military function from that of the police and downplaying the latter's paramilitary capacity. From now on, routinely unarmed and relatively small numbers of constables became the main mode of social control, with the military constituting a small backstop (although imperial might was the ultimate safeguard). The principal purpose of the state was now to maintain the state of social order which it had imposed on white and brown inhabitants alike, and improve it in ways which would (inter alia) foster the economy in difficult economic times.

The restructuring of state coercive mechanisms declared, in other words, that the frontier had given way to a modern, stable society characterised by peaceful interpersonal relations, the import of 'civilised' values from the old world and the triumph of values such as social fairness which had been developed in the new. This was a far remove from the race-based violence of the past and the socially atomised world of the itinerant, whose social bonds were at most the ephemeral ones

of 'mateship' with rowdy comrades on farms or at diggings or in crews.[59] Now, in the words of the time, the colony was officially assessed as having been 'tranquillised'.[60]

This great 'settling down' had resulted from complex processes of colonisation which are still only dimly understood, although state strategies had clearly formed a significant and quickening part. While much governmental effort had been infrastructural, there had also been considerable willingness to experiment with various types of assistance to the settlers – the provision of life insurance from 1869, for example, when overseas control of the industry proved inadequate to guarantee retirement income, or free and compulsory education for primary children from 1877.[61]

Stability and experimentation

Social stability had emerged by 1886, then, and state coercion was accordingly generally only wielded against individual or small-group offenders against 'order and regularity'. Significant potential collective threats to peace and tranquillity – young men from bush-clearing or railway camps descending on town to spend their earnings riotously, for example – were closely monitored. This did not mean that there were no serious collectively or ideologically based challenges to the nature of officially prescribed order. Individuals and movements with different definitions of utopia railed against a system dominated by men of economic and political power, often reflecting schools of thought from Europe and elsewhere such as the socialist and the labour movements. The worst years of the long depression were 1887–8 (when more people left than arrived), and agitation against conservative governments was steadily building up as the decade progressed. But state willingness to intervene in 'social evils' helped defuse their full impact in the antipodes, or at least deflected a great deal of opposition. When the rise of new manufactories led to an industrial unionism with militant capacity, demands centred on eradicating 'sweating' in garment and other factories began to be addressed through state investigation and regulation.[62]

When social containment failed, the velvet glove usually proffered by the state to its subjects would be discarded, revealing the iron hand beneath: the suppression of *pakeha* workers in the Maritime Strike of 1890, for example, or the armed expedition to quell the Hokianga Dog Tax Rebellion in 1898. In paradise, there could be no room for troublemakers, especially those who organised collectively. On the other hand, the propensity for people to collectivise their efforts could be marshalled, and from 1890 onwards the ruling sector's individualist ideology was qualified by a cooperatist resonance. Late that year, in the wake of the crushing of the maritime strike, the electorate selected a government which declared that concentration of wealth and power in the hands of the few endangered democracy and egalitarianism, responding to at least some of the radical voices which had become ever more insistent during the depression.

The triumphant Liberal Party leaders depicted the owners of vast landed estates, in particular, as the enemies of progress and paradise. The new government talked the language of interventionism, aiming to address the glaring gaps between reality and myth. It trumpeted a society based on sector cooperation. While its policies and measures were often called 'state socialist', it essentially stood for a harmonious partnership between state, capital and labour, a capitalist society that would provide fairer prospects for those of limited means. The message was summed up in Premier (from 1893) Richard Seddon's words that the 'life, the health, the intelligence, and the morals of the nation count for more than riches'. He 'would rather have this country free from want and squalor and unemployed than the home of multi-millionaires'.[63] From 1906 onwards, Liberal Premier Joseph Ward talked more soberly, but just as progressively for the times, of why and how public utilities should be state-owned.[64]

The new ministers set about applying radical ideas circulating internationally, attracting considerable attention around the globe. In particular, Minister of Labour W. P. Reeves steered through legislation in 1894 making arbitration between employers and unions compulsory and, for a time, this both protected wages and eradicated strikes.[65] The Liberal ministry introduced greater regulation all round, complementing other progressive innovations. Women gained the vote in 1893, and old-age pensions were legislated for in 1898, while state-backed social security provisions in other areas, such as insurance, were also implemented.[66] New Zealand quickly became world renowned as a 'social laboratory' which many (including international observers)[67] believed to be a utopianist 'third way' between capitalism and socialism – fairness, equality of opportunity, a decent life for all, a prototypal welfare state in a capitalist democracy.[68]

But life in the colony of social stability was not everyone's idea of paradise. Those who fell by the wayside often felt worse than those in other colonies, given that their dreams were unrequited in an environment in which everyone was supposed to be able to prosper. For others, the problem was the 'great tightening', the application of increasing numbers of socio-political rules and moral strictures, official and unofficial, on how to behave in the world of post-frontier respectability.[69] Even the temperance movement made considerable headway in a society once dominated by hard-drinking workingmen, although that was partly because it was allied to sections of the labour and socialist movements which saw the 'booze barons' as destroying workers' lives and diverting them from both class struggle and family life.[70]

Only those assessed as worthy could get pensions, unacceptable aspects of working-class culture were frowned upon and suppressed as vigorously as many a Maori custom, and bureaucrats and employers alike sought to accustom working people to adjust to rhythms and conditions of production that bore little resemblance to depictions of utopia. While there was some considerable resistance to tightening moral and behavioural control, many did accept closer monitoring and disciplining of their public, workplace and (sometimes) private lives as a necessary price to pay for stability and impending utopia. Indeed, where once the masses had to be coercively policed, in the eyes of the state most individuals now policed themselves satisfactorily most of the time. The unarmed constables were held up as exemplars of social behaviour, a far cry from the rough semi-soldiers of only three decades before.[71]

The prototypal paradise was, however, essentially for whites. The *tangata whenua* were still seen to be disappearing physically or culturally, Asians were not welcomed and the Pacific Island inhabitants of sub-colonies that New Zealand began to acquire were not accorded even the limited rights acquired by Maori. The core Liberal electoral base was the *pakeha* man of small means, and the government was especially exercised by getting him onto the land.[72] Liberal propaganda portrayed this process as primarily 'bursting up' the big estates, but it was achieved more by acquiring much of the remaining Maori-owned land. All the same, Maori continued to seek ways of retaining their *mana* over their remaining land, including by leasing it out for *pakeha* to engage in the scientific farming that the Crown insisted upon for 'the public good'. They remained determined, additionally, to preserve their culture, and they had not abandoned hope of being able to exercise their *rangatiratanga* in substantive ways.

One means of doing so was to complement their voice in 'the Pakeha Parliament' with the Maori Parliament, established in 1890 out of the *Kotahitanga* movement. Another built on pre-existing willingness for selective engagement with the West, and a number of younger leaders came to see this as the key strategy for socio-economic and political survival and revival. But even these 'modernisers' aimed to preserve Maoridom and its customs and values as a distinctive socio-political sphere within this most British of the colonies. The Westernising strand of thought, led by Apirana Ngata and a circle that came to be known as the Young Maori Party, became the main coordinating and mediating body between tribes and Crown.[73]

In response, the state made a number of concessions. For example, in 1900, it established two new sets of institutions, including Maori Councils, agencies with some devolved self-governance powers. These undoubtedly brought benefits to Maori communities – often, for example, focusing on sanitation reform in association with central agencies, which both improved lives and boosted demographic revival.[74] Indeed, the Maori Parliament quickly dissolved itself in favour of annual Maori Council plenary meetings.[75] This was a triumph for the Crown, which felt threatened by national Maori groupings, another successful harnessing of Maori organisational energies – but again in ways which also brought some benefits to Maori.

The death of both of the Parihaka prophet-leaders, Te Whiti and Tohu, in 1907 was widely heralded as symbolising closure on the 'old time Maoris' and their resistance to displacement and replacement. That year the Tohunga Suppression Act, promoted by the Young Maori Party modernisers and guided through Parliament by mixed-race Minister of Native Affairs James Carroll/Timi Kara, outlawed religio-medical practice by customary Maori experts. While this was ostensibly on medical safety grounds, for which there was some considerable evidence in support, the main reason was to suppress traditionalist opposition to Western ways and worldviews. It was now beginning to be clear that Maori were not going to wither away, so the pace of assimilation needed to accelerate. As 1907 opened, the New Zealand International Exhibition in Christchurch was thriving, but Maori were on display as an exotic Other from a time gone by. They were a mere coda to the exhibition's theme: 'the material progress of New Zealand since it was first redeemed from barbarism by the white man'. The official report assigned their presence at the exhibition to the Ethnological Section, to the past – the Maori future lay in their absorption into the 'one race' proclaimed by Hobson in 1840.[76]

When New Zealand became a Dominion, it was no longer Aotearoa but definitively New Zealand. But was it a settler *utopia*? Most historians long ago abandoned the myth of a benign colonial exceptionalism towards Maori, but many have been somewhat reluctant to do so with regard to *pakeha*. This is partly *because* of the attention given to Maori issues in recent decades. Re-visioning New Zealand history as 'rivalry . . . between the races'[77] has tended to lump all whites together (including many of the immigrant groups of non-British origin, such as Scandinavians brought in to fell forests), whatever the class relationships and socio-political loci of power in colonial New Zealand. This race rivalry approach has, in fact, diverted attention from the myth of a land of utopian classlessness.

Yet the *pakeha* world was clearly dominated by a small number of the wealthy and powerful. Even after the Liberals' opening up of the land to dairying and other small enterprises, relatively few people owned the land on which the New Zealand economy depended, and fewer still owned other means of production and distribution. Many *pakeha* continued to wander the land, offering their labour for daily hire, while still others worked in the manufactories – for a rural country a surprisingly high proportion of the population (almost half by 1907) had become dwellers or sojourners in cities and boroughs. Many in the urban and rural working class had been seduced by the ideological construct of a utopia of middle-class 'classlessness'. Farmhands called themselves 'farmers', linking themselves with the often struggling 'small farmer' breaking in the land. When it came time to crack the heads of the industrial working class – which tended to be rather sceptical about the alleged attainment or imminence of paradise – they and white-collar workers volunteered in their droves.[78] While New Zealand was a white person's country by 1907, it remained one of highly unequal whites, whatever the Liberal government's aims and actions.

For those who thought they had attained paradise (although not generally that to be found in utopian literature),[79] many more could only keep hoping, comforted by the possibility of state or private assistance should they experience difficulties through no fault of their own. Meanwhile, the majority could obtain an 'ample sufficiency' in life, especially as recolonisation escalated, and

there were few stigmas attached to status or job. It was undoubtedly, then, a *relatively* utopian land for *pakeha*, offering very real possibilities of upwards socio-economic mobility – or reasonably good living standards for those in work, and a state and private-sector charitable environment for those down on their luck.[80]

Even the families crowded into the slum-like conditions of inner cities or the swagmen hawking their labour on dusty country roads generally lived well compared to the mass of workers in the mother country. When the Christchurch exhibition closed in April, nearly two million tickets had been sold, twice as many as the colonial population. There had been virtually no crimes committed in the extensive grounds, and a senior policeman noted that this mirrored the orderly state of the country as a whole. In 1907, the scene was set for several decades of general stability, and the historian of policing for much of the Dominion period would call his book *A Policeman's Paradise?*, implicitly answering the title's question in the affirmative.[81]

But there were already signs of trouble in paradise as Dominionhood approached. Just as the 'public good' had been explicitly evoked to rationalise parting Maori from their land, so too it implicitly denied most *pakeha* the possibility of owning it or any other means of production. Industrial workers were increasingly seeing corporatist class harmony as chimerical, and the strike and other classical tools of class warfare were soon to be taken up again. While early twentieth-century New Zealand had a globally envied reputation for stability, prosperity and peace, for both indigene and immigrant the reality fell far short of the national mythology. Within half a dozen years of Dominion status – something not pushed for by recolonial New Zealand – police and workers were clashing in the streets, and in 1916 the police invaded the last of the Maori regions whose leaders proclaimed the Maori right to govern Maori affairs.[82]

Conclusion

In 2014, a New Zealand foundational myth was challenged by the Waitangi Tribunal's conclusion that, when the northern chiefs signed the Maori translation of the Treaty of Waitangi in February 1840, they did not see this as transferring sovereignty, the British having obfuscated their intention to establish a new settler colony.[83] This colony was to be under indivisible Crown control, as Maori soon found out. Later arrangements involving indigenous authority were temporary expedients pending dispossession of Maori and their replacement by settlers.

In the first two decades of the colony, there were sufficient resources for many immigrants to do well, or at least to lead a life of 'freedom' compared to that 'at Home'. In the 1860s, a decade marked by turbulence and its pacification, the conditions were established for a final grand push to tame both the indigenous terrain and its people. After 1870, huge infrastructural schemes worked to join up the discrete settlement areas, and state-directed immigration disgorged large numbers of *pakeha* from Britain and elsewhere. By the mid-1880s, the frontier had given way to the peaceful and thriving proto-nation widely seen as 'God's Own Country'. But soon its new-found capacity to send all the meat and dairy commodities it could produce to London had socio-political and cultural consequences that in effect put a hold on its development as an independent nation. This was of little concern to the *pakeha* majority enjoying the increasingly high living standards that the colony owed to the reforged British link.

New Zealand was, in essence, a capitalist democracy with the rough edges smoothed, its heavy state regulation providing some significant protections for its subjects. Its government saw itself as presiding over a social experiment aimed at producing equality, classlessness and fairness, including for Maori, whose heritage was touted as a unique point of difference from the rest of the world – a colony often popularly called 'Maoriland'.[84] All in all, New Zealand was seen as distinctive, special, exceptional, the best country in the world for whites and indigenes alike.

At the international exhibition, the 'great and benevolent' Department of Labour showcased its 'workmen's model houses', boasted of its capacity to provide immigrant labour to employers and presented a 'sad and unpleasant contrast' between 'English "Sweated" Industries' and New Zealand's concerns for 'the interests of our workers'.[85]

Whatever the utopianist exaggerations, there had certainly been dramatic transformation over seven decades. In 1837, a sole British official and a handful of whites dwelt in a country divided into large numbers of tribal and sub-tribal polities. Twenty years later, the number of British immigrants surpassed Maori in a land where the governor and settler leaders had divided up power in complex and layered ways. Another 20 years further on, a centralised settler government presided over mass immigration and infrastructural enterprises, while the Native Land Court continued to set the scene for continuing land alienation from Maori. With taming of both people and countryside essentially achieved by the mid-1880s and New Zealand on its way to becoming a gigantic farm supplying the metropole, a remarkable tranquillity generally prevailed. This provided the basis for the reforms that made the late-nineteenth New Zealand famous as a progressive social laboratory.

Complex socio-economic and politically directed processes had produced a stable base from which New Zealand could enjoy one of the highest living standards in the world for a long time to come, and so a kind of utopia had been created. But along the way there had been many casualties, Maori and *pakeha*. Samuel Butler's 1872 book *Erewhon*, which emerged from the author's New Zealand sojourn, canvassed a flawed utopia. Had the author revisited for his sequel, published some 30 years later, he would have found a very different colony; but equally, he may well have concluded that an elite establishment (albeit different to that he had originally satirised) remained in control, projecting 'images of unity' of an imagined community. This conclusion would have had resonance for most Maori and many *pakeha* alike. But equally, most would have understood why his protagonist was 'reluctant to leave the idealised world of Erewhon'/New Zealand. While he was returning to the Home that *pakeha* loved, its flaws had induced them to seek utopia in the antipodes, and most did not regret that move; for Maori, the New Zealand landscape was more than just home, it *was* them.[86]

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27

SETTLER COLONIALISM IN NEW CALEDONIA, 1853 TO THE PRESENT

David Chappell

Overseas colonies in which European settlers were the demographic majority became what Alfred Crosby called 'Neo-Europes'.[1] Most such migrants went to temperate climate zones similar to their homelands, so they could transfer many of their domestic animals, food crops and lifestyles to the new countries they created. Meanwhile, the indigenous populations often declined due to conquest, land alienation, exploitation and imported diseases, thereby enabling the settlers to become clear majorities of the populations who could develop local resources in commercial ways. The settler countries of the former British Empire demonstrated this transformation, for example in the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, where small indigenous minorities continue to struggle for recognition and restitution. Such countries also received more economic investment and earlier self-government than those with indigenous majorities. Tropical colonies, however, tended to experience influxes of slave or indentured laborers who often came from other tropical zones (especially Africa or southern Asia). Yet the French national state was much less able to create viable Neo-Europes abroad, because domestic population growth was slower and fewer French settlers went overseas. French Canada and Algeria became settler colonies *manqués* with enduring indigenous majorities (like Kenya, Rhodesia and South Africa), and in New Caledonia it was only in the 1960s that settlers finally became a majority, by including both European and non-European economic immigration during a nickel mining boom.

In his comparative overview of 'settler colonialism',[2] Lorenzo Veracini has suggested that settler frontiers constituted a distinct category of imperialism because settlers often shared similar ideological pathologies, such as starting the history of the country with their own epic arrival and struggle to tame the environment and resisting efforts to redress past injustices to indigenous peoples or to give them equal rights. In fact, settler historiography often seeks to de-indigenize the native inhabitants in various ways, for example by arguing that it was the settlers who brought modernity, while indigenous 'nomads' were simply part of the challenging natural landscape itself. De-territorialization was a linked erasure trope based on the presumption that primitive kin groups only 'occupied' lands without developing their full commercial potential, a Lockean basis for private land ownership that in Australia was used to claim that 'Aborigines were savages and heathens who did not deserve to keep their lands'.[3] Settlers usually blamed indigenous peoples for any violence on colonial frontiers, despite the bloody conquests. That biased perspective portrayed indigenous homelands as *terra nullius* (empty land), thanks in part to Joseph Banks' lie to the British Parliament in 1785 that Aborigines simply wandered about with no sense of territory

and 'would speedily abandon the country to the newcomers', when in fact he had seen for himself that they shook their spears at the first British explorers right on the beach.[4] French historian Isabelle Merle, a specialist in the French settlement of New Caledonia, makes the distinction that the 'indigenous population is an essential element in the case of so-called colonies of exploitation, unsuitable for European labor. It disappears, in contrast, in the definition given to settler colonies [where] the European can propagate "his race". Climate and health are the only elements taken into account when considering the country'.[5]

In New Caledonia, French settlers or their descendants have often compared themselves to the 'hardy pioneer' myth of the US Western frontier, which historian Frederick Jackson Turner portrayed in 1893 as a line of 'civilization' advancing into 'free land'.[6] Yet those territories were inhabited by Native Americans, so the settler invasion caused well-known conflicts, while speculators and railroad builders transformed most western American lands 'from matter into property'.[7] As in Australia, most early settlers in New Caledonia were convicts, and another ironic similarity is that Anglo-Australian ranchers raised beef cattle in the French colony to feed the prisoners. Later, free French 'pioneers' relied on the coerced labor not only of convicts but also of indigenous Melanesians or indentured Asians, and the unfettered advance of the French frontier by livestock into indigenous territories provoked indigenous resistance, as in Australia.[8] The purported 'civilizing mission' toward natives tends not to come up very often in settler discourses. The 'Black War' genocide in Tasmania inspired British anti-slavery and pro-Aboriginal humanitarians to push for colonial reforms that would respect indigenous land rights, as in the Waitangi Treaty in New Zealand, but armed conflict over land and sovereignty nevertheless ensued on settler frontiers.[9] This essay examines the trajectory of colonial settlement in the French Pacific island country of New Caledonia through three phases: the colonial era (1853–1946), post-World War II decolonization, regression and revolt (1946–1988), and the era of negotiated peace accords that have proposed economic 'rebalancing' and seeking a 'common destiny' for the nearly equal settler and indigenous communities (1988–today).

New Caledonia (1853–1946): a Neo-Europe manqué?

Before the nineteenth century, the main French experiment in overseas settlement was in Canada, but outside the St. Lawrence River valley, the French presence on the ground was minimal. Church, state and nobles all tried to recruit small farmers, offering them some privileges compared to the peasants of their homeland and land concessions along the river, which were heavily forested and required significant labor to clear, while the northerly climate limited the growing season. After the first century of colonial presence, the population of *habitants* and soldiers of New France was only about 15,000, a small fraction of the size of British settlements farther south, partly due to a continuing gender imbalance. The fur trade remained the main source of income, and canoe *voyageurs* traded westward with Indian allies, creating an important *métis* population. In 1737, a priest wrote that Canadiens were 'as poor as artists and as vain as peacocks'.[10] The epidemiological advantage of European settlers manifested itself early on, as their ailments took a heavy toll on the indigenous population, but the French governor engaged in symbolic ceremonial exchanges with indigenous leaders, who remained for the most part sovereign, because colonization was 'neither intensive, nor exclusive . . . so French America was in reality a Franco-Indian America'.[11] In 1759, the British seized Canada, but francophone cultural and political nationalism has persisted in Quebec province, despite the Anglophone majority in that country.

The French colonization of Algeria that began with military conquest in 1830 was larger in scale, but it also was a more spectacular failure as a Neo-Europe because most European settlers (about 900,000) fled the country when it became independent under an Arab Socialist regime in

1962.[12] The Mediterranean coastal region had become a department of metropolitan France, but the indigenous majority were mostly 'nationals' who inhabited interior military zones, not citizens (similarly to South Africa, which became a self-governing dominion in the British Empire in 1910 when most of the indigenous majority could not vote). Settlers in Algeria, a large proportion of whom actually came from Spain or Italy, were partly self-governing by 1881, but the Muslim majority was deemed unworthy of civil rights. *Pieds noirs* (black feet, or settlers) relied mainly on non-whites to do the hard labor, despite a typical settler myth of taming the wilderness. Yet they needed to remain part of the metropolitan nation-state in order to claim to represent a French demographic majority.[13] In 1960, during the Algerian war of independence, French President Charles de Gaulle proclaimed publicly to have understood the settlers but said privately, 'The *pieds noirs* continue to clamor for "French Algeria" as if this magic formula was going to save them! But French Algeria is not the solution, it's the problem. It's not the remedy, it's the illness! How could we have allowed this European immigration to grow out of control, in the middle of a radically different population, in a hostile country?'[14] Settlers had regarded Algeria as *terra nullius*, despite its three million indigenous inhabitants, and they domesticated it rhetorically as a Mediterranean crossroads in which the French were simply another wave of conquering migrants like so many others since antiquity.[15] Yet most of them finally left. As Albert Memmi[16] might say, those mediocre 'Neros' would then compete against waves of Algerian migrants looking for work in France. Thousands of *pieds noirs* went (or moved back) to Corsica, helping to provoke a nationalist movement against 'outsiders' taking land there,[17] and two thousand would go on to New Caledonia; a French legislator quipped it had to 'console the Sahara'.[18]

In the nineteenth century, French colonial discourses tried to reconcile their post-1789 revolutionary rhetoric of universal human rights with their ensuing Napoleonic legacy of glory-seeking conquests, which had damaged the link between nationalism and democracy.[19] In effect, two versions of the right to citizenship emerged in the modern nation-state: fundamental equal rights for all guaranteed by the impartial state (rights by birth soil) and a distinctive national ethno-cultural heritage (rights by bloodline). Those delicately intertwined juridical concepts still trouble France and other countries, especially when dealing with immigrants.[20] Does the state build the nation, or does the nation build the state? Or as Benedict Anderson[21] might put it, who imagines the community, and what practical methods create a lasting sense of unity? Nationalism, after all, is about exclusion as well as inclusion. One proposal often voiced by French expansionists was the assimilation of natives overseas, a rhetorical device that French historians have sometimes used to suggest that their colonialism was very different from that of the British, who ruled more indirectly and therefore maintained ethno-cultural separatism. French rhetoric envisioned an 'imperial nation-state' in which everyone could benefit from progress.[22] In reality, however, the mass assimilation of indigenous peoples would have cost enormous amounts of money and time for education, equal employment and local infrastructure that served the whole population, not just companies (e.g. most roads or railroads in colonial Africa went straight from mines, plantations or forests to seacoasts for the efficient export of raw materials and thus most economic surplus). And the French as well as the English and others often appointed local chiefs on the basis of loyalty rather than customary legitimacy, inadvertently creating a two-tiered native administration. As Raymond Betts[23] has shown, French military commanders overseas generally favored cost-saving 'association': let the missionaries educate a few *évolués* to help them rule, and let the rest learn what they can from colonial 'guidance', mostly through cheap labor.

In New Caledonia, after British explorer James Cook named the main island after Scotland in 1774, British sandalwood traders, Protestant missionaries (including Polynesians) and plantation labor recruiters had the most outside influence until the 1840s, when French Catholic missionaries also arrived. In 1853, in front of a crowd of curious indigenous Melanesians at a Catholic

mission station, a French admiral read a decree of Emperor Napoleon III that proclaimed New Caledonia to be a French 'national possession', after which the Melanesians were told to go home and naval and mission personnel signed the document inside the fort.[24] France annexed New Caledonia for several reasons. First, for prestige, in its habitual competition with Britain, which for example had annexed New Zealand in 1840 after a French attempt to establish a settlement there. Despite the prevalent British influence in Tahiti, the French navy had annexed that island in 1842 and then conquered it. When the admiral annexed New Caledonia in 1853, a British naval commander en route to do the same thing killed himself for having failed to arrive in time.[25] The second motive was strategic interest, in the form of safe 'ports of call' for French naval and merchant vessels around the world, and the third was the need to establish a penitentiary for French convicts, in the same way that Britain had used Australia, and also for political prisoners such as Algerian rebels and domestic captives from the 1871 Paris Commune uprising.[26] For thirty years, most French settlers in the colony were prisoners.

In post-annexation New Caledonia, armed indigenous revolts began as early as 1856 and lasted to 1917.[27] The largest uprising occurred in 1878, but the French defeated the resisters with scorched earth tactics and divide and rule tactics that profited from linguistic diversity. Rebel Chief Ataï's severed head was finally returned from a Paris museum to his people in 2014. His revolt was blamed not on land or sovereignty issues but instead on ex-convicts selling alcohol to natives or on Ataï's having been rejected by a white woman he had courted, but Ataï had clearly complained to authorities about cattle ruining crops and disturbing indigenous activities.[28] Other rebel leaders were executed by firing squad or exiled to Tahiti, and defeated clans lost their lands and were crowded into native reserves. As early as 1855, their sovereignty and lands had been declared to be possessed by 'a civilized nation', not 'by savage tribes'.[29] In Balade, where the annexation decree had first been read, settlers soon arrived to claim 'vacant' lands, and in Pouebo, the French set up a guillotine to prove their point. In a rather typical vision of rule by association, the colonial regime said of Melanesians, 'the contact with our soldiers, whose mores are so gentle, will lead them to renounce their savage habits and will prepare them little by little to enter sooner into civilization'.[30] By 1864, the outer islands were added to the territory, and another decree in 1868 claimed dominion by 'right of conquest'. The French created collectively owned native reserves that would amount to only 10 per cent of the main island, though the smaller, resource-poor outer islands would be entirely native reserves (and labor pools). Administratively, indigenous clans were grouped arbitrarily into 150 'tribes' ruled by appointed chiefs and patrolled by gendarmes. The latter recruited villagers for forced labor and imposed an annual head tax (which settlers did not have to pay) so indigenous people would also need to work for pay; in fact, they could leave their reserves only to labor for the French. Indigenous clans were thus actively 'underdeveloped' by being partly monetarized while having one foot in the traditional farming and fishing economy, so they would not in theory need fair wages.[31] In 1896, when some settlers suggested that more should be done to help the indigenous people, who were suffering from inadequate land, epidemic diseases and an unfair tax, the head of native affairs replied that if the official policy changed, 'We would have to leave . . . because, after all, colonization is only a business'.[32] When French Protestant missionary Maurice Leenhardt arrived in 1904, the mayor of Noumea asked why bother, since the natives were dying out?[33]

As in Australia's early days, marines would police the colony, while Anglo-Australian ranchers, such as James Paddon (a former sandalwood trader who sold land for the colony's capital to the French), received large land grants to start cattle grazing. The penitentiary also rented out convicts to coffee farmers and, from the 1870s, for mining nickel and other minerals. If convicts finished their sentences, they might be allowed to return to France, but repeat offenders or those who had committed serious crimes had to stay in the colony. *Libérés* who remained could receive small

farm plots, though fewer than 10 per cent actually did, and two-thirds of those failed to prosper, partly due to discriminatory laws that hindered their education and employment opportunities. More than 20,000 convicts arrived between 1864 and 1894, along with several thousand political prisoners.[34] In 1901, involuntary settlers still constituted almost half of the European community, and convict descendants would endure a social stigma from the later arrivals until the 1980s.[35] Free settlers also began to arrive, especially in the 1880s and 1890s, when the governor decided to turn off the 'dirty faucet' of the penal transportation system that gave the colony an unsavory image and deterred immigration. He actively recruited small farmers from France to grow commercial crops such as coffee or cotton using convict, indigenous or Asian labor. Migrants received three to five hectares of farmland, 20 more for pasture (mainly on the west coast) and a house lot, tools and a food ration for six months. Yet fluctuating crop prices and environmental, transport and security issues haunted them, so many failed rural settlers migrated toward urban centers. Because the penitentiary was the largest employer, market for consumption and source of cheap manpower, in both agriculture and mining, 'The pioneer frontier was the product of a wild capitalism supported by the government'.[36]

In the 1870s, another Anglo-Australian, John Higginson, helped to expand mineral exports to Australia, especially of nickel, with financing from the Rothschild bankers in France, and by 1880, *La Société de Nickel* (SLN) emerged as the largest local company. Most successful small farmers depended on the needs of the miners to survive. In 1887, New Caledonia adopted the Algerian colonial system known as the *Indigénat*, segregating the indigenous communities from the Europeans not only spatially but also legally, because the indigenous people had no civil rights. Because of indigenous confinement on native reserves, 'the two communities, French and Kanak, lived juxtaposed, but without intermingling and indeed virtually incommunicado'.[37] The indigenous population did not die out as expected. In fact, their population began to revive in the 1920s and would remain the majority of local residents until the 1960s. Indigenous revolts repeatedly drove many rural settlers south toward the capital, Noumea, but the myth of rural pioneers (and hardy prospectors) endured.[38] A wealthy elite of two dozen families claimed that settlers had brought modernity, but others disagreed: 'Isolated, individualistic, jealous of their landed property, and accustomed to having cheap labor at their disposal, the *broussards* [bush settlers] lacked the pioneer spirit required to develop a new country'.[39] After the 1952 discovery in New Caledonia of distinctive Lapita pottery dating back to 1200 BC, settler historiography attributed it to a pre-Melanesian 'golden age' when ancient 'light-skinned' voyagers had produced intensive terraced farming and ritual decorative arts until 'nomadic' Melanesian migrants had destroyed that 'civilization'.[40] As in the Mediterranean crossroads trope among Algerian *pieds noirs*, this New Caledonian 'ancient' settler myth proposed that later French, Asian and Polynesian arrivals are simply additional migrant waves. Nor are New Caledonia's Melanesians truly aboriginal but purportedly form part of a contemporary mosaic of multiple ethno-cultural communities with equal historical standing. Recent archeology has disproven such spurious temporal and racial claims: local Melanesians speak Austronesian languages just as the Lapita potters did, continued to make other ceramics and built the terraces around AD 700. Christophe Sand has argued that the indigenous inhabitants had developed intensive agriculture and larger chiefdoms by the time that Europeans arrived with epidemic diseases and colonization to interrupt local progress.[41]

In addition to French convicts, political prisoners and coerced Melanesian labor, European settlers hired Asian indentured workers on five-year contracts as early as the 1860s, because although imported, they cost far less to employ than Europeans. First came Indians from Reunion in the Indian Ocean to grow sugar cane, then Chinese, particularly to work in the nickel industry in the 1880s, along with Indonesians, Vietnamese (including convicts and rebel prisoners) and Japanese, who were deported in World War II and had their properties confiscated

and auctioned off.[42] By 1930, Asian immigrant workers actually outnumbered the entire European population, but the latter had shown increasing signs of a racial backlash after the convict transportation system ended. As early as 1910, the year the SLN nickel processing plant opened at Doniambo, the local press and labor unions had promoted hiring indigenous workers (as 'first occupants of this land') instead of Asians/*Asiatiques*. Yet in 1929, the punishments under the *Indigénat* for employed Melanesians who committed insubordination also increased because 'French that we are, we would like to stay that way in our essentially white Caledonia'.[43] After 1945, the remaining indenture contracts terminated, and most Asians were repatriated (Vietnamese took longer because of the Indochina war), except for a few who remained in niche farming and small businesses. As one settler farmer wrote, 'Like everyone, I would be happy to have new workers; my land that I had cleared with so much trouble, is returning to bush, my coffee plantation is transforming into virgin forest because I alone cannot do everything. Yes, it is urgent that the labor situation should change, otherwise it will be the end of colonization here'.[44] Menial Asian labor, at least in the mines and construction, would increasingly be replaced by Polynesians from other French territories in the south Pacific such as Wallis and Futuna and French Polynesia, plus a small stream of contract workers from nearby Vanuatu (formerly the New Hebrides, a 'condominium' that France shared with Britain until 1980). Today, Asians and Polynesians constitute about one-fifth of the total population of New Caledonia and, despite their heritage of being mostly subaltern employees of the Europeans, the latter tend to count them politically as fellow settlers because of intermarriage and their shared French citizenship, which allows them to stay in the country. Lingering economic dependency has also made most Asians and Polynesians into French loyalists.[45] Notable exceptions to this pattern include André Dang, head of the pro-independence mining company in the Northern Province; Gustave Teheo, a Tahitian Chinese lawyer who supports independence; Aloisio Sako of Wallis and Futuna, who heads a pro-independence party; and Michel Teharuru of Tahiti, who is a militant pro-independence labor leader.

By the 1940s, the minority settler population that had developed in New Caledonia was far from being a Neo-Europe. Instead, it was mostly absent in the outer islands, scattered among a few small towns and farms in the interior of the main island and predominately clustered around the capital in the south, where a client oligarchy of ranchers, mine owners and businessmen controlled politics and the economy. This pattern had developed as early as the 1880s, when 90 landowners possessed at least 500 hectares, of whom 12 had over 12,000 hectares each. In the 1940s, 72 per cent of privately owned land was in the hands of 5 per cent of the settlers, of whom six held 29 per cent. Moreover, less than 2 per cent of settler-owned land was actively farmed, and fewer than a thousand settlers lived outside urban centers; Melanesians were still legally, politically and economically marginalized before World War II.[46] The settlers participated in a small General Council as early as 1885, but French colonial expansionist Paul Leroy-Beaulieu had called that step 'premature' and recommended that either the role or the electorate of the council should be restricted.[47] Tensions existed in the General Council between conservatives nicknamed the 'Mountain', who felt that white settler interests should remain paramount, and the more anti-oligarchic and somewhat pro-indigenous 'Plain', but the governor had final say in any case.[48] Meanwhile, the 1931 Colonial Exposition in Paris displayed undressed Christian Melanesians as cannibals in the New Caledonian exhibit, even shipping a few off to a Hamburg zoo in exchange for crocodiles.[49] Two countries in one had developed, the settler colony and the indigenous reserves. The white inhabitants of the former called themselves *calédoniens* (ironically, from Scots), and the latter were labeled *canaques* (from the Hawaiian word *kanaka*, or person, which had traveled around Oceania in shipboard and plantation pidgin as a term for natives), though by the 1970s that would become Kanak.

The pendulum swings of decolonization and the
Kanak Revolt (1946–1988)

This rigid colonial system experienced a severe shock when France fell to the Nazis in 1940 and endured four years of occupation, in effect making it a colony of Germany. Francophone anti-colonialists Aimé Césaire and Frantz Fanon, both from Martinique in the Caribbean, regarded it as the outcome of French karma to experience the imperial conquest and exploitation that its overseas non-white subjects had endured. As Césaire put it: 'At the end of the blind alley that is Europe . . . is Hitler'.[50] In the Pacific, French territories were left to choose between Charles de Gaulle's 'Free France' in exile or Marshal Pétain's puppet Vichy regime, whose wartime motto was 'three colors, one flag, one empire', referring to its black, brown and yellow subject races.[51] To win overseas support, De Gaulle in his 1944 speech in Brazzaville, Congo, offered greater 'participation' in democracy and development after the war to the colonies which sided with his Free France movement.[52] Meanwhile, after some hesitation, French Pacific colonies chose Free France, while Vichy supporters were shipped off to pro-Vichy Indochina. In New Caledonia, many settlers (and indigenous chiefs) rallied to De Gaulle and demonstrated in Noumea. Armed *broussards* (bush settlers) from the interior pushed the governor to accept a De Gaulle appointee, though some actually demanded independence.[53] Then, in 1942, thousands of United States troops set up bases in New Caledonia and hired people at better wages than ever before, including indigenous workers, fueling a local economic boom. American troops outnumbered the 60,000 local inhabitants by about two to one, and altogether over a million passed through on their way to fight the Japanese.[54] In addition, the alliance with the Soviet Union helped to inspire the creation of a local Communist Party that won labor union support and agitated for indigenous rights. Asian indenture contracts were terminated in 1945, and the following year Paris enacted reforms that abolished the *Indigénat* and finally enabled the indigenous people to obtain citizenship and voting rights after a century of colonial rule. Such emancipation resembled the 1789 elections to the Estates-General in France (after a 175-year hiatus). In the words of local historian Ismet Kurtovitch, New Caledonia was thus able to 'exit from a juridical ghetto'.[55]

After World War II, the United Nations voiced support for the self-determination of all nonself-governing territories and set up a committee to monitor decolonization, but France and other colonial powers (who at the time still made up the majority of UN members and several of whom had veto power in the Security Council) resisted outside interference. Britain, and its settler surrogates Australia and New Zealand, freed the most colonies in the south Pacific, especially after losing India in 1947 and Suez in 1956, but France, like the US, was most reluctant to do so, apart from co-ruled Vanuatu and the Philippines, respectively. The Cold War also complicated decolonization in Oceania, as the 1952 ANZUS Treaty effectively turned the region into an anti-Communist lake and atomic bomb testing by the US, Britain and France aroused the resentment of indigenous peoples, who regarded it as 'nuclear colonialism'.[56] France granted civil rights to its colonial nationals, who thus became citizens, renamed its colonies as 'Overseas Territories' and removed its Pacific territories from the UN Decolonization list. Those reforms opened a new era of local politics in New Caledonia, where, by 1947, the elected General Council was dominated by a leftist alliance. The local Communist Party appealed to indigenous Kanak with rhetoric of liberation, solidarity and communalism that induced about 2,000 to join up.[57] But missionaries became alarmed at the spread of "atheistic" propaganda and organized Kanak members of Catholic and Protestant churches into civic associations that recruited nearly 8,000 members for articulating reformist political agendas. These chief- and church-based organizations supported the 1951 election of Maurice Lenormand, a metropolitan migrant who had married a Kanak woman, as deputy to the National Assembly in Paris. He campaigned for social

peace and harmony among all elements of the population, though conservative critics called him the Canaque Deputy.[58] Kanak were half the population of about 65,000, European settlers were one-third, and other minorities were 20 percent.[59]

By 1953, Lenormand's multi-racial supporters united as the *Union Calédonienne* (UC), which won most elections for a generation. The UC party motto was 'two colors, one people', though it relied primarily on Kanak voters, whose numbers increased in increments until, by 1957, all Kanak adults could vote. By then, Paris had granted self-governing 'autonomy' to the territory, such that the members of the executive cabinet of the Territorial Assembly (TA) held ministerial decision-making powers, so it appeared that decolonization in New Caledonia was proceeding smoothly. The UC was progressive, creating a comprehensive social security fund, supporting labor unions and educational and infrastructure improvements in Kanak reserves, and seeking greater local control over resources such as nickel. But it came under relentless attack by smaller conservative parties representing the old colonial oligarchy, who complained bitterly that autonomy would lead to independence. A French scholar has argued that the UC represented out-groups and was still rather paternalistic in its mainly European leadership over the mainly Kanak membership.[60] That claim is partly true, though by winning local elections by large margins for 20 years, the UC clearly had a mass appeal, and over time its settler support shifted somewhat from rural agriculturalists to urban unionists. When De Gaulle returned to power in 1958, after the Algerian war had destabilized France, he sought to restore the national image and offered overseas territories a choice of membership in a new French Community or independence (only Guinea voted for that). French military personnel and settlers attempted to seize power in Algeria, unsuccessfully, and, in Noumea, French military and settlers demonstrated violently, harassing UC members of the assembly and pushing the governor to declare a state of emergency and call for new elections.[61] In effect, self-determination was interrupted for the second time since French annexation in 1853.

De Gaulle appointed a new governor to New Caledonia who had previous experience in suppressing radical nationalism in the Ivory Coast, and Gaullist Paris began a process of withdrawing self-governing powers from the territory over the next decade. De Gaulle regarded New Caledonia's nickel (used in armaments as well as electronics) and nuclear test sites in French Polynesia as strategic assets, so his regime falsely accused Lenormand and Tahitian autonomist Pouvanaa a Oopa of promoting violence. Lenormand lost his civil rights for several years, while Pouvanaa went to prison in France.[62] The UC continued to win elections but increasingly lacked political authority as ministerial and other powers ended. The liberal wing of the settlers and Kanak communities had been calling for the creation of a 'Caledonian Personality' within the French Community, and as late as 1967, 69 percent of local voters supported that arrangement. But conservatives wanted to maintain their former colonial monopolies and kept accusing the UC of incompetence and adventurism in trying to open up its economy to foreign investors outside France and also to develop diplomatic relations with countries in Asia. The oligarchy lacked sufficient demographic and democratic numbers to control the government the way it had done before World War II, so it kept appealing to Gaullist Paris. Their quest was helped by the nickel boom caused in part by the US war in Vietnam, from the late 1960s into the early 1970s, when over 20,000 immigrants arrived, mostly from France but also from Wallis and Futuna and French Polynesia. In violation of a 1970 UN Resolution (2621), Paris deliberately orchestrated this new influx of opportunistic *zoreilles* (ears, or job seekers), many of whom had better qualifications than Caledonians and incurred resentment from local-born workers.[63] In 1971, French Premier Pierre Messmer wrote, 'The indigenous nationalist demand will only be avoided if non-Pacific communities form the majority . . . in an operation of overseas colonization',[64] and Noumea Mayor Roger Laroque said, 'We must make whites (*faire du blanc*), make metropolitans come here.

That way, there will be no Canaque problem'.[65] As a result of the new wave of immigration, in 1972, the UC lost the TA elections for the first time.

Meanwhile, UC dissidents and radical anti-colonialists had begun to voice demands for a return of autonomy, or even independence from France. Yann Céléné Uregei of the UC had come to resent settler paternalism within the party and personal defeats in his attempts to become TA vice-president, so he rallied dissidents into a new party by 1971, which vacillated between coop-eration with the UC and with the conservative bloc.[66] Young Caledonian and Kanak university students also became more active in radical politics after studying in France in the 1960s and experiencing the May 1968 student-worker uprising against De Gaulle. They had learned from Third World writers like Fanon and Memmi and metropolitan activists that the 'mother country' that was 'recolonizing' their homeland under De Gaulle also had a revolutionary heritage. Their 1968 action committee demanded a restoration of autonomy in New Caledonia 'in the name of France', because due to retrograde decrees, 'freedom is censored, equality transformed into a system of exploitation, and fraternity replaced by paternalism'. They said they had seen the true face of France in May: 'In the streets of the Latin Quarter, in spite of police clubs, thousands of students woke up'.[67] In early 1969, they launched a new journal, *Canaque Homme Libre* (Kanak Free Man), whose founding staff of 10 members were four Kanak, five white Caledonians and an Asian. In a way that resembled Aime Césaire's reinterpretation of '*nègre*' in the 1930s Négritude literary movement, they revalued a colonial epithet as an anti-colonial identity (spelled Kanak by 1972), and chose

> 'Canaque' as a symbol of our action, because this word reflects the total reality of contem-porary Caledonia: the European says it with contempt, the colored person designated by the word carries the label like a burden, it wounds him. Being certain that humanity is the highest good, the only one worthy of the pain of combat, we take this word, which flatters the egotism of one race while hurting the other, in the following sense: Canaque, Free Man. Canaque is no longer for us a pejorative term reserved for a race, but for all Caledonians passionate about freedom, no matter what race they belong to.[68]

The conservative-owned press in Noumea criticized the young radicals for wasting their time and scholarship money on politics when they should be learning to help their country. But for several years, students such as Jean-Paul Caillard (medicine), Max Chivot (economics) and the Kanak chief's son Nidoish Naisseline (sociology) had been articulating in a previous journal their critical vision of the distortions caused by Paris politics and nickel boom economics in New Cal-edonia. They pointed to the growing social inequalities, the decline of agriculture, the insufficient education for local development, the recent powerlessness of the TA and the need for settlers and migrant *zoreilles* to respect the indigenous identity instead of re-marginalizing it after only a generation of emancipation. They had communicated with Kanak priest Apollinaire Anova-Ataba, whose thesis re-examined the 1878 revolt, with Uregei, with Deputy Rock Pidjot of the UC, who had replaced Lenormand, and with *Sikiss*, a leftist union bulletin in Noumea. They also developed plans for a possible 'awakening' of residents of the capital, from testing racial discrim-ination in popular restaurants to painting graffiti on walls. Shortly before the French national celebration of Bastille Day (14 July 1969), Caillard and two white accomplices did the latter with slogans such as 'Vive l'Indépendance!' They were quickly arrested, but the night before their trial, still more graffiti appeared, this time with a more Kanak flavor, such as 'Canaques, Be Men' and criticisms of Kanak participation in the upcoming Pacific Games in Papua New Guinea – a protest reminiscent of the 1968 raised-fist protests by African-American Olympians in Mexico City. Naisseline and others were arrested, but as a chief's son, he attracted a large Melanesian

crowd outside the police station demanding his release, and a riot ensued on 2 September that the radicals called their Bastille Day.[69]

These provocations, trials and conflicts baptized a multi-racial anti-colonial movement that became known in the press as the *Foulards Rouges* (Red Scarves, which were worn around heads or arms). They soon published a new journal, *Réveil Canaque* (Kanak Awakening), which attracted a growing following of young Caledonians and Kanak, including secondary school students and teachers. When Naisseline was blamed for distributing a radical tract, which was translated into two indigenous languages, an illegal act in itself at the time, he was put on trial for inciting racial violence. 'It's true', he said, 'we wanted to commit two murders: that of the myth of white racial superiority and that of the myth of Canaque savagery. . . . Whites must understand that the Canaque problem is a Caledonian problem, that our problems are theirs'.[70] The small radical movement would gradually grow, temporarily allying with Uregei and spawning two offshoots, one that focused on the issue of returning lands to Kanak clans on the main island and another that proposed leftist remedies for socioeconomic ills and political recolonization. By 1975, Uregei, the UC and other political groups espoused the radical demand for independence after French President Jacques Chirac told them autonomy was obsolete. The following year, young radicals formed a new political party for the upcoming TA elections, Palika (*Parti de Libération Kanak*), and Naisseline won an assembly seat in 1977, despite his previous arrests.[71]

By then, however, another rising political star among Kanak had also arisen, Jean-Marie Tjibaou, an ex-priest who had organized Melanesia 2000 in 1975, a cultural arts festival in Noumea that included some revolutionary theater about colonization in New Caledonia. He had replaced Lenormand and Pidjot with his own team as leaders of a more Kanak UC, which to the present day remains the largest pro-independence party.[72] But because of rising conservative voter numbers, millionaire Jacques Lafleur organized his own *Rassemblement* (Rally, playing on De Gaulle's call to rally to Free France during the war), a multi-ethnic but mostly settler coalition that was business-oriented and loyalist. Polarizing ethno-political tensions continued to escalate, but Socialist François Mitterrand's election as French President in 1981 gave the UC and others new hopes for decolonization. Mitterrand encouraged attempts at cross-cutting compromises in New Caledonia as well as steps toward greater local self-government.[73]

Settler vigilantes, some of whom were *pieds noirs* or exiles from Indochina or nearby Vanuatu (which had just become independent in 1980), had been organizing armed militias to protect their rural lands from Kanak activist claims and occupations. The French secretary-general of the UC was assassinated in his own home in Noumea, and the land office was bombed. Alarmed by increasing violence, centrist dissidents from Lafleur's Rassemblement formed a governing coalition with Tjibaou's team in the TA and discussed land reform, but settler extremists rioted in the capital and invaded the TA hall to attack cabinet members. The Tjibaou-centrist coalition would endure for two more years, during which the first negotiation over future status was undertaken by the Socialist Premier Georges Lemoine, in 1983 at Nainville-les-Roches outside Paris. After heart-felt dialogue, in which Kanak nationalists accepted the settlers as fellow 'victims of history', Lemoine drew up a communiqué to restore autonomy. But Lafleur's team would not sign it, so Lemoine and Tjibaou and their teams signed it, recognizing the 'innate and active right' of the indigenous people to independence. Tjibaou's independence coalition formed a new organization, the FLNKS (*Front de Libération Nationale Kanak et Socialiste*), and a 'Provisional Government of Kanaky' in 1984. The FLNKS continued to occupy lands, boycotted elections and erected road blocks, while settlers ambushed and killed a dozen unarmed relatives and fellow villagers of Tjibaou and shooting matches developed in the bush.[74]

A sporadic conflict ensued for four years that killed over 70 people (mostly Kanak), as armed settler militias, their hired Polynesian auxiliaries, and 10,000 French troops and police confronted

poorly armed Kanak militants, who nevertheless seized several up-country towns and mines. The Non-Aligned Movement helped the FLNKS to have New Caledonia reinstated on the UN Decol-onization list, but the French and settler loyalist press invoked Cold War and racial stereotypes against the FLNKS.[75] The culmination of that struggle was a firefight in 1988 during the presi-dential elections in France, when Gaullist Premier Chirac challenged Mitterrand for the French presidency, with National Front leader Jean-Marie Le Pen preaching a hard line against 'terrorism'. On Ouvea, an outer island, Kanak nationalists attacked a police station, took hostages and found themselves surrounded by French paratroopers and riot police, some of whom were veterans of the war in Chad against Libyan-backed rebels. The FLNKS wanted to negotiate, but the pressure on Mitterrand and Chirac before the second round of voting elicited a military assault that killed 19 Kanak and contributed to Mitterrand's election to a second term. The new Socialist premier, Lafleur, and Tjibaou went back to the negotiating table, and this time everyone signed. But Tjibaou paid for the compromise with his life when a Kanak from Ouvea assassinated him in 1989.[76]

Two negotiated peace accords: seeking a common destiny (1988–present)

The Matignon Accords of 1988 were the first successful negotiation between Paris, the settlers and the indigenous people. They recognized the 'double legitimacy' of indigenous and settler communities and postponed the independence issue for a decade until a referendum could be held. But meanwhile they proposed 'rebalancing' through greater state investment in economic development in rural Kanak areas, more training for administrative jobs and the creation of three semi-autonomous provinces, each of which would have its own assembly, from which members of the TA would be chosen proportionally.[77] Since then, Kanak have controlled two of the three provinces (north and outer islands), while settler loyalists control the more populous, multi-ethnic and economically powerful south. Some observers questioned whether the impact of the accords would help to prepare the country for more self-government or make it more dependent on French subsidies (as it had already been since the mid-1970s), thereby deterring a future 'yes' vote on independence, even among newly employed and empowered Kanak. The latter remained a demographic minority (44 percent), but perhaps a fifth tended to vote loyalist. By the late 1990s, the northern province acquired a mining company from Lafleur and used militant protests to pressure France into allowing and even subsidizing the construction of a Canadian-backed nickel processing plant there, and a second accord was soon negotiated instead of a referendum on independence.[78]

The Noumea Accord of 1998 officially recognized Kanak identity and culture in various ways, including the French-subsidized construction of a Cultural Center in Noumea named after Tjibaou and creating a Customary Senate to deal with Kanak cultural issues; the teaching of Kanak languages in schools and adapting school textbooks to the new political reality; allowing individuals to choose whether to live under French civil law or indigenous custom; the use of Kanak assessors to assist in law courts; and more land reform (today private Kanak and settler landownership is about equal, though the former is usually communal and the latter comprises far fewer proprietors). The accord 'irreversibly' restored autonomy to the country by increas-ingly devolving self-governing powers from Paris to Noumea, thereby creating a kind of federal arrangement with France that lacks a label in French law.[79] It also promised a referendum by 2018 on whether to transfer several powers reserved for Paris, such as defense and public order, and it proposed that the rival ethno-political communities of New Caledonia should peacefully seek a 'common destiny', for example in choosing shared symbols such as a motto, hymn, bank note images, flag and country name. The first three are now in place, but the last two remain conten-tious, along with the issue of establishing a local citizenship, e.g. by favoring locals in hiring and

restricting voting rights to long-term residents on key matters such as provincial elections and an independence referendum.[80]

The Kanak nationalist movement pushed France and the settlers to sign important negotiated peace accords that increasingly enlarge self-government in New Caledonia (reminiscent of the aborted 1950s trend) and officially recognize Kanak 'civilization' and promote more balanced economic development, though social inequalities remain. Both accords referred to the 'double legitimacy' of Kanak and settlers, but questions linger about whether an inclusive Caledonian identity should be encouraged or Kanaky can mean a future national identity, not simply an ethnic one. In a sense, the efforts of Kanak nationalists to re-center the country around their own heritage and reorient the 'common destiny' toward Oceania more than Europe skip over the notion of a cohesive 'settler' component built on more than loyalty to France, considering the diversity of non-Kanak ethnic communities. Liberal or even radical European settlers have played a role in New Caledonia, from the Committee for the Protection and Defense of Indigenous People in the 1890s that had demanded the return of Kanak lands and abrogation of the Kanak head tax[81] through the reformist 'Plain' faction of the General Council in the 1930s, the local Communist Party in the 1940s, the liberals with Lenormand in the UC, local Socialists and the centrists of the early 1980s, as well as those who participated in various ways in the anti-colonial movement from its birth in the 1960s as the Foulards Rouges to the FLNKS and associated groups. Yet the majority of white settlers and also of the Asian and Polynesian communities voice lingering fears of an independence that might cut them off from French citizenship rights, financial aid and police security, and together they still slightly outnumber the indigenous people

Although progress has been made in the new millennium in passing 'country laws' (with approval of the French council of state) and in working together on educational, environmental and socio-economic reforms, such issues as the new flag, voting rights and citizenship have sparked recurring polarization between loyalists and pro-independence leaders. Yet officially today everyone is at least an autonomist. Moreover, in the purportedly 'post-colonial' era since the two peace accords, the old ethno-political blocs have experienced increasing factionalism. In 2004, loyalist dissidents who had often complained about Lafleur's 'dictatorial' leadership style finally formed a new centrist party, Future Together, which won the provincial election in the south and took command of the congressional cabinet as well. They had a more social-democratic agenda than the pro-business perspective of Lafleur and his conservative allies. But the centrists soon splintered, and Caledonia Together, an offshoot of Future Together, took command in the 2009 provincial elections, only to be overthrown by successive cabinet resignations. They rebounded in 2012, however, by taking the two deputy posts in the French National Assembly from the conservatives, who nevertheless retained their two French Senate seats. After the May 2014 provincial elections, loyalists held 29 congress seats compared to 25 for the pro-independence parties, and six cabinet posts compared to five. But rivalries within those two opposing camps prevented the election of a stable cabinet for nearly a year. At last, on 1 April 2015, a portion of the UC (still the largest independence party, with 15 seats) decided that Caledonia Together (still the largest loyalist party, with 15 seats) shared its socio-economic goals, if not its desire for full sovereignty.[82] Can actual dialogue and day-to-day cooperation build more cross-cutting bridges?

Out of 54 members of Congress, the UC-FLNKS and Caledonia Together can potentially command 40 votes, compared to only 14 for two conservative loyalist parties. That is quite an opportunity to get things done, including dealing with rising living costs, housing shortages and other inequalities as well as better coordinating the mining industry for the future of the country. And independence or not, it is likely that the same or similar faces will continue to sit across the table. Daniel Goa, the UC president who compromised with Caledonia Together for the sake of having a functioning government executive, called for a 'vision of the country that we foresee

putting into place, to share with the majority of Caledonians. The project of society that we propose . . . permits to each Caledonian, whatever their race, ethnicity, origins or community, to grasp 'the day after' [a referendum] with confidence and calm. . . . For us, it's about unifying Caledonia because the moment has come for her to be empowered to take her place in the concert of nations'.[83] If ad hoc settler-Kanak cooperation can endure amid ongoing challenges, trust between the two sides may grow, and self-government might become a habit. At the risk of sounding too optimistic, one could perhaps ask the question, has settler 'colonialism' finally ended?

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28

SETTLER AUSTRALIA IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

Sarah Maddison

In 1901, the six British colonies that had established themselves on *terra australis* were transformed into the states of the new Commonwealth of Australia. Federation created a new Australian political system, with a new constitution and a federated system of government that together constituted the settler colonial state as an independent nation. But while the colonies moved further towards independence from Britain, for the original inhabitants of the continent, federation changed little. Indeed, the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples of Australia were profoundly ignored during the process of federation to the extent that mention of them was omitted from the new constitution (barring certain racist provisions discussed later in the chapter). The eliminatory logic of settler colonialism was much in evidence as a new nation set about constructing itself as though the Indigenous peoples of the land had never existed.

Over the following century, this settler colonial logic persisted. Despite certain periods of apparently more progressive policy-making in the Indigenous domain, settler colonialism has remained the dominant structuring force in the relationship between the Australian state and Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples.[1] In the face of this logic, both the continued existence of Indigenous people and their sustained political demands have proved problematic for the Australian settler state, which has attempted to eliminate the Indigenous presence through policies of protection, assimilation, self-determination, intervention and, most recently, recognition. Despite analyses of these policy regimes that highlight their apparently divergent ideological underpinnings, it is evident that the logic of settler colonialism has remained in operation throughout the twentieth century and into the twenty-first.[2] Indeed, it is clear that contemporary settler colonial relations in Australia are actively produced and reproduced in present day politics, policy and discourse.[3]

Yet, as this chapter will argue, Indigenous contestation of settler colonial dominance has also persisted throughout the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, and it is in fact through this contestation that the eliminatory logic of contemporary settler colonialism is most clearly revealed. The chapter argues that the Australian case exemplifies what can be seen as the *key political dynamic of settler colonialism*, that is, the endless cycling of attempts to eliminate or absorb the Indigenous population, which are met with Indigenous resistance that in turn disrupts settler legitimacy. This political dynamic has been a constituent component of all settler colonial regimes, including Australia, since their various moments of invasion. In Australia, however, contestation and resistance by Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples came into particular focus in the second half of

the twentieth century, as the Indigenous rights movement began to articulate their claims as colonized peoples demanding recognition of their sovereignty rather than as an excluded minority seeking civil inclusion.[4]

Importantly, however, the moments of 'unease and disruption' produced by Indigenous resistance provide no evidence of an effort to reconcile a settler colonial past, as some suggest.[5] Instead, these moments both reveal the falsity of a linear narrative of decolonization manifesting in some kind of 'radical break' with the past and attest to the 'structural temporality' of settler colonialism, which effectively obscures the 'vanishing endpoint' of its own resolution or consummation.[6] This revelation allows an understanding of contemporary Australian settler colonialism that emphasizes its structural continuity, discredits ideas of gradual decolonization and reveals the underlying similarities between 'conservative' and 'progressive' policy regimes.[7] In contrast to suggestions that the twentieth century saw Australia begin to develop what Moran calls an 'indigenizing settler nationalism' that was less exclusionary of Indigenous peoples,[8] a more critical analysis suggests that settler colonialism persists in structure and policy. Indeed, it is significant that the contemporary Australian settler colonial imaginary still sees the nation on a pathway towards a more 'settled' post-colonial future that has 'reconciled' past injustice.[9] This dynamic of settler colonial nation building has been evident throughout the twentieth century.

Nation, identity, treaty

The constitution that created a federation of the former Australian colonies in 1901 gave little thought to how Indigenous peoples might be included in the new nation. In fact, the only references to Aboriginal people were in Section 51 (xxvi), which empowered the federal parliament to make laws with respect to the 'people of any race, other than the aboriginal race', and Section 127, which excluded Aboriginal people from being counted in the national census. And while neither section actually excluded Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people from Australian citizenship, they both suggested that Indigenous peoples were not really a part of the Australian nation.[10] Race and racism were certainly a component of this exclusion. Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander cultures were considered primitive and inferior to the whiteness and Britishness that were valorised in early twentieth century Australia and which formed the cultural base and ethnic foundations of the settler state. Indigenous people were imagined as lacking the qualities required for civic inclusion and, significantly, as a people without a future and therefore likely to be only a 'fleeting problem' for the new nation.[11]

This exclusionary framing of the nation, so typical of settler colonial logic, perpetuated what the anthropologist W.E.H Stanner described as the 'great Australian silence' about the atrocities and injustices perpetrated against Indigenous people. Stanner contended that the degree of neglect afforded to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples in Australian history was not the result of mere 'absent-mindedness' but instead reflected something fundamental to Australian national identity, creating 'a view from a window which has been carefully placed to exclude a whole quadrant of the landscape'.[12] Despite this careful placement, however, the colonial view from this window has been persistently interrupted by the Indigenous presences and by assertions of sovereignty, demands for a treaty and the wider contestation of the legitimacy of the settler state. Indeed, Indigenous resistance to the settler colonial narrative of nationhood has effectively 'destabilized' this narrative and, particularly since the 1960s, foregrounded the more unsettling history of dispossession and injustice.[13]

Yet in the face of this destabilisation, the 'settlers' that occupied increasing areas of Australian territory continued to cling to a sense of British national identity, despite becoming increasingly multicultural and cosmopolitan in their composition over the course of the twentieth century.

From the passing of a 'White Australia' policy as the first act of the new federal parliament to the rejection of a 1999 referendum proposing that Australia become a republic, settler national identity has maintained a stubborn attachment to Britain as the 'mother country.' At the same time, however, settler communities promulgated a view of themselves as profoundly egalitarian, creating a national mythology of Australia as the 'Lucky Country'[14] – the so-called land of the 'fair go'. In the face of such assertions, the contestations over legitimacy and national identity that dominate the relationship between settlers and Indigenous peoples, along with the more critical history of colonization and its impacts that emerged during the twentieth century, brought into question both the founding stories of how the nation came to be and the assertion that this 'new' nation was a place of justice and egalitarian opportunity.[15] The conflict between the settlers' view of themselves as fair and just and the historical evidence of brutality and injustice has added a certain brittleness to Australian settler-Indigenous political contestation, particularly those contestations concerned with questions of national identity.[16]

Key among these contestations over nation and national identity has been the Indigenous demand for a treaty. The annual celebration of Australian settler nationalism on 26 January (the anniversary of the European invasion) is one example of the settler colonial political dynamic in action in twentieth-century Australia. Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people have long called for a change of date for Australia's national day, dubbing 26 January Survival Day or Invasion Day rather than Australia Day. The contest around this particular aspect of settler colonial domination entered the national consciousness during the 1988 bicentennial celebrations when the demands of the 'Treaty '88' campaign effectively disrupted the official proceedings. Over time, Indigenous demands for a treaty have taken various forms, some conciliatory, some secessionist. In 2000, for example, Patrick Dodson[17] articulated the key principles that would need to be addressed in a more conciliatory treaty, specifically including political representation; reparations and compensation; regional agreements; Indigenous regional self-government; cultural and intellectual property rights; recognition of customary law; and an economic base. Much earlier than Dodson, and by contrast, Kevin Gilbert[18] developed a draft treaty that called for the creation of a sovereign and autonomous Aboriginal State, which comprised a land base of 'not less than forty percent of the land mass of each "Australian State."' Gilbert's draft was a central component of the Treaty '88 campaign, which also saw the then Prime Minister, Bob Hawke, presented with the Barunga Statement[19] and in response commit to negotiating a national treaty with Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people.

This commitment was never realized. Although in the 1980s both conservative and Labor governments had considered Indigenous calls for a treaty, by the 1990s, both major political parties had deemed the claim to Aboriginal sovereignty, which underwrote the demand for a treaty, unreasonable. During national debate about a treaty in 1988, John Howard (who would go on to be Australian prime minister from 1996 to 2007) declared it 'an absurd proposition that a nation should make a treaty with some of its own citizens'.[20] The formal reconciliation process was proposed as an alternative that would take the issue of a treaty forward but in fact failed to progress this aim in any meaningful way. Indeed, the Howard government's formal response to the Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation's final report vehemently rejected calls for a treaty, arguing that:

> such a legally enforceable instrument, as between sovereign states, would be divisive, would undermine the concept of a single Australian nation, would create legal uncertainty and future disputation and would not best harness the positive environment that now exists in reconciliation. In fact, such a process could threaten that environment.[21]

Thus, while Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people continue to see a treaty or treaties as a significant step towards the recognition of their sovereignty, potentially allowing for a new framework in the settler colonial political relationship, for the settler state, calls for a treaty remain a deeply unsettling reminder of the nation's founding illegitimacy. A treaty was considered 'too divisive' for the Australian nation, with reconciliation instead offering to 'include' Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples in the Australian state.[22] In rejecting calls for a treaty, the unity of the Australian state was defined in such a way that alternatives allowing for both domestic citizenship and some form of political independence became impossible.[23] Yet such rejection has not succeeded in closing down the treaty debate. Indeed, the continuous assertion of Indigenous sovereignty throughout the twentieth century has remained an explicit challenge to the legitimacy of the settler state. A contemporary campaign to see Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people recognized in the Australian constitution has brought treaty talk back into public discourse, and such a future negotiation does not seem impossible.

The policy regimes of settler colonialism: assimilation, self-determination, intervention

Alongside the limited and exclusionary framing of the nation permitted by the logic of settler colonialism, twentieth century Australia perpetuated a series of policy regimes that were further intended to erase the Indigenous presence. By the time of federation, the general policy framework was one of 'protection', which saw Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people kept separate from settler society on reserves and missions. Protection policies assumed that Aboriginal people were merely an ancient remnant who would inevitably die out. Between 1901 and 1946, the protection regime saw all Australian States pass legislation to control Indigenous peoples' independence of movement, marriage, employment and association and that authorised the removal of Aboriginal children from their families. Throughout this period, protection policies were also subverted and resisted, and by the 1920s and 1930s, activists such as Fred Maynard and the Australian Aboriginal Progressive Association and William Cooper and his organisation, the Australian Aborigines' League, were working to develop a national movement to contest these policy regimes and demand citizenships rights. The logic of settler colonialism effectively contained these efforts, however, in large part due to the continuing restrictions on Indigenous people's movement under protectionist regimes.

Over time, however, as it became evident that Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people were not dying out, the settler regime adopted a different strategy of elimination, and by the 1950s, the state was advancing a policy of 'assimilation' (although many States had adopted policies of assimilation earlier than this). The assumption underlying assimilation policy was that Indigenous people could be 'absorbed' into settler society and thus be erased as a distinct and confronting polity. Assimilation policies insisted that Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people give up their cultural distinctiveness, with full and substantive citizenship rights ostensibly offered as a 'reward' to Aboriginal people prepared to renounce their Aboriginality and embrace the dominant culture.[24] To facilitate the process of assimilation, light-skinned Indigenous children were targeted for removal from their families to be placed in white institutions or with white families, a practice that became the subject of a later apology.

Yet despite the extraordinary challenges faced during these discriminatory policy eras, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people continued to prioritise their independence from the state and their continuing connections to land and kin. Resistance to settler colonial authority during this period saw the evolution of Indigenous political struggle against dispossession and settler domination, struggles which combined vocal demands for entitlements from the state

with demands for rights to land, political autonomy and self-determination. To some extent, this contestation was effective, and from the 1960s onwards the Australian settler state attempted to distance itself from earlier, coercive policy regimes and instead present itself as more neutral in the exercise of its authority, governing for both Indigenous and non-Indigenous people.[25] As a result, by the 1970s there was growing optimism among Aboriginal leaders and activists that the Australian settler state was beginning to recognise their political claims. This optimism reached a zenith when, in 1972, the federal government introduced a formal policy of self-determination, which was to remain the dominant political framing of the settler policy regime for the next thirty years.

Yet despite the new rhetoric, the Australian settler state did not in fact allow a formal policy of self-determination to displace its colonial ambitions. The version of self-determination introduced in Australia had weak and compromised philosophical underpinnings that meant Indigenous aspirations for autonomy were buried in practices that remained fundamentally assimilationist. As Macoun and Strakosch point out, self-determination functioned as a further attempt by the settler state to demonstrate its sovereign legitimacy by showing that it had 'absorbed independent Indigenous political life and successfully completed the settler colonial project'.[26] Although the self-determination regime saw a new investment of resources into Indigenous cultures and communities, by absorbing Indigenous culture and community while erasing Indigenous political existence, such practices can also be seen as the 'most successful' form of settler colonial political assimilation.[27]

Yet even the successes of assimilation–as–self-determination were not enough to satisfy the eliminatory logic of settler colonialism in twentieth century Australia. The troubled history of Indigenous political representation exemplifies this point. Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people had some form of elected national representation almost continuously from the 1970s to the mid-2000s. The most sustained was the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC), which began life in 1990. During the 15 years of its existence, ATSIC was subject of both praise and criticism. Some saw any effort to incorporate Indigenous representation into a bureaucratic structure as an effort to derail and de-mobilise Indigenous contestation of the settler state. Nevertheless, ATSIC survived until its abolition by the Howard Government in 2005, when, at the media conference announcing the organisation's abolition, Howard described ATSIC as a mere 'experiment in separate representation' that would not be replaced. The description of ATSIC as an 'experiment' underscored the contemporary settler state's discomfort with even a government–managed model of self-determination. Indeed, Indigenous critics of ATSIC's abolition made clear that the organisation's value had hinged on its role as an 'independent voice' with the capacity to express and amplify Indigenous views that 'conflicted with the federal government's'.[28]

In the years immediately following the demise of ATSIC, it quickly became clear just how important that independent voice had been in resisting and contesting settler colonial policy regimes. In June 2007, the then-Prime Minister, John Howard, announced an 'emergency intervention' into Aboriginal communities in the Northern Territory in response to the *Ampe Akelyernemane Meke Mekarle 'Little Children are Sacred'* report from the Northern Territory Board of Inquiry into the Protection of Aboriginal Children from Sexual Abuse.[29] The 'emergency response' contained extraordinary provisions including (among other measures) widespread alcohol restrictions on Northern Territory Aboriginal land; paternalistic welfare reforms that would 'quarantine' social security income for approved purchases; measures to enforce school attendance by linking income support and family assistance payments to school attendance; a ban on the possession of X-rated pornography and audits of all publicly funded computers to identify illegal material; and the appointment of government business managers in all prescribed communities.

Passing the legislation to introduce the intervention policies required the suspension of the Racial Discrimination Act (1975) by prescribing the intervention as falling under the 'special measures' provision of the Act.

As many Indigenous and non-Indigenous critics were quick to observe, the racialised, neo-assimilationist, settler-colonial intentions of the intervention effectively advanced the settler colonial project of domination and elimination and obscured the structural violence inherent in the regulation and control of Indigenous societies.[30] Settler culture was used as a 'benchmark' against which Indigenous cultures were evaluated, with the assumed superiority of settler culture revealing the ways in which a settler-colonial 'mentality' continues to influence Australian policy regimes.[31] Through intervention, indigeneity was to be absorbed into the superior moral order of the settler state, where it would (hopefully) disappear from view, thereby reinforcing the sovereign legitimacy of the settler state.[32] Further, in advancing this policy regime, the Australian settler state moved away from the more neutral self-representations of the self-determination regime, again becoming overt in its exercise of authority over Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander lives.[33] Indigenous peoples in Australia have found this more explicit expression of settler domination quite difficult to contest, particularly given its characterization of indigeneity itself as problematic. Yet, while muted, Indigenous resistance and contestation of this policy regime has continued, and this key dynamic of settler colonialism continues to deny settler legitimacy.

Land and law

Another key feature of contemporary Australian settler colonialism has been persistent struggles over land, which have been a feature of the relationship between Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples and the state ever since Indigenous lands were first invaded in 1788. Henry Reynolds describes colonization in Australia as 'one of the greatest appropriations of land in world history', arguing that the British declaration of *terra nullius* set the stage for more than two centuries of land struggles.[34] This appropriation of land was particularly distressing because, like many Indigenous peoples around the world, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples' relationship with land goes beyond a Western conception of property and ownership to also underpin their foundational cosmology. Yet it is precisely this deep connection to land that is most threatening to settler-colonial society, challenging both the settlers' access to land as an economic resource and – perhaps more significantly – the settlers' sovereign authority over the territory.[35]

Indigenous peoples in Australia resisted the invasion of their territories from the outset, but it was not until the second half of the twentieth century that struggles for the recognition of the prior and distinct nature of Indigenous landholding began to gain political ground. New political contestations over land rights began to emerge in the 1960s: 1963 saw the Yolngu bark petitions sent to Canberra in protest over the mining of their land on the Gove peninsula, and 1966 witnessed the Gurindji walk-off from the Wave Hill station. The land rights campaigns of the 1960s and 1970s were a central aspect of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander resistance to the settler state. These struggles, waged by an emerging, national movement, made direct links between the issues of land rights and Indigenous sovereignty.

Over time, Indigenous contestations of settler authority over land began to have some impact. Although Australian governments had long acted as if Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people had not existed or held any rights before the arrival of the British, in 1971, the landmark legal judgment in *Milirrpum v Nabalco Pty Ltd* (often referred to as the 'Gove Land Rights case') began to reverse this thinking by accepting that Indigenous peoples had maintained a system of land ownership that predated settler society but determined that the communal nature of that ownership meant it could not be recognized in Western property law. This view was maintained

until the 1992 Mabo case, when the High Court of Australia determined that the communal ownership of land by Aboriginal people in fact constituted a unique form of title that had existed prior to colonization. The 1993 *Native Title Act*, the legislative response to the Mabo decision, created collective rights to land in the Australian legal system. During these same decades, demands for land rights had been fought in the courts and on the streets, eventually resulting in state/territory-based land rights legislation around the country. The colonial appropriation of Indigenous land eventually proved 'unstable', provoking something of an 'ideological crisis' for the settler state, to which it responded, according to some, by 'seeing in the [Mabo] decision an opportunity to make some recompense for dispossession, and to move the settler nation into a truly post-colonial stage'.[36]

Yet despite these apparent advances, it is evident that the question of land in Australia remains dominated by the settler state. With regard to the Mabo decision, for example, although the judicial branch of the state, through the High Court, did redefine the relationship between settlers, Indigenous peoples and the land, it did so without examining the far more vexed question of sovereignty over the territory. Indeed, a more critical assessment acknowledges that the Mabo decision was in fact another element in the settler colonial project of 'dissolving Aboriginal sovereignty into the larger Australian polity', in particular by containing and channeling Indigenous resistance into less challenging arenas.[37] Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples remain under pressure to participate more fully in the settler economy, which rests on resource exploitation on Indigenous lands, and the mainstream settler economy remains widely unproblematised as the desirable end-goal of an Indigenous development trajectory.[38]

Certainly the 1993 native title regime has produced only very mixed results. Russell McGregor argues that struggles for the recognition of land rights promoted a diagnosis of Indigenous disadvantage that emphasized 'dispossession over discrimination' and the notion of 'Aboriginal distinctiveness', and by translating these claims into title deeds, 'land rights promoted attentiveness to the deep past of Aboriginal societies and the recovery of traditional culture'.[39] However, the central test to legitimate a claim for native title is proof of continuous association with the land over which a group is claiming title, meaning that for those Indigenous peoples dispossessed soon after the invasion of their territory – notably groups in the southeast of the continent – native title claims have remained out of reach. Further, economic elites in Australia have acted in concert with the settler state to limit and contain Indigenous control of land. The mining industry opposed the *Native Title Act* during 1993 negotiations, first seeking to prevent the introduction of the Act at all and later lobbying the Commonwealth government for amendments on the grounds that the proposed act was 'unworkable and an impediment to development'.[40]

Yet in the face of what is clearly an unequal contest, with the power and technologies of the settler state acting in concert with the resources of an economic elite to advance the settler logic of elimination, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples have continued to resist. In particular, traditional owners of Indigenous lands have contested the erasure of their culture and relationships to country by maintaining their connections to land and sustaining cultural traditions and practices.[41] In so doing, they continue to deny the legitimacy of the settler state and provoke an ongoing conversation about reconciliation and redress.

Reconciliation, apology, reform?

The cycle of domination and resistance that forms the key dynamic of settler colonialism in Australia has also produced moments of apparent progress towards decolonizing practices, particularly when Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples have succeeded in getting their

concerns on the national agenda. Alongside some of the reforms in land tenure discussed earlier, these moments have included a successful referendum to address some of the original exclusions in the Australian constitution, a national commitment to formal reconciliation, a state apology to members of the Stolen Generations and a more recent commitment to further constitutional reform, ostensibly aimed at 'recognising' Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples in the constitution. Ultimately, however, these moments have not fulfilled their decolonizing potential and have instead continued to serve colonial ends without any fundamental disruption to the foundations of settler dominance.[42]

The successful 1967 referendum is still regarded as a high water mark in transforming the relationship between Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples and the settler state. Achieving the extraordinary outcome in the referendum vote – which saw 90.77 per cent of Australians vote in favour of reform, the highest majority ever – required a decade of activism by Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australians working together. The referendum campaign asked the Australian public to simply 'Vote yes for Aborigines', which, while clearly a successful strategy, has left many Australians believing that in voting 'yes' they were giving Aboriginal people citizenship or the right to vote, or a conflation of the two. In fact, Aboriginal people had (at least technically) been citizens since 1948[43] and had had the right to vote (at federal elections) since 1962 with the passage of *Commonwealth Electoral Act*. The reforms in the 1967 referendum were in fact quite modest, giving the Commonwealth Government the power to make laws in relation to (although not necessarily for the benefit of) Aboriginal people and to allow Aboriginal people to be counted in the census. They did not, in any way, disturb the structures of settler colonialism.

Nevertheless, the popular success of the 1967 referendum issued in a new era of optimism about the possibilities of transforming the relationship between Indigenous peoples and the settler society that underpinned the nationwide activism towards land rights, sovereignty and a treaty, as discussed earlier. Yet while these mobilisations were profoundly unsettling for the settler state, ultimately, the state reasserted its domination of the relationship by moving to contain Indigenous demands in more domesticated arenas. In particular, as noted, the promise of a treaty was abandoned in favour of a formal process of reconciliation in the decade between 1991 and 2001.

The formal Australian reconciliation process originally developed from a recommendation made by the Royal Commission Into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody[44] – one of two major public enquiries during the 1980s and 1990s to examine aspects of the Indigenous experience of Australian settler colonialism. In response to this recommendation, the government of the day created the Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation (CAR) and set out the timeline for the formal process, to conclude in 2001. The Minister for Aboriginal Affairs at this time, Robert Tickner, has since outlined what he saw as the three objectives for reconciliation in Australia: first, the need to educate non-Indigenous Australians about Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander culture and the extent of disadvantage still experienced by Indigenous people; second, the process needed to get onto the public agenda what Tickner – in an attempt to get away from the apparently polarizing language of 'treaty' – described as a 'document of reconciliation'; finally, Tickner envisaged that the reconciliation process would build a social movement that would drive the nation to 'address Indigenous aspirations, human rights and social justice'.[45]

However, even this more modest approach to reforming the relationship between Indigenous peoples and the settler state met with intense resistance from conservative forces in Australian politics. By the mid-1990s, public discussion had become dominated by an intense debate about Australian colonial history, with a renewed assertion of the modern-day economic, social and political benefits accruing to all Australians as a result of colonization. A new

phrase, the 'black armband view of history', crept into public discourse, suggesting that there was more in Australia's colonial history to be celebrated than regretted. This view was taken up by John Howard after his election as prime minister in 1996, and he argued that in contrast to the 'black armband' view, 'the balance sheet of our history is one of heroic achievement' and that 'we have achieved much more as a nation of which we can be proud than of which we should be ashamed'.[46] The election of the Howard government also saw a significant change in official attitudes towards the reconciliation process, with the rejection of anything thought to be merely 'symbolic' and a new focus on the need to adopt 'practical measures' to address Indigenous disadvantage.

These arguments confirmed the fears that many Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people had held about the formal reconciliation process from the outset, particularly that it was an attempt to avoid a political settlement. As in many other settler colonial states, reconciliation in Australia became a means of justifying colonial sovereignty and domination[47] rather than transforming the relationship between Indigenous people and the settler state. Thus, for many critics, including many Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people, the process was little more than an exercise in colonial obfuscation of ongoing dispossession, assimilation and the persistence of settler colonial structures.[48] As Kevin Gilbert expressed with force:

> What are we to reconcile ourselves to? To a holocaust, to massacre, to the removal of us from our land, from the taking of our land? The reconciliation process can achieve nothing because it does not at the end of the day promise justice.[49]

Indeed, the formal Australian reconciliation process was widely criticised for its resistance to any decolonising action, such that it effectively placed a 'colonial ceiling' on Indigenous aspirations by emphasising nation-building and national unity above all else.[50] Indeed, the Australian reconciliation process remained extremely tightly controlled and managed within politically acceptable boundaries. Although perhaps initiated in an acknowledgment of historic injustice, as in other settler states, reconciliation in Australia focused less on making various reparations for colonial harms and more on the restoration of moral and political legitimacy to settler institutions by drawing the Indigenous population into the wider polity.[51] As Muldoon and Schaap argue:

> By acknowledging their shame for the wrongs of the past, the settler society demands recognition from Aboriginal people of a newfound postcolonial identity, freed from the weight of the colonial past. In casting conflict between Aboriginal people and the settler society as already internal to the national community, reconciliation and the limited recognition it affords is implicated in the further colonization of Aboriginal people.[52]

In this way, reconciliation in Australia provided Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples with 'a right to be incorporated into the Australian nation but not a right to refuse'.[53]

A key moment in the decade of reconciliation concerned the release of the report of the Inquiry into the Separation of Aboriginal Children from their Families, generally referred to as the *Bringing them Home* report, which documented the forcible removal of Indigenous children from their families under past policies of protection and assimilation, which the authors charged constituted an act of genocide contrary to the UN Convention on Genocide. The report recommended that all Australian governments should officially and publicly apologise to the 'stolen generations'[54] for the harms done by past policies. The federal government immediately contested the report's findings and rejected recommendations calling for an apology or

compensation. The debates that followed focused on the fundamental question of whether past injustice should be judged by contemporary moral standards, with many Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people insisting that coming to terms with the wrongs of Australia's history was a vital prelude to genuine reconciliation.[55]

Eventually, however, a change of government saw the new prime minister, Kevin Rudd, make a formal apology as the first act of the new parliament. In his speech to the parliament, Rudd declared:

> The time has now come for the nation to turn a new page in Australia's history by righting the wrongs of the past and so moving forward with confidence to the future. We apologise for the laws and policies of successive Parliaments and governments that have inflicted profound grief, suffering and loss on these our fellow Australians. We apologise especially for the removal of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander children from their families, their communities and their country. For the pain, suffering and hurt of these Stolen Generations, their descendants and for their families left behind, we say sorry. To the mothers and the fathers, the brothers and the sisters, for the breaking up of families and communities, we say sorry. And for the indignity and degradation thus inflicted on a proud people and a proud culture, we say sorry.[56]

For members of the Stolen Generations, and for many more in the settler society, the apology lifted a burden and provided a moment of relief and connection. However, even here the settler state asserted its logic, addressing Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples as members of the Australian nation and, by failing to make any mention of the claims of genocide, discounting the essential conflict between Indigenous peoples and the settler society upon which the colonial state still rests.[57] Thus, in an important sense, the apology was used to strengthen rather than challenge the legitimacy of the settler state, leaving settler domination untroubled and possibly even strengthened through, for example, the maintenance of state authority to determine which Indigenous claims may be recognised and what reparation will or will not be made in response to these claims.[58]

In the wake of the apology, during which time the intervention policies have been maintained and even extended in some regards, those still concerned with transforming the relationship between Indigenous peoples and the settler state turned their attention to the demand for the constitutional 'recognition' of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples. Although Australia's constitutional and legal order is regarded as one of the world's most stable, adaptable and popularly supported systems, it has long been pointed out that this stability rests on what Melissa Castan describes as some 'inherent defects' that undermine its acceptance by Indigenous people. Chief among these is the Australian constitution's neglect of historical dispossession of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples. Castan maintains that, until such defects are addressed, 'reconciliation of our past history with our present aspirations for justice will remain unattainable'.[59] For those advancing the case for constitutional reform, the failure to recognise Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples in the constitution is thought to perpetuate the original injustice of invasion and the eliminatory logic that saw them excluded from the 1901 document.

The contemporary conversation about Indigenous constitutional recognition was prompted by a 2007 election promise by former Prime Minister John Howard, who pledged to hold such a referendum if he were re-elected. In the years since then, a referendum on constitutional recognition has become the policy of both major parties, and in 2010, the then-prime minister, Julia Gillard, commissioned an 'Expert Panel' of Indigenous and non-Indigenous experts to

undertake a nation-wide consultation on the issue. The panel released its report in January 2012, recommending the repeal of two provisions in the constitution that allow racial discrimination (Section 25 and Section 51 xxvi) and the creation of a new section recognizing that 'the continent and its islands now known as Australia were first occupied by Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples'; acknowledging their continuing cultures, languages, heritage and relationship to their traditional lands and waters; and proposing that the federal parliament have powers to make laws for the 'advancement' of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples. The Panel further proposed two additional sections expressly prohibiting racial discrimination and providing for the recognition of Indigenous languages. Significantly, however, the Panel rejected the call from many Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people that a referendum should consider the 'constitutional recognition of the sovereign status of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples' on the grounds that such a proposal 'would be highly contested by many Australians, and likely to jeopardize broad public support' for the reforms.[60]

The campaign in support of constitutional reform is being led by both Indigenous and non-Indigenous advocates, who are working to engage the wider population in support of this issue, thus far with only limited success. At the same time, there are dissenting Indigenous voices insisting that recognition within what they see as an illegitimate constitution will not address their claims upon the legitimacy of the nation. These groups are instead seeking to revive debate on the recognition of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander sovereignty and the making of a treaty or treaties between Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples and the Australian state. Indeed, it is evident that the capacity of measures such as constitutional reform to properly address colonial injustice may be wholly inadequate, as their starting point is to assume the legitimacy of settler state sovereignty over Indigenous peoples.[61] Thus, it may be considered that the proposed referendum on constitutional recognition is yet another cycle in the endless process of contestation between settler legitimacy and Indigenous sovereignty. A vocal minority of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people are continuing to contest the very terms of the relationship, still refusing to allow the settler state to achieve its imagined postcolonial future.

Conclusion

Throughout the twentieth century and into the first two decades of the twenty-first century, the Australian settler state has maintained an eliminatory logic that has attempted to erase Indigenous alterity through a range of techniques. Through constituting a white, British nation and adopting racist tropes that supported often brutal policies, the settler state justified the continuing dispossession of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples from their land, the removal of Indigenous children and policies that maintained the explicit intention of assimilating Indigenous cultures and communities as a means of erasing the differences between coloniser and colonised.[62] Yet in the face of these regimes, and in response to every attempt to eliminate their existence, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples have continued to resist, to contest, and to deny the settler state the sense of sovereign legitimacy it so craves. This cycle of elimination and contestation seems likely to persist for several future generations, at least. The Australian settler state continues to deny all demands for a treaty or other means of recognising sovereignty, while Indigenous peoples maintain that their sovereignty is an undeniable political reality that must be addressed.

Yet the endless nature of this cycle – the 'vanishing endpoint' of settler colonialism that Macoun and Strackosch describe – should not be taken as evidence that this could never change. Political contest always retains the potential for meaningful transformation, and the Australian

settler state also retains such political possibility. What the logic of settler colonialism reveals, however, is that transformation will never come about as a result of settler benevolence or a benign acceptance of the state's foundational illegitimacy. Resistance and contestation remain an essential response, and the only political possibility available to an Indigenous population that has been brutalized but never wholly broken by the settlers' logic of elimination.

Notes

1   E. Strakosch and A. Macoun, 'The vanishing endpoint of settler colonialism', *Arena Journal* 37/38, 2012, 40–62, 43.

2   Strakosch and Macoun, 'The vanishing endpoint of settler colonialism', 44.

3   M. Lovell, 'A settler-colonial consensus on the northern intervention', *Arena Journal* 37/38, 2012, 199–19, 202.

4   R. McGregor, *Indifferent Inclusion: Aboriginal People and the Australian Nation*, Canberra: Aboriginal Studies Press, 2011, p. 164.

5   D. Howard-Wagner, 'Reclaiming the Northern Territory as a settler-colonial space', *Arena Journal* 37/38, 2005, 220–40, 227.

6   Strakosch and Macoun, op. cit., pp. 51–2.

7   A. Macoun and E. Strakosch, 'The ethical demands of settler colonial theory', *Settler Colonial Studies* 3, (3–4), 2013, 426–43, 427–8.

8   A. Moran, 'As Australia decolonizes: Indigenizing settler nationalism and the challenges of Settler/ Indigenous relations', *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 25, 6, 2002, 1013–1042, 1036.

9   B. Bhandar, ' "Spatializing history" and opening time: Resisting the reproduction of the proper subject', in S. Veitch (ed.) *Law and the Politics of Reconciliation*, Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Ltd. 2007, pp. 93–94.

10 McGregor, *Indifferent Inclusion*, pp. xvii–xx.

11 Ibid., p. xx.

12 W. E. H. Stanner, *The Dreaming and Other Essays*, Melbourne: Black Inc. 2009, p. 188–9.

13 Moran, 'As Australia decolonizes', 1028.

14 D. Horne, *The Lucky Country: Australia in the Sixties*, Melbourne: Penguin Books, 1964.

15 B. Attwood and S. Foster (eds.) *Frontier Conflict: The Australian Experience*, Canberra: National Museum of Australia, 2003, p. 12.

16 The experiences of European settlers have been extensively documented, for example, in volume three of A. Atkinson, *The Europeans in Australia*, Sydney: NewSouth Books 2014. The impact of this clash of national mythology and historical injustice has been detailed by authors including Sarah Maddison in *Beyond White Guilt*, Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 2009, and Henry Reynolds, *This Whispering in Our Hearts*, Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1998, and *Why Weren't We Told? A Personal Search for the Truth about Our History*, Melbourne: Viking, 1999.

17 P. Dodson, *Beyond the Mourning Gate: Dealing with Unfinished Business*, the Wentworth Lecture 12 May 2000, National Gallery of Australia: AIATSIS, p. 17.

18 K. Gilbert, *Aboriginal Sovereignty: Justice, the Law and the Land*, Canberra: Self-published, 1988, p. 53.

19 The Barunga Statement is a statement of national Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander political claims, presented to the then-prime minister, Bob Hawke, at the 1988 Barunga Festival. The statement from 'the Indigenous owners and occupiers of Australia' called for (among other things) self-determination, land rights and the negotiation of a treaty. Prime Minister Hawke responded with a commitment to making such a treaty by 1990, a promise that was never fulfilled.

20 Cited in A. Schaap, 'The absurd proposition of Aboriginal sovereignty', in A. Schaap (ed.) *Law and Agonistic Politics*, Farnham: Ashgate, 2009, p. 209.

21 Quoted in A. Gunstone, *Unfinished Business: The Australian Formal Reconciliation Process*, 2nd ed., Melbourne: Australian Scholarly Publishing, 2009, p. 26.

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29

SETTLER COLONIALISM IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY NEW ZEALAND

Felicity Barnes

Twentieth-century New Zealand's history has rarely been considered colonial. Like many other settler colonies, New Zealand has a strong vein of nationalist historiography. In these narratives, 'colonial' New Zealand was a nineteenth-century phenomenon; the twentieth century, by contrast, was the site for a slowly evolving sense of national identity, whose touchstones were to be found in events as varied as the rejection of federation with Australia in 1901, the victorious 1905 All Black rugby tour of England and even in the short-lived flowering of national literary magazines.[1] World War I became the critical turning point: W.P. Morrell, the first historian to interpret 'the history of New Zealand as the growth of a nation, concluded that New Zealand announced its manhood to the world on the bloody slopes of Gallipoli in 1915'.[2] He would not be the last: war, along with sporting success, social innovations, the development of a distinctive New Zealand literature, film, art and music became familiar fingerposts in a story that charted New Zealand's growth and development away from its colonial past and towards an independent future.

This progressive national narrative had little room for a sense of continuing colonialism. Māori, central to the story of a nineteenth-century colonial New Zealand, a century later were to be found only on the margins, 'reced[ing] into the shadows of the grand narratives for most of the twentieth century, making brief forays back into the limelight on the backs of key individuals . . . and organisations'.[3] Even those brief forays could be timed to help support the colony-to-nation narrative arc; a putative resurgence in demands for indigenous rights in the late twentieth century, termed a 'Māori renaissance', fits a wider schema of growing national maturity, one that would group Māori protest with other movements like gay rights as part of blossoming independence rather than as a direct expression of colonialism in the present. Nor was it just Māori that would be reduced to 'peripheral subplots' in the nation's story.[4] Empire itself was to be cut adrift, as assuming a national identity meant escaping the independence-sapping grasp of Mother England. Once again, twentieth-century history marginalised a central colonial dynamic, as enduring British relationships were underplayed and underestimated, their persistence and function explained as either weak-minded nostalgia or colonial cringe.[5] A national, not colonial, focus also managed to make New Zealand's own imperial identity disappear. By the end of the nineteenth century, New Zealand had begun to establish its own Pacific empire. Its impact was sizeable: by 1921, the 'native' population of New Zealand was 52,751, while the populations of New Zealand's Pacific acquisitions amounted to around 50,456, meaning about half of New Zealand's 'colonised bodies'

lay outside its national borders. They also lay outside its national histories: as Damon Salesa has noted, 'one would be hard pressed to discover this in New Zealand historiography. . . . A substantial part of New Zealand colonialism is absent from the histories of New Zealand colonialism'.[6] Ironically, where New Zealand's Pacific colonies are present in these histories, they are often used as evidence of nation-building and not as evidence of a thorough and continuing entanglement in imperial politics, economics, culture and ambition.

If twentieth-century colonialism has been missing from our national histories, it has also been curiously absent from newer post-colonial work. Again, as in other settler colonial societies, New Zealand historians have worked to shrug off the 'straitjacket' of the nation to reveal the colonial mechanisms of the past more clearly.[7] These post-colonial approaches need not be limited to the experiences of the nineteenth century: as Giselle Byrnes suggests, post-colonialism is an attitude, not an epoch.[8] Notably, Peter Gibbons' cultural colonisation thesis emphasises the role cultural production, from books on birdlife to schoolroom texts, played in 'settling' the colony and explicitly drew attention to colonisation as an ongoing process that continued into the twentieth century.[9] Drawing together strands of New Zealand's economic and cultural history, James Belich's concept of 'recolonisation' also reframes New Zealand's history as colonial until the late twentieth century.[10] Yet despite these interventions, surprisingly little work pursues the processes and practices of colonial culture into the twentieth century.[11] Inadvertently mirroring the temporal colony/nation divide in national histories, cultural historians have eschewed colonialism in favour of other analytical approaches, notably transnationalism, to interrogate New Zealand's twentieth-century experiences. In New Zealand historiography, then, being colonial remains a distinctly Victorian activity.

There are two important exceptions to this picture of the twentieth-century nation as antithesis to the nineteenth-century colony. One is the extensive body of history generated as the result of the indigenous claims settlement process begun in 1975 under the Waitangi Tribunal – 'by far the most comprehensive and extensive review of any country's colonial legacy'.[12] This legacy reaches into the twentieth century, and the tribunal itself can also hear contemporary claims, thus helping to extend the connection with colonisation outside its familiar nineteenth-century environs. But there are limitations: though supportive of the settlement process, some historians have been uneasy about the nature of 'tribunal history' and its relationship with New Zealand history.[13] Critiques of its ahistorical, presentist and adversarial nature have served to limit the tribunal's wider historical influence. Further, many of the claims are the product of nineteenth-century colonial experiences, including *raupatu* (confiscations of land after the New Zealand Wars) and other manifestly unjust schemes for acquiring Māori land (although variations on this theme persist into the late twentieth century, they are, because of earlier losses, smaller in scale). In this respect, tribunal history can reinforce the nineteenth century as locus of colonialism.

The other exception is a small, but growing, body of work on Māori in the twentieth century. Often, this research focuses on the relationship between Māori and the state, spotlighting the persistence of colonial practice into the present whilst simultaneously emphasising Māori resistance, adaptability and resilience.[14] These works foreground what Ranginui Walker labelled in his landmark Māori history, '*ka whawhai tonu matou* – the struggle without end' against colonialism and its effects.[15] Yet more recent work by Māori historians, whilst always conscious of the colonial context, also looks to 'escape the past into which they have found themselves written; the dominant historical discourse which tends to locate Māori history in the context of British colonialism and expansionism'.[16] For these historians, Māori history is not simply a story of colonisation, nor is it always 'Māori' history, which itself can be seen as a creation of the settler state.[17] Instead, it may be histories of non-national groupings like *iwi* or *hapu*, (tribes and sub-tribes) based on *mātauranga Māori* (Māori ways of knowing).[18]

The call to write indigenous histories up from under the weight of colonisation poses a challenge to the premise of settler colonial studies, which tend to focus their energy on the colonised/coloniser nexus. As a consequence, in this growing field, Māori may once again find their histories confined within the colonial project. Indeed, the name itself suggests who owns the discourse – it is the settlers who define this particular historical landscape and not those who were 'settled'. Yet if settler colonial studies fail to liberate indigenous histories from colonial bondage, they could at least free some held under false pretences. Though Tony Ballantyne has recently re-emphasised that 'being colonial was defined by both a set of relationships between the colonists and the indigenous people they dispossessed *and* a set of relationships that connected those colonists to the United Kingdom, Ireland and component parts of the empire', the main frameworks for thinking about both sets of relationships, despite their fundamental differences, have been post-colonial.[19] This has led to the untenable situation where settlers have been referred to as 'colonised' too. Caroline Elkins and Susan Pedersen, for example, refer to the modern nation states formed from settler colonies as 'born of a dual defeat', meaning both the defeat of indigenous and 'of the imperial metropolis that held settlers in dependence'.[20] This seriously misstates the role of metropolitan relationships in creating settler states. New Zealand, or Australia or Canada's relationships with empire were not 'held in dependence' – on the contrary, by 1900, these countries had used their metropolitan relationships to create some of the highest living standards in the world, and, understandably, they were in no great hurry to sever those ties. This was symbiosis, not subjugation, and it is hard to put this kind of 'defeat' in the same sentence as that inflicted on a colony's original inhabitants.

Post-colonialism alone then obscures rather than articulates this dynamic. It occludes what could be termed the post-metropolitan effect: the way settler states shaped their cultures in relation to the metropolis, a process that continued well into the twentieth century, longer than either nationalist or post-colonial histories have recognised.[21] Crucially, it was settler/metropolitan relationships, not just settler/indigenous relationships, that worked to shore up the nascent settler state. Indeed, it is the interaction of these two sets of relationship that lies at the heart of the settler colonial project and should lie at the heart of settler colonial studies. This chapter traces that interaction during the twentieth century, rematerialising New Zealand's recent past as both a post-colonial and post-metropolitan phenomenon. To do so, it takes three 'nation building' moments – Dominion Day, the 1940 Centennial and the 1974 celebration of New Zealand Day – and uses these official constructions of identity to test the ongoing importance of metropolitan links in their formation and the ways in which identity proscribed and prescribed relationships with *tangata whenua*. This approach may not help Māori escape the colonial past. But uncovering the post-metropolitan role in sustaining the 'nation state' in the twentieth century means settlers can no longer escape it either.

1907: 'new' New Zealand and 'backward' Māori

On 26 September 1907, in a flurry of officially organised flag-waving, brass bands and military parades, the old 'Colony of New Zealand' was transformed into a new Dominion. Dominion status, invented by the leaders of the white settlers colonies at a conference held in April in London that year, brought New Zealand's colonial era formally to an end. But it did not signal the demise of the colonial project. Instead, it celebrated colonialism's continuing success. The white settler colonies had, as Canadian Premier Sir Wilfrid Laurier declared, 'passed the state when the term 'colony' could be applied to [them]'.[22] Not only would they leave their own pasts behind, the new title also meant they were quite separate from the dependent colonies of the 'black empire'.[23] These countries were modern white Neo-Britains in name as well as character.

New Zealand's official celebrations helped mark out this new form of colonial identity. With the assumption of Dominion status, it was claimed, 'the word colony and the things pertaining thereto had been put away in the great archive of the splendid past'. Accordingly, a 'new' New Zealand was on display. Children were mobilised as symbols of 'newness': in the capital, Wellington, where the most elaborate construction of Dominionhood was staged, 3,000 were herded into a public park to form a living Union Jack, literal embodiments of the neo-British ideal. Around the country, thousands more marched as military cadets, substantiating New Zealand as a young and vigorous member of empire. The country's youthfulness was even captured in lights: the 'New Dominion', complete with map, appeared as illuminations on Wellington's General Post Office, and the past was reduced to a hyphen in lights which read 'Advance New Zealand 1840–1907'. Electric illuminations also symbolised modernity, a metropolitan, not colonial, characteristic.

Amongst these official constructions of a young modern British nation, there was little room for Māori. Though, like fernleaves and kiwis, aspects of Māori culture might sometimes be mobilised to give New Zealand's settler identity a touch of distinctiveness, anything more was troubling in the construction of Dominion-ness, where it might reinforce unwanted links with the colonial past. Dominion status underwrote progress from 'savagery to nationhood', meaning 'savages' were no longer required.[24] One long-running solution to the conundrum of their actual existence was the assimilation of Māori as 'Brown Britons' (the strangely pervasive theory that Māori shared an Aryan ancestry helped this process). They were imagined as becoming fully acculturated over time, or more romantically, assimilated away through intermarriage, leaving behind, as one Native Minister hoped, a 'white race with a slight dash of the finest coloured race in the world'.[25] Another solution was to minimise them. Both strategies were employed at the Wellington celebrations. Māori were given no formal part in the official ceremonies. However, they did attend: newspaper reports noted a Māori face 'here and there', and some performed an impromptu *haka*.[26] The press then completed its own assimilation process, assuming their appearance 'symboliz[ed] the unity of the races'.[27]

Though Dominion Day itself had only fleeting significance, the 'new' New Zealand it depicted had solid foundations. Like other settler colonies at this time, New Zealand began to regulate its migration to help secure its construction as a white, and preferably British, nation. From 1881, the first of a series of acts was passed to restrict Asian, especially Chinese, migrants. After experiments with poll taxes, fingerprinting and language tests, the government passed the Immigration Restriction Amendment Act in 1920. A permit-based system that would remain in force until 1974, it allowed the minister to exclude any individual without explanation. White citizens of the British empire were not affected (though other 'natives' of that empire were); the aim, as the prime minister had suggested, was to reflect the 'deep seated sentiment of the majority of the people of this country that this dominion should be what is called a white New Zealand'.[28] Whiteness on its own, however, was not quite enough, as the same act was also used to exclude southern Europeans.[29] New Zealand's essentially British character was to be further reinforced over this period by renewed migration from Britain. Some of this was assisted: almost 36,000 up till 1914, and another 60,757 between 1921 and 1930, came through government schemes.[30]

'New' New Zealand's British identity was also reinforced by a changing economy. The advent of successful refrigerated shipping from 1882 allowed New Zealand to leave an older, struggling, colonial economy, with its frontier feel and its emphasis on extractive industries like timber and gold mining, behind. Its place was taken by the thoroughly modern business of exporting butter, cheese and frozen meat back 'Home' to Britain. These new economic ties had unexpected cultural effects. Far from the twentieth century ushering in an era of increasing nationalism, tightened trade ties drew New Zealand and Britain closer together in a process James Belich has

described as recolonisation. 'In some respects, New Zealand and the relevant parts of Britain made up a single entity. Essentially New Zealand became a town supply district of London. London became the cultural capital of New Zealand'.[31]

Political, social, economic and cultural forces thus converged at the beginning of the twentieth century to buttress the idea of a modern, white, New Zealand. Conditions for Māori also made it easier than it had ever been to imagine New Zealand this way. After almost sixty years of colonisation, the Māori population had reached its lowest point, around 40,000, in 1896. Some suspect this number might be an underestimate, but even if that is the case, Māori visibility in New Zealand society was not just a product of their own numbers but of their proportion to *Pākehā* (European) settlers. At the end of the 1850s, Māori and Pākehā populations were close to equal size; just 40 years later, Māori were outnumbered almost 20 to 1. Many lived in isolated, rural areas, part of a phenomenon that historians have referred to as 'withdrawal'. The term suggests a degree of agency, and some Māori actively restricted their contact with Pākehā. But the geographic isolation of Māori was also an unavoidable consequence of large-scale land loss – 'most first class land had passed from Māori hands by 1900' – and lack of other economic opportunity.[32] 'Points of contact between Māori and Pākehā were superficial as the Māori were reduced to selling their labour as bush-fellers, roadmakers, farm workers and seasonal workers in the freezing works and sheep shearing gangs'.[33] 'Confinement' therefore might be a better descriptor than 'withdrawal.'

The marginalisation of Māori in 'new' New Zealand was a product of time as well as space. As their absence from Dominion Day celebrations indicated, Māori were anachronisms in a modern dominion, belonging instead to the colonial past. The perception of Māori as backward was commonplace in rhetoric, and this was not just a case of simple racism. When Māori were described as 'lazy, indolent, regressive people' whose preference for a primitive 'communistic' lifestyle led to 'idle and waste lands', it was in comparison to progressive hard-working settlers who would bring this land into 'utility'.[34] The new Dominion had no room for the unproductive ways of the past. Māori thus were not only in the wrong place, but in the wrong time, and being 'backward' became justification not only for continued colonisation but for its particular form.

This is clear in legislation controlling Māori land. Since the formation of the Native Land Court in 1865, settler governments had sought to break Māori communal tenure into individual title. This process, which aimed to wrest land from Māori at the same time it claimed to be rescuing them from the moral evil of primitive communism, continued into the twentieth century. In 1900, with the implementation of the Māori Lands Administration Act, which suspended purchasing, encouraged leasing and allowed some Māori control over their remaining lands, there seemed to be a change; at the very least, the government had recognised Māori should not be left completely landless. Yet even the chief architect of this '*taihoa'* ('slow down') policy, part-Māori MP James Carroll, recognised the Act's main purpose was not to allow some Māori autonomy but to open up lands for settlers. 'The sole criterion of success in state eyes would be the proportion of idle lands brought quickly into settler production'.[35] This was an example of what Richard Hill has described as the co-option of Māori organisational structures for the benefit of the state. When progress by such means proved too slow, the government quickly acted to take back control; taihoa was replaced by 'hustle'. Elected Māori representatives were removed from land boards, land deemed 'surplus' to Māori requirements was compulsorily taken for sale or lease, crown pre-emption was restored and then removed to allow private sales. By 1920, less than a million acres of good land remained in Māori hands.[36] The state rationalised this as part of its greater modernising mission. 'Learning quickly to be European, speaking only English, living in Western ways, behaving like the British through observing and copying such exemplars of society as the policemen – all involved leaving the land – or at most working for the Pākehā farmer on it'.[37]

Māori 'backwardness' also underwrote state approaches to health and welfare. The dire state of Māori health and living conditions, directly reflected in declining population rates, was interpreted not simply as the product of disease, poverty and dislocation caused by colonising forces but as reflection of Māori failure to fully adjust to a more civilised way of life. As the prominent young Māori leader, and health officer at the time, Te Rangihiroa, remarked, 'The communism of the past meant industry, training in arms, good physique, the keeping of the law, the sharing of the tribal burden, and the preservation of life. . . . The communism of today means indolence, sloth, decay of racial vigour, the crushing of individual effort, the spreading of introduced disease and the many evils that are petrifying the Māori and preventing his advance'.[38] For such Māori leaders, engaged in a struggle against what was seen as 'imminent and inevitable Māori extinction', the solution to Māori problems was a more thoroughgoing adoption of European ways.[39] Nevertheless, they aimed to implement these ways through existing tribal structures. Pākehā held different views: 'leaving health laws to be "administered by natives" was "futile"'.[40] In such a climate, an initiative like the Māori Councils Act of 1900 had little real prospect of success. This act gave local Māori committees limited powers to 'improve the health, welfare and moral wellbeing' of their communities. It was a small experiment in autonomy, and the committees made some progress.[41] However, they were tasked with a great deal of surveillance and given little actual funding. By 1909, even that small amount of government support ended. In the meantime, attention turned to ridding Māori communities of another sign of their primitive past. The traditional Māori healer or *tohunga*, 'wedded to ancient and inappropriate remedies', was outlawed by the 1907 Tohunga Suppression Act.[42]

In welfare, backwardness was not so much a problem to be solved as a yardstick to determine payments. Though amongst the poorest inhabitants of New Zealand's famed social laboratory, Māori access to welfare was reduced because it was thought that their communal lifestyle and generally lower standard of living meant they required less. Living in a *pah* (Māori community) was a reason to pay widows, invalids, and the elderly less than their Pākehā counterparts.[43] 'By 1937, 93% of the 2380 Māori old-age pensions were paid at reduced rates', a situation that lasted until after the Second World War.[44] Payments were also subject to greater control and inspection, with officials, tribal committees and even storekeepers being drawn into supervisory roles.

The idea of modernity also arguably helped shape the state's relationships with Māori organisations over the period. Māori were never passive recipients of state actions, and responses to continuing colonisation in this period took a variety of forms, from the 'state within a state' approach taken by the Kīngitanga movement to the prophetic movement led by Rua Kenana to the direct action of Waikato tribes in resisting conscription in the 1914–1918 war. Together, they have been described as 'disengagers' – groups that chose not to work with the state.[45] Likewise, the state had little interest in working with them, ignoring calls for parallel representation, sending militia against Kenana and imprisoning Waikato resisters. But one group, known as the Young Māori Party (YMP), did engage with the state, and it did so through a conscious mobilisation of colonial modernity. The YMP was a group of young Western-educated Māori men dedicated to working to improve the lives of Māori through a 'best of both worlds' approach. The state in turn responded more positively, if always half-heartedly, and the YMP made progress in slowing land sales and improving Māori health. Their facility with a modern, Western approach has sometimes seen YMP members portrayed as collaborators, too ready to sacrifice Māori ways in the interests of progress, casualties of what Aroha Harris has described as the 'creative tension between the so-called traditional and modern worlds of Māori culture'.[46] However, perhaps the best-known member, lawyer and politician, Sir Apirana Ngata, worked for 'progress along modern Pākehā lines in every department that will enable the Māori to survive and take his proper place in the social civil and political life of the Dominion, consistent with maintaining the best features of the

old Māori regime'.[47] Ngata tried to balance old and new. He initiated programmes to develop and preserve Māori art, culture and heritage; at the same time, he attempted to harness state land policy to the support of Māori communal farming ventures. But the requirements of a 'new' dominion made this a difficult balance to strike. Whilst the government supported his efforts to preserve traditional Māori arts and crafts – after all, these were fairly harmless ornaments of passing race – his land-development schemes, with their emphasis on retaining tribal organisation, eventually ran afoul of the state. After a Commission of Inquiry suggested impropriety in his land dealings, Ngata resigned from Cabinet in 1934. In his approach to land, which worked against individualism, this modernising Māori was not quite modern enough. Māori aspirations once again conflicted with the ideology of a modern settler state.

1940: one hundred years of progress and some 'modern' Māori

That modern settler state, first celebrated in 1907, was on display again in 1940. The occasion was 100 years of European settlement; or, in the rhetoric of colonial modernity, 'one hundred years of progress'. Certainly the scale of official celebration had progressed; Dominion Day's last-minute organisation was outclassed by long-term and careful planning, which, despite the interruption of war in 1939, still produced a full calendar of events, a slew of publications and a Centennial Exhibition held in the capital, Wellington, all designed to celebrate and commemorate New Zealand's progress. Yet in important ways, little had changed in the decades between the two events. Although there was much talk of a 'national spirit', British links were as evident in this celebration as they had been 30 years previously. The settler nation incorporated a British identity as part of the national whole: British government officials graced most events, and the United Kingdom's pavilion was prominently placed at the entrance to the Centennial Exhibition.[48] Crucially, though, it was the founding and progress of a British society that lay at the heart of the celebrations: '1940 signified, not just the signing of a treaty with Māori, nor a century of settlement and government, but also a hundred years of membership in the British Empire'.[49] Displays of modernity became important proof of the success of this project, and the Centennial Exhibition, with its sleek modernist architecture, its emphasis on health and educational developments, and the adoption of technologies like radio as a promotional tool, epitomised the modern state.

Just as in 1907, the presence of Māori conflicted with the projected modern nation, and once again the solution was to minimise and marginalise them. No provision was made for Māori at the centrepiece Centennial exhibition; they were represented only because one trade exhibitor cancelled at the last minute, leaving empty space. Ngata seized upon this opportunity and rushed together a Māori Court. But he was acutely aware that creating some Māori space within the national exhibition did not necessarily solve the problem of where Māori were perceived to be in time. In the accompanying souvenir booklet, Ngata described the exhibition *whare runanga* (meeting house) as 'modern' in form and urged that 'it would be greatly mistaken' to imagine such buildings as 'only a sentimental revival and a clinging to relics'.[50] He was swimming against the tide. The Māori role in other centennial events remained circumscribed by time and space. Most were held in rural locations, and Māori participation generally was either 'traditional' or otherwise contextualised as part of the past. The fashion for re-enactments, of the signing of Treaty of Waitangi or of the first *waka* (canoe) landing, suited these purposes. Māori, though, saw their involvement differently. Participation underlined their *mana* (pride) and their status as *tangata whenua* (people of the land), and it could also, on occasion, be used to remind the state of its shortcomings. Some of the local tribe wore red blankets to Waitangi celebrations as a symbol of land loss, and Ngata's speech on that occasion also chided the government, whilst tribes

affected by raupatu boycotted celebrations. Yet much of this went over the heads of Pākehā, for whom Māori involvement was confined within a narrative of benign British settlement before being absorbed into the harmonious 'one people' of modern New Zealand. The same story was repeated in histories commissioned for the centennial: between their covers, 'New Zealand history was Pākehā history. Māori history was something separate: at best the prologue before the main story began, the Māori at most marginal characters in the central narrative of European colonization'.[51]

Many of the same forces that had marginalised 'backward' Māori at the beginning of the century remained in play as it neared its midpoint. Migration slowed during the depression years, but it was no less British in its orientation. British trade links had, under the same circumstances, tightened. During the 1920s, New Zealand's own producer boards and the British government ran extensive advertising campaigns to encourage the public to buy from empire. In these campaigns, indigenous New Zealand was downplayed, and the country was consistently constructed as British: even the lambs were branded as 'British New Zealand sheep'.[52] The economic crisis of the 1930s created a further turn towards empire. In 1932, Britain and the white dominions formalised a scheme of imperial trade preferences in the Ottawa Agreements, strengthening their economic ties. In the same period, New Zealand declined to ratify the 1931 Statute of Westminster, which would have given them legislative independence from Britain. Greater independence would wait until the 1980s.

But if the metropolitan relationship and its cultural impacts remained strong, the situation for Māori was beginning to change. Contrary to popular expectations, the 'dying race' rallied. By 1936, the population had almost doubled, from its low of around 40,000 40 years earlier to over 80,000. Though it was still possible at this time to claim 'the average New Zealander rarely sees a Māori', imagining New Zealand as white would become increasing difficult.[53] Rapid population growth coupled with marginal land resources led to the beginnings of Māori movement to the city from the late 1930s. Manpowering requirements of World War II sped the process up, while others were drawn by the attractions and opportunities of city life. 'At home there was nothing for young people to do. In the city there was plenty of paid work for everyone who wanted it and a dance with live music . . . practically every night of the week'.[54] By 1961, the population had grown to 200,000, and by the 1970s only a quarter of Māori lived in rural areas.[55]

It was not only in demography that Māori bucked the trend. From the 1930s, Māori political affiliation began to shift away from modernisers like the YMP towards a new organisation known as Ratana. Its popularity was enormous: pan-Māori rather than pan-tribal in outlook, by 1934, Ratana had attracted, by some estimates, 40,000 members, or almost half of the Māori population.[56] Formed around Wiremu Tahupotiki Ratana, it was originally a religious movement, and in this sense harked back to an older tradition of Māori prophetic movements. Consequently, Ratana himself, who practised faith healing, was even accused of that embodiment of primitiveness, *tohungaism*. Like those older movements, Ratana also seemed to be a disengager, and the state reacted accordingly. When Ratana decided to travel to London to seek an audience with King George over land and treaty grievances, the government only reluctantly provided passports, and no royal meeting eventuated. The conservative farmer-led governments of the 1920s were also suspicious of a rapidly growing organisation of poor Māori and their potential links to other working-class movements. But Ratana's relationship with the state changed rapidly. By the end of the 1920s, Ratana had added politics to faith, fielding candidates to stand for parliament's Māori seats. The first Ratana candidate won in 1932, and they would go on to hold almost all the Māori seats for 50 years from 1943.[57] This was the politics of engagement, albeit in a new form, and once again the possibility was underwritten by ideas of modernity. In 1936, Ratana formed an alliance with the then hugely popular Labour Party, whose progressive social and economic

policies brought them to power in a landslide in 1935 and radically reshaped New Zealand as a welfare state. Those on the Ratana side believed Labour could offer more to Māori, and, at least in terms of access to welfare, they did. From Labour's perspective, Ratana not only delivered voters, but the movement's emphasis on Māori as individuals, not tribes, dovetailed with Labour's ideological 'quest for "equality of opportunity" for all citizens'.[58] However, over time, this would prove problematic. By May 1947, Labour's Māori caucus claimed the party's policy had been characterised by an ' "equality" that homogenized and pakehaised' them.[59] Equality Labour-style downplayed Māori-ness and began to look something like assimilation.

Māori engagement in the war effort also made it harder for the state to overlook them. Indeed, the old campaigner, Ngata, referred to Māori war service as the 'price of citizenship'. If so, they paid dearly for it: around 50% more than other New Zealanders. The 28th (Māori) Battalion was raised in 1939, and close to 15% of the Māori population served in it, compared with just fewer than 10% of the general population. Their casualty rate was 50% higher as well. Those at home paid too. To support the troops, tribal groups developed their own homefront campaigns that coalesced into the state-sanctioned, but not state-controlled, Māori War Effort Organisation (MWEO). Autonomy generated participation, meaning 'even the tribes with the most vocal grievances against the Crown could take part enthusiastically'. By 1945, 15,000 Māori were working in essential industries.[60]

A growing population, increased urban migration and greater engagement with the state pressed against old ideas of Māori as marginal in colonial time and space. Gradually the state began to accommodate the possibility of a modern New Zealand complete with modern Māori. Anthropologists even began to study them: one example, Ernest and Pearl Beaglehole's work *Some Modern Māoris*, appeared in 1946. But though the Beagleholes were on the lookout for modern Māori, they had difficulty coping when they saw them. A group of Māori girls in traditional costume performing an action song at a social gathering lent 'an authentic contemporary Māori touch to the evening', but it was spoiled by the 'usual incongruous girl dressed in piupiu (flax) skirt, vivid yellow jumper and high heels . . .'.[61] Symptomatic of an assimilationist outlook, Māori could be traditional, or modern, but not both. They could also be the wrong kind of modern: Māori went to too many movies and read too many 'cheap pulps' for the Beagleholes' liking. 'The intellectual interest shown by the Kowhai Māoris can at best only be described as very limited. Study of international affairs provides a partial exception'.[62]

Māori modernity, then, needed to be on Pākehā terms, an idea reinforced by state actions. Despite, or rather because of, the success of the autonomous MWEO, the government looked to take back control. Ignoring Māori demands for the MWEO to be used to take over the functions of the Department of Native Affairs, it was replaced in 1945 with a state-organised Māori Welfare Organisation. Independent tribal committees could continue, but if they wanted to be officially recognised by the new body and receive its benefits, they had to opt in. As part of the process, they also needed to 'follow European administration and meeting practice'. In 1951, the Department of Māori Affairs had all committees placed under the control of Pākehā district officers. By the mid-1950s, officers were 'primarily concerned to introduce modern ideas'.[63] The 1953 Town and Country Planning Act was a blunter modernising instrument; it could displace communities for the 'public good' while those in 'economically retarded' areas could be cut off from access to loans and encouraged to join the move to the cities.[64]

Not all Māori organisations came under this type of control. One of the most important, the Māori Women's Welfare League, formed in 1951, retained considerable autonomy, perhaps because a women's organisation was not considered particularly threatening and because its focus on health and housing conformed to the state's modernising agenda. However, the most detailed statement of this agenda came in 1960, with the Hunn Report. Rapid Māori urbanisation had

not been without problems, including rising crime and imprisonment rates, whilst educational achievement remained lower than for Pākehā. The country with 'best race relations in the world' also found that closer contact exposed petty racism. Instances of Māori being refused service in hotels or barred from the best seats in cinemas were uncovered. The government's response to what came to be seen as 'Māori problems' was a wide-ranging investigation led by civil servant Jack Hunn. His recommendations were similarly wide-ranging, but hinged on one key idea: Māori social and economic progress would be enhanced by speeding up what he called their 'integration' into Pākehā society. 'New' New Zealand still had no room for backward Māori. In a classic restatement of the kind of social Darwinist thinking that had constructed Māori as a dying race, Hunn's report noted that '"only the fittest elements" of Māori culture' had been 'able to survive the "onset of civilisation"'. The policy aimed to '"raise" Māori who were still "complacently living a backward life in primitive conditions" to the level where they became "integrated"'. They could retain the ornamental elements of Māori culture 'while feeling totally "at home" in Pākehā society'. Some could even go further and be fully assimilated.[65] Optimistic officials, choosing to overlook more than a century of Māori cultural persistence and resilience, thought this process might be complete in two generations. Bestowing modernity, not simply Pākehā-ness, was at the heart of the project, and they hoped 'full realisation of this fact might induce the hesitant or reluctant Māori to fall into line more readily'. Their hopes were misplaced. The only lines reluctant Māori formed were to protest the report's version of Māori modernity. For all the report's breadth and depth, Hunn's integration was assimilation's last gasp. From the 1960s, a different version of New Zealand began to emerge, one in which modernity might also have a Māori face.

1974: a New Zealand Day and the past in the present

On 6 February 1974, New Zealand celebrated its first national day. Like Dominion Day or the centennial before it, New Zealand Day was another official attempt at constructing an identity, and, at first glance, it seemed to continue the tradition of imagining New Zealand as young, modern, British nation. The centrepiece of celebrations was an updated version of 1940's 'one hundred years of progress'. An evening pageant, televised live to the nation, mustered 750 performers to once again tell the story of New Zealand from the arrival of Māori to the present day. The finale, a rendition of the 'Age of Aquarius' from the musical 'Hair', complete with dancers in groovy kaftans and space-age satin suits, perhaps can only be explained as yet another claim to New Zealand's modernity. And once again, a British presence was central to the performance of the New Zealand nation. This time however, instead of governors general and plaster pavilions, we had the real thing: attending New Zealand's inaugural national day were Queen Elizabeth and Prince Philip, Prince Charles, Princess Anne and Captain Mark Phillips.

Yet the social, cultural and economic underpinnings of that imagined 'new' New Zealand were shifting. Despite the fulsome array of royalty present at the 1974 celebrations, New Zealand's relationship with Britain had changed dramatically. In 1973, nearly a century of tight trading ties between the two came to end as Britain joined the European Economic Community (EEC). Though the British share of New Zealand's export trade had been declining in the postwar period, the consequences of Britain's move for New Zealand farmers were immediate and severe: between 1972 and 1974, the amount exported to Britain fell by a quarter, from 515,000 to 387,000 tonnes.[66] As the symbiotic system failed, New Zealand finally tried the subjugated colonial line. Some 'special arrangements' for New Zealand were negotiated with the EEC to cushion the blow, largely by 'emphasising weakness . . . dependency and vulnerability'.[67] Even so, by 1980, Britain's share of New Zealand export trade was just 10% and would fall to 5% by

the end of the century.[68] Migration ties also began to fray. In a series of acts between 1962 and 1971, Britain began to control immigration from the Commonwealth. The aim was to stem migration from the non-white commonwealth, but, much to their dismay, New Zealanders also lost their previous rights of unrestricted entry to Britain in the process. In 1974, the New Zealand government returned the favour. Assisted migration schemes, which had recommenced in 1947 and had brought around 100,000 mainly British migrants to New Zealand, came to an end. At the same time, the government introduced a nonrace-based immigration system. British migrants were now on the same footing as any other; for the first time, the government indicated that 'New Zealand citizen and a British national were not interchangeable'.[69] Though Britain would continue to be an important source of migrants, it was now joined by increasing numbers of Pacific and Asian migrants.

Cultural ties proved a little more resilient. American popular culture, always a feature of twentieth century New Zealand, still shared space with the British variety. *Coronation Street*, a soap opera set in Manchester, was New Zealand's most popular television programme in 1971, though British and American television shows shared New Zealand screens evenly in 1975, just as they split the audience for popular music as late as 1985.[70] And we still called Home often: in 1981, most long-range toll calls from New Zealand still went to Britain.[71] But wider economic and social shifts meant a British identity could no longer be taken for granted in New Zealand. Something new was needed to fill the gap, and the Kirk Labour Government's invention of New Zealand Day was a 'conscious effort to construct or reinforce New Zealand nationalism' in response.[72] It was also a cautious effort; celebrations negotiated the changing cultural landscape by adding elements to 'new' New Zealand rather than dismantling it entirely. For example, though Britishness remained central, the celebration wrote other ethnic groups, including Danes, Indians and Chinese, back into New Zealand's founding story.

But it was not just the retreat of a British identity that eroded the old certainties of 'new' New Zealand. Māori were no longer to be contained by its colonial ideas of time and space. The Hunn Report, with its last-ditch attempt to keep Māori in their proper ideological place – as either marginal living remnants of the past or exemplars of the Pākehā image of modernity – galvanised a resurgent population into active resistance. One of the report's recommendations became the 1967 Māori Affairs Amendment Act, yet another state intervention into Māori land ownership which quickly became notorious as the 'last land grab'. The result was 'a major and cohesive Māori land rights movement', and one of its most important moments was the 1975 Land March.[73] Led by 80-year-old *kuia* (female elder) Whina Cooper, a lifelong activist for Māori rights, the march was designed to bring the continued loss of land to public attention. Starting with 50 people in the far north of New Zealand, the *hīkoi* (protest march) travelled 1,000 kilometres and swelled to 5,000 people by the time it arrived in Wellington. As Cooper walked and the media watched, the Māori past became part of the Pākehā present. Long-held land grievances became hard to ignore. Nor did they die down when the *hīkoi* ended, with some internal dissension, at the steps of Parliament. Rather, the march sparked a wave of other land protests, including occupations of confiscated land held in places like Raglan and Bastion Point.

Māori protest was not limited to land loss, nor was it always headed by respected tribal elders. Groups like Ngā Tamatoa (The Warriors) were formed by young, urban, university-educated Māori, influenced by other indigenous rights movements like the Black Panthers and the American Indian Movement. They not only supported land rights but demanded recognition of Māori language and culture and increasingly called for *mana motuhake* (self-determination) and *tino rangatiratanga* (sovereignty.) Sometimes, young Māori activism provoked an angry response from older leaders. But different generations of protest coalesced around the Treaty of Waitangi. Signed in 1840, the treaty incorporated New Zealand within the British Empire. Under its terms, Māori

accepted some form of governance in return for the undisturbed possession of their land and resources, along with the rights of British subjects. From its signing, 'Māori treaty consciousness had continued and developed unbroken . . .'.[74] For Pākehā, it was a different story. Declared legally a 'simple nullity' in 1877, it had disappeared into the government's files, only to be redis-covered, rat-eaten, in 1908. The remnants were restored and rehoused, and at the same time the treaty's meaning was refurbished. Though still a legal nullity, it became fittingly tatty proof of the benevolent nature of British colonisation, an enlightened symbol of partnership between two peoples. It was eventually displayed to the public for the first time at the Centennial in 1940. Even so, it did not become central to any national consciousness. Waitangi Day, which commemorated the first signing, was only a regional holiday until 1974, when the Kirk Government co-opted it as the basis for New Zealand Day. Even then the treaty itself was not central: it was just 'the best available founding moment rather than anything of significance in and of itself. Introducing the New Zealand Day Bill in 1973, Internal Affairs Minister Henry May expressed the hope that the day would focus on nationhood and other principles which he felt were symbolised by the Treaty, rather than on the actual signing'.[75] The treaty remained a relic of the past, not a charter for the future.

That would change in 1975. In that year, the Minister of Māori Affairs, Matiu Rata, finally succeeded in creating the Waitangi Tribunal, a permanent commission of inquiry into claims by Māori against the Crown.[76] Rata would soon leave Labour to form his own party, Mana Māori Motuhake, the very name of which expressed his continuing desire to press for Māori self-determination against a less–than–responsive government. Indeed, the tribunal was the culmi-nation of years of political effort: Labour/Ratana MPs, like Rata, had been working for this for four decades. It also reflected the power of protest, which helped 'retrieved the treaty from the dustbin of history'.[77] From the late 1960s, Māori had begun demonstrating at Waitangi. In 1971, Ngā Tamatoa disrupted speeches, and in 1973 they wore black armbands and claimed Waitangi as a day of mourning. But the 1975 tribunal remained constrained by time, able only to focus on contemporary breaches of the treaty.

It was not until 1985 that the colonial past was brought firmly into the present. That year, the newly elected Labour government empowered the Waitangi Tribunal to make recommen-dations on claims dating back to 1840. Māori responded rapidly; by 1986, there were just under two dozen claims lodged, growing to 102 just three years later.[78] Strains quickly began to show. The tribunal lacked resources, especially given the size and complexity of claims like the Ngāi Tahu claim, which covered the majority of the South Island. Lodged in 1986, the tribunal report on this claim would not be completed until 1991, with a settlement finally reached in 1998. Further, the claims process was hampered by Labour's other, and more important, agenda: the implementation of far–reaching state and economic reforms. Attempts by the government to sell state assets like forests, part of this reform, were in direct conflict with the claims process. Māori rightly feared that privatisation of state assets could affect the nature and scope of their claims and compensation. They lobbied to ensure that the key piece of legislation, the State Owned Enterprises Act (1986), contained a declaration that 'nothing in this Act shall permit the Crown to act in a manner that is inconsistent with the principles of the Treay of Waitangi', then took a successful case to the Court of Appeal to ensure tighter safeguards. Its landmark decision stressed the importance of the treaty as 'akin to a partnership', a crucial factor in future negotiations, and implemented mechanisms to protect Māori interests in state assets.[79]

Though the extension of the Tribunal's power was the most important of the new govern-ment's political initiatives, there were others that suggested Māori would no longer be kept in the margins. In 1985, biculturalism was made ceremonially manifest in the appointment of the first Māori Governor General, Sir Paul Reeves. The country's indigenous language, Māori, was

likewise given long-overdue official status. By 1989, the government looked to further 'main-stream' Māori by dismantling the Department of Māori Affairs, replacing it with a policy minis-try and outsourcing its functions to tribally based providers and other government departments. *Iwi* radio stations proliferated in the early 1990s, supporting language and culture, and at the same time, lifting Māori visibility. (The advent of a dedicated Māori television channel in 2004 has gone beyond this. Their coverage of 'national' events like Anzac Day has lent them support across a wide swathe of the public, raising the possibility of Māori television being not simply a niche provider but a national public broadcaster.)

Treaty settlements accelerated through the 1990s, and by June 2013, the process passed the halfway mark, with 62 historic settlements having been reached, with another 60 remaining.[80] The outcomes of the settlements from some of the older cases are impressive. Ngāi Tahu's settlement totalled $170 million, which, in the ensuing decade, they have turned into an asset base worth over $1 billion.[81] But the development of the tribunal and the settlement process have also been subject to numerous setbacks, including government attempts in the 1990s to restrict the level of reparations, through a policy known as the fiscal envelope, and efforts to put a time limit on making claims. Throughout, Māori discontent simmered and sometimes boiled over into protest, like the 79 day occupation of Pākaitore (Moutoa Gardens) in Whangaui in 1995. A government decision in 2004 to limit Māori claims to the foreshore and seabed not only resulted in a fresh wave of protest but the emergence of a new political force, the Māori Party. In addition, the treaty process has also led to some division amongst Māori. Claims were expected to be heard along *iwi*, or tribal lines. But *iwi* are agglomerations of smaller social groupings, some of which have felt their views have not been fully represented. Māori who no longer have links to, or identify with, a tribal structure, usually as the result of rapid urbanisation from the mid-twentieth century, also made the case for a different form of treaty settlement.

Further, despite the progress made on treaty issues, it would be misleading to see it as a panacea to all colonial ills. In an undesirable version of the past in the present, Māori still do not fully share the nation's social and economic benefits. Labour's economic reforms, extended by the National government through the 1990s, hit Māori disproportionately hard. Deregulation of the private sector, especially manufacturing, and restructuring of the state sector saw many lose their jobs. By 1996, Māori men's incomes had declined to 65% of that of non–Māori.[82] Social statistics have improved over time, but they still lag behind Pākehā. Differences in home sizes, overcrowding, imprisonment rates and educational qualifications point to entrenched inequality.

There has also been a Pākehā backlash. Attempts by the Labour Government in 2000 to 'close the gaps' in these statistics by targeting social spending toward Māori and Pacific peoples provoked public responses of 'preferential' treatment.[83] In a similar fashion, some have claimed the treaty is separatist, giving Māori more rights than other New Zealanders. Some have likened treaty settlements to a gravy train, or a 'grievance industry', while still others just wanted to put the past behind them, and in the old language of assimilation, 'get on with living like one peo-ple'.[84] In 2004, these views found a champion in the conservative National Party leader Don Brash, who, in his infamous Orewa Speech, resurrected familiar old colonial ideas about time and space in the construction of the nation: Māori culture would always be 'cherished', but 'we must build a modern prosperous nation on one rule for all, we cannot allow the loose threads of 19th century law and custom to unravel our attempts at nation-building in the 21st century'.[85] Yet though Brash briefly rode a popular wave, the treaty and its settlement processes continued. For all its difficulties, through the tribunal, the past had officially become part of the present: in an inversion of the 'new' New Zealand, formed almost 100 years previously, the nation could no longer be imagined without it.

Post-colonial, post-metropolitan

It was not, then, until almost the end of the twentieth century that New Zealand began to be imagined as something other than a 'colonial' nation – or at least, it was no longer the same kind of colonial nation. That change was precipitated by the shifting nature of two distinct, but inter-linked, colonial dynamics: one between settlers and the indigenous people and one between the settler state and its metropolis. This chapter has tried to stress both their independence and their interactions, and, in doing so, provide a different perspective on both New Zealand's history and approaches to settler colonialism. This is perhaps most obvious in the final section. The resurgence of Māori activism from the 1960s has often been called a Māori renaissance, though the term has been problematized by historians who believe that this characterisation underplays the important but different work of preceding generations and overplays the extent to which changes in Māori demography, like urbanisation, equalled changes in Māori culture. At the same time, the idea of indigenous renaissance serves to support a wider (and colonising) colony-to-nation narrative. However, by recontextualising Māori activism within settler/metropolitan shifts, we can highlight another problem with the renaissance idea. It relies on a too-benevolent reading of Pākehā attitudes.[86] Whilst changing demographic patterns, international influences and continued government mishandling help explain how a new wave of Māori protest emerged, it does less to explain why Pākehā became more receptive. I suggest Māori were able to effect change through their own efforts but also because the previous foundations for Pākehā identity were shaky. In the vacuum caused by the economic, social, political and cultural retreat of the metropolitan relationship, it became not only possible, but essential, to imagine a different version of New Zealand. For Pākehā, reinventing New Zealand as a bicultural nation became one way to fill the gap. To understand why this vision of New Zealand – where the past must be accommodated with the present – remains contentious requires not only the post-colonial but the post-metropolitan dimension of our past.

Notes

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3 A. Harris, 'Dancing with the State: Māori creative energy and the policies of integration, 1945–1967', PhD Thesis, University of Auckland, 2007, p. 25.
4 N. Mahuika, 'Re-vitalising Te Ika Maui', *New Zealand Journal of History* (*NZJH*), 43, 2, 2009, 134.
5 F. Barnes, 'Pictorial photography and colonial culture', *NZJH* 47, 2, 2013, 136–56.
6 D. Salesa, 'New Zealand's Pacific', in G. Byrnes (ed.) *New Oxford History of New Zealand*, Oxford University Press: South Melbourne, 2009, p. 151.
7 Ibid., p. 8. For a recent summary, see G. Byrnes, 'Introduction: Reframing New Zealand history', in G. Byrnes (ed.) *The New Oxford History of New Zealand*, Oxford University Press: South Melbourne, 2009, pp. 1–18; and G. Byrnes and C. Coleborne, 'Editorial introduction: The utility and futility of "The Nation" in histories of Aotearoa New Zealand', *NZJH* 45, 1, 2011, 1–14.
8 Byrnes, 'Introduction', p. 9. For an analysis of post-colonial limitations in considering Māori history, see M. Williams, ' "Back-home" and home in the city: Māori migrations from Panguru to Auckland, 1930–1970', PhD thesis, University of Auckland, 2010, pp. 12–13.
9 P. Gibbons, 'Cultural colonisation and national identity', *NZJH* 36, 1, 2002, 5–15.
10 J. Belich, *Paradise Reforged: A History of the New Zealanders from the 1880s to the Year 2000*, Penguin Books: Auckland, 2001.
11 Exceptions include C. Hilliard, 'Island stories: The writing of New Zealand history, 1920–1940', MA Thesis, University of Auckland, 1997; K. Ross, *Going Bush: New Zealanders and Nature in the Twentieth Century*, Auckland University Press: Auckland, 2008; A. Calder, *The Settler's Plot: How Stories Take Place in New Zealand*, Auckland University Press: Auckland, 2011.

12 M. Belgrave, *Historical Frictions: Maori Claims and Reinvented Histories*, Auckland University Press: Auckland, 2005, p. 1.

13 For these debates, see M. Belgrave, *Historical Frictions;* G. Byrnes, *The Waitangi Tribunal and New Zealand History*, Oxford University Press: South Melbourne, 2004; W. H. Oliver, 'The future behind us: The Waitangi tribunal's retrospective Utopia', in A. Sharp and P. McHugh (eds.) *Histories, Power and Loss: Uses of the Past – A New Zealand Commentary*, Bridget Williams Books: Wellington, 2001, pp. 9–30; A. Sharp, 'Recent juridical and constitutional histories of Maori', in Sharp and McHugh (eds.) *Histories, Power and Loss*, pp. 31–60.

14 The latest and most comprehensive expression can be found in A. Anderson, J. Binney and A. Harris, *Tangata Whenua: An Illustrated History*, Bridget Williams Books: Wellington, 2014. See also M. Durie, *Te Mana, Te Kawanatanga; the Politics of Maori Self Determination*, Oxford University Press: South Melbourne, 1998; Harris, 'Dancing with the state'; Richard S. Hill, *State Authority, Indigenous Autonomy: Crown-Maori Relations in New Zealand/Aotearoa 1900–1950*, Victoria University Press: Wellington, 2004; Richard S. Hill, *Maori and the State: Crown-Maori Relations in New Zealand/Aotearoa 1950–2000*, Victoria University Press: Wellington, 2009; Claudia Orange; *An Illustrated History of the Treaty of Waitangi*, Bridget Williams Books: Wellington, 2004.

15 R. Walker, *Ka Whawhai Tonu Matou – Struggle Without End*, Penguin Books: Auckland, 1990.

16 Harris, 'Dancing with the state', 24–25.

17 B. Hokowhitu, 'As for these blankets, burn them: Māori and indigeneity', in D. Keenan (ed.) *Huia Histories of Maori: Nga Tahuhu Korero*, Huia: Wellington, 2012, p. 202. For examples see M. Williams, 'Back Home' and M. Stevens, 'Muttonbirds and modernity in Murihuku: Continuity and change in Kāi Tahu knowledge', PhD Thesis, University of Otago, 2010.

18 The debates around the uses of Māori history are far more nuanced than can be described here; see however, Mahuika, 'Revitalising Te Ika a Maui'; Hokowhitu, 'As for these blankets, burn them'; T. Maire Tau, 'Matauranga Maori as an epistemology', in Sharp and McHugh (eds.) *Histories, Power and Loss*, pp. 61–73.

19 T. Ballantyne, 'Knowledge, sociability and community in Gore's intellectual life, 1875–1914', *NZJH* 44, 2, 139.

20 They adopt this description to differentiate between older white settler colonies and those formed in the twentieth century, for example Palestine or the Japanese in Korea. C. Elkins and S. Pedersen, *Settler Colonialism in the Twentieth Century: Projects, Practices, Legacies*, Routledge: New York, 2005, p. 3.

21 See F. Barnes, *New Zealand's London: A Colony and Its Metropolis*, Auckland University Press: Auckland, 2012; J. Belich, *Paradise Reforged*; P. Buckner, *Canada and the End of Empire*, UBC: Vancouver, 2004; S. Ward, *Australia and the British Embrace: The Demise of the Imperial Ideal*, Melbourne University Press: Melbourne, 2001.

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23 F. Barnes, '"Thinking from a place called London": The Metropole and Colonial culture, 1840–1907', *Journal of New Zealand Studies*, Special Issue, 2011, 107–24.

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