FOREIGN AFFAIRS

AN AMERICAN QUARTERLY REVIEW

OCTOBER 1964

World Perspectives, 1964 . . . . . *Grayson Kirk* 1
Japanese Security and American Policy . . . *George F. Kennan* 14
Quebec in Revolt . . . . . *William E. Griffith* 29
After the U.N. Trade Conference: Lessons and Portents *Sidney Weintraub* 37
Australia and Southeast Asia . . . . . *Paul Hasluck* 51
Laos: Continuing Crisis . . . . . *Eric Pace* 64
Viet Nam: Do We Understand Revolution? *Major-General Edward G. Lansdale* 75
Soviet Policy in the Developing Countries . . . *Philip E. Mosely* 87
The Importance of Being Black: An Asian Looks at Africa *Frank Moraes* 99
For An Atlantic Future . . . . . *Theo Sommer* 112
Moscow and the M.L.F.: Hostility and Ambivalence *Zbigniew Brzezinski* 126
SOUTH AFRICA AND THE WORLD:
In Defense of Apartheid . . . . . *Charles A. W. Manning* 135
Some Maxims and Axioms . . . . . *Philip Mason* 150
Korea's "Mendicant Mentality"? A Critique of U.S. Policy *Pyong Choon Hahm* 165
Recent Books on International Relations . . . . . *Henry L. Roberts* 175
Source Material . . . . . *Donald Wasson* 193

HAMILTON FISH ARMSTRONG
Editor

PHILIP W. QUIGG
Managing Editor

Editorial Advisory Board

ALLEN W. DULLES
ALFRED M. GRUENTHER
GEORGE F. KENNAN
WILLIAM L. LANGER
JOHN J. McCLOY
PHILIP E. MOSELY
ISIDOR I. RABI
HENRY M. WRISTON

Published quarterly by Council on Foreign Relations, Inc. Editorial and Business Offices, 58 East 68 Street, New York, N.Y. 10021. All mail, including correspondence about subscriptions, should be sent to this address. Cable address. Foraffairs, New York. Subscriptions, $6.00 a year, post free to any address. The Editors will consider manuscripts submitted, but assume no responsibility regarding them. Printed at 10 McGovern Avenue, Lancaster, Pennsylvania.

Vol. 43, No. 1.

Copyright 1964, Council on Foreign Relations, Inc. Printed in U.S.A.

CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS ISSUE

GRAYSON KIRK, President of Columbia University * * * *GEORGE F. KENNAN,* of the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton; Ambassador to Jugoslavia, 1961–63; formerly Ambassador to the Soviet Union, and head of the Policy Planning Staff in the Department of State; author of "Soviet-American Relations 1917–1920," "Realities of American Foreign Policy," "On Dealing with the Communist World" and other works * * * *WILLIAM E. GRIFFITH,* Research Associate, Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and Professor of Soviet Diplomacy, the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy; author of "Albania and the Soviet Rift" * * * *SIDNEY WEINTRAUB,* Chief of the General Commercial Policies Division in the State Department's Bureau of Economic Affairs; formerly chairman of the Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania; author of several books in the field of price theory * * * *PAUL HASLUCK,* Australian Minister for External Affairs; former Minister for Territories; former delegate to the U. N. General Assembly; author of several historical works * * * *ERIC PACE,* correspondent for *Time-Life* in Southeast Asia * * * *MAJOR-GENERAL EDWARD G. LANSDALE, U.S.A.F.,* retired; Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, 1957–63; adviser to the Philippine Government during the Huk rebellion and to President Diem of South Viet Nam, 1954–56 * * * *PHILIP E. MOSELY,* Director of the European Institute, and former Director of the Russian Institute, Columbia University; former Director of Studies, Council on Foreign Relations; Political Adviser, European Advisory Committee, 1944–45; author of "The Kremlin and World Politics" and other works * * * *FRANK MORAES,* Editor-in-Chief, *The Indian Express,* Bombay; former Editor of *The Times of India;* author of "Report on Mao's China," "India Today," and a forthcoming book with the same title as his article * * * *THEO SOMMER,* Political Editor of *Die Zeit,* Hamburg * * * *ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI,* Professor of Government and Director of the Research Institute on Communist Affairs, Columbia University; author of "The Soviet Bloc—Unity and Conflict," "Ideology and Power in Soviet Politics" and other works * * * *CHARLES A. W. MANNING,* Professor Emeritus of International Relations at the London School of Economics; South African born, educated at South African College, Cape Town, and Oxford; former Deputy Professor of International Law, Oxford; author of "The Policies of the British Dominions in the League of Nations," "The Nature of International Society" and other works * * * *PHILIP MASON,* Director, Institute of Race Relations, London; former Director of Studies in Race Relations, Royal Institute of International Affairs; for many years an official of the Indian Civil Service; author of "Racial Tension," "A New Deal in East Africa" and other works * * * *PYONG CHOON HAHM,* Assistant Professor of Law, Social Science Research Institute, Yonsei University, Seoul, Korea.

The articles in FOREIGN AFFAIRS *do not represent any consensus of beliefs. We do not expect that readers of the review will sympathize with all the sentiments they find there, for some of our writers will flatly disagree with others; but we hold that while keeping clear of mere vagaries* FOREIGN AFFAIRS *can do more to guide American public opinion by a broad hospitality to divergent ideas than it can by identifying itself with one school. It does not accept responsibility for the views expressed in any articles, signed or unsigned, which appear in its pages. What it does accept is the responsibility for giving them a chance to appear there.* The Editors.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Vol. 43 OCTOBER 1964 No. 1

WORLD PERSPECTIVES, 1964

By Grayson Kirk

SØREN KIERKEGAARD once said that "Life can only be understood backwards; but it must be lived forwards." As applied to public policy in general, and to foreign policy in particular, this is a counsel of despair because it implies that men must govern themselves and shape their policies without really knowing what they are about or why. But if this observation is to be disproved, and the historian unseated as the only proper analyst of human affairs, then men must be prepared resolutely to try to follow Aldous Huxley's advice "to look at the world directly and not through the half-opaque medium of concepts, which distorts every given fact into the all too familiar likeness of some generic label or explanatory abstraction."

In reference to American foreign affairs, and particularly at this time in our history, such an effort is difficult. In all countries foreign affairs are likely to become the object of more emotionalism and irrationality than domestic questions. This is the heritage of history viewed through the lens of nationalism. And today the task of looking outward upon the world with calm objectivity and realism becomes doubly difficult because ours is a world so different from that of even our immediate forebears that neither national experience nor the clichés of political leaders offer easy guidance to the puzzled but conscientious citizen. The effort, however, must be made, and particularly so in an election year when important choices face the voter.

Perhaps it may be useful to begin with an unscholarly oversimplification and to suggest that the United States may be about to enter a fourth period in the history of its foreign policy. The first, of course, was our century-long avoidance of any long-

term diplomatic commitments in Europe or elsewhere. Wrongly called a policy of "isolation," it was, in fact, merely a shrewd use of a special historical situation—the nineteenth-century Western European equilibrium of power and the British Navy's domination of the Atlantic—in order to gain precious time for the growth of national strength and unity.

A second policy period coincided roughly with the first half of the present century. Following the flexing of our muscles in the Spanish-American War and the assumption of political commitments in the Pacific, we became concerned over the rise of German naval power and the consequent drawing in of British naval power from the Far East. In terms of its relationship to our own security, we then began to value more highly than before the existence of even an unsteady European power equilibrium. When it was threatened with destruction, in each of two world wars, we intervened to help preserve it. In both cases we were drawn into actual belligerency by a series of incidents that blurred this central issue, but our antipathy to a possible German victory was in part an instinctive reaction that our own national future would be more secure if Western Europe avoided domination by a single powerful state.

Our effort after World War II to set up barriers against Soviet expansion was in the same general policy tradition. The physical exhaustion of the Western European countries, the vast military strength of the Soviet Union and the Stalinist commitment to the extension of Soviet power caused the United States—once the early illusions of postwar Allied collaboration were dispelled—to try to rebuild some degree of European equilibrium by such heroic measures as the Marshall Plan and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. There was genuine fear that western continental Europe otherwise might be forced to follow the Eastern European states into the Communist orbit; hence we strove mightily, and successfully, to ward off this danger and to restore a reasonable power balance. We did not hope to equate Western Europe with the Soviet Union, but we did believe, as before, that single-power domination of Western Europe would be inimical to our own security interests.

To accomplish this end, we were obliged to recognize that the postwar situation was so new and different that we could be successful only if we were to abandon a primary characteristic of our second policy period—namely, ad hoc interventionism—

and accept permanent diplomatic and military commitments. This was such a basic policy change that it seems reasonable to refer to the situation roughly since the end of the last war as a third major period in United States foreign policy. Moreover, and again in distinction to the second policy period, our commitments now ranged far beyond Western Europe. The identification of the Soviet Union as our great antagonist and the military weakness of all the states around the Soviet periphery forced us to expand the policy of containment to global proportions. Our new world-wide foreign aid program—technical, financial and military—was in substance an extrapolation of our commitment to try to preserve a strong and independent Europe. Since such a program could not be confined to Soviet border states, it became, in effect, a world-wide program of defense against Soviet infiltration. It has been staggeringly expensive, and since it had to be based upon the strengthening of democratic forces and institutions in countries where, in some cases, there was little upon which to build, the American people, always prone to demand quick and dramatic successes, have become increasingly restive and critical of results achieved by such a massive and costly effort.

Meanwhile, in this third period, the fantastic developments in military technology obliged us to undertake hitherto unimaginable peacetime defense expenditures at home. To meet the new Soviet capability for direct attack upon the continental United States, we went into a crash program, both for defense and retaliation, that has made a primary claim upon our national budget and upon our supply of scientific talent. This burden has been borne without serious taxpayer complaint because our people have realized that all our political, diplomatic and military efforts abroad would be useless unless they were based upon our recognized ability, in the face of this new situation, both to ward off a direct Soviet attack and, if need be, to inflict massive destruction upon Soviet power centers.

These, then, have been some of the guide lines of our third-period policy: massive strength at home, both for offense and defense against a direct Soviet onslaught; aid, in some form, to all countries where a Communist threat, direct or indirect, is believed to exist; the encouragement, with American participation, of regional, anti-Communist, international organizations; and a general opposition to any policies, by any non-Communist govern-

ment, that might be somehow beneficial to the Soviet Union. We have supplemented this policy by warm collaboration with the United Nations and other international organizations wherein there might be discovered opportunities to mitigate the cold war, but the general anti-Soviet temper of the American people, fed by frequent Moscovite provocation, remains a basic, national, policy-conditioning attitude.

II

It is the argument of this paper that while the third, or post-war, policy of the United States has served us well and has achieved many of its major ends, the time may not be far off when we shall want to reëxamine it substantively. The reconsideration of any policy does not necessarily lead to major changes; it could merely reaffirm the general conclusion that, despite new situations, the original policy and the basis upon which it was constructed remain as sound as ever. But the benefit of any thorough and periodic reëxamination is that it may lead our decision-makers and the general public to envisage and grasp new opportunities, afforded by changing circumstances, to give greater benefit to our country in its world relations.

This task of reëxamination is not easy in these complicated days even for our statesmen, and still less so for the private citizen, but the effort ought not to be avoided just because it is difficult and because it is bound to evoke mixed reactions, particularly from those whose commitment to a fixed line of policy is such that they may ascribe dubious motives to all who propose even a reëxamination.

Several years ago when I was invited to have a personal interview with the head of a major European state, I was somewhat taken aback by his opening question: "What is your opinion of the general state of affairs in the world?" As the conversation progressed, I soon realized that this had not been merely an opening gambit or an effort to make polite conversation. Rather it was a reflection of a profound personal need to think globally about situations and trends that might have an effect upon the basic architecture of his foreign policy.

In that spirit, and in the conviction that the basic world situation may be beginning to change in certain respects, it may be useful to try to list certain conclusions, facts, situations and trends that ought to be taken into account in any basic reëxami-

nation of policy. Such a listing necessarily is a highly personal exercise, and it is not likely to be useful unless it provokes some disagreement both over inclusions and exclusions. Such an exercise, moreover, is more useful for the private citizen than for the policy-maker, but the latter must bring the former with him if he is to do anything more than remain in a well worn policy rut. And most government officials do back away from any public-opinion battle that can be avoided. To date, Senator Fulbright is one of the few men in public life to indicate an acute awareness of the value to be achieved by a fresh look at foreign policy.

A first item on such a list is the simple fact that the Soviet Union must be regarded as a viable political and economic entity with which our country necessarily will coexist for an indefinite time. Because the U.S.S.R. has so frequently proclaimed itself to be an avowed antagonist of the United States, and has so acted on many occasions, some Americans, seizing upon well-publicized Soviet failures and shortcomings, still cling to the hope that one day it may disintegrate under the weight of its own internal contradictions and inadequacies as a political, economic and social mechanism.

Such catastrophic happenings are always possible, particularly in a political system that has not yet solved the thorny problem of the orderly transfer of political power. But the fact remains that the Soviet Union has survived—through great internal and external trials—for nearly half a century. Today, as far as a foreigner can judge, its internal effectiveness, stability and popularity are greater than at any time in its history. The Soviet Humpty Dumpty one day might fall off the Kremlin wall, but it would be the height of folly for Americans to base any policy assumptions on that expectation.

Further, if through some internal or external cataclysm the present régime were to be ousted from power, we have no right to assume that any successor régime would be markedly different in attitude or theory, or any easier for us to deal with. This observation is prompted by the belief that most of the basic foreign policies of the Soviet Union—as distinct from many tiresome speeches and policy pronouncements—have been motivated to a greater degree by what are conceived to be Russian national interests than by the desire to encourage the doctrinaire advancement of world Communism. While many Americans reject this

conclusion, its validity as a policy consideration for the United States seems to be borne out by the phenomenon of the Soviet-Chinese split.

A second possibility, derived from the first, is that the conservative and cautious tendency currently apparent in Soviet policy may be an evidence of a long-range trend and not merely a temporary gambit designed to lull our suspicions and lure us off base. Societies generally become less adventurous when hard-won gains could be lost by failure—a point illustrated by the tactical and ideological differences now so apparent between China and the Soviet Union. None the less, and human nature being what it is, it is not to be expected that Soviet leaders ever would make any open dramatic renunciation of past beliefs or practices. Hence, one cannot take seriously occasional American statements to the effect that because the Soviet record is one of duplicity in international dealings, we must avoid placing any trust in any Soviet action unless the Soviet leaders openly disavow their past and announce that they now wish to settle down and become normal and coöperative members of the world community. This is merely childish thinking.

But it is reasonable to conclude that as conditions in Russia become progressively better, and as Marxist illusions about the outside world recede into unreality, Soviet leaders are likely to talk more and more about the ultimate and eventual triumph of their system through peaceful demonstration of its validity, and less and less about any world cataclysm to be brought about through the expiring death throes of decadent capitalism. Therefore, relying upon the significance of actions rather than words, it seems fair to conclude that the present Soviet policy line is not a tactical manœuvre but a reflection of growing stability at home and an unavowed re-assessment of the prospects for the non-Communist world.

Such a judgment is based upon a third fact of our contemporary world, which is the continued and growing strength and vitality of the more important non-Communist Western countries. The Soviet masses may still believe propaganda about the decadence, weakness and internal disunity of the West, but their leaders can have no such illusions for they are fully aware of the facts. Just as Western policies must be based on the assumption of the continued viability and strength of the U.S.S.R., so Soviet policies must be founded on a similar conclusion about the West.

The revival, for example, of postwar Western Europe is a success story that cannot be discounted or overlooked by any intelligent Soviet policy-maker.

Another contemporary "fact of life" is the much-discussed nuclear stalemate which means that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union can force its will upon the other without risking its own total destruction in the process. Senator Fulbright recently observed that "By their acquisition of nuclear weapons the two great powers have destroyed the traditional advantages which size and resources had placed at their disposal. Their security now is a tenuous thing, depending solely on their power to deter attack and, ultimately, on sheer faith that each will respond with reason and restraint to the deterrent power of the other."[1]

The Cuban confrontation bears ample testimony to the essential validity of the position that nuclear weapons, in a state of sufficient quantity and equivalence on each side, are more of a restraint upon the free exercise of policy than a means for achieving desired ends. Chairman Khrushchev had to withdraw from an untenable position, and the United States, in turn, accepted the unattractive conclusion that it ought not to accept the risk of insisting upon the total liquidation of the Castro régime. The simple fact, and one that is new in history, is that great nuclear powers cannot now consider the use of force against each other as an instrument of policy. In such a situation a policy of Soviet or American "brinkmanship" is essentially irresponsible because it does not really carry with it the actuality of a threat that might make it successful in breaking the will of an opponent. It is dangerous to peace because it could unleash popular emotions so powerful politically as to determine, fatally, the process of decision-making in a crisis situation that had been allowed to escalate to major proportions.

Another situation, stemming partly from the nuclear "balance of frustration," needs to be kept in mind in thinking about United States foreign policy. This is the fact that, despite the formidable military, financial and industrial capability of our country, our *relative* status in the world has been declining. European recovery has produced new rivalry for world trade opportunities and new freedom from financial dependence upon us. As a consequence of this trend and our massive foreign expenditures

[1] J. W. Fulbright, "Old Myths and New Realities." New York: Random House, 1964, p. 54.

we have been plagued by a persistently adverse balance of payments that has weakened our gold position to a point where it has occasioned genuine national concern.

Such developments in Western Europe were the inevitable consequence of success of the aid programs after the war. Now that this success has been achieved, the adjustment by the United States to a condition of greater equality in partnership is filled with policy implications at every level. The problem appears, for example, with respect to attitudes toward trade and other relations with the Communist world. If it is in any way true, as has been suggested by some writers, that Americans seem to have grown attached to the cold war, the same could not be said of our European allies who, in varying degrees, have shown that they believe that closer diplomatic and economic relations with the Communist world will be more a source of long-run safety than risk.

The lessening of America's world status is not confined to our relations with Western Europe and its resurgent strength. The effects of what is called "polycentrism" as the successor to "bipolarity" can be observed in the significant growth of either outright anti-Americanism or vocal criticism of the United States throughout much of the world. One London newspaper remarked editorially a few weeks ago that one explanation for the results of the Republican Party convention was a natural American reaction against the torrent of criticism and abuse to which this country had been subjected from so many foreign centers in recent years. This may be an exaggerated view, but it does point up the fact that the world leadership of the United States is not accepted as unquestioningly today as it was in the years immediately after the last war. And Americans, who do like to be liked by foreigners, often have been offended by this mounting criticism, particularly when it comes from countries whose current status has, we believe, been made possible to such a large extent by our own foreign-aid program. It is quite clear that we have relied overly much upon "gratitude" as a force in international affairs because we have viewed our program as sheer national generosity while many foreigners have regarded it as a policy device for the expansion of American influence, the relief of agricultural surpluses and the advancement of our global policy of Soviet "containment."

But criticism and depreciation of the United States abroad is

not important to our policy-makers except as it is a reflection of the world-wide phenomenon of resurgent nationalism. It was to be expected that many of the newly independent states in Asia and Africa, whatever their history—or lack of it—or their weaknesses and doubtful viability, would be strongly nationalistic in this first flush of emotional exuberance following the achievement of freedom. Our own history should have prepared us for this conclusion. We were not, however, quite prepared for the same outburst of popular demands in Western Europe for independence from what was felt to be United States domination. It was a natural phenomenon, probably inescapable, but it has caught the American people unawares and, momentarily, it appears to have produced a political reaction that could have important policy consequences.

Possibly of greater significance is the fact that the same trend has appeared in the Soviet bloc. Some of the Eastern European satellite states have profited from the opportunity of the Sino-Soviet split to assert, in varying degrees and in cautious ways, more independence of policy than before. One should not underestimate the possible long-range significance of their encouragement of trade and, more recently, tourist traffic, with the non-Communist world. The grim and dramatic reality of the Berlin Wall has perhaps caused us to overlook the growing movement of peoples for travel and business across the Iron Curtain elsewhere in Europe. If affluence and political relaxation could permit such traffic to assume substantial proportions in the years ahead, the results might be beneficial.

The rising current of nationalism is another indication of the fact that, for an increasing number of people everywhere, the last war is being forgotten except as an event of past history. Those Americans who continue to view the outside world as they did quite reasonably even a decade ago should remember that young Europeans of voting age could have been born as late as 1943, and even earlier in countries where the minimum age is less than 21. Such young people have no real recollection of the war and only a dim memory of its immediate aftermath. It is this rising generation that, understandably, helps to foster the attitudes of independence, and even sharp criticism, with respect to the United States and its erstwhile predominance. These younger people must be expected to be unimpressed by our role in the struggle against Hitlerism and our aid to European reconstruc-

tion thereafter. They are growing to adulthood in a Europe of revived prosperity, and one cannot assume that they will be everlastingly grateful for something they did not experience. Theirs is a new world, a postwar world, and in the immemorial fashion of young people they look only to the present and the future. In Europe the change in the past five years to a new postwar mentality is a phenomenon which cannot escape the attention of any thoughtful observer. It helps to explain the immense popularity of the late President Kennedy in Europe, and it has profound significance for the present and future artificers of our foreign policy.

So many other items could be added to this list of things which ought to influence our foreign-policy thinking. Among them are (1) the world-wide instability produced by the excessively rapid proliferation of new and weak states with such poor prospects for viability as effective, independent, political entities; (2) the effects of this flood of new states upon the United Nations as an action agency; (3) the rising levels of expectation among populations of underdeveloped lands and the problems thereby presented to the world; (4) the strong possibility, with or without Castro's influence, of explosive social change in some Latin American states; and (5) the menace of Communist China to its Asian neighbors and, quite possibly, to the world.

But the choice to leave these issues to one side here and to direct attention primarily to Europe and the Soviet Union was deliberate. In the years immediately ahead, as in the past, the single greatest influence upon our foreign policy will be the climate of our relations with this part of the world. Everything else we do, everywhere, will be profoundly affected, perhaps determined, by our European and Soviet policies.

III

What conclusions and implications should one draw from the five items singled out for brief discussion: (1) the strength and viability of the Soviet Union; (2) the strength and viability of the Western democracies; (3) the balance of nuclear power between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.; (4) the possibility that Soviet foreign policies may follow a long-range trend of gradual but increasing conservatism and adjustment with the West; and (5) the effects of the rising tide of nationalism in the world?

First of all, it must be emphasized that, though we may have

a détente of growing significance in Western-Soviet relations, we should not expect any dramatic or rapid clearing of the political atmosphere. Undoubtedly, and for some time in the future, the United States will continue to try to counter and to contain efforts to expand Soviet influence abroad, and the Kremlin will seek to do the same for our foreign activities. Each will continue to manœuvre against the other as long as each sees in the existence, policies and strength of the other a threat to its own future. But this kind of contest for external political influence, familiar to all diplomatic historians and inherent in the collisions of highly competitive, great-power states, bids fair now to be carried on in relative freedom from the old fear that it may be but a prelude to Armageddon. Given an irrational person in a post of the highest authority in either state, a world catastrophe could ensue; for today the head of a nuclear-armed state, in his capacity as commander-in-chief of all the defense forces of his country, has literally in his own hands—unchecked by any legislative mandate—the power to plunge mankind into an unimaginable abyss. Such power did not exist in the old days of conventional weapons. Its mere existence is frightening, and it is sure to have some cautionary effect upon the selection of any head of government. We must assume, however, that leaders in this awesome position will be prudent, rational men, in which case the great-power diplomatic contest of the foreseeable future will be reasonably free from the possibility of any deliberate resort to the use of ultimate force as an instrument of state policy.

With respect to nuclear-weapons policy, the immediate prospect is for the tacit continuation of the status quo. The Soviet Union appears unlikely to accept that measure of international inspection that might make us willing to accept a substantial reduction of nuclear armaments. In the absence of any such assurances the United States cannot, and should not, take any steps that would diminish its own existing nuclear capability. Those who clamor for disarmament as a path to peace should remember that armaments are more a product of distrust than a cause thereof. We should be content with the present balance of power, and we should maintain it at whatever level may be necessary. As indicated above, the adversity of a nuclear standoff has uses that may be beneficial to us even if they are not sweet in the mouths of either the pacifists or the jingoists.

These two general observations point to four foreign-policy

implications for the near future. First, we should be prepared to take advantage of all opportunities arising from the growing trends toward nationalism to encourage individual Eastern European states in the Communist orbit toward greater independence of action vis-à-vis Moscow. This will be a slow process because any excessive or premature action on their part would certainly provoke a Hungary-like repression. But it would be catastrophic for us to assume that the entire Communist bloc is merely a single, monolithic, centrally directed conspiracy against the West. The men in the Kremlin make no such mistake in their dealings with the Western Alliance. The leaders of the West, if they are clever and unimpeded by obsessions, gradually may be able to strengthen the spirit of nationalism that coexists uneasily with Communist internationalism in every Eastern European state. If this can be done in such a way and at such a pace as to avoid giving Moscow the feeling that a mortal blow is being prepared, good and positive results for the West might be forthcoming. At least, the effort is worthwhile.

Second, we must accept the fact that the prospective development—economic, political and social—of a large part of the world will not be according to our own pattern and quite possibly not greatly to our liking. Many of the rising countries feel the political urgency of more rapid national development than can be achieved by primary reliance upon the private sector. Therefore, the mix between private and public sources of capital is likely, in many cases, to go further in the direction of "socialism" than we would prefer. But this is a fact of contemporary life and we would impair the strength of our basic world position if we professed to see in all such trends and developments merely the cunning hand of the professional Communist agitator.

Politically speaking, the same prospect is before us. Throughout much of the world we are likely to see far more authoritarian government than we like. Reluctantly, we are beginning to accept the fact that some of our earlier ideas about world political trends and the inevitability of democracy were, to put the matter bluntly, naïve. We now know that democratic institutions, such as we enjoy, require for their successful operation a whole set of conditions—political experience, a satisfactory level of education, general agreement on the fundamental structure and purposes of the state, etc.—that are entirely lacking in much of the world. Time and wise direction may bring to many of these states

conditions in which individual liberty may be widened and deepened, but even then the end result may be quite different from our own institutions and ideas.

Third, as suggested earlier, we will be living in an unsettled and even dangerous world for a long time to come. Therefore, the conduct of our foreign policy must be animated by prudence and great sobriety even though undergirded by fully maintained strength. Flamboyance and brinkmanship always will have popular appeal, but patience is a greater attribute of statesmanship than sabre-rattling. For the individual as well as a society there is an emotional catharsis in losing one's temper and threatening an opponent with dire punishment, but such a course is always a luxury which few individuals and no great powers can afford.

Finally, our policy must continue to do whatever can be done to strengthen all available mechanisms of international coöperation and peaceful adjustment of differences. It would be folly to believe that the United Nations or any other international organization can be regarded as a complete substitute for diplomacy in a world of independent nation-states, but it can help to solve small problems that otherwise might grow to dangerous proportions, provide the best possible means of face-saving for a loser, and offer a world forum in which, hopefully, a growing consensus about standards and procedures relating to international conduct gradually may evolve.

To sum up: our new policy period must be characterized by an attitude of resolute firmness whenever necessary, but this must be tempered with greater flexibility, inventiveness and realism about the world as it is. As we move into such a time, our greatest national danger could arise from a widening gap between the thinking of our policy-makers, who have been trained to view the world coldly, prudently and realistically, and the attitudes of large sections of the public which frequently reflect little more than strident emotionalism. This gap always exists, but it is a growing danger, and only the courage and forthrightness of our leaders in their public utterances can help to close it. The demagogues always will be with us, but the field of public discussion must not be left to them simply because other and wiser men fear the rough and tumble of public debate. The issues at stake are great, and the American people deserve from their leaders not only candor and courage but also sobriety and restraint.

JAPANESE SECURITY AND AMERICAN POLICY

By George F. Kennan

THE provisions of the Japanese Constitution barring the resort to war as an instrument of Japanese policy, and effectively committing Japan not to maintain armed forces on a major scale, has long raised the question how Japan's security is to be assured in a world still replete with sources of international conflict. As late as 1948 it was still General MacArthur's view, if the writer of these lines understood him correctly, that it would not be essential for the United States to maintain armed forces on the Japanese archipelago permanently or for a protracted time either for its own security or for that of Japan; in his view, the most suitable status for Japan would be one of permanent demilitarization and neutralization under such general protection as might be afforded by the United Nations and by the friendly interest of the United States. He appeared to believe, as did this writer, that if such a status could be arranged with the concurrence of the Soviet Government, the likelihood of a Soviet attack on Japan would be minimal; and it was not easy to see from what other quarter Japan could be seriously threatened. This concept assumed, of course, an eventual agreement between the Soviet Union, the United States and other interested parties, on the terms of a Japanese peace settlement.

In the following year—1949—however, the decision was taken in Washington, for reasons still not fully clear, to proceed at once to the negotiation of a separate United States-Japanese treaty, one which would envisage virtually a bilateral alliance between the two countries and the retention for an indefinite period of American bases and defense facilities on the Japanese islands. Preparatory talks on such a treaty were well advanced when the Korean War broke out. To what extent these discussions, and the American disposition they reflected, were a factor in the Communist decision to launch the attack in Korea is a question which still awaits exhaustive historical scrutiny. Certainly, they were not the only factor; but it would be surprising if they had had no effect at all on this decision.

The Korean War changed the entire aspect of the Japanese

security problem quite basically. The dream of a demilitarized and militarily neutralized Japan now faded from sight. That concept was not at all in accord with the view, so hastily embraced and fondly cherished in Washington officialdom, that the Communist attack in Korea was not the result of local causes but represented only the first move in a Soviet program of world-wide military conquest. Not even the greatest efforts of those who had closer knowledge of Soviet affairs could serve to disabuse the policy-making echelons of the Administration of this belief; and in the face of this interpretation, the idea of a Japan left without strong outside support, questionable enough anyway in the light of events in Korea, appeared, quite naturally, as the wildest frivolity.

The result was, of course, the Security Treaty signed at Tokyo on February 28, 1952, and the Administrative Agreement which accompanied it—arrangements which were basically renewed and prolonged by the Treaty of Mutual Coöperation and Security concluded in January 1960.

It might be useful to attempt now to reconstruct the assumptions on the American side on which these arrangements were originally established. These may have varied somewhat in the minds of the various personalities involved, but probably it would be not too wide of the mark to suppose that the following were among them:

1. That Japan was seriously threatened with invasion or with overt military intimidation from the Communist mainland of Asia; and that such dangers were being averted, and could be averted in future, only by an active American commitment to the maintenance of Japanese security, involving the more or less permanent stationing of American forces in Japan.

2. That a similar situation prevailed with respect to South Korea, where any relaxation of the American presence would be the signal for an immediate renewal of hostilities by the Communists. In this connection, it was further postulated that the security of South Korea was essential to the security of Japan; and that American bases in Japan, in addition to their relation to the defense of Japan proper, were also necessary to support the security of South Korea.

3. That Japanese opinion could be brought to share these assumptions, at least in adequate degree, and thus to understand and accept the need for a strong American military presence in Japan proper and in neighboring territories.

II

It will be interesting to examine the extent to which these assumptions have been affected by subsequent developments.

Let us take first the threat of invasion or of military intimidation. Here the greatest change that has occurred since these assumptions were first made is that what was once seen as a single problem has now, quite obviously, become two. The policy and behavior of Peking can no longer be identified with that of Moscow. One has to recognize that Japan has two possible opponents, not one, on the mainland of Asia; and one has to consider each of these separately.

It can be argued, in the case of Moscow, that not even in the days of Stalin did Soviet policy ever envisage anything resembling a full-fledged Soviet invasion of Japan. It can be argued with even greater ease that the idea of such a military action had no place at all in the political outlook of Nikita Khrushchev, and would have had none even if the conflict with Peking had never arisen. But it is not necessary to be satisfied on either of these points in order to recognize that today, in the light of the conflict with China and of other problems of the Soviet Union and the bloc, nothing could be further from the thoughts of policy-makers in Moscow than a venture of this nature. It would play directly into the hands of the Chinese Communists, who have no more fervent dream than to see Moscow embroiled in a conflict with the United States (and any Soviet military action against Japan could not fail to produce such a conflict, security treaty or no security treaty, bases or no bases) from which they could themselves remain aloof. It would split the bloc even more woefully than it is split today. It would bewilder a Soviet public fed for years on the pap of peaceful coexistence. It would involve the operation of immensely lengthy and difficult lines of communication around the great salient of Manchuria, with the Chinese installed securely on the flank. Altogether, it is permissible to say that if American diplomacy had no greater problem than the possibility of a Soviet invasion of Japan in the conditions of 1964, a great many people could go home and go to bed.

In the case of the Chinese Communists, the picture is somewhat different. Their policy in Asia is obviously dynamic. Nothing could be more enticing to them than a wide power of disposal over the financial and industrial resources of Japan. It is they, not the Russians, whose influence is dominant today in the

Communist Party of Japan. It is they who might hope mainly to profit from a communization of Japan.

But there are powerful reasons why the Communist Chinese leaders cannot contemplate direct military action as a conceivable means of realizing their aspirations with regard to Japan, and why they could not contemplate it, in the face of a general American commitment to Japan's security, even if American forces were not physically present on the Japanese islands. There is their lack of amphibious strength. There is the problem of Korea, the solution of which in a manner favorable to Peking would be a prerequisite to any successful exertion of military pressure against Japan. There is the obvious undesirability of committing Chinese Communist forces in a major way on a single sector of the vast perimeter of China so long as other problems—Taiwan, Southeast Asia, the frontier with India and above all the long frontier with the U.S.S.R.—remain unsettled. If a Russia contemplating an invasion of Japan would have to think of China on her flank, a China contemplating such a project would have to think of Russia in her rear. And there is, finally, the fact that any direct and unprovoked military action against a neighboring country would quite destroy the image Peking is trying to establish, and would play directly into the hands of Moscow in the competition for dominant influence within the world Communist movement.

Too much should not be made of these reflections. Conditions can always change. Great military establishments have a way of remaining important for the shadows they cast, even where there is little likelihood of their actual employment. In particular, these considerations should not be taken as suggestions that either the needs of Japanese security or those of peace in the eastern Pacific area generally could be adequately met at this juncture without our continued interest in, and commitment to, Japan's security. Certainly, any abrupt withdrawal of this interest and commitment would create a new situation, to which the above considerations might not be relevant. It is enough, for the moment, to note that a change has come over the Japanese security problem, and that it has important connotations.

III

It was not the intention to treat in this article the present state of the perennial problem of Korea. But again, there are certain

points, affecting the security of Japan, where elements of change ought to be noted.

At the time of the attack on South Korea, in 1950, one of the considerations which inspired the vigorous American reaction, in the minds of at least *some* Americans involved, was the threat which a Communist seizure of South Korea would have posed for the internal security of Japan, particularly in view of the important part played by Koreans in the Communist Party of Japan—especially in the larger Japanese cities. Even today, Japan is sensitive (and she must always remain so) to whatever occurs in the southern part of Korea. But the stabilization of conditions in Japan has somewhat altered the dimensions of this problem. While these are questions of degree, there is good reason to regard Japan as having entered, or being in process of entering, the ranks of those advanced nations the nature of whose economy not only undermines the rationale for any Communist take-over but raises the question whether the Communists would be capable, even if initially successful in the political sense, of directing an economy so complex and so extensively geared to the economies of other advanced nations. One is obliged to ask whether Communist administrators, not too successful even in the case of much more primitive economics, could hope even to keep this one in operation without drawing extensively on cadres outside their own ranks and without watering down their own doctrinal approaches to something like those of the contemporary Western welfare state. In any case, the position of constitutionally appointed authority in Japan is far stronger today than it was in 1950. Today, the effects on Japan of possible political developments in Korea have to be looked at from the standpoint of the reactions of the great non-Communist majority of the Japanese people, not in the light of the anxieties that related to the relatively fragile internal political situation of 1950.

In 1950, furthermore, it was primarily Russian influence with which the United States was confronted in Korea. Today, by all accounts, the preponderant weight of outside influence would seem to have shifted to the Chinese. So far as concerns basic political attitudes and aspirations, this is certainly no improvement. The Chinese Communists have, if anything, even more reason to wish today that South Korea could be brought under Communist control than did the Russians in 1950. But it is reasonable to suppose that their enthusiasm for any new aggres-

sive action by the Communists in Korea would stop sharply at the point where it threatened to require their own military support. When in late 1950 the Chinese finally committed their forces in the Korean War, under the flimsy pretext of these being volunteers, they could count on the benevolent sympathy and support of Moscow, and they had no cause for anxiety over the security of their frontiers elsewhere in the North Asian area. Today, this comforting assurance would scarcely be present. Peking cannot today lightly contemplate any developments on the Korean peninsula which would require the involvement of Chinese Communist forces but from which the Soviet Union could remain aloof; for this would certainly weaken the general Chinese position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. One must suppose, accordingly, that Peking would observe utmost caution in giving approval or encouragement to any new initiatives by the North Koreans which might place demands on Chinese resources.

Finally, one has to recognize, as a factor which did not enter into the original assumptions of American policy toward this area, the lack of success encountered to date in the effort to achieve an ordered and productive working relationship between South Korea and Japan. The sad significance of this is not greatly changed by the fact that the difficulty has been caused less by the Korean Government itself than by violent sectors of public opinion. Whatever the reasons, it has to be recognized that efforts to achieve a normal relationship between South Korea and Japan have thus far been unsuccessful and at present show small prospects for success.

This is a reality which, in the long run, will have to be taken account of in determining American policy. Those in Korea who oppose the establishment of acceptable relations with the overwhelmingly peace-loving Japan of the present day show scant appreciation for the advantages of American protection and little inclination to be helpful to the United States in the exercise of the responsibilities it has assumed in that area. Surely, no one on the American side conceived, in 1950, that the United States was moving to the support of South Korea merely to create or to perpetuate another source of hostility to the postwar Japan, whose effort to found a new national life was partly a matter of American inspiration and for whose success the United States bore a considerable measure of responsibility. If the régime in South Korea, whose domestic failures are serious enough in any

case, is forced to remain a dead weight on American policy toward Japan, it will eventually compel a reconsideration of American policy toward Korea generally; for Korea is important, but Japan is more important still.

The developments mentioned above do not represent, in themselves, any sudden or fundamental alteration in the conditions which have been seen thus far to require an American military presence in Korea, with all the implications this carries for the American military presence in Japan and elsewhere in that region. They do, however, represent significant changes in the background of circumstances against which American policy was formulated at the time of, and in the wake of, the Korean War.

IV

There remains the question of Japanese opinion. Ten or twelve years ago, when the present security arrangements were in process of formation, Japanese opinion was still strongly affected by the numbness of defeat and occupation. Only to a limited extent had it begun to occupy itself actively and responsibly with the problems to which these arrangements were addressed. The intervening years have brought a great change. The earlier passivity has not been everywhere overcome, but there is a growing consciousness that the major responsibility for Japan's security must be borne, in the long run, by Japan herself; and the outlines of popular attitudes toward these problems are becoming clear.

These outlines, unfortunately, indicate a sharp division of opinion between the Socialist and intellectual Left, which continues to regard the present security arrangements with varying degrees of skepticism, hostility and bitterness, and more conservative opinion which, with many shadings and gradations, tends to accept them as a necessary if not desirable evil. The sharpness of these differences, and particularly the violence of left-wing and intellectual opinion, became evident (even, finally, to an American Government decidedly slow on the uptake) in the appalling disorders which attended President Eisenhower's ill-considered effort to visit Japan after the 1960 Summit fiasco.

The reasons for this division run very deep. They are at least as much emotional as intellectual. They involve internal political problems as well as problems of foreign policy. They reflect the whole great schizophrenia of thought and feeling induced in the Japanese people by the shock of defeat, the destruction of old

values, and the introduction by the victors of concepts at odds with the traditional premises of political and social thought. The United States Government has a measure of responsibility for this conflict of conscience by virtue of the abruptness with which it altered its own concepts of international security in the years following the Second World War. Americans will have to recognize that if they are to indulge themselves in such violent fluctuations of outlook as those that affected their view of world Communism in the years from 1943 to 1953, they must not expect others, however well-inclined, to follow them in such inconstancy.

On the liberal and Socialist-intellectual side, the negative attitudes toward the present security arrangements embrace many varieties and shades of opinion. These range all the way from a Marxism so radical as to place itself to the left of both Soviet and Chinese régimes, at the one extreme, to outlooks founded mainly on an uneasiness about American policy in Asia generally and a desire for minor modifications in the security arrangements that would give Japan greater influence and freedom of action in shaping them to the needs of the future. They reflect the strong feelings that prevail in Japan on the subject of nuclear weapons. They reflect the resentments and sense of humiliation that so naturally surround any maintenance of foreign military establishments on a country's territory. They reflect even more intensely the unfavorable reports received in Japan about the state of affairs in Okinawa: the size of the American military establishment there, the burden it imposes on the local population, the depressingly narrow limits in which it has been allegedly willing to concede the rights of self-government, the uncertainty concerning the future of this island. They reflect pessimism about the prospects for success of American policies in Korea and Southeast Asia. Above all, they reflect an uneasiness about American policy toward China.

One has to visit Japan to appreciate the extent to which Communist China now dominates the external horizon of Japanese opinion and the depth of the desire there for better relations with the Chinese Mainland. Russia has been virtually eclipsed, in Japanese eyes, by the Communist China that lies so near and is so little known. In student and other left-wing circles, outlooks are determined largely by an uncritical acceptance of Marxist semantics and Marxist interpretations about the United States, but also by a naïveté about the Communist régime in China and

an idealization of it no less devastating than that with which worthy Americans once viewed its Nationalist-Kuomintang predecessor. The involution of values evoked by these distortions has to be seen to be believed. It results in an outlook in which the United States is everywhere the predatory imperialist and Peking the peace-loving force, defending Asian independence and freedom.

But even in more conservative circles, where Marxian semantics have little or no hold, the desire for closer relations with the Communist mainland has powerful currency. This is more than just a matter of a Japanese "guilt complex" toward China, about which so much is spoken today. It is also not fully explained by the frequent references to an ancient cultural affinity, or by hopes for increased commercial exchanges. There is—and Americans may as well face it—a perfectly natural desire among the Japanese to escape at least partially from the cloying exclusiveness of the American tie, from the helpless passivity it seems to imply, from the overtones of "anything you can do we can do better," which so often accompanies American friendship, and to throw open a sector of the international horizon where Japan could have a set of relationships and an importance of her own, not dependent on American tutelage, perhaps—who knows?—even helpful, ultimately, to the United States in an area where we seem to have difficulty helping ourselves. One is moved to reflect, as one travels about this world, how much Americans would stand to gain if they would admit to limitations in their ability not just to cope with world realities but also to understand them, and would occasionally accept help from their friends as well as proffering it.

Behind this reaction, there are, of course, real differences of interpretation, ones of degree but differences none the less, between even the moderate Japanese view of objective conditions surrounding the China problem and the view that seems to predominate in official circles in the United States. Neither in point of the intentions and reactions of the Peking régime, nor of the political prospects of the government on Taiwan, nor of the appraisal of the dangers of trading with a Communist power, nor of the prospects for a successful international boycott of such a power, does most Japanese conservative opinion fully accord with concepts which would be dominant today in Washington, particularly in the legislative branch of the government. Such divergencies are bound to have some effect on bilateral security ar-

rangements which by their very nature imply a wide community of outlook on the political problems of the area.

The casual visitor to Japan will hear reassuring things in official circles, both American and Japanese, about this question of Japanese opinion. The Socialist intellectuals, it will be pointed out, are not in power, and have little chance of achieving a parliamentary majority. Among Marxist students, opinion has become divided, and feelings are not so strong as they were in 1960. The Japanese Government remains steadfast in its loyalty to the existing arrangements. It is necessary only to brave out the criticisms of the opposition and to proceed as before.

Superficially, and for the short term, all this sounds plausible. But such reflections can lead only too easily to that special complacency into which it is so easy to fall when problems are not acute. Surely, it is in principle undesirable that an American military presence in another country should be the subject of so painful a division of local opinion as has been the case in Japan in recent years. This is particularly dangerous where the division coincides with the outlines of a deep inner-political division, as is also the case in Japan today. The fact that many students and intellectuals, frustrated by the failure to prevent renewal of the Security Treaty in 1960, are today bewildered, discouraged and of divided counsel does not mean that basic misunderstandings have been overcome or that they could not again assume dangerous forms. Nor are the differences of interpretation that divide American opinion from that of moderate or conservative Japanese circles to be lightly ignored. Their sharpness of outline may well be dimmed, today, by lack of urgency and by the Oriental addiction to a courteous indirectness and understatement when delicate political matters are discussed. But they could quickly be moved, by external events, to the status of painful misunderstandings. An admission of Communist China to membership in the United Nations, for example, would almost certainly be followed at once, as things now stand, by full-fledged Japanese diplomatic recognition, whatever the American feelings. And the demonstration by Peking of the capability of detonating a nuclear device, however limited its real military significance in the light of advances elsewhere in the development of such weaponry, may be expected to throw into Japanese opinion a shock which will take the most varied, partly contradictory, forms, and will put Japanese-American relations to a severe test.

V

For the present, if there are any changes that are needed in the Japanese-American security arrangements, they would seem to be small ones, and ones of degree—designed merely to eliminate rough edges and to achieve better understanding. Commendable progress has already been made in reducing the number of the American forces stationed in Japan and in limiting the inconvenience and annoyance they bring to their Japanese hosts. The presence in Tokyo of an American Ambassador sensitive to all shades and sectors of Japanese opinion, conversant with the Japanese language, culture and history, and supported by a highly trained and competent staff, has already done much to dissipate the misunderstandings which American diplomacy, as well as the military presence, have encountered. The tasks of intellectual mediation between these two countries, where the technical difficulties of communication are truly formidable, is one for specialists. It is not accomplished, as many Americans like to believe, merely by thrusting ordinary people together and "letting them get to know each other." That the United States Government has recognized this represents the most positive contribution it has made in recent times to the development of relations with Japan, and one which—if properly supported at home—may be expected to bear further fruit.

The specific point at which, for the moment, there is greatest opportunity for improvement is probably Okinawa. Here, all one could ask is that the American military authorities bear in mind that the fate of the Okinawans is something to which Japanese opinion is extremely sensitive. With the appointment in August of a new High Commissioner to the Ryukyus, there has seemed to be a new recognition that there can be instances where measures to curtail the weight of the American military establishment, as it rests on the local population, are warranted by regard for Japanese opinion even if they constitute something less than the military ideal.

The longer future is a different matter. It presents both greater dangers and greater possibilities. The present Treaty of Mutual Coöperation and Security has a ten-year term. It does not automatically expire at the end of that term; it continues unless one side or the other gives notice of a desire to terminate it. It might be difficult, in these circumstances, for the Japanese to call for its

renegotiation without this appearing to be something more of a political demonstration than it was meant to be. When the difficulties arose in 1960 over ratification of the Treaty, one of the principal objections voiced, even in moderate Japanese circles friendly to the United States, was that the Treaty's term of validity was too long and would give the Japanese Government inadequate opportunity to assure that its terms and operation remained at all times suitable to the needs of a developing situation.

One wonders whether the purposes both of courtesy and of political expediency would not be served if the United States Government, instead of simply letting the term of the Treaty run its course and invite automatic renewal, were to enter into consultations at an early date with a view to affording the Japanese Government an opportunity to state its views on the suitability of the various arrangements in the current situation, and perhaps on the question of the Treaty's term as well.

There is, incidentally, a further reason why it would be desirable to keep currently in touch with the Japanese Government concerning the future of the Treaty. The NATO treaty comes up in 1969 for review and possible revision. This will no doubt occasion a good deal of public and official discussion in the preceding period. Japanese opinion will be sensitive to whatever is said and done concerning the future of NATO. For the Japanese to be confronted with anything in the nature of a *fait accompli* on this sector would be almost certainly deleterious to the American-Japanese relationship in general; and this is something which timely consultation could prevent.

In judging the advisability of consultations with the Japanese concerning the future of the special security relationship, Americans can usefully bear in mind certain considerations.

There is, first, the fact that the establishment of better relations between Japan and the countries of the Asian mainland is, in the long run, an essential requirement, politically and psychologically, of Japanese policy. The instincts, outlooks and needs of the Japanese people simply will not tolerate for long anything that appears to be an effort to enlist Japan as a passive instrument in an all-out cold war to which no one in Japan can see a favorable issue generally and which seems to imply the indefinite renunciation by Japan of all hopes for a better relationship with the mainland. Anything of this sort can only exacerbate the divisions already existing in Japanese society, increase the difficul-

ties of the Japanese Government, and be destructive of the foundations of the U.S.-Japanese relationship. If the United States wishes to preserve as an effective ally the most industrious and economically advanced of the East Asian peoples, a people with extraordinary civilizing and technological talents, disposing over what is already far and away the greatest industrial workshop of Asia, it will have to shape the mutual security relationship between the two countries in such a way that it conduces to overcoming rather than prolonging the division now so unnaturally prevailing between Japan and her mainland neighbors.

Many of us may have our doubts—some Japanese have them, too—as to how much Japan would stand to gain, in the present circumstances, from the cultivation of closer relations with Communist China, in particular. But if these doubts have merit, this is something the Japanese will have to discover for themselves, as a lesson of experience. It will not do just for us to assure them of it. It need not be considered that American policy has failed if the effort to create a better relationship between Japan and the mainland proves abortive. What is important is that American policy should not be permitted to appear as an obstacle to the effort itself but should rather reflect a generous tolerance for special Japanese needs and feelings, and should let it be demonstrated, at every point, that if there are limits to the possibilities for improvement of Japan's relations with the mainland, these lie in the outlooks and policies of the mainland powers themselves and not in the preconceptions of American policy-makers.

The second point that might well be borne in mind, as one considers the future of the Security Treaty, is that, in addition to these psychological and political aspects, arrangements designed to assure Japanese security would be intrinsically strengthened, and very greatly so, if they had the general assent and support of at least one of the two great mainland powers, and that, viewed from this standpoint, the position of Russia is quite different from, and more encouraging than, that of China. This state of affairs could, of course, be greatly affected by the development of Soviet-American relations on a global scale. The active insertion of Soviet power against American efforts to preserve the independence of South Viet Nam could obviously create complications in the face of which what is being said here would have little relevance. But assuming that Soviet disapproval of these

American efforts is not given active military form, and that there is no major deterioration in the Soviet-American relationship from other causes, there should be no reason to despair of the possibility of achieving a more constructive Soviet relationship to the problem of Japanese security.

It is not inconceivable, for example, that in return for relatively moderate concessions on the American side the Soviet Union might be prepared today to make satisfactory settlement of the question of the Soviet-occupied islands off Hokkaido, which have thus far stood in the way of a normalization of Soviet-Japanese relations, to agree to a common peace treaty with Japan, and to associate itself with the United States in a joint guarantee of Japanese security under sanction of the United Nations, thus realizing, at long last, General MacArthur's far-sighted concept. The approach to such a solution may appear long and difficult; there may be many reasons why it could be undertaken only after most careful preparation and with the observance of many safeguards. But the very fact that such a solution is no longer beyond the range of reasonable imagination represents an important and hopeful change in the situation, and one of which American policy-makers should not lose sight.

V

The question remains as to how these concepts would fit with American policy further afield in Asia, and particularly with American policy toward China. Would an American policy designed expressly to leave open the way for an improvement of relations between Japan and the mainland not conflict with the American position with relation to China, or call for modification of it? And would a readiness to admit the Soviet Union to a share in the responsibility for Japanese security not bewilder allies taught to believe that American policy is aimed at the destruction of Communism, generally, in Asia? The answers to these questions may be brief.

In the case of our China policy, there is no appreciable conflict here in so far as Communist China itself is concerned. There is no reason why Japanese policy toward Communist China should be identical with that of the United States. We have to do here with two different countries, in wholly different geographic and historical situations, with needs and interests which, while compatible, are not identical.

When it comes to the government on Taiwan, the conflict is potentially more serious. The Japanese are, by and large, not without sympathy for the American effort to preserve Taiwan from conquest by the Communist mainland. They are less enthusiastic and less hopeful about the pretention of the Taiwan régime to be the government of all of China, and understandably skeptical about any policy which, by definition, cannot be called successful unless Communism is overthrown and the authority of the Nationalist Government reëstablished throughout the entire Chinese Mainland. At the heart of this difficulty lies the assumption, so lightheartedly embraced by F.D.R. and Harry Hopkins at the Cairo Conference and imbedded ever since in U.S. policy, that the only possible future for the island of Taiwan was as an integral part of China. The Japanese, one senses, would feel far more comfortable if the United States were to take a less doctrinaire position on this point and recognize that the final status of this island, in the light of all that has occurred since 1943, is something which ought ultimately to be determined with due regard to the feelings of the inhabitants and to the needs of peace and stability in the Pacific area generally—a formula which would not preclude a permanent association with China but would also not assure it or attempt to define what it might conceivably be. Were this adjustment to be made in the American view, so that one could treat the problem in terms not just of a possible "one China" or "two Chinas" but also in terms of a possible "one China—one Taiwan," there would be no reason why the Japanese-U.S. relationship should be at any point seriously disturbed over the China issue.

So far as the Soviet Union is concerned, the answer is simple but basic. If it is the purpose to destroy, everywhere, all that calls itself Communist, regardless of how it conducts itself in its external relations, then, of course, one cannot contemplate the encouragement of a better Soviet-Japanese relationship. If, on the other hand, it is the purpose to oppose and to frustrate any and all efforts of any power, Communist or not, to subvert and subjugate other peoples or to disrupt world peace, and if Communism is to be fought wherever—but only wherever—it places itself in this category, then there is no reason why a better Soviet-Japanese relationship should not have its place among the objectives of American statesmanship, and there are formidable reasons why it should.

QUEBEC IN REVOLT

By William E. Griffith

FOR over 150 years after the fall of Quebec to the British in 1759, the Province of Quebec was a poor, agrarian, patriarchal, clerical society. It wanted little more from the English Canadians than to be let alone to slumber peacefully and to preserve its language and (like Ireland) its Roman Catholic religion. But little by little, and particularly since World War II, the industrialization and prosperity of the United States and of the rest of Canada have brought great changes. Less than half of the people of Quebec now live on farms; the growth of its cities has been enormous (Montreal now has more than a million people); and its rich natural resources—minerals, timber and hydroelectric power—have been rapidly developed.

By the early 1950s, as a result, Quebec had a small but brilliant and dynamic élite, which was determined that Quebec should become a modern society by breaking the hold of its traditionalist clergy, its corrupt and demagogic politicians, and of the American and English Canadian capital which controlled more than 75 percent of Quebec's natural resources and industries. This new élite was also determined not to become assimilated into English-speaking North America but to retain and modernize French Canadian culture—the French language, literature and arts whose character and fame France's postwar revival had taught them even more to cherish. Since 1952 when television came to Quebec, the élite has used this medium to spread their ideas and programs to the masses of the population. In addition the recent tendencies toward liberalization in the Roman Catholic Church, in which Cardinal Léger of Montreal is a leader, have also helped their efforts.

Quebec has experienced waves of French Canadian nationalism before, but they were always worn down by the overwhelming force of their traditionalist opponents and by the lack of full endorsement by the Quebec Roman Catholic clergy. The late Prime Minister Maurice Duplessis preached a demagogic nationalism but always deferred to the United States and English Canadian investors who controlled Quebec's economy; and he never challenged the Roman Catholic hierarchy's complete control of education and massive influence on public life in general.

Finally, although bilingualism and other minority rights were constitutionally guaranteed to the English-speaking minority in Quebec, hundreds of thousands of French Canadians living outside Quebec had no such rights, and all French Canadians were discriminated against in government and industry if they did not master English. What was more, Quebec was an economic colony of Toronto and New York; French Canadians had little chance of rising to top positions in the industries of their own provinces, the more so because their backward educational system ill fitted them for success in the modern world of economics and technology.

Even before Duplessis died in 1959, the drive for modernization was making rapid headway in the Quebec trade unions and among university faculties and students. In 1960, new elections swept into power, under the motto "masters in our own house," a Liberal Party cabinet headed by a relatively young, dynamic Prime Minister, Jean Lesage, which included a majority of younger, modernizing and often technocratic intellectuals. Why did they win, what are they like, and what do they want?

II

They won because Quebec had changed decisively and for good, both in economics and in psychology. Young French Canadians in their twenties and thirties, pulled into the cities from the farms by the rapid industrialization, had lost the traditional moorings of the agrarian, clerical society and were searching for new, modern goals in life. Furthermore, they could now better see how rich Quebec was and how relatively little of its riches benefited French Canadians. Finally, the world-wide wave of decolonization, and notably the independence of the French-speaking African states ("if Guinea can be independent, why can't Quebec?"), added to their determination to be masters in their own house.

What are these new, modernizing French Canadian politicians, intellectuals and technicians like? Above all, it is a question of generations. Those between 25 and 40, who grew up in the struggle against Duplessis' demagogic nationalism, revolted against it and most other aspects of the society he dominated. Internationalists by inclination, they are pragmatists interested in social and economic reform. They want more political and economic power over their own destiny, but they also want to

remain part of Canada and to maintain the continued inflow of American capital.

The younger generation, university students under 25, is in large part separatist; they want an independent Quebec. They are determined to achieve political and economic control over their destiny, if necessary at the expense of foreign capital investment, and their more extreme elements are largely committed to terrorism and violence to achieve their goals. (Most of them are extreme rightists; only a few, contrary to many reports, are extreme leftists.) For many of this generation, psychologically alienated and disoriented from their fathers' traditional society and contemptuous of what they think to be the excessive patience and half-measures of the older intellectual groups, nothing short of total independence and radical social revolution will suffice. And terrorism, as Algeria and Viet Nam have demonstrated, can transform a political problem into a major national crisis.

Yet these intellectuals are only a part of the story. Separatism or social radicalism has as yet achieved no hold over Quebec's workers or farmers. (A recent public opinion poll showed only 13 percent of the population for independence.) Except perhaps in a few depressed areas, the most important goals are held to be a further rise in the standard of living (which though some 30 percent below Ontario's is stilll most impressive on any but a United States scale) and the assurance of more jobs through foreign investment and economic development. And so it is for the Lesage government.

Considerable concern has been expressed outside Quebec lest Lesage's recent nationalization of the hydroelectric industry, inspired by the most nationalistic member of the cabinet, René Lévesque, portends more moves toward socialization. There seems little basis for this fear. Quebec was the last Canadian province to nationalize the hydroelectric industry; its previous owners were fully compensated by bonds sold successfully on the New York market. Moreover, the Lesage government is aware that it is confronted by two contradictory popular goals: first, rapid economic development, which is impossible without massive non-French Canadian investment; and second, more control of Quebec's economy by French Canadians. The first goal makes this difficult, but French Canadian public opinion requires it; and failing it the Lesage government might well be replaced by

a more radical, even more separatist one. Talking to its members and to other observers, however, one gets the impression that pragmatism will determine the Lesage government's measures: nationalization of the hydroelectric industry; the use of a newly established governmental loan corporation to strengthen French Canadian-owned enterprises and to prevent their falling into English Canadian or American hands; the encouraging of Americans to employ more French Canadians, particularly in leading positions (as is being done); and, finally, a major overhauling of Quebec's out-of-date educational system to produce many more technically trained French Canadians who can fill such jobs when they are available.

But Quebec's demands do not stop here. In the first place, no modern industrial society can really be "master in its own house" unless it has control of, or at least substantial influence over, monetary, credit and tariff policy; and in Canada these are now fixed by the Canadian federal government in Ottawa. Hence, if Quebec is to achieve such influence, substantial changes in the Canadian federal system will be necessary.

The first significant encounter between Quebec and Ottawa on the economic level occurred earlier this year when the Quebec provincial government insisted that it should have complete control over the old-age retirement funds coming from and destined for the province. After long, hard bargaining in Ottawa between Lesage and Canadian Prime Minister Lester Pearson, Lesage won an almost complete victory. This gives the Quebec provincial government control over the investment of the large sums accumulated from old-age and retirement payments, and thus additional financial means to support French Canadian industries and, should it wish, to buy shares in the hitherto entirely English Canadian- and American-owned corporations which dominate Quebec's economy.

Another example, this time a symbolic and purely political one, is the issue of the new Canadian flag. Prime Minister Pearson has proposed that three red maple leaves on a white background with vertical blue bars on either side should replace the present "Red Ensign" which has the British Union Jack in the upper left-hand corner. Pearson's proposal was made almost entirely as a gesture of good will toward French Canada, which always has resented the Union Jack as a symbol of its conquest by the British in 1763. But Quebec has been unenthusiastic

if not indifferent; the change seems to most French Canadians much too little and too late. On the other hand, some English Canadians, proud of the traditional ties with the mother country, have been outraged, and Pearson has felt compelled to add to his proposal the retention of the Union Jack itself as a symbol of Commonwealth membership.

The flag controversy has shown, fortunately on a symbolic issue only, that the gulf between English and French Canada is deep and growing deeper. Will the gulf be bridged?

The fanatical French Canadian separatists in Quebec and the fanatically pro-British and anti-Quebec English-speaking elements in the rest of Canada can only hinder any containment or resolution of the controversy. Neither represents as yet more than a small minority of English or French Canadians; and together they constitute a minority of Canadian citizens. The majority of moderate opinion on both sides is now agreed that there must be significant changes, but it has not yet agreed on what they should be. What are the minimum demands of the moderate French Canadians and how much of them are acceptable to the moderate English Canadians? Can a compromise be reached?

III

The basic, minimal moderate French Canadian demand is that Quebec be recognized not as just another one of the ten provinces of Canada but as the home and representative of the vast majority of French Canadians who make up one of the two founding nations of Canada, and that this recognition bring specific political, cultural and economic results. In economics, at present the most important area of controversy, this would mean that on issues involving Quebec, such as money, credit, tariff and investment policy, Quebec would have much more say than it does at present—enough to establish primary control over its own economic destiny while remaining within a common Canadian monetary, fiscal and tariff system. Culturally, this would mean extending to all French Canadians throughout Canada the rights that the English Canadians now have in Quebec: a school system in their own language and recognition of French as equal to English in political and economic life—the economic life of Quebec included. Politically, it would mean the revision of Canada's federal structure so that on the economic issues cited above Quebec would have an equal voice with the rest of Canada,

perhaps through the remodeling of the Canadian Senate to be a Chamber of Nationalities, through revisions in the make-up and practices of the Supreme Court and the Bank of Canada, and so on. These minimal demands are likely to increase with time. Only this June the Montreal branch of the St. Jean-Baptiste Society, a major organ of the Quebec "Establishment," advocated—as Lévesque did earlier—an "Austro-Hungarian solution": two states in Canada freely and equally associated only in the areas of foreign policy, defense and economics.

Moderate English Canadian opinion varies, but it seems agreed that some concessions to Quebec must be made. Prime Minister Pearson believes the greatest problem Canada faces is to agree upon the nature of these concessions, and he and his Liberal Party are ready to go far in an attempt to solve it. Former Prime Minister John Diefenbaker and his Progressive Conservatives, who draw almost all their support from English-speaking Canadians, are more hostile to moderate French Canadian proposals. (Moreover, many English Canadians are postwar immigrants from Europe who naturally prefer their native tongues rather than French as a second language.) On the question of giving Quebec more political power, however, English Canadians of both parties balk. Why, they ask, should some 38 percent of the population, by no means the most economically or educationally advanced part, a part which now shows even less loyalty to the Canadian state than the little it ever did, and within which radical separatist and terrorist groups, if still small, are gaining in strength—why should we give this minority a veto over our actions?

The answer is, one supposes, that the alternative—at worst the break-up of Canada, at best prolonged unrest, instability and consequent decline in economic growth—would be worse than the concessions Quebec demands from English Canada. Granted, pure democracy would rule against the French Canadians, but successful federal systems have never considered pure democracy to be necessarily the determining factor. Substantial concessions may be necessary if only because by now the majority of French Canadians (and the overwhelming majority of their élite) are convinced that they constitute a nation, and that Quebec is its embodiment; and a nation is something very different from a minority.

There are other reasons why both English and French Cana-

dians shy away from the possibility of Canada breaking up. Considering its past history, an independent Quebec would probably have a strongly rightist régime, perhaps even an authoritarian one; and few modern Quebec intellectuals think that this kind of retrogressive nationalism is any solution for the problems of an increasingly modern North American nation. Secondly, geographically and economically, Canada's settled areas are a long, narrow strip of land north of the United States border, with none but political and historical reasons for remaining separate from the United States. Indeed, English Canadians, increasingly conscious of the attraction of the American economy and the invasion of the American mass communications media, have themselves been searching for ways to reaffirm their Canadian national identity. Nor do French Canadians particularly like the American economic and cultural invasion; on the contrary, they fear for their language and culture—another source of their increasing nationalism. So, ironic as it may seem south of the border, the United States is to both English and French Canadians not only a common friend but also a common threat; it is on this basis, if the truth be told, that Canada has always found its unity—and may well keep it. Furthermore, independence for Quebec would probably mean, at least at first, a considerable drop in its standard of living. It would also mean that English Canada would be split like Pakistan, its Maritime Provinces to the east separated by Quebec from the rest of the country. And finally, even though many English Canadians—weary of what they find the incomprehensible and increasing hostility of Quebec—talk in their more pessimistic moods of joining the United States if Quebec secedes, it seems doubtful that they could bring themselves to this even if the United States would take them.

IV

It would be wrong to end on such a pessimistic note. English Canadians, like the English and Americans, have always been pragmatic; and it seems likely, once they are consciously faced with the alternative of Quebec's seceding, that their fear of its consequences will overcome their natural reluctance to make concessions to what they have always regarded as a backward minority, and that they will therefore make sufficient concessions to save Canada.

Much will depend on when and how this confrontation will

come, and who will lead both sides. Ignorance of French Canada among English Canadians is great, and much work will be needed on both sides to dissipate it. Even so, one should not overestimate Quebec separatism. It still lacks the four essential ingredients for success: (1) a charismatic leader, (2) an efficient political organization, (3) an ample supply of funds, and (4) the demonstrated hostility of English Canadians to moderate French Canadian goals. On the other hand, five conditions—all present in Quebec—operate strongly against a successful thrust for independence: (1) relative affluence and rising living standards; (2) full civil rights; (3) major powers, including education, in provincial hands; (4) a foreign unifying threat (the U. S.); and (5) a felt danger of falling living standards, after independence, due to withdrawal of foreign investments.

There are some alarming symptoms in Quebec—radical nationalism, terrorism, massive foreign control of the economy, rapid reaffirmation of national and cultural identity by a hitherto passive minority. And, as the world today demonstrates, nationalism, even if confined to a youthful intellectual élite, is an unpredictable and explosive phenomenon. But Quebec is not an underdeveloped country; and one should be wary of applying the lessons of Africa, Asia and Latin America to the banks of the St. Lawrence. The majority of intellectuals are rational and modern men, and the greater part of its population belongs to the North American mass consumption society. Barring a major depression, it still seems likely, therefore, that Canada will survive.

And if it does, it will do so as a different and quite possibly a better country. Nothing was more unhealthy for Canada than to have its one-third of French extraction clinging to the eighteenth century; and, as Switzerland continues to demonstrate, nothing can be more vitalizing than genuine confederation of peoples with more than one language and culture. If the French minority will show reason and patience, and the English majority understanding and generosity, Canada's future may well be more stable and more promising than its troubled present.

AFTER THE U.N. TRADE CONFERENCE: LESSONS AND PORTENTS

By Sidney Weintraub

THE United Nations Conference on Trade and Development —UNCTAD—was not only the biggest trade conference in history, it was the biggest international conference in history on any subject, numbering upwards of 2,000 delegates. It is worth repeating what Isaiah Frank noted in his article in the January 1964 issue of this journal, that the developing countries viewed the conference as the single most important event for them since the founding of the U.N. The formal findings and recommendations of the conference, which lasted for 12 weeks ending in mid-June, are embodied in its Final Act. That governments consider this an important document is clear from the long hours and occasional bitter debate that went into its formulation. But it is also clear that the official record of the conference at best can give only official conclusions and that these alone are not the stuff of which future policy is made.

The official conclusions are important. The preamble of the Final Act contains the "message" the developing countries want the world to have about the conference and why it was called. The Final Act states flatly: "The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development was convened in order to provide, by means of international coöperation, appropriate solutions to the problems of world trade in the interests of all peoples and particularly to the urgent trade and development problems of the developing countries."

The "findings" listed in the Final Act contain an excellent catalogue of what the developing countries see as their trade problems. These include the disproportionately small share of developing countries in the more than doubling of world trade since 1950 and the resultant insufficiency of their foreign exchange earnings—hence, as they see it, the adverse effect this has had on their development. Developing countries contend that their terms of trade have deteriorated seriously in the last decade; that is, that there has been a marked decline in prices for many commodities which developing countries sell, and some increase in prices for the manufactured goods they must buy for their development process. This combination of price movements

is cited as an important factor aggravating the difficulties of the developing countries. The Final Act enshrines the concept of a "gap" between import requirements and export earnings of developing countries, and even embodies an estimate made by the U.N. secretariat that the "gap" could be around $20 billion a year in 1970, given the 5 percent-a-year rate of growth which is the target of the U.N. Development Decade, and assuming that the future will be a replica of the recent past.

The use of the $20 billion figure illustrates that "facts" are not necessarily factual but may merely be a reflection of the views of the majority. The findings in the Final Act cite various policies of developed countries as contributing to the sluggishness of the export growth of developing countries, including tariffs, price support programs, the accumulation of surpluses and their depressive effect on world commodity prices, and the like.

The Final Act contains all the recommendations approved by the conference. UNCTAD was conducted in five main committees of the whole—the whole being 119 countries—dealing with primary commodity trade, trade in manufactures, finance and invisibles, institutional issues, and then a catchall committee for all other issues but which focused largely on attempting to formulate a set of principles which could guide the world in its future trade relationships. The Final Act contains recommendations in all these fields—in some cases the same recommendations that emerged from the committees; in other important instances, compromise recommendations which were reached in plenary only after the committees completed their work.

The Final Act is thus a vital document. It reflects the aspirations of the developing countries going into the conference, the issues deemed central coming out of it, the recommendations the conference was able to agree on by at least a two-thirds majority vote, and the observations of countries either concurring in these recommendations or indicating why full concurrence was not possible.

What the Final Act is not is perhaps more important to keep in mind. It is not necessarily a guide to what was in the minds of men—and of countries, since the men were official representatives—as the conference proceeded to its final, cliff-hanging agreements. The cliché sounded by almost all speakers as the conference closed was that this was just the beginning—this was only UNCTAD-1. The cliché, in this case, was true.

What governments must now focus on is where they, and the world, go from here in meeting the aspirations of the developing countries as set forth in the Final Act.

II

This is the first lesson, and a crucial one: that UNCTAD, or some variant of it, is now with us for the foreseeable future. The "continuing machinery," as the phrase went at the conference, could be important, or it could be futile. (The Swiss national exposition held every 25 years was going on at Lausanne concurrently with the conference. One of the exhibits at the exposition was a piece of machinery that moved its parts a lot, made a lot of noise, but served no other purpose. Some conference delegates referred to it as the "continuing machinery.") There is no easy *a priori* answer as to what the machinery will turn out to be—this depends on its secretariat and on governments, both of developed and of developing countries.

The approved recommendation on the continuing machinery calls: for future conferences at least every three years, and the next early in 1966, only two years hence; for a Trade and Development Board of 55 countries, almost half the participants, to meet normally twice a year between conferences, for which it is also to prepare; for the Trade and Development Board to have at least three committees, to deal with primary commodity trade, trade in manufactures, and with invisible issues (debt servicing, tourism, etc.), including shipping, and finance related to trade; and for all of this machinery to have its own secretariat in the U.N. structure, headed by a secretary general of the conference to be appointed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations and confirmed by the General Assembly.

What is significant is that the U.N. now will have machinery to review systematically, over time and in depth, all issues related to the trade and development of the developing countries. This, above all, was what the developing countries wanted. It is this that governments must now prepare for. And it is this that makes it important to understand the conduct at the first conference, and to seek to understand, also, the motivations for that conduct.

At the conference, the developing countries—the so-called Group of 75, since slightly expanded to 77—operated as a cohesive bloc. In a joint declaration of the developing countries

read at the final plenary session and incorporated in full in the Final Act, this unity of the 75 was called by them "the outstanding feature of the entire conference and an event of historic significance." The developing countries clearly consider this unity as a portent of great significance.

How one looks at this unity depends on whether it will serve to generate reasonable or extreme positions. As the 75 rolled up inevitable majorities on resolution after resolution in the main committees, and even in the drafting committee where the factual record of the conference was assembled, there was some doubt as to its desirability. But it is a fact, and an important one, that the developing countries concluded that in unity there is strength.

At times this unity led to extremes and to majority votes on issues on which the developed countries were being asked to take actions but which tended to ignore their views. At other times, the unity of the 75 made compromise resolutions possible.

Fostered by this cohesiveness of the 75, the conference took on the air of a North-South confrontation, of the rich against the poor. There has been much talk in recent years that the division of the world, if one can talk of such a thing, should be along North-South economic lines rather than along the East-West lines of the cold war. UNCTAD was the first major conference where this was in fact the case. East-West issues arose, but secondarily. The Soviet Union generally was deemed to be a developed country and tended to be lumped together by the 75 with other developed countries. It would be utopian to hope that East-West divisions will be totally absent from the continuing machinery, but it can realistically be expected that these will be secondary to the North-South alignment.

But to call this a North-South "division" also would involve over-simplification. What the conference called for, as the developing countries themselves stated, was "international cooperation," not an international adversary proceeding. If there is to be a successful Development Decade, there will have to be a "joining" of interests between the North and the South. This, certainly, is an important lesson.

The developed countries, whether of the market or centrally planned type, as the U.N. parlance goes, were not monolithic. On many substantive issues of fundamental importance the industrialized countries of the West, plus Japan, New Zealand and

Australia, were often widely divided. The Soviet bloc sometimes split on important votes when Poland or Rumania went in a direction different from that of the U.S.S.R. Divide and conquer took peculiar turns—turns which may well become the norm in the continuing machinery.

III

By trying to understand the motivations which led to the various decisions at this first conference, we may find it possible to understand also how governments are likely to act at future meetings.

In international bodies, governments don't like to talk too much about what they themselves should do; they prefer instead to place the emphasis on what others should do. This made for a sort of continuing refrain at UNCTAD and is likely to be the same in the continuing machinery. The theme of the conference —and this is reflected in the Final Act—was on what the developed countries must do to foster the economic development of the developing countries. The assumption under which the developing countries operated was that they already were doing what was possible in their own behalf and what the conference was all about was to examine what others, the developed countries, must do to help them. The following sentence from the final declaration of the 75 is illustrative of this mode of thinking: "The efforts of developing countries to raise the living standards of their peoples, which are now being made under adverse external conditions, should be supplemented and strengthened by constructive international action."

The developed countries argued that the crucial factor in economic development is self-help, and that if the conference was all about development, it should focus on the responsibilities of the developing countries. The latter were willing to accept this, in the abstract. This idea is even reflected in the Final Act. For example: "The developing countries recognize that they have the primary responsibility to raise the living standards of their peoples; *but* their national exertions to this end will be greatly impaired if not supplemented and strengthened by constructive international action based on respect for national sovereignty." The italics are supplied; there was always a "but" in the thinking of the developing countries. It was the phrase after the "but" that the conference focused on.

The tendency to want to talk about the shortcomings of others is a normal one. No country wants to spend its time at an international conference with a *mea culpa.* And yet, it will be appropriate for the continuing machinery to focus on both aspects of the development problem, the internal action and the external coöperation. They must go together if the aspirations of the developing countries are to be met. The job of governments, and of the secretariat of the continuing machinery, is to bring this mutuality of interest into focus without alienating either side.

There are issues on both sides in which sensitivities run deep. Some of these were highlighted at the conference and are likely to come to the fore again in the continuing machinery. By taking account of the depth of feeling, it may prove possible to minimize the acrimony.

Perhaps the most sensitive of all issues, especially to the most recently independent of the developing countries, is the concept of one country, one vote. This is wrapped up closely with the feeling for national sovereignty. On the other side, that of the developed countries, the feeling runs deep that the countries which will be principally responsible for taking actions in the trade and development field in the interest of the developing countries cannot subject themselves to the tyranny of the majority—in short, that one country, one vote is meaningless when automatic majorities are rolled up by countries which do not have to take any action in response to the votes. The conduct of the 75 in rolling up just such majorities on certain issues heightened this feeling of the developed countries.

As the conference negotiated itself to a close, this voting issue stood athwart all other issues and its resolution was required before all other compromises could become effective, and before the conference could close "successfully" or end in "failure." What could be done in the continuing machinery to protect the minority which was being asked to act, and at the same time recognize the deep feeling that national sovereignty should be preserved in the form of one country, one vote? This was, and is, the issue. The issue was sidestepped in the final compromise. The Secretary-General of the U.N. was asked to appoint a special committee to report to the General Assembly, and to prepare proposals for procedures in the continuing machinery which work to establish a process of conciliation before voting, and to provide safeguards in the adoption of recommenda-

tions for action which might substantially affect "the economic or financial interests of particular countries." The resolution states that proposals of the special committee should not imply "any departure from the principle that each country has one vote."

In their final joint declaration, the 75 phrased their viewpoint on this issue as follows: ". . . it is their view [*i.e.* of the 75] that there should be ample scope for reaching workable agreement on substantial issues. But they categorically declare that no arrangements designed for this purpose should derogate from the ultimate right of the proposed Board and the Conference to adopt the recommendations on any point of substance by a simple majority vote in the case of the Board and two-thirds majority vote in the case of the Conference. The developing countries attach cardinal importance to democratic procedures which afford no position of privilege in the economic and financial, no less than in the political sphere." To the developing countries, "democracy" in U.N. parlance means that the vote of any one country is as good as that of any other country, the Security Council and several other bodies excepted.

This remains an unresolved problem. Its solution, in a way satisfactory to both groups, is probably a sine qua non to an effective continuing machinery. This is one of the cardinal lessons that delegates must have taken home with them.

Organizational questions also aroused deep feelings in other ways. The developing countries showed resentment, in varying degree, against various bodies in which their voice is not controlling. Some of these bodies are the U.N. Economic and Social Council, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and to a lesser degree the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. The resentment often takes the form of lashing out at important bodies dealing with trade and development problems which have not been solved. Yet world food problems have not been solved, and the Food and Agriculture Organization is spared the resentment that devolves on the other institutions cited above. World health problems have not been solved but the World Health Organization is also spared sharp criticism.

Resentment seems to stem from a combination of important but unsolved problems (great problems are rarely "solved;" they are worked at), plus a less than controlling voice in the

organization by the developing countries. As GATT grows in the number of its contracting parties, the majority of which already are developing countries, the feeling of developing countries toward it is changing. GATT operates under a one-country, one-vote rule, but voting is infrequent. If the U.N.'s Economic and Social Council is enlarged to increase the representation of developing countries, their feeling toward this may alter. But, of course, there may be a countervailing feeling. When developing countries control organizations, as they are likely to control the continuing machinery of UNCTAD, resentment may begin to build up on the side of the developed countries.

IV

Feelings run deep, too, on many substantive issues. Here there are vast differences in emphasis among the 75, and it was on these issues that logrolling among them was most effective; some important compromises took place among them, permitting the 75 to remain a cohesive whole.

The issues of the conference ran the gamut of international and domestic economic affairs. They included removing barriers to trade in primary commodities; examining the possibility of using commodity arrangements to expand export earnings of developing countries; removing barriers to trade in manufactured goods; the coming Kennedy Round of trade negotiations; building an export potential in the industrial field in the developing countries, and then of export promotion; giving trade preferences to developing countries for their manufactured products; improving the terms and conditions of aid; improving the procedures of the International Monetary Fund for compensatory financing to mitigate short-term fluctuations in export earnings; providing some form of long-term supplementary financing when the trend of export earnings of a developing country is declining; mitigating debt-servicing burdens of developing countries; examining the world shipping problem; making greater use of the world's money markets for financing development; promoting private investment; fostering greater regional coöperation among developing countries; providing adequate rules for access to ports for the score or more of landlocked countries in the world; and a host of others. Space is too limited to discuss all of them. It may be helpful, as a guide to the future, to highlight a few of these substantive issues—particularly those which are

likely to be the focus of attention in the continuing machinery.

Terms of trade, and their deterioration for primary commodity exporters over the last decade, were an issue which had been highlighted by the secretariat in advance of the conference. Raúl Prebisch, the secretary general of the conference, and formerly the executive secretary of the Economic Commission for Latin America, has been stressing terms-of-trade problems for many years. Even those developing countries whose terms of trade had not worsened, or had even improved, felt obliged to refer to deteriorating terms of trade.

All developing countries, and for that matter most developed countries, agreed that some corrective action must be taken to prevent sharp fluctuations and declines in primary commodity prices. Where it may not be feasible to hold the price line for commodities, *e.g.* where doing so might merely invite natural or synthetic substitutes, some form of compensatory or supplementary financing was suggested in order that development programs not suffer from declining export receipts. This is perhaps the key substantive issue with which the continuing machinery must deal. It cuts across commodity policy; and primary commodities still make up some 85 to 90 percent of the export earnings of the developing countries. And it cuts across financial policy and the nature of aid to developing countries. Many of the resolutions at the conference dealt with some facet of this issue, which will be with the world for a long time.

The developing countries felt deeply that a new set of trade principles must be developed to govern future international trade relations. These principles are to be the Magna Carta of the world's "new international division of labor." Principles were drafted at the conference, some labeled general and others special, although it is hard to distinguish between the two groups. These principles were adopted by virtue of the developing countries voting yes, while the developed countries frequently abstained or voted no. In short, what UNCTAD adopted was a set of principles which does not have general agreement. It was agreed before the conference broke up that a major task is to reëxamine these trade principles, seek to shape them into a coherent whole, and to achieve more general agreement.

One other substantive issue should be noted—that dealing with preferential treatment for the manufactured products of

developing countries when exported to developed countries. Among the developing countries, some of the more advanced might benefit from trade preferences. Those which are less advanced, and have practically no industry, would not benefit from preferences on goods they do not even produce as yet; on the other hand, they would, for the most part, have nothing to lose either. Some countries in Africa, however, now enjoy preferential trade treatment in the European Economic Community and might be in a worse position if they had to share these on an equal basis with other developing countries. Here, therefore, the interests of developing countries diverged. And here effective compromising was done at the committee level. It was agreed that preferences which involved discrimination against developing countries should be eliminated only along with "the effective application of measures . . . providing at least equivalent advantages . . ." for the countries losing these exclusive preferences. What these "equivalent advantages" should be were hinted at but never really spelled out in detail.

A similar, and perhaps even more important, compromise was worked out among the 75 to deal with the problem of the African countries which might lose their preferential entry into the European Common Market for such products as coffee and cocoa, on which the Europeans maintain tariffs for the express purpose of favoring their former colonies.

These were important compromises on issues on which feeling runs deep among the developing countries. Latin America, for example, has long resented the discrimination it faces in marketing its coffee in the European Common Market. But the fact that a compromise was possible was a tribute to the power both of logrolling and of the desire of the 75 to maintain unity.

V

There are other important lessons to be derived from the discussions at the conference. One is that the developing countries want change. They want a "new" international division of labor, which implies that the present one is bad. They want and have a "new" trade forum. They want "new" trade principles. They want new and different techniques of aid, not necessarily at the sacrifice of the old, but in addition to what is now being done. They want new trade rules to replace the most-favored-nation concept and instead deliberately to favor the developing countries.

There was some nervousness on the part of many developing countries in much of this. If aid techniques are to be altered, what about those countries doing fairly well in aid receipts? The other side of the trade-preference coin is trade discrimination. Some of the more advanced of the developing countries, those on the borderline and uncertain of their proper classification, were privately concerned that they might not be among the countries receiving preference and that they would therefore be discriminated against. These misgivings were not publicly aired, but were privately expressed. The unity of the 75 was too precious for public doubts.

However, the key fact is that the world's poorer countries want change. To the extent that their proposals are not accepted, this is often interpreted as a desire to maintain the status quo and is resented.

The developing countries are irritated by what they sometimes believe is the patronizing air adopted by the representatives of developed countries. The lesson of avoiding condescension must be learned and relearned. The press in the developed countries often reported that one important function of UNCTAD was education, and by this was meant the education of representatives from developing countries. The fact that education might also work in the other direction tended to be ignored.

It is hard to state which way the education went in this instance. People who attend such conferences, whether from developed or developing countries, are never quite the same 12 weeks and hundreds of thousands of words afterwards. Something of the other fellow's viewpoint does come through. Presumably, open-minded and inquiring delegates from both developed and developing countries learned something, and closed-minded ones learned nothing, no matter what their national origin or the level of development of their country.

Insensitivity to the emotions and viewpoint of other people is not unique to representatives of developed countries. It also works the other way. Representatives of developed countries did not relish it when they were accused of being negative, or of being advocates of the status quo, only because they did not accept proposals of developing countries in precisely the words in which they were offered. Also, the running up of inevitable majorities by the developing countries, asking the other fellow to

do something, was a technique which inevitably irritated the representatives of developed countries.

These same delegates were also struck by what often seemed to them to be a double, or even triple, standard on the part of the developing countries. The standard went something as follows: no developing country would make demands on any other developing country, on the assumption that they already were doing all that was possible; developing countries would make demands on what the U.N. calls the centrally planned economies, *i.e.* the Communist countries, but would not be insistent when the Communists balked or wished to rephrase these demands in their own language; finally, developing countries would make uncompromising demands on what the U.N. calls the market economies, *i.e.* the Western industrialized countries, and would not only reject the latter's attempts at modification, but would even express dissatisfaction when demands were not accepted precisely as made.

As an example, one of the demands made at the conference was that developed free-market countries should eliminate internal taxes levied on such tropical beverages as coffee and cocoa, on the grounds that these taxes impede consumption. In some European countries, the elimination of these long-standing taxes, while desirable, is also difficult since alternative sources of revenue must be found. Nevertheless, the developing countries continued to insist on the elimination of these taxes, and properly so.

A device in Communist countries comparable in effect if not in purpose is the large margin between import and retail prices for tropical products. These, too, impede consumption. It was suggested that these margins in the centrally planned economies should reflect only normal distribution costs and profit. The representatives of centrally planned economies objected to this, and quite vociferously. They said that retail prices were immaterial in a planned economy. They implied that the only purpose of retail prices was to act as a market-clearing mechanism. They argued that anyone advocating a reduced import-retail price margin in order to stimulate imports just did not understand what a planned economy was all about. The issue, of course, is important to the Communist countries in that it raises the issue of consumer sovereignty; but the argument that limiting the margin between import and retail price is impossible for a

planned economy is no more convincing than the argument that a free-market economy cannot control its internal taxes.[1]

The important point that delegates noticed was that the developing countries, while they did bargain hard with the Communist countries, did not insist on maintaining their demands in the final resolutions, but instead accepted expressions of good intent, using language drafted by the Communist countries saying that they would increase their imports from developing countries.

It is hard to state why the demands placed on the Western industrialized countries and Japan tend to be greater than those placed on the Soviet Union. The reason given by most representatives at the conference was that the free-market economies tend to be more responsive to such pressure, and the Communist countries less so. In other words, the developing countries presumably exert pressure against the industrialized market countries because they hit pay-dirt; they exert less pressure against the developed Communist countries because their demands tend more easily to be sloughed off. Also, of course, the Western countries represent far more significant markets. Another reason might be that the developing countries are only now beginning to get used to treating the Soviet Union as a developed country, and their demands on it may increase as time passes. This is a portent for Moscow to ponder.

Perhaps the greatest danger that can come from these mutual irritations is that each side loses its appreciation of the aspirations and sensitivities of the other side. This is a lesson both sides must learn.

On the part of the developing countries, closing statement after closing statement reflected disappointment that UNCTAD, after only 12 weeks, had not solved all of the problems of economic development. For example, the final declaration of the 75 countries notes: "They [the 75] do not consider that the progress that has been registered in each of the major fields of

[1] At about the time this discussion was taking place, an article appeared in the Summer 1964 issue of *The New Hungarian Quarterly*, written by Róbert Hardi, an economist at the Karl Marx University of Economics in Budapest and Deputy Manager of KONSUMEX (Commodity Trading Enterprise). Mr. Hardi wrote that the socialist countries could undertake internal actions to stimulate imports from the developing countries. First among these, he wrote, "would be a decrease in the prices of tropical products on the home markets, resulting in increased demand. Price decreases of this type have recently taken place in a number of socialist countries. In Hungary a decrease in the price of coffee has, for instance, brought about a 100 percent increase in the volume of sales."

economic development has been adequate or commensurate with their essential requirements."

A great danger is that in the developed countries a plague-on-your-house feeling will develop, prompted by the seeming insensitivity of developing countries to the viewpoint of others, the rolling up of majority votes, and the double and triple standard referred to earlier. Such a reaction could be tragic, in that it could result in the developed countries losing sight of the very real problems which the developing countries have in achieving adequate economic growth.

There was much talk in the closing days as to whether the conference was a "success" or "failure," but it was never quite clear what these words meant. To some developing countries, success meant stating all their demands in unvarnished form, without any alteration in wording, in order that these might serve as a charter for what the developing countries thought must be done. To most developing countries, it seemed more important to arrive at some agreed resolutions "in recognition of the need for a coöperative effort in the international field."

If one conceives of UNCTAD as a start, then if it made a good start, it was successful. One would assume that from the viewpoint of the developing countries a good start was made. The developing countries will have a forum in which to examine their problems systematically and to seek remedies to what they consider are now the defects in the world's trading system. From their viewpoint, this must be considered a major achievement.

From the viewpoint of the developed countries, the real issue certainly must be the extent to which international action can be taken to help the developing countries solve the real problems which they face. Economic development is a complex process, possibly the most complex process of human endeavor. Certainly, there is agreement among all men that greater prosperity for each is desirable for all.

The issue for the United States, therefore, must be: What can be done by all countries—developed and developing—to help achieve this greater prosperity? Viewed in this way, "failure" is to permit conditions to develop in the world which would prevent these coöperative international actions from being taken to achieve higher living standards throughout the world. "Success" will be measurable as greater prosperity is achieved.

AUSTRALIA AND SOUTHEAST ASIA

By Paul Hasluck

AUSTRALIA, the sixth continent, lay outside world affairs until settled by Europeans. The 300,000 aborigines, who were its only inhabitants until the end of the eighteenth century, were untouched by the outside world except for infrequent visits by Malays and possibly Chinese to a few points on the northern coastline, and these had no knowledge of or interest in world affairs. But modern Australia is neither isolated nor isolationist. Australians have fought overseas in five wars in the last century, have known hostile bombs on their own soil and at present have a substantial proportion of their armed services on duty in other lands. By its origin in six British colonies, modern Australia was linked to world power contests; by its growth it has become part of them, and today we cannot read our national future except in the language of world politics.

Luckily the six colonies grew up at a time when British naval power in all oceans of the world was unchallenged. Nevertheless, one of the earliest expressions of Australian foreign policy was a movement in the colonies of New South Wales and Victoria in the 1850s to create a colonial navy because of a Russian scare following the appearance of the Russians in the Pacific. In the 1880s the colony of Queensland led a movement, in which all the other Australian colonies shared, to persuade the British to annex part of the island of New Guinea, largely because of the fear engendered by a German appearance in the Pacific. At that period Asia, yet unawakened, did not appear so definite a danger to Australians as did European power intruding into the Pacific. As in other countries of the Pacific, toward the end of the century Australian publicists took up the phrase "the yellow peril" and found meaning in it not so much as a military danger as a threat of coolie labor to the industrial conditions and standards of living which had been made an Australian ideal. After federation as the Commonwealth of Australia in 1901, the rising naval power of Japan caused some concern, but in the 1914–18 War Australia still saw her destiny linked only with the power struggle in Europe and, with the Japanese as an ally, sent her available manpower to a war in Europe and the Middle East, the convoys sometimes being escorted by Japanese warships.

After Versailles there was strong Australian concern over naval power in the Pacific. Great hopes were set on the Washington Treaties. Their failure to check the continued rise of Japanese naval power contributed to the confusion in Australian foreign policy throughout the 1930s. The power struggle in Europe was seen as one phenomenon and danger in the Pacific as another. International socialism bemused others into thinking that peoples and not nations were the real units in international politics. Growing interest in trade to and from Asia sometimes fed hope and sometimes fed doubt. Concern over Hitler's aggression alternated with forebodings about what Japan might do when other powers were busy in Europe.

After the disappointments at the failure of the Washington Treaties to arrest naval growth in the Pacific, the thoughts of Australians turned toward other means of ensuring Pacific security. In 1936 Robert Menzies, then Attorney-General in the Lyons Government, argued "that an effective contribution to the general principle of collective security contained in the League (of Nations) would be for States, in regions where their national interests are directly involved, to agree to some form of a regional pact, subsidiary to the Covenant, by which they would be obliged to render military assistance, in circumstances laid down by the agreement, if one or more of them should be attacked by an aggressor." Such agreements would be supplementary to and not in substitution for any of the provisions of the Covenant. He drew attention to the fact that, as the United States and Japan were not members of the League of Nations, regional agreement of this particular kind—within the compass of the Covenant—could hardly be applicable, but that it should be possible to promote a regional understanding and a pact of non-aggression for Pacific countries in the spirit of League undertakings. Sir George Pearce, the Minister for External Affairs, who had represented Australia at the Washington Conferences and can probably be regarded as the first significant Foreign Minister for Australia, spoke in June 1937, after his return from an Imperial Conference in London, of the lead which Australia had given to the conference in proposing a Pacific pact. Joseph Lyons, the Prime Minister of the day, informed Parliament on August 24 that he had indicated to the Imperial Conference that Australia "would welcome the regional understanding and pact of non-aggression in the Pacific and that we would be pre-

pared to collaborate with all other peoples towards the achievement of such a pact;" he defined the historical and existing Australian interest in simple terms: "Our desire as a nation is to live at peace with our neighbours and to develop our trade with them." Still the tendency was to see the Pacific danger and the European danger in separate compartments.

At the outbreak of the War of 1939–45 there was division of political opinion regarding the form of the Australian war effort, some seeing the greater peril in the East as a case for concentrating on home defense. Nevertheless, expeditionary forces were sent into the Middle East and the pick of Australia's airmen and part of her navy went into the northern hemisphere. Reliance was still placed on the strength of British power centered in Singapore. In the outcome—after Pearl Harbor, Japan's southward move and the fall of Singapore—the war came to mean for Australia largely war in the Pacific, danger from Asia and a feeling that the Allies, in the agreed strategy of defeating Hitler first, were not fully aware of the East.

The War of 1939–45 taught two lessons. One was that geographical isolation was no defense. An Asian power could attack Australian territory and threaten it with invasion. That lesson has since been underlined by changes in the nature of offensive weapons. The other was that British power was not great enough at the time of a war in Europe to conduct an effective defensive war in the Far East. That lesson has since been underlined by the postwar changes in the old British Empire.

II

Immediately after the war the virtual disappearance of colonial rule from southern Asia and from the Indonesian Archipelago produced a set of conditions totally dissimilar to those that prevailed at the time when Australia first began to discuss Asia. At the same time as Mainland China was growing in power under the first centralized, authoritative and single-minded government it had known in modern times—and a Communist government at that—the rest of Asia was being fragmented into inexperienced, newly independent states, some economically shaky and some politically unstable; Japan was disarmed and India neutralized itself. The Kashmir dispute had the effect of turning inwards the defense planning of two potentially great Asian armies. There has necessarily been a re-thinking of Australian foreign policy.

Behind this re-thinking, however, the dominant motives are still much the same. Australia wants to be safe, free and independent. These are not rhetorical terms. Being safe means to have a reasonable certainty that if any enemy attacks its territory that enemy will be defeated, and that if any enemy wants to cut communications between Australia and the rest of the world, and particularly between Australia and its distant allies, that enemy can be prevented from so doing. Being free means that a government elected by the Australian people will be able to make decisions according to its own judgment of what suits the Australian people best and that no other power or authority can prevent those decisions from being put into effect. Being independent means that in using its own judgment any Australian government will not be influenced or coerced by reason of the existence of any conditions or arrangements other than those which it has itself willingly brought about. There can be no true independence under the shadow of hostile power.

The second great requirement for Australia is that it should continue to develop its resources and maintain its standard of living. It must have economic opportunity and, for Australia, this means access to trade. Australia is high on the list of the trading nations of the world. It is not one of the richest countries of the world, nor in population or resources is it one of the biggest, but it is one of the great trading nations and, from the nature of its economic opportunities, it must continue to expand its trade. The total of Australian external trade per head of population is twice that of the United States. Of economic necessity, Australia has a major interest in peace throughout the world, in political stability and in rising prosperity in all other countries. In postwar years this necessity has been felt in respect of the countries of Asia more keenly than in respect of any other region.

Thirdly, Australia is an idealistic country. In its domestic affairs Australia has set itself certain standards of living and a belief in sharing wealth and opportunity; and it has placed a high value on law and order and kindly human relationships. It has also followed the British traditions of protection of rights of the individual, the rule of law, respect for property and honest administration. It tends to apply the same standards and to seek their achievement in all other parts of the world. If it is to be criticized it is for the naïveté with which it assumes that what it

finds good for itself at home is readily applicable in every other part of the world. Indeed one of the points at which Australia most closely resembles the United States is that it shares both this idealism and this naïveté with the American people.

Another resemblance may be found in the early postwar years. Australia, active in the formation of the United Nations, embraced the truth that the way to security is to build a secure world. It also had to learn from Korea onwards that, in these imperfect days, aggression must be fought in order to be checked.

All this is necessary background to any discussion of the present-day relationships between Australia and Asia and to an understanding of Australian policy in Southeast Asia. The two consistent strands in Australian policy toward Asia are, first, the search for means of maintaining security both by alliances and by arrangements for regional coöperation; and secondly, a consistent willingness to assist in raising standards of living to help Asian countries to help themselves. These two strands emerge today in a clearly discernible pattern of interest. Peace or war in the Pacific region means peace or war for Australia. Australia has political, economic and strategic interests in peace and stability in the region as a whole and in the peace and stability of each country of the region. The trend toward increased trade with Asia means that Australia has both a practical and a humanitarian concern in rising standards of living and in the economic progress of all countries of Asia. In this region of the world, no less than in any other, Australia believes that aggression must be resisted and the established conventions of international conduct observed, for here, as elsewhere, any unwillingness to resist, or failure in resistance, will dissipate the only climate in which our national independence, freedom and safety can endure.

In the postwar period there have been two significant developments in Australian foreign policy—one resulting in the achievement of regional arrangements for security and one in a revision of the national defense structure.

The idea of a Pacific pact was revived even before the Korean War. Foreign Minister P. C. Spender referred to it in March 1950 as "some form of regional pact for common defense" and "a defensive military arrangement, having as its basis, a firm agreement between countries having a vital interest in the stability of Asia and the Pacific and which are at the same time capable of

undertaking military commitments." He saw the British Commonwealth countries as the nucleus but hoped that other countries would associate themselves with the pact, and he referred particularly to the United States, "whose participation would give such a pact a substance that it would otherwise lack." At the same time he recognized that defensive pacts are in many ways negative. He hoped, too, for a pact that had more positive aims—"the promotion of democratic political institutions, higher living standards, increased cultural and commercial ties." This theme was pursued by Australia at the Baguio Conference in the Philippines and in discussions in Washington with Secretary of State Dulles. It was developed against the background of the Japanese Peace Treaty, the Korean War and the early experience of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Expression was given in due course on the positive side by the Colombo Plan inaugurated in 1950, and on the defensive side by the alliance with the United States and New Zealand in the ANZUS Treaty of 1951, and the establishment of SEATO in 1954, although care was taken to include in the SEATO arrangements a provision for constructive aid to the member countries. Under SEATO Australia committed itself to join in common efforts for the defense of the region. Under ANZUS it entered into an alliance of mutual assistance. Australia also contributed forces of all three services to the Commonwealth strategic reserve in Malaya, an integral part of the over-all defense of Southeast Asia.

The other significant change in the postwar period was in national defense. For the first time in Australian history a regular army was formed. Previously the conception had been one of home defense in peacetime and of expeditionary forces to be raised if necessary after a declaration of war. In the world today we know that fighting comes without a declaration of war and that infiltration and not direct attack is the sneaking mode of conquest favored by aggressors. Expeditionary forces, which have to be trained after they are raised, are unavailable in the situations with which we have to deal. Hence a regular army was created to be fully trained and as readily available as the Air Force and Navy. This improved availability of forces is being added to by recent decisions of the Menzies Government to create an Emergency Reserve from men who have completed their terms of enlistment in the regular forces and who are to be kept in full training; and to amend the Defense Act so that those

officers and men who are on voluntary part-time service in the citizen forces will be available for service overseas in circumstances short of a declaration of war.

The sweep of the Australian military commitment overseas is perhaps not always fully realized. We maintain forces and bases to assist the defense of Malaysia, an air unit and engineers in Thailand, and a military assistance group and air transport unit in South Viet Nam, while at the same time taking the primary responsibility for the defense of the border of Eastern New Guinea and of the Australian continent. Australia fought in Korea and helped to stamp out Communist terrorism in Malaya. Australia gave immediate material aid to India when that country was attacked by China and participated with the United Kingdom and the United States in an Indian air defense exercise last year. Australia participates in SEATO planning and her forces join in its exercises. We have supplied defense aid under SEATO to Pakistan, Thailand and the Philippines and to South Viet Nam. These commitments and contributions are the expression of our political, economic and strategic interests in the region. We believe that peace and stability cannot be achieved by neutralism but by combining with like-minded nations to defeat aggression and, at this stage of events, to give a backing of strength and military resolution to diplomatic efforts to remove threats against the territorial integrity and political independence of the nations of this region.

As an adjunct to these two significant moves in building a regional security system and a new structure of defense, Australia has extended her own diplomatic network and sought peaceful opportunities to come closer to Asia. Before Pearl Harbor, legations had been opened in Tokyo and Chungking. Today Australia is represented in Tokyo, Seoul, Saigon, Vientiane, Pnom Penh, Bangkok, Kuala Lumpur, Djakarta, Rangoon, New Delhi, Karachi, Colombo, Manila and Katmandu. Trade Commissioners are posted to Ceylon, India, Pakistan, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines and Thailand. Colombo Plan expenditures now total about $130,000,000. SEATO aid, special assistance to India and Malaysia, contributions to the Indus Basin Development Fund and other grants to Asian countries add at least another $30,000,000. Australia has been admitted as a regional member of ECAFE (Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East). Trade agreements have been concluded

with Indonesia, Malaya and Japan, and trade discussions have proceeded with the Philippines and India. The flow of visits by Asians to Australia and by Australians to Asia is increasing both for business and holiday. There are 11,000 Asian students in Australia today. Australian specialists and technicians are helping in Asian projects. Australian universities and schools have greatly expanded their courses and research projects in the Asian field, although most of us think that expansion should be even greater. Australian journalists have started to make Asia a special field of interest and enterprise.

III

Friendship with Asia, reciprocal trade, closer cultural relations and a clearer understanding of Asia and its peoples are in the forefront of Australian policy. They are also becoming part of the popular Australian outlook.

Foreign affairs are not conducted, however, by expressing good intentions but by handling particular problems as they arise. At the present time two major questions require immediate attention in Southeast Asia, namely the Indonesian attempt to "crush Malaysia" and the situation in South Viet Nam and Laos.

The attempt to crush Malaysia has brought Australia into opposition to Indonesia. There is no matter in dispute between Australia and Indonesia themselves, nor is there likely to be one unless Indonesia were to make an aggressive move against Australian territory in the eastern half of the island of New Guinea. There is certainly no Australian ambition in respect of Indonesian territory. It is basic to our own thinking that Indonesia should maintain its integrity and we should like to see it progressive and prosperous. Any fragmentation of Indonesia would not come by our wish. The natural and desirable future to which we look is an Indonesia that is joined in a chain of friendship from India through Thailand, the Philippines and Malaysia to Australia. The disruption of such hopes arises from Indonesian aggression against Malaysia, and we are also disturbed by the rise inside Java of a strong Communist party looking toward Peking. We deplore the circumstances in which President Sukarno has led his nation on courses which seem to us to be contrary to the enduring interests of his people and, certainly, contrary to our own. Even while we resist his aggression against Malaysia we hope that, eventually, Indonesia will turn into ways that will make enduring friendship with Australia possible.

Those hopes, which have been dimmed by events, do not lessen in any way the determination of Australia to support Malaysia. We do so for three clear reasons. One is that Malaysia has been brought into independence by constitutional means endorsed by its own people and approved by the United Nations. The formation of Malaysia seemed to us to offer the best and most expeditious opportunity for the orderly completion of the progress of Singapore, Sabah and Sarawak from colonies to nationhood. The independence of Malaysia is now under attack by an aggressor and its territory invaded. We believe that the aggression must be resisted and the independence of this young nation protected. Furthermore, Malaysia is a fellow member of the Commonwealth of Nations and we feel a special bond with her for that reason. For the same reason we supported and gave military aid to another member of the Commonwealth, India, when it was the victim of aggression by China. Thirdly, we believe that the survival, the integrity and the progress of Malaysia are essential elements in the peace and political stability of the region.

Therefore, at the outset of the confrontation, the Australian Government committed itself to assist the Malaysian Government in its defense so far as the situation might require and, since then, in response to requests made from time to time to us by the Malaysian Government, we have contributed both men and matériel to Malaysian defense.

In these activities Australia fills a different role from that of the United Kingdom, which has treaty commitments and responsibilities under the arrangements made for the independence of Malaysia; it is a distinction on which Australia places some value. We are not contributing to the defense of Malaysia because of any former relationship with the country as a colonial power for, in fact, we had no such relationship; nor are we acting to fulfill any treaty commitment. Our contribution is a simple and direct response to the need of an independent Malaysia, a neighbor and a fellow member of the Commonwealth, whose survival in the face of this attack seems to us to be essential to the future stability of the region.

In Laos and South Viet Nam we have become interested for two reasons. One is that South Viet Nam is also the victim of aggression and the defeat of that aggression appears to us to be vital for the whole of Southeast Asia. There is a double necessity

here. One is to defeat the aggressor and to halt the southward move of Mainland China. The other is to demonstrate plainly and victoriously to the other small nations of southern Asia, whether they are neutralist or committed, that aggression will fail. If aggression succeeded in South Viet Nam, resistance throughout southern Asia would crumble and many countries, including Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and Burma, could come under the domination of China to such an extent as to lose their independence. In some cases there might be physical occupation —in others the subservient role of an unwilling satellite. We stand readily alongside the United States in support of South Viet Nam because we believe that we are both defending the independence of a free nation and maintaining the conditions in which other countries of the region can remain free and independent.

In the case of Malaysia it is hoped that the failure of aggression may open the way to attempts to find conditions under which Indonesia will cease its policy of confrontation and apply itself more constructively to the great domestic tasks of reconstruction and to playing its due part in the diplomacy and defense of the region. In South Viet Nam the defeat of aggression will probably not present at once any possibility of a local solution isolated from broader problems of world politics. In both cases, but in the second even more than in the first, it has to be recognized that the military solution will not be the final one. The military resistance to aggression deals only with the edges of the problem. After military success or even while military success is being sought, restraints and inducements of a diplomatic kind have to be considered. It would be futile to consider them without having first proved ourselves capable of delivering a military check. Proposals for neutrality or recourse to the United Nations seem to us to be inadequate at the present stage because, until the military check is given, neutrality can mean only surrender to the aggressor, and recourse to the United Nations can result only in impeding those who resist and placing no handicap on those who attack. Neutrality and recourse to the United Nations are not to be sought for their own sake as policies sufficient in themselves but can only be justified by the effect they are likely to have on the final outcome.

When one turns to think of the final outcome, one appreciates immediately as a basic reality that Asia is not a land that can be "conquered" nor is it possible that any part of Asia can be

brought again under the rule of non-Asian countries. One also recognizes that whatever settlement is arrived at in Asia must be one that suits Asia itself and is in conformity with the needs and interests of the Asian people. In the present situation, when countries outside Asia are combining with the newly independent states of southern Asia to help ensure their survival, there is perhaps a tendency for us to transfer to Asia our own ideas on subjects such as national unity, democratic government and the will of the people. It will be vain to try to fashion Asia in the likeness of the West. Consequently we have to see that the non-Asian powers who are helping in the struggle are not attempting to convert Asia or to rule any part of it but are fighting to give the peoples of that continent a chance to find their own life and to rule themselves, freed from fear.

The small nations of Asia cannot do it alone. Behind all that is happening or will happen in Asia looms the fact of China. The doctrines and the intentions declared by its Communist government, its invasion of Tibet and India and its political activities throughout Asia today are all plain to read. The fear of China is the dominant element in much that happens in the region, and the fear is well founded.

Consequently, for the foreseeable future, the presence of non-Asian strength in the area, and particularly the strength of the United States, will be essential if fear is to be removed and freedom of choice restored. The countries of the region are entitled to look outside their borders for "foreign" help. Self-governing nations are entitled to decide whether and to what extent they will prepare the bases from which a concerted resistance to aggression will be maintained. The reality that has to be faced is that at present no balance to the power of China can be found in southern Asia. The balance has to be provided from outside Asia, and unless it is provided the region will fall under the domination of the Communist régime of Peking.

These considerations extend even beyond the area of the present conflict. What happens in Southeast Asia has its influence in other regions. India, Pakistan and the African states bordering on the Indian Ocean are also involved. Australia is deeply concerned in these long-range effects. We need to have a two-ocean policy, both in foreign affairs and defense, for it is plain that in the coming years the Indian Ocean will be of just as great strategic and diplomatic importance to us as the Pacific. Some of the

prospective problems of relationships in the Indian Ocean are already being influenced by the contests in South Viet Nam and Malaysia. What eventually happens will be shaped to a large extent by the result in Southeast Asia.

We in Australia have a strong interest in freedom and independence among all the countries of Asia. Our own future is intimately linked with their future and the great task of our present and prospective diplomacy is to work out the terms on which we will live as neighbors. We could not endure to have a single dominant power in Asia capable of dictating the terms on which neighboring countries could conduct their relations with us, determining the conditions under which we ourselves would have to live in this region, able to interrupt our communications with the world at large. We want peace and political stability and continued social and economic advancement in all the countries of Asia.

We should not make the mistake again of keeping Pacific affairs and North Atlantic affairs and Indian Ocean affairs in separate compartments. We should not fall into the error of thinking that the world power contest is other than world-wide. The diplomacy of power has to be transacted in all continents; the ideological struggle is being waged throughout the world; aggression must be resisted and made to fail wherever it threatens peace; and the principles of civilized conduct have to be maintained abroad as well as at home.

These may seem big words for a small power. They are stressed here to support two final remarks. In making our main contribution in our region of the world we have not ignored our responsibilities or our interests in other regions, and we seek to be consistent in the stand we take internationally in all matters that come before the nations of the world for judgment. Frankly, we find it hard to understand those small nations which accept support in their own danger and are quite unwilling to be aligned when similar dangers threaten other nations similarly placed. In these troubled days we all have to choose which side we are on and stick to it not only to meet our own needs but to uphold in all places the cause for which we have chosen to stand.

The other remark is that, although the role now being played by the United States and the United Kingdom in Southeast Asia is of great and immediate value to us as a means of checking aggression in this region, we see it, too, as the discharging by

them of the world-wide responsibilities of great-power leadership. The final honor and respect in which we hold them and our readiness to stand with them in constancy do not come simply from the fact that they are the allies whom we need to keep us safe. They are upholding here as elsewhere those rights and those principles that have to be maintained for a good world. They are holding in balance, here as elsewhere, the power that threatens peace. We stand with them.

It was in this light that the Australian Government viewed the incidents in the Gulf of Tonkin in early August. At the time of writing we are too close to the events to know whether the "fitting and limited" response given by the United States to a hostile attack will lead to a pause and a reëxamination by North Viet Nam of its policies. The demonstration of American firmness, endorsed by the historic resolution of Congress on August 6, was a heartening signal to those who resist aggression of American determination and capability to play a responsible and we hope determinative role in Southeast Asia.

LAOS: CONTINUING CRISIS

By Eric Pace

THE April coup in Vientiane and the subsequent defeat of the neutralists at the Plain of Jars underscored the fact that the 1962 settlement was only a fig leaf, not a solution, for the country's perennial civil war in Laos. The events of the past two years have left the situation there as complex and explosive as before.

Under the hopeful provisions of the 1962 settlement, embodied in the Geneva Accords and the Plain of Jars Agreement, Laos was declared neutral and foreign military intervention was forbidden. The neutralist, right-wing and Communist-controlled Pathet Lao factions were united in a coalition cabinet under the neutralist leader, Prince Souvanna Phouma. His new government was to rule all of Laos and preside over the reintegration of the three factions' respective armies.

The agreements proved ineffective, however. Within less than a year the Pathet Lao withdrew from the coalition, making it meaningless. Civil war broke out again, with Viet Minh soldiers supporting the Pathet Lao and United States military aid backing the anti-Communist coalition formed in Vientiane by the two remaining factions. Laos remained divided: the Pathet Lao administered approximately two-thirds of the country as a hostile, expansionist state, while right-wing generals controlled almost all the rest. Souvanna Phouma presided over the rump government by virtue of foreign support. After the coup, fear of further violence kept Vientiane tense, and still another coup was averted in August. In the same period, when the United States was busy shoring up South Viet Nam, the Laotian situation had come unstuck.

The renewed instability in Laos works to the advantage of the Pathet Lao, since of the three factions they have the best organization and, with their Viet Minh reinforcements, the strongest army. In the past two years they have achieved exclusive control of something less than 8,000 additional square kilometers of territory. Military experts calculate that if it were not for the threat of Western intervention, the Pathet Lao-Viet Minh forces could capture Vientiane in two weeks. Hence the situation poses dangers for United States interests: further Pathet Lao victories

would be interpreted by Southeast Asians as an American defeat and would, as much as any Gaullist neutralization proposal, dilute their will to oppose Asian Communist expansionism.

A Communist take-over in Laos would have little direct effect on the military situation in South Viet Nam, since the Pathet Lao already firmly control the Laotian border areas through which North Vietnamese men and matériel reach the Viet Cong territory. But morale in South Viet Nam would sag further, perhaps decisively. The Thai, with their acute sensitivity to their own national interest, would be encouraged to compromise their pro-Western stand. The Burmese would grow more obliging toward Peking. Communist China and North Viet Nam would find their "paper tiger" view of the United States vindicated. And Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia would have further evidence to support his predictions of ultimate Chinese victory in Southeast Asia.

The causes for the dangerous turmoil in Laos lie partly in defects of the 1962 settlement as such and partly in recent changes within the three factions. Finding themselves unable to subvert the coalition, the Pathet Lao adopted a policy of complete belligerence. Their former allies, the neutralists, turned against them and relied on the United States for support. The right wing, on which the United States had pinned its hopes in the past, was brought almost to the point of disintegration by internal feuding.

II

When United States policy-makers approved the formation of the neutral Laotian government in 1962, it was largely because the Soviet Union had promised to support the new arrangement. On its face, however, the settlement was unpromising. The tripartite cabinet was crippled by a requirement that all important decisions be unanimous. A similar handicap plagued the International Control Commission, whose task was to ensure the withdrawal of all foreign troops, except for a small French training contingent. The Polish I.C.C. commissioner felt, as did the Pathet Lao, that tripartite agreement between him and his Canadian and Indian colleagues must exist before they did any investigating.

Thus the success of the 1962 arrangement depended on coöperation by the Pathet Lao. But when the United States accepted the Soviet assurances, it apparently failed to take into account

the speed at which the Sino-Soviet split was developing. Soon it became clear that the Soviets had lost either the ability or the will to influence China, North Viet Nam or the Pathet Lao to uphold the settlement; they may have felt that they had troubles enough with Peking without arguing over Laos.

Outwardly, however, the situation remained relatively calm for a few months after the coalition government was installed, with the titular Pathet Lao leader, Prince Souphanouvong, and the right-wing commander, General Phoumi Nosavan, as deputy premiers under Souvanna Phouma. But friction was growing between the neutralists and their former allies, the Pathet Lao, who were trying to enlist the active support of neutralist officers and men. Most neutralists followed Souvanna Phouma and his military commander, General Kong Le, who remained aloof. A few, however, sided with the Communists, some for ideological reasons, others because they felt the neutralists were being deceived by their new right-wing coalition partners. The most powerful of these pro-Pathet Lao neutralists was Quinim Pholsena, a longtime leftist who had been named foreign minister in the new coalition cabinet.

By late 1962 a clear split had appeared between the bulk of the neutralists on one side and the Pathet Lao with their dissident neutralist supporters on the other. The Pathet Lao had begun to share less and less of their supplies of rice, salt and war matériel with Kong Le's troops, and finally they cut off the aid altogether. Without outside support, the neutralist units could not maintain their positions; Souvanna Phouma was obliged to ask the United States to start flying them supplies. The United States quickly complied with this request, first with non-military provisions, later with military equipment. This aid, an important factor in bringing the neutralists around to their present pro-Western position, infuriated the Pathet Lao. In November 1962, a gunner commanded by Colonel Deuane Sipaseuth, an influential neutralist officer who had gone over to the Pathet Lao, shot down a plane flying American aid to the neutralists. After a brief subsequent reconciliation with Kong Le, Deuane later redefected to the Pathet Lao and became the leader of what Asian Communists call the "true neutralists," those who have broken with Kong Le and Souvanna Phouma to side with the Pathet Lao. With these "true neutralists" now numbering perhaps 500 on their side, the Pathet Lao feel entitled to control all the areas

which, under the 1961 cease-fire, they held jointly with Kong Le's forces.

Meanwhile a conflict had developed in Vientiane between Souvanna Phouma and Quinim, who was constantly working in the interests of the Pathet Lao. He was the Communists' great hope for influencing the coalition government's policies from within. This hope was dashed, however, on April 1, 1963, when, in retaliation for the murder of one of Kong Le's officers, a neutralist guard machine gunned Quinim to death. With Quinim gone, the Pathet Lao felt they had lost their stake in the coalition. They moved quickly. Souphanouvong and the Pathet Lao information minister, Phoumi Vongvichit, withdrew from Vientiane on the ground that Quinim's assassination proved their lives were endangered in the capital. Since then, the Pathet Lao have taken no part in government decisions and accordingly consider its actions invalid under the 1962 agreements. At the same time, they brook no interference by Vientiane in the administration of their own areas.

Pathet Lao and neutralist troops had been skirmishing off and on in their jointly held areas during the months before Quinim was killed. In April 1963, the Pathet Lao launched a full-scale attack and pushed Kong Le's troops out of the eastern Plain of Jars region. Their attack was an ominous foretaste of the May 1964 offensive, when they took the rest of the Plain. Coupled with Souphanouvong's withdrawal, the 1963 assault completed the break between the neutralists and the Pathet Lao.

Souvanna Phouma had little contact with Souphanouvong from then until early 1964, when the two half-brothers met briefly at Sam Neua in Pathet Lao territory. Their rendezvous was friendly, but Souphanouvong still refused to return to fill his cabinet seat in Vientiane. A few days later, the Pathet Lao began a series of successful attacks on right-wing positions in south-central Laos, apparently in revenge for rightist attacks late the previous year.

Depressed by these further setbacks, Souvanna Phouma threatened to resign, and set off on a ten-day trip to Hanoi and Peking to ask the Chinese Communists and North Vietnamese to get the Pathet Lao to take a less belligerent stand. The Chinese gave Souvanna Phouma the impression that they would consider Laos and Viet Nam as two separate problems. This he took to indicate that Communist policy in Laos would be less aggressive, at

least until the conflict in South Viet Nam was resolved. He returned home encouraged.

At the same time, however, the Pathet Lao were holding a party congress, their first in eight years, apparently, among other things, to decide what to do if Souvanna Phouma should go through with his threat to resign. His self-advertised weak position apparently influenced the party to take an even harder line. It proclaimed its intent to "struggle against United States imperialists and their followers, the traitors, for a correct implementation of the Geneva accords."

On April 17, the leaders of the three factions finally, with elaborate security arrangements, conferred on the Plain of Jars. Souphanouvong was obdurate. He demanded that Phoumi agree then and there to the detailed provisions of a Pathet Lao proposal that Luang Prabang, the royal capital, be neutralized and demilitarized as a provisional seat for the coalition. When Phoumi insisted on time to study the proposal, the talks broke off. Souvanna Phouma, thunderstruck, announced he would resign.

His announcement prompted two Vientiane generals to stage a coup d'état the following morning. The ringleader was General Siho Lanphouthacoul, then only 28, the commander of the national security police, which includes three highly trained paratroop battalions quartered outside Vientiane. Siho was disgusted at the inefficiency of the coalition government and saw a chance to increase his own influence. He persuaded an older, more powerful general to head the coup: Kouprasith Abhay, a courageous but indecisive aristocrat in command of the right-wing army units in the Vientiane area. Their troops invested the capital and put Souvanna Phouma under arrest. They declared the coalition government suspended.

In their haste, however, the two generals had miscalculated foreign reaction. They assumed the United States would support them as it had backed General Khanh in Saigon after his successful coup. The American Ambassador, Leonard Unger, soon convinced them that United States support for Souvanna Phouma was unchanged; they were forced to back down rather than face the eventual withdrawal of American aid. The coalition government was allowed to continue in operation and Souvanna Phouma was released. Encouraged by the support of the United States and other nations, he resolved to continue as premier.

Nevertheless, the generals' control of the capital remained un-

challenged. In the weeks that followed they used their newly demonstrated power to ensure certain governmental changes, some of which worked to the disadvantage of General Phoumi, Siho's former patron, who had remained aloof from the coup. Although Souvanna Phouma held the coalition defense portfolio, Phoumi had remained *de facto* commander-in-chief of the right-wing army. This state of affairs was changed when Souvanna moved his office into the defense ministry and delegated considerable military authority to the army chief of staff. Monopolies in which Phoumi had an interest were broken up. His political party, the Party of Social Progress, was, theoretically at least, merged with the neutralists. More importantly, the right-wing army was merged at the staff level in Vientiane with Kong Le's neutralist forces.

The coup and its upshots made it easier for the Pathet Lao to repeat their previous year's offensive in the Plain of Jars region. The evidence is that the timing of this year's assault was dictated by the approach of the rainy season, rather than by the coup itself, but the confusion in Vientiane helped the Pathet Lao in their continuing efforts to woo neutralist officers over to "true neutralism." At the Plain of Jars, Kong Le's army was alarmed by rumors that Souvanna Phouma had been killed and the coalition destroyed. Certain officers felt they had been sold out by the merger with their right-wing former enemies. A visit by Souvanna Phouma to Kong Le's headquarters failed to alleviate the situation: the Pathet Lao were already in contact with officers on the north and south flanks of the neutralist defenses. On May 16 the Pathet Lao, with assistance from the Viet Minh and probably from Colonel Deuane's "true neutralists," attacked, striking first at the flanks, which quickly collapsed. Outnumbered and battered by artillery fire, Kong Le's forces gave up the Plain of Jars area, losing almost all their tanks and artillery in the process.

The United States quickly supplied the Lao air force with additional propeller-driven T-28 fighter-bombers to supplement the half-dozen they had already received. The planes were used in combat for the first time, aided by photo-reconnaissance obtained by unarmed American jets which flew over Pathet Lao territory at the formal request of the coalition government. After Pathet Lao artillery shot down a jet on June 6, armed American jet fighters accompanied the reconnaissance missions with orders to

return fire from hostile anti-aircraft installations. Later, troops were called out in Vientiane to prevent a right-wing countercoup while seesaw fighting continued between the Pathet Lao and the combined anti-Communist forces, which achieved some encouraging victories.

These events were followed by a flurry of diplomatic activity in which the United States made clear its opposition to the reconvening of the fourteen-nation conference which had produced the Geneva Accords of 1962. It was feared that a full-scale gathering would provide a platform for Communist propagandizing and for discussion of proposals to neutralize South Viet Nam. The United States insisted that the 1962 settlement, so unsatisfactory in the past, was still adequate to meet the situation, despite the changes which the intervening years had brought.

III

This quick review of events since 1962 shows that of the factions in Laos, the Pathet Lao have had by far the most influence on recent developments there. Their unflagging aggressiveness spurred the neutralists' new pro-Western orientation and heightened the confusion within the right wing. This aggressiveness, unique in Laos, is rooted in the Chinese Communist concept of "national liberation struggle." Peking influences the Pathet Lao directly, through the coördination of propaganda and the strong Chinese presence in the northernmost Laotian province, Phong Saly. The Pathet Lao are also influenced by China indirectly—and more significantly—through the North Vietnamese Communist Party, to which the most important Pathet Lao leaders belong. These outside influences ensure their unswerving adherence to Mao's idea of "struggle" as a purely two-sided affair, with the "progressives" on one side and all non-progressive forces lumped together as their enemy. This view of the East-West conflict leaves no room for "neutralism" in the Western sense. It explains why the Pathet Lao, although they formally accepted the "neutralization" of Laos, were so quick to turn against the majority of neutralists who refused to become "progressives" by actively supporting their cause.

Earlier, the Pathet Lao had been less discriminating about their neutralist associates. After Kong Le's coup of 1960 they had been glad to join forces temporarily with what they considered an anti-imperialist bourgeois movement. By 1962, however, they

apparently felt the time had come to demand complete adherence rather than mere partnership from their bourgeois allies. When most neutralists made it clear that they preferred to retain their independence, it became necessary, in Peking's phrase, to divide friend from enemy. By the logic of the "national liberation struggle," Kong Le and Souvanna Phouma were considered part of the un-progressive enemy and thereby lost the right to call themselves neutralists. This view may seem illogical and oversimplified, but it has become Pathet Lao dogma, and it will impede attempts at a new international settlement of the Laos problem.

The problem is complicated further by the fact that the Pathet Lao have established a functioning, cohesive state in their part of the country, with a relatively well-disciplined army. They levy taxes, circulate their own currency and exercise political control down to the village level, which contrasts with the loose administration in the right-wing areas, where the traditional Asian amalgam of central bureaucracy and village autonomy prevails. Capitalizing on this situation, the Pathet Lao have put their own agents into about half the villages in the right-wing areas. Occasionally, Pathet Lao infiltrators requisition rice in right-wing villages and sabotage a truck or bridge as an indication of what might be the next stage of their belligerence, if circumstances require: Viet Cong-type sedition behind the anti-Communist lines.

In contrast to the Pathet Lao, the neutralist faction has never had an ideological underpinning for its policies. Ideally, Souvanna Phouma has hoped to make his country a Southeast Asian Sweden or, failing that, a sort of Finland, retaining as much independence as possible from both East and West despite the proximity of a great Communist power. At the time of Kong Le's coup, the United States opposed this objective, while the Pathet Lao were willing at least to pay it lip service. Now, however, the United States has accepted Souvanna's goal while the Pathet Lao are openly working against it. As a result, he and his followers have made an 180-degree turn from deep suspicion of the United States to their present heavy reliance on it for support.

When he took office as coalition premier in 1962, Souvanna Phouma bore no great love for the United States. He had resented American pressure in the 1950s and he blamed American support for the success of General Phoumi's march on Vientiane

in December 1960, which led to the departure of the neutralist government of the time. But as premier in 1962 he welcomed the full support of the United States and its allies. With American aid flowing to the neutralist army, he began to see that United States military support for the right-wing army was not calculated as a means of depriving him of political power.

As Souvanna Phouma's fears of the right wing decreased, his disillusionment with the Pathet Lao grew. For years he had considered Souphanouvong to be merely a royalist who had lapsed into a kind of "salon-leftism." He hoped Souphanouvong's sense of his own Lao nationality would lead him ultimately to reject dictation from Peking and Hanoi and to coöperate in a settlement for Laos. The events of the past months, however, have led him to conclude this hope is no longer possible. He has come to agree with Western experts, who long ago concluded that Souphanouvong does not control the Pathet Lao and that the strong men behind him are dominated by the North Vietnamese, who have no intention of reducing their influence in Laos.

This realization has led Souvanna Phouma to alter his political style. Earlier, he had tried to function as an arbitrator between the Pathet Lao and the right wing, at the expense of his own executive initiative. At the Plain of Jars "summit" he said he would approve whatever agreement Souphanouvong and Phoumi were able to reach. Later, however, he apparently became convinced that mere arbitration was not enough. Accordingly, he has been taking a more leading role in what is left of the coalition, behaving more like a conventional chief of government. In the wake of the coup, he has gained the active support of some influential right wingers who no longer find his views so different from their own.

The factionalism within the right wing, which had long been growing, was merely brought into the open by the coup of April 19. It could explode into violence again at any time. The politicians and generals who control most of the roughly one-third of Laos (and two-thirds of the population) which has escaped Pathet Lao domination are divided into overlapping groups whose borders run along family, party and geographical lines.

The most important rightist leader is still Phoumi, who is the coalition finance minister as well as deputy premier. The power play of the coup leaders and the subsequent changes in the defense ministry greatly reduced Phoumi's military influence, but

he still retains the loyalties of certain provincial generals, notably in the area of Savannakhet, seat of the powerful Voravong family, to which he is related. The merger of Phoumi's party with the neutralists is significant only in that it reflects his desire to strengthen his formal ties to the coalition, now that his informal power, through the army and the system of monopolies, has been curtailed. In addition, a rival right-wing element, the powerful Sananikone family, began after the coup to support Souvanna Phouma as a means of indirectly working against Phoumi. The Sananikones, to whom Kouprasith is related, also quietly pressed for government financial inquiries in the apparent hope of revealing corruption in which Phoumi was involved.

Siho and the men who surround him are a new force within the right wing: a coterie of young, highly ambitious officers largely without influential family connections or great personal wealth. Now that they have proved their power, the preservation of peace in Vientiane hinges on the continuation of their alliance with Kouprasith. Together, the coup leaders influence government operations by pressuring officials at the sub-cabinet level, and through a system of inter-ministerial committees established after the coup. Their influence has also led to a series of cabinet changes. Souvanna Phouma's physical safety depends on their whim; at least once since the coup a high American official has been obliged to dissuade a group of officers who were planning to arrest Souvanna all over again. Nevertheless, the influence of the right-wing elements in general is limited by their internal feuding, by the slack system of local administration in the areas they control and by the lack of over-all cohesiveness between the various military commands.

Despite their internal changes, the three Laotian factions have been kept in precarious balance by outside pressures. It is only with support from the Viet Minh that the Pathet Lao have been able to make their advances; most military experts in Vientiane believe the right-wing and neutralist armies, with a combined strength of over 60,000, would be able to push back the less than 20,000 Pathet Lao combat troops if the North Vietnamese withdrew. By the same token, without the threat of Western retaliation, the Pathet Lao-Viet Minh forces would long since have pushed through to the Mekong. And without pressures from the United States, Siho and Kouprasith might well have broken up the coalition government.

This balance of foreign pressures has shifted in recent months. The great change, of course, was the increased activity of the United States. While heavily subsidizing the coalition government and the anti-Communist armies, the United States avoided increasing its commitments before 1964. The 1962 settlement was clearly not working, but with the uncertain situation in South Viet Nam, it seemed wiser not to rock the boat in Laos. The coup and the Plain of Jars offensive, however, posed such grave dangers that the United States was forced to intervene quickly by providing the T-28s, increased military aid and the jet reconnaissance flights, which led by their own operational logic to American fighter jets raiding the Pathet Lao. The Communists did not retaliate by stepping up their own military activities, presumably because of repeated American threats of further intervention if necessary. Meanwhile the other powers occupied themselves with various initially unsuccessful efforts to bring the Laotian leaders and the interested nations together for a meeting, in one form or another.

The success of whatever arrangement emerges from the next conference or conferences will depend in the long run on how firmly the United States can convince Peking and Hanoi that it will retaliate as necessary in the event of further Communist encroachment in Laos. The North Vietnamese gunboat attacks on United States destroyers provided a kind of clear-cut provocation which makes possible a neatly calibrated reprisal. In Laos, however, Communist moves are less crisp; the covert nature of Viet Minh support for the Pathet Lao coupled with complex and unstable relationships between their neutralist and right-wing opponents poses a more delicate policy problem. But unless the United States is prepared to make, and maintain, really convincing long-range commitments against Pathet Lao-Viet Minh advances, it must face the prospect that Laos will come even more unstuck.

VIET NAM:
DO WE UNDERSTAND REVOLUTION?

By Major-General Edward G. Lansdale

WHATEVER course the long struggle in Viet Nam finally takes, short of nuclear holocaust, one thing seems certain: the people of Viet Nam still will be there. This is a reminder that war in Viet Nam is a "people's war." As such, it is a constantly recurring phenomenon of this period of man's history. How it is fought and what happens to the Vietnamese people as a result have meanings, therefore, far beyond today or the boundaries of Viet Nam itself. "People's wars" elsewhere will also make demands on the American people to help solve them. Thus, although the hour is late in Viet Nam, terribly so, there is time yet for Americans to consider the war in Viet Nam in its "people" nature, especially as regards what American assistance in these critical months will come to mean to the Vietnamese people in their own future, and to us in ours.

Nearly four years ago now, on December 20, 1960, the Communists set up the political base with which they hoped to win Viet Nam by revolutionary struggle. The base consisted of an idea and of an organization to start giving that idea reality. Both the idea and the concept of the organization were foreign, having traveled the distance in time and space from Lenin in the Soviet Union via Mao in China.

The Communist idea was to gain control of the 14,000,000 people living in South Viet Nam by destroying their faith in their own government and creating faith in the inevitability of a Communist take-over. The organization to do this through a phased series of disciplined actions was called "The National Liberation Front of South Viet Nam." It had a central committee to direct its operations, the beginnings of a country-wide apparatus for political-psychological-military actions, and a wide assortment of member "fronts," manned by small cadres, to appeal politically to mass groupings of Vietnamese people: the farmers, the workers, the youth, the intellectuals, and even the civil servants and military.

Ever since the creation of a Communist political base in Viet Nam, the successive governments of Viet Nam and their

supporter and counselor, the United States, with the approval and sometimes the help of other free-world peoples, have given their substance and made their sacrifices to prevent a Communist win. The harsh fact, and one which has given pause to every thoughtful American, is that, despite the use of overwhelming amounts of men, money and matériel, despite the quantity of well-meant American advice and despite the impressive statistics of casualties inflicted on the Viet Cong, the Communist subversive insurgents have grown steadily stronger, in numbers and in size of units, and still retain the initiative to act at their will in the very areas of Viet Nam where Vietnamese and American efforts have been most concentrated.

Most American reactions to this stark fact have fallen within three general categories. Some believe that we should disengage in Viet Nam, preferably by setting up means to end the struggle and bloodshed through international accommodation. Some believe we should plainly identify the struggle as a war and make use of our military proficiency to force the Communist régime in Hanoi to cease its adventure in the south. Some believe we should continue along the present course, but greatly increasing the quantity and effectiveness of what is done so that it eventually smothers and kills the Communist insurgency. The anomaly in these reactions is that each falls short of understanding that the Communists have let loose a revolutionary idea in Viet Nam and that it will not die by being ignored, bombed or smothered by us. Ideas do not die in such ways.

A fourth belief, admittedly in a minority in the free world at present, is to oppose the Communist idea with a better idea and to do so on the battleground itself, in a way that would permit the people, who are the main feature of that battleground, to make their own choice. A political base would be established. The first step would be to state political goals, founded on principles cherished by free men, which the Vietnamese share; the second would be an aggressive commitment of organizations and resources to start the Vietnamese moving realistically toward those political goals. In essence, this is revolutionary warfare, the spirit of the British Magna Carta, the French "Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité" and our own Declaration of Independence.

For American consideration, this fourth belief might be put another way. It is this. In trying to help the Vietnamese, the United States has been contributing in generous measure those

things which it so far has felt most qualified to give and which the Vietnamese may lack—money, equipment and technical advice. In general, though, the United States has felt inhibited about trying to make a contribution in areas in which it feels that the chief responsibility must rest with the Vietnamese themselves, particularly in finding the motivation for conducting a successful counter-insurgency effort. The thesis of this paper is that, due to the extent of our involvement, and because everything depends on that motivation, Americans cannot escape responsibility in this area either.

It will be staunchly maintained by some that no nation can endow another nation with the will to be free, that only an indigenous movement can have genuine popular appeal, that Americans should not interfere in the domestic affairs of another nation, and that the Vietnamese war is now in such a state that political innovations could invite disaster. This makes it necessary to examine the revolutionary solution in some detail.

II

Two near neighbors of Viet Nam offer examples of countries which were successful in maintaining their freedom when attacked by Asian Communist subversive insurgents. True, the circumstances were not the same as in Viet Nam today. Yet in each case the insurgencies were conducted as "wars of national liberation" by native Communists using a revolutionary political base, and these insurgencies were defeated.

The unconventional methods which were developed and used in the successful campaigns in Malaya and the Philippines are the lessons most often studied and adapted for use elsewhere, including in Viet Nam. They have their importance. However, both of these successful campaigns had one great lesson in common, which the leaders recognized as the single most significant and vital factor in victory. The great lesson was that there must be a heartfelt *cause* to which the legitimate government is pledged, a cause which makes a stronger appeal to the people than the Communist cause, a cause which is used in a dedicated way by the legitimate government to polarize and guide all other actions—psychological, military, social and economic—with participation by the people themselves, in order to bring victory. In Malaya, the cause was to safeguard the impending national independence from seizure by Communist neo-

colonialism. In the Philippines, the cause was to safeguard the Constitution whose true value came to be appreciated as it was made a working document for the people, so that appeals by the Communists to the people to join them in overthrowing the constitutional government by force actually made the Communists a minority against the people's best interests.

These necessarily brief descriptions of two causes cannot convey the strength of their tremendously moving appeal to the people on the two battlegrounds. As with most fundamental truths, their concepts were plain to understand once they were explained correctly. After they were discovered and made effective, they seemed so natural and obvious that many people who had not shared the deep emotions of the insurgent battlegrounds tended to overlook them or under-rate their vital significance, looking elsewhere for more romantic or technical foundations from which the victories might be supposed to have been started.

Of specific interest to those concerned with the problems of Viet Nam, and as a commentary on the frailty of human perceptions, it should be noted that the vital causes which became the rallying points in Malaya and the Philippines were disregarded during years of tragic struggle in those countries. Once they were recognized and given dynamic use by leaders such as Templar, Magsaysay and others, even though this was done after there had been years of indecisive fighting, the climax of each campaign came quickly. If it can be expressed by a formula, the lesson might be stated as: When the right cause is identified and used correctly, the *anti*-Communist fight becomes a *pro*-people fight, with the overwhelming majority of the people then starting to help what they recognize to be their own side, and the struggle is brought to a climax. When the pro-people fight is continued sincerely by its leaders, the Communist insurgency is destroyed.

This concept of revolutionary warfare seems to lie close to the heart of American beliefs. In the President's June 23, 1964, press conference, in which he restated our Southeast Asian policy, he said, "This is not just a jungle war, but a struggle for freedom on every front of human activity." The month before, the Secretary of Defense explained to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs that "the mission of our men in South Viet Nam is the same as of those Europeans [he named Kosciusko, Von Steuben and Pulaski] who came to assist us in our fight for liberty."

Now as already mentioned, the concept that the United States should give advice and counsel on waging revolutionary warfare in the form of a "pro-people fight" involves exporting American political principles, and some see such an export as something improper, or even immoral. Such an inhibition deserves close scrutiny when it is applied to a life-or-death struggle, such as the one in Viet Nam, since it rules out or at least weakens American help in providing the attacked country with a dynamic political answer with which to meet and overcome the foreign ideas introduced by the Communists as the political base of their attack. Lacking such a dynamic answer, the country is left to make do with its own political resources—which, as we have witnessed time after time, often evolve into a one-man leadership with strict control over all national resources, in order to save the country. Americans see this result as a dictatorship and feel a moral inhibition against giving it assistance; some well-meaning people go so far as to attack it. Not surprisingly, the United States thus comes to be looked upon abroad as immature or callous or self-righteous.

Admittedly, great wisdom and sensitivity are required if the United States is to help in the internal political problems of foreign peoples. It would be a drastic change for most U.S. officials to try to satisfy the hesitantly expressed desires of leaders and peoples of sovereign states for political advice with a higher content of American idealism in it. Some might do the task badly, lacking the required perceptivity and understanding of the political backgrounds of either the host country or our own.

Yet the United States has undertaken political tasks of this sort in foreign nations in the past, and the results have brought it considerable honor and prestige. The two most recent examples were Japan and West Germany, defeated nations with which it somehow became "correct" to share the best possible American political thinking. Another example was the Philippines. We tutored the Philippine people and encouraged them in self-government in the same brotherly spirit which elsewhere today could make all the difference in struggles between freedom and Communism. While the Philippines, Japan and Germany are primarily examples of U.S. government efforts, others which have been most useful were private or semi-public, such as the work of American lawyers abroad in helping establish the legal foundation of government. It is not surprising or unseemly that the Con-

stitution of India contains so many provisions based upon decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, that the 1955 Constitution of Ethiopia recognizes so many of the same rights as does the U.S. Constitution, that the 1940 Constitution of Cuba remains the very antithesis of Castro and the eventual return to its observance one of the great hopes of the Cuban people.

III

The great *cause* in Viet Nam which last united the overwhelming majority of Vietnamese, both North and South, was "independence." For many of the Vietnamese, including nearly all the Vietnamese leaders with whom we work today in South Viet Nam, "independence" was a goal to be won by revolutionary means against a colonial power. In this aspect, Viet Nam's revolutionary spirit was close to that of the American Revolution.

The tragedy of Viet Nam's revolutionary war for independence was that her "Benedict Arnold" was successful. Ho Chi Minh, helped by Vo Nguyen Giap, Truong Chinh, Pham Van Dong, and a small cadre of disciplined Party members trained by the Chinese and Russians, secretly changed the goals of the struggle. Instead of a war for independence against the French colonial power, it became a war to defeat the French and put Viet Nam within the neo-colonial Communist empire. When they discovered the truth, those patriots who could escaped. It is worth remembering that, after the Geneva Accords were signed in 1954, Viet Minh troops were stoned by the population in Qui Nhon, the farmers of Ho Chi Minh's home province of Nghe An revolted against their Communist overlords, and a million Vietnamese fled from Communist territory.

The national revolution was reborn in South Viet Nam when Ngo Dinh Diem placed the fate of the new nation in the people's hands in 1955. Their secret ballot elected him almost unanimously to become their President, with the mandate to hold further elections for a Constitutional Assembly which would establish a government to govern with the consent of the governed. This was a revolutionary act and the Vietnamese people rallied to the cause. Again, it is worth remembering that soon after this election, which had so roused the people to the cause of freedom, the Soviet Union sent representatives to London to meet with the representatives of the other co-sponsor of the Geneva Accords, Great Britain. The two sponsoring parties agreed to call off the

plebiscite which the Accords had scheduled to be held in 1956. An internationally supervised secret ballot in Viet Nam might well have gone heavily against the Communists at that time.

Unlike the American Revolution, the reborn national revolution in Viet Nam lost its momentum. The spirit of revolution began to be replaced by the spirit of "business as usual" and Diem became more and more shut off from the people. The Communists kept up unceasing psychological pressure to weaken the bonds between government and people, both through "character assassination" of government leaders and by means of terror. (Informed observers estimate that more than 6,000 minor Vietnamese officials, such as village elders, rural police and their families, have been murdered by the Viet Cong since 1959.) The forcible overthrow of Diem last November and the later coup in January were revolutionary acts in themselves, but appear to have been outside a national revolution at the rice-roots level, since they put the government largely into the hands of the army and the bureaucracy. While these are sizable, organized groups, they still are not the majority of the Vietnamese, the "people" among whom the Viet Cong hide and get support for their operations.

Widely shared feelings about revolution were summed up ably in a document written by the patriot Dan Van Sung, addressed to other Vietnamese nationalist leaders in July 1963. He wrote:

> Emergent nations like Viet Nam are in the midst of a political revolution. They are groping towards a new political and social order. In the process, many ideological schools may be fighting against one another. On the one side are the Communists; on the other side are grouped the Nationalists of various tendencies, each of which is still in need of development. Whether the United States likes it or not, the aid program has to take the local revolution into account because American aid is bound to affect the revolutionary course and direction in one way or another, for the benefit or the damnation of the recipient people. This gives rise to a new responsibility which, while not propounded in the implementation of the Marshall Plan, must be dealt with realistically. Within the framework of American foreign policy, anti-Communism now has a revolutionary context. The American respect for the recipient people's "self-determination" can no longer be guaranteed by a negative policy of "non-intervention" which, practically speaking, may lead to just the contrary. In order to make sure that an emergent people really control their own destiny, the United States is expected to make positive efforts helping them develop control of themselves. In other words, American aid ought to be devised so as to help their legitimate aspirations come true through the achievement of their political revolution. This cannot be done without getting to the bottom of the revolutionary situation

and taking sides in it, not only for anti-Communism but also for democracy. . . . By emphasizing anti-Communism rather than positive revolutionary goals and from lack of a better adaptation to the local situation, the United States has reduced its anti-Communist efforts in Viet Nam to the maintenance of an administrative machine and of an army. . . . The way out, to our mind, is not by an abandonment but, on the contrary, by going deep into every local revolutionary problem and helping solve them using principles of justice and freedom, and perhaps in fusing them with the revolutionary spirits of 1776.

IV

The foregoing leads to the final question of the feasibility of American help in banding the leaders, the military, the civil servants and the people of Viet Nam into a united force for freedom. This was tried by edict in the emergency national mobilization of August 1964. Yet, the sovereign Vietnamese people, even in such a time of stress, are unlike the defeated Japanese and Germans who had no choice but to submit to a rule by edict, supported by massive American advisory help throughout all echelons of government. In a revolutionary or peoples' war, such as the war in Viet Nam, where the enemy is embedded within the population, the lasting quality needed for a win is the *voluntary* action of the population in joining together with the government forces, and with the American influence coming from respect and trust earned by the spirit in which individual Americans give their help.

There is no short-cut, no magic formula, to be used in engineering a great patriotic cause led by some universally loved Vietnamese of American selection. This type of puerile romance should not be attempted in real life. Nor does it seem probable in the light of Viet Nam's recent history, despite the cheering urban crowds in all too brief moments of great emotion, that the Vietnamese themselves will find quickly and easily any revolutionary solution which will carry them all the way to victory.

At this point in time and experience, perhaps the most valuable and realistic gift that Americans can give Viet Nam is to concentrate above everything else on helping the Vietnamese leadership create the conditions which will encourage the discovery and most rapid possible development of a patriotic cause so genuine that the Vietnamese willingly will pledge to it "their lives, their fortunes, their sacred honor." Among the attributes of such a cause are that it shall give hope for a better future for each Vietnamese, that it shall provide a way for all Vietnamese

to work for it, and that it shall have such integrity that it will induce Vietnamese leaders to start trusting one another. A number of actions can be undertaken, step by step, to create the conditions required. Some of them will now be suggested.

Foremost among the specific actions open to the United States is one to help the Vietnamese stabilize their government, even in its caretaker status, so that its leaders can afford to pay less attention to protecting their backs and more to the future. It is reported that there are several Vietnamese proposals about how to do this among the present leadership. It should not be too difficult for the United States to influence the adoption, as a matter of urgency, of the proposal most acceptable to Vietnamese leaders. Its success should be ensured through American advisers counseling individual Vietnamese on how to make the project work most harmoniously for the good of all, while being alert to curtail intemperate moves toward a coup or studied disobedience.

Another important need is to help the Vietnamese make the present caretaker government just that, a temporary caretaker, in accord with the government's own expressed desire. It would seem premature to set a precise day to hold elections, such as those announced for late in 1964. The Viet Cong subversive insurgents dominate too many villages for truly free universal elections. It would seem more realistic to say that an election will be held on the date when a simple majority of the population can vote by secret ballot, free of any threat.

If democracy is ever to become established in Viet Nam, as Vietnamese patriots hope, then political leaders and political parties need encouragement to gain experience and strength. They cannot do this on the political sidelines. Some new place should be found in the government for political leaders not now included, perhaps in a new Assembly of Notables which would fill the void left by the abolition of the consultative Council of Notables. A truly practical task for such an Assembly might be for it to send out committees to check on the situation in hamlets and villages, to certify when conditions become favorable for holding a free popular election for hamlet and village officials, and then to help organize such an election. As a next step, similar procedures could open the way to elections for district chief, then province chief, and, when a majority of provinces are freed, to national elections. This program would provide a practical short-range political goal, give hope that a longer-range

goal is attainable, stimulate a healthy growth of political parties and start giving people their own government at the rice-roots in direct confrontation to the Communist idea.

Americans could add to the attractiveness of these political goals by designing our local aid program to increase social and economic progress at a more rapid pace in villages where elections have been held. The incentive of a system of reward of visible material benefits along with the political benefits of freedom should be a dynamic instrument for accelerating progress. If rewards are given when conditions are stable enough to merit them, rather than in an attempt to buy the loyalties of the people, word of this will spread rapidly throughout the country; and they will not only become a brake on Communist recruiting efforts but also put the American presence in a most favorable context.

A Vietnamese provincial official told an American friend in August that the country would be saved if each of Viet Nam's leaders "acted as though each day were his last day to live." Some form of spirited and selfless motivation for all Vietnamese in positions of authority does seem to be required. Perhaps it could be achieved through a Declaration of Liberty or other pledge to serve the country, signed in blood and providing strong penalties for failure to honor it. In any case, American advisers in all echelons, who are in daily association with Vietnamese in positions of responsibility, can encourage loyal patriotism by paying them proper respect. When American advisers express contempt for the fighting quality of the Vietnamese, as reported in our press this summer, it is a sign of the failure of such advisers to help develop the inherent quality of the Vietnamese. They might note and remember that the well-motivated "Sea Swallow" troops of Binh Hung, under Father Hoa, have fought against great odds, and that in almost constant engagements from the end of 1960 to the summer of 1964, 189 of them have been killed in actions in which 2,272 Viet Cong were killed.

The most urgent military need is to make it the number one priority for the military to *protect* and *help* the people. When the military opens fire at long range, whether by infantry weapons, artillery or air strike, on a reported Viet Cong concentration in a hamlet or village full of civilians, the Vietnamese officers who give those orders and the American advisers who let them "get away with it" are helping defeat the cause of freedom. The civilian hatred of the military resulting from such actions is a powerful motive for joining the Viet Cong.

If American leaders in Viet Nam are to make this war "a struggle for freedom on every front of human activity," and if the Americans with them are to become today's Kosciuskos, Von Steubens and Pulaskis in spirit, they should keep fresh in mind what happened in the hamlets of Tay Ninh province earlier this year, as an affront to every American doctrine, civilian or military. In Tay Ninh province, which is on the Cambodian border and not far from Saigon, two Viet Cong battalions had entered a cluster of six adjoining hamlets. They fought their way in, overwhelming and destroying the Civil Guard post, whose men stood to the last in defense of the hamlets. Once inside, the Viet Cong announced that they were going to stay for 72 hours. Then at noon the next day, A.R.V.N., the Vietnamese Army with its American advisers, arrived. A.R.V.N. deployed along a half perimeter and for 18 hours poured into these six hamlets all the firepower it could, from the ground and from the air. Meanwhile, of course, most of the Viet Cong had slipped out of the unguarded part of the perimeter, not waiting to become targets. Many of the men, women and children of the hamlets had to stay there and take it. Afterwards, survivors said they were grateful to the Viet Cong, who had made them dig foxholes.

American bounty, whether in the form of military-civic action or economic aid by U.S. civilians, cannot make up for such mistakes. Nor can it buy the friendship of the Vietnamese people. However, the U.S. military *can* give a major boost to the political effort simply by upgrading the importance they assign to military-civic action and to guiding the Vietnamese military into accepting it as a basic soldierly quality in this war, just as the Viet Cong do. Civic action means more than giving economic help; it is an attitude of behavior, an extension of military courtesy, in which the soldier citizen becomes the brotherly protector of the civilian citizen. The Viet Cong practice it, under severe penalties for misbehavior, as Point 9 of their Military Oath of Honor, which General Giap adopted from the 8th Route Army code of Mao Tse-tung known as the "Three Rules and the Eight Remarks." This code implemented the concept of the people as the water where the troops live as the fish. It must be puzzling to Communist observers to note that Americans in Viet Nam usually initiate "civic action" in the form of public works by special A.R.V.N. units and not as a performance expected of every soldier. Observers who are most experienced in insurgent

warfare believe that the Viet Cong will not be defeated until A.R.V.N. catches the spirit of civic action and practices it through all ranks.

Viet Nam is predominantly an agricultural nation, and what happens in the countryside may well determine the outcome of the war. The Communists are short of food, and the countryside is the prize which they seek above all. When American fertilizers increase by 100 percent the rice production in one season in one region, the prize becomes all the more tempting to the Communists (however galling must be the comparison with North Viet Nam, where Chinese agricultural advisers have had so many failures). But this must not impede the process of economic development. The Americans have also introduced a rudimentary coöperative method in pig raising in the northerly provinces of South Viet Nam; if it is recognized and developed to its fullest politico-economic potential, it could be the start of one of the biggest changes in Vietnamese life yet seen. The pig-raising project has brought about the formation of farmers' associations, to handle the paddy-farm end of agrarian credit from the government as well as the distribution of piglets and feed. These farmers' associations are a new form of social unit in Viet Nam. If they are encouraged to grow, and become an economic success, and begin having a voice in national affairs, strong bonds will have been created between people and leaders. This operation deserves the attention of the best American *political* thinking, along with American economic help.

The foregoing are just a sample of actions which Americans can undertake to create favorable conditions for the emergence of a powerful Vietnamese "cause." If devotion to a true revolutionary cause can bring the struggle in South Viet Nam to a favorable climax, its revolutionary appeal might eventually spread to the people of North Viet Nam, wounding Communism at its most vital point—Communism's control of the masses.

Whatever course the war in Viet Nam takes, Americans will do well to remember the importance of "Nguoi Thuong Dan," the symbolic Vietnamese. It is the name the Vietnamese give to "the man in the street," the rice-paddy farmer, the shopkeeper, the artisan—the citizen. He is the key piece in the whole war in Viet Nam, both its subject and its object, the pawn and in an ultimate sense the decider. There is still time for Americans to help him determine rightly the fate of his country.

SOVIET POLICY IN THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

By Philip E. Mosely

THE recent journey of Nikita Khrushchev to the United Arab Republic, and the more extensive travels of Chou En-lai to Asian and African countries, have pointed up the new context of an old dilemma of Soviet and, more generally, of Communist policy. Should Communists-in-power give vigorous political, economic and strategic backing to non-Communist and nationalist régimes in order to strengthen them and thus weaken the "imperialist bloc?" Or will this strategy lead, through the development of effective non-Communist régimes, to blocking the spread of Communism? Or would it be more profitable in the long run for Moscow and Peking to direct their support only to avowed or potential supporters of Communist doctrine and revolutions?

The Western philosophy of aid to newly independent countries rests on the assumption that nationalist régimes, preferably with a strong emphasis on economic and cultural development, offer to "new" or "old-new" nations the best and probably the only workable alternative to Communism. And this assumption has recently received unexpected support from the Chinese Communist leadership in its polemics with Moscow, even though its day-to-day practice is not very different from the Soviet one.

From the beginning of Soviet rule in Russia the question of the proper posture toward developing countries called for an urgent answer. Faced by the same dilemma as Khrushchev confronts today, Lenin gave different answers in different situations, but from 1921 he opted for a cautious policy of support for nationalist but non-Communist régimes. In the "semi-colonial" (an adjective now discarded in favor of "developing") countries it was essential, he maintained, to strengthen the forces of national independence even though, according to Marxist terminology, they were working for "bourgeois" revolutions. This policy, Lenin asserted, would help undermine the economic foundations of imperialism through depriving the metropoles of markets and investments, and would speed the progress of awakening countries from "feudalism" into and through the stage of "bourgeois-democratic" revolution.

Lenin's decision, however distasteful to his revolutionary hopes, to strengthen Kemalist Turkey even while it was crushing the embryonic Communist Party of Turkey, was a realistic one. Soviet Russia was too weak and poor to offer an attractive model of development, and the security of the Soviet state called for strengthening nationalist régimes in Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan as buffers against a revival of British control or influence.

A similar dilemma has confronted Moscow since the Nineteenth Party Congress of October 1952, which foreshadowed the opening of a new political offensive in developing countries. At that Congress Stalin's spokesmen abandoned the post-1945 dogma which divided the world into two "camps," and pictured a tripartite division: the "imperialists," the Communist bloc of "peace and socialism," and a third grouping of developing and largely uncommitted countries. The future shape of the world would, they insisted, be settled when the Communist bloc had succeeded in winning the third of these groupings to its side and in isolating the "imperialists." The same tripartite concept governs Soviet—and Chinese Communist—strategy today, even though they clash sharply over methods and tactics.

In seeking to enhance its influence in the underdeveloped continents, the Soviet Union of today has a vast range of advantages over the Russia of Lenin's time, as well as over Communist China. It has been putting those advantages to use with growing boldness and flexibility, though not without some hesitations and setbacks. Its policy has encountered a new and unforeseen set of complications in the rival challenge raised by Peking, which is straining every fiber to expel both Western and Soviet influences from the shaping of the "third world" and to establish its eventual primacy there.

II

One of the main issues between Moscow and Peking is the quarrel about the nature of the transition from national-democratic revolutions, usually equipped with programs of social and economic reform, into "socialist," or Communist-type, régimes. Between the cautious turn to a more active policy at the Nineteenth Party Congress, and the nuclear confrontation of October 1962, Soviet ideologists had elaborated a new concept, which has been useful to them in explaining and justifying their more flexible approach.

They did this by inserting into the Marxist-Leninist schema a new category, that of "national democracy," to bridge the gap in Communist theory between the earlier stage of bourgeois-nationalist revolution and the more distant one of building socialism. In this transitional stage, which may be relatively brief or prolonged under differing circumstances, the "national democracies" are expected to cut themselves loose step by step from the imperialist system and move steadily closer to the socialist camp. Thus the policies of a "national democracy" are supposed, perhaps without any dramatic conflicts or shocks, to take on more and more of a socialist content, until one fine day its citizens would discover that they had already entered the more advanced stage of "building the foundations of socialism."

The steps recommended by Moscow include all or most of the following: nationalization of all foreign-owned enterprises, to be followed eventually by the expropriation of all local manifestations of capitalism; rejection of "imperialist" aid and reliance on Moscow's "disinterested" assistance; agrarian reform, followed eventually by the creation of large-scale state-run farms to replace peasant ownership; elimination of "imperialist lackeys" from political leadership, and the creation of one-party systems, within which organized Communist parties would, however, remain free to press for their own policies and to seek power.

Moscow's first candidates for the title of "national democracies" were Castro's Cuba and Lumumba's Congo, but each in different ways failed to fit into the ready-made category contrived for it. For many months Moscow's pronouncements seemed to be urging Fidel Castro to be satisfied with the rank of leader of a national democracy. However, Castro refused very early to settle down in this halfway house. He insisted, months ahead of Moscow's express approval, that his régime was already engaged in building socialism and should therefore be granted the status due to a member of the socialist camp.

Quite apart from the dangerous crisis of October 1962, with its unfavorable repercussions on his hopes and prestige, Castro has not found it easy to steer an even course between Peking and Moscow. The Fidelist model for revolutions in Latin America is in closer harmony with Peking's militant formula of "uninterrupted revolution" than with Moscow's gradualist prescriptions, such as those issued to Communists in Chile, Brazil, Peru and elsewhere in Latin America. Yet the survival of the Castro

régime requires powerful strategic and economic support from the Soviet Union and its East European allies.

Neither Havana nor Peking could have been happy over *Pravda's* featuring (July 17, 1964) the decision of the Venezuelan "Revolutionary Movement of the Left," as announced by its General Secretary, Americo Chacón, to shift toward the Moscow line. "The party . . .," he declared, "condemns the dogmatism of the leaders of the Communist Party of China . . ." and has decided ". . . to correct the mistakes that have been committed under the influence of the dogmatists." Whether or not this change of line would stick, its public adoption exposed some of the strains that have arisen between Havana and Moscow, as well as between Peking and Moscow. Perhaps Castro's offer, in late July, to cease his support for armed insurrections in Latin America, in return for concessions by the United States, was a last-minute effort to claim credit for a Moscow-imposed change of Havana's line.

In the Congo of 1960 the first round of national democracy, under Patrice Lumumba, brought fewer risks than in Cuba, but far greater disappointments to Moscow, as evidenced in Khrushchev's shoe-pounding in the United Nations General Assembly. Still, nothing seems very predictable in Congolese affairs, and in the new round of turbulence in 1964 the Chinese Communist formula of incessant attack has made great headway against both Western hopes and Soviet ambitions. Some Soviet policy-makers may yet regret the failure, to which they contributed a good deal, of the U.N. action to provide an orderly transition of the Congo to unity and effective self-government.

Moscow's favored concept and practice of national democracy has been bitterly attacked by Peking. Moscow, Mao's spokesmen say, has allied itself with "anti-popular" (*i.e.* anti-Communist) rulers. It sits by while they execute "honest revolutionaries," simply for the sake of currying favor with actively or potentially anti-Communist régimes. In a somewhat more realistic vein, Peking argues that, if nationalist-reformist régimes succeed in their aims of national development, they will thereby bar the path to Communist rule, perhaps for a long time to come.

Ever since Lenin's day, Communist theory and Communist analyses of successful and unsuccessful revolutions have placed special emphasis on identifying the "weakest link" in the "chain" of imperialism and on deciding with what groups and forces

Communists should seek alliances, pending the day when they become strong enough to seize and hold a monopoly of power. To Moscow it is now clear, after some hesitations, that Soviet support can profitably be given to nationalist régimes, provided this strengthens them against Western Europe and the United States, and provided it also brings these régimes into closer alignment with major Soviet policies. Peking, on the other hand, maintains that conditions are fast ripening for Communist seizure of power in a good many of the developing countries, which can thereby move rapidly into the stage of building socialism and into close coöperation with the Peking center of militant revolution, the lawful heir of Marxism-Leninism. On the contrary, to strengthen the bourgeois régimes of today in such countries, Peking insists, can only confuse, weaken and even destroy the forces of genuine or socialist revolution.

The differences between Moscow and Peking are, of course, overstated by the polemicists, as they strive to score Marxist-Leninist points off their rivals. If anything, Khrushchev has spoken out more sharply than Chou En-lai against the real or alleged persecution of Communists by several of the governments to which the Soviet Union has been rendering large-scale aid. Published accounts of Chou's visit to the United Arab Republic, for example, contain no references to any protests against the treatment of local Communist groups, perhaps because the Egyptian Communists, disregarding the militant Peking line, have constantly been offering their "loyal" coöperation to Nasser, as the Communists in Algeria have promised theirs to Ben Bella.

In his speeches in Egypt and Moscow, Khrushchev stepped close to, or even beyond, the limits of what is permitted in relations between independent states:

> There was a time [he said] when Communists were arrested and imprisoned for their activities. The leaders of the United Arab Republic told us that this is no longer the case. It must be assumed that the persecution of Communists is a thing of the past. . . . It is necessary to realize that there are no more steadfast fighters for progress and socialism than the Communists.

Just what role will be permitted to avowed Communists within Nasser's newly created single party, the Arab Socialist Union, will presumably be determined by the degree of ideological and political discipline that the new party can achieve and by its success or failure in forestalling Communist boring from within.

III

How many varieties of non-Communist "socialism" can the Kremlin approve or even tolerate without undermining the unity of Communist action? This issue will certainly take up a good deal of time in the meetings of Communist parties, which the Soviet party has set for December 15, 1964, in preparation for calling a world congress of parties in 1965. The problem of whether or not to approve various doctrines of non-Communist socialism outside the Soviet bloc has important implications for Moscow's ability to manage the increasingly divergent trends within the bloc.

Khrushchev has renounced the practices of the "bad old days," when Stalin freely changed the programs and tactics of foreign parties and appointed and dismissed their leaders more or less at will. Since 1957 Moscow has explicitly renounced this powerful prerogative, perhaps more from necessity than from conviction. It has tolerated marked deviations of the Jugoslav and Polish parties, and it has shown itself unmistakably eager to contain the ideological wanderings of the Rumanian party within the fold of Communist unity.

This dramatic change has, however, not resolved the underlying dilemma. Moscow says that each party must henceforth choose its own leadership and define its program. At the same time it insists that the Soviet party has the greatest power and experience, and therefore the greatest responsibility, and therefore all parties should work in basic harmony with its policies. In his tortuous dealings with Communist parties abroad, as in some aspects of his domestic reforms, Khrushchev is pursuing the mirage of "voluntary unanimity." In contrast, Peking shows no doubt of its own right to be the sole judge of Communist orthodoxy and aims to become the single center of decision for all Communist parties. In this respect, at least, Mao Tse-tung does claim all of Stalin's mantle!

Outside the realm of Communist writ, Soviet doctrine has likewise wavered a good deal on the acceptability of Arab, African and other non-Communist varieties of socialism. In the first stage of its new policy, between 1955 and 1960, at a time when the Soviet Government was actively seeking access to, and good will among, the developing countries, Soviet ideologists were still keeping up a drumfire of warnings against various forms

of "petty-bourgeois" and "utopian" socialism, while holding aloft the banner of "scientific socialism."

Then, between 1960 and 1962 a substantial swing took place. Increasingly, Soviet analysts stressed the partial merits of "Arab" and similar socialisms. Though far from the "perfection" of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine, nevertheless these "anti-capitalist" programs marked a break with the imperialists and a step toward rejecting the bourgeois path of development—a shift away from the colonialist bloc and toward alignment with the Communist states. The petty-bourgeois trends of these platforms would, they predicted, be replaced gradually, under the pressure of national needs and changes in the balance of world power, by a more and more Marxist-Leninist content. Under the pressure of their peoples' unsatisfied needs, the new leaders would learn to "think in Marxist-Leninist style" even without themselves being aware of the change.

Since late 1963 Soviet comments on national democracy have reflected a less sanguine mood. In his speeches in Egypt and on his return to Moscow, Khrushchev's statements showed a more somber emphasis on the inevitability of sharp struggle and class warfare, rather than relying on a smooth, almost automatic progress through the stage of national democracy. To his hosts' discomfiture, Khrushchev laid renewed stress on the two-stage concept of revolution. The first stage, which had begun in Egypt in 1952, had, he said, been carried out with the participation of "all national forces," including "the representatives of national capital and part of the feudal landowners, who were not opposed to driving out the British invaders and to the overthrow of the venal royal régime." Since then, Khrushchev went on to explain in the tone of a patient schoolmaster addressing his rather backward pupils, Egypt has entered "the second stage of the development of the revolution, when the nationalization of major industrial and commercial enterprises and banks has begun . . ., when agrarian reforms and other social measures are being implemented. . . ." President Nasser may have been surprised to learn that nationalization and agrarian reform had only "begun" at this late stage.

Khrushchev then came to his main point: The second stage of the revolution ". . . is characterized by the inevitable clash of the interests of the toilers and the interests of the exploiters. . . ." In addition, Khrushchev made repeated attacks on the concept

of Arab unity. To Khrushchev's most outspoken attack, delivered at the site of the Aswan Dam, against the goal of Arab unity and in favor of an alliance of "workers, peasants, intelligentsia" against "exploiters," Nasser made a conciliatory parry, stressing that "freedom, socialism, unity" were the goals sought.

It is not clear how far Nasser was impressed by Khrushchev's appeals for a more militant policy against "exploiters," domestic and foreign, and just what practical lessons he may draw from this massive dose of Marxist-Leninist exhortation. Traditional Arab courtesy toward an honored guest would explain his reserve. In any event, perhaps with one eye to his exposed Chinese flank, Khrushchev firmly avoided issuing a seal of purity to Arab socialism. In his Moscow report of May 27, he referred with precise wording to "the fact that the United Arab Republic has proclaimed that it is entering upon the path of socialist development" (without himself endorsing that assertion), and added that this fact is, "of course, a joy to us Soviet people."

In another striking thought, which he expressed at Aswan and Moscow, Khrushchev drew a clear line between two groups of recipients of Soviet aid. "It has been correctly said here that the Soviet Union renders assistance without any political conditions. But I shall say frankly that we take great satisfaction in rendering aid to countries that are embarking on the path of socialist construction." This vigorous nudge was a reminder to Nasser's régime not only to proclaim socialism as its goal, but to accept the Soviet dictum that ". . . the only correct path for the toiling people is the path of socialist construction."

The Kremlin's greater caution in giving even a rhetorical approval to non-Soviet varieties of socialism may be due to a number of factors. In recent months Moscow has been perturbed by the insistence of the Rumanian party leaders on pursuing the specific interests of their own régime, at the expense of the Soviet hope of promoting closer coöperation and division of labor within the COMECON grouping. The wholehearted rehabilitation of Tito's party, in defiance of Peking's anathema, has led, for the first time since the Moscow-Belgrade reconciliation of 1955, to a marked expansion in Jugoslav influence within other Communist régimes in East Central Europe, and even to some heartburnings over Jugoslavia's advantageous situation as a country that is both Communist and non-aligned.

Because Jugoslavia survived Stalin's attacks, because Tito has been repeatedly wooed by the Kremlin, because it is an influential member of the loose grouping of non-aligned countries, Jugoslavia's influence in world affairs is much greater than its intrinsic strength. Her position suggests to other countries, within and without the Soviet bloc, the advantages of avoiding too much dependence on any one major power. In its broad emphasis on anti-imperialism, national liberation and economic development, Jugoslavia's policies are, of course, Communist in concept. Yet in the day-to-day give-and-take of international politics Jugoslavia also illustrates the virtues of "active non-alignment," of rejecting military blocs, and retaining a genuine freedom of initiative.

In its efforts to win over non-aligned countries, the Kremlin uses various forms of political flattery. The title "Comrade" was, for example, bestowed rather ostentatiously on President Ben Bella in the course of his triumphal journey through the Soviet Union. This term is, of course, applied also to Socialists, but only on occasions when they arouse "comradely" feelings or hopes in the Kremlin leaders. In reporting Ben Bella's meetings with Khrushchev in Egypt, be it noted, the Soviet press dropped this title, presumably to avoid drawing a distinction between his position and Nasser's in the Soviet roll of honor.

A more unusual gesture has been made in the past two years or so toward several one-party but non-Communist states—Ghana, Guinea, Mali. All three ruling parties have been represented, along with numerous Communist parties, at congresses and conferences of the Soviet Communist Party. While all three governments have embraced Soviet aid and have supported certain Soviet positions, it would still seem premature for Moscow to bestow on them honorary membership in the Soviet bloc.

IV

Outwardly clearcut, Peking's attitude toward the very diverse members of the "third world" in fact presents many contradictions. Mao's spokesmen accuse Moscow of allying itself with the "national bourgeoisie" against the true bearers of proletarian revolution. Yet it was Mao who coined the "four classes" definition of the revolutionary front, in which he included "national" capitalists, in contrast to the "compradore" bourgeoisie, which he rejected as agents of foreign imperialism. Perhaps Mao resents

Moscow's skill in stealing a page out of his own revolutionary manual! Similarly, it was Mao who popularized the vivid formula, "Fight, talk, fight, talk, fight!" which is a parallel to Lenin's "One step back, two steps forward!" But now Mao calls for "uninterrupted revolution," for unrelenting pressure against the "imperialists," while Khrushchev has borrowed the Chinese tactic of alternating attack with negotiation.

Chou En-lai's visits to important governments of non-aligned countries had a different flavor from Khrushchev's. Chou emphasized the common interest in opposing the "colonialists," but published reports gave no hint of the free-swinging Party-style advice with which Khrushchev was so lavish during his stay in Egypt. Thus Chou's speeches left the impression of a rigidly "correct" or state-to-state approach, based, in accordance with traditional Communist doctrine, on defining a temporary parallelism of interests, not on any hope for the early change of national democracies to the stage of "building socialism."

Chou was also pursuing, of course, an immediate goal—that of excluding the Soviet Union from the forthcoming Second Congress of Asian and African Countries. At the preparatory meeting in Djakarta, Chen Yi, Peking's Minister of Foreign Affairs, insisted that the Soviet Union was not an Asian power and therefore could not be invited. In a strong rebuttal of May 5, the Kremlin rejected this line of argument and once again accused the Chinese Communist Party of stirring up racialist emotions in order to seize the banner role in the struggle for "national liberation."

Peking aims, of course, to be the only great power within an Afro-Asian grouping. Moscow's absence from the first Bandung Conference, together with the fears that have been aroused in Asia by Peking's militant posture, may well lead to a Soviet defeat on this issue, to which it has committed a great deal of prestige. To avert this, if possible, Moscow has been exerting pressure on India, Ceylon, Burma and Indonesia, and in Egypt Khrushchev pressed Nasser openly to back the Soviet claim.

One of the main issues between Moscow and Peking has been the argument over the nature of peaceful coexistence and the role of force. Peking accuses Moscow of fearing and rejecting not only nuclear war but also wars of liberation. It does so in order to press its own claim to sole leadership of Communism. In response the Soviet leadership has constantly stressed its dual

approach: caution toward nuclear war, strong support for wars of national liberation. The traditional distinction was reaffirmed by Khrushchev in a speech of July 9:

> . . . When I say we are against war, I have in mind aggressive, predatory wars. But there are other wars, wars of national liberation, when oppressed peoples rise in struggle against their oppressors, the colonialists and imperialists. We consider such wars just and sacred. We support the peoples who take up arms in defense of their independence and freedom. And we support them not only in words but with concrete deeds.

Thus, between Moscow and Peking there is at bottom no real difference in basic doctrine, but mainly a disagreement over the uses to which Communist power should be put. Each remains committed to promote the "national liberation" of oppressed peoples. Each remains free to choose the time, occasion and extent of that assistance, in accordance with its own appraisal of interests and risks.

V

The Soviet leadership is groping with a many-faceted dilemma in its commitment to capture the aspirations and hopes of the developing countries. Massive programs of economic aid, military support and political backing have brought gains in some countries, none of them so far decisive, as well as some rebuffs and setbacks. Major beneficiaries of Soviet aid, such as the United Arab Republic, Iraq, Afghanistan, India and Algeria, pursue their own paths of reform and seek to strengthen a posture of non-alignment that sets them apart from both the West and the Soviet Union.

Figures on new Soviet aid commitments—not aid actually delivered—record a striking return since late 1963 to a more active policy. New commitments, which reached the equivalent of nearly $1 billion in 1959, dropped sharply in 1960, and were negligible in 1961, 1962 and the first half of 1963. These figures do not take account of the unpublished costs of the support Moscow has given Castro's Cuba since 1960, and it is possible that between early 1961 and mid-1963 the burden of Cuba's needs made the Soviet leaders reluctant to take on large new commitments elsewhere. In addition, since there is a long lag in Soviet aid programs, as in United States development programs, between promise and fulfillment, the Kremlin may well have preferred to complete some of its outstanding commitments

before taking on any new ones, especially to the same recipients.

Since 1962 and the Cuban missile crisis, Soviet propaganda has placed less emphasis on its concept of national democracy as a convenient ideological and political bridge between its own goals and those of the developing countries. Instead, it has placed a renewed stress on the role of "struggle" in advancing to the stage of building socialism. It seems less optimistic about the prospect of making early and important political gains. Its policy-makers appear more aware of the truly limited leverage provided by outside aid and even outside pressure.

At the very time when the Soviet perspective in the struggle to win over the developing countries to its side has been lengthened and complicated by more intimate contact with real life, the Kremlin has also had to face up to a sharpening challenge posed by Peking to its assumptions, its programs and its methods. At times the Soviet leaders seem almost as troubled and uncertain as Western ones about the course the tumultuous wave of national awakening may take. In this more complex world the ritualistic repetition of Marxist-Leninist formulas has not given the Kremlin any clear or new answer to this old dilemma.

THE IMPORTANCE OF BEING BLACK

An Asian Looks at Africa

By Frank Moraes

AFRICA poses a challenge largely because of its unpredictability. The Dark Continent, to some extent the Unknown Continent, it has come up politically with a rush; the postwar fever for independence catapulted some 30 states into freedom within a decade. Culturally, vast tracts of Africa have leaped from the Stone Age to the twentieth century in a matter of three generations. Growing industrialization in the cities and towns between the two wars and after has led to a migration from the bush to the developing urban centers which has affected not only the economic but the social and political values of the African; uprooted from his tribal moorings and exposed to a new way of life, thought and civilization, he finds himself embarked on a voyage of rediscovery which concerns not only his individual self but his people and country.

If the African's voice on attaining freedom and equality has seemed to some unnecessarily shrill and strident, who can blame him? Men who climb out of a dark void are dazzled by the light. The speed of Africa's lightning advance and arrival took the rest of the world by surprise. It also surprised Africa. In their attitude to that continent and its people both Europe and Asia are afflicted by a guilt complex—Europe as the main exploiter and Asia as its abettor; and both of them, recovering from the first rude shock, do not know quite where to fit in the new arrival who until yesterday was an outsider. They wonder whether all the rules of the game are applicable to him. And Africa, uncertain of its own place, tends to draw attention to itself by alternately bawling like a neglected infant or, in its adult moments, treading deliberately on other people's toes or, more aggressively, punching the nearest nose within reach. While Africa regards the West as being unduly complacent, the West accuses Africa of being unnecessarily truculent. Asia's heart is with Africa though her head is often more inclined to the West.

Not all the norms common to Europe and Asia apply to Africa, which, purposeful in mind, is often willful and wayward in method. Hence the developing image of an unpredictable Africa. Like the Jews, the Africans have found their Zion, and the ques-

tion arises—pertinent to the African but not to the Jew—whether the race-consciousness which now understandably permeates him may not some day explode into aggressive racialism. Vis-à-vis the rest of the world, Africa today seems to present a front which is more competitive than coöperative—again an understandable trend because of the tremendous lag the African feels he has to make up.

Pan-Africanism is an expression of race consciousness, but *négritude* veers dangerously close to the concept of racialism. Perhaps it would be more correct to say that while Pan-Africanism poses the political face, négritude presents the emotional face of the same coin which is African-ness. The feeling engendered in the African by years of oppressive brutality, exploitation and subjection to the notion that he represents "just the tail-end of the human race" has naturally created in him an obsession to lord it over others. He is both dual and ambivalent. The duality is seen in the strangeness felt and expressed by many sensitive American Negroes when transplanted to the Africa of their forefathers; the ambivalence surfaces in the educated African's love for and questioning of his own culture along with his simultaneous rejection and acceptance of Western culture. This duality and ambivalence, induced partly by environment and partly by history, account for much of the African's unpredictability. A prominent Nigerian has expressed the average African feeling: "Blackism is the answer to our problems."

Thus Africa presents a challenge to the rest of the world with a sort of inverted *Herrenvolk* cult. It stresses the importance of being black in its most exuberant and uninhibited form. Yet the attitude bristles with contradictions, for whereas négritude owes much to the French-speaking African who also admires French culture and lays great store by the French association, it is looked at askance by most English-speaking Africans who are often aggressively assertive in denouncing British political institutions and ideas. To the South African writer, Ezekiel Mphahlele, négritude is "just so much airy intellectual talk. . . . Imagine a Chinaman waking up one morning and shouting in the streets that he has discovered something Chinese in his sculpture or painting or music."

Chauvinism, in its many manifestations, is common to the human race. But in the emancipated Africa of today it takes shapes which often puzzle and sometimes repel the European

and Asian, stressing as it does color as the dividing line, and adding the minatory promise that the oppressed will soon inherit the earth. Over 60 years ago, at the first Pan-African Congress in London in 1900, Dr. W. E. B. Du Bois, who died in Ghana in August 1963 aged 95, prophetically proclaimed the nature of the battle. "The problem of the twentieth century," he declared, "is the problem of the color line—the relation of the darker to the lighter races of men in Asia and Africa, in America and the islands of the sea." Whether Du Bois is proved right depends as much on the darker as on the lighter races of men today.

While older historians, anthropologists and sociologists like Charles Seligman and Reginald Coupland pooh-pooh the African as a savage whose history begins only with his exposure to European civilization, more modern and sympathetic observers of the African scene, notably Basil Davidson and Harold Isaacs, recognize that his cultural roots are longer and deeper and not necessarily as derivative as the "Hamite hypothesis" suggests. The seaboard cities of Kilwa and Malindi cannot be written off as Arab contributions in which Africans had no share and which they merely appropriated as part of a civilized veneer. Else, how explain the mysteries of the pillared splendors of Husuni Kubwa, that medieval palace poised on the edge of the Indian Ocean, or the scattered ruins of the city of Engaruka in the recesses of Tanganyika? Like Hinduism, Africanism has a strong assimilative pull evidenced by its adaptation of Arab cultural influences in the Swahili tongue and civilization. Granted that Africans are often juvenile to the point of being infantile in their reactions and manifestations; but is this surprising, against their background of slavery, ostracism and oppression which has intensified their inferiority complex, leading them to regard as naturally inherent what has in fact been artificially imposed?

The brand of slavery survives like the mark of Cain. Because of his appearance and color, which he has been taught to regard as attributes of the helot, the African's race-consciousness has its roots in color-consciousness, once furtive and ashamed, but now often proudly arrogant. Even a light-skinned Negro like the poet Langston Hughes, who is of mixed descent, flaunts "blackism" like a banner:

> I am a Negro
> Black like the night is black,
> Black like the depths of my Africa.

The sense of differentness assails a European and, frankly, even an Asian in the presence of an African. As Africans become more and more part of the social and political landscape, this sense of differentness will dim and must in time disappear. But to deny its presence is to be deviously evasive. An English observer writing in *The Times* (London) of June 25, 1962, remarks on the sudden turnabout in African attitudes which bewilder, confuse and exasperate the stranger. "Mr. Mboya," he notes, "can within the space of a few weeks deliver a challenge to Europeans in Nairobi, a revolutionary call in Cairo, a reasoned analysis of Kenya's constitutional difficulties in London and a human appeal for help in New York. . . . President Nkrumah attacked the United Kingdom last year for sending a warship to Angola, yet the British Government received private assurances from Ghana which seemed to render the attack harmless. . . . One is left holding the broken pieces which somehow have to be fitted into an intelligible pattern."

The same observer suggests that the explanation for this pattern of peculiar behavior is that, while all utterances in all parts of the world are conditioned by the circumstances in which they are made, in Africa the conditioning is not controlled. It stems from a habit of mental indiscipline born of the colonial hangover, of uncontrolled personal ambition and of the triple continental curse—poverty, ignorance and disease. Africa is afflicted by its own special type of behavior common to all cloistered communities, such as Communist China and Russia, which have their own yardsticks of behavior applicable to an insulated society. As *The Times* correspondent comments: "The conference table in Lancaster House and the African political scene are as far removed from each other as Bernard Shaw and a No play."

The African's exuberance fortifies the foreign belief that a certain untamed wildness characterizes him. Yet among themselves African politicians differ as sharply as their counterparts elsewhere, nourishing their own moderates and militants. Thus the Nigerian Prime Minister, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, has little or nothing in common with Kenya's Oginga Odinga and differs even from a moderate like President Senghor in not sharing a belief in the African Personality. In his modes of thinking Balewa intrinsically is no different from any European politician of similar stature save that his emphasis is naturally on his African-ness though not on négritude, whereas the European's

interests are primarily European. The vital question, however, is: Does Africa possess enough Balewas to hold her together within a sober framework? A South African has sourly observed: "The layer of cream at the top of the bottle is too thin." The remark unfortunately has some justification.

II

Political systems, like individuals, are conditioned by circumstances. A question often posed by the constitutional pundits is whether democracy as practiced in the West has a future in Africa, or for that matter in Asia. Most of the postwar independent governments in both continents, while protesting their allegiance to democratic principles, have veered far from democratic practice as expressed constitutionally in elected legislatures, the two-party system, a cabinet and an independent judiciary.

Both in Asia and Africa the trend toward a one-party, single-leader state is developing, the second following consequentially from the first; for with the emergence of a one-party state the legislature is at a discount and, with the weakening of the legislature, power tends to pass not necessarily to the executive but to the individual who dominates the executive. Hence a single-leader state seems a natural corollary to a one-party state. This is happening conspicuously in Africa, but also in Asia.

There are many reasons for this, some of them applicable to both continents. In Africa as in Asia colonial governments have generally yielded power under the pressure of a single nationalist party which on the attainment of freedom carries with it the aura of national fervor, sacrifice and suffering. Contrariwise, those parties which oppose it are labeled ingrates, anti-nationalists and reactionaries. In a small minority of independent states in Africa multi-party systems exist, but with the possible exception of Nigeria the opposition is nowhere evident in any strength; and even in Nigeria the strength of the coalition government tends to coalesce and grow at the cost of the parties or groups ranged against it. The presence of more than one party in Nigeria derives largely from its federal structure which is demonstrated in the highly regional character of the various parties.

The same state of affairs prevails to a considerable extent in Asia where virtual dictatorships masquerade as "guided" or "controlled democracies." Indonesia and Pakistan fall in this category, while Burma and Thailand are for all practical pur-

poses military dictatorships. In Ceylon, the parliamentary system exists on paper with the island really under the control of an oligarchy of the Left. India enjoys democracy poised on a razor's edge, dependent as it has been for many years on one party and a single leader faced by only a nominal and divided opposition. But the force of institutional democracy is stronger in India than in other Asian countries, as evidenced by the loosening grip of the party in power and the growing militancy of the opposition.

A striking parallel which suggests itself to an Indian is that between the old village *panchayat* and the old African tribal council, both of which have subconsciously molded constitutional concepts. Common to these two systems is the idea that decisions should be arrived at by discussion and not through force, by a consensus of opinion rather than by the numerical measuring of strength as between majority opinion and the minority. In this context, a formal opposition becomes unnecessary. A feature of the tribal council, as of the village panchayat in India, is (to adapt the words of the late Prime Minister Sylvanus Olympio of Togoland) that minority opinion should be allowed to express itself within the party without intimidation; in other words, opinion may be freely expressed within the party, group or council, the ultimate decision representing a consensus of opinion. Like the Indian village headman, the African tribal chief rarely enjoyed or exercised the sanction of force behind him. In both cases, what counted was the moral voice of the community as a whole as expressed collectively by the panchayat or tribal council.

In my journeyings through Africa I was often faced with this challenge by African acquaintances who defended the one-party system. The parallel between the panchayat and the tribal council then struck me forcefully. Was it possible, I wondered, that the way of political thinking of many Asians and Africans was conditioned by their separate but in some ways similar backgrounds? Why should they slavishly copy and adopt Western institutions when the rule of law which is the core of democracy could be equally respected and safeguarded in other forms? As the Africans also argued, the West had itself given different shapes to democratic institutions, and they pointed to the familiar example of the difference in the division of powers between the judiciary, legislature and executive in the United States and in Britain. Women have not the right to vote in

certain democratic countries and the right is often circumscribed in various ways by property and educational qualifications in others. Some elections to legislatures were direct, others indirect. "Why," they demanded, "should Africans be expected to accept Western institutional forms of democracy? We believe in democracy, but in a democracy which suits our conditions and background. So long as we lay store by the values of democracy, how do the forms matter?"

Judging from the utterances and writings of various African intellectuals, these values theoretically conform to Western norms for they postulate: firstly, respect for the rule of law; secondly, respect for fundamental freedoms; and thirdly, the presence of a representative body. "An organized opposition is not an essential element," writes President Nyerere of Tanganyika in defending one-party democracy, and his opinion is supported by an Asian, no less a man than U Thant, Secretary-General of the United Nations. "The notion that democracy requires the existence of an organized Opposition to the government of the day is not valid," he affirms. "Democracy requires only freedom for opposition, not necessarily its organized existence."

Happily, not all Africans or Asians subscribe to these views which are based on a series of assumptions collectively expressed by Nyerere in the omnibus phrase: "Democracy is a declaration of faith in human nature." This is a large assumption which begs the question: "Faith in whose human nature—that of an omnipotent individual or that of a responsible, responsive, representative body?" The Africans who are opposed to the one-party system come significantly from the more forward-looking southern regions of Nigeria and include the former Governor-General and present President, Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, and his political opponent, now languishing in jail, Chief Obafemi Awolowo, once leader of the opposition Action Group.

Africans and Asians who insist that democracy can exist without a party system forget that without the existence of an opposition or of alternative parties the average citizen is left to the perpetual rule of one party, which in practice usually spells one dominating leader. In a comparatively orderly community, his disappearance from the scene usually leads to group rule, or in a disorganized community to disorder which may culminate in chaos ending in the emergence again of a dominating figure. The French Revolution produced Napoleon, industrial strife gave

Mussolini his opportunity, the futilities of the Weimar Republic brought Hitler to power. If the rule of law has a purpose, it is the avoidance of personal power, and the canalizing of power through institutions which provide curbs or limits on the executive.

To a country fighting for its freedom, multiple parties are a luxury since they divide and dissipate nationalist strength. Apologists for the one-party, one-leader state carry the argument further by contending that this system is necessary for a decade or so after independence if a united nation is to be welded out of freedom. Africans often argue that a multiplicity of parties intensifies and consolidates tribal divisions. Similarly, many Asians affirm that a single party makes for national cohesiveness. The argument is plausible and would be justifiable if within a single-party state the values of democracy, quite apart from its institutional forms, were able to thrive. But Asian and African experience proves the contrary. Democracy under such a system tends to wither and wilt. Despotisms are built and survive only through one sanction—force. And force, visible or invisible, is the negation of democracy.

The rule of law, emanating from a single person, can, despite the veneer of a consensus of general opinion, make nonsense of fundamental freedoms and representative assemblies. While the latter in such circumstances represent no more than the will of an individual, the former depend for their scope and magnitude on his whims. Respect for the human personality, which is the essence of democracy, is thereby transmogrified into reverence for an individual. The difference between the Indian village panchayat and the African tribal council on the one hand and a modern legislature or senate on the other is more than a difference in form, for it affects the substance and spirit of democracy as that term is commonly understood. The African argument that separate parties tend to intensify tribal divisions is based on the assumption that a party must necessarily be organized on strictly tribal lines. The argument loses its validity in the context of the tribal council which, if anything, offers greater encouragement to fissiparous divisions than the party system. Nor is it easy to reconcile this attitude with the cry for one-man one-vote which most Africans identify with democracy. The tribal council like the village panchayat has its place and use in an essentially rural society. It is incongruous and anomalous in the developing urban social structure of today.

III

Is authoritarian government essential for rapid economic growth in a society with precarious political moorings? If one applies Walt Rostow's formula which envisages economic growth in five stages, a large part of backward Africa is still in the first stage—that of a traditional rural society. There are, however, some African territories such as Nigeria, Ghana and the Ivory Coast which are in the second formative stage preparatory to the "take-off." The take-off stage is generally reached by the modernization of industry, which calls for considerable capital formation, and Africa is in no position to achieve this without drastically stepping up her agricultural output. In a backward, developing society such as exists in most parts of the continent, this cannot be done on a basis of private enterprise but needs government support and intervention supplemented by foreign aid, investment and technical know-how. It does not, however, demand detailed, centralized planning on the Soviet model but can be achieved as effectively, if not better, on the Japanese model. Japan is a sound guide for Africa since, like Africa, it lacked at one time the necessary capital formation for the take-off and set about creating it with intensified agricultural output and increased returns from business enterprise. During the Meiji era, which lasted from 1868 to 1912, Japan built herself into a modern state by adopting the industrial and commercial techniques of the West and adjusting them to suit her particular needs and resources. Production per person in agriculture doubled. This was done largely by piecemeal planning with improvisations as one progressed, and not by wholesale collectivization. It is wrong to believe that collectivization on the Soviet or Chinese models accelerates agricultural output. Both provide dismal examples of failure, for if there is one field where the two countries have displayed their inadequacy and inefficiency it is that of agricultural production.

India, by laying too great stress on governmental intervention and planning (though theoretically her economy is mixed), has retarded the pace of her economic growth and progress. Africa can benefit from Japan's example and India's mistakes, chief among which is over-nationalization.

Africa must evolve an economic and political pattern suited to her environment and enriched by the example and experience of other civilizations. Being the latest arrival, she can benefit

from the mistakes of others. The road to progress and fulfillment does not lead either to chauvinism or to Communism. "African unity," writes Nyerere, "is not, to us, a chauvinistic racialism but an essential step towards our full participation in the main stream of human development." What Nyerere and other sober-minded Africans visualize is not a single Africa but a united Africa, which is what Pan-Africanism signifies to them—an Africa which has its own contribution to make to the pool of human progress and coöperation from which she has for so many years been excluded by the majority of mankind. From this sense of grievance and of cruel isolation comes the chauvinism which characterizes many Africans in their speech and patterns of behavior. In the African, chauvinism is a racial hang-over which will evaporate as the continent moves toward maturity. Islands of white reaction such as South Africa and the Portuguese possessions polarize black hostility and ignite racial venom.

Many, including not a few Marxists, hold that African economic and social conditions are not favorable to Communism, and that since the African is acutely aware of himself and lacks a class consciousness because of the absence of compradors, entrepreneurs or large property owners, he is not easily vulnerable to Marxist dogmas or doctrines. Even according to Sékou Touré, who is generally but mistakenly regarded as an African extremist, a social revolution is possible in Africa without a class struggle. The single-party system, as it exists in the continent, is not impregnated with Communist ideas but inspired as being representative of the mass of people as a whole. Moreover, land does not normally attach to the individual but to the tribe; Africa, it is argued, can therefore skip the stage of proletarian dictatorship and move from the communal ownership of property to a socialist system.

Plausible as the African hypothesis is, it does not stand up to close examination. In West Africa, particularly in Nigeria and Ghana, a class of African businessmen, along with successful lawyers, doctors and other professional men, has grown in recent years, especially since the war. A leaven of African "master farmers," helped by loans from the marketing boards and other kindred public bodies, has also come into being. African-owned estates, worked by paid labor, are on the increase, and the creation of farmers' unions testifies to the emergence of a rural bourgeoisie. African labor shows an increasing tendency to mi-

grate across the open frontiers of underpopulated territories, thereby making inroads into the old social cohesiveness. Yet African socialism, whether in the guise of nationalization, a planned economy or the building of coöperatives, clings stubbornly to its African character. Mali and Guinea, for instance, have banned the Marxist-Leninist group known as the *Partie Africane de l'Independence*. Collective ownership of the land and of the means of production, where it exists in Africa under a planned economy, is on a restricted scale.

Yet the question arises whether with the end of colonialism and with the political withdrawal of the White Presence certain countries of the continent might not be tempted to resort to the Communist solution. There are several reasons against this—the weakness of Communist parties within Africa; the reluctance of the leaders of the newly independent countries to exchange one form of foreign domination for another; the open rift between Moscow and Peking; and the realization, particularly by African students and leaders, that the Russians and Chinese are as color-conscious as the Western democracies. Informed observers place the number of Communists in the continent at only around 50,000, and despite the suspicion once attaching to Sékou Touré, the Communists include none of the top-ranking leaders.

IV

The attitude of Africans to Asians, whom they regard with some justice as abettors of white imperialism during the period of Western domination in the continent, has not visibly thawed. If anything it has hardened. I recall a white settler in Northern Rhodesia remarking angrily: "Once we are gone the Africans think they can step into a £20-a-week job and ride in American cars. They are nowhere as good as European employees but demand the same salaries." He agreed, however, when I said that the Asians and not the Europeans would be the first economic casualties, which is what has happened. In Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika, Asian employees in government offices and commercial concerns are being replaced more quickly than Europeans. This is natural, since big Asian-owned commercial establishments and industries are few and far between and, additionally, the Indian serving as a bank assistant, salesman or government clerk signifies to the African a competitor who can now be easily dislodged and replaced. The European's economic

presence operated institutionally through large corporations such as shipping units, insurance companies and banks. As many Asians, both Indians and Pakistanis, explained to me, their primary concern was trade, and because of this they kept for the most part away from the politics of the continent. It was obvious, though they did not say so, that in the process they were interested in preserving the political status quo.

A truth which suddenly dawned on me in Africa was the realization that the Asian, particularly with his caste and community consciousness, found it comparatively easy to accept the compartmental way of social life common to the African and was not excessively embarrassed by it, for the average Indian is habituated to living within his caste and community whether in his own country or abroad. He accepted segregation with less resentment than the African, for within his own caste and community the Indian lives a fairly full life. True, he resented the European's attitude of social superiority, but curiously his own attitude toward the average African was not very different from the European's. And the African was acutely aware of it. To a cosmopolitan Indian, the spectacle of Sindhis, Gujarathis and Sikhs, each with their own separate housing colonies and schools, appeared anomalous and contradictory. At the same time, there was a common, composite Indian awarenesss among them. In all this it very largely reflected Indian society at home.

V

Margery Perham makes a shrewd point when she stresses that African nationalism, as compared with Western nationalism, has an extra and major ingredient—the sense of racial feeling which derives from a consciousness of color. To a lesser but none the less discernible degree it is also evident in Asian nationalism. From this sense of derogation and repression of his race arises the African's inverted complex of superiority toward the non-black. With independence, the Asian has largely shed this compulsive urge, but with the African it still lingers and rankles. Time, however, is bound to efface it, for as the African achieves political freedom and an acknowledged status in the comity of peoples, the world's color consciousness will fade. Miss Perham also makes a perceptive point when she observes that "it is not so much the principle of democracy for which Africans have struggled as the end of the rule of white over black." Theirs has

been as much a revolution as the French Revolution with its slogan of "liberty, equality and fraternity," but the motive force has differed; for whereas the European revolutionary was reaching out for a form of democracy, however tinsel, the African revolutionary was primarily interested in ending race rule and white domination. Color, not creed, provided the stimulus. Hence négritude, which arose from the African's long isolation and the loneliness which he sought to sublimate in a feeling of togetherness with his own kind. The gulf which once separated the sensitive educated African from his European counterpart was almost as wide as that which divided him from the passive, ignorant masses of his own country. The layer of cream at the top of the bottle was too thin. What the South African writer, Lewis Nkosi, terms the African's "quest for identity and selfhood" might, following the encounter with Europe, "produce a new man altogether in Africa." Nkosi sees the perpetual quest for self ending in the achievement of a synthesis. But obviously this calls for a greater two-way traffic between Europe and Africa than exists today. Both Europe and Africa must lose their color-consciousness.

By and large, Africans have obtained their independence with less violence than Asian countries and largely in agreement with the colonizing powers. Africa, moreover, is not afflicted to the same degree by the appalling population problem which weighs on many Asian countries. Her main economic problem is that the countries of the continent are too often reliant upon a single crop in a single area which puts the local economy at the mercy of fluctuations in world raw-material prices. Africa, for the most part, is devoid of those apparently insoluble problems that make countries like India an economic nightmare. Nor are they unduly oppressed by the necessity of belonging to one bloc or another. As Nyerere has picturesquely put it: African states have no intention of becoming "jumping jackasses" siding automatically with West or East. They want to live their own way of life in peace and coöperation.

Slowly but surely they are climbing out of the sense of not belonging which for so many years has burdened them. Africa is no longer a thing apart. A vital force animates her being, and with the lifting of the white man's menace she seeks a place among the sons of earth.

FOR AN ATLANTIC FUTURE

By Theo Sommer

WHERE does West Germany stand in the Great Debate about the future shape of the Atlantic Alliance? Are the "Atlanticists," represented by Chancellor Erhard and his Foreign Minister Schröder, really on the wane? Is the "Euro-Gaullist" school of thought, led by former Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, former Defense Minister Franz-Josef Strauss and Karl Theodor zu Guttenberg, in the ascendancy?

It would be easy to draw wrong conclusions from this controversy within the governing party in Bonn. The salient fact is not that it has occurred at all but that Dr. Erhard, as soon as he took a firm and determined stand, had no trouble putting the Euro-Gaullists in place and re-asserting the Atlanticist point of view which has been underlying his policy ever since he took over from Dr. Adenauer a year ago. Certainly the controversy will go on smoldering; the Euro-Gaullist spokesmen, egged on by personal preference or ambition, will continue to proclaim their views; and this *fronde* may well become a permanent feature of the German scene, just as Gaullism is likely to remain a feature of the world scene. But one would do well to remember that the malcontents, although prominent and vociferous, constitute only a minority, are regularly outvoted in the party caucus, and can act only from the periphery of power—Adenauer from the C.D.U. chairmanship, Strauss from his parochial home base in Munich. Nor do they have widespread popular support.

Most Germans discount the idea of a Gaullist Europe. They need only look to Berlin to realize the value of the link with the United States. Small wonder, then, that they distrust all those doctrines which, if practiced as well as preached, can have no other effect but to break that link. They know such doctrines are primarily designed to increase the weight and influence of those who advocate them; purporting to secure the independence of Europe from America, they conjure up the spectre of an America trying to secure her independence from Europe. But any estrangement between the two halves of the Alliance would be widely deplored in Germany, where such concepts as Atlantic partnership or Atlantic Community are still regarded as equally valid today as they were when first conceived—if not more so.

II

There are several reasons why the major lines of European and American interests may be expected to converge for a long time to come. The first and foremost is that the cold war is by no means over. The Kremlin leaders have called off one particular offensive, and they have also adjusted their grand strategy to the new thermonuclear weapons environment. This must be a source of gratification to us, but it should not lull us into carelessness. As Professor Walt W. Rostow has pointed out: "Whether, in fact, the turning point of 1962–63 becomes a watershed in human history, in which the cold war gradually gives way to the organization of a peaceful and progressive community of nations, or whether it leads merely to a parenthesis between two Communist offensives, depends primarily on what we in the free world make of the interval."[1] Indeed it does. For only if the Western nations remain together, even in the absence of an acute threat to Europe's danger point, Berlin, and in the face of seeming Soviet reasonableness—only then can they hope to harvest the fruits of their past labor. Western unity alone can keep Khrushchev from embarking on an aggressive course again; Western discord would put a premium on renewed Soviet adventurism.

The second reason is the fact that the simple power pattern of the postwar world is breaking up much less radically and much less rapidly than is generally supposed. To be sure, the bipolar structure of world politics has been modified by the growth, both in numbers and in influence, of the new nations; it is further being challenged by those who—like Mao Tse-tung or Charles de Gaulle—resent such discipline as bipolarity imposes on them. But while new centers of *ambition* have sprung into existence, no new centers of *power* are visible anywhere on the map of the present world. This situation is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future. For a considerable period only the two superpowers will possess the technological basis, the financial and scientific resources, and the wide open spaces which are the prerequisites for an efficient, credible nuclear strategy, and therefore an effective global policy. Thus the confrontation between the American-led Western bloc and the Russian-led Eastern bloc would appear to remain the main fea-

[1] Speech before the American Chamber of Commerce, Brussels, March 16, 1964.

ture of world politics. The true measure of the importance of any event anywhere on the globe will be its relevance to this basic feature. Bipolarity might be obnoxious to some, but it will nevertheless remain the dominant fact of international relations.

The third reason is related to this. In the opinion of most Germans, neither Europe nor the United States has a viable alternative to partnership. It is a Gaullist delusion that it is possible for Western Europe, as it was during the nineteenth century, to maintain a stable equilibrium with Eastern Europe on a quite independent basis. The old balance cannot be reëstablished—simply because the old scales have been toppled over. In the thermonuclear age, Western Europe can make up for the disadvantages of its geography only by a close and indissoluble alliance with the United States. The Old World needs the New World for the great and delicate balancing act in Europe; in their confrontation with the Soviet Empire, the Europeans cannot but identify themselves with the wider Atlantic grouping and defense system. Conversely, it is an illusion of American isolationists to believe in the possibility of the United States "going it alone," without Europe, in a world full of problems and troubles. American security is thoroughly bound up with the security of Western Europe. Thus NATO is indispensable to the West, for it is equally essential for the survival of Europe as it is for that of America. And it is indeed hard to see how this basic and historic rationale of the North Atlantic Pact could be rendered invalid during the next 15 years. It may be obfuscated by ambitious men, but it cannot simply be preached out of force.

These are three good reasons for clinging to the undiluted concept of Atlantic partnership. There is a fourth, a special German reason. More than any other country, the Federal Republic depends on her allies—and on the cohesion amongst these allies. Without the United States, the Central European status quo can be neither maintained nor changed; Germany's present security as well as her future hopes rest upon Europe's transatlantic links. No solution of the German question is imaginable unless both American power and the combined strength of the alliance can be brought to bear upon the world scene. And while Europe can neither be organized nor defended without France, hardly anyone in West Germany harbors the delusive hope that France could ever be a substitute for the United States.

III

Certainly General de Gaulle is trying to create an alternative. So far, however, he has not found a large following outside France. He spreads distrust vis-à-vis the United States but has nothing to offer himself. He casts doubt on the supranational institutions of postwar Europe, blocking their future development, but his appeal to old-fashioned nationalism can only ruin what has been achieved hitherto. He claims to speak for Europe but does not even speak for the Europe of the Six; and where he purports to act on behalf of Europe, he is only acting for himself —witness Pompidou's sentence: "C'est à la France de jouer le rôle de l'Europe." The suspicion is not unfounded that he wants to use Europe in order to build up the glory of France, rather than using France to promote the evolution of Europe; and there is a fairly widespread feeling that he seeks for himself in European politics exactly the position which he begrudges the Americans in Atlantic politics: the role of hegemonial power. The General's press conference of July 1964 strongly reinforced this impression; it provided an eye-opener to many who had still been inclined to grant him the benefit of the doubt.

Dean Acheson has said: "The conception of a united Europe revived and strengthened only to be controlled and directed by a European power for its own national purposes, as an elephant is controlled by a mahout riding on its neck, has no appeal in the United States." One ought to add: it has no appeal in Europe either, and none in the Federal Republic. To be sure, most Germans do look forward to a "Europe revived and strengthened." But they do not want, in the process of establishing it, to undermine the alliance with America. To quote Professor Klaus Mehnert in *Christ und Welt* (February 7, 1964): "De Gaulle rejects the Atlantic Alliance because there France (and the other states) depend on America's nuclear armory, but he desires a European alliance in which the other partners depend on the nuclear arms of France. Now, if as a German I will have to rely on the nuclear weapons of some other power (and that will remain the case in the foreseeable future), then I have more confidence in the loyalty of the Americans." And, one might continue, also in the credibility and the efficiency of their armory. Or, in the same vein, Professor von der Gablentz in *Der Monat* (November 1963): "France missed its chance of leading Europe when

it voted down the European Defense Community in 1954. The 'fatherlands' on which de Gaulle banks no longer exist. The old nationalism is finished, and a new European nationalism cannot be based on the countries of the Six. For although the blocs may appear to be crumbling, the Atlantic ties of Europe's western half and the Russian ties of its eastern half are much too strong."

De Gaulle's continental partners do not believe that Europe could, either politically or militarily, become a third force in world affairs. They know that the French bomb can never be the basis for great power policy within the alliance. While some of them might be prepared to take a closer look at the idea of a European deterrent, they cannot see any encouraging sign of French willingness to consider the *force de frappe* the nucleus of a truly European deterrent. Anyhow, most would appear to be wary of the concept if it involved the risk of splitting the alliance between Europe and America. A European nuclear force built without or in opposition to the United States might cause the Americans to withdraw from Europe. One would have to expect Washington to pull half a million G. I.'s out of Europe if they could be jeopardized by actions over which it had no control; and it is not inconceivable that the U. S. President would make clear to his opposite number in the Kremlin that he assumed no responsibility whatsoever for any nuclear adventures of the Europeans. Apart from that, no European nuclear force would make sense without an equitable control arrangement. In a *"Europe des patries"* such a control arrangement would appear to be out of reach; the squabbles now besetting Atlantic nuclear policy would be hardly less stultifying in a European context, and the vexing problem of how many fingers on how many triggers would remain unresolved. A European deterrent presupposes a European federation and, more especially, a European President able to act in any crisis with unquestioned authority. It is hard to see such a "Fatherland Europe" on the horizon of the sixties or even the seventies. And it is quite ludicrous to believe that the bomb could function as a "federator." In the absence of a common political will and a general congruence of views, nuclear weapons would tend to divide rather than unite.

All this adds up to the conclusion that Charles de Gaulle will not be able to lead Europe in the direction of a third force. To succeed, he would at least need the support of Germany. But although a small group within the ruling party likes to echo

Gaullist slogans, the majority of the Christian Democrats is firmly committed to the Atlantic idea. So is the Social Democrat opposition party. Chancellor Erhard, Foreign Minister Schröder and Defense Minister von Hassel are all avowed "Atlanticists." The preamble which the *Bundestag* affixed to the Franco-German Treaty of 1963 also proves the Atlantic bent of the West German mind, and recent opinion polls bear out that it has widespread popular support. Last April, the percentage of those who regarded de Gaulle's policy as detrimental to Germany was higher than at any other time since August 1962, shortly before the General's German tour: 38 percent versus 32 who considered Gaullist policy rather favorable for Germany (61 percent in October 1962.) Other polls show that most Germans want to "stick to the Americans." They think little of making common cause with de Gaulle—but much of remodeling the Western Alliance to fit the exigencies of a changed and changing world.

IV

The causes of the present state of Western disarray are well known. Firstly, the North Atlantic Alliance is suffering from its very success. In 15 years of cold war NATO has prevailed; and while its members used to knit firmly together at moments of acute crisis, it now appears to lack a cementing challenge.

Secondly, there is the vexing question of NATO's nuclear structure in an age of two-way deterrence. Even those European leaders who see no reason to doubt the validity of the American defense commitment have grown increasingly anxious to gain a wider measure of active participation in strategic planning. Likewise they are pressing toward a sensible sharing of nuclear control within the alliance—and the firmer their decision not to embark on national nuclear programs, the harder this pressure is bound to be.

Thirdly, the brilliant economic recovery of Western Europe has revived the ancient pride of the continental nations. Today, Europeans find unquestioning subordination to the United States harder to put up with than in the immediate postwar era. Most would accept a measure of inequality that is natural to any relationship between small nations and a superpower, but they would like their interests, their judgments and their sensitivities respected by that superpower; they do not relish the idea of having to act the part of the Delian Leaguers vis-à-vis an Ameri-

can Athens. If in the military field they demand a voice in the formulation of alliance strategy, in the political field they want a place in the Western mechanism of crisis management. Also there is a vague yearning for some system of pre-crisis management—a system, that is, for common intelligence and policy assessments transcending the geographical limits of NATO's treaty area as well as for the management of intra-alliance differences in times of relative quiet.

Three urgent tasks, then, would seem to confront the Western Alliance. The North Atlantic partners must rebuild NATO on a basis of hope instead of the basis of fear that provided the chief element of cohesion when NATO was founded in 1949. They must find a reasonably satisfactory solution to the problem of nuclear control—not by encumbering the American finger on the trigger in the event of conflict, but by subjecting it to agreed rules and standards of action. And they must secure for the Europeans a role both in the pre-crisis game of deterrence and in the formulation of world-wide policy. What the alliance needs to reëstablish is both a military and a political consensus.

One difference which will have to be resolved relates to the proper strategy for the defense of Europe. Right now, it would seem, there is no strategy which is either agreed upon or, in the event of war, tolerable. The task remains to deter any form of aggression by preparing to respond adequately at any level of force. Europeans will have to learn that a flexible response must also be a controlled response; Americans will have to learn that "controlled response" cannot be restricted to mean "exclusively American-controlled response." Europeans will have to grasp that the threat of escalation is not the only deterrent to conventional attack; Americans will have to grasp that the possibility of escalation, while raising the heinous spectre of nuclear war, must nevertheless be impressed on the mind of the opponent in order to deter him. More particularly, however, Europeans must learn to appreciate that their insistence on an automatic nuclear response to *any* aggression must eventually prompt the Americans to withdraw the bulk of their land forces from Western Europe. Instead of keeping the United States committed, such insistence could lead only to a weakening of its interest in the actual defense of Europe, and it might well undo the most important feature of NATO: an American guarantee not only given on paper but made visible by the presence of sizable U. S. forces

right along the Iron Curtain and elsewhere in Europe. Luckily, there seems to be a growing awareness, at least in Germany, that an exclusively nuclear doctrine would spell disaster for the Federal Republic if deterrence failed; it is generally realized now that the threat of self-destruction should not be the only means of defense available. (Accounts of recent French manœuvres have had an extremely sobering effect on many military men in Bonn.) A sensible compromise does not, therefore, appear impossible of achievement.

Such a compromise on strategy is all the more important as it furnishes the only instrument to forestall friction in another field: that of arms control in Europe. Only against the background of a jointly arrived at and agreed upon defense doctrine (plus the military establishment to support it) is a European-American arms control consensus conceivable. This goes for anything from the establishment of ground observation posts at one end of the spectrum to a thinning out of troops or a denuclearization at the other end. For inevitably there will be European —and especially German—resistance to even the most innocuous move toward arms control as long as there is neither strategic doctrine nor military apparatus both to explain and to justify it. But if there is, the often-heard outcry against a Russian-American "duopoly" need not worry us unduly.

This duopoly is inherent in the present power situation. Protests will not change it, nor will pathetic protestations of ambition. Of course, it makes for good copy in many French and also in a few German newspaper offices. But it was a Frenchman, Raymond Aron, who has provided the most lucid analysis of the precarious relationship between "les frères ennemis," stripping it of its sinister implications by pointing out both the motives and the limits of Russo-American coöperation. And an increasing number of Germans have come to realize that there is no reason for them to be unhappy about any great power agreement that limits the risks of war. Such limitation, indeed, is in the interest of the European nations as much as in that of the United States and the Soviet Union. In order to prevent further cracks in the alliance, however, the allies will have to be kept fully posted on future developments—and at an earlier stage in the game than was the case, for instance, during the test-ban negotiations; never should the impression be created that Washington was prepared to conclude agreements with the Kremlin

at the expense of its European partners. Improved consultation practices would seem to be an absolute prerequisite to any new American-Soviet moves toward East-West détente.

Beyond that, improved and—particularly—more systematized consultation would seem to be the precondition of a new lease on life for NATO. Such a consultative system ought to repair the two main deficiencies of the alliance: its loose diplomatic organization, and its outdated geographical limitations. It is indeed strange to think that NATO rests militarily on the principle of integration while politically it still clings to the old prescription of coalition diplomacy; while it has an integrated military command structure, it has yet to establish similar political institutions. And it is difficult to imagine that nowadays, when shots fired in some faraway region are likely to reverberate around the world, the outlying areas continue to be treated as though they were none of NATO's concern. The Cuban crisis of 1962 ought to have taught us a different lesson. Do we have to wait for the events unfolding in Asia to bring the lesson home? Mao's shadow is lengthening over the Pacific, America's backyard. It is incontestable, however, that the emergence of China as a world power is a matter of concern not to the United States alone. Neither lack of interest nor pathetic rivalry adds up to a policy for Europeans. What is needed now is their participation, together with the United States, in a coöperative effort—at least an effort jointly to assess the risks and dangers looming on the Oriental horizon. NATO must build the apparatus for concerted contingency planning encompassing the whole of the globe. The Four Power group that has been dealing with the Berlin problem for the past few years could usefully serve as a pattern for such a consultative body.

V

The reforms and adjustments outlined above would be difficult to implement even under the most favorable circumstances. Now one might easily despair of them, as the indolence of the many is powerfully reinforced by the obstructionism of one. No longer, so it would appear, can a mere overhauling of the present transatlantic machinery satisfy the ambition of the French President. The whole concept of interdependence is anathema to him, and so is the principle of integration. Instead of interdependence he desires independence, instead of integration merely

coöperation. While the other Europeans continue to uphold the broad conception of NATO and the Atlanticist "grand design" for its future, de Gaulle repudiates both. By resuscitating old-fashioned nationalism in France he arrests the movement toward European unity—and thus he blocks the straightest road toward a transatlantic partnership on an equal and equitable footing. But although Europe cannot become a real partner for the United States as long as it remains a fragmented multitude of nations, there are no indications that this pernicious fragmentation can be overcome soon. The question, therefore, arises: Does European stagnation condemn the West to Atlantic stagnation, too? Is there no way around de Gaulle? It is an ill wind that blows nobody good, and one may wonder whether the slackening of the European pace might not, in the end, be turned to the advantage of the wider Atlantic Community.

There have always been two schools of thought with regard to the relationship between European unification and Atlantic integration. One thought the two aspirations reinforced each other; the other thought the two integrative movements were bound to obstruct each other. Whatever the original validity of the first expectation, today, clearly, the assumption of a pre-stabilized harmony between the European and Atlantic goals seems rather too facile. Indeed, even without de Gaulle one might have expected difficulties between the United States and a Europe which was growing in strength as well as in self-confidence. The psychological need of the Europeans to manifest their new sense of identity could easily have led to a kind of "profile neurosis": a policy more intent upon underlining European separateness from America than on emphasizing European solidarity with her. Today, mindful of de Gaulle's aspirations, we recognize the temptation and the danger. In retrospect, therefore, the "dumbbell" concept of the future relationship between the United States and Europe might seem less brilliant than when it first gained currency. Dumbbells—linking, as they do, two spheres of equal weight—in fact have a built-in tendency to break in the middle. There is, as has been pointed out repeatedly, no guarantee that relations between two equal Atlantic halves would of necessity result in a consensus between the two, or in recognized and effective leadership of one over the other. This is especially true in view of the fact that the European sphere could at best gain theoretical equality in the field of nuclear armaments and strategy.

Conversely, however, there is no evidence that all dumbbells do break. The dumbbell, or "twin pillar," concept may work—or rather, it might have worked, given the right spirit and the right approach. But in the decade ahead, there is not going to be any European center of power such as envisaged in John F. Kennedy's Grand Design. Not only is the Europe of the Six hamstrung by Charles de Gaulle in its efforts to establish closer links with the Europe of the Seven; it is failing even to make headway toward its own political integration. Thus the American pillar of strength will most probably remain without a European twin. For even if de Gaulle's successor should initiate a new policy, it is far from certain whether the British, still smarting from the blows of January 1963, could and would adjust to the situation then arising.

But waiting for de Gaulle's successor, or for Mr. Harold Wilson, does not constitute a policy. Powerful though the temptation may be to settle down, more or less uncomfortably, in one of those recurrent cycles of futility which seem to mark the development of common Western institutions, we must attempt to make the best of a muddled situation. One question in particular deserves attention and study. Even if no new impetus toward integration can be expected within a purely European framework, is it not, perhaps, possible to go right ahead (right around de Gaulle, too) and lay the foundations of an Atlantic partnership based not so much on the dumbbell concept as on the image of an umbrella which could give shelter to all those who actually desire such shelter?

It is not only possible—it is necessary. There is no other way of ensuring that the ties across the Atlantic are not weakened or cut while the Europeans mark time in the construction of Europe. A transatlantic effort of coöperation between all those willing to coöperate here and now might serve as a catalyst for non-Gaullist Europe. It would establish a pattern of interdependent interaction that looks more fruitful than a dejected retreat into bilateralism between the United States and individual European countries. And it would prove to de Gaulle the futility of his own efforts. At any rate, it would not, as any compromise was bound to do, put a premium on his obstreperousness.

Such a transatlantic effort would have to be made on two distinct but complementary levels: the institutional and the practical level.

One task would be the creation of an organizational skeleton around which the Atlantic partnership—and, in due time, an Atlantic Community spelled with a capital C—could take shape. There are already plenty of proposals how this should be done. Government Committees for Atlantic Unity, a Permanent Council, a Consultative Atlantic Assembly have variously been suggested as institutional foci for a common Atlantic venture. Such bodies will be helpful. But they alone cannot generate nor keep up any integrative momentum. When all is said and done, only some eye-catching project of practical coöperation can engender a new spirit of cohesion and mutual confidence. So far, no better proposal for such a project has been made than that envisaging the creation of a Multilateral Nuclear Force.

One may doubt whether there is a crying military need for the M.L.F., but it can hardly be doubted any longer that it will be able to play a useful role when it materializes. It is worth pointing out that in 1970, if established, it will muster a deterrent force of 140 megatons; the French *Mirage* fleet will amount, in the same year, to little more than six megatons. And the political value of the M.L.F.—or, to be precise, *an* M.L.F.—seems incontrovertible. It would diminish the risk of proliferation; advance the nuclear education of the Europeans; give Europe a share in strategic planning and, in time of crisis, a voice in the operation of the deterrent; but above all it would be an important step toward integration of American and European forces. Its chief objective, then, would not be to make the Germans happy but rather to cement the alliance. The principle of mixed-manning is an enormous advance, and so is the principle of joint ownership of nuclear warheads. In the face of General de Gaulle's obstinacy, the M.L.F. could provide a vital new link between the two halves of the Western alliance. It could spark the development of a genuinely Atlantic Community in much the same way in which the European Coal and Steel Community furnished the initial impetus toward European integration. Possibly the road to a European deterrent may lie through the M.L.F.—if Europe came into existence as Europe, and if it then felt the need for a nuclear deterrent of its own (which, however, by force of its genesis, would have the least anti-American tinge). Hopefully, at the end of the road something else may be waiting: namely a single Atlantic deterrent which would include all U. S. forces as well as all European nuclear units.

While we may still be very far from that goal, we should nevertheless work toward it. In any case, we should not create a number of tiny European nuclear sovereignties but rather try to prevail upon the Americans to abandon some of theirs. This, at any rate, would seem to be one of the greatest advantages of coöperative ventures like the M.L.F.: that the United States would at least make a start toward the transfer of sovereign national rights. One of the drawbacks of the dumbbell concept was the fact that it imposed sacrifices of sovereignty only on the Europeans (who, in order to create Europe, were expected to sign away their national birthrights in favor of the wider union); no similar sacrifice was demanded from America. Under the umbrella concept, this would be different: the United States would be expected to give up as much as her partners on the other side of the ocean. The M.L.F., then, might teach the Europeans the refined logic of the nuclear age, but it might also teach the Americans the beginnings of that difficult art—supranational integration.

More immediately, the M.L.F. seems the only system in the framework of which European (minus Gaullist) and American interests can be reconciled at the present juncture—the only system, too, in which the momentum toward greater Atlantic fulfillment can be regained. The London *Economist* (April 18, 1964) put the point very succinctly: "The M.L.F. suggests both the possibility of a revivified NATO and, if that proves impossible, then some substitute for it (consisting essentially of a tripartite agreement between America, Britain and Germany). . . . If the managing committee of the M.L.F. proved successful in handling the business of joint operation of a nuclear weapons system, there might well be a good case for adopting a similar structure in other fields in which closer allied coöperation is desirable. . . . The presence, present posture—and, indeed, the indispensability —of France in NATO makes the treaty organization itself a rickety framework for such consultation. . . . In the difficult period between now and 1969, America and those of its allies who want to see Europe, both defensively and positively, take an 'Atlantic' shape have to try to make General de Gaulle see how much France has to lose by obstructing further military and political integration within NATO. . . . Enlarging upon the M.L.F. machinery could never be a complete substitute for a rejuvenated (and perhaps renegotiated) NATO. But at least it would not

leave the West at such a loss for alternatives if another resounding 'No' rings out from the Elysée."

Indeed, we need not wait for Europe to take shape as United Europe before we go about reorganizing and reinforcing the ties of partnership across the Atlantic. The unfulfilled desire for the one must not obstruct the speedy realization of the other. The ideas of Atlantic partnership and European unity are not mutually exclusive, and while it is regrettable that circumstances thwart their simultaneous fruition, we must not miss the opportunities which the present moment offers—opportunities for cooperation, even integration, despite all obstacles.

VI

Nowhere is the spectre of the dissolution of the Atlantic Alliance feared more than in the Federal Republic. Narrow nationalism presents neither an option nor a temptation to Germany. *La Germania farà da se?* The old slogan about Germany looking out for herself does not stand the test of sobriety. The spirit of Rapallo is dead; no one need fear that the Federal Republic will settle the German problem in a "deal" with Russia, thus double-crossing her allies and sneaking out of the Western community again. European nationalism is likewise rejected because of its divisive effects. The Germans really believe in the indivisibility of Western politics and aspirations, and the state of disarray within NATO causes them more agony than most. They are willing to do everything in their power to help settle the differences that rend the alliance; Chancellor Erhard's recent call for a top-level conference to deal with NATO's malaise testifies to their concern. But the Germans also realize that their power is limited.

The country on whose imagination, moral courage and determination the fate of the Western community will continue to turn is the United States. While it would be wrong to expect the American leaders to work wonders, nothing would be more detrimental to the morale of the Atlantic world than a United States policy of despondency or loss of interest—or a retreat into American continentalism. America must continue to give a lead —so that, as Dean Acheson has said, "others will follow and the opposition will have to buck a tide instead of using inertia as an ally." And we must all remember John F. Kennedy's dictum: "Lofty words cannot construct an alliance or maintain it—only concrete deeds can do that."

MOSCOW AND THE M.L.F.: HOSTILITY AND AMBIVALENCE

By Zbigniew Brzezinski

IN the Soviet opposition to the American-sponsored scheme for a Multilateral Force—the NATO nuclear-missile fleet—two themes have been paramount: the M.L.F. is the opening wedge for the German acquisition of nuclear weapons, and the M.L.F. will set in motion the process of nuclear proliferation. According to Soviet spokesmen, the consequences are bound to be dangerous for the peace of the world, and, as if to give credence to these warnings, they have ominously hinted that the "most serious" consequences will follow implementation of this scheme.

Although the issue of German access to nuclear weapons and the matter of proliferation are obviously inter-related problems, the Soviet and East European spokesmen have tended to place more stress on the German danger, both in their public statements and in the attacks on the M.L.F. by their press and radio. This is presumably because of the greater emotional response that can be generated by the very thought of Germans wielding nuclear weapons. The German theme naturally has been stressed particularly heavily by the Czechs and the Poles; their public comments and their official notes to the United States have concentrated heavily on the remilitarization of West Germany, on the building of the national German Army, its growing offensive capacity, and so on. It is noteworthy that the Rumanians, Bulgarians and Hungarians, all historically somewhat more indifferent to the subject of Germany than the Czechs and the Poles, have been markedly less interested in the M.L.F. The more serious Soviet treatments of the problem, as, for instance, in the monthly journal *International Affairs,* as well as informal comments by Soviet spokesmen, have laid equal stress on the danger of proliferation of nuclear weapons, hinting at the complications that could ensue for both sides, especially with regard to the American-Soviet disarmament negotiations.

In recent months, the Soviet attacks have become more shrill, frequent and even somewhat more threatening in tone. The current Soviet offensive against the M.L.F. raises the question, what is the *real* Soviet purpose? Is it the same as that proclaimed, namely, to deny West Germany any access to nuclear weapons

systems and to stop the process of proliferation, thereby serving the cause of peace? Or is there some hidden and different motive?

It is legitimate to ask this, even though the Soviets might charge that in doing so one is questioning their good faith. Yet if their good faith is not involved, then perhaps their good judgment might be. The Soviet leaders must realize—since it is a matter of public knowledge—that today the European situation is far more complex for the United States than was the case even a decade ago, and that the French decision to pursue its own *national* nuclear force (following the English precedent) creates a real political alternative for West Germany. The Soviet leaders must also know that within West Germany there is already a powerful political faction, centered in Bavaria, pressing for a Gaullist policy, and that its influence and potential nationalist appeal are not to be dismissed lightly. The Soviet leaders should, therefore, at least consider the possibility that a defeat of the M.L.F. will not mean the maintenance of the status quo, but an irresistible German drive for its own nuclear force or, alternatively, a Franco-German nuclear enterprise, linking together for the first time in a joint military venture the two European nations with the most distinguished history of martial achievements.

The Soviets must know that at the present time NATO's tactical missiles and strike aircraft are under the so-called "two-key system" and, given the existing political pressures in Western Europe, it might be expanded to include Medium Range Ballistic Missiles (M.R.B.M.s) unless the development of the M.L.F. preëmpts that probability. Under the "two-key system," allied countries own and man the missiles, while the warheads are controlled jointly by the United States and the country where the missiles are placed. This arrangement comes much closer to the national deterrent idea than does the M.L.F.

II

One possible answer to the question concerning Soviet motives in opposing the M.L.F. can be called the extreme Machiavellian interpretation. According to it, the Soviets do realize the consequences of the failure of the M.L.F. and they welcome them. That is why they also frequently tell the West Europeans that the M.L.F. is an American scheme for the perpetuation of U.S. monopoly, thereby cynically playing on European nationalist feelings. In their view, a resurgent, militarist Germany will, first

of all, do more than all of Khrushchev's present and past efforts to resolidify the Soviet bloc, now torn asunder by nationalist conflicts. The Poles, the Czechs and the others, threatened by a militant and nuclear-armed Germany or Franco-Germany, will have no choice but to flock to Moscow for their protection. The Soviet people will also rally more closely around their leaders.

Secondly, a resurgent nuclear-armed Germany will inevitably disunite the West. It will drive England and Italy into neutralism, and might even give Paris some second thoughts. One consequence might be to push the United States into a posture of direct conflict with Bonn, thereby putting America and the Soviet Union on the same side against the continental West Europeans. Alternatively, it might drive the United States out of Europe. Clearly all of this would be most desirable from the Soviet point of view. Such an extreme Machiavellian interpretation can even draw on historical analogy: the Soviet attitude toward the rise of Hitler was very much of that sort. Acting on the theory of "the worse, the better," Moscow opposed Hitler's rise only verbally, while instructing the German Communist Party not to support the Social Democrats in their efforts to stop the Nazis.

The extreme Machiavellian interpretation presupposes a high degree of recklessness and cynicism in the Soviet approach to the M.L.F. and discounts any sincerity in the proclaimed Soviet fears of Germany. If that is correct, there is nothing to be done but to go ahead with the M.L.F., ignoring altogether the Soviet concerns. Yet this interpretation is not entirely satisfactory. For one thing, it simply ignores the recent historical experience of Russia and Eastern Europe, particularly during World War II; it is most unlikely that this ordeal did not leave its mark on Khrushchev's and Gomulka's patterns of thought. Furthermore, if it were correct to suppose that the Soviet leaders cynically and recklessly see political advantage in a nuclear-armed West Germany, then a *purely* national German nuclear force would serve these Machiavellian Soviet objectives even better. But both the Soviets and the East Europeans have made it amply clear that they would regard that as nothing short of a calamity.

The fact is that fear of Germany in the East is a reality in the same way that the preoccupation of many Americans with Cuba is a reality—except that the Russians, having only recently lost 25 million people in a war with Germany, have somewhat more cause to be concerned about the 70 million technologically ad-

vanced Germans than perhaps we do about the 6 million Cubans. The real and deeply felt concern thus blends with other Soviet political objectives, some of which correspond less with the proclaimed Soviet stand; and together they produce a Soviet policy that may be labeled the mixed-motive interpretation.

III

There is some evidence to suggest that recent Soviet efforts to establish a bilateral American-Soviet relationship are closely related to the increased Soviet fear of a German-French alliance, inevitably directed at the present status quo in Europe. To counter that, the Soviet leaders would like to achieve an American-Soviet co-sponsorship of the present division of Europe, thereby gaining time for the reconsolidation of the East while setting in motion new dissensions in the West. The quest for a bilateral relationship with the United States has made the Soviet leaders rethink their long-standing objective of driving the United States out of Europe; they can no longer be sure that success in this would actually benefit them, and the hesitant and fumbling Soviet approach to West European problems during the last several years reflects continued indecision on this score.

Notwithstanding this ambivalent attitude toward the United States, a standing component of Soviet policy is its opposition to any American sharing of nuclear weapons with the continental Europeans and its determination to obstruct any Western measures which aim toward greater unity. When in late 1959 it was proposed under the Norstad Plan that NATO become the fourth nuclear power (and some suggested variants even provided for coördinated national nuclear forces), the Soviet response was very negative. A. Arzumanyan, the Director of the influential Institute of World Economy and International Relations, described the Norstad Plan as "a compact between the most aggressive and reactionary American top brass and West German militarism." Some Soviet commentators implied that in the Norstad Plan they saw a double threat—the actual and direct spread of nuclear weapons, including to Germany, and the potential resolution of internal Western conflicts. Initial Soviet comments on the M.L.F. were somewhat milder; it was seen primarily as an effort to reduce Western political bickering and more specifically to forestall Paris' wooing of Bonn. In retrospect, it seems clear that at least in part the Soviet willingness to change its previous

attitude and to sign the test-ban agreement was connected with the calculation that it would force the abandonment of the M.L.F. (as well as perhaps promote some new Western dissensions). Only as the M.L.F. moved closer to fruition was the Soviet campaign against it stepped up. It reached a new peak in the middle of this year with the bitter attacks on Erhard and the Soviet note to the United States of July 11, 1964, threatening "severe and perhaps irreparable consequences."

There appears to be some tension between the Soviet desire not to drive America altogether out of Europe, thereby leaving a vacuum which Moscow thinks inescapably will be filled by de Gaulle and Strauss, and the obvious Soviet advantage in keeping the West in a state of fragmentation. As the M.L.F. could become an instrument for coördinating the Western military effort in the decisive branch of nuclear weaponry and for forging even closer political ties between Europe and America along the lines of the Atlantic Community concept (albeit for the time without France), the Soviet leaders see an immediate stake in strongly opposing it. The emotional implications of even indirect German access to the nuclear club then become useful in stimulating opposition in Western Europe, within the Labor Party, or among the potential neutralists in Scandinavia and Italy.

For the time being, it is this short-range and mischievous interest in Western disunity that appears to be the chief Soviet stake in preventing the M.L.F., and it over-rides the long-range genuine fear of Germany. A prolonged period of internal Western bickering is certainly the optimum condition from the standpoint of the Kremlin. The Soviet leaders may presumably calculate that there is no immediate danger of a sudden German veering toward Paris and of a defiant German pursuit of an independent national nuclear deterrent. Therefore, they can afford to oppose the M.L.F. and even put their opposition to good use in terms of inter-Communist politics. In this respect, the mixed-motive and the Machiavellian interpretation overlap. The German threat is always helpful in gaining greater adhesion from the Poles and the Czechs, and the opposition to proliferation justifies the Soviet nuclear monopoly in the Communist world. Multilateral nuclear arrangements in the West would eventually embarrass the Soviet monopolists, but it is doubtful that the Soviets would wish to share their know-how and devices with the Poles, the Hungarians, etc., not to speak of the Chinese.

On balance, it would seem that the Soviet attitude toward the M.L.F. is thus not so much a matter of total recklessness and cynicism as of shortsightedness and a combination of ambivalence about the United States position in Europe, of a basic hostility to Western unity, and of real concern about Germany. The ambivalence makes it more than likely that the present détente will not be affected by the M.L.F.; the Soviet stake in not having America back the West Germans and the French in a more vigorously anti-Soviet policy is too great to be affected by the M.L.F. In fact, one is reminded here of the various Soviet threats after the collapse of the E.D.C. of what would follow West German rearmament. Just as the Soviets have warned recently of "most serious consequences" that would follow the implementation of the M.L.F., in December 1954, a special communiqué issued by the Soviet Union and the East European states warned that the rearmament of West Germany "would be an act aimed against the preservation of peace and making for another war in Europe." Yet because of the broader Soviet interest at the time in developing the so-called "spirit of Geneva," the rearmament of Germany was followed by . . . the Austrian Peace Treaty. The reopening of the Berlin crisis or any other overt Soviet action ending the present détente will be based on broader calculations than just a reaction to the M.L.F. Similarly, Soviet hostility to Western unity has to be taken for granted. There is no reason to expect the Soviet Union not to oppose the M.L.F. or any other multilateral Western arrangement.

IV

However, because in the past the Soviet record in analyzing developments in Western Europe has not been notable for its perception, there is merit in further discussions with the Soviets and the East Europeans about the M.L.F. in the hope of assuaging at least those aspects of their hostility that stem from genuine fears and from a misreading of developments. In talking to them, it would be especially desirable to draw on arguments derived from actual Soviet experience; mere American assertions that the M.L.F. is designed to prevent nuclear proliferation, particularly to Germany, can be dismissed by Moscow —from its very different perspective—as inherently dishonest or simply naïve. Yet Russian fears, if genuine, exist already in respect to the two-key system. The point which Moscow ought

to be made to understand better is that the M.L.F. provides less national access than the two-key system, and as long as Western Europe is exposed to Soviet M.R.B.M.s there will be demands for a comparable West European deterrent. The only question is under what and whose control.

Recent Soviet experience offers two mutually reinforcing avenues of argumentation that may strike closer to home. First of all, Moscow makes much of German rearmament, and the West German Army is cited daily as a threat to peace. Because of their emphasis on this, the Soviet leaders should be reminded of their earlier opposition to the E.D.C. There are strong parallels between that opposition and the present attacks on the M.L.F. It is doubtful that at the time the Soviet motives were of the "extreme Machiavellian" variety; rather, then as now, they were probably mixed: desire for less Western unity, fear that the E.D.C. would prompt German rearmament, hope that its failure would perpetuate divisions in the West and avoid the creation of a German Army. The Russians now know how wrong they were. The collapse of the E.D.C. led straight to the formation of a German Army. If their concern over German rearmament is real, perhaps they occasionally entertain some second thoughts about their opposition to the E.D.C. And if that is the case, then perhaps they might give the M.L.F. a second look.

Even more effectively, because it is still a live issue, the Soviets might be asked to reflect on their recent and unsuccessful attempts at alliance management, particularly with respect to China. This should not be approached as a matter for Western glee, but as providing an analogy for the purpose of drawing a lesson useful to both sides. The Soviet experience shows that defying the desire of one's allies for a larger share of the decision-making and of military power can be very unrewarding. Today the Chinese are openly striving to achieve a national nuclear force, and the Soviet Union cannot stop them. If the Soviet leaders are seriously concerned about proliferation, and especially about the eventual German acquisition of nuclear weapons, they should ponder their failure to cope with the Chinese. The Germans are certainly better prepared technologically for acquiring such weapons, they have potential political and military backing in France, and there is already a "Chinese faction" within the ruling Christian Democratic party in the persons of Strauss et al. Moscow should realize that its disregard of these pressures simply

reinforces the suspicion that its policies toward the M.L.F. are in fact governed by purely Machiavellian calculations, and that in reality it does not mind Germany taking a "Chinese" path. A temperate evocation of the Soviets' own experience with Peking may drive home the lesson—which Marx also taught—that frustrated nationalism becomes simply more nationalistic; that nationalism satisfied and controlled by multilateral arrangements becomes internationalism.

The M.L.F., far from weakening the Soviet opposition to the Chinese, even buttresses the present Soviet stand and in the very unlikely event of a reconciliation could even provide the basis for continued Soviet opposition to a Chinese national nuclear deterrent. By attacking the M.L.F. as nothing but a device for spreading nuclear weapons to our allies, the Soviets strengthen the Chinese claim for Communist national deterrent forces and in effect embarrass themselves. By seeing the M.L.F. for what in fact it is—a multilateral arrangement—the Soviets further justify their earlier refusal to aid the Chinese.

It would also be important to talk with the East Europeans, particularly the Czechs and the Poles, who have shown most concern with the implications of the M.L.F. for West Germany, and who have increasing, if still limited, leverage on the Soviet Union. Their stake in the situation is far simpler and less ambitious than the Soviets'; it is to assure their own security. Hence it would be useful to impress them with the fact that they should not accept uncritically the Soviet interpretation of the M.L.F., nor Soviet policies toward Germany as a whole. They should be asked whether they would prefer West Germany to own M.R.B.M.s under the "two-key system," rather than the M.L.F. Without entering into the complex and necessarily speculative issue of the nature of Soviet motives, one could recall to the Czechs and the Poles that if the E.D.C. had come into being there would be today no national German Army. The M.L.F. is simply an atomic equivalent of the E.D.C.

Furthermore, the Poles and the Czechs might be reminded that the primary consequence of the two postwar Soviet offensives in Germany—namely, the two Berlin crises in the late forties and the late fifties—has been to strengthen West Germany's military position. Increased Soviet pressure on the West simply led in each case to a new push in West German rearmament. This may or may not have been intended by the Soviets, but it is doubtful

that the outcome has been beneficial for East European security.

That the East Europeans may in fact have a more realistic understanding of the situation is suggested by Gomulka's proposal of December 1963 for the denuclearization of Central Europe, which did not make the abandonment of the M.L.F. a precondition (although the Poles held that German ports would have to be closed to M.L.F. ships); parallel East German statements, echoing the Soviet line, were far more rigid, and warned that the M.L.F. would further reduce the chances of German reunification. Presumably, the Poles realized that the M.L.F. does in fact reduce somewhat the chances of Germany acquiring an independent national nuclear force, and for the East Europeans this is most important.

Yet when all that has been said, it is still necessary to come back to the elusive historical-psychological dimension of the problem. Europeans find it hard to understand why Americans are so concerned about Cuba—and we often feel that the Europeans are letting us down by not sharing our view of Castro. We feel strongly that missiles in Castro's hands would be a threat to us and to peace; the argument is doubtless valid, even though Cuba is small and has never waged war on the United States. That cannot be said about Germany in relation to Russia and Eastern Europe. It is therefore essential to dispel legitimate fears. The United States stands to lose very little by making a public pledge that it would oppose any attempt by West Germany to transform its participation in the M.L.F. into an independent nuclear force; this would merely reinforce the point made by President Kennedy in his *Izvestia* interview of November 1961. Some M.L.F. participants which do not now have national nuclear forces—as for instance, Germany—might wish to file a formal declaration with the United Nations, stating that under no circumstances would they seek an independent nuclear deterrent, outside of multilateral control and manning. Neither step is likely to reassure fully the Soviets and the East Europeans, who know that in political affairs words have a short life span, but it would show that we recognize and respect the Soviet fear that the M.L.F. might evolve into national nuclear forces. Public and solemn pledges would become an additional obstacle to national proliferation and would underline the twin purpose of the M.L.F.: to provide a collective nuclear defense of the West without promoting the spread of national nuclear forces.

SOUTH AFRICA AND THE WORLD

IN DEFENSE OF APARTHEID

By Charles A. W. Manning

AT a time when South Africa, by reason of what are commonly referred to as its "racial" policies, has become the object of such universal censure, it behooves any thinking South African to examine for himself the anatomy of that program which is exciting so much dissent, and not simply to content himself with a public posture suggested by some climate of opinion, whether in South Africa or abroad. The fact that he may not have voted for those who sponsor the program should not prevent him from according it such merits as it seems to him to possess, independent of its parenthood. It need not prevent his seeing many of the strictures currently passed upon it as unwarranted and incorrect.

Of one thing he may be sure. The hostility of the non-white world can be explained without reference to the merits of the apartheid program. Indeed, for Afro-Asians the possibility that it has any merits can scarcely arise. It is the policy of white men governing black; and the only good thing that white men still wielding authority in Africa can do is to abdicate in favor of the non-white majority. Anything else they may think to do is by definition bad. In the eyes of the Bandung confraternity, South Africa ought never to have existed and ought now no longer to exist. It is not a question of whether she is meeting her responsibilities with humanity, wisdom, even a measure of self-abnegation. What in their eyes is wrong is not what South Africa may do, but the fact that she should continue in a position to do anything at all.

King Ahab, in the Old Testament story, was not interested in how Naboth was administering his vineyard. Hitler was not really much concerned with what Beneš might be willing to do for the Sudeten Germans. The Addis Ababa powers are not interested in South Africa's current policy of home rule for all. If those powers have not consciously adopted Hitler's language, it must at least be admitted that Hitler did anticipate some of theirs.

Nor should it be beyond South Africa's comprehension that the major Western governments may in these circumstances shy

away from identifying themselves with her position. In the world of tough diplomacy old friendships may have to be set aside in deference to new expediencies. At a time when even Emperor Haile Selassie is constrained to forget what he owes to South Africa, when Israel finds it necessary to ignore the analogy between South Africa's predicament and her own, and when Britain has to be cautious even in her support for Israel, it is easy to see why neither Britain nor the United States can be other than cautious in support of South Africa. Though the South African may not admire the posture of the Western powers, he can at least claim to understand it.

To understand the attitudes of foreign governments, whether at the United Nations or elsewhere, is one thing; to contrive to take them seriously, except in the sense that any unfriendliness must of course be taken seriously, is another. For the better the South African understands the official hostility of his former friends, the less intrinsic importance is he able to accord it. And —at a time when little that South Africa may do can be expected to win approval—it certainly seems futile to allow the fear of disapproval to weigh against more substantial considerations in judging what policies for South Africa are well advised.

It is not as if it were open to South Africa to do just nothing. The situation in which she finds herself is a heritage from a complicated past. Where the irresponsible foreign onlooker has merely to insist that apartheid is "morally wrong," the responsible South African has rather to ask himself whether there is any less immoral approach to South Africa's problem. He reads, for instance, in the Tomlinson Commission's report that "a continuation of the policy of integration would intensify racial friction and animosity," and that "the only alternative is to promote the establishment of separate communities in their own separate territories where each will have the fullest opportunity for self-expression and development." And he remembers how, at the Savoy Hotel dinner in 1961, Dr. Verwoerd threw down his challenge to a fascinated company: "Ladies and Gentlemen, what would *you* do?" He remembers also how, although the so-called "native question" had been on the agenda for South African statesmanship since before the turn of the century, it was not until 1948 that the country had a government with the necessary electoral backing to undertake any treatment of the question at all. And he notices that, while the world's judgment on apartheid is com-

monly expressed in moralistic language, it was, by contrast, upon sociological appraisal that the architects of the program based their recommendations for the progressive bettering of a given state of things which mere condemnation would not cure.

Not that foreign censure of South Africa's policies is without effect upon the domestic situation. But the effect is the opposite of what is intended. As happened in the 1930s when pressure from Geneva was put at one time on Japan and at another on Italy, pressure today upon South Africa from New York seems to increase support for those who, as the country's official spokesmen, are the immediate targets for the internationally orchestrated polyphony of execration.

International disapproval of South Africa, while more violent of late, has been at least audible from the early days of the United Nations. It was General Smuts who first had to bear the brunt of it; and he foresaw that his apparent impotence in the face of this disapproval might result in his defeat by those who could be expected to meet it in less accommodating language than he. As one of the authors of the Charter, he had emerged deeply disillusioned from debates in which he could detect little sign of any serious desire to understand the problems of a society not merely multi-racial, but multi-cultural as well. And it was Dr. Verwoerd, the present Prime Minister, who returned from the conference at Lancaster House in 1961 with a similar sense of disappointment, having said at the outset that he was ready to have apartheid discussed, though on the assumption that the discussion would proceed "in a mature manner." And in recent debates at the United Nations it has become increasingly difficult to impute much sense of reality to delegations which could join in a demand that South Africa take no action against those accused of attempting to destroy with high explosives the installations upon which the country's viability is dependent. Critics who see the defense of law and order as reprehensible merely because the government responsible happens also to be pursuing policies not widely understood are not considered by South Africans to have any qualification to pass judgment on what is being done. In a country where the least sign of official displeasure on the part of the Permanent Mandates Commission would at one time have excited grave concern, it is indeed a pity that the moral authority of the United Nations should have fallen almost to zero.

In few cases, if any, can a Communist-encouraged, if not necessarily Communist-inspired, campaign of systematic mood-engineering have met with comparable success in the Western world. Whether, for instance, the Communists should be described as having joined with the Western democracies in condemning the suppression of saboteurs in South Africa, or whether it is the democracies that should be said to have toed the Communist line, may seem an academic point. But it is not from Western propaganda that the Communist countries will have learned their hostility to a capitalistic South Africa. Who shall say that the converse is equally true? Is it the democracies that have deliberately set themselves to create chaos in South Africa? They may well appear to have been doing so; but it is hard to believe that they really have. Whereas, if the Communists have been striving to avert chaos, their efforts have been remarkably well disguised.

Someone has said that if South Africa did not exist she might have to be invented. What other target could have provided so unifying an emotional focus for the Bandung world? And it now begins to look as though South Africa were supplying the basis on which the two sides in the global ideological conflict may at last find themselves linked in a kind of uneasy partnership.

It is indeed typical of the spirit in which the anti-South Africa campaign is being conducted that crisis measures there are commonly condemned without any reference to the existence of a crisis; and that the crisis, if ever mentioned, is represented as being of the government's own creation—when the whole effort of so much of the outside world has seemed directed to bringing it about. South Africans are not blind to the fact that the defense of law and order is incumbent upon any government, and that in South Africa its neglect would be a betrayal of the law-abiding, both black and white. They know that the powers which governments give themselves in times of crisis are always subject to possible criticism as being unnecessarily drastic. But the key word here is "unnecessarily" and not "drastic."

II

In attempting to evaluate the policy of apartheid and, more important, the philosophy which underlies it, the troubled South African must be struck by something rather commonly overlooked—namely, the importance of differentiating between the

standpoint of the sponsors of the program, on the one hand, and the public psychology which makes its application feasible, on the other. Color prejudice, so evident in parts of the United States, and not absent even in Britain, has long been endemic in South Africa; and those South Africans who believe in "keeping the native in his place" may be expected to approve a program of separate development whether they fully understand it or not. But to say this is not the same as saying that at cabinet level the policy is grounded in unfriendliness toward the nonenfranchised majority of the population, for whose welfare the white minority has borne responsibility since 1910.

In any assessment, it is also necessary to differentiate between the electorate, the parliament, the government and the majority party. Pressures upon the South African people, to induce them to support some alternative set of policies, may be a rational undertaking—though politically not very sophisticated. Pressures upon the South African Government, to induce it to pursue policies not accepted by the people, would be less sophisticated and certainly less rational. To inveigh against a government for not attempting the politically impracticable may be emotionally rewarding. But it is otherwise rather pointless—particularly when it results in strengthening rather than weakening that government's position at home. If outside pressures are to produce in South Africa the allegedly needed "change of heart," it is in the electorate and not simply in the government that that change must be effected. If integration, against which the Tomlinson Commission gave warning, is, as it appears to be, the only thing that the world will accept, it is on the few local advocates of integration that the world must rest its hopes. There is little realism in supposing that, in a country whose constitution is based upon the Westminster model, the government could in deference to foreign pressures adopt a principle whose exponents have almost without exception lost their deposits when running for a parliament seat. It is true that at the last election some 70,000 voters supported the Progressive Party, which now has one member in the House; but, except as proving that political opinion in South Africa is sufficiently free, this could not in itself give much encouragement to those who want an early change.

Different policies might be adopted tomorrow, but at present it is separate development that is being tried. To understand it, one must, of course, examine it in its historical and sociological

context; for to study apartheid in the abstract would be as inept as to study the policy of desegregation in the United States in the same restricted manner.

"Ours," declared George Kennan in referring to the defensive nationalism of the American people, "is not the imperial frame of mind." At the root of the separate development program lies the nationalism, equally defensive, of the Afrikaner *volk*. It is indeed an error to see apartheid as expressive only of an attitude of the white man toward the black. For nationalism as such is not a question of color feeling, and it is nationalism, rather than racialism, that the honest inquirer has basically to comprehend. In the first place the nationalism we are speaking of is not that of all South African white people. Rather it is the nationalism of the Afrikaner *volk*, a majority indeed, but by no means the whole, of the enfranchised population. It is easy for the foreigner to deride a nationalism which he does not share; but nowhere in human history has nationalism ever been destroyed by foreign scorn. Admittedly, Afrikaner nationalism is a form of collective selfishness; but to say this is simply to say that it is an authentic case of nationalism. For what is nationalism anywhere if not collective self-love? What underlies apartheid is at bottom an attitude not toward the black man, but toward the forefathers—and the future—of the Afrikaner people. It is to these that a responsibility is felt, to conserve a cultural heritage in defense of which white men fought against white men from 1899 to 1902.

In a parliamentary political system it is always possible that the electorate may be persuaded to withdraw its support from a particular party. What is well nigh inconceivable, however, and presumably without example, is that a party should abandon its constitutive principles at a time when these principles are winning it ever increasing support at the polls. The apartheid program is the program of a particular party—the National Party; and it is germane to reflect in what circumstances that party had its birth.

The idea that English-speaking and Afrikaans-speaking South Africans might merge together into a single people was the basis of the Union and the accepted ideal of the Botha Government in 1910; and when in 1912 General Hertzog broke away from the Botha Cabinet, the government was anxious lest the spiritual patrimony of Afrikanerdom should suffer in competition with a more potent and by no means inferior, but importantly different,

cultural heritage—that of the English-speaking world. The Europeans who in the 1600s had come to settle in southern Africa, as others at about the same time were settling on the eastern seaboard of America, felt themselves different from the indigenous inhabitants they encountered on arrival. And their sense of having a distinctive cultural heritage worth preserving reasserted itself in the 1800s against the outlook of the English, from whose domination they presently sought to escape. A party formed specifically to preserve the integrity of Afrikanerdom against the danger of obliteration by a culture which was seen not as inferior but as different is hardly of a kind to opt for the merging of white society into a culturally uncongenial and in principle homogeneous all-African mass. Thus in the context of any discussion on alternatives to apartheid, the *raison d'être* of the National Party needs to be seen and appreciated for what it is. And if apartheid is to be understood, it should be studied in terms of the assumptions on which it is practiced by the National Party, rather than simply in the light of those prejudices which ensure its acceptance by enough of the voters to permit its resolute application.

When, for example, it is said that people are being penalized for the color of their skins, this is a crudely tendentious way of putting the position where, the whites having a monopoly of political responsibility, and power having passed into the hands of a party dedicated to the preservation of Afrikanerdom, things are done for the sake of this over-riding ideal which works to the disadvantage of those without a vote—who happen to be black.

Given, therefore, that the only program with any immediate prospect of going into operation in South Africa is that of the party in power, and given that an insistence on the differences not merely between the whites and the non-whites but to some extent even between the Afrikaans-speaking and the English-speaking elements in South Africa is the root principle of National Party policy, it is this philosophy of differentiation that has to be inquired into if the changes now being effected in South Africa are to be understood. Just as the National Party originally had its rationale in a danger to the Afrikaner *volk,* so today its apartheid policy has its justification in a threat to the European-type civilization which has in the course of three centuries been so hopefully built up in the South of Africa. And, as the party's original preoccupation with the needs of Afrikanerdom implied no necessary disrespect for British culture as such,

so now its concern for the safeguarding of what white men have created in South Africa need imply no reflection on the quality of African civilization in itself. For the European to see African culture as something essentially other than his own is by no means necessarily to hold it in disesteem. And in so far as the declared intention in the creation of the Bantustans is to provide for the several peoples within the Republic at least as good an opportunity for progressive self-fulfillment as is presumably now assured to the peoples of Tanganyika, Ghana and Kenya, the charge that apartheid is meant to hold the African indefinitely in a status of inferiority is without foundation.

Nor is it pertinent to depict apartheid as being based on the now no longer reputable American concept of "separate but equal." Separate but equal meant equal though separate, the context being a specific constitution under which the equality of all men was required to be affirmed. No such political system was ever established in South Africa. There it was white men's societies that the migrant Boers established; and at most what could be claimed for apartheid might be that it accepts as its criterion the formula "separate but reasonable"—reasonable, that is, in the given situation in which the future of the African is admittedly a responsibility of the whites. It is simply not conceded that there ever has existed in South Africa a single community comprising 16,000,000 souls, a community now to be divided into parts, each with its claim to a proportionate share of the country's total wealth. When the principle of Irish home rule was accepted in Britain it was not "a fair share of the United Kingdom" that was proposed to be allocated to the Irish; it was merely that to that portion of the country which was historically the Irish part a new status was to be given, in enjoyment of which it might presently emerge into membership in the League of Nations, into sovereign independence, into equality of nationhood among the peoples of the world.

True, it is not full sovereign independence that is now being conferred on the Transkei; but today's developments are declaredly no more than a phase in a process, the speed of which it will be partly up to the several Bantu peoples to decide. When therefore it is asked, "What is to be the ultimate outcome, what the final pattern, in South Africa?" the very question reveals a lack of understanding of apartheid. Apartheid means the granting of autonomy—the enthronement, that is, of communal wills

independent of that of the existing white electorate. Purportedly to give autonomy to others, while at the same time prejudging issues in respect of which their autonomy should be promising them a say, would be somewhat contradictory. The definitive blueprinting of South Africa's future is not being attempted now. There is no way to know what choices the Bantu may make in the situations of tomorrow. It is a liberal fallacy to suppose that those to whom freedom is given will use it only as foreseen by those who gave it.

Conceivably there could even today be found individuals who, regretting Britain's renunciation in 1922 of the vision of a single "British" community, would question the virtue of preserving the traditional identity of either the English, or the Irish, people. And some might even condemn as defeatist Britain's final abandonment in 1947 of her vestigial hope that, when she eventually withdrew from India, India might persist as a single whole. But Britain was sufficiently realistic to see that neither Islam nor Hinduism was digestible by the other, nor Irish nationalism assimilable into the nationalism of the British people. When, in 1910, South Africa was established as a single country, no attempt was made to fuse its many peoples into one. Such a fusion was attempted only for the two originally European, white-skinned, Afrikaans-speaking and English-speaking elements. And today, after more than 50 years of that experiment, it is more than ever obvious how enterprising a concept this was, and how marked are the persisting incompatibilities between two living cultures, neither of which is disposed to lose itself in the other. It is similarly easy to see the differences between the Zulu nation on the one hand and the Asian community, or communities, on the other—as indeed between the Zulus and any other of the major ethnic groups which together make up the African majority of the total population. Were the complete fusing of all South Africa's peoples to be proposed, and the constitutional framework for realizing it devised, and were the resulting battle for ascendancy to bring peace at the end, what is wholly unpredictable is whether it would be the Zulus or some other of the African peoples, or whether it might not after all be the Europeans, who would survive as "top dog" nation, imposing their solutions upon what might remain of the rest.

In 1909, the British Parliament could of course have rejected the formula which placed a virtual monopoly of responsibility

so securely in the hands of the European element. As that element forms so small a minority of the total population, it is somewhat as if Britain, in giving self-determination to an unpartitioned India, had placed power in the hands of the Muslims, and as if subsequently the world had directed its disapproving attention to the way in which the Muslim minority was safeguarding its identity by refusing to introduce majority rule. A case could doubtless be made for the swift liquidation of Pakistan, or of Israel, or for the incorporation of Basutoland in South Africa, or of Gibraltar in Spain, or similarly for the displacement of the whites in favor of the Africans in South Africa. It has even been suggested that Algeria provides a pointer to the future of South Africa; the fact overlooked is that the vital decisions on Algeria were made in Paris and in Evian, and were not made by a white community in Algiers. But in South Africa, which has long been self-governing, the relevant decisions must be made in Pretoria, or Pretoria and Cape Town. If the colons of Algeria have indeed been expended, this was not of their doing. The liquidation of white South Africa would require, constitutionally, an act of collective submission—a manifestation, perhaps we should say, of that sacrificial love which is the very essence of Christianity. But, if it is only by such collective self-immolation that a people can reveal itself as Christian, never since the coming of Christianity has there existed a Christian people, as distinct from a people composed in part of Christian individuals. Not only is it difficult to conceive of a Christian nation, in the sense of a nation capable of giving its all for others; it is even difficult to argue that the democratic system of government is a Christian system. For here, too, collective selfishness is enthroned; it is assumed, correctly of course, that men in general, when given a vote, will use it to suit themselves, to suit their group, their section of society; they will not use it to manifest sacrificial love.

Fortunately, the Africans in South Africa have in general not as yet become impatient of European rule. Indeed, there is a considerable reservoir of good will toward the whites, and certainly a disposition to look to them for much of the leadership, the enterprise, the initiative, the giving of employment. And maybe it is this comparative absence of hostility on the side of the Africans that explains the sense of responsibility with which they still are generally regarded by the whites. Individually the behavior of

white men may in many instances be unforgivable. But collectively and officially the Europeans still reveal a sense of paternalistic concern which could all too easily be lost if the non-whites should be seen by the whites as potential political rivals, and therefore eventual rulers. No one who questions the sincerity of the white leadership to "do the right thing" for the African can hope to understand the philosophy of apartheid; and it is presumably the fact that so many do seemingly doubt that sincerity which accounts for some of the incomprehension with which current policies are viewed.

III

How else is one to explain the apparent incredulity with which the simplest facts with respect to Bantu education are commonly received? Since white men, allegedly hating black men, must presumably be unwilling to seek their advancement, it is seen as inconceivable that Bantu education can have any object except to hold the Bantu down. What apparently is not believed is that the white man can possibly see that in the interests of his children an African élite must be created if the program for the Bantu homelands is to succeed. Yet, to doubt the sincerity of the program is becoming daily more difficult; so it is the feasibility rather than the sincerity of the program which has to be called in question instead. This is done, not infrequently, by ascribing to it objectives which have never, in fact, been a part of the plan.

Were the Bantustans program inherently and obviously unfeasible, this could hardly have gone unsuspected by its more intelligent exponents, in which case the whole thing must after all be an elaborate bluff—though it is hard to see who was to be deceived. And the truth is that, if the plan did not offer any serious promise of providing an answer for South Africa's possibly, but not certainly, insoluble problem, it could scarcely be receiving the support it does. Even doctors cannot always know that their patients will recover; but the belief that they possibly might do so is the basis on which they typically proceed; and for South Africans it may well be sufficient to believe that apartheid might possibly prove the answer for them to be willing to give it a trial. And this goes for black South Africans as well as for white.

One thing at least is certain: the homelands program, if patently unworthy of Bantu acceptance, will be rejected by the

Bantu. They are not rejecting it yet. This must be irksome to South Africa's enemies and may explain the vehemence with which they are now demanding that it be frustrated from abroad. Were they really quite so certain that the program was a bad one they might be content simply to sit back and see it fail on its own demerits. But the trouble with just waiting for it to fail is that it might succeed and be seen by the world to be succeeding.

The fact that the Bantu have been so prompt in participating in the work of the new Transkei Parliament is not, of course, a guarantee of their love of the program as it stands. There is such a thing as joining in an enterprise with the intention of making it fail. But it surely is a form of color prejudice which simply takes it for granted that the African of the future, unlike some Europeans, will be quite incapable of moderation, of humor, even perhaps of fair play. Anyone with any faith in the good judgment and good nature of the Bantu will prefer to assume that there may be enough of them who will choose to adapt themselves to the realities of political life as they find them. They do not despair of seeing some of the best of the new generation active in the politics of the Bantustans. Extremism there will doubtless be; that one must indeed accept. And should the extremists "get on top" the program may very easily fail. But it also offers worthwhile possibilities for the less extreme; and it seems reasonable to hope that these, too, may have a role in the running of the new Transkei. Like Basutoland, the area must long remain economically dependent upon the good will of Pretoria; and it is not by immoderate gestures that African leaders will be in the best position to retain that good will.

Not the least among the many disservices that some of the black man's self-styled friends have done him is to have encouraged in him a disposition to ask for the moon. White men know better than to train their own offspring to expect the impossible, to suppose that the world owes them a living, to believe that if things happen to go ill with them it is because there is a conspiracy against them. All too commonly non-whites are tempted to believe that, were it not for their pigmentation, life might for them have been relatively free from ups and downs. All too readily are they given to suppose that when once they have won their independence paradise will be theirs, and incidentally that paradise is the least for which they can be expected to settle. All too often some sensible suggestion is disposed of with the com-

ment that "the African would never be content with that." Too seldom is it asked with what the white man might not be content. Too seldom is it conceded that in the world as it is peace may well be dependent upon black and white alike adjusting themselves to conditions with which no one is entirely content.

It is no kindness to the African to convince him that his grievances are more serious than they are—to tell him, for instance, that the area of the Bantustans, barely 13 percent of the Republic, is insufficient for his needs and plainly inequitable as the portion for 75 percent of the population. There is no reason why further land, if needed, should not eventually be added to the Bantustans. Already they are larger than England and Wales, with their population of some 40 million. That the Bantustans, when rehabilitated and industrialized, should accommodate, say, 10 million people does not seem an unreasonable estimate. And again, on the question of South Africa's wealth, it is difficult to maintain that the Bantu have in any consequential sense been partners in the development of the country. Labor they may indeed have provided, on terms sufficient to draw more and more of them in from the outside every year. But if by their physical exertions those from the Transkei have earned a proprietary interest in the gold mines, for instance, why not also those from the Rhodesias and Mozambique, or the coolies that Lord Milner imported from China, for an agreed remuneration, in a time of exceptional dearth?

Apartheid is sometimes referred to as an "ideology;" and, since it is on the face of it inconsistent with Western liberalism, it is seen as in principle wrong. But it is wiser to recognize it as simply an expedient, an exercise in social therapeutics. It is a remedial treatment for a state of things deriving from the past. In part it is, of course, dictated by a passionate concern for the future of a European-type white society, and no doubt that society's right to self-preservation is itself a matter for debate. But it is this, and not the principle of apartheid, which thus is the matter for debate. Concede to the white man a right to preserve his achievement, and some such policy as apartheid may well appear as an inevitable corollary. Deplore the white man's collective self-concern, and you may equally well damn every other example of nationalism, white or black. It is absurd to assume that nationalism is nice, or nasty, according to its color.

It is possible of course that the Afrikaner, strict legalist that he

is, may exaggerate the moral importance of constitutional right. Contrary to what his detractors imply, he shows little disposition to seek his objectives save through the methods of the constitution. What cannot be done constitutionally cannot, in his philosophy, be done. But conversely what can so be done, it is technically his right to do; and he is prone to hold that he is therefore right to do it. He has little patience with those who brush his constitutional arguments aside, even censuring his reliance on them—and this in a period when it is from people who disregard and even manipulate their constitutions that mankind has probably the more to fear.

It is perhaps propitious that everybody should think of his own political system as about the best there ever could be; but if each wants to impose the principles of his own on all others, the outlook for peace is poor. Honored voices have lately proclaimed the ideal of a world made safe for diversity. What else is this but the very principle of the apartheid program? Just as in the world as a whole there are many societies, each distinctive in its peculiar culture, so also within the confines of geographical South Africa there are more than one or two societies. That very self-determination which his fathers fought for is what the Afrikaner now envisages for each of the African peoples still subject to the white man's rule. The philosophy of separate development implies a rejection of the fallacy that wherever a single system of government is in operation, there do the governed compose a single people. Were the critics of South Africa to accept squarely the fact that South Africa comprises more communities than one, their admonitions would be more persuasive and their proposals more to the point. As it is, what many of them keep calling for is something which they might well know to be impossible—the inauguration, namely, of a system in which South Africa's many peoples would resolve themselves unreluctantly into one.

It is this cult of unreality in the assumptions of her critics that has given South Africa her now, alas, almost habitual indifference to what they may choose to say. When, for instance, they affect to see in the Transkei experiment a device for providing a reservoir of cheap labor, they seemingly forget that that is just what the Transkei has traditionally been, and that the granting to it of autonomy, with the creation of thousands of local opportunities both in government and industry, must tend, if anything, to make the territory's manpower less rather than more

plentifully available for service in the white man's system. Or again, when they dismiss primary school instruction in the "mother-tongue" as a stratagem for barring the Bantu's access to the cultural resources of the West, they overlook that degree of proficiency in both English and Afrikaans which the Bantu child has concurrently the opportunity to achieve before moving up from one standard to the next. When they hail as a "setback" for the apartheid policy the success of possibly awkward candidates in the Transkei elections, they only show how apparently defective is their conception of what may be expected to occur in free elections. When they complain that the autonomy now being accorded is incomplete, they ignore the object lessons offered by Belgium's precipitate withdrawal from the Congo. And when they question the capability of the Bantustans to stand economically on their own, they neglect to ask themselves whether even Britain's Basutoland will ever be able to do that either.

The philosophy of apartheid is the standpoint of politicians who, having no mandate for effecting the liquidation of so-called white supremacy, must do the best they can, in circumstances where nothing they may realistically contemplate can be expected to win them the approval of the world. It is the philosophy of patriots who, while aware that certain powers could presumably choose to destroy them tomorrow, do not therefore feel free to abandon their tasks of today; and who, though charged with despising their African fellow-citizens, have more occasion to contemn their erstwhile Western friends who, for fear of the displeasure of the Afro-Asian "Establishment," can seemingly no longer afford to have eyes and minds of their own.

South Africa knows that it is not she that has lately changed; that never at any time were her peoples a single community or her constitution other than oligarchic, and that it is nevertheless essentially for this that she is now being blamed. And, from the fact that in their reviling of her, critics rely so largely on misconceptions as to what she is doing, she can draw a measure of hope. For perhaps it will not be too long before persons of independent outlook, who as of now are apparently accepting the fashionable evaluation of her policies, will begin to perceive and to appreciate those policies for what they are.

SOME MAXIMS AND AXIOMS

By Philip Mason

WILLIAM JAMES divided philosophers into the tender-minded and the tough-minded; similarly, anyone who has given concerned study to South Africa and the present international situation may find it useful to categorize his thoughts into what he would like to happen and what he thinks likely to happen. This article is an attempt to summarize in a highly condensed (and therefore oversimplified) form some personal conclusions from these two angles and to suggest certain maxims or lines of policy for Britain and the United States.

In Britain, the question of South Africa has been looked at lately from many different points of view—sometimes from the angle of high morality, sometimes from that of national interest. Among those who put moral considerations first, there are both professing Christians and humanist-agnostics. The Christians, however, are divided, perhaps more sharply than the humanist-agnostics; some are resolutely militant, but others feel that militant intervention can only cause violence and that the calculation of whether such violence is outweighed by ultimate good is too nice to be susceptible of any clear conclusion; some indeed would consider it one on which a Christian should not embark. In this article I propose to deal with the second set of arguments—those pertaining to national interest—but this is not because I think the moral arguments unimportant.

Here too, among those who proceed from the point of view of national interest, there is sharp division. Some, probably a majority, argue quite simply that we have substantial stakes both in capital and trade which would be lost by any interference in the present situation; others regard these stakes as something to be balanced against loss elsewhere if we persist in a support of South Africa that might lead to isolation. From whatever angle the question is regarded, it is highly complex and there are many factors capable of different assessment; all that seems clear is that almost any course that might be adopted involves considerable disadvantages alike for the United States and for Britain.

II

To clarify thought, it seems useful to state certain propositions which for me have come to look like axioms, because on these I have reached some degree of certainty as to what is likely to happen. They are not of course really axioms in Euclid's sense, because most of them are controversial and many people would differ with them. But using them as points of departure, it is possible to consider whether what one would like to happen can be reached from them, and finally whether any of them need reassessment in view of the conclusions to which they have led. We must look at them and see whether they can be shaken, like the alibis in an old-fashioned detective story.

First Axiom: South Africa is our business; it can no longer be held that its internal affairs are purely domestic.

This is clearly a crucial point on which all others turn. Many would argue that the principle is dangerous; there are, they say, many other countries where human rights are denied, and once we have international bodies interfering with a sovereign state there will be no end to it. There are two answers to this argument based on merit and a third on the political facts.

The first is that the denial of human rights in South Africa differs in kind because it is so complete over so wide a field, and because nowhere else is it so explicit or based so clearly on a quality over which a man has no control—namely, the color of his skin. It would not be easy to judge whether the right to security of person—that is, freedom from torture and arbitrary arrest—is respected any more or any less in South Africa than in one of the Iron Curtain countries. But equality before the law, freedom of movement, freedom to marry, are clearly much less evident in South Africa. Catholics in Poland may not have the right to educate their children as they want, but they are not debarred from living with their wives and children in large areas of the country, nor forced if they lose a job to give up their houses and move to some remote part of the country. They are not confronted with benches on which they may not sit and vehicles in which they may not travel. They are not sent to segregated schools and forbidden to marry outside their community. But let me emphasize that it is not only the extent of the denial of rights but also the fact that it is explicit and open that makes the South African tyranny different in kind from that of other oppressive states.

Secondly, I suggest that the whole argument about the right of a sovereign state to do what it will with its own subjects within its own boundaries is becoming more and more out of date. At an earlier stage of social development, it was no doubt permissible to beat one's wife and any interference with such chastisement was an infringement of the right of the head of the house. At another stage, it was common for great landowners to keep private armies. We begin to reach a stage in international affairs where the sovereign independence of single countries is becoming progressively limited in the same way as that of individuals in domestic law. A network of obligation is being established which constitutes international law. And international law does proclaim quite loudly that certain human rights ought to be observed,[1] while it embodies, somewhat uncertainly, the beginnings of provision for making this fact. Every disregard of these rights is dangerous to all of us because the appalling prospect of nuclear war makes it of paramount importance to strengthen respect for international law. Surreptitious breaches of human rights are constantly occurring and in themselves are deplorable, but they are less dangerous to international law and the future of mankind than the open and explicit refusal to acknowledge observance as even desirable. In this, South Africa alone is guilty.[2]

These are arguments on merits; in addition, certain facts must be taken into account. One by one, the powers which argued that the affairs of South Africa were solely matters of internal jurisdiction have abandoned this position; the last Resolution of the Security Council was unanimous and the Resolution of October 10, 1963, in the Assembly was carried by a vote of 106 to 1 (recorded by South Africa). Those who take the other view have been beaten. It is no use ignoring this.

Second Axiom: Revolution from within will not succeed without outside help.

Arguments that "a people cannot be held down forever" are unconvincing; they proceed either from cases where the government was ineffective or had scruples or where the government

[1] See the second paragraph to the preamble of the United Nations Charter and the 2nd and 3rd Purposes of the United Nations under Article I. The Declaration of Human Rights was adopted by the General Assembly on December 4, 1948, and all Members were called on to publicize it.

[2] South Africa has repeatedly refused to accede to requests and suggestions from the United Nations respecting the treatment of Indians, the mandate on South West Africa and visits of United Nations teams, as well as on the denial of human rights on grounds of race.

was in a hopeless minority. In the French and Russian Revolutions, workers, peasants, soldiers and the middle classes were united against an aristocracy which was not particularly efficient and by comparison was small in numbers. In India, the government was responsible to a distant parliament which in its turn was responsible to an electorate with strong humanitarian elements and no conviction that its own interests were involved. In South Africa, the aristocracy of white men is a fifth of the population; it is on the spot, its interests are very much involved and it has in its hands all weapons and posts of importance. It is efficient and ruthless. Further, the terrain is quite different from Malaya or Kenya; there is no jungle and the country can be divided into sectors by railway lines and rivers which can be patrolled by helicopter.

Third Axiom: The South African Government will not fail through internal weakness.

This is clearly a more controversial axiom than the last. But the "crack in the Dutch Reformed Church" which has been prophesied for many years does not grow very wide; a small minority are deeply disturbed in conscience by what is happening—they have established the Christian Institute which is non-racial—but, so far, whenever there has been a General Synod, this minority has been over-ruled. In general, recent events have brought the English-speaking whites closer to the Afrikaners; for one idealist lost they have gained a materialist, and humanly speaking there is no foreseeable likelihood of the government losing power through constitutional means.

Fourth Axiom: Prosperity does not make the South African Government's policy acceptable to the African.

It is argued that wages are high in comparison with other parts of the continent and the African is therefore better off. But in the first place the urban wage is often supplemented in other parts of Africa by produce from the reserve or country area, and this is seldom the case in South Africa; second, the cost of living in the towns is high and real wages are low;[8] third, the ratio of white wages to African has not grown less, as might have been expected by analogy with other countries where industrialization

[8] Accurate statistics are not easy to obtain. But the Chairman of the Bantu Wages and Productivity Association said on October 30, 1963, that the average monthly income of heads of households was $58.87 per month. In 45.8 percent of households, the head is the sole breadwinner. The minimum family income needed for subsistence is calculated at $64.40 per month. There must therefore be many families below it.

has reduced the differential between skilled and unskilled labor; on the contrary it has increased.[4] In the reserves, mortality rates indicate how widespread is malnutrition;[5] in the towns high mortality rates and malnutrition must be set against the emergence of an apparently prosperous middle class. The prosperity, then, is more apparent than real. But even if prosperity were real, experience elsewhere does not suggest that an emerging and prosperous middle class with no civil rights is likely to be a stable element; on the contrary, it is likely to be revolutionary. There is, however, no exact precedent for an emerging and prosperous middle class faced with so menacing a network of personal restrictions and privations.

Fifth Axiom: More prosperity will not end apartheid.

It is argued that the growth of industry will in time bring an end to apartheid and that the right policy for outside powers is to invest more in South Africa and speed up industrialization. But this—the hormone weed-killer argument—does not stand up to the facts. For the last 15 years South Africa has been getting more and more prosperous and more and more industrialized; apartheid has been getting sharper and sharper. Most of the great industrialists would prefer to have a more mobile and interchangeable labor system, but political considerations come first and they have to sacrifice economic desirability to keeping in with the government. The same thing happened in the southern states of America when industry had moved from the north; the factory manager usually behaved in accordance with state customs which did not suit him rather than become unpopular with state and local authorities.

Sixth Axiom: Direct armed intervention by other African states will not be successful without direct help from a major power.

This needs no elaboration. Even the Organization of African Unity would not argue to the contrary.

Seventh Axiom: Things will not stay as they are.

Other African states, though unable to mount military action

[4] Average monthly wages calculated from figures published by the Transvaal and Orange Free State Chamber of Mines Annual Report for 1962 were $20.80 for 392,000 Africans, $294.00 for 48,639 Europeans. Most of the Africans are living as single men and are housed and fed. The cash wage is about half the total cost to the company, the other half consisting of housing, food and recruiting. Europeans also get some benefits not in cash, but these are probably equivalent to not more than 10 percent of salary.

[5] Infant death rate in 1961 per 1,000 live births for white children was 27.6, for Asians 43.3, for colored 126.8; for Africans it is estimated to be as high as 400 per 1,000 in some rural areas.

directly against South Africa, are already training guerrillas, some of whom will find their way into South Africa. They are likely to be helped considerably by Communist powers, particularly if no legal action is taken by the United Nations. Guerrilla action will not by itself produce decisive results; but in South Africa it will produce increasing misery and destruction and outside it will increase hostility to Britain and the United States, since they are South Africa's trading partners and allies. Forced to choose between their interests in South Africa and their interests elsewhere, Britain and the United States will step by step renounce their special relations with South Africa.

Eighth Axiom: Economic sanctions in the form of an embargo on a single commodity will not be successful in forcing South Africa to change her policies.

It is urged that the South African economy is particularly vulnerable in respect of oil, ball bearings and gold. Oil has been chosen by many as the commodity best suited for restrictive action; being bulky, it is easier than others to control from outside the country. But no agreement to deny oil to South Africa is likely to be complete. There is a world surplus of oil competing for markets and if an agreement to deny oil were to be reached between the larger companies and producers, the profit to a small producer which did not join might be considerable. Moreover, the South African economy is based on cheap coal, and oil represents only 10 percent of fuel requirements. True, it is for agriculture and defense that oil is needed; but stocks are certainly between three and six months' supply and probably nearer the latter, particularly for defense. Any idea of an embargo is likely to be debated for some time and the South Africans would have enough warning to impose rationing in good time and, to a certain extent, to stock up (though this does mean construction of storage capacity). They could also increase in about one year's time the production of oil from coal. Rationing might be expected to double the period for which stocks would last, and even if the embargo were complete (which is unlikely) it seems that at least a year would elapse before it would be seriously felt. The considerations which apply to ball bearings and gold are different, but of course these items are less bulky and easier to transport; the broad conclusions are similar, that is to say, that the effect on the economy of any restrictions on these commodities would be slow to operate and would not be entirely crippling.

Ninth Axiom: Sanctions will not be effective unless backed by a blockade.

Only a blockade seems likely to be able to hold out any prospect of controlling the supply of oil; it follows that general sanctions in respect of all supplies to South Africa (which would include many items that were more difficult to control) would also be controllable only by blockade.

Tenth Axiom: General sanctions could not be successful without the coöperation of the United States and the United Kingdom.

Britain has the largest volume of trade with South Africa, and the United States is the next largest trader. Their coöperation would thus be required for an embargo; it has already been indicated that an embargo by itself would be useless and would be effective only if backed by a blockade. In any case, it may be taken as certain that Britain would not give up trade with South Africa unless confident that other powers would be forced to do the same. Furthermore, a blockade would require the use of aircraft carriers. Only eight powers possess aircraft carriers, and it is suggested that one would be needed off each of the five main ports. The burden seems likely to fall heavily on the United States and the United Kingdom.

Eleventh Axiom: Britain and America will not undertake a blockade unless there is a unanimous vote by the Security Council in support of a legal issue.

The interests of the two powers are similar but are distinct. Britain has approximately £1,000,000,000 worth of investment in South Africa and about £150,000,000 a year of trade. (According to what is included in the calculation, these figures can vary widely, but they appear to provide a reasonably accurate indication of the size of the interests involved.) This is far larger in absolute terms than the American interest and in proportion to national income it is of course very much larger still. Exports to South Africa constitute about 4 percent of Britain's total exports; in certain areas of the country and of industry the percentage is considerably higher, and in certain constituencies the political effect of unemployment resulting from action against South Africa might be considerable.

Then there is the Simonstown base. This is perhaps of some importance to NATO, much more certainly to Britain, in the event of any minor wars or threats to the peace in the Indian

Ocean or Southeast Asia. It seems unlikely that it could be of major importance in a major war. But we cannot disregard it.

More important, in many eyes, is the question of the three High Commission Territories—Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland. Basutoland is entirely surrounded by the territory of the South African Republic and is highly vulnerable to economic action. All three are eventually part of the South African economy; Basutoland and Bechuanaland, however, are set on the normal British colonial course toward ultimate independence under democratic institutions. This is a markedly different pattern from that of the South African native reserves, the so-called Bantustans. In both Basutoland and Bechuanaland there are leaders who believe it is better to avoid open conflict with South Africa, but in both countries there would be considerable reluctance to become part of the South African political system and there is great sympathy with the Bantu-speaking inhabitants of South Africa. Both countries send migrant workers into South Africa and would be hard hit if this were stopped. Both know what it is like to live in South Africa. The relative strength of these contradictory pulls is hard to assess but there can be no doubt that any international action against South Africa would involve initial suffering for the Protectorates. Almost any attempt to mitigate their hardships—for instance, dropping food from aircraft—would be likely to provoke retaliation in which they would suffer more severely still and which might result in shooting.

The case of Swaziland is somewhat different, as this alone among African territories has voted overwhelmingly for traditional chiefs who have indicated a much greater readiness than is found in the other two territories to accommodate themselves to South Africa, perhaps in fear of British democratic processes. Whatever happens in Swaziland, it seems certain that Basutoland and Bechuanaland will remain hostages to South Africa; for Britain this reinforces the prospect of loss of trade and capital as arguments for inaction.

In the United States there is much less personal involvement with South Africa, in the sense of fewer relations and friends; and while there is apathy and ignorance among the public in both countries, it is more marked in the United States. Investment in South Africa, though growing, is balanced by an investment in the rest of Africa which is larger. On the other hand—

though it is a bold foreigner who pronounces on trends in United States policy—the civil rights question is surely likely to influence the policy of the United States. Those who opposed the Civil Rights legislation will probably feel an inclination to support South Africa rather than intervene. A majority, however, supported the Bill which has now become law. But it will not bring a new heaven on earth. It seems likely that pressures on the United States will mount from the 20,000,000 Negroes and those who most actively supported the Bill. The President is likely to need all the Negro support he can get. It will be easier to accede to pressure urging intervention in South Africa than to end all domestic grievances; and there will of course also be mounting pressure from the United Nations.

All this seems likely to incline the Administration more and more toward intervention. But this is a matter in which the United States will wish to persuade, rather than drag, the United Kingdom. Step by step the two are likely to move in this direction, the one more, the one less, unwillingly. But at present, it seems that only a clear breach of international law will bring the United States to the point of sanctions and only pressure from the United States will induce Britain to acquiesce. At the time of writing, both would veto sanctions. This, however, might well not be the case in 18 months' time and on a legal issue.

III

This brings to an end the list of axioms, or points on which I feel some confidence as to what is likely to happen. The general picture is one of a strong and increasing determination among the Africans and Asians (and to a lesser extent the South Americans) in the United Nations to achieve some positive intervention in South African affairs. The fact that this embarrasses Britain and the United States will not be a deterrent. But it will be Britain and the United States which are asked not only to give up substantial advantages in trade and capital investment but also to undertake the expensive and thankless task of enforcing the policy of blockade. Technically an act of war, a blockade might easily lead to a shooting war because, if South Africa did grow desperate, resistance would at some stage almost certainly be offered.

South Africa is not the only problem in the world. What action would the Communist powers be taking elsewhere, notably in

Southeast Asia, while the blockading forces were engaged in a prolonged and exhausting operation against South Africa? What would they be doing in Africa if Britain and the United States refused to take part in action against South Africa and thus found themselves diplomatically isolated? Whatever course is taken by the United States and Britain, if pushed to extremes, can be used to advantage by the Communists.

What would be the results of international intervention? Rhetorical phrases such as "bringing the South African Government to their knees" are used, but it is not clear what exactly they mean. Economic measures seem likely in the first place to rally white opinion to the government, but prolonged and effective measures with real determination behind them might persuade some of the more materialistic among the present supporters of the government that their interests lay in another course. It seems unlikely, however, that they would be given constitutional means of registering a change of mind. The present government has a majority in Parliament, and in what was virtually a state of war this would not be shaken. The life of Parliament could be prolonged. Meanwhile, the burden of economic sanctions would fall first on the African working class; if, driven by hunger and unemployment, they demonstrated against the government, they would be shot down. Insurrection has no more chance of success when a blockade is in progress than before. In fact, it seems likely that once sanctions were imposed there would be little likelihood of surrender until in fact military occupation became necessary.

This is a course on which no one would lightly wish to embark and it would not be easy to bring it to a satisfactory conclusion. Even if a war was won, an occupation would present the considerable problem of disengagement. This is an additional argument for being clear as to the kind of result we want to produce. Otherwise, the present South African Government and its followers are forced to fight for all they hold vital to their national life, with no option but total surrender; they will go on until the only choice lies between a period of anarchy and chaos and one of prolonged international occupation. Analogy with other recently independent African countries is apt to be misleading. In South Africa the economy and the administration are wholly in white hands as they have not been elsewhere; except in the former Belgian Congo, there was at least some preparation for

independence. In South Africa there is no machinery for a peaceful transition of power because the government does not contemplate such an outcome. Further, it seems almost impossible to visualize a South Africa from which all white persons—there are 3,000,000 of them—would be wholly banished. This would indeed be genocide; operations which resulted in this would be substituting one intolerable evil for another.

It is urged that in order to avoid demanding total surrender and the last ditch mentality which it produces, sanctions might be imposed with the limited object of bringing the South African Government to a council table with the Africans. But would a lasting agreement result from a conference forced on one party? On the other hand, if the government has clearly recognized that it has to agree to whatever the other party imposes, with the alternative of finding itself back again in a war it no longer can hope to win, this is only marginally different from total surrender.

All these considerations point to the extreme difficulty of imposing sanctions and to the unpalatable nature of the results likely to follow. Premature and unsuccessful action by the United Nations would be perhaps the supreme disaster. It would also be a disaster if Britain and America were isolated diplomatically by refusing to take part in action against South Africa. They would be fighting against the course of history.

The conclusion seems to be that while the United States and Britain cannot afford to ignore the problem or postpone dealing with it, any measures taken should be designed to give the South Africans some opportunity for concessions without complete surrender, in the hope that this might lead to formation of a government that would negotiate. Any solution which is to last must surely have its roots in South Africa, yet it is impertinent to attempt to force concessions on South Africa unless one recognizes the difficulty of its position and unless one has some general idea of a solution that would be acceptable to the rest of the world.

The South African Government's own solution is unacceptable to the rest of the world because apartheid does not represent a partition of the country based on any fair principle. Further, it is not proposed that the inhabitants of the Bantustans should have any rights in the white part of South Africa, which at present is about 87 percent of the whole. But is it not possible

to contemplate eventually a very different kind of partition, in which rights between the two areas (or groups of areas) would be reciprocal, in which resources and territory would be divided in some degree of relationship to the numbers involved, and in which there would be necessarily a non-racial zone for the highly industrialized area of the Rand? Can one not see, for example, a predominantly white area in the Western Cape and predominantly black states in other parts of South Africa, perhaps linked in a loose confederacy based on agreements derived ultimately from mutual convenience? In both areas, it would be necessary to guarantee human rights for all inhabitants. This is the merest speculation, but it seems the least objectionable outcome of which there is any hope. If confederacy is impossible, separation might have to be complete, but what is essential is that there should be no explicit denial of human rights by either state.

IV

Many South Africans believe that the fully independent African states of the north will crumble and display an inability to govern themselves, thereby gradually convincing Britain and America of "where their true interests lie." They visualize, in short, a breakdown of faith in international action and a line-up of the rich white nations against the poor non-white nations. It is assumed for the purpose of this article that it is a major aim of British and American policy to avoid such a result.

On this assumption, it seems that four main objectives remain. Most of them would be generally recognized as valid objectives, but what is important is the order of priority. The first three are primary or world objectives; the fourth is of vital and immediate importance, but it is local in nature and ought to rank behind the other three. The objectives are:

First: To strengthen forces making for a system of international law which will command respect and ultimately enforce compliance.

Second: To avoid any attempt by international forces to carry out a policy which lacks an adequate chance of success. (This flows from the first.)

Third: To avoid the diplomatic isolation of the United States and Britain. (This again flows from the first, because the international system cannot succeed without the United States.)

Fourth: To achieve in South Africa a transition to a demo-

cratic government with a minimum of bloodshed. (This is the local objective).

In this view, we should try to achieve the best solution we can to the last objective, bearing in mind always the fact that the means adopted must not hinder the first three. To make this order of priorities clear may well be the best way of achieving the local objective, because what holds the South Africans on their present course is the belief that in the last resort Britain and America will support them against the rest of the world.

If, then, we are to avoid either a long-drawn-out and inconclusive war or, on the other hand, economic sanctions escalating into an internal revolution backed by external force and eventual occupation, we must face the fact that war is a possibility. Surely history has shown that, between two negotiators, one who is determined to get his own way will prevail over one who is undecided. If there were in the United States and Britain a clear determination that the priorities are as suggested here, there might be a real chance in South Africa of a growing recognition that it was useless to fight against irresistible power.

The pledges which the South African Government hold against Britain are Simonstown, the High Commission Territories and our investments (and here Americans are concerned too). The first question to be asked is how long we can hope to preserve these if we take no action. We have decided against throwing in our lot with the South Africans; we have not yet decided that we cannot be neutral. If we stick to our present line of policy, it seems likely that these hostages will be stripped from us as we are dragged protesting into action in which we make the major sacrifices and for which we obtain no credit.

In any case, the Simonstown strategy is questionable; many believe it needs rethinking and replacing. The High Commission Territories are ultimately part of the South African economic system, and anything which brings nearer a democratic government in South Africa would probably be to their advantage in the long run. Again, in the long run, it is arguable that investment in South Africa has a better prospect once a democratic government is in power than before. This has certainly been the view taken by substantial interests in Northern Rhodesia; and an African government in South Africa would have on call a far larger number of educated Africans, and with wider experience, than in Northern Rhodesia.

It is here that the suit brought by Liberia and Ethiopia against South Africa in respect of South West Africa becomes of importance. It provides a legal issue, and if the International Court of Justice at The Hague hands down a decree against South Africa it may provide it with a demonstration of the strength of world opinion. There are many who believe that, after all possible procrastination, the South African Government would in the end abandon South West Africa rather than provide the United Nations with grounds for legal action. If that were so, the lesson would be salutary and might induce a real change of opinion. If it is accepted that only a legal issue will bring the United States to the point of action, it seems clear that this must be the test case against South Africa.

But to African nations—and possibly to Asian and South American ones also—this involves intolerable delay. Lives, they point out, are being ruined by the present régime. But more lives would be ruined by premature action. We can only succeed in persuading the Africans to let this be the testing case and to delay other action if we make our ultimate position perfectly clear, both to the South African Government and to African nations. Our present policy of secret diplomacy and private warnings, which is designed to avoid rallying the South Africans behind their government, leaves all parties uncertain as to our ultimate intentions. Such a report as that of the U.N.'s Expert Committee does not provide the unshakable legal ground that South West Africa would provide for proceeding against South Africa; and it will not bring the United States or Britain to the point. It is therefore surely preferable to delay until the stronger ground has been tried and the white people of South Africa are shown how powerful international action can be.

In the light of this discussion, the following maxims seem to emerge:

First Maxim: We—the United States and Britain—must make it clear that we prefer the friendship of the world to that of South Africa, that we shall not use the veto to save her from international action and that we are determined to see a change of government.

Second Maxim: We—the United States and Britain—should provide the South Africans with occasions on which to retire gracefully, as preliminary exercises in preparation for the final concession of calling a national convention.

Third Maxim: We—the United States and Britain—should make it clear to the rest of the world that this is our intention and that we are already prepared to give up certain local and temporary advantages. For Britain, this would mean bringing to an end all forms of special relationship such as those in connection with the sterling area, Simonstown and the supply of arms.

V

This policy has no chance of success unless we have firmly made up our minds that we may in the last resort have to face blockade which may lead to war. It is not a particularly attractive policy from any point of view, but it is preferable to being gradually forced into the same course without any credit to ourselves and with no chance at all of producing a change of government not accompanied by violent revolution. If we reëxamine the axioms in the light of these disheartening conclusions, our attention will center on the third—that the South African Government will not fail through internal weakness. The policy suggested *might* alter this, because it would destroy the main hope of the nationalist white South African and *might* produce a peaceful change of government.

This is to be tender-minded and hopeful. If I am tough-minded and revert to what I think likely to happen, the eleven axioms seem solid. Further, it seems unlikely that either the United States or Britain will make up its mind as suggested. That is not the way of democracies, particularly just before or just after an election. What seems likely is that we shall reach these conclusions too slowly and too late to achieve their objectives.

To some, the thinking in this article will seem to present black and white too starkly. It is a British habit of thought to seek for compromise, a middle way out of every dispute, to believe that things will not be so bad after all. And most politicians tend to consider every day that passes a day gained. It is to combat this tendency to complacent drift that thought has been expressed here in harsh terms.

Two factors stand out. It is almost impossible to overstate the conviction of African leaders that something must be done about South Africa; it is very easy to under-rate the determination of the Afrikaner people.

KOREA'S "MENDICANT MENTALITY"?

A Critique of U. S. Policy

By Pyong Choon Hahm

NOT long ago, at a social gathering, I overheard a high-ranking U.S. military officer berating the Korean people for their "mendicant mentality." He was deeply annoyed by the inability of the Koreans to find a way to live independently, without always looking to the United States for financial help. He did not see how the American taxpayers could be made to carry indefinitely the burden of helping a poor nation that seems unable or unwilling to help itself. He cited the billions of dollars of American aid that have been poured into Korea since 1945. If this has not made the Koreans self-supporting by now, could there ever be an end to American almsgiving? The Koreans must be made to realize, he said, that they had to get onto their own feet very soon; otherwise continued American aid would only create what one American news magazine several years ago termed a "handout mentality."

This line of argument is by now familiar. As one of the Koreans who is presumably afflicted with a "mendicant mentality," I feel constrained to present the Korean view of the question. First of all, if what we Koreans have been receiving in the form of American foreign aid has been nothing more than charitable handouts from the American people, we have for 20 years been chasing a rainbow. If the American military aid with which the Korean armed forces have been equipped and supplied has been a "handout to a mendicant nation," the Korean soldiers who have fought and died are not even worthy to be called "international soldiers of fortune"—they were armed beggars. Have we really shed our blood and tears, during and since the Korean War, for no reason at all except to maintain the flow of American largesse? If so, I must admit that various Americans are right in arguing that the billions of dollars spent for Korea have been wasted. Of course, those who make U.S. foreign policy do not necessarily think of aid to Korea as almsgiving on an international scale. If it turned out that they did, Prince Sihanouk and the Cambodian people would soon have the Koreans for company. I am not here advocating that the Koreans should join the Cambodians in their political gyrations. It is only because I am worried that such a

state of affairs might arise in Korea, and with such serious consequences, that I am writing this criticism of much American thinking in connection with my country.

Is it possible that Americans are so naïve as to believe that they are indulging in almsgiving—that they are aiding Korea purely out of generosity? In the course of two decades of mutual effort in fighting Communism, we had been led to believe that American aid was a token of appreciation and a measure of support for the efforts of an ally in defending this part of the free world against the Communists. We even thought that American aid was a form of reimbursement to us for carrying a disproportionate share in the mutually beneficial effort to resist Communist imperialism. We believed that we were defending not only ourselves but Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, and, above all, the interests of the United States in the western Pacific. To be sure, the primary beneficiary of our efforts to resist Communist aggression has been ourselves. But were we the only beneficiary?

We could not have withstood the onrushing forces of Communism solely for our own benefit. We needed the conviction that we were fighting for the entire free world. But now we are given the feeling that if South Korea should go over to Communism, no nation would be hurt, not even the United States—that after a few tears had been shed out of sympathy, the Americans would not miss us much.

There has been talk about "the domino theory" as applied to the countries of Southeast Asia. Do our American friends really think that the same theory would not apply in the western Pacific? Would United States interests there remain unaffected by the communization of South Korea? If Americans do not believe that South Korea is indispensable in the defense of the rest of Asia we had better reconsider our national destiny. In this age of international interdependence, no nation can live all by itself. If a nation with an annual per capita income of less than $80 maintains a standing army of 600,000 men and devotes 45 to 50 percent of its national budget to defending a truce-line against its own divided countrymen as well as against the vast masses of Red China, and does this solely for its own benefit, something is terribly wrong. We somehow had the idea that what we were doing was important not only for ourselves but for others. We considered that the truce-line that divided our country was the common frontier of all the free nations. And since by

defending it we were doing something for all the free nations, we expected unqualified support in return.

In order to endure present hardships, Koreans must have hope in the future; if they do not have the expectation that the harder they work the better the future will be, they are dead—living corpses. It is our misfortune that Korea has not as yet had the political leadership that could give this hope and certainty to the people. For this, no one but ourselves is to blame. But on top of this feeling of helplessness, there has been piled the feeling of humiliation that our nation has now come to be treated as an international beggar.

II

Policy-makers in the United States who may be shocked by my words will of course reply that I have misunderstood terribly "the emphatic commitment" of the United States to stand by its ally, South Korea. As eloquent proof, they will point to various pronouncements of American officials and to the vast amounts of American aid that have been poured into Korea. Unfortunately, what looms largest in the minds of both Koreans and Americans is the dollar sum, not the "commitment." United States policy-makers may think that they have made their commitment to stand by the South Korean people plain enough. But to most of the Korean people this regrettably is not so.

The American people may wonder why their foreign aid has not resulted in their acquiring any great number of genuine friends abroad. The fact is that when a nation, however poor, feels that it is assumed to be acting as a beggar, it can hardly be expected to remain a friend. The United States would have done better not to give any aid in the first place; and if it believes that a recipient is developing a "handout mentality," it should discontinue the aid then and there. Otherwise some people may be tempted to try their luck under Communist rule rather than continue receiving aid and humiliation together.

The worst part of it all is that the American people do not intend to humiliate their allies who are receiving aid (at least, so I believe). Nor is the United States unwilling to commit itself in the common defense of the free world. Why is it, then, that the United States fails to convey the awareness of its own interest in seeing that its allies remain within the free world? What they want is not just the dollars but the articulated appreciation of

their efforts to preserve the community of common interests. The fact that the United States and its allies are partners in a common destiny is what binds them together. If this fact is not believed by all its members, no amount of dollars will keep the community whole. What is primary, therefore, is not dollars but this mutual appreciation of one another's efforts and the firm acknowledgment of common cause and destiny.

The basis of the partnership must be fully understood. If the U.S. taxpayer, with an average per capita income of $3,000 a year, feels too heavily burdened with defense spending, what is the Korean taxpayer with his $80 per capita income to feel? The U.S. Government thinks it necessary to economize. But what about the Korean Government? One would expect that it would be the Korean Government which was thinking of reducing defense spending and devoting more of its scarce natural resources to economic development. I am not saying that the United States should not economize. If I were an American taxpayer, I would regret the necessity of paying for the defense of the free world and contributing to the economic development of underdeveloped countries; I would no doubt be resentful that the United States is the country bearing the chief burden. What I wish to point out is that in terms of economic necessity the Koreans feel the strain with greater urgency.

III

Some years ago, former President Eisenhower reportedly justified United States military aid to Korea by explaining that to maintain one U.S. soldier in Korea would cost the United States $3,000 a year, but to maintain a Korean soldier cost only $600 a year. In other words, it was cheaper to have Korean soldiers defend the common defense line than to have American soldiers do it. We are willing and proud to render satisfactory service in defense of our common frontier cheaply. But how cheaply are we expected to do so? Is it a mendicant mentality to expect $600 from the United States? How hard a bargain will the Americans drive?

Since we devote such a large share of our very much smaller resources to the common defense we have come to expect reimbursement for our defense spending in the form of economic aid. Now it is reported that the United States must decrease its economic aid. Is it understood by Americans that in this event we

shall have to reduce our military spending to avoid economic ruin? Moreover, have they forgotten what they intimated when they urged the Korean people to accept the cease-fire in 1953? At the time, the entire Korean population was against the proposed cease-fire, not because they loved the war but because the proposed redivision of the country in the name of a truce would neither solve their problems nor bring permanent peace in the Far East.

Following the death of General MacArthur, there was a revival of the debate as to whether he was or was not right in advocating a decisive victory in the Korean War at the cost of extending it to the southern part of Manchuria. To us, the redivision of the country was as shortsighted as the original division had been in 1945 on the ground of military expediency. For that expediency we paid a very dear price, and now we are paying an even costlier price for a second act of expediency.

The peculiar pattern in which Korea's natural resources are distributed is often forgotten. The northern part of the country, which is now under Communist rule, is blessed with almost all Korea's natural and energy resources. The southern part is agricultural, with little industrial potential except a vast supply of underemployed labor. The population there has been swollen by large numbers of people who fled the north; moreover, the rate of population increase is one of the highest in Asia. With all this in mind, the Koreans felt that it would be better to die in the war against the Chinese Reds than to find themselves condemned to a life of slow death. Nevertheless we did not insist on continuing the ugly war, nor did we wish to drag an unwilling world into it. Furthermore, the American Government's spokesmen who persuaded us to accept the unpopular truce promised (or so we thought) that the United States would see to it that South Korea became economically self-sufficient. We did not see at the time how this could be done. We did not think that we could be self-sufficient without the reunification of the country. However, the American officials seemed rather certain of success, and we reluctantly acquiesced in the cease-fire.

To make matters worse, we hear arguments that the two U.S. army divisions now stationed in Korea should be pulled out. The United States Government has emphatically denied any such intention. Yet it insists that it has to economize, and notes that in this age of "Big Lift" the withdrawal of forces to Okinawa or

Hawaii would in any case make no difference militarily. The question cannot be viewed simply in terms of military tactics alone. Again it boils down to the U.S. commitment in Korea. An American political scientist once described countries like South Korea, Taiwan, South Viet Nam and others as "military-base countries." If the U.S. divisions are withdrawn, South Korea would be something less than even a military base. It would be a place where you fight, where you do the shooting and killing. It would be not a place fit to station troops but a kind of wilderness, reserved for bombing, strafing and shelling. In short, it would be a place in which to fight a war, but not a fit place in which to live.

In the light of these arguments, do Americans feel that they have made their "commitment" explicit and clear? Is there any wonder that as things stand many Koreans, especially young ones, feel insecure, indeed somewhat desperate?

IV

As a part of its economy drive, the United States seems to be trying to shift a large part of the financial burden in Korea to Japan. The arguments in favor of the "normalization" of the Korea-Japan relationship sound plausible enough. Two such close neighbors cannot continue to be unfriendly indefinitely. Economic coöperation will benefit the South Korean economy a great deal. Furthermore, Japanese participation in that economic development will enable the United States gradually to lessen its over-heavy burden.

In spite of these rather self-evident arguments, the Koreans have remained apprehensive of what would follow "normalization." One reason is the fear that it might entail dilution of the U.S. commitment in South Korea, particularly at a time when Japan is still reluctant to commit itself to a community of interests with South Korea, and when its attitudes toward Red China and North Korea are still very ambivalent. The Japanese Government has been stressing only the commercial advantages to be derived from normalization, thus increasing the fear of the Koreans that the Japanese will take over their weak economy. Another factor militating against improved relations has been the impression given that the Japanese are seemingly to be brought in to do what the United States has so far been unable to achieve. We cannot believe that the Japanese have a magic formula for developing our economy that the United States does

not possess. We fear that the inevitable outcome of economic coöperation with Japan is that our economy will become an appendage of the booming Japanese economy.

Especially irksome is the sermonizing attitude of Americans in accusing us of being narrow-minded and spiteful toward the Japanese. They tell us that everyone else has forgiven and forgotten their enmity toward the Japanese, and ask why we cannot do the same. And they remind us that they have forgotten Pearl Harbor and that even the Taiwanese, who had been under Japanese colonial rule longer than the Koreans, have forgotten and forgiven. They also cite as an example the new Franco-German friendship. Assuming for the moment that our reluctance to open up our economy to the Japanese is really due to our animosity toward them for the wrongs they have done us in the past, the fact remains that our experience with the Japanese is something no other people can understand. Furthermore, we hear members of the Japanese cabinet remark publicly that Japanese colonial rule was a boon to us in terms of modernization and that we ought to be thankful for what they did. We are reminded of Mussolini's justification of his conquest of Ethiopia as "a sacred mission of civilization." Perhaps we should have welcomed the Japanese as "champions of freedom, justice, civilization and order," as Il Duce claimed the Ethiopians welcomed his conquest.

I do not wish to deny absolutely the necessity for normalizing the Korea-Japan relationship. But this seems the wrong time for it. Our economy is in such a chaotic state that what is called normalization may turn into something very abnormal for all the countries concerned. We feel that Japanese capitalism is still at the stage where American capitalism was before the turn of the century. We are concerned not so much with technology as with a way of thinking. We simply do not believe that Japanese capitalism has reached the degree of sophistication where the self-interest of the business community is truly enlightened. We have not yet been able to find any evidence tending to dispel our doubts concerning the motive of Japanese businesses coming to Korea. Are they coming to help our economy? Are they so altruistic? Or are they coming to exploit a ready consumer market?

We are capable of understanding that an economic exchange which is enormously profitable to one side may be very profitable to the other also. So long as the economic relationship between

the two countries remains purely commercial this may be true. But when the talk is of "economic coöperation," premised on the idea that the Japanese are going to "aid" the Koreans in their economic development, the principle "let the buyer beware" is not enough. Furthermore, our economy is too weak and unstable at present to give us a reasonable bargaining position, even if the whole relationship were to be strictly commercial. We are, of course, aware that American businessmen are not always altruistic in their relations with us. But there is one important difference (so, at least, we should like to believe) in the fact that most Americans do have an enlightened self-interest, reinforced by a conviction that we are partners in a common cause.

Aside from the present disparity in bargaining powers of Japan and South Korea, two things at least must precede any normalization of their relationship. First, the Japanese must acknowledge their indebtedness to the costly sacrifices made by the Korean people in defending the Far East from Communist aggression for the past 20 years. Second, they must state publicly that they are committed to becoming a partner in a common destiny with South Korea, the United States and other free nations in Asia. So long as they do not acknowledge that they belong to this community of interest with the South Korean people, their motive for so-called "economic coöperation" will always be suspect. So far, the Japanese Government has done nothing to alleviate the Koreans' fear of a new form of the old Japanese imperialism. One era of Japanese exploitation of Korea in a century is more than enough.

V

But the final responsibility must rest with us, the Korean people. American foreign policy is not responsible for all the ills presently afflicting us. If our economy is too weak and chaotic to resist the challenges of the expanding Japanese economy, it is at least in part our fault. If it has not been able to become self-sustaining, we are in no position to claim that this goal is unattainable. And if our politics is permeated with corruption and suffers from instability, that especially is our own fault. As Confucius said, no nation is destroyed by an external foe until and unless it first destroys itself. When the Japanese colonized us in the early part of the present century, it was we, the Korean people, who let them take over our country.

Yet when we remember the destruction, both material and spiritual, wrought by the Korean War and the fact that our cultural heritage is authoritarian and absolutist, and thus stacked against democratic processes, our shortcomings may not loom so large. Tragically, the modernization of Korea started with Japanese colonization and militarism. We moved from an Oriental despotism to another form of absolutism under a foreign power. In August 1945, when the country was liberated from Japanese rule, our life was still largely medieval in its outlook and mentality. Suddenly faced with the task of building a nation that could join the world community of the mid-twentieth century, we were literally overwhelmed by the problem of closing the gap of several centuries in a decade or two.

Also, it was our misfortune that our liberation from Japanese militarism was made possible by the superior military might of the United States. Our first post-liberation contact with Western democracy commenced with a military government and the division of the country. And the ideological war, stemming from the division of the country, finally turned into a fratricidal holocaust. South Korea is the only nation that has had the experience of living under Communist rule even for a few months and then coming out of it to tell what it meant and to take an anti-Communist stand. Our young people learned by experience the superiority of democracy. But their admiration for American democracy has been directed more toward its advanced technology of warfare than to its ideological merits. Our anti-Communist posture has been too military in nature. Our learning about the military manifestations of American democracy has been very rapid; but it has not been so rapid in other ways.

In our political life, we have not yet been able to develop the kind of statesmanship that gives the people inspiration and hope for the future. Great political leadership could give the people a feeling of national identity, a vision of the place the nation would occupy in the world community 10 or 30 years from now. This lack of confidence in the nation's future has stifled its economic development. The people have been unwilling and unable to invest in a future so clouded and uncertain. They have been able to think only of short-term gains. They are without a sense of direction and purpose. The corruption and dishonesty are symptoms of this fundamental sickness.

There is no single, final and encompassing answer, of course, to

Korea's problems. What might come close to being an answer may not be an answer at all. But I venture to use two words to describe two intangible commodities that seem to me essential for my nation's future. One is *patience;* the other is *confidence.* I am fully aware that these two "resources" are among the scarcest in underdeveloped countries. But I am thinking more in terms of the patience of our allies and their confidence in our ability to achieve finally a viable democracy in our corner of the world. This is even more important to us than to control our own impatience with the slowly rising material standard of living and our temptation to weaken our faith in the democratic way of life. Unlike Communism, democracy does not promise easy and quick over-all solutions for our ills. Democracy can be realized in Korea only gradually; it may take more than a generation or two. In the meantime, we need to be assured by those who have already achieved democracy that it is a possible goal for us also and that it is indeed superior to any other way of life. As beginners and learners, we are naturally very sensitive to the impatience of our allies. There will be more failures and setbacks ahead of us. But we should like to believe that we are making headway, perhaps too slowly but none the less unceasingly. My belief is that this patience and this confidence are the "foreign aid" we need most.

RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

By Henry L. Roberts

with the assistance of William Diebold, Jr., Economics; Fritz Stern, Western Europe; Howard Linton, Asia; Richard H. Nolte, Middle East, North Africa; Joseph A. Ellis, Latin America; Pamela Day, Africa.

General: Political and Legal

THE DEBATABLE ALLIANCE. By Coral Bell. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1964, 130 p. $1.40 (Paper).

Miss Bell, an Australian scholar and author of "Negotiation from Strength," here examines with much perception the tribulations of Anglo-American relations "as an element in the central power-balance." A lucid, critical but hopeful discussion.

FINANCING THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM. By John G. Stoessinger and Others. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1964, 348 p. $6.75.

Professor Stoessinger, in collaboration with ten experts, here goes thoroughly into the many ramifications of the financial plight of the United Nations operations and possible ways to solve the situation, which he holds is above all a "political crisis over the proper role the United Nations is to play in the national policies of its member states."

INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE: THE CRAIGVILLE PAPERS. Edited by Roger Fisher. New York: Basic Books, 1964, 290 p. $6.50.

A quite wide-ranging set of papers by a number of psychologists, sociologists, political scientists and economists and dealing with such themes as the nature of international conflict, handling conflicts, international community, decision-making and public influence.

WINNING WITHOUT WAR. By Amitai Etzioni. Garden City: Doubleday, 1964, 271 p. $4.95.

A thoughtful essay on the East-West conflict, critical of the "duopolist" strategies of both the "protracted conflict" and the conflict-resolution schools. The author seeks a third course aiming at non-armed rather than armed conflict and competition.

THE MILITARY IN THE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT OF NEW NATIONS: AN ESSAY IN COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS. By Morris Janowitz. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964, 134 p. $4.50.

A sociologist's comparative study of the role of the military in the political life of the new nations of Asia and Africa analyzing the "political capacities of the military to rule and to modernize."

NOTE—By special arrangement with World Affairs Book Center, readers of Foreign Affairs may obtain, *post free,* any book published in the United States (except paperbacks) at the publisher's regular list price. Send orders, with check or money order, to Desk FA, World Affairs Book Center, 345 East 46 Street, New York 17, New York.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. By Harold F. Alderfer. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964, 251 p. $8.50.

A concise, general description of the patterns of local government in Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, Asia and selected Communist states.

THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL WATERWAYS. By R. R. Baxter. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964, 371 p. $9.50.

A well-documented study of existing laws pertaining to international waterways —straits, canals and rivers—the various organizations which administer them, the obstacles to international administration. Special attention is given to the rules guiding the use of the Suez, Panama and Kiel Canals.

MARXISM OF OUR TIME OR THE CONTRADICTIONS OF SOCIALISM. By Gilles Martinet. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1964, 126 p. $3.25.

A quite stimulating essay by the Marxist editor of *France Observateur* on the contradictions that have beset the Marxist movement and on the possibilities of a renovation.

VOICES THROUGH THE IRON CURTAIN: THE RADIO FREE EUROPE STORY. By Allan A. Michie. New York: Dodd, 1963, 304 p. $4.50.

A report by the former deputy director of Radio Free Europe on the success of this "unique venture in psychological warfare." The chapters on Poland and Hungary are most revealing of the effectiveness of the agency.

WELTGESCHICHTE DER GEGENWART. Edited by Felix von Schroeder. Berne: Francke, 1962–63, 2 v. Swiss Fr. 96.

This is a massive collaborative handbook of contemporary world history. The first volume is organized by country and region. The second comprises studies on various leading themes and issues.

AMERICAN AGENCIES INTERESTED IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS. Compiled by Donald Wasson. New York: Praeger (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1964, 200 p. $4.50.

The latest (fifth) edition of this handy reference book provides detailed data on the aims, organization, activities, personnel and publications of American organizations concerned with world affairs. It also includes listings of foreign chambers of commerce and information bureaus. The subject and personnel indexes add to the book's value.

General: Military, Technical and Scientific

INTRODUCTION À LA STRATÉGIE. By General Beaufre. Paris: Colin, 1963, 127 p. Fr. 9.

A remarkably interesting essay, by an experienced French officer, on the general principles and theory of strategy, a work that Captain Liddell Hart has called the most complete and most carefully formulated of our generation.

THE WEAPONS ACQUISITION PROCESS: ECONOMIC INCENTIVES. By Frederic M. Scherer. Boston: Harvard University, Graduate School of Business Administration, Division of Research, 1964, 447 p. $7.50.

A solid and rather technical study of the problem of providing economic incentives for the maintenance of the development and production of advanced weapons systems in the United States, undertakings carried on chiefly by private firms under government contract.

THE DISPERSION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS: STRATEGY AND POLITICS. EDITED BY R. N. ROSECRANCE. New York: Columbia University Press, 1964, 343 p. $7.50.

A number of essays directed to the problems resulting from the spread of nuclear weapons to an increasing number of states, including discussion of the French and British efforts to achieve nuclear capabilities.

TOMORROW'S WEAPONS, CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL. BY BRIGADIER GENERAL J. H. ROTHSCHILD. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964, 271 p. $6.95.

The former Commanding General of the U.S. Army Chemical Corps Research and Development Command discusses the potentialities of biological and chemical weapons and the moral and political aspects of their employment.

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY FORCES. BY LINCOLN P. BLOOMFIELD AND OTHERS. Boston: Little, Brown, 1964, 296 p. $5.00 (Paper, $2.50).

A lengthy essay by Mr. Bloomfield plus a symposium of shorter pieces by a number of specialists dealing with the question of international military forces, both as an adjunct to current efforts to maintain the peace and as a possible world army to enforce the peace.

DISARM AND VERIFY. BY SIR MICHAEL WRIGHT. New York: Praeger, 1964, 255 p. $6.95.

A retired British foreign service officer with much experience in recent disarmament conferences discusses the central obstacles that have confronted the negotiations and the possible means of overcoming them.

THE UNITED STATES AND WORLD WAR II. BY A. RUSSELL BUCHANAN. New York: Harper and Row, 1964, 2 v. $12.00 (Paper, $4.50).

This work in the New American Nation series is a useful and concise, though two-volume, account of the role of the United States in the Second World War, based on a wide use of the tremendous body of official and other military histories.

OPERATION BARBAROSSA: THE BATTLE FOR MOSCOW. BY RONALD SETH. London: Blond, 1964, 191 p. 25/.

An able brief account of the background and operations of the German attack on Russia in 1941.

BEHIND THE BURMA ROAD: THE STORY OF AMERICA'S MOST SUCCESSFUL GUERRILLA FORCE. BY WILLIAM R. PEERS AND DEAN BRELIS. Boston: Atlantic (Little, Brown), 1963, 246 p. $5.95.

Colonel Peers, commander of Detachment 101 of O.S.S., and Lieutenant Brelis, serving under him, write a full account of the complex 1943–1945 guerrilla operations in Burma. An important contribution in a field of current military interest.

THE MARCH ON DELHI. BY A. J. BARKER. London: Faber, 1963, 302 p. 42/.

An account, by a lieutenant-colonel who was army air liaison officer during the siege of Imphal, of the 1944 attempt by the Japanese Imperial Army to invade India. It incorporates materials supplied by the Japanese Army Commander Lt.-General Mutaguchi and other surviving commanders.

ARMAGEDDON: 1918. BY CYRIL FALLS. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1964, 200 p. $3.95.

A tribute to the "shock action" of British and Arab troops under Allenby and the last great cavalry charge in the Palestine offensive of September 1918 in which

the Turks were rapidly defeated. This is one of the Great Battles of History series and is the work of the official historian of the Palestine campaign.

THE MOON-DOGGLE: DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE SPACE RACE. By Amitai Etzioni. Garden City: Doubleday, 1964, 198 p. $4.50.

As the title indicates Professor Etzioni argues that the space race is "not a propellent but a drag" and has "proved to be a monumental misdecision."

General: Economic and Social

ECONOMIC GROWTH IN THE WEST: COMPARATIVE EXPERIENCE IN EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA. By Angus Maddison. New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1964, 246 p. $4.50.

This is a very valuable book in at least two ways. In seeking explanations for growth, and particularly for differences in national growth rates, Mr. Maddison, an Englishman who works for O.E.C.D., sets forth analyses and arguments with a clarity that helps define the issues whether one agrees with his conclusions or not. In putting forward his case Mr. Maddison presents a valuable body of data, interestingly arranged.

CHALLENGE TO AFFLUENCE. By Gunnar Myrdal. New York: Pantheon Books, 1963, 172 p. $3.95.

High levels of unemployment and low rates of growth are not affluence. In his usual forthright manner, the Swedish economist prescribes various dosages of several different medicines for a patient he has treated before.

INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS POLICY. By Richard D. Robinson. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1964, 252 p. $4.00.

Professor Robinson uses historical, legal and to some extent philosophical approaches to explain the difficult position in which foreign businesses often find themselves in underdeveloped countries. He sets forth some rather stiff tests that management practices and investment decisions ought to pass if foreign businessmen hope for a happier future. In the process much interesting material is presented.

INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS: PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS. By Howe Martyn. New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1964, 288 p. $5.50.

A much more popular treatment than Robinson's and covering a wide range of subjects rather quickly.

STERLING IN THE SIXTIES. By Christopher McMahon. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1964, 118 p. $1.40 (Paper).

This is a most intelligent and intelligible discussion of the problems of achieving a long-run improvement in the British balance of payments and keeping sterling operating as a reserve currency. Mr. McMahon stresses the fundamental political character of monetary measures and is very good on the extent to which national sovereignty in these matters is limited in fact if not in law. He recommends steps toward a truly multilateral reserve system.

THE THEORY OF TRADE AND PROTECTION. By William Penfield Travis. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964, 296 p. $6.25.

An interesting effort to make the theory of international trade more realistic

by bringing protection into it. This also permits an assessment of the significance of protection. The largely theoretical body of the book is followed by a chapter analyzing the recent trade policy and tariff structure of a number of major countries.

AGRICULTURAL PROTECTION AND TRADE: PROPOSALS FOR AN INTERNATIONAL POLICY. By J. H. Richter. New York: Praeger, 1964, 148 p. $5.00.

A former official of the U.S. Department of Agriculture, with much European experience, here sets the latest phases of the problems of international trade in farm products against an assessment of past national policies and their future evolution. He does a very good job in explaining the common agricultural policy of the European Community and has suggestive, if controversial, ideas on the ways the United States might try to negotiate.

WITNESS FOR AID. By Frank M. Coffin. Boston: Houghton, 1964, 273 p. $4.50.

A former Congressman who then ran the Development Loan Fund and now represents the United States on the Development Assistance Committee of the O.E.C.D., Mr. Coffin has witnessed aid from several vantage points. He writes well and vigorously in support of an aid program that emphasizes long-run development, professionalism in administration, and realistic expectations of what can be accomplished.

WHERE DID YOUR MONEY GO? THE FOREIGN AID STORY. By Andrew Tully and Milton Britten. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1964, 223 p. $4.95.

Less sensational than it sounds, this journalistic effort at "constructive muckraking" draws together largely familiar material that goes well beyond aid into other foreign policy difficulties.

THE REFUGEE IN THE WORLD: DISPLACEMENT AND INTEGRATION. By Joseph B. Schechtman. New York: A. S. Barnes, 1964, 424 p. $8.50.

A comprehensive, disturbing study of the attempts made to solve the refugee problems which developed from 1945 to 1963 in Europe, Asia and Africa; Cuban refugees are treated in an appendix.

The United States

VIEW FROM THE SEVENTH FLOOR. By W. W. Rostow. New York: Harper and Row, 1964, 178 p. $4.00.

In this brief book, based largely on earlier lectures and articles, the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council undertakes to explain U.S. foreign policy, its objectives and measures, since 1960. At present reading, it seems overly sanguine, anachronistic in spots and not altogether persuasive as a sketch of the world situation and our position therein.

THE McNAMARA STRATEGY. By William W. Kaufmann. New York: Harper and Row, 1964, 339 p. $5.95.

This is chiefly a presentation, much of it in McNamara's own words, of the changes brought about by the Secretary of Defense. In the author's view two major revolutions have been achieved—a redesigning of our military strategy and forces, and the creation of a new method of decision-making within the Pentagon.

POWER AT THE PENTAGON. By Jack Raymond. New York: Harper and Row, 1964, 363 p. $6.50.

An experienced correspondent for *The New York Times* takes us on an informative tour of the Pentagon and its inhabitants, including extended discussion of the American military organization and effort in recent years.

STRANGERS ON A BRIDGE: THE CASE OF COLONEL ABEL. By James B. Donovan. New York: Atheneum, 1964, 432 p. $6.95.

The point of view of the defense counsel adds interest to this true spy story and toward the end there are some episodes that offer food for thought on the manner of negotiating with the Russians.

THE CONSERVATIVE AFFIRMATION. By Willmoore Kendall. Chicago: Regnery, 1963, 272 p. $5.95.

THE CONSERVATIVE PAPERS. Garden City: Doubleday, 1964, 268 p. $1.45 (Paper).

WHAT IS CONSERVATISM? Edited by Frank S. Meyer. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1964, 242 p. $4.95.

These are three further contributions to the rapidly growing body of writings defining, defending or advancing the cause of American conservatism. Mr. Kendall's work is a quite extensive discussion of both the premises and politics of conservatism. The two other books are symposia on various themes.

SUICIDE OF THE WEST: AN ESSAY ON THE MEANING AND DESTINY OF LIBERALISM. By James Burnham. New York: Day, 1964, 312 p. $5.95.

Part of Mr. Burnham's continuing indictment, this work, as he says, "is a set of variations on a single and simple underlying thesis: that what Americans call 'liberalism' is the ideology of Western suicide."

BEFORE THE COLORS FADE. By Fred Ayer, Jr. Boston: Houghton, 1964, 266 p. $6.00.

An affectionate but quite candid portrait of the late General George S. Patton, by his nephew.

WHEN THE CHEERING STOPPED: THE LAST YEARS OF WOODROW WILSON. By Gene Smith. New York: Morrow, 1964, 307 p. $5.95.

This is an overly dramatic, distorted account of those years in Wilson's life which have already been more accurately recorded—his second marriage, struggles at the Paris Peace Conference, fight for American participation in the League, prolonged illness, retirement and death on S Street.

THE REPUBLICAN PARTY, 1854–1964. By George H. Mayer. New York: Oxford University Press, 1964, 563 p. $9.75.

A scholarly, event-crammed narrative of the fortunes of the Republican Party, dealing very heavily with elections and legislative controversies. The author is Professor of American History at Purdue.

PRICE AND QUANTITY TRENDS IN THE FOREIGN TRADE OF THE UNITED STATES. By Robert E. Lipsey. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963, 487 p. $10.00.

This is a typical National Bureau of Economic Research book in its valuable contribution of basic data on important subjects and the meticulous investigation of divergences and alternative explanations.

The Western Hemisphere

PEARSON OF CANADA. By JOHN ROBINSON BEAL. New York: Duell, 1964, 210 p. $3.95.

A popularly written, far from satisfactory biography of an outstanding statesman and his many national and international accomplishments, up to the time he became Prime Minister in 1963.

LE QUÉBEC CHANGE DE VISAGE. By MICHEL BERNARD. Paris: Plon, 1964, 217 p. Fr. 9.85.

A French author's report on Quebec and the French Canadians: history, culture, frustrations and the question of "separatism."

LOS SUBAMERICANOS. By VICTOR ALBA. Mexico City: Costa-Amic, 1964, 324 p.

A prolific writer sketchily examines the present state of Latin America and concludes that both "classic" capitalism and "inhuman" Communism have failed to provide the means for Latin America's development and that another route must be found to resolve Latin America's social and economic problems.

THE PAPALOAPAN PROJECT: AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE MEXICAN TROPICS. By THOMAS T. POLEMAN. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964, 167 p. $4.50.

This factual study of Mexico's attempt to develop a humid, tropical region traces this "T.V.A." project from its beginnings in 1947 and notes that difficulties have stemmed largely from technical considerations rather than problems of capital. A publication of Stanford's Food Research Institute.

REVOLUTION IN BRAZIL: POLITICS AND SOCIETY IN A DEVELOPING NATION. By IRVING LOUIS HOROWITZ. New York: Dutton, 1964, 430 p. $7.50.

A collection of writings and articles by the leaders and intellectuals of Brazil's contemporary political, social and economic revolution, supplemented by Professor Horowitz's incisive assessment of present-day Brazil—its problems and prospects.

FIDEL CASTRO & COMPANY, INC.: COMMUNIST TYRANNY IN CUBA. By MANUEL URRUTIA LLEÓ. New York: Praeger, 1964, 217 p. $5.95.

As indicated by the title, this is a bitter personal account of the Cuban Revolution betrayed, written by the man who was Castro's first president during the early months of 1959. The book's interest lies in the author's anger and his inability to suggest a positive alternative to the Castro régime—other than an abstract "militant democracy"—and, as such, reflects the present difficulties of the Cuban exile groups in coördinating their actions.

THE BAY OF PIGS: THE LEADERS' STORY OF BRIGADE 2506. By HAYNES JOHNSON AND OTHERS. New York: Norton, 1964, 368 p. $5.95.

This detailed account of the abortive invasion of Cuba is based primarily on interviews with the leaders Manuel Artime, José Peréz San Román, Erneido Oliva, and Enrique Ruiz-Williams, and the survivors of the highly idealistic but inadequately prepared Brigade 2506. An important and fascinating book which helps clarify much of the controversy surrounding the event and points to the independent role of the C.I.A. as more involved in the disaster than previously thought.

CUBA: SOCIALISME ET DÉVELOPPEMENT. By René Dumont. Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1964, 189 p. Fr. 9.90.

A sympathetic assessment of the Cuban Revolution, its failings in the agricultural sector and the need, given Cuba's lack of an industrial base, to find an "original way" in resolving the agrarian problem within a Marxian framework.

QUISQUEYA: A HISTORY OF THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC. By Selden Rodman. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1964, 202 p. $5.95.

This "first complete history" of the Dominican Republic is helpful in providing contact with a little-studied country, but is a book without depth or perspective.

Western Europe

BRITAIN AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, 1955–1963. By Miriam Camps. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964, 547 p. $8.50.

There is little doubt that this will be *the* book on its subject for some time to come. For years Mrs. Camps, an American living in Britain, has been a close observer of both the development of the European Community and the evolution of British policy toward it. While much of the account is detailed and properly concerned with the concrete issues of tariffs, quotas and the like, Mrs. Camps does not let her readers forget that "the negotiations have also been about the future shape of Europe." The book is first-rate both as recent history and as an analysis of the interplay of national policies.

EWG UND FREIHANDELSZONE. By Karl Kaiser. Leyden: Sijthoff, 1963, 270 p. Gldrs. 27.90.

Covering a shorter period than Miriam Camps' book—from Messina to the breakdown of free-trade-area negotiations at the end of 1958—this also focuses on British relations with the Continent. It is a very good job, realistic in its concentration on British and French aims and policies.

WESTERN EUROPE SINCE THE WAR: A SHORT POLITICAL HISTORY. By Jacques Freymond. New York: Praeger, 1964, 236 p. $5.50 (Paper, $1.95).

Not a history of Europe, but a series of intelligent essays focused on the development of "Atlantic Europe."

EURATOM: ITS BACKGROUND, ISSUES AND ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS. By Jaroslav G. Polach. Dobbs Ferry (N.Y.): Oceana Publications, 1964, 232 p. $7.50.

A detailed study of the background, organization and scope of this agency.

EIGHT EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANKS. New York: Praeger (for the Bank for International Settlements), 1963, 336 p. $10.50.

A study of the organization and activities of banks on the Board of the Bank for International Settlements (Basle)—the central banks of England, Sweden, Switzerland and the Common Market countries. The volume comprises individual authoritative studies clearly explaining international monetary coöperation.

REPRESENTATIVE AND RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT: AN ESSAY ON THE BRITISH CONSTITUTION. By A. H. Birch. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1964, 252 p. $5.00.

In his thoughtful and important book, Professor Birch examines the different

theories and expectations concerning representative government and measures them against prevailing practices.

BRITISH POLITICS IN TRANSITION, 1945–63. By Francis Boyd. New York: Praeger, 1964, 253 p. $5.95 (Paper, $1.95).

Mr. Boyd, a leading British correspondent, analyzes Britain's political machinery and the key issues which successive governments faced since 1945. He maintains that the system has functioned well, despite defects.

HUGH GAITSKELL, 1906–1963. Edited by W. T. Rodgers. London: Thames, 1964, 167 p. 25/.

A collection of essays by friends and associates which constitutes a preliminary biography of the late political leader. Arthur Schlesinger expresses the sentiment of many: "Without becoming Prime Minister, he won international confidence as a man who nobly strove for the democratic purposes of decency, freedom, and justice. . . ."

BRITISH POLITICS IN THE SUEZ CRISIS. By Leon D. Epstein. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1964, 220 p. $5.00.

A thorough examination of the British domestic response to Suez, placed in the context of the British system and of lingering imperialist sentiments. Professor Epstein is struck by a "rigidly partisan political world" that determined parliamentary response.

THE POLITICS OF INFLUENCE. By Graham Wootton. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963, 301 p. $5.50.

A political scientist studies the impact of British ex-servicemen's organizations on British politics and culture.

DE GAULLE AND THE FRENCH ARMY: A CRISIS IN CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS. By Edgar S. Furniss, Jr. New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1964, 331 p. $4.00.

A thoughtful and spirited account of de Gaulle's struggle with the army over Algeria. The author, long a student of French affairs, sees in de Gaulle's championing of the *force de frappe* a means of reconciling the army. Important for the analysis of France and for its critical comments about American policy.

LE GAULLISME. By Jacques Bloch-Morhange. Paris: Plon, 1963, 238 p. Fr. 12.35.

This little book discovers that Gaullism is but the invention and appeal of a remarkable man.

LA CONSCIENCE POLITIQUE DANS LA FRANCE CONTEMPORAINE. By Pierre Fougeyrollas. Paris: Denoël, 1963, 337 p. Fr. 22.

A social scientist combines a methodological inquiry with a brief report on political consciousness in the various French parties, based on public opinion polls. He fears that Gaullism may mark the abdication of the traditional form of political consciousness.

DREAM OF EMPIRE: GERMAN COLONIALISM, 1919–1945. By Wolfe W. Schmokel. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964, 204 p. $6.00.

The pervasive appeal of colonialism and Germany's diplomatic efforts to regain an overseas empire, both under Weimar and Hitler, are clearly depicted in this important scholarly monograph.

THE CAPTIVE PRESS IN THE THIRD REICH. By Oron J. Hale. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964, 353 p. $6.50.

The Nazis first muzzled the once flourishing German press and then usurped the ownership as well. A dreary tale of power, cupidity and unprincipled subservience, told authoritatively and on the basis of extensive research by a well-known historian.

BIG BUSINESS IN THE THIRD REICH. By Arthur Schweitzer. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1964, 739 p. $7.50.

A far-ranging analysis of big business and the Nazi State in the prewar era of "partial fascism," by an economist who tries to emulate Weber's sociological analysis of economic conditions. The author holds that from 1933 to 1939 Germany was governed by a "coalition of Nazis, generals, and big business," which left big business stronger and richer than before and its enemies, including the anti-capitalistic wing of the Nazis, defeated. An important, ambitious and uneven work.

ZWISCHEN DEMOKRATIE UND DIKTATUR. By Gerhard Schulz. Berlin: De Gruyter, 1963, 678 p. DM. 56.

Volume One of a valuable and thorough analysis of the political ramifications of constitution-making and constitution-reforming in the first 11 years of Weimar, with foremost emphasis on the question of federalism.

DIE IMPROVISIERTE DEMOKRATIE. By Theodor Eschenburg. Munich: Piper, 1963, 305 p. DM. 8.80.

A collection of stimulating essays—mostly biographical—on the Weimar Republic, by one of Germany's leading political scientists.

DIE UNVOLLENDETE ERNEUERUNG: DEUTSCHLAND IM KRÄFTEFELD 1945–1963. By Eugen Kogon. Frankfurt/Main: Europäische Verlagsanstalt, 1964, 257 p. DM. 8.80.

These searching essays on disparate topics, by an outstanding German writer, illuminate most of the central problems of recent German history.

HITLER ET LES ÉTATS-UNIS (1939–1941). By Saul Friedländer. Geneva: Droz, 1963, 298 p. Swiss Fr. 26.

An excellent and important study of German policy toward the United States, based in part on hitherto unavailable sources, especially German naval documents. The author insists that—contrary to earlier opinion—Hitler was afraid of U.S. intervention after 1940 and sought, by a policy of self-restraint, to prevent or postpone it.

POSTWAR TRADE IN DIVIDED GERMANY: THE INTERNAL AND INTERNATIONAL ISSUES. By Karel Holbik and Henry Myers. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1964, 138 p. $5.00.

This is a useful little book with a good bit of material that is not generally accessible. Its approach is political and institutional more than economic.

DER SOWJETSEKTOR VON BERLIN. By Siegfried Mampel. Frankfurt/Main: Metzner, 1963, 496 p. DM. 38.

A useful study of the administration of East Berlin.

MUSSOLINI: A STUDY IN POWER. By Ivone Kirkpatrick. New York: Hawthorn Books, 1964, 726 p. $10.00.

THE DAY OF THE LION: THE LIFE AND DEATH OF FASCIST

ITALY, 1922–1945. By Roy MacGregor-Hastie. New York: Coward-McCann, 1964, 395 p. $6.95.

The late distinguished British diplomat has written a gripping account of the *Duce,* whose "driving force . . . was ambition and lust for power for power's sake." The author draws on his personal experience and postwar publications, and he interprets the evidence in a detached, sometimes compassionate, manner. MacGregor-Hastie, a British journalist at home in Italy, has written a briefer, breezier, but far less satisfactory biography. He emphasizes Mussolini's efforts to be a peacemaker in the 1930s, that "Fascism did not lead inevitably to war," and merely summarizes the years after 1940.

WASTE: AN EYE-WITNESS REPORT ON SOME ASPECTS OF WASTE IN WESTERN SICILY. By Danilo Dolci. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1964, 352 p. $6.75.

A compassionate, yet critical inquiry into the appalling poverty and wasted lives of Sicily, by a well-known reformer. Because of the merits of the book and the universality of the problem, Dolci's work deserves wide attention.

PORTUGALS ÜBERSEEPOLITIK. By Adriano Moreira. Baden-Baden: Lutzeyer, 1963, 168 p. DM. 7.80.

A series of essays by a Portuguese ethnologist and former Minister for Overseas Territories, pleading Portugal's position.

Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union

SOCIALISM IN ONE COUNTRY, 1924–1926. VOLUME THREE—PARTS I AND II. By Edward Hallett Carr. New York: Macmillan, 1964, 2 v. $17.50.

This volume, in two parts, is a continuation, at the same impressive level, of Mr. Carr's magistral, multi-volume "History of Soviet Russia." It deals with external affairs—both the foreign policy of the Soviet state and the activities of Comintern—during the critical years 1924–1926. Part One treats of Soviet relations with the West; Part Two, the Soviet Union and the East, including the Chinese Revolution in those years.

THE LIFE OF LENIN. By Louis Fischer. New York: Harper and Row, 1964, 703 p. $10.00.

LENIN: THE COMPULSIVE REVOLUTIONARY. By Stefan T. Possony. Chicago: Regnery, 1964, 418 p. $7.95.

THE LIFE AND DEATH OF LENIN. By Robert Payne. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1964, 672 p. $8.50.

Three new and quite substantial Lenin biographies have appeared almost simultaneously, each with certain merits and defects. Mr. Fischer's study stresses Lenin's years in power after 1917 and is, in fact, almost a history of the early Soviet state. Mr. Possony is particularly concerned with the underground aspects of Lenin's career: plots, double agents, German money and the like. Mr. Payne's work, while quite readable, is somewhat less sure-footed and tends to rather sensational conclusions. For Lenin's early career and the origins of Bolshevism the reader should still refer to the works by Haimson, Treadgold, Keep and Wolfe.

A VIEW OF ALL THE RUSSIAS. By Laurens Van der Post. New York: Morrow, 1964, 374 p. $5.95.

This is a quite remarkable travel book. Although most of the author's itinerary in Russia is by now a fairly familiar one, his power of perception and of reflecting

on what he has seen is such as to create a most valuable and informative portrait of the Soviet Union and its inhabitants. No Soviet specialist, Col. Van der Post occasionally skids on Russian names and history, but his previous accounts of African peoples provide a fresh and unusual perspective for his comments on Russian society. A pleasure to read.

CONTEMPORARY HISTORY IN THE SOVIET MIRROR. Edited by John Keep and Liliana Brisby. New York: Praeger, 1964, 331 p. $7.50.

A symposium of papers by a number of leading British and American scholars dealing with recent trends in Soviet historiography on a variety of recent and contemporary topics, including diplomacy and international affairs.

JUSTICE IN MOSCOW. By George Feifer. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1964, 353 p. $5.95.

An American student's very interesting first-hand account of the actual operations of the court system in Moscow, based on his attendance at numerous trials and legal proceedings.

THE SOVIET POLITICAL MIND. By Robert C. Tucker. New York: Praeger, 1963, 238 p. $6.00 (Paper, $2.25).

A collection of Professor Tucker's perceptive and provocative essays on Stalin, Stalinism and changes in the post-Stalin era.

COMINTERN AND WORLD REVOLUTION, 1928–1943: THE SHAPING OF DOCTRINE. By Kermit E. McKenzie. New York: Columbia University Press, 1964, 368 p. $6.50.

A close study of the question of world revolution in Communist theory as reflected in the Comintern during the years 1928–1943.

THE ECONOMIES OF THE SOVIET BLOC. By Stanislaw Wellisz. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964, 245 p. $6.95.

An introduction to the operation of Soviet-type economies with particular reference to decision-making and resource allocation. The Polish experience receives most attention.

UNGARN ZWISCHEN OST UND WEST. By Otto Rudolf Liess and Theodor Peschaut. Hanover: Niedersächsische Landeszentrale für Politische Bildung, 1963, 167 p.

A brief survey of Hungary's vicissitudes since 1945, with some attention to cultural policy.

The Middle East

THE IDEOLOGICAL REVOLUTION IN THE MIDDLE EAST. By Leonard Binder. New York: Wiley, 1964, 287 p. $6.50.

A political scientist seeks an explanation of the process of ideological change through an examination of political developments in the modern Middle East. The result, in prose more opaque than necessary, is important both as a contribution to political science theory and as an exposition of contemporary nationalist ideas.

EMPIRE BY TREATY. By M. A. Fitzsimons. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1964, 235 p. $6.00.

A well-done history of British policy and the postwar Middle East, leading the author to conclude that the surprising thing was not the decline of British influence so much as the fact it could be maintained so long in the absence of real power.

POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IN JAPAN AND TURKEY. Edited by Robert E. Ward and Dankwart A. Rustow. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964, 502 p. $8.75.

Essays by leading American scholars on politics, economics, education, mass media and other topics in the effort to account for the success of Japan and Turkey in modernization and for the differences in their rates and patterns. Revisions of papers prepared for a Gould House conference in September 1962.

LA RÉVOLUTION MILITAIRE DE 1960 EN TURQUIE (SES ORIGINES). By Ali Fuad Basgil. Geneva: Perret-Gentil, 1963, 206 p. Swiss Fr. 12.

Professor Basgil reviews the rise and fall of Turkish democracy.

JOURNEY AMONG BRAVE MEN. By Dana Adams Schmidt. Boston: Atlantic (Little, Brown), 1964, 298 p. $6.95.

The lively narrative of correspondent Schmidt's clandestine six weeks in 1962 among the insurgent Kurds of northeastern Iraq and the story of their struggle for self-determination.

CRISE AU MOYEN-ORIENT. By Camille Chamoun. Paris: Gallimard, 1963, 436 p. Fr. 16.

The President of Lebanon (1952–58) presents an outspoken inside history of postwar Lebanon culminating in the international crisis of 1958 (for which he was partly responsible) and the landing of American troops. Nasser is his chief villain and U.S. policy his despair.

SYRIAN POLITICS AND THE MILITARY, 1945–1958. By Gordon H. Torrey. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1964, 438 p. $7.00.

This record of political developments in postwar Syria, a first charting of a little-known "wilderness," is a valuable addition to the contemporary history of the Middle East.

GOLDA MEIR: WOMAN WITH A CAUSE. By Marie Syrkin. New York: Putnam, 1964, 320 p. $5.95.

This "authorized biography" of the Foreign Minister of Israel is an admiring and interesting albeit not overly critical account of that formidable lady.

THE DESERT KING: IBN SAUD AND HIS ARABIA. By David Howarth. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964, 307 p. $6.50.

This biography of "the great king," the best so far, is at the same time a lively and authoritative history of the Saudi state he created.

THE YEMEN: IMAMS, RULERS, AND REVOLUTIONS. By Harold Ingrams. New York: Praeger, 1964, 164 p. $5.00.

A serviceable and up-to-date account of Yemen history and politics by a British administrator and writer ("Arabia and the Isles") of many years' experience.

NATIONALISM IN IRAN. By Richard W. Cottam. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1964, 332 p. $6.00.

A timely study of nationalism as a twentieth-century phenomenon in Iran and its effects on Iranian political behavior, embodying among other things a critique of postwar U.S. policy. Professor Cottam is a political scientist with experience in Iran as an American Foreign Service officer.

AFGHANISTAN: LAND IN TRANSITION. By Mary Bradley Watkins. Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1963, 262 p. $5.75.

An American free-lance writer, Chairman of the Asia Society's Afghanistan Council, made three trips to Afghanistan to observe the country, its people and their objectives. While stating that her book is not a "scholarly treatise," she nevertheless has produced a highly informative account of external and internal pressures and conflicts in a nation of multiple tribal strongholds with diverse cultures.

South and Southeast Asia

THE SCRUTABLE EAST: A CORRESPONDENT'S REPORT ON SOUTHEAST ASIA. By Robert Trumbull. New York: McKay, 1964, 275 p. $4.95.

Candid accounts of each of the eight Southeast Asian countries, with appraisals of their leaders, by one of *The New York Times'* veteran, and most respected, foreign correspondents. He foresees an "Asian rather than a Western" solution to the area's political instability.

SOUTHEAST ASIA: ILLUSION AND REALITY IN POLITICS AND ECONOMICS. By Lennox A. Mills. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1964, 365 p. $6.50.

A University of Minnesota professor emeritus in political science, specializing in Malaya, analyzes the post-independence governments of Southeast Asia and concludes "all of them are dictatorships or oligarchies controlled by small groups of Western-educated, urban nationalists."

BALLOT BOX AND BAYONET: PEOPLE AND GOVERNMENT IN EMERGENT ASIAN COUNTRIES. By Hugh Tinker. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1964, 126 p. $1.40 (Paper).

Mr. Tinker refutes the popular statement that democracy has failed in Asia and Africa. His own thesis is that the essential and universal elements of democracy have been retained, and that those elements peculiar to Western countries, necessarily and understandably unworkable in the non-European new states, have been replaced by new, indigenous concepts of democracy.

ASIAN AFRICAN LEGAL CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE: REPORT OF THE FIFTH SESSION HELD AT RANGOON JANUARY 17TH TO 30TH, 1962. New Delhi: Secretariat of the Asian African Legal Consultative Committee, 1963, 189 p.

The fifth session of this Committee, originally composed of Asian countries but expanded in 1958 to include the African continent, concerned itself largely with the subjects of dual or multiple nationality and the legality of nuclear tests. The book includes draft articles to be considered at the next session when comments from the governments of the participating countries will have been received.

THE FORMATION OF MALAYSIA: NEW FACTOR IN WORLD POLITICS. By Willard A. Hanna. New York: American Universities Field Staff, 1964, 247 p. $6.50.

Twenty-four reports dating from February 1962 to September 1963, originally published separately by the A.U.F.S., by one of its most brilliant observers, long a specialist on Southeast Asia. He traces the progress of the formation of the new state and discusses the possibility of its successfully confronting opposition by Indonesia and the Philippines.

CEYLON. By S. A. Pakeman. New York: Praeger, 1964, 256 p. $6.95.

Mr. Pakeman, 31 years in Ceylon as professor and member of the Ceylon House

of Representatives, divides his book equally into the period of British rule and the years since World War II. Concluding chapters concern Mrs. Bandaranaike as Prime Minister and Ceylon's crucial economic problems. Following a recent visit to Ceylon, he is pessimistic about current conditions and prospects for the future.

LES PROBLÈMES DE LA NOUVELLE AGRICULTURE VIETNAMIENNE. By Nguyen Van-Hao. Geneva: Droz, 1963, 227 p. Swiss Frs. 26.

A review of Viet Nam's pre-independence agrarian structure and problems followed by a discussion of the aims, methods and results of post-independence "agricultural politics." Dr. Nguyen urges improved educational and teaching techniques and proper administration of foreign aid to ameliorate conditions for the rural masses and to eliminate dangers in the spread between rich and poor.

AGRICULTURAL INVOLUTION: THE PROCESS OF ECOLOGICAL CHANGE IN INDONESIA. By Clifford Geertz. Berkeley: University of California Press (for the Association of Asian Studies), 1963, 176 p. $4.00.

A University of Chicago anthropologist analyzes the history of Indonesia with the aim of explaining the country's difficulties in attaining sustained economic growth after 200 years of static conditions under Dutch rule. Professor Geertz blames the hostile attitude of the political élite for failure of earlier attempts at economic and industrial development, and holds little hope for the success of the current eight-year plan.

The Far East and Pacific Ocean

MAO: ROTER KHAN DER GELBEN PARTISANEN. By Gerd Stamp. Boppard/Rhine: Boldt, 1963, 208 p. DM. 9.80.

An interesting and useful selection of speeches and writings by Mao Tse-tung and those who have influenced him (especially Sun Tzu, Sixth Century B.C. military strategist), together with commentaries on them, to show the thinking behind the Chinese leader's policies and decisions. Mr. Stamp's prognosis is that Mao will strengthen his own position during a debilitating course of Moscow-Washington conflicts.

THE CENTER OF THE WORLD: COMMUNISM AND THE MIND OF CHINA. By Robert S. Elegant. Garden City: Doubleday, 1964, 396 p. $5.95.

Mr. Elegant has spent over ten years in Asia, mostly as correspondent for *Newsweek*. He analyzes, from information derived from the Chinese press and hundreds of interviews in Hong Kong with Mainland refugees, the psychological and cultural influences on Communist leaders and on the nation they have created, concluding that the United States should change its policy toward China and that China should be admitted to the United Nations.

LA RÉPUBLIQUE POPULAIRE DE CHINE, CADRES INSTITUTIONNELS ET RÉALISATIONS. I: L'HISTOIRE ET LE DROIT. By M. Engelborghs-Bertels and R. Dekkers. Brussels: Université Libre de Bruxelles, Institut de Sociologie, 1963, 227 p. Belgian Fr. 210.

LA RÉPUBLIQUE POPULAIRE DE CHINE, CADRES INSTITUTIONNELS ET RÉALISATIONS. II: LA PLANIFICATION ET LA CROISSANCE ÉCONOMIQUE, 1949–1959. By Victor Ginsburgh. Brussels: Université Libre de Bruxelles, Institut de Sociologie, 1963, 184 p. Belgian Fr. 200.

In the first of these two volumes Miss Engelborghs-Bertels discusses contemporary China's continuing revolutions since 1923, foreign affairs and public

law. Mr. Dekkers concludes with chapters on civil and penal law. In Volume II Mr. Ginsburgh, after briefly discussing the pre-Communist economy in China, provides a descriptive, rather than critical, view of conditions, developments, successes and failures since 1949. Both studies were put out by the Centre d'Étude des Pays de l'Est in collaboration with the Centre National pour l'Étude des Pays à Régime Communiste. Documented.

INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT IN COMMUNIST CHINA. Edited by Choh-ming Li. New York: Praeger, 1964, 205 p. $5.75.

Twelve studies, originally published by *China Quarterly*, on various aspects of China's industrial economy since 1950, based primarily on Communist press statements and all by top-rank scholars expert in analyzing, evaluating and interpreting the scant and often misleading data emanating from the Mainland.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND THE USE OF ENERGY RESOURCES IN COMMUNIST CHINA. By Yuan-li Wu with the Assistance of H. C. Ling. New York: Praeger (for the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace), 1963, 275 p. $7.50.

Professor Wu, China-born and doctoral graduate of the London School of Economics and Political Science, selected energy resources as his topic for its far-reaching relationship with every other aspect of economic development.

JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES IN WORLD TRADE. By Warren S. Hunsberger. New York: Harper and Row (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1964, 494 p. $9.95.

A comprehensive examination of Japan's commercial and financial relations with the United States. While the author, an experienced observer of the Asian scene, is concerned primarily with the postwar development of U.S.-Japanese trade and its implications for national policy in each country, he also provides a careful analysis of Japan's trading and balance-of-payments position with the rest of the world, and offers suggestions on likely trade developments.

AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT IN MODERN JAPAN. Edited by Takekazu Ogura. Tokyo: Fuji Publishing Co., 1963, 688 p.

A compilation of essays by writers currently active in the fields of agricultural economics, administration and technology, concerning the economic, legal and technological aspects of agriculture. Of special importance are the chapters on the land tenure system, small-scale farming, and paddy-field rice culture, all mutually dependent and of particular value to less developed nations of Asia.

THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC SINCE 1900: A MODERN HISTORY: AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND, THE ISLANDS, ANTARCTICA. By C. Hartley Grattan. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1963, 759 p. $10.00.

Highly readable histories of change on the political, economic and cultural scenes in the Southwest Pacific. It is a companion volume to an earlier history of the area up to 1900, published in the same series, "The University of Michigan History of the Modern World."

Africa

THE GEOGRAPHY OF MODERN AFRICA. By William A. Hance. New York: Columbia University Press, 1964, 653 p. $12.00.

An encyclopedic treatment of the economic geography of the African continent which will surely serve as the definitive work for a long time to come.

LA POLITIQUE ÉTRANGÈRE DES ÉTATS AFRICAINS. By Doudou Thiam. Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1963, 166 p. Fr. 10.

The Foreign Minister of Senegal appraises the ideological foundations and the present and prospective foreign policies of the African states. A valuable contribution.

AFRICAN AGRARIAN SYSTEMS. Edited by Daniel Biebuyck. New York: Oxford University Press (for the International African Institute), 1963, 407 p. $7.20.

Professor Biebuyck's introductory essay gives continuity and comparability to a series of papers presented at the second International African Seminar held at Lovanium University (Leopoldville) in January 1960.

AFRICA, THE DYNAMICS OF CHANGE. Edited by H. Passin and K. A. B. Jones-Quartey. Ibadan: Ibadan University Press (for the Congress for Cultural Freedom), 1963, 262 p. 15/.

Excerpts from papers and discussions of the Ibadan Seminar on "Representative Government and National Progress" sponsored by the Congress for Cultural Freedom in March 1959. Ayo Ogunsheye, Thomas Diop and S. N. Eisenstadt were among the participants; the papers and discussion give valuable insight into political thought at that pre-independence period.

TUNISIA: THE POLITICS OF MODERNIZATION. By Charles A. Micaud and Others. New York: Praeger, 1964, 205 p. $6.00.

The French colonial impact and the Tunisian response, the evolution of the Neo-Destour as the instrument of modernization, and an evaluation of the Tunisian achievement to date by three able scholars make this an excellent interim report on one of the most promising of the new nations.

GHANA AGRICULTURE. By S. La Anyane. New York: Oxford University Press, 1963, 228 p. $4.00.

The chief agricultural economist in the Ministry of Agriculture traces the development of agricultural products and institutions in Ghana from the eleventh century to the present.

LA RÉVOLUTION GUINÉENNE ET LE PROGRÈS SOCIAL. By Sékou Touré. Conakry: Imprimerie Nationale Patrice Lumumba, 1963, 812 p.

The political history of the Parti Démocratique de Guinée, and thereby of Guinea, as chronicled by the President of the Republic. The book contains full reports on the conferences at Kissidougou in 1960 and at Conakry in 1961. A detailed diagram compares the structure and functions of the party with those of the administration.

HISTOIRE POLITIQUE DU TCHAD DE 1900 A 1962. By Jacques Le Cornec. Paris: Librairie Générale de Droit, 1963, 374 p. Fr. 42.50.

Focusing on the role of the chiefs and the place of chieftaincies during the period under review, M. Le Cornec describes the legal and administrative changes that have taken place in Chad. The book's documentation will be valuable for future comparative analysis.

HISTOIRE DU CONGO (LÉOPOLDVILLE). By Robert Cornevin. Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1963, 336 p. Fr. 33.

In one volume is contained a detailed treatment of the Congo: prehistory, the great kingdoms of the pre-colonial era, the colonial period, independence and the

tempestuous months through the latter part of 1963. M. Cornevin has repeated the great service he has already given to the field of African studies through his earlier histories of Dahomey and Togo.

SÉCESSION AU KATANGA. By J. Gérard-Libois. Brussels: Centre de Recherche et d'Information Socio-Politiques (C.R.I.S.P.), 1963, 363 p. Belgian Fr. 240.

A detailed study of the secession of Katanga complementing earlier C.R.I.S.P. works. The analysis considers the situation in Katanga prior to independence, the period of secession, and the province's potential role in the Republic of Congo.

L'ONU ET L'AFFAIRE DU CONGO. By Claude Leclercq. Paris: Payot, 1964, 367 p. Fr. 16.

A chronological rather than analytical examination of the much debated United Nations actions in the Congo.

THE KING'S MEN: LEADERSHIP AND STATUS IN BUGANDA ON THE EVE OF INDEPENDENCE. Edited by L. A. Fallers. New York: Oxford University Press (for the East African Institute of Social Research), 1964, 414 p. $6.40.

Research conducted under the auspices of the East African Institute of Social Research by such prominent scholars as Fallers, A. I. Richards, Martin Southwold and Leonard W. Doob is brought together in these fascinating studies of the various facets of social change among the Baganda.

ANGOLA AND MOZAMBIQUE: THE CASE AGAINST PORTUGAL. By Anders Ehnmark and Per Wästberg. New York: Roy, 1964, 176 p. $4.50.

Two Swedish authors treat separately and somewhat journalistically the conditions of African life in both territories.

SOUTHERN RHODESIA—THE PRICE OF FREEDOM. Edited by Fred B. Rea. Bulawayo: Stuart Manning, 1964, 141 p. 6/.

Nine Rhodesians define the present untenable situation and advocate non-violent forms of change for the future, emphasizing the need for rapid transition to majority rule.

THE SOUTH AFRICAN ECONOMY. By D. Hobart Houghton. New York: Oxford University Press, 1964, 261 p. $4.10.

Making use of Walt Rostow's concepts of economic growth, the Professor of Economics at Rhodes University has written a valuable study of the growth of the South African economy to its present level of development.

LANGA: A STUDY OF SOCIAL GROUPS IN AN AFRICAN TOWNSHIP. By Monica Wilson and Archie Mafeje. New York: Oxford University Press, 1963, 190 p. $4.10.

Detailed research in an African suburb of Cape Town provides the basis for this description of the forces for cohesion and for cleavage among African groups in an urban environment.

SOURCE MATERIAL

By Donald Wasson

I. DOCUMENTS

Documents may be procured from the following: *United States:* Gov't Printing Office, Superintendent of Documents, Washington 25, D.C. *Great Britain:* British Information Services, Sales Section, 845 3rd Ave., New York 22. *United Nations, International Court of Justice:* United Nations, Sales Section, N.Y.; *United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Org., Food and Agric. Org.:* Columbia University Press, Int. Documents Service, 2960 Broadway, New York 27. *Int. Labor Office:* 1262 New Hampshire Ave., Washington 6, D.C. *European Coal and Steel Community, Economic Community, Euratom:* 808 Farragut Bldg., Washington 6, D.C. Washington imprints are Government Printing Office, and Congressional documents, unless otherwise noted, are for the 88th Congress, 2nd Sess. London imprints are Her Majesty's Stationery Office, and New York imprints are United Nations, unless otherwise noted.

Africa

Organization of African Unity: basic documents of the Organization of African Unity. Addis Ababa, Organization of African Unity, 1963. 58 p.

Africa south of the Sahara; a selected, annotated list of writings. Washington, Library of Congress, 1963. 354 p. $2.25.

Social scientists specializing in African studies. Paris, UNESCO, 1963. 375 p. $11.50.

Official publications of French Equatorial Africa, French Cameroons, and Togo, 1946-1958. Washington, Library of Congress, 1964. 78 p. 50¢.

Malawi. London, Central Office of Information, Reference Division, 1964. 34 p. (RF.P. 5659.)

Agriculture

Education and agricultural development. Paris, UNESCO, 1964. 62 p. (FFHC Basic Studies, 15.)

Atomic Energy

AEC authorizing legislation fiscal year 1965. Hearings, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Jan. 22–Feb. 7, 1963. Washington, 1964. 3 pts.

——. Report, to accompany S. 2755, Apr. 21, 1964. Washington, 1964. 47 p. (S. Rept. 987.)

——. Report, to accompany H.R. 10945, Apr. 21, 1964. Washington, 1964. 47 p. (H. Rept. 1332.)

Convention on third party liability in the field of nuclear energy. Paris, European Nuclear Energy Agency, 1964. 73 p.

Nuclear terms; a brief glossary. Washington, Atomic Energy Commission, 1964. 37 p.

Commercial Policy and Trade

The Role of GATT in relation to trade and development. Geneva, Contracting Parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 1964. 56 p.

Statements on impact of Common Market regulations on export of United States poultry. Committee on Finance, Senate, Feb. 5, 1964. Washington, 1964. 34 p. (Com. Print.)

East-West trade. Hearings, Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, Mar. 13–Apr. 9, 1964. Washington, 1964. Pt. 1.

Small business and foreign trade. Report, Select Committee on Small Business, House, Apr. 6, 1964. Washington, 1964. 46 p. (H. Rept. 1303.)

Discriminatory ocean freight rates and the balance of payments. Hearings, Joint Economic Committee, Nov. 19–20, 1963–Mar. 25–26, 1964. Washington, 1964. Pts. 3–4.

Disarmament

Soviet disarmament policy, 1922–1931, by R. W. Lambert. Washington, United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1964. 218 p. (Research report 64-2.)

Eastern Europe

Recent developments in the Soviet bloc. Report, Subcommittee on Europe, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, Je. 1, 1964. Washington, 1964. 19 p. (H. Rept. 1442.)

Soviet political agreements and results, revised to Jan. 1, 1964. Staff study, Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act . . ., Committee on the Judiciary, Senate. Washington, 1964. 2 pts.

The Many crises of the Soviet economy. Symposium, Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act . . ., Committee on the Judiciary, Senate, Je. 2, 1964. Washington, 1964. 78 p.

EDUCATION in the Rumanian People's Republic, by R. L. Braham. Washington, Office of Education, 1963. 229 p. $1.00.

FAR EAST AND ASIA

WOMEN in the new Asia; the changing social roles of men and women in South and South-East Asia, ed. by Barbara Ward. Paris, UNESCO, 1963. 529 p.

FARM development in Japan, by W. Y. Yang. Rome, Food and Agriculture Organization, 1962. 76 p. (FAO Agricultural Development Papers, 76.) $1.00.

INTERIM review of development in Malaya under the Second Five-year plan. Kuala Lumpur, Di-chetak Di-jabatan Chetak Kerajaan Oleh Thor Beng Chong, A.M.N., 1964. 76 p. Malaysian $2.50.

GREAT BRITAIN

REPORT of the Committee on Representational Services Overseas appointed by the Prime Minister, under the Chairmanship of Lord Plowden, 1962–1963. London, 1964. 176 p. (Cmnd. 2276.) 10s.

THE COMMONWEALTH we live in. London, Central Office of Information, 1964. 77 p.

LATIN AMERICA

THE FLOW of capital from the European Economic Community to Latin America. Washington, Pan American Union, 1963. 87 p. 50¢.

PRIVATE investment in Latin America. Report, Subcommittee on Inter-American Economic Relationships, Joint Economic Committee, May 25, 1964. Washington, 1964. 27 p. (Jt. Com. Print.)

SOCIAL aspects of economic development in Latin America. Vol. 2, by J. M. Echavarría and B. Higgins. Paris, UNESCO, 1963. 272 p.

COMPLIANCE with the convention on Chamizal. Hearings, Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, on S. 2394, Feb. 26–27, 1964. Washington, 1964. 61 p.

NEAR EAST

ADMINISTRATIVE problems of rapid urban growth in the Arab States; report of a United Nations Workshop held at Beirut, Lebanon, 11 to 22 March 1963. N.Y., 1964. 153 p. (64.II.H.1.) $2.00.

AGRICULTURAL planning and village community in Israel, ed. by Joseph Ben-David. Paris, UNESCO, 1964. 159 p. (Arid Zone Research, 23.) $2.50.

DEVELOPMENT plan; first five year, 1963–1967: 1964 annual program. Ankara, Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey (for the Prime Ministry State Planning Organization), 1963. 263 p.

PUBLIC LAW 480 and other economic assistance to the United Arab Republic (Egypt). Washington, Economic Research Service, 1964. 34 p. (ERS-Foreign 83.)

RELIEF AND REHABILITATION

FOREIGN Assistance Act of 1964. Hearings, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, on H.R. 10502, Mar. 23–May 6, 1964. Washington, 1964. 7 pts.

——. Report, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, on H.R. 11380, Je. 1, 1964. Washington, 1964. 75 p. (H. Rept. 1443.)

A.I.D. and the universities; report to the Administrator of the Agency for International Development, by J. W. Gardner. Washington, Agency for International Development, 1964. 50 p.

INTERNATIONAL Development Association Act amendment. Hearings, Committee on Banking and Currency, House, on S. 2214, Mar. 23–24, 1964. Washington, 1964. 104 p.

——. Report, April 9, 1964. Washington, 1964. 16 p. (H. Rept. 1312.)

——. Act, approved May 26, 1964. Washington, 1964. 1 p. (88-310-S.2214.)

EXTENSION of Public Law 480—Titles I and II. Hearings, Subcommittee on Foreign Agricultural Operations, Committee on Agriculture, House, Feb. 18–28, 1964. Washington, 1964. 188 p.

CINQ ans de fonds d'aide et de coopération (1959-1964), by R. Triboulet. Paris, Ministère de la Coopération, 1964. v.p.

SCIENCE and technology for development; report on the United Nations Conference on the Application of Science and Technology for the Benefit of the Less Developed Areas. N.Y., 1963.

Vol. 3. Agriculture. 309 p. (63.I.23.) $5.50. *Vol. 4.* Industry. 265 p. (63.I.24.) $5.25. *Vol. 5.* People and living. 217 p. (63.I.25.) $5.00. *Vol. 6.* Education and training. 197 p. (63.I.26.) $5.25. *Vol. 7.* Science and planning. 167 p. (63.I.27.) $5.00 *Vol. 8.* Plenary proceedings, list of papers and index. 295 p. (63.I.28.) $6.50.

Social Questions

1963 Report on the world social situation. N.Y., 1963. 191 p. (63.IV.4.) $2.50.

European Convention on Human Rights; manual. Strasbourg, Council of Europe, 1963. 148 p.

Recueil de textes; organisation, compétences et procédure de la Cour. Luxembourg, Cour de Justice des Communautés Européennes, 1963. 332 p.

United States

Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce, the Judiciary, and related agencies appropriations for 1965. Hearings, Subcommittee, Committee on Appropriations, House, Feb. 3–Mar. 13, 1964. Washington, 1964. 2 pts.

——. Report, Committee on Appropriations, House, to accompany H.R. 11134, May 4, 1964. Washington, 1964. 43 p. (H. Rept. 1374.)

Department of Defense appropriations for 1965. Hearings, Subcommittee, Committee on Appropriations, House, Jan. 20–Mar. 19, 1964. Washington, 1964. 5 pts.

——. Report, to accompany H.R. 10939, Apr. 17, 1964. Washington, 1964. 51 p.

Background material on economic aspects of military procurement and supply, 1964. Subcommittee on Defense Procurement, Joint Economic Committee, Apr. 1964. Washington, 1964. 177 p. (Jt. Com. Print.)

Impact of military and related civilian supply and service activities on the economy. Hearings, Subcommittee on Defense Procurement, Joint Economic Committee, Apr. 16–21, 1964. Washington, 1964. 384 p.

Pyramiding of profits and costs in the missile procurement program. Report, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Committee on Government Operations, Senate, Mar. 31, 1964. Washington, 1964. 156 p. (S. Rept. 970.)

Materials Reserve and Stockpile Act of 1964. Hearings, Subcommittee, Committee on Armed Services, Senate, on S. 2272, Jan. 24, 1964. Washington, 1964. Pt. 2.

Review of the stockpiling of minerals and metals. Hearings, Subcommittee on Mines and Mining, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, House, Mar. 17–Apr. 14, 1964. Washington, 1964. Pt. 1.

Cotton and wheat programs. Report, Committee on Agriculture, House, to accompany H.R. 6196, Je. 6, 1964. Washington, 1964. 57 p. (H. Rept. 366.)

——. Report, Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, Senate, to accompany H.R. 6196, Feb. 20, 1964. Washington, 1964. 58 p. (S. Rept. 874.)

——. Act, approved Apr. 11, 1964. Washington, 1964. 10 p. (88-297—H.R. 6196.)

U.S.-owned foreign currencies. Hearings, Subcommittee, Committee on Government Operations, Nov. 18–20, 1963. Washington, 1964. 260 p.

The U.S. ideological effort: government agencies and programs. Study by the Legislative Reference Service for the Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, Jan. 3, 1964. Washington, 1964. 66 p. (Com. Print.)

Ideological operations and foreign policy. Report No. 2 on Winning the Cold War: the U.S. ideological offensive, Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, Apr. 27, 1964. Washington, 1964. 19 p. (H. Rept. 1352.)

Administration of national security. Hearing, Subcommittee on National Security Staffing and Operations, Committee on Government Operations, Senate, Apr. 8, 1964. Washington, 1964. Pt. 8.

——. The American ambassador. Study, Subcommittee on National Security Staffing and Operations, Committee on Government Operations, Senate. Washington, 1964. 16 p. (Com. Print.)

Fishing in U.S. territorial waters. Hearings, Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, House, on S. 1988, H.R. 9957, and H.R. 10040, Feb. 19–26, 1964. Washington, 1964. 208 p.

——. Report, Apr. 28, 1964. Washington, 1964. 20 p. (H. Rept. 1356.)

Western Europe

NATO bibliography. Paris, NATO, 1964. 205 p.

Economic development prospects in the EEC from 1960 to 1970; report by a working party. Brussels, European Economic Community, 1962. 85 p. $3.00.

Results of the business survey carried out among heads of enterprises in the Community. Brussels, European Economic Community, 1964. 15 p.

Employment and economic growth. Geneva, International Labour Office, 1964. 217 p. $2.25.

European Investment Bank, 1958–1963. Brussels, European Investment Bank, 1964. 50 p.

Statistics of national accounts, 1950–1961. Paris, OECD, 1964. 282 p. $3.50.

Economic policies and practices. Papers, Joint Economic Committee, Washington, 1964. *No. 4.* Private trade barriers and the Atlantic Community. n.d. 42 p. 20¢. *No. 5.* Unemployment programs in Sweden. Apr. 21, 1964. 51 p. 20¢.

Oil today; as viewed by the OECD Special Committee for Oil. Paris. OECD, 1964. 147 p.

Yearbook of Nordic statistics, 1963. Stockholm, Nordic Council, 1964. 68 p.

MALTA. London, Central Office of Information, Reference Division, 1964. 29 p. (RF.P. 5568/64.)

NETHERLANDS. Paris, OECD, 1964. 31 p. (Economic Surveys.)

NORWAY, 1945–1962; bibliography of social science periodicals and monograph series. Washington, Dept. of Commerce, 1964. 59 p. (Foreign Social Science Bibliographies, Series P-92, No. 15.) 40¢.

THE TOTAL defence of Sweden. Stockholm, Swedish Defence Staff, 1963. 36 p.

II. PAMPHLETS

ACTA BALTICA, 1960/61–1962. Königstein in Taunus, Institutum Balticum, 1962–1963. 2 v. (Liber Annalis Instituti Baltici, 1–2.)

AFRICA AND THE EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET: A PERSPECTIVE, by Arnold Rivkin. Denver, Univ. of Denver, The Social Science Foundation and Dept. of International Relations, 1964. 61 p. (Monograph Series in World Affairs, 2.) $1.00.

THE ARAB IMAGE, by Clovis Maksoud. Delhi, Ramlochan, 1963. 102 p.

ASIA: A SELECTION OF PAPERS DELIVERED BEFORE THE ASIA SOCIETY. N.Y., The Asia Society, 1964. 92 p. $1.00.

ATOMVÅBNENE OG NATOS KRISE, by N. J. Haagerup. Copenhagen, Det Udenrigspolitiske Selskab, 1964. 58 p. (Udenrigspolitiske Skrifter, Serie VI, no. 3.) Kr. 6.00.

AUSSENPOLITISCHE GRUNDSÄTZE; Deutschland und die "friedliche Koexistenz," by Ludwig Freund. Würzburg, Holzner, 1963. 64 p.

BALTIKUM; EINE ERINNERUNG . . . LANDESKUNDLICHE EINFÜHRUNG, by Erik Thomson. Frankfurt am Main, Weidlich, 1963. 118 p. DM.21.50.

BONN. INSTITUT FINANZEN UND STEUERN. Schriftenreihe. Bonn, Author, 1964.

15, Bd. 13. Der Bundeshaushalt. 195 p. 72. Bundesverfassungsgericht und Rückwirkung von Gesetzen, by F. Klein and G. Barbey. 138 p. *73.* Länderhaushalte. 112 p.

BUSINESS POTENTIAL IN THE EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET, by Robert Theobald. N.Y., American Management Association, 1963. 72 p. (AMA Research Studies, 62.)

THE CASE FOR THE MLF: A CRITICAL EVALUATION, by R. E. Osgood. Washington, The Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research, 1964. 57 p.

CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE; report of a conference of the European Movement arranged by the Central and Eastern European Commission, Brussels, January, 1964. Brussels, European Movement, 1964. 42 p.

CHINA, by Ping-chia Kuo. N.Y., Oxford Univ. Press, 1963. 128 p.

CHINA AND THE NINE POWER CONFERENCE AT BRUSSELS IN 1937, by Tsien Tai. N.Y., St. John's Univ. Press, 1964. 37 p. (Asia in the Modern World, 4.) $1.25.

COLONIAL DEVELOPMENT; a factual survey of the origins and history of British aid to developing countries. London, Overseas Development Institute, 1964. 96 p. (British Aid, 5.) 7s.6d.

THE COMMONWEALTH AS INDIA SEES IT, by C. D. Deshmukh. N.Y., Cambridge Univ. Press, 1964. 35 p. (Smuts Memorial Lecture.) 75¢.

COMMUNIST CHINA; the politics of student opposition, ed. by D. J. Doolin. Stanford, Stanford Univ., The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, 1964. 70 p. (Hoover Institution Studies.)

CONFLICTING CONCEPTS OF THE UNITED NATIONS, by Conor Cruise O'Brien. Leeds, Leeds Univ. Press, 1964. (The Twenty-first Montague Burton Lecture on International Relations.) 2s.6d.

THE CRISIS OF EUROPEAN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION, by Wilhelm Röpke. Zurich, Swiss Credit Bank, 1963. 12 p.

CYPRUS—OLD PROBLEM, NEW CRISIS, by the eds. of Deadline Data on World Affairs, 1964. 72 p. (On Record, vol 2, no 1.) $1.50.

DECISIONS OF NATIONHOOD: POLITICAL AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE BRITISH CARIBBEAN, by W. Bell and I. Oxaal. Denver, Univ. of Denver, The Social Science Foundation and Dept. of International Relations, 1964. 99 p. (Monograph Series in World Affairs, 3–4.) $2.00.

DEUTSCHES INSTITUT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTSFORSCHUNG. Sonderhefte, Neue Folge, Reihe A. Berlin, Duncker, 1964.

68. Die Wandlungen der industriellen Branchenstruktur in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1950 bis 1960; ein Beitrag zur Analyse der Ursachen und Wirkungen differenzierten Wachstums, by Dieter Mertens, 202 p.

DEUTSCHLAND UND FRANKREICH IM SPIEGEL DES VERTRAGES; VII. Deutsch-Französische Konferenz, Bad Godesberg, 24.–26. Mai 1963. Bonn, Der Deutsche Rat der Europäischen Bewegung, 1963. 112 p. (Schriftenreihe des Deutschen Rates der Europäischen Bewegung, 15.)

THE DEVELOPMENT OF LATIN AMERICAN PRIVATE ENTERPRISE; a report, by Frank Brandenburg. Washington, National Planning Association, 1964. 134 p. (Planning Pamphlets, 121.) $2.50.

DOKUMENTE ZUR PARTEIPOLITISCHEN ENTWICKLUNG IN DEUTSCHLAND SEIT 1945, ed. by O. K. Flechtheim. Berlin, Wendler, 1962–63. 3 v. DM.105.

THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF MONETARY AND COMMERCIAL INSTITUTIONS OF A EUROPEAN ORIGIN IN AFRICA, by T. Balogh. Cairo, National Bank of Egypt, 1964. 71 p.

EUROPE-AMÉRIQUE; rélations de partenaires nécessaires à la paix, by Jean Monnet. Lausanne, Université de Lausanne, Centre de Recherches Européenes, 1963. 13 p. Sw.Fr. 4.00.

L'EUROPE ET L'ORGANISATION DE LA PAIX, by Jean Monnet. Lausanne, Université de Lausanne, Centre de Recherches Européenes, 1964. 14 p. Sw.Fr. 4.00.

THE EUROPEAN FREE TRADE ASSOCIATION TODAY AND TOMORROW. Geneva, Business International, 1964. 43 p.

FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES, by Klaus Knorr. Princeton, Princeton Univ., Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Center of International Studies, 1964. 58 p. (Research Monographs, 17.) $1.00.

FRENCH AID: THE JEANNENEY REPORT; an abridged translation of La Politique de Coopération avec les Pays en Voie de Développement. London, Overseas Development Institute, 1964. 51 p. 5s.

FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS OF AGRARIAN STRUCTURE AND REFORM IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES; documentation on the international conference held from May 12 to 18, 1962 at Berlin-Tegel, comp. by Nikolaus Newiger. Berlin-Tegel, German Foundation for Developing Countries, n.d. 89 p.

THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE. N.Y., International Chamber of Commerce, U. S. Council, 1964. 12 p.

GERMANY AND THE CENTRAL POWERS IN THE WORLD WAR 1914–1918, by Walther Hubatsch. Lawrence, Kansas, Univ. of Kansas, 1963. 133 p. (University of Kansas Publications, Social Science Studies.)

THE HAMMARSKJÖLD FORUMS; case studies on the role of law in settlement of international disputes. Dobbs Ferry, N. Y., Oceana Publications (for the Association of the Bar of the City of New York), 1964. $1.75 each.

3. The Inter-American security system and the Cuban crisis, by Covey Oliver. 96 p. *4.* Disarmament, by Louis Henkin. 98 p.

HEADLINE SERIES. N. Y., Foreign Policy Association, 1964. 75¢ each.

164. Germany after Adenauer, by Klaus Epstein. 63 p. *165.* Cuba under Castro, by D. D. Burks. 64 p.

HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY; the roots and growth of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948–1963, by Egon Schwelb. Chicago, Quadrangle Books (for the B'nai B'rith), 1964. 96 p.

IFO-INSTITUT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTSFORSCHUNG. Schriftenreihe. Berlin, Duncker, 1964.

57. Der spezifische Energieverbrauch der Industrie; seine Entwicklung, seine Bestimmungsfaktoren und ihre Auswirkungen 1950–1960, by Bernd Schreiber. 155. p. *58.* Das Problem der Kondratieff-Zyklen; ein Beitrag zur Entwicklung einer Theorie der "langen Wellen" und ihrer Bedeutung, by Ulrich Weinstock. 128 p.

INDIA AT MIDPASSAGE, by William Clark [and others]. London, Overseas Development Institute, 1964. 55 p. 6s.

INTERNATIONAL REVIEW SERVICE. Reports. N.Y., Author, 1964. $2.50 each.

83. Colonialism and the United Nations: Decolonization Declaration; Committee of 24; Neo-Colonialism; Border questions; Africa's colonial heartland. 105 p.

AN INTRODUCTION TO CANADIAN DEFENCE POLICY, by Brian Crane. Toronto, Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1964. 75 p. $1.00.

KHRUSHCHEV'S RUSSIA, by Merle Fainsod. Melbourne, Australian Institute of International Affairs, 1963. p. 233–259. (Dyason Memorial Lectures.)

KIELER VORTRÄGE; Neue Folge. Kiel, Institut für Weltwirtschaft, 1964.

31. Stabilisierungsplan und Einkommenspolitik in Frankreich, by Pierre Dieterlen. 14 p.

LAKE EUROPA: A NEW CAPITAL FOR A UNITED EUROPE, by J. M. Miller, N.Y., Books International, 1963. 114 p.

LE MARCHÉ COMMUN ET LES PAYS TIERS; incidences de la CEE sur le commerce international, by Hermann-Michel Hagmann. Lausanne, Université de Lausanne, Centre de Recherches Européennes, 1963. 105 p. Sw.Fr. 13.00.

A NATIONAL FARM PROGRAM FOR FEED GRAINS AND WHEAT; a statement by the NPA Agriculture Committee on National Policy. Washington, National Planning Association, 1964. 18 p. 50¢.

NATIONALISM AND INDIRECT RULE IN THE GOLD COAST, 1900–1950; the specific economic and cultural factors leading up to the current situation, by R. Y. Gildea, Jr. N.Y., William-Frederick Press, 1964. 34 p. $1.00.

NOT BY GOVERNMENTS ALONE: the role of British non-government organisations in the development decade, by Peter Williams and Adrian Moyes. London, Overseas Development Institute, 1964. 51 p. 3s.6d.

ONE PER CENT; THE CASE FOR GREATER AUSTRALIAN FOREIGN AID, by A. C. Ross [and others]. N.Y., Cambridge Univ. Press, 1963. 49 p.

OSTHANDEL; DIE REGELUNG DES VERFAHRENS IM HANDEL MIT OSTSTAATEN, by Uwe Lüthje.

Frankfurt am Main, Verlag für Wirtschaft und Verwaltung, 1963. 72 p. (VWV-Reihe zur Aussenwirtschaft, 9.)

OUTER SPACE AND INTERNATIONAL ORDER, by J. E. S. Fawcett. London, The David Davies Memorial Institute of International Studies, 1964. 14 p. (Annual Memorial Lecture, 1964.)

PANAMA—NATIONALISM AND THE CANAL, by the eds. of Deadline Data on World Affairs, 1964. 56 p. (On Record, vol. 2, no. 2.) $1.50.

PEACE . . . ? MAN AND NATIONS IN A CHANGING WORLD COMMUNITY. N.Y., National Council of Churches, 1964. 48 p. 50¢.

PLAN ODER PROGRAMM FÜR EUROPAS WIRTSCHAFT? Diskussionen um eine Planung der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung in Europa. Bonn, Der Deutsche Rat der Europäischen Bewegung, 1963. 59 p. (Schriftenreihe des Deutschen Rates der Europäischen Bewegung, 13.)

PLANNING. London, Political and Economic Planning, 1964.
Vol. XXX. No. 480. Commodity agreements and EEC farm policy. p. 149–209. 6s.

PROBLEMS OF MONETARY CONTROL, by Jacob Viner. Princeton, Princeton Univ., Dept. of Economics, International Finance Section, 1964. 61 p. (Essays in International Finance, 45.)

REPORT ON THE EVENTS IN PANAMA, JANUARY 9–12, 1964. Geneva, International Commission of Jurists, 1964. 46 p.

RWANDA E BURUNDI: PROBLEMI E PROSPETTIVE DI SVILUPPO ECONOMICO. Milano A. Giuffrè, 1963. 91 p. (Pubblicazioni del'Istituto di Politica Economica e Finanziaria della-Falcoltà di Economia e Commercio dell'Università di Roma.) L.800.

SCIENCE, ETHICS AND POLITICS, by Albert Szent-Gyorgyi; with an appreciation by Bertrand Russell. N.Y., Vantage Press, 1963. 91 p.

LA SITUACION LABORAL EN LA CUBA CASTRISTA. Mexico City, ORIT-CIOSL, n.d. 31 p.

THE SOVIET BLOC, CHINA AND AFRICA, ed. by Sven Hamrell and C. G. Widstrand. Uppsala, The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1964. 173 p. Kr.18.00.

LA SUISSE, L'URSS ET L'EUROPE ORIENTALE. Lausanne, Société d'études économiques et sociales, 1963. 164 p. (Revue Économique et Sociale, Avril 1963.) Sw.Fr. 12.00.

LA SUISSE ET LA COMMUNAUTÉ ATLANTIQUE. Lausanne, Société d'études économiques et sociales, 1963. 99 p. (Revue Économique et Sociale, September 1963). Sw.Fr. 10.00.

LES SYNDICATS DANS LES PAYS DE L'EST., journées d'etude, 19–21 Nov. 1962. Brussels, Univ. Libre de Bruxelles, Centre d'Étude des Pays de l'Est, 1963. 97 p. (Études des Pays de l'Est.)

TOWARD A STRATEGY OF PEACE; an election year guide for responsible citizens, by J. P. Warburg. N.Y., Current Affairs Press, 1964. 72 p. 75¢.

TOWARD TRANS-ATLANTIC AGRICULTURAL POLICY BARGAINING; a statement by the NPA Agriculture Committee on National Policy and a report by Lawrence Witt. Washington, National Planning Association, 1964. 19 p.

TRADE NEGOTIATIONS FOR A BETTER FREE WORLD ECONOMY; a statement on national policy by the Research and Policy Committee of the Committee for Economic Development. N.Y., C.E.D., 1964. v.p. $1.50.

TRAINING OF EUROPEAN EXPERTS AND SPECIALISTS WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE; documentation on the international conference held from 29 June to 4 July, 1962 in Berlin-Tegel, comp. by C. Bonte-Friedheim and H. Meliczek. Berlin-Tegel, German Foundation for Developing Countries, n.d. 96 p.

THE U.S.S.R., by Wright Miller. N.Y., Oxford Univ. Press, 1963. 126 p.

THE UNITED STATES AND THE NEW NATIONS: PROBLEMS AND RESPONSIBILITIES, by V. M. Dean, Cincinnati, The Methodist Church, Board of Missions, 1964. 90 p. $1.00.

VÄRLDSPOLITIKENS DAGSFRÅGOR. Stockholm, Utrikespolitiska Institutet, 1964. Kr.2.00 each.
2. Hongkong, by Torsten Brandel. 31 p. *3.* USA:s ekonomi och Dollarn, by Lennart Waern. 32 p. *4.* Malaysia, by T. G. Wickbom. 32 p. *5.* Den ryska jordbrukspolitiken, by Erik Swedborg. 32 p. *6.* Kampen om arabunionen, by Henry Christensson. 31 p. *7.* Problemet Cypern, by Kjell Säfström. 32 p.