

Barton Whaley



STRATAGEM

DECEPTION AND SURPRISE IN WAR

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Barton Whaley



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INTRODUCTION TO THE 2007 REPRINT

This book is actually three books in one, but *Stratagem* is more than just the sum of its parts. The great majority of its readers, quoters, and critics see the first book, namely, the six chapters of text plus the bibliography, as an historical analysis of deception and surprise. And, of course, they are right. Others see the second book, the two appendixes that form a handy source book of more than 100 case studies. They too are right. And a few have perceived a third book—an original exercise in methodology—a method designed to unmask deception where it is present.

This “third” book is a shadowy one, interwoven throughout the others and knitting them together. It is a model, a set of methods that underlie and pervade the entire work, sweeping back and forth and across the analytical chapters, case studies, bibliography, and the final database. More than either a historical analysis of military deception or a mere set of case studies, the deeper and more lasting value of this book is as a model or template of how to study and analyze deception operations. This model is constructed of the following seven separate and but mutually reinforcing methods:

- The introductory chapters, by taking both a broad and deep look at surprise operations, provided promising questions and hypotheses about the possible causes of surprise, including deception. Each case looks on both sides of the hill, concentrating on the goals, planning, expectations, security, leaks, warnings, intelligence assessments, and final results.
- The analysis is conducted online—not by hindsight. Online, or “abductive,” inference is the reasoning process used by all consistently successful analysts of mysteries, from physicists and magicians to police detectives and intelligence analysts, regardless of whether they are analyzing past or current mysteries.

Although all the case studies in *Stratagem* were past events, only six had come to my attention prelabeled *Deception*. Many weren't even labeled *Surprise*. Consequently, they posed mysteries that could only be solved by the same kind of online analysis as if they had been current and ongoing. So, about halfway into the research, I evolved the following rule of thumb: Whenever some source reports surprise, look closely for deception—even faint hints of possible deception. If these are found, it justifies and should trigger a close search for verification among independent sources or channels.

Other clues indicating that surprise and/or deception have been present are large discrepancies between casualties on both sides (“body counts” do count) or the results of combat that greatly exceeded or fell short of expectations.

- Each case study ends with a conventional list of “References” but unconventionally divided by categories that, where available, had specific evidence. These categories are: Warnings, Surprise, Deception, and General, plus occasional special categories of Intelligence, Security, Enemy Expectations, and Camouflage. This model constantly and systematically reminds the analyst to seek and report these special types of data—types of data that even skilled analysts often overlook or underplay.
- One of the more interesting points of method that emerged early in my research was that I never had to fall back on my top-secret clearance. Yet all my research on *Codeword BARBAROSSA* and *Stratagem* was completed shortly *before* the British and U.S. governments began to open the classified files, particularly on all matters involving deception planning and operations in World War II. To detect deception, one must, at the minimum, know to look for those specific types of clues that point to deception. Some of those types of clues, or categories of data, are suggested earlier; they are an essential part of the counterdeception analyst's toolkit.
- The tables that accompany most of the case studies are designed to summarize the data in such way as to emphasize the main factors that lead to surprise, success or failure (and to what degrees), high or low casualties, and so forth.
- Finally and, I believe, most importantly, a cross-disciplinary attack is essential for detecting deception in either past or ongoing operations. By happy chance, I brought to these analyses substantial training in a rich mix of disciplines. The most relevant of these were the physical sciences, bacteriology, philosophy of science, sociology, political science, and Chinese area studies (Sinology), which itself encompassed the disciplines of, among others,

history, linguistics, anthropology, and geology. So it was no accident that I was a ripe 41 years old when I completed *Stratagem*. It had taken me that long to acquire the cross-disciplinary knowledge to do so. No amount of urging or funding could have enabled me to do so before. But any suitably designed interdisciplinary team could do so quite effectively.

This overall architecture of *Stratagem* is my reason for never attempting a revision or update. Having created a comprehensive methodological structure, I judged it complete and moved on to other compositions. In 1979 I drafted an updated and enlarged database titled *DECEPTR* that covered 232 battles in 20 wars from 1914 to 1973. I hope others will enlarge its database, expand its historical scope (both before 1914 and after 1968), and refine (or reject) its theory. To date, it seems that *Stratagem* has inspired only three substantial analyses but no true efforts to replicate, much less expand or refine.¹

Forerunners and Influences

Misdirection sets the scene for deception. If the misdirection fails, the deception will fail. When applied to military theory, I believe this key concept should be credited to the famous but highly controversial British military theorist, Captain B. H. Liddell Hart, although he never quite put it in these words. He first proposed the notion of an “indirect approach” strategy in 1929 in his *The Decisive Wars of History: A Study in Strategy* and enlarged on it in 1954 in *Strategy: The Indirect Approach*. Unfortunately, his critics seized on the ambiguous word “indirection” to grossly oversimplify his original insight and dismiss his consequent theory as mere circular reasoning. To do so, they had to twist his argument to be that only successful military operations are labeled as indirect. Even two of Liddell Hart’s most ardent supporters, Field-Marshal Archibald Wavell and Colonel T. E. Lawrence, privately accused him of imposing

¹ These three studies are: (1) William R[obert] Harris, *Counter-Deception Planning*, Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, July 13, 1973, 169 unnumbered pages. Labeled as RAND Report R-1230-ARPA. A fine contribution to theory. Based on a detailed critique of *Stratagem*. (2) Ronald G. Sherwin, [with] Barton Whaley, “Understanding Strategic Deception: An Analysis of 93 Cases,” in Donald C. Daniel and Katherine L. Herbig (eds.), *Strategic Military Deception* (New York: Pergamon Press, 1982), pp. 177–194. A secondary analysis of data on the 93 strategic-level deceptions in my updated DECEPTR database. Dr. Sherwin was the sole author, with my contribution being limited to the database and some kibbutzing. (3) John Anton Van Vleet, *Tactical Military Deception*, Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, September 1985, 258 pages. Mainly a secondary analysis of the raw coded data on tactical cases in DECEPTR.

indirection on many of his case examples. Liddell Hart's theory might have fared better had he stressed the words *direction* and *indirection* (that is, *misdirection*) and *deception* and *surprise* and spelled out the connections between each pair.

His book (and its update in 1954 as *Strategy*) has been either wildly applauded or blindly attacked for its broad generalizations about strategy. To my surprise *none* of its many admirers or detractors have remarked on what I immediately recognized as its most important, indeed unique, merit, namely, its research method. This 1929 book of military history first applied *any* more or less systematically quantitative approach to one set of case studies, that is, a database—a rather large database. Liddell Hart laboriously collected and analyzed data (according to fairly uniform criteria) on 240 campaigns in 27 decisive wars (9 ancient, 18 modern) from antiquity to the end of the Great War, that is, nearly 25 centuries (405 B.C. to A.D. 1918). From this survey he concluded that: “In only six of these campaigns ... was a decisive result obtained by a direct strategic approach to the main army of the enemy!” Conversely, he found:

twenty-six campaigns in which both the decisiveness and the indirectness of approach are manifest beyond dispute.... This high proportion of history's decisive campaigns, enhanced as it is by the comparative rarity of the indirect approach, enforces the conclusion that the indirect approach is by far the most hopeful and economic form of strategy.” He also found that “the consistently successful commanders of history, when faced by an enemy in a position strong naturally or materially, have hardly ever attacked it directly.... Further, history shows that rather than resign himself to a direct approach, a Great Captain will take even the most hazardous indirect approach—if necessary over mountains, deserts or swamps, with only a fraction of force, even cutting himself loose from his communications.

Liddell Hart had made a monumental breakthrough. That it has gone unnoticed can, I believe, be mainly attributed to the conventional education of the great majority of historians in general and military historians in particular. Being trained to seek out the small details, they tend to miss broad patterns. Most abhor “numbers, charts, and graphs,” as historian J. Bowyer Bell contemptuously called them (even while collaborating with me). The few historians who aimed for sweeping historical and cross-cultural generalizations were rightly demolished for stepping outside their periods and cultures of expert knowledge. But this particular litmus test doesn't apply to the mathematically oriented military writers from F. W. Lanchester (1914, with his data-free hypothetical models), through Trevor Dupuy (1977), to Biddle (2004). We employ a level of statistical abstraction that is essentially operations research (OR) or, as in my case, out of the sociological tradition. We lean towards inductively building a database that we then search for patterns rather than deductively cherry-picking to support a preset theory.

My starting point for developing a theory of deception was Liddell Hart, particularly his 1929 and 1956 editions, which I first read in 1967 or 1968. They were the necessary kick start for my *Stratagem* (1969). Then, in 1970, William “Bill” Harris returned from his first short stay at the RAND Corporation in Santa Monica bearing three key papers by R. V. Jones (1957, 1965, and 1968) and thrust them upon me. Amazed by these timely treasures, they crucially helped refine my view of deception theory and opened my thoughts to the rich possibilities for counterdeception.

A Deception Project

This book, *Stratagem: Deception and Surprise in War*, originated as part two of my quadrilogy on deception. That project began in 1967 while I was at MIT’s Center for International Studies. I finished the initial two studies, both focused on military deception, in 1969. The first study was published four years later as *Codeword BARBAROSSA*. It had begun as an attempt to replicate Roberta Wohlstetter’s *Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision* (1962), the classic signal-versus-noise model of surprise attack. But, to my surprise, my study ended as a new surprise-through-deception model.

Wohlstetter’s Signals and Noise Model

Roberta Wohlstetter had first spelled out the Wohlstetter Hypothesis in 1962 in her brilliant analysis of the Pearl Harbor strategic surprise. Her theory is a counsel of despair, telling us that surprise is inevitable because it is only by hindsight that we can distinguish the warning signals from the surrounding noise. This extraordinary and brilliantly presented theory has become the underpinning of all subsequent no-fault arguments to which all failed intelligence analysts from Pearl Harbor to 9/11 appeal. From then until today, the great majority of military intelligence analysts have assumed that she was right. I had agreed at first—indeed urged students to apply her research model to other cases of strategic surprise. Having failed to stimulate others to do this, I decided to do so myself, picking the seemingly similar case of Hitler’s 1941 surprise invasion of the Soviet Union. However, I diverged from Wohlstetter by 1969—first with *Codeword BARBAROSSA*’s alternative deception model and then when my reanalysis in *Stratagem* (Case A30) showed that even her Pearl Harbor case was less one of signals–noise befuddlement than that of a cunningly designed, competently executed, and successful Japanese deception operation.

Both Wohlstetter and I were working blind in the early stages of searching for explanations of the Pearl Harbor and BARBAROSSA surprises. Hindsight told us only that the victims had been surprised, nothing about how that had happened. So our research method was not hindsightful but forward-looking in its puzzle

solving—the so-called Method of Zadig, that is, strictly in accord with standard abductive logic. Professor Ben-Zvi rightly says that Wohlstetter’s noise model pessimistically made no “claim” to “predicting or preventing surprise attacks,” but my deception model does make just such an optimistic claim.

Wohlstetter had quickly attracted supporters among analysts of military surprise, particularly strategic surprise. Their mantras are: “Anyone can have 20–20 hindsight” and “It’s easy to be a Monday-morning quarterback.” The flaw in this argument had long ago been solved not only in practice (with the scientific method), but also, as mentioned earlier, in theory (abductive or retroductive inference).

This had been my MIT doctoral dissertation, “Operation BARBAROSSA: A Case Study of Soviet Strategic Information Processing Before the German Invasion,” which I defended in 1969 in the Political Science Department. The MIT Press published it in 1973 with negligible changes.

BARBAROSSA was as an exercise in methodology. It was my first effort to systematically incorporate a primitive version of the method that has recently come to be known in the intelligence community as Richards J. Heuer’s Analysis of Competing Hypotheses (ACH).² That it discovered, developed, and proposed an original model, specifically a deception model, to explain the strategic surprise of Hitler’s 1941 invasion of Russia was central. However, all but one of the book’s more than 60 initial reviewers ignored its method. They focused on its conclusions, either agreeing, doubting, or rejecting it. The exception was Alan Bullock, historian and chancellor of Oxford University, who recognized that I had attempted not just one more case study but instead used that case to create a rather fresh approach to a special type of problem in historical research—that is, not a method but methodology in the full sense of that widely misused term. His review, my favorite, in *The New York Review of Books* (June 28, 1973), concluded:

Mr. Whaley’s conclusion is a controversial one which not everyone is going to accept. But that does not affect my admiration for the clear and systematic way in which he has gone about his study, with a running commentary explaining at each stage what he is doing, building up first one, then another hypothesis as he fits the [78] different bits of evidence into place. For this is a way of pursuing his-

² I trace this primitive ACH-type research model back to A. J. A. Symons’s *The Quest for Corvo: An Experiment in Biography* (1934). Symons’s ingenuous approach was to interweave his own detective search to uncover the truth about the mysterious Baron Corvo with the reconstructed biography of the man. In both *Codeword BARBAROSSA* (1973) and *The Man Who Was Erdnase* (1991) I purposely followed Symons and Leonardo Olschki, *Guillaume Boucher: A French Artist at the Court of the Khans* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1946). Professor Olschki, the good teacher, leads us step by step through his search for evidence, including sending us down all the blind alleys that he had pursued, discarding successive hypotheses until we (and he) confront and accept the most plausible one. This particular ACH analytical method has been codified by Richards J. Heuer, Jr. (1999) and refined by Stech and Elsaessar (2004).

torical inquiry that allows mistakes to be corrected and alternative hypotheses considered without invalidating the method, a case study in historical detection which would have delighted the late R. G. Collingwood ... and which gave me great intellectual pleasure to read.

My second study (although the first published) is the one you see here. I had designed it to establish the relative frequencies of the signal-noise and deception models. It analyzed 168 cases of deception, surprise, and nonsurprise in 16 wars from 1914 to 1968. Appearing in 1969, it showed, again contrary to my expectations, that the then-standard signal-noise model was, in fact, both rare and weak (at least during the period studied), while the new deception model provided a more common and sturdier explanation of most strategic and operational-level surprises.

The third study in the quadrilogy was *The Prevalence of Guile*. Although begun as the third study, it will be the last to be completed. It tracks the trajectory of deception through time, across cultures, and into military, political, and religious-philosophical disciplines. I began exploring the questions about the different roles of deception around late 1973, presented a summary in 1979 at the Fletcher School's conference on "Intelligence, Deception and Surprise" in 1979, and in 1980 revisited parts of this topic in a short article.³ Unable to find funding for this project, I reluctantly set it aside for a quarter century until July 2006 when the orphan was adopted by the Foreign Denial & Deception Committee of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. Thus, research resumed with updates, much new data, and substantial rethinking.

How do we explain this roller-coaster history of *Stratagem* and its two flanking monographs that collectively sought to better understand how deception works? All three originated with and were developed over the past four decades without any outside funding until 2006. This was, I believe, a direct consequence of one of these studies' own main findings, namely, that interest in funding deception research or practice by universities, think tanks, governments, and the military varies greatly through time. Thus military deception doctrine in the United States, having peaked during both world wars and almost vanishing afterwards, saw a fitful revival of interest in the 1970s, then passed into partial eclipse (with two pre-9/11 blips in 1999 and 2001), and is only now reviving once more in this first decade of the new millennium.

³ In Harold Lasswell, Daniel Lerner, and Hans Speier in their monumental three-volume survey of *Propaganda and Communication in World History* (1980–1981).

The fourth and final part of my quadrilogy was the short paper titled “Toward a General Theory of Deception” (1982).⁴ This proposed the first theory of how deception operates and pervades all disciplines, throughout history, and across cultures. Having thus boxed the compass of how to deceive, it remained only to describe how to detect it. That began a new cycle of research, one still in progress.⁵

Future Research

I hope that this renewed availability of *Stratagem* will stimulate similar systematic research on how deception works in military and political-military operations. The most useful research raises more questions than it answers. Today deception is widely accepted as a *force multiplier*, but how much so? To what degree or by what factor? Two times? Three times? And under which specific circumstances does deception give an unfair advantage to the deceiver? I suggest the following eight research priorities:

- Update the *Stratagem* database. This is crucial to develop new case studies of specific operations in the Soviet-Afghan War (1979–1989), the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988), the Gulf War (1990–1991), Somalia (1993–1995), the Balkans (1992–1995), the U.S.-Afghan War, 1st Phase (2001–2003), and the Iraq War (2003). Enough unclassified information from both sides in these conflicts is now in the public domain for satisfactory unclassified analysis. (Are there any operations where access to classified intelligence would produce *significantly* different assessments?)
- Enrich the database. The criteria for *Stratagem* required that only those wars in the 1914–1968 period be included where all cases of strategic and operational battle were covered. Because of time constraints, *Stratagem* covered only 16 wars. It would be desirable to add at the minimum the following wars where adequate deception-relevant data is available: the Riff War (1919–1926), the Gran Chaco War (1932–1935), and particularly the Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945).

⁴ Barton Whaley, “Toward a General Theory of Deception,” *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 5, No. 1, March 1982, pp. 179–193. Reprinted in the magician’s journal *Epoptica*, No. 5, January 1984, pp. 270–277. Although useful distinctions can be made, for our present purposes, the terms deception, guile, and stratagem are treated as synonyms.

⁵ See Barton Whaley and Jeffrey Busby, “Detecting Deception: Practice, Practitioners, and Theory,” in Roy Godson and James J. Wirth, (eds.), *Strategic Denial and Deception* (New Brunswick: Transaction, 2002), pp. 181–221; and Barton Whaley, *The Maverick Detective; or, The Whole Art of Detection* (in progress).

- Backdate the database. Extend the time frame backwards to include cases from the earliest documented history to *Stratagem*'s close-off in 1914. A good starting point would be Captain Liddell Hart's inventory of wars and campaigns, including particularly the deception, surprise, and data-rich campaigns of the Mongol world conquest, the Byzantine Wars, the American Revolution, the Napoleonic Wars, and the American Civil War.
- Deepen the database. At present it covers only the strategic and operational levels of combat. It is important to extend the range of cases to cover all levels of tactical operations. Many tactical cases are described and analyzed in the opening chapters of *Stratagem*, but only anecdotally, not systematically. The best evidence is that, while all the basic theory and principles of deception apply throughout the strategic-tactical spectrum, there are notable differences in such matters as timing and the number and types of channels available for the communication and verification of deceptive messages.
- Refine at least some of the categories of analysis. For example, I have never been comfortable with the crude measure used for categorizing the degree of surprise. This is particularly important because the great majority of military historians and an unfortunately large proportion of intelligence analysts tend to treat surprise as an either-or event. *Stratagem* showed that this is probably never the case—surprise is never 100% or 0%. It seems that both combatants in every battle will experience at least some small element of the unexpected.
- More closely assess the role of deception in asymmetric wars. The question had been raised in *Stratagem* but treated only anecdotally in one chapter. There are many apt examples from antiquity to the present—Roman legions versus barbarian rabble, Chinese and European imperial conquests and the many subsequent “small wars,” Soviet guerrillas in World War II, and so forth.
- Identify and develop new categories of analysis. I suspect, for example, that entirely new categories can be identified and developed for measuring the degree of sophistication of deception methods. The one used in *Stratagem* is a crude (but surprisingly effective) total count of the number of gross types of channels used to “sell” each deception. With what is now known, this measure can be refined by both assigning “weights” to each channel and further refining the channels into a number of subchannels.
- Finally, and perhaps most importantly, refine and test the database to assess the effectiveness of various counterdeception techniques.

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PREFACE

“I did send for thee to tutor thee
in stratagems of war.”
—Shakespeare, *Henry VI*, Pt. I, Act IV, Sc. 5

This is a study of surprise and deception in warfare, with special reference to their operation at the strategic rather than the lower tactical level. For strategic deception I have revived the traditional word *stratagem*. Although it eventually became stretched to mean deceptive tricks or schemes in general,¹ specifically any more-or-less elaborate plan to entrap or circumvent, *stratagem* remains an accepted military term and originally was only that.

The word *stratagem* and its military meaning comes to English from the French *stratagème*.² It reached French through the Italian *stratagemma* from Latin *strategema*. Naturally, the Greeks had a word for it: *strategema*, which betrays its military root in *strategos*, “a general” or, literally, “leader of an army.” It is, appropriately, a distant cognate of “strategy”—although this last word is modern both in its military sense and as a loan word in English.³ It is a French loan-word into Russian as *stratagema*. Its international acceptance is further evidenced by the Spanish and Portuguese *estratagema*.

The reason *stratagem* as a military term has fallen into relative disuse is because its practice as one of the military arts underwent a long period of decline during the 19th century and has had only a slow and somewhat spasmodic revival in the 20th. But that renaissance is the subject of this study. . .

A brief note is in order here at the outset about the way in which I have handled the empirical data. In addition to general readings in military theory and history, I have made specific studies of 168 battles from 16 wars during the period from 1914 through 1968. The studies—presented in outline in the appendices—comprise three categories. The main category—designated as the Type A Cases—comprises *all*, or virtually all, 68 instances of *strategic* surprise and/or *strategic* deception, as defined by the fairly rigid criteria spelled out in Chapter V. The second category—the Type B Examples—gives 47 selected examples of *tactical* surprise and/or deception. This category is included in the

¹The Oxford English Dictionary (O.E.D.) records its earliest appearance in this general sense in 1588.

²The O.E.D. gives several citations beginning in 1489 with Caxton.

³Specifically, in the late 18th century.

analysis to judge if any meaningful differences emerge as surprise and deception shade from the strategic into the tactical. (To anticipate the findings: in general, no major differences were found.)

The third category—the Type C Examples—gives 53 selected examples of battles where there is *specific evidence* that *neither* surprise *nor* deception were involved. This category is included to provide the maximum or sharpest contrast with the two categories that do contain the strategic and tactical instances. (It was found that the differences were unexpectedly many and surprisingly profound.)

At this point I must stress the fact that I have avoided using the terminology, much less the techniques, of mathematical statistics. A word of explanation is perhaps in order for the information of readers who are not familiar with statistical theory but are accustomed to find statistical manipulation in political, sociological, and military studies based on sets of cases, some of which number less than the 163 comprising this study. Statisticians will already have realized from even my brief description of my three types of cases and examples that none meet the basic criteria of statistical samples.⁴ Types B and C are *selected* examples, hence they do not meet the fundamental requirement of “randomness.” Failing this, they do not constitute “samples,” in their technical statistical sense. Type A, on the other hand, exceeds or transcends the requirements of a statistical “sample.” It is neither *selected* nor *random* but claims *all-inclusiveness*. Consequently, it is not statistically legitimate to generalize to any wider “universe” or “population” of cases or examples, because the Type A cases already exhaust the members of their class while Types B and C are composed of selected examples of uncertain typicality.

It is, of course, quite proper to treat such sets of data *quantitatively*, summarizing them as frequencies (totals, sub-totals), percentages, fractions, ratios, etc. This is the limit of quantification applied in this paper. However, even here, the reader should be most cautious how he applies or extrapolates these quantitative findings to any cases not reported, particularly those outside the 1914-1968 period studied, as no *statistically* valid judgments about such cases are warranted. The “best educated guess” can be our only blind-man’s guide into such unknown terrain.

Finally, some comments about sources. Because the topic of this research goes to one of the innermost rings of secret intelligence operations, I am often asked how such research is possible on an unclassified basis. In fact, the problem has not been to ferret out the rare indiscretion but, rather, to select the more detailed, perceptive, and authentic references from a quite voluminous literature of most varied quality. The extensive bibliographical appendix and many footnote references testify to the dimensions of this—the real-problem. First, hundreds of examples and all the generalizations are already present in Greek, Roman, Biblical, Chinese, and Vedic antiquity and in the European Renaissance. Second,

⁴Particularly relevant discussions of the frequent abuses of statistics are given by the medical statistician, Lancelot T. Hogben, *Statistical Theory* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1960); and the sociologist, Hanan C. Selvin, “A Critique of Tests of Significance in Survey Research,” *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 22, No. 5 (October 1957), p. 519-527.

memoirs provide a rich source of directly pertinent data, although most of this is of as fragmentary a nature as their authors' brief glimpse into the workings of a deception operation. Third, some astonishing indiscretions have occurred, particularly on the part of American writers who published their memoirs in the period after regular wartime censorship ended in 1945 and before the onset of the Cold War in 1948 retightened the security system. This was, for example, true of Eisenhower's aide, Captain (U.S.N.) Butcher who in 1946 disclosed the SOLO ruses for the North African invasion and much of the FORTITUDE plan—including the Monty's double hoax—for Normandy, as well as mentioning such unmentionables as "one-time pads."⁵ Similarly Robert J. Donovan (also 1946) published a (carefully garbled) version of "the man who never was." 1946 was a vintage year for disclosures for even J. Edgar Hoover then provided the only detailed account of FORTITUDE NORTH, omitting only the code-name. In 1947, Major General Deane, Chief of the wartime U.S. Military Mission in Moscow, gave us not only the code-name (futilely censored by all subsequent U.S. and British official historians) but what remains our only detailed account of the still classified Operation BODYGUARD, the brilliant and successful deception of grand strategy to shield the Second Front. The British were more cautious. In 1946 their official historians were directed to avoid nearly all aspects of intelligence.⁶ Moreover, they have enforced this control even to the extent of virtually monopolizing the early published output of German, World War II intelligence memoirs.⁷ Despite these restrictions a number of disclosures leaked through, such as those in the 1947 memoirs of Montgomery's intelligence officer and later Chief of Staff, Major-General Sir Francis DeGuinding. Also, in 1950, the wartime Minister of Information, Duff Cooper, managed to surface enough new details of the "man who never was" ruse in the thin guise of a novel to trigger some subsequent official disclosures. This is the current pattern. Enough unauthorized disclosures have appeared to bring enough relaxation of official restrictions that it is generally true to say that the broad outlines and many of the details of most deception operations through World War II are now in the public domain. Even the Russians have recently begun to acknowledge their part.

⁵Some overpaid editor (or censor) managed to delete the code-name FORTITUDE from the page proofs but missed it (and its definition) in the index.

⁶Donald McLachlan, *Room 39: A Study of Naval Intelligence* (New York: Atheneum, 1968), p. xv.

⁷An instructive exercise is to do a comparative study of the editors and publishers and, particularly, the translators of these works.

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Chapter 1

STRATAGEM IN WARFARE

All warfare is based on deception.

—*Sun Tzu, 4th Cent. B.C.*

Having decided to initiate war, open a new theater of operations, launch an offensive, or merely renew an ongoing battle, the national leader or military commander faces a dilemma. And if his foe has comparable or greater strength his choice will have decisive consequences. His dilemma is how to mobilize and deploy his martial means while retaining enough secrecy or at least uncertainty to avoid sacrificing surprise, much less drawing a preemptive attack.

The pedestrian textbookish answer to the planning of surprise attack is “security.” Although security is a logical—indeed tautological—cause of secrecy, it is unrealistic to expect it to conceal any large-scale operation. With rare exceptions, even the tightest security measures guard against disclosure only to the most naive, preoccupied, witless, incompetent, or unlucky enemy. Of the 61 cases of strategic military surprise that occurred between 1914 and 1968, no more than 4 can be exclusively or even mainly attributed to the initiator’s passive security.¹ This seemingly holds even at the tactical level where, although as would be expected, security usually has an easier task, still at most only 7 out of 54 of the selected examples of tactical surprise can be attributed to effective security. More or less specific warning signals almost inevitably filter through the security screen and reach the intended victim. Moreover, these warnings usually increase in frequency and specificity as the attacker’s preparations unfold, drawing more and more indiscrete persons into the planning and making ever more visible the many necessary adjustments in mobilization, deployment, logistics, and perhaps diplomacy.

The commander need not sit impotent, hoping that the rare lucky chance or the uncertainty engendered by the ever-present “fog of war” will smite his

¹See Appendix B, Lists A and B, for columns Surprise (code Y), Deception (code N), Warning (code N).

foe with an even more profound blindness. There is one type of activity still available that will multiply his chances of gaining surprise. That is stratagem.

1.1 Deception in History

The stone that was rejected by
you, the builders, which has
become the corner stone.
—Acts, 4:11

Although deception runs through the history of war, historical surveys are very rare.² Moreover there are no analytical studies of the topic. The reason for this gap seems to be that deception has been so infrequently or, rather, intermittently and idiosyncratically practiced that it has never gained a firm hold on formal doctrine. As Colonel T. E. Lawrence observed, “deceptions . . . for the ordinary general were just witty hors d’oeuvres before battle.”³ Even its resurgence in World War II and the subsequent urgent stress on strategic surprise in nuclear war have produced only two or three case studies and no analytical efforts, at least not in the public domain.

Deception is one of those odd strategic techniques of war, like psychological warfare, that seems fated to cycles of loss and reinvention despite being both older than history and international. Pre-historic legend gives us such familiar examples as the Trojan Horse and Gideon. History adds many examples such as Hannibal in the 3rd century B.C. And Chinggis Khan was a 13th century master of the surprise attack in all its strategic, tactical, and technological aspects. The ever victorious Maréchal de Saxe restored deception, surprise, and maneuver to European battlefields in the early 18th century. Wolfe used deception against Montcalm in the mid-18th century. Frederick the Great, during the late 18th century, employed various stratagems in battle, but to neither the extent nor with the unalloyed triumph that marked Saxe. Napoleon used it, particularly in his early (successful) battles before he shifted his reliance to the crushing weight of massed artillery and disciplined numbers. “Stonewall” Jackson (and Lee) revived it, and Sherman perfected it in the mid-19th.

Although the elevation of deception to a strategic principle has almost always been an idiosyncratic fad of exceptionally imaginative leaders rather than a routine textbook practice, all military and intelligence services have made sufficiently frequent *tactical* use of it—or of particular aspects of it—that it has at least developed its own technical vocabulary. Thus, at the most general level of strategy, it is called *stratagem* or *deception* by the British, *deception* by the CIA, *diversion* or *demonstration* by the American military and in NATO, *stratagème*

²Those known to me are Frontinus’ first century A.D. Latin primer, the *Strategemata*; Carlet de la Rosière, *Stratagèmes de Guerre* (1756), reputedly a mere set of cases; Colonel G. B. Malleon, *Ambushes and Surprises* (London: Allen, 1885), a rambling, untheoretical, inconclusive group of case studies; and *The Tangled Web* (Washington, D.C.: Luce, 1963), an undigested potpourri by the editors of the *Army Times*.

³T. E. Lawrence, *Seven Pillars of Wisdom* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1935), p. 537.

or *ruse de guerre* by the French, and *Täuschung* or *Kriegslist* by the Germans. In English we also meet the terms *feint* and *ruse*. Similarly, the deliberate feeding of false or misleading information to enemy intelligence services is variously called *deception* by the British, *intoxication* by the French, *Irreführung* or colloquially *Blüten* (“blossoms”) by the Germans, and *dezinformatsiya* by Soviet intelligence. Finally, at the mere level of concealment or disguise it is called *cover* by the British and American intelligence services, *camouflage* by their armies, and *Tarnung* by the Germans.⁴

Churchill put it to an appreciative Stalin that strategic deception was the “bodyguard” of surprise. This is perhaps as generally valid a fact of strategic surprise as can be made. The assertion has its empirical verification in Chapter VI, where in 41 out of 53 cases deception directly aided the achievement of strategic surprise. Despite the great importance of this topic, it is almost entirely overlooked by historians and students of international relations. This oversight is a direct consequence of the fact that governments continue to withhold that particular part of their World War I and II archives long after the public release of most other case materials. As one former senior CIA official has confirmed: “. . . strategic deception, whether in peace or in war, is the most secret of secret operations.”⁵

1.2 The Practitioners

How can you fancie one that lookes so fierce,
Onelie disposed to martiall Stratagems?
—Marlowe, *Tamburlaine*, Act III, Sc. 2.

Deception has been a military art—not a craft, much less a science. Consequently it has its practitioners with their biographers, autobiographers, and case studies—but not its field manuals, much less its theoreticians, at least not until after World War II. Rather, deception has been transmitted from practitioner to practitioner by either direct personal instruction or historical example.

In early times, the practitioners—the “notable Captaines stratagematique”—were the commanders themselves: Hannibal, Caesar, Chinggis Khan, Saxe, Frederick the Great, Napoleon, Wellington, and others. We do not have to seek behind the commanders for clever illusionists whispering strategies and suggesting stratagems, because these commanders performed virtually unsupported by the advice of specialized staffs.⁶

By the 19th century, the growth and international diffusion of the general staff system had begun to shift military planning and decision making from

⁴See particularly Colvin (53), 108, 121; Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Dictionary (JD), (Washington, D.C.: 1962), under “demonstration” and “diversion.”

⁵Christopher Felix (pseud.), *A Short Course in the Secret War* (New York: Dutton, 1963), pp. 152-154.

⁶Chinggis Khan and some other early commanders did have primitive general staff systems. And these and still others commonly had courtly advisers who sometimes contributed military advice. Consequently, the difference between their period and the 19th-20th centuries was more quantitative than strictly qualitative.

individuals to committees. Even then it seems that the outstanding innovators—Generals Bonaparte, Jackson, and Sherman—pretty much kept their own counsel in matters of grand tactics and broad strategy, which they deemed to include stratagem.

It is only when we enter the 20th century that we find stratagem relegated to a staff function. General Roberts achieved surprise and gained his victory at Kimberly through the use of deception, but this last was the contribution of his staff intelligence officer, Colonel Henderson, who merely applied his academic studies of “Stonewall” Jackson. Indeed, the field intelligence services became henceforward the main repositories of this moribund art. Moreover, the military intelligence services were generally puny, neglected affairs. Consequently it is not really surprising that stratagem held such fragile claim on war. The commanders appointed to send the big battalions to glory—Joffre, Nivelle, Foch, the younger Moltke, Falkenhayn, Robertson, Haig—neither used nor understood surprise, much less deception. The practice of deception in the Great War is found only intermittently and, then, mainly on peripheral fronts—at Gallipoli in 1915, in East Africa in 1916, and Palestine in 1917-1918. It was never part of what then passed for grand strategy.

There are only seven—perhaps thirteen—exceptions to my generalization that stratagem has become a mere staff function in 20th century strategic planning. These altogether exceptional persons are Churchill, Hitler, Wavell, Rommel, Alexander, MacArthur, and Dayan. (The other possibles—uncertain only because conclusive evidence is lacking—are Marshall, Atatürk, Mao, Yadin, and Giap.) It is probably fruitless to muse over the presumably special quality of mind shared by these men. All are highly unorthodox, creative, imaginative men. All—except Rommel and Zhukov—have a strong sense of history. But these same qualities were also shared by Joseph Stalin, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and John F. Kennedy, and in part by Chiang Kai-shek, De Gaulle, and Gamal Abdul Nasser, none of whom ever demonstrated any deep understanding of stratagem as applied to war. Comparison of these two groups hardly supports the most obvious hypothesis: that day-to-day experience with political or bureaucratic deviousness is a natural training-ground for its military-strategic counterpart. In other words, there is no direct connection between proficiency in political stratagem and proficiency in military stratagem. This is doubly remarkable, if we consider Clausewitz right in his argument that war is an extension of politics.

Moreover, political stratagem and military stratagem are, at least on the spotty evidence, sharply distinguished by the manner in which they are acquired as skills. On the one hand, political deception seems to be picked up as one element in a general socializing process, being usually acquired unconsciously or at least un-selfconsciously as a result of the trial-and-error reward-and-punishment learning process that comes with social pressure, peer-group emulation, etc. In other words, socio-political hypocrisy is learned, but it is not formally taught. Like mores, hypocrisy is, as Professor Gitter has empirically demonstrated, simply “a way of life.” Stratagem, however, seems to be learned as a result of verbal or written instruction. Thus Wavell cites Meinertzhagen, Clarke could cite Wavell, and Montagu could quote Clarke. Stratagem is a skill

transmitted by conscious instruction from master to student. I do not understand why these two superficially similar modes of deception are evidently so different. The question should prove an answerable one through the method of comparative biography-interviews with the practitioners themselves being the most direct way to collect data. At any event, it is surely a worthwhile problem for students of psycho-politics and political-military decision-making.

Where Hitler took only a pragmatically shrewd view of the utility of deception, Churchill was delighted—even somewhat fascinated—by it as an intellectual game in itself. He enjoyed inventing or encouraging such toys for his soldiers. Thus, his “tanks,” “Mulberries,” “Commandos,” and the electronic “Wizard War” that he would unleash against Kaiser and Hitler alike. It is striking that many of these and other devices and techniques were conceived for their surprise effect in support of strategy or even stratagem. The “Wizard War” was Churchill’s name for the game of electronically deceiving the Luftwaffe. The “tanks” were to revolutionize war by their surprise appearance. The covert Special Operations Executive was directed by him to do nothing less than metaphorically “set Europe ablaze.” “Mulberries” were the artificial harbors towed to the Normandy beachhead thereby permitting major landings at points German intelligence had judged “impossible.” Churchill’s first such notion was, I think, that of an entire dummy fleet. Conceived by him in 1911, he directed its construction in 1914 as a master ruse to lure the German High Seas Fleet into battle.⁷ Churchill’s second known ruse of his own devising was the Royal Marine’s demonstration landing at Ostend on 26 August 1914 (Example B2). His early flair for stratagems continued through both world wars, reinforced by his keen encouragement of this talent in others.

Was the controversial “Monty” a master of surprise and deception? This is implied by their successful application under his command in North Africa—particularly at Alam Halfa, Alamein, and Médinine—and his participation in operations supported by stratagems in Dieppe, Tunisia, Sicily, Italy, and France.⁸ And as “Monty’s double” he was himself the ruse. Moreover, his auto-hagiographic memoirs do little to suggest that any of his many successes stemmed from other minds. But, did Earl Montgomery of Alamein make any personal contribution to the deception planning in the campaigns for which he had command responsibility? This does not seem to be. Neither his own memoirs nor the official campaign histories show that he took any interest in such matters even when they were present. Moreover, a growing body of critical scholarship and personal memoirs contradicts his claims to imaginative strategic conceptions, comprehensive planning, and daring execution.⁹ These accounts now attribute his outstanding leadership to other qualities. Much the same point—and here I refer only to their roles in deception planning—applies to both General Eisenhower

⁷See Case A2.

⁸See Cases B27, A35, B29 and B26, B30, A38, B31, A45, A47.

⁹I think particularly of Correlli Barnett, R. W. Thompson, and Liddell Hart. And even the personal memoirs of two of his closest associates and most avid supporters, de Guingand (his chief of staff) and Alexander (his chief) do not link Montgomery directly to the deception plans conducted under his command.

and General Patton. Regarding only deception, Wavell's mantle of stratagem was passed to Alexander rather than to Montgomery.

It is tempting to link some general personality "type" with the ability to understand and use surprise and deception and to associate its reverse type with the failure to do so. Yet, if such a correlation between personality and use of these particular military concepts exists, it is not a simple one—at least, I am unable to see it on the basis of preliminary comparisons either among the more prominent practitioners or between the practitioners and non-practitioners. From the 1920s on Montgomery proved himself incapable of even understanding the concepts of surprise, the "expanding torrent" (i.e., the Blitzkrieg exploitation of a break-through), or the importance of information about his enemy. Montgomery had gained a cocksure mastery of the most advanced strategic concepts evolved on the Western Front by 1918, but he was unable to give more than lip-service to the subsequent concepts of Fuller and Liddell Hart, despite ample exposure to them.¹⁰ Yet the commander whom Montgomery seems most closely to resemble in personality traits—MacArthur—was a master practitioner of surprise, and deception. Thus we are left with an unanswered question.

While the spotty evidence available does point to stratagem being pretty much an art passed on from teacher to student, there is at least the low probability that it can sometimes be an entirely self-taught technique. Despite the great rarity of independent invention, it does occur; and military deception is no exception. Stratagem was evidently quite independently developed at both ends of the ancient world: China and the Mediterranean. Moreover, it seems quite plausible that an imaginative commander invent it by merely applying in his profession hypocrisy and deceptions of his everyday social or political life.¹¹ (The 18th century British General Wolfe may be a case in point.) While stratagem can aid the strong as well as the weak, the defensive as well as the offensive, the exigencies of desperate survival do stimulate wise leaders to seek such unorthodox solutions, as witness Churchill's ready acceptance of deception planning in 1941 and the Israelis in 1948.

¹⁰R. W. Thompson, *The Montgomery Legend, Vol. I* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1967), pp. 90-91, 103-104. Also Liddell Hart, I (65), 55-56; and Montgomery of Alamein, *A History of War* (Cleveland: World, 1968), pp. 20-21.

¹¹A plethora of sources could be cited from fiction (Orwell, Akutagawa, etc.), political theory (Lenin, C. W. Mills, and Marcuse), economic humor (C. Northcote Parkinson), and sophisticated "common sense" (Eric Berne). However, all of these depend entirely on anecdotal evidence. Only one single empirical study exists devoted explicitly to this problem—the unpublished doctoral dissertation, *Hypocrisy as a Way of Life* (1963), by the Polish-American sociologist, Professor A. George Gitter of Boston University.

1.3 The Ruses of War

“Whiche subtilites and wylis are called stratagemes of armes.”

—Caxton,

The Book of Fayttes of Armes and Chyvalrye (1489),

Chap. II, Part i.

The variety of ruses comprising stratagem is very great indeed. The array is limited only by the inventiveness of devious minds. As catalogues of these are readily available in the *Strategemata* of Frontinus and in the appendices of this present study, I will not attempt to list them here. However, a brief listing of the more important types is in order.

1.3.1 Diversions: Feints and Demonstrations

The terms diversion, feint, and demonstration are frequently met in military jargon where, however, they tend to be used more-or-less interchangeably.¹² Throughout this text I have somewhat arbitrarily distinguished among them as follows. Diversion may be defined as any movement of military units intended to imply a main attack. Its purpose is to divert the opponent’s attention and strength away from the real or main operation. Diversion has two modes: feints and demonstrations. The *feint* is an entirely mock attack or simulation of a build-up for an imminent attack. It is analogous to the feint in boxing or fencing.

Its specific purpose is to divert the enemy without tying down one’s own local forces in battle or incurring the losses of battle. The demonstration, on the other hand, involves actual commitment to battle. Its specific purpose is—or, rather, should be—to fix the enemy, locking his local forces in combat and drawing his reserves into an irrelevant fray.¹³ Thus, while the demonstration seemingly gives more assurance of a prolonged and large commitment of enemy strength, it risks heavy loss of men and materiel. Despite its special quality, the demonstration attack is essentially a sacrifice operation and should, therefore, be employed sparingly and then only in extreme or special circumstances. Nevertheless, there is a marked tendency for commanders to overlook these distinctions, with consequent waste of their limited military resources. This oversight is, I suggest, probably due to the failure of doctrine to recognize the degree to which a sophisticated deception plan can usually assure that a cheap feint will prove more effective than a costly demonstration.¹⁴

¹²See Subsection 5.4, page 101.

¹³In military usage “demonstration” has a secondary meaning of a display of one’s capabilities for purposes of deterrence or coercion.

¹⁴An important exception to this generalization arises in those (historically) rare cases where demonstrations are themselves both directed against worthwhile targets and shielded by their own subsidiary deception plan.

1.3.2 Camouflage

“Let every soldier hew him down a bough,
And bear’t before him; thereby shall we shadow
The numbers of our host, and make discovery
Err in report of us.”
—*Macbeth*, Act V, Sc. *iv*.

Camouflage is intimately related to stratagem.¹⁵ While some camouflage doctrines acknowledge a relationship,¹⁶ none of which I am aware have developed to a point where camouflage and stratagem can be said to be connected by theory.¹⁷ Although camouflage was known to and used by field commanders since antiquity, it took the prying eye of aerial reconnaissance to provoke a response in the form of a comprehensive program of concealment conducted by specialized camouflage units. That innovation took place at the Western Front in 1915, almost simultaneously in the French, British and German armies, and the technique soon spread to the other combattant powers.¹⁸

Thus formal camouflage doctrines began, as its very name (French *camouflier*, “to disguise”) indicates, merely as a security technique. However, by 1917,¹⁹ the gradual growth of stratagem had made a second mode of camouflage general. Camouflage doctrine then explicitly acquired its two key functions: “negative” or dissimulative camouflage whereby military objects were concealed and “positive” or simulative camouflage in which dummy military objects were displayed to mislead the enemy. It is this “positive” or simulative aspect that elevates from security to stratagem. This most significant concept then gained a hold on camouflage doctrine and received important reinforcement in World War II as a consequence of its general use by German, British, and Russian deception planners.²⁰ However this hold is still a tenuous one, as shown by the fact that this particular bimodal concept has recently been dropped from U.S. Army camouflage doctrine.²¹

1.3.3 Disinformation

The most important single broad category of ruses includes all false information fed into another’s information system in order to deceive him. The standard

¹⁵General readings include Lt.-Col. C. H. R. Chesney, *The Art of Camouflage* (London: Hale, 1941).

¹⁶For example, current British, U.S., and Soviet camouflage doctrine.

¹⁷Camouflage in modern national military doctrine is described country-by-country in Chapter II, below.

¹⁸For camouflage in WW I see Major E. Alexander Powell, *The Army Behind the Army* (New York: Scribner’s, 1919), pp. 82-97.

¹⁹The earliest case known to me from WW I of the use of simulative camouflage in conjunction with a deception operation is Case A2 (Gallipoli, 25 April 1915).

²⁰For camouflage in WW II see Jasper Maskelyne, *Magic-Top Secret* (London: Paul, 1949); and Geoffrey Barkas and John Hutton, “Camouflage of Middle East Airfields,” *Royal Air Force Quarterly*, Apr 1953, as digested in *Military Review*, Vol. 33, No. 10 (January 1954), pp. 99-107.

²¹*FM 5-20*, (January 1959), pp. 4, 5, 28-29.

technical term is “disinformation”. It is conventionally meant to cover only the verbal or written forms of information, leaving “camouflage” and “diversion” to cover the nonverbal or visual forms.

Disinformation was originally a World War I term, having been first applied to the Disinformation Service of the German General Staff. The Russian Bolshevik Cheka adopted the term (as *dezinformatsiya*) and the technique in the early 1920’s, and it has been in use by the Soviet state security (OGPU, NKVD, KGB, etc.) and military intelligence services (GRU) ever since.²² Current Soviet Russian intelligence parlance uses this term in a sense so broad that U.S. Government translators sometimes translate it as “deception,” although Russians are careful to distinguish it from physical camouflage (*maskirovka*).²³ The term, as borrowed from the Russian, is now also common in U.S. intelligence parlance, but is used in a less comprehensive sense.

Any communication channel that transmits relevant and true information (“signals”) can also transmit both irrelevant information (“noise”) and relevant but false information (both deliberate “disinformation” and inadvertent “misinformation”). I find this tri-modal categorization of human information more useful for both didactic and analytical purposes than the now common bi-modal “signal-noise” model borrowed by Roberta Wohlstetter from Shannon’s electronic Information Theory. Mrs. Wohlstetter’s analogy loses both misinformation and disinformation in her limbo category of “noise,” thereby making it impossible for her model to cope with deception operations as a distinct problem for intelligence analysis.²⁴

Disinformation is generated for several purposes. It can be used in indiscriminate volume to overload an opponent’s communications and analysis system during critical periods, thereby causing delays and confusion. While I do not know of any actual examples, such a tactic is quite feasible, as most information processing systems operate with little margin for coping with sudden increase in volume. (This is illustrated by the delays the U.S. Army and Navy cryptanalytic sections experienced in dealing with their Japanese intercepts immediately before the Pearl Harbor attack in 1941²⁵ or by the temporary breakdown in NATO communications during the Czech invasion of 1968.)²⁶ Disinformation is very widely practiced for political propaganda and subversion.²⁷

Disinformation is routinely used by all counterespionage services to discredit the more valuable information sources of opposing intelligence services. (The

²²W. G. Krivitsky, *In Stalin’s Secret Service* (New York: Harper, 1939), pp. 234-240, gives some authoritative remarks on the history of the term.

²³For example, in Shimansky (68). See also *TM 30-544: Russian Military Dictionary* (Washington, D.C.: War Department, 1945).

²⁴Roberta Wohlstetter, *Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962), pp. 1-3, 55-56, etc. For my detailed critique see Whaley, *Operation BARBAROSSA* (69). I have made some additional comments in my own reassessment of the Pearl Harbor attack (Case A30).

²⁵David Kahn, *The Codebreakers* (New York: Macmillan, 1967), pp. 14, 16.

²⁶Andrew Wilson, “Why the Czech invasion caught NATO napping,” *The Observer*, 17 November 1968, p. 4.

²⁷The most comprehensive single study is Paul W. Blackstock, *Agents of Deceit: Frauds, Forgeries and Political Intrigue among Nations* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1966).

British have been particularly adept at inducing self-destruction among their enemies' intelligence services ever since Colonel Richard Meinertzhagen played his lethal games with German agents in the Great War.)²⁸ Finally, but most relevant for the present study, disinformation forms a key element in stratagem.

In theory, any communication media or channel can carry disinformation. All that is required is that the deceiver have access to the channel and that the intended victim be a user of that channel. While this is a truism, its elements are, in practice, too often forgotten or taken for granted.²⁹ The key question is: "Is anybody listening?" It must be asked, it deserves major efforts to verify that the chosen channel is open, and it requires an answer. Where there is any reasonable doubt about the free flow of disinformation in the channel, the only solution is channel redundancy—to use other channels to repeat the message.

Again, if this is mere truism, it too is one commonly forgotten as, for example, even by Allen Dulles when he failed to query the intrinsic implausibility of his false presumption that the clearly risky (but successful) "Man Who Never Was" Operation MINCEMEAT was the "single move" in the deception operation mounted by the British to mask the Allied intention to invade Sicily.³⁰

There are, I suggest, three reasons for the non-systematic application of such "obvious" principles of stratagem. First, there is no broadly accepted body of theory of intelligence or information processing to set universal standards or procedures—intelligence remains an art subject to the idiosyncratic doctrines or whims of individual chiefs of intelligence. Second, the quality of intelligence suffers from its dependence on human organizations which inevitably treat other activities as more salient to their parochial goals. Third, while any type of communication channel can be used to transmit disinformation, a rather small number are in common use. At this point I will simply list them together with brief comments. They are presented approximately in descending order of frequency.³¹

Word-of-mouth Although rumors generally enjoy a very low credibility rating,³² word-of-mouth channels have been used in more deception operations than any other single type of channel. Surprisingly, it is far too often just these few deliberately planted rumors that filter through to the enemy's skeptical intelligence officers and are credited by them. (Conversely,

²⁸See Case A6.

²⁹As several of the case studies (such as Example B40) show. This syndrome reached the farcical level during the Korean War when the dozen or so transmitters of VUNC (Voice of the United Nations Command) had only one reported listener, a woman in Shanghai who tuned in to hear the jazz on the preceding U.S. Armed Forces Radio disk-jockey show. (In 1959 I did discover several additional members of the 1950-1953 target audience.) In addition, it was known—from the Chinese themselves—that 2,000 Communist cadre were officially assigned to monitor VUNC and other foreign psychological warfare broadcasts. However this sophisticated "captive" audience was not treated as a psywar "target."

³⁰Allen Dulles, *The Craft of Intelligence* (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), p. 146.

³¹For rough frequency counts (covering the size range from grand strategy down through grand tactics) see Table 5.16 on page 100 below.

³²The most comprehensive general study is still Gordon W. Allport and Leo Postman, *The Psychology of Rumor* (New York: Holt, 1947).

almost every authentic warning coming through word-of-mouth channels is discredited, if it is competing with a deception campaign.)³³

Newspapers The prestige press of all nations is a major medium for transmission of disinformation. In totalitarian societies this is done mainly by planted articles and news stories. In democratic societies this is achieved by a combination of officially inspired leaks and occasional plants by cooperative journalists. This channel has the advantage that all content is known to be monitored by foreign intelligence, hence it provides an open and direct conduit between the deceiver and his intended victim. Moreover, most information passed through this channel will be judged more-or-less credible even by a skeptical enemy. This is because one major function of mass media is to apprise sub-elites of certain facts and policies and any high proportion of entirely false information would prove dysfunctional. Compare, for example, the relatively high degree of convergence in information content on a controversial topic such as the CIA in such intensely and oppositely biased prestige publications as *Ramparts* and *The New York Times*.

Military Radio Ever since 1915, one year after the innovation of field radio service on the Western Front, all major powers have systematically listened in on the official military radio communications of their enemies. Even today, when unbreakable codes are in common use for key messages, most tactical messages are still transmitted in “clear” or by simple codes or ciphers. Military radio messages are highly credible because they are an essential part of the military command-and-control net. However, dummy transmissions of disinformation can be introduced in any desired volume without any appreciable dysfunctional effect, because they can be explicitly addressed to nonexistent or witting units.

Public Radio Same remarks as for Newspapers above.

Diplomacy Diplomatic negotiations are often used to mask intended aggression by falsely indicating through both their fact and content that vital national differences are still negotiable. Both formal negotiations and “tacit” negotiations can be used to this end.³⁴ To the extent that negotiations *per se*—and quite aside from their content—imply an unresolved decision to attack, they can also be considered as a non-verbal form of camouflage or diversion.

Espionage Counterespionage (CE) organizations play an imaginative variety of disinformation games with enemy intelligence services. Two main modes of inserting disinformation may be distinguished: by planting it with double agents and by leaving it (usually in the form of documents) where the

³³See particularly my *Operation BARBAROSSA* (69), and Case A53 (Bavarian Redoubt).

³⁴The only use for deception purposes of Thomas Schelling’s model of “tacit” negotiations of which I am aware was made by the Germans to cover their intended invasion of Russia in 1941. See Case A28 (BARBAROSSA).

enemy service is known to have gained access through his agents. Among the more rare and exotic variations are such things as planting authentic information on a “blown” or otherwise thoroughly discredited agent.³⁵

³⁵See, for example, Case A45 (OVERLORD).

Chapter 2

DECEPTION IN NATIONAL MILITARY DOCTRINES

“If you want peace, understand war.”

—Liddell Hart, 1932

Doctrine is the bridge between practice and theory. Having described the practice and practitioners of deception and before turning to its theoretical analysis, it is now appropriate to summarize its place in military doctrine. To reduce repetitiousness I will discuss this at the specific level of national doctrines, although it could be described in terms of “schools” of doctrinal thought that transcend national boundaries. Moreover, I have tended to limit my discussion in this chapter to the twentieth century, as the earlier history has already been sufficiently surveyed above.

2.1 British

Deception seemingly did not appear in the British Army as a more-or-less standard practice until the beginning of the 20th century. Even the magnificent surprise-through-deception inflicted on the Marquis de Montcalm in 1759 by Major-General James Wolfe in scaling the “unscalable” Heights of Abraham was seemingly the very idiosyncratic concept of that one man,¹ or rather as recent research suggests of one of his three brigade commanders, Brigadier Robert

¹B. H. Liddell Hart, *Great Captains Unveiled* (Edinburgh: Blackwood, 1927), pp. 206-274. A possible influence on Wolfe was Saxe, whose *Reveries* appeared in its first English translation in 1757 in London while Wolfe was there. Moreover, as a subordinate officer, Wolfe had earlier faced Saxe in battle.

Monckton.² Then, two generations later, came Wellington who has been characterized as a master of surprise-through-deception by one military scholar, himself a practitioner of that art.³

Although by the end of the Napoleonic Wars the British had produced their proportionate share of “notable Capitaines stratagematique,” the art quickly died out. Unlike their Continental counterparts, the British masters of stratagem had not described their methods for future readers. Moreover, those Britons who were responsible for codifying military doctrine in the 19th century overlooked even recent experience, preferring instead to base doctrine on the fashionable popularization’s of first, the Jominian and, then, the Clausewitzian schools. Thus, as on the Continent did the very words “surprise” and “stratagem” quickly disappear from military texts.

As the following summary will show, even the intermittently successful struggle through the first half of the present century to install strategic deception in professional doctrine was due entirely to a fragile chain of transmission from one teacher to another. Only after 1941 did it begin to diffuse through a few proliferating branches of the military network.

As a tradition—however fragile—military deception returned to Britain from America. Lieutenant-Colonel G. F. R. Henderson was Britain’s most unorthodox military scholar in the 19th century. In his classic study of the American Civil War published in 1898 he identified a whole range of strategic (and tactical) ruses used by the Confederates, particularly the highly unorthodox General “Stonewall” Jackson, and to which he explicitly attributed their frequent attainment of surprise.⁴ Henderson was given the very rare opportunity to apply his purely academic theories to war when two years later he accompanied Lord Roberts into the hitherto disastrous military quagmire of the Boer War. As head of Robert’s Intelligence Service, Colonel Henderson devised the carefully coordinated plan of feint-and-deception that relieved Kimberley and permitted the move against Bloemfontein.⁵ It has significance for the rest of the story that a 29 year old Major named Allenby was present and an even younger Second Lieutenant named Wavell soon joined this company.

At the outbreak of the Great War, the imaginative and innovative A. P. Wavell was placed in charge of M.O. 5, the key staff section of the Military Operations Directorate concerned with security, the secret service, ciphers, and general military intelligence. (At that time, the British Army combined Intelligence with Operations.) One of his many odd jobs was the “last-minute improvisation” of a field intelligence service, the Intelligence Corps. From September to November he was in France at British Expeditionary Force G.H.Q., personally commanding Intelligence Corps, whose 30 or 40 officers were distributed

²Christopher Hibbert, *Wolfe at Quebec* (New York: 1959), pp. 114-133, 173; and C. P. Stacey, *Quebec 1759: The Siege and the Battle* (New York: 1959).

³Colonel G. F. R. Henderson, *The Science of War* (London: Longmans, Green, 1905), pp. 102-103.

⁴Lieutenant-Col. G. F. R. Henderson, *Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War* (London: Longmans, Green, 1898).

⁵For deception in the Boer War see General Sir Archibald Wavell, *Allenby*, Vol. I (New York: Oxford University Press, 1941), p. 80.

singly or in pairs among the B.E.F. corps and divisions.⁶

This brand new Intelligence Corps virtually monopolized the keen advocates of stratagem during the Great War. However, for two very long years its superiors rejected its use as fit only for “comic opera,” as one put it during the instructive butchery at the Somme in 1916.⁷

Then, in 1917, on another bogged front, Allenby announced his arrival by unloosing a full bag of tricks—tactical and strategic—on the German and Turkish commanders in Palestine. There, on 31 October 1917, four months after his arrival, he launched his famed feint-cum-deception Third Battle of Gaza that thoroughly surprised General Falkenhayn and routed the off-guard and off-balance Turkish army, breaking an eight months’ stalemate and going on to take Jerusalem as trophy.⁸ Allenby himself had learned some of these tricks in the Boer War from General Roberts and *his* Intelligence Officer, Colonel G. F. R. Henderson who was, significantly, the authority on “Stonewall” Jackson. Now, at Third Gaza, his own brilliantly innovative Intelligence Officer, Major Richard Meinertzhagen, was to design his stratagems.⁹

“After the Meinertzhagen success,” as T. E. Lawrence wrote, “deceptions, which for the ordinary general were just witty hors d’oeuvres before battle, became for Allenby a main point of strategy.”¹⁰ Allenby repeated the initial success a year later, on 19 September 1918, at Megiddo. This time he used a similar pattern of feint-cum-deception but reversed the real line of operations to the coast. Coordinated with this were a series of feints and ruses by Major T. E. Lawrence to divert enemy attention inland to his trans-Jordan desert front. This strategy succeeded in unbalancing the smaller and weaker Turkish-German force and precipitated it into headlong flight. Seven days later all Palestine had fallen.

Allenby’s unorthodox successes had been observed firsthand by Archibald Wavell. He followed the Palestine campaigns with admiring approval after the “dull, unimaginative, heavy-footed business” that represented the Western Front to him. Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel Wavell had monitored the Third Gaza Battle, as Liaison Officer between Allenby and the Chief of the Imperial General Staff. And, as Brigadier-General Wavell, he had served on the staff of General Chetwode’s XX Corps in the brilliant Megiddo campaign.

Although the British had become the acknowledged masters of deception during the Great War, they had lost this technique—as they virtually had with military intelligence—by the beginning of World War II. The sole repository of such wisdom in a position of command was General Wavell, now the G.O.C.-in-C. Middle East. Wavell had learned deception from Allenby in the Great War and had perfected its theory in his highly unorthodox inter-war training maneuvers.¹¹ After the fall of France, Wavell put theory to effective prac-

⁶John Connell [pseud. of John Robertson], *Wavell* (London: Collins, 1964), pp. 92-94.

⁷Captain Ferdinand Tuohy, *The Secret Corps* (London: Murray, 1920), pp. 213-215.

⁸See Case A6.

⁹Wavell, I (41), 80, 202, 208, and II (44), 26.

¹⁰Lawrence (35), 537.

¹¹Major-General R. J. Collins, *Lord Wavell* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1948), pp. 85-

tice in his rearguard defense against the over-cautious, semi-competent but far stronger Italian Army in the Western Desert.¹² Finally, in December 1940, he proved its value by gaining the first British strategic surprise and victory of the war.¹³ Then, sometime in 1941 he sent one of his staff officers (probably Brigadier Dudley Clarke)¹⁴ to London to argue the need for the centralized inter-theater planning and coordination of strategic deception.¹⁵ The dreary failure of previous half-hearted cover plans such as at Dakar¹⁶ were vivid reminders of the need to improve such operations. Moreover, Churchill was quite willing to try out any unorthodox method that might supplement Britain's militarily weak hand against the Axis. This proposal was adopted by the Chiefs of Staff who, following Wavell's practice, created a small special deception planning staff committee under the Chiefs of Staff and directed that each theater commander would henceforward prepare a cover plan as an integral part of his proposed operational plan, the whole being coordinated at the center.¹⁷

It seems likely that Wavell's revolutionary recommendation to upgrade and centralize deception was accepted because of the fortuitous circumstance that Churchill was then Prime Minister. Churchill was himself a quite unorthodox military thinker, always ready to consider (and sometimes overly willing to approve) the most outrageous innovations—such as tanks, amphibious warfare, guerrilla warfare. Also, as already noted, he was an earlier practitioner of stratagem.¹⁸ Lawrence and Liddell Hart had his ear and he was an early advocate of the “indirect approach”—indeed had independently conceived the outlines of this strategic doctrine as early as 1915.¹⁹ Moreover, during the extensive reorganization of the proliferated secret services in late 1941, Churchill was known to fully endorse deception, favoring it over even psywar, of whose utility he was wisely skeptical.²⁰ Regardless of whatever his still unrevealed rôle in the acceptance of Wavell's 1941 proposal on deception planning, Churchill was quick to use it and to recommend its use to others, including both Roosevelt and Stalin.

86, 95, 142, 158, 200, 275; and Sir Ronald Wingate, *Not in the Limelight* (London: Hutchinson, 1959), pp. 189-204.

¹²Collins (48), 268-270.

¹³See Appendix A, Case A25 (Sidi Barrani).

¹⁴Dudley Clarke (1899-), a highly imaginative gunnery officer, one of the founders of the Commandos, whose name he took from his boyhood memories of the Boer War. For his connections with deception operations see Fergusson (61), 333, and Maskelyne (49), 80-81. He also had some connection with the formation in early 1941 of the so-called Special Air Service (S.A.S.), whose name he created as a cover for that non-airborne group of commandos in the Western Desert. See Virginia Cowles, *The Phantom Major* (New York: Harper, 1958), p. 23.

¹⁵Wingate (59), 189. In July 1942 Wavell himself issued a short paper on the general subject of “Ruses and Stratagems of War.” See Field-Marshal Earl Wavell, *Soldiers and Soldiering* (London: Cape, 1953), pp. 131-135. For his stress on maneuver, surprise and deception see also Field-Marshal Earl Wavell, *The Good Soldier* (London: Macmillan, 1948), pp. 154-161.

¹⁶See Appendix A, Case A24 (Dakar).

¹⁷Wingate (59), 189-190.

¹⁸Chapter I, Part B. See also Example B2.

¹⁹Winston S. Churchill, *The World Crisis, 1915* (London: Butterworth, 1923), pp. 49-50.

²⁰David E. Walker, *Lunch with a Stranger* (New York: Norton, 1957), p. 152.

Piecing together the fragmentary data—often mere hints—that have crept through the Official Secrets Act, it becomes clear that the British located strategic deception at the heart of their planning process. As with the Germans, coordination was at the top. Lieutenant-General Sir Hastings Ismay, Churchill’s personal Chief of Staff revealed that deception was the province of a mere “handful of planners” who soon came under his supervision.²¹ The actual coordination of the various secret organizations—including PWE, SOE, and “deception”—was handled by Ismay’s No. 2, General Leslie Hollis.²² Ismay further identified his deception planners as the same ones who developed the Operation MINCEMEAT tidbit for the Sicily invasion in mid-1943 and the FORTITUDE deceptions (including the Monty’s Double ruse) attending the Normandy landings in 1944.²³

Specific details about organization and personnel of the British deception planning group is even more vague. For example, it seems that it was, in fact, an intelligence group. For example we are told that by the summer of 1942 they were “a small inter-Service and interdepartmental committee which used to meet weekly to deal with questions of the security of intended operations.” The committee “comprised not only Regular officers . . . , but also temporary officers and civilians with most varied backgrounds,”²⁴ but it is significant that the one or two identified members were both intelligence officers: Lieutenant-Commander Ewen Montagu, R.N.V.R., of Naval Intelligence and, seemingly, Squadron Leader Sir Archibald Cholmondley of Air Intelligence.²⁵ Moreover, the only office location mentioned was “Central Intelligence Headquarters” in St. James Street. (However, this mention was in connection with a liaison meeting, so it may have been only an accommodation address.) This situation continued through at least the TORCH (North African) and HUSKY (Sicily) operations, that is until mid-1943.²⁶ A latecomer to the group was noted theater critic Stephen Watts, who served in it as an Army Major from early 1943 to late 1945. He was in personal charge of the “Monty’s Double” ruse for Normandy. From his other assignments, it is clear Watts was in domestic counter-espionage, almost certainly the Security Service (M.I. 5) itself.²⁷

An authoritative but puzzling clue was dropped by the official U.S. history of SHAEF. This reveals that “projects to mislead the enemy as to Allied intentions” were “planned” by the combined plans and operations sections of SHAEF’s G-3 Division. They were united under U.S. Brigadier General Arthur S. Nevins, with Scottish Brigadier Kenneth McLean (former chief Army planner at COSSAC) heading the plans section. Curiously, when the plans and ops sections were separated in late May 1944, the deception function went with

²¹Ismay (60),174. Also Ismay’s “Foreword” and the author’s introductory remarks in Montagu (54), 12, 14.

²²Leasor (59), 198-202, 253-254.

²³Ismay (60), 292, 347-348. And Cases A38, A45.

²⁴Ewen Montagu, *The Man Who Never Was* (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1954), pp. 17-18.

²⁵Terence Robertson, *The Ship with Two Captains*, (New York: Dutton, 1957), p. 167.

²⁶Montagu (54), 22-23.

²⁷Stephen Watts, *Moonlight on a Lake in Bond Street* (London: The Bodley Head, 1961), pp 143-173.

ops.²⁸ This evidence suggests that FORTITUDE, the deception project to cloak OVERLORD, was a SHAEF function. This is plausible, but it raises a problem vis-à-vis the “Monty’s Double” ruse. Watts implies it was part of FORTITUDE but also implies he was part of the deception planning sub-committee directly under the British Joint Chiefs of Staff. The seeming contradiction can be resolved by assuming that part of FORTITUDE planning was delegated to SHAEF. It was, as described below, standard British practice to delegate deception planning and operations to the immediately concerned lower headquarters; and SHAEF would have been the appropriate locus for such delegation of some of the FORTITUDE activity.

Finally, we now have the striking disclosure from Professor Hugh Trevor-Roper that:²⁹

The highly successful deception program was largely controlled from M.I.5. The famous episode of “The Man Who Never Was” was conceived by M.I.5 and the Admiralty.

This is as authoritative a statement as we are apt to get, for Professor Roper was then (early 1941 to 1945) a sub-section chief in S.I.S.’s elite counterespionage Section V.

The name of the head of the deception planning group for at least the period of OVERLORD planning in early 1944 is known. He was Colonel J. H. Bevan.³⁰ This information was disclosed in one of the many revealing memoirs that emerged in the immediate postwar years while military censorship was momentarily relaxed. (And as the Russians were fully cognizant of Colonel Bevan and his role, it is one of the greater absurdities of Anglo-American security that Bevan has subsequently become one of the un-persons of official World War II history.) In his superb memoir, Major General Deane who, as chief of the U.S. Military Mission in Moscow, worked closely with Bevan and the Russians on Plan BODYGUARD,³¹ stated:³²

The British had developed the art of cover and deception during the war to a degree that was far more advanced than that attained by either the Russians or the Americans. Colonel J. H. Bevan was

²⁸Forrest C. Pogue, *The Supreme Command* (Washington, D.C.: OCMH, 1954), pp. 69-70.

²⁹Hugh Trevor-Roper, “The Philby Affair,” *Encounter*, Vol. 30. No. 4 (April 1958), p. 18.

³⁰John Henry Bevan (1894-). Educated at Eton and Oxford. Served on Western Front, 1914-1919, with the Hertfordshire Regiment, winning the Military Cross and rising to the rank of major in 1918. A reserve officer until 1939 when recalled to service. Received the Companion of the Bath in 1945 [presumably for his OVERLORD work] upon his final retirement from military service. He is now a director of four banking and insurance companies. These skimpy peripheral details comprise his entire public biography as given in *Who’s Who: 1968-1969*, p. 251, and commercial British reference works. See also *Tangled Web* (63), 134, for Bevan’s rôle in the FUSAG ruse for FORTITUDE.

³¹See Case A45.

³²John R. Deane, *The Strange Alliance: The Story of Our Efforts at Wartime Co-operation with Russia* (New York: Viking Press, 1947), p. 147. Major General Deane was the intelligent and conscientious chief of the U.S. Military Mission in Moscow throughout its existence from early October 1943 through October 1945.

in charge of the preparation of such plans in the British War Office [M.I.5?]. It was he who developed “Plan Bodyguard,” which was to include Russian participation in our efforts to deceive the Germans concerning Overlord. Bevan developed his plans with such subtlety and skill that it was difficult for his own people to know what parts of the plan were to be carried out and what parts were simply to appear as though they were being carried out.

In sum, British deception organization in World War II, at least after 1941 or 1942, was as follows.³³ It was located at the highest levels of central strategic military intelligence *and* planning, under the direct supervision of Churchill’s personal military Chief of Staff (Lt.-Gen. Ismay) and the latter’s deputy (Maj.-Gen. Hollis). This control was exercised directly through the Joint Intelligence Committee (J.I.C.) to the specific group responsible for “the choice of operational code-words, the control of all deception plans and the safeguarding of the secrets of all combined operations.” That group, one of several J.I.C. subcommittees, was the Inter-Service Security Board (I.S.S.B.).³⁴ In turn, it was a special committee of the I.S.S.B that “developed . . . the arts of deception and counter-propaganda by rumor.”³⁵ As already noted it was this last body that was chaired ex-officio by the representative from M.I.5.

Because of OVERLORD’s paramount importance, its security *and* deception were centered in another special committee T.S.S.B, the OVERLORD Security Sub-Committee, formed in August 1943.³⁶ This case also illustrates the value of the much criticized British committee system, for, while this arrangement kept the central planning and coordination of OVERLORD stratagem (i.e., Operation FORTITUDE) at the highest strategic planning level, typically it permitted all immediately concerned parties a full voice through staffing the committees with their own representatives, (Moreover, the British committee system proved an excellent guarantor of security, because it enabled the number of individual knowers to remain quite small while assuring that all functionally concerned organizations were adequately informed,) Thus it seems that SHAEF was adequately represented by its own G-2,³⁷ then British Major-General John Whiteley.³⁸

Double agents were a major channel for dissemination of misinformation directly to enemy intelligence. This effort was primarily that of M.I.5, which

³³See also Chart 1, following.

³⁴McLachlan (68), 5, 68, 364-365.

³⁵McLachlan (68), 364-365.

³⁶Pogue (54), 162.

³⁷The essential clue is provided by Kenneth Strong who notes in passing that: “Pending my arrival . . . [on 25 May 1944 to replace him, the SHAEF G-2] had been among those responsible for the Allied deception arrangements which so effectively misled the Germans regarding our point of attack.” See Major General Sir Kenneth Strong, *Intelligence at the Top* (Garden City, Garden City, N.Y.:Doubleday, 1969), p.197.

³⁸John Whiteley (1896-). As a brigadier on Wavell’s (and Cunningham’s) staff in 1941-1942. As SHAEF G-2 until 25 May 1944 when succeeded by Major-General Kenneth Strong and reassigned as Eisenhower’s Deputy Chief of Operations. See Strong (69), 197; Pogue (54), 21, 68, 71; and *Who’s Who: 1968-69*.




Figure 2.1: Approximate Coordination of Military Deception Planning in World War II, 1941-1945.

also handled the bulk of double-agents including all those in Britain. One of the few known M.I.5 specialists in deception operations *and* running of double agents in WW II was Tomas Harris.³⁹

In the British scheme, deception was coordinated at the top, but some detailed planning as well as all operations were distributed among appropriate lower commands and organizations. In addition to the ever present involvement of M.I.5, we know that P.W.E., S.O.E., SHAEF, British 21st Army Group, British Eighth Army and even B.B.C. were tied in from time to time. I presume that S.I.S. (“M.I.6”) was also used as the executive of specific aspects of deception operations, simply because of its intelligence, counterespionage, and communications capabilities; although I have not found any direct evidence of this use.

Special Operation Executive (S.O.E.) was assigned frequent parts in various deception operations from late 1941 on.⁴⁰ For example, David Walker, S.O.E.’s station chief in Lisbon (posing as a foreign correspondent for the London *Daily Mirror*) from Fall 1941 until Summer 1944, was mainly occupied with deception through the dissemination of rumors (“sibs”) through local agents and citizens in contact with German intelligence networks. Beginning with mere subversive propaganda, Walker’s rumor-mongering gradually expanded to include tactical and strategic deception.⁴¹ However, Ian Colvin is wrong in asserting that MINCEMEAT was an S.O.E. show.⁴² As concluded above, that operation was directly managed by M.I.5.

The actual conduct of the well-known “Monty’s Double” ruse,⁴³ used as part of the FORTITUDE cover plan to camouflage the direction the main Allied invasion of Europe was clearly undertaken by the Security Service (“M.I.5”) itself. Mr. James, the actor co-opted to play this rôle says so; and Captain Watts, his mentor, provides a number of supporting clues.⁴⁴

The Psychological Warfare Executive (P.W.E.) was also involved in deception campaigns, although no details have as yet been published as far as I can determine. As its name explicates, P.W.E. was the main organization designing, producing, and disseminating British propaganda abroad. Because of its expertise in “black” propaganda, it seems reasonable that its “black” radio (and other media) would be used, at least from time to time, to communicate disinformation to its overseas audiences. It is reported that P.W.E. did contribute to the dissemination of deception rumors.⁴⁵ Incidentally, all rumors were vetted and coordinated by the Rumor Committee, a small body of men drawn from the various secret services and the Ministry of Economic Warfare which met

³⁹The late Tomas Harris was an art dealer with connections in Spain and a friend of Guy Burgess and H. A. R. Philby. See Page, Leitch, Knightley (68), 265.

⁴⁰Walker (57), 150, 163, 207.

⁴¹Walker (57), 151-153, 163, 170-171, 188-191.

⁴²Colvin (53), 103.

⁴³Case A45.

⁴⁴M.E. Clifton James, *I Was Monty’s Double* (London: Rider, 1954), pp. 11, etc.; and Stephen Watts, *Moonlight on a Lake in Bond Street* (London: The Bodley Head, 1961), pp. 143-174.

⁴⁵Walker (57), 152.

once a fortnight at P.W.E.'s offices at Woburn Abbey.⁴⁶

It has been asserted that even the B.B.C. was made to contribute to strategic deception, specifically in connection with the crucial Normandy landings in 1944.⁴⁷ Because the great value of B.B.C. as a propaganda agency came from the pristine "whiteness" and "straightness" of its news, it was important not to jeopardize its high credibility rating by too frequent insertion of fake material. However, the very fact of its credibility—even with German intelligence—makes it likely that it was occasionally used to broadcast strategic deception material. It is known that it did very infrequently lend its name and facilities to spreading some of P.W.E.'s more promising subversive propaganda hoaxes.

The Security Service ("M.I.5") was in sole charge of the deception plan to mislead the Germans about the targeting accuracy of their V-1 and V-2 "flying-bombs" in 1944. The key element in this plan involved using M.I.5-controlled German agent-spotters to send false target reports from June 1944 on. This ruse succeeded in getting the Germans to readjust their firings so that an even greater proportion landed harmlessly short of London. The monopoly on the operation exercised by Sir David Petrie and his M.I.5 was not merely desirable because it was his double-agents who were involved but it was demanded by the political situation. With the connivance of certain key officials, the Security Service was secretly continuing this ruse in direct contravention of the explicit decisions of the Cabinet, which had adopted the policy that it would be immoral and impolitic to divert enemy bombs from one set of Britons, however densely packed, onto those dispersed through the country south of London.⁴⁸

As already noted, one consequence of Wavell's recommendations was that each subordinate military command was made responsible for developing and conducting its own deception operations—although only in close coordination and with the approval of the center, specifically the I.S.S.B.'s deception committee. We know, for example, that this mission devolved on the planning (and intelligence) staffs of the Eighth Army in North Africa and Italy from 1941 to 1943,⁴⁹ Alexander's 15th Army Group (and, later, Mediterranean Command) in North Africa and Italy (1943-1945),⁵⁰ and Slim's 14th Army (and each of its subordinate corps and even divisions) in Burma (1945).⁵¹ This was also true of Montgomery's 21st Army Group in England on the eve of D-Day in 1944. Moreover, Clifton James, the actor coopted by M.I.5 to double as "Monty," disclosed that 21st Army Group then had a specific staff unit known as the Deception Branch and headed by a Top Deception Officer. (a young, handsome, and reputedly clever colonel).⁵² (Not only was this man witting on the Monty's Double ruse, but also Montgomery's Military Assistant, Lieutenant-Colonel Christopher Dawnay, the son of Major-General Guy Dawnay who, in World War I, had been

⁴⁶Delmer (62), 67; and Walker (57), 153, 164.

⁴⁷Walker (57), 207.

⁴⁸David Irving, *The Mare's Nest* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1965), pp. 250-251, 255-258. I am obliged to Mr. William R. Harris for this reference.

⁴⁹See Case A35 and Examples B21, B23, B25, B27.

⁵⁰Jackson (67), and specifically Cases A41, A44, and Examples B28, B33, B36.

⁵¹See Case A54.

⁵²James (54), Chapters 4 and 5.

a principal deception planner for Hamilton at Gallipoli and Allenby at Third Gaza.) Given the known fact that this centralized deception planning system had been superimposed from the top in 1941, I presume that the fragmentary glimpses of it cited above do in fact represent the general organizational structure from 1941 to 1945, from the top, through theatre commands, army groups, armies, to corps and divisions.

Finally it should be mentioned that the British armed services included the usual military camouflage sections to provide the development, training, and production of the simulated and dissimulated vehicles, aircraft, ships, ground facilities, etc., used in strategic as well as the conventional deception operations.⁵³ British camouflage art advanced in step with the growing sophistication of deception, because of the close liaison between the personnel of these two functions. Indeed, a variety of clues suggests that British military camouflage, while nominally a Royal Engineer service, was very closely tied in with S.O.E. and Military Intelligence.⁵⁴ For example, the key developmental and operational service in the Western Desert, the Camouflage Experimental Section, was eventually (1943?) absorbed along with other presumably secret services by Brigadier Dudley Clarke's "A" Force.⁵⁵

2.2 German

Germany was the only power that practiced strategic deception throughout World War II, simply because it was the only one that had not entirely discarded this technique in the inter-war years.

Yet even the methodical German General Staff had only a vague understanding of stratagem. For example, the element of deception (and even surprise) is absent in that paragon of thorough planning, the Schlieffen Plan of 1905, even though Graf Schlieffen had conceived it as part of a two-front general European war.⁵⁶ Schlieffen himself seldom mentioned surprise and then only casually.⁵⁷ German doctrine conceded the value only of tactical camouflage and lures.⁵⁸ Fascinated by this particular tunnel-vision, the German chiefs quickly bogged down into an unimaginative routine of mud and slaughter. Strategic deception was not practiced on a large scale on the Western Front until 21 March 1918 when it was introduced by Field Marshal Ludendorff, the First Quartermaster General, in Germany's last great offensive, winning far more ground at no higher cost than any previous one had done.⁵⁹ But the balance of imagi-

⁵³Maskelyne (49), 13-14, 17, 19, 29-30, 36, 85, 152-153.

⁵⁴Maskelyne (49), 75, 84, 88, 123, 146-147, 154, 169.

⁵⁵Maskelyne (49), 80. I have been unable to find any other references to "A" Force, whatever it was.

⁵⁶Gerhard Ritter, *The Schlieffen Plan: Critique of a Myth* (New York: Praeger, 1958).

⁵⁷Erfurth (43), 32.

⁵⁸As embodied, for example, in the 1917 manual *The Construction of Defensive Positions*. See Corelli Barnett, *The Swordbearers* (New York: Morrow, 1964), pp. 251-252.

⁵⁹See Case A7 and, specifically, Tuohy (20), 216, 222-223; and Brigadier-General Sir James E. Edmonds, *Military Operations: France and Belgium, 1918, Vol. I* (London: Macmillan, 1935), pp. 153-156.

nation was partly restored seven days later when General Foch was appointed Co-ordinator of the Allied Armies in the threatened sector and soon permitted the introduction of tactical and strategic deception as standard procedures on the Allied side.⁶⁰

That Germany did not immediately forget the lessons of surprise and deception in the post-war period can be attributed to two main factors. First, the rebuilders of the Reichswehr was a master and advocate of fluid tactics, General Haas von Seeckt, the planning “brain” behind Field-Marshal von Mackenson. Seeckt was responsible for making surprise the keynote of the post-war German military manuals: “Every action should be based on surprise... Ruses and wiles of every kind ought always to be used to deceive the enemy.”⁶¹ Second, the severe limitations on German rearmament specified by the Treaty of Versailles temporarily undercut the majority of conventionally minded staff officers by making impossible their pedestrian strategy of mass armies fighting slow-grinding offensives. This combination of the “right” man and a challenging constraint produced the invaluable experience of illegally raising, training, equipping, and testing an army under a cloak of “ruses and wiles.” Not the least of these ruses was the intensive secret collaboration with the urgently rebuilding Red Army.

The German skill in conducting covert military rearmament from 1919 until Hitler unilaterally abrogated Versailles in 1935 was carried to its ultimate performance in battle during the Spanish Civil War of 1936-1939. Throughout that conflict Germany conducted an extensive but covert intervention against the Spanish Republic. Luftwaffe pilots arrived as “Strength Through Joy” tourists to join the regular air, tank, and anti-aircraft Wehrmacht units comprising the 6,000-man Condor Legion, all thinly disguised as “volunteers.”⁶² Deception was used in these two cases of rearmament and intervention not to gain surprise (nor did they, as their cover was too transparent), but rather to provide a shield against the legal or political reprisals that overt acts would have invited. Nevertheless, these operations provided valuable experience in deception for the Abwehr and, indeed, all the Nazi military, diplomatic, and propaganda machines.

This insertion of high international politics into “conventional” military deception operations brought a new dimension to the strategic *ruse de guerre* that elevated it to the top echelon of strategic direction, Hitler himself. There it found a congenial environment, for Hitler recognized the need to supplement his initial meager power with any ruse that came to hand. Thus his successful bluffs that won the Ruhr in 1936 and Czechoslovakia at Munich in 1938.

Although *strategic* deception fell into disuse, *tactical* deception remained—

⁶⁰Or so says Tuohy (20), 215. Captain Tuohy was then with the Intelligence Corps in Palestine and may well overstate this. Other accounts (Liddell Hart, Barnett) do not confirm this claim for Foch. Other evidence (see Case A8) suggests General Pétain was behind this innovation in the Grand Quatier General.

⁶¹As quoted by [B.H.] Liddell Hart, *Europe in Arms* (New York: Random House, 1937), p. 37.

⁶²See my draft paper, *Soviet Intervention in the Spanish Civil War*, Chapter IV, Section A (“German Intervention”).

and as an organized function of German military intelligence. From at least the early thirties through World War II, Abwehr III-D (the D sub-section of Col. Bentivegni's Section III in Admiral Canaris' military intelligence service, the so-called Abwehr), manufactured deception materials to mislead, misinform, or simply confuse enemy intelligence services, particularly those of Britain, France, and Poland.⁶³ The dissemination of this material was in part the responsibility of Abwehr III-F which, as the sub-section for penetration of foreign intelligence services, controlled the Abwehr's double-agents that constitute a major channel for insertion of deception material. In a quite astonishing wartime disclosure of one's own intelligence success in penetrating the secrets of the Abwehr, Dr. Stefan Possony in 1943 published the information that: "It has been reported that during 1942 the Germans added a section for *Irreführung* (that is, for confusing and misleading the enemy) to their General Staff."⁶⁴

However, even the Abwehr was only the tool of its next higher echelon, the High Command of the Wehrmacht (OKW), in the planning and conduct of *strategic* deception. In part this situation was a logical consequence of the centralization of strategic planning in the highest staff echelons. But it was also a consequence of Hitler's impetuous changing of plans. As one junior Abwehr officer said:⁶⁵

Hitler managed his own deception at the time [1940]. How could the staff do any strategic deception planning, when it was unaware what Hitler would order next?

In 1938 this continued interest in surprise and deception produced what I believe may be a unique book, a monographic study of surprise *per se*. It was written by Lieutenant-General Waldemar Erfurth, the official Military Historian of the OKW (the OQuV). His book, *Surprise in War*, is an excellent exposition of the effects and importance of surprise *and* deception, illustrated by numerous historical examples. Although Erfurth does not give any new theoretical insights, it is a sound summary of the historical evidence. Moreover, it is significant that Erfurth both rediscovered the long overlooked relevant passages in Clausewitz (whom he uses as his main inspiration and authority) and also shows his close reading of Liddell Hart.⁶⁶ He argues that:

Surprise is a particularly efficient means of defeating the enemy and as old a method as war itself. The history of war shows that through the centuries, almost all decisive victories have been preceded by successful surprises, despite tactical and strategical changes.⁶⁷

⁶³Ian Colvin, *The Unknown Courier* (London: Kimber, 1953), pp. 120-123, based on interview with Abwehr Lt.-Cdr. Richard Protze. Also H.J. Giskes, *London Calling North Pole* (London: Kimber, 1953), p. 12; and Paul Leverkuehn, *German Military Intelligence* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1954), pp. 29, 32, 80.

⁶⁴Possony, "Comment," in Erfurth (38/43), 91.

⁶⁵Colvin (53), 120, quoting Protze.

⁶⁶General-lieutenant Waldemar Erfurth, *Überraschung im Kriege* (Berlin: Mittler, 1938), as translated into English by Dr. Stefan T. Possony and Daniel Vilfroy as *Surprise* (Harrisburg, Pa.: Military Service Publishing Company, 1943).

⁶⁷Erfurth (38/43), 31.

And he goes far toward proving his conclusion that: “Surprise is the key to victory.”⁶⁸

Various German organizations practiced deception against the Allies. For example, the German Legation in Berne was the source of a steady flow of disinformation directed at the British listening-post there.⁶⁹ Similarly, the German Press Attaché in Madrid was responsible for diffusing false rumors preceding BARBAROSSA.⁷⁰ Despite the marked tendency of the Nazi bureaucracies to expend more effort in bitterly jealous political infighting than in combating their foreign foes, there is good evidence that most of their deception campaigns were originated and coordinated at the top, specifically in the OKW, Hitler’s personal military staff. Local theater, Army Group, and Army Commanders—such as Rommel, Kesselring, and Manstein—did however initiate deception plans for their own sectors.

Before Hitler, German military planning had been centered in the General Staff, the OKH. However, when Hitler came to power, he superimposed a new Supreme Command of the Military (OKW) on the traditional service structure. The OKW was Hitler’s personal military planning and command staff, directly subservient to him, and his direct means exercising dictatorial control over the professional Army, Navy, and Air Force. Henceforward central planning gradually passed into the hands of the OKW.

I have seen no evidence or writings that suggest what, if any, doctrine on surprise or deception the new West German military may have. (The East Germans have only the current Soviet military doctrine.) One might presume that because the West German military missions are basically those of a deterrent to East German pin-pricks and of a “trip wire” for Soviet invasion that no occasion for strategic deception arises—outside of the geographically wider context of NATO strategy. On the other hand, one might equally presume that stratagem could play a significant part in the delicate political-military maneuverings of the Cold War (such as the several Berlin crises) by its unique ability to modify the enemy’s perception of political and military risks and options.

Finally, some mention should be made of the German art of military camouflage, because it is peripheral to deception planning and operations. Although the German Army excelled in camouflage during the Great War, they were quite inferior to the British and even Russians throughout World War II when their equipment was primitive and their personnel both unimaginative and unwilling to learn from their enemies.⁷¹ Moreover, few senior German commanders made use of camouflage for that coordinated interplay of simulation and dissimulation that raises mere camouflage to the distinctive level of stratagem. There are two known exceptions. Thus, immediately after his taking command in North Africa in February 1941, General Rommel employed camouflage to make the British more cautious by inducing them to overestimate his strength. He did this by

⁶⁸Erfurth (38/43), 199.

⁶⁹Kelly (52), 275, in recalling his tour as H.M. Minister in Berne, January 1940–April 1942.

⁷⁰Whaley, *Operation BARBAROSSA* (69), Chapter III.

⁷¹Maskelyne (49), 14, 19, 183–184.

mounting dummy tank bodies on Volkswagen automobiles.⁷² The second known instance occurred during Field-Marshal Kesselring's final and abortive attempt to smash the Allied beachhead at Anzio.⁷³

I presume that the post-war West German Bundeswehr has inherited the Wehrmacht's know-how in stratagem. Certainly its first generation of senior officers had received good experience in planning and directing some fairly sophisticated deception operations in the OKW, OKH, and in Rommel's command. This was particularly true of key officers like General Adolf Heusinger. However, I have seen no evidence indicating how, if at all, this traditional wisdom has been translated into current doctrine or organization.

2.3 American

When the United States entered the war in December 1941, her enemies and allies had already had two to four years' continuous, high-pressure experience in matters of strategic intelligence and deception. In these matters, except for its superb achievement in solving some Japanese ciphers, the Americans came to the common cause almost empty handed. Indeed, Donovan's newly formed COI (later OSS) depended heavily on "reverse lend-lease" from the British S.I.S. and S.O.E. for its initial training, methods, techniques, and gadgets. Moreover, the Americans left most of the intelligence and planning—including nearly all strategic deception—in British hands in the combined staff planning for the European theater. I am unable to detect any deception planning originating in Washington until October 1944, four months after the British had conclusively demonstrated its value in the Normandy landings. However it does seem that that remarkable maverick, General MacArthur, had independently reinvented strategic deception and applied it in his Southwest Pacific Area satrapy. At least this is the implied claim of former MacArthur staff officers.⁷⁴

This activity was apparently centered in MacArthur's G-3 (Plans and Operations) headed since mid-1942 by Lieutenant General Stephen J. Chamberlain, a meticulous West Pointer. However this claim for MacArthur requires verification. The earliest case I can find dates only from June 1943 (Operation ELKTON III), by which late date one could suspect the influence of the British-trained Australian planners on MacArthur's staff.

Admiral Halsey, Commander of the Third Fleet and (until 15 June 1944) the South Pacific Area, was involved in strategic deception at least as early as October-November 1943 in the Bougainville campaign (Case A39). But, as this so-called Operation CHERRYBLOSSOM was conducted jointly with MacArthur, it is difficult to separate out Halsey's contribution, if any, to the

⁷²Rommel (53), 103, entry for 17 February 1941, and 273. See Case A26.

⁷³Example B33 and, particularly, Peter Tompkins, *A Spy in Rome* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1962), pp. 148-149.

⁷⁴Major General Charles A. Willoughby and John Chamberlain, *MacArthur: 1941-1951* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1954), pp. 8, 126; and Sidney Forrester Mashbir, *I Was an American Spy*, (New York: Vantage Press, 1953), pp. 329-330.

deception planning. However in reminiscing about a later period (November 1944), Halsey has passed the following intriguing remark:⁷⁵

After the movie, I sat in on the nightly meeting of my Dirty Trick Department—Mick Carney, Ham Dow, Doug Moulton, Harold Stassen, and Johnny Lawrence and listened to them concoct new methods of bedeviling our gullible enemy. (The Navy prefers me to drop this topic right here.)

As far as I can discover, the first⁷⁶ time in World War II that the United States either initiated, much less planned, a comprehensive stratagem coordinating theaters did not occur until 1944 in support of the invasion of the Philippines in October.⁷⁷ To distract Japanese attention from that real target, the object of MacArthur's command, Nimitz in his Central Pacific theater and Mountbatten in his China-Burma-India theater were co-opted to provide diversions suggesting that Allied grand strategy had other priorities. Seemingly, the conception and the planning originated in Washington, in the Joint Chiefs of Staff.⁷⁸ It is likely that the complete success only four months earlier of the British BODY-GUARD and FORTITUDE plans for masking the Normandy landing impressed some thoughtful officers with the JCS. Colonel Baumer, as one of the few American officers associated with the British deception planners, was very possibly the main channel of indoctrination to the highest staff levels to Washington.⁷⁹ If so, such examples and advocates would have found at least one understanding and sympathetic mind at the very top of the strategic direction of the global war. This was no less than the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General George Catlett Marshall who, as a colonel in Pershing's G-3 (Operations) had done the detailed planning for the "Belfort Ruse," the comprehensive deception operation that insured surprise in the A.E.F.'s first all-American offensive on the Western Front in 1918.⁸⁰

However, the JCS's favorable attitude toward surprise and deception was not in general shared by its Navy member nor by the U.S. Navy. For example, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Ernest J. King, pencilled in on his rejection in 1943 of a study recommending that the U.S. build midget surprise-attack submarines the remark: "The element of surprise has been dissipated. —EJK."⁸¹ At that point, U.S. Navy policy on surprise was felt fulfilled defensively by its

⁷⁵Fleet Admiral William F. Halsey and Lieutenant Commander Bryan III, *Admiral Halsey's Story* (New York: Whittlesey House, 1947), 235. This 5-man "Dirty Trick Department" comprised: Rear Adm. Robert B. Carney, C. of S. SOPAC and Third Fleet; Lt. Comdr. Leonard J. Dow, Halsey's Communications Officer; Capt. H. Douglas Moulton, Halsey's Air Operations Officer; Lt. Comdr. Harold E. Stassen, Halsey's Flag Secretary; Lt. Comdr. John E. Lawrence, an Air Combat Information Officer

⁷⁶But not the only one, as incorrectly asserted by the special Navy historian, Morison, XII (58), 60. See Case A52 (Luzon).

⁷⁷Case A49 (Leyte).

⁷⁸Case A49 (Leyte).

⁷⁹Case A45 (Normandy).

⁸⁰Case A8 (St.-Mihiel).

⁸¹Burke Wilkinson, *By Sea and By Stealth* (New York: Coward-McCann, 1956), p. 204.

large-scale harbor defense program. Its potential in offensive operations was overlooked in the confident reliance on its sheer numbers. Surprise and its tools were, as “weapons of despair of the have-not nations, . . . not for us.”⁸² This negative attitude toward surprise and deception, connected with a simple misunderstanding of their nature and interrelationship, permeates the magnificent 15 volume semi-official naval history by Rear Admiral Morison. For him, deception is seldom more than a comic interlude before the real business of battle.⁸³

Until World War II, camouflage was strictly a matter of local improvisation in the U.S. Army. Indeed, that it was used at all in World War I was due entirely to the initiative of the Army Corps of Engineers, which simply went ahead and undertook the task without any such mission having been formally assigned by regulations. Consequently, the service disappeared entirely in the inter-war period, except for a handful of enthusiasts who, on their own, kept the art alive. The complete absence of camouflage in the 1940 maneuvers prompted G-2 and the engineers to slowly press ahead on their own—with some help from the British—and during World War II camouflage became a regular service of the U.S. Corps of Engineers, providing both research and field Camouflage Companies.⁸⁴

So far, this section has described U.S. deception as a practical experience rather than as a formal part of American military doctrine. Measured by this criterion of use the Americans were late (or at least intermittent) comers. Yet the theoretical concept of deception (and its relationship to surprise) had gained a tenuous foothold around 1930. This was a direct consequence of the assignment to The Infantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia, of the man who had designed the first and most elaborate U.S. strategic deception operation of World War I, Colonel George C. Marshall.⁸⁵ From 1927 to 1931 he was Assistant Commandant of The Infantry School, an appointment that carried with it the headship of the Academic Department. Appalled by the unrealistic pedantry of the curriculum and training techniques, this highly imaginative and unorthodox officer set in motion a “quiet and gradual revolution.”⁸⁶ A significant portion of America’s World War II and post-war military leaders thereby received some of the benefits of continuity of the knowledge of surprise and deception painfully learned in the Great War.⁸⁷ The lecture work culminated in 1934 in publication of a still useful book on *Infantry in Battle*, incorporating Marshall’s doctrine and drawing entirely on historical examples and experience from the Great War. This book had an immediate small success both at home and abroad.⁸⁸ Its chapter

⁸²Wilkinson (56), 205-212.

⁸³Samuel Eliot Morison, *History of United States Naval Operations in World War II*, (Boston: Little, Brown, 15 volumes, 1947-1962).

⁸⁴Blanche D. Coll, Jean E. Keith, and Herbert H. Rosenthal, *The Corps of Engineers: Troops and Equipment* (Washington, D.C.: OCMH, 1958), pp. 81-87; and Major E. Alexander Powell, *The Army Behind the Army* (New York: Scribner’s, 1919), pp. 82-97.

⁸⁵See Case A8.

⁸⁶Pogue, I (63), 248-260.

⁸⁷Among the subsequently famed staff who worked closely and enthusiastically with Marshall in this endeavor were Lieutenant Colonel Joseph T., I Stilwell, Major Omar N. Bradley, Captain J. Lawton Collins, and Lieutenant Charles T. Lanham. Students included Captain Matthew B. Ridgeway.

⁸⁸[Major Edwin F. Harding (editor)], *Infantry in Battle* (1st Ed., 1934; 2nd Ed., Washing-

on surprise is excellent and modern but, surprisingly, only vaguely implies its connection with deception. It characterizes surprise as “the master key to victory” and proceeds to demonstrate this otherwise sterile homily. It shows that surprise can be gained by the defender as well as an attacker. And, perhaps most original, it stresses that surprise “should be striven for by all units, regardless of size, and in all engagements, regardless of importance.”⁸⁹ The book illustrates this point by citing in passing three major surprise offensives and then proceeding to analyze in detail four small unit operations, as was appropriate for a school intended primarily for company grade officers.

Moreover, the theoretical concept of strategic deception had been lying fallow in the American Army’s own Field Services Regulations since at least as early as 1941.⁹⁰ There it was buried in the section on “Counterintelligence,” which, after a brief but fair definition of its tactical and strategic value, enjoined that “such measures may be adopted only by the theater commander or by his authority.” The place of its appearance clearly suggests that deception was considered to have been assigned as a mission of G-2 (Intelligence) which, if true, would explain its strategic disuse, G-2 being then such a neglected staff.

When the Americans finally learned the principles and art of deception from the British in 1943 and 1944, they did not realize that their mentors had simply returned the favor. As we have seen, the British planning staffs had been educated in this by Wavell (or, rather, his delegate, Brigadier Clarke). And Wavell had learned from Allenby (and Colonel Meinertzhagen). And Allenby had learned from his experience and study of Roberts (and Colonel Henderson). Yet Henderson himself had evidently learned this technique from his close study of the campaigns of Confederate General “Stonewall” Jackson who had employed a large array of these same ruses—and coordinated Lee’s overall strategy.⁹¹

Today, deception—at least in its tactical aspect—receives rather considerable stress in U.S. Army doctrine. The current Field Service Regulations briefly commend “tactical cover and deception” to the commander and put him on notice that they are “an integral part of all (sic) operational planning.” Otherwise only slim practical guidance is given:⁹²

In developing such plans the commander must visualize and understand the enemy viewpoint and he must take into account the impact on his operations should the deception fail. The plans adopted must be such that if unsuccessful they will not cause the operation to fail.

ton, D.C.: *The Infantry Journal, Inc.*, 1939), Chapter VIII (“Surprise,” pp. 107-121). The “Introduction” is by Marshall. See also Pogue, I (63), 255, 259.

⁸⁹Harding (34), 107, 118.

⁹⁰Department of the Army, *FM 100-5* (1941), p. 58. This section remained unchanged through at least the 1944 edition (pp. 71-72).

⁹¹Lieut.-Col. G.F.R. Henderson, *Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War* (London: Longmans, Green, 1898), index under “strategy: concealment of movements,” “strategy: deceiving the enemy,” “strategy: luring enemy into false position,” “tactics: demonstrations,” etc.

⁹²*FM 100-5* (1962), pp. 50, 56. This edition is still current, with no changes pertinent to deception through 1967.

Then, the commander is cautioned that “coordination . . . with higher, adjacent and lower units is essential to insure against compromise of other operational or deception plans.” Finally, the reader is referred to a classified field manual⁹³ for “detailed discussion of tactical cover and deception.” U.S. Army camouflage doctrine acknowledges the value of tactical deception, but seemingly overlooks “strategic camouflage,” in its basic field manuals on Camouflage⁹⁴ and Field Decoy Installations.⁹⁵ And now deception is urged—but quite in passing—in the field manual on Counter guerrilla Operations.⁹⁶

Having rather painfully relearned the lessons of deception, the U.S. Army was quick to use it in the Korean War in 1950-1952.⁹⁷

And the CIA has adopted it as a standard part of its operational repertoire.⁹⁸ Moreover, the very fact that the standard term introduced by the CIA to the U.S. intelligence community is now “cover and deception,”⁹⁹ reflects a rare theoretical grasp of the subject, implying as it does that interplay of dissimulation and simulation that produces the more effective stratagems. However, the fact that as recently as 1961 the details of CIA’s Operation PLUTO (the Bay of Pigs) could have such a singularly inept cover and deception operation,¹⁰⁰ suggests that there may still be room for both improvement and greater centralization (or, at least, coordination) of stratagem. For those who claim that it is unfair to base a generalized criticism on one or two publicly exposed failures, I would argue that the sheer lowness of the *level* of design and performance of the cover and deception aspect of such a major operation could occur only if the responsible department operated with low standards.¹⁰¹ The British M.I.5 deception group has evidently been able to operate consistently above that level since 1941. Moreover, the even more recent (1967) National Student Association scandal suggests some systematic flaw in CIA’s cover operations.

The recent personnel changes at CIA and the organizational innovation of the DIA (Defense Intelligence Agency) may have done much to improve U.S. deception work.

In general, it seems that while the American military and intelligence services have recently relearned the arts of surprise and stratagem and unquestionably possess the best technical facilities to implement them, they still lag behind some of their foreign counterparts—certainly the British and Israelis—in the priority or place of prominence that they give these factors. For example, the U.S. Army not only today (1968) assigns surprise only eighth place in a list

⁹³FM 31-40 (1958, CONFIDENTIAL), still (1968) current. It is interesting that this particular manual was not in the “30” series for U.S. Army intelligence but in the “31” series for “special warfare,” which was then closely coordinated with CIA.

⁹⁴FM 5-20 (1959), pp. 4, 5, 28, 39. This edition is still (1968) current, with few changes.

⁹⁵FM 5-23. (Not seen by me).

⁹⁶FM 31-16 (1967), pp. 31, 67, 81.

⁹⁷Cases A59 (Inch’on landing) and A61 (Kojo feint).

⁹⁸Felix (63), 152-154. See also Allen Dulles, *The Craft of Intelligence* (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), pp. 145-153.

⁹⁹Roger Hilsman, *To Move a Nation* (Garden City New York: Doubleday, 1967), p. 165. Also FM 100-5 (1962), 50.

¹⁰⁰Case A65.

¹⁰¹See the footnote concerning FM 31-40, earlier in this section.

of nine “principles of war,” but—as discussed below¹⁰²—goes against the modern international trend in having, in 1962, lowered it to that position.

2.4 Russian

Red October fused the two major contemporary intellectual traditions that explicitly, frankly, and realistically understood deception or hypocrisy to be a veritable way of life. It brought together the cosmopolitan Marxist and the Russian national literary intellectual. Both recognized deception to be a major weapon, one for defense or attack and by self or foe.¹⁰³

The Soviet Union had made deception a part of its military doctrine well before World War II.¹⁰⁴ Moreover, as early as 1918, Stalin himself had raised the concept of surprise to the status of a major “factor” in war.¹⁰⁵ Nevertheless, Soviet Russian military theory has been plagued by a curious ideological inhibition regarding the concept of surprise. This is the direct and immediate and still (1968) present consequence of the German invasion on 22 June 1941.¹⁰⁶ It was a shock felt throughout the country—even Stalin reportedly suffered a temporary nervous collapse—and neither the appalling lack of defenses nor the utter failure of the Leader’s vaunted omniscience could be concealed. Stalin therefore adjusted the concept of surprise by simultaneously downgrading and separating it from the other “factors” or principles of war. The others became “permanently operating factors,” while surprise was assigned to a newly created class of *non-permanently* operating factors. The hasty improvisation involved and the embarrassed avoidance of this problem is evident from the fact that Stalin never bothered to specify the other factors that fell into this secondary class. This intimate linkage of Stalin’s name and rôle with the topic of surprise made any critical reappraisal of the subject taboo during his lifetime.¹⁰⁷ Similarly, it has remained one of the more sensitive topics since his death in 1953, because it is one of the central questions involved in the reappraisals that go with the struggle over de-Stalinization. This special circumstance has greatly inhibited Soviet restatements of military doctrine; although it is a moot point to what degree it has degraded, calcified, or stimulated their practice of the arts of surprise and deception.

During the 1943 “Big Three” conference at Teheran, a particularly revealing exchange occurred between Churchill and Stalin at the plenary luncheon gathering on 30 November. President Roosevelt had opened the happy occasion by announcing that OVERLORD had been definitely scheduled for “May 1944.”

¹⁰²Chapter III, Russian.

¹⁰³Some one hundred examples are collected and discussed in Nathan Leites, *A Study of Bolshevism* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1953), Chapter XIII (“Deception”), pp. 324-340.

¹⁰⁴Raymond L. Garthoff, *Soviet Military Doctrine* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1953), pp. 265-272.

¹⁰⁵Garthoff (53), 34.

¹⁰⁶Case A28.

¹⁰⁷Garthoff (53); and H. S. Dinerstein, *War and the Soviet Union* (New York: Praeger, 1959), pp. 6-9.

Then, at the Third Plenary Session late that afternoon, coordinated cover and deception plans for OVERLORD were first raised, discussed, and agreed with the Russians. With full attendance of almost thirty conferees, this altogether remarkable group must have represented nearly all senior Allied officials then writing on deception operations at the level of grand strategy.¹⁰⁸

Churchill raised the question of a strategic deception plan in the following-terms, as he later recalled:¹⁰⁹

I asked if there would be any difficulty in the three Staffs [British, U.S., and Russian] concerning cover plans. Stalin explained that the Russians had made considerable use of deception by means of dummy asks, aircraft, and airfields. Radio deception had a so proven effective. He was entirely agreeable to the staffs collaborating with the object of devising joint cover and deception schemes. "In war-time," I said, "Truth is so precious that she should always be attended by a bodyguard of lies." Stalin and his comrades greatly appreciated this remark when it was translated, . . . and upon this note our formal conference ended gaily.

General Sir Alan Brooke, the C.I.G.S., reintroduced this subject at the subsequent dinner, celebrating Churchill's 69th birthday. In responding to Stalin's toast, he remarked:¹¹⁰

. . . You will remember that this morning while we were discussing cover plans Mr. Churchill said that "in war Truth must have an escort of lies." You will also remember that you yourself told us that in all your great offensives your real intentions were always kept concealed from the outer world. You told us that all your dummy tanks and dummy aeroplanes were always massed on those fronts that were of an [no?] immediate interest, while your true intentions were covered by a cloak of complete secrecy.

A rather similar version of this part of the discussion is given in the recent memoirs by Stalin's interpreter at Teheran, Valentin Berezhev.¹¹¹ He states

¹⁰⁸For the record, those present at the Third Plenary Session included the following, with those who joined the group during dinner marked by an asterisk. Britons: Churchill, Sir Alan Brooke (C.I.G.S.), Eden, Ambassador Clark Kerr, Sir R. Bullard, and *Randolph and* Sarah Churchill; Americans: Roosevelt, Hopkins, Harriman, Winant, Lt. Gen. Brehon Somervell, Adm. Leahy, Adm. Wilson Broun (Roosevelt's Naval Aide), Charles E. Bohlen, *Major John Boettiger (Roosevelt's son-in-law), and *Elliot Roosevelt (Roosevelt's son); Russians: Stalin, Molotov, Voroshilov, and Pavlov (interpreter).

¹⁰⁹Churchill, V (51), 387. The notes taken by "Chip" Bohlen are published in *FRUS*, Vol. "Conferences at Cairo and Teheran, 1943" (61), 576-578. See also Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy, *I Was There* (New York: Whittlesley House, 1950), p. 209.

¹¹⁰Churchill, V (51), 387. The paraphrased version in Brooke's own diary is given in Arthur Bryant, *Triumph in the West* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1959), p. 68. For the notes taken on the occasion by Major John Boettiger see *FRUS*, Vol. "Conferences at Cairo and Teheran, 1943" (61), 584.

¹¹¹Valentin Berezhev, "The Teheran Meeting," *New Times*, 1967, No. 50 (Moscow: 13

that Stalin agreed with Churchill's views on maintenance of OVERLORD secrecy, commenting: "There is no concealing a big operation." Churchill then turned to the question of how to camouflage the preparations and mislead the enemy. In his reply:

Stalin described how the Soviet army went about it. We misled the enemy in such cases, he said, by building dummy tanks and planes and mock airfields. The dummies were moved about, enemy intelligence reported these movements, and the Germans thought that was where an offensive was being prepared, while where it really was being prepared everything was kept absolutely quiet, all movements were carried out under cover of darkness. There would be as many as five or eight thousand dummy tanks and two thousand dummy planes in some places, and large numbers of mock airfields. Then, too, we used radio to fool the enemy. Transmitters in places where no offensive was planned set up a lot of activity, and the enemy got the impression that there were large forces in the area. Sometimes enemy planes bombed these places day and night when actually they were quite empty.

Berezhkov adds that:

After hearing this account, Churchill pronounced: "Wartime truth is so precious that it has to have a bodyguard of lies." Then, more matter-of-factly: "Anyway, steps will be taken to mislead the enemy."

While the Anglo-American and Russian versions of the discussions about stratagem support, indeed supplement, each other both in general and in detail, there is a significant discrepancy—that of tone. The Anglo-American versions imply that an open exchange had occurred, with Stalin seemingly having seen strategic deception in at least a fresh light. The Russian account, on the other hand, depicts the all-knowing Vozhd as the dispenser of stratagematic wisdom to a rather foolish Churchill.¹¹²

The Teheran discussions of OVERLORD stratagem bore fruit under the indiscreet covername of Plan BODYGUARD, a comprehensive inter-Allied strategic deception operation.¹¹³ The detailed plan was developed in London by Colonel John Bevan, who was then in charge of such plans in the British War Office [M.I.5?]. Then, at the end of January 1944, four months before Normandy D-Day, he came to Moscow to present BODYGUARD to the Russians.

December 1967), p. 33. This article represents a fragment from Berezhkov's memoirs, whose publication is announced as forthcoming in Russian in the *Moscow Journal of Modern History* and in various translations to be published abroad.

¹¹²As elsewhere in his memoirs Berezhkov was not nearly so Stalinist, it may be that here he is simply elevating Soviet military *science* over the cruder bourgeoisie *art*, taking Stalin merely as its mouthpiece. Still, Berezhkov is treading quicksand.

¹¹³John R. Deane, *The Strange Alliance* (New York: Viking, 1947), pp. 146-151, gives the only account of Bevan and his mission to Moscow.

He was accompanied by Lieutenant Colonel William H. Baumer, a U.S. Army intelligence officer specialized in cover plans. In Moscow, they joined Brigadier General John R. Deane, the very sharp chief of the U.S. Military Mission there. On 10 February, Bevan, Baumer, and Deane met with Colonel-General Fedor Kuznetsov, the representative of the Soviet General Staff specifically assigned to work with them on BODYGUARD. Although little is publicly known about this very senior officer,¹¹⁴ it is believed in U.S. intelligence agencies that he was Director of Soviet Military Intelligence (GRU), and seemingly held that post from 1943 (when he succeeded Major-General I. I. Ilyichev) until 1945. If so, this is the only evidence suggesting that during World War II the Russians may have located responsibility for their deception planning in the GRU. This hypothesis is quite attractive, because contrary to widespread belief, the GRU was the only Soviet intelligence service that survived the Great Purge with enough professional competence, to continue to provide high quality foreign intelligence reports in volume during the war. (Sorge, Rado, Rössler, Trepper, the Rote Kapelle, and Canadian atomic espionage ring, were all GRU people.) The monstrous NKVD (the state security organization now known as the KGB) was then preoccupied as an instrument of political terror, censorship, and counter-intelligence. In its zeal to over-fulfill its assigned purge quotas, the NKVD had virtually destroyed its once effective foreign intelligence service.¹¹⁵ Consequently, because the GRU was the *military* intelligence service, was professionally competent, and had extensive viable agent networks abroad that could be used for transmission of disinformation, the GRU would have been a logical locus for military deception planning and operations. However, the few subsequent Soviet references to their wartime stratagems all stem from and seemingly link it to the NKVD-KGB. It may be, of course, that *both* GRU and NKVD contributed, with central control being provided by the General Staff and Supreme Command (*Stavka*). If this were the case, then the Russian deception system resembled the German one more than the British.

In any case, Kuznetsov had two or three further planning meetings with Bevan, Baumer, and Deane during mid-February, and other Russian officers and representatives of the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs were drawn into the discussions. Then, on 5 March, after two weeks of purely internal Russian discussions, Kuznetsov accepted Bevan's plan without change.¹¹⁶ And, in what proved to be one of the very rare instances of truly mutual wartime cooperation, the Russians fulfilled their diversionary rôle in BODYGUARD during the crucial period of the Allied cross-Channel invasion.¹¹⁷

In 1965 the Soviet state security office, the KGB, published a major article on its rôle in World War II. Following an explicit and rather accurate appraisal

¹¹⁴Fedor Fedorovich Kuznetsov (1904-). From 1945 until 1957 he alternated between being Deputy Head and Head of the Main Political Administration of the Soviet Army. Since 1958 he has been a Member of the Military Council and Head of the Political Administration of the Northern Command. For the highly inconsistent evidence of his likely GRU career see my monograph, *Soviet Clandestine Communication Nets* (draft, 1967), Chapter III, Section D.

¹¹⁵See my *Soviet Clandestine Communication Nets* (draft, 1967).

¹¹⁶Deane (47), 148.

¹¹⁷Deane (47), 148-151. See also Case A46 and Example B35.

of the German deception plan or BARBAROSSA, it proceeds to discuss its own contributions to deception from 1942 to 1945. Because of its rarity, I quote the relevant paragraph below. Note, however, that the specific examples cited by the KGB are all at the level of *tactical* deception.¹¹⁸

During the war years, the organs of state security skillfully conducted the dissemination of misleading information to the enemy, leading him into error about the true intentions of the Soviet command, the movement of troops, and the situation behind the lines. For example, from 1 May through 1 August 1942, in accord with a plan approved by General Headquarters, misleading information was disseminated to imply a concentration of Soviet troop units. Similarly, in January 1943 Nazi intelligence was fed misleading information about the formation of a reserve army in Gorky and also misleadingly told of the unloading of 1,300 aircraft and 2,000 tanks in northern ports. In order to pin down the enemy forces in the north, misleading material was fitted about a concentration of troops on the Karelian front. In transmitting misleading material to the enemy, several scores of radio stations that had been seized by the organs of state in our rear area from German agents were exploited. Conducted on a large scale, the dissemination of misleading information made possible the conduct of offensive operations by Soviet troops.

The Russians have recently (1968) disclosed the almost full details of their deception operations for the great Belorussian offensive of 1944.¹¹⁹ As this was one of the later and more important Soviet offensives, it is fair to presume that it approaches the high-water mark of Russian art in stratagem in World War II. If so, the author, Colonel Shimansky has merely shown how far behind the Britons and Germans the Russians were then, in understanding this technique.¹²⁰ For example, he proudly discloses that among several otherwise unidentified innovations was the use of:¹²¹

...reconnaissance in force not only in front areas involved in the offensive, but also in other contiguous strategic directions.

But this “new element” in Soviet stratagem had already been standard practice in British, U.S., and German military deception operations in the *First* World War! Moreover, he uses this rather primitive historical case study to explicitly illustrate future means:¹²²

¹¹⁸ “Sovetskie organy gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti v cody velikoi otechestvennoi voiny” [Soviet organs of state security in the years of the Great Patriotic War], *Voprosy Istorii*, 1965, No. 5 (May, pp. 20-39).

¹¹⁹ See Case A46.

¹²⁰ Colonel A. Shimansky, “O dostizhenii strategicheskoi vnezapnosti pri p gotovke letneosennei kampanii 1944 goda” [About the achievement of strategic surprise in the preparation for the summer-fall campaign of 1944], *Voenno-Istoricheskii Zhurnal*, No. 6, 1968, pp. 17-28.

¹²¹ Shimansky (68), 18.

¹²² Shimansky (68), 17.

... why in order to achieve strategic surprise it [is] necessary to carry out a whole system of measures aimed at strategic camouflage, and deception [*strategicheskoi maskirovke i dezinformatsii*].

Thus, Colonel Shimansky unwittingly(?) implies that current (1968) Soviet doctrine on surprise and deception still lags that in, at least, the British and Israeli armies. Incidentally, this article cannot be dismissed as the idiosyncratic view of some uninformed minor officer. Colonel A. N. Shimansky, as a Candidate of Historical Sciences and one of the 15 members of the committee chaired by Marshal Sokolovsky that co-authored *Military Strategy* in 1962, would be fully informed on his subject.

My tentative conclusion that the Russians still have much to learn about the subtleties of stratagem is reinforced by the abject failure of their officer training schools and their military advisory mission to in any way prepare their Egyptian clients to anticipate much less even understand the stratagems played upon them by Israel in both 1956 and 1967.¹²³ Even their successful surprise-through-deception in Czechoslovakia in 1968 demonstrates only that they can do a good job of stratagem when favored by circumstances.¹²⁴

I suspect that if the Russians are indeed still as weak on stratagem as the limited public evidence indicates, this is a direct consequence of the dead hand of Stalin, which still restrains comprehensive rethinking about the broader topic of military surprise. At the beginning of this section it was noted that Stalin's solution to the intolerable embarrassment of the surprise of the German invasion in 1941 was the mindless evasion of re-categorizing surprise as a transitory factor. By making military doctrine a cosmetic mask for his "cult of personality," Stalin imposed a political barrier that prevented any reevaluation of doctrine during his life and inhibited pragmatic or empirical reassessment since his death in 1953.¹²⁵ Even the urgent search for doctrines appropriate to the unprecedented opportunities opened by missile-nuclear technology for surprise and preemption has had to proceed with wary attention to the day-to-day political vagaries of de-Stalinization.

The first attack on Stalin's doctrine of permanent-vs.-transitory factors appeared six months after Stalin's death in the chief theoretical journal of the Soviet Ministry of Defense. It was an article by that confidential journal's own Editor, Major-General Talensky¹²⁶ Although this piece opened the debate in mild terms that merely qualified rather than overthrew Stalin's doctrine, it was an immediate sensation both because of its high-level sponsorship and because it presented the first original thoughts on Communist military theory to have come from any writer other than Stalin himself in the previous 25 years. Because of the very way in which Stalin had formulated his doctrine, the entire subsequent debate has necessarily involved a reassessment of the rôle of surprise. This

¹²³Cases A63 and A66.

¹²⁴Case A67.

¹²⁵Dinerstein (59), 8-9.

¹²⁶Major-General N. Talensky, ("On the Question of the Character of the Laws of Military Science") [in Russian], *Voennaya Mysl*, No. 9 (September), 1953, as described in Dinerstein (59), 9, 36-47, 168.

was true even in Talensky's original very general piece.¹²⁷ The ensuing internal debate—conducted in limited-circulation journals—soon erupted in public view in *Red Star*, the official Army newspaper in a series of articles. Subsequently, with much disputatious vacillation, the debate progressed from modifications of the Stalin doctrine to their eventual overthrow in 1955.¹²⁸ The landmark article supporting and enhancing the rediscovery of surprise was by Tank Marshal Rotmistrov.¹²⁹ Khrushchev's "Secret Speech" of 1956 merely dealt the *coup de grâce* and brought this specific issue before the entire Communist Party membership.¹³⁰ Since then the occasional Soviet books and articles on surprise have shown an increasing sophistication but still fall short of British and Israeli writings in their grasp of the relationship between surprise and deception. Moreover, to an even greater extent than American writers, they continue to be obsessed with the false notion that "negative" security is the crucial factor in surprise.¹³¹

After World War II, Allen Dulles tells us, the Soviet Union "centralized the responsibility for planning and launching deception operations in a special department of the State Security Service (KGB) known as the Disinformation Bureau"¹³² However, the only post-World War II Soviet deception operations specifically attributed by the CIA to that bureau are concerned with production of the trickle of forged political propaganda documents that "leak" to the press from time to time as well as inspiring a stream of anti-CIA books, pamphlets, and articles that appear throughout the world.¹³³ In any case, the Disinformation Department, known as Department D, was founded in 1959 and is one of the major parts of the KGB's First Main Directorate, the directorate charged with foreign intelligence. From its founding until 1967 it was headed by Major-General Ivan Agayants.¹³⁴ The present head is not yet publicly known.

Its organizational affiliation suggests that the mission of the Disinformation Department is perhaps much more than planting mere propaganda or spreading simple confusion, as the CIA publicity releases imply. Its subordination to the foreign intelligence directorate indicates a counterintelligence mission, specifically in the area of "deception operations," as Dulles asserts. While I am not aware of any specific operations of this type, the Disinformation Department is uniquely equipped to engage in them. That is, it has the capability—through its control of at least two known channels for distribution of false information in addition to those already disclosed by the CIA.

¹²⁷Dinerstein (59), 40-41, 44.

¹²⁸Dinerstein (59), 49-51, 180-212.

¹²⁹Marshal of Tank Forces P. Rotmistrov, ("On the Role of Surprise in Contemporary War") [in Russian], *Voennaya Mysl*, No. 2 (Feb.), 1955, as described in Dinerstein (59), 181, 184-188.

¹³⁰As pointed out by Dinerstein (59), 202-203.

¹³¹For my detailed critique of this common myth see Chapter 6 below.

¹³²Dulles (63), 150.

¹³³Paul W. Blackstock, *Agents of Deceit: Frauds, Forgeries and Political Intrigue among Nations* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1966), pp. 164-171, 185, 277-286, 310.

¹³⁴Ivan Ivanovich Agayants (1911-May 1968). Armenian. Member of Soviet secret police since 1930. Chief intelligence officer in Teheran, 1941-1943, under name Ivan Ivanovich Angarov. Chief intelligence officer in Paris, 1947-1949. Head, Disinformation Department, First Main Directorate, KGB, 1959-summer 1967. Deputy Chief (one of 3), First Main Directorate, summer 1967-May 1968. See obituary in *The New York Times*, 15 May 1968, p. 41.

First, they have direct control of certain agents abroad, permitting them to feed deception material quickly and directly into selected news and intelligence channels. These agents are in some cases overtly Soviet sources such as Victor Louis (Vitaly Lui) who since 1956 has purveyed exquisitely contrived “scoops” to several gullible western journalists, news media, publishers, and businessmen.¹³⁵ For example, it was Mr. Louis who used NBC and *Parade Magazine* to gull the American public that the films of Khrushchev in retirement had somehow reached them through private enterprise rather than courtesy of the KGB. Second, through its own officials assigned as censors to key Soviet journals, the Disinformation Department *inserts* material,¹³⁶ which it knows Western intelligence clipping services will pick up. (These special censors are in addition to the ubiquitous Glavlit censors who delete sensitive material.)

Although the Imperial Army had transmitted the standard European field camouflage techniques to the Red Army, Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist theory failed to inspire any significant innovations. Consequently the Red Army faced the German invasion with only the most conventional camouflage techniques to enhance or stimulate deception operations. The main differences in Red Army practice down through 1941 were that camouflage was 1) partly integrated with general deception doctrine, 2) thoroughly mastered, and 3) the assigned duty of the infantry rather than the engineers as in other armies.¹³⁷ While wartime exigencies produced the usual imaginative tactical improvisations, the main source of Russian innovations in camouflage came from her British ally. This occurred in late 1941 and 1942 when the British stage magician, Major Jasper Maskelyne of the Camouflage Experimental Section, instructed visiting Russian officers from “a parallel service” in the latest applications of theatrical illusionist techniques to military camouflage.¹³⁸

2.5 Italian

I have seen no evidence that the Italian Army has ever made use of strategic deception. This seems to hold for their operations in the Great War (1914-1918), the Italo-Ethiopian War (1935-1936), their covert¹³⁹ intervention in the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939), and during their part in World War II (1940-1943). This is surprising for a country that produced such masters of deception in the political realm as Machiavelli and Mussolini and Ciano.

The Italian Army did not even have a sophisticated camouflage service, despite the fact that the Italian theater possessed a highly developed tradition of illusions and “transformations,” equaled only by the British.¹⁴⁰

¹³⁵See particularly “Ambiguous Russian Salesman: Victor Yevgenyevich Louis,” *New York Times*, 12 August 1967, p. 26.

¹³⁶Statement of a former Soviet journalist who recently defected in Britain. I am indebted to Professor Uri Ra’anan for this information.

¹³⁷Garthoff (53), 266-268, 270-271, 318, 386, 405-406.

¹³⁸Maskelyne (49), 66, 92.

¹³⁹See my unpublished paper, *Submarines as Weapons of Covert Warfare* (draft, 1966).

¹⁴⁰Maskelyne (49), 132-135.

Indeed, the history of Italian arms since the 19th century is a dreary record of almost fanatical adherence to the doctrine of direct strategic approach. Its unaccustomed victories were all against enemies who either used the same strategy or were hopelessly outnumbered.

2.6 Japanese

The Japanese—or at least their naval commanders—were reared on the legendary stroke of strategic surprise visited by Admiral Togo on the Russian fleet at Port Arthur in 1904. While it does not seem that this opening blow of the Russo-Japanese War involved strategic deception, it made the element of surprise—including undeclared war—such a salient part of the unorthodox strategic thinking of Togo’s foremost student, Admiral Yamamoto, that he was quick to make use of deception. Yamamoto conceived, planned, sold and ordered the Pearl Harbor attack, emulating Togo down to the symbolic detail of raising the original “Z” signal flag of Tsushima to launch his aircraft at H-hour.¹⁴¹

The Japanese can be rated only fair at camouflage, although late in World War II they showed remarkable proficiency at some points as, for example, at Iwo Jima.¹⁴²

2.7 French

The French are similar to the Italians in that they attempted to fight both World Wars without having understood much less used strategic deception. The lone exception among senior French commanders—and then only in World War I—was Pétain.¹⁴³ Also, like the Italians with Machiavelli as a revered model to point the way, the French had Napoleon who in his practice and writing had stressed stratagem. Moreover, the French gave international currency to the phrase *ruse de guerre* and the word *camouflage*. Indeed the very word *stratagem* comes to English through the French, *stratagème*. Despite this tradition the French managed in the 19th century to reduce this art to its tactical mode where it remained in virtual stasis. Even the two most prominent early 20th century French military theoreticians, Foch¹⁴⁴ and De Gaulle,¹⁴⁵ give only passing mention to deception and then only in some of its tactical applications.

I do not know what places the principle of surprise and the concept of stratagem take in post-war French military doctrine. That they are not unknown is proven by their use by staff officers in the French Indo-China campaign where various lures and ruses were used with mixed results against the

¹⁴¹John Deane Potter, *Yamamoto* (New York: Viking, 1965).

¹⁴²Morison, XIV (60), 16.

¹⁴³For Pétain’s views on surprise see Lord Hankey, *The Supreme Command, 1914-1918* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1961), Vol. II, p. 626. For his contribution to deception operations see Cases A8 and A9a.

¹⁴⁴See Ferdinand Foch, *The Principles of War* (New York: Fly, 1918), pp. 253-274.

¹⁴⁵Captain Charles de Gaulle, *Vers l’Armée de Métier* (1934). See the English translation, *The Army of the Future* (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1941), pp. 103-104.

Viet Minh.¹⁴⁶ However, the best hint that the French Army now—for the first time since Bonaparte and, briefly, Pétain—restored surprise and deception to its doctrine is the fact that General André Beaufre, its leading theoretician and one of its senior chiefs—is an avid and perceptive student of Liddell Hart. He was first converted to this view after reading Liddell Hart's *The Decisive Wars of History* sometime in 1931 or 1932. At that time Beaufre concluded that:¹⁴⁷

The essential factor in defeating the enemy was not force, but deception; it was necessary to delude him, to worry him, to disorganize him by an unexpected approach, and having thus created a weak point to exploit it to the full.

2.8 Israeli

Israel is one of the contemporary masters of the art of strategic surprise-through-deception. They seem to employ stratagem on at least as sophisticated a level as the British and seemingly at a superior level to that achieved by either the Russians or Americans.

While theoretically there is no reason why small military powers should not have integrated stratagem with their military doctrine, I am aware of no case in the post-World War II period except Israel.

There are three or four channels through which *Zahal*, the Israeli Army, may have acquired this technique, although the answer will remain highly speculative until the Israelis choose to divulge such most secret portions of their history. First, I must concede the possibility that Israeli deception planning may have been a self-taught technique. Stratagem is a substitute for sheer force, and the exigencies of desperate survival did stimulate the Israeli leaders to seek such unorthodox solutions.

Second, the Israeli Army and its commanders consciously draw military inspiration, wisdom and lore from the Bible; and the Old Testament teaches its share of stratagems of war. The very names their Biblical land give constant reminder of ancient ruses.

Whatever the extent of indigenous trial-and-error learning or Biblical inspiration, specific techniques and doctrine of military deception did diffuse to Israel from Britain. Initial contact was through Allenby's field intelligence chief, Colonel Meinertzhagen, who in 1917 employed 15 Palestinian Jews on his staff. Indeed his principal agent and adviser was no less than the legendary Aaron Aaronsohn, leader of the Zionist intelligence service, *Nili*.¹⁴⁸ Henceforward all the related covert and clandestine skills of smuggling, insurgency, and guerrillaism were preserved, developed and transmitted by the Hagana, particularly its intelligence service (*Shai*).¹⁴⁹

¹⁴⁶See Case A62.

¹⁴⁷General André Beaufre, *1940: The Fall of France* (New York: Knopf, 1968), p. 40.

¹⁴⁸Anita Engle, *The Nili Spies* (London: Hogarth, 1959); R. Meinertzhagen, *Middle East Diary, 1917-1956* (London: Cresset, 1959), p. 5; and Tuohy (20), 173-175.

¹⁴⁹Efraim Dekel, *Shai: The Exploits of Hagana Intelligence* (New York: Yoseloff, 1959).

A further input—at least of unconventional police-combat techniques—was supplied in 1938-1939 by the brilliant, eccentric, and pro Zionist British Army Intelligence officer, Captain Orde Wingate. Encouraged by the local Force Commander, Major-General A. P. Wavell, he co-opted Hagana members into a special intelligence-cum-police-cum night combat patrol to fend off Arab raids. One of those who gained additional experience in Wingate's special Night Squads was an obscure young *sabra* farmer named Moshe Dayan.¹⁵⁰ And he has said that: "Every Israeli soldier is a disciple of Wingate. He gave us our technique."¹⁵¹

By 1956, after Moshe Dayan had become chief of staff of the Israeli Army and its only general, Israeli military doctrine had been honed down and summarized in 14 simple rules, of which two explicitly stressed surprise:¹⁵²

—"Always try for surprise in one form or another."

—"When local surprise is possible, don't expose movement with premature fires."

2.9 Chinese

The Chinese have the oldest (and virtually unbroken¹⁵³) tradition of theory and doctrine on surprise and deception. This tradition stretches from the world's earliest text on military theory—the *Military Doctrine* of Sun Tzu—to the modern doctrines of guerrilla and revolutionary war of Mao Tse-tung. The place of both authors in military theory and history is described elsewhere in this text.¹⁵⁴ At this point I will discuss them only in their relation to contemporary Chinese military doctrine on surprise and deception.

The Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) practiced what Mao preached. In their battles with the Japanese and Nationalist Chinese they had mastered the techniques of mobility and camouflage that enabled them to evade defeats or to inflict ambushes. This was true also of the metamorphosis in 1950 of the PLA Fourth Field Army into the Chinese People's Volunteers (CPV) in the Korean War. There, however, the PLA/CPV—first under Lin Piao, then under P'eng Teh-huai—was never quite able to find either the tactics or strategy for cost-effective local success much less victory. Nevertheless, the old PLA doctrines and techniques did achieve two notable successes in the war. The first was their initial deployment across the Yalu and into North Korea in October-November 1950 that dramatically reversed the fortunes of the war. That was made possible only by the most careful use of camouflage and tactical deception. The second

Dexel was himself a chief of Shai (Sherut Yediot, "information service") and was the Jewish Agency liaison officer with Wingate in 1938.

¹⁵⁰Christopher Sykes, *Orde Wingate* (London: Colliers, 1959), pp. 140-181; Leonard Mosely, *Gideon Goes to War* (New York: Scribner's, 1955), pp. 34-78; and Field-Marshal Earl Wavell, *The Good Soldier* (London: Macmillan, 1948), p. 62.

¹⁵¹Robert J. Donovan, *Israel's Fight for Survival* (New York: Signet, 1967), p. 83.

¹⁵²S.L.A. Marshall, *Sinai Victory* (New York: Morrow, 1958), p. 23.

¹⁵³There were a few long breaks.

¹⁵⁴Case A60.

was their utter frustration of Operation STRANGLE, the all-out effort in 1951-1952 of a much too confident U.S. Far East Air Force (FEAF) that it could interdict most of the flow of supplies to the front. Although the Chinese (and North Koreans) were mainly able to circumvent the obstacle of air interdiction—where FEAF had absolute command of the air—by superb organization of their primitive transportation and repair services,¹⁵⁵ much of the credit is due their imaginative use of camouflage to dissimulate trains, trucks, and porter columns and to simulate “broken” rails, “unrepaired” bridges, and “destroyed” trucks.¹⁵⁶ It is instructive that the veteran North Vietnamese army of Ho Chi Minh and Vo Nguyen Giap—both close readers of Mao—have used similar techniques with similar success in moderating the effects of the similarly overweening U.S. effort to interdict the supply routes into South Vietnam.

During the Korean War, the PLA/CPV also proved itself adept at the minor tactical level at setting ambushes and in occasional surprise attacks, particularly at night. Again, these merely represented the application of their guerrilla techniques to conventional battle. However, one innovation was made. This was the setting of ambushes for U.S. aircraft, luring them to targets that were well guarded by anti-aircraft fire or artificial obstacles (such as cables stretched across ravines through which the aircraft would make their run).¹⁵⁷

¹⁵⁵Robert Frank Futrell, *The United States Air Force in Korea, 1950-1953* (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1961), pp. 400-438.

¹⁵⁶Robert Leckie, *Conflict: The History of the Korean War 1950-53* (New York: Putnam's, 1962), p. 320; and Futrell (61), 411-413, 416.

¹⁵⁷Leckie (62), 320-321.

Chapter 3

THE PLACE OF SURPRISE AND DECEPTION IN MILITARY THEORY

“The most potent thing in war is the unexpected.”
–*Julius Caesar*, 47 B.C.¹

“To surprise is to conquer.”
–*Marshal Suvorov*, 18th Cent.

“Surprise is the key to victory.”
–*Lt.-Gen. Erfurth*, 1938²

“Surprise is the most vital element for success in modern war.”
–*General of the Army MacArthur*,
23 August 1950³

Deception has never been fully accommodated to military theory. However, its intimate relationship to the “principle” of surprise has been recognized by some writers, from antiquity to the present day. This chapter will trace the evolution of the theory of stratagem—although it will be seen that the story is not so much one of smooth *evolution* or systematic growth of *theory* as it is one of spasmodic *accumulation* of *unconnected* concepts and insights.

Although the use of strategic deception can be found among the earliest recorded cases of war, it has received only rare, intermittent and, even then,

¹As quoted by Suetonius in Fuller (65), 210.

²Erfurth (38/43), 199.

³Quoted in Higgins (60), 45.

generally unsystematic treatment from the historians, philosophers, and theoreticians of war. A brief survey of its ambiguous place in military theory will illuminate this problem.

The earliest surviving monograph on military doctrine is attributed to General Sun Wu, better known as Sun Tzu, a Chinese professional soldier. It was almost certainly written during the 4th century B.C. in the Warring States period. In any event this remarkable book, *Military Doctrine*, not only acknowledges—indeed stresses—the importance of deception (in both its tactical and strategic aspects) but imbeds it in a succinct yet complete body of military theory.⁴

Sun Tzu wrote a century and a half after Confucius. In the interval, the nature of Chinese warfare had changed from feudal nobles fighting set-piece tactical battles according to a rigidly observed chivalrous code to professional soldiers organized under a hierarchical command with staff, fighting strategic campaigns of maneuver governed mainly by pragmatic constraints. Confucius had deplored the occasional lapses from the old gentlemanly code; and his great disciple, Hsun Tzu (3rd Century B.C.), urged that: “The armies of the benevolent man cannot use deceit.” But the school of Sun Tzu was “in.”

Sun’s little book became the most widely read and influential military text throughout the Far East. The Mongol conquerors of China may have absorbed some of its lore through their Chinese scholar advisers. The Japanese took over Sun Tzu *in toto*⁵ and did not abandon it until the late 19th century when they adopted German tactics along with Western arms.⁶ The Chinese Government also had adopted the Western military system in time for defeat from the Japanese in Manchuria, stalemate in the Sino-Japanese War, and defeat by the Chinese Communists.⁷

But Sun Tzu’s principles have been retained—although heavily overlaid by Marxist objectives—by Mao Tse-tung.⁸

Surprise and stratagem figure, of course, in several surviving writings of classical Greece. The successful surprise-through-stratagem of the Trojan Horse being the veritable paragon.⁹ And references to *tactical* ruses are scattered liberally through various texts of the period.¹⁰ The Romans were, however, the

⁴Sun Tzu, *The Art of War* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963). For his doctrine on deception see pp. 9, 16, 31, 41, 51, 53, 66, 92-93, 97-98, 102, 106, 109, 133-134, 139, 146, 149. The Chinese title is *Sun Tzu Ping Fa* (*The Military Doctrine of Sun Tzu*), the *fa* of the title meaning (now as well as in Sun Tzu’s time) “doctrine” or “laws” and not “art.”

⁵Samuel B. Griffith, “Introduction” to Sun Tzu, *The Art of War* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963).

⁶Liddell Hart (54), 159-160. See also Ernst L. Presseisen, *Before Aggression: Europeans Prepare the Japanese Army* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1965).

⁷See Evans Fordyce Carlson, *The Chinese Army* (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1940); F. F. Liu, *A Military History of Modern China* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956); and Liddell Hart, “Foreword” to Sun (63), *vii*.

⁸Griffith in Sun (63), 44-56. See also S.Y. Teng, *The Nien Army and Their Guerrilla Warfare: 1851-1868* (The Hague: Mouton, 1960), Chapter VI.

⁹The story of the Wooden Horse of Troy is alluded to by Homer in *The Odyssey* (Books IV, VIII, and XI) and is told in detail by the Roman poet Virgil (70-19 B.C.) in his *Aeneid* (beginning of Book II).

¹⁰For examples, in the book (c.356 B.C.) by Aeneas *The Tactician* and in *The General* (c. 58 A.D.) by Onasander. Both works are translated together in the Loeb Classical Library

first to collate this lore.

The first monograph on military deception *per se* is the *Strategemata* (“The Stratagems”) of Sextus Julius Frontinus (c. 35 A.D.c.104), a conscientious Roman engineer, three-time Consul, one-time provincial governor in Britain, and Augur, in which latter office he was succeeded by Pliny the Younger.¹¹ His *Strategemata* is merely a catalogue of historical ruses collected under Books and Chapters. The three books cover stratagems, respectively, in preparation for battle, during battle, and for sieges. The 43 chapters cover as many situations of the type “On distracting the attention of the enemy” or “On concealing reverses.” The value of this volume rests solely on its multitude of examples drawn from history, for Frontinus makes no effort at discussion, much less analysis or theory. At most—but this point is significant—the author points out that stratagem serves the *defense* as well as the offense, “is effective quite as much when the enemy is to be evaded as when he is to be crushed.”¹² Otherwise he leaves his readers to their own inductive resources.

In the West, from Roman times through the 18th century, by far the most widely read and influential textbook on war was the *De Re Militari*, a late (c. 390 A.D.) codification of Roman military theory, regulations, and lore by Vegetius.¹³ This eminently practical little work stresses surprise and stratagem in their defensive as well as offensive modes, thus pointing clearly to what Liddell Hart later termed the “luring defensive” and the “baited offensive.” Noting that “surprises, ambushes and stratagems” are the *only* hope of success for a much weaker protagonist, Vegetius also points out that “stratagem and finesse” and “famine, surprise or terror” are always preferable to general engagements. The former makes it possible to “destroy the enemy . . . in detail and intimidate them without exposing our own forces,” while in the latter “fortune has often a greater share than valor.”¹⁴

Stratagem slipped into disuse in Europe of the Middle Ages and early Renaissance, one reason why the Russian princes, Teutonic Knights, and Hungarian kings fell such easy prey to the ruses of the Mongols in their 13th century sweep to Liegnitz and the Adriatic. As late as the Battle of Ravenna (1512) adversaries were accustomed to open battle, with chivalrous challenges and to conduct war, at least in theory, in accord with agreed rules and fixed means. It fell to the Florentine statesman, Niccolo Machiavelli (1469-1527), to point out most explicitly the very intimate interactions of war, politics, and economics, and to apply to military theory the common practice of political deception.¹⁵ He urged

series as *Aeneas Tacticus*, *Asclepiodotus*, *Onasander* (London: Heinemann, 1923).

¹¹Frontinus, *The Stratagems* (London: Heinemann, 1925).

¹²Frontinus (25), Book I, Introduction.

¹³Flavius Vegetius Renatus, “The Military Institutions of Romans” (translation by Lieutenant John Clarke), in Major Thomas R. Phillips (Ed.), *Roots of Strategy* (Harrisburg, Pa.: Military Service Publishing Company, 1940), pp. 65-175.

¹⁴Vegetius (40), Book III, pp. 133-135, 138, 139, 143, 146, 149, 151, 158-159, 166 and 167, 172.

¹⁵Niccolo Machiavelli, *The Discourses* (Walker trans., New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950), particularly Discourses 14, 40, 48. See also Felix Gilbert, “Machiavelli: The Renaissance of the Art of War,” in Edward Head Earle (Ed.), *Makers of Modern Strategy* (Princeton:

that any and all means were justified to defend the state or insure its victory: efficacy was the only sensible criterion. Moreover, recognizing that an army was an economically precious commodity, he urged that the wise commander “never attempted to win by force” what he “was able to win by fraud.”¹⁶ Although Vegetius was Machiavelli’s most influential general source, for stratagem he particularly recommended Frontinus for his book on stratagems.¹⁷

Deception and surprise in their strategic as well as tactical senses are also found in the three main modern schools of Western military theory: the “classical,” the “romantic,” and that of the “indirect approach.” However, these concepts do not appear with either the emphasis or the frequency that they do among the Far Eastern military theorists. Nevertheless the most influential proponents these three Western schools—Jomini, Clausewitz, and Liddell Hart—do give high place to these concepts. It has been their followers who have often merely neglected (rather than explicitly rejected) these parts of their teachers’ writings. Only Liddell Hart managed to press these concepts home on a substantial number of his followers, particularly among the Germans and Israelis.

The Mardchal de Saxe (1696-1750) of France was not only the most consistently successful commander of the 18th century, but also the first modern military writer to stress the importance of maneuver and surprise and the many ruses, stratagems, and feints that may support these means by diverting the enemy’s reserves.¹⁸ He was strongly influenced in these matters by Machiavelli. Saxe’s *Reveries sur l’art de la guerre*, written in 1732 and published posthumously in 1757, enjoyed an immediate success, but one that was quickly superseded by the fames of Frederick the Great and Napoleon.

Frederick the Great (1712-1786), King of Prussia, was not as uniformly successful a general as Marshal Saxe but his example and one of his early writings proved more influential in the 19th and 20th centuries. Frederick both practiced and counseled stratagem as the key means to gain surprise. His writings, including even his early (1747) “best-seller,” *Instruction for the Generals*, stress this factor, giving much practical advice and discussion. In particular he was the first writer to point out that dissimulation, stratagem, and ruses have great value at *every* stage of a campaign.¹⁹

Napoleon Bonaparte (1769-1821) made frequent, effective use of a pinning

Princeton University Press, 1943), pp. 3-25.

¹⁶Niccolo Machiavelli, *Vita di Castruccio Castracani* (1520), Paragraph 40, in Machiavelli, *The Prince and Other Works* (Gilbert translation, Chicago: Packard, 1941), p. 205.

¹⁷Gilbert, in Earle (43), 14.

¹⁸Marshal Maurice de Saxe, “My Reveries Upon the Art of War” in Major Thomas R. Phillips (Ed.), *Roots of Strategy: A Collection of Military Classics* (Harrisburg, Pa.: Military Service Publishing Company, 1940), pp. 189-300. For surprise and ruses see pp. 235, 239, 261-262, 263, 267-268, 271-274, 285, 294. Saxe also had a keen understanding of the psychological factors bearing on the discipline and behavior of soldiers, officers, and commanders—enemies as well as his own. Saxe took as his principal models the Roman Legions and the campaigns of Turenne. See also Hart (27), 61, 62.

¹⁹Jay Luvaas (Ed.), *Frederick the Great on the Art of War* (New York: The Free Press, 1966), pp. 324-327 (for stratagem). For the “Instruction of Frederic the Great for His Generals (1747)” see Thomas R. Phillips, *Roots of Strategy* (Harrisburg, Pa.: Military Service Publishing Company, 1940), pp. 346-354 (for stratagem and ruses).

frontal feint attack with tactical deceptions to support his famed *manoeuvre sur les derrieres*, a surprise envelopment of his opponent's rear concealed by its speed, a dense cavalry security screen, and terrain. But the battle was, for Napoleon, only the culmination of a carefully laid strategic plan. And his grand strategy made full use of a carefully orchestrated deception plan to confuse and mislead his enemy even before the campaign was launched or a battle joined. Thus, prior to a campaign, a dense curtain of security would descend over the planning: the press would be muzzled to prevent leaks and Fouché's counter-intelligence would protect against penetration by enemy agents. Information was assiduously collected about the victim: from both public sources and through Fouché's secret intelligence service. Deception was mounted through inspired articles in the controlled press. Then when the campaign was underway, various ruses were systematically used to deceive the foe about the timing, direction, strength, and nature of Napoleon's blows: unit designations were continually changed, deployments were shuffled about, and feint attacks constantly mounted.²⁰ This was Napoleon's practice as analyzed by recent historians; but, while some of it carries over into the earliest and most widely known collections of his maxims, it does not appear there in any coherent structure.²¹

The preeminent work to codify and enlarge the Newtonian "classical tradition" of military theory was done by General Antoine Jomini (1779-1869), a Swiss national who served in senior staff positions under both Napoleon and, after 1813, Napoleon's enemies. From this uniquely two-faced vantage point he wrote his *Precis de l'Art de la Guerre*, published in 1837. Although Jomini therein treats surprise and diversion as important elements in war, he does not give any guide as to how to achieve them, leaving their realization to the ineffable psychological realms of intuition and "opportunity."²²

Clausewitz (1780-1831) gave both more attention and fuller exposition than Jomini to the elements of surprise, stratagem, and diversion.²³ But even he was unable to integrate these concepts into a general theory. Consequently his influential disciples were able to shop freely among his notions—accepting some, rejecting others. In this competition for attention, it is understandable that his principles of surprise, stratagem, and diversion were by-passed in favor of the more readily applicable ones. But in doing this his successors ignored his injunction that without surprise "preponderance at the decisive point is not properly conceivable." Clausewitz also followed Frederick the Great in stressing

²⁰David G. Chandler, *The Campaigns of Napoleon* (New York: MacMillan, 1966), pp. 133-201, particularly 145, 146-147, 150, 163.

²¹Maxims 2, 8, 16, 18, 36 and 63 in the collection by General Burnod (1827).

²²Baron de Jomini, *The Art of War* (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1862), pp. 70, 209-210 (for "surprises of armies") and 69, 217-223 (for "diversion"). See also Michael Howard, "Jomini and the Classical Tradition in Military Thought," in Michael Howard (editor), *The Theory and Practice of War* (New York: Praeger, 1966), pp. 3-20; and Crane Brinton, Gordon A. Craig and Felix Gilbert, "Jomini," in Earle (43), 77-92.

²³Gen. Carl von Clausewitz, *On War* (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Tribner, 1911), Book III, Ch. 9 ("The Surprise"), and Ch. 10 ("Stratagem") Book VII, Ch. 20 ("Diversion"). In general see Peter Paret, "Clausewitz and the Nineteenth century," in Michael Howard (editor), *The Theory and Practice of War* (New York: Praeger, 1966), pp. 21-41; and H. Rothfels, "Clausewitz," in Earle (43), 93-113.

its ubiquitous role: “Surprise lies at the foundation of all undertakings without exception.” He added that “there is a degree of stratagem, be it ever so small, which lies at the foundation of every attempt to surprise.” In developing these maxims Clausewitz produced some remarkable contributions toward a theory of surprise that have been entirely overlooked by his followers.²⁴ These points will be discussed below.

The Great War saw the introduction to warfare of one new technology and one new art that were immediately added to the arsenal of deception techniques: radio and camouflage.

The application of radio in the Western Front was quickly followed by interception services to solve enemy codes and ciphers and read their cryptograms or to make “traffic analyses” of those messages that could not be read. These techniques were soon being exploited by the enemy who could counter with false messages and misleading traffic. Henceforward, communications deception has been a standard—and major—part of stratagem and tactical ruses.²⁵

Camouflage (from the French *camoufler*, “to disguise”) was also first introduced in the Great War, mainly as a response to aerial reconnaissance. Previously, some armies had conventionally made effective use of nature for “cover and concealment.” Napoleon and other commanders made good use of terrain features to conceal their marches, night and fog were sometimes used to hide movement, and some armies adopted field-green, horizon blue, or khaki uniforms to provide less conspicuous targets in forest or desert. However, the practice of camouflage now permitted commanders to simulate harmless nature or dissimulate military artifacts at will. A regular camouflage service was established by the British Army by 1916 and the manufacture of special materials begun; and the French, German, Italian, and Austrian armies also developed their counterpart services during this period.²⁶

In sum, I have traced the “principle” of surprise—and, with it, stratagem—from antiquity through World War II. This survey has shown how it passed into virtual limbo during the period 1800-1939, only to be restored to practice during World War II. Now, before leaving this historical survey of doctrine, I will briefly note the continuing high status of surprise in the contemporary theories of nuclear, limited, and guerrilla warfare.

The revolutionary innovation of nuclear weapons brought almost immediate and urgent attention to the problem of surprise nuclear attack.²⁷ Such attack, if carried out on the sudden and large scale that technology permitted, seemed to promise total, immediate, low cost victory to the party striking the first blow. Theory recognized that deterrence of this threat depended on possession of a counter-blow capability. In practice this meant developing a system allowing

²⁴Except Erfurth (38/43).

²⁵Specifically, the Germans had begun to use false traffic against the French as early as 1916, and Allenby used false traffic against the Germans and Turks in Palestine in 1917 and 1918. See Kahn (67), 307, 333.

²⁶Cyril Falls, *The Art of War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1961), pp. 118-120.

²⁷See, for example, Henry A. Kissinger, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Foreign Policy* (New York: Harper, 1957), pp. 214-219.

early warning, quick decision, and rapid weapon deployment. This type of system could either hope—as with NATO policy—to launch its counterblow under an incoming attack or—as with published Soviet doctrine—to preempt. This “balance of terror”²⁸ has now seemingly been stabilized by the development of virtually indestructible “second strike” weapon systems that more-or-less assure mutual deterrence.

While America and Britain and their NATO allies came increasingly to rely on their nuclear armory as a deterrent to both nuclear and conventional general war, Liddell Hart warned in 1950 of the potential dilemma posed by “limited war” (thereby reviving Clausewitz’ phrase), a local attack with conventional weapons for narrowly defined goals.²⁹ The potential threat became reality a few months later when the Korean War broke out; and the theory of local “limited war” was quickly evolved by W. W. Kaufmann (1954), B. Brodie (1954), W. Millis (1954), H. A. Kissinger (1955), and others³⁰ as a viable alternative to the contemporary official U.S. policy of “massive retaliation.”³¹ During the Presidential campaign in 1960, Senator Kennedy indicated his grasp and approval of the new “limited war” theory; and, although he mentioned Generals Taylor and Gavin as exponents, it is interesting that he did so in the context of a detailed and enthusiastic book review of Liddell Hart’s latest book:³²

I share Captain Hart’s judgement [that] responsible leaders in the West will not and should not deal with limited aggression by unlimited weapons whose use could only be mutually suicidal.

When, the next year, the Senator became President, the new concept of appropriate response became firm policy, and his new Defense Secretary, Robert S. McNamara, quickly began to build the means.³³

²⁸For example, Albert Wohlstetter, “The Delicate Balance of Terror,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 37 (January 1959), pp. 211-234.

²⁹B.H. Liddell Hart, *The Defence of the West* (London: Cassell, 1950), pp. 308-324. Inexplicably, Halperin’s survey overlooks this key work published on the eve of the Korean War. See Morton H. Halperin, *Limited War* (Cambridge, Mass.: Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1962), pp. 1-2.

³⁰Halperin (62), 2-14. See also Bibliography on *Limited War* (Department of the Army Pamphlet PAM 20-60, 1958).

³¹B.H. Liddell Hart, *Deterrent or Defense* (London: Stevens, 1960).

³²John F. Kennedy, review of Liddell Hart’s *Deterrent or Defense* in *Saturday Review*, Vol. 43, No. 36 (3 September 1960), pp. 17-18.

³³William W. Kaufmann, *The McNamara Strategy* (New York: Harper & Row, 1964).

3.1 The Ethics of Stratagem

Be frustrate all ye stratagems of Hell
And devilish machinations come to nought.
—Milton, *Paradise Regained* (1671),
Book I, Lines 180-181.

Force, and fraud, are in war the two cardinal virtues.
—Thomas Hobbes
Leviathan, (1651), i, 13.

We are not Duke Hsiang of Sung and have
no use for his stupid scruples about
benevolence, righteousness and morality in war.
—Mao Tse-tung,
On the Protracted War (1938), Sect. 83.

Is stratagem ethical? Are deception, or even surprise, ethically acceptable in war? That they are not is implicit in the apparently sincere moral condemnation heaped by Roosevelt and Hull upon the Japanese over their “sneak” descent upon Pearl Harbor or the similar outcry of Stalin and Molotov over Hitler’s deceitful surprise attack on the Soviet Union. Of course, the fact that Roosevelt and Stalin freely used these same techniques in retaliation suggests the existence of a double standard; and Stalin’s evident contemplation of preemption in 1941 virtually proves it.

The ethical problem of stratagem has been recognized since antiquity. But even the ancient Indians—who excelled in setting and practicing “humane ideals of warfare”³⁴ as late as the fourth century B.C.—could argue both cases. Thus the *Mahābhārata* epic has one hero quote even more ancient verse to silence contemporary moralizing and justify surprise attack and slaughter in the night, urging that the enemy should be struck even when he is tired, wounded, eating, sleeping, in flight, or confused by battle.³⁵ A similarly expedient view was taken by the contemporaneous Chinese military philosopher Sun Tzu and the general Wu Ch’i (c. 430 B.C.-381 B.C.).³⁶

Machiavelli urged the view that:³⁷

Although deceit is detestable in all other things, yet in the conduct of war it is laudable and honorable; and a commander who vanquishes an enemy by stratagem is equally praised with one who gains victory by force.

³⁴A.L. Basham, *The Wonder That Was India* (London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1954), p. 126.

³⁵Sarva Daman Singh, *Ancient Indian Warfare with Special Reference to the Vedic Period* (Leiden: Brill, 1965), p. 167.

³⁶*Wu Ch’i Ping Fa* [The military principles of Wu Ch’i], Chapt. II, Sect. 2, as translated in Appendix I (pp. 150-168) of Sun Tzu, *The Art of War* (Samuel B. Griffith, translator, New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), pp. 156-157.

³⁷Machiavelli, *Discourses*, Chapt. XL.

This, however, was a casuistical argument, as it ran counter to the *professed* (albeit seldom practiced) ethic of his own time.

In general, I find that while all major occidental and oriental military cultures assume stratagem to be somehow immoral, none have unilaterally forsworn it. Sheer expediency has always proved sufficient justification. The only cases where I have found stratagem banned are those involving tacit bilateral arms control of the type styled “rules of chivalry,” specifically in ancient India and medieval Europe.

A clear statement of the ethical dilemma was put by a 19th century British general:³⁸

We are bred up to feel it a disgrace even to succeed by falsehood; the word *spy* conveys something as repulsive as *slave*; we will keep hammering along with the conviction that honesty is the best policy, and that truth always wins in the long run. These pretty little sentiments do well for a child’s copybook, but a man who acts on them had better sheathe his sword forever.

A detailed argument is given by Milton in his heretical and suppressed *The Christian Doctrine*. He concludes by cautioning that falsehood should be defined in a specially qualified manner:³⁹

Falsehood is incurred when any one, from a dishonest motive, either perverts the truth, or utters what is false to one to whom it is his duty to speak the truth.

Among a number of other real situations, Milton also applies it to deception in war:⁴⁰

It is better therefore to say that stratagems, though coupled with falsehood, are lawful for the cause above assigned, namely, that where we are not under an obligation to speak the truth, there can be no reason why we should not, when occasion requires it, utter even what is false; nor do I perceive why this should be more allowable in war than in peace, especially in cases where, by an honest and beneficial kind of falsehood, we may be enabled to avert injury or danger from ourselves or our neighbor.

Thus, with notable exceptions, the weight of philosophical and religious authority generally justifies deception in warfare. However, regardless of how we judge the merits of the debate, the fact that it has been the subject of extended debate has, I suspect, had one significant consequence for the practice

³⁸Sir Garnet Wolseley, *Soldier’s Pocket-Book* (1869), as quoted by Robert Debs Heinl, Jr., *Dictionary of Military and Naval Quotations* (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute, 1966), p. 283.

³⁹Ioannis Miltoni, *De Doctrina Christiana* (ms. c. 1657), Book Two, Chapter XIII, in *The Works of John Milton*, Vol. 17 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1934), pp. 300-301. (C.R. Sumner translation.)

⁴⁰Milton, 302-303.

of stratagem. Labeled as somehow evil, disreputable, or cowardly, it is understandable that those officers nurtured on the 19th century code of the gentleman, would feel uneasy in using stratagem. Certainly, the tendency in the 19th and 20th century has been for the great majority of professional soldiers to either reject stratagem entirely or to avoid it by passing such an “unsoldierly” task to the limbo of the secret services along with psychological warfare, covert operations, and the other black arts. While there are very good rational arguments for placing deception planning and, particularly, operations under the intelligence (or counterespionage) staffs, I suspect that this psychological factor has been at least as effective in assuring that placement. Moreover, it has almost certainly inhibited the effective integration of stratagem with routine operations planning. I suspect, for example, that this might well prove to have been a contributing factor in the slow and still incomplete adoption of stratagem in U.S. military doctrine.

Notwithstanding the above arguments, if we *assume* stratagem to be an undesirable aspect of war, are any control measures possible? In other words, could stratagem be included in arms control or disarmament proposals as other than the subject of pious injunctions? An answer is not self-evident. However, we know from history that the deliberate suspension of the use of stratagem is indeed possible. Thus it was *voluntarily* foresworn during the Vedic Age in India and in the Middle Ages in Europe.⁴¹ The rarity of these cases does, however, strongly suggest that the conditions in which stratagem can be controlled may be very closely circumscribed. Moreover, both cited cases involved control through general acceptance of a code of chivalry. This suggests that the conditions for constraining stratagem perhaps require a distinctive pattern of social interaction, one involving understood obligations and trust to a degree not present in our time—even within nations much less between them.⁴²

3.2 Guerrilla

From antiquity to the present day, a seemingly quite distinct mode of warfare has been practiced parallel to the conventional form but, commonly, in direct physical conflict with it. This so-called guerrilla, unconventional, irregular, or small war differs from conventional warfare in many quite marked ways: force size, organizational form, political goals, strategy, tactics, and others. But unconventional warfare—particularly in its more viable and successful cases—shares at least five characteristics with the notably successful cases of conventional warfare described above: deception, surprise, mobility, flexibility, and an effective

⁴¹See the evidence in the first part of this chapter.

⁴²However, some remarkable local or brief periods of accommodation have sometimes been reached between enemies even during war. For example, the substantial chivalry in the Western Desert. See Desmond Young, *Rommel* (New York: Harper & Row, 1950), pp. 126-138. Also between the Chinese Nationalist guerrillas and local Japanese garrison troops, and—in the first two years of World War I—between the German and Allied airmen.

information (command net and intelligence) system.⁴³ This coincidence, cutting as it does right across what are perhaps the two most grossly different categories of warfare—conventional and unconventional—suggests the rough hypothesis that the five shared characteristics may embody highly general conditions for success. While such an hypothesis or, rather, hunch is probably amenable to definitive empirical proof by the method of systematic comparative case studies, it is beyond the scope of this paper. However, some preliminary research and theory does exist that supports this hypothesis. This literature will now be briefly outlined.

Aside from a neglected passage in Clausewitz,⁴⁴ there was no theoretical literature on unconventional warfare before the present century. Indeed it was only in the late 19th century that comparative case studies and preliminary efforts to classify this ancient form began. These efforts had some practical worth because of the high frequency of such combat in the Napoleonic, British colonial, and revolutionary wars of the late 18th and 19th Centuries. I think the first such effort was Colonel Callwell's textbook, *Small Wars* (from Spanish, *guerrilla*, "little war"), published for the British General Staff in 1896.⁴⁵ This landmark study recognized and stressed the importance to both guerrilla and counter-guerrilla of the factors of surprise, deception, mobility (if not, strictly speaking, manoeuvre), and intelligence. Next, in 1906, Lenin produced the first Marxist article on "Partisan Warfare," although it was merely an operational guide to organized terrorism, holdups, and robberies, and does not get into the matter of surprise much less deception.⁴⁶ Then, in 1926, ex-Colonel T. E. Lawrence published his memoirs of and reflections on the highly unconventional warfare he had waged in Arabia. In this remarkable book, Lawrence included a succinct but fully rounded theory of *guerrilla*.⁴⁷ Moreover, in doing so, he explicitly rejected as irrelevant the theories of Clausewitz, Von der Goltz, and Foch and turned back to the 18th century to credit Saxe and Cuibert for apposite contributions.

Although T. E. Lawrence never publicly extrapolated his general principles of guerrilla warfare to the conventional form, he did communicate them privately in 1928 to Liddell Hart.⁴⁸ It was then left to this most unorthodox and influential of all post-World War I military theoreticians to combine these two streams of theory and accommodate them to his general theory of the "indirect approach."⁴⁹

In the next section I will discuss Liddell Hart's "indirect approach" and

⁴³For this last point see my *Guerrilla Communications* (Cambridge, Mass.: Center for International Studies, M.I.T., 1967, multilithed).

⁴⁴His brief but perceptive comments on "people's war" are in Clausewitz, Book VI, Chapter 26 ("Arming the Nation"). I am indebted to Dr. Richard Barringer for this reference.

⁴⁵Colonel C.R. Callwell, *Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice* (3rd Edition, London: H.M.S.O., 1906), particularly Chapters 4, 6, 7, 8, 11, and 15.

⁴⁶The initial England translation of this obscure piece is V. I. Lenin, "Partisan Warfare," *Orbis*, Vol. 2, No. 2 (Summer 1958), pp. 194-208.

⁴⁷Lawrence (35), 188-196.

⁴⁸See Lawrence to Hart, letter dated 1928, in Hart (35), 381, and see also 127.

⁴⁹B.H. Liddell Hart, *The Decisive Wars of History* (London: Bell, 1929), pp. 116, 200-202.

relate it to my general findings on deception. However, before leaving the topic of *guerrilla*, it should be noted that the “principle” of surprise has received very high priority indeed in the theoretical writings of the leading Communist practitioners: Mao,⁵⁰ Guevara,⁵¹ and—but to remarkably lesser degree—Giap.⁵²

3.2.1 Simulated Guerrilla Warfare

A very specialized type of “total stratagem” has recently emerged—or, perhaps, only lately been recognized.⁵³ Both its theory and its application to three post-World War II insurrections have been formulated by Professor Ernst Halperin to whom I owe the concept and most references in the following summary statement.⁵⁴ This remarkable operational form stands somewhere near the furthest reach of political military bluff. Halperin terms it “token insurgency,” which suggests its quality of simulated insurrection or psychological attack. It is a technique for insurrection⁵⁵ that substitutes disinformation for military force or organizational strength in order to induce cracks at the *top* of the existing regime. The disinformation campaign is designed to grossly exaggerate the insurgent’s token military force and/or organizational strength to make it seem to be a full-blown rising. By thus selectively jamming and misleading the enemy regime, the technique aims to provoke such clearly inappropriate responses to its shadowy foe that the Government panics and becomes demoralized and rapidly loses the backing of its key supporters—individuals, political-military cliques, and socio-economic groupings.

An essential adjunct of this stratagem is that the insurgents, as their second overt act, monopolize or selectively manipulate the public and official (particularly military) communications of the target regime. They must do this for reasons of both security and deception. That is, they must forestall premature disclosure of the militarily impotent nature of their “rising” and they must exacerbate the “fog of war” engulfing the opposing leadership.

Although Halperin has explicitly identified only three historical examples of “token insurgency” (Guatemala in 1954, Cuba in 1958, and the Bay of Pigs in 1961), others may exist. For example, as Halperin himself points out, in 1931 the prominent Italian Fascist journalist, Malaparte, attributed the invention and use of a similar method (the seizure of the Government’s communications) to Trot-

⁵⁰Mao Tse-tung, *On the Protracted War* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1954), paragraph 83 (pp. 97-100).

⁵¹Che Guevara, *Guerrilla Warfare* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1961), pp. 19, 25, 26.

⁵²General Vo Nguyen Giap, *People’s War, People’s Army* (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1961), pp. 48, 172.

⁵³The general type of “total stratagem” is described in Chapter 6.

⁵⁴Halperin, a Visiting Professor of Political Science at M.I.T., is now completing an article on this subject and is planning monographic treatment. For the record, his hypothesis was first stated in nurtured form in January 1969 and his term “token insurgency” coined during our conversation on 18 February.

⁵⁵At least, this particular technique seems limited to insurrectionary situations. It is certainly not applicable to the classical *coup d’état*, which involves direct and immediate replacement at the top.

sky in effecting the Bolshevik takeover in Petrograd in 1917.⁵⁶ Many elements of “token insurgency” also appear in the special mode of nonviolent social revolt now termed “civilian defense,” particularly the broad class of method identified as “non-violent intervention” by Gene Sharp, although Dr. Sharp does not distinguish simulated insurrection as a peripheral sub-type.⁵⁷ Liddell Hart hits even nearer this target in his recent discussion on “non-violent resistance,”⁵⁸ but he too just misses specific consideration of the subtle mix of violence, simulated violence, and sham threat of violence comprising token insurgency as it might appear in either indigenously generated resistance movements or some externally stimulated forms of “camouflaged war.” Reexamination of such cases for their psywar, communications, and possible deception factors might disclose additional instances of token insurgency.

Halperin’s theory can perhaps be most readily understood by a brief look at the three cases he has already identified. Note that while his model stands on its own merits as a plausible method for insurrection, the historical examples are identified only by inferential hypothesis. That is, until the actual operational plans are published by the governments concerned, we can only infer them from the incomplete, scattered, and often contradictory evidence that has emerged. However, as Halperin’s hypothesis does both account for all the controversial interpretations⁵⁹ of these cases, Occam’s Razor requires us to acknowledge it as, by far, the most elegant explanation.

The first identified application of “token insurgency” was the CIA’s overthrow of the Guatemalan Government of President Jacobo Arbenz Guzman in 1954.⁶⁰ This primitive but successful prototype was seemingly the invention of Frank Wisner, the then senior CIA official in charge of the operation to subvert President Arbenz.⁶¹ Wisner’s unique stratagem was to break Arbenz’ will by convincing him that an irresistible *U.S.-backed* insurgent force had invaded

⁵⁶Curzio Malaparte (pseudonym of Kurt Suckert), *Coup d’Etat: The Technique of Revolution* (New York: Dutton, 1932). The original (French) edition appeared in 1931.

⁵⁷Gene Sharp, “The Technique of Non-violent Action,” in Adam Roberts (Ed.), *The Strategy of Civilian Defense* (London: Faber and Faber, 1967), pp. 87-105, particularly p. 90.

⁵⁸B.H. Liddell Hart, “Lessons from Resistance Movements—Guerrilla and Non-violent,” in *ibid.*, pp. 195-211.

⁵⁹Such, for example, as those collated but unresolved by Leiss and Bloomfield (67), for the Bay of Pigs case.

⁶⁰We still know too few details of the unsuccessful Anglo-American (i.e., S.I.S. and CIA) effort to subvert the Albanian Government by guerrilla warfare in 1950 to know if that catastrophe was a trial-run of “token insurgency.” If so, the technique was probably a British invention. In either case, the operation’s premature failure was due to the fact that the British co-manager was the Russian agent, Philby.

⁶¹Frank Gardner Wisner (1909-1965) was then DDP, the CIA Deputy Director heading the Plans Division, having succeeded Allen Dulles in that position in 1951. Earlier he had been with OSS as mission chief in Istanbul during the war and in Germany afterwards. Then, after a brief return to his law practice, he joined the CIA in 1948. He was succeeded as head of Plans in 1958 by Richard Bissell and moved to London as Station Chief there from 1959 until his resignation and return to law practice in 1962. In 1965 he committed suicide by shotgun. See his obituary in *The New York Times*, 30 October 1965, p. 35, and biographical references in David Wise and Thomas B. Ross, *The Invisible Government* (New York: Random House, 1964), index.

and was about to topple his régime. The necessary stage “army” was provided by an ill-trained rabble of some 150 Guatemalan émigrés nominally led by the CIA’s protégé, the incompetent Colonel Carlos Castillo-Arenas. (Critics of the CIA have missed the point that lack of training and leadership qualities were irrelevant to the mission of this band.) The fact of U.S. backing was made plain by a handful of U.S. war-surplus pilots and planes and the colorful semi-public maneuverings of Ambassador John Puerifoy. Simultaneously, the legal fiction of U.S. non-involvement was preserved by the translucent cover of “volunteer” pilots flying planes “sold” to the fully cooperative Nicaraguan Government while Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge boldly lied to the UN Security Council on D+2 that:⁶² “...the situation does not involve aggression but is a revolt of Guatemalans against Guatemalans” and categorically denied U.S. support of the rebels.⁶³

Amidst a fanfare of publicity, the insurgent band “invaded” on 18 June, but immediately bivouacked just six miles across the Nicaraguan border. Yet a calculated propaganda campaign had the world’s press advancing the insurgents forward to success after success. To hide the sham of this “invasion” two essential steps were taken. First, all journalists were excluded from the front; and, second, the radio communications of the 7,000-man Guatemalan Army were monitored and false messages fed back into the channels. Meanwhile the only military acts were also primarily psychological—sweeps over the capital by the CIA planes, which dropped only leaflets on D-day but soon added some noisy but light and selective bombing and strafing. (An effort to knock out the pro-Arbenz radio tower failed.⁶⁴)

The effect of this giant hoax was to so confuse or, rather, selectively mislead President Arbenz that he was unable to make appropriate much less effective decisions. Moreover, those few and belated decisions he did take were dysfunctional, serving only to discredit him with the general public, the middle class, and the army. On 27 June, after 9 days of watching their panicked President, the army finally moved on its own—to force Arbenz’ resignation and seek a solution acceptable to the U.S.

The second case is particularly astonishing for it is nothing less than the overthrow of President Batista of Cuba during 1958, the innovative stratagem-

⁶²*New York Times*, 21 June 1954, p. 3, col. 4. The State Department had earlier made similar disavowal of U.S. involvement. See *New York Times*, 20 June 1954, p. 1.

⁶³This brilliant technique of translucent cover has been widely used with complete success to gain full public credit while avoiding embarrassing international legal complications. The technique was invented by Lenin in the 1920’s, perfected by Stalin in his covert interventions in the Spanish Civil War and the Korean War, and revived by his successors in the Vietnam War. Similar benefits were reaped through the same technique by the German Condor Legion and the Italian submarines that aided Franco’s insurgents during the Spanish Civil War. The Chinese Communists also got away with this thin ruse in the Korean War. The data is discussed in my draft-studies *Soviet and Chinese Clandestine Arms Aid* (1965), *Soviet Intervention in the Korean War* (1967) and *Soviet Intervention in the Spanish Civil War* (1966), as well as my unpublished paper “Submarines as Weapons of Covert Intervention in Limited War,” (1966).

⁶⁴Most of the relevant data is scattered through the account by Wise and Ross (64), Chapter 11, although these authors quite miss their significance.

tist being Dr. Fidel Castro himself.

On 15 November 1956 Castro had publicly announced he would invade Cuba before the year's end. Colonel Alberto Bayo,⁶⁵ the Spanish Civil War practitioner of guerrilla and amphibious warfare and instructor of Castro and Che Guevara, remonstrated:⁶⁶

Bayo Don't you know that a cardinal military principle is to keep your intentions secret from your enemy?

Castro You taught me that, but in this case I want everyone in Cuba to know I am coming. I want them to have faith in the 26th of July Movement. It is a peculiarity all my own although I know that militarily it might be harmful. It is psychological warfare.

This remarkable statement—as well as later reflections by Castro—show that Castro has an intuitive rather than theoretical understanding of the means of his insurrection. It also exemplifies the barriers of preconception that balk understanding of deception operations. Thus Bayo, the “conventionally” minded expert on unconventional operations, failed to grasp the nature of either token insurrection or even of strategic surprise, mistaking surprise of intention and time for surprise of place, strength, and style; and Castro had let Bayo mislead him on this point of theory. Fortunately for the Cuban Revolution and unhappily for the recent try in Bolivia, Castro heeded his psycho-political intuition while Guevara was fascinated by guerrilla technique.⁶⁷ But then Guevara had graduated at the head of Bayo's class of 1956, while Castro had been rated a rather indifferent student.⁶⁸

Ten days later Castro and his 82-man expeditionary force sailed from Mexico on *Granma*, landing belatedly on Cuba on 2 December. They lost their communications gear, the strictly military phase aborted, and—lacking any control over mass media—Castro was unable to disprove Batista's claim that he and most of his band had been killed immediately after landing, a claim credited and passed on by the United Press and *The New York Times*. Castro was thus forced to improvise a secure base in the Sierra Maestra with the dozen survivors of the landing. The essential public communications were not restored for two months until Castro arranged to be interviewed by *The New York Times* whose Herbert L. Matthews published his crucial photo-story on 27 February 1957.⁶⁹ Henceforward it was the embarrassing news of Castro's continuing survival in the countryside interacting with urban agitation that eventually brought Batista down, not the military pinpricks of Guevara and the other small bands of guerrillas. The guerrilla activities were necessary, but for their mythological support of what was essentially a psychological attack. Only in that sense did Castro's

⁶⁵For biographical information on Bayo see my *Guerrillas in the Spanish Civil War* (draft, 1966).

⁶⁶Jules Dubois, *Fidel Castro* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1959), p. 138.

⁶⁷I also owe to Halperin this distinction between Castro and Guevara.

⁶⁸Dubois (59).

⁶⁹Phillips (59), 289-290, 298-299.

final force of one thousand or so guerrillas “defeat” the more than 15,000 regulars of Batista. In reality, Batista had simply lost the support of all his backers: from the U.S., through the Cuban middle class, to his own army.

The third and most recent case of simulated insurrection identified by Professor Halperin is that of the Bay of Pigs—the CIA’s Operation PLUTO. In that case the final plan (not the emasculated improvisation superimposed by President Kennedy) was that of Richard M.-Bissell, Jr.,⁷⁰ the CIA’s DDP (Deputy Director for Plans) who was then in charge of PLUTO. Bissell’s scenario was an extension of Wisner’s for Guatemala. It was designed to deceive Castro, his senior chiefs, and the Cuban populace that a strong U.S.-supported force of Cuban insurgents had landed to trigger an irresistible insurrection. This plan is described in detail separately in the case study appendix, below.⁷¹ In essence, it was simply a more elaborate and sophisticated replication of the Guatemalan subversion.

⁷⁰Richard M. Bissell, Jr., (1909-). Took Ph.D. in Economics at Yale in 1939. Taught economics at Yale and M.I.T. With War Shipping Administration in WW II. Joined Marshall Plan in 1948, rising to become Acting Administrator. Joined CIA in 1954 as Special Assistant to the Director. Succeeded Wisner as DDP in 1959, remaining in that position until 1962 when eased out by President Kennedy. Subsequently he has served in senior executive posts with the Institute for Defense Analyses, 1962-1964, and (since 1964) the United Aircraft Corporation.

⁷¹See Case A65.

3.3 The “Indirect Approach” in Strategy

“By indirections find directions out.”
—*Hamlet*, Act II, Scene I.

“Ruses . . . are detours which often lead
more surely to the objective than the
wide road which goes straight ahead.”
—Frederick the Great,
Instructions for His Generals (1747), ix.

“Never attack where the enemy expects you
to come. It is much better to go over
difficult ground where you are not
expected than it is over good ground
where you are expected.”
—*Patton* (47), 347.

“One should not forget . . . that the earth
is round and that ‘every road leads to Rome.’ ”
—Waldemar Erfurth,
Überraschung im Kriege (1938)

Captain B. H. Liddell Hart and many other soldiers returned with deep-felt revulsion from the monstrous slaughter of the Western Front. While many British intellectuals adopted such noble pacifisms as the Oxford Movement to forestall the predicted horrors of another Great War, Liddell Hart-like Fuller and Lawrence and Wavell and Von Seeckt and MacArthur—believed that, as further war was probable if not inevitable, the wise course was to reform it. Accordingly, these men sought fervently to harness the modern technological means of war, making those means once again responsive to the political goals that unleash them. This search led Liddell Hart into a profound reappraisal of military history and theory.⁷²

Although he was a crusader driven by a moral and emotional demon, Liddell Hart adopted a systematic research method that led in most of his more than thirty books to sharply focussed yet compellingly documented conclusions. Of course, most of his conclusions are found scattered through the writings of Sun Tzu, Saxe, Frederick the Great, Sherman, and Henderson—he drew freely upon their ideas. And similar conclusions have been expressed by such contemporaries as Lawrence, Fuller, Wavell, DeGaulle, Guderian, Rommel, MacArthur, Beaufre, Yadin, and Dayan—they drew upon each other, although, most often, Liddell Hart supplied the general theory while they fed back new case material for his research mill.

If, in this section on deception, I seem to rely over-much on Liddell Hart, it is because he is the single most influential modern military theoretician, he

⁷²Captain Liddell Hart, *Memoirs*, Vol. I (London: Cassell, 1965).

has given both the broadest and most detailed treatment of his chosen topics, he yields the clearest expression of his conclusions, and, most important, he has gone further than the others toward integrating his separate findings and conclusions in a systematic theory.

What is Liddell Hart's research method? It is the simple but painstaking one of the comparative case study. For his first comprehensive study he selected the biographies of the more successful commanders, from Hannibal to Allenby. He intentionally biased his sample by excluding (or, rather, setting aside for contrast) all commanders such as Emperor Napoleon (as distinguished from the younger General Bonaparte), Haig, or Foch whose indubitable successes were bought with heavy casualties. In other words, he was seeking those elements of strategy associated with victory at low cost in human life. Using this filter of history, he found not only that the order of priority of the most widely accepted military principles was drastically reshuffled but that some hallowed principles disappeared altogether. This biographical work reached its first plateau in 1927 with the publication of his *Great Captains Unveiled*. Here, however, his major findings were not generalized, but left implicit as themes running through his exposition of the particular examples.

Liddell Hart then turned his comparative case study method to specific campaigns and achieved the first comprehensive formulation of his general theory in 1929 with the publication of his *The Decisive Wars of History*.⁷³ It was in this book that he introduced and vigorously advocated his central concept of the "indirect approach." As codified by Liddell Hart, this theory has found wide acceptance in military doctrine (particularly the Nazi German and Israeli) and among leading practitioners (Guderian, Dorman-Smith, Yadin, Dayan, probably MacArthur, etc.).⁷⁴ However, it is curious that it has not been refined, much less enlarged, by any subsequent military theoreticians. Indeed, while many have engaged Liddell Hart in polemic over specific details (such as his pre-World War II emphasis on the defense over the offense) none have attempted a frontal assault on the main body of his theory. Instead, such writers as Cyril Falls simply ignore the target—a reduction of the "indirect approach" to absurdity.

Hart built his argument on a "survey" of "more than" 280 campaigns, covering the period from antiquity up to 1914. These cases were those found by examining 30 wars—12 ancient and 18 modern. (The prodigious research was possible for Hart only because he was the Military Editor for the *Encyclopedia Britannica*.) His main finding was striking: "In only six of these [280] campaigns . . . did a decisive result follow a plan of direct strategic approach to the main army of the enemy."⁷⁵ Moreover, even these six successful applications—

⁷³B.H. Liddell Hart, *The Decisive Wars of History: A Study in Strategy* (London: Bell, 1929), pp. 141-158. Enlarged and reissued in 1954 as *Strategy: The Indirect Approach* (New York: Praeger, 1954), pp. 161-164, 333-372.

⁷⁴Jay Luvaas, *The Education of an Army* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), pp. 376-424; and Robin Higham, *The Military Intellectuals in Britain, 1918-1939* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1966), pp. 46-49, 82-116.

⁷⁵Liddell Hart (54), 161-164. Unfortunately the original list of wars and campaigns and their assigned characteristics as judged by Liddell Hart has never been published. Consequently it is not possible to systematically critique his method or conclusions. For example, he does not

2 ancient and 4 modern—of the neo-Clausewitzian imperative, were all partly affected by unintended indirectness. Conversely, victory invariably followed all cases where an indirect strategy was employed. Although he does not report his statistics on this plus side of the ledger, he cites 28 specific examples—9 ancient and 19 modern—out of a “large number.” He adds that the remaining cases included “numerous border-line campaigns in which the indirectness or its effect are clearly established.” He concludes:⁷⁶

This high proportion of history’s decisive campaigns, the significance of which is enhanced by the comparative rarity of the direct approach, enforces the conclusion that the indirect is by far the most hopeful and economic form of strategy.

Moreover, Liddell Hart found that the relationship of ineffectiveness/effectiveness with direct/indirect strategies matched so closely along their scales that it was almost a general rule that *whatever the attendant circumstances*, the direct approach should be avoided and an indirect approach sought. Thus whenever otherwise successful commanders or armies have switched to a direct approach they more often than not succeed only in blotting their record. Conversely, rather than risk a superficially tempting direct approach the outstandingly successful commander will choose even the most hazardous indirect course, even if this forces him to cross forbidding terrain, to use only a fraction of his force, or even cut himself loose from his lines of supply.

Liddell Hart also largely succeeds in integrating into his theory two other findings stressed by his intellectual forbears. First, he shows that the indirect approach applies with full force to the defensive as well as the offensive.⁷⁷ Secondly he shows that the essence of the indirect approach is psychological, quoting Lenin with approval to the effect that:⁷⁸

The soundest strategy in war is to postpone operations until the moral disintegration of the enemy renders the delivery of the mortal blow both possible and easy.

even report the total of cases where “decisive results” flowed from use of the “indirect strategic approach.” Thus the result of his statistics—as well as his categorical definitions—remains open to question.

⁷⁶Liddell Hart (54), 162-163.

⁷⁷Liddell Hart (54), 163.

⁷⁸Liddell Hart (54), 163, 164.

3.4 Surprise and “The Principles of War”

“The fundamental principle of the
magician’s art [is] misdirection.”
—*Blackstone the Magician*⁷⁹

From the time of Sun Tzu to the most recent U.S. Army Field Manual, military writers have sought to encompass the art of war in a short set of so-called “principles of war.” However these are not presented as principles in the sense that they set forth causes and effects but only that they are somehow basic abstractions that the planner or the commander should always keep in mind. In other words they are, in fact, maxims rather than principles in their philosophic sense.⁸⁰ Nevertheless, they are of great value because—as the list of Principles of Wars of each individual compiler represents his thoughtful judgment of the most relevant factors and, indeed, often by their rank order—we can easily determine the status accorded surprise in doctrine and theory across time.

Table 3.1 summarizes in a crude form the changing status of surprise among the principles of war.

Inspection of the table shows several relevant points. First, surprise is explicitly identified as a principle of war by 18 of the 24 theoreticians. One author (Jomini, 1836), subsumes surprise in his category of “diversion.” Only five authors exclude surprise from their lists. Of these five, all but one simply do not consider surprise relevant to the art or science of war. The exception is Mao Tse-tung (1938) who, while not listing surprise as a principle, does consider it a very important element.

Second, we see that all four authors who relegate surprise to military limbo fall in the period from 1858 to 1920. As this period closely coincides with that in which stratagem had disappeared or sharply down-graded in both military theory and practice, the table provides some weak but independent confirmation of the anecdotal impression that deception has been conceptually tied to the notion of surprise. Further analysis, which surveyed a more complete list of theoreticians and official manuals, would more rigorously test this finding.⁸¹

Third, if we view the rank order of priority in which surprise is placed, we find that while only one of the 24 authorities examined gives it first (or second) place, no less than 8 have placed it third. Moreover, it is the U.S. authorities who from the 19th century to 1968 have consistently gone against the international trend by rating surprise toward the bottom of their scales.

⁷⁹Harry Blackstone, *Blackstone’s Secrets of Magic* (Garden City, N.Y.: Garden City Books, 1958), p. 10.

⁸⁰Henry C. Eccles, *Military Concepts and Philosophy* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1965), pp. 108-113.

⁸¹See Chapters I and III.

Theoretician	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Sun Tzu, 4th Cent. BC [1, 2]	Objective	Offensive	Surprise	Concentration	Mobility	Coordination			
Vegetius, ca. 390 AD [1]	Mobility	Security	S	Offensive					
Saxe, 1757 [2]	Mobility	Morale	Security	S					
Napoleon, 1822 [2]	Objective	Offensive	Mass	Movement	S	Security			
Clausewitz, 1832 [1, 2]	Objective	Offensive	Concentration	Economy of Force	Mobility	S			
Jomini, 1836 [1]	Objective	Movement	Concentration	Offensive	Diversion				
P. L. MacDougall, 1858 [2]	Mass	Direction							
N.B. Forrest, 1864 [2]	Mass	Direction	Rapidity	Offensive					
Fuller, 1912 [2]	Objective	Mass	Offensive	Security	S	Movement			
Stalin, 1918-1947 [4]	Stability of the Rear	Morale	Quality and Quantity	Armament	Organizing Ability of Commander	S			
Foch, 1918 [1]	Offensive	Economy of Force	Freedom of Action	Free Disposal of Forces	Security				
C.V.F. Townshend, 1920 [2]	Objective	Economy of Force	Mass	Offensive	Direction	Security			
US War Dept. Training Regs. 1921 [2]	Objective	Offensive	Mass	Economy of Force	Movement	S	Security	Simplicity	Cooperation
Fuller, 1925 [2]	Direction	Offensive	S	Concentration	Distribution	Security	Mobility	Endurance	Determination
Liddell Hart, 1929 [1]	Objective	Movement	S						
US Command & Staff School 1936 [2]	Offensive	Concentration	Economy of Force	Mobility	S	Security	Cooperation		
Mao, 1938 [1]	Political Objective	Mobility	Offensive	Defensive	Concentration	(S)			
US Army FM 100-5, 1941, 1944 [1]	Objective	Simplicity	Unity of Command	Offensive	Concentration of Superior Force	S	Security		
Cyril Falls, c. 1945 [2]	Economy of Force	Protection	S	Aggressive Recon.	Maintenance of the Aim				
Liddell Hart, 1954(-1967)[1]	Alternative Objectives	Movement	S						
Giap, 1960 [1, 3]	Political Objective	Speed	S	Morale	Security	Cooperation			
Guevara, 1960 [1]	Objective	Mobility	S						
Montgomery, 1968 [1]	S	Concentration of Effort	Cooperation of all Arms	Control	Simplicity	Speed of Action	The Initiative		
US Army FM 100-5, 1962 (-1968) [1]	Objective	Offensive	Mass	Economy of Force	Maneuver	Unity of Command	Security	S	Simplicity

Table 3.1: Principles of War, c350BC to AD1968. Priority in ascending order. Notes.
 [1] Compiled by me from the authors own published works. [2] Willoughby (39), 25-44.
 [3] Graham (67), 74-78. [4] Garthoff (53), 34.

Chapter 4

A THEORY OF STRATAGEM

“Gentlemen, I notice that there
are always three courses open
to the enemy, and that he usually
takes the fourth.”
—The Elder Von Moltke

This chapter presents my preliminary formulation of a general theory of stratagem. Its elements are the alternative goals or objectives of the protagonist, the alternative expectations of the victim, and the technique—stratagem—by which the former can be designed and the latter manipulated to yield surprise. The exposition will proceed in that order, from objectives to expectations to manipulation.

4.1 Alternative Objectives and Alternative Expectations

Liddell Hart’s theory of the “indirect approach” has successfully integrated the principle of mobility with that of surprise and also stresses the importance of deception in attaining surprise. But it leaves hanging the precise manner in which deception planning fits his theory. He abandons the argument at just the point where he might have shown how deception serves surprise. It is unfortunate that Liddell Hart did not press his analysis a step further, because I am inclined to believe he then would have given an operationally useful guide to deception planning. It seems immanent in what he has already written. I will now make it explicit.

Deception is a psychological notion. As such it falls within the set of military “principles” that includes surprise, determination or morale, endurance, psychological warfare, and—in part—security. Conversely, it falls outside the set

of “principles” that includes objective, mass, direction, offensive, economy of force, concentration, rapidity, mobility, distribution, etc., etc. *These latter concepts of military theory are conventionally defined in terms of Euclidian geometry or Newtonian physics. As such they are measurable and mappable.* They readily fit the broad academic subjects of tactics, logistics, ballistics, and topography. Consequently they can be and are successfully taught in all military schools and barracks, presented in organizational charts, vectored maps, tables of equipment, and similar quantitative or representational models.

It is much more difficult to find suitable heuristic models for deception, precisely because deception is not made of concrete elements but is, rather, composed of intangibles that cannot be directly measured or mapped. Some model appropriate to psychological processes is needed. Of the several types available, I have chosen to construct a decision-making model, taking as my point of entry Liddell Hart’s concept of “alternative objectives.”

General Sherman put it that the trick is to place the victim on the “horns of a dilemma”¹ and then impale him on the one of your choosing.² How is this done?

Ideally, *the strategist should plan his campaign so that each stage offers him at least two viable goals.* This notion of alternatives was first expressed in the dictum of Pierre Joseph Bourcet (1700-1780):³

Every plan of campaign ought to have several branches and to have been so well thought out that one or other of the said branches cannot fail of success.

The young General Bonaparte apparently drew on Bourcet’s writings, of which he was an avid student, for his own emphasis on alternative plans. He similarly advised the commander to “prepare his plan in two modes.”⁴

With both Bourcet and Bonaparte in mind, Liddell Hart rephrased the maxim (quoted approvingly by Major-General Yigal Yadin):⁵

A plan, like a tree, must have branches if it is to bear fruit. A plan with a single aim is apt to prove a barren pole.

This concept of “alternative objectives”⁶—adumbrated by Bourcet and Sherman and formalized by Liddell Hart—stands in direct opposition to the hallowed

¹Sherman to Grant, letter dated 20 September 1864, in William T. Sherman, *Memoirs* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1957), p. 115. See also B.H. Liddell Hart, *Sherman* (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1929), pp. 315-316.

²Although Liddell Hart modestly credits Sherman with this consequent forced-choice, the explicit statement of the concept is original with Liddell Hart. Sherman only very ambiguously implies it. He had not fully understood his own insight.

³P. de Bourcet, *Mémoires historiques sur la guerre... 1757-1762* (Paris: 1792), p. 88, as quoted by Hart (35), 92.

⁴As quoted by Hart (35), 92.

⁵Hart (54), 344, and also 388. He first stated this maxim in 1932.

⁶This concept (and the term “alternative objectives”) was introduced by B.H. Liddell Hart in his *The British Way in Warfare* (London: 1932). See also Liddell Hart (54), 343-344; and Liddell Hart, *Memoirs*, Vol. I (1965), pp. 166-168.

principle “maintenance of the objective.” Liddell Hart put it this way:⁷

...to insure reaching an objective *one should have alternative objectives*. ... For if the enemy is certain as to your point of aim he has the best possible chance of guarding himself—and blunting your weapon. If, on the other hand, you take a line that threatens alternative objectives, you distract his mind and forces.

(What, I wonder, is the origin of the systematic search for “options” introduced by President J.F. Kennedy as a routine foreign policy and military decision-making procedure in the U.S. Government?).⁸

This discussion in the literature, insightful as it is, fails however to heed Wellington’s injunction to peer on “the other side of the hill.” The principle of alternative goals is discussed only as a problem in decision-making for the protagonist. Ignored, or rather taken too much for granted, is the problem of ambiguous or alternative perception of intentions as viewed by the victim. This view goes to the heart of the problem because it is the misperceptions of the victim that provide both the eventual surprise and the prerequisite for the protagonist’s stratagem. Therefore, the hopeful deceiver should recognize that surprise is itself nothing more nor less than the victim’s own wrong pick among alternatives. It is only the fact that this choice is often merely implicit in the situation rather than an explicit or conscious choosing that makes it easy to overlook its own decision-making character.

The enemy’s choice may, of course, be left entirely to chance. In that case the probabilities of his anticipating the real objective of the attack are directly related to the number of alternatives he perceives as equally viable: 1 out of 1, or certainty, in the case of a single forced-choice; 1 out of 2, or odds even, where two alternatives exist; 1 out of 3 with 3 options open; and so forth. That is, the larger the number of perceived alternatives, the greater the chance of the enemy making a wrong guess and hence being surprised without stratagem. The mathematical properties of this simple arithmetic progression are, therefore, quite uninteresting *except* at the first stage where the quantum jump from a probability of 1.0 to one of 0.5 is simultaneously a qualitative leap from certainty to merely even odds.

In other words, by pursuing only a single, direct, and most obvious strategy or course of action, the planner forfeits surprise and, consequently, delivers his fate ineluctably to the vagaries of battle and his army’s ability to buck its way forward by overwhelming superiority of force (hence the “magical” ratio of three attackers to one defender), skill (including more effective training, materiel, or tactics), or sheer *élan*. Yet this was precisely the situation in the overwhelming majority of World War I battles and, indeed, in the majority of all battles

⁷Liddell Hart (32), as quoted in Liddell Hart, I (65), 167.

⁸If the adjective systematic is stressed in this question, the answer is, perhaps, Robert S. McNamara who brought this style from business administration into the Department of Defense. See William W. Kaufmann, *The McNamara Strategy* (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), pp. 44-45, 47-101. Unfortunately, no answer to this question is given in the recent books by the Kennedy “men”: Sorensen, Schlesinger, Fay, or even Hilsman.

since then. *My sampling procedures do not permit any more exact statement of the proportions than this impressionistic one. However, the data does exist that would enable such a determination.* Such has been the tyranny of the misunderstanding of Clausewitz' principle of "the objective" –amply aided by failure of imagination—that most battles since 1914 have been planned and launched with but a single objective or goal in mind. Any general who intends surprise in such a circumstance has only one thin hope: that his intended victim will somehow unilaterally fail to perceive the obviousness of the chosen objective and the unambiguous signals filtering through the almost inevitably imperfect screen of security. If it were simply a matter of the former, the general would have some cause for optimism. What may seem an obvious goal to one man can easily be overlooked by his opponent. It is very common to find mutual misperception and misunderstanding of motives, intentions, and goals—even in situations where ostensibly good communications exist between the parties.⁹ This possible cause of surprise was explicitly recognized by both Hitler¹⁰ and Churchill in its extreme form, where the protagonist chooses his goal for irrational reasons. Thus, Churchill, in reflecting on Japan's decision to attack Pearl Harbor, observed that: "Madness is . . . an affliction which in war carries with it the advantage of surprise."¹¹

Surprises that result from sheer misunderstanding do occur and, I suppose, with increasing frequency as one moves down the scale of operations from those of grand strategy to those of small-unit battle tactics, where less intercommunication and greater speed combine to favor surprise, as Clausewitz first argued. However, the possibility of surprise through misunderstanding diminishes nearly to the vanishing point as one considers the more elaborate strategic operations. There are several factors contributing to this outcome, but by far the most important is that the victim's information receptors (including his intelligence services) will usually detect at least some indication of the attacker's objective. The sheer size—i.e., large number of visible activities and witting individuals—and general slow preparation of a strategic operation makes perfect security a will-'o-the-wisp.

On the other hand, if the planner can see or develop a valid or even merely plausible second, or alternative, line of operations, he can then effectively employ the whole range of stratagems to mislead and confound his enemy—at least halving the effectiveness of his enemy's countermeasures and at best gaining the enemy's unwitting cooperation in contriving his own destruction. There is an almost total qualitative difference between these two types of strategic approach to problem solving. They differ in the style of planning, in the nature or significance of the enemy's responses, and in the appropriate course of action. Moreover, the historical evidence demonstrates that these two strategic types

⁹This problem of mutual misperception of goals and intentions in political-military situations is now well-documented in the research literature. Particularly relevant are the findings from World War I by Robert North and his colleagues at Stanford University and the anecdotal material that emerges during political-military gaming.

¹⁰I have given the Hitler statement as the epigraph heading Case A36.

¹¹Churchill, III (50), 603. His italics.

also differ sharply in terms of cost-effectiveness. If the planner adds more options he will affect only this quantitative aspect. Additional options do enlarge the planner's freedom of action and increase his chances for success at low cost; however, these advantages increase at an ever diminishing rate as the number of options are increased one-by-one. For example, tripling the number of plausible options from three to nine will require *at least* triple the initial investment in intellectual effort (man hours of planning), communications to the enemy (number of outgoing messages), and camouflage (number and size of dummy installations, troop demonstrations, etc.). Yet such a tripling of options brings only a marginal increase in the chances of the victim missing the real choice. Indeed, mere multiplication of alternatives is neither the most efficient nor the most effective form of stratagem. At best, it only makes the enemy uncertain and indecisive. While that state will often be sufficient to insure surprise and success, the ultimate goal of stratagem is to make the enemy quite certain, very decisive, *and wrong*.

I will interrupt at this point, before describing the technique of deception, to introduce two important additional concepts. These are the relationship between surprise and the strategic-tactical dimension and the effect on surprise of crisis and mobility.

Clausewitz added one original refinement toward a theory of surprise. It is an important and, I think, valid one. He asserts that surprise is "much more at home" in the realm of tactics than it is with strategy. Clausewitz argues that this is true because tactics, being intrinsically more rapid in their manifestation and more confined in space are both easier to conduct and more likely to prove successful, while strategic surprise "seldom succeeds to a remarkable degree" because of the possibilities for disclosure and fumbling when the full military bureaucracy is involved. Or, as he puts it:¹²

In idea it promises a great deal; in the execution it generally sticks fast by the friction of the whole machine.

He stresses the great risk of disclosure of goals by the slowness and high visibility of the large-scale operations typical of strategy. Nevertheless, he urges that because strategic surprise is "never wholly unproductive of effect" it is always worth the effort because of the scale and ramifications of even "small" effects in the strategic realm. Clausewitz' argument on this point is, I think, valid¹³ but only—as he himself points out—as a matter of practice, not of theory. He has clearly recognized that it is more difficult to guard the secrecy of *strategic* operations because of their intrinsically larger and slower nature. But Clausewitz forgets or overlooks the point that this is precisely one of the problems that stratagem can solve—by *capitalizing* on the very disclosures that the almost inevitably leaky security system cannot wholly prevent.

Although seemingly all the cases of deception studied here involved more-or-less slow advanced planning, there is no logically necessary reason why deception

¹²Clausewitz (11), Book III, Ch. 9, p. 200.

¹³Its validity can be empirically tested by a more refined analysis of the historical data presented in my study. This should be done.

cannot be applied on a “crash” basis in the midst of a rapidly developing or even quite fluid situation. The only special prerequisites would seem to be a keen imagination that accepts stratagem as highly salient and appropriate to crisis and that it be advocated at or centralized in the highest decision making council. Indeed, Liddell Hart cites two spectacularly successful historical examples of the attacker successfully “selling the dummy” first one way and then the other”¹⁴ while pressing swift and deep penetration offensives. The first was Sherman’s 130-mile sweep to Atlanta (with his basic line of operations sharply constrained by his logistical dependence on a single rail line) and 300-mile follow-through to the sea.¹⁵ His second example was the Rundstedt-Manstein blitzkrieg through France in 1940.¹⁶ A third example is offered by O’Connor’s brilliant 500-miles-in-2-months follow-up of the Wavell-O’Connor breakthrough at Sidi Barrani on 9 December 1940.¹⁷ Other instances that I have identified are Rommel’s 400-mile-in-2 weeks drive to Egypt in April 1941¹⁸ and his return engagement in January, 1942,¹⁹ and the Israeli drives into Egypt and Jordan in 1967.²⁰

Such an approach also lends itself to verification and training in peacetime maneuvers.²¹

These historical cases are particularly instructive because the continuing succession of surprises and traps they achieved were apparently due entirely to observance of the principle of “alternative objectives,” unsupported by specific tactical deception operations other than feints. It seems reasonable that such quickly usable tactical ruses as camouflage or dummy and false radio traffic, could only enhance the probabilities that the enemy accept the baited alternative. Indeed there exists at least one major example—an entire campaign—where stratagem was continually in use to help “sell the dummy” right and left along the line of operations: MacArthur’s island-hopping drive to the Philippines, 1943-1945.²²

This type of case where one surprise is piled upon another is one of the great opportunities provided by highly mobile warfare. In general:²³

Movement generates surprise, and surprise gives impetus to movement. For a movement which is accelerated or changes its direction inevitably carries with it a degree of surprise, even though it be

¹⁴To “give” or “sell the dummy” is a phrase from Rugby football meaning to feign to pass the ball so as to deceive one’s opponent. O.E.D., Supplement (1933), p. 312

¹⁵Liddell Hart (54), 149-153.

¹⁶Liddell Hart (54), 233; and Liddell Hart, *Memoirs*, I (65), 168.

¹⁷As claimed by Major-General Eric Dorman-Smith in 1942. See his letter in Liddell Hart (54), 373-375. See Case A25.

¹⁸See Case A26.

¹⁹See Example B22.

²⁰See Case A66.

²¹As in the British Tank Brigade’s 130-mile run in its 1934 exercise on Salisbury Plain. See Liddell Hart, *When Britain Goes to War* (London: Faber and Faber, 1935), pp. 283-286; his *Memoirs*, I (65), 239, 246-247; and his *The Tanks*, I (59), 320.

²²This claim is made explicitly by both MacArthur and his G-2 (Willoughby). Liddell Hart (54), 273, also credits this “by-passing” campaign as “a variant of the strategy of indirect approach.”

²³Liddell Hart (29), 153.

unconcealed; while surprise smooths the path of movement by hindering the enemy's countermeasures and counter-movements. . .

The former point is the more important, as expressed by MacArthur who said: "Only through surprise action can collision with the enemy's prepared positions be avoided, and to gain surprise nothing is more important than superiority in mobility."²⁴ In any case, introduction of "alternate objectives" will multiply the effect of surprise given by sheer movement. Again, the use of stratagem will enhance the chance of mobility yielding surprise.

4.2 Stratagem as a Decision-Making Model

Operationally, stratagem is best imagined as a decision-making model. As such, it is a simple procedure for designing political-military operations in such a way as to substantially increase the chance of gaining surprise. Indeed, the term "decision-making" is doubly apt because the model describes a decision-making procedure for the protagonist that will induce disfunction in his enemy's decision process.

The purpose or goal of stratagem is to insure that the victim be surprised—that he does indeed choose a false or unfavorable alternative. The technique of stratagem achieves this by a two-step operation. First it makes certain that the victim is faced with an ambiguous situation. If the victim has by his own unaided efforts already attained a state of ambiguous perception, the stratagematist need only assure himself of that. If however the victim is known or believed to share the protagonist's perception of the most appropriate objective or direction of operations, the stratagematist will supply at least one plausible alternative. In either case, the technique of stratagem next proceeds to present the victim with alternative solutions to his predicament.

The strategist can bias the probabilities of the alternatives in either direction, depending on whether he discloses or masks his intentions. Conversely, his intelligence service may be able to improve the accuracy of his own assessments of the opponent's perceived options.

The most elegant stratagem is that in which the victim is offered only a pair of alternatives to choose from and then made to pick the wrong one. This situation has been, historically, the most common one. It was the style of stratagem used by Sherman in Georgia, Allenby at Gaza and Armageddon (Cases A6 and A9), Rommel in North Africa (A26, B22, A32), MacArthur in the Pacific (A43, etc.), and Yadin and Dayan in the Sinai (A56, A63, A66). It is the most economical, most efficient, and—if it works—the most effective.

²⁴ "Annual Report of the Chief of Staff for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1935," in Frank C. Waidrop (Ed.), *MacArthur on the War* (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1942), p. 285. Although Hart (65), 271, is probably right to say MacArthur was here inspired by the 1934 maneuvers of the British Tank Brigade, the idea was not entirely new to him. Thus the 1923 edition (paragraph 382) of the U.S. Army *Field Service Regulations* states: "The effect of surprise is dependent upon rapidity of maneuver." Quoted by Willoughby (39), 46.

This paired choice is what Liddell Hart calls the “baited gambit,” which he breaks down into two modes—the “baited offensive” and the “luring defensive.”²⁵ As his terms imply, the direction of an offensive may be camouflaged so that a false direction of attack distracts the enemy’s attention from the real one. Conversely, a withdrawal or defensive position can be so contrived to constitute a lure or trap to draw the enemy. The special form of the latter, the deliberately attractive static “weak” point, is what French strategists recognize as an *abces de fixation*.²⁶

While this simple bimodal “baited gambit” is the most elegant stratagem, it is probably not the most practical one. That is, while it is sound in theory, there is one serious practical factor that can unhinge it—the enemy may not take the bait. All the careful efforts to make the enemy mistake the false alternative for the real one can go astray. In other words, there can be no guarantee that the deceivers’ output of real and false information will be either picked up by the victim’s intelligence system in quite the mix intended or, even if picked up, that the victim’s decision-makers will perceive the pattern intended. It is always possible they will not take the bait, simply because they do not see it. If that happens, then the intended victim will, in theory, inevitably, or, in practice, most likely anticipate the real action. To insure against this, the optimum practical stratagem is therefore one that introduces a secondary alternative so that the victim is faced with three optional choices. In that case, if the primary or baited alternative fails, the sheer uncertainty or ambiguity of the remaining alternatives guarantees a more-or-less even chance that the victim will still make the wrong choice.

There is an interesting sub-type of this optimum “practical” stratagem that has, though rarely used, proven most effective in actual situations. This involves designing a hierarchical stratagem, wrapping one stratagem within another. The “classical” and most elaborate example was a coordinated set of deceptions surrounding OVERLORD, the cross-Channel invasion in 1944. In that case (Case A45) the overall intentions of Allied grand strategy were shielded by the BODYGUARD stratagem, the general cross-Channel strategy was shielded by FORTITUDE I, and the grand tactics of Normandy were hidden by the follow-up stratagem of FORTITUDE II. This device greatly increases the chance that even if strategic surprise is lost, tactical surprise is retained.

In other words, the best stratagem is the one that generates a set of warning signals susceptible to alternative, or better yet, optional interpretations, where the intended solution is implausible in terms of the victim’s prior experience and knowledge while the false solution (or solutions) is plausible. If the victim does not suspect the possibility that deception may be operating he will inevitably

²⁵This is a good example where, in his rush of often polemical prose, Liddell Hart scatters his vivid terminology and leaves implicit a central concept—here that of deception’s offensive/defensive modes. For his usages see: (a) “BAITED GAMBIT”: (54), 267, 278; (b) *The Tanks*, II (59), 215, and (65), 166, 201; (c) “BAITED OFFENSIVE”: (54), 233; (d) “LURING DEFENSIVE”: (65), 221. He coined this term in 1932 in his lecture “The Future of Infantry.” See also (54), 278.

²⁶Bernard B. Fall, *Hell in a Very Small Place* (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1967), pp. 5, 49.

be gulled. If he suspects deception, he has only four courses open to him:

1. He can choose to act *as if* no deception is being used, taking the conscious risk that he has correctly second-guessed his opponent. This was evidently the course taken by President Kennedy in the Cuban Missile Crisis.
2. He can yield rationally to uncertainty and give equal weight to all perceived solutions, striving to cover all possibilities. This luxurious strategy, violating as it does the “principle” of economy of force, is warranted only when two conditions are simultaneously met: he must be as many times more powerful than his antagonist as the number of options the latter offers and the issue must be one of survival itself.
3. He can yield rationally to uncertainty, and engage in random behavior, risking success or failure on blind guesswork. This type of solution is warranted only when either the stakes are low (i.e., the consequences of a wrong guess would be trivial) or when the trade-off between risk and long-shot gain is deemed worth the gamble. In other words, the victim simply makes a raw calculation of the probabilities.
4. He can yield *irrationally* to uncertainty, i.e., *panic*. This is a paradoxical situation in that it offers quite as good a long-shot chance of success as the rational course 3) above. Panic is, behaviorally, simply a random (mindless) search for a solution to a problem for which neither the intellect nor conditioned response provide an answer. In other words, panic behavior has very real survival value. However, the beneficial effects are usually only of a short-term nature, as protracted panic will prevent him from recognizing any opportunities that might suddenly emerge during the melee.

4.3 Counter-Deception

“That is good deceit which mates
him first that first intends deceit.”

—*Henry VI* (c.1591)
Part II, Act III, Scene *i*.

So far, this model has considered only the interplay of trickster and dupe. Machiavelli was right in saying that a deceiver can always find a fool. But Pliny, Lincoln, and Barnum were also right that some persons cannot be fooled all the time. What, then, are the consequences when one stratagematist pits himself against another?

There are, I suppose, three conditions or modes of interplay between two deceivers. First, if either can successfully feign ignorance of the art, he can play out a series of deception plans that his opponent will mis-attribute to the ambiguity of his intelligence data. This is the flaw in the currently widespread tendency to apply the signal-noise concept of electronic “information theory”

to psychological intelligence-processing. Any intelligence analyst who operates according to this, the Wohlstetter model²⁷, invites manipulation by deception planners.

Second, if both deceivers are evenly matched, and equally alert to each other's stratagems, I presume that, at worst, a stand-off in stratagem is achieved. In that case, the outcome of battle will be determined in the usual manner, by sheer force of arms or more skilled application of the principles of war. However, because parity of skill in deception is as intrinsically unlikely as parity in any other such complex organizational-intellectual effort, a more relevant mode of interplay is [the following]:

Third, where the deceivers are unmatched in skill. Here the edge clearly lies with the more skillful antagonist. He will be able to mount deception operations more often, on larger scale, and with greater elaboration. And more of these will be successful,²⁸ unless his opponent is more skilled at discovering his stratagems. But what of the less skilled stratagematist? Can the discrepancy in skill be so great that the less skilled loses all power to launch successful stratagems? This is, in principle, not possible. Even a primitive effort will, by threatening alternative objectives, times, strengths, or styles of attack, create enough uncertainty that even the most wily opponent will have either to disperse his anticipatory efforts or take a calculated gamble on having correctly second guessed the stratagem.

The semi-official historian of World War II British Naval Intelligence very wisely cautions:²⁹

There must be constant alertness against deception, for those who practised it with the ruthless and methodical ingenuity developed by the British . . . found their best targets in the obsessions of the enemy.

But there is stinging irony in the fact that even these most masterful deceivers were themselves easy dupes for their enemy's more primitive efforts.³⁰ That the British ledger of stratagem shows much satisfying black ink is, I suspect, due more to the sheer frequency of their methodical persistence than to their prideful ruthlessness or vaunted ingenuity.

Indeed, this is a general finding of my study—that is, the deceiver is almost always successful *regardless* of the sophistication of his victim in the same art. On the face of it, this seems an intolerable conclusion, one offending common sense. Yet it is the irrefutable conclusion of the historical evidence. Even the

²⁷As developed by Roberta Wohlstetter at the RAND Corporation in the 1950's. See my critique in Whaley, *Operation BARBAROSSA* (69).

²⁸As with the British against the Germans in World War II.

²⁹McLachlan (68), 354.

³⁰The most remarkable instance is their wholehearted readiness to accept Hitler's flimsy campaign to convince them that SEA-LION was a lively animal for over a year beyond its cancellation. See Case A23. Even McLachlan (68), 347-348, in frankly revealing the British obsession on this point, fails to recognize its interaction with Hitler's deception plan.

British could be tricked by the Germans and they, in turn by the Russians.³¹ Is there, then, no way by which the target of stratagem can untangle the web of deceit? While I recognize the apparent contradiction, I would suggest that it is indeed only apparent. The alert stratagematist should not—need not—be deceived. The contradiction can be resolved, if we recognize that neither sophisticated practice nor reminders of “constant alertness” provide any practical guidance on just *how* to avoid victimization. Exhortations to *avoid* being deceived are, I suspect, as uselessly homiletic as those to *use* it. Earlier, I implied that the sort of incitements to (and paragons of) stratagem given by writers from Sun Tzu to Clausewitz are very incomplete guides to practice. To achieve realization in action, exhortation and example must be supplemented by some didactic decision-making model of the sort offered in the preceding section of this chapter. I suggest that the avoidance of victimization by stratagem requires an analogous decisional model, specifically one designed to analyze the signals of stratagem rather than the one designed to synthesize their false signals.

This problem can be illustrated by two negative sets of evidence that emerged during the historical study. First, I noticed that intelligence analysis seems consistently to treat camouflaged (i.e., simulated and dissimulated) objects (tanks, guns, planes, ships, camps, factories, etc.) in a particularly biased way. Specifically, while conventional intelligence analysis conscientiously seeks to expose the shams of camouflage, it does so only in order to report the real objects. I have found no instance where shams are reported for their own sake outside the intelligence analysis community, for example, no simple map overlays showing patterns of deception. In other words, having done the work to identify camouflage, the analyst uses his findings only to correct his regular situation reports, order-of-battle maps, or traffic analysis studies. He does not use these same findings to analyze the patterns of camouflage or “noise” to see if they could imply a positive deception plan or campaign. I see no reason why this sort of analysis cannot be done and it is clear that it should be attempted. Basically all that is required is to ask the question of whether the data on camouflage alone fits any pattern suggestive of an alternative objective in the mind of the enemy. Validation should often be possible to obtain in the form of the parallel patterns that would normally be simultaneously generated in such other communications media as rumor networks or in such visible signs as troop deployments.

The second type of historical evidence is from the field of propaganda content analysis. Ever since its development in World War II by the British and American psychological warfare specialists,³² this technique has proved highly effective for giving early warning of changes in enemy political and military policies. And a special modification of this technique has, more recently, become

³¹And not just in general but in confrontations between acknowledged practitioners such as Rommel vs. Wavell or Hitler vs. Churchill.

³²See particularly Alexander L. George, *Propaganda Analysis: A Study of Inferences Made from Nazi Propaganda in World War II* (Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson, 1959) and Ernst Kris and Hans Speier, *German Radio Propaganda* (London: Oxford University Press, 1944), Chapter X (“Anticipation of Action”), pp. 289-325.

perhaps the most effective tool of the “Kremlinologist”³³ and “Pekingologist.”³⁴ However, these types of analysis will necessarily yield false findings in those cases where the communicator chooses to use these channels for waging a deception campaign against the foreign analysts that he knows monitor these channels. But such use will be infrequent, because the communicator would otherwise destroy the main purpose of these channels or modes of communication. Thus the B.B.C. would not jeopardize its high credibility rating for its news broadcasts by permitting more than very occasional insertions of disinformation. Similarly the Soviet (and even Chinese) mass media are too important for disseminating higher policy guidance to subordinate elites to risk being garbled except after the most careful calculation of the internal effects. Moreover, a wise deception planner himself would avoid frequent tampering with these channels, because he would know that indiscriminate use would soon undermine the credulity of his target audience, the enemy deception analyst. But occasional diversion of such channels for deception purposes can be effective, in practice be well as theory. Thus, in 1941 and again in 1942 Nazi Propaganda Minister Goebbels briefly contributed the facilities of the state controlled press and radio to at least two major strategic deception operations,³⁵ yet at least one group of Allied psywar analysts was, even after the event, uncertain of their feint aspect.³⁶

4.4 Future Development

We have now been through the history of stratagem and my preliminary effort to formulate its theory. What further research remains? The most obvious course would be to continue the comparative case study approach used in this paper, increasing the number of cases. If the time frame were widened to include both earlier and more recent wars, we could learn to what extent my generalizations about deception hold across such major stylistic changes in warfare as characterized the ancient, feudal, imperialist, and nuclear ages. If tactical cases were included in the “size” range of cases, we could rigorously test my hypothesis that the theory of deception operates independently of the size, echelon, and complexity of operations. Finally, if closer attention were given such specific elements as the viable alternatives open to the deceivers and the estimates made by the intended victims, we could not only verify Liddell Hart’s hypothesis about the effectiveness of “alternative objectives” but also discover some of its limits

³³The pioneer work was Franz Borkenau, “Getting at the Facts Behind the Soviet Facade: An Expert Explains his ‘Content Analysis’ Method”, *Commentary*, Vol. 17, No. 4 (April 1954), pp. 393-400. See also Myron Rush, “Esoteric Communication in Soviet Politics,” *World Politics*, Vol. 11, No. 4 (July 1959), pp. 614-620. The most recent and detailed account of its nature and decipherment is William E. Griffith, “Communist Esoteric Communications: *Explication de texte*,” in Wilbur Schram (Ed.), *Handbook of Communication* (New York: Rand McNally, 1968).

³⁴See the recent work by Professor Uri Ra’anan of the Fletcher School of Diplomacy, particularly his “Peking’s Foreign Policy ‘Debate’: 1965-1966,” in Tang Tsou (Ed.), *China in Crisis*, Vol. II (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1968), pp. 23-71.

³⁵Cases A23 and A34.

³⁶Kris and Speier (44), 301-302.

or prerequisites.

A more fruitful line of further development of a theory of stratagem might be to subject it to the discipline of programming for a decision-making computer simulation.³⁷ Such a procedure would, as always, sharpen understanding of the limitations and power of the analytical system, enforce a higher degree of operational definition in its elements, and expose any logical inconsistencies. For example, the analysis would be strengthened by a sharpening of the distinctions of categories in such continua as the tactical-strategic or the victory-defeat, which I have left somewhat vague.

It should also be possible to refine and partially “verify” this theory of stratagem in the “manual” forms of military or political-military games.³⁸ If this were done, I would recommend that the “horns” and their covering deception plan be introduced through a “dummy” team as pre-programmed long-range goals, strategic decisions, and appropriately deceptive communications to the actual playing teams.³⁹

Gaming (both the “manual” and “machine” types) could be used not only to develop the theory but also to provide simulated tests of the efficacy of deception by comparing matched sets of with-and-without-deception games.

³⁷As, for example, in the feedback-looping CRISISCOM[munications] simulation being developed by Ithiel de Sofa Pool and associates at M.I.T. See, for example, Ithiel de Sola Pool and Allan Kessler, “The Kaiser, The Tsar, and The Computer: Information Processing in a Crisis,” *American Behavioral Scientist*, Vol. 8, No. 9 (May 1965), pp. 31-38.

³⁸For a brief description of this technique see Lincoln P. Bloomfield and Barton Whaley, “The Political-Military Exercise: A Progress Report,” *Orbis*, Vol. 8, No. 4 (Winter 1965), pp. 854-870.

³⁹As, for example, in those pre-programmed decision alternatives “trees” developed empirically in gaming by W. Edward Cushen, *The Pollex-Dais Games: Game Analysis Technique* (Cambridge, Mass.: Center for International Studies, M.I.T., April 1966, Paper No. C/66-7).

Chapter 5

THE RESEARCH STUDY

“I haue already found a stratageme,
To sound the bottome of this doubtfull theame.”

—Thomas Kyd,
The Spanish Tragedie (1592),
Act II, Sc. 1.

So far I have recounted the history of military deception and surprise. I have also put forth a rudimentary general theory of stratagem. To verify it in detail would require a rather large-scale research project. However, as the relationship between surprise and deception has not previously received any research attention, even an exploratory study has value and interest. This chapter describes my own preliminary research and presents my empirical findings and conclusions.

At first sight, it seems odd that the strong tradition of the quantitative comparative case method inaugurated by the great German 19th century military historian, Hans Delbrück (1848-1929),¹ and carried forward by the British Quaker physicist Lewis Richardson (1881-1953)² and the American lawyer Quincy Wright (b. 1890)³ has not yet addressed itself to the factors of surprise or deception. On reflection, however, the answer seems clear. Those scholars dealt mainly with directly measurable and numerable categories. They laboriously compiled and systematically compared such characteristics as size of armies, populations, budgets, and national incomes; numbers of casualties, allies, or neighboring countries; and frequency of conflicts. By concentrating on such quantitative categories they slighted the “psychological” factors in war.⁴

However, even inherently qualitative factors such as surprise and deception can easily be manipulated quantitatively by characterizing or categorizing them

¹See Gordon A. Craig, “Delbrück: The Military Historian,” in Earle (43), 260-283.

²Lewis F. Richardson, *Statistics of Deadly Quarrels* (Pittsburgh: Boxwood Press, 1960).

³Quincy Wright, *A Study of War* (2nd ed., Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965). The first edition appeared in 1942.

⁴Although Richardson and Wright and perhaps even Delbrück would be among the first to acknowledge the importance, even preponderance, of the psychological dimension.

in terms of their presence or absence and then counting the *frequency* of their occurrence across a number of cases or against other categories, which themselves may be qualitative or quantitative in nature. Thus we can investigate the relative frequency of surprise, the coincidence of surprise with deception, the association between crying “wolf” and the attenuation of alertness, etc., etc.

5.1 The Case Studies

The study covers an inventory of all 68 cases known to me of strategic surprise and/or strategic deception that initiated a war, campaign, or major battle during the period 1914-1968 in connection with international war. (Also included are 47 selected examples of tactical surprise and/or tactical deception as well as 53 examples of military operations explicitly known to have not involved either surprise or deception.) The six specific defining criteria are:

1. By “surprise” I mean those instances where a sudden military action by one antagonist has not been predicted, much less anticipated, by its intended victim.⁵ Two modes are recognized: “strategic” and “tactical.”
2. By “deception” I mean an act *intended*, by its perpetrator to dupe or mislead a victim. Note that this definition excludes those instances where the victim unilaterally misunderstands. Two modes are recognized: “strategic” and “tactical.”
3. “Strategic surprise” is distinguished from “tactical surprise” by the degree to which the military action affects the victim’s mobilization, deployments, or grand strategy. In general, “tactical surprise” grades into “strategic surprise” in that region of the tactical-strategic scale where the locus of command shifts from the narrow zone of battle with its field commanders to directly involve other regions and higher military or political leaders.⁶
4. By “cases known to me” I mean those instances of surprise and deception, explicitly identified as such, found in surveying the literature cited in the footnotes and bibliography of this book. (My “inventory” of cases of strategic surprise and/or strategic deception is very probably almost complete as all “strategic” operations mentioned in the standard and official histories surveyed carried at least some evidence or indication as to whether or not surprise or deception were involved.)
5. By “initiated a war, campaign, or major battle” I mean a deception and/or surprise that occurred at the opening phase of a war, campaign, or large-scale battle. This criterion was introduced to exclude those important

⁵For my belated or post-research thoughts on a more refined typology see Chapter VI, Part A (“The Variety and Intensity of Surprise”).

⁶For my suggestions for a more refined categorization see Chapter VI (“The Strategic-Tactical Dimension”).

World War I	1914-1918
Soviet-Polish War	1920
Greco-Turkish War	1921-1922
Italo-Ethiopian War	1935-1936
Spanish Civil War	1936-1939
Sino-Japanese War	1937-1939
Soviet-Japanese Border Conflicts	1938-1939
Russo-Finnish War	1939-1940
World War II	1939-1945
Israeli War of Independence	1947-1949
Korean War	1950-1953
Vietnam Revolution	1946-1954
Suez War	1956
Bay of Pigs	1961
The Six-Day (Arab-Israeli) War	1967
Czech Invasion	1968

Table 5.1: The Sixteen Wars That Comprise The Census, 1914-1968.

but difficult-to-identify instances of follow-on or ongoing and usually improvised exploitation drives in which the “dummy” of stratagem is “sold” right and left along the axis of advance.

6. Sixteen wars comprise the census for the period 1914-1968. They are listed in Table 5.1.

Obviously this list does not exhaust the large-scale martial conflicts of this period. But it does—I believe—include all confrontations that contain examples of the type of strategic surprise or deception that meet the specified census criteria.

One point should be stressed about the above definitions. Deception is defined (and used throughout this paper) only in its active sense; that is, as viewed by the practitioner rather than in terms of its effect on the intended victim. Thus I exclude Goethe’s aphorism that:

We are never deceived.
We deceive ourselves.

Conversely, surprise is defined exclusively as viewed by the victim, in other words, as an effect. Consequently, the two terms—deception and surprise—are made to fall into quite separate logical categories: the perpetrator’s *intention* to deceive and the victim’s *perception* of surprise. Thus defined, these terms thereby avoid the easy pitfall of circular reasoning.

Because the distinction between “strategic” and “tactical” is vague, several of the cases arbitrarily included in my inventory of strategic surprises and deceptions can be challenged. I suppose the more vulnerable ones are Tanga (A1),

Dakar (A24), Alamein (A35), Tarawa (A40), Anzio (A41), Luzon (A52), and Kojo (A61), all of which were more-or-less localized operations whose wider implications are open to debate. However I cannot follow Professor Samuel Eliot Morison, who would reduce even OVERLORD to a case of mere “tactical” surprise on the niggling ground that the enemy expected invasion, even if he did not know the time, exact beaches, or strength of the blow. Morison simply misses the subtlety of the OVERLORD deception plans that gained just the right *type* of strategic surprise.⁷

There are several borderline cases of major battles involving surprise or deception that have been excluded because they do seem clearly to fall on the “tactical” side of the “strategic-tactical” criterion. Those examples of which I am aware are summarized together with the other known “tactical” operations in List B, and all receive more or less detailed description in the case study appendix. However, as these examples form neither a statistical sample nor a complete inventory, they will be discussed only illustratively in the main text.

I have definitely excluded all cases at the extreme of the small-scale, local actions of the commando type, although many of these achieved surprise and were intended as diversionary raids or served political-strategic ends. Indeed, General Telford Taylor is prepared to class Skorzeny’s spectacular kidnapping of Mussolini in September 1943 as a “strategic coup,”⁸ apparently because of its political character and in spite of Il Duce’s dissipated political and even symbolic significance. A good example of a border-line case that I have counted as “tactical” is the Dieppe “reconnaissance in force” in 1942 (Example B26). Of all 168 cases and examples studied, only two involved an initial attacking force of less than division size (or 5,000 men).⁹

There is one interesting “case” of strategic surprise credited in the literature¹⁰ that I have excluded because it originated in the manufactory of a notorious forger.¹¹ This is the story told in a sensational book by the mythical Soviet defector “Colonel Kyril Kalinov” –actually the figment of the imagination of Gregori Besedovsky or his onetime assistant, Victor Alexandrov. Kalinov-Besedovsky “quotes” Marshal Zhukov as stating (in 1949) that the Germans were tricked into resuming their costly winter offensive against Moscow on 15 November 1941. Indeed, Hitler and the Army General Staff had decided to launch this final drive because they had grossly underestimated the Russian strength. Zhukov-Kalinov states:¹²

In this connection I can now disclose an important detail which has hitherto been kept secret. The report about the allegedly destroyed

⁷A detailed discussion of this typological problem is supplied in Chapter VI (“The Variety and Intensity of Surprise”).

⁸Brigadier General Telford Taylor, “Foreword,” in Charles Foley, *Commando Extraordinary* (New York: Putnam’s, 1955).

⁹Case A65 and Example B25.

¹⁰The credulous historian is Carell (64), 163-165

¹¹Cyrille D. Kalinov (pseud.), *Les Maréchaux soviétiques vous parlent...* (Paris: Stock, 1950).

¹²Kalinov (50), as translated in Carell (64), 163-164.

330 divisions was launched by us deliberately to find its way to Germany through the Military Attachè of a neutral country whom we knew to be in touch with Germany's military intelligence service.

5.1.1 The "Soft Underbelly" Policy

Was Churchill's famous and controversial "soft under-belly" policy a case of strategic deception? I am unable to judge, and the plethora of sources and studies generate more fog than clarification. For example, the most detailed monograph on the general question of Churchill's "second front" entirely evades its Balkan aspect.¹³ Indeed, I know of only one study that even begins to pose the relevant questions.¹⁴

We know that throughout the war Churchill did advocate pressure on Germany through the Mediterranean, which he deemed to be its most vulnerable flank—its exposed "soft under-belly," as he first termed it in 1942.¹⁵ However, his policy varied in content, priority, and strength of advocacy in response to changing political-military considerations, particularly the collapse of Italy and the intransigence of his Russian and American allies who were pressing for a cross-Channel attack at the earliest possible moment. Churchill, however, argued that such a direct frontal assault on the point of the enemy's greatest strength would yield prohibitive casualties and likely defeat unless either Germany showed signs of breaking or the Anglo-American invasion force could be of such size that it would not risk a useless catastrophe at the beachhead—a second but grander "Dieppe."¹⁶ Churchill fought hard and successfully for deferrals of the cross-Channel invasion from 1942 until 1943 and then, again, to 1944. Meanwhile he pursued a grand strategy of ever tightening economic blockade, increasing volume of strategic bombing, and stronger military pressure on the periphery, particularly the Mediterranean. His angry, critical Allies did raise the question of a hoax but only in terms of their suspicion that he was deceiving *them* about his intention to *ever* cross the Channel.¹⁷

Thus, the esoteric question of whether the "soft under-belly" was a desirable or even effective *stratagem* has been obscured by the still heated debate of whether it was a desirable or potentially effective *strategy*.

As already described, the British deception plan for the 1943 invasion of Sicily included a feint against Greece.¹⁸ But aside from this one instance, there is no direct evidence that the British made any further use of this ruse. However, I am struck by that fact that the Germans continued to the end to divert

¹³Trumbull Higgins, *Winston Churchill and the Second Front* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1957). Even Higgins' *Soft Underbelly* (New York: Macmillan, 1968) misses the deception possibility.

¹⁴W.G.F. Jackson, *The Battle for Italy* (New York: Harper & Row, 1967).

¹⁵In his note dated 12 November 1942 surveying the prospects in the Mediterranean.

¹⁶Example B26.

¹⁷See, for example, Ivan Maisky, *Memoirs of a Soviet Ambassador, The War: 1939-43* (New York: Scribner's, 1968), pp. 245-365; and Sir Samuel Hoare, *Complacent Dictator* (New York: Knopf, 1947), pp. 106-108.

¹⁸See Case A38.

Date	Balkans Ger/All.	N. Africa & Italy Ger/All.	West Ger/All.	Eastern Front Ger/All.	Norway & Denmark Ger/All.	Home Ger/All.	Total Ger/All.
1939 Sep 18			42/70	65/30		/5?	117/105?
1940 May 10		0/2	136/156	4/	/0	/0?	156/158
1941 Jun 22	7/0	2/3?	38/0	123/151	13/0	22/80?	205/234?
1942 Sep				169/			
1943 May 7	7/0	2/0	/0		/0		
Jul 10	13/0	7/8	/0		/0		
Sep 3	/0	17/19	/0		/0		
Oct-Nov	/0	19/19	/0	/330	/0		260/
Dec	/0	18/13	/0		/0		
1944 Jan 22	25/0	23/18	53/0	179/	16/0		
Mar	/0	24/21	/0		/0		
Apr 14	26/0	23/	51/0	206?/	17/0	0/	336/
May 11	/0	23/25	/0		/0		
Jun 6	28/0	26/25	59/7	165/	18/0	0/31	296/
Aug	15/0	26/20			/0		
1945 Jan 1	7/2	27/19	76/71	133/461	17/0	0/0?	260/553
Apr	/3	23/17		147/			

Table 5.2: Geographical Distribution of German and Allied Divisions in European Theatre. References: Jackson (67), 26-27, 317-320, 326-343; Collier (67) 386-387, 454; Guderian (52), 150; Bradley (51), 494; Butcher (46), 520-521; Erickson (62), 767-768; Ziemke (68), 7-8, 19, 370, 416; Whaley, *Barbarossa* (69), Chapter III, Tables I and 2; Deane (47), 145; *Correspondence*, I (57), 318.

precious strength to defend against a never-to-materialize amphibious invasion of the Balkans.¹⁹ The question therefore remains: Did the Allies—or rather, the British—do anything to deliberately feed the fires of Hitler’s expectations? If the answer can be shown to be “yes,” then we are dealing with one of the more brilliantly successful stratagems. Even if the answer is “no,” the case still serves as an excellent model of how a stratagem could have been applied at the level of grand strategy, because it did cause a major dislocation in the Wehrmacht’s deployments, without detracting from the strength of the cross-Channel attack when it did finally materialize.

A measure of the serious maldistribution of Germany’s flagging strength is seen in Table 5.2.

5.2 The Coincidence of Surprise with Deception

I have identified 68 cases of strategic surprise and/or strategic deception during the 55 year period from 1914 through 1968. A rough measure of the rarity of these events compared with the very large number of other major military operations during the same period is that they averaged only 1.3 per year; or, if we count only the 30 wartime years, 2.2 per year. However, when we consider that most of these represented major turning points in the fortunes of war—indeed, account for a significant proportion of such crucial events—the importance of research on the subject becomes clear.

Of the 68 “strategic” type cases, 61 involved strategic surprise and 57 in-

¹⁹Jackson (67), I, 138-139, 317-322; Majdalany (57), 22; Churchill, IV (50), 823-824; Ziemke (68), 132; Guderian (52), 310. The credulous Germans included Warlimont (64), 337, 352, 383-386, 499; Guderian (52), 310; and General Siegfried Westphal, *The German Arm in the West* (London: Cassell, 1951), pp. 150, 200.

	Strategic Level (Type A Cases)		Tactical Level (Type B Examples)	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Both Surprise & Deception	49	73.1%	25	53.2%
Surprise only	11	16.4%	19	40.4%
Deception only	7	10.5%	3	6.4%
Totals:	67*	100.0%	47	100.0%

Table 5.3: Deception and Surprise at Strategic and Tactical Levels. *One case (Case A67) was added too late to incorporate in all the quantitative analyses.

involved strategic deception. (These yield rates of some two strategic surprises and two strategic deceptions per year of the 30 years of actual warfare during the 55-year period studied.) Table 5.3 shows the distribution of these cases among their logical conditions.

Immediately we see that surprise and deception are commonly associated, particularly at the level of strategic operations (although still more often than not at the higher tactical levels). Is this frequent relationship something other than coincidence? Recall that these two categories have been defined so that deception could be a “cause”, and surprise an “effect.” Moreover, Table 5.3 verifies that the categories of surprise and deception have been defined so as to be logically quite distinct and are not merely tautologically linked. Thus the table shows 11 cases where the victim was surprised without the need of deception and 7 cases where deception was used but failed to yield surprise.

What, then, is the relationship between deception and surprise? Examining the 115 detailed accounts of operations in Appendix A, we find that surprise is a consequence of several factors. These factors may act singly or in concert to produce surprise. In no particular order of importance, these are:

Secrecy Tight security or ineffective enemy penetration does sometimes shield intentions or the clues pointing to intentions. The victim remains unwarned. However, this absolute condition does not exist in a single one of the cases. Some more-or-less specific warnings are present in all cases. Security and counterintelligence serve, at most, to protect only part of the truth. But this is sometimes enough to open the door to uncertainty. E.g., Cases A28 (Russia), A30 (Pearl Harbor), A57 (Korea), etc.

Preconception The victim of surprise forms an estimate of his opponent’s intentions and capabilities. This estimate is often wide of the mark. E.g., Cases A21 (France), A25 (Sidi Barani), A28 (Russia), A30 (Pearl Harbor), A45 (Normandy), A58 (Russian intervention in Korea), etc.

Deception The deliberate misleading of the victim.

Response Time There seem to be rare cases where the sheer physical ability of a victim to deploy to meet a fully perceived threat is so slow (relative to the attacker’s ability to quickly plan and deploy for attack) that the

War	Dates	Strategic Level (A)				Tactical Level (B)			
		Sur.	Dec.	Both	Total	Sur.	Dec.	Both	Total
WW I	1914-1918	1	0	9	10	10	0	9	19
Soviet-Polish	1920	1	0	0	1	-	-	-	-
Greco-Turkish	1921-1922	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	1
Italo-Ethiopian	1935-1936	-	-	-	0	-	-	-	0?
Spanish Civil War	1936-1939	3	0	0	3	2	0	0	2
Sino-Japanese	1937-1941	-	-	-	0	-	-	-	0?
Russo-Jap. Border	1933-1939	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0
WW II	1939-1945	5	5	30	40	5	3	15	23
Russo-Finnish	1939-1940	-	-	-	0	-	-	-	0?
Israeli Ind.	1947-1949	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	2
Korean War	1950-1953	1	0	4	5	-	-	-	0?
Vietnam Revltn.	1946-1954	0	1	0	1	-	-	-	0?
Suez	1956	0	1	1	2	-	-	-	0?
Bay of Pigs	1961	0	0	1	1	-	-	-	0
Six-Day War	1967	0	0	1	1	-	-	-	0?
Totals:		11	7	49	67	19	3	25	57

Table 5.4: Incidence of Surprise and Deception in War, 1914 through 1963.

way to strategic victory is still open. Perhaps we should then speak of strategic paralysis or impotence rather than strategic surprise. E.g., Case A61 (the Kojo feint) and, just possibly, Case A59 (the Inch'on landing).

These four factors leading to strategic surprise—secrecy, preconception, deception, and response time—are, of course, quite gross categories. They are examined more closely below. Moreover, they certainly do not exhaust the array of possible factors. For example, another that can well be imagined is salience: a powerful “victim” being simply uninterested in what some much weaker enemy might have in train, confident that any loss could always be regained. However, the four factors named are the only ones identified in the cases studied.

The incidence of surprise and deception among the 16 wars examined between 1914 and 1968 (see Table 5.4) shows that they are fairly ubiquitous phenomena. Seemingly they are absent in only three of the wars, the Italo-Ethiopian, Sino-Japanese, and Russo-Finnish. (While I have confirmed their absence in the “strategic” operations of those wars, I believe more detailed research would turn up at least some instances of surprise at the “tactical” level.)

Similar conclusions are apparent in Table 5.5, which shows the frequencies of surprise and deception through time, decade-by-decade. This again shows, that these phenomena are very much a part of modern warfare.

Considering the last two tables together we get some hints about the nature of yet a third table, one which can, however, be generated only by knowing the absolute frequencies of battles in each war (and each decade). Only by doing this could we generate the table (or, rather, tables) showing the relative proportions (across wars and through time) between surprise and/or deception on the one hand and the absence of the characteristics on the other. However, given a rough, impressionistic grasp of the magnitudes involved, I would expect such a table to show the following important trends:

First, the proportion of military operations involving surprise unaided by deception is sharply declining. I would attribute this almost entirely to the

Period	Surprise	Deception	Both	Total
1914-1919	1	0	9	10
1920-1929	1	0	1	2
1930-1939	3	0	2	5
1940-1949	5	5	30	40
1950-1959	1	2	5	8
1960-1967	0	0	3	3
Totals:	11	7	50	68

Table 5.5: Strategic Operations (Type A Cases).

trend throughout our century in which intelligence analysis is improving at a much faster rate than are the techniques of passive security. Thus, modern surveillance and communications-ferreting systems and computer-aided analytical techniques are rapidly increasing in their ability to disclose the physical evidence of military operations, while security countermeasures have not kept pace.

Second, the proportion of military operations involving deception alone—i.e., where stratagem has failed to yield surprise—has remained at a rather constant but low level. This I would attribute entirely to the rather generally poor level of understanding of the nature of stratagem. I presume that improved deception techniques would correct this deficiency.

Third the proportion of military operations involving *both* surprise and deception has sharply increased. The theory of stratagem would attribute this entirely to the trend in military doctrine toward various strategies of the “indirect approach.”

5.3 The Causes of Surprise

Writers on surprise in war will sometimes single out specific factors to which they attribute its achievement. At this point I will simply collate these factors and examine them in the light of the empirical case study evidence.

5.3.1 Terrain

There are certain terrain features that can conceal the movement of military forces. Frederick the Great was perhaps the first writer to explicitly emphasize this factor and to recommend the two obvious intelligence counter-measures: behind-enemy-lines espionage to extend vision beyond line-of-sight and long-range reconnaissance-in-force to acquire early contact and maintain it. This element of the “principle” of “security” is second-nature to professional soldiers. It will not be investigated in this paper, although detailed case or simulation studies might serve to identify its parameters.

5.3.2 Weather

Meteorological conditions are occasionally mentioned as important in gaining surprise, although it is striking how few are the official military historians who include this on their check-list of points to be covered.²⁰ Indeed, the weather factor is one of those that is so very “obvious” that it is usually overlooked by war historians and analysts. The field commander must of course, be cognizant of weather, but some appalling examples are recorded where rear echelon planners and theater commanders remained unconcerned by even disastrous changes in weather.²¹

Two specific types of weather are relevant. First, there are those that render movement “impossible.” To the extent that these “impossible” conditions can be surmounted, surprise will follow. These are intense cold and mud-producing rainstorms.²²

The other type of weather is that which conceals movement. Here night (darkness) and fog (or mist, rain, overcast, etc.) are the two relevant subtypes. If the attacker is trained to maneuver in such conditions, it is asserted that he can greatly increase his chances of surprise.²³ In earlier times night attack was limited to small, highly trained, tactical teams, because of the virtual impossibility of controlling large groups of unseen (and unseeing) moving men. It was the speciality of the guerrilla and commando, although the masking dark has been mastered by some large units to conceal large scale redeployments.²⁴ However, the introduction late in World War I of navigational and communications gear unaffected by visibility made night attack a feasible technique to gain surprise at the level of “grand tactics” and strategy.²⁵

Dividing the 24-hour day into three equal periods, we see that night attacks are, as predicted, more commonly associated with surprise than with non-surprise situations. Over half the cases of surprise began in the night, while this was true of only one-quarter the non-surprise cases as in Table 5.6.

Similar remarks apply to fog. In the late 1920’s, Captain Liddell Hart noted as a consequence of his encyclopedic study of World War I battles that the

²⁰Thus, while the indices of the official British history of the Great War contain at least 34 separate references to the effects of fog and mist, they are thrown in rather haphazardly. See Hankey, I (61), 806-807.

²¹Thus, at the Battle of Loos on 25 September 1915, the Commander of the attacking British 2nd Division, Major-General Sir Henry Horne, insisted that Haig’s “programme must be carried out whatever the conditions.” The programme was that his division was to release chlorine gas prior to its assault. The conditions prompting his remark were that the wind had just switched *toward* the British trenches. The result was that his 2nd Division attacked with invalids who were promptly slaughtered by the ungassed Germans. Horne was promoted to command XVth Corps. See Liddell Hart (30), 192.

²²For example, Ludendorff surprised the Czarist army by attacking in fearful cold on 7 February 1915 at the Masurian Lakes (Example B3).

²³Liddell Hart was one of the first to develop a formal theoretical doctrine in his partially successful efforts to introduce “night attack” as a standard procedure in the British Army. See Liddell Hart, I (65), 212-218. Also Lt. Col. H.S. Yadev, *Infantry Journal* (India), No. 2, 1956, as digested in *Military Review* Vol. 38, No. 1 (April 1958), pp. 75-82.

²⁴For example, the Chinese Communists, Viet Minh, and Viet Cong.

²⁵Montgomery was a master of this and demanded that his troops trained accordingly.

Time of Day	Surprise		No Surprise	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Night/Dawn (2200-0559)	49	52.7%	9	23.7%
Morning (0600-1359)	37	39.8%	22	57.9%
Afternoon/Eve (1400-2159)	7	7.5%	7	18.4%
Totals:	93	100.0%	38	100.0%
No data:	7		22	

Table 5.6: Effects of Time of Day on Surprise.

Natural Climate	Surprise		No Surprise	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Fog, mist	15	21.1%	4	12.5%
Rain, snow, cloudy	7	9.9%	7	21.9%
Clear	49	69.0%	21	65.6%
Totals:	71	100.0%	32	100.0%
No climate data	29		29	
Not applicable	6		0	

Table 5.7: Relationship Between Natural Climate and Surprise.

presence of fog was very often the only characteristic that served to distinguish surprise attacks from those met by alerted defenders.²⁶ The relationship between fog and surprise given by my own data is shown in Table 5.7.

This table shows that surprise is more commonly found associated with fog than those circumstances where surprise did not occur. However the data is both skimpy and already somewhat biased by the tendency in some of my sources to disproportionately report those instances where fog did contribute to surprise. Thus, while we should probably agree with Liddell Hart that fog often contributes to surprise, further research would have to be done to assess the magnitude of this effect. (Note also that, contrary to my expectations, rainy- and snowy or cloudy-conditions are quite *negatively* associated with surprise, at least on the basis of my weak data.)

Liddell Hart implies that his remarks about fog apply to localized (that is, tactical) battles only. Indeed, if we compare only those situations of strategic surprise with those of tactical surprise we find that our weak data again supports this. (Moreover, as we might suppose, inclement weather of all types favors tactical as opposed to strategic surprise.)

Included as a special meteorological factor is man-made weather as an aid to concealment of the attacker or befuddlement of the victim and consequent

²⁶Liddell Hart, I (65), 216. He implies his conclusion was based on some sort of statistical analysis. If so he has not published it.

Natural Climate	Strategic Surprise		Tactical Surprise	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Fog, mist	6	15.8%	9	27.3%
Rain, snow, cloudy	3	7.9%	4	12.1%
Clear	29	76.3%	20	60.6%
Totals:	38	100.0%	33	100.0%

Table 5.8: Cases of Natural Climate as Distributed Between Strategic and Tactical Surprise.

attainment of surprise. The innovation of smoke,²⁷ gas,²⁸ and artificial illumination²⁹ gave commanders enough environmental control to manipulate some tactical situations in World Wars I and II. The post-war period has seen improvements in all these fields plus an important innovation in the last in the form of infra-red “sniperscopes.” And today we appear close to gaining a degree of climatic *control* (as opposed to *prediction*) sufficient to affect strategic surprise as well.³⁰

My own data on artificial climate is very spotty. Thus Table 5.9 should be taken lightly, particularly as I have had to make the very dubious assumption that those cases where I found no data did not involve gas or smoke.

For what little it is worth, my empirical data shows that, in general, *artificial* climate has had only a trivial relationship to surprise. To the extent that there is any positive relationship, it applies only—as commonly assumed—to the poisonous or irritant gases. However, if we look only at the use of gas and smoke in the contexts of strategic and tactical surprise, we do see that they do—as surely expected—figure more prominently in tactical situations [see Table 5.10].

5.3.3 Timing

Third, there is the temporal factor. This has at least four aspects: speed, schedule changes, periodic, and associational.

Sheer speed is often quite sufficient to gain tactical and sometimes even strategic surprise. This truth has long been almost universally recognized, although discounted by those many who prefer to risk their fortunes in set-piece battles. These latter commanders and theoreticians might contemplate the accidental finding of this study that only one commander was found who proved

²⁷On smoke see Liddell Hart, I (65), 216-217; and Hankey, I (61), 229, 230, 246, 252, 300, 409.

²⁸On gas see Leo P. Brophy and George J. B. Fisher, *The Chemical Warfare Service: Organizing for War* (Washington, D.C.: OCMH, 1959); and Farago (42), 276.

²⁹On artificial light from World War I to the Korean War see Fuller (48), 413-415; Maskelyne (49); Hart, I (65), 217-218, 226, 297, 380; and Futrell (61), 421.

³⁰Herman Kahn and Anthony J. Wiener, “Technological Innovation and the Future of Strategic Warfare,” *Astronautics and Aeronautics*, Vol. 3, No. 12 (December 1967), pp. 28-48.

Artificial Climate	Surprise		No Surprise	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Gas and smoke	1	1.0%	2	3.2%
Gas only	8	8.1%	3	4.9%
Smoke only	4	4.0%	5	8.2%
Neither	26	26.3%	8	13.2%
No data (presumed neither)	60	60.6%	43	70.5%
Totals:	99	100.0%	61	100.0%
Not applicable:	7		0	

Data in Simplified Form				
Gas and/or smoke	13	13.1%	10	16.4%
Neither (incl. no data)	86	86.9%	51	83.6%
Totals:	99	100.0%	61	100.0%

Table 5.9: Relationship Between Artificial Climate and Surprise. Data is shown in full (top) and simplified (bottom) formats.

Artificial Climate	Strategic Surprise		Tactical Surprise	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Gas and smoke	0	0.0%	1	2.4%
Gas only	2	3.2%	6	14.3%
Smoke only	2	3.2%	2	4.8%
Neither	9	14.5%	17	40.5%
No data	49	79.1%	16	38.0%
Totals:	62	100.0%	42	100.0%

Table 5.10: Cases of Artificial Climate as Distributed Between Strategic and Tactical Surprise.

	Type A Cases	Type B Examples	Type C Examples
Advanced once	4	3	1
On Schedule*	26	23	34
Deferred once	16	10	13
Deferred twice	10	6	2
Deferred thrice	4	1	0
Deferred 4 times	1	1	2
Deferred 9 times	0	1	0
Deferred 16-21 times	3	0	1
Not applicable	3	2	0
Totals:	67	47	53

Table 5.11: D-DAY Schedule Slippage. *Note: All “no data” and “uncertain” cases have been given the benefit of the doubt by being classified as “On Schedule.”

consistently victorious despite his preference for the set-piece.³¹ This was Montgomery, who not only always enjoyed overwhelming preponderance in men and materiel but often obtained surprise by means other than speed. It has taken the nuclear threat of sudden, definitive attack to raise the salience of response-time to a point where systematic research has been applied, at least to that one specific environment.

D-day deadlines are often missed (Table 5.11). Among all 162 cases and examples where deadlines applied, almost half (or 43.9%) were delayed, 8 (4.9%) were able to go in ahead of their original schedule, and only slightly more than half (51.2%) remained on schedule.

In other words, put most conservatively, at least one-third of all military operations of, say, corps size and above are, for various reasons, unable to meet their deadlines. Moreover, this proportion holds roughly true regardless of the period, army, or size of operation studied. The two main reasons are weather (for example, amphibious and air operations schedules are highly dependent on the vagaries of weather) and administrative inability.

Curiously, this fact—that there is a more-or-less consistent 35-50% chance that a given attack schedule will not be met—is overlooked by both the historians and practitioners of war. It is highly relevant to our topic of surprise because this means that commanders and their intelligence services generally overlook this very likely contingency when estimating their enemies’ probable course of action, specifically the timing of attacks. Indeed, this oversight undoubtedly accounts for the rather noteworthy coincidence between schedule changes and surprise seen in Table 5.12

Table 5.12 shows three interesting facts. First, as expected, punctuality is *not* advisable if one seeks surprise. While its incidence was only 47.5% in

³¹A similar finding emerged—also quite unexpectedly—in my study of *Guerrilla Communications* (67). The question of the trade-offs between these two types of battle deserves systematic research.

Schedule	Surprise		No Surprise	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
On Schedule	48	47.5%	35	57.4%
Schedule Deferred	46	45.6%	25	41.0%
Schedule Advanced	7	6.9%	1	1.6%
Total:	101	100.0%	61	100.0%

Table 5.12: Relationships Between Schedule and Surprise.

Day	A	B	C	Total
Saturday	6	6	8	20
Sunday	10	4	11	25
Monday	13	9	9	31
Tuesday	10	6	10	26
Wednesday	8	5	5	18
Thursday	6	12	9	27
Friday	9	4	1	14
Not Applicable	5	1	0	6
Totals:	67	47	53	161
Mean Average:	8.9	6.6	7.6	22.1

Table 5.13: Days on Which Operations Were Opened, As Distributed Among Three Types of Cases and Examples.

situations of surprise, it jumps 10% (to 57.4%) in situations where surprise did not obtain. Second, as might have been expected (although I did not do so), of the two types (directions) of change the one more favorably associated with surprise is the advanced schedule, putting the attack in ahead of the original schedule. I presume this results simply from the enemy having less time to learn anything about the threatening attack. (This speculation is capable of empirical testing, unfortunately I did not think to collect data at that level of specificity.) Third, there is the ironic finding that even the annoying delays of administrative inefficiency and acts of God are rewarded by surprise, albeit with only a marginally greater chance.

The timing of surprise has minor but at least historically significant periodic aspects. Most human activities are geared in one way or another to daily, monthly, and seasonal cycles. Grounded in man's physiological links with such natural cycles, they represent the unbidden influence of his physiology on his psychology, customs, and society.

Let us begin by looking at the periodicity of the days of the week (Table 5.13).

No particularly sharp pattern is evident in Table 5.13, which distributes the days on which operations were opened among the three types of cases and examples. However, the wide divergence of several "cells" from chance expectation

(their mean average) bears a closer look.

It is widely believed that in World War II the Axis powers (or at least Germany and Japan) went out of their way to attack on the Sabbath (specifically the Christian Sunday). This is taken as proof of their devious, Godless, and monstrous nature. Moreover, it implies the plausible hypothesis that Sabbath (or weekend) attacks will tend to catch the victim at rest or worship. This specific popular belief and the underlying general hypothesis are easily tested, requiring only collation of the readily available dates of attack and a check of calendars to determine the day of week. Had any military historian done this he would have discovered that both the belief and the hypothesis are false.

The Nazis did not show any special preference for either Sunday or weekend attack. Of 24 attacks launched by them in World War II, only one-sixth (4) fell on Sunday and only one-eighth (3) on Saturday. This is virtually the same proportion as shown by the Germans in World War I, the British and Americans in World War II, and the Israelis (with a single Friday-Saturday Sabbath attack on Egypt) in the post-war period. Nor do the French, Japanese, or Italians show any noteworthy clustering about as particular day. The extreme preference for Sunday is shown by the Communist states (taking Soviet Russia, Red China, and North Korea) where even then only one-fourth of their attacks (3 out of 11) were started on Sunday. In general, no special bias for Sunday (or Sabbath or weekend) attack exists for any one nation or during any one period of history since 1914. Incidentally, the Pearl Harbor case is the only one where it is known that Sunday was deliberately chosen. Even then, the Japanese selected that day not so much for its day-of-rest inattentiveness as for the fact that it was the one day they could count on the U.S. capital ships—their target—being in port.³²

Indeed, as Table 5.14 shows, the only clearly biased day is Friday which, oddly enough, is rather sharply avoided. Of the 161 cases studied only half the chance expectation are Fridays (14 instead of 23). I have no explanation for this. Moreover, the mystery is deepened by the fact that avoidance of military initiative on Friday was entirely a phenomenon of the First World War.³³ Of 51 World War I cases studied, only one began on Friday. Thus, while I have accounted for this remarkable bias against Friday, I am quite unable to explain it. One reader³⁴ has plausibly suggested superstitious avoidance—Friday being the Westerner's traditional "unlucky day" and World War I a time when such superstitions were commonly heeded by soldiers.³⁵

³²See Case A30.

³³Table not reproduced.

³⁴Anonymous.

³⁵This hypothesis, that Friday was avoided due to superstition would be confirmed by finding explicit admissions in the memoirs of staff officers. The data does not support my own cynical suspicion that the senior generals might avoid upsetting their elaborate—indeed, sybaritic—weekend social plans by initiating military operations just before them. If this hypothesis were true, then one would expect Thursdays to also have been avoided and Mondays, Tuesdays, and Wednesdays to be the most common days for launching attacks. Neither was the case in World War I. In fact, as Thursdays, by appearing with twice its chance expectation, entirely take up the slack of Fridays, this supports the reader's hunch that Friday was indeed deliberately avoided and Thursday substituted for it. Chance remains a still possible but very lame explanation, one readily verified by taking an inventory or large random sample

Day	Surprise		No Surprise	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Saturday	12	12.0%	8	13.1%
Sunday	12	12.0%	13	21.3%
Monday	21	21.0%	10	16.4%
Tuesday	13	13.0%	13	21.3%
Wednesday	12	12.0%	6	9.8%
Thursday	18	18.0%	9	14.8%
Friday	12	12.0%	2	3.3%
Totals:	100	100.0%	61	100.0%
Mean Avg.:	14.3		8.7	

Table 5.14: Relation Between Surprise and Day of Attack

Looking at the relationship between surprise and the day of week (Table 5.14), I was startled to find that the two extremes involve Sunday and, again, the somewhat mysterious Friday. Sunday is, in fact, the one day least associated with surprise; and Friday the one most closely linked.³⁶

Perhaps the fact that Sunday is not favorably associated with surprise is simply because it is the mythically “expected” day. But, how can we account for Friday as the preeminent day of surprise? We cannot dismiss it as part of the off-duty weekend because the Friday attacks came in the morning or during the work day before the traditional weekend relaxation. Nor can we relate it to the overall rarity of its occurrence, because elimination of the set of 51 World War I cases (with their one Friday, which incidentally was a surprise attack) makes Friday appear in the remaining cases with its normal chance frequency. Thus I have no explanation for the curious “predictions” that if one attacks on a Friday he quadruples his chances for surprise and if he attacks on a Sunday he halves his chances.

I am not aware of any special bias for either attacking or withholding attack on regular festive or high holy days such as Christmas or Easter. In either case, an answer would require that a much larger number of cases be available or, failing that, explicit information about such considerations in the planning process. As it is, the only specific case I have found is that one of the many deferrals of his invasion of France (the one from December 17th to January first) was made by Hitler ostensibly to permit his troops Christmas leave.³⁷

A special consideration—particularly among Far Eastern armies—is a propensity to schedule the taking of objectives—as opposed to the launching of the attack—to celebrate the remembrance of some auspicious occasion. Thus, the Japanese in World War II had a regular custom of scheduling the capture of cities to coincide with their Emperor’s birthday. Such seeking of trophies to present as Imperial birthday gifts was, naturally enough, usually unsuccessful,

of World War I battles.

³⁶As shown more sharply by interchanging the axes of this table.

³⁷Taylor (58), 60.

except in the case of easy targets such as Singapore.³⁸ Even Douglas MacArthur played this game when through Xth Corps on 23 September 1950 he directed the 1st Marine Division—to the distress of its commander, Major General O. P. Smith who, correctly, calculated a high casualty rate for his men—to take Seoul on the 25th, which would mark 90 days from its capture. Somehow, MacArthur had been led to believe that 90 days held some magic significance for East Asians. In fact, Seoul was not secured until 1630 hours the 27th and 708 Marine battle casualties later; and MacArthur’s triumphal handing back of the city to a tearful Syngman Rhee was delayed to the 29th. However, as with MacArthur’s premature announcement of the recapture of Manila in 1944, the realities had not stayed his official declaration that the 25 September deadline had been met.³⁹

5.3.4 Preconceptions

“American people . . . expect you to be able to say
that a war will start next Tuesday at 5:32 p.m.”

—General Walter Bedell Smith
CIA Director-Designate, 1950⁴⁰

“Late in May [1941] one of my informants whose information had always
proved true came to tell me that at 3 A.M. on the fourth Sunday in
June [i.e., 22 June] the Germans would march into Russia.”

—Louis P. Lochner,
AP Bureau Chief, Berlin.⁴¹

Surprise also has certain associational or sequential preconditions and consequences. All I mean by this is that the expectations of a person or a group (such as an intelligence service or political-military decision makers) are in large part based on past experience. Because men cannot obliterate their memories (short of hypnosis, hysteria, brain damage, or death) their judgment of future events—including warnings—are very strongly biased against perceiving the developing patterns that signal the unprecedented. Consequently they are surprised when the event finally intrudes itself and their understanding of it is an *ex post facto*, hindsight, or retrospective process. Thus our understanding of such instances of strategic surprise as BARBAROSSA and Pearl Harbor come only from hindsight recognition of the interplay of perceptions and stratagem. Conversely, the

³⁸James Leasor, *Singapore: The Battle That Changed the World* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1968), pp. 259-260; and Farago (67), 206.

³⁹Sheldon (68), 301, 311-312, 316; Heintz (68), 210-211, 239-240; Montross, II (55), 244, 264, 233; and Geer (52), 116. See also Appleman (61), 527, 532, 536.

⁴⁰*Time*, 28 August 1950, p. 14.

⁴¹*New York Times*, 6 June 1942, page 4. Lochner’s informant is now known to have been Hermann Maass who acquired it through the then retired Colonel-General Beck from a still-unidentified general in the OKR[?]. For my detailed reconstruction of this fascinating tale of *liochyerrat*[?]-one conveniently overlooked in most of the German Resistance literature—see Whaley, *Operation BARBAROSSA* (69), Chapt. III.

False Alerts	Surprise		No Surprise	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
0	85	83.3%	58	95.1%
1	8	7.9%	2	3.3%
2 or more	9	8.8	1	1.6%
Total:	102	100.0%	61	100.0%

Table 5.15: Relationship Between False Alerts and Surprise

most assuredly successful stratagems are, I suppose, those that encourage a pattern of ambiguous signals, one of whose horns points in an *expected* but *wrong* direction.

It should be possible to adapt certain existing techniques to enable the intelligence analyst to escape the bias of the preconceptions that obscure most stratagems.⁴² Such a serendipity machine (computer or manual) would, I presume, involve a two-step process: a random (i.e., preconception-free) search for patterns in military posture followed by a comparison of such patterns with the array of theoretically *possible* military actions (i.e., capabilities). Those with best fit would be candidates for closer scrutiny and verification by conventional intelligence procedures.

The earlier, whimsical finding—that procrastination can help generate surprise—can be explained by the “cry-wolf” syndrome. There is some crude data to support this, as shown in Table 5.15.

Here we see that the instances of surprise are indeed somewhat more commonly preceded by false alerts than in those instances not involving surprise. Moreover, the trend is that the greater the number of false alerts, the greater the chance of their being associated with surprise.

Examining the factor of preconception more closely, we can see that it is composed of many, complexly interrelated, elements: gullibility, prior history of the conflict (Case A51: Ardennes); “lessons” drawn from perceived analogies (Case A59: Inch’on Landing), salience or priority given the potential conflict in the face of competing problems (Case A18: Norway), the previous history of false alarms, etc. Let us take the last as an example (Table 5.16). This is the familiar “cry wolf” syndrome. It is present in 17 of the 102 instances of surprise. Moreover, its Aesopian moral seemingly holds in most or all of the 17 cases, the false alarms serving mainly to undermine the credibility of the source and dull the effect of subsequent warnings.

⁴²Several papers on “probabilistic information processing systems” by Dr. Ward Edwards of the Institute of Science and Technology of the University of Michigan are directly related to this problem of how to overcome human preconception. I am indebted to Mr. William R. Harris for these references as well as for my awareness of the problem.

Surprise Achieved?	Wolf Cried?:	Yes	No
Yes		17	85
No		3	58
(N=163)			

Table 5.16: Relationship Between Surprise and “Cry Wolf” Effect

Thus we see that the “cry wolf” syndrome constitutes an important perturbation in intelligence estimates of future enemy action. Moreover, it is ironic that in at least 5 of the 17 instances, some of the D-day warnings were quite authentic, the enemy having merely unexpectedly deferred the operation.⁴³ The consequence was, of course, that several superb intelligence sources including Colonel Oster, Sorge, and Rössler received undeserved black marks on the eve of their subsequent definitive alerts.

⁴³Cases A16, A19, A20, A21, A28.

5.4 Surprise and Casualties

“Battles are won by slaughter and manoeuvre. The greater the general, the more he contributes to manoeuvre, the less he demands in slaughter.”

–Churchill, *The World Crisis, 1915* (1923), p. 5.

“Nearly all the battles which are regarded as masterpieces of the military art . . . have been battles of manoeuvre in which very often the enemy has found himself defeated by some novel expedient or device, some queer, swift, unexpected thrust or stratagem. In many such battles the losses of the victors have been small.”

–Churchill, *The World Crisis, 1915* (1923), p. 5.

“A big butcher’s bill was not necessarily evidence of good tactics.”

–Wavell, telegram to Churchill, c. 20 August 1941.

Casualty statistics are one important measure of the costs of battle, and casualty ratios an index of relative success or failure of the antagonists. I have made extensive use of them in my analysis, because they are generally available. For example, I was able to find statistics on losses (in comparable categories) for both antagonists in 86 per cent of the combat actions studied.⁴⁴

A favorable disproportion of casualty figures is frequently associated with surprise, so much so that it deserves a detailed statistical study to determine the relative roles of such other factors as stronger/weaker, attack/defense, etc. For the present, a cursory look will have to suffice.

For comparison let us glance at casualty figures in non-surprise situations.⁴⁵ In the Great War the total battle casualties on the generally static Western Front were 4 million German to 7.4 million Allies, that is, “favoring” the Germans almost 1:2. The major offensives showed ratios generally between 1:1 and 1:2, usually favoring the defender. In World War II on the Eastern Front alone, Wehrmacht dead (all causes) totaled 3 to 3.5 million as against perhaps 12 to 13.6 million Russians, favoring the Germans about 1:4.⁴⁶

While, it seems, no *military* writer has explicitly argued *direct* relationship between deception and low casualties, Shakespeare makes the assumption plain. Writing in 1599, he imagines King Henry the Fifth learning the casualties of the

⁴⁴Specifically:

134	Both antagonists
15	One only
7	Neither
<hr/>	
156	TOTAL COMBAT ACTIONS
7	Not applicable (no battle)
<hr/>	
163	TOTAL MILITARY OPERATIONS

⁴⁵For statistics on W.W. I casualties see Lieutenant-General Nicholas N. Golovine, *The Russian Army in the World War* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1931), pp. 75-104; and Willoughby (39), 131-135. For World War II see Esposito (64b), 399-401.

⁴⁶Ziemke (68), 500.

Battle of Agincourt (1415).⁴⁷ An English Herald reports the clear victory: 10,000 French slain to only 29 English.⁴⁸ Henry piously exclaims:

... O God! thy arm was here;
And not to us, but to thy arm alone,
Ascribe we all. When, without stratagem,
But in plain shock and even play of battle,
Was ever known so great and little loss
On one part and on the other? Take it, God,
For it is none but thine!

In fact, the French casualties were almost certainly no less than 5,500 to something under 300 Britons, a quite plausible accounting by 5,000 well deployed English armor-piercing longbows against a chivalrous mob of 40,000 to 50,000. Moreover, the English were killing their prisoners that day.⁴⁹ A copy-book case of the effects of technological surprise rather than divine intercession. While the real Agincourt is a relevant case, the point at issue is Shakespeare's use of a legendary Agincourt. His 16th century was one of renaissance of the martial arts. National need, public concern, and the printing press combined to yield almost 200 military titles. The numerous English translations of classical texts included such advocates of surprise and stratagem as Frontinus (English translation 1539) and Vegetius (English translation 1572). And Machiavelli's *The Arte of Warre* appeared in 1560. These translations and numerous original works—some discussing and recommending stratagem—were widely read by Queen Elizabeth's subjects.⁵⁰ And Shakespeare himself was immersed in this military ethos, if rather poorly read in its specialized literature.⁵¹ For example, 8 of his 15 uses of the word "stratagem" are explicitly in its military sense.⁵²

A highly favorable casualty rate is one of the most valuable consequences of surprise. Tables 5.17 and 5.18 show this most emphatically.

Table 5.17 shows that the mean average casualty ratios favor the initiator of military operations by only 1-to-1.7 in non-surprise circumstances but by

⁴⁷Shakespeare, *Henry V*, Act IV, Scene 8.

⁴⁸Shakespeare merely copies these absurd figures from his main source for *Henry V*, the second edition of the contemporary history by Raphael Holinshed, *The Chronicles of England, Scotland, and Ireland* (Second edition, enlarged: London: 1587), Vol. III, p. 533, as collated by W.G. Boswell-Stone, *Shakespeare's Holinshed* (London: Lawrence and Bullen, 1896), pp. 195-196. See also Richard Hosley (editor), *Shakespeare's Holinshead* (New York: Putnam, 1968), p. 135.

⁴⁹E.F. Jacob, *The Fifteenth century, 1399-1485* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961), pp. 153-156. Note also that Holinshead himself also reports five to six hundred English killed as an alternative figure "of greater credit."

⁵⁰Henry J. Webb, *Elizabethan Military Science* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1965), pp. 3-16, 169-176; and C.G. Cruickshank, *Elizabeth's Army* (2nd ed., Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1966), pp. 198-206.

⁵¹Paul A. Jorgensen, *Shakespeare's Military World* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1956); and Lily B. Campbell, *Shakespeare's "Histories"* (San Marino, Calif.: The Huntington Library, 1947), pp. 255-305.

⁵²John Bartlett, *A New and Complete Concordance . . . of Shakespeare* (London: Macmillan, 1894), p. 1476.

	Number of Cases	Average Casualty Ratio
Surprise	87	1: 14.5
No Surprise	51	1: 1.7
Total	138	
No data or N/A	29	
Grand Total	167	

Table 5.17: Effect of Surprise On Casualties, 1914-1967.

	Number of Cases	Average Casualty Ratio
Surprise	79	1: 5.3
No Surprise	45	1: 1.1
Total:	122	
Deleted extreme	*16	
Grand Total:	138	

Table 5.18: Effect of Surprise On Casualties In 90% Of Cases, 1914-1967. *Note: Sixteen rather than 14 were deleted only because this table has been summarized from a larger table where the 10% deletion rule was applied to *each* of the subcategories.

a thumping 1-to-14.5 when surprise is present. That is, surprise is more than eight times as effective at producing casualties.⁵³ However, this almost fantastic difference is in large part the result of a small proportion of surprise operations that yielded extremely favorable casualty rates, largely as a result of mass surrenders.⁵⁴ While these extreme cases may very properly be credited as an effect of surprise, it will be more practical to limit our discussion to the more usual set of cases. This is accomplished in Table 5.18 merely by deleting the 10% most deviant cases, 5% at each extreme.

Table 5.18 shows that while the usual non-surprise operations produce casualty ratios of about 1-to-1, those with surprise yield ratios of 5-to-1. That is, surprise may be rather reliably depended upon to quintuple the enemy's casualty rates, *relative to one's own*. This finding also holds roughly for both cases of "strategic" and "tactical" surprise.⁵⁵

The theory of stratagem predicts that the more intense the surprise,⁵⁶ the more favorable the casualty ratios. The empirical data quite emphatically verifies this, as seen in Table 5.19.

If, as the theory of stratagem asserts, deception is not only a main cause but also an enhancer of surprise, then the data must show that (a) casualty ratios are substantially greater in cases of surprise-with-deception than for those of surprise-sans-deception and (b) there is slight or no greater casualty ratios

⁵³Incidentally, the ratios would have been still much greater had I totaled the actual casualties and then taken their mean averages rather than merely averaging the average ratios.

⁵⁴For example, Case A27 and Example B30.

⁵⁵Strategic surprise giving a 1-to-4.5 ratio and tactical a 1-to-6.2 ratio. Table not reproduced.

⁵⁶For discussion of my index of *intensity* of surprise see Section G, below.

Intensity	Average Casualty Ratios
0	1: 1.1
1	1: 1.7
2	1: 4.5
3	1: 5.4
4	1: 4.1
5	1: 11.5

Table 5.19: Effect Of Intensity Of Surprise On Casualties In 90% Of Cases, 1914-1967.

	Number of Cases	Average Casualty Ratios
Surprise with Deception	59	1: 6.3
Surprise without Deception	20	1: 2.0
No Surprise with Deception	5	1: 1.3
No Surprise without Deception	40	1: 1.1
Total:	122	

Table 5.20: Relationships Between Surprise, Deception, and Casualties.

between cases of no surprise and those without deception. This is verified by Table 5.20.

Until now, I have described casualties only in terms of the ratio between those of the initiator of a military operation and those of his intended victim. But what of the absolute casualty figures? That is, what is the effect of surprise on actual casualties? While I have not generated the relevant tables, inspection of the raw data summarized in the Analytical Lists comprising Appendix B shows that the effect is two-fold. First, surprise increases the enemy's total casualties, particularly in numbers of prisoners taken. The effect is greatly enhanced if the protagonist is prepared to exploit the initial opportunities opened up by surprise. Second, surprise decreases the protagonist's total casualties. This effect is compounded of a direct consequence of surprise itself, which renders the enemy's response confused and hence inefficient and of an indirect consequence of the speed associated with surprise, as in the Six-Day War (Case A66) where *daily* casualty rates were high but the whole operation ended quickly in a decisive victory at a far below expected cost. In sum, the overall *military* effect of surprise is to produce both relative and absolute figures that are favorable to the protagonist. Moreover, the long-range *demographic* or social costs are favorable to *both* sides. Again the relative costs are less for the protagonist, but here the absolute costs for both sides are less in killed, maimed, and military and civilian property damage.

5.5 Surprise in Offensive-Defensive Modes

One of the longest standing debates in military theory has revolved about the relative merits of the offensive versus the defensive modes of battle. Changes in both weaponry and doctrine have shifted preference or emphasis first to one then to the other mode. While at the grossest level of analysis the debaters divide neatly between the advocates of attack and the advocates of defense, the issue becomes quite muddled at the next lower level of abstraction. There we find great variety: The defensive may be static (depending on forts or trenches) or mobile (depending on counterattack). The offensive may be conducted by crushing frontal attrition, or breakthrough followed by either the classical forms of exploitation or the *Blitzkrieg's* "expanding torrent," or various forms of out-flanking and other indirect maneuvers.

One of the legacies of the machine-gun and artillery-dominated Western Front was a "magic" number: three. Officers came to adopt the notion that a three-to-one local superiority in the zone of an offensive was necessary for a successful attack. And, indeed, this rule of thumb was consistent with statistical studies of the *overall* averages of Western Front battles.⁵⁷ This bit of Great War doctrine was carried into World War II (and beyond). Its main exponents have included General Alexander and his two Eighth Army Commanders (Generals Montgomery and Leese) and his Fifth Army Commander (General Clark).⁵⁸ Analyses seemed to show that even greater than 3-to-1 superiority was needed to success of break-out attacks in such confined pockets as Normandy.⁵⁹

Most Soviet and many American commanders also backed this doctrine. Even Chinese Communist military commanders—at least during the Korean War—are alleged to be "wary of launching an offensive unless their forces outnumber the enemy by three to one" and only then under cover of night, if possible.⁶⁰

Such magic numbers do have their origin in some limited or local experience. However, they become too readily generalized and applied without verification to only vaguely analogous situations. The ubiquitous ten-soldiers-to-defeat-one guerrilla is the most familiar recent example, and it is immediately exploded by comparative case studies.⁶¹

How does this 3-to-1 doctrine look in the light of our data on surprise?

First, let us look only at the World War I data. Of the 47 offensive battles for which data was available, the average strength ratio of attacker to defender was 2.1 to 1 (Table 5.21).

⁵⁷See, for example, Lieut.-Colonel F.O. Miksche, *Atomic Weapons and Armies* (New York: Praeger, 1955), p. 114.

⁵⁸See, for example, Majdalany (57), 254.

⁵⁹Liddell Hart, "Lessons of Normandy," unpublished(?) paper quoted in Miksche (55), 106.

⁶⁰Andrew Geer, *The New Breed: The Story of the U.S. Marines in Korea* (New York: Harper, 1952), p. 221.

⁶¹See, for example, Andrew R. Molnar, *Undergrounds in Insurgent, Revolutionary, and Resistance Warfare* (Washington, D.C.: The American University, Special Operations Research Office, 1963).

Achievement	Surprise			No Surprise		
	Number	Force	Ratio	Number	Force	Ratio
Victory (V+)	7	2.1	:1	0	—	
About as planned (V)	10	1.6	:1	5	2.1	:1
Below expectations (V-)	5	2.8	:1	5	1.3	:1
Defeat (D)	3	5.9	:1	12	1.8	:1

Table 5.21: Force Used to Gain Objectives In World War I. This table excludes the one extreme instance (Case A1) where the British enjoyed a 114-to-1 advantage *and* surprise at Tanga but failed to exploit either. Two other examples (B7 and B8) were excluded because they were purely defensive.

Achievement	Surprise			No Surprise		
	Number	Force	Ratio	Number	Force	Ratio
Victory	18	1.2	:1	1	2.5	:1
About as Planned	28	1.1	:1	4	1.4	:1
Below Expectations	17	1.4	:1	9	1.4	:1
Defeat	4	1.0	:1	20	0.9	:1

Table 5.22: Force Used to Gain Objectives After World War I. Case A65 (Bay of Pigs) was deleted as an extreme figure, and for Example B29 (Mèdinine) was transposed from British defensive to German offensive.

There is no obvious pattern here. But, before comment, observe the comparable table for the data *after* the Great War (Table 5.22).

Both tables 5.21 and 5.22, if taken together, support two important conclusions. First, we see strong proof for the notion that a substantial superiority of force is needed, although my data yields force ratios of about 2-to-1 rather than the traditional 3-to-1. However, this general remark holds true only for the more usual type of offensive military operation, that is, the one *not* involving surprise. For that type there is a fairly direct relationship between force and degree of success, the more the force the greater the success. Second, and both more important and rather unexpected, is that surprise intervenes to shatter the direct and simple relationship between force and success.

5.6 Military Environments: Land, Sea, Air, Amphibious

Each of the three gross geographical environments—land, sea, and air—poses its own problems and opportunities for surprise attack. These are mirrored in the separate doctrinal traditions evolved by each of the three services—army, naval and airforces—of each nation and their various combinations by the hybrid doctrine of combined or amphibious operations.

Although I had not set out to limit my study of surprise and deception to land operations, the great majority of cases in the period 1914-1963 have, in fact, been of that type, as there have been relatively few large-scale battles since

Combat Environment	Number
Land	125
Amphibious	33
Air	4
Naval-Air	3
All naval	1
Airborne	1
Total:	167

Table 5.23: Distribution of Combat Cases Among Environments

	Land		Amphibious		Other	
	No.	Percent	No.	Percent	No.	Percent
Surprise						
<i>with</i> Deception	46	36.8	25*	75.7	5	55.6
Surprise only	26	20.8	3	9.1	1	11.1
Deception only	4	3.2	3	9.1	1	11.1
Neither	49	39.2	2	6.1	2	22.2
Totals:	125	100.0	33	100.0	9	100.0

Table 5.24: Relationship of Combat Environment with Surprise and Deception, 1914-1967. *Note: Includes two cases (A22 and A23) where deception succeeded but where surprise was not applicable.

1914 that were predominantly naval or air engagements. Fortunately, therefore, the number of cases involving combined operations has been large enough to cast light not only on that particular type but on its component environmental elements as well (see Table 5.23).

I will begin with a broad look at the relationship of military environment to surprise and deception (see Table 5.24). To do so I have included all cases. However, the specific percentage figures that result should be taken lightly, because the category where neither surprise nor deception was present is grossly under-represented. In other words, the *trends across* columns are more meaningful than the percentages within columns.

Table 5.24 shows that, in the 20th century at least, surprise is present in almost all (85%) of amphibious landings, but in only about half (58%) of the land and other environments. The reason would appear to be not so much that the littoral environment offers greater opportunity for “natural or spontaneous” surprise as it is that deception is simply used in a larger proportion of such enterprises. Thus, the same table also shows that while deception was present in only 40% of the land operations studied, it was present in 85% of the amphibious cases.

The military environments can appear—and have done so from time to time—in their three unalloyed forms and in four combinations, seven modes in all [see Table 5.25].

Environment	Military Mode	Introduced
Land	Land War, Ground Operations	Prehistory
Sea	Naval Warfare	Antiquity
Land-Sea	Amphibious (or Combined, or Conjunct) Operations	Antiquity
Air	Aerial Warfare(including air-ground support)	W.W. I (1915)
Land-Air	Vertical Envelopment or Airborne Operations (glider, parachute, helicopter)	Spanish Civil War (1936)
Air-Sea	Carrier Warfare	W.W. II (1940)
Land-Sea-Air	Combined (or Amphibious) Operations	W.W. II (1940)

Table 5.25: Military Environments and Military Modes.

	Land Operations			
	World War I		World War II	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Surprise <i>with</i> Deception	12	26.1%	27	54.0%
Surprise only	10	21.7%	7	14.0%
Deception only	0	0.0%	3	6.0%
Neither	24	52.2%	13	26.0%
Totals:	46	100.0%	50	100.0%

Table 5.26: Stratagem Trends in Land Warfare

As each of these types of operation offers unique opportunities for surprise and deception, the fact that they appeared at different points in history and tend to occur in different proportions of frequency in any given military epoch implies that some epochs should offer greater opportunity for surprise than others. While systematic empirical verification of this hypothesis is beyond the scope of the present paper, it is worth raising because it suggests a major conclusion. Namely, that in the race between the increased number of opportunities for surprise (i.e., the greater number of feasible optional means and paths to a given goal) and the increased effectiveness (and number of means) of intelligence warning systems in preventing surprise, the rôle of deception becomes ever more decisive in providing the breakthrough to surprise. This is borne out by the trend in land warfare from World War I to World War II, as seen in Table 5.26.

Here we see a sharp increase with time in the proportion of all cases of surprise, from 48% in the Great War to 68% in World War II. From this it could *seem* that surprise has become “easier” to achieve. In fact, the table also shows that this *could* be entirely accounted for by the parallel rise in the use of deception.

5.6.1 Land

Land battles and campaigns have generally covered the great majority of large-scale military actions throughout history. This is true even today when air and amphibious operations have come to play a highly important role. This circumstance is fairly represented in my study where, of 168 operations, 126 were entirely on land. As the bulk of this paper has been concerned with land warfare, I will not single that topic out for any special remarks here.

5.6.2 Sea

My superficial examination of the writings of such naval theoreticians as Admiral Mahan indicates that that rather considerable body of literature has progressed even less than that of land warfare in imbedding the concepts of surprise and deception into general theory. The immediate reason for this, as British Vice-Admiral Gretton has shown in a damning appraisal, is that naval theoreticians from Malian to Bernard Brodie and Roskill have either uncritically borrowed or, at best, grudgingly accepted the “principles of war” as propounded by the land warriors.⁶² Moreover, they built upon the more sterile traditions of land war theory when surprise and deception were downgraded. This is unfortunate, because naval operations intrinsically lend themselves to abstract analysis more readily than land operations. This circumstance is implied by the fact that, compared to armies, navies have fewer major units (ships and bases) to deploy, a simpler and more centralized communication net, a more uniform media (the sea) on and in which to operate, and a smaller and more precisely defined set of potential objectives (other ships or coastal targets). Moreover, this circumstance is demonstrated by the fact that the entire modern analytical technique of operations research (OR) originated as a solution to the destroyer-versus-submarine dilemma in World War I.

5.6.3 Air

Aerial warfare (even including the rare airborne operation), like naval operations and unlike land war, is well-suited to the sorts of abstract analysis in which concepts like surprise and stratagem easily fit. However, I find no evidence that this has produced any greater theoretical attention to these concepts much less any new thinking than already exists in the theory and doctrine of land war. Indeed while the principle of surprise is recognized in the writings of airmen, the technique of stratagem does not have any special place in air doctrine, at least not in the public literature.

There is good reason to presume that surprise and stratagem do figure prominently in the classified air doctrines of all major powers. This would arise from the fact—implicit if not always explicit in the air literature—that these are very immediate and practical issues. From World War I to the present, the evolu-

⁶²Vice-Admiral Sir Peter Gretton, *Maritime Strategy* (New York: Praeger, 1965), pp. 21-24.

tion of air and aerospace strategy and doctrine has been intimately linked with problems of speed, interception, evasive maneuverability, and early warning.

The new combination of nuclear explosives with missile delivery systems has, by its potential for sudden decisive wars, raised the salience of surprise to an issue of survival itself, and it is recognized as such in the literature.⁶³ However, I am not aware of any advances in the theory of *strategic* deception, as opposed to such tactical ruses as multiple warheads (MERVS), dummy warheads, and electronic countermeasures (ECM) to confuse the victim's local defenses after an attack is launched.

5.6.4 Amphibious Operations

“Littoral War, when wisely prepared and discreetly conducted,
is a terrible Sort of War.

Happy for that People who are Sovereigns enough of the Sea
to put it in Execution!

For it comes like Thunder and lightening
to some unprepared Part of the World.”

—Thomas More Molyneux,
Conjunct Expeditions (1759).⁶⁴

The combined (or amphibious or conjunct) operation is probably the most difficult single type of military operation, seeking as it does by very definition to meld the recalcitrant structures, maneuvers, and evolutions of armies, navies, and—lately—airforces. However, it promises the greatest chance of gaining surprise precisely because it combines two or more environments, each of which multiplies the number of options for surprise.

Combined operations are not only the most difficult to plan and mount, but they are also generally believed to be the most risky. Until the beachhead is secured and operations expand outward to land battle, the viability of the entire enterprise is doubtful; and the cost for failure is deemed to be nothing less than disaster. The clear appreciation of this high risk led, I think, to the early application of stratagem to that type of operation. There is nothing like the exigent threat of disaster to open the minds of planners to unorthodox solutions.

The British themselves acknowledge it was their desperate plight in 1940 that brought quick acceptance of such off-beat expedients as combined, “special,” and deception operations. In any case, stratagem became more-or-less standard procedure in amphibious operations in 1915 and has remained so ever since, as Table 5.27 shows.

This circumstance explains, I would suggest, why amphibious operations do not, in fact, fail as often or as badly as their detractors predict. Indeed, they

⁶³See particularly Y. Harkabi, *Nuclear War and Nuclear Peace* (Jerusalem: Israel Program for Scientific Translations, 1966), pp. 41-51. This is a useful summary of the literature on nuclear surprise. Its interest is enhanced because the author was, as Chief of Israeli Military Intelligence during the Sinai Campaign of 1956, deeply involved in the practice of strategic and tactical deception.

⁶⁴Quoted in Heinl (68), xix.

	Amphibious Operations					
	World War I		World War II		After	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Deception and surprise	5	83.3	17	73.0	3	75.0
Deception only	0	0.0	2	9.0	1	25.0
No deception, but surprise	1	16.7	2	9.0	0	0.0
No deception, no surprise	0	0.0	2	9.0	0	0.0
Totals:	6	100.0	23	100.0	4	100.0

Table 5.27: Stratagem in Amphibious Operations

	Amphibious Operations			
	With Deception		No Deception	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Victory	6	21.4	1	20.0
About as planned	11	39.3	0	0.0
Below expectations	5	17.9	3	60.0
Defeat	6	21.4	1	20.0
Totals:	28	100.0	5	100.0

Table 5.28: Outcomes of Amphibious Operations

are generally less risky than land operations (Table 5.28).

5.7 The Varieties and Intensities of Surprise and Deception

Surprise is most commonly viewed in the military literature as an either-or quality: the victim is either surprised or he is not surprised. Up to this point, I have also found it convenient to treat it at this crudely abstract level. However, surprise may be viewed in greater detail as having at least two psychological dimensions: variety (or extent) and intensity (or depth). And both dimensions are manipulable by the alternative choice theory of stratagem. One dimension of surprise is its extent or variety—the different forms or modes that surprise may take. The first problem is how best to categorize these various forms. There is no shortage of suitable existing typologies. It is tempting to adapt one of those already in use in the communications research field. For example, even a primitive model such as the “who-what-where-when-why” mnemonic of professional journalists would give a useful starting point. Similarly Professor Lasswell’s familiar: “Who says what in which channel to whom with what effect.”⁶⁵ However, I have preferred to build a new set, using the bits and scraps already given in the military literature. These have the merit of familiarity and,

⁶⁵Harold D. Lasswell, “The Structure and Function of Communication in Society,” in Lyman Bryson (editor), *The Communication of Ideas* (New York: Harper, 1948), p. 37.

with slight addition and modification, seen suitable for my purpose. Accordingly I will categorize the varieties of surprise as a set with five elements or modes: intention, time, place, strength, and style.

Intention in the sense I mean it here is the go/no go element. Is the war (or campaign or battle) even possible? Before the event such questions as the following were asked in all seriousness. Dare Hitler invade Poland or England or Russia? Dare Tojo make war on the United States? Does Hitler intend to preempt in Norway; or the Israelis in the Sinai? Are Britain and France merely preparing a bluff against Suez? Does Rommel even consider counterattacking at Mersa el Brega? Such questions relate to the basic *intentions* and *decisions* to wage war *or* peace, to bluff *or* act, to attack *or* defend, to escalate *or* surrender. They are the fundamental *preferences* and *choices* that determine whether a given war, campaign, or battle changes from possibility to reality. In one sense, intention is a precondition of the other varieties of surprise.

Time. Unexpectedness of time is a key form that surprise takes. It is usually measured in minutes, hours, and days; also sometimes in weeks or months, although these longer time spans begin to blend into the more indefinite, even statically defined periods or eras that are covered by the above category of intention.

Place refers to the point or area threatened, or to the direction or axis of operations.

Strength refers to the amount of military force committed to the operation. It is usually measured, as I have done it in this study, by numbers of troops (or such aggregates as divisions or brigades), tanks, ships, planes, or missiles. Others measure it by the potential firepower (weight of naval broadside, tonnage of bombs, megatonnage of nuclear strike, etc.). Still others also attempt to add some index to take into account such qualitative factors as morale or efficiency.

Style. By *style* I refer to the form that the military operation takes, the fashion in which it is carried out. Thus one may be surprised by such stylistic things as the details of the operational plan as it unfolds, the types of weapons or weapons systems used (cavalry, tanks, chemical-biological, dive-bombers, machine guns, missiles, etc.), or the specific tactics (expanding torrent, frontal assault, static defense, etc.). This category is unusual in that it is often overlooked in the literature on surprise and in that it incorporates technological surprise (new weapons or weapons systems), which is almost always treated as a special category.

The factor of technological surprise has already been discussed in the text, and several examples are given in the appendices. Moreover, this particular mode of surprise is already well studied, as illustrated in the examples of poison gas at Second Ypres (Example B5), the tank at Cambrai (Example B13), and

the atomic bomb at Hiroshima (Case A55). Consequently I will leave this topic by remarking that the innovator of military gadgetry does have a high likelihood of gaining surprise. Thus he is well advised—and here I merely repeat the standard admonition—to be prepared to exploit his temporary advantage and not dissipate such potentially valuable innovation in real but minor combat trials whose results would thereby be shared with the enemy.⁶⁶

Although this particular five-fold set of varieties or types of surprise is not found in the military literature, the separate parts do appear in one or another form. Thus “intention” is commonly mentioned although not, as far as I am aware, *explicitly* identified as a type of surprise. The most common single type of surprise mentioned is “place.” Indeed, many military authorities imply that it is the only one.⁶⁷ The next most often met type is surprise of “time.” Indeed, many writers mention it together with “place.” A third type of surprise mentioned—almost always together with “place” and “time”—is “strength.” As noted above, some writers also explicitly discuss a special category of “technical” or “technological surprise.”⁶⁸ Finally, a very few writers recognize that innovations in tactics can yield surprise, although they do not seem quite able to fit that category into a general typology.⁶⁹ This simple list exhausts the thinking of the standard authors on war.

My theory of stratagem is a decision-making model of alternative choices.⁷⁰ However, the argument—deriving as it did from Liddell Hart’s theory of “alternative objectives”—drew its examples exclusively from that set of choices involving objectives or goals. All these goals were either specific terrain features (positions or regions) or specific objects (armies or localities) on the terrain. Thus, all the types of objectives were to be attained by moving units of military force over terrain from one area to another. Consequently, the theory may have seemed limited to the “where” or “place” of surprise. However, the model of alternative choices applies equally to the other modes of surprise, specifically to the set of types described in this section: intention, time, place, strength, and style. As all these five modes can be presented as real *alternative* choices before the protagonist and as *alternative* choices as perceived by his victim, the protagonist can apply the theory of stratagem to each or all of them in order to enhance his chances for surprise.

The most common mode in which surprise appears is place (or direction), being present in 72% of all instances of surprise studied. Place is closely followed

⁶⁶This admonition was put forward in most explicit general terms—perhaps for the first time—on 28 December 1914 by Colonel Hankey, the Secretary of the British War Council, in a Memorandum to that high body. Although this particular paper was one of the milestones in the introduction of the tank, smoke, and other devices, his caveat about wasting their surprise effect by field tryouts was ignored. Colonel (later Lord) Hankey was—with Churchill—one of the great technological innovators of both world wars. See Hankey, I (61), 228-231, 244-250.

⁶⁷Even Samuel Eliot Morison has sometimes slipped on this point.

⁶⁸For example, Erfurth (38/43), 191-194.

⁶⁹Although I now find that Miksche (55), 36-37, had anticipated me by a passing reference in which he gives the four-fold typology of surprise of time (“moment”), place (“direction”), “strength,” and “new weapon or new tactical form.”

⁷⁰Chapter IV.

Mode of Surprise	“Strategic” Cases		“Tactical” Examples		Total	
	No.	Percent	No.	Percent	No.	Percent
Place	47	74.6%	31	68.9%	78	72.2%
Time	46	73.0%	25	55.6%	71	65.7%
Strength	38	60.3%	24	53.3%	62	57.4%
Intention	29	46.0%	7	15.6%	36	33.5%
Style	16	25.4%	12	26.7%	28	25.9%
Totals:	63		45		108	

Table 5.29: Distribution of Mode of Surprise Among Strategic and Tactical Examples.

by *time* (66%) and *strength* (57%), trailed by *intention* (33%), and ended by *style*, which was present in only 25% of all instances of surprise. As Table 5.29 shows, this trend holds strongly for both “strategic” and “tactical” level operations. The one exception is that *intention* is better concealed at the strategic level.

Intensity is a second dimension of surprise. There are at least two ways by which the intensity of surprise can be measured. One measure is the *number* of modes in which surprise was attained out of the five possible modes defined above.⁷¹ The other measure of the intensity of surprise is the *degree* of surprise achieved for any one of the five modes—or for some index or “profile” that sums these five separate surprises. (One can, of course, also test various overall indices that combine both the *numbers* and *intensities* of the five modes.)

Although the second measure of intensity is the more realistic one, data on the first is far more readily available. Common sense is sufficient to suggest the hypothesis that the greater the intensity of surprise (by either of these two definitions) the greater will be the effects of surprise, such as more favorable casualty ratios, greater chance of achieving victory, etc. However, the first measure, the one that measures intensity by the sheer number of modes, is directly related to the theory of stratagem. Consequently, the hypothesis that there is a direct relationship between the intensity and effects of surprise can be derived from the theory, which is based on the frequency of alternatives. I will now show that this hypothesis is quite consistent with the data.

Table 5.30 shows the frequencies (number of instances) at each of the five possible levels of intensity of surprise (as measured by the number of modes of surprise inflicted).

In general, we see that the obvious is confirmed: the more intense instances of surprise are rarer. However, there is one striking exception. Surprise very rarely appears in only *one* of its modes. Inspection of Analytical Lists A and B shows that this is because surprise of *place* usually coincides with surprise in *time* or *strength*.

This general pattern also applies for both “strategic” and “tactical” operations, although it is more or less pronounced at the “tactical” level. While

⁷¹As noted by, at least, Miksche (55), 37, who, although he is one of the very few writers to make the point explicit, calls it “a hackneyed truism.”

Intensity of Surprise	Frequency		Total
	“Strategic Cases”	“Tactical Examples”	
1	7	9	16
2	22	20	42
3	18	11	29
4	12	4	16
5	4	1	5
Totals:	63	45	108

Table 5.30: Frequencies vs. Level of Intensity of Surprise

Outcome	0	1	2	3	4	5
	No./%	No./%	No./%	No./%	No./%	No./%
Defeat (coded D)	35/59.3	4/25.0	5/11.9	0/0.0	1/6.2	0/0.0
Well below expectations (V-)	14/23.7	2/12.5	9/21.4	6/20.7	5/31.3	1/20.0
About as intended (V)	9/15.3	6/37.5	21/50.0	15/51.7	4/25.0	1/20.0
Well above expectations (V+)	1/1.7	4/25.0	7/16.7	8/27.6	6/37.5	3/60.0
Totals:	59/100.0	16/100.0	42/100.0	29/100.0	16/100.0	5/100.0

Table 5.31: Outcome of Operation By Intensity (Number Types) of Surprise

this result could imply that surprise is more difficult to obtain at the tactical level (a very dubious hypothesis as we shall see), consideration of the history of the doctrines of and organizations for deception and surprise suggests a different cause—namely, that the art of surprise is not as commonly practiced at the tactical level.

We would expect that the degree of success in a military operation would vary directly with the intensity of the initial surprise. That is, the chances of the commander achieving his intended objectives or his pre-battle estimates of the outcome are markedly enhanced by the intensity of surprise inflicted by his initial stroke. The empirical evidence supports this, as shown in Table 5.31. While most of us would consider this a truism, I doubt that any would have expected the *degree* to which it is true. The trend far exceeded my expectations both in its steepness and in its consistency as analyzed across both dimensions. To cite only the extremes: Out of 59 battles fought without any initial surprise, only 2% substantially exceeded its general’s expectations while 60% ended in abject failure. Conversely, out of 50 battles where surprise was intense (rated 3 or more on a 0-to-5 scale), 34% far exceeded their objectives and only 2% ended in defeat.

Deception also can be typologized in all its variegated forms and measured by its intensity. I have tentatively adopted a rather rough-and-ready typology (Table 5.32). Moreover, the data is of poor quality, because there are very many cases where I know of only *some* of the specific ruses or types of ruses used. For

Type of Deception	“Strategic”	“Tactical”	Total
Feints (deployments simulating an imminent attack)	32	17	49
Dissimulative camouflage (concealed installations)	29	18	47
Simulative camouflage (dummy installations)	32	12	44
Demonstrations (diversionary attacks)	26	11	37
Rumors (deliberately planted)	25	5	30
Radio (deceptive traffic, excluding psywar)	22	7	29
Press leaks (including public announcements)	20	0	20
Negotiations (diplomatic)	13	1	14
Fake documents	6	2	8
Other	12	6	18
Totals:	63	45	108

Table 5.32: Decomposition of Deceptions in a Rough Typology.

example, I have certainly missed many cases in World War II where field radio was used to simulate and dissimulate deployments. Nevertheless, the data and categories are probably adequate for an initial look.

No comment on Table 5.32 seems needed, except perhaps to note that those types of deception more appropriate to larger scale operations—fake press leaks, diplomatic deception, and even rumors—are indeed more common at the “strategic” level.

A sharper look can be taken at the *number* of feints (deployments simulating a threat to a place) and demonstrations (real but diversionary attacks). This is justified for two reasons. First, the quality of data on both categories is quite good. Secondly, as both categories comprise major means of threatening “alternative objectives,” they relate directly to the theory of stratagem. For example, the following hypothesis⁷² may be tested. The larger the number of geographical points or directions threatened (i.e., approximately the sum of the feints and demonstrations), the greater the dispersal of the victim’s forces (as roughly measured by unfavorability of his force ratio to that of the deceiver at the point and time of the real attack). Table 5.33 results.

The hypothesis is generally confirmed. More feints are associated with more favorable strength ratios, as Table 5.33 shows.⁷³ However, the detailed analysis showed that there was only a slight marginal advantage gained by increasing the number of feints and demonstrations above two. The reader is cautioned that my choice of using strength ratios at the point of attack (or as near to

⁷²Suggested by William R. Harris, September 1968.

⁷³The actual ratio intervals are 0.01-0.3; 0.4-0.6; 0.7-0.9; and 1.0-14.0, where the number of units in the victim’s force are divided by the number of opposing units.

Strength Ratios	Number of Feints and Demonstrations					
	0		1		2-7	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
At least 3-to-1	7	16.3	9	32.1	14	45.1
About 2-to-1	9	20.9	6	21.5	6	19.4
More than 1-to-1	12	27.9	3	10.7	5	16.1
Less than 1-to-1	15	34.9	10	35.7	6	19.4
Totals:	43	100.0	28	100.0	31	100.0

Table 5.33: Feints and Demonstrations vs. Strength Ratios.

Degree of Surprise at Place	Number of Places Threatened							
	1		2		3-4		5-8	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
None (0)	23	47.0	8	26.7	4	15.4	0	0.0
Some (S-,S)	18	36.7	15	50.0	11	42.3	2	28.6
Much (S+)	8	16.3	7	23.3	11	42.3	5	71.4
Totals:	49	100.0	30	100.0	26	100.0	7	100.0

Table 5.34: Relationship Between Surprise and Number of Places Threatened

that sector of the front as I could get figures comparable for both sides) is an unsatisfactory measure of dispersal of the enemy forces. A better measure would be to compare the proportions of their whole forces, which each had deployed at the threatened portion of the front, a statistic that I did not collect.⁷⁴

Similarly, we can pose the hypothesis that the larger the number of geographical points threatened, the greater the chance of surprise (and the greater the degree of that surprise) *at the point of the real attack*. Again, the data is consistent with the hypothesis. Indeed, the trend is entirely consistent even in the full interval table of which Table 5.34 is only a summary.

The above analyses add to the impression that surprise does confer many great rewards to the side that inflicts it. Thus, any steps that a commander can take that will increase his chances of surprising his enemy should receive his attention. The central assumption of the theory of stratagem is that deception is the most effective means of doing this. So far, I have done no more than show the *coincidence* of deception and surprise and to argue from anecdote that the former *causes* the latter. Quantitative analyses of the type used here cannot *prove* cause. (After all, generals who think deceptively could all belong to some special type with a “winning” personality.) However, they can *account* for the anomalies (as, for example, when we found that the avoidance of Fridays as a day for launching operations was a World War I phenomenon). Moreover, our confidence in the likelihood of a causative relationship of deception to surprise

⁷⁴The ideal measure would be the proportionate *changes* in force at the threatened point *during* the period of feints and demonstrations. However, such detailed information is seldom available for any given operation.

Intensity of Surprise	Intensity of Deception											Total
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
0		1	1	3			1					6
1	6	5	1	1	2	1						16
2	7	7	7	12	6	1		2				42
3	4	3	9	6	5	1			1			29
4	1	2	2	3	2		1	4	1			16
5	2					2		1				5
Total:	20	18	20	25	15	5	2	7	2	0	0	114

Table 5.35: Relationship Between Intensity of Surprise and Deception.

Intensity of Surprise	Intensity of Deception					
	0		1-4		5-8	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
0	53*	72.6	5	6.4	1	6.3
1	6	8.2	9	11.6	1	6.3
2	7	9.6	32	41.0	3	18.7
3	4	5.5	23	29.4	2	12.5
4-5	3	4.1	9	11.6	9	56.2
Totals:	73	100.0	78	100.0	16	100.0

Table 5.36: General Trends in Relationship Between Intensity of Surprise and Deception. *Note: This cell is represented by all 53 Type C Examples. While it is not possible to say how representative the figure may be, the bias in selecting Type C was to err on the low side.

is increased as various corollary hypotheses are also tested and verified. The immediately preceding table was an important example in that it demonstrated the predicted relationship between one specific form of deception and one specific form of surprise.

The relationship between the intensities of surprise and deception are shown in Table 5.35.

The general trend can be seen more clearly in Table 5.36, which glosses the minor trends *and* perturbations.

Chapter 6

SPECULATIVE CONCLUSIONS

“So ends the bloody business of the day.”
—Homer, *Odyssey*

For this concluding chapter, I will go beyond my quantitative research to introduce five new topics. These are speculative insights rather than systematic empirical findings. They arose during the research to prepare the 114 case studies of surprise and/or deception, and are based on the portions of the data that are as yet too incomplete to warrant detailed quantitative analysis. Consequently, while these insights should not be accepted as proven, they do possess more-or-less strong empirical foundations. Moreover, all can be tested by quantitative analysis, the required data being available in the published literature.

6.1 The Security of Options

Stratagem, by its very nature, provides its own best security. This I call the “principle of security of options.” Although the term is original, the concept is only a generalized extension of Liddell Hart’s principle of “alternative objectives.”

Stratagematic security is absolute, if the deception operation succeeds in anticipating the preconceptions of the victim and playing upon them. In that case the victim becomes the unwitting agent of his own surprise, and no amount of warning (i.e., security leaks) will suffice to reverse his fatally false expectations.¹ Even if the deception plan runs counter to or fails to play upon the victim’s preconceptions, the very fact that it threatens alternative objectives will usually assure enough uncertainty to delay or diffuse or otherwise blunt the victim’s response.² The worst possible case would occur if the deception plan itself were

¹For example, Case A28 (BARBAROSSA).

²For example, Cases A49 (Leyte), A65 (Bay of Pigs).

prematurely disclosed to the victim. While there are no known instances of this having ever occurred,³ even if it did all would not necessarily be lost. First, the disclosure itself would have to be believed. Second, if the stratagematist knows or even suspects disclosure, he can actually capitalize on this by switching to one of the alternative courses of action or simply adopting a new deception plan to reverse appearances.⁴ Even if the *direction* or *objective* of the attack has been compromised, the planner can still manipulate his victim's perception of the timing or strength or even the intent or style of the attack.

6.1.1 Options and the Security of Reticence

The Marshal de Saxe (among others) advocated that the one certain way of assuring the perfect secrecy of plans is for the top decision-maker to keep his own counsel, withholding his intentions and final decision until the last moment. Notable practitioners include Saxe himself, Frederick the Great, Napoleon, perhaps Wellington, Wavell, and Rommel. In retrospect, their operations often seem to others as happy improvisations based on a genius for seizing opportunities that arise unbidden during the course of action. Without at all denying that this talent is a characteristic of many Great Captains, I would suggest that it rarely applies to the *preparatory* and *opening* stages of their battles, that is, the stages to which my cases and examples are largely limited. In these preliminary stages, at least, I suspect that these commanders have often quite calculatedly rigged their starting point so that it offers viable alternatives.⁵

This very special type of situation can produce a most effective form of surprise. This results from the interaction of security and preconception—that is, the secret and private nature of the surpriser's intentions and the faulty preconceptions of his victim.

Opposing intelligence services have no direct means of penetrating this particular veil of security, short of subverting the reticent top decision-maker himself. At best, they can hope to recognize these situations and to identify the opponent's available options—his *possible* courses of action—and have some contingency plan to meet each option should any one of them—rather than the most *probable* course—materialize.

A special risk is inherent in this otherwise effective means of attaining surprise. Because the method depends on the decision-maker withholding his intention from all, friend and foe alike, he risks confusion on his own side that could prove self-defeating. When this method is exercised by the top commander—as with Hitler in BARBAROSSA⁶—he runs the risk that his own subordinates will inadvertently sabotage or unwittingly disclose parts of his design. Conversely,

³The closest to this is Case A3 (Midway) when faulty security permitted the Americans to see *around* the primitive Japanese deception operation and set an ambush.

⁴An instructive analogy is provided by Example B38 (Gothic Line), where Field-Marshal Alexander successfully reversed an already successful deception operation by deliberately disclosing the first one.

⁵A similar point is made regarding Wellington by Major Eugene C. Camp, "The Estimate and the Duke of Wellington," *Military Review*, Vol. 38, No. 5 (August 1958), pp. 44-49.

⁶See Case A28. Also Hamilton at Suvla Bay (Example B6).

when this method is exercised by subordinate—i.e., insubordinate—commanders such as Rommel, it can interfere with higher level strategy.⁷

6.1.2 Economy of Means of Specific Ruses

One of the major unexpected findings of this study is that only a small repertoire of stratagems are needed to insure surprise after surprise. In other words, the mere fact that most specific ruses may become familiar to the victim does not necessarily reduce much less destroy their efficacy. This can be predicted from the theory, which postulates that it is the misdirection supplied by selective planting of false signals that yields surprise and not the specific communications channels (i.e., ruses) used. More significant, this economy-of-means postulate is fully verified by the data. This finding flatly contradicts those snatches of official military doctrine that explicitly address themselves to this problem. This mistaken view is seemingly based on nothing more solid than mere “common sense.” Thus Yugoslav Lieutenant Colonel Sekulich, in his major article on “Deception in War,” wrongly asserts:⁸

In deception, new ideas must be conceived. That is to say, one dare not repeat any old, well-known means, methods, or procedures for the enemy may quickly and easily see through them and adopt countermeasures. In fact, if one wishes the enemy to be really deceived and, therefore, surprised, unusual means and methods *must* be employed.

A specific example of this alleged attrition of ruses is given by Ian Colvin in his study of the famed “man who never was ruse” of Operation MINCEMEAT.⁹ Colvin assumes that this operation succeeded in part because the Germans did not suspect British intelligence would use such a means to send them false information. He also presumes that, once used, it would have to be dropped from the repertoire of stratagem. In fact, MINCEMEAT was only a minor switch on a rather common means of planting disinformation, the variety known to British deception experts as “the old Meinertzhagen haversack ruse.”¹⁰ The problem is simply one of credibility of source and plausibility of the misinformation as filtered through the victim’s preconceptions. Thus, of our 114 cases involving surprise or deception, 10 are known to have involved receipt by the victim of detailed *documents* about the attacker’s plans. Of these, five were deliberately planted misinformation and all were gullibly swallowed.¹¹ The other five cases

⁷See Case A26. Wavell also annoyed Churchill by his unwillingness to disclose the details of his plans. See also the mental muddle of the Bay of Pigs (Case A65).

⁸Sekulich (57/58), 95.

⁹Colvin (53).

¹⁰Although Colonel Meinertzhagen at Third Gaza (Case A6) had merely reinvented the type. Thus Frontinus in the 1st century attributed such a trick to Philip of Macedon in gaining unopposed passage through the Dardanelles around 340 B.C. See Frontinus (25), Bk. I, Ch. iv, Para. 13.

¹¹Cases A6 (Gaza), A8 (St.-Mihiel), A38 (TORCH-MINCEMEAT), A53 (Bavarian Redoubt), and Example B27 (Alam Halfa).

involved inadvertent loss of these documents. It is remarkable that of those five *true* “plans,” four were *discredited*¹² by the victim and only one was accepted as the authentic warning it was.¹³

6.1.3 Economy of Means in Scenario Design

The economy of means applies not only to the array of specific ruses needed for effective stratagem, but also to that of the overall deception plans. In other words, effective stratagem can be sustained even though only a small repertoire of basic scenarios for deception is used. Again, as with specific ruses, this economy of means is made possible because of the principle of the security of options.

Some find this notion contrary to common sense. For example, I have heard one person assert that Israel has now exhausted her options for surprise vis-à-vis Egypt. This judgment is based on the assumption that Israel’s geo-political position, contiguous to three hostile neighbors, sharply limits the number of options for unexpected international interactions. However, even if we grant this premise, the conclusion is unwarranted. There are two theoretical reasons for this. First, despite the truly limited notes in Israel’s repertoire, she is far from having rung all the changes of intention, place, time, strength, and style of attack. Second, even if she had only a single pair of viable scenarios, that is still enough to play the game of stratagem.

In fact, Israel is blessed with an abundance of options not available to some other commanders who were nonetheless able to successively alternate their deception operations and so obtain surprise after surprise. It was done under more constrained circumstances by Sherman in his push along the railway through Georgia in the American Civil War, by Allenby in his campaign from Gaza to Damascus in World War I, and by Alexander during the Italian Campaign in World War II.

It does seem true that the Six-Day War has, by bringing an immediately responsive Soviet military presence to the side of Egypt, foreclosed (or greatly increased the risk of) certain Israeli options. For instance, Israel presumably can no longer trust to preventive war (as in 1948 or 1956) or preemption (as in 1967). However, by her territorial gains against Egypt, Jordan, and Syria in the Six-Day War, Israel has acquired the valuable option of fighting a “luring defensive” campaign on her own ground.¹⁴ Not only would such a strategy avoid provoking direct Russian intervention but it would give full range for tactical stratagems.

¹²Cases A10 (Warsaw), A20 (Belgium), A21 (France), and A28 (BARBAROSSA).

¹³Case A34 (BLAU).

¹⁴This type of deception-aided surprise is rare at the strategic and grand tactical levels, at least since its standard use by the Mongol cavalry in the 13th century. However there is one modern paragon. Example B27 (Alan [blank]).

6.2 The Economics of Stratagem

Taking economics to include the trade-offs in material costs between two inter-related activities, the efficacy of stratagem may be evaluated relative to certain other military and intelligence operations. When this is done, stratagem is seen to yield large returns for small investment. Moreover, it is far more cost-effective than the traditionally used means-security.

6.2.1 Investment

Stratagem is cheap. It requires a very small initial investment of men and matériel. Effective stratagem can be the part-time work of only one man, particularly if he is the commander.¹⁵ And the most elaborate of such operations involved only diverting for a few weeks the services of several hundred men, a dozen or so small boats, a few aircraft, a fair amount of radio and other electronic gear, some wood canvas, and paint, and bits of aluminum scrap. None of this was permanently lost to inventory, except the aluminum.¹⁶

That last was the total cost of the deception operations for the Allied invasion of Europe in 1944. Its personnel requirements were the occasional part-time cognizance of perhaps a dozen top civilians and military leaders, the half dozen or so members of the M.I.5 deception planning group, the part-time efforts of a dozen or so senior staff planners and intelligence officers, a number—say 200—radio operators, several camouflage and construction companies—perhaps a thousand men—drawn from the Corps of Engineers, about a hundred pilots and crews to man the transports and an equal number of sailors for the boats involved in spoofing the German early warning systems, a hundred or so agents and underground members engaged part-time in spreading false information, and one lieutenant co-opted from the Army Pay Corps to simulate Field-Marshal Montgomery. In all perhaps 2,000 soldiers, sailors, and airmen; but none of who were regular first-line combat troops.¹⁷

The most costly single type of deception operation is the diversionary attack. This is the only form that necessarily costs lives and equipment or uses regular combat units. However, as such attacks are generally no more effective than plausible threats of attack, they should be used more sparingly than they have been up to now. And then only if the diversion is itself aimed at a worthwhile objective and shielded by its own tactical deception plan. This problem of the wastage of troops in feint attacks is even more critical in nuclear warfare where the commander who uses this technique to draw the enemy's nuclear weapons from his real attack risks the total loss of that portion of his force involved in successful feints.¹⁸

¹⁵E.g., Sherman, Brusilov, or, sometimes, Rommel.

¹⁶See Case A45 (Normandy).

¹⁷See Chapter V, Section G, for the empirical evidence.

¹⁸As pointed out by Khan (57/59), 104.

6.2.2 Return on Investment

Stratagem is a sound investment. Its costs are always low, it is seemingly never contraindicated or dysfunctional in the economics of war, and it has at least an 80% chance of achieving surprise. Thus it is that delight of the gambler, “near sure thing.”

As shown before, the payoffs for surprise are almost always impressively high. Surprise multiplies the chances for quick and decisive military success, whether measured in terms of the explicitly sought goals, ground taken, or casualty ratios. For example, surprise was found to quintuple the favorability of battle casualty ratios.

Deception itself also can induce the competitor to make inefficient investment of his own resources. Four examples. First, Hitler’s SEA-LION hoax (Case A23) kept the bulk of Britain’s precious few infantry, armor, and air units uselessly committed in England from September 1940 until 194[?] awaiting an invasion that was no longer intended. For a negligible investment, the British were induced to misallocate some 25 divisions for about 18 months, a total misallocation of 38 division-years. This is a gross misuse of inventory. However, in the next four cases we see that the British were able to play back the trick on the Germans with even greater effect.

The second example consists of the several British deception operations intended to draw and hold German divisions in Western Europe in anticipation of an Allied cross-channel invasion in 1943.¹⁹ Of the nearly 50 German divisions stationed in France and the Lowlands that year, perhaps 30 may be directly charged to the effects of the COCKADE hoax. Thirty division-years.

Third, Operation TINDALL and its successor, FORTITUDE-NORTH, kept 16 to 18 German divisions in Norway for some 29 months, from 1943 until the end of the war, awaiting a phantom Allied invasion.²⁰ Even if we assume that, say, six to eight of these divisions were needed for internal security and to deter loss by default, this still gives a misallocation of about 24 division-years.

Fourth, Churchill’s much berated “soft underbelly” policy did have the result—whether intended or not is moot—of keeping 13 to 28 German divisions tied down in the Balkans to meet this largely empty threat. This effect persisted for about 18 months, from early 1943 until late 1944.²¹ Again, if we subtract, say, a third of these divisions as needed for internal security occupation functions, we still get a figure for misallocation of more than 20 division-years.

These figures of wasted division-years represent appalling inefficiencies. Britain could ill-afford to fritter away 38 division-years in 1940 and 1941. Moreover this was a period of maximum mobilization, so that there is no question of any expendable surplus. The same applies to the Wehrmacht. During the entire 68 months of World War II in Europe (September 1939 to May 1945), the German economy generated just under 1,400 division-years, about 750 of them from 1943

¹⁹Case A45 and Chapter V, Section A.

²⁰See Case A45 and Chapter V, Section A.

²¹See Chapter V, Section A.

until the end.²² Thus the 74 division-years covered by the last three cases alone represent 10% of the entire German Army inventory from 1943 on that was rendered *hors de combat* by effective and virtually cost-free stratagem. Moreover, this figure measures the ability of stratagem to increase the cost to the enemy only at the grand strategic level.

Stratagem can have even greater or at least more decisive effects of this sort at the strategic, grand tactical, and perhaps tactical levels of operation. I will give only one example from the strategic category.

Operations FORTITUDE-SOUTH and FORTITUDE II²³ froze 19 desperately needed German divisions at the Pas-de-Calais awaiting the “real” Allied cross-Channel invasion until D-plus-66. In this case, the more than three division-years wasted is a gross underestimation of the true cost, namely the loss of Hitler’s last chance to avoid total early defeat. Only three understrength and unsuspecting German divisions were in Normandy to receive the eight Allied divisions that arrived on D-Day.

True, such figures do not necessarily represent total loss, as the mere fact of divisions-in-being or held overlong in general reserve may still have some deterrent, restraining, or other effects on the enemy’s force structure and allocations. (After all, the enemy should anticipate that his hoax may be exposed at any moment and his opponent make a better reallocation.) Nevertheless, these are wasteful misallocations of resources. The economic dimensions can be judged from the fact that the present cost of maintaining (i.e., aside from original purchase cost) a single U.S. division in a non-combat mode is roughly U.S. \$1 billion per year. Now, this figure is about one-fourth of the 1966 budgets for both the U.S. and Soviet intelligence establishments.²⁴ Indeed it is probably true that no government has an intelligence establishment whose annual cost exceeds that of four or five of its division-years. And, aside from those of the U.S., the Soviet Union, and China, it is unlikely that any intelligence establishments even approach this cost.

The point is not that intelligence services consume a small proportion of defense budgets but, rather, that this is money well spent *if* it does no more than permit a more realistic deployments of a few divisions.²⁵ For example, the multi-billion dollar *costs* of satellite surveillance systems can only be properly evaluated in terms of the multi-billion dollars *savings* they can yield by providing the intelligence data for more rational purchase and deployment (or allocation) of one’s own combat units. This is true whether one speaks of deterrence, of

²²As estimated from my table in Chapter V, Section A.

²³See Case A47.

²⁴Total U.S. intelligence budget is somewhere near \$4 billion with CIA account of perhaps \$1.5 billion of this and the NSA for about \$1 billion. Annual budget of the Soviet KGB is reportedly \$2 billion, not counting electronic espionage. The British intelligence services get by on about U.S. \$35 million per year. See David Wise and Thomas B. Ross, *The Espionage Establishment* (New York: Random house, 1967), pp. 17, 94, 172; and Kahn (67), 684.

²⁵I am indebted to Mr. William K. Harris of Harvard and Professor William W. Kaufman of M.I.T. for having pointed out the relevance of such economic trade-offs between intelligence on the one hand and force structure and force deployment on the other. See Harris (68), xxviii-xxix.

limited war, or—I presume—of general nuclear war. The recent “missile gap” debate in the U.S. illustrates one way in which faulty intelligence (and possible deception) can stimulate costly but needless allocations of production resources.

In sum then, stratagem is certainly the cheapest and often the most effective means of manipulating an opponent’s military economy.

6.2.3 Cover-and-Deception

Simulantur quae non sunt;
Quae autem vero dissimulantur.
—Latin motto

The Latin epigraph of this sub-section enjoins us to simulate that which is not, and dissimulate that which is. This interplay of simulation (deception—in its most narrow sense) and dissimulation (cover—in its passive sense) is the essence of effective stratagem. Both are present in some mix in most, perhaps all, of the great stratagems from Meinertzhagen’s efforts at Third Gaza, through I.S.S.B. FORTITUDE, to Dayan’s Operation NACHONIM. The coordinated use of cover and deception is a much more potent guarantor of surprise than the mere parallel application of both, much less their use singly.

Yet this key point is largely overlooked both in the literature and even by many of the successful practitioners, most of whom had a pragmatic flair for the art rather than a theoretical understanding of it. Still, this important insight is met from time to time. The Latin motto is the earliest example. The latest is the phrase²⁶ “cover and deception plan (or operation)” that was coined by the British in World War II and passed to their American and, I suspect, Russian allies. It is now the standard term for stratagem throughout the U.S. intelligence community, as indeed it is with Soviet intelligencers in its translated version *maskirovka i dezinformatsiya* (camouflage and disinformation). It is a happy choice of phrase because it both reminds the deception expert that stratagem has these two aspects and suggests to a narrowly trained security or intelligence expert that these separate specialties can somehow meld. It is a pregnant phrase, bridging insight and incite. One can play an instructive “if in history” game by imagining the consequences had this simple phrase been interjected into the planning stage of major operations that otherwise later went wrong. Imagine the flurry of rethinking that could result from a G-2 or G-3 proposal that was returned with the commander’s casually scrawled but demanding query: “Good start, but where is your cover and deception plan?” (Try General Clark and others at the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Battles of Cassino.²⁷) Or imagine the quiet stimulation and unobtrusive persuasiveness of draft planning papers going forward from G-3s that included a separate section on “Cover and Deception.”

²⁶Still better would have been the symbolically interconnected “cover-and-deception” or “cover/deception.” The unhyphenated form encourages an unimaginative escape into the familiar and disconnected concepts of “cover *and* deception.”

²⁷Examples C28, C30, C33.

(Would these have educated General Cadorna during his monotonously catastrophic 1st through 11th Battles of the Isonzo?²⁸ Or perhaps saved General Murray his command after Second Gaza?²⁹)

Cover and deception can reinforce each other so that their functional combination in stratagem is greater than their mere ‘arithmetical’ sum. Furthermore, the strategic interaction of cover and deception is such that ineffectiveness in one can be compensated for by greater effectiveness in the other. For example, if cover is compromised or security is ineffective, the deception operation can restore a level (or type) of secrecy necessary for surprise. Similarly, a weak deception plan can be compensated for by tighter security or a better cover story.

Although cover and deception can be varied to produce or maintain a given level of secrecy or surprise, they are not related by any numerical constant, much less a one-to-one relationship.

6.2.4 Trade-Offs Between Deception and Counterintelligence

I have already remarked in several connections above that deception, not security, is the most effective guarantor of surprise. While the theory of stratagem stresses that both deception and security *can* contribute—separately or together—to the attainment of surprise, it is only the empirical evidence that can establish which proves the more effective in practice. My statement about the greater effectiveness of deception is an empirical statement and neither a deduction from theory nor a truism based on “common sense” or “authority.” Indeed the evidence contradicts the consensus of authoritative assertions on the point.

Tight security—that is, effective counterintelligence—is almost universally believed to be the most common cause of surprise. This belief can be most economically displayed by citing only recent studies explicitly devoted to surprise or deception. In other words, studies where their authors had the opportunity to go beyond mindless copying of authorities to make fresh reappraisals.

The first example is the Yugoslav military writer, Lieutenant Colonel Sekulich in his official article on deception in which he asserted in 1957 that:³⁰

In order to be able to achieve deception it is necessary that the ideas, plans, and preparations . . . be kept and conducted with utmost secrecy, for the less the enemy expects his adversary’s decision and action, the more easily he can be deceived.

This article demonstrates that the Yugoslav General Staff has, at least until recently, retained its Stalinist obsession with security and does not understand stratagem. In view of current Yugoslav fears of Soviet invasion, I trust they have at least drawn the lesson in stratagem rendered by the Russians in their

²⁸Examples C2, C5, C9, C10, C15, C17.

²⁹Example C13.

³⁰Sekulich (57/58), 92.

1968 surprise invasion of Czechoslovakia. If not, they are a naked target for a similar *fait accompli*.

The second example is from a Pakistani officer in a generally shoddy article on surprise and deception. Major Khan unthinkingly combines two separate notions in Clausewitz when he asserts that:³¹

The surest way to deceive is to execute a military decision with utmost speed—secrecy and speed are mutually interdependent.

Clausewitz did say that surprise was the product of speed and secrecy. But, in quite another connection, he said that “there is a degree of stratagem, be it ever so small, which lies at the foundation of every attempt to surprise.”³² Major Khan has merely followed the discredited tradition that chooses from Clausewitz and Jomini their physical-geographical concepts and overlooks their psychological ones.

The third example comes from a generally weak article on surprise that appeared in 1953 in the official journal of the Spanish Army.³³ This makes the same error as the previous article by stressing “security” as the cause of surprise. The fourth example³⁴ shows that even the Israeli high command has not fully understood the relationships among surprise, speed, security, and deception. Finally, even today Soviet writers fail to stress the *interactive* rather than merely *supportive* relationship between security and deception.³⁵

In general, security and deception can be mutually supporting in preserving secrecy and thereby gaining surprise. That is, both can contribute to secrecy and surprise. However, I presume that they differ in their effectiveness in assuring each of the five main varieties of surprise: surprise of intention, place, time, strength, and style.³⁶ Thus, I can imagine only small contributions that deception can make toward assuring surprise of style, particularly technological surprise. That truly seems the proper province of counterintelligence or security systems. The forms of misdirection provided by deception systems can probably help only marginally toward concealing the sheer existence of specific weapons systems. Conversely, security is virtually useless for furthering surprise of intention, which is the province of the “security of reticence”³⁷ backed by diplomatic deception. And deception is, as is clear from the empirical evidence, the pre-eminent cause of surprise of place, time, and strength.

In sum, as compared to security systems, deception requires a much smaller investment and gives a much greater chance of military operations achieving surprise. Moreover, while the two methods can be mutually supporting, a small

³¹Major Muhammad Naqi Khan, “Surprise and Deception,” *The Owl* (Pakistan), December 1957, as reprinted in digested form in *Military Review*, Vol. 38, No. 12 (March 1959), pp. 100-104.

³²Clausewitz (1832/1911), Book III, Chapter 10.

³³Major Javier de Isasi Ivison [“Surprise—Its Present Value”], *Ejército*, May 1953, as translated and digested in *Military Review*, Vol. 33, No. 10 (January 1954), pp. 91-93.

³⁴Harkabi (66), 41.

³⁵For example, Shimansky (68) in his major article on deception and surprise (Case 46).

³⁶See Chapter V, Section G.

³⁷See section A, above

increment in deception can more than compensate for gross failures in security. Similarly it can compensate for loss of speed by concealing the purpose or direction of slowly evolving operations even after the enemy has become aware of them.

6.2.5 Deception Security

In the absence of stratagem, one's operational secrecy is in direct proportion to the quality of one's counterintelligence security measures and in inverse proportion to the success of the foe's intelligence success. This is the usual game. However, the presence of stratagem almost totally transforms this situation. Here, the paramount task of one's counterintelligence becomes the very special one of "deception security,"³⁸ the guarding of the deception plan itself. Deception security should be as tight as human ingenuity and technological proficiency can assure. Fortunately, because so few individuals need be witting about the deception plan, this task is quite small compared with the maintenance of tight security over the entire operation. Indeed, there is a highly economical trade-off between specific deception security and lavish general operational security such that if the former is intense the latter can be outright sloven. Moreover, the most efficient stratagems calculatedly utilize known inefficiencies in general operational security.

6.3 The Strategic-Tactical Dimension

"Surprise was the foundation of almost all the grand strategical combinations of the past, as it will be of those to come."

—Colonel G.F.R. Henderson, 190

How uniform are the practice and effects of stratagem along the strategic-to-tactical dimension? Few theorists—and I think none today—make a rigid distinction between tactics and strategy. In general, they are defined not as separate and contrasting categories but as two extremes of a continuum. Indeed, there has been an incipient trend since World War II to return to the pre-Napoleonic continuum—tactics, grand tactics, strategy, grand strategy.

The four terms of this particular set are commonly defined along the following rough lines. "Tactics" becomes downgraded to encompass only the smaller unit operations, from squads up to—say—brigade or division level. It is, typically, the art of the captain. "Grand tactics" is introduced to cover the activities of a single battle or the entire battlefield as conventionally dominated by the corps, army, or army group. It is the province of the general. "Strategy" becomes truncated at both extremes: upgraded at its lower end to encompass an entire campaign as fought on a front or in a theater and downgraded at its upper extreme to exclude overall war policy. It is the art of general staffs. "Grand

³⁸I owe this term to William R. Harris.

strategy” is introduced to cover the overall war policy in its political-military and inter-nation aspects. It is the art of the national war leader.

Contemporary Western military science has at least restored grand strategy to the list.³⁹ Soviet military science recognizes an interesting three-fold division: strategy (*strategiya*), operational art (*operativnoe iskustvo*), and tactics (*taktika*). The Russians explicitly identify these as corresponding to the Western concepts of, respectively, grand strategy, strategy, and tactics.⁴⁰ However, the place of “operational art” in Soviet military doctrine corresponds more closely to grand tactics, and their notion of strategy makes it somewhat less than grand strategy as conceived in the West.

In my selection of cases and in my empirical analysis, I had distinguished only between “strategic” and “tactical” deception, surprise, and operations. In doing so I had been quite misled by modern Western military usage to expect some sort of more-or-less strong distinction to emerge between “strategic” and “tactical” surprise on the one hand and “strategic” and “tactical” deception on the other. In fact, this is evidently not true. No strong or consistent differences in the theory, nature, practice, or effects of deception or surprise were disclosed by the analysis. Although this is an important finding of the study, I now realize that it is too sweeping a generalization. What I in fact investigated and demonstrated was—to use the four-part typology—that there are no major distinctions between *strategy* and *grand tactics* in the application to them of the theory of stratagem.

What then of possible differences in applying stratagem either to grand strategy and strategy or to grand tactics and tactics? It is apparent that the theory, nature, practice, and effects of stratagem do apply with no gross differences between grand strategy and strategy. This is evident not only from study of the individual cases (Appendix A) but particularly from inspection of the systematic summary lists (Appendix B). The data is quite adequate to support this conclusion, as the study includes 23 instances of operations at the level of grand strategy.⁴¹ Of these, only two are characterized by the complete absence of both surprise and deception, although a complete inventory would show that perhaps a third to a half of the grand strategic cases since 1914 involved neither surprise nor deception.⁴² This is roughly the proportion I would also expect to find in strategic operations. To the extent that this should prove true, I would suggest that it is due to the fact that the mounting political crisis and ponder-

³⁹As, for example, in the *British Field Service Regulations*. For some pertinent thoughts on “grand strategy” and its differences from “strategy” see Liddell Hart (54), 366-372.

⁴⁰Marshal of the Soviet Union V.D. Sokolovskii (editor), *Soviet Military Strategy* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963, translated and edited from the original Russian edition of 1962 by H.S. Dinerstein, L. Gourd, and T.W. Wolfe for the RAND Corporation), pp. 88, 521.

⁴¹These comprise all 19 cases coded “I” (war initiation) in the “Phase” columns of Appendix B. In addition, I classify Cases A2, A22, A23, and A45 as examples of grand strategic operations.

⁴²A complete inventory would add perhaps another dozen cases of grand strategic operations in the 16 specific wars studied during the period 1914-1968. Probably *none* of these would involve surprise or deception.

ous mobilization that typically signal the onset of grand strategic operations are largely offset by the diplomatic and psywar ruses that are added to the array of stratagems at that highest level of international interaction.⁴³

But what of the transition between grand and simple tactics? My data is quite weak here. Too few of my cases and examples illustrate small unit tactics. Taking 1 division (or its equivalent, or 5,000 troops) as the upper limit for a tactical operation, I have only 11 instances,⁴⁴ and most of these comprised the main or initial part of some larger operation. For example, Case A65 (Bay of Pigs) involved sending 1,443 brave men off on a filibustering expedition to accomplish some never agreed upon task of grand strategy. Thus I am not justified in comparing such few and ambiguous cases with the others that are clearly grand tactical in both size *and* conception.

What, then, can be said about the rôle of surprise and deception in small unit tactics? First, my theory of stratagem would predict that the rate of successful surprise when furthered by deception would remain about the same as between tactical and grand tactical operations. The greater speed of deployment and action available to small local units should compensate for the more limited array of feasible stratagems. (For example, small local units cannot routinely employ mass media or rumor networks to channel misleading intelligence to their enemy.) Second, the major theoretical writings and my own survey of the literature has no difficulty in finding examples of small unit surprise and deception.⁴⁵ Moreover, these cases do seem to contain the same factors (and their interactions) of surprise and deception found in the larger unit grand tactical operations. This evidence is, of course, only anecdotal; but it is entirely consistent with my theory of stratagem.

6.4 The Permanency of Stratagem

Are surprise and deception enduring elements in military art and military science? As phrased, the question is ambiguous. It fails to make the important distinction between the prevalence of surprise or deception as practiced through history and the ubiquity of their relevance to theory and doctrine.

I have already shown⁴⁶ that while deception and surprise have been present—and present together—through most of history, Eastern as well as Western, there

⁴³For example, Case A66 (Six-Day War).

⁴⁴Cases A61 (Kojo Feint), A65 (Bay of Pigs), Examples B2 (Ostend Demonstration), B15 (Hamel), B25 (Makin Atoll), B37 (Tinian), C34a (Vossenack-Schmidt), C38 (Bloody Ridge), C39 (Heartbreak Ridge), C41 (Little and Big Nori), and C41a (Triangle Hill). Increasing the minimum troop criteria from 5,000 to 10,000 men adds Case A24 (Dakar), Examples B26 (Dieppe), and C42 (“Nevada” Outpost).

⁴⁵See, for example, Harding (39), 107-121, for some case studies of tactical surprise in World War I. For Chinese ambushes in the Korean War see Hermes (66), 181; and for U.S. ones, Fehrenbach (63), 618. And the literature of guerrilla warfare and counterinsurgency supplies many examples of ambush, the stratagematic small-unit form of the luring defensive or baited trap.

⁴⁶Particularly in Chapter I, Section A.

have nevertheless been important gaps. Stratagem and, with it, surprise evidently disappeared in the medieval period in the Western world and again during most of the 19th century. Moreover, even in those periods—including our own era—when stratagem is employed it can hardly be said to have been understood—much less mastered—by other than a small proportion of commanders or writers.

However, the question I wish to pose now is the other, more difficult, and more important one. Does stratagem have permanent relevance for the theory and doctrine of war? In other words, could effective use have been made of stratagem even in the periods of its disfavor?

The question is not trivial nor is my positive answer a mere truism. The fact that a “yes” answer is neither self-evident nor a matter of “common sense” is proven by the fact that at least four major military theoreticians of the late 19th and early 20th Centuries entirely disregarded surprise (and deception) as a principle of war.⁴⁷ Moreover, several other major theoreticians have either given surprise a low priority or failed to see any relationship between it and deception. For example, Stalin explicitly discounted surprise by downgrading it to the category of a “non-permanently operating factor,” and this curious notion remained officially crippling Soviet military doctrine from 1941 to 1955.⁴⁸

I have already shown⁴⁹ that those theoreticians who discarded or discounted the principle of surprise did so only because of their profound inability to understand Jomini and Clausewitz and not because they either found some logical flaws in these theories or applied any new data that disproved them. Consequently we can dismiss these writings as irrelevant to our question about the sustained utility of stratagem.

The hypothetical argument therefore comes down to a question of whether there are any innovations in the nature of warfare that can dissipate or negate the element of surprise. If any such factors can be identified they would, of course, require a fundamental modification of my general theory of stratagem, at least reducing it to a special theory—one suited only to specific military environments.

While it may seem a fruitless exercise in “brain-storming” to seek such an unknown factor, the theory of stratagem itself indicates a potential source of its own limitation or negation. Stratagem is an information system that assumes at least some measure of incompleteness or ambiguity of information. That is, stratagem may be viewed as a “game” of incomplete information. This tells us that at least one hypothetical factor that could limit the ability of stratagem to achieve surprise is a “communications” factor. The implied hypothesis is that the more complete the information, the less the chance for surprise.

Now, it is interesting that it is just such a communications factor that some opponents of the element of surprise have urged to be the cause of its alleged obsolescence. The notion originated—or so I think—with Clausewitz and was then, characteristically, misunderstood by his followers. Clausewitz merely argued that strategic surprise was more difficult to obtain than tactical surprise

⁴⁷See Chapter III, Section D.

⁴⁸See Chapter II, Section D.

⁴⁹Chapter III.

because the slower and larger nature of strategic operations usually invites disclosure of their intention and objective. Moreover, Clausewitz vaguely implies that this was a trend, surprise increasingly deserting strategic level operations during the 17th and 18th Centuries.⁵⁰

For Clausewitz, this trend was mentioned only as a passing remark to caution that surprise did have limitations. Yet his students were quick to seize this one point to discredit the whole feasibility of surprise. Their argument was that the new and faster means of communications (telegraph, then telephone, and finally radio) would speed the warnings of hostile intent and specific deployments to the intended victim in ample time for him to prepare his response. Similarly, it was asserted that the defender could prepare his response more rapidly than his opponent, by making full use of his “interior lines” of transportation and the new, fast railway networks.

This view arose at a most unfortunate time, as it stood ready-made to help justify suppression of any imaginative way out of the static tragedy of trench warfare on the Western Front from 1915 through 1917.⁵¹

Even General Erfurth, the inter-war German official Military Historian and himself a leading advocate of surprise, shared some of this pessimism about the universal applicability of surprise at the strategic level due to the increasing speed of communications systems.⁵² I have seen several other writers who employ this sort of argument.

This pessimistic view is still very much alive in military circles. Witness the following murky prognostication by a man who is not only an advocate of surprise but one of the more expert practitioners of deception:⁵³

In the past, when war was conducted by standing armies and extensive mobilization was not necessary, surprise at the outset of a war was still possible. In modern times, with the necessity for general mobilization in order to utilize full military potential, the outbreak of hostilities has become a process rather than a simple event. . . . The development of air power has, to be sure, considerably increased the advantage of surprise in initiating a war and enhanced its importance, but even so war could not be decided by an all-out surprise air attack.

The author is Israeli Brigadier-General Yehoshafat Harkabi, the Director of Military Intelligence during the Sinai Campaign of 1956. The above statement represented his carefully considered view as late as 1966. It is ironic that the categorical contradiction supplied the next year came from two of his colleagues, Generals Hod and Dayan.

⁵⁰Clausewitz (1832/1911), 200, including the ambiguous footnote by the editor of the English edition, Colonel F.N. Maude: “Railways, steamships, and telegraphs have, however, enormously modified the relative importance and practicability of surprise.”

⁵¹See, for example, General Wladyslaw Sikorski, *Modern Warfare* (New York: Roy, 1943), pp. 222-224. This work was written in 1934.

⁵²Erfurth II (38/43), 31, 39-40.

⁵³Harkabi (66), 41.

The flaw in the reasoning of these writers is, of course, simply that they have failed to take into account the rôle of stratagem in guaranteeing surprise. Otherwise—that is, without stratagem—I would suppose these arguments are valid. In other words, the introduction of ever more detailed and faster information reception (radar, aerial and satellite reconnaissance, etc.) and processing (computers, electronic displays, etc.) has made surprise increasingly rare unless stratagem is used. (This hypothesis assumes that deployment and delivery systems are speeding up at a slower rate than the systems designed to detect them.)⁵⁴

I will give the final word on this to the most unorthodox British military writer of the 19th century, as his summation is as fresh today as when written at the opening of the century.⁵⁵

It is repeated *ad nauseam* that in consequence of the vastly improved means of transmitting information, surprise on a large scale is no longer to be feared. It should be remembered, however, that the means of concentrating troops and ships are far speedier than of old; that false information can be far more readily distributed; and also, that if there is one thing more certain than another, it is that the great strategist, surprise being still the most deadly of all weapons, will devote the whole force of his intellect to the problem of bringing it about.

⁵⁴The crude hypothesis to be tested is that since, say, 1850 there has been a gradual decline in the proportion of cases of grand strategic operations (and, but less so, in strategic and grand tactical operations) that succeeded in gaining surprise, where the sampled “population” comprises those cases where surprise was sought in the absence of stratagem.

⁵⁵[Colonel] G.F.R.H[enderson], “War,” *Encyclopedia Britannica* 10th Edition, Vol. 33 (1902), p. 747. Colonel Henderson’s article was written for the 10th Edition and reprinted in the 11th (1911) but was subsequently dropped.

6.5 Total Stratagem and the Fog of War

“Lay on many deceptive operations. Be seen in the west and march out of the east; lure him in the north and strike in the south. Drive him crazy and bewilder him so that he disperses his forces in confusion.”

—Meng Shih, c. 200 A.D.⁵⁶

“What if the universe wear a mask?”

—Pasternak,

Themes and Variations (1922)

In his 1938 essay, *On the Protracted War*, Mao Tse-tung reintroduced a quite remarkable notion that he had learned from the ancient commentary quoted as the epigraph of this section. Mao paraphrased and enlarged on this by remarking:⁵⁷

When an excellent condition of the people is present so that an information blockade can be enforced, it is often possible, by adopting all kinds of measures of deception, to drive the enemy into the plight of making erroneous judgments and taking erroneous actions, thus depriving him of his superiority and initiative.

Mao adds that illusions and surprise attacks are used “to make the enemy face the uncertainties of war.”⁵⁸ He concludes:⁵⁹

In order to win victory we must try our best to seal the eyes and the ears of the enemy, making him blind and deaf, and to create confusion in the minds of the enemy commanders, driving them insane.

Meng Shih and Mao Tse-tung suggest, or at least hint at, a quite remarkable strategy of information control. While neither spells this out either by further theoretical exposition or by concrete example, both seem to be striving toward a wholly new concept of what might be called total or grand stratagem. Total stratagem is a concept of military planning and decision making in which stratagem pervades strategy, in which stratagem, strategy, tactics, and psychological warfare merge throughout the course of an entire battle, or campaign, or even war. But is such a comprehensive program practicable—and, if so, what is it like and what could be its consequences? Before I answer this question,

⁵⁶This is one of the commentaries attached to Sun Tzu's *The Art of War*. See the translation by Griffith (63), 133. Because of the association, this epigram of the otherwise unidentified Mr. Veng is usually incorrectly attributed to Sun Tzu himself.

⁵⁷Mao (38/63), 97-98.

⁵⁸Mao (38/63), 98.

⁵⁹Mao (38/63), 100.

it may be helpful to examine an Occidental military concept that provides a similar basis for the quantum jump into grand stratagem.⁶⁰

The inspired phrase “the fog of war” is very widely quoted in the literature.⁶¹ It refers to the chaos of information inherent in the fast-breaking crisis of battle—the confusing muddle of delayed and mislaid messages, garbled and misunderstood orders, fragmentary and misinformed intelligence, pridefully exaggerated claims of successes and cringingly suppressed reports of blunders. In other words, “the fog of war” is the state of uncertainty resulting from the inability of a military information system to either accurately or speedily monitor the events of battle. The battle maps and situation reports become jangled representations of fiction and fact. The Commander neither knows what he knows nor can be certain of what he doesn’t know. Crucial decisions about deployment, tactics, and strategy are made with the most fragmentary information. The Commander—the decision maker—is uncertain about his own casualties and dispositions as well as those of his enemy. He is even uncertain whether he is winning or losing. His communications and intelligence systems have left him half blind, half deaf, and half mute; and he has become confused, uncertain, and frustrated.

Now, this concept of the fog of war is employed in the Occident for only three purposes. First, the fatalistic historians—exemplified by Cyril Falls—use it as an argument to support their contention that war is an art and never a science. Second, some unsuccessful commanders use it to excuse their failures. Third, some optimistic theoreticians and impatient commanders take it as a challenge—a situation that can be improved if not eliminated by better systems design.⁶²

But the fog of war can be perceived from a fourth viewpoint, one overlooked by the Western writers but perhaps grasped, if only dimly, by the Chinese. While the Occidentals view this fog of communications as an intrinsic effect, the Orientals perceive that it is also subject to external manipulation. One can “enforce an information blockade,” lay on “many deceptive operations,” overload and confuse communications, until the enemy is driven mad. In other words, there is much that one army can do to intensify the already murky atmosphere that engulfs the enemy commanders.

Can such an extrapolation of the theory of stratagem to its outermost limits ever become reality? There is no evidence that its Chinese advocates—ancient or modern—ever put it into practice, at least certainly not on any sustained basis. Is it only a paranoid dream, as mad as the psychological effect that it intends to enforce on the enemy? Napoleon did aim for some such comprehensive effect,⁶³ as did the British deception operations attending OVERLORD

⁶⁰For example, it—rather than Meng or Mao—led me to my initial formulation of this concept.

⁶¹The original source has not been traced. See Heintz (66).

⁶²As for example Napoleon and Montgomery with their liaison officers, or “Phantom,” the secret British World War II innovation of the GHQ Liaison Regiment whose special radio transmission and monitoring net was designed “to transmit vital information from the battle front, *ignoring the usual channels*, to the Commander.” The official history is R. J. T. Hills, *Phantom was there* (London: Arnold, 1951).

⁶³See Chapter III.

in 1944.⁶⁴ When I first drafted this notion,⁶⁵ I presented it only as a passing paragraph—a suggestive point to consider. I was unaware that the practice of stratagem had already reached this plateau the previous year. It is appropriate that this brilliantly conceived and effectively executed operation was the work of the post-World War II masters of stratagem, the Israeli Army, as they have repeatedly demonstrated since 1948. Then, in June 1967, in the Six-Day War they added to their usual battery of tricks when Israeli Army Intelligence under Brigadier Aharon Yariv mounted a unique deception operation that governed the entire course of battle on both the Egyptian and Jordanian fronts:⁶⁶

This operation misled top enemy commanders, drew them into traps, diverted their forces in the wrong directions, spread confusion and chaos within upper level headquarters, and speeded up the process of demoralization and disintegration of the channels of command.

The elaborate, well-orchestrated details are given in my case study of that war.⁶⁷ That Israeli Intelligence knew full well what it was about is implicit in the code-name chosen: Operation FOG OF BATTLE.

It is a fitting coincidence that this most recent case proved illustrative of the best and most sophisticated in stratagem. The entire Six-Day War was accompanied throughout by deception operations, from the initiating surprise attack that had been prepared by strategic deception, through the course of battle that was determined by the remarkable innovation in tactical deception, and into the political patching at the U.N. that was aided by a diplomatic ruse.

Thus an unprecedented picture of “total” stratagem emerges that summarizes the past, and perhaps, foreshadows the future.

Such an operation would represent an entirely new dimension in deception—a kind of “Total” or “Grand Stratagem”—involving the virtual fusion of stratagem, psychological warfare, strategy, and tactics. It could range from the pre-war strategic deceptions of diplomacy, propaganda, and troop deployments, through the strategic deceptions of campaigns and the tactical deceptions of battle after battle, and into perhaps even diplomatic and political deceptions of the post-hostilities phase. In such a grand design stratagem would no longer be an isolated act fitted to a single event as it has usually been. Nor would it even be the successive “selling the dummy right and left” through the course of a campaign as “Stonewall” Jackson and Wavell made it. Even there, stratagem was but the hand-maiden of strategy. But in its “total” mode, stratagem would be the governing factor, displacing or becoming itself *the* strategy.

⁶⁴Cases A45 and A47.

⁶⁵Around March 1968 when I drew upon only the fertile phrase “fog of war,” overlooking the full significance of the oft quoted Chinese maxims.

⁶⁶Leo Heiman, “A Military Classic,” *Military Review*, September 1967, as reprinted in Robinson (68), 364.

⁶⁷Case A66.

6.6 Summary

Stratagem was invented, used, and developed by the “Great Captains.” For the past 25 centuries—both East and West—it has proved one of their more effective means, as they themselves or their contemporary chroniclers have stressed. Moreover, *all* elements of both its practice and theory had entered the repertoire by the end of the 18th century, before the general staff system arose to take over the detailed functions of central planning and direction. This history, however, has been forgotten; and today, particularly since World War II, stratagem has come to be widely treated as the modern invention and arcane province of intelligence services. Its original and most effective place is at the central and highest levels of the military planning process.

Neither Liddell Hart’s theory of alternative goals nor my extension of it as a theory of stratagem offer “instant victory.” This paper is not a “Field Manual for the Ever-Victorious General.” While the amateur may suspect this and the professional will know it, it is worthwhile to note the limitation that practice imposes on this theory. Although I have found no historical examples, it is possible for stratagem to backfire. This could happen in either of two circumstances: first, where the deceiver incorrectly assumes his misleading information has been received much less appropriately understood; and second, where the intended victim has secretly obtained the deception plan itself.

Having stressed the limitations of this theory, I will exercise my author’s prerogative of concluding on a positive note of advocacy. A middle-level theory such as this has utility. Its value lies somewhere between Clausewitz’ glittering barrage of ideas and the pompous banalities of Foch; somewhere between Liddell Hart’s effort to build a general theory of warfare and Cyril Falls’ surrender to the “fog of war.”

Of course, the wise planner and decision-maker will recognize the ever-present “fog of war,” and Clausewitz’ notion of administrative “friction,” and Mrs. Wohlstetter’s insight about the ambiguity of information. However, they need not yield to helpless pessimism because of these factors. These elements of uncertainty and inefficiency are, after all, also present in the enemy’s camp. Both are subject to the awesome tyranny of chance. But success will usually go to whichever side can introduce the larger favorable bias among the otherwise largely random events that attend his plans, decisions, and actions. Military theories or “doctrines” can be potent guides for introducing such biases in the system. This theory is offered as one such guide.

If surprise is indeed the most important “key to victory,” then stratagem is the key to surprise.

Appendix A

CASES OF SURPRISE AND DECEPTION IN GENERAL WAR, 1914-1968

I still feel under obligation, in order to complete the task I have begun, to summarize in convenient sketches the adroit operations of generals, which the Greeks embrace under the one name *strategemata*.

—Frontinus, *Strategemata* (c. 90 A.D.)

Introduction

This appendix consists of case studies of the 115 known instances of surprise and/or deception from 1914 to 1968. These comprise the inventory of 68 “strategic” level cases (designated Case A1, A2, etc.) and the 47 “tactical” level examples (designated Example B1, B2, etc.).

These cases and examples should be read as preliminary drafts. First, the editing is rough. Second, in many cases¹ much of the specific details on surprise and deception remains uncopied from the sources.² Third, the case studies vary considerably in the degree to which I have incorporated both background information and—more important—details of the operational planning and intelligence estimates of the antagonists. Fourth, although all sources cited have been examined, many others are available and should also be examined.

¹E.g., Cases A28, A45, A51, and Example B37.

²I have, however, summarized much of this additional data in Appendix B.

Until these four tasks are completed, all conclusions about any single case should be treated as tentative.³ However, as I systematically examined all cases according to a uniform check-list of analytical categories, most biases due either to my incomplete reporting or to errors of fact should generally balance out.

The analytical check-list of categories or questions was as follows:

1. Does the victim admit to being surprised? If so, in what ways?
 - Intent
 - Place
 - Time
 - Strength
 - Style
2. Does the perpetrator admit to using deception? If so, to what ends?
3. Do the instances of surprise and deception fall into “strategic” or only “tactical” categories? (A belatedly introduced refinement sought to distinguish among the four-fold set of grand strategy, strategy, grand tactics, and tactics.)
4. Was deception coordinated and if so, at what administrative level?
5. Which specific means, if any, were used to deceive?
 - Hypocritical diplomacy to lull suspicions.
 - Planting false documents on victim.
 - Demonstration attacks or feints.
 - Floating misleading rumors by press or word-of-mouth.
 - Cover stories to conceal the real purpose of highly visible acts.
 - Camouflage, particularly in its simulative aspect.

³E.g., Cases A5, A18, A30, A31, A61, and Examples B19, B20, B35.

Example B1. Liège, 4 Aug 1914

Beginning in 1911, the key Liège part of the Schlieffen Plan for the conquest of the West had been the special province of a 44 year old Prussian General Staff officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Erich Ludendorff. On 2 August 1914, in accord with his mobilization orders, Ludendorff, now a general, was posted as Deputy Quartermaster General (i.e., deputy chief of staff) to General Karl von Bulow's Second Army, the very force assigned to the Liège sector.

On 3 August afternoon Germany declared war on France and invaded Luxembourg to seize the rail approaches to Belgium. At dawn the next day, the Germans launched their undeclared war against Belgium. In effect, it was a surprise attack and opposition was found to be negligible. Consequently, as planned, the six infantry brigades under General Otto von Emmich went forward to assault the vast fortifications encircling Liège. Ludendorff, being thoroughly familiar with the construction of this fortress, accompanied the assault force. It invested the fortress on the 5th and 6th.

Although the two forces were almost evenly matched in manpower, General Gérard Leman, the governor of Liège, assumed from the units of origin of the 800 prisoners taken on D-plus-2 that his garrison was being overwhelmed by five German corps. What he did not realize—and what the incompetent Belgian and Allied intelligence services had failed to discover in peacetime—was that Von Emmich's mere six brigades were a mixed force supplemented by detachments from five corps. Consequently, Leman courageously but wrongly ordered his ample 20,000-man infantry screen of 1 division and 1 brigade to retreat, leaving himself and the regular garrison of 20,000 to serve the 400 guns of the fortress. The next morning (D-plus-3) Ludendorff brought one brigade into the abandoned and submissive city of Liège. His legend and rapid promotion date from this incident. In fact, Leman continued to fight on in his ring of forts. They were finally reduced by D-plus-12 as a result of *technological* surprise. The fortress had been designed to withstand the fire of any guns up to 210 mm. The Germans, therefore, had simply equipped themselves with giant siege howitzers of 420 mm (16.5 inches).⁴ They had done this secretly, so the rapid reduction of the Liège fortress had come as some surprise to the defenders.

⁴That is, fully 5-1/2 inches greater than any land gun outside Germany and even 3 inches larger than the largest naval guns then in existence (the British 13.5-inch).

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- Erich von Ludendorff, *Ludendorff's Own Story*, Vol. 1 (New York, Harper, 1919), pp. 28-46.

- **Surprise**

- Erfurth (43), 54.

Example B2. The Ostend Demonstration, 27 Aug 1914

On 5 August 1914 the German army opened its great offensive on the Western Front by a swift wheel through Belgium. Pivoting on Verdun, the wheel turned the French left flank and pressed their center, forcing both back upon Paris. This maneuver was increasingly exposing the rear of their own right wing to the Channel ports. That area then held only the easily contained threat of the 65,000-man remnant of the Belgium army and scattered French units. However, this was the site of the very problematical reinforcement from Britain. In this race against time the 5-division British Expeditionary Force of only 90,000 men arrived in complete secrecy between August 9th and 17th.⁵ This monumental failure of the German intelligence services was not corrected until the 22nd and 23rd when the German Second Army and Colonel-General Alexander von Kluck's First Army finally identified the B.E.F.—by battle.⁶ Egregious intelligence was to plague the Germans during the forthcoming Battle of the Somme and contribute to the German withdrawal. It also set the stage for the first stratagem of the war.

At this juncture, on 24 August, the First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston S. Churchill, adopted Lord Hankey's notion of mounting a diversion at Ostend to support the Belgians and lift some pressure off the B.E.F. Lord Kitchener and the Belgian Government agreed, so on the 25th Churchill directed Brigadier-General Sir George Aston to land his mere 3,000-man brigade of Royal Marines at Ostend the next morning. Churchill specified: ⁷

The object of this movement is to create a diversion, favorable to the Belgians, who are advancing from Antwerp and to threaten the western flank of the German southward advance. It should therefore be ostentatious. . . . The object in view would be fully attained if a considerable force of the enemy were attracted to the coast. You will be re-embarked as soon as this is accomplished.

The demonstration landing was itself shielded by a diversionary attack—a very rare case of using a double-echeloned diversion in depth. Thus, to prevent any German naval interference with the vulnerable landing itself, the whole of the British Southern Force including Admiral Beatty's three battlecruisers made a most daring and successful demonstration on the 28th in the Heligoland Bight itself, in the very face of the German High Seas Fleet.⁸

To add ostentation, Churchill publicly announced in the House of Commons that a British force had begun landing at Ostend.⁹ Due to bad seas, disem-

⁵Churchill, (28?), 279.

⁶Alexander von Kluck, *The March on Paris and the Battle of the Marne, 1914* (London: Arnold, 1923), pp. 38, 40-41.

⁷Churchill, I (23), 335.

⁸Corbett, I (20), 96, 99-101. Curiously, Churchill does not mention the connection between the Ostend and Heligoland actions, despite treating both to detailed and enthusiastic accounts.

⁹Churchill, I (23), 336.

barkation was delayed until the morning of the 27th. On the 31st, on one day's notice and after only six days ashore, Aston's little group was quietly withdrawn but not before it had more than served its purpose.

On August 30th the first garbled news of the already four-day-old landing finally reached the German General Staff. It was well that Churchill had chosen the public press as the vehicle for his news, as German intelligence was evidently slow even at screening the British newspapers. In any event, Colonel Gerhard Tappen, the Chief of the Operations Branch at German Supreme Headquarters (OHL) later recalled this news for the 30th.¹⁰

One day countless British troops were said to have landed at Ostend and to be marching on Antwerp; on another that there were about to be great sorties from Antwerp. Even landings of Russian troops, 80,000 men, at Ostend were mentioned. At Ostend a great entrenched camp for the English was in preparation.

On September 3rd the Chief of Intelligence of the German General Staff, Lieutenant-Colonel Richard Hentsch, personally informed Von Kluck that the news was "bad." After mentioning the stiffening French resistance he said:¹¹

The English are disembarking fresh troops continuously on the Belgian coast. There are reports of a Russian expeditionary force in the same parts. A withdrawal is becoming inevitable.

Starved of information by their intelligence service, Moltke and his General Staff was reduced to fears that magnified the wraithlike 3,000-British Marines into an Army corps of 40,000 and conjured up a whole army of Russian bogymen.¹²

Incidentally, the curious rumor about the Russians seems not to have been tracked down. There is a legend that it sprang from the overheated imagination of an English railway porter. It is also just possible that it represented a much exaggerated leak of an earlier proposal by Churchill to fetch a Russian expeditionary force to the Western Front.¹³ In any case, the rumor emerged on 27 August as "explanation" for the seventeen-hour interruption of service on the Liverpool-to-London railway—70,000 to 500,000 Russians were in secret transit from Archangel to France. The rumor spread quickly throughout Britain. Sir Stuart Coats wrote his brother-in-law in America that 125,000 Cossacks had marched across his estate in Perthshire. Ten thousand were "seen" marching along the Thames Embankment at midnight to entrain from Victoria Station. British officers reported them. The naval sortie into Heligoland Bight on the 28th was explained by "insiders" as a diversion to cover the sea transport of

¹⁰As quoted in Churchill, I (23), 336.

¹¹As quoted in Liddell Hart (30), 85.

¹²The fears of a major British landing were justified only by the fact that the British did have no less than 14 territorial divisions in being at the time.

¹³Liddell Hart (30), 85.

these Russians. Diffusion of these rumors in Britain was entirely by word-of-mouth, government censorship suppressing all mention in the press. The rumor was quickly spread by travelers to France, the United States, Holland, and other countries, soon reaching German intelligence. Only on 15 September, after the Battle of the Marne, was an official denial published in the British press.¹⁴ It seems probable that this rumor arose spontaneously from a fortuitous coincidence of an unexplained disruption of rail service and great public unease over the fearsome news from the Western Front. Nevertheless, I think that research should be done to determine if British authorities—such as Churchill—did not at least give it encouragement as part of their Ostend deception operation. I find only one historian who even suggests that these rumors were “possibly initiated by the British Intelligence for enemy consumption,”¹⁵ and his comment is unsubstantiated speculation. My own suspicions are based entirely on the very odd fact that none of those most immediately concerned or affected—Asquith, Hankey, Churchill, and French—make any mention of these “Russians” in their detailed memoirs of 1914. This raises the question of possible deliberate suppression on the grounds that this indeed was an intelligence enterprise.

Nevertheless, the matter had recently been settled—at least to my tentative satisfaction—by the publication of the memoirs of Lord Hankey who had not only conceived the Ostend Demonstration but, in his capacity as Secretary of the Committee of Imperial Defense was privy to all secrets affecting this operation. True, he too makes no reference to the Russians in his otherwise quite detailed account of the Ostend bit. However, while the Official Secrets Act would inhibit any specific or detailed references to any rôle of the British secret services in this affair, it seems most implausible that Hankey would not have felt free in 1961 to mention the supporting rôle of this myth. Yet he concludes:¹⁶

Who knows what the result might have been on the Belgian sortie from Antwerp on September 9th, or even on the German main armies, if the Ostend bluff had been developed sufficiently to compel the Germans to detach divisions to deal with it? But the *ruse de guerre* was never our strong point. . . .

Plagued by phantoms and finding his tidy war plan ripped apart by a real and unpredictable opponent who did not behave as cooperatively as the sham soldiers of his war games, Moltke belatedly instituted a new operations plan on September 4th and finally, on the 10th, ordered a general withdrawal.

General A. Dupont, the Director of the Deuxième Bureau (i.e., French military intelligence), rated the Ostend Demonstration a culminating factor in Moltke's decision to retreat.¹⁷

It is instructive to see how historians evaluate the contribution of these fictions to the outcome of the Battle of the Marne. While most of the memoirs of

¹⁴Tuchman (62), 388-390.

¹⁵Tyng (35), 205.

¹⁶Hankey, I (61), 196.

¹⁷Churchill I (23), 33.

participants recognize the very real effect that misinformation has and decisions, most professional military historians forget this in their zeal to inappropriately substitute *ex post facto* reconstruction's of "fact" for the relevant contemporary perceptions of the decision makers.

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- *New York Times*, 20 September 1914, Sect. II, p. 6, col. 3.

• Deception

- Winston S. Churchill, *The World Crisis, 1911-1914* (New York: Scribners, 1923), pp. 334-336.
- Liddell Hart (30), 83-85.
- Hankey, 1 (61), 195.

Case A1. Tanga, 2 Nov 1914

“The Indian Army will make short work of a lot of niggers.”

–Major-General (later Colonel) A.E. Aitken,
Expeditionary Force Commander,
c. September 1914.¹⁸

“The troops ... constitute the worst in India, ...and the senior officers are nearer to fossils than active energetic leaders of men. ... One can only hope for the best and rely on ... the element of surprise.”

–Captain (later Colonel) R. Meinertzhagen,
Expeditionary Force Intelligence Officer,
Diary, 13 October 1914.

Britain’s expedition in 1914 to seize Tanga, a seaport in German East Africa was her first *opposed* amphibious operation in over one and a half centuries.¹⁹ This lack of experience partly explains its ignominious failure. The case is, however, relevant here because the expedition had achieved initial tactical surprise; and it is interesting because it ended by giving Richard Meinertzhagen his first opportunity to practice the deception techniques that were soon to give him deserved fame as an imaginative intelligence officer.

The German force, the Schutztruppe, was miniscule—3,000 men in 14 infantry companies, each comprising 15 to 20 German officers and NCOs, 200 native Askaris, and two or more machine guns. However, it was a homogeneous force and, as soon proved, brilliantly led by its gallant 44 year-old Prussian Commandant, Lieutenant-Colonel Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck.²⁰

In any case the British sought to eliminate German East Africa as a threat to Kenya and as a refueling base for German commerce raiders as well as to seize the whole vast territory as a bargaining counter in any peace negotiations. Accordingly London directed the Indian Government to mount an expeditionary force to seize the vast 384,000 square mile German colony, beginning with its small port of Tanga.

In Bombay, Major-General A.E. Aitken collected a numerically impressive force of two brigades comprising eight battalions—one of British Regulars, five of Indian Regulars, and two raised in Indian states—plus a battery of mountain artillery: 8,000 men in all.

¹⁸Meinertzhagen (60), 105.

¹⁹British landings in the American Revolutionary War, the Peninsular War, the American War of 1812, and the Crimean War were purely “administrative,” i.e., unopposed landings. The most recent British combat landing had been Wolfe’s coup at Quebec in 1759.

²⁰Although a thoroughly professional (that is, conventionally educated) German officer, Lettow-Vorbeck had learned much of guerrilla warfare while serving as Adjutant to the German Commander in South West Africa during the Hottentot Revolt in 1904-1905.

However, this Indian Expeditionary Force “B” was a scratch lot, padded out with many inexperienced officers and raw recruits. Even the staff had only just met for the first time in the too-hurried week of assembly before sailing on 16 October.

Aitken’s high-level briefings had made him overconfident and misinformed. Consequently, although his staff included only two men with African experience, he declined the offer of a battalion of the King’s African Rifles from Kenya when he stopped over in Mombasa on 31 October. This against the warning of his Intelligence Officer, Captain Richard Meinertzhagen, who eight years before had finished serving five years in Kenya.

The second decision that would wreck the expedition—and Aitken’s career—also stemmed from the visit to Mombasa. There it was learned that a local British naval officer had recently given the Germans an unofficial undertaking that their ports would not be attacked as long as they were not used for hostile acts. Aitken reluctantly accepted the advice of his Senior Naval Officer, Captain F. W. Caulfield, to honor that ill-conceived promise.

The expeditionary convoy of 14 transports and Caulfield’s old light cruiser, H.M.S. *Fox* arrived off Tanga at 0450 hours on November 2nd. Its coming was unheralded. Total surprise existed at that moment. Von Lettow-Vorbeck was 200 miles up the railway toward Mount Kilimanjaro. Only one platoon—about 70 men—was in town. And nearest help—two other platoons—was several miles off.

The surprise achieved by the sea-borne approach was, however, specific only as to time as Lettow-Vorbeck knew of the British intention to take the offensive, knew that this would be effected by an expeditionary force of 10,000 (actually 8,000) troops sent from India, and he guessed correctly that Tanga would be the target. This information had come to Lettow-Vorbeck in October from captured mails and, I presume, partially confirmed by his several spies in Mombasa. Lacking knowledge of the time of attack, he left only a small—but fully alerted—garrison at Tanga while continuing to press his own harassing attacks along the frontier of British East Africa.²¹

Surprise was now thrown aside, and it makes an instructive cautionary tale to see both how this was done and how its promised fruits can be easily lost through inattention to planning for speed and for follow-through.

At 0750 *Fox* anchored in the harbor to give proper notice of the abrogation of the truce and summon the District Commissioner aboard and demand his surrender. Herr Auracher refused and at 0830 returned ashore. The rest of the day was wasted in communications muddles and unnecessary mine-sweeping. At 1800 the first troops moved from their transports to lighters. Due to more muddled orders the lighters did not begin to move toward shore for another four hours. Under light rifle fire the first two battalions were finally ashore by midnight.

Von Lettow-Vorbeck had long since ordered all available units to Tanga. A two-battalion British advance at dawn toward the town, only 2,500 yards away,

²¹Lettow-Vorbeck (19/20) as quoted by Mosley (64), 52. See also Gardner (63), 44-46, 64.

D+3	British	German
KIA, DOW	359	69
WIA	315?	79?
MIA	143	—
PW	—	0
Totals:	817	148

Table A.1: British and German Casualties at Tanga. References: Gardner (63), 56, 64; and Meinertzhagen (60), 89, 96. However, Mosely (64), 68, gives British losses as 800 KIA, 500 WIA, and several hundreds MIA or PW. Of the British wounded, 130 of the more serious cases had been left at the beach for the Germans. However, these were returned by the Germans on the 5th, under flag of truce.

was stopped in a two-hour fight with the German defenders who now comprised all of one company—but fighting on familiar ground. At that time a third British battalion arrived but so did a second German company and by 1000 hours the invaders had been forced back to their beachhead, having suffered some 300 casualties. At 1700 Aitken followed the bulk of his force ashore. At this point, a reconnaissance would have revealed that the local German authorities had given up Tanga in the face of the seemingly overwhelming British force. However, at 2000 the defense was ordered reestablished by the commander who had now chugged down the railway to within 50 miles of Tanga.

By dawn of D+2 Von Lettow-Vorbeck had arrived with reinforcements and now marshalled a force of 1200 men, 13 machine-guns, and 2 small field guns. Victory was assured.

Following a monotonous series of errors of judgment and coordination, Aitken's battalions were thoroughly beaten on D+2. His mountain battery was firing from lighters but could not see its targets—higher authority had deemed a forward artillery observer unnecessary. Supporting fire from H.M.S. *Fox* was discontinued when it was discovered it was hitting among the British troops—no effective ship-to-shore or fire-control communication had been arranged. One Indian battalion had been routed by wild bees. Another had taken 30 percent casualties. The 2,000 African bearers had slipped away. There was no fresh water—that was in Tanga. The beachhead was a mere mob of panicked soldiers. The closest the British had come to accomplishing anything at all was when on the third night Meinertzhagen on patrol had gotten some shots off at Von Lettow-Vorbeck himself.²² Around 1300 on the 5th, Aitken began re-embarking his sorry force, ordering all stores and even light arms to be left to the Germans who sorely needed them.

Now, at last, deception—presumably Meinertzhagen's—was employed to good use. The withdrawal was covered by ostentatious but bogus signs that the British were about to renew their attack: while the British battalion made a feint attack into the bush, Aitken sent fake orders in clear by his ship's radio.

After the troops were all off the beachhead (at 1520), Meinertzhagen went

²²Mosley (64), 66; and Fergusson (61), 29.

ashore under the white flag of truce to arrange the removal of the wounded. The final humiliation was that even the re-embarkation was so badly managed that it took another 24 hours to get the troops onto the right transports. On the afternoon of the 6th Von Lettow-Vorbeck impatiently signaled that any ships still loitering on the next day would be fired on.

The Germans lost only 148 men (including 15 Germans and 54 Askaris killed). The cost to Britain was 817 casualties (including 127 Britons) and a great, if only local, loss of prestige. The “short happy” career of Major-General Aitken ended in reduction to rank of colonel (half pay at that) and no further assignment. Captain Caulfield was eventually promoted to Vice-Admiral despite his excess of chivalry. Captain Meinertzhagen continued to polish his ruses in German East Africa under Aitken’s successors, Generals Wapshare, Tighe, and Smuts. He was invalided back to the War Office late in 1916. Von Lettow-Vorbeck, pressed by British, South African, Kenyan, Nyasaland, Belgian and Portuguese troops, eluded capture throughout the war.

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• Warnings

- Gardner (63), 44-46, 64.
- Meinertzhagen (60), 85, 87, 103, 105.
- Mosely (62), 52.

• Surprise

- Meinertzhagen (60), 87, 105.

Example B3. The Winter Battle of Masuria, 7 Feb 1915

On the Eastern Front Ludendorff knew by January 1915 from his decrypted intercepts of Russian military radio traffic that Grand Duke Nikolai, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Land and Sea Forces, was planning a gigantic spring offensive.²³ Ludendorff elected to preempt, despite the severe winter weather.

To cover the secret reinforcement of his left wing that would mount the main drive and to pin the Russians on the right, Ludendorff had his denuded right wing begin a fierce demonstration on D-7 (January 31st) at Bolimov. To insure fascination there the Germans reintroduced their new secret gas weapon—a nose and eye irritant—by lobbing 18,000 shells of this tear gas, which did not prove too successful because of the unfavorable climate.²⁴ While Russian attention was indeed tied to this spot, the northward shift of major units was completed.

Delayed by an intense blizzard on 5-6 February, Ludendorff launched his offensive on the 7th. Complete surprise had been achieved. Not only had the Russians failed to detect the build-up on the German left-wing, but they had ruled out any major offensive as impossible at that time, due to the weather. (The first intimation of German concentrations was received on D-3 but was interpreted only as a local phenomenon.²⁵) On the other hand, the Germans had the precise order of battle of the Russian Tenth Army holding the Masurian Lake line. They had received this information from Colonel Myasoyedov, the treasonous counterintelligence officer of Tenth Army itself.²⁶

By D+14, when the German offensive ended with the surrender of 11 Russian generals and 30,000 troops at the encircled fortress of Grodno, Russian casualties stood at 110,000 prisoners and 100,000 dead. The first half of the Russian plan for their 1915 offensive had dissolved in this defeat.

²³General [Max] von Hoffmann, *The War of Lost Opportunities* (London: Kegan, Paul, 1924), p. 81.

²⁴In fact the Germans had first tried out tear gas on 27 October 1914 when they fired 3,000 eye-nose irritant-filled shrapnel shells in the Neuve-Chapelle sector. However the effect was so weak that it did not become known to the intended victims until after the war when revealed by the Germans.

²⁵Knox, I (21), 239.

²⁶Knox, I (21), 277-278. Colonel Myasoyedov was soon caught and, on 2 April, hung. The attendant scandal precipitated two months later the dismissal of Minister of War Sukhomlinov whose protégé the traitor was.

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 - Goodspeed (66), 153-159.
 - Churchill (31), 290-299.
 - Knox, 1 (21), 235-266.
 - Hoffmann (24), 80-90.
 - Ludendorff, I (19), 134-152.
- **Surprise**
 - Goodspeed (66), 154-156.
 - Knox, 1 (21), 237-239.
 - Hoffmann (24), 84, 86.
- **Deception** (i.e., the gas diversion at Bolimov)
 - Hoffmann (24), 84-85.

Example B4. Neuve Chapelle, 15 Mar 1915

It would, I think, be of more effect to compress the [artillery] fire into a terrific outburst for three hours... and follow it by a sudden rush of our infantry. This will take advantage of the element of surprise!

—Haig, *Diary*, 10 February 1915²⁷

The first Allied offensive of 1915 on the Western Front was the Battle of Neuve-Chapelle. It was an all-British effort. The B.E.F. was commanded by Field-Marshal Sir John French. The battle was carefully planned by General Sir Douglas Haig, then commander of the British First Army, and his Chief of Staff, Brigadier-General John Gough who had been killed by a stray bullet on D-minus-16. All was in readiness on 9 March and with the promise of improved weather, the attack went in next morning.

Planning sought and achieved complete tactical surprise. This was due to the suddenness of the attack, without the prolonged advance artillery bombardment that became common later when the front had degenerated into siege warfare. The new tactic involved a brief (35 minute) artillery preparation followed immediately by the infantry assault while the artillery concentrated on the approach routes of the enemy reserves.²⁸

Haig had also managed to secretly mass four full divisions along a two mile front defended by only one German division. It may well be in this connection that Captain Ferdinand Tuohy implies that the British Field Intelligence may have contributed some tactical deception measures. Intelligence Service may have contributed some supporting deception operations.

In any case, the surprise gained by the new artillery tactics easily won the German trenches and opened a gaping hole in their front. However, the British command had planned no follow-through. Consequently on D+1 the German counter-attack easily halted the British advance; and on D+3 the battle ended. The B.E.F. had lost 11,652 men; the Germans roughly the same. The British had gained less than one square mile of Flanders fields.

²⁷As quoted by Terraine (63), 139.

²⁸The notion of gaining surprise by a shortened artillery preparation had originated with the First Army artillery commander, General Freddy Mercer, when on 10 February he recommended to Haig that a four-day artillery preparation would suffice. See Terraine (63), 139.

References

- **General**

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- Brigadier-General John Charteris, *Field-Marshal Earl Haig* (New York: Scribner's, 1929), pp. 134-146.

- **Surprise**

- Tuohy (20), 213-215.
- Liddell Hart (30), 126, 129.
- Terraine (63), 139, 140, 141, 148-149.
- Falls (59), 108.

Example B5. Second Battle of Ypres, 22 Apr 1915

Germany's introduction of poison gas—chlorine—on the Western Front achieved a “technological surprise.” It panicked the two divisions of Algerian *tirailleurs* and French *poilus* upon whom it was used when on 22 April 1915 Falkenhayn launched one of his limited offensives—the Second Battle of Ypres—to reduce the 40-square mile Ypres salient. Tactical surprise was complete. Within two hours the four miles of front covered by the two divisions was empty except for the dead and incapacitated. The German advance immediately shaved that northern half of the 10-mile wide salient back some two miles.

The Allies had received several warnings of the Germans' intention to use poison gas.²⁹ Typically, all were disregarded. The gas cylinders were in position by 10 March, awaiting favorable weather. At the end of March German prisoners taken by the French in the salient gave full details of the storage of these cylinders in the forward trenches and the manner of their discharge. Although this intelligence was circularized to at least one other French army, no local action was taken.

Next, on 13 April, one of the local French divisions acquired a German deserter who brought complete technical details and even a crude respirator. This time, the French divisional commander, General Ferry, gave urgent warning to all the neighboring Allied divisions, his corps commander, and even to the visiting liaison officer from Joffre's GHQ. The upshot was that the corps commander deemed Ferry to be too credulous and ignored his suggestions to destroy the cylinders by bombardment and to lower the risk of high casualties by reducing the number of front-line troops. Joffre's liaison officer dismissed the story as myth and reproved Ferry for his passing the warning to the neighboring British division outside of proper channels. When Ferry was soon proved right he was relieved of command.

On 16 April fresh intelligence about gas came in from Belgian sources—presumably the Belgian division on the extreme northern hinge of the salient had gotten it from prisoners—but this warning was also scoffed off.

The local British corps did seek confirmation through aerial reconnaissance but, when nothing unusual was observed, no precautions were even suggested, much less ordered or taken.

The Allies remained unconcerned even when on 17 April they intercepted a German communique announcing that: “Yesterday, east of Ypres, the British employed shells and bombs with asphyxiating gas.” Rather than questioning its motive, the British dismissed the announcement as the lie they knew it to be.

The Allies may have been partly lulled by the fact that the Germans were not observed concentrating reserves—the usual sign of an impending offensive. Actually Falkenhayn had not done so because he planned no follow-through.

²⁹See also Example B3 for two earlier uses of tear gas, one on the Western Front on 27 October 1914 that went undetected and another on the Eastern Front on 31 January 1915 that was not reported to French intelligence.

Also, I would suggest that a “cry-wolf” effect may have occurred when the Germans advanced D-day several times in March and then to 15 April and finally to 22 April.

On D+2 Canadian reserves managed to hold the line, despite a second gas attack that inflicted heavy casualties on the unprotected Allied troops. From then to the end of the campaign on D+33 the battle was a mere brutal exchange of murderous frontal attacks and counterattacks. On D+33 the balance sheet stood at 47,000 Germans to 60,000 Britons plus some initial French casualties. In addition the Germans had reduced the 40 square mile Ypres salient to about 12. However, typically, the promising new weapon, which was entirely responsible for the initial collapse of the French lines, had been wasted as an experiment unbacked by any plan to exploit the opportunity that materialized. Germany had incurred international moral condemnation without any compensating advantage.

References

- **General**

- Liddell Hart (30), 174-185.
- Edmonds (51), 89-93.
- Esposito (64), 85.

- **Warnings**

- Liddell Hart (30), 176-178.

- **Surprise**

- Erfurth (43), 191-192.

Case A2. Gallipoli, 25 Apr 1915

The second major deception operation of the Great War was the work of General Sir Ian Hamilton, as Commander-in-Chief of the amphibious attack at Gallipoli on 25 April 1915. Although the Turks and Germans had had ample warning to reinforce that area by the public indiscretions of senior Allied officials, as well as the ill-advised naval bombardment and mine-clearing operations during the preceding two months, Hamilton sought to achieve at least tactical surprise to cover the landing of his 50,000 soldiers.

Pre-war British contingency planning on Turkey had concluded that the Dardanelles could only be forced by a combined naval and troop assault. Yet when faced with the actual decision they chose to try a “cheap” way by an all-naval break-through, the Western Front receiving troop priority. The Anglo-French fleet tried alone and failed in February and March 1915. The decision was then made to try it again with an amphibious assault. By now, however, the Allies had virtually disclosed their intention and greatly undercut any chance of strategic surprise. In late February the first of two Turkish divisions were brought to Gallipoli to reinforce the small local garrisons.

Then, on 24 March, only four weeks before the invasion, General Liman von Sanders, the German Military Adviser to the Turkish Government, was appointed to command the defense. For this purpose the new Turkish Fifth Army was provided, thereby increasing the fully alerted Turkish garrison from two to six divisions totaling 55,000-60,000 men. Four of these divisions were on Gallipoli, the other two on the Asiatic shore.

From March onward the Germans and Turks were inundated with rumors and reports of the forthcoming expedition, which more-or-less correctly indicated its target, strength, and schedule.³⁰ However the details were sufficient only to provide the Turkish-German defenders with a general warning.

It is interesting that of the many indiscretions that passed the gross sieve of the then amateurish Allied security system, the one least credited was, in fact, the most authoritative. The commander of the French troop contingent, General d’Amade, revealed at a press interview in Alexandria that the target was specifically Gallipoli.³¹ His blurted disclosure was dismissed as pure “bluff” by the enemy.

An impressive array of imaginative ruses and diversions were devised to conceal the main beachhead and, particularly, to thrust General von Sanders upon the horns of the dilemma of whether to commit his forces to the European (Gallipoli) or Asiatic banks of the Dardanelles. To do this, the ubiquitous British agents busily planted rumors throughout the Near East that Smyrna, on the Anatolian coast, would be the real target, preparatory to a land drive to the Dardanelles itself. This rumor was not credited by General von Sanders who recognized that the target would be the entrance to the Dardanelles itself. However he did persist in believing that the main landing would fall on the Asiatic shore.

³⁰Sanders (27), 56.

³¹James (65), 79-80; Moorehead (56), 119.

From D-minus-2 through the course of the main landings on 25 April, feints were made at several beaches. Also on D-day one demonstration force—a French brigade—actually debarked for one day on the Asiatic side at Kum Kale before rejoining the main group.³² Moreover, General Hamilton personally conceived the notion of landing a small (two-battalion) force on one seemingly inaccessible and hence undefended beach (Y Beach) to threaten the rear of the Turkish force defending the southernmost landing.

A major feint was made on D-minus-1 and D-day at Bulair, the Turkish camp guarding the narrow entrance to the Gallipoli Peninsula. This rôle was played, convincingly, by some 20 warships and transports and Churchill's own Royal Naval Division. The first act was a shore bombardment by the squadron's battleship and destroyers. The second act of this diverting drama was a solo performance by Lieutenant Commander Bernard Freyberg.³³ On D-minus-1, two days after burying Rupert Brooke on Skyros, Freyberg swam ashore before midnight to verify the presence of Turkish troops, light three batches of flares, and earn the first of his four D.S.O.s. The bombardment resumed the next day with General von Sanders himself in attendance. He immediately diverted a division *north*, away from Suvla, to help repulse the "landing" at Bulair that he was certain was already underway.³⁴

Camouflage was lavishly applied to mask the real deployment and strength of the Allied armada in the Aegean. Thus three harmless and old merchant ships disguised as dreadnoughts were brought out from Scapa Flow where they had been part of a battle fleet of 14 such dummy ships. Their transfer was done, among other things, to lure the Kaiser's High Seas Fleet out to fight in the North Sea in the false belief that Jellicoe's Grand Fleet had been denuded for Gallipoli. This ruse did deceive the Turks, who duly reported these "warships" to their German ally. One of the three dummy warships plying the Mediterranean was the 11,621-ton former liner SS *Merion*, which while posing as His Majesty's crack new 30,000-ton battle-cruiser *Tiger*, was sunk near Malta on 30 May by a German U-boat. These dummy warships were another of the imaginative ruses conceived and executed by the then First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston S. Churchill.³⁵

A second camouflaged ship ruse involved a troopship posing as an innocent collier. It was designed to beach as if by accident on D-day and then disgorge by surprise the entire initial assault wave. This stratagem was the notion of

³²For the Kum Kale demonstration see James (65), 74, 89, 101-102, 126-127, 134-135; Callwell (19), 59, 87-90; Nevinston (19), 120-121; Moorehead (56), 121, 130, 150.

³³Later General Lord Freyberg, V.C. (1889-1963). In 1916 he won the Victoria Cross at Beaumont-Hamel. In the Second World War he commanded the unsuccessful defense of Crete, commanded all New Zealand forces in the Middle East and Italy, and climaxed his career as Governor-General of New Zealand.

³⁴For the Bulair feint see Moorehead (56), 130-131, 133-134, 146; Nevinston (19), 119-120; James (65), 74-77, 86, 101-102, 127; and Callwell (19), 53, 58, 60-61, 90-91.

³⁵For the dummy fleet see Churchill (23, U.S. ed.), 308, 550; *Tangled Web* (63), 55-60; Moorehead (56), 122. The notion of the "dummy fleet" was originally conceived by Churchill in 1911 and ordered by him on 21 October 1914. Winston S. Churchill, *The World Crisis: 1911-1914* (New York: Scribner's, 1924), pp. 576-577. For collateral details see Admiral Viscount Jellicoe, *The Grand Fleet* (New York: Doran, 1919), pp. 171-172 and photo.

Day	Allies	Turks	Ratio
D	3,000	c.1,500	1:0.5
D + 3	9,700		
D + 14	19,000		
D + 97	57,000	57,000	1:1.0
D + 118	107,000	>97,000	1:0.9
D + 259	252,000	300,000	1:1.2

Table A.2: Cumulative Casualties at Gallipoli. References: Moorehead (56), 219, 360-361; Churchill (23), 333, 340, 47; and James (65), 141, 348, etc. Compare Sanders (27), 104, who gives the Turkish losses at D+259 at 218,000 including 66,000 KIA.

Commander Edwin Unwin, captain of the old gunboat H.M.S. *Hussar*. Inspired by the nearby site of ancient Troy, he proposed that the collier *River Clyde* be converted to a camouflaged troopship. The proposal was accepted and its enthusiastic inventor assigned to effect the refitting and command this co-opted landing craft, which the cognizant had begun calling the “Wooden Horse.” On D-day, the *River Clyde* beached as planned, troops disembarking through specially cut sally-ports and down improvised gangways, bridging the final yards across towed barges laid ship-to-shore. (This was the veritable prototype of the familiar LST of the next world war.) However, its 2,100 troops had by chance been disgorged directly in the face of murderous Turkish small-arms fire. In these unexpected conditions, commander Unwin and Able-Seaman Williams wallowed into the shallow water to position the lighters and earn their Victoria Crosses. Fortunately the large steel hull sheltered most of the troops until it was safe for them to land the next day.³⁶

These several crude ruses did however combine to gain tactical surprise. On D-day itself Hamilton landed about 21,000 men of his total combat strength of 50,000. This assault force was met at its five real beachheads on Gallipoli by an initial total of only about 2,500 Turkish troops. Moreover the deception efforts caused a paralysis of uncertainty at enemy headquarters that won 48 more hours before Von Sanders committed his main force to the defense of Gallipoli. This achievement and its lesson about the utility of deception tends to be overlooked in the general condemnation of this otherwise disastrous enterprise.³⁷ The precious time gained by tactical surprise was simply frittered away on the beaches by the confusion of untrained troops and the immobility of indecisive commanders, from Hamilton on down.

In addition to supporting the initial landings in April, deception entered the Gallipoli case on three other occasions. It recurred in conjunction with the new landings at Suvla Bay in August.³⁸

The next use of “deception” was simply an administrative hoax invented in

³⁶Keyes, I (34), 282, 283, 296.

³⁷Most specifically, the inexcusable assertion of the British Official Historian, Edmonds (51), 118, that Gallipoli was “an operation without any attempt at mystification or surprise.”

³⁸Example B6.

Area	Allies			Turks		
	Troops	Divisions	Guns	Troops	Divisions	Guns
Xeros Gulf						
Bulair	0	0	0	10,000	1	25
Gallipoli town	0	0	0	10,000	1	25
Southern Gallipoli						
Anzac Bay	12,000	1-1/3	4	3,000	3/12	10
Helles Point	9,000	2/3	?	6,000	6/12	10
Maidos	0	0	0	11,000	1-3/12	30
Asiatic Coast						
Kum Kale	0	0	0	c.1,000	0	0
Bashika Bay	0	0	0	10,000	1	25
Reserves, etc.	29,000	3	?	c.9,000	0	0
Totals:	50,000	5	?	60,000	5	125

Table A.3: Orders of Battle Along the Dardanelles, 25 April 1915. References: Sanders (27), 58-63; Churchill (23), 333-335.

Date	Allies		Turks	
	Troops	Divisions	Troops	Divisions
D-66	2,000	0	5,000	0
D-36	40,000	4	14,000	2
D	21,000	2	20,000	2
D + 1	29,000	3?	30,000	2-2/2
D + 2	50,000	5	30,000?	2-2/2?
D + 3	50,000	5	35,000?	3-1/2?
D + 4	50,000	5	40,000?	4?
D + 5	50,000	5	45,000	4-1/2
D + 6	50,000	5	50,000	5
D + 12?	50,000	5	90,000	9
D + 15	50,000	5	100,000	10
D + 41	50,000	6	100,000	10
D + 73	52,000	8	100,000	10
D + 103	70,000	10	100,000	15
D + 105	97,000	12	100,000	15
D + 113	120,000	14	120,000	20
D + 228	123,000	15	120,000	21
D + 240	40,000	4	120,000	21
D + 260	0	0	120,000	21

Table A.4: Build-Up of Troops on the Peninsula. References: Sanders (27), 58, 60-61, 62-63, 64, 67, 68; Churchill (23), 280, 478; Callwell (19), 63, 158, 183; Nevins (19), 216-218.

Cairo by Guy Dawnay and T. E. Lawrence and passed by Monro with tongue-in-cheek to Kitchener to offer him (and London) a third (if carefully loaded) option to take up some of the politically tearing strain of the stark alternatives to liquidate or escalate at Gallipoli. This was the notion that the withdrawal from Gallipoli would be made simultaneously with yet another amphibious landing—at Ayas Bay near Alexandretta in the Gulf of Iskanderum. The ruse did serve to ease the psychological stasis that was blocking decision. Emotional heat was diverted onto the Ayas plan which in being rejected restarted the wheels of decision about Gallipoli. The episode is interesting because it has been widely misinterpreted.³⁹

The third—or third and fourth—instances of deception were those involved in the evacuation of Gallipoli in December 1915 and January 1916, as described below.⁴⁰

The last element of deception associated with the Dardanelles venture was by way of epilogue. The public controversy that raged in England over that debacle had overflowed into Parliament to the point where on 1 June 1916 the Leader of the House, Bonar Law, thoughtlessly conceded the principle of wartime publication of relevant papers. The Dardanelles revelations were eagerly awaited not only by the Opposition but even by the deposed Churchill, who was disgruntled by having been made something of the scapegoat. However the Foreign Office immediately objected on the grounds that public disclosure would seriously compromise its current and very delicate negotiations for Romania's entry into the war. The Admiralty and War Office also objected that publication would necessarily involve disclosing many still valid military capabilities. Moreover, at the strategic level, as the then Secretary of the War Committee, Colonel Hankey, later observed:⁴¹

It was always in my mind that we should keep the Turks guessing whether we might make a fresh attack on the Dardanelles, so as to immobilize a strong garrison in the Gallipoli Peninsula, and keep it away from other fronts. By revealing our earlier plans by publication we should be indicating that we never intended to renew the attack.

It is therefore fortunate that such views prevailed; and, on 18 July, Prime Minister Asquith told a sniping Commons that the decision to lay the papers had been reversed. Thus was the negative side of security fulfilled. However, Hankey's excellent thought to mount a positive campaign of deception was seemingly never carried out.

For two of the enemy, this was their first of three practical lessons in military deception. These men were Cavalry General Liman von Sanders, the German military adviser appointed to command the Turkish forces, the Fifth Army, that opposed the Allies at Gallipoli and Lieutenant Colonel Mustafa Kemal

³⁹James (65), 329-331, citing Dawnay's private papers. Among those writers deceived on this point are Moorehead (56), 323-324; and Higgins (63), 230.

⁴⁰Examples B7 and B8.

⁴¹Hankey, II (61), 518.

(“Atatürk”) commanding the 19th Division. Their second lesson came four months later at Suvla Bay and their third would occur three years later in Palestine at the hands of Allenby. And some of the lessons of both strategy and stratagem were to be applied 29 years later at Normandy by the First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill.

References

• General

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- Alan Moorehead, *Gallipoli* (New York: Harper, 1956). (Often inaccurate.)
- Liman von Sanders, *Five Years in Turkey* (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute, 1927).
- Admiral of the Fleet Sir Roger Keyes, *Naval Memoirs*, Vol. I (London: Butterworth, 1934), pp. 173-519.
- Liddell Hart (30), 141-174.
- Major-General Sir C.E. Callwell, *The Dardanelles* (London: Constable, 1919).
- Henry W. Nevinston, *The Dardanelles Campaign* (New York: Holt, 1919).

• Security Leaks

- James (65), 79-80.
- Sanders (27), 56.
- Moorehead (56), 119.

• Intelligence

- Sanders (27), 56, 62.

• Surprise

- James (65), 101-102.

• Deception

- Moorehead (56), 119, 120-122, 130.
- Liddell Hart (30), 161-162.
- Liddell Hart, *Through the Fog of War* (New York: Random House, 1938), pp. 99, 297.
- Keyes, I (34), 282-284.
- Winston S. Churchill, *The World Crisis, 1915* (London: Butterworth, 1923), pp. 314-318.
- Trumbull Higgins, *Winston Churchill and the Dardanelles* (New York: Macmillan, 1963), pp. 175-178. 183.
- James (65), 80, 101-102.
- Callwell (19), 52, 53, 58, 59, 60, 87-91.

Case A3. Gorlice, 2 May 1915

To end the Russian threat to Hungary that had developed on the Eastern Front, the German Army returned to the offensive on 2 May 1915. The grand strategy specified a breakthrough by direct frontal attack on the Russian center at Gorlice—an altogether unpromising and unsubtle plan, typical of General Falkenhayn, one of the more unimaginative senior commanders in the German Army. Fortunately, he assigned field command and detailed planning to General August von Mackensen, whose Chief of Staff and main planner was Colonel Hans von Seeckt, a proponent of mobility and surprise.

The offensive began at 0600 after a preparatory artillery bombardment of four hours, enough to awaken the local enemy forces but not enough to bring up any significant reinforcements. The operation was a success. By D + 4 the German-Austrian forces totaling 170,000 men had penetrated 50 miles and taken over 100,000 prisoners and an immense quantity of materiel. By D + 12 the entire Russian line along the Carpathians had been driven back 80 miles to the San River where it stabilized. Although the attack was a success as measured by its limited objectives, its frontal nature ruled out a complete rout, as the Russians were permitted—indeed forced back upon—their own needed reserves, supplies, and railways.

Despite the poor plan, success had followed. It owed this largely to the fact that Mackensen-Seeckt had achieved total strategic surprise—of intention, time, place, and force—followed by rapid exploitation. Mackensen had, by sheer speed, formed his new Eleventh Army of six corps and positioned it on a narrow 25-mile front in complete secrecy. To pin and deceive the enemy, Falkenhayn had Ludendorff make three demonstration attacks at the other end of the line, in Poland.⁴²

If we exclude as “tactical” the unexploited success of the British surprise tank attack at Cambrai in 1917, Gorlice was the only case of strategic breakthrough in the Great War obtained through a direct frontal attack.⁴³ It suggests that the one “principle” of war absent in all the unsuccessful cases was surprise.

Mackensen took great pains to conceal the sudden appearance of his German army along the line. For example, all German patrols went out dressed in Austrian uniforms. It was only on 25 April, three days before they had completely taken over their assigned 30 mile part of the front, that the opposing Russians learned that German units were present.⁴⁴ The earlier reports of the Germans’ arrival, received from spies and one aerial observer, had been entirely disregarded.⁴⁵

Deception was enlisted to further conceal the German intentions. German intelligence had circulated false rumors of strong German concentrations building-up in East Prussia.⁴⁶

⁴²Ludendorff, I (19), 166.

⁴³Willoughby (39), 89-99.

⁴⁴Churchill (31), 313, 314.

⁴⁵Knox, I (21), 284.

⁴⁶Erfurth (43), 171.

By D + 13 the Russians lost somewhere between 100,000 total casualties (their own notoriously-underestimated admission) and the 170,000 prisoners the Austrians very plausibly claimed.⁴⁷

References

- **General**

- Erich von Ludendorff, *Ludendorff's Own Story*, Vol. I (New York: Harper, 1919), pp. 163-172.
- Winston S. Churchill, *The Unknown War: The Eastern Front* (New York: Scribner's, 1931), pp. 308-315.
- Knox, I (21), 281-290.

- **Warnings**

- Knox, I (21), 284.
- Erfurth (43), 170-171.

- **Surprise**

- Willoughby (39), 92-94, 99.
- Liddell Hart (54), 184.
- Liddell Hart (37), 37.
- Churchill (31), 313, 314.

- **Deception**

- Erfurth (43), 171.

⁴⁷Knox, I (21), 284.

Example B6. Suvla Bay, 6 Aug 1915

General Sir Ian Hamilton had been thoroughly frustrated in his effort in April 1915 to seize the Gallipoli Peninsula from the Turks. Although the deception-aided landings themselves had proved successful, the abject failure of almost all concerned to exploit the initial element of tactical (or, perhaps, even strategic) surprise had given the Turkish Fifth Army—commanded by General Liman von Sanders—ample time to deploy and encircle the original beachheads.⁴⁸

The arrival of fresh divisions on the Aegean island staging bases of Lesbos (then called Mitylene) and Imbros suggested that an opportunity existed for Hamilton to not merely reinforce his existing beachheads but to seek to break the deadlock by opening a new beach. This was indeed his strategy.

Hamilton decided not to hide his intention to make another landing. On the contrary he deliberately disclosed this general aspect of his strategy to the enemy while using stratagem to mislead as to which of three or four specific plausible alternative landfalls would be made. The cover target selected was Smyrna (specifically Adramyti Bay) on the Asiatic shore, opposite the British-occupied rear staging base on Lesbos. Indeed, there was much to commend an attack on Smyrna, as some of his Lesbian staff were urging. However, Kitchener had emphatically ruled out any landing on Turkey's Asian mainland as opening the way to ever increasing demands in manpower, that the Allies were not prepared to divert from the Western Front. The Smyrna deception plan comprised three complementary ruses. All were designed to imply preparations on Lesbos for an assault against Smyrna. The plan required only that the numerous enemy agents scattered through the Aegean faithfully report the several rumors and visible signs contrived for their benefit.

To alert enemy intelligence, a staff officer was sent in July to Lesbos to make ostentatious enquiries among Greek and Turkish landowners about local

⁴⁸See Case A2.

Area	Allies			Turks		
	Troops	Divisions	Guns	Troops	Divisions	Guns
Helles Point	35,000	6-1/3	124	40,000	7	94
Anzac Beach	37,000	3-2/3	72	30,000	3	76
Suvla Bay	25,000	2	12	1,500	0	5
Bulair	0	0	0	18,500	3	75
Maidos, etc. (reserve)	0	0	0	10,000	2	20
Total Gallipoli:	97,000	12	208	100,000	15	270
Asiatic Coast	0	0	0	20,000	5?	60
Reserves	23,000	2	0	0	0	0
Grand Total:	120,000	14	?	120,000	20	330

Table A.5: Orders of Battle at the Dardanelles, 6-7 August 1915. Note that figures for Allied guns includes intense naval gun support. References: Churchill (23), 455-456, 460, 478; Sanders (27), 80, 84; James (65), 252-253.

Date	British	Turks
D	10,000	1,500
D + 1	20,000	700
D + 2	20,000	700
D + 3	25,000	c.15,000
D + 4	30,000	c.15,000
D + 10	30,000	c.30,000

Table A.6: Build-Up of Troops at Suvla. References: Moorehead (56), 261-262, 264; James (65), 277, 295-296; Churchill (23), 459, 462-463; Callwell (19), 213-219, 232, 237, 245; and Nevinson (19), 219-220.

Date	British	Turkish
H + 30 min.	1	0
D + 1	1,600	800
D + 2	1,600	800
D + 3	> 3,000	heavy
D + 4	9,000	> 3,000
D + 9	> 10,000	?
D + 15	> 150000	?

Table A.7: Casualties At Suvla (Cumulative). References: James (65), 277, 281, 283, 286, 291, 297, 301, 305, 309; and Churchill (23), 463.

water supply and camp sites.⁴⁹ The earliest visible sign confirming this was the arrival throughout July of three new divisions, fresh from England, with two others in transit and due to arrive on August 10th. While most of their nine brigades were sent immediately to the main beachhead at Helles, others were held at the advance base on Imbros and, finally, at the end of July when the 10th (Irish) Division under Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Bryan Mahon arrived, half (one and a half brigades) was disembarked on Lesbos.⁵⁰ This last arrival was now deliberately publicized throughout the Aegean by rumor spread by British agents.⁵¹ Key man in this was Lieutenant Compton Mackenzie, who having just published his first novel had become a Royal Marine officer with the Royal Naval Division.

Mackenzie personally visited Lesbos at this time to assure that the desired rumors from that key place would be particularly loud and fast.⁵² Among other ruses, maps of the Asiatic coast of Turkey were widely distributed with spurious indiscretion among the three newly arrived divisions.⁵³

⁴⁹Moorehead (56), 247-248.

⁵⁰Nevinson (19), 217, 222, 224.

⁵¹Nevinson (19), 224; Callwell (19), 194.

⁵²Nevinson (19), 223, 224. Invalided out in September, Mackenzie went to Athens where he became a counter-espionage officer for M.I.6 under cover in the British Legation as a public information officer.

⁵³Nevinson (19), 224; James (65), 247; and Moorehead (56), 248.

Further calculated visibility was given Lesbos on 2 August by the arrival there of General Hamilton, flying his largest flag, and accompanied by his naval commander, Admiral de Robeck.⁵⁴

A second stratagem was arranged to immediately precede the landings at Suvla, when it would presumably be plain from British shipping deployments that the real target would not be on the Asiatic shore at Smyrna, but somewhere in the Gulf of Saros formed by the northern shore of the jutting Gallipoli Peninsula and the Aegean coast of the small Turkish European mainland. There, the cover target would be Bulair, the main garrison at the strategically vulnerable neck of Gallipoli itself. This was accomplished by a small temporary landing above Bulair on the northern shore of the Gulf of Samos.⁵⁵

Hamilton had a clear understanding that the success of his new effort hinged as much on surprise as speed. While his “positive” efforts to assure secrecy through deception were largely successful, his “negative” efforts to do so through intense security precautions were pursued with too great a zeal. While he was wise to keep his plans away from even London, he severely crippled many of his field commanders by withholding briefings and maps until *after* the attack. When, in mid-July, Hamilton learned that the corps commander at Anzac, Lieutenant-General Birdwood, had disclosed some of the plan to two of his division commanders, Hamilton immediately telegraphed the following drastic “rocket.”⁵⁶

I am sorry you have told your divisional generals. I have not even informed Stopford [who would command at Suvla] or Bailloud [the new French corps commander at Helles]. Please find out at once how many staff officers each of them has told, and let me know. Now take early opportunity of telling your divisional generals that whole plan is abandoned. I leave it to you to invent the reason for this abandonment. The operation is secret and must remain secret.

The new landing at Suvla was immediately preceded by renewed attacks from the two old beachheads in order to tie down the Turkish forces there and divert some of their reserves. In addition, Birdwood’s force at Anzac was to try a breakout. For this, some local stratagems were used. First, the force at Anzac was secretly doubled on D-minus -3, -2, and -1 by night landings of some 25,000 reinforcements, which were kept in concealed positions during the day.

Second, a tunnel was dug 500 yards out into no-man’s-land to give a secret approach and surprise at H-hour. Third, a new pattern of bombardment was established to lull the Turks into accepting the real H-hour barrage. Finally, the main attack was supported by feints at other portions of the line to conceal the direction of the thrust.⁵⁷

⁵⁴Nevinson (19), 224; Callwell (19), 194; Moorehead (56), 248, where Hamilton’s arrival is dated to the third.

⁵⁵For the Bulair feint see Moorehead (56), 240, 286; and Callwell (19), 194.

⁵⁶Quoted in Moorehead (56), 246.

⁵⁷Moorehead (56), 248-249; James (65), 241-43.

A critical measure of the achievement of strategic or tactical surprise is the disproportion of the contending forces in their distribution among potential targets or fronts at the time of attack. Thus does Table A.5 measure the surprise achieved by the Allied offensive and Suvla Bay landing in August. It shows that the British did make their landfall at the least defended coastal strip (Suvla Bay), while nearly half the Turkish force—nine divisions—were rather far from the real target.⁵⁸

One critical measure of the opportunity for exploiting tactical surprise is the disproportion in the rates of buildup of the contending forces in the threatened area. Table A.6, which gives those for the Suvla beachhead, shows that their successful stratagems had given the British almost three days (in fact, exactly 58 1/2 hours) jump on the Turks.

This timely opportunity, which was so completely unused, is also reflected in the (cumulative) casualty figures in Table A.7.

The Suvla Bay beachhead was abandoned simultaneously with Anzac Beach on the night of 19/20 December 1915, preparatory to the complete evacuation of Gallipoli the following January 9th. As described elsewhere, these evacuations were able to proceed without casualties because they were shielded by effective stratagems.⁵⁹

⁵⁸Moreover, one of the seven divisions at Helles was occupied in coast-watching between Helles and Anzac. Sanders (27), 80.

⁵⁹See Example B7.

References

- **General**

- James (65), 235-238, 277-283, 292-297, 304-307, 309-310.
- Moorehead (56), 241-294.
- Churchill (23), 454-477.
- Hankey, I (61), 390-402.
- Sanders (20/27), 82-97.
- Callwell (19), 192-255.
- Nevinson (19), 220-227, 286-332.

- **Security**

- Moorehead (56), 245-246.
- Hankey, I (61), 380.
- James (65), 247-248.

- **Warnings**

- Moorehead (56), 246, 260-261.
- Sanders (27), 79-80, 81, 82.
- James (65), 253.

- **Surprise**

- Callwell (19), 213, 216.
- James (65), 277, 282.
- Moorehead (56), 261, 264, 286.

- **Deception**

- Moorehead (56), 240-241, 245-249.
- Nevinson (19), 222, 224-225.
- Hankey, I (61), 391.
- Callwell (19), 194.
- James (65), 252.

Example B6a. Serbia, 7 Oct - 30 Nov 1915

The Serbs had managed quite well in repelling two Austro-Hungarian offensives during the first year of the First World War. Then in October 1915 the Austrian Third Army was joined in a surprise offensive by the German Eleventh Army and the First and Second Bulgarian armies. The Bulgarian participation began, as planned, on 11 October, that is, D-plus-4. Although this was generally expected, being signaled by Bulgarian mobilization, it came as a surprise in timing, coinciding with their declaration of war.

The entire attacking force (less one Bulgarian army of two divisions) was commanded by German Field-Marshal August von Mackensen, with Lieutenant-Colonel Richard Hentsch as his Chief-of-Staff. The Central Powers massed 24 division-equivalents (10 German divisions, 4 Austrian, and 5 double-size divisions).

Category	Central Powers	Serbians	Ratio
Battalions	341	194	1:0.57
Troops	330,000	200,000	1:0.61
Guns	1,200	300	1:0.25

Table A.8: Strengths of Central Powers and Serbians.

Deception was primitive, but took two forms. One was the continuation—however strained and threatening—of formal Serbian-Bulgarian diplomatic relations. These continued up to the moment of attack, providing some uncertainty over the imminence of the offensive. The other was the Austrian bombardment of the Serbian shores that was done during September, providing misdirection.

When the actual offensive was opened on the old front by the Austro-Germans on 7 October (preceded by only one day of preparatory artillery fire), a conventional set of feints on the Drina and Orsova rivers momentarily distracted Serbian attention from the real Danubian and Sava crossings. Tactical surprise was complete, largely due to Hentsch's success in planning that brought the assault forces up only at the last moment, too late for the Serbs to recognize the intent.

Strategic surprise was also present in two forms—one minor, one major. The minor form is that, by keeping the Serbs uncertain about whether Bulgaria would or would not become a belligerent, the invasion caught the Serbian army slightly off-balance regarding the distribution of its forces, with a disproportionate number retained on the active Austro-Hungarian front and only a weak guard facing the potential Bulgarian front. This imbalance is seen in Table A.9.

The major form of strategic surprise was that inflicted on the great Allied army assembling in Salonica, Greece, across the Serbo-Bulgarian border. This force began arriving on 5 October specifically to deter Bulgarian entry into the war. The ever-slow Allies were again too late. By 17 November when it had built up to 120,000 French and British troops the Serbs were on the point of breaking. Ill-coordinated and too late, this fresh force played no significant rôle

	Austrian Front		Bulgarian Front		Total
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	
Austrian	53	?	0	0	
German	111	?	0	0	
Bulgarian	0	0	177	?	
Central					
Power Total:	164	48.1%	177	51.9%	100.0%
Serbian Total:	116	59.8%	78	40.2%	100.0%

Table A.9: Battalion Orders of Battle, 6 October 1915.

during the 51 days it took the Central Powers to overrun Serbia. The huge Allied relief force did no more than advance nine miles into Serbia at one point, temporarily diverting only 24 Bulgarian battalions.

By D + 51 (30 November) all but a small corner of Serbia had been lost. The Serbian army had suffered perhaps 230,000 total casualties including prisoners. Only 245,000 had escaped to Greece. Total casualties for the Central Powers were evidently only 30,000.

References

- **General**

- John Clinton Adams, *Flight in Winter* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1942).
- Alan Palmer, *The Gardeners of Salonica* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1965), pp. 31-50.
- Esposito (64a), 223-225.
- Falls (59), 136-140.
- Falkenhayn (20), 179-187, 198-221.
- Luigi Villari, *The Macedonian Campaign* (London: Unwin, 1922), pp. 17-23, 26, 30, 85-87, etc.

- **Warnings**

- Adams (42), 51.

- **Surprise**

- Falkenhayn (20), 187, 199.
- Palmer (65), 31.

- **Deception**

- Falkenhayn (20), 198, 199.

Example B7. Evacuation of Suvla Bay and Anzac Beach, 20 Dec 1915

“So long as wars exist, the British evacuation of the Ari Burnu [Anzac] and Anafarta [Suvla] fronts will stand before the eyes of all stratagists of retreat as a hitherto unattained masterpiece.”

–*Vossische Zeitung*, 21 January 1916.⁶⁰

On 7 December 1915 the British Cabinet agreed to liquidate all of the Gallipoli enterprise except the tip position at Cape Helles. This difficult and embarrassing decision had been made with the concurrence of the War Committee, Lord Kitchener (the Minister for War), Lieutenant-General Sir Charles Monro (Ian Hamilton’s successor as commander in the Aegean) all of Hamilton’s former staff (now under Monro), and two of the three corps commanders on Gallipoli. The now isolated group favoring further escalation at Gallipoli was pretty much limited to Churchill, Commodore Keyes, Lord Curzon, the replaced Hamilton, one able Gallipoli corps commander (Birdwood), and the Secretary of the War Committee (Colonel Hankey).

Moreover, the decision to evacuate was made in full concurrence with the harrowing predictions of appalling casualties to be expected during the withdrawal phase. As early as 12 October, Hamilton had informed Kitchener (and, through him, the War Committee) that an evacuation would entail 50 per cent casualties and loss of all guns and stores. Although this was a lie told to forestall a decision to cancel his pet operation, privately even Hamilton expected 35 to 45 per cent casualties in such an event.

In late October, Hamilton’s former staff, though generally biased in favor of withdrawal, presented the newly arrived Monro with a careful estimate that reckoned on 50 per cent loss in troops and 66 per cent in guns. Monro himself notified Kitchener on 2 November his own estimate of loss of 30 to 40 per cent of both men (i.e., some 40,000) and materiel. Kitchener himself was more optimistic and reported to London on 15 November his expectation of only about 25,000 casualties (i.e., 25%), which was also then the reduced estimate of the local staff. On 22 November the British Army General Staff reported to the War Committee its estimate of 50,000 casualties (i.e., 50 per cent).⁶¹

The dire predictions of huge casualties were, of course, based on the assumption that the evacuation would be contested. Lord Curzon, the Lord Privy Seal, in a Memorandum circulated to the Cabinet on 25 November, pictured the operation in the following terms of gloom:⁶²

[The] evacuation and the final scenes will be enacted at night.
Our guns will continue firing until the last moment . . . but the trenches

⁶⁰Nevinson (19), 400n, citing an article by an anonymous German military correspondent present at the time.

⁶¹Moorehead (56), 303-304, 312, 316, 319, 320, 324, 333; James (65), 317, 322, 327, 336; Nevinson (19), 371, 387; Hankey, II (61), 458-459; and Higgins (63), 231.

⁶²As quoted in The Earl of Ronaldshay, *The Life of Lord Curzon*, Vol. III (London: Benn, 1928), pp. 130-131.

will have been taken one by one, and a moment must come when a final *saute qui peut* takes place, and when a disorganized crowd will press in despairing tumult on to the shore and into the boats. Shells will be falling and bullets ploughing their way into this mass of retreating humanity. . . . Conceive the crowding into the boats of thousands of half-crazy men, the swamping of craft, the nocturnal panic, the agony of the wounded, the hetacombs of slain. . . .

It is interesting that the differences among these various casualty predictions were directly associated with the predictor's bias for or against evacuation. The advocates of escalation pressed forward the more pessimistic figures, and the pro-evacuation position drew upon the optimistic estimates. Moreover, those individuals who changed their position on evacuation, simultaneously adopted the psychologically appropriate statistics. The most striking instance was Lord Kitchener who moved from 50 per cent casualties to 25 and then on 15 November when leaving Gallipoli and having just reluctantly concluded that evacuation was inevitable, he impulsively blurted out to Colonel Aspinall:⁶³

I don't believe a word about those 25,000 casualties. . . you'll just step off without losing a man, and without the Turks knowing anything about it.

(Similarly, *after* evacuation had been ordered by London, most of the local staff officers suddenly revised their *private* estimates downward to a comforting 15 per cent.)⁶⁴ Thus casualty estimates—far from being rational military calculations, much less seen in human terms—were used by the military and political professionals alike as political tools and psychological crutches. Fortunately, there was one exception to this sorry state of emotional self-seeking irresponsibility—General Monro.

Monro rejected the conventional feints or demonstrations as a supplement to the various ruses at the beachheads themselves. Because he was setting precedent, it is worth reading his own argument.⁶⁵

The attitude which we should adopt from a naval and military point of view in case of a withdrawal . . . had given me much anxious thought. According to textbook principles and lessons from history it seemed essential that . . . evacuation should be immediately preceded by a combined naval and military feint in the neighborhood of the peninsula, with a view to distracting the attention of the Turks from our intention. When endeavoring to work out the concrete fact how such principles could be applied to the situation of our forces, I came to the conclusion that our chances of success were infinitely more probable if we made no departure of any kind from the normal life which we were following both on sea and on land. A feint which

⁶³Quoted in Moorehead (59), 333.

⁶⁴Nevinson (19), 387.

⁶⁵Monro dispatch of 6 March 1916, as quoted by Callwell (19), 276-277.

Date	Time	Suvla		Anzac		Total	
		Men	Guns	Men	Guns	Men	Guns
Dec. 8		43,000	90	40,000	110	83,000	200
Dec. 10		?	?	?	?	80,000	?
Dec. 17		?	?	?	?	44,000?	?
Dec. 18	0600	16,000	?	22,000	?	38,000	?
	2000	16,000	?	22,000	?	38,000	?
Dec. 19	0530	9,000	16	11,000	10	20,000	26
	2000	9,000	16	11,000	10	20,000	26
	2200	2,000?	0	4,000?	10	6,000?	10
Dec. 20	0100	1,322+	0	2,000?	10	3,500?	10
	0400	550	0	800?	10	1,350?	10
	0415	200	0	0	10	200	10
	0515	0	0	0	10	0	10

Table A.10: Strengths at Suvla and Anzac. References: Moorehead (59), 341-347; James (65), 339-342; Callwell (19), 280-283, 295-298; Nevins (19), 387, 394, 398-399.

did not fully fulfill its purpose would have been worse than useless, and there was obvious danger that the suspicion of the Turks would be aroused by our adoption of a course, the real purport of which could not have been long disguised.

Portents of the decision to evacuate Gallipoli had been gradually accumulating before the public and enemy eye alike. Thus, the commander-in-chief of the expeditionary force, Hamilton, was relieved on 14 October. That same day, withdrawal was first openly advocated in the House of Lords by Milner. On 2 November, in the House of Commons, Prime Minister Asquith bluntly admitted the failure of the recent offensive. The announcement on 11 November of a reconstituted War Committee, (to replace the Dardanelles Committee) revealed that the two leading public proponents of the adventure, Churchill and Curzon, had been dumped.

	Total Force	Pessimistic		Optimistic		Actual Loss	
		No.	Percent	No.	Percent	No.	Percent
Men	83,000	40,000	50.0%	12,500	15.0%	5	0.01%
Guns	200	100	50.0%	30	15.0%	10	5.0%
Horses & Mules	5,000	2,500	50.0%	750	15.0%	56	1.1%

Table A.11: Predicted and Actual Losses.

Finally, on 18 November, Lord Ribblesdale, an outspoken advocate of withdrawal asserted in the House of Lords that General Monro had “reported in favor of withdrawal from the Dardanelles, and adversely to the continuance of winter operations there.”⁶⁶ It is interesting that on learning of Milner’s state-

⁶⁶Nevins (19), 378n.

ment, the Turks discredited it as a deliberate effort at deception. They fully expected the Allies to remain on Gallipoli.

It was decided that the evacuation would take place at night, although some troops were embarked under cover of tarpaulin in daylight. Aviation patrols were depended on to keep the few German reconnaissance aircraft from getting too close a look at the denuded positions, particularly on the last day when no less than five Allied aircraft maintained almost continuous air cover.

The monumentality of this task and its success is seen in the schedule of the evacuation (Table A.10). And yet it was completed without raising the suspicions of the Turks or General von Sanders.

The evacuation on the last night was effected with no dead and only 5 wounded (2 at Suvla, 3 at Anzac) and only 10 out of 200 guns abandoned (all at Anzac). Of some 5,000 draft animals, only 56 mules were left (all at Anzac). Even most of the 2,000 carts were salvaged.

A measure of the effect of surprise can be dramatized by comparing the predicted and actual losses (Table A.11).

In other words, even the “optimistic” predictions were too excessive by factors of 2500 for troops, 3 for guns, and 14 for draft animals.

The cost-effectiveness of surprise was so little understood by many that this bloodless coup was immediately attributed by one common rumor to the Turks having been bribed to permit the evacuation without opposition.⁶⁷

References

- **General**

- James (65), 309-347.
- Higgins (63), 225-238.
- Hankey, II (61), 456-465.
- Churchill (23), 507-536.
- Callwell (19), 276-304.
- Nevinston (19), 386-400.

- **Surprise**

- Sanders (27), 97-99.

- **Deception**

- Callwell (19), 277-281, 285, 286, 296, 297.
- James (65), 338-341.
- Moorehead (59), 339-349.
- Nevinston (19), 389-390.

⁶⁷Nevinston (19), 387.

Example B8. Evacuation of Helles Point, 9 Jan 1916

The success of the evacuation on 20 December 1915 of the beachheads at Suvla Bay and Anzac Beach⁶⁸ hurried the final decisions for the complete liquidation of the doleful Gallipoli enterprise. The only remaining beachhead was at Helles Point, at the very tip of the peninsula. On 23 December the British War Committee recommended this action, the Cabinet agreed to it on the 27th, and the Commander-in-Chief at Gallipoli (General Monro) was notified the next day.

The situation on Gallipoli did appear desperate. The Allied force of four divisions (35,268 troops) were all crowded into the 12-square mile beachhead at Helles Point. Facing them was a vastly larger force of Turks directed by German General (and Turkish Field-Marshal) Liman von Sanders. With the British evacuation of Suvla and Anzac completed, Sanders was concentrating his entire force of 21 divisions (120,000 troops) against the remaining Allied position. It was certain that a contested evacuation would be costly—perhaps even disastrous.

Could a second surprise withdrawal be made? Again General Monro chose to depend on simulating normalcy and avoiding any feints.⁶⁹ The basic plan that had worked so well a fortnight before was used again.

Date	Time	Troops	Guns
Dec 29		40,000	150
Dec 31		35,268	140
Jan 2		31,000	?
Jan 7		19,418	63
Jan 8	0500	17,118	54
	2000	17,118	54
	2330	9,918	17
Jan 9	0145	3,877	17
	0300	200	17
	0345	0	17

Table A.12: Strength at Helles. Sources: Moorehead (59), 350-355; James (65), 344-347; Callwell (19), 311, 312, 317, 319, 322-324; Sanders (27), 103; Nevins (19), 401.

One new technique was used: evacuation was carried out under the cover of reinforcement and relief. This succeeded so well that even the troops in the beachhead did not fully recognize what was underway until some time later. As some relief and reinforcement had been in effect since early December anyway, “normalcy” at Helles already meant much comings-and-goings. Now, however, beginning 29 December, the pattern of relief shifted slightly to bring in only units of IX Corps, which was experienced in the very special techniques of evacuation,

⁶⁸See Example B7.

⁶⁹Dispatch of 16 March 1916, as quoted in Callwell (19), 310.

	British Personnel	British Guns	Turks
Jan 7	164	0	“heavy”
Jan 8	few	0	few
Jan 9	5	17	0?

Table A.13: British Casualties

having just extricated itself from Suvla. Published orders were given out that VIII Corps was being relieved by IX Corps.

It even proved possible to evacuate all but 508 of the 4,197 horses and mules. Only 1,590 carts and some quantities of stores remained, mostly destroyed.

References

- **General** (See Example B7)
 - James (65), 342-347.
 - Callwell (19), 305-331.
 - Hankey, II (61), 459, 463.
 - Nevinson (19), 400-406.
- **Surprise**
 - Sanders (27), 101-103.
- **Deception**
 - Callwell (19), 310, 311, 314, 322-323.
 - Moorehead (59), 349-355.
 - Sanders (27), 101, 103.
 - James (65), 344.

Example B8a. Verdun, 21 Feb 1916: Operation “GERICHT”

“With any further delay there will not be much left of the intended surprise.”

–Crown Prince Rupprecht,
Diary, 14 February 1916.

At Verdun man realized a new plateau of emotional horror and intellectual and moral bankruptcy. The German and French military and political leadership collaborated to invent this mindless, fruitless, “passionate prodigality.” Other battles (the Marne and the Somme) had run up larger butcher bills. Still others (Passchendaele) had by triumphs of logistics managed to develop more efficient killing ground. But only Verdun so perfectly simulated hell. Yet, even this strange field produced surprise and deception. I am unable to imagine less promising ground for the wile necessary to surprise, yet Verdun produced two moments of tactical surprise. In fact, both episodes occurred just outside the somber central drama that rightly dominates the minds and emotions of Verdun’s historians and memoirists. Moreover, these two surprising and surprise events were the only ones that gained a tangible trophy at Verdun. Also, they are the only events where ground was gained for *disproportionately* few casualties by the attackers. And, finally, they were the only episodes where the *absolute* casualty counts were low.

To deceive—or, at least, confuse—the Allies as to the place and time of his great offensive, Falkenhayn mounted no less than eight false attacks (mainly elaborately simulated “pre-attack” bombardments) between 9 January and 13 February.⁷⁰ Of these conventionally prodigal efforts only one really took on the dimensions of a deception operation. This was a feint in upper Alsace. This was Operation BLACK FOREST, to be conducted by Army Group Gaede at the southern end of the line at Belfort. To enhance the realistic appearance of this feint, General Gaede was left to believe that his was the real offensive. The deception was enhanced by sending Crown Prince Rupprecht on a well publicized visit to Army Group Gaede on the deliberately transparent pretext of shaking hands with Swiss frontier guards.⁷¹

While offensives were being simulated elsewhere, the real attack at Verdun was being dissimulated. This was done by a combination of passive camouflage and active deception measures.

Falkenhayn severely limited the number of knowers by tight security and limited disclosure: senior headquarters were not informed; parallel headquarters were prevented from discovering the secret by the simple technique of excluding their liaison officers from the Fifth Army front at Verdun; and even Falkenhayn’s own artillery adviser, Colonel Bauer, was not informed until it was too late to modify the artillery program. Even the Austrian allies were not informed, to

⁷⁰Falkenhayn (20), 255, 264–265.

⁷¹Horne (63), 44.

their subsequent annoyance.⁷²

To hide the great accumulation of men and matériel near Verdun, large-scale camouflage efforts were undertaken. Full use was made of the broken terrain and wooded foothills. Nets and canvasses to cover the gun-pits were painted by teams of camouflage specialists (including Franz Marc who would die in the coming battle) The pits were dug and camouflaged one night, the ammunition brought up the next, and then the 1,220 guns. One innovation was the secret construction of *Stollen*, large shell-proof underground shelters built only 50 yards behind the front line. The assault troops could now be brought up gradually under cover of night and kept secret and safe until ready to emerge in a surprise attack, nearly 1,000 yards nearer the French trenches than earlier tactical doctrine had conceived.⁷³

Another innovation was the aerial interdiction of trench photo-reconnaissance aircraft—itsself a new art. To do this the Germans accumulated the then unprecedented force of 168 airplanes, 14 captive balloons, and 4 zeppelins, all to maintain an aerial umbrella to guard the secrecy of their preparations for battle and to lend ground support during the battle.⁷⁴

In the later stages of the huge build-up, when it was no longer possible to conceal that *something* was underway at Verdun, the Germans again turned to deception. Through their agents abroad, German Military Intelligence floated the rumor that Verdun was to be the site of a feint, the “real” attack to fall elsewhere. Even the medical personnel being collected in large new hospitals behind Verdun were told that they were there merely “for the treatment of internal illnesses.”⁷⁵

By these means, Falkenhayn managed to concentrate a much larger German force behind the eight miles of front chosen for his effort.

	German	French
Divisions	9	3
Battalions	72	34
Guns	1,220	270
Aircraft	168	c. 36

Table A.14: Strengths in Verdun Sector. References: Horne (63), 42, 45, 55, 59-60.

It is as well that Falkenhayn had taken these measures of cover and deception, otherwise surprise could not possibly have been attained after the long period of build-up and the *nine* postponements of the attack caused by an unlucky stretch of unfavorable weather. The postponements, however, did have the indirect benefit of the “cry wolf” effect, because they permitted the Allies to

⁷²Horne (63), 44.

⁷³Horne (63), 44-45.

⁷⁴Horne (63), 45-46.

⁷⁵Horne (63), 44.

undergo the falsely reassuring experience of two seemingly false alerts, on the 11th and 13th.⁷⁶

When the attack finally went in at 5 p.m. on the 21st of February, the French were taken quite by surprise. In fact, doubly so because the Germans had introduced a tactical ruse of singular effectiveness. What they had done was simply to change the conventional—and hence expected—pattern of preparatory artillery fire so that the French emerged into the open after the normal barrage, expecting to meet the onrushing enemy infantry, only to be caught in the open by the second, real barrage.⁷⁷

Falkenhayn had, in fact, succeeded. He had achieved his original goal of making Verdun a very special killing-ground for Frenchmen. His sole intention was to wage there a protracted battle of attrition, to make a surgical incision upon the body of France through which it would bleed and bleed and bleed until dead. And all went well at first. French losses in the first week of surprise were nearly thrice those of the Germans even though the latter were on the offensive, which doctrine decreed was more costly for the attacker than the defender. Falkenhayn flaunted and disproved this doctrine; but this remarkable illustration of the economical consequences of surprise was forgotten in the holocaust that followed. Falkenhayn brought on his own catastrophe by his very secretiveness. By neglecting to fully inform his superiors and colleagues of his strategy of attrition, they soon joined the French in viewing Verdun as a symbol, a trophy, that must be held at all cost. Thus did that smashed piece of real-estate become a killing ground for the Germans as well. Table A.15 illustrates this, showing that casualty rates only very slightly favored the Germans. Moreover, Table A.16 shows—for the first time—an even more interesting fact that completely exposes the bankruptcy of the German's strategy at Verdun. While the ratio of German to French casualties was 1 to 1.1, that is, slightly favoring the Germans, the ratio of casualties for the other sectors of the front during the same period were nearly 1 to 1.5. In other words, the *existing* German strategy was already about half again more effective for attrition than Verdun itself.

The only other major surprise at Verdun occurred toward the end of the campaign, well after the main battles, when on 19-24 October the French recaptured Fort Douaumont.⁷⁸

⁷⁶Horne (63), 56-58, 68-69.

⁷⁷Horne (63).

⁷⁸Horne (63), 308-318.

Period	German	French	F/G	Remarks
21 Feb.	600	—	—	German offensive with surprise
22 Feb.	2,350	—	—	German off. w/surprise
21-24 Feb.	—	> 16, 224	—	German off. w/surprise
21-26 Feb.	c. 9,000	25,000	2.78	German off. w/surprise
27-29 Feb.	16 000	—	—	—
27 Feb.-31 Mar.	72,000	64,000	0.89	German off w/o surprise
1-30 Apr.	39,000	44,000	1.13	Stable w/o surprise
1-31 May	—	52,000	—	Stable w/o surprise
1 May-15 Jul.	c. 130,000	149,000	1.14	—
16 Jul-31 Aug.	c. 31,000	33,000	1.07	Stable w/o surprise
1 Sep.-30 Nov.	—	15,000	—	Stable (with one exception...)
1 Sep.-31 Dec.	56,000	62,000	1.11	Stable w/o surprise
Totals:	337,000	377,000	1.12	

Table A.15: Casualties at Verdun, 21 February-31 December 1916, by periods. References: Horne (63) 82, 90, 99, 100, 152, 161, 215, 216n, 246n, 280, 300, 304, 318, 327; Blond (64) 119; Churchill (27), 90.

	Verdun			Other			Total		
	German	French	F/G	German	French	F/G	German	French	F/G
Total:	337,000	377,000	1.12	336,000	499,000	1.49	673,000	876,000	1.30

Table A.16: French and German Casualties on Western Front, February-December 1916

References

- **General**

- Alistair Horne, *The Price of Glory: Verdun, 1916* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1963).
- Churchill (27), 74-95.
- Georges Blond, *Verdun* (New York: Macmillan, 1964).
- Liddell Hart (30), 214-223.
- Cruttwell (36), 237-254.
- Falkenhayn (20), 249-250, 255-273.
- Esposito (64a), 86-88.
- Edmunds (51), 157-159.

- **Warnings**

- Churchill (27), 83-84.
- Falkenhayn (20), 255.
- Horne (63).

- **Surprise**

- Horne (63), 1, 58, 70-74, 275.
- Churchill (27), 85.
- Erfurth (43), 171-173.

- **Deception**

- Horne (63), 44-45, 74.
- Falkenhayn (20), 255, 264-265.

Example B9. Lake Naroch, 18 Mar 1916

In response to France's desperate call for a diversion from Falkenhayn's pounding offensive at Verdun (that began on 21 February 1916), the Tsar ordered a series of offensives on the Eastern Front. The first of these was at Lake Naroch near Vilna. On 18 March, following two days of intensive artillery bombardment, 30 Russian divisions under Generals Evert and Kuropatkin struck along a 90-mile front. Opposing it in the line was only a single German corps, the XXIst. (About 12 German divisions were in the area.)

Warning of impending offensive had reached the *de facto* German front commander, General Ludendorff, in the form of rumors from Russian deserters. However, he discounted these, judging the Naroch area as an improbable site for a major operation as it was poorly supported by railways and offered little room for maneuver. Moreover he did not believe the Russians would launch any offensive at that time, so close to the spring thaw that brings roadlessness to Poland. Feeling safe from attack, Ludendorff went to Berlin on 11 March to attend a royal wedding.

Thus the Russian attack achieved strategic surprise. However the Russians threw away almost certain tactical surprise by two days of noisy but ineffective preparatory shelling that only served to fully alert the opposing XXI Corps. The line held after three uncertain days. By D + 2 XXIst Corps counted 9,270 Russian dead to only 560 of their own. By D + 9 the Russians estimated their own casualties at 70,000.

Although stopped on D + 2, the Russians persisted with a frontal attack. When this attack ran dry by the end of the month, casualties stood at 110,000 Russians (including 10,000 captured) against only about 20,000 Germans. It had failed tactically, as the Germans soon (on 28 April) regained the little ground that the Russians had taken at such great cost. Moreover it had failed strategically, as the Germans were not forced to withhold, much less withdraw, any manpower from their charnel house at Verdun.

Day	Russian	German	Ratio
D+2	(dead) 9,270	(dead) 560	1:0.1
D+9	70,000	—	—
D+13	110,000	20,000	1:0.2

Table A.17: Cumulative Casualties at Lake Naroch

References

- **General**

- Major-General Sir Alfred Knox, *With the Russian Army, 1914-1917*, Vol. II (New York: Dutton, 1921), pp. 404-411.
- Falls (59), 221.
- Ludendorff, I (19), 246-250.

- **Surprise**

- Ludendorff, I (19), 247.
- Goodspeed (66), 179.

Example B10. Battle of Jutland, 31 May 1916

The greatest naval gunnery engagement of history—as measured by the number and tonnage of capital ships involved—brought the 37 dreadnoughts and battle-cruisers of the British Grand Fleet under Admiral Sir John Jellicoe in contact with the 27 capital ships of the German High Seas Fleet under Vice-Admiral Reinhard Scheer. The Battle of Jutland (Germans call it the Battle for the Skagerrak) was an altogether muddled business on both sides, but it is a relevant case because of the fortuitously successful element of routine deception that became a major factor in the outcome.

Admiral Scheer's flagship, *Friedrich der Grosse*, had the wireless call-sign "DK." The sailing of the flagship was an almost certain sign that the entire High Seas Fleet was abroad. Therefore, it was standard security-deception practice that whenever *Friedrich der Grosse* put to sea, it exchanged call-signs⁷⁹ with the guardship stationed at Entrance III to the main naval base at Wilhelmshaven. This was done again on 31 May 1916 when Scheer raised anchor in the Jade Roads and at 0230 hours led his full battle fleet into the misty North Sea.

This German routine was quite familiar to the British Naval Intelligence Division. N.I.D.'s brilliant Wartime Director, admiral Sir William "Blinker" Hall, had at his command the then super-secret "Room 40," the brilliant team of cryptanalysts who had broken several German naval codes and ciphers.⁸⁰ Unfortunately, as Admiral Sir William James said: "At the time of Jutland, the Room 40 staff were still, in the eyes of Operations staff, a party of very clever fellows who could decipher signals, and any suggestion that they should interpret them would have been resented."⁸¹ The Admiralty had concluded by noon of the 30th from its awareness of some of the preliminary activities that a sortie by the German fleet was possibly imminent. Consequently, the Grand Fleet were at sea by midnight.⁸²

However, Jellicoe's strategy hung on more precise knowledge of the fact and timing of the sortie of the main battle force of the High Seas Fleet that would be signaled by the movements of Scheer's flagship. Room 40 had acquired this vital intelligence but it was now to be denied Jellicoe by the very type of blunder that Admiralty politics had made likely. Thus, on the morning of the 31st, the Director of the Operations Division himself, Captain Thomas Jackson, went to Room 40 and asked where the directional wireless placed call-signal DK. The personnel there, including Lieutenant W. F. Clarke, gave a literal reply to this precise question: Wilhelmshaven. Jackson accordingly signaled Jellicoe at 12:30 p.m. that:

... FLAGSHIP IN JADE AT 11:10 [a.m.] G.M.T. APPARENTLY

⁷⁹Or, according to Marder (66), 41, it received a new call-sign.

⁸⁰For the N.I.D. and Room 40 in World War I, see Admiral Sir William James, *The Eyes of the Navy* (London: Methuen, 1956); Marder, III (66); Kahn (67); McLachlan (68); Barbara Tuchman, *The Zimmerman Telegram* (New York: Viking Press, 1953).

⁸¹Quoted in Marder, III (66), 42.

⁸²Harder, III (66), 41-42.

THEY HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO CARRY OUT AIR RECON-
NAISSANCE WHICH HAS DELAYED THEM.

Jellicoe received this telegram at 12:48 p.m. There were two consequences. First, by giving Jellicoe a false sense of security, he delayed his appointed rendezvous with Beatty to inspect some neutral ships to confirm they were not enemy scouts. (He did not detach destroyers for this purpose, in order to conserve their fuel.) Second, when an astonished Beatty and his battlecruisers (also misled by the D.O.D. signal) reported their contact with the High Seas Fleet only three hours later, Jellicoe's confidence in Admiralty intelligence was so undermined that he fought the rest of the battle mainly on the basis of the subsequently much less accurate sightings by his own ships, with disastrous consequences in the forthcoming dark.

Captain Jackson's bureaucratic conceit enabled Scheer to obtain an undeserved tactical surprise and denied Jellicoe the crucial information that would have virtually assured a decisive victory. As it was, Scheer was able to meet and destroy isolated clusters of British ships and narrowly avoid a head-on clash with the overwhelmingly concentrated broadside of the Grand Fleet. When Scheer evaded Jellicoe's trap to slip back to the security of his base on D-plus-1, he had inflicted twice the damage in naval tonnage sunk (115,000 to 61,000) and twice the officers and ratings killed. A week after Jutland, Jackson was promoted Rear-Admiral.

Thus the Germans were quite justified in claiming victory in the tactical battle they had sought. The British counter-claim of a strategic victory because they took the "high seas" out of the High Seas Fleet is a myth created by their undaunted propagandists at the time. In fact, it was the Germans who made three more bold sallies and the British who, driven to deplete their Grand Fleet for convoy duties, avoided another major fleet action.

References

• General

- Arthur J. Marder, *From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow*, Vol. III (London: Oxford University Press, 1966).
- Cruttwell (36), 318-338.
- Churchill (27), 101-169.

• Deception

- Kahn (67), 272.
- Marder (66), 41-42.

Case A4. Brusilov Offensive, 4 Jun 1916

During April and May 1916 the Russian Supreme Command was busily preparing their summer offensive. They planned a direct frontal assault on their “Western Front” against the German army. By June 1st, 58 infantry and 4 heavy artillery divisions plus several of cavalry had been concentrated for this drive, 26 to attempt the main breakthrough at the village of Krevo. The two other parts of the front—the Northern and South-West—each had only 38 divisions remaining. Only minor supporting operations were planned by these two wings. The Central Powers were quite aware through their intelligence services of the ponderous Russian buildup and deployment and with their superior railway system and more responsive staff had easily adjusted their own deployments⁸³ to match that of the Russians, whose Krevo offensive they awaited with equanimity.

	German	Austrian	Total Central Power	Total Russian
Northern Front	?	0	?	38
Western Front	?	2	?	58
Southwest Front	1	35	36	38
Totals:	?	37	?	134

Table A.18: Deployment of Infantry Divisions on Russian Front, June 1916. References: Knox, II (21.), 422, 432-436; Wright (21), 16. In addition the Russians had 33 divisions of cavalry. Moreover, Russian divisions were 50% larger than the German and 25% larger than the Austrian.

However, as we shall see, the key area would become the Southwest Front. Let us look more closely at the situation there (Table A.19).

Divisions	Austrian	Russian
Infantry	36*	38 (=550,000)
Cavalry	9	12.5 (=60,000)
Totals:	45*	50.5 (=610,000)

Table A.19: Deployment on Southwest Front, 1 June 1916. *Note: Including one of German infantry. References: Knox, II (21), 433-436.

Thus, on the Southwest Front the Russians and Austrians were quite evenly matched, the Russians’ slight edge in infantry and cavalry being at least balanced by the Austrians’ superior numbers in guns, machine-guns, and aircraft.

The Russian Southwest Front was competently commanded by General Brusilov. Since April 20th his four armies (50-1/2 divisions) had been preparing for their flank supporting rôle in Western Front’s forthcoming Krevo offensive.

⁸³Ludendorff, I (19), 258; Knox II (21), 421, 433-434, 454.

At this juncture, the obvious plans of the Russian Supreme Command were overturned by higher considerations of grand strategy and royalty. On 15 May the Austrians opened their Tyrollean offensive against Italy.⁸⁴ It went quite well and the Italian King soon appealed to the Tsar for a diversionary offensive. Nikolas II assented, and Brusilov announced that he was already set.⁸⁵ Consequently, the Russian summer offensive was triggered earlier and at a different part of the front than the Central Powers had anticipated. No special warning of this change of plans reached the enemy intelligence for four reasons. First, because no new dispositions or plans were made other than the decision to strike earlier than originally intended, there were no visible changes in patterns of Russian activity to observe, much less report. Second—and as a direct consequence of the first reason—security surrounding the revised timing could be easily maintained as only a very narrow circle of individuals were or needed to be witting, as the Krevo offensive was not immediately affected and the Southwest offensive had already been prepared as much as it ever was to be. For example, Brusilov’s Seventh Army was quite able to avoid any mention of the offensive even in its cipher telegrams.⁸⁶ Also Brusilov continued to grant leaves of absence until the week before his attack; and then, furloughs were cancelled without explanation, contrary to the usual practice of issuing formal published orders.⁸⁷ Third, all last minute movements were made under cover of night and such locally necessary pre-assault activities as sapping were repeated at unnecessary sections of the line.⁸⁸

Fourth, deception was used—at least in Seventh Army—to suggest that the offensive was still some time off. Thus, on 27 May, Seventh Army HQ telegraphed the commander of its II Corps:⁸⁹

IN VIEW OF THE TRANSFER OF THE [II] CORPS TO ANOTHER FRONT, YOU WILL PLEASE PREPARE FOR ENTRAINMENT BY JUNE 2ND AT THE STATIONS OF CZORTKOW, VYGNANKA AND KOPYCZYNC.

As Churchill commented:⁹⁰

It was this very derangement of the time-table that produced the greatest Russian victory of the war. . . . Yet it was this element of what is often called “lack of clear thinking,” which imparted to Brusilov’s attack the priceless quality of SURPRISE.

Complete strategic and partial tactical surprise had been achieved.⁹¹ It

⁸⁴See Example C7.

⁸⁵Knox, II (21), 437.

⁸⁶Knox, II (21), 440.

⁸⁷Sekulich (57/58), 93.

⁸⁸Knox, II (21), 440.

⁸⁹Knox, II (21), 441.

⁹⁰Churchill (31), 362. See also Knox, II (21), 455.

⁹¹Edmunds (51), 173, asserts the contrary—but on the irrelevant grounds that provision had been made to send reserves and the Austrians were dug in. That proves only that the Austrians anticipated a possible attack or attacks sometime, somewhere, and with some strength.

was simply another case where the very excellence of German and Austrian intelligence about the long-planned Krevo offensive had blinded them to the *possibility* of some last minute change.

When Brusilov's four armies began their general offensive on the 4th, the Austrians—surprised and with low morale to start with—immediately broke before three of them. Surprise was enhanced by the fact that Brusilov had used an unconventional and hence unexpected tactical procedure for his assault. Rather than concentrating his attack for a breakthrough at one or two points, he launched his armies forward at many points, supporting and exploiting only those that enjoyed immediate success.⁹² With both Austrian flanks collapsed, all that prevented a decisive victory was the fact that there were no Russian reserves at hand to exploit the situation. By the time reinforcements reached Brusilov from the northern front, German units had arrived to stabilize the line. By attempting to pursue this offensive in July and August along orthodox lines Brusilov even further expanded his ground but destroyed the Russian army in the process: 1,000,000 men lost.

In addition, the Russian gains in territory had been 1,000 square miles at D-plus-2 and 5,000 at D-plus-30.

D + 3	Russians	Central Powers
Killed, wounded	?	?
Missing captured	?	44,000
Totals:	few	> 44,000
D + 56		
Killed, wounded	415,000	300,000
Missing, captured	35,000	300,000
Totals:	450,000	600,000
D + 68		
Killed, wounded	?	?
Missing, captured	?	356,602
Totals:	> 1,000,000	> 1,000,000

Table A.20: Cumulative Casualties During Brusilov Offensive. References: Knox, II (21), 400-461, 477.

⁹²Sekulich (57/58), 95-96.

References

- **General**

- Winston S. Churchill, *The Unknown War: The Eastern Front* (New York: Scribner's, 1931), pp. 359-373.
- Knox, II (21), 432-482.
- Ludendorff, I (19), 257-267.

- **Surprise**

- Liddell Hart (30), 224-226.
- Churchill (31), 362.
- Lieutenant Colonel Miloje Sekulich, *Vojno Delo* ["Deception in War"] (Yugoslavia), 1957, No. 4-5, as translated in digest form in *Military Review*, Vol. 38, No. 8 (November 1958), pp. 92-97.

- **Deception**

- Knox, II (21), 440, 442-443.
- Sekulich (57/58), 93, 95-96.

Example B11. The Battles of Scarpe and Vimy Ridge, 9-11 Apr 1917

“April 9, 1917, was the most successful day’s fighting the British forces in France had yet had in two and a half years’ warfare.”

–Wavell, 1941.

Field-Marshal Haig acceded to General Neville’s desire for a British diversionary action to support the onset of the general Allied spring offensive on the Western Front. Accordingly, General Edmund Allenby’s Third Army (with the Canadian Corps attached) was ordered to mount a limited attack along his 11.5 miles of front. Allenby’s 22 divisions faced the 15 in Falkenhausen’s Sixth Army. Allenby also brought to bear 963 heavy guns, 360 aircraft, and 40 tanks.⁹³

Geared to Neville’s time-table, Allenby’s attack—originally set for April 1st—was first reset to April 8th. Then, on the 5th, Neville’s main offensive was deferred 48 hours. However, Haig agreed to postpone Allenby only 24 hours, because his preparatory artillery bombardment had already begun.

Hoping to gain at least enough surprise to prevent the arrival of German reserves *before* the battle, Allenby and his artillery commander, Lieutenant-General Sir Arthur Holland, had urged GHQ (specifically Haig and his Chief of Staff, Kiggel) that they be permitted to cut the conventional 7-day preparatory artillery bombardment to 48 hours. This daring idea was effectively silenced by immediately reassigning Holland.⁹⁴ (Incidentally, one long-range outcome of this decision was that the Operations Officer of the opposing 4th Guards Infantry Division, Major Franz von Papen, drew the faulty conclusion that Allenby preferred prolonged preparatory fire, a conclusion that was to enhance Allenby’s surprise six months later at Gaza where Von Papen was in part responsible for the Turco-German defense.)⁹⁵

Although German intelligence had prevented *strategic* surprise, *tactically* they were taken quite by surprise by both the time and the strength of Allenby’s attack. On D-minus-10 the Germans had estimated that the British attack would not come for three or four weeks and, accordingly, had their own special counterattack reserves too far to the rear. Consequently on D-day the British gained from 2,000 to 6,000 yards, exceeding all their assigned objectives. German prisoners alone were 9,000+ on D-day, 11,000 through D + 1, and 13,000 through D + 2. British and Canadians had suffered 18, 175 total casualties through D + 2, by which time Allied exhaustion plus the belated arrival of German reserves stabilized the front.

Although Neville’s plan for the general Allied offensive⁹⁶ (that, in fact, did not go in until April 16th) presupposed surprise, this was not to be had. First, it is quite possible that Neville’s own widespread indiscretions may have leaked

⁹³Note that the “Battle of Vimy Ridge” is also known as the “Battle of Arras.”

⁹⁴Liddell Hart (30), 324-325; Wavell, I (41), 174-175, 180; and Gardner (65), 100-101.

⁹⁵See Case A6.

⁹⁶See Example C12.

	Allied	German	Ratios
British Front (11.5 miles)	22	15	1:0.68
French Front	46	42	1:0.91

Table A.21: Distribution of Divisional Orders of Battle.

on to German ears. When, for example, Painlevé took office as Minister of War on March 20th he learned “by public voice” that the attack was set for April 8th, as indeed it then was.⁹⁷ Second, on March 3rd and April 6th, the Germans captured French documents that gave key information of Neville’s intention.⁹⁸ The Germans were able to make timely and appropriate deployments and withdrawals from exposed positions to meet the French part of the offensive. One measure of the difference between the situation of no surprise on the immediate front of the French offensive and that of *tactical* surprise in Allenby’s sector is seen in the divisional orders of battle on the respective D-days (Table A.21).

References

- **General**
 - Gardner (66), 98-108.
 - Edmonds (51), 229-233.
 - Wavell (41), 172-183.
 - Liddell Hart (30), 324-328.
 - Hankey, II (61), 613-625.
 - Charteris (29), 266-267.
- **Security**
 - Hankey, II (61), 621-622.
- **Warnings**
 - Hankey, II (61), 622,625.
- **Surprise**
 - Gardner (65), 104.
 - Wavell (41), 174-175, 178, 180.
 - Ludendorff, II (19), 412.

⁹⁷Hankey, II (61), 621-622.

⁹⁸Hankey, II (61), 622.

Example B12. Battle of Messines, 7 Jun 1917

On 7 June 1917 General Herbert Plumer's British Second Army took their objective, the Messines Ridge, from the Germans in a 12-hour fight, and at substantially lower cost in casualties. Moreover the attacker enjoyed only a 12-to-9 superiority in divisions, well below doctrinal specifications.

This achievement—limited though it was in its intended goals—was the direct result of virtually the only true application of siege-warfare throughout what was, in fact, from 1915 through 1917, a siege. The British broke the German resistance by opening the assault with the simultaneous blowing of 19 huge siege mines totaling 600 tons of explosive that had been tunneled directly under the German front.⁹⁹

The Germans had had a general notion of what the British were about. It was impossible to conceal the *surface* clues to 8,000 yards of tunneling that had been underway since January. Indeed, the Germans had succeeded in prematurely blowing one of the original 20 mines.

Liddell Hart's comment is apposite: "Although there was no surprise, there was surprise effect, produced by the mines and overwhelming [artillery] fire and this lasted long enough to gain the short-distance objectives that had been set."¹⁰⁰

References

- **General**

- Liddell Hart (30), 330-336.
- Edmonds (51), 242-243.
- Cruttwell (36), 436-438.
- Charteris (29), 273-275.

- **Surprise**

- Liddell Hart (30), 333.
- Hankey, II (61), 678.

⁹⁹Lord Hankey, I (61), 228-229, II (61), 678, claims to have "been the first person to suggest the adaptation to modern conditions of this ancient method of siege warfare."

¹⁰⁰Liddell Hart (30), 333.

Case A5. Caporetto, 24 Oct 1917

The Battle of Caporetto was the last great effort of the Central Powers to eject Italy from the war. It came close to success.

The Italian armies under its prodigal Commander-in-Chief, General Count Luigi Cadorna had finally produced a series of costly but effective battles of attrition that by September 1917 had almost succeeded in demoralizing the war-rotted Austro-Hungarians. At this critical point the German Supreme Headquarters (OHL) in the person of Ludendorff intervened to prevent the imminent collapse of their ally by a spoiling offensive against Italy. All the hard-pressed Ludendorff could contribute was the six divisions of the OHL's slender reserve; however his chief strategic planner, Major Wetzell, suggested that even this small additive might at least temporarily stay the Italian threat.

Having picked Caporetto as a promising site for their breakthrough, the Germans concentrated their divisions at that point by seven secret night marches. This achieved a local superiority of 10-to-4 divisions.

The Austro-German planning of Caporetto was materially aided by the fact that the Austrian cryptanalytic service had solved all of the Italian military codes and ciphers.¹⁰¹

Soon, warnings of the impending Offensive did begin to reach Cadorna. These came both from his intelligence services and from deserters, particularly Czech and Transylvanian officers. However, Cadorna remained too unsure of the intended direction of the attack to make any significant adjustment in his deployment. Even as evidence accumulated that the blow would fall in the Caporetto sector, Cadorna—now a virtual invalid—refused the urgent requests for reinforcements from General Capello, commanding the Second Army which was responsible for that threatened frontage. It would seem that Cadorna's uncertainty was at least partly exacerbated by the deception operations that the Germans brought along with their Fourteenth Army under General Otto von Below.

If the Austro-German offensive confused the Italians, it came as a complete surprise to the Allied Supreme War Council in Paris and to the then Chief of the French General Staff, Foch.¹⁰²

Caporetto was a landmark in German radio deception operations. This was described in 1939 in a rather indiscreet article by the head of the Wehrmacht Signal Service:¹⁰³

Radio deception on a large scale was first used by the German command at the time of the great offensive against Italy. During the whole period of preparations at the Isonzo, a radio ban was ordered for the troops assembled there. At the same time, with the help of

¹⁰¹Kahn (67), 320.

¹⁰²Wright (21), 44-46.

¹⁰³E. Fellgiebel, "Das Nachrichtenwesen der Wehrmacht," in *Die Deutsche Wehrmacht* (Berlin: Mittler, 1939), pp. 386-412, as translated by Ladislav Farago (editor), *The Axis Grand Strategy* (New York: Farrar & Rinehart, 1942), p. 397. The outlines of this ruse were first revealed in 1938 by Lieutenant-General Erfurth (43), p. 198, in his book on *Surprise*.

dummy radio stations and other similar measures, a strong concentration of troops was simulated in the Tyrol.

General Fellgiebel implies that the Germans supported this electronic ruse with both simulated and dissimulated activities on the part of the troops to provide plausible visual confirmation.

When Von Below's attack went in on 24 October, immediate tactical surprise was aided by the masking drizzle of sleet. The attack gained speed and the Italians were still in full rout by D-plus-17 when Cadorna was relieved and replaced by General Diaz.

By 12 November (D + 19) when the routed Italians finally held at the Piave, the Austro-German victory was clear-cut. The Italians had lost nearly 6,000 square miles including all previous costly gains. Moreover, their army had been cruelly punished (Table A.22).

D+17	Austro-German	Italian
KIA	?	10,000
WIA	?	30,000
PW	?	293,000
Deserted	few	400,000
Totals:	say, 40,000?	733,000

Table A.22: Casualties at the Battle of Caporetto.

References

- **General**
 - Cyril Falls, *The Battle of Caporetto* (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1966).
- **Warnings**
 - Falls (66), 28-29.
- **Surprise**
 - Liddell Hart (54), 191-192.
 - Erfurth (43), 173-174.
 - Wright (21), 44-48.
- **Deception**
 - Erfurth (38/43), 198.
 - Fellgiebel (39/42), 397.

Case A6. Third Battle of Gaza, 31 Oct 1917

The British and Germans had brought their Western Front strategy and tactics to the Near East. Although the scale of effort there was much less, both managed to conduct a similarly murderous and inconclusive war for three years. Then, in 1917, some new faces and new ideas were introduced by the British. These innovations broke the deadlock not only of the conflict in Palestine but—by a direct chain of personal influence and experience—of the Greco-Turkish War in 1922, the North African Campaign in 1940 and again in 1942, and the Arab Israel War in 1948.

On 28 June 1917, General Sir Edmund Allenby arrived amidst much publicity to take command of the lavish Cairo GHQ. He promptly moved GHQ to the front and formed his remarkable staff, two of whom are particularly noteworthy. Brigadier-General Guy Dawnay was a meticulous staff planner. He also had a mind of exquisite deviousness as demonstrated in 1915 when at Gallipoli he had produced the better plans and devised many of the more successful stratagems—both those military ones directed on the Turks and the political ones aimed at London.¹⁰⁴ Allenby had been preceded—without notoriety—by Major Richard Meinertzhagen who had arrived on 24 May to head GHQ's Advanced Intelligence Section.¹⁰⁵ Meinertzhagen had recently had field experience in German East Africa (Tanganyika) where, as the GHQ's Intelligence Officer, he had devised a number of deception operations.¹⁰⁶

On 12 July, two weeks after his arrival, Allenby had decided on his plan of campaign. This followed the strategy proposed by his old friend and outstanding field commander, Lieutenant-General Sir Philip Chetwode. Its essence was to abandon the previous (and unsuccessful) pattern of costly frontal assaults against the main enemy defenses at the coast in front of Gaza and, instead, envelope their army by a cavalry sweep through its weakly defended left flank in the desert at Beersheba. The tactical details were now worked up by Guy Dawnay, while the specific deception operations were planned and directed in large part by Meinertzhagen.

As chief (G.S.O.2) of military intelligence at Allenby's GHQ, Major Meinertzhagen applied his remarkable talents to preparing a firm groundwork of intelligence, security, and deception. Accordingly he improved the monitoring of enemy radio communications—a receiver was mounted on the Great Pyramid at Gizah.¹⁰⁷ He greatly expanded the behind-enemy-lines espionage—developing the closest liaison with the Zionist intelligence service, the famed “Nili” group led by Aaron Aaronsson.¹⁰⁸ Security was tightened, among other ways by re-

¹⁰⁴See Case A2 and Example B6, for Major-General Guy Dawnay (1878-1952).

¹⁰⁵Sir Wyndham Deedes (1883-1956) headed the parallel Political Intelligence Section. Before the war he had served with the Turkish Army. In early 1915, as Captain Deedes he was an intelligence officer at the War Office. Thence he transferred to Hamilton's staff in 1915 when he was, with Aspinall and Dawnay, one of the planners of the April and August landings at Gallipoli. See James (65), 41, 89, 244.

¹⁰⁶See Case A1 for Colonel Richard Meinertzhagen (1878-1967).

¹⁰⁷Gardner (65), 128-129; and Meinertzhagen (60), 216.

¹⁰⁸See Chapter II, Part H.

peating a technique he had perfected in 1915 against German agents in East Africa—discrediting and compromising them by payment and testimonial letters which were “allowed” to be intercepted by enemy intelligence. In this manner he arranged that the enemy execute their own most effective Arab spy-master in Beersheba.¹⁰⁹

Simultaneously, Meinertzhagen developed the deception operation. First, he arranged a reliable, rapid, and direct communication channel for getting his misinformation to German and Turkish intelligence. This was done by permitting the Turks to capture messages that enabled them to solve one of the British radio codes. Knowing that the German staff included an efficient radio interception and cryptanalytic team, Meinertzhagen could be confident this ruse would give him the desired channel. From 24 September on, Captain Schiller, the chief of German military intelligence (Nachrichten Dienst) in Palestine received a variety of ingenious clues designed to *imply* a cover target (Gaza instead of Beersheba) and a later attack date (after 4 November instead of on 31 October). Moreover, Beersheba was mentioned as a target for a mere feint or demonstration attack; and the Turks were told to expect an amphibious landing behind Gaza.

This done, the next task was to lull any doubts the enemy might have by providing plausibly “independent” verification in the form of a packet of faked documents. To do this Meinertzhagen laid on his famous “haversack ruse.” As his subordinate officers had twice failed (on 12 September and 1 October) to carry this off, on 10 October (D-minus-20)¹¹⁰ Meinertzhagen rode off alone into the desert no-man’s land to deliver the mail. He simulated a reconnaissance near Girheir until spotted and chased by a Turkish patrol. At that point, feigning a wound, Meinertzhagen dropped his field-glass, a life-saving water-bottle (an extra), his horse-blood smeared rifle, and the haversack.

Examination of Meinertzhagen’s haversack by Turkish intelligence disclosed such personal items as a letter from his “wife,” 20 pounds sterling in currency, a flashlight, a letter from another officer stationed on the Gaza front, which among some disparaging remarks about Allenby’s generalship had scattered clues to the time and place of the offensive. The haversack also contained some official documents—orders, maps, and other papers—that confirmed and elaborated on the false place and time. Within a few hours this “find” was passed along to Captain Schiller.¹¹¹ He remained properly skeptical until the following day when he learned from freshly captured orders, promptly decoded radio intercepts, Turkish patrols, and two prisoners, that the British were feverishly seeking to recover the “lost” haversack. All this circumstantial “confirmation” had, of course, been most careful arranged by Meinertzhagen.

This intelligence was brought to the attention of the energetic commander of the Palestine front, General Kress von Kressenstein, who issued orders on 11 October mentioning the:¹¹²

¹⁰⁹Meinertzhagen (60), 216.

¹¹⁰*Tangled Web* (63), 82, incorrectly dates Meinertzhagen’s ruse to the 25th.

¹¹¹*Tangled Web* (63), 88.

¹¹²Meinertzhagen (60), 285.

“...notebook showing the enemy’s strength, which evidently belonged to an officer of the enemy’s headquarters. In the notebook ... there was some very important information about their intentions and operations.”

The order ended by warning the officers of his command to be more careful of their own secret documents.

A Turkish corps order (captured on 8 November and apparently dated the 10th or 11th) stated that:¹¹³

... the information contained in these documents is of such great value to us that we have been able to ascertain the date of the enemy’s offensive and it will enable us to forestall him in that all our reinforcements will now be at Gaza in time for us to crush the arrogant English.

Turco-German emphasis accordingly shifted to Gaza. Two divisions (the 7th and 19th) were moved into reserve near the coast and defenses were generally strengthened there.¹¹⁴

One hitherto unrecognized element—and I think perhaps as important as the deception operations—that contributed greatly to the surprise was the fact that the German’s preconceptions had led them to anticipate a more-or-less conventional Western Front type offensive. The German Middle East theater commander, General Erich von Falkenhayn was, after all, the man whose sole innovation in military science was the invention of a new strategic means to Pyrrhic victory—Verdun. The commander of the Palestine front, General von Kressenstein, drew his experience and promotions from two years of easy victories over Allenby’s incompetent predecessor. The Germans were particularly unfortunate that the eve of the offensive coincided with the arrival of Major Franz von Papen to design the final Turkish-German front-line defensive deployments. Von Papen had fought opposite Allenby at Vimy Ridge six months before and assumed Allenby would follow the same tactic at Gaza by announcing his attack by *several days* of overwhelming artillery bombardment.¹¹⁵ This judgment—which he conveyed to the German and Turkish commanders—was wrong from the start. At Vimy Ridge,¹¹⁶ Allenby had been refused permission to cut the conventional 7-day preparatory barrage down to 48 hours, to at least prevent the arrival of enemy reinforcements. At Gaza, where Allenby was his own master, he went to the still further extreme of limiting his massed artillery barrage to a mere two hours.

The ever-inventive Meinertzhagen also introduced a psycho-chemical stragem to weaken the individual Turkish soldier. He arranged for the Royal Flying Corps to send the Turks packets of cigarettes wrapped in propaganda leaflets,

¹¹³Meinertzhagen (60), 285. Also Lawrence (37), 384; and *Tangled Web* (63), 88.

¹¹⁴*Tangled Web* (63), 86.

¹¹⁵Franz von Papen, *Memoirs* (New York: Dutton, 1953), pp. 70, 73, 74. It is characteristic of this future German Chancellor and Hitler’s wartime Ambassador to Turkey that without overtly lying he so edits his account to imply that he was blameless at Gaza.

¹¹⁶See Example B8.

dropping them on successive evenings from August on. Then, on 5 November, the eve of the attack on Gaza itself, the thousands of packs of cigarettes delivered were heavily drugged with opium. Allenby had vetoed this stratagem on the grounds that it was too much like using poison, but Meinertzhagen—like Dulles in Operation SUNRISE in World War II—proceeded with patriotic insubordination “on the principle that anything which saved casualties to our own men was justified.”¹¹⁷

To give the final touch of simulated reality to an attack on Gaza and amphibious landings about it, artillery preparation began on 27 October. This involved both the massed artillery opposite Gaza and coastal shelling by British and French warships. The Turco-German headquarters promptly advised its field commanders that the main British forces were indeed opposite Gaza and that: “When the attack is launched, the enemy may be expected to make a covering demonstration toward Beersheba.”¹¹⁸

On 31 October 1917, four months after taking command, Allenby launched his feint-cum-deception. It broke the eight-months’ stalemate by thoroughly surprising Falkenhayn and routing the off-guard and off-balance Turkish army. Victory was capped by the capture of Jerusalem on November 9th. Casualties were 18,000 British-Australian to 25,000 Turkish-German.

Allenby had enjoyed a marked advantage in strength: 72,000 to only 44,000 for the enemy. But aside from giving him greater confidence in victory and greater flexibility in making his secret deployment, this superiority did not influence the immediate battle. Its value came later, in enabling him to throw fresh reserves into the pursuit.

¹¹⁷ Meinertzhagen (60), 223-224.

¹¹⁸ *Tangled Web* (63), 86.

References

- **General**

- General Sir Archibald Wavell, *Allenby* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2 vols., 1941, 1944), Vol. I (41), pp. 191-233.
- Brian Gardner, *Allenby of Arabia* (New York: Coward-McCann, 1966), pp. 116-164.
- Captain Cyril Falls, *Military Operations: Egypt & Palestine from June 1917 to the End of the War*, Pt. I (London: H.M.S.O., 1930).
- Meinertzhagen (60), 212-227.

- **Warning**

- Wavell, I (41), 210.

- **Surprise**

- Gardner (66), 130, 149.

- **Deception**

- Meinertzhagen (60), 222-224, 283-286.
- Wavell, I (41), 201, 202, 205, 208, 210; and II (44), 26.
- Gardner (66), 129-130, 148-150.
- Falls, I (30), 30-32, II (30), 638.
- Lawrence (35), 383-386.
- Tuohy (20), 283-289.
- Major-General Sir George Aston, *Secret Service* (New York: Cosmopolitan, 1930), pp. 201, 204-205.
- *Tangled Web* (63), 76-89.
- Papen (53), 75.
- Kennedy, (57), 68.

Example B13. Cambrai, 20 Nov 1917

The military tank was first used in war on 15 September 1916 when the British unveiled their secret weapon, the very word “tank” having been its cover-name. However too few (36) were used to achieve any more than “technological surprise” and local panic.

Tanks were not employed in mass formation until 20 November 1917 when the British used 324 at Cambrai. Technological surprise was retained, as the Germans had no appropriate response to this new tactical formation, even though they now knew of its existence.

The attack at Cambrai also achieved tactical surprise despite a partial German alert ordered because of warning of the presence of tanks given by two prisoners taken on the 18th and also because of a fragmentary telephonic intercept of the 19th that implied an attack the next morning *somewhere* along the British line. Secrecy of the build-up had apparently been maintained. This had been assured through fairly tight security and such tactical deceptions as feint attacks elsewhere that used, among other things, dummy tanks. In the attack itself, the tanks were sent forward in mass, leading the attack, and—most important—without the then conventional warning given by preparatory artillery bombardment. Opening at dawn with startling success, the battle was stalemated by evening through lack of reserves to exploit the partial breakthrough.

Nevertheless the 10,000 yard advance had taken more ground (40 sq. mi.) than 51 British divisions had at Passchendaele (Third Ypres)¹¹⁹ during the preceding four desperate months at a cost of a quarter million casualties on each side. At Cambrai the British suffered only 4,000 total casualties to 8,000 Germans taken prisoner alone.

¹¹⁹Example C16.

References

- **General**

- Liddell Hart, *The Tanks*, I (59), 128-153.
- Bryan Cooper, *The Battle of Cambrai* (New York: Stein and Day, 1968).
- Goodspeed (66), 230-231.
- Esposito (64), 100-102.
- Falls (59), 315-322.
- Edmonds (51), 267-272.
- Charteris (29), 285-292.

- **Warnings**

- Liddell Hart, I (59), 136.

- **Security**

- Sekulich (57/58), 93.

- **Surprise** See “General” references, above.

- **Deception**

- Liddell Hart, I (59), 135.
- Sekulich (57/58), 94-95.

Case A7. St. Quentin, 21 Mar 1918: “MICHAEL”

Ludendorff opened Germany’s 1918 spring offensive on the Western Front on 21 March with a major drive on the Somme. This was his plan “MICHAEL,” known to the Allies as the Battle of St.-Quentin.¹²⁰ Detailed planning was completed in early February when D-day was set for 21 March, a date that was kept.

This offensive achieved a good measure of initial tactical surprise by a combination of means. First, it introduced a radically new tactical concept to the Western Front. This method had been developed on a small scale by General Oskar von Hutier and his Staff at Riga (1 September 1917) and further battle-tested at Caporetto (24 October 1917). These new “Hutier tactics” abandoned the conventional lengthy (4 to 19-day) pre-assault bombardment and substituted a short preparation that included a high proportion of gas and smoke shells followed immediately by a rolling (“creeping”) barrage that moved steadily forward at about one kilometer per hour just ahead of the first assault wave. The old method was, of course, more effective at *destroying* enemy defense positions and *killing* enemy troops but this advantage was more than offset both by giving the enemy ample warning to bring up reinforcements and by so chopping up the terrain that the attack itself was inevitably slowed. The new method was designed to temporarily *blind* and *confuse* the enemy observers and gun positions.¹²¹ It restored the element of surprise and a measure of mobility to trench siege-warfare.

To hide his build-up, Ludendorff’s troops were moved in behind the lines only under cover of darkness. To mask the specific sector of the attack, units elsewhere along the line made regular preparations as if for an offensive in *their* sectors. The degree to which Ludendorff was able to concentrate his force without any corresponding Allied defensive shift is shown by Table A.23. Given little more than parity in his overall strength, Ludendorff had built up a well over 2-to-1 advantage over the two British armies to be attacked and nearly a 6-to-1 superiority at the point of his main thrust.

Surprise was also aided by a dense fog that concealed the attacking troops without inhibiting either the preparatory or the creeping barrages, which were fired according to a predetermined map-and-time schedule.

D-day was almost deferred by a storm throughout 18-20 March. However, at noon on the 20th, with a favorable meteorological forecast for the next day, Ludendorff decided to go ahead, his decision being confirmed by a favorable omen in his prayer-book of the Moravian Brethren.¹²²

The day of the attack, 21 March 1918, the 40-60 mile sector of front chosen by Ludendorff for his battle had 71 German divisions facing only 29 British. Due to

¹²⁰The term *Kaiserschlacht* (“Emperor’s Battle”) is also sometimes applied, although it was only an unofficial and inappropriately sycophantic invention of the *Kölnische Zeitung*.

¹²¹Esposito (64), 105-107; and Liddell Hart (54), 205-207.

¹²²Goodspeed (66), 246-247.

Russia's withdrawal from the war, the Germans now had a slight superiority of 192 to 173 Allied divisions along the entire Western Front. Also, despite Allied general superiority in the air, locally the Germans had managed to concentrate 730 aircraft against the Allies' 579.

Ludendorff's offensive began at 0440 with a five-hour bombardment—6,000 cannon and 3,000 mortars firing gas, smoke, and high explosive. Then, at 0940, 32 German assault divisions, closely supported by 29 more, began its advance under cover of the creeping barrage and fog.

On D-day the British line was broken and they were forced into an orderly retreat that did not halt the Germans until D + 6, 40 miles later. The offensive had ground to a halt—more the result of Ludendorff's own incoherent leadership and continued preoccupation with frontal attacks on the enemy's main force rather than to the improvised Anglo-French defense. Although the lines had stabilized, Ludendorff did not break off the attack until D + 14. At that point it had become a Pyrrhic victory, as the Yanks were now coming to replace the British losses—70,000 prisoners, 200,000 other casualties, and 1,100 guns. German casualties were about equal, but irreplaceable.

Everyone knew the Germans were bound to launch an offensive in 1918. But the Allied commanders were quite divided as to just when or where to expect it. The earliest, most elaborate, and least accurate prediction was the direct product of a "War Game" played in February by General Sir Henry Wilson and his British staff on the happily short-lived Executive War Board of the Allied Supreme War Council. The game predicted that the Germans would hit with 100 divisions on the front between the La Bassée Canal and the Bapaume-Condé Road about July 1st.¹²³ (The real attack came three months later than predicted, with half the strength, on the only sector of the British front left untouched.) Fortunately the operations people—Field-Marshal Haig and *his* staff—had long since learned to distrust the strategic judgment of Wilson whom Haig considered, with justification, to be a political hack.

By mid-February Haig had correctly concluded from intelligence—mainly through positive identification of German deployment through active patrolling,

¹²³For the war game see Charteris (29), 309, 310, 314; and Wright (21), 128-129. While both accounts are in basic agreement on their facts, Charteris is far too supercilious in his judgement and Wright (the Secretary of the Executive War Board) too laudatory.

	Miles of Front	Divisions		A/G	G/A
		German	Allied		
Total Western Front	?	192	167	0.87	1.2
British Third Army (Byng)	30	31	14	0.45	2.3
British Fifth Army (Gough)	42	40	17	0.42	2.4
St.-Quentin sector	8	23	4	0.17	5.8

Table A.23: Deployments on Western Front by Sectors, 21 March 1918. References: Wright (21), 54, 111-114; Esposito (64a), 108.

aerial reconnaissance, and other intelligence work—that the German offensive would fall south of Arras.¹²⁴

On 6 March 1918 the British Director of Military Intelligence at GHQ, General Cox, correctly forecast the German offensive would begin on or soon after the 20th and confirmed the general area of the attack.¹²⁵ This timely appreciation was possible mainly due to the excellent behind-the-lines train-watching service run by the British Intelligence Corps.¹²⁶

This intelligence was augmented on 18 March by two German soldiers who deserted near St.-Quentin and promptly betrayed the date of the attack.¹²⁷ The interrogation of one of these Germans was conducted by a young American officer then training with British field military intelligence, Major William J. Donovan.¹²⁸

Otherwise, Allied intelligence was generally in the dark. Their cryptanalysts were not able to break the new German ADFGVX field cipher (that had been introduced on 5 March) until the next month. On D + 3 the head of intelligence at French GHQ asserted:¹²⁹

By virtue of my job I am the best informed man in France, and at this moment I no longer know where the Germans are. If we're captured in an hour, it wouldn't surprise me.

Thus, while Haig expected a strong German attack at the approximately correct time and place, he as well as the other Allied commanders were quite surprised by its power, ferocity, and tactics.

The Battle of St.-Quentin is not generally rated a strategic success both because of its Pyrrhic nature and the fact that Ludendorff had been unable to split the British army from the adjoining French.

References

• General

- Barnett (63), 269-330.
- Robert Cowley, *1918: Gamble for Victory* (New York: Macmillan, 1964).
- Charteris (29), 299-334.
- Captain Peter E. Wright, *At the Supreme War Council* (New York: Putnam's, 1921).
- Esposito (64), 107-110.
- Liddell Hart (54), 205-210.

¹²⁴Charteris (29), 316-317, 332.

¹²⁵Charteris (29), 318, 332; and Wright (21), 130.

¹²⁶Kirkpatrick (59), 19-20.

¹²⁷Goodspeed (66), 246, who asserts, Ludendorff knew of their defection but decided not to cancel (or postpone) his offensive.

¹²⁸Crozier (59), 199.

¹²⁹Kahn (67), 341.

- Goodspeed (66), 240-250.

- **Warnings**

- Barnett (63), 293, 300, 301, 304.
- Kirkpatrick (59), 19-20.
- Goodspeed (66), 246.
- Ludendorff, II (19), 228.
- Charteris (29), 316-317, 332.
- Emmet Crozier, *American Reporters on the Western Front, 1914-1918* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959), p. 199.
- Lord [Sholto] Douglas, *Combat and Command* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1966), pp. 202-204.

- **Surprise**

- Barnett (63), 308.
- Kahn (67), 340-344.
- Hankey I (61), 760-761, 784, 805-806.
- Erfurth (43), 174-176. (Claims only limited surprise.)

- **Deception**

- Erfurth (43), 175, 176.
- Tuohy (20), 216, 222-223.
- Barnett (63), 293, 301, 304.
- Brigadier-General Sir James E. Edmunds, *Military Operations: France and Belgium, 1918*, Vol. I (London: Macmillan, 1935), pp. 153-156.
- Ludendorff, II (19), 219.

Example B14. Chemin-des-Dames, 27 May-6 Jun 1918: GOERZ

Operation GOERZ, the German offensive along the Chemin-des-Dames ridge, began as a mere diversion, to attract Allied reserves prior to the real offensive that was planned to strike the British front further north at Hazebrouck.¹³⁰

For this “diversion,” General Ludendorff concentrated 24 divisions—such were the profligacies of the Western Front—supported by 3,700 guns and a very great number of trench mortars. All this on a 40-mile front.

This particular section of front was chosen because the Germans thought they could achieve surprise there. They were right. Pétain had expected an offensive to hit there in March, and when it did not materialize the French assumed the Germans must have decided the sector was impregnable. Consequently they permitted it to become denuded, used mainly for resting troops. When the Germans began their buildup, that front was sleepily guarded by only 11 divisions, comprising 7 raw French divisions and 4 recuperating British.

With great stealth—including some minor bits of tactical deception—the Germans concentrated their 24 divisions, disposed so that the initial breakthrough blow would pit 15 German divisions against only 5 Allied.

The French obstinately ignored the early warnings of their own and even American intelligence. Only on H-minus-12 hours did the French learn of the imminent attack from close interrogation of two captured German soldiers. It was too late to do more than alert the front, order 8 reserve divisions for immediate movement to the area, and try an unsuccessful spoiling artillery shelling the next morning.

One top agent-in-place for French intelligence had acquired correct information of the time, place, and approximate strength of the attack. The information came directly from the OHL, the German supreme headquarters itself. The agent was Herr Waegle, the commissioner of the German field police detachment assigned to provide physical security for the OHL. Waegle had sent his report from OHL on D-minus-5. Unfortunately it did not reach French intelligence headquarters until D-plus-10, far too late.¹³¹ In any case it is doubtful that any amount of warning would have helped in this particular case, at least at the tactical level, as the commander of the French Sixth Army covering the Chemin-des-Dames, General Duchêne, had already dismissed all intelligence warnings with the fatuous “J’ai dit.”¹³²

When the Germans struck on 27 May, strategic surprise was obtained; and during that first day of battle the German center made the longest single advance on the Western Front since trenches had appeared—13 miles. By D + 3 the Germans were again on the Marne and had taken some 65,000 prisoners.

The surprise and consequent spectacular initial success of this “diversion”

¹³⁰Also known as the Third Battle of the Aisne.

¹³¹Richard Wilmer Rowan, *The Story of Secret Service* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, Doran, 1937), pp. 634-635.

¹³²Rowan (37), 730.

led Ludendorff to hastily convert it into his real offensive, one that he now obstinately proceeded to press with mounting costs far beyond usefulness. By D-plus-6 the German advance was stopped and the effort on D-plus-13 to renew the offensive gained some additional ground but at prohibitive cost. The French had matched the Germans in strength, and surprise had been lost.

References

- **General**

- Cruttwell (36), 523-527.
- Liddell Hart (30), 411-418.
- Edmonds (51), 319-323.
- Churchill (27), 171-178.

- **Warnings**

- Cruttwell (36), 525-526.
- Liddell Hart (30), 411, 412-413.
- B. H. Liddell Hart, *Through the Fog of War* (New York: Random House, 1938), pp. 322-335.
- Richard Wilmer Rowan, *The Story of Secret Service* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, Doran, 1937), pp. 634-635.
- Charteris (29), 344.

- **Surprise**

- Cruttwell (36), 523-525.
- Liddell Hart (30), 411, 412, 415, 417.

- **Deception**

- Cruttwell (36), 525.

Example B15. Hamel, 4 Jul 1918

Although the action at Hamel on 4 July 1918 was on a very small scale and had been specifically planned as a test with only a limited local objective, the new infantry-tank tactics used gave technological and tactical surprise at very low cost in manpower.

The attacking force comprised only the 4th Australian Division, four American infantry companies, and 60 tanks from the British 5th Tank Brigade, plus some air support. The two types of forces had trained together since mid-June when the operation had been decided on, with “Z” day set for 4 July. The new tactic was that the hitting power of the tank substituted for the conventional artillery preparation, the tanks and infantry advancing together close behind a rolling barrage.

The one-day battle generally exceeded expectations. Its success led to the adoption of this modification of the old Cambrai tactics in the subsequent set-piece tank attacks of the Great War.

References

- **General**

- Major Clough Williams-Ellis, *The Tank Corps* (New York: Doran, 1919), pp. 272-279.
- Liddell Hart, *The Tanks*, I (59), 171-172.

Example B16. Second Battle of the Marne, 18 July - 7 Aug 1918

“Surprise is perfectly possible.”

–Gen. Mangin, June 1913.

The Second Battle of the Marne was a most effective French counterattack against the German front between Soissons and Château-Thierry on the western flank of a very exposed German salient.

Foch had been able to plan his counter-punch well in advance and precisely calculate it to cause maximum embarrassment to the Germans. This was possible because Foch had full and accurate knowledge of the place (the front from Château-Thierry eastward to the Argonne), strength, and even the time (15 July) of Ludendorff’s offensive. The information from prisoners, deserters, agents, and aerial reconnaissance had been pieced together to deny the Germans surprise.¹³³

Achieving a secret concentration of 20 divisions and 350 tanks, General Mangin launched a Cambrai-Hamel type attack—i.e., without prior artillery preparation—on 18 July 1918.

Complete “strategic” and “tactical” surprise was achieved due entirely to a combination of tight security, speed in buildup, and Ludendorff’s preoccupation with his own offensive plans elsewhere.

The attack went quickly and by D-plus-15 the Germans had been completely expelled from their 700 square-mile salient—and with a substantially greater number of casualties, some 168,000 to only 112,000 for the Allies.

References

- **General**
 - Liddell Hart (30), 419-428.
 - Edmonds (51), 333-336.
 - Cruttwell (36), 543-546.
- **Intelligence**
 - Hankey, II (61), 826-827.
- **Surprise**
 - Erfurth (43), 176-177.
 - Ludendorff, II (19), 667-668.

¹³³Hankey, II (61), 826-827, quoting his diary entries for 14 and 15 July 1918. The French had, however, not shared this intelligence with the British. Consequently, as late as D-minus-1 the British C.I.G.S., General Sir Henry Wilson, and Prime Minister Lloyd George had wrongly expected the blow to fall on the British sector. Hankey, II (61), 826.

Example B17. Amiens, 8 Aug 1918

The great Battle of Amiens (called *Montdidier* by the French) that opened on 8 August 1918 broke the back of the drained and demoralized German Army. Ludendorff called it “the black day.”

For the offensive the Allies massed 31 division equivalents (more than 10 French, 7 British, 5 Australian, 4 Canadian, and 1 U.S. double-size), 600 tanks, 2,000 guns, and 800 aircraft. The Germans opposite had only 20 understrength divisions, with few tanks, and only 400 aircraft.

Field-Marshal Haig’s planning was done in profound secrecy. To their annoyance, he did not even inform the Prime Minister (Lloyd George) or the Chief of the Imperial General Staff (Wilson). The word only leaked to them on August 1st—through the Canadian Prime Minister.¹³⁴

The actual buildup was carried out also amidst tightest security, at great speed, and aided by a variety of simple tactical deception measures.

The tactical deception plan was carefully devised. All movements—including 290 special trains—were made at night while Allied airplanes checked for any visible signs. Work was continued on the British rear defenses until the evening of D-minus-1 to simulate a defensive mode for that sector of the front. The massing of artillery (in concealed positions) was effectively hidden by careful regulation of times and rates of fire that permitted all guns to register without increasing the normal daily quantity of fire. The transfer of the Canadian Corps south from Arras was masked by sending a highly visible fraction north to Flanders. By these devices, the Allied force before Amiens was secretly doubled between August 1st and 8th.

The Amiens offensive ran quite contrary to German expectations; and the fact that the only change in D-day was the almost unprecedented one of triggering it *ahead* of time, by two days, undoubtedly helped assure secrecy. Haig also decided to omit the conventional preparatory (and warning) barrage and was content to depend for shock effect on his tanks and a simultaneous rolling barrage. These tactics assured complete tactical surprise.

The great offensive started in a masking fog at 0420, the tanks leading the partly motorized infantry immediately behind a rolling barrage. Again, as at Cambrai, these tactics proved successful. But here, for the first time, entire divisions—six of them—broke before the inexorable advance of the tanks. At the close of D-day the Allies had achieved a notable victory. The set objectives had almost all been taken and—most unusual for Allied offensives on the Western Front—at proportionately low cost: 12,000 Allied casualties to 28,000 German (13,000 killed and wounded, 15,000 captured). Of the 462 tanks, 109 had been knocked out but nearly all were repairable. Moreover, the German front line had been routed. Tactical surprise had been achieved.

¹³⁴On July 31st, Canadian Prime Minister Robert Borden had learned in confidence that the Canadian Corps was being shifted to an undisclosed part of the line in preparation for a new offensive. Hankey, II (61), 829.

However Haig's imaginative powers had already reached their limit in accepting General Sir Henry Rawlinson's plan and failed to make any preparations for a follow through beyond D-day itself.

References

- **General**

- Major-General J.F.C. Fuller, *A Military History of the Western World*, Vol. III (New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1956), pp. 276-298.
- Goodspeed (66), 258-260.
- Liddell Hart, *The Tanks*, I (59), 174-186.
- Liddell Hart (30), 429-438.
- Charteris (29), 348-355.

- **Surprise**

- Edmonds (51), 338-339.
- Falls (59), 374-375.
- Erfurth (43), 176-178.
- Douglas (66), 258.

- **Security**

- Hankey, II (61), 829.
- Liddell Hart, I (59), 174-175.

- **Warnings**

- Liddell Hart, I (59), 178.
- Erfurth (43), 177.

Case A8. St.-Mihiel, 12 Sep 1918

“Rather think we outfoxed ’em.”

—Pershing¹³⁵

On 24 July 1918 General John J. Pershing began planning the first major offensive of his quickly growing and recently blooded American Expeditionary Force. His goals were to eliminate the German salient at Saint-Mihiel, opposite Lorraine, and to threaten Metz. D-day was then set for 10 September.

To mislead the Germans as to the direction of attack, Pershing’s Intelligence Section (G-2) attempted two primitive efforts at deception. First, on 14 August they planted the announcement that the new U.S. First Army had been formed to operate in the Marne area, well to the northwest of St.-Mihiel. Next, a regiment of the U.S. 5th Division launched a demonstration attack that took the ruined village of Frapelle on the dormant Vosges front. Although only a minor attack for a useless object, it was, however, padded out with all the usual trappings—barrages, etc.—of a major operation. It at least caused the German GHQ to take notice and raise a question if it did not perhaps presage further American activity in that sector.¹³⁶

Such minor efforts at deception fooled no one. The clear importance of St.-Mihiel as a goal and the obviousness of the means—the build-up of U.S. First Army to 660,000 troops: 550,000 U.S. and 110,000 French—was as plain to the Germans as to the Yanks themselves and the local French civilians. The area was riddled with German spies and the enthusiastic A.E.F. had little notion of security.

On August 19, having heard of the ubiquitous security leaks, the Commander-in-Chief of the French Army, General Henri Pétain, wrote to Pershing suggesting that.¹³⁷

Under these conditions it is impossible that the enemy should not be forewarned, but we can attempt to deceive him. To this end, if you are in accord . . . , you could send American officers to make reconnaissances in the different sectors of Lorraine, of the Vosges, and of Upper Alsace, which are occupied by French troops. I would give . . . instructions which would lead them to believe that an offensive action by American forces is under consideration in these sectors.

Pershing concurred and began to prepare a remarkably elaborate “paper feint.”

Painfully aware of the general lack of security, Pershing realized that if his hoax were to succeed its secrecy was essential. To insure this he drew only three persons into his confidence: his Chief of Staff, Major General James W. McAndrew; his G-3 (Operations), Brigadier General Fox Connor; and a dashing intelligence officer, Colonel Arthur L. Conger, who had been General Bundy’s

¹³⁵Quoted in *Tangled Web*, (63), 75.

¹³⁶Johnson (28), 63.

¹³⁷*Tangled Web* (63), 64.

G-2 for VI Corps and was now at GHQ as Chief of the Military Information Service, G-2. A few other key senior officers were also informed, including the First Army Chief of Staff, General Hugh Drum; the First Army Chief of Intelligence, Colonel Willey Howell; and one of the latter's assistants, Captain Sanford Griffith.

Given Pershing's general directive to present Mulhouse as the cover target, detailed deception planning now devolved on Fox Connor's A.E.F. G-3 (Operations) staff. The initial outline of the Belfort-Mulhouse ruse was drawn up by the Deputy Chief of Operations, Lieutenant Colonel George Catlett Marshall, before he was sent on detached service to First Army GHQ at the end of August.¹³⁸

The plan was designed to convince the Germans that the real American offensive was being prepared in greatest secrecy to strike suddenly through the quiescent Belfort Gap in Upper Alsace, between the Vosges Mountains and the Swiss border, 100 miles southeast of St.-Mihiel—the goal being Mulhouse. This concept was brilliantly conceived to exploit the compromised intentions and obvious preparations at St.-Mihiel by suggesting that *they* were the ruse!

Pétain and Pershing launched their illusion by a joint visit to Belfort, near which the U.S. 29th Division was already deployed, Pershing visiting that unit on the 20th.¹³⁹

Next, Pétain inspired a French press liaison officer, Captain de Viel Castel, to spread appropriate false rumors at American Press Headquarters, with the A.E.F. arriving there direct from French GHQ to hint on 25 August¹⁴⁰ that Mulhouse would be the target for the first all-American offensive. He also encouraged the American newsmen to try out some "carefully worded dispatches" on the Chief Field Censor, Captain Gerald S. Morgan. This gambit found its credulous dupes among several of the American correspondents whose stories were indeed passed by Captain Morgan, whose Press Division was, significantly, as G-2-D, part of the Intelligence Section, GHQ, AEF. Among these were Edwin L. James of *The New York Times*, which carried his story on the 28th hinting at an American offensive in Alsace-Lorraine, "the shortest road into Germany."¹⁴¹ Moreover, on the 29th *The New York Times* headlined a dispatch datelined Amsterdam "Germans Fear Offensive on Sectors of Front Now Calm," citing the *Cologne Gazette* as its source.¹⁴²

Captain Morgan, himself a veteran correspondent, made one further use of his former press colleagues as part of the deception plan—but, this time, only after fully briefing them. He told them that, as it was believed the American

¹³⁸Pogue, I (63), 173.

¹³⁹Pershing's diary states only that his general tour of his units, 19-22 August, included spending the night of 19-20 at Belfort with a visit to the 29th Division there on the 20th. Pershing, II (31), 225.

¹⁴⁰Johnson (28), 113, dates this event "about August thirtieth," which cannot be correct. Crozier (59), 238, dates it to 27 August. I have used the date given in *Tangled Web* (63), 64, which fits the published press leaks.

¹⁴¹Edwin L. James, "Austrians Face American Blow," *New York Times*, 28 August 1918, p. 2. The cabled dispatch is datelined 26 August.

¹⁴²*New York Times*, 29 August 1918, p. 1.

press corps was under surveillance by the Germans, any shift in their travel routine might signal a new offensive. Consequently, for nearly a week before D-day, all the correspondents were frozen in their normal pattern of press activity.¹⁴³

On August 28th Major General Omar Bundy, commander of U.S. VI Corps which was training the more recently arrived American divisions, received a personal and secret order from Fox Connor to report with a small staff to the city of Belfort for further instructions. There, Colonel Conger conveyed Pershing's special instructions. These lied to Bundy that the St.-Mihiel offensive had been secretly cancelled and that he was immediately to plan the "real" one through the Belfort Gap, scheduled for 8 September.

Bundy immediately formed a planning staff composed of three officers drawn from each of the seven A.E.F. divisions designated by Pershing to be the attack force. This group set about a thorough survey of the terrain. The sudden appearance of these Americans was quite apparent to the local population. When they donned borrowed French uniforms, German espionage noted the ill-fitting disguise.

Rumors and gossip spread along the Upper Rhine where (the French military mission in Bern reported) German citizens were preparing to flee, customs and railway officials were given evacuation plans, reserve depots were being shifted to the rear, and the local German forces were going on alert.

To explain the absence of troop, artillery, and supply shifts to Belfort, the survey team there was told—and they, in turn, obliquely answered interested queries—that as the battle plan stressed surprise, the offensive would be launched with only a light covering artillery fire from local French batteries. Indeed, the main American force would not arrive in Belfort until the second day of battle.

Meanwhile the U.S. 29th Division near Belfort started a series of reconnaissance attacks to identify and maintain contact with the German units opposite to make certain that they were not shifting north toward St.-Mihiel to anticipate the real American drive there.

Radio deception was used. Radio operators of the 29th Division now began to transmit traffic to simulate that of a full U.S. Corps.¹⁴⁴ German aerial reconnaissance was increased, but Colonel Conger was out early with two or three old tanks arranging poorly concealed tank track-marks to simulate a major tank park. German reinforcements continued to arrive, and on 31 August all local German forces went on alert.

The real offensive at St.-Mihiel was postponed from September 8th to the 12th, a result of the expansion of the U.S. program to include a second and larger offensive in the Meuse-Argonne agreed between Pershing and Foch on 2 September. This delay required a corresponding adjustment in the deception plan. Accordingly, on the 4th, Conger told Bundy that Pershing now considered the Belfort "offensive" to be so promising that it was to be postponed long enough for Bundy to extend his front of operations from 20 to 38 miles, adding the Vosges Mountains.

¹⁴³Crozier (59), 239-240. See also Webb Miller, *I Found No Peace*, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1936), p. 86.

¹⁴⁴*Tangled Web* (63), 69.

Colonel Conger, the only witting American in Belfort, now—sometime after 4 September—capped the hoax with a chair-borne version of the old “Meinertzhagen haversack” ruse. Having reason to believe his hotelroom wastebasket contents were reaching German intelligence, Conger decided to use this traditional espionage media for his own purposes. Sometime after 4 September he typed an original and—using a fresh carbonpaper—one copy of a report to Pershing’s GHQ at Chaumont¹⁴⁵ that all the attack now needed was a starting date from GHQ. The discarded carbonpaper insert was removed from Conger’s wastebasket within five minutes of his leaving the room.

A few days before the offensive, Pétain made a final appearance at Belfort. He ostentatiously summoned a conference of all local American and French corps and divisional commanders. Security was intense, as signified by the presence of Colonel Aristides Moreno, the chief A.E.F. counterintelligence officer. To enemy intelligence it presumably looked like a final council of war. In fact, Pétain disclosed the hoax to the assembled generals and thanked them for their past—and continuing—cooperation.

The Germans too had been sufficiently, if not quite as completely, deceived. When on the 12th the American First Army struck at St.-Mihiel, Ludendorff had just stripped three divisions from there to reinforce the southern flank. As Colonel Conger learned from a German staff colonel after the Armistice, the latter’s pre-battle appreciation to Ludendorff had read, at least in effect:¹⁴⁶

I realize quite fully that all these [American] preparations being made for attack [through Belfort] may perfectly well turn out to be a *ruse de guerre* intended to mislead us as to the real point of the attack. However, there is nothing to indicate that it is not the real point of attack and our danger there is so great that I deem it imperative to have these [three] divisions.

As late as 2 October Major Baron von dem Bussche-Ippenburg delivered Ludendorff’s report to the Reichstag party leaders. Amidst its other cries of doom, the report announced that the main Allied offensive was yet to come—and it was scheduled for Lorraine and Upper Alsace.¹⁴⁷ It seems the Belfort ruse had survived well beyond its own creators’ most optimistic prognosis.

Special efforts were made to conceal the massing of Allied aviation near St.-Mihiel. In charge was Colonel William “Billy” Mitchell, the new Chief of the Air Service of the U.S. First Army. He would command an airfleet of 1,500 planes, specially assembled for the battle. He appreciated the need for initial secrecy because the Germans *could* concentrate 2,000 airplanes at the point of the offensive. Consequently his proposed aviation play, submitted to Pershing on 20 August stressed the pre-battle needs to simulate normal air activity near St.-Mihiel and to “absolutely prevent access to our lines by enemy reconnaissance

¹⁴⁵Johnson (23), 121-122, apparently based on an interview with Colonel Conger. Pershing himself describes Conger’s plant as “a copy of instructions to the commander of the VI Corps.” Pershing, II (31), 240.

¹⁴⁶*Tangled Web* (63), 74.

¹⁴⁷Johnson (28), 195.

aviation.”¹⁴⁸ By 1 September Mitchell’s air armada was concentrating at the 14 main airdromes and many substations:¹⁴⁹

...with the greatest secrecy possible so as not to let the Germans know how many airplanes we were assembling. We were careful not to make too great a display over the front; but on the other hand, we kept our pursuit patrols working up as high as they could go, about twenty thousand feet, so as to prevent German reconnaissance.

Colonel Mitchell describes his elaborate camouflage system:¹⁵⁰

In our advance airdromes for the observation groups ... I had camouflage or fake hangars constructed with fake airplanes in front, so that if the Germans took pictures of them, it would look as if a certain number of aircraft were there. Each day I had the position of the camouflage airplanes changed so as to make it look as if the place were active.

Then, the night before the real planes were due, real hangars were substituted for the fake ones and the real airplanes would arrive next evening just before dark and be concealed in the hangars. The only blunder occurred on September 10th when a Major Christy led his 88th Squadron into Souilly airdrome in broad daylight, lined it up on parade on the field, and then flew off to make a daring personal reconnaissance over Metz. Mitchell comments:

He was lucky not to have been killed but it disclosed our whole position at Souilly. ... It was a brave act but absolutely the wrong thing to do. I told Christy what I thought of it. Christy never did anything like that again.

We are assured that “in Switzerland, American Secret Service did a clever job. ...”¹⁵¹ No details are given, but the elipses in the original would seem to conceal an important chapter in the history of U.S. espionage. The small but effective American intelligence network in Switzerland was directed from 1917 through the end of the war by the 25-year old Secretary of Legation at Bern, Allen Dulles.¹⁵² It was, of course, this pioneer experience that led to Dulles’ OSS appointment to Switzerland in the next world war and subsequent fame. In 1918, one of Dulles’ principal collaborators was the prominent American Quaker, Dr. Herbert Haviland Field, who lived in Zurich where he was directing an international bibliographic research institute.¹⁵³ Moreover, Dulles was working

¹⁴⁸The complete text is published in Mitchell (60), 235-237.

¹⁴⁹Mitchell (60), 242.

¹⁵⁰Mitchell (60), 242-243.

¹⁵¹Johnson (28), 123.

¹⁵²For this early exploit of Dulles see Dulles (63), 2, 41; Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., in *The New York Review*, 11 Feb. 1965, pp. 10-11; and Rowan (37), 621-622.

¹⁵³Father of Noel Field, who during World War II was recruited by Dulles as a contact agent while actually in the employ of Soviet military intelligence (the GRU).

there closely with Colonel Ralph H. Van Deman, one of the founders of U.S. military intelligence.

Meanwhile German intelligence had been receiving considerable authentic information about the Americans' preparations for their real offensive against the St.-Mihiel salient. These warnings were of several types. First, we should assume that their agent-observers in France were faithfully reporting the same kind of information about military deployments that were perfectly visible to Frenchmen civilians and *poilus* and to American journalists and doughboys.¹⁵⁴ Second, two Americans deserted to the Germans on D-minus-1 and disclosed the timing of the American attack—but too late for the Germans to even go to a higher alert much less make any counter-deployments.¹⁵⁵

Third, the proficient German radio and telephone Intercept Service was not only monitoring most of the Allied military communications but thanks to the then egregious American slovenliness regarding communications security, were undoubtedly gaining many hints of the St.-Mihiel offensive from these intercepts, despite the fact that the A.E.F.'s field codes were excellent in 1918.¹⁵⁶ For example, the A.E.F. G-2 monitoring officer, Lieutenant Woellner was able to reconstruct from indiscrete telephone intercepts the entire First Army order of battle and was only one day off on the time of the St.-Mihiel attack. These leaks had come through a single switchboard and it was *hoped* by the disconcerted officers at GIQ that the Germans had not been monitoring this same line.¹⁵⁷

The Germans were sufficiently aware of the vulnerability of their St.-Mihiel-salient and of the ominous activities of the enemy opposite to decide beforehand on withdrawal.¹⁵⁸ Most writers¹⁵⁹ mistake this decision as proof that the Germans were fully forewarned and that the Americans had lost surprise—both strategic and tactical. On the contrary, German intelligence was acquiring much contradictory information about American activities and intentions that it was sending along to the Army commanders. The curious Foch-Pershing compromise thrashed out between 30 August and 2 September had committed the Americans to an unprecedented last minute change in plans whereby the St.-Mihiel offensive was retained but with its duration and objectives sharply curtailed to permit a much larger main effort to be mounted in the Meuse-Argonne a mere 10 to 15 days later.¹⁶⁰ The short lead time between the two operations (10 to 15 days) and between agreement on the new offensive and its fulfillment (22 to 27 days) required the Americans to plan and deploy both simultaneously. There was also too little time remaining for German intelligence to discover the pattern in these unprecedentedly complex marches and countermarches without assistance from the American GHQ or the French Grand Quartier-General

¹⁵⁴Johnson (28), 62.

¹⁵⁵Johnson (28), 67.

¹⁵⁶Kahn (67), 326-334.

¹⁵⁷Kahn (67), 334. Yardley (31), 43-45, has, I suspect, confused this incident in reporting that one of the encrypted radio messages contained not only the First Army order of battle for the St.-Mihiel sector but also the exact time of the projected attack.

¹⁵⁸Johnson (28), 34, 62, 75-76.

¹⁵⁹For example, Yardley (31), 44-46.

¹⁶⁰Case A9a.

(CQG). But the only information the Germans were getting from those quarters was the disinformation generated by the deception plan.

To enhance the chances of tactical surprise in the actual attack at St.-Mihiel on 12 September, Pershing ordered both an unconventionally brief (4-hour) preliminary artillery barrage and a delayed secondary attack.¹⁶¹

The attack pitted 33 First Army division-equivalents (15 double-sized U.S. divisions with 3 attached French) against only 10 understrength German divisions. Partial strategic and tactical surprise of place, time, and strength were obtained. This combined with rapid exploitation to move the First Army ahead of its schedule. By D-day evening it had already attained its D-plus-1 objectives. By D-plus-4, when the battle ended with its goal—the reduction of the 200 square-mile St.-Mihiel salient—achieved, the Germans had lost 16,000 prisoners and 443 guns to Pershing's 7,000 total casualties.

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• Warnings

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• Surprise

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- Johnson (28), 91.

• Deception

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- *Tangled Web* (63), 61-75. (A detailed but careless scrapbook account.)
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¹⁶¹Pershing, 11 (31), 263-265, 267.

Case A9. Megiddo, 19 Sep 1918

“Thorough preparation. Deception. Concentration of strength; with *strong* feints.”

—Allenby¹⁶²

General Allenby repeated his success of the Third Battle of Gaza a year later, on 19 September 1918, at the Battle of Megiddo, the Biblical Armageddon. Moreover, he managed it without the aid of Colonel Meinertzhagen, who had transferred to the War Office that January, or of Brigadier-General Dawnay who had gone off to the Western Front. This time Allenby used a similar pattern of feint-cum-deception, but reversed the real axis of operations from desert to coast.

The plan of campaign was—as was his style—entirely Allenby’s own.¹⁶³ He did not disclose it even to his staff until late August, after he had thought it through in detail. D-day was only three weeks off. His plan was to concentrate five of his seven infantry divisions, three of his four cavalry divisions, and all his heavy artillery along a narrow front on the coastal plain. This force would make the main attack, sweeping quickly up toward Nazareth and Megiddo, enveloping the entire enemy force. His two other infantry divisions under Lieutenant-General Sir Philip Chetwode would make a secondary attack up the Jerusalem-Nablus road. The false inland axis of attack would be simulated in the Jordan Valley and along the Hejaz Railway at Amman. This task was given to Major-General E.W.C. Chaytor’s *ad hoc* force comprising the veteran Australian-New Zealand Mounted Division and eight battalions of infantry (4 Indian, 2 West Indian, and 2 Jewish). Thus while his overall superiority in manpower was already about 2-to-1, Allenby managed to substantially improve on this as shown in Tables A.24 and A.25.

The essence of Allenby’s stratagem was to build upon his enemy’s preconceptions. He shrewdly and correctly reasoned that his name had become linked by the Germans and Turks with a cavalry thrust against their desert flank. Accordingly, his deception operations were now designed to reinforce this notion. Much of the credit for detailed planning, particularly that of the deception belongs to the Chief-of-Staff, Major-General Sir Louis Bols and, even more, his intelligent and able deputy, Brigadier-General William Bartholomew,¹⁶⁴ who after the war became Director of Military Operations and Intelligence at the War Office.

The disappearance from the desert of three of the four divisions of the cavalry (Desert Mounted Corps) was masked by dummy radio communications being continued from the now deserted site of the corps headquarters. Moreover, 15,000 canvas “horses” filled the abandoned horse lines. An *increased* level of

¹⁶²Quoted by Gardner (65), 195.

¹⁶³Indeed it represented a major revision of a similar plan that he had presented to his staff on August 1st.

¹⁶⁴Gardner (65), 180.

D-minus-21	British	Turco-German	Ratio
Coast	5	5-1/3	1:1.1
Nablus Road	5	5	1:1.0
Jordan Valley	1-1/3	3-1/3	1:2.5
Totals:	11-1/3	13-2/3	

D			
Coast	8	5-1/3	1:0.7
Nablus Road	2	5	1:2.5
Jordan Valley	1-1/3	3-1/3	1:2.5
Totals:	11-1/3	13-2/3	

Table A.24: Orders of Battle By Divisions And Fronts

	British Infantry	Turco-Ger. Infantry	British Cavalry	Turco-Ger. Cavalry	British Guns	Turco-Ger. Guns
Coast (15 miles)	35,000	8,000	9,000	0?	384	113
Other (50 miles)	22,000	20,000	3,000	3,000?	170	270
Totals:	57,000	*28,000	12,000	3,000	554	383

Table A.25: Strengths By Fronts (D-day). *Note: Plus some 6,000 infantry and cavalry on the Hejaz Railway.

activity was simulated by pitching new but empty encampments and detailing some local troops to march to-and-fro making noise and raising dust.

The buildup of forces on the coast was also masked. All transfers to the coast were made by night and no unnecessary movements or other visible activities in the coastal area were permitted by day. Moreover, in anticipation of the buildup, only existing camps and tents were used. The new arrivals simply doubled up.

To deceive the enemy about the timing of the offensive, an official public announcement was made that a major social event—a horserace—had been scheduled for September 19th, i.e., D-day itself.

The deception operations on the main front were planned and closely coordinated with a series of feints and ruses by the Arab irregulars on the trans-Jordan desert front—all to divert enemy attention inland. These colorful activities were being directed by the very able British military intelligence officer, Major T. E. Lawrence.¹⁶⁵ Lawrence had his agents spread false reports that very large quantities of forage would soon be needed in the Amman area, thereby implying both that the cavalry would soon be operating across the Jordan and that D-day was still some time off.¹⁶⁶

On 17 September, an Indian sergeant deserted to the enemy, revealing that a heavy attack was due the 19th in the coastal sector. The same day reports

¹⁶⁵Lawrence (35), 538-543, 553-554, 584, 593-594, 614-616.

¹⁶⁶Wavell, I (41), 269.

came that (Lawrence's) "hostile Arabs" were threatening the railroad near Dera. General Liman von Sanders believed these reports sufficiently to order a general alert and send 300 reserve troops to Dera.¹⁶⁷ Otherwise, he as well as his commanders were quite surprised by the specific point of Allenby's attack.

Allenby's strategy succeeded in unbalancing the smaller and weaker Turkish-German force (35,000¹⁶⁸ to his 69,000 frontline troops) and precipitated it into headlong flight. By D + 2 casualties seem to have been something like 3,500 total Allied to 10,000 enemy prisoners alone. By D + 7 all Palestine had fallen and 50,000 prisoners rolled up. Pursuit continued and Aleppo, 350 miles above Allenby's start-line, fell on D + 30. By D + 39 when the pursuit ended with the capture of all Syria, casualties totalled 75,000 enemy (including 3,700 Germans and Austrians) to 5,666 Allied (including only 853 dead). Of the original enemy force of 100,000 in Palestine and Syria, only 17,000 had escaped north. On D + 51 (October 30th), the drive had forced Turkey to sign its separate armistice with the Allies.

This, the "last" battle of Armageddon, may be compared only to Allenby's Third Battle of Gaza in exercising great influence on future military history. Both owe their special position not so much to the fact that they were among the very few "cost-effective" battles of the Great War as to their having been widely publicized during the interwar years. Some details of the deception plans were made public by 1920 when Captain Tuohy's book on the British Intelligence Corps appeared.¹⁶⁹ Then, in 1926, Colonel Lawrence gave out more details, including blowing Colonel Meinertzhagen's cover. By 1930 when Captain Cyril Falls' official history appeared (omitting only Meinertzhagen's name) stratagem had been restored to officers' required reading lists. I believe subsequent events show these revelations were read with particular interest and understanding by at least three veterans of Megiddo: Allenby's liaison officer, Wavell; the brilliant but erratic Commander of the Turkish Seventh Army, General Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk); and a young man in the all-Jewish volunteer 39th Royal Fusilier battalions, Corporal David Ben-Gurion.

¹⁶⁷Sanders (27), 274. See comment by Falls (64), 42.

¹⁶⁸Although the Turkish force had 12 divisions, they were far under their full strength size (9-12 battalions of 1,000 men each). General von Sanders states their "rifle strength" averaged only 1,300 per division, although the captured records of two of these divisions showed 1,878 and 2,262 rifles and total "rifle strength" of 5,600 and 6,457. This would imply that Allenby was, in fact, opposing a larger force of 72,000! Allenby's own intelligence estimate was 35,000 enemy troops. In addition, Allenby enjoyed a 3-to-1 superiority in artillery: 384 guns to 113.

¹⁶⁹For which indiscretion Meinertzhagen (60), 222, asserts Tuohy (whom he does not name) should have been court-martialed.

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Case A9a. Meuse-Argonne, 26 Sep 1918

If we had fought by the book rules, we would have wrecked ourselves about every twenty minutes.

–George C. Marshall,
reflecting on the Meuse-Argonne

The American First Army was assigned the Meuse-Argonne front as its sector for the Allies' last great general offensive on the Western Front.

Again, as at St.-Mihiel (Case A8), the Americans employed stratagem to mislead the Germans about the place of attack. The Intelligence section exerted considerable ingenuity in “creating the most artistic mirage of an offensive further east, near the Vosges.”¹⁷⁰ This stratagem contributed to the surprise attained as to both the place and the strength of the real offensive.

Surprise was also aided by the extremely rapid movement of 600,000 U.S. troops from the St.-Mihiel area (and elsewhere), *across* lines of advance of other units, over poor and already crowded routes, with hastily borrowed transport, and all in accord with the 26 September D-day schedule. The Germans did not think such a feat possible.¹⁷¹ Even Foch and Pershing had doubts. It was the quite remarkable result of the organizational, planning, and—especially—improvisational abilities of the new deputy G-3 (Operations) of First Army, Colonel George C. Marshall.¹⁷²

Allies		Central Powers	
French	102	German	193
British	60	Austrian	4
American	39		
Belgian	12		
Italian	2		
Portuguese	2		
Total Divisions:	217		197

Table A.26: Divisions On Western Front, 25 September 1918. The divisional orders of battle are best seen in the superb map given by Haig to Churchill. See Churchill (27), between 265 and 266.

Note however that the 39 American divisions were not only fresh but also double-size divisions of 28,000 men each. Moreover, all the German divisions were understrength, even more so than the French and British (of whose 60 divisions only 2 were full strength).

On their 20 miles of front the Americans placed 9 of their double-strength divisions (with 3 more in close reserve). In addition they massed 2700 French-made guns (1500 served by Americans), 821 aircraft (641 flown by Americans),

¹⁷⁰Liddell Hart (30), 463. I have been unable to discover any details of this feint.

¹⁷¹Cruttwell (34), 566.

¹⁷²Pogue, I (63), 175-179.

and 189 small French tanks (142 manned by Americans). The Germans opposite had only 4 understrength divisions in the line and one in reserve.

Having achieved surprise of place and strength, the Americans won half their first day's objectives with comparative ease (averaging a four mile advance along the 20 mile front). After that the offensive bogged down due to American hesitation and the arrival of German reserves (16 divisions). In all, the battle raged almost unabated for 47 days, ending only with the general Armistice on 11 November. American casualties in that period were 117,000 men.

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 - Liddell Hart (30), 463.

Case A10. Warsaw, 16 Aug 1920

The vigorous new post-war state of Poland had received an ill-defined and contested frontier with the equally new Soviet Russia. Taking advantage of his civil war-ridden neighbor, President and Marshal Pilsudski set about to detach several western provinces of Russia. The Polish offensive was launched into the Ukraine on 25 April 1920, beginning the Soviet-Polish War. The Red Army began its main counter-offensive on 5 June and forced a general Polish withdrawal that ended only at the gates of Warsaw itself on 3 August.

At this point the situation stood as follows. The 200-mile front formed an almost straight line from Warsaw in the northwest to Lwow in the south-east. Warsaw was invested by the Soviet Western Front force commanded by Tukhachevsky, the 28-year old former subaltern in the Czarist Imperial Guard, and comprising nearly 99,500 troops divided among the IVth, XVth, IIIrd, and XVIth Armies. These faced 108,000 Polish troops. The IVth, Tukhachevsky's "secret army" was sent on northwest into the bottleneck between Warsaw and East Prussia; the IIIrd faced Warsaw from the north; and the XVIth formed the rear, to the east of Warsaw. Next, east of Lublin, came the weak center hinge of the 8,000-man "Mozyr Group." Finally to the southeast, well preoccupied with its own siege of Lwow was the Southwestern Front, commanded by Yegorov.

Tukhachevsky now planned his final blow against Warsaw and what he very wrongly believed to be a crippled and demoralized Polish army. He intended to outflank Warsaw, by wheeling his "secret" IVth Army around from the northwest through the Polish left flank entrusted to General Sikorski. He further wrongly presumed that any Polish counterattack would come at that point. He was about to fall into a trap prepared for him by Pilsudski.

On August 6th, two map-watchers reached decisions about the wide gap at Lublin that Tukhachevsky had permitted to form between his Western Front and Yegorov's Southwestern Front. In Moscow, Kamenev, the Red Army Commander in Chief, was sufficiently disturbed to raise the question with Tukhachevsky who then demanded control of Yegorov's two nearest armies, the XIIth and Budenny's excellent 1st Cavalry Army.¹⁷³ And in Warsaw, Pilsudski decided quite on his own to launch his main counterattack at that weak point on the 17th, cutting straight across Tukhachevsky's narrow lines of communications and then rolling up his naked salient. That day he ordered the appropriate concentrations.

A day or so after Pilsudski's order of the 6th went out to field units, the IIIrd Red Army captured a copy. Tukhachevsky, intent upon his own plan and confident of his grasp of his enemy's intent, dismissed the document as a ruse. On the 10th (or 8th) he ordered *his* attack for the 14th.

On the 11th, as Tukhachevsky moved his IVth Army in on Sikorski, the Red Army High Command categorically ordered Yegorov to detach his XIIth and 1st

¹⁷³The legend that Pilsudski's French military adviser, General Weygand, had any part in this is now exposed as a political fabrication by Polish opponents of Pilsudski. See Piotr S. Wandycz, "General Weygand and the Battle of Warsaw of 1920," *Journal of Central European Affairs*, Vol. XIX, No. 4 (January 1960), pp. 357-366, as cited by Erickson (62), 95, 688n44.

Cavalry armies to plug the gaping hole at Lublin. However, the local satraps—Yegorov, Budenny, and Stalin—took calculated advantage of communications delays and a bureaucratic technicality to disobey, as they were unwilling to give up their own petty battle for Lwow.

Pilsudski advanced his counter-blow 24 hours and struck with his five divisions through Lublin on the 16th. Complete strategic surprise was achieved. Tukhachevsky's IVth Army was hopelessly entangled with Pilsudski. The XVIth Army, enveloped from flank *and* rear was routed. The dilapidated rail system was unable to bring in 50,000 waiting reserve troops. Budenny *started* to the support of the collapsing Western Front on the 20th—too late by far. The IVth Army was cut off and completely destroyed, its remnants fleeing to internment in East Prussia. By the 21st the Battle of Warsaw was won.

By aggressive exploitation of the complete collapse of the Russian line, Pilsudski soon drove the entire enemy force back to its original line of departure. By August 25th Tukhachevsky had lost 66,000 captured and 30-40,000 interned in East Prussia, 231 guns, 1,023 machine-guns, and 10,000 supply wagons. Polish losses (for all July and August) were 50,000.

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- Erfurth (43), 150-153.

Example B18. Battle of Eskişehir, 9-20 Jul 1921

The bitterly fought Greco-Turkish War began in early 1921. In direct consequence of the breakdown of the London Conference the Allies (i.e., Britain and France) declared their neutrality in the ongoing Greco-Turkish War. Greek King Constantine not only decided to go it alone but, in early June 1921, went to Smyrna to take personal control as supreme commander of the Greek army in Asia.

King Constantine opened his offensive with a marginal superiority in men and equipment. With a feint contributing to the surprise, the Greeks advanced rapidly inland to threaten Eskişehir, the gateway to the new Turkish capital at Ankara.

Atatürk ordered a quick withdrawal to save the garrison and set his new defense line 100 miles further inland, north of the Sakarya River.

References

- **General**

- Churchill (29), 421-423.
- Kinross (65), 305-310.

Case A11. Dumlupinar, 26 Aug 1922

The Greeks, with much British and wavering French diplomatic and material support, had pressed gradually forward in Turkey until August-September 1921 when they were stopped at the Battle of Sakarya. The Turkish Army held thanks to its decisive Commander-in-Chief, Mustafa Kemal, the future Atatürk. His achievement was in large measure due to the recently begun flow of clandestine arms aid from the Soviet Government and smuggled arms purchased in Italy and France with money lent for the purpose by the Soviet Government.¹⁷⁴

In October (or November) 1921 Marshal Kemal began secretly planning the Turkish offensive, to begin next year.¹⁷⁵ The plan was his own and not that of the Russians whose arms he welcomed but whose proffered troops and advisers he declined as politically risky. Specifically, he was annoyed when the Ukrainian Bolshevik General Frunze offered to draft the Turkish campaign plan during his stay in Ankara in December-January.¹⁷⁶

By June 1922 the Greek expeditionary force totalled 195,000 men (including 130,000 infantry) organized in 15 divisions. Although the Turks had gradually built themselves up to 23 divisions, they had only barely achieved parity in number of troops (187,000 men including 100,000 infantry) and they remained weaker in aircraft, artillery, machine guns, and other technical material, despite the continuing flow of arms from Russia and Italy.

On 28 July 1922, Kemal met his General Staff at Akshehir to make the final decisions and plans for the forthcoming Turkish offensive. This conference was held in secret, using the thin cover of attendance at a local football match.

Kemal was quite aware that his success depended on surprise. Furthermore, he recognized that surprise hinged on deceiving the Greeks on two points: the time and the place of his offensive.

To conceal the imminence of his offensive Kemal had, as remarked above, guarded against any suggestion of its planning leaking out. Moreover, he privately welcomed and did not overreact in countering the propaganda of his Opposition ministers that his army was demoralized and incapable of attack. To insure the desired diffusion of this view, Kemal had rumors spread among foreign circles to the effect that the army was as yet unprepared for offensive. As D-day neared, Kemal exercised particular care to conceal those of his movements that could hint at his intentions. He simulated a casual routine by coordinating security and deception. Thus, only the inner group of his military staff and key members of his government were privy to his comings and goings between the capital and the front, and they were instructed to speak to the unwitting as if he were always in the capital. Visitors were told he was busy. Taking final leave of his 71-year-old mother before battle he lied gently that he was going to a tea

¹⁷⁴See my unpublished draft manuscript, *Soviet and Chinese Clandestine Arms Aid* (Cambridge, Mass.: Center for International Studies, 1965, typescript), Chapter V, Part B, Section 4 ("Turkey").

¹⁷⁵The initial plan was worked out with the Chief of the General Staff, General Fevzi, and the Commander of the Western Front, General Ismet (Inönü). Kinross (65), 351.

¹⁷⁶See my previously cited manuscript. Also Kinross (65), 338; and Atatürk (63), 104, 105.

party. After he reached field headquarters on 20 August, the press announced he had scheduled a reception next day at his villa outside Ankara.¹⁷⁷

To mask the striking point of his attack Kemal combined a secret deployment with a feint. Having chosen to thrust through the southern part of the front, at Dumlupinar, he had to hide the concentration of the bulk of his force there so that the enemy could not restore the balance of opposing forces by shifting. He achieved this by an inconspicuous north-to-south redeployment spread over a one month period. Security was tight. The troops were moved by night to covered positions behind the line where they could not be readily observed by enemy reconnaissance aircraft. The depleted force of only six divisions left to cover the 130 kilometers of the northern part of the front now had to simulate its full size. Dummy campfires were lit at night to suggest the presence of large units. During the day dust was raised on the roads to suggest *reinforcement* of the northern front. And new roads were openly constructed there to suggest to snooping aircraft that that was deemed an active front. The battle itself opened with feints both in the north and at the extreme southern end of the line.¹⁷⁸ Even then the pretense was maintained until the end of the battle that *this was not* the real offensive. The official communiques announced only minor engagements and unimportant troop movements. This was intended as much to avoid panicking Greece's British friends into intervening as to mislead the Greek commanders.¹⁷⁹

By this combination of ruses, Kemal obtained strategic surprise about the timing of his attack and managed tactical surprise in achieving overwhelming troop superiority of 3-to-1 at the point of attack, rather than the mere three divisions that Greek aerial reconnaissance showed. In addition, the captured Greek Commander-in-Chief admitted his surprise.¹⁸⁰

Exploiting his surprise blow, Kemal pressed his attack forward 50 kilometers by D-plus-2. And by D-plus-4 the entire Greek army in Anatolia was in flight, half its men and nearly two-thirds of its equipment lost. On D-plus-6 its newly appointed Commander-in-Chief, General Tricoupis, was captured. On D-plus-14 Kemal took the Greek base on the Aegean at Smyrna, 160 miles further along.

This decisive victory put Kemal in such a position of strength that the Allied powers (Britain, France, Italy) occupying Constantinople soon agreed to his armistice terms.

¹⁷⁷Kinross (65), 352-353; and *Atatürk* (63), 116.

¹⁷⁸Kinross (65), 353-354.

¹⁷⁹*Atatürk* (63), 117-118.

¹⁸⁰Kinross (65), 355, 359. See also Halidé Edib, *The Turkish Ordeal* (New York: century, 1928), pp. 364-367, for an eyewitness account of the post-mortem meeting of Kemal with General Tricoupis on 2 September.

The only casualty figures I have found are plausible but suspect, considering their source and timing. In his victory proclamation of 14 September 1922, Kemal asserted that Turkish casualties were only 10,000 (three-fourths being “lightly” wounded) against over 100,000 Greeks (not counting prisoners).¹⁸¹ Greek prisoners numbered 50,000.

References

- **General**

- Lord Kinross, *Atatürk* (New York: Morrow, 1965), pp. 343-364.
- *Atatürk* (Ankara: Turkish National Commission for UNESCO, 1963), pp. 111-122.
- Winston S. Churchill, *The Aftermath*, 1918-1928 (New York: Scribner's, 1929), pp. 443-444.

- **Surprise**

- Kinross (65), 355, 359.

- **Deception**

- *Atatürk* (63), 115-118.
- Kinross (65), 350, 351, 353-354, 358.

¹⁸¹ *Atatürk* (63), 121.

Example B18a. Battle of the Jarama River, 6 Feb 1937

Frustrated in their efforts to take the Loyalist (Republican) bastion of Madrid, the Rebel (Nationalist) forces of General Franco sought to outflank by a surprise attack to the south, at the Jarama River.

The Nationalist attack was delayed (by rainy weather) from 23 January 1937 when it was originally scheduled until 6 February.

The Loyalist Commander at Valencia, General Pozas, preoccupied with preparing his own attack in that sector, was taken unawares by the initial thrust by German tanks on 6 February. However, the offensive developed too slowly and cautiously to permit effective exploitation. Instead of being thrown off balance, the Loyalists had enough time to rush up their reserves for a counterattack on the 12th. These reinforcements—specifically the 14th and 15th International Brigades—held after a bitter see-saw struggle that finally stabilized on the 16th.

References

• General

- Robert G. Colodny, *The Struggle for Madrid* (New York: Paine-Whitman, 1958).
- Tom Wintringham, *English Captain* (London: Faber and Faber, 1939), pp. 140-235, 253-260.
- Verle B. Johnston, *Legions of Babel* (University Park, Pa.: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1968), pp. 69-75.
- Herbert L. Matthews, *Two Wars and More to Come* (New York: Carrick & Evans, 1933), p. 252.
- Gabriel Jackson, *The Spanish Republic and the Civil War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), pp. 345-348, 527, 529.
- Hugh Thomas, *The Spanish Civil War* (New York: Harper & Row, 1961), pp. 374-380.
- Manuel Aznar, *Historia Militar de la Guerra de España* (3 vols., Madrid: Editora Nacional, 1958, 1961, 1963), Vol. II (1961), pp. 67-84.
- Bron (64), 463 and map 3.
- Arthur H. Landis, *The Abraham Lincoln Brigade* (New York: Citadel Press, 1967), pp. 3-90.
- Henry Buckley, *Life and Death of the Spanish Republic* (London: Hamilton, 1940), pp. 280-283.

• Surprise

- Johnston (67), 70.
- Jackson (65), 346.

Case A12. Guadalajara, 12 Mar 1937

Frustrated by an unexpectedly stubborn defense in his frontal assault on Madrid in December 1936, Rebel General Francisco Franco sought to take the half-encircled capital of the Republican Government (the “Loyalists”) by a flanking sweep cutting all its remaining communications.¹⁸² The offensive was launched on 8 March 1937. The Rebel (“Nationalist”) plan was to push down from the north in three columns: the right consisting of the Spanish troops of the understrength Soria Division under General Ituarte Moscardó, and the center and left of the Italian Corps of Volunteer Troops (Corpo Truppe Volontarie) commanded by Italian General Mario Roatta under his *nom de guerre* of “General Mancini.” This Italian force of 31,000 men consisted of the following units:

- Littorio Division under General Annibale Bergonzoli
- 1st Volunteer Division (“Blackshirts”) under General Silvio Rossi
- 2nd Volunteer Division (“Black Flames”) under General Giovanni Coppi
- 3rd Volunteer Division (“Black Arrows”) under General Nuvolari

Opposing on 8 March were only 2 Loyalist divisions with 10,000 men and 22 guns.

D-Day (12 March)	Loyalists			Rebels		
	Spanish	Foreign	Total	Spanish	Foreign	Total
Divisions	2 1/3	1	3	1	4	5
Troops	c.25,000	c.5,000	30,000	8,500	31,000	39,500
Bombers			30	0	13	
Fighters			90	0	51	
Reconnaissance				0	12	
Total Aircraft			120	0	76	76
Tanks		86	86	0	250	200
Guns				?	180	180

Table A.27: Strength. References: Aznar, II (61), 101; Colodny (58), 129-130; Landis (67), 113-114, 116.

The Rebel force began its attack on 8 March, following a 40-minute artillery preparation. Although their intention to attack was known, they enjoyed initial tactical surprise because the Italians had managed an unexpectedly rapid deployment from their previous position at Malaga at the southern end of the front. This was due to their highly mobile capability given by having 20 trucks for each 650-man battalion. The drive had swept about 25 miles toward Madrid when it was halted by the Loyalists.

It was now the Rebels who were surprised by the Loyalist defensive counterattack. This surprise took two forms. First the speed and strength of the

¹⁸²This battle is occasionally also known as the Battle of Brihuega.

D + 11	Italians	Nationalists	Total Rebels	Total Loyalists
KIA	2,000	148?	2,148?	2,000
WIA	3,000	300	3,100?	3,500
PW	800	—	450	
Total				
Casualties	5,800	448?	6,248?	5,950
Aircraft			21	18
Tanks			0	21

Table A.28: Casualties at Guadalajara. References: Aznar, II (61), 116; Landis (67), 123, 132.

Loyalist response on the ground was unexpected. Second, the strength and effectiveness of the air attack upon the Italian motorized columns proved decisive. The Loyalist use of aviation constituted virtual technological surprise, despite the fact that similar tactics had already been thoroughly tried out—and on a much larger scale—on the Western Front in World War I.

The Loyalist force assembled for the counterattack was the *ad hoc* IVth Army Corps commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Jurado under the overall direction of General Miaja.

The Loyalist airforce under Colonel Hidalgo de Cisneros concentrated every available aircraft at Guadalajara: some 120 machines. This response was substantially greater than anticipated by the Rebels, who had concentrated only 76 aircraft. Moreover, Loyalist control of the air was assured by the vagaries of weather, which kept the Rebel aircraft grounded at their bases beyond the Sierra de Guadarrama while the Loyalist craft were only infrequently grounded by the much less severe storm at *their* bases in the immediate zone of battle. The Loyalists took full measure of their advantage, flying low to strafe and bomb the Italian motorized columns, spreading confusion, creating traffic jams, and contributing to panic among the inexperienced Fascist troops.

References

• General

- Matthews (38), 254-278. Eyewitness account of *The New York Times* correspondent on the Loyalist side.
- Luis Bolin, *Spain: The Vital Years* (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1967), pp. 254-265. Memoirs of the then Nationalist Press Officer.
- José Martín Blázquez, *I Helped to Build an Army* (London: Secker and Warburg, 1939), pp. 323-327. Major Martín Blázquez was a Loyalist staff officer.
- Aznar, II (61), 90-120.
- Colodny (58).
- Landis (67), 106-125.
- Michas Bron, E. Kozeowski, M. Techniczek, *Wojna Hiszpańska, 1936-1939* (Warsaw: Ministry of National Defense, 1964), pp. 464-465 and map 4.
- F.G. Tinker, Jr., *Some Still Live* (New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1938), pp. 119-136. Eyewitness memoirs of an American fighter-pilot with the Loyalists.
- Buckley (40), 293-303.
- Gustav Regler, *The Owl of Minerva* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Cudahy, 1960), pp. 304-310.

• Surprise

- Willoughby (39), 185-187.

• Deception

- Captain Didier Poulain, “Aircraft and Mechanized Land Warfare: The Battle of Guadalajara, 1937,” *Journal of the Royal United Service Institution*, Vol. 83, No. 530 (May 1933), pp. 362-367.

Example B18b. Brunete, 6 Jul 1937

Taking advantage of Rebel preoccupation with their campaign in the north and hoping to improve their position before Madrid, the Loyalists launched their first offensive of the war at Brunete, 15 miles northwest of Madrid.

The Loyalists assembled their best units into three corps under the supreme command of General José Miaja, the famed defender of Madrid. His corps included the all-Communist Vth Army Corps under Lieutenant Colonel Modesto and the XVIIIth Army Corps under the Republican regular Lieutenant Colonel Jurado. The battle plan was developed by Miaja's Spanish staff in Madrid in conjunction with their Soviet Russian advisers.

Miaja managed to assemble his force in secrecy and to launch it with surprise. Given near parity in troops overall, the Loyalists had achieved a 7-to-1 superiority locally. This was due to the speed of the buildup and to the incompetence of Franco's intelligence services. The offensive had been widely discussed in Madrid cafes for the preceding three months. But any leaks through that channel would have been ambiguous, because the discussion raged over alternative strategies: the Russian advisers plumping for the Brunete one while Premier Largo Caballero urged an offensive in Extremadura. In addition, a Captain Luján on Miaja's staff defected to the Rebels with an early version of the Brunete plan.

	Loyalists	Rebels
Divisions	10	1
Troops	58,750	
Tanks	128	
Guns	136	
Aircraft	150	

Table A.29: Loyalist and Rebel Strengths at Brunete. References: Landis (67), 185; Aznar, II (61), 198-200; and Jackson (65), 396n.

D + 22	Loyalists	Rebels
Total casualties	15,000?	13,000
Aircraft	20	78

Table A.30: Casualties and Lost Aircraft at Brunete.

The initial Loyalist advance which began at dawn went in with such utter confusion that, although a breakthrough was achieved, the very first Rebel reinforcements that arrived by mid-day were able to slow the advance and, by next day, stabilize the entire line. Henceforward the battle degenerated into a costly slugging match.

References

- **General**

- Aznar, II (51), 189-200.
- Landis (67), 175-239.
- Jackson (65), 394-396.
- Thomas (61), 460-465.
- Wintringham (39), 240-246, 304.
- Bron (64), 467-468 and map 5.
- Stephen W. Pollack, *Strange Land Behind Me* (London: Falcon, 1951), pp. 16-20.

- **Warnings**

- Jackson (65), 394.
- Thomas (61), 461.

- **Surprise**

- Landis (67), 177, 184, 186.
- Jackson (65), 395.
- Thomas (61), 461.

- **Possible Deception**

- Landis (67), 186-187.

Case A13. Teruel, 15 Dec 1937

The Republican (Loyalist) offensive at Teruel that began on 15 December 1937 was timed to undercut the clearly imminent one by the Nationalists (Rebels). The Nationalists had massed three corps to take Madrid. Their offensive, originally scheduled for December 1st, was delayed by foul weather and problems of reconnaissance and general preparation until the 16th or 17th, just long enough to be spoiled by the Republican preemption.

Knowing of the Nationalist intentions, on December 8th, the Republican Supreme Council of War approved a plan that would simultaneously preempt and “force the enemy to send his troops and his reserves *far from that objective*.”¹⁸³ Thus Teruel was, in fact, conceived as a diversion. The buildup began.

	Republican	Nationalist
Divisions	9	?
Troops	100,000	c.10 000

Table A.31: Republican and Nationalist Strengths at Teruel. References: Aznar, II (61), 360.

In order to accumulate the stock of munitions to sustain their planned offensive, the Loyalists needed to acquire arms abroad. At this time the main sources of supply were in France. But as France was signatory to the international Non-Intervention Agreement, all military supplies had to be smuggled across the Franco-Spanish border. However, as the Government of Socialist Premier Léon Blum was cautiously pro-Loyalist, it did sometimes connive at secret circumvention of its own embargo of arms. It was particularly sensitive to pressures arising from dramatic changes in the fortunes of the war in Spain. At this juncture, an audacious bit of “black propaganda” was introduced to influence French Government policy to re-open—even covertly—the border to allow entry of the large quantity of purchased and waiting munitions. The scheme was that of the famed Czech Communist propagandist, Otto Katz (alias André Simon) a covert NKVD agent then in Paris heading Agence Espagne, the Loyalist news agency. His tool was the British Communist journalist, Claud Cockburn (alias Frank Pitcairn), then working as one of Agence Espagne’s correspondents. Between them they fabricated a wholly unfounded story that an uprising had occurred in Rebel-held Spanish Morocco. Their fiction was then floated into the regular news services and appeared throughout the French press the next morning, giving—according to unsupported testimony by Cockburn—the best arguments to the successful efforts of pro-Loyalist French deputies to induce Blum to reopen the frontier.¹⁸⁴

The Republican attack at Teruel gained surprise. The Nationalists were preoccupied with their own plans for Madrid and, I presume, expected that the Republican response would come at that place.

¹⁸³General Rojo as quoted by Landis (67), 346.

¹⁸⁴Cockburn (56), 307-309. Also in somewhat revised form in Cockburn (58), 27-29, 139.

D + 70 (22 Feb. 1938)	Loyalists	Nationalists
KIA	6,000-14,000	
WIA	20,000	
PW	14,500-17,000	
Totals:	< 50,000	80,000?

Table A.32: Casualties at Teruel. References: Jackson (65), 528, 529; Aznar, II (61), 404, 422-423; Thomas (61), 514; and Landis (67), 346.

The initial attack went well until the arrival on D + 3 of German and Italian aviation and subsequent ground reinforcements first blocked the breach and then turned the battle into a long and dreary sequence of attacks and counterattacks.

References

- **General**

- Landis (67), 341-402.
- Thomas (61), 504-509, 511, 513-515.
- Jackson (65), 398-400, 528, 529.
- Aznar, II (61), 343-424.
- Bron (64), pp. 472-473, and maps 8a, 8b, 8c.
- Buckley (40), 346-352.

- **Surprise**

- Landis (67), 345-346.

- **Deception**

- Claud Cockburn, *A Discord of Trumpets* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1956), pp. 307-309.
- Claud Cockburn, *Crossing the Line* (London: MacGibbon & Kee, 1958), pp. 27-29, 139.

Case A14. Ebro, 25 Jul 1938

By summer 1938, the prospects for the survival of the Spanish Republican (Loyalist) Government were dim. The Nationalist (Rebel) Army of Generalissimo Franco was larger, stronger, and once again grinding forward in ponderous offensive. To regain the initiative Premier Negrin called for a major diversionary attack. Accordingly, General Rojo, the Chief of Staff, proposed an attack across the Ebro to threaten both the Nationalist's lateral communications and their salient to the sea that divided the Republican zone.

Captain Tom Wintringham, the skilled one-time Communist commander of the British Battalion of the XVth International Brigade, provides a brilliant professional military analysis of Rojo's strategy. He asserts that:¹⁸⁵

The push across the Ebro was "the baited attack," to use Liddell Hart's phrase, in an almost perfect shape. Tactically it was the most advanced thing we had yet done; and strategically it had this very great advantage—that it was completely unexpected.

Strategic surprise was indeed obtained—and for two reasons. First, Franco was preoccupied with his own offensive against Valencia and assumed his enemy would respond in the manner usual to both sides, namely by direct confrontation. Second, the axis chosen by Rojo for his attack did not immediately threaten any important military objectives—that would only occur if the first stage were successful.¹⁸⁶ And that is just what happened.

The generally ineffective Nationalist Intelligence Service had failed quite badly in giving warning. Air reconnaissance had revealed part of the enemy build-up of troops, boats, and pontoons; but the preconception held that the upper Ebro was not a sensible place for attack.¹⁸⁷

The Republicans scraped together a large 10-division force of nearly 100,000 troops in Catalonia. On the morning of 24 July, the War Council in Barcelona authorized the attack. The mass crossings of the formidable Ebro began that same night at a quarter past midnight. Tactical surprise was assured by the moonless night, the absence of preparatory artillery fire, and swift execution of the initial assault. The small Nationalist force guarding the long 60-mile stretch of the river chosen for the crossing was overwhelmed by daybreak. It took over two hours for word of the attack to reach the sector headquarters—the two-division Moroccan Army Corps, headed by General Yagüe. Initial success was complete. By D + 1 the huge bridgehead covered 115 square miles and over 4,000 Nationalists had been taken prisoner. Republican losses were light. By D + 7 the Republicans held 250 square-miles. Moreover, the "baited" part of the attack also succeeded. Franco broke off his pressure elsewhere to rush all available force to contain the new threat.

At this point, the innovation of an "indirect" strategy had proved itself. Henceforward, imagination failed. Wintringham was wrong—the Republican

¹⁸⁵Wintringham (39), 312 and, generally, on pp. 308-317.

¹⁸⁶Wintringham (39), 312-14.

¹⁸⁷Larios (66), 220.

generals did *not* understand the theory of the “baited attack.” Their World War I and Soviet Russian doctrine of direct frontal attack immediately reasserted itself upon the appearance of major opposition. Like Verdun, both sides now began their prodigal commitment of lives to the cauldron at the beachhead. The Communist commander of the Vth Army Corps, Colonel Enrique Lister, proved his Russian military training by ordering that: “If anyone loses’ an inch of ground he must retake it at the head of his men or be executed.”¹⁸⁸ With such a “doctrine,” the irreplaceable Republican Army of the Ebro was virtually destroyed in the 115 days of attritional battle.

D + 113	Republicans	Nationalists
KIA	10,000	
WIA		
PW	20,000	4,000+
Total Casualties	70,000?	33,000?
Aircraft	200	

Table A.33: Republican and Nationalist Casualties at Ebro. References: Thomas (61), 547, 560-561. Compare Jackson (65), 461, 527, 529; Aznar III (63), 245, 260-264.

References

• General

- Landis (67), 509-588.
- Jackson (65), 454-461, 527, 529.
- Aznar, III (63), 197-270.
- Wintringham (39), 308-320.
- Bron (64), 478-479 and map 10.
- Thomas (61), 544-549, 559-561.
- Captain José Larios, *Combat Over Spain* (New York: MacMillan, 1966), pp. 215-224.

• Warning

- Larios (66), 220.

• Surprise

- Wintringham (39), 312-314.
- Landis (67), 514.

• Deception

- Wintringham (39), 308-317.

¹⁸⁸Thomas (61), 548.

Case A15. Battle of Khalkhin-Gol (Nomonkhan), 20 Aug 1939

Since July 1938 the Russians had fought off the Japanese in a series of minor and inconclusive engagements along the frontier between Siberia and Communist Outer Mongolia and Japanese-occupied Manchuria.

Then, sometime in the summer of 1939, Stalin decided to end this festering situation by a quick surprise attack. For this test he selected the troublesome Japanese position centered at the Manchurian town of Nomonkhan on the eastern bank of the Khalkhin-Gol, which marked the border with Outer Mongolia. The Japanese force there had itself been ordered by an Imperial Edict to launch its own offensive on 24 August, but the Russians managed to preempt by 4 days.

The Japanese Kwantung Army had assigned the Khalkhin-Gol front to its Sixth Army, which mustered 25 infantry battalions, 17 cavalry squadrons, 120 tanks, 450 planes, and 135 guns. The Russian Trans-Baikal Military District had designated Army Commander (*Komandarm*) 2nd Grade Gregori M. Shtern to head an *ad hoc* “front group” to coordinate the Soviet and Mongolian forces. In early August the local forces were heavily reinforced and incorporated into the 1st Army Group under its own Military Soviet, headed by a promising but unblooded young Corps Commander named Georgi K. Zhukov. He commanded a crack force of 35 rifle battalions (4 divisions), 20 Mongolian cavalry squadrons (2 divisions), 498 tanks, 346 armored cars, 581 aircraft, and 266 guns. It is plain that Zhukov was not to be permitted to fail.

The key to Zhukov’s strategy was to obtain a sufficiently secret build-up that the Japanese would be unable to match his strength. This was achieved by a combination of tight security, speedy deployment, and tactical deception. The entire buildup took less than three weeks. The final movement to their starting positions involved 720 trucks shuttling up 18,000 troops and 2,600 other trucks to shift the ammunition and fuel for the artillery and tanks.

Zhukov’s elaborate deception plan was designed to mask his offensive intent. Thus on D-10 trucks stripped of their mufflers were paraded along the front to cover the noise of the tanks moving into their final positions. A hand-book titled *What the Soviet Soldier Must Know in Defense* was widely circulated to dissimulate the aggressive intent.

Zhukov preceded his attack against the well fortified Japanese positions with a short (3-1/4 hour) artillery preparation. Then, at 0900 the tank-and-aircraft-supported infantry assault went in. The Soviet-Mongolian forces slogged ahead slowly but surely and without regard to casualties. On D-plus-7 the Japanese recognized their local defeat and began a general break-out from their then virtually encircled position. On D-plus-7 the last of the Japanese had been cleared out. Although the Kwantung Army prepared an autumn counter-offensive, the Japanese Government had been impressed by the unexpected show of Soviet strength and proficiency. Consequently, the border war ended on 16 September with an Armistice-in-place.

The Japanese subsequently admitted a total of 18,000 casualties; and, while

no figures on Russian losses are available, most students of the battle believe they were less than those of the Japanese.¹⁸⁹

References

- **General**
 - Erickson (62), 522, 532-537, 805-806.
- **Warnings**
 - *FRUS: 1939*, Vol. III (55), 46, 50, 59.
- **Surprise**
 - Erickson (62).
- **Deception**
 - Erickson (62), 532.

¹⁸⁹David J. Dallin, *Soviet Russia and the Far East* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1948), p. 39.

Case A16. Poland, 1 Sep 1939: Operation WHITE

The Poles and particularly their British and French allies quite misread the signals of the German attack on 1 September 1939.

Operation WHITE (*Fall WEISS*) foreshadowed BARBAROSSA in at least three ways. First, it involved a deception plan. The Wehrmacht mobilization and eastward deployment was announced as annual fall maneuvers. Second, Hitler continued diplomatic negotiations to screen his real intentions. Third, it involved an inadvertent cry of “wolf,” the original Y-day having been deferred at the last possible moment from 26 August to 1 September. Some Allied newsmen and intelligence officers had correctly predicted the earlier date and, when it did not materialize, were discredited.

When the Germans struck at dawn on 1 September 1939, the Poles were taken quite by surprise, in both its strategic and tactical senses. They were astonished by the sudden furious tempo of the German air and ground assault, their military doctrine having presumed a slow, cautious, probing and testing crescendo of battle. The war began at 0440 with an all-out airstrike against the sleeping Polish airfields that drastically increased the initial 3-to-1 aircraft superiority of the Germans (1,600 to 500) and foreclosed on any significant rôle that aviation might have played in defense.

These factors of deception, a cry of wolf, and Polish preconceptions combined to find even the Polish Army unprepared. As mobilization had been put off as “provocative” and expensive until 31 August, the huge reserve including 10 divisions on which the Polish Army depended was only beginning to gather on D-day. Thus 55 German divisions including 4 *Panzers*, had to deal with only 30 Polish divisions, 1 armored brigade, and 11 cavalry brigades.¹⁹⁰ Indeed, the speed of the German advance was such that even the standing army was only able to partly deploy and few reservists were able to join units.

Within the first week 6 or 7 Polish divisions in western Poland were cut off and the rest in retreat. In the third week 10 or 11 other divisions in a northwest pocket counterattacked but were defeated and 150,000 prisoners taken. The final desperate hope of Marshal Smigly-Ridz ended on 17 September when the USSR invaded from the east, in accord with the secret clause in the Hitler-Stalin Pact signed the previous month. At the close of hostilities (6 October), Polish casualties were as shown in Table A.34.

Prisoners of Germans	694,000
Prisoners of Russians	217,000
Escaped to Lithuania, Hungary and Rumania	100,000
Killed	?
Total:	1,011,000

Table A.34: Polish Casualties (to D + 36).

The Wehrmacht took 70,000 square miles of Poland; the Red Army, 79,000.

¹⁹⁰There is little agreement as to these figures. A critical discussion is in Taylor (52), 324-325.

The price was only 46,000 German casualties.¹⁹¹

References

- **General**

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- **Warnings**

- Ciano (446), 118-120, 129, 130, 135 entries for 11, 12, 13, 25, 27, 31 August 1939.
- Edmund Ironside, *Time Unguarded* (London: Constable, 1962), p. 90.

- **Surprise**

- Lochner (42), 1-12.
- Kimche (62), 1-6.

- **Deception**

- Baldwin (66), 5, 389-390.
- *NCA*, VI (46), 933-934.

¹⁹¹110,572 KIA, DOW; 5,029 MIA; 30,322 WIA.

Case A17. Denmark, 9 Apr 1940: Exercise WESER SOUTH

On 9 April 1940 the Wehrmacht invaded both Denmark and Norway. Despite their simultaneity they are treated here as separate cases for two reasons. First, they were considered by the Germans themselves as separate operations, each serving a different purpose. Denmark was included only because the Luftwaffe coveted Danish airbases for its future campaigns in the North Sea and in the projected campaign against the Lowlands and France. It was little more than an afterthought.¹⁹² On the other hand the Norwegian campaign was a major amphibious operation provoked by accurate German knowledge of the Anglo-French plans to seize Norwegian harbors to interdict the transshipment of Swedish iron ore. Second, the attack and the surprise were separately perceived by Denmark and Norway.

The Danish Government had five days detailed notice of the Wehrmacht's assault, Exercise WESER SOUTH (*WESERÜBUNG SUD*), yet took no advance notice.

The forthcoming German invasion of Denmark was not only in part masked by the more visibly provocative target of Norway but by two other actions that Germany was threatening. I do not know to what extent, if any, these threats were being deliberately magnified by the Germans to divert attention from Scandinavia, but they did serve that end. The first was the renewed flurry of rumors about a forthcoming offensive against France. For example, both the Italian Embassy in Berlin and the German Ambassador in Rome were assuring Italian Foreign Minister Ciano as late as All Fool's Day that the assault on the Western Front would definitely "take place, and perhaps in a short time."¹⁹³ The second diversion was a last minute set of clues put out by the Germans in diplomatic circles that implied they were about to move in the Balkans.¹⁹⁴

One measure of the degree of surprise was that less than a week before the Danish Minister in London, Count Eduard Reventlow, had sent his wife and children home to Denmark to get them safely away from the war. Asked about this by the Soviet Ambassador he said despairingly: "No symptoms! No signals! Everything took place absolutely unexpectedly, as though it had fallen from heaven."¹⁹⁵

Overall commander for WESERÜBUNG (Operation WESER) was General Nikolaus von Falkenhorst. However he was preoccupied with the main show in Norway (WESERÜBUNG NORD). The operation against Denmark was carried out under General of Artillery Leonhard Kaupisch with two divisions and attached units.

The Germans attacked at dawn on April 9th and the battle—if that is the

¹⁹²While planning for an invasion of Norway had been ordered by Hitler on 14 Dec 1940, he did not include Denmark until 29 Feb 1941.

¹⁹³Ciano (45), 230, entry for 1 Apr 1940.

¹⁹⁴Ciano (45), 233, entries for 8 and 9 Apr 1940.

¹⁹⁵Ivan Maisky, *Memoirs of a Soviet Ambassador* (New York: Scribner's, 1968), pp. 58-59, citing his diary for conversation with Reventlow on D-plus-2.

D-day	German	Danish
KIA	?	13
WIA	?	23
Totals:	20	36

Table A.35: German and Danish Casualties. Reference: Taylor (58), 114n.

word—for Denmark ended about 7 a.m. A German infantry battalion had landed by ship in Copenhagen itself, rushed the Citadel (already reconnoitered on 4-5 April by the battalion commander posing in mufti as a tourist), overpowered the Royal Bodyguard, and forced the capitulation of King Christian. An almost bloodless conquest.

References

• General

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- Eric S. Einhorn, *“Surprise Attack and the Small Power: the Case of Denmark, 1940.”* (Unpublished course paper for Government 282, Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, Harvard University, December 1966.)
- Telford Taylor, *The March of Conquest* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1958), pp. 82, 92-94, 102-115.
- William L. Shirer, *The Challenge of Scandinavia* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1955), pp. 223-225.

• Surprise

- Maisky (68), 58-59.
- Taylor (58), 113.

• Warnings

- Ritter (58), 167.
- Dulles (47), 59.
- Kimche (62), 27-29, 88.
- Schellenberg (56), 100-101.
- William Phillips, *Ventures in Diplomacy* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1952), pp. 264-265. The then U.S. Ambassador to Rome recalls that Italian Foreign Minister Ciano occasionally leaked bits of political and military information to him and that Phillips interpreted one of these bits—after the fact—as a warning of the attack on Denmark and Norway.

Case A18. Norway, 9 Apr 1940: Exercise WESER NORTH

As with the Danes, similar warnings of the German amphibious invasion of Norway were discounted by the Norwegian, the British, and the French governments.

The OKW's Exercise WESER NORTH (*WESERÜBUNG NORD*) achieved virtually complete surprise. This was attained mainly because the Norwegian leaders' attention was then preoccupied with another imminent aggression: the Anglo-French expedition to mine Norwegian waters and seize some Norwegian ports (including Narvik) to deny their use to German shipping, particularly that carrying iron ore. The British and especially the French had been repeatedly signaling their aggressive intent toward Norway since the previous December both through intense diplomatic pressure and by such palpable acts as the *Altmark* incident on 16 February.¹⁹⁶

In the face of these obvious signals, the Norwegian Foreign minister, Dr. Halvdan Koht, who dominated his country's foreign policy, paid little heed to the quieter alarms from Germany. These latter consisted mainly of urgent dispatches from the Norwegian Minister in Berlin, Scheel, that we now know came chiefly from the ubiquitous Colonel Oster of the Abwehr. However these authentic warnings had already been partly discredited by the "cry-wolf" effect, as similar warnings in late December 1939 and early February 1940 had failed to materialize. Hence Dr. Koht all too readily dismissed the new signals as unfounded rumor. Moreover, Dr. Koht was operating on one fatal assumption: that Hitler would himself supply the authentic crisis signal by submitting negotiable demands or at least an ultimatum. Koht had been led to this assumption by Hitler's previous behavior in the Austrian, Czech, and Polish crises. Like Stalin after him, Koht opted for the "ultimatum hypothesis" and did not give sufficient attention to the possibility that Hitler would break his own precedent.

Most commentators have dismissed the closeness of the race for preemptive invasion of Norway as a mere coincidence, however remarkable, in which the German expeditionary force arrived by chance only two days before the Anglo-French one was scheduled to embark. While this did correctly represent the situation after March 1st when Hitler authorized the invasion plan, it does not hold after April 2nd when Hitler set D-day, for the 9th (or at least after 0930 on the 5th when the final go-ahead was issued) because he did this with unimpeachable knowledge of the imminent Anglo-French move (Operation STRATFORD, in accord with Plan R.4). His source, which Johan Holst dismisses as "some intelligence reports"¹⁹⁷ was nothing less than the intercepts of the British Admiralty signals concerning its mining and Narvik plans. The German Navy's superb cryptanalytic section, the *B-Dienst*, had recently solved one of the Ad-

¹⁹⁶For the Anglo-French plan of aggression see particularly Rear Admiral Paul Auphan and Jacques Mordal, *The French Navy in World War II* (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute, 1959), pp. 43-53.

¹⁹⁷Holst (66), 42.

miralty codes and this coup was now to assure them surprise in the timing of their invasion.

Knowing the Anglo-French intentions and actions, Hitler devised an effective deception plan to enable him to move his weakly guarded invasion armada into southern Norway without risking disaster from the vastly superior British Home Fleet. He simply timed his invasion to come in under the approaching Allied units, using his Narvik-bound flotilla as a decoy to divert the Allies to the extreme north. When this decoy force was detected by the Home Fleet on April 7th, the feint succeeded in drawing the British warships away from the highly vulnerable main convoys headed toward southern Norway. The Admiralty was, as Churchill wrote on D-plus-1, “completely outwitted.” Moreover, the familiar presence of the British squadrons provided some measure of cover for the unexpected German ships, the Norwegian units initially mistaking the latter for the former. There is conflicting evidence whether this final ironic twist was mere luck or whether it was part of the German plan.

In any case Hitler had explicitly *ordered* that WESERÜBUNG be a surprise. Grand-Admiral Raeder’s directive of 6 March 1940 specified that to enhance this the German invasion armada “will fly the British White Ensign until the beginning of disembarkation” except at Narvik where “the local military commander, Colonel Sundlo, is pro-German.”

The German expeditionary force under General Nikolaus von Falkenhorst comprised no less than six divisions, requiring a half million tons of shipping. While deception could help mask the build-up, the Germans realized that its sheer ponderous bulk could jeopardize the surprise desired to preempt the planned Allied counter-invasion. Therefore, the invasion was to be spearheaded by 9,000 assault troops transported in fast warships to the key ports.

The speed of the German invasion also meant that only about half of Norway’s 120,000-man reserve was called up before their mobilization centers fell. Moreover it caused a confused fortnight’s delay in the sailing of the six-battalion Allied stand-by force at Scapa Flow. Thus on D-day itself when the Germans landed some 10,500 men, there were only 15,320 Norwegian troops under arms and half of these were in the far north guarding the border with Finland and Russia.

Organized military resistance ended on 8 June when King Haakon sailed into exile with the withdrawn Allied expeditionary force. A local armistice was signed on the 12th, at D-plus-64.

The overall costs were certainly to Germany’s immediate advantage. However the D-day and D + 1 costs were relatively greater due to the sinking of several warships, many troop-laden.¹⁹⁸

Strategic political-military surprise demands explanation. It is a commonplace of human behavior that the explanations adopted are often those that

¹⁹⁸A loaded troopship was sunk by a Polish submarine on D-minus-one. On D-day the troop-laden heavy cruiser *Blücher* was sunk in Oslofjord and the light cruiser *Karlsruhe* was sunk after discharging her troops at Kristiansand. And the light cruiser *Königsberg* was sunk at Bergen. On D + 1 five destroyers were sunk and five more on D + 4. The Allies lost one carrier, one cruiser, and nine destroyers.

D + 60	German	Allied*
Killed	1,317	?
Missing	2,375	?
Wounded	1,604	?
Captured	–	?
Totals:	5,296	5,000

Table A.36: Casualties (ground fighting only). *Note: Allied counts include Norwegian casualties, except those who surrendered: some 15,000 to 60,000. Reference: Taylor (58), 120n, 134n, 152-153.

cause the least psychological pain or official embarrassment. Thus do myths arise to explain away such events. The fall of Norway provides its share of myths, and one is relevant here because it was a myth about deception. This was a variant of the ubiquitous “Trojan Horse” ruse. The Germans had already used such a trick in Poland and they would use it repeatedly later in Holland, Belgium, Russia, and at the Battle of the Bulge. However, they did *not* use this ruse in Norway. The maritime “Trojan Horse” myth was credulously accepted as fact by British Premier Churchill and Norwegian Foreign Minister Koht, among others.¹⁹⁹ It stated that the German assault force had arrived secretly during the week before D-day, concealed in the holds of German ore and other merchants ships. This myth probably arose from the need to explain the sudden appearance on 9 April of thousands of German troops in ports where the only German ships, aside from their supporting warships, were these earlier arrivals. In fact, the troops were brought exclusively on the warships.²⁰⁰ This was done more for the need of speed in eluding interception by the British Navy than as the most effective ruse it turned out to be.

References

- **Note:** The excellent study by Holst (66) is the first attempt to apply Roberta Wohlstetter’s “signals-vs.-noise” model of analysis to a case of strategic surprise other than Pearl Harbor. Unfortunately this approach is not entirely appropriate to the Norwegian case, because its key category of “noise” fails to distinguish deliberately deceptive messages.
- **General**
 - Hubatsch (60).
 - Taylor (58), 82-154.
 - Halvdan Koht, *Norway: Neutral and Invaded* (London: Hutchinson, 1941), pp. 51-127.

¹⁹⁹See Churchill, I (48), 590; and Koht (41).

²⁰⁰The best exposé is Taylor (58), 102-103. On the much exaggerated rôle of Quisling and his “Fifth Column” see Louis DeJong, *The German Fifth Column in the Second World War*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), pp. 54-65, 158-181.

- Ironside (62), 181-197, 209-230, 245-298.
- **Surprise**
 - Taylor (41), 98-99, 102, 110, 111.
 - Churchill, I (48), 591-593, 600.
 - Koht (41), 63-66, 91-96.
 - Maisky (68), 58, 61.
 - Ironside (62), 248-250.
 - Beaufre (68), 174.
- **Warnings**
 - Hubatsch (60), 124-125, 135 (Warnings and leaks.)
 - Ironside (62), 211, 221, 229, 248-249.
- **Warnings** (from Col. Oster):
 - Colvin (51), 109-111.
 - Abshagen (50), 251-256, 261.
- **Cry Wolf**
 - Koht (41), 60-62.
- **Intelligence** (German Navy's radio monitoring of British fleet movements):
 - *TWC*, X (51), 795-746, for Nürnberg testimony of Admiral Schniewind.
 - Raeder (60), 307.
 - Hubatsch (60), also in 1st ed. (52), 57-69.
- **Security**
 - Warlimont (64), 72-73.
 - *TWC*, X (51), 762, 766, 768, 779, 780.
 - Taylor (58), 89, 91.
 - Ironside (62), 217 (on British leaks), 221 (French leaks), 243.
- **Deception**
 - Kahn (67), 465.
 - Koht (41), 94, 96-97.
 - *TWC*, X (51), 768, 782.
 - Ernst Kris and Hans Speier, *German Radio Propaganda* (London: Oxford University Press, 1944), pp. 292-297.

Case A19. Netherlands, 10 May 1940: Case YELLOW

The simultaneous invasion of the Netherlands and Belgium and the offensive against France was considered by Hitler as an omnibus operation—Case YELLOW (*Fall GELB*). However, I have counted them as three separate instances of strategic surprise, because each victim was individually responsible for having been deceived.

The Dutch ignored the detailed and accurate warning on 9 May 1940 of the German invasion of the Lowlands the next day from their alert Military Attaché in Berlin, Major Gijsbertus Sas. These warnings originated with both the Japanese Embassy and the German Abwehr. Other, but much more vague, warnings from the British Foreign Office were dismissed as alarmist rumor.

Tactical deception was also applied against the Dutch in the opening hours of invasion. This consisted of using German troops and Dutch Nazis disguised in Dutch military police uniforms to seize the five road and railway bridges at Maastricht and Gennep. Despite advance warning of this classic *ruse de guerre*, the Dutch (and Belgian) frontier guards had not been alerted. The Gennep bridges fell as planned about 4 a.m. to a unit of the Abwehr's Brandenburg Special Duty Battalion 800. However, the Maastricht effort—conducted by an army unit—failed as the Dutch were able to detonate their demolition charges during the affray. These operations were planned in tightest secrecy under the very appropriate cover-name TROJAN HORSE.

On 10 May 1940, without declaration of war, the Germans swept across the 200 miles of their common frontier with the Netherlands. The task was assigned to General Georg von Küchler's Eighteenth Army, whose 10 divisions quickly subdued the 9 divisions and assorted units mustered by the Dutch. Although evenly matched in manpower, the Royal Netherlands Army was no match for the Wehrmacht's modern tactics, paratroops, tanks, larger airforce, and more numerous artillery. The Queen and Government fled to London on D-plus-3, and late on the afternoon of D-plus-4 the Dutch Commander-in-Chief proclaimed capitulation, at which point Dutch military casualties alone stood at 100,000.

References

- **General**
 - Taylor (58), 42, 55, 163, 180-182, 187-205.
- **Warnings** See also references for Case A21 under **Warnings**.
 - Deutsch (68), index.
 - Taylor (58), 195.
 - Leverkuehn (54), 64, 205.
 - Abahagen (50), 262-263.
 - Schellenberg (56), 349-351.
 - Dulles (47), 58-61.
 - Churchill, I (48), 599.
 - Kirkpatrick (59), 146.
 - Ironside (62), 296.
 - Giskes (53), 153.
 - Bendeš (54), 94, 102.
- **Surprise**
 - Taylor (58), 190-192, 194.
- **Deception**
 - Taylor (58), 188, 196-197.
 - Leverkuehn (54), 98-100.
 - Boelcke (66), 347.

Case A20. Belgium, 10 May 1940: Case YELLOW

The Belgians were similarly warned of their fate in the same invasion of May 10th. This warning came through their Berlin Legation from the Japanese Embassy. In January they had even accidentally received an earlier German invasion plan but concurred with their French and British intelligence collaborators that it was a German “plant.” In fact, that plan was quite authentic; but, as the Belgians did not learn of its subsequent cancellation, they were lulled into the “cry-wolf” mode of skepticism when the scheme failed to materialize.

This event, critical to the understanding of the surprise visited upon Belgium (and Holland and France as well), is the famed “Lucifer” affair whereby on 10 January 1940 the intended victims inadvertently received some of the key orders for Case YELLOW. These were being carried by Major Helmut Reinberger, a Luftwaffe paratroop officer assigned to General Kurt Student’s staff to plan the airborne operations in Belgium and Holland. Summoned on the 9th to a conference in Cologne he found himself stranded in Münster by the congested rail traffic. That evening at the officer’s club he met Major Erich Hönnmanns who, needing some flying time, volunteered to pilot Reinberger to Cologne. The next morning, the 10th, they took off, Reinberger carrying his secret maps and orders, in flagrant contravention of the standing security prohibition of carrying the most secret documents by air. Hönnmanns quickly got lost in the clouds, went off course, and—unfamiliar with the plane—killed the motor. Deadstick-landing beside a river they thought was the Rhine, they discovered it was the Meuse when they were arrested by Belgian troops near Mechelen-sur-Meuse. Reinberger’s efforts to burn his papers on capture and again at the regional police headquarters both directed attention to their importance and gave the incident its nickname of “Lucifer affair” from the type of matches Major Reinberger kept asking for in his bumbling efforts to burn his papers. Belgian intelligence recovered quite enough to disclose the broad outlines of the entire German invasion plan plus specific details of its airborne aspect. The Belgians soon went on alert and notified the British²⁰¹ and French.

In addition to producing immediate Allied and Belgian alerts, the “Lucifer Affair” now developed its long-range effects. First, the Allies wrestled with the question of whether the documents might not be a deliberate plant. As the weeks passed and no attack materialized, they tended to accept their authenticity. This delay, however, produced the second effect, namely of “cry wolf,” being one more unfulfilled alert. Third, it ended by forming a very conscious part of the German deception plan. While their victims puzzled over the documents’ authenticity, the Germans agonized over what portion, if any, had been disclosed. Hitler, Göring, Keitel, and Jodl spent a long evening comparing copies of Major Reinberger’s documents with the complete plan to discover how much of the latter could have been compromised. On the 12th, Reinberger’s superiors

²⁰¹Ironsides (62), 204-205, diary entry for 13 January 1940, noting the report reached London during the night of 12-13 January.

(the commander and the chief of staff of Air Fleet 2) were, respectively, retired and reassigned,²⁰² and Kesselring and Speidel appointed in their places. On the 13th the German air attaché in Brussels reported the (planted?) misinformation that “the dispatch case was burned for certain,” but Berlin remained healthily skeptical. That day, motivated by this uncertainty and a run of unfavorable weather, Hitler postponed D-day first to the 20th then to the spring. “Lucifer” also influenced Hitler’s decision to make those drastic changes in Case YEL-LOW that entrapped and surprised the Allies when finally sprung on 10 May 1940. At that point the Allies were gullibly expecting the discarded version of the plan.

Entirely surrounded, on D-plus-18 King Leopold III surrendered Belgium and its army.

References

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- Taylor (58), 208-219, 244-252.
- *Belgium: The Official Account of what Happened, 1939-1940* (London: Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1941).

- **Warnings (General)**

- Taylor (58), 55, 60-62, 195, 209.
- *Belgium* (41), 13-15, 21-22, 26-27.
- Leverkuehn (54), 64.
- Ritter (58), 167.
- Schellenberg (56), 98-99, 350.
- Dulles (47), 61.
- Ironside (62), 113 (September 1939 alert by French), 115, 148-149.

- **Warnings (late October 1939)**

- Belgium (41), 13-14.

- **Warnings (November 1939)**

- Guingand (47), 33-36, gives a valuable discussion of that false alarm.
- Draper (44), 16-17.

- **Warnings (“Lucifer Affair,” 10 January 1940)**

- Jean Vanwelkenhuyzen, “L’alerte du 10 janvier 1940; les documents de Mechelen-sur-Meuse,” *Revue d’histoire de la Deuxième Guerre Mondiale*, Year 3, No. 12 (October 1953), pp. 33-54.
- Colvin (53), 113-120.

²⁰²If this summary punishment—widely discussed in Luftwaffe circles—of two senior officers became known to Allied intelligence it presumably tended to support the authenticity of the documents.

- Taylor (58), 60-62, 170, 171.
- Belgium (41), 14-15, 85-91. (Includes English translations of texts of three of the “Lucifer” documents.)
- Peter Fleming, “A Bonfire on the Balcony,” in the author’s *My Aunt’s Rhinoceros and Other Reflections*, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1958), pp. 56-60. A personal recollection of Hitler’s response to the “Lucifer” Affair by “Kapitän zur See B. . .” (actually Captain Leopold Bürkner), a Deputy Chief of the Abwehr. As told to former S.O.E. Officer, Fleming who originally published it under his nom de plume of “Strix” in the *Spectator*.
- Goutard (59), 92-93.
- Theodore Draper, *The Six Weeks War* (New York: Viking, 1944), pp. 18-19.
- Kesselring (54), 48-49.
- Churchill, I (48), 556-557.
- Ironside (62), 204-208.
- Dulles (47), 58.
- Dulles (63), 152.
- Beneš (54), 94, 102.
- Boelcke (66), 267. (For rôle of Goebbels’ Propaganda Ministry.)
- Karl Bartz, *Al der Himmel Brannte* (Hanover: Sponholtz, 1955). (Not seen by me.)
- Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, *Dokumente zur Vorgeschichte des Westfeldzuges 1939-1940* (Göttingen: Musterschmidt, 1956), pp. 161-185. (Not seen by me.)

• **Deception**

- Leverkuehn (54), 98-100, for the tactical ruse of Germans disguised as Belgian troops.
- Whitwell (66), 210, for the same.

Case A21. France, 10 May 1940: Case YELLOW

“All quiet on the Western front.”
 –German High Command Communique,
 9 May 1940.²⁰³

The Lowlands were, of course, merely the Achilles Heel of the Maginot Line. And the French (and their British ally) were as surprised as the Dutch and Belgians by Hitler’s general offensive on May 10th.

Contrary to popular myth, the French High Command fully expected a German offensive through the Lowlands in an effort to outflank the Maginot Line. However, they had drawn several false conclusions from their similar experience in the Great War. They anticipated the main attack at the extreme northern flank and they accepted the assurance of Deuxième Bureau’s *A Comprehensive Study of the Polish Campaign* that: “The type of warfare used by the Germans in Poland was related to a peculiar situation. . . . Operations on the Western Front will be very different.” They were convinced that the Ardennes forest was impenetrable terrain for the German armor and so a thin screen of only 12 mediocre divisions was assigned to that 95-mile sector in the center of the line.

In fact, the *original* German YELLOW plan *was* generally just what the Allies were prepared to counter. On 9 January 1940 Hitler ordered this plan to begin on the 17th, but the next day—the 10th—the key elements of the German plan were delivered by an air accident to the Belgians and, through them, to French and British intelligence.²⁰⁴ This accident simply confirmed the French in the rightness of their defensive strategy. However, on 17 February, Hitler suddenly switched to Manstein’s daring proposal to concentrate the attack through the Ardennes, using 44 divisions, including all but one of his 10 Panzer divisions.

Although the final battle strategy had now been decided, there was a further series of postponements of the campaign. First, Hitler decided that it would not begin until “a few days” after Norway was secured, releasing the Luftwaffe. This point was reached at the beginning of May. Now began a series of day-to-day postponements dictated by the Luftwaffe meteorologists until Hitler impatiently ordered the go-ahead.

While the German Army General Staff (i.e., the OKH) was engaged in developing the plan for the military campaign, Hitler and his personal Military Supreme Command Staff (the OKW) contributed the deception planning. For example, the OKW produced both its *General Instructions for Enemy Deception* and the *Time-Table*, dated 22 February 1940, that coordinated the military operations, time-schedules, and deceptions. This last, the *Time-Table* became a standard part of all subsequent Wehrmacht campaign plans including BARBAROSSA.

Deception had aided surprise, and surprise combined with an astonishingly inept French strategy of defense to deliver Hitler a stunning victory. For only 156,000 casualties he had destroyed the French, Belgian, and Dutch armies, and

²⁰³Kris and Speier (44), 300.

²⁰⁴The so-called *Lucifer Affair*, described in Case A20, above.

No.	D-day Set For	When Scheduled	Alerts
1	“as soon as possible”	27 Sep 1939	
2	10 Nov 1939	15 Oct	
3	after 15 Nov	17 Oct	
4	12 Nov	25 Oct	Dutch, Belgian, French
5	15 Nov	7 Nov	French
6	19 Nov	9 Nov	
7	22 Nov	13 Nov	
8	26 Nov	16 Nov	
9	3 Dec	20 Nov	
10	9 Dec	27 Nov	
11	11 Dec	?	
12	17 Dec	?	
13	1 Jan 1940	12 Dec	
14	9-14 Jan	27 Dec	Belgian, French, British
15	17 Jan	10 Jan	
16	20 Jan	13 Jan	
17	Spring	20 Jan	
18	10 May	16 Mar?	Belgian, French, British

Table A.37: Scheduling D-Day (*A-Tag*) for Case YELLOW. References: Taylor (58), 41-46, 49-50, 54, 60, 62-64, 170, 177. Beaufre (68), 180. Draper (44), 16-17, 19.

the British Army lost 68,000 men and most of its equipment. Only 338,000 Allied troops were evacuated to fight again.

	French	British	Allied Total	German Total	A/G
KIA	100,000			27,074	3.7+
WIA	120,000			111,034	1.1+
MIA	—			18,384	—
PW	1,500,000			—	—
Totals:	1,720,000	68,000	1,788,000	156,492	11.0

Table A.38: Allied and German Casualties. Reference: Taylor (58); Williams (68), 369.

References

• General

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- Major L.F. Ellis, *The War in France and Flanders* (London: H.M.S.O., 1953).
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- Taylor (58), 155-186, 206-314.
- Goutard (59).
- Churchill, II (49), 27-223.
- Draper (44).

- **Warnings**

- Goutard (59), 92-93, 104, 105.
- Kimche (62), 25, 28, 35, 88.
- Maj.-Gen. Sir Francis de Guingand, *Generals at War*, (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1964), pp. 229-238. Describes an accurate SIS agent report on the D-day date.
- Ellis (53), 32, 44, 340, 344.
- Ironside (62), 240.
- Beaufre (68), 180.

- **Preconceptions (French):**

- Goutard (59), 77, 85-94.

- **Security (German)**

- TWC, X (51), 851-854.
- Curt Riess, *Joseph Goebbels*, (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1948), p. 183.

- **Surprise**

- Goutard (59), 104-107.
- Manstein (58), 99, 104, 109, 113, 118-119, 123-124.
- Hart (48), 117.
- Guderian (52), 96-97.
- Williams (68), 89-90.

- **Postponements**

- Taylor (58), 41-46, 49-50, 54, 60, 62-64, 170, 177.
- Warlimont (64), 85.
- Hart (48), 111.
- Ellis (53), 32, 338, 340.

- **Deception**

- Warlimont (64), 52.
- Goutard (59), 106, 115.
- Ellis (53), 346.

Case A22. Invasion of Britain: Planning Phase, Jun-Sep 1940: Unternehmen SEELÖWE

“Everything seems to point to the Germans starting something from Norway and the Baltic against Iceland, the Shetlands, or perhaps Scotland.”

—Ironsides, *Diary*, 5 July 1940²⁰⁵

Contrary to a belief common at the time, the much overrated German General Staff had done no advance planning for an invasion and conquest of Britain. Even superficial planning began only after the fall of France on 23 June 1940. The enterprise was designated—by Jodl or Hitler himself—*Unternehmen SEELÖWE*, “Undertaking” or “Operation SEA-LION,” one of the more obvious codenames,²⁰⁶ equalling in its indiscretion Churchill’s OVERLORD and Mark Clark’s DECOY.

As planning proceeded, fantasy yielded to realism. The original grandiose dream of landing 40 divisions yielded gradually to a first wave of 13 divisions (a quarter million men) in two or three days and finally to nine divisions (plus two airborne) ferried over during an 11-day period for the first wave with a reinforcement rate of two divisions every four days. Simultaneously the projected cross-Channel beachhead shrunk from 235 miles to 70.

D-day was again and again deferred to later dates. Curiously, it now seems—with our hindsight knowledge of German and British capabilities—that Hitler’s best chance was at the beginning. Had there been some advance planning and had Hitler not hesitated at the Channel in June but immediately mounted an expedition, it is quite possible it would have succeeded.²⁰⁷ Time then favored an improvised attack over an improvised defense. Delay simply permitted the Britons to improve the strength and efficiency of their defense at a faster rate than the Germans that of their offense. Serious planning began on 2 July 1940 and, on 19 July, D-day (*S-Tag*) was set for 15 August. Finally, after four delays, OKW on 17 September declared SEA-LION “Postponed until further notice.” In reality, SEA-LION was cancelled, but the thin concealment of that fact was the basis of the great strategic deception operation that constitutes the next case study.

The Germans mounted several rather simple deception operations to mislead the British as to the actual site of their intended beachhead—on the south coast—and thereby induce Britain to divert or at least disperse her meagre defenses. As usual, deception planning originated in and was centralized by the OKW, the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, Hitler’s personal military staff. These stratagems were then passed along to the separate services for detailed planning before OKW integrated them into the final master Timetable that governed the

²⁰⁵Ironsides (62), 380-382.

²⁰⁶Ansel (60), 142-143.

²⁰⁷Fleming (57), 298-299.

No.	D-day Set For	When Scheduled
1	15 August 1940	19 July 1940
2	1 September	21
3	15	31
4	21	late August
5	24	11 September
6	"Postponed until further notice."	17

Table A.39: Scheduling D-Day (S-Tag) for SEA-LION. Note: I have relied on Ansel (60). Fleming (57) is incomplete and often wrong on these schedulings. See also Churchill, II (49), 310-311.

overall operation. In the case of SEA-LION, two cover targets were proposed: Ireland and Scotland.

The Irish cover plan never really got beyond the paper stage.²⁰⁸ The only concrete part of that ruse was that five or six German divisions garrisoning the west coast of France (in the Brest and Biscay region and not needed for SEA-LION) were given amphibious training and encouraged in the false belief that they were destined for Ireland. This threat was on too small a scale and at too remote a place to give serious concern to the British. Indeed it is not even known if they ever learned of this (pretended) threat.

The main German cover target was the east coast of England and Scotland. German control of the excellent and well protected harbors of Denmark, the Baltic, North Germany, and particularly Norway made a safe and secret build-up there and a sortie thence for a descent on eastern Britain seem a likely prospect. In fact, as we shall see, the British did hold to this reasoning, while the Germans never intended to do other than follow Caesar and the Normans straight across the Channel.

OKW's notion of a Norway-to-east-England demonstration landing was passed to the Navy for detailed planning and implementation. This became HERBSTREISE ("Autumn Journey")—for once a wise "indiscretion" in selection of a codename, as this was an operation whose ostensible purpose one wanted to disclose to the enemy.²⁰⁹ HERBSTREISE was the responsibility of Admiral Carls, the competent and far-sighted head of Naval Group Command North, based on Wilhelmshaven. He submitted his draft plan in early August. In its final version HERBSTREISE consisted of a fleet of some eight ocean-going transports including the liners *Europa* and *Bremen* and the southern Norwegian ports of Bergen and Oslo. There the transports would embark troops of Colonel-General Nikolaus von Falkenhorst's Norwegian command. They would then sortie on D-

²⁰⁸Except that briefly in December 1940 through January 1941 Hitler toyed with the idea of a *real* invasion of Ireland to counter what then looked like a possible *British* conquest. Stephen (65) 186-193.

²⁰⁹Although I have seen no evidence that British intelligence discovered this particular codename, either by design or inadvertence.

minus-2 in convoy with the pocket-battleship *Admiral Scheer* and four cruisers (including *Hipper*). With air cover flown out of Norway they would sail directly toward the Scottish-Yorkshire coast between Aberdeen and Newcastle. Then while *Scheer* and *Hipper* slipped off to break out into the Atlantic for a very real life of convoy raiding, the rest of the armada would turn back to Norway under cover of darkness, but remain ready to repeat the performance the next day (D-1) if this seemed propitious. The HERBSTREISE feint was, in effect, cancelled on 19 September when OKW released the eight transports earmarked for that operation.

At the same time a secondary diversion was to be mounted out of Holland, using the operationally impotent occupation forces of XXXVII Group Command. Their mission was to make a small but actual demonstration landing on the southwest coast between the Wash and Harwich.

There remained the problem of how to mask the preparations along the Channel coast. When on 16 August Hitler decided to contract the original conception of landings along the broad (235 mile) stretch between Lyme Bay and Margate to the narrow (70 mile) stretch between Brighton and Folkestone, a simple ruse was to be used to deceive the enemy that a broad beachhead was still intended. The ruse was that the expedition's mounting would still cover the length of the German-held coast opposite, from Le Havre to Ostend. The Germans presumed that such a dispersion of landing craft and other activities visible to R.A.F. reconnaissance would imply a comparable dispersion of targets.²¹⁰ Later, when the more elaborate deception plans evolved, the preparations for the real cross-Channel invasion were to be made to seem as if *they* were the feint.

Once ashore, the Wehrmacht contemplated at least one ruse. This was the old tactical one—already tried in Poland and Belgium—of using special assault troops disguised in the local uniforms. The Abwehr's special Brandenburg Regiment had orders to take Dover while wearing British uniforms.²¹¹

Although six major research studies of SEA-LION exist, none of the authors—four Britons, one American, and one German—has thought it worthwhile to examine the question of the effectiveness of the German deception plan in throwing the British off the scent. Indeed, except for Klee, these writers mention HERBSTREISE only in passing and then just for comic relief.²¹² The other German SEA-LION stratagems get even shorter shrift, if noted at all. And yet, all these writers record the gross failure of British intelligence to divine the SEA-LION plan. Moreover, the British estimates from early July to early September—that is, during the *entire* period when SEA-LION was at all seriously intended—consistently predicted that the main invasion would come against the east coast while the cross-Channel build-up was to be at most a secondary or diversionary effort, if not sheer bluff. The delusion was complete. It was shared with

²¹⁰Ansel (60), 235.

²¹¹Stephan (65), 170.

²¹²For example, Fleming (57), 169 and 262n, who flatly asserts that: "Attempts to simulate a threat to the coasts of Scotland and Yorkshire . . . were not successful." And Ansel (60), 232, sums up these stratagems as a counterproductive "Hitlerian extravaganza."

unaccustomed unanimity by the service intelligence staffs, the two successive Home Force commanders (Generals Ironside and Brooke), the First Sea Lord (Admiral Pound), the Admiralty staff, the Chiefs of Staff, and Prime Minister Churchill. Accordingly, by August the British had stationed 15 1/2 divisions (with two earmarked from GHQ Reserve) uselessly along the east coast and only 5 (with 3 available from Reserve) along the south. This delusion and its consequent strategy was, of course, precisely the one that the main German deception operation—HERBSTREISE—sought to encourage. The question is: Was this delusion indigenous or did German deception operations implant or reinforce it?

The British fascination with a threat to their east coast did almost certainly *begin* with their own unaided misperceptions. They had succumbed to this notion by 5 July,²¹³ whereas the Germans did not—or so it seems—float their east coast deception until early August.²¹⁴

Even the growing concentration of landing craft along the Channel coast that was observed by British aerial reconnaissance did not alert the Combined Intelligence Committee (formerly the Invasion Warning Sub-Committee) of the Chiefs of Staff. As late as 7 September that most senior intelligence evaluation body had managed to protect its preconceptions with the ingenious theory that it was all a decoy to divert British bombers and attention from the “real” show being mounted elsewhere. And as late as 11 September the GHQ Home Forces Intelligence Summary similarly discounted the cross-Channel threat.²¹⁵ However, some perceptive rethinking began to take hold in late August or early September when Colonel Kenneth Strong’s lowly M.I.14, the German Section of Military Intelligence, saw the true import of the photographic evidence. On 17 September Churchill accepted this view and the coastal defense strategy was hastily reoriented to double from 8 to 16 the number of divisions (on station and in reserve) earmarked to meet a cross-Channel attack.²¹⁶ But by that time—specifically by that same 17 September—Hitler had quite abandoned whatever serious thought he may have had of landing in England. His mind had now sharply refocussed eastward, toward Russia.

References

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²¹³Ironside (62), 380-382; Churchill, II (49), 288-291.

²¹⁴Ansel (60), 231.

²¹⁵Fleming (57), 173-174.

²¹⁶Fleming (57), 169, 174-175; Babington-Smith (57), 70-72; and Churchill, II (49), 297, 311. The photo-interpreters in the Photographic Reconnaissance Unit of R.A.F. Intelligence were, understandably the first to recognize the signs for what they were. And priority probably goes to Britain’s most innovative photogrammetric expert, Michael Spender, the brother of the poet.

- Peter Fleming, *Operation Sea Lion*, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1957).
- Ronald Wheatley, *Operation Sea Lion: German Plans for the Invasion of England, 1939-42* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1958).
- Walter Ansel, *Hitler Confronts England* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1960).
- Duncan Grinnell Milne, *The Silent Victory, September 1940* (London: The Bodley Head, 1958).
- Basil Collier, *The Defence of the United Kingdom* (London: H.M.S.O., 1957). Churchill, II (49), 280-340.

- **Warnings**

- Fleming (57), 165-177.
- Babington-Smith (57), 69-73.
- Churchill, II (49), 296-297, 311-312.

- **Deception—General**

- Klee (58), 225, etc.
- Ansel (60), 230-232.
- Ironside (62), 380, entry for 5 July 1940.
- Fleming (57), 166, 169, 174, 262.
- Enno Stephan, *Spies in Ireland* (Harrisburg, Pa.:Stackpole, 1961), p. 170.

- **Deception—“HERBSTREISE” (Autumn Voyage)**

- Grinnell-Milne (58), 108-109, 113, 127, 149.
- Fleming (57), 256, 290.
- Ansel (60), 230-232, 245.
- “Fuehrer Conferences on Naval Affairs, 1939-1945,” *Brassey’s Naval Annual: 1948*, (New York: Macmillan, 1948), pp. 128, 133, 139.

- **Deception—Simulated Invasion of Ireland**

- Ansel (60), 230, 231.
- Fleming (57), 171-172, 262n.

Case A23. Invasion of Britain: Hoax Phase, Sep 1940-1942: Unternehmen SEELÖWE

A revealing insight on the writing of military history is implicit in the fact that the one American and all four British monographs on Operation SEA-LION—Hitler’s planned invasion of Britain—drop their subject in September 1940 when only *hindsight* tells us that the SEA-LION had been officially left to die on the coast of France. This attitude characterizes that large and largely unfruitful school of historians whose passionate grasping for “facts” overlooks the very real and historical consequences of those same “facts” being selectively perceived or misperceived by the decision makers of the time. This attitude, mistaking potent myths for inconsequential fictions, necessarily prevents its holders from understanding much less defending against stratagems.

As before, it was the Photographic Reconnaissance Unit of R.A.F. Intelligence that first—during October 1940—detected the significant visible changes in the conformation of the German invasion alert, that is, the general decline in activity and dispersion of ships and landing craft.²¹⁷ But, also as before, the higher echelon intelligence evaluators—those who had to integrate all signals—were sceptical. Again hard data shattered against the wall of preconception and its particles disappeared into the fog of German deception.

On 3 February 1941 a German directive ordered the build-up for BARBAROSSA be camouflaged as long as possible and, when this could no longer be done, that it should be explained as a training maneuver for SEA-LION.²¹⁸

Then on 24 April, Brauchitsch ordered a major deception operation—*Fall Haifisch* (“Operation SHARK”). This involved military activities from Scandinavia to Brittany intended to suggest that an invasion of Britain was still a live issue.²¹⁹

Thus the inspired notion of SEA-LION as the main cover story for BARBAROSSA originated with Hitler. As was usual with the Nazi deception operations, it was then planned, coordinated, and directed at the center by Hitler’s personal military staff, the OKW. The separate German military, intelligence, diplomatic, and propaganda organizations were then brought into the picture and set various tasks in support of this well-orchestrated deception campaign.

Admiral Wilhelm Canaris’ Abwehr, the intelligence service of the OKW, was a major channel for this hoax. In March 1941, Colonel Franz von Bentivegni, the Chief of Abwehr III (counterintelligence) was directed by Canaris to begin an intensive campaign for spreading false information through Abwehr III’s foreign intelligence networks to suggest that both preparations for a blow against Great Britain and an improvement in Russo-German relations were underway.²²⁰

²¹⁷Babington-Smith (57), 73.

²¹⁸See Whaley, *Operation BARBAROSSA* (69), Appendix C, Document 8; and *Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal, Nürnberg, 14 November 1945-1 October 1946*, Vol. 26 (Nürnberg: International Military Tribunal, 1947), pp. 391-399.

²¹⁹Klee (58); Wheatley (58), 97-98; Ansel (60), 305.

²²⁰Whaley, *Operation BARBAROSSA*, (69), Appendix C, Doc. 16.

Reinhard Heydrich's SD (*Sicherheitsdienst*), the secret intelligence service of the SS, also played its part in the SEELÖWE-BARBAROSSA deception. The SD contrived to pass to Russian intelligence considerable misleading information prepared by the Wehrmacht including material about renewed preparations for SEA-LION.²²¹

The fiction of an invasion was assiduously maintained throughout the German armed services themselves. For example, around 2 June, in Paris, Reichsmarschall Hermann Göring gave a carefully contrived "pep-talk" on the imminent invasion of *Britain* to a gathering of all his Luftwaffe unit commanders in France. Afterwards he called two wing commanders aside and jovially admitted his lie. Under seal of secrecy he disclosed the truth to these two famed fighter aces, Generals Galland and Mölders. Göring revealed that SEA-LION had become a mere bluff to mask the real goal—the imminent invasion of Russia.²²²

Throughout this period, Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels had been contributing his own special brand of fakery by waging a "war of nerves" with the British, implying the imminence of an overwhelming invasion. During 1940 this was not strictly speaking deceptive, because Goebbels himself believed that the operation was real. However, by 1941, his efforts were more-or-less coordinated with the SEA-LION hoax. An early possible example was his article in *Das Reich* of 9 March 1941 that represented a momentary return to explicit and specific threats of imminent invasion.²²³ In any case, as the very many signs and rumors of the imminent move to the East could not be suppressed, Goebbels resorted to deception to "explain" them. Thus, on 5 June, at his regular daily senior staff conference, he even turned aside the questions of his own top subordinates with the instructions:²²⁴

Gentlemen, I know that some of you think that we are going to fight Russia, but I must tell you today that we are going to fight England [instead; and] the invasion is imminent. Please adapt your work accordingly. You Dr. [Heinrich] Glasmeier [the Superintendent of radio broadcasting], will launch a new propaganda campaign against England. . . .

This simple lie had the merit that it brought the vast machinery of the Propaganda Ministry to the service of SEA-LION deception without extending beyond Goebbels himself the number of persons witting on BARBAROSSA.

The Germans not only played games between BARBAROSSA and SEA-LION, but also between SEA-LION and MERCURY, their airborne invasion of Crete on 20-31 May 1941.²²⁵ Eight days *before* that operation, Field-Marshal Kaitel, the O.K.W Chief, had issued his directive covering the "second phase"

²²¹Schellenberg (56), 197.

²²²Adolf Galland, *The First and the Last* (London: Methuen), pp. 105-106.

²²³Bramsted (55), 243, calls this article a possible "cunning manoeuvre of diversion."

²²⁴*TMWC*, Vol. 17 (48), 252, where however this conference is incorrectly dated to "around the beginning of May." For details Whaley, *Operation BARBAROSSA*, (69), Appendix C, Doc. 56; and Boelcke (66), 765.

²²⁵Case B20.

of BARBAROSSA deception. Among other stratagems, this directive specified that MERCURY could, perhaps, be utilized under the slogan: "Crete was the general try-out for the landing in Britain."²²⁶ Again, Propaganda Minister Goebbels played his special part. He did this through a signed article in the *Völkischer Beobachter* of 13 June, headlined "Crete as an Example." In this piece he "disclosed" that England would meet the fate of Crete within "the next two months." The first edition containing this article was then ostentatiously withdrawn as soon as copies were known to have reached the foreign press correspondents. This "censorship" version was credited by the world's press (including *The Times*, and *The New York Times*). Delighting in his own cleverness, and to complete the masquerade, Goebbels then even encouraged the rumors that he was in disgrace.²²⁷

The deliberate German campaign to mask BARBAROSSA as SEA-LION enjoyed wide success. Only Churchill insists—in his very much *ex post facto* memoirs—he had not expected SEA-LION to materialize in 1941, but some of his closest advisers verify his claim.²²⁸ However Churchill has not explained four public speeches after BARBAROSSA to the House of Commons in which he urged a continued invasion alert.²²⁹ At the time, some believed Churchill took this public stand only to thwart a threatening British relaxation in the war effort while their Bolshevik ally had taken over the main burden of the fight.²³⁰ Conversely, others later thought Churchill's professed view did reflect his intelligence reports of increased invasion preparations.²³¹ In either case, we must concede the Prime Minister greater prescience than shared by any of his advisers or subordinates.

The British political, service, and intelligence chiefs were much less willing than Churchill to accept the calculated possibility that the invasion would not materialize. Consequently they became too credulous of the German deception efforts. As intended, they continued until 1942—over a year beyond the time (15 September 1940) that we now know Hitler had abandoned any serious notion of invading Britain—to withhold from active or potential fronts much of Britain's meagre striking power in a useless wait for a phantom. The now crack Home Forces had not only ceased to be a deterrent to invasion; but even as a force-in-being it failed to immobilize any substantial Wehrmacht strength along the western littoral of Hitler's Fortress Europe, because it was not until 1943

²²⁶Whaley, *Operation BARBAROSSA* (69), Appendix C, Doc. 42. See also *Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression*, Vol. 3 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1946), pp. 635-636.

²²⁷Loc cit., Doc. 60. See also *New York Times*, 14 June 1941, p. 3.

²²⁸Churchill, II (49), 577-578, and also III (50), 248. Churchill's consistently optimistic view on this during 1941 is independently confirmed by Kennedy (57), 91, 109-110, 112; and Hollis in Lessor (59), 166.

²²⁹The complete texts of these speeches of 29 Jul, 30 September, 12 November and 10 December 1941 are in Winston S. Churchill, *The War Speeches*, Vol. II (London: Cassell, 1952), pp. 54, 86, 91, 112, 125. Churchill did not give the Commons his optimistic view until his secret session speech of 23 Apr 1942 (*ibid.*, p. 240) and his public speech of 1 July 1942 (*ibid.*, p. 292). See also *ibid.*, pp. 68-69, 152-153, 335, 337, 447.

²³⁰As reported by Root, I (45), 202.

²³¹Root, I (45), 202, who himself categorically accepts the validity of these false intelligence reports; and Higgins (57), 60.

that Allied amphibious capabilities would make an invasion of the Continent a credible threat.²³²

The principal (and most vehement) voice arguing that the imminent threat of invasion prohibited a build-up of British forces in Egypt or Singapore was the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Lieutenant-General Sir John Dill. It was his historical and professional misfortune to press this false view with Churchill on 16 September 1940, the very day after the Luftwaffe had conceded the Battle of Britain, although this fact did not become immediately apparent.²³³ On 22 April 1941 Dill sought to limit the number of tanks to reinforce the coming offensive in the Western Desert.²³⁴ And as late as 6 May, he circulated a major paper urging that the threat of invasion required a minimum security force of six armoured divisions and four tank brigades.²³⁵ This too cautious assessment of Hitler's strategic intentions (and perhaps even capabilities) was shared by the very pedestrian Commander-in-Chief Home Forces, Brooke;²³⁶ by the Chiefs of Staff;²³⁷ and even by the wise Director of Military Operations, John Kennedy.²³⁸ The Americans, particularly the Joint Chiefs of Staff and General Chaney, shared this view as late as a month after the invasion of Russia.²³⁹ Indeed, as late as September 1942, Dill (then in Washington) and Paget (Brooke's successor as Commander-in-Chief Home Forces) were worrying that the imminent Anglo-American landings in North Africa would overly strip England of sufficient force to deter the German invasion.²⁴⁰ Even the Director of Military Operations, Major-General Sir John Kennedy, did not surrender this antiquated *idée fixe* about invasion until October 1942.²⁴¹

A rare voice of sanity that agreed with Churchill was his grand old friend, the Premier of the Union of South Africa, Field-Marshal Smuts. On 6 March 1941 at a meeting at Cairo with Eden and Dill (with Wavell, Cunningham, and Longmore present) Smuts courageously expressed his doubts that Hitler any longer intended to invade Britain, as indicated by the recent German air reinforcements to the Balkans.²⁴²

The conjurer's trick that substituted the illusory SEA-LION for the factual BARBAROSSA evidently found an appreciative audience in Moscow. As early as 16 February 1941, the Soviet central press quoted *The Times* on the con-

²³²This critical failure in intelligence estimating has not yet received the close study it deserves. So far the problem has been squarely faced only by Kennedy (57), 91; and Lessor (59), 126, 144, 148-152, 163-170.

²³³Anthony Eden, *The Reckoning* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), p. 159.

²³⁴Churchill, III (50), 248.

²³⁵Churchill, III (50), 419-424, for the bulk of the text of Dill's paper and Churchill's reply and comment. See also Hollis in Lessor (59), 166-167; and particularly Kennedy (57), 113, 115-116, 142, for the Dill-Kennedy riposte that Churchill omitted.

²³⁶Brooke, in Bryant (57), 191-194, 205, 212.

²³⁷Kennedy (57), 76.

²³⁸Kennedy (57), 81, 84, 112, 128, 157.

²³⁹Kennedy (57), 153, 156-157.

²⁴⁰Kennedy (57), 267.

²⁴¹Kennedy (57), 270.

²⁴²Eden (65), 252.

tinuing threat of a German landing in Britain.²⁴³ Moreover, and this was the original and main intention of Hitler's great ruse, it probably helped lull Stalin into complacency toward the catastrophe that was gestating at his frontier.²⁴⁴

The Japanese were apparently also deceived by Hitler's SEA-LION hoax. Both the Imperial Liaison Conference—the top policy body—and the Army continued at least as late as 15 November 1941 to plan on the basis of a future German invasion of Britain.²⁴⁵ This despite reports in April and May from the Japanese Naval Attaché in Berlin that any such German landing now seemed unlikely.²⁴⁶ (Incidentally, these attaché reports were being intercepted and read by U.S. and British intelligence.)

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- **Deception-General**

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- Fleming (57), 296.
- Kris and Speier (44), 302. Galland (55), 99, 105-106.

- **Deception-"Fall HAIFISCH" (Operation SHARK)**

- Klee (58).
- Wheatley (58), 97-98.
- Ansel (60), 305.

- **Deception-"HARPUNE"**

- Klee (58).
- Ansel (60), 305.

- **Deception-Creté as rehearsal for SEA-LION**

- Whaley, *BARBAROSSA* (69), Appendix C, Documents 42 and 60.
- Bramsted (65), 421.
- Higgins (66), 115.
- Galland (55), 105.

²⁴³Werth (64), 116.

²⁴⁴See Case A28 and Whaley, *Operation BARBAROSSA* (69).

²⁴⁵Ike (67), 245-249.

²⁴⁶Ike (67), 245.

Case A24. Dakar, 23 Sep 1940: Operation MENACE

On 23 September 1940, a joint British-Free French amphibious task force attempted to seize the key west African port of Dakar from Vichy. This ill named Operation MENACE is particularly interesting because it is one of the few cases where strategic deception was used and failed, the attacker utterly unable to surprise and win.

The British deception plan was simply too thin, consisting only of a half-hearted effort to make Aden seem the port for which the expedition was headed. Some such ruse was sorely needed because DeGaulle had already alerted Vichy by his Free French activities in the neighboring French colonies, and a significant Vichy French naval reinforcement coincided with MENACE. Although the ill-fated expedition's sailing from Liverpool on 31 August had been accompanied by a veritable fanfare of security leaks, it does not seem that any specific warning reached the abysmally ineffective German (or Vichy) intelligence.

Having foregone even local tactical surprise (by issuing an ultimatum on its arrival off Dakar), having failed to anticipate the degree of resistance, and lacking any plan of attack, the expeditionary force—2,400 Free French and 4,000 British troops in some 13 transports with powerful naval support—simply slunk away.

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- **General**
 - Wingate (59), 159-173.
 - Auphan and Mordal (59), 167, 183-192.
- **Security**
 - Charles de Gaulle, *The Complete War Memoirs*, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1964), p. 128.
 - Wingate (59), 159, 165-166.
 - Fergusson (61), 61-68.
 - Churchill, II (49), 478, 479.
 - McLachlan (68), 198-199, 303-304
- **Warnings**
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- **Deception**
 - Fergusson (61), 61.
 - Churchill, II (49), 479..

Case A25. Sidi Barrani, 9 Dec 1940: Operation COMPASS

As described elsewhere,²⁴⁷ the principles and practice of strategic deception were painfully relearned by Britain in World War II. Their teacher was General Wavell and his first practical lesson presented a weary King and country their first exhilarating victory of the war. This resulted from his surprise offensive (Operation COMPASS) against the numerically much superior Italian Tenth Army led by Marshal Graziani.

	Total Troops	Combat Troops	Divisions	Planes	Tanks	Guns
British	36,000	31,000	2-1/3	few	275	120
Italian	250,000	80,000	10	many	400+	2,250
Ratios:	1:7	1:2.6	1:4	1:3	1:1.5	1:19

Table A.40: Strengths of British and Italians at Sidi Barrani.

Although few details are known, Wavell rummaged deeply into his conjurer's bag. Security was as tight as he could make it. The circle of knowers was kept astonishingly small—only about a half dozen on his own staff, smaller numbers on the combat staff, and even in London only Churchill, Eden, the Chiefs of Staff, and the Director of Military Operations, General Kennedy. Orders were almost all verbal and no detailed plan was forwarded even to London. Neither the large corps of journalists in Cairo nor the Egyptian Government had ferreted out any hint of Wavell's offensive.²⁴⁸ Wavell created a small special deception planning section that became a permanent addition to British Middle East Headquarters.

The ruses known to have been used were: First, the build-up for the attack was quietly announced as a second training exercise. Accordingly, on the nights of October 6th and 8th, 25,000 troops moved forward in secrecy to their jump-off points. Second, to give the impression that no British offensive was imminent, information was leaked in Cairo that their meagre strength had not only already been drained too far by transfers to Greece but that further levies for Greece were contemplated. This last trick played—whether knowingly or not I do not know—directly to Italian preconceptions for on 5 November Graziani had been told by Rome that as the main Italian front was now in Albania he must support this action by preventing the transfer of British forces to Greece.

Other deceptions known to have been generally used by Wavell against the Italians—and that I presume were employed in this campaign—were dummy tanks and false dust trails to mislead about deployments, dummy headquarters to simulate non-existent units, feints, and the old “Meinertzhagen haversack” trick—planting false (or real) orders on the enemy to lead him to act in a desired way.

General Archibald Wavell was overall British commander, in his capacity

²⁴⁷See Chapter II, Part A.

²⁴⁸Connell (64), 291; and Moorehead (65), 65.

D-day	Troops		Tanks		Guns	
	British	Italian	British	Italian	British	Italian
KIA, DOW, WIA	56	?				
MIA, POW	0	4,000				
Totals:	56	4,000+	?	35	?	?
D+3						
KIA,DOW,WIA	500-	?				
MIA, POW	?	30,000+				
Totals:	500	30,000+	?	50	?	100
D+7						
KIA, DOW	133	?				
WIA	387	?				
MIA, POW	8	38,300				
Totals:	528	38,300+	?	73	?	400
D + 28						
POW	?	83,300				
Totals:	528+	83,300+	?	201	?	862
D + 49						
POW	?	113,300				
Totals:	528+	113,300+	?	280	?	1,098
D + 60						
KIA, DOW	500	?				
WIA	1,373	?				
MIA, POW	55	130,000				
Totals:	1,928	130,000+	?	400	?	1,290

Table A.41: Cumulative Losses. References: Rommel (53), 93-95; Barnett (61), 35, 37-38, 43, 45, 57, 62; Connell (64), 292-295, 297, 301, 302, 317; Churchill, II (49), 614, 616.

as Commander-in-Chief Middle East Command. His field commander, as Commander Western Desert Force (the future Eighth Army), was Major-General Richard O'Connor. On the eve of his offensive, O'Connor's force was markedly inferior in numbers to Graziani's. It was about to demonstrate what quality of matériel and generalship could do in the face of numerical odds.

Deception and security had guaranteed surprise. And surprise combined with daring operations to bring a stunning victory to General O'Connor's small force. Within a week the Italians had been pushed back into Libya and were still in flight, leaving behind 38,300 prisoners, 237 guns, and 73 tanks. Five Italian divisions had been shattered at a cost to the British of only 133 killed, 387 wounded, and 8 missing. O'Connor continued to press his crumbling enemy 400 miles further until 7 February 1941 when the Second Libyan Campaign was cancelled in order to reinforce Greece. At that point (D + 60) the British had destroyed four Italian army corps totalling 10 divisions, taken 130,000 prisoners, captured 400 tanks and 1,240 guns, and seized Cyrenaica. The British had done this with only two divisions whose total casualties were 1,928 (500 killed, 1,373 wounded, and 55 missing).

It is an interesting measure of Wavell's sensitivity to opportunities for strategic deception that he suspected the German build-up in Rumania in January 1941 was perhaps only a bluff to make the British take pressure off Graziani by transferring British troops from the Western Desert to Greece. Actually we now know that the Germans were not so subtle.²⁴⁹ In any case, Wavell warned the Chiefs of Staff of this possibility, adding—this time rightly—that, even if the German activities in Rumania were only in preparation for an attack on Greece, British reinforcements would be too weak to stop them.²⁵⁰

References

• General

- Playfair, I (54), 257-275.
- Connell (64), 273-300.
- Collins (48), 234-317.
- Barnett (61), 19-62.
- Fuller (48), 94-99.
- Rommel (53), 91-97.

• Security

- Kennedy (58), 62, 67-69.
- Collins (48), 275, 285, 290, 297, 300.
- Connell (64), 277-278, 279-280, 281-282, 283-284, 291.
- Alan Moorehead, *The March to Tunis* (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), p. 65.

²⁴⁹Connell (64), 310-312; Warlimont (64), 128.

²⁵⁰Barnett (61), 45.

- **Warnings**

- Playfair, I (54), 274.

- **Surprise**

- Collins (48), 290, 297, 300.
- Playfair, I (54), 260, 273-274.
- Connell (64), 278.

- **Deception**

- Collins (48), 86, 268-270, 275, 285.
- Churchill, II (49), 610.
- Barnett (61), 39, 42, 45.
- Playfair, I (54), 258, 260, 262, 263, 266, 274.
- Connell (64), 280, 284.

Example B19. Italian East Africa, Feb-May 1941

The strategy of this interesting peripheral campaign was conceived by General Wavell. His successful deception plan, carried out by Lieutenant-General Sir Alan Cunningham, hinged on a feint from Kenya, although no details have been published.

When the Italian forces under the Duke of Aosta surrendered on 19 May 1941 after three months of campaigning, Wavell's forces had taken over a half-million square miles of Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Italian Somaliland and reconquered British Somaliland and defeated its quarter-million man army at a tolerable cost of about 4,000 British Empire casualties.

References

- **General**

- Playfair, II (62).
- Connell (64), 358-380.
- Fuller (48), 99-103.

- **Deception**

- Wingate (59), 196-197.
- Connell (64), 362, 364.

Case A26. Mersa el Brega, 31 Mar 1941

“I do not believe that he can make any big effort for at least
another month.”

–Wavell, D-minus-1

“It’s going to be a ‘Cannae,’ modern style.”

–Rommel, D-plus-8

On 11 January 1941, with Graziani’s Libyan army in full flight before Wavell,²⁵¹ Hitler decided to rush in just enough Germans to prevent the embarrassment of his Roman ally’s eviction from Africa. Hitler had already chosen the Balkans and Russia as his next victims, and did not then intend more than a holding operation in Libya. To accomplish this limited aim, on 6 February he created the Afrika Korps and appointed as its commander a promising Panzer officer, Lieutenant-General Erwin Rommel.

Rommel arrived in Africa on February 12th, four days after Lieutenant-General Sir Richard O’Connor’s advance force had rounded the Gulf of Sirte at Mersa el Brega and stopped to regroup for its final drive to the Tunisian frontier. The next day, February 13th, Churchill issued his controversial decision to end the Libyan campaign and divert its best units to support the British expeditionary force being sent to Greece. O’Connor was packed back to Cairo (as G.O.C., British Troops in Egypt) and the static Cyrenaica Command was set up under Lieutenant-General Philip Neame, V. C., with only three inexperienced and understrength divisions to hold Cyrenaica.

It did not occur to Rommel that the British would go defensive at this juncture. He saw only an urgent need to preempt before they could set up for what he believed would be their final push.

Afrika Korps comprised only two divisions: the motorized 5th Light (Infantry) and the 15th Panzer. Moreover, they trickled across to Tripoli, the infantry during the period from 14 February through mid-April and the armor during 11 March (when one Panzer regiment with its first 120 tanks arrived) and the end of May. Knowing that the tanks—which he did not yet have—would give the British pause, Rommel had dummy tanks produced at Tripoli by suitable camouflage of Volkswagen.²⁵²

On 19 March Rommel received orders from OKH to mount a short drive into the British lines, *when* his full Panzer division arrived at the end of May. However, Rommel set the timetable back, to strike before the British could strengthen their line. Thus, in the pre-dawn hours of the last day of March, Rommel launched his attack. He sent in everything he could move forward: one German motorized infantry division that included one Panzer regiment of 120 tanks, one Italian infantry division, and one Italian mechanized division with 80 serviceable-tanks. Although Rommel expected to achieve only a spoiling attack,

²⁵¹See Case A25.

²⁵²Rommel (53), 103. This order for dummy tanks was, however, not his “first” order, as Brigadier Young (50), 115, makes it.

it was characteristic of him that he was quite determined to exceed his orders by exploiting whatever opportunities might materialize during the battle.²⁵³

The British were totally surprised, tactically and strategically, from Neame to Wavell to Churchill. The very first intimation was in the pre-dawn H-hour itself when a British advance patrol spotted six German tanks charging toward their lines.

During this period the British had, thanks to their intelligence services, virtually *total* knowledge of the German plans for and deployments in Libya.²⁵⁴ From their mass of detailed, mutually supporting, wholly credible, and—in fact—entirely accurate intelligence the British drew the quite plausible conclusion that they were in no immediate danger of attack. Wavell's Intelligence at Cairo G.H.Q. made the estimate that, as Rommel would know from the balance of forces that he could not win, that he would not attack.²⁵⁵

On 2 March Wavell himself signalled the Chiefs of Staff in London that: "I do not think that with this force he [the enemy] will attempt to recover Bengazi."²⁵⁶ Even on D-minus-1 Wavell—now rather nervous as a result of his knowledge of German reinforcements and aggressive patrolling—signalled Neame: "But I do not believe that he can make any big effort for at least another month."²⁵⁷ Indeed, from the unnecessarily confused reports of the battle itself, Wavell did not realize until D-plus-3 that Rommel had aspirations beyond Bengazi.²⁵⁸ Churchill was also astonished. He did not begin to appreciate the depth of Rommel's intentions until after April 2nd.²⁵⁹

Even the German high command was surprised by the timing and extent of Afrika Korps' offensive. Rommel had achieved the ultimate in security simply by keeping his intentions to himself until the last moment, preparing for and reserving the options of offense or defense. This was, of course, the very effective method advocated as early as the Marshal de Saxe and practised as recently as Hitler. Intelligence services have no direct means of penetrating this particular form of security. But the risk of this method when exercised by subordinate commanders is that it can interfere with higher level strategy. In this case, General Paulus, the OQuI (i.e., deputy chief) of the Army General Staff (OKH), charged that Rommel's unauthorized offensive had caused the British to withdraw prematurely from the trap set for them in Greece by the Germans.²⁶⁰ In fact, Paulus' charge was false; the British evacuation of Greece had been entirely determined by local Balkan circumstances. However, Rommel's unauthorized

²⁵³Rommel (53), 105.

²⁵⁴Carell (61), 5-6.

²⁵⁵Young (50), 74.

²⁵⁶Connell (64), 381.

²⁵⁷Connell (64), 390. Connell suggests—perhaps rightly—that the reports of "large German forces landing at Tripoli" were "perhaps planted and certainly exaggerated." If so, this means that Rommel's plan to deceive Wavell succeeded by simulating a stronger force than Wavell's.

²⁵⁸Connell (64), 393-394.

²⁵⁹Connell (64), 387-388, 394.

²⁶⁰Connell (64), 426-427, 477; Rommel (53), 119; Playfair, II (62), 153; Higgins (66), 104, 108-109; and Walter Goerlitz, *Paulus and Stalingrad* (New York: Citadel, 1963), pp. 30-32. Paulus was on an inspection tour of Rommel's command from 27 April until at least 4 May.

success could not be denied, and Hitler was forced to drain precious resources from his Russian venture.

Rommel could inflict such surprise because of the interaction of two factors mentioned above: British preconceptions and the secret and private nature of his own intentions.

Surprise was so complete that the already badly deployed British were unable to coordinate a defense, and Rommel was thus able to defeat them in detail. By D-plus-3 he had 800 British prisoners in the bag and their other forces on the run. On D-plus-4 Benghazi fell. On D-plus-6 the Germans captured Derna with 800 men and the two main British commanders, Lieutenant-Generals Neame and O'Connor. On D-plus-8 a major-general, one brigadier, and 2,000 men were captured at Mechili. On D-plus-10 Tobruck was besieged and bypassed. Finally on D-plus-13, Rommel's masterful 400-mile drive was halted by a British line at Sollum.

Although I am not aware that Rommel used anything other than his own closely hidden daring plans to achieve his initial surprise, he did use tactical deception throughout the drive. For example, he believes that his deployment of his dummy tanks at Agedabia on D + 3 frightened the British off by their sham show of strength, and between Tobruck and Sollom (D + 10 to D + 13) he had his dust-making trucks drive around to simulate tanks to the confusion of the enemy.²⁶¹ Rommel was also impressed on D + 2 to find that one group of seven British tanks had "used a very effective camouflage in the form of Arab tents."²⁶² Because Rommel had overestimated British strength and incorrectly presumed they were readying their own offensive, his deception plans ran a risk of back-firing. The British were stopped as it was, and Rommel's successful effort to simulate a larger tank force than he actually had only succeeded in making Wavell more apprehensive and alert than was desirable. In other words, his deception efforts almost amounted to a warning. Fortunately for Rommel, Wavell still underestimated his aggressiveness.²⁶³

²⁶¹Rommel (53), 109, 120; Carell (61), 18.

²⁶²Rommel (53), 109.

²⁶³Connell (61), 390.

References

- **General**

- Carell (61), 1-23.
- Rommel (53), 98-140.
- Connell (64), 381-423.
- Guingand (47), 72-75.

- **Surprise**

- Carell (61), 4-5, 8, 10
- Young (50), 5-6, 74-75.
- Connell (64), 381-382, 384-389.
- Tedder (66), 60-61, 67.
- Eden (65), 240.

- **Deception**

- Rommel (53), 103, 109, 120.
- Connell (64), 390.

Case A27. Yugoslavia, 6 Apr 1941: Undertaking 25

The Yugoslav General Staff received ample, detailed, accurate, and quite disbelieved warnings of the intent, planning, and the precise date of “Undertaking 25” (*Unternehmen Fünfundzwanzig*), the German invasion of 6 April 1941. Beyond declaring Belgrade an “open city,” no countermeasures were taken.

Although the hurried Germans mounted no specific deception plan (so far as I can discover), they achieved surprise because of their unprecedentedly swift response to the Yugoslav *coup d'état* that, in effect, severed the pact with Germany. The unexpected coup occurred on March 27th, which gave the Germans only ten days to plan and mount their entire invasion operation.

When hostilities began the Yugoslavs had succeeded in mobilizing only two-thirds of their 31 divisions (28 infantry plus 3 cavalry). Moreover they lacked modern equipment in general, had no armor, and only 300 obsolescent aircraft.

As usual, the best of the many warnings came from Admiral Canaris' Abwehr through Colonel Oster. In this case, the Yugoslav Military Attaché in Berlin, Colonel Vladimir Vauhnik, was the immediate recipient. He also served British intelligence. The “amazingly comprehensive and correct” quality of Vauhnik's knowledge of German military and political plans is verified by Schellenberg²⁶⁴ who had him under close surveillance in order to ferret out his sources for his reports that the Germans were intercepting in Belgrade. Vauhnik was arrested two days before the invasion of Yugoslavia, but managed to misdirect Schellenberg's suspicions away from his key source, Oster.

King Peter II says he did indeed expect the attack on the 6th, having been warned on the 4th “by private informers.”

The Yugoslav capitol of Belgrad fell on D-plus-6, and an Armistice was signed on D-plus-11. At that point the Wehrmacht had crushed the 344,000-man Yugoslav army and seized a 97,000 square mile country at the absurdly low cost of only 588 casualties.²⁶⁵

²⁶⁴Schellenberg (56), 175-183.

²⁶⁵See also Boelcke (66), 700, 718.

References

- **General**

- J.B. Hoptner, *Yugoslavia in Crisis*, 1934-1941, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962).
- Mellenthin (56), 28-31.

- **Warnings**

- Eden (65), 232-236.
- Hoptner (62), 281-283, citing Colonel Vauhnik's unpublished memoirs.
- Schellenberg (56), 179.
- Colvin (51), 136.
- King Peter of Yugoslavia, *A King's Heritage* (New York: Putnam's, 1954), p. 85.
- Beneš (54), 150.

- **Surprise**

- Maisky (68), 129.

Example B20. Crete, 20-31 May 1941: MERKUR

Following defeat on the Greek mainland, a substantial portion of the British Expeditionary Force evacuated to Crete at the end of April 1940. There the 42,000 defenders, a scratch force of 31,000 British-Australian-New Zealanders plus 11,000 Greek regulars, awaited a German attack. At most they had only 36 aircraft. The defense was commanded by General Bernard Freyberg, V.C.

Although the British were aware that the Germans did intend to attack Crete, they were taken by tactical surprise by the placement and strength of the airborne infantry attack, having expected an amphibious assault *supplemented* by airborne units.

	Allies			German
	British	Greek	Totals	
KIA, MIA	1,742	2,600	4,300	3,492
WIA	1,737			2,131
POW	11,835			0
Total Casualties	15,314	11,000	c.26,000	6,116
<hr/>				
Aircraft lost	46	0?	46	147
Cruisers sunk	3	0	3	0
Destroyers sunk	6	0	6	0

Table A.42: Costs, 20-31 May 1941, Operation MERKUR. References: Baldwin (66), 102-103. Figures do not include Royal Navy casualties of 1,828 dead and 183 wounded suffered at sea.

References

• General

- Alan Clark, *The Fall of Crete* (New York: Morrow, 1962), 53-54, 60.
- Baldwin (66), 57-113.
- Connell (64), 464-476.
- Dr. Karl Gundelach, “The Battle for Crete, 1941,” in H. A. Jacobsen and J. Rohwer (eds.), *Decisive Battles of World War II*, (New York: Putnam’s, 1965), pp. 99-132.

Case A28. Russia, 22 Jun 1941: BARBAROSSA

BARBAROSSA, the German invasion of Russia on 22 June 1941, a case where surprise was a direct consequence of German deception operations. These became the ultimate shield of secrecy, misleading enemy intelligence about Hitler's *intentions* after all other details of BARBAROSSA had leaked out through the faulty German security system.

References

- For the security aspect of BARBAROSSA see Whaley, *Operation BARBAROSSA* (69), throughout; and for the deception aspect see particularly Chapter V and Appendix.

Case A29. Kiev, 25 Aug 1941: Führer Directive No. 34 – Supplement

At the beginning of August 1941, the German campaign in Russia was still in high gear and aimed at Moscow. On August 10th Jodl, the OKW Chief of Staff, submitted to Hitler a major appreciation that represented the—for once—consensus of senior professional military thinking in both the OKW and OKH. This paper had been written during the previous days by Colonel Warlimont and his OKW Section L (operations) staff in full agreement with Heusinger's OKH Operations Section. After recapitulating the arguments favoring Moscow as the top priority target, it proposed a final offensive for the end of August with the infantry to push straight ahead and the armor to sweep in from both flanks. In accord with this proposal, Hitler on August 12th issued a *Supplement to Directive No. 34*.

At this point the Germans were unwittingly playing the Russians' game. All essentials of the German plans were known to Stalin who had set a trap to catch the Wehrmacht. On 10 August, the superb GRU network of Alexander Rado in Switzerland had radioed the OKW plan to its Moscow headquarters. This intelligence was undoubtedly based on intelligence obtained by Rado's main collaborator, Rudolf Rössler, from Rössler's magnificent source or sources inside the OKW or OKH, and must have been based on Warlimont's draft memorandum. This intelligence was fully credited by Stalin who had learned from bitter experience on 22 June 1941 that the Rado-Rössler warnings of German invasion plans were entirely authentic. General Yeremenko recalls in his memoirs how Stalin summoned him to Moscow on 12 August, gave him command of the battle, telling Yeremenko flatly that "reconnaissance and other information" showed "an attack on Moscow was imminent from the Mogilev-Gomel area, via Bryansk" and that "the drive against Bryansk has been assigned to Guderian's armoured group."

Meanwhile—indeed all along—Hitler had been toying with quite another strategy. His thoughts had turned from the administrative machinery of Moscow toward the food and fuel of the Ukraine and the Caucasus. OKH and OKW/L had tried desperately to keep Hitler to the agreed plan by submitting supplementary memoranda on the 18th. However, Hitler's intuition was to prevail, and on the 21st Hitler had his two OKW overlords, Keitel and Jodl, issue new orders diverting both Army Groups Center and South toward Kiev and the Ukraine.

The new German deployment was immediately detected by Russian intelligence through their prisoner interrogations and aerial reconnaissance, but dismissed as a probe to support the expected Bryansk offensive. On 24 August Chief of Staff Marshal Shaposhnikov alerted Yeremenko that the attack was "expected within the next day or two." The attack came as reported but not where the Russians awaited it.

In this case no deception was necessary. The Wehrmacht achieved strategic surprise and a huge victory by the sheer chance that Hitler impetuously

substituted a new plan of attack for the one the Russians awaited with full but false confidence, in total disregard of indications that the Germans were shifting south.

References

- **German Planning**

- Warlimont (64), 181-193.

- **Surprise**

- Carell (64), 108-112, citing mainly Yeremenko's *Towards Moscow* (1959).
- Guderian (52), 196-203.
- “Verräter im Führerhauptquartier,” *Der Spiegel*, Vol. 21, No. 4 (16 January 1967), pp. 30-42.

Example B21. Sidi Rezegh, 18 Nov 1941: Operation CRUSADER

Operation CRUSADER was the first offensive of the newly designated British Eighth Army under General Sir Alan Cunningham against Panzergruppe Afrika under General Erwin Rommel. It had been a race against time, as both commanders knew, as to which would get his offensive off first. The impatient Rommel had been forced to delay from late September to late November; Cunningham had also had to defer his attack twice: first from November 1st to the 15th, finally triggering it on 18 November 1941, preempting Rommel by only two days.

At this point the British enjoyed marked advantages in armor and aircraft, the two weapons that would decide the outcome.

D-day	Troops	Divisions	Tanks	Aircraft
German	65,000	3	260	120
Italian	54,000	7	154	200
Total Axis	119,000	10	414	320
Total Eighth Army	118,000	6 + 6/3	453	1,100

Table A.43: Axis and Eighth Army Strengths at Sidi Rezegh. References: Collier (67), 241; Bayerlein in Rommel (53), 156, 158; Mellenthin (56), 54; Barnett (60), 88; Young (50), 98.

During the pre-dawn hours of D-day British Commandos made an audacious effort to paralyze the very core of the German command-net by assassinating (or, if feasible, capturing) Rommel. However, Intelligence had failed on two counts. First, Rommel was visiting Rome—had been there a week. Second, his headquarters was in fact 110 miles nearer the front than the point identified.²⁶⁶

Rommel's intelligence service under Major Mellenthin appreciated that an Eighth Army offensive was brewing and in mid-October had circularized the various formations alerting them to this. The reinforcements of men and equipment were known, and Rommel's radio interception service had discovered²⁶⁷ (and POW interrogations confirmed) in September that two Commonwealth divisions had moved from the Delta into the Western Desert. However, the Germans did not know either the time or direction of the initial British thrust. Rommel himself was away in Rome consulting about *his* planned offensive and did not return until the very day of the British attack. As Colonel Fritz Bayerlein, Chief of Staff of the Afrika Korps, recalled: Cunningham achieved "complete tactical surprise."

One major, last-minute warning was received on D-minus-1 when a captured

²⁶⁶Of the many—mostly inaccurate—accounts of this raid, the most comprehensive is Carell (61), 45-57. See also Young (50), 83-85.

²⁶⁷On this interception service see Mellenthin (56), 58, 61; Bayerlein in Rommel (53), 158, 159; and Carell (61), 69-70.

	German	Italian	Total Axis	Total British
Killed	1,100	1,200	2,300	2,900
Wounded	3,400	2,700	6,100	7,300
Missing/Captured	10,100	19,800	29,900	7,500
Totals:	14,600	23,700	38,300	17,700

Table A.44: Casualties at Sidi Rezegh (D+60). References: Playfair, III (60), 97; Churchill, III (50), 575; Collier (67), 241; Rommel (53), 170, 178; and Barnett (60), 121. Young (50), 85-86, gives the British calculation of Axis casualties as 60,000 (21,000 Germans and, by implication, 39,000 Italians) killed, wounded, or captured). The German figures are given as 14,760 German and 21,700 Italian casualties.

sergeant with the staff of the Indian 4th Division divulged details of Eighth Army deployments and plans. In fact, his information was so rich that it was entirely disbelieved until verified by the battle itself.²⁶⁸

Although German intelligence had correctly interpreted the signs of the British build-up and even had a fairly accurate notion of the British order of battle, Cunningham retained complete surprise as to the *timing* of and *deployment* for his offensive. He had successfully guarded these secrets from German ground patrols, aerial reconnaissance, radio interception, and behind-the-lines espionage. Excellent camouflage had concealed the secretly prepared advance dumps that permitted effective British deployment, particularly on the deep desert flank. Eighth Army's final approach march to its starting positions was concealed by night movement, camouflage, and radio silence.

The deception plan succeeded in misleading the Germans specifically about the direction of attack. The most plausible alternative strategies available to Cunningham (and appreciated by Rommel as well) were either a thrust in the north toward beleaguered Tobruk coupled with a flanking attack from the center and south or *vice versa*. Cunningham chose the former while leading Rommel to expect the latter—Rommel's own preferred choice because of the opportunities it offered for *his* counterattack.²⁶⁹

The original British CRUSADER battle plan had evaporated by D + 4 as a result of Rommel's vigorous counter-thrusts. Henceforward the fortunes of battle see-sawed wildly until 7-8 December when Rommel, seriously weakened, disengaged and conducted a fighting withdrawal that ended on 12 January 1942 at Mersa el Brega, 300 miles back along the coast. On 26 November Auchinleck replaced Cunningham with Ritchie.

By D + 14 Rommel's HQ reported enemy losses as 814 tanks and various armored vehicles, 127 aircraft shot down, and 9,000 prisoners.

²⁶⁸Bayerlein in Rommel (53), 159; and Carell (61), 73, who says the capture took place on mid-day of D-day itself. Carell's source was an interview with Bayerlein.

²⁶⁹Young (50), 87, citing interview with Bayerlein.

By D + 60 the Germans had lost 300 tanks to 278 for the British. Of the Axis prisoners, 14,000 (4,000 German and 10,000 Italian) had been in the by-passed garrisons at Bardia (fell January 2nd) and Sollum-Halfaya (January 17th), taken at a cost of less than 500 Eighth Army casualties.

References

• General

- Barnett (60), 80-121.
- Collier (67), 228-243.
- Liddell Hart, I (59), 99 ff.
- Fuller (48), 157-159.
- Churchill, III (50), 557-575.
- Young (50), 85-97.
- Bayerlein in Rommel (53), 154-188.
- Mellenthin (56), 54, 56-91
- Carell (61), 71-101.
- Tedder (66), 176-214.

• Intelligence

- Carell (61), 58-70.
- Mellenthin (56), 58-60.
- Bayerlein in Rommel (53), 156-158.

• Warning

- Bayerlein in Rommel (53), 159.
- Young (50), 81-82.

• Surprise

- Young (50), 87, 88, 90.
- Carell (61), 68 (quoting his interview with Westphal), 71-72.
- Mellenthin (56), 61-62.
- Bayerlein in Rommel (53), 158.

• Deception

- Young (50), 87, 88, 90.
- Carell (61), 64, 68 (quoting his interview with Westphal).
- Bayerlein in Rommel (53), 157-158.

Case A30. Pearl Harbor, 7 Dec 1941: Operation Z

I have been sitting here wondering just what the special significance and the importance in this enquiry is the question of whether prior to June 1941, or at any time, the Japs suspected that we were cracking their code.... I am probably dumb about it, but I do not quite grasp it.

—Mr. William D. Mitchell,
General Counsel of the Joint Committee of the
Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, 1946.²⁷⁰

All our [Pacific Fleet] intelligence pointed to an attack by Japan against the Philippines or the southern areas in Malaya or the Dutch East Indies. While Pearl Harbor was considered and ruled out, the mass of the evidence made available to us pointed in another direction.

—Fleet Admiral Halsey, 1953.²⁷¹

The Americans were in fact deceived by the cover plan with which the few Japanese officers planning the attack were concealing from their own staffs in Tokyo—the fact that Pearl Harbor was the target.

—McLachlan (68), 29-30.

The Americans, with most of the relevant clues of war available from the broken Japanese diplomatic codes and radio traffic monitoring of the Imperial Navy, were still the victims of partial strategic and total tactical surprise on the morning of 7 December 1941.

One key factor to remember is, as in the case of many of Hitler's surprises, that Pearl Harbor was a belated addition to the Japanese target list. Since the late 19th century, Japan had been pressing aggressively to the west and south. Foreign diplomatic and intelligence organizations had become as preoccupied in watching and sometimes countering that particular thrust as had the Japanese in furthering it.

Until January 1941, the very notion of an attack on Pearl Harbor was only a day-dream of Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku, a brilliantly unorthodox tactician and proponent of carrier warfare, and Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet. Then in late January 1941 Yamamoto ordered his own staff and the chief of staff of the Eleventh Air Fleet to examine the feasibility of a surprise carrier strike to cripple the U.S. Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor as the opening act of

²⁷⁰ *PHA*, Pt. (46), 1817-1818.

²⁷¹ Halsey's "Foreword" to Theobald (54), vii.

a Japanese offensive to the south.²⁷² Yamamoto kept his planning within this small circle, carefully working out the details, until late August when he invited all fleet commanders, key members of their staffs, and Naval General Staff Chief Admiral Nagano to a Pearl Harbor war game at the Naval War College, Tokyo.²⁷³ Although impressed by the game results, Nagano reserved judgment because it also made plain the high risks and probable costs. So planning continued, with the Army General Staff being brought in during September.²⁷⁴

Relations with the United States continued to deteriorate as the Government of Prince Konoye was unable to move negotiations either fast or far enough for the militarists. Konoye's Government resigned on this issue, bringing General Tojo Hideki up from War Minister to Premier on 18 October. This meant that a negotiated peace with the U.S. was much less likely. Consequently, Tojo now won the Navy's agreement in principle to launch its own maximum attack plan—i.e., the one that included Pearl Harbor on the target agenda—by promising the Navy a larger share in the national oil and steel reserves.²⁷⁵ (Although the all-out Pearl Harbor plan was the Navy's own, the Navy had been unwilling to advocate its execution.)

On 1 November 1941, the Liaison Conference—the highest Japanese policy making body—formally decided on war, with the proviso that negotiations would continue in the slim hope that diplomacy could avert it. (D-day was tentatively set for 1 December.)²⁷⁶ On 3 November Admiral Yamamoto approved and, on 5 November, distributed the Combined Fleet Top Secret Operations Order No. 1, his comprehensive attack plan against the U.S., Britain, and the Netherlands.

With the basic war policy resolved, Admiral Yamamoto and General Teruchi, commander of the Southern Army, reached on 10 November a “Central Agreement” to launch simultaneous attacks on Pearl Harbor and Southeast Asia.²⁷⁷

On 7 November, Yamamoto had tentatively set D-day for 8 December (i.e., the 7th, Hawaii time). And on 2 December the Pearl Harbor Task Force was notified that D-day was confirmed.²⁷⁸

A sufficiently strong *prima facie* case for Japanese use of deception exists to warrant a close examination of its possible rôle and a possible need to reassess the now widely accepted view of Pearl Harbor presented by Roberta Wohlstetter. The points in evidence are collated below. In addition to the deception (i.e., simulation) efforts, I have included the security (dissimulation or camouflage) efforts, as well as noted the relevant preconceptions and false alarms that influenced American perceptions. (I have throughout listed *all* references to each point given by Wohlstetter, Morison, Farago, and Kahn. Therefore the absence of a reference indicates that the author in question has overlooked that

²⁷²Morison, III (50), 82-83.

²⁷³Morison, III (50), 83-84.

²⁷⁴Morison, III (50), 80, 84-85.

²⁷⁵Ike (67), 200; Morison, III (50), 71.

²⁷⁶Ike (67), 199-207.

²⁷⁷Morison, III (50), 71-72.

²⁷⁸Morison, III (50), 78, 86; Farago (67), 266, 297.

particular point of evidence.)

1. In order to gain the maximum advantage of surprise, the Japanese planners substituted a simultaneous attack on Pearl Harbor, the Philippines, and Malaya for the initial plan that had called for a sequence of attacks.²⁷⁹
2. The attack was deliberately scheduled for a Saturday or Sunday in order to increase the chances for surprise, the Japanese having understood that the American custom of “week-end” would find the U.S. fleet in port and the largest proportion of military personnel at “liberty.”²⁸⁰
3. Negotiations over U.S.-Japanese differences were continued beyond the point of the basic Japanese decision on 1 November to go to war with the U.S., Britain, and Holland. These negotiations provided a thin screen, giving the American leaders a false impression that war was somewhat further off.²⁸¹ The Japanese Foreign Ministry has been rather too harshly handled by the historian for its part in the camouflaging of intention. In fact, the Foreign Ministry and particularly Foreign Minister Togo continued until 29 November to hope that some last minute accommodation might be found to avert war. Moreover, the Navy deliberately withheld the details of place, time, and nature of their attack plan from the Foreign Minister. So, in part, the Japanese diplomats were negotiating in good faith.²⁸² This was particularly true of the diplomats in Washington—Nomura and Kurusu—who were not privy to any of the key decisions made in Tokyo from 5 November on, although they correctly guessed at the trend toward war from their incoming messages, messages that were being simultaneously intercepted and read by the Americans. However, on 29 November, the final deadline for diplomacy came.²⁸³ As one unidentified member of the Imperial Liaison Conference (not Foreign Minister Togo) stated with unusually brutal candor for that very proper body:²⁸⁴

Our diplomats will have to be sacrificed. What we want is to carry on diplomacy in such a way that until the very last minute the United States will continue to think about the problem, we will ask questions, and our [real] plans will be kept secret.

Togo bowed to this necessity, although he was unhappy at the need to deceive his own diplomats. On 30 November, knowing that the deadline

²⁷⁹Reports of General MacArthur, Vol. II, Pt. I (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1966), p. 59; Wohlstetter (62), 339-343, 361-362, 371; and Morison, III (50), 72.

²⁸⁰*Reports of General MacArthur*, II/I (66), 52; Morison, III (50), 86; Butow (61), 370; and Farago (67), 266.

²⁸¹Wohlstetter (62), 200-203, 349, 393; and Ike (67), 199-260. Also *PHA*, Pt. 11 (46), 5355-5356; Morison, III (50), 64-79; Farago (67), 321; and Kimmel (55), 56-57.

²⁸²Ike (67), 196-262. Also Wohlstetter (62), 197, 202, 208; Kahn (67), 32; and Morison, III (50), 70-71.

²⁸³The deadline for diplomacy had first been set (on 12 November) for 25 November. It was deferred (on 22 November) to the 29th.

²⁸⁴Ike (67), 262.

for diplomacy had passed and that Pearl Harbor Task Force was already in its fourth day at sea, Tojo informed the Japanese press that Ambassador Nomura was still negotiating.²⁸⁵

4. Specifically, from at least as early as 4 July Ambassador Nomura was forwarding to the State Department false or, at least, too optimistic reassurances of the negotiability of the outstanding differences. Ladislav Farago asserts that these messages were part of a deliberate Japanese “campaign to camouflage its true intentions.”²⁸⁶ Certainly the discrepancy was quite great between the Japanese diplomatic notes to the State Department and their messages intended only for their Embassy staff, as was being simultaneously disclosed to the Americans in their interception of these same messages.²⁸⁷ Although his home office was not being entirely frank even with Nomura, even he was mortified by his invidious role: “I don’t want to go on with this hypocrisy, deceiving other people.”²⁸⁸
5. To bolster the demoralized Ambassador Nomura, the Japanese Foreign Ministry decided to send Ambassador Kurusu Saburo as a sort of deputy. The U.S. was notified of this on 3 November and Kurusu arrived in Washington on the 15th.²⁸⁹ Some Americans and Britons privy to the Japanese diplomatic intercepts were puzzled by this development. For example, William Stephenson, the chief of British secret intelligence in the U.S.—the so-called British Security Coordination—suspected that Kurusu’s mission was intended to expedite U.S. compliance with the Japanese position and, failing that, to lull the Americans into a false sense of security until the actual attack. In an only partly successful effort to verify his suspicions, Stephenson had one of his agents—the distinguished Japanologist, Sir George Sansom—ingratiate himself into Kurusu’s party.²⁹⁰ However, as we have already seen, Kurusu was sent in good faith and negotiated in these terms.²⁹¹
6. Special precautions were taken to insure the secrecy of the planned attack on Pearl Harbor. For example, the Imperial Navy’s richly detailed war plan—*Combined Fleet Top Secret Operations Order No. 1*—was issued on 5 November 1941 in 700 printed copies and gave full details of the attacks on the Philippines, Malaya, Netherlands Indies, etc., but pointedly deleted the Pearl Harbor missions of the [submarine scout] Advance Force and the [attack and destroy] Task Force, stating only that they would be included among units that “will operate against the American Fleet.” This most sensitive part of the order was only communicated verbally and then only to a very limited number of senior Navy General Staff officers and staff

²⁸⁵Morison, III (50), 78; and Wohlstetter (62), 380.

²⁸⁶FRUS: 1941, IV (56), 291-292; and Farago (67), 211.

²⁸⁷Farago (67), 211; Wohlstetter (62), 186-211; Morison, III (50), 64-79; and PHA (46).

²⁸⁸Farago (67), 211, 259, 263-264.

²⁸⁹Farago (67), 260-261, 264-265.

²⁹⁰Hyde (62), 212-213; and Farago (67), 260-261, 419.

²⁹¹Ike (67), 208; Wohlstetter (62), 197, 208; and Morison, III (50), 72-73.

officers of Combined Fleet, First Air Fleet, and Sixth Fleet Headquarters.²⁹²

7. Much has been made of the fact that the Japanese Navy changed all its ships' radio call signs on 1 December.²⁹³ While this was a largely successful security measure, serving to hide the identity of minor fleet units until after the outbreak of war,²⁹⁴ it was generally counter-productive. The fact that it happened at all merely served to galvanize U.S. Naval Intelligence to seek by all means to discover the Japanese fleet dispositions, and the fact that its timing was unprecedented was strong confirmation that a major fleet operation was impending. Moreover, the change in call signs would only make it more difficult for the American monitors to receive the deception messages and dummy traffic intended to reassure them that the carriers, at least, were still at their Japanese home bases. I am quite puzzled by this event and am unable to offer any explanation for it.
8. A key problem was to make the Pearl Harbor Task Force "invisible." The Japanese were fully aware that the Americans could track and sometimes identify Japanese naval vessels and fleets by monitoring radio traffic, even if they could not read the coded messages. Hence, beginning on 10 November, all direct communication by radio between the Task Force ships beginning to sortie from Kure on the Inland Sea was forbidden.²⁹⁵ Indeed, from 16 November on, U.S. Naval Intelligence did lose radio track of *all* Japanese carriers.²⁹⁶
9. To conceal the sailing of the Task Force, deliberate radio deception measures were immediately begun by the 1st Combined Communications Unit. The remaining ships at Kure, Yokosuka, and Sasebo and in the Inland Sea padded their radio traffic to simulate the volume of the entire force.²⁹⁷ As for the specific silence of the carriers, Morison adds that "the Japanese wished us to think" that they had merely switched to low-frequency short-range wavelengths the Americans could not pick up, as they had, in fact,

²⁹²*Reports of General MacArthur*, II/I (66), 8, 67, quoting *Combined Fleet Top Secret Operations Order No. 1* issued on 5 November 1941 and citing postwar interrogation of Rear Admiral S. Tomioka, the then Chief, First Bureau (Operations), Imperial General Headquarters, Navy Section. The complete translated text of Order No. 1 is published in *PHA*, Pt. 13 (46), 431-484. Wohlstetter entirely overlooks this special security handling of Pearl Harbor in the Japanese naval orders.

²⁹³Kahn (67), 39. Also Wohlstetter (62), 40-41, 111; and *PHA*, Pt. 17 (46), 2636. Farago (67), 268, confuses the routine biannual change of call signs on November 1st with the unprecedented change only one month later, on December 1st.

²⁹⁴Of 20,000 service calls monitored during the period 1-7 December, only 200 had been partially identified. *PHA*, Pt. 17 (46), 2486.

²⁹⁵Morison, III (50), 88; and Wohlstetter (62), 379.

²⁹⁶Morison, III (50), 130; Wohlstetter (62), 41-44; Farago (67), 269-270; *PHA*, Pt. 10 (46), 4834-4842.

²⁹⁷Morison, III (50), 88-89; Wohlstetter (62), 379 and 393; and Farago (67), 267-268, 297. Only Farago gives his sources, taken mainly from *PHA* (46) and Admiral Yamamoto's own Operations Order No. 1. See also *PHA*, Pt. 1 (46), 185, 238, Pt. 11 (46), 5357., Pt. 13 (46), 397.

done five months earlier during the crisis over French Indochina.²⁹⁸ Both ruses succeeded, Morison conceding both, and Wohlstetter only the first explicitly, although she implies the success of the second as well.

10. An important part in the Task Force concealment was that its regular wireless operators—at least those from the carriers—were left behind at Kure to give the dummy signals the “swing” presumably familiar to the American monitors, as a radiotelegraphist’s touch (“fist”) is as distinctive as his handwriting.²⁹⁹ This disguise was so perfect that it even fooled the Chief of Staff of the First Air Fleet, the aviation unit specially created to make the attack. This man, Rear Admiral R. Kusaka, recalled later that he reprimanded his communications man, only to learn that the “message” was part of the dummy traffic from Kure.³⁰⁰ In any case, this particular ruse apparently failed, as the American monitors “lost” the carriers anyway. Curiously there has never been any explanation of why the Americans did not pick up these signals being deliberately fed to them and overheard even by Admiral Kusaka.
11. The impression that the Task Force was still in the Inland Sea was reinforced by sending a conspicuous portion of the men of the Yokosuka Naval District on shore-leave to Tokyo and Yokohama. This simulated the pattern of the July crises when the main fleet had indeed remained in home waters with its sailors visibly at liberty.³⁰¹
12. A simple yet effective ruse was used to becloud the destination of the Task Force. As the departure deadline neared, it became necessary for the ships, planes, and men to be “winterized.” At this point, apparently sometime just after 7 November, Admiral Kusaka confided his Task Force’s mission to a supply officer not formally attached to his special unit, Commander Shin-Ichi Shimizu; and posed the dilemma: how to draw their winter gear without indicating the expedition’s northern course when all other navy ships were openly getting ready for tropical service? Commander Shimizu simply requisitioned tropical as well as arctic supplies, glibly telling the startled depot personnel that if war came one never knew where he might be sent. To enhance the deception, Shimizu did not have the supplies sent directly to the intended ships, rather he loaded both the needed and the unwanted supplies on a freighter and sailed off on a disguised

²⁹⁸Morison, III (50), 130, unfortunately omitting his source. Wohlstetter (62), 42, 111, 385, notes this point but does not suggest it was intentionally deceptive. Kahn (67), 8-9, 39-40, shows how the Americans were indeed deceived. See also *PHA*, Pt. 10 (46), 4838.

²⁹⁹Lord (57), 17, based apparently on a private communication from the then Rear Admiral R. Kusaka. This evidence is noted by Farago (67), 297, and Kahn (67), 32, although the latter incorrectly includes the regular operators of all the ships among the left-behind traffic simulators.

³⁰⁰Lord (57), 17.

³⁰¹Lord (57), 25; and Wohlstetter (62), 111, 379-380. Farago (67), 297-298, alleges that these men were actually soldiers, disguised as sailors to deceive Americans and British service attachés. I find such a ruse both unlikely (too easily disclosed) and unnecessary (with the fleet gone, shore personnel would be readily available).

course for Hitokappu Bay, the Task Force's secret rendezvous where final provisioning took place.³⁰² Although there is no evidence that U.S. or any other intelligence channels picked up these false leads, they did serve to confuse the ship's own crews. Thus a fighter pilot on *Kaga* guessed a northern target from the planes' change to winter oil, *Shokaku's* junior medical officer guessed Dutch Harbor, and *Akagi's* chief engineer presumed from the amount of fuel carried that they were off for the Philippines.³⁰³

13. The very special security net drawn over the formation of the Task Force was enhanced by assigning a secret place of rendezvous. Between about November 10th and 18th, the 32 ships assigned to the Task Force slipped out one by one from their bases in the Inland Sea. On the 21st the last of these ships arrived at its secret assembly point in the remote Kurile Islands—Hitokappu Bay, a desolate harbor where the sole signs of life were a Naval radio station, a single pier, and three fishermen's huts. Even so, the tightest security discipline was maintained: no shore leave, no jettisoning of garbage, absolute radio silence.³⁰⁴ On the 25th Admiral Yamamoto signalled the go-ahead, and Nagumo's fleet sailed the next morning for Hawaii.
14. The approach to Hawaii of Vice Admiral Nagumo's carrier Task Force of 32 ships was ordered by Combined Fleet to be conducted "taking every precaution to conceal its movements." To do this Nagumo continued total radio silence,³⁰⁵ took a course well off shipping lanes and out of range of U.S. aerial patrols, and screened his carriers with destroyers to provide advance warning of any surface patrols.³⁰⁶
15. On 25 November, the Foreign Ministry publicly announced that the NYK line flagship, *Tatuta Maru*, would sail December 2nd for Los Angeles and Balboa to evacuate Japanese nationals from the U.S. and Panama. While this announcement indicated the extreme and increasing depth of the crisis, it misled the American community in Japan—into believing that any "final break was unlikely while Japan's crack liner was at sea."³⁰⁷ This

³⁰²Lord (57), 16, based on post-war recollections of Commander Shimizu and, perhaps, Admiral Kusaka. This material is mentioned, but without acknowledgment of source, by Wohlstetter (62), 379.

³⁰³Lord (57), 20; see also Morison, III (50), 88.

³⁰⁴Lord (57), 17-18; and Morison, III (50), 88-90. Noted in passing by Wohlstetter (62), 379; Farago (67), 267-268; and Kahn (67), 32-33.

³⁰⁵Although Farago recently published some entirely new data, which—if authentic—proves that low frequency transmissions did take place between ships of the Task Force. Moreover, these signals were monitored from December 1st through 3rd, their points of origin fixed and tracked, and their source tentatively identified as coming from a Japanese fleet steaming stealthily toward Hawaii. This was done by Mr. Leslie E. Grogan, wireless operator of SS *Lurline*, flagship of the Matson Line passenger ships. See the supplement to the 1968 paperback edition of Farago (67).

³⁰⁶*Reports of General MacArthur*, II/I (66), 68, 71. See also Wohlstetter (62), 379; Kahn (67), 33, 56; and Morison, III (50), 90.

³⁰⁷Tolischus (43), 304, 311, 315. Also noted, in part, by Wohlstetter (62), 380. Previously, on

was surely a calculated deception operation. On the afternoon of the scheduled sailing from Yokohama a naval intelligence officer, Commander T. Ohmae, delivered a sealed box to the vessel's master with instructions to "open it at 0000, December 8." The box contained a loaded pistol and orders to return immediately to port, observing radio silence. This was done, and her 23 well-deceived American passengers were interned.³⁰⁸

16. The "cry-wolf" effect was also working to lull the Americans. For example, as early as 27 January 1941 Ambassador Grew reported a flurry of rumors in Tokyo—his source was the Peruvian Minister—that the Japanese were "planning to go all out in a surprise mass attack on Pearl Harbor."³⁰⁹ This was almost certainly a false rumor as the Japanese had not yet included Hawaii in their target list, although the faint possibility exists that this rumor represents an unintended leak from someone on Admiral Yamamoto's planning staff.³¹⁰ Again, when in July the Japanese had sent a naval task force south to French Indochina to deliver its ultimatum, the Americans were aware that the main carrier force had remained in home waters, possibly as a shield against any U.S. counteraction.³¹¹
17. As Pearl Harbor Day approached, the volume, frequency, and specificity of reporting on U.S., British, and Dutch naval dispositions and defense capabilities transmitted by Japanese naval attachés and other agents increased. These communications were, of course, being read simultaneously by the intended victims; however they did not betray any special interest in Pearl Harbor, because similar information in similar volume and frequency was forthcoming from all targets. Yamamoto's English biographer, John Potter, asserts that this data was gathered at the explicit request of Admiral Yamamoto. Moreover, Potter asserts: "This was part of Yamamoto's cover plan."³¹²
18. The conclusive type of evidence that insured Japanese surprise at Pearl Harbor was precisely that set of signals that diverted American-British-Dutch eyes to the south. Thus, while there were very few signals pointing due *east* toward Pearl Harbor, there were many pointing directly *south* toward Thailand, the Philippines, Malaya, and the Dutch East Indies.³¹³

18 November, the Japanese Foreign Office formally requested permission to send the *Tatuta Maru* on the 25th. *FRUS:1941*, V (56), 441-442; and *FRUS:Japan, 1931-1941*, II (43), 273.

³⁰⁸Farago (67), 298, citing a 1953 Japanese study.

³⁰⁹Joseph C. Grew, *Turbulent Era*, Vol. II (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1952), p. 1233; *FRUS:1941*, IV (56), 17; and *PHA*, Pt. 14 (46), 1044. These rumors were entirely discounted at the time by U.S. Naval Intelligence. See Farago (67), 135-136; and Morison, III (50), 60-61. It is also noted by Wohlstetter (62), 386; Theobald (54), 43; and Kimmel (55), 35-36.

³¹⁰A point raised only by Potter (65), Ch. 6.

³¹¹*PHA*, Pt. 10 (46), 4839. Noted by Wohlstetter (62), 42-43; and Kahn (67), 39.

³¹²Potter (65), Chapt. 6. Although no specific source is cited for these assertions, Potter did make extensive use of interviews with Japanese including Yamamoto's biographer and several former members of his staff.

³¹³Morison, III (50), 61-62, 76-77, 130, 135, 141; Wohlstetter (62), 43, 380, 385; *PHA*, Pt. 10 (46), 4834-4835, 4837; and Kahn (67), 39-41.

Source/Date	Included	Omitted
PHA (46)	14?	5?
Morison, III (50)	12	7
Wohlstetter (62)	14	5
Farago (67)	13	6
Kahn (67)	9	10
Whaley (69)	19	0

Table A.45: Coverage of 19 Points Relevant to Pearl Harbor Deception.

Moreover, this pattern was all the more acceptable to the intended victims because it fitted precisely into the American, British, and Dutch preconception of probable Japanese action.³¹⁴

19. Of the many south-pointing signals,³¹⁵ the most important type was the rising volume and proportion of messages being directed southward over the 200 radio circuits operated by the Japanese Navy. This southern radio traffic increased throughout November and confirmed the massive movement south of major portions of the Imperial Navy. Most significant is that the Japanese made no effort to camouflage this traffic.³¹⁶

Having scanned the array of evidence of Japanese activities that, in fact, quite deceived the Americans that Pearl Harbor was to be one of the targets of the clearly impending attack, we can now ask the key question. Did the Japanese deliberately manipulate their enemy's preconceptions by permitting some south-pointing signals while rigorously suppressing the eastward ones? If the answer is an emphatic yes, then the Pearl Harbor case becomes merely one additional example of the "BARBAROSSA" type and Mrs. Wohlstetter's classification of it with those cases of surprise through ambiguous information must be modified or altogether dropped.

Remarkably, no writer on the Pearl Harbor surprise attack has discussed deception as a separate topic. This despite the fact that most of them do scatter some of the key evidence throughout their accounts, often even explicitly labelling it as "deception," "camouflage," or "smoke-screen." Indeed, none of the studies have sought systematically to even collate this evidence. Thus, of the 19 points in evidence cited above, we can see in a gross way from the following table, the rather casual manner in which the key data has been handled by the major studies of the Pearl Harbor attack.

Moreover, I have counted as "included" the most casual passing reference, even—as is often the case—where the author does not relate it at all to possible deception. I should also point out that the key evidence was already available—albeit chaotically—in 1946 in *PHA* and all data on all 19 points had appeared by 1957 with the publication of some new interview material by Walter Lord.

³¹⁴Morison, III (50), 48, 61, 127-135, 141, 164; and Wohlstetter (62), 43-44, 381.

³¹⁵See also Case A31.

³¹⁶Kahn (67), 39, 40; and *PHA*, Pt. 11 (46), 5356.

This allegation of deliberate Japanese deception was first emphatically suggested in 1946 during the Pearl Harbor hearings.³¹⁷

The 1st Combined Communications Unit was directed to maintain deceptive traffic to simulate the presence of the main strength of the Japanese Fleet in the Inland Sea. At the same time, the early December movements of the Japanese units en route to the south were not conducted under complete radio silence—possibly because the element of surprise for that part of the campaign could not be preserved by silence since Allied visual observations could be made of those movements and possibly because of the belief that the ability of Allied intelligence to trace the southward movements of the Southern Force, and only those movements, would further bolster the effectiveness of the strategic surprise desired for the operations [against Pearl Harbor] of the Striking Force.

Were the Japanese cryptologists aware their American counterparts were reading any of the coded radio traffic? An affirmative answer would make an attractive hypothesis because it could rationally account for a very large part of the many cases of U.S. intelligence failures over Pearl Harbor that historians have hitherto attributed to “ambiguity,” “noise,” or “bad luck.” In other words, such awareness would have enabled the Japanese to *deliberately* create the pattern of signals that did, in fact, mislead the Americans. There were several serious gaps in the U.S. secret that it had broken several major Japanese codes, and the Japanese had even received some vague warnings to this effect.³¹⁸ However, all the evidence that has been published on this point categorically indicates that the Japanese communications and intelligence specialists reached the comfortable conclusion that only occasional isolated plain texts had been stolen and did not realize that the very ciphers themselves were compromised.³¹⁹

I am unable to resolve this question of whether the Pearl Harbor surprise was an intended consequence of a centralized and orchestrated deception plan. However, we can recognize that specific deception operations were conducted and at least some of these contributed to the surprise. Consequently, Wohlstetter’s picture of Pearl Harbor “noise” does require at least some modification. Moreover, it seems very likely that there was indeed an orchestrated deception plan, although the evidence of its centralization is inconclusive. The Pearl Harbor attack was, on the one hand, an integral part of the Japanese war *strategy*; but, on the other hand, its original conception, detailed planning, and final execution was not only an exclusively Japanese Navy affair but, most specifically, an initiative of Admiral Yamamoto, the Commander of the Combined Fleet, and his personal staff. And some, perhaps all, of the deceptions were

³¹⁷Navy Department memorandum dated 5 Apr 1946 and titled “Reconstruction of Japanese Plans Leading up to the Attack on Pearl Harbor,” as reprinted in *PHA*, Pt. 11 (46), 5356. See also *PHA*, Pt. 1 (46), 185, 238, for implied statements to this effect.

³¹⁸See Whaley, *Operation BARBAROSSA*, (69), Chapter IV, Section D; and particularly Kahn (67), 26-27.

³¹⁹Kahn (67), 27, 31.

also the work of Yamamoto's group. Such an almost unprecedented type of decentralization of deception was *possible*, because while Yamamoto knew the overall decisions and plans of the Imperial Liaison Conferences and of the Army, Navy and Foreign Ministries, *they* were not privy to *his* activities. It seems, for example, that Yamamoto had direct access to Japanese Navy intelligence and communications—a circumstance that would have given him an unparalleled opportunity to conduct his own world-wide deception operation without reference to high Navy or Government authority. Further research should begin at this point, with the specific rôle of Yamamoto.

Seemingly only once has anyone thought to put the direct question about deception to the Japanese. On 17 October 1945 a questionnaire was issued to the Liaison Committee to guide its postwar interrogations of Japanese officials about their planning and conduct of the war. The one relevant question was:³²⁰

[Question] 21.g.: Give complete details of how the [Pearl Harbor attack] plan was developed. Discuss: What deceptive measures to draw U.S. attention elsewhere were employed?

Unfortunately, the interrogators did not do full justice to this question in their selection of respondents. The question was put only to Captain S. Tomioka, Chief of the Operations Section of the Naval General Staff; Commander T. Miyo, a member of that section; Combined Fleet Staff members Captain K. Kuroshima and Commander Y. Watanabe; and Commander M. Fuchida, CO of the Air Unit on carrier *Akagi*. Nevertheless, their answer is quite significant:³²¹

The Main Force in the Inland Sea Area and the land-based air units in the Kyushu Area carried on deceptive communications, and deceptive measures were taken to indicate that the Task Force was still in training in the Kyushu Area.

I will now conclude with a brief look at the military economics of the Pearl Harbor attack.

On 7 December (8 December, Japanese time) the Japanese attacked. The line-up of forces in Hawaiian waters was as given in Table A.46.

Surprise bought a great victory at negligible (initial) cost. Although the Japanese had expected to lose at least two of their six carriers—and were prepared to lose all six—they lost only 29 planes, 1 large submarine (of 1955 tons), and 5 midget submarines (of 45 tons each), and less than 200 men (55 airmen, 9 with the “midget” submarines, and the entire crew of the large sub). American losses were 5 battleships sunk or beached (3 later salvaged) plus 3 battleships damaged; 3 cruisers damaged; 2 destroyers destroyed and 1 damaged; 1 target ship destroyed; 1 minelayer sunk (later salvaged); 1 seaplane tender damaged; and 1 repair ship damaged. Of those warships totally destroyed, about 2,500

³²⁰ PHA, Pt. 13 (46), 397.

³²¹ PHA, Pt. 13 (46), 397. Curiously, Wohlstetter (62), 379, manages a badly garbled paraphrase of this answer, neglects to give her source, and misses its significance.

	Japanese	U.S.
Carriers	6	0
Battleships	2	8
Heavy Cruisers	2	2
Light Cruisers	1	6
Destroyers	11	29
Submarines (fleet)	28	5
Submarines (midget)	5	0
Other naval ships	8	44
Total Naval Ships:	63	94*
Aircraft	443	394
Soldiers	0	42,952

Table A.46: Military Economics of Pearl Harbor Attack. *Note: The other ships of the U.S. Pacific Fleet were at mainland bases or away on various patrol or ferrying missions. They included all 3 carriers, 1 battleship, 10 heavy cruisers, 3 light cruisers, 38 destroyers and 22 submarines. The Atlantic Fleet had the remaining 2 carriers and 6 battleships.

Service	Killed	Wounded
Navy	2008	710
Marines	109	69
Army	218	364
Civilians	68	35
Totals:	2403	1178

Table A.47: U.S. Casualties at Pearl Harbor.

tons were Japanese, and 65,600 U.S. In addition, 188 U.S. planes were destroyed and 159 damaged. U.S. casualties were as shown in Table A.47.³²²

D-day	Japanese	American	A/J
Naval tonnage destroyed	2,500	65,600	26.2
Killed in action	200	2,403	12.0
Aircraft destroyed	29	188	6.5

Table A.48: Costs at Pearl Harbor

A Wry Footnote on Warnings

In my research on Operation BARBAROSSA, I stumbled across an astonishing story of Russian attempts to warn the British and U.S. authorities of the imminent Japanese attacks on Malaya and Pearl Harbor. As this story has been

³²²Morison, III (50), 126. Slightly different figures are cited by other writers.

entirely overlooked by all students of the Pearl Harbor and Malaya-Hong Kong-Indonesia-Philippines attacks, I will analyze it in detail. However, as the story comes only from Arthur Upham Pope (with possible independent verification from Louis Fischer),³²³ it must be taken as questionable. Nevertheless, I have given the story below “straight,” without further critical qualifications except to point out certain demonstrable errors and discrepancies in the sources.

On 5 December 1941 while the Japanese carrier fleet was 10 days out of port and closing on Pearl Harbor, Maxim Litvinov—flying to his new post as Soviet Ambassador to the U.S.—touched down in Honolulu. There,³²⁴

Entertained by the highest American Army and Navy officials, he told them about the unexpectedness of the Nazi blow against Russia. He said a country at peace cannot get accustomed to the idea that it may soon be attacked and so it is caught unawares. At this very moment, he stated, the Japanese may be planning war on the United States; they might strike Honolulu. Litvinov advised the American officers to be vigilant day and night.

This incident occurred at the Governor’s House. Admiral Kimmel and General Short were allegedly present. Someone remarked: “They would be fools to attack us now.” Litvinov commented: “Yes, indeed, they would be fools. But they will attack.”³²⁵

Was it only coincidence, or did Litvinov perhaps seek to warn on the basis of specific information? Did he know more than he said and say more than Stalin intended? We now know that Russian intelligence was aware of the impending Japanese moves. The Russians were intercepting and decrypting at least some of the Japanese diplomatic codes and—as masterful cryptanalysts and outright thieves—may very likely have been also reading some of the relevant military traffic. Furthermore, Richard Sorge’s superb network in Japan had been keeping GRU headquarters in Moscow well informed of Japan’s strategic intentions from July 1941 until Sorge’s arrest on 18 October.³²⁶ Moreover, while Litvinov’s pointed reference to Honolulu may have been only rhetoric geared to shock his local audience, it does at least suggest that the Russians may have had more detailed intelligence about the Japanese operations plan than either the Americans or the British.

If Litvinov had, in fact, made some such statement in Honolulu, this was not evidently known to the Japanese. The local FBI field office had been keeping an

³²³Although Fischer was a friend of Litvinov, he was also Pope’s publisher. Consequently, the likelihood seems high that Fischer’s account is not independent verification.

³²⁴Louis Fischer, *The Great Challenge* (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1946), p. 35.

³²⁵Arthur Upham Pope, *Maxim Litvinov* (New York: L.B.Fischer, 1943), p. 473. This information was seemingly given by Litvinov in the U.S. sometime in 1942 or 1943 in a not-for-citation interview with his biographer, Pope.

³²⁶Deakin and Storry (66), 232-247. However, the authors suggest that the Russian intelligence chiefs may have preferred to credit the *German* intelligence reports that they were intercepting. Many of these favored a desired conclusion that Japan would open a much-needed second front against Russia rather than attack the U.S., British, and Dutch possessions in the orient.

illegal wire-tap on Mrs. M. Mori, the Honolulu correspondent of the militaristic Tokyo newspaper, *Yomiuri Shimbun*. On 5 December they monitored the following relevant passage of a trans-Pacific telephone report from Mrs. Mori to some editor or re-write man at her home office:³²⁷

Mori: Here is something interesting. Litvinov . . . arrived here yesterday. I believe he emplaned for the mainland today. He made no statements on any problems.

Yomiuri: Did he make any statements concerning the US-Japan question?

Mori: No, . . . [and] he also did not mention anything pertaining to the Russo-German war. It appears he was ordered by his government not to make any statement.

From this fortuitous fragment we can infer that Litvinov did not make any more than casual remarks in his brief exposure to the press, at least in public.³²⁸

Assuming that Litvinov did have actual intelligence about the Japanese war plans, where and how did he acquire it? His itinerary brought him to Honolulu via Teheran, Baghdad, Calcutta, Singapore, Manila, Guam, Wake, and Midway.³²⁹ Consequently he could not have gotten his information directly from Soviet intelligence in the Embassy in Japan. Much later, Litvinov himself claimed that he had indeed received explicit information about the Japanese intentions. He stated that he had first learned of it during his unscheduled layover during 17-23 November at the Soviet Embassy in Teheran where the relevant intelligence reports had just been forwarded from the Narkomindel, the Soviet foreign office.³³⁰

And on his arrival at Singapore on 28 November, Litvinov again read the latest intelligence at the Soviet consular office. These reports were even more serious. Visiting Government House that day, Litvinov and his English wife, Ivy, discussed the question with the British officials, including Sir Shenton Thomas, the Governor of the Straits Settlements. Litvinov expressed his view that the Japanese would soon attack Britain and America. He flourished one of the Soviet diplomatic signals to this effect to the incredulous Britons.³³¹ Litvinov

³²⁷PHA, Pt. 37 (46), 909-910, for transcript as monitored, and Pt. 39 (46), 451-452 for comments in the Hewitt Report. See also Kahn (67), 48-49, 51-52.

³²⁸Litvinov had arrived on the 4th, stopped overnight at the Royal Hawaiian Hotel, visited Government House on the 5th, and left that same day. See PHA, Pt. 37 (46), 910.

³²⁹Litvinov's itinerary is traced in detail by Pope (43), 468-474; and in *The New York Times* from 10 November to 7 December 1941.

³³⁰Pope (43), 472.

³³¹Pope (43), 472, is wrong in claiming the Litvinovs spoke with either Lieutenant-General Arthur Percival (the G.O.C., Malaya, who was then touring Sarawak) or Duff Cooper (the War Cabinet's itinerant fact-finding member who was then returning from Australia). Although he makes no mention of Litvinov's visit, Cooper (53), 290-300, confirms the optimism rampant in the British colonial administration, excepting only himself and Sir George Sansom, the distinguished Japanologist then heading the S.O.E. station in Singapore. See also *The Times* (London), 29 November 1941, p. 3.

continued to press his view until his departure on the 29th, but without effect.³³² A state of emergency was declared in the Straits Settlements two days later, but the initiative came from London.³³³

In Manila on 30 November, the Litvinovs were house guests of High Commissioner and Mrs. Francis B. Sayre. General and Mrs. Douglas MacArthur were allegedly present. Litvinov again warned of an impending Japanese attack. Again he did not seem to be believed.³³⁴

Litvinov arrived at Washington's National Airport on Sunday morning, December 7th. He was met by some junior American and British foreign service officers and Joseph E. Davies.³³⁵ But, exhausted by his gruelling 25-day journey, he did no more than get through the formalities and a quick lunch with Davies before retreating to his bed in the Soviet Embassy. Four hours later he was awakened to the news that his prediction had been fulfilled.³³⁶

In any case it is quite unlikely that Stalin would have warned the Americans. He surely welcomed a Japanese-American war. It would have greatly diminished or even entirely removed the ever-present threat of a Japanese attack at Russia's back, and Stalin also may have calculated that it would hasten America's entry into the European conflict. Any warning to Washington would have jeopardized this desire without bringing any advantage to Russia. A forewarned America-Stalin might well have reasoned—could better take diplomatic or military measures to discourage the Japanese attack, turning Tokyo's ambitions and priorities once more toward Siberia.

In view of all these considerations, it seems that Litvinov's warnings must surely have been made on his own initiative. Furthermore, we do not have to assume that his own first knowledge came from the information messages to the Soviet Teheran and Singapore offices. Even during most of his tour in political limbo Litvinov held a key post in the Central Committee Secretariat and, after the German invasion, as Stalin's English interpreter. Moreover, two or three of his intimates who survived the purge with him remained in the Foreign Commissariat. Thus, both from his own post and from such old friends as Boris Stein he may well have received whatever earlier intelligence reports were reaching the Central Committee Secretariat or the Narkomindel.³³⁷

³³²Pope (43), 472-473. Again, Pope's source seems to be Litvinov himself and evidently also Madame Litvinov, as a fragment from her diary is quoted on this point.

³³³PHA, V (46), 2071-2072.

³³⁴Pope (43), 473. See also *New York Times*, 1 December 1941, p. 9, and 2 December 1941, p. 5. Pope is seemingly contradicted by Mrs. Woodbury Willoughby, the wife of Sayre's financial adviser, who was present at the dinner. She states that Litvinov only "beamed at everyone and said little." Amea Willoughby, *I Was On Corregidor* (New York: Harper, 1943), p. 10.

³³⁵Pope's assertion that General Marshall (and Admiral King) were among Litvinov's greeters greatly excited Senator Joseph McCarthy in 1952. Dr. Pope promptly admitted his error. In fact, the nation's Chief of Staff was untraceable that critical morning because he was horseriding along the Potomac. See *LIFE*, Vol. 32, No. 15 (14 Apr 1952), pp. 101-110; and *New York Times*, 8 December 1941, p. 8.

³³⁶Pope (43), 473-474. But the *Washington Post*, 8 December 1941, p. 5, and Davis and Lindley (42), 322-323, state that Litvinov was "at lunch with Joseph E. Davies when the word came from Hawaii."

³³⁷Ehrenburg recently recalled that Litvinov had both an outspoken independence of Stalin

In any case, Litvinov's warning to the Britons and Americans was too vague to be noted, much less credited. Moreover, it was but one of many warnings reaching Anglo-American intelligence at the time. It is interesting not because it throws new light on the Pearl Harbor case, but because it illustrates the problem of credibility and policy utility of vague messages delivered by suspect sources, which was exactly the dilemma that had earlier defeated the British and American governments in their efforts to warn the Russians of BARBAROSSA. There is rare irony that the unsuccessfully warned victim of June was ignored by the complacent victim of December.

References

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- Farago (67).
- Kahn (67), 1-67
- Morison, III (50), 48-142.
- James Deane Potter, *Yamamoto* (New York: Viking, 1965).
- Forrest C. Pogue, *George C. Marshall*, Vol. II (New York: Viking, 1966), pp. 193-231, 429-435.
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- Husband E. Kimmel, *Admiral Kimmel's Story* (Chicago: Regnery, 1955).

• Japanese Policy and Plans

- Nobutaka Ike (translator and editor), *Japan's Decision for War: Records of the 1941 Policy Conferences* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1967).
- Morison, III (50), 80-98.
- Wohlstetter (62), 339-381.
- Farago (67), 124-140, 215-223.
- *PHA*, Pt. 13 (46), 391-922.
- Potter (65), Chapters 6-8.

and a knowledge that he lived on only at Stalin's whim (since 1937 Litvinov kept a loaded pistol at his bedside). Ilya Ehrenburg, *Post-War Years, 1945-1954* (London: Macgibbon & Kee, 1966), pp. 276-279.

- **Warnings**

- All references under “General,” above.

- **Surprise**

- All references under “General,” above.

- **Surprise (personal recollections):**

- General Matthew B. Ridgway as told to Harold H. Martin, *Soldier*, (New York: Harper, 1956), p. 48. Ridgway was then a colonel in the War Plans Division.

- **Deception**

- McLachlan (68), 29-30.
- Potter (65), Chapt. 6.
- *PHA*, Pt.13 (46), 397.

Case A31. Malaya, 7-8 Dec 1941: Operation No. 1

Americans “Remember Pearl Harbor” but Britons “Remember Hong Kong” and Singapore. Although the British response to the Japanese diplomatic and military maneuverings leading to 7-8 December 1941 differed only slightly from the American one, a comparative study would be instructive because the differences existed despite nearly identical intelligence.

As in the case of the simultaneous Pearl Harbor attack, the many historians of the Japanese southern operations have failed to enquire about the possible use of strategic deception. Again, as in the Pearl Harbor operation, a *prima facie* case—although, in this instance, a very weak one—can be made out that they did. If so, the history of these two major examples of strategic surprise should, of course, be carefully reassessed.

We do know that *tactical* deception was *planned* by the Japanese 25th Army, which more or less independently planned and directed its own assault on Malaya. For example, Lieutenant Colonel M. Tsuji, the Chief of the Operations and Planning Staff of the 25th Army, had attempted to implement his plan to send the first 1,000-man Japanese battalion across the Malaya border immediately following a secret D-day landing in the Thai border town of Singora by disguising them in Thai uniforms and having them simulate a retiring Thai unit. This ruse aborted only because the Japanese military agent in the Consulate at Singora—who was to obtain the necessary cooperation of the local Thai police—was himself caught quite unprepared when the Japanese arrived. This man, Major Ozone, had prematurely burnt his code book and hence could not read the telegram informing him of the time and date of the operation.³³⁸ (That a conventional tactical diversion was later successfully carried out during the final assault on Singapore in February 2 had, of course, no part in the initial achievement of strategic surprise but does give further proof that the Japanese planning staff were at home with tactical deception.)

Japanese Army commanders in northern French Indochina had received plans for large-scale attacks on the Chinese air base at Kunming, thereby establishing southwest China as a cover target for the actual march into Thailand and Malaya. This Kunming plan was not cancelled until December 3rd.³³⁹ I do not know if this was a deliberate effort to reinforce a known U.S. preconception, but a Japanese move in that direction had bulked large in the projections forwarded to the State Department by both the American service attachés in Japan on 17 July³⁴⁰ and by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek on 30 October.³⁴¹

A mild “cry wolf” effect may have contributed to the lulling of British attention. Around the beginning of February 1941 the British had some sort of-

³³⁸Tsuji (60), 64-67, 83-88. 2Tsuji (60), 234.

³³⁹*United States Strategic Bombing Survey: Interrogations of Japanese Officials*, Reports, Pacific War, No. 72, Vol. “Japanese Air Power,” p. 8, as cited by Wohlstetter (62), 380, 394.

³⁴⁰Farago (67), 208-209. I have been unable to verify this assertion from Farago’s cited sources.

³⁴¹*FRUS:1941*, IV (56), 565-566; and Farago (67), 210.

intelligence that made them conclude the Japanese were apparently planning an offensive on a large scale, and that this was “presumed” to be directed against Indo-China, the Malay Peninsula, or the Dutch East Indies, “no doubt to be coordinated with [an] attack on Great Britain approximately February 10.” At least this is how it appears from the clumsily drafted TOP SECRET dispatch of 3 February from the U.S. Naval Attaché in London to the U.S. Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Stark, based on information officially passed to the attaché from British authorities.³⁴² Although the Japanese had indeed turned a shrewdly appraising eye toward the south, the allegation of detailed operational planning (as opposed to merely rough contingency planning) was quite premature.

The Japanese expeditionary force of transports and warships sailed from Hainan on D-minus-4. On D-minus-2, having come parallel to the Gulf of Siam, the fleet changed course, heading into the Gulf as part of a feint toward Bangkok.³⁴³ The hope was that any British (or American) reconnaissance ships or aircraft would think it was aimed at Siam rather than Malaya. There is some evidence that this maneuver may have succeeded.³⁴⁴

The December sailings of the Japanese expeditionary forces—at least some of them—and their movement south was “not conducted under complete radio silence.” Consequently this movement was noted and (at least partly) tracked by the alert U.S. radio monitors and the British notified.³⁴⁵ However, according to Colonel Tsuji, who was aboard in his capacity as Chief of the 25th Army Operations and Planning Staff, the fleet maintained strict radio silence throughout its voyage.³⁴⁶ These two claims are not necessarily contradictory, if we assume that special security precautions were applied to the Malayan expedition as opposed to the general southern operations. If so, this suggests that the Japanese were perhaps deliberately seeking to manipulate the Allies’ uncertainties about the optional sites of landfall—a characteristic of deception operations.

One of the British official war historians, Gwyer, published the flat assertion in 1964 that it was “probable” that the Japanese used “tactical deception” to befuddle British intelligence about whether the Japanese amphibious stroke would fall in Thailand or directly upon Malaya. Gwyer asserts that the Japanese deliberately floated rumors in Thailand giving it as their intention to land only on the Kra Peninsula, i.e., in southern Thailand. The purpose was presumably to cause the British to preempt and therefore appear the “aggressors.”³⁴⁷ Gwyer’s point is well taken because this action would, in fact, have triggered Operation MATADOR, the British contingency plan to preempt such a landing by immediately moving troops to occupy southern Thailand. The British had foreseen three possible Japanese moves that could threaten Malaya. First,

³⁴²PHA, Pt. 17 (46), 2476; and noted by Kimmel (55), 33.

³⁴³Morison, III (50), 187-188.

³⁴⁴Churchill, III (50), 601, 616.

³⁴⁵PHA, Pt. 11 (46), 5356. Also Kahn (67), 39, 40.

³⁴⁶Tsuji (60). This dilemma can probably be resolved by close examination of the monitoring records or, perhaps, even from Japanese sources.

³⁴⁷Gwyer, III, Pt. 1 (64), 301-302.

a landing at Khota Baru on the northeast coast of Malaya itself. This move would necessarily initiate war. Second, a landing on the Kra Peninsula or at Singora in southern Thailand. At the first clear indication that this was about to take place, the British would initiate Operation MATADOR in the hope of preempting and despite the implied British aggression on Thailand. Third, simultaneous landings in southern Thailand and northern Malaya. This would be treated in the same manner as the first contingency.³⁴⁸ Given this particular set of British perceptions and contingent responses—and the likelihood that the Japanese knew or, at least, assumed these—the stage was set for a deception operation that would use a *fourth* contingency, one not recognized by the British, to lure the British into Thailand and *then* cut them off by a landing at Khota Baru.

The Allies were receiving, sharing, and circulating many confusing reports on this point. For example, on 1 December, the U.S. Chief of Naval Operations (Admiral Stark) notified the U.S. Asiatic Fleet (Admiral Hart) of a curious Japanese intrigue in Malaya whereby they planned to land at Khota Baru in British Malaya itself but near enough to the Thai border to provoke a British countermove across into Thailand, permitting the Thai Government to brand Britain an aggressor and formally invite Japanese aid. This information was quoted by Stark directly from an intercepted message sent on 29 November from Japanese Ambassador Tsubokami in Bangkok to Tokyo.³⁴⁹

A possible clue that the Japanese had carefully coordinated deception to gain surprise is their own assertion that the Dutch in the second-stage target of their Indonesian archipelago were to be “lulled into a sense of security by continuing the economic negotiations at Batavia, while secretly instigating an independence movement among the natives and securing military data for the invasion of the Netherlands East Indies.”³⁵⁰

The 70-day campaign ended—only four days behind schedule—with the surrender of Singapore on 15 February 1942. It had been a shattering defeat for British and white prestige in the Orient.

³⁴⁸Kirby, I (57).

³⁴⁹PHA, Pt. 17 (46), 2484, Pt. 36 (46), 130. This message is noted by Kimmel (55), 50.

³⁵⁰Saburo Hayashi, *Kōgun: The Japanese Army in the Pacific War* (Quantico, Va.: The Marine Corps Association, 1959), p. 199n, quoting the International Military Tribunal Far East *Transcript* for 10 November 1948, pp. 49, 461-463.

	British	Japanese
Troops	90,000	30,000
Divisions	3	3
Aircraft	141	144
Tanks	0	several
Battleships	2	2
Aircraft carriers	0	0
Heavy cruisers	0	7
Light cruisers	3	3
Destroyers	6	24
Submarines	0	12

Table A.49: British and Japanese Strengths. References: Leasor (68), 163, 239, 250-251, 253.

D + 61	Japanese	British
KIA	1,792	
WIA	2,772	
PW, MIA	0	
Totals:	4,564	
D + 69		
KIA	3,507	8,708
WIA	6,150	-
PW	0	130,000
Totals:	9,657	138,708

Table A.50: Casualties. Leasor (68), 258. Barber (68), 288n, gives total Japanese casualties at 9,824.

References

- **Note:** There is no study of December 7th/8th as viewed from London. The voluminous American sources and studies include some relevant British material because of the more-or-less coordinated AngloAmerican intelligence and policy liaison on Japan's activities and intentions. For some reason the British have not seen fit to publish more than a very small and very carefully sifted portion of the voluminous record.
- **General**
 - Major-General S. Woodburn Kirby, *The War Against Japan*, Vol. I (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1957). (An official history.)
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 - Pope (43), 473.
- **Japanese Planning**
 - Kirby, I (57), 89-96.
 - Tsuji (60).
- **Warnings**
 - Pope (43), 473.
- **Intelligence Failure**
 - Attiwill (60). (A damning critique of the monumental failures of intelligence and command.)
 - Kennedy (57), 182.
 - Leasor (68), 161-162.
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 - Morison, III (50), 48-56, 152, 156-157.
- **Anglo-U.S. Intelligence Exchange**
 - Morison, III (50), 157.
 - Wohlstetter (62), 383.
 - Farago (67), 248-261, 315, 321, 338, 343-351.
 - Kahn (67), 10, 23, 45.

- **Surprise**
 - Kirby, I (57).
- **Deception**
 - Kirby, I (57).
 - Tsuji (60), 64-67, 83-88.
 - Gwyer, III, Pt. 1 (64), 301-302.

Example B22. Mersa el Brega, 21 Jan 1942

“If you would keep your secret from an enemy, tell it not to a friend.”

–Benjamin Franklin,
Poor Richard’s Almanac, (1741).

“I had maintained secrecy... and informed neither the Italian nor the German High Command.”

–Rommel, D-day, 21 January 1942.

Forced back by 11 January 1942 to his original starting point on the Cyren-
aican-Tripolitanian border by Cunningham’s Operation CRUSADER,³⁵¹ Rom-
mel seemed even less fit to counterattack than 10 months earlier when he sur-
prised both the British and his own superiors.³⁵² Yet he proceeded to replay
the earlier scenario with similar success.

	German	Italian	Total Axis	Total 8th Army
Tanks	139	89	228	150
Aircraft	?	?	less	more

Table A.51: Axis and Eighth Army Strengths. References: Bayerlein in Rommel (53), 180-181; Churchill, IV (50), 25, 27, 34.

On 21 January, just ten days after his 300 mile retreat, “the improbable occurred: without warning the Axis forces began to advance.” So reads Auchinleck’s official after-battle dispatch.³⁵³

As before, Rommel did enjoy two advantages over the British. First, he was again close to his main supply base at Tripoli. Second, wider strategic considerations had intervened to divert British strength precisely at the point when their final decisive drive was being readied; as with Germany’s invasion of the Balkans before, it was now Japan’s attack in Southeast Asia. Nevertheless, this time, Rommel could expect fewer reinforcements, and Auchinleck was not nearly so denuded as Wavell before him. Indeed, he was ponderously readying his own offensive—for the middle of the *next* month.

As before, Rommel had assured the complete secrecy of his plans by the simplest of expedients—he kept his own counsel. Both the British and German high commands assumed that Rommel was on the defensive. He was, but they forgot that, as before, this did not preclude a defensive counterstroke. On 12 January Rommel’s Chief of Staff, Lieutenant-Colonel Westphal, suggested a counteroffensive. While (wrongly) expecting an imminent final British offensive,

³⁵¹See Example B21.

³⁵²See Case A26.

³⁵³Young (50), 99.

Rommel decided the next morning to do just this,³⁵⁴ but did not so much as hint of his decision to anyone except his own staff and, in letters, his wife. Then on the 20th (or perhaps even the 21st itself) he ordered it.

He wrote in his diary on D-day, the 21st:³⁵⁵

I had maintained secrecy over the ... forthcoming attack ... and informed neither the Italian nor the German High Command. We knew from experience that Italian Headquarters cannot keep things to themselves and that everything they wireless to Rome gets around to British ears. However, I had arranged with the Quartermaster for the [attack] order to be posted up in every [Road Maintenance Depot] in Tripolitania on the 21st January—the day the attack was due to take place.

The Italians were most annoyed, but Rommel's swift success forestalled any disciplinary action.

As usual, Rommel was not content to rely solely on tight security to conceal his intention—in this case, offense—so he again enlisted deception to assure that his rejected alternative—defense—was believed. First, his failure to disclose his reversal of plans to Berlin and Rome served not only the purposes of security but also—and I presume deliberately so—those of deception. Thus, knowing as he did that the Italian (and, unknown to Rommel, the German) military communications were also reaching the British, Rommel could assume that British intelligence would presume those higher headquarters to know Rommel's broad intentions. In other words, by misleading his superiors he was also deceiving the British who were privy to the expectations of those superiors.

Second, Rommel floated the rumor that he intended to abandon his line at Mersa el Brega and retire closer to Tripoli. This rumor spread from his staff to the Italians and from them by British intelligence to Cairo and Cunningham on 18 January (D-minus-3).³⁵⁶ Cunningham was sufficiently skeptical to order increased reconnaissance but this only seemed to corroborate the rumor, particularly as on 20 January on Rommel's orders the Germans had begun burning houses (empty) and exploding ships (hulks) at Mersa el Brega.³⁵⁷

Rommel's offensive wrecked and routed the one British armored division (by D-plus-2), just missed trapping their infantry division (D-plus-6), took Bengazi with its vast stores of supplies and POL intact (D-plus-8), and forced the British to withdraw to Gazala where they dug in. Rommel had advanced over 250 miles in two weeks (D-plus-14). The Eighth Army had lost over 100 tanks.

³⁵⁴Carell (61), 126-127; and Rommel (53), 179-180, quoting his letters to his wife dated January 14, 17, 19, 20, and 21.

³⁵⁵Rommel (53), 180.

³⁵⁶Carell (61), 127.

³⁵⁷Carell (61), 128.

References

- **General**

- Carell (61), 125-139.
- Barnett (61), 125-129.
- Rommel (53), 179-183.
- Churchill, IV (50), 20-35.

- **Security**

- Rommel (53), 179-180, 181.

- **Surprise**

- Barnett (61), 125.
- Tedder (66), 232, 235.
- Churchill, IV (50), 27.
- Young (50), 99.
- Bryant (57), 270.

- **Deception**

- Carell (61), 127, 128-129.
- Churchill, IV (50), 29 (feint), 31 (hint of a planted intercept).

Example B23. Kerch, 8 May 1942: Operation BUSTARD

Wehrmacht General Erich von Manstein executed a surprise-through-deception tactical breakthrough at Kerch in mid-1942. His Eleventh Army was then operating in the Crimea, the most isolated section of the southern front in Russia.

Manstein achieved surprise by striking at the point the Russians least expected, where the sheer difficulties of terrain precluded an easy attack. Manstein deliberately and wittingly chose that particular approach because he correctly judged the Russians would only lightly guard it.

A deception plan was then put into effect to confirm the Russians in their preconceived false estimate of the most probable direction of the German attack. To do this Manstein employed a wide range of ruses: radio deception, “Quaker guns,” and false deployments.

For relatively light German casualties he inflicted a major defeat on the Russians, who lost not only the Kerch beachhead into the Crimea but 100,000 prisoners as well, by D-plus-10.

References

- **General**

- Field-Marshal Erich von Manstein, *Lost Victories* (Chicago: Regnery, 1958), pp. 231-238.

- **Surprise**

- Manstein (58).

- **Deception**

- Manstein (58), 234, 235-236.

Case A32. Gazala (Western Desert), 26 May 1942: Fall VENEZIA

The Battle of Gazala (the Germans call it *Marmarica*) was fought in the Western Desert from 26 May to 15 June 1942. The British Eighth Army was still commanded by Lieutenant-General Sir Neil Ritchie and directed from Cairo by General Sir Claude Auchinleck, the Commander-in-Chief Middle East Forces. Auchinleck had scheduled his own offensive for 15 May but had had it deferred to 15 June by London in order to await reinforcements that would give marked superiority in numbers. This was a fatal error because it meant that Colonel-General Rommel would preempt with his Panzerarmee Afrika, as he had timed his own offensive for 26 May, having done so the previous month in the face of much evidence³⁵⁸ of Ritchie's build-up.

The two armies were rather evenly matched. Each numbered about 100,000 troops. The Axis had 9 understrength divisions and the Eighth Army had 7 division equivalents at full strength.

Divisions	Axis			8th Army	Total
	German	Italian	Total		
Armored	2	1	3	2-2/3	
Motorized	1	1	2	-	
Infantry	1/3	4	4-1/3	4-2/3	
Totals:	3-1/3	6	9-1/3	6-4/3	

Table A.52: Division Strengths of Axis and Eighth Army.

They were evenly matched in the air, the 542 Axis planes including some better fighters than the 604 British aircraft. Eighth Army did enjoy an edge in armor; but, as this was to be a tank battle, this was a most significant advantage. The Germans had 320 tanks, the Italians contributed 240 light tanks and 90 motorized guns; The Eighth Army had 847 tanks with an additional 145 far enough along in the "pipeline" that they arrived during the prolonged battle. The Eighth Army was also much stronger in armored cars and artillery. The only real German advantage was that they had Rommel while Churchill's impatient dumping of a succession of commanders had brought to the fore in Ritchie a singularly cautious and unimaginative man.

Rommel's intelligence officer, Major von Mellenthin, admits that an accurate appreciation of Eighth Army order of battle, deployment, and intentions were greatly hindered by its excellent security (particularly wireless silence), camouflage, "misleading information from agents," and defensive air and land screens to inhibit direct reconnaissance.³⁵⁹

In any case, Rommel's attack took Ritchie by a surprise that triggered the "Gazala Gallop," one of the less creditable retrograde movements of British

³⁵⁸See Mellenthin (56), 93, 94n.

³⁵⁹Mellenthin (56), 94.

D + 12	German	Italian	Total Axis	Total British
KIA, WIA	?	?	2,000	2,000
MIA, PW	1,660	2,340	4,000	8,000
Totals:	?	?	6,000	10,000

D + 55				
KIA	2,300	1,000	3,300	?
WIA	7,500	10,000+	17,500	?
MA, PW	2,700	c.5,000	7,700	60,000
Totals:	12,500	16,000	28,500	80,000+

Table A.53: British and Axis Casualties. References: Rommel (53), 263; Churchill, IV (50), 365.

arms.

In this disaster, Eighth Army casualties to D + 27 stood at 80,000, mostly prisoners, 33,000 of whom were captured at the fall of Tobruck on 21 June alone.

References

• General

- Barnett (60), 130-165.
- Liddell Hart, *The Tanks*, II (59), 152-180.
- Young (50), 101-109, 237-242.
- Collier (67), 330-346.
- Carell (61), 159-184.
- Rommel (53), 191-224.
- Churchill, IV (50), 357-373.
- Mellenthin (56), 92-113.

• Warnings

- Tedder (66), 277-280, 288.
- Guingand (47), 106-110.
- Barnett (60), 138-139.

• Surprise

- Barnett (60), 139-142.
- Guingand (47), 109, 114.
- Mellenthin (56), 97.

• Deception

- Carell (61), 160, 161, 192.
- Young (50), 237-238.
- Rommel (53), 202, 206.
- Mellenthin (56), 98.

Case A33. Midway, 3 Jun 1942: Operation MI

Admiral Yamamoto made a confident effort to cap Pearl Harbor by a surprise attack *coup de grâce* (Operation MI) against the greatly outnumbered surviving U.S. Pacific Fleet at Midway on 3-4 June 1942. Instead, he met ambush and a stunning defeat by Admiral Nimitz whose cryptanalysts literally stole the victory from Japan. With the back of its carrier force broken, the Imperial Navy was henceforward on the defensive. Nimitz summed up his victory in the statement: “In attempting surprise, the Japanese were themselves surprised.” He acknowledged that “Midway was essentially a victory of intelligence.”

Nimitz’ cryptanalysts had given him the key to victory by their solution of Yamamoto’s detailed and comprehensive operations order of 20 May. Nimitz knew with complete confidence the Japanese fleet strength, deployment, strategy, timetable, and place of attack. Moreover, Nimitz even had full knowledge of the Japanese Naval General Staff’s secondary plan, a prior raid on the Aleutians, part demonstration to mislead Nimitz and part interdiction of any American bombers from there.

Diversionary attacks by Japanese submarines were also mounted against Madagascar and Sydney. I do not know if these minor feints were known to U.S. intelligence. Counter-surprise by Nimitz had bought 4 Japanese carriers and one cruiser at the cost of only one American carrier and one destroyer.

References

- General

- Kahn (67), 561-573, 603-604, 606.
- Walter Lord, *Incredible Victory* (New York: Harper & Row, 1967), pp. 7, 9, 15-28, 76.

Example B24. Tobruk, 20-21 Jun 1942: Operation DOUBLE BED

In his sweep back into Egypt during the Battle of Gazala³⁶⁰ in May-June 1942, Rommel bypassed Tobruk, and began its second siege.

The garrison, commanded by Major-General H. B. Kiopper, comprised 35,000 men of whom 10,000 were base and area personnel. The combat units were one division of South African infantry, one brigade of Indian infantry, 3 battalions of British infantry, 2 regiments of field artillery, 2 regiments of armor with 54 tanks, and 69 anti-tank guns and 18 anti-aircraft guns.

Rommel's strategy was the same as he had planned during the first siege. Lieutenant-Colonel "Freddie" de Guingand, Auchinleck's Director of Military Intelligence, had surmised this. Moreover the D.M.I. had captured a complete copy of Rommel's attack orders which were flown up to Eighth Army and subsequently dropped into the besieged fortress, but without effect.³⁶¹

Rommel's deception plan, Operation DOUBLE BED, was so simple that it has been generally overlooked. It hinged on making it appear to the British that he would repeat his strategy of April 1941 when he invested but did not divert forces to assault Tobruk until 10 weeks later after his drive toward the great prize of Cairo had been halted by British resistance. This time, Rommel decided to give Tobruk much higher priority as a target. He repeated the pattern only up to a point: while lightly investing the perimeter—mainly with Italian infantry—he pressed forward 60 miles further with his German armor until he reached the more-or-less important coastal town of Bardia. There he immediately made his personal presence known to Eighth Army Intelligence by sending some key radio orders in the clear. These referred to Operation DOUBLE BED which even his own radio intercept monitors interpreted as referring to an imminent operation against Bardia. His radio intercept service also knew that their British counterparts had monitored these messages and reported on them to higher headquarters. However, having implanted this false lead, Rommel and his assault units turned straight around and during the night of 19-20 June, rushed back to Tobruk in time for their dawn attack.³⁶²

After a brief shelling and bombing preparation by artillery and planes (80 Stukas and 100 bombers), the ground assault by both of Rommel's Panzer divisions and two Italian divisions went in.

Communications quickly became a shambles both between the beleaguered

³⁶⁰See Case A32.

³⁶¹Guingand (47), 123; Carell (61), 58-70. In fact, the Germans had already learned on 17 or 18 November 1941 from a POW that British intelligence was in possession of Rommel's Tobruk plan. Carell (61), 73.

³⁶²Carell (61), 192. Unfortunately Carell does not specify his source for this highly relevant information, but it may come—at least in part—from an interview with Karl Dorn, a wireless operator with the 200th Panzer Intelligence Unit. Although the author was sufficiently "de-Nazified" to head the Secretariat of the Bonn Parliament while writing his series of internationally best-selling histories of World War II, his German and foreign publishers never disclose to the reader that Paul Carell is not only a pseudonym but specifically that of Dr. Paul Otto Schmidt (1899-), the official interpreter-rapporteur for Ribbentrop and Hitler.

garrison and Eighth Army HQ and within Tobruk itself. Numerous false reports were circulating by telephone and it has been suggested—on no specific evidence—that some of these may have been the work of German intelligence.³⁶³

At 0500 the next morning Rommel entered the city itself. At 0940 the famed bastion surrendered, only 26 hours after the beginning of the assault. At most a few hundred men escaped east to rejoin Eighth Army, leaving about 33,000 for the POW camps, together with 2,000 serviceable vehicles and much fuel and provisions.

The next day Rommel was promoted Field-Marshal.

References

- **General**

- Barnett (60), 148-162.
- Carell (61), 185-199.
- Anthony Heckstall-Smith, *Tobruk* (New York: Norton, 1960), 209-248.
- Churchill, IV (50), 413-431.

- **Intelligence**

- Guingand (47), 123.

- **Deception**

- Carell (61), 192.
- Heckstall-Smith (60), 240.

³⁶³Heckstall-Smith (60), 240.

Case A34. Summer Offensive in Russia, 28 Jun 1942: Case BLUE

By February 1942 the Russian's winter counteroffensive had stalled and Hitler was deeply involved in planning his forthcoming summer offensive in Russia. As before, he alone planned grand strategy. Moreover, since December when he had replaced Field-Marshal Von Brauchitsch as Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Hitler had also extended his secretive and capricious style to the central *operational* planning. Thus the summer offensive plans underwent several sudden and bewildering changes in both objectives and timing that surprised and confused the German military staffs as well as the Russians.

The proliferation of mutually exclusive plans made it impossible for OKW to develop effective supporting deception operations. For example, sometime in mid-February OKW (and OKH) issued written instructions with the object of misleading the Russians and on 23 February the Navy (OKM) ordered preparations for operations in the Black Sea, thinking it to be a feint. However, these efforts soon backfired as Hitler gradually shifted his sights to the south, turning Moscow and Leningrad into increasingly secondary targets.³⁶⁴

Code-names are assigned to military operations for several reasons: brevity, explicitness, prestige, and magic, but also for security.³⁶⁵ However, security—specifically the suspicion that a code-name is compromised—edges out prestige and magic as the main reason for *changing* them. Thus the German summer offensive was originally called SIEGFRIED. However, on 5 April it was changed to Fall BLAU (“Case BLUE”), Hitler having after BARBAROSSA become shy of coupling heroic and legendary names with the vagaries of battle. Then, on 30 June, D-plus-2, it was finally changed to BRAUNSCHWEIG (“Brunswick”) for fear of it having become known to the Russians.³⁶⁶

On 5 April 1942 Hitler issued War Directive No. 41, formally specifying that the renewal of the German offensive in Russia would strike through the Southern Front. The immediate goal was to trap and destroy the Russian defenders before they could withdraw behind the Don River. The larger strategic political-military goal was to exploit the expected enemy collapse on that front by a drive to the much needed oil of the Caucasus.

To mask their intentions the OKW evidently launched a major deception campaign to divert the attention of the Russians from the Southern Front and convince them that the forthcoming German offensive would come straight through the center to Moscow. We know the details of the important contribution to this plan made by Propaganda Minister Goebbels.

³⁶⁴Warlimont (64), 229-230, 615n6, citing the still unpublished OKW order Number 55328/42 g. Chfs WFStab/Op and the OKM 1/Sk1 order Number 1-275/42 g.Kdos Chfs dated 23 February 1942.

³⁶⁵The almost universal but quite misleading assertion is made by books and manuals on security and intelligence that security is the only consideration in assigning operational code-names. This mistakes the ideal for the real, as examination of past practice in Britain, the U.S., and Germany shows.

³⁶⁶Warlimont (64), 231, 615n11.

That day and the next—April 5 and 6—Lieutenant-Colonel Hans Martin, the OKW Liaison Officer with the Propaganda Ministry, visited Goebbels at his country home. There they:³⁶⁷

... canvassed the possibilities of camouflaging our impending offensive. Unfortunately the eyes of all international observers are turned in the direction of the southern sector of our Eastern Front, in other words, to the very point where the first offensive action is to take place. The task of German propaganda will therefore consist of focusing international attention on either the central or northern front. It remains to be seen what chances we shall have for so doing. We have already published a number of articles in military periodicals pointing out that possession of the capital is always the determining factor in war, but the opposition thus far hasn't bitten.

Goebbels' campaign opened with the same type of ruse he had used for BARBAROSSA³⁶⁸—planting an “unauthorized” article in the press and, then, after some copies had reached enemy intelligence channels, ostentatiously suppressing it and publicly reprimanding the author for “lack of discipline” in “revealing” war plans. The *Frankfurter Zeitung* was selected as the most appropriate vehicle for the planted article. (Although the Nazis now completely controlled this once famed liberal newspaper, they were careful to preserve a sham appearance of its independence in order to use it as an outlet for just such deceptions.)³⁶⁹ The “unauthorized” article was prepared on May 15th and published in the *Frankfurter Zeitung* on the 20th when it was officially suppressed and then denounced during a press conference.³⁷⁰

To follow up the *Frankfurter Zeitung* piece, Goebbels gained OKW approval on 23 May for a second:³⁷¹

... camouflaged article written to divert attention to the central front. I am going to try to have this article placed through middlemen either in the Turkish or the Portuguese press. That will be quite difficult, as the authorship of this article will probably become evident, in which case the article would cause harm rather than do good. But one must now try everything possible to cover the whole situation with a veil of secrecy until the big assaults begin.

Goebbels' part in the deception effort included a second type of deception operation—rumor. As early as April 6th he formulated a plan to send a prominent German Journalist, Dr. Otto Kriegk, to Portugal to spread rumors of the

³⁶⁷Goebbels (48), 162, item for 6 Apr 1942. See also pp. 129, 137, 142 for earlier disclosures by Hitler, of his summer offensive plans. Riess (48), 223, says this deception mission was assigned to Goebbels by Hitler himself.

³⁶⁸See Whaley, *Operation BARBAROSSA*, (69), Chapter III.

³⁶⁹Comment by Louis P. Lochner in Goebbels (48), 214.

³⁷⁰Goebbels (48), 214, 221, entries for 15 and 20 May 1942.

³⁷¹Goebbels (48), 226, entry for 23 May 1942.

summer offensive, but pointing to a front other than the intended southern one. Kriegk was chosen because of his reputation among the foreign press corps as a talkative drunk. To give credence to his “inside” expertise, Kriegk was to be packed off on a one week tour of the Russian central front.³⁷² On the 21st of the next month, while articles by Kriegk authenticating his recent trip to the central front were appearing in the German press, Goebbels briefed him on his forthcoming trip to Portugal, scheduled for the 26th. Kriegk was, while simulating drunkenness at a Lisbon bar:³⁷³

to commit several indiscretions along the lines that our coming offensive is not planned for the south, but for the center. He is to say that he has exact information on this matter and that he has been able to convince himself of its accuracy by a personal visit [to the Eastern Front, as authenticated by his just-published articles]. . . . I hope that [these remarks] will then quickly reach the ears of neutral and even enemy journalists. These will report them with lightning speed to London and Moscow. Whether we shall succeed thereby in diverting attention from the south, is not yet clear. But one does what one can.

Although Goebbels was clearly leaving far more to chance than he need have, Hitler fully approved these several attempts on May 23rd when briefed by Goebbels.³⁷⁴ Unfortunately Goebbels’ diary entries for the next six months are missing so we are not told the outcome of this effort.

In any case, Higgins asserts (without noting the deception plan) that:³⁷⁵

Fortunately for the early stages of Operation BLAU, the bulk of the Soviet Air Force still remained in the north against the anticipated renewal of the German attack on Moscow.

Hitler’s Case BLUE offensive had been scheduled for late May, but was preempted on 12 May by an otherwise unsuccessful 40-division offensive launched in the same sector by Timoshenko to recapture Kharkhov. In this connection there is interesting evidence that the Russians used crude strategic deception in launching their own surprise offensive. This evidence appears in the one entry in the OKW War Diary that makes explicit mention of Germany’s behind-the-Russian-lines intelligence. The Diary entry for 12 May, the very day of the Russian attack, refers to (curiously incorrect) intelligence:³⁷⁶

. . . reports from Kuibyshev, according to which the Russians are planning to counter our planned offensive by proceeding to attack themselves along the entire front.

³⁷²Goebbels (48), 162-163, entry for 6 Apr 1942. See also Riess (48), 223, who says Goebbels planned to send Herr Kriegk to the Balkans to carry out his rumormongering.

³⁷³Goebbels (48), 223, entry for 21 May 1942. See also under 20 May.

³⁷⁴Goebbels (48), 228, entry for 23 May 1942.

³⁷⁵Higgins (66), 201.

³⁷⁶OKW *Kriegstagebuch*, entry for 12 May 1942, as quoted by Jong (56), 238-239.

In any case, the Germans countered locally on the 17th with their own long-planned FRIDERICUS I riposte, which by the month's end had virtually destroyed Timoshenko's army. The Russians lost 100,000 or more prisoners to the Germans 20,000 total casualties.

Up to this time the Russians had been receiving (and lately crediting) detailed and generally accurate information on the German strategic plans and order-of-battle. This information had been flowing from high sources (such as the OKW) to Rudolf Rössler ("Lucy") and thence to the superb Soviet Military Intelligence (GRU) network in Switzerland headed by Alexander Rado. These messages were then sent by one of Rado's radio operators, Alexander Foote, to the GRU Director in Moscow. However, at the end of the war, in Moscow in March 1945, the Director told Foote that the only false message to ever come from Rössler had been one dealing with the German order of battle that became the basis for Timoshenko's disastrous drive on Kharkov. As an immediate consequence the GRU discounted Rössler's messages for the next "months" as possible Abwehr plants.³⁷⁷ (While great mystery still surrounds Rössler's *faux pas* at this time, I would suggest that Rössler's error was due more to incomplete than to false intelligence, for whatever his sources the German planning of this particular campaign was marked by an unprecedented degree of unresolved inconsistencies in the many orders coming from OKH, OKW, and Hitler.)³⁷⁸

The Wehrmacht finally launched its great offensive drive on 28 June. But the Russians had been partly informed—apparently mainly from having captured nine days earlier the German battle plan of the opening drive on Voronezh, as the pertinent "Lucy" (Rössler) intelligence was then being discounted. Consequently the Russians were able to avoid a disastrous battle by a—for once—somewhat orderly withdrawal behind the Don.

Seemingly Stalin remained convinced of the threat to Moscow even after the southern offensive, if we can believe his own speech of 6 November 1942 in which he proudly declared that:³⁷⁹

...the purpose of the advance to the south was ... to divert our reserves as far as possible from Moscow and to weaken the Moscow front so as to make it easier to strike at Moscow. In short, the principal objective of the German summer offensive was to surround Moscow and to end the war this year.

³⁷⁷Foote (49), 98, 205-206. In their generally inaccurate study, Accoce and Quet (67), 129-133, 146-150, 153-157, treat this event as the *high point* of Rössler's reputation with Moscow and the source of Moscow's warning on Operation BLUE: As usual, they cite no source and are oblivious of Foote's well-known testimony on this point.

³⁷⁸See Clark (65), 188-192.

³⁷⁹Riess (48), 227.

References

- **General**
 - Higgins (66), 199-203.
 - Carell (64), 476-487.
 - Ziemke (68), 15-22.
- **Planning**
 - Warlimont (64), 229-233, 242-243.
- **Disclosures**
 - Ciano (46), entry for 29-30 Apr 1942, for Ribbentrop's disclosure to Ciano that the offensive would hit the southern front.
- **Warnings**
 - Carell (64), 513-520.
 - Goerlitz (63), 54-55, 57.
- **Surprise**
 - Higgins (66), 201.
 - Foote (49), 98, 205-206.
- **Deception**
 - Goebbels (48), entries for 6 April and 15, 20, 21, 23 May 1942.
 - M[orris] J[anowitz], "Propaganda for Strategic Deception," in William E. Daugherty (editor), *A Psychological Warfare Casebook* (Baltimore: Operations Research Office, The Johns Hopkins University, 1958), pp. 381-382. Although his only source is 'the well-indexed Goebbels' Diary, Professor Janowitz somehow managed to overlook the entry for 6 April 1941, thereby missing the key facts about OKW involvement, more than one planted article, and Kriege's original tour of the Eastern front being merely part of his "cover."
 - Warlimont (64), 230.
 - Riess (60), 223, 227.

Example B25. Makin Atoll, 17-18 Aug 1942

This example of tactical surprise is the smallest-scale operation included in this study.

The American objective was a hit-and-run amphibious raid on the four square-mile Japanese-held atoll of Makin, in the Gilberts. It had a garrison of only 43 men under Sergeant Major Kanemitsu. The raid's mission was to destroy enemy installations, collect intelligence, test such raiding tactics, boost homefront morale, and divert some Japanese attention from the recent Guadalcanal-Tulagi landings further south in the Solomons.

The U.S. force comprised 222 Marines of the 2nd Raider Battalion ("Carlson's Raiders") under the personal command of Lieutenant Colonel Evans F. Carlson. (His executive officer was Major James Roosevelt.) They left Pearl Harbor on 8 August, stuffed aboard two large fleet submarines. Arriving off Makin on the 16th, they reconnoitered for a day before landing.

The case is not one of strategic surprise, because the Japanese high command was vaguely aware that the U.S. was preparing an offensive somewhere in the area. Hence a general alert had already been in effect for several days when the Marines arrived off Makin.³⁸⁰

While, strictly speaking, stratagem was not used to gain surprise, Carlson did deliberately select as his point of landing the beach that had the most difficult approach. He did this on the correct assumption that it would be least guarded. Thus, despite mechanical failures, delays, and general confusion of darkness in getting his 19 rubber boats ashore, all men were landed without the Japanese being alerted. Indeed, the alert was given only when one Marine accidentally fired his weapon.

On D-day, a Japanese transport with 60 reinforcements was sunk by the 6-inch gunfire from one of the subs, but two flying-boats managed to bring in about 35 reinforcements that day.

The atoll was secured on D-plus-1, a few surviving defenders having escaped to nearby islets. In their confused haste to depart that day, nine Marines were inadvertently left behind to be captured and subsequently beheaded. Haste was needed, however, for the Japanese rushed up over a thousand troops from the Marshalls and landed them on Makin the day after the Marine Raiders had left.

D + 1	U. S.	Japanese
KIA	21	86
WIA	20+	?
PW	9	0
Totals:	50	86*

Table A.54: Casualties. *Note: Not counting the 60 drowned in the sunk transport. References: Morison, IV (50), 240; and Blankfort (47), 4, 53, 67.

³⁸⁰Morison, IV (50), 237. But see Blankfort (47), 38, who asserts the Japanese had some specific warning that Makin would be a target.

References

- **General**

- Morrison, IV (50), 235-241.
- Michael Blankfort, *The Big Yankee: The Life of Carlson of the Raiders* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1947), pp. 4-6, 38-70.
- F.O. Hough, V.E. Ludwig, and H.I. Shaw, Jr. *Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal: History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II*, Vol. I, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Marine Corps, 1958), pp. 284-286.

- **Warnings**

- Morrison, IV (50), 237.
- Blankfort (47), 38.

- **Surprise**

- Morrison, IV (50), 237.
- Blankfort (47), 42-43.

Example B26. Dieppe, 19 Aug 1942: Operation JUBILEE

Operation JUBILEE (originally called RUTTER) was a large-scale raid on German-held Dieppe by an amphibious force of 6,000 Canadian troops and British Commandos.

Deception-aided tactical surprise was achieved. However, poor British intelligence and planning had landed the expedition in the very midst of an unexpectedly strong German garrison that quickly rallied. In the subsequent disaster the Allies suffered 60% casualties in their assault units alone.

	British	German
KIA, DOW	258	316
WIA	897	326
PW	1,894	30
MIA	1,335	-
Totals:	4,384	672

Table A.55: British and German Casualties at Dieppe (Including naval and airforce). Mordal (63), 245-246, 249; Robertson (62), 385-386; Thomson (57), 209-211.

References

• General

- Terence Robertson, *Dieppe* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1962), pp. 136, 152, 169-176, 179-183, 387-389, 400, 408.
- Fergusson (61), 172-174.
- R.W. Thompson, *At Whatever Cost: The Story of the Dieppe Raid* (New York: Coward-McCann, 1957).
- Jacques Mordal, *Dieppe* (London: Souvenir Press, 1963).

• Security

- Robertson (62), 152-156.

• Intelligence

- Robertson (62), 172-176, 183, 400.

• Warnings

- Captain S. W. Roskill, “The Dieppe Raid and the Question of German Foreknowledge: A Study in Historical Responsibility,” *Journal of the Royal United Service Institution*, Vol. 109, No. 633 (February 1964), pp. 27-31. An official British historian of WW II demonstrates that the Germans had only vague indications of a raid, *somewhere* along the Channel coast, *some-time* that year. Roskill effectively lays the irresponsible charges by Mr. David Irving (in the *Daily Telegraph*, beginning 9 September 1963) that

the Germans had precise warning due to alleged indiscretions by Mountbatten.

– Robertson (62), 179-180.

- **Surprise**

– Roskill (64).

– Robertson (62), 136, 387-388.

- **Deception**

– Robertson (62), 169-171, 180-183, 388.

Example B27. Alam Halfa, 31 Aug 1942

For his first battle, eighteen days after receiving command of the British Eighth Army, Lieutenant-General Montgomery planned³⁸¹ a trap for the forthcoming offensive by Field-Marshal Rommel. Hoping to entice Rommel's armored drive onto slow-going sand, several deceptions were employed.

The British ruses included planting of a false "going map" of the terrain on the Germans that decided the direction of their drive. While attempting a wide out-flanking sweep in and up to the Alam Halfa ridge, the German tanks bogged in the sand and were soon repulsed by the waiting Eighth Army, which was not only fully dug in but had actually rehearsed their defence.³⁸² This twist on the old haversack ruse was devised by Brigadier De Guingand, a former intelligence officer under Wavell and Auchinleck, now serving as Montgomery's Chief of Staff.

	German	Italian	Total Axis	Total 8th Army
Tanks	200	240	440	700
Aircraft	?	?	570	500

Table A.56: Strengths of Axis and Eighth Army at Alam Halfa. References: Collier (67), 350.

The British victory not only achieved its goal of spoiling Rommel's offensive but also inflicted proportionately greater casualties (Table A.57)

D + 6	German	Italian	Total Axis	Total 8th Army
KIA			570	?
WIA			1,800	?
MIA			270	?
PW			300	350
Total				
Casualties	1,859	c.1,081	2,940	1,750
Tanks	c.40	11	51	68
Aircraft	36	5	41	68

Table A.57: Axis and Eighth Army Casualties and Losses. References: Collier (67), 353; Rommel (53), 283; Churchill, IV (50), 548. The British had incorrectly "estimated" German-Italian casualties at 4,800.

³⁸¹Or, more accurately, adapted a plan devised by Auchinleck.

³⁸²Without examining all the readily available German evidence, Liddell Hart and the British Official History dismiss the effectiveness of this ruse. However, it evidently did influence Rommel's strategy. This is verified by Bayerlein (Rommel's Chief of Staff), Mellenthin (Rommel's Deputy First General Staff Officer), and Von Thoma, who arrived subsequently (20 September) to command the German forces in the field until his capture at Alamein in November. See Liddell Hart, I (59), 219; and Playfair, III (60), 384n.

Although British losses in tanks and aircraft were slightly greater, Rommel could not afford this nominally favorable proportion, given Montgomery's initial advantage and more rapid rate of replenishment. Montgomery, having won his easy battle, failed to exploit his overwhelming advantage and permitted Rommel to withdraw on his own terms to fight again.

References

- **General**

- Liddell Hart, *The Tanks*, II (59), 214-225.
- Rommel (53), 260-286.
- Thompson, I (67), 95-107.
- Young (50), 144-147, 246-247.
- Churchill, IV (50), 545-548.

- **Surprise**

- Rommel (53), 272-278.

- **Deception**

- Guingand (47), 147-148, including copies of the false and real “going” maps.
- Hunt (66), 124-125.
- Mellenthin (56), 144.
- Lieutenant-General Fritz Bayerlein, “El Alamein” in Freiden and Richardson (56), 104.
- Field-Marshal Earl Alexander of Tunis, *The Alexander Memoirs*, 1940-1945 (London: Cassell, 1963), p. 25.
- Playfair, III (60), 383-384, who however leaves the point moot as to whether the map-in-the-haversack ruse influenced Rommel's plan.
- Lieut.-General Sir Brian Horrocks, *Escape to Action* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1961), pp. 120-121, 128. As commander XIII Corps, Horrocks was then directly involved in the “going” map ruse.

Case A35. Alamein, 23 Oct 1942: Operation LIGHTFOOT

When, on 23 October 1942, Lieutenant-General Montgomery launched the second Battle of Alamein, the German command was astonished. As Tedder, the then Air C.-in-C., Middle East, summed up: “A most elaborate campaign of deception had successfully misled the enemy’s Intelligence.” So much so that while Montgomery had at most hoped for *tactical* surprise (concealing the exact time and places of his main thrusts) he, in fact, achieved full strategic surprise as well.³⁸³ The German intelligence appreciations in Berlin and North Africa had categorically rejected the possibility of an early British offensive in the desert and had even recalled Rommel to Berlin for discussions, medical treatment, and rest.³⁸⁴

Only Rommel (and his staff) felt some apprehension. Thus on 9 September—six weeks before Alamein—he wrote in one of his characteristically indiscreet letters to his wife that he was “inclined to think that [Churchill is] considering launching a new offensive with superior forces in four to six weeks’ time.”³⁸⁵ Rommel, in his desire “to bring about some postponement of the British offensive,” used the occasion of press interviews in early October while in Germany to give an overly-optimistic account.³⁸⁶ However, his private effort at strategic deception had no significant effect, if any.

The Eighth Army’s deception plan, BERTRAM, was designed by Colonel Charles Richardson, the G.S.O. 1 of Eighth Army headquarters’ planning staff. It included the following elements among, I presume, others. Bogus radio traffic. A dummy pipe-line laid at a slow pace to suggest that D-day was not until early November. The secret troop redeployments that began on D-minus-17 were covered by dummy vehicles, tanks, guns, and command posts. To imply that the main British blow would come in the south, a feint was made there at Deir el Munassib on 30 September.

Churchill was widely believed to have stated that Britain would be able to hold on in Egypt only a few months longer.³⁸⁷ Whether or not this story was a British hoax, part of BERTRAM, I do not know.

As late as 20 October, the Germans (specifically General Stumme) expected the British offensive any time and at any point but most likely in the south, as the British intended.

Montgomery has been widely faulted—including by the Germans—for having failed to follow his previous luring defensive at Alam Haifa by an immediate of-

³⁸³Contrary to the assertion of the anti-Montgomery clique such as Thompson, I (67), 134, 139, 140, who in their haste to shred the Montgomery legend fail to look over the hill to the German evidence.

³⁸⁴Rommel had then been in Germany for three weeks. Hitler apprised him of the desperate situation around noon of the 24th. He left for Africa the next morning and reached his battle headquarters that evening.

³⁸⁵Rommel (53), 290, and also 296.

³⁸⁶Rommel (53), 295.

³⁸⁷Rommel to Frau Rommel, letter dated 9 September 1942 in Rommel (53), 290.

	German	Italian	Total Axis	Total 8th Army
Men	53,000	43,000	96,000	220,000
Divisions	3	9	12	11
Tanks	219	339	557	1,100
Guns	?	?	less	1,200
Aircraft	?	?	less	1,200

Table A.58: German and Italian Strengths. References: Rommel (53), 296-297, 302, 336; Barnett(60), 121, 256-257; Churchill, IV (50), 586-587; Collier (67), 358-360.

D+20/D+12	Axis			Total
	German	Italian	Total	8th Army
KIA	1,100	1,000	2,100	?
WIA	3,900	1,600	5,500	?
MIA, PW	7,900	16,000	23,900	?
Totals:	12,900	18,600	31,500	13,500
Tanks			500	432
Guns			400	0?

Table A.59: Casualties and Loss of Tanks & Guns at Alamein. References: Rommel (53), 336, 355, 358; Barnett (60), 121, 271. At D + 8 General Alexander estimated total Eighth Army casualties at 10,130.

fensive. While it is true he was constitutionally incapable of exploiting sudden opportunities—choosing always his cautious set-piece “Master Plan”—he also had the rare capability of planning his next battle while still in the midst of the earlier. Thus, the detailed planning for Alamein was underway before Alam Haifa was ended. This far-sightedness extended to the deception planning. When on 7 September Lieutenant-General Brian Horrocks, commander of XIII Corps, pleaded to be allowed to press ahead to take the Germans’ commanding observation sight of Himeimat Hill, Montgomery refused, saying:³⁸⁸

What is the good of constructing all these dummies [the fake dumps and pipe-line] if the Germans cannot see them? Leave them in possession of Himeimat. That is where I want them to be.

The Battle of Alamein ended on D + 16. It had been a spectacular triumph for Montgomery. The Axis had incurred 59,000 casualties (34,000 Germans and 25,000 Italians killed, wounded, or captured) and lost 500 tanks, 400 guns, and thousands of vehicles. British losses were only 13,500 casualties (killed, wounded, and missing) with 432 tanks out of action. Montgomery now pressed Rommel into his long retreat that did not end until the Wehrmacht was expelled from Africa, 1,400 miles later. However, Montgomery’s exploitation of his initial advantage was characteristic of the man: a careful dull business that permitted Rommel the rare luxury of a planned orderly withdrawal. Moreover, the Alamein offensive was unnecessary, for the Allied landings in North Africa on D + 15 would have forced Rommel’s retreat to cover that threat to his rear. To this extent, Alamein should not be considered a *strategic* achievement, much less of any decisive importance. It was perhaps, as one cynical historian has pointed out, simply Churchill’s last chance to produce an all-Commonwealth victory.³⁸⁹

³⁸⁸Horrocks (61), 125. It is startling to see how this passage is distorted by R.W. Thompson in his overzealous need to prove Montgomery’s blind foolishness. Thompson, I (67), 101, expediently omits the reference to the deception plan, leaving only the two final peremptory sentences on his bugbear’s lips.

³⁸⁹Thus Barnett (60), 255-256. An even more sinister political motive is argued by Thompson, I (67), 107-116.

References

- **General**

- C.E. Lucas Phillips, *Alamein* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1962).
- Young (50), 85-86, 149-154, 248-249.
- Rommel (53), 287-336.
- Barnett (60), 251-283.
- Churchill, IV (50), 586-603.

- **Deception** (Plan BERTRAM)

- Field-Marshal Montgomery of Alamein, *Memoirs* (Cleveland: World, 1958), pp. 106-107, 110-111, 113.
- Wingate (59), 197-198, 201.
- Sir David Hunt, *A Don at War* (London: Kimber, 1966), p. 136.
- Lord Tedder, *With Prejudice* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967), p. 357.
- De Guingand (47), 155-156.
- Bayerlein in Freiden and Richardson (56), 107-109.
- Phillips (62), 132-135, 142-144.
- Kahn (67), 477.
- Major-General I.S.O. Playfair, *The Mediterranean and the Middle East*, Vol. IV (London: H.M.S.O., 1966), pp. 17-19, 23-24, 26-27.
- Horrocks (61), 125, 129, 131, 136.
- Young (50), 150-151.
- Churchill, IV (50), 601.

- **Camouflage**

- Maskelyne (49), 120-123.

Case A36. North Africa, 8 Nov 1942: Operation TORCH

“If I were opposed by an adversary of true calibre, military calibre, I would be able to calculate, more or less, where he would attack. If, however, one is faced by military idiots, one cannot know when they will attack. It could be the maddest undertaking, and this is the only unpleasant thing that with these insane or eternally drunken people, we never know what they will do next.”

—Adolf Hitler,
30 September 1942 radio speech.³⁹⁰

The Allied landings in North Africa on 8 November 1942 (Operation TORCH, formerly GYMNAST) achieved virtually complete surprise of time and place over the Germans and, to some extent, the Italians as well. The huge and unconcealable concentration of shipping and the greatly increased signals traffic had by mid-October warned the Axis that a major amphibious operation was due to descend upon them sometime soon. But the British (and American) deception campaign made the Axis intelligence services and military staffs uncertain as to whether it would come in France, the Mediterranean area, Norway (SOLO ONE), or Dakar (SOLO TWO).

Deception included such things as a decodable signal from a British destroyer indicating the Algiers convoy was en route to the eastern Mediterranean and a “leak” to the press arranged by Brigadier Mockler-Ferryman, the HQ public relations officer, indicating that the commander, General Eisenhower, was returning to the U.S. for consultations.

The OKH War Diary admitted the surprise and, most significantly, expressed its suspicion that it had been duped.³⁹¹

As simultaneously similar plans for other areas—Norway, the Channel, France—were being reported with the same certainty, the enemy achieved, probably purposely, his aim, that none of these complex reports would be so evaluated in time to make the necessary long-range defensive plans against the operation. We have lost this battle of communications. . . . Without doubt the enemy kept the knowledge of his true plans restricted to an exceptionally small circle, and through purposely misleading communications understood how to veil the situation even in his own diplomatic circles.

This list of anticipated targets implies that M.I.5’s deception planners had indeed been effective. Moreover, the confusion and uncertainty spread upward to Hitler, who even without helpful British hints believed Crete to be a likely target.³⁹²

³⁹⁰Kris and Speier (44), 292.

³⁹¹Fergusson (61), 214-215.

³⁹²Warlimont (64), 253, 271.

The Abwehr appears to have been the only cog in the Nazi decision-making machinery that correctly perceived the Allies' target. At least this is the *post factum*—and quite possibly self-interested—claim of the Abwehr officers most concerned. Thus Propaganda Minister Goebbels noted in his diary five months later that:³⁹³

Admiral Canaris gave me a verbal report of our counterespionage. I gather that it has done better than I assumed. Unfortunately the results of its work were not used properly. Thus, for instance, our counterespionage reported the North African undertakings of the English and Americans as well as the meeting at Casablanca well ahead of time, but these facts were not reported to the Fuehrer with sufficient clarity.

Correct predictions are also claimed by the wartime Abwehr station chief in Spain, Captain Wilhelm Lenz, and Lieutenant Joachim Canaris, the Abwehr Chief's nephew, then posted to Madrid. Lenz says he "told the head of the Naval branch of the Abwehr when he visited Madrid" and the young Canaris "sent a ciphered message by radio from Madrid early in November that an attack on North Africa was imminent."³⁹⁴

Even if we credit these belated Abwehr claims of unambiguous warnings, particularly from Spain, the same may not be said of the diplomatic intelligence reporting from there. Only two days before the Allied landing, Ambassador Baron von Stohrer gave a dinner party at which a Spanish naval staff officer insisted that the invasion was aimed at North Africa. The German Ambassador countered with the revealing assertion that, on the contrary, the Allies were going for Italy and the Eastern Mediterranean. The *British* Ambassador, Sir Samuel Hoare, who soon learned of this conversation, comments that the Spaniard was so persistent that Von Stohrer felt obliged to forward the warning to Berlin but with the disclaimer that "all the German intelligence organizations in Spain were unanimous against the idea of an African invasion."³⁹⁵

While the Germans were thoroughly misled about Allied intentions, the Italians were less so. Italian Foreign Minister Ciano categorically recorded in his *Diary* under 9 October that he had been convinced by the Director of the SIM (Italian military intelligence), General Cesare Amè, that the Allies were "preparing to land in force in North Africa." On 4 November Ciano records that Italian intelligence in Gibraltar reported the assembly of a "great convoy" there which is interpreted as aimed at Morocco. Then, on the 6th, Ciano noted with foreboding and uncertainty that "a convoy of exceptionally large proportions is advancing" eastward from Gibraltar. Finally, on the 7th, Ciano categorically states that he, the Duce, and the General Staff had agreed that the Allied convoys were headed for French North Africa, in full knowledge of the contrary views held by the Germans.³⁹⁶ However, Admiral Francisco Maugeri,

³⁹³Goebbels (48), 319, entry for 9 Apr 1943. Compare Riess (48), 232.

³⁹⁴Colvin (53), 130, citing his post-war interviews with Lenz and young Canaris.

³⁹⁵Sir Samuel Hoare, *Complacent Dictator* (New York: Knopf, 1947), p. 174.

³⁹⁶Ciano (46), 528, 538, 539, 540.

D+3	U.S.	British	Total Allied	Total French
KIA	526	4	530	803
WIA	837	50	887	1,000+
MIA	52	11	52	?
Totals:*	1,404	65	1,469	2,894

Table A.60: Allied and French Casualties, Operation TORCH. References: Howe (57), 173, 228; Auphan and Mordal (59). *Note: Not counting prisoners taken prior to the general surrender of the Vichy French in Algeria and Morocco. These included 200 Allied troops at Oran, 300 Vichy French at Safi, and 200 Vichy French at Port-Lyautey. Howe (57), 173, 228.

the Director of naval intelligence (SIS), recalls that his service was quite uncertain of Allied intentions. Moreover, he questions the truthfulness of Ciano's version, alleging that these entries were later interpolations by the notoriously vain Foreign Minister.³⁹⁷

Fighting lasted only four days until on 11 November the local Vichy authorities surrendered.

References

• General

- Playfair, IV (66).
- George F. Howe, *Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the West* (Washington, D.C.: OCMH, 1957), pp. 3-273.
- Auphan and Mordal (59).

• Security

- Kennedy (57), 262, 263.
- Don Wharton, "How the North African Campaign was Organized," *Readers Digest*, Vol. 42, No. 2 (February 1943), pp. 95-100.
- Eden (65), 398-399. (Mentions Soviet Ambassador Maisky's indiscreet leaks to the London foreign press corps. Maisky [68] himself discloses nothing on this score.)
- Fergusson (61), 206. (Other leaks.)
- Colvin (53), 58-61. (Leaks)
- Butcher (46), 63, 124-125. (Leaks)
- Clark (50), 61-62. (Leaks)
- Hoare (47), 166.
- McLachlan (68), 81-82, 85, 204-207, 333, 340.

³⁹⁷Maugeri (48), 87-88.

- **Intelligence**
 - Hoare (47), 153, 164, 165, 174.
- **Warnings**
 - Ciano (46), 528, 540. Ciano categorically recorded in his diary for 9 October 1942 that he concurred with General Amè, head of Italian military intelligence (SIM), that the Allies were “preparing to land in force in North Africa.”
- **Surprise**
 - Arvid Fredborg, *Behind the Steel Wall* (New York: Viking, 1944), 145.
 - Playfair, IV (66), 135-136.
 - Ciano (46), 540, entry for 8 November 1942.
 - Howe (57), 74.
 - Warlimont (64), 270-271.
 - McLachlan (68), 259-260.
 - Patton (47), 9.
- **Deception (General)**
 - Wingate (59), 197-200.
 - Walker (57), 188-190.
 - Schlabrendorff (47), 47-48.
 - Kesselring (54), 161-165.
 - Butcher (46), 46, 60, 66-67, 161.
 - Robert Murphy, *Diplomat Among Warriors* (Garden City, Doubleday, N.Y.:1964), pp. 125, 127.
 - Clark (50), 65-66.
 - Hoare (47), 153, 166.
 - Colvin (53), 61.
 - Carroll (48), 21-22, 238.
- **Deception (“SOLO ONE”–Norway as cover target)**
 - Butcher (46), 46, 51, 60, 67.
- **Deception (“SOLO TWO”–Dakar as cover target)**
 - Butcher (46), 46, 51, 60.
 - Stewart Alsop and Thomas Braden, *Sub Rosa* (Revised edition, New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1964), pp. 75-91. (Role of OSS.)
 - Donald Q. Coster, “We Were Expecting You at Dakar,” *Reader’s Digest*, Vol. 49, No. 4 (August 1946), pp. 103-107.
 - Auphan and Mordal (59), 216.

Example B28. Kasserine, 14 Feb 1943: Operation SPRING WIND

The Allies had forged a semi-circular line pinning the Italo-German armies of Africa in Tunisia. Their strategy now was to draw this ring ever tighter around Tunis itself. For this task they had the British First Army under Lieutenant-General Sir Kenneth Anderson in the north before Bizerts, two Free French infantry divisions to its south, next the U.S. II Corps under Major General Lloyd R. Fiedendall centered on the Kasserine Gap area, and the veteran British Eighth Army under General Montgomery who had by early February followed Rommel's withdrawal to the Mareth Line position on the south-east corner of Tunisia.

To delay the final Allied blow, the Axis forces mounted a series of spoiling attacks at various points along the front. However, only one of these showed any significant success. This was the Battle of the Kasserine Gap, a surprise attack against the American-held front that marked their first major set-back, caused great embarrassment, and just barely stood a chance of inflicting a decisive reverse.

The Italo-German plan was worked out by General Jürgen von Arnim, the *de facto* commander of the Axis forces in Tunisia. Contrary to popular belief, Rommel's rôle in planning and fighting this battle was secondary and belated.

When Arnim struck at Faid Pass at dawn on 14 February he achieved complete surprise. Since early February Allied intelligence had reported the likelihood of an enemy attack 35 miles north at Fondouk that would sweep northward behind the British lines. The Allied command became convinced that this would be Arnim's strategy and consequently set themselves up to be surprised when the attack did come.

Arnim hit with two divisions and 150 tanks, quickly overrunning the single and badly scattered U.S. 1st Armored Division while Rommel led one of his Panzer divisions up in a pincers from the then quiescent Mareth Line. They passed through the Kasserine Gap chewing up the Allied reserve units as they trickled up.

That Allied intelligence may have been the unwitting victim of a deliberate stratagem by Arnim is, with one exception, not even suggested by any of the memoirs or official or private histories. Yet the faulty intelligence estimate does seem to have resulted at least as much from a German ruse as from the preconditioning instilled by the earlier German activity at Fondouk. The evidence and speculation was recorded at the time in the official diary kept by Eisenhower's Naval Aide and published by him in 1946. It notes that on 18 February 1943:³⁹⁸

Ike told [General Alexander that] General Anderson had been influenced not to send reserves to Fredendall [on the 14th, immediately after the attack] because of intercept of enemy radio messages, that this was to be merely a diversionary move, and that the real one

³⁹⁸Butcher (46), 264, entry for 18 February 1943.

D + 3	Germans	Allies
Total troops:	slight	1,000 POWs
Tanks:	slight	117+
D+6		
Total Troops:	?	2,000?
Tanks:	60?	117+
D+9		
KIA		192
WIA		2,624
MIA, PW		2,459
Total Troops:	less	5,275
Tanks	less	150?

Table A.61: German and Allied Casualties and Losses, Operation SPRING WIND.
References: Eisenhower (48), 148; Butcher (48), 265; Truscott (54), 157-158, 165.

was coming further north. So the information proved to be wrong and made me [Captain Butcher] wonder if we have been listening to something the Germans have purposely been using to build us up for a grand letdown at deception.

By D-plus-8 the Germans had recaptured nearly 8,000 square miles and inflicted disproportionately heavy casualties on the Allied force.

Eisenhower considered the intelligence error sufficiently serious to sack his G-2, Brigadier Eric Mockler-Ferryman, and replace him with another Briton who proved a happy choice, Brigadier Kenneth Strong. He also considered the tactical errors of Major General Lloyd R. Fredendall sufficient to soon relieve him of command of II Corps, replacing him with another good choice, Major General George S. Patton, Jr.

References

- **General**

- Martin Blumenson, *Kasserine Pass* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1967).
- Rommel (53), 397-408.
- Carell (61), 339-346.
- Lt. General L. K. Truscott, Jr., *Command Missions* (New York: Dutton, 1954), pp. 142-173.

- **Warnings**

- Eisenhower (48), 140, 142.
- Bradley (51), 25.
- Truscott (54), 152-153.

- **Surprise**

- Eisenhower (48), 143, 147.
- Bradley (51), 25.
- Truscott (54), 134-135, 153, 156.
- Clark (50), 152-153.

- **Deception**

- Butcher (46), 264, 265-266.

Example B29. Médenine, 6 Mar 1943

At Médenine in Tunisia, Rommel planned another of his surprise counterattacks against the approaching Eighth Army. Originally scheduled for 4 March 1943, the attack was deferred until the 6th. When the attack finally went in, Rommel found not only that surprise had been denied him, but that Montgomery had set his own trap. It was Rommel who was surprised.

A French NCO captured later was found with the complete details of Rommel's attack plan, giving D-day as the 4th. Thus, with at least two days warning Montgomery set an anti-tank trap of massed artillery across the path he knew Rommel's Panzers would come. Moreover, Montgomery used camouflage and other deceptions to conceal the trap.

Rommel's force lost only 130 men, but that was not the measure of the battle. Of his 160 remaining tanks he lost 52—the British, none. Henceforward, the German force in Tunisia would fight a brokenbacked campaign. And for Rommel, it was his last battle in Africa. Three days later, on 9 March, he flew to Hitler to plead for the evacuation of the Axis forces in Tunisia. His plea was rejected and Rommel was ordered to remain in Europe.

References

- **General**
 - Howe (57), 514-519.
 - Thompson, I (67), 183-186.
 - Collier (67), 367.
- **Surprise**
 - Carell (61), 350-354.

Example B30. Massicault, 6 May 1943: Operation STRIKE

In the third week of April 1943, the Axis forces in Tunisia had been severed from their bases in Sicily and Italy by Allied command of the air and sea.³⁹⁹ The quarter-million Italian and German troops were left to their fate⁴⁰⁰ in a 5,000 square mile defense perimeter whose radii centered on Tunis.

For his final breakthrough to Tunis, General Sir Harold Alexander adopted an elaborate deception plan to convince Colonel-General Jürgen von Arnim–Rommel’s replacement–that the next offensive would come from Montgomery’s stalled Eighth Army on the eastern flank, while the British First Army under Horrocks struck through the center.

Deception was achieved by “a delicate balance of forces” or, rather, a calculated *imbancing* of the enemy. This precondition was obtained by a strong diversionary attack mounted on 22-26 April by British IX Corps at the extreme left of center that succeeded in provoking the enemy to over-respond by diverting much of his armor and committing almost all his mobile reserve to this sideshow.⁴⁰¹

Meanwhile, Alexander had shifted other forces to General Sir Kenneth Anderson’s British First Army for a concentrated drive from left-center to Massicault and down the Medjerda Valley.

The deception plan included use of concealed troop movements, diversionary attacks, and dummy tanks. Alexander also counted on the almost non-existent German aerial reconnaissance to fail to note his deployments. Moreover, he counted on the charisma of Montgomery’s Eighth Army to keep German attention focussed on the south. Although the battle was a success for Alexander, deception—at least in its “strategic” dimension failed—the Germans had expected the offensive by First rather than Eighth Army and deployed their limited forces accordingly. Their penetration of Alexander’s strategic deception plan was made possible by interception of Allied radio traffic that disclosed the shift of major units from Eighth to First Army. However, the official U.S. military historian misses the subtlety of Alexander’s deception plan in asserting it failed merely because Arnim “expected the main attack by First Army in the general area where it was launched.”⁴⁰² For Alexander’s stratagem had sown enough uncertainty and misperception with Arnim that when the blow fell the German line was still badly imbalanced, the reinforcements to the “expected” general area consisting of only one Panzer regiment and a single anti-tank battalion.

I particularly question the categorical assertion of the official U.S. military historian that poor Allied radio security gave away Alexander’s ruse. While the Americans were still novices in these matters, the British were skilled professionals who knew all the tricks of radio deception. Indeed, for this specific

³⁹⁹Operation STRIKE is also known as VULCAN.

⁴⁰⁰Indeed the Axis high command had made this decision on 8 April.

⁴⁰¹Alexander (63), 36-37. See also Howe (57), 610-612.

⁴⁰²Howe (57), 647-648.

operation we have a single good example from French intelligence sources. Although General de Gaulle and his Free French were still *persona non grata* in North Africa the intelligence services of the ex-Vichy administration there were singularly anti-German and quite willing to cooperate with the Allies. The principal figure was Commandant Paul Paillole, the Director of the Direction de Sécurité Militaire (D.S.M.), which at that time covered both Military Security and Counter-Espionage. The small but excellent Counter-Espionage service, operating under deep cover as the “Enterprise General de Travaux Ruraux” (T.R.), was then running three of its “T.R.” networks in North Africa. Early in 1943 the network based on Algiers, T.R. 119, had recruited an Abwehr Arab agent, Chouali ben Larbi (“le Chinois”), and ran him as a double-agent in an effective radio game against the Abwehr.⁴⁰³ The main contribution of “le Chinois” to Alexander’s stratagem for Operation STRIKE came on the night of 3 May, in his radio transmission to his unsuspecting Abwehr ex-masters. His message was designed to indicate that a British division in the center was about to redeploy southward to penetrate the German front there. This piece of French “intoxication” was coupled with other (unspecified) bits of Allied disinformation and admirably complemented by the careful efforts by the British division the next morning to simulate the necessary visual signs of incipient redeployment, signs duly observed by Luftwaffe reconnaissance aircraft. As a consequence, the German Command immediately switched “an armored division” from the center to the south.⁴⁰⁴

U.S. General Mark W. Clark, in a letter dated 15 June 1943 to D.S.M. Director Paillole, explicitly acknowledged the value of the “intoxication” techniques employed by the T.R. network in the liberation of Tunisia.⁴⁰⁵

The breakthrough on 6 May down the Medjerda Valley was decisive because its exploitation was superbly conceived, prepared, and carried through by Alexander. His First Army pressed through the naked gap in an “expanding torrent” that engulfed the enemy positions. On 12 May, D-plus-6, the remaining 5,000 square miles had been taken and the Axis forces completely overcome. For only 2,000 Allied casualties, the entire Axis army of 248,000 men had surrendered, only 663 escaping to Italy.

Obviously, such a decisive victory as this could be considered a *strategic* one; but I have chosen to count it on the *tactical* side of the ledger, because Hitler had already written it off.

⁴⁰³Stead (59), 143-145.

⁴⁰⁴Stead (59), 144.

⁴⁰⁵*Bulletin de l'Amicale des Anciens Membres des Services de Sécurité Militaire et des Réseaux T.R.*, No. 4, as cited by Stead (59), 145.

References

- **General**

- George F. Howe, *Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the West* (Washington, D.C.: OCMH, 1957), pp. 645-650.
- Horrocks (61), 164 ff.
- Alexander (63), 36-39, 69-70.

- **Surprise**

- Liddell Hart (54), 289-290, explicitly attributes the victory to surprise through deception.

- **Deception**

- Howe (57), 645, 647-648.
- Playfair, IV (66), 447, 448.
- Hunt (66), 174-175, 178-179.
- *Bulletin de l'Amicale des Anciens Membres des Services de Sécurité Militaire et des Réseaux T.R.*, No. 6, as summarized by Philip John Stead, *Second Bureau* (London: Evans, 1959), 144.
- Alexander (63), 36.

Case A37. Huon Peninsula, Jun-Sep 1943: Operation ELKTON III

ELKTON III (also CARTWHEEL) was a comprehensive plan, worked out in April 1943, covering the amphibious capture of the Huon Peninsula of New Guinea and Western New Britain by General MacArthur and of New Georgia and Bougainville in the Solomons by Admiral Halsey. The campaign lasted from 23 June 1943 (the seizure of small islands in Nassau Bay suitable for airstrips) to 6 September (when Lae fell).

Deception operations were mounted during the early phase of the campaign to make the Japanese believe that MacArthur's drive was aimed from his left flank—western Australia—into Indonesia rather than from his extreme right flank into the Pacific. To achieve this deception, at least two activities were carried out. First, diversionary air raids were made against such Indonesian islands as Ambon and Timor. Second, dummy military radio traffic was increased from the northwestern Australian radio stations at Darwin and Perth. It seems that this ruse worked; at least the Japanese did not begin to reinforce the actually threatened area until late July after the campaign was well underway.

In the later phase (Operation POSTERN), when the main direction of the campaign was disclosed and Japanese reinforcements began to arrive, MacArthur introduced further deception to draw the Japanese reserves and reinforcements to the wrong local target. Complete surprise was achieved and success swiftly followed when the Japanese moved south in strength to protect the cover target at Salamaua while MacArthur simply bypassed it to strike further north at Lae.

References

- General

- John Miller, Jr., *Cartwheel* (Washington, D.C.: OCMH, 1959).

- Deception

- Willoughby and Chamberlain (54), 126-128.
- Morison VI (50), 255, 256, 258, mentions only the Salamaua feint and one case of mere camouflage in which a dummy airfield was constructed at Bena Bena, a few miles in front of the real field being built at Marilinan.
- Miller (59), 26, 198, 200, 202.
- Louis Morton, *Strategy and Command: The First Two Years* (Washington, D.C.: OCMH, 1962), p. 631, in which the original ELKTON Plan prepared by GHQ, SWPA, on 28 February 1943, already envisioned “diversions” that the JCS should request from forces either in the Indian Ocean and/or the Aleutians.

Case A38. Sicily, 10 Jul 1943: Operation HUSKY

“From reports coming in about Anglo-American landing intentions it is apparent that the enemy is practising deception on a large scale.”

—German High Command report
to their army in Tunisia, February 1943.⁴⁰⁶

Despite nearly 50 advance warnings of the Allied landing on Sicily (Operation HUSKY) on 10 July 1943, the vaunted OKW was quite confused. The local commanders, Mussolini and Field-Marshal Kesselring, thought the primary target would indeed be Sicily; but Hitler overruled them and continued to await never-to-be landings in Sardinia and Greece for thirteen days *after* the invasion. The Luftwaffe C-in-C in Italy, Field-Marshal von Richthofen, had also opted for Sardinia and, independently of Kesselring, concentrated his defenses there. The consequent German failure to reinforce their Sicilian defense was not so much a mere unlucky guess in the face of ambiguous information as it was a succumbing to a well-coordinated multi-part deception campaign.⁴⁰⁷

It was to this campaign—HUSKY—that the British contributed the most widely publicized operation of World War II—Operation MINCEMEAT, forming the subject of one novel, two non-fiction books (one of which was a “best-seller” Book-of-the-Month offering in both England and the United States), and a popular movie.⁴⁰⁸ This was the “Man Who Never Was” ruse.⁴⁰⁹ It comprised the delivery to the gullible German Abwehr intelligence service of the “drowned” body of a “Major Martin,” a simulated British courier, complete with faked papers indicating Sardinia or Greece as the target. On 30 April,⁴¹⁰ the cadaver-cum-papers was deposited in Spanish coastal waters by H.M. Submarine *Seraph*. Three days later the Spanish secret intelligence service acquired the documents and promptly passed them to their local German friends and counterparts. By 9 May the planted intelligence began to flow into Berlin where it was judged

⁴⁰⁶Cited in Montagu (54), 140.

⁴⁰⁷Oddly, former CIA Director Dulles (63), 146-147, did not learn of this campaign in researching the history of deception. He was aware only of the MINCEMEAT operation, which he twice characterizes as the “single move” and the “isolated ruse” in the successful deception of the Germans over Sicily.

⁴⁰⁸The novel is Alfred Duff Cooper, *Operation Heartbreak* (London: Rupert Hart-Davis, 1950). The first non-fiction book was Ian Colvin, *The Unknown Courier* (London: Kimber, 1953). The second and bestselling book was Ewen Montagu, *The Man Who Never Was* (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1954), an officially inspired and carefully cleared account. Although the historians and memoirists correctly trace the official publication of this deception operation to the indiscretions of Cooper’s novel, the rumor mongering in Fleet Street, and the post-war revelations from the German side of the hill, it is interesting that the first leak occurred in 1946 in an article published by the former OSS Director. See William J. Donovan, “Intelligence: Key to Defense,” *LIFE*, Vol. 21, No. 14 (30 September 1946), p. 118, where the operation is described but incorrectly identified as a Free French ruse.

⁴⁰⁹Which supplied the title for an American television series on espionage in the 1966-67 season.

⁴¹⁰According to his cover story, “Major Martin” died on 24 April. The corpse was finally buried at Huelva on 1 or 2 May.

authentic. On 12 May the OKW ordered defense priority for Sardinia and the Peloponnesus.

The secret planning group for HUSKY, Eisenhower's so-called Force 141, requested that London prepare and conduct some central strategic deception operation to cover the projected landings in Sicily.⁴¹¹ Among those ruses that were developed in response to this request was MINCEMEAT. It was conceived, planned, and carried out by the small British inter-service and inter-departmental deception committee under the British Chiefs of Staff. The committee included Lieutenant-Commander Ewen Montagu of Naval Intelligence and, probably, Squadron-Leader Sir Archibald Cholmondeley of Air Intelligence (Montagu's "George"?).

A quite real incident of this type had occurred recently, in mid-November 1942, when the authentic body of British courier R.N. Turner was washed up on the Iberian coast. He too had been lost in an air accident and he too had been carrying most secret papers—although his related to the earlier invasion of North Africa. The only difference in the two stories was that the British recovered Turner's TORCH papers uncompromised. It seems likely that this incident inspired MINCEMEAT.⁴¹²

Another but more general deception scheme was Plan BARCLAY, which employed various ruses to present the French Riviera and the Balkans as the "cover targets." Among other things, BARCLAY included attaching Greek interpreters to battalions of the Sicilian expeditionary force amidst a fanfare of "secrecy."⁴¹³ A major diversion (that I presume was part of BARCLAY) was the highly visible west-to-east movement of "Force H"—a large British naval task force of six battleships with attendant cruisers and destroyers—on 1 July through the Sicilian narrows. Force H then proceeded to make a nuisance of itself around Crete, in conjunction with Commando raids there.⁴¹⁴ A special part of the BARCLAY deception was ANIMALS, S.O.E.'s rôle in creating a partisan diversion in Greece.

These deceptions succeeded to the extent that, at the expense of Sicily, precious German reserves were committed to Sardinia and Greece. Indeed, in the latter case, Hitler was so certain of Allied invasion of Greece that as late as 23 August Field Marshal Rommel was made C.-in-C. South-East and packed off to Greece. (However, the overthrow of Mussolini only two days later forced the Germans to give Greece lower priority.)⁴¹⁵

As early as April, the Abwehr had already concluded that major Allied

⁴¹¹Garland and Smyth (65), 64.

⁴¹²Butcher (46), 124-125; Hoare (47), 166; Clark (50), 61-62; and Colvin (53), 49-52, 58-61, 73. Only Colvin notes the coincidence and suggests that the accidental loss of the real courier inspired the MINCEMEAT ruse. Curiously, the official account by Montagu (54) is silent on this point.

⁴¹³Fergusson (61), 245.

⁴¹⁴Butcher (46), 340-345-346.

⁴¹⁵[Erwin Rommel,] *The Rommel Papers* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1953), pp. 431-432; General Siegfried Westphal, *The German Army in the West* (London: Cassell, 1951), p. 150; and Warlimont (64), 340.

activity would fall in the Balkans.⁴¹⁶ Consequently when U.S. Navy Secretary Frank Knox was publicly quoted that Sicily would be the next target, Goebbels was so preconditioned that he noted in his diary on 13 May that: “We pay no attention to these . . . attempts at camouflage.”⁴¹⁷

The Italian General Staff *Intelligence Summaries*⁴¹⁸ for June, July, and August 1943 showed that very large-scale Allied Mediterranean invasions were expected imminently during July and August. Moreover, they expected to face simultaneously more than one major amphibious operation. This false appreciation was based on a gross overestimation of Allied capabilities, one largely derived by the Italians from their German allies. This estimate credited the Allied forces with 50 divisions and 10,000 aircraft in the Mediterranean alone. Consequently Italian and, probably, German intelligence judged the Allies capable of *simultaneous* landings in Greece, Italy, and southern France. It was not until September, with the invasion of the Italian mainland, and particularly in October when nothing followed that the Germans gradually realized that Italy was indeed to be the only landfall that year.⁴¹⁹ The feeble and unsuccessful British effort to seize the Dodecanese Islands on 9 September only confirmed the Germans in their new and more realistic assessment.⁴²⁰

The overall manpower costs of HUSKY were 167,000 Axis troops (37,000 German and 130,000 Italian killed plus captured) to 31,000 Allied (killed, wounded, and missing). The Germans had succeeded in withdrawing some 60,000 men to the Italian mainland, leaving only 7,000 as prisoners.

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- Jackson (67), 19-78.

• Security

- John Schwartzwalder, *We Caught Spies* (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1946), pp. 65-67.

• Warnings

- Senger and Etterlin (64), 133.

• Intelligence

- Alan Moorehead, *Eclipse* (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), pp. 52-55. (Originally published in 1945. Uniquely reports the Italian General Staff estimates for June-August 1943.)

⁴¹⁶Goebbels (48), 324-325, entry for 11 April 1943.

⁴¹⁷Goebbels (48), 376, entry for 13 May 1943.

⁴¹⁸These were weekly reports that circulated to only 200 senior officers.

⁴¹⁹Moorehead (45/68), 52-55. This British journalist personally read these Italian intelligence summaries at the time of their capture, apparently through the good offices of Major-General Sir Francis de Guingand, General Montgomery's Chief of Staff.

⁴²⁰Moorehead (45/68), 54.

- Goebbels (48), 324-325, 376, 394, entries for 11 Apr, 13 May, and 25 May 1943, giving the German intelligence estimates, particularly those of Canaris.

- **Surprise**

- Senger and Etterlin (64), 128, 148.
- Montagu (54), 125-126.

- **Camouflage**

- Maskelyne (49), 128-129.

- **Deception (in general)**

- Warlimont (64), 318, 319, 333.
- Garland and Smith (65), 64.
- Wingate (59), 201-203.
- Churchill, V (51), 33, 647.
- Leverkuehn (54), 203.
- Kesselring (54), 189-192, 195.
- Foot (66), 308.
- Hunt (66), 187.
- Carroll (48), 102, 165.

- **Deception—“MINCEMEAT” (The “man who never was” ruse.)**

- Donovan (46), 118. (An early, garbled disclosure.)
- Cooper (50). (A novel)
- Colvin (53).
- Montagu (54).
- Deakin (62), 346-356, 383-386.
- Goebbels (48), 394, entry for 25 May 1943 of Goebbels-Canaris discussion of the MINCEMEAT papers.
- Garland and Smyth (65), 64-65.
- Walker (57), 192-193.
- Kennedy (57), 293.
- Wingate (59), 194, 203.
- Ismay (60), 292.
- Hunt (66), 187.
- Hyde (62), 187.
- Amè (54), 304.
- Robertson (57), 167-169. (For H.M.S. *Seraph*’s part in delivering “Major Martin.”)

- **Deception—“Plan BARCLAY”**
 - Garland and Smyth (65), 65.
 - Fergusson (61), 206, 243. (Describes two of its specific ruses without giving the covername.)
 - Butcher (46), 340, 345-346.
- **Deception—“Plan BARCLAY”—“ANIMALS” (S.O.E.’s part in Greece)**
 - Sweet-Escott (65), 160-161, 168, 169.
 - C.M. Woodhouse, *Apple of Discord* (London: Hutchinson, [1948]), pp. 133, 137, 144-145.
 - Edgar O’Ballance, *The Greek Civil War* (London: Faber and Faber, 1966), pp. 62-63, 84, 85.

Case A39. Bougainville, 1 Nov 1943: Operation CHERRYBLOSSOM

Bougainville, the largest of the Solomon Islands, was the last major obstacle on the thrust to Rabaul. 40,000 Japanese ground troops defended its 130-mile length. Admiral Halsey decided to establish the beachhead at lightly defended and fairly inaccessible Cape Torokina in Empress Augusta Bay.

Deception operations took two forms. First, a series of jabbing feints against Bougainville and its off-shore islands and a 12-day reconnaissance-in-force against neighboring Choiseul Island to keep the enemy off balance and “conceal the real power of our left hook to his belly at Empress Augusta Bay,” while he rushed reinforcements to these abandoned beaches. As intended, these raids drew off Japanese strength. Second, there was an effort to draw Japanese troops from Bougainville itself. The more elaborate deception consisted in making the Shortland Islands the cover target. To do this, combat patrols deliberately left evidence of their visits, photo-reconnaissance planes made almost daily low-level sweeps, and bomber sorties were flown and off-shore bombardments made to simulate a pre-landing softening-up. This succeeded; and the Japanese began to move in troops, artillery, and heavy equipment from Bougainville. Post-war interrogations confirmed that the Japanese were tricked into believing the Shortlands to be the real target.

The real, two-division landing at Torokina was opposed only by the local 300-man garrison half of whom were killed for a loss of only 78 Americans.

References

- **General**

- John Miller, Jr., *Cartwheel* (Washington, D.C.: OCMH, 1959).
- Morison, VI (50).

- **Surprise**

- Halsey and Bryan (47), 176.
- Morison, VI (50), 284-286, 288.
- Miller (59), 237-238, 241, 248.

- **Deception**

- Halsey and Bryan (47), 175-176, 177.
- Morison, VI (50), 293, 295, 296.
- Miller (59), 236-237, 241.
- Eichelberger (50), 96.
- Isely and Crowl (51), 177-178.

Case A40. Tarawa, 20 Nov 1943: Operation GALVANIC

The Japanese offensive had recently been turned in the southwest Pacific. Guadalcanal and most of the other Solomon Islands had been retaken by forces of Pacific Ocean Area under its Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Nimitz; and the first campaigns on New Guinea were just being won by the green troops of Southwest Pacific Area whose Supreme Commander was General MacArthur. U.S. strategy now called for Nimitz to invade the Gilbert Islands both to force the Japanese from the vulnerable flank of the direct supply and communications route linking Nimitz and MacArthur and to begin Nimitz' "island hopping" drive across the central Pacific. The main target in this Operation GALVANIC was the Tarawa atoll (with simultaneous seizures of Makin Island and the islet of Apamama).

Meanwhile the Japanese had expected an American offensive in the area, but their intelligence did not know where or when. When U.S. carriers struck Wake on 5-8 October, Admiral Koga rushed to its unneeded defense, but retired to Truk on the 24th having decided it was a false alarm. Then came the U.S. landings on Bougainville and Koga shifted south. By Tarawa D-day itself, Koga had decided that no further U.S. offensive was near, and had called off his alerts.

U.S. deception included a false announcement that the destination of the 2d Marine Division, in departing from Wellington, New Zealand, was Hawkes Bay, implying it was only a training exercise. In addition, rumors were deliberately spread that the group would return to Wellington in time for a scheduled dance. However, in view of the gross ineffectiveness of Japanese espionage, it is unlikely that this misleading information ever reached Tokyo.

Costs at Tarawa: U.S. (Marines and Navy)—1,711 killed (including 37 who died of wounds) and 2,175 wounded. Japanese—4,500 killed, 17 captured.

References

- **General**
 - Baldwin (66), 236-255.
- **Surprise**
 - Morison, VII (51), 136-137.
- **Deception**
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 - Henry I. Shaw, Jr., Bernard C. Nalty, Edwin T. Turnbladh, *History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II*, Vol. III (Washington, D.C.: USMC, 1966), p. 51.
 - Morison, VII (51), 81, 83, for JCS and British notions of simultaneous operations to deceive Japanese and tie down their reserves.

Example B31. Battle of the Sangro, 28 Nov - 2 Dec 1943

After landing on the Italian mainland on 3 September 1943, the Allies advanced slowly up the difficult spiny terrain. The Allied order of battle had General Alexander in overall command—of 15th Army Group—with the predominantly American Fifth Army under Lieutenant General Clark moving up the western half of the peninsula while the British Commonwealth Eighth Army under General Montgomery pressed up the eastern side.

On 8 November Montgomery reached the Sangro River. Alexander (and Churchill) now believed the time ripe for beginning his favorite strategy—a coordinated sequence of punches delivered from alternate sides of his line until a breakthrough was achieved. This time Montgomery was to open the general offensive by striking across the Sangro. Originally scheduled to go on 20 November, Montgomery's attack was postponed twice (by rain-swollen rivers) to 28 November and then went partly in one day early, the 27th, as weather suddenly cleared. Finally, the main attack started on the 28th.

The delays and several abortive and partial assaults had evidently warned Field-Marshal Kesselring of the imminent offensive, for he used the time to reinforce that part of the line. Thus, on 20 November Montgomery's assault force (V Corps) of three divisions had faced only a single inexperienced infantry division; but by the 28th the Germans had brought in advance elements of three experienced mobile divisions. Moreover, Montgomery's intelligence was unaware of this major change in his enemy's forward deployment, the foul weather having prevented both the ground patrolling and aerial reconnaissance that might have detected these moves. Robbed of much if not all of the element of surprise, the battle raged for five uninspiring days, although V Corps did succeed in achieving a 3 to 5 mile advance across 20 miles of front before halted by exhaustion of its men and matériel.

The Battle of the Sangro is of particular interest, because Montgomery failed to gain surprise despite using a comprehensive deception operation. Indeed, this battle represents not only one of the rare cases where stratagem failed to yield surprise but may be the extreme instance where *elaborate* and *comprehensive* deception failed. The deception plan is therefore worth describing and analyzing in some detail.

First, although no overall deception plan embracing *both* Montgomery's eastern sector and Clark's western sector has been reported, it would have been quite out of character for Alexander not to have had some such notion in mind, particularly as he had planned Montgomery's punch from the right to prepare the way for Clark's left hook. Indeed, Sangro D-day was originally deliberately scheduled to follow by five days the end of Clark's first effort to break through the defile leading to Cassino, a threatening move that *may* have been intended to draw off German reserves earmarked for the east coast. It is likely that if Alexander did have a macro-level deception plan it would have involved an exaggerated threat to the west coast. In any case, such a plan had at least one

severe limitation. It was simply neither possible nor plausible for Alexander to use deception to mask major shifts of units between the two zones, the terrain and lack of adequate lateral communications precluding this. Consequently the Germans, having once determined the force distribution between Fifth and Eighth Army, would know they need not expect any sudden exchange between them. Moreover, as the Germans had better lateral communications networks they could easily keep pace with any known inter-army shifts. Finally, Alexander's superiority over Kesselring in local ground forces (18 divisions to 15)⁴²¹ was not enough to force the German to abandon his low-risk defensive strategy, willingly trading one small river valley at a time rather than either fight a stand-still battle of attrition or risk entrapment by a too hasty commitment of units.

The only remaining strategic ruse available to Alexander—indeed the only one of any practical value under the circumstances—was to maintain a threat of further amphibious landings behind the German lines.⁴²² In this particular case, however, Alexander may well have specifically decided against an amphibious feint against the western coast because he had, in fact, already decided on a very real one-division landing just below Rome at Anzio around 15 December when it was expected the Allied winter offensive would have reached the coast 30 miles from Anzio.⁴²³

If there was little that Alexander's 15th Army Group headquarters could do by way of effective *strategic* deception, Montgomery's Eighth Army headquarters planners were also rather limited in plausible *tactical* frauds with which to bedazzle the immediately opposing LXXVI Panzer Corps under General Trautgott Herr, much less Kesselring as the overall commander in Italy. At least this is the pessimistic view of Major-General W.G.F. Jackson who argues that while there were four passable roads leading north, only one—the main coastal highway—was large enough and adequately surfaced to carry the traffic of an attacking corps. Hence Montgomery had, in effect, no choice but to take the obvious line of operations.⁴²⁴ The maximum intention was merely to delay General Herr's decision to commit his reserves to the point of the attack by demonstrating along the entire Eighth Army front, specifically by having his other corps (British XIII Corps) simulate preparations for a large scale attack at the opposite end of the Eighth Army front.

To achieve this limited and unpromising objective Eighth Army employed its now stock set of stratagems in a vain effort to misdirect the German defense to this inherently implausible alternative. Elaborate radio deception operations were carried out, simulating such routine pre-attack activities as the transfer of Montgomery's famous personal "tactical headquarters" to the XIII Corps area. Ammunition dumps and artillery positions on the coast were carefully camouflaged while those inland were not only left sufficiently exposed but were

⁴²¹Counting all Italy, Alexander had 21 divisions, Kesselring 23.

⁴²²Jackson (67), 144-145.

⁴²³The Anzio landing was successively deferred to 5, 15, 22 January when it finally went ashore in a much expanded version. See Case A41.

⁴²⁴Jackson (67), 146-147.

supplemented by dummy installations. The British 1st Airborne Division, which had been withdrawn from the line in V Corps (awaiting shipment to Britain) but was still in the area, staged embarkation exercises at Barletta harbor (110 miles below the Sangro) to give the impression of an imminent amphibious landing at Pescara or Ancona (20 and 100 miles, respectively, behind the German line). The Royal Navy was to lend credibility to this ruse by bombardment of the Pescara area. Meanwhile some effort was made to redistribute the units in V Corps itself to provide a secret buildup directly behind the point of attack.

Despite these efforts at tactical deception, the attack that went in on 28 November failed to gain surprise. After one final push forward five miles to the next river line (the Battle of the Moro), 8-20 December, Montgomery recommended to Alexander that these series of costly and relatively ineffective operations be suspended for the winter. On 30 December Montgomery handed Eighth Army over to General Leese and left for England to take command of 21st Army Group, already earmarked for OVERLORD.

References

- **General**

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- **Deception**

- Jackson (67), 146-147.
- Montgomery (49), 173.

Example B32. Monte Camino, 2-10 Dec 1943: Operation RAIN COAT

In early November 1943 General Alexander planned to break the deadlock along the “Bernhardt Line” across the southern part of the Italian peninsula. He intended a sequence of three punches by his 15th Army Group to roll back the Germans under Kesseiring. First would come an offensive by Montgomery’s British Eighth Army across the Sangro River on the east coast.⁴²⁵ This would be followed by a series of attacks by Clark’s U.S. Fifth Army along the western half of the line. The final blow would be the amphibious landing at Anzio⁴²⁶ by elements of Clark’s force.

Clark’s part of the general offensive was originally scheduled to start around 30 November with a drive to take Monte Camino. This opening phase—Operation RAIN COAT—was postponed to 2 December by the intense rains and flooding that delayed both Montgomery’s offensive and Clark’s preparations.

The assault on Monte Camino was preceded by several deception operations to misdirect the attention of the enemy to the coast, well to the west of the actual point of attack. Dummy tanks were concentrated near the coast, and an amphibious threat to the Germans’ seaward flank was simulated by loading troops on landing craft in Naples harbor. In addition U.S. VI Corps mounted demonstrations from their extreme eastern end of the Fifth Army front.⁴²⁷

The attack went in on 2 December. It comprised both divisions of British X Corps and the single division of U.S. II Corps plus the six-battalion mixed Canadian-American commando-type 1st Special Service Force. They were opposed by two Panzer Grenadier divisions of General von Senger and Etterlin’s XIV Panzer Corps.

Von Senger admits that he first learned of the direction of the attack when by chance he was visiting that part of the line, arriving at the beginning of the assault. The fact that the Germans did not make any major redeployments verifies his recollection. Monte Camino itself was taken at considerable cost on D-plus-4 and RAIN COAT ended on D-plus-8 when the area was cleared. The subsequent phases, however, made only slow and too costly advances. In six weeks the eight divisions of Fifth Army had gained seven miles and lost 16,000 men. The six defending German divisions had yielded this ground as planned at much lower cost.

⁴²⁵See Example B27.

⁴²⁶See Case A41.

⁴²⁷Jackson (67), 155.

References

- **General**
 - Jackson (67), 144, 154-157.
 - Clark (50), 237-242.
- **Surprise**
 - Senger (64), 186.
- **Deception**
 - Jackson (67), 155.

Case A41. Anzio, 22 Jan 1944: Operation SHINGLE

The Allied armies in Italy under General Alexander had been stopped since early November 1943 by Field-Marshal Kesselring along the Gustav Line, which ran directly across the narrow 80-mile waist of the Italian peninsula, 20 miles above Naples and 75 miles below Rome. Impatient and embarrassed by the delay and with the bulk of the Mediterranean amphibious capability soon to be sucked up by the ever-demanding maw of OVERLORD, then scheduled for May, Churchill pressed for a deadlock-breaking amphibious “end-run.”⁴²⁸ Accordingly, a two-division British-American landing (Operation SHINGLE) was made on 22 January 1944 at Anzio, 60 miles above the Gustav Line.

Although this Churchill-Clark maneuver failed to panic Kesselring into a major withdrawal by threatening the right flank of the Gustav Line, the landing itself achieved complete strategic and virtual tactical surprise. Of course, many warnings were reaching the Germans to the effect that the Allies were preparing a major amphibious move. But these warnings were contradictory about the time, place, and strength of this operation. Therefore Kesselring had established a general coastal alert and deployed his reserve divisions to cover a number of contingencies. Anzio was one of these, its local alert codeword being RICHARD. However, the day before the landing, Admiral Canaris had in person delivered his Abwehr’s considered estimate that no Allied landings were imminent. Both Kesselring and his Chief of Staff, Westphal, accepted this judgment; and—pressured by their subordinate field commanders who pleaded that the prolonged alerts were fatiguing—ordered the reduction of the state of the alerts, including RICHARD. Fortunately for the Germans, the effect of this order had not reached the local units when General Clark’s VI Corps arrived off Anzio.⁴²⁹ Nevertheless, on the night before D-day, there were only four German officers in Anzio itself (watching a striptease act) and the general area was manned only by three engineer companies and some convalescent troops. The D-day landing of 36,000 men was opposed by only these thousand scratch troops and two light bombing attacks.

Because Naples was the staging base for the Anzio operation, responsibility for security fell to the U.S. Army Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) detachment there, headed by Major M.J. Papurt. Security measures inside Naples were tightened as much as possible, but it was recognized that the fevered preparations involving hundreds of ships, thousands of vehicles, and tens of thousands of troops could not be concealed from the Neapolitans and the many left-behind German agents. The most rigid “travel control” measures were instituted to prevent these agents from carrying this information outside, and the Signal Intelligence units listened closely for clandestine radio transmissions.⁴³⁰

⁴²⁸This term, taken from American football jargon, was introduced to amphibious operations by General Patton during his earlier operations in Sicily. Initially a puzzlement to his British colleagues, it soon stuck. See Jackson (67), 74, 76.

⁴²⁹Jackson (67), 173; and Kesselring (54), 232.

⁴³⁰Schwarzwalder (46), 102-107.

Fortunately for the security of TORCH, the Royal Navy had introduced a special edition of their tactical cipher, one that the German naval cryptanalysts (the B-Dienst) did not master in time to read the 158 signals they did intercept.⁴³¹

The confusion and uncertainty in the German camp—from Berlin through Kesselring’s headquarters to the beach at Anzio itself—was not the result of “ambiguous” intelligence or the “fog of war.” For, if it were “fog” in any sense, it was man-made—the result of the Allied deception campaign. Alexander’s seasoned team of deception planners cooked up their usual brew, including radio deception⁴³² to mislead the German monitors.

Moreover, knowing that even the relatively excellent security that CIC had obtained in Naples would not prevent the Germans from discovering that some sort of major amphibious operation was in train, they deliberately capitalized on this German expectation by planting a number of false leads to suggest a target other than Anzio. The cover target selected was Civitavecchia, 40 miles above Rome. As planned, this calculated misinformation reached Kesselring; and, as hoped, he acted on it.

D	Allied	German
KIA	13	?
WIA	97	?
MIA	44	?
PW	-	227
Total:	154	227+
D + 7		
Total:	5,500	c.5,500

Table A.62: Casualties at Anzio (Anzio beachhead only, cumulative).

Prior to the Anzio landing (and, I presume, partly connected with it) was the effort of the deception planners to confuse and mislead the enemy about future amphibious landings. The one known element of this plan was the use made of Lieutenant General George S. Patton, Jr., whose name now *meant* amphibious assault by the U.S. Seventh Army. On the assumption that his itinerary would be closely watched by the enemy as a clue to Allied intentions, Patton was sent off on two suggestive trips: first to Corsica from 31 October to 2 November 1943, then to Egypt and Palestine during 12 to 20 December. This latter trip—to imply a possible invasion of Greece and the Balkan “soft underbelly”—sent Patton off with nine aides and instructions (and the necessary expense account) to make himself visible in the fleshpots of the Nile. The press and radio dutifully reported these maneuvers, arranged by Patton’s host, Air-Marshal Sholto Douglas.⁴³³

⁴³¹McLachlan (68), 85.

⁴³²Jackson (67), 173.

⁴³³As revealed by Lt. Gen. Hobart R. Gay in his annotations of the posthumous letters of Colonel Charles R. Codman, *Drive* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1957), pp. 121, 125. At that

To draw in Kesselring's reserves, Alexander had ordered offensives launched by General Clark's Fifth Army two to six days before Anzio D-day along the main line of battle,⁴³⁴ in addition to the feint at Civitavecchia. These efforts were largely effective.

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- General Siegfried Westphal, *The German Army in the West* (London: Cassell, 1951), p. 156.
- Vaughan-Thomas (61), 47, 49-50.
- Jackson (67), 173.
- Tompkins (62), Chaps. 5, 6.

• Deception

- Sheehan (64), 28-29, 38-39, 45, 54, 61.
- Blumenson (63), 57, 65, 73, 80, 95, 108.
- Morison, IX (54), 329-331.
- Vaughan-Thomas (61), 43.
- Jackson (67), 173. (My only source for Allied radio deception.)

time Gay was Patton's chief-of-staff. See also Patton (47), 72-83; and Douglas (66), 537-538. Air-Marshal Douglas is wrong in recalling that the event occurred "just before the invasion of Sicily."

⁴³⁴These demonstrations by Fifth Army comprised the thrusts on D-6 by British X Corps from the coast, on D-2 by U.S. II Corps under Monte Cassino, and also on D-2 by the Free French Expeditionary Corps on the extreme right flank.

Case A42. Kwajalein Atoll, 1 Feb 1944: Operation FLINTLOCK

In July 1943 the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff had directed Admiral Nimitz to lead his Central Pacific Force against the Gilbert and Marshall islands. After Tarawa and the other Gilberts were secured in late 1943, Nimitz set his sights further westward to the Marshalls. In late December 1943 planning for the Marshalls took final form. The target would be the Kwajalein atoll deep in the western section of the group, “island-hopping” all the others except for a lightly defended atoll (Majuro), which would be seized to give some security to the line of communications to Kwajalein. After one delay, the target date for Kwajalein was set for 1 February 1944. Two divisions (the veteran 7th Infantry and the unblooded 4th Marine) were allocated to the reduction of the 9,600 man Japanese garrison.

D + 7	U.S.	Japanese	Ratios
KIA, DOW	372	7,870	1:21
WIA	1,582	—	—
PW	0	265	
Total:	1,954	8,135	1:4

Table A.63: U.S. and Japanese Casualties, Kwajalein Atoll.

Although none of the several official, semi-official, and unofficial accounts of the Marshall Islands campaign mention it, this campaign was the subject of a very high level deception operation. This was handled from Washington through the Joint Chiefs of Staff and made use of the counter-espionage facilities of the FBI, at least in its one publicly known element. In late 1941 the German military intelligence service, the so-called Abwehr, had sent a trained agent, an import-export businessman, to Uruguay. Once there he immediately offered himself to the U.S. Embassy for employment as a double agent. He went thence to the United States where, coopted by the FBI, he was set up on Long Island with a radio transceiver. There, on 20 February 1942, he made radio contact with the Abwehr radio station at Hamburg and began a long career of feeding disinformation to his ostensible employers until the British Army took Hamburg on 2 May 1945. In November 1943 he radioed the information that the U.S. was planning an amphibious invasion of the Northern Kurile Islands. This operation was merely a diversion for the real strike against the Marshalls. As expected, the Germans passed this carefully planted information to the Japanese.⁴³⁵ Later, the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed the FBI that the planted information had contributed to the success of the Marshalls attack.⁴³⁶

⁴³⁵Through Ambassador Oshima, I presume. If so, the Americans—who were intercepting and reading Oshima’s communications, would have immediately known of the success of their plant.

⁴³⁶Whitehead (56), 196-198. ND98 appears to be the Abwehr’s codename for this still anonymous agent, although Whitehead leaves open the possibility that it was his FBI designation.

The Kwajalein Atoll was secured by D + 6 at a proportionately low cost (Table A.63).

References

- **General**

- Morison, VII (51), 201-281.
- Isely and Crowl (51), 253-309.

- **Deception**

- Don Whitehead, *The FBI Story* (New York: Random House, 1956), pp. 197-198.

Moreover, although his nationality is not specified, circumstantial evidence seems to rule out his being either German (he entered and had *free run* in the wartime U.S.) or American (he *sold* his services to the U.S.).

Example B33. Second Counteroffensive at Anzio, 29 Feb – 1 Mar 1944

After the first major counteroffensive against the Allied beachhead at Anzio failed on 16-19 February,⁴³⁷ Hitler ordered a second effort. As before, Field-Marshal Kesselring was in overall command while General Eberhard Von Mackensen commanded the Fourteenth Army blocking the exits from Anzio. On the Allied side, Lieutenant General Mark Clark had recently relieved Major General John P. Lucas as commander of the “fifth Army Allied Bridgehead Force” (i.e., VI Corps) and replaced him with Major General Lucian K. Truscott, Jr.

Kesselring, writing eight years later while dying of throat cancer, recalled:⁴³⁸

The lessons of the first attack were considered and measures of camouflage and diversion perfected, although I was not convinced this was necessary in so narrow an area.

The imaginative Kesselring-Von Mackensen strategy was to deploy his force in two spearheads, one on each beachhead flank, while seeking to deceive Truscott that the attack would come straight through the center.

To simulate this center buildup Von Mackensen emplaced some 60 wooden guns and 180 dummy tanks in that area. This equipment had been specially manufactured for the occasion in late February in the carpentry shops of the leading Roman motion picture studios’ at Cinecittà.⁴³⁹ The illusion of strength given by this conspicuously displayed dummy materiel was enhanced by having the local units (of I Parachute Corps) simulate attack preparations by extensive raiding and ill-concealed vehicular movement.⁴⁴⁰

However, all this elaborate preparation was to go for nought, as Fifth Army headquarters had received timely reports of the complete details of this counteroffensive including the ruse and camouflage. Truscott and the air support from Fifth Army made full use of this intelligence to break the attack before it could develop thrust. This superb intelligence had been sent by the lone OSS agent in Rome, Major Peter Tompkins. He had acquired it through the Italian Nenni-Socialist underground intelligence service from a German traitor inside Kesselring’s own headquarters.⁴⁴¹

On D-plus-1 Kesselring wisely cancelled his thwarted attack. By D-plus-4 the German Tenth Army was back in its defensive posture. The Germans had lost 3,000 men (including 500 as prisoners) and 30 tanks.

⁴³⁷Example C31.

⁴³⁸Kesselring (54), 236. The perfected “measures” were apparently confined to secrecy and diversion rather than stratagems *per se*. See Blumenson (63), 117-118.

⁴³⁹Tompkins (62), 148-149.

⁴⁴⁰Blumenson (63), 147.

⁴⁴¹Tompkins (62), 148-149.

References

- **General**

- Sheehan (64), 158-163.
- Blumenson (63), 146-152.
- Kesselring (54), 236.
- Sheehan (64), 158-163.
- Jackson (67), 207-208.
- Truscott (54), 343-348.

- **Warnings**

- Tompkins (62), 148-149.
- Jackson (67), 207.
- Truscott (54), 344.
- Sheehan (64), 158-159.
- Blumenson (63), 149-150.

- **Deception**

- Tompkins (62), 148-149.
- Kesselring (54), 236.
- Sheehan (64), 159 (only diversions mentioned).
- Blumenson (63), 147.

Example B34. Crimea, 8 Apr – 12 May 1944

The great Russian winter 1943-44 offensive on the southern front swept past Perekop around 1 November. The Crimean peninsula was now cut off from the rest of the German lines, but Hitler refused to permit evacuation of the Seventeenth Army now bottled-up there. The Russians could now pick their own good time for the final assault.

When the Russians finally mounted their cleanup drive five months later, on 8 April 1944, the Seventeenth Army under General Erwin Jaenecke comprised 12 divisions: 7 Rumanian and 5 German, 4 of which had been recently sent into the trap as reinforcements. The Russians struck with 3 armies totalling 27 divisions.

Tactical surprise was achieved—apparently without use of deception—and the German defenses crumbled. By D + 4 Jaenecke had fallen back to the prepared Gneisenau Line running through Simferopol, having yielded all but 1500 square miles of the 26,600 square mile Crimea. The Gneisenau Line gave way on D + 8 and by D + 10 Jaenecke had withdrawn into the 100 square mile enclave of Sevastopol, having suffered 30,783 casualties (13,131 German and 17,652 Rumanian).

To keep Turkey neutral, Hitler still hoped to hold the Sevastopol beachhead the six or eight weeks until he assumed he would have beaten off the expected Anglo-American invasion in the West. However, Jaenecke was forced to evacuate on D + 35 (12 May), leaving to their fate 26,700 men of his remaining force of 64,700.

Reference

- General

- Ziemke (68), 291-295.

Case A43. Hollandia, 22 Apr 1944: Operation RECKLESS

An outstanding victory in the Pacific phase of World War II was General Douglas MacArthur's amphibious assault on Hollandia, the main Japanese rear base on New Guinea. He achieved complete strategic surprise through the effective coordination of intelligence and deception.

MacArthur had been able to confidently plan this invasion 400 miles behind the advance Japanese outposts because he had detailed knowledge of Japanese deployments, plans, and expectations. His information came mainly from the intercepts of the local Japanese coded naval radio traffic. Using the basic code solutions developed in Washington by the Army Signal Intelligence Service and the Office of Naval Intelligence, MacArthur's secret cryptanalytic section, the "Central Bureau" headed by his Chief of Signals, Colonel Spencer Akin, was able to read much of this traffic.

Armed with such a complete knowledge of the enemy, MacArthur's efficient G-2 intelligence section under Major General Charles A. Willoughby developed "a comprehensive deception plan" that included the following actions:

MacArthur suddenly shifted his plan from Wewak to Hollandia, 450 miles further up the coast. Fake plans to indicate that Wewak (and Hansa Bay) was still the real target were "leaked" by rumor and, perhaps, other means. Bomber sorties were long held just short of Hollandia to suggest that it was beyond Allied reach. Finally, the invasion task force of 215 vessels steamed 300 miles out of its way to establish a misleading course before suddenly turning toward the true target beaches.

Tight security was observed, only the higher echelon planners knowing that Hollandia was to be the real target.

Surprise was complete and success quick when on 22 April 1943, MacArthur's 66,000 troops landed and took Hollandia. Only 87 Americans were killed as against virtually the entire Japanese garrison of 3,500. Simultaneously a secondary task force took the Japanese landing field at Aitape, 125 miles back toward Wewak. There, only 440 Americans were killed to the Japanese 8,300.

References

• General

- Willoughby and Chamberlain (54), 174-187.
- Mashbir (53), 43, 431-432.
- Morison, VIII (53), 59-90. This otherwise useful summary entirely overlooks the crucial deception aspect.
- N.B.: This is one of the few published cases where the part played by cryptanalysis is overlooked by Kahn (67), although it had been publicly disclosed a baker's dozen years earlier by Willoughby and Chamberlain (54), 180-181.

- **Surprise**

- Reports of General MacArthur, I (66), 145-146; and II/I (66), 262-272.

- **Deception**

- U.S. Department of the Army, General Headquarters, Far East Command, Military Intelligence Section, General Staff [Col. J.P.Craig, *et al*], *A Brief Story of the G-2 Section, GHQ, SWPA and Affiliated Units* (Tokyo: Far East Command, U.S. Army, 1948), pp. 25-29, for section on “Role of G-2 in the Hollandia Operations: A Deception Plan.”
- Robert Ross Smith, *The Approach to the Philippines* (Washington, D.C.: OCMH, 1953), pp. 48-49, 53, 55.
- Robert L. Eichelberger, *Our Jungle Road to Tokyo* (New York: Viking, 1950), pp. 102, 104.
- George C. Kenney, *General Kenney Reports* (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1949), pp. 373-374, 380, 384.
- *Reports of General MacArthur*, I (66), 145-146; and II/I (66), 263n45.
- Major General Courtney Whitney, *MacArthur* (New York: Knopf, 1956), pp. 110-111.
- Douglas MacArthur, *Reminiscences* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964), p. 190.

Case A44. Fourth Battle of Cassino, 11 May 1944: Operation DIADEM

For six bitter months the Allies had been ineffectually battering at the “Gustav Line,” which Field-Marshal Kesselring, the German Commander South, had established across the 100-mile width of the Italian Peninsula, 80 miles south of Rome. While British Eighth Army (initially under Montgomery and later Leese) had been flapping unsuccessfully in the Sangro River valley on the eastern wing, U.S. Fifth Army under Clark was bogged down along the Rapido-Garigliano river line under the shadow of Monte Cassino. Fifth Army made three efforts to bludgeon its way through with its marked superiority in men, machines, and aircraft. All the corps-level efforts had failed. The situation had become critical. The Normandy landings were at long last imminent, and the only military *raison d’être* for Alexander’s command now was to drain German strength away from Normandy. Only a major revitalization of this static front could help at this juncture when Italy had become militarily useless and politically embarrassing.

At this point, General Alexander intervened to an extent that he had not done since the initial series of landings and the abortive November-December offensives, interjecting a theater-wide strategic offensive. This involved a major deception plan devised at his GHQ. A decisive breakthrough was to be the immediate result.

Alexander had—now, for the first time—the physical means for a general offensive. With 25 divisions he was at maximum strength. Although Kesselring was nearing his maximum strength in Italy with 23 divisions, only 18 of these were in the combat zone. The other five were tied down in the north by the never-to-materialize threat of yet another Allied amphibious landing and by the sheer need to garrison the defected Italians. Thus Alexander had a 25 to 18 division advantage for the forthcoming offensive. Not content with this 40 per cent superiority, Alexander would now proceed to contrive an overwhelming 3-to-1 superiority at the points of breakthrough. He would meld deception, security, and intelligence to do this while simultaneously keeping the German garrison and reserve divisions immobilized.

Alexander’s strategy was to gain a quick breakthrough by a surprise attack, immediately exploiting it by thrusting through with overwhelming reserves that had been secretly built up at that point while assuring the continued unbalance of the German Tenth Army by a flank attack. To do this he moved the bulk of his Eighth Army over to a compressed Fifth Army front. He then had two armies concentrated on a mere 25-mile front from Cassino to the sea, ready for the breakthrough. Simultaneously he had reinforced his 4-division contingent of Fifth Army on the Anzio beachhead, 60-miles behind the German lines, to six divisions, ready to launch their arm of a gigantic pincer to catch the entire German Tenth Army.

The essence of Alexander’s deception plan was to convince Kesselring that—after six months of costly fruitless battering against the Gustav Line—the Allied armies had finally conceded its invulnerability and that their all too obvious

build-up for a summer offensive would be committed to a major seaborne “end run” to outflank the Gustav Line. In other words, Alexander used the standard bi-modal stratagem that simulates an attack at one target while dissimulating the attack at the alternative.

To simulate the fictitious amphibious part of his stratagem, Alexander chose for the tactical cover target Civitavecchia, 35 miles north of Rome and 110 miles behind the front. The U.S. 36th Division, having been earmarked for a later phase of the offensive, was sent to the Naples-Salerno beaches to receive intense and visible amphibious training. To make it seem that this single U.S. division would land as the assault force of the Canadian I Corps (i.e., a plausible total of three seaborne divisions: one U.S. and two Canadian) it was made a dummy part of the Canadian Corps by signals exercises and liberal use of the Canadian maple leaf symbol on the road signs in the assembly and embarkation areas. Simultaneously, the Royal Navy openly concentrated a mass of real and dummy landing craft in Naples harbor and openly practiced its part in the fictitious landing. To specifically indicate Civitavecchia, the Allied airforce made frequent reconnaissance flights over that specific area.⁴⁴²

Parenthetically it should be noted that the amphibious cover target of General Alexander’s 15th Army Group in Italy was backed by a complementary stratagem at the next higher headquarters under Field-Marshal Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, commanding the Mediterranean theater. This theater-level deception consisted in maintaining an amphibious threat to southern France—Operation ANVIL.⁴⁴³ This was done by the British against the vehemently expressed wishes of the Americans and Russians who only later forced British acquiescence in its being mounted as the very real Operation DRAGOON (see Case A48).

To dissimulate the vast concentration of his forces for the forthcoming offensive, Alexander supplemented tight security with further deception. All deployments near the front were made at night.⁴⁴⁴ In those special cases where daytime movements were necessary but visible to the enemy’s line-of-sight observers—as along a mile of road in view of the Germans on Monte Cassino—special camouflage screens were erected. Units already in the frontline were moved as little as possible. Movement of armored units were camouflaged by leaving behind dummy tanks and associated matériel. Strict fire discipline was kept by all artillery units so that the total daily volume and distribution of fire neither increased nor decreased along the front, while old guns were shifted laterally and fresh guns brought forward. Moreover, all transferred and new artillery units moved secretly into previously camouflaged positions. When the Polish Corps relieved the British 78th Division in the Monte Cassino area, radio dis-

⁴⁴²The details of these simulations are in Majdalany (57), 254-255, 257; and Jackson (67), 226.

⁴⁴³Jackson (67), 222, 225n.

⁴⁴⁴However, as Allied air supremacy prevented any effective German aerial reconnaissance, the delays imposed by keeping to night movement now overbalanced the reduced advantages in security. The Germans themselves first raised this criticism of Alexander’s continuing this standard security procedure long after it had become merely self-defeating.

				Ratio X:1	
		Allied	German	Allied/German	
West	March	9	6	1.5	
	11 May	16	5	3.2	
Anzio	March	5	6	0.8	
	11 May	6	6	1.0	
East	March	7	3	2.3	
	11 May	3	5	0.6	
Other	March	0	9	9+	
	11 May	0	8	8+	
Totals	March	21	24	0.9	
	11 May	25	24	1.0	

Table A.64: Divisional Orders of Battle in Italy by Fronts, 1944. Based on data in Jackson (67), 222, 227, 229, 237-239.

cipline was strictly imposed to avoid their presence becoming known by their language, and English signalmen were attached to provide the essential radio communications. Darkness, camouflage, and stealth were used by the engineers in all their riverbank and approach preparations for the projected crossing of the Rapido. While the two divisions picked to assault the Rapido were lying quiet in their camouflaged assembly areas, the crack British 78th Division that the Germans might expect to spearhead an attack were ostentatiously practicing river crossings some 50 miles behind the lines.⁴⁴⁵

The degree of Alexander's success in bringing off this deployment for DI-ADEM without provoking counter-deployments by Kesselring is seen in Table A.64.

Alexander had managed to double his divisional superiority to a three-to-one advantage along the part of his front that would carry the assault. He had also brought his division strength at Anzio up to parity. This was a fine example of applying the "principle of concentration of effort." Yet it was largely due to stratagem.

Alexander's deception plans were an outstanding success. They gave him surprise of place, time, and strength. In the main they succeeded because they played upon Kesselring's optimistic preconceptions—his very success in holding the Gustav Line had grown to a too rigid faith in its impregnability. Kesselring was conscious of the array of possible strategies open to Alexander: a renewed drive on the east front (most probably through Cassino), a breakout from Anzio, or a landing north of Rome (most probably at Civitavecchia). His preconceptions about the Gustav Line combined with Alexander's deceptions to reverse the latter's actual priorities. Kesselring virtually excluded another offensive on the main line and although he was partly aware of the Allies lateral shift of units from east to west he made only the minimum adjustments necessary to

⁴⁴⁵The details on these various dissimulations are in Majdalany (57), 255-256; and Jackson (67), 225-226.

contain a secondary or demonstration attack from that direction. More likely, he judged, was an attempted breakout from Anzio (*supplemented* by a secondary attack from the eastern part of the main line). This was, of course, Alexander's strategy—with the very important twist that the Anzio breakout was to become the *supplementary* blow. But Kesselring's errors did not end there. He judged the *most* likely Allied strategy to be a new amphibious landing north of Rome. In that he was a complete victim of the Allied cover-target plan.

Indeed, Kesselring did not realize that something was seriously amiss with his prediction of an amphibious attack until about D-plus-6 when one of his radio interception units identified the Canadian Corps in the line (rather than embarking at Naples and Salerno as he had been misled to believe).⁴⁴⁶ Even then Kesselring refused to believe that the main attack had already started and throughout kept two crack divisions uselessly coast-watching north of Rome until D-plus-8 and D-plus-14 respectively.⁴⁴⁷

Kesselring and OKW also grossly misjudged the timing of Alexander's offensive. They were confident that it could not be mounted until summer. This incorrect appreciation of the state of the enemy's readiness had several consequences that adversely affected Kesselring's own defensive posture when Alexander struck in late spring. First, OKW had transferred one Panzer division to Hungary and had also pulled out one crack infantry division to prepare to move to France. Second, Kesselring took "advantage" of the time he thought available to pull all his mobile and a third of his infantry divisions back for rest and refitting. Third, a number of senior officers who had gone on leave at the end of April were still away when DIADEM struck on 11 May. This was especially important in the case of the commander of XIV Panzer Corps anchoring the German line from Cassino to the sea, General von Senger und Etterlin, whose parting order was for his corps to be alert for battle *from 24 May on*. His chief-of-staff was also on leave. Moreover, Colonel-General Heinrich von Vietinghoff, the commander of the entire trans-Italian front (Tenth Army), had planned to *start* his leave on 11 May.⁴⁴⁸

Finally, Kesselring was also surprised by the strength achieved by Alexander at the points of attack. At the crucial Cassino front Kesselring estimated that his four divisions there faced only six Allied divisions when, in fact, there were thirteen.⁴⁴⁹

Alexander achieved the decisive victory demanded by London and Washington. He deceived and surprised Kesselring, defeating and routing two German armies and, on D-plus-24, taking Rome. Moreover, he not only held the 23 German divisions in Italy, preventing them from redeploying for the defense of Normandy when the Allies landed there on DIADEM D-plus-26, but attracted four new German divisions.⁴⁵⁰ He was robbed of his third goal, the complete

⁴⁴⁶Jackson (67), 236.

⁴⁴⁷Jackson (67), 237, 239, 242, for these deployments of the 29th Panzer Grenadier and Hermann Göring divisions.

⁴⁴⁸Senger (64), 243-244.

⁴⁴⁹Majdalany (57), 257-258.

⁴⁵⁰Jackson (67), 338-340.

	Polish II Corps (to D+14)	British XIII Corps (to D+3)	Canadian I Corps (on D+12)	French Exp. Corps	U.S. II Corps	Total Allies (to D+7)	Total Germans (to D+14)
KIA	923						?
WIA	2,931						?
MIA,PW	345						9,018
Totals:	4,199	4,056	500	?	?	13,000	9,018+

Table A.65: Casualties, Operation DIADEM. References: Connell (63), 196, 202; Clark (50), 236, 238, 350, 356, 365; Churchill, V (51), 603, 605.

destruction of the German army in Italy only by the difficulty of the terrain and the altogether astonishing action of General Clark who disregarded Alexander's desire that the breakout from Anzio on D + 12 cut the then beaten Germans' retreat and, instead, moved parallel to the coast to take the glittering but militarily useless prize of Rome.

References

• General

- Jackson (67), 219-246.
- Fred Majdalany, *The Battle of Cassino* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1957), pp. 251-300.
- Truscott (54), 366-380.
- General Frido von Senger und Etterlin, *Neither Fear Nor Hope* (New York: Dutton, 1964), pp. 243-258.
- Charles Connell, *Monte Cassino: The Historic Battle* (London: Elek Books, 1963), pp. 58-206.

• Surprise

- Jackson (67), 226-229, 236-237.
- Senger (64), 244.
- Connell (63), 62-63, 67, 110.
- Majdalany (57), 256-258.
- Kesselring (54), 241.

• Deception

- Jackson (67), 222, 225-226, 228, 236, 237.
- Majdalany (57), 254-257.
- Connell (63), 8, 59-60, 95-96, 97, 110, 116, 130-131.
- Clark (50), 338-339.
- Churchill, V (51), 588-589.

Case A45. Normandy, 6 Jun 1944: Operation OVERLORD

“The year 1944 will bring the invasion in the West and with it the decision of the war. The invasion . . . is most likely to come in June. . . . The most likely possibilities are: (1) Along the English Channel; (2) Astride the Seine estuary; (3) Along the east coast of Normandy. . . . Deception maneuvers are always possible and likely.”

–Field-Marshal Von Rundstedt,
estimate submitted to OKW, early 1944.⁴⁵¹

German intelligence was quite unable to determine the time, place, or strength of the OVERLORD beachhead. Their faulty appreciation read July rather than 6 June 1944, the Pas-de-Calais rather than Normandy, and credited the Allies with 42 quite mythical divisions. Of over 250 relevant agent reports received by German intelligence before D-Day, only one disclosed the correct time and place. And it had been audaciously planted by Allied intelligence on a thoroughly *discredited* former Abwehr collaborator. The closest the Germans came to penetrating the secret of D-Day was having learned the code-name OVERLORD itself and correctly inferring that this referred to a cross-channel assault—into France. This was the achievement of “Cicero,” the Turkish valet-spy who was passing on the secret papers of the British Ambassador in Ankara. However, the Germans failed to make use of Von Papen’s suggestion for a counter-deception propaganda campaign: publicizing the code-name OVERLORD and implying the Germans knew its detailed content, thereby forcing the Allies to adopt a new plan.

Allied security was more than adequate to cope with the poor showing of German espionage, but main credit for the utter defeat of German intelligence belongs to the superbly orchestrated deception planning of the British. Their work had begun in March 1943 under the pre-SHAEF planning group, COS-SAC, headed by General Frederick Morgan. COSSAC’s very first directive—of 23 April 1943—already specified that all planning would include elaborate deceptions. Their contribution to deception was Plan COCKADE comprising three parts: Operation TINDALL (to convince the Germans that a major strike was aimed at Norway), Operation WADHAM (to exaggerate the buildup of American forces in England and show its Vth Corps earmarked for Brest), and Operation STARKEY (which with its British Army deployment—HARLEQUIN—was to suggest that the main Allied blow was indeed scheduled for the very obvious Pas-de-Calais).

COCKADE was successful in that it distracted attention from Normandy while keeping substantial German forces tied down on an inactive front during 1943. When, in January 1944, SHAEF superseded COSSAC, FORTITUDE

⁴⁵¹As recalled by Lt.-Gen. Bodo zu von Zimmermann to Allied interrogators in 1946. Quoted in Sheen (50), 20.

succeeded COCKADE. It has two phases—FORTITUDE I and FORTITUDE II—and two aspects—FORTITUDE NORTH and FORTITUDE SOUTH. The first phase covered the period up to D-Day and was designed to make it seem that D-Day would come in July and that no landing was planned for Normandy. The second phase was designed to convince the Germans that the actual landings at Normandy were themselves only a diversion for the main assault that would inevitably follow elsewhere. Meanwhile, FORTITUDE NORTH was the specific set of false indicators pointing to secondary landings in southern Norway while FORTITUDE SOUTH suggested the main assault would hit the Pas-de-Calais. Moreover, even FORTITUDE was only one part—albeit the crucial one—of an even wider scheme of strategic deception. This last, the personal contribution of Churchill, was Plan BODYGUARD, a comprehensive program coordinating all British, American and Soviet deception operations. Originally proposed in November 1943 by Churchill at the “Big Three” Teheran Conference, BODYGUARD was developed by Colonel John Bevan of the British “War Office,” co-ordinated with the Americans, and then—in February 1944—sold to the Russians (Colonel-General F.F. Kuznetsov, probably Director of the GRU) by Bevan, Lieutenant Colonel William H. Baumer (“an American expert on cover plans”), and Major General John R. Deane (Chief of the U.S. Military Mission). The Soviet contribution comprised a simulated delay to July in their own offensive, a feint against Petsamo in northern Norway, and a threatened amphibious landing on the Rumanian and Bulgarian coasts.⁴⁵²

The most widely publicized part of FORTITUDE I was the scheme whereby just before D-Day, the M.I.5 deception team sent the specially co-opted professional actor, Lieutenant Clifton James, to Gibraltar and Algiers to impersonate Montgomery, the designated *de facto* commander of the D-Day ground forces (21st Army Group), thereby diverting enemy attention to the Mediterranean.

Three major feints were made during the night before D-Day by British aircraft and small naval vessels. One was Operation GLIMMER, directed at Boulogne. A second was TAXABLE, aimed at Cap d’Antifer. The third was BIG DRUM, at Pointe Barfleur. The essence of these three sham attacks were elaborate radar countermeasures. One of these, the MANDREL screen, a technique for swamping the German early warning radar was deliberately held in abeyance after its development until the night of 5 June when it was introduced to mask the approach of the invasion fleet itself—a rare instance of *technological* surprise.⁴⁵³

A key element in both FORTITUDE II and FORTITUDE SOUTH was to convince the Germans that a complete army group (i.e., at least six divisions) would attack the Pas de Calais and to sustain this belief well beyond the real D-Day in Normandy. To simulate such a force, at least three ruses were used. First, dummy headquarters were simulated by radio. Second, dummy installa-

⁴⁵²See Example B35 and Case A46.

⁴⁵³Sir Charles Webster and Noble Frankland, *The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany, 1939-1945*, Vol. III (London: H.M.S.O., 1961), p. 150. See also Wilmot (52), 228, 246-247, from which it seems that MANDREL was composed of the air-dropped “window” (i.e., metal strips) and ship-towed balloons.

tions (including fake invasion craft in the Thames estuary) were set up for Luftwaffe reconnaissance to photograph, (This dummy equipment was developed by a group that included Major Basil Spence, the postwar architect of the new Coventry cathedral.)⁴⁵⁴ And third, real and prominent officers were appointed to this command: Lieutenant General George S. Patton, Jr., was publicized as the “assault” commander of the group, said to comprise the U.S. Third Army and the Canadian First Army. To add to both the obfuscation and misdirection this dummy invasion force was attached to the very real First U.S. Army Group (FUSAG). Although real, FUSAG existed secretly and only on paper except for a small headquarters staff for planning purposes. Its commander was no less than General Omar Bradley—concurrently commander of the U.S. First Army—and its function was to stand ready to move to Normandy to coordinate the build-up of additional U.S. armies as they arrived.⁴⁵⁵ Meanwhile British M.I.5 passed some of this “secret” information directly to German agents in Britain to reinforce and supplement what German intelligence was presumably already getting from the calculated leaks to the press.⁴⁵⁶ FORTITUDE SOUTH was also given some false teeth by including the pas-de-Calais in the pre-invasion aerial bombings.

British Colonel John Bevan was responsible for conceiving the network of radio deception that simulated the various dummy units and their deployments. Its two main roles were in making it appear by landline routings that Montgomery’s headquarters near Portsmouth was in Kent and that all the many dummy units of FUSAG were in East Anglia.⁴⁵⁷ Indeed, “all the Allied effort in the radio war for D-Day was British.”⁴⁵⁸

One aspect of D-Day strategic deception entirely overlooked by all studies of that event was the FBI’s contribution in misleading the Abwehr. They did this through Abwehr agents whom they had doubled in 1941 or early 1942 and had used to feed disinformation to the Abwehr’s transceiving station in Hamburg. Indeed they had already used the first man in an earlier strategic deception operation.⁴⁵⁹

For OVERLORD the FBI used their earlier agent, even today publicly identified only as “ND98,” to help draw the Abwehr’s attention toward the Mediterranean. Thus, on 1 June 1944, D-minus-5, ND98 radioed Hamburg:⁴⁶⁰

Nevi reports that express liners Ile de France and New Amsterdam will leave New York.

Harbor for undisclosed Mediterranean destination within next few days.

Appearing of highest importance possibly indicating some plan change.

⁴⁵⁴ *Tangled Web* (63), 146.

⁴⁵⁵ Bradley (51), 173-174, 180, 204, 210-211, 221-225.

⁴⁵⁶ Bradley (51), 344.

⁴⁵⁷ *Tangled Web* (63), 134.

⁴⁵⁸ Churchill, VI (53), 11.

⁴⁵⁹ See Case A42.

⁴⁶⁰ Whitehead (56), 198. Some additional material on ND98 (taken from some source other than Whitehead) is given by *Tangled Web* (63), 135.

It appears that a force.

Consisting of a number of infantry and armored divisions originally scheduled for United Kingdom are being.

Diverted for a special operation.

Will make every effort to ascertain further details.

This FBI effort certainly appears to have been related to the part of the FORTITUDE deception plan that included M.I.5's "Monty's Double" ruse intended to suggest both that the French Channel ports were not necessarily the main D-Day target and that D-Day itself was not as near as it in fact was.

The second Abwehr agent was a Dutch jeweler called—with evident whimsical pseudonymousness—Albert Van Loop by J. Edgar Hoover. Van Loop had defected to the Americans in Madrid on 6 April 1942 while en route to his Abwehr espionage assignment in the U.S. After Van Loop taught his new masters his codes and telegrapher's "fist," FBI radio operators began their radio game on 7 February 1943 when they established contact with Hamburg in Van Loop's name. In addition to considerable general disinformation, the "Van Loop" messages were specifically designed to support FORTITUDE NORTH, the feint against Norway. This was done by sending a set of clues that, taken together, indicated a major U.S. troop buildup in Iceland. On 3 March 1944, the message that formed the key to the set was sent. The very next day, for the first time in months, a German reconnaissance plane investigated Iceland. It found Reykjavik harbor full of ships—Iceland was used as a transit depot—and a very large number of barracks—mostly fakes.⁴⁶¹

One of the more credible ways to get misleading OVERLORD information to German intelligence would have been to feed it to unsuspecting S.O.E. or OSS agents and their French, Dutch, or Belgian Underground workers. This could take forms ranging from increased general activities, through diversionary attacks, to deliberate betrayal of these misinformed men into the hands of Gestapo interrogators. I am not aware that any of these things were done. However, many prominent French and Dutch resistance veterans believe that they were made the expendable tools of the Judas ruse, at least on other occasions. This charge has been repeatedly denied by spokesmen of the British intelligence services.⁴⁶² It is, therefore, rather odd that Major General William Donovan, the wartime OSS Director, sponsored a feature film released in 1946 that credits the fictitious U.S. "077" organization with having used a similar ruse on a German agent who had infiltrated to learn the D-Day date and place.⁴⁶³ Similarly, in 1960, Twentieth Century-Fox released a second film in which a misinformed Canadian officer in S.O.E. is betrayed to the Gestapo.⁴⁶⁴

⁴⁶¹Hoover (46), 21.

⁴⁶²See, for example, E.H. Cookridge [pseud. of Edward Spiro], *Set Europe Ablaze* (New York: Crowell, 1967), pp. 309-310.

⁴⁶³"13 Rue Madeline." A Twentieth Century-Fox feature film released in late 1946 starring James Cagney, Annabella, and Richard Conte. OSS was not mentioned by name because General Donovan objected to some of the scenes in the final release version. See *LIFE*, Vol. 22, No. 3 (20 January 1947), pp. 115-119.

⁴⁶⁴"Circle of Deception." A Twentieth Century-Fox British-made feature film released in

Date	Allied	German
D-Day	9,000	4-9,000
D+16	29,156	?
D+34	61,549	80,783
D+39	?	100,089
D+43	96,728	?
D+66	170,000	?
D+74	?	200,000

Table A.66: Cumulative Casualties, Operation OVERLORD. References: Ellis, I (62), 222-223, 307, 308n, 323, 493; Rommel (53), 486; Baldwin (66), 280; Montgomery (58), 231, 235, 236; Montgomery (48), 180.

Because the major part of the British and American armies were involved one way or another in preparing for OVERLORD, it was recognized that the intention of *an* invasion of Fortress Europe could not be hidden. Consequently security could function only within specially designed compartments. Thus its innermost secrets were limited to a select group of several hundred. This special group was handled by special security arrangements, controlled by Brigadier General Thomas Betts, SHAEF's Deputy G-2. This group, which comprised all persons privy to the time and place of the invasion, was assigned the *ad hoc* security classification BIGOT.⁴⁶⁵ It is, therefore, ironic that this codeword marking and masking this innermost "bigoted" group itself hints at half the ultimate secret. Any newly "bigoted" American who, after the first smile faded, wondered just why "bigot," and then checked his current Merriam-Webster desk dictionary would have found it was "a name once given to the Normans in France."⁴⁶⁶ Fortunately for OVERLORD, the term BIGOT was not discovered, much less understood, by the ineffective German intelligence services. Of course, there is always the possibility that a compromised codeword—such as OVERLORD itself, which was sold by "Cicero" to the Germans—will be suspect as a deliberate plant.

On D-Day itself the Allies placed 156,000 troops on Normandy—8 divisions, 3 airlifted in and 5 brought by 2,727 ships. They were met by only three understrength German divisions. The beachhead was secured.

1960. Starring Bradford Dillman, Suzy Parker, and Harry Andrews. Based on a novel by Alec Waugh. Screenplay by Nigel Balchin and Robert Musel.

⁴⁶⁵For BIGOT see Perrault (65), 100-101, 104-105; Bradley (51), 223; Pogue (54), 162.

⁴⁶⁶Thus *Webster's Collegiate Dictionary* (5th ed., 1941); and *Webster's New International Dictionary* (2nd ed., 1934). The other contemporary standard American and British dictionaries and etymologies either gave the origin as "unknown" or gave such a profusion of theories as to pose no threat to security.

References

• General

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- Morison, XI (57), 72-74.
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- *NCA*, Supplement B (48), 1625-1627, for Schellenberg’s Nürnberg testimony.
- Papen (53), 517-518, for the “Cicero” leaks of the Teheran Conference and codeword OVERLORD.
- Moyzisch (50), 122-123, 144-150, 165-166, (Ditto).

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- McLachlan (68), 333-337.
- Warlimont (64), 422-425.
- Morison, XI (57), 43-44, 48-49, 87, 107, 153.
- Wilmot (52), 318, 332-333.
- Bayerlein in Rommel (53), 470-471, 474, 478.
- Churchill, VI (53), 10-11.

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- Maskelyne (49), 112, 175, 183.
- *Tangled Web* (63), 146.

- **Deception—“BODYGUARD”**

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- Butcher (46), 536, 544, 576.
- Ellis, I (62), 103-104.
- Eisenhower (48), 519.
- *Tangled Web* (63), 132.
- Churchill, V (51), 383.

- **Deception—“FORTITUDE” and in general**

- Ellis (62), 103-104, 127-130, 323, 489-490.
- Harrison (51), 76, 453.
- Morison, XI (57), 19, 74-75, 152-153.
- Chester Wilmot, *The Struggle for Europe*, (New York: Harper, 1952), pp. 110, 199-201, 209-211, 228, 246-248, 283, 290, 318, 332-333.
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- *Tangled Web* (63), 129-147.
- Albert Norman, *Operation Overlord* (Harrisburg, Pa.: Military Science Publishing Co., 1952), pp. 124-128.
- Allan A. Michie, *The Invasion of Europe* (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1964), pp. 121-125.
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- Foot (66), 344, 350-351, 386-387.
- Guingand (64), 217-220.
- Walker (57), 203-213.
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- Ismay (60), 347-348.
- Fergusson (61), 333-334.
- Churchill, V (51), 595-596; VI (53), 11.
- Kahn (67), 508-509.
- Delmer (62), 190, 297.
- Butcher (46), 492, 522, 545, 554, 889. (First public use of code-name FORTITUDE, but only in the Index, and, in fact, covering only FORTITUDE NORTH.)
- Dulles (63), 147.

- **Deception—“FORTITUDE NORTH” (Norway)**

- Butcher (46), 536, 545, 889.

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- Codman (57), 136.

- **Deception–“FORTITUDE SOUTH”–Operation COLUMBIA**

- *Tangled Web* (63), 140-141.

- **Deception–“FORTITUDE II” (see also FORTITUDE I–U.S. 1st Army Group)**

- *Tangled Web* (63), 146.
- Kennedy (57), 325.
- Butcher (46), 615.
- Churchill, VI (53), 11.

- **Deception–“PLAN COCKADE” (comprising Operations WADHAM, TINDALL, and STARKEY)**

- Harrison (51), 51, 70-71.
- Pogue (54), 58, 105-106.

- **Deception–“STARKEY” (and “HARLEQUIN”)**

- Morgan (50), 57-59, 81-101, 103, 155, 227, 239.
- Kennedy (57), 303-304.
- Foot (66), 278.

- **Deception–“Monty’s Double”**

- M.E. Clifton James, *I Was Monty’s Double* (London: Rider, 1954).
- Stephen Watts, “I Was Monty’s Double Once Removed,” in his *Moonlight on a Lake in Bond Street* (London: The Bodley Head, 1961), pp. 158-173.

- Butcher (46), 549, 582-583.
- Bernard Dennelle, “Le sosie de ‘Monty’,” *Historia*, February 1960, pp. 201-204. Not seen by me.

- **Deception–“GLIMMER”**

- Alfred Price, *Instruments of Darkness* (London: Kimber, 1967), pp. 207-210. (Not seen by me.)
- Morison, XI (57), 75.
- *Tangled Web* (63), 144-145.
- Wilmot (52), 228.
- Montgomery (48), 43.

- **Deception–“TAXABLE”**

- Price (67), 207-210.
- Saunders, III (54).
- Morison, XI (57), 75.
- *Tangled Web* (63), 144-145.
- Wilmot (52), 228.
- Montgomery (48), 43.

- **Deception–“BIG DRUM”**

- Morison, XI (57), 75.
- *Tangled Web* (63), 144-145.

Example B35. Karelia, 10 Jun 1944

On 10 June 1944, just four days after the Normandy landing, the Russians launched an offensive against Finland.

The offensive began with a strong thrust by Marshal L. A. Govorov through the Karelian Isthmus, from Leningrad toward Vyborg. It was, as the Russians now assert, primarily a “feint” attack intended to prepare the way for the subsequent main summer offensive in Belorussia (see Case A46).⁴⁶⁷ It was also, as Stalin wrote Churchill on D-minus-1, the “first round” of the summer offensive and as such scheduled to prevent the Germans from freely redeploying divisions to France.⁴⁶⁸ Moreover, it may have been specifically designed to suggest to the Germans that the Normandy landing was only a diversion for the “main” landings that would come in Scandinavia.⁴⁶⁹ The coordination of these eastern and western offensives was in accord with Plan BODYGUARD, the grand strategic deception plan agreed among Stalin, Churchill and Roosevelt at the “Big Three” Conference at Teheran in October 1943. However, if their Karelian operation was geared to the FORTITUDE NORTH part of BODYGUARD, the Russians seemingly did not communicate this intention to the Anglo-American command.

The following tables show the Russian and Finnish strengths in the southern section of the Russo-Finnish border, covering what the Russians then designated the “Leningrad Front” (i.e., the Karelian Isthmus, commanded by Govorov) and the “Karelian Front” (i.e., East Karelia, under Meretskov). It will be seen that their forces were deployed about equally between these two sectors.⁴⁷⁰

	Russian	Finnish
Troops	450,000	268,000
Divisions	24	13
Artillery pieces	10,000	1,930
Tanks	800	110
Aircraft	1,547	248

Table A.67: Strengths on Southern Finnish Sector

The Russian attack on the Karelian Isthmus opened on 10 June. It took the Finnish High Command quite by surprise. This, despite several warnings. These included indications in May that led the Finnish Army Intelligence service to predict on 1 June that a Russian offensive was due within 10 days. Also, on D-minus-4 or 5, the Russians had imposed field radio silence, a security measure that conventionally signalled an imminent offensive. However, the Finnish Army

⁴⁶⁷“Sovetskie organy. . .” (65); and Shimansky (68), 18.

⁴⁶⁸Text of message in Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., *Correspondence Between the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. and the Presidents of the U.S.A. and the Prime Ministers of Great Britain . . . 1941-1945* (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1957), Vol. I, p. 226. See also Butcher (46), 576; and Churchill, VI (53), 8.

⁴⁶⁹I am indebted to Mr. William R. Harris for suggesting this possibility.

⁴⁷⁰Ziemke (68), 296, 298, 302.

	Karelian Isthmus		East Karelia	
	Russian	Finnish	Russian	Finnish
Tank Divisions	3	1	0	0
Infantry Divisions	10	6	11	6
Infantry Brigades	0	2	6	3

Table A.68: Deployments on Southern Finnish Sector

Chief of Operations remained unconvinced, and it was his opinion that carried with Marshal Mannerheim.⁴⁷¹

The Finnish lines on the Isthmus crumbled before the unexpected assault, and on D+6 Mannerheim had so denuded East Karelia in his urgent search for units to stop the Russian drive that the Finns were also forced back in that sector when the Russians attacked there on D+9 (19 June).

By the end of June the Finns had lost 18,000 troops and substantial territory. Moreover, by their operation in Karelia, the Russians had managed to help their own scheme for their summer offensive (that opened on the Belorussian Front on 22 June) by drawing in some precious German units, specifically one infantry division and an artillery brigade.

References

- **General**
 - Ziemke (68), 296-303.
- **Warnings**
 - Ziemke (68), 296, 298.
- **Surprise**
 - Ziemke (68), 296, 298.
- **Diversion**
 - Shimansky (68), 18.
 - “Sovetsky organy ...” (65).

⁴⁷¹Ziemke (68), 296, 298.

Example B36. Saipan, 15 Jun 1944: Operation FORAGER

Saipan with its 72 square miles was the northernmost of the Mariana Islands, 1200 miles SSE of Japan. Because it was favorably situated for beginning the very long-range B-29 bombing attacks on the Japanese home islands, Saipan was selected by Admiral Nimitz as the first target in his Marianas campaign—Operation FORAGER. The basic decision for the Marianas campaign was made in November 1943 and Nimitz began intensive planning on 13 January 1944 with Saipan (and neighboring Tinian) picked as the initial target. D-day was initially set for 1 November, but the unexpectedly rapid approach through the intervening Marshalls and the decision to by-pass Truk in the Carolines meant that in early April D-day for Saipan was speeded up to 15 June, the date that was eventually kept.

	U.S.	Japanese	Ratio
D	c.3,000	?	?
D+1	4,000	?	?
D+24	16,525	25,591	1:1.5

Table A.69: Operation Forager Casualties (Cumulative). References: Isely and Crowl (51), 330, 339-340, 350; Morison, VIII (53), 168, 200, 339.

By D-plus 20 the 72 square-mile island had been overrun and only isolated resistance remained. Saipan was declared “secured” on D-plus-24 (July 9th) and three months later the first B-29s were off to bomb Japan.

References

- **General**
 - Crowl (60), 33-266.
 - Morison, VIII (53), 149-210, 322-340.
 - Isely and Crowl (51), 310-351.
- **Surprise**
 - Morison, VIII (53), 183.
- **Diversion**
 - Morison, VIII (53), 187.

Case A46. Belorussia, 22 Jun 1944

At the Teheran Conference, on 30 November 1943, Roosevelt told Stalin that the OVERLORD D-day was set for sometime in May 1944. Stalin agreed to co-ordinate operations on the Russian Front to prevent any major transfer of German units to northwest France during the critical period of Allied lodgement, which Churchill specified as the first 30 to 50 days. Stalin undertook to organize a major Russian offensive for the same month.⁴⁷²

The Russians planned their main offensive to go through across the Belorussian Front. Meanwhile the Germans confidently expected the offensive to come again from the Ukraine. The Soviet Supreme Command (Stavka) knew this. Consequently, Stavka initiated an elaborate deception operation to “confirm” the Germans’ expectations while making a covert build-up of strength in Belorussia.⁴⁷³ This build-up began in the third week of April, but the Germans did not even begin to get indications of this until 30 May. The final Russian directive went out to the front commands on 31 May. Without unduly alerting the Germans, the Russians achieved increases of 60% in troops, 300% in tanks, 85% in artillery, and 62% in air. Indeed, on 3 June, the German Army’s Eastern Intelligence Branch dismissed the partially observed activity as “apparently a deception,” and even at the end expected only a feint in Belorussia in support of the “real” offensive in the Ukraine.⁴⁷⁴ Thus the Russians obtained superiority of up to 10-to-1 at the initial assault points.

	Russian	German	Ratios (x-to-1)
Troops	2,500,000	700,000	3.6
Line	1,200,000	520,000*	2.3*
Reserve	1,300,000	180,000*	7.2*
Divisions	166	51	3.3
Line	80*	38	2.1*
Reserve	86*	13	6.6*
Tanks	4,000	930*	4.3
Guns & Mortars	24,400	8,400*	2.9
Aircraft	5,300	775	6.8

Table A.70: Strengths Along the Belorussian Front. Note: Items marked by * are my extrapolations. References: Werth (64), 860-861; Ziemke (68), 319; and *IVOVSS*, IV (61), 164. These figures are mainly the official Russian ones. German sources place the Russian superiority even higher. Compare Stalin’s statement to Churchill on 21 June 1944 that the forthcoming offensive would involve “130 divisions, including armoured ones.” See *Correspondence*, I (57), 230.

The Russian command in the Belorussian sector was held jointly by Marshals Zhukov and Vasilevsky. The opposing German Army Group Center was weakly

⁴⁷²Churchill, V (51), 373, 380-381, 383; Berezhevskiy (67), 32-33; and Deane (47), 146.

⁴⁷³*Istoriya Velikoy Otechestvennoy Voiny Sovetskogo Soyuzha, 1941-1945* Vol. IV (Moskva: Institut Marksizma-Leninizma, 1961), p. 127, as cited by Ziemke (68), 314.

⁴⁷⁴Ziemke (68), 314-315.

	Belorussia		Ukraine	
	German Estimate	Actual Deployment	German Estimate	Actual Deployment
Tank armies	0	2	6	4
Other armies	18	22	?	?
Totals:	18	24	?	?

Table A.71: Deployment Of Soviet Armies On Two Fronts, 22 June 1944. References: Shimansky (68), 19, 20.

commanded by Field-Marshal Ernst Busch.

The excellent degree of Russian success in concealing the redeployment of their forces is seen in the Table A.71 showing the German estimates of Soviet deployment between the Belorussian and Ukrainian Fronts and the actual deployment, as of 22 June by which time German intelligence had gradually identified many of the Russian units.

Specifically, the Russians had one-third more units facing the Germans on the crucial Belorussian Front than the German intelligence estimates had credited them with. Moreover, this additional force was top-heavy in armor.

Coordinated planning for the BODYGUARD deception plan for the Second Front and Eastern Front offensives that had been agreed upon at the Teheran Conference was carried out in Moscow early in 1944. It was one of the very rare instances where the Soviet authorities fully cooperated on an equal basis with their wartime Allies. For this purpose, the British sent their chief deception planner, Colonel John Bevan; the Americans sent one of their deception experts, Lieutenant Colonel William H. Baumer; and the Russian General Staff assigned Colonel-General Fedor Kuznetsov, who was then probably no less than the Director of Soviet Military Intelligence (the GRU). During four or five meetings from 10 February to 5 March, Bevan explained his carefully designed Plan BODYGUARD and the Russians agreed to accept it without change. The Russian contribution to BODYGUARD had two aspects. First, the Russians were to make demonstrations in Northern Finland and against the Bulgarian and Rumanian coasts to imply coordination with (dummy) Allied invasions of Scandinavia and the Balkans. Second, they were to lead the Germans to believe that their summer offensive would—like the Second Front—not materialize until July (while, in reality, both the Allied invasion and the Russian offensives were set for June).⁴⁷⁵

During May, the Russians began leaking misinformation to deceive the Germans about the goals, place, and timing of their summer offensive.

Accordingly, the Soviet May Day proclamation declared the primary goal to be the liberation of all occupied Russia “from the Barents Sea to the Black Sea,” rather than a battle of annihilation directed into Germany.⁴⁷⁶ Similarly, Stavka directives issued to all fronts during that week of May ordered extensive training,

⁴⁷⁵Deane (47), 147-149; and Chapter II, Section D.

⁴⁷⁶IVOVSS, IV (61), 126, as cited by Ziemke (68), 311.

reconnaissance, and clearing of a 25 kilometer strip behind their frontlines to preserve security—all serving to establish routines that were consistent with a prolonged defensive posture.⁴⁷⁷ These ruses fooled the Germans. They have also recently fooled Dr. Ziemke, the U.S. official military historian of Russia in World War II.⁴⁷⁸ Yet this story had already been revealed in 1947 by Major General John R. Deane who, as Head of the U.S. Military Mission, hosted the BODYGUARD conferences in Moscow. Deane noted:⁴⁷⁹

In carrying out the plan some of the information leakages which appeared in the Soviet press were just as startling to Russia's allies as they were to Germans. Only those who knew of Plan Bodyguard realized that these revelations were for deception purposes. . . . With regard to [Russian] inability to launch a summer offensive until July, the Germans had been led to believe that the Soviet High Command [Stavka] was forming a new army of selected troops on the central front and that it had been ordered to complete its organization by the end of June; also that new Russian reserves were being trained for employment in July.

In a general way the Russians kept their Allies informed of their own part in the coordinated summer plans. On 23 April, General A. E. Antonov, the Deputy Chief of the Soviet General Staff, replied to the notification that OVERLORD D-Day had been set for 31 May (plus-or-minus two or three days) by the terse assurance that the Russian summer offensive would occur at the same time. Then on 6 June, OVERLORD D-day itself, Stalin informed the Allies that the agreed offensive would begin “in mid-June in one of the vital sectors of the front.”⁴⁸⁰ Then, on 21 June, Stalin informed Churchill and Roosevelt that:⁴⁸¹

..The second round of the summer offensive of the Soviet forces will begin within a week. The offensive will involve 130 divisions, including armoured ones. . . . I hope it will be a substantial help to the Allied operations in France and in Italy.

It is only rarely that the Russians make even passing reference to their deception operations. For example, it was not until 1961 that the Russians disclosed even the bare fact that their Belorussian offensive had involved a comprehensive program of deception.⁴⁸² It is fortunate therefore that a senior Soviet military writer selected this example for the first detailed published case study of a deception operation. Colonel A. N. Shimansky's 11-page article

⁴⁷⁷*IVOVSS*, IV (61), 127, as cited by Ziemke (68), 311.

⁴⁷⁸Ziemke (68), 311. Inexplicably, Ziemke completely overlooks the relevant public literature on Teheran and BODYGUARD.

⁴⁷⁹Deane (47), 148-149.

⁴⁸⁰Correspondence, I (57), 224, and II (57), 145. See also Deane (47), 149-151; and Churchill, VI (53), 6-7.

⁴⁸¹Correspondence, I (57), 230, and II (57), 147.

⁴⁸²*IVOVSS*, IV (61), 127.

was published in June 1968 in the official historical journal of the Ministry of Defense.⁴⁸³

Colonel Shimansky's article discloses that the Belorussian campaign employed the most sophisticated deception used by the Russians up till then:⁴⁸⁴

Towards the end of May, the Soviet command employed some new elements, in addition to the creative utilization of experience gained in the achievement of strategic surprise in the past campaigns. These new elements included, for example, reconnaissance in force not only in front areas involved in the offensive, but also in other contiguous strategic directions.

Because this campaign represented something of a high-water mark in the Soviet practice of stratagem—one that the author recommends to his 56,000 subscribers as a still valid example—two comments are in order. First, even with the innovation of such “new elements” as dispersed superfluous reconnaissance, the level of stratagematic sophistication was no greater than that already achieved by the British and Germans by 1917! Second, the timing of these innovations strongly suggests that they were a direct infusion from Colonel Bevan's four or five seminars on his Plan BODYGUARD given to Soviet General Staff officers only three months earlier.⁴⁸⁵

Briefly, the Soviet deception plan for the Belorussian operation consisted of the following elements:

First, extremely tight security was imposed from the top on down. Only six persons knew the overall plan: the Supreme Commander-in-Chief (Stalin), the Deputy Supreme Commander-in-Chief, the Chief of the General Staff and his deputy, and the Chief of the Operations Division and his deputy.⁴⁸⁶ Operational plans were prepared in great secrecy and orders issued in single hand-delivered copies or by reporting in person outside normal channels.

Second, great care was taken to sustain the German preconception that the Ukraine was still the locus of main Soviet strength. Thus the General Staff ordered the Commander of the Third Ukrainian Front (Tolbukhin) to simulate the *arrival* of nine divisions and an armored corps. Their simulated arrival by rail through four main depots was carried out between 29 May and 14 June, and their concentration and animated activity near the front done between 15 June and 5 July. (Note that this last period carried 13 days beyond D-day for Belorussia, thereby introducing the fiction that the expected Ukrainian offensive might *still* follow the existing one in Belorussia—the same sort of brilliant two-stage ruse seemingly first used by the British in FORTITUDE II, earlier that month.) All the physical signs of a deployed army were used, including dummy tanks, artillery, aircraft, depots, and dugouts, as well as radio nets. To lend verisimilitude, it was, however, necessary to establish a real anti-aircraft zone

⁴⁸³Shimansky (68), 17-28.

⁴⁸⁴Shimansky (68), 18. (I have used the JPRS translation as a pony.)

⁴⁸⁵The likelihood of Colonel Bevan's influence on Soviet deception doctrine was first suggested in 1968 by Mr. William R. Harris.

⁴⁸⁶*Voenna-istoricheskoy zhurnal*, No. 9, 1965, p. 52, as cited by Shimansky (68), 18, 28.

with full fighter cover. An added touch was to concentrate the bulk of the Soviet long-range bomber operations in that direction. The Germans responded as desired: they increased their aerial reconnaissance in the area, detected the proffered visible signs, and concluded that the Russians were indeed preparing their “main strike” for that area.⁴⁸⁷

Third, elaborate steps were taken to conceal the offensive preparations at the Belorussian Front. Elaborate camouflage procedures were used to conceal the arrival and deployment of new units.⁴⁸⁸ In addition, extensive—and highly visible—building of defensive positions was undertaken during May and June to imply a defense posture for Belorussia.⁴⁸⁹

Fourth, the Russians took the general step of simulating normalcy—or, at least, equality—along the entire line. Thus, early during the offensive preparations, Stavka ordered all front commanders to make all redeployments under cover of night and to preserve the existing pattern of artillery fire.⁴⁹⁰ Special care was taken to prevent disclosure of the new deployments through German monitoring of Russian field radio transmissions. To do this, Stavka directed from 9 May on that all Front and Army radio networks cease transmission. Exception was granted only to the radio nets for the air force, air defense, reconnaissance, and artillery fire control.⁴⁹¹ As D-day approached and increased patrolling became necessary to test the German lines, care was taken to do so all along the front, including even the passive sectors. Finally, on 16 June, D-minus-6, Stavka authorized reconnaissances in force (i.e., up to battalion size) to begin in Belorussia, but required that an identical pattern be conducted by the immediately contiguous fronts as well.⁴⁹²

Fifth, the real offensive was preceded by 12 days by a major feint attack, the offensive against Finland, that began on 10 June.⁴⁹³

The Russians opened their great summer offensive on 22 June, appropriately the third anniversary of the German invasion. The attack on the 22nd was an encirclement of Vitebsk; and, during the next day, the offensive became general along the entire 488 miles of the Belorussian Front.⁴⁹⁴ The attack caught the local German commander, Field-Marshal Busch, off in Germany since the 20th, awaiting an interview with Hitler,⁴⁹⁵ a sure sign that the time (as well as the place) of attack was a surprise.

Deception-aided surprise was so complete that the Germans broke along the entire front at the first assault. Moreover, the Russians were able to effectively exploit this situation because they had prepared—also in secret—a massed reserve

⁴⁸⁷Shimansky (68), 19-20.

⁴⁸⁸Shimansky (68), 18, 21-22.

⁴⁸⁹Shimansky (68), 22-23.

⁴⁹⁰*Voenna-istoricheskii zhurnal*, No. 9, 1965, pp. 57-58, as cited by Shimansky (68), 18.

⁴⁹¹Shimansky (68), 15.

⁴⁹²Shimansky (68), 18, 22, 23.

⁴⁹³See Example B35.

⁴⁹⁴All Soviet sources consistently date the beginning of this offensive to 23 June. However, the German sources insist on the 22 June date and give the necessary supporting details. See Ziemke (68), 319.

⁴⁹⁵Ziemke (68), 316, 320.

Source	Divisions
Army Group North	4
Army Group Ukraine-North	10
Army Group Ukraine-South	2
Germany	3
OKH Reserve	2
Norway	1
Holland	1
Total Divisions:	23

Table A.72: Sources of German Reinforcements. References: Shimansky (68), 27.

of many divisions for the follow-through. The Germans, on “the other side of the hill,” were forced to pull together scratch forces, feeding them in in dribblets. Consequently the Soviet Army was able to advance 320 miles and recapture 50,000 square miles by D-plus-26. Only then was their tide spent and the German blocking forces in place. But the Germans had paid an even greater price in casualties for their initial miscalculation: 350,000 killed, wounded and captured, including the complete destruction of 17 to 28 divisions by D+11 alone.⁴⁹⁶ On D+36 all Belorussia was cleared with the recapture of Brest-Litovsk. Moreover, by having to denude other fronts to get the 23 divisions sent as reinforcements, the Germans exposed themselves to defeat elsewhere, a situation the Russians were quick to exploit in the North Ukraine on 13 July. *The War Diary* of the OKW deemed the defeat in Belorussia to have been “a greater catastrophe than Stalingrad.”

⁴⁹⁶ *IVOVSS*, IV (61), 198, as cited by Shimansky (68), 27; Ziemke (68), 325; and Werth (64), 862, 864-865. No figures for Russian casualties are available.

References

- **General**
 - Ziemke (68), 309-329.
 - Shimansky (68), 17-28.
 - Werth (64), 855-865.
 - Guderian (52), 336, 352-355.
- **Warning**
 - Ziemke (68), 315.
- **Surprise**
 - Ziemke (68), 319.
- **Deception**
 - Shimansky (68), throughout.
 - Deane (47), 149, 151.
 - Ziemke (68), 314.
 - *IVOVSS*, IV (61), 127.

Example B37. Tinian, 24 Jul 1944: Part of Operation FORAGER

We can shoulder our way in through the enemy's back door. It's the only way to surprise him.

—Col. Evans F. Carlson

This operation was termed by U.S. Marine General Holland “Howlin’ Mad” Smith “the perfect amphibious operation in the Pacific war.”⁴⁹⁷ More specifically, it is an elegant example of tactical surprise obtained according to the principle of “alternative goals.”

The Problem: How to establish an unopposed beachhead with some 5,000 troops on a clear day on an island 12 miles long and 4 miles wide and teeming with over 8,000 well-armed do-or-die enemy? Handicap One: The enemy is fully alert and knows his island will be invaded that day. Handicap Two: The island has only three beaches, one of which is not negotiable with existing amphibious equipment.

The Solution: Develop the needed equipment and land on the “impossible” beach. A simultaneous feint at one of the proper beaches at the far end of the island convinces the enemy that that will be the point of landing so he sends most of his reserves there. (The technical modification in this case was nominal—an improvised carpet spread from the front of the smaller landing craft to enable them to negotiate the treacherous coral shallows.) Only 15 Marines and one sailor were killed during the first 16 hours following the landing.

This solution was that of the Planning Officer of the 4th Marine Division, Colonel Evans F. Carlson.⁴⁹⁸ I wonder if he was not inspired by his pre-war service as an observer for U.S. Naval Intelligence with Mao Tse-tung’s Eighth Route Army, whose training methods and leadership principles he had successfully applied in 1942 in his own command, the Second Marine Raider Battalion, the famed “Carlson’s Raiders.” In any case it was a technique he had already successfully tested with his Raiders in the hit-and-run operation against Makin on 17 August 1942.⁴⁹⁹ Wounded on Saipan on 22 June, the final Tinian planning was handled by others.

⁴⁹⁷Smith (49), 201.

⁴⁹⁸Blankfort (47), 337.

⁴⁹⁹Blankfort (47), 40.

D	U.S.	Japanese
KIA	16	
WIA	225	
PW	0	
Totals:	241	?
D+1		
KIA		1,241
WIA		800
PW		0
Totals:	?	2,041
D+8		
KIA	389	8,000
WIA	1,816	—
PW	0	252
Totals:	2,205	8,252
Ratio: 1:3.7		

Table A.73: Casualties (Cumulative).

References

- **General**

- Philip A. Crowl, *Campaign in the Marianas*. (Washington, D.C.: OCMH, 1960), pp. 269-303.
- Morison, VIII (53), 351-370.

- **Surprise**

- See all references under DECEPTION below.

- **Deception**

- Crowl (60), 276, 283, 287, 289, 292.
- Morison, VIII (53), 351, 355, 359, 364.
- *Tangled Web* (63), 148-157.
- Smith (49), 203-204, 208.
- Blankfort (47), 337.

Case A47. Normandy Breakthrough, 25 Jul 1944: Operation COBRA

For five weeks after landing in Normandy the Allied armies were mired in a series of local battles to expand into the Cotentin Peninsula. To end this deadlock and restore mobility, Lieutenant General Omar Bradley, commanding the American forces ashore (U.S. First Army), conceived a breakthrough plan by 10 July, based loosely on the very rough, post-beachhead part of NEPTUNE Planning. It was promptly dubbed COBRA by Bradley's G-3, Colonel Truman Thorson, in a moment when salesmanship superceded security considerations. Adopted by Eisenhower three days later, COBRA D-day was set for 18 July. The plan involved a sharp thrust through St.-Lô in the center of the western American-held half of the Allied line, the entire event to be triggered by a massive carpet-bombing to open a path through the enemy front. The aerial preparatory bombardment and the concentration of the assault divisions were to constitute the element of surprise.

Meanwhile, on the eastern British-held end of the Allied line, General Montgomery was preparing a major diversion, Operation GOODWOOD, to go in through Caen on 17 July, that is, COBRA-minus-1. As viewed by SHAEF, this would maintain Montgomery's assigned rôle of drawing and holding the bulk of the German divisions, particularly their armor. (Montgomery shared this view but with the possible reservation that if COBRA did not succeed he would be prepared to exploit any breakthrough that GOODWOOD might achieve.)

Delays caused by unfavorable weather and slow preparatory advances caused GOODWOOD to be reset for 18 July and COBRA to 21 July. GOODWOOD went in on schedule but bogged down on 21 July, having made very limited gains but succeeding in holding the Germans in tight embrace.⁵⁰⁰ COBRA D-day depended on weather suitable for flying to permit the concentrated airstrike that would trigger the whole show and clear the path for the breakthrough. Weather did intervene on 20 July to postpone the 21 July date, at first indefinitely, then—on 23 July with clear skies predicted for the next day—to 24 July.⁵⁰¹

H-hour for the bombing attack was set for noon on 24 July. Air Chief-Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory, the Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Air Force (AEAF), had come from London that morning to personally observe the effects of the carpet bombing. Finding an overcast sky and thick clouds, Leigh-Mallory ordered the airstrike cancelled. He made his decision at 1130 hours and at 1140 the order went out by radio. With only 20 minutes to H-hour it is not surprising that half of the 1,800 heavy bombers and half the 350 fighter-bombers went ahead oblivious of the recall order. Only the 400 scheduled medium bombers were stopped before take-off. Except for about 450 heavies that aborted only because they couldn't locate the target area, the rest (335) swept in *over* the American lines rather than parallel to them as Bradley had requested and expected and as—confusion compounded—the 175 fighter-bombers

⁵⁰⁰By GOODWOOD-plus-3 Montgomery had lost 500 tanks and over 4,000 men.

⁵⁰¹Bradley (51), 346. Blumenson (61), 228, says 1300 hours.

did do. Although the American front line had pulled back 1,200 yards for safety, enough bombs were prematurely released to kill 25 and wound 131 Americans in the 30th Division. Moreover, it alerted the Germans to (without stunning them for) the American ground attack *which went in on schedule* because the local corps commander, Major General J. Lawton Collins, was understandably confused by receiving word of the airstrike cancellation order *and then seeing* that pre-arranged trigger go off. Collins very wisely pursued the cautious course of committing only the initial three-division ground strike while holding the exploitation units in their concealed bivouacs. Thus when a half hour later Collins was told the COBRA ground attack had also been postponed, he was able to restrain the subsequent phases while his troops recovered their original positions for only about 200 casualties in addition to the 186 hit by their own air. (Total casualties inflicted on the Germans by both the airstrike and ground battle that day was only about 350 men and 10 tanks.)

COBRA was now reset for 0940 hours, 25 July. This time it went in as planned. Over 2,400 bombers dropped about 4,000 tons of bombs on a 2-mile by 4-mile corridor to the immediate front of the U.S. lines. Too late to change their plan, the heavies again made their bomb run perpendicular to the American front, inflicting 601 casualties on their own troops, including 111 dead. But, this time, they fully succeeded in smashing the entire German division opposing them, killing 1,000 outright and wounding, stunning or mind-shattering the rest. All the bombs were in the 100 to 500 pound range to minimize the cratering that had been found in earlier cases of carpet or saturation bombardment to seriously slow the advance of tanks and infantry. When the infantry attack went in on its new schedule at 1100 hours, it found the way well prepared.

The success of COBRA—and the hard-going of GOODWOOD—hinged on strategic deception. While, as seen,⁵⁰² the FORTITUDE I deception plan had concealed the site and timing of the Normandy landing, it had an integral follow-on, FORTITUDE II, to prevent effective German countermoves in Normandy by convincing them that the *main* landing was *still to come*. The mechanism for this ruse was still Bradley's shadowy First U.S. Army Group (FUSAG), whose cluster of real and simulated armies pretended to sit in East Anglia ostensibly eagerly waiting to mount the "main" landing at Pas-de-Calais, the cover target in the FORTITUDE SOUTH deception sub-plan. The real unit under FUSAG was the potent Third Army commanded by Lieutenant General George S. Patton, Jr. The impatient Patton and his Third Army were being held back not to lend verisimilitude to the FUSAG-Pas-de-Calais sham, but simply because OVERLORD logistics were already booked to capacity.

The Allied deception plan meshed neatly with the incompetence of the German intelligence services to give the German military planners a grossly misleading picture of the Allied order of battle. [See Table A.74.]

Given this great—almost two to one—discrepancy between the estimated and actual number of divisions available to the Allies for their cross-channel invasion, it is really not surprising that the Germans could persist so long in believing

⁵⁰²See Case A45.

	German Estimate	Real Number
U.S.	?	20
British and Canadian	?	18
Total Divisions:	80	38

Table A.74: Allied Divisions in Britain, 5 June 1944. References: Pogue (54), 180; Harrison (51), 350-351 (gives the German estimate as 85 Allied divisions); Belfield (65), 125-27 (gives it as 70).

	U.S.	British	Canadian	Total Allied	Total German
D-Day (6 Jun-1944)	5	3	1	9	3
D+2	6	3	1	10	
D+3	7	3	1	11	
D+4	7	4	1	12	
D+5	7	5	1	13	
D+7	9	5	1	15	
D+24					16
D+48 (24 Jul)	16			33	23
D+55 (31 Jul)	21			37	
D+66	21			37	

Table A.75: Divisions On Normandy Front. References: Bradley (51), 240-284, 361; Montgomery (48), 102-105, 181. Montgomery (58), 232, 235.

the Normandy assault to be only a preliminary and, indeed, secondary invasion. Already, a full year earlier, German intelligence had been similarly duped in the Mediterranean.⁵⁰³ It is only hindsight that makes it “obvious” that Normandy was rapidly absorbing all available Allied divisions. At the time, German intelligence was only slowly recognizing that their enemy-order-of-battle maps had shown some 42 non-existent units.

When on 6 July Patton finally arrived in Normandy with the vanguard of his Third Army headquarters, this move was made in greatest secrecy to preserve the fiction of its attachment to FUSAG, which was still in England. In a publicity-grabbing breach of security, Patton’s COBRA mission was disclosed on 18 July to the Allied press corps that had accompanied Third Army to Normandy. This selfish stunt was performed by Patton’s Public Relations Officer, Lieutenant Colonel Kent A. Hunter, or so Patton claimed.⁵⁰⁴ In any case this information failed somehow to reach German intelligence and, indeed, the Germans apparently did not learn of the Patton-Third Army presence until somewhere around the time they went into action on August 1st. Even then

⁵⁰³See Case A38 (Sicily).

⁵⁰⁴Oldfield (56), 98. A rather different version is in Bradley (51), 356. I have tended to follow the account by Colonel Oldfield, who as a PRO with 21st Army Group was closer to the men and the event.

a tight security censorship lid was kept on identifying either Patton or Third Army as participating in that push for over two weeks, until sometime in late August.⁵⁰⁵

When in July FUSAG made ready to move to Normandy its name was changed to the Twelfth Army Group to avoid exposing its hitherto central part in the FORTITUDE SOUTH ruse. But FUSAG remained in London, now as a wholly paper organization.⁵⁰⁶ On August 1st, the Twelfth U.S. Army Group was formally activated to assume direction of the old 1st Army (Bradley moving up to command the new echelon) and the simultaneously activated Third Army of Patton.⁵⁰⁷ Bradley was succeeded in the now entirely mythical command of the fictitious FUSAG by Lieutenant General Lesley J. McNair who arrived in England to take his new “command” by 17 July, all amidst much publicity and feigned security.⁵⁰⁸

A near break in security was an inadvertent consequence of the partly blundered bombing on 25 July. Lieutenant General McNair, the simulated Commander of the dummy FUSAG, was visiting one of the assault battalions to observe COBRA when he was killed by one of the “shorts.” To avoid compromising the cover-plan, McNair was secretly buried two days later with only senior officers in attendance and the news of his death suppressed until his successor—Lieutenant General John L. DeWitt—could be picked and brought over to England.⁵⁰⁹

The magnificent FORTITUDE II-SOUTH hoax worked with full effect until about 1 August, an almost incredible D-plus-66. Even the most optimistic OVERLORD planners had only counted on an effective life of perhaps a week. It is an impressive example of the resilience and persistence of a faulty intelligence estimate once it has been fixed in the enemy’s mind. A handful of imaginative planners and perhaps a few hundred rear echelon camouflage engineer and radio signalmen had completely immobilized an entire enemy army of 19 divisions for two months of critical battle. The FORTITUDE cover was blown only by the acknowledged physical appearance of Patton at the head of his Third Army. It is quite possible that the game might have been played out longer still by suitable pseudonyms for Patton and the Third. They were the two names the Germans feared and whose movements they watched. The FUSAG fiction was maintained in Southeast England under Lieutenant General John L. DeWitt. Although German intelligence may have been deceived by FUSAG, the German staff was no longer worried by it. Its usefulness ended, the paper army group was formally abolished in October 1944, a month after Montgomery had by-passed Calais.⁵¹⁰

FORTITUDE II’s carefully calculated stratagem to unbalance the German deployment was so successful that at the end of June when the U.S. front had

⁵⁰⁵Bradley (51), 393.

⁵⁰⁶Bradley (51), 180, 226, 344-345.

⁵⁰⁷Ninth Army (Simpson) was added to the Twelfth Army Group roster in late August.

⁵⁰⁸Butcher (46), 614; Eisenhower (48), 288.

⁵⁰⁹Eisenhower (48), 272, 288; Blumenson (61), 236; Bradley (51), 348-349; Patton (47), 95, Oldfield (56), 97-98; Butcher (46) 625, 626, 638.

⁵¹⁰Blumenson (61), 209, 345; Bradley (51), 371.

D-day	German			Allied		
	West	East	Total	West	East	Total
Divisions	9	14	23	15+4	14	33
Armored	2	6	8	2+?	3	5+?
Infantry	7	8	15	13+?	11	24+?
Tanks	110	600	710		1500	
Guns				1,100+		

Table A.76: German and Allied Strengths, Operation COBRA. Note: Allied West column consists of U.S. 1st and 3rd Army; Allied East column consists of British and Canadian Forces.

only two armored divisions, it was feared that by its very weakness it might attract German armor seeking an easy counterattack. Consequently Major General Leonard T. Gerow's V Corps was given a "rubber division" of tanks. This dummy unit was nothing more than a "deception detachment" with inflatable rubber "tanks" and a radio net to simulate the radio traffic of a real armored division. It is a measure of the intense secrecy then surrounding even such "tactical" deception that Gerow, who had been head of the War Plans Department of the Army at the time of Pearl harbor, admitted to Bradley that: "I never even heard of your phony tanks before."⁵¹¹ This anecdote is also a measure of the intense secrecy that was reinstated after the first flurry of post-war leaks, for although Bradley disclosed the incident in 1951 in his best-selling memoirs—carefully explaining its important tactical and strategic significance—the U.S. official military historians omitted it in their detailed accounts of the campaign that have appeared as recently as 1961.

The American assault divisions moved in behind the lines under careful camouflage and at night and Allied air supremacy prevented fully effective German photo-reconnaissance.⁵¹² Nevertheless the German intelligence did appreciate that something was brewing on the American front. Consequently they did divert some new units there, including two Panzer divisions.⁵¹³

By mid-July 33 Allied divisions were ashore in Normandy opposed by 23 German divisions. British Second Army under General Dempsey had his 14 divisions all on the left flank near Caen holding down an equal number of German divisions (including 7 out of the 9 German Panzer divisions with 600 tanks). U.S. First Army under Lieutenant General Bradley had all its 15 divisions (plus 4 divisions of Patton's Third Army in reserve) on the right, opposed by only 9 division equivalents with only 110 tanks. Thus, FORTITUDE II meshed with Montgomery's activities to induce the Germans to distribute their resources in accord with Allied desires.

An important element of technological surprise was injected into COBRA by the innovation of the "Rhino[ceros]." This was a cutting device invented in the

⁵¹¹Bradley (51), 328.

⁵¹²Bradley (51), 332, 335-336.

⁵¹³Bradley (51), 335, 343.

D + 6	U.S. 1st Army	German 7th Army
KIA	?	1,000+
WIA	?	?
PW	?	20,000
Totals:	3,000+	21,000+
Tanks and self-propelled guns	?	362
Vehicles	?	1,337
D+16		
KIA		10,000+
WIA		?
PW		50,000+
Totals:		60,000+

Table A.77: Casualties and Losses, U.S. 1st Army and German 7th Army, Operation COBRA. References: Blumenson (61), 240, 331, 333.

field by Sergeant Curtis G. Culin, Jr., of the U.S. 102d Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron. Attached to the front of tanks, it permitted them to chew their way directly and easily through the hedgerows (*bocage*) that had previously prevented tanks from moving off the hedge-lined roads of Normandy. When Sergeant Culin demonstrated his two prototypes to General Bradley on 14 July, Bradley immediately ordered their mass production for his tanks earmarked for COBRA. To insure their maximum surprise effect, Bradley forbade their use until COBRA, when three-fifths of his tanks went into battle with this unexpected capability.⁵¹⁴

By D-plus-6 Bradley's forces had seized their objectives, taken some 600 square miles of terrain, routed the local German defenders and opened the way for Patton's aggressive breakout when his 7-division phantom Third Army exploded into Brittany on August 1st. Casualties had been disproportionately low.

⁵¹⁴Blumenson (61), 207; Guingand (47), 395; Bradley (51), 342; and Eisenhower (48), 268-269.

References

- **General**

- Martin Blumenson, *Breakout and Pursuit* (Washington, D.C.: OGMH, 1961), pp. 185-286.
- Pogue (54), 196-208.
- Ellis, I (62), 327-400.
- Bradley (51), 315-371. (In several ways, a clearer and more balanced account than that given by the official military historians, Pogue, Blumenson, and Ellis.)
- Eversley Belfield and H. Essame, *The Battle for Normandy* (Philadelphia: Dufour, 1965).

- **Warning**

- Blumenson (61), 229-231, 233, 238-239.

- **Surprise**

- Blumenson (61), 325-328.
- Bayerlein in Rommel (53), 489.
- Warlimont (64), 428.
- Carell (63), 231-236.

- **Deception**

- Bradley (51), 326.
- Blumenson (61), 191.

- **Deception–FORTITUDE II–SOUTH–FUSAG (The fictitious First U.S. Army Group)**

- See bibliography under Case A45, References–FORTITUDE SOUTH (Patton).

Case A48. Southern France, 15 Aug 1944: Operation DRAGOON

The Allied (3 U.S. and 7 French divisions, plus a British brigade, offloaded from 330 ships) landing on the French Riviera took place on 15 August 1944, after OVERLORD was securely lodged in Normandy. This operation, originally titled ANVIL, had been at first—but only briefly—conceived by its British COSSAC originators in July 1943 as a pure “cover target” deception for OVERLORD, to involve no actual landings.

After the Americans (and Russians) entered the planning, ANVIL evolved to become a large-scale secondary landing operation. Finally it was retitled DRAGOON and received its own deception plan.

The Allied planners realized that, despite negligible German air reconnaissance capability, the intensive preparations in Naples, the main staging base for DRAGOON, would be apparent to the many local enemy agents. Exceptional security procedures were instituted to intercept German agents, couriers, and clandestine radios. A very large number of each of these were caught by Fifth Army CIC, because—while the Germans had intensified their intelligence activity—the quality of their agents had deteriorated. CIC was able to capitalize on this situation for deception purposes. By turning around some of these captured agents and radios they were able to feed misleading information to German intelligence.

The deception plan sought to convince the Germans that the amphibious stroke was aimed at the Gulf of Genoa to outflank their position in Northern Italy in conjunction with an Allied drive up the Italian peninsula. This was a more-or-less effective effort, because it played up to the preconceptions of the Germans.

To increase German uncertainty as to which beach was targeted, pre-D-day bombing raids were more-or-less evenly distributed among four regions of the Franco-Italian Riviera: 1) the area around Cette, from Cap d’Agde to Montpellier, 2) Marseilles and Toulon, 3) the actual assault area around Saint-Raphaël, and 4) the Italian Riviera from Cape Mele to Genoa.

Similarly, on D-day itself, but preceding the 0800 H-hour, a series of simulated and diversionary landings by the Special Operations Group were aimed at both Genoa and the Baie de la Ciotat (between Marseilles and Toulon). The first diversion, known as ROSIE, was commanded by Lieutenant Commander Douglas Fairbanks, Jr., USNR, a U.S. Navy camouflage expert. With only two gunboats, one command ship, and four PTs it steered toward Genoa, noisily simulating a large task force and landing 67 commandos near Cannes at 0140 hours. Although the commandos were captured, Radio Berlin credited Fairbanks with the command of “four or five large battleships.”⁵¹⁵ The second diversion took place on the other flank of the target beach at 0155 when five C-47 transport planes dumped 300 dummy “paratroops” outside La Ciotat. (The fact that they were booby-trapped to blow up their “capturers” was denounced

⁵¹⁵Morison, XI (57), 250. See also Maskelyne (49), 79-80.

D+1	Allied	German	Ratios (1:x)
KIA, WIA	183	?	
POW	0	2,129	
Totals:	183	2,129+	11.6
<hr/>			
D+14			
Totals:	6,700	57,000	8.5

Table A.78: Allied and German Casualties, Operation DRAGOON. References: Truscott (54), 415.

by Radio Berlin as a ruse that “could only have been conceived in the sinister Anglo-Saxon mind.”) This simulated airborne preliminary was immediately followed-up by a simulated amphibious landing in which one destroyer and 20 small craft streaming reflector balloons successfully deceived the German radar at La Ciotat.

References

- **General**
 - Morison, XI (57), 221-292.
 - Jackson (67), 247-264.
 - Truscott (54), 381-424.
- **Cover Target Role of “DRAGOON”**
 - Morgan (50), 242-243.
 - Harrison (51), 76n, 126-127, 167, 453.
 - Fergusson (61), 308.
 - Jackson (67), 222, 225n.
- **Surprise**
 - Clark (50), 369-370.
 - Kesseiring (54), 251-252, 255.
 - Morison, XI (57), 244, 249-250, 251, 252, 267-268. (Gives a dissenting opinion on surprise.)
- **Deception aspects of “DRAGOON”**
 - Schwarzwald (46), 69-70.
 - Morison, XI (57), 221-222, 243-244, 248, 249-250.
 - Butcher (46), 615.

Example B38. Battle of the Gothic Line, 25 Aug 1944: Operation OLIVE

For his decisive offensive to breach the German-held Gothic Line (*Gotenstellung*)⁵¹⁶ that reinforced the natural defenses of the Apennines, General Alexander, commanding the Allied 15th Army Group there, originally (in early June 1944) planned his main breakthrough to go through the mountainous center, with a feint along the Adriatic coast. Deception operations were set in motion that convinced his German counterpart, Field-Marshal Kesselring, that the Adriatic feint would be the main attack.⁵¹⁷ Then, on 5 July, Alexander was formally notified that the final decisions in Washington and London to proceed with the ANVIL/DRAGOON landings in southern France (see Case A48) had decreed he would lose many of his U.S. divisions and, particularly, all his French divisions on whose mountain warfare experience he was depending for his offensive.

Consequently, on 4 August, Lieutenant-General Oliver Leese, the Eighth Army commander, convinced Alexander to reverse his original plan, making the real attack up the Adriatic coast with the Eighth Army while the denuded Fifth conducted the demonstration attack at the center, above Florence—in other words—the very strategy that the current deception operations were communicating to the Germans.⁵¹⁸

This reverse of strategy now required a plausibly adjusted stratagem. This I suppose is the most difficult trick to bring off. Moreover, with OLIVE D-day set for 25 August, Alexander's deception planners had only three weeks to reverse the perceptions of the enemy—a feat that history shows to be extremely rare.

The essence of the new deception plan was to work a double bluff by having the Germans now believe that the *old* “evidence” fed them had been and still was part of a deliberate bluff. This was attempted by a new and elaborate program of radio deception. This consisted, at least in part, of using radio to simulate the continued presence in the center of the departed divisions of V Corps.⁵¹⁹

As far as I am aware, this is the only case where a deception plan was turned back upon itself—a stratagem to attempt to discredit earlier disinformation by exposing it for the stratagem it was.

The shift in the axis of attack from center to east involved transferring two Eighth Army corps totalling eight divisions from the center to the east coast behind the two divisions already manning that part of the line. This transfer was completed by D-minus-5 without the Germans quite realizing what had happened.⁵²⁰ Headquarters of the opposing German Tenth Army had received

⁵¹⁶Although the Germans had already renamed it the “Green Line,” the earlier designation is more familiar.

⁵¹⁷Orgill (67), 30. But compare Kesselring (54), 256.

⁵¹⁸Jackson (67), 266.

⁵¹⁹Orgill (67), 33.

⁵²⁰A vivid eyewitness report by the Collier's correspondent is Martha Gellhorn, *The Face of War* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1959), pp. 116-175.

D+10	German 8th Army	British 10th Army
KIA/DOW		
WIA		
MIA		
POW		3,700
Totals:	8,000	3,700+
D+26		
KIA/DOW		
WIA		
MIA		
POW		8,000
Totals:	14,000	8,000+
Tanks:	250	
D+37		
Totals:	50,000	?

Table A.79: German 8th Army and British 10th Army Casualties and Losses at Gothic Line. References: Orgill (67), 112, 158, 160, 194; Jackson (67), 273, 276, 277.

reports of the noise and dust created by the large-scale Allied lateral shift. Army headquarters was interested but tended to accept the opinion of the commander of its 76th Panzer Corps, General Traugott Herr, that this movement was merely the *westward* shipment of war material that he assumed was now being unloaded in quantity at the recently captured Adriatic port of Ancona.⁵²¹ Allied air supremacy prevented the Germans from verifying this false hypothesis.

In any case, Kesselring was not entirely disabused about the *original* deception plan and had, accordingly, reinforced the Tenth Army with General Richard Heidrich's crack 1st Parachute Division. Nevertheless, he did perceive a center attack as sufficiently plausible that he insured himself against that alternative by holding two divisions in reserve near Bologna.⁵²²

When OLIVE began at one hour before midnight—with five divisions jumping the Metauro River and spearheading the three-corps attack—the usual preceding artillery preparation was dispensed with in order to insure maximum surprise. And surprise was indeed achieved, not only of place and strength but of timing as well—both the German field commander (Colonel-General Heinrich von Vietinghoff) and a key divisional commander (General Richard Heidrich) were still on leave.⁵²³ Moreover, the assault caught one German division just during the period it was being relieved in the line.⁵²⁴

Surprise gave initial success, but the offensive was soon halted by the com-

⁵²¹Orgill (67), 33-34.

⁵²²Orgill (67), 33.

⁵²³Orgill (67), 43.

⁵²⁴Kesselring (54), 256. Compare Orgill (67), 43, who, citing British sources, says *two* German divisions were being relieved.

bination of the difficult terrain, lack of reserve units, and the ability of the Germans to bring theirs up over a far better road system.

References

- **General**

- Douglas Orgill, *The Gothic Line* (New York: Norton, 1967).
- Jackson (67), 252-277.

- **Warnings**

- Kesselring (54), 256.

- **Surprise**

- Orgill (67), 43.
- Kesselring (54), 256.

- **Deception**

- Orgill (67), 30, 32, 33-34.
- Jackson (67), 266, 268.
- Lieut.-Col. G.W.L. Nicholson, *The Canadians in Italy, 1943-5* (Ottawa: Queen's Printer and Controller of Stationery, 1957), p. 491. (Not seen by me.)
- Maj.-Gen. R.F.H. Nalder, *The Royal Corps of Signals* (London: Royal Signals Institution, 1958), p. 402. (Not seen by me.)

Case A49. Leyte Island, 20 Oct 1944: Operation MUSKETEEER II

MacArthur had been promising to return to the Philippines for over two years and the Japanese had believed this since the summer of 1944. Yet when he landed at Palo on Leyte on 20 October 1944, he achieved strategic surprise.

The Japanese realized, of course, that a major American offensive was due—sometime, somewhere. To meet this uncertainty they evolved in late July a comprehensive plan (*SHŌ Go*, “Operation VICTORY”) to cover all plausible targets. The basic plan husbanded the Japanese naval, air, and ground strength in mobile reserves at Singapore, Formosa, and Japan itself. All forces would then concentrate in a furious counter-attack at the first clear point of the Allied offensive, crushing the landing force before it could consolidate its beachhead. Four sub-plans were developed to meet each of the four most likely target areas: SHŌ I for the Philippines, SHŌ II for Formosa and the Ryukyus, SHŌ III for Honshu-Kyushu, and SHŌ IV for Hokkaido and the Kuriles. However, the Imperial General Headquarters did correctly anticipate that the Philippines would prove to be the American choice. Indeed they had reached this conclusion well before the Americans themselves did.

As MacArthur’s airforce and Halsey’s carriers were meeting unexpectedly light resistance in their first probings of Philippine waters, it was suddenly and quickly decided during 13-15 September to switch plans. MacArthur, Halsey, Nimitz, and the JCS agreed to leapfrog the immediate objective of Mindanao (Operation MUSKETEEER I) and go directly for Leyte (MUSKETEEER II).

Meanwhile the Japanese were husbanding their weakened forces to counter-punch the main U.S. blow.

D+67	U.S.	Japanese
KIA,DOW	2,888	56,263
WIA,MIA	10,019	—
PW	—	389
Totals:	12,907	56,652
D+200		
KIA,DOW,MIA	3,593	80,557
WIA	11,991	—
PW	—	828
Totals:	15,584	81,385

Table A.80: U.S. and Japanese Casualties at Leyte Island, Operation MUSKETEEER II. References: Cannon (54), 367-369.

The U.S. attack fleet of 843 ships included 420 amphibious transports and 262 naval combat ships. The local Japanese defenders at Leyte were first alerted at 0650 on the 17th by radar sighting of the attack force. By 0809, the C.-in-C. Combined Fleet, Admiral Toyoda, then on Formosa, had correctly concluded

that the Philippines were indeed the main U.S. target. Accordingly, he *alerted* the Fleet for SHŌ I (SHŌ ICHI), the optional counter-plan designed to meet a main thrust aimed at the Philippines. The U.S. deception plan had failed to that extent. However, it was not until 1701 on October 18th that the Navy High Command in Tokyo, having concluded that Leyte was indeed to be the site of the main U.S. landing, issued definitive orders for SHŌ I. The Japanese Army also immediately put its own plan into effect.

For the first⁵²⁵ time in the Pacific mode of World War II the U.S. had instituted a comprehensive deception operation that involved coordinated action by theater commanders: MacArthur, Nimitz, and Mountbatten. Moreover, it was apparently the first deception operation in the Pacific that involved Washington. It seems likely that the complete success of the British FORTITUDE deception plan in shielding the recent Normandy beachhead had impressed some thoughtful officers in the JCS, specifically its unorthodox chairman, General Marshall, as I attempt to show elsewhere.⁵²⁶

The purpose of the deception plan was to draw Japanese attention away from the chosen target, the Philippines, and immobilize their naval reserves in Japan and Singapore. Its elements, as carried out, were the following:

First, on October 9th, Nimitz' Pacific Fleet shelled tiny Marcus Island to suggest the U.S. was about to come "up the ladder of the Bonins" direct to Japan itself. Rear Admiral "Hoke" Smith's Task Group 30.2 (from Halsey's Third Fleet) of 3 heavy cruisers and 6 destroyers struck "with great fanfare"—a day-long bombardment, smoke puffs covering the horizon and floats with dummy radar targets and elaborate pyrotechnics—to simulate the onset of a major amphibious assault.

Second, on 17 and 19 October, the British Eastern Fleet under Admiral Sir Bruce Fraser, carried out heavy air and surface bombardments of the Nicobar Islands off Sumatra to imply an imminent Allied attack on Malaya or Indonesia. (This last action was at the request of Admiral King, by virtue of his position on the JCS.) Neither of these cover targets failed to hold much less draw the local Japanese fleets.

Third, according to Colonel Mashbir, MacArthur also mounted a deception campaign that convinced the local Japanese garrison in the Philippines that the first landings there would indeed come at the most likely—southernmost—spot: Davao on Mindinao. The Filipinos themselves were also assertedly taken in on this point. This deception was promoted by "cleverly worded propaganda" pointing to Davao. I presume this was radio propaganda from MacArthur's Psychological Warfare Branch, supervised by Brigadier General Bonner F. Fellers and headed by Lieutenant Colonel J. Woodall Greene.

⁵²⁵But not the only one, as incorrectly asserted by Morison, XII (58), 60. Case A52, below, on Luzon.

⁵²⁶Chapter II, Part C.

References

- **General**

- M. Hamlin Cannon, *Leyte: The Return to the Philippines* (Washington, D.C.: OCMH, 1954).
- *Reports of General MacArthur*, II/II (66), 365-381.

- **SHÖ Plan**

- Morison, XII (58), 65-70, 160-169.

- **Surprise**

- Willoughby and Chamberlain (54), 236-240.
- Morison, XII (58), 66, 70-73, 118.
- Cannon (54), 45-49, 53.
- Baldwin (66), 289.

- **Deception**

- Morison, XII (58), 61, 87.
- Mashbir (53), 329-331.
- Kirby, IV (65), 211-212.
- Roskill, III, Pt. II (61), 201-202.

Case A50. Leyte Gulf, 24 Oct 1944: SHŌ I

SHŌ-Go (“VICTORY Operation”) was the final desperate Japanese plan for victory in the Pacific. Its first part SHŌ I was the counterstroke to the expected American attack on the Philippines.

At 0809, October 17th, alerted by radio intercepts of the U.S. transport sortie from Hollandia on the 14th and by local visual reports from Leyte of the approaching U.S. armada, Admiral Toyoda, C. in C. of the Combined Fleet, ordered SHŌ I into effect from his headquarters in Tokyo.

Vice Admiral Ozawa’s “Mobile Force” (called “Northern Force” by U.S.) comprised one heavy cruiser, two converted battleships with flight decks aft, three light carriers, and a screen of 3 light cruisers and 8 destroyers. The original and sole mission of this fleet was as a suicidal decoy, specifically to tempt Halsey away from Leyte by the prize of sinking Japanese carriers. In fact this force was expendable anyway, as the Japanese had no carrier pilot replacements for them.

To assure that Halsey would find him, Ozawa made his approach as visible as possible by incautious reconnoitering, making smoke, and breaking radio silence.

Halsey was indeed drawn into Ozawa’s trap, and the Japanese suicide fleet was destroyed at the ensuing Battle of Cape Engaño, which appropriately means “hoax” or “lure” in Spanish. However, Ozawa’s sacrifice was in vain, because the main Japanese fleet was not quite able to break through from the southwest behind Halsey to destroy the U.S. troop transports.

References

• General

- Baldwin (66), 285-314, 474-490. (Easily the most balanced summary of the several still highly controversial issues that comprised this operation.)
- Willoughby and Chamberlain (54), 243-258.
- *Reports of General MacArthur*, I/II (66), 381-402.

• Intelligence

- Mashbir (53), 44, 341.
- James A. Field, Jr., *The Japanese at Leyte Gulf: The Shō Operation* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1947), pp. 28, 30-31.

• Deception

- Willoughby and Chamberlain (54), 249.
- E.B. Potter and Chester W. Nimitz, *The Great Sea War* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1960), pp. 374, 377, 384.
- Morison, XII (58), 167, 192, 320-322.
- Field (47), 24-25.

Case A51. Ardennes, 16 Dec 1944: Operation WATCH-ON-RHINE

“The use of deception is not new to warfare, but the important lesson here is that it is not obsolete because of this.”

–Major Burton Hood,
Office, Deputy Chief of
Staff for Operations.⁵²⁷

As the intelligence aspects of the Battle of the Bulge are already rather well detailed and analyzed in the published literature, I will only summarize the case.

On 16 Dec 1944 the desperate Wehrmacht launched Operation WATCH-ON-RHINE. It took the Anglo-American commanders quite by surprise and the ensuing Battle of the Bulge in the Ardennes forest was a serious blow and a near disaster for the Allies. It was also one of the last strategic deception operations that the exhausted Nazis would conduct.

WATCH-ON-RHINE was a model of effective security. Unusual precautions were taken by Hitler in this regard. He told only a handful of his senior officers his intentions and basic plan. Special guarantees of trustworthiness were required of all witting officers. All orders related to the planned offensive were conveyed by word-of-mouth or specially selected couriers, radio being expressly forbidden. (They knew the Allies were listening.) All witting personnel were forbidden to fly west of the Rhine. (Shades of the 1941 “Lucifer Affair.”⁵²⁸) All non-German troops such as the mongrelized Waffen-SS divisions were removed from the chosen portion of the front. The units selected for the operation were concentrated as late as possible and only moved up at night. For once, security worked. All of these elaborate actions went undetected or were misinterpreted by most of the vast Allied intelligence system.

For its last offensive, the Wehrmacht did manage to scrape together an impressive force (Table A.81).

	German	U.S.
Divisions	19+5 reserve	4
Men	300,000	?
Tanks	2,000+	?
Aircraft	≈ 2,000	?

Table A.81: German and U.S. Strengths, Operation WATCH-ON-RHINE.

When the German offensive went in on 16 December, it achieved virtually total surprise—of time and strength and, perhaps, of place and even intention.

⁵²⁷Hood (60), 43.

⁵²⁸See Case A20.

D+14	German	U.S.
Battle casualties	?	42,000
Tanks	?	471

Table A.82: German and U.S. Casualties and Tank Losses, WATCH-ON-RHINE. References: Cole (65), 675.

D+30	German	U.S.
KIA,DOW	?	8,607
WIA	?	47,139
MIA,PW	?	21,144
Total Casualties:	90,000	76,890
Tanks	600	733
Planes	1,000	?

Table A.83: German and U.S. Casualties and Losses, Battle of the Bulge. References: Eisenhower (48), 365, 503n40; Baldwin (66), 350. Allied estimates of German casualties are 100,000 and 120,000, also at D-plus-30. The initial U.S. estimate of its own casualties totalled only 59,000. See Bradley (51), 494.

Moreover, it succeeded in its initial purpose of obtaining a breakthrough. However, lacking the reserves for a follow through drive, it was soon slowed and finally stopped by hurried Allied reinforcements.

One of the more spectacularly successful diversionary operations of all time was part of the Germans' Ardennes offensive. This was the famous Operation GRIFFIN (GREIF) in which a mere platoon-sized group of Skorzeny's special commandos disguised with American uniforms, gear, a quickie course in Americanisms, and two tanks infiltrated the U.S. lines to spread local confusion. This really rather pathetic force was quickly magnified by over-imaginative Allied intelligence and panicky security officers into a vast horde of guerrillas and assassins freely roaming all the way to Paris. I will leave this cautionary tale here, as it is both already well studied and applied only to the follow-through period of the offensive.

Although their offensive was effectively blocked, the Germans persisted too long. Hence the final tally at D-plus-30 shows that the Battle of the Bulge was for the Germans a Pyrrhic victory. Not only did they suffer more casualties than they inflicted, but these losses represented the last of their reserves. This was the last offensive that the Wehrmacht would or could mount.

The Battle of the Bulge is widely ascribed to the failure of Allied intelligence. While this criticism is fully justified, it must be stressed that the failure was not in the intelligence collection stage—many clues and warnings were picked up—but in the intelligence analysis stage. And the commanders must share that failure with their intelligence chiefs.

References

- **General**

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- Hugh M. Cole, *The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge* (Washington, D.C.: OCMH, 1965).

- **Intelligence**

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- Cole (65), 56-63.
- Walker (57), 214-220.
- Bradley (51), 447-449, 459-464.
- Kahn (67), 509.
- Frederick Ayer, Jr., *Yankee G-Man* (Chicago: Regnery, 1957), pp. 133-136.
- Eisenhower (48), 341, 342, 345-346.
- Codman (57), 229-230.

- **Surprise**

- Bradley (51), 354, 447, 449, 455, 463-464.
- Horrocks (61), 236-237.
- Eisenhower (48), 343-344, 346.
- Patton (47), 186, 188-190.
- Baldwin (66), 316, 319, 325, 330, 351, 352, 360.
- Guingand (47), 425-428.
- Oldfield (56), 169-175.
- Montgomery (48), 277.
- Ridgway (56), 112-113, 123.

- **Deception-General**

- Cole (65), 48-51.
- Baldwin (66), 320, 352, 499.
- Bradley (51), 447, 460-461.
- Pogue (54), 361.
- Sekulich (57/58), 92.

- **Deception-Operation GRIFFIN (*GREIF*)**

- Major Burton F. Hood, “Operation Greif,” *Military Review*, Vol. 39, No. 10 (January 1960), pp. 37-43.
- Cole (65), 269-271.

Case A52. Luzon, 9 Jan 1945: Operation MUSKETEEER III

MacArthur's invasion of Luzon—Operation MUSKETEEER III—was the largest single amphibious assault of the Pacific War to that time: some 203,000 troops put ashore in 10 divisions and 5 regimental combat teams plus the equivalent of 1 division and 2 regiments of local Filipino guerrillas.

The Japanese defenders—the 14 Area Army—mustered 275,000 troops (120,000 more than Major General Willoughby's not always perfect G-2 had confidently estimated). Moreover, this formidable force commanded by one of their more imaginative leaders, General "Tiger" Yamashita, who had been given that critical command in September in correct anticipation of the nearness of MacArthur's return.

A coordinated, inter-theater deception operation was tried for the second time by the Americans in the Pacific as a preliminary to MUSKETEEER III. The official U.S. Army historian, R.R. Smith, describes this somewhat cryptically as:⁵²⁹

... a Pacific-wide deception program to make the Japanese believe that the Formosa Amoy area, rather than Luzon, would be the next major Allied target after Leyte.

However, judging only from Mr. Smith's references, the original conception was that of MacArthur and the detailed planning and coordination was by the JCS. The effects of this program are unknown.

Later, MacArthur's own command launched a three-part deception plan to convince the local enemy commander, Yamashita, that eventual landings on Luzon would take place on its *southern* beaches, drawing the Japanese defenders away from the real target site far to the northeast.

One part of this plan involved the seizure of Mindoro, the large island off the southern coast of Luzon. A substantial force began a surprise and unopposed takeover of Mindoro on 15 December. This effort served the three-fold purpose of covering the flank of the new main base on Leyte, gaining airfields within easy striking range of Luzon, and simulating a staging base for an "obvious" crossing to southern Luzon.

A second part involved a series of minor naval demonstrations, simulated landings, dummy parachute drops, and radio and radar deception measures at several points along Luzon's southern coast.

The third part of MacArthur's deception plan involved triggering the large guerrilla force in southern Luzon to begin extensive sabotage of the Japanese supply, transport, and communication facilities throughout that area. These guerrilla operations were closely coordinated with air strikes on the same targets.

⁵²⁹ Although he gives no further details, Smith (63), 53, cites the following radio communications relative to the planning. (a) MacArthur to JCS and Nimitz, 16 November 1944; (b) Nimitz to MacArthur and JCS, 19 Nov; (c) MacArthur to JCS and Nimitz, 23 Nov; (d) JCS to MacArthur and Nimitz, 30 Nov.

D	U.S.	Japanese	Beachhead (sq. mi.)
Total	0	0?	80
D+2			
KIA	55	150-200	
WIA	185	?	
Totals:	240	?	160
D+8			
KIA	250		
WIA	750		
Totals:	1000	?	600

Table A.84: U.S. and Japanese Casualties (cumulative), Operation MUSKETEEER III. References: Smith (63), 77-78, 87, 117.

MacArthur's clique—Willoughby, Whitney, and Mashbir—claims that these operations were entirely successful in focussing Yamashita's attention on south Luzon. For example, Major General Courtney Whitney—who directed the guerrilla operations from MacArthur's headquarters—categorically asserts:⁵³⁰

These tactics of deception worked. The enemy was tricked into rushing a division of troops from its northern force to Batangas and another division to Bataan.

This sort of statement illustrates both the pitfall of mistaking coincidence for cause-and-effect, as well as the too common failure of intelligence services to test their initial estimates against subsequent evidence. In fact, Yamashita had very shrewdly fathomed MacArthur's intentions and correctly predicted the main landing would come in Lingayen Bay. Yamashita's alleged "reinforcement" of Batangas—if it took place at all—was, I presume, only a result of his pre-invasion decision to evacuate the Manila garrison south for a delaying operation against a U.S. drive *down* from Lingayen. While MacArthur's intelligence placed 13,000 Japanese in the Bataan region (his G-2, Willoughby, was predisposed to believe the Japanese would repeat MacArthur's historic withdrawal into the bastion of Bataan) they had only 4,000. Indeed the alleged "division" reinforcement in late December comprised only a partial regiment and was merely the fortuitous result of the cancellation of that regiment's orders to reinforce Leyte.

The initial landing on Luzon took place on 9 January 1945 across the southern beach of Lingayen Gulf on the northwest coast. The landing was entirely unopposed. Complete *tactical* surprise had been achieved because Yamashita's planners had categorically ruled out this specific beach in the bay as too inferior a landing site and because Yamashita himself believed the invasion was at least a fortnight away. For once, however, MacArthur, his staff, and his biographers have been mistaken in attributing the success of the operation to the

⁵³⁰Whitney (56), 180. Cp. Smith (63), 241, 311-312.

initial surprise. Yamashita shrewdly denied them this linkage by adopting an unprecedented strategy. He recognized that the Americans would concentrate overwhelming strength on their beachhead, as he could expect no serious support from the recently sacrificed Japanese fleet and airforce. Therefore, he chose to give the Americans their landing and use his time and resources to prepare a redoubt in the northern mountains of Luzon and conduct a static defense there, with only minor delaying actions elsewhere.

References

- **General**

- Robert Ross Smith, *Triumph in the Philippines* (Washington, D.C.: OCMH, 1963), pp. 3-135.

- **Surprise**

- Smith (63), 27, 31, 88-90.
- Whitney (56), 184.

- **Deception**

- Smith (63), 37, 53-54.
- Willoughby and Chamberlain (54), 261.
- Whitney (56), 180, 181.
- Mashbir (53), 330.

Case A53. The Bavarian Redoubt: Jan-May 1945

One of the more widely credited myths of World War II was that the Nazi Thousand-Year Reich had planned its final stand in the Bavarian Alps where the Leader could direct an heroic *Götterdämmerung* from the vast picture-window of his “Eagle’s Nest” at Berchtesgaden. This notion had an appealing plausibility—just the sort of drama a Wagnerian romantic like Hitler would conceive and act out. However, it did not occur to Hitler but rather to some overly imaginative American in the U.S. Consulate General in Zurich.

In September 1944 this anonymous American⁵³¹ in Zurich uncritically combined the authentic but fragmentary reports of rather trivial German Army preparations in the Austro-Bavarian Alps, some guesswork about Nazi psychology, and the existing model of Switzerland’s own *national reduit*. From this mélange, he wrote and dispatched to the State Department a report that raised the specter of a Nazi “*reduit*” (he used the Swiss term) where Hitler could gain at least a half-year’s time and inflict more Allied casualties than the total already suffered, etc., etc.⁵³²

It is not known what, if any, effect this report had in official Washington where the OSS was independently reporting the same evidence—but without the hysteria—from its own sources, including Allen Dulles, its skeptical bureau chief in Bern (with “cognizance” for Germany).⁵³³ However, the report did have major repercussions among the German officials who read it. The Nazi SS Security Service (SD) in Switzerland had intercepted a copy and passed it to the SD frontier station at Bregenz. The commander there, SS Major Gontard, was in the habit of currying favor with the local Tyrolean Nazi boss, Gauleiter Franz Hofer, by passing him occasional intercepts from Switzerland. Thus did Hofer receive this American report in September, and finding it such a congenial idea, in November passed the suggestion for a German national redoubt (which he called the Alpenfestung, “Alpine Fortress”) through Nazi Party chief Bormann to Hitler.⁵³⁴ However, Hofer had timed his approach badly; Hitler was in one of his euphoric moods, busily planning his great Ardennes offensive that would forestall invasion of the Fatherland.⁵³⁵ He was in no mind to consider such

⁵³¹Possibly the Consul General himself, Sam E. Woods (1892-1953). Since 1940 in his earlier post as Commercial Attaché in Berlin, this unassuming and cosmopolitan Texan had maintained contact with an as yet publicly unidentified circle of anti-Nazi German officials formerly associated with the Catholic Center Party’s ex-Chancellor, Heinrich Brüning. Through these contacts Woods had obtained some of the earliest and best intelligence on such matters as Hitler’s operational plans for the invasion of Russia, the new German magnetic mine, and their research on heavy water. He also personally arranged the escape of nearly 1,700 Allied aviators interned in Switzerland. Beginning as an amateur intelligencer, Woods was probably a “professional” with OSS in Switzerland as he surely was with CIA in Munich on his last tour, although these extra-diplomatic affiliations have never been acknowledged. See Whaley, *Operation BARBAROSSA* (69), Chapter II.

⁵³²Minott (64), 15-19.

⁵³³Minott (64), 14-15, 19; Dulles (66), 29, etc.; and Kirkpatrick (68), 69-70.

⁵³⁴Minott (64), 15-16, 19-24.

⁵³⁵See Case A51.

defeatism—however heroic—as represented by the Redoubt concept.⁵³⁶

The wild, irresponsible rumors circulating in Switzerland soon spread to the international press. (The fact that they also used the term “National Redoubt” suggests they were inflamed by indiscretions from the U.S. Consulate General in Zurich.) The first was an article on “Hitler’s Hideaway” by a London writer for *The New York Times*’ Magazine Section published on November 12th. This was followed by the Communist New York *Daily Worker* on both November 15th and December 24th.⁵³⁷

At this point, deception entered to take advantage of the climate of rumor that had developed. Its instigator was Nazi Propaganda Minister Josef Goebbels—apparently acting on his own, although he connected it with Hitler’s recently declared “no surrender” policy. In any case Goebbels had collaborated in at least two earlier deception plans⁵³⁸ and was more-or-less alert to such possibilities. Now, during December, Goebbels took full charge of the manipulation of news concerning the Redoubt. On the one hand he called a secret briefing meeting of all German editors and prominent journalists and reiterated his earlier prohibition on publishing any rumors about a Redoubt on the grounds that they might undermine belief in victory. This negative step served to eliminate any unauthorized speculation. On the other hand Goebbels instituted a positive program of deception by creating a special propaganda section inside his own Ministry of Propaganda (PROMI). Going into operation in January 1945, this group now propagated numerous stories about the Redoubt. These played up one central theme: that of an impregnable fortress with its scientifically sited defense work, underground factories, huge supply dumps in bomb-proof shelters—all manned by elite troops.⁵³⁹

Next, the SD—acting on its own—decided to supplement Goebbels’ propaganda with faked “hard” intelligence. Accordingly it began manufacturing false blueprints and other documents and feeding them to eager American agents and journalists.⁵⁴⁰ Hofer’s continuing small-scale and more-or-less parochial defense measures in the Tyrol lent a gloss of plausibility to these fabrications by the PROMI and the SD. Moreover the SD made certain that the few real activities were made known to U.S. intelligence.⁵⁴¹

The Allied press was soon featuring this carefully planted German material in rich detail, thus, *Collier’s* magazine on January 27th, the New York *Daily Worker* again on 26 January and 3 March, and *The New York Times* on 1, 3, 4, 11, 14 February and 18 March.⁵⁴²

Allied intelligence was, of course, also receiving this material. Their response was, however, quite mixed. An interested but healthy skepticism was

⁵³⁶Minott (64), 24, 26.

⁵³⁷Minott (64), 23-25, 28.

⁵³⁸See Cases A23 and A34.

⁵³⁹Minott (64), 24-25, 52, citing the several works by Wilhelm Höttl (“Walter Hagen”).

⁵⁴⁰Minott (64), 26, 28, 30, 52-53.

⁵⁴¹Minott (64), 30-31.

⁵⁴²Minott (64), 28-30, 37-38, 165n8.

maintained throughout, particularly by the British⁵⁴³ and the OSS.⁵⁴⁴ This was also the attitude of the excellent and deeply concerned Swiss Army intelligence.⁵⁴⁵ However, some Allied intelligence services proved more credulous. The Russians acted as if they believed in the Redoubt.⁵⁴⁶ But the Americans were the most gullible of all. This was certainly true of SHAEF G-2,⁵⁴⁷ where the question was at its most salient as Eisenhower's headquarters was precisely where the *decision to act* on the rightness or wrongness of this intelligence would be made. The critical period for decision lay between the arrival at the Rhine on 7 March and the crossing during late March and early April. By 28 March General Eisenhower, the Allied Supreme Commander, decided to shift the axis of his attack toward the south. Several strategic considerations determined his decision, but one that he judged "equally important" was to cut across the Germans' line of retreat to their "National Redoubt," whose reality Eisenhower accepted.⁵⁴⁸

The evidence was clear that the Nazi intended to make the attempt and I decided to give him no opportunity to carry it out.

While some reservations about the reality of the Redoubt were held by SHAEF G-2, directed by Eisenhower's very able British intelligencer, Major-General Kenneth Strong,⁵⁴⁹ these diminished as one descended the chain of command toward the forward headquarters. This latter situation was particularly important, for SHAEF did not collect its own intelligence but only evaluated reports sent to it by both lower and higher headquarters.⁵⁵⁰ On 21 March General Omar Bradley's Twelfth Army Group issued new orders reorienting its strategic priorities to accomplish a quick isolation of the Redoubt. This change was in large part based on the Group G-2 evaluation of the Redoubt. This inaccurate but fairly reasonable assessment was the responsibility of Bradley's G-2, Brigadier General Edwin L. Sibert.⁵⁵¹

The worst offender, however, was G-2 of Lieutenant General Alexander M. Patch's Seventh Army in the Sixth Army Group commanded by Lieutenant General Jacob L. Devers. Their estimate issued on 25 March was an almost hysterically uncritical mish-mash of all the rumors and disinformation planted by both Goebbels and the SD.⁵⁵²

⁵⁴³Minott (64), xvi, 151.

⁵⁴⁴Minott (64), 150; Dulles (66), 29, 51, 216, and Kirkpatrick (68), 69-70.

⁵⁴⁵Kimche (62), 151.

⁵⁴⁶Minott (64), 39.

⁵⁴⁷Minott (64), 30-31, 45, 49-53, 55n, 149, 150-151.

⁵⁴⁸Eisenhower (48), 397. This motive is confirmed by Eisenhower's Chief of Staff (and later CIA Director), Walter Bedell Smith. See Smith (56), 176-177, 186.

⁵⁴⁹Minott (64), 55n, 62, 149-151.

⁵⁵⁰On SHAEF G-2 see Minott (64), 144-157; Pogue (54), 71-73; and Smith (56), 176-177, 189-190.

⁵⁵¹On U.S. Twelfth Army Group G-2 estimates of the Redoubt see Bradley (51), 463-464, 537; and Minott (64), 50-54, 150, 151.

⁵⁵²On the Redoubt estimates by U.S. Seventh Army see Minott (64), 54-55. Patch's G-2 was Brig. Gen. William Quinn.

Belief in the reality of the Redoubt seemingly also existed in the headquarters of Mediterranean Command, then headed by Field-Marshal Alexander.⁵⁵³ The fact that Alexander's armies in Italy were then pressing Kesselring's Army Group C back toward the Alps gave high salience to this question, and the fact that Kesselring engineers were busily erecting a defense line (the Voralpenstellung) in the Alpine approaches lent plausibility to the otherwise false notion that they were coordinated with some trans-Alpine defense program. Moreover, Mussolini was also ineffectually planning his own redoubt program and trying in a vague way to coordinate it with the Germans.⁵⁵⁴ Although his program was, if anything, even less substantial than the German one, some rumors surely reached Alexander's headquarters through the gross sieve of Fascist security.

As Bradley concluded:⁵⁵⁵

Not until after the campaign ended were we to learn that this Redoubt existed largely in the imaginations of a few fanatic Nazis. It grew into so exaggerated a scheme that I am astonished we could have believed it as innocently as we did. But while it persisted, this legend of the Redoubt was too ominous a threat to be ignored and in consequence it shaped our tactical thinking during the closing weeks of the war.

A recent comment by a former OSS officer and subsequent senior CIA official is pertinent because of its confusion:⁵⁵⁶

Some historians are now trying to claim that it was Allied fear of a Redoubt that allowed the Russians to capture Berlin, but this is not true. Intelligence attention was directed to the Redoubt only because of the necessity of being aware of all possibilities, and its importance and potentiality were not of much concern.

While Professor Kirkpatrick is probably correct in disconnecting the Berlin problem from that of the Redoubt, he is—as seen above—quite wrong in asserting that the Redoubt was an intelligence problem with insignificant military consequences.

The evidence on the Redoubt has been compiled and sifted by the American historian Rodney G. Minott in his *The Fortress That Never Was*, to make a detailed case study of how preconceptions can blind an intelligence system to new inputs. However, although Minott himself supplies the essential evidence, he misses the conclusion that this myth was due as much to German deception as to Allied self-delusion.⁵⁵⁷

⁵⁵³Jackson (67), 295, who was a senior officer with Alexander's staff.

⁵⁵⁴Deakin (62), 728-729, 765, 775, 787, 789, 792-793, 811, 815.

⁵⁵⁵Bradley (51), 536. Also in Minott (64), 109.

⁵⁵⁶Kirkpatrick (68), 69-70.

⁵⁵⁷Minott (64) uses throughout the "flash-back" device to enhance the mystery and drama of his story. This proves too successful. By discarding chronology, he sacrifices control of his data and is unable to analyze *diffusion* of the myth through time and from person to person.

The myth of the Redoubt was, of course, eventually dispelled—first by the capture of senior German commanders and Nazis, and definitely by the virtually bloodless seizure of its site in May.⁵⁵⁸

What had begun as local defense measures became transformed into an imagined threat by an American diplomat; was then played back by Goebbels as a bluff; was finally responded to by SHAEF with drastic military actions, which had alleged political consequences that remain controversial to this day.

References

• General

- Rodney G. Minott, *The Fortress That Never Was: The Myth of Hitler's Bavarian Stronghold* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1964).
- Hoettl (53), 281, 285-295.
- Dulles (66), 29, 43, 51, 98, 119-120, 175, 177, 216, 222.
- Deakin (63), index under “Alpine Redoubt.”
- Cornelius Ryan, *The Last Battle* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1966), pp. 209-214, 446-447.
- Butcher (46), 799, 809-810.

• Intelligence

- Minott (64), 136-157.
- Eisenhower (48), 397, 415.
- Kirkpatrick (68), 69-70.

• Surprise

- Minott (64), 3-5.
- Bradley (51), 536-537.
- Patton (47), 315, 320-321. (Seemingly remained credulous throughout.)

• Deception

- Minott (64), 24-25, 26, 28, 30-31, 52-53.
- Dulles (66), 216.

Curiously, Minott entirely misses Mussolini's simultaneous and related efforts to develop a contiguous Italian redoubt—an oversight that had, fortunately, already been attended to by Deakin (62).

⁵⁵⁸Minott (64), 3-9; Bradley (51), 536-537.

Example B39. The Battle of the Reichswald, 8 Feb 1945: Operation VERITABLE

The Battle of the Reichswald was part of the Allied winter 1944-45 offensive in the Rhineland. It was, however, one of the many interconnected operations that were slightly deferred by the unexpected German December offensive in the Ardennes (see Case A51). Except for this delay—to 8 February 1945—the Rhine offensive went as planned: a pincer to clear the area between the Meuse and the Rhine from Nijmegen in the north to the Roer in the south. The northern prong of the pincer was Canadian First Army under General H.D.G. Crerar; the southern, U.S. Ninth Army under General Simpson. First Army would launch first, hoping to draw in the German reserves before Ninth Army hit from the south.

The initial punch by Canadian First Army was provided on 8 February by British XXX Corps commanded by Lieutenant-General Brian Horrocks. His task was to break through the Reichswald before Nijmegen. This narrow part of the front had a single German infantry division (the 84th) facing two Canadian divisions. Withdrawn from the line on 13 December for this very purpose, XXX Corps now secretly massed around Nijmegen. The heavily reinforced XXX Corps with its 200,000 men and 1,400 guns was concentrated forward by 35,000 vehicles, the construction of 5 bridges over the Maas, and the building or improvement of 100 miles of roadway.

The secrecy of this huge pre-attack deployment was apparently obtained by a combination of tactical deception, night movement, and the Allied command of the air that made German aerial reconnaissance ineffective. Reconnoitering parties from XXX Corps were disguised in Canadian uniforms. Deception operations were conducted to imply that the forthcoming offensive would be aimed westward against Utrecht rather than east toward the Rhine.

Although the Germans soon brought up reinforcements, XXX Corps pressed ahead to take its place on the western bank of the Rhine where the Battle of the Reichswald ended on 10 March.

D	British XXX Corps	German
KIA, WIA		?
PW		1,100+
Totals:	“not severe”	?
D+30		
KIA, WIA		?
PW		16,800
Totals:	15,634	75,000

Table A.85: British XXX Corps and German Casualties (Cumulative), Operation VERITABLE.

References

- **General**
 - Montgomery (48), 290-291, 293-309.
 - Horrocks (61), 236, 243-255.
- **Deception**
 - Montgomery (48), 296.
 - Horrocks (61), 246-247.

Case A54. Irrawaddy, 13 Feb 1945: Operation EXTENDED CAPITAL

Beginning in late 1944 Mountbatten began his final offensive—Operation CAPITAL—to drive the Japanese from Burma. The crucial phase would be the difficult river crossing of the wide Irrawaddy. Detailed planning and command of this phase—Operation EXTENDED CAPITAL—was in the hands of the 14th Army under Lieutenant-General Slim.

As his army neared the Irrawaddy, Slim assumed—correctly—that the enemy would realize that his next move would be to cross the river. They would also station a light screen of garrisons and patrols—to act as a detection-tripwire—along their lengthy river-bank. Moreover they could—and would—deploy their main force as mobile reserves able to quickly descend on and destroy the British beachhead before it could consolidate. Nevertheless, Slim achieved a strategic surprise by his crossing on 13 February that so disrupted the Japanese strategy that they were forced into complete withdrawal from their generally favorable defensive positions along the river. He achieved surprise only because of a most successful, comprehensive deception plan.

Slim's 14th Army deception plan was the key to surprise and victory. Knowing that the Japanese expected an offensive, expected it soon, and expected it to involve only a single main crossing at one point, Slim wisely concentrated his effort to mislead his enemy about the site of his real crossing at Nyaungu.

The 14th Army used the same sort of comprehensive, carefully coordinated deception operation first used by Montgomery at Alamein: camouflaged bases, covert deployments, counterfeit units, fake radio traffic, and a premature feint attack to draw the enemy's reserves to the wrong end of the battle-line. Each unit, from corps to division, had its own part to play and was responsible for designing and carrying out its own deception operations synchronized and coordinated with the general plan. The key was CLOAK, the specific deception plan devised by IV Corps to mask its crossing.

The degree of surprise is measured by the fact that with approximate parity in unit strength—5 divisions in British 14th Army to 5 divisions in Japanese Burma Area Army—along the active portion of the Irrawaddy-front, the British were able to concentrate and move 2 divisions and 1 brigade across at a point where the Japanese mustered only a single understrength regiment.

This case is of special interest because it is the only one for which the actual text of a British deception plan (the IV Corps' CLOAK plan) has been published.

References

- **Deception**

- Kirby, IV (65), 173-175, 255, 254-257, 258, 263-266, 271-273, 422. The complete text of the CLOAK plan is given on pp. 501-505.
- Field-Marshal Sir William Slim, *Defeat into Victory* (London: Cassell, 1956), pp. 411-431.
- Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland, *Time Runs Out in CBI* (Washington, D.C.: OCMH, 1959), p. 221.

Example B40. Iwo Jima, 19 Feb 1945: Operation DETACHMENT

Operation DETACHMENT—the taking of Iwo Jima—was originally scheduled for 20 January 1945. This target date was twice postponed by operations in the Philippines, first (on 18 November 1944) to 3 February and finally (on 6 December) fixing on 19 February. These proved very costly delays because they gave the enemy an extra month to dig the most-formidable and costly defenses the Americans would meet in the Pacific. Somehow the Japanese garrison had ample and accurate foreknowledge of the assault, had calculated its approximate time, and even knew the three specific U.S. Marine divisions (the 3rd, 4th, and 5th) assigned to it. Indeed, their only error was in overestimating the Marine force to be used—the writer of one captured Japanese diary expected four divisions plus one brigade and one prisoner of war testified to the prevailing expectation of five divisions.

The broad outlines of Admiral Nimitz' strategy in the Central Pacific were now rather well understood by the Japanese. This strongly indicated that Iwo Jima would be an early target for an amphibious landing. This was virtually decreed by the U.S. Joint Chiefs' clear policy of acquiring bases suitable for the B-29 strategic bombing raids on the Japanese home islands. The two next closer archipelagos for this purpose were the Nanpo Shotos (Bonins) and the Ryukyus and they did indeed represent the next U.S. targets. However, the former partly blocked the approach to the latter and also lay directly across and threatened the B-29 alley between Japan and their existing bases (in the Marianas). Consequently, Nimitz was directed on 3 October 1944 to tackle the Nanpo Shotos first, giving him the choice of any one suitable for both amphibious assault and as a B-29 base. In fact these criteria constituted a forced "choice" as Iwo Jima was the only island in the chain that fully met both. The Japanese had also followed the same reasoning, thereby denying *strategic* surprise to the Americans. Japanese intelligence confirmed this as well as adding the specific information that enabled them to also avoid *tactical* surprise. As this was, as far as I am aware, the *only* post-1941 coup by the singularly incompetent Japanese intelligence services, it is unfortunate that the channel has not been traced.

The American decision to seize Iwo Jima was taken on 3 October 1944. The Japanese had already begun their intensive build-up on 15 June. The U.S. Marines began their specific training for Iwo in early fall.

To further enhance the already highly realistic landing training, the unprecedent step was taken of providing many staff and field officers at all echelons with an actual map of Iwo Jima. The only concession to security was that the map omitted all proper names and latitude-longitude indications, was captioned "Island X," and was classified SECRET. Despite the security classification, use of the map in field exercises led to its being widely seen by unauthorized officers and men. With over 68,000 divisional and 14,000 corps-level Marines—not counting the Navy and Army Air Corps personnel—involved in these exercises,

D	U.S.	Japanese	Ratios
KIA, DOW	566		
WIA	1,854		
Totals:	2,420		
D+35			
KIA,DOW	6,812	20,703	
WIA	19,189	-	
PW	0	216	
Totals:	26,001	20,919	1:0.8

Table A.86: U.S. and Japanese Casualties (Cumulative) at Iwo Jima. References: Morison, XIV (60), 44, 69; and Isely and Crowl (51), 482n. See also Newcomb (65), 296-303, for very slightly different figures.

opportunity for a security leak certainly existed. However, at this juncture, a major security blunder occurred that might well have made disclosure certain. The Air Force—apparently acting through Nimitz’ PRO—released the first photograph of Iwo, identifying it as a H-29 target. It was published in the Honolulu press; and as one intelligence report stated: “Any man familiar with Island X maps who saw the newspaper photos couldn’t help but know our destination.”⁵⁵⁹ The photo did stimulate much loose talk in Honolulu; and, to counter it, the Marine Fifth Amphibious Corps headquarters (Major General Harry Schmidt, commanding) resorted to the subtle ruse of floating the plausible rumors in the bars and hotels of Honolulu that the “real” objective was Formosa, whose east coast did resemble the Mount Suribachi-dominated Iwo, which those who recognized the photograph would now—it was hoped—assume to be merely the “cover” target.⁵⁶⁰

Since early fall 1944 the Mariana-based Seventh Air Force had been stepping up its bombing and reconnaissance of Iwo Jima. To mask it as the intended landing target the air missions were evenly distributed among military targets in the archipelago. This effort was so thorough that even the aircrews—who had not been briefed on the purpose of their missions for fear that some might be shot down and captured—did not realize the prime importance of Iwo.

To divert Japanese attention from the final concentration of aerial and naval bombardment of Iwo Jima, which would finally signal an imminent amphibious assault, this preparatory fire was made to coincide with the first massed carrier strikes against Japan itself, which began on 16 February.

Iwo Jima was finally secured on D-plus-35. But the cost was not only high in absolute number of casualties, but also was one of the rare cases where the American casualties exceeded those of the Japanese. The lack of surprise was only one of several contributory causes.

⁵⁵⁹Isely and Crowl (51), 454-455.

⁵⁶⁰Isely and Crowl (51), 455.

References

- **General**

- Morison; XIV (60), 1-75.
- Isely and Crowl (51), 432-530.
- T. Grady Gallant, *The Friendly Dead* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1964).
- Lt. Col. Whitman S. Bartley, *Iwo Jima* (Historical Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, 1954).
- Richard E. Newcomb, *Iwo Jima* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965).

- **Warning**

- Isely and Crowl (51), 434, 454-455.
- Gallant (64), 16.

- **Deception**

- Isely and Crowl (51), 455.

Example B41. Po Valley, 9 Apr-2 May 1945

Beginning in January 1945, Field-Marshal Alexander, now Supreme Commander of Mediterranean Command, began intensive planning for what both sides appreciated would be the final Allied offensive in Italy. His opponent was Army Group C, again under Field-Marshal Kesselring. Army Group C, comprising 23 divisions, was the best trained, best equipped, and most fit army remaining to the now rapidly disintegrating Wehrmacht. To oppose this still formidable machine, Alexander's force in Italy—his old 15th Army Group, now commanded by General Mark Clark—totalled only 17 divisions: 9 in the U.S. Fifth Army (Lieutenant General Lucien Truscott) commanding on the west part of the front and 8 in the British Eighth Army (General Sir Richard McCreery) in the east. Although theirs was the smaller ground combat force in Italy, the Allies were far superior in replacement potential, supplies—particularly gasoline—and in air and naval support.

Alexander's strategy was for Eighth Army to outflank and envelop the German left wing and then have Fifth Army break through with a sudden punch at their weakened center, driving them back against the Po River and annihilating them there. The essential weakening of the center was to be induced by Alexander's deception plan.

The essence of Alexander's stratagem was to convince Kesselring that the main attack would come in the east where an offensive by Eighth Army would be coupled with an amphibious landing near Venice (or Istria). This was intended to induce Kesselring to shift his forces eastward, leaving his center denuded when Fifth Army delivered its surprise left hook a few days after Kesselring had committed his reserves to countering Eighth Army's weaker right punch.

The amphibious threat was a complete hoax, as Alexander had long since been compelled to give up hope of another such "end run." (He simply lacked the requisite reserves and landing craft.) It was, however, effectively simulated by displaying landing craft at Ravenna and increasing the amount of assault shipping at Ancona. A subtle blending of tactical feints with the Eighth Army's real assault was intended to both look like an attack coordinated with the amphibious "landing" and draw German attention slightly away from the real local axis of attack.

Meanwhile, Fifth Army carried out its part in the deception, which was to *dissimulate* its very real strength. This was done by pretending a "secret" lateral shift of 4 of its 9 divisions into reserve behind Eighth Army. To further enhance the illusion that Fifth Army was cast only in a supporting role, a double ruse was worked. This consisted of a demonstration attack⁵⁶¹ up the *west* coast toward La Spezia to simulate the main diversionary attack to draw off German reserves from the *Eighth* Army.

The Germans were well-deceived by most of this, which set them up for the surprises to come. They took the bait of the "forthcoming" amphibious landing and sent a motorized division up to sit uselessly on the Venetian coast. The

⁵⁶¹By the Negro-Nisei U.S. 92nd Division.

land feint up the Adriatic coast on April Fool's Day confirmed the Germans in their misperception and hurried the unnecessary preparations at Venice. The Negro-Nisei diversion which started on 5 April up the west coast went so well that it drew in much of the one remaining German reserve division.

Originally scheduled to go in on 10 April, the attack was mounted one day early due to particularly fine weather for the aerial and artillery program.

The Germans had since the last week of March received several warnings of *an* imminent offensive. Hence they were not particularly surprised by its timing—nor were they supposed to be. They were, however, thanks to the deception plan, quite surprised by the various places and strengths of attack. The only intelligence they received of this nature was an aerial photo of preliminary operations in Lake Comacchio that could have revealed Eighth Army's part in the offensive. However, this intelligence reached German headquarters too late to be acted on.

By D-plus-14 the German divisions were all either shattered or routed. On D-plus-19 (April 28), the secret surrender negotiations (Operation SUNRISE) being conducted in Switzerland by the OSS Station Chief, Allen Dulles, belatedly bore their fruit in an agreed cease-fire and surrender timed for 2 May.⁵⁶²

References

- **General**
 - Jackson (67), 292-315, 343.
- **Warnings**
 - Jackson (67), 307.
- **Surprise**
 - Jackson (67), 305, 306-307.
 - Senger (64), 298.
 - Truscott (54), 485.
- **Deception**
 - Jackson (67), 299-300, 304, 305.
 - Clark (50), 428, 429.

⁵⁶²Dulles (66).

Case A55. Hiroshima, 6 Aug 1945: The S-1 Program

When “Fat Man” was successfully test-fired at the Alamogordo proving ground on 16 July 1945—too late to use on Nazi Germany—the Americans and British faced the final decision on its use against Japan. This decision—concerned only with where and when; the whether-or-not was throughout simply taken for granted—was reached on 22 July. The drop was then scheduled for sometime between August 1st and 10th, the earliest period that seemed technically feasible. Final drop would hinge only on proper weather conditions for flying and photographing. On 25 July the drop date was advanced to “after about 3 August” and the target specified as Hiroshima, Kokura, Niigata, or Nagasaki. Weather alone caused delays in drop from August 4th, to the 5th, to the 6th, Japanese time. The target was specified as Hiroshima, with Kokura as the alternative in case of poor visibility over the primary target.

“Little Boy” was dropped at 0815 on the 6th. Some 70,000 to 80,000 persons, mainly civilians, were killed outright or mortally injured and an equal number wounded.

Complete tactical and strategic surprise was achieved by this first use of a nuclear weapon. It is one of those rare instances of “technological surprise” that was immediately exploited for strategic purposes. In this sense, it is analogous to the conclusive demonstration of the English longbow against French armored cavalry at Crécy in 1346 and stands in contrast to such other major innovations as firearms, cannon, machine guns, gas, and the tank, which were either introduced in too small numbers, too gradually, or were—as with the tank—initially exploited only in a local tactical situation.

The atomic bombing of Hiroshima was also a very rare case where surprise was founded on effective security, albeit generously abetted by inept Japanese and German intelligence, which had failed to detect the development, prior testing, or mounting of the attack. Apparently no strategic deception plan was used to mask these stages leading to its use; although careful cover stories were, of course, invented to conceal the nature and purpose of the research, component industries, and assembly.

References

• General

- Robert J. C. Butow, *Japan's Decision to Surrender* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1954), pp. 150-153, 231-232.
- Gar Alperovitz, *Atomic Diplomacy* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1965). (Not seen by me.)
- William Craig, *The Fall of Japan* (New York: Dial, 1967), p. 118.
- Len Giovannitti and Fred Freed, *The Decision to Drop the Bomb* (New York: Coward-McCann, 1965).

Example B42. Palestine, 15-22 Oct 1948: Operation YOAV

On 14 May 1948 the National Council of Palestinian Jewry proclaimed “the establishment of the Jewish State in Palestine, to be called Israel.” The next day the Arab forces (Egyptian, Trans-Jordanian, Syrian, Lebanese, and Iraqi) began or, rather, renewed their clumsily coordinated attacks. Contrary to widely held belief at the time, neither side had overwhelming superiority: Israeli effectives under the Haganah High Command mustered 35,000 (all services) including 25,000 combatants, and the Arabs disposed of only a roughly comparable force.

When the first UN truce was gratefully accepted on 11 June, a virtual stalemate existed. Both sides had fought a series of ill-coordinated, ill-planned, exhausting, and inconclusive battles. Both sides had been guilty of the most flagrantly wrong intelligence estimates, both had failed to achieve centralized planning, and both had neglected to employ surprise or deception. But it was now only the Israelis who took full advantage of the truce to correct these critical defects: much needed arms were smuggled in from Czechoslovakia and Defense Minister Ben-Gurion enforced his centralized command over the armies. Thus when the Egyptians broke the UN truce on 8 July, a dramatically transformed Israeli Army of 60,000 faced an only slightly enlarged Arab force of 40,000.

Many mistakes were still made by the Israelis during this period. For example, in Operation DANI, a major effort on July 8th, Brigadier Moshe Carmel, whose 6,000 troops comprised the largest Israeli force yet assembled under one commander, tried but failed to surprise, envelop, and trap the Syrians. Too casual preparations and inadequate planning found a waiting enemy and only by an improvised switch in plans was Carmel able to effect a real surprise in taking Nazareth just before the second UN truce interrupted operations on 19 July.⁵⁶³

The Israelis recognized the Egyptians as their main enemy and now, during the final period of hostilities from 15 October 1948 to 7 January 1949, would concentrate their effort in that direction. Israel now commanded a re-equipped and enlarged army of 80,000 men, which permitted a slight advantage in men and equipment over the Egyptians in the zone of battle.

On a contrived pretext,⁵⁶⁴ Premier Ben-Gurion got the Egyptians to breach the truce on October 15th, triggering Operation YOAV. The goals of YOAV were to defeat the Egyptian forces, capture additional territory for Israel, and gain secure access to the Negev. The operation had been designed by the Chief of Operations, Brigadier Yigal Yadin, based on an earlier proposal by Brigadier Yigal Alon, the Commander of the Southern Front. Incidentally, Yadin had originally called the plan Operation TEN PLAGUES, but this was later changed to the more modest YOAV from fear that it may have been compromised by

⁵⁶³Kimche (60), 225-226, where the co-authors explicitly contradict the Israeli Army Archives on this point, on the basis of their interviews with “some of the officers in charge.” Compare Lorch (61), 280-287, for the official view.

⁵⁶⁴As freely admitted by the official Israeli military historian, Lorch (61), 343. Also noted by Kimche (60), 240, 244.

too many Israelis knowing and talking of it.

Although initial surprise through speed was gained, Israeli inexperience and fumbling failed to exploit it, and the Egyptians not only held but initially repulsed the Israelis led by Brigadier Alon.⁵⁶⁵ When the engagement ended on 22 October none of its goals had been entirely achieved.

References

- **General**

- Lorch (61), 342-368.
- Kimche (60), 240-246.

- **Surprise**

- Kimche (60), 244.

⁵⁶⁵Kimche (60), 244-246.

Example B43. Galilee, 28-30 Oct 1948: Operation HIRAM

The Israelis next briefly turned their attention from Egypt (Example B42) northward to Syria. In Operation HIRAM, from 28 to 30 Oct 1948, Brigadier Moshe Carmel led three Israeli brigades against the Syrian-supported Arab Liberation Army of Fawzi el-Kaukji.

During HIRAM Carmel made effective use of feints and rapid secret night deployments to surprise and decisively defeat Kaukji's army and occupy a 600-square mile chunk of Upper Galilee.

D+3	Israeli	Arabs
KIA	?	400
WIA	?	?
PW	?	550
Totals:	few	950+

Table A.87: Israeli and Arab Casualties, Operation HIRAM.

References

- **General**
 - Lorch (61), 368-379.
 - Kimche (60), 255-256.
- **Deception**
 - Lorch (61).

Case A56. Israel, 22 Dec 1948: Operation AYIN

With their northern front now secure⁵⁶⁶ and a cease-fire on the east, the Israelis turned to the final offensive in the south—Operation AYIN (also HOREV). Its goals were specified in the directive of 10 December issued by Brigadier Yigal Yadin, the Director of Operations, to be nothing less than the defeat and expulsion of the Egyptian forces from southern Palestine. The Southern Front Commander was still Brigadier Yigal Alon, disposing of five Israeli brigades against four Egyptian, three clustered along the coast and only one inland. All preparations were to be completed on 16 December, and zero hour was set originally for the night of 20–21 December. But, at the last moment, the attack was put off one night because of intense rain.

Yadin's plan was to capitalize on the Egyptian expectation that the main attack would be directed at the coast. To do this he mounted a convincingly large attack on the night of 22 December to take Hill 86 astride the Egyptian road to Gaza. The one Israeli brigade assigned this mission was able to keep the three Egyptian brigades fully occupied on the coast throughout most of the operation.

Even when the Israeli battalion was driven off Hill 86 on the afternoon of D+1, the ruse was only enhanced. The Egyptians had found a copy of the operation order of the Hill 86 attack on the body of the slain battalion deputy commander. The order—which concealed its diversionary nature from friend and foe alike—only confirmed for the Egyptians that the Israeli offensive was indeed aimed at the coast.

Moreover, the initial Israeli airstrikes and naval bombardment concentrated on the coast.⁵⁶⁷ The deception now even extended to the Israeli press, which joined the Egyptians in presuming the Israeli objective was to isolate and roll up the Gaza strip.⁵⁶⁸

Meanwhile, the real Israeli attack was to be mounted 50 miles inland with a drive from Beersheba to Auja and thence fanning out through the Negev to take the Egyptians far to their rear. This attack started after a 24-hour delay due to flooding—at 0900 on Saturday, 25 December, thereby breaking the Sabbath (as well as, irrelevantly, Christmas).

AYIN had been planned and conducted at the center by Yigael Yadin, most explicitly as he makes plain,⁵⁶⁹ in conscious emulation of Liddell Hart's strategy of the "indirect approach" and his principle of "alternative goals," including the ruses and diversions that can be played with it. Moreover, AYIN was apparently deliberately conceived as a replication of Allenby's brilliant Third Battle of Gaza (Case A6).⁵⁷⁰

Even the final phases of the campaign, from 18 December 1948 to 7 January 1949 seem to have made such effective use of the new situation by improvising

⁵⁶⁶As the result of Operation HIRAM (Example B43).

⁵⁶⁷Lorch (61), 411–412.

⁵⁶⁸Lorch (61), 413.

⁵⁶⁹Yadin (49/54).

⁵⁷⁰Lorch (61), 408.

new diversions in conjunction with the principle of “alternative objectives” that I would judge that the Israeli Army can be said to have “sold the dummy” right and left along their axis of advance.

While no casualty figures specifically for AYIN appear to be published, the cost cannot have been prohibitive because the total killed (including civilians) in the fighting from 1 April 1948 to 7 January 1949 were only 3,000 or 4,000, with an additional 2,000 killed in the earlier months of the War of Independence, a grand total of about 6,000 or almost one per cent of the Jewish population.

References

• General

- Lt. Colonel Netanel Lorch, *The Edge of the Sword: Israel's War of Independence, 1947-1949* (New York: Putnam's, 1961), pp. 404-436.
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- Lieutenant-General Sir John Bagot Glubb, *A Soldier with the Arabs* (New York: Harper, 1957), pp. 87-217.

• Surprise

- Edgar O'Ballance, *The Arab-Israeli War, 1948* (London: Faber and Faber, 1956), pp. 196-200.
- Lorch (61), 412, 417, 419.

• Deception

- Lorch (61), 405, 406-408, 410, 412, 413, 436.

Case A57. Korean War: North Korean Invasion, 25 Jun 1950

“It was a surprising war in a surprising place at a surprising time. . . .”

—Rear Admiral E.M. Eller,
Director of Naval History, 1962.⁵⁷¹

Warnings abounded of the North Korean attack that began the Korean War in June 1950, but the U.S. Government and its intelligence services were taken unaware because of their quite inappropriate assessment of the profuse facts and even clear recognition of the *possibility* of invasion.

I will not go into the details of this opening blow of the Korean War because it is well reported and documented (see References below). Moreover, the evidence suggesting that the surprise attack was aided by deception can be briefly summarized. In any case, in this one instance surprise did not need deception—Communist secrecy and American preconception were sufficient guarantors.

During early 1950, the Communist North Korean People’s Army (KPA) had been rapidly preparing itself for war. The Soviet Russian military advisory mission continued its training and planning. Additional Russian arms arrived for the KPA. And the Chinese Communist People’s Liberation Army (PLA) returned the last expatriate Koreans of the Korean Volunteer Army that had gained invaluable training and experience fighting the Japanese and the Chinese Nationalists. To facilitate secrecy for its forward deployments, the North Koreans cleared their frontier zone of all civilians for 14 miles back of the border, and between 15 and 24 June the KPA moved in strength into that zone.

None of these aggressive moves by the KPA went undetected by either the United States or its South Korean protégé. Moreover, both recognized that they were faced with a chronically touchy and potentially inflammable frontier, as signalled for many months by the propaganda barrages and border raids exchanged between the two Korean regimes. However, what the South Korean Government, the UN Commission, and, particularly, the U.S. intelligence services did not perceive was the extent of North Korean intentions. Even a specific warning, forwarded by the U.S. military mission (KMAG), that an invasion would come *sometime* that June was dismissed.⁵⁷²

To mask their intentions during the final preparations for invasion, the North Koreans perpetrated a simple ruse. They momentarily adopted a more conciliatory posture by halting their border raids and, from 10 through 19 June, issuing “peace proposals” calling for a single national election. This posture was almost certainly intended to guarantee surprise attack,⁵⁷³ but it may also have been calculated to forestall the preventive war that South Korean President Syngman Rhee had been publicly threatening for some time.

⁵⁷¹In Eller’s foreword to Field (62), ix.

⁵⁷²Futrell (61), 20.

⁵⁷³Poats (54), 6-7; and Leckie (62), 11, 40-41. These two are the only historians that I can find who note the probable deception aspect of this “peace” campaign.

D-day (25 Jun)	NKPA	UN				UN/NKPA
	Total	ROK	U.S.	Other	Total	
Divisions	10-1/3	8	0	0	8	0.78
Combat						
Troops	112,000	65,000	0	0	65,000	0.58
Support						
Troops	23,000	33,000	500	0	33,500	1.46
Tanks	150	0	0	0	0	—
Combat						
Aircraft	132	0	0	0	0	—
Other						
Aircraft	30	16	0	0	16	0.53
D+36 (31 Jul)						
Divisions	11	5	4-1/3	0	9-1/3	0.85
Combat						
Troops	70,000	45,000	47,000	0	92,000	1.31
Support						
Troops	?	38,000	12,000	0	50,000	?
Tanks	40	0	?	0	?	?
Combat						
Aircraft	65	0	c.500	26	c.500	8.00
D+67 (31 Aug)						
Divisions	14-2/3	5	4-1/3	1/3	9-2/3	0.66
Total						
Troops	98,000	91,500	87,000	1,500	180,000	1.84
Tanks	50?	0	530	0?	530?	5.00
Combat						
Aircraft	18	0	c.650	some	c.700	35.00

Table A.88: STRENGTHS of North Korean Peoples Army and UN Coalition. References: Appleman (61), 7-18, 262-265; Montross, I (54), 19-36; Leckie (62), 115-116, and Futrell (61), 17-20, 56, 64, 95-96.

In sum, then, while the South Korean and American intelligence services and political-military decision makers had more or less correctly assessed North Korean *capabilities*, they grossly miscalculated their *intentions*. Thus when the invasion came in the small hours of 25 June 1950, the South Koreans and Americans were thoroughly surprised—by the very fact as well as the timing of the event.

D+5 (30Jun)	Total NKPA	U.N.		Total	UN/NKPA
		ROK	U.S.		
Total:	6,000+?	44,000	0	44,000	7.?
D+36 (31 Jul)					
KIA			1,884		
WIA			2,695		
MIA			523		
PW			901		
Total:	58,000	70,000	6,003	76,000	1.31
D+67 (31 Aug)					
Total:	84,824?	?	12,074	?	?
D+81 (14 September)					
KIA,DOW			4,599		
WIA			12,058		
MIA			2,107		
PW	4,305		401		
Total:	103,000?	?	19,165	?	?

Table A.89: North Korean and UN Cumulative CASUALTIES, North Korean Invasion, 25 June 1950. References: Appleman (61), 7-18, 262-265; Montross, I (54), 19-36, and Appleman (61), 27, 34-35, 262-263, 391-392, 546-547, 603n.

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- Trumbull Higgins, *Korea and the Fall of MacArthur: A Précis in Limited War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1960), pp. 15-16.
- John Gunther, *The Riddle of MacArthur* (New York: Harper & Row, 1951), pp. 164-167.
- Ridgway (56), 191. (Brief recollection of the then U.S. Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Administration.)
- Futrell (61), 7-8, 20.

- I.F. Stone, *The Hidden History of the Korean War* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1952), pp. 1-66. A collector's curio in which Stone quaintly argues that it was the North Koreans who were surprised.

- **Warnings**

- Stone (52), 2-11.
- Futrell (61), 20.

- **Camouflage**

- Futrell (61), 93, 95.

- **Deception**

- Leckie (62), 40.
- Poats (54), 7.

Case A58. Korean War: Russian Intervention, 1950-1953

FIRST RUSSIAN: We have the best pilots in the world.

SECOND RUSSIAN: How is that?

1st R.: Because they can fly with no hands.

2nd R.: Why do they do that?

1st R.: They have to use their hands to slant their eyes so the Americans will think they are Koreans.

-A favorite joke among Russian troops in Korea, 1952.⁵⁷⁴

U.S. intelligence did not perceive the extensive *direct* intervention of regular Soviet units *throughout* the Korean War, 1950-1953. During those early Cold War years, the U.S. intelligence services shared the generally held but false assumption that Soviet *military* aggression would take the form of a WW II-type *Blitzkrieg*. Consequently, they were superbly geared to detect sudden, large-scale redeployments of massed Soviet tanks, bombers, and infantry divisions; but quite overlooked the other, more subtle, modes of direct and indirect military intervention available to the Russians—the very modes that were widely and intensively used in Korea.

It was not until well after the Truce that Russian and Polish Communist defectors, returned Allied prisoners, and Manchurian refugees apprised U.S. intelligence of the very active Soviet rôle throughout the Korean War. Because this belated evidence was not inserted in the wartime record, the subsequent official U.S. Army, Navy, Marine and Airforce histories overlook it. As a direct and unfortunate consequence of this oversight, the recent hasty assessments by Morton Halperin and others of Korea as a “limited war” have been too quick to credit *some* of the “tacit agreements” on limitations that the Russians accepted.

References

- **NOTE:** There are no published studies of this revealing subject. Meanwhile see my *Soviet Intervention in the Korean War* (draft, 1965). Some useful published references follow.
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 - Karig, VI (52), 327-330.

⁵⁷⁴Quoted by Monat (62), 160.

- Pawel Monat with John Dille, *Spy in the U.S.* (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), pp. 156-174. (Memoirs of the Polish Military Attaché to Peking and Pyongyang, 1951-1953, who subsequently defected to the U.S.)
- No Kum Sok as told to Martin L. Gross, “I Flew My MIG to Freedom,” *Saturday Evening Post*, Vol. 227, No. 15 (9 October 1954), pp. 19-21, etc.
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Case A59. Inch'on Landing, 15 Sep 1950: Operation CHROMITE

"I also predict that large-scale amphibious operations
... will never occur again."

—General Omar N. Bradley, Chairman, JCS,
19 October 1949.

"Inch'on is not impossible."

—Rear Admiral James H. Doyle,
23 August 1950.

"It succeeded and remains a Twentieth Century Cannae ever to be
studied."

—David Rees (64), 96.

General MacArthur's dramatic envelopment of the deeply penetrated North Korean Army by an amphibious assault at the west coast port of Inch'on was a bold and imaginative stroke of strategy, and its success was a turning point in the Korean War.

As an old hand at such things, MacArthur had considered the utility of amphibious operations ever since the first fortnight of the war. However, the swift advance of the Korean People's Army had swept away such plans as fast as MacArthur could devise them.⁵⁷⁵ Then, on 12 August 1950, he issued Plan 100-B of Operation CHROMITE, despite the cautious reservations of the JCS. This plan called for a landing in strength at Inch'on.⁵⁷⁶

In arguing his strategy before a special JCS delegation on 23 August MacArthur—uncharacteristically—did not stress his own previous experience, but went back to the apt historical precedent established in 1759 by General Wolfe in scaling the "unscalable" Heights of Abraham to seize French Quebec:⁵⁷⁷

Like Montcalm, the
North Koreans would regard an
Inchon landing as impossible.
Like Wolfe, I could take them by surprise.

This then was the keystone of MacArthur's stratagem: to deliver his indirect stroke at a point the enemy would not be covering because it was unlikely. Indeed, as MacArthur and his planners well knew, Inch'on had all the "don'ts" on the amphibious doctrine list—poorly situated for naval supporting fire, little

⁵⁷⁵The original plan, Operation BLUEHEARTS, was first pressed by MacArthur on July 4th with a proposed D-day of July 22nd. BLUEHEARTS was cancelled within a week. Heintz (68), 16-18; Sheldon (68), 40-44; Appleman (61), 488-489.

⁵⁷⁶The original Operation CHROMITE draft considered three options: Plan 100-B, the landing at Inch'on; Plan 100-C, a landing at Kunsan; or Plan 100-D, one at Chumunjin on the east coast. Appleman (61), 489.

⁵⁷⁷MacArthur (64), 349.

shelter from weather, inadequate beaches, unsatisfactory off-shore configuration, mined approaches, etc., etc. Of the several available landing sites, Inch'on was as General Almond mused: "the worst possible place we could bring in an amphibious assault." And this was precisely why MacArthur chose it—the "worst" place was the "best" gamble.⁵⁷⁸

Planning now proceeded with astonishing swiftness, given the large scale and very short lead time of the operation.⁵⁷⁹ It was guided by the *ad hoc* Special Planning Staff, GHQ, Far East Command in Tokyo. The X Corps was created on paper for this operation, with MacArthur's Chief of Staff, Major General Edward Almond, commanding, with all GHQ reserves and newly arriving troops secretly earmarked for it.

The withdrawal from the front at Pusan of the U.S. 1st Provisional Marine Brigade to join X Corps' sealift was camouflaged by assigning it to the Pusan general reserve until the last possible moment, namely its embarkation on D-minus-3.

The final plan as carried out called for D-day as 15 September, with a D+1 offensive by Eighth Army from the one surviving perimeter defense at Pusan to immobilize the surrounding main North Korean force.

During the weeks before D-day, all air strikes, photoreconnaissance flights, naval presence, and even the small beach survey landing party at Inch'on were matched by similar activities at the cover targets. This was conventional amphibious doctrine, designed to avoid giving unambiguous clues to interest in the real target. Thus from D-minus-16, the airstrikes from the two large, fast carriers then with Rear Admiral Edward C. Ewen's Task Force 77 were distributed 30 per cent north of the Inch'on-Seoul target area, 40 per cent within the target, and 30 per cent south of it.⁵⁸⁰

To increase the salience of some of these targets and raise them to the status of credible cover targets, elaborate feints were gradually but systematically focussed upon specific points, particularly Kunsan, Samch'ok, and Chinnampo.

Most attention was directed at Kunsan, a west-coast port 100 miles below Inch'on, that is, only two-thirds of the distance from Pusan to Inch'on. Kunsan was such a plausible spot for an "end-run" that it had—as Plan 100-C—been one of MacArthur's three original provisional targets, passed over for Inch'on by only a narrow margin.⁵⁸¹ Task Force 77 carrier strikes that had been underway throughout the southwest coastal area since D-minus-16 were focussed on

⁵⁷⁸Heinl (68), 24-28.

⁵⁷⁹At that time accepted amphibious doctrine specified 60-90 days for mounting a single division landing. Heinl (68), 16-17.

⁵⁸⁰Heinl (68), 59.

⁵⁸¹Compare Marine Major General O.P. Smith who commented in 1951: "This alternate plan was really a cover plan. I don't think there ever was any intention to land there. Possibly the intention was to leak information about the Kunsan landing in the hope of deceiving the enemy." As quoted in Heinl (68), 272n29. But Smith was not brought into the CHROMITE planning until 24 August, by which date Kunsan was definitely used only for feint and deception. Heinl (68), 42, also quotes a categorical remark (seemingly by Brigadier General Edwin K. Wright who, as G-3 and chairman of JSPOG, *would* know) that MacArthur's planners (JSPOG) had "never really considered Kunsan except as a feint and a deception."

military installations in Kunsan itself on D-minus-4 through a major attack by heavy bombers from Tokyo of Lieutenant General George E. Stratemeyer's Far East Air Force (FEAF).⁵⁸² Then it became the target of the *ad hoc* Special Operations Company (or Special Activities Group), a commando-type detachment of some 124 U.S. Army troops commanded by Colonel Louis B. Ely, an experienced but rather bizarre intelligence and amphibious specialist. Ely's mission was to go ashore near Kunsan and create enough noise and whoop-la to simulate a major landing. Brought directly from Japan by the Royal Navy frigate *Whitesand Bay*, the group failed on its first scheduled try on D-minus-4. Then, on D-minus-3, the landing party and the frigate—all guns firing—completed its mission at a cost of only two dead and one wounded.⁵⁸³ This ruse was enhanced by Rear Admiral Sir William Andrewes' Task Force 91 on D-minus-1 when HMS *Triumph* launched airstrikes around Kunsan.⁵⁸⁴ Psywar leaflets were also airdropped on Kunsan at that time.⁵⁸⁵ Although the withdrawal of the U.S. Marine Brigade from the Pusan Perimeter to the amphibious task force was cloaked in tight security, it was also wisely given a cover story in case word of its movement leaked. Consequently, during their embarkation at Pusan on D-minus-3, the Brigade was formed up and given a semi-public briefing by loudspeaker on the hydrography of Kunsan.⁵⁸⁶

The second cover target was Samch'ok, 100 miles up the east coast anchor of the Pusan Perimeter defense. It was also a plausible site for an "end-run" landing. Accordingly, the heavy cruiser *Helena* and three destroyers comprising Rear Admiral Charles C. Hartman's Task Group 95.2, began bombardment of Samch'ok on D-minus-2. The next day the group was joined off Samch'ok by the veteran battleship *Missouri*—just arrived on station from the United States—to add the U.S. Navy's only 16-inch pyrotechnics to the very impressive show.⁵⁸⁷ However, this simulated pre-landing softening-up bombardment, originally planned to continue beyond Inch'on D-day, was aborted by an unanticipated blunder. Eighth Army at Pusan had—without notifying either Tokyo or the Navy—landed a 780-man ROK guerrilla team at Changsadong, 80 miles below Samch'ok (i.e., 15 miles above the frontline) on D-day (or D-minus-1). Intended not as a diversion, but to prepare the way for Eighth Army's breakout try on D-plus-1, the ill-planned landing was immediately in such trouble that Task Group 95.2 had to break off its bombardment mission at Samch'ok to rush to aid the guerrillas, finally rescuing all but 92 of the party on D-plus-4.⁵⁸⁸ Despite this fumbling, the North Koreans were, I presume, at least as confused as the Americans by this intense activity on the east coast. In any case, the

⁵⁸²Heinl (68), 79; Sheldon (68), 146; Montross, II (55), 144.

⁵⁸³Sheldon (68), 143-150; Karig (52), 211-212; Appleman (61), 494, 500; Heinl (68), 79. Poats (54), 64, incorrectly states that this was a joint U.S. Ranger-South Korean force.

⁵⁸⁴Field (62), 187, 189, 190; Heinl (68), 78.

⁵⁸⁵Rees (64), 84.

⁵⁸⁶Montross, I (54), 238; Field (62), 187; Heinl (68), 79.

⁵⁸⁷Field (62), 212; and Karig (52), 244-245. Sheldon (68), 133-134, 146, 239, describes this feint but mistakenly locates it at Wonsan, 150 miles further north.

⁵⁸⁸Field (62), 212; Montross, II (55), 145; and Geer (52), 123. Heinl (68), 79, wrongly asserts that this EUSAK landing was at Samch'ok.

Date	Troops	Vehicles	Cargo (tons)	Combat Units Landed
D	13,000?	?	?	1st, 5th Marine Regiments, 1st, 3rd ROK Marine Btns.
D+1	15,000	1,500	1,200	2nd ROK Marine Btn.
D+2	20,482+	?	?	None
D+3	25,606	4,547	14,166	32nd Army Regiment
D+4	?	?	?	None
D+5	?	?	?	31st Army Regiment.
D+6	49,568	5,356	22,222	7th Marine Regiment.
D+7	53,882	6,629	25,512	None
By D+15	71,339	?	?	None

Table A.90: Disembarkation At Inch'on By Tenth Corps. References: Field (62), 204-205; Appleman (61), 513,519; Heintz (68), 52, 119, 149. Compare Sheldon (68), 222.

east coast feint at Samch'ok thoroughly deceived some American journalists in Tokyo who reported a "two-pronged amphibious envelopment."⁵⁸⁹

Chinnampo, 150 miles up the west coast from Inch'on, was the port and gateway to the North Korean capital of Pyongyang. As such, it was also a plausibly attractive site for an amphibious venture—its extreme riskiness being balanced by the decisive prize. Indeed, MacArthur had explicitly, albeit momentarily, considered Chinnampo before finally choosing Inch'on. Now it was to serve as the *post*-D-day cover target. For this purpose the British carrier *Triumph* concentrated its airstrikes there on D-plus-1 and 2.⁵⁹⁰ The purpose was, of course, to imply to the enemy that the very real landings underway at Inch'on were only a demonstration or secondary attack while the *main* or, at least, *another*, landing was forthcoming at Chinnampo. This ruse had worked with spectacular success during the Normandy invasion, causing the Germans to delay transferring vitally needed forces from the post-D-day cover target at Calais to the real and only landings in Normandy.⁵⁹¹ Although there is no evidence that MacArthur's effort to similarly deceive the North Koreans succeeded, the threat was at least barely credible whether or not the enemy perceived it as such. In other words, a second landing was just feasible. Thus, the rate of disembarkation of the 70,000 men of Tenth Corps lying offshore could, in theory, have allowed a second landing site on, say, D-plus-2 or 3 [see Table A.90].

Even assuming full commitment of X Corps *and* its landing craft and supporting ships, additional units in the Pusan Perimeter *could* have been supplied and a second assault landing at a defended site mounted sometime after the transport, landing, and support shipping was free of Inch'on. For example, even

⁵⁸⁹Poats (54), 64.

⁵⁹⁰Karig, VI (52), 164, 211; and Field (62), 189. The other major histories that bother to mention Chinnampo at all—Montross, II (55), 144; Rees (64), 84; Heintz (68), 59; and Sheldon (68), 146—wrongly imply or (in Rees' case) assert that it was merely one of the *pre*-invasion cover targets.

⁵⁹¹See Case A45.

on an improvised basis MacArthur himself believed he was capable of mounting a three-division landing at Kunsan by 15 October (D-plus-31). This possibility arose as a very real consideration on D-plus-4 when it seemed that an additional threat to the North Koreans besieging the Pusan Perimeter might be needed to pry them loose. At that point, MacArthur momentarily revived Plan 100-C, calling for such a landing at Kunsan.⁵⁹²

The 261-ship armada of Joint Task Force 7 began landing the 70,000 men of X Corps in a virtually unopposed landing, 15,000 being unloaded by the end of D-day itself. Evidently complete surprise had been achieved, as the mere 2,400 North Korean troops garrisoning the area had not been reinforced. The Marine assault waves on D-day lost only 196 total casualties against enemy casualties roughly estimated at over 1,200 killed and wounded and almost 300 captured.

Militarily the operation was a complete success. The beachhead was quickly secured and Seoul, 25 miles up-river, recaptured on D-plus-14. The enemy's half-enveloped army began a headlong retreat that stopped only at the Yalu. MacArthur's strategy had not only thrown the invaders back across their own borders, but had pushed them against their frontier with China, all within six weeks. The war against China was about to begin; but the war with North Korea had, in fact, been won.

CHROMITE was a complete strategic success,⁵⁹³ but was it a success of strategic deception? While a definitive answer is not possible, it does seem to have been the case, as seen from the following.

Security was, to put it gently, weak. Almost everyone knew that MacArthur was building up for a major offensive. The Japanese ports of Kobe, Sasebo, and Yokohama and the Korean port of Pusan were feverishly and quite visibly preparing for CHROMITE, beginning in late August. Indeed 37 of the 1st Marine Division's 47 LST's were crewed by Japanese civilians. As Japan (and probably Pusan) was covered by numerous Soviet, Chinese, and Korean intelligence networks, MacArthur's judgment that because the public news media kept mum "that the projected counter-attack was a well-kept secret" seems most improbable.

The foreign correspondents in Japan knew—they called it "Operation Common Knowledge"—but they suppressed it, and where they did not most of their home-town editors did. A significant exception was *The New York Times*, which on D-minus-1 speculated that: "An amphibious landing on the Korean coast well behind the enemy's front lines is an obvious and possible strategy."⁵⁹⁴

⁵⁹²Appleman (61), 571; and Heintz (68), 147-148, 257.

⁵⁹³I emphatically reject the contrary view of MacArthur detractors, particularly USAF General O.P. Weyland, that the victory was entirely due to EUSAK's breakout from Pusan. Indeed, that view asserts CHROMITE was actually harmful in that it weakened the offensive on the main front by contravening the principle of concentration of force. True, but that argument overlooks the tradeoff in "principles"—one (concentration) for two (surprise and maneuver). Such advocacy of frontal assault—the "direct" approach—has the whole weight of military experience against it. Moreover, it is contradicted by the disproportion in deployment and casualty statistics between Inch'on and the Perimeter themselves.

⁵⁹⁴*New York Times*, 14 September 1950, as cited by Heintz (68), 79. I have been unable to verify this quotation.

The enemy also knew at least something was underway. A week before D-day, a Korean Communist spy, operating under the Japanese name of Iwamura Yoshimatsu and with the conspiratorial codename “Seki-san,” was caught in Japan with detailed Inch’on invasion plans, operational details, troop strengths, supply lists, etc.⁵⁹⁵ Moreover senior U.S. and Korean spokesmen were talking publicly about an imminent offensive. Thus Syngman Rhee had indiscreetly blurted: “We are about ready to go.”⁵⁹⁶ And the commander of the ROK Army was forced to deny widespread reports that he had asserted in a radio broadcast that:⁵⁹⁷

...you may expect startling news in a few days—September may turn out to be the month of our return to Seoul.

The strongest hint was the pep-talk that Eighth Army Commander Lieutenant General Walton H. Walker carried to his troops on 13 September, declaring repeatedly and emphatically that the U.N. forces would “soon” take the offensive.⁵⁹⁸ These last leaks probably did no harm—indeed they may well have been deliberate stratagem—because they served to draw attention more to the existing perimeter front than to any new one.

There is an intriguing footnote to the security aspect of CHROMITE. It was a happy circumstance that MacArthur and his proficient staff could so quickly rush it from the drafting table to the beaches of Inch’on. And the Americans were twice blessed in MacArthur’s arrogance and cocksureness that both kept his plans so much to himself and kept the CIA at arm’s distance.⁵⁹⁹ Otherwise we can now say with almost complete certainty that it was only a matter of time before Soviet intelligence in Washington, D.C., learned the time, place, and strength of the invasion. (Indeed we cannot entirely exclude the possibility that they did have foreknowledge; but, if so, they clearly did not pass the word to their North Korean protégés or even their own military mission in time for countermeasures to be taken.) Those early months of the Korean War were precisely the time that two remarkable circumstances coincided. First, Anglo-American cooperation on intelligence matters (the so-called “special relationship”) was at its closest. Second, Soviet intelligence agents held the key Anglo-U.S. liaison posts inside the British secret intelligence and diplomatic services. Thus Guy Burgess (a former M.I.5 agent turned Foreign Office Far East expert) joined the British Embassy in Washington as Second Secretary in August 1950 and served there until May 1951. Far more important, however, was H. A. R. “Kim” Philby who from early autumn 1949 to 3 June 1951 while posing as the Embassy First Secretary was, in fact, the official liaison officer between the CIA and the Secret

⁵⁹⁵Sheldon (68), 132.

⁵⁹⁶Heinl (68), 79.

⁵⁹⁷*New York Times*, 14 September 1950, p. 21, for an AP dispatch dated 13 September.

⁵⁹⁸Harold Faber, “Walker Declares Enemy Weakens,” *New York Times*, 14 September 1950, p. 1, and in several other stories that day.

⁵⁹⁹MacArthur was notorious for his lack of cooperation with OSS in World War II and CIA during the Korean War.

Intelligence Service (S.I.S.).⁶⁰⁰

Although it was not known to U.S. intelligence at the time, the Soviet Government was already sufficiently aware of MacArthur's amphibious capabilities—if not, perhaps, his intentions and plans—that the Soviet Navy's advisory mission to North Korea had begun to incorporate a major program of coastal mining by 10 July. Within a month after the Inch'on landing, Soviet direct but covert aid in mines and naval personnel had actually managed to deny control of North Korean waters to the U.S. Navy—as categorically admitted by the U.S. Chief of Naval Operations—when Tenth Corps was utterly frustrated in its efforts to replicate its Inch'on triumph at Wonsan. For six embarrassing days—the so-called “Operation Yo-Yo”—the ambitious American armada drifted uselessly back-and-forth off Wonsan, while minesweeping crews worked desperately to clear a path through 2,000 mines.⁶⁰¹ However, this Soviet intervention was just too late to spoil MacArthur's Inch'on operation. They had only time to set up their headquarters and depots at Chinnampo and Wonsan and to begin mining at those two ports as well as at Kunsan and Mokpo. In Inch'on harbor itself—an ideal place for mines—only 12 (or 17) anchored contact mines had been laid, all apparently on 10 September, but a railway flatcar was found in the town loaded with 10 of the dreaded magnetic influence mines.⁶⁰² In general, Inch'on had been low on the Russian timetable for defense.

Curiously, the final sign that both MacArthur and Marine Major General Oliver P. Smith took as conclusive proof of surprise was false. Writing in 1964, MacArthur could still recall his midnight arrival off Inch'on harbor on D-minus-1.⁶⁰³

Then I noticed a flash—a light that winked on and off across the water. The channel navigation lights were on. We were taking the enemy by surprise. The lights were not even turned off. I went to my cabin and turned in.

These lights—in the old Palmi Do lighthouse—had, in fact, just been relit by Lieutenant Eugene F. Clark, USN, as part of his specific instructions—in Operation TRUDY JACKSON, the joint CIA-G-2-ROK Naval Intelligence pre-attack beach reconnaissance operation that had been ashore since D-minus-13.⁶⁰⁴

⁶⁰⁰Cookridge (68), 147, 152-153, 158, 161, 204; Page, Leitch, Knightley (68), 196-203, 215-220, 226-236; and Philby (68). Contrary to later charges by MacArthur—see Spanier (59), 94-95—Donald MacLean could not then have been involved as he was on leave from the Foreign Office recovering from a nervous breakdown, from May to 1 November 1950, when he was appointed Head of the American Department in the Foreign Office, a post held until his defection with Burgess on 25 May 1951.

⁶⁰¹Mott (59), 272-277; Field (62), 230-237, 243.

⁶⁰²Mott (59), 271; Field (62), 183, 187, 191-193, 230; Heintz (68), 27, 31, 32, 80, 81-82, 85; Sheldon (68), 166, 220; and Montross, II (55), 85-86.

⁶⁰³MacArthur (64), 353.

⁶⁰⁴Heintz (68), 67-69, 89; Sheldon (68), 1-12; Karig, *et al.* (52), 176-191; Willoughby and Chamberlain (54), 372-373.

D-day	U.S.	ROK Marines	ROK Army	British Navy	Total UNC	Total NKPA	NKPA+UN
KIA,DOW	21				21	c.1,230	
WIA	174				174		
MIA	1				1	—	
PW	—				—	c.270	
Totals:	196	0	0	0	196	c.1,500	7.7
D+1							
KIA,DOW	24				24	1,350	
WIA	196				196		
MIA	2				2	—	
PW	—				—	300	
Totals:	222	0?	0	0	222?	1,650	7.4
D+5							
KIA,DOW	83			1		3,350	
WIA	574			2			
MIA	5			0		—	
PW	—			0		1,349	
Totals:	662	few	0	3	665+	4,699	7.1
D+15							
KIA	536	29		1	556	14,000	
WIA	2,550	96		2	2,648	3,000+	
MIA	65	0		0	65	—	
PW	—	0		0	—	7,000	
Totals:	3,151	125	166	3	3,269	24,000+	7.0

Table A.91: Casualties at Inch'on Beachhead (Cumulative). References: Heinl (68), 119, 167, 257-258, 289n; Sheldon (68), 177, 184, 209, 220, 222, 314; Appleman (61), 506, 507, 509, 512, 540-541; Montross, II (57), 297, 333.

D+15	UN COMMAND				Total NKPA
	U.S.	ROK	Other	Total	
KIA,DOW	968				
WIA	3,981				30,000?
MIA	57				
PW	1				30,000
Total					
Casualties:	5,007	some	few	?	60,000?
Tanks				60	239

Table A.92: Costs: All Korea (15-31 September 1950). References: Appleman (61), 547, 602, 603n, 604, 605. Compare Montross, II (55), 285, for his evident error on PWs.

	From Inch'on Beachhead	From Pusan Perimeter
D (15 September)	3	0
D+1	25	0
D+7	350	1,000
D+11	450	9,000
D+15	800	30,000
D+36	-	45,000
D+39 (24 Oct)	-	53 000

Table A.93: Square Miles Taken by UNC Forces (Cumulative). References: Appleman (61), 504, 549, and Maps IX and X; Field (62), 189, 228, 255; Heintz (68), 247.

Front	UN COMMAND				NKPA	UN/NKPA
	U.S.	ROK	Other	Total		
Inch'on	68,553	2,786	0	71,339	2,200	62.0
Kimpo	0	0	0	0	> 2,900	—
Seoul Area	0	0	0	0	> 15,700	—
North Korea	0	0	0	0	some	—
Pusan Perimeter	68,260	83,502	1,693	153,683	70,000	2.2
Total Combat Troops:	136,813	86,288	1,693	223,683	> 90,800	2.3
Divisions	7	6	1/3	13-1/3	14-2/3	0.9
Combat aircraft	c.800	0	c.100	c.900	c.10	90.0

Table A.94: UN and NKPA Strength and Deployment. References: Appleman (61), 382, 500, 540-541, 545-548; Heintz (68), 30-31; Sheldon (68), 217-218, 241.

In general, it is clear that not only strategic but virtual tactical surprise was obtained at Inch'on. For example, monitoring of KPA military radio signals did not detect any alerting warnings until D-minus-2, when a Korean monitor-interpreter aboard the destroyer U.S.S. *Mansfield* picked up an urgent message from Inch'on itself. The message reported the visual sighting of the approaching advance elements (including *Mansfield*) of the Joint Task Force, reported the bombing of Wolmi Do, alerted the local coastal defenses, and concluded that "there is every indication the enemy will attempt a landing" at Inch'on.⁶⁰⁵

In sum, I think it a fair judgment to regard MacArthur's cover and deception plan at Inch'on to be neither better nor worse than those he used across the Southwest Pacific in World War II. In other words, it was adequate for its purpose, more-or-less effective, but rather unsophisticated and ill-coordinated by contemporary British standards.

⁶⁰⁵Karig, VI (52), 202; Heintz (68), 82; Sheldon (68), 163; Field (62), 195.

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- William J. Sebald, *With MacArthur in Japan* (New York: Norton, 1965), p. 196.
- Sheldon (68), 4, 94-95, 97-98, 103.
- Heinl (68), 79.
- Geer (52), 118-119.

• Warnings

- Sheldon (68), 131-134, citing his interview with Jae Duk Hahn, chief of the Pyongyang bureau of the (North Korean) Central News Agency, who later defected. Also p. 163.

- **Surprise**

- Heint (68), 82, 97, 145-147.
- Sheldon (68), 154, 216-217, 218.
- Montross, II (55), 145.
- Appleman (61), 508.

- **Deception**

- Heint (68), 24-28, 57, 59, 78-80.
- Middleton (65), 107-108.
- Whitney (56), 351.
- Karig, Cagle, and Manson (52), 141, 164, 211-212, 245.
- Sheldon (68), 95, 146.
- Appleman (61), 494, 500.
- Montross, II (55), 144-145.
- Field (62), 185-187, 190, 212.

Case A60. Yalu River, 25 Oct 1950

“The war is very definitely coming to an end shortly.”
 –MacArthur, 21 October 1950

“These two things—creating illusions for the enemy and springing surprise attacks on him—are used to make the enemy face the uncertainties of war while securing for ourselves the greatest possible certainty of gaining superiority, initiative, and victory.”

–Mao Tse-tung,
On the Protracted War, (1938)

When China intervened in the Korean War in October 1950, the U.S. intelligence services failed to give adequate warning. Their estimates of Chinese intentions, strength, and timing were grossly in error. This was true from Eighth Army field intelligence in Korea, through MacArthur’s Far East Command G-2 in Tokyo, to the CIA in Washington. Consequently, the major commanders, from Lieutenant General Walton H. Walker in Korea, through General MacArthur in Tokyo, to President Truman in Washington were caught quite by surprise. Indeed, they were repeatedly surprised by this intervention—by the initial movement of Chinese armies across the Yalu and into Korea on the 12th or 13th of October, upon their first appearance in battle on 25 October, and finally by their first offensive on 24 November.

This egregious intelligence failure, although oft-told, is worth summarizing again as a cautionary tale. It is particularly instructive precisely because the faulty assessments of Chinese intentions followed from many quite specific warnings. Moreover, the final series of surprises that turned victory to stalemate were due in large measure to Chinese stratagems.

The warnings—some real and explicit, some real but obscure, and some fancied—of possible Chinese intervention fall into two quite distinct periods. The first period began with the sudden and successful U.S. leap to aid invaded South Korea in June 1950. It was characterized by two types of Chinese warnings. One group comprised the many, frequent, and quite explicit declarations by senior officials that China did not intend to permit the total defeat of its fraternal Communist regime in North Korea. The only ambiguity—if that is even the word—is that these statements did not specify the precise nature of Chinese counteraction although it seemed clearly implied that this would take some military form. In any case their threatening tone varied directly with the degree of physical threat to the North Korean regime.

The more important warnings of Chinese *intent* were the following. On 20 August Foreign Minister Chou En-lai wired the UN that: “The Chinese people cannot but be concerned about solution of the Korean question.”⁶⁰⁶ Then, on 22 September, a Foreign Ministry spokesman publicly confirmed MacArthur’s

⁶⁰⁶Whiting (60), 70, 79, 84, 86, 91, 95.

charge of the 18th that the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) had transferred a division of ethnically Korean troops to North Korea shortly before the outbreak of war. To this provocative admission, the spokesman added that: "The Chinese people . . . will always stand on the side of the Korean people."⁶⁰⁷ Three days later, the 25th, the Acting Chief of Staff of the PLA, General Nieh Jung-chen "informally" told Indian Ambassador K.M. Panikkar that China would not "sit back with folded hands and let the Americans come up to the border."⁶⁰⁸ This was a virtual ultimatum and the fact that it was "informal" and delivered privately shows that it was not intended as mere "grand-stand" international propaganda, but served some other, quite serious purpose.

In case the "informality" was distrusted, Foreign Minister Chou En-lai broadcast an official statement on 30 September that the Chinese people would not "supinely tolerate seeing their neighbors being savagely invaded by the imperialists."⁶⁰⁹ Then, on 3 October, he reinforced this and spelled it out by privately but formally telling Ambassador Panikkar most explicitly that China would directly intervene should U.S. or UN (as opposed to South Korean) forces cross the 38th parallel into North Korea. Panikkar promptly informed his Government which passed the ultimatum to both the U.S. Government and the UN Secretary General, and MacArthur was soon notified.⁶¹⁰ And on 10 October Radio Peking made a declaration of intention similar to that of Chou En-lai.⁶¹¹ Amidst a number of warnings that were now pouring in from covert intelligence sources, one is worth particular mention. Early in October an escaped American officer informed MacArthur's G-2 that on 22 September, during his interrogation in North Korea by three Soviet (KGB?) officers, one (a senior colonel) asserted that if U.S. troops crossed the 38th Parallel, new Communist forces would enter the war.⁶¹²

Throughout this period, Soviet Russian propaganda, official statements, and diplomacy paralleled those of Red China, albeit in a more subdued key. Thus while Stalin was fully supportive of his Chinese ally, he was clearly prepared to let them take the lead (and its rewards or punishments) in this international adventure.

Unfortunately, the Americans mistook the very real Chinese—and Russian—warnings as sheer bluff. Their hunters' blood was up and neither MacArthur nor the UN would be denied. On October 7th both crossed the metaphorical Rubicon—MacArthur, geographically and the UN General Assembly politically by passing the resolution recommending that: "All appropriate steps be taken to ensure conditions of stability throughout Korea."⁶¹³ As late as 14 October the Far East Command Daily Intelligence Summary went on record with the

⁶⁰⁷Whiting (60), 93, 105.

⁶⁰⁸Panikkar (55), 108; Whiting (60), 93, 107.

⁶⁰⁹Rees (64), 107; Whiting (60), 93, 107-108.

⁶¹⁰Panikkar (55), 109-110; Whiting (60), 94, 108-109; Appleman (61), 758-759. Chou reiterated this point in reminiscing with Edgar Snow in 1960. See Edgar Snow, *The Other Side of the River* (New York: Random House, 1962), pp. 88-89.

⁶¹¹Whiting (60), 94, 115, 116, 127; Appleman (61), 759.

⁶¹²Appleman (61), 759.

⁶¹³Rees (64), 108.

Date	Divisions	Number of Troops	Units (Commander)	Source
1947	60	600,000	4th Field Army (Lin Piao)	<i>In situ</i>
May to mid-Jun		120,000	4th Field Army GHQ + 42nd Army	<i>In situ</i>
Mid-June to end July	?	180,000	+38th, 40th Armies	Central and South China
August to Mid-Sep				
Mid-Sep to 15 Oct		300,000	+50th, 20th Armies	Central and East China
15-30 Oct	78	780,000	+18 divisions of Third Field Army	
1-15 Nov			+ divisions of Third Field Army	

Table A.95: PLA Build-Up in Manchuria. Sources: Appleman (61), 750-751; Whiting (60), 23, 64-67, 118-122; Rees (64).

estimate.⁶¹⁴

Recent declarations by Chinese Communist leaders, threatening to enter North Korea if American forces were to cross the 38th Parallel, are probably in a category of diplomatic blackmail.

The second type of warning in this first period was the reports of the redeployment of a major portion of the Chinese Peoples' Liberation Army (PLA) to Manchuria, directly across the Sino-Korean border. This deployment supplemented the Chinese professions of *intent* to intervene militarily by giving them a clear *capability* to do so. While Peking did not publicize this deployment, it presumably realized that U.S. intelligence would learn of it. Indeed the Chinese authorities should have welcomed such information reaching the Americans, as it would have lent an essential—albeit insufficient—element of credibility to the published threats.

The second period or stage was that of actual Chinese intervention. It began on October 12th or 13th-14th when the PLA began its movement across the Yalu and into Korea. While the first period was one of open warnings and unconcealed preparations for intervention, the second period was sharply distinguished by an end of warnings, secret deployment into the zone of battle, and covert intervention. In other words, while the Chinese Government openly and sincerely sought to prevent escalation of the war, once committed to fight they entered the battle with enough stealth to assure surprise.⁶¹⁵ The Yalu

⁶¹⁴Leckie (62), 171.

⁶¹⁵Whiting (60), 117.

marked not only the line between peace and war but also the line between candor and deception.

While the PLA in Manchuria was visible, its metamorphosis into the CPV and movement across the Yalu were carefully concealed. Its deployment in Korea was made with great and successful care to avoid detection by U.S. aerial observation. Thus movement was entirely under cover of night, while during daylight troops remained effectively hidden in the hills under perfect camouflage discipline. UN Command intelligence was receiving many but fragmentary reports of this mass Chinese movement from North Korean prisoners and civilians; but, because they were not confirmed by direct aerial observation, they were entirely discounted.⁶¹⁶

The superb march discipline and porter system of the PLA/CPV infantry accounts in large measure for its ability to quickly deploy and maintain a very large force in Korea. For example, one PLA Army covered the 286 miles from Antung in Manchuria to the combat zone in less than 19 days, one of its three divisions averaging 18 miles per day for 18 days.⁶¹⁷ This ability—unsuspected by U.S. intelligence—accounts for the fact that the Chinese had managed to position 300,000 troops during October and November,⁶¹⁸ by which time MacArthur personally credited them with a capability of moving to Korea and sustaining no more than 50,000 to 60,000 troops.⁶¹⁹ Hence the Chinese offensive on 24 November came not only as a surprise as to its mere fact but struck with a force four times that credited to it. By failing to correctly assess either intention or capability, U.S. Intelligence had permitted the Chinese to inflict surprise both as to fact and strength.

Although Chinese intervention was wholehearted and large-scale, it was covert. From first intervention to final truce negotiations the Chinese were careful to preserve the superficial fiction that it was not the regular Chinese Peoples' Liberation Army (PLA) but merely individual Chinese "volunteers" who had entered the conflict. The fiction further maintained that these *private individuals* were then organized *in Korea* as units of the "Chinese Peoples' Volunteers" (CPV).⁶²⁰ To avoid incriminating evidence members of the CPV carried no identity papers—as shown by search of their dead and prisoners—although some individuals had inked in their names and units on the inside left of their blouses.⁶²¹ The Chinese Communists shared the long-standing Russian Soviet tradition and special techniques for covert military intervention.⁶²²

Realizing, as they surely must, that the sheer fact of their intervention could

⁶¹⁶Appleman (61), 688, 717, 769-770; Marshall (53), 1, 14.

⁶¹⁷For CPV march and bivouac discipline see Appleman (61), 770.

⁶¹⁸Appleman (61), 769, 770.

⁶¹⁹As he informed President Truman at the Wake Island Conference on 15 October. At that very moment the Chinese already had gotten 120,000 across. Higgins (60), 58; and Appleman (61), 760, 767.

⁶²⁰Rees (64), 131, 139, 290.

⁶²¹Appleman (61), 688.

⁶²²For studies of covert intervention see Barton Whaley, *Soviet and Chinese Arms Aid* (draft, 1965); Barton Whaley, *Soviet Intervention in the Spanish Civil War* (draft, 1966); and my short paper, *Submarines as Weapons of Covert Intervention* (draft, 1966).

Date	By 8th Army	By X Corps	Total
October 25	3	1	4
26	3	1	4
27	3	1	4
28	5	3	8
29	10	19	29
30	?	19	29+
31	7	26	36+
November 2	55	?	81+
10	?	84+	139+
20	84	?	168+
23	96	86+	182+
December 2	—	—	300
28	—	—	616

Table A.96: Chinese Prisoners (cumulative). References: Appleman (61), 673, 675-678, 686-687, 744, 751-752, 755, 756. See also Stone (52), 156, 173, 181, 216.

not go long undetected the CPV took special precautions to assure that its *strength* would not be prematurely disclosed. The stratagem employed to this end was the simple one of assigning code designations to each unit. These not only masked their original Chinese unit designation (thereby muddying UNC G-2 efforts to track the shift of PLA/CPV units from China to Manchuria to Korea) but downgraded the size of units. Thus the PLA 38th Army became the CPV “54th Unit,” the 115th Division of the 39th Army became the “1st Battalion, 55th Unit,” and so on. The first Chinese prisoners (4 of them) were captured—all along the line—on 25 October. Despite the prisoners’ own willing efforts to correct the error, Eighth Army intelligence insisted on treating the “Units” as small detachments rather than as 30,000-man Armies. And as late as 5 November—by which time about 100 Chinese had been taken—Eighth Army G-2 was still only willing to grant divisional status to the Chinese “Units,” thus underestimating their strength by a factor of three.⁶²³

On 24 November, after three weeks delay, General Walton H. Walker’s Eighth Army and Major General Almond’s independent Xth Corps went on the offensive intended to end the war in Korea. The eight divisions (5 U.S., 3 ROK, plus 2 British and 1 Turkish brigades) were not sufficient. They were stopped by D-plus-2, and by D-plus-4 they were in full retreat. Only in this manner did the U.S. intelligence services at last discover the scope of Chinese Intervention.

The catastrophe at the Yalu was a great embarrassment to MacArthur and his G-2, Major General Willoughby, as well as to the various military units there. This circumstance probably accounts for the lack of casualty reporting in the official sources, despite the fact that the data exists. For example, the destruction of the Turkish Brigade (for which the U.S. secretly apologized to

⁶²³Appleman (61), 753-754; Leckie (62), 194-195; and Fehrenbach (63), 293.

	Communist			UN			
	Chinese	NKPA	Total	U.S.	ROK	Other	Total
25 Oct 1950							
Divisions	14	4?	18?	6	8	2/3	14-2/3
Combat Troops	120,000	25,000?	145,000	125,000	101,000	8,000	234,000
Total Ground Forces				279 000	293,000	8 000	580 000
1 Nov 1950							
Divisions	21	4?	25?	6	8	2/3	14-2/3
Combat Troops	180,000	25 000?	205,000	125,000	98,000?	8,000	231,000
13 Nov 1950							
Divisions	33	4?	37?	6	9	2/3	15-2/3
Combat Troops	300,000	25,000	325,000	125,000	105,000?	10,000	240,000
1 Jul 1951							
Divisions	40	23	63	6	9?	4/3	15-4/3?
Combat Troops	248,000	211,000	459,000				
Total Ground Forces				253,000	273,000	28,000	554,000
1 Nov 1951							
Divisions			72?	6	9?	1-1/3	16-4/3?
Combat Troops	377,000	225,000	602,000				
Total Ground Forces				265,000	282,000	33,000	580,000
1 May 1952							
Divisions			82	5	9	1-1/3	15-1/3
Combat Troops	630,000	268,000	908,000				
Total Ground Forces				260,000	341,000	36,000	637 000
Jan 1953							
Divisions				8	12	1-1/3	21-1/3
Combat Troops	600,000	200,000	801,000	c.165,000	c.120,000	c.25,000	c.310,000
Total Ground Forces			1,000,000				768,000

Table A.97: Communist and UN Strengths, Yalu River. References: Appleman (61), 604-606, 618, 667, 765-769; Hermes (66), 76-77, 199-200, 283-284, 357-361, 512; Ridgeway (67), 218; Montross, IV (62), 84-85, 218; Geer (52), 206; Rees (64), 229.

D+29	Communist			UN			
	CPV	NKPA	Total	ROK	U.S.	UN	Total
Total	thousands	2,000+	thousands	2,677+	1,173+	113+	thousands
D+48							
KIA			25,000				
WIA			12,500				
Totals:			37,500+	2,677+	13,464	1,011	17,152+

Table A.98: Cumulative Casualties, Yalu River. References: Montross, III (57), 351, 382; Fehrenbach (63), 294, 376; Appleman (61), 708, 774; Willoughby (54), 405.

an astonished Turkish government) is entirely glossed over.⁶²⁴ And the widely quoted total loss of 13,000 troops reported by Willoughby conveniently overlooks both ROK and UN losses.

In sum, the public record of intelligence failure on Korea is quite clear, at least in all its significant aspects. Its consequences for the American nation's involvement in an unpopular war, for partisan politics, and for the dramatic conflict over authority and insubordination between the President and the Hero combined to assure public disclosure. This disclosure has had two results of enduring value to the government and public alike. First, it provided the kind of shock needed for even minimal reform of the hitherto bickering parochial U.S. intelligence bureaucracies, producing certain rational structural changes to yield a *coordinated intelligence community* and much greater degree of *centralized*, intelligence collation and evaluation.⁶²⁵ Second, it continues to provide a rare and healthy insightful lesson on the lengths of self-deception and dissembling that an intelligence service—in this case MacArthur's G-2—can sometimes go to defend a self-generated myth of infallibility. For the first time since the Pearl Harbor investigation, it could not hide behind the sheltering smokescreen of self-serving security regulations but had to defend and justify its blunders in open forums.

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⁶²⁴Fehrenbach (63), 318-320.

⁶²⁵Ransom (58), 89, 133, 173, 174, 179, 188-189.

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- S.L.A. Marshall, *The River and the Gauntlet* (New York: Morrow, 1953), pp. 8-10.
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Case A61. The Kojo Feint, 15 Oct 1952: Operation DECOY

Because Korea is a peninsula, it is a particularly attractive target for amphibious operations and, hence, surprise outflanking attacks. General MacArthur had grasped this simple but then doctrinally unpopular concept within a fortnight of the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950. Within three months he had proved his point by a west coast landing at Inch'on⁶²⁶ that outflanked the entire North Korean Army and precipitated its withdrawal from all its occupied territory. Although this initial brilliant amphibious stroke was also the last of the three-year-long war, it served to make the enemy conscious—perhaps even hyperconscious—of the need to divert at least some portion of its troop strength and planning effort to guard against a repetition. The situation thus was comparable to that during General Alexander's campaign up the Italian peninsula in World War II. There, by maintaining a continuing amphibious threat following the early landings at Salerno and Anzio, Alexander had tricked the Germans into keeping two or more precious divisions in continual reserve awaiting a never-to-materialize event.

In Korea the credibility of further amphibious assaults was easily sustained through 1950. This was done by frequent coastal raids by both naval air and gunnery, hit-and-run landings by ROK Marines and guerrillas, and the major “administrative” (i.e., unopposed) landing of X Corps at Wonsan (Operation TAILBOARD) on 26 October 1950.⁶²⁷

From 1951 through to the end of the war, a credible threat of major landings was perpetuated by a combination of five factors.

First, there was the ever-present capability for such action, as potently symbolized by the presence of the U.S. 1st Marine Division. And it was the policy of the UN Command to try to keep that unit in a segment of the line close enough to the (east) coast to permit its rapid withdrawal for amphibious action. Moreover, it was known that enemy intelligence took special pains to monitor all movements of the Marines and other amphibiously trained units.⁶²⁸

Second, there was continuing coastal harassment by the guns and aircraft of the U.S. Seventh Fleet and its UN components.⁶²⁹

Third, the ubiquitous hit-and-run landings by ROK Marines and guerrillas and British Royal Marine Commandos⁶³⁰ were now supplemented by capture and permanent occupation of a number of off-shore islands,⁶³¹ particularly those in the vicinity of such attractive targets for full-scale landings as Wonsan, Hungnam, and Kojo. Wonsan itself was kept under constant siege from 16 February 1951 until 27 July 1953 when the Armistice went into effect. This notable siege consisted of seizure and permanent occupation of several of the off-shore

⁶²⁶See Case A59.

⁶²⁷Field (62), 220-249; Appleman (61), 614-637.

⁶²⁸Field (62), 343, 351, 430, 434.

⁶²⁹Field (62), 412, etc.; and Hermes (66), 108-110, 196.

⁶³⁰Field (62), 412, 422-423.

⁶³¹Hermes (66), 196-197, 328, 398; Field (62), 326-327, 422-426, 449.

islands, regular reconnaissance, frequent naval bombardment, occasional guerilla and Marine raids, and intermittent mine-sweeping. In addition to denying the enemy the use of this port and inhibiting its value as a rail and road transshipment depot, the siege posed a constant threat of outright invasion. It is known that to meet this threat the enemy gradually built up a major garrison to cover the 60 miles of coast centering on Wonsan, from Hungnam down to Kojo. It is estimated that nearly 80,000 enemy combat troops were tied down by this threat, including apparently two NKPA artillery brigades on the shore, 3 NKPA infantry divisions nearby, and several Chinese divisions inland. The captured reports of an enemy war game played in early 1952 show that they conceded that even this force was insufficient to prevent a beachhead lodgment by a four-division assault.⁶³²

Fourth, there was the fact that from time-to-time the UN Command did seriously plan actual landings, and some intimation of such planning may very well have reached the enemy—to his undoubted consternation. Thus on 5 September 1951 Eighth Army Commander, Lieutenant General James A. Van Fleet recommended an outline plan for an amphibious landing on the east coast near Tongch'on to follow up a mid-October west front attack (Plan TALONS) by I Corps.⁶³³ Then in mid-September Van Fleet proposed Plan WRANGLER, substituting Kojo for Tongch'on as the amphibious beachhead. By this maneuver it was hoped to outflank the enemy by an east coast landing in October in conjunction with a major offensive (Plan CUDGEL) through the center of the line by U.S. and IX Corps. However, on 3 October Van Fleet himself recommended cancellation after careful calculation of the risks and probable casualties.⁶³⁴ Again, in early October 1952, the next Eighth Army Commander, General Mark W. Clark, unhappy with his colorless rôle on a stalemated front during delicate armistice negotiations, proposed to the JCS a drive to the Pyongyang-Wonsan line in an all-out offensive including a major amphibious assault. Unfortunately for Clark's ambitions, President-elect Eisenhower took no interest in this scheme.⁶³⁵

Fifth, and finally, the UN Command made frequent use of these previous four circumstances to mount deception operations to convince the enemy that a major amphibious operation was forthcoming.⁶³⁶ The illusion of forthcoming amphibious offensives was created by more-or-less skillful blending of the visible signals (such as offshore naval concentrations, focussed bombardment and raiding, and suggestive reconnaissance) with both intelligence leaks and psychological warfare leaflet campaigns. The general alertness of the UN Command to the deception possibilities is illustrated by the fact that the cancellation of at least one planned landing (at Wonsan, I think) was accompanied by its

⁶³²Wonsan Siege: Field (62), 326-328, 331, 353, 409-411, 419, 434, 457-458; and Hermes (66), 196, 197, 399, 491.

⁶³³Hermes (66), 86-87.

⁶³⁴For Outline Plan WRANGLER see Hermes (66), 87, 98, 176; and Field (62), 414, 415, 444.

⁶³⁵Hermes (66), 366-367. See also Clark (54), 81.

⁶³⁶Field (62), 367.

metamorphosis into a feint, the simulation being sustained by such tricks as a realistic leaflet campaign instructing the local civilians in self-preservation and collaborative techniques during an assault landing.⁶³⁷

Thus to support the general offensive that was slowly forcing the Chinese People's Volunteers and (North) Korean People's Army back to the 38th Parallel, it was decided to mount two amphibious feints—one on each coast. This decision was prompted by intelligence indicating the Chinese were indeed worried about a behind-the-lines landing. In fact, MacArthur might well have mounted a real landing but for the fact that his Marine assault troops were tied down combatting guerrillas and his naval forces were dispersed. The first of these was Operation ASCENDANT, a simulated amphibious feint in the Kansong-Kosong area, on the east coast some 50 miles above the front lines.

On 30 January 1951 Rear Admiral Allan E. Smith demonstrated off Kansong with his Task Force 95 (the battleship *Missouri*, cruiser *Manchester* and destroyers) together with two attack cargo ships, two LSTs, and two rocket ships borrowed from the Amphibious Force, and some carrier air support. The next day the force shifted its operations to Kosong.⁶³⁸ The second simulated landing took place at Inch'on itself, on the west coast. Rear Admiral Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter had been there with the heavy cruiser *Saint Paul* since 25 January when, on 8 February, Captain Samuel G. Kelly arrived with two attack cargo ships and an LSD to begin simulated pre-landing activities. The group was joined the next day by *Missouri* to dramatically escalate the effect with its 16-inch guns. Rear-Admiral Sir William Andrewes arrived to administer the pretended landing. This was scheduled for the afternoon of the 10th, but simulation gave way to reality when the Chinese pulled out of Inch'on under pressure from the landward side and ROK Marines were able to make an unopposed landing. Eighth Army estimated that this February feint at Inch'on had served to tie down two enemy divisions.⁶³⁹

The renewed Eighth Army push (Operation RIPPER) back to the 38th Parallel in March 1951 depended on the enemy being unable to preempt with his own offensive. To help inhibit enemy, particularly Chinese, preparations for this, Eighth Army (EUSAK) Commander Lieutenant General Matthew B. Ridgway requested another unnerving amphibious demonstration along the west coast. The newly promoted Vice-Admiral Andrewes again complied but planned a longer than usual operation, believing that previous efforts had perhaps been of too short duration to allow for the generally sluggish enemy reactions. Consequently, from 27 February to the opening of RIPPER on 7 March, Andrewes mounted a series of west coast feints, particularly near Chinnampo, by bombardment naval air strikes, and the deliberate parading of five amphibious attack transports. Eighth Army estimated that this hoax induced the enemy to

⁶³⁷Personal recollections of the author, who was then (1951-1952) Research Librarian of the S-2 (i.e., Intelligence) Section of the 1st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group, Far East Command.

⁶³⁸Operation ASCENDANT: Field (62), 323-324.

⁶³⁹Field (62), 324, 353.

redeploy one division to the area.⁶⁴⁰

The Communist spring 1951 offensive that finally began on 22 April brought urgent calls for new amphibious feints to siphon off at least some of the enemy combat units. Ridgway had now relieved MacArthur as Commander, Far East Command (FECOM) and UN Command (UNC), and his replacement as Commander EUSAK, Lieutenant General Van Fleet, was the source of these requests. The first of these feints on the east coast were merely hasty improvisations: a two-hour bombardment of Kosong by three cruisers and four destroyers on 24 April, a demonstration in the Kojo area on 29-30 April by two cruisers and four destroyers accompanied by three attack transports, Kansong and Kosong were bombarded by one cruiser and four destroyers on 6-7 May, and yet another demonstration scheduled for 18-19 May was cancelled.⁶⁴¹

British Rear-Admiral Alan Scott-Moncrieff shared the view of his predecessor, Andrewes, that such feints and demonstrations were too brief and too obvious for full effect. Consequently his first effort opposite Cho Do (near Chin-nampo) on the west coast was a careful, sophisticated demonstration landing. Psychological groundwork was laid by invasion rumors spread by agents of Leopard Force (a west coast ROK guerrilla organization). These rumors produced a large sign on the target beach reading "Welcome, U.N. Army." On 20 May 1951 a U.S. Navy cruiser and Commonwealth warships opened preliminary bombardment, and that afternoon a dozen landing craft chugged up to the beach and the three that were not merely empty debarked a force of Royal Marines who made a brief incursion inland before reembarking. Intelligence indicated that the enemy now responded by rushing some troops into this hitherto undefended area of Hwanghae Province and then gradually building up a strong coastal garrison there.⁶⁴²

Next, on 30-31 August 1951, Vice Admiral C. Turner Joy's Seventh Fleet conducted an elaborate amphibious demonstration at Changjon on the east coast. This diversion had been ordered by General Ridgway to draw the North Korean forces away from the X Corps-ROK I Corps area during the latter's August offensive. Accordingly, Admiral Joy put on a quite realistic show that day. The curtain went up with heavy beach bombardment led by the 16-inch guns of the U.S.S. *New Jersey*. The second act was comprised of a naval air strike that saturated the beach area with rockets. Those who remained for the third and final act saw the lowering of landing craft from the offshore transports, their approach pass at the beach, and their return to their mother ship, accompanied by some final salvos from the fire support group. Aside from some presumably anxious days, it is not known what effect if any this performance had on its hostile target audience.⁶⁴³

The last of the feints and demonstrations in the Korean War was also the most ambitious. This was the Kojo Feint—Operation DECOY—of 15 October 1952, characterized with parochial exaggeration by a participant as the largest-

⁶⁴⁰Field (62), 330, 353.

⁶⁴¹Field (62), 346, 348, 351.

⁶⁴²Field (62), 351, 353.

⁶⁴³Field (62), 414; and Hermes (66), 110-111.

scale fraud in military history.

In July 1952 General Mark Clark raised the question with Vice Admiral Robert P. Briscoe, the Commander of Naval Forces Far East, whether it might not prove more economical to combine amphibious training with the routine troop movements between Japan and Korea.⁶⁴⁴ As we have seen, Clark was then thinking in terms of grand schemes for an all-out offensive that might include an amphibious assault. Apparently Briscoe passed the question to his staff and—inspired by General Van Fleet’s aborted Plan WRANGLER—Rear Admiral Francis X. McNerney, an experienced amphibious expert and Commander of the then underemployed Amphibious Force Far East (Task Force 90), first suggested that these routine troop movements and amphibious training might also be profitably combined with deception operations.⁶⁴⁵ (The view that Operation DECOY was the brainchild of General Clark is unwarranted.⁶⁴⁶ Despite over two years’ exposure to and involvement in the excellent deception plans generated by Field Marshal Alexander’s staff, Clark developed neither appreciation for nor understanding of the technique.) Briscoe recommended this; and, in August, Clark agreed. As the next transfer from Japan to Korea of major units would begin in October with the first of the three regimental combat teams (RCTs) comprising the 1st Cavalry Division, that seemed an appropriate target month. Accordingly, Joint Amphibious Task Force Seven was created under Vice Admiral Joseph J. Clark (concurrently Commander Seventh Fleet). On 13 September, General Clark directed a go-ahead in an operations plan that set D-day at 15 October and specified the target as Kojo, 20 miles down the east coast from Wonsan.

The entire operation was intended as little more than a feint—with only the vaguest of links to coincident ground action by Eighth Army—to lure enemy reinforcements onto the roads where they could be hit by air strikes and naval shelling. Eighth Army’s rôle was confined to a mock paratroop operation, simulated by withdrawing the 187th Airborne Regiment from the line, and a seemingly ambitious but in fact limited two-battalion attack near Kumwha, which went in on D-minus-3. The Far East and Fifth Air Forces stepped up their operations, particularly from D-minus-3 on. The full naval air capability of four fleet carriers and two escort carriers was brought in to provide cover and strikes (667 sorties on D-minus-3 alone). Also on D-minus-3 (12 October) the large Advance Force (the battleship *Iowa*, two heavy cruisers, and several destroyers) arrived off Kojo and began a very realistic preparatory bombardment. Meanwhile, the amphibious transports fetched the 8th Regimental Combat Team to Kangnung where, on D-minus-3, a dress rehearsal landing was carried out in a 25-knot wind.

On schedule at dawn of D-day, the 15th, more than 100 ships gathered offshore from Kojo. The bombardment reached a crescendo and at 1400 hours seven waves of landing craft were sent forward—empty except for their crews as no troops had been boated due to the weather that had further deteriorated to

⁶⁴⁴Hermes (66), 328.

⁶⁴⁵Field (62), 444.

⁶⁴⁶Thus, the official U.S. Army historian, Hermes (66), 328.

50-knot winds and heavy seas. The boats crossed the Line of Departure, turned about, and retired seaward. The feint had ended. Five carrier planes had been lost to antiaircraft fire and two minesweepers had been hit by shore batteries, but no troops or boats had been lost.

To all this the Communists made little response, for whatever reason—conceivably merely a slow reaction time, possibly a decision to not contest the beachhead against such seemingly overwhelming force, probably a skeptical wait-and-see attitude. In any case, they did not reinforce the threatened area. The antiaircraft and shore battery were, apparently only the already emplaced garrison force. No major troop movements were observed; although—inexplicably—some redeployments occurred in the Kojo Wonsan region during the following weeks.

Although there is no evidence one way or the other as to the Communists' reaction, if any, they must have known *something* was afoot; and the unprecedented volume of activity, degree of realism, and tightness of security⁶⁴⁷ probably made them believe a landing was likely. One often reliable indicator was that the sheer volume of local U.S. naval radio communications at this time reached a record level, one twice that reached during the vast amphibious operations in 1950.⁶⁴⁸

The only certain result—noted even by the official Army, Navy, and Air Force historians—was the wave of fury and disgust throughout the UN Command that followed the realization that they at least—if not the enemy—had been thoroughly hoaxed. Security had been perhaps too tight. Only the most senior commanders had known it was only bluff, the rest, including even the planners, and the commanders of the Advance (naval bombardment) Force and carrier strike force, had truly exerted themselves and taken unusual risks in the belief that they were supporting a real landing.

References

- **NOTE:** References here are for Kojo Feint only.
- **General**
 - Cagle and Manson (57), 391-397.
 - Field (62), 428, 429, 444-445.
 - Futrell (61), 494-497.
 - Hermes (66), 328-329.
 - **NOTE:** Curiously, General Clark's own memoirs of Korea, published in 1954, make no reference to this feint. It may be that this omission was due to the subject still being under security wraps rather than to the author's possible desire to conceal this widely resented incident.

⁶⁴⁷Although the designation—Operation DECOY—surely breaks all records for explicitness. There is, unhappily, no evidence that this fatuity can even be written off as Poe-etic license.

⁶⁴⁸Field (62) 428.

Case A62. Dienbienphu, 20 Nov 1953-7 May 1954: Operation CASTOR

General Henri Navarre very deliberately committed major elements of his French Army in Indochina to its long travail at Dienbienphu. His intention was that it serve as a trap to draw General Vo Nguyen Giap's regular divisions into a set-piece battle on the killing ground of Navarre's choosing. To induce Giap to adopt a frontal or siege tactic, the bait had to appear weak while being, in fact, strong.⁶⁴⁹ This technique—on smaller scale—had been and continued to be a standard tactic among the French who term such a baited trap an *abcès de fixation*.⁶⁵⁰

The French took Dienbienphu from the Viet Minh by airdrop on 20 November 1953 and gradually increased its garrison to a peak of 13,000. Meanwhile the Viet Minh had increased their besieging force to 50,000 combat troops, with 55,000 in support. Giap was not only tempted by the "bait" but able to bring overwhelming pressure on the French hedgehog defense, once the latter had reached the limit of their ability to reinforce it. The French had been able to commit only nine battalions of infantry, insufficient even for a tight perimeter defense with limited air support, while the Viet Minh had moved in three divisions, supported by massed artillery. Although Navarre was acutely aware of his own force limitations, he grossly miscalculated not only his enemy's strength but both their speed of reinforcement and their ability to stand and fight despite complete French air mastery.

No really large-scale diversionary feints were attempted, despite their being repeatedly urged on Navarre by subordinate staff officers.⁶⁵¹ And the pin-prick diversions that were launched failed to divert Giap from his main prize. However, there is some slim evidence that the largest such effort, Operation CONDOR, did generate considerable—but insufficient—pressure in April within the Viet Minh leadership to persuade Giap to lift the Dienbienphu siege. CONDOR—a four-battalion, 3,100-man overland relief force from Laos—sought in April to simulate the vanguard of a (nonexistent) major offensive by incorporating small detachments from French units throughout Indochina in the expectation that as some fell into the hands of enemy intelligence, the Viet Minh might believe the ruse. The French decoys were themselves successfully deceived on this point, and it may have contributed to Giap's momentary second thoughts.⁶⁵² An even more credible threat to Giap's besieging army may have been Operation VULTURE, rumors of which were then being widely reported in the Western press. These rumors, some of which came through highly authoritative sources, concerned the possibility or even likelihood of large-scale American airstrikes around Dienbienphu. Urged by JCS Chairman Radford and Secretary of State Dulles, VULTURE, it is now known, had been finally rejected only on April

⁶⁴⁹That no full battle developed in early 1968 over the U.S. enclave at Khe Sanh may well prove to have been a case of similar bait that was, however, declined by the Viet Cong.

⁶⁵⁰Fall (67), 5, 49.

⁶⁵¹Fall (67), 41-43.

⁶⁵²Fall (67), 228, 317-318, 342, and index under "Condor."

	French	Viet
KIA	2,242	7,900
WIA	6,463	15,000
MIA	3,711	?
PW	6,500	0
Totals:	18,916	22,900

Table A.99: Casualties At Dienbienphu (21 November 1953 through 8 May 1954).
References: Fall (67), 484, 487.

29th by President Eisenhower, the Joint Chiefs, and Congressional leaders (including Senator Lyndon B. Johnson),⁶⁵³ It is interesting to speculate that had VULTURE been a carefully orchestrated stratagem rather than an unpopular strategy, it might possibly have appeared more credible to the Viet Minh.

Dienbienphu was overrun on 7 May 1954. And the Vietnamese history professor turned victorious general summed up:⁶⁵⁴

The French Expeditionary Corps faced a strategic surprise—it believed that we would not attack and we did attack; and with a tactical surprise—we had solved the problems of closing in, of positioning our artillery, and of getting our supplies through.

The French could not even claim that the enemy had won only a Pyrrhic victory, as losses had been nearly equal in a war where it was the French who were chronically short of manpower.

Navarre could (and repeatedly did) point out that 4 per cent of his total force had for half a year held 20 per cent of the enemy's, including 60 per cent of his main battle force.⁶⁵⁵ However, important as this undoubtedly was in its effect on the outcome of many minor operations, it begs the fact that Navarre lost the one politically decisive battle of the entire war.

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• Deception

- Fall (67), ix, 49, 76, 318.

⁶⁵³Fall (67), 342 and index under “Vulture.”

⁶⁵⁴General Giap as quoted by Fall (67), 51.

⁶⁵⁵Fall (67), 342.

Case A63. Sinai Campaign, 29 Oct 1956: Operation KADESHI

The Israeli-Egyptian War, or Sinai Campaign of 1956, is a rare case of ruse-within-ruse. The Israeli attack on Egypt opened with a well-designed, successful deception operation.⁶⁵⁶ Moreover, this brief campaign was itself imbedded in a ruse of international British-French-Israeli grand strategy.⁶⁵⁷

The timing, strategy, and stratagem of the Israeli attack ultimately depended on its interplay with the Anglo-French attack on Suez (see Case A64). However, while the final Israeli decisions had become contingent on collusion with the Franco-British effort, their early resolve to attack grew solely from their direct relations with the Arab states. The direct threat to Israel came from two directions. First there was the long-festering conflict with Egypt, which still professed itself technically in a state of war with Israel. In September 1955 Nasser drastically tightened his previously nominal blockade of the Straits of Tiran. In direct consequence, Ben-Gurion (then recently returned to Government as Minister of Defence) resolved on a preventive attack to seize the Straits and, on 22 October, directed the Israeli Army Chief-of-Staff, Major-General Moshe Dayan, to begin planning such an operation. Immediately after his reappointment on 2 November as Prime Minister, Ben-Gurion recommended this action to the Cabinet. However, “doves” outvoted “hawks” and the Government secretly decided that the time was not ripe, but did resolve that Israel should act “in the place and at the time that she deems appropriate.” Dayan was so informed and continued his planning.⁶⁵⁸ Thus did matters remain regarding Egypt until the following year when France and Britain supplied the “appropriate” circumstance.

The second threat to Israel was the sudden and increasing belligerence of Jordan that had begun early in 1956. This situation had developed to the point that on 27 September, Dayan concurred with Ben-Gurion’s view that an Israeli-Jordanian war could readily occur should any of the following circumstances arise: 1) If Jordan aided Egypt in an Israeli-Egyptian war, 2) if the Egyptian-led *fedayin* raids from Jordan and Israeli reprisals escalated greatly in scope, or 3) if the Iraqi Army entered Jordan, particularly if it stationed itself on the Israeli border.⁶⁵⁹ The Israeli reprisal raid of 10-11 October had the happy result of

⁶⁵⁶Kadesh—as Dayan (66), 38, rightly explains—was the Biblical site (Kadesh-Barnea) in the Sinai where the Israelites organized themselves against their enemies before proceeding to the Promised Land. Gervasi (67), 145n, asserts that the code-name memorializes those killed by the *fedayin* raiders. Curiously, Ben-Gurion (63), 117, 121, refers only to “Operation Sinai.”

⁶⁵⁷All early uncertainty about the “collusion” theory was dispelled by the publication of the two unusually frank memoirs published by Dayan and Nutting in 1965 and 1967 and by the detailed account by Thomas that appeared in 1967. They correct the naive but honest speculations of Colonel Henriques (57), General Marshall (58), and Childers (62), the questionable omissions of Major O’Ballance (59) and Colonel Barker (65), the discreet omissions of Ben-Gurion (63), and the deplorably mendacious memoirs of Eden (60).

⁶⁵⁸Dayan (66), 11-15, largely contradicting Ben-Gurion (63), 72, 88-89, who completely dissimulates on this point in his own, earlier and less frank, account.

⁶⁵⁹Dayan (66), 28.

inducing Jordan to tighten her border patrols by 15 October, temporarily but effectively halting the Egyptian *fedayin* raiders.⁶⁶⁰ Moreover, the Jordanian parliamentary elections of 21 October ended Jordan's vacillations between Egypt and Iraq. A pro-Nasser Government was firmly installed and the Israelis realized that the hitherto very real and urgent threat of any attack from that direction by Iraqi forces had ended.⁶⁶¹ But these new circumstances undercut Dayan's deception plan of using Jordan as the cover target for Israeli mobilization and attack. Thus, after 21 October, the only remaining plausible cause of an Israeli-Jordanian war was precisely the circumstance that Dayan's deception plan had to dissimulate an Israeli attack on Egypt.

The Israeli plan was to launch a preemptive surprise attack against Egypt to seize the entire Sinai Peninsula in a 7 to 10-day campaign. On Thursday, 25 October 1956, following some two months of very delicate and quite secret contacts both at home and in France,⁶⁶² the final decision was taken to begin Operation Kadesh at dusk on the 29th. As Moshe Dayan confirms: "The decision on the campaign and its planning are based on the assumption that British and French forces propose to launch their operations on 31 October 1956 . . . to secure control of the Suez Canal Zone." By striking two days before the Allies, the Israelis would be well on the way to their private objective while shielded from any future full-scale Egyptian counter-attack by the imminent Anglo-French interdiction along the Canal and the existing secret provision by French of fighter air-cover for Israeli cities.⁶⁶³

The very hinge of the Israeli strategy was itself a two-fold deception plan.⁶⁶⁴ First, to make the Arabs believe that Israeli attention was riveted on Jordan. Second, to make the Egyptians believe that the opening operation—the 395 paratroopers dropped deep inside Sinai, at Mitla Pass—was only another Israeli reprisal raid.

The first phase of the Israeli deception plan comprised the preparatory period leading to D-day. During that phase the Egyptians were to be lulled into the belief that the Israeli target was Jordan. The plausibility of an Israeli-Jordanian war had gradually grown during the year as the result of certain dramatic shifts in the Jordanian political and international position. After terminating her long-standing ties with Britain—symbolized by the abrupt dismissal on March 1st of Lieutenant-General Sir John Bagot Glubb as Commander of the Arab Legion—Jordan wavered between a pro-Egyptian and a pro-Iraqi (i.e., back-door pro-British) orientation.

Starting September 12th, and ending October 11th, the Israelis conducted four reprisal raids, all concentrated against Jordan. They were of increasing force and ferocity and caused a rising expectation of war between Israel and

⁶⁶⁰Dayan (66), 54.

⁶⁶¹Dayan (66), 59. See also Finer (64), 345.

⁶⁶²Thomas (67), 81-120; and confirmed from the Israeli side by Dayan (66), 61.

⁶⁶³Dayan (66), 61-62.

⁶⁶⁴A point quite missed by the professional military students of the campaign such as Brigadier General S.L.A. Marshall and Colonel Robert Henriques, until pointed out by General Dayan in his *Diary*.

Jordan together with her Iraqi and perhaps even British allies.⁶⁶⁵ Thomas asserts that the Israelis had been “deliberately fomenting” this border crisis “*primarily*” (Thomas’ italics) “as a diversion from their plans against Egypt.”⁶⁶⁶ This is not, understandably, admitted by Dayan. Moreover, it seems more likely that Thomas has the causation turned around. During the raiding period the Israelis were simply not yet convinced that Britain and France would move against Egypt, as Thomas himself points out elsewhere in his book. Secondly, the evidence (particularly from Dayan and even Thomas himself) suggests that the use of Jordan as the cover target was a later interpolation in the Israeli plan. Consequently I prefer to assume that the Israelis wisely took advantage of the coincidental Jordanian border crisis, rather than deliberately provoking what might easily have become a most untimely second war front.⁶⁶⁷

It was at a special meeting of the General Staff on 2 October that Dayan disclosed—for the first time—both that a campaign against Egypt was likely (D-day tentatively set for 20 October) and that this would take advantage of Anglo-French actions. While mobilization of reserves could be delayed, preparations to that end were ordered by Dayan. At that point Dayan put into effect his notion of Jordan as the cover target by directing the General Staff to explain all such preparations “in terms of the possible entry of Iraqi forces into Jordan.”⁶⁶⁸

Parenthetically, I should concede at this point that Childers may be right in asserting that the last of the four Israeli reprisal raids on Jordan—the raid of 10-11 October—was a feint intended to make Jordan seem the reason for Israeli mobilization.⁶⁶⁹

As mobilization is conventionally one of the stronger indicators of impending war, Dayan not only tied it into his deception plan but delayed it as much as possible. The General Staff began initial preparations on 3 October, when D-day was still assumed to be 20 October. At that point the only overt step was to recall all officers then on overseas training courses. On 7 October Dayan drastically trimmed the already quite conservative mobilization schedule proposed by the General Staff. The approved plan specified that only officers would be called up several days before D-day, armored units not until D-minus-3, and all others on D-minus-2, a total of 100,000 reservists. Secret mobilization was well underway on D-minus-4, 25 October; but this fact was soon known to the intelligence services of the major powers.⁶⁷⁰ On 27 October, Prime Minister Ben-Gurion (having secured the agreement of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Security Committee) formally ordered the mobilization of the reserves. To avoid

⁶⁶⁵Dayan (66), 9-10, 25, 43-52. These raids—all against Jordanian police forts were on September 12th, 13th, 25th-26th, and October 10th-11th. Israeli casualties totalled 100, Jordanian 200. See Burns (63), 163-175.

⁶⁶⁶Thomas (66), 95, 103.

⁶⁶⁷My assumption that the Israeli decision to attack Egypt came *after* the reprisal raids on Jordan is shared by the Brombergers and by the then Chief of Staff of the U.N. Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), General Burns (63), 175.

⁶⁶⁸Dayan (66), 32, 34.

⁶⁶⁹Childers (62), 231-232, as cited by Leiss and Bloomfield (67), 660.

⁶⁷⁰For example, Eden (60), 584, notes that he learned on the 25th that Israeli mobilization was forthcoming.

overly exciting the Israeli public (and, I presume, interested foreign observers), the Government avoided the “Emergency” method, which was simply a radio announcement. Instead, the alternative method was used whereby mobilization orders were disseminated entirely by word-of-mouth down through the chain of command. Of the 100,000 reservists sought out in this manner, 90 per cent were successfully brought in by the second day, the entire Air Force reservist mobilization taking only 43 hours. Of 13,013 private trucks and other vehicles called to the colors, 40 per cent responded.⁶⁷¹

By Friday, 26 October, Israeli Military Intelligence, whose Director was Colonel Yehoshafat Harkabi, was—as Dayan himself revealed—busily:⁶⁷²

... spreading the rumour that the Iraqi Army has entered Jordan. This is part of the deception plan to produce the impression that our [Israeli] activity is aimed at Jordan and Iraq. (In Operations they claim that Intelligence is so successful that they have begun to believe their own rumours.)

This rumor of Iraqi movement into Jordan had spread throughout the country⁶⁷³ and particularly along the diplomatic cocktail circuit in Israel on Saturday, 27 October, when the credulous UN and foreign diplomats agreed Israel was “clearly and reasonably preparing for action on the Jordan frontier.”⁶⁷⁴ On Sunday, the 28th—when to speed up mobilization the so-called “emergency call-up system” (i.e., radio announcement) was introduced—the reservists were told, by way of explanation, that it was necessitated because:⁶⁷⁵

... a clash was likely with Jordan because of the entry into its territory of Iraqi forces, and because of its joining the Egypt-Syria Command. This deceptive explanation ties in with the news and articles which have been appearing in the press in the last few days, and the prospects are good that we may succeed in camouflaging the true purpose of the mobilization.

To supplement these rumors—which may well have been perceived by foreign intelligence services as the more credible channel—the Israeli Foreign Ministry on 28 October officially published the identical cover story to explain the now palpable mobilization. The announcement stressed its defensive nature and its orientation toward Jordan—in light of the border raids from Jordan, the threat of Iraqi troops in Jordan, and Jordan’s recent alliance with Egypt and Syria.⁶⁷⁶

Normally *any* announcement of mobilization would have sharply raised the level of crisis. In this case, the Israelis were partly protected by the “cry wolf”

⁶⁷¹Dayan (66), 32, 34, 37-38, 68, 69-70; and Ben-Gurion (63), 118.

⁶⁷²Dayan (66), 67.

⁶⁷³Thus Ben-Gurion (63), 118, in his only allusion—and that a dissimulated one—to Jordan as the cover target.

⁶⁷⁴As reported, after the fact, by Colonel Henriques (57), 31, who, unwitting about the deception plan, attributes the rumor to “very lax” security.

⁶⁷⁵Dayan (66), 70.

⁶⁷⁶Burns (63), 177.

syndrome. Partial mobilization of Israeli reserves had become a rather ordinary event over the previous year or two. Moreover, the invariable practice of the U.S. Military Attaché in Tel Aviv to panic and report these routine mobilizations as signs of crisis and possible war had had the expected Aesopian lulling effect. Thus even the local UN observers were so thoroughly conditioned that they mistook the real alarm for “just a repetition of previous false alarms,” as the then Chief of Staff of UNTSO frankly admits.⁶⁷⁷

Even the next-to-final deployment of the Israeli strike force—the Paratroop Brigade—was intended to give Egyptian and other interested intelligence services the false impression that matters were building to a climax on the *Jordanian* frontier. The operation against Egypt was to open with the airborne seizure of the Mitla pass by a single battalion of the 202nd Paratroop Infantry Brigade while the two other battalions of the Brigade hurried to the support of its first echelon by a more-or-less secret overland route. As this one brigade represented Israel’s only airborne strike force, enemy knowledge of its deployment could all too easily disclose wider intentions and strategy. Consequently it was wisely decided to employ deception to mask its intended direction of use. The Brigade was alerted on D-minus-4.

It was then at its base near Ramat Gan. The battalion selected for the drop had to remain at base because that was the only practicable point from which its Dakota transports (of which the Israeli Airforce had only 16) could lift them. However, on Saturday night (D-minus-2) the rest of the Brigade moved to a concentration area at Ein Khussub (near Hatzeva) 100 miles *east*, on the *Jordanian* frontier.⁶⁷⁸

Meanwhile, the necessary preparations on the Egyptian frontier were dissimulated to preserve a business-as-usual atmosphere. Thus, when on 9 October Colonel Simhoni’s Southern Command requested permission to send reconnaissance patrols to discover feasible tank passages through the dunes near Rafah, Dayan personally authorized only a single patrol and specified that the approach be made over hard ground and that.⁶⁷⁹

... not more than two men would actually walk on the dunes—and that these would wear Bedouin sandals made in Hebron so that their footprints would not be different from those of ordinary Arab smugglers.

Finally, as mobilization was nearing completion it was important to conceal the fact that the bulk of the recalled reservists were being assigned to Southern Command. Consequently, on 27 October, it was decided to order the UN observers to leave the Egyptian frontier so that they could not “report the concentration of our forces preparing for action.”⁶⁸⁰

⁶⁷⁷Burns (63), 177-178.

⁶⁷⁸Henriques (57), 69-71; Dayan (65), 83.

⁶⁷⁹Dayan (66), 40-41.

⁶⁸⁰Dayan (66), 68. I cannot verify that this decision was implemented. The first incident reported in the memoirs of the UNTSO commander was the expulsion of the U.N. Military Observer on duty at El Auja at 1730 on the 29th. Burns (63), 179-180.

The recommendation by the Civil Defense chief of a blackout of Israeli cities on D-day was rejected on D-minus-2 by Dayan to confirm the Egyptians in their delusion that war had not begun.⁶⁸¹ (The blackout was only ordered on D-plus-1, *after* the news of action in Sinai had broken.)⁶⁸²

The second phase of the deception plan—during D-day and perhaps D+1—was to permit the Egyptians to believe that the full-scale Israeli invasion was merely another, albeit somewhat larger, reprisal raid; thereby delaying Egyptian response both on the ground and in any bombing raids on Tel Aviv and Haifa until the Israelis could neutralize them. These considerations caused Dayan personally to introduce two last changes in the 25 October Kadesh Operational Order for the Kadesh Planning Order No. 1 of October 5th which had called for a naked fullscale assault on D to D+1. The first change involved devoting D-day to a single-battalion airborne seizure of the strategic Mitla Pass on the far side of the Negev desert. The second change involved having the Israeli Air Force confine itself to ground support missions through D+2 rather than strike the Egyptian airfields. Dayan's revisions were also made to give Israel a day or two to reserve absolute commitment to all-out war, "if"—as Dayan frankly states—"things go wrong and for some reason or other we have to halt the campaign." Dayan very realistically anticipated both Russian intervention (but hoped for a quick victory that would present a *fait accompli* before the Russians could respond with "volunteers") and British betrayal (where Eden's *current* threats to Israel concerning Jordan compounded long-standing suspicions). In any event, the revised strategy would allow the Israeli to unilaterally end the attack on D+1 and withdraw with a plausible "claim that this was only a reprisal action."⁶⁸³

The timing of D-day had been most complicated. On the one hand Allied expectation of Israeli participation allowed them to speed up their own Operation Musketeer. Conversely, Israel's Operation Kadesh was geared to Musketeer from at least as early as September 1st when Dayan learned of the latter. The Israeli Government expected on October 3rd that Musketeer D-day would be the 20th. On the 10th the Israelis induced the French to advance their Musketeer D-day from the 20th to the end of the month. The final British operation order was issued on 24 October with the D-day landings set back (for once) from 8 to 10 November to the 6th.⁶⁸⁴

Operation Kadesh is not only one of the most recent strategic deception operations, but it appears to be one of the finest examples. Like Husky, Fortitude, and Barbarossa, it was centrally planned and directed. Like Fortitude it involved diplomatic, political, intelligence, and military personnel, yet security remained tight. Like Fortitude it was fully integrated with the military plan. Like Barbarossa, it employed the principle of "alternative goals" in its highest form: playing two potential enemy countries (Egypt and Jordan) off against

⁶⁸¹Dayan (66), 68.

⁶⁸²Henriques (57), 31-32, who mistakes this fact as evidence that Israel's attack was not planned in advance.

⁶⁸³Dayan (66), 61-63.

⁶⁸⁴Thomas (67), 96-97, 104.

one another. Like Fortitude, it carried deception beyond D-day itself to delay even further a full counter-blow. Like Wolfe at the Heights of Abraham, the U.S. Marines at Tinian, and MacArthur at Inch'on, it involved striking the geographically most unlikely point—the Mitla Pass, deep behind the lines. Like Allenby at Gaza it broke with the pattern of previous operations, a pattern that the enemy had grown to expect. And like Barbarossa and Soviet intervention in the Korean War it played upon the enemy's preconceptions, turning them against himself.

Moreover it succeeded. Although final judgment must await full disclosure of the Egyptian as well as Israeli archives, Kadesh seemingly may be faulted on only two grounds. First, by Dyan's own testimony, some of the key elements were a matter of his personal and last minute improvisation—a brilliant but risky procedure. Second, it fumbled slightly in execution by Colonel Asaf Simoni, the General Officer commanding Southern Command, who on D+1 prematurely launched the 7th Armoured Brigade because he had not been made witting about the deception plan and exercised an otherwise correct military judgment against an attractive target of opportunity.⁶⁸⁵

Although the Egyptians enjoyed superiority in heavy equipment (air, armor, and navy), it is important in understanding the Israeli victory to know that—contrary to popular belief in a David versus Goliath struggle—the Israelis had at least parity (after mobilization) in overall manpower. Moreover, the Israelis enjoyed marked superiority in numbers on the Sinai front, as the Egyptians had concentrated much of their force in the Nile Delta in uneasy anticipation of possible Anglo-French action there.

Again strategic surprise demonstrated its “cost-effectiveness”—ability to yield large gains at relatively small material and human cost. When hostilities ended on D-plus-7 Israel had most of the Sinai—some 24,000 square miles—as a bargaining point in the subsequent negotiations.

In addition, the Israelis captured much equipment, including 1 destroyer, 58 tanks, 260 Bren-gun carriers, 122 other armored vehicles, and 2,984 unarmored vehicles—more than compensating her material losses.

⁶⁸⁵Dayan (65), 91-92. See also Henriques (57), 112, who however misses the deception aspect.

	Israeli			Egyptian		
	Sinai	Elsewhere	Total	Sinai	Elsewhere	Total
Troops,						
Regular & Reserve	45,000	80,000	125,000	30,000	70,000	100,000
National Guard	0	0	0	0	100,000	100,000
Total Troops	45,000	80,000	125,000	30,000	170,000	200,000
Tanks,						
Heavy	0	0	0			50
Medium	250	0?	250-300			380-480
Light	100	0?	100			some
Total Tanks	350	0?	350-400			430-530
Bombers,						
Medium, jet			0			40-50
Medium, prop			2			30
Light			17			0
Fighter-bombers,						
Jet			22			0
Prop			16			0
Fighters,						
Jet			31			230-300
Prop			29			> 20
Total						
Combat Planes			117(a)			320-400
Destroyers &						
Frigates			2			11
Patrol Boats,						
MTBs, etc.			11			32

Table A.100: Strength and Deployment. Notes: (a) Supported by about 44 Mystère IVA jet fighters (with some transports) supplied by France with French pilots. References: Dayan (66), 72, 211-219; Leiss and Bloomfield (67), 664-665; 694, 700-702; Henriques (57), 54-46; Eisenhower (65), 72.

D+7	Israeli	Egyptian
KIA,DOW	172	1000-2000
WIA	817	?
MIA	3	?
PW	1	4000-6000
Total Casualties	993	> 8000
Aircraft	15(a)	8

Table A.101: Israeli and Egyptian Casualties and Losses. Notes: (a) All but one, a Piper Cub, to ground fire. References: Dayan (66), 165, 201, 226-229; Henriques (57), 32, 65, 153; Barker (65), 83.

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- **Deception**

- Dayan (66), 34, 41, 62-63, 67, 68, 70, 71, 77, 83, 89.
- Thomas (67), 95, 103, 105.
- Barker (65), 73.
- Henriques (57), 71.
- O'Ballance (59), 82, 90.
- Fall (57/68), 167.
- Burns (63), 177, 179.

Case A64. Suez Canal 31 Oct 1956: Operation MUSKETEER

The altogether curious incident of the Suez War in 1956 finds much indiscriminate deception yielding little surprise and considerable backfire at an unacceptable cost. The only analogous fiascos that come to mind are the British expeditions to Tanga in 1914 and to Dakar in 1940 and the American one to Cuba in 1961.⁶⁸⁶ The very rarity of such cases makes them worth special mention as cautionary tales.

The Egyptians unilaterally nationalized the Suez Canal on 26. July 1956, and the British and French decisions to either force or persuade Egypt to yield to their minimum demands over the Canal followed in early August. Planning and deployment for Operation Musketeer⁶⁸⁷ began at that time. In early September it had become obvious to the Allied governments that Nasser was not about to yield except to military coercion. The expeditionary force was then more-or-less set to go and the subsequent delays and several deferrals of D-day are attributable partly to weather—and mainly to the need to await some convenient political-military pretext for aggression.

The pretext was soon found and used in the form of the existing Israeli resolve to launch their own war against Egypt.⁶⁸⁸

The overriding Allied deception plan—such as it was—strove to make the quite firm decision to act seem mere bluff.⁶⁸⁹ This is a fairly common type of ruse, one intended to restore the initiative and insure surprise by implying that options other than war are still open, thereby concealing the full urgency of a crisis and encouraging the intended victim in the belief that he has more time and more options than is, in fact, the case. This was the ruse behind the Japanese attacks on Port Arthur in 1904 and Pearl Harbor in 1941; of the German attack on Russia in 1941; the British attack at Alamein in 1942; and the Israeli attack on Egypt in 1967.

Because of the extreme political sensitivity of the overall operation, the strictly military aspect—Operation Musketeer⁶⁹⁰—was insulated from the central planning and decisions. This was certainly true of the entire British military staff, from General Sir Charles Keightley, the Allied Commander-in-Chief, on down, none of whom were aware of the decisive factor of the collusion with Israel. By being kept in the dark about this key factor concerning the timing of the Allied attack, the nearly 40,000 soldiers—from planning staffs through the smallest combat units—waiting in Cyprus and Malta presented a convincing picture of

⁶⁸⁶See Cases A1, A24, and A65.

⁶⁸⁷Originally dubbed *Operation Hamilcar* (after one of Hannibal's generals) by the British, the French spelling as *Amilcar* led to such confusion that the new codename was substituted.

⁶⁸⁸See Case A63.

⁶⁸⁹Thomas (67). See also Fergusson (61), 390.

⁶⁹⁰Another case of a code-name not drawn by random. Lieutenant-General Sir Hugh Stockwell, the Land Task Force commander, was a fancier of Dumas and I presume its triadic (land-sea-air) implication of "all for one, one for all" appealed to him. Barker (65), 34. Whatever the allusion, it was not that of the triumverate as Stockwell was not then aware of Israel's participation.

D+6	Anglo-French Allies			Egyptian
	British	French	Total	Total
KIA	22	10	32	600-1,000
WIA	97	33	130	2,100+
MIA	0	1	1	?
PW	0	0	0	< 230
Total Casualties	119	44	163	~ 3,000
Aircraft	8	2	10	260

Table A.102: Suez Canal Casualties, Operation MUSKETEEER. References: Barker (65), 185, 205-206; and Thomas (67), 151. Compare Fergusson (61), 395, 401.

an army that was ready, indeed impatient to go but increasingly doubtful that it would ever see action. As September and most of October slipped past, the odds being wagered in Keightley's own headquarters "lengthened from eights to fifties."⁶⁹¹ Officers who, in the happy anticipation of a good fight, had delayed scheduled reassignments home, now left. I do not know if this situation was deliberately encouraged by Allied deception planners, but it was certainly well-suited for such purpose. In any case, this pessimistic professional guesswork being freely rumored about on Cyprus and Malta must surely have reached the Egyptians, if not through their rather ineffective Intelligence Service,⁶⁹² then presumably through that of their Russian friends.

The element of initial surprise achieved by the Allies through their airstrike yielded the usual cost-effective results, in this case the Russian-equipped airforce being eliminated—260 planes destroyed outright and the rest flown to refuge in the Upper Nile and neighboring Arab states at a cost of only 10 Allied aircraft, 4 of which are charged to accident. Overall, the British suffered only 22 deaths and the French 10 to perhaps as many as 1,000 Egyptian soldiers. However, the body counts and inventories of material losses are, in this case, quite unsuited as indices of victory. Nothing was gained by either partner, unless one counts France's costly lesson in the realities of alliance with England. And for England, this was, as Thomas concludes, the first time her power was shown to the whole world to have faltered.

⁶⁹¹Fergusson (61), 392.

⁶⁹²Nasser spoke later of information received from "Egyptian liaison officers working secretly in Cyprus, Malta and Aden." Thomas (67), 43. The Egyptian Intelligence Service was then heavily dependent on ex-Abwehr officers for its expertise, hardly a sign of proficiency.

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- **Deception (Political)**

- Thomas (67), 152, 160.

- **Deception (Military)**

- Thomas (67), 118.

Case A65. Bay of Pigs (Cuba), 17 Apr 1961: Operation PLUTO

I stood right here at Ike's desk and told him I was certain our Guatemalan operation would succeed, and, Mr. President, the prospects for this Plan are even better than they were for that one.

—Allen Dulles to John F. Kennedy,
c. March 1961.⁶⁹³

How could everybody involved have thought such a plan would succeed?

—John F. Kennedy, c. May 1961.⁶⁹⁴

Introductory Note

After writing the following section on the Bay of Pigs operation as it was actually carried out, my attention was drawn to a remarkable new hypothesis about to be published that shows the CIA *plan* in an entirely fresh light, one that obligates me to reverse my sharp criticism of CIA deception planning for the operation. The new analysis is summarized in the subsection below on page 496.

The Operation

The CIA, anticipating that it might be directed to repeat in Cuba its recent success in Guatemala, began preliminary planning for a possible guerrilla overthrow of Castro. Some recruiting, initially only for underground and propaganda missions, began as early as November 1959.⁶⁹⁵ Vice President Nixon had also favored some sort of military solution, if all else failed to bring Castro around; but the State Department and President Eisenhower then opposed such a drastic solution.⁶⁹⁶

On 16 December Castro began his shrill but vague warnings that Yankee-supported invasions would take place in 1960.⁶⁹⁷ But it is not yet known whether Castro did this on the basis of hard intelligence, shrewd anticipation, or for mere propaganda. Seemingly, a bit of the last two, because the CIA did not begin even its own planning for Cuban liberation until shortly after 1 January 1960.⁶⁹⁸ Soon thereafter CIA began infiltrating teams of Cubans into the country, a process that continued throughout 1960.⁶⁹⁹ These developments were apparently discovered by Castro's effective secret service, the G-2, by March when Castro

⁶⁹³As repeated by Kennedy to Sorensen (65), 296.

⁶⁹⁴Quoted by Sorensen (65), 294.

⁶⁹⁵Johnson (64), 24-28; and Schlesinger (65), 227. Artime was recruited in November 1959.

⁶⁹⁶Schlesinger (65), 222, 225-226.

⁶⁹⁷Phillips (62), 138; Johnson (64), 28.

⁶⁹⁸As only recently admitted by Kirkpatrick (68), 185.

⁶⁹⁹Johnson (64), 59.

began publicly asserting that Cuba would *not* become another Guatemala.⁷⁰⁰ Then, on 22 April, he amplified this point in a speech that stated that the U.S. had a “well-prepared [sic] and premeditated plan” to build an internal resistance organization against his régime.⁷⁰¹

Meanwhile, on 17 March 1960, President Eisenhower had approved the CIA’s own recommendation to organize the refugee political fronts and, more specifically, to recruit, equip, and train Cuban refugees as a guerrilla force for a possible overthrow of Castro.⁷⁰² The CIA responded that same month by shifting their Cuban planning from an underground subversion mode to a guerrilla one.⁷⁰³ Sometime in late spring, President Miguel Ydígoras Fuentes of Guatemala agreed to permit the use of Guatemalan territory for the CIA-Frente base.⁷⁰⁴ It seems that Castro had at least some early word of this—either from his own G-2 or, perhaps, through the Russian KGB—for, on the occasion of the 1 May Labor Day celebration, he told a throng that the U.S. was preparing aggression against Cuba through Guatemala—with backing from the United Fruit Company (sic). The occasion also marked the first use by Castro’s clique of the “Cuba Sì, Yankee No” slogan-chant.⁷⁰⁵

In May, the powerful transmitter on Swan Island, operated by the self-styled World-Wide Broadcasting System (i.e., CIA) began its anti-Castro broadcasts.⁷⁰⁶ Secret training in guerrilla techniques had already begun on a small scale by May, but in Florida, at the staging camp on Useppa Island.⁷⁰⁷ At this time, the recruits received serial numbers, beginning with #2,500, in order to exaggerate the size of the force should Castro get such information.⁷⁰⁸ On 22 June the first group of 28 recruits arrived at the U.S. Army jungle warfare training camp at Fort Gulick in the Panama Canal Zone.⁷⁰⁹ After completion of a guerrilla warfare course, they went on 22 August to the CIA camp, Base Trax at Helvetía, in Guatemala near Retalhuleu. There they acted as cadre for the main body of recruits who had already begun arriving directly from Useppa in July.⁷¹⁰

As the U.S. Presidential elections drew to a close in November 1951, Cuba had become an inflammatory issue.⁷¹¹ At that time Castro not only repeated his charges that the Yankees intended to invade but added that they were training mercenaries for this purpose.⁷¹² So far his flagrant charges had received little credit outside Cuba. Now matters rapidly changed. Too many people in

⁷⁰⁰Szulc and Meyer (62), 74.

⁷⁰¹Szulc and Meyer (62), 56.

⁷⁰²Schlesinger (65), 222, 226. Also Szulc and Meyer (62), 77.

⁷⁰³Johnson (64), 29-31.

⁷⁰⁴Szulc and Meyer (62), 81-82.

⁷⁰⁵Szulc and Meyer (62), 47.

⁷⁰⁶Phillips (62), 250-251.

⁷⁰⁷Johnson (64), 33-37.

⁷⁰⁸Johnson (64), 37-39.

⁷⁰⁹Curiously, the Cuban Ambassador to Panama had already charged by March that anti-Castro forces were being trained there.

⁷¹⁰Johnson (64), 39-49.

⁷¹¹Szulc and Meyer (62), 65-72.

⁷¹²Johnson (64), 49.

Miami and Guatemala knew. On 14 October, on the floor of the Guatemalan Senate, opponents of President Ydígoras' Government charged that hundreds of Cubans were getting commando training at local plantations.⁷¹³ Ydígoras' denial only stimulated the publicity and, on 30 October, the Guatemalan newspaper, *La Hora*, broke the full story of the training camp near Retalhuleu and the preparations there for an invasion of Cuba.⁷¹⁴ However, despite its very high salience, the story was only slowly diffused and confirmed by the world press. U.S. readers were first apprised of this activity in November in an article by Dr. Ronald Hilton of Stanford University that appeared in the *Hispanic-American Review* and was then reported in *The Nation*.⁷¹⁵ For example, even John F. Kennedy, the President-elect, only first learned of the existence of the camp when briefed by CIA Director Dulles and Deputy Director Bissell on 18 November, 10 days following his election.⁷¹⁶

In October Castro mobilized his militia to resist the "imminent" invasion by "mercenaries" or U.S. Marines.⁷¹⁷ On 1 November the UN General Assembly rejected the Cuban and Soviet bloc demand for debate on Cuba's accusation that the U.S. was about to invade.⁷¹⁸ Typical of the coverage these charges were receiving was the report from Cuba by Max Frankel of *The New York Times* that the diplomatic corps in Cuba judged it to be no more than Castro propaganda to win Soviet arms.⁷¹⁹

By this time—say, late November—the camps in Guatemala had become an open secret in the Cuban refugee community in Miami. Recruitment practices, political bickering within the political groups of the CIA-supported Front, and letters home from the camps had accomplished these leaks. Rumor, which consistently exaggerated its size, ran the force up as high as 20,000 men.⁷²⁰ All this flood of information was undoubtedly reaching Castro's G-2 from his many agents in Florida—reportedly 100 known to the Miami police alone.⁷²¹ In his New Year's harangues on 31 December and 2 January Castro warned that the U.S. invasion would take place before the inauguration of Kennedy on 20 January. Simultaneously the militia went on full alert.⁷²²

On 5 January 1961, the Fair Play for Cuba Committee, a pro-Castro group

⁷¹³"Mystery Strip," *Time*, Vol. 77, No. 2 (6 January 1961), p. 34.

⁷¹⁴The article, by that newspaper's Director, Clemente Marroquin Rojas, was published in violation of the Guatemalan government's ban on the topic. See the *Nation*, Vol. 191, No. 17 (19 November 1960), p. 378.

⁷¹⁵As summarized in the *Nation*, Vol. 191, No. 17 (19 November 1960), pp. 378-379. See also Kirkpatrick (68), 194.

⁷¹⁶Nixon's charge in 1962 that Kennedy had been so briefed on 23 July notwithstanding. See Richard M. Nixon, *Six Crises* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1962), pp. 353-356, and his grudging footnote on p. 354 of later editions. Schlesinger (65), 225-226, 232-233; and Sorensen (65), 205-206, 291, 295. Nixon's charge had been uncritically accepted by Szulc and Meyer (62), 65.

⁷¹⁷Phillips (62), 260.

⁷¹⁸Szulc and Meyer (62), 73.

⁷¹⁹Max Frankel in *The New York Times*, 2 November 1960, p. 10.

⁷²⁰Johnson (64), 57.

⁷²¹Szulc and Meyer (62), 95.

⁷²²Phillips (62), 285-286, 288, 293-294.

in the U.S., demanded that Congress investigate the numerous reports that the CIA was developing secret Caribbean bases for an invasion.⁷²³

The “covert” operation was now proceeding undeterred—indeed stimulated by a sense of urgency—by the rather detailed publicity attending it. The working press was alerted and in December several U.S. newspapers began carrying stories about the mysterious activities in Guatemala.

The next week, on 10 January, *The New York Times* began its belated reporting of these suspicions with a front-page dispatch from Guatemala by Paul P. Kennedy.⁷²⁴ Then, sometime in late February or early March even photographs of the main camp in Guatemala somehow appeared throughout the Latin American press, including Cuba.⁷²⁵

Just at this juncture, indeed by 4 November when Dulles had issued the implementing directive, a crucial decision was made by the secret “Special Group,” the top echelon State, Pentagon, CIA, and White House committee handling the over-all planning of the counterrevolution as part of its regular task of supervising all covert operations. They decided to abandon the existing plan for a slowly expanding guerrilla movement and substitute an overthrow by a conventional amphibious invasion (near the southeastern city of Trinidad) that would then join the local guerrillas in the Escambray Mountains. This decision was taken for three reasons: certain purely technical problems in sustaining much less expanding such an operation, the accelerating flow of Communist arms to Castro which was somehow thought to require a more rapid means of overthrow, and a sudden appreciation that Castro’s sheer physical control of the populace and militia was too great to guarantee the sort of slow subversion and defection on which guerrillaism depended.⁷²⁶

Base Trax completely switched its organization, armament, and training (only 60 men continuing with guerrilla training, in Panama) and the 430 men became the Brigada Asalto 2506 and quickly expanded to its eventual size of nearly 1500 troops.

After an abortive effort in late January, 1961, the Brigade began on 11 February to land its small infiltration teams in Cuba.⁷²⁷

When John F. Kennedy took office as President of the United States on 20 January 1961, he inherited the detailed plans and running machinery for this covert, semi-proxy invasion. The schedule then called for a March D-day. On 28 January, Kennedy directed that planning and preparations continue, but reserved his final decision. The original D-day went by default and guerrilla resistance in the Escambray was collapsing (the last guerrillas left on 23 March). Accordingly, on 15 March a new plan—Operation PLUTO—was hastily improvised to put the landing at the Bay of Pigs. With misgivings, Kennedy gave

⁷²³Johnson (64), 58.

⁷²⁴Paul P. Kennedy, “U.S. Helps Train an Anti-Castro Force At Secret Guatemalan Air-Ground Base,” *New York Times*, 10 January 1961, p.1.

⁷²⁵Johnson (64), 63.

⁷²⁶Johnson (64), 53-56, 65; Schlesinger (65), 228-229, 233-235, 237-238; and Kirkpatrick (68), 191-193. See also Sorenson (65), 296.

⁷²⁷Johnson (64), 59. Other CIA teams, unconnected with the Brigade, had been entering Cuba throughout 1960.

tentative approval.⁷²⁸ The new target date for invasion was 5 April, but this was soon set forward to 10 April and finally 17 April.⁷²⁹

On 7 April Castro now made the even more specific charge that Cuban counterrevolutionaries and the CIA were preparing to invade.⁷³⁰ And, two days later, the Washington correspondent of the *New York Post* agreed that Cuba was about to receive “the Guatemala treatment.”⁷³¹

Kennedy (and the State Department) had from 11 March onward made one crucial condition for his final approval—that there be no direct, overt participation by U.S. armed forces. For him, *any* such support would be as provocative as total support and would be “contrary to our traditions and to our international obligations.”⁷³² Kennedy insisted that U.S. participation be entirely covert so that the U.S. could disavow it as an all-Cuban operation.⁷³³ Comfortable in the assurance of his advisers on this point, Kennedy pledged at his April 12th press conference that:⁷³⁴

... there will not be, under any conditions, any intervention in Cuba by United States armed forces, and this government will do everything it possibly can... to make sure that there are no Americans involved in any actions inside Cuba.

I presume that Castro—and the Cuban and Russian intelligence services—read through the deliberate ambiguity of Kennedy’s statements and interpreted them correctly as confirming his already firm notion that the invasion was not only imminent but that it would be covert and indirect in nature. And, of course, these statements were soon known throughout the world as rather disingenuous attempts at deception. President Kennedy’s principle was the very sound one perfected by Lenin and Stalin in their covert arms aid to Germany, Turkey, Spain, China, and elsewhere throughout the 1920’s and 1930’s.⁷³⁵ But the new president was not as practiced in these arts as the Soviet Russian leaders and his chosen instrument was not up to the standards of effective cover of the Soviet Military Intelligence (GRU).

At this point, at dawn on 15 April, D-minus-2, Kennedy and the CIA did a most remarkable thing that simultaneously sounded the invasion alert for all including Castro to hear and also told the world of U.S. involvement. This was the airstrike that was to destroy Castro’s small airforce and give the Assault Brigade unchallenged control of the air on D-day. Such an act was about as unambiguous a pre-invasion signal as any opponent could hope for, as Castro himself declared in a two-hour broadcast speech the next day.⁷³⁶ The Brigade’s

⁷²⁸Schlesinger (65), 243, 251-252; and Sorensen (65), 296.

⁷²⁹For the D-day schedules see Johnson (64), 65, 67; and Schlesinger (65), 267.

⁷³⁰Phillips (62), 313.

⁷³¹*New York Post*, 9 Apr 1961, as cited by Szulc and Meyer (62), 115.

⁷³²Sorensen (65), 297-298; and Schlesinger (65), 242-243.

⁷³³Kirkpatrick (68), 193.

⁷³⁴Sorensen (65), 298.

⁷³⁵See Barton Whaley, *Soviet and Chinese Clandestine Arms Aid* (draft, 1965).

⁷³⁶Szulc and Meyer (62), 123.

B-26's flew from Guatemala on the night of 14-15 April and hit the three Cuban air bases at dawn. The raid had failed to destroy or cripple four (or five) Cuban fighter planes, which were enough to give Castro air control during the subsequent invasion. They then returned to base. All, that is, except two that went on to the U.S. One carrying two pilots did so inadvertently—because of damage—and landed at the Key West Naval Air Station. However, the other, with only one occupant, landed deliberately at Miami International Airport in accord with a singularly patchy “cover” story: that he (and others) had “defected” from Castro’s airforce.

His arrival and story was given the full publicity treatment. That same morning at the UN, Cuban Foreign Minister, Raúl Roa, denounced the act for what it was; and U.S. Ambassador Adlai Stevenson—in unwitting farce—simply passed on the cover story complete with a photograph of the plane with its Cuban Airforce markings. The cover story did not last out the day before it was “blown,” and by no less than two flaws in the CIA’s own public relations. First, the photos of the plane showed in addition to the dubious markings the indisputable presence of a plexiglass nose, a variant of the B-26 which the Cuban Airforce did not possess, Castro’s B-26’s being the opaque-nosed variety.⁷³⁷ Secondly, the photos of the pilot in that afternoon’s *Miami News* were immediately recognized by his astonished wife and friends as Lieutenant Zuñiga whom they thought to be in the training camp in Guatemala.⁷³⁸

Operation PLUTO is a unique event, despite its dreary similarities to other military disasters. Gallipoli was exposed as having similarly embarrassing feet of clay. Dieppe was a comparable catastrophe in terms of shattering casualties. Dakar produced similar shoddiness in deception planning and gross inadequacy of means. Although PLUTO is the most recent amphibious operation, we have to go back to the *first* modern one—Tanga in 1914—to find such a combination of ill-conception, bungled planning, overweening confidence in estimates of enemy morale and capabilities, general wishful thinking, all ineluctably yielding the final ignominy.

Security was strangely mixed. For example while not one press officer in the U.S. Government had specific forewarning of the invasion,⁷³⁹ the world’s press had been filled with generally authentic information since the story of the Cuban exile brigade’s CIA training first broke in October 1960.⁷⁴⁰

The U.S. intelligence “community” had worked itself into a situation where wishful thinking (particularly in the CIA) combined with unwarranted concern with “security” to render itself incapable of collecting much less evaluating new information about the crucial factor of Cuban loyalties to Castro.⁷⁴¹ Such behavior is dysfunctional in any decision-making group; but, in an intelligence

⁷³⁷Szulc and Meyer (62), 83, 120-124. I presume the hard-nosed Cuban ones were the B-26B model and the Brigade’s plexiglass-nosed ones were the B-26C model, which placed the bombardier more effectively up front.

⁷³⁸Szulc and Meyer (62), 121; and Szulc (67), 325.

⁷³⁹Salinger (66), 145, specifically mentioning himself as Presidential Press Secretary as well as his counterparts at CIA, DOD, and State. See also Schlesinger (65), 248.

⁷⁴⁰Salinger (66), 146.

⁷⁴¹See particularly Hilsman (67), 31. Also Sorensen (65), 304.

service, it nullifies its very purpose. The ability to revise its hypotheses (“estimates” or “appreciations”) is the final imperative of any functional intelligence service. Failure at the Bay of Pigs was predetermined by the flagrant disregard of this imperative.

Although the U.S. intelligence services were crippling the operation by a self-inflicted shortage of information about the target, none of the published accounts has thought to point out the appalling problems plaguing Castro and his intelligence service, headed by the old line Communist, Major Ramiro Valdés.⁷⁴² Of course, the Americans—specifically the CIA—had given Castro the strategic secret that an attack was imminent. CIA security and cover were so inadequate that the Cuban Army G-2 needed nothing more than subscriptions to American, French, or British newspapers and periodicals to keep posted on the raw fact of impending attack involving CIA-backed Cuban exiles.

What was the source of Castro’s warning and the subsequent public and international embarrassment of the U.S. Government when the shallow covering of its deep involvement was disclosed? There is a widespread belief that the American press was responsible. This notion was purveyed immediately after the debacle by some angry and frustrated U.S. Government officials, righteous journalists, and defensive academics. This view is largely—perhaps entirely—a myth, resulting probably from the simple fact that as these men first saw the public disclosure of these secrets in the U.S. press they drew one false conclusion and one implausible one. The false conclusion is that any of the key disclosures initially “broke” in the U.S. press. In fact, the Latin American (Guatemalan, Mexican, *and* Cuban) and European press was independently getting out the developing story. The unwarranted and rather thoughtless conclusion is that the U.S. press was the main or earliest source of Castro’s intelligence. In fact, as seen above, several Castro announcements indicate that he was getting authentic details well before *any* public media. His source clearly was intelligence—his own and, perhaps, Russian. It was already an open secret in Miami and Guatemala City; and, for example, the Miami police allegedly had identified over 100 Castro agents there alone.⁷⁴³ As Tad Szulc of *The New York Times* and Karl E. Meyer of the *Washington Post* observed: “The stories revealed no secrets to Fidel Castro” nor, I would add, to Latin American or European newspaper readers; “but they did attempt to let the American people know what was going on. At this point the White House might have reasonably concluded that it would be impossible really to conceal United States participation.”⁷⁴⁴

Thus, Castro expected *an* attack and gave full publicity to this expectation in the Cuban and world press media and at the UN.⁷⁴⁵ He also apparently knew the approximate ground strength of the assault force and that the attack

⁷⁴²Concurrently Minister of Interior, Major Valdés, was thus also head of the political police as well as the Army G-2. His chief deputy was Major “Red Beard” Pineiro. Szulc and Meyer (62), 24, where, however, Valdés is incorrectly identified as a Communist. He was, in fact, one of Castro’s original followers.

⁷⁴³Szulc and Meyer (62), 95.

⁷⁴⁴Szulc and Meyer (62), 115.

⁷⁴⁵Johnson (64), 18, 49.

	Brigade 2506	Cuban		
		Bay of Pigs	Elsewhere	Total
Men	1443(a)	20,000	204,000	240,000
Tanks	5-6	40	75	115
Fighters	0	4	0	4(b)
Bombers (B-26)	24	2	0	2(b)

Table A.103: Distribution of Strength in Bay of Pigs Operation. Notes: (a) This authentic total figure for the Brigade was disclosed by Kirkpatrick (68), 193. Apparently it represents only the main assault force. It does not include the 168 (or 152) men in Major Diaz' command. Nor, seemingly, does it include the Brigade's supporting airforce pilots and air and ground crews totaling at least 100 Cubans. (b) The rest of Castro's Airforce (approximately 5 fighters and 13 B-26 bombers) were damaged or destroyed by the D-minus-2 airstrike. References: Leiss and Bloomfield (67), 427; Kirkpatrick (68), 193; Johnson (64), 121, 132, 137; Sorensen (65), 298; and Schlesinger (65), 266.

would be a more-or-less conventional amphibious landing. Moreover, he claims to have also had forewarning of the time of the attack, a claim lent plausibility by the D-minus-2 airstrike, the probability that the Brigade's sailing from Guatemala was surely observed by Cuban and Russian agents, and the fact that on D-minus-1 Major Valdés' political police suddenly arrested all 100,000 known malcontents.⁷⁴⁶ Thus only two factors remained unknown to Castro: the extent of direct U.S. support and the site of the intended beachhead.

Tactical surprise on D-day was to be insured by two stratagems. One aborted, but the second succeeded quite well. The failure was an ambitious diversionary landing to be made in Oriente Province by a specially trained commando of 168 men led by the ex-Castro guerrilla, Major Higinio "Nino" Diaz. This group came *directly* from Florida aboard the cargo ship *La Playa*, flying the Costa Rican flag. They simply failed—for no reason apparent to their annoyed American advisers—to make their scheduled landing on D-minus-2. Moreover, they failed again in a second landing attempt on D-minus-1.⁷⁴⁷

The one successful stratagem was pure hoax. It was an offshore feint at Pinar del Río province accomplished by nothing more than rubber boats fitted with sound effects simulating a major battle.⁷⁴⁸ This mechanical ruse proved both more reliable and more effective than the human one, and represents a successful revival of the theatrical performance played off Genoa in 1944 by Lieutenant Commander Douglas Fairbanks, Jr.⁷⁴⁹

The landing itself went well, with no more error or confusion than is found in even the most carefully planned amphibious operations. During disembarkation

⁷⁴⁶Phillips (62).

⁷⁴⁷Johnson (64), 85, 88, 95, 110, 111, 121; Szulc and Meyer (62), 55-57, 84, 120, 128-130; Sorensen (65), 302-303; and Kirkpatrick (68), 196. Diaz' force (given as 152 men by Szulc and Meyer) never did get into action.

⁷⁴⁸Johnson (64), 85, 110.

⁷⁴⁹See Case A48.

D-Day	Brigade 2506	Cuban
KIA	40-50	500
WIA	40-50	1,000
PW	1	200
Totals:	c.101	1,700
D+2		
KIA	201(?)	1,250
DOW		400
WIA	1,190	> 2,000
PW		(freed)
Totals:	c.1,391	> 3,650

Table A.104: Casualties in Bay of Pigs Operation. Note: Figures for D+2 include some casualties that occurred over the following two weeks. References: Johnson (64), 113, 125, 127, 137-139, 178-179, 190, 192, 205, 228, 270, 293; Sorensen (65), 308.

only 28 men were drowned or killed, all by Cuban aerial strafing and bombing. As far as the landing and beachhead operations on D-day and D+1 are concerned, they are a credit to their managers and the members of the Brigade.

Late on D-plus-2 with their ammunition low and their positions about to be overrun, organized resistance at the beachhead ended. Some 46 men fled into the adjoining swamps where they were gradually rounded up over the next fortnight. Over 52 members of the landing force escaped: 22 by sailboat (of which only 12 survived the 15-day ordeal at sea) on D-plus-2, some others got off by rubber raft, and more than 30 were rescued by U.S. Navy frogmen during the next week. Approximately 1,190 men of the Brigade were captured. Of these 10 died almost immediately through mistreatment, one was released in Cuba, the 60 most seriously wounded were returned to the U.S. on 14 April 1962, and 1,119 were returned in December. Assuming that the full Brigade force of 1,443 men landed, this means that no more than 201 were killed or died before capture.⁷⁵⁰

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- Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *A Thousand Days* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), pp. 215-297.
- Theodore C. Sorensen. *Kennedy* (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), pp. 294-309.

⁷⁵⁰The whole affair is plagued by conflicting estimates of casualties.

- Pierre Salinger, *With Kennedy* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1966), pp. 145-160.
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- Wise and Ross (64), 8-90.
- R[uby] Hart Phillips, *The Cuban Dilemma* (New York: Obolensky, 1962). (Mrs. Phillips was the Havana correspondent for *The New York Times*, 1937 May 1961.)
- Dulles (63), 169.

- **Castro Intelligence**

- Szulc and Meyer (62), 24, 55, 91, 95.

- **Security**

- Salinger (66), 145.
- Kirkpatrick (68), 188-190, 193, 203-204.

- **Warnings**

- Tad Szulc, “*The New York Times* and The Bay of Pigs,” in David Brown and W. Richard Bruner (editors), *How I Got That Story* (New York: Dutton, 1967), pp. 315-329.
- Leiss and Bloomfield (67), 416, 417.
- Johnson (64), 18, 70-71, 89.
- Kirkpatrick (68), 188-189.
- Szulc and Meyer (62), 118 and throughout.

- **Surprise**

- Sorensen (65), 298, mentions the “tactical place of landing.”
- Szulc and Meyer (62), 127, quoting Castro’s surprise of place but not of time.

- **Deception**

- Johnson (64), 37, 57, 85, 95, 110-111.
- Schlesinger (65), 234, 242-243.
- Sorensen (65), 300-301.
- Szulc and Meyer (62), 116-121, 128-130.
- Kirkpatrick (68), 196.
- Blackstock (64), 249, 251, 264.

Epilogue: “Plan PLUTO”

The preceding section described Operation PLUTO as actually carried out. That was indeed a sorry thing rued by all its engineers—from President to White House staff to JCS and CIA. Moreover, as conducted, PLUTO gives the appearance that U.S. deception planning and coordination had regressed to the primitive level of 1914. However, this would almost certainly be a false conclusion, at least as far as the CIA is concerned. There are two reasons for this assertion: First, PLUTO was planned, mounted, and carried out as an *ad hoc* operation by specially designated and carefully limited groups and individuals drawn from various parts of the Government apparatus. Consequently, it might be quite wrong to assume the involvement of the regular deception planning group—whoever they are and wherever located in the U.S. defense structure. The weak public evidence allows for the likely possibility that the regular deception planners were simply by-passed in PLUTO.⁷⁵¹

The second and main reason for asserting that we should not infer the quality of U.S. deception planning from PLUTO is that the *operation* was an emasculated improvisation superimposed on the CIA’s *plan* by an inexperienced President. It is to that original plan that we must now look for insight on U.S. deception sophistication.

Professor Ernst Halperin has recently hypothesized—and virtually demonstrated—that the final plan devised by Richard M. Bissell, Jr., the CIA Deputy Director for Plans, was never intended to be primarily a “military” or even “paramilitary” operation but rather as a psychological one. It was the third and most recent historically identified instance of what Halperin calls “token insurgency,” a type of simulated insurrection.⁷⁵² Moreover, it was the CIA’s second and more sophisticated and elaborate attempt with this technique, for Operation PLUTO was simply to be a replication of the field-tested Operation DIABLO,⁷⁵³ the successful CIA effort in 1954 to overthrow the government of Guatemala. That it was a deliberate and conscious replication is implied both by the generic relationship of the two codenames (which are not typical CIA codenames)⁷⁵⁴ and by the fact that the CIA (and the JCS) estimated PLUTO’s chances explicitly in terms of DIABLO rather than such other successful operations as the coup to overthrow Mossadegh.⁷⁵⁵

The White House memoirists and critics of CIA (including myself) were quite right in pointing out the obvious—that 1400 filibusterers, with or without the controversial “second” airstrike, could not possibly fight off Castro’s 200,000

⁷⁵¹My thanks to William R. Harris for pointing out (in December 1968) this loophole in my data.

⁷⁵²See Chapter III-B for a summary of Halperin’s theory of “token insurgency” and his identification of the CIA Guatemalan operation of 1954 and Castro’s 1958-59 revolution in Cuba as earlier applications.

⁷⁵³Or, perhaps, DEVIL or SATAN. See Wise and Ross (64), 173.

⁷⁵⁴Halperin also first drew attention to this relationship. I would add that their shared implication of “underground” was intelligent cover, because premature disclosure (or deliberate leak as seems the case with DIABLO) would only reinforce the enemies’ false expectation of an underground uprising.

⁷⁵⁵Sorensen (65), 296.

militiamen. But, it seems that Plan PLUTO never intended that they do so. More important, we were all⁷⁵⁶ also probably wrong to presume that the plan had ever envisioned *any* sort of mass uprising.

This matter of Cuban public opinion, specifically the degree of mass support for Castro, is one of the important mysteries resolved by the Halperin hypothesis, which enables us to assess the charges and countercharges hurled between the White House and CIA factions as simple misunderstanding. Each faction was assured that the condition of opinion was adequate for the success of PLUTO. To the CIA planners this meant that the majority of Cubans could *favor* Castro but not rush to his active support, remaining vulnerable to the pressures of the psywar campaign. To those who perceived PLUTO as a military operation this meant most Cubans would *oppose* Castro, many of them actively so. Significantly, the one *direct* point of evidence that President Kennedy himself was in this latter group is his concerned effort to get independent verification of the CIA public opinion estimates.⁷⁵⁷ Moreover, the proof of Kennedy's (or, at least, of Schlesinger's) confusion is that when the careful 1960 survey research study secretly contracted for by USIA and sub-contracted to a Cuban research firm by Lloyd Free's Institute for International Social Research (Princeton, N.J.) belatedly reached the White House, it was interpreted as crucial disproof of the CIA estimates.⁷⁵⁸ In fact, the Free study generally corroborated the CIA estimates.⁷⁵⁹

The only on-the-record public statements on this point came from Dulles himself. In his 1963 book he asserted that:⁷⁶⁰

Much of the American press assumed at the time that this action was predicated on a mistaken intelligence estimate to the effect that a landing would touch off a widespread and successful popular revolt in Cuba.

Those who had worked, as I had, with [underground movements] . . . would have realized that spontaneous revolutions by unarmed people in this modern age are ineffective and often disastrous. . . . I repeat now what I have said publicly before: I know of no estimate that a spontaneous uprising of the unarmed population of Cuba would be touched off by the landing.

⁷⁵⁶Including such insiders and sideliners as Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. (65), Theodore Sorensen (65, pp. 294, 297), Roger Hilsman (67, pp. 31, 86), Lyman Kirkpatrick (68, pp. 191, 202) and Thomas Sorensen (68). This view was also reportedly accepted by President Kennedy and Dean Rusk and admittedly so by such diverse persons as Lloyd Free, Wise and Ross, Tully, Szulc and Meyer, and Haynes Johnson.

⁷⁵⁷Schlesinger (65), 247, 248-249.

⁷⁵⁸Thomas Sorensen (68), 140.

⁷⁵⁹My personal recollection of the Free report, which I read *prior* to the Bay of Pigs. Incidentally, Thomas Sorensen, the then USIA Deputy Director, seemingly did not and does not realize that this study was suppressed inside USIA because a middle-level official had decided the President would not be interested in a study proving Castro to be popular with most Cubans. Hence neither Sorensen much less Director Morrow saw it prior to the invasion.

⁷⁶⁰Dulles (63), 169.

Most of the subsequent memoirs by Kennedy men on the White House, USIA, and State Department staffs flatly contradict Dulles on this point; none support him. Some resolve the discrepancy by asserting that Dulles conveniently forgot his own (allegedly) contradictory estimates; others⁷⁶¹ do so by charging lie. Fortunately for the historian, some CIA officials were less scrupulous than their Director about waging subversive public relations warfare against other portions of the bureaucracy. In one almost certainly CIA-leaked version as transmitted and interpreted by Charles Murphy of *Fortune* magazine, Murphy dutifully but perhaps somewhat confusedly asserts that:⁷⁶²

It was never explicitly claimed by the CIA that a general uprising was immediately in the cards. . . . Once the beachhead was consolidated, however, and if fighting gear went forward steadily to the guerrillas elsewhere in Cuba, the [CIA] planners were confident that a mass revolt could be stimulated.

And one CIA official had explained CIA's expectations of Cuban public opinion:⁷⁶³

Our intelligence reports did not say the population would rise against Castro, but that the masses would remain indifferent, waiting to see if there was a real struggle before making up their minds.

The belief that the CIA plan hinged on the landing triggering a popular insurrection originated with President Kennedy himself.⁷⁶⁴ It is Halperin's contention that this crucial misperception was the direct consequence of a communication breakdown between the CIA and the White House. The inexperienced President, for all his seeking for "options," could just not comprehend Dulles' explanation of a subtle option that involved a delicate mix of military and psychological elements. As Kennedy himself tellingly admitted to Reston and Schlesinger on D+1: "... I have never worked with him [Dulles], and therefore I can't estimate his meaning when he tells me things."⁷⁶⁵ All pro-Administration accounts of the Bay of Pigs have noted the appalling gap in communications both among and within the White House, State, JCS, and CIA; but they place most or all blame on the CIA, specifically Dulles and Bissell. Moreover, they accuse the CIA of either having an unworkable patchwork plan⁷⁶⁶ or of deliberately seeking to force the President's hand.⁷⁶⁷

⁷⁶¹E.g., Wise and Ross (64), 48n.

⁷⁶²Charles J.V. Murphy, "Cuba: The Record Set Straight," *Fortune*, Vol. 64, No. 3 (September 1961), p. 97. The authoritative allegation of CIA leakage to Murphy are Hilsman (67). Oblique confirmation comes from Kirkpatrick (68), 184. See also Blackstock (64), 250, 337.

⁷⁶³Sanche de Gramont, *The Secret War* (New York: Putnam's, 1962), p. 33, quoting his not-for-citation interview with the official.

⁷⁶⁴Schlesinger (65), 246-249, who assumes Dulles had misled Kennedy on this point.

⁷⁶⁵Schlesinger (65), 272, who of course faults Dulles.

⁷⁶⁶As charged, for example, by Sorensen (65) and Hillman (67).

⁷⁶⁷See, for example, Wise and Ross (64); and Blackstock (64), 257-261.

But these sources are not merely biased, as some pro-CIA defenders have lamely pointed out, but incapable of presenting the CIA side of the plan, because they simply misunderstood it. For example, Roger Hilsman, as the then Director of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research and a former OSS guerrilla commander and West Point graduate, was well qualified to understand Bissell's plan. Yet Hilsman, having been forbidden by Secretary of State Rusk from studying the plan, unthinkingly discloses that he (and Rusk) simply presumed that it was a military operation designed to trigger a popular "rising."⁷⁶⁸ Hence, while the State Department revelations on this point support the White House military-insurgent interpretation, they can be dismissed as not only second-hand but sheer uninformed presumption. Even the JCS, while presumably fully informed on the CIA plan, was also allegedly not permitted to use its own staff to make an independent study.⁷⁶⁹ In any case, the JCS has never been permitted to present its own side,⁷⁷⁰ although it has been bitterly attacked privately by Kennedy and publicly by his White House staff memoirists.⁷⁷¹

What of the CIA's own version of its plan? Surprisingly, it has yet to appear. Despite the many CIA-inspired leaks and the public statements and writings by Dulles, Bissell, and Kirkpatrick on the CIA's part in the Bay of Pigs episode, the CIA has maintained a curious reticence on this one specific point.⁷⁷² Although I cannot disprove the existing consensus that dismisses the CIA counterclaims as mere personal or institutional protectiveness, two other possible motives that are even more typical of Dulles would support the Halperin hypothesis. First, Dulles categorically espouses the principle that directors of covert operations are obliged for imperative reasons of state to silently accept whatever measure of blame the Chief may choose to ascribe.⁷⁷³ (And President Kennedy made plain that his assumption of "responsibility" for the Bay of Pigs fiasco was only the ultimate responsibility of any commander-in-chief and that he personally held Dulles and the CIA at fault.) Second, Dulles always rigidly—sometimes perhaps unnecessarily or even dysfunctionally—adhered to the maxim that one never discloses the techniques of secret operations.⁷⁷⁴ (And this is precisely what an admission of the Halperin hypothesis would do.) Either or both motives could account for Dulles' statement that: "...I have not commented on any details of the 1961 Cuban operation and do not propose to do so here..."⁷⁷⁵ In any case, a number of fragmentary clues have emerged that suggest the outlines of Bissell's scenario for PLUTO.

Bissell's new plan envisioned making the landing site not a mere point of dispersal and infiltration into the now virtually nonexistent-guerrilla bands in the

⁷⁶⁸Hilsman (67), 31. The public has yet to hear the informed views of A.A. Berle.

⁷⁶⁹Hilsman (67), 31; and Wise and Ross (64), 48.

⁷⁷⁰Arthur Krock, *Memoirs* (New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1968), p. 371.

⁷⁷¹The only still publicly silent White House insider is McGeorge Bundy, Kennedy's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs.

⁷⁷²See, for example, Dulles (63), 169.

⁷⁷³Dulles (63), 197-198.

⁷⁷⁴See, for example, Dulles (63), 6.

⁷⁷⁵Dulles (63), 169.

hills but, rather, a major beachhead and airhead. It would be a highly visible and well-publicized bit of “liberated” Cuba to which the Cuban Revolutionary Council could be brought from Miami⁷⁷⁶ where they were being held unwillingly incommunicado by the CIA.⁷⁷⁷ President Cardona and his CRC would be immediately followed to that scrap of Free Cuba by some two hundred members of the U.S. and foreign press under an elaborate plan presumably worked up by the CIA and passed on to Lem Jones Associates for coordination with the individual journalists.⁷⁷⁸ Thus the one real part of the operation would receive early, credible and overwhelming publicity: dozens of journalists giving independent verification of Free Cuba, the nearby battle, the Cuban-piloted bombers flying off the single airfield at the beachhead,⁷⁷⁹ and interviewing the hundreds of prisoners and defectors from Castro’s militia. And with its own superb radio facilities (RFE, Radio Liberty, WRUL, Radio Swan, etc.) CIA could be assured that these reports would reach the Cuban populace including Castro, his immediate entourage, and his own militia. With Castro’s own public radio and television and military radio knocked off the air or selectively jammed, the effect of the public and clandestine broadcasts would surely have proved shattering to the régime. Rendered blind *and* mute, the Cuban Polyphemus⁷⁸⁰ would cease to be a communicator, with the likely consequences that both Malaparte and Mao Tse-tung have predicted.

The only detailed account of the psywar campaign appears, significantly, in the CIA-inspired article that appeared in *Fortune* magazine shortly after the event. This notes, although only in passing, that:⁷⁸¹

Also cranked into the [PLUTO] plan [by the CIA] were ingenious schemes—a barrage of radio-broadcasts from the nearby islands and showers of pamphlets from airplanes—intended to galvanize the anti-Castro Cubans in the cities and villages into demonstrations as the invaders struck. . . . [The] intention was to sow enough chaos during the first hours to prevent Castro from smashing the invasion on the beach.

But once again the State Department convinced the President that the psywar campaign would be a too obvious showing of the U.S. hand. Consequently, during the week before the expeditionary force’s embarkation on 10 April Kennedy cancelled “the arrangements for arousing the Cuban populace and trying to stampede Castro’s militia with leaflet raids and radio-

⁷⁷⁶Kirkpatrick (68), 192-193.

⁷⁷⁷Wise and Ross (64), 52.

⁷⁷⁸Personal recollections of Ernst Halperin who was scheduled to be in the second press wave, immediately after Joseph Alsop. Lem Jones Associates solicited journalists for this junket in a squib in *The New York Times* that appeared in the D-day issue. Curiously, this highly indicative clue has been entirely overlooked by all earlier accounts of the Bay of Pigs operations.

⁷⁷⁹According to Wise and Ross (64), 20, this was an explicit part of the CIA plan. CIA anticipated that the airfield would be operational by Tuesday, D+1.

⁷⁸⁰The imagery is Halperin’s.

⁷⁸¹Murphy (61), 97. Also noted by Blackstock (64), 246, but plainly based on Murphy.

broadcasts.”⁷⁸² Nevertheless Radio Swan and WRUL maintained to the end a steady flow of what were mainly fictitious alerts and reports of risings and military successes.⁷⁸³ These, at least, succeeded in convincing the largely gullible press corps.⁷⁸⁴ But, with the cancellation of the full jamming and deception campaign, these false reports failed to fully panic either Castro or his militia, whose primitive uncoded microwave military communications were an open invitation to the whole range of radio games: monitoring,⁷⁸⁵ selective jamming, and dummy messages.

I suspect that the general misperception of Bissell’s final Plan PLUTO as a military or paramilitary operation was in large measure the result of the carry-over “halo effect” from the two earlier schemes. The original CIA plan—in effect from late 1959 until 4 November 1960—was for a more-or-less “conventional” guerrilla war to be stimulated and enlarged by landing the then 400-man guerrilla-trained force of Cuban exiles and having them disperse into the hills to join, inspire, equip, and train the still viable local guerrillas and other dissidents. This was envisioned as a model guerrilla-underground movement that would gradually destabilize and eventually overthrow Castro’s regime.⁷⁸⁶ The second plan—briefly considered in the Fall—was for a full-scale conventional amphibious military operation using as much open or thinly disguised U.S. naval and airpower as needed to insure success of a thousand-man *conventionally* trained force of Cuban exiles. President Eisenhower even warned President-elect Kennedy at that point that: “You may have to send troops in.” This was viewed as a straight military operation intended to achieve a swift knockout.⁷⁸⁷ Given this earlier preoccupation with military operations and the singularly weak communications among and within the several planning, operational, and decision-making units of the Government, it is understandable that thinking could not readjust to grasp Bissell’s new plan, particularly as its highly innovative nature would have made it difficult to understand even in the freest communications environment. Indeed, there seems to have been some difficulty over understanding PLUTO even within CIA itself. At least Charles Murphy could misinterpret the information leaked to him from his anonymous CIA sources as indicating Bissell’s plan to be “essentially a military one.”⁷⁸⁸

Presidential misunderstanding of PLUTO seemingly had profound consequences for the CIA’s capability for ever again experimenting with this promising innovation in insurrectionary technique. The example of ignominious failure has discouraged replication and brought a more prudent (or perhaps only mindlessly cautious) attitude toward covert operations in general. Dulles and Bissell were dropped as soon as tactfully convenient. And finally, the main recommen-

⁷⁸²Murphy (61), 227. Also noted by Blackstock (64), 249, but drawn from Murphy.

⁷⁸³Wise and Ross (64), 54, 318, etc.

⁷⁸⁴Szulc (57), 326-327.

⁷⁸⁵See Szulc (57), 327, who was monitoring this traffic at Miami.

⁷⁸⁶For the initial plan see Murphy (61), 96; Johnson (64), 24-28; Schlesinger (65), 225-227; and Kirkpatrick (68), 185, 191.

⁷⁸⁷For the second plan see Murphy (61), 96-97; Wise and Ross (64), 31; Johnson (64), 53-56, 65; Schlesinger (65), 228-229, 233-238; Hilsman (67), 32; and Kirkpatrick (68), 192-193.

⁷⁸⁸Murphy (61), 96.

dation of the Taylor Committee (Gen. Taylor, Allen Dulles, Robert Kennedy, and Adm. Burke) was adopted in late 1961 that henceforward CIA would surrender responsibility for such large-scale paramilitary operations to the Special Warfare section of the Department of Defense. The CIA was now limited to paramilitary operations of sufficiently small scale to be “plausibly deniable.”⁷⁸⁹ However, as the Taylor Committee also treated PLUTO as a military operation, its recommendations have, in fact, only directly inhibited repetition of Kennedy’s military fiasco and not of Bissell’s untried psychological campaign.⁷⁹⁰

I do not wish to play an “If in History” game by arguing that Bissell’s plan would have succeeded. It is enough to point out that it was never tested, while Kennedy’s patchwork scenario was. Moreover, the Bissell plan embodied two factors that made it more promising than the Guatemalan plan: first, unlike Guatemala, the Cuban middle class was disaffected with the régime; second, Castro, having made himself virtually dependent on radio and television from his communications, was singularly vulnerable in a crisis to loss of these channels coupled with their comprehensive stratagemic use by his enemy. The unknown—and now unknowable—crucial factor was the breaking-points of Castro and his regime. Finally, I do not wish—any more than Halperin does—to be labelled an advocate of “token insurgency.” While that technique does seem a promising short-run means for insurrection, particularly when backed by the sophisticated communications gear of a foreign power, its long-run consequences for democratic government and of international relations raise the most serious questions about its desirability as an instrument of subversion.⁷⁹¹

In sum then, we should conclude that the CIA is probably quite capable of generating not only sophisticated strategic deception plans but has proven highly innovative in this regard. However, the Bay of Pigs case does illustrate the importance of educating key senior and staff people in the White House and State Department in such stratagems.

⁷⁸⁹Hilsman (67), 78-79. Also Wise and Ross (64), 190.

⁷⁹⁰This is possibly hinted in an odd passage in Kirkpatrick (68).

⁷⁹¹Amidst a welter of largely uninformed, superficial, and often hysterical attacks on subversion—particularly when practiced by the U.S.—one reasoned and informed analysis stands out: Blackstock (64).

Case A66. The Six-Day War,⁷⁹² 5 Jun 1967

“We will choose the place and the time...”

–President Nasser,
press conference, 28 May 1967.

“War [cannot] be decided by an all-out surprise
air attack.”

–Brig.-Gen. Y. Harkabi,
former Director of Israeli
Military Intelligence, 1966.

“With a diplomat words *must* diverge from
acts—what kind of a diplomat would he
otherwise be?”

–Stalin, 12 January 1913.

“What crisis?”

–Richard Nolte,
U.S. Ambassador to Cairo,
21 May 1967.

“He who comes to kill you, rise and kill him first.”

–The Talmud

The Six-Day War, the Israeli-Arab conflict of 1967, is a remarkable case of surprise and deception. It is worth as close an examination as presently available materials permit.

Premier Levi Eshkol’s Cabinet decided on a preemptive strike⁷⁹³ against Egypt. This desperate move was prompted by the generally rising crisis that was compounded of the steady inflow of Soviet Russian arms and technical advisers to the Arabs, increasing frequency and severity of border incidents, general military alerts (since 15 May) and the prohibitive cost to Israel of maintaining 10% of her population mobilized, culminating with Nasser’s remilitarization of Sharm-el-Shaikh and publically announced blockade of the Tiran Straits (22 May) and the signing of the Nasser-Hussein Pact of Amman (30 May). The Israeli Cabinet decision for war was taken by June 1st when Moshe Dayan was hustled back into the Cabinet as Defense Minister. However, it is widely believed that it was not until the Cabinet meeting of the 4th that D-day was set for the next day.⁷⁹⁴

⁷⁹²This name for the 1967 Israeli-Egyptian campaign, paralleling the six days of the Creation, was officially adopted by its initiator-victors.

⁷⁹³For a most revealing view of Israeli doctrine on preemptive war see the analysis by the former Director of Israeli Military Intelligence, Y. Harkabi, *Nuclear War and Nuclear Peace*, (Jerusalem: Israel Program for Scientific Translations, 1966), pp. 41-51.

⁷⁹⁴See particularly Laqueur (68), 109-160.

The basic Israeli battle strategy—Operation Nachonim⁷⁹⁵—had been developed well in advance in its many bits and pieces by the very competent Chief-of-Staff Major-General Itzhak Rabin. It envisioned a surprise *coup de main* against the Egyptian forces, while holding the line on the Syrian and Jordanian fronts. The initiating blow—the intricately timed and elegantly executed airstrike—was the special contribution of the Air Force Commander, Brigadier-General Mordecai Hod, and—I presume—his staff. While Defense Minister Dayan is now widely credited with some significant final adjustments in the war plan, it would seem that his main contribution was to the deception plan, a subject in which he proved his mastery in 1956⁷⁹⁶ and for which Rabin has no publicly known talent.

The sudden appointment at this tense time of Israel's preeminent "hawk" could easily have signalled the Israeli decision to preempt. However, an alternative—defensive—interpretation existed that was as plausible, and it was this alternative pose that Dayan now struck on the evening of Saturday, June 3rd, at his first public appearance as Defence Minister Designate. As he knew they would, Dayan's remarks were immediately reported world-wide. As the *Jerusalem Post* reported the next morning:⁷⁹⁷

Defence Minister Dayan . . . said that it was too late for a spontaneous military reaction to Egypt's blockade of the Tiran Straits—and still too early to draw any conclusions of the possible outcome of diplomatic action. "The Government—before I became a member of it—embarked on diplomacy: we must give it a chance," Dayan declared.

By this inspired lie, one that her enemies were flattered to believe, Israel had suddenly regained the initiative that alone could assure strategic surprise when Israel preempted on 5 June.⁷⁹⁸

Incidentally, the view of Douglas-Home (68) and others that sees even the earlier (i.e., pre-June) Israeli policy as having chosen war and her diplomacy as providing hypocritical camouflage does not seem credible given the extensive knowledge we now have of the differences on war policy dividing the Israeli Government.

To lend credibility to Dayan's Saturday evening statement, several thousand Israeli soldiers were given week-end leave. By Sunday morning the Israeli and the world press was featuring—alongside Dayan's statement—photographs of the

⁷⁹⁵After Nachon, the leader of Biblical Judah. See Byford-Jones (67), 56, 86.

⁷⁹⁶See Case A63.

⁷⁹⁷Churchill and Churchill (67), 73-74. An excellent analysis and the transcript of the press conference is in Byford-Jones (68), 33-43. The element of deception in this statement is also noted—but only in passing—by Donovan (67), 87; and Gruber (68), 49-50. See also Laqueur (68), 157; and MacLeish (67), 84, 146-147.

⁷⁹⁸Compare General Rabin's interview statement that "after all there was no strategic surprise" because the Egyptians had concentrated their forces in the Sinai days or weeks before the war began, and the whole political set-up was such that everybody expected something to happen. Robinson (68), 359.

Israeli Army relaxing on the beaches.⁷⁹⁹ The Egyptian Army also relaxed—Egyptian generals were prominent on the tennis courts of Cairo that Sunday, D-minus-1.⁸⁰⁰

The Israeli Government played its full part in giving false credit to the sudden, feigned restoration of peace. An official communiqué was released Sunday night (ostensibly for publication in Monday newspapers) that summarized the regular Sunday Cabinet meeting. This implied that only perfunctory attention was given “the security situation” before the Cabinet busied itself with the intricacies of loans and taxes, employment policies for immigrants and ex-servicemen, Israeli-Belgian cultural exchange, and Israeli-Peruvian cooperation on peaceful uses of atomic energy.⁸⁰¹

Everyone—except the Israeli Cabinet ministers—was satisfied that Israel had “missed the boat,” that she had been outmaneuvered by President Nasser and had acquiesced—at least for the moment—in the Tiran Straits blockade. That weekend most of the foreign correspondents in both Israel and Egypt who had arrived in anticipation of renewed battle went home,⁸⁰² after filing their deescalatory dispatches for their Sunday editions.⁸⁰³

The superbly imaginative strategic hypocrisy at the highest levels of Government was complemented by conventional but efficient tactical deception carried out by the Israeli military services both before and during their lightning-swift war. At least four ruses were used prior to the fighting to induce the Egyptian forces to deploy in ways desired by the Israelis. First, the minuscule and antiquated Israeli Navy under Commodore Shelomo Erel deceived the Egyptians that major amphibious operations were to be mounted in the Red Sea, thereby drawing off major units of the Egyptian Navy. This was accomplished by the old theatrical and cinematic ruse—familiarized by *Carmen* and *Birth of a Nation*—of simulating “a cast of thousands” by running the same small number of “extras” repeatedly before the audience, their true circular route passing out of sight off-stage or behind the camera. In this case the Israelis simulated a major buildup of landing craft in the Gulf of Aqaba by bringing just four such boats overland to Eilat where they were seen to arrive on each of several days. However, these were the same four boats, which under cover of the night were transported back into the desert ready for their daylight return engagements. Meanwhile, the total Israeli Red Sea naval contingent of only three motor torpedo-boats maintained aggressive patrolling. This activity—real and simulate—drew off at least two Egyptian destroyers from the Mediterranean on D-minus-2, tying down 30 per cent of the Egyptian Navy in inactive waters when D-day came.⁸⁰⁴

The second ruse was carried out by the Israeli Army. Brigadier General

⁷⁹⁹Churchill and Churchill (67), 74, 77; Bondy, Zmora, Bashan (68), 498; MacLeish (67), 85; and Laqueur (68), 156.

⁸⁰⁰Churchill and Churchill (67), 75.

⁸⁰¹Churchill and Churchill (67), 74; and MacLeish (67), 83-84.

⁸⁰²Churchill and Churchill (67); Byford-Jones (68), 42; and Bondy, Zmora, Bashan (68), 64. For the foreign press in Egypt see MacLeish (67), 70.

⁸⁰³Byford-Jones (68), 42, citing those from David Leitch of the London *Sunday Times* and Patrick O'Donovan of the *London Observer*.

⁸⁰⁴Churchill and Churchill (67), 97-98.

	Israel	Egypt	Syria	Jordan
Troops,				
Regulars	60,000	160,000	54,000	38,000
Reservists	204,000*	80,000	0	12,000
Total Troops Mobilized	264,000	240,000	54,000	50,000
Tanks,				
Heavy	0	60-100	0?	
Medium	650	920-1,100	300?	
Light	150	20	0?	
Total Tanks	800	1,000-1,220	300	200
Bombers,				
Heavy	0	30	0	0
Medium	0	40-90	0?	0
Fighter-bombers	70-80	0	20?	C.10?
Fighters (Jet)	154-170	360	100?	c.30
Total Combar Aircraft	224-250	430-480	120	40
Destroyers, Frigates	3	7	0	0
Operational Submarines	1	12	0	0
Patrol Boats, MTBs, etc.	20	72	20	0

Table A.105: Strengths of Forces in Six-Day War. *Note: The entire Israeli reserve was capable of mobilization within 77 hours. References: Churchill and Churchill (67), 27, 54, 60-66, 85, 95, 97; Leiss and Bloomfield (67), 702-712; Byford-Jones (68), 47-50; Donovan (67), 52; and Bondy, Zmora, and Bashan (68), 351. See also *The Military Balance, 1967-1968* (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1967).

Yeshayahu Gavish, Commander of the Southern Front, had the problem of masking from the Egyptians the exact deployment of his mobilized ground forces facing the Sinai. To do this he—like the Egyptians—resorted to conventional measures of field camouflage to dissimulate part of his force. However, Gavish combined this with simulative camouflage. He had some small detachments of his armor circle about behind selected portions of the front, dragging plows to stir up enough dust to simulate large concentrations of tanks where there were none.⁸⁰⁵

The fourth pre-hostilities tactical ruse was the Israeli Airforce effort to draw Egyptian fighter aircraft away from their northern bases in the zone of intended combat. This was done by intensive aerial patrolling in the Gulf of Aqaba and Red Sea. This ruse complemented the naval ruse already mentioned by implying the Israeli war plan called for a major aerial strike from the southern flank. To counter this supposed strategy the Egyptians transferred 20 of their first-line Russian fighters to the southern airfield of Hurghada. Consequently they were not only *hors de combat* during the critical early hours of the air battle on D-day

⁸⁰⁵Gruber (68), 58.

but, when they did predictably arrive, found the northern runways smashed and fell easy prey to the waiting Israeli jets.⁸⁰⁶

When the initial Israeli airstrike was airborne at 0745 hours (0845 Cairo time), Brigadier-General Mordecai Hod's planes gained complete initial tactical surprise by sweeping in "on the deck" under the Egyptian (and Soviet) radar. This technique—contraindicated against an alerted and airborne enemy—enabled the Israelis' aircraft to make a secret approach without using their electronic countermeasures (ECM), which would have warned the Egyptians (and Russians and Americans) that *an* air attack was underway if not its direction and strength.⁸⁰⁷ In these first 170 minutes some 300 Egyptian aircraft were destroyed *on the ground*—90 per cent of their first-line combat planes. Only 8 Egyptian fighters got airborne during that decisive battle for aerial supremacy.

Finally, deception was needed to prevent international action by the UN in proclaiming Israel the aggressor, which might inhibit or prematurely halt her all-out attack. To do this it was necessary to pretend that *Egypt* had struck first. For this, pleading existing acts of war such as the blockade of the Straits of Tiran would not suffice; it had to seem that Egypt had already launched an all-out offensive. Thus at 0755 hours on 5 June the Israeli cities sounded their first air-raid warning.⁸⁰⁸ (At that moment, as Israeli air intelligence knew, no Egyptian combat aircraft were airborne, the regular dawn patrols having returned to their bases for refueling. For the previous 10 minutes the entire Israeli air fleet had been rising for their surprise attack, capitalizing on the gap in Egyptian air patrolling.)⁸⁰⁹ At 0815 an anonymous spokesman for the Israel Defense Army interrupted the Voice of Israel (Kol Israel) with a special—and, I presume, carefully prearranged—announcement that, in its entirety, stated:⁸¹⁰

From the morning heavy battles are taking place in the southern area, between Egyptian armored and air forces and Zahal [Israeli Army] forces which advanced to stop them. The Egyptian forces opened air and land attack this morning. Egyptian armored forces advanced at dawn across the Negev and our forces went out to meet them. At the same time a large number of Egyptian air jets which were approaching the coast of our country were seen on radar screens.⁸¹¹ A similar effort was made in the Negev area. The Israel

⁸⁰⁶Churchill and Churchill (67), 80.

⁸⁰⁷Churchill and Churchill (67), 80-81.

⁸⁰⁸Bondy, Zmora, Bashan (68), 113.

⁸⁰⁹Churchill and Churchill (67). Verified in an inadvertent slip by Bundy, Zmora, Bashan (68), 498.

⁸¹⁰Bondy, Zmora, Bashan (68), 113. Compare Byford-Jones (68), 56, who times the first radio announcement at 0855. This version was substantially the same given the press corps later that morning (before 9 a.m.) by the official military spokesman, Colonel Moshe Pearlman. See also MacLeish (67), 90-91.

⁸¹¹This particular assertion about radar citing may be more dissembling than outright fabrication. Egyptian aircraft (transports?) did violate Israeli airspace *sometime* early that morning. They crossed from Egypt to Jordan, passing near Elath. They were bringing the newly accepted Egyptian military adviser, General Riadh, with his staff. But compare MacLeish (67), 91.

Air Force went out to meet the enemy and air battles were begun which are continuing at this minute.

This set the tone and content of the official Israeli cover story. It was promptly elaborated by the Israeli Mission to the UN, particularly after the hurried arrival there of Foreign Minister Abba Eban. While the unsubstantiated official lies were urged with patriotic gall upon the UN, it is significant that the Army commanders quickly disassociated themselves from that game, leaving hypocrisy to the diplomats. On D-day itself, at 8 a.m., Air Force Commander Hod announced only that the "Egyptian foe has raised his hand to destroy us."⁸¹² But Defense Minister Dayan in his first broadcast to the nation at 10:30 a.m. that same morning avoided any explicit accusation of Egypt launching the first blow.⁸¹³

A fortnight after the war, when asked the direct question "How did the attack begin?," Brigadier-General Hod referred only to the sudden destruction of the airfield-bound Egyptian Air Force.⁸¹⁴ Similar back-tracking was done by the Commander of the Southern (i.e., Sinai) Front, Brigadier-General Yeshayahu Gavish. Two days after the Cease-Fire he told the press corps that:⁸¹⁵

... the enemy attacked first. The beginning of the Egyptian offensive took the form of aircraft moving against Israel which was discovered by radar, of artillery fire on settlements along the border, and of a large armored force moving in the direction of our border in the Mitzpe Ramon sector.

And later, Gavish mentioned learning at 0745 hours on the 5th "that the Egyptian air force was aloft," that shelling of Israeli border settlements had begun, and that an Egyptian division was moving toward Mitze-Ramon, so "our air force went out for counter-attack." In any case, Gavish's own ground forces moved forward in general attack at 0815. On the day of Cease Fire, Dayan spoke only of having "frustrated" the enemies' "connivings"; and Chief-of-Staff Rabin, the next day, mentioned only "the struggle we have waged against those who would have shrouded us with oblivion" and having "banished" the Syrian "threat."⁸¹⁶ These discrepancies were soon given perspective by a senior Israeli Military Intelligence officer (and Professor of Physics), Colonel Yuval Ne'eman, who—motivated to defend Dayan against his political opponents in the Government—disclosed publicly, a week after the war, that:⁸¹⁷

His [Dayan's] inclusion in the government made all the difference in reaching the final decision to take up the enemy's challenge at the

⁸¹²Text in Bondy, Zmora, Bashan (68), 138-139, and also 157-158.

⁸¹³Text in Bondy, Zmora, Bashan (68), 117-118.

⁸¹⁴Raphael Bashan, interview with Brigadier-General Hod, "How We Did It," *Ma'ariv*, 30 June 1967, as reprinted in Bondy, Zmora, Bashan (68), 158-166.

⁸¹⁵Texts in Bondy, Zmora, Bashan (68), 169-173 and 173-177.

⁸¹⁶Texts in Bondy, Zmora, Bashan (68), 380 and 379.

⁸¹⁷Prof. Yuval Ne'eman, "How to Safeguard the Achievements of the War," *Ma'ariv*, 18 June 1967, as reprinted in Bondy, Zmora, Bashan (68), 442-450. My italics. Chief of Israeli Military Intelligence at that time was, contrary to Bondy, *et al.*, Brigadier Aharon Yariv.

next provocation. . . . When the enemy *began* moving towards our frontiers, there were none who hesitated any more, and there was nobody to suggest that we should wait again and try to swallow yet *another* pill.

Even Abba Eban had back-tracked somewhat by 19 June when before the UN General Assembly he stressed the blockade of the Tiran Straits on 23 May as “an act of war” that itself ended “any discussion about who had fired the first shot” and gave only passing reference to the fact that on 5 June “Egyptian forces moved by air and land against Israel’s western coast and southern territory . . .”⁸¹⁸ Thus the further one moves away from the declarations of 5 June and from the legalistic and propaganda statements by the Israeli commanders and senior staff officers, the more clearly do we see a scenario of preemptive or even preventive war.

At the war’s end, the Israeli Government published several captured Egyptian (and other Arab) documents.⁸¹⁹ These were released to prove the aggressive intent and high state of alert of Israel’s neighbors. They do prove this; and they must be authentic because that is *all* they prove. They only confirm the expected—that the Egyptian Army and Airforce had been directed to maintain a state of readiness in keeping with the sabre-rattling public threats of the Egyptian Government and press. They do not prove the half-hearted Israeli claim of Egyptian first strike. Indeed, given the fact that the Israeli Army quickly overran all the headquarters of the alleged Egyptian air and ground striking forces, the very absence of any specific attack orders (or memoranda of radioed or telephoned orders) strongly indicates that there were, in fact, none. It is commendable that the omission was not filled by forgery.

Thus if the historian is to understand the nature and effectiveness of Dayan’s hastily improvised deception plan and the Israeli’s surprise attack and victory, he must seek outside the necessarily hypocritical official early press releases and defensive arguments in the UN. This line of argument and conclusion is accepted by all five major studies of the Six-Day War so far published and it is significant that one of these is by Israeli journalists persona grata with the Army, one by a leading British scholar, one by pro-Israeli British journalists, one by a pro-Israeli British military expert, and one by a pro-Israeli American journalist.⁸²⁰ Aside from official Israeli accounts, the only books I have seen that deny Israel’s first strike are one by a team of Israeli journalists and one by a flagrantly propagandistic Frank Gervasi.⁸²¹

Once again a deception-aided surprise had helped reap a cost-effective Israeli

⁸¹⁸Text in Laqueur (68), 336-356; and Bondy, Zmora, Bashan (68), 451-463.

⁸¹⁹Reprints of some of these texts and photocopies are also in Gervasi (67), 226-249; Robinson (68), 252-259; and Byford-Jones (68), 219-221. For some discussion see MacLeish (67), 63-65.

⁸²⁰See particularly Kimche and Bawly (68), 159-181; and Laqueur (68), 155-159. Also Churchill and Churchill (67); Byford-Jones (68), 67-75; and MacLeish (67), 86, 95, 96, 147. Donovan (i.e., the *Los Angeles Times* foreign news staff) (67), 90, 92, 105-106, fluctuates between concurrence and equivocation on this point, although the evidence included only supports it. Some vagueness also exists in the account of Howard and Hunter (68), 29.

⁸²¹Bondy, Zmora, Bashan (68); and Gervasi (67), 168, 227.

D+5	Israel	Egypt
KIA	275	7,000-10,000(c)
WIA	800	thousands
PW	9	4,500
Total Casualties:	1,084	> 11,500
<hr/>		
Tanks Destroyed	61	500
Tanks Captured	0	200
Fighters and		
Fighter-Bombers	19	207(a)
Bombers	0	57
Other Aircraft	0?	45(b)

Table A.106: Israel and Egypt Casualties and Losses. Notes: (a) Egypt also lost 8 fighters between D+12 and D+17. (b) Plus one SAM-2 missile system captured intact. (c) Israeli estimates. In July, Egyptians admitted “about” 5,000 killed. References: Bondy, Zmora, Bashan (68), 157, 171-172, 425, 498-500; Churchill and Churchill (67), 85, 87, 88, 91, 177, 179, 198; Byford-Jones (68), 128-129, 185n; D. Dayan (67), 131. Yaël Dayan (67) reports that the casualties of Brigadier-General Ariel Sharon’s division alone were 240, including 58 dead.

victory. In addition the Israeli now held the Sinai Peninsula—together with its 315,000 permanent Arab refugees in the Gaza strip (Table A.106).

It is rather wry that the total number (9) of Israelis captured by the Egyptians exactly equals the number of Egyptian generals captured. The 10 Egyptian colonels taken prisoner were a further dividend for Brigadier Yariv’s Military Intelligence.

Similar results were achieved against the Syrians and Jordanians (Table A.107). In addition the Israelis had occupied the strategic Syrian Heights, some 500 square miles.

The simultaneous struggle against Jordan was also particularly fierce (Table A.108).

In addition, Jordan lost the Old City of Jerusalem and the West Bank of the Jordan River, nearly 2,000 square miles with, however, the noisome problem of the nearly 200,000 permanent refugees there.

The outbreak of the Six-Day War was preceded—indeed partly precipitated—by an altogether curious incident that may have been a *Russian* stratagem. Nasser disclosed (after the war) that in early May the Russians had warned him (and the Syrians on 13 May) of the massing of Israeli troops on the *Syrian* border, intending invasion there.⁸²² It was wholly false. Indeed the Israelis took special precautions to avoid a build-up on that frontier until they had matters in hand with Egypt. The only substance to the charge was that a) the

⁸²²Nasser, in his resignation speech of 9 June 1967. Complete text in Laqueur (68), 320-324. The version given by *The New York Times*, 10 June 1967, and copied by Draper (68), 235-237, is incomplete although this fact is not acknowledged. Nasser repeated his charges in his speech of 23 July. See Laqueur (68), 327.

D+5	Israel	Syria
KIA	115	1,000-3,000(b)
WIA	306	8,000
PW	3(a)	333
Total Casualties:	424	9,333
<hr/>		
Tanks Captured	0	40
Tanks Destroyed	?	60-70
Aircraft	?	61(c)

Table A.107: Israeli and Syrian Casualties and Losses. Notes: (a) Including 1 PW of the Lebanese. (b) Israeli estimates give, variously, 1,000, 2,000, and 3,000. Syria officially admits only 145 dead. (c) Including 1 Lebanese fighter plane. References: Churchill and Churchill (67), 86-88, 188; Bondy, Zmora, Bashan (68), 157, 351-353, 357, 425, 499, 500; Byford-Jones (68), 128-129, 161, 166.

D+5	Israel	Jordan
KIA	c.297(a)	6,094(c)
WIA	1,000(a)	762(c)
PW	4(b)	483
Total Casualties:	1,301	7,339(d)
<hr/>		
Tanks Captured	0	40-45
Tanks Destroyed	?	45
Aircraft	?	46(e)

Table A.108: Israeli and Jordanian Casualties and Losses. Notes: (a) Official Israeli figures are given for the Jordanian front as c.190 dead and “hundreds” wounded among their forces of Central Command and 107 dead and 322 wounded from their Northern Command. (b) Including 2 prisoners of the Iraqis. (c) Jordanian estimates. King Hussein earlier estimated 15,000 killed. (d) Israelis estimate 8,000 total Jordanian casualties. (e) Including 17 supporting Iraqi aircraft. References: D. Dayan (67), 220; Byford-Jones (68), 128-129, 161, 166; Churchill and Churchill (67), 86-88, 147; Bondy, Zmora, Bashan (68), 158, 425, 499, 500.

D+5	Israel	Arabs
KIA	730(a)	23,000
WIA	2,800(b)	> 8,000
PW	16	5,459(d)
Total Casualties (c)	3,546	> 26,459
Tanks	> 61	780
Aircraft	26	452(e)

Table A.109: Total Costs of Six-Day War to Israel and Arab Countries. The Israeli casualty figures for their own dead and wounded are slightly higher (by 43 killed and several hundred wounded) than the total of the previous three tables. These larger figures are from the second official Israeli count published on 5 July 1967, which was not broken down by fronts. Notes: (a) Including(?) about 100 DOW. (b) Including 1,700 permanently damaged cases. (c) Including Israeli casualties in the Canal Zone on D+12 and D+17 of 16 KIA and 27 WIA. Additional Egyptian casualties (from D+12 through D+17) exceeded 44 KIA and 133 WIA. (d) Comprising 5,316 of specified nationality in PW cages and 179 seriously wounded (no national breakdown given) in Israeli hospitals. (e) Of these, 393 were destroyed on the ground. References: Byford-Jones (68), 172; Bondy, Zmora, Bashan (68), 145, 157, 165, 380, 499, 500. Also Churchill and Churchill (67), 137, 156; Fein (68), 320; *Time*, 23 June 1967, p. 26; and Donovan (67), 126.

Israeli-Syrian frontier was tense because of its current history of border incidents, although the Israelis had neither recently nor significantly altered their deployment in that direction; and b) the Israeli Army was gradually mobilizing, although the reservists were earmarked ostensibly for Jordan and actually for Egypt. Nasser states that he believed this false Russian “intelligence,” which misled him to reinforce the Sinai as a deterrent to Israeli blackmail or invasion of Syria. (It seems that his self-deluded “success” in causing Israel to “back down” from this mythical aggression whetted Nasser’s appetite and led him into the adventures in the Sinai that actually precipitated the Israeli attack.) Unfortunately there is no evidence indicating why the Russians gave this false intelligence to Nasser. Presumably their motive was to provoke Nasser into a safe bluff. If so, they failed, because he went far beyond that. In positing this explanation Walter Laqueur suggests that the Russians knew the information to be false, that the KGB’s skillful Department of Disinformation simply fabricated some plausible documentation.⁸²³ There is also the possibility that the KGB’s Near-Eastern experts were simply wrong. The subsequent shake-up in the KGB could point to either possibility, assuming as seems quite possible that the KGB purge was indeed a mark of Politburo displeasure with the KGB’s part. But it remains an open question whether the KGB purge was the consequence of a deception operation that backfired, of the gross failure to warn the Politburo (much less Nasser) of the impending Israeli invasion of Egypt, or even of some

⁸²³Laqueur (68), 71-82, 160, 175; and Draper (68), 52-58. Also Stock (67), 223-224; Kedouri (68), 802; Eban in Laqueur (68), 350-351; MacLeish (67), 20-21; and Byford-Jones (68), 17-18.

other and possibly quite unconnected circumstance.⁸²⁴

I have reserved to last the most interesting part of Israeli stratagem used in the Six-Day War. This was employed after the initial attack to support the follow through. It is a true innovation in deception operations.

That the Six-Day War was just that and not the “Eight” or “Nine-Day War” is in very large part the work of Israeli Military Intelligence, whose Chief was then Brigadier Aharon Yariv. In addition to providing much of the superbly accurate operational intelligence on the Egyptian air bases—including pinpointing most of the dummy aircraft—that permitted their efficient destruction,⁸²⁵ Military Intelligence also planned and carried out Operation FOG OF BATTLE. The codename aptly—too aptly for security reasons—suggests the nature of the operation. It commemorates the widely quoted and inspired phrase “the fog of war,” signifying the chaos of information inherent in the fast breaking crisis of battle—the confusing muddle of delayed and mislaid messages, garbled and misunderstood orders, incomplete and misinformed intelligence, exaggerated claims of successes and suppressed reports of blunders. The “fog of war” is a consequence of the imperfections in the information system of each military organization. Operation FOG OF BATTLE, in contrast, was an effort by one military organization to intensify the already murky atmosphere of an opponent’s army.

In an unprecedented leak of a contemporary deception operation, Mr. Leo Heiman asserts that:⁸²⁶

This operation misled top enemy commanders, drew them into traps, diverted their forces in the wrong directions, spread confusion and chaos within upper level headquarters, and speeded up the process of demoralization and disintegration of the channels of command.

If this assertion can be sustained, Israeli Military Intelligence can claim to have introduced an entirely new dimension to deception—a virtual fusion of strategy, stratagem, tactics, and psychological warfare that I have discussed in the main text under the heading “total stratagem.”⁸²⁷

Heiman, unfortunately, mentions only one key part of this program, namely the manipulation of claims of captured terrain. This was done by careful orches-

⁸²⁴Laqueur (68), 179-180. Note that the KGB Chairman, Semichastny, was relieved on 18 May, i.e., after the rumors of an intended Israeli attack on Syria but *before* the consequent war.

⁸²⁵See References—Camouflage (Egyptian) at end of this case.

⁸²⁶Heiman (67/68), 364. The accuracy of this unattributed account must remain somewhat suspect as long as it remains the only published account. The material in Byford-Jones (67/68) gives substantial but incomplete verification, as does that in Gruber (68). Mr. Heiman, an independent journalist with offices in Israel and New York, is a widely published writer on Middle Eastern military affairs. He claims to have served in the Partisan movement in Russia during World War II. Although Mr. Heiman’s disclosures look like the grossest betrayal of Israeli security, it may well be that Israeli authorities have good reason to believe that the Egyptians, Russians, and Americans were able to accurately reconstruct the deception plan from after-battle reports. In that case, it could be a well-calculated disclosure.

⁸²⁷See Chapter VI, Part D.

tration of both public announcements (via communiqués and press conferences) and military radio deception.

The deceptive use of tactical radio was, in fact, quite general, as we learn from Colonel Byford-Jones. It was known that the Egyptians—even their Airforce—had made little progress since 1956 toward improving their very insecure tactical communications. This, despite their Russian technical assistance and advisers. Israeli Military Intelligence knew all the Egyptian radio channels, procedures, and—I presume—tactical codes.⁸²⁸ This painstakingly acquired knowledge now formed the basis for a comprehensive program of radio “games.”

Heiman gives the following examples of Operation FOG OF BATTLE.

1. The Israelis delayed announcing their early capture of El Arish,⁸²⁹ the main Egyptian air base in the Sinai Peninsula. Moreover, its Israeli captors briefly pretended that El Arish was still in Egyptian hands. They did this by a combination of the simple ruse of leaving the UAR flag flying and the sophisticated one of maintaining the routine control tower radio chatter. Thus Egyptian pilots—seeing their flag and receiving landing instructions in Egyptian-accented Arabic—continued to land for several hours after its capture. The Egyptians had received no warnings that El Arish was even threatened, much less that it had fallen.
2. Israeli military communiqués gave the Egyptian staff the initial impression that their forces were advancing toward Tel Aviv while the Israeli Army was immobilized in the desperate defense of the settlements and villages in the Negev Desert and along the Gaza Strip.⁸³⁰ In fact, the Israeli columns had already carried their war of maneuver deep in the Sinai well behind major Egyptian units.
3. In Jordan, the garrison and citizens of Nablus welcomed the Israeli armored column that came from the east, having momentarily mistaken them for the expected advance column of the Iraqi Expeditionary Force. In fact, the Israelis had already intercepted and defeated that force, but had made no mention of their presence east of Nablus. Thus Nablus fell without battle, and the Jordanian forces entrenched west of the town were readily surprised from the rear and easily defeated.⁸³¹
4. Also in Jordan, the Israelis delayed for 48 hours announcing their capture of Jericho despite its great propaganda value as an historical, religious, and emotional trophy, spiced by the news value that the name of the officer who led the seizure was Joshua. However, Jericho was also the

⁸²⁸See, for example, Byford-Jones (68), 63.

⁸²⁹El Arish was captured by D-day evening, presumably in time for the scheduled 9 p.m. press briefing. However, the announcement of its capture was not made until 0130 the next morning when the deferred briefing was finally held. Byford-Jones (68), 65, 120-121.

⁸³⁰Although, as Liddell Hart (68), 18, points out, Brig.-Gen. Tal's efforts to lure Egyptian ground forces in the Gaza Strip failed as the Egyptians merely kept to the defensive.

⁸³¹Nablus fell sometime after morning of D-plus-1. The broad outlines of this maneuver are confirmed by Byford-Jones (68), 160-161.

main strategic juncture of all roads crossing the Jordan River to Amman. Thus the Israelis were able to set roadblock ambushes to capture the Jordanian units retreating to Amman via Jericho.⁸³² Only after that did the Israeli citizens (and the Arab commanders) learn that Jericho had been taken, when Kol Israel broadcast the general announcement that a military government had been formed to police the occupied portions of Jordan, including the Jericho district.

Colonel Wilfred Byford-Jones—a British journalist and World War II information officer—supplies a detailed account of manipulative deception practiced by the official Israeli military spokesman, Colonel Moshe Pearlman at his second (i.e., first detailed) briefing.⁸³³ (Byford-Jones was present at both briefings at Beit Sokolov, the temporary headquarters of the military censors in Tel Aviv.) Sometime on D-day Israeli Intelligence verified that their Egyptian counterpart had received special urgent instructions to augment their monitoring service to encompass all dispatches sent from Israel by the foreign press correspondents. The Israelis correctly inferred that Nasser had decided to turn to that channel as the main source of his battle reports, knowing as they did from their own monitoring of the urgent service messages from senior to lower Egyptian military headquarters that the Egyptian command was receiving almost no (authentic) battle reports from its own units. The Israelis now knew that Nasser was as eagerly awaiting Colonel Pearlman's scheduled 9 p.m. briefing as was the assembled press corps. Consequently, Dayan and Rabin "willfully sat upon the facts of the first day's battle for four-and-a half hours."

How nearly *total* was Operation FOG OF BATTLE? It covered both the Egyptian and Jordanian fronts, but Heiman gives no indication that it also was used on the Syrian front. I presume that similar ruses were used there; although the narrow front (40 miles), mountainous terrain, and strong Syrian defense line inhibited the kind of highly mobile warfare in which FOG OF BATTLE would best flourish.

Operation FOG OF BATTLE also made fully coordinated use of the Israeli Army public information office⁸³⁴ as well as public and military radio. Note that deception here was apparently confined to the delay in publicizing actual victories—delay of from 24 hours up to the duration of the war itself. Thus, it did not involve entering any false claims. This policy won and sustained the high rating of credibility given it by the foreign correspondents and also by the Egyptian General Staff, which after all was in a position to quickly verify at least some types of falsely claimed Israeli victories. Such a B.B.C. standard of credibility not only served well in getting the foreign correspondents and international news media to act as supplementary channels to the Egyptians but also gave greater credit to the small deceit practiced by the Israeli Mission

⁸³²According to Byford-Jones (68), 146-147, Jericho had been entered late on D-plus-2 and was cleared the following morning.

⁸³³Byford-Jones (68), 62-65. Another and rather different eyewitness account of these briefings is by MacLeish (67), 90-92, 94-95, 102-104, 113-121.

⁸³⁴Headed by Colonel Moshe Pearlman who had also held that post during the 1956 campaign. Byford-Jones (68), 60.

to the United Nations over the legally embarrassing question of “first strike” guilt discussed below.

After the initial brief radio bulletins announcing the opening of hostilities, a regular newscast was scheduled for 10 a.m. At that time, instead of news, a remarkably frank statement was made by Brigadier-General Chaim Herzog, the familiar, quiet-voiced Military Commentator of Kol Israel. He reassured the news-starved and apprehensive listeners that:⁸³⁵

The fact that no announcements are being made does not necessarily indicate that there is nothing to announce. . . . It is not always advisable to report on battles, for at times the enemy is interested to learn the facts of the situation no less than we are. Under the circumstances of unprecedented hysteria on the part of the Arabs, their false reporting and utter instability, it is advisable that they continue to believe their own false stories, up to a point.

General Herzog concluded his commentary by saying: “The fog of war hinders the enemy, and so let us leave him with it rather than dispel it.”

The “fog” was patchy in some areas. Coordination with the Israeli press was imperfect. Thus on the afternoon of D-day, *Ma’ariv*, the largest daily, hit the streets with a Reuters dispatch datelined Paris that reported the destruction of 117 Egyptian aircraft that morning. Although this report was undoubtedly available in Cairo and the Egyptian leaders may have had fairly clear reports of their own air losses,⁸³⁶ the Israeli Army promptly announced that the story was “premature, unverified, and highly unreliable.”⁸³⁷

When did Israeli Military Intelligence perceive the opportunity for Operation FOG OF BATTLE? Heiman says that this occurred sometime during D-day itself.⁸³⁸ However, as seen from Gruber’s evidence above,⁸³⁹ the operation was fully underway by 10 a.m., that is within two hours and fifteen minutes of the opening of hostilities. I doubt that this was enough time for even the Israelis to coordinate an information deception campaign between Military Intelligence, the Military Information Office, and the Voice of Israel. We can reconcile the data from Heiman, Gruber, and Byford-Jones by assuming that the planning and coordination preceded D-day and that its implementation required only verification that the confusion in Egyptian field communications was beginning to operate as expected.

Why was the Egyptian military intelligence service so dependent on the Israelis for their combat intelligence? While all intelligence services audit their enemies’ mass media and military communications, none would by choice take them as their sole source for to do so would make them too obviously vulnerable

⁸³⁵Gruber (68), 62-63.

⁸³⁶However, Nasser either lied or did not know the extent of his aerial disaster when the next day he told King Hussein by telephone that “we are flying our planes over Israel today; our planes are striking at Israel’s airfields since morning.” Gruber (68), 75.

⁸³⁷Gruber (68), 66-67.

⁸³⁸Heiman (67/68), 364.

⁸³⁹Gruber (68), 62.

to disinformation. I would speculate that Israeli Military Intelligence astutely recognized that the confusion of combat breeds an unparalleled opportunity for tactical deception. Moreover, they may have recognized that their enemy could be made entirely dependent on them for intelligence, *if his own independent sources of intelligence and verification were destroyed*. And the degree to which this destruction could be achieved would more or less directly increase the degree of dependence on Israeli sources.⁸⁴⁰

It is known that the Israelis did intentionally havoc the Egyptian information collection and communication systems. Within the first hours of the war, nearly all radar stations were destroyed, many communications centers hit, and—by command of the air—all aerial reconnaissance prevented.⁸⁴¹ Moreover, the intelligence officers with the advancing Israeli units closely monitored the Egyptian field radio communications and very *selectively* jammed them, permitting all falsely optimistic reports of local unit commanders to go up the Egyptian chain of command, but jamming the more accurate reports. Jamming gradually became general over the three main areas of Egyptian collapse and Egyptian efforts to reestablish contact by ground patrols were met by roadblocks. Israeli intelligence was also instantaneously measuring the spread of confusion and uncertainty within the enemy's higher echelons by monitoring the service calls from Cairo and other senior headquarters.⁸⁴²

The two common sources of battle intelligence available to the Egyptians were espionage and "contact." As to espionage—train watching, etc.—the Egyptians are generally deemed inferior to the Israelis. Moreover, whatever double agents the Israeli intelligence services may have been running would themselves be convenient for transmitting seemingly independent verification of such Israeli deceptions as deployments and intentions.

As to "contact"—specifically the immediate perceptions of the field commanders battling Israeli units—it is precisely here—at the center of the storm—that the fog lies thickest on the ground. And here the Egyptians suffered a special handicap of which the Israelis and probably also the Egyptian general staffs knew quite well from earlier experience. Egyptian officers tend to exaggerate achievements and to minimize defeats in their reports, grossly beyond that found in any modern army.⁸⁴³ Thus, such field combat reports probably received small credit at rear echelon headquarters. In addition, the fact that the Israelis were on the offensive would itself minimize the number of their own troops captured for interrogation (only 9 Israelis were captured) or of headquarters overrun with their operational orders. And the fact that the Israeli offensive was a particularly swift and fluid one would intensify effects of the delays inherent in the Egyptian combat intelligence reporting and evaluation system. Finally, the Israelis may be presumed to have done rather well in guarding their secrets from Soviet Russian intelligence, which I suppose was sharing at least some of its findings with

⁸⁴⁰While Heiman (67/68) does not discuss this aspect, I find that Byford-Jones (68), 63-64, does do so.

⁸⁴¹See particularly the excellent account by Churchill and Churchill (67).

⁸⁴²Byford-Jones (68), 62-64.

⁸⁴³Byford-Jones (68), 62-63.

the Egyptians through their large military aid mission. First, we know that the initial Israeli air strike was conducted in a manner well calculated to evade radar monitoring and their later operations were covered by (presumably) effective electronic countermeasures (ECM).⁸⁴⁴ Second, there is good evidence that the Israelis have been using the one-time random-key tapes since at least 1956 for their most secret communications. As this system is absolutely unbreakable, not even the inquisitive Russian KGB or GRU or the U.S. CIA or NSA could do more than perform traffic analyses with the intercepts.⁸⁴⁵

Thus, having struck the Egyptians blind and deaf the Israelis could then drive them mad with a comprehensive campaign of misinformation, fulfilling the ancient dream of Meng Shih and the imperfectly practiced teaching of Mao Tse-tung. Incidentally, I wonder if at least many of the absurd claims of Israeli defeats issued by the Egyptians were not due to their having swallowed the ersatz intelligence of Operation FOG OF WAR rather than—as argued in the studies of that war—merely having credulously believed the conceits of their generals. The entire war was accompanied throughout by deception operations, from the initiating surprise attack that was prepared by strategic deception, through the course of battle that was determined by a remarkable innovation in tactical deception, and into the political patching at the UN that was aided by a diplomatic ruse.

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⁸⁴⁴Churchill and Churchill (67).

⁸⁴⁵I infer this from veiled references in American memoirs that indicate conclusions drawn from traffic analysis of intercepts but not from cryptanalysis. On the general commercial availability of the new radioactive decay-based (i.e., random) one-time systems—price \$50,000 from Boris Hagelin's Crypto Aktiengesellschaft, Zug, Switzerland—see Kahn (67), 433-434.

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- **Surprise**

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- Brigadier-General Hod’s CBS-TV Interview of 18 Jul 1967 in Robinson (68), 354.
- Robinson (68), 354.
- Heiman (67/68), 365, 366-367.
- Liddell Hart (68), 16-18.

- **Camouflage (Egyptian)**

- Churchill and Churchill (67), 48, 85.
- Heiman (67/68), 363.
- Bondy, Zmora, Bashan (68), 165.
- Donovan (67), 106-107.
- Robinson (68), 354.

- **Deception (General)**

- Churchill and Churchill (67), 73-75, 81, 97-98.
- Heiman (67/68), 366-367.

- Byford-Jones (68), 33-43, 50, 57, 78.
- MacLeish (67), 84, 85, 146-147.
- Liddell Hart (68), 18.
- Donovan (67), 87.
- Lacquer (68), 156.
- Gruber (68), 49-50, 58.

- **Deception (Operation FOG OF BATTLE)**

- Heiman (67/68), 364.
- Byford-Jones (68), 62-65, 79.
- Gruber (68), 62-63, 66-67.

- **Addenda-General**

- Brigadier Peter Young, *The Israeli Campaign, 1967* (London: Kimber, 1967). (Not seen by me.)
- B. H. Liddell Hart, “Strategy of a War,” *Encounter*, Vol. 30, No. 2 (February 1968), pp. 16-20.

Case A67. Czechoslovakia, 20 Aug 1968

While the evidence is by no means all in on the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968,⁸⁴⁶ quite enough is known to identify it as a successful case of surprise through deception.

It is rarely that covert operations so quickly divulge their intelligence secrets. Indeed much information came to light even during the first week following the invasion. We have, of course, *prima facie* evidence of deception supplied by the accomplished fact of an attack in the midst of political negotiations and facilitated by the cry-wolf effect of military “maneuvers.” That much was obvious upon hearing the very first news bulletin. In addition, as early as D-plus-3, senior officials of General Gerhard Wessel’s West German Intelligence Service (the Bundesnachrichtendienst, BND) were leaking many details.⁸⁴⁷

And in November, several high NATO officials “leaked” their versions in rich if off-the-record detail.⁸⁴⁸ Although these disclosures share the usual dubious and self-serving purposes of almost all such “leaks” from intelligence services, they do conclusively establish that the Soviet attack involved deception and surprise of timing for the intelligence services of the Czech Government, NATO Headquarters, the British, the U.S. CIA, and in part the West German BND.

The Soviet Build-up and Invasion

First, a brief chronology of the crisis.

The Czech Communist regime had long been flawed with nationalist and democratic stirrings. Then, in *December 1967*, the entire system began to unravel when Novotný failed to hold power by a military coup.⁸⁴⁹ His fall and succession by Dubček as First Secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party on *5 January* posed a serious problem for continued Soviet Control.⁸⁵⁰ If Dubček could not be kept to the line, Czech freedom would constitute an intolerable affront to Soviet predominance and control. The Russians were probably prepared to accept Dubček’s nationalism as they had that of Gomulka’s in Poland; but the democratic tendencies were another matter, particularly as the Soviet leadership was itself now retreating toward the Golden Age of Stalinism.

Meanwhile, a series of Russo-Czech CP meetings and conferences would be held concerned with resolving their political differences. It is still moot at which

⁸⁴⁶This case arose too late to fully incorporate in my quantitative analyses. I am indebted to Mr. William R. Harris of Harvard and to Dr. Robin Remington of M.I.T. for supplying the bibliographic references and to Professor Uri Ra’anan of the Fletcher School of Diplomacy for his highly original interpretation of the central events. Most Western journalistic accounts incorrectly—as will be seen—date the Soviet invasion to the 21st.

⁸⁴⁷Ostensibly Wessel permitted these disclosures to reassure German voters that his organization had done a good job of intelligence collection and evaluation and to prevent the U.S. Government from “playing down” such warnings in the future. See Terry (68), 8.

⁸⁴⁸Wilson (68), 4.

⁸⁴⁹A useful account is Robert Conquest, “Czechoslovakia: The Soviet Outlook,” *Studies in Comparative Communism*, Vol. 1, Nos. 1 and 2 (Jul/Oct 1968), pp. 7-16.

⁸⁵⁰See Deryck Viney, “Alexander Dubček,” *Studies in Comparative Communism*, Vol. 1, Nos. 1 and 2 (July/October 1968), pp. 17-39.

point the Russians decided that negotiations had failed, opted for the military solution, and henceforward used inter-Party diplomacy as a mask for their real intentions. In any case, the level of Russian anxiety was sufficient by February for CIA and BND agents in Eastern Europe to report back a flurry of indications that the Soviet Army might move against Czechoslovakia.⁸⁵¹

The crises continued to deepen; and, on 23 March, the Russians received a further insult when Novotný was forced out even from his face-saving post as President. The next major sign was the Moscow *Pravda* statement of 12 April that announced the Czechs had been warned about “anti-socialist elements” which were attempting to reintroduce multi-party “liberalism.”⁸⁵² Then, on 22 April, Russian propaganda introduced the ominous theme that there was an “imperialist design” to “build bridges” to the socialist countries, implying that certain Czechs might be collaborating in such treason.⁸⁵³

On May 9th and 10th, during the celebration of Czechoslovakia’s liberation, all major western wire services reported Soviet troop movements along Czechoslovakia’s border with Poland and East Germany. Although these reports were initially denied, on 10 May, Radio Prague announced that a Warsaw Pact exercise was indeed underway in southern Poland, and on 14 and 15 May the Soviet and Polish press confirmed this.⁸⁵⁴

The military threat was increased by an additional and much larger-scale Warsaw Pact exercise in Poland and the GDR during June. Moreover, the Czechs were induced to participate, allowing some 16,000 Soviet troops to enter Czechoslovakia and familiarize themselves with local conditions. Although it was officially announced as having ended on 30 June,⁸⁵⁵ the Soviet troops loitered on until 11 July when Moscow announced final conclusion of the exercise as of that date.⁸⁵⁶ Although the Soviet Army elements had departed Czechoslovakia, the surrounding troops did not stand down: “maneuvers” were simply continued (from 25 July) as Operation SKY SHIELD, ostensibly a defensive anti-aircraft exercise, but one that extended up to the Czech border. The sinister implications of these activities were clear when, beginning on 29 July, Western intelligence sources detected the deployment toward the Czech border of about 75,000 Russian troops in East Germany and others in Poland.⁸⁵⁷ Two East German divisions moved up with the Russians, and this movement continued through early August.⁸⁵⁸

Meanwhile, the Western press was carrying a flurry of unauthorized leaks, semi-official comments, and—most significant—off-the-record but authoritative remarks by expert or senior American Government officials. It must be assumed that these were being read with great interest by Soviet Intelligence and the Politburo in their copies of “Red TASS,” the daily Russian translations of the

⁸⁵¹Wilson (68), 4.

⁸⁵²Wilson (68), 4.

⁸⁵³Robinson (68), 149.

⁸⁵⁴Robinson (68), 160-167.

⁸⁵⁵*New York Times*, 1 July 1968.

⁸⁵⁶Moscow TASS International Service in English, 2310 GMT 11 July 1968.

⁸⁵⁷*New York Times*, 30 July 1968.

⁸⁵⁸Dunn, Marks and Wilson (68), 2.

foreign news media.⁸⁵⁹ If so, by late July—three or four days before the Cierna conference—they were no doubt reassured to learn that if they were to take direct action in Czechoslovakia, the U.S. (and hence NATO) would do nothing.⁸⁶⁰ Indeed, there had even been one official public warning Soviet intentions. This occurred back on 24 May when Herr Diehl, the official spokesman for the West German Government disclosed at a Press Conference that the Soviet maneuvers were mere cover for a full-scale invasion plan that was in existence. This statement was apparently made without the knowledge of Chancellor Kiesinger and was quickly officially denied and Herr Diehl reprimanded for such “irresponsible and panic-creating talk.” BND officials charge that this denial was made on U.S. request.⁸⁶¹

The crisis had escalated to the point where the Russians now demanded bilateral and multi-lateral talks at the highest levels, ostensibly to resolve it. The Czech leaders agreed to two of these. The first was the lengthy Russo-Czech meeting held at the Czech village of Cierna from 29 July through 1 August. This was immediately followed by the six-party meeting at Bratislava on 4 August. The Czechs came away from these meetings with the feeling—fully shared by Western commentators—that, although matters remained critical, they were still negotiable.⁸⁶²

Immediately following the Bratislava conference, the top Russian leaders—Brezhnev, Kosygin, and Podgorny—went off on holiday, or so it was reported. (Edmund Stevens later took this as proof that they too believed the crisis had passed, not realizing that such a sign could have been mere camouflage.)⁸⁶³

The Soviet troops earmarked for the invasion were ordered on general alert on 11 August and remained in that posture until the final go-ahead on the 20th.⁸⁶⁴ Incidentally, many of the units earmarked for the Czech operation were—as in the 1956 Hungarian operation—calculatedly deceived about their own imminent rôle by being shuffled about in the “maneuvers” and by other misleading orders and briefings.⁸⁶⁵

On 16-17 August three senior Soviet officers made what we now presume to have been a final readiness check. The triumvirate comprised Marshal I. A. Grechko, the Defense Minister, Marshal A. I. Yakubovsky, the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Army, and Army General A. A. Yepishev, the Chief of the Main Political Administration. They “consulted” in East Berlin on the 16th and in Poland the next day.⁸⁶⁶

On Saturday the 17th (D-minus-3), a planeload of Russian KGB men arrived

⁸⁵⁹See my *Daily Monitoring of the Western Press* (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T., Center for International Studies, 1964).

⁸⁶⁰As commented on by Professor Uri Ra'anani before the invasion.

⁸⁶¹Terry (68), 8.

⁸⁶²Conquest (68), 34-35.

⁸⁶³Edmund Stevens, “How the Kremlin top men lost out to the Army,” *Los Angeles Sunday Times*, 25 August 1968.

⁸⁶⁴As admitted by Soviet military personnel in Czechoslovakia following the invasion. *New York Times*, 24 August 1968.

⁸⁶⁵From a not-for-attribution source.

⁸⁶⁶*Pravda*, 17 and 18 August 1968.

at Prague's Ruzyně airport. They acted as the key advisers on planning the coup to the Czech Interior Ministry which—except for the Minister himself—was completely controlled by pro-Moscow Czechs.⁸⁶⁷

On Sunday and Monday the 18th and 19th, Brezhnev, in his capacity as CPSU General Secretary, notified the Polish, East German, Hungarian, and Bulgarian Party leaders of the Soviet intention. The obstreperous Rumanians were not so warned nor, of course, was the Czech Party.⁸⁶⁸ Brezhnev, Kosygin, and Podgorny had hastily returned to Moscow from their holidays to attend an emergency “enlarged meeting” of the Politburo held on Monday the 19th.⁸⁶⁹

At 4 p.m.⁸⁷⁰ on the 20th, Deputy Minister of Interior, Viliam Salgovic briefed his senior staff, disclosing the program for their part in the imminent invasion. The security services were to seize certain key officials and all major communications centers.⁸⁷¹

The invasion began at 2230 hours on the 20th with the lighting airborne coup at Prague's Ruzyně airport.⁸⁷² Then, “around 2300” hours that evening, the Soviet and allied ground forces began crossing the Czech borders.⁸⁷³

All military operations were under the command of one of the rising stars of the Soviet Army, Army General I. G. Pavlovsky.⁸⁷⁴ The initial striking force comprised elements drawn from 23 to 26 divisions plus smaller units that—including token representation from four of Russia's Warsaw Pact allies—totalled 150,000 to 200,000 troops (Table A.110). This left an approximately equal force on immediate call at the frontier had serious military resistance developed.

Under the circumstances the picked and carefully rehearsed invasion force was quite adequate for its mission, as the Czech regular army had only 14 divisions totalling about 75,000 troops. Moreover, these Czech forces were tied into a westward-facing deployment, oriented against NATO in accord with the Czech obligations to her Warsaw Pact partners. The Czech Government had chosen not to redeploy the army to face its Communist neighbors presumably because, while this might have had some weight as a military deterrent,⁸⁷⁵ it would have been a politically intolerable provocation by confirming Moscow's

⁸⁶⁷“Black Book,” as quoted in *Newsweek*, 16 December 1968, p. 55.

⁸⁶⁸*New York Times*, 24 August 1968.

⁸⁶⁹Stevens (68).

⁸⁷⁰All hours are given in local Czech time unless specifically indicated. Prague time was then one hour ahead of Greenwich Mean Time (GMT).

⁸⁷¹“Black Book,” as quoted in *Newsweek*, 16 December 1968, p. 54.

⁸⁷²Chapman (68), 1-2. Although other equally plausible reports give the time as just after midnight, i.e., *after* the ground invasion.

⁸⁷³According to the Czech Presidium announcement carried by Radio Prague Domestic Service at 0050 GMT 21 August 1968. For complete text in English translation see FBIS, *Daily Report: East Europe*, 21 August 1968, p. D1. This time is confirmed by the “Black Book” as quoted in *Newsweek*, 16 December 1968, p. 54.

⁸⁷⁴Ivan Grigorevich Pavlovsky (1909-). A Ukrainian who has only held high political and military offices since 1966. In 1967 he was appointed First Deputy Minister of Defense. *Prominent Personalities in the USSR* (Metuchen, N.J.: Scarecrow Press, 1968), p. 473. A comprehensive biographical sketch has reportedly been issued by the Radio Free Europe research staff in Munich.

⁸⁷⁵My assumption here is that Russia *preferred* to avoid the bloodletting victory that could easily have followed such a direct military confrontation.

Nationality	Number of Divisions	Number of Troops
	Earmarked	Committed
Russian	16	150,000
Polish	3	15,000
Bulgarian	1	5,000?
East German	2	4,000
Hungarian	2	1,000?
Totals:	24	~ 5,000

Table A.110: Initial Forces for Invasion of Czechoslovakia, August 1968. References: Dunn, Marks and Wilson (68), 2; and Terry (68), 8. The Czech “Black Book” gives the implausibly high figure of 500,000.

charges that the Czechs were playing the Westerners’ game. If this was indeed the Czech calculation, it was a delusion, because the Russian Politburo had already judged the political provocation to have reached an intolerable level.

The Czech Communist Party Presidium was in session that night. At 11:40 p.m., quickly following some vague reports, the Presidium received confirmation of the invasion. All members were surprised except perhaps three of the “conservatives”: Bilak, Indra, and Svestka.⁸⁷⁶

Early the following morning, at 1:15 a.m., the Warsaw Pact installations began large-scale and generally successful jamming of NATO radar. As such jamming had happened from time to time before (but not during the current exercises), this instance was initially assumed to be part of the ongoing maneuvers. It was not until one or two hours later that the NATO military command posts first learned that the invasion was already underway.⁸⁷⁷

The Czech Presidium just managed to get the announcement of the invasion out by Radio Prague in a special bulletin at 1:50 a.m., as the Russian and Czech security men were seizing most of the transmitters.⁸⁷⁸

The initial Radio Prague bulletin tersely stated that:⁸⁷⁹

Yesterday, troops of the Soviet Union, the GDR [German Democratic Republic], the Polish People’s Republic, and Hungary crossed the frontiers of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. All citizens are requested to maintain quiet and not to offer any resistance.

This was immediately followed by a longer official announcement from the Czech Presidium that noted the presence of Bulgarian troops and specified the time of invasion as “around 2300” hours.

A minor piece of deception occurred in connection with this official Czech radio announcement of the invasion. Unable to suppress it, Lieutenant Colonel

⁸⁷⁶ “Black Book,” as quoted in *Newsweek*, 16 December 1968, p. 54.

⁸⁷⁷ Geisenheyner (68), 40; and Terry (68), 8. I suspect that the NATO information came from the official Czech announcement at 1:50 a.m., which was monitored in London.

⁸⁷⁸ Radio Prague Domestic Service, 0340 GMT 21 August 1968.

⁸⁷⁹ Radio Prague, 0050 GMT 21 August 1968, as translated in FBIS, *Daily Report: East Europe*, 21 August 1968, p. D1.

Vanek, a senior Soviet agent in the Interior Ministry, had circulated the rather widely credited rumor that the broadcast had been a hoax.⁸⁸⁰

Moscow (and the other East Europeans) did not make its official announcement of the invasion until 5:50 a.m. Czech time.⁸⁸¹

The Soviet military operations went quickly and rather smoothly; and the occupation was completed swiftly, and aside from some traffic jams en route, efficiently. The main Russian spearhead of 500 tanks covered the 60 miles from the East German frontier to Prague in just over three hours. Other columns crossed directly from Hungary and from Russia herself.

High priority was given to the takeover of Czech airfields. This was part of the initial stroke and was conducted according to a carefully designed program whereby a small advance commando party would fly in to seize the airport communications and administration after which larger forces would land to provide local security until the overland arrival of the ground forces.⁸⁸²

It is in connection with this special program of airfield takeover that tactical deception has been alleged. The key airfield was the Ruzyne International Airport at Prague. At 10:30 p.m. on the 20th an unscheduled Russian Aeroflot passenger plane requested landing clearance, which the Prague control tower promptly granted. An all-male "tourist" party disembarked, visited the lavatory, and emerged as uniformed troops to seize the airport tower. (However, they overlooked a teletype room, whose operator's frantic call to Frankfurt was the first direct clue from inside Czechoslovakia that some operation was underway.)⁸⁸³

Although no estimates of total casualties have been released, the invasion was comparatively bloodless. By 26 August (D+6), Czech casualties in Prague stood at 22 dead and 314 wounded (110 of whom were then still hospitalized), all civilians. Only one Soviet soldier was known to have been killed and that accidentally by his own comrades.⁸⁸⁴

Russian Motives and Decisions

Soviet-Russian strategy was designed to present both the Czechs and NATO with a *fait accompli* that would forestall any effective military or political countermoves by either. To do so, the Russians devised their operation both to conceal their intentions by a deception plan that masked their very evident force preparations and to then move with utmost speed once the actual attack began.

⁸⁸⁰The "Black Book," as summarized by *The New York Times*, 12 December 1968, p. 16.

⁸⁸¹TASS International Service, 0450 GMT 21 August 1968. See FBIS, *Daily Report: Soviet Union*, 21 August 1968, p. A1.

⁸⁸²Dunn, Marks and Wilson (68), 2.

⁸⁸³Chapman (68), 1-2; and Geisenheyner (68), 40, who places the time of landing around 1 a.m. on the 21st. The "Black Book" (as quoted by *Newsweek*, 16 December 1968, p. 54) asserts that Ruzyne airport was seized shortly after midnight by Soviet troops from two transport planes.

⁸⁸⁴"Black Book," as quoted in *Newsweek*, 16 December 1968, p. 55.

The Western intelligence services seemingly and the Western Soviet experts certainly have failed to agree on the Russian motives, goals, and decisions preceding the invasion. This despite the voluminous evidence and the considerable advantages of hindsight. The individually cocksure theories, assertions and interpretations of such Anglo-American analysts as R. Conquest, Z. Brzezinski, H. Schwartz, and E. Stevens do not bear close comparison for mutual consistency. Moreover, on the three key points where some consensus has emerged, their conclusions do not account for certain outstanding facts. The only “scenario” proposed so far that survives Occam’s Razor is the highly original, unorthodox one by Uri Ra’anan. It may, of course, prove wrong in the light of yet to be disclosed facts, but for the present it is the only theory that is at once elegant and comprehensive. Moreover it is the only one that plausibly accommodates the evidence for deception.⁸⁸⁵

The experts fail to agree on three main points. These relate to the manner in which the Soviet leadership divided between pro- and anti-invasion factions, the date on which the decision to invade was reached, and the goals that the Russians sought. On the first point, I will only note that there are as many theories as there have been expert statements and until a convincing analysis appears, it is not practical to attempt to relate individual Russian (or East German) decision-makers to the second point, the timing of the decision to attack.

On the second point—that of the date of the Soviet decision—the experts can be roughly divided into two groups: those who believe the decision for war was taken late—on, say, the 19th—and those who presume it took place much earlier. The difference between these two positions is critical because the former implies that there was no deception, only improvisation, while the latter raises the salience of understanding the deception plan.

The “late” decision position⁸⁸⁶ comprises the following elements. It assumes the Russians were negotiating throughout in good faith. It speculates that from the conclusion of the Bratislava meeting on the 4th (or at least from the troop alert of the 11th) the Russians were hopefully awaiting Dubček’s satisfactory fulfillment of his promises.⁸⁸⁷

The scenario of the “early” decision⁸⁸⁸ hypothesis runs as follows. It assumes that the majority of Soviet leaders⁸⁸⁹ had come to believe by early 1968 that

⁸⁸⁵The remainder of this section is based on this speculative “scenario” conceived by Professor Ra’anan of the Fletcher School of Diplomacy.

⁸⁸⁶Held, for example by Harry Schwartz (in *The New York Times*, 22 August 1968), Edmund Stevens (in the *Los Angeles Sunday Times*, 25 August 1968), *The New York Times*, the *London Sunday Times*.

⁸⁸⁷“Moscow is Said to Have Felt Dubček Broke Secret Pledges,” *New York Times*, 24 August 1968.

⁸⁸⁸As held explicitly by myself, broadly by Uri Ra’anan, and more-or-less by the Czech “Black Book,” the West German BND intelligence service, some senior intelligence officials of NATO, *The Observer*, and Stefan Geisenheyner (the Europe Editor of *Air Force/Space Digest*).

⁸⁸⁹Most likely an *ad hoc* majority of the Politburo that formed only for special reasons geared to the political needs of Russia’s position vis-à-vis her fellow socialist states rather than to the old “hard” vs. “soft” or “hawks” vs. “doves” political-military factions.

the Czech challenge to Soviet prestige would have to be suppressed.

The Warsaw Pact “maneuvers” were never anything but a thinly contrived series of fables to justify the military buildup that had *already* begun on 9 May. The June maneuvers that included Czechoslovakia itself gave the 16,000 Russian troops introduced then the opportunity both for reconnaissance and a virtual dry-run. The very length of these military preparations should not necessarily be taken as a sign that the Russians were undecided about invasion. For, while there may have been an element of procrastination, 3-1/2 months was in fact a very short lead-time to plan, deploy, and rehearse for such a complex and almost perfectly executed operation. For example, considerable time was required to arrange even the token contingent of Bulgarians as they had to be brought by sea from Varna to Odessa⁸⁹⁰ and thence flown to the Czech border on 17 August, as a result of Romania’s refusal to grant overflight rights.⁸⁹¹

The “early decision” hypothesis also views the Cierna and Bratislava “negotiations” from 29 July to 4 August as *primarily* and perhaps entirely part of the deception plan.

The gratuitous character of Soviet brutality is most clearly seen in the inclusion of the token East German contingent in the invasion force. Typical of the Czech response is the slashing satire published in an underground edition of *Rude Pravo*, the officially suppressed organ of the Czech Communist Party Central Committee. The anonymous author, signing himself “Joseph [The Good Soldier] Schweik,” wrote:⁸⁹²

Let us be frank: it is good to have our friends in our midst. The sight of our German comrades, in their distinctive uniforms, will awaken particularly poignant feelings of nostalgia among members of our older generation.

Western commentators⁸⁹³ have quite missed the significance of this East German presence, taking the small size of the contribution and its limited deployment as a sign of Russian consideration for Czech sensibilities. The relevant point is that the German contribution was entirely unnecessary. Hence it was, as Uri Ra’anan has concluded, a deliberate affront. Although at least two East German divisions were available for the Czech operation, only about 4,000 actually entered, i.e., less than three per cent of the entire invasion force. Nor were they even needed to cover the German portion of the Czech border, as nearly 75,000 of the Soviet troops garrisoning East Germany were redeployed along the Czech-German border in late July.⁸⁹⁴ In other words, the Russians made certain to include *enough* Germans that their presence would be known, while seemingly making sure that there were neither so many nor so provoca-

⁸⁹⁰Information from an authoritative foreign source.

⁸⁹¹Terry (68), 8; and Dunn, Marks and Wilson (68), 2.

⁸⁹²Complete text in English translation in *Studies in Comparative Communism*, Vol. 1, Nos. 1 and 2 (Jul/Oct 1968), pp. 331-333.

⁸⁹³For example, Dunn, Mark and Wilson (68), 2.

⁸⁹⁴*New York Times*, 30 July 1968.

tively deployed (as, say, to Prague) that they would have precipitated a general battle.

NATO Warnings and Surprise

NATO, U.S., and West German intelligence were only partly surprised by the invasion. Their more-or-less pooled reports had provided an accurate picture of the changing deployment in the Warsaw Pact countries. Most of the raw intelligence data came from U.S. space satellite photos, U.S. high altitude photo-reconnaissance aircraft, and reports from West German field agents in Eastern Europe, with close-in data on the actual frontier build-up supplied mainly by NATO radar (and other electronic ferrets) along the West German-Czech border. From their evidence, the Western intelligence services accurately perceived the specific border build-up through the background noise provided by the ongoing Warsaw Pact maneuvers. Since as early as February 1968 Helms' CIA and Wessel's BND were reporting vague indications of the *possibility* of some Soviet military move against Czechoslovakia.⁸⁹⁵ Then, by June, the BND reported the ominous fact that some East European units were being earmarked and specially trained for the invasion.⁸⁹⁶ By early August Western intelligence knew the specific invasion routes. And some NATO intelligence officials correctly concluded that an invasion would be launched but they erred in presuming it would not occur until 1 September⁸⁹⁷ or not until immediately before the Czech Communist Party Assembly scheduled for 9 September.⁸⁹⁸

Although individual intelligence officers were quite apprehensive, NATO did not go to a full state of military "alert."⁸⁹⁹ As British Defense Secretary Denis Healey subsequently revealed, to journalists at Brussels in early November, NATO had moved up only to the less stringent state of "vigilance." Healey explained the failure of NATO to make an accurate estimate of the situation:⁹⁰⁰

As the crisis developed in August, it revealed weaknesses in NATO—a failure in communications, not only between governments themselves, but also between governments and the military.

In addition, it is now known that there were serious failures and delays in telecommunications networks in delivering some of the key information.⁹⁰¹ Moreover, national preoccupations and preconceptions predisposed all the Alliance governments to evade a close look at this threat as it developed. This was particularly true of the U.S. Government which consistently played down the intelligence warnings, preoccupied as it was with its war in Vietnam and

⁸⁹⁵Wilson (68), 4.

⁸⁹⁶Terry (68), 8.

⁸⁹⁷Dunn, Marks and Wilson (68), 2.

⁸⁹⁸Terry (68), 8.

⁸⁹⁹As mistakenly asserted by Lord Wigg in early November 1968.

⁹⁰⁰As quoted by Wilson (64), 4.

⁹⁰¹Wilson (68), 4.

unwilling to jeopardize its hopes for East-West arms control agreements by any pressure to deter possible Russian aggression against Czechoslovakia.⁹⁰²

Within two months of the Czech invasion, two major espionage cases came to public attention. These showed that at the time of the Czech crisis both NATO and the West German intelligence and defense services had been all along penetrated at their higher levels by the Soviet KGB. While full details are not yet available—not even it seems to harrassed Western security officers—there is strong circumstantial evidence that at least two Soviet espionage networks involved were both deeply concerned with the Czech affair. The first case was that of NATO's financial comptroller, Mr. Nahit Imre, who had worked inside NATO as a Soviet agent since 1958. In 1968 his prime mission was to ferret out NATO papers and data on Czechoslovakia. Even when he was denied this material after he came under NATO security surveillance in March he was able to by-pass security by going directly to unsuspecting members of his own Turkish delegation until his arrest on 11 September.⁹⁰³ The second case, that of the flurry of six "suicides" in October among well-placed West German officials, was far more serious in general and, very possibly, regarding Czechoslovakia, because these officials collectively knew all that NATO and West German intelligence had on Czech-Russian relations, on Russian deployments, and on NATO counterplans. Those implicated were Rear-Admiral Hermann Lüdke (the Deputy Chief of NATO Logistics), Major-General Horst Wendland (the Deputy Chief of the DNB itself), two key officials of the Defense Ministry, and one each from the ministries of economics and information.⁹⁰⁴ Most or all of these persons were almost certainly Soviet agents, and their information was precisely of the kind needed by the Russians to design a campaign of deception and misinformation that would best fit Western preconceptions about the timing and other aspects of the invasion. Although it is not yet known that the Russians did do this, they do seem to have had access to the appropriate data.

Thus, the timing of the Russian stroke hit with complete surprise. For example, many key British and West German ministers and officials were then off on summer vacations and considerable delays attended efforts to reestablish contact with some of them.⁹⁰⁵ A surer sign of Western surprise is that the Western intelligence services and leading analysts of Soviet affairs have been unable even *after the fact* to agree on such key Soviet motives and decisions as the timing of the decision to invade or the political goals sought.⁹⁰⁶

⁹⁰²Terry (68), 8; and Wilson (68), 4.

⁹⁰³For the case of Nahit Imre see Miguel Acoca, "Turk with a thirst for Scotch and secrets," *LIFE*, Vol. 65, No. 24 (13 December 1968), pp. 30-31.

⁹⁰⁴For the Lüdke-Wendland-Schenk-Gräpentin-Grimm-Böhm "suicide" case see Philippe de Vosjoli, "In NATO: Scenario of Spies and 'Suicide'," *LIFE*, Vol. 65, No. 24 (13 December 1968), pp. 26-29; and "Die Pannen im Fall Lüdke," *Der Spiegel*, Vol. 22, No. 45 (4 November 1968), pp. 27-32.

⁹⁰⁵Wilson (68), 4.

⁹⁰⁶As discussed above.

Czech Warnings and Perceptions

Just how much warning the victim—the Czech Government—had is difficult to say. Almost certainly less than the West, as Czech Military Intelligence in Eastern Europe was entirely coordinated by Russia through the Warsaw Pact and could have received little more than the Russians would have deliberately given them. Moreover, the Czech internal security force and its political intelligence service was entirely controlled—except for Interior Minister Josef Pavel himself—by Soviet agents, as the Czechs themselves have now revealed.⁹⁰⁷ Consequently, for their knowledge and estimate of the *military* situation the Czechs would have been almost entirely dependent on what few agents they may have controlled through loyal members of the diplomatic corps in the West as well as from any leaks that may have been passed to them by official or private Western sources. And it seems that Western intelligence services retained their monumental leaking until *after* D-day. Thus the Czechs probably had little more than the general indications available to readers of the Western press. They knew (directly and unambiguously, of course) of the political deterioration in their relations with Russia that had been building up through the year. And they also knew of the Warsaw Pact maneuvers in Czechoslovakia itself that occurred in July; however we do not know that they shared the apprehension of many Western military intelligence observers that these maneuvers constituted a kind of reconnaissance in force or dry-run.⁹⁰⁸ Moreover, the subsequent maneuvers in Eastern Europe surely did look like—as they in fact were—a cover for direct action.

Conclusion

The purely military part of the invasion was entirely successful in terms of its own immediate goals. It had achieved complete tactical and partial strategic surprise and was completed quickly enough to avoid any Czech military resistance or foreign intervention of any sort. Indeed, by 0200 hours of D-day itself, that is within 2.5 hours after the invasion, Radio Prague simultaneously announced the border crossings and forbade military resistance.

The subsequent story of the occupation, in which popular resistance has so far denied the Kremlin the political fruits of its military victory, is not germane to this study. Except, that is, in one particular. The extent that the Czech Government and bureaucracy (particularly the mass communications services) had seemingly prepared in advance to operate under a military occupation is one excellent proof that they had a rather sound grasp off the strategic situation and the options open to them. The immediate success of their own active but non-military “civilian defence” provided a remarkable instance of “technological” or “stylistic” surprise for the Russians, the watching world, and perhaps even themselves.

⁹⁰⁷ *New York Times*, 12 December 1968, p. 16.

⁹⁰⁸ Wilson (68), 4.

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Appendix B

Analytical Lists of Battles, 1914-1968

[Author's note for 2007 Reprint:] Appendix B, organized as a data base in three lists, is omitted from this reprint. They may be found in the original edition or from the (bartwhaley@alum.mit.edu) email address.

These lists represent the categorized data for each of the 168 case studies. I used them to generate the tables scattered throughout the text. Using pencil and paper, I could do a simple cross-tabulation in 20-30 minutes. It was faster than waiting to use the MIT Cray computer. Readers are invited to use them to either verify my old tables or, better, test new original hunches themselves. Under my supervision, around 1979, a CIA/Mathtech staffer keyed these (plus some new cases) into the now missing computerized DECEPTR data base.

The lists comprise

List A: Inventory of Cases of Strategic Surprise and/or Strategic Deception

List B: Examples of Tactical Surprise and/or Tactical Deception

List C: Examples of Battles Involving neither Surprise nor Deception

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