



Making Sense of Race

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Edward Dutton

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Epigraph

There is . . . no doubt that the various races, when carefully compared and measured, differ much from each other,—as in the texture of the hair, the relative proportions of all parts of the body, the capacity of the lungs, the form and capacity of the skull, and even in the convolutions of the brain. But it would be an endless task to specify the numerous points of structural difference. The races differ also in constitution, in acclimatisation, and in liability to certain diseases. Their mental characteristics are likewise very distinct; chiefly as it would appear in their emotional, but partly in their intellectual, faculties.

Charles Darwin, *The Descent of Man* (1871)

*Things You Shouldn't Mention at the Dinner Table—
Indeed, At Any Table*

Introduction

It's a scene you find all over the world. Men get together after work or at the weekend. They sit in pubs, drink beer, and talk about sports. Players and teams are ranked; match-ups are hotly debated; stories from the past are retold; details of athletes and performances are analyzed down to the millimeter and millisecond. No aspect of sports is off the table . . . except one. In these scenes, it's almost impossible for men not to tread, at some point or another, upon our age's great taboo—*the reality and impact of race*. They are acutely aware of physical and mental differences between players; that these differences matter a great deal; that they are mainly genetic in nature; and that they are deeply related to race. Yet talking about it remains *verboten*, except, perhaps, in the roughest of pubs.

The numbers speak for themselves. The top-10 all-time fastest times in the 100-meter dash are held by men of West African descent, regardless of which nations they call home. The last White man to win Gold in the 100-meters was Allan Wells of Scotland back in 1980. Since then, 95 percent of all Olympic medalists in this event, over the last 10 Games, have been West African. Weightlifting is a completely different story, with Caucasians (mostly Eastern Europeans and Iranians) holding the lion's share of world records in the dead-lift, snatch and clean-and-jerk. In the World's Strongest Man competition—which includes feats like stone tossing, vehicle pulling, and keg throwing—every single champion in its 43-year history has been Caucasian. Men with names like Hafþór Björnsson and Mateusz Kieliszkowski fill up the leader boards. In Marathon running, East Africans, Kenyans in particular, have been remarkably successful in the big-city events, with the occasional European winning a race here and there. Kenyan Eliud Kipchoge boasts the fastest marathon on record (2:01:39), which occurred in Berlin in 2018.

In the United States, among the 32 starting running backs in the National Football League (NFL) in 2019, all but one were African-Americans; among cornerbacks, there were no exceptions. The year before this, Christian McCaffrey became the first White running back to rush for 1,000 yards in over 30 years. The National Basketball Association (NBA) is roughly 75 percent Black, despite African-Americans being 12-15 percent of the American population. This hasn't changed much in the last half century, despite the game's newfound global popularity. When *Sports Illustrated* compiled its list of the 50

greatest players of all time, 62 percent (31) were African-American; 34 percent were White (17); and 4 percent (2) of partial African background.¹

We could go on. Of course, there are interesting exceptions. And, of course, culture plays a role: few Nigerians, for instance, take up ice-hockey. But the patterns don't change. West-Africans predominate in activities that demand quickness and bursts of energy, whereas East Africans excel in endurance events, and Caucasians, in tests of strength. East Asians have reached heights in swimming and gymnastics, as well as sports that demand spatial awareness and acuity, like table-tennis and professional darts.²

The larger point, however, is that race informs all aspects of social and cultural life. You simply can't avoid it, even—or *especially*—in the non-political, “color blind” realm of sport. Race is everywhere. And it is high time we talk about it in a rational, scientifically informed, and down-to-earth manner. That is what this book is about. Our reluctance to confront reality infects our language. Modern people use the word “race” every day, but are hesitant, maybe even terrified, to define it properly, resorting to euphemisms and half-measures like “background” or “skin color,” all of which are designed to avoid frank discussions of the nature of race and its consequences.

The common refrain “race is only skin deep” is quite revealing. Though meant to dismiss the concept of race, the phrase implies that skin color is, indeed, biological and heritable. The notion that human skin can be understood racially, and every other component of a human biology, behavior, and cognition cannot, is an exceedingly implausible claim. In fact, skin color, like anything that varies between human sub-groups, is adapted to different environments. There was no white skin until 10,000 years ago. At that point, many human groups innovated agriculture, and it spread to areas with long, dark winters. Agriculture meant permanent settlements, greater reliance on a single crop, and, thus, less access to fruit, vegetables, and other sources of Vitamin D. White skin became an advantage in such ecologies, because you could absorb more Ultra Violet light from the sun and synthesize this into Vitamin D. Hence, white skin was selected for—and hence Somalis living in Sweden need double the Vitamin D supplement of Swedes to remain healthy.³

Returning to sport and its pesky patterns, many people have attempted to argue that athletic excellence has environmental explanations. White people stereotype Blacks as athletic because it makes them seem animalistic. Black people, in turn, internalize this stereotype and think that the only thing that they

are any good at is sport. Blacks are also poor, meaning they can only attain status through sport. You know how it works.


Even if there are kernels of truth in environmental explanations—and there are—they don't explain why you don't find many West African marathon runners, nor why you don't find many East African sprinters. It is simply empirically inaccurate to say that “Black people are good at sport.” As mentioned, there is a distinct lack of Black champion weightlifters, shot putters, darts players, javelin throwers, and swimmers. Sometimes you might hear the special pleading that Black people are less likely to have access to swimming pools and thus less likely to learn to swim. But they surely have access to heavy objects and things which they can throw. Anyway, if we're going to follow this argument, then why are African-Americans hugely over-represented in American Football, with all its expensive equipment and the need for parks in which to practice? And why are Black people in Britain over-represented among soccer players, and in particular among mid-fielders and strikers, yet under-represented among goalkeepers? Surely, there is no widely known stereotype that Black people just can't tend the goal.

There are certain strongly genetic factors that predict excelling in specific sports. In 1977, famed NFL running back O.J. Simpson told *Time* magazine,

We are built a little differently, built for speed—skinny calves, long legs, high asses are all characteristics of blacks. That's why blacks wear long socks. We have skinny calves, and short socks won't stay up. I'll argue with any doctor that physically we're geared to speed, and most sports have something to do with speed.⁴

Tube socks have gone out of style, but Simpson is largely correct. First off, sprinters and most footballers need to be *mesomorphic*, a body type defined by long legs, long arms, a short trunk, and a lot of muscle. They also require “fast twitch muscle fibers,” which permit massive bursts of energy. If we compare West Africans, East Africans, Whites, and East Asians, then West Africans are, on average, the most mesomorphic, and they also have the highest percentage of fast-twitch muscle fibers. This combination of body type and muscle fibers fulfills the requirements of an effective sprinter, explaining why West Africans excel in the sports which they do.

Figure 1.1: Ectomorph, Mesomorph, and Endomorph Body Types



Evolved in much more mountainous regions, East Africans are very different. Success in long-distance running is predicted by a highly *ectomorphic* body: long arms, long legs, and very little muscle, combined with a large lung capacity and mostly slow-twitch muscle fibers, permitting considerable feats of endurance. Of the four racial groups noted above, East Africans are the most ectomorphic, parsimoniously explaining their admirable abilities in long-distance running. Ability in weightlifting, darts, goal keeping, and shot put is explained by a combination of pronounced upper body strength and an optimum muscle-fat ratio, permitting you to be both bendy and strong. This relatively *endomorph*ic body type is associated with White people. East Asians are the most endomorphic; meaning short arms, short legs, a large trunk, and a high level of body fat. East Asians also have a relatively large lung capacity, but they lack the upper body strength of Whites. It, therefore, makes sense that they excel in gymnastics and swimming and, to a limited degree, darts.⁵

Dangerous Thinking

If we leave the pub for the more rarefied arena of a hospital cafeteria, then doctors are likely to be having parallel conversations. We'll find similar and obvious patterns, and the same reluctance to talk about them without resorting to euphemism. Doctors and nurses will notice that there are consistent race differences in the prevalence of illnesses that have any genetic component. South Asians are more likely than other races in the UK to have diabetes. Men of Sub-Saharan-African descent are prone to developing prostate cancer. They may be discussing the fact that they wish that more Black or South Asian people would donate their organs. This is because, if you have an organ transplant, the body is far less likely to reject the donor organ as incompatible if the donor is of the same race as the person who requires the transplant.

Go down the road to the teachers' lounge at the local elementary school, and

race is, again, very real, though obscured by a thick lens of social science. Teachers might talk about the fact—much as they wish it wasn't the case—that the children consistently segregate themselves along racial lines (and they may be careful with which other teachers they discuss this). They may even notice race differences in the achievement of these children, but they will do all they can to force these observations out of their minds. In fact, they may even avoid discussing the obvious fact that the Black boys—whose ancestors are from West Africa—always seem to win sprint races when they teach their class physical education. To merely observe this would open up the Pandora's Box of “race”—and the possibility of race differences in socially valued psychological characteristics, such as intelligence.

We can't openly discuss the issue of “race” because it raises too many difficult questions. But the existence of race as a biological reality is undeniable, as evident in differences in sporting ability, prevalence of genetic illnesses, and the need to take race into account when it comes to organ donation.

This raises questions. Why do these race differences, which are clearly hereditary, exist? The answer is, I shall argue, that races are human sub-species that have been adapted to different environments. If Darwinian evolution could be summarized in one sentence, it would be something like this: “biological organisms are plastic to their environments.” But if different environments have led to physical differences, this raises a very serious problem. If we accept Darwin's Theory of Evolution by Natural Selection—which is taught in schools as fact—then if these different ancestral environments select for average physical differences between races, surely they would also select for average psychological differences as well. In fact, this would make sense of other points that may have been observed by our sports enthusiasts at the local pub, our lurching doctors and nurses, or our teachers in the lounge. Why don't you get many Black table-tennis players? Could it partly have something to do with reaction times—which are slowest in Blacks and fastest in East Asians, and which actually correlate with intelligence? Why don't you get many Black chess champions, but lots of Ashkenazi Jewish Grand Masters? Could it be because of the high average intelligence of Ashkenazi Jews, as evidenced by the Jewish lawyers and prominent journalists and intellectuals you seem to find in the U.S.? The doctors will have noticed—and they know why even if they are careful whom they tell—that Black people are much more likely to suffer from schizophrenia and post-traumatic stress than East Asians. But East Asians are more likely to suffer from anxiety and are more likely to take their own lives.

And the teachers will undoubtedly have noticed that, on average, the Black children are the worst behaved and the Asians, the best, and that the East Asians seem to academically outperform Whites.

It would make sense, therefore, that there are genetic race differences in psychological traits. But this is unthinkable—at least if you have been inculcated with the doctrine of “equality” and know what’s best for your career. Not only is it unthinkable, but it is *dangerous*. It may lead to people prejudging those of certain backgrounds, discriminating against certain races . . . it will prove very bad people, such as these nebulous “White nationalists” one hears about in the media—maybe even Hitler himself—to be correct.

This situation creates something very psychologically disturbing—*cognitive dissonance*. This is when there is “dissonance” between what the empirical evidence is telling you is the real world and what you profoundly wish to be true in your heart and mind. This causes you to question how the world works and who you are. And it leaves you with some deeply uncomfortable feelings: Have you been misled? Have you been lied to? Have you misled others? Have you been foolish? Are you still a good person? Sometimes, people create *cognitive consonance* by changing their worldview. But, often, they generate consonance by clinging to any piece of evidence they can find—no matter how tenuous, overly complicated, and objectively unconvincing—that their critics are wrong and their deeply held convictions are right. They can even become extremely aggressive with naysayers in an attempt to insulate themselves from “dangerous thinking”—and try to shut them up or shut them down. This is the common reaction if you try to discuss race with a scholar at a modern university in a Western country. A professor might have perfectly reasoned opinions on a wide variety of subjects, but when race is brought up, he will “attack the messenger,” rather than the theory, and he will essentially argue that if you think the theory is correct, then you are evil, possibly even “literally Hitler.”

Multiculturalism and Keeping Quiet About Race

For around half a century, advanced Western societies (such as the U.S., UK, Europe, and Australia) have operated under two, sometimes competing, principles or “meta-politics.” The first is *civic nationalism*: “Our national identity consists of values such as democracy, equality, and justice, and these values hold us together.” And *diversity*, which enjoins us to “celebrate our differences.”

Under such principles, it is exceedingly difficult to discuss race seriously and cognitive dissonance runs wild. Civic nationalism means that the society is constantly seeking unity among its population, whether culturally or economically. Diversity (and its concomitant embrace of mass-immigration) means that societies will increasingly fragment into multi-racialism and multiculturalism.

Multiculturalism (and related ideologies such as *postmodernism*) has been argued to possess many, though not all, of the key dimensions of a religion, and specifically of a religion in the Christian tradition.⁶ In this sense, it can be understood as an “implicit religion,” “replacement religion,” or “secular religion”—similar to a religion but lacking overt metaphysical belief.⁷ In multiculturalism, there is fervent belief that certain dogmas, such as “equality” (that races have equal intellectual capacities), are absolutely true. These are “moral truths,” and if the empirical evidence undermines them, then the moral person should, nevertheless, continue to accept the “moral truth.” It will, surely, ultimately be proven correct at the End of Days. Stating these counter-factual dogmas, thus, becomes a profession of faith; a mark of the intensity of your in-group loyalty: “*I believe it because it’s absurd.*” Those who fail to accept these “moral truths” are, effectively, in league with the Devil in this religion’s dualistic worldview. This renders them “wicked,” hence the strongly emotional reactions that believers display towards the “racists” who do not accept the dogmas or authority of the Church. Whereas Christianity idolized the poor as pure and holy, and Communism idolized the worker, Multiculturalism idolizes the non-White person. Multiculturalism regards it as a religious-moral duty to empower this supposedly marginalized group and to disempower Europeans, in a kind of racial version of Jesus’ promise that “the last shall be first, and the first last” (Matthew 20: 16) in the Kingdom of God. The non-White is sometimes even allowed to express a sentiment that would normally be condemned as “racist,” so long as he remains a professing Church member.

Christians today believe in a revealed truth, and a natural, objective reality created by God. In the godless religion of equality, however, there is not one objective truth. Claims about truth are deconstructed as “truths”—each one pronounced from a position of power: “his truth,” “her truth” “their truth”—with no claim to universality over another. “Truths” receive status in the privileging of one set of values over another. An objective truth might imply that some cultures have views that are inaccurate or immoral, and this would, in turn,

imply inequality. For this reason, “truth claims” are reducible to power-relations. The group whose “truth” is accepted is the most powerful, and this group’s “truth” must be questioned until there exists a world where all groups’ “truths” are equal. This implicitly means that “power is truth” and even “might is right.” The least you can say is that from the standpoint of Multiculturalism, it takes little effort to reject the concept of “race” as simply a means of oppressing non-White groups.

The Multicultural Church perceives itself as marginalized and is continuously struggling for power. It is always finding some evidence of disempowered minorities, meaning it is engaging in an eternal revolution. For this reason, it could be argued that, from the Multiculturalist’s perspective, the world is run by the Devil; a view held by some Early Christian, Gnostic sects.⁸ To the extent that “truth” is subjective, this means that if you believe something to be true—if I believe I am female, for example—then it *is* true. For others to dispute this means that they are claiming there exists objective truth, which is an attempt to impose their culture on me. Interestingly, though, if I assert that I believe that I am a Black man, that is *not* true, because the Church has not declared that one can change race, though there are people within it pushing for such a change to the dogma.⁹ So, in effect, the Multicultural Church dictates what is true and moral, and, beyond that, truth and morality are subjective. In that sense, the individual is God.¹⁰

In this Church, you can “celebrate the differences,” but God help those who *notice* differences in, say, test scores and rates of crime, poverty, and foreclosures. Just noticing these differences is to question the correctness of key Church dogmas. Since the waves of immigration from the “developing world” after the Second World War, countries of Western European descent (such as the U.S. or Australia) now include a growing percentage of people who are not European; indeed, in the United States and Great Britain, Whites will become minorities within the next quarter of a century. This has a number of negative consequences when it comes to discussing race. It means that if these recent immigrants and their descendants are to be accepted as equal members of the society, the society can no longer be held together by shared ancestry, as has previously been the case in most countries across the world. As such, merely raising the issue of race can be potentially uncomfortable. It is not “celebrating diversity”; it is highlighting the ways in which those who are non-White are outsiders, are somehow not quite British, for example, or not quite “one of us.”

It can also be psychologically difficult for some British people to discuss the issue, even if they are not fully convinced members of the Church. To get through life, they want to see things positively, and they want to believe that what the authorities are telling them is true—that they live in a multicultural society where race doesn't matter (or doesn't even exist beyond trivial differences) and non-Whites merely want a "better life" and will bring something of value to Britain. The problem is, they look around, and they can see that this is not the case. Even though they live in a multiracial area, all of their friends are White and all of their children's friends are, too. When their son reached out and invited the little Somali girl in his class to his seventh birthday party, she didn't bother turning up. They know how relaxed and happy they feel when they go to parts of England where everyone is White. And they feel confused and guilty about this. Thus, discussion of race "triggers" such people: it makes them feel cognitive dissonance and gets under their skin, so to speak.

It also raises extremely sensitive questions. If we discuss race, and it moves on to race differences in psychological traits, then isn't it reasonable to ask whether immigrants from some races are, on average, more conducive to happy societies than others? Are some races more intelligent than others? More prone to criminality than others? More insular than others? Less likely to integrate than others? If the research indicates that races are biologically real and that multiracial societies almost always degenerate into racial conflict,¹¹ might not someone propose that immigration be stopped and that the multicultural society be completely reversed? And, if people start questioning this, might it not cause people to question other postwar sacred cows such as sexual equality and gay rights? Many of those who now occupy positions of power in Western countries have got there, in part, by "virtue signaling" about these issues, by stressing the extent to which they believe in "equality." So, if these issues are open to serious question, then there is a degree to which the current ruling class in Western countries may be open to serious question as well.

For all of these reasons, it is very difficult to talk about race in a multicultural society. You will, at worst, get into a fight and, at best, be accused, in an intellectually intimidating way, of "stereotyping." As we will see below, this raises a further problem, by virtue of the fact that most racial stereotypes are demonstrably empirically accurate, as are most stereotypes more broadly, at least to a certain extent.¹² Moreover, as the English political scientist Noah Carl has demonstrated, the "appeal to consequences" argument, which maintains that we

should not discuss race, simply does not hold. Carl notes:

It is often asserted that, when it comes to taboo topics like race, genes and IQ, scholars should be held to higher evidentiary standards or even censored entirely because of the harm that might result if their findings became widely known. There is held to be an asymmetry whereby the societal costs of discussing certain topics inevitably outweigh any benefits from doing so.¹³

But Carl shows, empirically, that no such “asymmetry” has ever been demonstrated. He also argues that “stifling debate around taboo topics can itself lead to harm.” It holds morals hostage to facts, by implying that if the putative race differences did exist, then it would make sense to discriminate against different races. But this “blank slate” view of human nature has also been used to justify the persecution of successful groups within society, because if all groups are equal, then the wealthy could only have achieved their wealth via “nefarious means.” Conceptualizing all races as equal will lead to the neglect of, for example, medical problems that affect a specific race, including race differences in the side effects of drugs. The grooming and rape of White children in northern England at the hands of Pakistanis was permitted to continue for as long as it did due to race being taboo and officials fearing accusations of racism, as was found by an independent inquiry.¹⁴ Moreover, such suppression of race can lead to people voting for demagogues simply out of anger at Political Correctness. Thus, Carl demonstrates, suppressing the discussion of race does “more harm than good.” Carl was implicitly accused of racism by Britain’s left-wing *Guardian* newspaper simply for writing a cautious defense of the ethics of research on race.¹⁵ In other words, cognitive dissonance was triggered.

Clearly, race is a biological reality. It needs to be understood. The most up-to-date research on it needs to be widely known. Its implications need to be explored. That is the purpose of this book.

1—Jack McCallum, “SI’s 50 greatest players in NBA history,” *Sports Illustrated*, February 8, 2016, <https://www.si.com/nba/2016/02/08/michael-jordan-lebron-james-stephen-curry-nba-greatest> (accessed May 15, 2020).

2—See Edward Dutton and Richard Lynn, *Race and Sport: Evolution and Racial Differences in Sporting Ability* (London: Ulster Institute for Social Research 2015).

3—Sandra Wilde, Adrian Timpson, Karola Kirsanow, *et al.*, “Direct Evidence of Positive Selection of Skin, Hair, and Eye Pigmentation During the Last 5,000 Years,” *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, 111 (2014): 4832-4837.

4—Quoted in Jose Antonio and Chris Streets, “Speed Demons: The Domination of Sports by Blacks,” *TNation*, December 6, 1998, <https://www.t-nation.com/training/speed-demons> (accessed May 15, 2020).

5—*Ibid.*

6—John Gray, *Black Mass: Apocalyptic Religion and the Death of Utopia* (London: Penguin, 2011).

7—Edward Bailey, *Implicit Religion in Contemporary Society* (Leeuven: Peeters, 1997).

3—Jacques Lacarriere, *The Gnostics*, trans. Nina Rootes (San Francisco: City Light Books, 1989), 108.

2—American activist Rachel Dolezal regards herself as transracial and lives as a Black woman despite being genetically White. See Rachel Dolezal, with Storms Reback, *In Full Color: Finding My Place in a Black and White World* (Dallas, TX: BenBella Books, 2017).

10—See Edward Dutton, *Culture Shock and Multiculturalism* (Newcastle Upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2012).

11—This is exactly what data indicates. See Tatu Vanhanen, *Ethnic Conflicts: Their Biological Roots in Ethnic Nepotism* (London: Ulster Institute for Social Research, 2012); Robert Putnam, “E Pluribus Unum: Diversity and Community in the Twenty-First Century. The 2006 Johan Skytte Prize Lecture,” *Scandinavian Political Studies*, 30: 137–174.

12—Lee Jussim, *Social Perception and Social Reality: Why Accuracy Dominates Bias and Self-Fulfilling Prophecy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).

13—Noah Carl, “How Stifling Debate Around Race, Genes, and IQ Can Do Harm,” *Evolutionary Psychological Science*, 4 (2018): 399-407.

14—Lizzie Dearden, “Grooming Gang Review Kept Secret as Home Office Claims Releasing Findings ‘Not in Public Interest,’” *The Independent*, February 21, 2020, <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/grooming-gang-rotherham-review-home-office-findings-a9344896.html> (accessed May 15, 2020).

15—Richard Adams, “Cambridge Gives Role to Academic Accused of Racist Stereotyping,” *The Guardian*, December 7, 2018, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/dec/07/cambridge-gives-role-to-academic-accused-of-racist-stereotyping> (accessed May 15, 2020).

Selection Pressure

Understanding Darwinian Evolution and Heritability

Before we can really make sense of race, we have to understand how Darwinian selection works. As we will discuss, races are defined as breeding populations that differ in gene frequencies for inter-correlated characteristics, such that they can be divided into genetic clusters that noticeably differ in appearance and also in numerous other important ways. Because these differences are ultimately at the level of genetic inheritance, we need to know how this works.

“Heritability” refers to the proportion of a trait—such as skin color or height—that is due to genetics, and thus is not a consequence of environment or chance. Some traits have a high heritability; some traits have a low heritability. The bulk of the heritability is due to what is known as *additivity*. Genes with “additive effects” usually exert—as individual genes—very small effects. This means that a complex trait, such as intelligence, for example, is extremely *polygenic*. It involves enormous numbers of genes—perhaps 10,000—with small additive effects, each contributing to the whole. In this sense, we can conceive of such a trait as a “society.” Additivity is the reason why children are commonly the mean of their parents in terms of something as multi-layered as intelligence. Your parents’ genes—a gene being comprised of one allele from each parent—have all “blended” together to produce you. So it follows that in general—though not always—your IQ will be the average of your parents’.

In general, people tend to be sexually attracted to those who are moderately genetically similar to themselves.¹⁶ This is known as “assortative mating,” and we’ll discuss it further in Chapter 9. Couples are, on average, more *genetically similar* than two random members of the same race, and especially on the more genetically influenced physical measures, such as wrist circumference. This mating for genetic similarity increases the extent to which children resemble their parents. The parents are more similar to each other, so they will naturally more strongly resemble their children. People engage in assortative mating because it is a way of indirectly passing on more of their genes. If they mate with somebody *too* genetically similar, then they risk genetic defects due to children inheriting two copies of a harmful allele—*inbreeding depression*. If they mate with someone too distant, then they will pass on fewer of their genes than they could. Furthermore, more distantly related genes could combine in ways that may be harmful to the offspring—*outbreeding depression*. According

to research from Iceland, the “sweet spot” in terms of fertility, or producing the highest numbers of children, is your third cousin,¹⁷ or a person with whom you share the same percentage of genes above the population baseline as you would with a third cousin. This practice of assortative mating among separated breeding populations is, in effect, a kind of *endogamy* (“marrying in”), leading to population differences becoming bigger and bigger over time, potentially until the difference is sufficient to regard two populations as separate races. As we will see, however, there are also other selection factors involved in the development of different races.

Some traits, such as eye color, do not work in this way. Instead you have a *small* number of genes that have *big* effects. When one allele is simply dominant over another, you have a *dominance* effect. This explains why if one parent has brown eyes and the other blue, the children are much more likely to have brown eyes. The third form of genetic action is known as *epistasis*. Interactions can take place between genes with *both* additive *and* dominant effects, but the effect of one gene will only be triggered if the other is also present. This process is called epistasis. It’s as if the genes in this case were like Jack Sprat and his wife:

*Jack Sprat could eat no fat,
His wife could eat no lean.*

Alone, each gene doesn’t do anything, but when they are present as a pair, they interact with each other:

*And so between them both, you see,
They licked the platter clean.*

The contribution made to intelligence by genes with dominant effects and interactions is smaller than the contribution made by pure additivity.¹⁸ However, because dominant and epistatic effects nonetheless play a role, children can occasionally be significantly different from their parents and their siblings simply by genetic chance. This is extremely rare, but it *can* happen. If two White American parents both have distant Black ancestors (who were slaves, for example), it is possible, though extremely unlikely, that they may have a child who is a genetic throwback and clearly reflects these African-American genes in their appearance. In much the same way, two people of average IQ might have an extremely intelligent child, simply by genetic chance.

Natural Selection

Now that we understand the different kinds of genetic inheritance, we can turn

to the different means by which genes are selected for. There are four essential kinds of selection. *Natural Selection* is the process whereby an organism is adapted—both physically and mentally—to a particular kind of environment. In the process of procreation, an infant inherits copies of genes from both of its parents. Sometimes something will go awry, and these genes will not copy correctly. This causes mutation. Under the harsh conditions of Natural Selection, organisms are strongly adapted to their ecology; so the mutations almost always make them less well-adapted to it. Accordingly, the carriers of these mutations will be selected against: They either won't pass on their genes, or they won't pass them on to any significant degree. Sometimes, a mutation will actually provide the carrier with an *advantage* in its particular environment. Lighter skin, as mentioned earlier, would have given the first white-skinned person an advantage, because he or she would have been able to absorb more sunlight and synthesize this into more Vitamin D, in an ecology where it was relatively dark for much of the year.¹⁹ When this kind of mutation occurs, the gene will be *selected for* and the carrier will end up with a larger number of descendants. In general, mutation is *selected against*.

Sexual Selection

The second form of selection is *Sexual Selection*. In most animal species, males will fight to mate with as many females as possible. In winning these fights, they establish who is strongest, who is the healthiest, and who, therefore, has very few mutant genes. Male deer grow antlers, rams grow horns, peacocks grow elaborate tails, *not* for protection against predators or as weapons or camouflage, but to effectively “show off” to females and engage in largely symbolic fights with other males to prove their potency.

Females, in turn, are sexually attracted to males who triumph in these fights. The dominant male, as far as the females are concerned, will provide them with healthier children and these children are more likely to survive the rigors of natural and sexual selection themselves. This will mean that the female's own genes are more likely to be passed on. The population will remain healthy, in part, because those with poor genetic health—those carrying a high percentage of mutant genes—will find that the females do not want to have sex with them. In fact, the females will aggressively fight off any attempt by an unattractive male—that is, one with a high mutational load—to copulate with them. Darwin himself observed, “It is certain that with almost all animals there is a struggle

between the male for possession of the female.”²⁰ Males compete for territory—or, in the case of social animals such as humans—the group competes for territory, but each male competes for a position within the status hierarchy of the group. Only those who are successful in getting territory or attaining high status within the hierarchy will be attractive to the females. And the males will ultimately do this through winning fights.

In addition, the females will generally be specifically attracted to the kinds of qualities that lead to the males obtaining status. In a society where status is gained through fighting, these will be markers of physical strength and genetic health: muscles, size, a big furry mane. Males will showcase these desirable qualities through fighting in front of the females, but also by what is known as “displaying” or “strutting.” They will walk around advertising their genetic quality. A good example of this is the aforementioned peacock’s tail. As American psychologist Gregory Miller has observed, only a genetically healthy peacock will have sufficient bio-energetic resources left over to be able to grow a large and colorful ornament.²¹ The human male will stereotypically display his (supposed) wealth and, by implication, his relatively high place in the hierarchy. He has the resources left over for the designer shirt and the sports car, or, at least, he wants the females to think that he does.

Group Selection

The third form of selection is *Group Selection*, which accounts for conflicts over territory and breeding rights between groups. When two groups that adopt different forms of social behavior—such as being more or less internally cooperative—are antagonistic, then there will be Group Selection, with one group tending to triumph over the other.

It should be noted that there is considerable debate over the utility of group selection as a construct. American evolutionary biologist David Sloan Wilson²² has advocated the *Multi-Level Selection Theory*. He argues that once cooperative groups develop within a species, then selection will act to promote those groups that possess the optimum level of certain qualities that permit them to out-compete other groups. Thus, selection will still operate on individuals within a group, but can also be seen to operate on groups themselves, as collections of individuals (who identify as such and create group borders) and, in some circumstances, can shift away from individual and towards group selection. Indeed, this model of group selection can be understood as a logical extension of

something that most evolutionary biologists happily accept.

The British biologist William Hamilton (1936-2000) conceived of what he called “inclusive fitness.”²³ This is the idea that there are a number of ways in which you can pass on your genes; it doesn’t have to be only by conceiving offspring. Hamilton argued that we all follow a process of “kin selection,” where we invest in people who are not our children but who are still closely related to us. Thus, uncles and aunts will invest in their nieces and nephews, with whom they share 25 percent of their genes. Cousins will help each other out, sharing 12.5 percent of their genes, and this may even extend to cousins once removed, with the older one treating the younger one as a niece or nephew. According to Hamilton, people will act altruistically if the benefit to their inclusive fitness is greater than the fitness cost of the act—something known as “Hamilton’s Rule.” If people really do unconsciously follow Hamilton’s Rule, then certain kinds of behavior begin to make a lot more sense. It would make sense for a menopausal mother to lay down her life to save her only child. This would not make so much sense if the mother, aged 21, was told to make a choice between her unborn baby’s life or her own, as she could go on to have many more children. In these circumstances, we would expect her to choose her own life. It makes sense that the spinster aunt—who has no children of her own—will invest in and give presents to her sibling’s children. In doing so, she is not simply being altruistic, because if she were, she could just give money to charity. She is helping to pass on her own genes, a quarter of which are carried by each nephew or niece.

The idea of *kin selection* can be extended to *group selection*. It is a genetic fact that ethnic groups are genetic clusters—a fact that comes out if populations’ genetic assay data are compared. This is true even when comparing very similar populations. Consider the native populations of England and Denmark, which are genetically similar ethnicities. The average Englishman is (slightly more) genetically similar to the next average Englishman *relative* to the average Dane, based on genetic assay data. The Australian political ethologist Frank Salter has calculated that if the world were divided between only English and Danes, then the genetic kinship coefficient between two average English people (or between two Danes) would be 0.0021. This coefficient would be the equivalent of sharing a set of six-time great-grandparents, that is, being seventh cousins. From a genetic perspective, it could be adaptive for an Englishman to fight to protect his ethnic group from Danes, even if it risked his having no children at all. If his actions prevented 60 Danes from replacing 60 English, that would compensate

for the soldier having one fewer child.²⁴

These numbers are based on old assay data. But more recent data from the Human Genome Project confirm that ethnic groups are genetic clusters. These demonstrate that in a world consisting of only native French and native Japanese, two randomly chosen Frenchmen (or two Japanese) have a kinship coefficient of 0.06; the equivalent of first cousins. A French soldier would only need to prevent four Japanese replacing four Frenchmen to compensate for the loss of one child. The same applies to Japanese soldiers blocking French incursion.²⁵ So, the soldier, who laid down his life in this way, would be operating at the level of group selection. Indeed, computer simulations have shown that the more ethnocentric group—the group whose members are more inclined to repel outsiders and make sacrifices for the good of the group—always eventually dominates in the battle of group selection, all else being equal.²⁶ We will discuss this further in Chapters 9 and 10.

Group selection is simply a logical extension of this, as ethnic groups are extended kinship groups, as has been demonstrated with genetic assay data.²⁷ The important qualification to this model is that people will only engage in altruistic behavior if the genetic payoff outweighs the sacrifice. This means that it is more difficult for them to be exploited by selfish free-riders. They are altruistic, but only within certain limits.

Group selection, nevertheless, raises fervent criticisms from certain biologists. One of the reasons for this seems to be little more than a misunderstanding of what is meant by it. When modern evolutionary psychologists talk about group selection, they mean Multi-Level Selection or what is often termed New Group Selection. The original model of group selection argued that altruism developed because co-operative groups were more likely to survive. The major weakness with this model was “subversion from within.” Any group of altruists would be exploited by selfish free-riders, who would manifest by genetic chance, and these would then outbreed the altruists.²⁸ However, this is not what New Group Selection is arguing. As we have already noted, New Group Selection is simply extending kin selection to a very distant level of kin—the ethnic group. It is distinguishing between “kin” and “ethnic group” because most people would not necessarily conceive of their ethnic group as genetic kin. So there is a nuanced difference between New Group Selection and kin selection.

Nevertheless, New Group Selection has been criticized in depth by Canadian

biologist Steven Pinker.²⁹ His key criticisms are that Group Selection deviates from the “random mutation” model inherent in evolution. Moreover, he argues that we are clearly not going to be selected to damage our individual interests, as group selection implies. And he avers that human altruism is self-interested and does not involve the kind of self-sacrifice engaged in by sterile worker bees.

Each of these points can be answered. First, if the group selection model is building on the individual selection model, then it is bound to present a slightly different metaphor. To dismiss it on these grounds seems to betoken nothing more than a fervent attachment to the original metaphor. Secondly, the group-selection model merely suggests that a group will be more successful if there is genetic diversity, meaning that an optimum percentage of its members are inclined to sacrifice themselves for their group. Thirdly, it is clearly the case that, in many groups, a small percentage is, indeed, prepared to sacrifice itself for the group; otherwise, we’d lack the great store of poetry honoring fallen heroes. So, it seems to me that it is reasonable to accept multi-level selection. In addition, computer modeling has shown that groups which are internally cooperative but harsh to members of other groups eventually win in the battle of group selection: they dominate the computer grid after many generations. This is group selection in action.³⁰

It is also worth noting the language which Pinker employs in criticizing group selection. His essay is titled the “*The False Allure of Group Selection*,” and he terms it a “dust bunny” and “hairy blob” that apparently “bleeds outwards to a motley collection of other, long-discredited versions.” It has, claims Pinker, “placed blinkers on psychological understanding by *seducing* many people” (emphasis added). This is extremely emotionally manipulative language, which attempts to compel the reader to associate group selection with being taken advantage of sexually, with stupidity, with beasts of burden, and with being “discredited.” In other words, Pinker employs the logical fallacy of “poisoning the well,” and the fact that Pinker engages in this would tend to imply cognitive dissonance—that he rejects group selection for his own personal reasons; realizes that the model is likely reasonable; and is thus triggered to react in an emotional fashion.³¹

So, now that we have a clear understanding of how selection works, we can turn to the central issue of this book: *What is race?* How did different races develop? How are they genetically different? How many races are there?

- 16—See J. Phillippe Rushton, “Genetic Similarity, Human Altruism, and Group Selection,” *Behavioral and Brain Sciences*, 12 (1989): 503-518.
- 17—Agnar Helgason, Snæbjörn Pálsson, Daníel F. Guðbjartsson, Þórður Kristjánsson, Kári Stefánsson, “An Association Between the Kinship and Fertility of Human Couples,” *Science*, 319 (2008): 813-816.
- 18—Anna A.E. Vinkhuyzen, Sophie van der Sluis, Hermine H. M. Maes, and Danielle Posthuma, “Reconsidering the Heritability of Intelligence in Adulthood: Taking Assortative Mating and Cultural Transmission into Account,” *Behavior Genetics*, 42 (2012): 187-198.
- 19—Wilde, Timpson, Kirsanow, *et al.*, “Direct Evidence of Positive Selection of Skin, Hair, and Eye Pigmentation During the Last 5,000 y,” *op cit.*
- 20—Charles Darwin, *The Descent of Man* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, (1981 [1871]), 259.
- 21—Gregory Miller, *The Mating Mind: How Sexual Choice Shaped the Evolution of Human Nature* (New York: Anchor Books, 2000).
- 22—David Sloan Wilson and Elliott Sober, “Reintroducing Group Selection to the Human Behavioral Sciences,” *Behavioral and Brain Sciences*, 17 (1994): 585–654.
- 23—William Hamilton, *The Narrow Roads of Gene Land* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996); Hamilton, “The Genetical Evolution of Social Behavior,” *Journal of Theoretical Biology*, 7 (1964): 1–52.
- 24—Frank Salter, *On Genetic Interests: Family, Ethnicity and Humanity in an Age of Mass Migration* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2007), 70.
- 25—Frank Salter and Henry Harpending, “J.P. Rushton’s Theory of Ethnic Nepotism,” *Personality and Individual Differences*, 55 (2013): 256-260.
- 26—Robert Axelrod and Ross A. Hammond, “The Evolution of Ethnocentric Behavior,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 50 (2006): 1-11.
- 27—Frank Salter, *On Genetic Interests*, *op. cit.*
- 28—Samir Okasha, “Biological Altruism,” in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Fall 2013), ed. Edward N. Zalta, <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2013/entries/altruism-biological/> (accessed May 15, 2020).
- 29—Steven Pinker, “The False Allure of Group Selection,” *The Edge*, June 18, 2012 <https://www.edge.org/conversation/the-false-allure-of-group-selection> (accessed May 15, 2020).
- 30—Ross A. Hammond and Robert Axelrod, “The Evolution of Ethnocentric Behavior,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 50, 6 (2006), 1-11
- 31—Group selection has been criticized more cogently by physicist Gregory Cochran, who claims to have mathematically calculated that it is vanishingly unlikely to ever manifest. One could respond that given the millions of different species on Earth, it would have come about eventually and if it is the simplest explanation for available data on how humans behave then it very probably has done.

That Grizzly Ain't No Social Construct

The Formation of Races

The word “race” is so well established in its everyday usage that a definition seems superfluous—you know it when you see it. Few have trouble classifying, say, Samuel L. Jackson as a “Black guy” or Tom Cruise as a “White guy.” One can safely refer to Japan as an “Asian country,” referencing both the geographic region and the race of the people. Certainly, administrators of major universities, corporations, or law firms in America and Western Europe don’t struggle with basic classifications when they seek to “expand diversity.” They know it when they see it, too.

There are, of course, ambiguities when it comes to the race of both individuals and groups. U.S. President Barack Obama, for example, had an African father and European-American mother, but was identified as “America’s first Black president” by the media and, largely, by himself. The tribes that make up the nation of Kazakhstan are variously derived from Mongoloid, Turkic, Slavic, and European groups and might elude the typical classifications present in the West. And terms like “Black,” “White,” and “Colored” have different connotations in America and Brazil, due to those countries’ different histories regarding slavery and race relations.

But just because a concept like race has “blurry borders” does not mean that the concept itself is unsound or does not refer to an important reality. And as we’ll discuss below, the “blurry borders” of race actually reinforce the concept, since the borders are blurry due to the intermixing of different races.

The concept of *species*—a population of organisms that can interbreed and exchange genetic material—is one of the least controversial in the natural sciences. But even here, we find “blurry borders” and “exceptions.” The clear dividing line between two species is that they cannot interbreed and produce young. And yet we have the mule, a sterile offspring of a male donkey and female horse, which has been a domesticated animal for centuries. Lions and tigers have been known to produce “ligers” and “tigons,” depending on the male-female pairing, when they are brought together in captivity. Their offspring were thought to be sterile, though some parents have produced fertile cubs. But none of these examples—as intriguing as they might be—seriously brings into question whether donkeys and horses, or lions and tigers, are different species.

In the natural world, many animals fall under the category of *subspecies*: a

breeding population separated from another of the same species long enough to be noticeably evolved to a different environment, though not long enough to be unable to have fertile offspring with that other group. Subspecies abound in the wild. The North American Grizzly bear, for instance, is a distinct subspecies of the Brown bear. He can interbreed with all Brown bears, and even more distant cousins such as Polar bears, producing “Pizzly bears.” And the Grizzly subspecies contains its own morphological variations—or “sub-sub-species,” if you will—in different regions in North America.

In the realm of humans (*Homo sapiens*), subspecies are referred to as “races” and, in this book, this is what we mean by the word “race.” A race is a breeding population that differs genetically from other such populations as a result of isolation caused by geography, cultural separation, or endogamy, and which shows distinct patterns of genotypic frequency for a number of inter-correlated characteristics compared with other breeding populations.³²

The most obvious manifestations of this are observable differences in physical appearance and physical and mental ability, which correlate together. This indicates that it is useful, following the scientific desire to be able to make accurate predictions about the world, to divide humans into racial categories in much the same way that we might divide any other animal species into subspecies. Naturally, these sub-species are not immutable. They are subject to evolutionary pressures and are thus undergoing constant slow change, as does everything in the world. (We will discuss the formation of new races and ethnicities (“ethnogenesis”) in Chapters 4 and 9.)

The human species exhibits the divisions into subspecies so clearly that the phenomenon is empirical and irrefutable. We only need to choose a word for it. Whether we choose “subspecies,” “race,” “breed,” or perhaps “genetic cluster” is of no consequence, as long as it refers to the same thing. It should be obvious immediately that inasmuch as “subspecies” is entirely uncontroversial when it comes to animals other than humans, and if we accept the Darwinian view that humans are a highly advanced form of ape, then the term “race” should be entirely uncontroversial. It follows that if people find it controversial, they, in effect, do not accept the reality of Darwinian evolution: they implicitly regard humans as somehow “special”—uniquely made in the image of God.

As mentioned above, there will be individuals and even groups that do not fit neatly into one of two categories. Geographical contact zones may develop many thousands of years after races have separated, leading to racial hybrids. These

hybrids, depending on the degree of admixture, usually have intermediate gene frequencies in relation to the two parent races. And if the hybrid subsequently becomes geographically and culturally separated from the parent races, a case may develop for terming it a separate race. These racial hybrids are known as “clines.” Examples would include many “Hispanics”³³ (specifically “Mestizos,” who are Native American with European), Cape Coloreds (European with Sub-Saharan African and other racial admixture), and African-Americans (Sub-Saharan, usually West, African with European).³⁴

The Ashkenazi Jews could also be regarded as a cline. With them, 40 percent of their maternal DNA has been shown to be European. This would be consistent with Middle Eastern males making their way to Eastern Europe and marrying Gentile females. It’s notable that this is entirely incongruous with the stereotype that Judaism always passed through the female line. And it would potentially also imply that some Europeans, for whatever reason, converted to Judaism at various points.³⁵ The Sephardic Jews are a less mixed population. However, analyses of the genetics of North African Sephardic Jews is consistent with mixed heritage. The Sephardim emerge “during Classical Antiquity with proselytism of local populations, followed by genetic isolation with the rise of Christianity and then Islam, and admixture following the emigration of Sephardic Jews during the Inquisition.”³⁶ Thus, it would seem legitimate to regard the Ashkenazi Jews as a European-Middle Eastern cline and the Sephardi as a Middle Eastern group with European admixture. In the case of Jews in India or Yemen, although they may ultimately trace descent from a Jewish ancestor, admixture has been so substantial that they are little different from the surrounding population. The Ethiopian Jews descend from ancient converts and are very genetically similar to other Ethiopian tribes.³⁷ Some scholars, however, argue that the population was ultimately founded by itinerant Jews who converted and then interbred with the Ethiopians.³⁸

Within accepted “races,” there are further sub-categories, reflecting even smaller periods of geographical isolation, or fractions of admixture from other races, and thus even smaller degrees of genetic difference. Nevertheless, such groups do reflect—albeit weakly—average differences in genetic frequencies or inter-correlated characteristics and can be understood to be “on their way to becoming races.”³⁹ Some of these are called “ethnys” or “ethnic groups.”⁴⁰ They are defined by a belief in common descent, a shared history, a distinctive and shared culture, shared attachment to a homeland, and some degree of

solidarity.⁴¹ And for ethnic groups, these non-genetic factors shouldn't be underestimated. The Irish, for instance, are a Caucasoid people, and, within that, part of a Celtic sub-grouping that originated in Central Europe. But, of course, these hereditary designations don't capture what it means to be Irish: The Irish language, shared myths and folklore, the Catholic Church, and a shared history. In other words, however an ethnicity can be genetically defined, language, myth, and politics feature prominently in how they understand themselves.

Ethnic groups within a race will vary in the extent to which they may have come into contact with other races. But all of them will, nevertheless, be sufficiently genetically and physically distinct from that other race—and genetically closer to one another, than they are to a random member of that other race—for it to make sense to categorize them as being of this race rather than being a cline. This can be seen among Europeans. On the European periphery, there are small amounts of non-European admixture among the native population. For example, the Sub-Saharan African Haplogroup L is carried by about 1 percent of Europeans. However, it is 5.83 percent in Portugal and three percent in Spain⁴² and parts of southern Italy.⁴³ This reflects historical influence from the Moors and the African slaves whom they imported. Similarly, the level of South Asian admixture is higher in Iberia and other parts of southern Europe due to contact with the Moors or Turks. On the northern periphery of Europe, the Finns have approximately 5-10 percent Northeast Asian genes.⁴⁴ European peoples who have colonized regions populated by other races but remained strongly separate from the natives usually, nevertheless, reflect some admixture with the natives. For example, the average Afrikaans person in South Africa is around 94 percent White, the remaining genes being Khoi, and non-Khoi African, as well as South Asian and East Asian.⁴⁵ (We will discuss the nature of the Khoi in the next chapter.)

Ethnic groups within a race can be further subdivided according to how genetically related they are to each other. Within Europe, for example, it has been shown that geographical closeness is a strong proxy for genetic relatedness when comparing different European ethnic groups: the closer their homelands are, the more genetically similar they tend to be.⁴⁶ There are, however, outliers due to various factors, such as geographic isolation. For example, the Finns are relatively genetically isolated from other European ethnicities,⁴⁷ due to geographical isolation and “founder effect,”⁴⁸ a concept we will explore in the next section.

The Formation of Races

There are five inter-related processes through which races or subspecies evolve: *Migration*, *Genetic Drift*, *Mutation*, *Adaption*, and *Breeding*. We'll discuss each one in turn.

Founder Effect

A particular population splits, with part of that population migrating to a new area. As they stop interbreeding, the two groups gradually become increasingly genetically different. This happens, especially, if the number of founders is small and if the populations remains isolated. An example of this can be observed in the significant genetic differences between the (coastal) Western Finns and the Eastern Finns. Eastern Finland was wilderness until the 16th century, when a small number of Western Finns emigrated to the interior. This created, in Eastern Finland, isolated communities with very small gene pools, resulting in significant genetic difference between the two kinds of Finn. Most noticeably, for foreigners, Eastern Finns tend to be highly extraverted and confident; in other words much less “stereotypically Finnish,” with Finns being known for their shyness and introversion.⁴⁹

Genetic Drift

Gene frequencies change over time as a matter of chance. Genetic mutation is, of course, random by its very nature. As this effect is extended over a long period, it can lead to increasing differences between races and subspecies. This effect, by the way, has also been found to be relevant in making sense of differences between the Western and Eastern Finns.⁵⁰

Mutation

Individual genes can take many different forms. The most well-known distinction is between the “long form” and the “short form” of certain genes, but there are many further possible distinctions. Genes come in pairs of alleles, with one allele inherited from each parent. Variants of genes are also known as alleles. When alleles are passed from parent to child, sometimes the process of copying the genetic information goes awry, leading to a mutation or, in other words, to a new allele. Mutation Effect occurs when new alleles appear by chance in some populations and are highly advantageous for survival and reproduction in that population's particular environment. When this happens the

allele in question spreads through the population. An advantageous mutant allele may appear in one racial population but not in another, and this leads to genetic differences between the two populations.

Adaptation

When one population moves to a new environment, alleles that were not especially advantageous in the old environment may become advantageous in terms of survival and reproduction and will thus begin to be selected for. Accordingly, they will spread throughout the population. This, and the Mutation Effect, are usually the most important genetic effects in understanding racial differences.

Domestication and Breeding

In addition, subspecies can be developed when a particular species is domesticated by another. The most obvious examples are household pets. Dogs are ultimately derived from wolves, and they have, over the centuries, been deliberately engineered by humans to have certain physical and behavioral characteristics, which render them useful in specific sets of circumstances or which simply make them friendly and aesthetically pleasing pets. Golden Retrievers (developed in the 20th century) have a mild disposition, large webbed feet for swimming, and a soft jaw to bring water fowl back unharmed to their masters. Basset Hounds, which are a much older breed, are low to the ground and have a powerful nose for chasing rabbits. Darwin termed breeding like this “artificial selection,” and in *The Origin of Species* (1859), he analogized this well-known practice with—and also distinguished it from—his new theory of “natural selection.”

The existence of separate races is uncontroversial when discussing non-human animals. As already noted, if Darwin’s Theory of Evolution is accepted, it should be likewise uncontroversial to assert that humans include distinct subspecies or races. As English biologist John Baker (1900-1984)⁵¹ has noted, there are a number of subspecies among our closest relatives, the chimpanzees. Each one is slightly different because it evolved in somewhat different environments in line with the processes outlined above. The true chimpanzee is indigenous to West Africa, Guinea, and Nigeria; the bald chimpanzee lives in Cameroon and Gabon; the pygmy chimpanzee is found in the north and central areas of the Democratic Republic of Congo; while the Schweinfurth chimpanzee is found in the northeastern regions of the same country. Each of these races

differs in terms of physical appearance, distribution of blood groups, and even in terms of the kinds of cries they employ.⁵² Baker also examines similar differences between breeds of gorilla.

Domestic dogs of different breeds can, in most cases, produce fertile offspring, thus conforming to the generally accepted definition of a species (though it should be appreciated that the use of the word species does not always conform to this rule). Nevertheless, domestic dogs don't just differ in physical appearance, but also in personality and intelligence. American psychologist Stanley Coren observes that the most intelligent breeds of domestic dog include Border Collies (the most intelligent), Poodles, and Golden Retrievers. These dogs understand new commands after fewer than five repetitions and obey commands 95 percent of the time or higher. The least intelligent breeds require more than 80 repetitions to understand a new command and obey commands less than 30 percent of the time. These relatively unintelligent dogs include Basset Hounds, Pekingese, and Bulldogs.⁵³ If you've ever owned any of these breeds, you know what I'm talking about. Other species have assorted subspecies that differ in similar ways, even if the differences aren't quite as pronounced as within the artificially bred species that is the domestic dog.

Race is a useful concept among non-human animals because dividing these animals up into races permits correct predictions to be made about their physical and mental abilities, a finding which is of practical use when dealing with them or even keeping them alive. But before examining such differences among humans, we will turn to the history of the concept of race.

Taxonomies of Races

Anthropologists began to systematically classify human races in the middle of the 18th century, though an awareness of them can be found much further back. Baker presents evidence that such an awareness was present in antiquity. When the Indo-Afghans began to penetrate into northern India in around 1,500 BC (as part of the so-called Aryan invasion), they established what would later become the Hindu caste system, a system which was originally clearly divided in terms of color. The word for caste ("*Varna*") literally meaning "color." In the Old Testament, three separate ethnic groups are supposed to have sprung from the three sons of Noah (Genesis 10). As such, we see evidence of the idea that different racial groups are distinct extended families.⁵⁴ Many other examples of what we could cautiously call "awareness of racial differences" might be

provided, such as Pope Gregory I (540-604) seeing Anglo-Saxon slave boys at the marketplace in Rome and observing how distinct they looked from his own people, something recorded by the Venerable Bede (c. 672-735) in around 731.⁵⁵ It is unclear, however, in many cases, whether they understood these differences to be hereditary, though some researchers have maintained that the Ancient Greeks had a concept that was extremely close to what we now mean by “race.”⁵⁶

Towards the end of the 18th century, an increasing level of quantitative rigor was being added to racial classifications. The Dutch anatomist Petrus Camper (1722-1789) introduced the “facial line,” setting up a skull in the horizontal and then measuring the angle and distance from the most protruding part of the skull to the least. He noted that the skull of the Sub-Saharan African was more sloping than that of the European, while the skull of the chimpanzee was more sloping still.⁵⁷ The issue of racial classification provoked particular interest over the course of the 19th century, with perhaps the best known racial taxonomist of this period being French writer Arthur de Gobineau (1816-1882). His *Essay on the Inequality of the Races* was published in 1855.⁵⁸ The issue of racial superiority or inferiority, upon which Gobineau focused, need not concern us here. But it is worth noting that Gobineau’s taxonomy was composed of just three essential races with pigmentation used as the proxy for inter-correlated morphological and behavioral differences: White, Yellow, and Black. Within these broad categories, Gobineau examined various “sub-races,” including the Nordic strain of the “White” race. Debate over the precise number of races continued throughout the 19th century, but there was general agreement that “race” was a meaningful taxonomy.

In the early 20th century, data were collected on differences in the frequencies of blood groups in various populations throughout the world. Frequencies of a number of blood types correlated with racial differences in pigmentation and morphology: blood group A is present in 41 to 48 percent of Europeans but in only about 28 percent of Sub-Saharan Africans. Blood group B is found in between 10 and 20 percent of Europeans and in roughly 34 percent of Sub-Saharan Africans. Native Americans have almost no A or B blood group, and the overwhelming majority possess the O blood group.⁵⁹

Scientists discovered a large number of important differences that clustered along the kind of the racial dividing lines suggested by anthropologists of the 18th century, and these permitted important life-history predictions to be made.

Some began to designate more than three separate races. Data on the distribution of the Rhesus (Rh) blood groups was employed by American immune-chemist William Boyd (1903-1983)⁶⁰ to propose a *five-race* taxonomy. This was composed of:

1. **Europeans** with high frequencies of blood groups Rh cde and cde.
2. **Africans** with very high frequencies of Rh cde
3. **East Asians** with high frequency of B and almost no cde.
4. **American Indians** with a very high frequency of O, absence of B, and few cde.
5. **Australids** (Aborigines) with high A, negligible B, and cde.

Moving into the 1980s and 1990s, huge advances in the study of genetics further evidenced the meaningfulness of race as a category. Geneticists developed a novel means of classifying humans into races on the basis of a variety of genetic polymorphisms.⁶¹ A polymorphism refers to a gene that can be composed of alleles that have different forms; meaning different numbers of repeats. Their technique involved taking polymorphic genes for blood groups, blood proteins, lymphocyte antigens, and immunoglobulins, and calculating different allele frequencies in populations throughout the world. The results were then factor analyzed to discern the degree to which the allele frequencies were associated into population clusters that were genetically similar to each other. Factor analysis, it should be noted, is a statistical process where scientists examine a number of potential causes to see which is the most important. This technique was employed by Italian geneticist Luigi Cavalli-Sforza (1922-2018) and his colleagues to analyze a larger data set of 120 alleles for 42 populations.⁶² These data were used to calculate the genetic differences between each population and every other population. From these, the team created a genetic linkage tree that grouped the populations into what they termed “*clusters*.”

They found ten major “clusters.” These were:

1. **Bushmen and Pygmies**
2. **Sub-Saharan Africans**
3. **South Asians and North Africans**
4. **Europeans**
5. **Northeast Asians**
6. **Arctic Peoples**
7. **Native American Indians**
8. **Southeast Asians**

9. Pacific Islanders

10. Australian Aborigines and the Aboriginal New Guineans.

These “clusters” are almost exactly the same as the “races” of Classical Anthropology, as we will see shortly. German-British geneticist Sir Walter Bodmer and Cavalli-Sforza note that:

[R]aces could be called sub-species if we adopted for Man a criterion from systematic zoology. The criterion is that two or more groups become sub-species when 75 percent or more of all individuals constituting the groups can be unequivocally classified as belonging to a particular group.⁶³

And when the races are defined broadly—that is, using the “big three” categories of Classical Anthropology—it is possible to identify the race of many more than 75 percent of the human population. Racial groups differ in genotypic frequency for inter-related traits in a particular direction leading to these groups varying in predictable ways on numerous traits that are central to survival and psychology. Hence, sub-species (that is, races) certainly exist among humans by any reasonable scientific understanding of the word *exist*.

Out of Africa?

There remains debate over precisely how races developed. For a long time, scientists accepted the “Out of Africa” theory of human origins. According to this model, anatomically modern humans (*homo sapiens*) migrated out of Sub-Saharan Africa, approximately 100,000 years ago and populated the rest of the world. In doing so, different human groups became separated for sufficient periods of time to lead to the evolution of the races of Classical Anthropology, which we can still observe today. Prior to *homo sapiens* migrating “Out of Africa,” assorted proto-human or quasi-human primates, such as *homo erectus*, had made a similar migration. Some of these evolved into the *Neanderthals*, who were in Europe from roughly 400,000 years ago. Others evolved into *Denisovans*, who made their way to Southeast Asia approximately 700,000 years ago. But modern humans left Sub-Saharan Africa approximately 70,000 years ago, and all humans alive today are descended from them.

An alternative model is the “Multi-Regional Origin Hypothesis.” Proponents argue that the available genetic and archaeological evidence make far more sense if we posit that the human species first arose in Africa around two million years ago, if we include in the category of “human” such proto-human primates as *homo erectus*. According to the theory, ancestors of *homo erectus* left Africa

and, in each region of the world, modern humans are separately descended from these. Thus, the European evolutionary line moves from *European homo erectus* to *Archaic European* to *Modern European*. The same lineal descent occurred in Asia, Africa, and Australia. Moreover, at each stage, there was some interbreeding between the different groups. For instance, *Modern Europeans* interbred with *Archaic Europeans* and also with *Modern Asians*. Other races evolved from these “Big Four.” South Asians and North Africans are subgroups of Europeans; Northeast Asians, Southeast Asians, Pacific Islanders, Native Americans, and Arctic Peoples are all Asian subgroups; and Sub-Saharan Africans, Bushmen, and Pygmies are African subgroups. But sufficient genetic distance ultimately developed such that we see the genetic clusters that we discussed above.

As DNA analysis of ancient skeletons has developed, it has become increasingly clear that neither theory is exactly correct. It is becoming accepted that there were many waves of migration of both archaic and relatively modern humans “Out of Africa” and, indeed, *back* into Africa again. These humans interbred with archaic humans, such that modern Europeans carry a small percentage (roughly 4 percent) of Neanderthal DNA. Some Pacific Islanders carry approximately 6 percent Denisovan DNA and appear to have interbred with them as recently as 15,000 years ago. Australian Aborigines also carry Denisovan DNA. Skeletons of Neanderthals have been found to carry specifically modern European DNA. However, Africans also interbred with archaic humans in Africa.

All that being said, the genetic relationships between the different races are so strong that we should talk of a nuanced version of the “Out of Africa” model, informed by aspects of the Multi-Regional Origin Hypothesis, as being the most accurate. This is not least because some humans seemingly went back into Africa again and mixed with those who had remained there. One recent major change to this model, however, is that new genetic analyses imply that modern humans did not originate in East Africa, as long believed, but actually in southern Africa. Thus, the race known as the Bushmen, who mostly live as pastoralists and foragers in southern Africa,⁶⁴ are the closest race to the first anatomically modern humans, as demonstrated by the ancient DNA that they tend to carry.⁶⁵ Currently, therefore, there is an on-going debate about the precise nature of human origins and the subsequent evolution of the Twelve Races of Classical Anthropology, which we examine in the next chapter.

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- 33—“Hispanic” technically refers to a language, not a racial group. It was first adopted in the United States by the Richard Nixon administration and has appeared on census forms since 1980. The term is ambiguous and should be treated with care when applied to race.
- 34—See Michael Levin, *Why Race Matters: Race Differences and What They Mean* (Oakton, VA: New Century Foundation, 2005).
- 35—Marta D. Costa, Joana Barbosa Pereira, Maria Pala, *et al.*, “A Substantial Prehistoric European Ancestry Amongst Ashkenazi Maternal Lineages,” *Nature Communications*, 4 (2013): 2543.
- 36—Christopher Campbell, Pier Francesco Palamaara, Maya Dubrovsky, *et al.*, “North African Jewish and Non-Jewish Populations Form Distinctive, Orthogonal Clusters,” *PNAS*, 109 (2012): 13, 865–13,870.
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- 38—Jon Entine, *Abraham’s Children: Race, Identity, and the DNA of the Chosen People* (New York: Grand Central Publishing, 2014).
- 39—Salter, *On Genetic Interests, op cit.*
- 40—Pierre L. Van den Berghe, “Race and Ethnicity: A Sociobiological Perspective,” *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 1 (1978): 401–411.
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- 42—Luisa Pereira, Carla Cunha, Cíntia Alves. António Amorim, “African Female Heritage in Iberia: A Reassessment of mtDNA Lineage Distribution in Present Times,” *Human Biology*, 77 (2005): 213–29.
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- 45—Razib Khan, “The Non-European Ancestry of Afrikaners,” *Gene Expression*, September 22, 2017. <https://www.gnXP.com/WordPress/2017/09/22/the-non-european-ancestry-of-afrikaners/> (accessed May 15, 2020).
- 46—John Novembre, Toby Johnson, Katarzyna Bryc, *et al.*, “Genes Mirror Geography Within Europe,” *Nature*, 456 (2008): 98-101.
- 47—Monkol Lek, Konrad J. Karczewski, Eric V. Minikel *et al.*, “Analysis of Protein-Coding Genetic Variation in 60,706 Humans,” *Nature*, 536 (2016): 285-291.
- 48—Elina Salmela, Tuuli Lappalainen, Ingegerd Fransson, *et al.*, “Genome-Wide Analysis of Single Nucleotide Polymorphisms Uncovers Population Structure in Northern Europe,” *PLoS ONE* 3(10, 2008): e3519.
- 49—See Edward Dutton, *The Silent Rape Epidemic: How the Finns Were Groomed to Love Their Abusers* (Oulu: Thomas Edward Press, 2019); Salmela, Lappalainen, Fransson, *et al.*, “Genome-Wide Analysis of Single Nucleotide Polymorphisms Uncovers Population Structure in Northern Europe,” *op cit.*
- 50—Salmela, Lappalainen, Fransson, *et al.*, “Genome-Wide Analysis of Single Nucleotide Polymorphisms Uncovers Population Structure in Northern Europe,” *op cit.*
- 51—John Baker, *Race* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974).
- 52—Richard Lynn, *Race Differences in Intelligence, op cit.*
- 53—Stanley Coren, *The Intelligence of Dogs: A Guide to the Thoughts, Emotions, and Inner Lives of Our Canine Companions* (New York: Bantam Books, 1994).
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- 55—Bede, *An Ecclesiastical History of the English People*, trans. Thomas Miller (London: English Text Society 1890).
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Heinemann, 1915).

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People Are Different


The Twelve Races of Classical Anthropology

So, what are these twelve races of Classical Anthropology? We will draw upon these racial groups throughout this study, so before commencing, we will provide brief descriptions of the central characteristics of each. It should be noted that modern research has confirmed clear, significant and predictable morphological differences between races.⁶⁶ However, the descriptions below paraphrase and develop the detailed descriptions advanced by American anthropologist Carleton Coon (1904-1981).⁶⁷

Sub-Saharan Africans or Negroids

The *face* is characterized by a broad and round nasal cavity; no dam or nasal sill; Quonset hut-shaped nasal bones; notable facial projection in the jaw and mouth area (*prognathism*); a rectangular-shaped palate; long cranial form, a square or rectangular eye-orbit shape; and large megadontic teeth. Their prognathism likely reflects their being among the earliest Modern Humans, with Bushmen and Sub-Saharan Africans having split more than 100,000 years ago.⁶⁸ There is evidence that some human evolution has been *pedomorphic*,⁶⁹ whereby childhood or *neotenus* traits are retained by an adult because so-doing is adaptive. The *hair* of the Sub-Saharan African is Black, tightly coiled, and woolly, to reduce sweating in dry environments. There are relatively low levels of body hair. Lips are thick.

Figure 4.1: African Male



Skin pigmentation varies from dark to light brown, as protection against the sun's rays. This in itself should refute the argument, of those who are critical of the concept of race, that race differences are "trivial" or "superficial." All of the hypotheses advanced to explain the evolution of dark skin propose that it has

been selected for in this ecology, meaning that those who were born with insufficiently dark skin did not pass on their genes. Skin color is, thus, a matter of life and death. The most strongly supported hypothesis is that dark skin evolved because lighter skin breaks down more easily under intense Ultra-Violet rays.⁷⁰ It is noticeable that there is a conspicuous contrast, in Sub-Saharan Africans, between the general skin color and the color of the skin on the palms of the hands and on the soles of the feet, the so-called “volar skin.” The volar skin is much lighter. This contrast exists in all humans, but it is the most obvious in dark-skinned people. This contrast occurs because these lighter areas are not generally exposed to the sun. Pigmented skin is metabolically expensive to produce, meaning that there would have been a selective advantage to not having it on parts of the body where it was not required.

Figure 4.2: African Female



The *body* is characterized by long legs and arms, a short trunk, narrow hips, a low level of body fat, and the retention of fat on the buttocks and back rather than the stomach. These adaptations make sense, broadly, in terms of a hot climate. Fat prevents the loss of heat, and fat on the back prevents covering a person with a coat of fat during sleep, and longer extremities and shorter trunks assist heat loss, as do narrower hips.

There is also a noticeable distinction between *West Africans* and *East Africans*, who split from each other roughly 150,000 years ago. West Africans are closest to the *mesomorph* body-type, meaning long limbs, a low level of body fat, and a highly muscular body. East Africans are closest to the *ectomorph* body shape, meaning long limbs, a low level of body fat, and a weakly muscled body. The distinctions between these two sub-races are, in part, due to West Africans having evolved in lowland areas and East Africans, in highland areas. This led to East Africans developing adaptations to lower levels of oxygen, and to an environment with lower biomass in which food must be obtained by more

sustained effort, where highly muscular people tend to have poor endurance.⁷¹ In addition, East Africans have considerably more European influence, with one study estimating that Ethiopians have around 40 percent European genes, rendering them a cline.⁷² The southern Africans include groups that are a mixture of Sub-Saharan African and other African races, especially the Bushmen and related groups.⁷³

Northeast Asians

The *face* is characterized by a broad and short skull, large and protruding cheek bones, broad and flat nasal bones, a broad cranial form, and a concave nasal bridge. Northeast Asians are adapted to a particularly cold ecology, and this kind of face permits the retention of heat. A flat face also protects against frost bite. The *eyes* are narrow and are characterized by the epicanthic eyefold. As an adaptation to extreme cold, this reduces glare from the snow.

Figure 4.3: Northeast Asian Female



The *hair* is dark, thick and straight. Straight hair better allows the passage of UV light (and thus the synthesis of Vitamin D) during winter darkness.⁷⁴ Despite general adaptation to the cold, levels of body hair are low. *Skin* ranges in color from yellow to light brown. Light coloring allows better absorption of light while the yellow color reflects a high level of fat beneath the skin, an adaptation to extreme cold. The *body* is highly *endomorph*. This means that it is characterized by short limbs, a long trunk, wide hips, and a relatively muscular upper body. These adaptations slow down the body's release of heat. A high level of body fat and the tendency for fat to accrue on the stomach is also a characteristic of this race. This keeps the body warm and allows the stomach to act like a blanket.

Figure 4.4: Northeast Asian Male



The Northeast Asians are widely accepted as being the most *neotenized* of the races, with Europeans, in turn, more neotenized than Sub-Saharan Africans.⁷⁵ Neoteny or juvenilization refers to *paedomorphism*, whereby childhood traits are retained by an adult. The Northeast Asians are the closest in their physical characteristics to a human baby and as the Northeast Asians are among the most recent races to develop—which they did roughly 40,000 years ago—this implies that human evolution has been paedomorphic.⁷⁶ They are also short in stature, again as a way of retaining heat.

Europeans

The *face* is characterized by a medium cranial form, minimal protrusion of the lower part of the face, small mouth, retreating cheekbones (making the face look pointed), a longish, narrow nose (allowing air to be warmed as it is breathed in), with tear-shaped nasal cavity and medium-sized eyes, which range from blue to brown.

Figure 4.5: European Male



The *hair* tends to be wavy and varies in color from blonde to black, depending on the sub-race. There are relatively high levels of body hair, reflecting Neanderthal admixture.⁷⁷ *Skin* pigmentation varies from light brown to white, depending on the sub-race. The presence of such light skin, eyes, and hair is

understood to be, partly, an adaptation to the rise of agriculture.⁷⁸ This reduced Vitamin D in the diet and light coloring permitted its better absorption from the sun. In general, however, the shorter days and longer nights prevalent in colder climates selects for lighter skin, as this permits the easier absorption of Vitamin D. This is why dark-skinned people living in Nordic countries, such as Somalis in Finland and Sweden, need to take double the amount of Vitamin D that Whites do in order to remain healthy.⁷⁹

Figure 4.6: European Female



The *body* is less endomorph than that of the Northeast Asian but is still relatively endomorphic. They are also taller than Northeast Asians. They are adapted to relative cold, but less adapted to this than are the Northeast Asians.

South Asians

The South Asian *face* is characterized by relatively sharper features than the European and by larger eyes, especially a long, narrow face and nose and developed forehead. *Skin* is brown, ranging from light to dark. This intermediate color likely reflects the competing pressures of protecting the skin from the sun and obtaining sufficient Vitamin D from it.

Figure 4.7: South Asian Female



Hair is Black, can be wavy, with lower levels on the body than Europeans. *Body* is more ectomorphic than the European, though there is also a slightly higher level of body fat. It is assumed that this is an adaptation, though its cause remains unclear.⁸⁰ One proposal is that it is because South Asia is impacted by the unpredictable El Niño weather phenomenon, causing an “erratic resource base”⁸¹ and thus the need to store fat.

Figure 4.8: South Asian Male



Southeast Asians

Southeast Asians are similar to Northeast Asians. However, they are less endomorphic, tend to be darker skinned, and are, in many respects, between South Asians and Northeast Asians. In particular, the epicanthic eye fold is less prominent, as is the flattened nose, as predicted by a warmer environment.

Figure 4.9: Southeast Asian Female



Figure 4.10: Southeast Asian Male




North Africans and Middle Easterners

These, along with *Arabs* and *Turks*, are genetically between South Asians and Europeans, though there is also Sub-Saharan African influence in some North African groups, such as southern Egyptians. They are characterized by light-brown skin, sharper features than the Europeans (such as long, pointed, noses), wavy Black hair, and a higher level of ectomorphy than Europeans. Their faces are more pointed than those of South Asians.

Figure 4.11: Arab Female



Figure 4.12: Arab Male



Native Americans

The most noticeable features of Native Americans, and which distinguish them from East Asians, to whom they are relatively closely related, are their

darker and sometimes reddish skin, hooked or straight nose, and lack of the complete East Asian epicanthic eyefold, although the inner eyefold is sometimes present.

Figure 4.12: Native American Male



Figure 4.13: Native American Female



Arctic Peoples

Sometime between 40,000 to 50,000 years ago, some of the archaic East Asian peoples migrated into the far northeast of Asia, where they evolved into the Arctic Peoples. They became a separate race because they were geographically

isolated from the East Asians to the south by the high Chersky, Khrebet, Khingan, and Sayan mountains, and about a thousand miles of forest north of the Amur river. They also crossed into Greenland. The Arctic Peoples experienced the severest winter conditions of all the races, with coldest winter temperatures of about -15°C and falling to about -20°C during the main Wurm glaciation. In response to these cold winters, the Arctic Peoples evolved more pronounced forms of the morphological cold adaptations of the East Asians, consisting of a flattened nose, short legs and thick trunk, a subcutaneous layer of fat that gives the skin a yellowish appearance, and the epicanthic eyefold.

Figure 4.14: Arctic Female



Figure 4.15: Arctic Female, Male, and Child



Pacific Islanders

Closely related to Southeast Asians, Pacific Islanders migrated to the South Pacific Islands and reached Samoa by about 1,500 BC, Hawaii by 100 AD, and New Zealand by 800 AD. Pacific Islanders differ from East Asians by virtue of combining a high level of endomorphy with a very high level of muscularity. Some of them have the epicanthic eyefold.

Figure 4.16: Pacific Island Male



Figure 4.17: Two Pacific Island females



Australian Aboriginals

This group made its way through Southeast Asia, interbreeding with the Denisovans, and then became strongly isolated once it reached Australia. They have a well-developed torso, arms, and slender legs.

Figure 4.18: Aboriginal male



The color of the skin is dark brown or black, and the eyes are very dark brown or black. Their hair is black and wavy. The beard in males is well developed, as is the hair upon the body and the eyebrows. They have prominent brow ridges, broad noses, heavy jaws, and thick lips. The skull appears pentagonal from behind. Adapted to desert environments, they can withstand extremes of temperature. Genetic cluster analysis has found that Australian Aboriginals are sufficiently similar to Aboriginal New Guineans to form one cluster.

Figure 4.19: Aboriginal female



Bushmen

Until around 1200 years ago, the Bushmen, also known as the San, occupied most of southern Africa. Negroids, specifically the Bantu, then advanced south and drove the Bushmen into the Kalahari Desert.⁸² For this reason, many Negroid ethnic groups in South Africa, such as the Xhosa, are actually a cline between Sub-Saharan African and Bushman. For example, the Xhosa are around 60 percent San, helping to explain their relatively light skin—light skin being a Bushman trait. The Swazis are about 25 percent San.⁸³ South African president Nelson Mandela (1918-2013) was Xhosa royalty.⁸⁴

Figure 4.20: Bushman Male



The Bushmen have a number of physical characteristics that distinguish them from Sub-Saharan Africans. They have peppercorn hair that grows in spirals with open spaces between tufts, whereas most Negroids have helical woolly hair that forms a tight mat. It is believed that the peppercorn hair of the Bushmen evolved as an adaptation in hot and damp forests in which they lived for many millennia because it affords protection from strong sunlight, but at the same time, the open spaces between the tufts allow sweat to evaporate. This adaptation would have occurred before they were driven out by Negroids. The mat woolly

hair of Negroid Africans is a more advantageous adaptation in dry, hot environments because it gives greater protection from strong sunlight and reduces sweating.

The skin color of the Bushmen is yellowish brown, while that of Negroid Africans is black or dark brown. This is because Bushmen are adapted to life further from the equator where it is not as hot. Some of the Bushmen have an epicanthic fold on the upper eyelid, similar, though less pronounced, to that of East Asians and Arctic Peoples. The advantage of the epicanthic fold for Bushmen is probably that it reduces the dazzling effect of glare from strong sunlight reflected from the desert, as it does the glare from snow for the East Asians and Arctic Peoples. This characteristic must have arisen independently through convergent evolution.


Figure 4.21: Steatopygia of a Khoi Female



A distinctive characteristic of Bushmen is the very large buttocks of the women, known as *steatopygia*. The adaptive advantage of these may have been to store food and water in times of famine and shortage.⁸⁵ However, John Baker has disputed this, arguing that the Bushmen are not strongly selected to desert life and that, accordingly, the enlarged buttocks of the females are likely to be a product of sexual selection.⁸⁶ The genitalia of the Bushmen are unique among the human races. Bushwomen have prominent minor labia (inner labia/vaginal lips), which descend about three inches below the vagina, adhering together. They are known to show these off to males during erotic dances. They become larger at puberty.⁸⁷ In general, the human female's labia swells when she is aroused.⁸⁸ Bushmen's non-erect penises stick out horizontally. This position is known as *penis rectus*. The non-erect penis of most other humans is in the

position, *penis pendulus*, meaning its direction goes vertically downwards.⁸⁹ Interestingly, J. Philippe Rushton finds that East Asian erections are “parallel to the body and stiff,” while Black ones are “at right angles to the body and flexible.”⁹⁰ Those of Whites are between the two extremes. It has been argued that Neanderthals also had a *penis rectus*, something that would make a flaccid penis appear semi-erect.⁹¹

Figure 4.22: Vagina of a Khoi Female



It should be noted that the Bushmen are a genetically diverse group, composed of many different sub-groups or tribes. Some of these tribes are as genetically distinct from each other as Europeans are from South Asians.⁹² Such genetic diversity is possible in Africa due to the relative weakness of Darwinian selection, with basic needs being met all year round due to the climate. As discussed above, Bushmen are physically more neotenous than Blacks, something that is most obvious in their faces, which, in some respects, resemble those of East Asians. Indeed, this is something that the Bushmen have noticed themselves. A number of Japanese anthropologists have conducted studies of the Bushmen.⁹³ It has been found that the Bushmen refer to animals they eat as *!a* (“meat”), animals that are dangerous to them (such as lions, hyenas, Europeans, and Blacks) as *!oma* (“incredible animals”), but they refer to themselves as *zhu* (“person”). They also refer to the Japanese, but not to Europeans or Blacks, as *zhu*. It has also been noted that, like Japanese babies, Bushmen babies have the “Mongoloid Spot,” a blueish discoloration at the base of the spine which disappears with age.⁹⁴

In discussing the Bushmen, we should distinguish between two closely related groups. The *San*, discussed above, are hunter-gatherers. They might be described as archetypal Bushmen and the word “Bushman” is often used specifically to refer to them. The *Khoi* (formerly known as the *Hottentot*) engage in primitive agriculture, specifically herding. The *Khoi* are genetically distinct from the Bushmen, but notably have similar secondary sexual characteristics, such as steatopygia.⁹⁵ The two ethnicities are grouped together by anthropologists,⁹⁶

sometimes using the classification “*Capoid*.”⁹⁷ However, the Khoi are darker skinned than the San, having mixed with Bantu peoples to a greater extent,⁹⁸ the Bantu being a group of sub-Saharan African peoples in Central and Southern Africa, who speak related languages. Reflecting their greater Bantu admixture, the Khoi are also “slightly taller and narrower-headed.”⁹⁹ So, the *Khoi* are extremely similar to the *San* or *Bushmen*, but they have modest Bantu admixture.


Pygmies

The Pygmies occupy the dense rain forests of Central Africa, having been driven out of more Westerly rain forests about 1,500 years ago by encroaching Negroids. Pygmies have the same peppercorn hair as Bushmen, but they have much darker skin. They are characterized by their short stature: Mbuti Pygmy men reach around 4 feet, 7 inches (1.39 meters), for example. Pygmy children are of normal height, but they experience no pubertal growth spurt because of their low output of the insulin-like growth factor 1.

Figure 4.24: Pygmy Females with a European Female



Figure 4.23: Pygmy Male



There is no agreement on why pygmies have developed such short stature. One theory is that it could be related to adaptation to low ultraviolet light levels in rainforests. This might mean that relatively little Vitamin D can be manufactured in the skin, limiting calcium uptake from the diet for bone growth.¹⁰⁰ Another theory is that it reflects a fast life history strategy, investing in breeding very young rather than in growth.¹⁰¹ We will discuss “Life History Strategy” in more detail shortly.

Negritos

The Negritos are short, dark-skinned, frizzy-haired and have a slightly mongoloid facial morphology. Some anthropologists used to believe that they were related to the Pygmies, though this view is now widely dismissed. The Negritos resemble the Pygmies, in key respects, due to independently experiencing similar environmental pressures.¹⁰²

Figure 4.25: Negrito Males with two European Males



Australian Aboriginals are sometimes classed as part of a broader “Australo-Melanesian” group, which includes Negritos found on India’s Andaman Islands, and on islands of the Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia.¹⁰³ However, there is on-going debate about the genetic origins of these peoples and many scholars argue that Negritos are closer to Pacific Islanders genetically.¹⁰⁴ Other studies

have found them to be closest to East Asians, from whom they apparently diverged as recently as 8,000 years ago. They then experienced a genetic bottleneck, leading to their very distinctive features that are in some ways similar to those of Pygmies.¹⁰⁵

Figure 4.26: Two Negrito Females



Clines

As noted in Chapter 3, many ethnic groups can be regarded as *clines*, which do not fit into any of these categories. *Hispanics*, for example, are a mixture of European and Native American, as are the *Metis* in Canada. American Hispanics, a diverse population, have been found to be about 65 percent European and about 35 percent Native American, based on data from 23andMe, a company that allows people to discover their genetic heritage. The same data has revealed that African-Americans are 75 percent Sub-Saharan African and 25 percent European.¹⁰⁶

Many of the peoples of the Near East, such as Uzbeks and Tartars, are various clines between European and South Asian, South Asian and Northeast Asian, or a mixture of these. The South African Coloreds are a cline between European (specifically Dutch settlers), Sub-Saharan African, *Khoi*, and South and East Asian.¹⁰⁷ The Afrikaans brought Indonesian slaves to South Africa in the 16th century, and many Bengali slaves were brought to South Africa in the 18th century.¹⁰⁸ There was then an influx of Indian indentured laborers in the 19th century.¹⁰⁹ There is enormous diversity within the Colored category, but 60 percent of Colored maternal lineages have been found to be *Khoi*.¹¹⁰ A number of East African peoples, such as the Northern Sudanese, the Somalis and the Ethiopians, are a cline between Arab and Sub-Saharan African. Consistent with

this, all three ethnic groups speak Semitic, rather than African, languages.¹¹¹ Around 80 percent of the modern-day Greenlandic have at least 25 percent European (generally Danish) admixture.¹¹² There are many other such groups. Frequently, early members of such clines interbred with each other over generations, leading to the formation of a new ethnic group, with its own cultural traditions. This process of *ethnogenesis* has many examples, such as the Anglo-Indians, who descend usually from British soldiers, stationed in India during the Raj, and Indian women. By 1947, there were two million Anglo-Indians in British India, characterized by being Christian and speaking English as a native language.¹¹³ In Namibia and South Africa, the Rehoboth Baster are the descendants of Boer males, who established themselves on the South African Cape, who had *Khoi* concubines. The results of these unions intermarried over generations to create the Baster. This cline migrated to Rehoboth, in Namibia, in 1868, and they were self-governing until 1990. They speak their own dialect of Afrikaans and follow a typically Boer way of life, focused on agriculture.¹¹⁴ Naturally, within many of the races we have outlined, there are variations in degree of admixture with other races depending on which ethnic group within the race you examine. For example, as noted earlier, some studies have found that Finns have around 10 percent Northeast Asian admixture.¹¹⁵

Relationships Between Races

All of these races ultimately have a common ancestor. They have split from each other and remained separated for long periods of time after people began to leave Sub-Saharan Africa. Accordingly, the different races are related to different degrees. For example, the ancestors of Europeans and East Asians split around 40,000 years ago. But the ancestors of Australian Aborigines split around 75,000 years ago. They made their way through South Asia, interbred with the Denisovans, colonized Australia, which then split away from New Guinea, leaving the two populations isolated from one another for about 12,000 years. By contrast, the Native Americans only split from the Northeast Asians around 12,000 years ago, and the Arctic peoples only became isolated about 4000 years ago.

Table 4.1, which can found in end of this chapter, shows the genetic distances between the 12 races of Classical Anthropology. The smaller the number then the closer is the genetic relationship.¹¹⁶ So, it is clear that “race” is as much a scientific category as any other. Races can be established from morphology with

75 percent accuracy, and this morphology precisely parallels genetic clusters, which differ in consistent ways in important and inter-correlated genotypic frequencies.

But some people continue to insist that “race” is not scientifically valid, and it is to their arguments that we will now turn.

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The War On “Race”

The Transformation of Anthropology

Is race an outmoded, morally dubious idea that was deservedly cast into the dustbin of history, along with Stalinism, astrology, and blood-letting? Many say so. In 2004, the American Anthropological Association announced on its website that “race is not a scientifically valid biological category.”¹¹⁷ A few years later, that organization produced an exhibit and accompanying book at the Smithsonian National Museum of Natural History in Washington, DC, entitled “RACE: Are We So Different?”¹¹⁸ The message was the same:

New scientific understandings about human variation demonstrate that human populations are not clearly defined, biologically distinct groups that some people call races.¹¹⁹

According to the exhibit’s creators, race should only be understood as a “powerful myth.” In the multi-authored volume, *Race and Intelligence: Separating Science from Myth*, African-American biologist Joseph Graves avers, “The majority of geneticists, evolutionary biologists, and anthropologists agree that there are no biological races in the human species.”¹²⁰ Anthropologist Mark Cohen likewise opines, “Almost all anthropologists agree that races in the popular sense do not exist and never have existed.”¹²¹

Such assertions are simply factually incorrect, at least when anthropologists are asked anonymously. A 2001 survey of Polish anthropologists found that 75 percent of them agreed that there were races,¹²² and a 1985 survey of American anthropologists found that 59 percent held the same stance.¹²³

In 1994, a national controversy erupted around the publication of Richard Herrnstein and Charles Murray’s book, *The Bell Curve*, which argued that social class is greatly influenced by heritable factors like intelligence, and that intelligence differs between the races.

Mounting evidence indicates that demographic trends are exerting downward pressures on the distribution of cognitive ability in the United States and that the pressures are strong enough to have social consequences.¹²⁴

The Bell Curve was meant as a broadside against the welfare state, but it was largely taken by its critics in the media as a revival of Social Darwinism, eugenics, and racial nationalism. Responding to the row, the psychologist Linda Gottfredson issued a statement in the *Wall Street Journal* in which she laid out what she called “Mainstream Science on Intelligence.”¹²⁵ It included the

following statements:

Members of all racial-ethnic groups can be found at every IQ level. The bell curves of different groups overlap considerably, but groups often differ in where their members tend to cluster along the IQ line. The bell curves for some groups (Jews and East Asians) are centered somewhat higher than for whites in general. Other groups (blacks and Hispanics) are centered somewhat lower than non-Hispanic whites. [...]

Individuals differ in intelligence due to differences in both their environments and genetic heritage. Heritability estimates range from 0.4 to 0.8 (on a scale from 0 to 1), most thereby indicating that genetics plays a bigger role than does environment in creating IQ differences among individuals. [...]

There is no persuasive evidence that the IQ bell curves for different racial-ethnic groups are converging. [...]

Gottfredson sent her missive to 131 fellow scientists, of whom 100 responded by her deadline. Fifty-two academics signed on to the statement (52 percent of the respondents and 40 of those contacted). Forty-eight of those contacted declined to endorse the statement: “seven because they thought the statement did not represent the mainstream, 11 because they did not know whether it did, and 30 for other reasons.”¹²⁶ Eight of those who refused to sign did so because they feared jeopardizing their employment or were wary of being associated with controversial researchers. This split opinion—and voiced fear of political correctness—gives us a useful snapshot of academic opinion on race at the end of the last century. And the evident controversy raises the question of whether race science could properly be termed “mainstream.”

So much had changed in the previous 50 years. From the 18th century to the middle of the 20th, almost all biologists and anthropologists accepted that the human species could be divided into biologically distinct races. But since around 1900, anthropology in Western Europe and the U.S. gradually moved from being a branch of biology, concerned with the physical and social evolution of humans, to a discipline in the humanities. This meant that the field lost a crucial grounding.

Today, anthropology, like so much in the humanities, is highly ideologically driven and influenced by dogmas associated with the Church of Multiculturalism, which we discussed earlier. These include “cultural determinism”—that “culture” explains all population differences in behavior—“cultural relativism”—that all cultures are equally valuable and have their own truths—and “postmodernism”—that “truth” is subjective and merely the ideology of the powerful, and we should deconstruct their “truth” and promote the marginalized).¹²⁷ It is reasonable to use the word “dogma” here, because

these ideas are often fervently expressed and treated as untouchable; fundamental critiques of the outlook are ignored, dismissed, or denounced.

In the U.S., a major turning point in the study of mankind occurred in the first half of the 20th century with two figures: Madison Grant (1865-1937) and Franz Boas (1858-1942). Grant was a sometime lawyer and passionate conservationist, involved in the establishment of the Bronx Zoo, Glacier National Park, and Save the Red Wood League, among many other projects. Never an academic, he was an independent researcher and progenitor of what could be called “racial history,” as exemplified in his two major works: *The Passing of the Great Race; or, The Racial Basis of European History* (1916) and *The Conquest of a Continent; or, The Expansion of Races in America* (1933).¹²⁸

Boas, a professor at Columbia, was a central figure in the promotion of “cultural relativism,” and he proved so influential that he is commonly remembered as the “Father of American Anthropology.” Though Boas was a fierce critic of Grant and what he labeled “scientific racism,” he nevertheless understood himself as a Darwinist. But ultimately, Boas’s most salient ideas ran against a proper evolutionary understanding of humanity. In 1936, Boas appeared on the cover of *Time* magazine announcing the triumph of “environmentalism.” Twenty years earlier, he and his wife had theorized, in *American Anthropologist*, that as Italian immigrants entered the United States, their head shapes would mutate, with the second generation having a shape closer to that of the American majority than their parents. Not only are such findings highly implausible, they were discovered to be fraudulent when the data were reanalyzed decades later.¹²⁹

Boas’s other influential concept was that of the “psychic unity of mankind,” which was originated by one of his teachers, Adolf Bastian (1826-1905). In this view—which is a striking rejoinder to Darwinism *and* “environmentalism”—not only does every individual and group have equal intellectual capacities but all cultures are based on a universally shared mind. This notion was more mystical than scientific, and had a deep influence on Carl Jung (1875-1961).

Despite the inherent problems with Boas’s methodology and his conception of Darwinism, he proved to be the defining force in contemporary anthropology. Grant, on the other hand, marked the “road not taken.” Boas’s cluster of ideas also goes a long way in understanding the contradiction within the minds of most contemporary academics: they enthusiastically endorse the theory of evolution by natural selection . . . yet when the prickly issue of race comes up,

they invariably retreat into obfuscation, mysticism, and wishful thinking. Whatever the case, there is a vociferous movement in anthropology, as well as in the mass media, opposed to the use of race as a biological category. Their opposition functions through a series of “memes” or “variations on themes,” which recur again and again. It is to these arguments that we now turn an informed and critical eye.

The Arguments Against “Race”

How Can You Draw a Line Between Different Races?

A chapter summary in *Race and Intelligence* includes the lines:

There are no biological races. Human physical appearance varies gradually around the planet, with the most geographically distant peoples generally appearing the most different from one another.¹³⁰

In other words: there is no clear way to divide different races. They merge into each other, with great variation in-between. A version of this argument is that there is no specific gene that is found only in one specific race. It can be countered that races are, of course, not entirely discrete categories because, if they were, they would be more like species, or perhaps genera, families, or orders on up the taxonomic scale.

Even if it were true that no unambiguous line can be drawn between races, this does not undermine the utility of race. The line between Grizzly bears and Brown bears is blurry, too—but you still know one when you see one and making distinctions between these subspecies is meaningful. Moreover, even if we were to accept that a species varies in small ways due to slightly different environments, then those at the extremes would differ so much, and in consistent ways, that it would become useful to distinguish between them.

Ultimately, it seems like people who make this argument are flirting with a kind of “tactical nihilism.” After all, no concept about the real world is mathematically pure. If “race” is “problematic” because it has blurry borders, then the concept of “history” is equally “problematic”—indeed, the term “problematic” is “problematic.” We use categories to divide our world into manageable chunks and thus negotiate it successfully. If we could not do that, we’d die. So the “blurry borders” argument fails the philosophical test of pragmatism. There exist population clusters that differ profoundly due to varying degrees of evolutionary isolation. These allow correct predictions to be made. That is all that is being argued.

Race is a “Western” Concept

Some say that race is illegitimate or immoral because it is steeped in Western history (and thus things like slavery and oppression), as well as the supposedly myopic and suffocating outlook of “Western science.” But this same argument could be made about almost any concept—including the ones that supposedly undermine or overcome Western hegemony. At some point, we have to accept a basic framing. And the central question is whether race is a *predictive* category or not. If race is problematic—that word again. . .—because it’s Western, then, presumably, we cannot use Western concepts at all to analyze anything non-Western. Following this logic, we shouldn’t even talk about anything that is non-Western using a Western tongue. Such argument may sound profound, but under inspection, they’re rather shallow. And for what it’s worth, non-Western cultures clearly have words and concepts that track with the Western notion of “race,” as we discussed earlier.

Race Has Meant Different Things

It has been noted that the word “race” can mean different things. Historically, it has been used in ways that “culture,” “ethnic group,” “nation,” or even “family” are now employed. Lord Acton’s *Cambridge Modern History*, for instance, referred to the “Habsburg race” in reference to the dynastic line.¹³¹ While the history of words is interesting, the fact that the meaning of words change over time is simply irrelevant to our purposes here. We are clear that by “race” we mean breeding populations separated in prehistory and adapted to different environments. If anyone uses race to mean anything else, then our use of race and his are merely homonyms. For what it’s worth, the word “mean” has meant different things historically. In Middle English, it meant “to intend.” Only by 1834 was “mean” widely being used in the way in which it is above.¹³² Does that “mean” that we cannot use the concept of “meaning”?

Studying Race Leads to Bad Things

Another supposed problem with race is that developing the concept leads to bad consequences. It legitimizes “racist groups,” “inspires hatred,” and so forth. That it might do this is clearly of no relevance to whether or not it is a scientifically justifiable and predictive category. This argument commits the fallacy of an “appeal to consequences” and, depending on how the consequences are described, an “appeal to emotion.” Firstly, it’s obvious that concepts of all kinds can have bad effects. Ecology—as well as awareness about pollution and

natural degradation—has, on some level, “inspired” eco-terrorism and murder. Does that mean that research into cleaning the oceans and preserving their ecosystems should cease because it has led, in some way, to violence? To ask the question is to answer it.

Beyond that, it can be convincingly argued that *suppressing* the concept of race leads to very bad consequences. If a South Asian person has a kidney transplant and is given the kidney of a White person, then his body will likely reject it, elevating the possibility that the patient will die of kidney failure. This scenario is the reason why Britain’s National Health Service regularly appeals for more Black and South Asian organ donors.¹³³ During the 2020 Covid-19 pandemic, it was found that mortality was particularly high among Blacks and South Asians living in Northern Europe, something that was argued to be for genetic reasons. Specifically, Vitamin D deficiency rendered one more susceptible to serious complications from Covid-19, and non-Europeans were much more likely to be deficient due to their darker skin, leaving them less able to absorb Vitamin D from the sun.¹³⁴

There are consistent genetic racial differences in the prevalence of many serious medical conditions. Sometimes these stay in populations because a single inherited allele had positive consequences in ancestral environments, overwhelming the negatives consequences for individual carriers of two alleles. An example is sickle cell anaemia, a condition associated with Sub-Saharan Africans. If you carry two copies of the mutant allele, then you develop this debilitating condition. If, however, you carry one copy, then you will likely be immune to malaria.¹³⁵ Cystic Fibrosis, a congenital disease among Northern European, is similar.¹³⁶ It only appears when two carriers of the faulty allele have a child, there being a 50 percent chance that such a child will have Cystic Fibrosis. Various hypotheses have been advanced to explain why Cystic Fibrosis has remained in European populations. One states that carrying a single copy of the faulty allele causes carriers to be better able to fight off tuberculosis.¹³⁷

In some cases, something is adaptive under Darwinian conditions but is maladaptive under modern conditions. For example, South Asians are particularly good at storing fat, and this is useful in the context of food scarcity, for obvious reasons. But with food abundance brought on by the Industrial Revolution and the use of fossil fuels, South Asians become diabetic more easily than Europeans.¹³⁸ Helping South Asians deal with these problems can only occur with a proper understanding of their nature.

There is evidence that Northeast Asians are less well-adapted to flu-like viruses than either Europeans or Sub-Saharan Africans. This may be because flu thrives in cold and wet or hot and wet ecologies, meaning that Europeans and Sub-Saharan Africans would be more strongly selected to be resistant to flu.¹³⁹ Moreover, races that never developed complex agriculture—such as the Inuit, the Australian Aborigines, the Pacific Islanders, and many Native American groups—have low resistance to flu because animal husbandry often causes viruses to jump the species barrier, and races that evolved in such a context developed better adapted immune systems.¹⁴⁰ This would imply that, during an influenza pandemic, East Asians in Western countries should get special protection from the flu. Denying that race exists would simply put people in danger. All of these are poignant illustrations of why race is definitely not a “social construct” and a proper understanding of it is literally a matter of life and death.

Lewontin’s Fallacy

A more scientifically informed criticism of race can be found in the common criticism, “There are more differences within races than there are between them.” This is wheeled out with great profundity by biased scientists when interviewed in biased newspapers, without any references. It has come to be known as “Lewontin’s Fallacy,” named after biologist Richard Lewontin (b.1929), who argued that 85 percent of human genetic differences are due to individual variation, and only 15 percent due to differences between populations and ethnic groups; ergo, “there are more difference within races than between them.”

This fallacy can be easily dispatched. The sheer number of differences is less important than the *direction* of the differences. If a variety of small differences all push in the same direction—which they will in the case of subspecies evolved to different ecologies—then this can add up to significant overall differences between average members of different races.¹⁴¹

British biologist A.W.F. Edwards presented a systematic critique of Lewontin’s argument (along the way, coining the phrase “Lewontin’s Fallacy”).¹⁴² He noted that Lewontin simply looked at a small number of genetic loci and found that, indeed, 85 percent of human variation was due to individual differences. However, argues Edwards, if you look at lots of loci, then you will find these loci correlate differently in different groups, due to gene frequency

differences, leading to very different results. Indeed, this leads to races being very different in numerous predictable ways, rendering “race” a scientific category. Edwards pointed out that, using Lewontin’s logic, we wouldn’t be able to distinguish between different tree structures, because these differences are hidden in the correlational data, just as race differences are. But using only genetic data, scientists were able to correctly highlight 15 forms of tree structure. As Edwards notes, Lewontin’s argument could only work if each of the genetic loci highlighted were randomly distributed between races, but it is in the very nature of races—being adaptations to different ecologies—that genes are not randomly distributed. Thus, Lewontin presents us—albeit wrapped up in abstruse scientific language—with nothing more than a circular argument.

To make matters worse, the loci which Lewontin used do not vary substantially between races. He used markers such as blood-type, and, as anthropologist Peter Frost has noted, these are “not particularly selectively important. . . . [W]hen genes vary within a population, despite similar selection pressures, it’s usually because they have little or no selective value.”¹⁴³ When methods were used with markers that *do* vary between races, such as craniometric variation and skin color, it was found that 81 percent of the variation is between races.¹⁴⁴ Lewontin, therefore, only uncovered the findings he did by using genetic loci that aren’t especially relevant to regional evolution—despite evolution to different regions being the essence of race. So, Lewontin’s argument is a kind of sleight of hand.¹⁴⁵ What he is actually proclaiming is this: When you use genetic loci that are distributed very similarly in all races, and in which there is much variation within races due to these loci not being very important to selection to different ecologies, then there are, indeed, more differences within races than between them. He hardly disproved the reality of race.

We’re All 99% The Same

In recent years, an argument against race has arisen that is much like the Lewontin fallacy: “Science has proven that every individual is more than 99 percent identical to every other.” This meme of “99%” was introduced at the turn of the century by none other than the Human Genome Project.¹⁴⁶

On the individual level, tiny genetic differences (humans only differ by 0.0012 percent on average) have important consequences, and it is highly misleading to downplay them. The genetic differences in heritable musical ability between a

professional musician and Mozart are probably rather small, but they are obviously profound. Moreover, on the level of species, humans share a remarkable amount of genetic similarity (upwards of 98 percent) with our closest evolutionary relative, the chimpanzee. We even share much in common with other animals, like pigs and dogs. Clearly, small differences can have dramatic physical, psychological, and behavioral effects. And no one is willing to assert that since humans and chimpanzees are “98% the same,” we should not make distinctions between the two.

The Concept of Race Makes Me Uncomfortable

Another argument—and there are many versions of it—amounts to an appeal to emotion, in which a person essentially argues that “race” makes him feel unhappy. All that can be said is that this is manifestly fallacious and thus should be dismissed out of hand. How you feel is irrelevant to whether or not something is true. If being told that you have a rare blood disorder makes you feel unhappy, does that mean that it is not true or that you shouldn’t be told about it?

On a deeper level, we should understand that science is fundamentally amoral. It is about the relentless search for the objective truth. New scientific discoveries almost always offended some vested interest or other. This is why the kind of scientists who tend to make really important discoveries—so-called “geniuses”— seem to combine outlier high IQ with moderately low Agreeableness (altruism and empathy) and moderately low Conscientiousness (impulse control, rule following). This means that they can “think outside the box,” not bound by conventional rules—maybe they even take pleasure in slaughtering sacred cows. It also means that they either don’t care about offending people or they are sufficiently high on the “autism spectrum” that they wouldn’t be able to anticipate offending people even if they did care.¹⁴⁷

If You Are Interested in “Race,” Then You Are Probably “Racist”

This criticism—that discussing race is “racist”—amounts to a so-called “fact-value conflation.” That a person presents something as being a “fact” has no bearing at all on his “values.” Facts are value-neutral. If a doctor tells you that you only have a week to live, does that mean he wants you to die? Furthermore, we should probably be, at the very least, suspicious of those who regularly employ the word “racist.” The first recorded use of the word “racist” was in 1932, with “racism” first observed in 1928. These terms gradually came to replace “racialist,” which was first recorded in 1910, and “racialism,” first noted

in 1882.¹⁴⁸ In 1928, “racism” meant the belief that each “race” (meaning “ethnic group”) should have their own state and that civic society was optimal if states were racially based.¹⁴⁹ “Racialism” referred to prejudices against other races and the belief that one’s own race was superior.

In the wake of World War II, “racist” gradually came to mean what “racialist” had once meant.¹⁵⁰ However, the term “racist” has been extended far beyond this, to refer to anybody who is seen to deviate from ideological orthodoxy with regard to the issue of race. Terming such a person the “racist” associates him with that which is accepted as somehow evil and immoral. As this association is damaging, the term “racist” is an emotionally manipulative means of keeping people on the “correct” ideological path. In other words, it is an *ad hominem* criticism. The essence of the accusation is that the subject has strayed sufficiently far from orthodoxy that he is immoral; he is a heretic. There are many terms of this kind. As English historian Alexandra Walsham summarizes, in her analysis of Early Modern religious non-conformity in England, the accusation of “atheist” was “available for the expression and repression of disquiet about ‘aberrant’ mental and behavioral tendencies—for the reinforcement and restatement of theoretical norms.” Both “atheist” and “papist” were “categories of deviance to which individuals who were even marginally departed from the prescribed ideals might be assimilated and thereby reproved.”¹⁵¹

There is simply no logical reason to reject the concept of race, and there are very persuasive reasons to accept it as what it is—a scientific category. On this basis, one should be rather guarded about the motives of those who refuse to accept it, who resort to name-calling and obfuscation, or who are mired in the contradictions and incoherence.

Living Fast, Dying Young

Understanding Life History Strategy

Having established, then, that “race” is a scientifically valid category, three questions arise:

- What is the best way to make sense of the evolution of different races?
- Why do they differ in the ways that they do?
- Can these differences be reduced to a clear model that makes correct predictions?

One such model is “Cold Winters Theory.”¹⁵² It holds that races are adaptations to different average temperatures. Though this may be true to some extent—and though it may quite helpfully explain race differences in intelligence—there is much that it cannot explain. Why, for example, do the Bushmen sport extremely large buttocks, while the North East Asians do not? Clearly, a more sophisticated analysis is required.

J.P. Rushton and Life History Theory

One of the best attempts to do this was presented by the British-Canadian psychologist J. Philippe Rushton (1943-2012) in his 1995 book *Race, Evolution, and Behavior: A Life History Perspective*.¹⁵³ Indeed, it may be testimony to just how frighteningly accurate his theory was that when he first presented it, at a conference in January 1989, the government of Ontario looked into prosecuting him for thought crime. The governor called for him to be fired from his university, and leftist campaigners invaded his department and picketed his lectures. Ultimately, the Attorney General of Ontario declared him “loony but not criminal.”¹⁵⁴

Rushton’s alleged “crime” was to have taken “Life History Theory”—a model commonly used to make sense of differences between species—and applied it to human races. Specifically, Rushton examined Caucasians (Europeans, North Africans, South Asians), East Asians, and Sub-Saharan Africans. In doing this, he presented a model that—while not perfect and while in need of refinement—certainly makes a great deal of sense.

Life History Strategy (LHS) refers to a spectrum with *fast* (so-called *r*-strategy) at one end and *slow* (*K*-strategy) at the other. In essence, *fast* Life History Strategists invest most of their energy in copulation and very little in

their offspring. *Slow* Life History Strategists invest relatively little energy in sex and direct most of their energy into nurturing their young. Other important differences emerge as well, which we will discuss below. The “r” and “K” designators are borrowed from the logistic equation for population growth within a confined space: “r” stands for biotic potential or the maximum reproduction rate of an organism, and K , for the carrying capacity of the environment, that is, how many individuals an ecology can sustain.

In the animal world, oysters generate half a billion offspring in a typical year and take no notice of them at all; they are extreme r strategists. Mammals and birds have fewer offspring, but feed and care for them in early life. Rabbits are a popular byword for fertility, but the 12 offspring they average per year come nowhere near the fertility of fish or amphibians.

Humans are the most advanced K strategists in nature, but we, too, exist on a spectrum. The rake who seduces women left and right, and abandons them if they get pregnant, is the archetypal fast Life History Strategist. The gentleman who gets married for life and is a loving and doting father to his children is the archetypal slow Life History Strategist. Rushton’s basic argument was that the Caucasian, Black, and East Asian races, on average, sit at different points on this spectrum.

Before we look at Rushton’s evidence for this proposition, we need to answer two questions:

- How do these two different strategies develop?
- What are the key characteristics of the two strategies?

Imagine two different ecologies. The first is tropical and bounteous—a place of low-hanging fruit and abundance, but also dangers, as it undergoes random flooding and droughts. The other ecology is cruel and seasonal, with icy winters and short periods of fecundity. There, you must plan, sacrifice, and struggle just to survive.

In the first ecology, food can be obtained all year round; yet the relative instability means that you could be wiped out at any moment. There, organisms tend to adopt a fast LHS. In essence, this means that they “live fast, die young.” They invest most of their energy in sex; they have many sexual partners; and they tend to have a large number of children, which they show little care for, as some are bound to survive.

On the other hand, the harsh ecology, where food is hard to come by, will more quickly reach its maximum carrying capacity for any species. Thus, individuals of that species will compete with each other for survival. If you adopt a fast LHS and invest next to nothing in any of your offspring, then it's likely your young will all die off, due to insufficient protection during the cold winters. But this harsh ecology is also more predictable, rewarding the individuals who direct resources away from copulation and towards "nurturing," that is, caring for a smaller number of offspring, and planning for their future. In essence, the successful strategists will "live slow, die old."

They are more likely to be able to successfully nurture their offspring, to survive the predictable yet harsh ecology, if they are high in intelligence, impulse control, altruism and empathy, so these traits become part of a slower LHS. Testosterone predicts aggression and impulsiveness, meaning that it is negatively associated with a slow LHS. They are more likely to be able to learn the skills necessary to survive in this competitive yet also foreseeable environment if they have a longer childhood; so as the species becomes more *K*-selected, childhood becomes longer and life slows down. The more *K*-oriented the ecology is, the more specific is the niche to which the animal is adapted, meaning that there is more benefit to learning and less benefit to simply being instinctive. So, offspring are increasingly dependent on their parents, born at earlier stage of development, and less able to survive on their own. In that more energy is now being invested in sexual partners, animals become pickier about who they are prepared to copulate with, wanting to ensure that they only invest energy in those who are healthy and robust. Males begin to guard their mates to ensure that their investment of energy is not wasted. The result of this is fewer sexual opportunities. This means that the ability to live longer, to optimize the extent to which you can pass on your genes, starts to be selected for. There is a less of a need—in a stable environment—to conspicuously advertise genetic quality, in order to stand out from the crowd. That same energy is better invested in being a good nurturer. As a consequence, sexual selection on secondary sexual characteristics becomes less intense and size differences between males and females become smaller. As the species becomes more *K*-selected, they start to develop cooperative groups, as these elevate the survival chances of the individual members. And if they are higher in these qualities than their rival group, with stronger internal bonds, they will be more positively ethnocentric, a trait that ensures survival, dominance and expansion and a trait which computer models have shown predicts group survival.¹⁵⁵ This also means that there will be

stronger bonds between sexual partners. In general, these *K*-traits will all inter-correlate, though some species may be less *K*-selected on some traits than others, especially as the niche to which they are evolved becomes increasingly specific. For example, a tortoise follows a faster Life History Strategy than a human on most traits, with the exception of aging. With aging, it pursues a slower strategy and lives considerably longer than the human. As summary of the differences between *r*- and *K* can be seen in Table 6.1.

Table 6.1. *r*-*K* Strategy Essentials

r-Strategy	K-Strategy
Family Characteristics	
Large litters	Small litters
Short birth spacing	Long birth spacing
Many offspring	Few offspring
High infant mortality	Low infant mortality
Little parental care	High parental care
Individual Characteristics	
Rapid maturation	Slow maturation
Early sexual reproduction	Late sexual reproduction
Short life	Long life
High reproductive effort	Low reproductive effort
Inefficient energy use	Efficient energy use
Low encephalization	High encephalization
Population Characteristics	
Opportunistic exploiters	Consistent exploiters
Dispersing colonizers	Stable occupiers
Variable population size	Stable population size

Lax competition Keen competition

Social system

Low social organization High social organization

Low altruism High altruism

As already indicated, Rushton applied this model to differences between what he called the “three big races.” The results were highly consistent. Sub-Saharan Africans are the most r-selected, relatively-speaking; East Asians are the most K-selected; and Caucasians are intermediate, though closer to East Asians. In my earlier book, *J. Philippe Rushton: A Life History Perspective*, I updated Rushton’s model and found that a number of traits that he had not explored were also in the predicted direction. These results can be seen in Table 6.2.¹⁵⁶

Table 6.2. Ranking of Races on Diverse Variables

Measure	Mongoloids	Caucasoids	Negroids
Brain size			
Autopsy data (cm3)	1,351	1,356	1,223
Endocrinal volume (cm3)	1,415	1,362	1,268
External head measures (cm3)	1,356	1,329	1,294
Cortical neurons (billions)	13.767	13.665	13.185
Cranial Capacity (cm3)	1487	1458	1403
Intelligence			
Intelligence test scores in USA (IQ points)	106	100	85
Decision times			
Simple	361 ms	371 ms	398 ms
Complex	423 mls	486 mls	489 mls
Odd man out	787 mls	898 mls	924 mls
Cultural achievements			

Number of times all 21 accepted measures of civilization independently achieved	1	4	0
Top 40 most important scientists, 800BC to 1950	0	100%	0
Scientists in <i>Dictionary of Scientific Biography</i>	2%	98%	0

Gestation time

Already born at 37 weeks	6.2%	6.9%	15.6%
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Skeletal development

Bone age, measured by months in excess of chronological age among adolescent females	0	4 months	10 months
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Motor development

Walking	13 months	12 months	11 months
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Dental development

Age at permanent tooth eruption	8	6.1	5.8
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Age at first sexual experience

Sexually experienced aged 21	9%	40%	64%
Age of first pregnancy	29.5	27	24.2

Age at Menopause

Menstrual aged 40-55	46.3%	29%	24.4%
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Senility

Dementia	65+ %	2.5%	3.6%
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Lifespan

Life span (years, male, USA, 2008)	80.3	76.8	72.7
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Psychopathic Personality

Assorted proxies	10.1%	14.6%	16.6%
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Marital Stability

Percent married or cohabiting in middle age	66	63	35
Law abidingness			
Serious assaults per 100,000 by groups of nations	37.1	61.6	110.8
Mental health			
Schizophrenia Odds ratio, UK	-	0	2.5
Reproductive Effort			
2 egg twinning (per 1000 births)	4	8	16
Hormone levels			
CAG Length (Low testosterone genetic marker)	23.1%	21.31%	20.23%
Size of genitalia			
Erect penis length	10-14 cm	14-15.3 cm	15.9-20.3 cm
Erect penis diameter	3.2 cm	3.3-4.1 cm	5.1 cm
Secondary sexual characteristics			
Male Voice depth	108 Hz	110 Hz	117Hz
Permissive attitudes			
Intercourse frequencies per week	1-4	2-4	3-10
Promiscuity, 5 or more sexual partners in lifetime	8%	26%	38%
Percent of population with AIDS	0.07%	0.4%	8%

It can be seen from Table 6.2 that there is an astonishing consistency to the racial pattern of what Rushton termed Differential *K*. In almost all instances, East Asians are the most *K*-selected, Sub-Saharan Africans are the least, and Caucasians, intermediate.

It's noteworthy that African-Americans have a longer puberty than White Americans, puberty being a process in which different markers, such as genital hair, manifest at different times. It has been argued that this is congruous with Rushton's model because the process of puberty is stressful and can be

associated with anti-social behavior, meaning that, in a harsh ecology, it would be preferable for it to be over as quickly as possible.¹⁵⁷ However, I have found many instances where race differences do not manifest as Rushton's model would predict. They can be found in Table 6.3.¹⁵⁸

Table 6.3. Counter Examples to Rushton's Model

Measure	<i>K</i>		<i>r</i>
Personality			
Neuroticism	Black	European	E. Asian
Testosterone			
2D4D Ratio	European/E. Asian		Black
Baldness	Black	East Asian	European
Hairiness	Black	E. Asian	European
CAG repeats on the AR Gene	E. Asian	European/Black	
Prostate Cancer	European	Black	E. Asian
Oral sex preference	European	Black	E. Asian
Nurture			
Adoption	European	Black	E. Asian
Pet Ownership	European	Black	E. Asian
Negative ethnocentrism	European	Black	Asian
Secondary Sexual Characteristics			
Testicle size	E. Asian	Black	European
Cultural Achievement			
N. times 21 civilization measures independently reached	European	E. Asian	Black
Percentage of Eminent Scientists	European	E. Asian	Black

These counter-examples imply that, though Rushton has explained a great deal, his theory requires further nuance. This has been attempted by British psychologist Michael Woodley of Menie with his *Cognitive Integration Effort Hypothesis*. Woodley of Menie argues that, as a group becomes more *K*, it becomes more adapted to an ever-more specific niche. The result of this is that the positive manifold between the different components of *K* becomes weaker, such that the highly *K*-selected group can adopt the very specific survival strategy that it requires.¹⁵⁹ In other words, there are numerous traits that make-up a slow Life History Strategy, such as a long childhood, a cooperative personality, and high mental stability. But a very slow LHS involves adapting to a very specific and very predictable niche. This means that as that niche becomes more specific, it may be that a generalized slow Life History Strategy is less adaptive than one that is slow in most respects but fast in others. Consequently, among very slow Life History Strategists, the correlation between the different components of a slow Life History Strategy becomes weaker. In much the same way, as people become more intelligent, the correlation between the different kinds of intelligence—such as verbal, spatial and mathematical—becomes weaker. This means that, at the extreme, you find highly intelligent people who cannot perform tasks that are weakly associated with intelligence and which are no problem for not-so intelligent people. Think of the stereotype of the “absent-minded professor,” who writes treatises on poetry but is always losing his keys or the fictional genius Sheldon Cooper, from the TV show *The Big Bang Theory*, who’s unable to drive a car.

The *Cognitive Integration Effort Hypothesis* would explain why the most *K*-selected group—the East Asians—display the most exceptions to Rushton’s model, and now we can start to make sense of these exceptions. East Asians score higher in mental instability than Europeans, which is odd because the more cooperative the society needs to be, the stronger would be the selection pressure for mental stability. But this finding of high Neuroticism scores among East Asians is driven by their being extremely high in the Neuroticism trait of “social anxiety”—a trait that, in fact, makes them highly cooperative and pro-social. East Asians are so high in this, that it overwhelms the fact that they are lowest in the other components of Neuroticism.¹⁶⁰ So, this anomaly reflects, in reality, their pronounced level of *K*-selection.

In terms of cultural achievement, it has been argued that the strong *K*-selection of East Asians means that they have a very “small gene pool,” that is, a low level

of genetic diversity not, of course, a small number of people. This is because their ancestral environment was so harsh that there was relatively little room for any deviation from the optimum. They are also extremely high in altruism (Agreeableness) and rule following (Conscientiousness).

Cultural achievement is predicted, substantially, by national average IQ. Indeed, this strongly predicts many measures of civilization, such as literacy, education level, health, wealth, sanitation, low child mortality, low religiousness, and so on.¹⁶¹ Equally important to a nation's cultural flourishing is its "smart fraction"—its innovators, the geniuses who come up with highly original ideas. These people are the motors of civilization, driving the crucial breakthroughs that allow all of us to progress.¹⁶² As mentioned earlier, scientific geniuses typically combine outlier high IQ with moderately low Conscientiousness and moderately low Agreeableness.¹⁶³ Sir Isaac Newton (1643-1727)—an obsessive eccentric, unworldly, and cold-hearted—is the prototypical example. He would become lost in thought on the stairs for hours at a time, even while entertaining guests. Newton had very few friends and, in an argument with his mother, once threatened to burn her house down.¹⁶⁴ As already noted, the scientific genius's outlier high IQ means, of course, that he can generate highly original and important ideas. His moderately low Conscientiousness makes him creative; able to "think outside the box." Breakthroughs almost always offend vested interests. But, low in Agreeableness, the genius simply doesn't care—he might not even be able to anticipate that he would cause offense, due to his lack of empathy. He may even enjoy triggering the powers that be; his contrarian nature being part of the reason why he questions everything he is told and thus makes new discoveries.

The East Asians' smaller gene pool means they are less likely to produce people with outlier high IQ, let alone produce people who combine this with a moderately anti-social personality. Moreover, the flip-side of geniuses would be high IQ dreamers, who are parasitic on the society, as well as low IQ, anti-social people—in other words, criminals or malcontents. And you can't have the good without the bad. For East Asians, the selection pressure for cooperativeness in such a harsh ecology would be so strong that it would be dangerous to risk producing geniuses. We're reminded of the Japanese proverb, "The nail that sticks up gets hammered down." For these reasons, it is the Caucasians—not the extreme K East Asians—who have the greatest cultural achievements.

The lower rates of pet ownership and adoption and the higher rates of

ethnocentrism among East Asians can also be explained by Woodley of Menie's development of Rushton's model. In a highly *K*-ecology, group selection would be extremely strong, and this would select for groups with pronounced ethnocentrism. An alternative strategy would be low negative ethnocentrism but high levels of genius, permitting expansion and the development of a large gene pool and thus ever more genius. But, as we have discussed, this option would be problematic for the East Asians.¹⁶⁵ Low levels of adoption and pet ownership would be consistent with high levels of generalized *K*: In an extremely harsh ecology, strong bonds are only made with genetic kin; kindness shouldn't be squandered on those who don't share your immediate genetic interests.

Why East Asians are less inclined than Europeans to have oral sex is unclear. This is a *K* trait, because it involves bonding, and it helps to ensure that the woman becomes pregnant by that specific partner. It has been argued that by swallowing the man's semen, the female's immune system is less likely to treat it as an enemy agent, elevating the probability that she will be impregnated by that specific male. In addition, once she does become pregnant by that male, the fetus will release proteins relating to him. But she will be accustomed to these, meaning she will be less likely to treat them as enemy agents, reducing the probability of her suffering from pre-eclampsia and losing the fetus. The anomaly may be because we mainly have student samples, and East Asians tend to reach sexual maturity later.¹⁶⁶

Most of the Black-White anomalies—such as baldness or hairiness—can be explained by these being problematic measures of *K*. For example, hairiness is a marker of testosterone but also simply of Neanderthal ancestry. Otherwise, anomalies are likely the result of small sample sizes. Thus, overall, Rushton's model has considerable predictive validity, especially when combined with Woodley of Menie's subsequent developments of it.

Sexual Dimorphism

Yet another surprise—but one that is broadly consistent with Woodley of Menie's model, rather than Rushton's—is race differences in the magnitude of sex differences. In nature, females will generally select for the biggest and strongest males or those with the largest secondary sexual characteristics. This is famous among peacocks. Not only is the peacock considerably bigger than the peahen, but, as we discussed in Chapter 2, he sports an enormous and colorful tail. This is because the ability to grow such a tail is a sign of healthy genes.

According to the “handicap principle”¹⁶⁷, the tail is a visible disadvantage. For the male to grow such an ornament and still be alive and kicking signals his potency. This has led to an arms race among peacocks, who increasingly grow outlandish displays, as well as to become bigger and stronger, leading to pronounced differences between the sexes.

Among humans, however, the situation is rather more complicated. Rushton showed that more *K* races tend to have smaller secondary sexual characteristics. This is because the harsher and more stable the ecology is, the less you need to conspicuously advertise your genetic quality, and the more bioenergetic resources you need to invest in a complex brain, which permits you to be more intelligent, pro-social, and nurturing. In an ecology in which people need to invest in their sexual partners, they will also be proportionately more interested in that person’s propensity to nurture than in that person’s physical appearance, meaning that secondary sexual characteristics will become smaller. A woman will become less interested in the “Alpha male,” who will simply ensure that her offspring inherits his attractive genes for strength and winning fights, and more interested in the “Beta,” who’s more agreeable and more inclined to stick around and take care of their young.¹⁶⁸ “Brains over brawn” means less outrageous displays of manhood. This can be observed not just when comparing Rushton’s “three big races” but also when comparing Sub-Saharan Africans and Bushmen, the latter being less *K* selected and boasting the most pronounced secondary sexual characteristics among all humankind.

Consistent with this, there are race differences in how attractive secondary sexual characteristics are found to be. It has been discovered that men who score higher on “sociosexuality”—that is, sexual promiscuity—are more attracted to women with large breasts than are those who score lower.¹⁶⁹ Men who are of lower socioeconomic status in Malaysia, as well as men who are hungry in Britain, are also more attracted to large breasts, again implying this association, as hunger makes people more short-term oriented.¹⁷⁰ American psychologist Rachel Sewell has examined a multiracial sample of students from the U.S., which has the advantage of controlling, to some extent, for culture and socioeconomic status.¹⁷¹ She found that Black men were the most attracted to “extra-large” breasts, while Asians were the least so. Ten percent of Black men found “extra-large” to be the most attractive, compared to zero Asian men. There is evidence that large-breasted women are relatively low in Conscientiousness, that is, they are relative r-strategists, and it is fellow r-strategist males who are

most attracted to women with larger breasts. *K*-strategist women tend to have small breasts, and *K*-strategist men are more attracted to females with smaller breasts, with sociosexuality and Conscientiousness used as proxies for LHS.¹⁷² In a *K*-context, males would be more likely to pass on their genes by investing in good mothers who would be sexually faithful. Accordingly, they would need to trade physical characteristics for psychological ones, meaning it would make sense to actually be attracted to smaller breasts. Similarly, it would make sense for females to advertise their nurturing and faithful nature via smaller secondary sexual characteristics. These characteristics would also manifest by their differentially directing bioenergetic resources.

That said, in terms of size differences—sexual dimorphism—the picture is very different. British biologist Jonathan Wells has drawn upon anthropometric data on 96 non-industrialized populations across the world and found, “The magnitude of dimorphism was not randomly distributed across global regions.” It was “lowest in African and Asian populations and greatest in Arctic populations.

There was a negative correlation across populations between lean mass dimorphism and adiposity dimorphism, independent of temperature. With decreasing temperature, dimorphism in both lean mass and adiposity increased. Dimorphism increased in fatter but not taller populations, independently of temperature.¹⁷³

This means that European women are more physically different from European men than African women are from African men or than Asian women are from Asian men. In addition, Wells emphasizes that women in cold environments invest disproportionately more in “lean mass” than do men, and that differences in dimorphism will be predicted by a combination of genetic and environmental factors.

Furthermore, South African sports researcher Richard Stretch and I analyzed race and sex differences in Olympic track and field achievement and showed that these differences were congruous with Wells’s implied findings that sexual dimorphism is lower among Blacks and Northeast Asians than Europeans. The difference in Black-White field achievement is smaller among females than males, because Black females are relatively more masculinized than White females.¹⁷⁴ With regard to Sub-Saharan African females, it might be argued that a pronounced *r*-strategy and an unstable, dangerous environment means that they benefit from relatively high levels of testosterone. In particular, they are highly likely to find themselves raising their children alone, with all of the physical

dangers that entails. This would help to explain a relative lack of sexual dimorphism. As the ecology becomes more *K*-oriented, females would increasingly select for males who can invest in them and their offspring; males, in turn, would increasingly select for trustworthy females who are good at nurturing. The result would be a growing divergence between males and females, with males increasingly focused on work, engaged in to achieve status, such as hunting and farming, and females increasingly focused on nurturing. In other words, there would be an increasingly pronounced division of labor. We would thus expect males to become, proportionately, increasingly more muscular and taller than females, and this is precisely what Wells's research has found. We would also expect a similar divergence in male and female psychology, which we will explore in Chapter 8.

Returning to the Races of Classical Anthropology

A further problem with Rushton's model, which I highlighted in my book on the matter, is the "races" he chose to use.¹⁷⁵ Based on Salter's presentation of the genetic differences between races, there is little justification for lumping together Northeast Asians, Arctic peoples, Southeast Asians, Pacific Islanders, and Native Americans as one "race" known as "East Asians," because the differences between these races are substantial. For example, Arctic peoples are about as distant from Southeast Asians as Europeans are from Southeast Asians. Australian Aborigines are so genetically isolated, moreover, that they should surely be included as a separate race. Indeed, as we have already noted, there appear to be approximately 10 distinct genetic racial clusters, possibly as many as 12. If we accept this, then there are further problems with reducing racial differences down to differences in Developmental *K*.

A variety of factors mean that, on certain measures, the differences are not in the expected direction. For example, the Arctic is so cold and selection pressures so intense that Arctic peoples never developed agriculture. In such an ecology, it is simply too risky to experiment with new possibilities and too cold to make agriculture a successful strategy. Agriculture may have developed where it did, in the "Goldilocks Zone" of the Fertile Crescent in the Middle East, because just the right environmental conditions were present at just the right time for experimentation. Once agriculture develops, then it tends to select out those who have short-time preferences and can't plan for the future. In doing so, it selects out those who have low intelligence and, therefore, elevates overall

intelligence.¹⁷⁶ And as we will see in the following chapter, even though the Arctic peoples are adapted to the harshest ecology in the world, their average IQ is lower than that of the Northeast Asians and Europeans, and is commensurate with that of Southeast Asians. At the same time, Arctic peoples have the largest average brain size of all races, despite not having the highest IQ, with brain size weakly correlating with IQ at the individual level. This anomaly appears to be because the Arctic peoples, in their extremely harsh ecology, have been strongly selected towards certain specialized abilities, especially spatial intelligence and memory, leading to larger brains.¹⁷⁷

Related to this is the issue of alcohol. The widespread fermentation of fruit and grain was a consequence of the spread of agriculture. Hunter-gather populations would, of course, drink clean, fresh water from a spring. As civilization arose, and along with it increasing urbanicity and more unsanitary conditions, alcoholic drinks had the added benefit of their anti-bacterial qualities. Thus, races that had developed agriculture, and began enjoying beer and wine, subsequently underwent an evolutionary process in which those who could “handle their drink” were selected for. Races that did not develop agriculture, or did not develop complex agriculture (but merely herding)—such as Bushmen, Arctic peoples, Australian Aboriginals, and many Native American groups—are strongly susceptible to drunken violence and alcoholism. This, at least in part, explains relatively high levels of anti-social behavior among Native Americans, often to the extent that—based on various proxies—they have actually been rated as higher in psychopathic personality than have African-Americans. However, African-Americans—in terms of twinning and their speed of growth—pursue a faster Life History Strategy than Native Americans.¹⁷⁸

In a similar vein, a mutant gene that produced an enzyme (“lactase”) that allows adults to digest lactose was selected for, some 8,000 years ago, among the Neolithic farmers who had domesticated sheep, cattle, and goats. This allowed them to take advantage of nutritious animal milk. The mutation eventually spread throughout the population; today, some 90 percent of Northern Europeans, along with certain East African tribes, are lactose tolerant. They are, in effect, mutated populations of “mampires,” who feast off the milk of another species.¹⁷⁹

Religiousness also interferes with the direction of race differences in certain *K* measures. A number of studies have shown that religiousness essentially takes forms of behavior that are adaptive at the level of group selection and turns them into the “will of the gods.” (We discuss this matter in more depth in Chapter 9.)

Consequently, religion elevates positive and negative ethnocentrism.¹⁸⁰ In other words, religion renders a “conservative” and “traditional” worldview—you could even say “nationalist” one—as more likely to be adhered to. Accordingly, the decline of religiousness in Europe means that measures of fast Life History Strategy—such as a young age at first intercourse, high number of sexual partners, and high level of divorce—are actually more pronounced among Europeans than they are among South Asians, North Africans, or Arabs living in European societies, as can be seen in Table 6.4

Table 6.4. Sexual Promiscuity Among Whites and South Asians in the UK.

Measure	Country	White	South Asian
Married, 30-34	UK	65%	88%
Cohabiting, 35-39	UK	93%	97%
Multiple sexual partners (2 or more in last 5 years), 16-60. Males	UK	35%	28%
Multiple sexual partners (2 or more in last 5 years), 16-60. Males (females)	UK	23%	8%

The best explanation for this is that these latter groups tend to be more religious.¹⁸¹ In addition, religiousness elevates positive and negative ethnocentrism more generally, meaning that, based on current data, South Asians are higher in positive ethnocentrism (being prepared to make sacrifices for their ethnic group, for example) than are Europeans.¹⁸²

Yet another complication is the high living standards enjoyed in Western countries. Indeed, these limit the extent to which comparisons are even possible. For example, Europeans have begun puberty earlier and earlier across the 20th century. In Europe, between 1860 and 1970, the average of menarche fell from 17 to 13, and it has continued to fall since then.¹⁸³ (Among girls, age of menarche, the first occurrence of menstruation, is often employed as a proxy for the beginning puberty.) A study from the Netherlands in 2010 found that the average age of menarche for a Dutch girl was 13.1, whereas it was 11.4 for South Asian girls living in the Netherlands.¹⁸⁴ This is the direction we would predict, though how representative South Asian immigrants to the Netherlands

are of South Asians in general is unclear. But for many races, there is simply no comparable data, because the nation in which the data is gathered, the exact year in which it is gathered, and even race differences in average living standards within the country all act as confounds. This problem of environmental confounds is true of many other measures of Life History, which might be applied across the 12 races of Classical Anthropology. A partial test of Rushton's model can be made, such as comparing senility levels between different races in Singapore and finding that senility comes earlier among the Southeast Asian Malay than among the Northeast Asian Han Chinese.¹⁸⁵ But even here, there is the confound of the South Asian Singaporeans being a highly select immigrant population, not representative in their Life History Strategy of South Asians in India.

An example of the way in which the results do not easily fit with Rushton's model when extended to the 12 races of Classical Anthropology can be seen when we look at age of menopause. The very fact of the menopause can be regarded as evidence of a more *K*-strategy. It is only known to exist in two species: humans and one species of toothed whale. There are two hypotheses to explain its selection and, as we will see, highly heritable nature. According to the "mother hypothesis," menopause is selected for because a menopausal woman invests more in her existing children thus boosting her fitness. The "grandmother hypothesis" has been posited to explain why the menopausal period should be so lengthy, even in pre-modern societies. Grandmothers increase their own fitness by investing in the children of their daughters and nieces. A rather different hypothesis suggests that there is a trade-off between genes that allow successful early fertility and the later degeneration of fertility, meaning that those who are highly fertile at a very young age will become infertile earlier.¹⁸⁶ However, this would still raise the question of why only highly *K*-evolved mammals have developed menopause at all, thus the mother hypothesis and its variants would seem more plausible.

Unlike menarche, the age of menopause is not affected by nutrition, except by severe undernourishment, which may bring it forward. American epidemiologist Ellen Gold and her colleagues argue that low education and smoking appear to hasten menopause, while use of oral contraception delays it, as does a high level of education, though these may simply be underpinned by a slower Life History Strategy.¹⁸⁷ Indeed, on average, more intelligent women reach menopause later than less intelligent ones¹⁸⁸, and women living in developing countries appear to

reach menopause earlier when comparing them to women of the same race in developed countries.¹⁸⁹ That said, despite evidence that some aspects of modern life may hasten menopause, the age associated with entering this period has remained remarkably constant. Historical records in the fifth to eighth centuries in Europe show that the average age of menopause was understood to be around 50.¹⁹⁰ As we will see, this is very similar to the current average age of menopause in Europe. In a study of British monozygotic and dizygotic twins, Dutch epidemiologist Harold Snieder and colleagues found that the age of menopause was 0.63 genetic.¹⁹¹ Race differences in menopausal age in the U.S. can be seen in Table 6.5, expressed as odds ratios. A higher number means a younger age at menopause.¹⁹²

Table 6.5. Race Differences in Age of Menopause in the U.S.

Race	Maximum Odds Ratio
European	1
African American	1.02
Pacific Islander	1.05
Japanese American	0.93
Hispanic (US born)	1.10

Another study found that the mean age for the onset of menopause for African-American women is 49.¹⁹³ If we were to simply go by differential K , then we would predict that the order, from youngest to oldest, would be African-American, Pacific Islander, European, and Japanese-American. Clearly, this is not what we find in the data. This surprising order might be due to environmental factors, perhaps also because menopausal age is only a single measure of K , and there may be localized reasons for it being later than we might otherwise expect in Sub-Saharan Africa. That said, when comparing races at the extremes of the Life History continuum, Differential K is still useful. For example, the most extreme fast LHS race is the Pygmies. The average adult dies, of natural causes, at the age of 24, and the average age of menopause is 37.¹⁹⁴ Mean age at menopause among the Agta people of the Philippines is 44 and, based on approximate comparisons with a Bushman sample, it is estimated that

average Bushmen menopause occurs at 41.¹⁹⁵ Mean age of menopause among Australian Aboriginals is 45.9 in rural areas and 46.9 in urban areas, compared to 48.3 for urban Whites in Australia.¹⁹⁶ Not only are these in the correct order if we use average racial IQ scores as a proxy for *K* strategy, which we'll discuss in the next chapter—but they are all in the correct order compared to Sub-Saharan Africans, Europeans, and Northeast Asians. With other races, the results tend to be more ambiguous and otherwise not in line with average intelligence differences, as we have noted with Pacific Islanders and Sub-Saharan Africans in the U.S. In these kinds of ambiguous zones, it is debatable which race follows a faster or slower LHS and the decoupling of different aspects of *K* at high levels of *K*-strategy may also be relevant, as might the European genetic admixture in African Americans. In summary, it is difficult to precisely extend Rushton's model to the 12 races of classical anthropology beyond comparing the extremes of the spectrum.

Sexual Behavior

r-*K* theory is fundamentally about sex, restraint, reproduction, and sustainability. We would thus expect it to manifest vividly in differences in sexual behavior between the races. One way of measuring sexual behavior is looking at the age of first intercourse, but this can also be regarded as a measure of psychopathic personality (which we will explore in a subsequent chapter). Another good measure is marital stability, which also reflects the strength of bonds between partners, and within the society at large. Rushton finds that marital stability is highest among Northeast Asians, lowest among Blacks, and that Whites are intermediate but closer to Northeast Asians. Richard Lynn summarizes the results of four studies, all of which indicate that Native Americans are intermediate between Whites and Blacks in terms of the likelihood of being married at a given age. He also observes that they are intermediate between Whites and Blacks in terms of unplanned pregnancies. We can see clear differences in marital patterns, when we examine the 2010 American Census, focusing on the population over the age of 15.¹⁹⁷

Table 6.6. Race and Marriage in 2010 in the USA

	Married	Widowed	Divorced/Separated	Never Married
White	52.9	6.5	12.8	27.9
Black	30.0	6.0	16.4	47.8

Black	29.9	6.0	10.4	47.0
Native	37.9	4.8	16.1	41.2
Pacific Islander	46.8	3.9	10.3	39.0
Asian	58.5	4.3	6.2	31.0

Unfortunately, the U.S. data does not distinguish between different kinds of Asians. According to UK data, however, British South Asians who are in sexual relationships are overwhelmingly married, and their rate of divorce is half that recorded among Whites.¹⁹⁸ Thus, they can be regarded as having higher marital stability. I am not aware of data specifically on Arabs or North Africans living the UK. However, data does exist from the Netherlands. It shows that 1 in 7 marriages between two Dutch people end within 10 years, but one in three marriages between foreign-born ethnic minorities living in the Netherlands do so. The divorce rate among Turkish couples in the Netherlands is 1.5 times higher than that of Dutch couples.¹⁹⁹ This is congruous with Rushton's model, though it may also reflect the higher acceptability of divorce in Islam.

Singapore allows us to compare the Northeast Asians (Chinese) and Southeast Asians (Malays), while controlling for cultural and economic differences to some extent. Unlike many other countries where there are Southeast Asian minorities, Singapore specifically collects information on this group. Even though the Malays are Muslim, 27 percent of divorces in Singapore in 2005 were Malay couples, despite the fact that they were only 14 percent of the population at the time.²⁰⁰ Thus, their marital stability is lower than that of the Chinese, as Rushton's model would predict.

A report on Australian Aborigines by the Australian Institute of Family Studies, using data from 2001, found that Aborigines who had been married were far more likely to be divorced or separated than were Whites: 30.9 percent of Aborigine women were divorced or separated compared to 18.9 percent of White women. Amongst men, 15.5 percent of Whites were currently divorced or separated as against 24.8 percent of Aborigines. These data excluded those who had been widowed or who had never married.²⁰¹ Based on 2006 census data, Parker and colleagues found that 69.9 percent of Aborigine single mothers had never been married, compared to 34.7 percent of non-Aborigine single mothers.²⁰² As such, we can reasonably conclude that Aborigines have relatively low levels of marital stability and a relatively low level of relationship

commitment.

The divorce rate among Canadian Inuit (a native Arctic people) is typically lower than among the European population, but they are also less likely to marry in the first place. For example, in 2008, the territory of Nunavut had a divorce rate (by 30 years of marriage) of 351 per 1,000, compared to a Canadian average of 407 per 1,000. Nunavut is over 80 percent Inuit. Research in Greenland among the Greenlandic Birth Cohort (N 400) found that 63.6 percent of those aged between 16 and 46 were cohabiting when about to have a child, 10.6 percent were single, and only 25.9 percent were married.²⁰³ As such, 74.2 percent of Greenlandic children were illegitimate. In Denmark in 1998, the figure was 46 percent.²⁰⁴ This implies a low level of marital commitment among the Inuit and less conservative sexual attitudes than exist among Danes, as Rushton would predict. Equally, in 1996, 17 percent of Inuit families in Canada were led by a single mother. This is compared to 23 percent of First Nations families and a Canadian Average of 12 percent.²⁰⁵ Certainly, then, Inuit families can be regarded as less stable than European families, though possibly more so than Native American families.

Ethnographies on the Bushmen indicate that marriage is not taken particularly seriously. Unlike in neighboring agricultural societies, there is no bridal dowry. As such, marriages are freely entered into and freely dissolved, especially if couples do not have children. In addition, in such communal societies, it is common for children to be reared by relatives, making the issue of childcare less pressing as well. So the Bushmen also have low marital stability, certainly lower than that of Blacks in more complex African societies.²⁰⁶ Again, the cultural differences between Bushmen and, say, Europeans are so great that direct comparisons are of limited value. That said, these cultural differences themselves reveal important aspects r-K theory.

Sex Appeal

Another salient difference, which relates to Life History Strategy, are the traits that are found sexually attractive. Much of this is universal. In all racial groups and in all cultures, males find certain physical qualities exciting—almost always, they are markers of youth, fertility, and pathogen resistance. A symmetrical face shows that, in the face of disease, a proper phenotype has been maintained. This betokens a high level of pathogen resistance and is thus attractive to both males and females, as are high cheek bones, which are also associated with high

pathogen resistance. Facial symmetry shows that relatively few genetic mutations, which are almost always negative, have been inherited, as the face testifies. Large eyes are found attractive, because they are a marker of slow aging, as eyes tend to become narrower with age. This is possibly why female eyes are exaggerated in size in cartoons and Japanese anime.

A woman's waist-to-hip ratio (WHR), reflecting the "hourglass figure" idolized in beauty pageants and art, is particularly potent. A very high WHR means that the woman is obese, and that correlates with a myriad of health problems, including infertility. On the other hand, a low WHR means that the woman is starving, which raises other serious concerns, also including infertility.²⁰⁷ In European cultures, an optimum WHR of around 0.7 is found most attractive.

Finally, light-skin tone in females is attractive to men. There are a number of possible reasons for this. Firstly, skin lightness in females is associated with fertility.²⁰⁸ Secondly, dark skin in females is correlated with high testosterone, which could be expressed in impulsive behavior, aggressiveness, and cheating on the male.²⁰⁹ Thirdly, light skin may be attractive as it allows men to better judge parasite resistance because it means they can better perceive imperfections in the skin. From a sociological perspective, it might be argued that light skin implies not engaging in farm labor, meaning higher social status. But this does not explain why lighter skin is found attractive even in Western countries, where skin tone would not imply much about one's profession.

There are racial variations—even when standards of living are substantially controlled for—in what is perceived as the most attractive WHR. American psychologist Rachel Freedman and her colleagues found differences in the evaluation of the attractiveness of female figures when comparing White and African-American male evaluators. Both racial groups were most attracted to women with average weight and a WHR of about 0.7. However, a higher proportion of African-Americans favored an extremely low WHR (again, meaning obesity). In addition, both groups were the least attracted to overweight women, preferring underweight to overweight. African-American men, however, were less repelled by overweight women than White men.²¹⁰ Interestingly, American psychologist Natalie Colabianchi and colleagues found that White American adolescent females of normal weight, who were perceived as being "attractive" by interviewers, reported greater preoccupation with weight than did those regarded as less attractive. But these differences did not exist among

normal weight African-American females, possibly because African-American men regard being overweight as less repulsive than White men do.²¹¹ Indeed, a literature review has noted that six studies in the U.S. all found that African-American men, when controlling for ethnic issues in the pictures, are less repelled by overweight females than Whites.²¹²

Beyond the science, overweight women as sexual objects is a distinctive feature in African-American pop culture: “baby got back,” “shake that booty,” and “super base” being rather colorful examples of this widespread phenomenon. This can be contrasted to East Asian culture, in which infantilized, “girly” women are frequently depicted as the ideal type. Why should African-American men be attracted to bigger women? Some suggest that pre-industrial peoples find bigger women attractive because they live in an environment of food scarcity. But none of the participants in these studies are living in such a context and, anyway, food scarcity would imply an unstable ecology and elevated r-strategy. Could the answer lie in socioeconomic status? A study in London found no difference in the ideal female body when comparing the views of White British and Malay British men, despite the Malay British lower average socioeconomic status. The study similarly found no difference when comparing Malays and Chinese in a Malaysian city.²¹³ One way of interpreting these data is that, in a context in which there is no scarcity of food, African-Americans are more attracted to women who show evidence of very high fertility, because this is predicted (except at the extreme) by high WHR. This replicates findings with men from the Hazda tribe of Tanzania, which found that 0.6 was their preferred WHR in women when culturally appropriate images were used to conduct the assessment.²¹⁴ It also replicates a study of European men that found that men whose sexual strategy was “sociosexual” found women with a high WHR more attractive than did men who pursued a more *K*-strategy. Equally, such r-strategy men were more sensitive to facial cues of fertility and health, such as symmetry or skin tone.²¹⁵ It should be noted, however, that various studies in developing countries have found that, while normal weight women are preferred, slightly overweight women are preferred to slightly underweight ones.²¹⁶ A plausible explanation is that, in such societies, being underweight is a sign of low status, poor health, and an unattractive intelligence-personality profile. Being overweight, though indicative of poor health, would imply high social status and, thus, in the family at least, a more attractive intelligence-personality profile.

Drawing on Freedman’s research, post-industrial White men appear to care

less about a woman's fertility and more about her weight than do Black men. In a post-industrial context of food abundance, being over-weight is associated with low social status, poor impulse control, and low intelligence.²¹⁷ Research on Chinese men has also found that, for them, 0.6 is the most attractive WHR in women.²¹⁸ This is lower than the 0.7 found in studies of Europeans.²¹⁹ Alas, this is not a comparative study, but may imply deviation from the optimally most fertile WHR, which may imply a trade-off with psychological characteristics. The desire for a lower WHR may reflect cultural differences, as the ideal WHR fluctuates within a range in Western societies, and it might be argued that the West and China are not truly comparable in terms of issues such as food scarcity. However, a study exists on American students, which, therefore, substantially controls for this problem and, to a degree, for socioeconomic status. It found that the most attractive female body type was "hour glass," which 76 percent of Blacks and 72 percent of Whites preferred. However, the most popular body shape among "Asian/Pacific Islander" (a category that is substantially East Asian in the U.S.) was "thin all over," which 43 percent of Asian/Pacific Islander men found the most appealing. Accordingly, U.S. Asians favored the *least* fertile body type, while Blacks most strongly favor the most fertile one.²²⁰ As Rushton would predict, East Asians seem to be trading secondary sexual characteristics, such as large hips, for markers of psychological trustworthiness.

The second aspect of attractiveness we can compare is the face. There are seemingly many variables that affect the ideally attractive female face. There is evidence that a somewhat less stereotypically feminine face is preferred in developing countries, while a more feminine one is regarded as the most attractive in developed countries, with the Japanese favoring the most highly feminine face. South African psychologist Vinet Coetzee and her team used a sample of Scottish (White) and Black South African men and asked them to rate the attractiveness of various Black female faces. They found strong cross-cultural agreement on the most attractive female face. However, the Scottish evaluators preferred thinner and less robust faces and tended to use facial shape, rather than skin tone, as their primary means of judging attractiveness. South African Blacks preferred thinner/less robust faces as well, but their preference was less extreme. They were also more likely than the Whites to use skin-tone in judging attractiveness.²²¹

These results are difficult to interpret. Firstly, as Coetzee notes, the lower

exposure of Scots to African faces may render them less able to distinguish between these faces and thus less able to read cues for poor health or infertility, the face being a cue for both of these.²²² Secondly, the lower use of skin tone by Scottish participants may reflect the unconscious influence of “political correctness” and an accordant desire not to rate an image negatively because of its skin tone. But, seemingly, this research replicates the finding that low testosterone and thinness in females are more important for Whites than Blacks, as a narrow face is associated with low testosterone and thus a more agreeable and cooperative personality.

Furthermore, dark skin, like a robust face, indicates high testosterone but light skin in females (within races) is an indicator of fertility. Masculine facial features express high testosterone and thus poor impulse control, high aggressiveness, high sex drive, and possibly a greater potential for sexual promiscuity. For this reason, light skin tone measures both fertility and lack of testosterone, while facial shape is simply a measure of testosterone. This would make it more important for *K*-strategists. This is because the characteristics associated with high testosterone would also render that woman untrustworthy and more likely to cheat (though they might mean that a woman could survive better in an unstable environment). Accordingly, we can argue that White men are less interested in fertility and more interested in the female’s personality (and, indeed, faithfulness) than are Black men. This would be in line with Black-White differences on the *r-K* spectrum. We have noted the imperfect nature of the studies used in reaching this conclusion. However, the probability of it being accurate is augmented by evidence that working-class men in Western societies are less repelled by fat women than are men of high socioeconomic status. This was found when asking men of differing socioeconomic statuses to rate levels of attractiveness in photographs.²²³ As we have discussed, social class differences are underpinned by differences on the *r-K* spectrum, with those of low socioeconomic status being, generally, lower in *K* than those of high status.

Finally, English psychologist Anthony Little and his team²²⁴ found that the degree to which female facial symmetry was attractive was much higher among the Hazda, hunter-gatherers from Tanzania, than among White people from the UK. In that facial symmetry is a proxy for pathogen resistance and fertility, we would expect this to be the case based on Rushton’s hypothesis. It is unclear, however, what impact environmental variables may have had on this result. We might expect cues for pathogen resistance to be deemed more important in a

society with high pathogen load and high levels of child mortality; as such, this difference might not exist if the environment were better controlled for. But these findings are also congruous with the other study we have examined which found the supposed physical attractiveness (as a proxy for fertility) of a woman is less important to White men than to Black men. So, a tentative conclusion is that race differences in perceptions of female attractiveness reflect a greater Black focus on female fertility and, thus, a lower degree of *K*-orientation. This is congruous with research within races, which has found that men looking for a long term partner are prepared to compromise physical attractiveness (a more *r*-strategy dimension) in favor of a focus on non-physical traits, such as interpersonal and emotional responsiveness.²²⁵ Men who follow this strategy also judge the attractiveness of women more conservatively.²²⁶

The Most Desirable Secondary Sexual Characteristics

Men who score higher on sociosexuality (again, promiscuity) are more attracted to women with large breasts than are those who score lower, showing the association between a marker of *r*-strategy and a penchant for large secondary sexual characteristics.²²⁷ As mentioned above, men who are of lower socioeconomic status in Malaysia, as well as men who are hungry in Britain, are also more attracted to large breasts.²²⁸ The attractiveness of large breasts would seem to be a function both of resource scarcity (perhaps because large breasts signal greater fat reserves) and *r*-strategy. And, of course, it could be argued that resource scarcity leads to the feeling that life is unstable and pushes one towards an *r*-strategy; so these two findings are actually consistent.

Rachel Sewell, whom we met earlier, has examined a multiracial sample of students from the U.S.²²⁹ This has the advantage of controlling, to some extent, for culture and socioeconomic status. She found that Black men were the most attracted to “extra-large” breasts, while Asians were the least attracted to these. Ten percent of Black men found “extra-large” to be the most attractive compared to zero Asian men. However, overall, 56 percent of White men and 38 percent of Black men found “large breasts” the most attractive. In the context of a fast LHS, people are programmed to invest in reproduction and are focused on physical attributes. As we have discussed, in this context, we can see how there would develop an “arms race” to produce larger and larger secondary sexual characteristics. These would be a means of advertising genetic quality, just as a peacock’s tail tells the peahen that he has sufficiently good genes to be able to

grow such an ornament. The male who was more attracted to larger breasts would thus be more attracted to the better quality females, and would so pass on more of his genes.

As such, Rushton found that the more r-strategy races tend to have larger secondary sexual characteristics, and we can see why this would be so. In an unstable ecology, you need to be able to conspicuously advertise your genetic quality. And large secondary sexual characteristics imply that you have enough energy left over to grow them, implying a low mutational load. Fast LH strategists are programmed to invest more of their bioenergetic resources in sexual advertising. A *K*-strategist would trade this for energy invested in the brain and the development of a more cooperative and agreeable personality. So, people who were more *K*-selected would be less interested in secondary sexual characteristics—which would simply be a sign of health and (indirectly) fertility, and more interested in psychological characteristics. This would mean less of an arms race for large secondary sexual characteristics. Ergo, the population would have smaller breasts.

In such a context, there would, of course, be individual variation. There is evidence that large-breasted women are relatively low in Conscientiousness, that is, they are relative r-strategists.²³⁰ In a *K*-context, males would be more likely to pass on their genes by investing in good mothers. Accordingly, they would need to trade physical characteristics for psychological ones, meaning it would make more sense to be attracted to smaller breasts. Studies have found that Black males have a preference for female buttocks—specifically *large* female buttocks—compared to White males, who prefer them small and firm.²³¹ East Asians prefer the smallest buttocks of all.²³² This would be consistent with the same preference for large secondary sexual characteristics, among Blacks, that has been found in relation to breast preference.

In terms of markers of sexual behavior, therefore, almost all of these relationships are in the expected order when the nation in which the samples live is held constant. The only exceptions are the relationships between Europeans and South Asians or North Africans, the key reason for the anomaly almost certainly being religiousness. However, comparing both race differences in menopausal age and race differences in sexual behavior has clearly shown that, though Rushton's Differential *K* model of racial differences has predictive validity, it also has clear limitations. The model has to be nuanced in order to make sense of some of the differences between Europeans and Northeast Asians.

Moreover, it can only be extended to the 12 races of classical anthropology when races at the extremes of this spectrum are compared, in the case of sexual behavior and especially in the case of the menopause.

The development of different races does not just reflect adaptations to different ecologies oriented around varying degrees of *K*, as Rushton argues. Rather, the different “genetic clusters” reflect, in the extent of their *K* strategy, an interrelated sequence of selection factors that stem from their ecology, including differences in purifying Darwinian selection, sexual selection, specialization, division of labor, population density, gene-pool size, parasite stress, and group selection intensity, as well as how recently some of these pressures—such as intense Darwinian selection for health or group competition—have weakened. All of this may also be relevant to race differences in intelligence, an issue to which we will now turn.

The Smart Set

Race Differences in Intelligence

The most “controversial” aspect of the study of race—the thing that really makes it untouchable—is intelligence. Contemporary academia can tolerate a discussion of race differences in ear-wax density; intelligence, on the other hand, is considered highly offensive. It raises the specter of structural inequality in a “color blind” society and so-called “genetic determinism,” the idea that an individual’s life is fixed due to factors he cannot control.

Regardless of our skittishness on the matter, race differences in intelligence are simply a consequence of our understanding of the races as subspecies of mankind. In the last chapter, we discussed Rushton’s Life History model of racial differences. The more “harsh yet predictable” an ecology is, the more likely it is to select for intelligence. The ecology’s harshness will mean that basic needs are met to a lesser extent, ensuring that there are a larger number of more difficult problems to solve—such as how to keep warm and how to find food in winter, with the essence of intelligence being the ability to solve complex problems. When such an ecology is “predictable,” intelligence will be heavily selected for, because intelligence allows people to be strongly future-oriented, planning for how they will survive the winter at the height of summer. Cooperative groups are more likely to survive in such harsh conditions, as has been shown by computer modeling,²³³ and intelligence predicts the ability to solve social problems, get on with and trust other people, and regulate one’s emotions in order to avoid fights, as we will see below. Also, the more difficult and the more group-oriented the ecology is, the more important intelligence will be in rising to the top of the male hierarchy, and thus attracting females. And to a lesser extent, intelligence will also predict being a successful mother and faithful wife, meaning it will be sexually selected for by males as well.

For all these reasons, it makes sense that intelligence is a component, at the group level, of a slow Life History Strategy. An environment that selects for lower intelligence is one in which you can “live for today” and pick the “low-hanging fruit.” A *K*-selected environment, on the other hand, is one in which restraint, problem-solving, and cooperation are required for survival. In that races are evolved to different ancestral environments, it makes sense that there would be race differences in intelligence and that these would be mainly genetic in origin.

The discovery of these average racial differences in IQ has, not surprisingly, led to a great deal of emotional outrage. When American psychologist Arthur Jensen (1923-2012) reported in 1969 that African-Americans had lower average IQs than White Americans,²³⁴ he received death threats, security had to escort him around the University of California at Berkeley campus, and the police advised him to move house. When Hans Eysenck (1916-1997), a psychologist who had fled National Socialist Germany for Britain and who published on race differences in IQ, attempted to speak at the London School of Economics in 1973, his podium was pulled down by a “Maoist” student mob, and he was punched in the face.²³⁵ Many researchers who dare to enter this “forbidden zone,” have found themselves subject to a variety of tactics, including being fired, suspended from teaching, subject to biased or dishonest misconduct investigations (where conformers would be given the benefit of the doubt), unfair research appraisals, withdrawal of funding, public condemnation by their university, withdrawal of honorary university positions, removal from the university’s website (when such positions cannot legally be withdrawn), and, of course, mob violence or the threat thereof.²³⁶ This is true of many of the scholars whose work is cited in this chapter, including Helmuth Nyborg, Richard Lynn, Noah Carl, Linda Gottfredson, Michael Woodley of Menie, and Jan te Nijenhuis.²³⁷ But before we turn to their controversial research, we must understand what “intelligence” is and how we can measure it.

What It Means To Be Smart

“Intelligence” can be defined as “the ability to reason, plan, solve problems, think abstractly, comprehend complex ideas, learn quickly, and learn from experience.”²³⁸ In essence, intelligence means problem solving. The quicker you can solve the problem, then the more intelligent you are. The harder the problem has to be before it is simply beyond you, then the more intelligent you are.

Intelligence is quantified by the intelligence quotient (IQ), a score that can be derived from a number of standardized tests. These tests measure reasoning ability across a wide range of areas, for example, verbal, mathematical, and spatial. Abilities in these subsections positively correlates with abilities in the other subsections; in other words, if you’re good at one thing, you’re likely to be good at a lot of things. This insight allows us to posit that intelligence tests together measure an underlying factor called “general intelligence,” which designated as “*g*.” This is the essence of intelligence, and it is what we are

talking about when we say that one person is “more intelligent” than another.

What about specific cognitive abilities? We all know people who have, say, very good language comprehension but poor mathematical ability. But in fact, these people are unusual—the exceptions that prove the rule. Across a large group of people, all specific cognitive abilities are positively correlated with each other, and this is also true of most specific cognitive abilities for most individuals. Intelligence can be conceived of like a pyramid. At the base, there are numerous specialized abilities—such as throwing a dart—which are weakly associated with general intelligence. Above these are the key intelligence types of verbal, spatial, and mathematical, which even more strongly correlate with *g*. And *g* itself constitutes the apex of the pyramid.

In this line, intelligence shouldn’t be understood like a “talent,” like say, one individual’s preternatural ability to shoot a basketball through a hoop or paint a beautiful landscape in watercolor—though, it should be noted that general intelligence is associated with better motor skills and focus. *g* can be described as the ability to apply the mind to the world around you—to think analytically and creatively. *g* also doesn’t mean that you’re “just good at taking tests.” In fact, it correlates with a number of traits that are overwhelmingly considered to be social and moral norms: health, civic participation, trustworthiness, artistic creativity, and so on. A list of such traits is found in Table 7.1.²³⁹

Table 7.1. Behaviors and Preferences Associated with Intelligence

Positive Correlation	Negative Correlation
Achievement motivation	Accident proneness
Altruism	Acquiescence
Analytic style	
Abstract thinking	
Artistic preference and ability	
Atheism	Aging quickly
Craftwork	Alcoholism
Creativity	Authoritarianism
Diet (healthy)	Conservatism (of social views)

Liberalism (or views)

Conservatism (or social views)

Democratic participation (voting, petitions)

Crime

Educational attainment

Delinquency

Eminence and genius

Dogmatism

Emotional sensitivity

Falsification ("Lie" scores)

Extra-curricular attainments

Hysteria (versus other neuroses)

Field-independence

Illegitimacy

Height

Impulsivity

Health, fitness, longevity

Infant mortality

Humor, sense of

Obesity

Income

Racial prejudice

Interests, depth and breadth of

Reaction times

Involvement in school activities

Religiousness

Leadership

Smoking

Linguistic abilities (including spelling)

Single/young motherhood

Logical abilities

Marital partner, choice of

Truancy

Media preferences

Trust (lack of)

Memory

Weight/height ratio (BMI)

Migration (voluntary)

Military rank

Moral reasoning and development

Motor skills

Musical preferences and abilities

Myopia

Occupational status
Occupational success
Perceptual abilities
Piaget-type abilities
Practical knowledge
Psychotherapy, response to
Reading ability
Social skills
Socioeconomic status of origin
Socioeconomic status achieved
Sports participation at university
Supermarket shopping ability
Talking speed
Trusting nature

It cannot possibly be argued that intelligence is “a very Western concept,” a typical criticism of the scientific study of the matter. Proxies for intelligence, like general knowledge, social skills, and altruism, are things that are valued in all cultures.²⁴⁰ And intelligence is negatively associated with criminality, which is disliked in all cultures. Intelligence is also robustly correlated with education, income, and health. As such, intelligence cannot be dismissed as context-dependent or as only relevant in largely White countries—nor can it be dismissed as unimportant. And we know that these tests are reliable because their results correlate with other intuitive measures of cognitive ability, such as educational success.


The (Dreaded) Bell Curve

As mentioned, intelligence can be measured, however imperfectly, by IQ tests. This in itself is “controversial,” due in large part to the fact that most people—

including most intelligent people—don't like the idea of being defined by a standardized test, or perhaps they simply don't like *taking* standardized tests. But an IQ test—or something like the American SAT or GRE or Britain's A-Level—is an intellectual challenge; it is a problem-to-be-solved. And an intelligence test is certainly less stressful than the “tests” of yesteryear, which included avoiding getting eaten by predators or storing up enough food and supplies in summer so you wouldn't starve or freeze to death in winter.

Rather like height, IQ is “normally distributed” across a population through what looks like a “bell curve.” Millions of individual instances form a clear picture in aggregate. Many things that can be quantified naturally form this kind of distribution. There is an average, a range that captures the majority of the sample, and increasing infrequencies at the extremes. For instance, among adult American males, the average height is 5 feet 10 inches (1.78 meters). Most people you meet in your life will be between 5-feet 6-inches and 6-feet 2-inches tall (or between 1.68 and 1.88 meters). Men either shorter or taller than these standard deviations are rare, and, of course, there are physical limits at both extremes.

Figure 7.1. Idealized Normal Distribution




With IQ, the population mean is set at 100, with a standard deviation (SD) of 15 points. Your intelligence is quantified relative to others from the same population group, which is typically those who live in your country. Intelligence increases with age during childhood, peaking at around the age of 35.²⁴¹ Even a below average 16-year-old performs better than a very clever 3-year-old who can already read. IQ is therefore calculated relative to people of the same age. The average person scores 100; anything less than this is below average; and anything above it is above average.

Most people have an IQ of around 100, with the percentages with lower or


higher IQs tapering off on both sides. As one standard deviation (SD) is already defined as 15 points, 68 percent of people have an IQ between 85 and 115, and 95 percent of people have an IQ between 70 and 130 (± 2 SD). This is the “normal” range. If you score below it, you are classified as retarded. If you score above it, then you are exceptionally bright.

Figure 7.2: The Black and White IQ Distributions in the NLSY Version I



As we discussed in Chapter 5, in 1994, most of the worldwide media were scandalized by the publication of Richard Herrnstein and Charles Murray’s *Bell Curve*. In fact, much of their data and argumentation had been familiar to specialists since the First World War, as we will see below. Herrnstein and Murray merely brought the science of intelligence back into popular relevance. The United States has a normal distribution of IQ just like any other country; on that point, there was no controversy. But Herrnstein and Murray’s thesis was that IQ distribution was the foundation of the American social-class structure. And being largely heritable, IQ simply can’t be overcome through public policy. The reaction became particularly inflamed when the authors broke down the data for Black and White IQs into separate distributions. These can be seen in Figure 7.2. They observed that the average American Black IQ lags about 15 points behind the average White IQ (85 vs. 100)—one standard deviation.

Figure 7.3: The Black and White IQ Distributions in NLSY, Version II



A standard deviation difference in averages is significant, but this still means that there is considerable overlap in cognitive ability between the two races. However, when the data are adjusted to reflect the frequency distributions proportional to the racial composition of the U.S. population, a more powerful image comes into view (Figure 7.3). The adjusted distribution reflects both the broad White middle class and the Black lower and under-classes, which were not participating in the wealth and abundance of their fellow citizens.

Much larger differences can be found around the world. Black Africans have an average IQ of around 70; the 85 IQ of African-Americans reflects the higher living standards in America and significant White admixture, as we will discuss below. Australian Aborigines are even lower at 64. The Northeast Asians (Chinese, Japanese and Koreans) have an average of 105, slightly higher than Europeans. Ashkenazi Jews average as high as 112 (or even higher according to some estimates).

Table 7.2. IQ Around the World

Northeast Asian	105
European	100
Arctic Peoples	91
Southeast Asians	87
Native Americans	86
Pacific Islanders	85
South Asians	84
North Africans/Arabs	84

Sub-Saharan Africans	70
Australian Aborigines	64
Bushmen	54
Pygmies	53

The insights of *The Bell Curve*, and similar efforts to take race and intelligence seriously, can be considered good news on many fronts. Politicians and social scientists long fretted over America’s decline in educational achievement and warned that American schools are “failing” or that the system is “broken.” In fact, American schools only fail at the impossible task of overcoming thousands of years of human evolution. According to the Program for International Student Assessment (PISA), White Americans score at levels at or above most Western and Central European nations. And Black Americans score significantly higher than their cousins in Africa. Asian Americans even outpace students in Korea and Japan, possibly due to the IQ-immigration nexus.²⁴²

Test Anxiety

The modern IQ test was first developed at the turn of the 20th century by Alfred Binet (1857-1911), who had been commissioned by the French state to evaluate young people entering the newly compulsory education system. This led to the subsequent Binet-Simon scale, which is still the basis for standardized mental assessment. When the United States entered the First World War in 1917, it evaluated some 1.75 million draftees through the U.S. Army’s Alpha and Beta Tests.²⁴³ Data from these huge samples were analyzed by eminent psychologists such as Carl Brigham (1890-1943)²⁴⁴ and Lewis Terman (1877-1956), the latter writing the first major longitudinal study of intelligence in America.²⁴⁵

The concept of IQ, as well as the tests themselves, has always been contentious, especially as it became an important part of Western nations’ efforts to become “classless,” “meritocratic” societies. Brigham and Terman used their data to explore issues of race, immigration, and even eugenics. But IQ testing has also been motivated by what could be called “egalitarian” ideals. Harvard President James Bryant Conant (1893-1978), working with Brigham, advocated for the Scholastic Aptitude Test as a “pure intelligence test,” which could identify talented students across the country who didn’t have the privilege of

attending prep schools on the eastern seaboard. And certainly, then and now, the SAT strongly correlates with IQ tests, and is thus a practical gauge of *g*.²⁴⁶ Similarly, IQ testing for public and private employment has sometimes been promoted as a means of cutting through racial bigotry in hiring practices. That said, as we will see, testing has ultimately been rejected by institutions because it consistently reveals the reality of race.

This problem came to a head in America in the '60s and '70s. In 1963, the Motorola television factory in Chicago denied a job to an African-American who had scored poorly on an IQ test. The Illinois Fair Employment Practices Commission ordered Motorola to hire him anyway, setting a precedent for the political overriding of standardized measures of intelligence. Some 15 years later, in the Supreme Court case *Regents of the University of California v. Bakke* (1978), the Court ruled against an explicit quota system, where certain places in California, spots in medical-school class were set aside for minority applicants; however, the opinion of Justice Lewis Powell allowed for race to be a “factor” in admissions decisions. These ambiguous outcomes have led to an increasingly Byzantine regime in hiring and academic admissions in the U.S., as well as in Western Europe: race, test scores, school marks, “diversity,” and other factors are weighed against one another—though with no explicit quota in place.

Since the controversies in the '60s and '70s, test-taking companies have made efforts to avoid “bias” in the way that questions are articulated: stereotypically White names and activities—some early tests are said to have included questions mentioned “yachting”—have been eliminated, and more supposedly inclusive names and phrases are employed. But after decades of this “neutralization” process, little has changed.

Table 7.3. SAT Performance by Race/Ethnicity for the Class of 2018

	% of Total	Critical Reading	Math	Writing
All Test Takers	100	495	511	484
American Indian/Alaska Native	1	481	482	460
Asian	12	525	598	531
Black/African American	13	431	428	418
Mexican or Mexican American	8	448	457	438

Puerto Rican	2	456	449	442
Other Hispanic/Latino	10	449	457	439
White	47	529	534	513
Other	4	490	519	487
No Response	4	434	492	436

With regard to the SAT—which is still widely taken by American students planning to attend university—the gap between Black and White test-takers has not changed in decades; in fact, it has grown slightly.²⁴⁷ The SAT measures literacy, numeracy, and reading comprehension and has traditionally been based on a 1,600 point scale: 800 points for Verbal, 800 for Math. For a 10-year period (2005-2015), the test was split into three 800-point sections: Evidence-Based Reading, Writing, and Mathematics. In 2015, the average score (among 1.6 million test-takers) was 1,490 out of 2,400, with a standard deviation of around 115 points on the separate parts of the exam. With the proper adjustments to reflect different scoring systems, the measurable intelligence of American students desiring to take part in higher education has remained relatively unchanged over the past four decades.²⁴⁸ The results for 2015, broken down by race and ethnicity, can be found in Table 7.3.²⁴⁹

The gap between White and Black test-takers is roughly 100 points on each section. The gap between Blacks and Asians is more striking, particularly on the Math portion, in which the average difference is 170 points. Breaking down these scores even further, The Brookings Institute reported:

[A]mong top scorers—those scoring between a 750 and 800—60 percent are Asian and 33 percent are white, compared to 5 percent Latino and 2 percent black. Meanwhile, among those scoring between 300 and 350, 37 percent are Latino, 35 percent are black, 21 percent are white, and 6 percent are Asian.²⁵⁰

In other words, the overall American intelligence distribution is best understood as separate distributions of racial groups. And these reflect Life History Theory. Races that originated in environments that select for a fast LHS are clumped at the bottom of the distribution, since intelligence was simply of lesser value in their evolutionary histories. Whites and Northeast Asians, who originate in “harsh yet predictable” environments—with Northeast Asians being the most *K*-selected—appear at the top of the distribution, and are thus best

prepared to succeed in an advanced technological society. Though scores have varied slightly across generations, the standard deviation difference between Blacks and Whites has stubbornly persisted—and has remained an almost obsession among school reformers and scholars of education, as we shall see.

Critiques of IQ

Many criticisms have been leveled against IQ tests, and even the concept of intelligence itself, but none of the arguments pass scrutiny. Some have been expressed with great profundity; others amount to little more than hand-waving. In the end, IQ tests have been found to have high predictive validity for school achievement (and, thus, other measures of cognitive ability), occupational status, and criminality (negatively).²⁵¹ They cannot be argued to be substantially “culturally biased,” as they correlate with objective measures, such as reaction times (negatively) and cranial capacity (positively): they correlate with how quick you are to respond to stimuli and simply how big your brain is—unsurprisingly, since the brain is a thinking muscle. The robust negative correlation with reaction times—how quickly you react to a cue, such as a light being switched on; the cleverer you are, the shorter your reaction time—implies that intelligence can substantially be explained by a high functioning nervous system.²⁵²

The validity of IQ tests has been specifically criticized when it comes to comparing different races. Richard Lynn’s meta-analysis of twin studies found that intelligence had a heritability, on adult samples, of 0.83.²⁵³ The environmental component appears to relate to an intellectually stimulating environment, especially during key growth phases.²⁵⁴ The heritability of a child’s IQ is much lower, because it reflects, in part, the environment created for it by adults who may have higher or lower IQs than they do. Only when a person reaches adulthood, and starts to create his own environment consistent with his innate intelligence, does the heritability rise to 0.83.

It might be argued that intelligence is highly heritable, but, even so, environmental factors might explain, for example, why Blacks in the U.S. have a lower average IQ than Whites. This seems most unlikely, however, and the reasons for this have been set out by American philosopher Michael Levin in his book *Why Race Matters*.²⁵⁵ If the IQ of White Americans is set at 100, then the average African-American score is 85. The SD difference between White and Black IQ scores in the U.S. is evident by the age of three. The earlier a

difference becomes evident, the more likely it is to be genetic.²⁵⁶ Interracial adoption studies have shown that Blacks who as children were adopted by White parents have IQs in adulthood that have no relation to that of their adoptive parents; however, their adult IQs are very similar to that of their biological parents.²⁵⁷ The more resistant a difference is to interventions, the more likely it is to be genetic. J. Philippe Rushton has noted that Black people have been assessed for millennia, even by Moorish explorers, to have low average intelligence, and attempts to boost their intelligence, based on environmentalist assumptions, have had no significant impact.²⁵⁸

Others have suggested that intelligence tests, and the SAT in particular, should be better understood as “wealth tests,” which, in fact, measure “privilege,” not intellect.²⁵⁹ In the American context, Whites typically grow up in wealthier families and in more desirable neighborhoods and schools, with greater access to test preparation and tutoring. And unquestionably, students’ SAT scores track closely with their household income and wealth, with the educational attainment of their parents also being a significant factor. This can be seen in Table 7.4²⁶⁰ But even if we accept that standardized tests reflect wealth, we shouldn’t jump to the conclusion that the SAT is, therefore, a “wealth test.” In many ways, it’s more accurate to say that wealth is an intelligence test. At its best, heritable intelligence operates in a cycle between parents and children: intelligent people seek wealth, status, and education, which they pass on—both genetically and environmentally—to the children, who then pass it on to theirs, and so on.


Table 7.4. Mean SAT Mathematics and Verbal Scores for College Bound Americans in 2003

Family Income	Black Test-takers		White Test-takers	
	Math Score	Verbal Score	Math Score	Verbal Score
Less than \$10,000	382	381	478	480
\$10,000 to \$15,000	395	398	478	481
\$15,000 to \$20,000	400	405	485	488
\$20,000 to \$25,000	409	413	493	495
\$25,000 to \$30,000	411	419	495	497
\$30,000 to \$35,000	413	425	495	497

\$30,000 to \$35,000	419	426	502	504
\$35,000 to \$40,000	422	430	504	505
\$40,000 to \$50,000	431	438	510	510
\$50,000 to \$60,000	441	450	516	514
\$60,000 to \$70,000	440	450	521	519
\$70,000 to \$80,000	448	457	528	524
\$80,000 to \$100,000	461	468	539	534
More than \$100,000	490	495	568	557

Moreover, the data above demonstrate that the “Black/White gap” is far more a factor of race than wealth and class. Whites from poor families score at levels of Blacks from families who are well off. Specially, students who hail from families with incomes around \$20,000 per year—which is at or below the poverty line for most Americans—have roughly the same intellectual profile as African-Americans from families with incomes upwards of \$100,000.²⁶¹

Figure 7.5. 2003 SAT Math Scores For Black and White Americans, broken down by family income



As discussed above, IQ tests of various flavors can be divided into different subtests. Ability in each subtest varies in the degree to which it is genetic. Some subtests are more “culture fair” than others—in that they require less knowledge—and the more “culture fair” the subtest is, the better a measure of *g* it is, and the more genetic that measured component of IQ tends to be. Blacks score the best on the *least* “culture fair” components of the IQ test (Verbal). They score

the worst on the *most* “culture fair” components²⁶² (Math). So, it cannot be argued that Blacks score worse than Whites on IQ tests because the tests somehow reflect “White culture.” In addition, Arctic Peoples in the U.S., specifically Alaskan Natives—many of them living in highly impoverished conditions—score on average around six points higher on culturally fair IQ tests than do African-Americans.²⁶³ The experiences of Native Americans (or American Indians) are quite distant from White American norms, as many live on reservations; nevertheless, they score, on average, one point higher than African-Americans. Northeast Asian Americans score on average five points higher than Whites, despite the fact that many are immigrants who learn English as a second language. Clearly, IQ tests are equally fair to different races and, within the U.S. as well as within other Western countries, they find that Blacks have the lowest IQ, followed by Whites, Northeast Asians, and, finally, Ashkenazi Jews.

One particularly fashionable argument against the validity of IQ tests is the concept of “stereotype threat.”²⁶⁴ The idea is that people who belong to a group believed to do badly on IQ tests—such as Black people—do badly because of their own expectations that they will do badly, which presumably stresses them out, reducing their performance. However, meta-analyses have found that this effect is mostly non-existent, and when it can be found—for certain people in certain situations—it is much smaller than the group differences it is used to explain away. Some studies have found that groups told that they will do badly on IQ tests, because of some factor about them, seem to consequently do *better than expected*. There is also a huge problem of publication bias in this area, with studies disproving stereotype threat simply not being published.²⁶⁵ In addition, the theory does not address the critical question of how systematically incorrect stereotypes could originate, as 75 percent of racial stereotypes have been found to be at least partly accurate and 50 percent completely accurate.²⁶⁶ The simplest explanation, as has been empirically explored in detail by American psychologist Lee Jussim, is that stereotypes develop because they are broadly true.²⁶⁷

Finally, some have attempted to undermine the concept of unified general intelligence (*g*). A popular alternative was proposed by American psychologist Howard Gardner.²⁶⁸ Gardner argued that there are “multiple intelligences,” such as bodily-kinesthetic, emotional, musical, and interpersonal. The problem with Gardner’s model is not the categories themselves, but his assumption that these

abilities are independent, as they are related to different parts of the brain, and that a person can be high in one or more “intelligences,” while being below average in others. This is simply not the case. Higher IQ people perform better in most cognitive domains, and lower IQ people perform worse. Gardner’s assorted kinds of “intelligence” are either a misuse of the word “intelligence” or they are simply examples of narrow cognitive abilities underpinned by “intelligence” as normally defined. “Emotional intelligence” is a concept that has also been launched as a competitor to IQ or *g*. But the ability to deal with other people and solve social problems is positively correlated (though weakly) with IQ at about 0.3.²⁶⁹ In other words, the more intelligent you are, the more empathetic you are; the better you can imagine what it would be like to walk in someone else’s shoes.

The Furore Over ***IQ and the Wealth of Nations***

Richard Lynn has done more than anyone else to bring together studies of IQ on representative samples from around the world, both on traditional IQ tests and, more recently, international student assessment tests, such as the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA). This test is administered to representative samples of 15 year-olds from OECD countries every four years and correlates with national IQ scores at approximately 0.8.

National IQ scores were first presented by Lynn and Finnish political scientist Tatu Vanhanen (1929-2015) in their 2002 book *IQ and the Wealth of Nations*.²⁷⁰ In August 2004, Vanhanen gave an interview about the book to the monthly magazine attached to Finland’s biggest newspaper, *Helsingin Sanomat*. He told the journalist, based on the best available figures at the time: “Whereas the average IQ of Finns is 97, in Africa it is between 60 and 70. Differences in intelligence are the most significant factor in explaining poverty.” This summary of his academic research resulted in Finland’s “Ombudsman for Minorities,” Mikko Puumalainen, demanding that Vanhanen be prosecuted for “inciting hatred against an ethnic group.” The Finnish National Bureau of Investigation then announced that they were investigating whether there were grounds for prosecution, and quickly discovered there were none. The incident, nevertheless, generated huge media coverage in Finland because Vanhanen’s son, Matti Vanhanen, had become Prime Minister the previous year.²⁷¹ Lynn and Vanhanen last updated their results, to take international student assessments into account,

a decade later, and a few years before Vanhanen's death, with the book *Intelligence: A Unifying Construct for the Social Sciences*, in which they correlated national IQ not just with wealth but with numerous other markers of civilization, including health, low criminality, and low corruption.²⁷²

Meanwhile, in 2006, Lynn had drawn upon their data from *IQ and the Wealth of Nations*, as well as other data, to present *Race Differences in Intelligence*, in which he calculated the average IQ of each of the races of classical anthropology.²⁷³ *Race Differences in Intelligence* was heavily criticized, as was *IQ and the Wealth of Nations*. So Lynn and Vanhanen used their 2012 volume as an opportunity to respond to their critics. A number of complaints were lodged against their methodology, in particular that it involved (in various cases) drawing upon small samples, different kinds of IQ tests, tests which are substitutes for IQ tests, and merely estimating the average IQ in countries where data is unavailable. In addition, critics tended to emphasize small mistakes, attempting to use these to imply that Lynn and Vanhanen's entire work was suspect. This latter criticism can simply be regarded as an example of "composition fallacy": where a small mistake is manipulatively employed to attempt to undermine a body of work. The former criticisms are broadly unnecessary—so-called "straw men." Lynn and Vanhanen had always conceded that there were a number of problems with their data, but they had argued that it is the best that we have and we, therefore, have no choice but to employ it. The deficiencies in these data have led some critics to argue that the results are, therefore, "meaningless." But Lynn and Vanhanen counter that their national differences in average IQ strongly correlate with national differences in sound proxies for IQ, such as education level, per capita wealth, law-abidingness, political stability, lack of corruption, and with health, among many others.²⁷⁴ Accordingly, we can be reasonably confident that Lynn's estimates for national IQs, and by extension racial IQs, are reasonably accurate.

But Lynn and Vanhanen's critics were right that there were discrepancies in their data; that there were many minor mistakes; and, often, that the methods through which their numbers were obtained were less than clear. Lynn and Vanhanen had data for 81 out of 185 countries and so had to estimate the IQs of the missing countries. Some national samples were small or elite, and some of their literature reviews were less than entirely systematic. In response to this, all of Lynn's IQ scores were recalculated from scratch, as well as updated, by German political scientist David Becker. These scores, along with precisely how

they were reached, as well as exactly which tests were employed and why, were then placed in a constantly updated online database called *View on IQ*, where Becker shows that his own recalculation of all known national IQs correlates with Lynn and Vanhanen's results at 0.87.²⁷⁵ The most up-to-date IQ scores for almost every country in the world have been presented by Lynn and Becker in their 2019 book *The Intelligence of Nations*.²⁷⁶ Accordingly, we can be confident in the validity of the average racial IQs presented by Lynn in the second edition of *Race Differences in Intelligence*, which was published in 2015.²⁷⁷

There is also every reason to believe that these differences are genetic. Moving beyond Levin's evidence for the genetic nature of race differences in intelligence, which we discussed earlier, Italian anthropologist Davide Piffer has found genetic evidence for average national IQs. Piffer found that the average frequency in the population of genetic variants that are correlated with extremely high educational attainment, something which is very strongly associated with high IQ, is correlated at 0.9 with national IQ.²⁷⁸ In another study, Piffer replicated this finding with a sample of 1.1 million people from 52 countries.²⁷⁹ In effect, Piffer provides extremely persuasive evidence that race differences in intelligence are overwhelmingly a reflection of genetic differences. In addition, average race differences in IQ strongly correlate with an objective measure: average race differences in cranial capacity. These data are found in Table 7.5.²⁸⁰

The association between cranial capacity and IQ at the individual level is around 0.3,²⁸¹ so it should be no surprise that the IQ-cranial capacity nexus is less than 1, but it is nevertheless extremely high. The Pearson correlation is 0.8 ($p < 0.01$). The results raise a number of questions, which are well worth pausing to discuss. What should we make of the fact that the Sub-Saharan African IQ is 70, whereas, as we have noted, the African-American IQ is 85? As already noted, this difference is likely explicable by two issues. African-Americans, by virtue of living in a developed country, benefit from a more stimulating environment and from better education, meaning that their average IQ is pushed closer to its phenotypic limit. In addition, African-Americans are a cline, being on average around 25 percent White,²⁸² due to intermixture on slave plantations, usually between a female slave and a male master.²⁸³ This is consistent with Y chromosome analyses showing that around 40 percent of

African-American and Caribbean males have an ultimately European paternal lineage.²⁸⁴

Table 7.5. Race Differences in IQ and Cranial Capacity

Race	IQ	Cranial Capacity (cc)
Northeast Asian	105	1416
European	100	1369
Arctic Peoples	91	1443
Southeast Asians	87	1332
Native Americans	86	1366
Pacific Islanders	85	1317
South Asians	84	1293
North Africans/Arabs	84	1293
Sub-Saharan Africans	70	1280
Australian Aborigines	64	1225
Bushmen	54	1270
Pygmies	53	-

The IQ of the Arctic peoples and of Native Americans likely reflects the fact that neither the Arctic peoples nor the northern Native Americans developed agriculture. Agriculture would have elevated intelligence by placing a premium on planning for the future and cooperation, and by selecting out those with insufficient future-orientation. In addition, in that IQ is around 20 percent environmental, their relatively high levels of poverty would likely mean that their IQ is below its phenotypic maximum. The unexpectedly large cranial capacity of the Arctic peoples likely reflects the weakening positive manifold between K traits at a high level of K , and specifically adaptation to an ecology in which highly specialized abilities are more important than g , leading to a larger brain, without a parallel rise in g . For example, although the Inuit have lower IQ than do Europeans, they possess far superior spatial intelligence. This would be

particularly useful in a context of snow-covered tundra, with few landmarks, needing to be negotiated on long hunting trips.²⁸⁵

The anomaly of the Bushmen IQ being lower than that of the Australian Aborigines is possibly caused by the fact that the Bushmen are mostly a preliterate group. In some cases, Bushmen are employed as farm workers and have moved on to reservations, but in general they are foragers.²⁸⁶ This means that their IQ has been measured by proxy, using the Draw-a-Man test. The Draw-a-Man test involves asking a subject to draw a man and then comparing it to what an average European would produce. This works inasmuch as drawing ability is associated with intelligence and children's drawings become more realistic with age. The problem is that Draw-a-Man correlates with IQ at between 0.2 and 0.8, and the correlation becomes weaker the older the child is.²⁸⁷ As such, it may be that the Bushmen are more intelligent than the Aborigines or that they have elevated specialized abilities compared to them. The latter explanation seems more likely, in that Bushmen drawings are childlike—literally stick men—compared to those of Sub-Saharan African farm laborers, whose drawings are more realistic and involve considerable detail.²⁸⁸ This would imply that we can be cautiously confident in employing the test as a proxy for race differences in IQ.

It is also worth noting, as part of our discussion of the “controversy” surrounding race and IQ research, that an attempt was actually made to suppress the evidence of race differences in cranial capacity. In *The Mismeasure of Man* (1981)²⁸⁹, Harvard University celebrity paleontologist Stephen J. Gould (1941-2002) critiqued IQ, the concept of race, and the evidence for race differences in IQ. In particular, Gould attacked the work of English scientist Samuel Morton (1799-1851), claiming that Morton allowed unconscious biases to influence his measurements of the supposedly differing average cranial capacities of a sample of 1000 skulls from different races. Indeed, Gould had conducted his own analysis of Morton's data and reported that, in reality, there were no consistent race differences in cranial capacity.²⁹⁰ The book publicized Gould's findings, establishing them as the “truth” in the public mind: “No serious person,” one might say, “thinks that there are race differences in skull size—or that this would have any connection to intelligence.” However, in 2011, researchers re-measured the cranial volumes of 46 percent of the skulls in Morton's collection. They also re-examined the statistical analyses conducted by Morton and by Gould. They found that, in contrast to what Gould had argued, Morton had not falsified or

manipulated his measurements, and to the extent that there were measurement errors in Morton's work, they actually exaggerated African cranial capacity in comparison to European. The authors also showed that Gould had only achieved his desired supposed falsification of Morton by tendentiously omitting specific sub-groups of skulls and by presenting incorrect calculations. Tellingly, the authors then felt the need to praise Gould for his various attempts to combat "racism."²⁹¹ This was presumably a ploy to deflect criticism from the politically correct mob, which would likely engage in fact-value conflation and assume that, because the authors reported a fact, they must, therefore, believe it to be a good thing. The authors, however, had shown that the celebrated "anti-racism" campaigner Stephen J. Gould had committed scientific fraud. Gould had falsified data on race differences in cranial capacity in order to force the accepted "facts" to conform to what he desired them to be. In reality, Gould sullied the reputation of a genuine, truth-seeking scientist in order to achieve this goal.²⁹² In doing so, Gould proved that he was the very opposite of a genuine, truth-seeking scientist.

Ethnicity and the Evolution of Intelligence

As we have already discussed, races can be divided into ethnicities, each of which can be understood as being on its way to becoming a race. Just as races differ in intelligence due to adaptation to different ecologies, the same is true of ethnic groups. However, ethnic groups have been separated for less time than have races and often interact, to a very limited degree, with other ethnic groups within the same race in order to trade or fight for territory. Consequently, factors other than geographic adaptation become germane to ethnic differences in intelligence, such as the extent of endogamy, gene-pool size, patterns of migration, and patterns of admixture with other races, such as when one ethnic group is closer to the natural border with another race than another one is.

European ethnic groups on the borders of Europe and Asia, or of Europe and North Africa, are likely to have greater non-European admixture than ethnic groups in Central Europe. This may also be true of ethnic groups that build empires, causing them to intermix with other races as a consequence of conquest and politics. Migration is largely predicted by intelligence. This is because migration requires forward-planning, cooperation, problem-solving, and openness to new possibilities, all of which are associated with high IQ. Accordingly, an ethnic group that occupied a particularly harsh or difficult ecology might witness considerable migration, which would reduce that ethnic

group's average intelligence. War, at least in modern times, appears to have a negative impact on intelligence. This is because intelligence is associated with pro-social behavior, such as life-risking gallantry. It is also correlated with occupational status, and up to a certain level, the higher a soldier's military rank, the more likely he is to be killed, because he is leading the subordinate troops into battle.²⁹³ American zoologist David Starr Jordan's (1851-1931) 1915 book, *War and the Breed*, paints a heart-breaking portrait of how modern warfare has led to the "downfall of nations" through the "obliteration of the most virile elements." Jordan viewed this as one of the most important reasons to end the modern "War System of the world," as murder on a gigantic scale.²⁹⁴

Yet another factor in assessing intelligence differences within races is how early a country industrialized. Once a country industrializes, a number of interrelated factors converge that begin to *reduce* intelligence. There is strong evidence that until the Industrial Revolution, there was a process of on-going selection for intelligence. British economist Gregory Clark has shown that until the Industrial Revolution, society was characterized by the "Survival of the Richest." Based on a sample of wills from the English counties of Essex and Suffolk, he demonstrated that the richer 50 percent of testators had 40 percent more surviving children when these testators died than did the poorer 50 percent of testators.²⁹⁵ This was likely, in part, because wealth predicted being able to provide for your offspring a healthier environment and more nutritious food. This meant that we lived in a society of "downward social mobility." Every generation, the poorest and least intelligent members of society would die off; those above them would, by necessity, have to socially descend to occupy the place in the hierarchy vacated by those below them. This process—again, something like the opposite of the "social mobility" promoted in the West—was ultimately highly eugenic; it "bootstrapped" the nation, making it more and more intelligent every generation.

Consistent with this, the number of per-capita major inventions per year increased continuously from the Medieval period until around 1870. The same occurred with the use of high order words in published texts. Our heads literally grew bigger and bigger to accommodate our growing brains; literacy and numeracy increased, despite little change in living standards; and alleles associated with high intelligence became increasingly common in European populations.²⁹⁶


The Industrial Revolution changed all this. By permitting improved medicine

and better public health, it meant that child mortality—which was a strong correlate of low intelligence—collapsed. In 1800, child mortality was approximately 40 percent, though it was much lower among the more intelligent (the wealthier) and much higher among the less intelligent (the poorer). By 1900, there was no longer a positive relationship between wealth (and thus IQ) and completed fertility. Shortly afterwards, a number of factors turned this into a *negative* relationship. Reliable contraception was developed, the successful use of which is associated with impulse control, forward-planning and thus with intelligence. The more intelligent desired fewer children than the less intelligent, because they were better able to rationalize everything, including the benefits or otherwise of a large family to their living standards.²⁹⁷ And the development of contraception allowed them to accomplish this, meaning large families became a function of low intelligence. The rise of feminism led to the more intelligent women dedicating their most fertile years to higher education and their careers, meaning they would only have a small number of children, with the most intelligent women having no children at all. The rise in the welfare state also meant that there was no longer a disincentive for those low in intelligence to limit their fertility. Indeed, child support payments acted as a positive incentive for them to have children.²⁹⁸ At the time of this writing, in the UK, only families where both parents are on welfare, which implies an IQ of around 80, are breeding at above replacement fertility.²⁹⁹ Accordingly, one factor in reducing a nation’s average IQ will be how early it industrialized.

Economist Jonathan Huebner has examined technological innovation across the past five centuries, particularly in light of the *bien pensant* that “things just keep getting better,” that is, that technology will advance exponentially *ad infinitum*.³⁰⁰ To the contrary, Huebner found that the rate of innovation—the number of important technological innovations divided by the world population—is not advancing at all but declining precipitously. It peaked in the late 19th century, following a steady rise since the Middle Ages. These findings can be seen in Figure 7.6. Huebner suggests that this is a matter of technology reaching its physical and economic limits, but it could be argued the Industrial Revolution’s impact on demographics played a decisive role. The Industrial Revolution was itself the product of high intelligence and a society that valued it. But its ultimate effects proved to be detrimental to the advancement of intelligence, at least among the broader population, and perhaps even to the maintenance of civilization itself.

Figure 7.6: Rate of Innovation Since 1455

Figure 7.6: Rate of Innovation Since 1455



Ethnic Differences in Intelligence

Ethnic differences in intelligence within Europe have been explored in detail by Richard Lynn³⁰¹, and later updated through collaboration between Lynn and David Becker.³⁰² Most European countries, and especially those in Central and Northern Europe, have an average IQ little different from that of Britain's. British IQ test scores are the "Greenwich Mean," to which the average scores of all other countries are compared. Scores for the native population are the same or no more than 3 points lower than this Greenwich Mean, in France, Germany, Austria, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden, Denmark, Norway, and Iceland. This is also true of some of the more northerly countries of the former Soviet Bloc, sometimes despite later industrialization, specifically Belarus, Estonia, Hungary, and Russia. Slovenia's average IQ is, likewise, around 100. In that these countries industrialized later than Britain, this might explain why their IQ is approximately the same, despite their having lower living standards and their being less technologically advanced, these being factors that have been shown to push IQ to its phenotypic limit—a phenomenon known as the Flynn Effect.³⁰³ The IQ of Latvia, based on only one known administration, is 94. However, its PISA results imply an IQ of 98, which may well be more reliable.

The IQ of the Czech Republic is 94, while that of Slovakia is 96. These scores may reflect long-term migration of the most intelligent among these populations to the center of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, of which they were a part, as well as more recent emigration to Western Europe. This may, likewise, explain why Poland's IQ is 96, although the ravages of World War II may also be relevant in that regard. The Lithuanian IQ is also 96, a country bordering Poland and formerly having been run by it. The Ukrainian IQ is 90, perhaps reflecting the acute devastation of that region under Communist rule. The Irish IQ is 95, probably due to its very long history of migration, particularly to the U.S. in the

wake of its devastating famine in the mid-19th century. The outlier in the other direction is Finland, which may have an IQ as high as 103, based on its PISA data which are more reliable than the very limited number of representative IQ administrations conducted on Finns. A number of reasons have been suggested for Finland's relatively high IQ, with the Finns also having very fast reaction times. Possible reasons include Finland's late industrialization, her extremely harsh ecology and history of population-devastating famines and wars, and its Northeast Asian admixture of between 5 percent and 10 percent, with Northeast Asians having, on average, an IQ of 105.³⁰⁴

In general, the IQ of Southern Europe is significantly lower than that of Northern Europe. In part, this is likely due to the ecology being less harsh, resulting in less intense selection for intelligence under pre-modern conditions. Lynn has suggested that this may also be due to admixture with non-European populations such as Arabs in southern Spain and southern Italy, resulting in an IQ of 94, and Turkish admixture in Greece (90) and Cyprus (93). However, in the case of Greece, this does not appear to be correct, as the modern Greeks are closely genetically related to Ancient Greeks.³⁰⁵ Interestingly, though, it has been found that the Greek Cypriots share a common, pre-Ottoman paternal ancestor with Turkish Cypriots.³⁰⁶ Lynn argues that substantial numbers of African slaves in Early Modern Portugal, who later integrated with the native population, has helped to result in the Portuguese IQ of 93. It should be added, however, that the IQ of Whites in Brazil has been found to be 95,³⁰⁷ so it may be that high IQ emigration from Portugal to Brazil is also relevant. In line with this hypothesis, in 2006, 20 percent of the Brazilian population had at least one Portuguese grandparent,³⁰⁸ and we have noted that IQ predicts migration, likely because migration requires planning, future-orientation, openness to new possibilities and a degree of wealth. Lynn suggests that Turkish admixture may also be partly responsible for the relatively low IQs of many of the former Eastern Bloc countries that were under Ottoman Rule in the Balkans, such as Romania (86), Bulgaria (84), and Serbia (89). In addition, it may be that the large Roma (or "Gypsy") populations—Roma having an average IQ of around 75—partly explains the particularly low scores in some of these countries.³⁰⁹ The average Maltese IQ is 91. The Maltese are very similar genetically to the southern Italians,³¹⁰ who also have an IQ of around 90.³¹¹

Unsurprisingly, there are further ethnic differences within countries. The Scots, Welsh, and Northern Irish have lower average IQs than the English. And

the Southeast of England has the highest IQ, likely due to centuries of migration to England and specifically to the area around London.³¹² The IQ of the Welsh is lower than that of the Scots, and also the Northern Irish, many of whom have Scottish ancestry. It may be—and Cold Winters Theory would predict this—that there was a period of time, until the 19th century, when IQ was higher in Scotland than England, but the Scottish ecology was so relatively harsh and survival-focused that it was too risky to innovate and thus develop. This model would explain why the Romans or Greeks, who were under less harsh conditions and thus likely less intelligent than those further north, made so many innovations. Once those further north obtained those innovations, they were no longer only just about surviving, giving them space to fully employ their higher intelligence. Certainly, the Scots are disproportionately represented among British 18th and 19th century innovators.³¹³

Non-European Races and Clines

Similar ethnic and national differences in intelligence are evident within other races. For example, the IQ of the mainland Chinese is 104, whereas it is 106 in Taiwan and Singapore. This likely reflects the way in which more intelligent Chinese would have migrated out of China to these two areas, such as in the wake of China's civil war and its fall to Communism. Within Japan, the southern Japanese have a lower IQ than the northern Japanese and the difference is on *g*, and so strongly genetic. The Okinawan ethnic minority, in the far south, have the lowest IQ of all, partly consistent with Cold Winters Theory.³¹⁴ Within India, the southern Indians have a higher IQ than do the northern Indians, possibly reflecting far higher levels of Muslims, and thus cousin marriage and the consequent reduction of IQ through inbreeding depression, in northern India.³¹⁵ In much of the Arab world, there is a *pigmentocracy*. Northern Egypt has higher IQ than southern Egypt, with southern Egyptians having higher levels of Nubian (Sub-Saharan African) admixture.³¹⁶ A similar phenomenon can be observed in Sudan, where intelligence decreases as one moves south and Sub-Saharan African admixture increases.³¹⁷ Similarly, the IQ of the Cape Coloreds in South Africa is 85, this being equidistant between the two groups of which they are mainly composed: the Afrikaners (100) and the Black South Africans (70).³¹⁸

This pigmentocracy among the clines of South America, which are generally a mixture of Europeans and Native Americans, is very clear. Using regional data

from Mexico, Brazil, the U.S., and Colombia, it has been shown that level of European admixture correlates with average IQ at 0.7. Once genomic ancestry had been taken into account, skin reflectance—how dark people’s skin is—no longer correlates with IQ, meaning that the crucial factor to intelligence differences among Hispanics is the extent of their European ancestry.³¹⁹ The IQ of Hispanics in the U.S. is approximately 91, a difference which has been shown to be on *g*.³²⁰ This is equidistant between the estimated Native American IQ, of 86, and the Spanish IQ of 96, which is approximately what we would expect.

There is ultimately no question that there are genetic race and ethnic differences in intelligence. Critics are left with one final argument, which is that the hypothesis fits the evidence but it *must not* be true, or *must be kept secret* because it’s “dangerous” or “offensive.” It can be responded that this is a fallacy: an appeal to consequences. That it may be dangerous or offensive is irrelevant to whether or not it is true. Moreover, there are numerous serious potential dangers to building public policy around inaccurate information and wishful thinking. That there are genetic race differences in IQ should be no more offensive to any non-White person than the degree of offense I might feel if an Ashkenazi Jew asserted that Ashkenazi Jews have a higher IQ than Whites. I don’t feel any offense. It’s a fact. Ashkenazi Jews in the U.S. have an average IQ of 112. In much the same way, it’s a fact that university graduates have a higher mean IQ than non-graduates. It doesn’t make any sense that all non-graduates should harbor pain and resentment over this fact. As is always the case, variation within any group is large enough that the group average does not determine the psychological properties of any particular individual. I can testify, from having attended Durham University in England and then Aberdeen University in Scotland and especially from teaching in the Cultural Anthropology Department at Oulu University in Finland, that you can meet some quite stupid university graduates and some quite clever people working at the pub.

Getting Personal

Race Differences in Personality and Behavior

In June 2019, I was at a bar in Chicago, at which there was a partly-covered roof-top drinking area. The patrons were mainly African-American, and in one corner, there was a basketball hoop, much like there are dart boards in English pubs. Drinkers were encouraged to challenge each other to matches of “free-throws.” I watched as male African-Americans scored again and again, with incredible ease. Eventually, I was pestered into having a go. A particular African-American man was enthusiastic about this, presumably amused by the juxtaposition of a smartly dressed Englishman in a predominantly African-American Chicago bar attempting to play basketball. Extremely friendly, and also tactile, he attempted to school me in the “technique” that would inevitably allow me to get the ball in the hoop. Employing this “technique,” I threw the ball many times, to no avail. Eventually, I ignored his amiable advice and simply chucked the ball in the general direction of the hoop as hard as I could. It went in.

My African-American coach erupted with joy, as did a number of friends of his, while I, and those with whom I’d come to the bar, was rather more circumspect and skeptical about the achievement. For my new African-American friends, however, it was a quite brilliant accomplishment, rendering me worthy of considerable “respect.” To a casual observer, it may have appeared that African-Americans experience positive feelings—such as joy—more intensely than do White people. This is a stereotype about African-Americans in comparison to more “reserved” Northern Europeans, and, as with most racial stereotypes, it turns out to be accurate. African-Americans score higher than White Americans in the personality trait known as “Extraversion.” Before exploring race differences in personality in more depth, however, we need to get to grips with the nature of personality and how differences in it can be measured.

What is Personality?

Human personality might seem ineffable, and defining it, the task of poetry, drama, and portraiture. Looked at through a scientific lens, personality can be (however imperfectly) measured, as well as understood collectively, or, for the purposes of this book, *racially*.

Personality can be defined as “the combination of characteristics or qualities

that form an individual's distinctive character." In this way, personality can be seen as a set of variable traits.³²¹ A number of personality models have been developed and are used in parallel; in recent decades, the so-called Big Five model has come to dominate. The Big Five is a bottom-up model, based on actual correlations between people's ratings of a large number of statements about themselves.³²² Various personality traits, such as "warmth" or "depression," have been found to correlate positively or negatively with each other, but to have no correlation, or only a very weak correlation, with other personality traits. Twin studies show that the heritability of personality traits is in the region of at least 50 percent³²³ and possibly up to around 66 percent.³²⁴ For the present discussion, the Big Five serves at least as well as any other model, and it is also currently the most widely accepted. Its variables are regarded as substantially independent of intelligence, though they are not entirely so. The Big Five traits form the memorable and euphonious acronym O.C.E.A.N.:

1. **Openness-Intellect:** Those who are creative, imaginative, aesthetic, artistic, and open to new ideas.³²⁵ This is contrasted with those who are practical, conventional, and less open to new ideas. The traits which compose Openness such as "unusual thought patterns," "impulsive non-conformity," or "aestheticism," are often only weakly correlated. This has led some researchers to suggest that Openness-Intellect is, essentially, a combination of intelligence (or "intellectual curiosity"), low Conscientiousness and low Agreeableness, and should simply be abandoned.³²⁶
2. **Conscientiousness:** Organized, directed, rule-following, hardworking, but controlling. The opposite types are spontaneous, careless, and prone to addiction.
3. **Extraversion:** Those who are outgoing, enthusiastic and active, seek novelty, risk and excitement, and who experience positive emotions strongly. Those who score low on this express *Introversion* and are aloof, quiet, independent, cautious, and enjoy being alone.
4. **Agreeableness:** Trusting, cooperative, altruistic, and slow to anger. This is contrasted with those who are uncooperative and hostile. There are two key aspects to *Agreeableness*: altruism and empathy, the latter of which is the "theory of mind"—the ability to intuit what others are thinking. These positively correlate, but they are not the same thing.
5. **Neuroticism:** Those who are prone to stress, worry, and negative emotions. The opposite is those who are *Emotionally Stable*.

In each case, the traits are conceived as a spectrum and are named after one extreme on the spectrum. They are considered useful because variation in the Big Five allows successful Life History predictions to be made. For example, in 1921, psychologist Lewis Terman, whom we met in Chapter 7, identified a cohort of 1,500 Californians who scored exceptionally high in the Stanford-

Binet IQ exam. Over the next 70 years, his subjects began to be referred to the “Termanites,” in homage to the chief researcher.³²⁷ Drawing upon the wide-ranging data set, it was found that Extraversion, independent of any other factor, was a predictor of early death. It increased the risk threefold, probably because Extraversion encourages you to take risks in pursuit of the high positive emotional reward.³²⁸ Low Agreeableness predicts criminality and divorce. High Conscientiousness predicts doing well in the worlds of education and work, while low Conscientiousness predicts criminality, low socioeconomic status, and addiction. High Neuroticism predicts depression, anxiety, marital breakdown and aspects of creativity.³²⁹ It is also associated with being a religious seeker and having periodic phases of religious fervor,³³⁰ as well as, very specifically, with heart disease.³³¹ An optimally high level of Openness is associated with artistic success.³³² These personality characteristics also predict the kind of subjects that will interest you. Science types tend to be high in Conscientiousness, Agreeableness, and Intellect, and low in Neuroticism and Openness. In the Humanities, this pattern is reversed.³³³

As already noted, the Big Five are substantially independent of each other, though there is a correlation at the level of the aspects of which they are composed. Specifically, what we might call the socially positive aspects of each trait do in fact correlate. These are the aspects that make you a socially effective person—friendly, diligent, cooperative, reliable, open-minded—meaning, in essence, that you “get on in life.” As such, personality can be reduced down to a “General Factor of Personality,” much as intelligence can be reduced down to the *g*-factor. People can be positioned higher or lower on a spectrum measuring this General Factor of Personality, GFP for short. GFP is associated with socioeconomic success.³³⁴

Race Differences on the Big Five

I am aware of one study which has explored race differences on the Big Five in most of the races of classical anthropology.³³⁵ The results can be seen in Table 8.1.

Table 8.1. Race Differences on the Big Five

Race/Region	N	GFP (SD)	O	C	E	A	N
Asian	2022	-0.16 (69)	37.133	528.837	532.0		

NE Asia	187	-0.16	(69)	37.532.729.636.932.0
SE Asia	1835	-0.16	(69)	37.133.628.737.532.0
Caucasian	12,936	0.02	(74)	39.833.330.238.530.9
European	10,529	0.03	(0.75)	40.333.330.238.530.7
Indian	1505	-0.07	(0.69)	37.233.230.238.532.1
Middle East	506	-0.01	(0.73)	38.033.730.838.431.8
North African	396	-0.01	(0.77)	38.633.330.138.430.7
Black	259	0.19	(0.77)	39.634.730.939.628.1
Arctic	13	0.24	(0.64)	39.831.534.437.426.4
Indigenous-Australian	24	-0.12	(0.74)	39.030.331.535.130.2
Native-American	201	0.02	(0.83)	37.034.730.238.229.7
Pacific	65	0.03	(0.66)	37.933.030.738.229.3
Mixed race	1430	-0.019	(0.77)	39.633.030.038.030.9
Other	2532	0.03	(0.75)	37.234.330.739.030.9

Note: O = Openness, C = Conscientiousness, E = Extraversion, A = Agreeableness, N = Neuroticism

There are a number of problems with this information. Most obviously, there is the cultural effect of the people being from different countries and interpreting the statements in the personality test—statements such as “I am a tidy person”—by comparing themselves to others around them. This would help to explain why Northeast Asians, whom we would expect to be highest in Conscientiousness, are lowest in it and Blacks and Aborigines, whom we would expect to be the lowest in Conscientiousness, are actually highest in it. Psychology student Brett Andersen, who conducted this study, concludes, based on it, that East Asians actually score lower on GFP than do Blacks,³³⁶ something which previous studies have also found.³³⁷ But Andersen and others have failed to account for this obvious and fundamental problem, which has been explored in considerable depth elsewhere.³³⁸ The sample size for a number of races—in particular Australian Aborigines, Pacific Islanders, Northeast Asians, and especially Arctic

people—is extremely small, meaning they should be treated with considerable caution, if not simply dismissed. The author, also, has not calculated which differences attain significance, merely reporting a significant difference on the GFP between Blacks, Whites, and East Asians.

National Differences in Personality Proxies

Clearly, it is very difficult to employ personality tests across cultures. However, it may be possible to make comparisons using certain proxies. If a person has an extreme placing on any of the Big Five, or is very low in GFP, then they are understood to have a “personality disorder,” in other words they are “pathological.” Usually, these disorders do not directly cross-over with the Big Five. A personality disorder is characterized by maladaptive patterns of behavior and inner experience that cause the sufferer to differ sufficiently from the norms of their own culture so as to be regarded as pathological. The symptoms tend to cluster together, meaning that psychologists have been able to identify a number of distinct personality disorders. Some people are more pronounced or clearer exemplars of these disorders than others. Equally, many disorders involve extremes of personality, meaning we can conceive of a spectrum, with “normal” in the middle. National differences in these kinds of pathologies are highly relevant, because it is notoriously difficult to obtain sound data on national differences in personality traits, because the traits are self-rated, and hence, to a considerable extent, relative to one’s own population. Comparing self-ratings across countries does not, therefore, establish that Finns are, for example, higher in Conscientiousness than the English, although this is almost certainly the case. On so many occasions, I have watched Finns wait at zebra crossings (pedestrian “crosswalks” in America) because there is a red man (meaning “don’t walk”), even though there are clearly no cars coming. British people, in such circumstances, would simply cross the road. But Finns only seem to pluck up the courage to cross the road on a red man—and “break the rules”—if I lead the way. This difference almost certainly wouldn’t be recorded if we were to compare representative samples of, for example, Finns and English people on scores on some test of the Big Five. If anything, the English would probably score higher in Conscientiousness. Consistent with this, as we have already noted, international comparisons have produced intuitively bizarre results, such as that the Japanese are very low in Conscientiousness and that

Nigerians are very high in it.³³⁹ This is because the personality surveys involve people subjectively evaluating the degree to which they are “tidy,” for example. But they will be making this evaluation according to different cultural norms of how tidy “tidy” really is, meaning it is extremely problematic to compare different cultures in this way.³⁴⁰ As such, racial comparisons in personality—based on personality tests—need to be made within a specific country.

Race Differences in Personality

There are, however, some studies which have compared race differences in personality *within* specific countries. A number of studies have found consistent personality differences between Europeans, Northeast Asians, and Sub-Saharan Africans, when controlling substantially for environment. As already noted, Rushton found consistent differences on aggressiveness, cautiousness, dominance, impulsivity, self-control, and sociability, with Sub-Saharan Africans at one end of the spectrum and Northeast Asians at the other. In terms of r-K, these differences would make a great deal of sense. As Cuban-American psychologist A.J. Figueredo and colleagues argue,³⁴¹ those who are evolved to stable yet selective environments will depend on many long-term and cooperative social bonds and, indeed, such bonds are fundamental to survival in such an environment. Accordingly, saying or doing the wrong thing at the wrong time would be a disaster for slow LH strategists, meaning that they must learn a high level of emotional intelligence, concern for the feelings of others, and perhaps simply have a high level of general intelligence, so that they don’t make social mistakes. For the same reason they must also learn to control their impulses and not become easily enraged. By contrast, in an unstable environment, fast LH strategists are likely to be killed if they carefully consider the right course of action in the face of an immediate threat. They must react decisively and immediately to crush the threat, something which might be aided by extremely high levels of aggression and thus low impulse control and low Agreeableness. Numerous studies, summarized by J. Philippe Rushton, have compared White-American and Chinese-American babies and young children and have shown that White-American babies are less temperamental (Neurotic), less inhibited (Conscientious), less hostile (Agreeable) and less sociable (Extraverted), though these are not reduced to the Big Five.³⁴²

More recently, it has been found that there are consistent differences between American Whites and “East Asians,” with American Whites being higher in

Extraversion and Openness but lower in Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, and Neuroticism, as Rushton's model would propose, *except* with regard to Neuroticism.³⁴³ The explanation for this anomaly is that the extreme levels of social anxiety among Northeast Asians overwhelm their otherwise low levels of Neuroticism. Brazilian psychologist Heitor Fernandes and colleagues,³⁴⁴ as noted earlier, have brought together the studies on race differences in Neuroticism, specifically in anxiety, in a meta-analysis. They show that East Asians (there is no division in the studies between north and south) exhibit the highest levels of social anxiety, followed by Whites and then by Blacks. This makes sense, as the more *K*-oriented the ecology is then the more important are tightly structured social groups to survival, causing a propensity towards social anxiety—as a means of ensuring that one gets on with people—to become ever more important. At the same time, noted Fernandes and colleagues, generalized anxiety becomes ever more important as a means of predicting and so avoiding future threats in a highly predictable environment. More generally, they demonstrate, a proneness to worry about the future is actually weakly associated with Conscientiousness, which we would expect to be highest in Northeast Asians and lowest in Blacks, with Whites being intermediate, based on the predictability and harshness of these races' ancestral ecologies. These differences have been found to exist even when socioeconomic status is controlled for.

Fernandes and his colleagues also demonstrate that these differences are reversed with regard to Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. This is consistently highest in Blacks and lowest in East Asians, with Whites being intermediate. This would make sense inasmuch as PTSD can be regarded as maladaptive and thus likely to be selected out under conditions of harsh selection of the kind pertaining to the ancestral environment of Northeast Asia. Indeed, it has been argued that a propensity to suffer from Post-Traumatic Stress may actually have been selected *for*, as it's potentially adaptive in a highly unpredictable ecology, teaming with predators. The PTSD reaction involves “avoidance, attentive immobility, withdrawal, aggressive defense, appeasement and tonic immobility.” This would potentially be selected for in the African ancestral ecology; as basic needs are met, such a withdrawal, as a way of working through trauma, would be possible and potentially beneficial. But such time spent away from caring for basic necessities would be all but impossible in a harsh ecology.³⁴⁵

Rushton has summarized many studies that imply that African-Americans are

higher in self-concept and hostility (markers of low Agreeableness) than Whites, as well as lower in inhibition (Conscientiousness).³⁴⁶ A meta-analysis has found that African-Americans are higher in Extraversion, and lower in Agreeableness, than are Whites, when the Big Five are applied. Blacks are also lower in Conscientiousness, slightly higher in Neuroticism, and very slightly lower in Openness, perhaps due to its association with intelligence. The meta-analysis also found publication bias, whereby studies indicating that Blacks were lower in Agreeableness and Conscientiousness were more likely to remain as unpublished theses, conference presentations or communications.³⁴⁷ The small difference in Neuroticism is consistent with Whites being extremely high in anxiety, albeit to a lesser extent than Northeast Asians. Race differences have also been found in the General Factor of Personality (GFP) in the direction that differences in Life History Strategy would predict. American psychologist Curtis Dunkel and colleagues drew upon a large dataset of American students, assessed in 1960, to show that Whites had higher GFP than Blacks. “Asians” were found to be intermediate.³⁴⁸ This may have a number of explanations, such as the inability to distinguish between South Asians and East Asians within the sample and, in particular, the relatively extreme *K*-strategy of Northeast Asians. As we have discussed, the higher the *K*-strategy, the more uncoupled the different components of *K* become, as the group becomes adapted to an extremely narrow niche. In such a niche, it may be that GFP is less important than high scores on far more specific and subtle personality traits, such as anxiety, to provide a salient example. In general, those who have high GFP will tend to be low in generalized anxiety. Other research has confirmed the Black-White difference in the U.S., whereby Whites are higher in General Factor of Personality than are Blacks.³⁴⁹

Psychopathic Personality and Crime

We earlier observed that one of the ways in which group differences in personality can be discerned is by exploring the prevalence in each group of particular personality disorders, as these are often extreme manifestations of personality traits. Psychopathic personality disorder (officially known as “anti-social behavior disorder”) is characterized by the following traits, according to the American Psychiatric Association:

1. Inability to sustain consistent work behavior.
2. Failure to conform to social norms with respect to lawful behavior.

3. Irritability and aggressiveness, as indicated by frequent physical fights and assaults.
4. Repeated failure to honor financial obligations.
5. Failure to plan ahead and impulsivity.
6. No regard for truth, as indicated by repeated lying, use of aliases, or “conning” others.
7. Recklessness regarding one’s own or others’ personal safety, as indicated by driving while intoxicated or recurrent speeding.
8. Inability to function as a responsible parent.
9. Failure to sustain a monogamous relationship for more than one year.
10. Lack of remorse.
11. Presence of conduct disorder in childhood.³⁵⁰

Thus personality disorder can cautiously be reduced to a combination of extremely low Conscientiousness and extremely low Agreeableness.

Using a large number of proxies for anti-social and risk-taking behavior, Richard Lynn has shown that there are clear race differences in psychopathic personality disorder, it being the highest in Blacks and the lowest in Northeast Asians, with Whites being intermediate.³⁵¹ This is, of course, the pattern we would expect using r-K theory. And this same pattern appears on the Psychopathic Deviate Scale of the MMPI (Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory): African-Americans score the highest, East Asian Americans score the lowest, and Whites are intermediate. And again, this same relationship is found in the U.S. when on a plethora of measures of anti-social personality: conduct disorder among school children, school suspensions and exclusions, attention deficit disorder, moral understanding, honoring financial obligations (though here the East Asian data is from South Korea), serious crime, crime in general, incarceration rates, long term monogamous relationships, extra-marital sex, multiple sexual partners, unplanned pregnancy, work commitment, sexual precocity and infant homicide.

Crime—especially, serious crime, such as murder, assault, and rape—can be understood as an extreme manifestation of psychopathic personality; violent criminal behavior indicates aggression, recklessness with regard for consequences and social norms, as well as lack of empathy. In turn, serious crime is associated with lower intelligence, though compounded by the presence of psychopathic personality. As we discussed in Chapter 7, intelligence can be reduced to the ability to solve complex problems. It is also reflected in “delayed gratification” and “time horizons.” In the famous “Stanford Marshmallow experiment” from 1972, Walter Mischel offered children between the ages of 3

and 5 the choice of one small reward now (a marshmallow or pretzel) or a bigger reward later (two marshmallows or pretzels), if they were willing to wait 15 minutes.³⁵² In a follow-up study 17 years later, Mishel discovered that those children who were able to delay gratification achieved far greater success on a host of measures of life outcomes: SAT scores, health, economic success, and life expectancy.³⁵³ In this way, “time horizon” or “time preference” is a direct reflection of intelligence and also reveals much about the criminal personality. Crime, along with sexual debauchery, is a patent example of “getting it now,” regardless of the costs this might entail for the future. Table 8.2 includes statistics on serious crime in the United States, expressed as incidents per 10,000 of population.³⁵⁴ Clear race differences are manifest, and they are consistent with race differences in estimated psychopathic personality.

Table 8.2. Race Differences in Serious Criminality in the U.S.

Crime	Year	Sex	Asian	Black	Hispanic	Native American	White
Homicide	1979-1981	M	-	6.4	-	-	1.0
Homicide	1979-1981	F	-	1.3	-	-	0.3
Homicide	2000-2009	M/F	.20	2.09	1.32	1.23	0.26
Robbery	1957-1988	M/F	-	27.7	-	-	2.3
Rape/assault	1989	M	-	51.6	-	68.1	48.9
Rape/assault	1989	F	-	34.5	-	44.0	28.5
Rape	1989	M	-	9.1	-	-	3.8

It can be seen, as we would predict, that Blacks’ level of serious crime is considerably higher than that of Whites or Asians. This can also be observed from Table 8.3, in which the differences are expressed as the number of crimes that occurred per one hundred people for any one community.

Table 8.3. Race differences in convictions for aggressive and violent crime per 10,000

Crime	Year	Sex	Asian	Black	Hispanic	Native American	White
Assault	1994	M/F	0.5	5.0	3.0	2.0	1.0

Rape	1994 M	0.5	5.5	3.0	2.1	1.0
Robbery	1994M/F	0.8	11.2	3.0	1.7	1.0
Murder	2001M/F	0.2	8.2	2.4	2.3	1.0
Man-slaughter	2001M/F	0.2	5.8	2.3	2.3	1.0
Rape	2001 M	0.1	2.4	1.2	1.8	1.0
Robbery	2001M/F	0.2	14.4	4.0	3.2	1.0
Assault	2001M/F	0.2	7.2	3.8	3.7	1.0

New York City presents an excellent case study of race differences in crime. It is the most densely populated city in the U.S., with a population of 8.3 million living in some 300 square miles (785 square kilometers), and it is also truly multicultural, where no one race holds a majority. New York is roughly 30 percent Hispanic, 30 percent White, 20 percent Black, and 15 percent Asian and Pacific Islander. The City has also publicly released its accounting of race and crime; the statistics for murder and non-negligent manslaughter for 2019 can be found in Table 8.4.

Table 8.4. Murder and Non-Negligent Manslaughter, New York 2019³⁵⁵

Race	% of Population	Victim	Suspect	Arrestee
American Indian	0.2%	0.3%	0.0%	0.0%
Asian/Pacific Islander	14.1%	6.9%	3.8%	3.0%
Black	21.7%	56.6%	62.4%	58.0%
White	31.9%	4.9%	3.0%	3.3%
Hispanic	29.2%	31.2%	30.8%	35.2%

Hispanics commit violent crime and are victimized at rates that are roughly equivalent with their percent of the New York population. Whites and Asians, on the other hand, commit violent crime and are victimized far below their

population levels (indeed, lower by multiples of four to ten). The major driver of crime in New York is African-Americans, who commit violent acts, and are victimized, at some three times the rate of their population.

It has been frequently argued that African-Americans are poorer than Whites and therefore more likely to commit crime, perhaps due to the stresses caused by poverty. This, however, begs the question of why they are poorer than Whites in the first place. As we have discussed, poverty is predicted by low intelligence, as is criminality, and the African-American’s average IQ is 15 points lower than that of Whites. Psychopathic personality is also associated with criminality, and this is higher in African-Americans than in Whites. Thus, the same (significantly genetic) factors that would predict elevated Black poverty would also predict elevated Black criminality.

In addition, as American philosopher Michael Levin has noted, most studies conclude that unemployment, for example, does not make people significantly more likely to commit crime and, we might add, especially not crimes such as murder and rape, which are substantially elevated among Blacks. Also, observes Levin, when Jewish immigrants arrived in the U.S. in the early 20th century, they were extremely poor, but did not commit crimes disproportionately to their percentage of the population, as Black people do.³⁵⁶ The Fiscal Policy Institute determined that, in New York City in 2014, the average White household’s income (\$122,200) was roughly 1.7 times that of the average African-American household (\$69,100).³⁵⁷ However, Blacks are arrested for murder at 21 times the rate of Whites; for rape, 7.5 times that of Whites; for robbery, 10 times; for assault, 6 times; drug offenses, 4 times. This is detailed in Table 8.5.³⁵⁸

Table 8.5. Crime in New York City in 2014

Race	Suspect	Arrestee
Murder and Non-Negligent Manslaughter		
Black	59.8 %	61.8 %
White	6.0 %	2.9 %
Rape		
Black	49.3 %	43.2 %
White	6.0 %	2.9 %

White	9.4 %	5.7 %
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Felony Sex Crime

Black	45.9 %	39.3 %
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White	16.9 %	13.3 %
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Robbery

Black	70.6 %	61.5 %
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White	4.1 %	6.1 %
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Felonious Assault

Black	55.3 %	53.2 %
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White	8.7 %	8.7 %
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Grand Larceny

Black	60.7 %	49.2 %
-------	--------	--------

White	11.6 %	16.6 %
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Misdemeanor Criminal Mischief

Black	48.1%	37.8%
-------	-------	-------

White	16.8%	20.0%
-------	-------	-------

Proactive Offenses (Drugs)

Black	47.6 %	43.9 %
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White	14.2 %	11.5 %
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It also cannot be argued that “White racism” somehow causes high Black crime rates; levels of criminality in Sub-Saharan African nations are similar to those in African-American communities.³⁵⁹

Personality Differences Between the Races of Classical Anthropology

ANTHROPOLOGY

On the whole, it's clear that Rushton's model works when comparing the personalities of Blacks, Whites and East Asians, with certain caveats due to the high anxiety of Europeans and East Asians and the relatively low IQ of Blacks. However, making predictive statements about modal personality becomes rather more complex when turning to the other races of Classical Anthropology.

Richard Lynn has extended his earlier research on psychopathic personality to encompass most of the races of Classical Anthropology, employing some or all of the proxies utilized earlier in this study. These have been presented in his book *Race Differences in Psychopathic Personality*.³⁶⁰ In particular, Lynn examines the large data sets related to race and crime within various countries around the world. In addition, elsewhere in the book, he provides data on race differences in criminality in the Netherlands, comparing the South Asians and the Dutch. Consulting Lynn's source, however, comparisons to other races can be made, albeit by sight from a particular table.³⁶¹ Also, I have found information on the crime rate in the Baffin region, which is compared to the crime rate in Canada of 1992.³⁶² The Baffin region is approximately 75 percent Inuit.³⁶³ I have turned these into odds ratios and added them to Table 8.6.

Table 8.6: Race Differences in Criminality

Race	Country	Odds Ratio	IQ
Aborigines	Australia	16.0	62
Sub-Saharan Africans	USA	7.5	85
Pacific Islanders (Maori)	New Zealand	5.9	92
North Africans (Moroccans)	Netherlands	4.75	92
Inuit	Baffin, Canada	2.3	91
Native Americans	United States	2.2	86
Southeast Asians	Netherlands	1.6	93
Europeans	General	1.0	100
South Asians	Britain	1.0	89
Northeast Asians	UK and USA	0.5	105

I could not find any relevant data on criminality on any Bushmen or Pygmy groups. I have added estimated IQs of the racial groups where I could find data in the specific countries in which data were collected. I have added these for comparative purposes, so that we can correlate the crime rate with the IQ and see if a factor other than mere IQ might be explaining race differences in criminality.³⁶⁴ It can be seen that all of these IQs are considerably higher than is the case among people of this race in their own countries. This would be consistent with a more intelligence race's society push their IQ to its phenotypic maximum and also with the migration-IQ nexus. In addition, as we have discussed, IQ predicts immigration, meaning that such immigrant communities are likely, anyway, to be more intelligent than are those whom they have left behind. Of course, the problem is that criminality is also a reflection of low IQ. Thus, if race differences in criminality are also reflecting race differences in psychopathic personality, we would not expect an exact correlation.

It can be seen in Table 8.6 that there is a strong correlation between IQ and criminality, of -0.88 ($p < 0.001$). But there is clearly another factor at work, and Lynn argues that this is psychopathic personality. The extent to which criminality levels cannot simply be explained by IQ is evidently pronounced among the Australian Aborigines, whose criminality level is double that of African-Americans, and the New Zealand Maori, whose IQ is actually relatively high. At the other extreme, the relatively low IQ and low criminality of South Asian immigrants would be consistent with low levels of psychopathic personality. Lynn has presented many datasets that are consistent with this in the UK, such as South Asians being less likely to be expelled from school than White British students. American psychologist Donald Templer (1938-2016) argued that the low levels of psychopathic personality, and high levels of Conscientiousness and Agreeableness, among South Asians are a result of their being evolved, over a very long period of time, to living in extremely population-dense environments, elevating the need for social harmony.³⁶⁵ The relatively high religiousness of South Asians in the UK may also be relevant, as it has been demonstrated that the belief that one is being watched—whether by a god or a person—elevates pro-social behavior.³⁶⁶ (We will explore race and religion further in the next chapter.)

One caveat that should be borne in mind is that high criminality as evidence of psychopathic personality may be, to some degree, compromised in the case of

the Australian Aborigines, Maori, Native Americans, and Inuit, by virtue of these peoples having very limited ancestral adaptation to alcohol. Exposed to it, they tend to become drunk very quickly and develop alcoholism very easily, elevating the likelihood of criminality.³⁶⁷ As discussed in Chapter 6, the development of alcohol was all but inevitable once settled agriculture arose. And there are obvious benefits to consuming alcohol: fruit would ferment, people would drink this fermented fruit, and this would mean they wouldn't have to drink water, from which they would possibly contract water-borne pathogens.³⁶⁸ Consequently, genes that permitted people to better process alcohol without the harmful side effects of drunkenness (and its associated loss of inhibition) and chronic alcoholism would have spread throughout agricultural societies. This process would have been occurring the longest around the Fertile Crescent, where agriculture was innovated 10,000 years ago. Accordingly, as we move away from that area, populations are increasingly less adapted to alcohol and thus more prone to drunkenness and addiction. Hunter-gatherer societies have, essentially, no resistance to alcohol at all, meaning that alcohol tends to ravage communities once they come into contact with it. This is noticeable with the Bushmen groups that have abandoned hunter-gathering and taken up work as laborers for Black farmers. In Botswana, for example, many Bushmen have been evicted from their reservations in recent decades, supposedly to preserve the wildlife from overhunting. Attempts have then been made to integrate the Bushmen into the world of the Black population living in villages, which has exposed the Bushmen to alcohol. Many live in "resettlement camps." The result is widespread alcoholism and devastation among these Bushmen.³⁶⁹ The government of Botswana conceded in 2006 that these Bushmen are effectively "drinking themselves to death."³⁷⁰ In Namibia, the settled Bushmen also display "grave and perilous levels of alcoholism."³⁷¹

Taken as a whole, criminality as a measure may unfairly exaggerate psychopathic personality—and fast Life History Strategy—among groups that did not historically practice widespread agriculture. Consistent with this, it has been found that the modal personality of Native American and Inuit children is relatively similar to that of Northeast Asians, to whom they are genetically quite closely related. Teacher observation finds that such children, when compared to White Americans or White Canadians, are more pro-social, have higher impulse control, and are more inhibited and quieter, implying lower Extraversion.³⁷² By contrast, among adult samples, Native Americans score higher than African-

Americans on the Minnesota Measure of Psychopathic Personality.³⁷³ Maori and especially Australian Aboriginal children, however, are more problematic in their behavior than are White children, though alcohol is likely to exaggerate the differences among adults.³⁷⁴

Sexual Behavior

Marriage and cohabitation patterns offer a second, and perhaps fairer, measure of race differences in psychopathic personality. A marker of low psychopathic personality is the ability to maintain long-term relationships, though this is certainly affected by the overall religiousness of a society. In turn, sexual dysfunction and promiscuity is a sign of psychopathic personality.

Table 8.7: Race Differences in Marriage and Cohabitation

Race	Percentage Married or Cohabiting	Year	Country
East Asian	79 %	1999	USA
European	68 %	1999	USA
Native American	53 %	1999	USA
African	39 %	1999	USA
South Asian	97 %	1996	Britain
Inuit	23 %	2002	Canada
Aborigine	30 %	2010	Australia

The data in Table 8.7 is, again, partly taken from Lynn’s *Race Differences in Psychopathic Personality*. For the Inuit measure, I have employed the proxy of percentage of children born to unwed mothers, as the Canadian average on this measure is very close to the percentage who are neither married nor cohabiting. I have employed the same measure for the figure for Australian Aborigines.³⁷⁵ Here we find the predictable r-K pattern, consistent with race differences in psychopathic personality: East Asians (79 percent married or cohabiting) are likelier to form monogamous pairings than White (68 percent); both have significantly higher rates of monogamy than Africans (39 percent). Important outliers include South Asians, whose marriage patterns are to a large extent re-

enforced by Islam or Hinduism, at a remarkably high rate of 97 percent.

Rates of sexual promiscuity also offer us a glimpse into psychopathic personality within racial populations. Sexually transmitted diseases (STDs) act as a useful proxy in this regard, and on this matter, there is a tremendous amount of data, as public health organizations seek to treat these ailments and are interested in defining the communities most at risk. The U.S. Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) has released data regarding the HIV/AIDS crisis, revealing a distressing situation within African-American communities.³⁷⁶ In Table 8.8, infection rates are expressed per 100,000. The Hispanic rate of HIV diagnosis (16.4) is some three and half times the rate of White and Asians; the African-American rate is even more dire, over eight times that of Whites and Asians.

Table 8.8. Diagnoses of HIV Infection in the United States, 2018

Race	Number	Rate
American Indian/Alaskan Native	186	7.7
Asian	876	4.7
Black	16,047	39.2
Native Hawaiian & Pacific Islander	66	11.3
White	9,572	4.8
Hispanic	9,820	16.4
Multirace	948	13.3

A similar picture emerges when looking at the rates of other STDs in the U.S. Table 8.9 includes the CDC's data for Chlamydia, Gonorrhea, and Syphilis for 2018.³⁷⁷ Here again, infection rates are expressed per 100,000.

Table 8.9. Rates of Reported STD Cases, 2018

Race	Chlamydia	Gonorrhea	Syphilis
American Indian/Alaska Native	784.8	329.5	15.5
Asian	132.1	35.1	4.6

Black	1,192.5	548.9	28.1
Native Hawaiian & Pacific Islander	700.8	181.4	16.3
White	212.1	71.1	6.0
Hispanic	392.6	115.9	13.0
Multirace	184.9	94.4	9.4

African-American rates of each STD are many multiples of those of Whites: 5.6 times higher for Chlamydia, 7.7 times higher for Gonorrhea, and 4.6 for Syphilis.

While STDs act as a proxy for promiscuity, data also exists on self-reported age of first intercourse. Unfortunately, I have been unable to find a measure of this which is precisely the same for each race. However, the data we do have is certainly illustrative of significant race differences in this area.

Rushton notes that age at first intercourse is lowest among Blacks, highest among East Asians, and intermediate among Whites, as we would expect. Many meta-analyses substantiate this view. Summarizing the available data, Marc Bornstein and colleagues observe that age at first intercourse in the U.S. is 15 among Blacks, 16.5 among Whites and Hispanics, and 18 among “Asians.”³⁷⁸ According to data from 1993, although a specific average age is not given, it appears that age at first intercourse among Greenlandic women is much lower than among Danish women. Based on a sample of 129 Greenlandic and 126 Danish women aged 20-39, it was found that 14 percent of Greenlandic women had lost their virginity before the age of 14, compared to 2.4 percent of Danish women. In addition, 61.2 percent of Greenlandic women had had over 20 sexual partners, while this was 3.2 percent of Danish women.³⁷⁹

Data from the UK reflects a significantly higher age of first intercourse among South Asians compared to Whites (N. 12,110). In the period 1999 to 2000 among 16-44 year-olds, the median age was 20 for Pakistani and Indian-origin men compared to 17 for English men and women. For Pakistani-origin women, it was 22 while it was 21 for Indian-origin women. This reflected the very high rate of pre-marital abstinence among South Asians, which we saw reflected in marriage patterns above; 30.6 percent of Pakistani and 28.2 percent of Indian men were virgins when they married. 74.8 percent of Pakistani women and 45.8

percent of Indian women were, likewise, virgins at this point. Among English people, 1.4 percent reported being virgins when they married in these years.³⁸⁰ Fenton and his team find that South Asian women reported to have had an average of one sexual partner compared to three for Black African women, four for Caribbean Black women, and five for White women. However, the researchers also observed that women tended to downplay their number of sexual partners, while men exaggerated them—not a particularly surprising source of error. Interestingly, in this respect, although Black women reported fewer sexual partners than White women, they reported significantly higher numbers of sexually transmitted diseases: 22.7 percent of Caribbean women had suffered from at least one STD, compared to 12.7 percent of White women.³⁸¹ As such, they may have been less honest, something which would be predicted by higher levels of psychopathic personality amongst Sub-Saharan Africans than among Europeans.

According to the Indian Adolescent Health Survey of 1987 (N. 13000), the average age of first intercourse for Native Americans was 14.2 for girls and 13.6 for boys.³⁸² A survey of 710 Native Americans (age range not stated) in 1990 found that 30 percent had had two or more sexual partners in the last year.³⁸³ The mean of two surveys cited by Lynn from the U.S. with similar parameters with reference to White Americans aged 15-44 was 16 percent having had two or more sexual partners in the last year. In Manitoba, a survey of 320 “street youth” aged 14 to 24 found that “First Nations” youth reported an average of 4.67 sexual partners while for “non-Aboriginals” it was 2.90.³⁸⁴ I have been unable to find studies indicating average age of first intercourse or average number of sexual partners among Arabs in Western countries. However, a Dutch survey of 12-25-year-olds in 2005 found that Moroccan and Turkish youth were less likely than Dutch youth to have dated anybody or to have experienced falling in love.³⁸⁵ As with South Asian Muslims in the UK, it is extremely likely that cultural conservatism and Islam would mean that Arabs in Western countries would have fewer sexual partners and a later age of first intercourse than Europeans.

Although they do not give an exact age, Melissa Kang and her colleagues found, based on a representative sample of 856 Australians aged between 15 and 25, that Aboriginals were more likely to have lost their virginity before the age of 16 than were White Australians.³⁸⁶ In addition, according to 2009 data, 62 percent of Aboriginal 15-year-olds had already had sex. 34 percent of Aboriginal

males and 7 percent of females had had sex under the age of 14.³⁸⁷ Among White Australians, in 2008, only 25 percent had already had sex at age 15.³⁸⁸ I have been unable to uncover reliable data on the average number of sexual partners Aboriginals have when compared to White Australians. That said, ethnographic data implies that it would be higher. In a study of the Walbiri, a tribe in Australia's Northern Territory, Australian anthropologist Mervyn Meggitt (1924-2004) found that though their divorce rate is relatively low, from his observations and interviews, "most of them probably commit adultery several times during their early married life."³⁸⁹ However, it should be emphasized that this is only based on Meggitt's subjective observation.

With regard to Pacific Islanders, research from New Zealand by Stephen Lungley and colleagues found, among pupils aged 12-17, 24 percent of Whites were sexually active whereas this was true of 28 percent of Pacific Islanders and 48 percent of Maori.³⁹⁰ Another survey, among 15-16 year-olds in New Zealand, found that 51 percent of Maori were sexually active before the age of 14.³⁹¹ Although I can find no study specifically looking at the average number of sexual partners among Maori or Pacific Islanders, studies from New Zealand have found a positive association between age of first intercourse and number of sexual partners among Maori women.³⁹² I have been unable to unearth studies on these variables on the Southeast Asians in Western countries. However, it is clear that average age of first intercourse in Southeast Asian countries is higher than in the West. For example, the average age of first intercourse was 19 in Vietnam in 1996, with only 2.6 percent of women and 17 percent of men having experienced premarital sex.³⁹³ Accordingly, the numbers of lifetime sexual partners are likely to be relatively low. Another study found that age of first intercourse for lower-class Cambodian women was 19.8, and 94.8 percent reported having only one sexual partner.³⁹⁴

A related matter is intercourse frequency. Put simply, we would predict that the more *K* strategy races would have less sex, as they would be investing more of their bioenergetic resources in nurturing. Rushton quotes a number of surveys of couples in their 20s with regard to how often they have sex. In particular, a 1951 survey found that for Native Americans and Pacific Islanders, it was one-to-four times per week, for Whites it was two-to-four times per week, and for Blacks it was three-to-ten times. Later surveys confirmed this, finding it was 2.5 times for Chinese and Japanese, four for American Whites, and five for

American Blacks, although the age group employed is unclear.³⁹⁵ Unfortunately, I have not been able to find studies which control for country of origin that allow us to extend this measure of *r-K* (and psychopathic personality) to the other races. In the absence of such studies, a useful data source—though it must be treated with some caution—is the 2005 *Durex Sexual Wellbeing Survey*. This finds that the number of acts of sexual intercourse per year ranges from 73 (Japan) to 96 (China) in Northeast Asian countries, 77 (Indonesia) to 97 (Thailand) in South East Asian countries, 75 in India, 111 in Turkey, 109 in South Africa, and a range of 92 (Sweden) to 138 (Greece) in Europe.³⁹⁶ To the extent that we can extrapolate anything from this, it is a reiteration of the relatively low levels of sexual intercourse among Northeast Asians. But, in addition, it also shows, as we would expect, that levels of intercourse are higher among Southeast than Northeast Asians.

Sex Differences in Personality

We have already observed that there exist race differences in the extent of sexual dimorphism, that is, the structural differences between the sexes. These, of course, also exist in relation to personality. Compared to males, females are, on average, greater *K*-strategists. This makes sense, because females can get pregnant and need to look after the resultant child. This elevates the importance of nurturing behavior and thus Agreeableness and Conscientiousness, both of which are required when looking after a child's welfare. Females are also higher in Neuroticism, due to the salience of social anxiety in successfully looking after a child, and in Extraversion, which makes them more warm-hearted, friendly, and inclined to talk to their child.³⁹⁷

The extent of these sex differences varies by race. In general, the slower the group's Life History speed, the more pronounced these sex differences tend to be, though in the modern age, the influence of feminism on Western countries might be expected to have ameliorated them, were a mainly environmental hypothesis correct. The proposed explanation for the greater dimorphism in more *K*-selected environments is that as an ecology becomes harsher and more stable, there is greater pressure to pursue ever more specific ecological niches. This results in an ever more specific division of labor, leading to a growing divergence in modal personality between males and females. In addition, in a less stable ecology, the male is more likely to abandon the female, requiring her to take on some "male" roles—such as defending her offspring—meaning she

will benefit from being more aggressive.³⁹⁸ This is paralleled by the magnitude of sex differences in intelligence. A small sex difference in average IQ—of around four points—appears to exist among adult samples in Western countries. Boys pull ahead of girls only by around the age of 18, due to the fact that they experience puberty—and thus rapid brain development—at a later stage. Males also have a wider IQ range than females: a higher percentage of extremely high and extremely low IQ outliers.³⁹⁹ These differences, however, appear to be absent, or much smaller, in studies on sex differences in IQ in developing countries.⁴⁰⁰

Accordingly, there is something of an irony that highly *K*-evolved societies created the Industrial Revolution, which indirectly led to the pronounced decline in traditional religiousness, the rise of feminism, and the assertion that males and females have no innate differences and that all such differences are due to social factors. This, in turn, led people to ask why females tend to be under-represented at high levels in science, industry, and politics. Success in these fields is associated with an optimum combination of very high IQ and moderately low Conscientiousness and Agreeableness, allowing geniuses simply not to care if their bold ideas offend, or providing politicians with a magnetic self-confidence and charisma.⁴⁰¹ Leading politicians and businessmen, in particular, tend to combine very high IQ with moderate but optimum levels of psychopathic personality.⁴⁰² Accordingly, it makes sense the females will be under-represented at these levels and, at the same time, over-represented at the middle level of caring professions, such as teaching and general practice, and in non-scientific subjects, such as the Humanities.⁴⁰³ This is because, in these subjects, linguistic IQ—which women are higher in than men—is more important, and Mathematical and Spatial IQ and *g*, which they are lower in, are less important.⁴⁰⁴ Thus, it is the very societies in which the innate sex differences in personality and intelligence are the largest that develop an ideology that demands equality between the sexes and assumes that cognitive differences are environmental. The proponents of this ideology are continuously mystified when fail to create sexual socioeconomic equality, at least with regard to very high levels of achievement. In the conclusion of this book, we will return to the issue of how the scientific study of race is suppressed and deformed by our age's dominant ideologies. But before that, we tackle two more highly combustible topics: nationalism and religion.

Us And Them

Ethnicity and Ethnocentrism

This book was first drafted in the aftermath of two great shocks across the Western world: “Brexit” and “Trump.” In June 2016, Britons voted in a referendum on exiting the European Union. The British political class had generally considered an exit from the EU unthinkable; indeed, the referendum was put forward as a way of ending the issue permanently. As it turned out, Brexit narrowly passed, outperforming the opinion polls and even the expectations of its supporters. Then came Donald Trump’s victory that November. Trump had no political experience and was known mostly as a television personality. As a candidate, he was involved in one outrageous and embarrassing scandal after another. But Trump pulled off an unlikely victory, largely by mobilizing voters who had previously been apathetic or aligned with the Left. To a certain extent, the Brexit campaign had done the same.

Both Brexit and Trump occurred before the backdrop of the “Refugee Crisis” that began in 2015 as a result of the Syrian Civil War. Some 5-6 million Syrians became refugees and many others from the region joined them in entering Europe, seeking humanitarian assistance and, in many cases, citizenship. The crisis intensified popular anxiety across Europe and many called for strict border enforcement and expulsion. In the minds of many, this raised the specter of *xenophobia*.

It’s not my intention to condemn or endorse Brexit or Trump. They are complicated phenomena, and partisan politics is beyond the scope of this book. But both of these events express the enduring power of *nationalism*. Trump was unusual in that he openly called himself a “nationalist,” but nationalism is something that all parts of the political spectrum call upon in some fashion: French President Emmanuel Macron stands for the glory and history of France . . . the left-wing of most countries advocate for protecting national manufacturing from globalization . . . one of the staunchest opponents of Brexit, the Scottish National Party, sought its own national liberation from the United Kingdom . . . Examples abound.

For our purposes, both nationalism and xenophobia can be understood as an expression of *ethnocentrism*, the cohesive bond within a racial or ethnic group—in other words, “Us and Them.” Ethnocentrism can be divided into two components to reflect its internal and external characters:

- **positive ethnocentrism:** valuing and being prepared to make sacrifices for your own national body;
- **negative ethnocentrism:** disliking, desiring separation from, and being prepared to inflict suffering upon other nations.

Again, ethnocentrism calls up strong emotions, both for and against, but it is a reality of social life, and has all the markings of an evolved phenomenon. And as we will see later in this chapter, as ethnicities evolve, so will expressions of nationalism and xenophobia.

Race Differences in Ethnocentrism

There is evidence of race differences in the average level of ethnocentrism. This is extremely important because, as we discussed in Chapter 2, all else being equal, the more ethnocentric groups will tend to triumph in the battle for group selection. Ethnocentrism can be measured, however imperfectly, through self-reported answers to existential questions—such as whether you would object to having a foreigner as a neighbor or whether you would be prepared to lay down your life for your country.⁴⁰⁵

When comparing Sub-Saharan Africans, Europeans, South Asians (including Arabs and North Africans), and Northeast Asians, it has been found that Arabs are the highest in positive ethnocentrism, closely followed by Northeast Asians. Far behind them are Europeans and Africans. The same ordering has been found with regard to negative ethnocentrism.

A number of factors predict national differences in ethnocentrism. First, positive ethnocentrism is negatively associated with atheism. In other words, countries that don't believe in God are less likely to be positively ethnocentric. It may be that lower ethnocentrism is a component of atheism. It seems more likely, however, that belief in God—and often the accordant belief that your people are blessed by God—elevates positive ethnocentrism, along with other genetically adaptive inclinations, such as high fertility.⁴⁰⁶ We will explore this further in the next chapter.

Low national IQ also predicts high levels of positive ethnocentrism. On the one hand, it may be argued that low IQ renders us more instinctive (less able to think rationally and so ignore our cognitive biases), and we are likely to have a group-selected instinct towards positive ethnocentrism. Israeli-American psychologist Daniel Kahneman, for example, has argued that logical thinking is a form of effortful control, which allows us to see the world objectively and

move beyond our instincts.⁴⁰⁷ On the other hand, higher positive ethnocentrism may be a result of the fact that low-IQ societies are stressful to live in, as they tend to be poor, unstable and corrupt.⁴⁰⁸ Periods of intense stress tend to elevate religiousness, as the certainty it provides helps people survive and remain positive.⁴⁰⁹ Within nations, poverty is significantly positively associated with positive ethnocentrism. This is clear from data on GDP and per-capita income. So-called “mortality salience”—that is, awareness of death—also predicts positive ethnocentrism, as there is a significant relationship with infant-mortality rate.

Cousin marriage is also a factor. Consanguineous breeding between first and second cousins is itself an intense expression of ethnocentrism, as it builds up strong bonds on the level of the *tribe* or *clan* and implies distrust of outsiders. Today, it is mostly practiced in the Middle East, West Asia, and North Africa, where rates of cousin marriage are as high as 25 to 50 percent.⁴¹⁰ Cousin marriage, along with geography, informs the political structures of these regions in ways that are overlooked by most mainstream commentators. As nations are tribally divided, they lack the broader social trust needed to develop modern governments.

Cousin marriage can be understood as the product of a relatively fast Life History. Those who adopt an extremely fast LHS will tend to “hedge their bets” by selecting for fit individuals who are highly genetically different from themselves, in the hope that these people carry some useful adaptation to their unstable ecology. Those who adopt a slow Life History Strategy will tend to select for those who are genetically similar, which maximizes the extent to which they pass on their genes, and which also means that they will strongly bond with both partner and offspring, elevating the capacity to nurture. This genetic similarity will also mean that the family will be adapted to the harsh and predictable ecology. Cousin marriage—despite involving a greater degree of selection for genetic similarity—sits between these two extremes. It implies a society that is sufficiently developed that people are aware of relatively distant levels of kinship but sufficiently low in trust (implying an unstable ecology) that something needs to be done to persuade males to cooperate with each other, and so foster an ethnocentric society that can successfully battle others. The solution is cousin marriage. Trust is so low in these societies that people can only be induced to cooperate with others if so-doing very strongly promotes their genetic interests. Males can only be induced to invest in their off-spring if they marry

kin; this offers them the assurance that, even if they had been cuckolded, their offspring would still be closely related to them. Such a system partly overcomes the problem of low trust, as it helps to reduce the gene pool into distinct tribes of closely knit people. Accordingly, it would elevate negative ethnocentrism by artificially creating greater genetic distance between one's tribe and other tribes, and it would artificially elevate positive ethnocentrism by providing people with a strong incentive to cooperate. The downside of cousin marriage, and the attitudes underpinning it, is that it would be difficult to develop larger and more complex polities which could themselves become highly developed and triumph over competing groups accordingly. America's recent invasion of Iraq and attempt to install a democratic republic, which caused tremendous suffering and waste, is one example among many of Westerners's dangerously mistaken and naïve perceptions of the Middle East, which derive, in large, part from mistaken and naïve perceptions about the importance of ethnocentrism.

In research on the national-level correlates of ethnocentrism, cousin marriage was close to reaching significance as being positively associated with negative ethnocentrism and was significant in terms of a desire to fight for the country. Nations that practice cousin marriage are fragmented, but citizens are still willing to defend themselves against outsiders, who are likely genetically distant. This fact also implies that a smaller gene pool would predict positive ethnocentrism.

In terms of negative ethnocentrism, the study found a number of gene forms and highly genetic characteristics that we associate with a fast Life History Strategy. These, in turn, positively predicted high levels of negative ethnocentrism, demonstrating that group differences in ethnocentrism are partly genetic. More religious countries were more negatively ethnocentric. This is understandable in terms of the foreigner being perceived as "less godly." Factor analysis also revealed that cousin marriage had an important unique contribution to understanding national differences in negative ethnocentrism. Low intelligence seems to predict important aspects of negative ethnocentrism, as does stress.

The socioeconomic and cultural effect on ethnocentrism can be seen when we look at differences *within* races. Pew Research Center asked 56,000 Europeans whether they would be willing to accept a Muslim or a Jew as a member of their family (an obvious gauge of negative ethnocentrism).⁴¹¹ This topic reveals a clear fault between the "rich" and "liberal" West and "poor" and "post-

Communist” East, which remains decades after the Cold War. A divide between Mediterranean (particularly, Greece and Italy) and Western Europe also stands out, though those two might be largely a product economic and not just cultural forces.

Table 9.1: Percent Who Say they would be willing to accept ___ as a member of their family

	Muslims	Jews
Armenia	7%	28%
Czech Republic	12%	51%
Belarus	16%	41%
Lithuania	16%	41%
Georgia	17%	27%
Latvia	19%	53%
Hungary	21%	57%
Estonia	25%	61%
Ukraine	25%	43%
Romania	29%	39%
Moldova	30%	40%
Greece	31%	35%
Bulgaria	32%	55%
Poland	33%	57%
Russia	34%	40%
Bosnia	42%	37%
Italy	43%	57%
Serbia	43%	61%
Slovakia	47%	73%

UK	53%	69%
Austria	54%	65%
Germany	55%	69%
Croatia	57%	67%
Switzerland	57%	72%
Ireland	60%	70%
Finland	66%	82%
France	66%	76%
Portugal	70%	73%
Spain	74%	79%
Belgium	77%	89%
Sweden	80%	92%
Denmark	81%	92%
Norway	82%	95%
Netherlands	88%	96%
Central/Eastern Europe Average	28%	48%
Western Europe Average	67%	78%
Northern Average	77%	90%

In Western Europe, 67 and 78 percent of the population reported a willingness to accept a Jew or Muslim, respectively, as a member of their families. The Nordic countries polled were particularly tolerant, with averages of 77 and 90 percent on these questions. The Dutch can lay claim to being the most tolerant of all. Central and Eastern Europe was starkly different, with only a quarter and a half of the population expressing willingness to accept Muslim and Jewish family members. These responses largely track with levels of religiosity, a topic we'll take up in the next chapter.

Genetic Similarity Theory

So how can race differences in ethnocentrism be broadly explained in terms of evolution? We could begin with the Northeast Asians. Japan, for example, is an extremely wealthy society and is no longer particularly religious. Nevertheless, it remains much more ethnocentric than most European nations. This is likely because the extreme harshness of its ecology very strongly selected for extraordinarily cooperative social groups that were prepared to act lethally against outsiders. In addition, ecological harshness ensured a small and distinct gene pool, rendering outsiders a particularly acute threat to the group's genetic interests and elevating the group's interest in violently repelling outsiders, if necessary through self-sacrificial behavior.

J. Philippe Rushton made sense of all this through what he called *Genetic Similarity Theory*.⁴¹² He demonstrated that we maximize our genetic fitness by investing more in people who are more genetically similar to us. "Birds of a feather flock together," as the saying goes, and most humans engage, however unconsciously, in what's known as "assortative mating." Married partners are genetically closer to each other than are two random co-ethnics in the same population, and couples tend to be the most similar on the most heritable features. People are sexually attracted to those who are relatively genetically similar; indeed, it has been found that we find photos of people of the opposite sex more attractive when our own faces are subtly morphed into the photographs.⁴¹³ This trend seems to hold even for friendships, which can also be understood as promoting your own genetic interests, though indirectly. Studies of animals in the same litter have shown that full siblings come to each other's aid more often than do half-siblings. Taking GST to an almost comical level, one study asked the question, "Do People Look Like Their Dogs?" In fact, the researchers found, "women with long hair tended to prefer the lop-eared dogs while women with the short hairstyles preferred the prick-eared dogs, consistent with the folk belief."⁴¹⁴

Anthropology has also confirmed Genetic Similarity Theory. Researchers examined street beggars in Moscow. Some were ethnic Russians, just like the vast majority of the pedestrians.⁴¹⁵ Others were dressed in the distinctive costume associated with Moldova, where people speak Romanian. Also, some beggars were dressed as dark-skinned Roma. The Russian pedestrians preferred to give money to their fellow Russians, then their fellow Eastern European

Moldovans, and finally to the Roma. This occurred despite the fact that the Roma went beyond mere begging to more persuasive tactics such as singing and dancing, importuning people, and sending out groups of children to beg.⁴¹⁶ Another group tested GST through a study of Inuit tribes in Northern Canada. It calculated coefficients of consanguinity within and between these various tribes. The group found that pro-social behavior, such as wife exchange, and anti-social behavior, such as the genocidal murder of women and children from another tribe during warfare, paralleled the degree of genetic distance in the expected direction.⁴¹⁷

As Frank Salter has shown, it is possible to calculate the amount of damage inflicted on a group's genetic interests based on how many outsiders are permitted to enter that group's territory and the level of genetic difference between the two groups. On average, random members of an ethnic group are related as first cousins in opposition to other populations. This encourages humans to be hostile to invading outsiders (xenophobia) and easily triggered to engage in self-sacrificial behavior in order to protect their ethnic group (nationalism). Salter calculates, for example, how many members of a different ethnicity must invade a group's territory for it to be the equivalent of each member losing a child; in other words, he computes "genetic interests." For instance, if 10,000 Danes migrated to England, this would amount to the English people losing 140 children, due to the extent to which the English and Danes would integrate and fewer English genes would be passed on. If this were 10,000 Bantus, however, who are far more genetically distant from the English than the Danes, then the English would lose the genetic equivalent of approximately 11,000 children.⁴¹⁸ With a small gene pool, it takes fewer foreign invaders to achieve significant loss of genetic interests, helping us better understand the natural impulse towards xenophobia.

Ethnic Differences in Personality

Ethnic stereotypes abound: the "hot-blooded Italian," "silent Finn," "uptight Englishman," and so on. Whenever we find stereotypes like this, which are long-standing and ubiquitous, we are likely looking at evolved behavior; and such maxims should not be dismissed as mere bigotry. Within Europe, empirical evidence of ethnic differences in personality is limited and indirect, but we can cautiously say that what your uncle told you about nationalities is probably true.

Extraversion is a good place to start. One method of assessing this is looking

at loquaciousness—how much people talk. A study observing mothers from Estonia, Sweden, and Finland confirmed the “Silent Finns” stereotype. Swedes talk to their babies the most, while Finns talk to their babies the least.⁴¹⁹ Being over-sexed or reserved is another classic. As already noted, data has been collected on national differences in the frequency of sexual intercourse and the prevalence of the long form of the AR CAG allele, both of which are markers of testosterone. Based on these data, Greeks appear to be a high testosterone—and thus temperamental—people by European standards, while Norwegians, Swedes and Germans are more reserved by comparison.⁴²⁰ This can be seen in Table 9.3, looking at sexual intercourse frequency.

Table 9.3: Durex 2005 Global Sex Survey:
Annual Intercourse Frequency (Abridged)

Country	Annual Intercourse Frequency
Greece	138
France	120
UK	118
Netherlands	115
Poland	115
US	113
Italy	106
Germany	104
Denmark/Norway	98
China	96
India	75
Japan	45

The prevalence of left-handedness also offers a surprisingly glimpse into national differences in personality and ethnocentrism. In Western countries, approximately 90 percent of people are right-handed; females are even more

likely to be right-handed than males.⁴²¹ Consistent with this, there is a body of evidence that left-handedness is associated with elevated levels of male hormones, such as testosterone.⁴²² Indeed, studies of tribal peoples have found that left-handedness is particularly high in extremely aggressive groups—the Yanomamö of Venezuela, for example, known as “the Fierce People,” are 22 percent left-handed.⁴²³ The norm is for humans to be right-handed. Left-handedness seems to arise due to “developmental instability,” which refers to the inability of an individual to produce a given phenotype under specific environmental conditions. If they are subject to such instability, however—premature birth, for example—they are more likely to be left-handed, partly because the brain has developed differently. Thus, it would make sense that left-handedness would correlate with traits that would help you survive in an unstable ecology, such as aggression, and would be higher in unstable ecologies.⁴²⁴ In that left-handedness is higher in males than females and is seemingly associated with markers of testosterone, national rates of left-handedness act as a useful proxy for personality.⁴²⁵ National differences in left-handedness can be seen in Table 9.4.

Table 9.4. National Differences in Left-Handedness

Nation	Percent Left-Handed
Netherlands	13.2
US	13.1
Belgium	13.1
Canada	12.8
UK	12.24
France	11.15
Denmark	11
Italy	10.5
Germany	9.8
Finland	9.1
Greece	8.7

Greece	0.4
India	5.2
Japan	4.7
China	3.5
Korea	2

There are also weak correlations between intelligence and personality, which is to be expected because, at the group-level, intelligence correlates with a *K*-strategy. This is not the case at the individual level, however, something known as “Rushton’s Paradox,” which we explored earlier. Michael Woodley of Menie’s *Cognitive Differentiation Integration Effort Hypothesis*, attempted to resolve this quandary. He puts forth that, at the individual level, people are adapted to different niches, and the more niche-adapted they are, the less strongly related are different components of *K*. Moreover, the more intelligent they are, the less strongly related are the different components of IQ. This leads to considerable diversity at the individual level and thus no overall relationship between *K* and IQ. Returning to our example from Chapter 6, we all know highly intelligent people who can hold forth on the poetry of Wordsworth, but who are disheveled in appearance and hopelessly disorganized. In other words, the man with his “head in the clouds,” who combines high IQ with traits we otherwise associate with low intelligence.

There are, however, weak relationships between personality traits and IQ at the group level. The more intelligent a group is then, on average, the higher will be its level of *K*. Accordingly, we can cautiously conjecture what an ethnic group’s modal personality will be like simply from its average IQ. More intelligent ethnic groups will be higher in Conscientiousness and Agreeableness, lower in Extraversion, and lower in Neuroticism in general, though probably higher in social anxiety. Indeed, a twin study has found weak correlations between IQ and the Big Five at the individual level. Significant positive phenotypic correlations with IQ were found for Agreeableness (0.21) and Openness (0.32). There was a negative correlation found for Neuroticism and IQ (-0.10). Genetic correlations were 0.3–0.4 between IQ and Agreeableness and Openness, and negative correlation between IQ and Neuroticism (-0.18).⁴²⁶ Accordingly, with considerable caution, it is possible to infer ethnic differences in personality simply from the ethnic group’s average IQ.

In the last chapter, we explored psychopathic personality, which can be measured in terms of criminality within a population among other measures. When examining personality differences between countries, crime becomes a questionable proxy due to variations in the nature of the criminal justice systems. Accordingly, more objective correlates of personality need to be employed in order to assess ethnic differences. One method to compare population differences in personality is to look at the population prevalence of gene forms—polymorphisms—which are associated with specific extremes of personality, something which has been explored by the Japanese economist Kenya Kura and his colleagues.⁴²⁷ They showed that, based on differences in the prevalence of these polymorphisms, Northeast Asians would be predicted to be more risk-averse and more conformist than Europeans.

Yet another method is to explore population averages in markers of testosterone. People who are high in testosterone tend to be aggressive, driven, uncooperative, and highly sexed (in other words, low in Agreeableness and Conscientiousness). There are many markers of testosterone for which national-level data is available, including left-handedness, hand shape (the so-called 2D:4D ratio, whereby a smaller distance between the longest finger and the shortest finger reflects higher testosterone), hairiness of fingers, prostate cancer prevalence, number of sexual partners, and frequency of sexual intercourse.⁴²⁸ Based on the Durex Survey 2005, there are clear variations in frequency of sexual intercourse and the number of sexual partners by country. Australians, New Zealanders and Icelanders reported 13 sexual partners, whereas residents of Hong Kong, China, Vietnam and India reported approximately 3. The world average for the countries surveyed, which did not include any African countries, was 9, with 9.8 being the number for the UK and 10.8 for the U.S. Average sex frequency was 103 times per year. As noted above, this ranged from 138 times in Greece down to 45 times in Japan, with Americans having sex 113 times a year. The different measures of androgens are all inter-related. Sex frequency and number of sexual partners correlate at 0.32, while sex frequency and hairiness of fingers correlate at 0.55. According to the available data, East Asians are lower in markers of testosterone than Europeans.⁴²⁹

The prevalence of autism and schizophrenia in a population offers a surprisingly useful measure of personality differences between groups. Autism is associated with markers of high testosterone, reflecting, as it does, a kind of “extreme male brain,” which is high in systematizing but low in empathy.⁴³⁰

Schizophrenia, in contrast, is associated with markers of low testosterone, and a brain that is low in systematizing power but very high in empathy.⁴³¹ Autistics struggle with “theory of mind,” that is, the ability to discern the emotions of others through, say, subtle changes in tone or non-verbal cues. Schizophrenics, by contrast, have an overdeveloped sensitivity to other people and the world around them, seeing meaning in everything; they are thus highly susceptible to paranoia, “conspiracy theories,” and religiosity. These two pathologies are understood to sit at either end of the schizotypy scale—with low empathy, high-testosterone autism at one end and high-empathy, low-testosterone at the other. Ascertaining the percentage of a population who suffer from a pathology allows us to compare populations on the basis average personality, because the pathology will tend to be an intense form of personality traits, reflecting the average on these traits across a population. One study has noted that schizophrenia and right-handedness appear to be higher in countries such as Finland and Japan, where people are typically regarded as cooperative and self-controlled, which would be consistent with left-handedness being a marker of testosterone.⁴³²

The Genius Personality

The modern age has been fascinated by the idea of the “genius”—the individual, who, against the odds and against established wisdom, generates fantastically original and ambitious ideas. This could be Newton or Napoleon, Picasso or Darwin. “Genius” is a tricky concept due to the highly social nature of human endeavor. Any creative project builds on the achievements of others; we develop earlier concepts, and we require the collaboration of colleagues or, in many cases, governmental or academic patronage. This reality often lures us into following paths already trodden and dissuades us from leaps into the unknown. The philosopher of science Thomas Kuhn famously posited that, over the long haul, science never progresses in a linear fashion, with a gradual accumulation of knowledge and understanding. Instead, science undergoes “revolutions” and fundamental “paradigm shifts.”⁴³³ Copernicus’s heliocentric view of the cosmos didn’t “build on” Ptolemy’s geocentric model; it overturned it; and the two are incommensurable. It takes a brave man—maybe an arrogant man, maybe one who’s “out of touch”—even to attempt a break with hegemony of this magnitude.

What kind of personality does a “genius” possess? Not likely a friendly or

easygoing one. The genius is obsessive and driven. In the sciences at least, his personality is characterized by outlier high IQ combined with low Agreeableness, low Conscientiousness, and low empathy.⁴³⁴ And these character traits—just as much as intelligence—are critical. As a person who “breaks the rules,” he will present ideas that are almost invariably met with hostility, because they offend vested interests. But the genius simply doesn’t care—and he might not even anticipate offending people if he did. One could also say that a genius is a manifestation of outlier high IQ plus high testosterone. Consistent with this, Dimitri van der Linden and colleagues found that when you look at countries with an IQ of at least 90—which takes in 98 percent of countries that have ever won science Nobel prizes—then national testosterone level (based on a range of testosterone proxies such as average number of sex partners, average sexual intercourse frequency, hairiness of fingers, and prostate cancer prevalence) predicts a nation’s per-capita number of science Nobel Prizes and even citations in important scientific journals.⁴³⁵

Table 9.5: Top 15 Countries in Per-Capita Nobel Prizes in Science per 10 million⁴³⁶

Country	# of Nobel Prizes	Per-Capita Nobel Prizes
Luxembourg	2	33.9
Switzerland	25	29.3
Austria	18	20.6
Denmark	10	17.4
Sweden	17	17.0
UK	109	16.4
Norway	8	14.9
Germany	92	11.2
Netherlands	19	11.1
USA	350	10.7
Cyprus	1	8.4

Hungary	11	8.2
New Zealand	3	6.3
France	39	6.0
Finland	3	5.4

There is a body of research indicating that eminent scientists are also high in autism traits or, at least, in the weaker form of autism known as Asperger's.⁴³⁷ This fits with our understanding of autism as correlated with high testosterone and being, in effect, an expression of an extreme male brain. Per-capita genius thus offers an important insight into a nation's prevalence of autism, as well as its collective personality. Geniuses are generally born to parents who are highly intelligent but within the "normal" range. They are products of unlikely but possible genetic combinations, meaning that when they have children of their own, they do not tend to be anywhere near as eminent as their mothers or fathers.⁴³⁸

As we have discussed, in certain core ways, schizophrenia can be regarded as the opposite of autism on a spectrum, with "normal" in the middle. Consistent with this, it has been found that in nations with an average IQ of at least 90, there is a strong negative correlation between per-capita schizophrenia prevalence and per-capita science Nobel Prizes. Finland is a clear example of a country with a high IQ but which has produced relatively few science Nobel laureates in the sciences; Japan is another. Both have far higher rates of schizophrenia than the countries (mostly in Northwestern Europe) that boast high per-capita Nobel Prizes. These countries—though there are outliers—combine an IQ of at least 90 with very low rates of schizophrenia. Such findings have been replicated using highly cited scientific publications as proxies, in lieu of Nobel Prizes.⁴³⁹

Studies like these allow us to assert, with a fair degree of certainty, that we would expect Finnish people to be, in comparison to other Europeans, high in Agreeableness, high in Conscientiousness, and low in Extraversion. This can be inferred from their high levels of per-capita schizophrenia, their low levels of left-handedness, and the high prevalence of alleles associated with *K* personality traits, on which they are an outlier in European terms, and closer to Northeast Asians. These inferences, moreover, are consistent with stereotypes that Finns

are cooperative, low in self-esteem (a marker of high Agreeableness),⁴⁴⁰ rule-following, and introverted.⁴⁴¹ Based on the schizophrenia marker alone, we would predict that people of Northeastern and Nordic European countries would be more reserved, more rule-following, and more cooperative than neighbors in either Southern or Northwestern Europe, which, stereotypically, tends to be the case. Based on left-handedness, we would predict that the Finns—who have low rates of left handedness by European standards—would be more Agreeable, Conscientious, and Introverted than the Italians, something which is substantiated by everyday observation. This comparison is germane because these two countries are on the line of best fit when exploring the relationship between left-handedness and per-capita science Nobel Prizes.

Mixed-Race People, Clines, and Personality

We noted in our exploration of intelligence that a number of clines—such as Hispanics—tend to be equidistant between the two parent races with regard to their average intelligence. This is, however, not necessarily the case, with intelligence or personality. When two strains are mixed, there are a number of possible results. The most well-known is *outbreeding vigor*, or *hybrid vigor*, which is more commonly used. This is a phenomenon whereby if two strains of an organism interbreed, then the result will be physically stronger than either of its genetically dissimilar parents by virtue of it having inherited relatively few double doses of harmful mutant genes. Accordingly, the hybrid will have a low mutational load, meaning that it will be genetically healthy. Consistent with this, mixed-race children appear to be taller and more intelligent than either of their parents. This would imply that an absence of double doses of harmful mutations has meant that they have better immune systems than mono-racials, allowing them to reach their phenotypic maximum height, develop better functioning nervous systems, and attain their phenotypic maximum IQ.⁴⁴² Some studies indicate that they are also perceived as more attractive, which might also be due to a relatively low mutational load.⁴⁴³

A less well-known phenomenon, however, is *outbreeding depression*—when the interbreeding of two genetically different strains causes the offspring to be less healthy than either of its parents. This can occur for two reasons. Firstly, there is a phenomenon known as *inbreeding vigor*, whereby if people who are genetically similar interbreed, then it will elevate the probability that their offspring will inherit a particularly useful adaptation in that ecology, immunity

to malaria being a common example. It is possible that inbreeding vigor is one of the reasons why people tend, on average, to be attracted to potential sexual partners who are relatively genetically similar to themselves, as we have discussed.

The second mechanism behind outbreeding depression is the way in which genes operate. As we have seen, for many traits, numerous different genes work together—in gene-gene interaction—in order to produce this characteristic. Over very long periods of time, therefore, different alleles are evolved to work together with other specific alleles. The shorter the period of time the two alleles have worked together, the less adapted they will be to collaborating successfully. And the less adapted they are to working together, the more unpredictable will be the results of their so-doing. In that humans have been, until relatively recently, very strongly adapted to their ecologies, anything unpredictable will, rather like mutations, likely have negative consequences for physical and mental health. So, on this basis, we might expect evidence of outbreeding depression among recent clines, as well as among mixed- race individuals.

In terms of individuals, a number of studies have shown that people who are mixed race are at greater risk of suffering from mental illness, especially from depression, a condition that has been found to be roughly 0.5 heritable and thus significantly genetic in origin.⁴⁴⁴ It should be cautioned, however, that these studies involve small differences and small samples; as such, we should await better research on this issue. That said, a study from Alaska found that mixed-race high-school students are more likely to suffer from mental illness, specifically extreme sadness, intense feelings of loneliness, and suicidal ideation. This was the case even when environmental factors that tend to protect against mental illness were controlled for. That said, among the mixed-race samples, these protective factors—such as access to trusted adults, extra-curricular activities, and involvement in a religious community—were more likely to be absent, heightening the depression of mixed-race students even further.⁴⁴⁵ Many other studies have similarly found elevated mental instability among mixed-race people. One from Canada on Black, White, and mixed Black-White people found that the mixed-race sample was intermediate between Whites and Blacks with regard to physical health, something partly attributable to socioeconomic status. However, the mixed group reported far worse mental health than either Blacks or Whites.⁴⁴⁶ This is not simply a Black-White or Native American-White matter, either. Another study, drawing upon America's 2002-2003

National Latino and Asian American Study, reported that, controlling for age and other important variables, 17 percent of mono-racial people in the sample had suffered from mental illness, compared to 34 percent of biracial people.⁴⁴⁷ An analysis of the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent health reached a similar conclusion.⁴⁴⁸

One possible explanation for these findings is that we would possibly expect those who contracted mixed-race relationships to be relative r-strategists, even by the average standards of their races. In a highly unstable ecology, there would be a benefit to extreme outbreeding, as someone strongly genetically different might carry some useful adaptive gene form. In addition, it could be argued that there would be a strong benefit to taking risks, and contracting a relationship with someone very different from you could certainly involve numerous risks—and, potentially, a genetic pay off. This being so, those who contracted such relationships would themselves be fast Life History Strategists, and they would genetically transmit such a strategy to their offspring, partly in the form of highly heritable mental instability. The problem with this argument is that, in both the U.S. and the UK, mixed-race children are, on average, from higher socioeconomic-status backgrounds than are mono-racial children,⁴⁴⁹ which would imply that their parents are *slow* Life History Strategists, though perhaps endowed with the trait of Openness, this being associated with intelligence. There is also evidence, from Hawaii, that mixed-race couples tend to compensate for their physical dissimilarity by being very strongly similar on highly heritable psychological traits, such as intelligence.⁴⁵⁰

That said, there may also be an environmental factor to elevated depression among those who are mixed race. Genetic Similarity Theory is based on the idea that how genetically similar you are to another person predicts how much energy you will invest in them. This holds even within families: people are closer to siblings who are more genetically similar to themselves.⁴⁵¹ If you contract a mixed-race relationship, your offspring will be relatively genetically dissimilar from you. This would predict investing less energy in them, and bonding with them less strongly, than you would otherwise with a child of your own race. This would set your children up to follow a relatively fast Life History Strategy, a component of which is elevated levels of mental illness.

Another possibility is that the mental stability or otherwise of mixed-race children depends on which races are mixing and which sexes come from which race. According to the U.S. 2002 National Survey of Family Growth, interracial

marriages, overall, have a higher divorce rate, which would be consistent with the argument that elevated mental illness in their offspring is simply a reflection of fast Life History strategists being more likely to contract mixed-race unions. However, compared to White-White couples, the probability of divorce was higher in White female/Black male couples and White female/Asian male couples. Couples where there was a non-White female and a White male were, in fact, less likely to divorce than were White-White couples. A White Husband-Black Wife marriage was the least likely to have ended in divorce by the 10th year of marriage. A Black Husband/White wife marriage was the most likely to have ended in divorce. White Husband/Asian Wife marriages ended in divorce as often as White-White marriages but far less often than Asian-Asian marriages, these being the least likely to end in divorce.⁴⁵² More research needs to be conducted into this area to see if the children of a White father and a Black mother are less likely to suffer from depression than are the children of a Black father and a White mother. If there is little difference, then this would potentially be evidence of outbreeding depression.

It is unclear why the interracial marriage divorce pattern operates in this way, but three studies—brought together—may be highly relevant. Firstly, a large scale survey in the U.S., conducted in 2015 by the American Sociological Association, found that females initiate 70 percent of divorces.⁴⁵³ Secondly, females are prone to marry hypergamously—they seek to “marry up” in social class—and they even follow this path in terms of race and nationality. All multicultural marriages in Finland in 2013 were examined in terms of the nationality of both partners and the average income in each nation. Consistent with female sexual selection patterns, Finnish women tended to marry foreign men from countries that were wealthier than Finland. Finnish men married foreign women from countries that were poorer than Finland. The socioeconomic status of the female was relevant inasmuch as less educated Finnish women showed a greater tendency to marry males from poorer nations, perhaps because they were selecting for physical attributes in what was, for them, a relatively unstable ecology.⁴⁵⁴ Thirdly, according to a large dataset mined from “OkCupid,” a popular dating website, all races appear to find White people attractive, presumably, in part, because there is greater status to being White.⁴⁵⁵ Taken together, we would expect a Black woman with a White husband to be very satisfied, meaning she would not initiate divorce. A White woman with a Black husband may well not be satisfied and may well have

married such a man due to a fast LH attraction to physical toughness. Such a strategy is also associated with creating weak social bonds and thus with relationship breakdown.

One possible example of outbreeding depression in terms of clines is the Colored population of South Africa. As already discussed, the Cape Coloreds are a mixture of Afrikaners Khoi, Blacks, Indians, and Southeast Asians. Interestingly, 75 percent of Colored babies have been found to have the Mongolian spots that is present among Bushmen.⁴⁵⁶ Coloreds have an average IQ of 85, higher than might be expected considering their significant Bushman ancestry. The conviction rate for “serious crimes” among the Colored population has long been more than double that of the Blacks, despite the Coloreds having higher living standards and far higher average IQ.⁴⁵⁷ This could imply elevated psychopathic personality among the Colored population. Of all South Africa’s races, the Coloreds are the most likely to drink very heavily and engage in behaviors associated with alcoholism.⁴⁵⁸ It might be argued that this is partly a reflection of their Khoi ancestry, meaning they have inherited a lack of adaptation to alcohol. Some “Black” ethnicities in South Africa, such as the Xhosa,⁴⁵⁹ also have considerable Bushman admixture but Coloreds are a mixture of Whites, Blacks (especially those with Bushman admixture), and Khoi, meaning that Bushmen or Bushman-like admixture is likely higher among Coloreds than it is among South African Blacks overall. Indeed, the Rehobath Baster, the Khoi-Boer cline whom we met earlier, have long been understood to have very serious alcohol problems.⁴⁶⁰

Ethnogenesis in America

When we hear the word “ethnicity,” we tend to think of peoples, like the Irish or Han Chinese, that trace their ancestry and history back millennia. But, of course, race and ethnicity are dynamic and evolving. Ethnic groups that have a “timeless” conception of themselves have, in fact, experienced more genetic change and engaged in more interbreeding than they might want to admit. Furthermore, there is no reason why we wouldn’t expect new and different ethnicities to emerge in the future.

As we discussed in Chapter 3, “race” is best understood as a subspecies of mankind; and ethnicity, a kind of “sub-sub-species” or hybrid cline. In other words, sometimes an ethnicity is a subgroup of a race, which has been relatively isolated for some reason or another; other times, ethnicities emerge through the

combination of two or more races. Over the past 50 years, the world, and particularly the Western world, has become increasingly multicultural and multiracial, due to immigration and the tremendous advancements in transportation and communication. This has led, unsurprisingly, to increased interbreeding between races and ethnicities—and interbreeding between groups that, before the age of globalization, would have scarce contact with one another. There comes a point at which a hybrid between two groups merits being understood as an ethnicity all of its own. This process of *ethnogenesis*—literally, the generation of a new ethnicity—takes centuries, but we can look at current trends in marriage and dating and at least speculate about the ethnicities of the future.

The United States has emerged as a kind of laboratory in this regard. As of this writing, (non-Hispanic) Whites compose roughly 60 percent of a population of 330 million; African-Americans, 13 percent; Hispanics, 20; Asians 6; and American Indians, just over 1. According to current projections, America will become a “majority-minority” nation in the next 25 years; that is, no one race will hold sway demographically. Even in such an environment, marriages are still overwhelmingly intra-racial.⁴⁶¹ If love were truly blind, that would not be the case. At the turn of the century, Americans were 75 percent less likely to know a person of another race “with whom they discuss important matters” than would be the case by chance.⁴⁶² It is important to point out, however, that the number of mixed-marriages has more than tripled since the overturning of anti-miscegenation laws in 1967. The Pew Research Center reports that, as of 2015, “intermarriage” occurred among around 17 percent of newlyweds (people married in the past year). The intermarriage rate is slightly higher in metropolitan areas, where Americans are more likely to encounter people of other races.⁴⁶³

Among 2015 newlyweds, White people chose a spouse of another race just over 10 percent of the time. Rates of intermarriage are significantly higher among other races: African-Americans, 18 percent; Hispanics, 27 percent; and Asians, 29 percent.⁴⁶⁴ While Asians are intermarrying slightly less often than 40 years ago (from 33 to 29 percent), the rate at which Blacks intermarry has tripled in the same period of time (from 5 to 18 percent).

Table 9.6. Percentage of U.S. Newlyweds who are Intermarried

Asians	33	29
Blacks	5	18
Hispanics	26	27
Whites	4	11
Total	7	17

There are significant racial and sexual differences in intermarriage. While White and Hispanic men and women intermarry at largely the same rate, Blacks and Asians do not. Twice as many Black men (24 percent) intermarry as Black women (12 percent). With Asians, something like the reverse is true: more than a third of Asian women intermarry, while 21 percent of Asian men do.

Table 9.7. Percentage of 2014-15 U.S. Newlyweds Who Are Intermarried

	Men	Women
Whites	12	10
Hispanics	26	28
Blacks	24	12
Asians	21	36

The most common form of intermarriage by far is between Whites and Hispanics, which makes up 42 percent of the total, followed by White and Asian partnering (15 percent) and White and Black marriages (11 percent).

Table 9.8. Percentage of 2014-15 Opposite-Sex Newlywed Couples

Coupling	% all intermarried couples
White/Hispanic	42
White/Asian	15
White/Multiracial	12

White/Black	11
Hispanic/Black	5
White/American Indian	3
Hispanic/Asian	3
Hispanic/Multiracial	3

Male and female Whites and Hispanics marry each other, more or less, at the same frequency. But from there, significant disparities emerge. As mentioned, Asians are the most likely race to “marry out,” and when they do, 75 percent of them marry Whites. The number of couples with a White husband and Asian wife is almost three times the size of a pairing of an Asian husband and White wife. Similarly, couples with a Black husband and White wife are more than twice as common as ones with a White husband and Black wife.

Table 9.9. Percentage of Opposite-Sex Newlywed Couples, Broken Down By Husband and Wife Pairing

Coupling	Share of intermarried couples
White Husband/Hispanic Wife	22
Hispanic Husband/White Wife	20
White Husband/Asian Wife	11
Asian Husband/White Wife	4
White Husband/Black Wife	3
Black Husband/White Wife	7
Hispanic Husband/Black Wife	1
Black Husband/Hispanic Wife	4

In many ways, the Pew Research Center’s Report from a half-decade earlier provides more detail than the one which employs data from 2015.⁴⁶⁵ According to this data, in 2008, when Whites males who had married someone of a different ethnicity in the last 12 months were asked what ethnicity it was, 46.1

percent said “Hispanic” and 26.9 percent said “Asian,” the second highest category. Only 6.9 percent said “Black.” For White women, only 9.4 percent said “Asian” while 51.4 percent said “Hispanic” and 20.1 percent said “Black.”

A White-Hispanic partnering, the most common intermarriage in America, does not foretell ethnogenesis. The term “Hispanic” has always been ambiguous, because it is a linguistic, not an ethnic, category. Genetically speaking, “Hispanic” connotes people of mixed European and Amerindian backgrounds—which is not being fundamentally affected through these intermarriages. Their offspring will simply be regarded as Hispanic or White, depending on the case. It’s worth pointing out, however, that this identity choice will have a small, though significant, effect on overall demographics as it is calculated by the U.S. Census.

More noteworthy is the next most common interracial pairing: Whites and Asians (again, usually East Asians), which accounts for 15 percent of the total. This is a new cline. Just as breeding between White males and Amerindian females produced Hispanics—who then went on to intermarry—there is an on-going process whereby White American males forming unions with East Asian American females might become an example of ethnogenesis.

This high rate of out-marriage among Asians likely reflects the relatively low number of Asians in the U.S.; indeed, as their population has grown, Asian “marrying out” has become slightly less common, falling by some 12 percent between 1980 and 2015. It may also reflect the way that females in particular would be predicted to wish to marry hypergamously and thus, potentially, to someone of another race, and especially to a White man, if being White is associated with status.

Consistent with this, according to 2008 data, 39.5 percent of Asian American women marry people of a different race—76 percent of these to Whites—compared to 19.5 percent of Asian American males who do so. Among African-Americans, this relationship is reversed: 22 percent of Black males marry someone of a different race (in 57 percent of cases to White women), compared to 8.9 percent of African-American women (58 percent of these cases to White men).

We see this “inequality of attraction” in dating as well. In 2009 and 2014, the popular dating site OkCupid released meta-data on race and gender generated by its tens of millions of users. It was analyzed by the site’s co-founder Christian Rudder—who subsequently deleted his post. As *New York* magazine lamented,

“the results did not quite suggest a colorblind utopia of post-racial love.

Most races preferred to date within their own race. Asian men and black men received fewer messages than white men, while black women received the fewest messages of all users.⁴⁶⁶

One of the most salient analyses was based on “QuickMatch” scores, in which the user is asked to rate a photo of a potential date between 1 and 5. The scores below are separated out by race and sex and show the percentage compared to the average; for example, Asian men rate Asian women 15 percent above the average woman, but rate Black women 20 percent below the average. We find that women strongly prefer men of the same race, somewhere between 18 to 24 percent above the average. The same, however, is not true for men. Both Black and White men seem to prefer Asian women slightly more than women of their own races. Black men are the least picky in terms of the race of the women they seek to date, as revealed by the small range of their responses. And overall, Black women and Asian men receive the lowest scores from other races.

9.10. 2014 OkCupid QuickMatch Scores

	Asian women	Black women	Latina women	White women
Asian men rating...	15%	-20%	2%	3%
Black men rating...	2%	1%	2%	-6%
Latino men rating...	4%	-18%	10%	4%
White men rating...	9%	-17%	3%	6%

	Asian men	Black men	Latino men	White men
Asian women rating...	24%	-27%	-15%	18%
Black women rating...	-13%	23%	-3%	-6%
Latina women rating...	-14%	-16%	18%	12%
White women rating...	-12%	-8%	1%	19%

These differences would be explicable in terms of three strands of research. On the one hand, when White women are shown photos of male Black, White, and East Asian people, they tend to regard Blacks as the most attractive, probably because they are the most masculinized, and East Asian males as the

least. This is reversed in White males, because East Asian females have typically ultra-feminine and neotenous features (rendering them “cute”), whereas Black females typically have the least feminine features, as researchers on race and attractiveness have pointed out.⁴⁶⁷ This would also help to explain why Black women are particularly unlikely to “marry out.” Males, as we have discussed, mainly select for youth and beauty and are less interested in status. Traditionally, being Black is regarded as low status; and, more importantly, Black females are low in neoteny. In addition, with regard to the racial marriage patterns noted, Genetic Similarity Theory would predict that Whites and Hispanics would be attracted to each other, due to their relative genetic similarity. Finally, there is some evidence that U.S. inter-racial marriages involve a trade-off of desirable traits, especially in Black male/White female unions. In these unions, the Black male tends to be of relatively high educational status compared to the woman, meaning that the female marries hypergamously in terms of education. It is proposed that this compensates for the fact that the female is marrying hypogamously (that is, socially downwards) in terms of racial status. In other words, she has engaged in status exchange.⁴⁶⁸

Regardless, we can see that a process of ethnogenesis is occurring in the U.S., primarily based around unions between White males and East Asian females. This has long been occurring in Hawaii, due to the established Japanese minority there, and the products of these unions are known by the Hawaiian word “Hapa,” which refers to a person of mixed ethnicity. Young people throughout the U.S. who are part White and part East Asian have increasingly embraced Hapa as a marker of their identity, though some Hawaiian activists have criticized this as an example of “cultural appropriation.”⁴⁶⁹ It is worth noting that Black-White biracials in the U.S. likely have a White mother, whereas Asian-White biracials are likely to have a White father. It is possible that this may lead to some effects in terms of which traits are inherited, but with the current state of research, this can only be speculated upon. According to Pew’s research, contracting a mixed-race marriage is positively correlated with education level. This may be due to the relationship between educational attainment and intelligence, something which is in turn associated with Openness. It may also be because of “exposure”: as Blacks, in particular, become more educated, they are more likely to live in areas where there are many Whites.⁴⁷⁰ However, there remains only a very weak relationship with education level.

What is clear is that the American nation is changing dramatically. To

understand this, one can look to Silicon Valley, California—America’s avant-garde region in terms of technology, culture, finance, and, increasingly, *demographics*. As of 2017, “Asians”—mostly from China and India—made up the largest majority (34 percent) in Silicon Valley, a collection of counties of 3.1 million. Among the share of highly skilled and educated workers, some 14 percent alone were from China, which rivaled the numbers from the state of California (17 percent) and the U.S. at large (16 percent). India outnumbered them all, making up 26 percent of high-skilled tech workers.⁴⁷¹

A situation like this will not render race “irrelevant” so much as it will generate a new people—or, more likely, *peoples*. We shouldn’t expect Peoria, Illinois, to resemble Silicon Valley anytime soon; however, the dramatic transformation that America is currently undergoing will unquestionably transform its collective feeling of nationalism—and xenophobia—in the not-too-distant future.

With God On Our Side

Race and Religion

Science is science. Religion is religion. Never the twain shall meet. For Stephen J. Gould, whom we met earlier, along with many others, this is only proper. “To cite the old clichés, science gets the age of rocks, and religion the rock of ages; science studies how the heavens go, religion how to go to heaven.” Gould even proposed an acronymic injunction—NOMA, the Non-Overlapping Magisteria.

[T]he net, magisterium, of science covers the empirical realm: what is the universe made of (fact) and why does it work this way (theory). The magisterium of religion extends over questions of ultimate meaning and moral value. These two magisteria do not overlap. . .⁴⁷²

Gould intended to strike a truce between science and theology and unburden us of the crisis of faith, which had been gestating for at least 200 years. Writing in 1999, Gould might have glimpsed on the horizon the “New Atheism” fad of the next decade. Led by evolutionary biologist Richard Dawkins, the movement directly attacked religion as a “delusion” and sought to promote atheism.⁴⁷³

There are many problems with the NOMA ceasefire—the first being purely intellectual. Could not a theologian offer insight into evolution? Or a scientist, into the nature of religious experience? Or a historian, into the life of Jesus? Why are these two disciplines conceived of as “non-overlapping,” when, for instance, mathematics and music clearly are not? More pressing for our purposes, NOMA disrupts our ability to view *religion as a phenomenon*, and examine it and its development from an evolutionary perspective.

As David Sloan Wilson writes in *Darwin’s Cathedral* (2002),

Something as elaborate—as time-, energy-, and thought-consuming—as religion would not exist if it didn’t have secular utility. Religions exist primarily for people to achieve together what they cannot achieve alone. The mechanisms that enable religious groups to function as adaptive units include the very beliefs and practices that make religion appear enigmatic to so many people who stand outside of them.⁴⁷⁴

Religion is a human universal, one that almost certainly preceded the development of the races discussed in this book. It bears all the hallmarks of an evolved phenomenon. Religiousness—the strength and rootedness of belief and collective practice—correlates with health, longevity, and fertility. It is roughly 40 percent genetic, according to twin studies.⁴⁷⁵ Religiousness is heightened at times of stress, meaning that it acts much like a survival instinct.⁴⁷⁶ Humans, we can only conclude, are religious because they have been selected to be so. It is

the evolutionary “norm,” much like erotic desire, the quest for status, and the fear of loss.

Obviously, many expressions of extreme religiosity are clearly not evolutionary advantageous, at least for the individuals who practice them. Devoted monks who lived lives of abstinence and seclusion—ascetics who stood on tall pillars preaching fasting and world denial—those who took to self-flagellation and even self-castration—were, needless to say, unlikely to pass on their genes. However, their fanaticism might have been highly advantageous at the level of the group.

The more successful group cooperates internally and fights outsiders ferociously and bravely. This has been demonstrated by computer models in which groups with different traits play one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma, in which you must either “cooperate” or “defect” with those whom you come into contact on a grid. Four “groups” are set up, each marked by different colors. The more “ethnocentric” group—whose members cooperate with their own color but defect with other colors—will always, eventually, come to dominate over groups which are humanitarian (cooperate with everyone), selfish (cooperate with nobody) or treasonous (only cooperate with members of a different group).⁴⁷⁷ Those religious zealots—who shamed or inspired others to get in line—may have played an important role in society beyond passing on their individual genes.

We have already explored the ways in which the collective worship of gods can be regarded as adaptive. Religions generally portray evolutionarily adaptive behavior—such as having lots of children or defeating enemies—as the “will of the gods.” But there is good reason to believe that the evolutionary benefits of religiousness are much more profound.

The key environmental determinants of religiousness have been found to be stress due to uncertainty—and especially mortality salience—and feelings of exclusion. These factors elevate religious fervor.⁴⁷⁸ In Western societies, those who collectively worship a moral god are more likely to be married, less likely to be divorced, are more likely to have children, and more likely to have larger numbers of children.⁴⁷⁹ They have lower rates of physical and mental illness, live longer, are more likely to get over serious illnesses, and have lower morbidity.⁴⁸⁰ Religiousness is also associated, even in non-religious societies, with low Neuroticism, high Agreeableness, and high Conscientiousness,⁴⁸¹ traits

which we would expect to be important among any social species. Religiousness is, therefore, an evolved *cognitive bias*.

To Dawkins's chagrin, atheism, and other deviations from traditional religious belief in modern populations, can be reasonably understood, therefore, as a mutation—and a harmful mutation at that. In line with this, atheism is associated with other markers of mutation such as autism, poor physical health, poor mental health, and being physically asymmetrical.⁴⁸² Atheism may be associated with certain examples of deviant sexuality, something that would tend to reduce individual fitness. Women who fantasize about being a man (“gender orientation fantasies”) are less likely to be intrinsically religious.⁴⁸³ In addition, being “right-wing,” which correlates with being religious at 0.75,⁴⁸⁴ and is thus substantially the same thing, is correlated with being rated as having a more symmetrical and more attractive face—in other words, a lower level of mutational load.⁴⁸⁵

For at least the past 100 years, the *secularization thesis* has informed, sometimes unconsciously, the minds of scholars, public intellectuals, and policy-makers: briefly, people and institutions are becoming less religious; those religions that do persist will be largely relegated to the private sphere and become more “tolerant,” more like lifestyles than ways of life. There were, of course, some good reasons for this assumption. The West's own crisis of faith resulted in greater apathy and even atheism, and the 20th century witnessed the rise of militantly secular political ideologies. The emancipation of women became an indisputable social good. And the combination of advancements in contraception and abortion along with the encouragement of women to pursue careers and higher education resulted in a decline in fertility on a global scale. Perhaps the fullest, most outlandish, expression of this thesis was Francis Fukuyama's evocation of the “End of History” in the early 1990s: all paths lead towards secular, liberal, and democratic states.⁴⁸⁶ Dawkins's “New Atheism” seems to operate on similar assumptions.

Social scientist Eric Kaufmann has thrown cold water on these assumptions. History will not end in secularism; the religious shall, in fact, inherit the Earth—and do so even within secular countries.⁴⁸⁷ The reason for this is demographic—or, more pointedly, due to how religion affects demographics. While fertility declined throughout 20th-century America, women in conservative Protestant denominations (the “evangelicals”) bore almost a child more than those in

mainline or liberal Protestant churches (the “WASPs”).⁴⁸⁸ Today, women with conservative views on abortion (regardless of their particular religion or denomination) bear nearly two-thirds of a child more than those who are “pro-choice.”⁴⁸⁹ Beyond America, Kaufmann perceives the rise of “counter-entropic” populations to fertility decline—the “fundamentalists” writ large—who not only reproduce themselves but are expanding, while their secular liberal cousins are stuck in a “birth dearth.” Kaufmann (himself a secular liberal) reluctantly concluded that these religious people are destined to “take over the world.”

So what is this powerful force, religion, which informs the process of evolution—and where did it come from?

An Evolutionary Perspective on Religion

Exactly how our ancestors came to believe in gods is a question we’ll never answer definitely. But we can engage in informed speculation. We’ll start on the individual level. One possibility is that there is an evolutionary advantage to over-detecting agency. If an archaic human heard a strange sound far off in the forest, he had a variety of potential reactions, each of which would have consequences. If he assumed that the sound was a dangerous beast, then he’d take shelter or prepare for an attack. If he were wrong about that, then he would have lost very little. If he were right, then he would have saved everything. If this archaic human were unconcerned by every strange sound he heard, then, sooner or later, he would be devoured. So over-perceiving evidence of agency would have been selected for. In other words, it pays to be paranoid. And we could imagine that a big-brained archaic human wouldn’t just make deductions from sounds in the forest; he would begin to perceive causality behind the world itself.⁴⁹⁰

Human altruism may also be relevant to our development of belief in gods and spirits. A key dimension of altruism is empathy—the ability to infer mental states from external signals and thus correctly intuit the feelings of others, and even feel them yourself. As we discussed in the last chapter, those who are extremely high in this trait, such as schizophrenics, are particularly prone to perceiving signals of agency everywhere, even in the world itself. Those who believe in God, but who are psychologically normal, also have this inclination, though to a less pronounced degree. (Unsurprisingly, stereotypical “high functioning autistics”—who are very low in empathy—tend to be atheists.⁴⁹¹)

Once people believe in God, they are also at an advantage, because they will

be more moral (more cooperative) and less stressed, and so less likely to get cast out by the band.⁴⁹² In line with this, as already noted, religiousness is associated with Agreeableness, Conscientiousness and low Neuroticism.⁴⁹³ Experimental evidence has found that if we feel we are being watched, then we become more prosocial.⁴⁹⁴ Religiousness would, therefore, be a marker of *prosocial personality*, meaning that it would be selected for.

However, this would raise a problem: free-riders who would merely pretend to be religious in order to attain, for a period of time, the accordant social benefits. Evidence indicates that being extrinsically religious—merely outwardly religious—is associated with Neuroticism, which is, in turn, associated with periodic religious fervor.⁴⁹⁵ Religions have dealt with this problem, in part, through tests of faith. They demand evidence of intense commitment, such as confessions of faith and detailed discussion of “how you found Jesus.” This would militate in favor of authenticity or, put more cynically, self-deceit—that is, people managing to convince themselves that they really do believe the religion’s doctrines. In other words, religiousness—as a marker of commitment—would be in a constant battle against free-riders and would evolve accordingly.

Overall, religiousness will be selected for and the group which is more religious will be selected for. Intelligence, as we have seen, correlates with impulse control, rule-following, forethought, altruism, and cooperativeness. It also correlates with a propensity for openness to decreasingly instinctive ideas, such as a single moral God, which less advanced human groups don’t believe in.⁴⁹⁶ So, as religiousness is selected for, both intelligence and the cooperative personality—involving altruism and high impulse control (the “General Factor of Personality”)⁴⁹⁷—are simultaneously also selected for, meaning that the nature of society changes over time.⁴⁹⁸ However—and this is the central point—religiousness itself then starts to select even further for these very same evolutionarily adaptive traits, often through superficially bizarre or even brutal rituals and rules which, horrible though they can be, are strongly evolutionarily adaptive. Circumcision rituals, for example, force you to display the extent to which you are prepared to cooperate, in undergoing pain or putting your children through pain. And precisely because they are presented as God’s will or the behavior engaged in by the gods, they are more likely to be followed. Once people felt that God was real, they would no longer always be asking themselves, “What do other people expect me to do?” but rather, “What would

God want me to do?” The supernatural becomes a means of controlling and channeling people—and large numbers of people—without the use of physical force. And, in general, the kind of behavior God would be understood to want would be group-oriented, pro-social behavior.⁴⁹⁹ This is because taboos and myths in all religions reflect what has worked successfully in previous generations.

Religious myths are encoded by the evolutionary survivors, because those who believed that God wanted different kinds of behavior from that promoted by the myths simply didn't pass on their genes. Religious ideas are products of evolution in the sense that the negative “mutations” have been weeded out over generations of selection. In effect, morals and other ideas attributed to God are, in reality, the net experience of human endeavor that has happened to be successful, at least for that particular group over a substantial period of time. Presenting that experience in terms of divine laws is, therefore, an extremely powerful way of preserving them to ensure future evolutionarily adaptive behavior. Reading the mind of God, and empathizing with Him, thus ensures the individual's and the group's evolutionary success.

Of course, there is room for error. For example, outsiders might triumph over a group—or become integrated within it—and then impose their religious ideas upon this group, indoctrinating them with a foreign creed. These ideas might be adaptive for the dominant people, but they might be maladaptive for the subservient one. This is why religions can evolve depending on the relative status of the group with which the religion is associated. This is obvious if you compare the Christianity of the Early Church, when Christians were a persecuted minority, to the kind of Christianity that predominated after the Council of Nicaea and the adoption of the religion by the state. Once this happened, Christianity gradually syncretized with paganism and became a means of justifying the current political dispensation. Inequality of justification is an aspect of many religions of this kind. God blesses whoever He wishes to.⁵⁰⁰

The “Stages” of Religion

In that religiousness is evolutionarily adaptive, we would expect different ecologies to produce different kinds of religiousness. As such, we would expect there to be race differences in religiousness. Many philosophers and theorists have attempted to offer a bird's eye view of human development. Scottish economist Adam Smith (1723-1790) argued that societies seemed to move

through four economic stages:

1. **Hunter-gathering**
2. **Pastoral and nomadic farming**
3. **Agriculture**
4. **Commerce**⁵⁰¹

This “stage” theory of development was built upon to explore differences in modal thought systems. French philosopher, Auguste Comte (1798-1857), also argued that as societies develop, they pass through a series of phases and concomitant worldviews. Comte called this process the Law of Three Stages:⁵⁰²

1. **Theological:** Nature is mythically conceived and explained by a supernatural being or beings.
2. **Metaphysical:** the world is explained through nature and vague forces.
3. **Positivist:** The world is explained through logic, reason, and science.

English philosopher Herbert Spencer (1820-1903) argued that, broadly speaking, one could conceive of two kinds of society: *Militant* and *Industrial*. The Militant Society was simple, undifferentiated and involved a hierarchy of sorts and obedience to it, whereas the Industrial Society was complex and associations were voluntary and contractually enforced. Societies would evolve from one to the other in accordance with the principles of natural selection: as people became more intelligent and creative, they would move towards industrialism. Spencer argued that what he conceived of as the “lower races” engaged in the most undeveloped form of religiousness—*ancestor worship*. As they evolved, their descendants began to worship *spirits and natural forces*, and as they evolved further, this changed into *gods*. This religiousness was eventually rejected in favor of scientific thinking.⁵⁰³

Scottish anthropologist Sir James Frazer (1854-1941) presented a similar “stage” theory of societal development:

1. **Primitive Magic:** belief in spirits and ancestors;
2. **Religion:** wherein gods are believed in;
3. **Science.**

Again, we can discern the implication that as society becomes more intellectually sophisticated, it rejects the more primitive, religious ways of thinking in favor of those that are more intellectually sophisticated and scientific.

Frazer is explicit in asserting this point in his *magnum opus*, *The Golden Bough* (1890). He writes that as civilizations developed “the keener minds came to reject the religious theory of nature as inadequate . . . religion, regarded as an explanation of nature, is replaced by science.”⁵⁰⁴ For Frazer, the movement from “superstition” to “religion” is also caused by the rejection of superstition by those who are of the highest intelligence. The English anthropologist Frank Byron Jevons (1858-1936) was even more specific. He looked at the specific stages within religiousness, arguing that it moved from animism and ancestor worship to polytheism and finally to monotheism, as societies became more complex.⁵⁰⁵

These “stage” theories, in highlighting racial differences in religiousness in the ancestral environments of races, appear to be broadly correct. The form of religiousness practiced by races who are hunter-gatherers, or who were hunter-gatherers until European contact, is qualitatively different from that of races who reached a more complex level of development. Hunter-gatherers do not believe in gods, let alone moral gods. They believe in spirits, with whom they must cooperate in order to be more successful at hunting and gathering. This is congruous, in most cases, with their being more r-selected. The ecology is less stable and less harsh, meaning that cooperation is less important for survival and pro-social behavior is selected for to a lesser extent. In addition, there is no reason whatsoever to cooperate with people who are not part of your kinship group, and there is little selection for generalized pro-social behavior. Thus, these societies do not appear to believe in moral gods. As we move towards an agricultural society, this gradually changes as, with agriculture, there is a harsher yet more stable ecology, meaning that the presence of agriculture tends to push society in a more cooperative and conscientious—that is, *K*-selected—direction. Those with short time preferences will fail at agriculture and be selected out. We start, therefore, to see the development of gods and ancestors who demand, to some extent, pro-social behavior, precisely because such behavior is now important. This also means that those who believe in such gods are more likely to pass on their genes.

It is when we reach the stage of cities that we start to see a radical shift. For urban environments to thrive, people increasingly needed to cooperate with those who are not in their kinship group, including people that they may well never see again. Thus, kinship—and the belief in common ancestors—no longer holds people together and can no longer so easily persuade them to cooperate.

Accordingly, generalized pro-social behavior needs to be elevated, so we start to see the rise of strongly pro-social gods, who demand profoundly moral behavior, which, in turn, makes people even more pro-social.⁵⁰⁶ Belief in a moral god thus becomes a kind of insurance policy. If a stranger believes in this moral god, then you can probably trust him. He will keep his word; he will be pro-social because he, like you, believes that this god is watching him and that this god will punish him if he behaves in an immoral fashion. This kind of thinking is found among groups that have moved beyond pastoralism to independently create city-states and more: South Asians, Europeans, Northeast Asians, North Africans, and Arabs, and some Native American ethnic groups, such as the Inca and the Aztecs. These are the groups that have some level of independent cultural achievement, as can be seen in Table 10.1. These are assessed by rankings of important contributions to science by race and the number of markers of civilization (out of 21 accepted markers) independently achieved.⁵⁰⁷ These markers include wearing clothes, use of the wheel, not practicing mutilation, towns and cities linked by roads, cultivating plants, domestication of animals, knowledge of metals where these are available, not practicing cannibalism, money, laws, writing, and some form of mathematics. This kind of religion is also found in groups that have come into contact with these accomplished groups, but they have not achieved it independently.

Table 10.1: Ranking of Races in Terms of Cultural Achievement and Civilization

Race	Rank	Measure
European	1	Contribution to science
Northeast Asian	2	Contribution to science
North African/Arab	3	21 markers of civilization independently achieved
South Asian	4	21 markers of civilization independently achieved
Native American	5	Half of 21 markers of civilization achieved
Arctic	6	0 markers of civilization independently achieved
Southeast Asian	6	0
Pacific Islander	6	0

Sub-Saharan African	6	0
Aborigine	6	0
Bushmen	6	0
Pygmy	6	0

The top ranking of Europe is an acknowledgment of the fact that the developed world is itself fundamentally “Western,” in terms of its political, legal, and economic systems and increasingly cultural norms. In general, the more *K*-evolved races—who have made the greatest strides in terms of civilization—are the most likely to have developed a belief in moral gods. There is, however, a concomitant process of increasing religious simplicity. Thus, the least developed races believe in numerous spirits and ancestors who can influence their lives. As they develop, this is reduced to a series of gods. And as they develop further, the many gods are reduced to one. This is consistent with science searching for the simplest explanation, as well as more intelligent people being more systematic and more scientific in their thinking.⁵⁰⁸ This is most obvious in Judaism, and thus in Christianity and Islam. However, with Plato’s innovation of the Demiurge and the theory of forms, Neo-Platonic monotheism became highly influential in Classical Paganism. In Hinduism, gods are often regarded as manifestations of three underlying gods.⁵⁰⁹

There is a tension in the Far East between belief in Paganism and Buddhism, with many people presenting a syncretism of the two. One survey in 1993 found that 65 percent of the Japanese did not believe in God, while 55 percent “did not believe in Buddha,” which is an important distinction.⁵¹⁰ It might legitimately be argued that the salience of a moral God is higher, or at least clearer, in monotheistic societies. Such a moral god directly dictates in-group moral behavior as His will. By contrast, in polytheistic societies, the gods are more likely to have all-to-human failings. Nevertheless, even here, it has been found that they are concerned with morality, though there are qualitative differences between monotheistic and polytheistic religions. Ritual observance is more important, and acceptance of dogma less important, in polytheistic religions, though there is much syncretism and variance. European countries, of course, were overtly polytheistic until the rise of Christianity, and many Christian groups syncretized aspects of monotheism and polytheism, such as the multiple objects of worship in the Catholic Church.⁵¹¹ Perhaps a key difference between

Europe and East Asia is how “religion” is defined. East Asians appear to perceive temple rituals as an aspect of “culture” rather than “religion,” even if engaging in them implies belief in fate, luck, and even the ancestors or gods being able to influence your lives.⁵¹²

National and Ethnic Differences in Religiousness

If religiousness is related to one’s ancestral environment, then there should be race differences in religiousness within multi-ethnic states. In the 19th and early 20th centuries, many thinkers suggested an inverse relationship between intelligence and religiousness. English scientist Sir Francis Galton (1822-1911) did not concentrate on the topic of religion, but in *Hereditary Genius* (1869), he connected the religiousness of the Spanish to the influence of the Spanish Inquisition:

The extent to which persecution must have affected races is easily measured by a few well-known statistical facts. Thus, as regards martyrdom and imprisonment, the Spanish nation was drained of free-thinkers at the rate of 1000 persons annually, for the three centuries between 1471 and 1781; an average of 100 persons having been executed and 900 imprisoned every year during that period. The actual data during those three hundred years are 32,000 burnt, 17,000 persons burnt in effigy (I presume they mostly died in prison or escaped from Spain), and 291,000 condemned to various terms of imprisonment and other penalties. It is impossible that any nation could stand a policy like this, without paying a heavy penalty in the deterioration of its breed, as has notably been the result in the formation of the superstitious, unintelligent Spanish race of the present day.⁵¹³

As with Frazer’s and similar “stage” theories, Galton argues that high levels of “superstition” reflect a less developed society than standard “monotheism” or “science,” and Spain is superstitious partly for biological reasons. In other words, whether he was empirically correct or not, Galton was arguing that the mass-murder of the Spanish intelligentsia resulted in a country that is more religious; as such, he seems to imply, intelligent people are less willing to accept religious dogmas. A very large number of studies have, indeed, consistently demonstrated that there is a negative correlation between religious belief and IQ. Meta-analyses find that this is around -0.2.⁵¹⁴

Galton is far from the only Victorian thinker to suggest an inverse relationship between intelligence and religion at the level of ethnicity. Such a relationship is strongly implied in a Victorian debate over the extent to which religion can be seen to be predicted by race. Barrister Luke Owen Pike (1835-1915) presented a paper to the Anthropological Society of London on March 16, 1869, entitled “On the Alleged Influence of Race on Religion.”⁵¹⁵ He argued that there is almost no racial influence on a group’s religion. Pike’s paper is reported to have evoked a

great deal of criticism from the assembled anthropologists, most of whom assumed the view that the less intelligent (whether “races” or individuals) would be more “religious” or, at least, less skeptical of religion. For example, race researcher J. Gould Avery (1811-1877) argued that Protestants are more “independent-minded” than Catholics and that this is reflected in the races that assent to these different denominations in the British Isles.⁵¹⁶ The Welsh are a racial mixture, and this is reflected in their deference to their “ministers.” Avery thus ascribed qualities associated with intelligence—independent and critical thinking—with the form of religiousness adhered to. The anthropologist and novelist McGrigor Allan (1827-1916) asserted, “If race had no influence on religion, how was it that England had not been able to make the Irish Protestants?”⁵¹⁷ This remark must be understood in the context of the widely held belief at that time that the Irish were of lower intelligence than other British “races.”⁵¹⁸ The discussion became so detailed that it was postponed until the next meeting, on April 6, where further criticisms of Pike’s theory were leveled. For example, corn merchant and Prussian émigré Adolph Bendir (1834-1897)⁵¹⁹ tied the discussion in with “stage” theories, claiming that races will develop religions, in terms of complexity, in accordance with their abilities.⁵²⁰ So, the debate seemed to evidence the belief that religion will vary according to something akin to intelligence, even if it does not explicitly state that the non-religious would be likely to have the highest intelligence.

Consistent with their hypotheses, it has been found, by German biochemist Gerhard Meisenberg and his team, using education as a proxy for intelligence, that within almost all countries in the world for which data is available, there is a negative association between religiousness and intelligence.⁵²¹ A notable counter-example is Sub-Saharan Africa, which appears to be exceptional due to on-going belief in spirits, which is not encompassed by questions about the certainty with which a person believes in God. Accordingly, in Sub-Saharan Africa, intelligence is positively associated with being religious, but this is because—in line with stage theories of religion—the less religious believe in spirits rather than gods. Within nations, there are further differences in line with this theory. Thus, in South Korea, the least educated adhere to Korea’s pre-Christian, polytheistic religion. Those of middling education level are Catholic, adhering to a religion which syncretizes monotheism with pagan beliefs in multiple deities, presented as angels, saints, and the Virgin Mary.⁵²² The most educated religious Koreans are Protestants, this being the most purely

monotheistic religious form. A similar relationship can be seen in the Netherlands, in which the average IQ of Protestants is higher than that of Catholics, but the non-religious have the highest IQ of all.⁵²³

In multi-ethnic states, there are differences in religiousness that seem to parallel race differences in intelligence. George Fitchett and colleagues drew upon the Study of Women's Health Across the Nation in order to explore race differences in religiousness.⁵²⁴ Belief in God was assessed thus: 1 = do not believe in God; 2 = no way to find out; 3 = believe in some higher power; 4 = believe in God sometimes; 5 = believe in God but have some doubts; 6 = know that God exists and have no doubts; and strength of religiousness thus: 1 = no religion; 2 = somewhat strong; 3 = not very strong; 4 = very strong. On both measures, Blacks were far more religious than Whites and other races: 80 percent of Blacks asserted that they "know God exists," compared to 61.7 percent of Whites and 67.9 percent of others; 49.3 percent of Blacks reported "very strong" religiousness, compared to 37 percent of Whites and 34.2 percent of other races. Fitchett and colleagues conducted a regression analysis in which they controlled for verbal IQ, age, sex, education, earnings, religion, and survey year and found that, even so, Blacks were significantly more religious on both measures than non-Blacks. Indeed, Fitchett asserted that "the effect of being Black on religiousness is stronger than the effect of intelligence." Another group of researchers, Chatters and colleagues, compared atheism amongst Black Americans, White Americans, and Caribbean Blacks, while also controlling for earnings (a sound if imperfect proxy for issues such as education and intelligence) and found that 15.5 percent of the White sample had no religious belief compared to 12.7 percent of the American Caribbean Blacks and 10.51 percent of the African-Americans.⁵²⁵ This would again indicate that something other than intelligence and environment is explaining at least part of the difference. Certainly, it is unlikely to be just environment because Blacks are relatively highly religious across social strata.

The Pew Forum has also reported that African-Americans are more religious than Whites.⁵²⁶ Some 79 percent of Blacks say religion is "very important in their lives," compared to a 56 percent average. Whereas 16 percent of the U.S. population was religiously unaffiliated in 2009, this was only 12 percent among Blacks. However, Pew found that religiously unaffiliated Blacks were mostly "religious" (as religious as mainline Protestants or Catholics) in contrast to atheistic, agnostic, or religiously unaffiliated Whites:

In fact, even a large majority (72 percent) of African-Americans who are unaffiliated with any particular faith say religion plays at least a somewhat important role in their lives; nearly half (45 percent) of unaffiliated African-Americans say religion is very important in their lives, roughly three times the percentage who say this among the religiously unaffiliated population overall (16 percent). Indeed, on this measure, unaffiliated African-Americans more closely resemble the overall population of Catholics (56 percent say religion is very important) and mainline Protestants (52 percent).

In addition, Black membership of “mainline Protestant churches” (which tend to be the most liberal) was 4 percent, compared to a national average of 15 percent. The survey additionally found that 53 percent of Blacks attend religious services at least once a week (against a 39 percent average), 76 percent say they pray on at least a daily basis (58 percent average), and 88 percent indicate that they are absolutely certain that God exists (71 percent average). “On each of these measures,” notes the Pew Forum, “African-Americans stand out as the most religiously committed racial or ethnic group in the nation.” Even Blacks who are unaffiliated with any religious group pray nearly as often as the overall population of mainline Protestants: 48 percent of unaffiliated African-Americans pray daily as against 53 percent of all mainline Protestants. Unaffiliated African-Americans are about as likely to believe in God with absolute certainty (70 percent) as are mainline Protestants (73 percent) and Catholics (72 percent) overall. Specific religious belief amongst American Blacks also follows the pattern which we would expect: 88 percent of Blacks are “absolutely certain” God exists, compared to 71 percent of all Americans; 55 percent of Blacks “interpret scripture literally” (a marker of fundamentalism, referring to a “literal” understanding of the Genesis creation account, for example), compared to 33 percent of the U.S. as a whole; and 83 percent of African-Americans are convinced of the existence of “Angels” and “Demons,” compared to 68 percent of Americans. In addition, 23 percent of unaffiliated Blacks believe in “Biblical literalism,” compared to just 11 percent of the broader unaffiliated population. A number of other studies are congruous with these findings. Even when controlling for education, marital status, income, region, urbanicity, and subjective health, older African-Americans (aged at least over 55), on almost every measure, are simply more religious than older White Americans, even when factoring in the greater religiousness of women.⁵²⁷

Research on Jewish Americans finds that they are the least religiously devout of all religious groups, which would be consistent with their high average IQ.⁵²⁸ This is likely because Jewishness is an ethnicity as well as a religion, leading Jewish atheists to identify their religion as Judaism. Unfortunately, research on

East Asian Americans, which might indicate the relationship between their superior intelligence and religiousness, is very limited. The Pew Forum tends to conflate East Asians with all other “Asians” (such as Indians) into one category. But where it makes a distinction, the results are as we would expect.⁵²⁹ Race and ethnic differences in religiousness in the U.S. are presented in Table 10.2, alongside average racial and ethnic IQ scores. The religiousness data comes from the Pew Forum.⁵³⁰

Table 10.2 —Ethnic Background, Average Ethnic IQ and Religious Non-Affiliation among Asian Americans

Ethnic Background	Average IQ (of nationality)	Religiously Unaffiliated
Chinese	105	52%
Filipino	86	8%
Indian	82	10%
Japanese	105	32%
Korean	105	23%
Vietnamese	94	20%

We can see from Table 10.2 a strong positive correlation, of 0.8, between average ethnic intelligence and religious non-affiliation. China and Vietnam are outliers, probably because of Communist influence, but the table shows that, amongst Asian Americans, as intelligence increases so does religious non-affiliation. So, even though, as we have discussed, there are difficulties comparing East Asian and Western religion, these findings are still as we would predict. We might also note that the average for non-affiliation in the U.S., according to the Pew Forum, is 16 percent and, as we would predict, East Asians significantly exceed this average with 35.6 percent being religiously unaffiliated. In addition, 79 percent of “Asian Americans” (again, an overly broad category) believe in God, compared to a national average of 92 percent, and 40 percent pray daily, compared to a national average of 56 percent. The modal personality profile of East Asians would predict the highest religiousness, so the fact that they have the lowest is likely to be explicable in terms of their having the highest average intelligence.

A reasonable conclusion is that low average intelligence explains a significant dimension of the high religiousness of African-Americans. However, the fact that they are still more religious than Whites when socioeconomic variables are controlled for is fascinating and raises a number of possibilities. Religiousness is positively associated with the personality traits Conscientiousness and Agreeableness in both U.S. and European samples,⁵³¹ which is consistent with it

being a reflection of evolutionary pressures that would push people in a more pro-social direction and also with religious belief making people more pro-social. We know, however, that Blacks are on average lower in these personality traits than Whites. Still, Blacks are more prone to schizophrenia than Whites and thus can be expected to be higher on the schizotypy spectrum. Consistent with this, they are more likely to have psychotic episodes even when salient controls are put in place.⁵³² African-Americans are three times more likely than are Whites to be diagnosed with schizophrenia. This is only partly explained by race differences in socioeconomic status, with stress tending to elevate the likelihood of a psychotic episode.⁵³³ In other words, the average African-American is higher, for genetic reasons, on a scale associated with intense religiousness than is the average White American, leading to far higher numbers of African-Americans at the extreme end of this spectrum.

African-Americans are also twice as likely as White Americans to suffer from temporal lobe epilepsy.⁵³⁴ It can be argued that epilepsy, like autism or schizophrenia, should be conceived of in terms of a spectrum, with severe epilepsy at one extreme.⁵³⁵ A large number of studies concur that epilepsy is associated with undergoing religious experience, with all such experiences involving activity in the temporal lobes.⁵³⁶ It would follow that the average African-American would score higher on the epilepsy spectrum than the average White, meaning that African-Americans would be more likely to undergo intense religious experiences. High schizophrenia among African-Americans would likely be due to weak selection pressure against anti-social psychological traits in Sub-Saharan Africa. It also implies an interesting curvilinear dimension to schizophrenia. It is high in Northeast Asia, due to aspects of it being an extreme, and maladaptive, manifestation of empathy and low testosterone. But it is also high in Africa, due to it being broadly anti-social, and Africans having been subjected to less selection pressure for pro-social traits in their ecology. It is also noticeable that African-Americans are more likely than Whites to believe in more primitive forms of religion, involving devils and demons. As we have discussed, this would be consistent with lower intelligence. The stereotypically “charismatic” nature of African-American Christianity—involving emotional forms of worship—is likely a reflection of their high levels of Extraversion. It has been found in the UK that Anglicans who are high in Extraversion are attracted to this form of worship.⁵³⁷ It may also reflect the ease with which religious experiences can be induced in people who are higher on the epilepsy

spectrum.

Another hypothesis to explain why African-Americans are more religious is because they have long been poorer than Whites and thus have been subject to more intense Darwinian selection, at least until more recently, than Whites have—in particular since the U.S. has only a limited welfare state. In that humans are, to varying degrees, selected to be religious, African-Americans may be more religious than Whites—when controlling for socioeconomic status—because they are less dysgenic than Whites. They are also protected, in terms of social epistasis, from the more dysgenic dimensions of White culture to a greater extent. Indeed, it could be argued that Multiculturalism encourages Blacks—though not Whites—to be ethnocentric and, in that sense, to be adaptive. In the UK, according to the 2001 census, roughly 18 percent of Whites claimed to have “no religion,” compared to 2 percent of Indians, close to zero Pakistanis and Bangladeshis, 10 percent of Blacks, and 32 percent of Chinese.⁵³⁸ These findings are in line with racial differences in intelligence except when it comes to the South Asians. One possibility, especially with regard to Indians as their IQ and socioeconomic status is relatively similar to that of Whites, is that they have been subject to harsh Darwinian selection for longer. It may also be relevant that Hinduism—as a polytheistic religion—is more focused around ritual and shared ancestry than it is around adhering to dogmas. In that sense, it can be argued that Hinduism is a matter of “culture,” and it is unproblematic to be both an atheist and a Hindu.⁵³⁹

Understanding ethnic differences in religiousness is more difficult, because of the key variable of different ethnic groups tending to live in different countries, rendering them subject to different environments. That said, clear divisions within the White race regarding religiosity came to the fore in a 2018 study by the Pew Research Center, which is found in Table 10.3. Pew polled countries across Europe and calculated a combined religiosity index for each, an aggregate of church attendance, engaging in regular prayer, and self-reported belief in God. Perhaps the most striking result is the overall decline of religiosity, particularly in Western Europe and Scandinavia. France’s high level of irreligiousness can be traced back to the long influence of Enlightenment and Revolutionary ideals.⁵⁴⁰ But as of 2016, the Netherlands can lay claim to being the first Western country in which a majority of the population has no religion at all.⁵⁴¹ Countries with Catholic majorities have remained nearly twice as religious as majority Protestant ones, and Orthodox-majority countries are the most religious of all.

As Pew points out, regional differences are stark, with Central, Southeastern, and Eastern Europe being, roughly, twice as religious as their neighbors to the west. These same patterns occurred among measures of ethnocentrism, which were highlighted in Table 9.2 in Chapter 9. Historical political divides are also significant. Those countries that were either part of the Soviet Union or under its dominion during the Cold War have emerged significantly more religious than those in the sphere of the American-led “free world,” or which were neutral (namely, Austria and Switzerland). Certainly, one of the great ironies of the 20th century must be that nations that were under a militantly atheistic ideology were better able to preserve religious traditions and collective belief in God.⁵⁴²

Table 10.3: % of European adults who are “highly religious”

Country	Religiosity Index	Majority Religion	Region	Cold War Alliance
Romania	55%	Orthodoxy	Central	Soviet
Greece	49%	Orthodoxy	Southeastern	U.S.
Moldova	47%	Orthodox	Southeastern	Soviet
Bosnia	46%	Islam	Southeastern	Soviet
Croatia	44%	Catholicism	Central	Soviet
Poland	40%	Catholicism	Central	Soviet
Portugal	37%	Catholicism	Southern	U.S.
Serbia	32%	Orthodox	Southeastern	Soviet
Ukraine	31%	Orthodoxy	Eastern	Soviet
Slovakia	29%	Catholicism	Central	Soviet
Belarus	27%	Orthodoxy	Eastern	Soviet
Italy	27%	Catholicism	Southern	U.S.
Ireland	24%	Catholicism	Western	U.S.
Lithuania	21%	Catholicism	Central	U.S.
Spain	21%	Catholicism	Southern	U.S.
Bulgaria	18%	Orthodox	Southeastern	Soviet

Country	Religion	Category	Source
Netherlands	18%	No Religion	Western U.S.
Hungary	17%	Catholicism	Central Soviet
Norway	17%	Protestantism	Northern U.S.
Russia	17%	Orthodoxy	Eastern Soviet
Latvia	15%	Protestantism	Central Soviet
Austria	14%	Catholicism	Central Neutral/U.S.
Finland	13%	Protestantism	Northern U.S.
France	12%	Catholicism	Western U.S.
Germany	12%	Protestantism	Central Divided
Switzerland	12%	Catholicism	Central Neutral/U.S.
United Kingdom	11%	Protestantism	Western U.S.
Belgium	10%	Catholicism	Western U.S.
Sweden	10%	Protestantism	Northern U.S.
Czech Republic	8%	Catholicism	Central Soviet
Denmark	8%	Protestantism	Northern U.S.
Estonia	7%	Orthodoxy	Central Soviet
Catholic Average	23%		
Orthodox Average	31%		
Protestant Average	12%		
Central Average	24%		
Eastern Average	25%		
Northern Average	12%		
Western Average	15%		
Southeastern Average	38%		

Southeastern Average	36%
Soviet Aligned Average	28%
U.S. Aligned Average	19%

Based on their national IQ data, Richard Lynn and Tatu Vanhanen have shown a clear relationship between a country's national IQ and its level of religiousness, meaning the percent who belief in God. This correlation is expressed as $R \times IQ$.⁵⁴³ The results can be observed in Table 10.4.

Table 10.4—Correlation between National IQ and Religiousness

Variable	N. Countries	R x IQ
Atheism	137	-0.6
Religious Belief	58	-0.58
Importance of Religion	60	-0.75
Percent Religious	60	-0.56

In addition, Lynn and colleagues have explored the percentage in each country that actively do not believe in God (Dawkinsian atheism, if you will), arguing that this is a better measure, as people might simply claim to believe in God due to social pressure or convention.⁵⁴⁴ This can be seen in Table 10.4.

Table 10.4—Non-Belief and National Intelligence

IQ Range	N. Countries	% Non-Believers	Range of Non-Believers	Non-Belief x IQ
64-108	137	10.69%	<1 percent to 81 percent	0.60
64-86	69	1.95 percent	<1 percent to 40 percent	0.16
87-108	68	16.99 percent	<1 percent to 81 percent	0.54

Lynn and colleagues point to a strong negative correlation between intelligence and atheism of 0.60. There are, however, many potential problems with these data. Firstly, there are relatively low response rates to the surveys. This means that it is difficult to be sure that the samples drawn upon are

representative of the countries in which they live. It may be, for example, that either the extremely religious or extremely irreligious are more likely to respond than those who are more moderate. Secondly, many of the samples are non-random, which is an obvious problem even if the response rate is high. It once more means that it is difficult to generalize the results to the entire population. Thirdly, political or cultural climates may affect the results. As Lynn and Vanhanen point out, in repressive regimes that promulgate state atheism, those who believe in God may be unwilling to admit it in case their identity is revealed—or *vice-versa* under regimes that promote a state religion. Even in more liberal societies, peer pressure still holds sway. People might falsely claim to believe in God because they think that is what others would like to hear.⁵⁴⁵ It's worth noting that, according to recent polling, Americans are significantly more willing to vote for a Muslim, Jewish, or homosexual presidential candidate than an atheist. Only "socialists" are more disliked.⁵⁴⁶

Fourthly, the intercultural use of religious terminology raises methodological problems. Terms such as "religious," "religion," "believer," "atheist," and even "God" may have different connotations and historical baggage in different cultures. The degree to which the survey data on religiousness in different cultures are comparable is clearly limited for various reasons. Those who employ it, such as Lynn and Vanhanen, emphasize this, but add that it is "the only available empirical data on religious beliefs. Therefore, we have to use them."⁵⁴⁷ If data demonstrate that religion and national intelligence inversely correlate, this would not necessarily prove the case in itself, because of the deficiencies highlighted. But in that it reaches this conclusion in the context of much more reliable data on religion and individual differences, there would be sound reasons for accepting its veracity.

Lynn and Vanhanen noted that a number of countries are outliers at more than 12 points from the level of religiousness that should be predicted by their IQs. These 16 countries are Bolivia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Ecuador, Iraq, Ireland, Kuwait, Libya, Malaysia, Malta, Oman, Poland, Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates, and the United States. Clearly, there is a pattern that can be discerned. Six of these countries are Muslim, both in North Africa and the Middle East. In addition, Malaysia is Muslim, as are a number of countries that are slight outliers, by less than 12 points out, such as Pakistan and Bangladesh. In all Muslim countries, the level of religiousness is higher than IQ would predict. This may be due to the fundamentalist reaction to recent and rapid

modernization in the Muslim world⁵⁴⁸ or even due to intense selection for religiousness. Seven of the outliers are Catholic. Religiousness in Cyprus is likely to reflect the war with Muslim Turkey in the 1960s.⁵⁴⁹ It has been argued that high religiousness in the U.S. may be as a consequence of two factors. The country was founded, in part, by fundamentalist Protestants, meaning that intense religiousness may have been passed on both genetically and culturally to future generations.⁵⁵⁰ Also, religiousness is associated with migration and predicts migration,⁵⁵¹ with much of the US population being descended from relatively recent immigrants.

There are 17 countries that are residual by 12 points or higher—that is, less religious than their IQs would predict. These are Albania, Belarus, China, Cuba, the Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Germany, Japan, Kazakhstan, North Korea, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Sweden, Uruguay and Vietnam. Eleven of these states are formerly or currently Communist; this perhaps suggests the long-term impact of Communism, even if the Eastern bloc has maintained stronger religious traditions than the West on the whole. But the crucial point is that we would expect humps and bumps because IQ is not the only factor that predicts religiousness. Modal personality, modernization, and other environmental pressures are also germane. Lynn and Vanhanen have shown that, when we bring together different measures of religiousness to account for cultural differences in the nature of religiousness then, in general, national intelligence is a strong predictor of low religiousness.

Angels and Demons

As I have argued in my book *Race Differences in Ethnocentrism* (2019), European nations had, at least, two evolutionary strategies open to them as a means of maximizing their genetic fitness: (1) The highly *Ethnocentric Strategy* and (2) The *Genius Strategy*. The latter strategy involved being relatively low in negative ethnocentrism. This allowed the group to expand, increase its gene pool, and so throw up geniuses by genetic chance. These geniuses would then innovate things of great use to their group, allowing the group to expand and dominate even further. This strategy would dilute the core gene pool, but it would be adaptive, so long as an optimum level of ethnocentrism were maintained, such as by means of religion or national pride.

This “genius” option was simply not open to the Japanese, hence their relatively low level of per-capita genius when we consider that their average IQ

is 105, a topic we discussed in the last chapter. The Japanese environment was too harsh for the gene pool to diversify to the extent required to produce a significant number of geniuses, and the risk factors involved in geniuses—such as low IQ anti-social people manifesting by chance and destroying group harmony—were simply too high. Accordingly, Northeast Asians are more ethnocentric than Europeans.

The usefulness of the genius strategy was also limited for Arabs and South Asians. Subject to less ecological harshness than Europeans, they are evolved to be relatively low in Conscientiousness, Agreeableness, as well as intelligence. How, then, could they compete with a highly intelligent society operating a genius strategy? The answer was by elevating their ethnocentrism. This they achieved through intense religiousness and cousin marriage. Cousin marriage incentivized males to invest in their tribe and their offspring; even if they had been cuckolded—a primal fear in human societies—this offspring would still be closely related to them. Cousin marriage thus elevated trust and cooperation between males, while also reducing the size and diversity of the gene pool and so increasing fitness benefits of positive and negative ethnocentrism. Religiousness also promoted highly ethnocentric behavior.⁵⁵² In particular, in Islam, restrictions on the movements and behavior of females—a system known as *pardah*—meant that males could be certain they would not be cuckolded. This would reduce male-male violence and elevate trust and cooperative behavior and thus increase ethnocentrism. This would help explain, in part, why both positive and negative ethnocentrism is higher among South Asians and related peoples than they are among Europeans.

Turning to Sub-Saharan Africans, the genius strategy would be rare due to the relatively low level of average IQ. It is, however, possible that elements of this strategy—such as superior weapons—assisted the Blacks in expanding southwards at the expense of the Bushmen—a population that appears to have considerably lower average intelligence. Overall, however, we would expect negative ethnocentrism to be higher among Africans as they are the most evolved to an unstable and easy ecology, meaning that there has been very limited selection for generalized trust. Thus, everybody would be distrusted, and especially outsiders, who would be genetically quite different. My study on race differences in ethnocentrism found a non-significant difference between Whites and Blacks on negative ethnocentrism. But this is likely due to a combination of the small sample size and the questionable nature of African nationality, as many

nations are divided tribally, and a sense of national unity, as a Westerner might understand it, is highly limited. Put another way, Africans are too high in negative ethnocentrism to be able to develop nations organically. There is, however, some evidence that Blacks are higher in negative ethnocentrism than Whites. Judd and his colleagues reviewed four studies, all of which find that African-American youths are more negatively ethnocentric than White youths, consistent with a Life History model.⁵⁵³ The genetic diversity of Sub-Saharan Africans, however, is relatively high, precisely because levels of ecological harshness are so weak. Often, Africans have divided into tribes, which will have the effect of artificially reducing the size of their gene pool and thus elevating the extent of their positive ethnocentrism. But, in general, and especially under conditions of weak selection, we would not expect it to be strong.

These differences mean that the collapse of religion is problematic for all intelligent societies—but especially for European ones, precisely because they have followed this “genius strategy.” When religiousness declines, God—who for so long has protected the society from the negative consequences of having high intelligence—is dead. And the society’s high intelligence potentially leads to its own destruction. Intelligence predicts being trusting—and the distinction between trust and naïvety can be blurry. Intelligent people will let foreigners into the society and assume that they are ultimately honest and good and everything will be okay in the end. Also registering high in Openness, the intelligent will be excited and fascinated by the exotic and different and thus prone to try to look for the positives in them, even for things they consider to be superior. Being high in empathy, if the immigrants, or potential immigrants, are from poorer societies, then the intelligent will be strongly inclined to want to improve their lot in life. And again, being trusting, they will assume that this will be reciprocated. For the intelligent, there are no enemies at the gates; they see only intelligent people like themselves. In the last chapter, I mentioned that the tragic “refugee crisis” of 2015 raised the spectre of xenophobia; it, too, raised the spectre of xenophilia —“Refugees Welcome!”—particularly in high-functioning societies in Western and Central Europe.

It has been argued that the collapse of religiousness in the West can itself be understood in evolutionary terms. Under Darwinian conditions, religiousness was strongly selected for, because religious groups were more ethnocentric. And for this reason, traditional religiousness was the evolutionary norm. This means it was, and remains, associated with adaptive traits, such as genetic physical and

mental health along with fertility. Under Darwinian conditions, child mortality was at least 40 percent; thus, every generation, the population was purged of those with poor genetic and physical health. The brain is 84 percent of the genome, making it a massive target for mutation. And mutant genes of the body correlate with mutant genes of the mind, as much evidence empirically proves. The collapse of child mortality with the onset of industrialization—which happened earliest among Whites, and Western Europeans in particular—led to more and more people with maladaptive minds. This, in turn, led to, a secular rise in autism, depression, and schizophrenia, among other things. Such people were more likely to espouse maladaptive worldviews—including being irreligious, anti-natalist, anti-nationalist, and multiculturalist. And these maladaptive people were *spiteful* to others, spreading their views far and wide. The eusocial (“hive mind”) nature of humans means that we are heavily influenced by those around us, allowing these “spiteful mutants” to gradually persuade others to adopt their fitness-damaging ideas—not having children, believing that life is meaningless, or putting the interests of other groups above their own. Thus the “spiteful mutants” played a likely indispensable role in undermining religiousness and ethnocentrism.⁵⁵⁴ For the mutant says in his heart, “There is no god.”

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The Chosen People

Race and the Jews

King Louis XIV of France reportedly asked the eminent mathematician and religious philosopher of the day, Blaise Pascal, to offer to his majesty proof of the existence of miracles. As the story goes, Pascal quickly replied that the best proof of miracles is the Jews. What Pascal meant is the Jews, as a diaspora population living as outsiders in host nations and subject to persecution, seemingly escaped the fate of decline and dissolution that met all other nations. As Pascal would write in his *Pensées*,

This people [the Jews] is not eminent solely by their antiquity, but is also singular by their duration, which has always continued from their origin till now. For whereas the nations of Greece and of Italy, of Lacedæmon, of Athens and of Rome, and others who came long after, have long since perished, these ever remain, and in spite of the endeavours of many powerful kings who have a hundred times tried to destroy them. . . .⁵⁵⁵

In addition to the remarkable circumstances of their survival, the Jewish people have maintained a significant influence on Western culture, despite not being Europeans themselves. Jews are over-represented among science Nobel Prize winners at a ratio of 8:1, as well as hugely over-represented, in countries in which they are a small minority, in all areas where superior intelligence is required: chess champions, bridge champions, academic prize winners, law, medicine, and academia. They are over-represented among the financial elite and wield significant influence in the legal profession, the media, and other industries. In many countries, it took no more than a generation for Ashkenazi Jews, fleeing Russian pogroms, to rise from immigrant poverty to elite status. In 1930, 40 percent of doctors in Slovakia were Jews. In Budapest, in the same year, half of all doctors and lawyers were Jews. As a race, the Jews' socioeconomic and intellectual accomplishments have been outstanding, congruous with religious Jews' self-perception as "the Chosen People."⁵⁵⁶

As such, for our inquiry on group evolutionary strategies, the unique case of the Jewish people demands a chapter of their own. To ignore the singular case of the Jews would be intellectually dishonest and also question-begging, in regards to what we have established so far on the reality of race. The difficult survival of the Jewish people, which Pascal deemed as evidence for miracles, we will examine through an evolutionary lens.

As we have already discussed, the Jews are essentially a cline, in that, on average, the Ashkenazi Jews are roughly 40 percent European, due to historical

admixture, including in the female line.⁵⁵⁷ There is no agreement on why Jews have adopted a system whereby you must have a Jewish mother in order to be accepted as Jewish. However, one possibility is that it ensures that there can be no paternity anxiety at all. All those who are accepted as Jewish will definitely be Jewish. Such a system etimizes the genetic interests of all Jews—as they can guarantee that they are cooperating with people who are at least partly Jewish. This would, in turn, potentially elevate their levels of positive and negative ethnocentrism, which would be beneficial in the battle of group selection. However, it seems that this system only became part of Jewish Law in around 200 BC at the very earliest and possibly much later. So, it may be due to specific historical reasons that are beyond the realm of this inquiry.⁵⁵⁸

There are four Jewish ethnic groups. The *Ashkenazi* ended-up in Eastern Europe and adopted the Yiddish language, a dialect of German that included many Hebrew words. The *Sephardi* Jews migrated to Iberia, where they developed the dialect known as Judezmo, essentially Spanish with borrowings from Hebrew and other languages, and also made their way to the Balkans. The *Mizrahi* Jews remained in the Middle East and spread to the Near East. They tended to speak either Aramaic or their own dialect of the local language, such as Judeo-Arabic. The fact that they developed their own dialects reflects the relatively high levels of endogamy among traditional Jewish groups. They were all strongly ethnocentric and strenuously maintained their own cultural, and thus genetic, separation, though studies of their genetics indicate that there was still significant Gentile admixture over the centuries. All three of these Jewish groups are closely genetically related. The outlier is the so-called *Ethiopian Jews*, who adopted Judaism during a period in which Jews were evangelical in orientation. Though the state of Israel recognizes Ethiopian Jews, and permits them right of return, they are genetically Ethiopian and their IQ reflects that fact. Consistent with this, they are overwhelmingly members of the Israeli working class.⁵⁵⁹ There are also significant genetic variations between the three genetically Jewish groups. For example, among Iraqi (Mizrahi) Jews, 58 percent suffer from G6PD deficiency, a problem in males which leads to anemia. Among Ashkenazi Jews, however, only 0.4 percent suffer from this.⁵⁶⁰

These groups also vary significantly in average IQ. The average IQ of Ashkenazi Jews in the U.S. and other Western countries has been found to be 112. There is also a strong verbal tilt: 117 for linguistic IQ, a full standard deviation above the European Greenwich mean of 100.⁵⁶¹ It is overwhelmingly

the Ashkenazi who have been strongly successful in Western countries, and it is thus the Ashkenazi who are primarily of interest to us here. The high average IQ of the Ashkenazi, specifically in Germany, was reported as far back as 1938.⁵⁶² The average IQ of the Sephardi has been estimated to be 99. This is about the same as that of Europeans, though it is between five and ten points higher than the average IQ of the nations where they lived, such as Spain, Portugal and the Balkan countries. Averaging at 91, the IQ of the Mizrahi is approximately seven points higher than the IQ of the countries which they called home. Finally, the average IQ of the Ethiopian Jews, at 66, is little different from that of Gentile Ethiopians.⁵⁶³

Richard Lynn has proposed a number of non-competing theories to explain the elevated IQ levels of three genetically Jewish groups, in comparison to the average of their ancestral host nations. He observes that Jews long practiced a form of eugenics in which the Rabbis, who tended to be the most educated and intelligent members of the community, were encouraged to have as many children as possible and were financially assisted to do this by the community itself. In Europe for much of its history, Jews were only permitted to practice a very limited variety of professions, most of them based around money-lending; usury being forbidden for Christians. These professions necessitated high IQ, meaning that when, by genetic chance, Jews manifested who had insufficient IQ to successfully practice these professions, there were two likely outcomes. First, they might fall into poverty and thus fail to pass on their genes, as until around 1800 in Europe there was a strong relationship between socioeconomic status and completed fertility, as already discussed.⁵⁶⁴ Or second, they would drop out of the Jewish community, take up a Gentile profession, and integrate into the Gentile population. Either way, this combination of factors would serve to raise Jewish IQ, at the genetic level, in comparison to that of the surrounding population. Congruous with this genetic model, it has been shown that certain polymorphisms—forms of a gene—are associated with very high IQ and that a higher percentage of Ashkenazi carry the very high IQ polymorphisms than do White Americans.⁵⁶⁵ It has also been demonstrated that the IQ difference between Whites and Jews is on *g*, the most genetically influenced aspect of IQ.⁵⁶⁶

A second factor, highlighted by Lynn, is intermittent pogroms. These can be regarded, argues Lynn, as “selection events.” Intelligence would predict surviving pogroms, as those of higher intelligence and socioeconomic status

would be more likely to see them coming, would be better able to execute plans to avoid them, would be more likely to possess the financial resources to avoid them, and would be more likely to have high-level Gentile contacts who could protect them. Many high-ranking Jews married their daughters into wealthy Gentile families, increasing the likelihood of their being protected. Other high-status Jews converted to Christianity, though often intermarrying with other families who had done so, leading to allegations, sometimes substantiated, that they were in fact “Crypto-Jews.”⁵⁶⁷ In addition, we would expect the most intelligent Jews to possess the social intelligence to avoid making Gentile enemies in order to cultivate useful Gentile contacts. Pogroms were a more significant factor in the history of Sephardi Jews than in the history of Mizrahi Jews, possibly helping to explain why the IQ of the Mizrahi is closest to its host population’s mean. Pogroms were particularly severe for the Ashkenazi, which, Lynn avers, is key to understanding why their IQ is so much higher than that of their host populations. Lynn suggests that the Nazi Holocaust would have been a particularly pronounced example of this process. It, too, was a “selection event.” The wealthiest and most intelligent Jews would have foreseen what was going to happen, would have been most oriented to the future, and would have had the necessary financial resources to get as far away from Germany as possible, preferably to the United States or, failing that, to the UK, a process which would also have been taking place throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries in response to Russian pogroms. This, Lynn argues, is key to the high IQ of the Ashkenazi.

In addition, Geoffrey Cochran and his colleagues have proposed a parallel explanation for high Ashkenazi IQ.⁵⁶⁸ Not only do they demonstrate that the high IQ of the Ashkenazi is strongly genetic, they also look in depth at precisely how it might have developed. Specifically, they highlight a possible example of “inbreeding vigor.” Due to the nature of the niche which Jews established, there was extremely strong selection for Mathematical and Verbal—though not Spatial—intelligence. For example, Jews needed to act as bankers and money-lenders and successfully negotiate business deals. In line with this, Ashkenazi Jewish spatial intelligence is approximately the same as that of Europeans. Cochran and his colleagues show that this Jewish inbreeding, often involving consanguineous marriage, led to a number of fitness-damaging genetic conditions that were long prevalent among the Ashkenazi. They show that if one has one copy of the related allele then one’s intelligence will be, on average, higher than that of the control. However, if one has two copies, then one will

suffer from a fitness-reducing condition. Under pre-modern conditions of 40 percent child mortality, those who carried two copies of the gene would likely have died young and failed to reproduce. Those who carried one copy would likely have accrued greater wealth, resulting in increased genetic fitness. Accordingly, we see a clear example of inbreeding vigor in which, under pre-industrial conditions, it benefited Jews to marry those who were genetically extremely similar to themselves, including their own cousins.

This brings us into the arena of modal Jewish personality. Jews are stereotyped as being highly ethnocentric. Direct evidence of Jewish ethnocentrism (in comparison to that of Germans) can be seen in the behavior of babies, such behavior being very likely to be strongly genetic in origin as the earlier a trait manifests, the more genetically-influenced it is likely to be. Developmental psychologists have found unusually intense fear reactions among Israeli infants in response to strangers, while the opposite pattern is found for infants from North Germany. The Israeli infants were much more likely to become “inconsolably upset” in reaction to strangers, whereas the North German infants had relatively minor reactions to strangers. The Israeli babies therefore tended to have an unusual degree of “stranger danger” anxiety, while the North German babies were the opposite—findings that fit with the hypothesis that Jews are more (negatively) ethnocentric than Europeans.⁵⁶⁹ More recently, data from the MIDUS study of middle-aged Americans shows that among White Europeans, there is a significant positive correlation between how religious they are and how group-oriented they are, an association that also exists in the Jewish sample. However, the Jews were the most ethnocentric (or group-oriented) religious group, despite being the least religious, and they maintained this status when factors such as religiousness and intelligence were controlled for.⁵⁷⁰

A plausible explanation is that their high levels of ethnocentrism are a function of their small gene pool, with their historical isolation and persecution selecting for ethnocentrism. It may be that the experience of the Holocaust would have boosted Jewish ethnocentrism, but Jewish ethnocentrism was observed long before the Second World War.⁵⁷¹ A reasonable explanation is that Jews are highly ethnocentric for partly genetic reasons, their high ethnocentrism being a stereotype about them that has been remarked upon throughout their history in Europe.⁵⁷² We should remember that stereotypes—including racial stereotypes—have a strong degree of empirical accuracy.⁵⁷³ One study compared samples of different religious groups in the U.S.—specifically Baptists, Catholics,

Methodists, Jews, and Atheists/Agnostics—asking subjects what they felt were most important in order to live a “good life.” Jews, in contrast to all the other groups, highlighted “extra money.” Jews and Atheists/Agnostics, in contrast to the other groups, also valued “a sense of accomplishment.”⁵⁷⁴

Ashkenazi Jews, interestingly, have the precise kind of personality that is associated with socioeconomic “accomplishment.” Specifically, according to research by Curtis Dunkel and his colleagues, the Ashkenazi score higher than Europeans on the General Factor of Personality (GFP); the “socially positive” poles of each of the Big Five personality traits. This Gentile-Jewish difference persists even when controlling for intelligence, so it is not a result of the relationship between IQ and prosocial behavior patterns.⁵⁷⁵ This, beyond Ashkenazi high IQ, would help explain high levels of Ashkenazi Jewish achievement. It is particularly important, as studies of other high IQ peoples have shown that they are lower in GFP than the lower IQ comparative sample. This is the case when comparing Finns and Finland’s Swedish-speaking minority, who are a cline between Finns and Swedes. In this instance, the cause of lower Finnish GFP is lower Extraversion and higher Neuroticism overwhelming other positive traits, with Finns’ higher Neuroticism likely being due to higher social anxiety.⁵⁷⁶

In addition, there is also evidence of elevated schizophrenia and bipolar disorder among Ashkenazi Jews. A meta-analysis of studies of the Ashkenazi genome has found that the Ashkenazi are as much as 40 percent more likely than controls to carry gene forms associated with both schizophrenia and bipolar disorder. These gene forms elevated the probability, in other samples, of developing schizophrenia or bipolar disorder by 15 percent.⁵⁷⁷ These findings would be in line with the stereotype of Jewish people as neurotic—in the quotidian sense of the word—and paranoid.⁵⁷⁸ There is also some evidence that Jewish males—though not females—are more prone to depression than are controls.⁵⁷⁹ It is possible that this is congruous with Ashkenazi higher overall GFP insomuch as an optimum level of relatively high anxiety has been shown to be associated with success in higher education.⁵⁸⁰

The Culture of Critique

One of the more “controversial” theories about Ashkenazi Jews is American psychologist Kevin MacDonald’s model established in his book *The Culture of*

Critique (2002)⁵⁸¹, and which drew upon his earlier writings on Jewish history, *A People That Shall Dwell Alone* (1994) and *Separation and Its Discontents* (1998)⁵⁸². MacDonald argues that Jews have indirectly promoted their own genetic interests by actively undermining those of their rivals. Jewish intellectuals and activists have subjected traditional ways of thinking that promote group-level evolutionary success, such as ethnic nationalism, religiousness, and certain forms of science, to withering skepticism and critique. They have, in turn, spearheaded movements of revolutionary change in their host societies, of moral or intellectual or political characters, ultimately to the point of radically changing the national population itself.

The first and most world-shaking of these ideologies and movements was Communism and Bolshevism—the lodestar for overturning of the “old world.” The contention that Communism has a pronounced Jewish character is often rejected as a “conspiracy theory,” but it is seemingly based in fact. Karl Marx (1818-1883) himself was ethnically Jewish, though his family converted to Lutheranism. Vladimir Lenin was of partial Jewish ancestry; Leon Trotsky (1879-1940) was born of Ukrainian-Jewish landowners; the trend continues outside of the Russian context, with Rosa Luxemburg (1871-1919) and György Lukács (1885-1971), Karl Kautsky (1854-1938), and many others.

Jews never made up more than five percent of the Russian population, but, as Yuri Slezkine details in *The Jewish Century*, “In all the revolutionary parties, Jews were particularly well represented at the top, among theoreticians, journalists, and leaders.”⁵⁸³ At the 1917 First All-Russian Congress of Soviets, some 31 percent of delegates were Jews. “At the Bolshevik Central Committee meeting of October 23, 1917, which voted to launch an armed insurrection, 5 out of the 12 members present were Jews.”⁵⁸⁴ Even by the 1930s, Jews were prominently placed within the Communist apparatus: 42 of the 111 officials of the NKVD (secret police) were Jewish.⁵⁸⁵

The situation of Jews in the Soviet Union became complicated, as many of the original Jewish Bolsheviks found themselves persecuted or executed under the leadership of Joseph Stalin (1878-1953). Indeed, Stalin’s own concept of “Socialism in One Country” marked a certain turn towards Russian nationalism, as did his calls for defense of the “Motherland” after Germany’s invasion in 1941. Nevertheless, Jewish prominence—indeed, indispensability—in early Communism simply cannot be discounted.

While Communists sought political and economic change, most of the figures MacDonal focuses on sought changes of the mind. Psychoanalysis was originated by Sigmund Freud (1856-1939), who was openly Jewish. Freud began as a clinical psychiatrist at the Vienna General Hospital, but has been deeply influential due to the philosophical, sociological, and historical nature of his writings. Moving away from empirical and medicinal approaches to psychosis, Freud developed a systemic theory of the mind, whose pre- or a-rational composition was reflected in dreams. There is the primal “Id” (*Das Es*), representing our instinctive, carnal desires; the “Ego” (*Das Ich*), the semi-conscious, navigating grasp of reality and self; and the “Super-Ego” (*Über-Ich*), the internalization of external values, morality, and guilt-mechanisms or, as Freud conceived it, the Father’s “No.”

While the efficacy of psychoanalysis on patients has always been in dispute, Freud succeeded in creating a totalizing system for understanding the human subject. Ideas like the “pleasure principle” (the defining of human action as a quest for sexual satisfaction, even deviancy) and “repression” (the unconscious suppression of “forbidden desire,” leading to neurosis and hysteria) have perhaps had their greatest impact outside clinical psychiatry.

Much as with Nietzsche and Darwin, Freud irrevocably undermined humanity’s view of itself as a rational, moral actor. *Everything*—from parental relationships to religion and myth to everyday slips of the tongue—was psychologized and, it can be argued, traumatized and sexualized. There is evidence that the more sexually repressed people and societies tend to be, the more creative and successful they are, as sexual energy is sublimated into accomplishment and expression⁵⁸⁶, an idea Freud himself endorsed in *Civilization and its Discontents* (1930). But regardless of Freud’s intentions and sensibilities, psychoanalysis had its most lasting impact in the promotion of “sexual liberation,” the unburdening of the “repression” that made civilization possible.

In Chapter 5, we discussed the changing face of anthropology, in particular the embrace of “cultural relativism” and “environmentalism” (which shouldn’t be confused with natural conservation), which has contributed to scientific discussion of race being deemed “taboo.” MacDonal argues that this is another example of a Jewish-led movement disrupting trends in society that are adaptive. As we learned, modern Anthropology was effectively founded by the Jewish American Franz Boas. Boas directed his academic efforts against those of

Madison Grant—thus squarely against efforts in eugenics, immigration restriction, and the conservation of a particular American type. This adoption of “cultural relativism” eventuated in overturning long-held beliefs in European superiority and, arguably, laid the groundwork for a belief in non-European superiority.

MacDonald devotes serious attention to the highly influential movement of Critical Theory or Cultural Marxism. These intellectual currents emanated from the Institute for Social Research in Frankfurt, Germany, during the Weimar Republic, before crossing the Atlantic to the United States. The so-called “Frankfurt School” was composed almost entirely of Jews, including Theodor Adorno (1903-1969), Walter Benjamin (1892-1940), Max Horkheimer (1895-1973), Herbert Marcuse (1898-1979), among others, and sought a synthesis of Marxism, Freudianism, sociology, and, in the case of Adorno, musicology. Adorno and company were harshly critical of National Socialist Germany (understandable given their predicament), but then were equally caustic towards their new American home—both for its uniformity and shallowness (the “culture industry”), as well as the fascism they saw lurking within.

Adorno’s most famous—if not quite his most representative—project was *The Authoritarian Personality* (1950)⁵⁸⁷. It was accompanied by a personality test developed for the state of California, “The F-scale”—the “F” is for fascism. The F-Scale was based on the spectrum between an “authoritarian” and “revolutionary” personality—the latter being replaced by “democratic” for the American audience. As Nathan Glazer observed in 1954, “No volume published since the war in the field of social psychology has had a greater impact on the direction of the actual empirical work being carried on in the universities today.”⁵⁸⁸ *The Authoritarian Personality* measured the following “anti-democratic trends”⁵⁸⁹:

- *Conventionalism*: rigid Adherence to conventional, middle-class values [...]
- *Authoritarian Submission*: a submissive and uncritical attitude towards authority figures [...]
- *Authoritarian Aggression*: a tendency to be on the lookout for, and to condemn reject and punish, people who violate convention values [...]
- *Anti-Intraception*: Opposition to the subjective, the imaginative, the tender-minded [...]
- *Superstition and Stereotypy*: the belief in mystical determinants of the individual’s fate [...]
- *Power and “Toughness”*: Preoccupation with the dominance-submission, strong-weak, leader-follower dimension; identification with power figures [...]

- *Destructiveness and Cynicism*: generalized hostility, vilification of the human [...]
- *Projectivity*: The disposition to believe that wild and dangerous things go on in the world; the projection outwards of unconscious emotional impulses [...]
- *Sex*: Exaggerated concern with sexual “goings-on” [...]

What is perhaps most remarkable about this list is how evolutionary adaptive the traits are that Adorno sought to target, pathologize, and correct. It is remarkable, as well, as MacDonald points out, for the fact that “F-scale” is directed at Gentiles, not towards Jewish ethnocentrism.⁵⁹⁰

Finally, ideologies such as postmodernism can be cautiously placed under this umbrella of the century-long “culture of critique.” Postmodernism is characterized by the view that there is no such thing as objective truth, because truth is merely the worldview of those in power. Morally, we must challenge those in power—by deconstructing their “truth”—and promote those who do not have power. Those who are regarded as disempowered include non-Western peoples. More broadly, postmodernism undermines a sense of structure, certainty, and superiority among Western peoples, akin, in some ways, to religion. They have no purpose, nothing is true, and there is simply no point: you may as well simply enjoy your life as there is no greater purpose, such as God or the good of your group. Many key-players in postmodernism were Jewish, such as Jacques Derrida (1930-2004), who was the leading figure in “deconstructionism.”

The key aspect to MacDonald’s theory is *not* that many Jews in the 20th century promoted “bad ideas”—for so did many Gentiles. Moreover, many of the ideas sketched out above can be taken in directions that clearly do not serve Jewish interests. Instead, MacDonald’s theory is based on the core contention that Jewish activism and intellectual activity reflects a long-term evolutionary strategy originating in their ancestral home in the “Middle Old World” cultural area. According to MacDonald, Jews arose in a context of inter-group conflict, in which multi-racial regions promoted highly ethnocentric, dogmatic, and rigid groups. Put simply, Jews evolved for inter-group warfare, and they are adapted to navigating a hostile environment. Europeans, on the other hand, evolved in hunter-gather societies of the North Eurasian and Circumpolar culture, a context that promoted the simple household, and individualism.⁵⁹¹

A Critique of The Critique

In 2018, Jewish-American philosopher Nathan Cofnas presented a detailed

critique of MacDonald's theory in the journal *Human Nature*.⁵⁹² He questions whether Jews are more ethnocentric than Gentiles, complicates the story of Jewish leftist activism, and argues that a simpler explanation is that Jews are simply more intelligent than Gentiles and accordingly over-represented in all intellectual movements (at least the non-anti-Semitic ones).

It can be countered that there is clear evidence that Jews are more ethnocentric than Gentiles, as we have already observed. On this basis, we would predict that in all aspects of life—and to a greater extent than Gentiles—Jews would be prone to seeking to elevate their own group genetic interests. This would include their espousal of the ideologies discussed earlier. Through “effortful control,” they would be better able to persuade themselves of the veracity of a worldview that is useful to believe, whatever the empirical evidence. Indeed, high intelligence has been shown to be associated with this ability.⁵⁹³

Moreover, J. Philippe Rushton's Genetic Similarity Theory can shed light on the matter. This theory highlights the fact that we tend to naturally engage in ethnic nepotism as a means of promoting our interests. This begins with the mate we choose and those we find physically attractive, which tend to be people who are optimally genetically similar to us, and this goes down to life's minutiae, such as which two academic sources making the same essential point we choose to cite when writing an article for an academic journal.⁵⁹⁴ We also act, more narrowly, in our specific personal genetic interests in everyday life, with “genetic similarity” predicting which friendships we contract, whom we vote for, and even which of our full siblings we get on with best.⁵⁹⁵

This raises an important question: If people ineluctably follow their inclusive fitness interests, why are Whites permitting their societies to diversify? Why are so many of them eager to welcome foreign people into their societies? Certainly, one intervening variable is strength of ethnic identity, which can be boosted or depressed by culture and by leaders. As we already discussed in exploring race differences in ethnocentrism, a salient factor in the strength of a group's ethnocentrism is religion, and a number of factors have acted to depress religiousness, especially in Western European countries. These include low levels of mortality salience and, simply, prominent people constantly questioning traditional religiousness and thus undermining it.

Cofnas notes of Communism that Jews in Poland were more likely than Whites to be killed by the Communist secret police. This, he argues, is consistent with Jews being over-represented among the Communist elite solely because of

their high intelligence in comparison to the Polish. But it can be countered that this is not a fair representation of MacDonald's argument. The key point is whether it can be argued, in theory, that an ideology such as Marxism would undermine the traditions (religion being one) that have held Western countries together and promoted the qualities of positive and negative ethnocentrism, which it has been shown ultimately lead to groups triumphing in the battle of group selection. However, it is quite possible for a way of thinking to evolve, which might prove quite dangerous for many members of your group (which Communism certainly was), and yet this way of thinking can be, ultimately, advantageous for the group as a whole. For example, it has been shown that the Medieval European practice of executing almost all felons—and thus around two percent of the male population every generation—elevated European GFP,⁵⁹⁶ intelligence, and religiousness⁵⁹⁷ and thus group selectiveness. And it has been demonstrated that religiousness is robustly associated with both positive and negative ethnocentrism.⁵⁹⁸ Marxism helps to undermine all of these things in European populations, therefore it follows that Marxism is in the group interests of ethnic minorities within this population. So, even if members of this minority were disproportionately killed, it is still, in the long run, in their group interest. Indeed, in that Marxism would be in their group interest, it may even be that it was the less group-selected Jews who would have been disproportionately killed, because they would be more prone to questioning the dominant system and not co-operating with it, which in the case of Communism would be in the Jewish group interest in that situation.

A Defense of The Critique

In the summer of 2018, I presented my critique of Cofnas' critique in the journal *Evolutionary Psychological Science*.⁵⁹⁹ This led to a predictable furor. The online magazine *UnDark* ran an entire article on the affair entitled “Kevin MacDonald and the Elevation of Anti-Semitic Pseudoscience” and subtitled “Why are ostensibly respectable, peer-reviewed journals now publishing discussions of what has long been dismissed as bigoted psychological research?”⁶⁰⁰ The article was hardly impartial. The use of the word “journals,” in the plural, implied not just that *Evolutionary Psychological Science* was morally wrong to publish a guarded defense of MacDonald's theory but that *Human Nature* was morally wrong to publish Cofnas's critique of it in the first place. The whole matter was apparently *verboten*; the author rhetorically asks, “Does

bigoted academic work like Kevin MacDonald's warrant a fair rebuttal, or does that legitimize it as part of mainstream discourse?" Further testimony to the report's lack of objectivity was the fact that it was illustrated with a cartoon image of a member of the Ku Klux Klan hiding behind a bookshelf. The author, Michael Schulson, himself Jewish,⁶⁰¹ implied that if empirical research leads to conclusions that "mirror" anti-Semitic beliefs, it is morally questionable to publish such research. He demanded that the editor of *Evolutionary Psychological Science*, Todd Shackelford, justify publishing my article, despite it passing peer review. Todd Shackelford duly did, but was evidently so flustered by a possible backlash that he seemingly forgot that my article had been peer-reviewed and that no further justification to publish is needed. In a follow-up email, he stressed his "serious reservations about Dutton's arguments"; however, he saw it as a serious response to Cofnas' dissection of MacDonald: "I thought Dutton did a very nice job of saying, 'hold on here, maybe we've thrown the baby out with the bathwater.'"

The fact that Schulson mentioned that Shackelford sent "a follow-up email" is further evidence of the article's sensationalist and biased angle, because it is a way of making Shackelford appear indecisive and worried. Schulson contacted the well-known Jewish-Canadian psychologist Steven Pinker, who sits on the journal's board. Pinker promptly, "sent a note to Shackelford . . . expressing his disappointment with the decision to publish [Dutton's article]." Shackelford then emailed Schulson again, stating that the journal would invite Cofnas to write a response to my rejoinder, which would, therefore, not be peer-reviewed. This Cofnas promptly did.

In his last missive on the matter, Cofnas argued that there was only weak evidence that people act in the interests of their ethnicities and that, most of the time, people do not act in their genetic interests.⁶⁰² As we have seen above, the evidence against this assertion is extremely strong. Cofnas further maintained that American Jews have the highest intermarriage rate of any religious group in the U.S., which, he suggested, is inconsistent with pronounced Jewish ethnocentrism. But according to Frank Salter, raw intermarriage rates are a poor guide to ethnocentrism.⁶⁰³ It is true that ethnocentrism motivates people to marry within their identity group; however, the raw intermarriage rates need to be compared to the rates to be expected if mate choice were random with respect to ethnicity or religion. Salter notes that in 2014, the Jewish intermarriage rate of 35 percent was roughly equivalent to that of mainline Protestants, which was 41

percent.⁶⁰⁴ But we cannot draw the conclusion that the two populations had similar levels of ethnocentrism from these data. This becomes clear if we switch from intermarriage to in-marriage (endogamy) and compare the actual rates of in-marriage with the probability of doing so if people ignored religion when choosing a spouse. In 2014, Jews were 1.9 percent of the American population, while mainline Protestants were 14.7 percent.⁶⁰⁵ That means that for Jews, the probability of meeting another Jew, assuming even distribution of religions (more about that later), was 0.036 percent. For mainline Protestants, the chance of meeting someone of the same religion was 2.2 percent.⁶⁰⁶ But the in-marriage rates were much higher for both religions, indicating that something—and the most likely candidate is ethnocentrism—drew some individuals to choose a spouse of the same religion. Different levels of ethnocentrism were required to achieve these two rates of in-marriage, because, by chance alone, mainline Protestants were more likely than Jews to encounter and marry coreligionists. Ethnocentrism is estimated by dividing the actual in-marriage rate by the rate expected by chance. The result is that in 2014, Jewish ethnocentrism was 49 times that of mainline Protestant ethnocentrism.⁶⁰⁷

It could be argued that this estimate is unrealistic because Jews are geographically and occupationally more concentrated than Protestants, due to non-ethnocentric factors such as elevated IQ and occupational preference. However, the discounting of Jewish ethnocentrism cannot be taken far unless their concentration is shown to have been 49 times greater than that of mainline Protestants. It would also need to be shown that this concentration was not produced by ethnocentrism itself. Both of those conditions are implausible, leaving the result that Jewish ethnocentrism is high, based on remarkably high rates of endogamous marriage.

And it can be further countered, against Cofnas' argument, that the divorce rate in these exogamous marriages is much higher than with endogamous marriages, consistent with Genetic Similarity Theory. Furthermore, the fact that Jews may be low on one marker of ethnocentrism in no way challenges the evidence they are higher in ethnocentrism than Whites. Indeed, such behavior could be understood as part of a group selection strategy. It is possible that an optimum level of exogamy could be just such a strategy. Jews carrying genes that made them highly ethnocentric would, under such conditions, have been more likely to remain Jews, while those who were low in ethnocentrism would have defected. With a certain level of attrition in every generation, combined

with Gentiles of lower ethnocentrism marrying-in, an optimum level of ethnocentrism could be produced. Such a strategy could potentially have a number of interrelated benefits. First, it would dilute the gene pool, which would be important if the group had become so endogamous that it was at increasing risk from double doses of harmful mutant genes. Secondly, when the minority is small, as is the case with Ashkenazi Jews in the U.S., it cannot hope to demographically dominate the majority and it can easily be dominated by the majority. Having lots of children, in an attempt to become the majority, would not work in a context of Darwinian selection, where the majority would also have as many offspring as they could. It seems possible that under certain conditions, an optimum strategy for avoiding persecution, and maximizing resources and influence, would be for a minority group to ingratiate itself with the majority population via an optimum level of endogamy. This will likely lead to a positive perception of the ethnic minority as a whole, helping to defuse any hostility or resentment which may be felt towards it, so long as the optimum balance is maintained.

This would not be a conscious or deliberate strategy. It would not be designed in any way, but it would, by happenstance, permit the minority to survive and flourish—minorities with different strategies having failed to do so. The offspring of such Jewish-Gentile marriages may even themselves identify as Gentiles. The conditions for this could be, for example, that the populations are physiologically similar, so that the genetic differences are not visibly apparent amongst spouses and their children, and that the human capital of the minority population is higher on average. That they generally do better than the average person will make them attractive as spouses and next of kin. It's difficult not to notice that in 2020, both major-party presidential candidates, Donald Trump and Joe Biden, have families that have intermarried with Jews, and in the case of Ivanka Trump, converted to Judaism. Although the optimum level of endogamy will sometimes not be reached, the strategy has at least protected the core Jewish population from persecution since World War II. Moreover, this works as a group strategy as long as the genetic similarity of the Jews (or Gentile-identifying offspring of a Jew) who pursue it, when compared to the Orthodox core, is greater than the genetic similarity between these liberal Jews and the Gentiles whom they marry. If exogamous Jews are more similar to the endogamous Jews than they are to the Gentiles, then the strategy is elevating the fitness, at the group level, of these exogamous Jews. We can conceive of a process whereby Orthodox Jews have children who become Reformed Jews,

who, in turn, have children who marry exogamously. As such, it is quite possible for high exogamy on the part of Reformed Jews to be a central component of an ethnocentric group strategy, with the Jewish group as a whole having better survived under conditions of intergroup conflict precisely because it has acted in this way.⁶⁰⁸ It must be stressed, once more, that we are not talking about a conscious strategy of some Jews strategically marrying Gentiles because they have calculated that it will aid their ethnic group. This is an evolutionary process, with Jewish exogamy having long been pursued in European societies.⁶⁰⁹ When Kevin MacDonald submitted a defense of my model to *Evolutionary Psychological Science*, the journal desk-rejected it (that is, refused to send it out for peer-review), “saying they didn’t want to have any more on this topic.”⁶¹⁰

MacDonald, in his original work on the “Culture of Critique,” presented a *qualitative* argument, akin to the kind of arguments presented by historians, for his case that key movements that undermine European ethnocentrism have been Jewish-centered. From the perspective of evolutionary psychology, it would be extremely surprising if he were wrong. Based on Rushton’s findings, we would expect that, in general, intellectuals would be attracted to theories that assisted their genetic interests. Moreover, this would be particularly likely to be true in a highly ethnocentric population, such as Jewish people or Northeast Asians⁶¹¹ and it would be less likely to be true among Europeans, as they are lower in ethnocentrism.

A number of criticisms have been leveled against this theory by the public academic Steven Pinker.⁶¹² Some are easily countered. Pinker claims, for example, that by arguing that Jews pursue certain hypotheses because they are Jewish, MacDonald is engaging in *ad hominem* criticism. I cannot see how this is relevant. If you engage in a meta-academic analysis, then it is legitimate to explore that which motivates academics, as they are merely people. This does not amount to an appeal *ad hominem*. MacDonald is not arguing that an idea is wrong *because* its advocate is a Jew.

Pinker criticizes MacDonald for the kind of language he uses and asserts that this gives the impression that this is no ordinary scientific hypothesis. This, of course, really is an “appeal *ad hominem*.” MacDonald’s personal views on the Jews are irrelevant to whether or not his theory is persuasive. Moreover, if MacDonald is right, we would actually expect that an American ethno-nationalist would be more likely to espouse such a theory than a less

ethnocentric colleague, whether it was logical or not. So if MacDonald is anti-Semitic, it is actually consistent with his own theory. Pinker highlights the fact that MacDonald uses no control group, nor does he compare his theory with other alternatives. With regard to the first criticism, it could be argued that MacDonald's theory is very difficult to statistically prove; it is qualitative, historical, and sociological. It would not necessarily help to show that Jewish people are over-represented in a particular intellectual school, for example, because we would expect this anyway by virtue of their superior intelligence. And even if Jewish people are not statistically over-represented in what MacDonald calls "Jewish intellectual movements," this has no bearing on the qualitative issue of how influential Jewish people are in these movements or what is likely to have motivated them. But, in theory, this could be quantitatively tested by agreeing on who are the most important people in certain intellectual movements and agreeing on a definition of Jewish.

Pinker is right that the model would benefit from a control group. If you are going to argue that Jews are particularly ethnocentric, it is necessary to show that other groups have not behaved in the same way. That said, there is a large body of evidence of particularly strong ethnocentrism among even secular Jews.⁶¹³ It would be useful if MacDonald showed that other ethnic groups behave in the same kind of way, and we will turn to this matter shortly. Finally, Pinker proposes an alternative theory—the "middleman minority." According to this model, many societies have hosted ethnic minorities who specialize in relatively cognitively demanding professions, and the wealthy and prominent in elite professions provoke animosity and are the subject of conspiracy theories, especially accusations that they have stolen the wealth of the native population.

Though Pinker's alternative model seems fairly accurate, a strong argument can be made that Jews are significantly different from other middleman minority groups, primarily due to their cultural, as well as economic, influence. The theory of middleman minority groups, developed first by Hubert Blalock⁶¹⁴ and refined by Edna Bonacich⁶¹⁵, remains imprecisely defined. But to the extent that it broadly refers to ethnic minorities that occupy an intermediate, rather than a low-status position, and who concentrate in trade, finance, and similar lines, the historical profile of the Jews in Europe certainly has some striking parallels with that of, say, the Chinese in Southeast Asia and the Indians in East Africa. These populations, as well, have aroused high levels of hostility among their respective national hosts.

Strong differences emerge, however, from the fact the Jews became intensively involved in European culture and politics following successive emancipations in the wake of the French Revolution. After this point, Jews became involved in European society to a much greater degree than any other middleman minority, whose presence in their respective host population was, and remains, largely economic. In fact, hostility towards Jews in Europe, which reached its peak in the form of legislation and violence in the early 20th century, occurred at a time when Jews had been economically diversified to a greater extent than at any other point in their history. The complaints of anti-Semites from this period do make reference to the local economic control of Jews, which tended in countries like Romania to be nearly monopolistic, but also to perceived cultural hostility and allegations of dual loyalties and an international conspiracy. Unlike the Chinese in Southeast Asia and the Indians in East Africa, whose forays into Filipino and Ugandan cultures were minimal, Jews across the West have produced many intellectuals and organizations, from Moses Mendelssohn (1729-1786) to the ADL, that seek to “make space” culturally for Jews within the host society, and to change its values in a way that benefits Jews and other minorities. Bonacich argues that host hostility is often aroused against middleman minorities because “elements in each group have incompatible goals.”⁶¹⁶ The argument could be made that this is applicable to the history of the Jews in Europe, whose goals are perhaps more extensive, and more prone to arousing the highest levels of host hostility, than those of other middleman minorities. Overall, while it can, perhaps, be argued that MacDonald over-emphasizes the uniqueness of the Jews, in the end, the “middleman minority” theory is not inconsistent with MacDonald’s thesis.

I would suggest that there are four dimensions to the Ashkenazi personality that predict their over-representation in “Critique” movements. Firstly, there is the high intelligence, which Cofnas highlights and which would predict their over-representation in most all matters intellectual. Secondly, there is their high General Factor of Personality, which would predict the same. Thirdly, there is their high ethnocentrism, which would predict that they would gravitate towards movements they perceived as being in their ethnic interests. Fourthly, there are their relatively high levels of schizophrenia and bipolar disorder. As we have discussed, schizophrenia is associated with over-empathizing and over-detecting agency and an inability to systematize. This would potentially make people attracted to dogmatic and illogical worldviews, in particular those that involve a “hidden hand” working behind the scenes. There is clear evidence, in this regard,

that schizophrenia is associated with being attracted to the paranormal and to conspiracy theories, partly because of the paranoia that is typically part of schizophrenia.⁶¹⁷ This is present in all of the ideologies highlighted by MacDonald. In Marxism, it is reified History that unfolds before our eyes; in postmodernism, everything, even truth itself, is ultimately the product of “power.” There is also a very weak association between Neuroticism and adhering to such theories,⁶¹⁸ which may be related to high Ashkenazi levels of bipolar disorder. In addition, proneness to psychosis is associated with militant political extremism,⁶¹⁹ which might be understood to be, in a diluted form, ideological fervor. Thus, elevated proneness to psychosis among Ashkenazi Jews, combined with high ethnocentrism, would neatly explain their attraction to leftist ideologies, while their high intelligence would explain their eminent positions in such ideological groups.

The question of the Jewish nature of “the Left” will remain with us, particularly as leftism and liberalism increasingly become the dominant moral system in the Western world. But we should not let that distract us from the broader Jewish story of survival—what Pascal offered as “proof of the existence of miracles.”

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mainline Protestants the probability was $0.147 \times 0.147 = 0.0216$.

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The Future of A Taboo

Conclusion

Returning to the pubs where great athletes, and the full variety of their abilities, get discussed . . . to our hospital cafeteria, where doctors fret over the lack of South Asian kidney donors . . . or to our primary school where the children of South Korean parents are coming out on top once again . . . These phenomena, and more, all make sense if we accept something that almost everybody accepted a century ago—*race is a reality, and race matters*.

If there is any biological component to race at all—skin color being an obvious example—then it must be a biological reality on a basic level. Race is as much a biological reality—and as much a “social construct”—as any other category in the human sciences. “Race” is as much of a social construct in human biology as “sub-species” is in ecology; it’s even as much of a social construct as “species” itself. Every concept is a linguistic or mathematical abstraction from reality. As such, every concept will invariably have “blurry borders” and surprising exceptions; and every useful and sound concept is worthy of refinement and revision as knowledge increases. “Race” is useful and sound because it allows accurate predictions to be made, and thus proves itself to be a successful means of mapping the world. For a medical doctor, understanding race can save lives; it improves the chances of accurate diagnosis and treatment and ensures that patients are given the most appropriate medicine or donated organ. For a police pathologist, identifying the race of a skeleton—which can be done with 80 percent accuracy⁶²⁰—can aid in discovering who the long-buried murder victim was. In the less consequential realm of sport, race helps fans better understand disparities in outcomes; and race has unquestionably been a paradigm for coaches and managers filling out their team, even if it is an increasingly unspoken one.

Making Sense of Race is not a definitive account of its subject; that is too much to ask of a book of this size—or of any size. But, hopefully, it is a relatively *definitive introduction*. It’s an invitation to “think racially” about mankind, society, culture, politics, world affairs, sport, and many other aspects of the human experience. The information we have explored helps us to be better equipped to understand the world—and make predictions about it. Moreover, the references in this volume can act as “breadcrumbs,” which you can follow, examining the material and data for yourself and developing a deeper understanding of this fascinating subject.

This final chapter will serve two functions. The first is to outline some of the latest research on race, now that the core concepts are clear in our minds. The second is to return to the prickly matter of *race as taboo*, which I brought up in the Introduction and which has returned throughout this book. There is certainly reason to hope that greater scientific knowledge about race will inform better public policy and better inter-racial understanding. After all, in an increasingly globalized, interconnected world, race *must* be addressed; and it were better if addressed rationally, after calm consideration of the empirical evidence. But there is also cause not to be particularly sanguine about that prospect. . . This derives, in part, from some of the concepts explored in this book, including ethno-nationalism, religiosity, and components of human personality. It's also a part of something bigger, beyond the scope of this book—the governing ideologies of our time. We are told that we live in a “secular age,” and yet, time-worn religious concepts keep returning under new guises. Race is not like any other contentious scientific subject. “String theory” and “electromagnetism,” for example, can be debated—with passion, to be sure—but with an absence of rancor and condemnation. Race, it seems, cannot. And this is because the ideology of Multiculturalism conforms to a kind of religious, and specifically Christian, logic. *We have sinned* (racism, slavery, colonialism, etc.). *We seek contrition* (anti-racism, color-blindness). *And we hope for redemption* (a post-racial society). Among other things, this belief system has suppressed a serious discussion of racial reality—instituting new designations for what is “sacrilege” and who we consider “heretics.” This is because, if race differences in outcomes are significantly genetic, they have nothing to do with our “sins,” leading to a fundamental challenge to the New Church and all those invested in it.

But before we delve into this “gloomy” territory, let's gaze onto brighter pastures. If, as we have shown, race is a scientific category, then there will always be new avenues of research open to us. Our understanding of racial differences will continue to become ever more nuanced and detailed, and we would expect there to exist race differences in superficially bizarre or recondite areas. On closer inspection, however, there would be a feasible evolutionary reason for these differences.

Ear Wax, Body Odor, and Bad Breath

In that races are evolved to different ecologies, and thus display differences in gene frequencies, average genetic race differences exist on numerous traits.

These differences have manifested due to subtle and not-so-subtle differences in the environment to which the different races are evolved. No book on the subject of race could come close to setting out all of these differences. There are, for example, consistent race differences in the size and shape of the teeth, in how easily the body retains Vitamin C, and even in how people experience taste. Taste sensitivity is higher among Native Americans and Africans than it is among Europeans and South Asians. Indeed, among South Asians, taste sensitivity is particularly low.⁶²¹ Could this partly help explain the South Asian propensity towards spicy food?

Another intriguing area of current research is ear-wax composition. There are racial differences in the smell and consistency of ear wax and these parallel racial differences in the strength of body odor. East Asians mainly have white, dry, flaky ear wax. Europeans and Sub-Saharan Africans mainly have yellow, wet ear wax, though among Sub-Saharan Africans it is a darker color, closer to orange. Other races are intermediate. For example, Native American ear wax is described as “dry White wax,” while people in South Asia vary, with roughly a third to half having one or other type.⁶²² The East Asian kind of ear wax does not smell to any significant degree, whereas European and Sub-Saharan African ear wax is pungent, the difference being down to a single gene. Those with the wet-type wax will also have more potent body odor.⁶²³

It has been demonstrated that the flakier kind of ear wax is more common the higher the latitude, meaning it is very likely an adaptation, in some way, to colder environs. Even among Europeans, where flaky ear wax is rarer, it is more common in colder ecologies.⁶²⁴ However, the pungency of ear wax varies along a consistent racial gradation, with volatile organic compounds—that is odor-causing compounds—being highest in Sub-Saharan Africans, then Caucasians, and lowest in East Asians.⁶²⁵ Baker argues that there are race differences in odor, with Blacks having the most apocrine (odor-secreting) glands, East Asians, the least, and Caucasians, intermediate.⁶²⁶ However, the ear wax finding means that the strength of the odor differs between races, regardless of the number of glands. Body odors are connected to human sexual attraction.⁶²⁷ Thus, it can be argued that, as with secondary sexual characteristics such as breasts, pungent ear wax (and scent in general) is a means of sexual advertisement. In an unstable ecology, you must advertise your genetic quality as conspicuously and immediately as possible. This would lead, as with breasts, to an arms race of stronger and stronger odor among those with good genes. This arms race would

be less pronounced the more *K*-evolved the ecology was. So, race differences in ear wax are as Rushton's model would predict.

Future research is likely to reveal numerous other significant race differences in all manner of obscure and fascinating areas. For example, there are documented sex differences in flatulence, with one study having found that female flatulence is less frequent than male but is greater in "olfactory offensiveness." The same is true of "bad breath." Females are more likely than males to suffer from bad breath due to "higher concentrations of sulphur compounds" in their breath.⁶²⁸ If these sex differences exist for genetic reasons, then it is possible that there are race differences in flatulence frequency and "olfactory offensiveness." In this regard, one study from the U.S. has found that Hispanics are the most likely to display "gastrointestinal symptoms" as a consequence of *Helicobacter pylori* infection. African-Americans are the most likely to have "dyspepsia"—indigestion, which could result in bad breath—due to this infection. Thus, the infection causes different noxious emissions in these two racial groups.⁶²⁹ There appears to be a stereotype that African-Americans have "bad breath," something which is put down to a supposed lack of oral hygiene.⁶³⁰ Another possibility is that, for genetic reasons, they are prone to breath that is of greater olfactory offensiveness. There is evidence that suffering from bad breath is partly genetic.⁶³¹ Moreover, we might expect bodily emissions to become more problematic the more intelligent a society becomes, due to the association between intelligence and taking in large amounts of information, and thus more easily becoming overstimulated.⁶³² For example, intelligence predicts color discrimination, because the more nuanced and detailed the information you take in, the better you can solve a problem.⁶³³ In this regard, it makes sense that Northeast Asians have long regarded Europeans as intolerably foul smelling.⁶³⁴

“I Have a (Lucid) Dream”

It is known that there are race differences in how you sleep. Whites move around more than Blacks; it's a way of keeping warm in an ecology where nights are very cold.⁶³⁵ Indeed, White Americans are three times more likely to suffer from "Restless Leg Syndrome" (where your leg shakes during sleep) than are African-Americans.⁶³⁶ But do races differ in the nature of their dreams? One study, albeit with a small sample, has found that IQ predicts incorporating new experiences into dreams to a greater extent, seemingly because the evolutionary

purpose of dreams is, in part, to effectively practice behavior that may be useful in waking life.⁶³⁷ This relationship was statistically significant only with regard to “early dreams,” which occurred during non-REM sleep. This is important, argue the researchers, because it is during non-REM sleep that people tend to create new memories. If this research is correct, then, by virtue of there being race differences in intelligence, we would expect to find race differences in the nature of dreams. The dreams of White people would be more likely to be about novel experiences undergone that day than would those of Black people, though we would expect this difference to disappear once intelligence was controlled for. It must be emphasized that, though significance was attained, the sample in the dream study discussed was only 24. But another study has revealed similar findings. The sleep quality of Black individuals is far more variable than that of Whites. This leads to them developing fewer memories and, in particular, fewer long-term memories.⁶³⁸ This would be consistent with a fast Life History Strategy, in which detailed knowledge of a stable ecology, and thus long-term memory, would be less important.

Tangential to this, a study in Virginia found that 76 percent of African-Americans reported having had a lucid dream, in which you are aware that you are dreaming. This compared to just 53 percent of Whites who had dreamt lucidly.⁶³⁹ Individuals who have lucid dreams are more prone to taking risks and enjoying taking risks, consistent with Black-White differences in Conscientiousness and possibly Extraversion. A high level of general arousal is also associated with lucid dreaming.⁶⁴⁰ Agreeableness has been shown to be negatively associated with lucid dreaming.⁶⁴¹ This would imply that there really are race differences in the quality of dreams and that these differences are evolutionarily underpinned. On this basis, we would expect Northeast Asians to have fewer lucid dreams than Whites. Indeed, a 2010 survey, though it found no significant difference between Blacks and Whites, reported that Asian Americans were much less likely to experience lucid dreams than Blacks or Whites.⁶⁴² More research is needed on the evolutionary mechanisms that undergird the relationship between personality type and lucid dreaming in order to make more sense of these race differences. In that lucid dreams decrease in frequency as one grows older, it may be that they are a manifestation of emotional immaturity, with East Asians being the most emotionally mature and so having the fewest lucid dreams.

Death To Heretics

While a great deal of research on racial differences takes place—this book wouldn't exist otherwise—it is sadly largely disconnected from policy-makers, as well as from most academics in the social sciences and humanities. Among popular intellectuals and journalists, those who communicate directly to the public, the ideas presented in this book are simply anathema.

Many of us who appreciate the reality and importance of race have long hoped that “one day” an irreproachable, eminently credible scientist might speak some sense on the matter—breaking open the gates for the rest of us. As we know, popular legitimacy for a point of view is derived not just by *what* is said but by *who* says it. Well, that “one day” arrived on October 14, 2007. Nobel laureate James Watson (b.1928) gave an interview to the *Times* of London in which he voiced the following observation:

I am inherently gloomy about the prospect of Africa because all our social policies are based on the fact that their intelligence is the same as ours—whereas all the testing says not really.”⁶⁴³

Hardly a bigoted “racist,” Watson took no pleasure in this fact; indeed, he wished that it were not so and hoped to find workable arrangements. But he stressed that these could only be devised once we came to terms with reality. It is difficult to imagine a more qualified person to bring this knowledge to the public. Watson, along with Francis Crick (1916-2004), co-discovered the double-helix structure of DNA in 1953; he is rightly remembered as one of the fathers of modern genetics and was a leading figure with the Human Genome Project. Who better to break the taboo?

After the *Times* interview was published, the outrage in the world media came fast and furious. Watson was widely denounced, and some speculated as to whether this once great man had lost his mind. Watson apologized almost immediately: “I cannot understand how I could have said what I am quoted as having said. There is no scientific basis for such a belief.”⁶⁴⁴ But that was not nearly enough. The next week, Watson was suspended as chancellor of the Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory on Long Island, as well as from its board of directors.⁶⁴⁵ The coming decade was one of silence and exile. In 2014, in an act of repentance, desperation, or humiliation, Watson auctioned off his Nobel Prize, claiming he wanted to donate some of the money to Cold Spring Harbor after being declared a “non-person” and bringing disfavor onto his institutional home.⁶⁴⁶

Interestingly, in 2019, some 12 years after the *Times* interview, Watson returned to the public eye for a documentary on his life made by American public television. When prompted in an on-camera interview on whether his views on race and intelligence had changed since 2007, Watson's response was "not at all."

I would like for them to have changed, that there be new knowledge that says that your nurture is much more important than nature. But I haven't seen any knowledge. And there's a difference on the average between blacks and whites on I.Q. tests. I would say the difference is, it's genetic."⁶⁴⁷

Watson has now entered his 90s and thus cannot be expected to be an energetic activist for unspeakable truths. But sadly, the "lesson learned" by most public scientists has been to talk about anything and everything except race. In reporting on the Watson affair, the *New York Times* interviewed various population geneticists, whose work implies racial differences, and yet who each balked at drawing obvious conclusions. One such man was Harvard geneticist David Reich, who has "argued that new techniques for studying DNA show that some human populations were geographically separated for long enough that they plausibly could have evolved average genetic differences in cognition and behavior." But Reich, the *Times* reports, rejects racial differences because they "correspond to longstanding popular stereotypes" and are thus "essentially guaranteed to be wrong."⁶⁴⁸ The problem is that stereotypes aren't "guaranteed to be wrong"; in fact, stereotypes generally carry a considerable amount of truth. You would only be exaggerating a little to say that they are "essentially guaranteed to be right," as they wouldn't exist if they weren't helpful.⁶⁴⁹ Someone like Reich, whose profession is to examine matters from an evolutionary standpoint, should recognize this.

Richard Dawkins, perhaps one of the most famous living scientists, has talked *around* the subject of race, and related matters like eugenics, for years in books and in the media. Yet at any moment when the situation becomes too sensitive—and when it appears as if he, too, might get "cancelled"—Dawkins strategically retreats. If he had lived in the age of Queen Victoria, publishing a book entitled *The God Delusion* might have come at great personal cost.⁶⁵⁰ Published in 2006, during the Prime Ministership of Tony Blair, Dawkins produced a work that, while controversial in some circles, ultimately rewarded him with speaking engagements, endowed university chairs, and television appearances—along with the patina of being "edgy." James Watson's mild comments, on the other hand, cast him into near-oblivion.

Can The World Accept Race?

In 2004, Anthropologist Vincent Sarich (1934-2012) and journalist Frank Miele, Senior Editor of *Skeptic* magazine, wrote a book with similar motivations as this one, *Race: The Reality of Human Differences*.⁶⁵¹ The authors sketched out three possible scenarios for how we might eventually “learn to live with race.” They foresaw three plausible ethical, economic, and political systems:

- **Meritocracy in the Global Marketplace**

Let the group-difference chips fall where they may, and try to manage resentment toward high-performance groups.

- **Affirmative Action, Race Norming, and Quotas**

State-enforced leveling down “at the expense of individual freedom and, ultimately, the total level of accomplishment.”

- **Rising Resegregation and the Emergence of Ethnopolitics**

Polarization and separation, with more danger, both domestic and international, from groups who see themselves as “victimized and shut out by the global marketplace.”⁶⁵²

Each of these paths would carry certain advantages and disadvantages. Global meritocracy and race blindness might, arguably, do the most for economic and scientific advancement—but it would also intensify inequality and resentment. As we discussed in the Introduction, modern Western states are governed on the basis of two separate ideologies, which arose at different points in time: *diversity*, on the one hand, and *civic nationalism* and *equality*, on the other. Put simply, *we’re all different . . . and we’re all the same*. Obvious racial disparities in outcome within nations—and even between nations—would almost invariably generate populist revolts. Every people wants its place in the sun. And it’s not an overstatement to say that “meritocratic globalism” generates its own destruction and is an entirely anti-human ideology at its core. We are simply not evolved to embrace such an arrangement. It is an evolutionary mismatch, because we are designed to function in societies of genetically relatively similar people.

We could also say that the three paths that Sarich and Miele propose, in fact, coexist today in modern Western nation-states, in an uneasy, volatile constellation. The United States, for instance, practices affirmative-action and race norming on the basis of national demographics in both private and public organizations, especially in academia. Yet these same institutions (or at least the big ones) also understand themselves as global in scope and open to the best talent from around the world. As a consequence, we see the rise of “identity

politics” among minority populations in the U.S., including those, like Hispanics, which are on their way to becoming pluralities. Even “White nationalism,” which was an entirely marginal ideology only a few decades prior, has become a hot topic in the mainstream media. A century from now, historians and political scientists might look back on our time as *transitory* in nature, based on patently conflicting norms, which, sooner or later, were bound to give way to a new dominant paradigm.

The more racially diverse a society is, the more ethnic conflict will become inevitable. People want to have a sense of “home”; they want to live with, and will disproportionately aid, members of their own race, and they will disproportionately distrust members of other races. In addition, as we have discussed, racial diversity reduces trust even *within* a particular racial group, because its members perceive their co-ethnics as possible enemy collaborators. As a result, the rise of “identity politics”—which includes, but is not limited to, block-voting in elections—should come to us as no surprise. This process will likely herald the decline of democracy, or at least “democracy” as it was understood in the 20th century, as the very idea of “us” is destabilized. The potential is real for racial demagoguery, as well as a kind of “authoritarian oligarchy,” in which ruling classes are disconnected from, or even hostile towards, the peoples they govern.⁶⁵³ We already see examples of this before our eyes.

Making sense of race is extremely important in these “interesting times.” I have no doubt that this book will be greeted with belligerence in some quarters. Others will actively ignore it, refusing to engage with concepts that are desperately relevant to their fields of expertise. But I did not write this book to generate outrage or division. I wrote it because it is vital to make sense of the world around us logically, systematically, and without the distraction of dogmas and emotion. And in the process, we might get closer to understanding who we really are.

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Table 4.1: Genetic Distances Between the Twelve Races of Classical Anthropology

	European	Non-European Caucasian	South Asian	Northeast Asian	Southeast Asian	Pacific Islander
European	0	0.0068	0.0093	0.0435	0.0364	0.0702
Non-European Caucasian	0.0068	0	0.011	0.0431	0.0381	0.0687
South Asian	0.0093	0.011	0	0.0367	0.0304	0.0637
Northeast Asian	0.0435	0.0431	0.0367	0	0.0056	0.0565
Southeast Asian	0.0093	0.0381	0.0304	0.0056	0	0.0572
Pacific Islander	0.0702	0.0687	0.0637	0.0565	0.0572	0
Native American	0.0615	0.0626	0.0582	0.0532	0.0572	0.0959
Arctic	0.044	0.0459	0.0402	0.021	0.0251	0.0708
Aborigine	0.0712	0.0691	0.066	0.0668	0.0683	0.055
Sub-Saharan African	0.0525	0.0459	0.0476	0.0673	0.0635	0.0635
Bushmen	0.0754	0.07	0.0712	0.0914	0.0880	0.1102

Pygmy 0.0719 0.066 0.0675 0.0838 0.0806 0.1019

	Native American	Arctic	Aborigine	Sub-Saharan African	Bushmen	Pygmy
	0.0615	0.044	0.0712	0.0525	0.0754	0.0719
	0.0626	0.0459	0.0691	0.0459	0.07	0.066
	0.0582	0.0402	0.066	0.0476	0.0712	0.0675
	0.0532	0.021	0.0668	0.0673	0.0914	0.0838
	0.0572	0.0251	0.0683	0.0635	0.0880	0.0806
	0.0959	0.0708	0.055	0.0857	0.1102	0.1019
	0.0576	0.0576	0.0985	0.091	0.1217	0.1098
	0.0985	0	0.0773	0.070	0.0993	0.0904
	0.091	0.0773	0	0.086	0.1128	0.1047
	0.1217	0.070	0.086	0	0.0466	0.040
	0.1098	0.0993	0.086	0.0466	0	0.0562
	0.1098	0.0904	0.1047	0.040	0.0562	0

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Figure 4.21: Steatopygia of a Khoi Female—“A Woman With Steatopygia,” Creative Commons, 19th century.

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About the Author

EDWARD DUTTON is Editor at Washington Summit Publishers. Based in Finland, he is a prolific researcher and commentator. In 2020, Dutton was made Professor of Evolutionary Psychology at Asbiro University in Łódź, Poland.

Born in London in 1980, Dutton read Theology at Durham University before completing a Ph.D. in Religious Studies at Aberdeen University in 2006. His research there was developed into his first book, *Meeting Jesus at University: Rites of Passage and Student Evangelicals*. He was made Docent of the Anthropology of Religion and Finnish Culture at Oulu University in 2011.

In 2012, Dutton made the move to evolutionary psychology and has never looked back. Dutton has published in leading psychology journals including *Intelligence, Personality and Individual Differences*, and the *Journal of Biosocial Science*. Among other positions, Dutton has been a guest researcher at Leiden University in the Netherlands and Umeå University in Sweden and an academic consultant to a research group at King Saud University in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Dutton's research has been reported on worldwide, by the *Daily Telegraph, The Sun, Le Monde, Newsweek*, among other publications, and his writings have been translated into Russian, Portuguese, Spanish, and Czech.

Dutton can be found online at his award-winning channel The Jolly Heretic. He is married to a Finn, has two young children, and enjoys Indian cooking and genealogy.