

SETTLER COLONIALISM *in the* TWENTIETH CENTURY

Edited by Caroline Elkins • Susan Pedersen



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Projects, Practices, Legacies

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Fig. 1 Africa in 1920, showing the colonies and the mandates. Reprinted with permission from *Africans: The History of a Continent*, by John Iliffe; © 1995 Cambridge University Press.




Fig. 2 East Asia c. 1940. Reprinted with permission by Oxford University Press from *Japanese Imperialism, 1894–1945*, by W. G. Beasley; © 1987 W. G. Beasley.

Introduction

Settler Colonialism: A Concept and Its Uses

CAROLINE ELKINS AND SUSAN PEDERSEN

The age of settler colonialism may be behind us, but its legacies are everywhere to be seen. Southern Africa's settler states have fallen to the force of nationalist movements and international opprobrium, but conflicts over the land, loyalty, and economic standing of the formerly dominant settler minority still wrack their successor majoritarian regimes. Repatriated settler populations remain touchstones for memories and controversies about the imperial past in Japan and France alike; Koreans and Taiwanese, Algerians and Kenyans live with the railroads and commodities, and sometimes the languages and laws, these alien masters brought with them. And if revolutions, immigration, and indigenous demographic collapse turned the new world settler colonies into nations, aboriginal or first-nation claims to land rights and cultural autonomy will not go away.

Does something unite these histories? Is there anything to be gained from examining Australia alongside Israel, or Northern Ireland against Zimbabwe? This book was born of the willingness of a group of scholars working in different fields to reach across specialization to try to answer that question. Taken together, the essays gathered here do two things. First, they demonstrate the continued centrality of settler projects to the histories of nations and empires in the twentieth century. In an era of endemic national rivalry, states sought to expand their spheres of influence or secure overseas possessions through settlement as well as economic integration. From the Japanese colonial project in Korea, to Portuguese settlement in Angola, to Mussolini's dreams of a Roman empire reborn in Ethiopia, to the Nazi project to transfer ethnic German communities to Poland, to French and British efforts after 1945 to knit their African settler colonies more tightly into the metropolitan economy, settlement remained a crucial part of imperial domination. Moreover, by juxtaposing these histories and by examining the ideologies, laws, and economic practices of settler colonial regimes comparatively, a second claim emerges. Settler colonialism, we believe, is a useful analytical concept to deploy when studying the

twentieth-century history of nations and empires. It is this second claim that this introduction seeks to substantiate.

Some Definitions

What do we mean, then, by *settler colonialism*? Settler colonialism is routinely and rightly distinguished from imperial expansion undertaken for military advantage or trade, for in such cases imperial overlords often concern themselves as little as possible with land seizure or internal governance, seeking instead to find and work through reliable indigenous partners or chartered companies. The presence of a settler population intent on making a territory their permanent home while continuing to enjoy metropolitan living standards and political privileges creates a quite different dynamic. But what is this dynamic, exactly?

If we look to the new world colonies of European settlement we find one answer to this question. In the United States, South Africa, Australia, and elsewhere, settlers sought to construct communities bounded by ties of ethnicity and faith in what they persistently defined as virgin or empty land. Indeed, insofar as there was a logic to their approach to the indigenous populations, it was a logic of elimination and not exploitation: they wished less to govern indigenous peoples or to enlist them in their economic ventures than to seize their land and push them beyond an ever-expanding frontier of settlement. In this sense, as several recent commentators have noted, the colonialism practiced by new world settlers seems defined mostly by its effort to escape this very category, for if colonialism is to be understood as a “relationship of domination” by which an invading foreign minority governs an indigenous majority according to the dictates of a distant metropolis,¹ it must be acknowledged that these settler colonies often sought to weaken (or even to rid themselves of) that metropolitan control and those indigenous populations as quickly as possible. With the indigenous defeated or disappeared, settler colonies could develop either as mixed or plantation economies reliant on imported (usually servile) labor, or as what D. K. Fieldhouse has labeled “pure” settlement colonies or Jürgen Osterhammel denotes as “colonies without colonialism.”² Such settler colonies, D. K. Denoon pointed out in an important early article, quickly became highly integrated into global markets, their prosperous immigrant populations supplying crucial metropolitan goods while enjoying considerable political autonomy.³

Over the last few years, a wealth of research into the interactions and exchanges among settlers and indigenous peoples in colonial or colonizing societies has called into question the usefulness and accuracy of such terms as *conquest*, *frontier*, or *pure settler colony*. Conquest, we learn, was a protracted, even open-ended affair; frontiers were porous and sometimes largely imaginary; intergroup relations were marked—even in conditions of unequal power—by negotiation and exchange as well as coercion and violence.⁴ Even in Australia,

notes Patrick Wolfe, settler colonialism cannot be seen as an essentially fleeting stage but must be understood as the persistent defining characteristic, even the condition of possibility, of this new world settler society. Indigenous peoples, Wolfe writes, were indeed brutally and even decisively defeated—yet settlers themselves were never able to put that defeat behind them, instead reenacting through their land, labor, and population policies that effort to make the indigenous disappear. Extermination and assimilation, he states provocatively, were two sides of the same coin: both aimed at protecting the culturally (and not simply racially) white character of the population, and of utterly destroying the indigenous world. Settler colonialism, then, is not the past—a violent but thankfully brief period of conquest and domination—but rather the foundational governing ethic of this “new world” state. Or, as Wolfe most succinctly puts it, “[t]he determination ‘settler-colonial state’ is Australian society’s primary structural characteristic rather than merely a statement about its origins. ... invasion is a structure not an event.”⁵

Wolfe alerts us to the lasting importance of settler colonialism even for the most determinedly modern and democratic new world societies, but, in his recognition of indigenous defeat and metropolitan distance, he also helps us to specify the differences between these ex-colonies and the largely twentieth-century cases discussed in this book. A first difference has to do with the size and tenacity of the indigenous population, for while settler communities were sometimes large (over a million in Algeria and in Manchuria), in none of the cases in this book (except Palestine/Israel after 1948) did settlers come to constitute a majority of the given territory’s population. Colonial enthusiasts in Japan, Italy, and Britain might portray Korea, Abyssinia, or Kenya as “empty lands”; settlers indeed might depopulate the countryside of its human inhabitants in their own recollections.⁶ Yet when there, both settlers and government officials understood otherwise, and found themselves locked in protracted negotiations or struggles with always more numerous indigenous populations. A second difference is found in the relative significance of the metropole in shaping or constraining settler projects and ambitions. Unlike new world colonies, which remained economically tied to imperial metropolises but often enjoyed considerable political autonomy, settlers in these later cases remained politically—and in the last instance militarily—subjected to and dependent on the metropole. Palestine/Israel, the sole case in this book of twentieth-century settlement undertaken by a diasporic community and not by citizens occupying imperial territory, is also the only case of successful settler nation building.

These differences thus help us understand the fragility and instability of settler colonialism in the twentieth century. If new world states were born of a dual defeat—the defeat of the indigenous populations, and the defeat (or weakening) of the imperial metropolises that held settlers in dependence—twentieth-century settler colonies did not follow this trajectory. There, if settler minorities hoped to rule in perpetuity, they had to contend with increasingly opinion-sensitive

metropolises and indigenous majorities that could neither be decisively defeated nor be made to go away. Settler colonialism in the twentieth century is thus marked by ongoing negotiation and struggle among four key groups: an imperial metropole where sovereignty formally resides, a local administration charged with maintaining order and authority, an indigenous population significant enough in size and tenacity to make its presence felt, and an often demanding and well-connected settler community.

It is this four-sided structure that, in ideal-typical terms, not only sets twentieth-century colonialism apart from these earlier settler societies but also helps us to distinguish it from such related phenomena as settler projects and settler states. Settler projects undertaken by communities driven by shared religious or national convictions and searching for new homes—the Boer Voortrekkers spring to mind, or perhaps the early Zionist settlers—may have been colonizing in their methods or in their impact on indigenous communities, but they lacked that aspect of imperial strategic direction or support central to settler colonialism. Likewise, while settler states (states which continue to structure power along a settler-indigene divide) may originate as settler projects or settler colonies, they have passed beyond that stage to independence—South Africa (for much of the twentieth century), Liberia, and Israel being some notable examples. Of course, the line between settler colony and settler state may be an ambiguous one, for settler colonies have often demanded (and sometimes been granted) considerable self-governing rights, as in Northern Ireland from 1922 until 1972 or Southern Rhodesia after 1923. They are not, however, fully autonomous—as the imposition of direct rule on Northern Ireland and the universal condemnation that greeted Rhodesia’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence have shown.

Yet settler colonialism is defined not merely by this four-way relationship but also by a particular structure of privilege. For settler colonies, like settler societies, are marked by pervasive inequalities, usually codified in law, between settler and indigenous populations. In settler colonies, the caste division between the settler and the indigene is usually built into the economy, the political system, and the law, with particular economic activities and political privileges (including, sometimes, rights to own land, vote, or be tried according to metropolitan standards of justice) reserved for members of the settler population. These two characteristics—a structure of governance marked by negotiation and struggle involving the metropole, local government, the settler population, and the indigenous community, and the institution of settler privilege—thus define what we might call (to borrow Weberian terms) twentieth-century settler colonialism’s ideal type.

The Beginnings of a Typology

If all cases of twentieth-century settler colonialism share these characteristics on some level, they show considerable variation in the nature and degree of their

articulation on the ground. One benefit that arises from the study of European settler colonies in Africa alongside Japanese settler projects in Asia is that it throws into relief not only commonalities but differences, allowing us to begin to construct a typology of settler colonialism—or, alternatively, to imagine a continuum along which we might place various cases. Let us consider variations on two levels (which reflect the two key characteristics of settler colonialism): the degree of control of state functions by settler communities on the one hand, and the degree of institutionalization of settler privilege on the other. For heuristic purposes, we can represent these variables, and then plot some of the instances of settler colonialism discussed in this book, as follows:

	High level of settler incorporation into governance	Low level of settler incorporation into governance
High institutionalization of settler privilege	Rhodesia Algeria Kenya Mozambique	South West Africa Nazi East
Low institutionalization of settler privilege	Northern Ireland	Manchuria Korea Taiwan

Fig. 3 Graph of settler privilege and incorporation into governance.

First, then, we need to distinguish between those instances of settler colonialism in which state authorities very much hold the upper hand, and those in which settlers have considerable local power. In the former cases, which include Japan's projects in Korea, Taiwan, and Manchuria as well as Germany's settlement efforts in Poland, settlers have little control over administration; however privileged, they are subject to and servants of a state project. Moreover, while there may be considerable tension between local administrators/rulers and the central authority—witness the jockeying for position between the civil government in Tokyo and the Kwantung Army, or between Berlin and the various satrapies of the Nazi state—the principal aim of both will be to expand the power and reach of the state. Settlement, then, will be merely part of a broader plan for geopolitical expansion and domination, one that may involve costly infrastructural investments in the new territories and sometimes co-optation of and collaboration with local elites. Unsurprisingly, in such cases, the threat to such projects arises less from either settler demands for power or

indigenous defiance than from global conflict over those expansionist projects. World war, not colonial risings, brought these instances of settler colonialism to their close.

In a second set of cases, settlers themselves exercise more independent power. In Rhodesia, and to a lesser extent in Algeria and Kenya, settlers were either granted or were able to claim considerable power within the local state. In part this is because settlement in such cases was less clearly planned or almost accidental; in part it was because metropolitan governments were concerned above all to limit the costs of empire and restricted the commitment of personnel to a (very) “thin white line.”⁷ In these cases, local administrations were often weak, while metropolitan authorities were (if not weak) neglectful, preferring to meet settlers’ demands for resources or support by devolving authority over the local indigenous population. Only when the resulting settler systems of land appropriation, labor control, or resource extraction led to anticolonial revolts were metropolises forced to choose either to defend their “kith and kin” populations or to withdraw—a choice they usually tried to avoid by doing each in turn. But, in the end, internal anticolonial revolts and civil wars rather than external geopolitical pressures brought these settler colonies down.

One could thus essentially plot instances of settler colonialism along this continuum ranging from state-oriented expansionism to settler-oriented semi-autonomy, the late and centrally directed Portuguese settlement projects in Africa, and the utter conflation of settler and metropolitan interests in South West Africa occupying something of a midpoint between these types. Yet, we need to qualify this continuum by adding another axis of variation. Although settlers are privileged vis-à-vis the indigenous population in all instances of settler colonialism, the intensity and degree of institutionalization of that privilege varies, and not necessarily along the same lines as the divisions noted above. Thus, while the level of institutionalized settler privilege was very high in many of those polities marked by local state weakness and settler power (the massive expropriation of African land in Namibia springs to mind, or the bar on African coffee growing in Kenya, or the effective limitation of voting rights to whites in most African colonies), in cases where the settler population formed a majority or where settlers could plausibly pose as a bulwark against an oppressive would-be metropole or still-more-alien colonizers eager to assert control, the institutionalization of settler privilege might be low. Likewise, while the more authoritarian states could enforce high—even genocidal—degrees of settler privilege (as the case of Germany shows), Japan followed a somewhat different path, devoting considerable material and ideological resources to cultivating the interests and loyalties of potential indigenous collaborators. Thus, while the Japanese empire’s emphasis on the superiority of Japanese civilization and law might recall European rhetoric and practices in Africa, its efforts to cultivate

business elites and religious associations and foster an anti-Western Pan-Asian alliance assuredly do not. The Portuguese colonies, where harsh land and labor policies coexisted uneasily with a rhetoric of cross-racial harmony and Lusotropicalism, once again occupy the midpoint on this continuum.

How do these particular patterns emerge historically? Why did some states undertake settler projects as part of wider expansionist efforts while others simply granted a measure of autonomy to settler communities established almost inadvertently? We have no parsimonious explanation to offer, but we do wish to note some suggestive commonalities in historical experiences. State-centered settlement was undertaken primarily by imperial latecomers moving into geographically contiguous areas under pressure of geopolitical rivalry and sometimes populationist anxieties; by contrast, settler semiautonomy emerged in those colonies where settlement was early, almost inadvertent, and less central to the interests of commercial empires seeking to preserve their global standing. Timing, geography, and the force of geopolitical competition thus all merit investigation as motivating or causal pressures; yet, when examining these various outcomes, we are struck by the complicated ways in which racial and political ideologies contributed to their articulation. It is noteworthy, and seems at first glance paradoxical, that settler power and settler privilege coincided most intensely in territories under the authority of liberal or republican metropolises: in such instances—as with the *pieds noirs*, or Southern Rhodesia's secessionist farmers, or indeed the American founding fathers—democratic or republican ideology clearly served less as a restraint on the exploitation of indigenous peoples than as an important resource for settlers seeking to enhance their autonomy and privilege. By contrast, while authoritarian or antidemocratic regimes (those of Japan, Germany, and Italy in the 1930s, and of Portugal) often treated indigenous populations with unrivaled brutality (as in Ethiopia, or indeed in Poland), in some instances that very state authoritarianism could act, paradoxically, to attenuate formal settler power.

The ideal type and typology offered here is, we realize, schematic. We hope that it will provoke refinements and alternative formulations. The aim of such broad comparative analysis is, after all, to help us to understand particularities better. For the rest of this introduction we will defend the analytical usefulness of this concept, and of our particular definition and typology, by looking more closely at the internal workings, trajectories, and legacies of some twentieth-century cases. We will examine how settler colonialism structured policies over land and labor on the one hand, and law and representation on the other; the particular flavor settlers brought to the endgames of empire; and some of the dilemmas faced by metropolises and former colonies, settlers, and local populations, after decolonization. We will turn briefly at the end of the essay to the implications of such an analytical focus for future research and scholarly work.

Elaborating Settler Colonialism: Land and Labor

When the great ancient historian Moses Finley considered the nature of colonies in 1975, he came to the position that “land is the element round which to construct a typology.” This was not the “customary approach” among either historians or political commentators, he admitted, but suggested that “that is because they habitually view the issues from the metropolis, rather than from the colonies.”⁸ From the standpoint of local populations, however (as Finley rightly grasped), no matter was as important as the land, and settler colonialism in the twentieth century—as settler colonialism at other times—is marked by the importance and intensity of struggles over land. In the current conflicts over white farms in Zimbabwe or Jewish settlements on the West Bank we see the legacies of these conflicts. Indeed, what marks the twentieth-century cases is that these questions of land alienation and title were never successfully disposed of through conquest or contained within the legal and political structure of the settler state, but retain a raw immediacy. For colonial South West Africa and Algeria (not to mention Korea or Mozambique) were never really marked by an expanding frontier behind which the settler state could believe itself in undisputed possession of the land, even though settlers in these areas also tried to mark out regions—those White Highlands or European quarters—of exclusive ownership. Yet, the fact that the demographic balance never swung in their favor (or, more bluntly, that conquest did not result in the elimination of most of the indigenous population) meant that settlement was always a patchwork rather than an overlay. Everywhere new owners lived as a vulnerable if privileged minority among the majority populations they had dispossessed. Everywhere they struggled to legitimate, secure, and render profitable their claim to the land.

Where settlers were essentially immigrants with little coercive power (as in mandatory Palestine), or where their authority was restricted by imperial administrations with more complex ambitions (as in the Japanese empire), land transfers took the form of purchase and could be relatively limited in extent. In the first case, settlers clustered into communities of their own; in the latter, they tended to turn quickly from cultivators into landlords, acting more as a pressure on land prices and markets than as an overt force for dispossession.⁹ In many parts of Africa, by contrast, settlement was facilitated through the kinds of unequal treaties and agreements common in the early settler colonies, and in a few areas, where settlers were unrestrained by the metropolitan power (Rhodesia) or where the establishment of a settler state was an overt metropolitan objective (South West Africa), that process of dispossession followed patterns reminiscent of those of the so-called pure settler colonies. Dispossession was an ideological as well as a political project: thus, as John K. Noyes shows, actual expropriation in German South West Africa was justified by scholarship that redefined indigenous nomadism not as a form of land use but rather

as a kind of rootless wandering, a sign of a population's barbarism, and hence a justification for its corralling into "native reserves."¹⁰ Expropriation may never have reached the level of Australia or indeed the Orange Free State (where, by 1890, over 90 percent of land was in private white hands), but by 1936 easily a third of Rhodesian and South West African land (as opposed to a mere 3 percent of land in the Bechuanaland Protectorate, later Botswana) was held by whites.¹¹ Yet, for all that, the prosperity that settlers strove for proved elusive. South West Africa's white settlers relied on the government to bore wells, provide loans, help with transportation, and deliver a docile workforce, but consistently failed to break even.¹² Disconcerted administrators struggled to prevent "poor white" settlers from adapting to their circumstances through that very "nomadism" they had worked so hard to define as the mark of barbarism.¹³

South West Africa was of course an extreme case, one in which the colonizing power identified so utterly with the cause of white rule as to be willing to pursue white land settlement regardless of its economic, human, and environmental costs. Yet even where environmental conditions were more favorable—as in the Kenyan highlands, or in Algeria—settlers required considerable metropolitan infrastructural investment or outright subsidization to get their crops to market at all. Algeria's *colons* received loans to finance irrigation and modernize rail transport, and still relied on the government to eliminate competition by restricting the indigenous population's access to fertile and easily accessible land,¹⁴ while in Kenya and Southern Rhodesia indigenous populations were confined (not entirely successfully) to officially demarcated "homelands" or reserves, inhospitable places rarely able to sustain subsistence production let alone surplus production for the marketplace. Even so, African peasants were sometimes able to seize new opportunities and pose a genuine economic threat to their settler counterparts, particularly in the first decades of the twentieth century. In some instances, they were able to capitalize on preexisting wealth and patronage networks to produce for expanding agricultural markets; other times, they took advantage of the incomplete penetration of capitalist relations and became sharecroppers, or even rent-paying tenant farmers on settler land.¹⁵

For metropolitan governments, such peasant enterprise posed starkly the question of whether the defense of settler privilege made much economic sense at all. It was, after 1918, certainly much harder to justify ideologically, and in some areas where settlers were not yet entrenched (or had been expelled after the German defeat, as in Tanganyika), metropolitan authorities restricted European or foreign access to land to pursue the alternative policy of "peasantization." Yet wherever Europeans already controlled significant amounts of fertile land, metropolitan governments—sometimes against their own better judgment—allowed local authorities to strengthen legal or regulatory systems protecting settler agriculture from market competition. In Kenya, Angola, Mozambique, and (of course) South Africa, settler populations were granted

the exclusive right to grow and market certain crops, or benefited from the manipulation of local markets. Through easy credit, transportation subsidies, exclusive production rights, and marketing boards, settler control of land was made effective and upheld.¹⁶

In no area was state intervention so important as in providing labor: except where settlers held communitarian or laborist ideals (as in mandatory Palestine), they looked to the state to furnish them with a cheap and abundant supply. Moreover, whereas earlier settlement projects resorted to large-scale importation of indentured servants, convicts, or slaves, these twentieth-century settlers relied on the local population for the workforce necessary to make otherwise undercapitalized and underdeveloped areas profitable. Of course, policies aimed at forcing indigenous populations into the workforce were ubiquitous in twentieth-century colonies, settler and otherwise. Taxation—whether in the form of the hut and poll taxes common to southern Africa, the land and other taxes used in Taiwan and Korea, or even the dog taxes introduced in South West Africa and Mozambique—forced local populations everywhere to earn an income through some kind of market participation. What marks African settler colonies, however, is the persistent (and rarely resisted) pressure on local administrations to structure their tax policies and labor laws to serve the interests of settler enterprise and settler farms. South Africa provided the model: there, a complex system of regulations restricting African enterprise, employment, movement, and residence proved capable of supplying the labor (and status) needs of internationally owned mining companies, Afrikaner farmers, and the white working class alike. It was, indeed, the alignment of these interests that brought about the move from a segregationist settler state after unification in 1910 to one of apartheid in 1948, and it would be the unraveling of this alignment that would bring about its demise in the 1990s.¹⁷

Settler communities in Rhodesia, Kenya, and other colonies were eager to follow in South Africa's footsteps. They too were developing significant urban white populations (especially in Algeria) and also saw the rise of significant social divisions in rural areas, with a class of precarious white smallholders coming to be seen as at once an economic burden on the state and a focus of status anxiety among whites. States needed to maintain race-based land and labor policies in order to defend white privilege (not to mention restrict costs), but here another tension inherent to twentieth-century settler colonialism came into play, for these were not independent states. They were bound, rather, to imperial metropolises facing international and internal pressure to reconcile colonialism with progressive sentiments and the ideology of trusteeship. Openly coercive labor and tax policies were easy targets for critics: the Portuguese in Angola and Mozambique, for example, like King Leopold in the Congo, faced international condemnation for forcing Africans into the labor market through quotas, guarantees, and other harsh interventionist policies.¹⁸ Yet even in Kenya, Southern Rhodesia, and Algeria, a formal commitment to free labor coexisted

uneasily with the belief that Africans, bereft of the work ethic characteristic of the West, would respond only to compulsion. Labor policy was, as a result, at once coercive and prone to occasional, humanitarian-inspired, *crises de conscience*. Thus, for example, while African men in Kenya were required to carry employment passes and all Africans labored under a Master and Servants Ordinance that made breach of contract a criminal offense,¹⁹ when Governor Edward Northey in 1919 urged government officials to take up the task of labor recruitment, the Anti-Slavery and Aborigines Protection Society and other groups raised the charge of forced labor, and the British government compelled him to back down.²⁰ Increasingly, both French and British officials would rely on what Frederick Cooper has termed the “subterranean world” of labor supplied through African chiefs and intermediaries—a practice more easily reconciled with ideals of indirect rule but one that would produce deep civil conflicts and legitimacy crises as colonial orders fell apart.²¹

If Africa’s settler colonies provide us with many examples of how the local state was pressed into service to help sustain settler enterprise, in the Japanese empire settlers were always kept subordinate to state and metropolitan needs. Thus, whereas African settlers fought to enlist the state in efforts to eliminate peasant production, Japanese colonial governors sought to knit its empire to the metropolitan economy by instigating agricultural revolutions similar to that which had swept through Japan with Meiji rule. The financial burdens of modernization would be borne, in part, by rural taxation; as in Japan, then, Taiwan and Korea underwent a series of land survey and registration programs in order to classify land, identify ownership, simplify transactions, promote better utilization, and—most important—provide accurate assessments for tax. In effect, the purpose of the policy was not necessarily to create a group of propertyless workers for Japanese settlers, but to rationalize landholdings and subject all local laborers to the combined disciplining pressures of the market and of massive new agricultural development programs; producers would be enticed by the prospect of increased purchasing power while at the same time be made capable of paying local taxes. Increased local production was used not to ensure fiscal self-sufficiency in the colony or to promote individual socioeconomic aggrandizement, as it was in places like Algeria and Kenya; rather, it was used to support Japan’s domestic economy, initially in the form of agricultural production—particularly that of rice. Later, when Japan moved to a semi-war economy, local labor in the colonies was again reoriented to the economic needs of the metropole, as exemplified by the state-directed industrialization of Korea in the 1930s.²²

The statist character of Japan’s policies of forcible modernization meant that settlers enjoyed less autonomous authority than in African colonies. Often from poor rural backgrounds, they were—while certainly privileged in comparison to the local populace—viewed instrumentally by colonial propagandists, colonial governors, and the imperial state. Moreover, only in the minds

of propagandists were Japanese settlers a farming class. In practice, settlers were drawn by the promise of small-scale business opportunities and became, if anything, a force for urbanization: while only 10 percent of interwar Koreans lived in cities, fully 70 percent of Japanese settlers did so.²³ When they bought land, they did so in small plots and to rent; by 1930, half a million Japanese settlers still held only about 8 percent of Korean land.²⁴ Their presence is significant, then, less because it led to massive land alienation than because it was part of a wider project of urbanization, forcible modernization, and consequent population shift throughout the Japanese empire. Such marketization and land hunger pushed Korean tenant farmers over the border into Manchuria, where they in turn pushed up rents, displaced Chinese farmers, and (given Japan's insistence that they fell under its imperial protection) became a point of contention between China and Japan.²⁵ By 1939, the Korean population in Manchuria (which included both an anti-Japanese dissident community and Korean farmers settled there by the Japanese) numbered more than a million, and together with more than a million Japanese settlers had become the sometimes unwitting front line of defense of the Manchukuo state.²⁶ Both—like the *Volksdeutsche* settlers so important to the Nazis' vision for Poland—would only sometimes live to regret their half-chosen, half-coerced adventurism.

Elaborating Settler Colonialism: Law and Representation

The concept of civil society is difficult to apply to settler colonies, for when settler colonialism is most fully elaborated civil institutions mirror the settler-indigene divide or are the exclusive preserve of settlers. Just as settler economic privilege in such cases is assured through laws restricting local access to land and deploying local labor, so too is political privilege embedded in the legal and political structure, with settlers enjoying metropolitan standards of justice and rights denied to the indigenous population. In practice, of course, legal and political systems were more varied and uneven, with African colonies (despite considerable variation) and Japanese colonies again following somewhat different paths.

In the settler colonies in Africa, racial segregation separated non-whites from whites in almost all spheres of public and private life. Algeria's mushrooming cities had separate residential quarters, as did Nairobi and Salisbury; trains and restaurants, clubs and taxicabs were racially segregated or for exclusive white use.²⁷ Metropolitan citizenship and metropolitan law were equally the preserve of whites; by contrast, the "native question" was usually dealt with by establishing separate institutions for various tribal units that were expected to enforce their own customary or traditional law.²⁸ British colonial administration was especially protective of the authority of "custom," empowering district officers and appointed chiefs to uphold such ostensibly timeless (although often invented) traditions, and while the French and Portuguese colonies paid less deference to such "traditions," their establishment of bifurcated

legal and judicial systems for the “civilized” and the “indigenous” in effect upheld racial hierarchies.²⁹

Of course, administrative and legal structures in most European colonies (settler or otherwise) turned on such racial or “civilizational” distinctions, but in settler colonies the presence of sizeable and influential non-indigenous populations made these distinctions more pronounced and intractable. This kind of institutional segregation was hardly the basis for any kind of assimilationist politics, and for much of the period of colonial rule indigenous populations were excluded from voting rights and represented (if at all) by government-appointed officials. Indeed, when embarrassed metropolitan governments sought to incorporate “civilized” indigenes into the political system, settlers mobilized either to block the initiative wholesale (as happened with the Blum-Violette plan in Algeria in 1936) or to limit its effect (as with the Lyttelton Constitution in Kenya in 1954). Multiracial power sharing would inevitably encroach upon settler privilege, and was thus only seriously contemplated in the wake of the mobilization of colonial troops and economies in the Second World War.

Once again Japan pursued a rather different course from that of the European colonizers, crafting legal and political systems largely to serve wider imperial—and not primarily settler—ends. Pan-Asianist sentiments and a reluctance to be seen to be practicing the kind of racial domination they had long denounced in the West predisposed many Japanese imperialists to favor bringing all Japan’s colonies under the metropole’s legal and administrative umbrella. However, fears of diluting Japan’s hegemony and outbreaks of indigenous resistance made for much more devolved and authoritarian practices. Thus while colonial authorities made great efforts to “Japanize” local populations in Taiwan and (even less successfully) Korea, with particular emphasis on language and appearance, when it came to extending metropolitan legal codes and political rights, Japan’s powerful governors-general in Taiwan and (still more) Korea balked. In theory, then, while Japan’s constitution applied to its colonies, with legislation to proceed from the Imperial Diet, in practice metropolitan laws were extended only if the colonial government so requested—a compromise that led eventually to considerable legal integration of Taiwan into metropolitan systems but left Korea governed almost entirely by administrative ordinances.³⁰ For our purposes, though, what is significant is that while such representative or electoral systems as were introduced tended to favor (or to be manipulated to favor) the Japanese settler population (by, for example, incorporating language or tax-paying qualifications³¹), authoritarianism limited political representation and rights altogether. Even the Japanese settler in Korea, as Alain Delissen remarks, was “more a colonial subject than a colonial citizen,” while politically, according to Bruce Cumings, “Koreans could barely breathe” at all.³² But if any breath of nationalism was harshly repressed, considerable numbers of Korean and Taiwanese businessmen found opportunities

in the hothouse industrialization set in motion by the engine of Japanese investment and expansion. Thus, while Japan curtailed and repressed the rights and culture of Koreans and Taiwanese in their own lands, it was able to use its offer of extraterritorial protection and a type of colonial citizenship to deploy both groups as—in Barbara Brooks’s term—“sub-imperialists” in China. “Japanese policy,” Brooks writes, “consistently sought to manipulate the citizenship of these individuals to effect far-reaching imperialist goals.”³³

In both European and Japanese colonies, then, efforts were made to establish hegemonic control over local populations, but the agents of that control were different. In Taiwan and Korea, governors-general ruled their polyglot populations with massive bureaucracies (there were some 246,000 Japanese civil servants in Korea by the 1930s³⁴) and a strong hand. Military authorities played a prominent role, and the permanent local police forces were a constant presence even in the remotest corners of a colony. Germany followed a similar pattern in Poland. By contrast, Britain and France ran their colonies with tiny administrations and on a shoestring (at least until the postwar period), forcing local administrations not only to devolve significant authority onto settlers (especially in times of unrest) but also to search hard for collaborators who would guarantee law and order without challenging either settler privilege or imperial control. In practice this meant that indigenous collaborators—the “decentralized despotism” of local chiefs and headmen in various parts of Africa, to borrow Mahmood Mamdani’s phrase—were essential to the structure of settler colonialism, carrying out such day-to-day functions as tax collection and labor procurement and arbitrating and enforcing customary laws.³⁵ Yet even with their state-directed military might, Japanese governors also looked to work through existing household-based administrative structures in Taiwan and local elite businessmen in Korea, in order to forge crucial links between state and society.³⁶ No variant of colonialism, whatever the degree of might deployed by the metropolitan state or the coincidence of settler power and privilege, could be wholly autonomous from the local population—as late-colonial states discovered when their tardy attempts at conciliation simply made the gulf between settler interests and indigenous demands apparent for all to see.

Settlers and the End of Empire

The end of colonial rule in different areas was shaped by the global politics and international responses set in motion by colonial expansion and domination. Japanese expansion into Taiwan, Korea, and Manchuria, as well as the German drive in Eastern Europe, were born from metropolitan agendas that saw the acquisition of colonial territories and the deployment of settlers as part of a drive to achieve international standing and regional hegemony in a world hitherto dominated by Britain and France. But as Mark Peattie points out, Japan was not satisfied with its consolidation of formal empire in 1922;

instead its strategic insecurities and drive for economic autonomy fueled colonial ambitions that flew in the face of the new language of trusteeship and collective security voiced by the League of Nations after the First World War.³⁷ Consequently, unlike the settler colonies of Africa, Japan would never contend with a mass nationalist movement after crushing the March First Movement in 1919, nor would the Germans face protracted anticolonial rebellion in their empire. For both antidemocratic regimes, settler colonialism ended with global conflict.

That same war, however, bought some time for European populations in Algeria, Mozambique, Kenya, and Southern Rhodesia. Although the world increasingly viewed formal colonial rule as a political anachronism, settler colonialism survived. This is explicable, in part, in economic terms, for with their domestic resources depleted, European governments turned to settler agriculture and enterprise to provide needed imports and foreign exchange alike. Ideological refurbishment was also much in evidence: France sought to recover from the humiliation of Vichy by articulating a yet-more-expansive rhetoric of assimilation; Portugal insisted on its historic aptitude for empire building (and exported thousands of settlers to Mozambique and Angola); even Britain turned away from trusteeship and indirect rule to adopt a language of colonial development and multiracial government. Yet the concern to protect settler populations meant these new ideals were scarcely implemented on the ground. Up until 1959–1960 at least, British governments envisaged progress toward multiracialism to be much slower in the settler colonies than in West Africa; successive French governments promised they would never let Algeria go.³⁸

Settlers, their power well entrenched within the political and economic institutions of the colonial state, were unprepared to relinquish their privileges. Revealingly, they met African demands not just for increased representation but for self-rule (and concomitant pressure from metropolises for concessions) with the rhetoric of republicanism. Algerian *colons* and Rhodesian farmers felt themselves only distantly tied to remote metropolises, and Jewish settlers in Palestine were not tied to any metropole at all; like American settlers before them, then, they invoked their right to defend their hard-won property and (when pushed) to self-determination as well. Metropolises were reluctant to coerce them. In Algeria, Kenya, Angola, and Mozambique, metropolitan governments fought brutal wars to defend their “kith and kin” empires—wars in which widespread terror, detention without trial, and torture were freely resorted to. For liberal states, the costs (moral as well as military) of these wars proved too high. Amid revelations of the use of torture and international condemnation, both Britain and France withdrew; the decisions to do so were viewed by the settler populations as the ultimate acts of betrayal.³⁹ Southern Rhodesia’s settlers, feeling that “wind of change,” moved to join Namibia in South Africa’s protective shadow. Only prolonged guerrilla warfare brought southern Africa’s settler regimes down.

Postcolonial Dilemmas

When armies and administrators withdrew, however, settlers did not always go with them. Japanese settlers tried to, making their way back from Manchuria or Korea as waves of warfare and retribution washed over them. German settlers in Poland likewise fled westward as Soviet armies advanced; with Nazi defeat, their numbers would be swelled by the forcible expulsion of millions of ethnic Germans from Czechoslovakia and Eastern Europe. French withdrawal from Algeria brought a million *colons* to France, many for the first time; Portuguese withdrawal from Mozambique and Angola led to a similar scramble for passages “home.” Yet, Kenya’s White Highlands are still dotted with the estates of European settlers who stayed on; Rhodesia’s settlers also gambled (now, it would seem, foolishly) on the importance of their profitable foreign-exchange-earning farms to the new Zimbabwean state. Namibia’s ethnic Germans, like South Africa’s Boers, had no real metropole to return to anyway, and tried to craft for themselves an indigeneity all their own.

Yet, whatever choices they made, settlers continued to be a lightning rod for postcolonial anxieties and dilemmas. In the former empires, repatriated settlers were often viewed with disquiet, as bearers of right-wing extremism or as nagging reminders of imperial enthusiasms many now preferred to forget. New nationalist governments, by contrast, were well aware of the ways in which their treatment of those who stayed affected their nations’ global economic standing and international legitimacy. Sometimes, then, they went out of their way to accommodate settlers and protect thereby their access to international capital; other times—as recently in Zimbabwe—they stoked land hunger or demands for retribution in order to flaunt their independence, crack down on dissident movements, or consolidate power. But the legacies of settler colonialism are not only felt in those places to which settlers returned or in which they stayed on. Rather, just as Wolfe insists that Australia’s settler-colonial origins remain visible in its landscape, culture, and educational and legal systems, so too the imperial and settler projects and practices we have discussed here have their ghostly afterlife in postcolonial regimes.

To say this is, of course, nothing new: there is a dense literature written by political scientists and historians treating the ways in which the economic relations, state structures, geopolitical boundaries, or ethnic identities invented by imperial powers constrain and bedevil their successor regimes. Yet might a focus on the degree of settler autonomy and settler privilege within the colonial regime shed some light on postcolonial trajectories? In a recent essay comparing the postindependence political structures and economic performances of Korea, Taiwan, and Vietnam, Bruce Cumings suggests how their colonial pasts help to account for divergence. Japan subjected the populations of Korea and Taiwan, as we know, to an intense and comprehensive program of education, registration, and economic modernization; the French, by contrast, “preferred

to spend comparatively little money—just enough to keep the colonial settlers happy; the rice, rubber, and tin flowing; and the natives pacified.”⁴⁰ As elsewhere, the French looked to intermediaries—settler and indigenous—to administer their colony; the Japanese, by contrast, sent armies of soldiers and bureaucrats to rework local structures from the top down and the village up. Today’s Taiwan and Korea, with their powerful bureaucracies, their mass educational systems, their “democratic deficits,” and their state-directed, neomercantilist economic miracles, show many traces of that unwanted foster parentage.⁴¹

And if Japan’s statism remains visible in these postcolonial regimes, so too the deference to settler interests that marked so many African colonies continues to plague successor governments. The problem isn’t simply one of “weak states” giving way to “failed states”; rather, it is, as Mahmood Mamdani has noted, that the central divide around which those colonies were structured—the distinction between the settler and the indigene—has become the basis for legal structures and identity politics alike. Of course, this is hardly the only legacy, for African populations also live with the often undiversified and export-oriented economies bequeathed to them by their imperial rulers. But, as Mamdani insists, surely part of the problem resides in the fact that African states have clung to the organizing principle of settler colonialism (the principle of founding all law on the divide between “settlers” and “natives”), even though they have in some cases transformed indigeneity into a basis for (always proliferating) claims and identities. The only way out of the cycles of conflict set in motion by these colonial categories is to “rethink the institutional legacy of colonialism, and thus to challenge the idea that we must define political identity, political rights, and political justice first and foremost in relation to indigeneity.”⁴² There have been “settlers” and “natives” long enough.

Conclusions and Implications

When political scientists have compared settler projects or states across regions and time, they have done so largely in order to develop hypotheses or theories about state expansion, regime structure, or political violence that might be of present-day use—that might, for example, offer insights to those coping with the conflict over Israeli settlement and governance within the West Bank or the worsening abuses of government power in Zimbabwe.⁴³ As historians our ambitions have been different. What we have sought to do here is first to argue for the analytical usefulness of a now relatively little-used term, *settler colonialism*, to offer a definition, to suggest some variables by which we might measure its applicability and strength, and to develop a typology within which we might plot particular historical cases. Second, we hold up a set of instances of twentieth-century settler colonialism in the hope that, through comparison, the character of any particular national or imperial venture might be seen more clearly.

Out of these efforts, some conclusions emerge. A first and most obvious is that the significance of settlement projects cannot be measured simply by size, but must be studied for the ways in which they impact colonial state structures, colonial economies, and indigenous populations. Only sometimes do settler projects metamorphose into settler colonialism; only sometimes do colonial states come to adopt the settler-native distinction as their foundation for all law. In terms of sheer size, only colonial Algeria had as large a settler population as colonial Korea; by comparison, the size of Kenya's European population was always minuscule. Yet in terms of land alienation and legal structure, settlers (as opposed to imperial administrators) had a far more profound impact on the character of the colonial regimes in Algeria and Kenya than in Korea. A second conclusion must be, then, that while European rule in many parts of colonial Africa fits our definition of settler colonialism relatively well, Japanese colonial rule does so only very partially. To say this is not to suggest that the Japanese were somehow "better" colonizers than the British: for a local farmer there was probably little to choose between having one's way of life reshaped to serve the needs of settler agriculture or to serve the needs of the imperial state. Rather, the point is that these different types of imperial rule affected subject populations and successor nation-states in different and lasting ways—ways that can only be grasped if the interventions themselves are studied comparatively and analytically.

There is, moreover, one final reason to insist on the usefulness of the term *settler colonialism* and the value of renewed attention to its character and dynamics. This is, of course, that the democratic new world states in which many of us work and live, were—and in ways we hardly appreciate, remain—settler colonial states. When Rhodesia's secessionist white farmers adopted the American Declaration of Independence as the model for their own claim for a racially exclusive vision of freedom, it was more than a cynical ploy. Republican freedom and band-of-brothers exclusivity are the entangled twin foundational ideologies of the settler colonial state, and our own ambiguous inheritance.

Notes

1. Jürgen Osterhammel, *Colonialism: A Theoretical Overview* (1995), translated by Shelley Frisch (Princeton, N.J.: Markus Wiener, 1997), 16–17.
2. D. K. Fieldhouse, *The Colonial Empires: A Comparative Survey from the Eighteenth Century* (New York: Delacorte, 1966), 372; Osterhammel, *Colonialism*, 17. Both Osterhammel and Fieldhouse distinguish between "pure" settlement colonies and plantation settler economies with an imported servile labor force, Osterhammel including such colonies under the rubric of "colonialism."
3. Donald Denoon, "Understanding Settler Societies," *Historical Studies* 18, no. 73 (1979): 511–27; see also Donald Denoon, *Settler Capitalism: The Dynamics of Dependent Development in the Southern Hemisphere* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983).
4. This conceptual shift has powerfully reshaped colonial American, Australian, and Native American and American western history, with far too many significant works in print to be cited here.

5. Patrick Wolfe, *Settler Colonialism and the Transformation of Anthropology* (London: Cassell, 1999), 163.
6. Charles Burdett notes, for example, that Italian settlers persistently portrayed Ethiopia as empty, even though that brutally conquered land was anything but sparsely populated; see Burdett, "Journeys to Italian East Africa, 1936–1941: Narratives of Settlement," *Journal of Modern Italian Studies* 5, no. 2 (2000): 211.
7. A. H. M. Kirk-Greene, "The Thin White Line: The Size of the British Colonial Service in Africa," *African Affairs* 79, no. 314 (1980): 25–44.
8. M. I. Finley, "Colonies—An Attempt at a Typology," *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 5th ser., no. 26 (1976): 178.
9. Peter Duus, *The Abacus and the Sword* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1995), chap. 10; and Louise Young, *Japan's Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1998), 399–405.
10. John K. Noyes, "Nomadic Landscapes and the Colonial Frontier: The Problem of Nomadism in German South West Africa," in *Colonial Frontiers: Indigenous-European Encounters in Settler Societies*, ed. Lynette Russell (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2001), 198–215.
11. A. J. Christopher, "Official Land Disposal Policies and European Settlement in Southern Africa, 1860–1960," *Journal of Historical Geography* 9, no. 4 (1983): 371.
12. Wolfe W. Schmokel, "The Myth of the White Farmer: Commercial Agriculture in Namibia, 1900–1983," *International Journal of African Historical Studies* 18, no. 1 (1985): 93–108.
13. Robert J. Gordon, "Vagrancy, Law and 'Shadow Knowledge': Internal Pacification, 1915–1939," in *Namibia under South African Rule: Mobility and Containment, 1915–46*, ed. Patricia Hayes, Jeremy Silvester, Marion Wallace, and Wolfram Hartmann (Oxford: James Currey, 1998), 51–76.
14. Benjamin Stora, *Algeria, 1830–2000: A History* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2001), 13–14.
15. Tabitha Kanogo, *Squatters and the Roots of Mau Mau* (London: James Currey, 1987); Charles van Onselen, *The Seed is Mine: The Life of Kas Maine, a South African Sharecropper, 1894–1985* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1996).
16. For one excellent early comparative account of the creation of settler colonial political economies in Africa, see Kenneth Good, "Settler Colonialism: Economic Development and Class Formation," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 14, no. 4 (1976): 597–620.
17. Bernard M. Magubane, *The Making of a Racist State: British Imperialism and the Union of South Africa, 1875–1910* (Trenton, N.J.: Africa World Press, 1996); Ivan Evans, *Bureaucracy and Race: Native Administration in South Africa* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1997); Nigel Worden, *The Making of Modern South Africa: Conquest, Segregation and Apartheid* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), 72–79.
18. For a discussion of Portugal's forced labor policies and their impact on the indigenous population and local settlers, see Leroy Vail and Landeg White, *Capitalism and Colonialism in Mozambique: A Study of Quelimane District* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1980); and Gerald Bender, *Angola under the Portuguese: The Myth and the Reality* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1978).
19. David Anderson, "Master and Servant in Colonial Kenya, 1895–1939," *Journal of African History* 41 (2000): 459–85; Anthony Clayton and Donald C. Savage, *Government and Labour in Kenya, 1895–1963* (London: Cass, 1974), 61, 132; Kanogo, *Squatters*, 3–5, 35–68.
20. Roger M. van Zwanenberg, *Colonial Capitalism and Labour in Kenya, 1919–1939* (Nairobi: East African Literature Bureau, 1975), 104–36.
21. Frederick Cooper, *Decolonization and African Society: The Labor Question in French and British Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 27.
22. Samuel Pao-San Ho, "Colonialism and Development: Korea, Taiwan, and Kwantung," in *The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895–1945*, ed. Ramon H. Myers and Mark R. Peattie (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), 347–98; Ramon H. Myers and Yamada Saburo, "Agricultural Development in the Empire," in Myers and Peattie, eds., *The Japanese Colonial Empire*, 420–54; Carter J. Eckert, "Total War, Industrialization, and Social Change in Late Colonial Korea," in *The Japanese Wartime Empire, 1931–1945*, ed. Peter Duus, Ramon H. Myers, and Mark R. Peattie (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996), 3–39.

23. Alain Delissen, "Denied and Besieged: The Japanese Community of Korea, 1876–1945," in *New Frontiers: Imperialism's New Communities in East Asia, 1843–1953*, ed. Robert Bickers and Christian Henriot (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000), 137.
24. W. G. Beasley, *Japanese Imperialism, 1894–1945* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 148, 153.
25. The League of Nations' Commission of Inquiry into the Manchurian crisis (the Lytton Commission) stressed how Japan's championing of Korean settlers had contributed to the worsening of relations with China; see League of Nations, *Appeal by the Chinese Government: Report of the Commission of Inquiry* (Geneva: League of Nations, 1932), 109.
26. Mariko Asano Tamanoi cites these figures in her "Knowledge, Power, and Racial Classification: The 'Japanese' in 'Manchuria,'" *Journal of Asian Studies* 59, no. 2 (2000): 250, even though her aim is to show the constructed nature of such racial categories; Bruce Cumings, *Korea's Place in the Sun* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1997), 169, gives that Korean population as one and a half million by 1940.
27. For one good example, see David Prochaska, *Making Algeria French: Colonialism in Bône, 1870–1920* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), chap. 5.
28. Mahmood Mamdani, *Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996), introduction.
29. Kristin Mann and Richard Roberts, eds., *Law in Colonial Africa* (Portsmouth, N.H.: Heinemann, 1991), 1–19; and Martin Chanock, *Law, Custom and Social Order: The Colonial Experience in Malawi and Zambia* (Portsmouth, N.H.: Heinemann, 1998), chap. 1.
30. Edward I-te Chen, "The Attempt to Integrate the Empire: Legal Perspectives," in Myers and Peattie, eds., *The Japanese Colonial Empire*, 241–74.
31. For examples of such manipulation, see Chen, "The Attempt to Integrate the Empire," 273; and Delissen, "Denied and Besieged," 135.
32. Delissen, "Denied and Besieged," 134–35; Cumings, *Korea's Place*, 148.
33. Barbara Brooks, "Japanese Colonial Citizenship in Treaty Port China: The Location of Koreans and Taiwanese in the Imperial Order," in Bickers and Henriot, eds., *New Frontiers*, 120.
34. Cumings, *Korea's Place*, 153.
35. Mamdani, *Citizen and Subject*.
36. See Ching-chih Chen, "Police and Community Control Systems in the Empire," in Myers and Peattie, eds., *The Japanese Colonial Empire*, 213–39; and Jun Uchida's essay in this volume. For a recent analysis of the coercive powers of colonial states and the role of local collaborators see Bruce Berman, "The Perils of Bula Matari: Constraint and Power in the Colonial State," *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 31, no. 3 (1997): 556–70. By contrast, Crawford Young argues for a much more omnipotent model of the colonial state in Africa, including settler colonial states, in *The African Colonial State in Comparative Perspective* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1994).
37. Mark R. Peattie, "Introduction," in Myers and Peattie, eds., *The Japanese Colonial Empire*, 22–23.
38. Frank Heinlein, *British Government Policy and Decolonisation, 1945–1963: Scrutinising the Official Mind* (London: Frank Cass, 2002), 119–23, 177–78, 189–91, 237–78.
39. See, for example, John Talbott, *The War Without a Name: France in Algeria, 1954–1962* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1980); Stora, *Algeria*, pt. 1; and Caroline Elkins, *Imperial Reckoning: The Untold Story of the End of Empire in Kenya* (New York: Henry Holt, 2005).
40. Bruce Cumings, "Colonial Formations and Deformations: Korea, Taiwan, and Vietnam," in *Parallax Visions: Making Sense of American-East Asian Relations* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1999), 73.
41. *Ibid.*, 86–92.
42. Mahmood Mamdani, "Beyond Settler and Native as Political Identities: Overcoming the Political Legacy of Colonialism," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 43, no. 4 (2001): 664.
43. See, e.g., Ian Lustick, *Unsettled States, Disputed Lands: Britain and Ireland, France and Algeria, Israel and the West Bank–Gaza* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993); Miles Kahler, *Decolonization in Britain and France: The Domestic Consequences of International Relations* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984); and Ronald J. Weitzer, *Transforming Settler States: Communal Conflict and Internal Security* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1990).

Part I

Creating Settler Colonies: Utopian Visions and Totalizing Worlds

Introduction to Part I

Seventeenth- and eighteenth-century settler colonialism was driven by commerce and faith, by the desire to establish plantations to grow the commodities—tea, coffee, cotton, sugar—now crucial to European life or to construct godly communities in newly discovered and presumed empty lands. By the nineteenth century many of those new world colonies had become nations, their indigenous populations eliminated, marginalized, or assimilated, and their ties to the metropole severed or rendered benign. Often democratic or republican in ideology and political form, their exclusivist foundations had been repressed, forgotten, or sometimes partially overcome.

The nineteenth-century settler colonies in Africa were founded with similar ideals in mind. The hope of economic opportunity lured a polyglot European population to Algeria; the promise of cheap land and abundant labor led would-be British aristocrats and adventurers to follow the railways into Kenya; more straitened Portuguese, German, British, and South African settlers would seek their fortunes in Mozambique and Angola, South West Africa, and Southern Rhodesia. Yet the character and trajectory of these later settler projects was very different. Settler ambitions notwithstanding, colonial powers themselves undergoing processes of nation building and state consolidation never quite ceded political control, and in some cases even sought to incorporate the territory directly into the administrative structures of the metropole. Nor were indigenous African populations either so dramatically decimated or so successfully incorporated as to make North Atlantic or Latin American outcomes possible. In Algeria, Kenya, the Rhodesias, and elsewhere, European states ended up managing colonies with minority settler populations that were determined to monopolize economic resources and codify exclusive legal and political privileges. Often, carried away by ambition or by the rhetoric of the civilizing mission, metropolitan authorities colluded with these settlers.

A third wave of settler projects, among them those examined in this section, is different again. Undertaken at the end of the nineteenth century and well

into the twentieth, in these projects states themselves—often undemocratic and authoritarian states in the grip of a virulent nationalism—had the upper hand. For the Japanese in Korea and Manchuria, settlers were tools to be deployed in a broader project of national consolidation and regional domination; for the Portuguese under Salazar and the Italians under Mussolini, settler projects were a means of demonstrating great-power status on the world stage. Most extremely, for the Nazi state, settlement of ethnic Germans in the East was part of an explicit project of racial ordering, cleansing, and domination. In all these cases, settlers were at once the beneficiaries and servants of powerful state interests. If they were the “master race,” they were nevertheless subject to the state: the language of republicanism and community rights so easily spoken by French and British settler populations found little echo. It is in the case of Palestine, where Zionist settlers sought—with some great-power sympathy but not at their behest—to build a Jewish nation-state out of a diasporic population, that we again encounter that language of republican citizenship and organic community characteristic of the nineteenth-century Anglo-American or French settler colonies.

The chapters in this section examine the ideological visions, and to a degree the practices, that drove these settlement projects. Utopian ideas of demographic revival, geopolitical expansion, national recovery, or racial consolidation underwrote these efforts, yet as Hyung Gu Lynn discovers of early settlement in Korea and Gershon Shafir demonstrates of early Zionist settlement in Palestine, in all cases theorists and planners (not to mention settlers) found themselves forced to adapt to the conditions they found on the ground. First among these dilemmas was the problem of the indigenous population, and states deployed very different strategies to deal with them. Chapters by Prasenjit Duara and Jeanne Penvenne show how latecomer imperialist states like Japan and (to a lesser degree) Portugal tried to foster collaboration with such potentially inclusive ideologies as Pan-Asianism or Lusotropicalism; Germany, by contrast, simply used military occupation to expropriate populations deemed inferior while—as Elizabeth Harvey’s essay shows—seeking to inculcate appropriate behavior in ethnic German front-line settlers through a combination of bribery, instruction, and coercion.

Late settlement projects were extreme but also derivative phenomena. The development companies set up to facilitate Japan’s colonization of Korea were more elaborate and statist variants on European models; early Zionists learned from French agricultural efforts in Algeria; Japan justified its annexation of Manchuria, and Italy its annexation of Ethiopia, with a “civilizing” rhetoric unblushingly borrowed from the great powers; wartime German planners then studied the Japanese experience. Yet if twentieth-century settler colonialism drew on early French and British models, those states were, after 1918, less certain of their imperial convictions. Exhausted by World War I and worried about geopolitical destabilization and internal disaffection alike, they looked

to weak but wordy international institutions like the League of Nations to craft a humanitarian language capable of rehabilitating empire. Susan Pedersen's final essay in this section traces the extent to which that emerging international language and bureaucracy began to delegitimize—if it did not arrest—the practices of settler colonialism. The stakes in these rhetorical battles were high.

Malthusian Dreams, Colonial Imaginary: The Oriental Development Company and Japanese Emigration to Korea

HYUNG GU LYNN

*What do the circumstances of life matter if your dreams make you lord
paramount of time and space?*

—W. Somerset Maugham, *Of Human Bondage*

Introduction

The term *settler colonialism* has seldom, if ever, been applied to Japan's overseas colonial projects in Taiwan, Korea, or Micronesia. The reason for this seems quite obvious. Unlike the British settler colonies that saw the displacement and destruction of indigenous populations in Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and America, Japan's two major colonies of Taiwan and Korea did not see Japanese settlers forming a large percentage of the total population. In colonial Korea for example, the total numbers of Japanese did not account for much more than 3 percent of the total population during any year. Furthermore, the majority of Koreans were not driven to remote parts of the land or corralled into reservations. As one observer put it in 1940, "the net emigration of Japanese to other parts of the world has been surprisingly small in view of the extent of the popular agitation against it and the number of diplomatic crisis it has precipitated."¹ In contrast to the British settler colonialists and more like their Portuguese counterparts, most (if not all) Japanese settlers left the postliberation Korea of 1945 as soon as possible, leaving behind most of their possessions.

On closer inspection, however, the connections between settler colonialism and Japanese colonial rule in Korea (1910–1945) become much more apparent. First, regardless of the numerical results, there were sustained and multiple efforts to establish large settlements of Japanese in all of its colonies. Second, the concept of settler colonialism directs attention to the easily discerned yet relatively underanalyzed intersection of Malthusian thought, organization, and migration in Japanese colonialism. Third, the category of settler colonialism

allows for a more nuanced analysis of the connections and distinctions among various types of emigration in pre-1945 Japan that were contractual, free, and state organized. In turn, this facilitates the study of colonial history in connection with migration and demographic histories, rather than as a separate field of enquiry.

This chapter focuses on the establishment, operations, and consequences of state-organized migration of rural Japanese households to Korea. The Oriental Development Company (*Tōyō takushoku kabushiki kaisha*; hereafter, ODC) was established in 1908 and endowed with a mission to promote the emigration of farmers from impoverished and “overpopulated” parts of Japan to Korea. After encountering very limited success in attracting and sending settlers, the ODC eventually evolved into a primarily financial institution. While there are invariably limitations with the use of a part as a window into the whole, the ODC’s case is a particularly useful analytic prism for looking at Japanese colonialism and the broader category of settler colonialism. The focus of this study is on the larger implications of the dynamics driving the ODC’s settlement projects rather than on failure of the projects themselves.²

Malthusian Dreams

At the time of the signing of the unequal Kangwha Treaty of 1876 between Korea and Japan, there were only fifty-four Japanese in Korea, all living in a trading post/embassy house in Pusan. By the time of colonization in 1910, this population had increased to 171,543.³ The growth in the population of Japanese in Korea over this period was linked in large part to the changing political and economic relationship between the two countries, and also the associated reforms regarding landholding laws. Sale of land to foreigners in the open ports and surrounding areas became legal under the 1883 Anglo-Korean Treaty, and once the protectorate administration was organized in 1906, Japanese officials proceeded to introduce various pieces of legislation that facilitated Japanese ownership of Korean land.⁴ Several Japanese agricultural companies acquired larger tracts of land in Korea, so that by 1907, there were over a hundred Japanese landowners with large tracts of farmland.

Political and legal changes created necessary conditions for the increase in the Japanese population in Korea, but additional factors were also necessary to diffuse the idea, if not the reality, of migration. In particular, the fear of overpopulation and the emergence of emigration as the solution fueled ever more calls for new settlement projects. Malthus, of course, posited that as societies flourished, resources increased arithmetically while population increased geometrically, reaching a point of diminishing returns on increasingly scarce land. Numbers would then inevitably decrease through famine, disease, and wars. Population pressures would thus dictate a low level of subsistence unless some “pressure valve” was employed or social restraints placed on fertility rates.

While some research has been done on the prevalence of social Darwinism in the discourses of late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century Japan, less scholarly attention has been devoted to Malthusian nightmares. The first Japanese (abridged) translation of Malthus was published in January 1877, but the salient points of Malthus's views of population had been introduced as early as 1871.⁵ Surveys of social issues related to overpopulation, books, seminars discussing Malthus's ideas, and other media helped the diffusion of the Malthusian view among politicians and intellectuals in the late 1880s and the 1890s.⁶ True, there were calls by Japanese intellectuals to expand northward into Korea, China, and Sakhalin, and southward into Micronesia, before 1877, as well as concrete projects to attract settlers to Hokkaidō, and to send emigrants to Hawaii and California as farm labor. None of these writings or undertakings, however, made any serious attempt to connect migration with surplus population. Rather, the predominant language at the time was one of military, political, and short-term economic concerns, with the settlers in borderlands filling the role of hired help, defense fodder, or ersatz fence posts.⁷

It was not until the late 1880s that explicit and sustained links were drawn between emigration and social issues, with unemployment and rural impoverishment being attributed to overpopulation. From 1887 on, works and organizations proliferated advocating the transport of the poor and the unemployed to Hokkaidō or overseas, and this trend continued through the 1890s and the 1900s. Numerous books were published that championed migration as the solution to the "population problem."⁸

Calculations of Japan's population growth rates vary, but it is clear that either in the 1890s or the 1900s they did increase significantly, due primarily to a decrease in the mortality rate. The government recognized urban unemployment as a problem, but urbanization rates were not unusually high in the 1890–1910 period. At the same time the total area of arable land also increased, as did rice-production volumes. Nonetheless, these developments were not enough to keep Japan from becoming, from 1897, a permanent net importer of rice. Japan's growth rate was considerably lower than that of the United States or Britain, but the national population density was higher.⁹ Rural impoverishment and overpopulation showed no signs of abating, undermining the view that surplus population would be absorbed into the modern factories mushrooming around the major urban centers.

Yet the realities of the demographic conditions in Japan, or for that matter Korea, were irrelevant to the champions of Japanese emigration. Whether or not there was an actual population problem was less important than the perception that one existed, and that there was an ideal solution to it. Given its proximity, Korea was a logical location for Japan's surplus population. Malthus's description of the new colonies of North and South America as vast, underdeveloped lands populated only by resolutely backward indigenes but with the

natural resources to support large populations, was recast and found in most Japanese descriptions of Korea in the late 1890s and through the 1900s.¹⁰

One organization with a focus on colonization and emigration was the Oriental Association (Tōyō kyōkai), legally incorporated in 1898 to support the new colonial project in Taiwan (a colony from 1895 until 1945). The original impetus for creating the organization came from bureaucrats in the Taiwan Government General, but the membership included a cross-section of colonial officials, politicians, and businessmen.¹¹ In 1900, the Association sent Katō Maturō, a technical advisor to the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce, to study land use in Korea. In 1901 Katō published the report of his trip, in which he portrayed Korea as a thinly populated land with an abundance of underdeveloped arable land. This image became a touchstone for subsequent works.¹² In 1902, for example, an official of the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce was sent on a survey of Korea and returned to report that Katō had been correct: Korea was indeed the answer to Japan's food shortage and surplus population problem.¹³

These and many other publications on Korea during this period conveniently overlooked the presence of Koreans. When their presence was recognized, Koreans were portrayed as backward people who would benefit from the influence of Japanese settlers. For example, a 1909 book argued that the development of Korean commerce, agriculture, and society required the presence of Japanese settlers.¹⁴ Koreans were, according to another author, "less stubborn than the Chinese, and seem better able to imitate other countries ... further, their level of economic development is far lower than that of the Chinese."¹⁵ In this formulation, the decrepit Korean economy could only be reformed through the injection of superior farming techniques and lifestyles, carried by Japanese settlers dispersed throughout Korea. Some writers cited Hokkaidō as a model of successful transplantation of small- and medium-scale farmers, and proclaimed that Japanese would be treated "like gods" by Koreans given the difference in the levels of the two societies.¹⁶

Other observers developed more sophisticated arguments for Japanese emigration. One 1908 work exposed the hole in the Malthusian argument, positing that accelerated expansion of agricultural productivity (a "green revolution") would compensate for the exponential growth of the population. The increased yields that would result from Japanese farmers teaching Koreans more "rational and modern" farming methods would allow Korea to "absorb the excess population," and at the same time reduce the demands on the limited natural resources of Japan.¹⁷ As the ability of existing cities in Korea to absorb more population was limited, agricultural emigration would be promoted. This would generate increases in harvests and productivity, which in turn would allow Korea to support greater numbers of Japanese settlers in both the cities and the countryside.

This did not mean average literate Japanese were reading translations of Malthus on the street corners, or that every official was persuaded that migration was the key to solving the Malthusian puzzle. Some political figures asserted that the prevailing images of Korea as an empty, potentially fertile colony were based on shoddy research and false premises. As early as 1891, industrialist Hamada Kenjiro suggested that the excess population was a temporary problem, and that there was no point in panicking. The poor and unemployed should be relocated to Hokkaido, not overseas, he argued.¹⁸ In 1902, Nishihara Kamezo objected that such views of Korea were “groundless, and based on some mistaken assumptions.”¹⁹ Academics also pointed out problems with the Malthusian analysis of population growth through public lectures and publications. One of the leading popularizers of economics, Taguchi Ukichi, presented his critique of Malthus in 1898, while a leading economist, Kawakami Hajime, published his first article criticizing Malthus and the 1877 translation in 1915.²⁰ During the first two decades of the 1900s economists and demographers engaged in extensive debates about the shortcoming of Malthusian theory and its implications for demography.²¹

Nevertheless, Korea was still viewed as the solution to perceived population pressures, making inroads into policy circles in Tokyo by the early 1900s. As the second verse of “The Settler Song” enticed so lyrically, “In Korea where the Diamond Mountains soar/uncultivated fertile fields await us all.”²² All that was needed was an organizational bridge to transport migrants across the strait into the imagined colonial agricultural dreamland. The Oriental Development Company was such a bridge.

Establishment

After signing the Gentlemen’s Agreements to limit Japanese emigration to North America during 1907–1908, the Japanese government sought a “pressure valve” for surplus population. When Foreign Minister Komura Jutarō announced in 1909 that Japanese expansion into Korea and Manchuria was a solution for the growing diplomatic frictions with the United States over immigration, this struck a chord with U.S. officials.²³ By 1911, there were more Japanese in Korea than in the United States, and the White House could support Japanese attempts to resolve their “population problem” through emigration to a place other than California.²⁴

It was amid the crescendo of calls to send migrants to Korea that the ODC was founded in 1908. In May 1907, the vice president of the Oriental Association, Komatsubara Eitarō (a former cabinet minister), went on an inspection tour of Manchuria and Korea to assess the possibilities for a new colonization company. Upon his return, Komatsubara headed an organizing committee within the Association that spent the summer drawing up plans. The committee espoused sending agricultural Japanese settlers to Korea as the optimal solution to Japan’s food situation.²⁵ In October 1907, the president of the Association,

Katsura Tarō (a former prime minister), visited Korean Prime Minister Yi Wan-yong and Song Pyōng-jun, a minister in the Korean cabinet, and obtained their agreement for the establishment of the ODC.

After much intrigue and negotiation between Katsura and his longtime political rival, Japanese Resident General of Korea Itō Hirobumi, the ODC was set up on August 27, 1908 under both Korean and Japanese laws.²⁶ The first company president, Usagawa Kazumasa, took his staff of eighty from Tokyo to Keijō (Seoul) to set up the corporate headquarters in 1909.²⁷ When the ODC stocks were placed on the market, the demand was so high that only one out of every thirty-five applicants was able to buy shares.²⁸ However, only 1.9 percent of total stock applications came from Korea, as criticism of the Korean government for “selling out” continued unabated in the Korean press.²⁹ Although the name of the company was changed from the originally proposed Korea Colonization Company (Kankoku shokusan) to the more anodyne Oriental Development Company, Korean concerns about a possible land grab continued to mount.³⁰ The problem was that the ODC was a semipublic “national policy company” (*kokusaku kaisha*), a status that lent the Korean settlement project official sanction. In Hokkaidō, by contrast, no large-scale public companies had been used in the attempt to populate the island in the 1880s. All national policy companies were incorporated under their own special corporate law, and were established with one of three official missions, concentrating in colonization and development, munitions and national security industries, or local development and distribution projects.³¹ Numerous private companies facilitated voluntary and contract emigration from Japan, but the ODC was the first national policy company created explicitly to promote migration.³²

While there are some similarities, the differences between Japanese national companies such as the ODC and the chartered companies of Western colonial possessions are significant. In Portuguese Mozambique and several parts of the British and French empires, chartered or concessionary companies were delegated to administer territories in order to minimize fiscal burdens on the taxpayer and on government budgets in the metropole. In some cases, the settlers brought in by these companies became a de facto advance guard for future colonization that could be placed on the borders of unclaimed territories.³³ Like many of the chartered companies, the ODC used several suspect methods. However, the ODC was dissimilar to the British East India Company and the British South Africa Company in that it did not administer the territories on behalf of the government; nor was it the product of an adventurous entrepreneur such as a Cecil Rhodes. Neither did the ODC settlers play any notable role in Korea’s shift from protectorate to colony. The first president of the company, Usagawa, a close ally of Katsura’s, was rumored to have been treated coldly by Resident General Itō Hirobumi until Itō was assassinated by An Chung-gūn in 1909. Nonetheless, there was little to indicate that the friction that marked some of the interactions between the chartered companies and the governments

were to be found among the ODC, the Government General, and Tokyo, especially after the reforms of 1917.³⁴ The ODC had twelve presidents over its thirty-seven-year life span, but the powers of appointment resided strictly within the Tokyo cabinets and lobbies orbiting them.

The standard periodization for the ODC is 1908–1916, 1917–1931, and 1931–1945, and is based on changes in its incorporation law.³⁵ The most significant reforms occurred in 1917, when the company's sphere of activity was extended from Korea to "Korea and other parts of Asia," paving the way for its expansion to Manchuria in particular. These and other changes reflected the transformation of the company from one whose primary function was to transport and aid agricultural settlers to Korea into a diversified conglomerate with investments in various industries throughout Asia. After 1931, especially, the ODC provided loans for a variety of operations in Manchuria and China, and invested in companies in strategic industries, such as electricity, mining, and agriculture.³⁶ The ODC's capital outlay within Korea hovered around 50 percent of the company total on an annual basis, with the rest going primarily to Manchuria and China and, to a lesser extent, Micronesia and Taiwan.

At the end of World War II, the company assets and landholdings in South Korea were taken over by the New Korea Company, which was established by the U.S. military government in Korea in 1946. All remaining New Korea Company assets were eventually signed over to the Korean National Land Administration in 1948. The Administration then sold the former ODC properties to Koreans in small allocations.³⁷

Settlement Projects

The ODC's settlements were a disappointment even before the company was dissolved in 1946. As a 1944 study of agricultural policy in Korea put it, "in numerical terms, the ODC settlements clearly cannot be called a success."³⁸ In fact, the corporate revisions of 1917 were in large part driven by the criticisms of politicians and bureaucrats in Tokyo regarding the ODC's failure to meet its settlement objectives. This particular evaluation has not changed over the years: post-1945 historians who have written on the ODC, regardless of their political leanings, all seem to agree that its settlement projects were failures. Given that these projects were based upon an idealized picture of the colony as an empty fertile land that would resolve Japan's perceived population problems, the results are not surprising.

This is not to suggest that Japanese settlers did not have any significant impact on the colonies. In terms of gross numbers, Japanese reached a total of around 752,000 out of some 26,000,000 in Korea and 384,000 out of roughly 6,000,000 in Taiwan. In other words, the total number of Japanese settlers in Korea roughly equaled one smaller prefecture in Japan.³⁹ In comparison, only 50,000 out of 3,000,000 in Portuguese Angola of 1929–1930 were white (and mestizo), while 35,000 out of 3,500,000 in Mozambique in 1928 were non-African.⁴⁰

Furthermore, according to one study, given that the average Japanese required more goods and services than the average Korean, the actual impact of annual increases of Japanese was five or six times the actual numbers.⁴¹ Especially in the major cities, large neighborhoods were reshaped into Japanese commercial and residential areas, city roads changed, massive buildings erected, and place names changed from Korean into Japanese.

Nonetheless, in terms of percentage of the total population, the number of Japanese in Korea never reached higher than 3 percent, while the population of Japanese in Taiwan peaked at 6 percent. In fact, Manchukuo surpassed Korea in the total population of Japanese (583,000 for Korea to 595,000 for Manchukuo) in 1935.⁴² Figures on rural settlement are even more revealing. Despite efforts to induce tenant farmers and small landowners to move to Korea, in 1942 only 3.9 percent of the Japanese population in Korea was agricultural. In contrast, manufacturing and commerce absorbed around 18 percent, and the government 40 percent. Among Japan's other colonies, only in Micronesia (and only after 1940) did agricultural settlers outnumber the other categories.⁴³

Within this relatively small category of agricultural settlers, the ODC was the single largest organizational bridge into Korea through the 1910s. In 1911, the ODC households accounted for 5.4 percent of the total number of Japanese farm households in Korea. This increased to 30 percent by 1917, and stayed around 40 percent after 1920.⁴⁴ Between 1910 and 1926, the ODC sent some five to six thousand households to Korea and produced a constant household population of roughly four thousand through the 1920s and 1930s. This number, however, only constituted about 30 percent of the target number of thirteen thousand households.⁴⁵

In addition to the inherent misconception of Korea that lay at the heart of the enterprise, there were several other reasons for the low immigration rate. First, settlement projects shifted from the initial idea of moving poor Japanese rural tenant farmers to Korea to using settlers as transmitters of modern agriculture, local facilitators of assimilation, and representatives of colonial rule.⁴⁶ There was certainly no shortage of applicants, as around 22,000 households applied for the 13,000 slots over the course of the program. The economic qualifications were set high to limit migrants to wealthier Japanese farmers, but not many prosperous farmers were interested in relocating to Korea.⁴⁷ In order to increase the number of qualified applicants, the ODC reorganized its categories and qualifications in 1915, breaking the settlers into two types. Those in Type One were given smaller plots of land and long-term loans to help them live as owner-farmers. Those in Type Two were given five times the area of land per household as those in Type One, and this land could be leased to tenants. The ODC eventually abandoned the pretense of attracting lower income farmers in 1922 when they cancelled the Type One program, then terminated new settlements shipments altogether in 1927.

That land acquisition fell short of projected goals, despite the use of exploitative methods, exacerbated the ODC's failure to reach its targeted numbers. The original plan called for ten thousand Japanese to be settled in Korea in 1910, twenty thousand in 1911, and thirty thousand per year after 1912. The settlers were to be placed on 240,000 chōbu/chōngbo of land (1 chōbu = 9,917 square meters). However, the ODC was only able to obtain about one-fourth of the targeted land area total by 1913.⁴⁸ The shortage was certainly not due to lack of effort. At the ODC's establishment, the Japanese agreed to provide capital, and the Korean government agreed to provide land in lieu of paid-up funds. Korean government-owned lands totaling an estimated 9,931 chōbu were handed over to the ODC at values that remained essentially fixed despite an annual increase of 6 percent in interest rates.⁴⁹ These were prime lands with high productivity that had been in the possession of the government or the Korean royal family. The original value and area assessments were based on estimates, and when those estimates turned out to be low, no adjustments were made.⁵⁰ The ODC also used more coercive measures to remove some tenant farmers from the land. In one case, the ODC claimed that it had purchased land from one of the Korean royal families in the South Chōlla province. The Korean residents in the area filed six separate lawsuits from 1911 to 1915, contesting the supposed sale on the grounds that the royal family had never owned the land in the first place, and therefore could not have sold it.⁵¹ In 1911, the ODC hired former military police as thugs to destroy the autumn harvest that the farmers had gathered, and in 1912 they tied up and beat an old woman to death.⁵² Due to the publicity and tensions stemming from the murder, the planned handover of the land to Japanese settlers was cancelled, and the land leased to Korean tenant farmers instead. In 1925, a Japanese socialist came to the area and took fifteen farmers to the colonial capital to file another petition and stage a sit-in in the courts. Eventually, the South Chōlla provincial governor brokered a deal between the ODC and the residents that resulted in the land being sold back to the residents—at twice the market price, and at 10 percent interest. Such strong-arm tactics triggered several conflicts with tenant farmers, the largest one occurring in the Hwanghaedo province in the north, in 1924–1925.⁵³

Selecting destinations without regard for conditions on the ground also contributed to the problems. Many of the settler households were sent into areas of southern Korea that were already cultivated and densely populated. Even more surprising, the destination sites were actually limited to the southern traditional farming areas until 1912. Starting in 1913 all provinces, except two of the northern ones, were deemed suitable for settlement, but the vast majority of settlers continued to move into the southern provinces.⁵⁴ The mistake of targeting already populated areas for settlements was compounded by the fact that the ODC did not invest significant amounts directly in cultivating new

land. The ODC possessed only seven new land-development locations that formed a little over one thousand chōbu in area.⁵⁵

Although the settlers themselves left little in the way of records, employees of ODC and journalists did record their impressions of these rural settlements, and the company conducted a formal survey in 1932. Several of these accounts portrayed people living in abject conditions, while the 1932 survey indicated little in the way of income disparity among the settler households. Most of the settlers formed small local associations, but in contrast to urban business and merchants associations, ODC settler associations seem to have undertaken little significant lobbying. What petitions were filed tended to be requests for new types of grain or aid in times of need.⁵⁶

The ODC's failure to reach its settlement goals was an important historical outcome that has been analyzed by many scholars. In wresting land deeds and sending in settlers to densely populated areas, this bridge between metropole and colony generated great disruption within Korea itself. But, more important for conceptual purposes, the ODC established a pattern that would reappear in other parts of the Japanese Empire.

Dream/Imaginary Redux

The ODC was the original manifestation of a five-step cycle of Malthusian dreams and colonial imaginaries that appeared in relation to various discourses, practices, and settings within the Japanese Empire. The first step was the (re)discovery of a population crisis in the home islands, usually by politicians and commentators rather than academic demographers; this was followed by the second step of identifying a target colonial imaginary, the latest instance of misrecognition of a space as fertile, vast, and empty. Once the solution to the Malthusian nightmare was identified, the third step was for the government to establish a national policy company that would facilitate the migration of Japanese settlers. This point distinguishes the post-ODC pattern from pre-ODC cases such as that of Hokkaidō. The fourth step was the actual implementation of settler projects, and the fifth step, the gradual recognition of the failure of the project in specific locales as the actual number of settlers failed to reach target rates.

The ODC template generated several chain reactions, of which two were most significant. One effect was for the cycle to be applied to a different geographical setting. Micronesia, Manchuria, and Taiwan were not new geographic discoveries, of course, but were identified as possible absorbents for surplus population after the ODC's failure. The second effect was the transfer of the cycle's start point to another locale or another group, most specifically to Koreans in the overpopulated southern provinces of Korea.

The use of the ODC model throughout the history of Japanese colonialism reflects the policy makers' refusal to confront colonial realities and counter arguments. As in earlier times, there were significant criticisms of the Malthusian

view of population, all of which were ignored. For example, the Japanese government's own Temporary Committee on Population and Food, which met from 1927 to 1930, concluded that emigration to the colonies was not the solution to Japan's population problem.⁵⁷ Scholars such as Ueda Teijirō, one of the leading neoclassical economists in Japan, argued that industrialization and fertility controls were far better solutions for dealing with the surplus population than emigration.⁵⁸ These and other views were lost amid the prevalent Malthusian miasma, much like Nishihara Kamezō's critique had been in 1901.

If Korea of 1901 had Katō Maturō to consecrate it as the escape route out of the Malthusian nightmare, Manchuria/Manchukuo of the 1930s had analogous proselytizers like Katō Kanji, and Micronesia had the professional demographer Noma Kaizō,⁵⁹ who wrote in 1944, "Micronesia has a lower population density than Taiwan. ... The levels of locals are very low, and they do not work hard. ... Japanese settlers should lead and advise locals in modern agricultural methods and cultural practices."⁶⁰ There is a striking similarity between Noma's comments and some of the Japanese observations about Koreans and Korea in the 1900s. By the start of World War II, the prevailing view seemed to support continued settlement into Manchuria rather than Micronesia. One observer, for example, argued that "there was no doubt" that Japanese would "better maintain or improve their qualities in cold areas rather than tropical ones."⁶¹

The familiar pattern of pundits promoting a specific locale as undeveloped empty fertile land followed by the formation of national policy companies, attempts to attract settlers, and failure to meet targets, recurred regardless of whether the expansion was southward or northward. The Taiwan Development Company and the South Seas Development Company were both established in November 1936, while in August 1937, a new national policy firm was established by the Japanese and the Manchukuo governments, with the mission to send agricultural settlers into Manchuria.⁶² The actual settlement project in Manchuria produced predictably mixed results. Settlement in Manchuria reached around 58 percent of target levels, considerably higher than the ODC's 30 percent rate, but hardly a success.⁶³ The fact that members of the Manchuria Youth Corps (youths mobilized to settle abroad and included among the total households) were coerced into joining by their schoolteachers, according to some recollections, may have helped the rates.⁶⁴ The total numbers for Micronesia and Taiwan remained extremely small despite the best efforts of Noma and organizations such as the South Seas Association, which continued to champion Micronesia and Southeast Asia as settlement destinations through 1944.⁶⁵

In Korea, by attempting to "solve" one population problem, the ODC exacerbated another. There are still ongoing debates about causes, but scholars generally agree that Korean population growth rates accelerated from the 1910s through the 1930s. Up to 1906, the population size remained relatively stable. Increasing coverage in surveys and data collection accounted in part for the dramatic rates of increase between 1905 and 1925 (when the first full census

was conducted), but the statistics indicate slow decline in mortality rates and a rapid increase in fertility rates between 1910 and 1930.⁶⁶ ODC settlement projects increased population density levels in already heavily populated areas, contributed to the incidence of disputes between tenants and landlords (some 350 total between 1922 and 1932), and pushed two to five Korean households off their land for every one ODC household settled. This resulted in nearly 300,000 Koreans migrating to Manchuria by 1926, most of whom were poor tenant farmers who had to endure high interest rates and harsh winters in their new lands.⁶⁷ The majority, according to a Government General survey, migrated due to economic duress.⁶⁸ The ODC and the South Manchuria Railway jointly established the Asia Hypothec Corporation (Tōa kangyō kōshi) in 1921 ostensibly to help Koreans in Manchuria settle, but in practice, most of its operations were restricted to allocation of land and mediation of disputes. Moreover, the company did not provide any loans or subsidies to Korean settlers.⁶⁹ As of 1931, some 64 percent of Koreans in Manchuria lived in the area known (in Korean) as Kando (present-day Yŏnbyŏn).⁷⁰

Malthus's explanation of population dynamics was first summarized in Korea in an 1886 newspaper editorial; even so, there was little indication of any sustained discussion of related issues until the late 1890s and the early 1900s.⁷¹ By the late 1920s, journal articles had exposed an ostensible surplus population in southern Korea, but it was not until after a 1935 survey that the Government General officially acknowledged the need to address a serious "population problem" in the south. The solution, not surprisingly, was to ship Koreans to another "empty" land—Manchuria—through yet another national policy company, the Korea-Manchuria Colonization Company (Sen-Man takushoku), which was established in September 1936. The mission of the company was to move fifteen thousand Korea households from the southern provinces to Manchuria over the next fifteen years. The severity of the population problem, or perhaps more important the extent to which the colonial administration perceived it as such, was reflected in the Government General's 1939 regulation that restricted intra-Korean migration into the seven southern provinces.⁷² Some sixty thousand people moved under the auspices of the Korea-Manchuria Colonization Company, while an estimated total of 150,000 to 200,000 Koreans moved to Manchuria from 1937 to 1945. By 1945, the number of Koreans in Manchuria reached some 1.5 million. The realities of the situation were less important than the pattern itself: the perception of a population problem, the identification of a migration site, the establishment of an institutional vehicle, and the failure to reach target goals.⁷³

After August 1945, a total of nearly three million Japanese civilians returned from China, Manchuria, Taiwan, Micronesia, and Korea. Another 350,000 or so that lived in the United States, Brazil, and other parts of the Americas generally stayed on. Many Koreans in Manchuria and Japan stayed as well, although the majority also returned to Korea. In the cities of Korea, the Japanese colonial

state left behind monolithic administrative buildings, while the urban settlers left behind Japanese-style homes and stores. In the countryside, although a few houses were left by wealthy Japanese businessmen or farmers, we do not find the meandering grand mansions redolent of a distant colonial efflorescence of the sort left by the Portuguese in Mozambique. The ODC's settlers and white-collar employees left only fragments of faded memories in the rural Korean countryside.

Conclusion

If each age and place has its preoccupations, it is clear what the obsessions of pre-1945 Japanese colonial policy makers were. The story of the ODC is not just one of facts, places, names, and events, but of dreams and fears that resulted in the alienation of large numbers of Koreans and Japanese farmers from their land. The specters of a Malthusian population problem coursed through the various settlement projects. It is this constellation of Malthusian dreams, imagined empty and fertile colonial utopias, national policy companies, and eventual failure that constituted the template that was later applied in other colonial settings.

The crescendo of politicians and pundits calling for Japanese to migrate to Korea in the late 1890s and early 1900s was largely driven by concerns over a perceived surplus population problem. The Malthusian discourse and the misperception of the colonial environment helped generate surveys, plans, and corporations that "trapezed" the gap between discourse and practice. The template for this was the ODC, established with the mission to conquer Malthusian dreamscapes and colonial imaginaries. The settlement project failed to reach more than 30 percent of its targets, but the land displacement from Japanese settlers amplified the population problem in the colony, and triggered an outflow of poor Korean tenant farmers into Manchuria. This epiphenomenal impact was not limited to Koreans, but extended into other geographic regions. The exact same pattern of "discovering" a population problem, misrecognizing a colony as the ideal settlement destination, establishing a national policy company for use in shipping settlers over, failing to reach benchmark numbers, and then repeating the process in new locale was evident in Manchuria, northern China, Taiwan, and Micronesia. But for all the circular migration it ultimately generated—Japanese to Korea, Koreans to Manchuria, Koreans to Japan, Japanese to Micronesia, Koreans to Korea, Japanese to Japan—the ODC and other national policy companies ultimately did little to dissipate the Malthusian nightmares.

It is likely that any attempt to arrive at a general theory that explains each and every variant of modern colonialism is as vain a project as counting stars. The confluence of specific political, military, economic, and psychological reasons are obviously important, and there is a need for further empirical research on migration and settler colonialism in the Japanese Empire. Nevertheless, this

study of the ODC has illustrated that while developmental stages of capitalism, unintended political consequences, or splinters of atavism can be considered among the possible propellants of colonialism, the power of Malthusian dreams to overcome colonial realities cannot be excluded from the list of major explanatory factors. As one contemporary remarked about Malthus, “His name hangs suspended over their heads *in terrorem*, like some baleful meteor.”⁷⁴

Notes

1. Elizabeth Boody Schumpeter, “The Population of the Japanese Empire,” in *The Industrialization of Japan and Manchukuo: Population, Raw Materials and Industry*, ed. Elizabeth Boody Schumpeter (New York: Macmillan, 1940), 70.
2. See, in contrast to this study, Kimishima Kazuhiko, “Chōsen ni okeru Tōtaku imin no tenkai katei,” *Nihonshi kenkyū*, 161 (1976): 25–26; and Cho Ki-jun, *Han’guk chabonjuui songnipsaron* (Seoul: Taewangsa, 1982), 460–73.
3. Morita Yoshio, *Chōsen shūsen no kiroku-Bei-So ryōgun no shinchū to Nihonjin no hikiage* (Tokyo: Gannandō, 1964), 2.
4. Peter Duus, *The Abacus and the Sword: The Japanese Penetration of Korea, 1895–1910* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1995), 373–76.
5. For details see Hori Tsuneo, *Meiji keizai shisōshi* (Tokyo: Nihon keizai hyōronsha, 1991), 480–81.
6. Toda Teizō, *Shakai chōsa* (Tokyo: Jichōsha, 1933), 39–40; and Yi Ki-jun, *Kyoyuk Han’guk kyōngjehak paldalsa* (Seoul: Iljogak, 1983), 36, 45–46, 49–50.
7. See, for example, Honjō Ejirō, *Nihon keizai shisōshi* (Tokyo: Yūhikaku, 1958), 151–58; and Kuwabara Masato, *Hokkaidō kaitaku to imin* (Tokyo: Yoshikawa kōbunkan, 1996), 49–50.
8. For details see, for example, Tsunoyama Yukihiko, *Enomoto Takeaki to Mekishiko shokumin ijū* (Tokyo: Dōbunkan, 1986), 167–69; and Okazaki Ayanori, *Nihon jinkō no bunseki* (Tokyo: Tōyō keizai shinpōsha, 1957), 44–45.
9. Schumpeter, “Population,” 53, 62–63; Okazaki, *Nihon jinkō no bunseki*, 57–59.
10. Thomas Robert Malthus, *An Essay on the Principle of Population* (1798), in *The Collected Works of Thomas Robert Malthus*, vol. 1, ed. E. A. Wrigley and David Souden (London: William Pickering, 1986), 39–42, and *An Essay on the Principle of Population* (1826), in *ibid.*, vol. 2, 28–45.
11. The Oriental Association was known until 1907 as the Taiwan Association. Hyung Gu Lynn, “Politics and Knowledge: The Tōyō Kyōkai’s Informational and Political Projects, 1900–1945,” *Takudai hyakunenshi kenkyū* 1–2 (1999): 8.
12. Yamaguchi Muneo, “Kōbuchi kaitaku mondai o meguru tai-Kan ime-ji no keisei-rufu katei ni tsuite,” *Shigaku zasshi* 87, no. 10 (1978), 58–64.
13. Yamaguchi, “Kōbuchi kaitaku,” 70–71; see also Duus, *The Abacus and the Sword*, 368–73.
14. Aoyagi Kōtarō, *Kankoku shokuminsaku* (Keijō [Seoul]: Nikkan shobō, 1909), 14, 28, 42, 43.
15. Itō Seizō, *Kankoku shokumin nanken* (Tokyo: Zenkoku nōjikai, 1908), 8–10.
16. Yamamoto Kotarō, *Saishin Chōsen ijū annai* (Tokyo: Minyūsha, 1904), 62.
17. Kōbe Masao, *Chōsen nōgyō iminron* (Tokyo: Yūhikaku, 1910), 49.
18. Okazaki, *Nihon jinkō no bunseki*, 44.
19. Yamaguchi, “Kōbuchi kaitaku,” 54. Nishihara is better known for his role in facilitating a Japanese government loan to China, 1917–1918.
20. Matsunō Hiroshi, *Taguchi Ukichi to keizaigaku kyōkai* (Tokyo: Nihon keizai hyōronsha, 1996), 5, 305.
21. See for example, Kawai Takao, “Kokusei chōsa no kaishi-minsei chōsa kara kokusei chōsa e” in *Kindai Nihon shakai chōsashi*, vol. 2, ed. Kawai Takao (Tokyo: Keiō tsūshin, 1991), 109–18; see also Hayashi Megumi, *Jinkō riron-kenkyū to hōhō* (Tokyo: Tōkō shoin, 1930), 123–34, 186–93.
22. The song likely dates from the mid-1930s. It is reproduced in Manshū kaitakushi kankōkai, *Manshū kaitaku shi* (Tokyo: Manshū kaitakushi kankōkai, 1966), 31.
23. Nakayama Takeo, *Komura Jūtarō den* (Tokyo: Shinkō sha, 1940), 293.
24. Matsunaga Tatsushi, “Tōyō takushoku kabushiki kaisha no setsuritsu to sono haikai,” in *Kokusaku kaisha Tōtaku no kenkyū*, ed. Kawai Kazuo et al. (Tokyo: Fuji shuppan, 2000), 40.

25. Mine Hachirō, "Kankoku kaihatsu to Nihon teikoku no sekimu," *Tōyō jihō* 110 (1907): 8–9; Cho Tong-göl, *Ilche ha Han'guk nongmin undongsa* (Seoul: Han'gilsa, 1979), 72–73.
26. For details see Moriyama Shigenori, *Kindai Nik-Kan kankeishi kenkyū* (Tokyo: Tokyo daigaku shuppankai, 1987), 200–203; see also entry for December 16, 1907, in *Hara Takashi nikki*, ed. Hayashi Shigeru and Hara Keichirō (Tokyo: Fukumura shuppan, 1965–1967); Matsunaga, "Tōyō takushoku kabushiki," 33; Han Ik-kyo, ed., *Han Sang-nyōng kun o kataru* (Keijō: Han Sang-nyōng shi kanreki kinenkai, 1941), 109–16; Ōkouchi Kazuo, *Maboroshi no kokusaku kaisha-Tōyō takushoku* (Tokyo: Nihon keizai shinbunsha, 1982), 27–37; and Karl Moskowitz, "The Creation of the Oriental Development Company: Japanese Illusions Meet Korean Reality," *Occasional Papers on Korea* 2 (1974): 73–121.
27. Kitazaki Fusatarō, *Tōtaku 30 nen no sokuseki* (Tokyo: Tōhō tsūshinsha, 1938), 471.
28. The initial structure was 200,000 shares at ¥1000 each; 60,000 shares went to the Korean government; 5,000 to the Japanese imperial household; 1,000 to related imperial families; and 1,700 to the Korean royal family, leaving 142,300 for sale. Tōyō takushoku kabushiki kaisha, *Tōyō takushoku kabushiki kashia 30 nenshi* (Tokyo: Tōyō takushoku kabushiki kaisha, 1939), 235.
29. Oh Mi-il, "Hanmal siksān hūngōpnon ū kyōngje kōnsōl pangan kwa ku chōngch'jōk sōngkyōk," *Yōksa munje yōn'gu* 2 (1997): 282–83; and Cho Ki-jun, "Il'in nongmin imin kwa Tongyang Ch'ōksik hoesa," *Han'guk kyōngjeihak nonch'ong* (Seoul: Tanmundang, 1982), 158.
30. Pak Hyōn-sō, "Tongch'ōk sōllip taehan Han'gukmin ūpanūng," in *Yi Hae-nam paksa hwa-gap kinyōm sahak nonch'ong* (Seoul: Iljogak, 1970), 325. The term *development* (takushoku) in the company name means "land colonization" or "land development," not development as in industrialization.
31. It should be noted that not all companies incorporated under their own law were national policy companies. Matsuzawa Isao, *Kokusaku kaisha ron* (Tokyo: Diamond sha, 1941), 19–49.
32. To confuse matters further, among the private companies, there was the Oriental Colonization Company (Tōyō shokumin gōmeigaisha), which lasted from 1899 to 1900, and the Oriental Emigration Company (Tōyō imin goshikaisha), which operated from 1897 to 1917. Alan T. Moriyama, *Imingaisha: Japanese Emigration Companies and Hawaii* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1985), 49–50, 155.
33. There are obviously too many works on chartered companies to list here. For an overview, see John S. Galbraith, *Crown and Charter: The Early Years of the British South Africa Company* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1974), 106–27; Leroy Vail, "Mozambique's Chartered Companies: The Rule of the Feeble," *Journal of African History* 17, no. 3 (1976): 389–416; Peter Slinn, "Commercial Concessions and Politics during the Colonial Period: The Role of the British South Africa Company in Northern Rhodesia, 1890–1964," *African Affairs*, 70, no. 281 (1971), 366–67; Robert L. Hess, *Italian Colonialism in Somalia* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967), 39–84; Lewis H. Gann and Peter Duigan, *The Rulers of Belgian Africa, 1884–1914* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979), 125–40.
34. Kitazaki, *Tōtaku* 30, 6–7.
35. See, for example, Kim Sōk-jun, "Tongyang ch'ōksik jusik hoesa ūi saōp chōngae kwajōng," in *Han'guk kūndae nongch'on sahoe kwa Ilbon chegukjūi*, ed. Han'guksa yōn'guhoe (Seoul: Munha kwa chisōngsa, 1986), 95.
36. For details see, Kurobe Yūji, "Tōyō takushoku kaisha no tai 'Manshū' tōshi," in *Nihon no kindai to shihonshugi-kokusaika to chiiki*, ed. Nakamura Masanori (Tokyo: Tokyo daigaku shuppankai, 1992), 87–126; Hatori Yoshihiko, "1920 nendai no keikiki to seiri," in Kawai et al., eds., *Kokusaku kaisha Tōtaku no kenkyū*, 94; and Kim Cho-sōl, "Tōyō takushoku kabushikia kaisha ni okeru kokusaku tōshi to senji taisei," in Kawai et al., eds., *Kokusaku kaisha Tōtaku no kenkyū*, 109.
37. C. Clyde Mitchell, *Final Report and History of the New Korea Company* (Seoul: United States Army Military Government in Korea, 1948), 1–3.
38. Kobayakawa Kurō, *Chōsen nōgyō hattatsushi* (Keijō [Seoul]: Chōsen nōkai, 1944), vol. 2, 489.
39. Kajimura Hideki, *Chōsenshi to Nihonjin* (Tokyo: Akashi shoten, 1992), 193.
40. James Duffy, *Portuguese Africa* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1959), 265–66.
41. Yi Yō-Sōng, *Suja Chosōn yōn'gu*, vol. 4 (Kyōngsōng [Seoul]: Segwangsa, 1933), 59.

42. Mizoguchi Toshiyuki and Umemura Mataji, eds., *Kyū Nihon shokuminchi keizai tōkei: suiseki to bunseki* (Tokyo: Tōyō keizai shinpōsha, 1988), 256.
43. Kaneko Fumio, "Taigai keizai bōchō no kōzu," in *Nihon no seiji keizai*, ed. Hara Akira (Tokyo: Tokyo daigaku shuppankai, 1995), 178.
44. Tōyō takushoku kaisha, Chōsen shisha, "Tōtaku no shokumin jigyo" (1935), reprinted in *Shiryō senshū Tōyō takushoku kaisha*, ed. Mizuta Naomasa (Tokyo: Yūhō kyōkai, 1976), 179–80.
45. Kitazaki, *Tōtaku* 30, 170.
46. Kim Cho-sŏl, "Tōyō takushoku," 67.
47. Inoue Kōsai, "Tōtaku imin ni tsuite," *Chōsen oyobi Manshū*, 70 (1913): 17.
48. Mitchell, *Final Report*, 3; and Kitazaki, *Tōtaku* 30, 129–30.
49. Kang T'ae-kyōng, *Tongyang ch'ŏksik ūi Chosŏn kyōngje sut'alsa* (Taegu, South Korea: Kye-myōng taehak ch'ulp'anbu, 1995), 73, 89–90.
50. Tōyō takushoku kabushiki kaisha, *Tōtaku 10 nenshi* (Keijō [Seoul]: Tōyō takushoku kabushiki kaisha, 1918), 36; and Kim Mun-sik, et al., *Ilche ūi kyōngje ch'im'talsa* (Seoul: Minjūng sŏgwan, 1971), 33.
51. Kwŏn Nyōng-uk, "Tōyō takushoku kabushiki kaisha to Kungsam jiken," *Chōsen kenkyū* 78 (1968): 52–60; Inomata Shōichi, *Watakushi no Tōtaku kaikoroku* (Tokyo: Ryūkei shosha, 1978), 96.
52. *Tonga Ilbo*, July 12, 1925.
53. Cho Tong-gŏl, *Ilche ha Han'guk nongmin undongsa*, 135–51.
54. Kitazaki, *Tōtaku* 30, 172; and "Tōtaku no shokumin jigyo," 204.
55. Tōyō takushoku kabushiki kaisha, *Teikoku gikai setsumei shiryō—gyōmu yōran* (1938), 105.
56. Kim Sŏk-jun, "Tongyang ch'ŏksik," 114; and Ōkouchi, *Maboroshi*, 65–66.
57. Okazaki Yōichi, *Nihon jinkōron* (Tokyo: Kokon shoin, 1999), 19–20.
58. Ueda Teijirō, *Nihon jinkō seisaku* (Tokyo: Chikura shobō, 1937), 25, 55–56.
59. See Louise Young, *Japan's Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1998), 318–22.
60. Noma Kaizō, *Jinkō mondai to Nanshinron* (Tokyo: Keio shobō, 1944), 259, 394, 412, 417.
61. Shimomura Hiroshi, "Dai Tōa sensō to jinkō mondai," *Jinkō mondai* 4, no. 4 (1942): 541.
62. Mikage Naoyuki, *Taiwan takushoku kaisha to sono jidai* (Tokyo: Ashi shobo, 1993), 466–67, 474, 483; and Matsuzawa, *Kokusaku kaisha ron*, 59–60.
63. Araragi Shinzō, "Manshū imin" no rekishi shakaigaku (Kyoto: Kōrosha, 1994), 46–47.
64. Yomiuri shinbun Osaka shakaibu, *Man-Mō kaitakudan* (Tokyo: Kakukawa shoten, 1986), 63–64.
65. For details see, for example, Hara Fujio, *Eiryō Malaya no Nihonjin* (Tokyo: Ajia Keizai Kenkyūjō, 1986), 66–115.
66. Ishi Yoshikuni, *Kankoku jinko zoka no bunseki* (Tokyo: Keisō shobō, 1972), 51–52, 205–7.
67. Yi Yō-Sōng, *Suja Chosŏn yŏn'gu*, vol. 4 (Kyōngsōng [Seoul]: Segwangsa, 1933), 90–97.
68. *Tonga Ilbo*, December 31, 1923; and Ko Sūng-je, *Han'guk iminsa yŏn'gu* (Seoul: Changmun-gak, 1973), 32.
69. Ko, *Han'guk iminsa yŏn'gu*, 324–25.
70. Hyōn Kyu-hwan, *Han'gukyu iminsa* (Seoul: Samhwa, 1976), 1:168.
71. For more information see Yi Ki-jun, *Han'mal sŏgu kyōngjehak doipsa yŏn'gu* (Seoul: Iljogak, 1985), 1, 37, 55.
72. Zenkoku keizai chōsa kikan rengōkai Chōsen shibu, ed. *Chōsen keizai nenpō, 1939* (Tokyo: Zenkoku keizai chōsa kikan rengōkai Chōsen shibu, 1939), 373–74.
73. While the data varies enormously, most estimates agree that there were at least one million Koreans living in Manchuria as of 1937–1938.
74. William Hazlitt, "A Letter in Answer to Malthus" (1807), in *The Complete Works of William Hazlitt*, vol. 1, ed. P. P. Howe (London: J. M. Dent and Son, 1930), 181.

Settler Citizenship in the Jewish Colonization of Palestine

GERSHON SHAFIR

This essay examines how Zionist legitimacy and authority were attained through the construction of institutions to control the three factors of production—land, labor, and capital—in the years 1882–1914, during the first two waves of Jewish immigration and settlement. These institutional arrangements enabled the creation of a republican form of citizenship and a Jewish citizen-settler population able to reach a “European standard of living” in Palestine. Taking the long-term view, these arrangements and accompanying sense of entitlement among these settlers served as major barriers to decolonization.

Agricultural Workers and Planters

In the last three decades of the nineteenth century, the belated arrival of modernization and industrialization undermined the traditional Jewish middleman role in the manorial economy of the Russian Pale of Settlement and central Europe. Instead of following the western European path of emancipation and assimilation, fear of competition on the part of the middle and lower middle classes led to waves of pogroms in southern Russia. Some of these were justified by traditional anti-Semitism, and others by modern nationalist and/or racist ideologies. In response, eastern European Jews experimented with a variety of alternatives: emancipation, assimilation, socialism, Jewish socialism, cultural nationalism and autonomism, territorial nationalism, and retreat behind the walls of a revivalist and fundamentalist orthodoxy. Finally, masses of Jews chose to emigrate from eastern Europe to western Europe, to the New World, and to Palestine or, as they called it, the Land of Israel (Eretz Israel). Zionist immigration to Palestine differed from other migrations in its political aims. While trying to break the historical tether that bound their ethnic identity to an economic niche, the Jewish immigrants in Palestine ended up re-creating it in a new form. They could escape Europe, but not rid themselves of it. As part of this contradictory process, the Jewish settlers’ convictions were

gradually transformed—without, however, ever foregoing completely its utopian rudiments.

Modern Jewish immigration to Palestine commenced in 1882 and this essay focuses on its formative period of the first two immigration waves. The first *aliyah* (wave of immigration) of about 20,000–30,000 immigrants came between 1882 and 1903; the approximately 35,000–40,000 immigrants of the second *aliyah* reached Palestine between 1904 and 1914. At the time about 425,000 Palestinians lived in Palestine.

The aim of Jewish immigrant-settlers, like most European emigrants, was to acquire land for settlement. Whereas on other frontiers colonization was undertaken by great powers, the Jewish settler-immigrants were not dispatched by and did not act on behalf of a colonial metropole. Moreover, while most European settlement colonies were founded on “free land,” this option was not available to Zionist settler-immigrants who wished to create their separate political community. In 1904 Menachem Ussishkin, one of the central eastern European Zionist leaders, asked rhetorically:

In order to establish autonomous Jewish community life—or, to be more precise, a Jewish state—in Eretz Israel, it is necessary, first of all, that all, or at least most, of Eretz Israel’s land will be the property of the Jewish people. Without ownership of the land, Eretz Israel will never become Jewish ... and Jews will remain in the very same abnormal situation which characterizes them in the diaspora. They will be without a recognized status. But, as the ways of the world go, how does one acquire landed property? By one of the following three methods: by force—that is, by conquest in war, or in other words, by robbing land of its owner; by forceful acquisition, that is, by expropriation via governmental authority; and by purchase with the owner’s consent.¹

Ussishkin ruled out the first method as being “totally ungodly,” although significantly he also added that “we are too weak for it.” He did not expect Jewish settlers to receive a charter to expropriate land owned by either Arab peasants or landowners. “In sum,” he inferred, “the only method to acquire Eretz Israel [Palestine], at any time and under whatever political conditions, is by purchase with money.”² The dependence of land accumulation for settlement on purchase led to a “low frontierity” in Palestine,³ resulting in Jewish ownership of only about 7 percent of Palestine by 1948.

Since the vast majority of the Jewish immigrants were “refugee-colonists” who did not have the wherewithal to purchase land, they had to rely on the resources of Jewish philanthropists such as Baron Edmund de Rothschild, on Baron Hirsch’s non-Zionist Jewish Colonization Association, and later on the Zionist movement. By 1903, the former two were past the peak of their drive to purchase land and build a *moshava* (colony), and the impact of the settler-immigrants who hailed from eastern Europe on the major Zionist body, the




Fig. 2.1 Jewish settlements in Palestine, 1878–1918. Reprinted with permission from *Land, Labor and the Origins of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, 1882–1914* by Gershon Shafir; © 1989 Cambridge University Press.

World Zionist Organization (WZO), which was the product of western and central European Jewry, had only just begun. As a result, the WZO only began purchasing land in Palestine and evolving its mass colonization program when the second *aliyah* was already on its way. Even then, the WZO was never able to buy enough land for all interested immigrants, and many therefore continued to earn their living as agricultural or industrial workers. Consequently, the

predominant historical process of the *Yishuv* (the Jewish community—literally, “settlement”—in Palestine) during the approximately first decade and a half of this century was a protracted labor market conflict between the first and second *aliyah*.⁴

Though Zionism was the result of a nationalist impetus, in following the colonial path Zionists encountered the choices faced by other colonists. All European settlement colonies were not alike.⁵ In most, settler-immigrants sought direct control of land but differed in their attitudes toward labor. The major division lies between plantation colonies like those in South Africa and the southern United States that relied heavily on cheap labor and erected color bars to separate the races and elevate all whites over blacks, and societies like those in Australia and the northern United States that sought to exclude nonwhite workers altogether and create a pure settlement type colony. Which of these two models—plantation colony or homogenous settlement colony—Palestine would become was the crux of the dilemma for Zionist settler-immigrants.

The institutions and character of Jewish settlement in Palestine were initially formed in imitation of other colonial models. Rothschild recruited French colonial agronomists from Northern Africa to reorganize the failing settlements of the first *aliyah* by copying the model of French colonial agriculture in Africa, particularly in Algeria, Egypt, and Tunisia. His first envoy and director of agriculture, Justin Dugourd, who had worked in Algeria and Egypt, recommended developing viticulture in Palestine. Gerard Ermens gained his experience in Senegal and Egypt and became the Inspector General of Agriculture after 1888. These early directors and the technical advisors, in Simon Schama's view, were “in the mold of the French ‘service colonial’ and imbued with their share of ‘la mission civilisatrice.’”⁶ Giladi and Naor point out that “as foreign experts, they considered Palestine to be a colonial domain, in which they had to carry out well-defined technical assignments.”⁷ The rain-fed field-crop cultivation typical of Arab agriculture was held in contempt by these experts and replaced in Rishon Letzion and part of Petach Tikva by viticulture. These *moshavot* were in turn imitated in the early 1890s by Rechovot and Hedera, the settlements of the first *aliyah*'s second wave.

The new plantation agriculture was based, first and foremost, on cash crops, primarily the grape. Almonds later became equally important, and orange production grew steadily throughout the period. Although attempts were made to diversify production through the addition of jasmine and other perfume plants, cotton, silk, sugarcane, tea, opium, and other products typical of colonial agriculture, these attempts failed. Agricultural production was redirected from subsistence or the selling of surplus in the local markets into production for the international market.

The monocultural vineyards, though on a smaller scale in Palestine than in North Africa, relied on employment of a large, unskilled, and seasonal Palestinian Arab labor force mixed with a small Jewish labor force. The eastern

European Jewish agricultural workers of the second *aliyah* were more expensive since they required year-round jobs as their only source of income and, being urban in origin, were used to a higher “European” standard of living. The importance of finding a way around this problem was well recognized; as Arthur Ruppin wrote in 1926, “Jews wish to maintain a European standard of civilization in Palestine and must yet compete economically with a majority not accustomed to such a standard. [This] contains the root of all the difficulties with which our agricultural colonization has to struggle.”⁸ Their lack of agricultural experience, coupled with their potentially threatening organizational skills, endeared them even less to the planters. The extensive employment of Arab workers, dictated by their lower wages, limited the potential for Jewish demographic growth in Palestine and pointed out the contradiction between market-based colonization and Jewish national aspirations.

The limits of Zionism as a colonial movement were quickly revealed, and it might have gone the way of the other late-nineteenth- and twentieth-century colonial movements analyzed in this volume. Zionism, however, was a national movement as much as it was a colonial one. Whereas other national movements adopted liberal, socialist, or fascist methods to ensure their success, Zionism relied on a colonial strategy to establish a “national home.”

At first the agricultural laborers invoked the nationalist goals of the movement in their struggle with the planters. Just a year after the beginning of the second *aliyah*, a small group of the Jewish agricultural workers adopted the militant strategy of “conquest of labor.” Their aim was the creation of a homogenous labor market in which Jewish workers would perform the whole gamut of tasks and from which Arab workers would be excluded. Consequently, in the plantations of the first *aliyah* a regime of “Hebrew Labor” would prevail. The tool for waging the labor market struggle in political and ideological terms was the newly formed Hapoel Hatzair (Young Worker) Party that, in effect, ushered in the powerful Jewish Labor Movement in Palestine. The party justified “conquest of labor” in nationalist terms, carrying on its masthead the slogan, “A necessary condition for the realization of Zionism is the conquest of all occupations in Palestine by Jews.”

The exclusionary strategy succeeded only modestly. Jewish agricultural workers successfully monopolized skilled jobs, pruning and grafting in the vineyards and operating irrigation pumps in the orange orchards. They were also intermittently able to claim the office of guarding the *moshavot* and their agricultural crops. Unskilled wages, however, did not reach a European standard of living and remained insufficient to support a family. By 1908, the masthead of Hapoel Hatzair carried a reworded slogan: “A necessary condition for the realization of Zionism is the increase in the number of Jewish workers in Eretz Israel and their entrenchment in all occupations.”⁹ The new meaning of “conquest of labor” had been shifted from total exclusion to the creation of a caste-based system. But skilled jobs gave Eastern European Jewish workers only

about 10 percent of the market, mostly in tasks that were even more seasonal than regular agricultural work. By 1909–1910 the workers of the second *aliyah* understood that the planters would neither yield nor be forced to prefer eastern European Jewish to Palestinian Arab workers. Consequently, a Jewish labor force could not be reproduced on the plantations. Workers repeatedly confirmed that a young person could remain committed to his or her ideals for five years at most; afterward the desire to have a family kicked in, and the hopelessness of the situation could no longer be avoided. Workers, it seemed, had reached a dead end, and indeed the largest emigration in all the Jewish waves of immigration, as high as 90 percent of the whole wave according to David Ben-Gurion, took place during the second *aliyah*.¹⁰

What eastern European Jewish workers learned from their failure was that while a strategy of economic exclusion had to be based on a militant nationalist stance, capitalist agriculture—which operates through the market—would always betray that nationalism. Workers thus began turning from the market to politics, seeking to be the foot soldiers of a state in the making that would subsidize and protect them. Just as eastern European Zionist nationalism turned the workers toward colonial settlement, so the colonial encounter in the labor market now reinforced the workers' nationalism.

The planters of the first *aliyah* were divided in response to these demands. The range of their positions found expression in a conference devoted to the problem of "Hebrew Labor," organized in consultation with Arthur Ruppin, the Palestine representative of the WZO (which will be discussed in detail below) in 1914.¹¹ The planters, whose view was expressed by Meir Dizengoff, demanded a fact-finding commission aimed at setting a market wage. For the planters the problem of Zionist colonization was above all economic, and had to be resolved through the creation of viable *moshavot*, even if this approach provided no opportunity for increasing the number of Jewish workers.

A more radical approach was offered by the most class-conscious member of the planter elite, Mordechai Ben-Hillel Hacoheh. He admitted the necessity of increasing Jewish immigration, but wished to ensure planters' control over the new arrivals. He suggested the establishment of a "Central Committee for Worker's Affairs" that would, as he crassly put it, allow "our man [to] set foot on the ship and disembark the new worker. Whoever wishes to work will come to us—to our institutions." Menachem Shenkin, another supporter of this view, went even further, suggesting that the planters establish their own organization for "Hebrew Labor" with branches abroad to recruit "real workers." This proposal came to naught; as Zeev Gluskin, the manager of the Winegrowers Cooperative, pointed out, since planters had erred once in importing Yemenite Jewish workers whom they could not gainfully employ, they had no desire to repeat that mistake. The planters never took up the gauntlet thrown down by Hacoheh and Shenkin because they didn't have to. They possessed an almost unlimited supply of low-paid Arab workers.

In general, as historian Dan Giladi has astutely observed, the difference between the Jewish planter and bourgeois and working strata in Palestine lay in their different position toward the private and public domains, a difference that was the result of their dissimilar connection to the public purse. “The economy of bourgeois circles was not dependent on public budgets,” notes Giladi; “hence they did not place themselves as individuals or organizations at the disposal of Zionist movement’s leadership. It was precisely the dependence of the workers and their need of national financial support ... that turned them into a ‘national army’ that conquers targets set by commands from above.”¹²

Of course, any market-based solution signaled the planters’ distance from the nationalist project and vacated the political arena to the workers. The struggle for “Hebrew Labor,” Giladi notes, “left its imprint on all social relations in the Yishuv, and excited the passions more than any other single question.” In consequence, the workers’ movement “won a most important propaganda, moral, and political victory, which it knew how to exploit to the full, both politically and educationally.” At the same time, the moral damage to the planters’ cause, and indirectly to the Jewish right wing in Palestine, was immeasurable.¹³

An even more acrimonious disagreement took place over the struggle of the paramilitary Hashomer (The Guard), an elite organization of workers who sought to monopolize the role of *moshava* guards. Though Hashomer was resented by most Jewish workers for its elitism and its members’ higher wages,¹⁴ its functioning was contingent on the sustained backing of the agricultural workers of the second *aliyah*. While the employment of a mixed Jewish and Arab guard force commonly led to confrontations, Jewish workers employed in the *moshava* served as Hashomer’s reserve army: guardsmen taken ill were replaced by workers and during assaults the workers reinforced the guards.¹⁵ Not surprisingly, Hashomer threw its support behind “Hebrew Labor,” and whenever Hashomer’s services were discontinued in a given *moshava* the number of Jews who had worked there dropped drastically.¹⁶ The link between the struggles for the “conquest of guarding” and “conquest of labor” made Hashomer unpopular among many planters, and in the younger generation—especially in Zichron Yaacov, the *moshava* which most exclusively employed Arab workers—a self-conscious and ideological opposition emerged to the second *aliyah*.

Its leader was Aharon Aaronsohn, who though he never completed his higher education became a world-renowned botanist and was the discoverer of wild wheat, ancestor of all cultivated wheat. During a tour of the United States in 1909, Aaronsohn was offered the famed Professor Hilgard’s Chair in agronomy at the University of California–Berkeley. But upon succeeding in raising sufficient funds to establish an experimental agricultural station in Atlit, near Hedera, he chose to return to Palestine.¹⁷ Aaronsohn regarded “conquest of labor” harshly and condemned the “fanaticism, and the lack of

humanism and Jewishness” that in his view accompanied “the separatism of our workers.” For Aaronsohn, the penetration of Jews into agricultural work would be the gradual result of technological and economic development, not of a political movement. Aaronsohn combined a paternalistic attitude to Arab society, justifying the employment of lower-paid Arab men, women, and children wherever possible in order to utilize their ecologically sound traditional knowledge in agriculture. In 1913, his brother Alexander and Avshalom Feinberg organized the Gideonites, an association of the native born to supervise Zichron Yaacov’s Arab guards. They also sought to democratize the *moshavot* by extending the vote from the planters to all its permanent residents. By then, however, the organized Jewish agricultural workers had found an ally and were directing their nationalist struggle not toward conquering the *moshava*’s labor market but into bypassing it altogether.¹⁸

The National Movement and Republican Citizenship

The “savior” of the workers appeared in the form of the official body of the Zionist movement, the WZO, which was established in 1897 but turned its attention to “practical work” in Palestine only slowly. Prior to the First World War the leadership of the WZO hailed from German and Austrian Jewry which was not inclined to immigrate to Palestine, whereas the Jewish masses lived in the Pale of Settlement of the Russian empire and in eastern Europe, where it was difficult to organize nationally. The value of workers for the WZO was demographic: only a Jewish labor force could produce a massive Jewish population in Palestine. Workers kept up a steady drumbeat on this point. In the words of their major ideologue, Berl Katznelson, “if it is impossible to increase the working multitude then it is impossible to create a large Yishuv, and therefore impossible to realize the goal of the Zionist national home.”¹⁹ To ensure the success of the colonial project and create a Jewish majority in Palestine, workers demanded the support of “national capital.”

The leaders of the WZO—Adolf Böhm, Theodor Herzl, Franz Oppenheimer, Arthur Ruppin, and Otto Warburg—were well acquainted with national conflicts in the Habsburg Empire, where large peasant populations of various nationalities threatened the dominance of the German speaking elite. They were also familiar with the “denationalization” of the eastern marches of Prussia where, as a result of the crisis of German grain production and the consequent flight of German agricultural workers to the cities of Germany and to the United States, Polish workers cultivated the Junkers’ estates. Otto von Bismarck set up a colonization commission that purchased such estates in the Posen district, subdivided them into small holdings, and sold them under favorable conditions to German farmers. Whereas Rothschild sought to emulate the French North African colonies, this Prussian state-initiated internal colonization, motivated by nationalist considerations and paid for from the public purse, found its way into Zionism.²⁰ The cooperation between the institutions of the

WZO and the second *aliyah*, in Michael Shalev's telling formulation, represented "a practical alliance between a settlement movement without settlers and a worker's movement without work."²¹

In 1901, the WZO set up its Jewish National Fund (JNF) to nationalize land in Palestine. Land purchased by the JNF from Palestinian and other landowners became the perpetual and collective property of the Jewish people: it could only be sublet, and only then to Jews. Four years later the WZO established its Palestine Office under sociologist Ruppin. Finally, in 1908, the WZO adopted the plan of the German Jewish physician and social reformer Franz Oppenheimer, which combined three aims: internal colonization, land nationalization, and cooperation. The Oppenheimer plan foresaw the establishment of "settlement cooperatives" in Palestine; when combined with the model of Russian traditional cooperatives (*artels*) familiar to the workers, it led to the *kibbutz*, the best-known Israeli form of settlement.²²

The first significant accomplishment of the alliance between the workers and the WZO commenced with the establishment in 1908 of the first communal settlement—*kibbutz* Degania—in Um-Djuni on the shore of Lake Tiberias. *Kibbutzim* were built on nationalized land provided by the JNF and, consequently, only Jews could be employed in them. Competition with Arab workers was done away with, and a homogenous Jewish economic sector was created. "The adoption of the Posen model," argue Shalom Reichman and Shlomo Hasson, "involved something much deeper than a transfer of a specific colonization technique. Essentially it meant the acceptance of or agreement with a political philosophy that assigned a leading role to the national needs and thus was congruent with the goals of the Zionist movement."²³ The WZO provided the workers with "national capital"—namely, funds driven by national, rather than market-based, considerations.

The *kibbutz* became the cornerstone of a vertically and horizontally integrated network of Jewish-owned and Jewish-operated economic enterprises and social institutions. These were centralized in 1920 under the institutional umbrella of the Histadrut, the General Federation of Jewish Workers in Palestine, the state in the making. The Histadrut bore the imprint of the colonial project in many other unusual ways, being not only a trade union but also an employer and a provider of social services.²⁴ It ran labor exchanges and producer, consumer, and marketing cooperatives and provided housing, access to (frequently subsidized) employment, and unemployment and health benefits to its members—that is, all that was necessary for an immigrant to sink roots into a low-wage country. By using its WZO subsidies to shield workers and their dependents from competition with Palestinians in the labor market, and by providing them with the social resources needed to maintain their European standard of living in Palestine, the Histadrut became the tool of Zionist colonization. As summed up by Zeev Rosenhek, "the emergence of an embryonic

welfare state during the pre-state era [was] intimately connected with the Zionist-Palestinian conflict and the process of Zionist state-formation.”²⁵

The alliance between the organized sectors of the eastern European Jewish agricultural workers in Palestine and the WZO transformed workers into settler-colonizers, and made the WZO into a mass movement. In the years before the First World War, workers replaced their self-designation as “worker” with “laborer,” and subsequently the Labor Movement adopted as its designation the term *hityashvut ovedet*, which translates as “Labor Settlement Movement.”²⁶

The moral justification for subsidizing Jewish settler-immigrant workers by the various bodies of the WZO rested on their self-representation as pioneers who would carry out the national goal through the colonization and cultivation of the land. Pioneers were lauded because they toiled for the collective good and frequently lived in collective communities whose structure embodied their members’ preference for the common good over individual “goods.” As Ben-Gurion put it, “[T]he first and foremost of the builders and fighters for the Hebrew renaissance is the Hebrew worker, and everything that brings about his entrenchment, development, the extension of his social and political rights, the increase of his material and mental strength—simultaneously benefits the nation in general.”²⁷

Since the national commitment was expressed in its fullness in the *kibbutz*, pioneering was most clearly bound up with that institution. The *kibbutz* was the polis of the Yishuv: a close-knit, intimate, communitarian body whose citizens were pioneers. In the *kibbutz*, as for the ancient Greeks or modern communitarians, a community is based on the civic virtue of participating in and identifying with the life of its political community. Members of such a community experience their citizenship not intermittently, as merely protective individual rights, but rather as active participation in the pursuit of a common good, through settlement and soldiering in the defense of the community.

At the same time, greater obligations were accompanied by exceptional privileges and the citizens’ civic virtue entitled them to a larger share of the community’s material and moral resources.²⁸ “Idealistic and deeply dedicated,” as anthropologist Alex Weingrod has put it, “the pioneers formed an elite group—they were the most esteemed members of the colonist society.”²⁹ While those contributing to the common good (that is, the national cause) were entitled to the WZO’s succor and subsidy, pioneering also served as a yardstick to rank other groups’ national dedication. Although planters, middle-class people, the orthodox, and most Jews hailing from the Middle East were potentially assimilable within the national movement, they were not pioneers and consequently could advance no equal claims to “national capital.” The Histadrut presented itself as a virtuous republican community; its members were the “quality,” the rest the “quantity” Zionism needed to create a Jewish majority in Palestine. An ethnonationalist citizenship framework that incorporated all Jewish immigrants

into the Yishuv without, however, extending to them the whole spectrum of social rights that pioneers enjoyed now coexisted with republican citizenship.

Participation in the Labor Settlement Movement provided limited civil and political rights but extensive social rights, and such rights were closely linked to the nationalist project of colonial settlement. A crucial component of Zionist pioneering was the national struggle against Palestinian rights and aspirations. In the cogent summary of Walter Preuss, an early historian of the Jewish Labor movement, “the Arab question ... became the focal point on which depended the whole existence of the Jewish working community. If they accepted matters as they were, they would not be able to stay in the country.”³⁰ Since the “Arab question,” from the eastern European Jewish workers’ viewpoint, meant the reduction of wages below an acceptable European level, it was tantamount to displacement from Palestine itself. With the assistance of the WZO, the Labor Settlement Movement was able to establish a “closed shop” of truly national dimensions by seeking the “conquest of labor” (in fact, of the labor market) through the “conquest of land” purchased on its behalf by the WZO. This new economic sector could employ only Jews, since it was constructed atop two institutional pillars, the JNF and the agricultural workers’ Histadrut. The aims of the JNF and the Histadrut were the removal of land and labor, respectively, from the market, closing them off to Palestinian Arabs.

Following the Young Turks’ revolt in 1908, the level of hostility between Jewish settlers and Palestinians flared up dramatically from the simmering embers of Arab popular opposition. In the twenty-seven years between 1882 and 1908, thirteen Jews were killed in accidents or in criminal acts committed by Arab residents but not necessarily directed at Jews,³¹ while only two were killed as a consequence of the national conflict. But in 1909 alone four Jews were killed for nationalist motives, and between 1909 and 1913 twelve Jewish guards lost their lives.³² Whereas before the revolt most Jewish observers were at pains to emphasize that the attacks on Jewish settlements were not motivated by “national hatred,”³³ in the years just before the First World War the local Jewish community and even the leadership of the WZO attested to a radical change in the attitude of the Palestinian population toward Zionist aims. They viewed this change as a result of the extension of the initial hostility of Christian merchants fearful of urban competition to a general Palestinian and peasant population, and a transition from localized conflicts to the beginnings of “national hatred and jealousy.”³⁴ The various responses to this escalating threat, however, remained feeble and included the establishment of federations of the *moshavot* of the Galilee and of Judea, the opening of a bureau in the Palestine Office for the translation of Arab language newspapers, and a more active role given to the representatives of the WZO in Istanbul.³⁵

The Jewish laborers’ position toward the national conflict with the Arab population in the labor market was, surprising though it may sound, welcoming.

Ben-Gurion declared in 1910, during the Sixth Congress of the (then Marxist) Poalei Zion Party, that “national hatred is the reason that will force, and bit by bit is already forcing, Jewish farmers to take on Jewish workers, whom they hate so much.” This “important reason” convinced Ben-Gurion “that the Jewish worker will penetrate into the Jewish *moshava*.”³⁶ Joseph Aharonowitz, editor of Hapoel Hatzair, listed “the fear of the farmer of the foreign worker” as the most important reason for the potential success of the struggle for the conquest of labor already in 1908. It was his feeling that “the more the Arab goes on developing, such incidents [of attacking Jews] will repeat themselves, or will stop being mere incidents and will assume the permanent form of national hatred and jealousy. And this thing, which frightens us so much, is the safest guarantee of the Jewish worker.”³⁷

At the same time, the leaders of the eastern European Jewish agricultural workers in Palestine sought to temper and limit such a nationalist perspective. For example, Itzhak Ben-Zvi, one of the main leaders and socialist ideologues (and later Israel’s second president), stated that “we have embarked on our course not against the Arab worker but to protect ourselves and our weak positions. ... In general, we have to be careful, that the question of labor will not assume a chauvinistic character, which is not only reactionary but is ridiculous at a place and time in which we are but a weak minority and we cannot move hand or foot without coming up against the strength of our more numerous and powerful neighbors.”³⁸

The limits of Jewish power in Palestine at the beginning of the twentieth century, and the prevalence of socialist ideology, did not allow exclusivist expressions of Jewish nationalism. At the same time, the Zionist movement and especially the Labor Settlement Movement were well aware of the overwhelming presence of, and distinct aspirations among, Palestinian Arabs as early as the late Ottoman period. In summing up an important historical symposium at the Zalman Shazar Center in Jerusalem, the editor concluded that, “all the lecturers refuted the widespread assumption that the Zionist movement—with the exception of small and marginal groups—supposedly closed its eye to the Arabs living in Eretz-Israel and to the ‘Arab question.’ ...”³⁹

Conclusion

Why were the Jewish settlers of the second *aliyah* ready to put up with the growing hostility toward them among the Palestinian Arab inhabitants, and why did they seek to continue and expand Zionist immigration and colonization? The search for Zionist legitimacy consisted of two parts: first, the leaders of the settler community sought to articulate their inalienable rights to Palestine or Eretz Israel; and, second, having come up against Arab resistance, they also sought to explain to themselves and to the world why this would not turn into an irreconcilable conflict. I will address each in turn.

The leaders of the Labor Settlement Movement, like other Zionists, emphasized Jewish rights in Palestine as the ancestral Jewish homeland. At the same time, they admitted that Jewish immigrants had “to earn” these rights in the present by gaining control of and developing the land. Many additional reasons were adduced by them and others, but at this early stage these served as the main internal explanations. The second of these justifications also served as the basis for the articulation of some of their expectations of future Jewish-Arab relations.

Most Zionists did not turn a blind eye to the presence or the aspirations of the Palestinian Arabs. In fact, the opposite was true. Ever since 1908, when the teacher Itzhak Epstein raised the “hidden question” of the Jewish-Arab land conflict as a zero-sum game, it never stopped being debated. But, according to Moshe Smilansky, a writer and planter, the conflict in the form raised by Epstein had no practical solution. Noted Smilansky, “[I]t is one of two: if Eretz Israel belongs—in the national sense—to those Arabs who settled here lately then there is no room for us here and we have to admit openly: our ancestral land is lost to us. And if Eretz Israel belongs to us, to the people of Israel, then our national interests take precedence to us over everything. There is no room for compromise in that case.”⁴⁰

Whether as champions of European culture or in terms of great power support, Jewish colonists believed themselves to have an advantage over the Palestinian Arabs. Nevertheless, it was their very acknowledgment of this inherent conflict of interests that led the Jewish colonists to seek to legitimate their position on three levels: social, psychological, and—ultimately—moral.

For Jewish colonists, the Jewish-Arab conflict in Palestine did not exist in a vacuum, but was always assessed against the circumstances of Jewish life in the diaspora. For Zionists, and for that matter for the majority of Jews, life outside Palestine was also one of confrontation. As early as 1882, the British *Jewish Chronicle*, writing of Eastern Jewish immigration to Palestine, concluded that “our fate there cannot be worse than here.” Arab hostility, to the Kattowitz chapter of Hovevei Zion in Russia, seemed, in 1884, minor by comparison with the wickedness and backwardness of Russian peasants.⁴¹ Zionist immigration to Palestine, after all, began in the wake of the 1882 wave of pogroms, while many of the leaders of the second aliyah were part of the self-defense groups organized during the 1905 pogroms.

Colonists also argued for the legitimacy of their enterprise as a means of psychological liberation. Jews suffered not only from being hated everywhere they lived, it was argued, but their hosts also heaped contempt on their weakness and humility. Though Jewish colonists were concerned about the awakening of Arab hatred, they pointed to the absence of contempt aimed at the Zionist enterprise. Life free of contempt and shame was an ideal that the more militant among the workers, especially the members of Hashomer, felt was worth fighting for. In a typically hyperbolic fashion, when Hashomer member Yehezkel

Nissanov was killed refusing to surrender his mules to attacking Palestinians, Israel Giladi, one of Hashomer's leaders, wrote, "When [Arabs] stole the animals from a farmer Nissanov would reproach him bitterly: 'How is it that you are still alive and your animals are gone? Shame on you!' And now he had demonstrated that he was as good as his word. 'I have shown,' Nissanov would say, 'that a Jewish worker will not permit himself to be put to shame, even if it costs him his life, for on having this [attitude] depends the honor and future of his nation.'" ⁴² To many Hashomer members, Zionist colonization and nation formation provided a sensation of liberation from the "deep insult of diaspora life." ⁴³

While this form of psychological liberation remained the preserve of a minority among workers, moral self-legitimation was almost universal among all walks of immigrant-settlers and Zionists. But the quest for a moral dimension to their national-colonial aim demanded justice for both the Jewish and Arab sides. One practical justification made of Jewish colonization was that it would not replace the Arab population of Palestine since the intensification of agriculture would create more than enough room for both indigenous and immigrant farmers. This was a form of self-vindication that Zionist settlers shared with European settlers in North America, New Zealand, and elsewhere.

A more original and arresting promise this early wave of Jewish settlers made to Palestinian Arabs and to themselves was rooted in particular Jewish circumstances and could be termed "the morality of the weak." This approach used the experience of weakness to set new and high standards of morality. Both Marxists and revisionist ideologues (Itzhak Ben-Zvi and Zeev Jabotinski, respectively) shared in this view. Ben-Zvi devised a minimum and maximum program for the Jewish proletariat, first to fight for higher forms of economic life in Palestine and later to support international working-class solidarity. ⁴⁴ Jabotinsky's most militant essay from 1923, the "Iron Wall," called for first ridding the Arabs of Palestine of any hope of removing the Jews, and then guaranteeing them equal rights and national self-determination. ⁴⁵ One of the clearest expression of the "morality of the weak" is found in an essay by Moshe Smilansky, who wrote, "Giving the weak into the hands of the mighty and hoping for his fairness is not a moral deed. Moral is the deed that gives the weak the ability to resemble the mighty. We do not want to remain weak and demand mercy and fairness from our opponents. We will become mighty like them, more than them, and then we will meet in the market place, and reach a compromise and will make peace as equals." ⁴⁶

Yet equality and membership in modern societies is articulated and institutionalized through citizenship. A brief overview of Israeli citizenship, defined not just as a bundle of formal rights but as a mode of incorporation of individuals and groups into society, will point out how the distinct Israeli framework has thus far precluded this kind of equality.

Citizenship has never been simple or unitary in form in Israel—a situation it shares with many other colonial and postcolonial societies. There has always been a multiplicity of hierarchically stacked citizenships, and after the 1948 establishment of the Israeli state and the first of the Arab-Israeli wars these came to be stratified into three legal or quasi-legal categories.

Israeli citizenship and attendant civil rights were granted according to the Nationality Law of 1952 and its amended version in 1980, following an individualistic liberal tradition, to most Palestinian Arabs. Such a legal status incorporated Palestinians into Israeli society, though never fully: they remained under military government until 1965 and saw their political rights frequently curtailed. An alternative citizenship framework was made available to all Jews. The Law of Return, enacted in 1950, based membership on ethnicity—or, in effect, religion—and made all Jewish immigrants citizens upon arrival. Jewish immigrants received the full complement of political rights and a considerable measure of social rights, in addition to civil rights. Finally, a third citizenship framework, the republican citizenship discussed in this chapter, provided full civil, political, and social citizenship, remained functioning in many spheres until 1985, and excludes Palestinian citizens in many spheres to date. Most of the institutions formed during the early period of Zionist immigration and colonization have continued to privilege those associated with the colonial project, and the Jewish National Fund still does so today.

I have discussed this incorporation regime elsewhere in great detail;⁴⁷ suffice it here to point out that of the three citizenship frameworks Palestinians are incorporated only into the one not connected directly to land and control of land. The full complement of rights in Israel, as illustrated in this chapter, was available only to those who were part of the colonization of Palestinian land. Most aspects and justifications of Israeli republican citizenship were abandoned and the institutions that buttressed it weakened in the period of economic and constitutional liberalization after 1985. At the same time, the legacy of the republican citizenship that at first provided Jews with the “European standard of living” necessary for the success of Zionist colonization and made the Labor Settlement Movement’s members into privileged citizens of Israel remains deeply anchored in public culture and in crucial aspects of law. If Israelis cannot have privileges in Israel, many ask, than what good is Israel for? The foundation of Zionist control, and the structuring of land, labor, and capital along the communitarian but elitist lines of republican citizenship, still serve as major barriers to equality between Israel’s Jewish and Palestinian Arab citizens. Israel, consequently, has entered a postcolonial stage only partially and haltingly.

Notes

1. *Sefer Ussishkin* (Jerusalem: Havaad Lehotzat Hasefer, 1964), 105.
2. *Ibid.*, 105–106.
3. Baruch Kimmerling, *Zionism and Territory* (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California–Berkeley, 1983), 106, 145–46.

4. Both *aliyot* included many traditionalist immigrants who moved to Jerusalem and the other holy cities of Palestine. I am using the terms *first aliyah* and *second aliyah* not in the broad chronological sense but in a more restricted sociological sense that includes only the settlers in the *moshavot* and Jaffa.
5. George Fredrickson, "Colonialism and Racism: The United States and South Africa in Comparative Perspective," in *The Arrogance of Race* (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1988), 218–21; D. K. Fieldhouse, *The Colonial Empires: A Comparative Survey from the Eighteenth Century* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1966), 11–22.
6. Simon Schama, *Two Rothschilds and the Land of Israel* (London: Collins, 1978), 63, 68, 79–80.
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Between Empire and Nation: Settler Colonialism in Manchukuo

PRASENJIT DUARA

This chapter examines the conditions faced by settler colonialism in the interwar years through the lens of Manchukuo, the Japanese puppet state in northeast China from 1932 to 1945.¹ Although Manchukuo cannot be seen primarily as a settler colony, it was in significant ways a response to the reality and projected future of a settler colonial society. After World War I, the world saw a radically altered relationship between imperialism and nationalism, and it was the settler communities that first felt the heat of this changed relationship. In Manchuria, the threat of a rising Chinese nationalism seeking to integrate the region more completely with the nation-state caused these communities to articulate a vision of sovereignty, an alliance with Chinese groups, and formal independence from Japan. At the same time, they were utterly dependent upon the Japanese military, which absorbed their ideas but over time transformed them into a full-fledged militarist project that often ran roughshod over the interests of both settlers and the local population.

I will explore here how an imperialist formation, affected by transformations in both international and local circumstances of the interwar years, responded to the still deeper imperatives of global competitiveness underlying these changes. The principal actors in this imperial formation, the Guandong Army and the settler community, sought to retain their threatened dominance of the region by riding the transformed circumstances with a bold vision of a new world. The contradiction within this vision of an advanced nation led and controlled by a minority may or may not have reached some kind of equilibrium (witness the extendedness of the British rule of Hong Kong); it was the drive for global dominance that led to its self-destruction.

With the end of World War I, the global circumstances that had permitted the unabashed flourishing of imperialism and colonialism in the East came to a close. Several related circumstances contributed to this situation. Chief among these was the rise of nationalism in the colonies and semicolonies. Wartime mobilization of European nations and the colonies and the loosening




Fig. 3.1 Manchukuo in 1944. Reprinted from *Japan's Total Empire*, by Louise Young; © 1998 the Regents of the University of California.

of imperialist control of the economy in large countries like China and India led to the strengthening of urban nationalism in these places. Moreover, the balance of global power was beginning to move away from Europe and toward the Soviet Union and the United States. Under Vladimir Lenin and Woodrow Wilson, these powers not only became committed to national self-determination but competed with each other to champion the cause of national independence and, we might add in hindsight, nationality formation itself.² This environment facilitated an unprecedented global outpouring of criticism against

imperialism and imperialist wars—in particular the most recent war, the scale of which portended the end of the world. This critique of imperialism was accompanied by the simultaneous emergence of the idea of the nation-state as a universal political form and nationalism as a natural condition of humanity.

These ideas found institutional expression and were reinforced by new global bodies and fora such as the League of Nations, the Court of International Justice, the Multilateral Treaty of Paris, the World Disarmament Conferences, and others.³ Although institutions such as the League of Nations were not successful in achieving their primary goal of peace, by integrating and reinforcing the dependency of nations upon the system they—discursively and practically—enhanced the primacy or even naturalness of the nation as the only basis of the sovereign polity. New nations were dependent upon the standards and procedures of these international bodies for recognition, and the League of Nations also became a means of channeling processes of global information control and monitoring that modern states depended upon.⁴ It is hardly surprising that the question of Manchukuo's sovereignty was brought to the League of Nations, and though the verdict went against the claim that it was an independent nation, the Japanese militarists sought desperately to gain for it both domestic and international recognition as a nation-state and not as a colony.

The postwar order found a strong ideological underpinning in a new discourse of civilization that came to both supplement and rival the European discourse of "Civilization." The nineteenth-century imperialistic idea that civilization was a singular phenomenon closely associated with the European Enlightenment had served to colonize the non-European world by denying rights and sovereignty to the people without civilization (and/or history). The unequal treaties contracted in East Asia, for instance, were based upon this premise. The Japanese and the Chinese spent considerable energy overhauling their societies and institutions in order to renegotiate these treaties as civilized societies. With the end of the war, an alternative discourse of civilization as multiple, spiritual, and moral as opposed to materialistic and legalist, which had survived in the penumbra of the singular Civilization, received an important fillip. The rise of this alternative conception accompanied the global critique of the "civilizing mission" that was seen by the colonized and many Western intellectuals, such as Arnold Toynbee, to be a fig leaf for the barbarism of European civilization demonstrated by the war.⁵ Western Civilization had forfeited the right to represent the highest goals of humanity, and the new national movements sought to turn toward their own civilizational traditions—often reconstructed in the image of Civilization—to found the ideals of the new nations and the right to sovereignty.

Thus the ideological foundations of the older imperialist world order confronted major challenges. In Asia and the Middle East (if not in Africa), colonial powers were forced to withdraw from the high ground of the "civilizing mission"

and adapt to the rhetoric of independence while devising alternative mechanisms of control, including indirect rule, incremental self-government, financial dependency, and client states. Some of these interwar arrangements, such as Britain's informal control of Iraq, lasted until 1958. Often these older imperialist powers regarded these as tactical changes and had no intention of giving up the imperial projects and profits they had become accustomed to during the nineteenth century and had fought over in the Great War.

Indeed, the League of Nations, for all its commitment to internationalist ideals, could not overcome the tension in nationalism between self-determination and expansionism—in other words, the historical relationship between nationalism and imperialism. The liberal idealist architects of the League of Nations were “firm believers in the unifying power of a higher ‘international mind’” based on the idea of a common civilization underlying nationalism.⁶ This same nationalism, however, also mandated that the sovereignty of existing states not be compromised in the least. The insistence on the inviolability of the external sovereignty of states was consistent with, and perhaps reflected, the League of Nations's highly ambivalent attitude toward imperialistically acquired state rights (and colonialism), which we shall see in relation to Manchukuo. It was manifested not only in the relative powerlessness to enforce compliance upon Japan, but also in its rhetoric respecting the special state rights acquired by treaties. Dominated as it was by imperialist nations, the League of Nations was forced to reconcile the reality of imperialism with the new rationale of national self-determination.

Of course, imperialism and nationalism had been historically intimately connected, and the interwar years would witness another stage of this relationship, particularly in East Asia. The nexus between imperialism and nationalism is best understood in relation to world-systems theory, which argues that nationalism is to a great extent a by-product of the relationship between state building, modern capitalism, and the global domination. According to Giovanni Arrighi, the creation and maintenance of global capitalism was made possible by the fusion of “two logics,” territorial and capitalist: the capture of mobile capital for territorial and population control, and the control of territories and people for the purposes of mobile capital. From the seventeenth century, the territorial state possessing absolute jurisdiction within its boundaries and growing military and organizational capabilities became necessary to control the social and political environment of capital accumulation on a world scale. In Arrighi's scheme, the hegemonic power in the competitive system of European states, such as the Dutch in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and the British in the nineteenth century, was successively challenged by latecomer territorial states that sought—in the drive to become globally competitive—to mobilize the economic and human resources first within their jurisdictions, thus producing some aspects of nationalism. Immanuel Wallerstein is more explicit, declaring that nationalism became the

very means whereby a state or social formation sought to leverage itself out of the periphery of the world system into the core.⁷

While this model of competition is hardly sufficient by itself to explain nationalism, since the spread of national rights discourse through the new media and global institutions had an autonomous logic, several new European nations and the United States and Japan fashioned themselves as nations in order to be competitive and achieve global dominance. Nationalism permitted imperialist states to mobilize resources, integrate the lower classes, and discipline the population for competition with the promise of imperial glory and rewards. But imperialism was not only something external to nationalism, applied to people outside its imagined community. Nationalist principles were also extended for imperialist ends or with imperialist consequences. Ideals of assimilation or brotherhood often ended up in a brutal imperialism. During the French revolutionary period, several French thinkers saw colonialism as a way to integrate the colonies into the universal project of the Enlightenment; yet the civilizing mission entailed and reinforced “the right to intervene.”⁸ Twentieth-century doctrines often associated with anti-imperialist nationalism, such as common civilization, socialist brotherhood, and democracy, have frequently become instruments of imperialism.

Japanese Pan-Asianism, based on the purported solidarity of a common civilization, was also deployed to build an empire. The relationship between imperialism and nationalism discussed above fits the Japanese case well. From early in the Meiji period, Japanese imperialism was justified by nationalism. Mainland northeast Asia was characterized as the outer zone of national defense. The security of the Japanese nation was depicted in popular representations of the Korean Peninsula as a dagger poised at the heart of the nation, and expansion in northeast Asia during the first three decades of the twentieth century was accompanied by the rhetoric that Korea, Manchuria, and Mongolia (successively, *Man-sen* and *Man-mo*) represented the “lifeline” of the Japanese nation.

In the 1920s Japanese nationalism grew out of several different social sites. Meiji orthodox nationalism built around the emperor system by the state was joined by the ultranationalism of a military disaffected by disarmament programs, the radicals of an “authentic” agrarianism (*nohonshugi*) responding to widespread rural immiseration of the time, and young disgruntled military officers, the Showa restorationists, who felt that the capitalists, politicians, and bureaucrats had abandoned the true *bushido* (way of the warrior) spirit of the Japanese nation.⁹ The radical nationalism that began to coalesce around these forces was centered upon powerful symbols of authenticity and supported continued expansion in deliberate defiance of an interstate balance of power perceived to be unjust to a sovereign Japan. It was catalyzed by the ideology of Pan-Asianism, which upheld the cause of an exploited Asia and thus justified expansion as a holy war against the West. Note here that Japanese militaristic

expansion into Manchuria in the early 1930s was enthusiastically welcomed by the entire social body of the Japanese nation, which was efficiently mobilized to support it.¹⁰ If the nation was behind imperialism, the imperialism of Japan in Manchuria was also shaped by nationalist ideas and practices.

The world-system perspective has enabled us to see the function of modern political forms in relation to the imperative of global competition in the dual logic of territory and capital. Both nationalist and imperialist practices were combined and often fused to gain competitive advantage. The period after World War I witnessed two contradictory forces. A strengthening nationalism justified aggression and domination, but an expanding system of nation-states and national movements produced moral and political pressure to extend some of the principles of citizenship to the dominated. Colonial nations had to find means other than formal colonialism in order to control resources and remain globally competitive. As Manchukuo shows, zones of imperialist domination could be reterritorialized as part of “regional economic blocs” where patterns of investment and economic modernization resembled those of nation-states.¹¹

Settler communities, once celebrated as pioneers, were to bear the brunt of these transformed relationships. Faced with delegitimation of the colonial enterprise and rising nationalist movements in much of the world, they too began to articulate their own situation in terms of these very discourses of internationalism and anti-imperialism. In Manchuria, where radical elements of the Japanese Guandong Army—themselves responding at several levels to the new global circumstances—sought a new agenda for global domination, the settler community saw, if not opportunity, at least an occasion, to maintain their status while reenvisioning the new state of Manchukuo.

The region known (in Chinese) as northeastern China, or simply the northeast, was, from at least the eighteenth century on, referred to as Manchuria by Europeans and the Japanese. The fertile agricultural valley of the Liao River in the south central part of the region was surrounded by mountains and deep forests in the north and east and by grasslands occupied by Mongol tribes to the west. The Manchu conquest of China in 1644 led the conquerors to close off much of this vast territory to Han Chinese settlers until the last forty years of Manchu rule, though they could hardly prevent fugitive Chinese settlements during the last two centuries. The avowed goal of the Manchus was to preserve the sacred primeval forests, distinctive traditions, and tribal communities from these settlers, but the interdiction also had to do with the monopoly of the rich tribute in furs and forest products from the region.

Facing rival imperialist pressures from the mid-nineteenth century on, first from the Russians and later the Japanese, the Manchus gradually transformed into what Benedict Anderson has called “Russifying nationalists,” whereby the dynast’s effort to distinguish their lineage from those whom they ruled was reversed both because of the pressure from nationalism within and from imperialism without. The Manchus reversed their policy of isolating the region, and

the ban on Chinese migration was officially ended in 1878. Between 1890 and 1942 an average of half a million migrants and sojourners flowed into the region every year and over eight million people were added to the population from outside. This influx rivaled the heaviest flow of European immigration to the United States over a comparable period in the nineteenth century. This population movement, facilitated by the network of railroads built by the Russians and the Japanese, was lured by the available land and high-value cash crops such as opium and soybeans. The rapid settlement of the region by Han Chinese from northern China that began in the latter half of the nineteenth century brought about a closer integration of the region with China.¹²

When the Manchus fell in the 1911 Republican revolution in China and no stable central power appeared capable of holding the different regions, the northeast (like many other regions) came to be dominated by warlords vying for power. Under these conditions, no power in Manchuria could escape the economic and military dominance of the principal imperialist power in the region—Japan. The Treaty of Portsmouth that concluded the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905, while acknowledging in theory China's sovereignty in Manchuria, granted Japan the Russian lease on the Guandong Peninsula and the South Manchurian Railroad. From this time, Japanese interests and influence grew, particularly after the annexation of Korea in 1910 and during the imperialist power vacuum in East Asia during World War I. Through Group II of the Twenty One Demands that it imposed on China in 1915, Japan acquired privileged economic rights in southern Manchuria and eastern Inner Mongolia, which it secured by several railway, industrial and loan contracts, and agreements. The Republican government, however, succeeded in resisting the demand that Japanese be permitted to own (as opposed to lease) land in the region, a resistance that thwarted Japanese efforts to colonize the land with settlers and agricultural corporations.¹³

The bulk of the Japanese population in Manchuria, which reached about 190,000 in 1926, was concentrated in the Guandong Peninsula and the railway zone.¹⁴ The economic and political affairs of the leased territories was managed by the Guandong government and the South Manchurian Railway (SMR), a quasi-governmental corporation with many subsidiary enterprises beyond railroads and one of the largest research organizations in the world until 1945. As early as in 1906, in the aftermath of the Russo-Japanese War, Gotō Shimpei, first president of the SMR, envisioned the railroad and settlers as the key to the Japanese control of Manchuria. As Takeo Ito then noted, "If within ten years by managing the present railroad we are able to induce 500,000 Japanese to emigrate to Manchuria, we will not have to commence hostilities recklessly despite Russian strength."¹⁵ The settlers who rode in on the SMR turned out to be principally Chinese, but Gotō's vision of Japanese domination of Manchuria continued to unfold. By the end of World War II, there were about 750,000

Japanese in Manchuria, including 300,000 rural settlers who were brought in from the 1930s.¹⁶

The establishment of the railroads linking the southern port of Newchwang to regions as far north as Harbin, and the opening of several ports in the first decade of the twentieth century—including Dairen (Dalian), which would come to rival the Shanghai port facilities—led to rapid economic growth, particularly in agriculture. By 1927, 85 percent of Japanese foreign investment was in China, and of its Chinese investment, 80 percent was invested in Manchuria. The investment of the SMR in 1920 alone was 440 million yen. By 1932, Japan's share of the total industrial capital in Manchuria was 64 percent while the Chinese share was 28 percent.¹⁷

Dairen quickly became the hub of Japanese government, business, and the settler community in the region. In the years immediately following the Russo-Japanese War, it became established as a banking and shipping center for large trading houses and financial groups. At the same time, it was also populated by petty entrepreneurs, spies, translators, prostitutes, and others employed or variously connected with the military and the SMR. Dairen attracted economic resources from the hinterland in exchange for finished commodities and credit, and it remained the base from which settlers spread out following the Japanese expansion into other parts of China. Thus, both petty entrepreneurs and large businesses fanned out into Qingdao in Shandong after the Japanese military took it over from the Germans during the First World War. Subsequently, other cities such as Mukden (Shenyang) and Harbin were opened to Dairen businesses when the puppet state of Manchukuo was set up in 1931. The Sino-Japanese War that broke out in 1937 gave these groups opportunities to expand beyond Manchuria into northern China as well.¹⁸

About 140,000 of the Japanese were employed by the various enterprises of the SMR.¹⁹ As such, the entire urban settler community had myriad links with the corporation; both big and small entrepreneurs had frequently been employees or managers in SMR companies. The settler community, and especially the vocal petty entrepreneurs, was extremely dependent upon the special imperialist privileges such as extraterritoriality in the leased territory as well as on the government and the SMR to stay competitive in Manchuria. They created pressure groups such as the SMR Consumer Cooperative and agitated with the government to protect and help them. This was particularly true in the depression of the late 1920s, when competition with Chinese merchants—who were still on the silver standard when Japan had moved to the gold standard—sharpened. According to Yanagisawa Asobu, the military action to establish Manchukuo was partly a response to the increasing fears of the petty entrepreneurs and the military's perception of the need to unify an increasingly divided commercial community.²⁰

The Japanese maintained economic and military control through the 1920s by means of a shaky alliance with the warlord ruler of the region, Zhang Zuolin,

a bandit turned warlord who rose to power in part because of Japanese support. Ultimately Zhang alienated both his Japanese backers and the civilian politicians by pursuing his militaristic ambitions for control of China and bankrupting the provincial treasuries. These exploits led to the movement known as *baojing anmin* (preserve the borders and secure the people), a movement for regional autonomy but which the Japanese among others interpreted as opposition to union with China. Zhang Zuolin was murdered by the Japanese in 1928, but his death merely exacerbated their problems, because his son Zhang Xueliang—surrounded by a group of nationalist intellectuals and bureaucrats—was even less interested in the Japanese and made overtures to the Kuomintang (KMT). When he hoisted the Chinese national flag and declared his allegiance to the KMT government of a unified China in late 1928, the future of the Japanese community and colonial interests in Manchuria looked precarious. On September 18, 1931, the Guandong Army precipitated the Mukden Incident and drove the Zhang Xueliang government out of Manchuria.²¹

Manchukuo was established in March 1932 as the Republic of Manchukuo (and subsequently changed to the Empire of Manchukuo). Despite the claims to independence, there is no question that the real power behind it was the Japanese army; hence the Western historiographical designation of it as a “puppet state.” Chinese scholarship refers to it as the “false Manchukuo” (*wei Manzhouguo*), indicating its illegitimacy. While both designations capture important aspects of the polity, these characterizations tend to shape the kind of scholarship that is produced and obscure a wide range of historical issues. Until recently, much scholarship tended to concentrate on the negative effects of state policies on people’s lives which, to be sure, became especially intolerable after the outbreak of the Pacific War for which Manchukuo became a principal supply base. The wider effects of the massive industrialization, urbanization, and modernization, perhaps more massive than elsewhere in Asia during the period, have barely been probed. Socially, the vast range of activities and complex responses to political power that do not conform to victimization, collaboration, or resistance are deemed to have little consequence. Finally, the puppet designation suggests a scarcely veiled colonialism and cannot capture the novel institutional arrangements that produced results very different from those in the old colonial states. Let us consider, then, the ways in which Manchukuo reflected settler ideas and concerns, and the military power they depended upon.

When Zhang Xueliang hoisted the nationalist flag in late 1928 and incidents of resistance to Japanese increased, the settlers began to organize into different groups whose principal representatives were, inevitably, employees of the SMR. The Mantetsu Shainkai advocated the ideal of racial harmony and a new state, while the Daiyūhōkai was inspired by Buddhist universalist ideas of divine compassion.²² Its monklike leader Kasagi Ryōmei fostered the ideal of ethnic harmony and advocated greater autonomy of Manchuria from both China and Japan. Another important group whose ideas informed the new

Manchukuo state was the Manchurian Youth League (Manshū Seinen Renmei), which claimed five thousand members. This group was particularly sensitive to the rise of Chinese nationalism and, although a paramilitary outfit, it was painfully aware that Japanese interests in Manchuria were doomed without some kind of compact with the Chinese communities or a framework of Sino-Japanese coexistence. Under its idealistic leader Yamaguchi Jūji, the Youth League developed the idea of *kyōwa*, or cooperation between races or nationalities, and the rejection of colonialist attitudes. This idea would ultimately incarnate in a fascistic mass organization in Manchukuo known as Kyōwakai or Xiehehui, and translated into English as the Concordia Society. Nonetheless, the association was built upon a rhetoric of eternal peace embedded in East Asian ideals and a framework of mutual cooperation among the different peoples. It advocated anti-imperialism and even conceived of a new type of anticolonial state that would replace all imperialist powers, including the Japanese.²³ Although the history of Manchukuo since the mid-1930s is a history of its subordination to Japanese expansionism, the effects of these early ideas and policies should not be underestimated.

In all these groups we see a mix of modern progressive, even radical, ideals of the equality of peoples combined with notions of the distinctiveness of Eastern civilizational traditions. Thus, Buddhist thinkers such as Kasagi Ryōmei of the Daiyūhōkai and Ishiware Kanji emphasized “Easternness,” while the Youth League and Tachibana Shiraki sought more progressive ideals. But it was Tachibana who synthesized this duality in a way that was suitable for the new state. A well-respected sinologist, Tachibana was a journalist in Manchuria who began to work for the influential SMR Research Department in 1925.²⁴ He was perhaps more sympathetic to Chinese nationalism than most other Japanese and his goal was to create a new East that was modern, progressive, and socialistically egalitarian.²⁵ At the same time, he was convinced that the East was organized around different ethical and spiritual principles and appealed to Sun Yat-sen’s ideal of *wangdao*, or the way of the ethical monarch of Chinese antiquity, as a means of countering the “way of the hegemon” represented both by Western powers and the local warlords.

Ironically, the Manchukuo state would seek to deploy precisely such Chinese ideals as *wangdao* and their own supposedly more genuine version of the Republic of Five Nationalities of 1912 in the Minzu Xiehe (Concordia of Nationalities). Not only did both these ideas refer to Sun’s rhetoric, but they also alluded, as had Sun, to Chinese civilizational categories including the Qing notion of the federated empire upon which the Republic of Five Nationalities had in turn been based. However creative his efforts to synthesize the modern West and ancient East and channel Japanese expansionist energies to rebuild Asian societies, Tachibana’s desire to see Asia unified under Japan led him to work with the military.²⁶ Like all the other idealists who dreamed of building

a new world on the frontier, the core reality of the military power would lead them to compromises and reversal of their ideals.

The Manchurian Youth League and settler community had sought from 1928 on to pressure the government in Tokyo to protect their interests and adopt a more aggressive stance toward Chinese nationalism. While the government of Tanaka Giichi did flex its muscles in China, the settler community became convinced that the civilian government had no consistent policy. They found a more receptive ear among the radical military officers of the Guandong Army. The single most forceful figure behind the creation of Manchukuo, senior officer Ishiwara Kanji, was a radical nationalist, but his nationalism was framed by a version of Pan-Asianism that culminated in a vision of the inevitable confrontation between East and West. This trend in Pan-Asianism was associated especially with Ōkawa Shūmei, a thinker who, embittered particularly by the racial exclusion laws enacted against Japanese and Chinese in the United States, viewed history in civilizational terms as progress born out of conflict and war—most centrally, war between Asia and the West. The ultimate victory of Asia over the West would be led by Japan's victory over the United States, which would liberate Asia from the enslavement of Western colonialism. This liberation was Japan's moral duty, even if the Asian peoples were ungrateful for it.

Ishiwara predicted in 1925 that this holy war or righteous duty (*zhengyi*, *seigi*) would take place in 1941 and saw the cooperation of China and Manchuria under Japanese leadership as necessary for its success.²⁷ He initially regarded the Japanese possession of Manchuria as necessary for the survival of Japan and its continued control over Korea. By the end of World War I, the idea of "strategic autarky" gained currency in the army and it figured Manchuria at the center of a sphere of self-sufficiency that would be critical to the outcome of any battle in the future. According to Tak Matsusaka, Japanese military analysts determined upon the notion of strategic autarky after observing the close relationship between state and resource mobilization during World War I. The participation of Manchuria and China would be necessary whether it was won through voluntary cooperation or occupation and coercion.²⁸ Additionally, the Japanese role in Manchuria would be strengthened by the promotion of Japanese rural settlements.

The history of the settlers and the military gives us clues as to why Manchukuo was established as a nominally independent state. It should be noted that Manchukuo remained a formally independent nation even after the withdrawal of Japan from the League of Nations and at a time when both Japan and other powers continued to possess colonies. As we have seen, while the settlers were deeply fearful of rising Chinese nationalism, their representative organizations recognized the need—expressed in the idea of the concord of nationalities—to develop cooperative relationships with pliable Chinese groups in Manchuria. Both Tachibana and Kasagi were highly influential in the design

of the new state, although the latter was forced out of government after the initial years because his ideals of cooperation and autonomy began to conflict with the military's vision. Meanwhile, Ishiwara recognized that in order to gain cooperation for his goal of global domination, the military would have to develop key alliances in Manchuria and champion the new discourse of rights and autonomy within the framework of a sovereign state.²⁹ Ishiwara became a convert to the Pan-Asianist idea of the formal equality of Asian nations; there was no contradiction between viewing the alliance as representing the supposed difference between Asian ideals and Western imperialism and as a means in the final war for global dominance.³⁰

The bloc idea grew by the mid-1930s into those of the East Asian League (Tōa renmei) and the East Asian Community (Tōa kyōdōtai), and still later into the idea of the Greater East Asian Coprosperity Sphere (Dai Tōa Kyōeiken).³¹ To be sure, commitment to the idea of an alliance—and even to Japanese renunciation of extraterritoriality in Asian countries—hardly meant that the Japanese were not thought to be intrinsically superior or that these Asian nations need not accept the leadership of Japan. Yet it is impossible fully to understand why the military encouraged the rapid modernization and industrial buildup in Manchuria without grasping its framing within Pan-Asianism.

While Pan-Asianist ideas, including ideas of Eastern civilization, were by no means espoused only by the Japanese, during the interwar years the Japanese emerged as the champions of this new civilization discourse, and, as we have seen, adapted it to its imperialist goals. As such, it is instructive to compare Pan-Asianism with similar civilizational ideologies that emerged with the anti-imperialist movement but became instruments of imperialism.

Lusotropicalism was such an idea, and was developed originally by the Brazilian sociologist Gilberto Freyre. The theory held that the Portuguese were unlike the other European imperialists because they brought to Brazil an ideal of multiracialism and racial equality. Freyre, who had studied in the United States in the 1920s with Franz Boas, appears to have developed his ideas in a counterrevolutionary intellectual milieu closely affiliated with the new civilizational discourse. In Brazil, the theory accompanied a national project that sought to integrate blacks into national society. The presence of “miscegenation” and the absence of overt racist laws and racial rebellion came to be seen as significant positive indices of a racially harmonious society. One critical contemporary view, however, suggests that Lusotropicalism in Brazil sought to celebrate legal equality among the races while stabilizing social and economic inequalities between them.³²

But if Lusotropicalism in Brazil was a national project, the Portuguese celebrated it as their glorious colonial heritage in order to boost national pride when Portugal had become very much a second-rate power. In this context, Lusotropicalism in Africa represented a Portuguese version of the “civilizing mission”:

a gift of their superior racial qualities to the lower races through interracial sexual unions. Only with the start of the Angolan armed struggle for independence after the 1960s did the Portuguese tone down their overtly racist rhetoric and emphasize ideals of racial harmony and absence of overt racist laws in a bid to justify its colonial rule. The criticism of this ideology has been ferocious and devastating, particularly in the African case, where the reality of racial discrimination in economic and political terms has been plain to see.³³

Like Lusotropicalism, Japanese Pan-Asianism represented an adaptation to the changed and threatened circumstances of imperialism at a time of rising nationalism. The theory of racial concord in Pan-Asianism also entailed a hierarchy of nationalities and a theory of benefits to be gained by subordinating oneself to the superior Japanese. But Japanese imperialism appears to have been more proactive in that it entailed nominal sovereignty, the building of modern institutions of control and development, mobilization of identity, and the quest for global dominance. Its wartime empire in Southeast Asia, built around the ideology of the Greater East Asian Coprosperity Sphere that developed out of the Manchukuo experiment, was initially greeted by many Asian nationalists as liberation from European colonialism. In other ways, the structure of this wartime empire was perhaps closer to the postwar Soviet and U.S. modes of neoimperialist control than to European imperialism.

With the fall of the Zhang regime in September 1931, most of the top military leadership defected to the new state and there was no shortage of Chinese drawn from autonomists, opportunists, “Eastern” religious salvationists, revolution-fearing elites, and war-weary masses who were persuaded or coerced into joining the “peace maintenance committees” that served as the effective administration under the provisional Self-Government Guidance Department guided by Kasagi. Once regular administration was reestablished, particularly after the establishment of the Republic of Manchukuo in March 1932, these county-level committees were formally dissolved. Yet the spirit of cooperation (and doubtless forced cooperation) that lay behind them was to be sustained through two institutions, the Concordia Society and the principally Chinese associations that I have termed “modern redemptive societies,” such as the Daodehui (Morality Society) and the Hongwanzihui (Red Swastika Society). The tacit alliance that the Manchukuo state formed with Chinese landed groups, local elites, autonomists, and redemptive societies, as well as with modernizing bureaucrats and modernizing elements in the Concordia Society, shaped the rhetoric of its sovereignty claims.³⁴

Pan-Asianism was the guiding ideology joining these two institutions to the new regime. The Concordia Society grew out of the Manchurian Youth League and made the rather outrageous claim that it represented not merely a nation, but one more advanced than most in the world. Not only was it supposed to reject exploitation and the reproduction of difference between ruler and ruled, but it was also designed to counter the homogenization of differences produced

by nationalism itself, which had led to insoluble conflicts in the early twentieth century. By allegedly granting different peoples or nationalities their rights and self-respect under a state structure, it saw itself as a nation in the mode of the Soviet Union or today's multicultural nations.³⁵ It was also designed to aid the state in its rapid program of modernization—an important basis for its claim to legitimacy. But where in the eyes of a Yamaguchi or Tachibana the Concordia Society was to represent the will of the people and was ultimately destined to replace the Guandong Army, by mid-decade it was purged of its original leadership and made into a fascistic mass organization of the army and government,³⁶ becoming less a means of ethnic, cultural, and occupational representation and more an agent of surveillance and mobilization. Although it enrolled a majority of the population through its various related associations and the distribution of rations during the Pacific War, ideologically it commanded little or no allegiance by this time.

The lesser-known redemptive societies were another story. Counting the numbers of their followers all over China often in the millions, hundreds of these societies grew out of the sectarian and syncretic traditions of late imperial China (*sanjiaoheyi*) which combined the three religions of Buddhism, Confucianism, and Taoism into a single universal faith. Many of them were formally established or saw their rapid expansion during the period from World War I through the 1920s, when the discourse of Western civilization as being overly materialist and violent began to emerge globally.³⁷ These societies sought to supplement and correct the material civilization of the West with the spiritual civilization of the East. The resultant synthesis they envisaged took the shape of a religious universalism that not only included Buddhism, Confucianism, and Daoism but also Islam and Christianity. In general, their goals involved the transformation of the self and society through self-cultivation and discipline as well as through philanthropic organizations (including hospitals, orphanages, and refugee centers); through dissemination and publicity (via schools, newspapers, libraries, and lectures); and through enterprises such as factories and farms employing the poor, savings and loan associations, and even engineering projects such as road and bridge repair.³⁸

In the late 1920s and early 1930s, the KMT government conducted antireligious campaigns and banned the redemptive societies along with other violent sectarian societies. It was under these circumstances that the redemptive societies began to draw close to the Manchukuo regime. For their part, Tachibana and a host of Japanese settler researchers and intellectuals saw an enormous opportunity in the Chinese state's rejection of these societies with their vast popular followings. They recognized the power of the old cultural universe in the establishment of the new polity. The East-West opposition furnished Tachibana with the vision of drawing what he called "objectively valuable" groups into the Manchukuo regime. The state's doctrines of the "great unity" (*datong*) and the "kingly way" (*wangdao*) represented the political symbols of

this ideology of Eastern civilization. They became nodes in an ideological nexus bringing together different groups, including political leaders of the old society such as Yuan Jinkai, Zhang Jinghui, and Yu Chonghan, dyed-in-the-wool Confucian monarchists such as Zheng Xiaoxu and his associates, and, most numerous, the deeply religious and universalist redemptive societies.

The Japanese ideologues of Manchukuo offered the redemptive societies an ideology and a space, however circumscribed, in which to pursue their goals. Given the history of their persecution, the latter must have found the opportunity very attractive. Nonetheless, as imperialists and modernizers, neither the Guangdong Army nor the settler intellectuals could long tolerate either the universalist or the “superstitious,” ecstatic, and potentially violent dimension of these societies. They needed to effect two transformations: to convert them into civic organizations susceptible to state control, and to fold their universalist and transcendent orientation into a project celebrating Eastern civilizational traditions against the West. While many of these societies remained implacably hostile to Japanese rule, Manchukuo had considerable success with them—at least until the Pacific War, when intolerable conditions led even to the alienation of these societies. One of these societies, the Daodehui, had eight million followers in Manchukuo alone.³⁹

The convergence of settler anxiety and military ambition produced an imperial formation—in the name of an independent state—that seemed to have considerable success in its early stages. We can see this in the creation of allies, the quick crushing of resistance, the rapid development of the modern, urban sector of the economy, and the establishment of a strong state and mobilization apparatus. However, none of these modern features made it any less imperialist. While Chinese personnel staffed all levels of administration, enterprises, and projects, Japanese officials formed a shadow supervisory structure. When Chinese and Japanese ate at the same table, the Japanese were served rice but the Chinese sorghum or other lesser grains (ostensibly reflecting the diet of the different nationalities, though this fooled nobody). The tensions between modernization and imperialism produced contradictory results. While in 1939 a Chinese factory worker made twenty-nine yuan for every one hundred yuan made by a Japanese worker in Manchukuo, the rapid industrialization ensured that Chinese workers continued to immigrate to Manchuria at an average rate of 1.2 million per annum from the 1940s.⁴⁰

The relatively novel form of imperialism based on alliance, mobilization, and urban economic development, however, was rapidly undermined by the military pursuit of global domination through war. It involved not only untold suffering for the colonized and others, but also the destruction of the laboriously constructed edifice of Manchukuo designed by representatives of the settler community. While, as we have seen, the settler community had encouraged military intervention in 1931, this community was quite divided by the military's plans to make war in China in 1937. Some protested that this would be

the end of Manchukuo's independence and ideals, but most others (correctly) feared that the military's demands and pressures would endanger the interests and relationships built up in Manchukuo. There is a certain logic in these urban ex-settlers' demand that the postwar Japanese government indemnify them for lost property and suffering caused by the war. But it is a perverse logic, and as Yanagisawa observes, the fact that these settlers were able to uproot and leave without much trouble suggests that they never did develop deep or extensive ties to the society, but had simply fattened on their privileged ties to imperial structures. Rather more complex is the situation of the rural Japanese settlers who were brought in during the 1930s and 1940s as part of the goal of strategic autarky.⁴¹

Since Manchukuo was built in part on an alliance with conservative Chinese landlords, its much touted goal of land reform was quickly abandoned. Instead, the military sought to counter Chinese agricultural settlement by bringing in a million Japanese rural settlers over twenty years. To this end a massive propaganda and recruitment effort in Japan persuaded about 300,000 of the poorest Japanese farmers to settle in northern Manchuria. The land for these Japanese farmers was supposed to be unoccupied, but in fact 18 percent of this land had been under Chinese cultivation. The government seized it through price manipulations, coerced sales, and forced evictions. Chinese rural resistance was crushed with systematic and brutal violence.

If Pan-Asianism, including both the modernizing ideas of Concordia and the traditionalism of the redemptive societies, sought to appeal to Chinese allies, there was a more traditionally imperialist ideology that sought to limit the role of the Chinese and develop Manchuria for the Japanese. This older Japanese view of Manchuria as a virginal frontier of grasslands, mountains, and primeval forests peopled by ancient tribal communities came to serve the argument for Manchuria as the lifeline for Japan's limited land and resources. By means of racial-linguistic theories such as the Ural Altaic hypothesis, some Japanese declared a primordial connection between themselves and the "original" inhabitants of the land, the Tungus. Manchukuo was seen as continuing the imperial tradition emerging from this region associated with the Jurchen, the Manchus, and others. These polities had been historically distinct from the settled agricultural empires of China and had succeeded until recently in keeping out the Chinese. The Japanese, who declared themselves the most advanced Tungusic peoples, claimed to be the inheritors of this tradition, with the right to serve as custodians of the autochthonous peoples and land.⁴²

We can often see this narrative in its negative form, in the absence or marginalization of the majority Han agricultural farmer in the proliferating media propaganda of a modern and industrialized Manchukuo. Thus, the regime tried to reconcile the contrasting images of a land with modern urban technology and vast, empty, and natural spaces. During the 1930s they sought and succeeded in discouraging Chinese agricultural immigration (although

immigration to the cities picked up in the 1940s). In their place, the military sought the Japanese settler. The prospect of settling in Manchuria was made very attractive to this rural underclass. Each family was given ten hectares of farmland and additional grazing and vegetable lands. Many of them were able to use Chinese farm labor to work their farms. At the same time, they were to serve as farmer-soldiers. They were armed and located in bandit-infested areas and along the Soviet-Manchukuo border, originally to serve as a backup for the army when the Guandong Army expected to fight the Soviet Army. Thus, despite the privileges of being a part of the “superior nationality,” it would seem that potential settlers were discouraged by some knowledge of the harsh conditions of settlement in a new terrain and among a hostile Chinese population while also engaging in military defense.⁴³

Among the Japanese in Manchuria, it was these rural settlers who suffered most piteously as the military maniacally pursued its objectives. With the outbreak of the Pacific War, the Japanese military was drawn away from the Soviet border and many of these soldier farmers were also increasingly recruited away to the Pacific front. When the Soviet army finally moved into Manchuria in 1945, these relatively defenseless communities became the first line of defense. No effort was made to evacuate them. What followed was mayhem and chaos as marauding Russian soldiers and plundering Chinese bandits committed murder and rape. Scenes of mass suicides, the separation of families, and parents having to kill, sell, or give away children were commonplace. According to Louise Young, more than a third of the settlers, 78,500 people, died in the wake of defeat, most of starvation or illness.⁴⁴

Although settler colonialism is principally a phenomenon associated with imperialism, by the interwar period it had developed many ties with nationalism. In the first place, Japanese expansionism was justified in the language of national defense and the necessity of securing the lifeline of the Japanese nation. Although this conception entailed agricultural settlements, partly because the Chinese government succeeded in legally restricting Japanese ownership of land in Manchuria, Japanese rural settlements were negligible before Manchukuo. Instead, the railroads enabled the rapid settlement of the land by farmers from northern China. It is interesting to note that during the 1930s Chinese nationalists made the “lifeline” argument for Chinese settlement, arguing that Manchuria was the “natural granary” for China and that the indigenous people had lesser claims to this land because as nomads they lacked a sense of territorial belonging.⁴⁵

By the end of World War I, the new balance of power, the rise of anti-imperialist nationalism, and the new discourse of civilization brought the urban settler communities in Manchuria closer to the radical military thinkers who envisioned a new and activist strategy of global dominance with Manchukuo at its center. Together they devised an agenda of transformation very different

from the old colonial agenda of resource extraction and minimal intervention. The conception of strategic autarky represented a new fusion of the twin logics of territory and capital. This was an imperialistic enterprise in that a minority retained the capacity to impose its will over the majority with arrogance and cruelty. But in its formal institutions and ideology, its developmental agenda, and its alliances forged to claim sovereignty and increase its capacity for societal penetration and transformation, it resembled the modern nation-state. Indeed, in many respects it foreshadowed the developmentally more successful client states of the United States and Soviet Union in the post–World War II era.

Strategic autarky also entailed rural settlement. The experience of these dirt-poor rural settlers, who were equally dominator and dominated, represented the most vulnerable part of this imperial formation. In a powerful recent work, Mariko Tamanoi has studied the stories of these rural settlers, comparing and contrasting their accounts with those of other more elite repatriates in the vast literature of repatriation (*hikiage bungaku*) in postwar Japan. While attending fully to the horrors that they suffered, she notes that their narratives of suffering and victimhood do not acknowledge the longer-term suffering of the direct victims of Japanese colonialism. Their view is that the Japanese nation-state abandoned them, its citizens, and they demand compensation and recognition.⁴⁶ The nation-state remains the frame of reference for their understanding of history and their role in it. In the process, the intimately intertwined relationships between imperialism and nationalism have been rendered relatively invisible.

Notes

1. This essay develops the incipient theme of settler colonialism that can be found in my book, *Sovereignty and Authenticity: Manchukuo and the East Asian Modern* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003); readers interested in further details about Manchukuo may consult that work among others cited in this chapter.
2. Geoffrey Barraclough, *An Introduction to Contemporary History* (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin, 1964), 119, 120–25.
3. Arnold J. Toynbee, “Christianity and Civilization,” in *Civilization on Trial* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1948).
4. Anthony Giddens, *Nation-State and Violence*, vol. 2 of *A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1987), 234–38.
5. Michael Adas, “The Great War and the Decline of the Civilizing Mission,” in *Autonomous Histories: Particular Truths*, ed. Laurie Sears (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1993), 109. See also Prasenjit Duara, “The Discourse of Civilization and Pan-Asianism,” *Journal of World History*, 12, no. 1 (2000): 99–130.
6. Jeannie Marie Morefield, “Families of Mankind’: Liberal Idealism and the Construction of Twentieth Century Internationalism.” Phd diss., Cornell University, 1999, 196.
7. Giovanni Arrighi, *The Long Twentieth Century: Money, Power, and the Origins of Our Times* (New York: Verso, 1994), 34–58; Immanuel Wallerstein, “The Construction of Peoplehood: Racism, Nationalism, Ethnicity,” in *Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities*, ed. Etienne Balibar and Immanuel Wallerstein (London: Verso, 1991), 81–82.
8. Tzvetan Todorov, *On Human Diversity: Nationalism, Racism, and Exoticism in French Thought*, transl. Catherine Porter (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993), 254, 261.
9. See Carol Gluck, *Japan’s Modern Myths: Ideology in the Late Meiji Period* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1985); and Ian Nish, “Nationalism in Japan,” in *Asian National-*

- ism: China, Taiwan, Japan, India, Pakistan, Indonesia, The Philippines, ed. Michael Leifer (London: Routledge, 2000), 182–89.
10. Louise Young, *Japan's Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1998).
 11. Ramon H. Myers, "Creating a Modern Enclave Economy: The Economic Integration of Japan, Manchuria, and North China, 1932–1945," in *The Japanese Wartime Empire, 1931–1945*, ed. Peter Duus, Ramon H. Myers, and Mark Peattie (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996), 136–70.
 12. Thomas Gottschang, "Economic Change, Disasters, and Migration: The Historical Case of Manchuria," *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 35, no. 3 (1987): 461. For 1878 see Juha Janhunen, *Manchuria, An Ethnic History* (Helsinki: Finno-Ugrian Society, 1996), 32.
 13. C. Walter Young, *The International Relations of Manchuria: A Digest and Analysis of Treaties, Agreements and Negotiations Concerning the Three Eastern Provinces of China* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1929), 136–52. For the role of the 1.5 million Korean agricultural settlers in Manchuria, see the essay by Hyung Gu Lynn in this volume.
 14. Yoshihisa Tak Matsusaka, *The Making of Japanese Manchuria, 1904–1932* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2001), 414.
 15. Takeo Ito, *Life along the South Manchurian Railway: The Memoirs of Ito Takeo*, trans. and with an introduction by Joshua A. Fogel (Amonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1988), 9.
 16. *Ibid.*, 4.
 17. Gavan McCormack, *Chang Tso-lin, 1911–1928: China, Japan and the Manchurian Idea* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1977), 7–8.
 18. Yanagisawa Asobu, *Nihonjin no shokuminchi keiken: Dairen Nihonjin shōkōgyōsha no rekishi* (Tokyo: Aoki shoten, 1999), 70–84.
 19. Ito, *Life along the South Manchurian Railroad*, 4.
 20. Yanagisawa, *Nihonjin no shokuminchi keiken*, 177–210, 237–41.
 21. See Duara, *Sovereignty and Authenticity*, 49–51.
 22. Yamamuro Shinichi, *Kimera Manshūkoku no shōzo* (Tokyo: Chūō koronsha, 1993), 99–101.
 23. See Ito, *Life along the South Manchurian Railroad*, 137–45; Gavan McCormack, "Manchukuo: Vision, Plan and Reality," unpublished paper, 1987, 4; and Yamamuro, *Kimera*, 94–95.
 24. Lincoln Li, *The China Factor in Modern Japanese Thought: The Case of Tachibana Shiraki, 1991–1945* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 17.
 25. Li, *China Factor*, 104; Yamamuro, *Kimera*, 113–17.
 26. Li, *China Factor*, 13.
 27. Yamamuro, *Kimera*, 42–48.
 28. Matsusaka, *The Making of Japanese Manchuria*, 214–23.
 29. Komagome Takeshi suggests that this decision should be seen in the trajectory of Japanese failed experiments with the participation of the colonized in government particularly in Korea; see Komagome Takeshi, *Shokuminchi Teikoku Nippon no Bunka Tōgō* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1996), 236–37.
 30. Mark Peattie, *Ishiwara Kanji and Japan's Confrontation with the West* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1975), 167, 281, 335. Note, however, that the special privilege of Japan and the supreme power of the Guandong Army was preserved by the signing between Japan and Manchukuo of two treaties, secretly settled beforehand; Yamamuro, *Kimera*, 162.
 31. Tessa Morris-Suzuki, *Re-inventing Japan: Time, Space, Nation* (London: M. E. Sharpe, 1998), 97–101; Young, *Japan's Total Empire*, 203–205, 221–27.
 32. On Freyre see Gerald J. Bender, *Angola under the Portuguese: The Myth and Reality* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1978), 4. For a critique of Brazilian Lusotropicalism see Kevin H. Ellsworth, "Racial and Ethnic Relations in the Modern World-System: A Comparative Analysis of Portuguese Influence in Angola and Brazil," paper presented at 1999 Conference of the International Studies Association, 30.
 33. Bender, *Angola under the Portuguese*, 199.
 34. Duara, *Sovereignty and Authenticity*, 64.
 35. See, for instance the authorless and limited-circulation publication *Soren no minzoku sei-saku*. In Tachibana's original plan for a national assembly, later rejected by the Guandong Army, the apportionment of seats was to use the following ratio: Han, seven; Manchu, three; Korean, two; Muslim, two; Mongol, two; Japanese, seven; and white (Russian), one. However, a general principle of representation was maintained within the bureaucracy and

for mobilization purposes. See Komagome, *Shokuminchi Teikoku Nippon no Bunka Tōgō* 262.

36. Peattie, *Ishiwara Kanji*, 171, 174.
37. Wanguo Daodehui Manzhouguo zonghui bianjike, ed. *Manzhouguo Daodehui nianjian* (Xinjing, China: Wanguo Daodehui Manzhouguo zonghui bianjike, 1934), 4:1; Toshihiro Takizawa, *Shyukyo chōsa shiryō*, v. 3 (Minkan shinyō chōsa hōkokushō) (Shinkyō [Xinjing], China: Minseibu [Minshengbu], 1937), 67ff; and Xingya zongjiao xiehui, ed., *Huabei zongjiao nianjian* (Beiping, China: Xingyayuan Huabei lianlobu, 1941), 505–507ff.
38. Xingya zongjiao xiehui, ed., *Huabei zongjiao nianjian*, 485–86, 491–93.
39. Shao Yong, *Zhongguo huidaomen* (Shanghai: Remmin chubanse, 1997), 321.
40. Gavan McCormack, “Manchukuo: Constructing the Past,” *East Asian History* 2 (1991): 122; Gottschang, “Economic Change, Disasters, and Migration,” 465; Jones, *Manchuria since 1931*, 169–70.
41. Honjo Hikiko, Uchiyama Masao, Kubo Tōru eds., *Kō’a’in to senji Chūgoku chōsa* (Tokyo: Iwanami, 2002), 47–55; Yanagisawa, *Nihonjin no shokuminchi keiken*, 336.
42. See Duara, *Sovereignty and Authenticity*, 180–88.
43. Young, *Japan’s Total Empire*, 400–409.
44. *Ibid.*, 411.
45. See Duara, *Sovereignty and Authenticity*, 196.
46. Mariko Tamanoi, “Remembering Manchuria: Migration, Colonization, Repatriation and Nostalgia,” manuscript in preparation.

4

Settling against the Tide: The Layered Contradictions of Twentieth-Century Portuguese Settlement in Mozambique

JEANNE MARIE PENVENNE

The gala events, publications, and exhibitions in the 1990s commemorating the five hundredth anniversary of Portugal's glorious "era of the discoveries" amply demonstrate that a heritage of maritime exploration and empire endures as Portugal's national touchstone.¹ Geography, architecture, literature, and monuments underscore the nation's Atlantic and maritime identity. The nature and scope of Portugal's overseas holdings and Portuguese emigration changed over five hundred years, as did the leadership's political and cultural relationship with lands overseas. Portuguese people of many descriptions labored at the interface of formerly unconnected lands, peoples, plants, and languages. Their imagined and lived experiences grounded a twentieth-century global empire that included Atlantic islands, parts of West and East Africa, the Asian Subcontinent, and East Asia.

Of all the European nations who sponsored white settlement in twentieth-century colonial Africa, Portugal's commitment was the most dramatic—in timing, focus, and scale. From the turn of the twentieth century, Portugal's leadership hinged its foreign policy and national identity on its colonial project. For the first three decades of that century, from the end of the monarchy through the First Republic, Portugal's relationship with its African colonies was often unstable and indirect. But after a military coup in 1926 ended the First Republic, and the Portuguese New State was forged under the leadership of António Salazar, and subsequently Marcello Caetano, Portugal's mainland African colonies assumed a new importance. They were integrated administratively as "overseas provinces," and imagined as an integral part of a single multicontinental nation. From the late 1940s until the mid-1970s this authoritarian regime sent thousands of Portuguese families to settle in Angola and Mozambique.

Yet Portugal settled these colonies against the tide, promoting substantial state-sponsored projects at the very moment that other colonial powers began to reconsider their colonial empires and to restrain settler efforts to secure and extend their authority. The New State's white settlement schemes also ran counter to the tide of African nationalism. No sooner were these schemes underway than Portugal was forced to send thousands of soldiers to defend them. By the 1970s African colonial wars consumed more than half of Portugal's annual budget. The New State's settlements and wars also ran counter to the tide of increasing Portuguese emigration to and economic interest in Western Europe.

It took a generation of armed conflict and the determination of a cohort of Portuguese junior military officers to make the political leadership face up to the political and economic problems that the New State had simply overridden. In April of 1974 the military "coup of the red carnations" overturned the New State regime. Portugal's African colonies then moved rapidly to independence. Within two years of the coup, Portuguese who settled in Angola and Mozambique returned to Portugal in a tidal wave of some 400,000 civilians and 100,000 troops. Thousands of Africans and people of African heritage joined the colonial exodus. Although no longer a colonial power, Portugal continues to engage its former African colonies through educational programs in the Portuguese language and reconfigured cultural and economic links.²

Why did Portugal commit to settler colonialism so late in the game and against such strong countervailing forces? Certainly Britain and other powers at times claimed Portugal's interests and initiatives were wrongheaded, inept, or both. Despite Portugal's claims that its interests and initiatives in Africa were misunderstood, even a cursory reading of official policy reveals that their claims of multi-racialism masked policies and practices that were explicitly and objectively designed to support white settlers. When Marcello Caetano was minister of the colonies in the mid-1940s he tentatively floated the notion of Lusotropicalism as developed by the Brazilian sociologist Gilberto Freyre. Rooted in Brazilian experience, Freyre argued from the mid-1930s on that the Portuguese were intuitive colonizers; they had a special way of "civilizing" peoples native to the world's tropics through their willingness to meld with indigenous cultures rather than dominate and displace them.³ The Portuguese colonial establishment who were opposed to intermarriage firmly eclipsed Caetano's initiative, and from the mid-1950s the New State was openly committed to white settlement.⁴

This essay examines Portugal's intense and historically anomalous African settlement projects. In brief, it argues that those colonial projects cannot be understood simply with reference to the New State's own claims, but must instead be placed within the wider context of the history of Portugal's imperial and economic ambitions on the one hand, and the changing nature of Portuguese emigration patterns on the other. Such contextualization reveals the

profoundly contradictory nature of these colonial efforts. Portugal not only encouraged settlement and investment in Africa while other colonial powers were moving out; the regime also officially sponsored Portuguese settlement in its African colonies against its own expanding European economic interests and the much stronger tide of Portuguese migrant laborers heading for France and Germany. Lusotropicalism provided a useful ideological veneer for settlement projects that were incongruous and necessarily short-lived, but such theories were never more than a veneer. Indeed, by examining some of the cultural products and projects of white settlement in southern Mozambique, this chapter reveals that much harsher and more instrumental attitudes toward Africans prevailed.

The Development of Portuguese Settler Colonialism: State Interests

From Portugal's earliest fifteenth-century contacts in North and West Africa, the tiny nation's mariners, soldiers, and merchants made their way around the Cape of Good Hope and into the Indian Ocean. The Portuguese settled the Cape Verde Islands and established mainland footholds at ports and upriver settlements in what are now Guinea, São Tomé, Príncipe, Angola, and Mozambique. They pressed their commerce from the Atlantic into the Indian Ocean to forge Portugal's first commercial empire in South and East Asia. The Eastern Empire eventually faltered and was eclipsed by a second Brazilian and South Atlantic empire rooted in the slave trade, slave-based sugar production, and precious minerals. The Portuguese second empire was a powerful engine for Portuguese prosperity from the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries. Except for the wine trade that developed from the seventeenth century on, Portugal's economic growth during this half millennium was more dependent on taxing and trading products from the empire through its ports and fleets than on the development of its own rural interior. With the important exception of Brazil, Portugal's empire was a commercial maritime enterprise with much stronger implications for Portuguese royalty and merchant elites in the key port cities of Lisbon and Porto than for ordinary Portuguese.⁵

But Portugal is a nation of emigrants. Between 1866 and 1966 more than 2.6 million Portuguese emigrated. During the twentieth-century New State era (1933 to 1974) just under two million emigrated, about a third clandestinely. Although Portuguese emigration to Africa was never a major flow in the larger context, Portuguese were among the first Europeans to settle on the African continent.⁶ Although small-scale Portuguese settlement in island and mainland Africa continued from the fifteenth century on, until the twentieth century the stock candidates for state sponsored emigration to Africa were orphans, criminals, political exiles, and the poor, cumulatively known as *degradados* (exiled persons). For centuries they moved relatively easily into African business protocols and modes of social exchange.⁷ Their adaptability was effective, but to the extent that they became more closely tied to local powers and interests

they tended to be less useful to the Portuguese crown. These early settlers and traders spread the Portuguese language, gathered commercial information, and developed markets between coastal trading posts and the interior. Although a sustained *mestiço* (mixed-race) population eventually developed in the originally uninhabited Cape Verde Islands, Brazil was the one spot where “Portuguese immigrants did not just die of tropical diseases or melt into the local population. Portuguese language and culture [became] firmly entrenched.”⁸

Portugal viewed Brazil’s declaration of independence in 1822 as an enormous loss. It became more concerned for its remaining colonies in Africa, imagining that another settlement colony might be established and more successfully sustained somewhere in Africa. Yet, however enduring and endearing the idea of such a “New Brazil” in Africa might have been to Portugal’s merchants, princes, and politicians, it did not appeal to Portuguese emigrants without significant state sponsorship and intervention. Despite its independence, Brazil remained the destination of choice for Portuguese emigrants for more than a century. Indeed, the political importance that white settlement in Africa held for Portugal’s politicians was in striking contrast with Africa’s weak appeal to Portuguese emigrants.

Portugal’s imperial goals in Africa were also out of keeping with its political, military, and economic strength, but the nation periodically made up for its obvious weaknesses through a combination of daring, diplomacy, and good luck. Throughout the nineteenth century Britain and Portugal had competing claims in central and southern Africa. Britain may have assumed that, despite the sustained presence and extensive travel of Portuguese people in Africa, Portugal’s increasing economic dependence on Britain would lead it to refrain from independent action. The competitive stakes in central and southern Africa increased sharply from the late 1860s with alluvial gold strikes in the Northern Transvaal. On the heels of that discovery, Portugal, with considerable diplomatic and legal skill, responded to British claims to the southernmost part of Mozambique, including Lourenço Marques, the deep water port closest to the emerging gold fields. At the turn of the century British speculators called the port “Delagoa Bay” and considered it “the key to South Africa.” The disputed territory was submitted to international arbitration under President Marshal MacMahon, and to Britain’s dismay, the MacMahon Decision of 1875 put that key firmly in Portugal’s pocket. Within the decade Portugal underscored its commitment by relocating its East African colonial capital from Mozambique Island in the far north to Lourenço Marques.

By the late 1880s prospectors realized the extent and richness of the Transvaal’s deep gold reefs around Witwatersrand. Speculators anticipated that the gold reefs extended north, well into the territories where the British and Portuguese competed for sovereignty. If the northern gold fields materialized, they too would depend upon service through Portuguese territory, the port of Beira. In 1886, with anxiety running high, Portugal put forth its claim to the area

in the notorious “rose-colored map.” The map painted Portugal’s claim to territories from the Atlantic coast of Angola to the Indian Ocean coast of Mozambique in a striking pink. The claim was large enough to comprise a “New Brazil,” and not only collided directly with Britain’s imperial designs for central Africa but also included the anticipated northern gold fields.⁹

Britain made it perfectly clear that it would not tolerate another Portuguese diplomatic maneuver akin to the MacMahon decision. In 1890, Britain issued an ultimatum, backed by the explicit threat of military force, insisting that Portugal immediately withdraw its claims from mutually contested areas in central Africa. Faced with this dramatic military posture, the humiliated Portuguese political leadership abandoned their central African claims and were turned out of office. Anti-British sentiment in Portugal spiked from latent hostility to public outrage. In the judgment of many Portuguese historians, the British Ultimatum of 1890 “gave rise to modern Portuguese nationalism ... cementing what was to become the mainstay of Portuguese foreign policy until the 1970s: the defense of the colonial empire.”¹⁰

The following year Portugal assigned a Royal Commission to secure what remained of Portugal’s African empire in Angola, Mozambique, Guiné, the Cape Verde islands, São Tomé, and Príncipe; indeed, from the 1870s to the 1920s military and police expeditions pressed such claims. Yet Portugal was too small and financially weak to secure its still extensive claims quickly or independently. Portugal’s military, in collaboration with armed local allies, incrementally undermined opposition and did eventually secure Portuguese sovereignty, but a generation later than its British and French colonial neighbors. In the 1890s Portugal fostered charter and concession company relationships with British, French, and Belgian investors for large areas of Angola and Mozambique. Defense of the colonial empire may have become a central tenet for Portugal’s twentieth-century foreign policy, but until midcentury Portugal effectively occupied much less of its African empire than she leased to foreign investors—including the very British interests whose competitive interest in its holdings contributed to the Ultimatum of 1890.

Portugal’s earliest efforts to claim effective occupation of its African territories through settlement relied on military outposts, penal colonies, and agricultural settlements worked by exiles. That was often an unfortunate combination, especially in light of the Christianizing and civilizing ideals that were supposed to lie at the heart of Portugal’s colonizing mission. Whenever the state resolved, yet again, to make something of the African colonies, incentives were developed to convince traders, state laborers, soldiers, and administrators to settle after their contracts expired and to attract rural Portuguese families to stake a claim in Africa. Such initiatives were typically small in scale, underfunded, and largely unsuccessful. The rural poor had few skills to cope with tropical soils and unfamiliar cultures.¹¹

Portugal's pattern of fitful settlement schemes shifted in the middle of the twentieth century. After decades of very limited investment in the African colonies, Portugal symbolically and substantively underscored its commitment to remain in Africa—indeed, to commit itself more fully to Africa—just when other colonial powers had begun to forge new partnerships with African leaders. The turning point was the bold series of six-year development plans for the metropole and colonies alike. The first (1953–1958) invested about \$55 million in Mozambique and \$100 million in Angola. It focused on colonial infrastructure, almost exclusively ports, roads, railways, and telecommunications. The second (1959–1964) more than doubled investment in Mozambique to \$125 million. The second plan increased investment in health care, secondary and university education, and agriculture, and was targeted disproportionately to ambitious agricultural settlement schemes and settler interests. The agricultural and irrigation settlements at Cela and Matala (Cunene) in Angola and on the Limpopo and Umbeluzi Rivers in Mozambique were designed largely for white settlers, and they received a disproportionate amount of the second plan's investment in agriculture: 71 percent of all agricultural investment in Angola and 84 percent in Mozambique. The state-sponsored settlement schemes in healthier highland areas or highly resourced riverine irrigation schemes were ultimately as much about policy and propaganda as they were about practice.¹²

From the early 1960s, however, the outbreak of African insurgency and the strong Portuguese military and police response made it difficult to untangle settler-driven investment, economic development, and job creation from the increased spending induced by war. Yet not only was colonial investment almost entirely targeted toward projects benefiting settlers (as Africans readily noticed), but such investment ran against broader economic trends.¹³ The New State political regime that dominated Portugal's twentieth-century colonial era may have imagined it was committing Portugal to greater economic and social partnership with Africa, but from the 1950s to the mid-1970s Portugal became more socially and economically engaged with Europe than with Africa. Scholars have noted that the 1974 coup did not simply reflect the fact that Portugal had changed "its place in the world," but rather that it finally developed new policies to reflect the place it had come to occupy in the world.¹⁴ This disconnect between an official commitment to colonial settlement and a reality of European integration was reflected in emigration patterns as well.

The Development of Portuguese Settler Colonialism: Emigrants' Responses

How did individual Portuguese men and women respond to these incentives toward settlement? In the 1950s white immigration in Mozambique increased by more than 100 percent. The number of immigrants entering per year nearly doubled from 2,700 in 1953 to 5,200 in 1957. The white population for the

colony as a whole increased 5.8 percent between 1940 and 1950 (with virtually all that increase after 1945), by another 7.3 percent between 1950 and 1960 and a further 5.7 percent from 1960 to 1970.¹⁵ Yet, Portuguese emigration to Brazil and France place the overall white population in Mozambique and Angola in sobering perspective. Up to the mid-twentieth century more than 80 percent of Portuguese emigrants settled in Brazil, and from the 1960s to the 1990s about half settled in France. Despite increasingly strong emigration to Africa in the 1950s, more than 237,000 Portuguese emigrated to Brazil from 1950 to 1959, at a time when the combined total white population of Angola and Mozambique was under 270,000. Emigration to Brazil dropped sharply in the early 1960s just as emigration to France and Germany spiked. In 1962, Portuguese emigrants to France outnumbered those to Brazil for the first time, and by 1970 Portuguese emigration to Europe had increased nearly ninefold to a peak of more than 160,000. More than 135,000 Portuguese emigrated to France in 1970 alone, by which point the entire white population of Mozambique was 150,000. In the three-year period from 1969 and 1971 more Portuguese left for European destinations than the total white population in Angola at its twentieth-century estimated peak. Numbers leaving for Europe declined thereafter, but from as early as 1963 to as late as 1977 more than half of all Portuguese emigrants went to Europe. For two decades Portuguese emigration to Europe drove the country's emigration pattern. It was as short-lived as it was significant; picking up sharply in 1961, peaking in 1970, and returning to 1960 levels by the mid-1980s.¹⁶

Census information for the Portuguese colonies outside of the major port cities was sketchy prior to the census of 1928, following the overthrow of the first Republic in 1926. Angola had the largest white population, just over nine thousand in 1900. In Mozambique, Lourenço Marques, where the majority of white Portuguese lived, did not reach nine thousand whites until 1928. Portuguese family settlement developed apace beginning in 1940, and it strongly correlated with state-sponsored settlement incentives.¹⁷ Indeed, Portuguese emigrants mirrored African patterns of seeking better-paid opportunities in neighboring countries. Thousands of Portuguese emigrants to Mozambique, for example, moved on to settle legally and illegally in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. Estimates vary of clandestine emigration from Portugal to Europe and Brazil, and from Angola and Mozambique to South Africa and Rhodesia, but such movements were clearly significant.¹⁸

However substantial Angola's white population may have been in comparison with Mozambique's, nothing in Angola's demography suggested the potential for a "New Brazil." At their peak percentage in 1960, whites comprised only 3.6 percent of the population of Angola, while 95.3 percent were black. By contrast, in 1940, whites comprised over 60 percent of the population of Brazil, while blacks that year comprised 15 percent; that dropped to 11 percent in 1950.¹⁹ The white proportion of the population was lower still in

Table 4.1 The White Populations of Angola and Mozambique²⁰

	Angola	Mozambique
1940	44,083	27,400
1950	78,826	48,200
1960	172,529	97,200
1970	290,000 (estimated)	150,000
1973	335,000 (estimated)	200,000

Mozambique. Despite the much more substantial and sustained arrival of white settlers in Angola and Mozambique from the 1950s to the early 1970s, both territories were overwhelmingly black. Moreover, despite strong efforts in the closing years of Portuguese colonialism to move Africans through the educational system, the crushing majority of Angolans and Mozambicans did not speak, write or understand Portuguese and did not enjoy the privileges of citizenship on par with even uneducated white Portuguese. As we shall see, despite Portugal's illusion of having formed a single multi-continental nation, within which all inhabitants of the former colonies would eventually become Portuguese citizens, the reality was much different. The case of Lourenço Marques reveals some of the contradictory dynamics of Portuguese settler colonialism.

Contradictions of Settlement: The Case of Southern Mozambique

Portuguese white settlement began in earnest in southern Mozambique almost exactly a century before it ended. Throughout this century the port city of Lourenço Marques was home to the largest and most stable community of whites in Mozambique. It was the administrative, commercial, and communications capital of the colony. The first large group of Portuguese whites arrived at the port in 1877 and the last large groups left in 1977. Lourenço Marques is one of the continent's best deepwater ports. Like Beira and Nacala to the north, Lourenço Marques's port and railways developed as a part of a service corridor linking the mineral-driven economies of the South African and Rhodesian hinterland to the world economy.

Shipping, customs handling, taxing, and licensing work at the busy port and railway complex employed most Portuguese throughout the twentieth century. By the 1950s and 1960s tourism, agricultural processing industries, light manufacturing, and the building trades became more important. Unlike in Angola, Portuguese whites in Lourenço Marques were less likely to fall back on petty trade because of stiff competition from South Asian shopkeepers. The Portuguese presence in southern Mozambique was always most robust in the urban civil service and at state port and railway junctions. Some Portuguese forged agricultural, lumber, ranching, or small processing industries along the roads and railway lines out of town. Some became agents for the lively South

African business interests in the region. A few became quite successful businessmen, but most did not.

In 1877 the first large contingents of public works and railway contract workers arrived from Portugal and Madeira. These men joined thousands of local people in building the roads, railways, and port facilities that transformed the sleepy southern trading post of Lourenço Marques into an international port capable of servicing the hinterland's burgeoning mineral industry.²¹ The public works staff who survived were joined in the 1890s by soldiers who arrived to challenge the remaining African military and political power in southern Mozambique, Ngungunhana of the Gaza state. Together they formed the core of Portugal's slowly growing presence of civil servants, state port and railway workers, and businesspeople. Portuguese-speaking settlers from Goa and Cape Verde were also counted among the "old settler" or pioneer cadres for this era.²²

This early pattern of Portuguese absorption into African society (and concomitant African absorption into Portuguese society as *filhos da terra*, sons of the soil) was strained by both the presence of a powerful South African business community at the turn of the century and the influx of a small but influential group of settlers in the republican era (1910 to 1929). Tolerance, Africanization of Portuguese settlers, and assimilation of African elites existed in pockets and individual cases throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, but the overall tenor of Portuguese-Mozambican relations changed. The influx of white settlers and their eventual domination of municipal and colonial resources and decision-making bodies steadily eclipsed the influence of all but the most powerful of the earlier generations of settlers.

The central illusion of settler society was that it existed somehow apart from African society in Africa.²³ In 1929, José dos Santos Rufino published an extravagant ten-volume set of photographs and promotional material featuring Portuguese colonialism in Mozambique. Lourenço Marques was showcased as the bastion of Mozambican settler society. Although Santos Rufino confidently proclaimed the city was "A Corner of Europe in South Africa," he hesitated somewhat in the supporting text: "This town of Lourenço Marques is now a modern town of Africa, which is endeavoring hard not to feel like Africa."²⁴ Africa implicitly and explicitly felt hot, dirty, and shabby. By the 1950s, however, even this awkward acknowledgment of African location had given way to a discourse of denial. Portugal referred to its colonial territories as merely Portuguese overseas provinces. The pinnacle of denial came in the 1950s with the festivals, signs, stamps, and sidewalk cobbling of the theme "Aqui é Portugal" ("This is Portugal"). The fantasy of the port city as a European corner on the African continent became the projection of southern Africa integrated in the west of Iberia.

The Portuguese may have modeled their urbanization plans after South African models and developed the waterfront in partnership with South African and British shipping and forwarding companies, but they were keenly aware

that these same groups viewed Lourenço Marques as the “natural” gateway to the great wealth potential of the Transvaal. From the turn of the century on, South African and British merchants, shippers, speculators, and bankers invested heavily in the city. Portuguese political leaders sought to accommodate British interests, but they also were determined to entrench Portugal as the region’s gatekeeper. The fact that British and South African residents preferred to call the city Delagoa Bay and not Lourenço Marques became a sore point in municipal council discussions; ultimately the Portuguese postal service refused to make deliveries addressed to Delagoa Bay. Portugal’s conflicted relationship with its powerful Southern African neighbors was also evident in Santos Rufino’s text:

There are fine and great colonial nations who have accomplished enormous tasks within their colonies. Great nations, rich nations, who with a growing number of inhabitants do not lack of either arms or resources or of other material of initial importance for the purposes of colonization. But none but Portugal, considering its small size and also the small number of inhabitants, has accomplished work so worthy of admiration as that which it is manifesting in East Africa. Lourenço Marques, its commerce, its port, its inner life are the greatest and best proof for the colonizing abilities of the Portuguese.²⁵

Claims regarding Portuguese colonizing abilities, from Santos Rufino in 1929 to Gilberto Freyre’s Lusotropical ideas two decades later, fragmented on cultural and racial lines. Whenever debate became fierce, conflicts over miscegenation predictably floated to the top. In the early 1930s, editors for the newspaper *A Voz Africana* (*The African Voice*) decried the stigma that labeled persons of mixed race as bastards, even though they conceded that statistics for illegitimate births revealed children born outside wedlock were overwhelmingly of mixed race.²⁶ Indeed, as the 1940 census shows, of the more than a quarter of all live births among the so-called civilized population that were illegitimate, fully 96 percent were of mixed race. That is hardly an auspicious statistic for those seeking to demonstrate the racially tolerant and assimilationist character of Portuguese colonialism.

Indeed, Portuguese misgivings about intermarriage were central to the tentative reception of Freyre’s theory of Lusotropicalism in both Portugal and Mozambique. His analysis was always more easily received in Brazil. An essay by Antonio dos Santos Figueiredo that was published in 1934 in association with the First Portuguese Colonial Exposition shows the ways in which the issue of intermarriage threw into relief Portuguese cultural tenets of family, patronage, tolerance, and racism. Santos Figueiredo claimed that Portugal maintained “a liberal and generous policy toward people of mixed race, recognizing them as full Portuguese citizens,” but cautioned that such tolerance did not mean that the state encouraged “marriage between persons of different

racas, especially Europeans with natives.” Instead, the state recognized that miscegenation was an “inevitable phenomenon whose inconveniences will diminish with the development of the colony and the introduction of white females.”²⁷ Again, Mozambicans were a threat and an obstacle to an implicitly white colonial dream.

On the whole, New State politicians approached the sensitive subject of miscegenation gingerly. Not so the intellectuals of the period who were publishing in Mozambican colonial journals. Manuel Simões Alberto, for example, echoed literature that portrayed mestiços as “imperfect hybrids” who were “anthropologically inferior.”²⁸ After 1955, when the New State leadership explicitly committed itself to white colonization, it implicitly confirmed a stand against miscegenation. Not until the 1960s, when Portugal faced insurgencies in three of its mainland Africa territories and international disapproval regarding its colonial intransigence, did Freyre’s ideas get a new hearing. The opportunism of the timing was obvious, and the effort rang hollow.²⁹

African and mixed-race intellectuals writing in the Mozambican press from the first decade of the twentieth century highlighted the hypocrisy around mixed-race marriage and children. Although public confirmation of white settlement as the preferred model came only in 1955, the valorization of the category “white” permeated census documents several decades earlier. Thus, the very same people who appear in the 1899 census as “whites of the land” were categorized in 1904 as mulatto and in 1912 as black.³⁰ In the mid-1920s the white child and the mixed-race child of the same father were treated quite differently by the educational system, with the white child attending primary school but the mixed-race child qualifying only for rudimentary education.³¹ Even in the 1950s, children of Portuguese fathers and Mozambican mothers could enter the primary school system as citizens rather than natives only if their fathers sponsored them and their documents carried the bizarre entry, *mãe incognita* (mother unknown)! Although ideas of racial equality and tolerance were enshrined in Portuguese colonial documentation, the New State’s commitment to white settlement undermined those goals.

The most striking contradictions were articulated by the settlers themselves and the small group of Africans and people of African and Portuguese heritage who wrote in Portuguese colonial publications in Mozambique. The work of Rodrigues Júnior is a fine case in point. Born in Portugal in 1902, Júnior came to Mozambique as a youth of seventeen. From the 1920s on he wrote for *Notícias*, the leading Portuguese newspaper in Lourenço Marques. He went on to publish more than thirty books, writing fiction, nonfiction, literary criticism, and ethnography. As a journalist with *Notícias* he featured Portuguese settlers in his regular columns and special issues; in 1945 he published “Settler Voices, an Investigation,” the fruit of many visits to their homes and enterprises throughout Mozambique. Between 1940 and 1944 he met with over five hundred settlers from Lourenço Marques in the south to Niassa in the north.

It is clear from this work that settler “success stories” were a minority. Júnior featured prominent settlers like Manuel Mendes, João Ferreira dos Santos, and António Vieira, men he felt epitomized the best in white settler achievement. He proudly highlighted the whitewashed square houses with red tile roofs, and noted the use of *azulejos*, Portuguese style blue and white tiles, in the homes of the wealthiest settlers. He frequently commented on settlers’ rough hands and sunburned faces. Yet, his commentary asserted that these exemplary settlers had risen above a still common situation of lethargy, ill health, and chronic poverty. Settlers increasingly had Portuguese wives, he noted—making clear that African women, in his view, were not wives. Instead, he underscored the moral importance of white marriage, commenting, for example, that he was now less likely to encounter a settler and “his black woman,” and dismissing Mozambican women as of “dissolute character.” Portuguese white children, he argued, unlike the children of Portuguese men and Mozambican women, needed scholarships to complete their schooling in boarding schools where they would be more fully exposed to Portuguese culture.³²

And yet, contradictions abound. Although Júnior emphasized the importance of an impermeable white settler family unit, the settlers he interviewed emphasized instead their need for “native labor.” Although some commented on the need to keep waterways dredged, bridges repaired, and roadways expanded, the most important requirement for the success and expansion of settler economic endeavors throughout Mozambique was, they insisted, a steady supply of low-wage native labor. Júnior seemed unaware that his analysis and his interviewees, with few exceptions, dehumanized and instrumentalized African people.

Such dehumanization of black Mozambicans was echoed in most Portuguese publications of the subsequent decades. The monthly illustrated magazine *Império*, published for the settler market in Lourenço Marques from 1951 to 1956, focused on Portuguese politics and settler attempts to develop agriculture, ranching, processing industries, and tourism. Articles such as “The Native in the Context of European Colonization” noted that “the native also knows how to drive machinery,” but then returned to the familiar tenets of “the problem of native labor,” treating native labor only as a potential implement for or impediment to agricultural and industrial development in Mozambique. Natives were civilized only by contact with whites, such articles argued. Once a labor contract ended and the laborers returned home, they would slip again into laziness or idleness.³³

Império also underscored the gendered texts of settler colonialism in the 1950s. Its fashion and consumer sections spoke to the middle-class and elite women who increasingly populated the city’s settler social scene. Portuguese women were featured as wives, consumers, and “beauties.” They, like African women, were not “settlers.” *Império*, reflecting the increasing economic importance of tourism and the potential for “exotic” tourism, developed features on “Portuguese

folklore” and “Mozambican anthropology”; the latter usually exoticized essays on bridewealth or tattooing. Mozambican women were only pictured under such headings and were seldom visible as human beings in these publications. In *Império*, African men were caricatured in the mastheads of the colonial sugar and beer companies Sena Sugar Estates and Fábrica de Cerveja Reunidas.³⁴ In sum, Africans were regularly portrayed in settler publications as commodities, implements for or obstacles to progress, chronic problems, or exoticized tourist attractions. The delineation between settler and native was as clear as the categories of civilized and noncivilized, which endured on into the early 1960s.

Although the white population was always concentrated in the capital city, by the late 1950s white settlers began to attain critical mass, and by the 1960s and early 1970s Lourenço Marques was beginning, in many ways, to live up to the state media’s portrayal of it as a white man’s town. The newspapers, business, and tourist journals of the time picture public events at city hall, the city’s many theaters, and cafés, all populated almost exclusively by whites. In tourist season white visitors came by the thousands from South Africa and Rhodesia, thus enhancing a sense of the city and its fashionable beaches and cafés as predominantly white. Looking only at the city’s public relations brochures and glossy magazines from the 1950s and 1960s, one could actually believe the slogan “Aqui é Portugal” and imagine oneself actually *in* Portugal. Political outreach to potential black allies in the city as part of the Portuguese “hearts and minds campaign” meant one would see the same predictably small number of black people featured at every gathering, yet blacks remained a minority in the capital’s public social settings, and most of those present carried trays and wore aprons.

The rural settlers—romanticized to the point of caricature by Rodrigues Júnior and the insulated and self-absorbed urban white society portrayed in *Império* in the late colonial era—existed in isolation from ordinary African life, promoting the fantasy that settlers lived not in Mozambique but in Portugal. Africans living in these white zones of settlement knew otherwise, but found themselves living out the contradictions between an assimilationist rhetoric and a separatist practice. Those Africans who had accepted the status of “assimilated citizens” were particularly undercut and betrayed. Ironically, the single group in Lourenço Marques to experience downward mobility relative to other populations between 1950 and 1965 were Africans at the top of the income and education scale.³⁵ Lusotropicalism notwithstanding, the Portuguese officials and propagandists were never willing or able to imagine Mozambique’s people as real men, women, and children with names and humanity, as the majority of citizens who would shape and share in the nation’s future.

The New State’s colonizing project—one that flew in the face equally of global patterns, Portugal’s own changing economic position, and the overall preferences exhibited by Portuguese immigrants—could not survive. Its collapse

was a tawdry affair in Portugal and in Africa. From 1974 to 1977 the main streets of Mozambique's capital were jammed with *caixotes* (large packing crates). Household goods were hurriedly sold off on street corners. Proud settlers returned to Portugal as humiliated *retornados* (returnees) with the careers they forged in Africa often reduced to the contents of their caixotes. In Portugal they stood in long lines seeking the documentation necessary to stake their claim to a pension or a job. Some actually lived in their packing crates, while others crammed riverside shanties and temporary quarters in Portugal's newly nationalized luxury hotels. It is telling that those Portuguese who returned with African partners and children had the most difficult time reestablishing themselves in Portugal.³⁶

Notes

1. See Joel Serrão and A. H. de Oliveira Marques, eds., *Nova História da Expansão Portuguesa*, 12 vols., especially vol. 11, *O Império Africano, 1890–1930*, coordinated by A.H. de Oliveira Marques (Lisbon: Editorial Estampa, 2001); Luis de Albuquerque, *Os Descobrimentos Portugueses* (Lisbon: Publicações Alfa, SARL, 1985); Jill R. Dias, *O Império Africano* (Lisbon: Editorial Estampa, 1998); and Valentim Alexandre, "The Colonial Empire," 41–59, and Nuno Severiano Teixeira, "Between Africa and Europe: Portuguese Foreign Policy, 1890–1986," 60–87, in *Modern Portugal*, ed. António Costa Pinto (Palo Alto, Calif.: Society for the Promotion of Science and Scholarship, 1998).
2. See the magazine *Revista ELO: Cooperação e Desenvolvimento*, online at <http://www.elo-online.org>.
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Management and Manipulation: Nazi Settlement Planners and Ethnic German Settlers in Occupied Poland

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The drive to turn occupied Poland into an area of German settlement was central to the Nazi regime's vision of German expansion in eastern Europe. Launched in the wake of conquest and occupation, the regime's "Germanization" policies evoked tradition while at the same time representing a radical break with the past. Propaganda depictions of the Germanization campaign drew on the motif of the "German drive to the east" and the long-established notion of a German "cultural mission" in eastern Europe.¹ Colonizing wartime Poland was presented as restoring German domination in lands torn from the Reich by the Treaty of Versailles and reclaiming historic sites of German settlement from a more distant past, as well as pushing outward into new territory. However, the regime was also quick to stress how unprecedented its policies were in their scope and in the means used to achieve them. For Nazi planners, the vision of the expanding frontier of "Germandom" was an opportunity to apply research in history, geography, and "racial theory" to the systematic management of populations. Polish territory was conceived as a vast laboratory for ethnic restructuring, a space to be emptied and refilled with a population of the "correct" ethnic/racial "stock." For those classified as non-Germans, the Nazi experiment was to have devastating consequences: colonization in wartime Poland was an instrument of genocidal warfare, a drive to destroy the nationhood of a defeated enemy and physically to eradicate people of "alien ethnicity."² Immediate impetus for displacing and driving out Poles and Polish Jews was given by the arrival of ethnic German resettlers (*Umsiedler*), who comprised a key element of the Nazis' "ethnic resources" for colonizing the east. Brought from other parts of eastern Europe in a series of population transfers in order to swell the numbers of Germans in Poland, the ethnic German resettlers were treated as the human material for a project of settler colonialism. The following discussion focuses on the regime's treatment of the settlers and explores how

purported lessons from other settler colonial projects figured in the drawing up of strategies to manipulate them. It aims to illuminate both the extent of the regime’s ambition to control the settlers and the limits of its power to achieve anything on the ground except destruction.

I

Following Poland’s defeat in September 1939, the Nazi regime moved quickly to reorganize the territory of the former Polish state and to embark on measures to change the structure of its population. On the basis of the Nazi-Soviet Pact of August 1939, and revisions to that pact made the following month, the Nazi and Soviet occupying forces each took control on one side of an agreed line of demarcation. This brought under German domination an area of central and western Poland with a total population of just over twenty million. A large swathe of this territory was annexed and incorporated into the Reich. In the process, two new administrative regions were created, known as Reichsgau Danzig-Westpreußen and Reichsgau Wartheland (Warthegau, for short). Other parts of the annexed territories were used to enlarge existing eastern provinces of the Reich. The population of the annexed territories comprised around eight



Fig. 5.1 Central and eastern Europe at the end of 1941; map by Sandra Mather.

million Poles, including around 600,000 Polish Jews, together with an ethnic German minority estimated variously at between 700,000 and 1,000,000. The remainder of the territory under German occupation, including Warsaw, Cracow, and Lublin, with a population of around 12,000,000 including a small ethnic German minority of around 100,000, was not incorporated into the Reich: instead, it was given the designation “General Government” and put under the control of “Governor General” Hans Frank.³

Adolf Hitler’s appointment of Heinrich Himmler at the end of September 1939 as “Reich Commissioner for the Strengthening of Germandom” (*Reichskommissar für die Festigung deutschen Volkstums*, or RKF) gave an early signal both about the direction of occupation policies and the agencies that were to implement them. Himmler’s brief was to eradicate the “influence of alien population elements” and to pave the way for population restructuring through deportations and resettlement.⁴ For Himmler and the “racial experts” of the Schutzstaffel (SS), the “new east” was a place to realize visions of a racial new order and a form of German national community that would be a model for the rest of the Reich. A burgeoning RKF apparatus emerged alongside the civilian administration of the annexed territories. Staffed by SS officials answering to Himmler as Reich Commissioner, it claimed responsibility for all tasks associated with Germanization: ethnic screening, expulsions and deportations, and resettlement.⁵ Himmler spelled out in a 1942 article what made the Nazi approach to colonizing the “east” novel and radical. “Our task is not to Germanize the east in the old sense—that is, teaching those living there to speak German and to obey German laws,” he wrote, “but to ensure that the east will be inhabited only by people of genuine German blood.”⁶ (“Germanizing the east in the old sense” was a derogatory reference to the Prussian state’s policies before the First World War to Germanize its Polish provinces.) The declared aim of the Nazi regime was thus not to assimilate but to decimate the non-German population in the areas to be colonized in order to clear space and seize resources for Germans.

The initial site for this program was the annexed territories. Population screening was used to set up a “German Ethnic Register,” separating those awarded citizenship (which meant, for adult males, the prospect of conscription) from the non-Germans, who were subject to draconian special laws and whose property was liable to be seized.⁷ The RKF apparatus embarked on the systematic removal of the “surplus” non-German population in the winter of 1939–1940, though the numbers deported fell well short of the figures originally set. As mass relocation schemes failed to achieve their targets, ghettos in the annexed territories were formed as holding places for the Jews.⁸ Meanwhile, non-Jewish Poles expelled from their homes in the annexed territories were initially deported to the General Government or sent to the “old Reich” (that is, the territory of the German state in its 1937 borders) to work as forced laborers; later, the emphasis shifted to retaining those expelled in the Warthegau

to work for the Germans. In the Warthegau, over half a million Poles had been expelled from their homes by the end of 1943, of whom around two-thirds had been deported to the General Government.⁹

The mass removals of the “ethnically alien” were given urgency by the RKF’s measures to bring in new sources of population to help secure and transform the territory. That transformation was intended to create a thriving peasant-based society: although plans for the east also envisaged the restructuring of towns and the creation of a “balanced” economy, creating a “frontier peasantry” remained central to the project. According to guidelines drawn up by the agricultural scientist and chief RKF planner Konrad Meyer early in 1940, “the decisive and most important element in reshaping the eastern territories is the peasantry. The consolidation of Germandom and the final possession of the soil that has been won by the sword depends upon its work on the soil.”¹⁰ Such thinking drew on an established notion of the frontier as a zone where only the bravest and toughest would prove themselves in the confrontation with the “enemy,” and on a ruralist ideology that declared the peasantry to be the bedrock of the *Volk* (people).¹¹ It also harked back to earlier attempts to increase and stabilize the German peasant population in eastern borderlands of mixed ethnicity. But the radical turn marked by Nazi expansionism in 1939 was clear. First, it placed historic outposts of German settlement beyond the borders of the Reich in the front line of a predictable future conflict with the Soviet Union. Before 1939, Nazi policy had sought to support, control, and manipulate “Germandom abroad” as an instrument of its foreign policy.¹² The decision to liquidate such outposts represented an about-face in policy. Beginning with Estonia, Latvia, and Soviet-occupied eastern Poland in the autumn and winter of 1939–1940, transfer agreements were concluded that brought a stream of ethnic Germans “home to the Reich.”¹³ Second, the dynamic of Nazi expansionism meant that there was no fixed frontier but a border that until 1942 continued to expand outward. This expansion triggered continually revised plans, including successive drafts of the notorious General Plan East produced by Himmler’s Reich Security Head Office, for new “fronts” of settlement activity and targets for the displacement, deportation, and destruction of “alien” populations.¹⁴

In studies of the Nazi experiment in colonization in the pursuit of its New Order in the east, the peoples victimized and annihilated in the process have understandably been central to historians’ concerns. As recent studies of the Nazi occupation of eastern Europe have shown, aspects of the Holocaust can be better understood when placed in this context of racial warfare and population restructuring.¹⁵ In erecting its hierarchy of “race” in the new spaces of the east, the Nazi regime singled out the Jews from the start for deportation, ghettoization, and finally systematic murder. The Nazi drive to “cleanse” Poland in readiness for German colonization meant in the first instance eliminating Jewish life and Jewish culture. Jewish resources and Jewish property were promptly

placed at the disposal of those ministering to ethnic German settlers. But in Nazi planning, the genocidal drive against the Jewish and Gypsy minorities of eastern Europe represented not an end point of racial warfare, but a prelude to further drives to displace and destroy the majority Slavic populations in the territories under Nazi control. The brutal onslaught upon non-Jewish Poles was evident from the start of Nazi occupation in the murder of non-Jewish Polish elites and the expulsion and deportation of farming families to clear space and free up properties for Germans.¹⁶ Poles feared that the killing of the Jews signaled what was in store for them, and in the winter of 1942–1943 their suspicions seemed to be confirmed by experimental mass “clearances” in the district of Lublin in the General Government in which those expelled were dispatched en masse to concentration camps.¹⁷

The vast scale and ruthlessness involved in the Nazi colonization of Poland also had singular consequences for the ethnic German resettlers imported as colonists. Their experiences, and their function within the racial/ethnic hierarchy in occupied Poland, have hitherto been less at the forefront of historians’ concerns, though a growing literature has begun to explore these topics.¹⁸ The settlers’ position was an ambiguous one: while they had the spoils of Nazi conquest bestowed upon them and enjoyed for a while the privileges of the “master” in occupied Poland, they can also be seen as pawns or even victims of the gigantic enterprise of population restructuring embarked on by the Nazis.

The radical and total approach to colonizing the “east” adopted by the National Socialist regime had twin consequences for the treatment of the settlers. It meant the regime would go to any lengths when it came to plundering the resources of the non-Germans in order to secure the welfare of the ethnic Germans and to bolster their position at the expense of other “racial” and ethnic groups. But the boundlessness of the project to which the settlers were harnessed also implied the exercise of unlimited control by the regime authorities over the settlers themselves. It entailed the closest scrutiny of their fitness, the most critical assessment of their performance, and the greatest intolerance of their failure.

II

The resettlement of ethnic Germans was the most spectacular aspect of the Germanization program, and its dramatic qualities made it a gift for journalists and photographers serving the Nazi propaganda machine. Germans in far-flung areas of historic settlement could be portrayed in heroic terms for answering the call of the Führer and the fatherland and abandoning their homes and homelands in a “supreme act of faith.” Their arrival in the Reich and the annexed territories of Poland was celebrated as a “homecoming.” As the Baltic Germans disembarked in Danzig, Gdynia (Gotenhafen), Stettin, and other ports, they were greeted by bands playing, rousing speeches, and formations of the Hitler Youth and League of German Girls providing a festive welcome.¹⁹ The

arrival of the Volhynian German column of horse-drawn wagons as it crossed the Soviet-German line of demarcation in January 1940, to be greeted personally by Himmler, also provided excellent press copy. Here were classic peasant families, the latest in a chain of Germanic peasants trekking away from oppression toward new lands, a marching column that would in time transform the “featureless Polish landscape” into flourishing German farmland.²⁰

By the spring of 1941, a total of around 465,000 ethnic Germans had been transferred to the Reich. A first wave, totaling around 190,000, had arrived in the winter of 1939–1940 from Estonia and Latvia, and from Volhynia and Galicia in Soviet-occupied eastern Poland; a further series of transfers, involving around 275,000, took place between the autumn of 1940 and the spring of 1941 from parts of Romania (Bessarabia, Bukovina, and Dobrudja) and from Lithuania.²¹ The resettlers were highly diverse in terms of confession and class background. They included the former owners of large estates as well as small peasant holdings, urban businessmen, and academics and professionals, as well as those who had only known life in a remote village. Such different backgrounds meant that their attitude and their degree of self-assertiveness toward the regime authorities varied considerably. Baltic German doctors, lawyers, and landowners, who might have already had close connections with Germany before 1939, were in a better position to assert their interests than were farming families from Volhynia, who had less experience and knowledge of National Socialist ways.²² However, in relation to the Nazi regime and to the colonization project the settlers had a certain amount in common. Not only had they—like any settlers arriving in a territory to be colonized—left their homes behind for an unknown future, but in being mobilized for resettlement they had been subjected to a considerable degree of pressure. It is true that the ethnic Germans’ decision to leave their homelands was formally an “option.” A small proportion of the ethnic Germans from the Baltic region, eastern Poland, and Romania did remain behind, and some did respond spontaneously to the “call,” relieved to be escaping from what they saw as an impending Soviet threat and optimistic about the prospects that awaited them in the Reich. However, SS resettlement teams also applied pressure by conjuring up the threat to German lives and property from an imminent Soviet takeover should they stay put and encouraging false hopes of what would await settlers “in Germany.”²³ Years later, those resettled still remembered the lies they had been told before they had signed up for transfer to the Reich—that their community would stay together, that their home village had been rebuilt for them in Germany, that once they got there it would simply be a matter of waiting to collect the keys to their new homes, and that the longest they would stay in a resettler camp would be three weeks.²⁴

Having left, the ethnic Germans had no way back.²⁵ They were trapped in the mills of the immigration machine set up by the RKF and run by the SS. Their prospect of receiving property or the grant of credits in Poland that

would recompense them for the farm, home, or business they had left behind was dependent upon the decision of Himmler's resettlement apparatus. Meanwhile, they were placed in resettler camps and subjected to intrusive tests of "racial" and political fitness and likely potential as colonists.²⁶ Those who failed such tests were liable to be sent back as "racially undesirables" to their places of origin or deported to the General Government.²⁷ Those deemed suitable only to work as laborers in the "old Reich" were dispatched westward, while those thought "fit for the east" were kept in camps either in the annexed territories of Poland, in the "old Reich" or in Austria until properties were "cleared" for them. The process involved long delays: according to RKF figures, of the 510,000 resettlers transferred to the Reich by March 1942, 287,000 had been resettled in the annexed territories of Poland and 93,000 had been placed in the "old Reich," leaving around 130,000 still waiting in resettler camps.²⁸ Those who were eventually settled in Poland remained highly dependent upon the regime and its agencies, and they were not given security of tenure in their new properties. In their new surroundings they were expected to renounce identities based on their old homelands, to integrate into the "national community," and conform to National Socialist norms of behavior. If their performance fell short, they could be removed from "their" farms and sent back to a resettler camp.

These circumstances greatly reduced the leverage available to the ethnic German resettlers in relation to the SS resettlement apparatus, though this did not prevent them from grumbling and protesting. In the resettler camps run by the Ethnic German Liaison Office (*Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle*), part of Himmler's RKF organization, the settlers waited, increasingly restive, for their placement on a farm or in a business. In May 1940, Himmler himself visited the resettler camp in Kirschberg near Łódź (or, as the Nazis renamed it, Litzmannstadt) in order to calm the Volhynian and Galician settlers. Himmler appealed to their patience and promised them they would be on their farms as soon as possible, but reminded them that "before you get your farm, a Polack has to be evicted."²⁹ The waiting went on, and inmates continued to chafe at the bullying manner of camp directors, the endless round of lectures and "political training." They also objected to the lack of scope for religious observance: this reflected the drive on the part of the Warthegau authorities to curtail the activities and influence of Christian churches.³⁰ In December 1941 Bessarabian Germans in the Kirschberg camp petitioned the resettlement authorities, in verse, for freedom to observe their religious customs. Picking up the propaganda notion of building a "human wall" in the east, the petitioners demanded that such a "wall" be cast from "the right metal," that of living traditions. Church institutions had always been at the heart of the German community in Bessarabia, they protested; were they expected now to abandon them?³¹

Attempts to improve the mood in resettler camps—many resettlers stayed there until the end of the war—ranged from setting up kindergartens and organizing cabaret performances to the launch of a resettler newspaper *Wir sind*

daheim (*We Are Back Home*) which carried homilies on the virtues of patience and self-help as well as anecdotes, stories, recipes, and news from different resettler camps.³² But disciplinary measures were also deployed. A circular from October 1941 ordered that “camp leaders and administrators ... must never hit a resettler,” but they were permitted to impose fines, bans on going outside the camp, solitary confinement for up to ten days and, for the most severe cases, transfer to a disciplinary “labor camp.”³³

When resettlers were finally placed in their new businesses or farms, they were often shocked. Some were upset by the run-down condition of their new homes, or by the fact that they were placed far away from anyone they knew. Others were alarmed at the fact that the premises they were taking over had been vacated by force, sometimes only hours before their arrival. Recalling the experience long after the war, some former settlers claimed that they felt permanently uneasy about living in premises that were not rightfully theirs and being complicit in an act of inhumanity and injustice.³⁴ Others recalled that they grew quickly accustomed to a world in which Germans simply helped themselves to Polish and Jewish property.³⁵

From the outset, reports from the Reichsgau Danzig-Westpreußen and the Reichsgau Wartheland, the annexed territories where the bulk of resettlement took place, highlighted difficulties with the resettled ethnic Germans.³⁶ Local officials in Kreis Krotoschin in the Warthegau claimed in September and October 1940 that resettled Volhynian Germans “did not work hard enough” and that Galician Germans “had no idea about farm machinery.” Some settlers allegedly found their farms too big; others, unhappy with what they had been allocated, had simply abandoned them and returned to the resettler camp in Litzmannstadt.³⁷ In Kreis Ostrowo in the Warthegau in August 1940, two settlers in Deutschdorf rallied twenty-five others for a collective protest in order to reject the farms they had been assigned: the pair were arrested and subsequently deported to the “old Reich” to work as agricultural laborers.³⁸ The obstacles facing the colonization project were underlined by an anonymous “liaison officer” in a memorandum to the Reich Security Head Office in October 1940. It cautioned against propaganda-fueled illusions that a “human wall” was already taking shape in the east and warned that resettled ethnic Germans were dismayed by the way their old communities had been broken up and scattered across the resettlement area.³⁹

Early warnings of problems in the field triggered more efforts to “look after” and galvanize the settlers. Party organizations rushed in, and settlers became the raw material for every organization’s pet project and experiment.⁴⁰ Looking after settlers yielded pleasing propaganda featuring “grateful” ethnic Germans. Moreover, it provided a testing ground for aspiring Nazis from the “old Reich,” as “eastern assignments” became part of ideological training.⁴¹ As a consequence, settlers in the countryside (particularly if they lived not too far from a main road) found themselves constantly being visited and assessed. Propaganda con-

tinued to depict settlers as model Germans and model peasants, disguising their subordination with the language of brotherhood, community, and comradeship. But the flourishing culture of reporting created an internal discourse about the settlers full of patronizing assumptions on the part of “Reich Germans” about Germans who from their perspective were clearly “other.”

Reports on rural settlers by various monitoring agencies reveal the arrogance of “Reich Germans” toward ethnic Germans that was a widely reported phenomenon of the “new East.” Such reports dehumanized the ethnic Germans by referring to them as “settler material” (*Siedlungsmaterial*), or infantilized them by asserting that they were “naïve, really just like big children.”⁴² The reports also reveal the workings of a hyperactive state, uninhibited in its drive to impose its norms in all areas of life. The settlers’ unfamiliarity with their new surroundings, their lack of security of tenure, and their dependence on handouts of clothing, household goods, farm equipment, and building materials exposed them to the full force of SS teams and Party agencies who had a pretext and an opportunity to discipline and supervise settlers on a grand scale. Settlers were removed from their farms (*abgemeiert*) for failing to run them efficiently, for expressions of political disaffection, or for contravening the ban on sexual contact with Poles; they were threatened with disciplinary action if they were thought to be mixing with Poles socially; they were also pressured over their housekeeping, their child rearing, and the way they celebrated Christmas.⁴³ Settlers might show their resentment of such intrusions and ignore the constant drizzle of advice aimed at molding them into “proper” Germans, but could do little to keep the surveillance at bay.

Meanwhile, as the settlement program expanded, some SS officials’ willingness to support settlers gave way to impatience. Some told settlers to pull themselves together; as one recalled, “There were a lot of whingers, but whenever you really pushed them up against the wall they had to admit they were satisfied and wanted to stay.”⁴⁴ Some took the view that there was too much pandering to settlers’ whims.⁴⁵ After all, were not the settlers to be the new colonial masters, confidently issuing orders to Poles and demonstrating their superiority and self-reliance as Germans? For all the regime’s powers of intervention and determination to drill the settlers into doing its will, recipes for successful “settler management” continued to be elusive.

III

Among those who thought they had the key to settler management were the self-styled experts of the small Settlement Research Unit (*Siedlungswissenschaftliches Referat*) set up in 1941 by the SS officer in charge of the resettlement program in the Warthegau, Wilhelm Koppe.⁴⁶ Koppe set up the unit as part of the Posen office of the RKF.⁴⁷ It was one of many research institutes and projects that sprang up as the Nazi empire expanded. Of these, many were concerned with the “new East” in terms of its economic and demographic

structure, the planning of its towns, and the transformation of its landscape. Academics leapt at the chance of helping to produce blueprints for a Germanic new order in Poland purged of Jews, dominated by Germans, and with Poles' status reduced to that of a serf.⁴⁸

The settlement research unit attached to the Warthegau headquarters of the RKF in Posen was less concerned with drawing up blueprints for future settlement. Instead, its purpose was to generate ideas about managing the settlement that had already taken place and to ensure that the current colonization of the east was properly documented for posterity. Apart from building up an archive and a library, the unit produced reports analyzing aspects of settlement schemes past and present.⁴⁹ What lessons, asked the researchers, could be learned from the history of frontier or colonial settlement? What methods and measures ensured that settlers, once settled, stayed put?⁵⁰ Such comparative evidence could also serve to place a documentation of Nazi colonization in a fittingly expansive historical framework. The unit's reports were not intended for publication, but were distributed directly to SS resettlement staff in Posen and Litzmannstadt, as well as to other interested parties such as the German Institute for Foreign Affairs (*Deutsches Auslandsinstitut*) in Stuttgart.⁵¹

The settlement research unit was run by women, illustrating how resettlement in the east opened up career opportunities for academically trained women who were also committed National Socialists.⁵² The first director of the settlement research unit in 1941 was a twenty-eight-year-old Austrian, Dr. Luise Dolezalek.⁵³ As a student activist in Berlin in the mid-1930s, Dolezalek had engaged in campaigns on behalf of "Germandom abroad," including some in the South Tyrol.⁵⁴ In the emerging ruling caste of "Reich Germans" in the Warthegau she was well-connected. Her husband Alexander Dolezalek, also a former student activist, was closely involved in resettlement operations in the Warthegau in the winter of 1939–1940 and later became head of the planning department in the RKF headquarters in Posen. There he distinguished himself with such proposals as limiting Polish population growth by incarcerating men and women in single-sex labor camps and raising the age of marriage.⁵⁵ Luise Dolezalek meanwhile carved out a niche for herself organizing female students to assist ethnic Germans in newly settled rural areas of the Warthegau and agitating for the appointment of permanent female settlement advisers.⁵⁶ In 1941, the position in the settlement research unit allowed her to pursue her enthusiasm for the theory and practice of "consolidating settlement." Her successor as director of the unit from late 1942 on was a thirty-year-old Berliner, Dr. Elisabeth Stoelzel.⁵⁷ Both women were the sort of academic activists who saw themselves as part of a younger generation destined for great tasks in the east.⁵⁸ In addition, as women they were both keen to stress the importance of female settlers and the cultivation of the domestic sphere.⁵⁹ In their comparative reflections, their reports are interesting for what they reveal about the mentality of their authors as eastern enthusiasts, their notion of what made the Nazi

experiment in colonization radical and modern, and the nature of the ruralist frontier fantasy that inspired them.

Several of the unit's reports located the Nazi settlement program in relation to a German tradition of state-sponsored settlement. This encompassed the policies of Frederick II to promote the colonization of underpopulated regions of Prussia, and the efforts initiated under Otto von Bismarck to settle German peasants in Prussia's eastern provinces.⁶⁰ But the unit also set out to stress the modernity of mass population transfers in the name of ethnic rationalization, and to present the Nazi colonization of Poland as being in tune with an age of bold experiments in consolidating and expanding national and racial power. Depicting the Greek–Turkish population exchange of the 1920s as an example of forward-looking ethnic restructuring, Luise Dolezalek commented that “[s]uch radical measures are only to be understood out of the spirit of a new age” and praised the decision to “tear asunder ties that go back centuries, even millennia” for a future in which ethnic and national boundaries were clearly drawn.⁶¹

If the Greek–Turkish population transfer seemed to be a precedent for the Nazis' uprooting of German minorities from eastern and southeastern Europe, the Japanese colonization of Manchuria appeared as a striking parallel to the Nazi colonization of Poland. After all, the Japanese in Manchukuo were, in the words of the report produced by the settlement studies unit in 1942 written by Elisabeth Stoelzel, “creating settlements in the midst of alien population” and seeking to build a “human wall of Japanese frontier soldiers on the borders ... that will protect the land from Bolshevism.”⁶² Outlining the lessons to be learned from the Manchukuo experiment, Stoelzel was partly echoing ideas that were common currency among RKF officials—for instance, the importance of local community leaders who would motivate and encourage settlers—and partly pushing a distinctive agenda that highlighted the contribution of women, of young people, and of religious values to the success of a settlement program. “If the women fail the settlement fails,” was one of Stoelzel's conclusions on Manchukuo, stressing—as Nazi women's organizations did continually—the crucial role of the domestic sphere in the cultural and biological reproduction of the *Volk*. The report also made much of the Japanese emphasis on recruiting and training youthful colonists. The emphasis on youth, according to Stoelzel, reflected the reluctance of older Japanese to migrate but also the fact that, in her words, “it is youngsters that can be enthused most easily for the idea of settlement as a national necessity,” using a combination of “mild pressure and ... images of the future.” The role to be played by young people in settling frontier lands, the report went on, had long been recognized by the National Socialists. Referring to the Labor Service and the Hitler Youth Land Service, which had been active in Germany's eastern borderlands before the war and were now engaged on tasks in occupied Poland, it observed that the Japanese were “setting out on a path that we took long ago.” Finally, and less predictably, the report remarked that the Japanese settlers who belonged to a religious

sect had proved particularly resilient in harsh conditions. Given that the RKF and civilian authorities in the Reichsgau Wartheland regarded Christian sects as a subversive influence among the settlers, this comment could be read as a pointed critique of official policy.⁶³

Armed with such insights gleaned from their comparative study of settlement past and present, and drawing on reports written by female settlement advisers employed in the Warthegau to “look after” resettlers in the countryside,⁶⁴ the staff of the settlement research unit then swung their spotlight onto current problems facing the Nazi settlement project. Their analysis was critical both of the settlers and of the “Reich Germans” who dealt with them. Volhynian German settlers were allegedly “too easily influenced” and too easily prone to an “inferiority complex” that prevented them from asserting themselves properly against the Poles.⁶⁵ On the other hand, “Reich Germans” exacerbated settlers’ feeling of insignificance and marginality by neglecting to involve them in community life. It was no wonder, then, “that they [the settlers] feel themselves to be human material for the organizational skills of party and state.”⁶⁶ Instead, settlers should be given a sense of responsibility for the “shared work of construction,” and be encouraged, for instance, to take on minor official functions at the village level, such as the job of local farmers’ leader. In these critiques, the women of the settlement research unit were promoting their own vision of how to manage settlers, quoting—surely not coincidentally—female success stories where women settlement advisers had succeeded at stimulating village community life on the grassroots level.⁶⁷ Such initiatives, it was implied, would ensure the settlers’ integration into a smoothly blended community of Germans, a “united and combative Germandom” to populate an emerging homeland for Germans in the east.⁶⁸ Helped by the right propaganda, such a homeland would ultimately attract even ordinary Germans back in the Reich and reverse the seemingly irreversible long-term population drift from east to west, “the worst enemy of our settlement work.”⁶⁹ In April 1943, apparently in all seriousness, Elisabeth Stoelzel made a case for producing, as a matter of urgency, a lavishly illustrated volume on the history of the Germans in the eastern Warthegau. This would, she was sure, help stimulate the “inner spiritual readiness to settle” among Germans back in the Reich and lure them eastward.⁷⁰ Her fantasy of the “new East,” at any rate, still seemed unclouded.

Whether the settlement research unit had any influence either on RKF policy or on the practice of SS settlement officials out in the field (for whom its reports were perhaps intended as bedtime reading) is hard to judge. Whatever its impact, its output sheds light on the mind-set of the ambitious and confident Germans from the “old Reich” with fresh degrees and doctorates, who installed themselves in occupied Poland and became absorbed in the vision of a rural but dynamic German society planted in the soil of the east. The reports also provide a window into the insulated world of the planning offices, from which it was possible in 1942–1943 to blot out the developing situation

in the occupied east and to diagnose the settlers' sense of powerlessness as a psychological symptom that would be cured by firm discipline, guidance, and measures to bind settlers into the Nazi structures of community life.

IV

By 1943, the settlement program in occupied Poland was lurching from one crisis to the next. Since 1941, Germanization efforts had been extended to the General Government, involving both a renewed screening of the resident population there and the importation of ethnic German settlers, but these measures had run into massive resistance. Above all, in the Zamosc area, near Lublin in the General Government, large-scale clearances of Polish villages from late 1942 onward to make way for German settlers triggered a partisan movement and violent attacks on German settler villages; each wave of German reprisals for partisan attacks triggered new raids.⁷¹ By 1943, even Himmler appeared to be losing interest in settlement schemes. The RKF drive to create new "belts," "bulwarks," "outposts," and "stepping-stones" of Germanism was flagging. Meanwhile, the farthest-flung areas of German settlement were beginning to be emptied; the frontiers were beginning to shrink and waves of German refugees began heading westward. In 1943–1944, ethnic Germans flooded into the General Government and the annexed territories of western Poland from the Ukraine, the Caucasus, and Transnistria. The Reich Governor and Gauleiter of the Reichsgau Wartheland, Arthur Greiser, gladly seized upon consignments of refugees from the evacuated Soviet territories to fill up his still-far-from-Germanized "model Gau," but their arrival was still a reminder of the military reverses being suffered by the Reich and a sign of things to come.⁷²

For the ethnic German settlers designated to play the role of "frontier peasantry," the pressures and dangers mounted. As the military and security situation worsened, the demands made on the settlers by the regime increased. Fathers and sons in settler families were increasingly conscripted; from 1942 onward, the resettler newspaper *Wir sind daheim* listed ever-growing numbers of settlers killed in action. Women were left behind to run farms alone, and some were reprimanded for being too conciliatory toward the Polish workers without whom they could not work their farms. The references to ethnic German settlers as "frontier peasants," shouldering their weapons as they tilled their fields, had up to this point been largely metaphorical, but now it became crassly literal.⁷³ Settlers were mobilized into makeshift militias, but given the sketchiest of training and inadequate weapons. A settler in the Zamosc area described in a postwar memoir how he had pleaded with an RKF official to evacuate the women and children and let the men join the army rather than forcing families to stay put in the face of partisan attacks. The response as he recalled it was sharp: "You are frontier peasants, your task is to carry your rifle on your back and follow the plough!"⁷⁴

Finally, the belated and chaotic flight westward was ordered. In the spring and summer of 1944, German civilians were evacuated from the eastern General Government. By the end of 1944, German forces still controlled the western part of the General Government and the annexed territories of the Reichsgau Wartheland and the Reichsgau Danzig-Westpreußen, but all these territories were soon to be overrun. In the mass retreat from January 1945 onward, representatives of the party and state typically fled first, often abandoning ethnic German resettlers to their own devices, along with the native ethnic Germans and other “Reich Germans” living in Poland.⁷⁵ In the immediate aftermath of the war, narratives of the treks westward and the deportation of civilians into Soviet captivity tended to subsume the particular experiences of the resettled ethnic Germans in the larger fate of the “Germans from the east”: as one former resettler put it, they exchanged their identity cards as “resettlers” for identity cards labeling them “refugees.”⁷⁶ Later, as former resettlers rebuilt community networks in West Germany, they published narratives in which they reconstructed their particular experiences of wartime resettlement and subsequent re-uprooting. In a reversal of wartime propaganda about the irrevocability of Germany’s “drive to the east” and the permanence of colonization, an alternative narrative of the settlers’ experience emerged. The time spent in Poland was recast as a brief episode in a turbulent journey, a step for some on the road away from a life of farming, and a way station on the long trek to the west.⁷⁷

The Nazi vision for the east was based on a fantasy about “race” and “space.” The terrain of Poland and later the Soviet Union appeared as a space to be cleared of the “racially alien” and to be peopled and defended with a racially renewed stock of Germans. For Nazi planners and “experts,” the chance to be part of an unprecedented experiment in population restructuring, urban and rural planning, and the social and psychological management of new settlements was irresistible. The women of the settlement research unit in Posen were part of an academically trained younger generation of Nazi enthusiasts who embraced the ideology of the frontier as a site of dynamic innovation. Committed to the vision and the fantasies on which it was based, they eagerly sought creative solutions to the problems they diagnosed, sifting evidence from historical and contemporary parallels in order to propose strategies for successful settler colonialism. In their eyes, the obstacles facing ethnic German communities uprooted from different parts of eastern Europe and resettled among Poles while the war was still going on could be resolved by psychological measures to boost morale and ignite community spirit. Meanwhile, the settlers’ reactions to their privileged but highly vulnerable position were mixed. Plenty of evidence testifies to their disappointment with their situation, but how much of their dissatisfaction was caused by unease and anxiety at the fact that their welfare was being sustained at the expense of the non-German population is harder to assess. By the end, however, the benefits and privileges had lost all

significance. When the war was clearly lost, all that was left was the regime's most basic demand upon the settlers: simply to be there, embodying the "human wall" at the edge of a colonial space that was long past defending.

Notes

Author note: All translations herein, from the works cited below, are my own unless otherwise noted.

1. On the ideology of Germany's "drive to the east," see Michael Burleigh, *Germany Turns Eastward: A Study of Ostforschung in the Third Reich* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); and Wolfgang Wippermann, *Der "deutsche Drang nach Osten": Ideologie und Wirklichkeit eines politischen Schlagwortes* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1981).
2. Martin Broszat, *Nationalsozialistische Polenpolitik 1939–1945* (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 1965); Robert L. Koehl, *RKFDV: German Resettlement and Population Policy, 1939–1945* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1957); Götz Aly, *"Endlösung": Völkerverschiebung und der Mord an den europäischen Juden* (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 1995).
3. Broszat, *Nationalsozialistische Polenpolitik*, 98; Aly, *Endlösung*, 15.
4. Martin Broszat, *Zweihundert Jahre deutscher Polenpolitik* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1972), 277.
5. On the relationship between the RKF apparatus and the civilian administration in the annexed territories, see Broszat, *Nationalsozialistische Polenpolitik*, 59–67; and Ruth Bettina Birn, *Die Höheren SS- und Polizeiführer. Himmlers Vertreter im Reich und in den besetzten Gebieten* (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1986), 189–97; on the role of SS "racial experts" in the Germanization of the annexed territories, see Isabel Heinemann, *"Rasse, Siedlung, deutsches Blut": Das Rasse- und Siedlungshauptamt der SS und die rassenpolitische Neuordnung Europas* (Göttingen: Wallstein-Verlag, 2003), 187–303.
6. Heinrich Himmler, "Geleitwort," *Deutsche Arbeit* 42, nos. 6–7 (1942): 157.
7. On the process of population screening and the German Ethnic Register (*Deutsche Volksliste*), see Broszat, *Nationalsozialistische Polenpolitik*, 112–27; and Heinemann, *"Rasse, Siedlung, deutsches Blut,"* 260–82.
8. Aly, *Endlösung*; Heinemann, *"Rasse, Siedlung, deutsches Blut,"* 198.
9. Broszat, *Nationalsozialistische Polenpolitik*, 98–101.
10. "Planungsgrundlagen für den Aufbau der Ostgebiete," cited in Niels Gutschow, "Stadtplanung im Warthegau 1939–1944," in *Der "Generalplan Ost": Hauptlinien der nationalsozialistischen Planungs- und Vernichtungspolitik*, ed. Mechtild Rössler and Sabine Schleiermacher (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1993), 233. On Konrad Meyer, see Karl Heinz Roth, "'Generalplan Ost'—'Gesamtplan Ost': Forschungsstand, Quellenprobleme, neue Ergebnisse," in Rössler and Schleiermacher, eds., *Der "Generalplan Ost,"* esp. 58–72.
11. On the stereotype of the border as the key to national destiny and the myth of borderlands dwellers as "better Germans," see Peter Fischer, *Die deutsche Publizistik als Faktor der deutsch-polnischen Beziehungen 1919–1933* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1991), 41–43; and Mathias Niendorf, *Minderheiten an der Grenze: Deutsche und Polen in den Kreisen Flatow (Złotów) und Zempelburg (Sępólno Krajeńskie) 1900–1939* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1997), 183–84. On Nazi conceptions of the peasantry, see John Farquharson, *The Plough and the Swastika* (London: Sage, 1976), 58–59.
12. Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, *Nationalsozialistische Außenpolitik* (Frankfurt am Main: A. Metzner, 1968).
13. Joseph B. Schechtman, *European Population Transfers 1939–45* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946); Valdis O. Lumans, *Himmler's Auxiliaries: The Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle and the German National Minorities of Europe, 1933–1945* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1993); Jürgen von Hehn, *Die Umsiedlung der baltischen Deutschen—das letzte Kapitel baltischdeutscher Geschichte* (Marburg: J. G. Herder-Institut, 1982).
14. On the various drafts of "General Plan East," see Roth, "'Generalplan Ost'—'Gesamtplan Ost,'" 25–97; Czesław Madajczyk, ed., *Vom Generalplan Ost zum Generalsiedlungsplan* (Munich: Saur, 1994).
15. Aly, *"Endlösung"*; Ulrich Herbert, "Vernichtungspolitik: Neue Antworten und Fragen zur Geschichte des 'Holocaust,'" 9–66, and Götz Aly, "'Judenumsiedlung': Überlegungen zur

- politischen Vorgeschichte des Holocaust,” 67–97, in *Nationalsozialistische Vernichtungspolitik 1939–1945*, ed. Ulrich Herbert (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 1998).
16. Broszat, *Nationalsozialistische Polenpolitik*, 41–51, 84–98.
 17. Czesław Madajczyk, *Zamojszczyzna: Sonderlaboratorium SS*, 2 vols. (Warsaw: Ludowa Spółdzielnia Wydawnicza, 1977).
 18. See, for instance, Hehn, *Die Umsiedlung der baltischen Deutschen*; Dirk Jachomowski, *Die Umsiedlung der Bessarabien-, Bukowina- und Dobrudschadeutschen: Von der Volksgruppe in Rumänien zur “Siedlungsbrücke” an der Reichsgrenze* (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1984); and Harry Stossun, *Die Umsiedlungen der Deutschen aus Litauen während des Zweiten Weltkrieges. Untersuchungen zum Schicksal einer deutschen Volksgruppe im Osten* (Hamburg: J. G. Herder-Institut, 1990).
 19. Helmut Sommer, *Völkerwanderung im 20. Jahrhundert. Die große Heimkehr der Volksdeutschen ins Reich* (Berlin: Limpert, 1940), 22–23.
 20. S. Zantke, “Die Heimkehr der Wollhyniendeutschen,” *Nationalsozialistische Monatshefte* 120 (1940): 169–71; Felix Lützkendorf, *Völkerwanderung 1940* (Berlin: S. Fischer, 1940), 46–47; see also Lumans, *Himmler’s Auxiliaries*, 17–21.
 21. For figures, see Schechtman, *European Population Transfers*, 255, and Aly, *Endlösung*, 167–68.
 22. On the resettlement of the Baltic Germans, see Hans-Erich Volkmann, “Zur Ansiedlung der Deutschbalten im ‘Warthegau,’” *Zeitschrift für Ostforschung* 30, no. 4 (1981): 527–58, and on Baltic German contacts with the Reich before 1939, see esp. 546–47.
 23. Koehl, *RKFDV*, 90–100, esp. 99; Schechtman, *European Population Transfers*, 81–102, 150–52, 174ff; Lumans, *Himmler’s Auxiliaries*, 158–65, 173.
 24. Therese Erker, “Vor 25 Jahren verloren wir unserer Heimat,” *Jahrbuch der Dobrudschadeutschen* 1965, 73–88, esp. 74; Fred Michaelsohn, “Neue Heimat im Osten,” *Heimatkalender der Bessarabiendeutschen* 1965, 100–109, esp. 102–103.
 25. A rare exception here was a group of Lithuanian Germans among those transferred to western Poland in early 1941 but then, after Lithuania had been occupied by German forces, resettled back in their former homeland in 1942–1943.
 26. On the resettler camps and the screening process, see Burleigh, *Germany Turns Eastward*, 179–81; and Heinemann, “Rasse, Siedlung, deutsches Blut,” 232–50.
 27. Heinemann, “Rasse, Siedlung, deutsches Blut,” 236.
 28. *Ibid.*, 247–48.
 29. HSSPF Ansiedlungsstab Litzmannstadt an die Führer der Arbeitsstäbe im Bereich des Ansiedlungsstabes, betr. Ausführungen des Reichsführers-SS, 21 May 1940. Bundesarchiv (BA) Berlin, R49, 20.
 30. Bernhard Stasiewski, “Die Kirchenpolitik der Nationalsozialisten im Warthegau 1939–45,” *Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 7, no. 1 (1959): 46–74.
 31. Otto Irian, Sammellager Kirschberg, an den hochlöblichen Ansiedlungsstab, 9 Dec. 1941. BA Koblenz, R57, DAI 1516. The petition includes the following lines (spelling per the original):
 Ihr Herren die Ihr gießet, im Osten einen Wall
 Habt acht u. nicht vermisset, das richtige Mettall
 Soll dieser Wall von Leute, soll er lebendig sein
 So gieset in ihn heute, gleich Leben mit hinein.
 So baut die alten Lieder, hinein in diesen Wall
 Dass bald erschallet wieder, der kirchliche Choral. [...]
 32. *Wir sind daheim. Mitteilungsblätter der deutschen Umsiedler im Reich*, originally launched in November 1940 for the camps in Saxony.
 33. *Straf- und Beschwerdeordnung für die Umsiedlungslager der Volksdeutschen Mittelstelle* (Berlin, 1942).
 34. Jeannette von Hehn, “Als Landfrau im Warthegau 1940–1945,” *Jahrbuch des baltischen Deutschtums* 1960, 90–93, esp. 91; Arnold Mammel, “Einer neuen Heimat entgegen,” *Heimatkalender der Bessarabiendeutschen* 1965, 96–100, esp. 98–99.
 35. Berndt von Staden, “Erinnerungen an die Umsiedlung,” *Jahrbuch des baltischen Deutschtums* 1994, 62–75; Rolf Freiherr von Ungern-Sternberg, “Bilder aus meinem Leben,” *Jahrbuch des baltischen Deutschtums* 1994, 79–80; N. N. Metz, “‘Heim ins Reich’: Erlebnisse eines Balten-deutschen 1939–1945,” *Jahrbuch des baltischen Deutschtums*, 1994, 121–39, esp. 124.
 36. By December 1940, around 71,000 ethnic Germans had been settled in the Warthegau; by September 1941, 14,000 Bessarabian Germans had been settled in Danzig-Westpreußen.

Internal figures in January 1944 showed the total number of ethnic Germans settled in the annexed territories as 343,000: 245,000 in the Warthegau, 52,000 in Danzig-Westpreußen, 38,000 in Upper Silesia, and 8,000 in the annexed territories integrated into East Prussia. RKFDV, Kleiner Umsiedlungsspiegel, Jan. 1944. BA Berlin, R49, 87.

37. Gendarmerie-Kreis Krotoschin an den Landrat Krotoschin, Lagebericht für den 6. Sept. 1940, 7. Sept. 1940; Landrat, Kreis Krotoschin an den Reg.präs. Posen, Lagebericht 14 Sept. 1940; Gendarmerie-Kreis Krotoschin an den Landrat Krotoschin, Archiwum Państwowe w Poznaniu (APP), Landratsamt Krotoschin, 33.
38. Gendarmeriekreis Ostrowo, Lagebericht vom 7. August 1940. BA Berlin, PL 90, film 72410.
39. Bericht eines Vertrauensmannes, "Der Aufbau des deutschen Volkswalles im Osten," October 1940, Institut für Zeitgeschichte (IfZ) MA 444/3.
40. "Umsiedlerbetreuung—Aufgabe der Partei," *Ostdeutscher Beobachter*, August 30, 1941.
41. The Nazi student organization, the Nazi women's organization, and the League of German Girls all ran "eastern assignments" as a form of political training.
42. Oberpräsidium in Kattowitz an den Präsidenten des Landesarbeitsamtes in Breslau, betr. Arbeitseinsatz von Volksdeutschen aus der Ukraine in der Landwirtschaft, 7 Oct. 1939. Archiwum Państwowe w Katowicach, Oberpräsidium Kattowitz, 826; Plähn, Führer des SS-Arbeitsstabes Nessau-Hohensalza an den Leiter des SS-Ansiedlungstabes Litzmannstadt, betr. Erfahrungsbericht, 2 Dec. 1940. BA Berlin, R49, 3072.
43. For an illustration of the work of the SS settlement teams and the scope of their interventions, see Die Ansiedlungstätigkeit im Kreis Leslau/Weichsel im Jahre 1941. Arbeitsbericht des Beauftragten des Reichskommissars f.d.F.d.V. Arbeitsstab für den Kreis Leslau, IfZ, Archiv Fb115. For examples of interventions in the private sphere by female settlement advisers, see the reports of settlement advisers, BA Berlin, R49, 121 and 122.
44. "Es gab sehr viel Meckerer, die aber immer, wenn sie ernstlich an die Wand gedrückt werden, eingestehen mußten, daß sie zufrieden sind und bleiben wollten": Ing. Richard Rupp, "Die Hofzuweisung" (undated), BA Berlin, R49, 3068.
45. Leiter der SS-Kreisstelle Tuchel an den HSSPF-Beauftr. RKE, Gotenhafen, betr. Beobachtungen über den Einsatz der bessarabiend. Umsiedler im Gau Danzig-Westpreußen, 4 Dec. 1942. Archiwum Państwowe w Gdansk, Bestand HSSPF, 4498.
46. The Siedlungswissenschaftliches Referat has attracted little attention from historians. For a brief mention, see Michael Esch, "Kolonisierung und Strukturpolitik: Paradigmen deutscher und polnischer Bevölkerungspolitik 1939–1948," in Christian Gerlach, Joachim Drews, Thomas M. Bohn, Michael Esch, *Besatzung und Bündnis: Deutsche Herrschaftsstrategien in Ost- und Südosteuropa* [=Beiträge zur nationalsozialistischen Gesundheits- und Sozialpolitik: 12] (Göttingen: Schwarze Risse, 1995), 139–79, esp. 173 n. 40.
47. Birn, *Die Höheren SS- und Polizeiführer*, 193.
48. On wartime planning and research in relation to the occupied "east," see Burleigh, *Germany Turns Eastward*, 155–299; Madajczyk, ed., *Vom Generalplan Ost zum Generalsiedlungsplan*; Rössler and Schleiermacher, eds, *Der Generalplan Ost*; and Götz Aly and Susanne Heim, *Vordenker der Vernichtung: Auschwitz und die deutschen Pläne für eine neue europäische Ordnung* (Frankfurt am Main: Hoffmann und Campe, 1993).
49. Luise Dolezalek, Vermerk betr. Bücherei des Siedlungswissenschaftlichen Referates, 10 Oct. 1941; Vermerk betr. Arbeitsanweisung zum Aufbau des Archivs, 2 Jun. 1942. BA Berlin, R49, 3078.
50. HSSPF/Reichsstatthalter in Posen, Vermerk betr. Kurzberichte des Siedlungswiss. Referats, 17 Jan. 1942. BA Berlin, R49, 3040.
51. HSSPF, Vermerk 17 Jan 1942. BA Berlin, R49, 3040; Auszug aus einem Bericht von Herrn Krause über seine Fahrt nach Berlin, Posen und Litzmannstadt in der Zeit vom 30. 8. bis 27.9.1942. BA Koblenz, R57/neu, 31.
52. On German women's involvement in Nazi Germanization policies in Poland generally, see Elizabeth Harvey, *Women and the Nazi East: Agents and Witnesses of Germanization* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2003).
53. Akte Luise Dolezalek, BA Berlin, ehemaliges BDC. Dolezalek's doctorate, completed in 1939 (under her unmarried name, Luise Fick), was on the history of the German youth movement; see Luise Fick, "Die deutsche Jugendbewegung" (Ph.D. diss., University of Jena, 1939).
54. Plan der Südtirolarbeit aufgestellt von Luis [sic] Fick u. Fred Kuzmany, Berlin, 20 Feb. 1936. Staatsarchiv Würzburg, RSF II, 535.

55. On Alexander Dolezalek, see Harvey, *Women and the Nazi East*, 147, 157–58; Heinemann, “Rasse, Siedlung, deutsches Blut,” 218, 613; and Krzysztof Kąkolewski, “Co u pana slychać,” in Madajczyk, ed., *Der Generalplan Ost*, 532–48. For his activities in relation to resettlement in the winter of 1939–1940, see SS-Rottenführer Gradmann an den Leiter der Einwandererzentralstelle, betr. Besprechung in der Wiss. Abt. des VDA, 4 Mar. 1940. BA Berlin, R49, 3044. For his proposal about labor camps for Poles and raising the age of marriage, see Alexander Dolezalek, “Plan für die künftige Arbeit der Planungsabteilung,” 18 Oct. 1941. BA Berlin, R49, 3066.
56. Dr Luise Dolezalek, Bericht über die Anfänge der Umsiedlerbetreuung im Warthegau 1940, 21 Jul. 1942. BA Berlin, R49, 3067.
57. Less is known about Stoelzel. Her Berlin Document Center file contains only a membership card for the NS-Lehrerbund indicating her occupation in 1939 to be a trainee Gymnasium teacher. Akte Elisabeth Stoelzel, BA Berlin, ehemaliges BDC.
58. See Elizabeth Harvey, “‘Die deutsche Frau im Osten’: ‘Rasse,’ Geschlecht und öffentlicher Raum im besetzten Polen 1940–1944,” *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte* 38 (1998): 191–214.
59. See L. Dolezalek, Bericht über die Anfänge der Umsiedlerbetreuung, for the argument that women had a special role to play in monitoring and “looking after” settlers.
60. Kurzbericht des siedlungswiss. Referates beim HSSPF Posen, “Die Seßhaftigkeit der von der preußischen Ansiedlungskommission angesetzten Siedler nach ihrer stammlichen Herkunft” (L. Dolezalek); “Leiden und Freuden einer Ansiedlung vor 200 Jahren”; 6. Kurzbericht, “Erfahrungen mit den Vorweltkriegssiedlungen der Kleinsiedlungsgenossenschaft”; 10. Kurzbericht: “Siedlungsgrundsätze, -praxis und -erfolg bei Friedrich dem Großen” (L. Dolezalek). BA Berlin, R49, 3040.
61. Kurzbericht: “Der griechisch-türkische Bevölkerungsaustausch im Vergleich zur Rücksiedlung der deutschen Volksgruppen aus dem Osten,” 13. April 1942. BA Berlin, R49, 3040.
62. Kurzbericht: “Die japanische Siedlung in Mandschukuo,” December 1942. BA Berlin, R49, 3040.
63. Niederschrift über die Landrätebesprechung am 28. und 29. January 1941 im Dienstgebäude des Regierungspräsidenten Litzmannstadt. BA Berlin, PL-116, Film 72636; Reichsstatthalter des Reichsgaues Wartheland, Beauftragter des RKF, an alle Arbeitsstäbe im Warthegau, betr. Erfassung der Sektenführer, 20 Jan. 1943. IfZ, MA 225/9985.
64. On the work of the female settlement advisers (*Ansiedlerbetreuerinnen*) in the annexed territories, see Harvey, *Women and the Nazi East*, 147–90.
65. L. Dolezalek, “Die Seßhaftigkeit der von der preußischen Ansiedlungskommission angesetzten Siedler.”
66. Siedlungswiss. Referat [E. Stoelzel], Aktenvermerk betr. Umsiedlerbewährung in ihren Ämtern, 7 May 1943. BA Berlin, R49, 3067.
67. Siedlungswiss. Referat [E. Stoelzel], Aktenvermerk betr. Einleben der Siedler im Warthegau, 2 Jul. 1943. BA Berlin, R49, 3067.
68. “Geschlossenes und schlagkräftiges Deutschtum.” Vermerk Dr Stoelzel betr. Umsiedler-Broschüren für Bessarabien- und Buchenlanddeutsche, 3 Feb. 1943. BA Berlin, R49, 3067.
69. L. Dolezalek, “Die Seßhaftigkeit der von der preußischen Ansiedlungskommission angesetzten Siedler.”
70. Elisabeth Stoelzel, Aktenvermerk betr. Bildband der altansässigen Deutschen im östlichen Warthegau, 29 Apr. 1943. BA Berlin, R49, 3067.
71. Madajczyk, ed., *Zamojszczyzna-Sonderlaboratorium SS*.
72. Gauleiter/Reichsstatthalter im Reichsgau Wartheland, Anordnung betr. Sofortaktion zur Ansetzung von Schwarzmeer-Deutschen, 11 Jan. 1944. APP, Landratsamt Scharnikau, 164.
73. “Wehrbauer im deutschen Osten,” *Wir sind daheim* 4, no. 4 (1944).
74. Rudolf Müller, “Unsere Ansiedlung im Generalgouvernement,” *Heimatkalender der Bessarabiendeutschen* 1965, 112.
75. For some accounts of the Germans’ hasty retreat from occupied Poland, see Harvey, *Women and the Nazi East*, 284–91.
76. Wilhelm Bannasch, “Die Ansiedlung unserer Tuchfabrikanten,” *Heimatkalender der Bessarabiendeutschen* 1977, 124–26.
77. Jeanette von Hahn, “Als Landfrau im Warthegau 1940–1945,” *Jahrbuch des baltischen Deutschtums* 1960, 90–93; Olrik Breckhoff, “Zwischenspiel an der Warthe—und was daraus wurde,” *Jahrbuch des baltischen Deutschtums* 1994, 142–49.

Settler Colonialism at the Bar of the League of Nations

SUSAN PEDERSEN

If we wish to understand how international organizations came to perceive, and in time to impinge upon, the powers of states to promote settlement projects and establish settler colonies, we might find some clues among the records and papers left by the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations. The Permanent Mandates Commission (PMC) has hardly gone down in history as a crucial influence on the character or demise of the twentieth-century empires.¹ It was established by Article 22 of the League Covenant as part of a new mandates system to administer seized Ottoman and German possessions, but even those victorious powers who set it up were far from enthusiastic about its creation. Imperialists in Paris and Tokyo, Cape Town and London, were disgusted that popular enthusiasm for Wilsonian ideas (not to mention Woodrow Wilson's own presence at the Paris Peace Conference) had made outright annexation of ex-enemy territories impossible, and only grudgingly agreed to administer them as "mandates" and under League oversight. They were thus relieved to discover that mandatory administration was indistinguishable from any other type of colonial administration, and that their sole obligation appeared to be to furnish the League with an annual report on their work, to correspond with the mandates commission about petitions from inhabitants in their territory, and to send a representative to Geneva once a year to answer its questions. Small wonder the anti-imperialist George Padmore concluded in 1937 that the mandates system had been a "huge fraud" devised by the great powers to expand their empires while "creating the illusion that they were not really annexing these territories as spoils of war."²

In terms of its impact on either governing practices or the timetable to independence, one would have to conclude that Padmore was right. Colonial administration in the mandates did not differ significantly from colonial administration elsewhere, and only in one case—that of Iraq—does mandatory status appear to have accelerated the timetable to self-rule. But did the mandates system have, then, no significance at all? I believe that it did, although in an arena

quite different from that in which impact has been sought. The mandates system, like other parts of the League, had few coercive powers: it traded in words and not arms; what it had to offer was legitimacy and not domination. Article 22 of the League Covenant may have committed the great powers in theory to administer territories differently; what it committed them to in practice, however, was merely to talk about administering territories differently. Put bluntly, it forced them to engage in a protracted, public, and comparative discussion over when and how undemocratic rule over alien populations could be justified. It required them, in other words, to allow for the elaboration of a kind of international “official mind” on questions of empire.

This international official mind did not represent a consensus view among the great powers about how empires should be governed. Still less did it reflect actual governing practices, for no empires administered their colonies according to its precepts. What it represented, instead, was an ideological effort, undertaken by those liberals and humanitarians who dominated interwar internationalism, and grudgingly sustained by their opinion-sensitive governments, to reconcile continued imperial rule with popular ideals of self-determination. This is the context within which the PMC operated. Its task, put most crudely, was to elaborate a theory of “trusteeship” that could patch some of the tears in the tattered clothes of empire.

This effort was, in a sense, a familiar one, for the nineteenth-century language of the “civilizing mission” or the “white man’s burden” had also been elaborated to perform just such ideological work. Yet the language of trusteeship was different, not only because it rhetorically elevated the obligation to guarantee the “well-being and development” of a territory’s indigenous population, but—more important—because it explicitly envisaged imperial rule as temporally bounded. Moreover, while that language of trusteeship has its own intellectual history, traceable back to the writings of John Locke on America and Edmund Burke on India, it was considered in 1919 to be something quite new—a decisive break with that program of territorial annexation, conversion, and cultural uplift identified with late-nineteenth-century imperialism.³ There was, certainly, considerable distance between the ideals of trusteeship and those of settler colonialism, which envisaged not temporary protection but rather the displacement of “uncivilized” indigenous populations and their permanent economic and political subjection to a transplanted metropolitan population.

What is important for our purposes is that the PMC came to appreciate that contradiction. It came, in other words, to understand that the implanting and empowerment of settler populations challenged, and could undermine, the legitimacy that they were trying so hard to develop. The PMC was not anti-imperialist; if anything, it was seeking to rehabilitate (and not to discredit) imperialism. Almost inadvertently, however, its performance of that task led it to do something else as well. It brought settler colonialism before the bar of the League of Nations, and found it wanting.

Introducing the Mandates Commission

But how, exactly, did it do this? The mandates commission was, as the great powers well understood, toothless. Not only did it have few formal powers, limited funds, and a small and unenterprising staff, but it also suffered from its members' susceptibility to national pressure and the disinterest (or even hostility) of the body from whom its authority derived. Although the commission's ten members were to be named for their competence and were not to be in government employ, in practice appointees were usually former colonial officials with close ties to their particular country's foreign policy establishments; on the commission, then, they sometimes behaved less as international watchdogs than as government mouthpieces, defending their own nation's colonial record and trying to expose the failings of other powers. And even when they managed to surmount their national interests and speak with a single voice, they discovered that the Council of the League, which appointed the commission's members and to which they reported, was less than happy to hear them. Consistently, the council sought to limit the commission's powers, refusing to countenance fact-finding missions or travel, and restricting its independent access to information or complaints. Even though inhabitants in the mandates held a statutory right to petition, the council ruled in 1923 (at the request of the British Colonial Office) that such petitions must be sent first to the mandatory power, which would then pass them along to the commission—a procedure that, as Dantès Bellegarde, the delegate to the League assembly from Haiti, acidly remarked, forced petitioners “to communicate their grievances to the very persons of whom they complain.”⁴ Yet, when the commission found itself unable to decide disputes without further information and asked the council for the right to hear petitioners directly, they were not only refused but rebuked.⁵ “It seemed to him,” British Foreign Secretary Austen Chamberlain said in the council (to an orchestrated chorus of approval from the representatives of Belgium, France, New Zealand, Japan, and South Africa, mandatory powers all) that “there was a tendency on the part of the Commission to extend its authority to a point where the government would no longer be vested in the mandatory Power but in the Mandates Commission”—a move that was, he said, “not the intention of the Covenant.”⁶

But if the commission suffered from inadequate resources, unclear authority, and a good deal of ambivalence about its oversight within the great powers' colonial establishments and the League Council alike, it held a few cards just the same. It was fortunate in the character of its first director, the Swiss lawyer and professor William Rappard—an independent-minded and principled man who developed a great interest in the work of the commission, remained as a member after resigning as director, and did much to raise the quality of its deliberations. Some of its other members—notably the famous British colonial governor Sir Frederick Lugard, the Dutch representative D. F. W. Van Rees, and

the commission's lone woman member in the 1930s, Valentine Dannevig—also proved far more independent-minded than the council must have expected. The commission also benefited from the fact that members served without fixed term and that turnover was low: the Italian Marquis Alberto Theodoli, the commission's first chairman, served for sixteen years; the Spaniard M. Palacios for fifteen; Lugard and Van Rees for thirteen each; the Norwegian Dannevig and the Portuguese Count José de Penha Garcia for eleven each; and Rappard for the commission's entire active life of eighteen years. Members could thus learn on the job and became hard to fool. It might be a thankless task to have to repeat the same questions year after year, Rappard once told a particularly obdurate South African representative, but he should not think the commission's "curiosity could be killed by prescription."⁷

Yet the commission's greatest advantage was not its members at all: it was, rather, that its work took place under the scrutiny of an interested and sometimes critical public. The mandates system, after all, had been set up amid a wave of popular revulsion against empires and of enthusiasm for nation building;⁸ in 1921, even W. E. B. Du Bois and his colleagues at the Second Pan-African Congress had greeted it with cautious optimism.⁹ The proliferating League of Nations Unions and internationalist organizations of the interwar years welcomed it with open arms, and across the Atlantic a generation of internationally minded and well-funded American scholars (Raymond Leslie Buell in affiliation with the Foreign Policy Association and Harvard University, Rayford Logan at Howard University, Parker Moon at Columbia University, and Quincy Wright at the University of Chicago) found it an excellent subject for academic inquiry and debate.¹⁰ The fact that both mandatory administration and League oversight were to be public and open both aided and fueled such scrutiny, for the texts of the mandates, the comprehensive annual reports required for each territory, the full minutes of each meeting of the commission (including their often acrimonious questioning of administrators), the commission's report to the council, the council and assembly debates over that report, and even the deliberations about petitions sent from the mandates, were all published in French and English and reported in the newspapers. True, only the inhabitants of the Middle East mandates really came to understand and exploit the publicity value of the petition process, but humanitarians and anticolonialists tried to provide such scrutiny for the African mandates as well. Indeed, discoveries of administrative malfeasance or charges of League apathy or bias were quite likely to arise in the press or in the more democratic League assembly, and then be passed on to the commission for investigation.

If the mandates commission was under one kind of pressure from the council, then, it was under another from the public. Indeed, it is because it was forced always to mediate between great powers' interests and popular opinion, or to justify the ways of empire to democracy, that it can serve as such a revealing window into the international official mind. If we examine how the mandates

commission grappled with questions of settlement and settler power in South West Africa, Tanganyika, and Palestine, we may begin to understand why settler colonialism remained such a critical part of particular imperial projects and yet lost the support of what would become “the international community.”

South West Africa; or, The Mandates Commission Learns about Settler Colonialism

If the League and the international community came to a new appreciation of the character and hazards of settler colonialism between the two world wars, it was in part by debating South Africa’s administration of South West Africa (now Namibia), a subject that absorbed a good deal of League attention and that aroused considerable popular passion after 1918. In the twenty-five years before the First World War, Germany had turned Namibia into its most cherished settler colony, defeating its indigenous population through brutal military campaigns, alienating large tracts of land to white settlers, and forcing Africans into their service through a ban on all native property, the registration of all male Africans over the age of seven, the imposition of a strict labor requirement, and the heavy use of “paternal chastisement” (or flogging).¹¹ South Africa, searching for new lands on which to implant its expanding “poor white” population, eyed these vast tracts to the north with jealousy; when the war broke out, a mixed force of British and South African troops quickly seized the territory. From 1915 until 1920, South West Africa was under military administration.

Jan Christiaan Smuts, the Boer War general and South African statesman who spent fifty years reconciling British and South African interests, had every expectation that South Africa would be allowed to annex the territory outright. Himself deeply involved in the drafting of the League Covenant, Smuts had conceived of mandatory administration as a means of internationalizing governance of the strategically significant Middle East territories seized from the Ottoman Empire. Smuts felt that Germany’s African colonies, by contrast, should simply be parceled out among the victorious Allied powers. He was disgusted when Wilson and the other statesmen gathered at Geneva insisted that Germany’s African colonies be defined as mandates as well, and only somewhat mollified when South West Africa (alone among the African mandates) was named a “C” mandate—a status reserved for particularly remote or underdeveloped areas and one that, Smuts told a white audience in Windhoek in 1920, amounted to “annexation in all but name.”¹² From the outset, then, South West Africa was envisaged by its “mandatory power” not as a distinct territory to be trained in the arts of self-government but rather as a potential fifth province, to be assimilated to South African ideals. It was to be turned, in other words, into a “white man’s country.”

Already under the period of military rule and intensively thereafter, South African administrators thus worked to convert South West Africa into the

archetypal settler colony. Every effort was made to build up the white settler population, both by conciliating the existing German settlers (who in other territories were quickly repatriated), and by making farms and loans available to white South Africans willing to move north. The white population of South West Africa expanded from just under 15,000 (of a total population of over 200,000) toward the end of German rule to some 31,000 by 1936, at which point whites owned fully 55 percent of nondesert land within the Police Zone of European direct control (an area comprising about two-thirds of the territory).¹³ The administration also mobilized to meet those settlers' voracious demands for labor. If able even minimally to meet their needs by stock raising and hunting, the Police Zone's African population of mostly Herero and Nama pastoralists flatly refused to work on white farms, and labor-starved settlers soon began clamoring for a return to the open coercion of the German period. The administration would not go so far as to restore a blanket prohibition on African stock owning, but they did enact a mesh of legal, financial, and bodily controls that forced Africans to labor on white farms. The "native reserves" they established were arid and inadequate, and Africans' ability to live off the land was further undercut in the early 1920s by the introduction of prohibitively high taxes on dogs used for herding and hunting. Outside the native reserves, moreover, Africans were required to carry a "pass," and were—if not able to show means of support—liable to be arrested for vagrancy. Sentences for various infractions, moreover, were usually served out in government service or in labor on white farms.¹⁴ Finally, the administration exploited the mandatory rhetoric of eventual self-government most cynically, declining to recognize any indigenous leadership while setting up a whites-only legislative assembly in 1925.

The PMC viewed with apprehension South Africa's interpretation of the nature of trusteeship. Already at their first sessions in 1921 and 1922, the commission noted that Germany's harsh settlement policies had demoralized and decimated the African population, and worried that the South Africans seemed inclined to proceed along similar lines.¹⁵ But what particularly brought the nature of the South West African regime home to them was the administration's handling of the so-called Bondelswarts rebellion. The Bondelswarts, a Nama ("Hottentot") group of between twelve hundred and thirteen hundred people living on the South African border, had expected to see their lands restored after the German defeat; instead, they found themselves facing further encroachments on their land, official refusal to recognize their chosen headman, new requirements on branding stock, and the strict enforcement of an extortionate dog tax. They were, by 1922, impoverished and resentful, and when their renowned leader Abraham Morris (who had served as a scout for the South Africans in the campaign against the Germans) returned from Cape Colony with some companions and a few rifles, Gys Hofmeyr, the territory's South African administrator, feared a rebellion. He thus moved

quickly to arrest Morris, and when the group refused to surrender him and retreated to the hills, raised four to five hundred troops and mounted an expedition in pursuit. In a move designed to foster terror and break the Bondelswarts' will, airplanes flown in from South Africa bombed their encampment, killing some women and children and maddening the corralled animals. The next morning, most of the population surrendered (at which point Hofmeyr's men burned their huts to the ground); under cover of darkness, however, Morris and perhaps 250 men with some dozens of rifles set off for the Orange River. Not without difficulty, they were tracked down and defeated. Morris and some hundred other Bondelswarts fighters lost their lives; two were killed on the government side.¹⁶

Seen in the context of repression of indigenous rebellions or "native unrest," nothing about the South African response (including the use of airplanes¹⁷) was particularly surprising. Yet, because this sorry incident took place in a mandate, a territory in which the welfare of the population was to be treated as a "sacred trust," there was an immediate outcry. The Anti-Slavery Society quickly publicized South Africa's actions, Haiti's representative to the League raised the matter in the assembly, and the PMC was asked to look into it.¹⁸ Hampered by distance and by the South Africans' unwillingness to answer their questions, the commission reported in August 1923 that it had neither the authority nor the capacity to conduct a full enquiry; the majority, however, had learned enough to conclude that the mandatory power had "persisted in the errors formerly committed by its predecessor" and failed to live up to the principles of the League Covenant. In a minority report of his own, the commission's usually mild-mannered chairman Alberto Theodoli charged that while the mandates system was based on the principle that "the interests of the natives" must come "first in importance," the South West African administration had "pursued a policy of force ... conceived and applied in the interests of the colonists."¹⁹

Although temperate in the extreme, even the majority report outraged the South African government. The maintenance of law and order and the process of white settlement were not inimical to indigenous interests but were instead the means by which "the native is being gradually civilised," high commissioner E. H. Walton wrote in a bitter response.²⁰ "These natives have been sunk in barbarism for untold centuries," Walton told the League assembly meeting that September, and "you are not going to lift people from barbarism to civilisation within a period of a generation."²¹ The assembly passed a resolution praising the commission for its "zeal" and "impartiality" anyway,²² but the council—as Lugard cannily predicted²³—took a more conservative stance. No League member except South Africa had much of an interest in South West Africa, and Sir Robert Cecil and other British representatives very much wanted to spare Smuts any embarrassment. The council thus simply thanked Walton for assuring them of the administration's "desire to ... restore the

prosperity of the Bondelzwarts people” and expressed the utopian (and, as it transpired, vain) hope that the future would show “a steady and continuous advancement in [their] civilisation and in [their] moral and material well-being.”²⁴

If the Bondelszwarts controversy taught South Africa that its administration would be conducted under the glare of international scrutiny, then, it did nothing to shake their confidence. “We presume in South Africa that white civilisation must be the guiding influence,” an unrepentant Hofmyer told the commission the following year; only thus would they inspire the African “with that measure of respect for the supremacy of the white man which is essential in a land the vast majority of whose inhabitants are as yet uncivilised.”²⁵ For the next fifteen years the South African representatives provided information without complaint while steadily insisting that one could not deal with “a type of native 2,000 years behind the European” in any other way.²⁶ They thus made no effort to hide the fact that they spent (in 1926) eight times as much on policing as they did on native affairs;²⁷ they defended their drastic labor laws with the claim that “any form of labour was for the moral good of the natives”;²⁸ they declined to “waste money” on native education with the argument that the natives did not want education anyway.²⁹ In the early 1930s, when the territory suffered not only from a serious economic slump but from drought, locusts, and an outbreak of plague in Ovamboland, they simply explained that they could not tax the white population just to help Africans.

The commissioners—and Lugard and Rappard in particular—found it hard to contain their frustration. They were hardly anticolonialists or cultural relativists: they shared the assumptions about African backwardness and Western superiority on which the mandates system was based. They had little interest in African culture: the view expressed by Dannevig that the bushmen were “an interesting people” of “no small culture” already well adapted to their desert life, found no echo.³⁰ But if most of the commissioners accepted that the mandates should be “developed” and that such development must be in white hands, they nevertheless believed that it should promote African interests and Africans’ capacity. A kind of autocratic paternalism was their ideal: South Africa’s practice of devolving economic and political power on to white minority populations thus struck them as a violation of the “sacred trust.” They were consistently critical of the administration’s tendency to treat Africans only as a source of labor for white enterprise, and Lugard (as the theorist of indirect rule) also objected to its unwillingness to foster any institutions of African self-government.³¹ One could not help comparing the policies pursued by the South African administration with those followed by other mandatory powers, Rappard told its representatives in 1934 and again in 1935, and whenever the commission did so the South Africans came up short. “The Administrator was generous enough to the white minority,” he pointed out; indeed, “the white population had been put in the saddle by the Mandatory Power.” The problem,

put simply, was that South West Africa was a settler state, a “white man’s country”—and, Rappard concluded, “history ... showed that it was a misfortune for natives to inhabit a white man’s country.”³²

Over the course of the 1920s and 1930s, then, the group of ex-imperial officials who made up the PMC, and the politicians, intellectuals, and humanitarians clustered around the League, developed a close and largely critical understanding of the nature of settler-oriented administration. Neither their understanding nor their growing hostility did much to change the conditions under which Namibia’s indigenous population labored, lived, and died, for the great powers who dominated the council (and themselves held mandates) scarcely wished to involve themselves in what they viewed as the internal affairs of a friendly member state. On one issue, however—that of sovereignty—the council did tie South Africa’s hands. It did so only reluctantly, but in the late 1920s, when the South Africans renegotiated the territory’s border with the Portuguese and passed legislation claiming ownership of its railway system, the council finally intervened.³³ “Sovereignty, in the traditional sense of the term, does not reside with the mandatory power,” it reminded South Africa—and, when the South Africans declined to agree, the council insisted that they accept this interpretation and amend the territory’s railway and harbor legislation accordingly.³⁴ Likewise, when the territory’s white South African population began urging incorporation into the Union of South Africa during the economic crisis of the 1930s, the commission and the council united to oppose any such action. “Only the evolution of the natives would justify a change in the regime,” Rappard told the South African High Commissioner in 1934; until they were able to decide for themselves, no other body—and certainly not an assembly of white settlers—could make decisions on sovereignty for them.³⁵ South Africa never agreed, but when faced with a League united front, they grudgingly backed down.³⁶

South Africa’s administration of its mandate is significant for our story not because it was particularly outrageous or astonishing, but because it was theoretically constrained by international agreements and hence took place under international scrutiny. South Africa did not govern South West Africa’s indigenous population so differently from how it governed its own “native population” (that was, for them, the point); its administration was not even that far from the systems prevailing in, say, Kenya or Algeria. But because South Africa was recognized as “not sovereign” in Namibia, its construction of a settler state founded on white supremacy was understood to violate the principles of trusteeship enshrined in the League Covenant. Although the League declined to do anything about it, in the eyes of the PMC and of that tide of progressive international opinion arrayed behind it, settler colonialism of the South West African variety was already understood as illegitimate, and South West Africa was considered—as it would be labeled after 1945—a “mandate betrayed.”

Tanganyika; or, The Mandates Commission Seeks to Protect “Trusteeship”

If the PMC came to see the administration of South West Africa as a violation of the “sacred trust,” they took heart from Tanganyika, which seemed, by contrast, a model of trusteeship. The mandate for Tanganyika had been awarded to Britain, which now controlled an unbroken swathe of Africa from the Cape to Cairo. But while imperialists in London, Nairobi, and Cape Town greeted that award with enthusiasm, their anticipated “white dominion” in East Africa never materialized, in part because Britain did not choose to administer Tanganyika along settler colonial lines. While not dictated by the League, this was a choice that the mandates commission heartily endorsed.

That different orientation was apparent almost immediately. Unlike that of South West Africa, the existing German settler population of Tanganyika was expelled at the end of the war, and although a polyglot white population of some 9,345 persons had established itself by 1938, that figure amounted to less than one-quarter of 1 percent of a population that included 34,000 South Asians and 5,000,000 Africans.³⁷ Settler agriculture remained a significant part of the economy, but land alienation was strictly controlled. A 1923 land act made all transfers conditional on the governor’s consent, and the 2.1 million acres in European hands by 1938 still amounted to less than 1 percent of all the land in the territory.³⁸ Moreover, despite vigorous lobbying,³⁹ the administration declined to orient its economic policy primarily toward the needs of settlers. Certainly they sought to marketize the economy, imposing direct taxes payable only in cash to force Africans to earn; but while they did facilitate plantation labor by regulating contracts and providing services for migrant workers, they also expanded African cultivation of cash and export crops. This policy of “peasantization,” of “backing the man with the hoe,”⁴⁰ enabled Tanganyika to develop a moderately diversified economy, usually self-sustaining in food production and with cotton and coffee grown by both African peasants and European settlers for export. Finally, the British administration did not ally politically with the settler population or devolve authority into its hands. Sir Donald Cameron, governor from 1925 until 1931, had served for seventeen years in Nigeria, and was determined to transplant Lugard’s system of indirect rule to Tanganyika. His comprehensive reform of local administration, begun in 1925, thus endowed “native chiefs” with a regular income paid out of tax revenues and strengthened their authority over land allocation and the administration of justice.⁴¹ This system was balanced, on the European side, by the creation of a legislative council in 1926, but real power inhered in the governor and his secretariat.

This system was anything but progressive. Indeed, as historians have pointed out, in its paternalism, its inefficiency, and its obsession with largely illusory “tribal” authority and traditions, it tended to sacrifice economic growth to

economic stability and social progress to social control.⁴² Yet that policy, at once autocratic and paternalistic, dovetailed perfectly with the assumptions underlying the mandates system.⁴³ From the early 1920s, the commission had little but praise for the Tanganyika administration. They endorsed its policies on land ownership in 1923, its efforts at agricultural instruction in 1924, its creation of a new labor department in 1925, its regulations on forced labor in 1928, and its efforts to improve labor conditions in 1929.⁴⁴ They were delighted when Cameron, whom they much admired, traveled to Geneva to appear in person at their session in July 1927, and were happy to hear him promise that Tanganyika “will always remain a predominantly native country, like Uganda.”⁴⁵ They paid tribute to his policies of safeguarding native land rights and fostering native self-government in 1929 and 1930, and after his retirement sought to extract the pledge that there would be no change in policy.⁴⁶

Faced with this record of mutual congratulation, it is tempting to see Tanganyika as the case where League oversight shaped administration and attenuated settler power, but a few caveats are necessary, for policy for Tanganyika was guided less by any international body than by a contest of wills within the British state between what we might term paternalistic and settler-oriented ideals of colonial rule. Paternalists (like Cameron) took their inspiration from Lugard’s administration of Nigeria; conversely, Kenya provided a model for those eager to expand settler power. Those British colonial officials who agreed that Tanganyika was to be “primarily a Black man’s country,” as Sir Charles Strachey of the Colonial Office put it in 1921,⁴⁷ thus viewed the mandates system less as a new model they were constrained to follow than as a resource to mobilize against the settler lobby in this internecine struggle. Tellingly, in his autobiography Donald Cameron both insisted that the “terms of the Mandate in the case of Tanganyika did not trouble or preoccupy my mind in any way” since its principles “were in complete accord with those with which I had become so accustomed in the administration of Nigeria,” *and* recalled how he relied on those terms when opposing settlers’ proposals to incorporate Tanganyika into “a great white dominion” or to introduce white self-rule.⁴⁸

This affinity between indirect rule and the ideology of trusteeship meant, however, that in particular instances—and especially when partisans of settler power seemed to be gaining the upper hand—League oversight could play a significant role. Unsurprisingly, as in South West Africa, it was over the issue of sovereignty that the League intervened most effectively. On this issue as others initial relations between the commission and the mandatory power were good, with Britain assuring the commission that it had no intention of claiming sovereignty over, much less annexing, Tanganyika territory.⁴⁹ In the late 1920s, however, when conservative political resurgence fueled demands for the amalgamation and self-government of Britain’s East African colonies, the PMC grew apprehensive. The terms of the mandate were worryingly elastic, for just as the South West Africa mandate allowed for its administration “as an integral

part” of South African territory, so the Tanganyika mandate allowed Britain “to constitute the territory into a customs, fiscal and administrative union or federation with the adjacent territories under its own sovereignty or control.” Yet, some commissioners feared that any such move would jeopardize the territory’s future independence,⁵⁰ and when Britain did introduce a customs and postal union among the East African territories in the early 1930s, they saw the thin end of the wedge. Lord Plymouth’s assurance in 1932 that such changes were purely administrative did not mollify them. “Closer political and constitutional union would always strike the Commission as not even debatable,” Rappard told Plymouth bluntly; “it would upset the mandate which it was the Commission’s business to defend.”⁵¹ Even administrative reforms, M. Leopoldo Palacios reiterated in 1933, might lead to closer union by degrees, or in some way endanger the sovereignty or economic well-being of the territory.⁵² The commission interrogated British representatives closely about all plans for cross-territorial collaboration throughout the 1930s.

As with South West Africa, then, the PMC mobilized to oppose policies that might in any way jeopardize Tanganyika’s autonomy and future sovereignty. And as with South Africa, the council lent its support, accepting the view that union of any kind touched upon “the very nature of the mandate.”⁵³ Unlike South Africa, however, the British government was conciliatory rather than defiant. As Michael Callahan’s careful study of the “closer union” controversy shows, the British government had already examined whether such federation would violate the terms of the mandate, and when its law officers concluded that it would, quietly agreed not to proceed down that road.⁵⁴ True, for the British, League pressures on the “closer union” issue were not decisive. Many other factors—a reluctance to offend Germany (now back in the League), an awareness of the depth of East African Indian opposition, considerable official and domestic antagonism (from Lugard, among others), and the Colonial Office’s growing impatience with a Kenyan settler community that one civil servant described as “a parasitic growth which is quite unable to stand by itself and has succeeded in sucking far too much nourishment out of the body politic”⁵⁵ also disposed Britain against East African federation. Since British interests were global and not regional, its concern to stabilize European political alliances or to conciliate other international and imperial constituencies understandably outweighed its solicitude for Kenya’s alternately belligerent and importunate settlers. The PMC was just one more weight in the scales disposing the British against settler conciliation in cases this open to international scrutiny.

Palestine; or, The League Defends Settlement in the Service of Nation Building

Only in one instance between the wars did the League and progressive Western international opinion fairly unambiguously support a settler project; this was

the Zionist project in Palestine. It was commonly held after 1945 that the British had betrayed their mandate by preventing the entry of increasingly desperate and threatened Central European Jews; only more recently have scholars acknowledged the degree to which they did in fact honor their pledge, first articulated in the 1917 Balfour Declaration and then written into the mandate itself, to “view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people.”⁵⁶ Palestine’s Jewish population increased from 80,000 (or about 10 percent of the total population) in 1922 to some 450,000 (or roughly one-third) in 1939,⁵⁷ and until the late 1930s such immigration was made conditional only on “economic absorptive capacity” and not on political conditions or other communities’ consent. Indeed, when it became clear that Arab consent was unlikely to emerge, British officials shelved their plans (also enjoined by the mandate) to foster representative institutions since, as Sir Herbert Samuel, the first high commissioner, told the PMC in 1924, “as the Arabs had declared that if they had a majority they would use it to oppose the establishment of a Jewish National Home, it was not possible to afford them an opportunity of acting in a way that was hostile to this requirement of the mandate.”⁵⁸ Not until the serious unrest of 1929 did the British begin consistently to argue that the mandate entailed equal obligations to Arabs and Jews, and not until the outbreak of a full-blown Arab revolt of 1936 did actual policy shift and plans emerge first for partition and then for restrictions on Jewish immigration.⁵⁹

The PMC, however, went through no such shift. Not all the commissioners were pro-Zionist, for the Portuguese and Spanish representatives sympathized with the Arab population and the Italian Theodoli, who was married to a Syrian Christian woman, did so as well. Yet with several commissioners (notably Rappard and the diligent Van Rees) in the Zionist camp, the PMC proved a vigilant overseer of Britain’s mandated obligations. Year after year, commissioners interrogated British officials to discover whether they were indeed facilitating Jewish immigration, the close settlement of those immigrants on the land, and the development of the “national home.” As British policy became more sensitive to Arab feelings, the PMC (especially once it was freed of Theodoli’s presence by the Italian withdrawal from the League), if anything, became less so. In 1930 and again in 1937 commissioners argued that the mandatory power’s “policy of conciliation” had had the effect of legitimating and encouraging Arab violence. Had the British made clear their determination to enforce the mandate regardless of Arab views, the commission implied, the revolt might never have happened; had they repressed it more decisively, it might not have spread.⁶⁰ When the British government retorted that the mandate was unworkable, began planning partition, and then temporarily suspended Jewish immigration, the commission became yet more critical.⁶¹ A majority of the commission found Britain’s 1939 White Paper, which proposed

making future Jewish immigration conditional upon Arab consent, a violation of the mandate.⁶²

Why did the PMC prove such a staunch defender of the Zionist cause when, in other instances, it had tended to look skeptically on settler projects? For some, certainly, ties of friendship and a humanitarian revulsion against anti-Semitism played a part. It is also true that the commission was the target of skillful lobbying by the Zionists, whereas Arab political pressure tended to be uncertain and ineffective. Chaim Weizmann, president of the World Zionist Organization, enjoyed a confidential friendship with key British politicians and in the early 1920s began cultivating crucial members of the PMC as well. Weizmann not only carried a friendly semisocial correspondence with Rappard and fed him a steady stream of commentary and memoranda about Palestine, but also traveled regularly to Geneva for personal meetings; and when the British government became “too sensitive” about such meetings, he simply dropped in on Pierre Orts or other commission members in Brussels or other European capitals.⁶³ By 1925, Weizmann was already describing Rappard as “very useful”⁶⁴ (and by the 1930s Rappard was passing along information about the commission’s likely subjects of debate), while by 1935 even Theodoli (whom Weizmann had described in 1924 as “first among” Zionism’s opponents in Geneva) was sending his warm personal regards to Weizmann’s wife.⁶⁵

Yet lobbying of this sort merely cemented prior affinities; it cannot alone account for the commission’s relatively sympathetic stance. A second factor—the “legalism” so apparent in all the commission’s deliberations—was important as well. The requirement to facilitate Jewish immigration and the “national home” was, after all, embodied in the mandate itself; Zionists were thus quite right to consider the mandate “[as] significant [as] the Balfour declaration” in legitimating their cause.⁶⁶ The Arab population, by contrast, was not mentioned in the text of the mandate and hence lacked any formal standing in addressing the PMC. Insofar as Arabs were objecting not to Britain’s fulfillment of the mandate but to the fact that the mandate itself was, as Rappard put it, “based on a principle which was incompatible with the national aspirations of the Arabs,” the commission thus ignored them. He quite understood the Arab view, Rappard insisted; indeed, it was one “with which, if he were an Arab, he would associate himself.” That grievance was, however, “no business of the Mandates Commission,” whose task it was not to question the terms of the mandate but merely to see that they were faithfully carried out.⁶⁷

And yet, “legalism” is also only a partial explanation, for even the most legally minded (and commission members were, as a rule, exceptionally legally minded) came up against the fact that even the mandate had qualified the obligation to facilitate Jewish immigration with the caveat, “it being clearly understood that nothing should be done which might prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine.” True, as Rappard and others pointed out, the indigenous population’s political rights

were not explicitly protected; and yet, since Palestine had been categorized as one of the “A” mandates, presumably it, too, was destined for independent nationhood in the near future. Weizmann himself recognized that the contradiction between the promises of Article 22 and the terms of the Palestine mandate constituted the “one good argument” the Arabs had,⁶⁸ and as communal relations grew more fraught that argument was evoked more and more. The requirement to facilitate the “national home” was subordinate to the broader obligation, common to all mandates, to protect the indigenous population and foster self-governing institutions, Theodoli insisted in 1930, and by the late 1930s British officials were saying much the same thing.⁶⁹ An Arab population that had been resident in Palestine for generations had seen an alien population settled among them, Colonial Secretary Malcolm MacDonald told the commission in 1939; if they were now willing to lay down their lives to stop that immigration in a movement that bore “the undeniable stamp of a wide, patriotic national protest,” Britain could not forever ignore their views. The mandatory power might now be “compelled to slay large numbers of Arabs” to uphold the mandate, but it would not agree to do that indefinitely. As MacDonald posited, “If the Arabs of Palestine, alone among all the populations of territories under mandate, were to be deprived of normal political rights, it would amount to saying that the Palestine mandate contradicted the spirit of the mandates system.” The British government, he insisted, was not willing to accept that. “It was impossible to set one’s face against the whole spirit of the twentieth century, which in many countries was a steady movement towards self-government.”⁷⁰

At least half of the commissioners disagreed, however. They argued, in other words, not only that Britain had an obligation to facilitate Jewish immigration, but that that obligation took precedence over the mandate’s other stipulations. Rappard, for example, contended that the Arabs must be made to understand that their right to self-government was subordinate to—and would be conditional upon—their acceptance of the Jewish national home, and in 1937 Baron Frederick van Asbeck, the Netherlands’ representative on the commission following the death of Van Rees, took the argument further. If one considered the obligations to the Jews and the Arabs to be equal, then the mandate might indeed be unworkable, he admitted, but no one had actually considered those obligations to be equal when the mandate was first established. It had been assumed at the outset that the promise to the Jews was paramount: if Britain and the League simply stuck to that interpretation, repressing Arab dissent and accepting the need for “government by force” until such time as the Jews formed a majority, then the mandate was perfectly workable.⁷¹ Dannevig also thought it necessary to maintain Jewish immigration, even if that meant deferring self-government indefinitely. She was sorry she had ever supported Britain’s plans to introduce representative institutions, she told the commission

in 1939, since she was now convinced that self government was a very long way off indeed—"perhaps 50 or 100 years, not five or ten."⁷²

For Rappard, Dannevig, and others, then, the specific pledges to the Jews took precedence over the more general obligations of trusteeship and self-determination; in a complex political landscape they took the Zionist side. The fact that they did so in the face of tremendous indigenous protest and despite the fact that that project required practices—alienation of indigenous land, harsh policing—that they deplored in other contexts should warn us against assuming that simply some admixture of laziness, hypocrisy, or vulnerability to persuasion can account for their views. These were, after all, intelligent and principled men and women; indeed, Rappard, Dannevig, and Van Rees were the most outspoken defenders of indigenous land rights and interests in other contexts. If they took the Zionist side, then, it was not because they were in some simple sense "biased" (or, still less, suborned), but rather because they believed that the Zionist project in Palestine—unlike South African ambitions in Namibia—was in keeping with those principles of self-determination and trusteeship that the League was pledged to protect.

And it is with this realization that we can begin to understand both the complexity of this particular historical conflict and the character of these commissioners' view. For unlike the cases in South West Africa or Tanganyika, where indigenous rights were threatened by the territorial ambitions of the mandatory power itself (or at any rate of citizens of that power), Zionist settlers in Palestine were not British nationals or settling at the mandatory power's behest. Although it took place under the protection of the League and the British Empire, and adapted methods common to other settler efforts, Zionism was in conception a nationalist and not an imperialist project: it was an effort to constitute a new nation within an already colonized space. It was, moreover, self-evidently an increasingly urgent project, with the endemic anti-Semitism of eastern Europe compounded by Nazi efforts to drive all Jewish inhabitants outside Germany's ever-expanded borders. As the 1930s wore on, then, the PMC's progressive wing became more deeply Zionist, casting its support for unfettered Jewish settlement in Palestine as at once a humanitarian necessity and a blow against a German regime they viewed with loathing and shame.

Seen as an exercise in "self-determination" by a stateless and increasingly victimized population, Zionism could easily be accommodated into the ideological framework of the League. Rappard, Dannevig, and others thus did not see the Jews as an alien population threatening an indigenous population (though their colleagues Theodoli and Palacios saw them that way); instead, they saw the Jews as a diasporic but also putatively indigenous population, one whose claim to Palestine was equal to that of the Arabs currently living there. Moreover, unlike Colonial Secretary William Ormsby-Gore, who rather disarmingly told the PMC in 1937 that "the British people could not for long be persuaded to use military force to settle a conflict between right and

right,”⁷³ Rappard and his allies had little trouble with that decision. The logic of self-determination, once applied, was pitiless. As Dannevig put it that same year, since the Arabs already had self-governing states while the Jews were being harried from their Central European homes, Jewish claims must take priority.⁷⁴ The mandate was clearly “against the will of the Arabs,” she reiterated in 1939, “but they had to submit to it.”⁷⁵ Zionist settlement took place under the sign of nation building and not imperial expansion; thus, even if it traduced ideals of “trusteeship” that they upheld in other contexts, the commission’s liberal wing was willing to support it.

Conclusion

The Permanent Mandates Commission ceased meeting in 1940. Overtaken by events, and then sharing in the opprobrium directed at the League of Nations after 1945, it attracted little subsequent scholarly or political attention. Yet its archives and reports repay scrutiny, for through them we can trace the debates and conflicts through which interwar “official” internationalists sought at once to reform and to rehabilitate empire. As I have shown here, they did so in part by distinguishing between “trusteeship” and the permanent settlement and annexation of dependent territories. The implanting of privileged metropolitan populations, the appropriation of land, the subjection of indigenous people, and the delegation of political authority to settler elites—all classic aspects of settler colonialism—aroused the commission’s concern and (sometimes) condemnation. Only when divorced from imperial self-interest and bound up with a project of nation building, as in Palestine, was the commission able to view settlement by an alien population with equanimity.

In many respects, this evolving international rhetoric did not amount to very much. It meant little enough to the actual inhabitants of the mandates, who lived under systems of administration devised to meet the mandatory power’s interests and containing often only the most cursory genuflection to League ideals. It meant even less in the nonmandate colonies, which imperial powers carefully kept from even this limited degree of international oversight. The League’s evolving mistrust of settler colonialism did not attenuate settler power in Kenya, Algeria, or Southern Rhodesia; it did not prevent Japan and Italy—and, in the context of war, Germany—from undertaking expansionist ventures (complete with ambitious settler projects) in adjacent territories. If anything, in fact, the interwar years present the paradoxical spectacle of the slow elaboration of an international critique of settler colonialism combined with aggressive settler projects undertaken in either passive (South Africa) or active (Japan, Italy) defiance of the League.

And yet, if we attend to the League’s function as an arena for debate and legitimation, we find that even this rhetorical evolution had its consequences, even though it is only after 1945, when a more powerful international organization replaced the failed structures of the League, that those consequences

fully played themselves out. Yet, even between the wars, if the rhetoric of trusteeship and the League's rulings on sovereignty did not prevent South Africa from constructing a settler colony founded on racial hierarchy and white power in Namibia, they did prevent that policy from being normalized as a domestic matter and moved out of the sphere of international scrutiny. In 1945, then, when South Africa refused to conclude a trusteeship agreement with the United Nations and began governing the territory explicitly (and not just implicitly) as a fifth province, these actions could not but be deemed illegitimate, catalyzing international protest and an armed liberation struggle.⁷⁶ In Tanganyika, by contrast, a British establishment sensitive to international opinion found many reasons to adopt that rhetoric of trusteeship; as one might predict, then, while Tanzania suffered from the underdevelopment and neglect that commonly accompanied indirect rule, it was spared the terrible wars that preceded decolonization in Africa's settler colonies. But it is in Palestine, where a diasporic Jewish population succeeded in winning international support for a settler project undertaken under the sign of nationalism, where we find the most complex legacies. League support, followed by United Nations recognition, helped to make that project—and then the state of Israel—legitimate, yet that state remains plagued by the dilemmas faced by any settler polity whose indigenous population has not been removed, assimilated, or overwhelmed. We might think about those dilemmas more intelligently if we think about them comparatively and in their historical context.⁷⁷

Acknowledgment

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Notes

1. Scholars between the two world wars tended to affirm the importance of the mandates system as a model for imperial administration (see note 10 below), but postwar scholars have been more cautious in their assessments. For Roger Louis's insightful posing of that question—did the mandates system actually influence colonial administration?—see his still crucial historiographical essay, "Great Britain and International Trusteeship: The Mandates System," in *The Historiography of the British Empire—Commonwealth: Trends, Interpretations, and Resources*, ed. Robin W. Winks (1966; reprint, Aldershot, England: Gregg Revivals, 1995), esp. 304–11. See also Ralph A. Austen, "Varieties of Trusteeship: African Territories under British and French Mandate, 1919–1939," in *France and Britain in Africa*, ed. Prosser Gifford and Wm. Roger Louis (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), 515–42. More recently, Michael Callahan has argued that the mandates system did alter the practice of European imperialism; see his *Mandates and Empire: The League of Nations and Africa, 1914–1931* (Brighton: Sussex Academic, 1999).
2. George Padmore, *Africa and World Peace* (1937; reprint, London: Frank Cass, 1972), 178, 177. Of course, this had long been E. D. Morel's view as well: as early as 1920 he dismissed the mandatory system as simply an attempt to camouflage "what is substantially a policy of

- imperialistic grab at the expense of the beaten foe"; see Morel, *The Black Man's Burden* (1920; reprint, Northbrook, Ill.: Metro, 1972), 228.
3. For that intellectual genealogy, see especially Kevin Grant, "Trust and Self-Determination: Anglo-American Ethics of Empire and International Government," in *Critiques of Capital in Modern Britain and America: Transatlantic Exchanges*, ed. Mark Bevir and Frank Trentmann (London: Palgrave, 2002), 151–73.
4. For the establishment of rules on petitioning, see LNA Box R60, 1/22099/22099, "Submission to the League of Nations of Petitions from Inhabitants of Mandated Territories. Memorandum by the British Representative on Procedures to be Adopted" (24 July 1922); *Records of the 3rd Assembly*, vol. 1, *Minutes*, Plenary Session, 20 Sept. 1922, 156, 166; and *Minutes of the 23rd session of the Council*, 1st and 5th meetings, 29 and 31 Jan. 1923, *League of Nations Official Journal* 4, no. 3 (1923), 200–201, 211.
5. For the commission's attempt to expand its rights, see LNA Box R60, 1/51258/22099, Permanent Mandates Commission [PMC] 405, "Note by Sir Frederick Lugard on the Procedure with Regard to Memorials or Petitions" (15 May 1926) and PMC 428 (1), "Procedure in Regard to Petitions. Draft Recommendations to the Council Regarding the Hearing of Petitioners. Submitted by M. Rappard" (12 June 1926); PMC, *Minutes*, 9th sess., June 8–25, 1926, 130.
6. *Minutes of the 41st Session of the Council*, 3rd meeting, 3 Sept. 1926, *League of Nations Official Journal* 7, no. 10 (1926): 1233; this episode is also covered in Callahan, *Mandates*, 123–29.
7. PMC, *Minutes*, 15th session, 1–19 July 1929, 77–78.
8. See, e.g., Erez Manela, "The Wilsonian Moment and the Rise of Anticolonial Nationalism: The Case of Egypt," *Diplomacy and Statecraft* 12, no. 4 (2001): 99–122.
9. For Du Bois's initial views, see W. E. Burghardt Du Bois, *The World and Africa* (1946; new ed., New York: International, 1965), 11–14, 236–41; and David Levering Lewis, *W. E. B. Du Bois: The Fight for Equality and the American Century, 1919–1963* (New York: Henry Holt, 2000), 43–48.
10. Rayford Logan, "The Operation of the Mandate System in Africa," *Journal of Negro History* 13, no. 4 (1928): 423–77; Parker Thomas Moon, *Imperialism and World Politics* (New York: Macmillan, 1926), chap. 28; Quincy Wright, *Mandates under the League of Nations* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1930); Raymond Leslie Buell, *International Relations* (1925; rev. ed., New York: Henry Holt, 1929), esp. chaps. 15–16; Raymond Leslie Buell, *The Native Problem in Africa*, 2 vols. (1928; reprint, London: Frank Cass, 1965).
11. Helmut Bley, *Namibia under German Rule* (1968; new ed., Hamburg: Lit, 1996), 249–79.
12. Much has been written on Smuts and the mandates system; see especially William Roger Louis, *Great Britain and Germany's Lost Colonies, 1914–1919* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967), chaps. 3–4; W. K. Hancock, *Smuts: The Sanguine Years, 1870–1919* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962), chaps. 20–21. For Smuts's speech in Windhoek, see *Cape Times*, 18 Sept. 1920, reprint, PMC *Minutes*, 2nd session, 1–11 Aug. 1922, Annex 6, 92–93.
13. For figures on population and landholding, see I. Goldblatt, *History of South West Africa* (Cape Town: Juta, 1971), 165, 200; Ruth First, *South West Africa* (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin, 1963), 247; and especially A. J. Christopher, "Official Land Disposal Policies and European Settlement in Southern Africa, 1860–1960," *Journal of Historical Geography* 9, no. 4 (1983): 371.
14. For the best account of labor and social relations in the mandate period, see Tony Emmett, *Popular Resistance and the Roots of Nationalism in Namibia, 1915–1966* (Basel: P. Schlettwein, 1999); see also Jeremy Silvester, Marion Wallace, and Patricia Hayes, "'Trees Never Meet': Mobility and Containment: An Overview, 1915–1946," 3–48; and Robert J. Gordon, "Vagrancy, Law and 'Shadow Knowledge': Internal Pacification, 1915–1939," 51–76, in *Namibia under South African Rule: Mobility and Containment, 1915–1946*, ed. Patricia Hayes, Jeremy Silvester, Marion Wallace, and Wolfram Hartmann (Oxford: James Currey, 1998).
15. League of Nations Archives, Geneva (hereafter LNA), PMC minutes, 1st session, 7th meeting (7 Oct. 1921), and A.35.1922.VI, PMC, *Observations of the Commission on the Reports Relating to the Territories under C Mandates* (23 Aug. 1922).
16. For an account of the uprising that pays particular attention to the League response, see Gail-Maryse Cockram, *South West African Mandate* (Cape Town: Juta, 1976), 121–63; on the deterioration of the Bondelswarts' living conditions and the causes of the revolt, see Emmett, *Popular Resistance*, 111–24. The most gripping narrative account, if one written

- with considerable imaginative license, is Richard Freislich, *The Last Tribal War: A History of the Bondelszwart Uprising* (Cape Town: C. Struik, 1964).
17. Regarding the use of airplanes see, e.g., Richard Dale, "The Armed Forces as an Instrument of South African Policy in Namibia," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 18, no. 1 (1980): 57–71.
 18. LNA Box R41, File 1/22331/15778, Buxton and Harris to Drummond, 3 Aug. 1922, enclosing "Crushing of the Bondelszwart Rebellion," *African World*, 29 July 1922, 554–55; [John Harris], "A Punitive Expedition under the League of Nations," *New Statesman*, 26 August 1922, 556–57; League of Nations, *Records of the Third Assembly*, Plenary Meetings, vol. 1, *Minutes*, 5 Sept. 1922, 38–39, and 8 Sept. 1922, 76, 81.
 19. A.47.1923.VI, PMC, *Report on the Bondelszwarts Rebellion* (14 Aug. 1923).
 20. C. 550.1923.VI, PMC, *Comments of the Accredited Representative of the Union of South Africa on the Commission's Report on the Bondelszwarts Rebellion*, 23 August 1923.
 21. Fourth Assembly, Plenary Meeting, 26 Sept. 1923, *League of Nations Official Journal*, Special Suppl. No. 13 (Oct. 1923), 92.
 22. *Ibid.*, 92–93.
 23. LNA Box R10, 1/30798/1347, Lugard to Rappard, 7 Sept. 1923.
 24. Minutes of the 27th session of the Council, 13 Dec. 1923, *League of Nations Official Journal* 5, no. 2 (1924): 341.
 25. LNA Box R11, 1/37014/1347, "Statement by Mr. Hofmeyr to the Permanent Mandates Commission," 25 June 1924, 22, 25.
 26. Dr. Conradie, Administrator of South West Africa, in PMC, *Minutes*, 27th session, 3–18 June 1935, 163.
 27. LNA Box R13, 1/59586/1347, *Report of the Government of the Union of South Africa on South West Africa for the Year 1926*.
 28. LNA Box R13, 1/62291/1347, J. S. Smit, South African High Commissioner, to Catastini, 17 Sept. 1927.
 29. PMC, *Minutes*, 14th session, 26 Oct. 13–Nov. 1928, 108–109.
 30. PMC, *Minutes*, 31st session, 31 May–15 June 1937, 123.
 31. PMC, *Minutes*, 11th session, 20 June–6 July 1927, 99.
 32. PMC, *Minutes*, 26th session, 29 Oct.–13 Nov. 1934, 61; PMC, *Minutes*, 27th session, 3–18 June 1935, 158–59.
 33. PMC, *Minutes*, 11th Session, 20 June–6 July 1927, 87–91; LNA Box R13, 1/60492/1347, PMC, "Question of Sovereignty. Note by M. Van Rees," (n.d. [July 1927]); PMC, *Minutes*, 15th session, 1–19 July 1929, 77–78, 294; C.494.1927.VI, Smit to Drummond, 22 Sept. 1927; C.305.M.105.1929.VI, "Comments of Certain Accredited Representatives," Louw to Drummond, 23 July 1929.
 34. Minutes of the 56th session of the Council, 6 Sept. 1929, *League of Nations Official Journal* 10, no. 11 (1929): 1467; Minutes of the 58th session of the Council, 13 Jan. 1930, *League of Nations Official Journal* 11, no. 2 (1930): 69–70; and Annex 1184, 139; Hertzog to Drummond, 13 March 1930, and Hertzog to Drummond, 16 Apr. 1930, *League of Nations Official Journal* 11, no. 7 (1930): 383–89.
 35. PMC, *Minutes*, 26th session, 29 Oct.–12 Nov. 1934, 52.
 36. "Minutes of the 84th session of the Council," *League of Nations Official Journal* 16, no. 2 (1935): 159–60; C.251.M.123.1935.VI, "Comments of Certain Accredited Representatives," Te Water to Secretary-General, 28 June 1935, 239.
 37. Population figures are from LNA PMC Minutes and Documents vol. 1, "Extracts of Report on Tanganyika Territory for the Year 1921" (Geneva: League of Nations, 1922) and Charlotte Leubuscher, *Tanganyika Territory: A Study of Economic Policy under Mandate* (London: Oxford University Press, 1944), 22–25. It should be borne in mind that Tanganyika's total population of over 7.5 million under German rule included the 3.5 million inhabitants of Ruanda-Urundi, which was separated and put under Belgian mandate.
 38. LNA Box R39, 1/29453/15313, *Report on Tanganyika Territory for the Year 1922*, 26–7; Leubuscher, *Tanganyika Territory*, 33.
 39. LNA Box R40, 1/54976/15313, "Resolutions passed by the East Africa Unofficial conference, 1926" (typescript, 1926).
 40. LNA Box R40, 1/51711x/15313, *Report by His Britannic Majesty's Government to the Council of the League of Nations on the Administration of Tanganyika Territory for the Year 1925*, 16.

41. Cameron expounds his philosophy of native administration in *My Tanganyika Service* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1939); see also his "Native Administration" (1925), quoted in PMC, *Minutes*, 9th Session, 8–25 June 1926, 137.
42. D. M. P. McCarthy, "Organizing Underdevelopment from the Inside: The Bureaucratic Economy in Tanganyika, 1919–1940," *International Journal of African Historical Studies* 10, no. 4 (1977): 573–99; John Iliffe, *A Modern History of Tanganyika* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), esp. 321, 326, 356.
43. Early scholars of British rule in Tanganyika note that convergence; see Leubuscher, *Tanganyika Territory*, 169.
44. LNA Box R39, 1/29970/15313, CPM 81 (1), "African Territories under British Mandate" (7 Aug. 1923), 4; Box R40, 1/37084/15313, CPM 161, "Draft Observations on the Administration of Mandated Territories. Tanganyika," (7 July 1924), 4; Box R40, 1/44414/15313, CPM 265, "Draft Observations. Tanganyika," (8 July 1925); C348.M.122.1927.VI, "Report to the Council on the Work of the 11th session" (1927), 5; C.305.M.205.1929.VI, Annex 20, "Report to the Council on the Work of the 15th session" (1929), 298.
45. PMC, *Minutes*, 11th Session, 20 June–6 July 1927, 65.
46. PMC, *Minutes*, 15th session, 1–19 July 1929, 111–12; PMC, *Minutes*, 18th Session, 18 June–1 July 1930, esp. 28–29, 202; PMC, *Minutes*, 22nd session, 3 Nov.–6 Dec. 1932, 131.
47. Sir Charles Strachey, quoted in Iliffe, *Modern History*, 262.
48. Cameron, *My Tanganyika Service*, 20, 85, 88, 232.
49. PMC, *Minutes*, 3rd session, 20 July–10 Aug. 1923, 144.
50. PMC, *Minutes*, 15th session, 1–19 July 1929, 18, 103–6, 109–10; PMC, *Minutes*, 18th session, 18 June–1 July 1930, 27–29.
51. PMC, *Minutes*, 22nd session, 3 Nov.–6 Dec. 1932, 135.
52. PMC, *Minutes*, 23rd session, 19 June–1 July 1933, 46–52.
53. Minutes of the 76th session of the Council, *League of Nations Official Journal* 14, no. 11, part 1 (1933): 1321, 1323.
54. Callahan, *Mandates and Empire*, 177–85.
55. National Archives, Britain, CO 533/456/3, Note by Flood on a report by Kenyan colonial officials on the extent of economic aid given to its white settlers, 6 April 1935.
56. The most important recent revisionist account is Tom Segev, *One Palestine, Complete: Jews and Arabs under the Mandate* (New York: Metropolitan, 2000), but some earlier scholars have also stressed the degree to which British hopes of reconciling their pledge to the Zionists with Arab nationalist interests were always illusory. See, e.g., Bernard Wasserstein, *The British in Palestine: The Mandatory Government and the Arab Jewish Conflict, 1917–1929*, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991).
57. PMC, *Minutes*, 36th session, 8–29 June 1939, 98.
58. PMC, *Minutes*, 5th session, 23 Oct.–6 Nov. 1924, 65; see also William Ormsby-Gore's statement the following year, PMC, *Minutes*, 7th session, 19–30 Oct. 1925, 102.
59. See esp. J. C. Hurewitz, *The Struggle for Palestine* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1950), and Christopher Sykes, *Crossroads to Israel* (London: Collins, 1965).
60. PMC, *Minutes*, 17th session, 3–21 Oct. 1930, esp. 143; PMC, *Minutes*, 32nd session, 30 July–18 Aug. 1937, esp. 228, 232.
61. PMC, *Minutes*, 34th session, 8–23 June 1938, 49–54, 228.
62. PMC, *Minutes*, 36th session, 8–29 June 1939, 196–208, 274–75.
63. Weizmann's lobbying of various PMC members can be traced through his letters; the comment about the British government's sensitivity to his Geneva visits is from Chaim Weizmann to William Rappard, 20 June 1931, in *The Letters and Papers of Chaim Weizmann*, vol. 15 (Jerusalem: Israel Universities Press: 1978), 171.
64. Chaim Weizmann to Vera Weizmann, 19 Oct. 1925, in *Letters and Papers*, vol. 12 (1977), 427.
65. On Theodoli, see Chaim Weizmann to Morris Rothenberg and Emanuel Neumann, 9 Nov. 1924, in *Letters and Papers*, vol. 12 (1977), 249; and Chaim Weizmann to Vera Weizmann, 3 Nov. 1935, in *Letters and Papers*, vol. 17 (1979), 56–57.
66. Nahum Sokolow and Chaim Weizmann to Zionist Bureau, London, telegram, 27 April 1920, in *Letters and Papers*, vol. 9 (1977), 342.
67. PMC, *Minutes*, 17th session, 3–21 June 1930, 82.
68. Chaim Weizmann to Morris Rothenberg and Emanuel Neumann, 9 Nov. 1924, in *Letters and Papers*, vol. 12 (1977), 249.

69. PMC, *Minutes*, 17th session, 3–21 June 1930, 49; Comment by Ormsby-Gore, PMC, *Minutes*, 32nd session, 30 July–18 Aug. 1937, 17.
70. PMC, *Minutes*, 36th session, 8–29 June 1939, 121, 125–27.
71. PMC, *Minutes*, 32nd session, 30 July–18 Aug. 1937, 189–90 (Rappard) and 162–65 (Van Asbeck).
72. PMC, *Minutes*, 36th session, 8–29 June 1939, 121.
73. PMC, *Minutes*, 32nd session, 30 July–18 Aug. 1937, 170.
74. *Ibid.*, 166–67.
75. PMC, *Minutes*, 36th session, 8–29 June 1939, 113.
76. For that later history, see, from very different perspectives, Cockram, *South West Africa Mandate*, and Isaak I. Dore, *The International Mandate System and Namibia* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1985).
77. This work is undertaken most notably in Ian S. Lustick, *Unsettled States, Disputed Lands: Britain and Ireland, France and Algeria, Israel and the West Bank–Gaza* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993).

Part II

Settler Colonialism in Action: Institutions and Practices

Introduction to Part II

After their initial conquest of territories and subsequent deployment of settlers, twentieth-century empires sought to extend and consolidate their control. To this end, they created complex bureaucratic apparatuses that linked the metro-pole to the most remote corners of the colonies and addressed crucial and often interlocking issues like land alienation, labor supply, market conditions, legal codes, and political rights. Once established, settler colonial states were ideally omniscient and omnipotent, with institutions and practices oriented toward the subjugation of local peoples, the reallocation of resources for the benefit of the colonizing power and their settler populations, and the long-term if not permanent expansion (or in the case of Israel, creation) of the nation-state.

Yet the degree to which this ideal was achieved varied widely. In the cases of British and French Africa, where colonial governance was loosely decentralized to start, the settler colonial state was not an autonomous, powerful arbiter but was rather weak and perpetually deficient in funding, manpower, and local knowledge. As a result settler populations and racial divisions became, over time, deeply imbricated not only in the economic enterprises of the colony, but also in the legislative and governing institutions as well. Colonial officials in London and Paris, along with their local administrators on the spot, were therefore constantly trying to negotiate a *modus vivendi* with the settlers (with whom they were mutually dependent) on the one hand, and the indigenous population (with whom they had to establish at least a modicum of legitimacy in order to govern effectively) on the other. In the end, issues pertaining to land, economy, law, and justice came to be largely structured around the needs and demands of the settlers, which were often at odds or at least in tension with the functioning of the colonial state and its ability to maintain control over the local population.

In contrast, the centralized, nationalist agendas of regimes in Japan, Italy, Germany, and to a lesser degree Portugal, created much more of a hands-on approach. Unlike their counterparts in much of Africa, settlers in Korea,

Manchuria, Abyssinia, and Eastern Europe, were hardly an independent political force dictating policy on the ground. Rather, those men and women sent to the far reaches of empire were more akin to local foot soldiers for broader metropolitan agendas. It was these agendas that largely drove the formation and evolution of colonial states whose institutions remained relatively autonomous and were never substantially captured and redirected by settler interests.

The essays in this section explore the dynamic of governance, the privileging of settlers as a category, and the degree to which these processes solidified over time. Carving out a colonial state required an initial degree of coercion, though this show of force had to give way to a systematic set of legal codes oriented toward maintaining the interests of the colonial power and its local settler population. In her essay on early Japanese rule in Korea, Alexis Dudden demonstrates that the colonial legal system, while severe and oriented around the needs of the colonizer, was crucial to establishing the legitimacy of the state. Moreover, in order to rule and further their own agenda, the Japanese, not unlike other colonial powers, depended on local collaborators who linked the state with indigenous society. Jun Uchida's essay on business elites in colonial Korea illustrates this dependency, and the degree to which it shaped and was reshaped by colonial policy and local demands. Nevertheless, violence or the threat of it was always present in settler colonies, as Ivan Evan's essay on the routinization of state violence in South Africa shows. Ultimately, the question of whether or not settler colonialism made fiscal sense was considered by many metropolitan officials at the time, and is explored here by Roger Owen in his essay on the economics of colonization in the Middle East and North Africa.

Colonial governance in settler states was later transformed in the aftermath of the Second World War. In the colonies of Japan, Italy, and Germany, settler experiments came to an abrupt end with the victory of the Allied forces. Conversely, in South Africa the election of D. F. Malan and his Nationalist Party in 1948 consolidated settler power, bringing in an idealized settler state under the banner of apartheid. The remaining settler colonies would come to a violent and protracted end in the years following the war. As Caroline Elkins demonstrates in the final essay, metropolitan governments were forced to step in to support weak states in places like Algeria and Kenya when indigenous populations took up arms; in turn, they were seen as branches of settler interests, fighting to preserve settler privilege and autonomy. In reality, however, colonial officials in Europe began to question the high price of the wars of decolonization and ultimately decided to cut their losses, even in the face of the recalcitrant and sometimes renegade behavior of local settler populations.

Mission Législatrice: Extraterritoriality and Japan's Legal Mission to Korea in the Early Twentieth Century

ALEXIS DUDDEN

Issues of settler colonialism have renewed currency. The government of Zimbabwe, for example, recently began overseeing the total eviction of white farmers from what such farmers describe as “their land.” During the summer of 2002, BBC news aired numerous stories concerning these farmers and quoted men and women with heavy Afrikaner and English accents saying, “We’re not being given one cent, nothing from the government for our property.” At the same time in the post-9/11 United States, it is quite possibly more difficult now to obtain an entry visa, let alone residency papers, than at any time in the nation’s history of issuing such documents.

These examples are illuminating, for the countries mentioned—Zimbabwe and the United States—in many respects embodied the ideal concept and practice of settler colonization. They were places imagined where “anyone” could begin life, or begin it again. Often such imaginings erased the possibility of anybody else living there. Thus, when so-called natives appeared in reality, settlers believed they had a right to remove them. Colonial regimes could also back up those powers by forging and deploying agreements with the countries from which settlers came, agreements that were sanctioned by the international order. Issues currently facing the United States and Zimbabwe thus compellingly draw attention to the power and contingency of laws underwriting colonizing beginnings, laws that enabled some people to move to new places and claim a right to be there in the first place.

The laws that gave some people rights to settle abroad and claim that territory as their own in ideal settlements such as Zimbabwe also operated in more complicated places—complicated to the colonizer, that is—such as Vietnam and Korea. In places such as Peru or Australia, colonizers did not pause to think before conquering. This chapter, however, examines instead why some colonial

regimes—Japan, in this particular case—created elaborate systems of extraterritoriality to justify their claims to be there.

Extraterritorial settlements were often the precursors to mass settlement. They were spaces carved into foreign territory and shared by the first waves of alien soldiers, merchants, and missionaries, as well as their human cargo of slaves, prostitutes, and others. Sometimes they led to seemingly innocuous developments, such as permanent embassy buildings and consulates, a condition especially true of places not seen as immediately or even desirably colonizable, like Japan itself. But in others areas, such as Egypt, Algeria, Hawaii, Korea, or Vietnam, officials went to elaborate lengths to maintain extraterritorial enclaves only to end up claiming the country entirely as their own. These latter histories bring into relief the importance to colonizing powers of mutually referential legal forms—forms crucial in such places to future settlement.

The importance of Japan's practice of extraterritoriality in Korea and its relationship to the trajectory of Japanese settlement there (1876–1945) lies in how Japanese officials eradicated extraterritorial privileges for other aspirant colonizers of Korea. In 1876 Japan opened Korea in a self-styled mimic of the United States' 1853 opening of Japan, establishing extraterritorial privileges for its nationals there much as the United States had done in Japan. Within less than a decade other colonial powers secured the same privileges for themselves in Korea, privileges these nations wound up abrogating, however, shortly after Japan's annexation of Korea in 1910. At that point, the United States, England, France, Germany, Belgium, and Italy submitted their nationals to the laws of Japan's Korea. By making Korea an uncontested space of Japanese control, therefore, the Japanese government established firm ground for settlers from the "mainland" (as Japan was known in reference to Korea in the early twentieth century) to come to Korea to begin new lives. This chapter considers how Japanese officials created such conditions in the first place, exploring how their efforts structured Japanese rule and shaped settler identity.

When discussing the history of Japan's empire in a comparative forum, it is vital to remember a key difference between Japan's imperialist past and that of other colonizing nations: other imperial nations eyed Japan just as Japan was laying the foundations for its own overseas empire. Japan's early history of colonial expansion becomes an invaluable means by which to understand the international workings of colonizing politics during the era of the "Great Game." Put differently, for Japan, empire was a reflexive enterprise in all its forms from small-scale extraterritorial encroachments abroad to the planned emigration of millions of Japanese to Hokkaido, Okinawa, Sakhalin, Taiwan, Korea, Manchuria, and elsewhere. That "reflexivity" did not mean, however, that Japan needed permission from England, France, or the United States to colonize Asia, but rather that Japan's leaders needed to write contracts with these other nations in mutually understood and referential terms. Japan's empire made sense, and

Japanese settlement made sense, because Japanese state aggrandizers explained their policies in terms used by the other colonizing nations.

Examining how Japanese colonizers made Korea appear to be a place where the civilized Japanese colonizer (in the terms of the day) implemented so-called enlightened law reveals the significance of this process to Japan's securing Korea as its own.¹ The international politics of imperialism taught Japan's Meiji era (1868–1912) aggrandizers that they should establish new legal codes in Korea in order to gain full legitimacy there as an enlightened exploiter. At least they ought to convey a desire and a plan to do so in international terms. Simply put, Japan needed to demonstrate that it had embarked on a legislating mission—a *mission législatrice*—to Korea.

The annexation of Korea in 1910 expanded the dimensions of Japanese settlement there, but the international community had already declared its admiration for Japan's legal mission to Korea. While Korea was still a protectorate in 1907, the Japanese colonial regime took over its judiciary, and reports from London affirmed that “[this] measure aims at securing life and property in Korea by substituting pure and competent tribunals of justice for the present and unskilled law Courts.”² A noteworthy hurdle arose at the time for the Japanese administration in Seoul. With Japan legally legislating Korea, the question arose whether what were sometimes awkwardly called “foreign foreigners”—Americans, English, French, and so forth—would recognize Japan as *their* “pure and competent” ruler too, or would continue to demand their long-standing privileges of extraterritoriality. Would they need to be judged differently from the Japanese, who were beginning to move in increasing numbers to Korea?

Japanese legal and state theorists knew that if the foreign foreigners maintained such restrictions in Korea, the so-called powers would, in effect, *not* be recognizing Japan's rule in full and might, in turn, end up competing with Japanese settlers for privileges and property there. In 1882 the United States had signed the Shufeldt Treaty with Korea, promising that once Korean judicial procedure and codes “conformed to the laws of the United States” it would eradicate special privileges for its nationals there.³ The United States, therefore, held a particularly important role in determining the reach of Japan's control over its colonial prize. Japan's demonstration to other colonizing nations—especially the United States—of the laws its legal missionaries established in Korea cemented Japan's control of Korea as its own, a place for Japanese “mainlanders” to settle as their own.

Significantly, before Japan established extraterritoriality in Korea, Meiji politicians and legal theorists discovered that as long as extraterritorial spaces existed for foreigners within Japan, the country did not rank as a full sovereign state. It is therefore instructive briefly to consider the eradication of extraterritoriality in Japan itself. One particular aspect of this process was ubiquitous in colonizing experiences around the world. Put briefly, the perceptions of a country's criminal codes ultimately determined how levels of civilization were

measured, even though laws concerning property ownership—rights that fall under the purview of civil codes—were chiefly at stake.

At the turn of the twentieth century, the few remaining threads of Euro-American extraterritoriality in Japan pertained to civil codes, particularly business practices. Yet the demand in the 1850s to implement and sustain extensive extraterritorial privileges stemmed from the colonizing gaze at Japan's criminal and penal codes. Merchants and travelers from Europe and the United States were horrified, for example, to see the heads of executed criminals displayed on stakes, failing to remember that the threat of their countries' cannon-laden ships kept them safe. It was always easier for imperialist sojourners or settlers to judge the "uncivilized" as "barbaric," "unchristian," or "cannibalistic" and forget the large-scale violence that accompanied and privileged their own movement.

In the 1870s and 1880s, the Japanese government's French legal adviser, Gustave Boissonade, concocted a formula to bring an end to the extraterritorial restrictions imposed on Japan by the United States and various European countries. Arriving in Tokyo in 1873, Boissonade began working on the country's criminal codes, drawing up a system of laws and procedures based largely on his country's 1810 Napoleonic Codes. He first laid out a mandate for the Japanese government: the Meiji regime must immediately abolish the practice of torturing prisoners in Japan or the "Western powers" would not think of abolishing their privileges of extraterritoriality there. Boissonade could not have been more axiomatic in his explanation. On April 15, 1875, he wrote Minister of Justice Ōki Takato, "Mortifying scenes occur every day [in the prison] without any attempt to conceal them. This takes place next to a school of law, opposite the offices of the Ministry of Justice—as if these acts were not contrary to law and justice itself. . . . Should I not be apprised of some Imperial Act to amend this outrage against humanity and slight to reason, I shall have to leave the Ministry of Justice."⁴

A month later, Boissonade presented the unresponsive Ōki with an ultimatum that should the Japanese government not cease torturing prisoners in the country's jails immediately, he would leave the country. Continuing the practice of torture was contrary to Japan's interests, he wrote, because the Meiji regime "promised [the European ministers it] would abolish torture. Until this is accomplished, Japan cannot pretend to begin serious negotiations about obtaining jurisdiction over foreigners."⁵ The emperor then limited the randomness with which torture could be used, and in 1879 Japan formally abolished the practice. Like other advisors to the Meiji government, Boissonade viewed Japan as a promising student but made it clear that some bodies were still more civilized—less colonizable—than others. French bodies would not succumb to Japanese law until such law—and by extension the country—could be considered civilized on their terms.

Boissonade's reputation as the "father of modern Japanese law" stems from his personal integration into Meiji modernization. In a thousand-page document on Japan's new criminal procedure published in 1882, he envisaged the logical evolution of Japan's efforts at self-civilizing, commenting, "For our part, in drafting this Schemata for the criminal Codes and also for the civil Codes, we have persevered and held in view as our main objective the preparation of the complete independence of Japan with respect to Jurisdiction. By introducing these Laws, we have accomplished this. At the same time, under our Tutelage, we have instilled principles of justice and natural reason which are the honor of modern times and which remove all plausible grounds, even all pretexts, for Extraterritoriality."⁶ Should Boissonade's efforts bear fruit as he thought they would, he conceded that even civilized bodies could be confident that they would be treated with the "honor of modern times." Extraterritoriality would be unnecessary.

Under Boissonade's tutelage Japan's new codes blended into the universal standard of civilization. Elaborating upon this point to justify why the existence of the new codes in Japan would rightly necessitate the eradication of extraterritoriality he wrote, "Moreover, if these new Codes are destined one day to be applied to foreigners residing in Japan, it is good that they are not of an overly particular national character. It is good that they offer, above all, a sort of common international law, sheltered from traditional prejudices and systematical criticism and from which nations, except on occasion, are no longer exempt."⁷ His self-importance aside, Boissonade worked to bring about the end of the degrading restrictions in Japan. His readers in Europe or America could feel that their nations were safe to disband their extralegal zones in Japan because familiar terms and practices now prevailed.

Boissonade educated numerous Japanese legal scholars both in the classroom and as they helped prepare Japanese translations of his codes. They and their students became members of Japan's legalizing mission to Korea in the first decade of the twentieth century. Their work proved vital in shaping the environment into which hundreds of thousands of Japanese eventually found themselves settling in Korea.⁸

Anthropologist Bernard Cohn's assessment of British views of law in India could just as easily illustrate Japanese descriptions of Korea, and it merits quoting at length:

Although it was recognized that there was "law" in India, that "law" was believed to be different from the European kind ... [T]he model of the Mughal-Indian political system was absolute and arbitrary power, unchecked by any institution, social or political, and resting in the person of the emperor, with property and honors derived solely from the will of the despotic ruler. ... Justice was dependent not on the rule of law but on the rule of men, who could be influenced by money, status, and exercise

in their office of judge. The idea that India had been ruled by “despots” was revalorized in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries as one of several ruling paradigms that formed the ideological infrastructure of British rule in India. In its cleaned-up version it was expressed thus: Indians are best ruled by a “strong hand,” who could administer justice in a rough-and-ready fashion unfettered by rules and regulations. Their courts, their procedures, their regulations, and the propensity of Indians to perjury and the suborning of witnesses only served to delay justice.⁹

The Japanese colonizers in Korea paralleled Cohn’s British colonizers by denouncing “*their courts, their procedures, their regulations*” and thus removing themselves to a position that mandated that the Koreans were eminently colonizable in Japan’s new “pure and competent tribunals of justice.”¹⁰

After Japan’s 1907 takeover of Korea’s legal system, Japanese officials advertised civilizing aims to an international audience. One way they did this was with the English-language 1907 *Report on Reforms and Progress in Korea*, which was self-consciously styled after British and French colonial reports. “The historical conditions” prevailing in Korea at the time initial treaties with foreign powers were signed, Japan instructed its international readers, made it “quite natural that civilized nations should have wished to make their consular jurisdiction as extensive as possible.”¹¹ “The Koreans,” the report insisted,

had little or no conception of private rights as were understood elsewhere in the Orient. Thus such maladministration existed for a long time that public officials were accustomed to pay only scant respect to the private rights of the people, and the latter, on their side, dared not complain against official extortion. In short, civil law guaranteeing private rights had practically no existence ... [J]udges and procurators, being utterly deficient in legal knowledge and training, often delivered wrong judgments ... Prison administration as heretofore carried out in Korea is a matter almost too unsavory to describe. The most common forms of punishment were beating, imprisonment, and confinement in the stocks. The Penal Code is full of directions for administering floggings, which were often so severe as to render the victim crippled for life, if he did not die under the infliction.¹²

The report pointed, however, to “the progressive tide of reforms” that Japan’s legal missionaries were now putting into place as reason for a “greatly diminished” need for alarm. Foreign foreigners could soon be sure of their safety, and once Korea was perceived to be as civilized as Japan, the space was secure for Japanese settlement to proceed aggressively.

The *Report* thus reflected what had been taking place in Japanese descriptions of the situation in Korea for some time, particularly in the legal profession’s newspaper, the *Hōritsu Shinbun*. The indigenization of Japan’s legal mission abroad confirms how the idea of colonization was naturalized in political practice

by the late Meiji period. By extension, then, it is possible to resurrect the horizon lines Japanese state aggrandizers envisioned for the future expansion of Japan, parameters that Japanese settlers would ultimately inhabit.

Japan's legal professionals deployed enlightenment thinker Fukuzawa Yukichi's 1885 mandate to "leave Asia" to learn civilized ways, but returned at the beginning of the twentieth century bearing civilization back to the continent.¹³ Articles in the jurists' newspaper, although aimed at a specialized audience, described the activities of Japanese lawyers, judges, and professors there. And while the paper maintained an elite readership, subscribers were spread throughout Japan, and included people working in regional courts who would eventually be involved in the settlement project.

The overall tone of the *Hōritsu Shinbun* established the maturity of the Japanese legal system—and particularly the criminal justice system—through comparison with Korean forms. Articles that appeared during the spring of 1905, for example, described Korea's execution practices: "In Korea, a country with which we have friendly and close relations, even now in the civilized twentieth century people are beheaded like pigs."¹⁴ By the time of this article's publication in May 1905, hanging had been standard procedure in Japan for three decades. Another article described how prisoners lived in wretched tiny cells, and "according to Korean law repeat theft [meant] the death penalty."¹⁵ Reporters of conditions in Korea—as well as those in Taiwan and mainland China—had no desire to remind readers of not-so-old practices in Japan because the country's current methods were apparently common sense.

Japanese legal missionaries to Korea publicized the wide range of their efforts to readers at home. Calling the legal missionaries "the judicial reform advance party (*senpatsu*)" the paper reported Japan's creation of 125 courts and 9 prisons in Korea—all *before* annexation, and noted how Japanese worked together with Koreans to rewrite codes, convening the Korean Judiciary Friendship Association (Kankoku Hōsō Konwakai) in the process. By 1909, Korea made legal sense both in Japan and abroad. Korean courts now operated according to the European defined "three-tiered trial system" (*sanshin seidō*), and the new judiciary broke down as follows:

Table 7.1 Korean Judiciary, 1908

	Japanese	Korean	Total
Judges	116	66	182
Prosecutors	46	12	58
Chief Clerks	4	0	4
Clerks	153	141	294
Translation Department	4	0	4
Interpreters	18	49	67

Source: *Hōritsu Shinbun*, August 5, 1909.

Not surprisingly, the proportion of Japanese to Koreans favored the colonizers, but nonetheless, under the workings of the new system, a third of the men working as judges were Korean.

Significantly, however, the legal “advance party” established different codes and practices for the Japanese and the Koreans. In particular, the new “enlightened laws” sustained the practice of torturing (flogging) Korean prisoners, a decision that had very obvious benefits for the colonizing regime and, ultimately, for the privileged position that Japanese settlers would soon occupy. In August 1909—a full year before official colonization—criminal code reformer Kuratomi Yuzaburō wrote a lengthy article for the Japanese press on the Korean judicial system.¹⁶ Japanese and Korean officials had worked in harmony to reform and rebuild the Korean system, he insisted, simultaneously incorporating Japanese-led reform into Korean history and criticizing the “failure” of earlier Korean “judicial efforts to protect individual rights.”¹⁷ In order to develop Koreans’ legal sensibility, Kuratomi explained that the law would uphold flogging Korean prisoners as a necessary practice.

How was flogging justified? In an emotional attack against Japanese colonial rule written in 1921, Korean immigrant to San Francisco Henry Chung argued that the Japanese continually “justified the use of flogging ... by claiming it was an ‘old Korean custom.’”¹⁸ And although Japanese censorship laws severely restricted information, Edward Baker has upheld the charge, demonstrating that torturing Korean prisoners in Japanese-run jails not only remained a practice throughout the colonial period but became, as he archly phrased it, a “policy objective.”¹⁹ According to Baker, “Flogging was an extremely cruel form of punishment. Victims suffered as many as ninety strokes on the buttocks with a bamboo rod while tied in a prone position. ... In a number of cases, death resulted. The total number of people flogged between 1913 and 1920 has been estimated to be as high as 600,000. According to official figures (Japanese printed), of the 83,128 people (Korean) subjected to summary judgment proceedings in 1912 and 1913, 38,397 were flogged.”²⁰ In keeping with the Japanese colonial administration’s decision to hire Koreans as judges and lawyers, the penal system employed a large number of locals as well [see Table 7.2]. With such a healthy ratio of Koreans working in the jails, a Japanese warden would always have had a Korean jailer available to flog a Korean inmate, ingraining the claim that flogging was an “old Korean custom” as demonstrable fact and memory. And, indeed, settlers later viewed Koreans as less than human for carrying out such practices.

With torture outlawed for Japanese and foreign foreigners, however, the *Hōritsu Shinbun* could claim that “if [Japan] took the initiative and repealed [extraterritorial] rights the United States and the others would not be able to countermand.”²¹ This commentator defined the success of Japan’s *mission législatrice* in Korea as a process of “making them assimilate to us.”²² The belief that extraterritoriality should and could be abandoned in Korea even before the

Table 7.2 Korean Prisons, 1908

	Japanese	Korean	Total
Wardens	8	0	8
Head Jailers	31	8	39
Interpreters	0	8	8
Prison Doctors	3	0	3
Part-Time Doctors	5	0	5
Part-Time Priest	1	0	1
Part-time Pharmacist	1	0	1
Jailers	151	160	311
Superintendent, Women's Jail	2	0	2
Part-Time Superintendent, Women's Jail	1	0	1

Source: *Hōritsu Shinbun*, August 5, 1909.

annexation took place expressed in international terms a general opinion that Korea was legitimately Japan's for the taking.

Revealingly, perceptions of criminal due process and the eradication of the practice of torture influenced the foreign foreigners' ultimate decision to recognize Japanese law as legal in Korea, just as Boissonade had predicted in the 1870s. After Terauchi Masatake and Yi Wanyong sealed the Treaty of Annexation between Japan and Korea in August 1910, Japanese and Koreans were theoretically ruled by the same laws in Korea, but in order for Japan to be recognized as the legal ruler of Korea, it needed to incorporate the foreign foreigners into their terms of law there as well.

Korea was now a part of Japan, and any agreements that Korea had made with other nations were "invalid," the Japanese government explained in a memorandum issued immediately after the treaty. "All foreigners residing in Korea [were now] subject to Japanese jurisdiction."²³ Although the Koreans were not redefined as Japanese, legally Japanese were no longer foreign, and settlement from the mainland could proceed smoothly. Thomas O'Brien, the U.S. ambassador to Japan (and now de facto ambassador to Korea as well) requested a more detailed explanation and was assured by Foreign Minister Komura Jutarō that Japan's legal reforms meant that in all cases involving foreigners "the organization of the competent Courts and the qualifications of the sitting Judges, are essentially the same as in Japan Proper."²⁴ No foreign power formalized Japan's assertion of legal control over foreign subjects or citizens, yet none protested.

The incident known in Japanese as the conspiracy to assassinate the governor general Terauchi and in Korean as the 105 Persons Incident forced the question of extraterritoriality onto the world stage. In the autumn of 1911, the governor general began a draconian investigation into an ostensible attempt on his life

that had occurred the previous December. Although hundreds of Koreans were imprisoned, tortured, and in some cases beaten to death, the whole affair would probably have remained unnoticed—as similar police actions most likely did—if Terauchi's investigation had not implicated a number of American Presbyterian missionaries. The foreign foreignness—the white foreignness—of some of the suspects turned the affair into an international incident.

Reports of what was deemed a conspiracy emerged erratically. It is important to note, however, that as public interest grew, the American consul in Seoul, George Skidmore, made it clear that the United States had already begun to acquiesce in Japan's control of Korea. The editor of the *Japan Weekly Chronicle*, Robert Young, recognized this fact when he wrote that if the government failed to protest the arrest of an American missionary named George McCune, it would have "in default" to recognize the abolition of extraterritoriality. This would mean that Japan was justified in abolishing extraterritoriality without any prior consultation with the governments that exercised such rights in Korea.²⁵ And in fact, the United States consul did recognize Japan's claims in part by preventing the Americans from asserting extraterritorial privileges.

Several entries in Governor General Terauchi's journal from the time confirm that the U.S. representative in Seoul wanted the missionaries to resolve the matter without official intervention.²⁶ In early 1912, for example, Terauchi noted that he had met with "foreign" missionaries without any official representation. Several weeks later he wrote that he "promised to meet with foreign missionaries,"²⁷ which he did by sending them a letter guaranteeing the legality of the investigation, which read in part,

Since the introduction of the new regime, the old procedure has been done away with, the persons under examination are now treated in the modern way. ... If you take into consideration the hours required of each person for careful examination, especially for interpretation, you will easily understand that the process is not at all unusual. Meanwhile, I may assure you that the authorities concerned under my provision would faithfully perform their duties entrusted to them by law, so that justice may be done to every body. You may rest assured therefore that if anyone is punished, it is only after he has been proven guilty of a crime by a fair trial.²⁸

Terauchi's police were, however, less polite, ransacking missionaries' houses and digging up their yards.²⁹ The missionaries again appealed to Skidmore, holding him responsible for the searches and insisting that "as American citizens our lives are in your hands for anything that may come from imprisonment."³⁰ The consul retorted, however, that Terauchi's men had acted legally, since the missionaries lived in the interior of the country, beyond the zone still covered by extraterritorial protection. Clearly, the U.S. government did not regard the investigation of a missionary or two—on sedition charges against

a foreign regime nonetheless—worth risking any of its commercial privileges. By depriving its citizens of consular protection, the United States in effect sanctioned Japan's takeover of Korea.

Although Skidmore hoped to resolve the incident quietly, the American missionaries wrote and telegraphed friends and colleagues at home to tell them of their plight. Appalled by the Japanese judges' and prosecutors' disregard for the Korean defendants and their lawyers, people such as former Harvard University president Charles Eliot became involved and traveled to Tokyo to express dismay to the Japanese government and emperor. In early September, Eliot wrote to his friend Arthur Judson Brown, secretary of the Presbyterian Board of Foreign Missions (PBFM) in New York about his efforts:

After I got to Tokio [*sic*], and while the preliminary investigation was still going on, I had several conversations with eminent Japanese about the treatment of the accused Christian Koreans. The two points I endeavored to make were, first, that no American would believe on any Korean evidence that a single American missionary was in the slightest degree concerned with the alleged conspiracy; and, secondly, that the Japanese preliminary police investigation ought to be modified, and particularly, that the counsel for the defense ought always to be present during all stages of the preliminary investigation. Counsel for the defense might or might not take part in the proceeding, but should be invariably present. *I represented that the standing of Japan among Western nations might be improved by judicious modifications of her preliminary proceedings against alleged criminals.*³¹

Speaking on behalf of the "Western nations" in favor of the Christian Koreans, Eliot made it clear that to perceive of Japan as a legal nation critically extended to activity in its empire.

During the summer of 1912, as reports of the Seoul District Court proceedings reached New York, Brown decided to voice the PBFM's concerns at the official level. He and four other religious leaders went to Washington to meet with the Japanese ambassador, U.S. President William Howard Taft, and U.S. Secretary of State Philander Chase Knox. "We did not go to Washington to ask for the intervention of our Government," Brown explained; "The trial of the accused Koreans is still in progress and no proof has been furnished that the treaty rights of our missionaries as American citizens have been denied, although the missionary work there has been seriously embarrassed. Officially, therefore, the question at its present stage concerns the dealings of the Japanese Government with its own subjects, and, of course, our Government would not feel that this called for interference through diplomatic channels."³²

The sentencing of the 105 "conspirators" in late September, however, propelled PBFM leaders to act with more resolve, and they called an emergency meeting for October 11, 1912. The list of "guests" at the Confidential

Conference on the Situation in Korea at a men's club in New York City names powerful and powerfully connected men whom the U.S. government could not ignore, including New York Mayor Seth Low, former U.S. Secretary of State John W. Foster, Yale University President Arthur Hadley, *Outlook* magazine editor Lyman Abbott, Eliot (now back from Tokyo), and others.³³ This group resolved to negotiate directly with the Japanese ambassador to the United States, Chinda Sutemi, on the grounds that "the course of the Japanese police and the first trial of the accused Koreans did not do justice to the real spirit and purpose of the Japanese Government and people in dealing with their subjects in Korea."³⁴ Yet even as they registered their displeasure over what appeared to all as a lawless trial, these men acknowledged that Japan had legally gained control of Korea. Just as the American consul wanted to protect commercial privileges, so too did the religious coalition want to guarantee proselytizing privileges. Despite challenging the Japanese colonial regime's desire to police its new territory, the men's resolution implied that the missionaries would work quietly within the prevailing system.

The following month Brown published a strongly worded essay on the Terauchi affair, ironically coining what would become the Japanese historiographical appellation of the event, the "Korean Conspiracy Case."³⁵ As Boissonade had in his 1882 commentary, Brown asserted that he spoke for "the civilized world." The conspiracy trial had raised "some grave questions in which western peoples are deeply concerned," and if it was true that "from the viewpoint of international law and diplomatic intercourse, these questions primarily relate to Japan's treatment of its own subjects ... it is also true that it may be said of nations, as of individuals, that 'none of us liveth to himself'. Mankind has passed the stage where it is indifferent to what any Government does to a subject race."³⁶ Regardless of the fact that international law presumed its own legality because its terms were practiced under God, in the activist missionary's estimation the voice of the apostle Paul overruled this particular mundane theory. Brown ended up defining Japan as a full practitioner of international terms, terms he considered subordinate to a higher Christian law.

Like Boissonade, Brown prescribed a specific method by which Japan could escape international denigration, taking up Eliot's suggestion that "judicious modifications of [Japan's] preliminary proceedings against alleged criminals" would raise "the standing of Japan among Western nations."³⁷ "Japan wishes to be considered one of the most advanced nations of the world," Brown elaborated, "and if it expects to be regarded as such, it should so amend its criminal law that it can withstand criticism that is based not on a technical difference of method but on that essential justice which mankind has come to demand even from the lowest of men."³⁸ In effect, the American Secretary of the PBFM challenged the governor general of Korea to display "essential justice" to "the civilized world" to secure Japan's status as one among the "most advanced nations of the world."

Before the 1910 annexation, Japan's legal scions laid the foundations for the colonizer's display of its "pure and competent" rule of Korea. Many in Japan and abroad, however, determined a gross mishandling of justice at the first trial in the Seoul District Court in 1912. Yet the display of justice performed at the subsequent appeals trials in Seoul and Taegu legitimated Japan's rule of Korea in international terms.

Most important, if perhaps most incorrect, is that observers came away believing that the use of torture was a thing of the past. Japanese judges, prosecutors, and defenders presented their lawful regime to brightly lit courtrooms full of spectators at the appeals proceedings. Defense lawyers had complained that there was a consistent lack of Korean translation during the first trial, so the governor general's office now provided ample interpretation. What witnesses judged, however, was not merely the English, but the legal terminology accorded to civilized practice—that is, the significance of the legal terminology surpassed the particular language in which it was spoken. The reflexively understood proceedings proclaimed the legitimate universality of Japan's rule in Korea. The first appeals proceedings lasted until March 1913, when the court upheld the long-term sentences of six defendants but acquitted the remaining ninety-nine accused. Even Robert Young's *Japan Weekly Chronicle*, which had so strongly condemned the governor general and U.S. complicity the year before, now proclaimed itself "satisfied to congratulate the Seoul Court of Appeal on having wiped away a very large blot which threatened to discredit the Japanese judicial administration in the eyes of the world for a generation."³⁹ Shortly thereafter, on April 21, 1913, other colonizing nations erased what extraterritorial privileges they had not yet ceded.⁴⁰

The relationship between the external perception of internal justice and the practice of torture surfaced acutely during those appeals proceedings.⁴¹ The defense based its appeal on the violent manner in which the governor general's policemen had obtained the prosecution's evidence. It sought to overturn all 105 sentences because lawyers argued that the convicted men made their confessions under torture. Judges Hara Masakane, Maruyama Etarō, and Suzuki Kumisaburo opened the appeals proceedings on the first day by calling Yun Chiho before the bench. In response to their interrogation, Yun stated simply in fluent Japanese that he had lied to police the previous spring when he was in jail because he was "tortured."⁴² The next "conspirator," Kim Ilchom, proclaimed through an interpreter that he told wild lies during the initial trial at the Seoul District Court because torture had caused him to be "delirious."⁴³

By the appeal trial's second day, November 27, 1912, the defense team's strategy was clear. When the judges questioned Yi Yonghwa, he detailed how Terauchi's police procured their evidence. As a reporter from the *Japan Weekly Chronicle* described the scene, "Yi Yong-wha was called. He is a stout, good-looking man with a moustache. He is a great orator and is said to be more

skillful in his own defense than any lawyer. He spoke so eagerly as to enlist the sympathy even of those who did not understand Korean.”⁴⁴

Countering the charges against him, Yi asserted that his jailers tortured him at length: they beat him, starved him for days, strung him up by his fingers, burned him, and injected unknown fluids into his body.⁴⁵ Yi’s testimony set the stage for subsequent defendants to detail their experiences, which they did throughout the proceedings’ fifty-one hearings. Unlike the first trial at the Seoul District Court the previous summer, in which the defense lawyers had often met the accused moments before the trial, at the appeals trial the prisoners’ attorneys met with the defendants beforehand to discuss what they would say. Moreover, the defense fostered an environment in the courtroom that encouraged the accused to report, for example, having been “hung from a tree with a sword thrust at neckpoint” and to describe death threats issued to his family members.⁴⁶ One prisoner, Yi Pyŏngje, gave a particularly vivid account. He described how Terauchi’s police tied his thumbs together behind his back and then suspended him by his thumbs. After further beatings and burnings with cigarettes, the police covered Yi’s face with paper, poured freezing water over him, and left him to hang outdoors, at times beating him with a block of wood.⁴⁷

The prisoners’ testimony shocked Japanese and foreign trial spectators and newspaper readers alike. Yet knowing that they presided over a trial that displayed the “essential justice” of the colonial legal system in Korea to the “civilized world,” the Japanese prosecutors never mentioned that Terauchi’s police tortured the prisoners in accordance with the law, torture being legal for native offenders. It was not necessary to explain the distinction. After all, the previous March, the governor general had officially upheld certain torture practices in the penal codes for use against Koreans. Anyone interested could read the rationale in English in the colonial regime’s annual report, which stated, “Flogging being a form of punishment practised in Korea for ages past, it seemed likely to be more effective as a measure of punishment for trifling offences than short imprisonment or small fines, provided it was done in a proper manner. Consequently it was decided to retain it, but only for application to native offenders.... The method of infliction was also improved so that, by observing greater humanity, unnecessary pain in carrying out a flogging could be avoided as far as possible.”⁴⁸ Despite the far-reaching implications of the Japanese government’s action, the ninety-nine overturned convictions largely satisfied the trial’s international observers that “pure and competent” justice had come to Korea.

The coverage of the so-called conspiracy proceedings coupled with the missionaries’ satisfaction that the Japanese colonial regime legitimately ruled Korea underscore the partiality of external perceptions of a particular regime’s internal execution of justice. In fact, Governor General Terauchi legally encoded torture for Koreans. In an open courtroom, Korean prisoners described the

horrors they endured—horrors that bespoke the animus toward Koreans felt by many Japanese colonizers then and of settlers to come. Nonetheless, representatives of other colonizing nations recognized the legality of Japan's display and openly abrogated their privileges of consular jurisdiction a month after the first appeals trial ended. The world determined Japan's rule of Korea fully legal and available for however Japan wished to use the country.

Notes

1. Chulwoo Lee, "Modernity, Legality, and Power in Korea under Japanese Rule," in *Colonial Modernity in Korea*, ed. Gi-Wook Shin and Michael Robinson (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999), 35, makes the necessary point that while much historiography points out the one-sidedness of Japan's "modernization" of Korea's legal system, "it does not take issue with the modernization of the legal form itself."
2. *Times* (London), July 29, 1907.
3. The Shufeldt Treaty, 1882, quoted in His Imperial Japanese Majesty's Residency General, ed., *The Annual Report for Reforms and Progress in Korea, 1907*, 28.
4. Gustave Boissonade to Ōki Takato, April 15, 1875, in *Notes des Correspondances avec Monsieur Boissonade* (Tokyo: Hosei University, 1978), 32.
5. Gustave Boissonade to Ōki Takato, in *Notes*, 43.
6. Gustave Boissonade, *Projet de Code de Procédure Criminelle Pour L'Empire du Japon Accompagné d'un Commentaire* (Paris: Ernest Thorin, 1882), xvi.
7. *Ibid.*, xiii.
8. In 1910, there were 171,543 legally registered Japanese in Korea; in 1942, there were 752,823. See Okurasho Kanrikyoku, ed., *Nihonjin no Kaigai Katsudō ni Kan suru Rekishiteki Chōsa* (1947; reprint Seoul: Koryo, 1995), 8.
9. Bernard S. Cohn, *Colonialism and Its Forms of Knowledge: The British in India* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996), 63–65.
10. *Annual Report on Reforms and Progress in Korea*, 27.
11. *Ibid.*
12. *Ibid.*, 22–25; 28.
13. For a discussion of Fukuzawa's views of Korea in the 1880s, see Kinefuchi Nobuo, *Fukuzawa Yukichi to Chōsen: Jiji Shinbun Shasetsu o Chūshin shi* (Tokyo: Sairyusha, 1997).
14. *Hōritsu Shinbun*, May 15, 1905; May 25, 1905.
15. *Hōritsu Shinbun*, May 15, 1905.
16. The *Hōritsu Shinbun* printed the fullest version of Kuratomi's essay and referenced the segments that the other papers had published as well; *Hōritsu Shinbun*, August 5, 1909; see also the *Tōyō Jihō*, and *Osaka Mainichi*.
17. *Hōritsu Shinbun*, August 5, 1909.
18. Henry Chung, *The Case for Korea* (New York: Fleming H. Revell, 1921), 74.
19. Edward J. Baker, "The Role of Legal Reforms in the Japanese Annexation and Rule of Korea, 1905–1919" (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Occasional Paper, 1979), 32; Lee, "Modernity," 31–34.
20. Baker, "Legal Reforms," 32.
21. *Hōritsu Shinbun*, July 20, 1909.
22. *Ibid.*
23. *Kankoku Heigō ni Kansuru Sengen*, August 29, 1910, *Nihon gaikō nempyō oyobi shūyō monjo* [NGNSM] 341.
24. Komura Jutarō to Thomas O'Brien, collected in *Ilbon Oemusong t'uksu chosa munso* (Seoul: Koryō Sōrim, 1989), 729.
25. *The Japan Weekly Chronicle*, February 29, 1912.
26. Yamamoto Shiro, ed., *Terauchi Masatake Nikki, 1900–1919* (Kyoto: Kyoto Joshi Daigaku, 1980), 525.
27. *Ibid.*, 527.
28. Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia [henceforth cited as PHS], Board of Foreign Missions, Presbyterian Church in the United States of America (1912), *The Korean Conspiracy Case. Japanese Colonial Government 1912; Selected Correspondence, Reports and Miscellaneous Papers* [this collection cited henceforth as MM], Letter #13.

29. *The Japan Weekly Chronicle*, June 13, 1912.
30. PHS, MM.
31. PHS, MM, Charles W. Eliot to Arthur Judson Brown, September 4, 1912, quoted in manuscript edition of Arthur Judson Brown, "The Korean Conspiracy Case, Nov. 1912," emphasis original. See also Arthur Judson Brown, *The Mastery of the Far East: The Story of Korea's Transformation and Rise to Supremacy in the Orient* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1919), 571–73.
32. PHS, MM, "The Korean Situation," Representatives of Missions Boards in Washington, 29 July 1912.
33. PHS, MM, "Confidential Conference on the Situation in Korea."
34. Ibid.
35. PHS, MM, Arthur Judson Brown, "The Korean Conspiracy Case," November 20, 1912.
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid., edited manuscript, 1.
38. Ibid., 15.
39. *The Japan Weekly Chronicle*, March 27, 1913.
40. Foreign Ministry of Japan, *Nihon Gaikō Monjo* (Tokyo: Nihon Kokusai Renmei Kyokai, 1913), 1:297–311.
41. The transcripts of the proceedings are reprinted in both Japanese and Korean in Kuksa P'yŏnch'an Wiwŏnhoe, eds., *Han Minjŏk Tongnip Undongsa Charyojip*; *Paekoin Sagun* (Seoul: Sisamunhwasa, 1986).
42. Ibid., 407.
43. Ibid., 413.
44. *The Japan Weekly Chronicle*, December 5, 1912.
45. Kuksa P'yŏnch'an Wiwŏnhoe, eds., *Han Minjŏk Tongnip Undongsa Charyojip*, 419.
46. Ibid., 431 and 442, gives the testimonies of Choe Cheku and Pak Chohyong, respectively.
47. Ibid., 575–76 (Yi Pyŏngje's testimony).
48. His Imperial Japanese Majesty's Residency General, ed., *The Annual Report for Reforms and Progress in Korea, 1912–1913*, 46–47.

Brokers of Empire: Japanese and Korean Business Elites in Colonial Korea

JUN UCHIDA

When Japan formally annexed Korea in 1910, the Japanese settlers on the Korean Peninsula totaled over 170,000, forming one of the largest colonial communities in the world. Their sheer number, close to a million by the end of the colonial period in 1945, and their concentration in cities suggest that the Japanese penetration into Korea proceeded with an intensity of urban colonial encounter that bears some resemblance to the experience of *pièds noirs* in French Algeria. The Japanese colonial migration and settlement also had many similarities with the patterns of Western Europe in colonial Africa and elsewhere. Upon close scrutiny, however, differences between the Japanese and European settler colonial states seem more compelling. When compared to the Europeans in Algeria or the British in Kenya and in Southern Rhodesia in the early twentieth century, for instance, the Japanese settlers in Korea and in Taiwan had no analogous authority and influence over the colonial government. They certainly never gained or sought such control over the institutions of the colonial state as to fill the bulk of colonial bureaucracy, as the settlers in Algeria did by the 1920s, let alone declare independence from the metropolitan state, as the settlers in Southern Rhodesia later did. True, the settlers in colonial Korea dominated the local councils that were empowered with legislative authority in 1930. But when compared to the representative or legislative councils of the settler states in colonial Africa, they had a semblance of authority at best. This may come as no surprise to us, given the relative brevity of Japanese colonial rule, the heavy presence of bureaucrats in the colonies, and the centralizing tendencies of colonial administration (its excessive concern about security and appetite for control), to list a few of the distinguishing features of Japanese colonialism, but it bears mention and analysis nonetheless.

While the Japanese settlers' power, in this institutional sense, paled in comparison to many European settler counterparts, the settlers still played a crucial, and often overlooked, role in Japan's simultaneous emergence as a modern state

and an empire in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In the case of Korea, after the opening of the port of Pusan in 1876, small- and middle-scale Japanese merchants facilitated the penetration of Japanese capital into the peninsula by scouring the treaty ports and venturing further inland, when large metropolitan firms remained reluctant to invest in Korea. These anonymous merchants, who constituted the largest group of early Japanese migrants to Korea, supported the lifeline of empire by purveying goods and supplies for the Japanese bureaucrats and soldiers pushing the imperial frontier into Manchuria and the Chinese interior. As Japan underwent a structural transformation from a largely agrarian economy to an industrialized country, its dependence on the overseas colonies increased, and so did the role of settlers in navigating this process.

The role of civilian settlers as subimperialists was not confined to the realm of capital: it spilled into the arena of colonial politics as well. In spite of (or because of) the lack of meaningful legislative organs to mold their interests into policy, politically aspiring settlers found multiple ways to bring their interests to bear on the policy makers—often through the interstices of the fragile structure of Japanese colonial governance. In this chapter, I propose to examine such Japanese settlers' efforts at expanding and institutionalizing their power by conceptualizing their role as brokers of empire.

With the term *brokers of empire*, I refer to those civilian settler leaders, mostly prominent "localized" merchants, who did not serve in government, but actively mediated the management of the colonial enterprise as its movers and shakers, often behind the scenes and at the grassroots level. The concept is useful in three important ways. First, it highlights the multiple and often informal conduits of Japanese settler power that was insufficiently institutionalized at the administrative level—in contrast to the case of the European settlers in colonial Africa mentioned above, who were considerably, if not completely, entrenched in the institutions of colonial governance by the mid-twentieth century. As we shall see, the enterprising Japanese settlers sought to increase their power not only through the existing official system of "self-ruling" institutions—chambers of commerce, city councils, and the like—but also by devising entirely new ones on their own. Second, the term *brokers* dovetails with the commercial and entrepreneurial background of these settlers, who sought none other than material profit as the ultimate goal of their endeavors. Finally, and most important, the concept of brokers enables us to explore the limits and possibilities of settler agency in mediating the power relations among the Koreans, Japanese residents, and colonial officials, and to demonstrate the contingent dynamics of their engagement and political bargaining.

This chapter is particularly concerned with exploring the last meaning, and to show how the activities of settler leaders were mutually shaped by those of the Korean elite whom the Japanese sought to co-opt into their hegemonic structure. To illustrate the role of brokers of empire, I discuss two key settler

projects in depth: the promotion of Korean industrial development, and the lobbying for suffrage and local autonomy in Korea. These movements represented the settlers' efforts to expand their leverage over the colonial management of Korea, precisely when the vast, yet still fledgling, empire faced unprecedented vigor of mass Korean nationalism in the 1920s. By launching these movements, on the one hand, settler leaders bolstered the official effort to bring a Korean bourgeoisie into class-based cooperation with the Japanese as a strategy to dampen Korean nationalism. On the other hand, the settlers simultaneously sought to expand their influence vis-à-vis the colonial and metropolitan authorities by co-opting the Korean elite into their lobbying efforts to obtain suffrage and industrial subsidies. More important, however, the two settler projects revealed the contingency of bourgeois collaboration: they brought the local Japanese and Korean leaders into closer relationship, but also produced new conflicts and unearthed deeper ethnic contradictions. Contrary to their original design, the settlers' efforts at appeasing a Korean bourgeoisie evolved in tension and competition with the concomitant growth in the latter's nationalistic assertions, as we shall see. Overall, I contend that such shifting and complex dynamics of colonial engagement underpinned the broader transformation of the political economy of Korea in the 1920s and in later years.

Saitō Makoto's "Cultural Rule" in the 1920s

In March 1919, the sudden outbreak of the Korean independence movement shook the Japanese empire to its core.¹ A combination of catalytic factors—the death of King Kojong and President Woodrow Wilson's Declaration of Fourteen Points a year before—unleashed the Korean cry for freedom, setting off a chain reaction of demonstrations around the country that lasted through the summer. The seeds of nationalist outburst had been sown during the first decade of Japanese experiment with "military rule," inaugurated by the first Governor General, Terauchi Masatake: he had turned Korea into a colonial outpost run by policemen and gendarmeries, and had suppressed an entire range of local political and public activity, thereby engendering antagonism at all levels of the society. The Japanese utterly failed to predict the incident, however, for they had mistaken the Korean silence for a sign of total submission. To add to their dismay, the nationwide movement was joined by many progressive Korean elites whom the colonial authorities deemed "pro-Japanese." Although the Korean appeal to the world ultimately failed to make the Western powers move, it compelled the Japanese to accept the need to adapt their policy to the changing international climate that was increasingly less disposed to colonial violence. Their solution was a more liberal and conciliatory policy toward the Koreans, dubbed "cultural rule" by the new Governor General Saitō Makoto, who was appointed in August 1919.

Saitō's "cultural rule" also reflected the new atmosphere of political liberalism in the metropole. The rise of party politics in Japan had brought the new

prime minister Hara Kei, who was a long-standing critic of Terauchi's autocratic rule and an advocate of civilian rule in the colonies. Hara's vision of "liberal" reform in the colony, however, was not one of the British system of colonial self-rule, but one of Algeria under France or Alsace and Lorraine under Germany. Fearing the specter of Korea turning into the Ireland of the Japanese empire in the face of Korean unrest, Hara called for binding the colony ever more closely to a modernized Japan under the policy of *naichi enchō* (extension of the mainland). Having successfully pushed for a similar assimilation policy for Taiwan in the 1890s, Hara envisioned the full integration of Korea to Japan through the extension of Japanese laws wherever feasible, including the gradual extension of Japanese political rights to the Koreans in the future. Although Hara's advocacy of civilian rule in Korea was thwarted by the military, and his assassination in 1921 led to a sudden halt in the more ambitious programs of reform, Saitō's cultural rule embodied much of this spirit of *naichi enchō* in enacting an extensive range of bureaucratic reform in Korea.²

As part of his liberal gesture, Saitō relaxed bans on the press and freedom of assembly, which ushered in an upsurge of political and cultural activity in Korea. Korean organizations of all types proliferated at a phenomenal rate, jumping from 985 in 1920 to 5,728 by late 1922.³ He also abolished the gendarmeries, rescinded the Company Law that had curtailed local economic activity, and removed some barriers to Korean bureaucratic employment. While stripping the empire of its most visible signs of oppression, however, Saitō kept the Japanese military presence intact, enlarged the colonial police force, and refined the system of censorship control. This carrot-and-stick policy was guided by an official concern to balance tolerance with coercion in dealing with the rapid growth of Korean nationalist activities in this period. The colonial authorities countenanced and to some degree encouraged moderate Korean nationalistic activities as a conciliatory measure, while repressing socialist and other radical elements completely.⁴ More sophisticated and effective than the outright suppression of his predecessor, Saitō's divide-and-rule tactic indeed aimed to weaken Korean nationalism by fostering internal divisions between moderates and radicals, while corralling the isolated Korean upper class—aristocrats, landlords, entrepreneurs, and bureaucrats—into the apparatus of collaboration with Japanese.

The kernel of Saitō's strategy for dealing with Korean nationalism, however, was to mobilize local men of influence, Korean as well as Japanese. From the outset, the Saitō administration labored hard to crystallize whatever tenuous ties the colonial state had forged with the Korean upper class. At the same time, it looked to the local Japanese leaders for their connections and political clout in negotiating with influential segments of the Korean society. To secure elite support of the colonial policies, Saitō promptly announced his intent to "enlist public opinion" on various affairs of the colonial state. As a first such measure, in September 1919 Saitō brought local Korean and Japanese leaders

from every province to listen to their views on administrative reform, and subsequently created more opportunities for elite political participation by expanding the system of local advisory councils.⁵ Saitō was particularly eager to promote class-based unity of Japanese and Korean capitalists as a basis of his assimilation policy and obtain their cooperation in diverting Korean people's concern from independence to industry.⁶ Thus, he encouraged them to form a variety of joint organizations, and appointed some prominent local Japanese and Korean entrepreneurs, such as Han Sang-nyong and Cho Chint'ae, to a number of committees to discuss new colonial policies on Korean industry and education.

The Promotion of Korean Industrial Development

Settler leaders pondered much before they breathed life into this mechanism of collaboration envisioned by Saitō. As among the earliest Japanese to settle and succeed in Korea, these prominent "localized" merchants and entrepreneurs had a distinct sense of entitlement, as "pioneers" of Korean progress and as spokesmen for the resident business community that had shouldered the burden of empire from its inception. Although they had cultivated close personal relations with the Korean aristocrats and entrepreneurs, the settlers abhorred the prospect of being treated on the same level as the Koreans and harbored strong resistance to the official policy of assimilation. Thus, the settler leaders around the peninsula rose in vehement protest against Terauchi's decision to abolish the system of residents' associations, a key institution of settler self-government, which resulted from his attempt to bring both Japanese and Koreans under the unified administrative control of the Government General.⁷ And while some welcomed Saitō's new liberal alternative, most settler leaders feared its ominous ramifications, for his wide-ranging reforms seemed to offer greater material and political benefits for the Koreans, however skewed and limited they turned out to be in reality. When 120 leading Japanese merchants and businessmen from around the peninsula secretly assembled at the Seoul Chamber of Commerce in late 1920, for instance, many complained about Saitō's "Korean-centered" reforms to pacify the Korean leaders while ignoring the voices of the Japanese residents. Some terrified settlers even desired the return of military rule to suppress Korean nationalism, while others rejected the viability of the policy of assimilation with Koreans altogether.⁸

To appease such settlers' sentiment, the colonial government took particular care to preserve their privileges, for instance, by limiting the election of advisory local councils to cities with large Japanese settlements. Although such measures did little to dispel their anxiety, the settlers, too, understood that in the long run they had no choice but to seek a rapprochement with the Koreans in order to secure and expand their vested interests amid this increasingly volatile populace. For the time being, then, a shared anxiety about Korean nationalism among settlers and colonial officials turned the immediate task of appeasing

the Korean bourgeoisie into a cooperative project. While the merchants and businessmen had come to agree that the promotion of Korean industry held the key to this task, Saitō announced a policy to foster “cooperative capitalist development” between Japan and Korea.⁹ Although the official priority, as defined by the home government, clearly lay in increasing the Korean production of rice to sustain and complement Japan’s industrializing effort, Saitō allowed a limited degree of industrialization in Korea to bring the Korean business elite into the structure of cooperation with upper-class Japanese.

In response to Saitō’s policy, the settler leaders promoted bourgeois solidarity between Japanese and Koreans through the Korea League of Chambers of Commerce, which represented all eleven regional chambers of commerce on the peninsula. Led by powerful settler merchants and businessmen and joined by first-class Korean entrepreneurs, the Korea League of Chambers of Commerce in 1922 embarked on an extensive lobbying effort to promote Korean industries by declaring the Four Great Points for Industrial Development: the rapid completion of Korean railway systems; the removal of tariffs; the improvement of port facilities for the development of the marine products industry; and the campaign to increase rice production in Korea. These goals would be achieved by applying a metropole government surplus of 200 million yen generated by the recent disarmament agreement in Washington, D.C.¹⁰

The Four Points were also designed to ensure the swift implementation of industrial objectives for Korea discussed at the Industrial Commission of 1921, a joint official-civilian forum that was convened by Saitō and attended by some leading members of the Korea League as well. By tailoring their demands closely to the official programs already underway, the settler leaders, many of whom represented the civil engineering and construction sector, sought to accelerate Korea’s infrastructure development while also advancing their own business opportunities in a sure-footed manner. The Korea League particularly focused on petitioning for the completion of Korean railroad networks—“tools of empire” that served to bring the Japanese metropole and the Korean periphery closer for the assimilationist goal of *naichi enchō*. Railroad development, of course, required massive capital outlays and thus the support of the state—in this case, the metropolitan approval of a colonial budget. Under the charismatic leadership of Watanabe Sadaichirō, who became head of the Seoul Chamber (and the Korea League) in August 1924, the settler leaders petitioned the colonial and metropolitan authorities for more rails to link cities, ports, and mines around the peninsula and to link them further to Japan and to the rest of the industrial world. They cemented an empire-wide platform of official-civilian cooperation by co-opting the Korean bourgeois elite and recruiting a host of colonial and metropolitan sympathizers in the railway lobby. Their cooperation worked, thanks largely to Vice Governor-

General Shimooka Chūji, who was Watanabe's strong official ally as well as an early advocate for developing industries in parallel to agriculture in Korea.¹¹

The lobbyists, too, suffered some serious setbacks along the way. The most detrimental was the Great Kantō Earthquake of 1923, which threatened to cut back the promised official subsidies for Korean development. They also failed to gain support from the National League of Chambers of Commerce in Japan, which rejected their proposal for railroads as a "regional problem."¹² And in their settler community the lobbyists ran into criticism from the "commerce" faction, who chided them for meddling in state policy concerns at the expense of local commercial affairs.¹³ Nonetheless, the resilience of their petitioning movement compelled the Imperial Railway Association in Tokyo to conduct a serious investigation of the Korean railroads and submit a petition to the Diet bearing most of the lobbyists' demands in March 1926.¹⁴ Meanwhile, the lobbyists established the Association for the Rapid Construction of Korean Railroads in January 1926, which tied together the settler and Korean elites, colonial bureaucrats, and a host of influential metropolitan backers with strong connections to Korea.¹⁵ By strategically placing its headquarters in Tokyo and staging their last petitioning drive during the budgetary reformulation in late 1926, the lobbyists finally managed to see the proposed railroad bill through both Houses of the Imperial Diet in March 1927.¹⁶

By the mid-1920s, the lobbyists had also seen all tariffs except on liquor and textiles removed, the campaign to increase Korean rice production reimplemented, and more and better port facilities being constructed along the southern flank of the peninsula, thereby more or less achieving their Four Points. The settlers' lobbying effort went further. Soon after passage of the railroad budget, the Korea League of Chambers of Commerce advanced the Six Great Points. The League called for further infrastructure projects, ranging from afforestation and flood control works to the development of manufacturing, mining, and marine products industries.¹⁷ The settlers now demanded that the colonial state embark on a more dynamic industrial policy in Korea.

The settlers' persistence in pursuing their ambitious industrial vision reveals more than their relative flexibility to lobby beyond the metropolitan agenda that tended to bind the colonial government.¹⁸ What underlay their industrial movement and partnership with Korean entrepreneurs was their deepening anxiety about the rapid growth of Korean nationalistic activities. The settlers at times found themselves compelled to pursue their industrial movement in competition with a Korean counterpart led by the moderate nationalists. One notable example was the Korean Production Movement, which was founded by Cho Man-sik and Yi Kwang-su and joined by such prominent nationalist businessmen as Kim Sōng-su. This nationwide movement, which began in late 1922 and continued into the 1930s, aimed at promoting the idea of Korean economic self-sufficiency and called on the Korean population to patronize Korean

products and stores, leading to some boycotts of Japanese goods during the peak of the movement in 1923.¹⁹

Ironically, however, the dialectic between settler colonialism and moderate Korean nationalism also revealed their points of intersection: the Korean aim of self-strengthening in economic terms could conveniently overlap with the settler anxiety to promote Korean industry as a conciliatory gesture toward Korean society. For instance, the creation of the Association for Korean Production in November 1924, though undoubtedly centered around the interests of Japanese manufacturers in Korea, aimed at introducing Korean products and promoting their overall trade in Japan.²⁰ And the official instruction to the regional governors in the following year to prioritize the use of Korean products strikingly echoed the nationalist rhetoric of self-strengthening as well.²¹ The regional chambers of commerce also increasingly pressed for shared concerns of local Japanese and Korean merchants, such as easier access to low-interest loans. From the mid-1920s on they dispatched trade missions, composed of Korean and Japanese merchants, to Manchuria, China, Taiwan, and different parts of Japan in search of prospective markets for Korean exports.

While it is easy to interpret these settler efforts within the framework of official social policy toward Koreans, it is also important to note that settlers had real material stakes in the colonial project—concerns not shared by the high-ranking officials who stayed in Korea only temporarily. Indeed, the settlers refused to see Korea as an overseas colony supplying only raw materials, and often criticized the metropolitan officials for hewing so closely to the classical vision of a colonial division of labor that relegated Korea to Japan's agricultural appendage. Anxiety about Korean nationalism apart, then, the settlers' devotion to Korean industrial development is more logically explained by the fact that their own economic endeavors were by no means immune to the effects of the official tendency to prioritize agriculture over industry. In the colonial periphery of Japan's capitalistic modernization, where local economic activities were structurally bound to metropolitan needs, settlers and Koreans could find some common ground in their economic demands, and even find each other useful allies in their struggles over policies that catered to the metropole at the expense of local economic interests.

This congruity of interests could give rise to new spheres of alliance between Japanese and Korean merchants in chambers of commerce, trade associations, and other joint ventures. Frequent business and personal interactions among top-class Japanese and Korean entrepreneurs, many of whom had also studied in Japan, could especially foster a new social dynamic that blurred the clear-cut distinctions between ruler and ruled. Nonetheless, solidarity was largely limited to the upper class, and even such a bond was contrived at best. For one thing, the Japanese took for granted their dominance in the chamber of commerce and its lobbying activities, showing little regard for their "token" Korean allies. Moreover, their capitalist collaboration masked the settlers' ambivalence

about sharing their privilege and status with the Korean elite on the one hand, and the nationalistic and entrepreneurial motives of the Korean elite to cooperate with the Japanese on the other.

Such tension of colonial contact bespeaks, to borrow the term of one Korean scholar, a “gray zone” between Japanese coercion and Korean collaboration in patterns of engagement among settlers, Korean elites, and colonial officials.²² Indeed, “collaboration” between settler and Korean business elites entailed a range of dynamics from willing to coerced collaboration under official pressure, and certainly masked the main compromises and unspoken conflicts with each other.²³ As a colonizing minority vastly outnumbered by the local population, the settlers had a kind of besieged mentality that never freed them from fear about mass Korean nationalism on the one hand, and ambivalence toward the official effort to mollify and reward the Korean elite for their collaboration on the other. The individual Korean incentives for collaboration are harder to document, but their repeated demand for “Korean-centered policy” in their engagement with the Japanese indicates that even the most “pro-Japanese” Korean entrepreneurs like Han Sang-nyong never fully supplanted their nationalistic sentiment with class consciousness that, in practice, brought them closer to the Japanese than to the rest of the Korean society.²⁴ For many Korean businessmen, indeed, to cast their lot with the Japanese was often a means of obtaining necessary capital, subsidies, and some protection for Korean-run companies and nascent Korean industries such as textiles. Given the lack of a realistic alternative it was a pragmatic choice made by talented Koreans to pursue their career ambitions and expand their life possibilities.

Lobbying for Suffrage and Local Autonomy

While lobbying for rails and industries with the Korean bourgeoisie through the chambers of commerce, the settler leaders simultaneously began to strengthen their ties to a broader range of influential Koreans through other “self-ruling” institutions. Making good on his intention to “enlist public opinion” and to woo the local Japanese and Korean leaders into his program of cultural rule, in 1920 Saitō allowed the election of the city councils hitherto appointed by the provincial governor, and created similar advisory councils at both provincial and village levels. The city councils, deemed most important to local governance,²⁵ were filled with a familiar combination of locally prominent Japanese settlers and a few upper-class or upwardly mobile Koreans, many of whom were also current or former members of the chambers of commerce or other community institutions.²⁶

While Saitō thus opened up more avenues to political participation for the local leaders, the city councils still remained advisory in capacity, and the newly elected settler and Korean councilors soon found themselves dissatisfied with their limited power. They were allowed to discuss certain aspects of municipal administration, such as the budget and the revision of municipal laws, but

their decision was not binding. Their “autonomy” was also severely limited by a web of restrictions and easily overridden by the legislative power of the mayor. Indignant at such a “despotic” system of municipal governance, the members of the Seoul city council began searching for an alternative platform of political activity. They also called on leading members of the chamber of commerce, the Japanese-run school association, and the Korean-run school council in the city to join in this effort. Their discussion led to a broader vision of creating a nationwide civilian forum on issues of suffrage and local autonomy, and culminated into their attempt to convene the first national meeting of civilian leaders around the peninsula in June 1924.²⁷

The meeting in Seoul brought together over one hundred civilian leaders, Japanese as well as Korean, from all twelve cities in the colony. The participants were restricted to members of the city councils, chambers of commerce, school associations (Japanese), and school councils (Korean) who were mainly merchants and businessmen by profession. As civilians serving in these local “self-ruling” institutions were generally referred to as “public officials” (*kōshokusha*), their meeting was formalized as the All-Korea Public Officials’ Convention, and was convened every year until 1944. According to its Seoul organizers, the immediate objective of the Public Officials’ Convention was to turn the existing local advisory councils into legislative organs, but its long-term goal seemed to be more open-ended. The overall idea was to discuss various agendas on “matters related to Korea,” such as suffrage and education, and present their resolutions to the authorities “as a strategy to make the mainland (Japan) recognize Korea’s power.” While some saw this as a training ground for self-rule in the spirit of “a Korean assembly,” most Japanese organizers desired to use the convention to press for suffrage that would allow them to send their spokesmen to the Imperial Diet in Tokyo—that is, to demand the extension of the metropolitan legislature to Korea in line with the policy of *naichi enchō*.²⁸

Among thirty-odd agenda items discussed at the first convention, the issues of suffrage and local autonomy provoked lively debates, showing some conflicts of opinion among settler leaders as well.²⁹ Nevertheless, the Japanese dominated the overall forum and most argued for suffrage unambiguously to promote their economic interests. Watanabe Sadaichirō, head of the Seoul Chamber of Commerce, and another Japanese organizer advocated suffrage as the key to advancing Korea’s industrial development. In their view, suffrage provided a means of increasing their bargaining power with the metropole and securing funds for Korea’s industrial projects, especially railway construction. Establishing connections to the metropolitan political parties would solve the problem of Korea’s chronic financial shortage; the failure to gain suffrage would oblige Korea to “continue to act like a beggar to the central government.”³⁰

Their call for suffrage also embodied a more long-term demand for settler autonomy, denied by Terauchi a decade earlier and still held under restraint by Saitō. Speaking on behalf of settler pioneers, Takahashi Shōnosuke, who had

once led the abolished residents' association in Seoul, bitterly recalled how Terauchi forcibly ended settler self-government as part of his design to bring Korea under his central command and to make it financially independent from Japan. Terauchi's insistence on financial autonomy, Takahashi contended, had since lessened the metropolitan commitment to Korea, thereby forcing its residents to travel all the way to Tokyo to lobby for subsidies every year. Takahashi thus urged his fellow public officials to bolster the ongoing petitioning effort of the Korea League of Chambers of Commerce in promoting Korea's industrial development, in conjunction with pressing for suffrage.³¹

For Takahashi and other long-time settlers, then, their demand for self-government lay "not in its foundation but in its recovery."³² It was in this vein that like-minded Japanese public officials and residents of Seoul, joined by a few Korean associates, founded the "Kōshi Club," two months after the first meeting of the Public Officials' Convention. The Kōshi Club was created as a "standing lobby" of the convention to press for suffrage at the metropole. Because the formation of political organizations was still restricted at the time, the police authorities watched the activities of the Kōshi Club with "utmost caution."³³ While it had a semblance of a joint settler-Korean organization, however, the Kōshi Club was, at the core, an interest group of Japanese old hands based in Seoul (such as Watanabe and Takahashi mentioned above) who were anxious to promote their own agendas.

It was no coincidence that Watanabe Sadaichirō, one of the founding members of the Kōshi Club, also became head of the Korea League of Chambers of Commerce in the summer of 1924. From the outset, the leaders of the Kōshi Club and the Korea League, who overlapped in many ways, carefully coordinated their petition movements for industry and for suffrage. In the increasingly unstable political realities of Korea, the settler leaders had to deploy subtle strategies to advance and justify their economic privilege and political influence: pressing for industry and suffrage appeared to provide just the right means of killing two birds with one stone. As for the most pressing concern, they had to cope with the doubly harmful effect of the Great Kantō Earthquake of 1923, which not only curtailed the promised official subsidies for Korea's infrastructure projects, as mentioned earlier, but also rekindled the Korean hostility toward Japanese with news of the massacre of Korean residents. Thus, the settlers made sure to cloak their petitions to recover their lost subsidies as well as their lost "rights" to self-government, in terms of the "popular demand" of the residents of Korea.³⁴

While the Public Officials' Convention submitted its resolutions on suffrage and local autonomy to the colonial authorities, the Kōshi Club leaders launched a separate petition drive in the metropole in early 1925. Specifically they lobbied the Tokyo government to request (1) "the revision of the Law of the House of Lords to grant the same rights enjoyed by Japanese aristocrats to the Korean aristocracy" as well as "to open up a way for residents of Korea

to be appointed to the House of Lords by imperial decree”; and (2) the extension of the Election Law of the House of Representatives to Seoul, Pusan, Taegu and P’yŏngyang, and the enactment of laws concerning the qualifications for voting and the eligibility for election “suitable to Korea’s condition.”³⁵ These items constituted the core of the Kōshi Club’s petition, which was cosigned by a sympathetic Diet member and submitted to the Imperial Diet in February 1927.

Far from a demand for enfranchising the general Korean population, what this petition boiled down to was a request for extending suffrage to settlers and a few Koreans in select cities, based on the limited application of the assimilationist principle of *naichi enchō*. The content of this petition merely envisioned controlled elections in four cities of major Japanese settlements without specifying the electorate, and the inclusion of a few Korean aristocrats in the peerage in Japan. Such parochialism and the Seoul-centered attitude of the Kōshi Club leaders caused some tension with other Japanese delegates at the Public Officials’ Convention, especially with those from the cities left out of the petition, but also with some younger public officials in Seoul who insisted on a broader extension of suffrage to Korea.³⁶ The Kōshi Club invited criticism from the local Japanese media as well. One settler journalist scornfully ridiculed the club as “a gathering of the senile” who entertained “a faint hope to embellish their last years with seats in the Imperial Diet.” This writer quite correctly speculated that their demand would not be taken seriously at the metropole for it “does not represent the general opinion of the residents in Korea.”³⁷

A more serious challenge to the Kōshi Club came from the Korean delegates, however. As we have seen, the Public Officials’ Convention at the outset was led by a circle of settler old hands and a few Korean associates, including the leaders of the Seoul Chamber of Commerce and founders of the Kōshi Club. These organizers also formed a screening committee, which met prior to the convention to select agenda items from a pool of proposals submitted by regional public officials. Not surprisingly, the settlers who dominated the committee gave priority to their own economic and political agendas, while they sidelined or slighted what appeared to be “Korean-centered” proposals submitted by Korean public officials, such as the use of the Korean language in common schools and the elimination of discrimination between Japanese and Korean civil servants. As they convened more meetings, however, the settler leaders found that they could not rest assured of their dominance at the Public Officials’ Convention, for the Koreans increasingly turned the situation around.

The turning point came at the third Public Officials’ Convention of May 1926, in which “the settlers’ political demands were relatively slighted and [the convention] was appropriated by the Koreans instead.”³⁸ This appropriation occurred when a Korean delegate from P’yŏngyang made an emergency motion by bringing forth his deleted proposal in defiance of the screening

committee. He demanded that the convention take up his proposal for “the election of members of the Central Council (Chūsūin) by the provincial council instead of official appointment.”³⁹ Composed of former high-ranking bureaucrats in the preannexation Korean government, the Central Council had served as an advisory organ to the government general since 1915, investigating and guiding the officials on matters related to Korean customs and culture. Saitō then resuscitated its advisory role as part of his conciliatory policy toward the Korean elite in the 1920s. In response to the Korean delegate’s motion, however, a Japanese member of the screening committee, who was also a member of the Kōshi Club, retorted by denigrating the Central Council as “a useless relic” from Terauchi’s times, bearing “no interest to our daily lives, whether it was popularly elected or officially appointed.”⁴⁰ The Korean delegate roared at this Japanese in anger and the convention turned into an imbroglio. The Japanese member’s insulting comment incited another Korean delegate from P’yōngyang, who happened to be a member of the Central Council himself, to deliver a long sermon on “the mission of the Central Council” and its indispensable role for colonial rule in Korea. Having “made the whole audience listen with dutiful attention,” moreover, this Korean delegate introduced another emergency motion to propose the inclusion of members of the provincial councils, who had thus far been excluded from the Public Officials’ Convention.⁴¹ This motion contained a nationalistic hue, for the majority of provincial councilors were indeed Korean, and the Koreans believed their exclusion from the convention was intentional on the part of the Japanese. His motion was passed on the spot.⁴²

This episode was just one among many instances of ethnic tension between Japanese and Korean public officials, which increasingly turned the Public Officials’ Convention from a platform of collaboration into a stage of conflict. Indeed, in later years, even more radical and disturbing proposals were submitted to the screening committee. In 1927, for instance, the Korean public officials in Ch’ōngjin introduced such proposals as “the appointment of a Korean Vice Governor General,” “the protection of participants in the March First Movement,” and “the establishment of a Korean legislative assembly.” The settlers dismissed these proposals as “wild fantasies,” but the alarmed officers in the police affairs bureau apparently took these proposals seriously for “frankly displaying the psychological conditions of Koreans.”⁴³

And just two years later, what had been dismissed as a delusion—the creation of a Korean legislature—was accepted as a formal agenda for discussion at the sixth Public Officials’ Convention in 1929, and was even passed as a resolution the following year.⁴⁴ At the sixth convention of October 1929, a Korean delegate from the school council in Taegu proposed the creation of “a Korean legislative assembly.” To the dismay of the Kōshi Club members, he also explicitly rejected the extension of suffrage based on a *naichi enchō* policy or political integration of Korea to the mainland. Only a Korean legislature

separate from the Imperial Diet, he argued, would solve the current problem of educated Koreans, who merely turned into “advanced nomads” deprived of “any voice in laws concerning their own lives and property.” Although “the atmosphere of conflict” between its Korean supporters and Japanese opponents compelled the Korean delegate to retract his proposal in the end, such confrontation did not deter him from submitting the same proposal at the next convention in 1930—and it was passed after much debate.⁴⁵

What explained this unprecedented phenomenon? First of all, it attested to the increasing skill and assertiveness of the Korean delegates to “carry through their demands at a stretch by winning a majority”⁴⁶—despite cries of opposition from the Kōshi Club leaders, who rejected the idea of home rule in strict adherence to the policy of *naichi enchō*. In this sense, the Public Officials’ Convention provided a crucial medium for those upwardly mobile Koreans to engage in “combat at close quarters” with Japanese and negotiate their bourgeois nationalistic demands with the colonial authorities.⁴⁷ The Korean elites’ nationalistic assertion must also be explained within the broader political context: the sweeping strength of Korean nationalism led by the Sin’ganhoe, which had come into being as a united front of moderate and radical Korean nationalists in February 1927. The history of Sin’ganhoe is another story, but here it suffices to note that it signaled a potentially powerful resurgence of mass-based Korean nationalism, and in its brief existence, posed a great threat to the Japanese settlers. More important, this new development must have deeply stirred the Korean participants at the Public Officials’ Convention, who had earlier come under fierce attack of the vernacular press for their temerity to ignore “the popular will” and for their tacit acceptance of *naichi enchō* on the question of suffrage.⁴⁸ Indeed, even before the rise of Sin’ganhoe, the moderates and the radicals, and Korean public opinion more generally, were united in their opposition to the Japanese idea of suffrage based on a policy of *naichi enchō*, for it implied permanent political integration of Korea to Japan and denial of Korean independence. Moreover, since around 1925 the idea of Korean self-rule began to spread among the moderate nationalists and some socialists, and secret official reports suggest that even such “pro-Japanese” Koreans as Han Sang-nyong had been converted from assimilationists into advocates of Korean self-rule by the end of the decade.⁴⁹

One might thus contend that the Korean delegates at the Public Officials’ Convention increasingly tailored their agenda to such external pressure of public opinion, the mounting strength of Korean nationalism, and the diffusion of the idea of self-rule in the late 1920s. Aware that advocacy of suffrage based on *naichi enchō* branded one a traitor to the cause of independence, the Korean public officials began to explore the idea of home rule in earnest, as demonstrated by the rigor with which they pressed for such “Korean-centered” demands at the convention after 1927. By the time the proposal for a Korean assembly formally appeared on the discussion table in 1929, they were

speaking openly of “independence thought” and defining suffrage as a fundamental matter of the Korean nation (*minzoku*).⁵⁰ The Korean delegate from Taegu who submitted the proposal in 1929 even insisted that the metropolitan intent now resided with the words of a Japanese colonial theorist, Yamamoto Miono, who had argued for the abolition of *naichi enchō* policy and the adoption of a policy of national self-determination at an informal meeting on colonial affairs sponsored by the Japanese government.⁵¹ In short, a policy of *naichi enchō*, a cardinal principle of Saitō’s cultural rule backed by the Kōshi Club, now increasingly came under scrutiny and challenge by the countervailing discourse of Korean nationalism and independence.

Although the metropolitan government, save for a few sympathizers, never took the Kōshi Club’s petition seriously in the end, the discourse of Japanese and Korean public officials produced some impact on the colonial authorities. Apparently Saitō had his colonial officials draft “an opinion on suffrage and local self-government by the residents of Korea” in February 1927.⁵² This order coincided with the beginning of the Kōshi Club’s petition movement in Tokyo, and the emergence of the proposal for “a Korean assembly” at the Public Officials’ Convention. Saitō’s “opinion” envisioned the implementation of a complete system of local self-government by turning the advisory councils into legislative organs, followed by the extension of a limited suffrage to Korea. Moreover, it considered pros and cons of the creation of a “Korean local assembly.” A confluence of factors—the threat of Korean nationalism, the demands of settler and Korean public officials, and the diffusion of the idea of self-rule—compelled Saitō to accept the need to extend suffrage to Korea and even consider the possibility of a Korean assembly in the closing years of the 1920s.⁵³ Although his “opinion” never saw the light of day, in September 1929 Saitō enacted a new law on the system of local self-government, which transformed the local councils into legislative organs at the provincial, municipal, and selected village levels.

Conclusion

A complex matrix of economic imperatives and political opportunism underpinned the activities of settler leaders in Korea. In the aftermath of the March First Movement, the foremost priority of the settler leaders was ensuring their economic privilege, and with the inauguration of Saitō’s cultural rule, seizing new opportunities for profit and status by co-opting a Korean bourgeoisie into a joint capitalist project to promote Korean industry. At the same time, the settlers availed themselves of their increased contact with the Korean elite to press for greater political concessions and increase their bargaining power vis-à-vis the colonial and metropolitan authorities. Through these economic and political projects that were inextricably bound together, the settler leaders aggressively pursued material and political pay-offs by flexibly operating between the

colony and the metropole, as well as between the colonial officials and the Koreans as brokers of empire.

Their projects were by no means internally coherent, however. The lobbying movements for railroads and for suffrage each revealed an internally contested effort among settler leaders. More important, while they exhibited possibilities of class-based collaboration among settlers and Koreans, they revealed still greater limits of partnership. While the settler and Korean business elites could bury, however superficially, their ethnic divide under shared economic objectives, they could not do so as easily in their joint political activities, as the Public Officials' Convention showed. Far from a platform of collaboration as envisioned by the settlers, this joint political lobby of Japanese and Korean local leaders fueled more tension and conflict within their "collective" demand for suffrage. As the colonial police noted in alarm, this platform of political bargaining was increasingly "appropriated" by the Korean public officials to assert their nationalistic demands, not only against the colonial authorities, but also against fellow Japanese delegates at the convention.

Moreover, the Korean public officials gradually adjusted their agenda to the external pressure of Korean nationalism by moving beyond the discussion of suffrage within the framework of *naichi enchō* policy, and pressing instead for a Korean assembly. Indeed, the behavior of the Korean leaders evades simple categorization as "nationalist resistance" or "pro-Japanese collaboration," just as the activity of settler leaders defies simple characterization as semi-official agents or mere moneymakers. Rather, the Koreans traversed the divide between resistance and collaboration constantly, and joined the settlers in defining and redrawing the boundaries of inclusion and exclusion in the settlers' colonial projects.

The increasing ability of the Korean elite to exploit their ambivalence meant greater instability within the apparatus of collaboration, and greater difficulty for the settlers to keep the upper hand as the custodian of this apparatus. In short, the brokers of empire were agents as well as pawns of a structure of collaboration that rested on contingent dynamics of colonial engagement between Japanese and Koreans. Settler colonialism and Korean bourgeois nationalism, moreover, were mutually constitutive projects under Saitō's cultural rule. The settlers' lobbying effort to develop Korean industries proceeded in tension and competition with the growth of Korean nationalistic and capitalistic activities, just as their suffrage movement gave rise to a dialectical growth in Korean political ambitions and nationalistic demands. In the next decade, this dynamic continued to sustain the fragmented settler-Korean partnership based on a similar set of capitalistic interests in Korean industrial development and vaguely defined political objectives of suffrage and local autonomy, until it was subsumed under wartime mobilization in the late 1930s and 1940s.

Notes

1. See Frank Baldwin, "The March First Movement: Korean Challenge and Japanese Response" (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1969).
2. Hara Takashi, *Hara Takashi nikki*, vol. 8, ed. Hara Keiichirō (Tokyo: Kangensha, 1950–1951), 292–94. Mark R. Peattie, "Japanese Attitudes Toward Colonialism, 1895–1945," 106–107, and Edward I-te Chen, "The Attempt to Integrate the Empire: Legal Perspectives," 250, in *The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895–1945*, ed. Ramon H. Myers and Mark R. Peattie (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984).
3. Carter J. Eckert et al., *Korea Old and New* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990), 286.
4. See Michael Robinson, *Cultural Nationalism in Colonial Korea, 1920–25* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1988).
5. Chōsen Sōtokufu, *Chōsen ni okeru shinshisei* (Keijō [Seoul]: Chōsen Sōtokufu, 1921), 47.
6. "Chōsen minzoku undō ni taisuru taisaku" (c. 1920), reprinted in *Saitō Makoto bunsho*, vol. 9 (Seoul: Koryō Sōrim, 1990), 155–56.
7. On settler activities in the preannexation period, see Kimura Kenji, *Zaichō Nihonjin no shakaishi* (Tokyo: Miraisha, 1989), and Peter Duus, *The Abacus and the Sword: The Japanese Penetration of Korea, 1895–1910* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1995).
8. Keijō Shōkō Kaigisho, *Zensen naichijin jitsugyōka yūshi kondankai sokkiroku* (Keijō [Seoul]: Keijō Shōkō Kaigisho, 1920).
9. For a detailed case study on "cooperative capitalist development," see Carter Eckert, *Offspring of Empire: The Koch'ang Kims and the Colonial Origins of Korean Capitalism, 1876–1945* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1991).
10. Keijō Shōkō Kaigisho, comp., *Keijō Shōkō Kaigisho nijūgonenshi* [hereafter KSN], part 1 (Keijō [Seoul]: Keijō Shōkō Kaigisho, 1941), 179–83. See also Jun Uchida, "Settler Colonialism: Japanese Merchants in Korea in the 1920s," in "Japanese Settler Colonialism and Capitalism in Japan: Advancing into Korea, Settling down, and Returning to Japan, 1905–1950," Harvard University Edwin O. Reischauer Institute of Japanese Studies Occasional Papers in Japanese Studies no. 2002–2003, June 2002, 11–22.
11. For the details of their lobbying movement, see, Ōmura Tomonojō, "Chinjōkō," Keijō Shōkō Kaigisho, *Chōsen Keizai Zasshi* [hereafter CKZ] 103 (July 1924) and CKZ 104 (August 1924); "Chōsen Tetsudōmō sokushin undō no keika," CKZ 128 (August 1926): 58–64.
12. KSN, part 1, 199.
13. KSN, part 3, 76.
14. CKZ 126 (June 1926): 1–8; Senkōkai, *Chōsen kōtsūshi* (Tokyo: Senkōkai, 1986), 76.
15. KSN, part 1, 203–204; "Watanabe kaitō hōkoku," CKZ 131 (November 1926): 1–5; Senkōkai, *Chōsen kōtsūshi*, 77.
16. Watanabe Sadaichirō, "Dai-gojūnikai teikoku gikaichū tōjō undō keika hōkoku," CKZ 136 (April 1927): 49–52.
17. Chōsen Shōgyō Kaigisho Rengōkai, *Dai-jukkai Chōsen Shōgyō Kaigisho Rengōkai giji sokkiroku* (Keijō [Seoul]: Chōsen Shōgyō Kaigisho Rengōkai, May 1927); KSN, part 1, 208–12.
18. See Kawakita Akio, "1920-nendai Chōsen no kōgyōka rōngi ni tsuite," in *Kindai Higashi Ajia no shosō*, ed. Kagoshima Keizai Daigaku Chiiki Sōgō Kenkyūjo (Tokyo: Keisō Shobō, 1995), 172.
19. See, for instance, Cho Yong-man, Song Min-ho, and Pak Pyōng-ch'ae, eds. *Ilcheha ūi munhwa undongsa* (Seoul: Hyōnūmsa, 1982), 128–31.
20. CKZ 107 (November 1924): 50–52.
21. See "Chōsen seisanhin no shiyō shōrei ni kansuru seimu sōkan no kunji tetteihō ni kansuru ken," CKZ 115 (July 1925): 49–50; and CKZ 151 (July 1928): 1.
22. Yun Hae-dong, *Singminji ūi hoesaek chidae* (Seoul: Yōksa Pip'yōngsa, 2002).
23. For instance, the Korean members of the Pusan Chamber of Commerce seem to have ranged widely from "anti-Japanese" to "pro-Japanese" types. See *Pusan Sangūi sa, 1889-yōn-1982-yōn* (Pusan, Korea: Pusan Sanggong Hoeuiso, 1982), 253–54, quoted in Kimura, *Zaichō Nihonjin no shakaishi*, 55.
24. For instance, see Han Sang-nyōng's comments and other Korean petitions presented at the Industrial Commission of 1921 in Chōsen Sōtokufu, *Sangyō Chōsa Iinkai giji sokkiroku* (Keijō [Seoul]: Chōsen Sōtokufu, September 1921), 140, 155, 162, 246–48.

25. "Senkyo seido no enkaku narabini genjō," reprinted in *Saitō Makoto bunsho* vol. 2 (Seoul: Koryō Sōrim, 1990), 692–97.
26. On the Korean public officials, see Im Tae-sik, "Ilcheha Kyōngsōngbu 'yuji' chiptan ūi chonjae hyōngt'ae," *Sōul-hak Yōnguso*, *Sōul-hak Yōngu* 8 (February 1997), 100–25.
27. Kenjō Honmachi Keisatsu Shochō, "Zensen kōshokusha daikonshinkai no ken" (May 29, 1924), in the Han'guk Yōksa Chōngbo Tonghap Sisūtem [hereafter HYCTS], Kuksa P'yōnch'an Wiwōnhoe, Kyōnggi-do Kwach'ōnsi, South Korea.
28. *Ibid.*, 769–71. The "imperial subjects" resident in Korea and other colonies did not have the right to vote, but they had eligibility for election to the Imperial Diet.
29. More than half of the agenda items were concerned with education, but their proposals were adopted more smoothly than the proposals on suffrage and local autonomy.
30. Keijō Honmachi Keisatsu Shochō, "Zensen kōshokusha konwakai no ken" (June 15, 1924), 662–63, in HYCTS.
31. *Ibid.*, 665–67.
32. Fujimura Tadasuke in Fujimura Tokuichi, ed., *Chōsen kōshokusha meikan* (Keijō [Seoul]: Chōsen Toshō Kankōkai, 1927), 31.
33. Keishō Hokudō Keisatsubu, ed., *Kōtō Keisatsu yōshi* (Taegu: Keishō Hokudō Keisatsukyoku, 1934), 53.
34. Watanabe Sadaichirō, "Kaigisho no jigyō ni tsuite," *CKZ* 121 (January 1926): 1–8.
35. "Chōsen zaijūsha ni taisuru sanseiken fuyo ni kansuru ken" (February 19, 1927), in *Dai-gojūnikai teikoku gikai shūgin seigan bunsho hyō*, no. 519, 264; Chōsen Sōtokufu Keimukyoku Hoanka, ed., *Chian jōkyō* (Keijō [Seoul]: Chōsen Sōtokufu Keimukyoku, December, 1927), part 5, 6–7; Keishō Hokudō Keisatsubu, ed., *Kōtō Keisatsu yōshi*, 54.
36. Keijō Honmachi Keisatsu Shochō, "Zensen Kōshokusha Konwakai ni kansuru ken" (June 11, 1924), 629–33, in HYCTS.
37. *Chōsen oyobi Manshū* 232 (March 1927): 8.
38. Chōsen Sōtokufu Keimukyoku, *Gokuhi: Kōtō Keisatsu kankei nenpyō* (Keijō [Seoul]: Chōsen Sōtokufu Keimukyoku, 1930), 200–201.
39. Keijō Honmachi Keisatsu Shochō, "Dai-sankai Kōshokusha Taikai kaisai no ken" (May 12, 1926), 183, in HYCTS.
40. *Ibid.*, 184–85.
41. *Ibid.*, 194–95.
42. *Keijō Nippō*, May 13, 1926.
43. Chōsen Sōtokufu Keimukyoku, *Chian jōkyō* (Keijō [Seoul]: Chōsen Sōtokufu Keimukyoku, December, 1927), part 5, 3.
44. *Keijō Nippō*, April 28, 1930; and *Keijō Nippō*, April 29, 1930.
45. *Keijō Nippō*, October 8, 1929; and *Keijō Nippō*, April 27, evening edition.
46. Chōsen Sōtokufu Keimukyoku, *Chian jōkyō* (Keijō [Seoul]: Chōsen Sōtokufu Keimukyoku, 1930), 56–57.
47. Namiki Masato, "Shokuminchiki Chōsenjin no seiji sankā ni tsuite: kaihōgoshi tonō kanren ni oite," *Chōsenshi Kenkyūkai Ronbunshū* 31 (March 1993): 40.
48. Editorial, *Tong-a Ilbo*, June 18, 1924; editorials of *Chosŏn Ilbo* and *Sidae Ilbo*, June 18, 1924, compiled in Chōsen Sōtokufu Keimukyoku Toshoka, ed. *Onmon shinbun sashiosae kiji shūroku*, Chōsa Shiryō no. 29, (Keijō [Seoul]: Chōsen Sōtokufu Keimukyoku Toshoka, 1932), 124–27, and *ibid.* Chōsa Shiryō no. 31, 20–22.
49. See, for instance, "Kan Sō Ryū no gendō ni kansuru ken" (date unknown), *Saitō Makoto bunsho* (microfilm), Kensei Shiryō Shitsu, Kokuritsu Kokkai Toshokan, Tokyo.
50. *Keijō Nippō*, October 8, 1929.
51. *Ibid.*
52. See Kang Tong-jin, *Nihon no Chōsen shihai seisakushi kenkyū* (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1979), 365–88; Kang Jae-ho, *Shokuminchi Chōsen no chihō seido* (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 2001), 201; and Kim Tong-myōng, "Shihai to teikō no hazama: 1920 nendai ni okeru Nihon teikokushugi to Chōsenjin no seiji undō" (Ph.D. diss., University of Tokyo, 1997), 228–37.
53. Kang Jae-ho, *Shokuminchi Chōsen no chihō seido*, 201.

9

Settler Colonization in the Middle East and North Africa: Its Economic Rationale

ROGER OWEN

As far as the Middle East is concerned, the only area of European nineteenth-century agricultural settlement to be found within the confines of the Ottoman Empire was in Palestine, where a small number of Russian and east European Jews began working the land in the 1870s. However, if we include North Africa, we reach a much wider range of settler experience in the three French protectorates/colonies of Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco and then followed, after World War I, by the Italian colonization effort in Libya.

All have been the subject of a great deal of literature concerning the purchase or expropriation of agricultural land, the eviction of native herders and farmers, and the exploitation of indigenous labor as well as, of course, the always vexed question of relations among the settlers, native populations, and colonial governments, both locally and in the metropolis. Still, for all of this, there has been relatively little attention to the economic aspect of the whole enterprise—that is, how the land was farmed and at what profit to the settler farmers themselves, given the many subsidies, open or disguised, that the whole enterprise involved. And yet, in many ways, such questions stand at the heart of the viability of the whole enterprise, at least as far as the governments and the other promoters of settlement were concerned. Put at its most simple, how was it possible to assist European farmers to live at a European—or near-European—standard of living in lands devoted largely to rain-fed agriculture? Only then, so it was argued, would they wish to settle in the first place, as well as to remain on the land rather than moving off to the cities or back to their places of origin.

It should be said at the outset that these are difficult questions to answer with any degree of precision. For one thing, the information is hard to find given the fact that the authorities promoting settlement usually had their own good reasons for obfuscating the large degree of subsidization involved together

with any evidence of failure as measured by the proportion of settlers unable to make a go of it. For another, the wide range of patterns of settlement makes generalization difficult. There is the further problem of tracking developments over time. Start-up costs were usually high and, as almost all the governments and settler associations were quick to recognize, it could take decades for the settler farms to become viable enterprises, whatever “viable” might really mean. In the case of the French exponents of North African colonization the period of subsidization was sometimes assumed to be as much as fifty years.¹

Given the difficulties involved, as well as the small space at my disposal, it would seem best to focus on two features of the economic aspect of Middle Eastern and North African settlement. First, I shall concentrate largely on what French scholars have identified as public—versus private—colonization. Second, I shall do this through a comparison between two contexts: state-sponsored colonization in French Algeria; and Jewish- and then Zionist-sponsored colonization in Ottoman (and then British) Palestine. Though very dissimilar in many obvious ways, both efforts generated a great deal of “official” literature about the actual mechanics of the colonization process, with the promoters often addressing a very similar set of issues involving subsidies and other inducements, the advantages and disadvantages of particular crops, limitations on the sale of all or part of the property, and the measures thought necessary to keep the settlers on the land.² In contradistinction to this, and with the exception of Libya, where the Italians only implemented a process of official colonization for a very short period (1930–1941), the other North African states—Tunisia and Morocco—were almost entirely dominated by private settlement activity conducted either by European individuals or agricultural development companies.

Algeria

When the French military expedition arrived in Algeria in 1830 it quickly began to move inland through the coastal plain known as the Tell, where an average of over 300 millimeters of annual rainfall was enough to permit a type of dry cereal farming. This push was accompanied by increasing seizures of land, first from the former Bey of Algiers and then from the indigenous inhabitants, by means of various measures of sequestration, expropriation, and a form of districting (*cantonnement*) designed to drive the native population into designated areas away from the coast. The amount of land seized in this way is difficult to estimate with any great accuracy but had probably reached well over 350,000 hectares (1 hectare = 2.471 acres) by 1852.³ Much of it then passed into the hands of various types of colonists, speculators, and estate owners as well as would-be farmers. As a result, the European agricultural population reached 100,000 by 1864 and 200,000 by the end of a century.⁴

Some of the land was used as bait to attract new colonists from France, a process advocated *ab initio* by a number of prominent Frenchmen including Alexis de Tocqueville. Settlement was the subject of a long process of trial and

error, with the regular introduction of new systems involving different ways of allocating land with different financial and legal obligations, as well as different ways of financing the whole project. The year 1881 marked an especially important moment, with the final institutionalization of a basic distinction between the award of free concessions and of those by which settlers were obliged to pay for their land. The former type involved larger units than the latter but also the requirement to stay for a longer period before being able to sell (depending in part on the scale of improvements) and a rule forbidding the settlers to rent to Algerians. Settlers opting for the latter type had to pay a quarter of the value immediately and the rest in installments. Meanwhile, the whole process was financed by public loans.⁵

It is a considerable challenge to discover any basic rationale behind these changes apart from the frequent changes in both French governments and, more important, French political regimes. For one thing, settlement was always part of the larger political/military policy of establishing security, creating an infrastructure, and refining tax policies that greatly favored the European population, both in terms of incidence and of the uses to which they were employed so far as the provision of services was concerned.⁶ For another, the arguments used by the advocates of settlement tended to be couched in the most general terms—stressing, for example, Algeria's role as an outlet for surplus French population at least until the worrisome revelations of the country's own demographic crisis, which began to surface in the 1890s.

Nevertheless, it is possible to observe two reasonably clear logics at work. One, noted by a number of nineteenth-century authors such as the talented economist Paul Leroy-Beaulieu, is the influence on settlement of existing patterns of land use.⁷ Hence, the majority of settlers practiced dry farming just like their Algerian agrarian counterparts, with one million hectares devoted to cereals in 1910.⁸ Here their main advantage over the indigenous Algerians was the fact that they were generally settled in larger units on better land, and provided with much better equipment. During the period 1884–1893, for example, Europeans obtained average yields of 7.24 quintals/hectare of hard wheat and 6.58 of soft wheat, compared with the Algerians' 5.20 and 5.07, a superiority that was the result, very obviously, of their possession of plows and other tools worth Fr 17/hectare, against an Algerian value of only 30–35 centimes.⁹

The second logic, if *logic* is quite the right word for it, is a process of trial and error with a continuous search for more profitable models, sometimes from abroad—for example, Australia in the 1860s—sometimes in terms of modifications of local practice.¹⁰ This could, on occasions, involve a move toward some apparently more lucrative export products like wine. Indeed, there was a considerable expansion in the planting of vines in the hillier areas in the 1880s, where land (though not labor and equipment) was a great deal cheaper than in France itself.¹¹ This option, however, was available to only a relatively small number and passed through a considerable crisis in the early 1890s when, due

to overoptimistic borrowing, a large proportion of the vineyards had fallen into the hands of their creditors.¹²

In such circumstances it was clear to all that the settlers themselves would require considerable financial support before they could achieve anything like a French rural standard of living, particularly when so many of them seem to have been quite averse to supplementing their dry farming with animal husbandry.¹³ Unfortunately it is difficult to find figures to provide detailed support for this statement other than occasional pieces of information about start-up costs or about the measure of the success of some projects in terms of keeping the first colonists on the land. In 1871–1884, for example, the settlement authorities made 500,000 hectares of state-held land available, 70 percent of which was passed over to individuals at a total cost of Fr 66 million, including the value of the land itself (Fr 45 million), and other costs involving the provision of houses and equipment and of communal services such as town halls and schools (Fr 25 million), or an average of just over Fr 5,000 per holding or Fr 2,000 per settler.¹⁴ Nevertheless, in spite of their being what Leroy-Beaulieu calls “so generously subsidized,” fewer than a half of the original concessionaires were still farming their land at the end of the first ten years.¹⁵

Palestine

In the late nineteenth century, what was to become the British Mandate of Palestine included land from the southern part of the Ottoman province of Beirut and the Ottoman *sankjak* of Jerusalem. Its main geographical feature from an agricultural point of view was a long coastal plain north of Jaffa where rainfall averaging 500 millimeters a year between 1901 and 1940 was sufficient to grow winter cereals and a variety of other field and tree crops.¹⁶ Rivers and underground water sources were used to irrigate only a tiny proportion of the land, much of it devoted to the famous Jaffa oranges, which provided the native Palestinians with an income sufficient to attract the attention of one of the earliest supporters of Jewish land colonization, the Baron Edmond de Rothschild.

Rothschild's initial interest was in providing sufficient funds for the handful of Jewish agricultural settlements set up by the “Lovers of Zion” in the late 1870s and early 1880s to prevent their collapse and thus the return of their inhabitants to Europe.¹⁷ However, he was soon persuaded to introduce some more long-term measures designed to create a class of independent Jewish farmers able, after some decades, to live without subsidy. By and large the initial settlements followed local patterns of dry farming that necessitated a division of the land into relatively large land holdings of at least 200 dunums or so (1 dunum = approx. 0.25 acres), although these tended to become smaller over time thanks to the provision of better water supplies and the introduction of a more mixed pattern of farming.¹⁸

Although a private initiative, and so distinct from that of the settlement movement associated with the form of political Zionism introduced after the first Zionist congress in 1897, the Rothschild effort is worth analysis for two reasons. First, it was undertaken by a member of one of Europe's leading banking families along what were supposed to be strictly economic lines. Second, it generated a great deal of data about the costs of settlement and the enormous difficulties involved in keeping the costs of such an enterprise within strict financial limits, given its religious/ideological character and the existence of larger aims such as the creation of a new type of Jewish farmer and the elimination, where possible, of recourse to cheap Arab labor.¹⁹

Simon Schama's study of the affair, *Two Rothschilds and the Land of Israel*, reveals a considerable experiment with different methods of settlement with regard to contracts, farm size, and so on, as well as with different types of crops including, among others, vineyards, fruit orchards, and, for a brief period, mulberries, as the basis for an unsuccessful experiment with silk. It also provides a rich, although not always very clear, account of the Baron's difficulties in finding a way of calculating a measurable return on his fixed investment.²⁰ A particularly telling example of such problems concerned the 1899 efforts of one of Rothschild's local managers, Adolph Starkmeth, to assess the assets and liabilities of the agricultural colony of Zikhron and to review its performance over the previous fifteen years. His report revealed a pattern of out-of-control expenditure, a danger he suggested should be remedied by placing a strict ceiling on the colony's ordinary expenditure, supported by a realistic system for costing the production of one of the Baron's favorite products, wine.²¹

Starkmeth's efforts, together with others, also highlighted the problems involved in establishing the returns both of the individual farmers and of the colonization effort as a whole. These embraced such technical matters as proper methods of accountancy, including the ability to make a clear distinction between current and capital costs, as well as more basic factors such as the increase in administrative expense due to the employment of more and more managerial personnel, the constant demands for money for new investment, resistance from the settlers, and the aspirations of some of them for a bourgeois rather than a peasant-farmer style of life. And all this in a context of settling a difficult terrain far from Rothschild's Paris headquarters exacerbated by any number of short-term crises such as the phylloxera attack on the grapes in 1894 or the considerable problems faced by those trying to market Palestinian wine.²²

Difficulties of this type may have been a major contributor to the Baron's decision to hand over management to the newly formed Jewish Colonization Association (JCA) in January 1900, even though, as Schama asserts, the immediate reason was his own ill-health.²³ This led at once to an energetic attempt to lay the groundwork for a new approach involving financial retrenchment marked by a reduction in administrative personnel, better financial practices,

and greater attention to the influence of market forces.²⁴ Other innovations concerned new methods for allocating land, including the use of a system of sharecropping to get settlers started on the way to a long-term lease, backed up by a greater willingness to expel unsuitable farmers.²⁵ Equally important was the greater attention paid to local crops and conditions, underpinned by efforts to increase productivity through investment in better techniques.²⁶

Nevertheless, huge problems remained. JCA policies designed to promote self-reliance by keeping the initial advances low became self-defeating when conditions worsened—due, for example, to Palestine’s eccentric pattern of rainfall with two or three good years inevitably followed by two or three bad years, forcing the colonists into the hands of local usurers.²⁷ More generally, the JCA never pretended to be able to recover start-up costs. Nor did it find a way to cope with the problem of obtaining their repayment from those colonists who gave up and left agriculture altogether.²⁸ Schama writes of the “unremitting struggle” to keep a few thousand Jewish settlers on the land.²⁹ He also notes that up to 1914 the growth of Jewish settlement remained “very limited” and was “expensively maintained,” and that the idea of the self-reliant cultivator had been realized on only a few farms in the Galilee.³⁰

What “self-reliant” might really have meant is a question to which I will return in the next section. For the time being it is sufficient to note Schama’s characterization of the first official Zionist colonies—which were then beginning to attempt a more mixed pattern of communal agriculture (notably, the early versions of the *kibbutzim* established at Degania and Kinneret just before 1914)—as suffering from many of the same problems as their JCA neighbors.³¹

By 1944 the number of Jewish agricultural settlements had grown to 259, of which 44 were operated by independent farmers, 99 organized as cooperatives, and 111 as communal (*kibbutzim*).³² The majority, 59 percent, containing 31 percent of the rural Jewish population, had been established by the Jewish National Fund (JNF), which used money raised from the world’s Jewish community to buy land, to provide it with irrigation and drainage, and to supply the settlers with the long-term loans they needed to finance buildings and the purchase of livestock, machinery, and equipment.³³ Total settlement costs over the period 1920–1944 totaled £11.75 million, or a third of all Zionist capital imports.³⁴ More purely political and ideological than most of the other settlement bodies, the JNF was primarily interested in creating a Jewish national home with the help of notions like Zionist labor, which aimed at raising the level of Jewish wages by promoting exchange between Jews only and preventing the employment of non-Jewish workers.

Of the rest, forty-four—almost all consisting of independent farmers—had been established either by the JCA or its successor, PJCA (Palestine Jewish Colonization Association), which was founded in 1924. These farmers had been required to pay only a small part of the initial investment in land, buildings, livestock, and equipment with the remainder due over fifty years, after which

they were given title to what they now owned.³⁵ The result was a considerable reduction in PJCA land, from 468,000 dunums in the mid-1920s to 140,000 by the mandate's end in 1948.³⁶

The process of agricultural settlement was certainly successful in terms of raising output and productivity. Even if we leave out the enormously important role played by the citrus industry, which contributed three-fourths of Jewish agricultural output in the mid-1930s, Jacob Metzger's calculations demonstrate an almost fourfold increase in Jewish agricultural yields between 1921 and 1935 as a result of investments of various types—notably in irrigation, which by 1947 was used in 12 percent of the land along the coastal plains—as well as by what he describes as a “gradual” shift from low-yield extensive farming to a more mixed pattern involving livestock raising and dairy products.³⁷ Metzger also calculates that by the late 1930s putative Jewish per-capita income in Palestine (a combination of both the agricultural and nonagricultural sectors) had reached a level above that of Yugoslavia and Romania, and more or less the equivalent of Bulgaria, the three poorest European countries on his list.³⁸

The fact that the costs of such progress were justified first and foremost in terms of the ideological and political goals of Zionism makes it especially difficult to work out whether it could also be considered a reasonable rate of return on the investments in land purchase and land settlement. Such calculations are made more difficult by other factors such as Britain's Palestinian immigration policy, based on the extremely imprecise notion of the country's “absorptive capacity,” which required most categories of prospective migrants to show that they were already in possession of independent means, professional skills, and prospects for secure employment.³⁹ Even more important was the increasing impact of the persecution of German Jewry, which made it less likely that those arriving in Palestine would want—or be able—to leave. This makes it even more difficult to investigate that central index of the success of such a method of settlement: that is, the balance between those who stay on the land and those who leave.⁴⁰

Another observation is that the land colonization process involved a large measure of successful trial and error—for example, the development of a type of mixed farming associated with the Kibbutz movement in which the cultivation of cereals was accompanied by animal husbandry, dairy farming, and the production of higher quality crops like fruit and vegetables. However successful though this may have been in terms of planting, and then holding, colonists who came to Palestine knowing little about agricultural life in a context of great physical difficulty (and often considerable insecurity), it does not tell us whether the project made sense in purely economic terms as well. On the one hand, there was a high level of subsidy in the shape of “colonizing loans” at what Harry Viteles, one of the major historians of the Israeli cooperative movement describes as the “most favorable terms.”⁴¹ On the other, there was the willingness of the more ideologically motivated kibbutzniks to live in what

one report described as “temporary, dangerous and unsanitary accommodation” and to work for the equivalent of little more than subsistence wages.⁴² Last but not least, there was the support provided by the Jewish urban population in the form of their readiness to buy Jewish produce at higher prices than could be obtained from the Arab agricultural sector either in Palestine itself or from Arab neighbors like Syria and Lebanon.

Some sense of what was involved can be arrived at by examining the somewhat fuller information relating to the first decade after the establishment of the Jewish state of Israel. As a source quoted by Alex Rubner notes, agriculture remained the “privileged occupation of Zionism” after 1948 and so continued to benefit from large subsidies, both open and disguised.⁴³ Direct subsidies totaled twenty-one million Israeli pounds in 1956 and thirty-one million in 1957, representing some 5 percent of total budgetary expenditure. Indirect subsidies, which are much more difficult to quantify, included access to public resources such as land, water, electricity, public services, building materials, and credit at reduced prices.⁴⁴ To this should be added preferential access to investment goods in short supply—particularly those requiring scarce foreign currency—as well as an urban population still willing to pay more than the world market price for domestic agricultural products such as milk, eggs, poultry, meat, and vegetables.⁴⁵

The post-1948 period also provides useful information about the actual cost of the settlement process, with an average of 30,000 Israeli pounds per person during the first stage for housing, equipment, training, and the provision of part-time employment as a supplement to farm income.⁴⁶ According to Rubner, a fierce opponent of subsidization, this meant that the average rent was “far less” than the economic rent, with the gross economic rent at only 60 percent of the gross value of agricultural output.⁴⁷

Conclusion and Directions for New Research

Given the difficulties involved in obtaining the necessary figures, it seems unlikely that anyone will ever be able to calculate the real degree of subsidization and which, if any, of these settlement attempts could be considered “viable” even in the limited sense of having been able to repay all their initial costs. In one sense, of course, questions of this type are beside the point. Official settlement efforts must be seen as political projects that succeeded or failed largely for political reasons. And it is as political projects that they remain interesting today, in terms of their continued impact on the ongoing struggles between the settler-colonists and their descendants, on the one hand, and on the people they sought to replace, on the other.

Nevertheless, there are still important questions to be asked and interesting comparisons to be made. As the data just presented shows, official settlement projects involve a high degree of initial subsidization as well as the prospect of continued demands by settler pressure groups for many decades thereafter. This

in turn raises the question of the various kinds of domestic and colonial politics involved. First, we need to know who provided the money and what the balance was between the taxpayers in the metropolis or the colony, banks and other commercial lenders, and various types of philanthropy. We also need to know on what terms it was given or lent, and with what expectations. And, finally, to what extent was each set of contributors fully cognizant of how their money was actually used?

Then come the questions about what interests were involved and how their struggles with one another played out. It is a common story in colonial history, for example, that settlers would complain that the indigenous population was not contributing its fair share to government revenues. This was certainly true of the *colons* in Algeria just as much as the Zionist movement in Palestine.⁴⁸ Another set of relations involved those between the private settlers and the official ones. It is very possible, for example, that official settlement was made much easier when private settlement was either experiencing great difficulty or, at the very least, appeared to be doing so.⁴⁹ If true, this would be yet another reason for the organizers of official settlement to make great efforts to hide as many of the their problems as possible, from the real costs involved to the huge problems on the ground, in the interest of obtaining as large a share as they could of money, official settlers, and public support.

Turning now to the particular challenge posed by the initial emphasis on dry-land agriculture, we can raise questions as to the extent to which it could be made to produce a European standard of living even over the fifty-year time span that the JCA or Paul Leroy-Beaulieu projected. And this clearly involves an exploration of other key topics such as whether and under what conditions Europeans could make higher net profits than the local peasant farmers. Did the answer lie in a different size of unit, in better technology, in a somewhat different mix of crops and animals, or, most probably, a more efficient combination of all three? A related question concerns the success, or lack thereof, in holding officially supported settlers on the land. Once again, there is much to be said for trying to look at such problems in a comparative context in terms of the various costs and practices of settlement not only in other European colonies and dominions (such as Australia) but in large land empires like Russia and the United States as well.

Finally, it should be well understood that finding answers for these questions involves problems on two levels. The first one is on the technical level. As the experience of the Rothschild colonies and then of those supported by the JCA shows, attempts to establish separate balance sheets both for the individual farms and for the settlement project as a whole posed difficult problems for the accountants. It may also be that, in other cases, little effort was made to draw up any balance sheets at all. Then, on the second level, there is the even more difficult question of how “viability,” or the Rothschild goal of settler self-reliance, should be defined. Repayment of initial low-interest loans is one

thing; the ability to generate a standard of living sufficient both to keep the settlers on the land and to attract others to it is quite another. Establishing whether such levels were, or even could be, reached goes far beyond individual or settlement accounts to the much larger question of calculating the average income for the whole settler farming community.

Notes

1. See, for example, Paul Leroy-Beaulieu, *L'Algérie et la Tunisie*, 2nd ed. (Paris: Guillaumin, 1897), 207–208.
2. There are also some limited connections between Algeria and Palestine via the activities in both of the Alliance Israelite Universelle as well as the Algerian influence on the thinking of the French Rothschilds involved in promoting their own form of Zionist settlement in Palestine from the 1880s onward, particularly as far as the introduction of viticulture and winemaking was concerned. See, for example, Simon Schama, *Two Rothschilds and the Land of Israel* (London: Collins, 1978), 121–22.
3. John Ruedy, *Land Policy in Colonial Algeria: The Origins of the Rural Public Domain* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967), 98.
4. Leroy-Beaulieu, *L'Algérie et la Tunisie*, 67, 89.
5. Victor Piquat, *La colonisation française dans l'Afrique du Nord: Algérie—Tunisie—Maroc* (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1912), 196–99.
6. Leroy-Beaulieu, *L'Algérie et la Tunisie*, 205–206.
7. *Ibid.*, 68.
8. Mahfoud Bennoune, *The Making of Contemporary Algeria 1830–1987: Colonial Upheaval and Post-Independence Development* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 63.
9. Leroy-Beaulieu, *L'Algérie et la Tunisie*, 98.
10. *Ibid.*, 67.
11. *Ibid.*, 91.
12. *Ibid.*, 92.
13. Bennoune, *Making of Contemporary Algeria*, 64.
14. Leroy-Beaulieu, *L'Algérie et la Tunisie*, 77–79. This is Leroy-Beaulieu's own estimate. He notes that the “administration,” using a different method of calculation, put the cost per settler at Fr 969.
15. *Ibid.*, 80.
16. Government of Palestine, *A Survey of Palestine*, vol. 1 (Jerusalem: Government Printers, 1946), 106.
17. Schama, *Two Rothschilds*, 88.
18. The figures come from information in the Palestine agricultural census of 1927, quoted in A. Granott, *The Land System in Palestine* (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1952), 259–60.
19. Schama, *Two Rothschilds*, 119–20.
20. *Ibid.*, 120.
21. *Ibid.*, 126–29.
22. *Ibid.*, 121–28.
23. *Ibid.*, 134–35.
24. *Ibid.*, 148.
25. *Ibid.*, 149, 158.
26. *Ibid.*, 152–53.
27. *Ibid.*, 161.
28. *Ibid.*, 161–62.
29. *Ibid.*, 170.
30. *Ibid.*, 181.
31. *Ibid.*, 181–82.
32. Government of Palestine, *Survey of Palestine*, 1:372–73.
33. *Ibid.*, 376–77.
34. *Ibid.*; Jacob Metzer, *The Divided Economy of Mandatory Palestine* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), appendix A.24, 245.
35. Government of Palestine, *Survey of Palestine*, 1:376.
36. Metzer, *Divided Economy*, 101.

37. Ibid., 150–51.
38. Ibid., Appendix B.1, 248–49.
39. Government of Palestine, *Survey of Palestine*, 1:165–168.
40. Figures do indicate a net loss of Jewish migrants in 1927. They do not, however, indicate how many of those who decided to leave Palestine came from the agricultural sector.
41. Harry Viteles, *An Analysis of the Four Sectors of the Kibbutz Movement*, book 3 of *A History of the Cooperative Movement in Israel: A Source Book in Seven Volumes* (London: Valentine Mitchell, 1968), 71.
42. Henry Near, “The Crisis of the Kibbutz Movement, 1949–1961” quoted in *Israel: The First Decade of Independence*, ed. S. Ilan Troen and Noah Lucas (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995), 245.
43. Alex Rubner, *The Economy of Israel: A Critical Account of the First Ten Years* (New York: Praeger, 1960), 99.
44. Ibid., 100.
45. Ibid., 100, 109.
46. Ibid., 100–101.
47. Ibid., 102.
48. See, for example, Leroy-Beaulieu, *L’Algérie et la Tunisie*, 205–206; Metzger, *Divided Economy*, 187–90.
49. Gershon Shafir has suggested this point to me as almost certainly true of Palestine.

10

Racial Violence and the Origins of Segregation in South Africa

IVAN EVANS

This essay examines the role that violence played in the forging of segregation in South Africa in the period between the two world wars. At the time the Union of South Africa was formed in 1910, blacks confronted what this chapter will generally treat as two distinct sources of violence—violence from ordinary white citizens and from the state. South African historiography usually focuses on state repression and, except for several recent essays on the topic, has not paid much systematic attention to the role of private or interpersonal violence by white citizens. The emerging work on this topic locates the source of civilian violence in the “crisis of white masculinity” that rattled white men just before and after the disruptions occasioned by the Anglo-Boer War (1899–1901). By concentrating on the prerogatives and assumptions that white men viewed as central to their identities as men who bore responsibility for controlling black men, this approach has opened up an important and promising line of inquiry.¹ I suggest in this chapter, however, that an overly narrow focus on the psychodynamics of masculine identities runs the risk of obscuring distinctive trends in the evolution and management of racial violence in the segregation era. It is for good reason that the bulk of the literature on state formation in South Africa is devoted to the role of state repression: racial domination would have been impossible without the concerted efforts of the state to coerce, intimidate, and kill blacks who opposed the evolving racial order. In this sense, the violence used to establish segregation in South Africa illuminates the violence that was indispensable to most—perhaps all—settler society regimes.

Lord Hailey remarked that racial domination in South Africa at the turn of the last century was more coercive and white citizens more abusive and racist than in other British colonies.² However, the rapidity and early emergence of a complex industrial economy distinguished South Africa from settler colonial states elsewhere on the African continent. Thus, rather than analyze racial violence in South Africa against the background of the less-industrialized context of other settler colonial regimes in Africa, it seems more useful to turn to a region

to which South Africa is frequently compared—the American South. John Cell has observed that segregation in these two contexts had much in common. Cell’s central insight—that segregation, far from preserving an outdated system of race relations associated with slavery and the “frontier tradition,” in fact modernized the integration of racial domination and capitalist development—set the tone for all subsequent comparative analyses, including the literature dealing with the nexus between violence and white masculinity.³ Drawing on well-supported arguments in the postbellum American South, this literature shows that white men in South Africa resorted to violence against black men because the aftermath of war greatly diminished their material capacity to maintain their households and maintain their exclusive access to white women in the early stages of industrialization, when blacks entered the labor market in rising numbers. Evidence for this explanation of racial violence in the early decades of segregation in South Africa is encouraging. Still, the focus on the gendered anxieties of white men is too narrow and fails to account fully for the growth of state repression, which, I argue below, remains the most distinctive aspect of racial violence in South Africa. A comparison of racial violence in South Africa and the American South suggests, in fact, that the formal development of institutions that specialized in controlling the black majority may have significantly *checked* the public violence that white men were capable of in South Africa.

The evidence for this conclusion lies in the contrasting importance of lynching in the American and South African segregation orders. Lynching was fundamental to racial violence in the American South, as essential to the interior world of white men as it was to the public manifestation of racial domination. In contrast, although not foreign to South Africa, lynching was not central to white supremacy: white men did not rally around the institution and state officials did not countenance the public lynching of blacks by private white citizens. The reason for this outcome in South Africa lies in the bureaucratization of racial violence from the outset of segregation in 1910.

Lynching in the American South and South Africa

Whites in the American South used a staggering degree of violence first to beat back the ex-slaves that Reconstruction had sought to “uplift,” and later to intimidate African Americans into submission to racial segregation. Lynching was the most iconic form of racial violence: approximately five thousand blacks were lynched across the South between 1880 and 1930. For sound reasons, scholars have focused on what the literature refers to as “public” or “spectacle” lynching, although such lynchings accounted for only one-third of the known extralegal killings of blacks. Apart from the important issue of the number of participants involved, public lynchings should be distinguished from *private* lynchings in one important respect—private lynchings were frequently hasty and furtive affairs. In contrast, public lynchings were spectacular phenomena

in which the size of lynch mobs could vary from a handful to thousands. As Orlando Patterson has recently emphasized, one of the most common observations in the literature on public lynchings is the central importance of ritual and its near absence in private lynching.⁴

Patterson notes that a sequence of ceremonies attended the various stages in a public lynching, beginning with the accusation, apprehension, taunting, and torture, and culminating finally in the execution of the victim. Embedded in these rituals are vital clues about the cultural bases of racial segregation in the American South that offer fruitful ground for comparing the role that racial violence played in the establishment of segregation in South Africa. Perhaps the most consistent argument that emerges from the literature on public lynching in the South is that “spectacle lynchings” played a vital role in unifying white communities that were divided along axes of gender and class: in the words of Elizabeth Hale, public lynching had the effect of “making whiteness.”⁵ Divisions that pitted elites against ordinary men and women, employer against employed, and men against women lost their potency as word spread that an African American man had been identified, pursued, and captured—each phase contributing to the mounting excitement and unity within the white community. Preparations for the victim’s demise and the actual killing that ensued provided the opportunity for individuals to regain—or at least celebrate—the power of “whiteness.” However briefly, the concern with recouping power and achieving a sense of mastery over destiny became a catalyst for leveling out differences among whites. The recovery of power therefore emerges as a central theme in accounts of spectacle lynchings.⁶

William Brundage’s superlative analysis of lynching in the New South shows that support for public lynchings could not always be counted on and that three sets of conditions first had to be met: the offense had to qualify as a fundamental threat to white supremacy; the white victim had to enjoy a certain social standing to deserve the display of communal support; and, perhaps most important, a collective framework that portrayed the execution as an extension of the law had to be established. Public lynchings usually required the compounding presence of these three special conditions.⁷ Patterson concludes that public lynching was an act of human sacrifice that shares the essential characteristics of all ritual sacrifice first identified by anthropologists such as Henri Hubert and Marcel Mauss, who explored the meaning of ritual in “primitive societies.”⁸ In his essay “The Southern Rite of Human Sacrifice,” Donald Mathews argues that communal lynching possessed an element that was absent in private lynchings: a propitiatory impulse that transformed the taking of a human life into a dramatic reaffirmation of community among local whites. Curiously, the rituals associated with public lynching transformed the black victim into a Christlike figure whose own brutal lynching is central to Christian community. African Americans intuitively grasped the connection between public lynching and Christ’s death, that—as African American poet Gwendolyn

Brooks has written, “the loveliest lynchee was our Lord.” But few white Christians saw that “in a sacrifice celebrated in such dramatic and public fashion, the Christ had become black.”⁹ The attention of white Protestantism lay elsewhere, on the act of Christ’s punishment and the teaching that the salvation of Christians was dependent on Christ’s brutal death. Because “punishment was sacralized by the dominant religion of the American South,” communal lynchings could be readily grasped as the confluence of racial justice, spiritual cleansing, and collective atonement. And one of the most familiar observations in the literature on lynching is the unifying impact that lynching had on local white communities—the primary function of public lynching was to give substance to shallow claims about the “Solid South.”¹⁰

Although the paucity of research on interpersonal racial violence in South Africa militates against confident conclusions, lynching undoubtedly occurred in South Africa. The official designation of such killings as “Assaults on Natives” (as archival files are categorized) obscures both the existence and the pervasiveness of summary executions, ensuring that the word *lynching* would not gain a foothold in South African vernacular. Bland legal terminology pertaining to “assaults” and the various categories of serious violence and murder (“manslaughter,” “third degree murder,” “grievous bodily harm,” and so on) simultaneously normalized racial violence and portrayed the state as actively involved in stemming it. But if semantic discrepancies are set aside, examples provided below make it clear that the phenomenon of lynching was no stranger to the establishment of segregation in South Africa. It may be said with greater certainty, however, that public lynchings were unknown in South Africa and that all lynching was “private” in character. A thorough search of the relevant archival and secondary sources failed to reveal a single instance of an extra-legal killing of blacks by large groups of white citizens in ways that correspond with the public and ritual lynching of blacks in the American South as described by scholars such as Orlando Patterson. The absence of public or ritual lynchings in South Africa raises an interesting question about the “making of whiteness.” Why was lynching vital to “whiteness” in the American South, but not in South Africa? I suggest below that the answer centers on the role of the state.

White settler colonists at the beginning of the twentieth century agreed to place responsibility for the management of “race relations” firmly in the hands of the racial state, in keeping with a generalized orientation to state power that I will call statism. The fusion of segregation and statism was the “normal” condition of colonial regimes,¹¹ but was exacerbated by the challenges and opportunities thrown up by rapid industrialization in South Africa. The challenge confronting the young state in the two decades immediately after unification was to incorporate black workers into a restive industrial arena that was marked by three broad political dynamics: internecine squabbling among different employers, the emergence of a militant white labor movement, and the

first stirrings of strikes by African workers. The twin threat that African rebellion and industrial mayhem posed for whites is captured by General Jan Smuts who, in the course of his meditations on the violent strike by white mineworkers in 1914, wailed about “the dreadful spectacle of thousands of natives in the compound singing their war song. ... What would have happened if that wild collection of savages had broken loose?”¹² More fearful to Smuts than the violence with which white workers had challenged the still uncertain power of the state in 1914 was the ruinous potential of African resistance. Otherwise divided by class and ethnicity, Afrikaners and English-speaking whites embraced statism in recognition of the fact that only the state could manage this threat from below.¹³

Closely tied to the statist foundations of segregationist ideology in South Africa was the issue of white male masculinity, the indispensable matrix of violence against blacks. As Timothy Keegan has noted, “White masculinity, inseparable from the exercise of racial power, was in a state of malaise” at the time of unification in 1910.¹⁴ This insight echoes a long tradition in the literature on racial violence in the American South, with virtually all studies concurring on the central importance that gender and specifically *sexual* anxieties played in justifying the lynching of emancipated blacks. Fewer than one-third of lynchings involved allegations of rape committed by African American men on white women. The pioneering research by the African American antilynching activist and feminist, Ida B. Wells, demonstrated that sexual attacks on white women by African American men were a rarity in the postbellum South. Southerners nevertheless cited rape as the single most important justification for lynching. Such lynchings were frequently accompanied by sexual mutilations of the unfortunate black victim. Thus, a demonic “Southern rape complex” that depicted ex-slave men as “beast rapists” emerged during and after Radical Reconstruction. The myth empowered white men to lynch African Americans almost at will, with the reassuring knowledge that lynchers were unlikely to spend a day in court and virtually guaranteed not to spend one in a jail cell.¹⁵

Echoing the extensive research on “rape panic” scares in the American South, several recent studies have also drawn attention to the link between “Black peril” panics and violent white masculinity in South Africa. Because segregation in South Africa was preceded by violent warfare and political upheaval, just as it was in the American South, scholars have profitably noted that white men in South Africa worried more than usual about their ability to safeguard their women from the general dislocations occasioned by the Anglo-Boer War and the many practical and political uncertainties that clouded the constitutional achievement of 1910. Natal experienced a rape panic in 1886. Black peril outbreaks then erupted in the Cape, Natal, and the Witwatersrand area in 1902–1903, while flareups illuminated the anxieties of rural white communities in the Transvaal in 1906–1908 and again in 1911–1912. The latter outbreak resulted in the appointment of an official government commission of inquiry,

which issued its report in 1912. Echoing Ida B. Wells's findings for the American South, the report concluded that the number of black-on-white sexual attacks was neither high nor on the increase.¹⁶ By focusing on the rising pitch and growing frequency of rape scares at the time of Union, the literature on Black peril cases in the early years of segregation in South Africa paints a compelling picture of an embattled white masculinity in a context of rapid and uncertain social change.

What this literature does not adequately explain, however, is the relative restrained behavior of white men in South Africa whenever blacks were suspected of "sex-specific" offenses. This restraint stands in sharp distinction to the lynchings that almost always followed when African American men were suspected of "outrages." Despite evidence that South African white men exhibited a similar anxiety about their status and dominance at the time of union, not once did allegations of a "sex-specific" attack yield a lynching in South Africa in the first decades after unification. Instead, allegations of rape set in motion the much less incendiary machinery of the state. The incident with which Keegan begins his essay on the sexual politics of race at the time of union is typical of the outcome of rape scares in South Africa. For daring to write that "veld [that is, Afrikaner] girls" were "utterly abandoned" in the "indulgence of their passions" and, more provocatively, suggesting that "every farm native who has a desire for white women knows where he satisfy it," P. B. Carlisle was seized from his office by a mob of Afrikaner men who proceeded to tar and feather him. Carlisle was then taken by car and deposited on a city street where he was booed and heckled. John Edgar, the editor of the newspaper that had published Carlisle's article, was also attacked and violently beaten to the floor of his office. Carlisle was rescued by a journalist who took him to a police station where he made a statement. One of Carlisle's assailants presented himself for arrest but was told that no charge would be brought against him.¹⁷

The denouement was essentially the same in two other Black peril scares discussed in the literature. In an incident examined by Norman Etherington in colonial Natal, a virulent rape panic in the 1870s subsided as quickly and mysteriously as it had arisen, without whites attacking or assaulting blacks. In 1912, a group of white men formed the Turffontein Vigilance Society to suppress what the white residents of Turffonetin had convinced themselves was an outbreak of sexual assaults by black men. After beating up several black men found sleeping in the nearby bush, the Vigilance Society hastily disbanded after the police threatened to lay charges of criminal assault against them.¹⁸ White masculinity in South Africa may have been as fraught and pregnant with dangerous potential as it was in the American South. But, unlike white American Southerners, white South African men simply did not generate a lynch culture even when the "virtue" and "chastity" of white women were held to be at stake. The logic that links together white masculinity, political instability,

and lynching seems to work well for the Southern case, but seems less useful in South Africa because of the preponderant role that the state played in regulating “race relations.”

Violence and the Role of the State

Hostility to government intervention in the economy was a sturdy pillar of post-Reconstruction Southern political culture. Elites in particular virulently opposed any measure that potentially limited the authority and control of capitalists, and were especially hostile to any measure that curtailed employers' power over labor, whether black or white.¹⁹ Compared to developments in South Africa, the overt hostility that southern employers displayed toward “poor whites” was a striking aspect of “the solid South.” A large class of poor whites in the South had coexisted with black slaves, and high levels of “poor whiteism” would characterize the region at least until World War II. In response, David Roediger and others have argued, skin color became the most important badge of distinction for “poor whites,” publicly signifying that, unlike slaves, even the poorest of whites enjoyed “freedom from masters.”²⁰ The abolition of slavery therefore directly imperiled the “whiteness” of poor whites, setting the context for intense competition between blacks and poor whites at the lowest rung of the agrarian economy.

However, employers and state officials soon proved almost as indifferent to the plight of “poor whites” as they were to ex-slaves, steadfastly refusing to enact legislation to protect poor whites legally from competition with blacks. The infamous Black Codes that emerged immediately after the Civil War only briefly provided poor whites with some degree of protection before Reconstruction governments outlawed them.²¹ Intent on regulating the public spaces in which blacks and whites could interact, Jim Crow segregationist measures and the *Plessey v. Ferguson* ruling (1898) that legalized the “separate but equal” doctrine, introduced segregation in virtually all aspects of social life but did not directly dictate how blacks were to be incorporated into the economy; nor, for that matter, did Jim Crow laws directly disenfranchise blacks. A major consequence of Jim Crow measures was that it left these two issues unclear. Moreover, constitutional amendments in the Reconstruction period had specifically empowered blacks to vote and a small number of subsequent court rulings had upheld the civil liberties of blacks. This meant that extralegal measures were required to coerce blacks into submission. Likewise, because blacks were formally entitled to own property and behave as free agents in the labor markets of the South, further measures were also required to destroy these and other civil liberties. Despite Jim Crow laws, the emergence of segregation in the South was marked by very little formal discriminatory measures in the economy, a testament to the ability of elites to either block state intrusion into a realm they claimed for themselves or their failure to reach accord over the need for such measures.²² The combination of elite opposition to “big government”

and constitutional limitations on racially discriminatory laws meant that segregation could be neither fully elaborated by the courts nor vigorously implemented by formal bureaucracies. As a result, the extensive formal structure of segregationist measures that emerged in South Africa was not possible in the American South.

It was in this context that extralegal violence in the South retained its savage ferocity after 1900, by which time terror had already succeeded in keeping the vast majority of African Americans from the voting booths. The “Southern rape complex” came to the fore on the heels of this accomplishment. An obsession with the need to “protect” women from black men sustained the region’s popular acceptance of “repressive justice,” holding that citizens were entitled to inflict punishments that public officials either could not or would not lawfully impose. The ideology of “repressive justice” reinforced the lethal potential embodied in the Southern “code of honor.” According to this “chivalrous” code, white men were entitled, indeed required, to defend their “honor,” property, and women with violence rather than seek the intervention of the courts.²³ In communities deeply split along class lines and with white men increasingly uneasy about the growing economic independence of “their” women in the post-Reconstruction years, lynching played an important role in bolstering a collective sense of whiteness by shoring up the hegemony of all men, regardless of class. The institutionalization of “repressive justice” in Southern culture thus reflects the truncated legitimacy and reach of state authority among white citizens.²⁴ It explains why state authority could rapidly evaporate when lynch mobs felt thwarted by local sheriffs or state militias who refused to hand over black prisoners. Numerous accounts chronicle how lynch mobs shot down uncooperative jailers and stormed or dynamited prisons to prize African American prisoners from the hands of state authorities.²⁵

In South Africa, whites’ outlook on the role of the state is best captured by the term *statism*—the ideology that accepts and celebrates the interventionist powers of the state. In ways that were impossible in the American South, the task of organizing white unity in South Africa was directly taken up by a paternalist state that relied overwhelmingly on constitutional measures to shape race relations. Otherwise divided over a number of important issues, Afrikaners and English-speaking whites, capitalists and white workers, white men and white women all came to support (and even demanded greater) state involvement in society. None of the three major class actors in the South African economy—mine owners, farmers, and industrialists—seriously questioned the principle of state intervention because all sought to exploit the advantages of cheap labor. Heated disputes amongst different employers and sectors in the two decades after 1910 reflected the clash of competing demands for intervention, but not the principle itself.²⁶

Moreover, white workers militantly leveraged their class power to secure important racial protections from the state. For two decades after union in 1910,

white workers concentrated their political muscle on insulating themselves from the “fear of competition” that haunted poor whites in the American South.²⁷ After a decade of steadily escalating militancy, the momentous strike they staged in 1922 prompted the government to address the “poor white problem” seriously. Like mine owners, farmers, and urban employers, poor whites in South Africa looked to the state for their own salvation. Between 1910 and 1930, white politics was devoted to the search for a state suitably crafted to mediate rival interests in black labor. What emerged was a growing body of laws, institutions, and bureaucrats intended to hobble blacks politically and secure their distribution across the labor market in ways that, at least formally, addressed the particular needs of different employers. Political disenfranchisement, “job color bars” that legally reserved certain jobs for whites only, residential segregation, a pass system for controlling the mobility and involuntary servitude of blacks, and a bifurcated legal system that subjected blacks to draconian administrative control were but some of the far-reaching legal measures that were set in place in the first two decades after union.²⁸

All of these repressive laws would have been considered either undesirable or legally impossible in the American South. Many of these measures would have given to the state powers that employers in the South were loathe to cede to “big government.” For example, employers in the South rejected statutory color bars and racial quotas that would have buttressed the position of white workers. Likewise, until the New Deal imposed industrial conciliation machinery, Southern employers rarely hesitated to respond to white labor militancy by calling in sheriffs, state militias, and professional strike-breaking companies to quell violently strikes by white workers as well as the more infrequent displays of multiracial labor unity.²⁹ With equal alacrity, employers also incensed white workers by summarily calling in black scab labor. Nor did Southern employers support measures such as state subsidized housing for poor whites; moreover, as late as the 1930s, some states reduced further their already small expenditures on state white education.³⁰ Employers also categorically refused to protect poor whites by reserving whole swathes of industrial jobs for whites only.

In contrast, from 1910 onward, employers and governments in South Africa responded to the increasingly restive and organized poor whites streaming into the union’s urban areas. Small and grudging amounts of “poor relief” were first dispensed soon after unification by the pro-imperial South African Party government. These paltry but symbolically significant relief efforts were then complemented by the efforts of *die volkskerk*, the Dutch Reformed Church, which fused Afrikaner nationalism ideals to those of the Social Gospel and began its welfare work among poor whites just before the outbreak of World War I.³¹ However, it is the protective laws passed by the Pact and National Party governments to boost the wages and increase the employment opportunities of “civilized labor” that most clearly underscore the extent to which poor whites in South Africa benefited from direct state interventions. Together

with the full incorporation of white trade unions into the industrial conciliation machinery after the 1922 strike, these measures ensured that poor whites in South Africa were much more effectively protected from the wage-deflating presence of cheaper black labor in the economy.³²

No less than employers, working-class whites in South Africa looked upon government as the patron of the white poor, successfully extracting reforms in the 1920s that prefigured aspects of the New Deal that emerged in the United States in the 1930s.³³ Government, for its part, deepened the statist orientation of white labor. Unwilling to impose the burden of taking on expensive white labor on the gold mining industry, which resolutely opposed the idea, the South African Party government implemented the civilized labor policies most strenuously in the civil service, particularly in labor intensive operations such as the postal services office, the Department of Railway and Harbours, and in public works projects. The Carnegie Conference of 1932, called to investigate and propose solutions to white poverty, confirmed the importance that whites collectively attached to the social and political circumstances of the “poor white problem.”³⁴ From the moment the phenomenon was first identified as a “problem,” commentators observed that “poor whiteism” gained its salience from the presence of cheaper black labor consigned by law to the lowest rungs of the racial order. Poor whiteism confounded the state’s constitutional commitment to preserving the boundaries between black and white. As we see below, the implications were not lost on white labor.

It is noteworthy that on the three occasions between 1910 and 1930 when whites violently challenged the very foundations and legitimacy of the state—once with an armed rebellion by seditious Afrikaner nationalists (1914) and twice with explosive strikes against the mining industry (1913 and 1922)—the “native question” was not directly involved. For example, strike leaders in 1922 deliberately attacked black mineworkers, massacring at least twenty innocents in the process—but only because they hoped to provoke an outraged response from black workers that would have diverted the military machine aimed against the white strikers. The strategy failed (black workers did not take the bait) but reveals the shrewd calculation by white workers: however justified, any retaliation by General Smuts’s *bête noire*—“that wild collection of savages”—would have instantly altered the balance of forces and prioritized the defense of the racial character of the capitalist state.³⁵ The confinement of blacks in the mines’ hostels under the watchful eye of the police serves as a telling racial metaphor of the extent to which segregation in South Africa formally kept blacks as an “absent presence” on the margins of white politics. But if the intermediary role of the state authorities shielded them to some degree from collective violence by whites, it did not protect blacks from two other agents of violence: the state itself and the many white individuals who continued to brutalize and frequently kill blacks.

Statism and Racial Violence in South Africa

The statist orientation of whites' political culture in South Africa bears on the question of violence in several ways. First, statism upheld the state's monopoly over the means of racial violence. White citizens were therefore denied the power of life or death over blacks. Accordingly, whites who committed violence against blacks were regularly taken to court, where they were frequently—but by no means always—found guilty. As a result, paltry fines and both brief and suspended sentences were woefully insufficient to stamp out acts of private violence against blacks. In 1920, a white mineworker named M. Murray violently assaulted a black worker in what the director of native labor described as “an entirely unprovoked assault.” For suddenly pushing the black man down a mine shaft, causing severe head and face injuries, including the loss of two teeth, Murray avoided a court case by agreeing to pay a “compensation” to the man of £20.³⁶ Whites convicted of violence against blacks invariably received light sentences. John Barker, a white “shift boss” employed by the East Rand Premium Mines, was found guilty in 1922 for violently assaulting a black miner named Five Maribana, and handed a sentence of “£10 or 1 month's I.H.L. [Internment with Hard Labor].”³⁷ Nevertheless, even light sentences demonstrated that private violence would not enjoy the support of the state. A comment by an inspector in the Native Affairs Department in a letter sent to the South African Police captures the balancing act entailed in the state's attempts to “protect” blacks while avoiding the ire of whites: “assaults on natives by [white] miners are continually happening. ... The only effective method of checking the evil is to bring the offender before a Magistrate as it entails, apart from whether convictions are obtained or not, exposure and inconvenience, which in themselves is a deterrent. It also gives to the native a feeling of security as he must necessarily appreciate that every effort is being made on his behalf to protect him from the violent acts of his immediate employers.”³⁸

Robert Turrell has shown that legal ideology in the segregation years sometimes prompted judges to come down hard on white men whose violent actions threatened to “bring discredit to the superior race” and “embarrass” whites in the eyes of blacks.³⁹ Perhaps this is what a magistrate had in mind when he upbraided Barend Johannes De Lange after finding him guilty of common assault for shooting in the direction of the usual nameless “native.” Before imposing a sentence of “£10 or three weeks' hard labor” the magistrate made it clear that “he viewed very seriously the use of the rifle where the native was concerned. The rifle was the farmer's best friend in times of danger and not to be used lightly where natives were concerned.”⁴⁰ In sum, despite this equivocal approach to racial justice, the pattern of convicting whites for acts of racial violence stands out against the refusal of juries to do so in American Southern courts, where lynchers would first be convicted only in the 1960s.

Second, statism fostered a specialized bureaucratic juggernaut for controlling blacks. The state in South Africa assumed extensive responsibility for the recruitment, surveillance, discipline, and punishment of black workers. A broad swathe of inflammatory issues that regularly triggered racial disputes and violence in Southern society therefore passed out of the hands of individual white employers and was assumed instead by the gun-wielding forces of the law. The early integration of an infamous troika of institutions—passes, compounds, and reserves—therefore established a pattern of state intervention that immediately shaped South Africa’s racially coercive labor market. A clutch of armed law enforcement agents—municipal police, the national constabulary, hundreds of “native administrators” aided by thousands of (unarmed) African “assistants,” special “labor control” officials, and, of course, the military—stood ready to implement legal measures that regularly stirred employers and white citizens to collective violence in the South. The creation of the apparatus of intervention formally began with the establishment of a Native Affairs Department *pari passu* with unification in 1910. Almost immediately, the department’s activities were synchronized with the specialized institutions that the gold mining industry had evolved for recruiting and controlling migrant black labor in the final quarter of the nineteenth century. The logic of this system of labor ensured that law enforcement authorities would conform to what John Brewer describes as “colonial policing.” In this approach to policing, paternalist policies intended to “protect” blacks were a matter of some concern to state officials in the segregation years (in contrast to the apartheid era, when liberal paternalist sensibilities were expunged), but were subordinated to the state’s overriding commitment to white supremacy. The result was a diminution of the white citizenry’s “responsibility” to enforce violently their will on blacks and the steady growth of an authoritarian state bureaucracy primed to deal violently in the area of “race relations.”⁴¹

Third, statism privatized racial violence in South Africa. Evidence in numerous court cases reveal that white citizens gunned down, whipped, or beat blacks to death for reasons that were as trivial as those given to justify lynching in the South. Numerous points of contact between white superordinates and black employees remained charged with the potential for violence. Unsurprisingly, high levels of physical violence marked the workplace. This was particularly true for the gold mines, where white workers regularly assaulted black workers, occasionally to death, frequently, as Keith Breckenridge has shown, without censure from mining authorities.⁴² There are strong grounds for believing that physical beatings, whippings, and shootings were common in the white farming areas as well. Martin Murray, for example, describes how farmers contemplated forming armed posses to capture and lynch black farm workers suspected of stealing corn in the Orange Free State in the late 1930s.⁴³ Court cases also reveal that white workers in the urban areas assaulted blacks on the factory floor and during lunch breaks, sometimes to “have fun,” as a nineteen-

year-old white said when asked by a judge in 1927 to explain why he had doused a “a native man” with gasoline and set him afire.⁴⁴ Other records involving assaults against natives also suggest that white individuals regularly attacked black passersby for no reason, occasionally shooting them for sport or setting them aflame. The tragedy that occurred near Bethal and was reported in the *Rand Daily Mail* in October 1937 has all the sinister tones of a Southern U.S. killing: “Native woman shot dead from car on lonely road—Story of a white man who leaned out.”⁴⁵ Such incidents appear fairly frequently in court records for the period, suggesting that violent thrashings and private lynchings were indeed a familiar feature of segregation in South Africa.

But with so many signs confirming the state’s deepening commitment to social, political, and territorial segregation after 1910, white South Africans could not contend that the defense of segregation lay in the hands of individual white men. Although the protection that the state afforded blacks was at best equivocal, it was sufficiently strong to deter white men from escalating private killings into public lynching. For that to have occurred, white citizens would have had to invent and the state would have had to accommodate an ideology of “repressive justice” that upheld the right of white men to respond with lethal interpersonal violence to any perceived violation of racial decorum. State formation in the interwar years militated against the emergence of such a violent masculinity prior to World War II.⁴⁶ Thus, lethal interpersonal violence did occur, but remained a furtive affair that occurred in private spaces, usually on white-owned farms, down mineshafts, and on recondite rural roads.

Fourth, statism also had significant implications for the role that racial etiquette played in instigating violence. Racial etiquette was an amorphous code of submissive behavior that whites demanded from blacks. But racial etiquette does not appear to have been as fundamental to white identities in South Africa as it was in the American South. U.S. Southern culture was rooted in the intense vulnerability and subordination characteristic of slavery. Jim Crow laws extended these expectations into the twentieth century, when whites looked upon any sign of “insubordination” from blacks as a personal affront and lynched black men for the most trivial breaches of racial etiquette. Explaining why no jury, sheriff, or judge would ever convict white men for lynching in the name of racial etiquette, David Lee Jordan, a Mississippi state senator, crowed, “[A]ll a white woman had to say was, ‘that nigger kinda looked at me or sassed me.’”⁴⁷ In South Africa, files dealing with “Assaults on Natives” confirm that white men and women were charged with beating or killing “Native servants” who were “cheeky” or “rude.” In September of 1939, for example, a white woman, Mrs. C. Lingervelder, seized a wooden pole and struck a forty-year-old black, Charlie Sithole, in the face, causing him to go blind in one eye, after they got into an argument over Sithole’s absence from work the previous day.⁴⁸ At the same time, the evidence is more abundant that South African blacks were at much greater liberty than their Southern American counterparts to

challenge the protocols of racial decorum. Blacks in South Africa regularly took abusive employers before the courts (Charlie Sithole, for example, sued his assailant for £1,500); formed national political organizations to challenge government policy, including workers' movements that began to stage strikes around World War I; and criticized municipal authorities in civic bodies that opposed racial segregation at a time when Southern African Americans were routinely lynched for no more than failing to yield a sidewalk, "frightening" white children, or daring to place money directly into the hands of white female cashiers.⁴⁹

Commenting in the 1920s on the symmetry between Jim Crow laws in the American South and similar measures that enforced social segregation between blacks and whites in South Africa, Maurice Evans noted that African Americans were much more likely to be savagely beaten or lynched for breaches of racial etiquette that in South Africa were more likely to pass unnoticed or provoke a contretemps that stopped short of such violent outcomes. Evans attributed this to the lower level of competition between black and white workers. John Cell advances two additional reasons: first, segregationist laws in South Africa were "much less ambiguous," and second, Afrikaners, no less than English-speaking whites, were "racists ... [who] ordinarily spoke in softer, more paternal voices."⁵⁰ This latter comment echoes respective arguments by scholars such as Helen Bradford, Dunbar Moodie and Charles van Onselen, who note that racial domination in South Africa did not preclude the development of what Bradford describes as "a stunted ethic of paternalism." It appears that even in the recondite white farming areas such as the one examined by van Onselen in his epic book, *The Seed Is Mine*, white farmers were not given to brutal physical violence even when black sharecroppers challenged their authority or, as the eponymous hero of van Onselen's book did, refused to accept the farmer's "right" to beat the children of sharecroppers.⁵¹ Current research suggests three possible reasons for the relatively restrained use of lethal violence in the *platteland*. As Cell's comment suggests, Afrikaner civil religion promoted racist and nationalist demands for *die volk* (the people) but, at least prior to World War II, did not stray far from the benevolent paternalism of British colonial ideology. Both variants of benevolent paternalism looked to state institutions to segregate and control blacks, and neither ever approved of whites who brutalized blacks.⁵² Furthermore, white farmers were so dependent on black sharecroppers that they refrained from using "excessive" violence to extract work from or immobilize rural blacks on white farms. Finally, the response of blacks to physical mistreatment no doubt reminded farmers of the limits of violence. The most important expression of black resistance was migration, either in search of less hostile white farmers or as part of blacks' exodus to the urban areas.⁵³

The issue of interracial sex between white women and black men underscores the claim that breaches of racial etiquette were not the reliable trip wire

that, at any moment in the South, could set off lethal violence. After Ida B. Wells dared to write in 1893 that white women were known to welcome the attentions of African American men, only timely flight to the North saved her life. Curiously, the same observation was frequently made in South Africa by white observers and in letters published in the press, mostly to bemoan the fact of consensual interracial sex, but without threat to life and limb. The black author, Sol Plaatje, published these views in 1921 in his pamphlet "The Mote and the Beam: An Epic on Sex-Relationships 'twixt White and Black in British South Africa," and appears not to have been denounced for it.⁵⁴ In a section of the essay cleverly subtitled "The Modern Mrs. Potiphar," Plaatje went so far as to illustrate how a Zulu domestic employee collaborated with the husband of a white woman bent on seducing him. The ruse worked, the wife was exposed, and the young Zulu man received £5 from the husband. Yet no harm appears to have befallen Plaatje. Indeed, the tar-and-feathering of P. B. Carlisle may well have been a singular exception; not only did it not yield any fatalities, but it is also curious to note that the drama's actors were all white. In 1912, the government's own Black Peril Commission commented sourly on the phenomenon, several witnesses having drawn attention to white women who routinely required young male domestic employees to not only serve them coffee in bed but to help them bathe as well.⁵⁵ Allegations of this nature in the American South would likely have led to lynchings.

Finally, the widespread legitimacy of statism among whites militated against the likelihood that whites would convert public space into a macabre theater of racial torture and collective murder. Concerns about "outrages" and the "virtue" of white women failed to catapult the "crisis of white masculinity" into public mayhem and summary executions because the conditions for Southern "sacrificial murders" as described by Orlando Patterson and others did not exist in South Africa. If these authors are correct that a major function of public lynching was to achieve and reinforce white unity, then it is clear that the state, the organizing principle of white unity and the undisputed arbiter of race relations, played this role in South Africa. If white citizens did not engage extensively in lethal public violence against blacks, then, as numerous studies of "repression and resistance" in South Africa have detailed, the same cannot be said of the state itself.

By virtue of the extraordinary degree to which it regulated the details of black proletarianization, the South African state became inextricably enmeshed in "structural violence" against blacks. No matter how imperfectly they interlocked in practice, state institutions broadly extended official authority over the public and private lives of Africans. To briefly summarize the extent of the state's direct culpability for the plight of blacks: various government agencies intervened in blacks' sexual practices, dictated their mobility across racial space, served as landlords of the municipal houses they occupied in the urban areas, prevented them from seeking employment under some conditions while compelling them

to do so under others, and publicly subjected them to dehumanizing forms of administration (such as rule by decree) with far-reaching implications for their security and prosperity. “Civil administration” in effect became coterminous with coercion, while coercion, in turn, readily facilitated violence. The possibility that minor confrontations between blacks and law enforcement agencies might turn deadly is illustrated by the massacre of 163 unarmed members of the Israelite sect near Bulhoek in the Eastern Cape in 1921. In the urban areas, citizens and officials alike were alarmed by black workers’ movements and militant civic organizations. Here, the routine activities of urban administration frequently yielded a steady trickle of deaths at the hands of trigger-happy policemen, amounting to what was a series of minor massacres.⁵⁶ Archival files are filled with references to “Shooting of Natives,” such as the one involving the killing of “a Native named Paul” in May of 1928 by police in search of illegal liquor in Benoni. That same month, three Africans were shot and killed by a policeman who suspected them of stock theft near Uitenhage.⁵⁷

Native administrators in the reserves proudly noted that a handful of lightly armed white men controlled thousands of blacks in the reserves with the help of an intermediary class of chiefs and headmen. Already spurious in the late nineteenth century, by the 1920s this paternalist boast crumbled as rural administrators adopted more authoritarian methods to combat peasant opposition to state intervention in the subsistence economy.⁵⁸ Yet even then, the true violence that these men perpetrated did not register in acts of physical brutality but in the sweep of the powers they routinely used to extract taxes from impoverished rural communities, issue passes, or levy debilitating fines for minor administrative infractions. In rural areas about which white South Africans knew little and cared even less, whenever blacks upbraided or sought to replace chiefs who sided with local administrators, the state proved increasingly willing to put down scattered rebellion with lethal violence.⁵⁹

Statism thus spared blacks from unpredictable lynch mobs—only to deliver them into the hands of gun-toting law enforcement authorities. State violence was manifest, too, in the disproportionate degree to which blacks were sentenced to death for crimes such as rape and murder when the victim was white. Throughout the segregation years (and even into the first decade of apartheid in the 1950s), South African judges enjoyed a strong reputation for racial impartiality at home and abroad. But when the mandatory death sentence for murder was abolished in 1935, the governor general was much less likely to spare blacks from the gallows.⁶⁰ Considered together with the willingness of juries to acquit whites who killed blacks, it may be said that the racial politics of judicial murder afford another glimpse of the impact of state violence on the African population.

State violence in the first decades after 1910 seems to pale when measured against the brutality of apartheid after 1948. Nevertheless, formal state violence against blacks in the decades after 1910 was ubiquitous and extensively

institutionalized, the necessary counterweight to the state's paternalist posture towards "that wild collection of savages." The blend of bureaucratic oppression and paternalist sensibilities opened up a gray area that was fraught with the potential for racial violence. Statism shaped the culture of violence that emerged in the segregation years. If segregation ensured that racial violence became pervasive, statism ensured that violence was largely bureaucratized and doled out in accordance with formal scripts. If segregation tolerated violent whites by only lightly punishing them for what in essence were private lynchings committed in private spaces, statism spared blacks—and South Africa generally—from the peerless horror of spectacle lynching, the distinguishing badge of racial violence in the American South. Borrowing from the history of racial violence in the U.S. South, recent work has argued that a "crisis of white masculinity" spurred interpersonal violence against blacks. Considerable merit attends this claim. At the same time, the masculinity-violence nexus needs to be grounded within the statist orientation of racial culture in South Africa. By mediating the link between white masculinity and racial violence, statism in South Africa suppressed white citizens' potential for collective wrath and laid the foundations for the violent behemoth that emerged after 1948.

Acknowledgment

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Notes

1. See, for example, Jeremy Krikler, "The Inner Mechanisms of a South African Racial Massacre," *Historical Journal* 42, no. 4 (1999): 1051–75; Gareth Cornwell, "George Webb Hardy's *Black Peril* and the Social Meaning of the 'Black Peril' in Early Twentieth-Century South Africa," *Journal of Southern African Studies* 22, no. 3 (1996): 441–53; Timothy Keegan, "Gender, Degeneration and Sexual Danger: Imagining Race and Class in South Africa, ca. 1912," *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 27, no. 3 (2001): 459–77; and Norman Etherington, "Natal's Rape Scare of the 1870s," *Journal of Southern African Studies* 15, no. 1 (1988): 36–53.
2. William Malcolm Hailey, *An African Survey: A Study of Problems Arising in Africa South of the Sahara* (London: Oxford University Press, 1957), 239.
3. John Whitson Cell, *The Highest State of White Supremacy: The Origins of Segregation in South Africa and the American South* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982).
4. The literature on lynching is enormous. The best account is W. Fitzhugh Brundage, *Lynching in the New South: Georgia and Virginia, 1880–1930* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1993); see also W. Fitzhugh Brundage, ed., *Under Sentence of Death: Lynching in the South* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997). For a discussion of the role ritual played in public lynching, see Orlando Patterson, *Rituals of Blood: Consequences of Slavery in Two American Centuries* (Washington, D.C.: Civitas/CounterPoint, 1998).
5. Grace Elizabeth Hale, *Making Whiteness: The Culture of Segregation in the South, 1890–1940* (New York: Pantheon, 1998).
6. The escalating unity among whites that collective murder created is well captured in *Rosewood*, directed by John Singleton (DVD, Warner Bros., 1997), a Hollywood account of the massacre that took place in Rosewood, Florida, on January 4, 1923.
7. See Brundage, *Lynching in the New South*.
8. This discussion is based on Patterson, *Rituals of Blood*, chap. 3.
9. Gwendolyn Brooks, quoted in Donald G. Mathews, "The Southern Rite of Human Sacrifice," *The Journal of Southern Religion* 3 (2000), online at <http://jsr.as.wvu.edu/mathews1.htm>.

10. Brundage, *Lynching in the New South*, 13; and Patterson, *Rituals of Blood*, 187.
11. Bruce Berman and John Lonsdale, *Unhappy Valley: Conflict in Kenya and Africa*, book 1 (London: James Currey, 1992), 26; and David Northrup, *Indentured Labor in the Age of Imperialism, 1834–1922* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 111.
12. General J.C. Smuts, cited in Martin Chanock, *The Making of South African Legal Culture, 1902–1936: Fear, Favour, and Prejudice* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 137.
13. The best account of the intrawhite compromises leading to the consolidation of statism is to be found in David Yudelman, *The Emergence of Modern South Africa: State, Capital, and the Incorporation of Organized Labor on the South African Gold Fields, 1902–1939* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1983). The role that fears of African resistance played in the formation of the racial state is discussed in Laura Thompson, *The Unification of South Africa, 1902–1910* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1960); and Anthony Marx, *Making Race and Nation: A Comparison of South Africa, the United States, and Brazil* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
14. Keegan, “Gender, Degeneration and Sexual Danger,” 459.
15. Ida B. Wells’s pioneering research on lynching is insightfully discussed in Gail Bederman, “‘Civilization,’ the Decline of Middle-Class Manliness, and Ida B. Wells’s Antilynching Campaign (1892–94),” *Radical History Review* 52 (1992): 5–30.
16. This summary of Black Peril outbreaks is taken from Cornwell, “George Webb Hardy’s *Black Peril*.”
17. Keegan, “Gender, Degeneration, and Sexual Danger,” 459.
18. These details are reconstructed from several files and memoranda located in the Central Archives Depot [hereafter CAD] Pretoria, South Africa. See “Southern Suburbs Vigilance Society, Turffontein,” in LD 447 1957/07.
19. See Stanley Greenberg, *Race and State in Capitalist Development: Comparative Perspectives* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1980); Gerald Friedman, “Strike Success and Union Ideology: The United States and France, 1880–1914,” *Journal of Economic History* 48, no. 1 (1988): 1–25.
20. David R. Roediger, *The Wages of Whiteness: Race and the Making of the American Working Class* (London: Verso, 1991).
21. The Black Codes that Southern states adopted immediately after the Civil War directly racialized the production process by, for example, outlawing “vagrancy” and making “vagrants” available as free labor to white landowners, defining the length of the “working day,” withholding property rights from blacks, preventing blacks from holding skilled jobs, and defining virtually all blacks as “agricultural laborers.” The Black Codes were terminated by Reconstruction, which in turn was brought to an end by the infamous “gentleman’s agreement” between North and South at the time of the contested presidential election of 1876.
22. William Cohen, *At Freedom’s Edge: Black Mobility and the Southern White Quest for Racial Control, 1861–1915* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1991). Also, notwithstanding the landmark decision of *Plessey v. Ferguson* (1898), effectively legalizing the “separate but equal” doctrine, unfavorable rulings from the Supreme Court between 1900 and World War II occasionally reminded Southerners that federal and constitutional provisions either limited the reach of *Plessey* or left the ruling vulnerable to attack. African Americans took discriminatory measures before the courts between 1900 and 1939 and, to the concern of segregationists in the South, managed to secure a number of small but encouraging victories. See Christopher Waldrep, *Racial Violence on Trial: A Handbook With Cases, Laws, and Documents* (ABC CLIO: Santa Barbara, 2001).
23. Many such examples are to be found in the collation of lynch cases in Ralph Ginzburg, *One Hundred Years of Lynching* (New York: Lancer, 1969).
24. This is not to suggest that law enforcement was weak and incapable of dealing with African Americans accused of serious crimes. Brundage illustrates that Southern courts were in fact much more likely to obtain convictions and impose stiffer punishments than courts in the North.
25. For examples of confrontations between lynch mobs and law enforcement officials, see Ginzburg, *One Hundred Years of Lynching*.
26. Doug Hindson, *Pass Controls and the Urban African Proletariat in South Africa* (Johannesburg: Ravan, 1987); Greenberg, *Race and State in Capitalist Development*; and Ivan Evans,

- Bureaucracy and Race: Native Administration in South Africa* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1986).
27. Edna Bonacich, "Advanced Capitalism and Black/White Race Relations in the United States: A Split Labor Market Interpretation," *American Sociological Review* 41, no. 1 (1976): 34–51; Michael Burawoy, "The Capitalist State in South Africa: Marxist and Sociological Perspectives on Race and Class," in *Political Power and Social Theory*, vol. I, ed. Maurice Zeitlin (Greenwich, Conn.: JAI, 1981).
 28. Evans, *Bureaucracy and Race*; Mahmood Mamdani, *Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996).
 29. See Robert Michael Smith, *From Blackjacks to Briefcases: A History of Commercialized Strike-breaking and Union Busting in the United States* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2003).
 30. The mistreatment of poor whites in the South is well summarized in Cell, *The Highest State of White Supremacy*, 121.
 31. Lis Lange, *White, Poor and Angry: White Working Class Families in Johannesburg* (Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate, 2003); T. Kuperus, *State, Civil Society and Apartheid in South Africa: An Examination of Dutch Reformed Church-State Relations* (New York: St. Martin's, 1999); and Hermann Giliomee, *The Afrikaners: Biography of a People* (Cape Town: Tafelberg, 2003).
 32. The discussion of the implementation of the "civilized labor policy" is based on Yudelman's argument in *The Incorporation of White Labor*.
 33. Yudelman, *The Incorporation of White Labor*, 212.
 34. Jeremy Foster, "'Land of Contrasts' or 'Home We Have Always Known'? The SAR&H and the Imaginary Geography of White South African Nationhood, 1910–1930," *Journal of Southern African Studies* 29, no. 3 (2003): 657–80; T. Willoughby-Herard, "'Waste of a White Skin' or Civilizing White Primitives: The Carnegie Commission Study of Poor Whites in South Africa, 1927–1932" (Ph.D. diss., University of California–Santa Barbara, 2003).
 35. Krikler, "The Inner Mechanisms of a South African Racial Massacre."
 36. "Assault on Native House, at Block B," Inspector [signature illegible] to Director of Native Labour (10/12/1920), CAD, GNLB 151 213/14/9(21).
 37. "Rex v John Barker, Shift Boss, For Assault," Inspector, Native Affairs Department [signature illegible] to Director of Native Labour, (3/12/1914), CAD, GNLB 151 213/14/99.
 38. R. W. Nordan to District Commandant, South African Police (19/7/1921), CAD, GNLB 151 213/14/9(24)
 39. Robert Turrell, introduction to *White Mercy: A Study of the Death Penalty in South Africa* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2004).
 40. "Farmer Fined £10 for Assault on Native," *Rand Daily Mail*, article clipping, William Cullen Library, University of the Witwatersrand Library [hereafter WCL], A1913, Box 350.
 41. John D. Brewer, *Black and Blue: Policing in South Africa* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1994); and Ivan Evans, "Conclusion," in *Bureaucracy and Race*.
 42. Keith Breckenridge, "The Allure of Violence: Men, Race, and Masculinity on the South African Goldmines, 1900–1950," *Journal of Southern African Studies* 24, no. 4 (1998): 669–93.
 43. Martin Murray, "'The Natives are Always Stealing': white vigilantes and the 'reign of terror' in the Orange Free State, 1918–24," *Journal of African History* 30, no. 1: 107–23. Farm violence is also discussed in several essays in Alan Jeeves and Jonathan Crush, eds., *White Farms, Black Labour: Agrarian Transition in Southern Africa, 1910–1950* (London: Heinemann, 1997); for example, see the essays in this volume by Stefan Schirmer, "Land, Legislation and Labor Tenants: Resistance in Lydenburg, 1938," 46–60, and Martin J. Murray, "Factories in the Fields: Capitalist Farming in the Bethal District, c.1910–1950," 75–93.
 44. "Burnt a Native—Fined 10s," Article clipping, WCL, A1913, Box 350.
 45. Article clipping, WCL, A1913, Box 350.
 46. Conversely, this argument suggests that the *weakening* of state control would serve as a precondition for the emergence of such a violent conception of white masculinity. This seems to be the argument of David Chidester's examination of the public and ritual killing of blacks in the final days of apartheid; see Chidester, *Shots in the Street: Violence and Religion in South Africa* (Boston: Beacon, 1991).
 47. *The Murder of Emmett Till: The Brutal Killing That Mobilized the Civil Rights Movement*, directed by Stanley Nelson (DVD, WGBH, 2003). See also Charles Rowe, "Racial Violence and Social Reform—Origins of the Atlanta Riot, 1906," *Journal of Negro History* 53, no. 3 (1968), 234–56.

48. "Native servant claims £1,500—Alleged assault by woman employer," *The Star*, November 12, 1939, article clipping, WCL, A1913, Box 350. No other information on this case was found.
49. For examples, see Ginzburg, *One Hundred Years of Lynching*.
50. Maurice S. Evans, *Black And White in the Southern States: A Study of the Race Problem in the United States from a South African Point of View* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2001); and Cell, *The Highest Stage of Supremacy*, 118.
51. Charles van Onselen, *The Seed Is Mine: The Life Of Kas Maine, A South African Sharecropper, 1894–1985* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1996); Helen Bradford, *A Taste of Freedom: The ICU in Rural South Africa, 1924–1930* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1990); T. Dunbar Moodie, *Going For Gold: Men, Mines and Migration* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1994). Ian Ochiltree doubts the strength of paternalist relations between blacks and whites in the rural areas; see Ochiltree, "'A Just and Self-Respecting System'? Black Independence, Sharecropping, and Paternalistic Relations in the American South and South Africa," *Agricultural History* 72, no. 2 (1998): 352–80. See also Charles van Onselen, "Paternalism and Violence on the Maize Farms of the S.W. Transvaal, 1900–1950," in Jeeves and Crush, eds., *White Farms, Black Labour*.
52. See R. Morrell, "'Synonymous with Gentlemen? White Farmers, Schools and Labour in Natal, c. 1880–1920,'" in Jeeves and Crush, eds., *White Farms, Black Labour*; and Morrell, "Competition and Cooperation in Middleburg, 1900–1930," in *Putting a Plough to the Ground: Accumulation and Dispossession in Rural South Africa, 1850–1930*, ed. William Beinart, et al. (Johannesburg: Ravan, 1986).
53. This point is made in Evans, *Bureaucracy and Race*, 37.
54. Sol Plaatje, "'The Mote and the Beam: An Epic on Sex-Relationships 'twixt White and Black in British South Africa,'" in *Sol Plaatje: Selected Writings*, ed. Brian Willan (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1997), 274–83.
55. *Report of the Commission of Inquiry Appointed to Enquire into Assaults on Women*, UG 39/13 (1913).
56. See Edgar Roux, *Time Longer Than Rope: A History of the Black Man's Struggle for Freedom in South Africa* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1964); and H. J. Simons and R. E. Simons, *Class and Colour in South Africa, 1850–1950* (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin, 1969).
57. See "Re-Shooting of Native: Benoni 5/2/1928," Office of the Officer Commanding Benoni Area to District Commandant, to South African Police, Boksburg (7/3/1928), CAD, NTS 7689 312/331; and "Shooting of Natives Jimmy Stock and Farnie Fana by Michael Dorling: Stock Theft—Uitenhage," South African Police, Uitenhage, to Officer Commanding South African Police, Uitenhage (5/3/1928), CAD, JUS 443 3/376/28.
58. The essay by Bernard K. Mbenga reveals the extent to which violence was an integral part of rural administration in the pre-union Transvaal; see Mbenga, "Forced Labor in the Pilanesberg: The Flogging of Chief Kgamanyane by Commandant Paul Kruger, Saulspoort, April, 1870," *Journal of Southern African Studies* 23, no. 1 (1997): 127–40. For similar events in the twentieth century, see William Beinart's insightful assessment and summary in his "Introduction: Political and Collective Violence in Southern African Historiography," *Journal of Southern African Studies* 18, no. 3 (1992): 455–86.
59. Evans, *Bureaucracy and Race*, chap. 6.
60. The administration of the death sentence is the subject of Turrell, *White Mercy*.

Race, Citizenship, and Governance: Settler Tyranny and the End of Empire

CAROLINE ELKINS

Difficult and violent as the end of empire often was, it was particularly so in the settler colonial states of Africa. The presence of European settler populations with disproportionate amounts of socioeconomic privilege and political influence greatly complicated the process of withdrawal. Where “kith and kin” ties with metropolitan populations remained strong, or where settlers had managed to infiltrate local colonial governments or organize metropolitan political lobbies, nationalist movements found themselves facing the combined forces of entrenched settler interests and metropolitan military might. Imperial retreat, in these cases, was anything but a gradual or planned affair. Instead, great powers made a sustained effort to uphold settler power and “hang on,” fighting a series of costly and violent wars against increasingly powerful nationalist movements. Moreover, when metropolitan governments finally decided to cut their losses and pull out, they often found themselves coping with intransigent settler communities or even terrorist cells determined to go it alone.

The Algerian War, the Mau Mau Emergency in Kenya, the lengthy armed conflict in Angola, and the brutalities in Southern Rhodesia both before and after the Unilateral Declaration of Independence are all examples of the violence that underscored colonial retreat in settler societies throughout Africa. Explanations for the particular character of decolonization in settler states such as these are relatively few, despite the numerous books and essays that have addressed the nature, pace, and reasons for colonial retreat during the postwar period. Scholars have examined changing metropolitan opinions and circumstances, shifts in the international climate, and local colonial conditions;¹ more nuanced approaches have made the first attempts at a “fusion of [the] ‘three historiographies.’”²

Particularly useful for those seeking to analyze the settler states are those works that have insisted upon the preeminent importance of race. In his

introduction to *Emergencies and Disorder in the European Empires after 1945*, Robert Holland writes, “What gave these crises ... a raw and explosive quality, and made them essentially irresolvable without recourse to force on both sides, were as many contemporaries were not slow to point out, the misunderstandings and contempts impregnating race relations.”³ Yet while this is undoubtedly true, Holland has not gone on to differentiate among colonial political economies, or to explore how racial difference in settler colonies was articulated and institutionalized within the state itself. In his work on Portuguese Africa, Patrick Chabal suggests a correlation between the outbreak of violence, or colonial emergencies, in Africa and white settler presence, but stops short of providing any kind of explanation for why race may have become particularly salient in these contexts.⁴ Frantz Fanon’s belief in the liberating effects of violence belies Chabal’s analysis, as it does other literature on this topic, but it is not sufficient enough to explain the similarities in settler colonial retreat.⁵

This chapter argues that the particular violence attendant on colonial retreat in the settler states was the consequence not simply of the endemic racism present in these states but, more important, of the codification and institutionalization of white privilege, and hence settler authority, in most aspects of life. A similar form of settler tyranny evolved in twentieth-century colonial states whose political economies were dependent upon local, European production; this tyranny came to punctuate not only the daily interactions between Europeans and the indigenous majority, but also the institutions and practices of the colonial state. The first half of this chapter explores the dynamic relationship between racist thought and economic and political institutions in the settler colonies, showing how racial stereotypes and privileges, far from being attenuated over time, became even more entrenched as African nationalist consciousness and movements developed, and as imperial powers sought to exploit their settler colonies after the economic and political trials of World War II. The period from 1945 until the late 1960s, characterized by a Keynesian management of metropolitan economic recovery that often extended into the colonies, saw not a gradual retreat from empire but a collaboration between white settlers and the colonial state, and an intensified control and repression of the indigenous population—a process that culminated in brutal wars of decolonization in the settler states across the continent.

Racial Thought and the Construction of Settler Tyranny

The claiming of African territories and the eventual subjugation of local indigenous populations occurred near the end of the nineteenth century alongside the rapid development of European nation-states and their increased capacity for purposeful intervention around the globe. These nation-states had the scientific and military wherewithal to invade Africa’s interior as well as a growing nationalistic passion that drove colonial aggression, a passion that was imbued with a profound sense of Darwinian-reinforced racial superiority. Though race

had provided a category for exclusion since the Enlightenment, Europeans were poised to systematize racial hierarchies and use them to subjugate the African population in an unprecedented manner.⁶ As Crawford Young has suggested in his conceptualization of the African colonial state, “the arrogance of race was never stronger than at the moment of colonial onslaught on Africa. African culture had no redeeming value.”⁷ In turn, European nation-states institutionalized the virulent racism described by Young, resulting in a rigorous and systematic subjugation of indigenous populations never before witnessed in empire.

Nowhere was colonial racism in Africa more apparent than in the continent’s settler endeavors. Racism permeated nearly every aspect of the Europeans’ interaction with the indigenous populations. At its most basic level, racist assumptions separated black from white in public places. Hotels, restaurants, taxicabs, and colonial clubs like Muthaiga in Kenya were all the preserves of the local white populations. Economically, the color bar established a system of job reservation by race. To allow for employment competition between the races was based, as Southern Rhodesian Europeans argued, on the “fantastically weird theory [that] a mere veneer of education and civilization of the native gives him equality with the European.”⁸ Educational uplift, social spending, and improved health care were also hollow promises of the rhetoric of trusteeship and assimilation.

Most important, settlers dispossessed many indigenous populations of some or all of their land. European farmers purportedly brought with them superior agricultural know-how, yet many immigrants to Africa had little, if any, previous farming experience. Most Africans in the settler colonies were eventually squeezed into overpopulated and ecologically inhospitable reserves or native land units. From there many migrated either to the mines or urban centers in search of employment. Others were rendered permanent or seasonal laborers on the same soil that their ancestors had once cultivated or pastured. Territorially, economically, and socially, Europeans and Africans were separated. In the settler colonial order the best, if limited, resources of the territory were parceled to the white side of the racial divide. Whether a gentleman planter or yeoman farmer, a merchant or a former soldier, a white man was always superior to the African. Of course, the “poor white problem” challenged the racist assumptions that justified settler privilege and was a constant source of anxiety to colonial society, rivaled only perhaps by the threat of the “black peril.”⁹

Throughout the colonial period, ethnic groups that lived in closest proximity to the settler population received the harshest racial rebukes. In Kenya, for example, the Kikuyu who lived in the interstices of the White Highlands, were cunning, deceitful, savage, or as one former settler called them, “the blackest of the kaffirs.”¹⁰ In Algeria, there was less of a distinction between ethnic groups than there was simply between Europeans and the “dirty, yellow” Arab, or the *sale race*. Portuguese officials and settlers stereotyped the peoples of the

Zambesi as “‘docile,’ ‘primitive,’ ‘uneconomic,’ and ‘uneducable.’”¹¹ Norton de Matos began his first term as governor general of Angola in 1912 by commenting on the intensity of the “racial superiority” among the European population in the colony. He found slavery and forced labor acceptable practices among the settlers, who had been infected with what he termed “Germanic” racism.¹² The local attitude toward the indigenous population never progressed much beyond its historically rooted view of the African as a slave, characterized, as Gerald Bender has pointed out, by the popular saying, “manual labor is for the dog and for the black.”¹³ At best, white man’s country was littered with “child-like” beings who had to be disciplined if there was to be any hope of civilizing them.¹⁴

A crucial element of settler racism was an organic conception of “the people,”¹⁵ noteworthy for its contrast with the liberal-democratic trends that would eventually sweep through many of the European metropolises. With their colonial orders based on distinctions between black and white, settlers moved away from the increasingly color-blind notions of popular sovereignty to ones that linked the people—or those entitled to the benefits of citizenship in the colonial state—to a particular race, in this case white European. Such organic notions of citizenship that excluded the colonized subject from the people contrasted sharply with those of the metropolitan populations, where a stratified citizenry enjoyed an array of constitutional entitlements and protections. In short, there was an unwillingness on the part of the European settlers to grant the privileges of liberal democracy to the indigenous populations, who were instead mere subjects. Colonial settler societies were determined to maintain the racial purity of their citizenry by keeping the indigenous majority outside of the boundaries of popular sovereignty. The racially defined people, moreover, built their liberal democracy on the land and backs of the dispossessed population. The *colons* of Algeria, the white settlers living on Kenya’s White Highlands and Southern Rhodesia’s vast ranches, and the coffee growers from Angola’s northern countryside were all proponents and beneficiaries of an organic citizenry. The rhetoric of *multiracialism*, *assimilation*, or *Lusotropicalism* notwithstanding, the rights of citizenship were handed out parsimoniously, and largely at the twilight of settler colonial rule. Even then, they were bestowed largely upon a select group of Africans—loyalists, *harkis*, *civilizados*—all of whom had proven indispensable to the settler project and were viewed as collaborators in the eyes of the local, European population.¹⁶

For most of its existence, therefore, the settler colonial state accorded the rights and obligations of citizenship to the European minority while excluding most of the indigenous majority from liberal democratic rule, and subjecting them to a unique form of despotism.¹⁷ Definitions of citizenship, however, were not simply a function of local racist thought. The Western nation-states of the twentieth century produced colonial polities with administrative and judicial orders that were distinctive from the metropole, creating differences between

metropolitan citizens and colonial subjects that were much sharper than those in earlier settler endeavors. Nevertheless, while this constitutionalization of relations between metropole and colony helps to explain how the different status of colonial subject became accentuated in the twentieth century, one must look to within the governing structure of the colonies themselves to appreciate fully the entrenchment of settler tyranny.

The local European control and influence over certain institutions and practices of the colonial state was crucial to the maintenance of their hegemony and privilege, and to the establishment of a distinct, organic white community of citizens. It was the settlers' ability to ensure their racialized colonial order using the institutions of the state that made Algeria, Kenya, Southern Rhodesia, and—to a more limited extent—Mozambique and Angola unique among colonies throughout the continent. Throughout Africa, settlers and colonial states were in mutually dependent relationships that privileged the ideas and needs of the local European populations. Simply put, settlers could not maintain their exclusive socioeconomic status without the power of state support, nor could the state reproduce itself without privileging the needs—particularly the economic needs—of the settlers. Despite any discourse about trusteeship and the protection of indigenous interests, the state and settlers were structurally and ideologically bound to each other. This is not to suggest that the colonial state was simply a willing accomplice for settler demands. There are numerous examples in the twentieth century of colonial states and settler populations engaged in protracted struggles over policies that catered to local European self-interest. Nonetheless, negotiations often gave way to accommodations to the settlers, largely because the local Europeans had the political wherewithal to codify their interests into policy.¹⁸ Thus, the significance of settler tyranny lay not simply in its racist, ideological foundation, but in the institutionalization of settler ideology and domination into the structure of the state. During the periods of conquest and consolidation, this amounted to state enforcement of forced evictions, vagrancy laws, communal labor ordinances, taxation, *corvée*, and the like. Though settler ascendancy did vary from colony to colony, in each case the autonomy of the state was compromised by the power of the local European population, particularly as it became entrenched through colonial, representative councils and the proverbial old-boy networks.

By the interwar period, settlers had degrees of influence within local colonial governments that were disproportionate to their numbers. This was due in part to their economic influence, both real and perceived, and the state's dependency upon it. But it was also a function of the weakness of African colonial states more generally. European metropolises ruled Africa on shoestring budgets, had insufficient numbers of professional colonial administrators in the field, and grossly lacked in expert knowledge. As a result, settlers determined to protect their own interests and institutionalize their beliefs were well placed to take advantage of these shortcomings.

In particular, local Europeans were adept at assuring their interests through the legal language of the state; indeed, law would prove a critical instrument in establishing and maintaining settler hegemony.¹⁹ In Algeria this process began before the end of the nineteenth century, as David Prochaska has pointed out, when the inauguration of France's Third Republic brought with it new opportunities for the settlers "to create local pockets of power in the interstices of the looser civilian administration."²⁰ Over time, settler power in the *communes de pleine exercice*, and to a lesser extent the *communes mixtes*, grew significantly with settlers holding mayoral posts and dominating city councils. Their influence also extended beyond the local level, linked as it was to a formidable settler lobby in Paris, comprised mostly of *élus algériens*, or the French representatives of Algeria who held seats in the Assemblée Nationale. In the interwar years, there were over 750,000 French settlers who dominated the economic and political structures of a colony reputed to be assimilating some 6,500,000 local Muslims.

The Code de l'Indigénat, or Native Legal Code, had regularized the repression of the Muslim population in Algeria and the *colon* became synonymous with agricultural colonization, his existence dependent upon the complete dispossession and subjugation of the Muslim population. At the close of World War I, the *colons* had claimed over 200 million acres of land, and in the agriculturally rich region of Tell over 98 percent of the territory had been expropriated from the indigenous population. That dislocation, forced labor, hunger, and discrimination punctuated the lives of the Arab population since the early days of French rule in Algeria did not go unnoticed by contemporary observers. As chairman of the Commission of Enquiry of Eighteen, Jules Ferry had condemned "the attitude of the *colon* to the conquered." "It is difficult to make the European settler understand," he continued, "that there are other rights than his own in an Arab country ... the native is not for exploitation at will."²¹ The subjugation described by Ferry continued through the interwar years, largely through the settlers' successful efforts at denying the Muslim population any increased representation within the governing structure of the colony. No single event signaled the settlers' disproportionate power than their single-handed and successful campaign to quash the Blum-Violette Bill that would have offered political equality to a tiny fraction of the colony's Muslims.²² The settlers refused to consider any concession to the local population, or, as one *colon* told Charles-André Julien, a staunch proponent of the measure, "we will never tolerate [the possibility] that even in the smallest commune an Arab might be mayor."²³

In Kenya, the expansion of settler political power was reflected in their influence over local governing institutions and the passage of numerous pieces of African labor legislation. By the end of World War I, the settlers were effectively promoting their interests through seats in Kenya's Legislative Council, as well as through increasingly well-organized lobby groups that pushed European

interests in Nairobi and strengthened links with parliamentarians in Britain, many of whom were relatives or shared a similar ruling-class pedigree. Through their efforts Europeans in Kenya secured 999-year leases, evicted thousands of Africans from their land, and escaped state-imposed development conditions. After its evaluation of the colony in 1929, the Hilton Young Commission reported that settler control over crucial institutions of the state exceeded the “strictly constitutional position” that they had been granted. It became clear, as Bruce Berman has pointed out, that “Government by Agreement” between the settlers and the state often broke down; the political maneuverings of the settlers, instead, afforded them a “dominant influence over four key areas of policy: land, immigration and settlement, labour, and taxation and public expenditure.”²⁴

It was arguably in the realm of African labor that settler interests most clearly and consistently shaped colonial law in Kenya. In 1906, European farmers introduced a Master and Servant Ordinance, although such laws were now considered outdated in Britain because of their harsh and exploitative orientation toward labor. But London supported the settler demands, believing the ordinance necessary “in order to obtain reasonable service from the natives who are unused to the benefits and obligations of continuous labor.”²⁵ By 1923, the original Master and Servant Ordinance had been amended several times, each change calling for harsher penal sanctions for Africans who violated labor contracts.²⁶ Alongside it were several other pieces of settler-inspired labor legislation designed to force Africans into the wage economy, and to regulate their labor once there. In 1920, for example, the Registration of Natives Ordinance (1915) required all men over the age of fifteen to carry a *kipande*, a document that recorded their fingerprints, personal details, and labor histories; with this labor-oriented pass law, an African also needed the signature of his employer to leave one job for another—without it he was considered a deserter and could be fined or imprisoned.²⁷ Finally, in 1918 the settlers introduced the first of several Resident Native Labour Ordinances targeting the over 100,000 Africans who were not wage laborers, but rather were living on European-owned land as squatters or sharecroppers. By 1939, these ordinances had dramatically increased the power of the European employers; responsibility for squatters was transferred from the central government to settler-controlled district councils, and Africans were divested of any tenancy rights on the European farms and were required to work up to 270 days per year for their landlord—up from 180 days in 1918.²⁸

Further to the south was the extreme case of Southern Rhodesia, where white voters established a separate settler government in 1923. In this semiautonomous state the local Europeans had internal self-government, with Britain reserving certain powers, the most important of which was the right to veto any legislation discriminating against Africans—a power not exercised until November 1965 when the settler regime issued its Unilateral Declaration of

Independence. As in other settler colonies, land and labor dominated the legislative scene in Southern Rhodesia, and the first major bill introduced after 1923 was the Land Apportionment Act of 1930, which institutionalized the racial division of all land in the colony. Prior to its enactment, land outside of the African reserves could be purchased by any racial group, though less than half of it was actually under cultivation, and of the nearly 100 million total acres in the colony, barely fifty thousand had been bought by Africans. Nonetheless, whites feared that the indigenous population would demand and occupy more land; at the same time, the settlers sought to stymie African agricultural competition and reduce the so-called natives into a permanent reservoir of cheap labor. The act, amended some sixty times over the next thirty years, became the basis for the future forced removals of hundreds of thousands of Africans not just from the European delineated lands, which totaled nearly half of the colony's total area, but from the urban areas as well.²⁹ Indeed, accounts of forced removals litter the historical record, none perhaps more disturbing than the case of the Matabele and their evictions to Shangani in the 1940s. As Jocelyn Alexander, JoAnn McGregor, and Terence Ranger have remarked in their work *Violence and Memory, One Hundred Years in the "Dark Forests" of Matabeleland*, "The Rhodesian state, in fact, had embarked on a programme of institutional violence in the form of forced evictions. ... Africans on 'white' land were to be removed to the Reserves, by force if necessary. This policy involved suffering everywhere but evictions into the northwest were exceptionally harsh, even by Southern Rhodesian standards ... the deaths and hardships which resulted from being forcibly dumped in the disease-ridden wilderness were built into the evictees' collective historical memories."³⁰

The consolidation of settler power and the subjugation of the majority of Africans were accelerated by the events of World War II. The war and its aftermath witnessed a crisis and reconstruction of European capitalism and nation-states that rendered empire exceedingly important as a means of fueling metropolitan recovery and growth. After 1945, in British colonies throughout the world, London sought to use the £120 million provided by the Colonial Development and Welfare Act to expand raw material production that would earn money that would, in turn, help alleviate the sterling crisis and restore Britain's balance of payments.³¹ In Kenya this led to increased support of settler estate production, which had become profitable for the first time as a result of the wartime boom. The colonial government, as it had for decades, continued to create markets favorable to settler production by forbidding Africans from growing cash crops like coffee and tea and regulating indigenous agricultural output through manipulative marketing boards. The Africans in the colony also began to feel the full weight of state intervention into their day-to-day agricultural practices in the years after the Second World War. Whitehall and its technical experts focused on African development, deciding that the cause of overstocking and continuous cultivation in the reserves was not a by-product

of too little allocated land, but of the traditional and so-called backward indigenous farming practices. Thus, at the same time that the settlers were enjoying new infusions of metropolitan-sponsored economic and political support, many of the rural African cultivators were finding themselves subject to forced communal labor projects that were supposed to alleviate the ecological crisis of the reserves. A similar process also took place in Southern Rhodesia, where the postwar demand for agricultural products led to a doubling of the settler population (reaching nearly 160,000 by 1953), and several new amendments to the Land Apportionment Act were aimed at promoting European agricultural production. At the same time, in a futile attempt to arrest the overstocking and erosion crisis in the African reserves that it had itself created, the settler government introduced the Native Land Husbandry Act. Much like the agricultural policies underway in Kenya, this act sought to make Africans more efficient farmers on their meager plots by culling their herds and introducing conservation measures.³²

Whereas Britain looked to squeeze its colonies economically after the war, France hoped to restore its international prestige and resist subordination to an emerging Anglo-American alliance through closer integration with its colonies. The preamble of the 1946 Constitution of the French Union, the new name for the empire, reiterated the assimilationist principles upon which it was originally established and underscored the indissoluble unity of France and its colonial possessions. Indeed, as late as the mid-1950s, François Mitterand, then the minister of the interior, insisted that, "From Flanders to the Congo there is one law, one single nation, one Parliament. This is the Constitution and it is our will."³³ Real politics, however, remained in Paris and the number of deputies sent by overseas territories would depend on the rate of assimilation, something that remained vague at best. The case of Algeria, however, was an exception as it was considered part of France, though it was the *colons*, not the indigenous Muslims, who continued to fill the seats of political power; as Ian Lustick has pointed out, the nine settler deputies in the French parliament drove the legislative agenda. As a result, not only settler interests but also the settlers themselves were fully entrenched in the state in the years following the war.³⁴ One example of this was their sabotage of the 1947 statute, the purpose of which was to create an Algerian assembly granting at least a semblance of representation to the indigenous majority. Elections into the assembly were routinely rigged by French Algerians, and time and again administrative—or prosettler—candidates won the majority of the seats in the second college, prompting one historian to comment that "[e]lectorate fraud became an institution of the state."³⁵

In the years following the war, Portugal also looked to redouble its efforts in its African colonies by fostering increased settlement. The roots of this phenomenon lay in the 1933 Colonial Act of Estado Novo (the New State), whereby the government of Antonio Salazar clearly laid out Africa's role in the

future of the Portuguese nation by declaring, "It is of the organic essence of the Portuguese Nation to carry out the function of possessing and colonizing overseas domains and of civilizing the indigenous populations."³⁶ Like its predecessor, the regime of Marcello Caetano would also see Portugal's future in Africa. The Portuguese were clearly a junior partner in Europe's economic and political future; in Africa, they could reassert themselves as colonial masters and lead the continent's southern hemisphere in technological know-how and management. A cornerstone of this colonial vision was a massive deployment of settlers to the continent, particularly to Angola. By the mid-twentieth century their efforts had some success, though the vast majority of the settlers gravitated toward the urban center of Luanda rather than the countryside. In the aftermath of the war, the Portuguese government stepped up its directed settlement campaign, though it was not until the establishment of the Angolan Provincial Settlement Board (*Junta Provincial de Povoamento de Angola*, or JPP) in 1961 that the numbers of Portuguese immigrants to Angola skyrocketed. The last two decades of colonialism in Angola witnessed the metropole expending some \$100 million on planned rural settlements, and the numbers of immigrants nearly doubling from 162,000 to 335,000.³⁷

But as much as the Second World War heralded various forms of increased European investment in its empire, it also destroyed the myth of European omnipotence and racial superiority, at least in the eyes of many Africans. Hundreds of thousands of African men fought on the side of the Allied Forces on the Asian and North African fronts, witnessed firsthand European losses on the battlefields, and became more aware of demands for self-determination around the globe. Moreover, when these soldiers returned home the extension of metropolitan intervention was generating a new wave of socioeconomic dislocation. For them, as well as the bulk of the African population who remained at home and helped to support wartime demands, life after the war saw little improvement; in fact, compared to the local settlers, many of whom were enjoying the combined effects of the wartime boom and increased economic and political support from the state, conditions had dramatically worsened. African nationalism, in its early stages prior to the war, became more organized and vocal, demanding—among other things—a return of stolen land, access to settler privileges, and, ultimately, self-government.

The increased contestation of the settler order after 1945 in places like Algeria, Kenya, and Southern Rhodesia spawned a more contemptuous racist discourse. Fanon, perceptively, explained that in this "Manichean" colonial world,

it is not enough for the settler to delimit physically ... the place of the native. As if to show the totalitarian character of colonial exploitation the settler paints the native as a sort of quintessence of evil. ... At times this Manicheism goes to its logical conclusion and dehumanizes the native, or to speak plainly, it turns him into an animal. In fact, the terms the

settler uses when he mentions the native are zoological terms. He speaks of the yellow man's reptilian motions, of the stink of the native quarter, of breeding swarms, of foulness, of spawn, of gesticulations. When the settler seeks to describe the native fully in exact terms he constantly refers to the bestiary.³⁸

Time and again, as their privileges came under attack, Europeans decried African bestiality and atavism. Such dehumanization was crucial to the settlers' logic, since it justified the civilizing mission and ensured European superiority. Indeed, how could the native be prepared for independence or assimilation if he was still animalistic or, at best, trapped in a crisis between savagery and civilization?³⁹

With the institutionalization of settler influence during the first half of the twentieth century, the contradictions of settler colonial rule were reproduced within the state. For certain, in all modern states there is an ongoing dialectic between the ideal of liberal democracy, on the one hand, and living reality on the other. The institutions and practices of settler colonies, however, accentuated the tensions of this dialectic largely because the local state was not an autonomous arbiter but a necessary accomplice, to varying degrees, in upholding the narrow interests of the settler minority. These states stumbled through crises of legitimacy as they struggled to reproduce themselves. In the wake of World War II there was hardly a liberalizing trend in the settler colonies of Africa, despite popular conceptions to the contrary. In Kenya, Algeria, and elsewhere, the colonial state was too weak to retain effective control, and settler communities were increasingly dependent upon arbitrary measures to maintain their privileged positions. In the face of heightened demands for indigenous popular sovereignty, settler racism became more virulent. Initially, local Europeans dismissed the so-called nationalist leaders as Machiavellian troublemakers. But when ordinary Africans took up arms, settler racism moved farther to the right, dehumanizing the enemy and justifying increasingly awful wars. In the settler construction of the colonial universe, it was not difficult to see Mau Mau-infected Africans, or Muslim nationalists in Algeria, as subhuman. Inebriated by their civilizing mission, most local Europeans were prepared to atomize indigenous communities if it meant saving their own; they had no intention of giving up their home fronts, regardless of the cost. Through formal or informal co-optation of colonial institutions, the settler populations appropriated the resources of the state to protect their interests. Let us now look more closely at the dynamic of war and violence that was the rule in the decolonization of the settler states.

Settler Tyranny and the Crises of Decolonization

After years of conceding to the advancement of settler interests through the institutions of the colonial states and explicitly or tacitly permitting the

racial subjugation and economic exploitation of indigenous populations, metropolitan governments back in Europe should not have been surprised by the upheavals of decolonization in their African settler colonies. The fact is, however, that many officials were surprised or, at the very least, unprepared for the scale and length of violent conflicts that would unfold. In large part they underestimated the depth of African bitterness, a bitterness engendered by the behavior not only of the European minority, but also of the African collaborators who for years had served as the crucial link between the settlers and indigenous society. Chiefs and headmen, or local “big men,” were in the trenches of labor recruitment and tax collection, and were seen by many Africans as an appendage of settler colonialism. Rewarded handsomely for facilitating the needs of the settlers and their government, the colonial state’s local allies were at the center of a conflict-ridden process of accumulating wealth and power in local African societies, thereby widening the socioeconomic cleavages within indigenous groups.

When the wars of decolonization broke out insurgent violence was directed at the white and black faces of colonialism, creating both anticolonial and civil dimensions to the bloodshed. The metropolises had little choice but to protect their settlers and their long-term interests, even if it meant resorting to extreme measures like a suspension of all civil liberties, mass detention, villagization, torture, and murder. Yet the violence of the methods used had everything to do with local conditions, for they were often enforced by settlers determined to defend their home fronts and African allies bent on protecting their own privileges and patronage networks. As these struggles dragged on, it became increasingly apparent, at least to most officials in the metropole, that they were fighting to maintain control over the process of change rather than to “hang on” indefinitely. Some settlers met this perceived betrayal with outrage and intransigence, deciding to go it alone by either establishing their own independent commandos or breaking away entirely from the metropole and forming their own independent regime.

In Kenya, the move toward totalitarianism at the twilight of empire prompted, and was prompted by, dissension within the Kikuyu community over issues pertaining to stolen land, racial injustices, and community. Neither the settler population nor the colonial government in Nairobi was prepared to recognize any legitimate grievance. Instead, the Mau Mau movement was depicted as a bestial, atavistic rising whose oath-taking rituals and gruesome civil dimension only provided ideological support for the settlers’ cause. When Governor Evelyn Baring declared a state of emergency on October 20, 1952, the Europeans in the colony were relieved to have state support in suppressing the movement. Kikuyu savagery justified a dirty forest war, and the detention of nearly its entire population.⁴⁰ By 1956, several hundred thousand men were confined in a labyrinth of camps known as the Pipeline, while the vast majority of the women, children, and elderly were forcibly removed from their scattered

homesteads and held in some eight hundred barbed-wired villages scattered throughout Kikuyuland. In the camps, the liberal rhetoric of “rehabilitation” was used to disguise the routine use of torture. The “protected villages” likewise became sites of unspeakable violence where forced labor, rape, and famine destroyed the Kikuyu domestic landscape. Unlike the British colonial emergency in Malaya, however, martial law was never declared in Kenya. As a result, the civilian government was responsible for all aspects of the civil counterinsurgency operation.

In practice this meant that the settler population had a great deal of input into the harshness of the emergency regulations. The construction and execution of the detention and rehabilitation plan, the broad scope of capital crimes, and the enforcement of property confiscation all bore the imprint of settler influence. Other local Europeans thought Mau Mau bestiality deserved a harsher rebuke, and advocated “summary justice” whenever possible. In fact, many settlers had ample opportunity to exercise their beliefs, having been incorporated into the government’s civilian forces as temporary district officers, detention camp commandants, members of the police reserve, or soldiers in the Kenya Regiment. Whitehall recognized that reforms were ultimately necessary if there was to be a lasting end to the violence, but settler intransigence stalled any meaningful moves toward multiracialism during the heyday of the war. Instead, the political order expanded to accommodate only those few Africans who were considered loyal to the principles of Western civilization, and who had actively fought on the side of the settlers to preserve these ideals. These loyalists, as they were then called, were critical to the war effort, providing not just the manpower necessary to wage the struggle against Mau Mau, but an example of the civilizing mission’s success. Most Africans, particularly the former Mau Mau, would not qualify for the full benefits of citizenship for at least another generation. In March 1959, however, the beating deaths of eleven detainees at Hola Camp and the injuring of scores of others prompted London to thwart settler influence, reassert control over the colony, and move it rapidly toward African majority rule and decolonization.⁴¹

Algeria witnessed a similar descent into horrifying colonial violence after November 1954, with French Algerian forces pitted against the Front de Libération Nationale, or FLN. After the peasant uprising on August 20, 1955, repression in the French colony took on a new dimension, with violence spreading through the northern regions of the colony and eventually into the cities as well. As in Kenya, an emergency had been declared and the Algerian government soon enacted special powers restricting political parties and publications and suspending all individual liberties. In late 1956 the war took a new turn, with the introduction of *gégène* or electrodes, water torture, indiscriminate beatings, and the detention without trial of tens of thousands of Algerians in the camps of Bossuet, Lambessa, and Saint-Leu. Moreover, as with Mau Mau, the anticolonial war in Algeria was accompanied by an equally bitter civil war

between the Muslim majority and the pro-French *harkis*. Colonial intrusion had redefined indigenous institutions, with local upheavals centering largely around access to land. As Pierre Bourdieu and Abdelmalek Sayad have pointed out, the rise of the Armée de libération nationale (the FLN guerilla organization) and local recruitment into the *harkis* had as much to do with the protection of land rights and the “settling of scores” as it did with any allegiance to either nationalist organization; by the end of the war, the *harkis* contributed over 250,000 auxiliaries to the French Army, and throughout the fighting, though particularly after 1956, the FLN targeted the pro-French forces and their families, often torturing and killing them.⁴² Some in the French press were outraged at their country’s conduct, refusing to embrace the good-versus-evil rhetoric being deployed by the government and decrying what one journalist called “Your Algerian Gestapo.” Adding to the critical voice at home, a former reservist in the colony published the “Jean Muller dossier” in which he noted that “we are desperate to see how low human nature can stoop, and to see the French use procedures stemming from Nazi barbarism.”⁴³

In Algeria as in Kenya, metropolitan intervention was needed to bring an end to the fighting. French Algerians cried foul when French president Charles de Gaulle, instead of pursuing a self-described “Gallicization” or integration policy, gave the indigenous population the choice between partnership or secession. Nonetheless, it took the Fifth Republic more than two years to bring about a settlement in Algeria, largely because of the vicious activities of the Organisation Armée Secrète (OAS), a renegade group of military and settler commandos. Even then, after the March 19, 1962 cease-fire, the subsequent Evian Accords, and the six million Algerian votes for secession, several more months were needed to subdue the OAS and institute the will of the country’s Muslim majority. In the end, the Algerian War was one of the costliest decolonization struggles in terms of deaths, with estimates ranging into the several hundred thousands, the majority of which were Algerian Muslims killed in action or in the camps.

Violence also punctuated colonial retreat across the frontier of settler states in Southern Africa. There the Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique witnessed some of the bloodiest wars of decolonization not only in Africa but anywhere in the world. During Portugal’s redoubled efforts at colonial expansion, the urban areas of the settler colonies saw skilled or elite Africans forced out of better-paid or government jobs to make way for inexperienced but privileged whites. In the Kikongo-speaking areas where coffee production was a key export crop, Europeans began seizing land en masse in the 1950s and rendered the dispossessed Africans wage laborers.⁴⁴ By the 1960s, European-held land more than doubled in certain areas, while the size of African cultivated areas decreased at nearly the same rate. In effect, the color bar had generated a new wave of colonial privilege, and had strengthened local European control over local institutions, at a time when decolonization was sweeping through the non-settler colonies of West and Central Africa.

The Angolan war broke out in January 1961 in the Kwanza and Kwango Basins, where Africans had suffered under forced cotton-growing schemes for decades. The Kimbundu-speaking laborers suffered from endemic famine, though their starvation was dismissed by both the Salazar and Caetano governments as either imaginary or a result of their resistance to regular work. In January, the “cotton war,” or Maria’s War, erupted, with European stores attacked, infrastructure destroyed, and livestock killed. The Portuguese Air Force quickly and indiscriminately wiped out the protestors, though not before word of the uprising spread throughout the colony. Civil discontent soon spread in areas where European privilege stood in stark contrast with African poverty, forced labor, and dispossession. Civil unrest began in February 1961 in Luanda, where thousands of illiterate and unskilled whites had taken African jobs and assumed a life of privilege relative to the local indigenous population. Hundreds of Africans were massacred during the Luanda pogroms, and the Movement for the Popular Liberation of Angola (MPLA) shot to prominence in the wake of the violence. One month later, in the heavily European settled, coffee-growing region in northern Angola, more violence erupted. There, Africans who had been working under forced labor contracts demanded six months of overdue pay. The *colonos* responded with violence, and several hundred white settlers and black migrant workers from Central Angola were killed, after which European settlers organized commandos and retaliated against the northern population, massacring several thousand Africans and driving more than 100,000 across the border into Zaire.⁴⁵ Thereafter, Angola witnessed a full-scale Portuguese attack that included forced villagization, scorched-earth tactics, and an enormous campaign, modeled on a similar U.S. policy in Vietnam, to co-opt local recruits into the ranks of the colonial army.⁴⁶ Though the *colonos* did not have the same kind of political voice in resisting the decolonization process as did their counterparts in Kenya and Algeria, they nonetheless wielded a great deal of influence on the ground. Moreover, the authoritarian and imperialist Salazar and Caetano regimes were closer ideologically to the local settler populations than either London or Paris were to their colonial settlers; for the Portuguese, liberal democracy was practiced neither at home nor abroad. In effect, while the *colonos* did not have the same influence in the censored-state system, they also did not need to have as much control over colonial state institutions. As the myth of Lusotropicalism exploded after 1961,⁴⁷ Lisbon and Luanda largely worked together to reestablish Portuguese pride in the empire and to teach the Africans the meaning of Lusophone “civilization.”

In neighboring Southern Rhodesia, the settler minority observed the fate of their counterparts in Algeria, Kenya, and elsewhere and took deliberate steps to avoid a dismantling of their “white man’s country.” October 1953 had seen the establishment of the Central African Federation, comprised of both the Rhodesias and Nyasaland. Ostensibly the new federal state was designed to safeguard African interests and facilitate their advance toward

political participation, although economic power remained in settler hands, and the projected liberalizing effects of the federation fell far short of African expectations. By 1959 nationalist discontent led federal authorities to declare a state of emergency, something that would remain in force in Southern Rhodesia until its independence in 1980. African political parties were banned, their leaders detained, and a year later the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act and Emergency Powers Act were passed. This draconian legislation only touched off further disorder and violence, ultimately convincing the British government to rethink its commitment to Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. By 1962 the African nationalist leaders of both protectorates were released from detention and nonracial constitutions drawn up based upon majority rule.

The settlers of Southern Rhodesia, recognizing the imminent collapse of the federation, formed the right-wing Rhodesian Front Party in 1961 with an electoral platform of immediate independence under white rule. With its demands for the preservation of the Land Apportionment Act and the rejection of any kind of forced integration, the Rhodesian Front won the majority in the 1962 legislative assembly elections. The party's supporters were convinced that continued ties with Britain threatened their survival, so in November 1964 under the leadership of Ian Smith the colony's white electorate voted overwhelmingly in favor of unilaterally declaring independence from Britain. Though the Smith regime was condemned internationally and subject to economic sanctions, Britain refused to send in the troops to protect the African majority from its renegade colonists. In the words of Labour Party Prime Minister Harold Wilson, "the demand for Britain to attempt to settle all Rhodesia's constitutional problems with military invasion is out."⁴⁸ In effect, the British had learned their lesson elsewhere about costly decolonization wars, and they certainly weren't going to fight another one in a heroic attempt to rescue the indigenous population. Instead, it would take nearly fifteen years of a bitter guerrilla struggle known as the Second Chimurenga and the loss of some 30,000 lives, before the Smith regime was finally toppled and settler minority rule replaced by Robert Mugabe and the African majority.

Conclusion

How do we come to terms with the violence and suffering that attended the demise of the settler states in Africa? The moral blindness of the settler populations at the time of decolonization is particularly striking. This generation was, by and large, still savoring the victory of democratic decency over brutal fascism in Europe. Yet, on the heels of their triumph over Hitler and Mussolini, European settlers were perpetrating crimes that contemporary critics found Gestapolike. They conceived of their nations in a narrow, racially defined way, insisting that economic privileges and political participation be restricted to the white minority. At the twilight of empire, the British, French, and Portuguese settlers all defended their home fronts from a subject population defined as

ipso facto subhuman because of race. Settler tyranny—with its vicious racism, restrictive conceptualization of citizenship, and infiltration into the colonial state—unleashed uncontrollable violence in the final moments of empire. That the “natives” appeared to bring out the worst in settler behavior only fueled settlers’ rage. As one former colonial officer in Kenya remarked, “the British hated Mau Mau for the precise reason that it made them behave so badly. How else could they rationalize their behavior?”⁴⁹ The spiral of violence in these colonies continued until settler rule came to an end, and metropolitan governments asserted complete control over the transfer of power, bringing some notions of liberal democracy to the bargaining table. In the case of the Portuguese colonies, this only happened with the army coup d’état that overthrew the Caetano regime in April 1974. In Southern Rhodesia, by contrast, it never quite happened at all, for civil war (and not metropolitan reassertion) eventually ended white minority rule, with the security practices of the settler state sometimes simply appropriated unchanged.⁵⁰

The significance, however, of the relationship between settler tyranny and a trajectory of violence that exploded at the end of empire extends beyond Africa. Some scholars have argued that the settler colonialism of the twentieth century was a different variant from that which existed in the earlier empires. Patrick Wolfe, for example, argues that “‘pure’ settler colonialism of the Australian or North American variety should be distinguished from so-called colonial settler societies that depended on indigenous labor (for example, European farm economies in southern Africa or plantation economies in South Asia).”⁵¹ Yet, instead of focusing on the question of labor alone, one must also consider local settler ideology and interests and their infiltration—both formally and informally—into the state itself. The size of settler populations in Africa paled in comparison to those of the New World or Australia. Nonetheless, when judged by their influence on colonial state institutions, the conduct of colonial rule, and the violence of colonial retreat, their impact was no less significant.

Notes

1. The historiography on decolonization in the twentieth century is vast. For changes in metropolitan opinions, see John Strachey, *The End of Empire* (1959; reprint, New York: Praeger, 1966); Lewis H. Dunn and Peter Duignan, *The Burden of Empire: An Appraisal of Western Colonialism in Africa South of the Sahara* (New York: Praeger, 1959); Stephen Howe, *Anticolonialism in British Politics: The Left and the End of Empire, 1919–1964* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1993); and Philip Murphy, *Party Politics and Decolonization: The Conservative Party and British Colonial Policy in Tropical Africa, 1951–1994* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1995). For shifts in the international climate, see Paul M. Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict, 1500–2000* (New York: Vintage, 1989); Stewart C. Easton, *The Twilight of European Colonialism: A Political Analysis* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960); and William Roger Louis, *Imperialism at Bay: The United States and the Decolonization of the British Empire, 1941–45* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978). For analyses of local, colonial conditions, see Bruce Berman and John Lonsdale, *Unhappy Valley: Conflict in Kenya and Africa*, books 1 and 2 (London: James Currey, 1992); Frederick Cooper, *Decolonization and African Society: The Labor Question in French and British Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Robert Holland, ed., *Emergencies and Disorder in the European Empires after 1945* (London: Frank Cass, 1994); David Killingray and David

- Anderson, eds., *Policing and Decolonization: Politics, Nationalism, and the Police, 1917–65* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992); Henri Grimal, *Decolonization: The British, French, Dutch and Belgian Empires, 1919–1963* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1978); and D. A. Low, “The Asian Mirror to Tropical Africa’s Independence,” in *The Transfer of Power in Africa: Decolonization, 1940–1960*, ed. Prosser Gifford and William Roger Louis (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1982).
2. For one of the most recent attempts at “fusion,” see John Darwin, “Decolonization and the End of Empire,” in *The Oxford History of the British Empire*, ed. Robin W. Winks (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 5:552. See also John Gallagher, *Decline, Revival and Fall of the British Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982); and R. F. Holland, *Europe and Decolonization, 1918–1981: An Introductory Survey* (New York: St. Martin’s, 1985).
 3. Robert Holland, introduction to Holland, ed., *Emergencies and Disorder*, ix.
 4. Patrick Chabal, “Emergencies and Nationalist Wars in Portuguese Africa,” in Holland, ed., *Emergencies and Disorder*, 236; and Patrick Chabal, *Power in Africa* (London: Macmillan, 1992).
 5. Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth* (1961; reprint, New York: Grove, 1963), and Frantz Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks* (1952; reprint, New York: Grove, 1962).
 6. Ivan Hannaford, *Race: The History of an Idea in the West* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996); George L. Mosse, *Toward the Final Solution: A History of European Racism* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985); Albert Memmi, *Racism* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000).
 7. Crawford Young, *The African Colonial State in Comparative Perspective* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1994), 280.
 8. W. B. Collyer to Editor, *Rhodesia Herald*, April 16, 1929, quoted in Carol Summers, *From Civilization to Segregation: Social Ideals and Social Control in Southern Rhodesia, 1890–1934* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1994), 245.
 9. For the “poor white problem” in early colonial Kenya and Southern Rhodesia, see Dane Kennedy, *Islands of White, Settler Society and Culture in Kenya and Southern Rhodesia, 1890–1939* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1987), 170–74; for the same in Algeria, see Benjamin Stora, *Algeria 1830–2000: A Short History* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2001), 22–23. The most recent work on the “black peril” is Jock McCulloch, *Black Peril, White Virtue: Sexual Crime in Southern Rhodesia, 1902–35* (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 2000).
 10. Anonymous interview with the author, Nairobi, Kenya, December 3, 1998.
 11. Quoted in Allen Isaacman, *The Tradition of Resistance in Mozambique, Anti-Colonial Activity in the Zambesi Valley, 1850–1921* (London: Heinemann, 1976), 75.
 12. John A. Marcum, *The Angolan Revolution, Exile Politics and Guerrilla Warfare (1962–1976)* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1978), 2:54–56; Gerald J. Bender, *Angola under the Portuguese: The Myth and the Reality* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1978).
 13. Bender, *Angola under the Portuguese*, 225.
 14. Elspeth Huxley, *White Man’s Country: Lord Delamere and the Making of Kenya* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1935).
 15. For “organic” and “stratified” notions of citizenship and a conceptualization of “the people,” see Michael Mann, “The Dark Side of Democracy: The Modern Tradition of Ethnic and Political Cleansing,” *New Left Review* 235 (1999): 18–45; for differences between metropolises and colonies, see Young, *The African Colonial State*, 74.
 16. The loyalists were the Kikuyu minority fighting on the side of the government, and against their Kikuyu neighbors, in the anticolonial and civil struggle of Mau Mau; see Caroline Elkins, *Imperial Reckoning: The Untold Story of Britain’s Gulag in Kenya* (New York: Henry Holt, 2005). For more on the *harkis*, see Marcel Roux, *Les Harkis, Les Oubliés de l’Histoire* (Paris: La Découverte, 1991). The *civilisados* were those Africans officially recorded—up until 1950—as having met the qualifications of being “civilized,” though the benefits that this bestowed on them were questionable; see Malyn Newitt, *Portugal in Africa: The Last Hundred Years* (London: C. Hurst & Co., 1981), 138–47.
 17. For commentary on the bifurcated or dual colonial state see Young, *The African Colonial State*, and Mahmood Mamdani, *Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996).

18. In numerous instances, like the Devonshire Declaration in Kenya, the state attempted to declare itself autonomous from settler interests through a symbolic statement of great importance. Though critical to maintaining state legitimacy, at least in the short term, settler interest was hardly superseded by those of the indigenous population. See Bruce Berman, *Control and Crisis in Colonial Kenya: The Dialectic of Domination* (London: James Currey, 1990), 136–37.
19. See Michel Foucault, “Power, Sovereignty, and Discipline,” in *States and Societies*, ed. David Held, et al. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983), where Foucault writes about the relationship between law and sovereignty, and states that “the law (not simply the laws but the whole complex of apparatuses, institutions and regulations responsible for their application) transmits and puts in motion relations that are not relations of sovereignty, but of domination” (306). He concludes by writing that the “state consists of the codification of a whole number of power relations” (312). Foucault’s reflections are important to understanding how the settlers were able to ensure the perpetuation of their racialized interests through the state.
20. David Prochaska, “The Political Culture of Settler Colonialism in Algeria: Politics in Bône, 1870–1920,” *Revue du Monde Musulman et de la Méditerranée* 48–49, nos. 2–3 (1988): 295.
21. Jules Ferry, quoted in Charles-Robert Ageron, *Modern Algeria: A History from 1830 to the Present* (London: C. Hurst, 1991), 56.
22. See Stora, *Algeria*, 18–19; and Charles-Robert Ageron, *Histoire de l’Algérie contemporaine*, book 2 (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1979), 609–10.
23. Quoted in David C. Gordon, *The Passing of French Algeria* (London: Oxford University Press, 1966), 41.
24. Bruce Berman, *Control and Crisis*, 141. Here Berman also describes “Government by Agreement,” as it was openly acknowledged in the 1920s, as “an attempt by the state authorities to avoid disruptive and embarrassing clashes by consulting with settler leaders on major issues of policy before they were brought to the Legislative and Executive Councils for formal enactment.”
25. Mandy Banton, “‘Constantly the Subject of Small Struggles’: The Colonial Office, Colonial Governments in Africa and Master and Servants Law” (unpublished paper, Seminar on Law and Labour in the Commonwealth, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, University of London, May 1989), 7, as quoted in David Anderson, “Master and Servant in Colonial Kenya, 1895–1939,” *Journal of African History* 41 (2000): 461.
26. For the most recent analysis of the Master and Servant Ordinance in Kenya, see Anderson, “Master and Servant,” 459–85.
27. Anthony Clayton and Donald C. Savage, *Government and Labour in Kenya, 1895–1963* (London: Frank Cass, 1974), 61, 132; Roger M. van Zwabenberg, *Colonial Capitalism and Labour in Kenya, 1919–1939* (Kampala, Uganda: East African Literature Board, 1975), 183–89.
28. Tabitha Kanogo, *Squatters and the Roots of Mau Mau* (London: James Currey, 1987), 3–5, 35–68.
29. Roger Riddell, *The Land Problem in Rhodesia* (Gwelo, Zimbabwe: Mambo, 1978).
30. Jocelyn Alexander, JoAnn McGregor, and Terence Ranger, *Violence and Memory: One Hundred Years in the “Dark Forests” of Matabeleland* (Oxford: James Currey, 2000), 46.
31. See, for example, Frank Heinlein, *British Government Policy and Decolonisation, 1945–1963: Scrutinising the Official Mind* (London: Frank Cass, 2002), 27–33.
32. For a recent assessment of the impact of the Native Land Husbandry Act, see Eric Worby, “‘Discipline without Oppression’: Sequence, Timing, and Marginality in Southern Rhodesia’s Post-War Development Regime,” *Journal of African History* 41 (2000): 101–25.
33. Frank Giles, *The Locust Years: The Story of the Fourth French Republic, 1946–1958* (London: Secker and Warburg, 1991), 37–38.
34. Ian Lustick, *State-Building Failure in British Ireland and French Algeria* (Berkeley: University of California–Berkeley Institute of International Studies, 1985); Ian Lustick, *Unsettled States, Disputed Lands: Britain and Ireland, France and Algeria, and Israel and the West Bank–Gaza* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993), chap. 4–5, 7.
35. The Algerian assembly consisted of two colleges, the first of which had sixty delegates and represented some 460,000 Frenchmen with civil status and another 58,000 Muslims. The second college also had sixty delegates, though it represented some 1.5 million canvassed Muslim voters over the age of twenty-one. This meant, of course, that nearly 6 million of the indigenous population went completely unrepresented. Ageron, *Histoire de l’Algérie*

- contemporaine*, 610–12. See also, Stora, *Algeria*, 26; and Tayeb Chenntouf, “L’assemblée algérienne et l’application des réformes prévues par le statut du 20 septembre 1947,” in *Les chemins de la décolonization de l’empire colonial français*, ed. Charles-Robert Ageron (Paris: Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1986), 367–75.
36. Adriano Moreira, “A revogação do Acto Colonial,” *Estudos Ultramarinos* 1 (1951): 17, cited in Bender, *Angola under the Portuguese*, 96.
 37. Bender, *Angola under the Portuguese*, 95–131, 228.
 38. Fanon, *Wretched of the Earth*, 41–42.
 39. During the Mau Mau Emergency in Kenya, for example, the Kikuyu—when not dismissed as simply bestial and atavistic—were often depicted as caught in a “crisis of transition” or as “neither primitive nor modern.” For one of the earliest references, see J. C. Carothers, *The Psychology of Mau Mau* (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1954).
 40. Berman and Lonsdale, *Unhappy Valley*; Anthony Clayton, *Counterinsurgency in Kenya: A Study of Military Operations against Mau Mau* (Nairobi: Transafrica, 1976); Frank Furedi, *The Mau Mau War in Perspective* (London: James Currey, 1989); Cmnd. 1030, *Historical Survey of the Origins and Growth of Mau Mau* (London: HMSO, 1960); and Elkins, *Imperial Reckoning*.
 41. Caroline Elkins, “The Struggle for Mau Mau Rehabilitation in Late Colonial Kenya,” *International Journal of African Historical Studies* 33, no. 1 (2000): 25–57; Caroline Elkins, “Detention, Rehabilitation, and the Destruction of Kikuyu Society,” in *Mau Mau and Nationhood: Arms, Authority, and Narration*, ed. E. S. Atieno Odhiambo and John Lonsdale (Oxford: James Currey, 2002), 191–226; and Elkins, *Imperial Reckoning*.
 42. Pierre Bourdieu and Abdelmalek Sayad, *Le déracinement: la crise de l’agriculture traditionnelle en Algérie* (Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1964).
 43. Stora, *Algeria*, 51.
 44. David Birmingham, “The Coffee Barons of Cazengo,” *Journal of African History* 19 (1978): 523–38.
 45. John Marcum, *The Angolan Revolution* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1969), 1:124–35.
 46. For a fictionalized account of the effects of the Angolan War on the African population, see David Birmingham, “Colonialism in Angola: Kinyama’s Experience,” in *Portugal and Africa* (New York: St. Martin’s, 1999), 122–32.
 47. R. J. Hammond, “Race Attitudes and Policies in Portuguese Africa in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries,” *Race* 9 (1967): 205–16; Bender, *Angola under the Portuguese*, 3–18.
 48. Harold Wilson, quoted in David Martin and Phyllis Johnston, *The Struggle for Zimbabwe: The Chimurenga War* (London: Faber and Faber, 1981), 71–72.
 49. John Nottingham, interview with the author, Nairobi, Kenya, January 26, 1999.
 50. Ronald John Weitzer, *Transforming Settler States: Communal Conflict and Internal Security in Northern Ireland and Zimbabwe* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1990).
 51. Wolfe, “Land, Labor, and Difference,” n. 7.

Part III

Settler Communities after Decolonization: Myths, Memories, Strategies

Introduction to Part III

What happened to settler populations when their imperial overseers pulled out? They had imagined their presence as permanent; now they faced choices they had never thought possible. Should they depart for distant and unfamiliar homelands or stay under the rule of peoples they had often thought of as barbarians and had treated as servants?

How they answered this question depended on many things: the conditions under which the settler regime collapsed, the degree to which the settler community participated in violence at its end, the attitude of the new state, and, sometimes, whether the settler community had any homeland to return to at all. Japanese and ethnic German settlers in Manchuria or Poland spent only a few brief years on seized land; in 1944 and 1945, abandoned by the military and rightly fearing retribution or attack, they fled before or were overrun by advancing Soviet troops. Algeria's *pieds noirs*, much more deeply rooted in their colony but also much more implicated in the brutalities of France's war to retain it, also left en masse for a metropole many had never seen and by which they felt betrayed. The builders of Portugal's overseas empire also became *retornados*, but some at least of Kenya's whites were lured by Kenyatta's promise of all-round amnesties (and amnesia) and stayed—as did other white populations in southern Africa. South West Africa's white population, or at least that part still self-identified with a Germany long since gone, began their earnest—if bumbling—campaign for incorporation in the new Namibia.

The chapters in this final section explore some of these experiences and trajectories. In doing so they pay attention not only to the self-understandings of the settlers themselves, but also to the role they have played and continue to play in the social worlds and imaginations of their (now) postcolonial metropolises. Benjamin Stora explores the nostalgia and bitterness with which Algeria's *pieds noirs* recall their lost southern homeland; by contrast, as Stephen Lubkemann shows, Portugal's *retornados* have tried to distance themselves from colonial involvements now seen as selfish and out of keeping with more familial

and solidaristic emigration strategies. Japan's repatriates from Manchuria, as Lori Watt demonstrates, have also become a stigmatized group, held responsible for imperial misadventures that were at the time overwhelmingly popular in the metropole.

Yet not all settlers returned, and for those who did not—and, still more, for the citizens of those postcolonial states that allowed them to stay on—the challenges of social integration and cultural reformation may be especially hard. What kind of national identity can incorporate the memories and values of settler intransigence and nationalist rebellion alike? Jeremy Silvester's exploration of the politics of memorialization and memory in Namibia today shows how a white population recuperated the rituals and symbols of "Germanness" in order to establish their claim to belong. Yet, the possibility of crafting a nationalism that can overcome the damaging legacies of settler colonialism demands not just strategic social and cultural adjustment by the formerly dominant minority but also an almost unimaginable degree of grace and forbearance among an often poor and still-subjected majority population. There is now a particular diplomatic language of apology deployed by former colonial powers eager to at once show sensitivity toward former subjects and defuse demands for restitution; truth and reconciliation commissions seek to balance the claims of justice with more pragmatic national interests. As the case of Northern Ireland may yet show, with the passage of enough time even age-old antagonisms may be, if not overcome, rendered chronic rather than acute. Nationalist movements learned partly from settlers the language of organic community and exclusivist rights, and they inherited at independence often formidable apparatuses of repression and political control. Now, as settler remnants scramble to master a new language of global community and human rights, will those postcolonial states agree to renounce those lessons and powers—to follow, in other words, their interests rather than their hearts?

The “Southern” World of the *Pieds Noirs*: References to and Representations of Europeans in Colonial Algeria

BENJAMIN STORA

Algeria was never a colony like others in the French empire, largely because of its huge settler population. This settler presence deeply interested French intellectuals of the 1960s, who were caught up in the debates over, and then the prospective dissolution of, the Algerian drama of the period. The first works of the sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, the historian Pierre Nora, and the political scientist Bruno Etienne, dealt specifically with the problem of the “settler colony,” and sometimes judged it harshly.¹ With hindsight, and in light of new historical research,² however, one can offer a more nuanced and complex assessment. We begin by examining the system of representations and references elaborated by this “community,” one million strong at the beginning of the 1960s, the moment of Algeria’s independence.

Confusions about a Word

The French of Algeria are called *pieds noirs* (“black-feet”) today, and they claim this label as their own, although for a long time it was understood to be pejorative. What is the exact origin of this term?³ Some claim that it was invented by the Arabs, surprised to see the soldiers of 1830 disembark with black boots on their feet. Others suggest that the name refers to the color of the feet of Algerian winemakers, who trod grapes to make wine. Still other explanations might be put forward. In any event, the French of Algeria were only awarded this label on arrival in metropolitan France in 1962, at which point it seemed necessary to find a way to distinguish between those rich land-owning families known as “colonists” and others of more modest standing. But the term *pied noir* still remains obscure (why echo, for instance, the name of an Indian tribe?), and its meanings entangled, the constructive spirit with the destructive instinct, the proselytizing altruism of the Mediterranean bound up with a reflexive blindness toward Muslim Algerians.

And yet, these very tensions and ambiguities can be explained. If colonial history has been written in France essentially with reference to the “Algerian model,” it is because Algeria was long considered the “jewel” of French colonization, a status based on the twin pillars of extensive agricultural development (after the dispossession of the Muslims) and of a century-long juridical tie to France (the establishment of *Algérie française*). Algeria comprised three French departments, and meant much more, therefore, than remote colonies like Senegal or Tunisia, which were mere protectorates. “Algeria has become the only one of our overseas territories where the creation of ‘France’ has really succeeded,” the *pied noir* writer Gabriel Audisio explained.

The Uniqueness of a Settler Colony

In 1954, at the beginning of the Algerian War, the French of Algeria thus felt themselves “at home” in this land where they had sometimes lived for four generations. (And this is to say nothing of the Jews of Algeria, naturalized as French citizens in 1870, whose presence antedated even the arrival of the Arabs.⁴) Between the end of the First World War and the first gunshots of November 1954, the settlers’ sense of belonging to a country, Algeria, took firm root. The European population in fact grew from 833,000 inhabitants in 1926 (657,000 French and naturalized French citizens, 176,000 foreigners of European origin) to 984,000 in 1954, of which some 79 percent had been born in Algeria. Whatever their origin, they considered themselves to belong to the “Algerian French,” distinct from the “French of France.” Their beliefs, their sense of self, were formed through their habit of constantly comparing their status with that of their mainland French compatriots. By contrast, they rarely dared compare their situation to that of the “indigenous peoples,” the Algerian Muslims, many of whom had been dispossessed of their lands at the time of the French conquest. They had no wish to see themselves as beneficiaries of the colonial situation, that is to say, of a system of privileges from which they profited in comparison with the colonized peoples. They did not have a higher standard of living than their metropolitan compatriots, and did not understand metropolitan French accusations about their supposed wealth (they were accused of “making the *burnous* sweat”).⁵ They claimed, justifiably enough, the right to live where they were born, where their ancestors were buried. In their eyes, it was the duty of France not to abandon them, but to protect them by maintaining the French flag on Algerian soil. France had held Algeria since 1830, for almost a century and a half, and yet it would all fall to pieces in a few years. Small wonder that even at the moment of their exile in 1962, the French of Algeria did not really grasp what was happening to them.⁶

A Memory that Still Bleeds

On Wednesday, March 13, 2002, a few days before the fortieth anniversary of the signing of the Armistice of Evian, eleven families of *pieds noirs* who had

disappeared or were assassinated in Algeria between March and July 1962 lodged a complaint in Paris for "crimes against humanity." Like the case begun six months earlier by some *harkis* (Muslim Algerians engaged by the French Army as auxiliaries during the Algerian War), this initiative was largely a symbolic one.⁷ From a strictly legal point of view, the charge of "crimes against humanity, arbitrary arrests, detentions, and imprisonments" has little chance of succeeding, for the law of July 31, 1968, offers "amnesty for all infractions committed in connection with the events in Algeria." Moreover, the current definition of crimes against humanity in France applies only to crimes committed during the Second World War, or acts after 1994. Regardless of the outcome of the case, however, memory still bleeds for the French of Algeria.

After independence in 1962, an immense literature of grief evoked and memorialized ties to an engulfed and entombed land—the Algeria that had been French. The *pieds noirs*, as they were called from the moment of their arrival in metropolitan France, dominated journalism devoted to daily life overseas, to sunny yet wounded Algeria, to its cruel war. From the 1960s to the 1980s, in autobiographies, memoirs disguised as novels, and painful confessions, Jean Pélégri, Jules Roy, Emmanuel Roblès, Marie Cardinal, Alain Vircondelet and others made this history live. Dozens of works appeared that were shot through with melancholy, with affection for a land that had disappeared forever, and with bitterness for having been a people misunderstood, betrayed, and abandoned. These works were about *not* forgetting: they enjoined, as a kind of "Eleventh Commandment" (to quote the title of André Rossfeld's recent book), that one remain true to one's own.⁸

Voyage to a Land Celebrated as a Woman, Loved and Lost

In the twilight of their lives, some French intellectuals also tried to express what they owed to their Algerian past, "revealing" the importance of this particular birthplace—like Jacques Derrida, and (less expectedly) Louis Althusser in his fine memoir *L'avenir dure longtemps*. Theirs were stories of quest, of the attempt to find, in the morass of history, some road into their childhood, in the hope of filling a void. But this land and its war feature in the works of many other writers born in Algeria as well, albeit in different ways. The classic theme is of loving fascination for a lost land, which bears the face of a beloved woman.

Above all is the theme of woman as mother. Albert Camus' saying is well known; to a question posed as he received the Nobel Prize for literature, he responded, "I would rather choose my mother than justice." But thanks to the same Albert Camus, who taught him that "Arabs have a soul," the famous writer Jules Roy was considered a traitor by his own family, and especially by his mother, who was very attached to *Algérie française*. Roy proved disloyal to an adored mother, against whose prejudices he struggled; in *Adieu ma mère, adieu mon coeur*, his final hopeless journey into his childhood and past,

he wrote of a return in 1996 to an Algeria “where they cut each others’ throats.”⁹ The figure of the mother also appears in the works of Jean Pélégri, and especially in *Ma mere d’Algérie*, where he evokes, with a restrained lyricism free of melancholy, the landscape of his native Mitidja. Amid the war in Algeria, which he remembers as an “album of murders,” he finds a subtle and soft idiom through the figure of Fatima, who has lost her only child. She teaches him to write Arabic, and through this language, he embraces his “native mother.”¹⁰

Algeria is also represented through female attributes and childhood personalities. Jean-Noël Pancrazi examines the Algeria of his childhood, at Batna. In *Madame Arnoul*, a child becomes friends with a woman who is not really integrated into the European community. Then the war comes, and with it the sense of blood running everywhere, in streets clogged with anonymous soldiers and real victims. Madame Arnoul, denounced as a suspicious character by a sympathizer of the diehard Organisation Armée Secrète (OAS), is carried off by the police. The child will never again see his friend, and becomes aware that he himself is becoming a kind of stranger, lost boy.¹¹

Alongside the “woman as mother,” with her powers, doubts, and secrets, who carries and protects the man-child, appears the “woman as metaphor,” the symbol of a fading love story, of loss. Norbert Régina, in *La femme immobile*, uses the city of Oran as the setting for his characters. It is a strange city that turns its back on the sea, a city seized in the madness of the end of the war. The work focuses on Nina Régnier, a woman of thirty-seven years of age, beautiful, married to a lawyer, but dying of an incurable illness. She dies on July 1, 1962, the day of Algerian independence. The author recounts, in a parallel narrative, the last days of *Algérie française*. Nina’s son, Sébastien, does not know what causes him more suffering—the disappearance of his mother or of his native land.¹²

Ten years earlier, Alain Vircondelet, in *Maman la blanche* (1981) and then in *Alger, l’amour* (1982), as well as in poems and prose, disguised or overt autobiographical pieces, showed his love for his city, his distress about leaving it, his flight (“we must flee, flee during these days of March 1962, beneath the spit, the jibes and the thrown rocks, with you near-paralyzed by fear. Flee those who became our enemies and whom we never wanted to hate”), and then his mourning for a lost land.¹³ And we can find Algeria, the beloved and lost woman, in other accounts. The novelist Jean-Luc Allouche evokes thus his native city: “While our women, their graces worn by age and exile, are moved to a trance by the devilish sound the bow pulls from the violin placed on the thigh, stiff as a phallus, by the pounding beat the agile brown hand wrests from the tambourine, by the sensual, almost obscene groan exhaled by the lasciviously curved lute, soldered to the singer’s groin, I find at last, naked and offered up to me, my unfaithful and always desired city: Constantine.”¹⁴

Many years have gone by since the 1960s, but writers still rely on these themes of melancholy and memory, never having enough of them, their obvious

staleness notwithstanding. This kind of account continues to be produced, and seems always to run along the same lines. Behind the desire to resist an always deceptive lyricism one finds the same nostalgia for landscapes, for images nestled in the furthest corners of memory. Thus, André Rossfelder, in 2000, speaks of "the air of the south that embraces you the moment the sea disappears," of the "uneasy gardens, arid and yellow," or of the Bay of Algiers, "its sandy shores rounded in a perfect curve from the cliffs of La Pérouse on the morning side, to the rocks of the point of Pescade toward night."¹⁵ It would be unfair to locate this literature of exile, of the loss of a vanished Andalusia, solely within the fertile lineage of colonial writing. That tradition, for the whole of the nineteenth century, saw colonialism as the rebirth of Latin culture after the "dark centuries of Islam." By contrast, the late-nineteenth-century works of orientalists such as Louis Bertrand or Ernest Mercier proposed a genealogy of the Algerian "melting-pot" strongly reminiscent of American ideas of the period.

Algérie Française, a Half-Way America?

In the early years of the colonial conquest, Algeria was, above all, a "new frontier" for France, a kind of half-way America with its (purportedly empty) vastnesses to conquer and develop. The "colonist pioneers" played a crucial part in this vision. At the beginning of the twentieth century, a literature emerged that was based on the (unacknowledged) models of the American West or South, with their lost towns, crimes of passion, and concealed and exaggerated sexuality—an influence seen, for example, in certain writings of Camus, like *l'Etranger*. Algeria was a lonely but passionate land, where the almost palpable heat of scorching afternoons seemed as heavy as death.

At the end of and after the Algerian War, partisans of the lost *Algérie française* again took up these themes, which would define a kind of French-style "Southernism." Pascal Gauchon and Patrick Buisson's OAS (named after the Organisation Armée Secrète) gives us the main "American" themes of French Algeria: "Algeria, for France, is a pioneer frontier of great riches, a territory to conquer, a land of adventures. It is, in a way, France's dream—the dream of a far-off south rather like the American Far West, in a land where towering cities of sky-scrapers call to mind California more than the Auvergne!"¹⁶

Initially a land of dazzling experiences, an arena of unexpected encounters, a place of incredible exploration that spared one the trip to distant America, Algeria became, under the impact of colonization, a cornucopia of riches.¹⁷ The military writings of the nineteenth century, and narratives of travel and exploration, greatly aided in the construction of this myth of a southern Eldorado, a new promised land. Of course, since then, other texts have revealed a world not of luminous landscapes and proud nomads, but of emaciated Muslims and greedy adventurers.¹⁸

The Story of “Pioneer” Settlement

It was, then, in this Algeria of wide-open spaces that a new race of pioneers went forth with courage (and with difficulty). “The *pieds noirs*, this American people, we might say, was born of a real melting-pot where all the populations of the western Mediterranean intermingled, all the outcasts of the failed revolutions of France united with the victims of territorial change,” explain Gauchon and Buisson.¹⁹

Let us therefore follow these “pioneers” after arrival. After the French landing at Sidi-Ferruch in 1830, emigrants from the metropole accompanied the army. As General Thomas-Robert Bugeaud had wanted, laborers would replace soldiers. But the new community grew slowly. The deadly battles against the Muslim population, often cruel and bloody, were followed by other battles— against the soil, against the climate, against epidemics. Losses were severe, and many gave up. Between 1842 and 1846, we can count 198,000 arrivals and 118,000 departures. In the first settlers’ villages, the “pioneers” battled a hostile environment: natural disasters, thieves who went after the harvests, and Muslim Algerians who harassed property owners and demanded their due. The image of the promised Eldorado blurred before their eyes. Emigrants often looked more like vagabond-adventurers than conquistadors.²⁰

Successive deportations of republicans hostile to Louis-Philippe and then Napoleon III were needed to strengthen the colony. The exiles of 1848, the deportees of the Second Empire, and penniless immigrants all claimed the heritage of liberal republicanism. These first French of Algeria, a mixture of peasants left behind by the industrial revolution in France and of exiled “forty-eighters” and Communards, gradually acquired the mentality of small land owners. And the old Republican tradition, an amalgam of peasant individualism and attachment to liberty, flourished in this section of Algeria’s European population.

In the period following the defeat of the Second Empire, France committed itself to an official policy of colonization. It hoped to extend rural French settlement through the free concession of land. The Treaty of Frankfurt, which removed Alsace and part of Lorraine from France, led several thousand Alsacians loyal to France to seek new lands to cultivate south of the Mediterranean Sea. The names of villages created in Algeria mark this page of history: Strasbourg, Kléber, Belfort. Later official colonization efforts were aimed especially at peasants in the south of France. The Corsicans, in particular, made up the most important regional contingent in 1896, followed by emigrants from the Pyrénées-Orientales, the Hautes-Alpes, the Drôme, and the Gard.

Social Divisions, and the World of the “Poor Whites”

Areas of settlement grew rapidly due to viticulture. Although a settler without capital could support himself by growing wheat, it was the phylloxera plague suffered by French vineyards at the end of the nineteenth century that offered

new opportunities. Colonists responded to the global decline in grain prices by embarking on this new venture. Vineyard land under European cultivation increased from 15,000 hectares in 1878 to 167,000 hectares in 1903. Yet wheat did not disappear; it instead developed as a speculative crop. Large holdings became the rule, as big European grain-producing estates and vineyards absorbed smallholdings. According to the historian Charles-Robert Ageron, in 1930 a "quarter of European rural properties had more than 100 hectares under cultivation."²¹

But in contrast to a tenacious myth, which places the *pieds noirs* in the countryside surveying their large domains, settlers lived mainly in cities or in the larger Algerian towns. Statistics demonstrate the magnitude of this phenomenon, showing the role played by urban space in the settler economy and demography. In 1872, 60 percent of Europeans were (already) urbanites; this proportion grew to 63.6 percent in 1886, 65.4 percent in 1906, and 71.4 percent in 1926. After the Second World War, Algiers and Oran (with their suburbs) and Constantine and Bône alone contained more than half of the European population.²²

A world of wage earners rubbed shoulders in the cities, making up the majority of the one million Europeans present in Algeria in 1954. The bulk of this group of urban European employees was comprised of civil servants, lawyers, merchants, shopkeepers, entrepreneurs, and artisans. Of 355,000 employed individuals, 190,000 earned modest salaries, 90,000 as industrial workers and 92,000 as civil servants. There were also 56,000 middle ranking or senior executives, and 60,000 merchants, artisans, or members of the liberal professions. Many civilian or military pensioners came to live out their old age under the Algerian sun. One can see that this Algerian society in no way constituted a distillation or microcosm of French society. But was it, for all that, a privileged society?

Barely 3 percent of the French of Algeria had a higher standard of living than the average in the rest of France; 25 percent had about the same income; and 72 percent earned 15 percent to 20 percent less, although the cost of living in Algeria was not lower than that of France. This disparity in income was a consequence of the nature of economic relations between France and its principal colony, Algeria. Within the framework of the "colonial pact," Algeria had to settle for being a source of raw materials and an outlet for French manufactured goods.

It would therefore be wrong to consider the *pieds noirs* a homogenous people. Very often, as a result of their social situation, they came into conflict with a dominant class made up of large land owners (Borgeaud, Germain) or of large capitalists (Blachette, Tiné). They formed what one might call a class of "poor whites" (to adapt a term borrowed from American social history) and led a difficult existence. But they unanimously defended the privileges that made the most minor French civil servant superior to any Algerian. They were united by their common fear of the Muslim majority.

From “French” to “European”

Neither, however, was the *pied noir* population composed exclusively of people coming from France and of French Jews naturalized by the Crémieux decree of 1870. In the latter part of the nineteenth century a wave of desperately poor emigrants from the coasts of the Mediterranean also appeared. Spaniards came first, for history had woven ancient ties between the “Barbary lands” and the Kingdom of Spain. Indeed, nearly 35,000 Spaniards lived in Algeria in 1849, when the French had just begun to arrive. By 1886, 160,000 had left Spain to create virtual fiefs, especially in the Oran region. In 1851, Arzew had, for instance, 700 Spaniards for every 170 French people. In 1911, in the whole area of Oran, there were 95,000 French natives, 92,000 Spaniards naturalized as French citizens, and 93,000 Spanish citizens.

Italy and Algeria also share a long history: from the Roman presence at the beginning of the Christian era, there has been continuous commercial interaction. In 1886, 35,000 Italians were concentrated mainly in Constantine and Bône. Finally, we have the Maltese, who answered the call of the colonizers and found themselves in a land strangely like their own. In 1886, 15,553 Maltese were scattered through the east, especially at Bône (Annaba), and in the port cities—Algiers in particular, where they settled in the Tagarin Quarter.

Once in Algeria, these emigrants took up their old lines of work. Market gardeners and day laborers from Spain set themselves up in Orania, Italian masons in the east, and the Maltese as goatherds and shopkeepers. Finding the land beyond their reach, most turned back to the cities, where they settled down. Soon they threatened to become more numerous than the French colonists themselves.

The law of June 26, 1889, imposed French citizenship; it “automatically naturalized each foreigner living in Algeria if he does not request, at the age of majority, the original nationality of his father.” (The law was inapplicable to Muslims.) In 1886, there were 219,000 French and 211,000 foreigners; in 1896, 318,000 French (of whom 50,000 naturalized) and 212,000 foreigners. From 1896 onward, the number of Europeans born in Algeria was greater than the number of immigrants. This was a pivotal moment, one that saw the birth of a new people on Algerian soil, a kind of Mediterranean “mixture.”²³

The religious question is important for grasping the uniqueness, in the *pied noir* community, of the Mediterraneans, and especially of the Spaniards. Their continued fervent religiosity—with its observance of Sabbath rest and religious feast days, its solemn celebration of the rituals of birth, marriage, and death, its communal processions—cushioned the shock of rupture with the native land. Face to face with Islam, the church gained significance as a means of preserving Algerian French identity.

Out of this mixture, bit by bit, a new culture emerged, with its own lifestyle, speech, and even cuisine. For Marie Elbe, a writer close to the activists of French

Algeria in the 1960s, this was "a young people, proud to have tamed the land, what one might call an 'adolescent race.'" ²⁴

A "Southernism" à la Française

The problem was that this "adolescent" people had spread into lands inhabited by natives! But no matter: for the task of the conquerors (after crushing and subjecting the natives) would be to protect the natives and impart to them the blessings of a *mission civilisatrice*, a civilizing mission. In a work on schools for natives in the Constantine region, one academic inspector, Gustave Benoist, wrote, "Our indigenous people are children, big children. One has to dazzle them, to capture their imagination in order to reach and arouse their intellect. ... Geography should initially be taught out-of-doors, since that is where our *little savages* find their bearings." ²⁵ Underneath republican benevolence, a "terrible" reality shines through: the big children/little savages have a long way to go before they will reach the far shores of civilization. In those triumphant years of conquest, colonial ideologues brought up the natives only to emphasize what they owed to France, the devotion they ought to feel for the colonizing country. If the past and present situation of the Muslim Algerians went unmentioned, it was because colonial rhetoric envisaged no place for them in the "new Algeria." In the south, members of one community never crossed paths with another, even though the ravages of poverty were felt by all. (European living standards, as mentioned, were considerably lower than in the metropole.) In this immense "vacant" land, where a law of separation reigned, a kind of connection between men was nevertheless possible, but only so long as each understood his place. The south—Algeria—was not a homogenous world, but a land made up of juxtaposed communal identities. Indeed, these powerful personal ties remind one "of the society of the Middle Ages, with its relations of protection and safeguard. These have been strengthened by insecurity and terrorism, which have forced the vassal to seek protection from a lord." ²⁶

And speaking of ancient history, of subjects and of lords, we may note that at the beginning of the twentieth century the jurist Émile Larcher had already explained, "Today, the French in Algeria live in conditions similar to those of the Franks in Gaul: a victorious race places its yoke upon a vanquished race. There are therefore masters and subjects." The condition of one determined that of the other, even to different legal and political rights. "The citizens are nobles or lords; the natives are commoners or serfs," Larcher continued, fearing he had not been explicit enough. ²⁷ Thus, French jurists of the era lent their authority to this colonial melting pot, source of a "new race."

Throughout the long conquest of Algeria, the whole of the nineteenth century, French colonizers never ceased urging colonized peoples to fit themselves into the mold shaped for them. Because access to educational institutions was so strictly limited, those few natives who managed to surmount all obstacles could be proud of their success. Finally assimilated, they could contemplate the

“collective prostration” out of which they had been able to drag themselves, abandoning en route all references to a native culture considered as “barbaric.” In a report from 1891, a member of the Assemblée Nationale thus touted the virtues of assimilationist education for a native population thought to be not entirely backward: “The fact is that a barbaric race already endowed with partial civilization, more or less normal social relations, customs sanctified by a stable tradition, and a deeply rooted religion, can no longer be subjected to the treatment accorded a similar but savage race. One must have recourse to other means to dominate it.”²⁸

Illusions of the Melting Pot

We’ve come a long way from *mixture* or *melting pot*; it is now a discussion of *assimilation* or *exclusion*. And yet, to my mind, the Algerian situation calls to mind not apartheid, that collection of racist laws established by the state in South Africa, but the social relations of the American South after the Civil War and the abolition of slavery.²⁹ Everyday racism and linguistic violence precede, accompany, and follow this “southernism,” which was founded not only on an emotional attachment to a beloved landscape or regret for a lost land. Rather, social relations themselves were suffused with segregationist attitudes.

From the end of the nineteenth century on, Algeria was administered not by the Colonial Ministry but by the Ministry of the Interior. The principles of cultural assimilation and political integration, and the organizational structure of the Third Republic, tended to homogenize the juridical French nation. Through school textbooks and the work of the *hussards noirs*,³⁰ the marginalization of local dialects, and the struggle against the church, administrative and cultural centralization was affirmed. Republican assimilationism was born. These values, conceived of as universal Republican principles, were exported to the colonies during French nationalism’s economically expansionist phase at the end of the nineteenth century. And such neouniversalist principles were applied even more stringently in Algeria, which was considered from 1848 on to be an integral part of France.³¹

On the one hand, assimilationist Republican rhetoric aimed at bringing together all individuals stripped of particularist identities, in keeping with the laws and principles of civic and republican equality. But on the other hand, a differentialist and segregationist strategy was deployed, based on the idea that some men and women were different. *Algérie française* thus emerged as a slogan, an ideological litmus test relied on by the European minority. Algeria was a particular type of colony. Its legal system was distinct from that applied in other parts of the French Empire. Algeria had nothing “in common with [these dependencies] but provisions taken from French metropolitan law. ... This separation might seem arbitrary to superficial minds. But the colonial problem in Barbary is so distinctive that it requires its own order and law,” wrote the legislator Arthur Girault at the beginning of the twentieth century. Girault’s

reasoning was that Algeria was "inhabited by diverse indigenous peoples, who hate one another and among whom the idea of nationality does not exist. ... Among all these men, so different and so divided, religious faith constitutes an ever stronger bond, because Islam is growing in extent and in intensity."³²

A strategy of differentialism was deployed against a rhetoric of assimilationism: simply belonging to the Muslim faith was a mark of distance from "Western civilization." Émile Larcher, professor of law at Algiers in 1903, wrote "It is folly to impose on a colony that differs from a French department entirely—in its size, in its racial composition, in its climate—metropolitan France's administrative structure and law. ... If assimilation is the application to the colony of the institutions of the motherland, one must be careful to avoid confusing it with a system that is its caricature, the mania for uniformity."³³ In order to deal with separate populations that were not to mix, the colonizer fragmented his law, creating a distinct legal system. This system could neither be French (since in time strict application of Republican principles would have threatened colonial authority) nor Algerian (since that could have raised the possibility of indigenous foundations for law). Rather, the colonizer worked out a system of law that assumed permanent and irreconcilable difference.

Within this false republican model, a particular kind of segregation could develop. It became rational to occupy a territory and to rule its inhabitants, because this would transform them into "civilized beings" and gradually eliminate differences. Living on his own land overrun by the conqueror, the "other" owed it to himself to acquire the qualities of a "civilized being," to be like him. The gift of civilization was a favor bestowed upon the native. Since he was not physically destroyed, he could achieve a higher form of learning.

Until the second half of the twentieth century, one part of French nationalism hid behind the mask of a kind of Republican universalism. But the battles over decolonization in the 1950s and 1960s ripped apart this "protection" and exposed universalism as nationalism. Two nationalisms collided: one of the *universal secular* type and another with a *communitarian and religious* character and borne in part by Algerian nationalism.³⁴ In the Algerian War, these frameworks were clearly apparent. Those who gave speeches on Republican universalism (in particular certain leaders of the French Left) revealed that they were simply reproducing French nationalism of the nineteenth century. In the name of the universal, they created the national—a misunderstanding only cleared up with the end of the Algerian War.

The Scapegoats of the North

This "south" constructed beyond the hexagon felt itself to be unloved and misunderstood by a hostile north disdainful of these upstart adventurers: "The time-lag between Paris and Algiers has deep causes, compounded of ignorance and misunderstanding. The French of the metropole did not like the *pieds noirs* at all, they willingly shared de Gaulle's contempt for this 'heap of loudmouths.'"

Men of the Left thought the settlers' dominant trait to be racism. Pierre Laffont thus noted, "Rather than just a superiority complex, one can say that the *French of Algeria behaved toward Muslims with a superiority that was anything but complex. Relations between men there were not the same as in the metropole*, but even if one tries to brand them with the now-ridiculed label of paternalism, there existed, especially in the countryside, a real human warmth between the different races, a like way of seeing things. ... This bond between men (imperfect but real) has now been replaced by a legal relationship."³⁵

How could a Mediterranean tradition, perforce "virile," be comprehensible to the inherently austere and cold partisans of a legal state? What separates Algeria from the metropole

is not the space of the Mediterranean but time. At the very moment when France turns its back on its peasant roots to throw itself into industrialization, war and terrorism force Algeria back upon those feudal gestures and attitudes which remained in force in rural areas. The weak expects salvation from the protection and benevolence of the strong, from this army that distributes assistance and arms. ... All of this irritates France; it is a millstone pinning it to its past. And, to kill the past, the French government will have to come by degrees to a second Algerian war, the one that France will wage against its rebellious children.³⁶

Large spaces and open plains, dead-tired European adventurers and hostile (but vanquished) natives, heroic army charges and a society attached to its glorious rural past and opposed to a distant and industrialized north; a savage south with its covered wagons and its pioneers in love with the land and with a lost innocence. All the elements were in place to turn the Algerian War into a nostalgic technicolor Western.

The Algerian War as a War of Secession

After the French disaster of 1940 and the establishment of the Vichy regime, the events of Sétif took place in May 1945. The Muslim uprising and its large-scale repression dug a bloody trench between Europeans and secessionist Algerians. Every hint of tension became a silent menace, the most banal events of communal cohabitation made the French colonial order tremble on its foundations.³⁷

The elements of the tragedy were in place. The Algerian War played the pivotal role in the emergence and entrenchment of a southern narrative. The partisans of *Algérie française* dreaded secession from the north, from metropolitan France. After Charles de Gaulle's famous speech of September 16, 1959, which for the first time raised the possibility of Algerian self-determination, veterans "disputed the idea that secession [might] be offered to *départements* constitutionally part of the Republic," and the Movement populaire du 13 mai (the Popular Movement of May 13, one of the parent organizations of the OAS) "repudiat[ed] with shame and indignation the proposal of *secession* as a real

insult to our dead.”³⁸ Political fervor seized the supporters of *Algérie française*. By raising barricades in Algiers in January 1960, they tried to repeat the events of May 13, 1958, which had brought down the Fourth Republic and put Gaulle in power. After this failed attempt at insurrection, most organizations defending *Algérie française* were dissolved. But activists did not lose heart, and made ready for new operations. On May 6, 1960, the Front de l’Algérie française (FAF) emerged as the largest and last legal organization supporting *Algérie française*. The FAF created its own journal, *Algérie terre française* [*Algerian French Soil*], and claimed close to 600,000 members at the end of 1960. The FAF emerged as the real forerunner of the OAS, with its slogan painted on walls: “The FAF strikes where it wants and when it wants.” The slogan was co-opted, verbatim, by the OAS.³⁹

The Algerian War turned increasingly from a Franco-Algerian war into a Franco-French civil war, in hearts and in minds—in the openly expressed desire for revenge against the metropole, the faraway north; in the unacknowledged French remorse for the abandonment of Algeria; in the fear and the hatred that flared up between Algerians and *pieds noirs*, between opponents and supporters of *Algérie française*. The OAS was created at this time. The referendum of January 8, 1961, in effect a plebiscite on the Algerian policy of de Gaulle, stiffened the resolve of supporters of *Algérie française*. Jean-Jacques Susini, Pierre Lagaillarde, and Jean-Claude Perez, who had taken refuge in Madrid to escape prosecution for their part in the January 1960 rising, decided to organize a new movement among civilians and deserters. On January 20, 1961, they came to an agreement about the abbreviation OAS, which would be used for the first time in a document dated February 21, 1961. Raoul Salan took on the presidency, and the OAS played a major role in preparing the failed putsch of generals Salan, Zeller, Jouhaud, and Challe on April 21, 1961. The OAS would nonetheless bring together the most intransigent activists of the French Army, the *pied-noir* community, and the far-right families of the metropole. Their ambition, their conception of history, were expressed thus: “*This is our war of secession*, comparable to the one in the United States that brought the traditional South into conflict with the industrial North.” Keeping these stakes in mind, we will perhaps understand the agony, the naïveté, and even the excesses of these “southerners,” among whom the elites (as in an idealized Middle Ages) clung to ideals of protection, while others, the “small men,” went from despondency to savage and desperate rebellion—a rebellion that drove them, following Marie Elbe’s phrase, “to suicide by revolt.” Those who read the schism of the 1960s as a great contest between “southern” Algeria and the “northern” industrialism of metropolitan France were not wrong. What remained of the French imperial myth, the residual ethos of a particular colonial tradition, could not adapt itself either to the imperatives of a technical civilization, or to the human relations that underlay it.⁴⁰

The End of French Algeria

After the Evian Accords of March 18, 1962, which laid out Algeria's transition to independence, and despite OAS orders forbidding the departure of Europeans, the exodus to the metropole began. OAS attacks did not cease. One could even say that terrorism increased in violence: there were individual assassinations of Muslims, manhunts, plastic explosives, mortar shots. At the end of April, a car bomb exploded in a market heavily frequented by Algerians during Ramadan. This was the first of its type, but on May 2, a second car bomb exploded in the port of Algiers, causing 6 deaths and wounding 110, all of them Muslims. In May, in Oran, between 10 and 50 Algerians were killed daily by the OAS. Such was the ferocity of these attacks that those still living in the European quarters quickly abandoned them. Each person hid or sought protection as best as was possible. Even the OAS leaders who were still at liberty knew that the game was up.

Each day, from the end of May, 8,000 to 10,000 of those who would later be called the *pieds noirs* left Algeria, hurriedly carrying off with them their most precious possessions. June 7, 1962, saw the culmination of the scorched-earth policy that the OAS continued to support. Its Delta Commandos burned the library at Algiers and threw its 60,000 volumes on the fire. At Oran, the town hall, the municipal library, and four schools were destroyed by explosives. Total anarchy reigned in the cities, which were split in two: not a single Algerian circulated in the European quarter. Paris's decision to open the frontier to the soldiers of the Armée de Libération National (ANL) stationed in Morocco provoked yet more panic among Europeans. In utter chaos, Algeria emptied of its executives and technicians. The European exodus became a human tide. Thousands of distraught people, numb with grief, waited in utter destitution for a boat. In 1962, as these French Algerians left Algeria, more than half of them would see France for the first time. Many of them settled in the south of the hexagon, but for most, separation from their native land would long remain a deep wound.

Lessons and Interpretations

The Algerian War did not follow a predictable path. Europeans of the Left, enamored of justice, ended up in the OAS; Algerian Muslims, attached to Republican egalitarianism, ended up joining the ranks of hard-line Arab Islamism.⁴¹ And, at the end of the conflict, Muslim auxiliaries (the *harkis*) fought in and beside the French Army, while groups of enraged Europeans took up arms against French soldiers.

The writer's pen always sketches a war of many cleavages, at the heart of which oppositions are anything but binary. During the Algerian War, veterans of the resistance against Vichy and the Nazis fought against de Gaulle. Take the case, for example, of André Rossfelder, who recounts how he took part in the battles of the Resistance at Algiers in 1942, narrowly missed being executed,

then fought in the hard campaigns in Italy in 1943 and France in 1944, in the Vosges and in Alsace. But then a particular myth bites the dust—that of the comradeship in arms born during those years, for the Algerian War exploded the solidarity of the Resistance. Jacques Soustelle and Georges Bidault, although they were among the earliest opponents of Vichy, turned against other Gaullists, and against de Gaulle himself.

Many accounts retell the inexorable unfolding of the Algerian drama as a kind of icy sword of injustice falling upon the French of Algeria. They see it as a tragedy made inevitable by Paris’s policy of burning all bridges between Europeans and Algerian Muslims. The figure of Camus—often invoked—movingly appears, seeking through his conception of “civil truce” to escape the logic of communal conflict with race or religion at its heart, and to recover a sense of a common humanity worth saving. “He invited the public to face up to mounting suffering and anguish, to reflect on the motives of each side, and to recognize the inevitable solidarity of all Algerians, Arab or French, on their common soil.” Camus’ attempt in 1956 had the wavering force of a candle at the bottom of a well.

Some books on the *pied noir* tragedy meticulously recount the efforts of those who refused to believe in the separation between France and Algeria, but fail to see the rottenness of these old and dubious colonial relations. Their authors retort that they never belonged to that colonial world, one that refused equality between *all* men on Algerian soil. Others develop arguments about the “terrorism” and “cruel violence” of the Algerian nationalists in ways that implicitly make reference to the present-day tragedy in Algeria. This apocalyptic style, with its obsessive focus on coups and atrocities, cannot help but bring the current Algerian situation to mind. One history cannot be imagined without the other, as if they were bound together by an indis severable chain—and thus we have the responsibility for the country’s endless strife, from yesterday until today, laid solely at the feet of those who sought separation from France. But while much of the cycle of terror was indeed introduced during the “first Algerian war,” must we not also, as Camus advised, wipe the tears of this other victim of the French Army and understand his moral and physical suffocation, as the conventions of his daily life were shattered by violence? Very few writers pass through the “mirror” to go and meet the sufferings of the other.

It is above all the war in Algeria that haunts works devoted to the *pieds noirs*. Caught in the spiral of an ever more terrible violence, some have lost their balance and thrown themselves into the void, thereafter joining the camp of the vanquished. In exile, these accounts often tell us, there is neither victory nor defeat—only an immense feeling of being alone forever, against all, against oneself, in mourning for a land lost for eternity.

Translation by Julia Torrie.

Translator note: all quotations from French that appear in the text of this essay have been translated by Julia Torrie.

Notes

1. Pierre Bourdieu, *Sociologie de l'Algérie* (Paris: PUF, 1962); Pierre Nora, *Les Français d'Algérie* (Paris: Julliard, 1961); Bruno Etienne, *Les Européens d'Algérie et l'indépendance algérienne* (Paris: Ed. du CNRS, 1969).
2. See, in particular, Joëlle Hureau, *La mémoire des pieds noirs* (Paris: Olivier Orban, 1987); Jean-Jacques Jordi, *De l'exode à l'exil, rapatriés et pieds noirs en France* (Paris: l'Harmattan, 1994); Jean-Jacques Jordi, 1962, *l'arrivée des pieds noirs* (Paris: Autrement, 1995); Danielle Michel-chich, *Les pieds noirs aujourd'hui* (Paris: Calmann Lévy, 1990); Janine de La Hogue and Simone Nerbonne, *Mémoire écrite de l'Algérie* (Paris: Maisonneuve et Larose, 1992).
3. See the historical arguments developed in Daniel Leconte, *Les pieds noirs, histoire et portrait d'une communauté* (Paris: Seuil, 1980); and Benjamin Stora, *Algeria: A Short History, 1830–2000* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2001).
4. For this singular history see, in particular, Jean Laloum and Jean-Luc Allouche, eds., *Les Juifs d'Algérie, Images et textes* (Paris: Scribe, 1987); Richard Ayoun and Bernard Cohen, *Les Juifs d'Algérie, 2000 ans d'histoire* (Paris: JC Lattès, 1982); Henri Mslati, *Les Juifs d'Algérie sous le régime de Vichy*, préface de Benjamin Stora (Paris: l'Harmattan, 1999).
5. *Burnous* refers to a hooded cloak worn in Algeria.
6. On the difficult settlement in France, see Doris Bensimon, *L'intégration des Juifs nord-africains en France* (Paris: Ed. Mouton, 1971), or the proceedings of the conference, *Les rapatriés en Languedoc Roussillon*, sous la direction de Mohand Khellil (Montpellier: Ed. Université de Montpellier, 1992).
7. Estimates of the total number of European Algerians who vanished after March 19, 1962, vary, according to Bernard Coll, secretary general of the association Jeune Pied Noir, "from the figure of 3018 given by the state, to the 6000–9000 cited by the associations, to the 25,000 estimated by André Santini, former secretary of state for those repatriated."
8. André Rossfelder, *Une vie algérienne: Le onzième commandement* (Paris: Gallimard, 2000).
9. Jules Roy, *Adieu ma mère, adieu mon coeur* (Paris: A. Michel, 1996).
10. Jean Pelegri, *Ma mère d'Algérie* (Alger, Algeria: Laphomic, 1989).
11. Jean-Noël Pancrazi, *Madame Arnoul* (Paris: Gallimard, 1995).
12. Norbert Régina, *La femme immobile* (Paris: Flammarion, 1992).
13. Alain Vircondelet would publish, with Jean-Pierre Stora, *Là-bas, souvenirs d'une Algérie perdue*, an album of text and photos (Paris, Ed. du Chêne, 1995).
14. Jean-Luc Allouche, "L'Algérie ne m'est rien," in *Mon Algérie*, ed. Monique Ayoun and Jean-Pierre Stora (Paris: Stock, 1988), 47.
15. Rossfelder, *Une vie algérienne*.
16. Pascal Gauchon and Patrick Buisson, *OAS, les plus beaux textes de l'Algérie française* (Bièvres, France: JPN, 1987), 14.
17. On this theme, see Joëlle Hureau, "L'Algérie, terre d'abondance, terre de déportation, terre de refuge," in *La mémoire des pieds noirs* (Paris: Hachette, 1987).
18. See the soldiers' accounts collected in Philippe Lucas and Jean-Claude Vatin, *L'Algérie des anthropologues* (Paris: Maspero, 1975). Another traveler, Alphonse Daudet, in *Tartarin de Tarascon*, showed Algeria in a very different and more sombre light: ineffective administration, depraved and indecisive leaders, colonists given over to theft and alcohol.
19. Gauchon and Bouisson, *OAS*.
20. See Jules Roy, *Les chevaux du soleil* (Paris: Grasset, 1970).
21. Charles-Robert Ageron, *Histoire de l'Algérie coloniale* (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1980).
22. On these statistics, see the records stored at Aix en Provence, *Encyclopédie maritime et coloniale*, 1948, in two volumes.
23. On demographic statistics, see Kamel Kateb, *Européens, Juifs et Musulmans d'Algérie, 1830–1962* (Paris: Ed. de l'INED, 2001).
24. Gauchon and Bouisson, *OAS*, 12.
25. Gustave Benoist, *De l'instruction et de l'éducation dans la province de Constantine* (Paris: Hachette, 1886), 138–39.
26. Gauchon and Bouisson, *OAS*, 14.
27. Émile Larcher, *Traité élémentaire de législation algérienne* (Paris: Rousseau, 1903), 4, 6.
28. Antoine Burdeau, *L'Algérie en 1891* (Paris: Hachette, 1892), 141.
29. After the war to abolish slavery, all Americans were theoretically equal before the law. All offices were open to blacks. After a few years, however, civil rights were restricted in the

whole of the south; reconciliation of the two parts of the country was in fact founded on a new antiblack policy. Discrimination in all areas of public life was then ratified by the supreme court in 1896. Segregation in housing, employment, and the army increased in the north as southern blacks moved there in search of work.

30. The phrase is a reference to Charles Péguy, “Les Hussards noirs de la République,” in which he described the ultra-republican school teachers of his childhood.
31. On these first moments of the military conquest of Algeria, the scholar Éric Savarese has written, “The progressive conquest of Algeria, confirmed by the victory of French troops over the Emir, made it clear that it was possible to establish a settlement colony there, and to build, under the African sun, a *second France*.” See Savarese, *L’ordre colonial et sa légitimation en France métropolitaine* (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1998), 198.
32. Arthur Girault, *Principes de colonisation et de législation sociale* (Paris: Sirey, 1907), 3–5, 71, 77.
33. Émile Larcher, *Traité élémentaire de législation algérienne*, 16–17.
34. See Benjamin Stora, *Les sources du nationalisme algérien* (Paris: l’Harmattan, 1988).
35. Pierre Laffont, quoted in Gauchon and Buisson, OAS, emphasis added.
36. Gauchon and Buisson, OAS, 14.
37. On this period, compare Jacques Cantier, *L’Algérie sous le régime de Vichy* (Paris: Odile Jacob, 2002) with Annie Rey Golzeiguer, *Aux origines de la guerre d’Algérie, 1940–1943* (Paris: Ed. La découverte, 2002).
38. *Le Monde*, September 18, 1959.
39. On the history of the OAS, see, above all, Rémi Kaufer, *OAS, histoire d’une guerre franco-française* (Paris: Seuil, 2002).
40. Gauchon and Buisson, OAS, 15.
41. See, for example, the career of Ferhat Abbas, in the biography written by Benjamin Stora and Zakia Daoud (Paris: Ed. Denoël, 1995).

13

Imperial Remnants: The Repatriates in Postwar Japan

LORI WATT

In April 2004, radical militants in Iraq kidnapped three Japanese citizens and threatened to slit their throats unless the government of Japan removed all of its approximately four hundred Self-Defense Force troops from Iraqi soil. As a result of intense negotiations by representatives of the Japanese and U.S. governments the radicals released the three hostages, who then returned to Japan.

And that is when their real troubles began. While some nations might celebrate the return of three independent-minded citizens—a young woman devoted to helping Iraqi street children, a freelance journalist who felt compelled to cover Japan's role in Iraq because the major media had withdrawn, and a recent high school graduate researching the effects of depleted uranium used in weapons—their return to Japan prompted protestors at the airport to hold up signs haranguing the released hostages for causing problems for Japan. Others posted messages to websites complaining that the hostages had brought shame to the nation. The three former hostages reported that returning home to an angry nation was more stressful than having been kidnapped and threatened in the first place. The *New York Times* quoted female kidnapping victim and social worker Takato Nahoko as saying, "I feel like going back home quickly, but I'm also afraid of going home."¹

After Japan's defeat in World War II and the abrupt loss of its colonies, millions of colonial Japanese returned to Japan to face a wide range of problems. Some of the problems were linked to the structures of empire, and many were compounded by the particular difficulty of trying to return to Japan after having been marked in some way by a foreign experience. This chapter narrates the history of the return of Japan's colonial settlers, investigates the problems they faced upon their return, and situates the episode of Japanese repatriates in the post-World War II global history of the return of colonial settlers.

The Japanese Empire and the Return of the Overseas Japanese

Japan acquired its overseas empire piecemeal, mostly as the spoils of victory in war: Taiwan in 1895 after the Sino-Japanese War; small parts of Manchuria and the Korean Peninsula in 1905 after the Russo-Japanese War; a League of Nations mandate for the Pacific Islands and parts of China after World War I; the Japanese-sponsored puppet state of Manchukuo in 1932; and parts of China and Southeast Asia during Japan's war on Asia from 1937 to 1945. Acquiring territory was only the first step in building the empire. The waging of wars and the settling of colonies required bodies, and millions of people answered the call. They went overseas in dribs and drabs, as soldiers, colonial administrators, and entrepreneurs.

Of particular interest in the history of settler colonialism is the group of approximately 300,000 Japanese civilians sent by the Japanese government to farm and settle in Manchuria and Mongolia. In an attempt both to alleviate the perceived problem of an overpopulation of poor farmers in Japan and to shore up the borders of Manchukuo with the Soviet Union, the government, mainly at the prefectural and local level, actively recruited people for two programs, the Manchurian Youth Corps Brigade for teenage boys and another for farm families.² Agrarian activists and the Japanese military in Manchuria never reached their goal of settling five million Japanese people in Northeast China, but the several hundred thousand who did go left their imprint both on Manchuria and in postwar Japanese history. Although the colonial settlers were only a small portion (about 10 percent) of the total number of Japanese civilians abroad at the end of the war, for many reasons addressed below, it was the image of the Manchurian repatriate that came to serve as the quintessential repatriate in postwar Japan.

Different imperatives drove Japanese civilians to settle throughout the empire. For Manchurian agricultural settlers, unemployment and grinding poverty at home, and the possibility of owning one's own piece of land, were key motivating factors. The promise of exemption from military service was also appealing for young men. While each Manchurian settler group had its own story, the history of one group, the Senzan Manchurian Settlement from Nagano Prefecture in central Japan, exemplifies many of the hopes that impelled people to go in the first place, and many of the problems they faced in Manchuria after the defeat. In 1940, the local government of the village of Sarashina in Nagano sent 120 households of about 500 people to establish a Manchurian "branch" of their own village.³ The Sarashino villagers settled in a reportedly unpopulated area near the mountain Jianshan, twenty-eight kilometers from the town of Baoqing, in a triangle of northwestern Manchuria that juts into what is today the former Soviet Union. Their closest neighbors, about twenty kilometers away, included two other Japanese settler communities and a Youth Corps brigade from Nagano. Photographs show the villagers living in tents in

the snow during their first, frigid winter, plowing the vast fields, harvesting their first crop, and celebrating at their new Shinto shrine. In 1941, thirty-year-old Tsukada Asae joined the village as an elementary school teacher in the Manchurian “national” school system, where, with the exception of horticulture classes, the curriculum was identical to schools back in Japan.⁴ For Tsukada, an adventurous young woman dissatisfied with the opportunities available to women in the Japanese countryside, moving to Manchuria appeared to be the only way to escape an arranged marriage and a predictable life. She saw Manchuria as the first step toward Paris and travel throughout the world. Another woman, Kuramoto Kazuko, had no choice in going to Manchuria: she was born in the Manchurian port city of Dalian in 1921, to a family who had been in the region since 1906.⁵ The histories and reflections of these two women do much to illuminate the aftermath of settler colonialism in Japan.

By the time of Japanese defeat, the numbers of overseas Japanese were significant: in August of 1945, 3,210,000 civilians and 3,670,000 military personnel—a total of 6,880,000 people—were outside the four home islands of Japan.⁶ With Japan’s 1945 population estimated at 75 million, this meant that nearly 9 percent of Japan’s population was abroad at the end of the war. Most were on the Chinese continent. Over 2 million Japanese people, mainly civilians, were in Manchuria and 1.5 million were in China proper. Korea and Taiwan each had a population of more than half a million Japanese nationals, most of whom were civilians. Another half a million Japanese people lived in Karafuto and the Chishima archipelago, now known as Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands, respectively. More than a million others, mainly military personnel, were spread through Southeast Asia and regions in the Pacific.⁷

With Japanese capitulation on August 15, 1945, overseas Japanese nationals went from being soldiers and civilians in territory controlled by their government to defeated nationals on enemy soil. Almost immediately, the Allied Forces of the Soviet Union, the United States, the United Kingdom (including Australia), and the Nationalist Forces of Chiang Kai Shek moved in to accept the surrender of the 3.8 million Japanese troops abroad, and then sent them back to Japan. The process went as smoothly as could be expected at the end of a vicious war, with the exception of Manchuria and other areas occupied by Soviet troops. The Soviet Union declared war on Japan on August 8, 1945, and launched an assault on Japanese troops and civilians in Manchuria, North Korea, Karafuto, and the Chishima archipelago. When Japanese troops surrendered, the Soviet military rounded them up and sent them to Siberia as a captive labor force. This was the fate of approximately 600,000 men, including a few civilians.⁸

The risky nature of the original settlement plan and the violent confrontation between the Japanese and the invading Soviets, as well as Chinese and Koreans seeking revenge, combined to create a hostile environment for Japanese civilians in Manchuria and contributed to the conditions that created the

first image of Japan's repatriates as ragged refugees. The stories of the last days of the Japanese settlers in Manchuria appear as a collage of nightmares—a combination of flight, starvation, terror, sickness, and death. The history of the Senzan Manchurian Settlement brings many of those hazy stories into sharp focus.⁹ In 1944, the Japanese military drafted only a few men from the village; but during the summer of 1945, in violation of promises made to the men when they went to Manchuria, the military commandeered almost any able-bodied man and by the end of the war, only 407 women, children, and old people in the isolated Senzan community remained.

On August 9, 1945, following last-minute evacuation orders issued by the Japanese military in Manchuria, the villagers set out for the nearby village of Baoqing. They had expected that Japanese troops would be there to protect them, but with the exception of a few sick and injured soldiers, the military had already withdrawn. The settlers from Senzan wandered around for days, joining up with other groups of Japanese civilians on the run. Toward the end of August, a group of approximately one thousand people comprised of villagers, Youth Corps brigades, and other Japanese stragglers settled temporarily in the remains of an abandoned Japanese settlement. They had no food or water, had no idea where to go, and were vulnerable to reprisals. Leaders of the various groups met to decide upon a course of action but could not reach agreement. On August 27, 1945, the Soviet military attacked the settlement. While some members of the group decided to commit suicide, with the adults killing the children and then themselves, the Senzan villagers decided to go down fighting. Most of them, including children older than twelve, reportedly charged the Soviet soldiers in battle, armed only with sticks and rocks, but others, including the schoolteacher Tsukada Asae, drank poison in an attempt to commit suicide. The Soviet military fought back, and 337 of the 387 people from Senzan present during this incident were killed.

Tsukada lost consciousness and was revived later by some of her surviving students from the village. A Soviet hand grenade had blinded her in one eye, and caused her to lose her hearing in one ear. While begging for food from Chinese villagers, the women and children made their way to the city of Boli by September 1, 1945. There, with her one good eye, and fifteen days after capitulation, Tsukada first saw a flyer announcing that Japan had surrendered.¹⁰ In Boli, the women and children were moved from camp to camp. In one, Tsukada was reunited with twenty children from her village who had miraculously survived the battle at the end of August. At this point, 67 of the original 407 who had fled from Senzan were still alive.

The refugees were placed with Chinese farm families for the winter of 1945–1946. Some died of illness or injury, and a few reported violence at the hands of their Chinese host families, leading some to commit suicide. Many, though, reported that they were treated the same as other people in the household and were provided with the same quality and amount of food.

In April 1946, rumors of repatriation reached the city of Boli, and indeed, the United States and Chiang Kai-Shek's Nationalists had decided to repatriate the remaining million Japanese from Manchuria after the Soviet pullout from the region that spring. The forty-eight members of the Senzan community who had survived the winter were placed into a repatriation unit of five hundred people. Three orphaned Japanese boys remained behind with Chinese families. The repatriation unit moved to Harbin to wait for repatriation and was housed in a former Japanese school. The refugees maintained good health throughout most of May, but because of disease, starvation, and maltreatment at the hands of the Soviets people began to die. In other words, as long as they had remained with Chinese families, they survived fairly well, but under the Soviet-run Allied Forces repatriation program, they suffered a great deal. By the time their turn for repatriation came at the end of August, of the forty-eight people who had made it to Harbin, only seven children and one adult, the schoolteacher Tsukada, were still alive. Of those, one child was sick and two others stayed behind, but on August 23, 1946, Tsukada and four seven-year-old girls left Harbin with their repatriation unit. One child died along the way, and a second, Hayashibe Rie, died while the ship was held up off the shore of Japan in quarantine for cholera, so that only Tsukada and the two others arrived in Hakata in September.¹¹ Nineteen other people who had split off from the group before the battle at Sawatari made it back to Japan by other means, but only three of the sixty-seven survivors of Sawatari returned to Japan in the immediate postwar period.

Dalian-born Kuramoto Kazuko also spent the year after defeat in Soviet-occupied Manchuria. As the daughter of an upper-middle-class colonial Japanese family in an urban center, she did not undergo the same horrific experience as Tsukada and the other agrarian settlers. Nevertheless, her father, a mid-ranking Japanese official, suffered a public humiliation at the hands of avenging Chinese, as the nineteen-year-old Kuramoto bore witness to the spectacular crumbling of the Japanese empire in Manchuria.¹²

And what Tsukada and Kuramoto share is their postwar fate as one of the most stigmatized group of Japanese repatriates, women from Manchuria.

The Creation of the *Hikiagesha* in the Immediate Postwar Period

While the Allied militaries had made specific provisions for demobilizing Japanese military men abroad, neither the Allies nor the Japanese government had made any plans concerning the fate of Japanese civilians overseas. Almost as an afterthought, the Allied militaries rounded up the overseas civilians, placed them into deportation camps, stripped them of everything except a maximum of one thousand yen (about thirty U.S. dollars) and whatever else they could carry, and shipped them back to Japan. Upon arrival in Japan, officials there inspected them and disinfected them, processed them at one of eighteen regional repatriation centers, provided them with documentation, and sent them home,

or at least to any address they could provide. The flow of people went both ways as the occupying U.S. forces and the domestic Japanese government worked to deport former colonials from Japan. By the end of 1946, sixteen months after Japan had surrendered, five million overseas Japanese had been shipped back to Japan while over a million Koreans and tens of thousands of Chinese had been deported.¹³

In English, “to repatriate” means to return a person to his or her *patria*, or fatherland. The Japanese verb “to repatriate” (*hikiageru*) is a euphemism, originally meaning to land cargo on a dock or to salvage a sunken ship. The word does not contain any reference to nation or family, like the root *patria*. From the verb *hikiageru* comes the noun *hikiagesha*—literally, “a person who has been lifted and landed”—and is used exclusively to describe Japanese civilians repatriated from the colonies after World War II. In this sense, it differs from the term *pied noir*, used to describe French Algerians throughout the colonial period, and probably has more in common with the Portuguese word, *retornados*.¹⁴

The label *hikiagesha* was applied both officially and colloquially to the returnees. Twenty-year-old Kuramoto Kazuko noticed the word, and its multilayered negative connotations, the moment she arrived “home,” a place she had never been, in 1947; as she recalls, “[My uncle] Taro always referred to us as ‘repatriates,’ as if we were of another race, not ‘real’ Japanese. I had first heard this term, *hiki-age-sha* (the repatriates), at the Sasebo Port when we had arrived in Japan. The man who welcomed us had said, ‘Welcome home my fellow repatriates.’ He had not said ‘welcome home, my fellow Japanese.’”¹⁵

She then went on to describe her arrival:

At the entrance to the temporary barracks set up for the repatriates, we were met by a group of white-jacketed sanitation people. They pulled open each of our collars and stuck in a hose to douse us with a pungent white powder called DDT.

“This is by the order of the occupation forces,” they told us, silencing our feeble protest. *The occupation forces! Of course, Japan was occupied by the United States, remember? So why not dunk us, the unwanted cargo kicked out of communist-occupied Manchuria, in DDT? Welcome home, you miserable maggots! Welcome home to the Land of the Rising Sun!* The pungent white powder hissed, crawling down my spine.¹⁶

Many Japanese repatriates recall such experiences, facing such problems. There was the sense that they were unwanted, a burden upon a nation on the brink of starvation and devastated by defeat, and the implication that they had been contaminated by communism or other negative foreign influences and were no longer truly Japanese. Although Kuramoto does not mention it explicitly, gender complicated this situation. Women in Manchuria, often suspected during the war of being prostitutes or at least sexually available, were

assumed to be sexually contaminated because of their exposure to foreign troops and other men in the immediate postwar period. Stories of the mass sexual violence perpetrated upon Japanese women by Soviet troops and other men had seeped past the U.S. occupation's censorship apparatus, and homeland Japanese often expressed an almost pornographic interest in the horrific experiences of the women abroad.¹⁷ Instead of sympathy for the violent experiences of these women, they were instead seen as people who had, in some way, betrayed, or at least sullied, the nation. All of these factors added up to the first and one of the most enduring images of the *hikiagesha* as a woman repatriated from Manchuria, deserving of pity for her assumed trials and poverty, but also depicted as useless and threatening because of the possibility that she was sexually contaminated, and as unpatriotic because she might have left some of her children behind. This image was fueled by a reservoir of masculine anxieties about Japanese men's inability to protect their women, and further complicated by the history of the Japanese military's sexual exploitation of Korean, Chinese, and other women in the empire.

The term *hikiagesha* grew out of colloquial usage, and the government made it official: the repatriate identification papers (*hikiagesha shōmeisho*) issued upon arrival at the repatriation camp served as official documents necessary for voting, registering for school, and receiving rations. Federal, prefectural, and local governments did try to provide aid, but always with the ubiquitous label *repatriate*: there were repatriate ships, repatriate camps, repatriate housing, repatriate orphanages, repatriate loan programs, and repatriate compensation. An administrative apparatus thus developed, sustaining the social definition. In time, the adjective *repatriate* grew to modify less tangible things: repatriate literature, repatriate identities, and repatriate consciousness.¹⁸ Some repatriates resisted the label. Others tried to put a positive spin on it, or substitute other words for it that stressed their cosmopolitan background. Still others defiantly accepted and celebrated it. Repatriates have faded in and out of the public view, based on the continued flow of returnees from abroad, their commemorative activities, and the national forgetting and remembering of the war and empire. Whether as recipients of modest compensation in 1957 and 1967, or as the target audience of a plush new museum devoted to repatriates and Soviet detainees that opened in downtown Tokyo in the year 2000, they remain a clearly defined legal, social, and cultural entity in Japan.

Repatriates and Other Colonial Returnees in Postimperial Societies

The social functions served by the *hikiagesha* can be better understood by evaluating this construct comparatively.

The episode of the expulsion of an estimated twelve to fourteen million ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe and elsewhere at the end of World War II has many compelling similarities to the case of Japanese repatriation.¹⁹ In 1945, the millions of overseas German and Japanese civilians changed from

being privileged citizens of nations in control of vast regions to defeated nationals of belligerent nations living in territory no longer under the control of their governments; both groups served as convenient targets for revenge. German and Japanese women in areas under Soviet control suffered sexual violence at the hands of Soviet troops; indeed, German and Japanese women gave strikingly similar accounts of their encounters with the Soviet soldiers, emphasizing both their brutality and simple-mindedness.²⁰ Approximately 3.5 million German prisoners of war and over half a million Japanese surrendered troops were dragooned by the Soviet military and kept in camps as forced laborers in the immediate postwar period, and both German and Japanese men faced problems upon their return to their countries.²¹

There are major differences, to be sure. Many of the expelled Germans were German by vague heritage alone and had spent generations in land that was awarded to Poland, and elsewhere. Moreover, the expulsion of the ethnic Germans (at least in its early stages) was more spontaneous and involved less Allied participation than Japanese repatriation. It is, however, in the postwar period that the histories of German expulsion and Japanese repatriation part ways most significantly. Historian Robert Moeller has argued that regardless of the actual experiences of expellees in postwar West Germany, the stories of their expulsion came to serve as the national story of wartime suffering for West Germans during the 1950s. This, according to Moeller, provided the means for West Germans to believe that they, too, were victims of World War II, in a narrative of suffering parallel to those of the better-known victims of National Socialism—Jews, gypsies, homosexuals, and others.²² Official historiography, political discourse, film, and other media in the 1950s privileged the narrative of the suffering of the expellees and Soviet prisoners of war, creating out of that story a national narrative of suffering.

The story of repatriation in postwar Japan has a completely different history. As John Dower has shown, narratives of Japan as the victim in World War II emerged almost immediately after defeat.²³ The strands of this belief were woven together out of the suffering experienced by Japanese people during the firebombings of major Japanese cities from March 1945, the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945, and the appealing idea that the hapless Japanese people had been led astray by a few renegade military leaders. That last idea was confirmed, in part, by the Tokyo War Crimes trial, in which nine major leaders of Japan were convicted, tried, and saddled with responsibility for a war that most Japanese had, in fact, supported. Because they were absent from the homeland for these crucial experiences, the repatriates were excluded from such national victims' narratives; likewise, because arguably more compelling stories of victimization were in place after the atomic bombings, those of the repatriates became superfluous. The repatriation story has thus received very little attention from historians within Japan during the postwar

period—and because repatriation was never Japan's national story of World War II, it was not necessary to put a noble face on the repatriates.

The fact that Japanese repatriation came about because of the failure of the imperial project also distinguishes it from German expulsion, complicates its role in national narratives within Japan, and ties it to the global history of settler colonialism. Until recently, repatriation was viewed as strictly a postwar problem, with defeat trumping decolonization. If, however, we look more closely at that context of decolonization, we can better understand both the situation of the *hikiagesha* and the ramifications of the fallout of empire throughout the world. Only by separating the postimperial from the postwar strands can the complex role of the *hikiagesha* in postwar society be illuminated.

Looking at Japan and the loss of its colonies by comparing the *hikiagesha* to the *pieds noirs* thus provides a perhaps more satisfying comparison. In 1962, a million French Algerians returned to France after Algerian liberation.²⁴ Like the *hikiagesha*, the *pieds noirs* maintained, by force or by choice, an identity different from that of other French people. What purpose, then, did the designations *pieds noirs* and *hikiagesha* serve in France and Japan? In the Japanese case, *hikiagesha* served as a foil for “homeland Japanese” (*naichi no hito*), distinguishing who had been abroad at the end of the war and who had been at home. This was important in building the narratives of Japanese victimization during the war and in crafting a new, national Japanese identity. In the immediate postwar period the designation “homeland Japanese” soon fell out of favor as the imperial project faded from view and it was no longer necessary to refer to the home islands as the metropole in contrast to the colonies. In public discourse, “homeland Japanese” soon became “ordinary people.” The term *hikiagesha*, however, remained in use and served as an implicit foil for ordinary people, who were able to redefine themselves as unconnected to empire. This was convenient for forgetting the passion for empire, and the “war fever” surrounding Manchuria in particular, that had gripped homeland Japanese during the colonial period.²⁵ It is possible that colonial returnees in France, Portugal, and elsewhere served a similar purpose of providing a buffer between home and the failure of empire.

Similarities between the *pieds noirs* and the *hikiagesha* were not lost on one repatriate critic. In a 1979 article, “The ‘Camus’ of Japan: Artists Born of Their Repatriate Experience,” investigative journalist Honda Yasuharu, himself repatriated from Korea as a child, profiles thirteen repatriate intellectuals who, he argues, experienced the same kind of alienation as the Algerian-born Albert Camus. Echoing Kuramoto's sense of repatriates having been excluded from the category of “Japaneseness,” Honda discusses his own alienation, noting, “I am Japanese and yet not Japanese. A person raised in Japan might have difficulty comprehending that feeling. At some point I noticed that I observe ‘the Japanese’ from a self-designated outside position. I look with eyes that are not quite those of a foreigner, but I still cannot manage to rid myself of the feeling

that there is something significantly different about me from the rest of the people in this country.”²⁶ Repatriates served as involuntary foils for “true” Japaneseness in the postwar period, but the imperial project and aftermath also produced many of postwar Japan’s most incisive social critics and artists, of which Honda is one.

All societies have mechanisms for creating social others out of new arrivals in their communities; Japanese society is not unique in doing so. But having been marked in language, in body, or in ideology by one’s experiences abroad is a factor that carries more weight in the calculation of otherness in Japan. This tends to be exaggerated at times when the discourses on Japanese national identities and homogeneity are resurgent, as they were at the end of World War II, when people within Japan began the project of redefining themselves after catastrophic defeat. Because the return of the overseas Japanese was intricately linked to this period, their otherness served many purposes in Japan in a way that is still being worked out today.

Epilogue

According to her memoir, Kuramoto was repatriated to Japan as a twenty-year-old woman, worked for the U.S. occupation forces, and became romantically involved with an American man working for them. Her fraternization with American men prompted her mother to lament that while all of her sons had returned from military service intact, she had lost a daughter to the war. Kuramoto indicated that in immediate postwar Japan, women repatriated from the colonies were distinctive:

“You are a repatriate, aren’t you?” the young woman asked. “Repatriate” had become a proper noun for those of us who had returned to Japan from Japanese colonies after World War II, to distinguish us from native Japanese.

I recognized her as a repatriate also. Somehow, we were different from the native Japanese.²⁷

Kuramoto eventually adopted a girl who had been fathered by an American serviceman and born to a single Japanese mother dying of tuberculosis. She emigrated to the United States and ended up in Ontario, Oregon, a community famous for actively welcoming Japanese Americans during World War II while other communities in the region were sending them away for internment as fast as they could.

The schoolteacher Tsukada Asae survived her violent postwar year in Manchuria, motivated mainly by the sense of duty to shepherd her pupils back to Japan, and arrived, near death, in Japan in the fall of 1946. In her hospital bed, convinced that she was going to die, she wrote a report of the last days of the Senzan farming community because she was afraid that the men who had been drafted from the Senzan community would return to Japan and never

know what had happened to their families.²⁸ She was correct in her prediction that some of the men from Senzan would make it back to Japan: of the men who had been drafted from Senzan, sixty-four ended up in Soviet detention, where twenty-one of them died. The remaining forty-three were released from Soviet captivity and repatriated between 1946 and 1949, only to find that their families and community had been destroyed.²⁹ While the sense of loss and betrayal among these men must have been strong, they at least were able to learn from Tsukada's narrative what had happened to their families—unlike many of their fellow detainees, whose families had also disappeared.

Tsukada survived and went back to her job teaching elementary school in her hometown in Nagano. For twenty years she spoke little of her experiences, but upon retirement in 1965, at age fifty-five, she broke her silence. In a letter to the local newspaper, she argued for the need to mourn the settlers who had died; a year later, she and twenty or so members from Nagano visited the People's Republic of China, in the midst of the Cultural Revolution, to mourn the Japanese dead and seek out the living. Tsukada worked for the return of Japanese orphans left in China and arranged for at least one of the boys who had been left behind at the time of repatriation to return to Japan as an adult with his family. This was a precursor to the exodus in the 1980s of thousands of Japanese orphans in China, by which ethnically Japanese children who had been raised by Chinese families returned, in middle age, to Japan. Few could speak Japanese and none were familiar with the Japanese way of life. The Japanese government initially did little for the latest wave of imperial casualties, placing the burden on relatives who were usually virtual strangers. Covered extensively but superficially by the Japanese press, the images of the disoriented returnees and their weeping relatives were an odd imperial remnant in the midst of the high-consumption and glitz of the economic bubble-era Japan.

Tsukada also came to think about her role in Japanese aggression abroad, and sought out the Chinese woman, known to her as Mrs. Zhang, who sheltered her during the winter of 1946. Tsukada sent modest compensation and gifts, and the two remained in contact. While the people of Japan have been criticized for not addressing their history of war and empire, Tsukada, at the end of her life, acknowledged that she had been a perpetrator as well as a victim of the Japanese empire in Asia.

But mainly she mourned for the children who died. Twenty of her second-graders were alive with her in the fall of 1946; only two survived to make it back to Japan in the first years after the war. Tsukada's grief over the deaths of these children was focused primarily on one child, Hayashibe Rie, who died on the ship while waiting to land at the port city of Hakata. Tsukada mourned this death by making an annual pilgrimage to Hakata from her home in Nagano. Today the journey would be quite comfortable, with most of the trip on the bullet train; during the first decades of the postwar period, it would have been

arduous and expensive. By the time I spoke to her in the fall of 2000, she had stopped these annual trips; after age eighty-five, still blind in one eye and deaf in one ear, she found it too much. But she kept a small doll on her mantle, one that she claimed resembled the child who had died, as a memorial to the girl. A few months after I spoke with her, at the age of ninety, she died at her home in Nagano.

Notes

1. Norimitsu Onishi, "For Japanese Hostages, Release Only Adds to Stress," *New York Times*, April 22, 2004.
2. Louise Young, *Japan's Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1998), esp. part 4, "The New Social Imperialism and the Farm Colonization Program, 1932–1945."
3. Nagano-ken kaitaku jikkōkai Manshū kaitakushi kankōkai, *Nagano-ken Manshū kaitakushi*, vol. 2 (Nagano: Nagano-ken kaitaku jikkōkai Manshū Kaitakushi kankōkai, 1984), 326–36.
4. Tsukada Asae, "Kaitaku gakkō no omoide," in *ManMō kaitaku no shuki—Nagano kenjin no kiroku*, ed. Nozoe Kenji (Tokyo: Nihon hōsō shuppan kyōkai, 1979), 332.
5. Kazuko Kuramoto, *Manchurian Legacy: Memoirs of a Japanese Colonist* (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1999).
6. Ara Takashi, ed., *Nihon no senryō gaikō kankei shiryō shū*, vol. 3 (Tokyo: Kashiwa shobō, 1991), 304.
7. The Ministry of Health and Welfare gives the following estimates of Japanese nationals abroad at the end of the war:

"Manchuria":	2,214,000 (1,550,000 civilians, 664,000 Army)
China, including Hong Kong:	1,631,000 (504,000 civilians, 1,056,000 Army, 71,000 Navy)
Korean Peninsula:	636,000 (300,000 civilians, 88,000 Army, 3,000 Navy)
Taiwan:	582,000 (350,000 civilians, 169,000 Army, 63,000 Navy)
Chishima and Karafuto:	481,000 (390,000 civilian, 88,000 Army, 3,000 Navy);
Southeast Asia and elsewhere:	1,034,000 military personnel (civilian estimates unavailable).

Kōseishō shakai engokyoku, *Engo 50 nen shi* (Tokyo: Gyōsei, 1997), 10, 17, 22–23.

8. William F. Nimmo, *Behind a Curtain of Silence: Japanese in Soviet Custody, 1945–1956* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1988).
9. *Nagano-ken Manshū kaitakushi*, 332–34.
10. Tsukada Asae, "Kaitakudan gakkō no omoide," 332–39.
11. Tsukada Asae, "Haisen zengo no Senzan Sarashina gō kaitakudan hinan jōkyō kiroku," diary written in the Ueyamada Hospital, Nagano, November 1946, courtesy of Tsukada Asae.
12. Kuramoto, *Manchurian Legacy*, 45–49.
13. See Kōseishō shakai engokyoku, *Engo 50 nen shi* (Tokyo: Gyōsei, 1997), 729–30, for the number of people repatriated; and Kōseishō engokyoku, *Hikiage engo no sanjūnen no ayumi* (Tokyo: Kōseishō, 1977), 151–52, for the number of deportees. The ministry in charge of repatriates, Health and Welfare, has published five volumes on the history of repatriation, providing very good documentation of the administrative history from the point of view of the government, as follows: Hikiage Engokyochō, *Hikiage engo no kiroku* (Tokyo: Kōseishō, 1950); Kōseishō Hikiage Engokyoku, *Zoku hikiage engo no kiroku* (Tokyo: Kōseishō, 1955); Kōseishō Hikiage Engokyoku, *Zoku zoku hikiage engo no kiroku* (Tokyo: Kōseishō, 1963); Kōseishō Engokyoku, *Hikiage to engo sanjūnen no ayumi* (Tokyo: Kōseishō, 1977); Kōseishō Shakai Engokyoku, *Engo 50 nen shi* (Tokyo: Gyōsei, 1997).
14. See Benjamin Stora's musings on the term *pied noir* in this volume. Also Alec G. Hargreaves and Michael J. Heffernan, *French and Algerian Identities from Colonial Times to the Present: A Century of Interaction* (Lewiston, New York: Edwin Mellen Press, 1993).
15. Kuramoto, *Manchurian Legacy*, 118.
16. *Ibid.*, 116.

17. Imai Seiji, "Lila saku gogatsu to nareba," *Minato*, June 1947, 20–30; Fujiwara Tei, *Nagareru hoshi wa ikite iru* (Tokyo: Hibiya Shuppan, 1949).
18. The literary critic Kawamura Minato has written most extensively about repatriate literature, identity and consciousness; see Kawamura Minato, *Sakubun no naka no dai Nippon teikoku* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2000); Kawamura Minato, "Sengo bungaku o tō—sono taiken to rinen—," (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1995); and Kawamura Minato, "Ikyō no Shōwa bungaku—Manshū to kindai Nihon—," (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1990).
19. Anna C. Bramwell, ed., *Refugees in the Age of Total War* (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988), 30.
20. Atina Grossman, "A Question of Silence: The Rape of German Women by Occupation Soldiers," *October* 72 (1995): 43–63.
21. For problems faced by German men, see Frank Biess, "Returning POWs from the Soviet Union and the Making of East and West German Citizens, 1945–1955" (paper for the Workshop "Military Culture in European Societies," Harvard University, February 20, 1998). For problems faced by Japanese men, see Yamasaki Toyoko, *The Barren Zone*, trans. James T. Araki (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1985).
22. Robert G. Moeller, *War Stories: The Search for a Usable Past in the Federal Republic of Germany* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2001).
23. John W. Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1999).
24. See Benjamin Stora's essay in this volume; see also Jean-Jacques Jordi, 1962: *l'arrivée des Pieds-Noirs* (Paris: Autrement, 1995).
25. The phrase comes from Young, *Japan's Total Empire*, chap. 3.
26. Honda Yasuharu, "Nihon no 'Kamyū' tachi: 'hikiage taiken' kara sakka ga umareta," *Shokun* 7 (1979): 199.
27. Kuramoto, *Manchurian Legacy*, 142.
28. Tsukada Asae, "Haisen zengo."
29. *Nagano-ken Manshū kaitakushi*, 31–32.

Unsettling the Metropole: Race and Settler Reincorporation in Postcolonial Portugal

STEPHEN C. LUBKEMANN

Introduction: Toward an Examination of the Colonizer's Postcoloniality

Examination of the complex legacies of European colonialism is virtually de rigueur in most contemporary studies of social, economic, and political developments in Africa. Yet while analyses of postcoloniality have reserved a significant role for the former colonizer, such studies have tended to focus upon processes unfolding within the former colonies themselves. Despite critiques that such approaches merely reconstitute the “third world” under a new name (the “postcolonial”),¹ and despite calls for redefining the field instead in terms of the “complexes of trans-national relations between ex-colonies and ex-colonizing centers,”² few scholars have ventured to explore the postcoloniality of former colonizer societies themselves.

This study is an early salvo in a larger project that seeks to examine how Portugal's very recent colonial past has shaped its political, socioeconomic, and cultural trajectory since its abrupt divestment of its five former African colonies (Angola, Mozambique, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, and São Tomé e Príncipe) in 1974–1975. It explores one of the most immediate and tangible effects of decolonization on Portuguese society and identity—namely, the sudden and massive return of former colonists from Angola and Mozambique, Portugal's two most important settler colonies. Three aspects of this wave of “decolonization migration” are investigated.³ First, I explore the negative reception granted these former settlers, or *retornados* (literally, “returnees”), as they sought to reenter a society that many had believed they had left for good. I argue that this problematic reception had less to do with any public discomfort with Portugal's complicity in “colonial oppression” than with the perceived impact of these migrants' departure to Africa on those kinfolk and local communities they left behind in Portugal itself. Second, I document the efforts and

eventual success of the large majority of these former settlers in reestablishing themselves within Portuguese society, noting especially their repudiation of any special *retornado* identity or recognizable *retornado* political interest group—a strategy that, ironically, isolated only that small minority of returnees who were prevented by race from rendering themselves similarly invisible.

Finally, through this analysis of the *retornados*, this study begins to show how the colonial past is being appropriated in the formation of Portugal's post-colonial identity. Important recent studies such as Jennifer Cole's *Forget Colonialism?* have drawn attention to the ways in which memories of the colonial experience have been continuously rewoven within former colonial societies through processes of selective recollection, repression, and emphasis. The past is thus an artifact made in and for the present, constructed for purposes of deployment in *current* struggles for power at multiple levels, ranging from the micropolitics of gender relations within households to macropolitical contests for state power and global influence.⁴ Such processes of reinvention have been shown to have played a vital role in the organization of both anticolonial resistance movements and postcolonial regimes throughout much of Africa, in particular in nations that emerged from long confrontations with settler colonialism.⁵ But a reinvigorated examination of postcoloniality equally requires an examination of processes of selective remembering and forgetting in former colonizing societies themselves.

Historical Background:

Decolonization and the Socioeconomic Impact of Settler Return

Portugal's revolution on April 25, 1974, brought about the demise of Europe's longest continuous twentieth-century dictatorship and resulted in the last major African decolonization by a European power. The period from April through September 1974 represented a time of confusion and internal conflict among political factions that had overthrown the dictatorship. During this period the more radical leftist factions in the revolutionary government had the most influence on matters pertaining to decolonization. Portuguese troops in the colonies increasingly refused to fight. Pursuing the fastest possible route to decolonization, the Portuguese government ceded power directly to the various anticolonial armed movements in the African colonies. By July 1974 independence for the colonies had already been announced in Lisbon and shortly thereafter transitional governments were put in place.

This move precipitated a number of white settler coup attempts in Angola and Mozambique. Despite the role of Portuguese troops in putting them down, these attempts further galvanized anti-settler sentiment in the colonies. Fearing reprisals, facing property nationalization by the newly independent regimes, and reacting to the outbreak of civil war in Angola, white Portuguese settlers along with others associated with the colonial regime began to leave the colonies en masse. While many fled to the neighboring countries of Southern

Rhodesia and South Africa, over 505,000 arrived in Portugal itself. Of this official number the overwhelming majority arrived from Angola (61 percent, or over 300,000) and Mozambique (33 percent, or over 165,000). Most of these so-called *retornados* arrived in Portugal in 1975 and 1976, resulting in an increase of 6–7 percent in Portugal’s population virtually overnight. As a percentage of the total population this represented a far more radical increase than any comparable postcolonial repatriation such as the *pieds noirs* in France or the Dutch returning from Indonesia.⁶

Most of this population arrived with little more than the clothes on their backs and came seeking housing and jobs in a country with an acute housing shortage and in the throes of a grave economic crisis. Early nationalization policies and the loss of protected colonial markets touched off Portugal’s economic downturn, which was aggravated further by the worldwide depression precipitated by the oil crisis of the mid-1970s. The *retornado* population thus received far less financial and social support from the economically hard-pressed and turbulent Portuguese government than did comparable returnees in France or the Netherlands.⁷

Portuguese Settler Colonialism as Migrant Colonialism

Despite Portugal’s centuries of involvement in Africa, the massive influx of white settlers occurred well into the eleventh hour of Portugal’s colonial enterprise. The bulk of Portuguese colonial emigration to its “settler colonies” occurred during the two decades after 1950, at a time when other European powers were contemplating or actually implementing decolonization. Antonio Salazar and his regime, by contrast, promoted Portuguese settlement in Africa precisely in order to counter international pressure to decolonize and to substantiate their 1951 proclamation that the colonies were really “overseas provinces.” At the same time, the dictatorship saw the colonies as a way to relieve rising socioeconomic and demographic pressures within Portugal itself. As a result, the overwhelming majority of white settlers in Portuguese African colonies—and, later, of the *retornados*—had either themselves been born in Portugal or were child dependants of parents who had been born in Portugal. As Gerald Bender notes, over 70 percent of the European population in Angola were first generation.⁸

“Settler colonialism” in Portuguese Africa might thus be best described as a kind of “migrant colonialism” in the sense that it was a process dominated by a population of individuals whose personal trajectories originated in the metropole and who retained social ties (and putatively social options) there. The differential impact on colonized societies of a settler colonialism dominated by such “first generation” immigrants, in contrast to the impact of longer-term multigenerational settler societies (such as in South Africa, Rhodesia, or Kenya), has yet to be explored. Yet this characteristic is certainly crucial

in understanding the impact such settlers had when they returned to the metropole in the wake of decolonization.

In the Portuguese case, *retornados* arriving in Portugal in 1975 overwhelmingly returned to the community from which they or an immediate family member had originally migrated. Fifty-three percent of the *retornados* who had been born in Portugal (or approximately 31 percent of all *retornados*) ultimately returned to the districts where they had been born.⁹ However, additional demographic analysis establishes the likelihood that a much larger percentage of all *retornados* returned to districts in which they had important family ties, even if these were not their districts of origin. Two demographic characteristics of the *retornado* population bear particular scrutiny in this respect. First, younger *retornados* who were born abroad but returned to their parents' districts of origin would have been officially counted as new immigrants to these districts. Second, *retornados* who settled in their spouse's district of origin would also have been counted as new immigrants to these districts. In both of these cases, however, family ties through parents or spouses clearly existed.

Retornados resettled in areas in which they maintained family ties in order to avail themselves of the assistance of extended kin. The rapid speed of decolonization, along with political conditions imposed by the new regimes in Angola and Mozambique, meant that most *retornados* arrived in Portugal financially destitute. Itself in the throes of economic crisis, and in some quarters fearful of the *retornados* as a potentially reactionary political force, the Portuguese government provided only minimal assistance to those who arrived from Africa. Under such conditions, most *retornados* saw extended family as their only source of support.

Stigmatizing *Retornados* as Rejecting Colonialism?

Yet the fact that most *retornados* returned to areas in which they had extended kinship and community ties did not lead to their unproblematic acceptance within Portuguese society. Instead, *retornado* quickly became a label that was pregnant with social stigma. Negative stereotypes proliferated as the print media ran stories of *retornados* unlawfully seizing houses in their owners' absence. Many of these reports erroneously conflated situations in which the government itself commandeered hotels and housing for the *retornados* with the far fewer cases of individual seizures (most of which were undertaken by rural migrants hard-pressed for housing in the cities, rather than by *retornados*).¹⁰ Likewise, press reports of government assistance provided to *retornados*, minimal as it was, sparked accusations that the returnees were stealing housing and jobs from Portuguese residents. The few large-scale temporary settlement schemes erected in urban or periurban areas (such as in Cascais or Leiria, or the large tent settlement in the Vale do Jamor area outside of Lisbon) were often described in the press as dangerous loci of criminality with direct analogies made to the encampments of gypsies—another strongly stigmatized population

in Portugal. Yet *retornados* recalled a grudging welcome even from close relatives. One, Mr. Maia, returning after twenty years in Angola, described his homecoming as follows: "When we returned in 1976 even our own family members did not want to know us. I was told, 'You left us because it was not good enough for you here with us and did not come back—now you should make it on your own like you wanted to before.'" ¹¹

How do we explain this response? According to Ricardo Ovalle-Bahamon, *retornados* were stigmatized upon arrival in Portugal largely because of their complicity in the colonial enterprise. The reconstruction of Portuguese national identity after the overthrow of the Salazar regime, he argues, was made possible by configuring colonial exploitation not as a historical relationship but as a product of individual settler agency. *Retornados* became the "depository for colonial structures" as part of a strategy of containment that promised to absolve the Portuguese nation of its colonial past. ¹²

Such a line of analysis may partially explain the overwhelmingly negative treatment of the *retornados* in the post-revolutionary Portuguese press. Yet it is important not to treat the press as a perfect reflection of popular opinion of the time. In their analysis of the Portuguese press in the late 1970s, Ben Pimlott and Jean Seaton demonstrate the tenuous relationship between popular opinion and press coverage, showing that the leading national newspapers continued to transmit fairly uncritically the voices of those officials in power, much as they had under the dictatorship. As politics moved leftward, the press thus faithfully reflected that drift. Indeed, given that both the Portuguese Communist Party and the more moderate Portuguese Socialist Party had much to fear from a *retornado* population quick to blame the Left for the loss of the colonies, press stigmatization of *retornados* can perhaps be read more accurately as a gauge of political party hopes and fears. Nor, in any event, was Portugal a press-dominated society. No truly mass-circulated press developed under the dictatorship, and high illiteracy rates—over 37 percent in 1971—further limited press influence. In a 1976 survey, fewer than 30 percent of the population reported reading a daily newspaper in the previous thirty days, and in towns of fewer than 2,000 (a category into which over 65 percent of the country's population fell), fewer than 6 percent had read a daily newspaper during the previous thirty days. ¹³

An analysis of the press thus does not necessarily convey an accurate picture of how the *retornados* were seen in Portuguese society at large. Such analysis is even less capable of explaining why so many *retornados* were poorly welcomed by their immediate relatives. To understand the negative reception of these returnees by actual family members it is necessary to return to the notion of Portuguese colonial settlement as "migrant colonialism," and to examine settlement in Africa within the larger framework of international migration as experienced and understood within rural Portuguese society.

Colonial Migration in the Broader Migratory Context

Emigration abroad has been a historically significant factor shaping Portuguese society and identity for at least four centuries. Caroline Brettell has described emigration as a strategy focused on improving and reproducing peasant life in rural Portugal rather than as a way of leaving Portuguese society altogether.¹⁴ Throughout the post–World War II period and well into the 1990s emigrant remittances played an extremely important role in local Portuguese rural economies.¹⁵ Emigrants not only sent sums of money regularly to their immediate family members but were expected to visit on an annual basis if possible. In small towns throughout rural Portugal every August witnessed (and still witnesses) a massive influx of migrants coming home to visit for several weeks. In many rural Portuguese communities emigrants achieved considerable social and economic status. Well into the 1980s and even to some extent the 1990s emigration was often considered the *only* possible route to material success. Emigrants working abroad aspired in particular to build the small mansions that visibly announced their achievement. Not infrequently these houses were expensively furnished, yet little used by emigrants who spent most of their time working abroad.

However, the local social status of emigrants has long depended not only on their ability to achieve personal prosperity, but also on their connection with, and care for, relatives who remained in Portugal. Those who remained behind closely monitored how an emigrant's extended family fared in their absence as a measure of their ability and willingness to fulfill moral obligations. Local residents likewise paid close attention to the frequency of visits by those working abroad. Emigrants were expected to be major contributors to community projects such as the building of local sports facilities and to support local civic associations and clubs.

Migration throughout rural Portugal has thus long been dominated by a strong ideology of return and continued commitment to the home community.¹⁶ This is most typically expressed through the Portuguese notion of *saudades*, a term that implies longing and nostalgia for, rootedness in, and past and future orientation toward a more essential state—always directed at and back to Portugal itself. Elsewhere I have described in greater detail the ways emigrants working abroad proclaim their commitment to return through continuous and conspicuous investment back home, often in the building of houses.¹⁷ Despite the fact that many emigrants ultimately do not return to Portugal, almost all leave with the stated intention to return and continue to invest back home for many years, often even after they recognize that they are unlikely ever to return on a permanent basis.¹⁸

Yet in stark contrast to the stated intentions of emigrants to other destinations, a decision to migrate to Angola or Mozambique generally signaled a break with home communities back in Portugal. Few *retornados* I interviewed recalled

any intention to return at the time of their departure from Portugal. In the course of over a decade of interaction with the residents of Olival I encountered only two *retornados* who claimed any original intention to return to Portugal. Moreover, both stated they had eventually renounced this intention after residing in Angola for more than a decade. The Salazar regime's policies played an important role in motivating permanent departure. The dictatorship specifically aimed at settler-driven development in Angola and Mozambique and thus only provided financial incentives to those who would commit to long-term—and, in principle, permanent—relocation to Africa. Moreover, those who left for Africa were far less likely to maintain regular contact with or to visit extended kin back in Portugal. Unlike Europe and the Americas, Angola and Mozambique were never sources of major remittances back to Portugal despite their sizable populations of rural Portuguese origin. In one regional study conducted in 1982 in the central region of Portugal, only 17.2 percent of *retornados* reported ever sending money back to Portugal, in contrast to 91.7 percent of returned migrants from other emigration destinations.¹⁹

Rural Portuguese thus judged the choice to migrate to Africa in light of understandings about what migration should normally mean. Migration to Africa appeared as a choice *not to follow* other proven and available migration streams to France, Germany, or elsewhere—streams that remained oriented to Portugal and played an important role in sustaining rural communities. Such a decision thus often sparked contention within extended families. Those who migrated to Africa were seen by those remaining behind as placing themselves above family and community—as having chosen to pursue a prosperity that was unshared and unresponsive to kinship obligations.

The *retornados'* ambiguous and often even hostile welcome by kinfolk on their return is more comprehensible once migration to Africa is placed within this broader context of the rural moral economy that shaped understandings of all international migration. Leaving one's community of origin in Portugal for Africa was condemned not because of its negative impact on African populations, but because of its negative implications for kin and community back in Portugal itself. Witness, for example, the observations of Mr. Simões, a retired ceramic worker from central Portugal, about the *retornados* who came back to his hometown in 1975–1976:

The *retornados* did not want to work in Portugal with their families after a life of ease (*vida a larga*) in Africa where the blacks did everything for them. ... They went to where others would do the work for them because they did not want real work, like my own in the factory for thirty years, or in the field, where life is hard ... even in France they must work long hours, but in Africa they could all have shops and sit and drink coffee. They would say to the blacks, "Do this, do that," and then they would say, "We are working" ... they were successful because

they exploited the government and forgot about their families so they would not have to work ... this is why so many have now become successful in commerce in the district, with grocery stores (*mercearias*) and clothing stores and in trade ... but even now you do not see them lift their hand to work the land and they always have clean hands without any calluses. ...

It is notable that the “exploitation” of African labor in Mr. Simões’s narrative was deemed reprehensible not for its impact on those Africans who suffered its direct effects, but because it represented a means by which those who chose to neglect kin and community in the pursuit of self-interest were able to realize their objective.

It is interesting to note that narratives like those of Mr. Simões may also reveal the *specific* character of the popular Portuguese indictment of its colonial past and of the settlers who participated in its realization. In local communities throughout Portugal condemnation of the colonial enterprise arguably did not involve a rejection of the fundamental ideas about the legitimacy and unique historical success of Portugal’s “civilizing mission”—the cornerstone of the Salazar dictatorship’s colonial discourse. Nor did most of the Portuguese population question the colonial enterprise in Africa because of its injustice to and exploitation of African populations. Rather, if the colonial enterprise was questioned *it was primarily because of the effects of colonialism “back home,” on Portuguese society itself.*

Negotiating Portugueseness by Proving Moral Worth

The primary challenge faced by *retornados* was consequently not that of justifying (or even denying) their exploitation of black Africans but rather that of justifying their neglect of kin and community back home. The reestablishment of their moral worth depended largely on demonstrating personal industriousness and a renewed commitment to home and hearth. Most *retornados* worked hard to dispel the negative stereotypes and suspicions that neighbors and family members had about their degree of commitment to kin and the local community.

Striving to be accepted again as “Portuguese just like everyone else,” *retornados* generally eschewed participation in organizations that pursued their distinctive interests as a group in the macropolitical arena, lest such activity legitimize suspicions of self-interest in the micropolitical arena of kin and local community. When they did speak out in public, *retornados* sought to emphasize their connections to Portugal and their claims on “Portugueseness.” In interviews, *retornados* consistently appealed to the Salazar regime’s legal redefinition of its African colonies as “overseas provinces of Portugal and an integral part of Portuguese territory.”

Strategies for successful reintegration into local kinship and community networks included very public and self-conscious performances of virtue and industry. The success of many *retornados*, particularly in small rural communities throughout Portugal, often required visible hard work and investment in the local community. In one small town, a *retornada* woman named Mrs. Letra described the ways in which views of the *retornados* changed over time as a result of their public demonstrations of industry.

[T]he women from here always said “*retornadas* don’t work, *retornadas* don’t work” ... but then they watched me open up the foundation of this house alone with a hoe while my husband worked ... and later on they saw me help the mason laying bricks because my husband could not. And he kept working even in his condition to keep bread on the table. Even after his surgery he drove a truck, delivered bread, collected scrap metal. Now we have better houses and cars than these people who always lived here do and they must be quiet because they saw the work we did and that when we came we had nothing and that now we have more than they do. ...

Drawing on business experience in Africa that had required a form of entrepreneurship stifled under the corporatist models of the Salazar state back in Portugal,²⁰ the *retornados* were at the forefront of post-revolutionary small business initiatives throughout the country. Frequently named after places in Africa (as in Café Luanda and Lourenço Marques Market), restaurants, small grocery shops, and numerous other small businesses soon signaled *retornado* enterprise and success. By 1981, five years after decolonization, the *retornados* comprised just under 10 percent of all small business owners. In 1981, when over 20 percent of the total Portuguese population was involved in mostly small-scale peasant agriculture, only 6 percent of the *retornados* followed this occupation, whereas 65 percent worked in the tertiary sector and 29 percent in the secondary sector. The fact that they arrived in Portugal without access to agricultural lands had encouraged *retornados* to move into the service and industrial sectors. It was precisely these sectors that experienced growth during the two decades after the revolution in which returns on small-scale agriculture suffered a significant downturn—a fact that reinforced *retornados*’ advantages over their rural counterparts.

As a population the *retornados* also benefited from considerably more education and professional experience than the rest of the Portuguese population. Whereas 51 percent of the total Portuguese population in 1981 had not yet completed at least a primary school degree, only 17 percent of the *retornados* had not. Although they comprised less than 6 percent of the total population, *retornados* represented 16 percent of all Portuguese with professional degrees and 11 percent of those with higher education degrees. *Retornados* arrived in Portugal at a time when many professionals were leaving the country because

of the uncertain political climate and the socialist economic policies of the post–April 25 period. They were accordingly well placed to fill needed vacancies and get in on the ground floor of Portugal’s economic expansion in the 1980s. By 1981, *retornados* represented over 14 percent of all professionals in the banking, financial service, and insurance industries and occupied just under 11 percent of all civil service positions in the country. Just over 50 percent of *retornados* exercised what was ranked as a “skilled profession,” as opposed to under 29 percent of the rest of the total Portuguese population. Such differences in human capital were likely to be even more accentuated in rural areas.²¹ Ultimately the entrepreneurial achievements of those who arrived from Africa and their material success after having “lost it all” allowed many *retornados* successfully to challenge their marginalization within the Portuguese community on moral grounds. It also strengthened the interest of local populations in having them participate in local exchange networks (such as public works organizations and cultural associations) and rituals (such as funerals, baptisms, weddings, and festivals).

Racial Exclusion and Reassignment as (Lusophone) Africans

Yet not all those who arrived from Africa escaped the social stigma and marginalization that the term *retornado* initially implied. Those *retornados* who showed phenotypic evidence of black African parentage have remained highly visible and marked in Portuguese society as “racial others.” The best estimates indicate that between 25,000 and 35,000 *retornados* had some African descent.²² Yet in the immediate years after decolonization all arrivals from Africa regardless of parentage, skin phenotype, or actual birth in Portugal were designated *retornados*, leading to some extent to the term’s association with racialized difference.

Above all else, it was this lurking suggestion of racialized ethnic difference that drove white *retornados* to reject the identity and the term. For years pervasive racism characterized and structured colonial society in Lusophone Africa, benefiting white settlers in Mozambique and Angola and shaping their sense of self. White settlers returning from Africa were thus particularly anxious to avoid being subsumed into a category that included nonwhites.

With most returnees rejecting the *retornado* label, those decolonization immigrants who were racial minorities were reclassified. They were lumped together with other “black immigrants” who had no citizenship rights—particularly the large number of Cape Verdeans who immigrated to Portugal during the 1980s to work in the construction industry.²³ Their identity was thus involuntarily reascribed to conform to a conception of Portuguese national identity in which race, nation, and increasingly location would be seen to coincide.

Phenotypically defined, race has remained a nonnegotiable cornerstone of the Portuguese imagined community. *Civitas* (legal rights to inclusion) and even kinship itself were subordinated to racial ideologies in the definition of

societas (the social practice and perception of inclusion). This was most clearly and poignantly evidenced in cases in which the kinship affiliation of *retornados* of mixed-race parentage was denied by Portuguese relatives in the metropole. Mr. João, a white *retornado* who returned to a rural Portuguese town in 1976 while married to an Angolan woman of partial African descent, recounted his experience with this form of rejection:

Those from here (in Olival) who could have helped us—they did not want to know of us or see our faces. They said the Portuguese did not need to take responsibility for what Africans had brought on themselves. ... Were we not Portuguese like they were? ... My oldest son was born in Luanda when Luanda was Portugal and now is he not Portuguese? ... Do they forget that his father was born here in this house because he is *mestiço*? ... I am revolted above all by those who of the same blood will nevertheless not speak to my children nor to me—but once and then we came to blows. To be treated by my own blood as a stranger—this is too much ... these are a treacherous people (*povo traiçoeiro*) who strike from behind like no people I knew in Africa ... and yet they say these beautiful children of mine are “unintelligent” and treat them like beasts at school. ...

Ultimately the successful negotiating of invisibility as “Portuguese like everyone else” by the white majority of *retornados* has only reinforced the exclusion of the black *retornado* minority by linking it to a population that had no rights of citizenship and far more tenuous culturolinguistic connections to Portugal than those the *retornados* claim. The fate of this minority has thus conformed to a pattern in which the claims of all racial minorities to Portugueseness have been systematically rejected.

Conclusion: Toward an Examination of the Postcolonial Colonizer

To investigate postcoloniality as the process of identity creation and power reconfiguration produced by interactions between colonizers and ex-colonies occurring since the end of colonialism we must attend to the aftereffects of the colonial experience not only in the ex-colonies but also within the former colonizing societies.²⁴ In the Portuguese case, few aftereffects have been as significant as that of the wave of humanity that arrived in Portugal in the immediate aftermath of decolonization. The fact that the trajectory of *retornados* differed so profoundly by race suggests the need for a broader investigation of how Portugal’s recent colonial past has been reimagined and deployed to serve in the formulation of a postcolonial national identity.

At the center of this project has been Portugal’s effort to see itself as the heart of a Lusophone world, defined and indeed naturalized through linguistic commonality and shared history. The active public discourse of Lusophonia has recast that history in a highly selective way, projecting Portugal as the bridge between civilizations, the catalyst for cultural interaction, the global pioneer of

multiculturalism and globalization and, most specifically, as the natural “hub” of a Portuguese-speaking world that includes Brazil, Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, São Tomé e Príncipe, Timor, and Macau. Increasingly, the Portuguese emigrant communities in countries such as the United States, Canada, Australia, Venezuela, South Africa, France, Switzerland, and Germany are also cast within this officially endorsed net. This multilayered discourse represents an effort to claim a geostrategic social and political place for Portugal today. Portugal thus presents itself within the European Union not as a peripheral nation on the Atlantic outskirts of Europe but as the E.U.’s portal to this larger Lusophone world.²⁵

But this Lusophone discourse is as noteworthy for what it excludes, suppresses, and selectively forgets. In his insightful analysis of the classification and presentation of music during the 1998 World Expo in Lisbon, Timothy Sieber interprets the concern among the organizers in Portugal to distinguish Portuguese from Lusophone genres of music as an attempt to recognize the former colonizer’s influence upon other societies while denying the reciprocal influence of the former colony on the colonizer itself. Portuguese music is thus preserved as a category unaffected by the rest of the Portuguese-speaking world, even as Lusophone music presumes the validating presence and influence of Portugal on its “intimate others”—that is, its former colonies.²⁶

So it is that the category of *retornado*, a category that invited and implied an exploration of the influence of the colonies on the colonizer, has been dissolved in ways that preserve an essentialized sense of “pristine Portugal” even while recognizing Portugal’s influence on the rest of the world. In the case of the white *retornado* majority this dissolution has taken place through a successful performance of “paradigmatic Portugueseness.” This dissolution has also depended on the studious and systematic denial of the influence of sojourns in Africa that provided many of these migrants with entrepreneurial skills and other forms of human capital they would have been unlikely to have obtained in Portugal itself and that they used to their advantage in rebuilding their lives. Publicly, we find this denial in *retornados*’ disinterest in forming national organizations; privately, it is noticeable in the absence of “African” mementos in homes and of any eagerness to talk about the family’s time in Africa. By contrast, the *retornado* minority with African parentage has been incorporated as members of Lusophone populations—evidence thus of Portuguese influence on the world—but rejected as Portuguese.

In selectively interweaving memory and amnesia, postcolonial Portuguese society has accommodated only that historical evidence (and those physical bodies) that support Portugal’s global image of itself—an image that retains more striking continuities than critical discontinuities with the colonial era. Thus has the postrevolutionary reconstruction of Portuguese national identity sought to absolve the nation of its colonial past. Yet, as this analysis of the racially differentiated trajectory of the *retornados* suggests, Portugal has yet to

confront or incorporate the exploitative and oppressive dimensions of its colonial presence worldwide in the public discourse that is shaping its national identity.

Notes

1. Arif Dirlik, "The Post-Colonial Aura: Third World Criticism in the Age of Global Capitalism," in *Dangerous Liaisons: Gender, Nation, and Postcolonial Perspectives*, ed. Anne McClintock et al. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 501–28.
2. Miguel Valle de Almeida, "The Brown Atlantic: Pitfalls and Perspectives in Anthropology, Post-Colonialism, and the Portuguese Speaking World" (paper presented at the Brown University/University of Massachusetts–Dartmouth Conference on "Race, Culture, Nation: Arguments across the Portuguese-Speaking World," April 6–8, 2001), 5.
3. The term is from Andrea Smith, "Europe's Invisible Migrants," in *Europe's Invisible Migrants: Consequences of the Colonists Return*, ed. Andrea Smith (Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam Press, 2003), 9–32.
4. Jennifer Cole, *Forget Colonialism? Sacrifice and the Art of Memory in Madagascar* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2001).
5. For more on this, see Jean Comaroff and John Comaroff, *Of Revelation and Revolution*, vol. 2 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997); and David Lan, *Guns and Rain: Guerrillas and Spirit Mediums in Zimbabwe* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1985).
6. Rui Pena Pires et al., *Os Retornados: Um Estudo Sociográfico* (Lisbon: Instituto de Estudos Para o Desenvolvimento, 1987).
7. See, for example, Pierre Baillet, "L'Intégration des repatriés d'Algérie en France," *Population* 30 (1975): 303–13.
8. Gerald Bender, *Angola under the Portuguese: Myth and Reality* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1978), 26.
9. Pena Pires et al., *Os Retornados*, 45.
10. Charles Downs, *Revolution at the Grassroots: Community Organizations in the Portuguese Revolution* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989).
11. This paper draws on over a year and a half of fieldwork and archival research conducted in 1990–1991 and 1993. I interviewed over forty *retornados* living in two areas—the greater Lisbon area and in a small town south of the city of Aveiro. I also interviewed many of their extended-family members and neighbors, along with other residents of the communities that witnessed their arrival. All individual names in this article are pseudonyms. This work also draws on a review of several hundred press articles on the *retornados*—a comprehensive archive, generously made available to me by the Instituto 25 de Abril at the University of Coimbra during the year I spent there as a Fulbright Scholar. Finally this analysis also owes a great deal to critical reflection on over a decade and a half of my early life that was spent living in postrevolutionary Portugal (1972–1986). Much of this time was spent within sight of the infamous *retornado* camp in Jamor, just outside Lisbon, and interacting with many friends and acquaintances who had arrived from Angola and Mozambique shortly after 1975.
12. Ricardo E. Ovalle-Bahamon, "The Wrinkles of Decolonization and Nationness: White Angolans as Retornados in Portugal," in Smith, ed., *Europe's Invisible Migrants*, 147–68.
13. For the postrevolutionary press, see Ben Pimlott and Jean Seaton, "Political Power and the Portuguese Media," in *In Search of Modern Portugal*, ed. Lawrence Graham and Douglas Wheeler (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1983), 43–57; and Jean Seaton and Ben Pimlott, "The Portuguese Media in Transition," in *The Press and the Rebirth of Iberian Democracy*, ed. Kenneth Maxwell (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1983), 93–116.
14. Caroline Brettell, "Leaving, Remaining and Returning: Some Thoughts on the Multi-Faceted Portuguese Migratory System," in David Higgs, ed., *Portuguese Migration in Global Perspective* (Toronto: Multicultural History Society of Ontario, 1990), 61–80; also Brettell, *Men Who Migrate, Women Who Wait* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986).
15. Helen Graham, "Money and Migration in Modern Portugal: An Economist's View," in Higgs, ed., *Portuguese Migration*, 81–98; Maria Beatriz Rocha Trindade, *Estudos Sobre a Emigração Portuguesa* (Lisbon: Sa da Costa, 1981); Joel Serrão, *A Emigração Portuguesa-Sondagem Histórica* (Lisbon: Horizonte, 1974).

16. Jorge Carvalho Arroiteia, *Os Ílhavos e os Murtoseiros na Emigração Portuguesa* (Aveiro, Portugal: APDNC-Região Aveiro, 1984); Eduardo. S. Ferreira, *Reintegração dos Emigrantes Portugueses: Integração na CE Desenvolvimento Económico* (Lisbon: CEDEP/AE ISE, 1984).
17. Stephen Lubkemann, "The Moral Economy of Portuguese Post-Colonial Return," *Diaspora* 11, no. 4 (2002): 189–214.
18. See Bretell, "Leaving, Remaining and Returning"; Maria I. Baganha, "Migrações Internacionais de e para Portugal: o que sabemos e para onde vamos?" *Revista Critica de Ciências Sociais* 52–53 (1998–99): 229–80; and Andrea Klimt, "European Spaces: Portuguese Migrants' Notions of Home and Belonging," *Diaspora* 9, no. 2 (1990): 259–85.
19. Isabel M. Boura et al. "The Economic Impact of Returned Emigrants: Evidence from Leiria, Mangualde, and Sabugal," in *Emigração e Retorno na Região Centro*, ed. Comissão de Coordenação da Região Centro (Coimbra, Portugal: Comissão de Coordenação da Região Centro, Ministério de Administração Interna, 1984), 67.
20. Joyce F. Riegelhaupt, "Peasants and Politics in Salazar's Portugal: The Corporate State and Village 'Non-Politics,'" in *Contemporary Portugal: The Revolution and Its Antecedents*, ed. Lawrence Graham and Harry Makler (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1979), 169–90.
21. For retornados' subsequent economic standing, see Pena Pires et al., *Os Retornados*, 114–66.
22. Baganha, "Migrações Internacionais," 232–35.
23. Rebecca Muir, "Community Development Work among the Cape Verdeans of the Bairro Santa Filomena, Portugal" (M.A. thesis, Department of Anthropology, University of South Florida, 1989).
24. Miguel Valle de Almeida, *Um Marda Cor da Terra: Raca, Cultura e Política da Identidade* (Oeiras, Portugal: Celta, 2000).
25. Andrea Klimt and Stephen Lubkemann, "Argument across the Portuguese-Speaking World: A Discursive Approach to Diaspora," *Diaspora* 11, no. 2 (2002): 145–62; Edite Noivo, "Towards a Cartography of Portugueseness: Challenging the Hegemonic Center," *Diaspora* 11, no. 2 (2002): 255–76.
26. Timothy Sieber, "Composing Lusophonia: Multiculturalism and National Identity in Lisbon's 1998 Musical Scene," *Diaspora* 11, no. 2 (2002): 163–88.

15

“Sleep with a Southwester”: Monuments and Settler Identity in Namibia

JEREMY SILVESTER

Introduction: Forging Southwesters

On March 21, 1990, the day that Namibia obtained its independence after twenty-nine years of German colonial rule and a further seventy-five years of South African occupation, an interesting bumper sticker was available for sale in some local tourist shops. The sticker proclaimed, “Sleep with a Southwester—We need more of them!” (Figure 15.1). In one corner it contained a phrase, in German, that asserted, “I love Southwest.” Here, as a new nation was being born, was evidence of a certain nostalgia for a colonial space that was being relabeled and refashioned.

Although much has been written about the construction of “the native,” far less has been written about the construction of “the settler” as a category used to create “imagined communities” that might otherwise have fractured along a range of alternative fault lines. Mahmood Mamdani has argued that “it is important to distinguish ‘nonnative’ as a legal identity from ‘settler’ as a political identity.”¹ However, it is too simple to equate settler identity in Namibia with whiteness. The definition of “whiteness” in relation to the “other” played an important role in social differentiation, but settler society also required the development of shared criteria by which the suitability of immigrants to be admitted to the imagined settler community could be assessed. The construction of a local white settler identity also involved the difficult forging of a sense of common allegiance to a particular territorial space. In the colonial period the assertion of a settler allegiance to the colonial territory that would become Namibia took the form of the development of the identity of the “Southwester” to distinguish those who had made a permanent commitment to settle and stay in the territory from those who were temporary residents, mainly colonial functionaries on tours of duty.




Fig. 15.1 Namibian bumper sticker, 1990; photograph by Jeremy Silvester.

The construction of an imagined Namibian community of white settlers—Southwesters—with political, legal, and residential rights involved processes of inclusion and exclusion as the identity of the settler community was negotiated and contested over time. At particular historical moments, for example, German-speaking settlers were conquered and denied the legal and political rights enjoyed by other settlers. The defeat of German forces in Namibia in 1915 and large-scale immigration to Namibia from the Union of South Africa generated further debate about the suitability of different sections of the white community to be recognized as equal members of the settler community and led to ongoing insecurities within “the” settler community. White immigrants to Namibia retained a range of externally orientated identities that were continuously employed in the political debates about the destiny of the territory in the years up to the end of the Second World War, which was a period of ethnic factionalism in white politics.

The first generation of German immigrants faced, in the wake of military defeat in 1915, a new wave of South African immigrants who were clearly perceived to pose a political and economic threat to the rights and ambitions of the existing settler community. In this context ethnic mobilization would remain a powerful tool for the next thirty years in white politics.² Tensions were at their most visible during the 1930s with the rise of the National Socialist Party. The conception of ethnicity within the white settler community is perhaps epitomized best by a statement by the Deutsche Bund, an organization seeking to mobilize German-speaking voters, during a by-election in Grootfontein in September 1932, arguing that “[f]or us Germans the best man will always be a German, for the Afrikaners an Afrikaner and for the English an Englishman.”³ Friction heightened considerably with the internment of almost all German-speaking men in prison camps in the Second (as in the First) World War. Such actions served to question the legitimacy of the German-speaking community as fixed members of the settler community. In this context German Namibians strongly advocated the assertion of local settler autonomy and a “Southwest” identity as a counterargument to requests that the territory should be politically and economically absorbed into South Africa.

The fact that the territory became a mandate of the League of Nations under the control of the Union of South Africa from 1920 meant that the potential also existed for settler politics to be projected onto the screen of international debate. The South African government was obliged to present annual reports to the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations and answer questions, and did so until 1945. In this year the League of Nations was superseded by the United Nations. The South African government then refused to recognize the jurisdiction of the United Nations to monitor its administration of Namibia under the new trusteeship system. The local media reported closely on the international criticisms and judgments that were made of the actions of the administration and settler community in Namibia. Settlers responded with the argument that they possessed "local knowledge" and could therefore securely ignore or dismiss external criticism founded only on "distant ignorance."⁴

The internment of large numbers of German-speaking men during the Second World War led to a massive shift in the orientation of local politics. Second- and third-generation German speakers, faced with the threat of being stripped of their settler status and viewed as noncitizens, transferred their political support from overtly German political parties to the local version of the National Party of South Africa and gave their support to its vocal opposition to interference from imperial or international actors. While this alliance led to widespread white support for the policy of incorporation, by which Namibia would become a fifth province of South Africa, it should be viewed as a strategy through which local white communities asserted their common identity as settlers and their collective right to determine the future of the territory.

While this political shift led to the direct representation of Namibian whites in the South African parliament, it should not be seen to represent the simple acceptance of a new South African identity by the white community. In the sphere of public history the postwar period saw the major development of a history and heritage agenda that stressed locality. The different language groups in the settler communities were represented in positive ways that stressed their roles as partners rather than enemies. Settlers' common experiences as conquerors, developers, and leaders in the territory fueled the assertion of their identity as "Southwesters"—as settlers who had been rewarded for their (self-projected) progressive and modernizing role in history with particular rights, roles, and responsibilities.

The history of heritage privileged the German-speaking community as the key actor in the narrative of German South West Africa, despite the relatively brief period of German colonialism and the demographic trends that saw Germans decreasing as a proportion of the white population. In the 1980 second-tier election for whites, ethnicity reemerged in settler politics with German speakers abandoning the National Party for the Republican Party. The point of fracture came with the attempt to renegotiate the Southwester

identity from being racially exclusive to being inclusive and embracing a wider multiracial definition of citizenship within a projected “independent” state that would be divorced from South Africa. The focus of this essay will be to explore the ways in which Namibia’s memorial landscape can be used to read the fictions and frictions that shaped settler society in Namibia.

The Graveyard Patriots: Resurrecting Whiteness?

The Namibian landscape is heavily inscribed with memorials to the colonial past. It has been claimed that postcolonial countries such as Namibia have a “dissonant heritage” that makes heritage sites meaningless to the new electoral majority. While such arguments may be true, they can distract attention from the historical significance of such heritage sites in shaping settler identity. As J. E. Tunbridge and G. J. Ashworth have argued, “[m]onuments, objects and past events and personalities, together with their interpretative markers, are one, often the principal, means through which places create a separate distinctive identity.”⁵ Historians have tended to neglect the extent to which these markers of colonial heritage have themselves presented a very public reading of Namibia’s history and the role and definition of the settler community within this narrative.

Tunbridge and Ashworth take southern Africa as one of their case studies and argue that the region contains “monuments of white hegemony” that exclude the voices and memories of the majority. Such an argument is necessary, but not sufficient. By submerging all heritage production within the category *white*, the analysis conceals the tensions and fractures within settler societies. After all, it should be remembered that one of the earliest examples of iconoclasm took place after the South African War of 1899–1902, when the British destroyed the Taalmonument at Bergersdorp in the Cape Colony. George Bond and Angela Gilliam have pointed out that for any community, “Interpretations of the past are an important feature of their political struggles for individual and collective identities and their claims to power and economic resources.”⁶ In Namibia the politics of heritage and commemoration played an important role in shaping the image and defining the boundaries of being a Southwester.

Certainly many of the symbols and events commemorating the colonial past in South West Africa were staged in such a way as to encourage a common sense of “whiteness” among German and South Africa settlers. Nevertheless, the small German-speaking community’s predominance in the local politics of memorialization also ensured a distinct identity for the territory and for Southwesters. In contrast, there was a tendency for Afrikaner commemorations to be incorporated within the larger narrative of Afrikaner nationalism and to use given markers of historical moments from this narrative, rather than constructing and celebrating events and personalities associated particularly with the territory. This form of public history ironically served to represent Afrikaners as immigrants whose sacred sites lay beyond

Namibia's borders, while German speakers studded the landscape with significant shrines that embedded the German-speaking community as significant actors in Namibian history.

Memorials, and prominent and uniform crosses on the graves of the dead—particularly those of the German Schutztruppe—became an important focal point for the preservation and celebration of local German identity in Namibia, reinforcing a community memory that Germans had died in battle in Namibia. Dr. van Jaarsveld was reported to have criticized Afrikaner nationalist politicians who relied on a romantic view of the past as *kerkhofpatriotte*—graveyard patriots.⁷ Yet the idea of sacrifice is a powerful one in the discourse by which settler colonialism has been legitimized and military graveyards in Namibia have been regularly employed as sites of memory.

Representatives of both the German and South African governments highlighted a history of death and sacrifice in order to justify the expansion of the settler community. General Berthold von Deimling, a senior German officer during the 1904–1908 war, was reported to have said of Namibia that “a country in which so many German sons have fallen and have been buried can no longer be a foreign land to us, but rather a piece of the homeland, to care for which is our sacred duty.”⁸ When the “sacred trust” to develop the territory fell to the Union of South Africa at the end of the First World War, a similar sanguineous bond was claimed. J. F. Hofmeyr, the South African minister of the interior, argued in 1938 that the commitment of the Union of South Africa to the protection and support of the settler community in the territory could be guaranteed since, “We have given pledges of blood—the blood of those of our people which was shed in this territory.”⁹

The first monument to be erected in Namibia, in 1896, honored the German and Baster soldiers who fell in battle against the local guerrilla leader Hendrik Witbooi. The monument formed the focal point of a small park in the center of the capital, Windhoek. The far heavier losses suffered during the war of 1904–1908 were commemorated in the Christuskirche (which was finished in 1910) on the top of the hill overlooking the park. One wall contained a large board listing the individual names of all the German soldiers who had died in the conflict. (The policy of individually identifying each man by name might be seen as anticipating the “democracy of death” that accompanied the memorialization of the military victims of the First World War.¹⁰) The memorial wall also provided the mainly indigenous names of the places where the soldiers had died. The scattered death sites are mapped and embraced within the unified purpose of the men whose names are listed by unit. The list proclaims both the metaphorical and physical occupation of the land by the German troops.

Yet these early memorials were both overshadowed by the prominent *Reiter* statue that was inaugurated on Kaiser Wilhelm's birthday on January 27, 1912, and has proved the most pervasive and enduring symbol of the German

presence in Namibia.¹¹ The large statue of a German Schutztruppe, rifle in hand, astride his mount, seems to symbolically survey the city of Windhoek from the central hilltop next to the Christuskirche. It guards the entrance to the Parliament buildings and stands adjacent to the Alte Feste, the German fortress that was the first significant feature of the German military presence in Namibia. The dominant physical position of this statue made it a powerful and well-known symbol and it became a commemorative icon for the German-speaking community. As late as 1962 a group of the Alte Kameraden (Old Comrades) held a ceremony on January 27 at the *Reiter* monument to mark both the fiftieth anniversary of its inauguration and the Kaiser's birthday.¹² During that ceremony the old German imperial flag rose again over the Alte Feste—a triumphal gesture that, perhaps, celebrated the fact that in the same year the old German fort would become the home of the new State Museum. However, it was Southwest Breweries that made sure that the *Reiter* statue would become the most visually prominent symbol of Namibia's distinctly colonial German local identity. From 1921 on it produced beer that was proudly advertised as being brewed according to seventeenth-century German purity laws, and the brewery prominently featured the *Reiter* monument in its logo (Figure 15.2).¹³

These early sites of memory gathered resonance in the years after the end of German colonial rule. They became the regular venues for commemorative rituals and the symbolic laying of funeral wreaths. A magazine, significantly titled *Der Reiter von Südwest*, was produced locally in the late 1920s and regularly contained photographs and features about commemorative events taking place in Namibia.¹⁴ The Pfadfinder youth movement repeatedly featured prominently as participants in marches to the gravesites of fallen German Schutztruppe or monuments commemorating soldiers who had lost their lives in the wars of colonial conquest. Cultural entrepreneurs ensured that the history of the German period of colonial conquest as represented in heritage was not only a highly visible feature of the cultural landscape of South West Africa, but that new generations were made aware of the history of German "sacrifice" that bound them to the territory. In 1937 a song was composed, "Die Südwesterland," and was sung by the Pfadfinder youth movement and others at these commemorative events.¹⁵ As recently as August 2001, German-speaking youth were still participating in an annual commemoration at a military graveyard in the Waterberg Plateau Park and singing "Die Südwesterland" (see Figure 15.3).¹⁶

If the German-speaking community was central to commemoration in Namibia, the brief German colonial period also clearly left its imprint on the landscape and the built environment. The mountains that loom over the town of Okahanda and over the University of Namibia itself in Windhoek are both known to this day as "Kaiser Wilhelm." The popular novelist Lawrence Green recalled the names of the hotels scattered around Windhoek in the interwar years. There were the Hotel Alter Römer, the Kaiserkrone, the Rheinischer




Fig. 15.2 *Reiter* statue in an advertisement for Windhoek beer; photograph by Jeremy Silvester.

Hof, the Hotel Stadt Windhuk, the Thüringer Hof, and the Westphälischer.¹⁷ German colonial rule ended, but the signs of it endured. The main streets through the center of both Windhoek and Swakopmund retained the name Kaiser Wilhelm. Streets commemorating the German chancellor Otto von Bismarck also featured prominently in Windhoek and Lüderitz. Local German colonial celebrities such as governors Theodor von Leutwein and Friedrich



Fig. 15.3 Waterberg commemoration, 2001; photograph by Jeremy Silvester.

von Lindequist, Imperial Commissioner Heinrich Göring, and Captain Curt von François were also honored in street names. The street names in city and town centers remained largely unchanged after the South African takeover.¹⁸ Likewise, an idea to call the new mandate Bothaland in honor of the South African prime minister Louis Botha was dropped, and German South West Africa was simply renamed South West Africa with the other major noticeable change being the changing of the name of the capital from Windhuk to Windhoek. While settlers from the Union of South Africa came to dominate the demographic profile of the settler community, the memorial landscape and urban architecture remained strongly German. When heritage initiatives were taken by the new wave of immigrants from South Africa, they sought less to rewrite Namibia's history than to incorporate it within the larger epic narrative of Afrikaner nationalist history.

One might identify three central historical markers that were used by Afrikaner nationalists in South Africa to nurture an Afrikaner identity and to facilitate political mobilization on an ethnic basis. The three events were the Great Trek of 1836, the Battle of Blood River of 1838 (which was commemorated as Dingaan's Day), and the South African War of 1899–1902, with particular attention to the suffering of Afrikaner women and children in British concentration camps. In Namibia the commemorative rituals of the Afrikaner community tended to form geographical extensions of these commemorative events and days initiated in the Union of South Africa.

Dingaan's Day was formally established as a commemorative day in Namibia from 1920 with a range of local events. Complaints arose when German

settlers ignored these events and preferred to continue celebrating the birthday of Kaiser Wilhelm (even though he had abdicated and gone into exile in Holland in 1918).¹⁹ However, the commemoration that seemed to generate the most public enthusiasm was the Voortrekker centenary celebrations of 1938. At a time when German identity was being aggressively asserted and linked to claims of colonial primogeniture in the territory, the event provided the platform for a suitable riposte and assertion of Afrikaner historical significance. A local branch of the Afrikaanse Kultuur Vereniging organized the celebrations in Namibia.²⁰ It has been argued that the celebrations in South Africa were a nostalgic and romanticized performance of a rural past at a time when Afrikaners were being forced off the land and into urban areas.²¹ However, in Namibia new Afrikaner immigrants were still able to represent themselves as pioneer settlers, bringing productivity to a previously barren landscape.

The arrival of the "Angola Boers" in Namibia, ten years before the centenary of the Great Trek, was already being depicted as stirring memories of the past as history repeated itself and it was said that "[t]he spirit of the Voortrekkers lives again."²² One of the first (and few) monuments to be erected in Namibia to commemorate an event in the Afrikaner community was the erection of a stone to mark the trek.²³ In 1950 over four hundred local Afrikaners traveled to a farm, Rusplaas, in Kaokoland to commemorate the trekkers' journey to Angola.²⁴ When the centenary celebrations arrived it was easy for those involved in organizing the land settlement program to justify it as the latest chapter in a grand historical narrative. A representative of the Land Board who oversaw the Land Settlement Programme involved in resettling the returning descendents of those trekkers cast himself in the role of a Voortrekker leading his people to the promised land.²⁵ Namibia was claimed as an extension of the narrative of the Afrikaner conquest of the land with the path having been beaten by the ancestors of the Angola Boers—the "Thirstland Trekkers" who had passed through the region before it had become a German colony. The association of the Thirstland Trekkers with the Voortrekkers was reinforced by the unveiling on July 2, 1953, of a monument in a remote corner of Kaokoland in northeast Namibia to commemorate the self-conceived local traces of the "Great Trek." However, the isolated location of the monument did little to challenge the German memorial dominance of the main sites of power in the landscape.

Yet despite these local associations, the focal point for the Voortrekker ceremony and other events that sought to stir the local Afrikaner community was always South Africa. The foundation stone of the Voortrekker monument had been laid in December 1938, but it was not officially opened until 1949.²⁶ One woman who kept a diary at the time remarked, "Having only recently emerged from the pioneer stage itself, South West Africa displayed considerable interest in the Voortrekker celebrations."²⁷ Once again the heritage agenda was to write Namibia and its settler community into a larger Afrikaner

historical narrative. As the administrator's wife, Mrs Hoogenhout, rode on an ox-wagon down Kaiser Street "in Voortrekker costume," a number of "despatch riders" set off from Namutoni, Tsumeb, Grootfontein, Vryheid, Outjo, Walvis Bay, and Swakopmund to ride to the Voortrekker monument and were joined by other riders as they passed through Windhoek and smaller towns in the south on their journey.²⁸

It was clear that one important aspect of the agenda of National Party politicians was the perceived need to create a settler culture that would provide the basis for a unifying settler identity—but the issue was whether the settler community would simply view themselves as South Africans (as the political system introduced in 1950 implied they should) or as Southwesterners, with a distinctive local identity.²⁹ Virtually every Afrikaner commemoration and ritual used South African-based sites and historical events as their reference point and thus represented the local Afrikaner community as a reflection of the larger Afrikaner community in South Africa. In contrast, the far smaller German-speaking settler community placed great emphasis on commemorating events and visits to sacred sites that reinforced their self-perception as having a particular relationship with the territory and also projected a particularly "German" flavor to settler identity. While Afrikaans speakers dominated the political forum, with Afrikaans becoming the common language of debate within the Legislative Assembly and the National Party dominating every election from 1950 to 1980, German speakers positioned themselves as the custodians of history and heritage.³⁰

The Commission for the Preservation of Natural and Historical Monuments was established in Namibia in the same year as the celebrations associated with the opening of the Voortrekker Monument in 1949. The nine national monuments that were proclaimed in the commission's first two years included four "natural" sites, the grave of an indigenous leader (Jonker Afrikaner), two German forts, one German ammunition store, and the remains of one of the houses of the Thirstland Trekkers.³¹ Early patterns acknowledging the buildings and historical remains of the German colonial period as the significant historical monuments of South West Africa persisted. Little emphasis was placed over subsequent years on local memorials to Afrikaner (or African) achievement. During the period 1947–1990 a total of 111 national monuments were proclaimed in Namibia; of these, 58 referred to buildings, graveyards, or historical sites that served as memorials to the period of German colonial rule.³² One might argue that one of the reasons for this emphasis was the influence of leading members of the local German-speaking community, such as Dr. Heinrich Vedder, on the board of the commission and the claims of this section of the settler community to having a deeper knowledge of the landscape and indigenous communities of Namibia. However, in addition to the construction of "intentional monuments," a number of "unintentional monuments" were given

prominence through local efforts to preserve German-style aspects of the built environment.³³

One apparent exception took place in 1951 when a monument was erected on Bismarck Street in Windhoek on the initiative of Gert Lemmer of Outjo. The monument was once again intended to locate the local Afrikaner community within the pages of the larger Afrikaner nationalist narrative. The monument commemorated the *Oudstryders* ("Old Fighters") and *Bittereinders* ("Bitter Enders") who had refused to surrender to the British during the 1899–1902 war (the plaque calls it the "Second Freedom War"), but had crossed the border and sought exile in Namibia. A circular stone plaque on the ground bears the names of individuals who settled in Namibia while the names of General Jan Smuts and of Lemmer himself are engraved in a larger font in the center.³⁴ The plaque bears a quote that translates as "We have also served." The timing of the erection of this memorial suggests that this comment might even have been a self-conscious response to the perceived Germanification of Namibian heritage. However, the monument failed to become a "memory site" in the manner of the Waterberg graveyard or the *Reiter* monument, and did not become the venue of any sort of annual gatherings. Indeed, while the memorial project was initiated during a reunion of the survivors in 1947, the monument did not open until October 10, 1960, and was not finally completed until 1981.³⁵

In 1952, when a massive festival was organized to mark the three hundredth anniversary of the arrival of Jan Van Riebeeck in Cape Town, a South West Africa pavilion formed part of the exhibition. Officials from the territory traveled to Cape Town to participate in the festival.³⁶ The following year the German press covered the unveiling of a memorial to Adolf Lüderitz in the small coastal town that bore his name.³⁷ It seems too much of a coincidence that a memorial to the man whom German settlers lauded as the founder of colonial Namibia was erected just a few months after a festival to commemorate the founder of colonial South Africa. Was it also a coincidence that it was in 1952 that members of the German-speaking community decided to organize a cultural festival, the Wika, organized by the Windhoek Sports Klub (SKW), which subsequently became an annual event and recently celebrated its fiftieth anniversary?³⁸

The monument of Lüderitz in Lüderitz has a further significance. It forms one of four memorials that were erected after the Second World War on a small rocky outcrop, little larger than a football field, known as Shark Island. The island was the site of the most notorious *Konzentrationslager* (concentration camp) used during the 1903–1908 war to contain African prisoners of war captured by the Germans. In fact, German official records suggest that 1,032 of the 1,795 men, women, and children held on the island died there over an eight-month period, while recent research argues that the total number of deaths exceeded 2000.³⁹

On this site, next to the monument to Lüderitz, stands another to Heinrich Vogelsang. Vogelsang was an agent who worked for Lüderitz and was the man who was remembered for negotiating the first land deals with local leaders on behalf of Lüderitz in 1883.⁴⁰ A semicircle of memorial stones nearby remind visitors to the island of the German soldiers from the town who died during the colonial wars of conquest. The final memorial erected on the rocks before Namibian independence was unveiled in 1981 and recalls the efforts of captain Amyr Klink, who set off from Lüderitz in that year to try to row across the Atlantic to Brazil. It would be hard to find a better example of memorialization that literally seeks to bury the past. The memorials promote the German foundations of the town, while crowding out alternative memories of the site (see Figure 15.4). The project was so successful that the island was developed during the 1970s as a camping site for tourists drained of its potentially haunting history.

In 1965 the seventy-fifth anniversary of the founding of Windhoek was marked by the erection of a large statue of Curt von François outside the offices of the municipality and the announcement that Windhoek had become a city. The statue promoted the claim that urban development had been a German initiative and served to obscure alternative readings of the precolonial origins of Windhoek as a settlement.⁴¹ The importance placed on the German colonial period was emphasized by the award of special certificates at the ceremony to the forty known surviving members of the German Schutztruppe.⁴² Yet such rampant celebration of German culture and heritage was contested. The Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk (NGK) campaigned consistently against the “immorality” of the Wika festival which, they claimed, centered around the consumption of large amounts of beer and, they warned, tempted revelers to infringe the Immorality Laws that outlawed interracial sexual activity. In 1968 the Windhoek Ring of the NGK went to the extent of placing a picket of church members outside the SKW to try and intercept any members of the congregation that might be tempted to participate. The NGK pleaded, unsuccessfully, for the establishment of an equivalent Afrikaans cultural festival organized by the Afrikaanse Kultuuraad as an alternative.⁴³

Conclusion: Unsettling the Settlers, Rewinding History

In the late 1970s, Fanuel Kozonguizi, one of the early African nationalist leaders in the territory, was reported to have said that the Herero community felt that only the Germans in Namibia were the “*real whites*.” He went on to explain, “People wonder if the South Africans really mean to stay or to go across the border, but the Germans mean to stay.”⁴⁴ By this time the German-speaking community in Namibia made up only 17 percent of the white population.⁴⁵ Yet despite the demographic, political, and economic dominance of the Afrikaans-speaking white community, the active intervention of German speakers in the cultural sphere and the prolonged emphasis placed on the heritage of the brief



Fig. 15.4 Memorial to German soldiers who died in the wars of conquest, Lüderitz; photograph by Jeremy Silvester.

German colonial moment in Namibia ensured that the German-speaking community was perceived as far more firmly located in Namibia than the Afrikaans-speaking white community for whom politics and heritage presented an image of a community with its roots beyond the border.

While studies of the construction of "whiteness" in the United States have focused on the economic dimension, the construction of settler history and identity through the medium of heritage should not be neglected. In examining the way in which the past was represented (as a history of heritage) one can find not only an affirmation of the belief that whites were central to the processes of settlement and development in Namibia, but also important variations in the positioning of different "imagined communities" within this narrative. Settlers drew on their ancestral ties to present themselves as "Europeans" in Africa, bearing skills and knowledge that would justify their leadership position. Yet the German-speaking community, in particular, sought to claim a local knowledge that would enable them to question the demands of outsiders.

The claims that the settler community should play a leading role in politics and the economy rested on a particular reading of history. The recasting of history and heritage in a nationalist narrative in Namibia today once again emphasizes the role of the settler. However, the previously privileged role of settlers as conquerors and colonial pioneers is now reversed as their history and heritage is recast in terms that emphasize its invasive and destructive qualities (see Figure 15.5). Kaiser Wilhelm Street has been renamed Independence Avenue. Once again issues of identity are becoming the topic of public debate. The question, however, is no longer who can rightfully be considered a



Fig. 15.5 Public art, Namibia: dismantling the *Reiter* statue; photograph by Jeremy Silvester.

suitable settler but who can be considered a legitimate Namibian. The way in which public history and political discourse explains and locates the white presence in Namibia will play an important role in determining whether the settler community is now redefined and accepted as “native.”

Notes

1. Mahmood Mamdani, "Beyond Settler and Native as Political Identities: Overcoming the Political Legacy of Colonialism," *Journal of Comparative History and Society* 43, no. 4 (2001): 257.
2. Richard Dale has explored the development of ethnic sectionalism within the white community in the period 1923–1950 and argues that "the state of South African–German relations were a more significant issue in settler politics than white–African relations." See Dale, "Reconfiguring White Ethnic Power in Colonial Africa: The German Community in Namibia, 1923–50," *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 7, no. 2 (2001): 75.
3. "Die Suidwes-Party und Anschluss an die Union," *Allgemeine Zeitung*, September 17, 1932; Union of South Africa, *Annual Report to the League of Nations for 1939* (Pretoria, 1940), 19.
4. For white claims of superior knowledge, see Robert Gordon, "Vagrancy, Law and 'Shadow Knowledge': Internal Pacification, 1915–1939," in *Namibia under South African Rule: Mobility and Containment, 1915–1946*, ed. Patricia Hayes, Jeremy Silvester, Marion Wallace, and Wolfram Hartmann (Oxford: James Currey, 1998), 69.
5. J. E. Tunbridge and G. J. Ashworth, *Dissonant Heritage: The Management of the Past as a Resource in Conflict* (Chichester, England: John Wiley and Sons, 1996), 16.
6. George Bond and Angela Gilliam, introduction to *Social Construction of the Past: Representation as Power*, ed. George Bond and Angela Gilliam (London: Routledge, 1994), 4.
7. Jan Burger, *The Gulf Between* (Cape Town: Howard Timmins, 1960), 106.
8. Gail-Maryse Cockram, *South West African Mandate* (Cape Town: Juta, 1976), 11.
9. "Speech in Three Languages," *Cape Times*, June 3, 1935.
10. Liz Stanley has made a similar point regarding memorials to the dead of the South African War of 1899–1900; see Stanley, "A 'Secret History' of Local Mourning: The South African War and State Commemoration," *Society in Transition* 19 (2002): 1–22.
11. The military administration that was established in Namibia after the German defeat was deluged in 1916 with requests from concerned settlers asking whether they would still be able to celebrate the Kaiser's birthday. National Archives of Namibia [hereafter NAN], ADM 47–6/8.
12. "Memorial Ceremony held by Alte Kameraden," *Windhoek Advertiser*, January 19, 1962. See also the photograph in *Windhoek Advertiser*, January 30, 1962.
13. "Windhoek Bier," *SWA Annual* (Windhoek, South West Africa: SWA Publications, Ltd, 1976), 1.
14. Thanks to Jan-Bart Gewald for pointing out this reference. See especially the photographs contained in the *Der Reiter von Südwest* editions for April, May, June, and July 1927 and March and December 1928.
15. Gerhard Gellrich and Unkel Rhein, "Das Südwestlied: Hart wie kameldornholz-Ursprung und Varianten," *Afrikanischer Heimatkalender* (1986): 106.
16. Personal observation, August 11, 2001. It has been argued that this annual commemoration dates from 1929. See Larissa Förster, "The Ups and Downs of Memory: The Waterberg Commemoration and a 'Native Graveyard'" (paper presented at the "Public History, Forgotten History" Conference, University of Namibia, August 2000), 2. The commemoration was banned by the Namibian government in 2002; Desmond Basson, "Germans Cancel Commemoration," *New Era*, August 8–10, 2002.
17. Lawrence Green, *Lords of the Last Frontier* (Cape Town: Howard Timmins, 1981), 14.
18. A. C. Stern and S. A. Harper, "Some Streets and Street Names of Windhoek, 1885–1915," *SWA Annual* (Windhoek, South West Africa: SWA Publications, Ltd., 1977), 108–109.
19. "Kalkfeld Correspondent," *Windhoek Advertiser*, January 20, 1926. See also *Windhoek Advertiser*, November 18, 1925.
20. See photo of group posing next to a Ford Truck that was donated to help with the organization of events; *Windhoek Advertiser*, December 17, 1938.
21. Albert Grundlingh and Hilary Sapire, "From Feverish Festival to Repetitive Ritual? The Changing Fortunes of Great Trek Mythology in an Industrialising South Africa, 1938–1988," in *African Studies Forum*, vol. 1, ed. Romain Hill, Marie Muller, and Martin Trump (Pretoria: HSRC, 1991).
22. Wolfram Hartmann, Jeremy Silvester, and Patricia Hayes, *The Colonizing Camera: Photographs in the Making of Namibian History* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1998), 62.
23. "Angola Boers—Trek Monument," *South West Africa Archives* 2319—A513/4.
24. Dorian Haarhoff, *The Wild South-West: Frontier Myths and Metaphors in Literature Set in Namibia, 1760–1988* (Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, 1991), 142.

25. Negley Farson, *Behind God's Back* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1941), 3.
26. T. Dunbar Moodie, *The Rise of Afrikanerdom: Power, Apartheid, and the Afrikaner Civil Religion* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1975), 19.
27. Mrs. Latham, "The Latham Diary: Walvis Bay's First White Women Settlers," *SWA Annual* (Windhoek, South West Africa, 1949–1950), 8.
28. "Items of Interest: Despatch Riders Reach Windhoek," *Windhoek Advertiser*, October 19, 1949.
29. The South West Africa Affairs Amendment Act, no. 23, of 1949 enabled the white electorate in Namibia to elect six members to the South African House of Assembly and two Senators to the South African Senate.
30. A.-J. Töttemeyer, *The State of Museums in Namibia and the Need for Training for Museum Services* (Windhoek, Namibia: UNAM, 1999).
31. "Annual Report of the Commission for the Preservation of Natural Monuments and Historical Monuments ... for the Year Ending 31 March 1950," and "Second Annual Report ... for the year ending 31 March 1951," NAN A 23.
32. "Proclaimed National Monuments in Namibia" (unpublished list, National Monuments Council of Namibia, n.p., n.d.).
33. One of the most famous "unintentional monuments" to early German efforts to introduce technology to the harsh Namibian landscape is a traction engine (nicknamed "Martin Luther") that is displayed on the side of the road on the outskirts of the coastal town of Swakopmund. The relic was actually proclaimed as a national monument in 1975.
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