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Democratic Wars

Looking at the Dark Side of Democratic Peace

Edited by

Anna Geis, Lothar Brock and Harald Müller



Democratic Wars

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and

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Part I

Democracies and War: Theoretical Challenge and Empirical Findings

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1
Introduction: the Theoretical Challenge of Democratic Wars

Lothar Brock, Anna Geis and Harald Müller

1.1 Democratic peace and democratic war involvement

Democracies do not go to war with each other; this democratic peace hypothesis has become a commonplace not only in international relations theory but also in the mindsets of Western politicians and diplomats. Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, Tony Blair and Condoleezza Rice, to name but a few, have all referred to this international virtuous cycle: promote freedom and liberty in the world, which is equivalent to promoting democracy, and we will have international peace. But the road to democracy may involve war. Thus, while the acceptance of the democratic peace proposition 30 years after the rediscovery of Immanuel Kant's famous hypothesis in Germany (Czempiel, 1972) and more than 20 years after its revival in the United States (Doyle, 1983a, b) is on the rise, democratic peace increasingly seems to be linked to war. Obviously, there is a dark side to democratic peace, and this is the subject of the present volume.

Most research in this area supports dyadic democratic peace theory, with its twin finding of the 'separate peace', that is, democracies are peaceful *towards each other* but *in general* they are as war-prone as any other regime type. However, monadic peace theory has recently gained ground; an increasing number of voices claim that democracies are in general more peaceful than non-democracies. They are slightly less involved in war, initiate wars and militarized disputes less frequently, and tend to seek negotiated conflict resolution more frequently (cf. Benoit, 1996; Ray, 2000, pp. 300–4; Russett and Oneal, 2001, pp. 95–6, 116, 122; MacMillan, 2003; Hasenclever, 2003). The proponents of monadic democratic peace theory concede that the statistical proof of these findings is

weaker than the proof relating to inter-democratic peace. Democracies *do* fight wars against non-democracies, and they *do* initiate such wars and other militarized conflicts with them from time to time.

Even though this democratic war involvement constitutes a tremendous challenge to theory building on democratic peace, it has so far only been a minor element in this field of research. Most of the studies published have been dedicated to establishing and explaining peace among democracies, not the involvement of democracies in war. This is hardly surprising, because democratic peace theory evolved as an effort to overcome, with the help of research on international cooperation and regime building, the dominant realist assumptions about war as a regular feature of politics in an anarchical system. From this perspective, the puzzle to be made visible and explained was and still is cooperation and peace, not defection and war. However, the theory of democratic peace remains fragmentary as long as it fails to account for the practice of war on the part of democracies.

1.2 Quantitative research and its discontents

The present volume is motivated by unease about the prevalence of quantitative studies on democratic peace. Most of the research efforts over the last 15 years have been focused on hypothesis-testing within one of the established approaches, but we still have no coherent theory. Statistical tests do not inquire into causal mechanisms, they establish correlations that can plausibly be interpreted as causation. They do not trace the cause–effect chains that lead from the independent variable (democracy) to the dependent variable (external [non]violent behaviour). Quantitative studies have produced a rich store of statistical data which spell out regularities in the behaviour of democracies; their pay-off, however, is limited when it comes to *explaining* war. The regularities are derived from correlations, and in order to proceed from correlation to causation, quantitative studies produce more correlations. The respective findings produce hypotheses which formulate a supposed fixed cause/effect relationship. The statistics, however, confirm the hypotheses only in a probabilistic way.

If we look at single cases, probabilistic hypotheses are of little help. Countries do not initiate a 75 per cent military dispute, and they do not go to war 81 per cent. They either go to war or they do not. Thus, two questions arise:

- How can democracies decide for *and* against military dispute initiation or war, and which intrinsic capabilities or attributes enable them to

choose one or the other option (though with different relative frequency)?
- What are the conditions under which one or the other option is chosen?

Probabilistic formulations which rely on statistical findings have a propensity to self-immunization. Counter-examples can be disposed of with the 'anecdotal evidence' argument. This is quite problematic – if the theory has any validity, it should stand the test of 'salient cases' as well as random evidence. Salient cases, in our understanding, are those major events involving the use of military force that have a decisive impact on the course of history.

It would be necessary to explain, case by case, 'anecdotal' failures in order to regain confidence that the respective probabilistic theory is likely to contribute to our understanding of the relation between democracy and war. Pointing to the fact that a theory whose causal assumptions are formulated in deterministic terms is inductively reformulated in probabilistic terms is not good enough to refute counter-arguments that are derived from salient cases. If statistical results are employed to reconstruct the incentives of actors, the importance of deviant salient cases tends to be downplayed. If we want to explain, for example, the behaviour of political leaders since 1815, it is not feasible to give an account of their rational calculations based on future experiences which only come to light in statistical analyses conducted 180 years later. But this is exactly what is done when it is claimed that the high probability of democratic victories in wars motivates their potential adversaries to refrain from entering hostilities. No earlier political decisions on war and peace can be assumed to have been taken in the light of future statistical studies on democracies' better fighting records.

The methodology of such statistical studies excludes path dependency, and treats every single data point as equivalent and as independent from earlier events. The problem with this can be easily highlighted by the case of the Second World War; treating this war as merely another single data point is rather absurd since this war had a tremendous impact on domestic societies and global politics. It is thus far more convincing to suppose that political leaders' calculations are decisively shaped by their knowledge about salient experiences of their time.

More importantly, probabilistic approaches to democratic peace conceal the considerable variance in the behaviour of democracies towards peace, war and militarized disputes. The statement 'democracies

are peaceful to each other and bellicose in general' is an aggregate statement about the behaviour of democratic states. This average is an academic artefact and obscures the fact that some democracies are quite frequently involved in military actions which they sometimes initiate, while others are apparently at eternal peace, and a third group of democracies is somewhere in between (cf. Chojnacki, 2003).

1.3 Shifting the focus: studying democratic wars as the dark side of democratic peace

Given the now vast amount of statistical studies on democratic peace, it is the aim of this volume to argue for a shift of focus in research. Rather than seeking explanations for an assumed average behaviour of democracies, we want to account for the marked differences between democratic states (Müller, 2004b). Inquiries into the reasons for the varying bellicosity of democracies will lead to enhanced knowledge about the causal mechanisms of democratic peace. Why do some democracies choose the military option in a given case, while others do not? Why, for example, have democracies like the United Kingdom, France and the United States been involved rather frequently in unilateral military actions during the past 50 years, while Finland and Austria have not? These two small states stand out because of their frequent involvement in peacekeeping activities, and their military capabilities would have made it quite possible for them to participate in the various coalition interventions after the end of the Cold War. Why did Germany not take part in the Gulf War of 1991, why did it get involved in the Kosovo War of 1999 but then again refuse to join the US in the recent Iraq War? This variance in behaviour makes it especially difficult to theorize democratic war involvement.

If one looks more closely, by way of comparative in-depth case studies, at the several 'roads to war' of those democracies involved and 'roads to opting out' of those not involved, one can compare reasons[1] for participation and non-participation and analyse how and why the assumed causal mechanisms have been suspended in some democracies. By carrying out a larger number of comparative case studies on democratic war involvement, one could specify the conditions under which the causal mechanisms of the democratic peace theory (do not) hold (cf. Elman, 1997; MacMillan, 1998; Owen, 1997).

In order to advance democratic peace theory, research ought to take a qualitative turn and investigate more closely the 'warring' face of

democracies. What is more, the present volume hopes to demonstrate that studying the relationship of democracy, peace and war should not be considered a *domaine réservé* of international relations. Drawing upon insights from other disciplines such as sociological studies or political theory can generate new questions and answers about democratic peacefulness or bellicosity. We propose to expand the conventional democratic peace agenda by outlining a new 'democratic war' research agenda as the dark side of democratic peace theory. It is rather surprising that no systematic linkage between democratic peace and democratic war has been developed so far.

What is meant by 'democratic war'? Actually, a more correct term would be the 'resort to the use of force' by democracies. There are different forms of the use of force with regard to the international set of rules which are supposed to govern states' behaviour in conflict. At one end of the spectrum there is outright aggression; at the other end there would be (but is not yet) collective action based on norm enforcement in the context of due process of law, including decision-making by a duly authorized body, control of the enforcement agencies by this body, and the control of this authority by courts. Between these two poles there is the use of force in the form of individual or collective self-defence, unilateral norm enforcement (humanitarian intervention), individual action authorized by the UN Security Council, and collective action authorized by the Security Council and carried out under UN command.

When we speak in this book of the wars of democracies, we refer to the use of force without due and express authorization by proper authorities, not to collective action in accordance with Chapter VII of the UN Charter. However, as the wide range of possibilities between the poles of outright aggression and collective action demonstrates, there is a substantial grey area between aggression and collective action. Those in power usually claim to be acting in self-defence when they attack other states. Those intervening in ongoing conflicts will claim to be serving universal ends such as protecting minorities from persecution or preventing gross violations of human rights. Occasionally, the use of force without express authorization by the Security Council has even been presented as an act designed to enforce Security Council resolutions, as was argued by the US and the coalition of the willing in the case of the Iraq War in 2003.

Democratic war, then, refers to the unilateral use of force which sidesteps collective authorization and action as provided for by Chapter VII of the UN Charter, and/or which is accompanied by attempts to widen

the scope of admissible unilateral force under Article 51 (pre-emptive strikes in self-defence). So 'democratic war' refers to the war involvement of democracies which tends to be based on a broad interpretation of Article 51, rather than collective action as defined in Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The term 'democratic war', however, also has a specific connotation. It refers to specific reasons which democracies, in contrast to non-democracies, have for resorting to the unilateral or semi-unilateral use of force and for broadening the interpretation of the pertinent UN Charter provisions (Article 51) in order to justify this. In analysing democratic war involvement and democratic war, we will therefore not only deal with the question of the circumstances under which the causal mechanisms of democratic peace are suspended but also take up the issue of the extent to which there are specific features of democratic politics or liberal thought which induce democracies to choose military options.

By exploring the troubling question of whether liberal democracy produces special incentives to go to war, the ideas advanced in this book have significance for practical politics as well. Until now democratic peace theory has emphasized only the pacifying effects of democracy. As a result, it increasingly runs the risk of serving as the ideological underpinning of a self-righteous foreign policy of the most powerful bloc of states in world history, the community of Western democracies. Contrary to this, the critical considerations presented here offer an academic antidote to such attitudes and caution against an overly optimistic view of the future development of international politics, even if the number of democracies in the world increases. The further expansion of democracy across the globe is undoubtedly desirable in itself, as it enables people to live in freedom and self-determination. But this should not be taken to be a guarantee of global peace. Despite the optimistic visionary speeches of Western democratic leaders, teleological notions of history culminating in global human freedom and eternal peace are not warranted. The equation 'freedom is democracy is peace' is, unfortunately, more complicated than it is made to seem in the popular theory of democratic peace.

1.4 The chapters of the volume

Despite our critical attitude towards popular assumptions drawn from democratic peace research, the aim of this volume is not to discard democratic peace theory but to advance it. In the following chapters, the authors present critical readings of mainstream democratic peace

literature and offer new interpretations, partly inspired by political and sociological theory.

In Chapter 2, *Sven Chojnacki* presents empirical findings on democratic war involvement since the end of the Second World War. He also re-examines the monadic democratic peace proposition in the light of military interventionism. Empirical evidence indicates that interventions in ongoing armed conflicts are a prominent type of the use of force today. One line of argument is that new security challenges (rogue states, 'new wars', international terrorism) and recent developments in the normative patterns of international order (promotion of democracy, protection of human rights) broaden the strategic motivations of democratic states. This is closely related to the idea of casualty-free warfare. Although democracies generally try to avoid the politically risky and cost-intensive consequences of military interventions, the revolution in military affairs, as well as strategic options such as the use of special forces, private military companies or local ground forces, help to keep the military option open.

In Chapter 3, *Harald Müller* and *Jonas Wolff* offer a comprehensive critique of existing democratic peace explanations. The authors identify serious flaws in all types of explanations, in terms of theoretical coherence and/or their ability to account for the data. In its second part, this chapter presents a reconstruction of the social constructivist approach designed to avoid these flaws. 'Militant' and 'pacifist' versions of the normative imperative on war and peace deriving from liberal thought are identified. While the former deems it justified to use force to bring freedom, democracy and human rights to oppressed fellow human beings, the latter takes issue with the claim that democratic self-determination can be fostered by militant enforcement action from the outside. It regards the (unilateral) use of force as a potential danger to the very rights and liberties which the enforcement action is to protect or to bring about. Liberal norms are characterized by a fundamental ambiguity which comes to bear in mixed dyads (democracies and non-democracies) and is absent only from the relations among democracies: wars against other democracies are excluded from the set of democratic policy options as they do not allow for legitimization compatible with any liberal norm.

In Chapter 4, *Christopher Daase* argues that democratic peace and democratic war are mutually constitutive. The common practice of analysing democratic peace and democratic war separately from one another has so far made it impossible to offer a convincing explanation of the 'separate peace'. As is shown in this chapter, the peaceful

relations of democracies towards other democracies and their war-proneness towards non-democracies are rooted in the very same factors. The same domestic institutions that help to prevent violent conflicts between democracies can enhance conflicts with non-democracies. Moral values and political ideals that are widely shared by democracies reduce conflict between them, but might render conflicts with non-democracies all the more frequent. The search for security made democracies join international security communities, which pacified their relations but also leads them to wage (sometimes preventive) war against outsiders. From this perspective, the 'separate peace' looks less of a puzzle. The peace between democracies is a sociational effect which stems from joint warfare and collective conflict resolution by democracies.

In Chapter 5, *Lothar Brock* proposes the concept of 'wars of enforcement' as an instance of 'democratic war'. Currently, the prohibition of the use of force by the UN Charter together with Chapter VII must be interpreted as calling for the transformation of war into collective action. Since the adoption of the Charter, however, a new type of war has emerged which operates on the borderline between collective action, aggression and self-help. These wars are waged in the name of norm enforcement, but entail a minimum degree of procedural self-binding on the part of the governments involved. The emergence of such 'wars of enforcement' conducted by democracies against non-democracies is explained in terms of a 'triangle of war', which the author deduces in successive steps from the 'triangle of peace' proposed by Bruce Russett and John Oneal. However, such wars are and will remain highly contested among democracies because they combine the 'duty to protect' derived from substantive norms (human rights, the right to democracy) with the logic of the state of emergency. Disagreement interacts with different notions of the liberal mission and accounts for the behavioural variance among democracies.

The following chapters draw upon the history of ideas and political and sociological theory to offer critical interpretations of the relationship between democracy, peace and war. In Chapter 6, *Nicholas Rengger* argues that democratic peace theory has systematically misread the relationship between democracy and war. He traces three responses to the relationship between war and politics in modern history: the 'heroic response', the 'realpolitik response' and the 'compassionate response'. While the heroic response lost its significance long ago, the other two continue to face each other in uneasy tension. The democratic peace thesis is one attempt to bridge this tension. However, this thesis makes claims that are untenable for both internal and external reasons.

It claims that there is a clear and direct relationship between regimes and political behaviour, it lumps together highly diverse types of democracies, and it rests upon a progressivist philosophy of history. In addition, it also provides a reason for using force to create democracies and thus secure international peace and stability – in other words, the 'flip side' of the democratic peace thesis is a democratic war thesis (which was already prefigured in the history of democratic thought and practice).

In Chapter 7, *Anna Geis* takes a closer look at exclusionary discourses and practices in democracies that have been highlighted in the recent rhetoric of evil and the politics of counter-terrorism after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. It is argued that the construction of enemy images and the politics of inclusion/exclusion are inherent features of all Western democracies. Drawing on state theory, democratic theory and the sociology of modernity, this chapter points to ubiquitous mechanisms of inclusion/exclusion, some of which imply a decivilizing and thus violent potential. Governments' reclaiming of internal state sovereignty, a democratic politics of identity and mobilization, as well as troubling tendencies of norm erosion within Western democracies all provide reasons why democracies might not be as peaceful as we thought. Recently, we have even been able to observe the tragic paradox that by attempting to spread democracy and freedom abroad, Western governments help to undermine it at home. Democratic peacefulness will thus be contingent upon restoring the micro-foundations of democratic peace, that is to say cultivating civic virtues and inclusive political discourses and practices within the domestic sphere.

The potentially violent outcomes of processes of inclusion and exclusion are also discussed in Chapter 8. *Catherine Götze* employs the relational sociological theory of Pierre Bourdieu to offer a coherent explanation of the 'separate peace' within one theoretical framework. The international sphere can be conceived of as a world society in which structuration processes of social positioning and distinction occur which are similar to those operating in the domestic sphere. Social characteristics such as wealth, power, influence and reputation account for the relations between states. From a Bourdieusian perspective, wars can be considered as part of an ordering process in world society. Democracies possess great material power, and since material and ideational power are intimately linked, their liberal ideas of individual freedom, rationalism and market capitalism have also gained dominance in the world. Inclusion and exclusion from the 'zone of peace' operates along the lines of the material and ideational structure dominated by these democracies, that is to say, the more a group accepts or challenges the

material and ideational position of the dominant wealthy democracies the more it qualifies as an ally or an opponent. The conflicts arise from the inherent tension between the formal equality of all states in the international system and the social reality of vast underlying inequalities.

The *final chapter* summarizes the volume's findings, relates them to the broader setting of changes within the international normative context, and outlines a 'democratic war' research programme. Future research needs to conduct more detailed case studies in order to inquire into the paths that lead democracies to war or induce them to avoid violent conflict, and international relations approaches to these issues need to be complemented by political and sociological theory. With regard to practical politics, our conclusion suggests that more humility and reflexivity are needed on the part of democratic governments and citizens. The self-assertiveness and self-indulgence that inform Western policies towards other countries to a large degree are identified as an extremely risky way of conducting foreign policy. International relations theory has contributed to this attitude since democratic peace theory has become part and parcel of Western political thinking. By introducing a new research agenda based on the idea of a 'democratic war', the editors and contributors hope to advance the refinement and specification of democratic peace theory. At the same time, the discussions in the book caution against an overly optimistic view of the distinct peacefulness of democracies.

Note

1. Note here that speaking of 'reasons' to go to war refers to public justifications for military actions, and not to any individual (private) motivations of democratic governments. The identification and verification of 'true motivations' pose almost impossible methodological problems to researchers. What can be analysed are the manifest justifications that are necessary to persuade democratic publics to assent to a specific case of military action.

   In common views on democratic war-making, it has often been surmised that democracies go to war because of vested economic interests, traditional power politics and the like. Whether this really identifies the 'true motives' or mere incidental corollaries to norm-based reasons remains an open question. Fear of an opponent's future behaviour and capabilities nurtured by the nefarious (anti-democratic) character of the adversary create an amalgam of normative liberalism and traditional motivations of defence and survival, as manifested in the enemy image of the 'rogue state' (Brunnée and Toope, 2004, p. 417). Judging by the security discourses within (some) democracies in recent decades, this might be an important factor feeding militancy.

2

Democratic Wars and Military Interventions, 1946–2002: the Monadic Level Reconsidered

Sven Chojnacki

2.1 Introduction[1]

Against the background of contemporary wars and military interventions an old puzzle deserves new scientific attention: Why do democratic states resort to violent means against other regimes and engage in as many wars as non-democratic regimes?[2] In addition, since the end of the Cold War, democracies have legitimized their interventions with a common set of reasons. Wars and interventions are fought in the name of human rights and democratization, externally justified by the alleged peace-fostering effect of democracies (cf. Cronin, 1998; Finnemore, 2000; Peceny and Pickering, 2002). Drawing upon the current debate over the qualitative transformation of warfare (among others Kaldor, 1999; Münkler, 2002; Chojnacki, 2005), Bernhard Zangl and Michael Zürn (2003) interpret these developments as 'new wars' in the 'post-national era', fought by states and international security institutions in order to combat new civil wars and transnational terrorism and to prevent state collapse, acts of state terrorism and gross crimes against humanity (Zangl and Zürn, 2003, p. 195).[3] The danger, however, is that war could rid itself of the normative bounds imposed on it by the prohibition of violence as enshrined in the UN Charter in the twentieth century.

If democracies wage as many wars as non-democracies, and if new justifications of the use of violence and innovations of warfare increase the risk of military involvement in the international system, then new doubts are raised about the common liberal notion that democracies are in general more peaceful than other regimes. 'Old' and 'new' developments of violence generally question the hypothesis underlying the liberal tradition that *republics* (Kant) or *libertarian systems* (Rummel, 1983, 1995)

are per se less prone to military conflicts and war. Explanations for this paradox are lacking (cf. Henderson, 2002; Müller, 2004b). Therefore, alternative and supplementary research strategies are of key importance. This applies to unilateral as well as to multilateral interventions into ongoing wars. Even though military interventions are a common element of inter- and intrastate conflicts, there remains a significant theoretical and empirical deficit (Pickering, 2002, p. 294).

In order to grasp both the well-known challenges ('democracies wage war against non-democracies') and the more recent problems of normatively and power politics-induced interventionism (among others in Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq), the monadic level of analysis provides an important point of departure. However, against the background of research trajectories followed so far, it needs conceptual amendments. This means primarily that military interventions must be conceptually integrated. Accordingly, the empirical aim is to systematically ground conflict behaviour of democratic states in a monadic perspective with an emphasis on military intervention. In a second step, some central explanations for violent conflict behaviour by democratic states are assessed theoretically. I focus on the question of how much explanatory power should be ascribed to selection effects or the claim that democracies 'choose' their adversaries in accordance with definable criteria and only engage in wars which they expect to win. Furthermore, I will show how military interventions and the transformation of the global security order interact with each other. This is based on the hypothesis that the explicit claim of democratic states to universally enforce human rights and spread democracy in the international system makes the use of military violence by democracies more likely. Therefore, as they adapt to changed forms of violence in the international system, democracies are themselves an engine of the transformation of war.

2.2 Empirical insights and debates

Empirical analyses focusing on the dyadic level and assessing how similar or different regime types interact have produced the rigorous result that democracies have not been fighting wars against each other since 1816 (cf. Bremer, 1992; Russett, 1993; Gleditsch and Hegre, 1997; Ray, 2000; Levy, 2002). The concept of scientific 'laws' is generally disputed in the social sciences, but this regularity comes closest to an empirical law we have in international relations (Levy, 1989, p. 88). It is contradicted, however, by empirical findings and conclusions drawn from the monadic level that assess how specific states behave in their

international environment. Thus, despite the prohibition of violence enshrined in the UN Charter since the end of the Second World War, democracies have been involved in military conflicts and wars as often as non-democracies (Small and Singer, 1976; Chan, 1984; Maoz and Abdolali, 1989; Henderson, 2002; Reiter and Stam, 2002). This suggests that there is no systematic connection between regime type and the war involvement by specific states and, thus, the talk of a *double finding*.

However, the frequent reference to this double finding in the relevant literature (among others Risse-Kappen, 1994b; Geis, 2001) is somewhat misleading. A closer look at the results of studies on the causes of war reveals that the results produced are actually fivefold. Besides the double insight that democracies have not fought wars against each other since the Congress of Vienna in 1815, while not generally being more peaceful than other regime types in their external behaviour, three additional findings have been made: (a) below the level of war (militarized interstate disputes) the effect of 'joint democracy' is weaker, though still statistically significant;[4] (b) revolutionary (violent) regime changes and specific processes of democratic transition exhibit a high risk of escalation into a military conflict within a dyad (cf. Maoz and Abdolali, 1989; Mansfield and Snyder, 1995, 2002); (c) the increase of democracies has not (yet) exerted a significant influence on the general level of violence in the international system (Eberwein, 1993; Maoz, 2001).

The double finding is also challenged by contradictory evidence. Some more recent studies do in fact consider democracies as more peaceful than authoritarian states. John Oneal and Bruce Russett (1997, p. 288) conclude in their study that 'democracies were more peaceful than autocracies generally', supporting the general hypothesis of the pacifying effect of democracy (cf. also Oneal and Ray, 1997; Rummel, 1995; Gleditsch and Hegre, 1997; Ray, 2000). A recent study by Errol Henderson (2002), however, strongly contradicts this finding. Performing a replication of previously established findings on the basis of a modified research design, Henderson concludes that democratic systems initiate and wage armed conflicts and wars with a significantly higher probability than other regime types (2002, pp. 53–8). Besides ascertaining and strengthening these results, Henderson points out the methodological problems with which more recent analyses have to cope. At the core of this criticism is the problem that, in order to support the monadic hypothesis of the democratic peace, the focus is on the dyadic level and a *weak-link* research design is applied (2002, pp. 55–8).[5] Such dyadic-inspired weak-link specifications raise the question of the adequate level of analysis and distort the picture on the monadic level, even

more since we cannot draw conclusions from one level to another without problems of transferring causal pathways from one level of analysis to another (cf. Levy, 2000, p. 320; Maoz, 2001).

In the face of these contradictory results at the monadic level on the one hand, and the alleged relevance of military interventions in the current international system on the other, a systematic empirical survey of conflict behaviour by democratic states in the international system since the end of the Second World War is presented here. Before that, the operational criteria of the dependent and independent variables are clarified.

2.3 Definitions and operationalization

Regime types are identified through use of data provided by the Polity IV project.[6] The Polity IV data set used here identifies political systems along two ordinal scales (one autocracy scale and one democracy scale).[7] Besides democracies and autocracies, so-called anocracies are also considered, an intermediate category between democracy and autocracy (Marshall and Gurr, 2003, p. 19). A political system is defined by the indicators of competition for political participation and leadership, regulation of political participation, degree of competition with regard to the recruitment of office holders and transparency therein, and openness of leadership recruitment and barriers to decision-making power (Jaggers and Gurr, 1995, p. 472). Thus, the regime's institutional characteristics are of primary importance.

For covering global wars since the end of the Second World War, a modified data set is used that encompasses all wars and military interventions between 1946 and 2002. The new list of wars draws on a comparison of previously existing data sets collected by other research projects (cf. Eberwein and Chojnacki, 2001), which address the theoretical and typological challenges stemming from the transformation of war in the international system (cf. Chojnacki, 2005). In terms of research strategy, the identified differences led to a new categorization of wars which also considers occurrence, duration and termination of violence by non-state actors as well as military interventions in ongoing conflicts.[8] Theoretically, the new war list builds on the idea that constructing a typology of war is both conceptually useful for explaining particular findings and estimating changing patterns of warfare (cf. Vasquez, 1993, p. 59). In conceptual terms, war is defined as an extreme type of military violence between at least two politically organized groups.[9] From an actor-centred perspective, this leads to

a distinction between four types of war: (1) *interstate wars*, (2) *extrastate wars*, (3) *intrastate wars* and (4) *substate* or *inter-communal wars*. In accordance with the basic COW (Correlates of War project) definition, interstate war involves conflict between one or more internationally recognized states (Small and Singer, 1982, pp. 39–43; Sarkees et al., 2003, p. 58; Gleditsch et al., 2002, p. 619). Extrastate war occurs between one member of the state system and one or more non-state groups outside its own territorial boundaries. Intrastate war involves armed hostilities between the government of a recognized state and armed opposition groups within that state's boundaries. Substate or inter-communal war, in contrast, occurs between non-state or non-recognized quasi-state groups, whether within or across formal state boundaries. In these cases, a monopoly of violence either does not exist, is limited to the capital or small parts of the territory, or is not enforced in the conflict region.

In order to operationalize the intensity of violence, the idea of a quantitative threshold is retained. If war is the most severe level of organized violence, then one cannot evade fixing intensity thresholds and measuring the number of deaths (cf. Small and Singer, 1982; Collier and Hoeffler, 2001). The designated threshold has both significant implications for the analyses of the onset, duration and termination of wars (Sambanis, 2001, p. 2) as well as for the arrangement of conflict escalation stages. Operationally, the following quantitative criteria are applied to determine wars:

1. With regard to interstate wars, I follow the COW threshold of 1000 'battle deaths' for the whole conflict among military personnel only (Small and Singer, 1982, p. 55). However, a differentiation was introduced in order to grasp the specific character of extrastate, intrastate and substate wars.
2. These conflicts resulted in at least 1000 military or civilian – attacked by state or rebel forces – deaths over their entire duration.
3. In order to rule out massacres, sporadic violence and terrorist attacks the conflict produced at least 100 deaths per year on both sides.
4. The start year is the first year in which at least 100 people were killed.
5. A war is rated as having ended only if the intensity of conflict has remained below the threshold of 100 deaths for at least two years, if actors stop using violence to accomplish their goals or if an effective peace agreement is concluded.
6. If a main party to the conflict drops out, but the fighting continues, a new war start is coded (for instance, Somalia in 1991 when Siad

Barre's regime collapsed and inter-communal violence among former allies began).

7. If fighting within a state occurs in distinct regions and between different rebel groups, multiple wars are coded.
8. From an annual perspective, a conflict can move from one type to another over time given substantial changes in the structural conditions of statehood and in the constellation of actors (for example, the war in Tajikistan is coded as intrastate between 1992 and 1994 and substate in 1995).

The selected criteria are obviously related to those stated by Doyle and Sambanis (2000), Fearon and Laitin (2003) and Fearon (2004). They differ in one respect from the COW project which applies the stricter criterion of at least 1000 battle-related deaths *per year* to extrastate, intrastate and inter-communal wars (Small and Singer, 1982, p. 55). However, in order to meet the requirements of the character of most wars, the COW threshold was modified here to take into account civilian fatalities. From qualitative studies we know that intrastate and substate wars are normally not characterized by huge decisive battles but by small skirmishes, focused attacks against civilian targets and by interruptions in the violence for longer, seasonal periods (cf. Newman, 2004). Although the difficulties of specifying the beginning and end of wars, the phases of war, as well as civilian and military deaths, are serious, the presented definition is highly specific, operationally reasonable and reproducible by other scholars.

Besides these types of war, the data set also includes outside interventions in ongoing conflicts. Military interventions are defined as active violent interventions (involving military personnel) in an ongoing war from outside by at least one member of the state system (cf. Pickering, 2002, p. 301).[10] Typically, they are convention-breaking and target the leadership of warring parties to affect the balance of power between them (Rosenau, 1968, p. 167; Regan, 2000, p. 9). Even though outside interventions in ongoing wars represent a frequent pattern of conflict behaviour that alters the course of conflicts, scholars dispute whether one should integrate military interventions into a typology of war (Pickering, 2002, p. 294).[11] While the COW project statistically records interventions only by adding the criterion of external participation, the Uppsala Conflict Data Programme (UCDP) develops a category of its own for *internationalized internal wars* ('similar to internal conflict, but where the government, the opposition or both sides receive support from other governments'). It is unclear, however, why other war types

are not also being considered by UCDP. Obviously, military interventions can take place in a variety of war settings. This is clearly the case when considering the Korean War (an interstate war) or the conflict in Liberia in the 1990s (a substate war). Moreover, and in contrast to UCDP, unilateral or multilateral interventions should not be treated as a type of war in its own right but rather as a particular form of external conflict behaviour which is related to a specific type of war.

Thus, incorporating military interventions into the scientific study of war would allow for an assessment of qualitative transformations of violence over time, thus rendering a theoretically and practically important point of departure for clarifying the relation between external interventions and conflict dynamics.

2.4 War involvement and military interventions

At first glance, a simple assessment of frequency suggests a clear-cut conclusion. Considering the occurrence of different war types, democracies were involved in 50 wars since 1946, either as warring parties or as interventionists (Table 2.1). Thus, democracies not only initiated and participated directly in more than 20 interstate and extrastate wars (which is, by the way, more than half of all inter- and extrastate wars identified over this period), but more frequently intervened in ongoing intrastate or substate confrontations. Particular insight can be drawn from the detailed observation that wars with democratic involvement had the strongest regional and/or systemic effects during the period of analysis (Korea War, Vietnam War, Israeli–Arab wars, Second Gulf War, Kosovo, Afghanistan).

A comparison of regime and war types creates a more specific picture. Measured according to the total number of years in which states were engaged in interstate and other types of war, Table 2.2 shows that democracies are engaged in interstate war far less often than other

Table 2.1 Democratic involvement in wars and military interventions, 1946–2002

	Number of wars	*War involvement of democracies*	*Democratic interventions in ongoing wars*
Interstate wars	23	13	1
Extrastate wars	17	10	1
Intrastate wars	108	–	20
Substate wars	16	–	5
Total	164	23	27

Table 2.2 War involvement and regime type, 1946–2002 (war years)

	War years	*Likelihood of war*
Interstate wars		
Democracy	23	0.010 (2338)
Anocracy	29	0.015 (1917)
Autocracy	61	0.023 (2662)
Total	113	0.016 (6917)
Extrastate wars		
Democracy	26	0.011 (2338)
Anocracy	30	0.016 (1917)
Autocracy	35	0.013 (2662)
Total	91	0.013 (6917)
Military interventions		
Democracy	153	0.065 (2338)
Anocracy	142	0.074 (1917)
Autocracy	122	0.046 (2662)
Total	417	0.060 (6917)

regime types. With 61 war years, authoritarian regimes have been involved in nearly three times as many interstate wars as democratic states ($N = 23$). Moreover, democracies do well comparatively when we measure the likelihood of war involvement (0.010).[12] Against it, anocracies and autocracies show a risk of involvement in interstate wars which is clearly higher than it is for democracies.

How do we explain this difference? Two aspects are decisive: first, wars launched against Israel by coalitions of Arab states increase the number of war involvements by authoritarian regimes. In contrast, democratic coalitions and alliances rather come to bear in military interventions (see below). Second, democracies are mainly involved in wars of shorter duration. Against that, longer-lasting military confrontations such as the war between Vietnam and Cambodia (1975–79) or the Gulf War between Iraq and Iran (1980–88) push up the value for the annual war involvement of autocracies.

Table 2.2 also includes extrastate wars. In this case, democracies are just as violent as other regime types. This is due mainly to the French and British wars of decolonization (among others Indochina, Kenya, Morocco, Algeria, Cameroon). Today, this war type has clearly lost its significance (cf. Sarkees and Singer, 2001; Marshall and Gurr, 2003). But as the Israeli–Palestinian conflict and the allied occupation of Iraq after the last Gulf War (2003) demonstrated, extrastate wars are not

completely obsolete. Rather the chameleon of war is changing its appearance once again, in view of the metamorphoses of international norms and governance procedures.

The distribution of war involvement shifts even more regarding military interventions in ongoing armed conflicts (Table 2.2). With a total of number 153 war years, democratic states not only intervene militarily somewhat more frequently than other regime types, but also show a high risk of involvement in ongoing wars (0.065).[13] However, only a small number of democracies regularly intervene militarily. Not surprisingly, the United States reaches the highest value with 13 military interventions, followed by France (eight interventions) and Great Britain (six interventions). Moreover, the figure of war years is increased by states such as Australia or New Zealand which have participated in military interventions through alliances or coalitions.[14] This is in line with the empirical observation that democracies are more likely to form alliances than other regime types (Siverson and Emmons, 1991).

Interventions since the end of the Cold War which were justified by humanitarian motives, highlight the phenomenon that democracies intervene in ongoing conflicts through alliances or coalitions. This form of multilateral military interventionism reached its apex at the turn of the century (Kosovo 1999, Afghanistan 2001). Not only were the great powers (US, Great Britain, France) involved, but also the younger democracies of eastern Europe, such as Poland, the Czech Republic or Hungary, participated as did democratic states which had previously established an anti-war norm as a core element of their foreign policy (Germany, Japan).

Figure 2.1 shows the probability that democratic states take part in intrastate wars, extrastate wars or outside interventions in a specific year (measured by the sum total of democracies in the international system per year). The highest value for the risk of a state's participation in an ongoing war was reached shortly after the end of the Second World War. This was largely due to the mobilization of external support during the Korean War (1950–53). The upturn during the 1960s and early 1970s is mainly attributable to military actions by former colonial powers (France, Belgium) and to the Vietnam War and to frequent military forays into neighbouring Laos and Cambodia. In the 1970s and 1980s, the foreign policies of democracies then display relatively little violence. Prominent exceptions are the Cyprus crisis and the Falkland Islands War between Great Britain and Argentina, as well as Israel's intervention in Lebanon and those by France into Chad and the Democratic Republic of Congo, formerly known as Zaïre. The end of the Cold War led to a return of military operations and humanitarian



Figure 2.1 Probability of democratic war involvement (intrastate wars, extrastate wars and military interventions in ongoing armed conflicts), 1946–2002 (annual figures and long-term trend line)

interventions (for example, in Somalia and in the Balkans). While by the middle of the 1990s, states seem to have learned the negative lessons of 'humanitarian' interventions, the involvement of democratic states in violent conflicts reached the second highest value for the period between 1998 and 2001. This is largely due to multilateral democratic interventions in the Kosovo crisis (1999) and the Afghan War (2001). Altered structures of opportunity for collective action (disappearance of systemic bipolarity, normative change) brought about a push for interventions justified by humanitarian concerns. Whereas the military operations of Western democracies in the Balkans were motivated by domestic and security concerns, multinational intervention in Afghanistan is directly linked to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 and the struggle against international terrorism. Normatively, the formation of multinational alliances is related to promoting or even enforcing international norms (human rights, democracy). This trend is associated with taking over functions of governance such as asserting political and administrative control or even establishing protectorates controlled by foreign powers or international organizations.

These developments are also well covered by the fourth polynomial as a long-term trend line. Obviously, the risk of democratic war involvement at the beginning of the 1950s was significantly higher than in all other periods. Nevertheless, there is a downward trend, which lasted until the mid-1990s, as well as the increased risk of democratic war involvement and military intervention thereafter. Firstly, this trend

points to the fact that democratization and the increase of democracies at the system level does not automatically produce a more peaceful international system. Secondly, it shows that military force is still part of the foreign policy repertoire of democratic regimes today and that wars against totalitarian or autocratic regimes (Iraq) and interventions in ongoing armed conflicts (internationalized wars) continue to be an important factor in international relations that should receive the attention of political scientists.

Additional patterns of conflict behaviour can be identified based on the presented data. Controlling for interstate wars or military interventions in ongoing confrontations, we can observe that democracies tend to use military force against opponents which are significantly weaker and more vulnerable than themselves. With regard to military interventions, this effect is even stronger: intervening democracies were strongly superior in terms of power in more than three-quarters of all available cases. The selection of weaker adversaries is linked with the empirical finding of other studies on the causes of war that democracies win wars more frequently than other regime types (cf. Lake, 1992; Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson, 1995; Siverson, 1995; Gartzke, 1998; Bennett and Stam, 1998). In a recent empirical study, Reiter and Stam (2002, Ch. 2) conclude that, since 1816, democracies won more than three-quarters of all interstate wars in which they were involved.[15] On the basis of the data used here, this finding is somewhat less strong for the latter half of the twentieth century. Democracies prevail in roughly 60 per cent of their interstate wars (8 out of 13). However, even though democracies win their wars slightly more frequently than other regime types, war tends to be an ever less promising means of foreign policy (cf. Rasler and Thompson, 1999). Clear victories or defeats decrease in the second half of the twentieth century, whereas *draw/stalemate* situations and mediated and negotiated settlements increase. The statement frequently made that democracies also initiate most of their wars is also less unambiguous (cf. Reiter and Stam, 2002). Out of the 13 interstate wars identified, democratic states initiated only four (that is, roughly 30 per cent). All wars initiated by democracies occurred in the context of interstate or regional rivalries (India vs. Pakistan, Israel vs. Arab states, Turkey vs. Cyprus/Greece). Instead, evidence suggests that democracies intervene in ongoing interstate or substate confrontations much more frequently (see Table 2.1; cf. Gleditsch and Hegre, 1997, p. 295). Thus, the empirical findings confirm the need to conceptually integrate military interventions into the research on the conflict behaviour of democratic states.

2.5 Democracies and the transformation of warfare

The recent development of military interventionism is embedded in the more general macro-trends of global war. These comprise a quantitative shift from interstate to intrastate violent conflicts over the last 50 years (Gleditsch et al., 2002; Marshall and Gurr, 2003), in addition to a geographical shift to zones of turmoil outside the OECD world as well as an increase of the duration of intrastate wars. Empirical studies confirm that, compared with the period before 1980, the likely duration of intrastate wars has more than doubled over the last two decades (Collier et al., 2003). At the same time, clusters of intrastate violence have emerged in several different regions (Collier, 2003, p. 40). These quantitative developments are accompanied by a qualitative change in forms of war. By the rather unfortunate term 'new wars' (Kaldor, 1999), it is suggested that a significant proportion of current wars evades the classical categories of state-centrist explanatory approaches. More precisely, substate wars can be defined as a state of conflict where the state has lost its monopoly of the legitimate use of force or is unwilling to effectively enforce it against combating local groups (for example in Nigeria or parts of Pakistan at the present time).[16] In other substate wars, the monopoly of violence has at least temporarily collapsed (Somalia, Lebanon) or is geographically restricted to the capital or specific regions (Chad, Afghanistan). In exchange, non-state actors (warlords, local or ethnic militia) are able to establish alternative, territorially restricted forms of centralized violence (Reno, 1998; Duffield, 2001). Even though substate wars are not a dominant type of war on the global level, their relative importance has grown over the last three decades (Chojnacki, 2005). Moreover, substate wars are most prone to external interventions. Out of a total of 107 intrastate wars, for example, about a quarter involved military interventions ($N=28$). For substate wars, the risk is twice as high, surpassing 50 per cent (8 interventions, measured against 15 wars).

What is the connection between these developments and the issue of democracy and war? The transformation of global war proceeds in line with a fundamental change of conceptions of international order, especially in democratic states, which also contains altered security–political practices that deal with the risks of substate and intrastate violence. This is especially the case in the international practice of multilateral 'humanitarian' interventions (cf. Finnemore, 1998, 2000; Cronin, 1998). This trend towards multilateral intervention is accompanied by strategic innovations which favour new forms of interventions and alter the face of war. First, the risks of offensive ground operations are

borne by local ground troops such as by northern Afghan warlords during the Afghan War and, thus, temporally granting them the status of partners.

Second, partial privatizations of war by employing *private military companies* (PMCs) occur.[17] In order to improve their own military positions, both governments (*top-down approach*) and non-state actors (*bottom-up approach*) make use of today's mercenaries who are driven by corporate profit, rather than individual gain (Singer, 2003). From the top-down perspective, commercial security agencies are used when states or international organizations seek to minimize the risks of own military casualties or when a military intervention cannot be pushed through against political obstacles and the lack of strategic interests. Empirically, it can be demonstrated that since the end of the Cold War, an increasing multiplicity of private security and military companies are directly or consultatively active in zones of military conflict (cf. Shearer, 1998; Singer, 2001, 2003). In operative terms, the spectrum of these groups' activities ranges from legal ones fully compatible with international law (logistic support of peace missions, provision of security in humanitarian emergencies) to an unregulated sector (military training, assignment of military experts) to clearly illegal activities (participation in armed conflicts on the side of the war parties or in order to secure the interests of external states or multinational corporations). Democracies are involved here not only as customers, but also as granters of licences. Related to this is the problem that not all states are equally interested in settling issues of definition and regulation but rather benefit from the lack of clarity and the functions of a transnational security industry.[18] Consequently, the involvement of such commercial providers of security influences military power relations and, thus, conflict dynamics. The privatization of warfare is thus accompanied, at least to some extent, by the partial privatization of security policy and peacemaking in which democracies are also involved. The qualitative transformation of war changed the options for action available for democratic states, and, thus, show an interconnectedness which should not be underestimated and which also impacts on theoretical explanations of the military conflict behaviour of democracies.

Third, the *revolution in military affairs* (RMA) gives rise to a technological transformation of warfare and creates new opportunities for military interventions (long-distance, high-technology air war, precision-guided munitions, special operation forces). Together these innovations improve military efficiency and lower the risk for deployed troops by

intervening alliances, reducing costs in both political and moral terms. However, in combination with the optimism of democratic states concerning the chances of establishing a global liberal order, these developments raise the risk of 'democratic' wars and interventions by single great powers or alliance systems. The lower political costs and figures of victims and simultaneously the better the prospects of military success, the more likely military force will be approved through democratic decision-making procedures (see, for example, Müller, 2004b). As a consequence of this, new normative and structural opportunities for collective action emerge *beyond* 'classical' interstate warfare and *below* massive and direct military operations.

2.6 Selection effects

If we ask why democracies react to old and new security risks in their international environment – just like other regime types – by employing military means but wage only *specific* wars and intervene only in *specific* ongoing intrastate, substate or interstate disputes, an explanatory approach emerges in the study on the causes of war which points to different *selection effects*. Siverson (1996), for instance, distinguishes between two effects concerning the choice of conflict adversaries and structural environmental conditions and determines the form of conflict behaviour. First, it is suggested that the initiators of war normally choose such states as their conflict adversaries they believe can be defeated. This concurs with the logic that states seek to win wars and, thus, wage war only if the prospect of victory or the expected benefit is sufficient (cf. Bueno de Mesquita, 1981; Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman, 1992; Reiter and Stam, 2002). Second, it is assumed that in wars or military conflicts, states choose to attack particular states that are not expected to find any alliance partners in the case of war. This means that 'the wars we see in history are a biased sample of wars that were selected by the initiator from all possible wars because it had the expectation of winning' (Siverson, 1996, p. 116).

Reiter and Stam (2002) attribute the selection of conflict adversaries and the premise of the possibility to win wars mainly to the enhanced sensibility of democratically elected governments to the anticipated costs of war and their dependence on political consensus (Reiter and Stam, 1998, 2002). Democratic elites are thus not per se more averse towards using violence than authoritarian rulers but must consider their decisions more carefully and justify them to the public. This is congruent with the institutional–structural explanatory variant of

democratic peace theory, which focuses on the function and effect of domestic constraints and structural filters (political participation, political competition, inertia and complexity of decision-making processes) on decisions concerning the use of military force (cf. Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman, 1992; Russett, 1993; Ray, 1995). The cost–benefit argument and institutional–structural restrictions imply the tendency of democracies to avoid long-lasting wars and choose military strategies which increase the prospect of success, restrict their own costs (efficient warfare strategy, low casualties) and minimize the number of civilian victims suffered by their adversaries. At the same time, the sensitivity to one's own casualties is one of the weaknesses of the assumption of the 'peacefulness' of democracies since the more the costs and casualties of violent foreign policy can be restricted, the better wars and military interventions can be pushed through democratic decision-making processes (Risse-Kappen, 1994b, p. 170; Müller, 2002a).

Drawing on game theory and the rationalist premise of strategic action that (like all governments) democratic governments seek to stay in office, Bueno de Mesquita et al. (1999) present another twofold argument. Because democracies must materially 'pay' relatively large *winning coalitions*, and because a defeat would probably lead to the government losing office, they initiate and wage war only if the prospects of success are sufficiently high. These prospects, in turn, are increased to the extent that sufficient resources can be mobilized. The ability of democracies to be prepared to make large investments and to proceed in utter severity makes it unattractive for non-democratic regimes to attack them (cf. also Pickering, 2002).[19]

In the light of these arguments, the preference of democracies for militarily asymmetric and small, limited wars which can be more successfully justified vis-à-vis their domestic societies becomes clearer. For the purpose of intervention, political decision-makers in democracies profit from discreet manipulation of media and public opinion in order to enhance public approval of the use of military force (used, for example, in the Second Gulf War and the Kosovo crisis). These effects, however, reliably function only as long as there is a quick victory and one's own and the adversaries' casualties remain limited. Lasting military operations, violence against the civilian population, or the application of a disproportionate use of force (such as in Vietnam or Kosovo) increases opposition against a war. Despite initial societal support (a *rally-round-the-flag* effect), democratic governments come under domestic pressure when military confrontations last longer than anticipated.

As shown by these structural–institutional explanatory approaches, considerations about the expectation of victory and selection effects may be, at first glance, the question of missing or alternative explanatory factors. In the light of the observation that, first, only very few democratic states are involved in interstate and extrastate wars and, second, only a few democracies possess the capability to wage war or intervene militarily, one must ask why a relatively small number of (not only militarily) strong democracies follow a violent foreign policy. Which mechanisms or societal forces favour strategies of using violence in the international environment?

Even in democratic states, it cannot be ruled out that particularistic interest groups gain influence on political decision-making processes. Competition and openness are central definitional criteria of democratic institutions and are covered by the Polity definition used here. However, this is also a weak spot in the Polity IV data because, if sectoral interest groups such as the military–industrial complex or globally active corporations (for example in the energy sector) have a high degree of organization and equivalent capacities to prevail in political competition, their influence on the executive and its decisions increases, which is not captured by the data. While Harald Müller (2002a, p. 59) concludes from this that democratic competition favours such actors 'whose interests run counter to the tendency of democratic peace', Ernst-Otto Czempiel (1996, 2002) regards such democracies as simply underdeveloped or deformed.

In addition to the problem of prevailing sectoral interests, there is the question of the role of great power status, relative power, or alliances for decisions to use force. Empirical results would be very different excluding the United States, France and Great Britain. Besides their higher density of interaction in the international system (compared with other democracies), the aspiration to shape the international system and to project power through their foreign policy, as well as perceiving and using war as a legitimate policy tool, can be regarded as decisive factors. The two other democratic states mainly responsible for the amount of interstate wars – Israel and India – are also prepared to use violence and have the necessary military and technological capabilities. Beyond that, these two democracies are involved in enduring interstate or regional rivalries and are embedded in an instable regional environment.[20] Studies on interstate rivalries show that, besides these two states, only a few other democracies (US, UK, Greece, Turkey) have been involved in such rivalries and disputes since 1946 (cf. Goertz and Diehl, 1992; Bennett, 1997). The factor of membership in alliances

should not be underestimated either. A larger group of democracies participate in alliances for security and/or domestic political reasons. Even though this mirrors the tendency of democratic states to form security alliances (cf. Gleditsch and Hegre, 1997, p. 294), it also increases the involvement of democracies in military conflicts. Again, the relevance of great powers is crucial here. Without participation of at least one great power, such a high rate of participation would be unlikely, for example in Kosovo and Afghanistan. It is also assumed that democracies embedded in alliances with other democratic states will not act alone against a potential adversary.

Generally, alliance membership and a strong preponderance of power (and thus the capability to project power) are important indicators of the probability of a military victory (cf. Desch, 2002, p. 7). In fact, most wars carried out by democratic states are marked by strongly asymmetric constellations in which non-democratic adversaries were militarily and economically inferior (cf. Gartzke, 1998).[21] This is in line with the empirical observation that only a few democratic states with sufficient military and economic capabilities or are embedded in security regions which are prone to crises do in fact initiate wars or intervene militarily. In addition, the relevant democracies represent only a very small proportion of the total sample. Out of the wars in which democratic systems prevailed, the majority were won by the United States, Great Britain and Israel.

However, selection effects and the alleged calculation of costs do not lead to the use of military force. Democracies cannot risk everything, but are dependent on constructions of threat in order to convince their societies and other states (at least other democracies and allies) that action is necessary. The importance of this factor is stressed by the US and British *attempts* to construct a threat out of 'weapons of mass destruction' and 'international terrorism' in the war against Iraq in 2003 which was perceived as more legitimate domestically and internationally than 'regime change', 'economic interests' and 'regional rearrangement'. Ongoing violent conflicts, the presence of weapons of mass destruction in non-democratic states, and the securitization of new threats[22] make it easier for democracies to justify military interventions.

If democracies choose to use military force, they are not immune against defeat. Expecting to prevail and strategic action do not rule out the possibility that actors may be mistaken. By making false estimations about the relation between goals and means, it is conceivable that decision-makers produce unplanned or unwanted results and rational decisions may be suboptimal under specific conditions (cf. Cusack and

Stoll, 1990; Wang and Ray, 1994). In this context, Mack (1975) formulated the argument that even great powers may lose wars against small states if the great power does not have to fear direct threats to its territorial integrity while the small state must. According to this argument, possible asymmetries in the perceptions of threat increase the small state's will to survive and its capacity to mobilize resources (cf. Stein, 1978).[23] The Vietnam War shows that selection effect, combined with power preponderance, is not empirically confirmed in all cases. It may thus be worthwhile not to dismiss Czempiel's (1996) idea which identifies the strategic incompetence of actors and the related inherent dynamic of interactions between large collectivities as a central cause of violence. If one links this with the idea of the process dynamics of military violence, it seems very difficult to calculate exactly the course of military violence as well as the domestic and international results. If it is true that wars are the result of interdependent decisions made by two or more conflict actors (Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman, 1992) and that there are *multiple paths to war* (Bremer, 1995; Vasquez, 1993), the question arises as to which factors favour the escalation of war and why some conflicts remain below the threshold of war while others escalate into regional or global wars. A simple dichotomization of peace/war cannot grasp this puzzle. However, this process-related perspective does not invalidate Bueno de Mesquita's (1981; Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman, 1992) theoretical assumption that actors act 'as if' they commanded utility-maximizing and successful strategies. Rather, it is 'false optimism' and the 'illusion of victory' (Van Evera, 1999) which lead to the use of violence. Looking at available lists of war, even political decision-makers should quickly realize that unequivocal, authoritative decisions are the exception. And even if democracies triumph militarily, this does not mean that conflict behaviour can automatically be converted into political victory – as demonstrated by the electoral defeat of the first President Bush in the aftermath of the First Gulf War.

Finally, the explanatory approaches cited here ignore normative and cultural factors. The normative–cultural variant of democratic peace suggests that democracies share a set of common norms, rules and practices which have a pacifying effect on their interactions with each other (cf. Russett, 1993; Risse-Kappen, 1994b). Notice here the argument inspired by constructivism that democracies not only learn through their external behaviour whom they are dealing with but also assume that non-democratic states feel themselves less bound by international norms and, thus, display a higher risk of violence both domestically and internationally. Thomas Risse attributes this to the emergence of

different behavioural norms linked to a difference in perceptions: while democracies in their interactions with each other externalize their domestic procedures of compromise, peaceful conflict resolution and settlement, their relations with non-democratic regimes proceed from a certain enmity (Risse-Kappen, 1994b, p. 160). Thus, the social construction of antagonism results. If authoritarian regimes do not act more aggressively, then the argument about the social construction of antagonism gains more weight. The critical factor is not an *objective* aggressive foreign policy of an authoritarian regime, but the *subjective* perception of threat and the over-securitization by democracies based on their values and identities. The categorization of 'rogue states', the label of 'axis of evil' or the declaration of 'war against terrorism' taken up by the US and used instrumentally to justify military interventions are only the most recent examples of the social construction of antagonism (see Geis, Chapter 7 in this volume). This demonstrates the existence of an *offensive* security culture. True, democracies do share common values and norms. However, this does not automatically enforce uniform actions (Shannon, 2000; Schjølset, 2001). This danger arises especially if changing security–political challenges suggest the necessity to adapt new forms of strategic action or if an international order's structure has changed, making it possible to interpret norms differently or to resort to different sets of norms.

Changes in the politics of security and order can clearly be demonstrated by the spread of the idea of prevention and the increased demand for intervention in the case of systematic, gross violations of human rights and humanitarian emergencies (cf. Czempiel, 2000; Väyrynen, 2000). Prevention euphoria and optimism about their own capacity to shape the international system on the part of democratic states have been diminished by some setbacks in the 1990s (for example, Somalia, Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia). However, democracies prepared to intervene have no fundamental doubts about military intervention as a last means of preventive action. Whereas interventions which are internationally legitimized and/or mandated by the UN Security Council are comparatively unproblematic, interventions against 'illegitimate states' (Cronin, 1998), aiming at regime change, pose the greatest political and legal challenge to the normative structure of international order. Such interventions are no longer justified only by reference to security concerns (regional/international stability) but normatively and thus by reference to order (societal emancipation, participation in government, human rights). Prevention and intervention are thus related to the normative goal of enforcing human rights and promoting the spread of

democracy and liberal values. This goes along with altered standards of governance, making some regimes more democratic and behaving acceptably (cf. Finnemore, 2000; Risse et al., 1999).

2.7 Summary and outlook

The well-known good news first: democracy as a form of political rule has brought about central pacifying effects in the past, and this is likely to remain so. Thus we know that, first, democracies cooperate more with each than other regime types (cf. Leeds and Davis, 1999) and, due to common interests, are embedded in complex interdependencies which render the use of military force very costly (cf. Oneal and Russett, 1997). Second, increasingly institutionalized forms of conflict management have been established in the context of security institutions and alliances (cf. Dixon, 1994). Third, democracy as a system of rule reduces the risk of being attacked (Reiter and Stam, 2002; Pickering, 2002). Fourth, democracies contribute considerably to the normative regulation of extrastate and interstate wars in the international system. Finally, democratic systems of rule are suited to the peaceful management of intra-societal conflicts – and substantially contribute to civilizing politics.

However, in their regional and international environment, democracies do not automatically act peacefully. The empirical findings discussed here do not confirm the monadic theory of democratic peace. Rather, they validate the findings of earlier studies that (some) democratic states are no more peaceful than other regimes. Compared to autocratic regimes, democracies are less likely to be involved in interstate wars, but they display a high degree of participation in extrastate wars. Above all, they show a high risk of involvement in military interventions. Normative and structural restrictions may at least partly account for the relative peacefulness of democracies *in their interactions with each other*, but they do not guarantee foreign policies averse to the use of violence.

Moreover, democratization as strategy and leitmotif of foreign policy not only increases the risk of war in many cases, but also raises the probability of war involvement by individual democratic states (for example, into Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq). The lower the expected costs and casualties of violent foreign policies are, the more effective the military strategy, the more likely wars and military interventions can be pushed through democratic decision-making processes. In this context, the spread of intrastate and substate violence as well as cross-border refugee flows create a paradoxical situation for the states joining the

zone of *democratic peace*: even though the anti-violence norm is for the most part effective in international relations between democracies, they cannot rule out the use of violence as means to enforce human rights, protect the civilian population in areas of conflict, and spread democracy. The attacks of 11 September 2001 have only strengthened justifications for military interventions. Thus, interventionism is now justified by humanitarian motives which sprang from the democratic optimism about the possibility of shaping the international system at the beginning of the 1990s. Authoritarian regimes and defective statehood are regarded as potential threats to a liberal international order (cf. Pickering, 2002; Rhodes, 2003).

The empirical findings on the monadic level also take the dyadic variant of the theory into consideration since the suggested causal mechanisms are by and large the same (cf. Henderson, 2002; Müller, 2002a). In order to construct new theories, it will not only be necessary to synthesize existing approaches which focus on the dyadic level (cf. for example Starr, 1992; Risse-Kappen, 1994b) but also to accommodate contradictory empirical results and analytically integrate different levels of analysis (Müller, 2004b).

Theoretically, the debate about the peacefulness of democracies is far from exhausted. Two core elements must be considered. First, research must break away from the war/peace dichotomy and adopt a more process-theoretical perspective (cf. Bremer, 1995), which can make visible the interdependent sequences of decision-making. Second, the conflict pattern of military interventions must be theoretically and conceptually integrated. Related to this is the question of how changes in the normative order structures of the international system affect human rights and democracy. Constructivist and discourse-analytical studies help explain how justification and the meaning behind humanitarian interventions have changed. In addition, the transformation of war must more adequately be integrated into our analyses. Through interventions and military–strategic innovations, democracies themselves contribute to the transformation of war – and are thus responsible for the increasing mismatch between the classical concept of war and empirical reality. It follows that we must critically evaluate the foundations upon which central terms and concepts of current war studies and international relations rest.

Methodologically, the democratic peace research programme is faced with multiple challenges. Whereas quantitative studies on the causes of war have made and will continue to make indispensable contributions to the establishment of empirical regularities and the disclosure of

causal pathways and macro-trends, the low number of cases of interstate wars and military interventions strongly suggests the application of qualitative research strategies. In this context, the question arises if and to what extent *small-n* studies applying comparative case study designs (cf. Stern and Druckman, 2000) and formal models (cf. Bueno de Mesquita et al., 1999) can trace the decision-making mechanisms as well as the normative and/or structural restrictions within democracies (Risse-Kappen, 1996; Czempiel, 1996), while dealing with alternative explanations and potential anomalies (Müller, 2004b). Quantitative and qualitative approaches complement each other and should not be regarded as competing or mutually exclusive approaches. Hence, the utility of multi-methodological approaches should be examined further, and democratic peace might be one research field especially suited for such research (cf. Levy, 2002, p. 361).

Besides empirical, theoretical and methodological gaps in research, this analysis also implies many risks to the politics of peace. First, if the number of casualties is restricted and the costs of war are minimized, the utilitarian cost–benefit argument in favour of the peacefulness of democracies erodes and the resistance of citizens to war as a legitimate policy is weakened (Müller, 2002a, p. 57). At the same time, Müller regards this as one of the *antinomies of democratic peace* which is further strengthened by the privatization of security (cf. Singer, 2001). Thus, cost–benefit efficiency and aversion to casualties (and the aim to end war as soon as possible) lead democracies in intrastate and substate wars to combine the most modern strategies and technologies of war (air attacks, seaborne missiles and special units) with the employment of private security agencies and 'local' ground forces. Their use is meant to avoid the incalculable costs and risks associated with large-scale ground offensives. As a result, new opportunities for action open up between the notion of interstate war and massive and direct military operations. As a consequence of the support they lend to foreign troops, warlords, who are hardly democratic, may be granted the chance of being elevated to cooperation partners of Western democracies. The illusion of cost-efficient wars (Van Evera, 1999, p. 30) could seduce political decision-makers to take foreign policy actions they would normally avoid. This questions whether the prospective spread of democracy in the international system will promote peacefulness.

Moreover, an active policy of democratization might not only accelerate violent processes but the norms of democracy and human rights may also be a pretext for pursuing power interests by military means (cf. Shannon, 2000; Schjølset, 2001). Taking into account the

growth in military intervention capabilities, unilateral options for action on the part of powerful states, and the existing power asymmetries in the international system on the one hand, and the relevance of violent intrastate and substate conflicts for international politics in an era of interdependence on the other, there is little reason to assume that the number of military interventions will decrease in the future.

A final risk to democratic peace arises through norm- and value-based demarcation processes and war-promoting patterns of argumentation vis-à-vis non-democratic systems. The more democratic states identify themselves in contrast to potential adversaries and the less the cost–benefit argument comes to bear in the face of technological superiority, the more the risk of war increases (cf. Müller, 2002a, p. 58). At the same time, it should be noted that superior military capabilities, normative orientations and global liberalization pressures could be regarded as potential threats to non-democratic states and regions. This could result in the emergence of new images of what an enemy is and a 'democracy-specific security dilemma' vis-à-vis the rest of the world (Müller, 2002a, pp. 59–60). The 'clash of civilizations' envisaged by Samuel Huntington could thus evolve as a self-fulfilling prophecy as it begins to inhabit the security policies of Western democracies. A policy of democratic interventionism would not only confront democracies with incalculable security risks but might also undermine their own normative claims.

Notes

1. I thank Björn Aust, Wolf-Dieter Eberwein and Anna Geis for very helpful comments. The author also wishes to thank the Berlin Research Group on the Scientific Study of War (Berliner Forschungsgruppe Krieg, FORK) for discussions; especially, the author gratefully acknowledges the research assistance of Nils Metternich and friendly comments by Željko Branović. This study is part of the project 'New Forms of Violence in the International System' and received funding from the German Peace Research Foundation (Deutsche Stiftung Friedensforschung, DSF).
2. See, among others, Small and Singer (1976), Maoz and Abdolali (1989), Chan (1984), Lake (1992), Henderson (2002), Reiter and Stam (2002).
3. Zangl and Zürn regard this type of 'new war' as 'quasi-interstate war' against 'non-state war', not entailing any territorial claims by the intervening parties and displaying a markedly altered strategy of warfare (Zangl and Zürn, 2003, pp. 194–5).
4. Empirical studies show that democratic state dyads may in fact escalate their conflicts to the level of reciprocal violence (cf. for Europe, Chojnacki, 1999; for the global level, Bremer, 1993; Senese, 1997).

5. Exemplary studies are Oneal and Russett (1997) and Oneal and Ray (1997), which conclude from their dyadic analyses that 'democratic states are more peaceful than autocracies at the national level of analysis' (Oneal and Ray, 1997, p. 751; for critical objections see Henderson, 2002, p. 56).
6. Most analyses about the nexus between regime type and conflict behaviour are based on the Polity data set. The current version is available at http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity.
7. Both scales comprise values from zero to ten. A polity reaching a value of more than +7, or –7 respectively, for a given year can be regarded as a coherent political system in the relevant category, that is, either as a democracy or autocracy (Jaggers and Gurr, 1995, p. 479). A regime ranging from +6 to –6 is characterized as an anocracy. The question as to exactly when a political system is an autocracy or a democracy is treated differently by different analysts (see Maoz, 1997; Marshall and Gurr, 2003). The critical thresholds lie between 5 and 7 on both scales. However, the higher the democracy index, the greater is the distribution of power resources and thus the level of pluralism in a political system. The number of 'relatively' democratic states is thus reduced to a minimum.
8. In a first step, the author has generated a candidate database and isolated critical cases on the basis of a comparative analysis of the available data sets. Next, in cooperation with the Berlin Research Group on the Scientific Study of War (FORK), these cases were scrutinized and categorized. In addition, qualitative analyses conducted by the research project 'New Forms of Violence in the International System' were used to record intrastate and non-state wars and to identify differentiating characteristics. The current version of the 'New List of Wars' and the data set used here are available on the internet at http://www.fork-berlin.org/data.
9. This conceptual definition of war refers to Bull (1977, p. 184), Levy (1983, pp. 51–3), Levy et al. (2001, p. 16) and Vasquez (1993, pp. 21–9).
10. Not included are non-combatant evacuation operations (humanitarian interventions), UN-mandated peacekeeping or peace-enforcement efforts, military training and supplies as well as actions (such as counter-insurgencies) that are exclusively directed or assisted by intelligence services.
11. Few actors empirically and systematically address the problem of military intervention, exceptions being Tillema (1991), Pickering (2002), Peceny and Pickering (2002) and Regan (2000).
12. The likelihood of war results from dividing the number of war years by the sum of state years of the respective regime type over the period of analysis.
13. Pickering (2002) comes to the same conclusion that democracies do not intervene militarily less frequently than other regimes. Moreover, his empirical analysis shows that democracies are significantly less often the target of military interventions.
14. In this respect, it should be considered that a significant proportion of democratic states' participations in military actions – such as those of the Netherlands and Belgium in the Korea War – resulted in only a very small numbers of casualties (Gleditsch and Hegre, 1997, p. 294).
15. Desch (2002) is sceptical of the empirical finding that democracies generally tend to win their wars. He mainly cites methodological problems, such as

incorrect aggregation of data, neglect of mixed alliances and power distributions, and dubious codings for victory and defeat.

16. However, substate wars do not break out in all instances where the monopoly of violence is fragile and rebel groups exert regional power. Thus, for example, the situation in Colombia displays a number of factors in line with the concept of 'new' wars (paramilitary groups, growing importance of economic motives, restriction of the range of the state's monopoly of violence), but the conflict continues to be characterized as a conflict between the government and well-organized rebel organizations.
17. The reasons for the increasing significance of PMCs which take on military or consultative functions in wars are: (1) the incapacity of numerous states to sufficiently perform security functions; (2) technological changes in warfare which increase demand for highly qualified expertise in terms of counselling, executive or logistic functions; and (3) the emergence of a private global market for available highly qualified military officials and weaponry systems after the end of the Cold War (Shearer, 1998; Singer, 2003).
18. This lack of clarity becomes especially clear with a view to private military companies such as Betac (US) which perform covert operations as instructed states and in so doing also have contact with intelligence agencies and act as subcontractors (for example, the CIA).
19. If it still occurs, as was the case in the Falkland/Malvinas War between Argentina and the UK, the calculation of geographical distance may be assumed to have played a considerable role for Argentina. The argument that democracies mobilize huge resources is confirmed even more by the fact that a British defeat would probably have ended the Thatcher government.
20. The concept of interstate rivalry is based on the assumption that the occurrence and escalation of military violence are embedded in a context of previous military conflicts (conflict history) and the 'shadow of the future' (cf. Goertz and Diehl, 1992).
21. The influence of the mobilization of economic capacities on the probability of war and victory is disputed. Whereas Lake (1992) argues that the efficiency and the welfare of democratic economies are key criteria, Domke and Kugler (1986) conclude that democracies have no advantage over other regime types in regard to the mobilization of resources in times of war.
22. For an introduction into the concept of securitization, see Buzan et al. (1998).
23. From another perspective, Bueno de Mesquita (1985) argues that it may well be subjectively rational for small states to wage military conflicts with great powers if the costs of capitulation in the worst case are sufficiently high: '[R]ational actors can choose to wage war even when their subjective (or real) prospects of victory are very small if they care enough about the issues in question' (1985, p. 157).

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Part II

Democratic Wars as a Challenge to International Relations Theory

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3

Democratic Peace: Many Data, Little Explanation?

Harald Müller and Jonas Wolff

3.1 Introduction[1]

In this chapter, we propose a theoretical explanation for three empirical phenomena: (a) that democracies do not fight each other but make war against other parties, (b) that democracies on average might be slightly, but not strongly, less war-prone than other states, (c) that there is a vast variance among democracies as regards their involvement in wars and militarized disputes.

We start by developing a typology of existing explanatory approaches, distinguishing between monadic/preference-based, monadic/institutionalist, dyadic/preference-based and dyadic/institutionalist explanations. We move on to a detailed critique of each of these attempts at theorizing democratic peace, following the work of Müller (2002a), MacMillan (2003) and Rosato (2003). We then develop an explanatory approach which is intrinsically consistent, accounts for the main empirical findings, and also contains reasons why these findings point not to deterministic, but to probabilistic causation; this addresses at the same time the fact that democracies do not behave alike, but show a wide variance in their readiness to use force. This approach – which is dyadic/preference-based and draws on social constructivist arguments – combines the notion of a specific democratic structuration of war/peace decisions with an exploration of the antinomies of liberal theory (Müller, 2002a, 2004b). Our main argument is that democratic features are fundamentally ambivalent and contingent on whether the interacting unit is another democracy or not. Generally, the normative imperative on foreign policy deriving from liberal thought appears to be bifurcated between a 'militant' and a 'pacifist' view. While the former deems it justified to use force to bring liberation, law and rights to suppressed fellow human beings, the latter rejects the

taking of innocent life as a violation of the natural, inalienable rights of humans. This fundamental ambiguity of liberal norms only dissolves in democratic dyads.

3.2 Competing explanations: typology and critique of democratic peace theories

A typology of attempts to theorize 'democratic peace' can be designed along two different axes. The first axis distinguishes between two levels of analysis: unit and interaction. Unit explanations have been labelled 'monadic' in the literature: certain unit characteristics cause democracies to behave peacefully towards all actors in the international system. Dyadic explanations hold that the external behaviour of democracies is not inherently pre-defined. The policy repertoire of democracies comprises peacefulness as well as the use of force, and which option is implemented depends on the type of interaction partner they face.

Both monadic and dyadic causal claims emphasize characteristics at the *unit level* as the *necessary* condition for this behaviour. Yet only monadic approaches construe these necessary conditions as also being *sufficient*. For dyadic explanations, they work only if the antecedent condition of a democratic partner is met. To be sure, no monadic account would assume that democracies make war/peace decisions without 'looking at the target'; they do suggest, however, that the causal path leading to democracies' peace-proneness is not systematically shaped by the democratic or non-democratic nature of the 'target'.

The second axis relates to the central attribute that causes the behaviour. Here we can distinguish between explanations that focus on specific majority *preferences* by democratic publics and those that focus on the specific features of democratic *institutions*.

Subcategories of preferences are *utilitarian* (the avoidance of the risks and costs of war) and *normative* (the appreciation of human rights and non-violent conflict solution) motivations. Here, democratic institutions are considered only as a *transmission belt* for the preferences without thereby functioning as an independent causal force. In purely institutionalist explanations it is not preferences that distinguish democracies from non-democracies, but the institutional features of democracy (elections, transparency, open debate) that shape policies such that the occurrence of war and militarized disputes is reduced generally (in monadic accounts), or foreclosed if these institutional features are shared (in dyadic accounts).

Combining both axes, we obtain a table of four boxes (see Table 3.1). To be sure, there are few accounts of the democratic peace phenomena that fit perfectly into these categories. Dyadic approaches all too often rely (if implicitly) on monadic premises just as monadic explanations regularly refer to interactionist arguments. Essentially, institutionalist theories at times appear to be based on substantial assumptions regarding specific preferences. In particular, theoretical approaches (especially, the traditional 'cultural' and 'structural' explanations) have been employed to account at the same time for both, namely the assumed general peace-proneness of democracies and the 'separate peace' that takes bellicose democracies for granted. Yet, we regard it as crucial to differentiate clearly. Hence, in what follows we will arrange the different arguments put forward according to our typology to see if explanations can be offered that are both internally coherent and empirically consistent.

3.2.1 The monadic/preference-based explanation

3.2.1.1 The utilitarian argument

The monadic/preference-based explanation traces the peace-proneness of democracies back to the individual citizen.[2] It starts from the utilitarian argument in Immanuel Kant's work on 'Perpetual Peace' (Kant, 1795). The rational citizen in liberal capitalist societies is generally peace-prone because war endangers not only his life (as a combatant or as a civilian victim), but is economically expensive as well. If the political system allows for the translation of this preference into foreign policy (and democracy does), the respective state will refrain from violent behaviour (Czempiel, 1996, p. 80) or, at least, will prove '*least prone* to international violence and war' (Rummel, 1983, p. 28). The causal chain thus leads from the rational calculus of the average citizen to a (relative)

Table 3.1 A typology of causation hypotheses in democratic peace theory

	Preference-oriented	Institutions-oriented
Monadic	Kant Czempiel Rummel (MacMillan)	Schultz (Huth and Allee in parts)
Dyadic	Risse-Kappen Kahl Owen Doyle	Lipson (Huth and Allee in parts) Bueno de Mesquita et al. Gelpi and Griesdorf

peaceful democracy provided that war entails more costs than benefits and public majorities are translated into political decisions.

This first premise, however, is not self-evident: the assumption that a rationalist calculus will regularly be war-averse cannot be justified a priori. From a utilitarian perspective, all types of political regime will wage wars that are profitable. Yet, whereas non-democratic regimes rely on smaller support groups (cf. Bueno de Mesquita et al., 1999), democracy constitutes the necessity for conducting *general* cost–benefit calculations to convince a majority of the population that the war offers a net utility. Thus, non-democratic regimes will wage wars with a negative total cost–value ratio as long as the (smaller) winning coalition profits. Corresponding to Rudolph J. Rummel's probabilistic utilitarian argument, a democratic regime will be less war-prone than a non-democratic regime.[3]

Even this qualified utilitarian approach, however, fails to account for a central empirical phenomenon, namely 'that democracies differentiate between kinds of governments in their use of force' (Kegley and Hermann, 2002, p. 17), employing it against non-democracies while refusing to go to war against much weaker democracies (Doyle, 1997, p. 282; Risse-Kappen, 1995a, p. 497). There is no logical basis within the monadic/utilitarian explanation to account for democratic wars and interventions (cf. Pickering, 2002). Rummel makes an attempt to solve this problem by blaming non-democracies for distorting democracies' peace-prone preferences: 'Libertarian states *are* involved in warfare, military intervention, and other kinds of international violence. This is usually reactive violence, a response to perceived aggression from nonlibertarian states or movements' (Rummel, 1979, p. 292). This explanation is at loggerheads with the use of force by democracies against small states (Czempiel, 1996, p. 82; Doyle, 1986, p. 1157) and during 'imperial' or 'colonial' wars (Rosato, 2003, pp. 588–9). Ernst-Otto Czempiel avers that it is the democratic deficits of democracies that are the reason for their persisting use of force. This leads to further contradictions. It remains unclear why these quasi-democratic wars should be directed only against non-democracies.[4] According to Czempiel, democracies are only fully developed, and thus peaceful, if there is an adequately informed middle class, special interest groups do not cause distortions, and the burdens resulting from political decisions are equally distributed (Czempiel, 1996, pp. 89–90). The Kantian theorem is suspended once the congruence between decision-making and exposure to war is weakened (1996, pp. 92–3). These are daunting conditions which can hardly be met perfectly in a real democracy: focused, well-organized interests enjoy a distinct advantage over widespread, but

diffuse interests (Downs, 1956), and the right of persons or entities of similar interests to associate is an indispensable element of democracy.

3.2.1.2 The cultural argument

The 'cultural' or normative explanation (cf. Maoz and Russett, 1993; Russett and Oneal, 2001, p. 53) maintains that democratically socialized citizens and leaders are accustomed to solve their conflicts in peaceful and consensus-oriented ways. In democratic societies a '*democratic norm of bounded competition*' (Dixon and Senese, 2002, p. 548) prevails with an emphasis on mediation, negotiation and compromise. States externalize the 'liberal norms of non-violent and compromise-oriented resolution of conflict' (Risse-Kappen, 1995a, p. 501).

This explanation is monadic (Rousseau et al., 1996, p. 514). Democratic norms apply to *all* citizens – even criminals shall be treated in accordance with the rule of law. Therefore, the normative explanation is meant to account for democracies' foreign conduct *in general*, as John MacMillan (1996, 2003, 2004a) has argued. MacMillan's monadic framework opens two possible roads to the use of force on the part of democracies. Firstly, by distinguishing between *liberalism* and the *liberal state*, the latter's inherent pluralism enables 'other political perspectives' to succeed in the competition 'for influence upon foreign policy' (MacMillan, 1996, p. 295). Secondly, there are 'circumstances in which liberalism may commission rather than constrain the use of force, such as in halting mass violations of human rights' (MacMillan, 2003, p. 241; cf. MacMillan, 2004a).[5]

The first account can explain the relative peacefulness of democracies. Assuming liberalism has a general war-constraining effect, dependent on the relative domestic strength of liberal norms and/or groups, war remains possible (if non-liberals are elected) but will be less frequent in democratic than in non-democratic states. Yet, two crucial problems emerge, for, on the one hand, if liberal norms are embraced only by liberal groups and non-liberals can achieve majorities, then the normative approach encounters the same problem as the utilitarian: the fact that democracies only go to war *against non-democracies* remains unexplained. Constructivists argue that it is the liberal public that prevents illiberal leaders from fighting other democracies, waking up from their usual indifference towards foreign affairs when the spectre of war arises, and abhorring the idea of slaughtering the citizens of fellow liberal democracies (Owen, 1994, pp. 100–1). But it is implausible that the same aversion is not effective if the prospective victims are the hapless inhabitants of a dictatorship, or why in this situation the threat

of war should be less effective in eliminating the public's apathy towards foreign policy. Secondly, if liberal norms are understood in a basic liberal-democratic sense (see MacMillan, 2004a, p. 180), it should be assumed, at least for mature liberal democracies, that most 'other political perspectives' in domestic politics share those essential basics – be they termed conservatives, socialists, social democrats or Greens (cf. Doyle, 1983a, p. 207). If conservative parties embrace the democratic constitution, they accept and promote the liberal values on which the normative argument for democratic peace rests.

That said, the burden of explaining the use of force as employed by mature liberal democracies lies entirely on MacMillan's second account. If certain reasons for war are compatible with liberalism and if this compatibility is, *inter alia*, dependent on the non-democratic nature of the state being attacked, then the problem would be solved. But that would mean we would have left the monadic realm. If liberal norms generally can 'commission' as well as 'constrain' the use of force, they are fundamentally ambivalent and no clear-cut causal mechanism can be constructed that connects liberalism (or, in our case, democracy) and peace on the unit level. MacMillan's example for a possible reason for liberal war ('mass violations of human rights') indicates that the dissolution of this ambivalence is dependent on the state being attacked and, thus, on the specific dyad.[6] The attempt to solve the logical inconsistencies and empirical incompatibilities of the monadic/preference-based explanation, thus, points directly to the dyadic level of analysis.

3.2.2 The dyadic/preference-based explanation

To date, dyadic/preference-based explanations have been built on social constructivism. Thomas Risse-Kappen (1994a, b, 1995a) argues that democracies transfer their internal model of conflict resolution – peaceful compromise and negotiations – onto international politics. Watching other democracies, they infer the same preference on the other side by comparing practices and structures (Risse-Kappen 1995a, pp. 503–4). Colin Kahl (1999) and also John Owen (1997) argue along similar lines, but instead of emphasizing the procedural characteristics of democracy, they focus on the substantive liberal ideas, namely individualism, the equal endowment of all individuals with reason, and universal equality among men. Yet, the basic mechanism works as described by Risse-Kappen (1995a, pp. 503–6): the mutual perception countries have of one another as democracies paves the way for (and is then itself reinforced by) cooperative interaction across a broad range of fields: cooperation is facilitated since democracies, having no mutual

fear of aggression, suspend the precautions that international anarchy otherwise imposes on cooperative interstate endeavours (cf. Doyle, 1983a, p. 230; Cederman, 2001).

The same cannot happen with non-democracies. Since these are perceived as not being peaceful at home, there is no validation of their peaceful intentions and they must be suspected of being potentially aggressive. Autocracies deny their subjects rights, and reason cannot function through their institutions which makes them 'unreasonable, unpredictable, and potentially dangerous' (Owen, 1997, p. 124; cf. Kahl, 1999, pp. 109–13). In-group/out-group dynamics exacerbate this distinction between different types of states: while positive identities are shaped, confirmed and reinforced in a virtuous circle among democracies, negative identities between democracies and non-democracies develop in a vicious circle (Kahl, 1999, p. 127; cf. Risse-Kappen, 1995a, pp. 506–7; cf. Doyle, 1986, p. 1161). The security dilemma in mixed dyads impedes cooperation owing to the concern with cheating and relative gains. This dilemma opens the door for wars between democracies and non-democracies despite defensive intentions.

However, the security dilemma can be mitigated by a variety of instruments and need not end in war at all. Democracies' preference for externalizing their non-violent mode of conflict management – as the social constructivist explanation emphasizes – must apply to their relations with non-democracies as well. This is not easy given the many uncertainties in anarchy, but it is not impossible:[7] the security dilemma argument is theoretically insufficient to explain why democracies should initiate war against autocracies,[8] and evidence supports this criticism. Recent military interventions and wars fought by democracies have rarely if ever been driven by the dilemma (Czempiel, 1996, p. 82):[9] the British Falkland War or the US interventions in Grenada or Panama lacked any link to the security dilemma. The Gulf War in 1991 restored the sovereignty of an occupied country and pursued wider geo-economic interests. The interventions in Somalia, Haiti (where fighting was avoided), Bosnia and Kosovo were initiated for 'humanitarian' reasons. Afghanistan was a case of self-defence in a new understanding of the term as recognized by the Security Council. The Iraq War in 2003 was allegedly fought in order to prevent the development of weapons of mass destruction by a rogue government – a possible security dilemma case. However, the plan developed by the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) to answer the open questions on these weapons in spring 2003 would have required only a few months of additional work (Blix, 2004). Moreover, revelations

about last-minute offers by Iraq imply that the government in Washington had the opportunity to deal with this aspect of the matter by means short of war (Risen, 2003). Generally, the security dilemma is a rather infrequent cause of international war (Reiter, 1995).[10]

Owen and Kahl avoid this problem by pointing to the ambivalence of the liberal heritage. After all, there is the possibility that indignation about the suppression of humans elsewhere could motivate the use of force to change the regime in the non-democratic target country. They argue that the same value orientation that explains inter-liberal peacefulness can give rise to a drive to force liberal democracy onto non-democratic systems (Owen, 1997, p. 117; Kahl, 1999, p. 112; cf. Doyle, 1983a, p. 206; Peceny, 1997, p. 417).[11] However, they conclude erroneously that this ambivalence will lead to such behaviour, for the *desire* to improve the situation of fellow humans elsewhere does not imply anything as regards the *instruments* for achieving that objective. Democratic preferences for non-violent conflict solution (Risse-Kappen) or for protecting and saving the lives of the possible victims of war (Owen and Kahl) should stand in the way of using force for this purpose.

The problem with the social constructivist approach is the unresolved tension between the (implicit) monadic premises and their dyadic transformation. At the unit level, democracies are generally assumed to be prone to peace, but when interacting with non-democracies they are forced, or at least induced, to resort to non-democratic measures. As proposed by the security dilemma argument, the threat posed by non-democracies who are not accustomed to democratic modes of peaceful conflict resolution could theoretically solve this tension.[12] However, as demonstrated, this clashes with the reality of 'democratic wars'. Owen and Kahl address this weakness by pointing to the inherent ambivalence of liberal ideas. In doing so, they replace the problem of empirical incompatibility with one of logical incoherence: if their monadic premises hold – democracies are seen to be 'by definition [...] pacific and trustworthy' (Owen, 1994, p. 89), and liberals 'see coercion and violence as unnecessary for, and corrosive to, political order' (Kahl, 1999, p. 111) – then there is good reason to peacefully promote democracy around the world, but the use of force should be ruled out as a legitimate means of democratic foreign policy.[13] That said, it comes as no surprise that the argument of the non-democratic threat creeps in through the back door in both Owen's and Kahl's approaches.[14] A third solution to the problem – suggested by Risse-Kappen – would be to remove the (implicit) monadic premises by characterizing both autocracies' aggressiveness and democracies' peacefulness 'not [...] as a

quasi-objective finding, but as a *perception* by democratic systems' (Risse-Kappen, 1995a, p. 503). If, however, the ascription of amity and enmity and thus the 'rule learned through the process of interaction' (1995a, p. 503) has no justifications with regard to the unit attributes differentiating democratic from non-democratic states, then inter-democratic peace is merely a random result.

Another problem the constructivist explanation faces is the fact that democracies are *not* alike (see Introduction). If the way democracies behave towards war and peace differs greatly, this should impact on the mutual perception of democracies. The observation of other democracies behaving militantly when the observing democracies prefer peaceful means refutes the expectation that all democracies prefer peace to war (Rosato, 2003, p. 590), unless there is complete cognitive closure as to events in the international system. There were constellations during the Cold War when democracies viewed the US as far from peaceful.[15] In a public opinion poll in November 2003 Europeans named Israel – a fellow democracy – as the biggest threat to world peace, with the US placed second, along with North Korea and Iran (Eurobarometer, 2003).

Warlike democracies cause inter-democratic patterns of perception that undermine the social constructivist explanation of the *separate* peace. When one democracy recognizes the internal structure of another democracy and the values of its citizens as 'alike', this does not translate into the presumption of peacefulness of other democracies independently of the factual, external behaviour of the observed democracy. Ido Oren has shown how the perception of 'deviant behaviour' by imperial Germany prompted a change in US perceptions of that country from liberal to autocratic (Oren, 1995). The basic idea in the constructivist approach, namely that monadic causal mechanisms lead via perceptual differentiation to dyadic results, does not hold.

3.2.3 The monadic/institutionalist explanation

Institutionalist explanations start from the rationalist theory of war. They suggest that states would not fight wars in an environment of complete information and undistorted communication; uncertainty over the truth content of publicly available information, however, makes it difficult for the states in question to give unambiguous signals both for how vital the issue at stake really is for the signalling state, and for the sincerity of a publicized willingness to keep the peace. Escalation of war may occur because peaceful assertions are not believed or forceful statements are misread as bluff (Fearon, 1995). In this environment, states

which can signal their intentions clearly have a better opportunity to settle their conflicts peacefully; if they signal that vital interests are at stake, the challenger will abandon the challenge, or the resister will cease resistance. If they signal their willingness to compromise, this will be interpreted as a genuine preference for peaceful relations (cf. Gelpi and Griesdorf, 2001, p. 636; Huth and Allee, 2002, Ch. 4).

The two most salient institutional attributes of democracy that influence external behaviour are the desire of politicians to be elected and the availability of information due to the institution of free speech and open political debate. Such information is largely private in non-democracies; in democracies it is public. This enhances the capability for unambiguous signalling and creates audience costs vis-à-vis the democratic electorate, which measures the performance of politicians against the latter's own public promises and commitments (Fearon, 1994a).

Public statements, therefore, have a greater likelihood of being believed if they are made by democratic rather than non-democratic leaders. Moreover, recipients of signals from a democracy have an even better opportunity to tell bluff from genuine commitment simply by scrutinizing the utterances of the opposition. If the opposition supports the government in a challenge or in resistance, the likelihood of bluff is small. If the opposition rejects the governmental position, the democracy is split, and the chances for its adversary to prevail in the conflict are good. As a consequence, democratic governments that enjoy the support of their opposition in a conflict are likely to prevail without war, as the enemy, reading the signals, gives in prior to hostilities. Democratic governments lacking support by the opposition are likely to give in themselves before shots are exchanged. Consequently, democracies are more peaceful than non-democracies (Schultz, 2001, Chs 2 and 3).

This approach has serious logical problems. The signal innate in the opposition's support for, or resistance to, war is much less clear than suggested. In a rationalist calculus the overriding objective of the opposition is to replace the government. If in the eyes of the electorate victory in war counts more than a diplomatic victory, the opposition should always support the government in a crisis. If the prospect for winning an ensuing war is very good, the government stands to gain less if the adversary surrenders to the united front before hostilities are opened, and the loss for the opposition would be smaller. If the country is likely to lose a war following challenge/resistance, the opposition has the incentive to take a position that emboldens the adversary by simultaneously closing the road to retreat for its opponents in government.

In either case, it is wise for opposition parties to keep the door open for a quick change of position if events take an unforeseen course; the argument that the previous position was based on false information supplied by the treacherous government is always open: think of British Tories or US Democrats in the aftermath of the Iraq War. Seen in this light, the signals an adversary receives from the public support or resistance by the opposition to governmental policy are anything but unambiguous: the opposition has strong incentives to bluff its way into power.

Mixed signals of democracies are depicted in rational approaches as signs of a lack of determination, and thereby as an invitation to challenge or to attack (Prins, 2003). But mixed signals essentially create uncertainty for the adversary. The sender of these signals might be wavering, or an iron will to prevail may still linger behind the lack of clarity. If history is screened for clues on how to interpret signals, the many examples of misreading should probably counsel governments to eschew from interpreting mixed signals as indicating wimpishness (Jervis, 1976; Lebow, 1981). A risk-averse adversary would thus be reluctant to mount a challenge or an attack in such a situation. If offensive steps are taken in response to uncertainty, this betrays a risk-prone preference order on the part of the adversary that contradicts the presumptions of the 'rationalist theory of war'.

The notion of audience costs leads to a more fundamental objection that is completely beyond the rationalist paradigm. Audience costs can unleash their causal effectiveness only if the sender and the receiver of the information have a common standard for what counts as 'cost'. This is far from self-evident. As studies on negotiations across cultural boundaries have shown, negotiators face major obstacles to draw on a shared system of reference when evaluating the speech acts on which they can build agreement (Cohen, 1997, 2000). If signalling cannot even rely on diplomatic rules and routines, as seasoned negotiators can do to their common advantage, reading signals correctly becomes even more difficult (for the full argument, see Müller, 2004a). In history, non-democracies frequently misread signals by democracies; democracies, in turn, have had difficulties to make their intentions clear. Germany did not believe that Britain would enter either the First or the Second World War. North Korea did not expect the United States to fight for the integrity of South Korea. The US signalled unanimous resolve by both political parties in the Vietnam conflict (Gulf of Tonkin Resolution) and lost anyway. It signalled resolve in Iraq twice, and in Kosovo, but was resisted. The West gave signals of wavering throughout

the Bosnian War but stood tall in the endgame. Additionally, some main contemporary adversaries of the West, Saddam Hussein, Milošović and Osama Bin Laden, all uniformly believed that Western democracies could not tolerate casualties and therefore would not see their commitments through (Bengio, 1992; Bin Laden, 1996; Vollmer, 1999). Conversely, in cases like Lebanon in 1983 or Somalia in 1993, democracies apparently fulfilled this expectation. Reading democracies correctly is much more problematic in practice than the rationalist blueprint of audience costs would have it.[16]

The very basis of the institutionalist approach to democratic peace is seriously flawed, namely the rationalist explanation of war. Empirical research on the causes of war seriously calls into question the claim that wars result largely from insufficient information on mutual preferences. The security dilemma has rarely been the cause of war (see section 3.2.2). The problem of private information is not decisive. Wars have most frequently resulted from enduring rivalries with fixed, diametrically opposed preferences for contradictory policies by either side (Vasquez, 2000a, b), which a rationalist model can only capture by renouncing the axiom of equal preferences (Huth and Allee, 2002, Chs 4 and 8).[17] And wars have been frequently caused by aggressive actors pursuing expansionist and 'predatory' policies (Schweller, 1994, 1996). Seen in this light, the axiom that all actors harbour preferences of risk aversion might be theoretically consistent with the rationalist paradigm, but fails to match the reality of war-making. Eventually, rationalists must admit: 'If there is a real democratic peace, the theory I have presented contributes to but probably does not provide a full explanation. Such an explanation would almost certainly have to include some argument about the nature of preferences [. . .]' (Schultz, 2001, p. 236).

3.2.4 Dyadic-institutionalist explanations

Dyadic-institutionalist explanations come in two versions. The first focuses on attributes such as transparency and audience costs to establish that democracies are more reliable in entering binding contracts (section 3.2.4.1). The second starts from the assumption that democratic leaders face a higher risk of being removed from office when they lose in conflict (section 3.2.4.2).

3.2.4.1 Contracting advantages

The contractualist approach (Lipson, 2003) also relies on the rationalist theory of war. Claiming indifference on preferences, it focuses on democratic institutions. These account for democracy's singular capability

to enter reliable contracts which stabilize the mutual relationships: the security dilemma is eliminated by a sustainable, agreed solution to whatever conflicts exist in a democratic dyad. Lasting contracts, in addition, help realize positive mutual gains, enhancing the commitment on both sides for continued cooperation.

This capability hinges on four institutional attributes of democracies (Lipson, 2003, pp. 4–7, 11–15):

- Transparency allows partners insights into the 'inner fabric' of democratic deliberations and creates trust in the sincerity of democratic leaders' public statements.
- Audience costs: foreign policy commitments by leaders (for example, support for treaties) cannot be retracted without a loss of face (reputation).
- Constitutional procedures – notably ratification – bind parliaments and opposition to a given international legal instrument.
- Continuity in democratic institutions means that the successor government remains bound by obligations undertaken by its predecessors.

These four attributes, and they are not available to the same degree and certainly not in combination in non-democracies, constitute democracies' unique capacity to be reliable partners.

On closer inspection, doubts arise as to the claimed causality that links these institutional attributes to the stated effects:

- Transparency can only convey to the outside what exists on the inside. It serves a pacifying purpose only if and when the transparent preferences are peaceful.
- Audience costs can be neutralized if the democracy in question is of the charismatic type, that is, if the leader commands a high degree of personal support and loyalty among the electorate, based on his perceived extraordinary personal qualities, as did de Gaulle as President of France; he was able to withdraw from NATO's military organization (the Alliance's headquarters were then located in Paris) while even gaining in public opinion at the same time. Also, democratic leaders can point to the *rebus sic stantibus* principle, arguing that the circumstances under which their country signed a certain contract have profoundly changed and that the legal obligation no longer applies. Audience costs would be nil in either case.

- Constitutional mechanisms, while powerful, remain a reliable guarantor of existing undertakings only as long as the preferences that led to them remain stable as well. Changed preferences exert a powerful pressure to withdraw from a treaty or ask for a renegotiation, as the case of the ABM treaty shows.[18]
- Continuity in institutions is only a guarantor of continuity of policy if the political parties compete for the dominant position at the *centre* of the political spectrum. Where politics are *polarized*, governmental changes can lead to fundamental policy shifts, including the breach of, or withdrawal from, treaties. The Bush administration's renouncing of the ABM treaty, as one example, demonstrated the effect of polarized politics. Autocracies with very stable bureaucratic rule may be better candidates for reliability by continuity (cf. Peceny and Butler, 2004; Senese, 1999).

All four attributes are thus much less certain mechanisms of contractual reliability than the theory implies. In fact, they function in the proposed direction only on the basis of existing and stable preferences for peace and cooperation. In Charles Lipson's work itself, the language is revealing in this regard (emphases added):

> *Risk aversion, if it really does drive democratic decisions*, is important because it opens a wider range of mutually profitable bargains short of war. (Lipson, 2003, p. 161)
>
> Constitutional procedures, *plus fairly stable voter preferences*, help lock in promises from one president or prime minister to the next. (2003, p. 170)
>
> They can make major tenable long-term commitments and *effectively signal that they do not pose security threats*. (2003, p. 174)
>
> *State preferences might change*, unravelling old bargains and making new ones difficult. All rationalist theories, including mine, make the simplifying assumption that underlying state preferences are constant. (2003, p. 178)
>
> The contracting explanation applies only to constitutional democracies, not to all states that elect leaders. Illiberal democracies, lacking a variety of constitutional protections, may threaten peace in two basic ways: Opaque procedures and *expansionist goals that leave little room for agreement*. (2003, p. 179)

Peaceful *preferences*, not institutions, are at the root of this theory's causal assumptions. They all hinge on the validity of the 'rationalist

theory of war'. As shown above, this theory falsely assumes there to be uniform preferences across states: if, however, state preferences vary in reality, then these varying preferences must be included in the theoretical framework when developing theories of democratic peace. Put differently, democratic institutions then transport very different impulses towards war and peace into decision-making. The contractual theory on democratic peace suffers not only from a certain indeterminacy in the causal mechanism it presumes exists; it is also flawed in its basic assumptions about the causes of war. Therefore, it cannot account for the vast variance in the use of force by democracies towards non-democracies.

3.2.4.2 Risks of democratic leaders

According to Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and colleagues' rationalist–institutionalist explanation, one single institutional difference between democracies and autocracies explains the separate democratic peace (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 1999, 2003, Ch. 6; cf. Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman, 1992). The argument runs as follows: because they need majority support of the active electorate to stay in power, political leaders in democracies need to generate and maintain larger winning coalitions than autocrats. While autocratic leaders can – even when faced with military defeat – compensate their relatively small constituencies with side payments, the political survival of democratic leaders hinges on successful policies. Audience costs in democracies add to this effect (Prins, 2003; Gelpi and Griesdorf, 2001; Huth and Allee, 2002, Ch. 4). Commitment or reciprocation to a challenge are hard to revoke without losing votes. For this reason, challenges and reciprocation by democracies serve as very strong signals to their opponents. It follows that democratic leaders will initiate war or mount a challenge only if it seems almost certain they will win or prevail (Gelpi and Griesdorf, 2001, p. 642; Bueno de Mesquita et al., 1999, p. 801). But, once engaged in war 'democratic leaders try harder [. . .] than do autocrats', because defeat is generally associated with subsequent deposition (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 1999, p. 799). Thus, democrats will invest an 'extra effort' in war, making democracies both reluctant aggressors and unattractive targets.

The solution of a game assuming two countries in dispute is clear-cut: democratic leaders generally 'prefer to negotiate when they do not anticipate military success'. While 'autocrats do not try as hard in war' and, thus, 'make attractive targets for democracies', the conditions for a war between democracies are hard to imagine (Bueno de Mesquita et al.,

1999, p. 799). Both democracies need to be almost sure to succeed, though both know that the other side will invest all its available resources in waging war. In all possible confrontations between two democracies the inferior state will give in before the dispute can escalate into war. The separate democratic peace results as the unintentional consequence of a single causal mechanism, namely deterrence, engendered by one institutional feature of democracy, the need for larger winning coalitions in domestic politics.

Despite its internal coherence, some basic propositions of this institutionalist model are in sharp contrast to reality. Firstly, the claim that for democratic leaders the costs of a lost war generally exceed those borne by autocratic leaders is untenable. Democratic leaders lose office more often,[19] whereas dictators may manage to stay in power. But if not, they fall beyond the retirement-plus-pension state of ousted democratic leaders; their fall may be as deep as the graveyard (cf. Rosato, 2003, p. 594; Desch, 2002, p. 23). Bueno de Mesquita et al. assume a preference scale that is standardized between political leaders of all systems regardless of type. That on this scale a 0.75 probability of being removed from office should rank lower than a 0.29 probability of the loss of life, freedom or property does not exactly correspond to the common-sense notion of a preference order within a rationalist framework (probabilities taken from Rosato, 2003, p. 594). The preoccupation with political survival (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003) obscures the fact that most people value physical survival higher. On the other hand, victory in war does not guarantee a grateful electorate at the next ballot, as Winston Churchill had to learn after 8 May 1945, and George H. W. Bush in 1991. The dyadic-institutionalist assumption on the democracy/autocracy difference is wrong in this regard.

Consequently, the assumption that democratic governments will generally invest maximal resources to win an ongoing war, while autocratic governments will not, appears equally wrong. Here, we point only to one salient case: US war efforts after 1945. In comparison to the Second World War, when close to 50 per cent of the GNP went into the US war effort, the US was subsequently prepared to abstain from winning some important wars without coming even close to that figure. In the Korea War – which ended in a draw – the defence budget lingered around the 10 per cent mark. In Vietnam, the level was lower than that in Korea, even though the US lost that war (on budgetary data, cf. IISS, annually).[20]

Thirdly, powerful democracies do not in general resort to threatening weaker democracies. Case studies of disputes between democracies show that often the more powerful state backs down to avoid escalation. The 'cod wars' between the United Kingdom and small Iceland – which does not even have a navy but only a tiny coastguard – are a case in point (Hellmann and Herborth, 2004). In democratic dyads, the distribution of power is a factor far less influential on the outcome of the conflict than in other dyads, notably in the early stages of a conflict when democracies settle most of their conflicts peacefully (Huth and Allee, 2002, Chs 7–9).[21] Power distribution is much more important at the stage of military escalation when democracies meet almost exclusively non-democracies (Huth and Allee, 2002, Ch. 9).

Fourthly, if Bueno de Mesquita's argument were valid, we should find traces of the risk calculus in the deliberations of governments, and in public debate in those democracies that were involved in a militarized dispute with another democracy (the 'near misses') or that were parties to the small number of wars which are counted by some as possible exceptions to the 'democratic peace' statistics. However, in the studies dealing with such cases the ascription of enhanced military risk to the democratic system of the potential enemy is conspicuously absent; this also applies to older cases where internal governmental sources have become available (Elman, 1997; Owen, 1994; Layne, 1994; Hellmann and Herborth, 2004).[22]

Fifthly, a carefully and coherently deduced dyadic institutionalist approach does not even correspond to the data. For if autocrats risk less in war, logically they should be more likely both to challenge and to reciprocate. Democratic leaders are very reluctant to challenge and reciprocate unless they are certain of victory and have signalled their preferences clearly. Additionally, while democracies' unwillingness to enter a difficult fight may lead non-democratic states to *pretend resolve*, once the decision to *really enter war* is concerned, any state will be more likely to target or to reciprocate an autocratic regime as compared to a democratic one (because the former does not invest as much in war as does the latter). Thus, we would expect autocracies to be considerably more warlike than democracies, and the frequency of armed conflict to rise as we move from democratic dyads to mixed dyads and then to autocratic dyads. In fact there are some, albeit relatively minor, differences between the general warlikeness of democracies and autocracies, and we find mixed dyads to be either equally or even more warlike than autocratic dyads (cf. Russett and Oneal, 2001, pp. 114–15). The fact that

this version of dyadic institutionalist theory ostensibly fits the data is a result of a flawed deduction, not of a correct theory.

Thus, the institutionalist model cannot offer an account that explains democratic peace. Neither the idea of domestic deterrence (for example, that democratic leaders face especially high costs in the event of military defeat) nor the concept of international deterrence (for example, that democracies are mutually peaceful because they are especially unattractive targets) can be sustained. There are no data to support a hypothesis that can be cogently derived from the theoretical assumptions.

3.3 An alternative explanatory model: dyadic, constructivist, structurationist

To account for the three main empirical findings mentioned in the beginning it is necessary to go 'beyond the separate peace' (MacMillan, 2003). Democratic features, and liberal norms in particular, shape democracies' interactions not only with their fellow democracies but in mixed dyads as well (cf. MacMillan, 1996). However, these latter interactions vary in accordance with the respective temporally or spatially specific solution to the ambiguity of democratic norms. The theoretical challenge is to account for both, namely uniformity (the general avoidance of inter-democratic war) *and* diversity (the complex sample of incidences of war/peace in mixed dyads). To this end we propose a genuine dyadic perspective that regards the ostensibly monadic causal mechanisms of democratic peacefulness to be fundamentally ambivalent.

3.3.1 Explaining the 'separate peace': a dyadic-structurationist framework

All dyadic explanations rest on assumptions about the interacting units. But whereas monadic explanations assume democratic features to be inherently linked to peaceful behaviour (Geis, 2001, p. 286), a genuine dyadic theory has to argue that the causal mechanisms leading from the independent variable 'democracy' to the decision on war or peace (the dependent variable) are contingent on 'the other', that is on whether the interacting unit is another democracy or not. Democratic peacefulness, then, is an emergent attribute of the interaction.

This dyadic approach uses Anthony Giddens's concept of structure (Giddens, 1984) to free the constructivist explanation of democratic peace from its monadic premises.[23] In line with what Giddens's theory states for all social structures, we argue that democracy's unit attributes – as specific sets of rules and resources – do not determine, but constrain

and enable agency (that is foreign policy). Hence, the features of democracy – as embodied in the structural and normative explanations of democratic peace (Maoz and Russett, 1993; Russett and Oneal, 2001) – and the outcome ('no war') are not directly connected through clear-cut causal mechanisms. Instead, these are assumed to operate only by their *structuring* democracies' war/peace decisions. Democratic governments are indeed *constrained* from waging war as they have to meet a set of 'legitimizing requirements'; but the fact that there are wars that can be presented as legitimate *enables* the recourse to external violence. It is only in inter-democratic relations that war is reliably excluded.

Both utilitarian and institutional mechanisms operate only to *structure* democratic war/peace deliberations but do not *determine* the results. Kant's utilitarian argument that the citizens will 'have great hesitation' in taking upon themselves all the costs of war (Kant, 1795, First Definitive Article), implies that war in democracies is constrained (by its costs) as well as enabled (if the benefits are greater than the costs). As for democratic institutions, these constrain the discretionary power of a war-prone executive, but there is no reason to think that procedural constraints in themselves 'normally' impede democratic wars unless the institutional argument is complemented by assumptions about the preferences held by the population and its representatives. The burden of 'causing' democratic peacefulness is thus left to the normative argument.

However, liberal-democratic norms prove to be fundamentally ambiguous (cf. Müller, 2004b). On the one hand, there exists the moral aversion of the 'children of enlightenment' to killing fellow human beings in other countries, people who bear the same natural rights, and are equally endowed with reason. For Kant himself, human rights could only be realized in a constitutional state of law if and when the law was imposed on the citizens by the citizens themselves – the self-rule system of democracy. Kant admitted that in a non-democracy, where some rule of law existed, the seeds were sown for future evolution, and no violent attempt to overthrow that political system would be justified (Kant, 1798). It is the same trust in the evolution of behaviour based on self-interest that leads him to believe that states (not only democracies) will found the Pacific Federation, and that this federation will grow until it comprises every state in the world. In Kant's argument, the path leads from self-interest to the creation of institutions; these institutions help humans to discover the basic moral reasoning on which these institutions are founded and to arrive, finally, at the voluntary implementation of these moral laws. In the end, moral laws are not imposed on the basis of the necessity of suffering and self-interest, but accepted by free

will, based on the insights of reason (Kant, 1784, 1795). In this perspective, Kant argues for an absolute prohibition of war (Kant, 1798, Conclusion).

In the complete absence of law, however, the imposition of legal rules from the outside would be advisable and justified; otherwise, the starting point for the desired moral evolution would never be reached. In the same vein, Kant claims that states have all rights, including the use of force, against an 'unjust enemy'. The 'unjust enemy' is one whose principles are incompatible with reasoned universal law (Kant, 1798, paragraph 60); the term is strikingly similar to the notion of the 'rogue state' (Klare, 1995; Litwak, 1994). Whether a state still comes under the category of 'authoritarian, but law-ruled' or is seen already as an 'unjust enemy' is largely a matter of interpretation. The impulse to abstain from killing other people can thus be turned into the impulse to save other people because their lives and happiness are endangered and their rights trodden underfoot by autocrats who obey no law and respect no human rights.[24] The normative imperative on war and peace deriving from liberal thought is thus not deterministic, but bifurcated (cf. Huntley,1996; Buchan, 2002; Müller, 2004b; see also Jaberg, 2002, Ch. 6)

Michael Doyle has noted that democracy (or liberalism) does not exclude war as an option in foreign policy. 'Liberal wars are only fought for popular, liberal purposes' (Doyle, 1983a, p. 230). Here, both dimensions of the structuring effect are obvious. In democracies, war needs to be legitimized by purposes compatible with democratic norms (and they need to be legitimized through the established democratic procedures). Thus, the range of possible democratic wars is constrained. On the other hand, if a democratic state (or government) succeeds in making the liberal purpose of the military undertaking plausible, war is not only possible but can be further driven by its own moral impetus (cf. Peceny, 2000, p. 2; MacMillan, 2004a, p. 187). In this sense, and a decade before the 1990s trend towards 'humanitarian intervention', Doyle argued that 'liberalism does appear to exacerbate intervention against weak nonliberals and hostility against powerful nonliberal societies' (Doyle, 1983b, p. 337).[25] But democratic peace theory has not identified the roots for the liberal inclination to condone the use of force in the *core political theory* of liberalism.

The bifurcation can also derive from the *externalization* of liberal norms. The democratic peace proposition rests on the idea that democracy provides a framework for the peaceful settlement of conflicts, which it tends to externalize if possible (see Maoz and Russett, 1993, p. 625; Risse-Kappen, 1994b, p. 179). Yet no democratic system generally rules out the use of force in its internal affairs. The democratic state still possesses the monopoly on the legitimate use of force. Using force is

sanctioned within the realm of the legitimate, and prohibited beyond the bounds of that realm. The assumed preference of citizens in a democracy to live in a peaceful society and the assumption that democratic institutions channel this preference into political decisions constitutes an argument 'only' for establishing certain rules *structuring* the use of this legitimate force (constitutional state, rule of law, police law and procedural regulations).

The same holds true for the normative argument, the moral aversion of democratic citizens to violence. This does not result in the absolute exclusion of internal force from the realm of legitimate political behaviour but in certain normative requirements being established for the use of 'democratic violence'. Force can be regarded as justified if individuals excessively depart from the range of socially accepted behaviour. These normative requirements are generally not restricted to situations of pure self-defence. The use of force to stop a head of the household from violating members of his/her family is compatible with liberal-democratic norms and would stand up in court. However, democratic violence is subject to the rule of appropriateness. In this regard, the democratic state relies on two complementary dimensions of legitimization (Przeworski, 1991; Habermas, 1992) which are *structuring*, *inter alia*, the use of its monopoly on force: the decision to resort to force requires its procedural accordance with institutional requirements (legality) *and* its substantial justification with reference to democratic values (legitimacy).

The interaction of procedural and substantial 'legitimizing requirements' means that the use of force by democratic governments is structured (constrained *and* enabled) in *specific democratic ways*. Our argument is *not* that it is *only democratic leaders* who have to legitimize their war/peace decisions. Yet, what is specific about democracies is their obligatory reference to liberal norms and their 'verification' through democratic procedures. In this sense, democratic governments cannot successfully establish a case for a war against another democracy. It is simply not possible to picture a fellow democracy credibly as 'unjust enemy'. The specific 'limit of escalation' (Risse-Kappen, 1994b, p. 166) or 'barrier to violence' (Rummel, 1983, p. 28) in democratic dyads is constituted by the limited range of legitimate reasons for war (Maoz and Russett, 1993, p. 266). These limits are not set by democratic norms, interests and/or institutions that lead *generally* or *normally* to peaceful behaviour but by a specific democratic 'enclosure' of war which will exclude its use against other democracies while enabling and under certain circumstances even driving wars against non-democracies.

The need to legitimize war with regard to basic liberal goals does not imply that individuals, interest groups or entire governments in democracies may not have other reasons for propagating military action abroad.[26] However, we can abstain here from investigating the implications of such (non-liberal) motivations: if the recourse to *liberalism* is required in order to persuade the citizens to decide in favour of military action, then it is these liberal norms that are the *public motivation* for the state and thus decisive for the democracy to resort to force – as opposed to the *private motivations* of the war entrepreneurs.

'Democratic wars' can only be directed against 'illegitimate regimes' (or 'outlaw states', as John Rawls [1999] puts it) as they are to be justified as ultimately in the interest of the country to be attacked.[27] Thus, the external use of force by democracies will be either informed by legal rules (for example, international law) or directed against actors who can be presented as violating such common rules with the goal being to maintain, create anew, or re-establish, the rule of law and peace at the national and/or international level.[28] Given that it is difficult to decide which regimes are to be considered 'illegitimate', and as at the international level there is no authoritative arbiter, democratic states continue to have a remarkable scope for discretion.

The discussed structuring of democratic war can account for the puzzle of the separate democratic peace and is compatible with the much less uniform democratic behaviour vis-à-vis non-democracies. This diversity in democratic foreign behaviour highlights the other pole of structuration theory (now that we have so far analysed the normative structure that constrains and enables), namely agency. If the structure allows for various courses of action under specific circumstances, then which particular course is taken depends on the attributes and activities of agents.

3.3.2 'Beyond the separate peace': a differentiating view on democracies

On the basis of the bifurcation of liberal thinking on peace and war, we can construct two ideal-type orientations of democracies in order to account for the variation in their behaviour towards non-democracies[29]:

- The 'militant' orientation adopts a policy of violent regime change to bring liberation, law and rights to suppressed fellow human beings;
- The 'pacifist' variant rejects the use of force other than for reasons of self-defence because war/intervention always means taking innocent life and thereby irreversibly violating the natural, inalienable rights

> of humans, and because the possibility of peaceful evolution is innate to states with even rudimentary systems of law.[30]

Policies embraced by the first type would confront non-democracies harshly, deny the existence of common interests, and would mean refusing to work in common international organizations or to establish shared rules of international law; any self-constraint entailed by submitting to constraining rules would then be seen both as illegitimate and dangerous in the face of non-democratic 'unjust enemies' (Brock, 2002). In contrast, the second type would seek to create common legal ground and to work through international organizations in order to trammel the non-democracies through an intricate cobweb of relationships, soften them up, thereby helping them evolve into a democratic state and into the rule of law. President Ronald Reagan's approach to the Soviet Union – the end of arms control, the intended scrapping of the Conference on Security and Cooperation, the effort to strangle the Soviet economy, and the arms race driven by the Strategic Defence Initiative (Czempiel, 1989) – came very close to the ideal type of a 'militant' democratic policy, the military option excluded only by the nuclear stalemate. German Ostpolitik during the same period pursued a strategy of 'change through rapprochement', lent support to all arms control approaches, struggled to maintain the CSCE, worked to expand economic relations with the East, and was not prepared to invest more in defence than immediate national security would require (Genscher, 1995); it was therefore a good example of the 'pacifist' type of democratic foreign policy. The alternatives came to the fore even more succinctly during the Iraq crisis of 2002–3 (cf. Larres, 2003; Müller, 2004c).

The bifurcation between 'militant' and 'pacifist' democracies defines the twin poles of ideal types at the ends of a line consisting of diverse mixtures of both types. Since both versions are legitimate children of liberal ideology, both have their followers in all democracies. Pluralism and open debate will cause them to exist side by side. Democracies at the centre of this ideological line may waver among the contradictory orientations from situation to situation. The more we move towards the two poles, the more fixed and long-lasting the orientations we find.[31]

We can thus construe there being more transient and more permanent orientations of democracies towards one or the other ideal type. In the more transient cases, domestic coalitions holding either ideology are sooner or later removed from power by the electorate. The coalition change will, in most cases, result from domestic rather than

foreign policy concerns; the reorientation towards a more pacifist or more militant attitude in foreign policy, then, is a random product of domestic political discourse.

In the more permanent cases, one of the orientations has become more deeply rooted in the political culture of a country and has shaped the identity of the democracy in depth; the opposite orientation may continue to exist only in small circles at the margins of political discourse. Such a 'structural' pacifist or militant orientation is more stable than in the case of shifting ideological coalitions, because all the relevant political forces in the country hold the same ideology, and a change in the governing coalition has no fundamental impact on external policy behaviour; Austria or Finland, for example, may represent the 'pacifist pole' at the one end of the line. Beyond strictly peacekeeping missions, these countries have not participated in military operations for decades. Germany's identity as a 'civilian power' might approximate, but not completely fit, such a more permanent 'pacifist' orientation (Katzenstein, 1997; Berger, 1998; Duffield, 1999; Harnisch and Maull, 2001). Its military engagements in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan point to the possibility for changes even in ostensibly 'structural' orientations. It shows the inevitable militant-liberal content even in an avowedly pacifist culture. Afghanistan was seen as a case of self-defence; Bosnia and Kosovo were interpreted in (contested) historical analogy to 'Auschwitz', the German-induced genocide that, according to the civil culture established in post-war Germany, must never be repeated again. However, unlike the United States or the United Kingdom, Kosovo, as a military intervention without a UN mandate, was strictly defined as an exception and not as a precedent for future military action (Maull, 2001).

Even a largely pacifist democracy may be willing to intervene militarily in violently escalating situations of complete state failure or in cases of genocide demanding humanitarian 'emergency help' (*Nothilfe*).[32] Hence democratic wars that can be presented as humanitarian interventions in a failed state or as 'emergency help' interventions, for example against genocide, can be expected to gain support among broad sections of those favouring the pacifist orientation as well. In contrast, democratic wars that aim to secure the international order or to enforce international law (world order wars) should be largely rejected even among moderately pacifist orientations. Finally, a regime-change war, and that was the way Iraq 2003 was presented by parts of the US administration, would find support only among hard-core advocates of the militant orientation.[33]

Figure 3.1 illustrates our theoretical argument. The *y*-axis shows the political culture of the democracies ranging from extremely militant to extremely pacifist. The *x*-axis lines up potential dyad partners for democracies from fully democratic to genocidal-totalitarian systems. The curve depicts the point at which the democracies would use force vis-à-vis their dyad partners. This curve first lies at zero (for states clearly perceived as democracies), starts slowly as only the most militant democracies would consider force to remedy smaller violations of democratic values abroad, assumes a stronger gradient as human rights abuses and other breaches of international legal rules would force a steadily higher proportion of democracies to join the militants in stopping the rule-breaker by force, and peters out finally as it reaches the realm of those radically pacifist democracies that reject any application of force other than in self-defence.

3.3.3 Compatibility with the data on democracies' foreign conduct

How would this differentiated dyadic approach account for the data on democratic peace? We assume pacifist democracies do not enter militarized disputes or wars with any other country except if they are attacked. We expect militant democracies to behave peacefully towards



Figure 3.1 The democratic war possibility curve

other fellow democracies, whether they are pacifist or militant, since the motivation to liberate suppressed human beings would not arise, and any attempt by war entrepreneurs to persuade the democratic public would fail.[34] They would, however, be prepared to initiate military conflict with non-democracies, notably those which are particularly repressive (or dangerous) if and when they see the opportunity of regime (or, at least, significant policy) change to come at an acceptable cost.

Depending on the distribution of democracies in the militant/pacifist continuum, we might see democracies, on the statistical average, as being as bellicose as non-democracies, a bit more bellicose or a bit less so.[35] We would not expect democracies to show completely peaceful behaviour on the statistical average. At this theoretical level, more precise predictions are not possible; this does not mean that the theory is immune to falsification. Hypotheses about the inclination of democracies *in a given period* could be made with more precision – and thus falsified – if a thorough analysis of the prevailing political discourses and the orientation of ruling coalitions establishes the distribution of more militant and more pacifist democracies in a given universe of democracies. But two clear-cut cases would falsify our approach: the inception of inter-democratic war, and the launching of war against a non-democracy by a democratic government without legitimizing this act publicly with reference to a liberal purpose.

Generally our dyadic constructivist approach is compatible with the basic empirical data: the 'separate peace', on the one hand, and the reality and diversity of democratic war engagement, on the other. We have shown why 'democracies differentiate between kinds of governments in their use of force' and specified the 'different rules [that] apply in democracies' interactions with others like themselves than in their interactions with nondemocracies' (Kegley and Hermann, 2002, pp. 17–18).

Based on this argument of 'different rules' operating in inter-democratic relations, the democratic propensity to form durable alliances and organizations (cf. Reed, 1997; Lipson, 2003; Ray, 2003, p. 221) becomes understandable. It is the inter-democratically shared feature of a selective preclusion of war against one another which democracies mutually perceive and which paves the way for the historical process of learning the rules of the separate democratic peace which enable inter-democratic cooperation and organization (cf. Risse-Kappen, 1995a).

In this way, the reconstructed dyadic explanation can also account for a secondary complex of democratic peace research, namely that democratic dyads are less likely to become involved in serious militarized

disputes and display a greater propensity to peaceful conflict resolution (cf. Ray, 2003, p. 221). However, the empirical research on democratic escalation and negotiation practices remains indecisive on whether democracies more infrequently enter militarized escalation processes, but when they do then escalate these no less than non-democracies do (cf. Reed, 2000; Huth and Allee, 2002), or whether they are especially prone to switch from escalation to negotiation (cf. Dixon and Senese, 2002; Kegley and Hermann, 2002, p. 18). What is generally confirmed is only the barrier of escalation in joint democratic dyads 'that tends to stifle their evolution short of war' (Dixon and Senese, 2002, p. 567; cf. Kegley and Hermann, 2002, p. 18; Huth and Allee, 2002, pp. 273–5). This resembles the barrier of inter-democratic escalation processes as predicted by the dyadic-structurationist approach (see section 3.3.1). Yet, whereas Huth and Allee (2002, pp. 228–9) conclude that 'democratic dyads avoid war with each other over disputed territory [...] because they are more likely to settle disputes through mutual concessions in negotiated agreements', the dyadic constructivist approach would argue that it could just as well be the other way round. Democratic dyads are more likely to settle disputes through mutual concessions in negotiated agreements because they tend to avoid war. The mentioned barrier to escalation operates because each government knows it can hardly establish a case for inter-democratic war and that the other side is equally constrained; this mutual perception allows for the interactionist effect that paves the way for cooperative conflict resolution. In this way, the dyadic-structurationist approach is able to explain both phenomena of inter-democratic escalation processes: the reluctance of democratic pairs of states to enter into militarized conflict as well as the propensity to switch from escalation to negotiation when drawing nearer towards the brink of war.[36]

3.4 Conclusion

In this chapter, we have developed a typology to clearly identify different theoretical approaches. We have then demonstrated that, on closer inspection, all four types of explanations reveal weaknesses in terms of theoretical coherence and their ability to account for the data. We concluded by offering a structurationist reconstruction of the social constructivist approach that seems adequate to avoid these flaws.

On the one hand, this dyadic approach clarifies the rationale behind the general peacefulness of democratic dyads. We have argued that democracy constitutes the need for a twofold legitimization of political

decisions which results in a specific structuring of democratic foreign behaviour. Whereas democracies do not on principle rule out the use of violence (neither domestically nor internationally), wars against other democracies are excluded from the spectrum of possible democratic behaviour as they do not allow for simultaneous normative and procedural legitimization. Thus, the 'schizophrenic' behaviour of democracies as stated by the 'separate peace' is constituted by the openness of the democratic process the ambiguities of which as regards decisions for or against war only dissolve in democratic dyads. Empirically further research will have to detail the different 'legitimizing requirements' at the domestic and international levels and the consequences thereof for concrete war/no-war decisions.

On the other hand, by acknowledging that there are two fundamentally different liberal interpretations regarding the appropriate behaviour towards non-democracies we can account for the pronounced differences in democracies' external conduct. Depending on the relative strength of these liberal positions – that is to say their political culture – real world democracies find themselves on a spectrum ranging from 'pacifist' to 'militant'. Further empirical research should analyse those domestic discourses regarding decisions for or against war (cf. Müller, 2002b) to clarify the respective ratios of mixture, their determinants and consequences.

Notes

1. The authors would like to thank Nicole Deitelhoff, Matthias Dembinski, Anna Geis, Andreas Hasenclever, Philip Liste, John MacMillan, Niklas Schörnig and Wolfgang Wagner for comments on earlier versions of this chapter.
2. The general ideas can be found in Czempiel (1972, 1981, 1986) and Rummel (1979, 1983). All translations of German quotations are the authors' own; unless otherwise stated, emphases in quotations are in the original.
3. This *ceteris paribus* clause, however, implies that democracies actually in existence today can prove even more war-prone than their non-democratic counterparts. Western democracies today march at the forefront of the 'Revolution in Military Affairs', the United States in particular (Müller and Schörnig, 2002). The effect of this 'revolution' is to shorten war and to reduce casualties to a historically unprecedented low. The conditions under which citizens might opt for, rather than against, war are thus currently met. For today's democracies, dominating international society, rational cost–benefit calculations alone lead to war more easily than ever and, supposedly, more easily than for non-democracies assuming all else remains equal.
4. Czempiel tries to meet this problem by employing another – if independently operating – Kantian factor (Czempiel, 1996, p. 98): the 'pacific union'.

As democracies tend to cooperate, to organize themselves and to enlarge the zone of democracies (peacefully!) they abolish the security dilemma between them (1996, p. 95). By contrast, democracies' interdependence and cooperation vis-à-vis small non-democracies are relatively marginal (1996, p. 79). Hence, the combination of low national democraticness and little international connectedness allows for the democratic wars against non-democracies. However, obviously interdependence and cooperation are not exclusively connected with democratic features (even if democracies are thought to be especially likely to cooperate), and the assumption that wars are fought primarily between remote and independent states is unconvincing (Czempiel himself mentions the example of the US's use of force against Panama).

5. MacMillan explicitly discusses liberal, and not democratic, norms. For our purposes, this distinction is not significant as we use democracy in the specific liberal-democratic sense that dominates in the debate on democratic peace (cf. Doyle, 1983a, pp. 205ff.).
6. MacMillan (2003, p. 239) mentions 'a whole series of moral and practical dilemmas' that non-liberal regimes present to liberals. While the existence of these dilemmas 'does not of itself sanction the use of force' (2003, p. 239), they can serve as a liberal legitimization of war, as his reference to John Rawls's 'just war' (MacMillan, 1996, p. 288) demonstrates. Thus, while he convincingly points 'to a sense of normative restraint extending beyond the "democratic peace" and which is constitutive in nature' (1996, p. 288), this restraint can operate in quite diverse ways: in joint democratic dyads as compared to mixed dyads, and in different democracies regarding interactions with different non-democracies. Correspondingly, MacMillan explicitly rejects the notion of a general liberal peace-proneness: '. . .[L]iberalism is not generally or universally peace-prone and may legitimate and in certain circumstances even commission the use of force by states' (MacMillan, 2004a, p. 180). Nevertheless, he defends a monadic perspective by rather arbitrarily hypothesizing that '[l]iberals will have a higher threshold for the use of force than other actors on the mainstream spectrum', a proposition from which precisely all those instances are exempted that may falsify the hypothesis: '(with the possible exception of those instances when liberal norms may commission the use of force such as collective security operation or responses to mass human rights violations)' (2004a, p. 187).
7. Risse-Kappen himself points to the difficulties to establish functioning arms control during the Cold War; it was difficult, but it succeeded time and again, and helped in the end to overcome the security dilemma for good even before the Soviet Union would become a democracy by Western standards (Risse-Kappen, 1988).
8. This assumption is unconvincing on theoretical as well as empirical grounds. On the one hand, '[d]emocratic norms are compatible with a strategy of reciprocity in bargaining, and such a strategy does not encourage exploitation; it allows states to prepare adequately to defend their interests and to respond with force if attacked' (Rousseau et al., 1996, p. 515; cf. Huth, 1996, pp. 63–4). On the other hand, 'the evidence that liberals utilize force pre-emptively [. . .] remains thin' (MacMillan, 1996, p. 290; cf. Rousseau et al., 1996, p. 527).

9. Then, however, the solution of the security dilemma between democracies can hardly serve as the central mechanism establishing the inter-democratic peace: if several 'democratic wars' against non-democracies are evidently not caused by the security dilemma, then its absence cannot be sufficient to prevent wars in democratic dyads either.
10. Even in the case of the First World War, which is often quoted as the prime example for such an unwanted escalation, alternative interpretations point to cultural factors or political objectives that drove countries towards war quite apart from the security dilemma (Snyder, 1991; van Evera, 1984).
11. Owen qualifies this hypothesis of a 'democratic war motivation' with 'sometimes' (Owen, 1997, p. 122), and defines the situations in which the 'sometimes' does not apply, that is, in which democracies would not go to a missionary war against non-democracies in purely rationalist terms: 'Usually, they estimate that the costs of liberalizing another state are too high, often because the illiberal state is too powerful' (1997, pp. 124–5).
12. This theme of generally peaceful democracies somewhat forced to adopt non-democratic means by threatening non-democracies prevails in much of the so-called dyadic democratic peace literature (cf. Maoz and Russett, 1993, p. 625; Russett, 1993, p. 33; Russett and Oneal, 2001, p. 99, p. 115; Doyle, 1986, p. 1162).
13. Owen explicitly states that liberalism's 'means are liberty and toleration', 'forgoing coercion and violence' (Owen, 1994, p. 94).
14. 'Illiberal states [. . .] are viewed prima facie as unreasonable, unpredictable, and potentially dangerous' (Owen, 1994, p. 96). Kahl describes the democratic relations with non-democracies as characterized by uncertainty, anxiety, misunderstandings and misperceptions, resulting in a state of affairs where 'liberal states are likely to fear and distrust illiberal ones, aggravating the security dilemma' (Kahl,1999, p. 130).
15. For example, the US was seen by citizens in many Western countries as responsible for the war in Vietnam and thus as an aggressive power (Müller and Risse-Kappen, 1987). India was one of the staunchest critics of US foreign policy for decades as New Delhi found it too offensive, militaristic and, at times, threatening (cf. Perkovich, 1999, Ch. 7).
16. Apart from the problem of common standards for deciphering signals, the sheer noise of the open democratic debate may add to this difficulty (Rosato, 2003, p. 598).
17. Compare Huth (1996, p. 176): 'On the one hand, democratic norms favor compromise and flexibility in diplomacy, but democratic accountability to popular and elite opinion may also convince leaders that compromise is not a politically supportable position in a dispute in which the international adversary is portrayed as an aggressive opponent.'
18. Correspondingly, Michael Desch (2002, p. 31) emphasizes that 'the evidence supports only the more modest conclusion that democracies are no worse than other types of regimes in making "lasting commitments" '.
19. However, even this most basic assumption remains contentious in statistical terms: for example, Chiozza and Goemans (2003, p. 459) generally find that 'defeat does not affect the overall probability of losing office'.

20. Correspondingly, Michael Desch (2002) has demonstrated that both empirical and theoretical support for the assumption regarding a positive relation between democracy and victory rest on rather shaky ground.
21. For example, a statistical assessment of democracies' behaviour in international crises between 1918 and 1994 has demonstrated that in crises between democratic states 'the effect of relative capabilities evaporates' (Gelpi and Griesdorf, 2001, p. 644). Correspondingly, the strong positive influence of mutual democracy on international settlement procedures that Dixon and Senese's analysis of militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) between 1816 and 1992 has revealed was not disturbed by any 'preponderance exception', as Bueno de Mesquita et al. would expect (Dixon and Senese, 2002, p. 561).
22. As noted above (see section 3.2.4.1), in the cases of Saddam Hussein, Milošović and Osama Bin Laden no particular fear of democracy's determination to fight and win is detectable – quite the contrary.
23. For an adaptation of Giddens's theory for the study of international relations see Wendt (1987) and Dessler (1989).
24. For example, the 'liberal cultural norms of tolerance for self-determination' (Peceny, 1997, p. 416) can generally justify both war (to enforce the right of self-determination) and peace (respecting the right of self-determination). This indeterminacy dissolves when seen from the dyadic perspective: while the recourse to the norm of self-determination helps justify war against non-democracies, a war against another democracy is clearly violating this norm (cf. Doyle, 1986, p. 1162).
25. Compare Peceny (2000) on the Clinton administration policy towards Somalia, Haiti and Bosnia. Doyle clearly rejects the view that the peaceful behaviour reflects something like the 'nature' of democracy, while the 'dark side' of the separate democratic peace is merely a response to the features of non-democracies: 'Both tendencies are fundamentally rooted in the operation of liberalism within and across borders' (Doyle, 1983b, p. 343; cf. Doyle, 1997; MacMillan, 2004a, pp. 187, 200).
26. To be sure, 'democratic wars' need not at all be fought mainly for Doyle's liberal purposes; but a democratic government can only succeed in achieving the (procedurally) necessary political support for a (howsoever motivated) war if it makes (normatively) plausible its compatibility with some basic liberal goals, for example self-determination. Hence, the phenomenon that the presumption of utilitarian motivations ('war on oil') is usually part of the critique of democratic wars whereas the government has to deny egoistic motivations emphazising normative justifications (human rights, liberalization, democratization, international law). John Rawls makes this requirement of democratic wars perfectly clear when he argues that – from his liberal perspective – 'No state has a right to war in the pursuit of its *rational*, as opposed to its *reasonable*, interests' (Rawls, 1999, p. 91). Indeed, whether rational, reasonable or neither rational nor reasonable interests may dominate the agenda of a war-prone government, the democratic frame requires the presentation of the reasons of war as liberally justifiable.
27. The recent war against Afghanistan is a case in point. Although after 9/11 the legitimacy of the US-led attacks as acts of self-defence was almost

undisputed nationally as well as internationally (as an instance of procedural legitimacy on the international level under Article 51 of the UN Charter as acknowledged by UN Security Council Resolutions 1368 and 1373), the claim that the war had to be seen as directed only against the cruel Taliban regime and as – at least by the way – aimed at freeing the Afghan people (and especially the oppressed women) played an astonishing role in justifying the attack. In this sense, Mark Peceny – in his case study on the Spanish-American War – concludes that the American perception of Spain 'as being outside the moral realm of the pacific union' and of the war 'as a crusade to liberate Cuban "freedom fighters" from Spanish tyranny' was 'crucial for the legitimation of a war fought to enhance the power and wealth of the United States' (Peceny, 1997, p. 415).

28. Another, at least historically relevant, possibility is exemplified by the colonial or imperial war directed against people who are not perceived as endowed with equal rights (cf. MacMillan, 2004a, pp. 194ff.; Doyle, 1986). This, again, does not necessarily point to a distorted externalization of liberal-democratic norms as the long history of domestic discrimination of certain societal groups (for example women, ethnic minorities, slaves, the poor and illiterate, immigrants, children) in really existing democracies exemplifies.
29. It should be noted that we would expect a similar differentiation based on the political culture reigning in non-democracies, for example between 'predatory' revisionist/missionary autocracies and satisfied/self-contained autocracies, producing a similar variation of external behaviour.
30. To the extent that no ideal type pacifist democracy can be assumed to exist in the sense that the militant-liberal position is completely and for ever absent in national discourse, democratic war/peace deliberations and decisions can only be understood from a dyadic perspective.
31. The differentiation between militant and pacifist democracies bears some resemblance to Kegley and Hermann's distinction between 'crusader' and 'pragmatist' types of democratic leaders (cf. Kegley and Hermann, 2002, p. 25). However, we see no reason to confine this differentiation to leaders only, while populations remain to be seen as homogeneous and/or passive. Furthermore, Kegley and Hermann's distinguishing criteria (more or less ideological impetus) miss the point that categorically war-averse pacifism is as much an ideological (or fundamentalist) position as radically war-prone militant liberalism.
32. There were few if any pacifists categorically rejecting the intervention in Somalia, while the genocide proposition and the legitimation as 'help in need' was pivotal for enforcing and sustaining the decision to join the Kosovo War in largely pacifist Germany.
33. The most recent war on Iraq indeed is a case in point. Not even in the US would a militant-liberal position that sees the liberal purpose of 'democratizing Iraq' as justification enough for war have been able to gain majoritarian support; hence the complex combination of aims (self-defence against Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and/or against Saddam Hussein as an ally of Al Qaeda; help in need for the Iraqi population as oppressed by a brutal dictatorship).

34. Other than in the case of misperception (cf. Owen, 1994; Kahl, 1999). Although this inter-democratic peace indeed is a 'perceptual peace' rather than a 'perpetual peace' (Henderson, 2002, p. 6), it is 'an enduring social fact' of international relations (Peceny, 1997, p. 329, quoting Alexander Wendt). Yet, democratic peace is neither the automatic outcome of some general democratic features nor an ahistorical law (Barkawi and Laffey, 1999, p. 406). Since findings on the external behaviour of democracies point to evolution rather than to path-independent eternal truths (cf. Cederman, 2001; Senese, 1999), sensitivity to possible change over time appears to be in order. As the example of US policy during the Cold War demonstrates, it is absolutely possible that the democracy/non-democracy division becomes over-determined by temporarily stronger perceptual divisions (cf. Barkawi and Laffey, 1999, p. 422): if communism is per definition associated with autocracy, governments that appear to be(come) communist can – whether they may or may not be democratically elected – become 'legitimate' targets of aggressive containment policy. At the present time, the same could happen to a howsoever democratic regime that is perceived to support Islamist terrorism. Additionally, the perception that a majoritarian democracy oppresses an ethnic minority could lead to the loss of the 'presumption of democraticness' on the part of another democracy (especially if the former state's minority is the latter's majority); indeed, empirical studies have found that the existence of 'ethnic co-nationals' as minority groups increases the probability of escalation (cf. Huth and Allee, 2002; Huth, 1996).
35. Seen from this perspective, the ongoing empirical debate about whether the aggregate population of democracies since 1815 may be statistically slightly more or somewhat less war-prone as compared to non-democracies becomes entirely meaningless.
36. As inter-democratic conflicts of interest certainly exist and as the inception of escalation processes is not always avoided, the phenomenon of a 'barrier of escalation' – indicating a particular capability of democratic dyads to switch from escalatory to de-escalatory strategies (and, thus, quite the opposite of credible signalling) – is another serious blow to the audience costs/signalling argument. Similarly, Dixon and Senese's monadically based normative explanation of the 'barrier' in inter-democratic escalation processes (that emphasizes democracies' experience with mediation, negotiation and compromise at the domestic level) remains silent on why democracies should wait to employ their negotiation skills until war draws near and why they should not use them in mixed dyads as well.

4

Democratic Peace – Democratic War: Three Reasons Why Democracies Are War-prone

Christopher Daase

4.1 Introduction

I am afraid that Immanuel Kant might have been mistaken. In his treatise on 'Perpetual Peace' he claimed that democracies are peaceful because citizens, 'if their consent is required in order to decide that war should be declared (...) would be very cautious in commencing such a poor game, decreeing for themselves all the calamities of war' (Kant, 1795, pp. 12–13). Yet the events of early 2003 are pointing in another direction: a number of democracies argued for war and attacked Iraq while the majority of their citizens had spoken out against military action (Gallup, 2003). Such blatant discrepancy between government and citizens had not been foreseen in Kant's democratic peace plan. Thus, it is in need of explanation just like other anomalies and antinomies of the democratic peace proposition which indicate that democracies are not inherently peaceful (Müller, 2002a). The famous 'double finding', that democracies do not wage war against each other but are intolerant and sometimes bellicose towards non-democracies, is still unexplained (see Müller and Wolff, Chapter 3 in this volume).

The reason is that traditionally democratic peace and democratic war have been analysed as separate phenomena. Certainly, Michael Doyle stressed that 'the very constitutional restraint, shared commercial interests, and international respect for individual rights that promote peace among liberal societies can exacerbate conflicts between liberal and nonliberal societies' (Doyle, 1983b, pp. 324–5); and Thomas Risse seconded this by pointing to the Janus face of democracies which do not fight among themselves, but 'are frequently involved in militarized disputes and war with authoritarian regimes' (Risse-Kappen, 1995a, p. 492). However, the peacefulness of democratic dyads has been researched with a focus on

either single aspect, with a clear emphasis on the former. But to understand the relationship between democracy on the one hand and peace and war on the other in a more comprehensive way, the two findings have to be theoretically integrated. The theory of democratic peace remains incomplete if it does not explain the wars fought by democracies; and an explanation of democratic wars is deficient as long as it does not address their pacifying long-term effects among democratic states. In this sense, I will argue that democratic peace and democratic war are mutually constitutive.

This hypothesis postulates a causal relationship between democratic community building, which draws on shared institutions, common values and security cooperation on the one hand, and democratic belligerence vis-à-vis non-democratic states on the other, which is based on non-recognition, exclusion and enmity. A process seems to be at work in international relations that works similarly to the mechanism Charles Tilly described as the state-building process in Europe, in which internal pacification was achieved through external war-making (Tilly, 1975a, 1985). In the international system of today, an analogous mechanism is contributing to democratic community building and the renunciation of violence through coalition warfare and collective conflict management (Cederman, 2001). That means that the very same reasons that generate peaceful relations among democracies also provoke democracies to wage war against non-democracies.

If this is the case, it might be helpful to draw on explanations of democratic peace in order to generate hypotheses about 'democratic war' and to explain the war-proneness of democracies vis-à-vis non-democratic states. Throughout this, it is important not to focus on the reasons for the use of force alone but also to look at the way in which military means are applied. For Alexis de Tocqueville observed that changing reasons for war also lead to changing forms of warfare. Therefore, to explain democratic war, Tocqueville seems to be more helpful than Kant. While Kant focuses on the singular decision to go to war, Tocqueville takes the processes into account by which democracies engage in military action. By doing so, he is able to analyse some of the dynamics that create the democratic war puzzle. In his famous book on 'Democracy in America' he summarized his findings: 'There are two things which a democratic people will always find very difficult – to begin a war and to end it' (Tocqueville, 1840, p. 393).

In what follows, I will focus on three reasons why democracies might be peaceful to each other, but abrasive or even bellicose towards non-democracies. The first reason is an institutional one: domestic institutions

dampen conflicts among democracies but aggravate conflicts between democracies and non-democracies. The second reason is a normative one: shared social values and political ideals prevent wars between democracies but make wars between democracies and non-democracies more likely and savage. The third reason is a structural one: the search for safety encourages democracies to create security communities by renouncing violence among themselves but demands assertiveness against outsiders and the willingness to use military means if enlargement of that community cannot be achieved peacefully. To illustrate this, I will draw mainly on the United States as an example following a Tocquevillean tradition, but knowing that not all democracies behave in the same way or that the US is the only war-fighting democracy. It is clear that the hypotheses are first conjectures and that more case studies and quantitative tests are needed to reach more general conclusions.

4.2 Institutional reasons for democratic peace and war

Institutions play a major role in explaining democratic peace; to explain democratic *wars*, however, institutions have largely been ignored. This is so because in political science in general and international relations in particular, institutions are regarded – at least implicitly – as instruments promoting cooperation and peace (Deutsch et al., 1957; Krasner, 1983; Keohane, 1989; Kratochwil, 1989). In many instances this certainly is the case. Democratic institutions guarantee that governmental power is tamed and checked by its citizens through frequent elections; bureaucratic checks and balances render decision-making processes transparent, professional and pluralistic; decentralized and fragmented governmental structures prevent hasty decisions on matters of peace and war (Crepaz et al., 2000; Reynolds, 2002). However, all these institutions work particularly well in favour of conflict prevention and accommodation if two democracies interact. If a democracy faces a non-democratic state, the same institutions might contribute to conflict escalation and the outbreak of war.

Elections are a case in point. Regularly held general, free and fair elections guarantee the accountability of democratic governments and thus curtail the execution of political power (Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman, 1992; Hagan, 1993). As long as a chance exists that a government can be voted out of office, this government will take public attitudes towards foreign affairs and the use of force into account. Kant as well as Tocqueville assumed for that reason that democracies have a natural reluctance to use force since the political future of those in power is directly linked to a successful war outcome.

The risk averseness of democratic leaders is empirically well-founded. The possibility of being ousted from government and the existence of an opposition that exploits anti-war sentiments pose a political threat (Levy and Mabe, 2004). Democratic leaders run the risk of losing elections if they lead their countries into wars that cannot be won (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 1992; Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson, 1995). However, this pacifying effect of democratic elections does not work in a consistent way, but rather in a cyclical fashion: in periods prior to elections, democracies tend to be peaceful, while in periods following elections they are statistically more prone to begin a war or to be attacked. This supports the assumption that democracies are peaceful when the relative impact of public opinion on government policy is biggest (Gaubatz, 1991, 1999).

However, there is a contradictory effect as well. Democratic governments are tempted to use military violence prior to elections if their public esteem is in decline and if they must fear not being re-elected (Ostrom and Job, 1986; Russett, 1990; Mintz and Russett, 1992; Mintz and Geza, 1993). In doing so, they count on the 'rally round the flag' effect, which is usually of short duration but long enough to make the public forget economic misery or governmental misbehaviour in order to influence tight elections results in favour of the incumbent. This diversionary effect of warfare is especially attractive to democracies since they have no other means at their disposal to diffuse discontent or suppress internal conflict. Therefore, the use of military force for diversionary purposes is generally 'a pathology of democratic systems' (Gelpi, 1997, p. 280).

It is worth noting that the internal effect of external confrontation is the more positive for a democratic government the shorter and more successful the war and the more authoritarian the enemy. Democracies, therefore, tend to wage war primarily against weaker powers, and they mobilize more funds for their war effort than non-democratic regimes. In addition, they try to delegitimize the enemy not only to secure public support for the use of force, but also to maximize the domestic gain of defeating an 'evil' enemy (see Geis, Chapter 7 in this volume). Where the demonization of the opponent is not easy to achieve because it is democratically elected, and where the democratic government must expect equally robust war efforts by the regime attacked, a military assault is unlikely. Diversionary military action of democracies is therefore a potential option only against authoritarian states.

Therefore, what can be observed is a causal mechanism that works both ways: elections help to reduce the willingness of democracies to

engage in open conflict with other democracies, while the same elections tend to increase democracies' willingness to use force against non-democracies. Consequently, elections are not only causes of democratic peace but also catalysts of democratic war.

Similar observations can be made with regard to other domestic institutions usually described as 'checks and balances'. Divided powers, shared government and inter-ministerial cooperation guarantee transparency, accountability and pluralism in democratic foreign policy decision-making. It is therefore argued that democratic governments are more constrained in waging war than non-democracies. But this again applies mainly to democratic dyads, not to mixed ones where democracies face non-democratic states. In such cases the same institutional provisions that prevent conflict escalation between democracies may indeed amplify and extend conflicts between democracies and non-democracies.

The complexity and fragmentation of democratic decision-making have a pacifying effect on conflicts only as long as no acute state of emergency exists and routine decisions are employed. In crisis situations, however, the framework for decision-making changes drastically (Holsti, 1979). Pluralism is abandoned and decision-making is transferred to closed circles in order to maintain the 'capacity to act' under stress. It is well known from psychological studies, that such small decision-making groups are prone to misperceptions and willing to make risky choices (Janis, 1982; Vertzberger, 1998). The institutions designed to control the US executive branch in times of war – in particular the War Powers Resolution – have thus a paradox effect in times of crisis: they allow the President to extend his room for manoeuvre and to decide on the use of force irrespective of the war powers constitutionally granted to Congress (Schlesinger, 1989).

The resolution authorizing the use of force in the 'war against terrorism' in 2001 is a good example. While in the run-up to this decision some members of Congress favoured an official declaration of war against Afghanistan and others called for an entitlement within the framework of the War Powers Resolution, a compromise was struck that conveys:

> That the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons. (Joint Resolution, 2001)

The last sentence in particular, in which the *prevention* of new terrorist acts is stressed, provides large leeway for the executive to extend military actions in time and space. The similarity to the notorious Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, which marked the beginning of the escalation of military action in Vietnam 1964, is striking. Then the President was authorized 'to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against forces of the United States *and to prevent further aggression*'.[1] With the *Authorization for Use of Military Force Resolution* of 14 September 2001, the Congress effectively suspended its legislative right to declare war and its duty to control the executive. White House press secretary Ari Fleischer declared this to be a natural thing: 'The way our nation is set up, and the way the Constitution is written, wartime powers rest fundamentally in the hands of the executive branch. It's not uncommon in time of war for a nation's eyes to focus on the executive branch and its ability to conduct the war with strength and speed' (*International Herald Tribune*, 21 November 2001). Uncommon, however, is the fact that the President is granted the right to decide single-handedly whether to extend military action to more states or into other regions. For in the 'war on terrorism' it is impossible to decide where one war ends, for example in Afghanistan, and another war starts, for example in Iraq or Iran.

Not always is it possible to create such strong political consensus on military action. Where democratic institutions do pose constraints on the use of force, governments have tried to circumvent them. American administrations have managed to sidestep constitutional provisions by waging war – even against democratic regimes – clandestinely (Forsythe, 1992; Isenberg, 1998). The Reagan administration's support for the Contra rebels against Nicaragua demonstrates that covert actions were used as a substitute for open war exactly because they allowed it to circumvent democratic institutions and to dodge checks on the use of force. Such behaviour precipitates scandals from time to time, as in the case of the Iran-Contra affair when

> the president secretly breached both the substantive and the procedural accords. Without consulting with Congress, the president unilaterally endorsed two opposite policy objectives – release of the hostages in Lebanon by virtually any means and private support for the contras. By so doing, he denied Congress its constitutional entitlement to participate in the setting of broad foreign policy objectives as well as its attendant rights to information and consultation. (Koh, 1990, p. 113)

But the pervasiveness of covert actions demonstrates that democratic institutions designed to control governmental action, do not always limit the presidential use of force effectively (Prados, 1986). What is more, they entice governments to use clandestine means to reach alleged national security goals if public support is lacking or congressional authorization is not forthcoming.

In order to foster political consensus and to overcome institutional intricacies, democratic governments use various strategies. One is to expand the original, narrowly defined war aims and to adopt more broadly defined objectives such as 'regime change'. The purpose is to move the justification for war into uncontested spheres. While it has become relatively easy to object to the use of force for selfish reasons, opposition against liberation, democratization and humanitarian intervention is more difficult to sustain. Mark Peceny argues that '[e]ven when presidents initially fail to adopt pro-liberalization policies, (. . .) liberal ideological attacks from the Congress often compel them to shift policies. Under these circumstances, presidents use the promotion of democracy to build domestic political consensus and "policy legitimacy" for U.S. interventions' (Peceny, 1995, p. 372). The point is that the institutional need for domestic consent works hand in hand with the normative disposition of democracies (to which I will turn in the next section) to expand their war aims.

This leads to the question of how democratic institutions affect actual war-fighting. For democratic wars tend to take the form of crusades. The need to justify military action beyond the sovereign right to wage war leads to a reideologization of war. While it might be true that a democratic public – in general – is risk-averse and, therefore, reluctant to support war, it is also true that once convinced of the necessity to use military means, it is difficult for a democratic government to settle for less than outright victory. As Samuel Huntington once noticed: 'The American tends to be an extremist on the subject of war: he either embraces war wholeheartedly or rejects it completely' (Huntington, 1957, p. 151). That is the reason why President George H. Bush had such a hard time defending his decision not to go all the way to Baghdad to unseat Saddam Hussein when US troops expelled Iraqi forces from Kuwait in 1991. While he correctly argued that only the restitution of Kuwaiti sovereignty had been mandated by the UN Security Council but not regime change, his decision did not square well with his war rhetoric depicting 'Saddam' as a second Hitler. His son's war effort in 2003 can be read to some extent as an attempt to finish what the father had started: a democratic war against Saddam Hussein to liberate the Iraqi people.

Carl von Clausewitz once observed that popular war (*Volkskrieg*) waged by a democratic people tends to approach 'absolute war', his ideal-type notion for the unrestricted use of military violence (Clausewitz, 1832). At first sight this seems counter-intuitive since democratic states pride themselves on strict institutional provisions for the civil control of the military. On closer inspection, however, it can be seen that these provisions are largely made for times of peace. In times of war, two radically different solutions for civil–military relations are possible. The first is the strict subordination of military aims under political objectives, as advocated by Clausewitz. The second is granting primacy to military thinking once politics has exhausted diplomatic means, as proposed by Antoine Henri Jomini. In the American tradition the Clausewitzian idea that even in times of war politics should guide the war effort, has never taken root (Huntington, 1957, pp. 143–62; Gacek, 1994, pp. 1–24). Rather, war and politics have been regarded as separate spheres, and politicians were expected to remain silent and 'let the soldiers do their work' once war had been declared. Again, President George H. Bush provides a good example when he promised on the eve of the Iraq invasion in 1991 that US soldiers will not be forced to fight with 'one hand tied behind their back' (*New York Times*, 17 January 2001). This mirrors the prevalent opinion that political interference in military affairs was the reason for defeat in Vietnam (see for example Summers, 1982), and that fighting a war with mainly political objectives in mind is un-American (Kimball, 1988). It is true that in times of war the political control of the military and civil restrictions on the use of force have been rather limited. The use of maximum military power has always been regarded as the truly 'American way of war' (Weigley, 1973). The 'limited wars' of the Cold War era, championed by strategists like Henry Kissinger (1957) and Robert Osgood (1979), should therefore be seen as exceptions rather than the rule of American democratic wars (Gacek, 1994).

In sum, democratic institutions, designed to limit governmental power, do not always have pacifying effects. They inculcate restraints in conflicts with other democracies but they can be circumvented by determined governments by using covert warfare. What is more, they may even contribute to the escalation of conflict by providing incentives for democratic governments to use force as diversionary action or to expand war aims in order to secure domestic consensus. Finally, democratic institutions allow for the relatively unfettered use of force since peacetime provisions for civil control of the military are lifted in times of war – at least in the American variant of civil–military relations.

Thus, democratic war is partly due to the institutional disposition of democratic states.

4.3 Normative reasons for democratic peace and war

A second cause of the democratic peace debated in academic literature is a normative one. Liberal democracies, it is argued, are peaceful because they share common values and norms with other democracies (Doyle, 1986; Maoz and Russett, 1993). Central to those values are individual freedom and human dignity. Freedom is interpreted as the right to exercise political influence, be it through expression of opinion, assembly or political organization. Dignity on the other hand is the chance for a self-determined existence and the enjoyment of fundamental human rights.

A widely shared assumption of the theory of democratic peace is that democracies perceive other democracies by means of those fundamental democratic values. They accept each other as 'just' and 'legitimate' political regimes. This mutual recognition creates stable expectations and confidence and induces the duty of conciliation in conflict situations:

> Domestically just republics, which rest on consent, then presume foreign republics also to be consensual, just, and therefore deserving of accommodation. (...) At the same time, liberal states assume that non-liberal states, which do not rest on free consent, are not just. Because non-liberal governments are in a state of aggression with their own people, their foreign relations become for liberal governments deeply suspect. In short, fellow liberals benefit from a presumption of amity; non-liberals suffer from a presumption of enmity. (Doyle, 1986, p. 1161)

Thomas Risse thus maintains that the normative argument provides a convincing explanation for the fact that democratic states in principle are 'defensively motivated' in international politics (Risse-Kappen, 1995a, p. 500).

The same mechanism, however, which contributes to the mutual recognition of democracies, and by implication to democratic peace, also leads to rejection and exclusion of non-democratic states and under certain circumstances to democratic war. Because non-democracies are not based on the free consent of their population, they cannot be seen as 'just' and 'legitimate' and lack the credibility and trustworthiness of responsible members of the international community (Roth, 1999). Disputes between democracies and non-democracies therefore easily

escalate into more fundamental conflicts over individual human rights, civil liberties and the right form of government.

Typically, democracies in such cases do not condemn states but regimes and draw a fine line between undemocratic governments and their populations. Woodrow Wilson made this very clear in his war message before Congress in 1917: 'We have no quarrel with the German people. We have no feeling toward them but one of sympathy and friendship. It was not upon their impulse that their government acted in entering this war. It was not with their previous knowledge or approval' (Wilson, 1917). It is easy to replace the 'German people' with the people of Panama, Iraq, Libya, Afghanistan or North Korea and insert Manuel Noriega, Colonel Qaddafi, the Taliban or Kim Il Sung instead of the Kaiser in order to see the scheme. For democracies do not quarrel with peoples or wage war against nations, but fight against evil governments and use military violence to achieve regime change and establish democratic statehood.

It has been shown in history that since 1898 American presidents have consistently linked military interventions with the aim to expand democracy (Peceny, 1995). Even in cases in which national security reasons were dominant at first, the war aims have often been altered to regime change during the war. The basis for this is the assumption that democracy is not only an ideal worth to be defended militarily but also to be spread globally. To quote Samuel Huntington again who explains the American attitude towards war: 'This extremism [to embrace war wholeheartedly or reject it completely] is required by the nature of the liberal ideology. Since liberalism deprecates the moral validity of the interests of the state in security, war must be either condemned as incompatible with liberal goals or justified as an ideological movement in support of those goals' (Huntington, 1957, p. 151). Democracies draw their very identity and legitimacy from their representation of cosmopolitan values and global liberties and establish their own credibility through the denunciation of the political 'other'.

Not surprisingly, in the 1990s with the constraints of the Cold War gone, we see a much more activist and interventionist foreign policy on the part of democratic countries, especially the United States (Mayall, 1996; Morales, 1994). The reason is that according to the liberal creed universal values such as human rights and civil liberties have to be defended, restored and strengthened wherever possible – with military force and without UN authorization if necessary (Reisman, 1999/2000; Tesón, 2003). The wave of so-called 'humanitarian interventions' in the 1990s had exactly this aim: to reinforce global humanitarian standards

and to promote democratic values (Gallant, 1992; Wheeler, 2000; Holzgrefe and Keohane, 2003). Even if there is still a long way to go in order to establish a legal 'norm' of humanitarian intervention, the military interference into hitherto sacrosanct sovereignty rights of states in cases of blatant human rights abuses is probably the most prevalent form of democratic war on the basis of liberal values.

However, the debate on the justification for democratic war does not end here. Some international lawyers and political scientists have argued that a right to democratic governance exists that endows each and every individual with the right to be ruled by democratically elected leaders (Franck, 1992; Fox and Nolte, 2000). Michael Reisman has extrapolated from that assumption the right, if not the obligation, for democratic states to work actively for the promotion of democracy and to establish democratic governments even with the help of forceful military intervention (Reisman, 2000). The US and UK governments have resorted to that argument when they found out that the original justification for the war against Iraq – the existence of weapons of mass destruction – did not hold. Even if democratization has so far been used mainly as a substitute where better arguments for the use of force have been absent or disappeared, there is a growing acceptance of linking democracy and the benevolent use of force. If this trend coincides with a further deterioration of the non-intervention norm, we might expect more wars of democratization in the future (Byers and Chesterman, 2000).

The normative impetus also has profound consequences for the actual military conduct of war. By invoking absolute and universal values – be it 'human rights' or 'democracy' – the threshold of acceptable means, including military force, is lowered. The times when states accepted each other as equal and conducted war as an 'extended duel', as Clausewitz put it, are gone and with it the restrictions of chivalry, military custom, and the laws of war which depend on the institution of reciprocity (Schmitt, 1950). A democratic state cannot, by its very nature, accept the equal right of the adversary to use military violence to settle conflicts. Thus, democratic wars easily take the form of crusades. The need to justify military action beyond the sovereign right to wage war leads to a reideologization: war is morally condemned and legally prohibited, but at the same time ethically justified and politically restored as a means to advance the common good.

The recent renaissance of the just war theory in the US and its specific reinterpretation as a casuistry of legitimate war fighting not only demonstrates the need to morally justify the use of force, but also shows the dynamic of the liberal discourse which tends toward the

global enforcement of universal civil and human rights. The civil–religious status of those values makes them powerful instruments in the quest for legitimacy. The use of religion and religious beliefs in politics is different from secular political ideologies because moral commitments and policy options derived from religious beliefs, practices and institutions are associated with the absolute and ultimate (Thomas, 2005). If war is justified as a means to spread the quasi-religious values of democracy by changing regimes and installing liberal governments, that is, if the *jus ad bellum* is secured with reference to an absolute norm, then this also has repercussions on the *jus in bello*, that is the legitimate application of violence. For the extension of the war aims also leads to the reduction of restrictions on the use of force. Take the principle of 'proportionality' as an example which is used in the just war theory to determine 'appropriate' degrees of military violence. If the enforcement of absolute values is the war aim, limitations on military means are difficult to sustain. In light of absolute values, all means are proportional. This is the reason why, for example, Madeleine Albright as US ambassador to the UN justified sanctions against Iraq and the side effects on the civil population in the mid-1990s, including the death of more than 500,000 children, 'a price worth being paid'.[2] In a similar vein, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld defended 'collateral damage' on the civil population during the war in Afghanistan and the use of the 'Daisy Cutter', the most devastating conventional bomb in the US arsenal. In face of absolute war aims like 'fighting terrorism' and waging war against an 'axis of evil' there are no limits to the use of force and the treatment of enemy combatants.

In fact, the very concept of the combatant has come under pressure. A number of US lawyers and military officers have argued that a reassessment is needed as to what constitutes 'military objects' which are regarded as legitimate targets by international law in times of war. They argue that modern, or rather postmodern, war erases the distinction between civil and military objects and that civilians and civil institutions aiding the war effort of the enemy pose legitimate targets (Crawford, 1997; Dunlap, 2000). This, however, would undermine the assumption of innocence of civilians in times of war and render the distinction between combatants and non-combatants meaningless. The humanitarian law as we know it would be in danger. If it is true that constraints on the means of military violence are directly dependent on the limitation of the war aims, then it is not surprising that democratic wars fought for absolute moral aims are less and less constrained by traditional restrictions on the use of force.

Thus, democratic norms are not constraining conflict by themselves. They dampen conflicts between democracies by instilling trust through shared values, but they can provoke conflicts between democracies and non-democracies. Especially if democracy is seen as a universal right that should be spread globally through regime change, democracy can become a cause of war. Because democratic wars are seen as 'just in themselves', they go hand in hand with a delegitimation and often demonization of the enemy. This in turn undermines traditional limitations on the use of military violence and the humane treatment of combatants and non-combatants.

4.4 Structural reasons for democratic peace and war

A third cause of democratic peace is the creation of security communities and international organizations. The specific exigence for security prompts democratic states to join forces and to give up the sovereign right to solve conflicts by resorting to violence among themselves (Deutsch et al., 1957; Adler and Barnett, 1998).

The peaceful effect of European integration is undeniable. In the case of NATO, the Deutschean prototype of a security community, the situation is more complicated. For the question is whether the internal democratic peace among NATO members was not dearly bought by external conflict. It is no accident that only after the end of the Cold War, when its existence was disputed, was NATO used militarily in Kosovo, and only when the original threat in the form of the Soviet Union had disappeared was Article 5 invoked following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. Clearly, the argument is not that NATO was out to search for new tasks. Rather, the definition of democratic security needs is so extensive that NATO without Cold War restrictions was naturally poised to be used to expand democratic peace – by peaceful enlargement or democratic war.

But what are democratic security interests? Again, Woodrow Wilson's war message provides a hint: 'A steadfast concert for peace can never be maintained except by a partnership of democratic nations. No autocratic government could be trusted to keep faith within it or observe its covenants. It must be a league of honor, a partnership of opinion. (...) The world must be made safe for democracy' (Wilson, 1917). Here, democracy is not so much a value that should be spread because of its intrinsic dignity, but rather a means to achieve practical security needs, a matter of political wisdom. For ultimate security for democracies can only be achieved in a world in which all states are democratic. Until

this stage is reached, the democratic security community must defend itself against manifest and potential threats with the aim to extend the scope of the community. For only by extending the security community can the democratic demand for security be satisfied, as Anthony Lake, National Security Advisor in the former Clinton administration, confirms:

> The successor to the doctrine of containment must be a strategy of enlargement (…) of the world's free community of market economies. (…) Our own security is shaped by the character of foreign regimes. Indeed most presidents (…) understood that we must promote democracy (…) because it protects our interests and security and because it reflects values that are both American and universal. (Lake, 1993)

Thus, the willingness to engage in conflict with non-democracies is a duty for all democracies. For the security community of democratic states only grows if democratic values and ideals are collectively represented and enforced. Democratic peace, one might say with only small exaggeration, proves itself in democratic war.

It is important to note that democracies tend to define their security needs so extensively that they subsume more and more issue areas (Daase, 1991; Waever, 1995). Shortly after the fall of the Berlin wall, NATO acknowledged that the direct threat posed by the armies of the Warsaw Pact had diminished but that new risks and challenges had emerged that made the new security environment even more dangerous: the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, organized crime, terrorism and so on (NATO, 1990, p. 20). The New Strategic Concept adopted at the North Atlantic Council in 1999 focuses on these new and emerging threats. This indicates a paradigm shift in security policy and a new emphasis on proactive risk management (Wallander and Keohane, 1999).

What makes a policy proactive is not to wait for the materialization of damage but to act in advance, either by taking preventive measures in order to stop damage from happening or by taking precautionary measures in order to limit the damage if it occurs (Daase, 2002). Prevention (loosely used to encompass both preventive and precautionary measures) has therefore become the buzzword of the new security policy. The new US National Security Strategy argues:

> The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction – and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the

> enemy's attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively. (NSS, 2002, p. 15)

But also the draft version of a new security concept for the European Union, the so-called Solana paper, acknowledged the need 'to act before a crisis occurs. (. . .) We need to develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention' (Solana, 2003, pp. 12–13). Even if the European leaders scaled back the emphasis on preventive intervention, proactive security policy is clearly on the agenda.

The US and UK governments made clear when they invaded Iraq in 2003, how democratic states implement preventive strategies against the spread of nuclear weapons. Doing so, they falsified an old assumption in political science, namely that democracies do not wage preventive wars. George Kennan made the statement in the early 1950s that democracies could not plan preventive wars because of their transparency and openness (Gaddis, 1982, p. 49). Bernard Brodie seconded this by stressing that a policy of preventive war had always been unrealistic for the United States (Brodie, 1965, p. 237). And still in 1992 Randall Schweller maintained that only non-democratic states would be inclined to use preventive force against a rising adversary (Schweller, 1992, p. 238). However, not only Israel's pre-emptive attack in 1956 (see Levy and Gochal, 2001/2), but also the preventive war against Iraq proves that a fundamental aversion of democracies against preventive war does not exist.

And again it has been shown that a reason which is said to contribute to democratic peace, can also enable democratic war. Renouncing military means and building common institutions among democratic states leads to democratic security communities and to the advancement of democratic peace. At the same time, it enables democratic states to wage war more effectively against non-democracies and to enlarge the democratic community of states.

4.5 Conclusion

My intention is not to denunciate democracy. Neither do I want to claim that all democracies are necessarily war-prone. And I know of course that it is difficult to generalize the very specific circumstances of American foreign and security policy. What I wanted to stress in this chapter is the fact that the peacefulness between democracies and the

bellicosity between democracies and non-democracies have the same sources: the institutions which help to keep peace between democracies are the same institutions that can cause war between democracies and non-democracies. The values that promote peace between democracies are the same values that can serve as inducement for war between democracies and non-democracies. The security communities that help to stabilize peaceful relations among democracies are the same communities that exclude non-democracies and are used to extend democratic values assertively. Democratic war can no longer be ignored or treated as an anomaly. Instead it must be taken seriously as the complement of democratic peace.

As far as the form of warfare is concerned, democratic wars differ markedly from other wars. The domestic structure of democracies tends to devalue traditional limits on military ends and means. Democratic wars, it seems, have a specific propensity to escalate, since institutions designed for the control of the military are overruled in times of war. The normative justifications of democratic war tend to favour 'regime change' as a war aim, thus dissolving another limitation of traditional warfare. Finally, the political reasons for democratic war call for proactive rather than reactive policy choices and allow the preventive use of force in order to expand the security community of democratic states.

The double finding of the peacefulness among democracies and the bellicosity between democracies and non-democracies is not so puzzling as is often described. Democracies, by nature, are both: peaceful towards democracies, bellicose towards non-democracies. In this interpretation, democratic peace is nothing but a sociational effect deriving from joint conflict management and coalition warfare (Cederman and Daase, 2003). There are many good reasons for considering democracy the better form of government. But peacefulness is not among them.

Notes

1. See Public Law No. 88-408, 78 Statute 384, my emphasis.
2. http://home.comcast.net/~dhamre/docAlb.htm (2 February 2002).

5

Triangulating War: the Use of Force by Democracies as a Variant of Democratic Peace

Lothar Brock

The present chapter addresses the use of force by democracies at the international level. It takes as its starting point the 'triangle of peace' constructed by Bruce Russett and John Oneal (2001). 'Bringing Kant back in', Russett and Oneal identify *democracy, interdependence* and *international organization* as the cornerstones of a self-enforcing peace system. The present chapter takes up this concept and argues that the self-enforcing peace system is not confined only to inter-democratic relations but, in principle, also works in a mixed group of democratic and non-democratic countries. Since the number of democracies is increasing and international organization as well as interdependence are becoming ever more complex, we may expect that the effectiveness of the 'triangle of peace' even in a mixed group of states will grow also. But how, then, are we to account for the persistence of the unilateral use of force by democracies (vis-à-vis non-democracies)?

I will tackle this question by looking at the conditions under which the positive effects of the interplay between democracy, interdependence and international organization come to bear and under which conditions they are neutralized or may even turn into a negative interplay offering specific incentives for democracies to fall back on the unilateral use of force. In this regard, the 'triangle of peace' may serve as a stepping stone for identifying a 'triangle of war' in which problematic aspects of democracy, interdependence and international organization combine to counteract their positive features as factors mitigating violence. Pursuing this issue, the present chapter arrives at a reformulation of the twin finding of inter-democratic peace on the one hand, and war between democracies and non-democracies on the other (Risse-Kappen, 1995a): democracies foster interdependence and international organization and thus increase the general incentives for peaceful behaviour even in

a mixed group of states. But interdependence and international organization, under the influence of the militarily and economically most powerful democracies, evolve in an uneven and contradictory way which, in turn, offers incentives for these very democracies to have recourse to the unilateral use of force in their dealings with non-democracies. They do not simply ignore international law but actually claim to enforce it. But this claim involves highly problematic interpretations of the procedural norms for the application of the use of force laid down in the UN Charter in favour of the advancement of substantive norms (peace, human rights, freedom). In this sense they fight 'wars of enforcement' located in the grey zone between collective action, self-defence and outright aggression.

5.1 Pushing and thwarting international legalization

Though 'prior to the events of 1989–91, "democracy" was a word rarely found in the writing of international lawyers' (Fox and Roth, 2000b, p. 1), democracies have contributed decisively to the development of the present international legal system. The US and UK in particular played a crucial role in setting up the United Nations which was (and is) to serve the highest ambition of international law, that is to 'save succeeding generations from the scourge of war'. Today, it seems that these very democracies are dismantling the system which they themselves helped to set up. This needs to be explained, especially since the end of the Cold War opened up a window of opportunity for moving ahead with the historic task outlined in the preamble of the UN Charter. Some steps were indeed undertaken to bring the UN back into focus and to strengthen collective action under Chapter VII. Drawing on earlier precedents in the struggle against apartheid, the Security Council expanded its understanding of threats to international peace so as to turn domestic conflict into a legitimate concern of the international community. It also called upon the Secretary-General to draw up a new comprehensive strategy for dealing with conflict including crisis prevention, peacemaking and peace consolidation. At the same time, the peace missions of the UN exploded into an unprecedented high, not only because there were so many new conflicts coming up, but also because the Cold War restrictions for dealing with them had disappeared. In this multilateral mood, the one remaining Cold War alliance, NATO, offered to function as a subcontractor for United Nations peacekeeping operations in the Balkans – even under the command of the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

But very soon the US backed away from the Secretary-General of the UN and NATO backed away from acting under UN command. By 1995, it was NATO, not the UN, which called the tune in the Balkans. In 1998, the US and UK decided that the time had come to renew bombing of the no-fly zones in Iraq. They claimed that they had the right to decide on their own whether the Iraqi regime was in material breach of UN resolutions or not, and to act accordingly (Weller, 1999/2000). In 1999, NATO carried through its bombing campaign against Serbia without UN authorization. As a response to September 11, the new US administration with the vague backing of the Security Council decided to fight transnational terrorism in the form of a protracted quasi-war which involved serious curtailments of international law, especially with regard to the pertinent provisions of the Geneva Protocol concerning the treatment of prisoners. Finally, in 2003, the US with the support of 'new Europe' decided to escalate the former bombing campaign against Iraq to an outright international war, claiming as before that it had the right and duty to decide to what extent the Saddam regime was abiding by the respective UN resolutions. By this time, NATO had been replaced by a coalition of the willing, making it even more difficult to bring to bear the checks and balances that go along with multilateral decision-making.

These developments were accompanied by a broad public debate in the democracies on 'humanitarian intervention' and 'just war'. The clue of these concepts is that they leave it to individual countries or groups of countries to decide on the use of force instead of calling for collective action as provided for by Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The Charter clearly distinguishes between the use of force by individual states (Article 2/4) and collective action. This distinction is not invalidated by the 'inherent right' to self-defence in case of an armed attack (Article 51). In the context of the long evolution of international law the task of the Charter is to transform the arbitrary use of force by individual states (*violentia*) into enforcement action by the international community (*potestas*), just as feuding in the modern state has been replaced by the rule of law.[1] Under this perspective Article 51 should be read as a fall-back provision to compensate for deficiencies of collective action, while Article 2/4 and the substantive parts of Chapter VII are really what the Charter is all about in the field of peace and security.[2]

With the military polarization between East and West during the Cold War, security policies were largely based on Article 51. But the Cold War is over and the Warsaw Pact has disappeared. Why then should the democracies which played a pivotal role in setting up the

UN system at the end of the Second World War, today dismantle its truly innovative features in the field of peace and security? Why, after the brief interlude of the early 1990s, should they go for broadening the meaning of Article 51 to include individual pre-emptive action (NSS, 2002) instead of strengthening collective action? Why should they undermine Article 2/4 – a historical breakthrough in the long struggle over the curtailment of the use of force by individual states and alliances – instead of moving ahead with the historic agenda incorporated in the Charter of the UN?

Under a realist perspective the questions already offer the answer because they simply indicate how things can be expected to go in an anarchical system (Waltz, 1979; Mearsheimer, 1990). From a liberal point of view one may accentuate the way in which conflicts in the world are being perceived by the democratic public and how this affects government policies (MacMillan, 2004a, b; Hasenclever, 2003). International lawyers may claim that Article 2/4 has been dead for many years and that security policies follow a 'post-Charter self-help paradigm' (Arend and Beck, 1998). From a constructivist viewpoint one could stress the specific cultures of security that have developed in the democracies and which have come to bear in the way in which political or security challenges are being framed (Katzenstein, 1996). A political–economy approach would stress the links between political and economic power differentials as they come to play in this context (Gilpin, 1987; Buzan, 1994). The present chapter is eclectic. It assumes that the structure of the international system, legal discourse, the way domestic and international issues are being linked, the framing of security issues in the context of the culture of democracy or liberalism, and economic interests all interact in a complex and basically open way. The chapter refers to the 'triangle of peace' set up by Bruce Russett and John Oneal (2001) as a way to structure this complex interplay and to open it up for systematic variations on the theme of democratic peace.

The chapter does not present new empirical findings but rather aims at generating hypotheses on the use of force by democracies. Taking Russett and Oneal's 'triangle of peace' as my starting point, I will first present the assumption that democracy, peace and interdependence interact in a mutually reinforcing way. On the basis of this assumption and the logic which it implies, I will then take up the question of the extent to which positive interaction should also work in a mixed group of states comprising democracies and non-democracies. In a third step, I develop the argument that interdependence unfolds in the form of uneven development. The question here is the extent to which uneven

development can be expected to modify the positive interaction between the three corners of the triangle. In the fourth step, I deal with the same question in regard to what Jürgen Habermas has called the 'underinstitutionalized' state of international order (Habermas, 1999). The issue here is to what extent democracies have specific inhibitions towards bringing international organization in line with their efforts to push liberal values and turn them into universally binding norms. At this point I will argue that due to the idiosyncrasies of democratic norm politics in a heterogeneous setting marked by uneven development and deficient international organization, the triangle of peace may turn into a triangle of war.

5.2 The war averseness of democracies in inter-democratic relations

The central contribution of the Enlightenment to the analysis of international relations may be seen via the normative argument clad into an empirical observation: that under the conditions of interdependence war does not pay because the opportunity costs of war will outpace any benefits to be gained from it, even for the winner (Brock, 1997). While most of the writers of those days, just like the free-trade pacifists of the nineteenth century and Norman Angell (1911) on the eve of the First World War, relied on the political impact of this argument in some kind of self-enlightenment of the society of states, Immanuel Kant felt that the (economic) reasonableness of peace would only come to bear in politics under the condition that those who had to carry the burden of war were involved in the decision-making on war and peace. Thus Kant linked foreign policy behaviour and regime type in the sense that democracies could be expected to be more averse to war than non-democracies. Or, to put it more precisely, Kant argued that government *should* be democratic ('republican') in order that it be reasonable to refrain not only from particular wars but to work towards the abolishment of war in general.[3]

However, Kant's linkage of democracy and peace was probabilistic, not deterministic. He was quite aware that states just like people will not always do what reason tells them to do. In Kant's reasoning, peace did not presuppose an altruistic human being but rather could come about even in a world of devils. But Kant felt that in addition to the structural prerequisite of democratic participation devils – like people – needed to be educated in order to realize their self-interest and behave respectively. In his eyes, a 'good constitution' would be helpful to

achieve this end (Niesen, 2001). The 'good constitution' was not to turn devils into angels, but to teach the devils to look after their interests in a reasonable way, that is to become rational benefit maximizers by internalizing those norms adherence to which could be expected from a reasonable actor. Of course, a reasonable actor in this sense is not confined to making rational choices. Internalizing the norms that govern reasonable behaviour also involves the evolution of standards of adequacy which in turn influence behaviour (Müller, 2004a; Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998; Risse, 1999). With reference to the international level, this means that in Kant's system democratic states needed some institution that would increase the probability of their peaceful behaviour in international disputes by helping them to build confidence and by institutionalizing such confidence in the form of generally accepted standards of adequate behaviour. Thus Kant called for a pacific union into which the democracies should enter in order to gradually overcome war. In addition, there was to be a global civil law (*Weltbürgerrecht*) regulating the movement of people in the pursuit of economic interests. While Kant agreed that the spirit of commerce was basically conducive to peace, he was critical of the practice of the colonization of people. In this respect Kant argued for a confinement of international law to the rules of hospitality. This was to say that people had a right to move freely around the world but that this freedom of movement did not include the right to expropriate others. Only under these conditions could 'the spirit of commerce' in the Kantian system of thought be expected to promote peace.

In their attempt to get back to the roots of the democratic peace debate, Bruce Russett and John Oneal (2001) have translated Kant's observations into a 'triangle of peace' comprising democracy, economic interdependence and international organization as its cornerstones. The triangle is in line with Kant's probabilistic approach. It conveys the message that democracy promotes peace but that this effect will be heightened if democracy unfolds in an international milieu of economic interdependence and international organization. Since interdependence and international organization are supported by, and favour on their part, democracy, the three factors signify a dynamic system moving, if in a never-ending process, towards perpetual peace.[4] As will be discussed later on, there are inherent tensions and contradictions in the triangle of peace that set limits to this dynamic. At this instance, however, I follow Russett and Oneal in that there is a positive dynamic and that this dynamic is especially high when democracies interact with each other.[5] This is to say that under conditions



Figure 5.1 Constellation 1: democratic peace

of interdependence and international organization democracies will clearly be more peace-prone than non-democracies. So as a starting point the present chapter affirms the triangle of peace as drawn up by Russett and Oneal (2001, p. 35), though with the slight variation that emphasizes the special features of inter-democratic communication (Figure 5.1).

5.3 The war averseness of democracies in mixed groups of states

How does the war averseness of democracies change in a mixed group of states? The standard version of the democratic peace proposition posits that democracies do not fight each other but are as likely as autocracies – if not even more so – to fight non-democracies (Risse-Kappen, 1995a; Geis, 2001). As John MacMillan has pointed out recently, missing from the debate about this twin finding 'is a discourse of democratic–non-democratic accommodation or respect and one finds only minimal political space for developing practices and norms of peaceful co-existence between democratic and non-democratic states' (MacMillan, 2004b, p. 482; also MacMillan, 2003). The triangle of peace offers the possibility to address this issue. It allows us to move away from the narrow focus on pairs of states and to look at groups of states and their behaviour towards each other in the environment of international organization and interdependence. What do we come up with under this perspective? Russett and Oneal talk of a Kantian system to which some states belong and others do not (2001, pp. 302–3). Yet they posit the possibility and challenge of integrating Russia and China into the Kantian system. In the long run, this would call for the

democratization of both countries. But, as John Maynard Keynes put it, in the long run we are all dead. So Russett and Oneal make a strong plea for integrating Russia and China into the Kantian system now (2001, Ch. 8). This leads to the question to what extent the 'triangle of peace' can be opened up for the interaction between democratic and non-democratic states in a world that, even after the 'third wave' of democratization (Huntington, 1991), remains comprised of a substantial (if not again increasing) number of non-democracies.

Kant does not dwell upon the possible impact of a heterogeneous setting on the behaviour of democracies, since the pacific union that he had in mind was to be formed by democratic states (with democratization figuring as an imperative of peace). On the other hand, his proposed world civil law was to be applied to the entire world, which included the relationship between Europe and its colonies. Also, Kant shared the opinion of classical liberalism that the 'spirit of commerce sooner or later takes hold of every people, and [that, L.B.] it cannot exist side by side with war' (Kant, 1795). This can be interpreted as an indication that Kant saw the possibility of moving towards a more peaceful world even in a heterogeneous environment. The justification Kant gives for the inadmissibility of intervention as a precondition for peace underlines this point.[6]

Russett and Oneal observe that democracy, interdependence and international organization each works towards peace (2001, Chs 3–5).[7] If this is the case, then the dynamic expressed by the triangle should also come to bear in a mixed group of states. The link Kant constructs between domestic political structure and foreign policy behaviour in principle does not contradict this conclusion.[8] This applies to all three standard arguments explaining democratic peace – the utilitarian, the normative and the institutional. As to the utilitarian argument, Kant believed that economic calculations mitigating the war-proneness of states would be more likely to come to bear in democracies than in non-democracies, not that they would never come to bear in non-democracies. As the above quotation from Kant on the mutual exclusion of war and trade suggests, on this point he and his student Friedrich Gentz (who praised the economic wisdom of pre-revolutionary Europe) were not as far apart as it would seem in regard to their diametrically opposed views of the French Revolution. Also, it would be absurd to speculate that the ability to make rational choices stops short of non-democracies. Again referring to the probabilistic approach to the issue, democracies can in general be expected to be more cost-sensitive than non-democracies. But the calculation of costs and benefits is highly contingent on

circumstances and the relative weight of behavioural preferences in conflicts of interests. I will get back to this point in the next section of this chapter.

As to the institutional explanation of democratic peace, here again we have to take note of the general aspects underlying the specific effects of democratic decision-making. If democratic institutions help to alleviate the security dilemma (Schultz, 2001; Lipson, 2003), there is nothing in the logic of the argument precluding spillover effects of the peace among democracies onto the relations between democracies and non-democracies. Because first of all, we may assume that increased transparency concerning the decision-making on war and peace in particular states would contribute to overall confidence-building among mixed cohorts of states (if to a lesser degree than it does between democracies). This should be especially the case if the democracies in such a group of states are the dominant powers (Mitchell, 2002; Cederman, 2001). In such a situation, greater transparency of decision-making on the part of democracies should at least reduce the rate of misinterpretations of their behaviour on the part of non-democracies. In turn, the non-democracies would have less reason to set in motion self-fulfilling prophecies of threats and counter-threats. If 'anarchy is what states make of it' (Wendt) non-democratic states will internalize cooperation and compromise as adequate behaviour to the extent that cooperation and compromise pay.

If institutions are understood to constitute frameworks of reference for politics, then they may even help to keep the peace among non-democracies. For instance, in the history of Latin America since independence interstate war has been a rare event. This can at least in part be attributed to the institutionalized idea that the countries of the subcontinent are bound together by a common colonial past and share a common fate in dealing with external intervention, be it by the Holy Alliance, the US, European countries or 'international communism'.[9] In this respect, explaining the democratic peace has a flip side: 'grasping the undemocratic peace' (Brock, 1998).

Likewise, the specific normative preferences of democracies as such do not offer a categorical objection to the thesis that the 'triangle of peace' should also work in a mixed group of states. First of all, the standards of adequacy under which states communicate are not fixed. Thus, candidates for EU admission have been socialized into the EU system (Schimmelfennig, 2000; Harrison, 2004). This is to say that their rational choice to join the EU has led to the establishment of new patterns of preferences as clearly observable with regard to the second wave

of admissions (the formerly authoritarian states of Portugal, Spain and Greece). Governments have also been 'shamed' into observing human rights by the respective activities of other states or non-governmental organizations (Klotz, 2002; Risse et al., 1999). Secondly, though the normative preferences of democracies typically lead to the formation of an in-group which distinguishes itself from the rest of the world (Risse-Kappen, 1995a; Owen, 1997), alliance formation and patterns of cooperation during the Cold War did not follow this line of distinction nor do they do so in the present 'war against terrorism'. This implies thirdly, that the normative argument can do more to explain the internal relations among democracies than their relations with non-democracies. Fourth, as a condition for joining the UN, all members of the organization pledge to uphold the same standards of appropriateness as far as dealing with conflict is concerned, which is to say that every one of them is expected to justify the use of force, whether democratic or not. In this respect, Kant's philosophical argument that the violation of law in one part of the world was felt everywhere has become a central feature of the UN Charter. This is not to deny the differences between democracies and non-democracies in this respect. But non-democracies incur political costs when using force just as democracies do. Besides, the political elites of democracies may not be quite as sensitive to societal preferences as theory would have it. Most coalition partners of the US in the recent Iraq War of 2003 had clear majorities against participation in the war. But none of the governments felt that they were jeopardizing themselves by going to war despite popular opposition (cf. Müller, 2004b). With the possible exception of Spain, all of them were right.

All of this is not to refute the democratic peace proposition but rather to argue that there is nothing in the logic of this proposition which would preclude the construction of a triangle of peace for a mixed group of states. Some of the earlier literature on the effect of interdependence, international organization and finally democracy on the foreign policy behaviour of states may have been reductionist to the extent that it looked at these factors in isolation from each other. But not all of the earlier findings are irrelevant, as for instance the most productive debate on security communities and international regimes demonstrates. In this respect, the 'triangle of peace' should be seen as building on pertinent earlier findings, not as replacing them. This would help to avoid heuristic closures with regard to the possibility of peace in a heterogeneous world which would unduly reduce the space for the perception of gradual change.



Figure 5.2 Constellation 2: emerging general peace

In sum, following the logic of the argument underlying the construction of the triangle of peace, the variables that explain the war averseness of democracies in principle also come to bear in a heterogeneous group of states especially when the democracies play a leading role in such a group of states in political and economic terms. In this respect, the difference between a heterogeneous group and a group of democracies is gradual and not absolute. While the war averseness of non-democratic states can be expected to rise, the war averseness of democracies would not necessarily decrease but would rather be stabilized to the extent that the war averseness of non-democracies grows. In this sense we may speak of an emerging general peace (Figure 5.2).

5.4 The war averseness of democracies under the conditions of uneven development

In the following section I will take a closer look at economic interdependence as one of the corners of the 'triangle of peace'. In its most general connotation the term signals that countries are important to each other and they will incur economically and/or politically relevant opportunity costs if they ignore this mutual importance. These costs would rise with the vulnerability of a country (Keohane and Nye, 1977). Under a liberal evolutionary perspective, interdependence will increase as countries move up the ladder from a mostly agricultural or extractive economy to industrialization. In the wake of such evolutionary change, interdependence will become ever more complex and thus will drive up the opportunity costs of war to a point where they, by necessity,

would exceed any possible economic benefit to be derived from war (cf. Russett and Oneal, 2001, Ch. 4).

Historically, interdependence came about first through trade and global colonization. From the nineteenth century onwards, investment played an increasing role. Today finance and services have been added to the driving forces of what is now being called globalization while the former colonial empires have been dissolved. Whether economic interdependence has acquired new dimensions, especially in comparison to the years preceding the First World War, was hotly debated in the 1990s. For the purpose of the present chapter it is not necessary to take up this debate. Suffice it to say that due to the new communication technologies, to migration and adjustment pressures there is a growing awareness of global interdependence and its ambivalence as a source of both wealth and insecurity. The reason for this is that interdependence has evolved in the form of uneven development. In the present chapter the term is to signify that the penetration of 'the rest of the world' by the European colonial powers and the US, contrary to the expectations of the modernization theories of the 1950s and 1960s, did not set into motion a process of gradually expanding modernization but brought about a world economic system characterized by what one may call shifting heterogeneity.[10] *Differences* in lifestyles, in patterns of production and reproduction, and in cosmologies turned into *inequality* to the extent that they were now integrated into a world economic and social system which received its dynamic from this very inequality between and within nations. The positions of countries in this global system are not fixed. This is apparent not only within the South but also in the North and between North and South (Asian Tigers, Chile, Gulf Emirates). It is therefore besides the point to argue that the North is a winner and the South is the loser in globalization. Rather, the very process of globalization produces major shifts not only concerning the positions individual countries and regions hold in the world market but also pertaining to the centre–periphery constellation as such. 'Shifting heterogeneity' is not confined to the South but can also be observed in the North. Today it seems to affect especially the middle-income groups, which in the old theories of modernization were considered (rightly so) as a crucial feature of liberal society. Under the pressure of world market competition, liberal societies may thus be undermined by the very dynamic which they have set in motion.

The 'historical incorporation' of the South (Ribeiro, 1971) into a division of labour dominated by the North which resulted in uneven development proceeded not only by way of offering economic incentives but

also by the use of force. The use of force deepened the social chasms in the South that went along with its exposure to the dynamics set into motion in and by the North. External violence provoked internal violence which in turn was answered by renewed external violence. Today this pattern of global change continues to produce violent conflicts in the South and incentives to intervene in them.[11] Thus the positive effects of interdependence with regard to cooperation and the pacific settlement of disputes noted above in accordance with Russett and Oneal are countered by the negative effects of uneven development. This is not to say that uneven development produces nothing but violence. Quite on the contrary, as already suggested, it has been historically, and it is today, a source of mobilization and innovation and has played a crucial role in setting into motion the kind of competition which accounts for much of the dynamic of globalization. But this positive side of uneven development is also the problem.

If uneven development did not have its mobilizing effect it could simply be replaced by a development strategy based on equity and sustainability. Under the pressure of competition with socialism, liberal societies indeed moved in this direction – even on the international level by inventing development cooperation as some kind of world social policy. But since the breakdown of socialism, the pressure to give up the achievements of a social market economy in favour of all-out competition is increasing. During the Cold War violence was enhanced through the East–West competition for influence; and today all-out competition seems to have the same effect. The post-Cold War civil wars of today may seem to be pre-modern events in regions and among people that have been left behind in global modernization. But they are fully integrated into the world economy because they are being financed by proceeds from the sale of commodities for which there is a high demand on the world market, and for this very reason may become a source for turning war into a way of life for entire generations (Kaldor, 1999; Duffield, 2001; Global Witness, 2002; Lock, 2004). Attempts to cut back on the financial resources which are being generated on the world market to finance these wars meet with the objection that they may introduce state intervention in a situation in which liberalization is the dominant strategy for releasing unused potentials of growth. So the emphasis is on self-regulation on the part of those who are trading with the pertinent products. This certainly has increased the general awareness of the role of 'business in conflict'.[12] Unfortunately, recognizing the problem does not always lead to curing it. What is more, in connection with organized crime and the growing shadow economy,

violence as such is turning into a big business (human trafficking, kidnapping, extortion and so on).

Uneven development also comes to play in transnational terrorism. Few would assume that there is a direct causal link between the functioning of the world economy and transnational terrorism. However, there is widespread consensus that poverty and the loss of hope and dignity that may go along with it offer a recruiting ground for those who are to be persuaded to join the ranks of the terrorists. For those who suffer the full brunt of structural adjustment, uneven development does not simply signal uneven progress on the road to a better world. It rather connotes material and spiritual deprivation (including the breakdown of preferred identities) for which there is no remedy in sight. Terrorists on their part tend to seek safe havens in countries where the government is either too weak to control the national territory or where it hopes to be able to instrumentalize terrorism for its own purposes. This leads to the internationalization of the fight against terrorism in the form of a 'war on terrorism' as proclaimed by the present US administration after 11 September 2001, and executed in Afghanistan and Iraq. Other countries including those who, like Germany, opposed the Iraq War are also expanding the geographical reach of their military operations by moving from a geographically confined defence posture to a globalized security policy.

Protracted violent conflict, in which it is increasingly difficult to distinguish between political and criminal actors or public and private actors, is closely associated with state failure. However, weak or failing states are not only an outcome of uneven development. They may also make a living out of their underdog position in the global system. Contrary to what would be expected under a Weberian perspective, political elites in weak states do not have an immediate interest to overcome state weakness as long as they can make use of it as a source of domestic and international rent. On the domestic level a rent is extorted from the respective domestic clientele in exchange for ad hoc services (for instance providing some degree of private security or 'authorizing' certain economic activities). On the international level rent is derived from the foreign aid community which helps to stabilize weak states by embedding them in the international political economy of North–South relations (Zinecker, 2004; Koehler and Zürcher, 2003; Christophe, 1998).

Finally, uneven development also has an impact on the probability of peace among democracies as Mousseau et al. (2003) have shown in a quantitative study of the influence of democracy, interdependence and economic development on the likelihood of war among pairs of states.

The authors affirm that trade which constitutes interdependence in general has pacifying effects.[13] However, even for democracies this pacifying effect seems to be linked to a certain level of development of states measured in GDP per capita. According to these findings, the pacifying effect of democracy seems to come to bear only among middle- and high-income countries. It does not seem to work among poor democracies. If this is so, then the spreading out of democracy leads to an enlargement of the zone of peace only if it goes together with economic development.

In short, interdependence and uneven development are closely linked for the very reason that uneven development produces the dynamic that brings about ever more complex interdependence. Therefore, uneven development is here to stay. This has contradictory implications for cooperation and compromise at the international level. Uneven development, as just pointed out, may produce indirect security threats even to the top dogs of the international system. During the Cold War, these threats were perceived in terms of the importance of 'underdevelopment' to the political, economic and ideological competition between East and West. Today, poor economic performance and failing states are seen as security threats to the extent that they are sources of uncontrolled migration, transnational terrorism, drugs, transnational organized crime and indirectly perhaps even of the proliferation of 'dirty' weapons of mass destruction. This has led to considerable conceptual activities concerning crisis prevention, non-military conflict resolution and peace consolidation. At the same time the interest in development cooperation and especially in good governance and the reduction of poverty was revived.[14] On the other hand, protracted violence in the context of uneven development and the conscious 'securitization' of non-military issues such as poverty, environmental destruction, identity claims and even health has helped to create a security climate in the Western democracies in which the differentiation of options and strategies for global military action outpaces effective innovation in the field of non-military conflict resolution.[15] This pertains especially to the US Revolution in Military Affairs which increases the military power disparities between the US and any state or combination of states it may face. It also cuts down costs in lives to which the democratic public is especially sensitive (Latham, 2002).

International organizations reflect this ambivalence of the security implications of uneven development. As a historic process, international organization has to be regarded as part of the efforts of the former colonial powers and the later OECD countries to open up new



Figure 5.3 Constellation 3: precarious peace

economic opportunities and to cut transaction costs of global sourcing. But international organization has also led to the promulgation of universal norms and standards and the evolution of a global culture of political organization (Meyer et al., 1997), which not only supported decolonization but also provided for the representation of the South in international deliberations and negotiations. This way international organization offered the means for scandalizing uneven development and the injustices that went along with it. It also helped to institutionalize post-colonial cooperation in the fields of economic development and political modernization. However, world economic policy is being made outside the UN by special clubs of states (OECD, Group of 8) which dominate the international economic organizations (World Bank, IMF, WTO) not so much with the help of weighted voting but of their sheer economic power. In this sense the UN system mirrors rather than transcends uneven development.[16]

At this stage the argument may be summed up in a third version of the triangle of peace which now begins to turn into a triangle pointing to uneven development as a systemic incentive for the highly developed democracies to use force (Figure 5.3).

5.5 Democratic war

Above, I have referred to international organization as a historic process. This is to say that it can be interpreted as an evolving system of governance beyond the state based on an ongoing differentiation of norms and institutions under which states and increasingly non-state actors interact. The resulting growth of international, transnational and

mixed state–non-state networks corresponds, since the end of the Second World War, with a declining number of interstate wars. Yet, during the Cold War, international politics remained under the threat of a war of an unprecedented magnitude. And though for the time being the nuclear scare (at least in the form of global annihilation) has gone, the post-Cold War epoch is still haunted by the spectre of interstate war. The unilateral use of force at the international level even seems to have been rediscovered as a Clausewitzian tool of politics. In this regard, the UN system certainly falls short of its historic mission, which was to overcome war. A large part of the responsibility for this must be attributed to the Western democracies, which today seem to be even more disposed to have recourse to the use of force than non-democracies (Chojnacki, Chapter 2 in this volume). Are there reasons beyond those offered by realism, that is beyond the claim that regime type does not matter, that can account for the present state of affairs? In the ensuing part of the chapter I will argue that the evolution of international or global governance is beset by contradictions that can be traced to the peculiar difficulties democracies encounter in working to strike a balance between domestic political processes and the need for an international management of interdependence. This difficulty comes to bear especially regarding the conflicts arising out of uneven development on the one hand, and the promulgation of universal norms and values on the other.

International law and international organizations both deal with a basic tension built into the modern (Westphalian) system of states – the tension between the drive for self-help on the part of the individual states and the need resulting from interdependence to get involved in some degree of rule-making in order to cut transaction costs in the pursuit of material and other interests, and to establish a frame of reference for defining such costs (Albert and Brock, 2000). The compromise between these two forces may be seen in the *self-binding* of actors in the form of international law, treaties and agreements. Self-binding remains fragile because there is the risk of cheating and because it is costly in terms of giving up some freedom to act for an advantage which may only exist in the abstract but does not always materialize in the concrete. These problems can be reduced by international organization in at least two ways: by developing routine procedures for dealing with contested issues and by transforming rules into standards of adequacy to which states turn not because they are forced to do so but because this is the way in which things 'are being done'.[17] In this respect, international organization plays a crucial role in the formation

of security communities (Deutsch et al., 1957). Yet the tension between self-help and self-binding is only eased this way, not dissolved. It constitutes a dilemma, affecting democracies in a special way.

In the historic process of international organization, no systematic distinction was made between democracies and non-democracies. Willingness to adhere to the aims and rules laid down in the instruments constituting the respective international organizations has always been the crucial criterion. This also applies to the UN system which neither makes democracy a precondition for peace nor distinguishes in any way between democracies and non-democracies. Likewise, international law traditionally knows only of states with equal rights, not of states with different regimes (see Fox and Roth, 2000b, p. 1). In this sense the differentiation of norms and institutions that characterizes international organization as a historical process has led to the emergence of a global sphere of mutual commitment under which, in the language of the English School, states begin to 'conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions' (Bull, 1977, p. 13). Of course, this global sphere looks a little like a town of the Wild West with ostentatiously oversized façades hiding shabby buildings. Still, there is no reason to be cynical about the fact that international organization has not yet taken the shape of a truly 'working peace system' (Mitrany, 1975, pp. 123–34). To bring about governance in a decentralized setting is a fairly difficult task on all accounts. Therefore, some modesty is in place in passing judgement on the achievements of the UN system. There is something to be defended there in spite of all its shortcomings.

Though international law and organization do not distinguish between regime type in order to ascertain who may be their subjects, they are not at all blind in regard to substantive norms to be respected by states in dealing with their own people and with people in general. On the contrary, already with the inauguration of the Westphalian system substantive norms concerning the relation between states and people began to emerge. Today, they cover almost every aspect of life. At the beginning, rules were made on how the governments, which had been granted the right to establish state religions, were to deal with religious dissenters.[18] In the second half of the nineteenth century humanitarian law emerged which was to regulate the way people were to be treated in war. Under the League of Nations, self-determination and the protection of minorities were enthroned as collective rights which provided the space for a new and increasingly

global discourse on state–society relations in the context of decolonization and post-colonial nation-building. Then, under the United Nations, human rights were introduced as an international issue. From the General Declaration in 1948, to the Vienna World Conference on Human Rights in 1993, the concept was constantly expanded so as to include classical political rights as well as economic, social and cultural rights, and finally even collective rights. The Vienna Conference recognized these rights as indivisible and universal. Today, a debate has been started to establish a right to democracy (Franck, 1992; Fox, 2000). The debate seems to be pushed especially by American scholars and indeed it does pick up a long-standing tradition of invoking substantive norms (the legal succession of governments, defence of freedom and democracy) in the foreign relations of the US. But it can also be regarded as a logical extension of the evolution of human rights and international organization since the end of the Second World War. In this regard we are not dealing any longer with a mere debate but with international law. As Fox (2000, p. 90) states, 'parties to the major human rights conventions have created an international law of participatory rights. They have agreed to open their political institutions to inspections for the purpose of ensuring minimum standards of procedural fairness.'[19] Add to this diffusion of rights the manifold themes and items put on the agenda of world politics by the other world conferences of the early 1990s, and there remains hardly any subject of relevance for the daily life of people which has not been turned into an object of legitimate international concern, including environmental protection and non-discrimination, reproductive rights and social security.

These substantive norms all address urgent issues which have indeed become a matter of world concern in the form that Kant envisaged when he stated that the violation of a right in one place of the world was felt everywhere. The crux of the matter is that these substantive norms have been pushed without the introduction of adequate procedural norms which would provide for internationally agreed upon ways of dealing with disputes over substantive norms. This is not to say that norms are only relevant when enforcement lurks behind them.[20] Rather, the problem is that the proliferation of substantive norms which are constitutive for the evolution of a world society (Albert et al., 2000), offers new opportunities for intervention along highly traditional lines of interstate politics.[21] So if we observe today that 'international notions of legitimacy are no longer oblivious to the origins of governments, but have come to approximate quite closely those domestic conceptions

embodied in theories of popular sovereignty' (Fox, 2000, p. 90), this is not quite as new as it sounds and it is also not quite as progressive in the sense of establishing new lines of international solidarity. When Michael Reisman states that 'international law still protects sovereignty, but – not surprisingly – it is the people's sovereignty rather than the sovereign's sovereignty' (Reisman, 2000, p. 243), we should not forget that those intervening in the name of the people's sovereignty may reject appropriate forms of self-binding which ensure that the interference really is for the good of the people in the name of which it proceeds and not in the first place for the good of the government which interferes. Democracies have a special problem with such forms of self-binding for the very fact that they act as states at the international level, though it is the 'people, not governments' which are sovereign.[22]

The problem which democracies have with self-binding through international treaties and organizations was foreseen but not solved by Kant. He pleaded for the introduction of a universal civil law and even argued that the regime of countries should be republican in order to attain the lasting peace which reason called for. But he was against any kind of international institution that would in any way infringe upon the right to self-determination of the people in those states that formed a pacific union. So it was a matter of logic that he should also call for non-intervention as a precondition for self-determination. Kant's solution amounts to a pluralist concept of international order (Jackson, 2000). It is based on the recognition of substantive norms including the right to self-determination, but deduces from this right the necessity to refrain from any attempt to force the substantive norms upon a people (because by the very nature of these norms they could only be attained by the struggle of those who were lacking them).

So should we refrain from helping people who are subjected to genocide and wait for their self-liberation? Kant succumbed to the moral dilemma that comes up at this point. He introduced the 'unjust enemy' who does not accept the most fundamental rules of reason and therefore could be made the object of the use of force. This figure, however, is not integrated into his argument but serves as a stop-gap device which serves to help escape the moral dilemma (Habermas, 1996, p. 8). The public debate in the Western democracies after the end of the Cold War took an alternative path. When people began to take note of the endogenous violence in the South which could no longer be pushed aside as mere derivatives of the Cold War or accepted as attempts to

reinvent humanity, a debate evolved regarding the need to redefine sovereignty so that it could not be invoked by warlords and other entrepreneurs of violence in order to shield themselves against outside interference. Central to the debate was the notion of 'humanitarian intervention'. While the concept is old, the key point was that it was reintroduced as a progressive innovation in international law, calling for the adjustment of the meaning of sovereignty to the canon of substantive norms, which in the eyes of the international community constituted a legitimate international concern.[23] 'Humanitarian intervention' was soon followed up by the renaissance of the 'just war' as another concept which made it possible to justify the unilateral use of force by reference to the protection of substantive norms (including the defence of freedom against fundamentalist terrorism) (Elshtain, 2002; cf. Buzan, 2002). In the light of the present debate on the right to democracy, 'democratic intervention' would be the next concept in line (Reisman, 2000). In practice it is already being invoked. After the official termination of the search for weapons of mass destruction in Iraq at the beginning of 2005, President Bush claimed that the war of 2003 was justified all the same because the world was better off without Saddam Hussein.

Obviously there are different ways of dealing with the gap between substantive and procedural norms. The pluralist alternative stresses the need to respect the Kantian argument against intervention because the latter is reflective of the need for self-determination. Under this perspective substantive norms provide a frame of reference for articulating injustices from within countries which will eventually lead to change.[24] The interventionist alternative stresses the need for direct international solidarity with 'strangers' and a redefinition of sovereignty in the name of 'good international citizenship' (Wheeler, 2000; Wheeler and Dunne, 1998). In the case of the Iraq War of 2003, 'old Europe' followed the pluralist line, while the US and Great Britain pursued an interventionist course. However, there is variance not only among democracies but also across time in the way in which individual democracies and even the same governments react to the violation of substantial norms in foreign countries. Thus the former coalition government in Germany (1998–2005) consisting of the Social Democrats and the Greens participated in the unauthorized war in Kosovo while stating flatly that it would not even participate in a mandated use of force against Iraq in 2002/3.

This variance reflects in part the specific cost–benefit calculations of governments. These calculations pertain to external factors such as

power constellations, alliance commitments and particular interests vis-à-vis a disputed case, but also internal factors pertaining to domestic support for, or resistance to, the foreign policy pursued in each specific case. For example, in the case of the US engagement in Somalia (1992) and the French post-conflict engagement in Rwanda (1994) the public put pressure on the respective governments to do something and not just stand there (Hasenclever, 2000). In the Kosovo War an attentive public interacted with a very active policy on the parts of the individual governments and NATO directed towards the mobilization of domestic support for an interventionist policy. Where such support does not materialize, a democratic government may still value the rewards of acting in the context of a democratic alliance as being higher than the sanctions which may threaten from acting against public opinion. In the case of the Iraq War of 2003, this cost–benefit calculation went wrong for the then incumbent Spanish government while all the other European members of the coalition of the willing survived despite domestic opposition to the war.

From these observations it follows that decision-makers do have to take the democratic public (including parliament) into account; however, this is a two-way street with the public influencing the cost–benefit calculations of the decision-makers and the decision-makers influencing the democratic public. The ground on which the democratic public and the executives are most likely to meet is the enforcement of substantial norms. In this respect democracies can be expected to conceive (and sell) the use of force as enforcement action. However, in order to be recognized as such, enforcement action has to meet certain procedural standards (as laid down in the UN Charter). The respect for these procedural standards is also subject to cost–benefit calculations, which are influenced by the degree to which the procedural standards are internalized as standards of adequacy by both the democratic public and the decision-makers.

At this point we address the specific problem that democracies face with regard to the meaning of popular sovereignty as a frame of reference in international politics. The democracies have played and are playing a crucial role in universalizing the values around which they form their own political identity. Among them is the notion of popular sovereignty. Popular sovereignty comes to bear in the form of self-determination. As Kant warned, self-determination cannot be achieved by external interference. External interference can only help to improve the domestic preconditions for self-determination. To attempt such a form of constructive interference is extremely risky because the line of

distinction between assisting and undermining self-determination is rather thin. As already suggested, *states* not *people* act when it comes to protect or support popular sovereignty abroad. And the action of states in rare cases can be seen as the direct translation of popular sovereignty. As just stated, it is beset with the specific cost–benefit calculations of those who hold power. The commitment of democratic states to certain procedural restrictions of their freedom of action (respect for the principle of non-intervention on the one hand, collective action on the other) can help to reduce this problem. But as foreseen by Kant, the self-binding of states can on its part infringe upon popular sovereignty of the people who live in them.

This problem has surfaced in the process of European integration. European integration has overcome centuries-old hostilities which were the source of two world wars during the twentieth century. It should therefore be regarded as a most successful project for establishing a lasting peace. On the other hand, European integration could undermine the very basis which it was built on – democracy. This can either happen as an unintended consequence of integration (Moravcsik, 1994) or as the result of a conscious attempt on the part of the political elite to use the decisions of the European bureaucracy for enlarging their general leeway of action vis-à-vis the participatory claims of domestic groups. In this case, the tension between self-binding and self-help would be solved in such a way that the political elites exchange a minor degree of self-binding on the international level for a larger degree of autonomy vis-à-vis its domestic constituency (Wolf, 1999). This is to say that international organization and democracy do not interact as smoothly as the 'triangle of peace' suggests.

To the extent that these arguments have to be taken seriously, there will always be those within democracies who will insist on republican autonomy vis-à-vis those who are in favour of global constitution-building. This would be in line with the strategy of the present US administration to extend the meaning of self-defence under Article 51 in order to broaden the procedural basis for unilateral action instead of committing states to collective accountability and action under Chapter VII. Such a solution to the need to somehow cope with the tension between universal norms and the notion of popular sovereignty appeals not only to neo-conservatives in the US but also to those in 'old Europe' who suspect that the transformation of self-binding into legal obligations under a global body of law contributes

more to undermining democratic self-determination than to securing it (Maus, 2002).

However, under complex interdependence the argument in favour of republican autonomy purposefully or unwittingly works in favour of a highly problematic redefinition of sovereignty: state sovereignty would be confined to democracies or at least to the states which respect the substantive norms which under the pressure of the democracies have become universally applicable, while those states which do not meet these standards, in the name of their people's sovereignty would forfeit the right to invoke state sovereignty (that is to say non-intervention). This would break up the very unitary system of law under which universality has come about in the first place.

These observations illustrate that democracies have a special problem with striking a balance between the need for self-binding and self-help because the latter connotes republican autonomy or democratic self-determination. These problems are exacerbated in a mixed group of states and under complex interdependence which comes in the form of uneven development. While democracies have pushed substantive norms, they have structural problems that follow with the commitment to procedural norms which would introduce *due process* to the international level and could undermine democratic accountability at the national level. This results in a strong normative dissonance in the sense of a growing commitment of democracies to the protection of substantive norms in an organizational setting characterized by procedural norms which are insufficient to guide the protection of the substantive norms. In this sense the international order has to be considered 'underinstitutionalized' (Habermas, 1999). The democracies themselves have helped to bring about this gap by pushing substantive norms but dragging their feet on improving the UN capacities for collective action. Because of the inbuilt tension between self-binding and self-determination, for the time being there will remain strong pressures within the democracies in favour of enforcement action based on an extended notion of self-defence (Article 51) and against new commitments to collective action and accountability under the substantive parts of Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Under this perspective, we can expect a continuation of wars of enforcement which operate on the borderline between collective action, self-defence and outright aggression.

So we end up with a fourth version of the triangle of peace which by now has turned into a triangle of democratic war (Figure 5.4).



Figure 5.4 Constellation 4: democratic war

5.6 Conclusion

There is nothing in the logic of the arguments put forward to ascertain the reality of a democratic peace which would preclude an incorporation of non-democracies into the 'Kantian system' as spelled out by Bruce Russett and John Oneal (2001). This pertains to the causal mechanisms supposed to work within democracies as well as to the functions attributed to inter-democratic interaction (Risse-Kappen, 1995a). Firstly, war is costly at any rate, no matter who the opponent is. Secondly, to the extent that the institutional features of democracies prevent quick decisions to go to war, this applies in general, too, and not only vis-à-vis particular states. Thirdly, the use of force is always problematic, so the general normative preferences of democracies should come to bear also vis-à-vis non-democracies. Finally, interaction is, of course, crucial, but perception obviously counts more than 'facts' (Peceny, 1997). For this reason democracies are apt to form 'coalitions of the willing' which are not necessarily reflective of regime type.[25] Beyond that, democracies communicate and cooperate with non-democracies in a routine way inside and outside the UN system. The logic of the democratic peace proposition offers no reason to suspect that such communication and cooperation will remain irrelevant for the maintenance of peace. The democratic peace proposition is probabilistic. This implies that the difference between inter-democratic relations and relations between democracies and non-democracies is only relative, not absolute. Therefore, the triangle of peace drawn up by Russett und Oneal (2001) can in principle also be applied to the relations in a mixed group of states,

though the positive feedback between democracy, interdependence and international organization will not be as strong.

On the other hand, if we take a closer look at the notions of interdependence and international organization, the triangle of peace may turn into a triangle of war. Interdependence has evolved and continues to unfold in the form of uneven development. In the context of uneven development a new security climate has arisen in which perceived threats proliferate (terror, drugs, organized crime, new diseases, migration, the waning of the middle-income groups) and military contingency planning has moved beyond the classical notions of territorial defence which prevailed until the end of the Cold War. Uneven development is a driving force of interdependence, so it is here to stay – another world may be possible, but it is not in sight.

Seen as a historical process, international organization is linked with the evolution of uneven development, though in an ambivalent way. While the early organizations of the nineteenth century assisted in the establishment of an international division of labour and the present world economic organizations help to sustain it, general international organization (League of Nations, UN) fostered self-determination, decolonization and human rights. The UN, especially, serves as a forum for scandalizing perceived injustices of the modern world order. However, the proliferation of substantive norms is out of step with the evolution of procedural self-binding of states at the international level. In this respect, one may concur with Jürgen Habermas's notion of an underinstitutionalized international order (Habermas, 1999). Democracies react to this gap in different ways. On the one hand there are those who argue for striking a new balance between non-intervention and collective action as envisaged by Chapter VII of the UN Charter. On the other hand there are those who favour an extension of the meaning of self-defence (Article 51). In light of the prevailing security climate (which is actually a climate of ubiquitous insecurity) we may expect a pragmatic middle path in the form of wars of enforcement which operate on the borderline between collective action, self-defence and outright aggression. This will be a typically democratic answer in as much as democratic publics under the impression of the proliferation of substantive norms and the linkages established between these norms to their own security interests through 'securitization', will put pressure on their governments to intervene where these norms are disregarded to a great extent. At the same time strong notions of popular sovereignty can be invoked against new forms of procedural

self-binding which could be considered as infringing upon democratic self-determination.

For this reason, redefining sovereignty by stressing people's sovereignty vis-à-vis the sovereignty of states does not really offer a viable alternative. Under the prevailing heterogeneity of the 'international community' it rather exacerbates the problem. This is so because people's sovereignty is being invoked against state sovereignty only by democracies in their dealing with non-democracies. Such a selective redefinition of sovereignty undermines the notion of a universal sphere of law based on equal rights and duties. It may thus offer even more incentives for waging wars of enforcement.

Notes

1. The International Court of Justice, in the famous case of *Nicaragua* vs. *the United States* (27 June 1986), ruled that even beyond the UN Charter, the obligation not to use force against another state constituted customary international law (ICJ Reports 14 [1986], paragraphs 187–201). I follow Kelsen's rejection of the claim that the right of self-defence is beyond the reach of positive law (Kelsen, 1951, pp. 791–2). As a matter of fact, that the individual states have tried and are trying to broaden the meaning of self-defence confirms that self-defence is open for legal regulation. For a debate of the different positions concerning this obligation see Gray (2000) and O'Connell (2003). Cf. also Brock (2005).
2. This is not to say that the Charter provisions are sufficient to deal with the present state of international affairs. On the contrary, they are in dire need of reform, especially regarding redefining the relationship between collective action and self-defence. Cf. Bothe et al. (2005).
3. This argument is already present in Montesquieu's observation that 'the spirit of monarchy is war and expansion, the spirit of republics is peace and moderation' (Montesquieu, cited in Knutsen, 1997, p. 124). However, Montesquieu did not attribute this directly to popular participation. His observation rather reflected the belief that republics because of their political system had to be small and thus were under the constant threat of monarchies, which led them to be defensive and moderate in their foreign relations. For a critique that Kant is being overrated in comparison to Montesquieu and the American federalists see Deudney (2004).
4. Russett and Oneal (2001, p. 35 and p. 200, with reference to Mitchell et al., 1999).
5. Russett and Oneal follow the monadic version of the democratic peace proposition (2001, p. 36). The present chapter, too, starts out with the assumptions that democracies are more peaceful in general since all the standard explanations used in the dyadic version in principle are not confined to the interaction of democracies with each other. This also goes for Thomas Risse-Kappen's 'in-group' argument (Risse-Kappen, 1995a). The alliance system of the Cold War on the Western side cut across regime types. The same can be observed with the alliance formation in the context of the

'war on terrorism'. In this regard it should be recalled that Karl Deutsch's security community does not presuppose democracy (Deutsch et al., 1957). For regime theory, too, the distinction between democracies and non-democracies is not constitutive (Rittberger and Mayer, 1993).

6. Kant argued that intervention would infringe upon people's right to self-determination.
7. The major part of Russett and Oneal's book (2001) addresses to what extent democracy, interdependence and international organization each reduce conflict. At this point I take the results of their research at face value because I am not interested in challenging their argument on empirical grounds but rather in taking up the logic of their argument and pushing it to a point at which the triangle of peace can also be read as a triangle of war. This will be done in successive steps.
8. Distancing himself from earlier literature on the impact of international organizations on the external behaviour of states, Andreas Hasenclever argues that this impact depends on the regime features of its members. He finds that homogeneous international organizations formed by democracies have a benevolent effect on their members (Hasenclever, 2002; cf. Dembinski et al., 2004). However, from this it does not follow that heterogeneous organizations have no benevolent effect on the behaviour of their members towards each other at all.
9. See Hurrell (1998), Kacowicz (1998) and Peceny et al. (2002); for the contrary concerning Latin America see Mares (2001).
10. In the earlier debates on this issue, modernization theory proceeded on the assumption that the transition of societies from tradition to modernity would produce a social and economic *dualism* as a passing phenomenon, whereas dependency theory postulated that penetration leads to *structural heterogeneity* as a lasting feature of the international division of labour between centre and periphery of the world economy. The term 'shifting heterogeneity' used in the present chapter refers to the fact that the social and economic dislocations that go along with modernization do not lead to fixed patterns of heterogeneity. Neither can they be conceived as mere difference in the speed with which modernization unfolds nor as a zero-sum game as conceived by Wallerstein (1974).
11. Uneven development that leads to internal marginalization may be answered by the use of violence on the part of the marginalized as a means of gaining access to the market (Zinecker, 2004).
12. Cf. the debate on 'do no harm' among the humanitarian aid community (Anderson, 1999).
13. With reference to Oneal and Russett (1999), Barbieri and Schneider (1999) and Russett and Oneal (2001).
14. For example, the National Security Strategy of the US of September 2002 calls for an intensification of efforts to reduce poverty. In Germany, the Ministry for International Economic Cooperation has become a member of the Federal Security Council. All the advanced countries agreed on the Millennium Development Goals of the Secretary-General of the UN, Kofi Annan. On the latter see the report by Jeffrey Sachs (2005).
15. After the breakdown of real socialism, NGOs were eager to push an extended security agenda in order to make use of the window of opportunity provided

in the early 1990s and to channel funds from the military to aid and environmental protection. This campaign was first taken up by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP, 1992), which pleaded for a reorientation of security policies from state to human security. Later on, governments among the Western democracies, too, began to talk in terms of an extended understanding of security. To this extent, 'securitization' of uneven development was successful (Waever, 1995). However, while reference to an extended understanding of security is now to be found ubiquitously in statements by the UN Security Council, Western governments and NGOs, up to now it has helped more to expand military contingency planning than to upgrade development cooperation in any substantial way. Early warnings that this may be the outcome of securitization are voiced by Deudney (1990) and Brock (1992).

16. To illustrate the point: in the early 1970s the UN served as a forum for the debate on a new economic order which was to make the world market more responsive to the needs of the South. However, no comprehensive negotiations on such a programme materialized (with the exception of the by now defunct agreement on the integrated management of the trade in natural resources). When the debt crisis began in Mexico in 1982, the World Bank and the IMF moved to the fore. These organizations shelved the ideas of the 1970s. Instead of working towards the adjustment of the world market to the needs of the South, the South (as well as today's social democratic North) was expected to adjust to the world market. This strategy was pushed through with the help of a new lending policy which tied new loans to concrete commitments of the receiving countries to structural adjustment. Structural adjustment, again, helped to mobilize resources but deepened social inequality. What is more, the debt problem in spite of new programmes of debt reduction was not solved. Instead, the 1990s saw the advent of two large financial crises in which the world economic organizations played a highly controversial role.
17. See Kratochwil and Ruggie (1986), Cortell and Davis (1996), Finnemore and Sikkink (1998), Checkel (1999), Martin and Simmons (2001), Haas and Haas (2002) and Wiener (2004).
18. The principle *cuius regio eius religio* was not directly mentioned in the Westphalian treaties but was already established earlier with the Augsburgian Peace of 1555. Under the Westphalian treaty the rulers were obliged to grant the right to emigrate to religious dissenters.
19. In the EU and the Organization of American States, adherence to democracy has become a condition of membership.
20. See the now extensive constructivist literature on how norms matter started off by Kratochwil (1989).
21. This is the reason for Jackson's plea to think in terms of adjusting the Westphalian system to new global concerns rather than to discard it (Jackson, 2000). These issues have long been an object of debate within the inter-American system. The US policy of a discriminatory recognition of governments that reacted to frequent coups in Latin America was regarded by the Latin Americans as a mere pretext for intervention because it was highly selective and guided by concrete US political, economic and strategic interests, not by an abstract concern for political legitimacy. Following an

older tradition of justifying intervention as anti-interventionist, the US after 1948 frequently referred to the strict and extensive prohibition of intervention in the Charter of the Organization of American States as justification of intervention in Central America and the Caribbean.

22. Thomas Pickering, cited in Reisman (2000, p. 251).
23. This is the approach of the so-called solidarist version of the English School. See Wheeler (2000), Dunne and Wheeler (1999) and Booth et al. (2001).
24. This is what happened in the Soviet Union where the CSCE process helped to establish a domestic space for a discourse on reform in most of the socialist countries.
25. Compare the cooperation of the US with the Latin American military during the 1970s and early 1980s, which it had itself helped to bring to power.

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Part III

Democracy, Peace and War: Perspectives from Political and Sociological Theory

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6
On Democratic War Theory

Nicholas Rengger[1]

It seems only a few short years ago that it was quietly, but increasingly, felt that war, that oldest and most permanent feature of world politics, was gradually declining in both incidence and utility. Eminent scholars from a variety of disciplines assembled to pronounce its imminent, if not demise, at least reduction, transformation or limitation to an ever-shrinking area of the world's surface. The military historian John Keegan, famously (if foolishly) pronounced at the end of his classic study *The Face of Battle*, 'The suspicion remains that battle is abolishing itself' (1976, p. 343); and, as international relations scholars will well know, Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye's venerable *Power and Interdependence* (1977, subtitled significantly 'world politics in transition' and now in its third edition) trumpeted as one of its key assumptions, the declining utility of military force among states enmeshed in relationships of complex interdependence. Of course, such scholars did not say that war had abolished itself, or that there was no utility in military force. It was a question of a trend, a direction, rather than a description.

Perhaps the most celebrated thesis to have emerged from this nexus of ideas and practices is known by various names. It is called, according to taste or preference, the democratic peace, the liberal peace or (sometimes) the liberal-democratic peace thesis. Its central claim is the deceptively simple one that democracies do not, or are very unlikely to, make war against other democracies, whatever might be their attitude towards other kinds of state. Held to originate in Kant's celebrated essay *Zum Ewigen Frieden*, penned in 1795, it has been retrieved and developed since the mid-1980s by an increasingly long and influential list of scholars and, latterly, policy-makers as well[2] and even under the obviously less than ideal conditions of the present time, retains the aura of something approaching orthodoxy in certain circles. This despite the

fact that we now also constantly hear of the appearance of new wars (Kaldor, 1999), of a revolution in military affairs, of virtual wars (Ignatieff, 2000), of the growing interpenetration of the media, industry, government and the military that will create virtuous wars (Der Derian, 2001), of the rise of 'humane warfare' (Coker, 2000), of the significance and importance of humanitarian intervention (Wheeler, 2000) and even of the transformation of war itself (Van Creveld, 1991).

Societies that would identify themselves as liberal societies[3] have perhaps found these developments especially problematic – and have consequently all the more eagerly seized upon the democratic peace thesis in part (as we shall see) because they have long had an ambiguous relationship to the use of force. While they have been prepared to use force, and indeed have done so with unprecedented lethality both before and during the twentieth century,[4] many contemporary liberals see the continuing utility of force in politics as a standing rebuke to the way in which they understand the character of liberal politics. For such individuals, the purpose of liberal politics, indeed part of its principal *raison d'être*, was to tame the excesses of sovereign power, and sovereign power is rarely as sovereign, or as powerful, as when it is comporting itself in military guise.

In this short chapter, I cannot treat any of these developments with the care or detail they deserve. Rather, I shall seek to do three things: first, to situate the origin of the appeal of the democratic peace thesis in an account of the evolution of European responses to war over the last few hundred years; secondly, to suggest that in seeking to establish the truth of the empirical claim that democracies do not fight one another, advocates of the thesis must recognize that there is, then, a reason for using force to create democracies and thus secure international peace and stability – in other words that the 'flip side', so to speak, of the democratic peace thesis is a democratic war thesis (already prefigured in the history of democratic thought and practice in any case). Finally, I shall argue that the thesis profoundly misunderstands the one claim it needs to make above all others – that there is a clear and direct relationship between regimes and political behaviour and practices. I shall then close these remarks with a brief consideration of one implication of these three points.

6.1 The origins of the thesis[5]

To start with, let me try and situate the emergence of this thesis in the history of political thought about the relationship between war and

politics. I shall take it as axiomatic that such a discussion concentrates on the moral relationship between the two – even if it also asks whether there is such a relationship. It is a familiar point that there are essentially three moral positions that can be taken about the organized use of force by political communities. That it is never justified, that justification in moral terms is hardly the point and that, given its inevitability in our world, we should seek justification in other terms and that it can, under certain circumstances be justified. By far the commonest positions, of course, are variations on the latter two, a point that holds across cultures and across time.[6] What is perhaps especially interesting is that the closer one looks the more blurred the boundaries between these two positions become. Generally speaking even the most hardened *realpolitiker* does not say that there is no 'moral' justification of war at all; rather they tend to see such justifications as being broadly based in some form of instrumental or consequentialist reasoning where the key assumption lies in the already given value of political community and, therefore, the requirement to use lethal force to enhance, glorify or protect it. This, for example, is the defence offered for Athenian imperialism by Pericles in the funeral oration (Thucydides, 1989; Brown et al., 2002, Ch. 1), and it is interesting and significant (in the context of Thucydides' overall position especially) that although the versions of this view offered in the Mytelenian debate and, even more famously, the Melian dialogue, differ in certain respects, they are recognizably variations on a theme (cf. Brown et al., 2002, Ch. 1). It is also significant that the 'Athenian thesis', as Thucydides presents it, is an explicitly 'democratic' one (though, of course, not a liberal one). More of this later.

Equally, however, more common moral justifications of war often rely on certain – usually unstated – assumptions about the prior moral worth of self-defence or of righting wrongs, or protecting those who cannot protect themselves and recognizes that there may be circumstances where 'one must do evil that good may come'. An example would be Michael Walzer's condition of 'supreme emergency' (1977) to which I shall briefly return later. It is also the case that people who fight wars, generally speaking have a conception of their calling which imposes certain restraints or at least rules on the activity. What Michael Ignatieff (1998) has called the 'warrior's honour' may not wholly be a moral virtue, but it is certainly partly that. Christopher Coker (2003) has recently argued that there are two broad justifications for war, which he terms instrumental and existential, and suggests that only in the latter case is there a role for 'warriors' as such. In the former case, everything is ultimately reducible to consequences and here 'warriors' themselves

have only an instrumental value. I think there is something to this, but before we can see exactly what, I want to offer a rather schematic account of certain ways in which Europeans at least have thought about the judgement of war over the last 500 years. Of course, these should be seen as ideal types rather than historically particular traditions of thought. Nonetheless, I think something like them are clearly recognizable.

6.2 The heroic response

We might call the first the 'heroic' response to war and it runs something like this. War is ugly, it is true, but it is also a peculiarly human institution. Other animals fight and kill; only human beings make war. And as a human institution, it is an inevitably evaluative practice and it is equally inevitably subject, in a certain sense at least, to rules. In this context, it is in war that both the highs and the lows of human behaviour are most famously manifest, most especially the idea of the fusion of the individual and the collective and the notion of the sacrifice. It is no accident that among the most powerful and totemic myths of Western culture from ancient times to our own is the warrior hero. As Joseph Campbell pointed out in his exhaustive study of the hero myth (1963), the hero may have a thousand faces but most of these are variations of the face of the warrior and, as Barbara Ehrenreich (1997) has also argued, the fact that war has been sacralized in almost all human cultures speaks to its power and centrality in our moral self-evaluation.

This response was fashioned out of very disparate strands. Ancient virtue, medieval chivalry, Renaissance ideas of the courtier, aristocratic honour and the republican tradition in political thought all played a part in it. Its social face is observable in the ritualistic and long-standing evolution of the duel in Western culture and in the emergence and spread of highly advanced techniques of fencing (for example) during and after the Renaissance which became a central way in which the nobility of Europe expressed the essence of what made them noble. The guiding spirit of this response to war is the idea of honour. Initially, this was personal honour but very swiftly honour was held to apply collectively and communally as well as individually, hence the centrality of national 'honour' in the international relations of modernity.

6.3 The realpolitik response

This 'heroic' mode existed, however, alongside a response that saw war as simply the pursuit of state interest. This response was fashioned out

of the emergence and evolution of the idea of *raison d'état* in early modern Europe, and out of the assumptions that underlay the Westphalian settlement that sovereigns have the power to make war for their own purposes. Its key concern was for the maximization of state – and later national – interest and war was seen largely, and sometimes simply, as a vehicle for this. Its presiding genius in the early modern period was perhaps Cardinal Richelieu, but its greatest philosopher was Clausewitz, who saw more clearly than anyone else what this idea represented.

In modern times, especially, this mode has been expressed in a way that gives credence to Coker's claim that the great alternative to what he calls 'existential' ideas about war is an explicitly 'instrumental' understanding of war. Although Clausewitz may not have been guilty of this *reductio ad absurdum* himself,[7] it is certainly how many of his most famous students and followers have tended to see it (cf. Paret, 1986) and certainly how some of the more influential contemporary strategic thinkers have seen it (cf. Gray, 1999; Luttwak, 1985). Of course, instrumentality does not mean a denial of the obvious fact that men fight wars and therefore the human element in warfare (courage, cowardice, heroism, tragedy) cannot be ignored; nonetheless it places the emphasis on a particular aspect of the relationship between politics and war: that of war's utility.

6.4 The 'compassionate' response

Yet, there has also been another response to war, a response usually rooted in Christian objections to violence. Certainly a minority view – at least until the mid-late nineteenth century – it has nevertheless been a persistent and powerful counterpoint to the dominant traditions from the eighteenth century onwards. Let us call it the 'compassionate' response.

On this view, war was the greatest mistake imaginable. The war system – though nobody called it that then – a disastrous and hugely wasteful spectacle, the heroism empty and the skill and ingenuity deployed grotesquely misplaced. Strong elements of this view can be found in many of the Renaissance humanists, perhaps most famously Erasmus, whose *Moriae Encomium* and *Querela Pacis* provide perhaps the most eloquent statement of this view into modern times (cf. Skinner, 1978). Yet it was not simply famous and well-known humanists who believed this. Echoes of it can be found in much religious writing in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, especially in the writings of the peace churches, Quakers, Mennonites and Anabaptists, in the late seventeenth and eighteenth century (cf. Caedel, 1996). It is retained in

some of the eighteenth-century writings on the idea and possibility of perpetual peace (for example, the Abbé de St Pierre's famous *Projet sur paix perpetuelle*) and it permeates much of the thinking of the Enlightenment in politics, especially, for example, the writings on international relations of Rousseau and Kant (of which more in a moment).

6.5 The dominant synthesis

It is not, perhaps, too fanciful to suggest that by the mid eighteenth century, the dominant response to the interrelationship of war and politics is best seen as a synthesis of the heroic and the realpolitik responses. Many in European society bemoaned war's follies, while heaping praise on those who took part in it. It was an uneasy synthesis for its roots took it in contrary directions. If one stays within the limits of the interests of one's state, then wars become tameable, controllable. One does not fight for glory, rather for – political, military or economic – profit. 'For the good of the state', as Dumas' Richelieu tells Lady de Winter, becomes the hallmark of this synthesis, and, of course, it was concomitantly popular among those charged with (or who charged themselves with) state responsibility. However, the heroic element in the synthesis often threatened to pull it in the opposite direction. The practices of war in the eighteenth century – the 'honours of war', the significance of 'colours' and so on – are all hallmarks of the heroic response and the extent to which honour and virtue were seen as inextricably interwoven with the fabric of combat made it very difficult to simply see war as a 'profit and loss' occupation.

The synthesis, however, held; and it held for the strongest of reasons. Simply put, it allowed the political and martial classes in Europe to do what they felt they needed to do and allowed them to justify it, both to themselves and to others. For this reason the heroic/realpolitik synthesis remained the dominant view of the relationship between war and politics in the Westphalian system for most of the post-medieval period. Indeed, one might see it as an abstraction from the practices of that settlement; a way of framing and making sense of the evolving character of European politics after the fraying and ultimate collapse of medieval assumptions.[8] Until, that is, 1914.

6.6 The synthesis in the twentieth century

The fate of this synthesis in the twentieth century is easily summarized. It is the story of the slow rise to prominence of the compassionate mode

and the collapse of the synthesis for the simple reason that the heroic mode was increasingly untenable as a partner to realpolitik. These two phenomena are, of course, related but not, I think, causally related. The decline in the acceptability of the heroic mode has a number of principal sources; unquestionably the most important was the growth of mass politics through the nineteenth and early to mid twentieth centuries. Coupled with this was the manifest incongruence of the traditional virtues of the 'warrior' and the weapons increasingly used for fighting wars. The decline of cavalry and the rise of industrial technology does nothing directly to damage realpolitik, but it clearly makes the heroic image of the warrior more and more difficult to maintain. It is, however, also true that the decreasing acceptability of certain of the mainstays of the 'heroic' scale of values (duelling, for example) – which was, in part, caused by the rising acceptability of the compassionate response – contributed to the heroic mode's decline.

If realpolitik had left the nineteenth century still allied with the heroic response, it quickly became associated with something else. As Karl Dietrich Bracher (1984) has pointed out, the twentieth century is the 'age of ideologies' and it was ideology, as well as interest, that became the hallmark of realpolitik during the twentieth century. There were a number of reasons for this. Again to quote Bracher, one of the hallmarks of ideological politics in the modern age is its need to justify itself and what we might call its 'manner of action'. This is as true of liberal democracy as it was of liberal democracy's opponents. This development had three specific implications on which it is worth dwelling here. First, the inevitable result of the alliance between realpolitik and ideology was to colour the requirements of realpolitik to include ideological (and not just state) interests, and the logical corollary of this was that the sphere of geopolitical competition became much greater. Second, and flowing directly from the first, this inevitably meant that war in the twentieth century would increase the tendency already witnessed through the nineteenth to become 'total' – at least in the sense of committing all of the resources of the state behind its cause. Mass politics played its part here too, of course. Third, given the technological changes of the twentieth century it almost inevitably meant that war would be much bloodier than it had been in the past (the warning of the American Civil War was there for all to see, but few were looking).[9]

Given that, in much of Europe, the rise of the compassionate response had gone hand in hand with a firm belief in progress and the rise of human (or at least European) civilization to the point at which

major powers would no longer use war to settle their disputes, it is not surprising that war, when it did come in 1914, provided such an existential as well as a political shock. It is this shock that, according to Paul Fussell (1977) among others, helps to make the perceptions of the First World War the paradigmatic perceptions of war for most Europeans and Americans in the twentieth century, and despite the attempts of more recent historians (like Niall Ferguson, 1998) to tell a somewhat different story about the war, it is Fussell's interpretation that has stuck. His point is not about what the war was actually like, only about how it was perceived and remembered and what effect this had on how we in the West saw war for the rest of the century.

The heroic response to war died, it might be said, in Flanders field and the result of that was simple: a Western world divided between those who saw war as simply one aspect of state policy among many (in fact very few), those who saw it as anathema under any circumstances, and those who saw it – when they thought of it at all – as a terrible necessity. However, the logic of the latter view is that war should only be fought when something 'really valuable' is at stake and, given the ideological orientation of the century, that will more often than not translate into fighting a war only when national existence, or values which amount to the same thing, are at risk, and under those circumstances, as Michael Walzer suggests in *Just and Unjust Wars* (1977), the maxim that necessity knows no law is likely to be omnipresent. In other words, realpolitik wedded to ideology is likely to produce 'total' war and the apotheosis of instrumental rationality in the context of judgement.

It is, I suggest, against this reality that the compassionate response in the latter part of the twentieth century has largely oriented itself. For advocates of the compassionate view, war must sometimes be fought, but it must also be possible to fight it justly and well. That is the only way to avoid the excesses of ideological war and of wholly instrumental realpolitik. As so often in this context, it is Michael Walzer who is the lodestar of the debate. His defence of the Second World War (1973) as the paradigm case of a justifiable war in the modern context (written against the background of his opposition to the Vietnam War being waged as he was writing) sets the context for his hugely influential rewriting of the just war tradition, but it is significant in this context that he starts from a position which largely accepts much of the ground of the realpolitik position, an acceptance which only becomes fully fleshed out in *Just and Unjust Wars* with his understanding of the requirements of 'supreme emergency'. It is in this context that many writers, convinced of the intractability of the problem of war, but

equally shying away from the bluntness of the realpolitik position, cast around for something that would enable a response to war compatible with the compassionate approach but allowing a meaningful deployment of the idea of legitimate force. And this search led to two things. First, the rediscovery of perhaps the most generally significant aspect of the Western tradition of moral and political thought regarding war, the just war tradition, which I have treated elsewhere (Rengger, 2002, 2004) and so will not emphasize on this occasion, and second to the development of the 'democratic peace' thesis.

6.7 Democratic peace, or democratic war

So the origins of the thesis, and the reasons for its appeal in contemporary circumstances, seem clear. What claims must advocates of the thesis make if it is to carry conviction? To begin with, it is important to emphasize from the start one central claim without which the democratic peace thesis (along with much else besides) would be simply impossible. This claim is rarely argued for in *more geometrico* for the simple reason that it is so central to dominant aspects of modern European thought it is hardly considered at all any more. The claim, put at its simplest, is the claim that we (and to whomsoever we might want to see the 'we' as referring) can make 'progress', by which is meant not simply a technical or material improvement but an epistemological, moral and/or even an ontological one. Of course, 'the idea of progress' is often said to be one of those ideas that were trampled under the hooves of the charging paladins of post-structuralism, along with the belief in meta-narratives and the superiority of high culture. Yet, it is unsurprising how resilient it has proved to be. Without it, we might say, the world could not be as it is.[10]

The general debates associated with this claim need not concern me here, of course; all I am concerned with is the particular form it has come to take in thinking about war and politics and specifically how liberals and democrats have thought of it. For here the crucial point, as Michael Howard (2001) has pointed out, is that in the eighteenth century some increasingly came to see war not as a permanent feature of human experience (as was generally the case prior to the eighteenth century) but rather as a problem that could, in principle at least, be solved (that is eliminated). Of course, this was much broader than simply the belief that war need not always be with us. Rather it was a belief in the capacity of individuals and societies to reshape the character of politics such that established traditions – in this case the tradition that

there was nothing that could be done about war as such, though always things you could do about particular wars – lost their grip on the European mind. Many of the innovations in nineteenth-century international relations are traceable to this idea. The foundation of the Red Cross is a good example, as are the disarmament conferences of 1899 and 1907; the very notion of 'disarming' and 'disarmament' is dependent on the idea that, at least in principle, it is not irrational to wish, and act, for a world without war.[11] Indeed much of the history of institutional change and 'reform' in international relations in general throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries is inexplicable in the absence of this belief, and much of the negative reaction to such attempts speaks volumes about the extent to which both reformers and their opponents occupy the same essential mental universe; as Michael Oakeshott (1962) once remarked apropos Hayek's critique of centralized planning, 'a plan to resist all planning may be preferable to its opposite, but it is still part of the same style of politics'.

And it is here that we see a second crucial assumption being made. Not only must we believe in the possibility (and possible actuality) of a world without war, but we must have a vehicle for getting us there. The chosen vehicle has, of course, been variable (Kant's *foedum pacificum*,[12] the growth of 'civilization' suggested by some in the nineteenth century,[13] economic interdependence as was hinted at by Kant and claimed more generally by Norman Angel[14] and many others), but there has been a growing conviction that it was possible, and that this possibility could be made law.

The democratic peace thesis in particular – and however it is understood in detail – depends upon the idea that there is a clear and unambiguous relationship between a political regime and its manner of acting; monarchies (for example) are war-prone (if not always warlike), republics peaceable (if not always peaceful). This claim, while it has ancient roots,[15] is traceable in its modern form to the Enlightenment. However, it is worth pointing out – especially given what I want to say at the end of my remarks – that the Enlightenment did not speak with one voice on this matter. The claim is frequently associated with Montesquieu's *De l'esprit des lois* and a widely cited passage in the context is his claim that 'the spirit of Monarchy is war and enlargement of dominion; peace and moderation are the spirit of a republic' (Montesquieu, 1949, p. 5). From this it followed that if you changed the social form of Europe from monarchy to liberal republics, you would abolish war. However, Montesquieu's point is actually the rather different one that war is not a feature of the human condition but

rather of social form; the character of the 'spirit of the laws' determines a society's predilection towards or away from the use of force, but it is a mistake to equate the spirit of the laws, as Montesquieu understands this, with constitutional form.

The thinker who certainly does make this claim – and as I have already said in contemporary terms he is easily the most influential advocate of the democratic peace *avant la lettre*, as it were – is Immanuel Kant. In a series of essays published in the 1780s and 1790s, Kant outlined a subtle and philosophically rich account of human social development that suggested, first, that properly republican states would have little to go to war over and, second, that history was effectively creating a situation where more and more states would become republican. However, for Kant, this was not irrevocable (or at least not so in any meaningful timescale) and so republican states had to look to protect themselves from states that would be, for a long time, in the majority. To this end, he thought, they should create a *foedus pacificum*, or pacific union of republican states, peaceful towards one another but prepared to defend each other against aggression. However, it is important to see that, for Kant, his philosophical history and moral philosophy were meant to go hand in hand; as I have put it elsewhere, what we might call his phenomenal teleology reinforces his noumenal teleology and vice versa.

This way of thinking is entirely characteristic of the dominant tenor of post-Enlightenment[16] thinking about war (as also it is, indeed, of thinking about many other topics). It assumes that the problem of war is essentially solvable if we move away from political and social forms that encourage it (monarchy or the 'martial spirit', for example) and towards political and social forms that discourage it (liberal republics/democracies) and that there is a historical process that can bring this about. This has given liberal thinking on war in general an institutional flavour which has permeated much of the international relations theory of the twentieth century, from Alfred Zimmern's *League of Nations and the Rule of Law* in 1936 to the most recent edition of Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye's *Power and Interdependence* published in 2001, and has been absolutely central to writing about democratic peace.

It is for this reason that Kant believed that a progressivist philosophy of history was required to turn this argument from a fairly banal one relating regimes to behaviour, prefigured in antiquity, to a much more significant comment on the emerging possibilities for humankind. Without what Kant famously called an 'idea for a universal history with a cosmopolitan purpose' (Kant, 1784) which emphasized the extent to

which republics would, over time, become the norm in international politics, his thesis is merely a recognition of the fact that republics would have to wage war – and perhaps wage it with considerable ferocity – if they were to survive in a world where most states were still not republics and were, in all probability, hostile to such republics. The other face of the *foedus pacificum* is a democratic war theory, an account of how and why republics will fight wars and a recognition that such wars may be very fierce and very frequent until such time as the *foedus pacificum* covers the earth.

Modern versions of the democratic peace thesis have alternated about what, in particular, has been the key factor in explaining peace between democracies. Is it perhaps democratic political mechanisms (Russett, 1993)? Or a liberal political culture (cf. Zakaria, 2003)? Or a combination of these things coupled with an active free market and trade? Or the salience and binding force of international institutions? Or all of the above? But the key points, of course, are that, firstly, whatever factor is identified should be seen as having, potentially at least, universal scope and secondly, that however interpreted the key assumption has to be that there is a direct and unmediated connection between a liberal democratic political regime and its behaviour in regard of war.

But on this there is surely an additional point to be made. If it is the case that the royal road to international peace and security runs through the establishment of democratic societies then surely there is a logic for seeking to create as many democracies as possible; even, perhaps, imposing them. Is it too fanciful to see something like this as at least part of the rationale for certain actions of the Bush administration since its epiphany of 11 September 2001? Democratic peace is, after all, still part of the semi-official rhetoric of the US government, and many have sought to suggest that a democratic Iraq, purged of the tyranny of Saddam Hussein, might be a beacon for the rest of the Middle East in terms first of democracy, then of peace. In other words, the democratic peace thesis is perhaps at least as available for those who would advocate the use of force as it is for those who are seeking to restrain such use. Many other features of contemporary international relations would seem to nudge us in this general direction as well, for example the burgeoning literature on 'humanitarian' intervention (Wheeler, 2000; Holzgrefe and Keohane, 2003).

6.8 A contested consciousness?

This point needs further elaboration and so it is as well to state the thesis as boldly as one can. The democratic peace thesis in both its Kantian and its modern forms depends upon there being a clear and

traceable link between regime type and certain kinds of behaviour. The chief problem for the democratic peace thesis (however it is expressed) is that it is very difficult to see how such a link might exist, or could be shown. To begin with 'liberal democracies' are themselves enormously diverse. Of course they have certain institutional similarities, which is why it is fair enough to call them by a common name, but it is equally certain that there are many differences. For there to be anything properly meaningful in the democratic peace thesis, however, one would have to say that when push came to shove it was the 'liberal democratic' aspect of a political community that mattered most, that this aspect of country A or B would overcome national or ethnic partiality, religious sensibility (or lack of it) or simple perspective of profit and loss. Yet it seems unlikely that this would necessarily be the case; surely it would depend upon the context. In which case one is looking for the context in which the existence of a democratic (or liberal democratic) political culture will lead to a certain kind of political behaviour, and, indeed, some theorists of democratic peace have done just this.

Yet even here, the implications for liberal democratic peace are not really as rosy as many of its advocates would have us believe, for the sort of strategy discussed in the above section is deeply problematic. Not only do 'really existing democracies' of course differ between themselves, in many ways and for many reasons, it is surely also reasonable to suppose further that even the specific form of government we might describe as liberal (or representative) democracy will have many fault lines within it. Michael Oakeshott, most especially in *On Human Conduct* (1975), has perhaps elaborated this claim best and I want to fill out this part of my argument by considering his presentation of it. It consists essentially in the claim that modern European states – liberal democratic states – inherit a political vocabulary that is radically polarized between two different, and opposing, understandings of the character of the political association and the office of its government.[17] Oakeshott famously describes these two understandings by borrowing two Latin terms from Roman private law: *societas* and *universitas*.[18] The former term denotes a mode of association which has

> agents who by choice or circumstance are related to one another so as to comprise an identifiable association of a certain sort. The tie which joins them . . . is not that of an engagement in an enterprise to pursue a common substantive purpose or to promote a common interest, but that of loyalty to one another, the conditions of which may achieve the formality denoted by the kindred word legality. (Oakeshott, 1975, p. 202)

For Oakeshott, a state understood in these terms is thus a *civitas*, a civil association, 'and its government (whatever its constitution) is a nomocracy whose laws are understood as conditions of conduct, not devices instrumental to the satisfaction of preferred wants' (1975, p. 203). *Universitas*, by contrast, is understood as

> persons associated in a manner such as to constitute them a natural person; a partnership of persons which is itself a person, or in some important respects like a person (. . .) [and] a state understood in terms of *universitas* is (. . .) an association of intelligent agents who recognize themselves to be engaged upon the joint enterprise of seeking the satisfaction of some common substantive want (. . .) government here may be said to be teleocratic, the management of a purposive concern. (1975, p. 203)

Oakeshott's point in his essay is to emphasize the extent to which the modern European political consciousness is a polarized one and that these are its poles. As he also points out, however, it is the latter understanding that has been – by far – the more popular over the course of the last 150 years. And he suggests some powerful reasons for this. Among these is the claim – I think indisputable – that there are certain changes in modern European history that have given powerful support to the 'enterprise' association understanding, chief among them what he calls 'the demands of modern war' (1975, p. 322). In other words, if we may adapt the phrase of Charles Tilly 'war made the state and the state made war' (1975b, p. 42) – but the state that war made was a state understood in a certain way, as an enterprise association. To this needs to be added the increasingly powerful sense of modern states as agents of the distribution of goods that aim at the satisfaction of particular wants, a sense made progressively more powerful by the rise of mass politics and the interests that this itself generated (cf. Lasch, 1991).

Taken together, all of these things have created in liberal democratic states an orientation that is heavily disposed to see itself in terms of an enterprise association, and a central component of this understanding is the ordering of a society for war. Of course, the common enterprise for which force may be used will shift over time; it may be obviously material in one generation – access to the goods and services of the empire, the 'expansion of England' and so forth – and more ideational in another – intervention for humanitarian purposes, perhaps. Nonetheless, central to the understanding of a liberal democratic state as an enterprise association is a willingness to see a 'common purpose' for

which, under at least some circumstances, force is an entirely appropriate response. Far from an 'enterprise association' which happens to be a democracy being necessarily pacific, it will be organized for war in terms of its politics, even when there is no prospect of it fighting any really threatening enemies; as Oakeshott says, the habits learnt through endless preparation for war are retained in times of relative peace.

One does not have to accept the whole of Oakeshott's case to accept that what we today call 'liberal democratic states' are a very odd ragbag, and that there is little reason to believe that the mere fact of them all possessing, in some form and to some degree, liberal politics and democratic institutions generates any particular commonality of behaviour. But if that is the case, then the democratic peace thesis, at least as a thesis, disappears. In order for it to be plausible, we need the direct link between regime type and behaviour that the above argument has suggested is impossible. There is no such direct link because inasmuch as modern states are the inheritors of this polarized consciousness, the mere fact of them being liberal democratic states will matter much less than the character of the association they imagine themselves to be. The full significance of this claim I want to gesture towards in my concluding section.

6.9 Conclusion

I said at the outset that I wanted to close these remarks by offering a thought about one particular implication of the foregoing. Before I do, however, I want to emphasize that none of the above suggests that there are not good reasons for supposing that liberal democracy is a system of government that offers much, in international relations as in other areas. I would even go so far as to suggest that there are good reasons for supposing that at least in principle the opportunities for peaceable behaviour are greater in states that are liberal democracies than in many other kinds of regime.[19] But the crucial word here is opportunity. Understood as *societas*, representative/liberal democracies have the possibility of adopting forms of self-understanding that limit the occasion for the legitimate use of force. And, as Oakeshott argues, this is a feature of one way of understanding the character of politics which certainly can flourish in a liberal democracy, and perhaps might be especially congruent with aspects of liberal democracy (though it is not limited to liberal democracy). The problem is that, for liberal democracies as we witness them today, as Oakeshott also suggests, this particular articulation of the character of politics has shrunk, in some

cases at least, to a whisper, though it has not, I think, ever been eliminated in its entirety.

However, a final thought might be worth offering here. The liberal democratic peace thesis – as a *thesis*, that is to say as a hypothesis about the political world – represents, it seems to me, in a particularly pure form, an error common in the history of European political thought over the last 200 years and especially common today and to which Oakeshott also points (1975, pp. 272–4). This is simply the confusion between describing the character of a regime, that is a particular set of constitutional arrangements, and disclosing the logic of a certain mode of association. As Oakeshott says, 'belligerence is alien to civil association' (1975, p. 273), but this has nothing specifically to do with the constitutional arrangements (republican, liberal or whatever) of a putative civil association and everything to do with how one understands the logic of association itself.

This error has a number of very unfortunate corollaries in many different contexts. It not only *conflates* regime type with mode of association but it allows for the identification of certain kinds of *behaviour* with certain kinds of regime rather than, as would be much better, the logics inherent to a certain mode of association. Moreover, it tends to encourage the belief that one can change or adapt behaviour deemed desirable or undesirable for various reasons by changing the relevant regime. This gives an additional impetus, if one were needed, for liberal democratic enterprise associations actually to prosecute war to bring about 'regime change' and therefore secure changes in behaviour. There certainly seems to be something of this logic behind at least some justifications of the United States' invasion of Iraq in 2003.[20]

In other words this kind of conflation, especially given the other aspects of the character of contemporary liberal democracy mentioned above, might even make democracies *more* war-prone rather than the reverse. Of course, the liberal democratic peace thesis is really about states that are already 'liberal democratic' so it is not necessarily invalidated per se by this. Yet, given the point made above it would seem to be unlikely that the mere fact of a liberal constitution could make a state that was already effectively an enterprise association naturally pacific. Only the logic of civil association could do that.[21] So a world composed largely of liberal democracies conceptualized as enterprise associations might not be any less war-prone than the existing international system, and indeed, in some respects, it might be more so.

Nonetheless, and for all the scepticism that I have offered in this chapter, it is worth saying that the democratic peace thesis at least

serves to remind us of important questions, largely ignored by political science and international relations scholarship in recent decades, and for that we should be grateful. What is exactly the relationship between political regime, logic of association and political action? Can 'liberal democracy' as a political form survive scepticism towards the progressivist narratives in which it was originally rooted? Is it in fact, just one 'political form' at all? Do we need a philosophical history to ground hopeful political action (even perhaps other kinds of action)? And what form should that history then take? Only the most churlish of sceptics could begrudge some thanks to the democratic peace thesis for having made such questions fashionable again. It is just a pity that most of its advocates wanted so much more for it; they wanted it to be true.

Notes

1. This chapter has its origins in a series of papers I have written over the last few years on the general question of the evaluation of war. The papers, much revised and rewritten, will – eventually – I hope emerge as a book called *The Judgement of War*. I am very grateful to all who have commented on any of those papers, or discussed them with me, for enriching my understanding, clarifying my errors and in one case especially (you know who you are) correcting my prose. Special thanks then to Michael Bentley, Chris Brown, Christopher Coker, John Gray, Ian Hall, Renee Jeffery, Tony Lang, Caroline Kennedy-Pipe, Terry Nardin, Onora O'Neill, Noel O'Sullivan, Oliver Richmond, Mitchell Rologas, Joel Rosenthal, Chandra Sriram and William Walker.
2. See, for example, the *locus classicus* of the modern version of the argument, Michael Doyle (1983a, b, 1986) – periodically updated and reprinted. The most exhaustive (not to say exhausting) social scientific version of the thesis can be found in Bruce Russett's *Grasping the Democratic Peace* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993).
3. In what follows I use the term 'liberal' (with, as they say a 'small' l) to imply a wide range of broadly constitutional positions in contemporary political thought. Thus many of those 'liberals' who see a central feature of liberal politics as the abolition of war (in principle at least) might see themselves as some way to the left of conventional liberals, and may indeed be so. Equally, some who are happy to be 'realists' in international affairs may indeed be unimpeachably 'liberal' in domestic politics. For my purposes here all are liberal.
4. For an interesting, if I think rather overstated version of this case, see Hanson (2001).
5. Aspects of this section were developed in a paper jointly written with Caroline Kennedy-Pipe and delivered at the February 2001 meeting of the International Studies Association in Chicago. I am very grateful to Caroline for allowing me to reuse some of our joint material in this context.
6. For informative discussions of the general position of world philosophies on such questions see David Cooper's excellent *World Philosophies* (1996).

7. For a defence of Clausewitz on this point see Gallie (1978, Ch. 2).
8. Useful discussions of the intellectual architecture of the Westphalian settlement in this regard can be found in Bialer (1992).
9. For a brilliant discussion of the manner in which the change in the character of warfare was rationalized in modernity see Pick (1993).
10. I have sought to elaborate more fully what is at stake in the acceptance or rejection of the idea of progress in 'Modernity and the Moral Life: Two Sensibilities' in Matti Sintonen and Thomas Wallgren (eds) *Modernity and Moral Identity* (The Hague: Kluwer, forthcoming).
11. For a wonderful illustration of this, as well as a superb discussion of the evolution of this sensibility in modern thought as a whole, see Best (1980, 1996).
12. Elaborated most fully in his essay *Zum Ewigen Frieden* (On Perpetual Peace, 1795); see Brown et al. (2002, pp. 432–50).
13. A classic discussion is Gong (1984).
14. Most famously in *The Great Illusion* (Angell, 1911).
15. There is a good deal to be said about the extent to which Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment understandings of the character of a regime (most obviously in Montesquieu and Tocqueville) draw upon ancient ideas about the 'character' of a regime and to what extent they differ from them. The most obvious difference is the emphasis, certainly in both Plato and Aristotle, of the equivalence between the soul and the city – Plato's discussion of the declining character of the souls/cities in books 8 and 9 of the *Republic* is an example – of which there is no real equivalent. However, there are other differences as well. For good discussions of the idea of the regime and its effect in antiquity see Kurt von Fritz (1954) and an even older classic, Alfred Zimmern (1911). Much contemporary writing from the friends and admirers of the late Leo Strauss has also stressed the importance of the notion of the regime and has also considered its modern imitators. Good examples would be Thomas Pangle's interpretive essay to his (excellent) translation of the *Laws* (1980). For his take on the Enlightenment version see his *Montesquieu's Philosophy of Liberalism* (1973). For a much more recent discussion, specifically on Aristotle, but very good on the idea of the regime and its significance, see Bernard Yack (1993).
16. In this context I mean post-Enlightenment in the sense of following on *in the spirit of* the Enlightenment, not merely chronologically post-Enlightenment.
17. Similar in form, though not at all in content, is Quentin Skinner's development of two equally differing accounts of what he calls 'our common life'; one which sees sovereignty as a possession of the people, the other of the state; one emphasizes the citizen, the other the sovereign. This is implied in his *The Foundations of Modern Political Thought* (1978), but developed much more explicitly in his three-volume *Visions of Politics* (2003). Note, for interest, Oakeshott's critique of Skinner in his review of *The Foundations* in the *Historical Journal*, 23, 2 (1980), pp. 449–53.
18. A rather different deployment of these ideas, in connection with international relations – indeed as modes of understanding international society itself – can be found in Nardin (1983).
19. Though not, by definition, all other kinds of regimes.

20. Witness, for example, some of Paul Wolfowitz's comments in an article printed in *Prospect*, November 2004.
21. Which, of course, does not mean that such societies would be pacifist. As even Oakeshott admits, some small admixture of common purpose in time of war is inevitable and quite right, and even civil associations would and should defend themselves. This raises the question of the balance between the two poles, not the claim one should abandon either pole. I do not have the space to discuss this at any length here, however.

7

Spotting the 'Enemy'? Democracies and the Challenge of the 'Other'

Anna Geis

Introduction: is there anything wrong with democracy?[1]

The bulk of mainstream democratic peace research is implicitly founded on an idealizing model of Western democracy inspired by the ideas of the Enlightenment: state actors and citizens are assumed to be rational people governed by the imperatives of reason, compromise and settlement, and capable of moral learning. Critical students of democratic peace have thus pointed out that its orthodox position embraces a faith in the moral and political superiority of democracies (MacMillan, 2004b). The scientific debate on democratic peace merely reflects a political self-image that considers the Western democratic regime type as more moral and efficient than others. Today, 'democracy' – a concept that was criticized and rejected by many opponents during most of historical time – has acquired the admirable status of an unquestionably desirable regime type.[2] A rather optimistic view on the future development of international politics even concludes that the international system culturally selects for the democratic regime type. The global 'victory' of democracy especially after 1989 suggests that the norms of the liberal pacific union produce international socialization effects and pressures upon non-democracies that might eventually lead to the global spread of the norms of a Kantian peace culture (Harrison, 2004).

So why ask whether there is anything wrong with democracy? Why spoil this positive outlook on democracy and democratic peace? Because this presentation of democratic states only highlights their benign features and obscures all the exclusionary political discourses and practices that are not in accordance with the positive self-image of democracies. This chapter thus focuses on this troubling side of democracies that is well highlighted in the recent policies of 'counterterrorism' of

some of the leading Western democracies. I do not intend to engage in democracy-bashing but to draw attention to the ever-present possibility of democratic politics to undermine and eventually abolish itself, and to favour exclusion and violence inside and outside of its borders. The normative underpinning of my argument is the insight that becoming critically self-aware of those troubling tendencies can help advancing the civilianization of politics, and that democratic peacefulness will crucially depend on cultivating civic virtues and inclusive discourses and practices in today's democracies. So the aim of this chapter is to point out some of the threats to a regime type that indeed has to be considered normatively preferable to others, and that is only very imperfectly 'democratic' today.[3] In contrast to much of mainstream democratic peace research, this chapter takes a more reserved stance on actually existing democracies' politics: the implicit optimism of most research on democratic peace seems hardly warranted if one turns to other crucial debates in social science. Many studies in democratic theory and sociology deal with phenomena of domestic disintegration and crises that should caution against an all too optimistic view on the future of democratic peace.

In what follows, I look more closely at the United States' policies of counterterrorism after the attacks of 11 September 2001 and its renewed construction of enemy images such as 'global terrorism', 'axis of evil' or 'rogue states'. This certainly special case is apt to reveal, if in an extreme manner, a challenge which *any* state faces, be it democratic or not – but which a democracy can be expected to meet in a more rational way: the handling of (sometimes extreme) difference, the coming to terms with people and cultures (sometimes extremely) 'other' than one's own. It will be discussed why the construction of threats and 'others' is still ubiquitous in today's democratic polities and not merely a distinct feature of the special US political culture.

By dealing with this issue, the chapter reviews deficiencies of modern democratic societies. It proceeds in five steps: the next two sections describe the enemy images after 9/11 (7.1) and the political consequences of the US government's subsequent policies of fear and threat (7.2). I then argue that these policies can be explained by combining several *interrelated* insights from state theory (7.3), democratic theory (7.4) and the sociology of modernity (7.5). State theory reminds us that the concept of state sovereignty is dependent upon defining and continually maintaining a boundary of the inside/outside of a political community, and that governmental elites in democracies typically aim at increasing their autonomy vis-à-vis societal actors. Whereas democratic theory is

critically aware of a 'politics of identity' and domestic problems of legitimization and mobilization, the sociology of modernity points to the fundamental ambivalence of modernity and the inherent decivilizing mechanisms of modern societies – barbarism lurks within civilization itself. In conclusion from all these critical observations on state, democracy and modernity, the last section argues that the peacefulness of *all* Western democracies will be contingent upon the cultivation of civic virtues and inclusive political discourses and practices (7.6).

7.1 Fighting evil, rogues and outposts of tyrannies

It has sometimes been suggested that the terrorist attacks of Al Qaeda provided NATO with a new enemy image, with a functional substitute of communism. However, it was less NATO and 'the West' as a whole that proclaimed a subsequent 'global war on terror' against the new enemy of 'global terrorism' but the US and to a lesser extent Great Britain. It has been noted that there are vast differences between warlike rhetoric and policies of the US government and the more moderate discourses and policies of most European governments that frame terrorism as a transnational matter of combating crime (cf. Risse, 2004, p. 117). Having experienced devastating wars on their territories for centuries, most Europeans do not view themselves as being at 'war' after 9/11 while the Bush administration has often repeated that the US is living in a state of war and thus must not back down.

Since the US as the indisputable superpower of the world is able to shape international discourses and practices on security to a considerable extent, it is most important how the hegemon frames and orders its relations to others. 'When the United States speaks, the world listens, so it matters what language the United States uses.'[4] What is more, language shapes and structures reality – if US politicians persistently frame threats and reactions to threats in a rhetoric of war, this changes reality in a significant manner. Research on 'securitization' demonstrates how strongly the speech acts of powerful political actors and credited security experts do shape public perceptions, politics and policies of threat (cf. Buzan et al., 1998; Huysmans, 1998). Since 9/11, the US government has referred to four labels of international military threats that gradually became linked to each other: 'global terrorism', 'axis of evil', 'rogue states' and lately the 'outposts of tyranny'. While the former three labels served the government to justify wars against Afghanistan and Iraq, the latter might include a future 'military option' against Iran.

So how does the US government describe these new adversaries of the free and civilized world after the end of the Cold War? In his address on the evening of 11 September 2001, President Bush declared that 'our nation saw evil'.[5] In Bush's subsequent speeches, the terrorists and their actual or alleged sponsors were often called 'evil' or 'axis of evil' that must be confronted by the 'good' and 'civilized' states of the world. Although terrorists are non-state actors, the President invoked the memory of the Second World War: terrorists, he claimed, are the heirs to all murderous ideologies of the twentieth century, they follow the paths of fascism, nazism and totalitarianism. As successors of these they could 'not be appeased. They must be defeated.'[6] When Bush was attempting to win the Germans' support for a war against Iraq, he cautioned in his speech to the German Bundestag against a new totalitarian threat: 'Call it strategic challenge, call it, as I do, axis of evil, call it by whatever name you want but let us speak the truth. If we ignore this threat, we invite certain blackmail, and place millions of our citizens in grave danger.'[7]

Bush describes the new enemy – and *enemy* this 'other' is indeed often named, for example in the National Security Strategy (NSS) of 2002 – in ontological dimensions, making the enemy a demon. He is accused of barbarism, devoid of soul and conscience. What is at stake is the whole of civilization that is threatened by the barbaric enemy. The friend–enemy distinction in the realm of international relations would now be ordered according to 'the great divide in our time – not between religions or cultures, but between civilization and barbarism'.[8] Bush did not, as some misinterpreted 9/11, frame the events as Huntington's notorious 'clash of civilizations', but he envisioned here the more fundamental struggle between civilization and barbarism (cf. Kline, 2004, p. 461). And: 'Everyone must choose: You're either with the civilized world or with the terrorists.'[9] Bush did not hesitate to present a rather complex global political exigency in most simple terms and reduce the challenge for the world to simple moral choices:

> Some worry that it is somehow undiplomatic or impolite to speak the language of right and wrong. I disagree. Different circumstances require different methods, but no different moralities. Moral truth is the same in every culture, in every time, and in every place. (. . .) We are in a conflict between good and evil, and America will call evil by its name. By confronting evil and lawless regimes, we do not create a problem, we reveal a problem. And we will lead the world in opposing it.[10]

The 'evil' of 'global terrorism' poses a special challenge to politics: as non-state actors terrorists are difficult to localize, to address and to confront. In contrast to global communism that was at home in many states and could thus be identified and confronted there by the US, transnational terrorism, except for a few known leaders, has no name, face and address. It might be argued that in order to handle this diffuse threat, the US soon linked it to a group of states that was discriminated from the realm of all other states because of its alleged obnoxious, roguish behaviour (cf. Derrida, 2003, pp. 148–50). The Bush administration created the category of the 'axis of evil' and revived the label of the 'rogue states' once coined by the Clinton administration. Both labels were meant to denounce states sponsoring terrorists, violating international law and acquiring weapons of mass destruction. US President Clinton used the term 'rogue state' for the first time in 1994, and it has since been employed to refer to 'outcasts', 'outlaw regimes' or 'pariah states' such as Iran, Iraq, Cuba, Sudan, Syria, Libya and North Korea (cf. Litwak, 2000; Minnerop, 2002; Derrida, 2003, pp. 133–50). In June 2000, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright proclaimed that the US would renounce the term since positive developments in these countries allowed them now to be classified as 'states of concern'. The Bush administration, however, revived the term 'rogue state', and focused more closely on Iran, Iraq and North Korea. In order to dramatize and forcefully link the threats emanating from these quite diverse states, Bush has repeatedly depicted these three states as an 'axis of evil' (Kline, 2004; Jeffery, 2005). The US National Security Strategy of 2002 explicitly declares only Iraq and North Korea to be 'rogue states' but it also mentions 'other rogue regimes' seeking weapons of mass destruction. The NSS defines 'rogue states' as follows (NSS, 2002, pp. 13–14):

> These states brutalize their own people and squander their national resources for the personal gain of the rulers; display no regard for international law, threaten their neighbors, and callously violate international treaties to which they are party; are determined to acquire weapons of mass destruction, along with other advanced military technology, to be used as threats or offensively to achieve the aggressive designs of these regimes; sponsor terrorism around the globe; and reject basic human values and hate the United States and everything for which it stands.

The NSS proclaims that by means of terrorist acts and the potential use of weapons of mass destruction, 'rogue states' pose a new kind of

imminent threat and concludes that pre-emptive action against these states and their 'terrorist clients' is legitimate (NSS, 2002, pp. 14–15). The unilateral right to pre-emptive action is an arrogation of the US that has since been very critically discussed in international law and public (cf. Brunnée and Toope, 2004; Der Derian, 2004). The war against Iraq was in part framed as a military action necessary to stop an aggressive regime developing or even using weapons of mass destruction and colluding with terrorists. As had to be admitted afterwards by the Bush administration, these allegations were wrong.

With the second inauguration of President Bush at the beginning of 2005, a new (and equally old) classification of states was proposed: 'tyrannies' or 'outposts of tyranny'. The second term of the Bush administration started with a vigorous pledge to spread freedom and democracy in the world, with the 'ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world'. Bush addressed himself to all oppressed people that the US will not ignore their oppression, and promised 'When you stand for your liberty, we will stand with you.' In a teleological notion of history, inspired by the faith in Providence, he declared:

> By our efforts, we have lit a fire (. . .) – a fire in the minds of men. It warms those who feel its power, it burns those who fight its progress, and one day this untamed fire of freedom will reach the darkest corners of our world. (. . .) History has an ebb and flow of justice, but history also has a visible direction, set by liberty and the Author of Liberty.[11]

In a similar expression of a philosophy of history, the new Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice linked recent developments in Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, the Palestinian territories and elsewhere together to claim a further progress for democracy and freedom in the world.[12] She declared that 'Human freedom will march ahead, and we must help smooth its way.'[13] In renewed analogies to the Second World War and Cold War, Rice claims that 'America and the free world are once again engaged in a long-term struggle against an ideology of tyranny and terror, and against hatred and hopelessness.'[14] Hence President Bush has set up the US mission of spreading freedom and democracy throughout the globe. Rice identified six 'outposts of tyranny': Cuba, Burma, North Korea, Iran, Belarus and Zimbabwe, and proclaimed: 'We cannot rest until every person living in a "fear society" has finally won their freedom.'[15]

The second Bush administration thus embraces two enemy images, global terrorism and tyrannies, but the rhetoric of 'evil' seems to be on the retreat. Instead, stressing the spread of global freedom and the progress a number of non-democracies have allegedly made figures more prominently in the 'Bush doctrine'. In adopting the idea of democratic peace, Bush and Rice remain, however, rather vague about the crucial question of *how* this envisioned global progress to freedom and democracy will *come about*: will it *emerge* peacefully, or might it in some instances – in the name of the just cause of history – be violently *forced* by Western democracies? If Western democracies mistake themselves to be the designated agents of a historical mission, this will probably enhance their bellicosity.

7.2 Return of the 'foe' and the 'leviathan': fighting evil with evil?

7.2.1 The rhetoric of evil

According to an account of Peter Singer, between taking up office in January 2001 and June 2003, George W. Bush spoke about 'evil' in some 319 speeches, and he used the term as a noun far more often than as an adjective (Singer, 2004, p. 2). The avowed Christian President Bush thus speaks of 'evil' as a force, a 'thing', and by this reveals a simple dualistic Manichean world view. This dualistic world view 'precludes the "good" president from recognizing the plethora of "evils" the United States commits and it seems to justify (...) all action perpetrated by "the good" (i.e. the United States and its allies) against its ever-changing "evil" opposition' (Jeffery, 2005, p. 181). Michael Ignatieff hence argues that the US is fighting evil with evil but the latter one, in his view, is the *lesser* evil, and this *lesser evil* can be considered right under certain conditions: if we are fully aware that 'evil' is involved, if the lesser evil is pursued in a 'demonstrable state of necessity', if evil means are means of last resort, and if these actions are justified publicly and submitted to the citizens' judgement as to their correctness (Ignatieff, 2004, p. 19).[16]

What is there to be made of this recent boom of 'evil' rhetoric? George W. Bush is not the first US president who appropriates the rhetoric of evil. Wilson, Truman, Roosevelt and, of course, Reagan with his famous denouncement of the Soviet Union as the 'Evil Empire' were forerunners of the rhetoric of evil (Kline, 2004, pp. 453–5). The US rhetoric of 'evil' – hardly resonant in contemporary Europe and only occasionally employed by the faithful Christian British Prime Minister Tony Blair – is usually traced back to the special political culture of the United States. This

culture is marked by a relatively high significance of religion in daily life and of a 'civil religion' which embraces the notion of a 'manifest destiny' and 'special providence' of the US, of the overriding values of freedom, liberty and democracy (cf. Bellah, 1967; Mead, 2002; Kline, 2004).

It can be argued that the recent boom of 'evil' rhetoric is mainly due to a particular domestic power coalition of the Bush administration consisting of secular neo-conservatives and the religious right. This ideological alliance combines the revitalized domestic neo-conservative 'culture war' on the restoration of core American values such as 'family values' with the external 'war on evil' (Kline, 2004, pp. 457–62). What ought to be of concern for the rest of the world is the fact that the 'war against evil' is an open-ended war and has no historical end in the right Christian mindset. Accordingly, George W. Bush, who likes to call himself the 'war president', has proclaimed an indefinite 'war against terror'.

In order to evaluate the rhetoric of evil and also its consequences for international relations, it is useful to distinguish two concepts of evil: one conceives of evil as 'absolutely-not-self' and the other as 'connected-to-self' (Abdel-Nour, 2004, pp. 430–5). The first concept places evil outside the self, it creates a distance between one's actions and one's self or it refers to others. In international relations such a conception of evil might lead governments to 'target one's adversaries for eradication, rather than simply for defeat' (Abdel-Nour, 2004, p. 431). Here, a distinction by Carl Schmitt helps to elucidate the matter: in commenting upon his equally famous and notorious friend–enemy distinction as the criterion of the political, Schmitt has differentiated the category of the enemy further.[17] The German language cannot express this distinction which is caught in the English words 'enemy' and 'foe'. The former, 'ordinary' enemy without whom there can be no politics in Schmitt's notion must not be eradicated, he is treated with 'a sense of agonistic respect between adversaries' (Behnke, 2004, p. 297), and conflicts and wars with him are limited ones since the enmity is a relative one. The 'foe', on the contrary, is the 'absolute enemy', the one that must be annihilated, and conflicts with him thus stretch out into delimited wars of destruction.[18]

Conceiving of evil as the 'absolutely-not-self' thus is a very dangerous path to take since the adversary is demonized and all accommodation or peaceful coexistence with him is impossible.[19] So the more promising alternative is to conceive of evil as connected-to-self. Evil then is not radically other from oneself but it is lurking in the self, it is a potential possibility of the self (Abdel-Nour, 2004, p. 434). Such a conception of evil can foster historical self-reflection of societies (as, for example, the

German debate on the Holocaust shows) and it can help societies to pursue more self-critical relations with others.

Why is the rhetoric of 'evil' employed at all? William D. Casebeer (2004, pp. 447–9) has identified four different rationales that might motivate speakers to use this rhetoric: it is used to motivate groups of people to act (motivational); to respond to others' use of the rhetoric of good and evil (counterforce); to classify others as being radically different and to weaken respect for them (divisional); and to make normative judgements about the moral aspects of a situation (evaluational). The motivational and the divisional rationale seem to be most important in the current rhetoric. Domestic constituencies in the US can be mobilized by strong rhetoric resonant with religious metaphors, and the adversary is depicted as so evil that he is demonized or dehumanized so that all means of fighting him are unquestionably justified.

This might lead soldiers to resort to unlawful means against the opponent for whom there is less respect as a fellow human being. Some uses of the rhetoric of evil increase 'the chances that we will cognitively foreclose a full examination of the moral situation. The upshot of this consequence is that we risk treating a human being as something less than human, and committing great evils in the name of fighting it' (Casebeer, 2004, p. 449). It is probably safe to assume that the unlawful treatment of the detainees of Guantanamo and the torture of Iraqi prisoners at Abu Ghraib (cf. Hersh, 2004, pp. 20–72) and elsewhere are partly also due to the strongly negative enemy images that have been created beforehand. If the adversary is denounced as inferior, as a most brutal terrorist or as downright evil, then it might seem almost logical to the morally superior fighter for the 'good cause' to deny this enemy lawful treatment as a combatant (cf. Abdel-Nour, 2004, pp. 437–8). Instead of 'prisoners', one then rather has 'detainees' without the rights granted to them by international law. 'The torture of prisoners is not an aberration. It is a direct consequence of the with-us-or-against-us doctrines of world struggle with which the Bush administration has sought to change, change radically, the international stance of the United States and to recast many domestic institutions and prerogatives' (Sontag, 2004, p. 4).

7.2.2 Exceptional measures: fighting evil with evil?

As has just been indicated in Susan Sontag's fierce critique, the rhetoric of evil and permanent war[20] is not mere rhetoric but has severe consequences for both domestic and foreign policies: a nation that is in a permanent state of war will have to be kept in a permanent state of

exception and the relationship between politics and international law has been reconsidered and reshaped to serve the interests of the bellicose hegemon.[21] The US policies of counterterrorism and the war against Iraq have aroused deep concern among all critical defenders of the rule of law, constitutional rights and civil liberties. To list but a few well-known items on the list of concern, some of which have partly been redressed in the meantime:[22] the Patriot Act, detention and deportation of immigrants, military tribunals, detainees in Guantanamo, the categories of 'unlawful combatants' or 'enemy combatants'. Critics worried that the US were developing a 'shadow judiciary' or a permanent emergency regime (Troyer, 2002, p. 24). After reviewing former US emergency governments in times of war, Andrew Arato cautioned against a current potential trend to an 'unconstitutional dictatorship' in the US since 9/11, for the emergency that could justify exceptional measures no longer seems to exist: 'Emergency has become its own purpose and justification', and the proclamation of a war without end is 'in the interest of a crumbling executive power' (Arato, 2002, pp. 466, 470–3).

The creation of the Homeland Security Department signalled that the Bush administration was resolved to stand firm against all kinds of perceived and alleged threats, and to pursue an enduring policy of prevention. The installation of the new department has been the biggest institutional restructuring of government since the Second World War when Truman created the National Security Council and the Department of Defense. Some 170,000 employees from intelligence and security agencies have now been united under the responsibility of one department to gather information about all kinds of 'security threats', to better coordinate and enforce security measures at the borders and within the territories of the US among all kinds of federal, state and local governments.

It is no surprise that the US policies of counterterrorism have been assessed very critically by many liberal observers. The contradiction within the Bush administration's policies is obvious: while it avows to spread democracy and liberty abroad, most prominently in Afghanistan and Iraq, it is currently undermining it *at home*. It has often been pointed out in European publics facing their own 'classical' separatist or left-wing terrorist threats such as IRA, ETA or RAF that it would mean the ultimate victory of terrorists if they managed to provoke the rise of the 'leviathan', the encompassing security state – that is, if the attacked democracy resorts to such harsh measures of counterterrorism that its liberties and values are undermined from within.[23] The challenge for all democratic governments is to strike a balance between the civil and democratic rights of the citizens and their need for security. The Bush

administration has failed to strike this balance since it prefers to capitalize on the citizens' fear and sense of security. Scaring people and keeping on telling them that they are in an unprecedented 'war' and that *warlike* measures are *legitimate* is probably the most dangerous response of democracies to the terrorist challenge. A 'Fear's Empire', as Benjamin Barber has termed the US, can hardly figure as the guardian of freedom and democracy: '(I)t is not terrorism but fear that is the enemy, and in the end, fear will not defeat fear. Fear's empire leaves no room for democracy, while democracy refuses to make room for fear' (Barber, 2004, p. 50). Kenneth Roth, Executive Director of Human Rights Watch, judges that in 'attempting to make Americans safer, it has made all Americans, and everyone else, less free' (2004, p. 7). Roth claims that since 9/11 the US have been setting a bad example for the world by the excessive use of war rules. In a similar vein, Jürgen Habermas (2003) has warned that the US administration of a perpetual 'wartime president' is already undermining the foundations of the rule of law.

US domestic and international policies since 9/11 have led some to assume that we are now facing a 'clash within Western civilization' (Brunnée and Toope, 2004, p. 418; cf. Habermas, 2004). As regards attitudes to international law and its foundational norms, this is probably true, and in spite of the serious rift among NATO member states over the Iraq War, many such differences are still downplayed in the current public rhetoric. And yet it would be myopic and self-righteous if Europeans engaged in finger-pointing at the hegemon. The politics and rhetoric of US counterterrorism have only served here as an (extreme) example to highlight threats to modern democratic societies that are in principle inherent in *all* Western democracies. So far, self-assured European readers might have leaned back in their chairs because they attribute the construction of strong enemy images and illiberal practices to a politically misled US administration and to the opportunity structure of a particular political culture. In the following, however, I will offer three types of reasons derived from state theory, democratic theory and the sociology of modernity which should caution against such an all too smug European sense of being immune to an excessive politics of fear and threat.

7.3 State sovereignty: drawing boundaries and defining threats

Any Western democracy is also a sovereign *state* and as such it is compelled to maintain borders and differentiate between inside and

outside of its community.[24] One can distinguish between a constitutive and a functional dimension of sovereignty, conceived of as a 'set of institutionalized authority claims' (Thomson, 1994, pp. 14–16). The constitutive dimension concerns the claim to final authority in a particular political space which constitutes the state as an actor in the international system. The functional dimension refers to authority claims that the state makes over a range of activities within its political space; that is, the variable regulatory relations of the state to civil society (including variable distinctions between the public and the private within a community). In the following, I look more closely at the constitutive dimension first and then turn to the functional dimension of state sovereignty.

7.3.1 Inside and outside of a community: drawing boundaries

The concept of state sovereignty implies that boundaries between the inside and the outside of a certain political community must be drawn (Walker, 1993). The modern Westphalian state system is founded upon the territorialization of political space, upon the unit of the sovereign territorial state – albeit this ordering principle has been historically contingent. A sovereign state is supposed to draw and maintain several kinds of distinctions and boundaries (cf. Münkler, 2002, pp. 68–74), but for the purpose of this chapter only one is to be considered more closely: a sovereign state must demarcate and control territorial borders which differentiate the inside of the state from the outside. Sovereignty is often conceptualized as the ultimate right to decide as the final authority in a certain territory and is by this closely connected to public authority (the presumptive right to rule) and territoriality (linking authoritative rule with the geographical reach of this rule) (Caporaso, 2000).

In order to exercise sovereign power, the state must successfully ascertain to whom claims of rule, command and compliance are to be addressed, that is, a political community subject to rule must be singled out and its borders vis-à-vis other communities must be protected and monitored. A sovereign state is recognized by others as having the legitimate claim to control its people and resources and to defend this claim against rivalling claims.[25] In the case of many modern states, especially in Europe, the gradual state formation involved the task of 'community building': the successful creation of a common identity of these communities, of a sense of belonging together, of solidarity and mutual trust (cf. Holsti, 1996, pp. 41–81).[26] The political identity of a community regulates various forms of inclusion and exclusion, which is

highlighted, for example, in the question who of the people living in a demarcated space is awarded citizenship.

What is crucial for the argument of this chapter is the fact that sovereignty is always dependent on the demarcation of some kind of boundaries (cf. Thomson, 1994, p. 13). Boundaries process the differentiation between 'us' and 'them', identity and difference. So, it is inherent in modern statehood and sovereignty that 'others' are permanently and inevitably constituted. Concerning our overall topic of the peacefulness of democracies, it is obvious that very much depends upon the public perception and construction of this 'other': whether the outside of one's border is seen to be populated by actual or potential friends, partners, allies, competitors, adversaries, enemies, foes and so on. To a considerable extent, it seems open to the deliberate *choice* of political elites and publics how to deal with the logic of inevitable inclusion/exclusion – but, of course, this choice is also circumscribed by the actions and rhetoric of this 'other': if he attacks or threatens you, you will certainly not perceive him as a 'friend'. Returning to the abovementioned example of the Bush administration and the denouncement of 'evil' or 'rogue states', it can be argued that while it is *constitutive* of states to identify and relate to 'others', it will increase the probability of violent policies when powerful elites frame these others within highly negative enemy images. In other words, the naming and framing of one's counterpart very much shape the potential options in dealing with him. Demonizing your 'other' forecloses any peaceful settlement with him – a dictator who is compared with Adolf Hitler (such as Saddam Hussein or Slobodan Milošović), or terrorists and regimes who are called absolute evil will definitely not be eligible for accommodation.

7.3.2 Enhancing sovereignty within: strengthening the executive

The construction of enemy images might also be explained with regard to internal sovereignty, that is, the functional dimension of state sovereignty. In such a perspective, the 'state', conceived of as 'the bureaucratic apparatus which claims ultimate administrative, policing, and military authority within a specific jurisdiction' (Thomson, 1994, p. 150), seeks to increase its autonomy vis-à-vis non-state spheres of society and to regulate ever more matters of these spheres. Provided that it is a basic interest of all actors (whatsoever) to increase their autonomy, all democratic states face the tension between the self-interested pursuit of autonomy by state actors at the expense of societal actors and the democratic claims by the citizens (cf. Wolf, 2000a, pp. 28–9, 62–71; Thomson, 1994, p. 150). This fundamental tension is particularly

highlighted in all security matters of a state. It is, of course, one of the basic state functions to protect the security of its citizens from threats from inside and outside, but governments have often capitalized on the security needs of citizens and overly extended the competencies of security and state agencies (cf. Glaessner, 2003). This usually implies the curtailment of civil rights as well as the overstatement of prevention. Such measures tend to nurture a culture of fear and thereby aggravate the logic of exclusion within democratic societies.

Thus, the construction of 'others' that are presented as threats to a society *in principle* lies in the self-interest of *all* democratic governments. Especially the invocation of an immense threat allows the government to expand the institutions and scope of the security state, it can increase its internal autonomy vis-à-vis its own citizens by passing more and stricter security laws. Although this confines the space of civil society, it will probably not cause too much opposition when the threat is perceived to be real. The restrictions on immigration in Western European states and the European Union during the last two decades might be a case in point (cf. Miles and Thränhardt, 1995). Unsolicited immigration could successfully be portrayed as a threat to the 'host societies', and in the public perception 'aliens' were often suspected of being criminals or undue beneficiaries of the social security systems.

Then 9/11 opened a further window of opportunity in this regard: regulations on immigration and non-member residents were tightened up in the name of preventing terrorist acts. For example, the British 'anti-terror act' of December 2001 justified the indefinite detention of foreign suspects without trial. Some detainees took their case to the highest court of appeal in the UK, and on 16 December 2004 the House of Lords ruled that the anti-terror act breaks human right laws. As Lord Hoffmann wrote in his ruling: 'The real threat to the life of a nation (…) comes not from terrorism but from laws such as these. (…) It is for parliament to decide whether to give the terrorists such a victory.'[27]

As regards internal security, European democracies and the European Union certainly did not react to 9/11 with the same vigour as the US – but '9/11' took place on US territory, not on Europe's, and Europe is used to the terrorist threat, if only to a more limited 'classical' terrorism. Nevertheless, Western European countries, too, have passed encompassing security laws in the aftermath of 9/11 so that, from a liberal standpoint, it would be rather out of place to only criticize the US and turn a blind eye to European measures.[28] While most Europeans do not invoke a global war on terror or a permanent state of exception, European governments also take advantage of their publics' fear of terrorist

threats and immigration. It is true that some European countries have also supported the recent Iraq War, but most European democracies have lately rather been preoccupied with individualized threats perceived to emanate from undesired migrants, transnational terrorism and organized crime. Threats by diffuse non-state actors are difficult to identify, target and prevent but can nonetheless serve to justify the expansion of the security state.

Studies on the transformation of Western statehood often claim an erosion of internal sovereignty of states since ever more decisions are not made within the narrow political system but in policy networks, commissions, corporatist arrangements and the like (Scharpf, 1992). In Western democracies, the state's power in civil day-to-day politics seems to have evaporated into numerous state-societal decision-making bodies – by displaying the 'security state', governments can seize the rather rare opportunity to reclaim and publicly demonstrate state power, action, competence and strength. William Connolly (1991, p. 206) has called this 'theatrical displays of punishment and revenge' and 'dramatized crusades' against the internal others such as criminals, drug users, racial minorities, the underclass, and external others such as foreign enemies and terrorists.

In order to further illustrate my argument here, it is useful to draw upon some ideas linked to the theory of 'securitization' (Buzan et al., 1998, pp. 21–47; cf. Williams, 2003):[29] this theory assumes that threats are not 'objectively' 'there' but that they are intersubjectively constituted, that is, socially constructed. Turning a matter into a matter of security is a securitizing act. Securitizing actors, for example governmental officials, utter certain kinds of speech acts. In so doing, they make securitizing moves, and only if these speech acts are accepted by the significant audience does the securitizing move turn into a successful securitizing act: the respective matter has 'successfully' been made a matter of 'security'. Security speech acts designate something as an existential threat which requires emergency action or special measures. 'Security' implies the sense of survival, urgency, necessity, and what is presented as threatened (the referent object) must be regarded by the significant audience as deserving survival: the state, the government, society, the environment, the national economy and so on. Security arguments are always related to alternative futures, the questions to what will happen if we do not take 'security action' and what will happen if we do (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 32).

In theory, any issue can be securitized but in fact there are facilitating conditions that make 'successful' securitization acts more probable: the

speech act follows a 'grammar of security', which includes existential threat, point of no return and a possible remedy. The speaker holds a position of authority, she possesses social capital and her statements are credited by an audience. The alleged threat is plausible or familiar to the audience, is commonly held to be a threat, is resonant with former experiences or is even obvious, as in the case when tanks are crossing the border or when images of polluted water are available (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 33).

When actors label an object as 'security', they often want to make the audience tolerate violations or changes of rules that they would otherwise not accept. Traditionally, when the term 'security' has been employed in politics, governments usually seek to mobilize, to take special powers or to legitimate the potential use of force. ' "Security" is the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics. Securitization can thus be seen as a more extreme version of politicization' (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 23). Since acts of securitization are potentially anti-democratic, the theory of securitization is attached to the normative ideal of desecuritizing most matters and in this way keeping them within the public sphere of 'normal', democratic politics (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 29; cf. Williams, 2003, pp. 523–4).

Referring to threats involving the intentional, direct attack on people's lives such as military threats and terrorist acts is immediately plausible to audiences, and securitization for threats like these has long since been *institutionalized* in the form of police, intelligence agencies and military. Threats like these are perceived as traditional threats, they constitute classical realms of 'security'. So, if governments define and since 9/11 emphasize threats like transnational terrorism or the proliferation of WMD, they can reckon that their citizens will accept expanding security measures and governmental autonomy. To conclude, it is always a *political choice* of both the speaker and the audience how a matter is framed and whether this framing is accepted – whether one securitizes or desecuritizes a matter (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 29; cf. Huysmans, 1998, pp. 234, 244; Williams, 2003, pp. 520–1).[30]

7.4 Consolidating legitimacy: democratic politics of identity and mobilization

What reasons can be derived from democratic theory to explain why today's democracies still make use of powerful images of an 'other'?

(a) One reason is the mobilization of consent: if Kant was right, then it is rather difficult to win the republican citizens' consent to a war – the costs they expect to incur by a war work as a deterrent. Democratic peace theory assumes that democracies are casualty-averse; if they go to war, they attempt to avoid the loss of lives (cf. Schörnig, 2005). Most Western democracies have become 'postheroic societies', that is, these societies do not hold military values in high esteem any more, and people are very reluctant to sacrifice their lives in wars (except for the case of clear self-defence) (cf. Luttwak, 1995; Münkler, 2002, pp. 193, 238). So, if a democratic government – for whatever self-interested, moral or other reasons – considers military action the appropriate solution to a crisis, then it will have to portray the adversary in the strongest of terms to mobilize their reluctant citizens' consent. This is indicated by the recent renaissance of just war theory (Rengger, 2002). In order to convince democratic publics that the use of force is necessary, this force is usually presented as 'just': stopping – or more controversially, preventing – genocide, new Hitlers, evil, tyrants, outlaws and so on serves to justify the waging of 'just wars'. The democratic sensitivity to casualties and the mobilization aspect are well captured in the following passage from George W. Bush's State of the Union Address on 28 January 2003 about seven weeks before the war against Iraq began:[31]

> Sending Americans into battle is the most profound decision a President can make. (...) This nation fights reluctantly, because we know the cost and we dread the days of mourning that always come. (...) We strive for peace. And sometimes peace must be defended. A future lived at the mercy of terrible threats is no peace at all. If war is forced upon us, we will fight in a just cause and by just means – sparing, in every way we can, the innocent. And if war is forced upon us, we will fight with the full force and might of the United States military – and we will prevail.

(b) A second set of reasons why democracies construct images of an 'other' is attached to processes of identity formation, to a 'politics of identity'. The construction of nationalist collective identities was not only crucial during long past times of national state consolidation in Europe or America but this construction is a permanent effort of imagining some kind of a 'we' (cf. Connolly, 1991; Campbell, 1992). Although, or exactly because, late modern democracies are characterized by pluralism, heterogeneity, difference and diversity, governments usually attempt to invoke a single 'identity' of the political community,

some sense of 'unity' and 'common' good (cf. Young, 2000, pp. 81–120). Such an imagined political community, if most of its members believe it to exist, provides the unquestioned cultural and moral background for distributional and regulative policies. This can be illustrated if one looks at the ambivalence of modern rights. Modern states have, over time, allocated three types of rights to their members: political liberties, democratic rights and social rights (some states have also granted the fourth type of special group rights to minorities). The allocation of such rights produces the fear of right-bearers that other right-bearers might misuse these rights and turn them against them. In order to alleviate or reduce these fears, the moral resources/virtues of tolerance, trust and solidarity are needed, and such virtues are, as it seems, most robustly developed if some powerful background condition is present such as nationhood (Offe, 2003, pp. 324–31).

Today, within the context of domestic pluralism and international denationalization, references to nationhood are not as easily available any more. Still, democratic governments face the challenge to present the citizens with some idea of a 'we' that legitimates the scope of policies. It is rather unclear who or what this collective identity can be. It can hardly be denied that *all* cultures feature a 'radical hybridity and polyvocality' (Benhabib, 2002, p. 25; cf. Senghaas, 1998). Seyla Benhabib hence considers it a consequence of 'bad cultural narratives' that moral asymmetries between insiders and outsiders are constructed: 'But who are "we"? Isn't the "we" attempting this evaluation just as much a subject of cultural multiplicity, diversity, and rifts as the others whom the "we" is studying?' (2002, p. 42).

So, if democratic actors construct powerful 'others', this might be the result of a politics of identity – an attempt to assert an imagined collective identity against an alleged difference. An identity can only be established if it is related to a set of differences. Inherent in the inclusionary/exclusionary logic of identity and difference is a temptation to devalue what is different from oneself and to transform some of these differences into 'otherness'. Such a conversion serves to secure one's own self-certainty (Connolly, 1991, pp. 40, 64; Campbell, 1992, pp. 78–9).

As regards domestic and international politics, whether other states are perceived or constructed as friendly bearers of differences or as threatening 'others' to a large extent seems to be a matter of choice within one's own conception of identity politics. The success of European integration might be a case in point: European nations who for many centuries were engaged in nearly permanent war with each other have gradually 'learnt' to construct/perceive their former 'rivals' or 'enemies'

with their different national identities as friends and partners. It will remain to be seen whether the formation of a common 'European' identity can really emerge in the absence of strong, nearby 'others'.[32] Critical studies in foreign policy analysis suggest that security policies enable a political community to represent and affirm itself by ever new discourses of threat and danger – if one threat, like the Soviet Union, has disappeared, another one will readily be made available (Campbell, 1992). In such a perspective, security policy is paradoxical: the political identity is reliant on the threatening force of others, but at the same time security policy aims at eliminating these threats (Huysmans, 1998, pp. 238–40, 248).

(c) While such interpretations probably overstate the importance of negative threat discourses for identity formation, the construction of some 'other' might nevertheless be relevant for the domestic legitimization of today's democracies. Reflections upon the consolidation of new democracies and the deconsolidation of the old ones after 1989 provide an interesting third set of arguments: internal legitimization of democracies can be enhanced by references to some kind of 'inferior' counterpart. This hypothesis was proposed within the context of the 'melancholic diagnosis' of the 1990s that at the very time when the further spread of democracy on the globe was celebrated as its objective 'triumph', there was the subjective sense of malaise and deep crisis in the consolidated Western democracies. In the meantime, a discourse of 'disenchantment' and 'disillusionment' in Western democracies as well as their democratic theory seems to prevail (Offe, 2003, pp. 136–8, 227–38; Buchstein and Jörke, 2003; cf. Greven, 2000, pp. 151–64).

To start with, one has to ask why the democratic regime type is 'better' than other regime types. Assuming that liberal democracy cannot be legitimated by the quality of its procedures alone, one will assess it by the quality of the results. Democratic theory identifies mainly four such accomplishments that *only* democracies seem to produce, but these four virtues have not all been empirically validated (Schmidt, 1998, 2000b). These four virtues can be summed up as the liberal, the international, the social progress and the republican accomplishment (Offe, 2003, pp. 138, 152–3). The liberal hypothesis assumes that democracies maintain and protect internal peace since they have institutionalized liberal and civil rights as inviolable ones. The international hypothesis is the well-known 'democratic peace' hypothesis: democracies do not fight each other. The social progress hypothesis states that democracies can achieve social justice by promoting economic growth as well as the fair redistribution of incomes. The republican hypothesis attributes to the

democratic political process a moralizing educational effect since it helps to transform egoistic and myopic citizens into well-informed citizens who are committed to the common good and who have a good judgement of public affairs. This demanding politico-moral qualification effect is, however, dependent on favourable structural conditions such as the high quality of educational institutions and the media or a minimum of social welfare.

Inasmuch as such accomplishments do not already materialize (as in new democracies) or are not produced to the extent generally expected by citizens, democracies can have difficulty winning or keeping the legitimization of which they are in need. In such cases, in order to consolidate the legitimacy of democratic rule, democracies benefit from the existence of an 'other'. As can be shown in transitional democracies, this regime type is in need of plausible self-descriptions that appeal to the mass of the citizens and that are apt to constitute the 'internal unity' of the demos. Such types of democratic discourses of self-description can be found in three temporal regards and all of them refer to differences (Offe, 2003, pp. 233–4): as regards the past, the new regime contrasts itself positively with the old bad one; such discourses deal with culprits and victims, with resistance, crime and failures of the old regime. As regards the present, the regime highlights its opposition to existing alternative regime types, that of the 'not-yet-democracies'. The Cold War was a unique opportunity for Western democracies to idealize themselves, both economically as well as morally, in contrast with the 'other', communist side. As regards the future, formulas for grand emancipatory projects, visions and missions are coined in order to mark a difference between today and a bright future of the regime that is bound to come and that will enhance freedom, welfare and security. Such political formulas serve to promote social integration by appealing to the common effort of the democratic self-transformation of society.

Since the collapse of communism, the differences have become less clear and visible for old democracies so that their self-descriptions with regard to the present and the future are rather 'colourless' now. As concerns the question of this chapter as to why democracies still construct enemy images, it can therefore be argued that this might also be a 'diversionary' strategy: by referring to strong enemy images such as global terrorism, evil or tyrannies, governments seek to mobilize and unite their discontented electorates behind a new common cause – while grand *domestic* visions of emancipation and liberation have been dropped in Western democracies, they might direct their energy and liberating impulses *outward* and engage in the global liberal mission of

'ridding the world of evil', of 'bringing down tyrannies' or 'smoking out the terrorists' (cf. Müller and Wolff, Chapter 3 in this volume). This diversionary hypothesis might nicely be illustrated by the British Prime Minister Tony Blair's speech to Congress in June 2003, where he professed to a similar philosophy of history as the Bush administration. The major fighting for the 'liberation' of Iraq being over, Blair envisioned a history culminating in a state of global liberty: 'I feel a most urgent sense of mission about today's world. September 11th was not an isolated event, but a tragic prologue. Iraq, another act; and many further struggles will be set upon this stage before it's over.'[33]

7.5 The ambivalence of modernity

Critical students of democratic peace have pointed out that this theory rests upon the ideas of the Enlightenment and embraces a progressivist philosophy of history (Rengger, Chapter 6 in this volume). As has been described above, some Western political leaders such as George W. Bush or Tony Blair approach world politics with narratives of the inevitable human progress to freedom, democracy and peace. In such a practical philosophy of history, there might be several setbacks on the path to freedom but they are only temporary, and the forces of liberty will prevail over the forces of tyranny, barbarism and evil. This persistence of such an idealized belief in the Enlightenment, peaceful modernity and civilization is quite surprising given the experience of global 'reverse' processes or acts of barbarism in the Western world in the twentieth century. It is a commonplace of critical social theory and sociology to acknowledge the deep ambivalence of modernity, the potential self-destruction of modernity and the dialectics of the Enlightenment (Bauman, 1991; Horkheimer and Adorno, 1969).

The sociology of modernity thus offers some compelling reasons why modern Western democracies might not be as peaceful as we thought. It challenges simple versions of modernization theory that cling to an optimistic 'dream of a modernity free of violence' (Joas, 2000, pp. 49–66). While democratic peace theory implicitly assumes a moral learning process of humans and presupposes societies that are quite civilized and constituted by rational and reasonable individuals (cf. Rawls, 1999, pp. 44–54), the sociology of modernity fundamentally questions such assumptions.

In dealing with the question whether modernity is equivalent with progress or with barbarism or with both, studies of modernity have

arrived at three answers (Miller and Soeffner, 1996): the first one, embodied in classical modernization theory and the studies of Norbert Elias, assumes that civilianization is the principle of modern societies, barbarism their counter-principle. The second one, advanced by Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno or Zygmunt Bauman, claims that barbarism is the flip side of modernity. The third position – which is also considered the most rewarding one for the argument of this chapter – holds that the project of modernity is just fulfilled in its self-reflexivity, that is, that modernity is critically aware of its potential of barbarism and that it attempts to overcome this negative potential by self-conscious civilianization: 'A sobered-up modernity is thus given the chance to recognize the attainable by analyzing the history of its own fallacies' (Miller and Soeffner, 1996, p. 17, author's translation). The third position allows us to develop a reflexive concept of 'barbarism' which locates barbarism not in others but within one's own society. As will be taken up in the last section of this chapter, the normative goal of identifying barbaric tendencies within oneself is to advance civilianization – and by this the peacefulness – of one's own society.

Sociological diagnoses draw our attention to numerous instances and mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion inherent in modern societies. Categories of people are permanently singled out and classified as problems to, or outside of, or even threatening to a certain social order. This can lead to the most extreme treatment of discriminated people: their killing. In his well-known interpretation of the Holocaust as a characteristically modern phenomenon, Zygmunt Bauman has proposed to 'treat the Holocaust as a rare, yet significant and reliable, test of the hidden possibilities of modern society' (1989, p. 12). He suggests that this genocide was fully in keeping with the modern spirit of instrumental rationality and the idea of 'social engineering'. In this perspective, the modern state is conceived of as a 'gardening state', as a 'problem solver', as an agent of structuring, classifying and ordering societies (1989, pp. 6–18).

This means that there are inherent decivilizing tendencies within modern societies the source of which are certain types of inclusionary/exclusionary practices. Bauman (1991, 1996) assumes that the task of *ordering*, of creating order and eliminating chaos, ambiguity and ambivalence, is the most important task that modernity has set for itself and that has made modernity what it is today. The obvious problem is that no social order is ever 'complete' since there are differing and changing conceptions of 'order' as well as changing guardians of order and since the distinction of what is (legitimate) 'maintenance of order' and

(illegitimate) violence is always contested (Bauman, 1996, pp. 40–1). This creates permanent inclusion and exclusion and reveals that instead of clarity and certainty, ambivalence and uncertainty are virtually ubiquitous in a modern society, and even more so in late/postmodern societies.

The fact of ambivalence frustrates the human desire for order, certainty and security. Life in pluralistic late modern societies nevertheless *requires* that citizens learn to cope with differences and ambiguities of all kinds. The increased presence and visibility of 'others', of perceived 'strangers', 'aliens', the displays of different lifestyles, moral attitudes and political choices – all this demands the increased supply of civic virtues that not all citizens dispose of: respect, tolerance, trust and solidarity with people one feels 'different' from (cf. Ladwig, 2005; Offe, 2003, pp. 324–9). The inability or reluctance of individuals to meet these challenges can lead to attitudes, actions or omissions that favour or even result in violence against 'others'. Claus Offe (1996) has termed such decivilizing tendencies within our own societies as 'modern barbarity'.

This barbarism is not emanating from a frightening stranger outside the border but it is the method *of making* others strangers within a society by way of internal exclusion, such as the marginalization of a 'new underclass' or the discrimination of migrants and minorities. This is accompanied by an insensitivity of citizens to the violations of norms, by an indifference to the claims of others to integrity and recognition. 'Barbaric', then, are not only actions but also omissions (for example, watching while skinheads burn down houses of asylum seekers); and modern 'barbarism' is the withering away of moral sentiments and the gradual erosion of nominally still existent norms in a society (Offe, 1996, pp. 265, 273; Ladwig, 2005). What is troubling is the fact that the emergence of moral indifference in modern societies is nurtured by their very structuring principles. Their scientification and bureaucratization produce a 'secondary illiteracy' of the masses: people feel cognitively and morally incompetent and shift responsibility to other authorities in the hierarchy. Bureaucracy, scientification and professionalization thus contribute to the erosion of moral competences (Offe, 1996, pp. 286–7; Bauman, 1989, pp. 48–53).

The upshot for democratic peace theory is obvious: today's actually existing Western democracies 'still' differ from the civilized societies which the teleological narratives of the Enlightenment envisioned – and perhaps, because of their inherent features they will turn rather more decivilizing in the future. Real citizens are not necessarily the

rational and moral beings which the theory of democratic peace assumes. And if Claus Offe's (1996, p. 281) observation is correct that after the collapse of communism people seem to develop a renewed desire to ascertain their identity through the delineation of difference – then the micro-foundations of democratic peace will gradually be undermined from within.

7.6 Conclusion: the micro-foundations of democratic peace

So where does this review of problematic features of Western democracies leave us? Is the theory of democratic peace pure ideology of self-praising Westerners, while they are in fact dedicated to violent exclusion and the construction of ever more enemies and foes? It was not my intention to tell a story of doom and gloom but to offer a set of reasons that, taken together, formulate a self-critique – not a denouncement – of late modern Western democracies. The normative goal of this self-critique is to identify the possible threats to the peaceful and civilizing potential of Western societies in order to enhance critical self-awareness.

Unfortunately, the constructive part of such a critique often comprises in its core message slightly more than moral exhortation and the counterfactual appeal to public reason and civic virtue: if democratic leaders and citizens only resist their 'worse selves' and try hard enough to avoid exclusionary rhetoric and practices wherever possible, things will definitely turn to the better. In order to achieve this, the liberal democratic virtues of fairness, tolerance, solidarity, courage, and the willingness to argue, participate, cooperate and take on responsibility are needed (cf. Buchstein, 1996, p. 303). That they were really available in a great amount is wishful thinking, but it seems that the peacefulness of democracies will nevertheless crucially depend on such moral attitudes and practices in daily life and politics. Democratic ethos and civic virtue accompanied by 'humility' might be a safeguard against democratic arrogation that lurks behind some of the 'democratic wars' dealt with in the other chapters of this book. As John Keane (2004, p. 205) has put it: 'Virtues are the substructure of a peaceable democracy, (. . .) the cardinal democratic virtue is humility. Humility (. . .) is the quality of being aware of one's limits.'

So this chapter concludes like many others concerned with democracy's edges: inferring from normative democratic theory that there is an increasing demand for moral resources and inclusiveness, and at the same time learning from sociological studies that this demand will hardly be satisfied, one ends up placing a high bet on the virtue, moral

learning and reasonableness of democratic citizens without knowing whether this bet is really warranted. To be sure, exploring the possibilities of inclusive, reasonable practices would require reforming the very fabric of 'conventional' Western democratic institutions. The intense debate in democratic theory on the reinvigoration of democratic life cannot, of course, be reproduced here; its institutional implications have been spelt out in the context of the debates on a 'strong' and a deliberative democracy.[34] Suffice it here to say that any institutional arrangement that helps the contestation of hegemonic discourses, the scrutinizing of political elites and the development of citizens' moral and civic competences might be an advancement: a vibrant, pluralistic (self-)critical public sphere, inclusive civic associations and the active participation of citizens in local political life are among the most popular candidates.

In contrast, the current overstatement of the 'security state', the creation of a culture of fear and suspicion, the impoverishment of the public sphere, the prevalence of prevention and surveillance are definitely *not* apt to invigorate democratic virtue and practice in Western democracies – but the future of 'democratic peace' will probably depend on just such a vigorous restoration of micro-foundations of democracy. If the numerous temptations to turn people different from ourselves into 'others', 'strangers', 'enemies' or 'foes' are not self-consciously resisted, we nurture fear and suspicion instead of defusing it.

This goes for the domestic as well as the international political realm. Political 'solutions' today must not resort to simple choices but must come to terms with complexity, pluralism and ambivalence. As Jef Huysmans argued, 'the expansion of security questions after the Cold War articulates a multiplication of enemies, dangers, threats', and this raises 'the fundamental question of how to mediate our relations to uncertainties, paradoxes and ambivalence in a peaceful way' (1998, pp. 243, 248). While an answer to this question is certainly not easily found, having recourse to strong enemy images surely does not help in this regard. It is undoubtedly legitimate and even necessary to publicly name threats and dangers in order to bring them to the attention of the citizens and to make them plausible to them, but it very much depends on the chosen framing and narrative (cf. Campbell, 1992). By identifying and fighting others as 'barbarism' and 'evil', we run the paradoxical risk of involuntarily creating 'evil' and 'barbarism' at home. It would be a tragic result of the proclaimed global liberal mission to spread liberty and democracy *abroad* if both were thereby undermined *at home*.

Notes

1. I thank Andreas Behnke, Lothar Brock, Rainer Schmalz-Bruns and Wolfgang Wagner for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this chapter.
2. See Offe (2003, pp. 136–8), Buchstein and Jörke (2003, pp. 472–3), Buchstein (2004, pp. 57–8). This recent 'triumph' of democracy is far from 'natural', as M.G. Schmidt (2000b, p. 506) observed: the history of democratic theory could mainly be written as a history of the *critique* of democracy.
3. One might convincingly argue that 'democracy', especially under the conditions of late modernity, will forever *remain* only imperfect, a promise never to be completely fulfilled, something to come; Jacques Derrida thus speaks of 'démocratie à venir' (Derrida, 2003, pp. 111–34).
4. Madeleine Albright's former spokesman Rubin, quoted in Minnerop (2002, p. 4).
5. Quoted in Troyer (2002, p. 5).
6. Speech on Pearl Harbor Day, 7 December 2001, see http://israel.usembassy.gov/publish/peace/archives/2001/december/120810.html (accessed on 11.03.2003). Cf. also the State of the Union Address by the President on 28 January 2003 (http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/01/20030128-19.html).
7. Speech to the German Bundestag, 24 May 2002, see http://news.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml = /news/2002/05/24/wbush24.xml (accessed on 23.11.2004).
8. Speech on Pearl Harbor Day, 7 December 2001, see http://israel.usembassy. gov/publish/peace/archives/2001/december/120810.html (accessed on 11.03.2003).
9. Speech on the Middle East, 3 April 2002, see http://www.cbsnews.com/Stories/2002/04/04/national/main505395.shtml (accessed on 20.01.2005).
10. Speech at West Point Academy, 1 June 2002, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020601-3.html (accessed on 30.01.2003). The first three sentences are also cited in NSS (2002, p. 3).
11. All quotations from Bush's inauguration speech, 20 January 2005, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/01/20050120-1.html (accessed on 21.01.2005).
12. See here also Bush's State of the Union Address, 2 February 2005, and his speeches during his visit to Europe in February 2005.
13. Rice's speech at the Institut d'Études Politiques, Paris, on 8 February 2005, http://www.state.gov/Secretary/rm/2005/41973.htm (accessed on 09.02.2005).
14. Rice at the confirmation hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 18 January 2005, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/wh/rem/40991.htm (accessed on 20.01.2005).
15. Ibid. With 'fear society' Rice referred to a term central in the book *The Case for Democracy. The Power of Freedom to Overcome Tyranny and Terror* by Natan Sharansky (New York: Public Affairs, 2004).
16. See here also Jean Bethke Elshtain's book *Just War against Terror. The Burden of American Power in a Violent World* (New York: Basic Books, 2003). While Elshtain justifies the US war against terror, Nicholas Rengger argues in his review of the book that a *permanent* war on terror is very unlikely to be a just war in any sense, and 'actions taken now may well damage what was won before' (2004, p. 115).

17. I thank Andreas Behnke for bringing this point to my attention. George Schwab and Julien Freund focused Schmitt's attention to the distinction between 'enemy' and 'foe' that Schmitt addressed in the 1963 foreword to the new edition of his *Der Begriff des Politischen* (1932) and in his *Theorie des Partisanen* of 1963. See Ulmen (1987) and Schwab (1987).
18. The rhetoric of US governments has often evoked the Schmittian concept of the political: 'US foreign policy is based on a complex of moral values that Americans believe to be universally valid. In presuming the fight for the "just cause", the US may thus cease to regard its opponents as "enemies" and treat them as "foes" ' (Schwab, 1987, p. 201).
19. As James Der Derian notes, after 9/11 the US chose 'coercion over diplomacy in its foreign policy, and deployed a rhetoric of total victory over absolute evil' (2004, p. 98). But note here that the rhetoric of terrorist Islamic fundamentalists amounts to the same consequences: the unfaithful West embodying all evil in the world cannot be accommodated but only eradicated.
20. Donald Rumsfeld cautioned the US citizens nearly 11 months after 9/11: 'Life seems to be returning almost to normal but that we must not do. Our enemies are sharpening their swords' (quoted in Troyer, 2002, p. 26). In the State of the Union Address of 28 January 2003, Bush declared: 'There are days when our fellow citizens do not hear news about the war on terror. There's never a day when I do not learn of another threat, or receive reports of operations in progress, or give orders in this global war against a scattered network of killers. The war goes on, and we are winning.' http:www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/01/20030128–19.html (accessed on 29.01.2003).
21. Due to the deep concern the US policy of counterterrorism and the war against Iraq have caused, many authors have dealt with these topics – to name but a few see Agamben (2004), Behnke (2004), Brunnée and Toope (2004), Habermas (2004), Huysmans (2004) and Troyer (2002).
22. For a critical discussion of the following see among others Arato (2002), Barber (2004), Dworkin (2002a, b), Scheuerman (2002), Schild (2003), Troyer (2002), Verdeja (2002) and Zolberg (2002).
23. Cf. Waldmann (1998, pp. 32–9, 183–201); for the differences between US and European perceptions of terrorism and measures of counterterrorism, cf. Daase (2001, pp. 74–7). Didier Bigo (2002, p. 77) notes that:

    > Rather than the ambiguous discourse of politicians or experts who, in trying to reassure the public, conjure up an impressive list of vulnerabilities never imagined by this very public, we would do well to adopt the slogan of 'living with terrorism'. As employed by General Carlos Alberto Dalla Chiesa to describe Italian policies in reaction to the *anni di piombi*, this was not a sign of fatalism, but of realism.

24. I will not engage here in the ongoing controversial debate on how much sovereignty has been lost and regained in the case of member states of the European Union; sovereignty is best regarded not as a dichotomous concept (sovereign or not) but as a continuous one (Caporaso, 2000, pp. 4–5). Of course, the borders within Western Europe have become very permeable, regulations on the free flow of goods and persons have been strongly relaxed during the process of further integration, but the borders are still

monitored and protected from *undesired* goods or persons crossing them such as drugs or immigration from non-member states. So, if one argues that the European Union downplays the relevance of territorial borders, it must always be asked 'For whom' – since this usually goes not for non-members. That is, the EU cannot escape the logic of inclusion/exclusion, it might only apply a different logic of inclusion/exclusion than before.

25. These are ideal-type notions of sovereignty. Again, I cannot deal here with the intense debate on the erosion of internal and external sovereignty, conditional sovereignty and the emergence of a post-Westphalian order (cf. Caporaso, 2000; Holsti, 2004; Zangl and Zürn, 2003).
26. In particular, state formation in the twentieth century demonstrates the great difficulties of this artefact of only 'one' community with a unique common identity: many states never succeeded in such a community building which is one of the reasons for the enduring internal wars of 'failed states' or the breaking up of states with many different nationalities (cf. Holsti, 1996).
27. Quoted in 'British Anti-Terror Law Reined In', by Glenn Frankel, *Washington Post*, 16 December 2004.
28. For critical analyses of security laws in Germany see Lepsius (2004), for France see Bigo (2002), for the UK and the EU see Statewatch, http://www.statewatch.org and Monar (2002).
29. I cannot deal here with the critique which the securitization theory of the 'Copenhagen School' has attracted; see, for example, Huysmans (1999) and Williams (2003). The latter also argues that with the accentuation of enmity, decision and emergency the theory echoes a Schmittian understanding of the political.
30. This is why postmodern strands of critical security studies, by way of the genealogical method, aim to expose the historical contingency of the 'filling' of crucial political categories. Hegemonic discourses are deconstructed to 'denaturalize' taken-for-granted discourses, for example in order to reveal how others are not natural enemies but become enemies by representations in domestic or international discourses (Campbell, 1992, p. 69). The underlying assumption is that 'representations of the world make a difference (performative force of language) and that there is no natural or neutral arbiter of a true representation' (Huysmans, 1999, pp. 14–15).
31. See address at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/01/20030128-19.html.
32. During the transatlantic rift over the recent Iraq War, some Europeans supposed that so marked differences between Europe and US came to the fore here that this greatly helped the building of a distinct European identity. The only problem for such a view were the EU member states that supported the Iraq War. Earlier it has also been argued that the honoured traditions of the European welfare states might be a focal point of a positive European identity – the problem with this view are the recent attempts to partly dismantle the welfare systems in Western Europe.
33. Prime Minister's speech to Congress on 18 July 2003, http://www.number-10.gov.uk/print/page4220.asp (accessed on 21.07.2003).
34. See, for example, Barber (1984), Benhabib (2002), Buchstein (1996), Schmalz-Bruns (1995) and Young (2000).

8

Sameness and Distinction: Understanding Democratic Peace in a Bourdieusian Perspective

Catherine Götze

8.1 Introduction[1]

Democratic peace theory comes in two *versions*, the monadic and dyadic. Up to now the theoretical link between them remained unclear. This chapter proposes an analysis from the perspective of the sociology of Pierre Bourdieu by which the monadic and dyadic assumptions are fused into one common theoretical framework.

Monadic explanations point to normative, utilitarian or institutional features of democracies that are supposed to make them more peaceful than the non-democratic systems[2] (cf. Benoit, 1996; Czempiel, 1996; Rummel, 1995). However, monadic explanations cannot account for the frequent use of military force by democratic states (see Chapter 1 in this volume). Hence, advocates of the monadic version make ad hoc assumptions about the reasons that motivate democracies to get involved in militarized conflicts. Some see the reasons for military action in the flaws of the democratic system (Auerswald, 2000; Elman, 2000; Czempiel, 1996), some consider that these are cases of anticipated self-defence (cf. Reiter and Stam, 2002), still others think that escalation processes draw democracies into militarized conflicts (cf. Brecher and Wilkenfeld, 2000; Lake, 1992). None of these explanations is coherent with the basic assumption that the democratic system itself makes such states less inclined to use military force than other types of regimes (except in the case of territorial self-defence).

Dyadic accounts do not assume that democracies are per se more peaceful. They consider the peace between democracies a particular feature only to be found because of communitarian processes between democracies (cf. Rousseau et al., 1996; Weart, 1998; Williams, 2001; MacMillan, 2003). Many dyadic versions of democratic peace are inspired

by social constructivism and build on assumptions about shared values and identities which allow resolving conflicts among democracies by negotiation rather than by military force (cf. Risse-Kappen, 1995a; Owen, 1997). Other dyadic accounts argue that negotiation processes between democracies are easier to initiate and that escalation between democracies is hampered by the institutional structure of government (Fearon, 1994b; Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson, 1997). Regardless which explanation is favoured, all dyadic accounts assume that democracies do not fight each other because they identify each other as equal.

Yet, they fail to explain *how* such identification processes take place and why they should be exclusively confined to democracies. Dyadic versions have to explain which specific values shape common identities in the democratic security community as there is some evidence that non-democratic states, too, do not fight each other (cf. Peceny and Butler, 2004).

Both versions of the democratic peace theory suffer from theoretical weaknesses. Additionally, the link between them remains unclear. The aim of this chapter is to overcome the dualistic monadic–dyadic divide by adopting a *relational* approach to democratic peace. My hypothesis is that the *disposition* of democratic peacefulness is inherently linked with the *position* of a state in international society. The idea here, which draws on the sociology of Pierre Bourdieu, is that democratic societies reflect material structures of power distribution within and in between societies. These structures create social and political spaces in which people – who are agents and actors at the same time as they reproduce the structure which in turn shapes them[3] – who share the same material position share equally their vision of the world as the material and ideational social structures are intimately linked. The social structure as a whole evolves from the actions through which the actors/agents reproduce the resources necessary for the conservation (or the change) of their positions.

From this perspective democratic peace is the result of a specific, historically contingent configuration of *positions* and *dispositions* in the international political field. This approach to democratic peace is supposed to blend the monadic and the dyadic arguments by analysing how the material reproduction of the positions of democratic states goes along with specific visions of the world, perceptions of the self and of others. The centrepiece of this approach is the focus on the relational dynamics between the actors/agents.

In the following I will initially discuss the puzzle of democratic peace. What troubles dyadic as well as monadic accounts of democratic peace

is the fact that democracies *do* use military force without being attacked on their own territory. Yet, not all democracies use military force in international relations. The characteristics of those who do may offer the key to understanding why they do so. So, I will investigate the hypothesis that these wars are part of an ordering process in world society. In order to do so, I will introduce the sociology of Bourdieu which evolves around a comprehensive understanding of social structuration processes.

8.2 The puzzle of democratic 'war'[4]

Despite an impressive record of data, quantitative research on democratic peace has not been able to tackle the overdetermination of the phenomenon. The most striking feature of democratic peace is the fact that democratic states are similar in a large number of aspects, not only their political regime. This is equally obvious if we look at the military behaviour of these states.[5] If we consider the sample of 38 democratic states which all score nine and higher in the Polity IV data set and which are rated as 'free' in the Freedom House data set,[6] we see that only a few of them used military force in the 1990s[7] and that these few resemble each other in a number of aspects.

I organized the sample according to five characteristics, which are significant for the war or peace behaviour of a democratic state. Some of these characteristics are additionally, according to Bremer (2000), relevant to the general war behaviour of states as they reflect their relative power status. First, I created four groups of democracies in order to evaluate the age and the consolidation of the democratic institutions.[8] I identified a first group of democracies which were established in the nineteenth century, a second group founded after the Second World War,[9] a third group emerging in the 1970s and a fourth group which came into being after 1989. The second characteristic was alliance membership. The third set of variables concerns the power status of a country. Drawing from the military capabilities data set,[10] four groups were constructed:[11] the superpower USA; the great powers France, Germany and the UK; the middle powers Australia, Canada, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain and Sweden; and the small powers Belgium, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Denmark, Ecuador, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Jamaica, Austria, Luxembourg, South Africa, Switzerland, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago and Uruguay.[12]

The fourth characteristic was the wealth of these states as measured by GDP in purchasing power parity. Referring to the OECD classification,

four groups were identified: high income countries, upper middle income countries, low middle income countries and low income countries. Finally, we included the military structure of a democracy in our variables, assuming that the normative reluctance to engage in military actions will be higher if the army is constituted by a general draft than if the army is a professional one.

Now it turns out that only a small number of democracies took part in military endeavours. If we put them under close scrutiny we observe an important multicolinearity of the variables 'great power', 'high income countries', 'NATO member', 'first or second wave democracy' and 'professional army' (see Table 8.1). We can conclude that a democracy that used military force in the 1990s was (a) a democracy founded in the nineteenth century or shortly after the Second World War, (b) a member of NATO, (c) a wealthy country, (d) a great or a superpower or the ally of such and (e) generally the possessor of a professional army. It seems plausible that only wealthy and powerful countries will engage in geographically distant military actions as they have been taken into account here. Research on war indicates that war is more likely to happen if there is a strong asymmetry in the power capabilities of the two belligerent countries (Bremer, 2000). The correlation between alliance membership and military action confirms the findings of institutionalism that has forcefully argued in favour of the strong cohesion of alliances such as NATO (Haftendorn et al., 1999).

Now the multicolinearity shows that it is impossible to say by simple correlation analysis which of the five variables (and therefore which 'reason') moves a democracy most strongly towards military action. Additionally, this finding contradicts an inference which could be drawn from democratic peace theory, namely that the more mature a democracy is, the more peaceful it will be. The contrary seems to be the

Table 8.1 Participation in military actions in the 1990s

	Participation in military action	*Super or great power*	*High income country*	*NATO member*	*First or second wave*	*Professional army*
Participation in military action	1.000	0.506**	0.692**	0.594**	0.471**	0.377*
N	38	38	38	38	38	38

** The correlation is significant 0.01 (Pearson correlation).

* The correlation is significant 0.05.

case as those states which, in the sample here, were classified as 'third wave' and 'fourth wave' democracies did not participate in military actions in a significant manner. But democracies that were founded in the nineteenth century and shortly after the Second World War were predominantly involved in military action. Contrary to intuition, it seems as if democratic consolidation rather pushes a country to military violence than to preclude such action.[13] This finding sheds doubt on the normative assertion that democratic virtue brings about peace in the world.

A last feature of democratic peace becomes equally clear from the statistics: all five variables are significantly correlated with, and hence possible causes of, the use of military force. Hence, we need approaches that can deal with overdetermination. Democratic military behaviour has to be analysed within the framework of an integrated approach in which economic welfare, cultural and moral history, political regime and social interaction are seen as interdependent.

8.3 A summary of Bourdieu's sociology

Bourdieu's sociology offers such a framework of analysis. Despite its complicated language, the main idea of Bourdieu's sociology is rather simple. Social order, that is the behaviour of human beings, customs, manners, morals and the like, is objective in the sense that it constitutes social facts for the people. All social *dispositions*, that is general points of view on the world, are the results of social relations, which in turn are the ties between social *positions*. Society is conceived as a space within which people converge into social groups according to their authority to dispose 'of goods produced previously and of the mechanism by which particular categories of goods will be produced in the future' (Bourdieu, 1985, p. 10). This authority of disposition is determined by four types of capital, that is to say four types of resources: financial (economic) capital, social capital,[14] cultural capital and symbolic capital, whereas the last one results from the former ones and is usually referred to as 'reputation', 'renown', 'charisma'. The objective form of these types of capital is culturally and historically different in each cultural realm, and this is why Bourdieu denies any substantial quality to them. Yet what is universal is the way these four types of capital establish the social position of the capital owner: the social position is a function of the accumulation of these four types of capital, their respective proportion and of the way they were acquired.

In order to render this position tangible it is endowed with distinctive signs. Distinction takes different forms, from the visible and obvious

display of wealth or political attitudes in external symbols such as cars, clothing or furniture to the subtleties of language, taste or manners. Distinction is not sought, it simply comes into existence according to the position taken in the social field (Bourdieu, 1994, p. 24) – according to the *dispositions* of the actors/agents, referring to the double meaning of the word. Recognition inside and in between social groups occurs by way of such distinctive signs. Even though the distinctive signs might be extremely visible, they are not superficial symbols nor are they consciously exposed. They are most often incorporated into the body and mind of the individuals and subconscious forms of living, acting, thinking, talking, communicating and so on (the tacit *comme il faut*). Cultural capital for instance may be objective or incorporated (like the title of a university professor and the knowledge accumulated in studies). It is this incorporation of dispositions that Bourdieu calls 'habitus'. The habitus materializes the experience of one's own position that in turn results from social practice.

Despite his structuralist approach Bourdieu does not claim that people are prisoners of the iron cage of society. Social life continues to contain some indeterminacy and therefore some risk for the holders of different social positions. Social cohesion, social mobility *and* social conflict arise from the competition for the power to determine this indeterminacy. The competition about naming what has not been named yet is a symbolic competition between social positions, as any social position goes along with a peculiar kind of perception of the social world (Bourdieu, 1985, p. 19). The social sphere in which this struggle is concentrated is the political field.

Bourdieu has not elaborated a proper theory of the 'political field' as he has done of the academic field (Bourdieu, 1984), of the educational field (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1985) or of the artistic field (Bourdieu, 1993). Nevertheless he has quite clearly defined and depicted the concept of the 'political field'. In general, a 'field' designates the space of social interaction in which people compete for the access to capital and resources. Fields are organized by different rules depending on the theme of social interaction: arts, literature, politics, business, school, academia and so on. By their very nature social fields are overlapping and capital accumulated in one field may be a resource in another. However, the 'conversion' of capital depends on the internal rules of the field. A dominant position in the academic field for instance cannot be bought as such but financial capital is an important resource for the acquirement of such types of capital that confer a dominant position in the academic field.

Bourdieu's description of the political field is focused on the domestic politics of a given country. As other social fields, the political field is constituted by the interaction of social agents and by their respective status in the field. Status and interaction are, in turn, constituted by the social conditions of the agents, that is their access to economic, social and cultural capital. In democracies the positions depend to some extent on the vote of the citizens but to an even larger extent on the *act of positioning* of the politician in the political field. This is in turn determined by her role in the party apparatus, by her performance in 'politician's politics', by her career (in France, for example, the School of National Administration plays a major role), her gender, race or religion, her financial and social capital, and, last but not least, her symbolic power over cultural goods (for example education) or in general her social status.

Bourdieu compares the political field to the religious field and finds some similarities, notably in the construction of the positions in the field. Politics is in his view first of all a fight about the right vision of the social world, about the doxa. In this sense there is an *orthodoxy* and there are *heretics* as in the religious field (Bourdieu, 2000, p. 68). There are also *lay persons* who do not have the competence, that is neither the institutional status nor the authorizing knowledge, to participate in the struggle about the doxa. Yet, these lay persons are the indispensable audience (whether they like it or not, whether they are interested or not) as they are, as addressees, the legitimators of either the orthodox (the right doxa) or the heretical discourse; the constituency provides a necessary legitimization of the politician in electoral systems. It is the dominant class[15] – the *priests* – whose discourse is the orthodox one as this class tries to legitimate its own position and to preserve the social order which bestows their position upon them.

'Discourse' in Bourdieu's terms is the kind of speech that reproduces the symbolic power of the speaker. In discourses the definitions of the respective class of what is right or wrong, good or bad, pretty or ugly, legitimate and illegitimate are developed and represented. Politics are, in essence, the struggle over these definitions, that is the categories by which the political community and the common good are to be ordered.[16]

By naming a social phenomenon the actors bestow a social *reality* upon it.[17] Thus, discourses define the boundaries of the political sphere, they pronounce the inclusion and exclusion line of the political and, hence, of the realities which are to be treated in politics and how they are to be treated. The boundaries of the political field, therefore, are

flexible. The centre of the field is quite clearly defined and recognizable as it is institutionalized in the state and the state functions. However, at the boundaries social fields overlap and the criteria of the inside/outside boundary become in themselves subjects of discourse. No material criteria can be cited as to where the political field ends or starts, any actor whose actions have an impact on the behaviour of other actors in the political field can be seen as belonging to the political field.

Intrusion at the boundaries of the field may be (and most often is) contested by the actors already inside. Such contestation takes place by, first, questioning the existence of the actors and their issues; second, by challenging their competence, that is their legitimacy (formal and informal, for instance their formal education and their expertise); and third, by contesting their relevance, that is, their capacity to alter the existing structures of the political field. Yet, in democratic societies the dominant, generally shared discourse declares that it is legitimate for every social being to participate in the political field. What is more, the access to dominant positions, that is to the capital by which such positions are obtained, is considered to be the rightful entitlement of everybody. Distinction has become the main device to delimit and defend positions against intrusion. Hence, in the political field (as in all others) it is the fundamental contradiction between the values of equality and the reality of inequality of life opportunities, which is a source of conflict. There is always one social group who is the temporary tenant of the symbolic power, that is the power of nominating/naming. Democracies, like all other societies, have two kinds of structures: the superimposed declaratory (normative) structure of equality and the 'real' social structure of inequality.

8.4 Describing world society with Bourdieu

Bourdieu's reflections on the political field refer to national and domestic politics (notably French politics). Nevertheless they can be transferred to the international sphere. The main problem social science is confronted with when conceiving of the world as a world society is the role of the state.[18] Relational approaches conceive of the state as a social structure (cf. Jackson and Nexon, 1999) which is nested with other social structures[19] – agents who enact agency in a specific institutional framework. States become agents and, in a structurationist view, actors. The state, in itself, has no a priori existence. It is not an entity but the holder of an exclusive kind of capital, namely the power to confer power. The state has monopolized the legitimacy to adjudicate

in the struggle for determining the indeterminacy (Bourdieu, 1985). This monopoly is based on the state's power to define via the educational system the legitimate cultural capital and to assure the form and the means of exchange of some types of capital, especially the economic one, by its legislative power (Bourdieu, 1994, pp. 101–9; Bourdieu and Passeron, 1985). From this it follows that the dominating social 'class' inside the state occupies leading positions in the institutional structure of the state and determines in wide ranges what and how different forms of capital are reproduced (what is to be learned in school, what kind of business activity is supported and which are not, and so on) (Bourdieu, 1989).

The international system can be seen as an agglomeration of such state configurations. Conceiving of the state as an institutionalized social field and as the monopoly of symbolic power allows for the extension of Bourdieu's theory into world society. If we conceive of world society as a social space, the attributes 'national', 'transnational' or 'international' are reduced to being symbols of distinctive social spheres. Social positioning develops well beyond borders in the same way as it develops within borders. Most groups inside a state, notably those who dominate it, probably have more in common with their equivalent group in the neighbouring state than with their compatriots. In the international political field and notably in a globalized world social convergence operates well beyond national borders. It does so by changing the material social structure. But social convergence is equally and even more so to be observed as a shift in the ideational structure of dispositions and discourses which, in turn, reproduce material structures.

There is no reason to assume that the struggle about the dominant discourse – the 'orthodox' discourse as Bourdieu calls it in allusion to the religious field – in the world follows other rules than within domestic societies. These rules imply, first, the imposition of an orthodox discourse by the tenants of the symbolic power; second, the contestation of this discourse by an opposition within the field (heretics); and third, the displaying of this dispute in front of a public of lay persons, that is all the groups of the population which are not initiated to and integrated in the political field.

Globalization has increased the number of transnational political spaces in which political struggle takes place. Such transnational political spaces may be highly institutionalized as is the case of the European Union; they are also created by the action of the so-called 'international community' in regions of post-war reconstruction, for example in Bosnia. But even in cases of a lesser degree of institutionalization the

force of isomorphism drives polities to adopt similar institutions, policies and politics.[20]

It seems safe to assume that the same political conflicts that arise within the societies of nation states take place between social groups at the global level, although the whole array of social structures here is much more complex. If we assume that there exists a transnational evolution of social classes and that at the same time the nation state remains one of the most dominant references for the social actors, then the struggle for symbolic power takes place in domestic politics *and* at the international level. However, the groups and, consequently, the boundaries may shift between the domestic and the international level as the distribution of access to the relevant capital forms differs widely between the international and the national level. A rich and powerful person in Mali may be a poor person at the global level, but she will still have more chances to access the different capital resources at the international level than a poor Malian. The doubling of the social structures may lead to several twists in the roles of orthodox and heretics. The orthodox group in Iran for example, the Shi'ite religious leaders, are heretics in the international system. The dissidents of Eastern Europe were at their time the heretics of their respective countries but fitted fairly well the orthodox discourse in the West.

Drawing maps of the national, transnational and international power relations and the social structure of the world seems, hence, an extremely complex undertaking. But despite its complexity this approach to world society where actors/agents are seen in their respective relations to other actors/agents and in their struggle about the 'right vision' of the world has several advantages. The main advantage is that the connection between internal features of a nation state, such as its democratic institutions, and the international community built on the basis of shared values is not a black box any more but becomes the genuine object of investigation. In our context, this allows us to link monadic with dyadic explanations of democratic peace. The question is how social groups constitute themselves with reference to each other in the domestic *and* the international political field. The assumption that democracies build communities on the basis of shared values becomes plausible because of the transnational socialization processes which, in turn, take place because of the force of similar material and ideational structures of capital acquisition and distribution. The 'mechanism' which links the monadic to the dyadic account of democratic peace can be seen in the similarity of the 'capital' structure of the democratic, market liberal states. The forces that create the conditions of the

monadic version of democratic peace can be seen as identical with the forces that animate the dyadic mutual understanding of peacefulness between democratic states.

8.5 A gang of the same kind: the reproduction of material capital structure in the world and the symbolic power of liberalism

In the light of the material structure of world society and its mental 'superstructure' the multicolinearity of the above-mentioned characteristics is not surprising. The bellicose democracies occupy superior positions in the material structure of world society. Not only are they the richest countries in the world but in addition, they hold the keys of access to the reproduction of economic, social and cultural capital, hence of the reproduction of material *and* symbolic power. The concept of capital does not only imply actual wealth but also the means of its reproduction. Concerning economic capital this means that it is not only the actual financial capacity of a country which is to be considered when evaluating its position in the material social structure but also its industrial weight, the structure of its industry, its productivity, the composition of its labour market, and the administrative, legal and financial setting of an economy's productivity. In all these respects the bellicose democracies score high compared to all democracies and highest in the world ranking compared to all other states of the world, no matter what political regime.[21]

The same can be stated with regard to social and cultural capital. If we measure social capital in world society by the number of memberships of a country in international and transnational institutions, then the cited democracies once again score highest (cf. Russett and Oneal, 2001). This finding is valid for intergovernmental institutions as well as for non-governmental organizations.[22] We could add further characteristics of capital types such as the regulative capacities of the state or the efficiency of administration (however, this is not easy to measure), cultural equipment and institutions of the countries (theatres and schools alike), cultural production (measured in output of publishing, the movie industry, the music industry, and so on).[23] We would find equal proofs of the dominant position of the old, wealthy democratic states – the very same that mainly led military campaigns in the 1990s. Arguing by analogy with Bourdieu we can assume not only that they showed high levels of military violence because they are the most wealthy and the oldest democracies but also that they did so in order to

maintain their favourable position in the material and ideational structure of the international system.

The ideational and discursive structure is interrelated with the material structure. It is far more than a mere justification or rhetorical device. The ideational and discursive structure is the expression (realization) of the distribution of capital and the dominant forms of its reproduction. Hence, the mental structure of the market liberal international system and the democratically institutionalized state is intimately linked to these two forms of reproduction of economic and political capital. It is important to understand that the ideational structure exists on the one hand as an internalized cognitive scheme of the individuals and on the other as a communicative flow in society, as 'culture', so to say. The way of perceiving this world, of seeing, hearing, understanding and judging it, is essentially coined by the way a person or a group of persons organizes its reproduction of capital. Capital reproduction is, in turn, organized in the way the world is seen by the actors/agents. The interrelationship between the material structure of the world and the mental structure of its representation is of a consubstantial nature – one does not exist without the other.

Individualism, rationalism and (political) liberalism can be seen as the cornerstones of the dominant mental structure. These thought systems reflect the specific means of capital reproduction in the modern world. All three are multifaceted, complex and interconnected ways of perceiving the human being, her capacities, the natural and the social world. It is not possible to discuss each of them in this chapter particularly because none of them is a coherent, canonical and inert corpus of ideas.[24] Yet, what is important to note here is the inherent relationship between these thought systems and the material structure of capital reproduction in the Bourdieusian sense. All three thought systems evolve around the central idea of the individual's reason, interest and creative will. The 'common sense' that is conferred to basic features of the social, political, economic and cultural world such as human rights or private property is derived from the basic belief in the self-conscious, willing and free individual.

Yet, even among societies which share the belief in the rational individual endowed with specific, inalienable human rights, this does not imply a general consensus on how these principles ought to be realized. Indeed, political struggle evolves mainly around the meaning that has to be conferred to the Enlightenment assumptions of individual reason and will, fundamental liberties and human dignity and how the corresponding social and political system has to be modelled. This political

struggle can be represented as three lines of a continuum, each of which having the dominant position as starting point and its complete negation as counterpoint.

The political field of the international arena is structured in a similar fashion as the domestic arena in democratic states. Beyond the formal structure of equal states, each of which supposedly sovereign and autonomous, exists a 'real' structure of unequal access to the reproduction means of economic, financial, social and cultural capital. Mobility in world society depends largely on the capacity to accede to positions of capital reproduction or of defending existing positions against newcomers. Social conflict arises mainly alongside this struggle for the access to resources of capital reproduction and is expressed in the discourses of how, if at all, individualism, rationalism and liberalism are to be realized.

8.6 Democratic peace as a process of social positioning

If these assumptions hold, the explanation of democratic peace changes fundamentally. It is not democracy per se that pacifies a state's behaviour, as monadic theory suggests, but the ideological resources and the symbolic power it procures. These are based, on the one hand, on the peculiar mix of the democratic states' economic capital, that is well-functioning industrialized market economies, their social capital, that is the high degree of embeddedness in powerful international organizations and their dominant position in these which supplies them with additional material and symbolic power resources, and their cultural capital, that is their dominance in the material and ideological production of cultural goods. On the other hand, and this is crucial, the in-group coherence emerges because there are other states in the world society from which the group of the capitalist democratic states seek to be distinguished. In relation to these other states, democratic states form a group – but not necessarily so because of the sole reason that they are *democracies*. In-group coherence is rather the effect of the dominant position democratic states occupy in the *material and mental* structure of the world society. Wealth and power bind them together as a group; individualism, rationalism and liberalism as cognitive and action-guiding scheme shape the way they relate internally to each other and how they behave externally towards other types of regimes.

In such a perspective, military violence by democracies seems to be based on very much the same grounds as democratic peace. Bruce Russett and John Oneal (2001) explain the dyadic democratic peace with

the 'Kantian triangle' of democracy, market economy and international institutionalization (see Brock, Chapter 5 in this volume). This Kantian triangle seems to create the integration of the democratic peace zone inside the group as well as the boundaries between it and the exterior world. This is plausible if we assume that the holders of the dominant positions in the material and mental world structure are certainly not willing to give up their positions but, on the contrary, are determined to reproduce the resources necessary for the maintenance of their dominance. As dyadic theories claim, democracies do not wage war against each other because they share the same visions of the world – and because they share the same material positions in the world. Peacefulness is a *distinctive* feature of democratic states (versus other 'classes' of polities) and it provides them with *symbolic* power which in turn legitimizes their dominant *material* position in the world system.

If we draw a graph depicting the economic and cultural capital of a country which largely determines the symbolic power of a country – that is the power to impose its discourses[25] – we find a quite interesting similarity with the boundaries of conflict zones in today's world (see Figure 8.1). The democratic peace community is the one which concentrates the economic and cultural capital of the world. The ideological discourse which goes along with their dominant material position is that of democracy and market economy.[26] Democratic states share ideological values because they occupy similar positions in the material structure of the world, that is similar access to the reproduction of their economic, social and cultural capital. They form a group of the same kind which is determined to maintain its dominant position and to defend it against any contestation of the formula that made their success. With regard to other groups of states in the world society and to contesting discourses (heretics), democracy and its implications (human rights, fundamental liberties and so on) has become a means of distinction, dividing the 'civilized world' from the 'barbarians' (cf. Donnelly, 1998).

Contestation of the discourse and the symbolic dominance of the West arises at two levels of intensity. First, contestation comes from actors/agents who dispose of the cultural capital to counter the Western discourse but not (yet) of the economic capital to threaten the dominance of the West. China, India and, in some respect, Iran are such countries. This group of states claims recognition of its growing economic and cultural stature in a rather confrontational way. They do not desire to erase the material structures and positions of the international system as such but they aspire to occupy their very own place



Figure 8.1 Economic and cultural capital and zones of conflict

among the dominant group. This group of states does not fundamentally question the world society structure but only those parts of it which they consider as excluding them from the powerful positions in it.[27] Their relationships with Western countries are tense, but conflict seems to be contained as these countries denounce only some aspects of Western dominance. The conflict takes place *inside* the political space of world society since the West cannot completely deny the others the right to participate in the political field. The material position of these countries and their cultural capital give them the power to struggle with the West about the question of 'right living' as the 'Asian values' debate shows (Englehart, 2000; Lau, 1999).

Moreover, there is a certain permeability between the industrialized democracies and these countries which points to a growing acceptance of the 'newcomers' in the selected circle of dominant nations. Economically, these countries are increasingly taken seriously not only as markets for Western products or as cheap production plants but also as producers in their own right and as serious competitors. In the same vein the rising attraction of places like the Chinese south or of cities like

Bangalore for international business and, accordingly, for international universities and business schools can be interpreted as a sign of the continuous strengthening of the cultural capital of these states which is mainly based on their ever stronger position in the world economy. With respect to the cultural field and capital, this rising symbolic power can be observed, for instance, in the strong growing fashion in the West for Bollywood movies or in the influences of Buddhist Zen culture and post-communist China kitsch in architecture and interior design.

Yet, at the same time that these countries aspire to 'social climbing' they are strikingly aggressive towards other countries, mostly neighbouring and competing countries (consider for instance the strained relationship between China and Vietnam or that between India and Pakistan[28]). In the language of social distinction one can call these states 'parvenus' who want to affirm their belonging to the dominant group by fighting potential rivals.

A second form of contestation comes from the marginalized groups of the world system. These cannot, for the time being, aspire to conquer one day the dominant position of the West as elites in countries like China or India do. Neither do they profit in any way from the economic, political and cultural mechanisms of world society; on the contrary the world economic system seems to perpetuate the exclusion of these people and their respective livelihoods from the means of access to national wealth. Violence in the form of internal civil strife and external aggressive behaviour is most notably to be observed in these regions as different segments of the population each try to gain profit from globalization despite the general bad state of their country. Conceiving of the world society as a relational structure of material capital reproduction and symbolic power allows us to establish a link between internal political fights of social groups about the dominating discourses and the international system (cf. for example Clapham, 1996).[29] Analysing a domestic conflict as a conflict about the adoption of exogenously given preferences and as a conflict about symbolic structures reintegrates the so-called 'new wars' (Kaldor, 1999) of the 1980s and 1990s into a framework of world society (cf. Clapham, 1996; Reno, 1998; Duffield, 2001; Macrae, 2001). In the light of a growing tendency to create international administrations in these regions in order to transform their political, economic and social systems according to Western liberal democratic ideals, such a linkage allows an instructive analysis of accommodation and resistance to these transformation projects. These conflicts between international administrations and local populations (cf. for instance Pouligny, 2004) are often living

examples of the political struggle about the power to impose a discourse and the corresponding mental and material social structure.

These conflicts show well how group convergence comes into being transnationally. Marginalized groups may be embedded in an institutionalized state (North Korea for instance), but they will be more often organized in a deterritorialized and non-state form as for example terrorist networks. This group is actually the biggest threat to the dominant group.

Figure 8.1 illustrates that peace or violent conflict are dependent on the distribution of capital, the social positioning of different social groups, some of which act in the form of the institutionalized state and some not, in world society. In this perspective, democracy does not create peace in and of itself. Rather, the specific way the material and the ideological resources, notably cultural capital, are reproduced in democratic, wealthy, industrialized and allied states assures their dominant position. Democracy is an important ideological element for the in-group coherence of the dominating states and serves as an important indicator of the out-group boundary.

In this perspective democratic wars seem to depend on much the same mechanisms as democratic peace. Democracy has a pivotal role in the symbolic power which creates in-group coherence and out-group distinction, but only as long as there are other types of political regimes from which democracies may be distinguished. It should be noted that the distinction process of the group of dominant states does not *necessarily* create violence and war towards the 'other' as some Schmittian friend-or-foe interpretations may want to have it. There is no evidence that the in-group cohesion of the 'zone of peace' relies on a violent, aggressive, purposeful exclusion of other countries. As was said for the political field in general, several strategies of exclusion of contentious discourses (and thus actors) exist: their existence as such can be denied, their competence can be downplayed or negated, or their relevance can be understated. Those strategies are easily employed by democratic, industrialized and wealthy states as they have a great capacity to reproduce their power position from within. The success of the Western model is not founded on the *violent* exclusion of the 'other' but on the endogenous process of the successful reproduction of resources.

It is noteworthy that, in the relational perspective, the challenge to the dominating group has to be posed in a provocative and defiant manner by the opponent state or group. Alternatives that do not challenge the dominant position of the democratic states or that even contribute to their reproduction do not push democratic states to use

military violence. Hence, the enormous difference between the Islamic alternatives proposed by Iran or by Saudi Arabia is that the former challenges willingly and provocatively the Western model while the latter, de facto, contributes to its reproduction despite the Islamic outlook of the regime.

However, the double structure of the system (discursive equality vs. real life inequality) continues to create severe tensions and nourishes conflicts at very different levels: between states, inside states (or what is left of them), between some states and some non-state actors. Notably civil strife in those countries which are on the margin of world society and 'world order wars' or 'humanitarian interventions' can be interpreted as the result of the world social structure. The violent contestation of the capitalist economy and the democratic model of politics which is expressed in these regions is the unintended, structurally emerging by-product of the Western security communities and the deepening democratic peace: a market economy which produces wealth and economic interdependence in an ever globalizing world; regional and also international institutionalization which reinforces the social embeddedness of the democratic and economically developed states; cultural dominance, ranging from Coca-Cola to Kant, which finally reproduces the legitimizing discourses of the West, discarding alternative views on how polities could be constructed and policies could be made.

Saying this, it should be noted, however, that the discourse on democracy ought not be seen as a functional means of power-hungry states. This would underestimate the incorporated nature of the mental structure of world society. The material and the mental structure are intimately linked and their reproduction does not depend on voluntary action but on mostly unreflective and unconscious practice.

8.7 Conclusion

The aim of this chapter was twofold. First, the objective was to bridge the gap between monadic and dyadic versions of the democratic peace theory, that is to identify the basis on which democratic states reproduce internally the capacity for keeping peace with foreign states. Second, the chapter aimed at explaining why democratic states take military action in the world. Both explanations, of course, ought to be coherent with one another.

The theoretical approach of Bourdieu which is founded on a relational understanding of society and which is focused on the interconnectedness of material and ideational power structures offers a key to

understanding the peaceful inclusiveness between democracies, as well as conflictual and aggressive relations between democratic states and pretenders or even explicit challengers. The way democratic, industrialized, market liberal states reproduce their material power position is intimately linked to the cognitive and normative thought systems of individualism, rationalism and liberalism. Inclusion and exclusion from the 'peace zone' operate along the lines of the material and ideational structure which is dominated by this group of states. This is to say that the more a group, be it in the form of a state or not, accepts or challenges the material and ideational position of the dominating wealthy democracies, the more it qualifies as an ally or an opponent. The lines of conflict run along the lines of struggle about the dominant discourse, that is the 'right' way of seeing, interpreting and modelling this world. The conflict as such arises from the inherent tension between the declared equality of all states, or people or human beings for this matter, and the real life inequality.

In principle, the existence of 'zones of peace' or 'zones of violent conflict' depends on the general picture of how different social groups relate to each other and which strategies they choose to obtain and reproduce their power resources. The peculiarity of liberal systems is that much of the power resources are produced from within. This confers a great capacity of inclusion and reflexivity to the system as it seeks to incorporate all potentially useful power resources. However, in the same vein this kind of process of resource reproduction also produces marginalization on a large scale for all those groups (states or persons) that cannot be usefully incorporated. As can be observed in the midst of the liberal, industrialized and wealthy democracies, violence is most likely to emerge in these excluded and marginalized zones. Somalia, Sudan, Haiti, Chechnya – all these regions show a striking parallelism at the level of world society to the marginalization and exclusion of 'futile' persons inside of states. The first conclusion to be drawn from this chapter is that the greatest dangers for peace stem from these processes of exclusion and marginalization.

The second conclusion is that democratic states have mainly two reasons to fight states or groups that do not correspond to the model of the democratic, liberal, market economy state. The first is rivalry about the 'orthodoxy'. As soon as alternatives to the Western model appear to be a real challenge to the material and ideational position of the democratic states in the world society, these may tend to answer this danger by the display and use of military power. Because of a similar impression of threat democratic states will try to pacify and democratize

regions in turmoil if and when the violence there entails real risks to the democratic states. This is the second reason which pushes democratic states to use military violence, as has been observed in the so-called humanitarian interventions and, even more obviously, in the 'war against terror'.

Yet, the final, most important conclusion derived from a conception of world society as a process of relational positioning in power structures is that the peacefulness between democracies observed to date is not necessarily stable. Democratic peace has to be interpreted as a historically contingent evolution that cannot be projected into the future in the same form. Distinction processes may occur in very different ways and, as they are relational processes, a strong convergence in world society towards democracy, human rights and market economy may enhance new forms of distinction. In the same vein it can be argued that 'democratic peace' is not confined to democracies only. Sameness may create equally strong forces of convergence and peacefulness between other types of countries.

All findings give reason to be very sceptical about one of the main conclusions that has been drawn from democratic peace theory in the past. Democratization and market liberalization as a strategy of securing peace in the world may have, after all, dangerously paradoxical effects. Such transition processes create marginalization on a large scale without necessarily creating the access to the resources of power that are the basis of the comfortable position of the dominating democratic and wealthy states. Hence, instead of creating peace, such transition processes might create the grounds for violence and exclusion. The importance of the issue should lead peace research to carefully evaluate and research this hypothesis.

Peace, in the end, depends on the challenge countries or groups with alternative models of capital reproduction and ideational structures pose to the Western model and how democratic states will face the defying forces.

Notes

1. I would like to thank Lothar Brock, Anna Geis, Harald Müller, Vincent Pouliot and Matthew Rendall for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of the chapter.
2. This is certainly not the place to discuss the more than unspecific notion of 'non-democratic' regimes; see Brooker (2000) for a thorough discussion.
3. As a reminder: actors act out of their own will without or with only little interference from structures; agents on the contrary act as representatives of

a larger structure. Structurationist approaches, however, refuse this dichotomy of actor–structure and see individuals as behaving on their own *and* as representatives of encompassing social structures.

4. For the use of the term of 'war', refer to note 5.
5. There are several benchmark systems to distinguish war from other kinds of military violence, see for example the Correlates of War Project (http://cow2.la.psu.edu) or the definitions of the Peace Research Institute, Oslo (Strand et al., 2002). For purposes of simplicity these distinctions cannot be discussed here. 'Military force' is meant to designate any kind of deployment of regular troops of a country in another one with a mandate that includes combat actions with other armed groups (hence this excludes joint manoeuvres or military assistance to befriended countries).
6. The definition of democracy is, of course, difficult but we assume that the combination of scoring nine and higher in the Polity IV data set and 'free' in the Freedom House data set allows selection of political systems whose democratic character cannot be denied.
7. The period from 1990 onwards was chosen in order to exclude from investigation the structural effect of the Cold War.
8. With reference to the four 'waves' of democratization see Huntington (1991, 1997), von Beyme (1994) and Schmidt (2000a).
9. The Federal Republic of Germany was made part of this group since the Weimar Republic is considered as a non-consolidated democracy, which would hardly have attained the score of nine in the Polity IV data set.
10. Version 2.1 of the data set, cf. Singer and Small (1982) and Singer (1987).
11. The COW data set differentiates only between 'major' and 'minor' powers. Here we reduced the data set to democracies and limited the time space to 1970–93 (end of the data set). In operating a cluster analysis with Euclidian distances four groups emerged.
12. Three countries could not be classified as data were missing.
13. Such a hypothesis would also explain the growing willingness we have witnessed during the Iraq crisis in 2002/3 of the 'new' democracies in Eastern and Central Europe to participate, alongside the US, in such military campaigns.
14. 'Social capital' in Bourdieu's terminology means the embeddedness of an actor in social networks, the quality of her social relationships and the scope of her social activities. The concept is, therefore, not the same as the one developed by Robert D. Putnam; see Putnam (1995) and Putnam et al. (1993).
15. Bourdieu does not use the notion of class in a Marxist way but rather in a biological sense of a clearly designated and delimited kind of people.
16. Referring to the rise of the right-wing party the Front National and of their discourse on immigration, Bourdieu cites the swing from the dichotomy of 'poor–rich' to 'national–foreigner' as an example of struggle over the ordering categories of the French political scene since the 1980s.
17. The question of how exactly discourses consolidate visions of the world has to remain open here. The process of 'linguistic materialization' deserves a research of its own which cannot be undertaken in this chapter, but see for example the instructive work by Alice Krieg-Planque (2003) on the materialization of the formula of 'ethnic cleansing' in the Yugoslav war. My argumentation

here sets out from the moment when discourses have already materialized, when they are already consolidated common sense.

18. See for a thorough discussion Hobson (2000) and Evans et al. (1985).
19. This is the main rationale of Niklas Luhmann's concept of world society as the largest of all social systems, cf. Stichweh (2000).
20. 'Isomorphism' is the term the so-called Stanford School of Institutionalism attributed to this phenomenon, cf. Boli and George (1999), Meyer et al. (1997), DiMaggio and Powell (1991).
21. Cf. the OECD or the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) statistics (access at http://www.oecd.org/statsportal and http://www.unido.org).
22. Cf. for instance the Global Civil Society Yearbooks (access at http://www.lse.ac.uk/depts/global/yearbook).
23. An exploratory gathering of data shows the great disparities of cultural production between the Northern states on the one hand and between democracies and non-democratic states on the other; for instance, 17 books are published per 10,000 inhabitants per year in the UK, there is only one published per 10,000 inhabitants in Brazil, and only 0.2 per 10,000 inhabitants per year in Egypt. See on data notably the UNESCO data sets.
24. This statement refers to a Weberian view of rational modernity, cf. Weber (1980), Giddens (1971), Raynaud (1996) and Schluchter (1996). Other authors, too, have stressed the centrality of individualism, rationalism and liberalism, cf. O'Hagan (2002), Elias (1991), Dumont (1991), Leca and Birnbaum (1990), Münch (1986), Hall (1985) and Lukes (1973).
25. Which is in turn an aggregate of economic, social and cultural capital.
26. Francis Fukuyama's essay *The End of History* (1992) illustrates this dominant discourse well.
27. The Chinese contestation of the human rights doctrine is a case in point. Accusations of human rights violations are most often refuted on the ground that the concept itself is a tool of Western domination.
28. The Heidelberg Institute on International Conflict Research classifies the first of the two cited conflicts as 'latent', the second as 'manifest'; see Heidelberg Institute on International Conflict Research (2004).
29. The Meiji restoration in 1868–1912 in Japan and the corresponding Satsuma rebellion are an example of this; Christopher Clapham (1996) argues that the civil wars in West Africa follow this scheme.

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Part IV
Conclusions

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9

The Case for a New Research Agenda: Explaining Democratic Wars

Lothar Brock, Anna Geis and Harald Müller

9.1 Democratic war: contradictions of democratic peace and liberalism

Democracies fight wars. From the viewpoint of traditional realism this is a trivial observation, because democracies are states and states fight wars simply because they are states among other states, with no one to oblige them to behave otherwise. The advocates of the democratic peace proposition observe that democracies do not fight each other. They wonder why this should be the case. They look for specific reasons that lie in the nature of democracy or inter-democratic relations and may explain democratic peace. They have been so busy claiming at least this piece of territory from the realists that they have paid too little attention to the second part of the question: why is the war averseness of democracies so much lower in a mixed group of states than in any democratic group?

If this question is not to lead back to the trivial observation mentioned above, one has to turn the heuristic perspective of the democratic peace debate upside down. The question then is whether there are any specifically 'democratic' reasons which explain why democracies go to war or let themselves be drawn into violent conflict, reasons which would not lead non-democracies to go to war. In short: is there a *democratic war*? The contributions to the present volume offer insights which underline the importance of tackling this question in a systematic way. They show, firstly, that over time and in abstract quantitative terms, the overall war involvement of democracies is comparable to that of non-democracies; secondly, that at present the war involvement of democracies is shaping world politics to a greater extent than the war involvement of non-democracies; thirdly, that there seem

to be specific features of democratic politics which enhance war involvement; and fourthly, that the variance in the conflict behaviour of democracies is greater than the variance in the features of their respective political systems. This means that there is an urgent need to investigate the factors determining the war involvement of democracies, and that in order to do so we need to go beyond the specific institutional characteristics of the different political systems of democracies.

When democracies use force, they typically do so in the form of intervention in ongoing conflicts. This intervention is not directed towards acquiring territory, but towards enforcing order. This order is defined in terms of universal values. While other universalisms which have tried to impose their will were and are quite clear about the fact that they are acting on behalf of a particularistic clientele (the proletariat or a particular religion), democracies wage war, if they do, in the name of humankind. The 'liberal causes' for which democracies are willing to fight are always thought of as serving the common good (cf. Doyle, 1983a, b). Democratic wars are wars fought for purposes and objectives that are embodied in the universalistic principles of democratic constitutions. Democracies fight to restore or enforce the rule of law; they fight to stop genocide in civil war-torn societies and to protect human rights; they fight to protect international security rather than national survival alone.

Unfortunately, although democratic or liberal universalism sounds fine in theory, it runs into formidable contradictions in practice. People are killed in order to save people; the rule of law is disregarded in order to install it; international security is undermined in order to strengthen it. These paradoxes can clearly be observed in the armed interventions and full-scale wars fought by democracies in the last ten years. They show up in the unintended consequences of these wars, they show up in the internal debates within democracies, before, during and after wars, and they show up, most spectacularly and acerbically, in the disputes between democracies about wars which are promoted by some and opposed by others. As emphasized in the preceding pages, democracies vary greatly in their attitudes towards the use of force. This reflects the practice of liberal universalism as illiberal anti-pluralism (Simpson, 2001). Variance in the behaviour of democracies should not be seen as a mere ontological gap between good intentions and less good outcomes, that is, between *ethos* and *kratos*. Rather, illiberal practice points to the dark side of liberal universalism, its fixation on the unjust enemy. The bright side is, of course, mutual respect under the rule of law. Along these lines, Gerry Simpson (2001) suggests that we should

distinguish between 'liberal anti-pluralism' and 'Charter liberalism'. Obviously, liberal universalism has two distinct sides to it. It can be referred to in order to justify the use of force (as enforcement of substantive norms), and it can be used to argue for restraint (as self-binding to procedural norms).

The bifurcation of democratic behaviour casts doubt on the rational, normative and institutional causal mechanisms assumed by democratic peace theory (cf. Müller, 2004b). Firstly, democracies are not the permanent objects of aggressive designs by non-democracies against which they have to defend themselves, or the realization of which they have to prevent, if not pre-empt. The security argument would be an easy way out of the explanatory difficulties, but it does not stand up to an empirical test. While some of the wars of democracies have indeed been defensive, in other cases, and increasingly so, democracies get involved in military action in the context of asymmetric conflicts which do not constitute a security dilemma. Secondly, the outcome of the utilitarian calculations which supposedly propel democracies towards peace is dependent on the circumstances. On the one hand, economic arguments against war involvement can be neutralized if the prospects for a cheap, successful and profitable (in terms of the value at stake) war are good, and if such profitable wars can be fought by a small professional high-tech army or private security companies in remote regions (Binder, 2004). On the other hand, wars are not being fought just because they are cheap. Thirdly, the normative preference for peaceful conflict resolution and human rights (including the right to life) can turn into militancy if an opposing regime is perceived as denying such rights and liberties to its people. Fourthly, the development of mutual empathy between democracies and their close clustering in international institutions may not be sufficient to keep them from ending up in politically contradictory camps, as happened during the Iraq War. Due to their openness, democratic institutions are accessible to the militants as well as the pacifists and to the hawks as well as the doves, with the concomitant uncertainties as to the results of decision-making. Thus, the same causes that are supposed to account for peace might provide incentives for waging war.

9.2 Enabling factors for the use of force by democracies

Several questions arise from these considerations. They all relate to the crucial issue of what it is that directs democracies in one or the other direction, towards peacefulness or towards war-making. If either possibility

is entrenched in the array of causes commonly supposed to move democracies towards peace, we must look for additional factors that constrain behaviour or enable militancy.

One crucial consideration pertains to the international normative setting. The set of norms within which states operate might exert a crucial influence on the attitudes democracies adopt towards the use of force. This appears to contradict the liberal notion that foreign policy is decisively shaped by domestic factors. But this is not necessarily the case. It is precisely because democracies are supposed to be more sensitive to norms (which they themselves help to establish) that we should attend to the possibility that norms generated at the international level penetrate democratic political cultures and, in turn, become guidelines for external behaviour.

Another consideration relates to the power position that a democracy occupies in the international system. One might surmise that a high rank in the power hierarchy would facilitate the decision to go to war, since a war could be waged without undue risk or expectation of intolerable cost. However, this constellation probably only serves as an opportunity structure, not as a causal mechanism in the strict sense. As already mentioned, the fact that war is cheap does not imply that it will be fought. In addition, it is not only individual status that affects the relative power of states vis-à-vis a potential enemy; the pooling of power resources, that is to say the building of alliances or coalitions of the willing, produces the same effect. Given the particular proneness of democracies to create international organizations, alliances and security communities and to join forces in war, this might again present a democracy-specific opportunity structure that makes war more, not less, likely, though it does not by itself cause war.

From this reasoning, two further questions arise that direct attention to the domestic features of specific democratic states and societies. They concern the formal and informal institutional structures of the respective democracies and their normative structures, that is to say their particular political cultures. The institutional question relates to the identity of the actors who participate in discourses on war and the concomitant decision-making, in particular to the 'war entrepreneurs' and their supposed motivations. The cultural question relates to citizens' normative attitudes towards war and peace and their historical roots. In order to determine the domestic opportunity structure and the chances it affords to war entrepreneurs, we must take into account the institutional as well as the cultural features of a democratic society. In the following two sections, we deal with the international and domestic sets of questions in more detail.

9.2.1 Changes in the international normative setting: broadening the grounds for intervention

The possible relationship between the evolution of the international normative structure (promoted by democracies) and the internal discourses on peace and war in democracies has been mentioned already. The notion of a normative structure complementing and overlaying the physical, resource-based power structure of the international system has been conceived by the English School as constituting an international society (Bull, 1977; Dunne, 1998; Little, 2000). Along the same lines but from a constructivist viewpoint, Alexander Wendt criticizes realism's asocial understanding of what the international system is made up of (Wendt, 1999). A normative structure that has become 'hegemonic' (in the understanding of discourse analysis) 'structurates' the realm of potential political choices for states at the international level. It makes options beyond the boundaries of the normatively permitted more costly than those within the corridor of the normatively justifiable; prohibited actions will provoke objections and countermeasures, extending from blaming and shaming, via diplomatic and economic sanctions, right up to military threats and the use of force.

In the 1990s, we can observe a weakening of the basic norms of international society as a group of states which recognize each other as equal and sovereign and therefore refrain from intervention. The change of paradigm can best be demonstrated with reference to the English School. The question of what to do about the continuing or newly erupting violence in many parts of the world after the end of the Cold War resulted in a bifurcation among the followers of the English School into a pluralist (Jackson, 2000) and a solidarist version (cf. Wheeler and Dunne, 1996; Dunne, 1998; Wheeler, 2000). While the pluralist group stuck to the notion of an egalitarian system of states recognizing each other as sovereign, the solidarist group held that the overarching principle of sovereignty, bolstered by the prohibition of intervention in Article 2.7 of the UN Charter, had to give way to a conditional right of the international community to intervene in states in order to protect people. Correspondingly, there was a duty of states to conduct their business in a 'responsible' manner if sovereignty in the meaning of Article 2.7 was to be granted. Responsibility as viewed by the US and the British governments, in turn, related to two specific aspects of state behaviour, both concerning the domestic political arena.

The first of these was the control of terrorist groups based on the territory of a state; if these groups acted from such a 'safe haven' against the territory of another state, the host state could be held responsible.

This principle emerged from a long and difficult struggle over the assessment of Israeli actions against neighbouring Arab states, notably Lebanon, but it took a clearer shape in the UN resolutions following Al Qaeda's attacks on US embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam and on the US warship *Cole* off Yemen. These resolutions urged the Taliban government in Afghanistan to prevent the repetition of these terrorist acts, and declared that the Taliban government would be held accountable if they continued. This development culminated in UNSC resolutions 1368 and 1373 of 2001, which declared that such acts constituted threats to international peace and security, soliciting UNSC reaction under Chapter VII, and even justifying the recourse to self-defence by the attacked state under Article 51. Tolerance of transnational terrorism emerging from one's territory was thus equated with a cross-border attack on another state. Refraining from such attacks was not enough; states also had to ensure that non-state actors operating in or from their territory observed the same prohibition of offensive warfare which they themselves were obliged to abide by.

The second development concerns the behaviour of governments towards their citizens and the protection of the latter by way of 'humanitarian intervention'. Though the concept as such was not new, it acquired a new meaning after the end of the Cold War (cf. Finnemore, 1996; Wheeler, 2000; Holzgrefe and Keohane, 2003). In the aftermath of the Gulf War of 1991, it was employed to enforce protected areas for the Kurds and no-fly zones over Shi'ite areas. Later on, it developed into a generalized principle of international conduct. Its content, though, is not entirely clear. The concept suggests that on a continuum from proper conduct to genocide, there is a line which governments must not cross without risking an international reaction, if necessary by force. Where exactly the tripwire lies is unclear, and cannot be deduced from the practice of the international community. Why Somalia and not Congo? Why Bosnia and not Sudan? Why Kosovo and not Myanmar? There seems to be a certain decisionism in the selection of the cases dealt with under Chapter VII and those that were addressed by milder instruments or ignored altogether.

Nevertheless, the overall consequence of establishing this norm was an even stronger hegemony of the Western liberal discourse in international affairs. This was, of course, only possible after the collapse of the global rival, the Soviet Union. To be sure, this hegemony is not total. For example, the Human Rights Commission has made some strange moves in recent years in electing its chairs from countries not widely admired for their human rights record, such as Libya. However, the

empowerment for intervention to restore human rights in cases of their brutal violation has certainly opened the door to the justification of wars of a specific liberal kind. It should be noted that – as the case of Somalia demonstrates – this justification can be invoked even if no government exists that could intentionally harm its subjects. This reminds one of the Kantian disdain for lawless societies in which the 'state of nature' rules completely. The UN Security Council has decided that such a state of affairs constitutes a threat to international peace, and may call for intervention in order to restore order.

The broadening of the grounds for intervention did not lead to the creation of a UN-based structure to conduct, command and control such actions; instead, the Security Council authorized member states to employ the means they deemed necessary to perform the task. The Council would then deal with the results. This move puts enormous discretionary power in the hands of those 'capable and willing' to act. As far as capability is concerned the Western democracies are certainly to the fore, though that does not mean that they are always willing. In cases far removed from their immediate interests democracies sometimes prefer others (including non-democracies) to step in and provide order.

What this means in practice is that, whenever the UN Security Council is called upon by events or articulate voices to take up a possible candidate case for 'humanitarian intervention', the Western states are in a doubly privileged position. They occupy three out of five permanent (veto) seats and usually three more (non-permanent) seats in the Security Council, and in addition the democracies form the most powerful group of states in today's world.

9.2.2 The domestic setting: the institutional and cultural fabric of democracies

The frequency of democratic war involvement, as shown by Sven Chojnacki in Chapter 2 in this volume, is distributed rather unevenly among the democracies (Müller, 2004b). Some are involved more often than others, and those democracies which have been involved over time take part in military actions only selectively. This irregularity of behaviour makes it difficult to theorize about democratic war involvement. The causes of this variance must be identified in the situational context of the particular international crisis, and in relation to domestic institutional structures and political cultures.

The importance of institutions for making democracies more peaceful has been widely discussed in the democratic peace literature (see for example Auerswald, 1999; Elman, 2000; Gaubatz, 1999; Morgan and

Campbell, 1991). Democratic institutions serve as checks and balances to governmental power, in frequent elections the government's work is regularly subjected to the citizens' approval, and democratic decision-making is more transparent, professional and pluralistic. However, as Christopher Daase has shown in Chapter 4 in this volume, all the institutions that work in favour of conflict prevention and accommodation when two democracies interact might contribute to conflict escalation when the democracy faces a non-democratic opponent. Institutions may enhance conflicts by providing incentives for democratic governments to use force as a diversion or to expand war aims in order to secure domestic consensus. In addition, democratic institutions may sometimes allow for the relatively unrestricted use of force, since peacetime provisions for civil control of the military are relaxed in times of war. Such institutional incentives are found in democracies to different degrees, depending on the institutional structure and the modes of power sharing, factors which can vary considerably (Lijphart, 1999; Schmidt, 2000a, pp. 307–75).

The different institutional structures of democracies provide different opportunity structures for sectoral interests or other 'war entrepreneurs' to push their particular interest in a military action. However, institutions only serve as transmission belts and should not be regarded as causing democratic peacefulness or bellicosity (Müller, 2004b, pp. 501–3). Conventional democratic institutions only transmit at a given time the preferences of actors – of citizens, interest groups, social movements and governmental actors. This means that a democracy's peacefulness is crucially dependent on what kind of majority preferences citizens and political actors have with regard to a specific international crisis. Such preferences can be largely shaped and modified by public debate, by exchanging arguments about the pros and cons of a potential military action. The democratic peace literature usually treats such preferences as exogenous to their research designs and assumes that citizens have peaceful preferences, while governments might have special interests in wars and need to be restrained by citizens' control. In fact, citizens can display any type of attitude towards military action and this will depend very much on the kind of military action in question. Their responses can range from enthusiasm via rational consent to indifference and outright opposition.

This consideration leads us from the institutional to the cultural features of a democracy. Majority attitudes towards violence and war in a society are crucial in understanding political choices for or against wars in democratic states. Such normative attitudes are shaped by

historical experiences of violence and by the special identity of a society as reflected in its political culture (cf. Joerissen and Stahl, 2003). Following the constructivist foreign policy analysis, it can be safely assumed that foreign policy choices are informed by such normative beliefs (cf. Boekle et al., 2001; Breuning, 1997). People's attitudes towards the legitimacy of the use of force are also influenced by the role conceptions which states in interaction with significant other states construct for themselves and enact in international politics. These role images consist of the self-ascriptions of a society as embodied in its national identity and political culture, and of the normative expectations of other states to which a state responds (cf. Holsti, 1970; Kirste and Maull, 1996).

For example, a powerful state that considers itself the world guardian of liberty and freedom such as the US is accustomed to the use of force. Former colonial powers such as the United Kingdom, France, Belgium and the Netherlands also have a certain record of military actions, often against their former colonies. Some other states were virtually forced to turn pacifist: Japan and Germany, with their militaristic pasts, had to learn lessons from their highly aggressive war policies and developed into so-called civilian powers after their defeat in the Second World War. The case of Germany demonstrates how normative beliefs about the legitimacy of the use of force can change over time within a society. Since unification in 1990, Germany has experienced the gradual transformation of a pacifist political culture to an ever-increasing participation in military actions of different kinds: UN peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions, as well as the illegal war against Serbia in 1999 (cf. Baumann and Hellmann, 2001; Takle, 2002). Today Germany makes the second largest contribution of military forces to UN missions, and German soldiers have been deployed in many parts of the world. Politicians partly explain this astonishing development by pointing out that unified Germany had been expected by its partners and allies to take on military responsibility in world politics and to support its partners in their difficult missions. It should be noted that the Germans' strong aversion to military action ('No more war!') has been gradually overcome by appealing to their normative belief that Germans must never again let a genocide or gross violations of human rights happen. In the public debates about the Balkan missions and the war against Serbia, the German past was invoked in order to persuade public opinion to accept German participation in the use of force. The normative imperative of 'No more war' can conflict with the other crucial imperative of German foreign policy, 'No more Auschwitz', and

the latter must then override the former (cf. Harnisch and Maull, 2001; Schwab-Trapp, 2002).

Therefore, if we seek to explain the variance in democracies' use of force, we need to investigate possible special incentives which particular institutional fabrics of democracies may provide (opportunity structures). Since institutions can only be transmission belts of preferences, it is even more important to analyse the politico-cultural fabric of the democracies. This includes historical experiences with violence, the normative attitudes of the majority of citizens towards the use of force, the world views of decision-makers as expressed in their speeches, and distinct features of the political identity and the role conception that encourage or discourage the use of force.

9.3 Democratic alliances, the ambivalence of liberal norms and democratic war

Another important factor influencing the peacefulness or war-proneness of democracies lies in their varying attitudes and behaviour towards international organizations and institutions. While democracies have a special inclination to join in international organizations and institutions (cf. Oneal et al., 2003), they also have difficulties in coping with the resulting tension between committing themselves to international rules and protecting their domestic democratic autonomy. These two aspects will be considered more closely in this section.

It can be argued that one of the reasons why democracies do not fight each other is rooted in their alliances with each other (see Daase, Chapter 4 in this volume). Democracies are used to forming alliances in order to pursue their specific interests vis-à-vis third states. It seems that democracies find it convenient to build inter-democratic alliances, since this saves on transaction costs and promises to be successful because democracies are the most advanced countries economically and the most powerful ones militarily. In addition, it could be claimed that democracies are more prone to build enduring alliances than are non-democracies because of the very nature of democracy (cf. Dembinski et al., 2004). Enduring alliances serve a double purpose: they strengthen their members in their dealings with the outside world, and they function as a collective security system on the inside, that is, among the members themselves. This, in turn, would stabilize the alliance.

In this sense, NATO would be a typical democratic institution. The use of force by such an alliance could be regarded as specifically pertaining to

inter-democratic relations, because they are based on processes of socialization which reflect typical democratic values. This comes close to the in-group/out-group argument put forward by Thomas Risse (Risse-Kappen, 1995a). To the extent that the in-group/out-group constellation, although a social construction, acquires a certain dynamic of its own, we would be dealing with patterns of interaction which point just as much to the importance of international circumstances (such as anarchy) for determining the foreign policy behaviour of states as to that of regime type. So with reference to the in-group/out-group thesis we come closer to identifying specific links between democracy and war, but these links may only be of secondary importance in that democracy helps to build enduring alliances and these may then function as an incentive to use force. However, all this may also have to do with ordinary relative gains motivations typical of action under anarchy. In addition, as we can observe today, powerful democracies may develop an inclination to form ad hoc alliances which are geared to specific conflict situations instead of binding themselves to the procedures and commitments of institutionalized alliances. The US is clearly suggesting that it may work just as much with specific coalitions of the willing as with NATO (cf. Daalder, 2003, p. 156).

In democratic wars, some inherent tensions within multilateralism and liberal values come to the fore. This can be highlighted by distinguishing three types of argument put forward in the inter-democratic debates during the last 10–15 years on the questions of why and under what circumstances democracies should resort to the use of force: democracies have to promote liberal values, if need be by force; democracies have to promote liberal values within the framework of multilateralism; democracies must promote multilateralism as part of the liberal values for which they stand. The first type of argument would come closest to the statements of the Bush administration, and the second to those of the Blair government – to the extent that it professes to adhere to the idea of an 'international community' (Blair doctrine) (cf. Dunne, 2005). We would expect to hear the third type of argument from, for instance, the left-wing coalition government in Germany.

All three arguments can be labelled 'milieu goals', which are goals aimed at shaping conditions beyond one's national boundaries, in contrast to 'possession goals' which are items a state competes for (Wolfers, 1962, Ch. 6, cited in Dunne, 2005, p. 10). All liberal democracies obviously pursue 'milieu goals' in the form of providing for a world order which is in line with liberal values. But this means different

things to different people. The first type of argument interprets liberal values in such a way that the use of force can be justified in their pursuit. The second type acknowledges that consensus and cooperation are part of the canon of liberal values so that the procedural norms of the UN Charter should be taken into consideration when deciding on the use of force. According to the third position one would argue that the use of force is only admissible as long as it serves to build up an international order which would be in line with the kind of order which reason (in the sense of the Enlightenment) calls for but which does not exist yet (cf. Habermas, 1999; Brock, 1999). In this case the use of force would amount to a kind of pre-emptive institution-building.

Now it is quite clear that all three versions of the liberal 'milieu goal' lend themselves to justifying the use of force without UN authorization. This includes the argument put forward by Jürgen Habermas, who argued in 1999 that for the time being the Kosovo War could not be considered as a priori illegal because the situation might provide a major impulse to UN reform (which, unfortunately, it did not). To the extent that any of these arguments are used to justify the use of force without due authorization, and to the extent that governments believe that such justification is necessary for reasons of democratic domestic politics, the result can be called a 'democratic war'. In this sense, the Kosovo War may serve as an archetype of a democratic war. Following this line of thought, it could also be argued that democratic war involvement reflects the intensity of conflict outside the zone of democratic states. Liberal democracies are drawn into these conflicts because they are sensitive, in terms of the values they stand for, to what is happening to people elsewhere.

These three types of argument and their link to countries' positions already hint that there may be a variance in the way wars are justified, and also with regard to the willingness to begin or join in a war. This variance can be explained in terms of a basic ambivalence of liberalism (see Müller and Wolff, Chapter 3 in this volume; cf. Brock, 2002; Joas, 2000, pp. 56–64; Simpson, 2001). This ambivalence results from two built-in tensions within liberal theory and ideology. The first tension is between a pacifist and a militant version of liberalism's universalist mission (Müller, 2004b). The second tension arises between substantive and procedural aspects of the canon of liberal values (cf. Brock, 1999). Fostering substantive norms (respect for human rights, political accountability, democracy) can conflict with procedural norms (obligation to act in accord with Chapter VII of the UN Charter), and vice versa. Substantive norms can even get in the way of developing procedural

norms along the lines of the Habermasian argument. The practice of people's sovereignty through national parliaments can be invoked against international institution-building to the degree that the latter erodes democratic participation. This is a big issue within the European Union today, as it was a big issue when the people in the former British colonies of North America had to decide whether they should form a federation or a mere confederation. In the US there is certainly a strong tradition of mobilizing republican thinking against international self-binding. In British political culture, such republicanism surfaces in the form of inhibitions about deeper political integration in Europe. The Germans have reconstructed a political identity after the Nazi regime around the notion of being a faithful member of good international institutions (cf. Harnisch and Maull, 2001).

These different traditions, together with the two built-in tensions of liberalism, explain some of the variance in the willingness of democracies to wage democratic wars. Liberalism seems to offer as many reasons *against* going to war as it does *for* going to war.[1] Which aspect prevails is a matter of the interplay between political traditions, domestic politics and international constellations. As part of these international constellations, we have to take into account the fact that international politics unfold in the context of uneven development (see Brock, Chapter 5 in this volume). This uneven development interacts with an 'underinstitutionalized political order' (Habermas, 1999), with specific reservations of democracies, rooted in republican thinking, about the erosion of popular sovereignty through international institutions, and with a specific interest of democracies, rooted in historical experience, in promoting liberal values because this would be to their political and economic advantage. This makes for an explosive mix which may lead us to yet another round of democratic wars and inter-democratic rifts over these wars.

It should be noted in this context that an ongoing discussion among international lawyers and political scientists on a 'right to democratic governance' might provide the academic justification for a new round of democratic wars (Franck, 1992; Reisman, 2000; Fox and Roth, 2000a). It is argued in this debate that every individual has a right to be ruled by democratically elected leaders. From this right a further right might then be derived, namely the right or even obligation for existing democracies to actively promote democracy in the world and, if necessary, to establish democratic governments by force (Reisman, 2000). As Christopher Daase and Lothar Brock argue in this volume, there seems to be a growing acceptance (not only among anti-pluralist liberals) that

democracy can be linked with the benevolent use of force. If this is accompanied by a further weakening of the non-intervention norm, we might expect more wars of democratization in the future (cf. Byers and Chesterman, 2000). The recent accentuation of a 'liberal mission' (cf. Slaughter, 1995; cf. Simpson, 2001) damages international law, which was once conceived of as a law of equals, and claims privileges for liberal democratic states within this law (cf. Brunnée and Toope, 2004). Self-empowerment to wage 'democratic wars' ultimately contains a threat of Western fundamentalism.[2] The violent propagation of traditional Western values, the disregard for global political and cultural pluralism, the self-assured and self-assertive interpretation of international law – all these tendencies might come together into a troubling weakening of normative inhibitions about the use of force in Western democracies. The domestic micro-foundations of democratic peace are not as solid as mainstream democratic peace theory seems to suggest: rational, moral and self-critical attitudes of democratic citizens and their elite cannot be taken for granted. Democratic discourses and practices in late modern societies are characterized by a logic of inclusion and exclusion, which might in some instances foster the erosion of norms. Inasmuch as such exclusionary attitudes and practices are externalized, we should be aware of a (potentially violent) democratic 'politics of identity' in relation to other states.

9.4 The case for a new research agenda

As has been outlined in the introduction to this volume, the aim of this book is to argue for a shift of focus. Democratic peace research might be advanced if, instead of focusing on democratic peacefulness, it were to look more systematically at democratic war involvement. Three interrelated topics for such a new research agenda emerge from the contributions to this book. Does democracy produce special incentives to go to war? Are democracies inclined towards a special type of war? Why do democracies behave so differently with regard to the use of force? It should be noted that these questions have become more significant since 1990, in other words since the global 'victory' of democracy was celebrated. This could mean that the saliency of the notion of a 'democratic war' may vary across history. We hope that the contributions to this book provide some initial indications of the direction in which future research might go. In the following, we put forward a preliminary list of research questions which together form a proposed new research agenda concerning 'democratic war'. Some of these questions have already been partly addressed within democratic peace research, but

these studies remain fragmentary and have never been integrated into a 'democratic war' research agenda.

1. *Does democracy produce special incentives to go to war?*

   - Why do democracies fight the wars they fight? Are there specifically 'liberal' reasons and justifications for these wars (protection of human rights, enforcement of law, promoting democracy, 'liberation')?
   - Which inherent tensions and ambiguities exist within liberal thought, and within liberal norms and values, that might foster democratic war-proneness?
   - How does the normative setting of the international system change towards favouring the more frequent use of force, and how do democracies shape and relate to international law?

2. *Are democracies inclined towards a special type of war?*

   - To what extent do democratic institutions induce the diversionary use of force?
   - Does the casualty aversion of democracies lead to armament efforts and types of warfare that reduce the risks to the lives of soldiers and civilians, and in this way weaken democratic inhibitions about the use of force? Are there features in democracies that favour the expansion of war aims (in order to mobilize public consent for a war)?
   - Do democratic politics foster the construction of powerful enemy images?
   - Do democracies form special kinds of alliances and security communities that are dependent on demarcation and distinction processes against an 'other', and in this way increase war-proneness towards 'outsiders'?

3. *Why do democracies behave so differently with regard to the use of force?*

   - How does the power position of a democracy in the international system affect its cost–benefit calculation with regard to the use of force? What is the role of special opportunity structures for sectoral interests or 'war entrepreneurs' in democracies, and is there anything in the institutional fabric of democracy that provides special opportunities for war-prone actors?
   - How important is membership of an alliance or powerful international institution such as the European Union, and how do attachment and loyalty to this institution affect behaviour?

- To what extent does the political culture affect the war-proneness or peace-mindedness of democracies? Can we speak of cultures of violence and cultures of peace as distinguishing features of democracies, or should such a distinction be regarded as a typical product of public discourse in all democracies? To what extent does historical experience come into play? Does the war involvement of democracies depend on their own identity constructions and the roles attributed to them from the outside?

This preliminary list, far from being complete, suggests that future research ought to encompass more case studies of the participation and non-participation of democracies in military actions. By comparing democratic 'roads to war' as well as 'roads to opting out', we will be able to specify the conditions under which the causal mechanisms of democratic peace (do not) hold. As far as international relations are concerned, many of the above research questions obviously call for social constructivist approaches in view of the significance of norms and values, of the construction of identities and roles, of framing in public debates, and the like. In addition, we hope to have shown that studying democratic war can benefit from interdisciplinary research and should thus not be carried out by international relations scholars alone. There are many intersections with disciplines such as political theory (especially democratic theory), sociological theory, comparative politics, history and international law.[3] For example, the ambivalence of liberal thought and liberal norms is, of course, extensively dealt with in the history of ideas and political theory. The pathologies or malfunctioning of democracies, as well as institutional fabrics, are investigated in democratic theory and comparative politics. Political (civic) culture is a major topic of comparative politics. The evolution of and changes in international normative settings and law are well researched in history and international law. Historical studies can also be consulted when we seek to grasp the collective identities and political cultures of democracies. Sociological studies can inform us about social processes of distinction, inclusion and exclusion, and their potentially violent outcomes. These remarks (together with the detailed application of some of these approaches in the contributions to this volume) should suffice to support our argument that interdisciplinary perspectives on 'democratic war' are a promising path to follow in future. It should also be noted that many research questions imply dialectical modes of thinking inspired by the Frankfurt School (for example, Horkheimer and Adorno, 1969), that is to say approaching issues in terms of their inherent

contradictions, ambiguities and ambivalence (cf. also Hasenclever and Wagner, 2004, p. 469; Müller, 2004d, pp. 126–7; Brock, 2002).

9.5 Political implications and future perspectives on security policy

The political significance of the considerations proposed in this volume is obvious. The linking of democracy and peace has become part and parcel of official political ideology, informing external strategies by democracies. Within the community of democracies we observe a certain tendency to self-empowerment beyond established international law (in some democracies this phenomenon is much more visible than in others). As discussed by Lothar Brock and Christopher Daase in the present volume, the claim to have a right and a duty to defend international order, to rescue fellow human beings from repression or even genocide, to replace totalitarian, murderous and dangerous regimes by democracy, and to act preventively to eliminate deadly risks to democracies and the broader international community – all this points in the direction of a new international law that restores the right to war, but confines it to certain actors pursuing a liberal agenda (cf. Feinstein and Slaughter, 2004). It goes without saying that this set of legitimate justifications lends itself to misuse for quite different objectives such as personal aggrandizement, geopolitical influence, power or economic gain (cf. Smith, 1996; Barkawi and Laffey, 1999). Democracies following this dangerous path are on their way to destroying the progress in civilizing international affairs that they have themselves worked hard to bring about (cf. Brunnée and Toope, 2004). A right to intervention claimed by democracies and not subject to the prescribed decision-making procedures of the UN Security Council, case by case, increases the security threats to every state whose policies and/or domestic political system do not meet the expectations of the democracies, at least of some of them.

The possibility that democracies may abuse the justification schemes just referred to for more traditional objectives of statecraft and power politics makes this feeling of insecurity even worse. These states are left to their own devices to struggle for their security, since the United Nations, which was meant to deal with conflict and to curb the use of force in a world inhabited by heterogeneous types of governments, is not seen by war-minded democracies as a legitimate decision-making forum, precisely because in the UN no distinction is made between democracies and non-democracies. Democratic self-empowerment thus

reinforces the existing discrimination and stratification of international society, as emphasized by Catherine Götze in Chapter 8 in this volume, adding to the frustration of those deprived and excluded and strengthening their will to resist, if necessary violently. Asymmetric strategies, possibly and even probably involving weapons of mass destruction as a short-cut deterrent, are the most likely response. This undermines decades of efforts to prevent, and indeed reverse, the proliferation of these types of weapons. Liberal self-empowerment thus tends to enhance the security dilemma globally (cf. Jervis, 1978), since the armament policies of such countries cause alarm on the part of democracies and also of the neighbours of the proliferators, who might feel more sanguine about the 'liberal threat' but are compelled to react to the growth of dangerous armament in their own neighbourhood.

The global arms race which might result from these movements, and the first steps of which we can observe at present, will in turn reinforce the current efforts of democracies to remain at the top of the power hierarchy. Democracies today account for about two-thirds of world military expenditure, with the US alone accounting for nearly 50 per cent and for an even greater share of research and development. This trend shifts resources and domestic power back to the executive, and to security agencies such as the military and intelligence at the expense of parliaments and civil society and thereby of democracy itself (cf. Czempiel, 1996). This development could be enhanced and accelerated by the growing shift of decision-making power on these issues to inter-democratic organizations where only the executives participate in determining the course of action (Wolf, 2000b; Dembinski et al., 2004).

This development also opens up a window of opportunity for actors in public political debates whose interests or ideology might not originate in liberal ideas, but who can easily utilize the more militant discourse with its justification schemes to foster their own imperialist, militarist or nationalist designs or their own crude vested profit interests (cf. MacMillan, 1998, 2004a). Even obsolete, archaic attitudes towards war such as the 'heroism' of dedicated warriors discussed in Chapter 6 of this volume by Nicholas Rengger might see an unexpected resurrection. Illiberalism or anti-liberalism can thus celebrate a political victory by putting on the mantle of lofty liberal values, mixed up with liberal militancy as identified by Harald Müller and Jonas Wolff in Chapter 3 in this volume.

However, militancy is not ubiquitous in the liberal camp; a version of liberal pacifism is dominant in the political culture of quite a few democratic states. The clash of liberal pacifism with liberal militancy,

however, threatens to undermine another bastion of modern international civilization, namely the closely knit network of inter-democratic cooperation that has become a bulwark of stability and peace during the last half-century (Dembinski et al., 2004; Haftendorn et al., 1999; Ikenberry, 1998). Militant democracies are alienated from their pacifist peers, which they regard as refusing to take risks and accept sacrifices for their core values, opposing the gallant efforts of others, and even bandwagoning with dictatorships (cf. Kagan, 2003). Pacifist democracies regard militant ones as warmongers ignoring the plight of the human beings on the ground in enemy territory, causing death and destruction for dubious objectives.

This mutual alienation could, if it continues, eventually lead to the decay of democratic security communities. These rest largely on the belief in shared values (cf. Risse-Kappen, 1995b; Adler and Barnett, 1998). Once the impression prevails that the values one holds in high esteem are not actually shared by the supposedly liberal 'other', the essence of the inter-democratic relationship would be reduced to interest and habits, and over time these might not be sufficient as building blocks for the closely knit security community structure.

Our findings therefore suggest, first of all, an institutionalized process of self-reflection that would insert a sense of humility and fallibility into the political discourse of liberal democracies – especially the strongest ones, as Anna Geis argues in Chapter 7 in this volume. They should be fully aware of their own inclination to use force for a range of reasons, not all of them noble. They should be aware of the possibility that they might err in their diagnosis, and that the lofty objectives they proclaim may serve as cover for more banal purposes.

In addition, democracies must return to orderly decision-making in the United Nations, where the voices of non-democracies also enter international deliberations on war and peace. If democracies do not subject themselves to international law and the ensuing procedures (cf. High-Level Panel 2004, Chapter IX), they will precipitate the fateful degeneration of international affairs towards more dramatic security dilemmas than we have seen up to now.

In order to curb inter-democratic alienation, democracies ought to restore the 'consultation principle' that was instrumental in making the transatlantic alliance a body where even the smaller members were confident that their views and interests would be duly taken into consideration (Risse-Kappen, 1995b). It will not be easy to iron out the differences in the interpretation of basic liberal values, since they are strongly held by important actors (or groups of actors) as well as by

relevant parts of the public. But if democracies can agree on concrete projects that reflect their more general values and in which they are all interested, such as building good governance in Afghanistan, or finding a lasting and just settlement of the Middle East conflict, they might be able to prevent the demise of their security community.

Notes

1. See also John Rawls's notion of 'burdens of judgment' (1993, pp. 54–7) which might in our context provide some explanation of the fact that wars are often the subject of heated debate in Western democratic public spheres. Rawls points out that in pluralistic societies reasonable disagreements persist between reasonable persons, the source of which are burdens of judgement. Such burdens have a number of roots. The evidence in a particular case may be conflicting and complex, and thus hard to assess and evaluate, or we may disagree about the weight of some considerations. All of our concepts are vague and indeterminate, so we must rely on judgement and interpretation. These will differ among reasonable persons. Our assessments and evaluations are partly shaped by our experiences, which also differ greatly between persons. Normative considerations are often pertinent to both sides of an issue, and it is difficult to make an overall assessment. Social institutions force us to select among values, but it is difficult to set priorities and to make adjustments. These burdens of judgement lead Rawls to conclude: 'Many hard decisions may seem to have no clear answer' (1993, p. 57).
2. We owe this thought to Rainer Schmalz-Bruns. We cannot deal here with the implications of the term 'fundamentalism', which is often used to describe the movement of traditional orthodox believers who attempt to avert the modernization and pluralization of their religion; see the comprehensive studies of the 'Fundamentalism Project' of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, edited by Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby.
3. For an analytical integration of democratic peace theory and international law see Liste (2005).

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