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

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Return to Table of Contents

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



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LARRY DOWNING/REUTERS

U.S. President Barack Obama announcing General David Petraeus as his top commander in Afghanistan, June 2010

The McChrystal affair was a sign of an emerging crisis not in political-military relations but in military professionalism.

Out of Order

Strengthening the Political-Military Relationship

Matthew Moten

In June, U.S. President Barack Obama acted swiftly and wisely in relieving General Stanley McChrystal of command of the war in Afghanistan. In removing McChrystal for making disparaging comments about civilian leaders in a *Rolling Stone* article, the president reasserted the constitutional principle of civilian control of the military. He also immediately appointed General David Petraeus as the new commanding general in Afghanistan, with the U.S. mission continuing as before. Republicans did not try to exploit the situation for political advantage. There was no crisis, no rending of the fabric of political-military relations, and no threat to the U.S. Constitution.

In fact, the current state of relations between the United States' highest civilian and military leaders is quite good. This is a welcome change, and it began with the tenure of Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, who changed the climate at the Pentagon from one of suspicion to one of collaboration. Gates has established an atmosphere of trust and respect, combined with an unflinching demand for accountability. Although Donald Rumsfeld had a reputation for leading by fear and intimidation, in his six years as secretary of defense, he fired only one service secretary, Army Secretary Thomas White—largely over personal differences—and no flag officers (the hundreds of generals and admirals who compose the country's senior military leadership). In contrast, Gates has dismissed two service secretaries, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the air force chief of staff, the commanding admiral of Central Command, two commanding generals in Afghanistan, and the surgeon general of the army.

Yet Gates and Obama have also shown forbearance. Last October, in the midst of the administration's review of the country's Afghanistan policy, McChrystal publicly warned of "mission failure" if a significant infusion of U.S. troops was not made. But instead of removing McChrystal, who had become commander of NATO forces in Afghanistan less than three months earlier, Gates and Obama gave McChrystal

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Matthew Moten is a Colonel in the U.S. Army. He is writing a history of U.S. political-military relations that will be published next year. The views expressed here are his own.

a clear message about his place in the political-military partnership. Obama had a private chat with the general on Air Force One, and Gates delivered a highly publicized speech in which he reminded his listeners that "it is imperative that all of us taking part in these deliberations—civilian and military alike—provide our best advice to the president candidly but privately."

Nonetheless, McChrystal failed to heed the warnings. It remains inexplicable why the general and his staff engaged in locker-room antics and spoke so contemptuously of their civilian superiors. Some have suggested that McChrystal's career in the shadowy environment of special operations left him unschooled in dealing with the media and ill equipped for the political demands of a four-star position. Such an assessment, however, gives him too little credit and ignores his time at Harvard and at the Council on Foreign Relations, as well as his two stints on the Pentagon's Joint Staff. McChrystal is not naive.

The problem, then, is not one of ham-fisted media relations but that McChrystal and his inner circle of handpicked, highly experienced officers held such attitudes in the first place. McChrystal has not denied the offensive quotations cited in the *Rolling Stone* profile; indeed, he apologized to those who were maligned. He and his staff expressed an intolerable level of disrespect for and mistrust of their superiors, which is completely at odds with the military's professional ethic, the constitutional principle of civilian control, and the Uniform Code of Military Justice.

Respected observers of political-military relations, such as Richard Kohn and Andrew Bacevich, have suggested that something greater is amiss than rogue behavior within McChrystal's coterie. They are concerned that contempt of civilian leadership is widespread within the military and that the problem is getting worse with the passing years of seemingly interminable wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. If they are right, then the situation is indeed grave. But I have yet to see evidence of such a cancer among the hundreds of military colleagues with whom I regularly work. The McChrystal affair was a sign of an emerging crisis not in political-military relations but in military professionalism. Erosions of military professionalism, in turn, threaten both political-military relations and the public's trust in an apolitical, competent fighting force.

RELATIONSHIP ADVICE

Political-military tensions have been a recurring theme throughout U.S. history. During the Mexican-American War of the 1840s, President James Polk had poisonous relations with the two commanders of U.S. troops, Zachary Taylor and Winfield Scott. In 1951, President Harry Truman famously removed General Douglas MacArthur as commander of U.S. forces in Korea after MacArthur made repeated comments critical of Truman's war strategy. Such tensions are built into the structure of the U.S. federal government: the Constitution divides control over military affairs between the executive and the legislative branches. There is the additional issue of personalities and individuals: mixing together ambitious, powerful, highly skilled, and strong-willed people with diverse perspectives and different experiences to collaborate on solving problems is bound to create friction.

This tension, however, can be either destructive or constructive. To the extent

that political-military tension fosters informed decision-making through analysis and debate, it can produce effective policy and strategy. For example, President Franklin Roosevelt had testy but productive relations with his military service chiefs during World War II. Political and military leaders—and the scholars who study them—should attempt to understand political-military relations with a view toward making the tension constructive.

Unfortunately, history does not always place forthright, well-meaning, talented, and stable individuals at the nexus of political-military relations. During the American Civil War, in the period when Abraham Lincoln was president and George McClellan served as commander of the Union army, the North found itself in a state of strategic stasis and confusion compounded by repeated embarrassing defeats at the hands of an inferior enemy. When Ulysses S. Grant assumed command of Union forces, he and Lincoln won the Civil War in little more than a year through relentless campaigning. But then, when Andrew Johnson took power after Lincoln's assassination in April 1865, other political actors were able to exploit Johnson and Grant's dysfunctional relationship, resulting in a crippled presidency and three years of failed reconstruction.

The current political-military climate is good in both absolute and historical terms. Moreover, historically speaking, the public standing of the military is high. According to annual Gallup polls, the military now enjoys the trust of 82 percent of Americans, compared with under 60 percent for the decade that followed the Vietnam War. Americans appreciate the sacrifices that soldiers make and generally believe that they are carrying out their responsibilities bravely, competently, and, for the most part, ethically.

Contrary to the musings of some pundits in the wake of the McChrystal affair, the military profession supports civilian control. Officers are educated in the theoretical and practical ramifications of that responsibility—from the moment they take their first oath, cadets learn that they have sworn to protect the U.S. Constitution, and their political science and history courses teach them that civilian control of the military is essential to the safe and effective functioning of government.

BACK TO SCHOOL

Although the U.S. military has maintained its professional credibility, the country's two long wars are becoming increasingly taxing. Under this strain, the military is not doing enough to maintain and expand its professional expertise. Over the past nine years, a large portion of the U.S. armed forces have been deployed in Afghanistan and Iraq. As a result, U.S. soldiers are exceptionally seasoned, experienced, and proficient. However, the strain on the military services has been evident for some time—especially in the army and the Marine Corps, which together have suffered over 95 percent of all U.S. combat deaths and injuries in Afghanistan and Iraq. The toll of these losses and of repetitive combat deployments is far-reaching: military families are overstressed, and junior and midlevel officers are leaving the force in large numbers. As a result, the army now promotes almost 100 percent of eligible captains to major and about 90 percent of majors to lieutenant colonel; less than 15 years ago, these figures were 25–30

Return to Table of Contents

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percentage points lower. If these trends continue, the army will soon have an entire generation of officers who for the first 20 years of their careers did not face the prospect of not being selected for a merit-based promotion.

Further, the military is paying less attention to professional education than in the past. Granted, this is not unusual—the U.S. armed forces have repeatedly shrunk the time devoted to professional education in wartime and expanded it again in peacetime. Yet the duration of these current wars has made the education deficit more chronic. The demands of two wars require frequent rotations of officers to combat assignments, meaning that some officers are opting out of professional schooling in order to return to the field. Those who attend command and staff schools—the institutions where midlevel officers learn how to control larger units and more complex forces—are there for shorter periods, and the curricula are focused more on readying them for the next operational assignment than on offering a broader, deeper education.

In January, I attended an army conference aimed at coming up with new ways to train officers for strategic leadership, including preparing them for responsibilities at the nexus of the political-military relationship. There was much talk of "finding the next Petraeus"—in other words, stamping the label "soldier-scholar" on combat-hardened officers in the hope that they will become strategic leaders, rather than committing time and effort to formal education. This is a shallow-minded formulation that indicates little commitment to professional reform. If the military selects its generals simply as a function of their 25 years of perseverance, demanding combat assignments, and abbreviated professional schooling—with no qualitative winnowing—the U.S. military's strategic leadership will only get weaker, with disastrous consequences for its ability to provide sound military advice to its civilian masters.

ACTIVE RETIREMENT COMMUNITY

The military is not working hard enough to maintain its standing as an apolitical instrument of national policy. The problem does not lie with the active-duty officer corps. Although many studies over the past two decades have shown that military officers tend to self-identify with the Republican Party, there is little evidence that these political preferences affect their performance. Rather, the problem is with a small but vocal number of retired flag officers. Since 1992, when William Crowe, a retired admiral and former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, endorsed Bill Clinton for president, the floodgates have opened.

In the 2008 election, more than a hundred retired generals and admirals publicly endorsed one of the presidential candidates. Retired officers have the right to endorse any candidate, of course, but by abrogating the ethos of nonpartisanship, they create problems for the military profession. In 2000, Charles Krulak, then a recently retired Marine Corps commandant, endorsed George W. Bush for president. Shortly thereafter, senior military officials told me that no matter who won the election, the new president would have reason to suspect the political loyalty of all the sitting military chiefs. Sure enough, not long after Bush was elected, some Republicans in Washington began referring to "the Clinton generals" in the Pentagon.

Rumsfeld soon began to personally interview candidates for three- and four-star nominations in all the services, a highly unusual practice that created the impression, and perhaps the effect, of politicization.

The spate of inappropriate political activity continued. In the spring of 2006, six retired generals publicly called for Rumsfeld to resign, which preceded Bush's decision to replace him that November. Equally troubling was the revelation in 2008 that numerous retired officers who had become military commentators on television had parroted talking points provided by the Department of Defense. Some of these former officers—most of them former generals—also had undisclosed financial ties to defense contractors. In all of these cases, former officers cloaked themselves in the honored garb of retired professionals and claimed to speak on behalf of military officers—while engaging in activity that none of them would have considered or allowed while on active duty.

Although such instances are becoming more prevalent in today's political and media environment, they do not raise altogether new questions. In 1959, Omar Bradley, a former chairman of the Joint Chiefs, spoke eloquently on the topic:

> Several weeks ago, I . . . read the television commentaries of a distinguished wartime colleague of mine. On the basis of that episode, and others, I am convinced that the best service a retired general officer can perform is to turn in his tongue along with his suit and mothball his opinions. The military service equips a man for a good many things, not the least of which is the exercise of initiative. Verbally, this initiative has often been exercised with great zeal. I could only wish that it might more often be exercised with prudence. It is not my purpose to contest the right of anyone—even a retired officer—to speak what he chooses. But when he presumes to speak with an authority which derives from his retired rank, he should exercise a sensible degree of circumspection and be discreet in the choice of causes to which he lends his name.

If retired officers want to engage in political advocacy—including criticizing current policy or serving officials and endorsing political candidates—they should explicitly distance themselves from the armed services, stating that they are speaking for themselves alone. If they do not, the Joint Chiefs of Staff should take steps to curb their activity: first, through private persuasion, and then, if needed, by publicly disavowing such behavior as harmful to the profession. Of course, retired officers who choose to run for political office should not be subject to these sanctions, since by virtue of their entry into partisan politics, they will be removed from their old profession.

PRIVATE PRINCES

Finally, the U.S. military may be jeopardizing its reputation for professionalism by not being vigilant enough in protecting its professional jurisdiction: the practice of ethical and effective warfare in pursuit of national policy. The overwhelming majority of people in the defense community—ranging from civilian and military leaders to national security scholars—believe that ever since the military began to shrink after the Cold War, it was inevitable that the country would come to rely on contractors to meet the heavy demands of fighting active wars. This idea is so advanced within defense circles as to be almost beyond challenge—

yet it is wrong. It is not the nature of warfare that has changed since the collapse of the Soviet Union but rather U.S. policy choices. The Defense Department has allocated a growing proportion of resources to private enterprise rather than to the professional military. This has led to decreased legislative and public oversight as well as less rigorous professional control. To be sure, this military-industrial partnership can be a boon to national security when properly overseen. In many cases, however, private contractors have assumed responsibilities that were previously considered inherently military, such as providing logistical support and protecting installations and high-ranking officials.

Relying on Halliburton, DynCorp, CACI, and Blackwater—to name just a few of the thousands of such corporations—to perform military functions represents a return to the failed policies of Machiavelli's time. And as *The Prince* shows, operational complications and fiscal corruption follow closely behind military contractors. Contractors now outnumber soldiers in Afghanistan and Iraq; although the majority of these contractors are responsible for noncombat duties, such as providing food or laundry services, an alarming number are authorized to bear arms while guarding high-ranking officials and sensitive facilities. A military that permits civilians to employ armed force on the battlefield tolerates mercenaries, the antithesis of professionals.

The predicament extends beyond the battlefield. As *USA Today* has reported, over the past several years, the U.S. military has hired 158 retired flag officers as advisers and senior mentors at rates ranging from $200 to $340 an hour. Eighty percent of those had financial ties to defense

contractors. Despite such conflicts of interest, there are no regulations regarding these advisory positions. Furthermore, a 2008 Government Accountability Office report found that as of 2006, 52 defense contractors employed 2,435 former generals and admirals in contracting and acquisitions positions senior enough to be subject to lobbying rules. Although the law bars retired military officers for life from representing corporations on matters that were in their active-duty portfolios, it allows them to lobby the Pentagon on other matters for one year after retirement.

Defense contractors do not hire retired flag officers for their business acumen, and their military currency atrophies quickly. Contractors hire retired officers for their access to former colleagues and subordinates. Military leaders should work to change these practices: specifically, they should ask Congress to extend the strictures on lobbying to a minimum of five years, and they should refuse to hire any advisers who have financial connections to defense contractors.

Yet corruption is not the worst of it. The military routinely relies on contractors to produce analytic studies and even to write its war-fighting doctrine. In perhaps the most egregious example of this kind of outsourcing, the army relies on a private contractor, MPRI, to draft the manual that governs the employment of contractors on the battlefield. One of the primary functions of any profession is to define its expertise theoretically and to advance it through continuous scholarship. A military that relies on contractors for its doctrine is farming out its thinking—the armed forces fight with their brains as much as with their arms.

By contracting out many core functions, the U.S. military is not only ceding its professional jurisdiction to private enterprise but also losing its ability to sustain and renew expertise, to develop the next generation of professional officers, and to nurture creative thinking. A military that chooses short-term expediency over long-term professional health is also choosing slow professional death.

Although only a vocal but prominent minority of retired generals and other officers are misbehaving, their offenses threaten the credibility of the entire military. Professions gain and maintain the trust of society with proven expertise derived from a long, formal education, years of practice, and a demonstrated commitment to employing that expertise wisely and ethically. If the military loses the confidence of society, it will be exceedingly difficult to establish the interpersonal trust essential for effective political-military relations.

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A New Plan For Nuclear Postures

Bruce Blair, Victor Esin, Matthew McKinzie, Valery Yarynich, and Pavel Zolotarev

On April 8, sitting beside each other in Prague Castle, U.S. President Barack Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev signed the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START). Just two days earlier, the Obama administration had issued its Nuclear Posture Review, only the third such comprehensive assessment of the United States' nuclear strategy. And in May, as a gesture of openness at the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference in New York, the U.S. government took the remarkable step of making public the size of its nuclear stockpile, which as of September 2009 totaled 5,113 warheads.

For proponents of eliminating nuclear weapons, these events elicited both a nod and a sigh. On the one hand, they represented renewed engagement by Washington and Moscow on arms control, a step toward, as the treaty put it, "the historic goal of freeing humanity from the nuclear threat." On the other hand, they stopped short of fundamentally changing the Cold War face of deterrence.

The New START agreement did not reduce the amount of "overkill" in either country's arsenal. Nor did it alter another important characteristic of the U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals: their launch-ready alert postures. The two countries' nuclear command, control, and communication systems, and sizable portions of their weapon systems, will still be poised for "launch on warning"—ready to execute a mass firing of missiles before the quickest

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of potential enemy attacks could be carried out. This rapid-fire posture carries with it the risk of a launch in response to a false alarm resulting from human or technical error or even a malicious, unauthorized launch. Thus, under the New START treaty, the United States and Russia remain ready to inflict apocalyptic devastation in a nuclear exchange that would cause millions of casualties and wreak unfathomable environmental ruin.

In the next round of arms control negotiations, Washington and Moscow need to pursue much deeper cuts in their nuclear stockpiles and agree to a lower level of launch readiness. These steps would help put the world on a path to the elimination of nuclear weapons—"global zero." And they can be taken while still maintaining a stable relationship of mutual deterrence between the United States and Russia, based on a credible threat of retaliation, and while allowing limited but adequate missile defenses against nuclear proliferators such as Iran and North Korea.

WAR GAMES

A stable nuclear deterrent exists between the United States and Russia when neither country would choose to launch a nuclear attack against the other regardless of the level of tension that may arise between them. Deterrence would become unstable if either country acquired a credible first-strike capability—the ability to attack without fear of reprisal. The stability of deterrence, then, comes down to an assessment of the viability of both sides' retaliatory capacities.

Such a metric of stability was applied by nuclear planners in coming up with warhead limits for the New START treaty. After calculating the damage from a first strike against nuclear forces, they determined how many surviving nuclear weapons could be used in a retaliatory attack against targets of value—economic and administrative centers. The planners assumed that in order for deterrence to be stable and predictable, a country had to be able to retaliate against 150 to 300 urban targets. These judgments played a key role in setting the warhead limit of 1,550 for each side in the New START treaty.

Many planners still contend that deterrence also requires the ability to retaliate against an opponent's leadership bunkers and nuclear installations, even empty missile silos. But this Cold War doctrine is out of date. Deterrence today would remain stable even if retaliation against only ten cities were assured. Furthermore, uncertainty and incomplete knowledge would make U.S. and Russian policymakers risk averse in a crisis rather than risk tolerant. So arsenals can safely be reduced much further than the New START level. But just how deeply can they be cut? And how can the reliance on a quick launch be eliminated while preserving strategic stability? To answer these questions, we created computer models that pitted U.S. and Russian strategic offensive forces against each other in simulated nuclear exchanges. We also modeled the thorny problem of missile defense systems to assess their impact on the stability of deterrence and to gauge at what warhead levels they become destabilizing.[1]

[1]The technical details of the analysis presented in this essay are available online at www.globalzero.org/files/FA_appendix.pdf.

We used public estimates of U.S. and Russian nuclear forces—their number, accuracy, explosive yields, reliability, vulnerability—and manipulated their launch readiness to test the effects of de-alerting on their ability to survive a first strike and be available for retaliation against urban centers. Because some range of uncertainty is associated with each variable, we ran the model simulation at least 100 times for each possible set of characteristics.

Our modeling found that the United States and Russia could limit their strategic nuclear arsenals to a total level of 1,000 warheads each on no more than 500 deployed launchers without weakening their respective security. De-alerting these forces actually helped stabilize deterrence at these and lower levels. And the modeling showed that fairly extensive missile defense deployments would not upset this stability.

Dropping to 1,000 total warheads is the low-hanging fruit when it comes to arms control. To make further progress toward a nuclear-free world, it will be necessary to pursue even deeper cuts. These will depend on the state of relations between the United States and Russia, on the worldwide deployment of missile defense systems, on the precision of long-range weapons, and on the prospects of involving other nuclear states in the process of reducing and limiting nuclear weapons. It is hard to imagine, for example, that the United States and Russia would go below 1,000 total nuclear weapons if China was increasing its nuclear capacity.

The next stage in arms control negotiations should cover all the complex issues of nuclear weapons, including those surrounding both strategic and substrategic (tactical) nuclear weapons, as well as limits on strategic offensive weapons with conventional warheads. A realistic goal would be for the United States and Russia to agree to each have no more than a total of 1,000 strategic and tactical nuclear warheads combined. Taking into account the fact that for Russia tactical nuclear weaponry is a sensitive problem (primarily because of the superiority of China's conventional forces), this treaty should allow each side flexibility in determining its warhead mix. For example, Russia might retain 700 strategic warheads and 300 tactical warheads, whereas the United States might retain 900 strategic and 100 tactical weapons.

Because the delivery vehicles, or launchers, for tactical nuclear weapons can also carry conventional weapons, the treaty should place limits not on tactical launchers but on tactical warheads. It will be essential that all the tactical weapons in storage be inspected regularly to verify that the treaty's provisions have been implemented. Strategic nuclear warheads should ideally be kept separate from tactical ones. Since Russia currently stores these warheads together, the treaty should designate one or two monitored storage locations for tactical weapons on each side.

Further strides toward nuclear disarmament will be possible only if the other nuclear powers freeze their arsenals and join in the negotiation process to reduce their forces proportionately. For this stage, the United States and Russia could cut their arsenals to 500 nuclear warheads each in exchange for 50 percent reductions by the other nuclear weapons countries.

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TOO READY

For almost half a century, about one-third of the United States' and Russia's strategic nuclear arsenals have been maintained on launch-ready alert. A massive salvo can commence just a few minutes after the combat order is received by the crews on duty. This posture has proved difficult to wind down, even though such high readiness comes with many dangerous risks.

Given the recent surge of terrorism and nuclear proliferation, the liabilities of maintaining such quick-launch postures are only increasing. In the future, the danger of mistaken or unauthorized use or of the exploitation of nuclear weapons by terrorists is likely to grow rather than diminish. War-ready nuclear postures keep hundreds of nuclear weapons in constant motion, changing combat positions or moving to and from maintenance facilities. This affords terrorists opportunities to steal them as they are transported and stored temporarily—the relatively exposed phase of their operation.

These postures also perpetuate a mutual reliance on nuclear weapons that lends legitimacy to the nuclear ambitions of other nations. When more states go nuclear, intentional use becomes more likely, and deficiencies in nuclear command and warning systems multiply the risk of accidental or unauthorized use or terrorist theft.

Given these dangers, going off launch-ready alert would yield major benefits—including opening up possibilities for still greater reductions in the size of arsenals. Although de-alerting was not on the table during the negotiations for the New START treaty, it should have been. The requirements of mutual deterrence between the United States and Russia are far less demanding today than they were two decades ago, even as the challenges of preventing proliferation and nuclear terrorism have grown.

To ensure stable deterrence with forces that are smaller and off alert, the nuclear forces of both countries should be divided into distinct components, each with a different degree of combat readiness. A stable deterrent whole would thus be constructed from more vulnerable, de-alerted parts. To demonstrate the stability of deterrence under such a setup, we again used simulations of nuclear exchanges. The latest U.S. Nuclear Posture Review concluded that de-alerting "could reduce crisis stability by giving an adversary the incentive to attack before 're-alerting' was complete." We found, in contrast, that de-alerting does not create incentives for re-alerting and launching a preemptive attack during a crisis. In fact, done properly, de-alerting stabilizes deterrence.

In our model, the primary group of de-alerted nuclear forces for each country is the "first echelon." It consists of equal numbers of U.S. and Russian high-yield, single-warhead, silo-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). These first-echelon ICBMs can be brought to launch-ready status in a matter of hours—for example, maintenance crews would reenter missile silos to activate the launch circuits. Their primary role is that of peacetime nuclear deterrence for the United States and Russia, the day-to-day frontline of deterrence.

The "second echelon" of de-alerted nuclear forces consists of a more diverse set of nuclear weapons, with equal numbers of warheads on each side but with asymmetry in the types of weapons. It

includes both multiple-warhead and single-warhead weapons: submarine-launched ballistic missiles, silo-based ICBMs, and road-mobile ICBMs. In their day-to-day, off-alert status, second-echelon forces are quite vulnerable. But they are highly survivable when they are re-alerted and dispersed—submarines surge to sea, for example, and road-mobile missiles dash into Siberian forests. These second-echelon forces take much longer to re-alert—weeks to months—than first-echelon forces. Warheads, for instance, might have to be removed from storage and mounted on missile launchers. But our results show that no advantage could be gained by any re-alerting of either first- or second-echelon forces. Deterrence is robustly reinforced by the lack of incentives to re-alert.

We looked at scenarios involving an attacking state and a victim state in which the attacking state secretly re-alerts its first-echelon forces and strikes the first echelon of the victim state—a so-called counterforce attack meant to disarm the adversary and gain a strategic advantage. In these scenarios, the attacker expends more warheads than it can destroy and must assume that the victim will respond by firing its surviving first-echelon forces at the cities of the aggressor. If the attacker used some of its first-echelon missiles to strike the victim's second-echelon forces, then the aggressor would expose additional cities to retaliation by the victim's first-echelon forces.

In our model, after the initial attack, both sides would re-alert their second-echelon forces (for example, deploying submarines to sea), and the second echelon of the attacking state would strike the second-echelon forces of the victim as they were being readied for use. Our model allowed for some random variability in the pace of re-alerting by both side's second echelons in a nuclear war. What was left of the victim's second-echelon forces could then conduct further strikes against cities of the attacker. This scenario is the way to test whether deterrence is stable when forces are off alert. If the victim has enough residual capability to deter an attacker contemplating a "bolt from the blue," then deterrence is stable.

If the United States' and Russia's nuclear arsenals were each limited to 1,000 (or even 500) warheads, and if their forces were de-alerted and partitioned into first and second echelons, an aggressor would still face the possibility of unthinkable devastation wrought by retaliation against more than 100 cities. That should easily be enough to deter any such attack, assuming the potential aggressor is rational enough to respond to the logic of deterrence in the first place.

PARTNERS IN DEFENSE

Missile defense, a divisive topic during the lengthy back-and-forth over the terms of the New START agreement, threatens to derail the next phase of negotiations. In September 2009, the Obama administration shelved plans for missile defense radars and other missile defense infrastructure in the Czech Republic and Poland. Russia welcomed this move. But the new U.S. posture keeps open the question of the U.S. missile defense system's capability against Russian strategic nuclear forces.

When antiballistic missile (ABM) systems are small enough, they do not distract from the arms reduction process. Russia, for example, is comfortable with having regional ABM systems near its borders that

are designed to shoot down short- and medium-range missiles, and it sees merit in joining with other states in creating a cooperative regional system. It is especially keen on regional defenses because its nuclear-armed neighbors—China, India, and Pakistan—are not subject to the ban on nonstrategic missiles stipulated by the U.S.-Russian Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. These neighbors have been deploying nonstrategic missiles, and still other countries (such as Iran and North Korea) are likely seeking them.

Russia was therefore disappointed by Washington's plans to create piecemeal regional ABM systems—partnering with Israel in the Middle East, with Japan in the Asia-Pacific region, and with NATO members in Europe—without consulting Moscow. Although the Obama team has suggested using Russian radar stations in the Azerbaijani city of Gabala and the Russian city of Armavir in a regional ABM system, the United States has shown little real interest in cooperating with Russia in such an endeavor. In Russia's eyes, the United States is intending to create not a true European system—including Russia as part of Europe—but a NATO system instead.

This noninclusive approach might lead to a new crisis in U.S.-Russian and NATO-Russian relations in a decade or so, when the United States' and NATO's new missile defense systems will likely be able to destroy significant numbers of Russia's strategic missiles. If this capacity is constrained in ways that reassure Russia that its nuclear deterrent will remain viable, then the process of nuclear weapons reductions will remain on track. But if Russia is not reassured, the New START agreement could become the end of nuclear weapons reductions rather than a step toward further ones.

That is why strategic missile defenses have to be kept from reaching a point where they can prevent retaliation by knocking out strategic offensive missiles. The results of our modeling for the 1,000-warhead level suggest that advanced missile defense systems, such as the SM-3 Block 2 that the U.S. Navy is testing, would not upset deterrence stability if their numbers do not exceed 100 interceptors deployed by each side. An attacking country could not expect to protect itself from retaliation against its cities if it possessed only 100 or fewer such interceptors. Under current plans, the United States will deploy fewer than 100 interceptors. Russia will strongly oppose expansion above this level.

Even more important than such limits will be U.S.-Russian cooperation on the missile defense problem—namely, an agreement to share control of missile defense systems. This arrangement should go beyond bilateral control to a broader European arrangement that at minimum should entail NATO-Russia cooperation. A cooperative system like this would not be a dual-key system that would give Russia or any other country a veto over missile defense operations and thus over other countries' security. Cooperation could, and ideally would, involve only the joint detection, identification, and countering of emerging missile threats.

The same logic applies to national and regional ABM systems, given the widespread geographic impact of missile defenses. For example, ABM operations in the Asia-Pacific region might result in interception and explosions above other states' territories or in potentially radioactive debris falling

onto another state's territory. Failing to coordinate national responses in such circumstances could lead to disaster.

In 2008, Russia proposed developing a joint database of missile attack threats, sought to create a common control body for the early warning and estimation of missile threats, and said it would be willing to engage in joint planning on a future regional missile defense system. There are small but significant steps toward that end that are worth taking: the United States and Russia could exchange military attachés, observe missile defense tests together, and establish a joint center for monitoring missile launches worldwide.

DESTINATION: ZERO

Once the New START agreement is approved by the U.S. Senate, the arms control process between the United States and Russia needs to continue moving forward. Washington and Moscow could easily reduce their nuclear forces to just 1,000 warheads apiece without any adverse consequences. They could also de-alert their nuclear forces, diminishing the risk of an accidental or unauthorized launch. Eventually, in concert with other nuclear states and after progress has been made on missile defense cooperation, they should be able to reduce their arsenals to 500 weapons each. Even after these deep cuts, hundreds of cities would still remain at risk of catastrophic destruction in the event of a nuclear war.

Such changes to the nuclear relationship between the United States and Russia should be accompanied by a change in attitude as well as forces: both countries must be more open in assessing nuclear threats and the requirements of deterrence. Secrecy about safeguards against unauthorized or mistaken launches and about estimates of first- and second-strike attacks hamper informed public debate and instill mutual suspicion. Open analysis can help inform the public and policymakers on the best way forward for nuclear policy, elevating the debate above the fray of politics, ideology, and secrecy to a higher plane of objective and transparent analysis. This openness could pave the way toward a safer and more stable world with fewer, and eventually zero, nuclear weapons.

Graduate School Forum
Focus on Faculty

Attending a professional graduate program in international affairs should be more than an academic exercise—it should be a life-changing experience. A key ingredient is the faculty. As you will see in the following pages, the faculty at these schools of international affairs work diligently to ensure that their students not only gain knowledge of the facts and theoretical underpinnings of the subjects they study, but also develop the analytical skills to assess and respond to immediate, real-world issues. Honing these skills can mean learning how to ask the right questions, when to ask them, and of whom. Additionally, faculty introduce students to a host of resources and activities geared to help them better understand the sources and motivations behind available information.

Practice What They Preach

The faculty of these schools and similar professional programs of international affairs usually have practiced what they preach. Many have served in government as policymakers or have had distinguished careers in diplomatic service, spent time in the private sector, or worked or consulted for NGOs.

These practitioner academics often travel around the world, staying on top of their areas of expertise, and have the ears of current policymakers. As a student in these programs, you should be aware that these faculty members are an important resource and powerful link to the career that you want to build. They can help you turn your interests and passions into a coherent plan of study so that you build the knowledge and skill sets you will need in the professional arena.

Beyond the Classroom

Professional graduate programs expect their students to not only read and study but also use this unique interlude in their life to establish and nurture relationships—with faculty, fellow students, and professionals in the field—in order to acquire a nuanced and multifaceted understanding of the issues they study. These programs understand that engaging with faculty beyond the classroom is an integral part of the international affairs graduate school experience.

Leigh Morris Sloane
Association of Professional Schools of International Affairs (APSIA)

Contents

A CONVERSATION WITH

David M. Lampton
Director of the China Studies Program and Dean of Faculty
The Johns Hopkins University Paul H. Nitze School
of Advanced International Studies (SAIS)

One School, One Vision, Three Continents

SAIS attracts the best and brightest applicants, eager to acquire the training to confront the world's most demanding challenges. Our graduates are recognized for their abilities in economics, diplomacy, and languages—and their capacity to apply theory to real-world problems.

To understand SAIS, a good place to begin is our logo. With campuses in Washington, DC, Bologna, Italy, and Nanjing, China, SAIS is the only global institution of its kind. Students have the unique advantage of experiencing our three strategically located centers.

How does the synergy that results from being a truly international graduate school enhance the SAIS education?

A recent China studies program trip is a prime example: We arranged for seventeen students to travel to China to examine water issues. The group's diversity was part of the learning experience. There were Americans, Asians, and Europeans, mirroring our three locations—one student had a technical background, another had been a reporter for Chinese television, and others had worked for government agencies.

The politics of water provides a window on the complexity of governance in a country with 20 percent of the world's population and a severe clean water shortage.

As an assistant professor nearly thirty years ago, I lived in Wuhan on the central reaches of the Yangtze River, where I studied water management. By looking at a problem that affected all Chinese, as water does, I could begin to understand the political system, regulatory process, and rationale for building large-scale multiuse projects such as the Three Gorges Dam.

In planning the student trip, I thought we should return to the places I had visited in 1982, so I could give a perspective on what had changed. Using that foundation, students conducted interviews with officials for insight into how the Chinese are now making decisions.

There were two key takeaways from the trip: Students learned firsthand that there are no easily solved problems in China, and these issues become more understandable when you are on the ground. Regional studies places people in the "mental shoes" of the other society. While it may be inexplicable in the West that China is building large dams as we are tearing them down, China is still a coal-based nation with significant flooding problems addressed one hundred years ago elsewhere.

With the growing importance of graduate degrees in international relations, how is SAIS preparing future leaders?

In this globalized environment, employers in every sector are seeking what SAIS provides.

First, the study of economics is a core aspect of the SAIS education. For example, China is about economic growth and development. Having a sophisticated understanding of the discipline most germane to China's endeavors places you at a huge advantage.

Second, SAIS emphasizes language literacy. Language is not just a tool—it is an avenue into the mindset of other people.

And third, students gain essential grounding in policy-relevant theory, critical for leaders who must analyze enormous volumes of pertinent information in a timely fashion.

Overall, our graduates develop a skill set that makes them invaluable to their organizations—possessing the intellectual capital to adapt in a rapidly changing world.

A CONVERSATION WITH

Rodolfo de la Garza
Eaton Professor of Administrative Law and Municipal Science
Columbia University
School of International and Public Affairs

Thinking Outside the Box... and Outside the Borders

Columbia University's School of International and Public Affairs (SIPA) brings together the scholarly and practitioner worlds in a variety of academic settings. Whether through degree programs, conferences, research institutes, or short executive training programs, SIPA's educational endeavors draw on the best current research in public policy and the outstanding practical experience of its faculty and students. We feature SIPA's unique approach in an interview with Professor de la Garza, an expert on immigration and Latino political behavior.

The new immigration law in Arizona has sparked debate among students. What are your thoughts?

There is a cultural and economic divide in Arizona. With the major pathways through Texas and California all but closed off, the flow of illegal immigrants into Arizona has greatly increased. Arizona also has a changing demography: retirees, snowbirds, and the unemployed—people with no history in the region—are pouring in from other parts of the nation. Plus, there is a division in the state between southern Arizona, a heavily Hispanic area, and the rest of the state, which historically has fewer Mexicans but dominates the state's politics; this division adds a powerful ethnic dimension to the crisis. Combine these factors and the conditions for conflict are ripe.

What about the United States' approach to immigration right now?

There has been a change in how we view immigration. Our view is through the prism of 9/11, which is further distorted by a visceral reaction to the amount of immigration that the United States has seen during the past few years. This perspective makes it difficult to develop reasonable responses to the problem.

Central to any effort to control immigration is controlling access to jobs. Under the Obama administration, we are finally beginning to see more rigid enforcement of job site verification laws. Of course, that creates a new problem—labor shortages in key economic sectors such as agriculture—which has jobs that most Americans do not want.

How have you brought this debate into discussion with students?

Even though they have differing opinions about the law, they are learning how to structure solutions. Students usually voice great concern for human rights, but seldom consider the rights of society. It takes a conversation to make them understand that an individual has the right to migrate anywhere, but a society has the right not to allow that individual to emigrate. Understanding these conflicting rights is part of the learning process. Once they engage this type of thinking, one can often see a shift in their policy positions.

How do your students contribute to your research?

It is often the students who raise ideas and hypotheses for further study. They also bring their individual circumstances into the discussion. A good example is their interest in how immigration is a gendered experience. Women experience immigration differently than men. I have become increasingly attentive to these differences, to the vulnerability of the female immigrant and to the distinctiveness of her experience.

A CONVERSATION WITH

Taylor Seybolt
Director of the Ford Institute for Human Security
Graduate School of Public and International Affairs
University of Pittsburgh

Students Take on Big Issues in Human Security at GSPIA

The Ford Institute for Human Security at the University of Pittsburgh Graduate School of Public and International Affairs (GSPIA) engages in research on causes and consequences of political violence. We make our research findings available through publications, presentations, and consultation to national and international policymakers, nongovernmental organizations, and other interested parties.

The Ford Institute treats human security and national security as mutually reinforcing. The gravest threats to human security arise when governments are unable or unwilling to protect their populations from internal and external dangers. Governments face their greatest challenges when the lives and livelihoods of their people are threatened.

As director of the Institute, I challenge students to think critically about some very uncomfortable subjects, like genocide, and what to do about them. Genocide is a big idea. It's a life or death issue. And it has some clear policy implications.

The Institute's students learn to bring academic excellence to real-world problems. I want the students to grapple with how to frame a problem and intellectually structure a response. This is one of the hardest things to do in policy research and analysis. We start with a broad issue and break it down into critically important components.

Currently, we have three research groups doing in-depth analysis on cutting edge issues. One research group addresses the question of how countries recovering from violent conflict transition from dependence on aid to sustainable development. The students compared levels of development aid and foreign direct investment in postconflict countries on one hand, with World Bank indicators of effective governance on the other hand. Early results show no apparent relationship between the amount of aid delivered to a country and the ability of the state to govern effectively. This troubling gap might be due to weak institutional capacity to absorb those resources.

A second research group focuses on the emerging norm of a "responsibility to protect." Critics fear it will lead to more military intervention. Research by the students at the Institute indicates that this idea has not increased the global incidence of military intervention. Equally important, when there has been an intervention, government rhetoric of protecting civilians appears to have changed more than the actual practice.

The third research group is analyzing the conditions under which the escalation of internal strife reaches a tipping point from "normal" violence to mass killing.

There's very little understanding in academic and policy circles about the short-term triggers of genocidal violence. There are many countries in the world where most of the factors that lead to genocide are present, but thankfully it doesn't happen. In a few cases it does, though, and we're trying to figure out why.

The Ford Institute for Human Security, founded in 2003, plays an instrumental role in developing one of the first human security majors in the country. The Ford Institute and the human security major prepare students for careers with policy think tanks, nongovernmental organizations in the United States and abroad, and government agencies.

We teach our students to think critically and creatively. This skill helps them propose practical, effective solutions for the most important policy issues we face today.

GSPIA

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A CONVERSATION WITH

Jack Donnelly
Andrew Mellon Professor and PhD Program Co-Director
Josef Korbel School of International Studies
University of Denver

Graduate School Mentorship at the Josef Korbel School

The Josef Korbel School student body, composed of approximately 450 students, join us from a wide array of academic and professional backgrounds. Regardless of the program students pursue, faculty-student mentorships are essential in selecting coursework, identifying internships and connecting students with resources that will help them explore and pursue their career paths.

How would you describe your mentorship role with your students?

My job as a mentor is to help students figure out what they want to do, and how to do it. I try to get a sense of where students stand, react to their questions and choices and point them in a variety of directions. Whether a student comes to us "knowing" what they want to do or have only the vaguest ideas about their future, I encourage them to explore their intuitions in selecting courses, internships, extracurricular activities and community service.

How do you advise students who find themselves presented with a variety of academic directions?

I advise students to take the opportunity to investigate topics that for some reason just seem interesting, even—perhaps especially—if they didn't fit neatly into their formal academic program. I value curiosity and the willingness to learn. I promote openness to resources and opportunities that are available on our campus and in our community that a student might never have thought about before.

A specific example of this is when I served as the thesis advisor for Shelley Siman, a 2009 MA International Human Rights student. Shelley applied to the Josef Korbel School because at the time it was the only graduate school in the United States that had an MA degree in International Human Rights. She had years of relevant work experience but wanted to gain the theoretical background. With her interest in human rights and rights of the disabled, I was a good fit as her advisor.

I was able to connect her with a contact from the Landmine Survivor Network (LSN) who helped her to attend the Eighth Session of the drafting of the United Nations' Convention on the Rights of People with Disabilities. This provided a great opportunity for her to meet some of the most important scholars and activists in the disability field, see how non-governmental organizations influenced the drafting of the Convention and understand the process through which states came to agreement on the draft.

What happened with the thesis?

It changed completely. When Shelley finished her coursework she began working on criminal justice policy in Denver. The disability thesis thus increasingly seemed to be less than ideal. So we went back to the drawing board. In the end, she did a thesis that she was able to take directly back to her job and apply to reforming Denver's policy. Academic and professional work fused into a chance to be able to try to alter policy from within. According to Shelley, "I'm now influencing policies and practices in a major metropolitan area that give people a second chance. I couldn't have done that without my program at the Josef Korbel School."

A CONVERSATION WITH

Josh Busby
Assistant Professor
Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs
The University of Texas at Austin



LBJ Students Map Africa's Vulnerability to Climate Change and Study South African Governance Challenges in Cape Town

What was the innovative course you taught?

This year I taught a year-long Policy Research Project (PRP) on climate change and security in Africa as part of a five-year research project being carried out by the Strauss Center's program on Climate Change and African Political Stability (CCAPS), funded by the U.S. Department of Defense.

What were the goals of the course?

I wanted students to have the experience of doing important work, to learn about a critical issue facing U.S. national security and to attain valuable skills for their future global policy careers.

What skills did they learn?

Students spent four months learning geographic information systems (GIS), a mapping software that displays data visually. Not only did they read, analyze, and discuss the latest research on links between climate change and security, but the students developed their own methods to map the areas in Africa most vulnerable to natural disasters, governance failures, and related problems.

Were the students able to communicate directly with policymakers?

Several students attended a conference of high-level policymakers in Washington. All of them presented their work to visiting officials from the Department of Defense, the National Intelligence Council, as well as former government officials on faculty at LBJ. Their reports are now being published as working papers by the Strauss Center. In 2010–2011, another cohort of students will track and analyze the challenges of delivering international aid for climate change adaptation in Africa.

You also taught a field course in South Africa. Tell us about that.

I team taught a three-week intensive field course for twenty Master's students in South Africa in May and June 2010 on governance challenges in southern Africa. This course met on the campus of the University of Cape Town, a fantastic setting for engaging with contemporary challenges facing the country and the region.

What opportunities did the students have?

It is important for students to see problems first-hand, particularly when they are studying global policy. The course in Cape Town is a great example. We had several amazing guest speakers and site visits, including visits to Robben Island (where Nelson Mandela was imprisoned), the South African parliament, among other sites. Students spoke with officials from the South African government, including health and finance ministry officials, as well as former members of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Human Rights Commission. They also met with NGO leaders and academics working on the AIDS crisis, conservation, education, security and crime, among other issues.

What else did the students get a chance to do and what do you feel was most memorable for them?

Students also took time to enjoy Cape Town's cultural offerings including the Cape of Good Hope, Table Mountain, local museums, sporting events, and theater. I'm sure all had profound, personal takeaways. One student told me that the most memorable part of the trip was being able to experience the sense of history happening right in front of her. Sixteen years after the end of apartheid, she could feel people's eagerness to continue to move forward.

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A CONVERSATION WITH

Roger Vickerman
Dean and Professor of European Economics
Brussels School of International Studies
University of Kent

Study in Europe and Gain a Competitive Advantage

The University of Kent's Brussels campus, home to the Brussels School of International Studies (BSIS), offers advanced programmes in international studies and provides students excellent opportunities for networking and professional advancement in the Capital of Europe. With some 220 students drawn from over 65 countries, this specialist postgraduate school prides itself on an unparalleled student experience, together with strong emphasis on the close interaction between faculty and students. With 93% of its graduates either in work or reading for a PhD, the formula seems to be working, and we raised this issue with Professor Roger Vickerman, the university campus' Dean.

Why do you think the Brussels School of International Studies offers students a unique learning experience, and what makes it stand out amongst its peers?

I think there are three key aspects to this. The first is that we offer a full UK accredited degree from an internationally respected UK university with all the advantages therein. Secondly, there is the interdisciplinary nature of the school. Five academic schools, from our main campus in Canterbury, offer courses in Brussels, each with its own rich academic heritage. Students have incredible choice and are able to design courses to suit their own particular goals. For example, as part of a politics degree you can take law, history, economics, or sociology courses. At Kent we appreciate that each student's needs are different, and this flexibility allows them to tailor their particular programme accordingly. Finally, studying in Brussels is an enormous advantage because it gives our students the opportunity to interact with practitioners in their chosen field, both in the classroom and at the multitude of conferences that take place here throughout the year. It provides students with the opportunity not only to look for work, but also to undertake internships at EU institutions and the thousands of companies and NGOs clustered around them. This mixture of academic learning and practical experience, I believe, gives our students the edge when entering the workplace

There seems to be a particularly strong bond between staff and students at BSIS. Why is this the case?

Although we draw upon the rich resources of our partner universities in Brussels, the university's premises in Brussels are relatively small and intimate. Staff and students share many of the same facilities and are therefore in almost constant contact. If one adds to that the idea that both faculty and students are on a common academic journey—that the staff do not simply teach facts but instead inspire students to learn for themselves—I think you can see where this is leading. At the Brussels School we are looking to recruit students who think for themselves, are self-starters, and relish a challenge. Whilst we might set the agenda in terms of programmes and courses, it is the energy from our students that makes the school the success it is today. We are, as one alumnus once said, "founded on a set of complementary conversations—among different academic disciplines, among academics and practitioners, among students from all over the world, and especially between the faculty and students".

A CONVERSATION WITH

Martha Finnemore
Professor of Political Science and International Affairs
Elliott School of International Affairs
The George Washington University

Examining Global Governors

At The George Washington University's Elliott School of International Affairs, I teach classes on "International Institutions in World Politics" at both the graduate and undergraduate levels. I think this class is tremendously important for any student trying to understand the international system, especially in this age of globalization. There are so many more actors on the world stage today—not just states, but multilateral institutions, advocacy groups, professional associations, and international corporations. All of these organizations are busily trying to set policy and make rules on issues they care about. It's a complex and fascinating web of alliances, motivations, and goals. If you want to be a policymaker or work in the international arena effectively in any way, you need to understand this system.

How do you help students apply their knowledge to "real world" issues?

The major assignment for this class asks students to identify a problem in world politics and design or reform an international organization to fix it. It's harder than it sounds. Students have to figure out who will support their organization, both financially and politically. They need to spell out what tools or resources it will use to solve the problem, and where it will get those. And they need to anticipate obvious problems or opposition and explain how they will overcome these. It's a tall order. But every year students come up with creative, thoughtful proposals that are fun, even inspiring, to read.

This sounds like a topic you touch on in your new book, *Who Governs the Globe*?

That's right. Every international organization was set up as a solution to somebody's problem. My coauthors (Deborah Avant and fellow GW faculty member Susan Sell) and I were struck by the fact that there's lots of talk about global governance but no one ever talks about global governors. Who actually does this governing? Why are they in charge? Why does anyone obey them? In this book, we begin to answer these questions. We examine many kinds of governors who make global policy and theorize the sources of their authority. We look at the forces that motivate these actors and how they influence the system. It turns out that many of my GW students have been involved with some of these global governors through internships or jobs after graduation, a connection that certainly improved the book and I hope was interesting for the students.

What makes teaching at GW special?

One of the things I enjoy most about teaching at The George Washington University is the level of excitement and knowledge about politics students bring with them to the classroom. It's true at all levels—undergraduates, master's, and PhD candidates. Students are engaged and plugged in to the global political scene in a way that makes teaching challenging but also fun.

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A CONVERSATION WITH

Sachio Nakato
Associate Dean
Graduate School of International Relations
Ritsumeikan University

An Interdisciplinary Approach to the Study of International Relations in Asia

How are courses at Ritsumeikan University tailored to fit the interests of your students?

Fully taught in English, our Global Cooperation Program (GCP) tackles global governance issues from an interdisciplinary approach, providing courses from cultural studies to economics. One course I offer, International Political Economy, not only introduces basic concepts and theories of IPE but also asks students to develop their master's thesis with an interdisciplinary approach.

My students, like Robert and Alexandra Gerbracht, find that coursework at Ritsumeikan ties in with the interests and experiences, that are already helping them develop their theses. Robert, who studied sociological anthropology in his master's studies at Columbia University, found similarities between this major and the sociological aspects of IPE. Currently a U.S. military officer, he now researches the sociological implications of Japan's military transformation from a variety of disciplines. His wife, Alexandra, who studied security studies at GW's Elliott School of International Relations, works on U.S.-Japan security and economic relations.

Students are encouraged to perform independent research. In order to guide students in their research, GCP offers individual systematic advising and supervision. An academic adviser is assigned from the beginning of the student's enrollment based on the student's research topic and is responsible for supervising research activities.

However, the teacher/student roles are not fixed. In my seminars, Muhammad Wahyu Widianto, a customs officer in Indonesia's Ministry of Finance, studies the impact of the ASEAN free trade area on Indonesia's manufacturing industry. Another student, Ezral Bin Uzaimi, from the Ministry of International Trade and Industry who engaged in the Japan-Malaysia Free Trade Agreement negotiations, also joins my seminars. I offer them theoretical advice and, in return, they provide me with practical knowledge on trade issues. We learn from each other through these seminars.

How has your research aided students in their academic development?

My current research interest is twofold. First, I am now working on a comparative study of Japanese and Korean responses to U.S. pressure in the beef industry. I will present this paper in the fall at the Six University Symposium in Shanghai, China. A couple of years ago, I published *The Political Economy of U.S.-Japan Trade Frictions*. My current work elaborates on the theoretical perspectives of this previous work.

My second research theme examines U.S.-Japan-South Korean engagement policy toward North Korea, funded by Japan's Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology. While I try to develop my theoretical framework based on the concept of "engagement" as part of my research, I have had intense talks with government officials from the United States, Republic of Korea, and Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

Because of these research interests, many Korean students join my seminars. PhD student Song Key Yong conducted research on the transformation of the U.S.-South Korean Security Alliance. Park Chung-hee, another PhD student, is studying the ideological conflicts within South Korean politics regarding North Korean policy; she hopes to be a politician in the future. We are all now translating a book on South Korea's unification policy toward North Korea into Japanese. I look forward to publishing a book with them when we conclude this current project.

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A CONVERSATION WITH

Deborah Bräutigam
Professor
School of International Service
American University

Collaborating on *The Dragon's Gift*

What is the relationship at SIS between a professor's own scholarship and working with students?

SIS faculty frequently connect our research topics, the courses we teach, and how we involve students. For my most recent book, I developed a database on China's aid, loans, and investment in Africa. With the help of a grant from the Smith Richardson Foundation, I involved students, who researched materials in a half-dozen languages. One was also able to do field research with me in China, and I was able to co-finance his own research in Ethiopia and Egypt.

The book is now published, and I will be using it in several of my courses, including a new course, China and the Developing World. I am now coauthoring several papers with students, which we hope to publish in academic journals.

What are the advantages of studying abroad?

Most of our graduate students already have experience abroad, but SIS has pioneered programs to introduce students to new regions, give them new skills, conduct research, and do internships for credit overseas. I just visited the SIS summer program at South Africa's University of Cape Town; students studied democracy and development with some of South Africa's leading scholars and then spent four weeks in internships with local organizations. I found it interesting that three of the students were from Latin America; they wanted to expand their experiences into a new region.

How can SIS help students find internships/jobs?

In the international arena, contacts and experience are critical for landing the perfect job or internship. Being in Washington provides a great opportunity to meet people who can open doors. Our large alumni network is an active part of this process. Former students are great sources of jobs for current students—and these relationships are easy to maintain when we all run into each other in the city.

As a scholar, tell us about your latest publication. What can students learn from your research?

I wrote *The Dragon's Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa* to show how China's rise in Africa is a complex and still-unfolding process that started over fifty years ago. The relationship between China and the United States is arguably the most important of the 21st century. If we are to engage Beijing effectively as a rising power, we must better understand what they are doing in places like Africa. Beijing's strategy reflects what they learned from Japan and the West when we started to engage in China. Doing my own field research in China and nearly a dozen African countries (while making use of that database collected by my students), I provided a balanced, evidence-based analysis of a complicated relationship that offers opportunity—as well as risks—for Africa.

The reception of the book has been enormously gratifying. It clearly fills a need. I tried to write a book that would contribute to and reflect the best traditions of scholarship, but be readable and policy-relevant. I hope journalists, students, and other researchers will find my work a useful baseline for their investigations and research on this important phenomenon.



A CONVERSATION WITH

Sakiko Fukuda-Parr

Professor of International Affairs and
Chair of the Development Concentration
Graduate Program in International Affairs, The New School

Preparing Leaders for International Development

How have approaches to international development evolved over the years?

In the 1950s and 60s, development practices were rooted in the idea that rich countries had all the solutions—that the technology and know-how that developed in the west in the 20th century would be transferable and applicable to developing countries. Almost no one believes that's the case anymore. Development today is seen as the empowerment of people, not just the growth of material production and consumption. At the United Nations, where I was director of the UNDP Human Development Reports for ten years, we thought of development from a human perspective as an expansion of freedom.

How does The New School prepare students to meet today's challenges of international development?

We realized that we had to rethink what it means to take leadership in international development in the 21st century, because many of the 20th century approaches are no longer relevant. You can't be a professional in this field without being aware of the complexities of each local context. What has worked in the United States cannot be just transplanted. That is one big lesson we have learned in the last 50 years.

Our program is interdisciplinary and has a very strong social science basis with a special focus on human rights. Our students mix their work in the classroom with internships, and some participate in our international field program in the summer. This combination of experiences is invaluable.

What types of projects do New School students undertake abroad?

Part of our mission is to expose students to experiences that can only be gained in the field, living with communities in need and figuring out how we can help. For example, a group of students from the International Affairs graduate program worked in Buenos Aires on the environmental rehabilitation program for the La Matanza-Riachuelo watershed area. Involving governmental and civil society organizations at local, provincial, and national levels, and supported by a billion-dollar loan from the World Bank, this is the single largest and most complex urban environmental project undertaken by the international community.

What did the students do in Buenos Aires?

They worked on designing the monitoring and evaluation system involving multiple actors. Students worked with one of several organizations involved in the program, including a water company that builds infrastructure, a local micro-credit organization that works with the local population, and the agency responsible for overall program implementation.

How important is the International Affairs program's location in New York City?

New York is probably the world's most international city, and it's the ideal location for our graduate program in international affairs. We have 400 students from more than 60 countries. Our faculty is international, multilingual, and multiracial. Beyond that, we're tremendously diverse in our research interests and very involved in public activities.

Our multidisciplinary approach is targeted at helping students become critical thinkers who are sensitive to the complexities of human development. I'm constantly impressed by how our students rise to the challenge.

A CONVERSATION WITH

Scott Fritzen
Vice Dean of Academic Affairs and Associate Professor
Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy
National University of Singapore



Leading in a New Age of Global Governance

How can your school give students the competitive edge they need in a rapidly changing policy environment?

The global economic crisis sparked a re-examination of what was once considered bedrock in public policy. The notion that governments can allow free markets to determine the best course for nations has lost currency and the pendulum has swung back toward an emphasis on good governance. Governments are grasping for solutions to cross-border issues—from international terrorism and global pandemics to trade, labor migration, and financial regulation—that defy orthodox policy prescriptions.

LKY School students gain the unrivaled ability to master these new frontiers. Our location in the heart of Southeast Asia, part of the world's most dynamic region, gives us a unique Asian focus evident in our curriculum and students. Our school has almost 400 students from around 50 countries, with no single nationality comprising more than 20 percent of the student body.

The LKY School's classrooms are laboratories for comparing global policies. Faculty stress the need to determine best practice and devise pragmatic solutions, and classmates exchange and learn from a panoply of institutional and cultural traditions.

Drawing on such varied experiences is critical to modern policymakers. There is no one-size-fits-all model for governments, which are being forced to develop supranational institutions while facing a wave of decentralization aimed at empowering local institutions. More than ever, policymakers are partnering with the private sector and civil society to formulate and implement policies.

Do students have the chance to network beyond Asian policy circles?

Our five graduate degree programs facilitate these kinds of interactions by connecting students, policymakers, businesspeople, and academics. Our two-year Master in Public Policy (MPP) is for future public service leaders; our one-year Master in Public Administration is for mid-career professionals. Senior leaders come to take advantage of our Master in Public Management and Executive Education programs, while students eager for more in-depth research pursue our PhD.

Our double degree programs offer MPP students the additional opportunity of spending a second year studying at Columbia University's School of International and Public Affairs, the London School of Economics and Political Science, Sciences Po in Paris, the Université de Genève, or the University of Tokyo.

Our mandate is to prepare and inspire leaders to transform Asia. The school recognizes that future leaders come from different economic backgrounds; thus, more than half of our students receive full scholarships based on merit and need.

How are your students helping to transform Asia?

Mainly by using the hallmark of policy education—the ability to integrate political, economic, and social considerations into their decision-making. Many of our students are entering leadership positions in both the public and private sectors. For example, a recent public management graduate, Ferdinand Cui Jr., was appointed the top civil servant in the Philippine presidential office, to advise newly elected President Benigno Aquino Jr. on policy implementation.

Like Cui, many of our alumni work on Asia's most pressing problems, like climate change and water policy. The LKY School offers aspiring leaders a rare venue to acquire the tools needed to address such issues.

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A CONVERSATION WITH

Mark B. Rosenberg
President and Professor of Politics and International Relations
School of International and Public Affairs
Florida International University

Preparing Students for Global Careers in an International City

Global. Diverse. Edgy. Florida International University offers students the opportunity to live, work and explore in one of the world's most dynamic hemispheric hubs—Miami, Florida.

A destination city for international trade and finance, coupled with a pulsating arts scene, historic neighborhoods and famed South Beach, Miami provides a living laboratory for students. Here, students don't just study international affairs. They're surrounded by it.

At FIU, we use cutting-edge research and state-of-the-art teaching to prepare our students to be worlds ahead. Our student-centered faculty are committed to a global perspective that appreciates the connections, multicultural realities and opportunities embedded in international, national and local dynamics. "International" is more than just our middle name. It is who we are—a diverse university with students from more than 170 different countries.

At the heart of it all, is FIU's School of International and Public Affairs (SIPA) in the College of Arts & Sciences. SIPA brings together many of FIU's internationally oriented disciplines, forming a premier center for research, education and training in the fields of international affairs and governance.

Because international relations is an ever-changing field, how does FIU build its curriculum for this diverse discipline?

We're very focused on developing innovative academic programs that are as much in touch with current events as they are with the fundamentals of the disciplines. A perfect example of this is our new Master of Arts in Global Governance, which will launch in the fall of 2011. This is a 36-credit professional degree designed to prepare students for careers in the private and public sectors, international organizations, non-governmental and non-profit organizations that are now at the forefront of global public affairs.

The program will initially focus on globalization and the issue of security as a fundamental human need. Students will explore how globalization has broadened and intensified the scale and character of modern-day security challenges including migration and refugee flows; environmental changes and resource scarcity; transnational crime and terrorism; poverty; and natural and manmade disasters.

Not only will our Global Governance students tackle these important topics, but they will also receive practical skills needed for their future careers—skills such as policy analysis, budgeting, methodologies, grant and professional writing, and presentation skills.

What else does SIPA offer students?

SIPA includes four signature departments: Politics and International Relations, Global and Sociocultural Studies, Public Administration, and Criminal Justice. It houses many of the university's most prominent international centers, institutes and programs.

The school supports real-world learning experiences with study abroad, lecture series, and networking with greater Miami's diverse international business, diplomatic and public affairs communities.

Our graduate students engage in policy-relevant research at the forefront of international debate—environmental preservation and restoration, migration, human and drug trafficking, human rights, war crimes, and the eradication of poverty. Our graduates have gone on to successful careers in the U.S. Department of State, Organization of American States, international NGO's, and other organizations that shape our world.

We're committed to providing a worlds ahead education through global curriculum, a new state-of-the-art facility and international access through our Miami community.

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A CONVERSATION WITH

Laurence R. Simon
Director of the Graduate Programs in Sustainable International Development
The Heller School for Social Policy and Management
Brandeis University

Diplomacy and Development: It *is* a Career.

I hear a lot of about diplomacy and development, but is that a career?

The Obama administration has put new meaning into the concept of diplomacy and development. Yet most Foreign Service officers are not trained in theories and methods of development.

Does The Heller School have graduate degrees in development?

Not only do we, but our graduate programs were the first in the world to develop an innovative, interdisciplinary Masters of Arts in Sustainable International Development (SID). The degree is two years, but most of our students do a practicum in the second year, working in a professional-level assignment in a development organization. To that we added a Master of Science in International Health Policy and Management and a PhD concentration in Global Health and Development Policy. This year we also welcome into Heller the Master of Arts in Coexistence and Conflict Resolution. These degrees create an exciting mix of study opportunities for our students that also include MBA and MPP course options.

Tell us about the SID community.

Our community this year will number over 180 students with two-thirds of them from developing nations and representing over 60 countries. It is truly a global community. What is most interesting to me is that our students come to us already believing passionately in a cosmopolitan view that embraces universal rights and concern for every person in the world vulnerable to poverty and preventable disease. Our faculty include renowned scholars and seasoned international development professionals who come from developing nations or development careers. Many of us have lived in developing nations and held key positions in UNDP, UNIFEM, World Bank, IUCN, UNICEF, USAID, Oxfam, and the Aga Khan Fund for the Environment, among others. Our students receive substantial scholarship support from the Ford Foundation's International Fellowship Program, the World Bank Scholar's Program, the Soros Foundations, and the Fulbright Program, among numerous other funding agencies.

Where do your graduates work?

Most of our international students return to their home countries or are employed by international organizations. Many U.S. students go overseas. Our graduates are employed by leading developing agencies including UNDP, UNICEF, USAID, the Asian Development Bank, the World Bank, the Oxfams, Mercy Corps, the World Bank, numerous governments, and local and international NGOs. Some of our graduates go on to do PhDs.

Why did you found the SID Programs?

My career in development taught me that practitioners and policymakers needed more than passion and conviction. They needed time to think about their values and their responsibility to the people they are there to serve. They also needed to learn cutting-edge methods of planning, monitoring and evaluation, gender analysis, and social theory drawn from many traditions in the world. Our statement of core competencies is the first to reunite ecology with social science—for how do you understand and solve problems of climate change, health, and poverty from only one narrow discipline? Come and talk to us about your careers. We love to help young people sort out the options.

The Heller School
for Social Policy and Management

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A CONVERSATION WITH

Robert Kaufman
Professor of International Relations
School of Public Policy
Pepperdine University, Malibu, California

A Distinguished Approach to the Study of Public Policy

Some students are eager to develop critical skills as analysts. Others are prepared to combine these analytic tools with organizational talents to leverage their work through the activities of other people, and are often recruited by both the public and private sectors. Some, perhaps an even smaller group, guided by strength of moral purpose, are able to design and inspire organizations that not only create value for those they serve but make meaning for those they lead. It is precisely this last group that seems to thrive most in the Pepperdine program.

Our approach toward the increasingly important interdisciplinary field of public policy is student-centered, innovative, and distinctive in several ways.

How does the faculty at Pepperdine foster a unique experience in earning a master of public policy (MPP) degree?

We define public policy broadly to include the private as well as the public sector. We stress the ethical as well as the practical dimension of policy, which we consider interdependent. Our goal is to develop the capacity of aspiring policymakers to think rigorously about reconciling the desirable and the possible in the realm of public affairs. The faculty instills in the core curriculum our conviction that understanding the first principles and the historical pedigree of policy debates are critical to elevating the discourse and outcomes of public policy by deliberation and choice.

How will the nature of a small MPP program benefit a student?

We combine the best aspects of a small program with large resources. Because we are small, students receive considerable attention and faculty access. Graduate assistantships are available and give the students the opportunity to gain exposure to faculty research and valuable mentorships. Currently I am coauthoring a book with a former student who went on to write speeches for President George W. Bush after he graduated from Pepperdine. In addition, because we are located in the Los Angeles area, Pepperdine draws on national scholars to supplement our program. We have brought to Pepperdine some of the most renowned scholars in the field of international relations and security studies such as Victor Davis Hanson, Anthony Lake, Greg Treverton, and Daniel Pipes.

What makes the leadership skills taught at pepperdine so critical for a successful career in public policy?

Reinhold Niebuhr captured our spirit best when he observed that "man's capacity for good makes democracy possible," just as, "man's propensity for evil makes it necessary." Our students have learned in the classroom and through experience that transparency is essential to bring out the best in us, and control our worst instincts. We all do our best when we are accountable. We demonstrate this by offering an excellent theoretical and practical training ground for ethically grounded leaders in all realms, particularly international relations and national security. As Ronald Reagan observed, it falls on every generation of Americans to defend our freedom, sooner or later. The School of Public Policy helps train leaders to do it in a way consistent with our interests, moral values, and a decent but not slavish respect for the opinions of mankind.

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About APSIA

The Association of Professional Schools of International Affairs (APSIA) comprises 34 member schools around the world dedicated to the improvement of professional education in international affairs and the advancement thereby of international understanding, prosperity, peace, and security.

APSIA members work to promote excellence in professional, international affairs education worldwide by sharing information and ideas among member schools and with other higher education institutions, the international affairs community, and the general public.

APSIA.org serves as a clearinghouse of information for prospective students and employers.

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

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Return to Table of Contents

Essays

Israel's nuclear policy clashes with both emerging global nuclear norms and democratic principles.

Beyond Moderates and Militants

How Obama Can Chart a New Course in the Middle East

Robert Malley and Peter Harling

In the Middle East, U.S. President Barack Obama has spent the first year and a half of his presidency seeking to undo the damage wrought by his predecessor. He has made up some ground. But given how slowly U.S. policy has shifted, his administration runs the risk of implementing ideas that might have worked if President George W. Bush had pursued them a decade ago. The region, meanwhile, will have moved on.

It is a familiar pattern. For decades, the West has been playing catch-up with a region it pictures as stagnant. Yet the Middle East evolves faster and less predictably than Western policymakers imagine. As a rule, U.S. and European governments eventually grasp their missteps, yet by the time their belated realizations typically occur, their ensuing policy adjustments end up being hopelessly out of date and ineffective.

In the wake of the colonial era, as Arab nationalist movements emerged and took power across the Middle East, Europe either ignored

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the challenge they posed or treated them as Soviet-inspired irritants. By the time the West understood the significance and popularity of these movements, Europe's power had long since faded, and its reputation in the region was irreparably tarnished by the stain of neocolonialism. Likewise, the United States only became fully conscious of the jihadist threat in the aftermath of 9/11, after Washington had fueled its rise by backing Islamist militant groups in Afghanistan during the 1980s. And Washington only endorsed the idea of a Palestinian state in 2000—just when, as a result of developments on the ground and in both the Israeli and the Palestinian polities, the achievement of a two-state solution was becoming increasingly elusive.

The West's tendency to adopt Middle East policies that have already outlived their local political shelf lives is occurring once again today: despite its laudable attempt to rectify the Bush administration's missteps, the Obama administration is hamstrung by flawed assumptions about the regional balance of power. Washington still sees the Middle East as cleanly divided between two camps: a moderate, pro-American camp that ought to be bolstered and a militant, pro-Iranian one that needs to be contained. That conception is wholly divorced from reality.

Paradoxically, such a prism replicates the worldview of the Bush administration, which, in almost every other respect, the Obama administration has rejected. Its proponents assume the existence of a compelling Western vision of peace and prosperity, which the region's so-called moderates can rally around, even as U.S. and European credibility in the Middle East is at an all-time low. It underestimates and misunderstands the role of newly prominent actors, such as Turkey, that do not fit within either supposed axis and whose guiding principle is to blur the line between the two. Most important, it assumes a relatively static landscape in a region that is highly fluid.

Ignoring the Middle East's changing composition makes it difficult to understand the significance of recent political adjustments. If the goal is to defeat the radicals in order to strengthen the moderates, how is one to assess Saudi Arabia's resumed dialogue with Hamas or its improved ties with Syria? What is one to make of a regime in Damascus that simultaneously ships arms to Hezbollah, deepens its intelligence and security ties with Tehran, and opposes important Iranian objectives

in Iraq? And how is one to interpret Turkey's multifaceted diplomacy—maintaining its ties to the West, deepening its relations with Syria, mediating a nuclear deal with Iran, and reaching out to Hamas?

By disregarding subtle shifts that are occurring and by awaiting tectonic transformations that never will, Washington is missing realistic chances to help reshape the region. Obama has an opportunity to change course by adopting a more elastic policy, but he cannot wait long: the United States might soon awake to a Middle East that it will find even harder to understand or influence.

LIKE FATHER, UNLIKE SON

During the 1990s, the United States arguably reached the apex of its power and prestige in the Middle East. President George H. W. Bush showcased Washington's formidable military capabilities by forcing Iraq out of Kuwait in 1991. Diplomatically, his performance was equally impressive: he assembled a diverse coalition in support of Operation Desert Storm and that same year convened an unprecedented Arab-Israeli peace conference in Madrid. President Bill Clinton's approach built on those achievements: he contained Iran and Iraq while managing the Arab-Israeli conflict through the peace process. Meanwhile, the Lebanese time bomb was temporarily defused by a U.S.-endorsed Pax Syriana that guaranteed stability in exchange for Beirut's submission to its neighbor's domination.

All told, Washington had successfully frozen the region's three most critical and volatile arenas of conflict: the Arab-Persian fault line, the occupied Palestinian territories, and Lebanon. This newfound equilibrium gave rise to a loose coalition among Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Syria, whose relative convergence of interests—maintaining the regional status quo, a U.S.-managed peace process, and a Saudi-financed and Syrian-policed order in Lebanon—helped stabilize the inter-Arab balance of power. However halting, frustrating, and disappointing it proved to be, progress on the peace process also made the region less allergic to Washington's continuing special relationship with Israel. But this delicately constructed regional order collapsed with the outbreak of the Palestinian uprising in September 2000, and the situation only grew worse during the presidency of George W. Bush.

Beyond Moderates and Militants

The George W. Bush administration's approach to the Middle East and its response to the 9/11 attacks fundamentally altered the region's security architecture. By ridding Afghanistan of the Taliban and Iraq of Saddam Hussein, Washington unwittingly eliminated Tehran's two overriding strategic challenges, thus removing key impediments to Tehran's ability to project power and influence across the region. At the same time, after the breakdown in the Israeli-Palestinian talks, the Bush administration redefined the core principles underpinning the peace process. It made meaningful advances dependent on preconditions, such as changes in the Palestinian leadership, the establishment of statelike institutions in the occupied territories, and the waging of a nebulous fight against an ill-defined terrorist menace. The end result was polarization of the region in general and of the Palestinian polity in particular. This approach also heightened the costs of the U.S.-Israeli alliance in the eyes of the Arab public. Finally, the United States overreached when—not content with having secured Syria's withdrawal from Lebanon—it pursued the unrealistic three-part goal of isolating Damascus, disarming Hezbollah, and bringing Lebanon into the pro-Western camp.

> The West sees the Middle East as cleanly divided between moderates and militants. That view is wholly divorced from reality.

Although U.S. policy at the time helped put an end to the impasses that had long plagued Iraq and Lebanon, this came at a heavy human and political cost. More broadly, the resumption of crises in the Persian Gulf, Lebanon, and between the Israelis and the Palestinians prompted an ongoing, persistently vicious, and periodically violent renegotiation in the balance of power among nations (involving Egypt, Iran, Israel, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Turkey) and within nations (in Iraq, Lebanon, and the Palestinian territories). Suddenly, everything seemed up for grabs.

This proliferation of conflicts and emergence of new threats to U.S. interests occurred just as U.S. power was eroding and regional rivals were gaining strength. Serious limitations to the United States' military capabilities were exposed directly (in the quagmires in Afghanistan

and Iraq) and indirectly (when Washington's ally, Israel, suffered setbacks in the Lebanon and Gaza wars).

Meanwhile, Washington made the promotion of liberal values a pillar of its Middle East policy, putting forth a profoundly moralistic vision of its role, precisely at a time when it was trampling the very principles underlying that vision. A president whose foreign policy was predicated on an ability to inspire Arabs with the rhetoric of democratic values undercut any such inspiration by occupying Iraq, rejecting the results of the Palestinian elections in January 2006, showing excessive deference to Israeli policies, and permitting human rights violations to take place, most notably at Guantánamo Bay and Abu Ghraib.

The "with us or against us" philosophy underpinning the U.S. war on terrorism placed Washington's Arab allies in a relationship that was becoming increasingly uncomfortable and politically costly as animosity toward the United States became widespread. Meanwhile, Iran, Syria, Hamas, and Hezbollah benefited from renewed popular sympathy and were driven together despite their often ambiguous relations and competing interests.

Washington's enemies were finding that the impediments to their geographic expansion and political ascent had disappeared: with the collapse of the Iraqi state, Iran was free to spread its influence beyond its borders toward the Arab world; Syria's withdrawal from Lebanon unshackled Hezbollah, helping transform it into a more autonomous and powerful actor; and the bankruptcy of the peace process boosted Hamas' fortunes and deflated Fatah's.

TOO LITTLE, TOO LATE

Even after the collapse of the Soviet Union, U.S. policymakers stuck to a Cold War–era approach to foreign policy: dividing the world between faithful friends and well-defined foes, anchoring diplomacy in relatively stable bilateral relationships, and relying on allies to promote clear-cut interests and contain enemies. In the 1990s, such a paradigm served as a more or less effective guide to Middle East policy because the United States enjoyed room to maneuver without being seriously challenged. Today, this model has become irrelevant.

The United States is currently juggling many competing and at times incompatible interests. These include curbing Tehran's increasing clout and its nuclear program while stabilizing an Iraq under heavy Iranian influence, shoring up the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty while protecting Israel's ambiguous nuclear status, retaining ties to friendly but repressive regimes while promoting democracy, preventing renewed violence in Gaza and Lebanon while not dealing with Hamas or Hezbollah, and advancing the peace process while perpetuating the schism among the Palestinians. Worse, the United States is striving to do all this at a time when it is no longer perceived to be as dominant as it once was. Local protagonists have learned various rhetorical and practical means of resisting U.S. pressure, ways of surviving and sometimes thriving by saying no. Local nonstate actors, which are harder to persuade or deter, have grown more powerful. Washington's foes can now use public opinion to their advantage, as do Hamas and Hezbollah, or curry favor with rival powers, as Iran has tried to do with Brazil, China, and Turkey.

Obama is pursuing policies that may have worked if George W. Bush had implemented them. Now it may be too late.

The Obama administration has shown some signs of adjustment. Conscious of the United States' declining credibility in the Middle East and of its inability to resolve crises independently of one another, Obama has sought to reinvigorate the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, reach out to Iran and Syria, and forsake the simplistic "war on terror" mentality inherited from the Bush administration. It has redefined U.S. national security doctrine to make room for a more multipolar world.

Indeed, Obama is pursuing policies that, had Bush implemented them during his administration, may well have worked. But the region has not stood still, and at the current pace of change, the United States risks making vital policy adjustments only after it is too late.

The Obama administration will push for an Israeli-Palestinian agreement but will likely recognize the importance of intra-Palestinian unity for that goal only after spending several more years playing Fatah against Hamas and only after differences between the two movements

have hardened beyond repair. Washington is engaging with Damascus, but by postponing a serious, high-level strategic dialogue about Syria's future regional role in a post-peace-deal environment, it risks making it immeasurably more costly for Damascus to relax its ties with Iran, Hamas, and Hezbollah. Similarly, Washington might formally accept Iran's right to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes only after Tehran has reached the point of no return in its nuclear weapons program.

At bottom, Washington still sees the Middle East as divided between moderates and militants—an understanding that blinds it to much of what currently fuels the region's dynamics. After all, on issues deemed central to U.S. interests, Washington's nominal allies in the region often pursue objectives that are not aligned with the United States', and its foes sometimes promote goals compatible with Washington's. For example, even though Iran and Saudi Arabia are bitter enemies, both tend to view Iraq through a similar confessional prism (albeit taking different sides in the sectarian competition), while Washington's vision of Iraq as a nonsectarian state is closer to Syria's and Turkey's. Even so, when it comes to Iraq, the U.S. government's inclination is to condemn Iran and Syria while praising Saudi Arabia and Turkey. Israel's undeclared nuclear program, foot-dragging approach to peace, and often single-minded reliance on military means to resolve conflicts are hard to reconcile with Obama's intention to restore the United States' standing in the Arab and Muslim worlds. And as Bush quickly discovered and as his successor knows, the United States' democracy and human rights agenda finds few takers among friendly regimes while resonating with the Islamist parties Washington is loath to empower.

Nominal U.S. allies often pursue objectives that are not aligned with Washington's, and U.S. foes often promote goals that are.

Regional actors simply do not fit into a recognizable moderate-versus-militant template. Syria, one of the Arab world's most secular countries, is also the one most closely aligned with militant Islamist movements. Hezbollah, a symbol of Shiite militancy, has adapted to Lebanon's political system, which, with its pluralistic confessional makeup, liberal economic leanings, and endemic corruption, defies the movement's self-proclaimed principles. One can be a secular,

liberal Arab democrat and still be profoundly hostile to Washington and the West, just as one can be an ally of the West and find common cause with certain jihadist groups.

Ironically, Iran espouses the bipolar logic of axes adopted by the United States, seeking to both lead and bolster a camp adhering to its militant values, even as Turkey, a NATO member and close U.S. ally, distances itself from Washington's vision and tries to erase the lines between the two purported groupings. Qatar hosts a U.S. military base, has enjoyed trade relations with Israel, has strong ties with Syria and Hamas, is friendly with Iran, and, through the global television network al Jazeera, has (notably on its Arabic channel) created the most potent and articulate exponent of the "militant" view. In May 2008, Qatar brokered the inter-Lebanese accord and Turkey mediated Israeli-Syrian negotiations. Neither Doha nor Ankara can plausibly be labeled as belonging to one axis or the other; both have earned reputations for talking to everyone.

THE MYTH OF THE MILITANT CONSENSUS

IT SHOULD come as no surprise that the West is finding it increasingly problematic to manage complex situations with a rigid, one-dimensional paradigm. It is difficult to place Israel, Fatah, Wahhabi-dominated Saudi Arabia, and Iraq's outgoing prime minister, Nouri al-Maliki, in the same so-called moderate camp when they share neither values nor interests. Each has strong ties with Washington, to be sure, but these relations are motivated by different and sometimes contradictory considerations. Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia—standard-bearers of the moderate camp—do not have much in common, either. They do not share a willingness to engage with Israel, they exhibit different systems of government, and each pursues a separate approach to addressing religious extremism—Cairo tries to suppress it, Amman channels it through participation in a controlled democratic process, and Riyadh seeks to coopt it.

The moderate camp is in desperate need of what has been most lacking: a credible U.S. agenda around which its members can rally and that they can use to justify their alignment with Washington. In the absence of such an agenda, the most relevant competition pits

two homegrown visions against each other. The first, backed by Iran, emphasizes resistance against Israel and the West and prioritizes security alliances and military buildups. The second, whose key advocate is Turkey, highlights forceful diplomacy, stresses engagement with all parties, and values economic integration. Although the two outlooks are being championed by non-Arab regional powers, both are largely in tune with local Arab sentiment. The region, it turns out, is organizing itself less in accordance with a U.S. policy and more in the absence of one.

The allegedly pro-Iranian axis also escapes neat description. In terms of ideology, interests, practical constraints, and even sectarian identity, Iran, Syria, Hamas, and Hezbollah differ in notable ways. Their ties fluctuate and reflect constant adjustments to shifting regional realities. Descriptions of this axis often veer into exaggeration and caricature. It is not, as some assume, the expression of a militant form of Shiism. Indeed, Syria is ruled by its Alawite minority, which has little in common with Iran's brand of Shiism, whereas Hamas is a quintessential Sunni movement and is at pains not to appear excessively beholden to Iran. Syria would prefer to see a Palestinian reconciliation that gave Hamas an important, albeit not exclusive, voice in decision-making. Hezbollah has outgrown its proxy relationship with Syria and has a vested interest in ensuring that Lebanese-Syrian relations do not revert to the old order. Contradictions between Iran and Syria run deeper still and are at play across the region. Whereas Iran has ruled out any dealings with Israel and openly calls for its destruction, Syria repeatedly asserts its willingness to negotiate and, should a peace deal be reached, normalize relations. And events in Iraq have brought Iran's and Syria's competing interests into even sharper relief. In Iraq today, as they did in Lebanon during the 1980s, Tehran and Damascus back different parties and espouse divergent goals: Iran seeks an Iraq under heavy Iranian influence, whereas Syria hopes to make the country an integral part of the Arab world.

What principally brings the so-called militant camp together is the need to counter what its members perceive as a U.S.-Israeli threat. The binary choice they face—either shift allegiances or remain frozen in a hostile relationship with the West—gives them no choice at all. On the contrary, the more that U.S., European, or Israeli pressure



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increases, the easier it becomes for them to disregard or downplay their disagreements. The unprecedented security coordination among Iran, Syria, Hamas, and Hezbollah is the clearest illustration of this dynamic, as each prepares for a potential wide-ranging confrontation. Meanwhile, "moderate" Arab countries—unsettled by a stagnant peace process and undercut by weakened U.S. leadership—face increasingly pointed social and political contradictions, potential succession crises, and a growing temptation to turn inward. Ironically, the United States has proved far more successful over the past decade in reinforcing the cohesiveness of its foes than it has in maintaining the unity of its allies.

TURNING THE PAGE

SOME HAVE been quick to conclude that the United States is marginalized, that Washington's era in the Middle East is over, and that the future belongs to Tehran or Ankara. This is fantasy. As both Iran and Turkey are no doubt beginning to appreciate, there is a strict limit to what they can accomplish without—let alone in opposition to—the United States. Even with its popularity on the Arab street rising, Turkey has yet to achieve a breakthrough on any of the major initiatives on which it has labored: holding Israeli-Syrian peace talks, negotiating a nuclear deal with Iran, mediating a truce between Israel and Hamas, or attempting to reconcile Hamas and Fatah.

Still, in the absence of more forceful U.S. leadership, the Middle East is fast becoming a region of spoilers, nations whose greatest imperative—and sole possible accomplishment—is to prevent others from doing what they themselves cannot do. Egypt is trying to thwart Turkey's efforts to reconcile the rival Palestinian groups and get Israel to lift its blockade of Gaza. Syria hinders peace efforts that come at the expense of its allies. Saudi Arabia is intent on blocking Iranian advances in Iraq. Practically no country has a positive agenda or is in a position to successfully advance one. Of course, despite the rise of its rivals, the United States still enjoys veto power over virtually all significant regional initiatives. But that is small consolation. To be spoiler in chief is a sad ambition for Washington and would be a depressing legacy for Obama.

The alternative is for the United States to play the role of conductor, coordinating the efforts of different nations even as it preserves its privileged ties to Israel and others. For example, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, together with Qatar and Turkey, could spearhead efforts to bring about Palestinian national reconciliation consistent with a continued U.S.-led peace process. Turkey, assuming that it mends its ties with Israel and maintains its newfound credibility in Arab countries, could serve as a channel to Hamas and Syria on peace talks or to Iran on the nuclear issue. Under the auspices of the United States, Iraq's Arab neighbors and Iran could reach a minimal consensus on Iraq's future aimed at maintaining Iraq's territorial unity, preserving its Arab identity, protecting Kurdish rights, and ensuring healthy, balanced relations between Baghdad and Tehran. Washington should intensify its efforts to resume and conclude peace negotiations between Israel and Syria, which would do far more to affect Tehran's calculations than several more rounds of UN sanctions. Syria also could be useful in reaching out to residual pockets of Sunni militants in Iraq.

As much as anything, the stalled Israeli-Palestinian peace process illustrates why a new approach is needed. Pillar after pillar supporting long-standing U.S. policy on this issue—strong, representative Israeli and Palestinian leaders; support from the Arab states; unrivaled U.S. power and credibility—has eroded to the point where they barely matter today. The Palestinian national movement has fragmented, Fatah's clout and legitimacy have dwindled, and foreign countries have boosted their influence over the Palestinian arena, affecting the decisions of Fatah and Hamas alike.

The most politically active Israeli and Palestinian constituencies—Israeli settlers and members of the Israeli religious right, on the one hand, and the Palestinian diaspora, Palestinian refugees, and Islamists, on the other—are the least involved in discussions about an eventual settlement, even though they are precisely the groups that could derail it. Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia, the Arab states on which Washington has customarily relied, are no longer popular enough in the region to sanction a deal on their own. Iran, Syria, Hamas, Hezbollah, and al Jazeera can dilute or even drown out any positive reaction to a possible accord by denouncing the agreement as a sellout. Given pervasive skepticism about the peace process among the Arab public,

criticism of a deal is likely to resonate far more widely than is support.

For the United States, adapting to new patterns of power would at a minimum mean accepting the need for internal Palestinian reconciliation and acknowledging that a strong, unified Palestinian partner is more likely to produce a sustainable peace agreement than a weak, fragmented one. The United States must take into account the concerns of different Israeli and Palestinian constituencies (for example, acceptance of the Jewish right to national self-determination and recognition of the historic injustice suffered by Palestinian refugees); acknowledge that meaningful Israeli-Syrian negotiations have become a necessary complement to Israeli-Palestinian talks, not a distraction from them; and grasp the necessity of including new regional actors to help achieve what is now beyond the ability of Washington and its allies to do on their own: giving legitimacy and credibility to an Israeli-Palestinian accord.

It will not be easy for the United States to undertake such a strategic shift, nor will it be risk free. Traditional allies, feeling jilted, might lose confidence or rebel; newfound partners, getting a whiff of U.S. weakness, could prove unreliable. Still, hanging on to an outmoded policy paradigm does not offer much hope. The likely consequences would be increased regional divisions, increased tensions, and increased chances of conflict. Obama began his presidency with the unmistakable ambition of turning a page. To succeed in the Middle East, he will have to go further and close the book on the failed policies of the past.

Bringing Israel's Bomb Out of the Basement

Has Nuclear Ambiguity Outlived Its Shelf Life?

Avner Cohen and Marvin Miller

In the shadow of the Holocaust, Israel made a determined effort to acquire nuclear weapons. However, just as fear of genocide is the key to understanding Israel's nuclear resolve, that fear has also encouraged nuclear restraint. After all, if Israel's enemies also acquired the bomb, the Jewish state might well face destruction, given its small size and high population density. Moreover, the specter of killing large numbers of innocent people, even to save their own, was morally unsettling for Israeli leaders.

This combination of resolve and restraint led to a code of nuclear conduct that is fundamentally different from that of all other nuclear weapons states. Israel neither affirms nor denies its possession of nuclear weapons; indeed, the government refuses to say anything factual about Israel's nuclear activities, and Israeli citizens are encouraged,

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both by law and by custom, to follow suit. And so they do, primarily through government censorship of and self-censorship by the media. This posture is known as nuclear opacity, or, in Hebrew, *amimut*.

The policy and practice of nuclear opacity was codified in 1969 in an extraordinary secret accord between Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir and U.S. President Richard Nixon. Although this agreement has never been openly acknowledged or documented, its existence was revealed in 1991 by the Israeli journalist Aluf Benn, and more information came out in some recently declassified memos regarding Nixon's 1969 meeting with Meir written by Nixon's national security adviser, Henry Kissinger. According to the Nixon-Meir pact, as long as Israel did not advertise its possession of nuclear weapons by publicly declaring or testing them, the United States would tolerate and shield Israel's nuclear program.

Ever since, all U.S. presidents and Israeli prime ministers have reaffirmed this policy—most recently, U.S. President Barack Obama, in a White House meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on July 6, during which Obama stated, "We strongly believe that, given its size, its history, the region that it's in . . . Israel has unique security requirements. It's got to be able to respond to threats. . . . And the United States will never ask Israel to take any steps that would undermine [its] security interests."

In Israel, for government officials, security analysts, and even the general public, nuclear opacity is one of the Jewish state's greatest strategic and diplomatic success stories. It has provided Israel with the best of all possible worlds: the advantages of nuclear deterrence to protect against existential threats but almost none of the potential political drawbacks of possessing nuclear weapons. If Israel went public about its bomb, it could face tangible costs. In particular, although the Arab states have learned to live, albeit uncomfortably, with the Israeli bomb, in 2008 they threatened to leave the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) if Israel declared its nuclear status. Moreover, some Arab states, especially Egypt, could face increasing popular pressure to challenge Israel's nuclear monopoly, as Iran is now doing.

Opacity may have been justified when Israel had just acquired the bomb and the United States did not wish to confront this reality openly. However, today Israel's nuclear policy clashes with both emerging global

nuclear norms and democratic principles, and it prevents Israel from arguing that it is a responsible nuclear power. Above all, Israel's nuclear monopoly in the Middle East is now facing two key challenges. The first is Iran's determined effort to acquire nuclear weapons under the cover of an ostensibly peaceful atomic energy program; the second is growing international support for the establishment of a nuclear-weapons-free zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East, as manifested in the final declaration of the recent NPT Review Conference.

An additional challenge is that the Netanyahu government's policy toward the Palestinians is widely viewed both within and outside Israel as undermining the establishment of a viable Palestinian state and a lasting two-state solution. Given that Israel's legitimacy as a de facto nuclear weapons state rests on its broader political legitimacy, the connection between political and nuclear issues cannot be ignored.

Finally, there is growing recognition globally that the nuclear status quo is dangerous—primarily because deterrence can no longer be relied on to prevent the acquisition and possible use of nuclear weapons by both states and nonstate actors. This has increased support for the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons—which raises the question of whether Israel can afford not to be part of this ongoing international debate.

Israel could increase its credibility as a responsible nuclear state in various ways, but almost all of them would require relaxing the policy of opacity, without fully abandoning it. This policy made strategic and political sense 40 years ago, but in today's regional and international climate, it has more vices than virtues.

DON'T ASK, DON'T TELL

IN 1958, Israel began secretly constructing a nuclear center in Dimona with French assistance. The United States did not learn about the Dimona site until late 1960, and responding to it posed a challenge for U.S. policymakers. Only 15 years after the end of the Holocaust and before international nuclear nonproliferation norms existed, Israel's founders believed that they had a compelling case for acquiring the bomb, although there was disagreement about whether to openly argue that case, as Meir urged, or to conceal the entire project,

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The Fall and Rise of China

Taught by Professor Richard Baum,
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12. "Resist Japan!" 1937–1945
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21. "Long Live Chairman Mao!" 1964–1965
22. Mao's Last Revolution Begins, 1965–1966
23. The Children's Crusade, 1966–1967
24. The Storm Subsides, 1968–1969
25. The Sino-Soviet War of Nerves, 1964–1969
26. Nixon, Kissinger, and China, 1969–1972
27. Mao's Deterioration and Death, 1971–1976
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29. The Post-Mao Interregnum, 1976–1977
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33. The "Normalization" of U.S.-China Relations
34. Deng Consolidates His Power, 1979–1980
35. Socialist Democracy and the Rule of Law
36. Burying Mao, 1981–1983
37. "To Get Rich Is Glorious," 1982–1986
38. The Fault Lines of Reform, 1984–1987
39. The Road to Tiananmen, 1987–1989
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42. The "Roaring Nineties," 1992–1999
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as David Ben-Gurion insisted. As prime minister at the time, Ben-Gurion prevailed.

In the early 1960s, Washington saw Israel as a small and friendly state surrounded by much larger enemies vowing to destroy it; moreover, Israel enjoyed strong support among U.S. voters. Yet the idea of a nuclear-armed Israel was perceived as antithetical to U.S. global and regional interests. President John F. Kennedy feared that without decisive global action to curb nuclear proliferation, the number of nuclear weapons states would inevitably rise and that Israel's acquisition of the bomb would undermine U.S. efforts to establish a global nonproliferation norm. He was also concerned that Israel's acquisition of nuclear weapons would lead to increasing Soviet influence over Israel's Arab neighbors and a heightened risk of a confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union in the event of another Arab-Israeli war. As a result of these concerns, in the spring of 1963, Kennedy pressed Ben-Gurion to permit annual U.S. visits to Dimona to verify Ben-Gurion's assurances that Israel had purely peaceful intentions when it came to its nuclear program.

> For Israelis, nuclear opacity is one of Israel's greatest strategic and diplomatic success stories.

Such regular visits began in 1964. Israel's new prime minister, Levi Eshkol, reiterated Israeli Deputy Defense Minister Shimon Peres' ambiguous pledge to Kennedy in 1962 that Israel would not be the first state to "introduce" nuclear weapons to the region. This effectively foreclosed the option of a public nuclear test. But Israel still had some leeway. The timing of the visits, the limited access granted to the inspectors, and the concealment of key operations ensured that the U.S. intelligence community found no incriminating weapons-related activities. This was accepted by the Johnson administration, which wanted to avoid a confrontation with Israel on the nuclear issue.

By the time of the Six-Day War, in June 1967, Israel had secretly crossed the nuclear threshold. At the time, the Johnson administration's nonproliferation priority was to enlist support for the newly negotiated NPT. The United States tried to pressure Israel to sign the NPT as a nonnuclear weapons state, but Israel resisted. And by 1969, when President Nixon and Prime Minister Meir took office, it became clear

to U.S. policymakers—particularly Nixon and Kissinger—that Israel probably already had a so-called bomb in the basement. Moreover, they knew Israel was reluctant either to give it up or to declare itself as a nuclear power by public acknowledgment or testing. A new understanding between the United States and Israel was needed.

In July 1969, Kissinger wrote to Nixon, "Our interest is in preventing Israel's possession of nuclear weapons. But since we cannot—and may not want to try [to]—control the state of Israel's nuclear program and since Israel may already have nuclear weapons, the one objective we might achieve is to persuade them to keep what they have secret." The recently declassified Kissinger memo goes on to argue that "this would meet our objective because the international implications of an Israeli program are not triggered until it becomes public knowledge." On September 26, 1969, Nixon and Meir reached a new agreement at the White House. Israel committed itself not to test its atomic weapons, advertise its possession of them, or threaten any other state with its newfound nuclear capability—an arrangement that the United States was willing to tolerate. Washington, in turn, would end its visits to Dimona and stop pressuring Israel to sign the NPT. Over time, U.S. tolerance has evolved into a policy of shielding Israel's nuclear capabilities from international scrutiny.

Nixon's rationale for becoming Israel's partner in opacity probably included both considerations of realpolitik and sympathy for the small Jewish state's need to have an existential insurance policy. Israel had already crossed the nuclear threshold, and it could be counted on as a democratic ally of the United States in its Cold War confrontation with the Soviet Union. Nixon also apparently trusted Meir as a responsible custodian of Israel's nuclear weapons. But as the Nixon-Meir accord enters its fifth decade, it is fair to ask whether this secret deal is still the best way for Israel to conduct its nuclear affairs. And if not, what are the alternatives?

AMBIGUITY'S HALF-LIFE

In Israel, opacity is viewed almost universally as the most prudent response—indeed, the only possible response—Israel could have fashioned to its nuclear dilemma.

Despite Israel's victory in its War of Independence, in 1948, Ben-Gurion was haunted by the nightmare that the Arab states, acting together, could overwhelm Israel's conventional forces. Thus, under his leadership, Israel seized the opportunity to acquire a nuclear deterrent starting in the 1950s. However, nuclear weapons were viewed as "a last resort," in case Israel's conventional forces failed, and Ben-Gurion was not prepared politically to openly declare Israel a nuclear state.

Today, opacity continues to have almost universal support among members of the Israeli security establishment, who contend that as long as Israel maintains its regional nuclear monopoly, opacity should continue to guide the country's nuclear affairs. Short of the imminence of a new nuclear state in the region, they believe, Israel must do everything possible to maintain the policy and practice of opacity. Indeed, as the Iranian nuclear threat has grown more ominous, the commitment to opacity appears to have been strengthened—most recently in a 2004 review of Israel's national security strategy headed by Dan Meridor, now the deputy prime minister in charge of intelligence and atomic energy.

Most countries have followed Washington's lead, accepting Israel's opaque nuclear posture and treating Israel's nuclear program as an exceptional case.

Senior Israeli officials insist—always off the record—that the policy of opacity is not a dogma and its continuity is not an article of faith. However, each review of the policy to date has concluded that there is no viable alternative to opacity and that a public acknowledgment of Israel's nuclear status would pose a major national security risk. Israel therefore enjoys remarkable and unparalleled freedom of action in the nuclear sphere. After a stormy decade in which Israel's nuclear program was a continuous source of irritation and friction between the United States and Israel, the 1969 deal made the United States a silent partner in Israel's policy of opacity. Ever since, Washington has provided Israel with significant diplomatic cover vis-à-vis the NPT regime. Over time, most other countries have followed the United States' lead, accepting Israel's opaque nuclear posture and treating Israel's nuclear program as an exceptional case.

Avner Cohen and Marvin Miller

Despite concerns that the advent of Israeli nuclear weapons would exacerbate the Arab-Israeli conflict, the politics of opacity created a reality that was more benign than anybody expected. Opacity has in fact moderated and eased Arabs' ambitions to acquire nuclear weapons. By not publicly flaunting its nuclear status, Israel has reduced its neighbors' incentives to proliferate. Finally, opacity makes it easier to resist increasing demands that Israel give up its nuclear shield before a just and durable peace is established in the Middle East—what Israelis commonly refer to as the "slippery slope" toward premature denuclearization.

Indeed, opacity has become much more than a government policy. Israel's nuclear ambiguity and the bomb itself have become essentially inseparable, and thus it is difficult for Israelis to debate whether and under what conditions Israel could continue to have the bomb without the opaque cover that now shrouds it from public view. The time for that debate has come.

THE BUNDY DOCTRINE

The first time we heard a plea for Israel to abandon its policy of opacity was in the spring of 1992, in a meeting we organized to enable U.S. and Israeli security experts and government officials to reflect on the issue of nuclear weapons in the Middle East after the first Gulf War. To the surprise of all present, and the discomfort of some of the attendees, our keynote speaker, the late former U.S. national security adviser McGeorge Bundy urged Israel to "come clean" about its nuclear status in order to reduce the risk of proliferation and the potential use of nuclear weapons in the Middle East.

Less than two years later, Bundy co-authored a book, *Reducing Nuclear Danger*, with U.S. Admiral William Crowe and the theoretical physicist Sidney Drell. They argued that all three existing de facto nuclear weapons states—Israel, India, and Pakistan—should acknowledge their true nuclear status. On matters of nuclear weapons, the authors maintained, the international community could no longer tolerate evading the truth. The possession of nuclear weapons was too serious a matter—for the states involved, for their neighbors, and for the entire world—to be left unacknowledged. With specific reference to Israel, the three authors suggested that "the fiction" of opacity was so "perverse"

that it prevented Israelis from seeing their own best interests. As they put it, "The pretense [of opacity] prevents any public defense of the Israeli program by the Israeli government and any effective argument that no state or group need fear an Israeli bomb unless it attempts the destruction of Israel."

It is unclear whether Bundy knew all the details of the Nixon-Meir accord, but he and his co-authors suggested that the United States should end its own participation in the policy of opacity and state in public that it considers Israel to be a nuclear weapons state. "Such a statement would clarify an important reality, would follow the guidelines of openness, and help the Israelis themselves to tell the truth," they wrote. Ultimately, however, the burden of disclosure would fall on the Israelis themselves: "The best way out of this cul-de-sac," they maintained, "is Israeli openness by Israeli decision."

Bundy's argument is even more salient today than it was in the 1990s. Moreover, opacity makes it very difficult for Israel to engage seriously in negotiations on arms control and disarmament in both the regional and the global context. A case in point is the proposed Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty. Compliance with such an agreement by Israel would require Israel to allow verification that it had ceased production of unsafeguarded plutonium at its Dimona reactor. Although a complete shutdown of the reactor could be verified remotely, it is widely assumed that the reactor also produces tritium—a hydrogen isotope used in advanced nuclear weapons—the production of which is not banned by the treaty. Thus, verification of a cutoff in the production of plutonium, specifically, would require intrusive on-site inspections, and these are not compatible with the pretense that Israel is not a nuclear weapons state.

The perceived need to maintain opacity can become a convenient excuse for not engaging in arms control and disarmament initiatives that could actually serve Israel's interests. Whereas India and Pakistan are now recognized and treated as weapons states, Israel remains in the nuclear shadow, as if its moral and political case for the bomb were weaker than New Delhi's or Islamabad's or those of the established NPT weapons states.

Ironically, the nuclear policy that served Israel's interest in the 1950s and 1960s is now an obstacle to achieving its political and diplomatic

objectives. In the early days of its nuclear program, Israel had no concerns about legitimacy, recognition, and status; all it cared about was acquiring a nuclear capability. The virtue of the Nixon-Meir accord was that it allowed Israel to do just that. Today, the situation is different. Israel is now a mature nuclear weapons state, but it finds it difficult under the strictures of opacity to make a convincing case that it is a responsible one.

A RESPONSIBLE NUCLEAR POWER

In recent years, leaders of the Israeli nuclear establishment have emphasized, in the words of Gideon Frank, vice chair of the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission, "Israel's long-standing commitment to norms of security, responsibility, accountability, and restraint in the nuclear domain." Although fully consistent with nuclear opacity, this new terminology allows Israel to promote its credentials as a supporter of the international nonproliferation regime. This represents a tacit but significant shift from Israel's past nuclear policy, which, for decades, was characterized by a determined effort to achieve an advanced nuclear capability outside the norms of the regime.

Having attained such a capability, Israel has shifted its priority to burnishing its image as a democratic, responsible nuclear state and thus, although still not an NPT signatory, placing itself on the right side of the global nuclear order and distinguishing itself from autocratic, rogue regimes with nuclear ambitions, such as the current government of Iran.

The behavior of regimes should no doubt be considered in devising strategies to prevent proliferation. However, regimes change. Pre-1979 Iran was encouraged by the United States, France, and West Germany to invest heavily in nuclear power plants, together with the associated technology and expertise, and a hostile regime in Tehran is now using civilian nuclear technology as a cover for obtaining nuclear weapons. As the Swedish physicist and Nobel laureate Hannes Alfvén once observed, "Atoms for peace and atoms for war are Siamese twins." Attempts to deal with this long-standing problem by encouraging nonnuclear weapons states not to acquire dual-use technologies, such as those for uranium enrichment, have met with considerable

skepticism in a world already divided between nuclear haves and nuclear have-nots.

To demonstrate its support for the international nonproliferation regime, Israel points out that it plays an active role in the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization, has harmonized its nuclear export control legislation and regulations with the guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, is a state party to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, and has cooperated with the committee charged with implementing UN Security Council Resolution 1540, which obligates all UN member states to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Nuclear analysts, such as George Perkovich and Pierre Goldschmidt of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, also emphasize that Israel has never threatened the existence of any other state with nuclear weapons, or by any other means, and that it is a responsible custodian of nuclear weapons with respect to both its nuclear doctrine and the procedures it has in place to govern their use. Specifically, they infer that Israel's doctrine remains one of "defensive last resort" and that its procedural safeguards are designed to minimize the risk of inadvertent or accidental use.

Opacity undercuts the need for Israelis to be informed about issues that are literally matters of life and death.

Obviously, there are matters that democratic governments need to keep secret, but transparency is vital to preserving democratic institutions. This is especially true with regard to nuclear weapons policy, an area in which decision-making is commonly the province of a small elite. To the extent that opacity keeps both the Israeli public and the rest of the world in the dark about Israel's capability, it undercuts the need for Israelis to be informed about issues that are literally matters of life and death: Whose finger is on the nuclear trigger? Under what circumstances would the country's nuclear weapons be used? And what are the occupational hazards and environmental risks posed by the possession and continued manufacturing of nuclear weapons?

There should not be an end to all secrecy on nuclear matters; the balance between the legitimate need for secrecy and the desire for

transparency needs to be carefully considered. However, nearly five decades after Prime Minister Eshkol told the Israeli Knesset that Israel would not "introduce" nuclear weapons to the region, neither he nor any of his successors has ever elaborated on the meaning of this ambiguous statement. Times have changed, and as long as Israel adheres strictly to the policy of opacity, it cannot address concerns about its nuclear capability or about the seriousness of its commitment to a NWFZ in the Middle East, which it has advocated since 1980.

The former Israeli nuclear scientist Mordechai Vanunu's revelations about Dimona to the *London Sunday Times* in 1986 have led to claims that Israel possesses hundreds of nuclear weapons, including thermonuclear devices and battlefield weapons such as neutron bombs and nuclear artillery shells. Such an arsenal would seem to be incompatible with a nuclear doctrine of "defensive last resort." And it remains unclear what "defensive last resort" means in practice, in particular with regard to how Israel would respond to an attack with biological or chemical weapons.

Israel should demonstrate that it is serious about its commitment to a NWFZ in the Middle East provided that a just and durable peace is achieved first. It should also acknowledge the inherent dangers of possessing nuclear weapons, even by "responsible" nuclear states. Progress toward a peace deal should proceed in conjunction with arms control measures short of complete denuclearization.

The difficulties involved in realizing a nuclear-free world, such as verifying and punishing noncompliance, have been acknowledged by many of its proponents, including Obama. What is significant about the current global debate is the growing consensus that the nuclear status quo is dangerous, especially with regard to the inadequacy of nuclear deterrence to deal with the growing danger that nuclear weapons will fall into the hands of nonstate actors. Thus, the final declaration of the recently concluded NPT Review Conference underlined the support of all the NPT member states for Article 6 of the treaty, which calls for "negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament."

Although Israel supports measures to reduce the risk of proliferation and nuclear terrorism, as a non-NPT state it is not obligated to

Return to Table of Contents

Return to Table of Contents

voice its support for Article 6. Nevertheless, Israel should make explicit that its support of a NWFZ in the Middle East also implies support of Article 6 of the NPT and of the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. Such a statement should endorse the perspective of the late Shalheveth Freier—the senior Israeli nuclear official who translated the Nixon-Meir opacity accord into a national doctrine. Freier argued in 1993 that "nuclear weapons are bad" for a number of reasons: they are so destructive that irreparable damage can be done, and second thoughts cannot redress that damage; they cause lasting and pernicious injury to people and the environment; they could proliferate to countries that might feel less inhibited in contemplating their use than the established nuclear weapons states; once a nuclear weapon has been employed in an actual conflict, there is no credible barrier to the escalation of their use and destructive power; and, finally, proliferation to a regime facing internal challenges to its rule or not exercising complete control over its military could have devastating consequences.

POLITICAL FALLOUT

THE ISRAELI bomb became opaque soon after its birth and remains so today. Yet unlike 50 years ago, Israel today needs to bolster its credentials as a democratic state that seeks a just peace with the Palestinian people and to deal effectively with the prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran—challenges that require a reconsideration of its opaque nuclear posture.

International support for Israel and its opaque bomb is being eroded by its continued occupation of Palestinian territory and the policies that support that occupation, such as settlement construction, house demolitions, and restrictions on the movement of Palestinians, all of which are widely perceived as undermining a genuine commitment to the establishment of a just and durable peace in the Middle East. What happens in the West Bank may have consequences in Dimona. For example, the Israeli political commentator Ari Shavit, who strongly supports Israel's retention of its nuclear shield, has observed that "the West is not prepared to accept Israel as an occupying state."

Such international criticism might well spill over into the nuclear domain, making Israel increasingly vulnerable to the charge that it

is a nuclear-armed pariah state. This associates Israel to an uncomfortable degree with today's rogue Iranian regime and the old apartheid government in South Africa. This charge needs to be countered by displaying a genuine commitment to the pursuit of peace and a willingness to modify the policy of opacity in order to reinforce Israel's credentials as a responsible nuclear state. Obviously, those who contest Israel's right to exist as an independent state and to possess a nuclear deterrent to secure that right are unlikely to change their views even if Israel alters its political and nuclear posture. However, there is a deep reservoir of goodwill toward Israel and admiration for its accomplishments in many countries. Altering its present course would significantly increase the support Israel now receives in the international community.

Israel should resist the view that military action is its only option for dealing with the perceived Iranian threat to its existence.

Agreeing to the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty or to a ban on uranium enrichment and reprocessing in the region would be problematic for both Israel and its neighbors at the moment. For Israel, such agreements would be incompatible with opacity; for the Arab states, they would legitimate an Israeli nuclear monopoly. However, Israel could take other steps on its own in the near term, whose cumulative impact would be to increase confidence in Israel's support of global norms to reduce the threat posed by nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. Specifically, Israel should ratify both the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and the Chemical Weapons Convention.

Given Israel's formidable conventional military capabilities—specifically, its edge in the quality of both its manpower and its technology, its aircraft in particular—as well as its nuclear deterrent, Israel can stand with the 184 states that are already parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention without any loss of national security and thus indicate that it views the use of chemical weapons as abhorrent and unnecessary. The same considerations should motivate Israel to join the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.

It is also important for Israel to follow the lead of the United States in its latest Nuclear Posture Review, which significantly circumscribed

the role of nuclear weapons as a means of responding to a biological or chemical attack. In particular, the new U.S. posture indicates that although the use of nuclear weapons in retaliation for a biological or chemical attack is not out of the question, the primary role of nuclear weapons is to deter their use by other states. Obviously, under the current policy of opacity, Israel cannot make a public statement of this kind. The policy of opacity should be loosened so that Israel can become both a more responsible and more legitimate nuclear state—and be perceived as such by the international community.

Almost all states publicly oppose the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Iran, but the willingness to take strong measures to achieve this goal is very limited. Even the United States, Israel's closest ally, seems unsure about how far it should go to counter the nuclear ambitions of a country whose president commonly refers to Israel as "an illegal political entity that is bound to disappear from the pages of history." And although global concerns about nuclear weapons in the Middle East are focused on Iran's imminent acquisition of nuclear weapons rather than Israel's "bomb in the basement," there is also widespread support for dealing with this problem in an evenhanded manner, namely, by establishing a NWFZ in the region.

Faced with such a situation, Israel feels isolated and under siege—a mentality that has deep roots in its history. However, Israel should resist the view that unilateral military action is its only option for dealing with the perceived Iranian threat to its existence. Although Israel has previously bombed nuclear facilities in Iraq and Syria to protect its nuclear monopoly in the region, the challenge it faces from Iran today is much greater, especially since Tehran's precise level of nuclear advancement is so difficult to discern. In particular, it is not clear whether Iran has made a decision to build actual nuclear weapons or simply decided to maintain a "latent" nuclear capability—essentially coming as close to the bomb as technically possible without actually completing it and thus precipitating a strong reaction from other states, especially Israel.

Israel has the ability to influence Iran's calculations by means other than military action. If Israel takes seriously the need to modify its own nuclear posture and its approach to the peace process, the international community, including key countries, such as China, India,

and Russia, that do not now back strong measures against Iran, is likely to be much more supportive of measures designed to stop Iran from crossing the nuclear threshold and to contain a nuclear-armed Iran if those efforts fail. Increased, coordinated international resistance to an Iranian bomb (or latent nuclear capability) could also influence the debate in Tehran about the wisdom of continuing to defy the international community.

Abandoning opacity involves many risks and should be pursued cautiously. It would not be prudent at present to take the option of military action against Iran's nuclear facilities off the table entirely. However, a loosening of Israel's decades-old policy of opacity would allow Israel to become a fuller partner in the international nonproliferation regime, improve its image as a responsible nuclear power, and enhance its democratic transparency at home by informing the Israeli public about the fateful decisions that are being made on its behalf regarding the bomb.

Israel was not the first state to acquire nuclear weapons, and given its unique geopolitical concerns, it should not be expected to lead the world into the nuclear-free age. But in order to deal effectively with the new regional nuclear environment and emerging global nuclear norms, Israel must reassess the wisdom of its unwavering commitment to opacity and also recognize that international support for its retaining its military edge, including its nuclear capability, rests on its retaining its moral edge.

Rebuilding HAITI

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC LEADS INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS

On January 12, 2010, a magnitude-7.0 earthquake struck Port-au-Prince, destroying the city and changing forever the dynamics between Haiti and the Dominican Republic — the two countries that share the Caribbean island of Hispaniola.

"In the 30 seconds that the earthquake lasted, more than 220,000 people lost their lives," said Dominican President Leonel Fernández, speaking at a recent conference in Punta Cana on the future of Haiti. "In merely 30 seconds, more than 300,000 were injured and more than one million people lost their homes… Haiti lost 120 percent of its Gross Domestic Product… thousands of children were orphaned, thousands lost their closest relatives, and thousands more were plunged into a state of anguish and despair, bewilderment, and confusion."

But in reality, he said, the Haitian tragedy began more than two centuries before this year's catastrophe — a historic paradox Fernández hopes to reverse by taking a lead role among world leaders fighting for Haiti's survival and ultimate success as a nation.

"It is the Haitian people who are the sole architects of their own destiny," said Fernández, who was the first foreign leader to arrive in Port-au-Prince, only 16 hours after the quake hit. "The Dominican Republic — like other nations and international organizations represented here — seeks nothing more than to assist, to help, to accompany them in this colossal task of rebuilding a nation."

> "The Dominican Republic seeks nothing more than to assist, to help, to accompany Haiti in this colossal task of rebuilding a nation."
>
> Leonel Fernández
> President of the Dominican Republic

Within a matter of days, several dozen mobile kitchens were transported across the border to Haiti to provide immediate relief for hungry Haitians — courtesy of the Dominican government.

Raymond Joseph, Haiti's ambassador to the United States, noted that his Dominican counterpart, Ambassador Roberto Saladín, showed up at his office barely 20 minutes after the disaster to offer support.

"I have said from day one that the Fernández government has been phenomenal in its response," said Joseph, who was born in the Dominican city of San Pedro de Macoris. He said that in the 1930s, when an earthquake hit the Dominican Republic, Haiti was the first to respond, adding that "President Fernández and President Préval have had a good friendship for a long time. So that really facilitates communications between the two in times of crisis."

The Dominican private sector also responded in a timely fashion.

Banco Popular Dominicano, one of the country's largest banks, immediately organized aid convoys at the request of Partners in Health, a well-known NGO.

"A lot of worldwide attention was focused on Port-au-Prince, but what people didn't realize was that everything moves through Port-au-Prince," said John Strazzo, the bank's vice-president for corporate security. "So with the capital city out of operation, the entire country was suffering — even those outside the earthquake zone. Nobody could get fuel or supplies."

About half a dozen bank employees were involved in the operation, said Strazzo. All told, the bank trucked from the Dominican Republic to Haiti 410,000 bottles of water, 5,000 beds and sheets, 5,092 gallons of diesel fuel (to hospitals throughout Haiti), 9,971 units of food, and $413,000 in immediate relief donation.

Construction company Estrella S.A., based in Santiago de los Caballeros, flew planeloads of medicines into Haiti; in fact, CEO Manuel Estrella was among the first foreigners to land at badly damaged Port-au-Prince International Airport immediately following the quake. Estrella told us that his company, which is building a $50 million highway linking Port-au-Prince to St. Marc, was back on the job within a week, providing work to more than 1,000 Haitians. And the Dominican government plans to build a $50 million university for 22,000 Haitian students displaced by the quake.

"This is a remarkable turning point in the history of the relationship between Haiti and the Dominican Republic," said former U.S. president Bill Clinton, special UN envoy for Haiti at the conference. He praised the Dominican government for, among other things, building windmills near the Haitian border to provide 20 megawatts of electricity for Haiti — a 50% jump in Haitian electrical capacity once the two countries' power grids are interconnected.

"This is the first time I have ever seen all of Haiti's neighbors so committed to its future," Clinton said. "It's the best chance we have ever had to see Haiti emerge as a totally self-sustaining country."

Photo courtesy of the Press Office of the Dominican Presidency

INSTITUTIONAL HELP FOR HAITI

The World Bank, United Nations, Organization of American States, and other key institutions are helping Haiti get back on its feet after the January 12 earthquake that left its government and finances in shambles.

The Inter-American Development Bank estimates Haiti will need up to $14 billion to recover from the catastrophe. To that end, the IDB will write off whatever Haiti owes it and convert undisbursed loans to Haiti into grants.

"We will take up the commitment to make of Haiti a model to show how the bank can help a member country recover and rebuild after an extraordinary crisis," said IDB President Luís Alberto Moreno. "To that end, we have agreed to deliver $2 billion in assistance to our sister nation over the next 10 years. Our goal is two fold: help Haiti build back better from its devastating earthquake, and help it achieve greater stability and prosperity. The bank will diligently pursue this challenge."

José Miguel Insulza, secretary-general of the OAS, told us on the sidelines of the Punta Cana conference that his 47-member body is rushing to organize presidential elections at the end of this year.

"The UN is in charge of security, logistics, and infrastructure, while we are in charge of Haiti's civil registry. This year, we expect to issue every Haitian citizen over 18 years old a national identity card," he said. "That's not the only thing we're doing. We're also putting together a national property register — something that's never been done before in Haiti — a system so we can know who owns what."

Insulza added that the Dominican Republic's role in earthquake recovery has been "essential" since the beginning.

"The Dominicans have been at the front line continuously. They already have over 700,000 Haitians living here, but that's not what's motivating them," he commented. "I think it's solidarity and support for the country with which they share an island."

> "Our goal is two fold : help Haiti build back better from its devastating earthquake, and help it achieve greater stability and prosperity. The bank will diligently pursue this challenge."
>
> Luis Alberto Moreno
> President of the
> Inter-American Development Bank

Alexandre Abrantes, the World Bank's special envoy for Haiti, agrees.

"It is true that contrary to previous administrations, this president [Leonel Fernández] seems eager to help. He's extended his hand in friendship, and the Dominicans were very welcoming and took care of the Haitian refugees who fled to the Dominican Republic after the earthquake."

Abrantes, a Portuguese citizen who took up his new post less than two months ago, previously managed the World Bank's portfolio for Brazil. He's served in 16 African countries and half a dozen more in Latin America — but never faced a challenge as big as this one before.

"The destruction is much bigger than I had anticipated," Abrantes told us. "A lot of the rubble still has not been removed, making driving conditions and logistics very hard. And do not underestimate the difficulty of moving people out of tent cities. I thought people would be dying to get out of them, but it's not the case. In many ways, these tent cities provide residents with services they did not have before."

According to Abrantes, the World Bank's Haiti portfolio comes to around $210.5 million. "After the quake, everything was destroyed, so we are helping those ministries in which we have a competitive advantage: restarting the Finance Ministry and the Central Bank, and recovering databases so that the salaries and pensions of civil servants can be paid."

Photos by Amin Rodriguez, enketamin@yahoo.com

Photo of bananas courtesy of the Dominican government (Comedores Economicos); photo of truck close-up by Larry Luxner, www.luxner.com

PROFILE: MINUSTAH'S EDMOND MULET

In December 1972, Edmond Mulet, then a cub reporter for the Guatemalan newspaper *Alerta*, arrived in Managua the day after a 7.5-magnitude earthquake devastated Nicaragua's capital city. It wouldn't be the last time he'd do such a thing.

In January 2010, Mulet landed in Port-au-Prince the day after a massive quake leveled the Haitian capital. One of the estimated 220,000 lives claimed by the tragedy was Tunisia's Hédi Annabi, head of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) — and Mulet had just been assigned by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon to take Annabi's place.

"The UN lost 102 staffers; in the political section, only one of 10 survived," he said. "All our houses were destroyed; the only one left intact was our logistics warehouse near the airport, so this is where we moved to. We had three showers for 400 people."

Mulet, 59, is used to adversity. As a journalist, lawyer, and politician, he fought against the military dictatorship in his own country, and was jailed and later exiled for his views. In May 2006, following a political career and ambassadorial posts in Washington and Brussels, Mulet was appointed chief of MINUSTAH — but left just over a year later to temporarily become the UN's assistant secretary-general for peacekeeping operations.

Unlike the aftermath of the Managua quake, Mulet says "there is definitely no corruption in the case of aid for Haiti. These are very responsible NGOs and institutions, and Americans can feel confident that donating through these institutions, their money will be well spent."

As chief of MINUSTAH, Mulet oversees 15,000 peacekeepers, police officers, and administrative staff, and an annual budget of $650 million.

"I was head of MINUSTAH in 2006-07, just after [President Rene] Preval's inauguration," he recalled. "At that time, my main task was to get rid of all the gang leaders who were terrorizing Port-au-Prince. We arrested more than 850 of them, but they escaped the day of the earthquake, so we're after them again."

Photo courtesy of UN photo/Sophia Paris

"This can be a real turning point for Haiti."

Edmond Mulet
Head of MINUSTAH

Mulet says he's encouraged by the outpouring of support from Haiti's Dominican friends.

"President Fernández really mobilized his people," he said. "After the quake, private Dominican citizens loaded up their cars by the thousands, bringing water, juice, rice, and sugar over the border. The government took hospital kitchens to Haiti and set them up to prepare food for survivors. What really moved me was seeing young men and women in Santo Domingo wearing T-shirts that said 'Yo Soy Haitiano.' There was a real sense of solidarity."

Mulet's biggest challenge now is ensuring that international aid goes to earthquake victims while keeping unrest and political violence to a minimum.

"With regard to the humanitarian response and the emergency phase, I think we did pretty well providing shelter, water, and food for victims of the earthquake, removing rubble here and there," he said. "What I'm concerned about is that we're not moving beyond that. We have not shifted gears from the urgent response into the mid-term development programs. Hopefully this new commission will balance the need to continue the urgent response with the development of long-term projects and investments."

Mulet added, "The main problem in Haiti is not the weakness or fragility of the state; it's the complete absence of state. However, I have no option but to be optimistic. This can be a real turning point for Haiti, if we do things right."

Return to Table of Contents

PUNTA CANA CONFERENCE SHINES SPOTLIGHT ON HAITI

The Dominican resort of Punta Cana — a roughly 10-hour drive east of the Haitian-Dominican border — was the June 2 venue for an international conference aimed at helping Haiti recover from the earthquake that devastated its capital earlier this year.

Under tight security, hundreds of delegates from 33 nations converged on Punta Cana's Moon Palace Hotel for the "World Summit on the Future of Haiti." Their objective: to get donors to disburse the money they pledged at a March conference in New York in the wake of one of modern history's worst natural disasters.

Participants invited by Dominican President Leonel Fernández included Bill Clinton, the UN special envoy for Haiti, as well as Haitian President René Préval and Prime Minister Jean Max Bellerive. All four men honored Sonia Marmolejos, a Dominican woman and local hero who breast-fed dozens of starving babies whose mothers had either died or were seriously injured in the quake.

"The Haitian people are not alone and never will be, as we will be here forever," said Fernández, "contributing not only with the recovery from the effects of the earthquake, but also the harmful effects of history."

So far, Fernández announced, more than US$11 billion in assistance to Haiti has been promised by governments around the world. Brazil, which has thousands of UN peacekeepers in Haiti, was the first contributor to the multinational donor trust fund, pledging US$40 million. Other donations include 326 million euro (US$395 million) pledged by French President Nicolas Sarkozy between now and 2011; the cancellation of US$395 million in Haitian debts to Venezuela's Petrocaribe; the establishment of a US$2 billion Venezuelan "solidarity fund" for the importation of fuel through 2016, and an annual US$200 million contribution from the Inter-American Development Bank for the next 10 years.

Smaller donations have been announced by Taiwan (US$121 million), Norway (US$100 million); Uruguay (US$3 million); Equatorial Guinea (US$2 milllion) and Peru (US$1.7 million), while the Dominican Republic is funding construction of a US$50 million university in Haiti.

Préval, whose speech followed a short video depicting the collapse of Haiti's National Palace in Port-au-Prince, told Fernández, "I will never forget your visit to Haiti. You were the first head of state who called on us."

Since the earthquake, said Clinton, "I think the Haitian people have done remarkably well under the circumstances. They have used this terrible tragedy to reimagine their future — but it is a future that cannot be achieved without the support of the international community.

In a highly unusual gesture for a former U.S. president, Clinton lavished praise on Cuba's post-earthquake medical assistance to its Caribbean neighbor, noting that "Haiti may well be the only subject in which you can find Venezuela, Cuba, and the United States in complete agreement."

He added: "If each of us commits to doing what we can, I believe we can help the Haitian people modernize the economy, build individual empowerment, restore their environment, and, for the first time ever, become a completely self-sustaining partner in this region and give their own people the future they deserve."

"Haiti may well be the only subject in which you can find Venezuela, Cuba, and the United States in complete agreement."

Bill Clinton, UN special envoy and former U.S. president

Photos courtesy of the Press Office of the Dominican Presidency

> "This is the first time we've ever done something like this. It proves the bond we have with the Haitian people."
>
> Carlos Castillo
> Consul General of the Dominican Republic in Haiti

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC BUILDS UNIVERSITY FOR HAITI

In an unprecedented gesture of solidarity, the Dominican Republic is constructing a major public-works project in Haiti. The proposed Universidad Modelo — to rise in the northern city of Cap-Haitien — will serve 22,000 Haitian students displaced by the recent earthquake.

"This is the first time we've ever done something like this. It proves the bond we have with the Haitian people," said Carlos Castillo, the Dominican consul-general in Haiti. He explained that Cap-Haitien was chosen as part of the Préval government's policy of decentralization in the wake of the earthquake that destroyed Port-au-Prince — and also to develop the northern part of the country.

Félix Bautista, director of the Office of Engineers and Supervisors of State Works (OISOE), told us in an exclusive interview that the project represents an investment of around US$50 million. Of that total, US$35 million will be financed by the Dominican state, with the remaining US$15 million coming from the private sector in the form of cement, steel, door fixtures, and other construction materials.

According to Bautista, the proposed university — sitting on a 100,000-square-meter tract of land — will consist of eight three-level buildings containing a total 144 classrooms. Two additional buildings will contain laboratories for chemistry, biology, physics, nursing, languages, and information technology.

A two-story library covering 2,600 square meters will be the university's largest structure, along with a smaller two-story administration building. Also part of the plan: an 850-square-meter service center, basketball court, parks, and a cafeteria serving 6,000 meals a day.

Bautista, a civil engineer and high-profile politician who has overseen the building of universities, hospitals, and other public works throughout the Dominican Republic, said construction of Universidad should be completed within a two-year time frame.

"For me, this project is very important because it will amplify and consolidate relations between our two countries," Bautista told us. "With this project, the Dominican Republic demonstrates our solidarity with the people of Haiti."

Images of the university project courtesy of OISOE (office of engineers and supervisors of public works)

EXPERTS SAY DOMINICAN REPUBLIC CRUCIAL TO HAITI RECOVERY

> "The Dominican Republic's commitment to Haiti following the January earthquake is one of the few positive stories today in the hemisphere."
>
> Mike Shifter, President, The Inter-American Dialogue

The Dominican Republic's commitment to Haiti following the January earthquake "is one of the few positive stories today in the hemisphere," says Michael Shifter, president of Inter-American Dialogue in Washington.

"If you look at all the issues going on today, Haiti at least provides some opportunity for cooperation. Just the magnitude of this tragedy trumps ideological and political differences — especially the response of the Dominican Republic, considering that bilateral relationship hasn't always been easy or smooth, and still isn't," said Shifter. "Whether it's motivated out of self-interest or just the spirit of generosity, the fact is President Fernández has been extremely helpful, engaged, and committed to this whole effort."

But that commitment didn't begin on January 12, argues Caribbean expert Eduardo Gamarra.

"Even before the earthquake, the Dominican Republic often felt that it had to unfairly shoulder the burden of instability, poverty, and social ills stemming from Haiti's collapse," said Gamarra, political science professor at Miami's Florida International University. "The Dominican government began thinking about a strategy for Haiti long before it was the 'in' thing to do, and it did so out of a sense of national urgency. President Fernández created a blueprint for thinking about Haiti from the perspective of integration, investment, and how to help Haiti overcome its international isolation and help consolidate its democratic process."

Close to one million Haitians live in the Dominican Republic, and around 3,000 Dominicans live in Haiti. Yet the earthquake suddenly motivated Dominicans to care more about their less fortunate Haitian neighbors, said Gamarra, "even pushing forward the president's vision of harmony and good relations with Haiti. He wanted gradual cultural integration, and this tragedy kicked it forward many, many years. So the outpouring of solidarity in my view is a very genuine thing."

José Raúl Perales, senior associate at the Woodrow Wilson International Center's Latin America program, says the role of the Dominican Republic has been "very constructive and fundamental, from the minute the emergency happened up until now," with the current focus more on long-term policy.

"This is the result of several things," he explained. "One of course is the sheer tragedy. Second is the recognition that the Dominican Republic's own security and well-being depends in large part on a stable, prosperous Haiti. I won't deny that there is political opportunity for Leonel Fernández here. He's played a leadership role in this region — in Honduras, in Haiti, and mediating between Venezuela and Colombia — and this is very much typical of his persona and his government."

Inter-American Dialogue's Shifter says he's heard lots of talk about putting Haitians in charge of their country's recovery efforts, but that "it's hard to know to what extent this is realistic or practical. This country has been completely devastated, and didn't have strong institutions to begin with. There needs to be very substantial support to enable the Haitians to exercise control. It's not going to happen overnight."

Bubble photo of girl courtesy of the Dominican government (Comedores Economicos)



U.S. LEGISLATION BOOSTS HISPANIOLA MANUFACTURING

Bottled water, tents, and food rations saved thousands of lives in the immediate aftermath of Haiti's January 12 earthquake, but only job creation can sustain long-term recovery — and that depends on further opening the crucial U.S. market to Haitian exports.

"When I arrived in Washington in 2004, I came with a slogan: Haiti is open for business. We had to create a secure atmosphere in the country," said Raymond Joseph, Haiti's ambassador to the United States. "Secondly, I had to convince Congress to give us preferential treatment for products made in Haiti, especially textiles. I worked very hard, and in July 2006, Congress — then controlled by Republicans — agreed to give me the HOPE (Haitian Opportunity through Partnership Encouragement) Act, but for only three years."

In 2007, Capitol Hill — by then under Democratic control — extended HOPE for 10 years, becoming HOPE-II, and with fewer restrictions, thanks to the influence of Rep. Charlie Rangel (D-New York) and senators Max Baucus (D-Montana), Sander Levin (D-Michigan) and Chuck Grassley (R-Iowa). This has helped revive Haiti's assembly industry, which in the 1980s employed 60,000 workers but in recent years had tumbled to around 15,000.

"Since HOPE's passage, we have doubled that, and now companies from South Korea and Brazil are looking at Haiti, and not only in textiles," said Joseph.

On May 5, Congress passed the bipartisan Haiti Economic Lift Program (HELP) Act, which expands duty-free access to the U.S. market for additional Haitian textile and apparel exports, and extends existing trade preference programs under HOPE until 2020.

The objective: to alleviate Haiti's 80% unemployment rate in the formal sector — even before the quake — which forced three-quarters of the population to live on less than US$2 a day.

Just as importantly, HELP also opens the door further to Dominican products; since factories and infrastructure in Haiti were largely destroyed by the earthquake, the immediate theater of operations is the Dominican Republic. To date, some 168 companies in the Dominican Republic now benefit from the HELP Act.

> "Haiti is a strategic partner for the Dominican Republic in every sense of the word, and we feel the effects of the earthquake and want to help as much as possible."
>
> Eddy Martinez
> Secretary of State for Investment and Exports

"This legislation is not a panacea for all of the new challenges that Haiti now faces, but it sends a clear message to buyers and investors that Haiti does not stand alone in meeting the challenges before it," Rangel declared. "We, Americans, stand with Haiti."

Despite some opposition from domestic producers worried that China would use Haiti as a back door to gain entry into the U.S. market, the bill enjoyed strong bipartisan support, said Joseph, who lobbied tirelessly for its passage.

"Countries like the Dominican Republic and Brazil have a chance to benefit from HELP, and also help Haiti become a powerhouse — not only in textiles but in other products as well," he said. "The average Dominican wage is quite high compared to Haiti, and for that reason, the D.R. has lost jobs to the Far East, mainly China. But now that HELP permits some Dominican products to be finished in Haiti, they're coming back."

One of the biggest cross-border employers is Grupo M, a Dominican garment manufacturer that employs 4,300 Haitians, more than half of them women, in the town of Ouanaminthe. Another 1,000 people work on the Dominican side of the border near Dajabón. Joseph said Grupo M — owned by Dominican businessman Fernando Capellan — plans to expand to 15,000 workers over the next five years thanks to HELP.

Photo by Larry Luxner, www.luxner.com

Return to Table of Contents

Photo by Larry Luxner, www.luxner.com

HAITI PROVIDES BOOMING MARKET FOR DOMINICAN EXPORTS

Despite their rocky history, Haiti and the Dominican Republic are today not only good neighbors, but excellent business partners.

Even before the tragedy that befell Port-au-Prince, the two countries that share the island of Hispaniola were doing US$700 million a year in official bilateral commerce. Add informal cross-border transactions, and total annual trade exceeds US$1 billion. Haiti is now the world's second-largest market for Dominican products, topped only by the U.S.

Since the earthquake, however, exports are soaring — prompted by Haiti's urgent need for everything from garbanzo beans to gasoline.

"It's hard to put a positive spin to the blood that was shed [during the earthquake], but our companies are the best-positioned to satisfy the needs of the Haitian people," said Eddy Martínez, the Dominican Republic's secretary of state for exports and investment.

In the first four months of 2010, Dominican exports to its neighbor came to US$227 million — up 17.5% from the US$193 million in official exports for the same period last year. That does not include foodstuffs, clothing, and other goods sold at a dozen or so informal markets along the Dominican-Haitian border.

"Haiti is a strategic partner for the Dominican Republic in every sense of the word, and we feel the effects of the earthquake and want to help as much as possible," said Martínez. "Whether it's the UN, NGOs, foreign embassies, or outside companies, buyers should look at what the Dominican Republic has to offer. First look at Haiti and what Haiti is capable of producing. And if Haiti cannot produce it, then we believe the Dominican Republic could be a natural supplier, because a variety of products — food, cement, steel bars, plastics — are made here at competitive prices with good distribution networks that we've developed over many years."

Speaking recently at a meeting of the Dominican Association of Exporters (ADOEXPO), Customs Chief Rafael Camilo said the local manufacturing sector has benefited from the upswing in exports. He added that the commercial, transport, and farming sectors have also boosted shipments to Haiti.

Gregory Mevs, president of the Haitian Chamber of Agriculture and CEO of Wingroup, a private conglomerate, has been asked to head up a binational entity tentatively known as Quisqueya Development Corp.

"We're looking to create clusters to provide enough jobs for people to rebuild their lives and have access to housing," Mevs explained. "The idea is to make sure both countries reinforce one another's competitive advantages. For example, we're looking at opening call centers using Dominican infrastructure and investment, and the French-speaking capacity of the Haitians."

The entity's first order of business is a US$120-million free zone located 30 minutes east of Port-au-Prince near the Dominican border. The Chambrum economic cluster project would focus on textiles, greenhouses, energy, and the IT sector. If all goes well, the zone should be finished within three years. "In order to relocate 30,000 to 40,000 people from Port-au-Prince, we need to create the jobs first," explained Mevs. "You have to rebuild Haiti from the bottom up, around jobs and dignity. You can't rebuild around charity."

The task of rebuilding Haiti is the most daunting challenge the Western Hemisphere has faced in decades. Those who haven't traveled to post-earthquake Haiti cannot begin to fathom the sheer scale and complexity of this country's suffering.

The equally tragic 2004 tsunami struck only coastal areas, leaving unharmed the central governments of affected nations. In centralized Haiti, however, the quake not only brought Port-au-Prince to its knees, but with it the entire country.

This has created a unique opportunity to mend the historical distortions of the past. In sharp contrast to previous Dominican administrations, President Leonel Fernández has proven to be a world-class statesman. His unwavering dedication to Haiti has trickled down to all layers of Dominican society, paving the way for a new era of tolerance, fraternity, and integration on Hispaniola.

But urgent challenges loom ahead. A recurring criticism of Haitian President René Préval has been his post-earthquake aloofness — a perceived disconnect that plays right into the hands of political "has-beens" like Jean-Bertrand Aristide and François "Baby Doc" Duvalier, who are exacerbating social tensions as a way to return to power.

On our most recent visit to Port-au-Prince, we witnessed organized militias violently demanding Préval's resignation ahead of the scheduled November presidential elections.

The international community must respond by uniting behind Préval and his prime minister, Jean-Max Bellerive — and by convincing Haitians of the dangers of increased social and political chaos should the current government be allowed to fall.

The Interim Haiti Reconstruction Commission (IHRC), inaugurated June 14 in Port-au-Prince, has its own challenges. First, it must make sure foreign governments honor their pledges of financial support and begin funneling money to Haiti's mid- and long-term reconstruction — with full transparency and accountability. Secondly, it must keep Haitians and foreign donors updated regularly so progress can be measured.

Finally, the IHRC must ensure, with the help of the MINUSTAH, the OAS and others that the November elections not be undermined by politicians of the past who hope to profit from this tragedy. Not doing so would jeopardize both the stability of Hispaniola and the credibility of all those involved.

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How to Handle Hamas

The Perils of Ignoring Gaza's Leadership

Daniel Byman

The biggest obstacle to peace between the Israelis and the Palestinians is not the Palestinians' demand that Jewish settlements in the West Bank be dismantled, the barrier separating much of the West Bank from Israel, or the recent rightward shift of the Israeli body politic. It is the emergence of Hamas as the de facto government of the Gaza Strip, where 1.5 million Palestinians reside.

Hamas has regularly attacked Israel with rockets from Gaza or allowed others to do so. It poses a strong and growing political threat to the more moderate Palestinian Authority, which is led by President Mahmoud Abbas and his technocratic prime minister, Salam Fayyad, and which governs the West Bank and used to run Gaza, too. Whereas PA leaders see negotiations with Israel and institution building as the best way to ultimately gain statehood, Hamas seeks to undermine the peace process. Many Hamas members have not reconciled themselves to the Jewish state's existence. Hamas' leaders also fear that Hamas would reap none of the benefits of a peace deal and that in the event of one, the PA would score political points at their expense. Hamas has shown repeatedly that it can bring talks to a painful end by castigating moderate Palestinians and turning to violence.

Daniel Byman is a Professor in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University and a Senior Fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution. He is the author of the forthcoming book *A High Price: The Triumphs and Failures of Israeli Counterterrorism*.

Daniel Byman

Despite Hamas' centrality to Israeli security and Palestinian politics, Washington still clings to the policy that the Bush administration established after Hamas beat more moderate Fatah candidates in elections in Gaza in 2006. The United States and other members of the international community withdrew development aid from Gaza, tacitly supporting Israel's shutdown of the Gaza Strip, and refused to work directly with Hamas. Their hope was to force Hamas' collapse and bring Fatah back to power. But isolation has failed, and today Hamas is far stronger than when it first took power. The Obama administration, more by default than by design, has continued these efforts to isolate and weaken Hamas, opposing talks with the group and condoning Israeli military raids.

Israeli policy also remains stuck in the past. Regular rocket barrages from Gaza mean that Israel cannot simply forget about the area or Hamas. Israel has kept Gaza under siege and has sometimes used considerable force. Although the Gaza war of December 2008 and January 2009 (which Israelis call Operation Cast Lead) did damage Hamas' credibility, and even though Hamas has since reduced its rocket attacks, the long-term sustainability of such an aggressive approach is questionable. Still, Israel and the international community have not developed a new strategy in response to Hamas' consolidation of power.

Some prominent Israelis, such as Efraim Halevy, the former director of Mossad, the Israeli secret service, and Giora Eiland, a former head of Israel's National Security Council, have called for negotiating with Hamas. Other Israelis, who fear that the group will never abandon its goal of destroying Israel, think the Israeli military should retake Gaza before Hamas gets any stronger; they argue that postponing the day of reckoning will cost Israel dearly in the future. But with neither option being palatable at this time, Israel continues to rely on economic pressure and military operations to preempt terrorist attacks from Gaza, kill the people there who launch rockets into Israel, and retaliate for Hamas' provocations.

Although shunning Hamas may seem morally appropriate and politically safe, that policy will undermine Israel's peace talks with Abbas and other Palestinian moderates. An alternative approach is necessary. Hamas could, perhaps, be convinced not to undermine progress on a peace deal. To accomplish this, Israel and the international community

would have to exploit Hamas' vulnerabilities, particularly its performance in governing Gaza, with a mix of coercion and concessions, including a further easing of the siege of Gaza. At the same time, they should support the state-building efforts of Fayyad and restart the peace process with Abbas in order to reduce the risk that Hamas will win the struggle for power among the Palestinians. Moreover, because the effort to transform Hamas into a responsible government could fail, the international community must be prepared to support a more aggressive military response by Israel if Hamas does not change.

THE EVE OF DISRUPTION

Peace talks can begin with Hamas on the sidelines, but they cannot finish if Hamas refuses to play ball. Hamas has proved that it has the means to threaten Israel and disrupt peace talks. Rocket and mortar strikes are the most obvious method. According to Israeli government statistics, in 2005, Hamas and other Palestinian groups launched around 850 rockets and mortars at Israel from Gaza. By 2008, the figure had climbed past 2,000. The death toll from these attacks was low, but the psychological effect has been considerable. Hamas uses Qassam rockets, which have unpredictable trajectories and so fall on soldiers and civilians alike. One 2007 study found that 28 percent of the adults and between 72 percent and 94 percent of the children in Sderot, the Israeli town most frequently hit by rockets, suffered from posttraumatic stress disorder.

In addition to the rocket attacks, Hamas and other militant groups shoot at Israeli soldiers and agricultural workers near the Gaza border. From 2000, when the second intifada broke out, through 2009, there were over 5,000 such attacks from Gaza. The vast majority occurred before Israel withdrew from Gaza in 2005, but Israel still suffered more than 70 attacks in each of the three years that followed. A particularly difficult problem has been Hamas' use of improvised explosive devices near the security barrier. These bombs are powerful enough to endanger Israeli soldiers patrolling the Israeli side but can only be dismantled from the Gaza side.

Attacks by Hamas plummeted following Operation Cast Lead, a tough, sometimes brutal three-week campaign against Gaza carried

IBRAHEEM ABU MUSTAFA/REUTERS

Palestinians protesting against the construction of an underground barrier, near the border between the Gaza Strip and Egypt, December 2009

out by Israel in December 2008 and January 2009; it ended with a cease-fire on both sides. After March 2009, no month of that year saw more than 25 rocket and mortar attacks—a far cry from the violence of 2008. There were only four shootings in 2009. So far, 2010 has seen a comparatively low number of rockets flying from Gaza—few, if any, of which were launched by Hamas itself.

But few attacks is not the same as no attacks. The Israelis still fear that Hamas, which is building its capabilities, could easily step up the violence if it chose to do so. For the Israelis, engaging in peace talks premised on giving up territory is difficult when their country is under attack; they justifiably feel the need to hit back. The Israelis also worry that Hamas or another Palestinian group would launch rockets from any territory that Israel surrendered in the West Bank, just as they did from Gaza after Israel withdrew its forces in 2005.

For moderate Palestinian officials seeking peace, the challenge goes beyond Israeli fears. Israel and the international community, of course, recognize that Abbas does not control Hamas. But if violence again flared up, the Israelis would question the value of peace talks with moderates if they cannot end the violence. Israel does not respond to every attack, but when it does it often hits back hard, killing

Hamas leaders and, inadvertently but regularly, civilians, too. Moderate Palestinian officials would find it impossible to gain popular support for negotiations while Palestinian civilians were dying at the hands of Israelis. So even when its attacks do no damage, Hamas walks away triumphant, whereas both Israeli and Palestinian moderates are discredited.

Hamas is also capable of kidnapping personnel from the Israel Defense Forces or other Israelis: a rare but game-changing event. The most dramatic incident was the June 2006 abduction of the Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit. Israeli society rallied behind Shalit's family, and the IDF invaded Gaza in an operation that killed over 400 Palestinians and failed to secure Shalit's release. The kidnapping also helped convince then Prime Minister Ehud Olmert to attack Hezbollah in Lebanon after Hezbollah kidnapped two Israeli soldiers in July 2006. In circumstances like these, negotiations are almost impossible.

Further complicating the picture is Hamas' ability to undermine peace talks without using violence itself. Gaza is home to various other terrorist groups, from Fatah rejectionists to Salafi jihadist organizations, none remotely as strong as Hamas but all itching to attack Israel. Hamas can allow these groups to operate and then claim impotence or ignorance. It can also stymie negotiations politically. Hamas lambasted Abbas for meeting with Israeli officials and for not demanding that the UN endorse the findings of the Goldstone report, which criticized Israel's conduct of Operation Cast Lead. Hamas uses such attacks to "prove" to Palestinians that Abbas is selling out the Palestinian cause. Such charges make it harder for Abbas to consider making any concessions to Israel, particularly the type that involve no immediate quid pro quos from Israel or, worse, that mean swallowing rebuffs or tolerating continued settlement building.

For now, Hamas does not have to do much to scuttle peace talks: disagreements over settlements and other disputes have left the Israelis and the PA unable to get anything going beyond indirect talks brokered by Washington. Both sides view these talks with considerable skepticism. But should negotiations move forward, as the Obama administration is urging, Hamas is likely to play the spoiler. Progress on negotiations with Israel would make the Palestinian moderates

look good and pose a threat to Hamas' standing among Palestinians by reducing the appeal of its ideological hostility toward Israel.

Skeptics might contend that peace talks have often occurred without Hamas' participation. Since the second intifada, Washington has tried to move the ball forward from time to time, but any resulting talks made so little progress that Hamas did not perceive them as a serious threat. When talks were near fruition in the mid-1990s, however, Hamas—much weaker then—struck. In 1996, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) launched a series of suicide bombings against Israel. These not only killed over 60 Israelis but also shattered the prospects of Prime Minister Shimon Peres and his pro-peace bloc in upcoming elections, paving the way for the triumph of Benjamin Netanyahu, who was far more skeptical of negotiations. Terror has worked for Hamas, and it might be tempted to use the tactic again.

THE ISOLATION OF GAZA

Israel, Egypt, and the international community have put Gaza under siege to isolate and weaken Hamas. Israel has sealed off Gaza from the sea, and the crossing points into it from Israel and Egypt have usually been closed to normal traffic. Humanitarian aid goes in, but there is a long list of prohibited goods. Ironically, however, Israel's humanitarian concerns have prevented it from truly pressuring the Gazan people. Israel has tried to coerce Hamas without causing mass starvation, an approach that Israeli officials have described as "no prosperity, no development, no humanitarian crisis." Although Israeli policies are pushing Gaza closer to the brink, the threat of even more misery simply is not credible.

This is small comfort to Gazans, however. Aid agencies now put Gaza's poverty rate at 80 percent, and most Gazans survive on UN handouts and aid from Hamas' patrons, such as Iran. The World Health Organization reported at the beginning of this year that hospitals are unable to deliver quality health care; their doctors, unable to receive training. Disease and malnutrition are spreading, and schools are deteriorating. Gazans, who for decades took menial jobs in Israel, lost access to the Israeli labor market after violence flared during

Return to Table of Contents

Return to Table of Contents

the second intifada. Subsequent border closures and the collapse of aid and investment have further decreased employment.

The world lays the blame for this humanitarian catastrophe at Israel's feet. After UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon visited Gaza in March 2010, for example, he declared Israeli policy "wrong," contending that it was causing "unacceptable suffering." Still, except during Operation Cast Lead, the siege received only limited attention until recently.

The spotlight focused again on Gaza on May 31, 2010, when Israeli commandos stormed the *Mavi Marmara*, a civilian Turkish ship trying to break the blockade, and killed nine activists. Turkish leaders, already at odds with their once close ally over Operation Cast Lead, denounced the raid, demanded an apology, and took reprisals, including the decision to close Turkish airspace to Israeli aircraft. British Prime Minister David Cameron said the raid was "completely unacceptable," and Obama administration officials called for "a new approach to Gaza." Soon, the botched raid became a broader fiasco for Israel. It put global attention back on the siege of Gaza. Israel's restrictions of innocuous items, such as cilantro and jam, came under increased scrutiny. Worse, Hamas started to look like it was the victim of Israeli cruelty and violence.

The siege has not weakened Hamas, which has by now crushed or outflanked its political rivals.

To appease critics after the *Mavi Marmara* bungling, Israel declared that it would focus on military-related goods only and promised to make it easier for Gazans to seek medical care outside the Gaza Strip. But it maintained a ban on "dual-use" items, which could include goods ranging from electronics to construction materials, depending on how the term is interpreted. Egypt, for its part, opened the Rafah crossing to allow humanitarian aid into Gaza and to admit into Egypt Gazans seeking medical care. But Cairo remains eager to avoid helping Hamas unless forced to by public opinion and, significantly, is continuing work on a wall along and under its border with Gaza. Easing Egypt's and Israel's siege would lessen Gazans' misery somewhat and help Hamas politically, but the Gaza Strip still has a long way to go before it is not a basket case.

Daniel Byman

HELP FOR HAMAS

THE SIEGE has failed on another level: it has not weakened Hamas, which has by now crushed or outflanked its political rivals. Today, Hamas has an unquestioned—and, in the eyes of most Gazans, largely legitimate—monopoly on the use of force in the Gaza Strip, and its political clout among Palestinians has grown at the expense of Fatah. Hamas bases its claim to power on its victory in the 2006 elections, when it ran largely on a platform that stressed Fatah's corruption and failure to deliver either services on the ground or sovereignty at the negotiating table. Younger Palestinians, in particular, are disillusioned with Fatah: they prefer the new brand of political Islam to old-fashioned Arab nationalism. Meanwhile, the plunge in trade and investment in Gaza has hurt the small Gazan middle class and others who might otherwise have had the resources to stand up to Hamas.

The siege has also increased the importance of the social services that Hamas provides. After it took over the Gaza Strip in 2007, Hamas revamped the police and security forces, cutting them from 50,000 members (on paper, at least) under Fatah to smaller, more efficient forces of just over 10,000, which then cracked down on crime and gangs. No longer did groups openly carry weapons or steal with impunity. People paid their taxes and electric bills, and in return the authorities picked up garbage and put criminals in jail. Gaza—neglected under Egyptian and then Israeli control, and misgoverned by Palestinian leader Yasir Arafat and his successors—finally has a real government.

Despite the siege, Hamas is growing stronger militarily. Its rockets are getting more powerful and are reaching farther. Until 2008, the rocket attacks hit only the relatively unpopulated areas near Gaza, such as Sderot. Over time, however, Hamas tripled the range of the rockets; today, they can reach large nearby cities, such as Ashqelon and Beersheba—and possibly even Tel Aviv. And it is developing indigenous rocket systems that have an even longer range and a larger payload. Through illicit tunnels linking the Gaza Strip to Egypt, Hamas smuggles out hundreds of young men for advanced training in Lebanon and Iran. Its fighters are becoming more formidable.

Hamas has also found a way to benefit economically from the blockade by taxing the tunnel trade, even creating a "tunnels authority." Yezid Sayigh of King's College London has estimated that Hamas earned up to $200 million from tunnel taxes in 2009. The tunnels also employ over 40,000 people, creating an important business constituency for Hamas.

And thanks to Israel's blockade and military strikes against Gaza, Hamas has found it easier to raise money from Iran, which gives Hamas tens of millions of dollars a year as part of its struggle against Israel and to score points with ordinary Sunni Arabs who admire Hamas. Hamas is also beginning to look beyond pariahs such as Iran for backing. Khaled Mashaal, the group's so-called external leader, met with Russian President Dmitry Medvedev in Damascus in May. And together with Turkish President Abdullah Gül, they called for including Hamas in peace talks. The *Mavi Marmara* raid has accelerated Hamas' escape from diplomatic isolation, with more and more countries casting Hamas as the victim.

> Hamas has shown itself to be pragmatic in practice, although rarely in rhetoric.

The siege is also dragging down U.S. policy toward the Muslim world. The suffering of Gazans—broadcast constantly on al Jazeera—acts as a radicalizing force from Morocco to Indonesia. Terrorists in the United States itself, such as Major Nidal Hasan, the Fort Hood shooter, and Faisal Shahzad, the Times Square bomber, cite Gaza to justify their actions. And as many Muslims see it, U.S. support for Israel's siege proves that the United States is anti-Palestinian. Although the Obama administration successfully pressed Israel to ease the blockade, the remaining restrictions and the general sense that the United States continues to be Israel's strongest ally have meant that this perception endures.

This perception would become stronger if a new military operation on the scale of Operation Cast Lead occurred—an ever-present risk. In part, this risk is random: the rockets that land in Sderot usually kill no one, but there is always a chance that one could kill children or harm enough adults that the Israeli government would feel political pressure to escalate the conflict. An even bigger problem for Israel is that the current cease-fire is now based on short-term deterrence rather

than a long-term deal. Hamas has stopped attacking Israel not because it has agreed to a broader political arrangement but because the benefits outweigh the costs for now. The deterrence equation could easily be disrupted if, say, more arms went to Hamas or if politics in Israel or Gaza changed. In other words, the siege is failing even on its own terms: Hamas has become stronger politically and militarily.

THE LIMITS OF FORCE

Some Israelis believe that the alternative to the siege is to confront Hamas head-on, removing it from power and forcing it underground. But that strategy would lead Israel into a quagmire. Conquering Gaza would be a relatively easy task for the IDF, but it would almost certainly result in far more Israeli casualties than the 13 who died during Operation Cast Lead. The Palestinians lost over 1,000 Hamas fighters and civilians in Operation Cast Lead, and they, too, would probably lose far more. In Operation Cast Lead, Israel penetrated only partway into the Gaza Strip and did not stay and occupy the territory. If the IDF were to remove Hamas from power, however, it would have to stay for months to dismantle Hamas' infrastructure there: the hospitals, mosques, and social services that Hamas has been putting in place for decades. And it would not be cheap, since Israel would have to bear the financial burden of deploying thousands of troops to Gaza.

Diplomatically, occupying Gaza again would hurt Israel's relations with the United States, the international community, and Palestinians in the West Bank. Israel would inevitably make mistakes and kill innocent Gazans, making negotiations even more difficult. Hamas, meanwhile, would try to make the long-term price of any occupation too high for Israel to sustain. In Gaza itself, the organization could attack Israeli soldiers with snipers, improvised explosive devices, suicide bombs, and ambushes, and in the West Bank it could use its operatives to strike Israel. All this would take a bloody toll on the Israeli military.

Another big political loser would be Abbas. When Israel invaded Gaza in December 2008, the credibility of both Abbas and Fayyad suffered; they called for a cease-fire rather than for the kind of violent opposition that Palestinian leaders had been extolling for years. At the time, many Palestinians believed, and correctly so, that Abbas was

rooting for Israel and against his fellow Palestinians because he sought to gain a political advantage over Hamas. Public opinion polls taken before the war showed that the leader of Hamas, Ismail Haniyeh, would lose a presidential race against Abbas; polls taken after the war showed Haniyeh winning. Renewing the peace process with Abbas will be impossible if the IDF and Hamas are shooting at each other in Gaza. Abbas would not want to be seen as supporting the Israeli takeover, and he openly rejected such an option during Operation Cast Lead. But even if Abbas kept a low profile, Hamas would still see him as complicit and try to undermine his position in the West Bank.

Another problem is that Israel would lack staying power. Israel left Gaza in 2005 in the hopes of never returning, and it does not have the stomach for another grinding occupation. On the other hand, seizing Gaza again only to withdraw again would simply allow Hamas to retake power once more, because Hamas' moderate rivals in the Gaza Strip are too weak to take over. A new occupation is not the answer, and despite bluster to the contrary, most Israelis realize this.

CEASE-FIRE CALCULUS

If Hamas cannot be uprooted, can it be calmed enough to not disrupt peace talks? Maybe—and the chance is worth pursuing. Although often depicted as fanatical, Hamas has shown itself to be pragmatic in practice, although rarely in rhetoric. It cuts deals with rivals, negotiates indirectly with Israel via the Egyptians, and otherwise demonstrates that unlike, say, al Qaeda, it is capable of compromise. Indeed, al Qaeda often blasts Hamas for selling out. Hamas has at times declared and adhered to cease-fires lasting months, and some leaders have speculated that a truce lasting years is possible. And although Hamas has refused to recognize Israel's right to exist, its leaders have also said they would accept the UN-demarcated 1967 borders between Israel and the Palestinian areas as a starting point for a Palestinian state. Perhaps the most important sign of pragmatism has been Hamas' general adherence to its cease-fire after Operation Cast Lead.

To be sure, there are many reasons why Hamas might undermine peace talks. Progress on negotiations would elevate Abbas' standing among Palestinians and threaten Hamas' position. More important,

it would weaken Hamas' message that resistance is the path to victory. In the 1990s, support for Hamas rose and fell in inverse proportion to progress on the peace talks, and Abbas hopes that he can outdo Hamas by rebuilding Fatah's political position at the negotiating table. Thus, if serious peace talks begin soon without Israel's dealing with Hamas first, Hamas will have a political incentive to break the cease-fire—either directly or by granting groups such as the PIJ more leeway to attack Israel.

And even if Abbas and the peace process were taken out of the equation, formalizing a lasting cease-fire would be risky for Hamas. Doing so would damage Hamas' credentials as a resistance organization. That, in turn, would jeopardize Hamas' funding from Iran and weaken it relative to Abbas, since both would then be tarred with the brush of passivity. Pressure from al Qaeda–like jihadists, the PIJ, and Hamas' own military wing make it hard for Hamas' leaders to renounce violence, particularly openly.

Hamas would also risk alienating elements of the group outside Gaza. The organization has a major presence in the West Bank, where it did well in elections in 2005 and 2006, and much of its leadership and fundraising apparatus is based in Syria and other Arab and Western states. These facets of the organization, which are committed to violent resistance and focus on gaining power in all of historic Palestine, not just Gaza, would have to take a back seat while the emphasis is on Gaza.

All these concerns seemed insurmountable in the past. And although they remain serious, today there is hope that Hamas can be convinced to let the peace process move forward. Its biggest vulnerability stems from its biggest victory: its electoral win in 2006 and takeover of Gaza in 2007. Now that Hamas must govern and is responsible for the welfare of the Gazans, it can no longer simply be a resistance group, criticizing and undermining Abbas and other moderate Palestinian leaders, avoiding responsibility for tough decisions, and gleefully watching moderates get blamed when Israel retaliates for its acts of terrorism. Hamas learned this lesson during Operation Cast Lead, when Gazans criticized it for the devastation the IDF inflicted on Gaza. The Gazan public is firmly opposed to renewing the rocket attacks. The siege has not weakened Hamas' power, but it has forced

the organization to become more realistic. Gazans are sick of empty slogans of resistance; giving them a better life will require Hamas to make compromises.

Although the siege of Gaza has weakened opposition to Hamas, it has also prevented Hamas from governing well and from proving to Palestinians in the West Bank and Arabs in general that Islamists can run a government. When Gaza came under Palestinian control in 1994, the poverty rate there was 16 percent, barely above that of the United States. In 2009, 70 percent of Gazans were living on less than $1 a day, according to the UN. Mundane concerns about making ends meet dominate the local agenda. As an International Crisis Group report quoted one Palestinian aid worker, "People in Gaza are more concerned with Karni [the crossing point to Israel] than al-Quds [Jerusalem], with access to medical care than the Dome of the Rock."

Iran, tunnel taxes, and Hamas' fundraising apparatus allow the movement to survive, but they are not enough to make Gaza prosper. Hamas cannot pay for all of Gaza's employees and projects. In the past, it spent money on sustaining its mosques, hospitals, personnel, and military. Now, however, it is responsible for all of Gaza—a much greater financial challenge. It is also difficult for Hamas to get currency into Gaza; it must smuggle it in from Egypt. Hamas is considering dramatic increases in taxes on cigarettes, gasoline, propane, and other basic commodities, which would dent its popularity. Even Hamas' tunneling infrastructure is at risk now that Egypt—with U.S. help—has begun to crack down on the tunnels, building a barrier along its border with Gaza that extends over 20 meters underground.

No longer can Hamas simply be a resistance group, criticizing and undermining Abbas.

Perhaps most damaging to Hamas was its failure to emerge from the 2008–9 Gaza war with the aura of victory that Hezbollah enjoyed after its 2006 war with Israel. Hamas' military strategy was poor, as was its implementation. The Hamas official Mahmoud al-Zahar had warned soon before the war, "Just let them try to invade Gaza. Gaza will be their new Lebanon," but Hamas found itself completely outmatched by the IDF and Israel's intelligence services. No Hamas terrorist cells attacked Israel from the West Bank or within Israel

proper, and Israel did not lose one tank or one helicopter or suffer one kidnapping. Hamas' rocket attacks tapered off as the conflict ended rather than growing in intensity, as Hezbollah's had in 2006, which allowed Hezbollah to claim it was unbowed when the guns went silent.

Hamas' political weakness outside Gaza also became evident during Operation Cast Lead. Hamas received no significant support from Arab states: most worried that the Islamist opposition in their own countries would get a boost from a Hamas victory. Even Hezbollah gave only rhetorical support, for fear of renewed conflict with Israel. In the West Bank, Abbas was successful in stopping pro-Hamas demonstrations, using the rebuilt Palestinian police and security services to suppress dissent.

Politically, Hamas is beset from all sides, and its leaders worry that they are losing ground. Fatah is always waiting in the wings, with Abbas salivating over any weakness on the part of Hamas. At the other end of the spectrum, the PIJ hopes it can gain support from disaffected Hamas members by claiming the mantle of Islamic resistance if Hamas moves toward a lasting cease-fire. The extreme Islamist position evokes considerable sympathy among Hamas' rank and file, particularly in the armed wing. In August 2009, Abdel Latif Moussa, a preacher in Gaza whose ideology resembles Osama bin Laden's, declared Gaza an Islamic emirate—a direct challenge to Hamas' caution on this score. Hamas fighters swarmed his mosque, resulting in a shootout that left 28 people dead, including Moussa.

Peace would push Hamas to emphasize governance more and strengthen the group's moderates.

For now at least, Hamas can neither govern freely nor fight effectively, and so it risks losing out to moderates on one side and groups more extreme than itself on the other. Improving the economy in Gaza from abysmal to simply poor would be one victory. So would allowing some Gazans to escape the quarantine the international community has imposed. But to accomplish either of those things, Hamas will have to be willing to make the existing cease-fire more permanent. Doing so would remove the immediate risk of another devastating and embarrassing military operation. Talks with Israel and the rest of the international community, particularly Western officials,

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would also demonstrate that Hamas is the voice of the Palestinian people in Gaza, and greater legitimacy could bring more aid to Gaza from international organizations and Arab states that so far have shied away from Hamas under international pressure. And if Hamas then managed to govern successfully, it could hope to gain more political power down the road.

DEAL OR NO DEAL?

In order for Hamas to want the cease-fire to last, Israel and its allies must change the organization's decision-making calculus—a process that will require both incentives and threats, political and military, and, above all, time.

One way to go about this would be for Israel to make a short-term concession on border crossings, allowing the regular flow of goods into Gaza with international, rather than Israeli, monitors manning the crossing points. Israeli intelligence would still watch what goes in and out to ensure that the international monitors did their job, but symbolically the switch would be important. In exchange, Hamas would commit to a lasting cease-fire and agree to stop all attacks from the territory under its control; in other words, it would no longer allow the PIJ to fight in its stead. Hamas would also close the tunnels and end its smuggling. To make the deal more politically palatable for both sides and remove another bone of contention between them, it should include a prisoner exchange that swaps Shalit for Palestinian prisoners. The deal would not require Hamas to officially recognize Israel or Israel to recognize Hamas (which Hamas does not want anyway).

Egypt would have to broker such an arrangement. Like Israel and the PA, Cairo does not want Hamas to succeed: Hamas emerged from the Muslim Brotherhood movement, Egypt's main opposition force, and its success could have an impact in Egypt itself. At the same time, Cairo wants to separate itself from Gaza; it does not want crises there to further damage its credibility by making it look like an ally of Israel in oppressing Muslims.

Such a deal would allow Hamas to claim credit for improving the lives of Gazans, and it could use the resulting increase in the flow of goods to reward its supporters. Also, Hamas' dealings with additional

outside actors could widen the circle of those who tacitly recognize Hamas. For Israel, the regular rocket attacks would come to a complete halt and the threat of renewed attacks would diminish, allowing Israelis living near Gaza to resume their normal lives. Hamas' rockets could rust. A cease-fire would also free up Israel diplomatically. If the problem of Hamas receded, Israel could take more risks in the West Bank and give Palestinians more control over security with less fear that this would lead to a Hamas takeover. Meanwhile, Abbas could negotiate with less fear that Hamas might undermine him. Internationally, a cease-fire would reduce, although hardly eliminate, some of the anger at Israel or at least take Gaza off the front pages.

The hope for Israel is that a long-term cease-fire would, over time, produce its own momentum. Peace would push Hamas to emphasize governance more, strengthen the group's moderates, and discourage its leaders from attacking Israel. Hamas' military capabilities might grow, but it would be reluctant to risk any economic improvements in Gaza in another round of fighting. Hamas could crack down on or neutralize groups such as the PIJ and the Salafi jihadists without risking its popular support. Hamas' ties to Iran would diminish—an important fact for Israel if tension between Tehran and Jerusalem grew over Iran's nuclear program—and indeed Tehran would be bitter that its stalking-horse had turned away from violence. Finally, a cease-fire that allowed goods to flow into Gaza would make it harder for Hamas to blame all of its constituents' problems on Israel.

HEDGING AGAINST FAILURE

FORMALIZING THE cease-fire with Hamas would raise the question of whether Israel and moderate Palestinians were simply postponing an inevitable fight and allowing the enemy to get stronger in the meantime. There is some validity to this concern. Certainly, the growth of Gaza's economy and the increased flow of goods, such as concrete, that can have both civilian and military uses would help Hamas' military. And Hamas has been taking advantage of the current lull in fighting to better arm and train its forces.

With border crossings open, however, Egypt and international monitors could more easily justify completely halting traffic through

the tunnels than they can today, since the goods that would be smuggled would exclusively be contraband. Now, stopping the tunnel traffic is too politically sensitive: with both weapons and consumer goods being smuggled in, it would mean exposing Gazans to the risk of starvation. Privately, even Israelis and Egyptians recognize that some smuggling should be allowed. But if legal trade becomes possible, there will be no more excuse for smuggling. Whatever military advantages Hamas would gain from the freer flow of trade, moreover, would be small: Hamas smuggles so much through the tunnels today that the relative increase in imports that could have military uses would be less than most Israelis fear. In any event, Hamas would still be a pygmy to the Israeli giant.

Another risk of striking a deal with Hamas is that Palestinian moderates would rightly complain that Israel was rewarding violence: once again, their biggest rival would be benefiting from concessions from Israel without having to accept the political price of peace. And if Gaza's economy improved, the contrast between living conditions there and living conditions in the West Bank would become less stark, which would hurt Abbas politically. Thus, in order to offset any political gains Hamas might make, the international community should encourage Fayyad's efforts to provide law and order, reduce corruption, and otherwise start building a state in the West Bank. This would help make the PA a true rival to Hamas when it came to governance.

Fatah would also benefit politically because Hamas could no longer argue against rejecting violence and talking to Israel; however indirectly, it would be doing these things itself. At the same time, Abbas and Fayyad need the political legitimacy that would come with any success in peace negotiations with Israel. If the settlements grow and the talks stagnate, Hamas' argument that what works is resistance, not negotiations, will only gain force. A deal would also place a heavy burden on the PA to outgovern its rival, which is not necessarily a bad thing. An ideal way to move forward would be by reconciling Hamas and Fatah. For Israel, reconciliation would mean that Abbas could cut a deal for all Palestinians and not have it rejected by Hamas. For now, however, that remains unlikely, and neither peace talks with Abbas nor a cease-fire in Gaza should wait for this.

Daniel Byman

The long-term success of a cease-fire is far from guaranteed. It will depend on the personalities, preferences, and political positions of Hamas' leaders and on the vicissitudes of Israeli politics. The silver lining, however, is that even failure could have its benefits. Right now, Hamas gains from the perception that Israel and the international community seek to crush the Palestinians. Opening the crossings into Gaza would dispel this impression and place Hamas in a difficult spot politically: it would have to give up either on resistance or on governance.

If the rocket attacks from Gaza resumed or if credible evidence emerged that Hamas was dramatically increasing its military capabilities, Israel would have a strong case for resuming the siege or using force. The international community, therefore, must support not only the idea of formalizing the cease-fire but also Israel's right to retaliate militarily in Gaza if, despite Israel's concessions, Hamas resorted to violence. Such backing would both make success in convincing Hamas to adhere to the cease-fire more likely and give Israel a Plan B should the cease-fire collapse. Failure might also foster splits within Hamas. Currently, the group's leaders disagree over how much to emphasize resistance over governance. Making the choice starker may not force Hamas to abandon resistance, but it could steer relative moderates away from the group.

Hamas is here to stay. Refusing to deal with it will only make the situation worse: Palestinian moderates will become weaker, and Hamas will grow stronger. If the Obama administration is to move its plans for peace forward, the challenge of Hamas has to be met first. At stake is not just the failure of the peace process but also the possibility of another war and of Israel occupying Gaza again.

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Staying Power

The U.S. Mission in Afghanistan Beyond 2011

Michael O'Hanlon

Nine years ago, the United States worked with Afghanistan's Northern Alliance to overthrow the Taliban government in Kabul. The world was united, the cause for war was clear, and U.S. President George W. Bush enjoyed the support of roughly 90 percent of Americans. That was a long time ago.

Today, the war in Afghanistan is a controversial conflict: fewer than half of Americans support the ongoing effort, even as roughly 100,000 U.S. troops are in harm's way. Troops from more than 40 countries still make up the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), but fewer than ten of those countries take substantial risks with their forces in the turbulent south and east of the country. And as the Netherlands prepares to depart Afghanistan this year and Canada remains committed to doing so in 2011, two of these coalition partners will likely soon be gone. Meanwhile, support for the coalition among Afghans has declined to less than 50 percent from highs of 80–90 percent early in the decade.

Over the years, the U.S. mission has lost much of its clarity of purpose. Although voters and policymakers in the United States

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and elsewhere remain dedicated to denying al Qaeda safe haven in Afghanistan, they have begun debating whether a Taliban takeover would necessarily mean al Qaeda's return; whether al Qaeda really still seeks an Afghan sanctuary, as it did a decade ago; and whether U.S. forces could contain any future al Qaeda presence through the kinds of drone strikes now commonly employed in Pakistan. The most pressing question is whether the current strategy can work—in particular, whether a NATO-led military presence of nearly 150,000 troops is consistent with Afghan mores and whether the government of President Hamid Karzai is up to the challenge of governing and keeping order in such a diverse, fractious land.

Such doubts would matter less if U.S. President Barack Obama did not seem to share them. Obama has more than doubled the U.S. military presence in Afghanistan since taking office, and his administration's protracted decision-making process last fall—which resulted in the president's authorizing 30,000 additional troops for the Afghan mission—was deliberate, serious, and intense. But to some in Washington, Kabul, and elsewhere, the length of that review signaled fundamental uncertainty on the part of the president himself. Contributing to this impression were leaks to the media that revealed major disagreements among top administration advisers.

Most important, in announcing his decision last December, Obama pledged to begin removing U.S. forces from Afghanistan by July 2011. By itself, the plan to make the military buildup temporary was not misguided or surprising; the Bush administration did much the same thing with the surge in Iraq. But Obama seemed to be promising a fairly rapid end to the war. Indeed, that appeared to be the message he wanted to highlight most for the U.S. Congress and the U.S. electorate. Aware of the nation's war fatigue, Obama tried to be muscular enough to create a chance to win the war while at the same time keeping the war's critics acquiescent.

Obama's attempt to have his cake and eat it, too, has had its downsides. To Afghans, Obama's words signaled that U.S. forces might depart before they had sufficiently built the Afghan security forces or achieved other key goals. Such a message may motivate some Afghans to accelerate reforms, as the Obama administration hopes, but it will also make many of them hedge their bets, unsure of what

will come next. Obama's speech has had a similar effect in Pakistan, where the country's traditional support for the Afghan Taliban has diminished more slowly than it might otherwise have. Some Pakistani military leaders still consider the Afghan Taliban to be their best defense against the potential consequences of a premature U.S. departure: either chaos or too much Indian influence in the country. That many of these fears are exaggerated or incorrect does not make them any less important.

In fact, the Obama administration's statements about July 2011 and realistic projections of how long the mission will take suggest that no sudden withdrawal will occur. Given the nature of the Afghan insurgency's dramatic recovery since 2005 and the reasons Obama agreed to a major troop increase in the first place, the drawdown will likely be gradual, with at least 50,000 U.S. troops still in Afghanistan through 2012.

TALIBAN RESURGENCE, U.S. RESPONSE

In 2005, the Taliban and other insurgent groups began one of the most impressive comebacks against a U.S.-led military coalition in history. By the time Obama came into office, the United States had to develop a new strategy for a largely new war—and one it was losing.

Such was the context for the Obama administration's fall 2009 policy review. Those in the administration who opposed sending more troops to Afghanistan—apparently including Vice President Joe Biden, National Security Adviser James Jones, and Karl Eikenberry, U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan—did so because of reasonable skepticism. After all, Washington had sent more than 30,000 additional troops to Afghanistan in early 2009, and just a few months later the military was asking for tens of thousands more. The skeptics also believed that Afghanistan, with its tribal society and weak traditions of loyalty to the state, was not a promising place for a classic counter-insurgency operation. They argued that the twin goals of such an operation—protecting the population and guiding the Afghan security forces toward self-sufficiency—were inconsistent with Afghanistan's history, culture, and society.

In the end, however, the president decided that the skeptics did not offer a viable alternative strategy. The Bush administration had already tried a light-footprint approach in Afghanistan, and it had resulted in the Taliban's comeback—including at least a fivefold increase in violence since 2005.

Since 2005, the Taliban and other insurgent groups—such as the Haqqani network, another extremist Pashtun movement straddling central parts of the Afghan-Pakistani border—had substantially improved their battlefield tactics. Several years ago, insurgents would sometimes mass a large number of fighters for battle only to lose quickly to Afghan security forces or to NATO reinforcements once they arrived. In the summer of 2006, for example, Taliban fighters sought to establish control over a large swath of southern Afghanistan but were defeated by a combination of Afghan, Canadian, and other NATO forces. By the end of 2009, however, the Taliban were typically launching large-scale coordinated operations against small, vulnerable NATO outposts, as in the city of Wanat in 2008 and in the Kamdesh District of Nuristan Province in 2009. More commonly, in smaller-scale attacks, insurgents adopted the practice of detonating roadside bombs to create initial injury and panic and then firing small arms against any incapacitated vehicles and Afghan and NATO security forces.

The Taliban had become, in many ways, a smarter insurgent force. They rarely targeted civilians with the sort of widespread and brutal

bombings that al Qaeda in Iraq once commonly perpetrated. Indeed, compared to many war-torn lands and even to high-crime countries, such as Colombia, Mexico, Nigeria, or South Africa, Afghanistan remained a safer place for normal citizens in per capita terms. But the Taliban and other insurgents made life very dangerous for NATO soldiers, Afghan security forces, and Afghan government officials. In 2009, the NATO-led coalition lost 500 soldiers, about half the total from the previous seven years combined, and the Afghan security forces lost 1,000 personnel (mostly police). Meanwhile, assassinations of political, business, civic, and tribal leaders increased, too.

The Taliban also developed a shadow government that allowed it to provide an alternative (if crude) judicial system in southern Afghanistan, especially in rural areas. And it did so in a manner often considered fairer than the government's corrupt and plodding ways. The Taliban had learned to present a kinder, gentler face, so to speak, than it had when it ruled Afghanistan from the mid-1990s until 2001. The group remained widely disliked—with 90–95 percent viewing it unfavorably in most polls—but it had softened the population's anger. At the same time, in classic Mafia style, it continued to carry out just enough violence to be feared.

By late 2009, NATO intelligence estimated that the Taliban included at least 25,000 dedicated fighters, nearly as many as they had before 9/11 and far more than they had in 2005. The Taliban also had substantial influence in most key districts of Afghanistan—keeping government officials away, requiring compliance with their edicts on property disputes and other legal matters, and sometimes taxing the population. These factors—coupled with the fact that the Taliban and the Haqqani network remained fundamentally opposed to the Afghan constitution and believed they were winning the war—led the Obama administration to conclude that the prospects were not good for high-level reconciliation with Afghan insurgents.

Against this backdrop, the administration decided it had little choice but to try a classic counterinsurgency approach. A light footprint could not arrest the Taliban's momentum, change the atmosphere of intimidation that the insurgency had created among Afghans, or protect the human intelligence networks needed to carry out even a

limited counterterrorism strategy. Nor, the administration calculated, could it give the United States the leverage necessary to reform and strengthen the Afghan government. The best approach, then, was to carry out a limited state-building mission aimed at developing Afghan security forces that could dependably control their own territory and civilian governance institutions that could provide some degree of law and order and gradual economic progress. The Obama administration rightly considered this the likeliest way to achieve its narrow goal of stopping the Taliban from retaking power and, in turn, of preventing al Qaeda and related groups from regaining substantial sanctuaries on Afghan soil.

BATTLEFIELD UPDATE

THE U.S. APPROACH—originally crafted by General Stanley McChrystal, now being implemented by General David Petraeus, and supported by such civilians as U.S. Ambassador Eikenberry; Mark Sedwill, NATO's senior civilian representative in Afghanistan; and Staffan de Mistura, the UN special representative in Afghanistan—focuses on the south and east of the country, where insurgent activity has been greatest and where local populations have been most inclined to support or tolerate the insurgency. The approach is discriminating: of nearly 400 districts nationwide, U.S. forces are placing primary emphasis (in terms of military and civilian resources) on 81 and secondary emphasis on 41. The initial goal is to establish a contiguous zone of safety throughout the south and the east in which the population can feel relatively secure, Afghan institutions can take root, and transportation and commerce can develop.

There have already been major pockets of success, especially in southwestern Afghanistan's Helmand Province. To be sure, progress in the town of Marja, where the U.S. military launched a high-profile operation in February, remains slow. But that operation was overemphasized, both as a barometer of the war's momentum and as a model for future operations, because Marja had been a Taliban stronghold without any government presence; most major towns and cities feature a less visible insurgent presence combined with some degree of government capacity. As a whole, Helmand Province is improving, with most major population

centers now opening schools and markets, farmers moving away from poppy as their preferred crop, and overall levels of violence dropping. (NATO and the Obama administration should better measure and document this progress; as it is now, observers must rely too much on anecdotal information and conversations with military and civilian officials, such as those I had when I visited Afghanistan in May.)

Battlefield Trends in Afghanistan
(Data are for June of each year, unless otherwise indicated)

	2005	*2009*	*2010*
U.S. troops	18,000	57,000	95,000
U.S. civilian officials	200	415	1,050
Other foreign troops	8,000	32,300	41,000
Afghan security forces	50,000*	170,000	230,000
Estimated size of insurgency	5,000	25,000	30,000
Reported weekly insurgent attacks	60	80	120
U.S. troop fatalities†	58	86	202
Other foreign troop fatalities†	5	70	121
Afghan security forces fatalities†	200*	485*	500*
Afghan civilian fatalities†	300	580	700

* Approximate † January–June of year

SOURCE: Brookings Institution, Afghanistan Index.

Such promising trends are not present, however, in Kandahar, the region that includes southern Afghanistan's largest city and that the Taliban consider their spiritual and historic capital. The number of assassinations of political leaders and tribal elders in Kandahar is up severalfold over the last few years, to at least one or two a week. Overall, rates of violence in the region have roughly tripled since 2006, according to ISAF figures.

Neither has the tide of battle turned against the insurgency on a national scale. From 2009 to 2010, overall levels of violence rose by 25–50 percent (depending on the metric used), and the Taliban showed increasing willingness to target civilians. ISAF currently estimates that only 35 percent of the priority districts have "good" security or better, a figure unchanged from late 2009; the number of such districts with "satisfactory" security has improved modestly, from 40 percent in late 2009 to 46 percent in the spring of 2010. Although the situation is not worsening, many priority districts still have only mediocre levels of security.

But it should not be surprising that the level of violence is still rising. The reduction of violence is a lagging, not a leading, indicator of success;

in Iraq, for example, troop casualty levels increased through the first six months of the surge, as additional U.S. troops entered the country. Also, as its forces have tripled in size over the last two years, ISAF has been initiating far more contact with the enemy than before. And although U.S. commanders do not emphasize this point because enemy body counts are not a highly reliable measure of success, they acknowledge that the coalition is now far more effective when it comes to arresting and killing key insurgent leaders than it was just last year. Crucially, while making these adjustments, the coalition has kept civilian casualties low. McChrystal's directives on reducing the use of force around civilians have apparently reduced the proportion of ISAF-caused civilian casualties from 40 percent in 2008 to 25 percent in 2009 and less than 20 percent in 2010.

Yet such statistics hardly capture the full state of the U.S. mission in Afghanistan. Two other factors get to the heart of what is involved in strengthening and legitimating the Afghan state: the development of the Afghan security forces and the fight to curb endemic corruption. The first is generally a good news story, at least with regard to the Afghan army; the second remains grim and calls for some new ideas from ISAF, the international community, and Afghans themselves.

TRAINING AND MENTORING

IN THE war's early years, the processes for recruiting, training, equipping, and fielding the Afghan security forces were quite poor. U.S. commanders told me last year, for example, that through 2008, only 25 percent of Afghan police officers received any professional training at all. Those who did receive training got too little and then almost no follow-up once deployed. Members of the security forces often reported to incompetent or corrupt leaders in the field and received pay that was too low to constitute a living wage. This dearth of resources was the result of Afghanistan's poverty and the economy-of-force philosophy that was guiding foreign actors.

NATO and Afghan officials have dramatically improved the situation. Since late 2009—when U.S. Lieutenant General William Caldwell, commander of the NATO training mission in Afghanistan, began working with troops from Canada and the United Kingdom to direct the initial

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training, equipping, and fielding of the Afghan security forces—the number of personnel completing basic training and unit training each year has more than doubled. The quality of training is up, too, largely because teacher-to-student ratios have more than doubled (despite ongoing shortages of trainers). In the Afghan army, the better of the main security institutions, 20,000 recruits are in training at all times, and the force is on pace to reach its interim goal of 134,000 soldiers by this fall. This is partly because the army has increased soldiers' base pay, their pay for deployment to dangerous parts of the country, and other compensation. The rate at which new recruits are joining the force is now twice the rate at which soldiers are leaving.

The rate at which recruits are joining the Afghan army is twice the rate at which soldiers are leaving.

Afghan enlistees who are illiterate—the vast majority of them—now receive mandatory literacy training. To train noncommissioned officers—those who really make good militaries work at the ground level—NATO has set up impressive new courses that focus on technical skills and on how to lead small units. And at the national military academy, which trains officers, enrollment and graduation rates have doubled in the last year. ISAF has also convinced the Afghan government to improve the procedures for selecting officers and assigning them to duty after graduation. As a result, according to NATO officers involved in the training, nepotism and favoritism have declined. In addition, almost every officer from this year's graduating class is headed out to the field, unlike in years past, when political pressures kept graduates within Kabul. These innovations have begun to yield results in combat, with increasingly positive reports of the performance of Afghan army formations against insurgents in the south and east of the country.

The approach devised by McChrystal emphasizes long-term partnering between ISAF and Afghan units, which now (for the first time) train, plan, deploy, patrol, and fight together. As of early summer 2010, about 85 percent of all Afghan army units were engaged in such partnering, which allows Afghans to be mentored and to build confidence, since they know that, if ambushed, they will have some of the world's

best soldiers fighting alongside them. It also gives NATO forces a direct view of the corruption within the Afghan ranks. Thus, ISAF officials can suggest that the Afghan minister of defense take remedial or disciplinary action regarding certain commanders in the field.

The mission to train the Afghan security forces still has difficulties, especially with regard to the police. On average, the police remain less competent and more corrupt than the army. ISAF's approach to training the police remains weaker than its approach to the army: ISAF relies largely on private contractors as trainers because soldiers are considered suboptimal for the task and because there are not enough Italian carabinieri or other NATO police officers in Afghanistan to handle the job. Even counting contractors, the training mission has roughly 1,000 fewer trainers than it needs. There are also too few police personnel available to partner with those Afghan police who have completed their initial training. To address such shortfalls, the U.S. government could ask for more help from NATO allies, such as Canada, France, and Italy. Additionally, it could create a program to allow police officers from the United States to take "sabbaticals" to work for a year in Afghanistan.

Overall, the Afghan security forces are making strong progress. Indeed, their improvement is likely to be constrained less by the limited capacity of foreign trainers than by the corruption and institutional weakness throughout Afghan society. Curbing that corruption and weakness is the crux of the United States' challenge.

CORRUPTION, CONTRACTING, AND KANDAHAR

THE AFGHAN government has limited reach across its territory because it is hampered by a lack of human capital and an excess of corruption. Of the 122 Afghan districts receiving special emphasis from ISAF, only about ten will have representatives from the Afghan government by the end of 2010, and only ten more are expected to receive representatives in 2011. To mitigate the problem, international personnel and Afghan leaders are trying to use the traditional *shura* (council) consultation process to give all tribes and communities a voice in setting development priorities. The National Solidarity Program, an initiative of the Afghan Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation

and Development, can then provide cash grants to the communities represented by *shuras* (or by the related bodies known as community development councils). NATO military commanders and civilian personnel can often disperse funds in a similar fashion. Thus, there are a number of bodies promoting local order and development that are imperfect but much better than nothing.

The Afghan government is one of the most corrupt in the world. Piles of cash from Afghanistan make their way to Dubai every day, often taken from foreign aid budgets intended for development projects. Positions in government are routinely sold to the highest bidder, who then sells subordinate positions—and the process ends with Afghan citizens having to pay bribes for virtually all government services.

The Afghan government's Major Crimes Task Force has undertaken at least one prominent prosecution, of a former minister of mines, Muhammad Ibrahim Adel, but the case is proceeding very slowly. More than a dozen other officials are under indictment or investigation for wrongdoing. These proceedings constitute a promising but still modest trend.

The corruption problem is particularly acute in Kandahar, where a mix of Afghan politics and NATO logistical needs is actually reinforcing the very corruption that fuels the insurgency. As a U.S. congressional report highlighted in June, ISAF relies on a system of private companies and security firms—militias—to transport supplies, construct roads and buildings, and protect vital supply lines and military bases. In so doing, the coalition not only tolerates but also strengthens a corrupt local order led by the syndicates of Gul Agha Sherzai (a former governor of Kandahar who is now governor of Nangarhar, in eastern Afghanistan, but whose family remains powerful in Kandahar) and Ahmed Wali Karzai (the head of Kandahar's provincial council and a half brother of Afghan President Hamid Karzai). These syndicates are far more powerful than the offices of the provincial governor or the mayor of Kandahar, both of whom are appointed by the president. Like the Mafia, the Sherzai and Karzai families control economic and political favors throughout the province. They continue to earn money from ISAF—and especially from the United States—because U.S. procurement and contracting laws require any company winning U.S. contracts to fill out onerous paperwork and comply with other



SOURCE: Brookings Institution, Afghanistan Index.

red tape. The Sherzai and Wali Karzai families are often corrupt, but only they have the personnel to fill out such forms, maintain contracting requirements, and produce rapid results on the ground. (Sometimes they pay off insurgents not to attack convoys; this achieves the immediate goal of getting supplies through, of course, but strengthens the insurgency in the process.)

Most NATO officials are aware of this paradoxical problem but have not produced a cogent strategy for addressing it. And although NATO forces in the area have good plans for how to strengthen the ability of the governor and the mayor to serve their constituents, that process will take time that the coalition may not have. Thus, U.S. forces risk destroying Kandahar as they try to save it. After all, corruption contributes to the insurgency as much as the Taliban's fanatical ideology does; the insurgency's strength in and around Kandahar is largely the result of certain tribes' becoming angry because they do not share in the region's wealth and choosing therefore to provide recruits to insurgent forces.

The U.S. military's recently formed Task Force 2010 has begun to provide oversight aimed at reducing abuses among Afghan contractors and subcontractors. In addition, the U.S. Congress could allow more

flexibility in the application of U.S. contracting procedures in war zones, so that the military could reduce its complete dependence on groups such as the Sherzai and Karzai syndicates. Existing Afghan power brokers may object to ISAF efforts to work with a wider array of local actors, but ISAF need not cut off the former to improve the situation. The imperative is to spread the wealth more effectively—to ensure that more tribes and powerful leaders have a stake in the current strategy and are therefore less likely to support the insurgency as a form of protest. This approach would require explaining to the existing power brokers that any violence they perpetrate against local competitors will jeopardize their ability to win business in the future. And now is the time to act, since local resistance to such changes will be easier to control while U.S. forces are still increasing their spending; it is easier to implement a new approach when the contracting pie is growing rather than shrinking.

WHAT IT TAKES

NATO's TWO-PART mission in Afghanistan—to protect the population while gradually training Afghan forces to assume that responsibility on their own—can be set to an approximate schedule.

Counterinsurgency doctrine suggests that a security force of 600,000 is needed to ensure robust security throughout a country of 30 million people, such as Afghanistan. But any doctrine is only approximate. In the case of Afghanistan, the ratio of 20 security personnel for every 1,000 civilians probably needs to be applied only in those parts of the country where Pashtuns predominate, since only there is the insurgency intense. Among the rest of the population—approximately 55 percent—a ratio of fewer than 10 security personnel for every 1,000 citizens would likely suffice. This implies that security in Afghanistan could be maintained by a competent force of roughly 400,000 troops.

By the end of 2010, ISAF will have nearly 150,000 troops in Afghanistan. The Afghan security forces will number about 250,000, with perhaps 150,000 of those in decent shape or in strong partnership arrangements with NATO troops. That means that there will be roughly 300,000 competent security personnel in place, half foreign and half indigenous—about 100,000 forces shy of the overall requirement

of 400,000. Given that shortfall, some parts of the country will have to be left relatively unguarded into 2011. According to current ISAF projections, it will take until late 2011 for Afghan security personnel to number 300,000. Making the force 350,000 strong would take most of 2012, and reaching 400,000 would take until 2013.

As the Afghan security forces build toward 400,000 competent personnel, ISAF forces will be needed for two main reasons: to make up the difference between the available Afghan forces and the goal of 400,000 troops and to train and mentor those Afghan forces. How many forces are needed for the second mission? Afghan-ISAF partnering needs to be intense for roughly one full year after a unit is formed, and the current partnering approach requires ISAF units to team up with Afghan units of similar size or perhaps larger ones that are better trained. Thus, for example, a NATO battalion of 1,000 soldiers might pair with a relatively weak Afghan battalion of 1,000 or a relatively strong Afghan brigade of 3,000. Recognizing that such details will be worked out on a case-by-case basis and that all projections are therefore approximate, one can estimate that to add 75,000 Afghan personnel to the security forces, NATO would need to provide roughly 35,000 trainers, mentors, and partners for them. (Even if it required 50,000 trainers or only 25,000, the U.S. mission would be lengthened or shortened by only a few months.) In addition to the trainers, NATO would also need to deploy additional forces to boost the aggregate (Afghan and foreign) security personnel to reach the 400,000 goal.

Consider where the U.S. mission will be in mid-2012, when Obama will likely be running for reelection. According to ISAF projections, by then the Afghan security forces will have about 300,000 troops formed into units (plus some tens of thousands more in training but not yet deployable). If ISAF deploys 35,000 troops to train, mentor, and partner with Afghan units, that would make for a total security force of 335,000 in the country. For the total to reach 400,000, another 65,000 ISAF troops would be needed. There would then be 100,000 ISAF soldiers in total, and given likely allied contributions by that point, roughly 65,000 of those would be American. The bottom line, then, is that Obama would be asking voters to reelect him when there were still well over 50,000 U.S. soldiers in Afghanistan.

According to current projections, the Afghan security forces could reach 400,000 by mid-2013. But even then, 75,000 Afghan soldiers would still require the help of an ISAF mentoring force of approximately 35,000 troops—two-thirds, or more than 20,000, of whom would likely be U.S. troops.

To be sure, these are optimistic estimates. Troop requirements would increase if parts of Afghanistan besides the south and the east proved more dangerous than expected or if the planned ISAF approach proved deficient. And there is also the matter of how U.S. policy may evolve, especially regarding the vague July 2011 deadline that Obama has set.

DECIPHERING A DEADLINE

THANKFULLY, it appears unlikely that the United States will rapidly depart from Afghanistan starting in July 2011. For one, the campaign plan drafted by McChrystal and Eikenberry last summer envisioned having at least three years to fight the Taliban and train the Afghan security forces. By the summer of 2011, the Afghan security forces will still be well short of their necessary size and competence.

In light of such practical considerations, there are major strategic and political reasons why Obama is unlikely to reduce the U.S. commitment dramatically. Since his presidential campaign began, he has declared the Afghan-Pakistani theater his top national security priority. Because he has gained full ownership of this war by now, to accelerate the U.S. departure prematurely—before the insurgency was weakened and Afghan forces adequately improved—would risk being seen as conceding defeat in a war that he chose and led. And although an anxious Congress may push him to withdraw, the fear of seeming weak on national security will probably pull at least as firmly in the other direction.

To discern the likely significance of July 2011, it is perhaps most instructive to look at the words of key administration officials and military leaders. In announcing the so-called Afghan surge last December, Obama said, "These additional American and international troops will allow us to accelerate handing over responsibility to Afghan forces, and allow us to begin the transfer of our forces out of Afghanistan

in July of 2011. Just as we have done in Iraq, we will execute this transition responsibly, taking into account conditions on the ground." He added, "It must be clear that Afghans will have to take responsibility for their security. . . . That is why our troop commitment in Afghanistan cannot be open-ended—because the nation that I am most interested in building is our own."

Several high-ranking officials spoke about the July 2011 date in the days after Obama's announcement. "While there are no guarantees in war, I expect that we will make significant headway in the next 18–24 months. I also believe that we could begin to thin our combat forces in about the same time frame," said Admiral Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, meanwhile, testified to Congress that "beginning to transfer security responsibility to the Afghans in summer 2011 is critical—and, in my view, achievable. This transfer will occur district by district, province by province, depending on conditions on the ground. . . . The United States will continue to support [Afghans'] development as an important partner for the long haul. We will not repeat the mistakes of 1989, when we abandoned the country only to see it descend into chaos and into Taliban hands."

Months later, in May, at a press conference with Karzai, Obama elaborated on the deadline: "Beginning in 2011, July we will start bringing those troops down and turning over more and more responsibility to Afghan security forces that we are building up. But we are not suddenly, as of July 2011, finished with Afghanistan." The next month, in June, General Petraeus quoted Obama in emphasizing to Congress that the United States would not be "switching off the lights" in Afghanistan in July 2011.

These comments suggest a plan to withdraw U.S. troops gradually over several years, not precipitously in July 2011. To be sure, some officials have characterized that month as a major turning point. In perhaps the administration's most emphatic utterance, Biden reportedly told the journalist Jonathan Alter, "In July of 2011 you're going to see a whole lot of people moving out. Bet on it." And indeed, Obama is preserving some wiggle room so that if he judges next year that the war is clearly being lost, the United States could accelerate its drawdown and cut its losses, effectively acknowledging the failure of the

current strategy. But that is not the existing plan, and nearly all public statements have emphasized that the troop reductions will be responsible, based on conditions on the ground, and gradual over a period of years.

The notion that the ISAF mission will be completed by July 2011 is not consistent with the conditions in Afghanistan, the U.S. campaign plan, or public utterances on the subject by administration officials. Indeed, it is likely that Obama will run for reelection with more than 50,000 U.S. troops still in Afghanistan, and with no realistic prospect of bringing them all home early in what would be his second term. He will have doubled U.S. expenditures on the war during his first term, and he may well also have presided over a doubling of U.S. casualties. The price for success will be high. But the United States and its partners can likely achieve a significant level of success—represented by an Afghan state that is able to control most of its territory and gradually improve the lives of its citizens—if ISAF and other key actors contain Afghan corruption and demonstrate several more years of resolve in what is already the United States' longest war.

Russia's New Nobility

The Rise of the Security Services in Putin's Kremlin

Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan

In December 2000, Nikolai Patrushev, who had succeeded Vladimir Putin as director of Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB), gave an interview to mark the anniversary of the founding of the Cheka, the Bolshevik secret police. He described the FSB's personnel: "Our best colleagues, the honor and pride of the FSB, don't do their work for the money," he said. "They all look different, but there is one very special characteristic that unites all these people, and it is a very important quality: It is their sense of service. They are, if you like, our new 'nobility.'"

Over the last decade in Russia, the FSB, the modern successor to the Soviet secret police, the KGB, has been granted the role of the new elite, enjoying expanded responsibilities and immunity from public oversight or parliamentary control. The FSB's budget is not published; the total number of officers is undisclosed. But even cautious estimates suggest that the FSB employs more than 200,000 people. For ten years, Putin, a KGB and FSB veteran himself, has held power in the Kremlin as president and now prime minister. He has made the FSB the main security service in Russia, permitting it to absorb much of

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Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan are Co-founders of the Web site Agentura.ru. Their book *The New Nobility: The Restoration of Russia's Security State and the Enduring Legacy of the KGB*, from which this essay is adapted, will be published this fall by PublicAffairs, a member of the Perseus Books Group. For an annotated guide to this topic, see "What to Read on Russian Politics" at www.foreignaffairs.com/readinglists/russia.

the former KGB and granting it the right to operate abroad, collect information, and carry out special operations.

When Putin was elected president, in 2000, the Russian secret services were in an extremely difficult position. They had been left behind in the mad rush to market reforms and democracy of the 1990s, and their ranks had thinned due to the lure of big money in Russia's new capitalist economy. Those who remained faced daunting and dispiriting new challenges: the festering war in Chechnya and the resulting rise of terrorism in Moscow and other cities far from the Chechen battlefield. FSB officers faced pressures of corruption that far exceeded those of Soviet times. The organization also suffered from deep public distrust, a legacy of both the repression carried out by the Soviet KGB and the chaotic first decade of Russia's post-Soviet experience.

Yet as the FSB appeared to be foundering, Putin gave the organization a new and riskier role. As a former KGB officer, Putin viewed the FSB as the only state agency he could trust. He gave the FSB the responsibility to protect the stability of the Kremlin's rule—and, by extension, the stability of the country. Over the past decade, the FSB has become the main resource of human capital for filling positions in the state apparatus and state-controlled corporations.

As its power has increased, the FSB has reduced the space available for open discussion of politics and public life. It has intimidated the country's scientific community with a series of harsh verdicts against scientists accused of espionage, restricted the work of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) by charging them with working for foreign states, and spied on Russian journalists.

Although many Russian dissidents, Russian journalists, and even some members of the security services have suggested that these changes represent a wholesale revival of the Soviet-era KGB, the reality is more complicated. The KGB of the Soviet Union was all-powerful, but it was also under the control of the political structure. The Communist Party presided over every KGB section, department, and division. Today's FSB—unlike its predecessor—is impenetrable to outsiders.

In fact, the FSB has become something very different from either the Soviet secret service or the intelligence communities in Western countries. In some ways, it most closely resembles the ruthless *mukhabarat*, the secret police found in many countries of the Arab world: devoted to

protecting the regime; answering only to those in power; and impenetrable, corrupt, and brutal in dealing with individuals and groups suspected of terrorism or dissent. FSB officers now regard themselves as the only force capable of saving the country from internal and external enemies—the saviors of a nation damaged by the upheaval and chaos of the 1990s. In their view, they are the heirs not only to the KGB but also to the secret police that the tsars deployed to battle political terrorism.

OPERATION RESURRECTION

THE KGB, known formally as the Committee for State Security, was established in 1954 as an outgrowth of several Soviet security organizations. It combined dozens of different functions: gathering foreign intelligence, guarding national borders, protecting Soviet leaders, obtaining counterintelligence, silencing dissent, and closely monitoring all aspects of Soviet life, from the Orthodox Church to the military.

Despite its sprawling and intrusive structure, the KGB was restrained in one very significant way: the Communist Party was keeping watch. Each division, department, and office of the KGB had a party branch, a peephole through which the state could monitor its agents. The guidelines of the KGB, approved in 1959, established as much: "Party organizations and every communist have the right . . . to report about shortcomings in the work of the organs of state security to the respective party organs." The Soviet Politburo, deeply traumatized by the Stalin-era purges, was determined to keep the secret police in check.

Since it was thoroughly embedded in Soviet life, the KGB suffered from the same inefficiencies that defined the Soviet bureaucracy as a whole. For example, many KGB officers in the Soviet army, whose job it was to ferret out corruption among military officials, were often themselves corrupt. The KGB worked according to a thinly veiled system of nepotism, which meant that the children of the Soviet elite—realizing the advantages of being stationed in the West—supplanted trained agents in the field. These intelligence officers working abroad often simply compiled reports from Western newspapers and passed them off as sensitive information.

But the KGB was able to use the secretive atmosphere of the Soviet system to hide its weaknesses and internecine rivalries. When the

Return to Table of Contents

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failures of the Soviet system became clear during the reign of Leonid Brezhnev, in the 1970s, the KGB chair, Yuri Andropov, deliberately promulgated a myth that the KGB was the only uncorrupt body capable of saving the state. Andropov, the longest-serving chair of the KGB, was infamous for his brutal repression of both the Hungarian revolt in 1956 and the Prague Spring of 1968. In November 1982, when he assumed leadership of the Soviet Union, he cultivated the notion that the KGB was made up of intelligent people and not brutal secret police officers. Andropov sought to fight the Soviet Union's stagnation by instilling workplace discipline and combating corruption, but his methods proved largely ineffective during his short, two-year reign. Under Mikhail Gorbachev, the KGB tried to distance itself from the crackdowns against dissidents that it had relied on throughout the 1960s and 1970s.

> FSB officers now regard themselves as the only force capable of saving the country from internal and external enemies.

When the Soviet Union collapsed, Boris Yeltsin aimed to weaken the monolithic Soviet KGB by splitting it up into smaller independent agencies. He was afraid that if he did not, hard-liners in the security services might try to stage a coup similar to the failed attempt against Gorbachev in August 1991. Like many in his political circle, Yeltsin felt that the only way to control the secret services was to strictly delineate areas of responsibility. The largest new department—initially called the Ministry of Security, then the Federal Counterintelligence Service (FSK), and finally, beginning in 1995, the FSB—would be responsible for counterintelligence and counterterrorism. The KGB's former foreign intelligence unit was transformed into a new espionage agency called the Foreign Intelligence Service, or SVR, the agency responsible for the 11 Russian "illegal" spies uncovered in the United States in June. Other divisions, such as those responsible for electronic eavesdropping and cryptography, became self-contained agencies. Lastly, the KGB branches that had protected Soviet leaders and guarded the Soviet borders were turned into independent services.

Meanwhile, party control over the security services dissipated—yet even a weakened security apparatus was too feared by the Kremlin to be left alone. Yeltsin's response was to encourage rivalry in the

splintered intelligence community, providing a precarious system of checks and balances. Under Yeltsin, the foreign intelligence agency remained in direct competition with military intelligence. The FSB struggled with the communications agency, known as FAPSI, which was responsible for electronic eavesdropping and cryptography and, like the FSB, was charged with keeping a close eye on the social and political situation in Russia. In one sense, this meant that Yeltsin had access to a diverse set of opinions: after reading a report from the FSB director, he could compare it with one from the FAPSI director.

In the early 1990s, the FSK was hardly considered effective or competent. Among other missteps, it was responsible for orchestrating the ill-fated attack on Grozny, the capital of Chechnya, in 1994. It dispatched three columns of tanks carrying forces disguised as opposition militants to serve as a demonstration of force to the separatist Chechen leader Dzhokhar Dudayev. But the disguised forces were ambushed by Chechens and their tanks burned in the streets of Grozny. The incident left the Kremlin with grave doubts about the abilities of the FSK.

After the FSK was renamed the FSB, it met with another failure—this time in the war against Russian organized crime. In 1996, the FSB opened a secret internal branch to prosecute Mafia groups. The unit quickly gained infamy as the most ruthless, brutal, and corrupt section of the intelligence services. In 1998, a number of officers from the group claimed that they had been ordered to kill the prominent Russian oligarch Boris Berezovsky. The unit was disbanded, and Nikolai Kovalyov, then the FSB director, was fired.

This volatile and imperfect system hobbled along through the last of Yeltsin's years in power. In the year before he resigned, Yeltsin appointed Vladimir Putin, who had served as a KGB agent in East Germany, to serve as the new director of the FSB. The late 1990s were a time of upheaval in Russia. In 1998, Russia defaulted on its debt and devalued the ruble, causing a financial crisis that bankrupted millions of people and cast doubt on the Western capitalist model. Russians wanted to find simple answers, and many looked for a strongman to replace Yeltsin, who was perceived to be a vacillating, weak character. This desire for decisive leadership came to a head in September 1999, when 216 people were killed in a bombing in two Moscow apartment

buildings. Putin, whom Yeltsin had by then tapped to be prime minister, pointed the finger at the Chechens, vowing to "rub them out in the outhouse." He launched a new military offensive in Chechnya, and such tough action immediately vaulted him to popularity.

With Putin's rise, rumors began to circulate that the Kremlin was preparing to recombine all the parts of the former KGB into one agency. Such talk seemed to be coming true, at least at first, as the heads of the various Russian secret services under Yeltsin lost their posts one after the other. In December 1998, Alexander Starovoitov, founder of the communications agency, was forced out; in February 1999, Sergei Almazov, creator of the tax police, resigned under pressure; in April 2000, Vyacheslav Trubnikov, the director of foreign intelligence, stepped down.

A round of major bureaucratic reorganization followed. In March 2003, Putin, then president, signed a decree that merged the border guards into the FSB, divided the communications agency between the FSB and the Federal Protective Service, and turned the tax police into a state antidrug agency to be headed by Viktor Cherkesov, a former KGB officer and one of Putin's close friends. In this reshuffling, the FSB came out with the upper hand over the Interior Ministry—which combines the functions of a national police force with an investigative department similar to the FBI—as FSB counterintelligence officers were placed in key posts in the ministry. Although the stated purpose of placing FSB officers inside the ministry was to strengthen discipline and morale inside the corrupted ministry, the larger purpose was clear: broadening the control of the FSB. Later in 2003, Putin appointed Rashid Nurgaliev, an FSB officer and close friend of Patrushev (then the head of the FSB), as minister of internal affairs. Finally, the Kremlin reinstated the FSB as the warden of army morale, giving the agency the responsibility of guarding against potential mutiny in the military. The agency's advancement did not always come through absorption, however. When it could not wholly subsume the SVR, for example, it created its own department for gathering foreign intelligence and operating abroad. In this way, the FSB entered the field previously dominated by the foreign intelligence service and military intelligence.

Putin made his mark on the FSB in other ways, too. In 2006, he changed the color of the uniforms worn by members of the Russian

security services from green to black. Putin's decision was driven by historical symbolism—a nod to a moment during the Russian Civil War when the White Army, losing its fight against the Bolsheviks, found inspiration by creating units comprised of officers dressed in black uniforms. They were strictly religious and wore black tunics as a symbol of their scorn for earthly goods.

Indeed, the FSB and the Russian Orthodox Church have been moving closer in recent years. In December 2002, the Cathedral of Saint Sophia was reopened just off Lubyanka Square, a block away from the FSB's headquarters (it had been closed by Soviet authorities in the 1930s). Patriarch Aleksei II himself blessed the opening of the cathedral in a ceremony attended by then FSB chief Patrushev. Although it was a target of the KGB in Soviet times, the Russian Orthodox Church has always been closely connected with the state. The tsar was the head of the church; Russia's brand of Orthodoxy is based on the notion that Moscow is "the Third Rome" (after ancient Rome and Constantinople) and on a belief in Russian "uniqueness." As part of this uniqueness, today's Russia sees itself as surrounded by numerous enemies—which must be combated by the FSB. In some cases, the fears of the church and the fears of the FSB align: in 2002, for example, five Catholic priests were expelled from Russia by the FSB, some of them accused of espionage. The FSB protects the Orthodox sphere of influence against Western proselytizing, and in return the church blesses the Russian security services in their struggle with enemies of the state. In short, after a few years of Putin's reign, the FSB had evolved into something more powerful and more frightening than the Soviet KGB—it had become an agency whose scope, under the aegis of a veteran KGB officer, extended well beyond the bounds of its predecessor.

SOMEBODY'S WATCHING ME

In Soviet times, political investigations were carried out by the infamous Fifth Chief Directorate of the KGB, which was created in 1967 under KGB Chair Andropov and comprised 15 separate departments. The first department infiltrated trade unions, the second planned operations against émigré organizations that were critical of the Soviet Union,

the third worked among students, and so on. In the middle of perestroika, in an effort to improve its image, the Fifth Chief Directorate was renamed the Directorate to Defend the Constitutional System (known as Directorate Z). However, it did not survive the fall of the Soviet Union and was eliminated in September 1991. Even so, its experienced officers remained on active duty in Russia's post-Soviet security services.

The FSB resurrected the unit in 1998, creating the Directorate for Protection of the Constitution. In an interview that year, its chief, Gennadiy Zotov, described his group's role: "The state pursued the goal of creating a subunit 'specialized' in fighting threats to the security of the Russian Federation in the sociopolitical sphere." He went on to say that the Russian state "has always devoted special attention to the protection of the country from internal sedition, for internal sedition has always been more terrible for Russia than any military invasion." To date, this is the most honest and open comment made by any FSB official on the FSB's motives for carrying out political investigations of prominent journalists, human rights activists, and opposition politicians.

In 2008, it was discovered that the Moscow regional directorate of the FSB was involved in penetrating the United Civil Front, a liberal political group that champions democratic electoral procedures and is led by the chess legend Garry Kasparov. Although Kasparov had only a few thousand followers, the FSB considered him to be an agent of the West who might be used by hostile foreign forces to overthrow the regime in Moscow. The revelation came in February 2008, when a Russian man named Alexander Novikov fled to Denmark, where he applied for political asylum. In Copenhagen, he told journalists that he was recruited by the FSB in 2006 to penetrate the United Civil Front. He said that he had become an active member of the United Civil Front's Moscow branch. Indeed, records, interviews, and photographs show that he had taken part in numerous demonstrations and pickets organized by the group. Novikov insisted that he had played an important role in helping the FSB disrupt Kasparov's political activities—for example, by informing the FSB about where Kasparov planned to hold public meetings to obtain signatures to become a candidate in the 2008 presidential election. In December 2007, the Kasparov group was blocked without explanation from renting a theater hall in Moscow; other venues similarly refused Kasparov and his supporters.

Whereas the Soviet police state tried to control every citizen in the country, the new and more sophisticated Russian system is far more selective.

The 2008 election was, of course, won by Putin's handpicked successor, Dmitry Medvedev. Despite this handover of power, the Kremlin's

efforts to maintain the political status quo have been challenged by the ongoing economic crisis. In response, the state has intensified its efforts to control the opposition. In September 2008, Medvedev changed the structure of the Interior Ministry, disbanding the department dedicated to fighting organized crime and terrorism and creating a new department charged with countering extremism. Overnight, thousands of experienced police officers accustomed to dealing with bandits and terrorists were redirected to hunt down a new enemy: "extremists," a term that the Russian state uses to describe not only groups organized around racial or religious hatred but also opposition movements and independent trade unions.

In April 2009, Yuri Kokov, the head of the new department, explained the reasons for the reform at a public meeting: "The operative situation might get worse under the conditions of the global crisis, [with] deterioration of the social and economic situation." In other words, any expressions of public discontent fell under the purview of the security services and could be combated accordingly. That same month, the head of the independent trade union at the Avtovaz car factory in the town of Tolyatti announced that he had been summoned to the prosecutor's office for "explanations about actions aimed at overthrowing the existing order." He had been questioned earlier by local Interior Ministry officials. His was not an isolated case: in June 2009 in St. Petersburg, police detained six protesters—real estate investors claiming they had been defrauded—and warned them that they ran the risk of being labeled "extremists." Russian bloggers have similarly been targeted. In March 2009, Dmitry Soloviev, a leader of the youth opposition group Oborona in Kemerovo, Siberia, faced criminal charges for criticizing the FSB on his blog. Experts called by the prosecution alleged that Soloviev's writing "incites hatred, hostility and degrades a social group of people—the police and the FSB." (The charges were eventually dropped.) Savva Terentyev, a 22-year-old blogger from the Komi Republic, received a one-year suspended sentence for posting a comment critical of law enforcement officers on the blog of a local journalist in March 2008.

Russia's security services have also been working on compiling an electronic database that will track everything from video surveillance to details about purchases of plane and train tickets to fingerprint

records. At the same time, the Interior Ministry has begun to develop a database of "extremists"—a large storehouse of information that someday could be used in a criminal investigation. The system should be completed by November 2010, officials say, and will allow the Interior Ministry, the FSB, and the Federal Protective Service to share information. Moscow's expanded surveillance efforts seem to be directly at odds with the spirit of the 1993 Russian constitution, which protects privacy rights, including the privacy of personal correspondence.

Whereas the Soviet police state tried to control every citizen in the country, the new and more sophisticated Russian system is far more selective—it targets only those individuals who have political ambitions or strong antigovernment views. Nonetheless, Russia's growing surveillance state, led by the FSB and the Interior Ministry, reveals a regime that is less interested in the goals of civil society and more concerned with maintaining rigid control. As Lyudmila Alekseeva, head of the human rights organization the Moscow Helsinki Group, put it, "There is a sense of déjà vu: the practice of surveillance of dissidents is back, taking people off trains, preventing conversations. The practice not only returned, but is enriched with new means of pressure on the people."

ALL IN THE FAMILY

In the days of the KGB, the rank and file received bonuses and free apartments, sidestepping long waiting lists. High-ranking officers were chauffeured in official black Volgas and qualified for country homes on the elite Rublyovka Road. But it was well understood by the recipients of these privileges that they were only good as long as one held on to one's position. The real owner of the dachas and the cars was the KGB itself. Agents, first and foremost, were servants of the state.

In the years after the Soviet collapse, the country's security officers once again developed a taste for luxury. They were awarded titles to the spacious country homes once managed by the KGB and drove around Moscow in black Mercedes and BMWs equipped with special license plates and sirens that allowed them to cut through the city's notorious traffic jams. Yet unlike in Soviet times, it was the FSB officers themselves—and not the state—who were the ultimate owners.

When Putin came to power, he offered current and former officers from Russia's security services the chance to move to the top echelons of power, enjoying not just comfortable perks but real influence. Putin hoped, perhaps, that opening the doors of the most powerful institutions of the country to security agents would allow them to form a vanguard of stability and order. Under Putin's reign, the ranks of such officers entering government and business swelled. Sergei Ivanov, who had served in the foreign intelligence branch of the KGB, for example, became deputy prime minister; Viktor Ivanov, another former KGB agent, became deputy chief of administration of the Kremlin. The telecommunications business of the huge Russian commercial empire Alfa Group, meanwhile, was headed by Anatoly Protsenko, the former deputy director of the Federal Protective Service. Vladimir Yakunin, a former Soviet intelligence officer, became president of Russian Railways, one of the world's largest railroad networks.

The perks afforded FSB employees offered significant means of personal advancement. Russia's new security officers were more than simply servants of the state; they were landed property owners and powerful players, capable of influencing hiring decisions and planting cronies and relatives in positions of power.

But once they had tasted the benefits, the agents began to struggle among themselves for the spoils. They failed to create a new elite capable of ruling the country—they are not, it should be said, a junta united by common perspectives on Russia's present and future. Their motives are much more personal. Although Patrushev may toy with phrases such as "new nobility," the members of the Russian security services—having been granted a free hand by Putin—have quickly moved to pursue their private interests, whether they be political or economic. Agents who were once colleagues in the KGB and took pride in its glorious past have found themselves in fierce competition with one another for influence and budgets.

In an open letter published in October 2007, Cherkesov, the head of Russia's antidrug agency, claimed that many of the best and brightest in the ranks of the KGB went on to make their own fortunes elsewhere and were now turning on one another in fierce competition. "Today," he warned, "experts and journalists started to talk about the 'war of groups'

inside secret services. In this war there can be no winners. . . . The caste is destroying itself from within, when warriors become traders."

Agents of the Russian security services tend to favor state-controlled capitalism with a high degree of regulation. It is no accident that as the Soviet Union collapsed and Russia plunged into a new capitalist system, few KGB officers emerged as business leaders. They were outflanked by younger and fleeter hustlers: a new breed of oligarchs. Instead, KGB veterans found their calling in the second and third tiers of the new business structure, often running the security departments of the tycoons' empires.

This hierarchy remains in place today: although many high-ranking FSB officers have benefited personally from the rise in commodity prices, the state has not attempted a large-scale renationalization program, and the main beneficiaries remain Russia's oligarchs. Indeed, the Kremlin appears willing to appease the FSB only until such a course threatens Moscow's economic interests. In April 2010, Yuri Trutnev, Russia's minister of natural resources, admitted that the production of shale gas by competitors is a "problem" for the state-run gas giant Gazprom. New hydraulic fracturing technology has made the shale gas that lies underneath many European countries more accessible, threatening Russia's grip on European energy supplies: member states in the EU receive about a quarter of their gas from Russia, with Poland especially dependent on Russian imports. But energy experts estimate that Poland is sitting on vast reserves of unconventional shale gas and now finds itself being courted by Western energy giants such as ExxonMobil and Chevron.

Trutnev's statement marked the change in Russia's policy toward Poland. Afraid of what energy independence might allow an adversarial government in Warsaw, Moscow has quickly moved to court its longtime rival. In April, Putin attended a memorial ceremony commemorating the 1940 Katyn massacre—an issue that has been a thorn in the side of Polish-Russian relations for decades—accompanied by Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk. (Polish President Lech Kaczynski was flying to another commemoration when his plane crashed in the forest near Smolensk, killing 97 Polish dignitaries.) Such a gesture from the Kremlin would have been unthinkable a year before. That same month, as part of Moscow's warming relations

Return to Table of Contents

COUNCIL *on* FOREIGN RELATIONS

New Independent Task Force Report

"The United States must seek to resolve rather than simply manage the challenge posed by a nuclear North Korea."

U.S. Policy Toward the Korean Peninsula

Charles L. Pritchard and
John H. Tilelli Jr., *Chairs*
Scott A. Snyder, *Project Director*

As tensions persist on the Korean Peninsula, a CFR-sponsored Independent Task Force warns that North Korea's continued provocations pose a serious threat to its neighbors and that its nuclear weapons program must be stopped. In its report, the Task Force, chaired by former special envoy for negotiations with North Korea Charles L. "Jack" Pritchard and former commander of UN Command/U.S. Forces Korea John H. Tilelli Jr., calls for an internationally coordinated response to the risk posed by North Korea, enabled by close U.S.-South Korea relations and China's cooperation and active engagement.

978-0-87609-475-4 • 96 pages • $15.00
Read this report at www.cfr.org/korea_task_force.

with Warsaw, Medvedev handed over 67 volumes of Soviet documents on the Katyn massacre to Poland—another unprecedented move.

The FSB can hardly be content with such a dramatic change of policy: those who killed Polish officers are still praised as war heroes at headquarters. In 2008, the FSB's regional department in Tver published a history of the department that depicted the major in charge of Tver's World War II–era NKVD—an early predecessor to the KGB—as an effective German spy catcher. But his department was also responsible for the execution of 6,000 Polish officers in the Ostashkov camp in the spring of 1940. The reports on the executions were signed personally by the NKVD major, yet no mention of this appeared in the book. But in the end, it was the interests of Gazprom and not the FSB that played the decisive role for the Kremlin.

THE PARANOID STYLE IN RUSSIAN POLITICS

THE OFFICERS who stayed with the FSB (and its predecessors) throughout the turbulent 1990s believed that the West had supported radical democrats who had split up the KGB and weakened the security services and the country. These officers have a provincial and inward-looking perspective, rooted in the FSB's organizational structure. The FSB comprises two unequal parts: its headquarters in Moscow, with a staff of a few thousand, and its regional offices, which employ hundreds of thousands. The structure of these regional directorates has remained largely unchanged for decades, which, when combined with the FSB's system of personnel rotation, means that the fossilized provincial state security offices shape the FSB from within. FSB officers are moved from one regional bureau to another and are eventually offered positions at FSB headquarters. For them, the KGB is still the ideal security service, lost in Russia's transition to democracy.

The FSB's skeptical and xenophobic outlook has helped shape Russia's approach to the West. The suspicions at FSB headquarters of the West were inflamed by a series of "color revolutions," which, between 2000 and 2005, toppled authoritarian regimes in Serbia, Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan. The FSB viewed these events as Western concoctions and became increasingly paranoid that Russia and its political allies in the region would be next. In an attempt to justify its role as the protector

of the state, the FSB has played on the Kremlin's fears, blaming foreign intelligence services for, among other things, supporting Russia's NGOs, which by the middle years of the last decade were the only remaining source of scrutiny over the Russian authorities. The FSB-led crackdown against the country's NGOs has created a paucity of independent information on government policy.

At the same time, the FSB has desperately tried to win the support of Central Asian governments. Moscow views the presence of U.S. and NATO forces in the region as a continuation of the nineteenth-century's Great Game. With the FSB taking the lead, the Kremlin has deliberately turned Russia into a hunting ground for the security services of the most authoritarian regimes in Central Asia.

To date, Russia's security services have failed to find an effective way to deal with terrorism.

Beginning in the mid-1990s, Russia had become a safe haven for the political opponents of Central Asia's dictators. Taking advantage of porous borders and using their old but still valid Soviet passports, a number of refugees, political opponents, and Islamic activists flowed into Russia, arriving from Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.

Then, in 2004, under the auspices of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization—an international group founded in 2001 by China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan—Russia led the call for the hunt for separatists and political opponents who posed a threat to the regimes of the SCO's member states. In just one example, Mahmadruzi Iskandarov, the former head of Tajikistan's state gas company, who later challenged the regime in Dushanbe, disappeared in Moscow in 2005 and later turned up in a prison camp back in Tajikistan—Tajik authorities claimed that he had been handed over by Russian security services. Other countries have benefited more from this arrangement than has Russia: although Russia has extradited dozens of people accused of extremism or terrorism to Central Asian states since 2004, it has not received anyone on its own wanted list.

The largest security challenge of all—for both the FSB and Russia as a whole—has been the tide of terrorist attacks originating in the

North Caucasus. In 2002, FSB troops stormed the Dubrovka Theater in Moscow, where Chechen terrorists were holding several hundred hostages. In the rescue operation, more than 100 hostages died, most from the fentanyl gas pumped into the theater by FSB operatives. The FSB called the storming of the theater a victory, hoping to stave off the next calamity. But during the next attack, two years later, at a school in Beslan, the leadership of the security services failed to take decisive action—indeed, failed to even arrive at the scene. Patrushev, then the FSB director, and Nurgaliev, the minister of internal affairs, did not make it any farther than the airport in Beslan before flying back to Moscow.

Russia's security services appear to have miscalculated the nature of the enemy in the battle against terrorism. Faced with guerrilla warfare, the security services responded in kind, carrying out operations to eliminate a generation of Chechen warlords and leaders, including Aslan Maskhadov, Shamil Basayev, and Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev. But when these leaders were wiped out, new ones took their place. The FSB makes paranoid claims about the involvement of Western intelligence services in the activities of Russia's Islamic rebels, spoiling the chance that these services could actually help Moscow find and extradite those militants who have fled Russia. As a result, Putin's secret services have turned to assassinations abroad, such as the killing of Yandarbiyev in Qatar in 2004. These killings have seriously damaged Russia's reputation, and its hand is now suspected every time a Kremlin opponent is killed abroad. Indeed, the high-profile poisoning of the former FSB agent Alexander Litvinenko in London in 2006 severely damaged British-Russian relations—four British diplomats were expelled from Moscow, and the two countries suspended cooperation on counterterrorism.

To date, Russia's security services have failed to find an effective way to deal with terrorism—a failure that was underscored once again in March 2010, when two female suicide bombers detonated explosives on Moscow's subway during rush hour. The bombings raised anew an important question that had been asked following the Dubrovka siege and the Beslan massacre: If the secret services have been given so much support by the Kremlin in the name of providing security, why did they fail to prevent such a tragedy?

Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan

DARK KNIGHTS

When Putin was elected president, in 2000, the security services, and chiefly the FSB, rose to prominence with him. They were hoping for a resurrection from the long decade of the 1990s, when they had felt left out of the tumultuous new capitalist economy and post-Soviet Russia's uncertain politics. Putin, who had been an officer in the KGB for 16 years, effectively invited the security services to take their place at the head table of power and prestige in Russia.

But this invitation to join the country's post-Soviet nobility failed to bring the expected results. The FSB hunted down foreign spies, but the unseemly methods it used raised questions about whether the threat was real or trumped up. Likewise, the FSB targeted NGOs out of fear that such groups might inspire a popular revolution against the Kremlin. This was a clear miscalculation; the organizations in question were too small to be significant threats and did not command widespread support.

The FSB was supposed to be a cog in the machinery of a state governed by the rule of law. But the rule of law remains a distant goal in today's Russia, where the security services have concluded that their interests, and those of the state they are guarding, remain above the law. The mindset of Russia's security services has undeniably been shaped by tsarist and Soviet history: they are suspicious, inward looking, and clannish.

Although Putin awarded high-ranking security officers more privileges and benefits, they retreated from risk and responsibility and thus proved less than effective in their duties, leading to lasting questions about their role in Russia's future. If Medvedev is serious about modernizing Russia and ending what he calls the "legal nihilism" that has run wild in recent years, he will need defenders of the state who are in tune with this goal, not security services deeply mired in the past.

Defending a New Domain

The Pentagon's Cyberstrategy

William J. Lynn III

In 2008, the U.S. Department of Defense suffered a significant compromise of its classified military computer networks. It began when an infected flash drive was inserted into a U.S. military laptop at a base in the Middle East. The flash drive's malicious computer code, placed there by a foreign intelligence agency, uploaded itself onto a network run by the U.S. Central Command. That code spread undetected on both classified and unclassified systems, establishing what amounted to a digital beachhead, from which data could be transferred to servers under foreign control. It was a network administrator's worst fear: a rogue program operating silently, poised to deliver operational plans into the hands of an unknown adversary.

This previously classified incident was the most significant breach of U.S. military computers ever, and it served as an important wake-up call. The Pentagon's operation to counter the attack, known as Operation Buckshot Yankee, marked a turning point in U.S. cyber-defense strategy.

Over the past ten years, the frequency and sophistication of intrusions into U.S. military networks have increased exponentially. Every day, U.S. military and civilian networks are probed thousands of times and scanned millions of times. And the 2008 intrusion that led to Operation Buckshot Yankee was not the only successful penetration. Adversaries have acquired thousands of files from U.S. networks and

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William J. Lynn III is U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense.

from the networks of U.S. allies and industry partners, including weapons blueprints, operational plans, and surveillance data.

As the scale of cyberwarfare's threat to U.S. national security and the U.S. economy has come into view, the Pentagon has built layered and robust defenses around military networks and inaugurated the new U.S. Cyber Command to integrate cyberdefense operations across the military. The Pentagon is now working with the Department of Homeland Security to protect government networks and critical infrastructure and with the United States' closest allies to expand these defenses internationally. An enormous amount of foundational work remains, but the U.S. government has begun putting in place various initiatives to defend the United States in the digital age.

THE THREAT ENVIRONMENT

Information technology enables almost everything the U.S. military does: logistical support and global command and control of forces, real-time provision of intelligence, and remote operations. Every one of these functions depends heavily on the military's global communications backbone, which consists of 15,000 networks and seven million computing devices across hundreds of installations in dozens of countries. More than 90,000 people work full time to maintain it. In less than a generation, information technology in the military has evolved from an administrative tool for enhancing office productivity into a national strategic asset in its own right. The U.S. government's digital infrastructure now gives the United States critical advantages over any adversary, but its reliance on computer networks also potentially enables adversaries to gain valuable intelligence about U.S. capabilities and operations, to impede the United States' conventional military forces, and to disrupt the U.S. economy. In developing a strategy to counter these dangers, the Pentagon is focusing on a few central attributes of the cyberthreat.

First, cyberwarfare is asymmetric. The low cost of computing devices means that U.S. adversaries do not have to build expensive weapons, such as stealth fighters or aircraft carriers, to pose a significant threat to U.S. military capabilities. A dozen determined computer programmers can, if they find a vulnerability to exploit, threaten the United States'

global logistics network, steal its operational plans, blind its intelligence capabilities, or hinder its ability to deliver weapons on target. Knowing this, many militaries are developing offensive capabilities in cyberspace, and more than 100 foreign intelligence organizations are trying to break into U.S. networks. Some governments already have the capacity to disrupt elements of the U.S. information infrastructure.

In cyberspace, the offense has the upper hand. The Internet was designed to be collaborative and rapidly expandable and to have low barriers to technological innovation; security and identity management were lower priorities. For these structural reasons, the U.S. government's ability to defend its networks always lags behind its adversaries' ability to exploit U.S. networks' weaknesses. Adept programmers will find vulnerabilities and overcome security measures put in place to prevent intrusions. In an offense-dominant environment, a fortress mentality will not work. The United States cannot retreat behind a Maginot Line of firewalls or it will risk being overrun. Cyberwarfare is like maneuver warfare, in that speed and agility matter most. To stay ahead of its pursuers, the United States must constantly adjust and improve its defenses.

Cold War deterrence models do not apply to cyberspace, where it is so difficult to identify an attack's perpetrator.

It must also recognize that traditional Cold War deterrence models of assured retaliation do not apply to cyberspace, where it is difficult and time consuming to identify an attack's perpetrator. Whereas a missile comes with a return address, a computer virus generally does not. The forensic work necessary to identify an attacker may take months, if identification is possible at all. And even when the attacker is identified, if it is a nonstate actor, such as a terrorist group, it may have no assets against which the United States can retaliate. Furthermore, what constitutes an attack is not always clear. In fact, many of today's intrusions are closer to espionage than to acts of war. The deterrence equation is further muddled by the fact that cyberattacks often originate from co-opted servers in neutral countries and that responses to them could have unintended consequences.

Given these circumstances, deterrence will necessarily be based more on denying any benefit to attackers than on imposing costs through

retaliation. The challenge is to make the defenses effective enough to deny an adversary the benefit of an attack despite the strength of offensive tools in cyberspace. (Traditional arms control regimes would likely fail to deter cyberattacks because of the challenges of attribution, which make verification of compliance almost impossible. If there are to be international norms of behavior in cyberspace, they may have to follow a different model, such as that of public health or law enforcement.)

Cyberthreats to U.S. national security are not limited to military targets. Hackers and foreign governments are increasingly able to launch sophisticated intrusions into the networks that control critical civilian infrastructure. Computer-induced failures of U.S. power grids, transportation networks, or financial systems could cause massive physical damage and economic disruption. Such infrastructure is also essential to the military, both abroad and at home: coordinating the deployment and resupply of U.S. troops and equipping troops with goods from private vendors necessarily requires using unclassified networks that are linked to the open Internet. Protecting those networks and the networks that undergird critical U.S. infrastructure must be part of Washington's national security and homeland defense missions.

The cyberthreat posed to intellectual property may prove to be the most significant one facing Washington.

Modern information technology also increases the risk of industrial espionage and the theft of commercial information. Earlier this year, Google disclosed that it had lost intellectual property as a result of a sophisticated operation perpetrated against its corporate infrastructure, an operation that also targeted dozens of other companies. Although the threat to intellectual property is less dramatic than the threat to critical national infrastructure, it may be the most significant cyberthreat that the United States will face over the long term. Every year, an amount of intellectual property many times larger than all the intellectual property contained in the Library of Congress is stolen from networks maintained by U.S. businesses, universities, and government agencies. As military strength ultimately depends on economic vitality, sustained intellectual property losses could erode both the United States' military effectiveness and its competitiveness in the global economy.

Computer networks themselves are not the only vulnerability. Software and hardware are at risk of being tampered with even before they are linked together in an operational system. Rogue code, including so-called logic bombs, which cause sudden malfunctions, can be inserted into software as it is being developed. As for hardware, remotely operated "kill switches" and hidden "backdoors" can be written into the computer chips used by the military, allowing outside actors to manipulate the systems from afar. The risk of compromise in the manufacturing process is very real and is perhaps the least understood cyberthreat. Tampering is almost impossible to detect and even harder to eradicate. Already, counterfeit hardware has been detected in systems that the Defense Department has procured. The Pentagon's Trusted Foundries Progam, which certifies parts produced by microelectronics manufacturers, is a good start, but it is not a comprehensive solution to the risks to the department's technological base. Microsoft and other computer technology companies have developed sophisticated risk-mitigation strategies to detect malicious code and deter its insertion into their global supply chains; the U.S. government needs to undertake a similar effort for critical civilian and military applications.

The United States rarely predicts accurately when and where military conflicts will occur. Predicting cyberattacks is also proving difficult, especially since both state and nonstate actors pose threats. More important, given that information technology is evolving rapidly, policymakers are left with little historical precedent to inform their expectations. Thus, the U.S. government must be modest about its ability to know where and how this threat might mature; what it needs is a strategy that provides operational flexibility and capabilities that offer maximum adaptability.

NEW STRATEGY

As a doctrinal matter, the Pentagon has formally recognized cyberspace as a new domain of warfare. Although cyberspace is a man-made domain, it has become just as critical to military operations as land, sea, air, and space. As such, the military must be able to defend and operate within it. To facilitate operations in cyberspace, the Defense

Department needs an appropriate organizational structure. For the past several years, the military's cyberdefense effort was run by a loose confederation of joint task forces dispersed both geographically and institutionally. In June 2009, recognizing that the scale of the effort to protect cyberspace had outgrown the military's existing structures, Defense Secretary Robert Gates ordered the consolidation of the task forces into a single four-star command, the U.S. Cyber Command, which began operations in May 2010 as part of the U.S. Strategic Command. Cyber Command is slated to become fully operational by October.

Cyber Command has three missions. First, it leads the day-to-day protection of all defense networks and supports military and counterterrorism missions with operations in cyberspace. Second, it provides a clear and accountable way to marshal cyberwarfare resources from across the military. A single chain of command runs from the U.S. president to the secretary of defense to the commander of Strategic Command to the commander of Cyber Command and on to individual military units around the world. To ensure that considerations of cybersecurity are a regular part of training and equipping soldiers, Cyber Command oversees commands within each branch of the military, including the Army Forces Cyber Command, the U.S. Navy's Tenth Fleet, the 24th Air Force, and the Marine Corps Forces Cyberspace Command. Because military networks are not impervious to attack, a critical part of the training mission is to ensure that all operational forces are able to function in a degraded information environment.

The new U.S. Cyber Command will be fully operational by October.

Cyber Command's third mission is to work with a variety of partners inside and outside the U.S. government. Representatives from the FBI, the Department of Homeland Security, the Justice Department, and the Defense Information Systems Agency work on-site at Cyber Command's Fort Meade headquarters, as do liaison officers from the intelligence community and from allied governments. In partnership with the Department of Homeland Security, Cyber Command also works closely with private industry to share information about threats and to address shared vulnerabilities. Information networks connect a variety of institutions, so the effort to defend the United States will

only succeed if it is coordinated across the government, with allies, and with partners in the commercial sector.

Given the dominance of offense in cyberspace, U.S. defenses need to be dynamic. Milliseconds can make a difference, so the U.S. military must respond to attacks as they happen or even before they arrive. To grapple with this, the Pentagon has deployed a system that includes three overlapping lines of defense. Two are based on commercial best practices—ordinary computer hygiene, which keeps security software and firewalls up to date, and sensors, which detect and map intrusions. The third line of protection leverages government intelligence capabilities to provide highly specialized active defenses. And the government is deploying all these defenses in a way that meets its obligation to protect the civil liberties of U.S. citizens.

The National Security Agency has pioneered systems that, using warnings provided by U.S. intelligence capabilities, automatically deploy defenses to counter intrusions in real time. Part sensor, part sentry, part sharpshooter, these active defense systems represent a fundamental shift in the U.S. approach to network defense. They work by placing scanning technology at the interface of military networks and the open Internet to detect and stop malicious code before it passes into military networks. Active defenses now protect all defense and intelligence networks in the ".mil" domain.

Because some intrusions will inevitably evade detection and not be caught at the boundary, U.S. cyberdefenses must be able to find intruders once they are inside. This requires being able to hunt within the military's own networks—a task that is also part of the Pentagon's active defense capability.

Active defense has been made possible by consolidating the Defense Department's collective cyberdefense capabilities under a single roof and by linking them with the signals intelligence needed to anticipate intrusions and attacks. Establishing this linkage was one of the most important reasons for the creation of Cyber Command.

The speed at which active defense systems must act means that the rules of engagement governing network defense must be set largely in advance. Devising these protocols is not easy. Indeed, the effort to define clear rules of engagement for responding to cyberattacks has been exceedingly difficult, and for good reason. These rules of

engagement will first have to assist in distinguishing between the exploits of a mere hacker, criminal activity (such as fraud or theft), espionage, and an attack on the United States. They will then have to determine what action is necessary, appropriate, proportional, and justified in each particular case based on the laws that govern action in times of war and peace.

The best-laid plans for defending military networks will matter little if civilian infrastructure—which could be directly targeted in a military conflict or held hostage and used as a bargaining chip against the U.S. government—is not secure. The Defense Department depends on the overall information technology infrastructure of the United States. For example, it relies on many outside networks in the ".gov" and ".com" domains, including those run by defense contractors that are not protected as effectively as the military's own network. The Department of Homeland Security has the lead in protecting the ".gov" and ".com" domains, but the Pentagon must leverage its ten years of concerted investment in cyberdefense to support broader efforts to protect critical infrastructure.

Critical infrastructure could be targeted directly in a conflict or be held hostage as a bargaining chip against the U.S. government.

The U.S. government has only just begun to broach the larger question of whether it is necessary and appropriate to use national resources, such as the defenses that now guard military networks, to protect civilian infrastructure. Policymakers need to consider, among other things, applying the National Security Agency's defense capabilities beyond the ".gov" domain, such as to domains that undergird the commercial defense industry. U.S. defense contractors have already been targeted for intrusion, and sensitive weapons systems have been compromised. The Pentagon is therefore working with the Department of Homeland Security and the private sector to look for innovative ways to use the military's cyberdefense capabilities to protect the defense industry.

Given the global nature of the Internet, U.S. allies also play a critical role in cyberdefense. The more signatures of an attack one can see, and the more intrusions one can trace, the better one's defenses will be. In this way, the construct of shared warning—a core Cold War doctrine—applies to cyberspace. Just as the United States' air and space defenses

are linked with those of allies to provide warning of an attack from the sky, so, too, can the United States and its allies cooperatively monitor computer networks for intrusions.

Some of the United States' computer defenses are already linked with those of U.S. allies, especially through existing signals intelligence partnerships, but greater levels of cooperation are needed to stay ahead of the cyberthreat. Stronger agreements to facilitate the sharing of information, technology, and intelligence must be made with a greater number of allies. The report *NATO 2020*, a NATO-commissioned study chaired by former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, rightly identified the need for the alliance's new "strategic concept" to further incorporate cyberdefense. The U.S. government must ensure that NATO moves more resources to cyberdefense so the member states can defend networks integral to the alliance's operations.

LEVERAGING DOMINANCE

The United States enjoys unparalleled technological resources, and it can marshal its advantages to create superior military capabilities in cyberspace. The Pentagon has already begun to explore how major companies can help the public sector address the cyberthreat. Through a public-private partnership called the Enduring Security Framework, the chief executive officers and chief technology officers of major information technology and defense companies now meet regularly with top officials from the Department of Homeland Security, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and the Department of Defense.

The U.S. government's research and development institutions have also turned their attention to cybersecurity. One of the more important innovations to emerge is the National Cyber Range program, developed by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). Although the U.S. military routinely exercises units on target ranges and in a variety of simulations, the Pentagon has had no such capability when it comes to cyberwarfare. This is why DARPA, which helped invent the Internet decades ago, is developing the National Cyber Range—in effect, a model of the Internet—which will allow the military to test its cyberdefense

capabilities before fielding them. Simulations are also relevant to understanding malicious software designed to infiltrate computer systems. The Department of Energy's national laboratories have developed computer farms that function as digital petri dishes, capturing live viruses from the Internet and observing how they spread. These training and diagnostic capabilities can help the United States stay ahead of its adversaries' innovative cyberweapons.

DARPA is pursuing even more fundamental research that may improve the government's ability to attribute attacks and blunt intruders' capabilities, thereby making cyberspace a less offense-dominant environment. The agency is also challenging the scientific community to rethink the basic design of the Pentagon's network architecture so that the military could redesign or retrofit hardware, operating systems, and computer languages with cybersecurity in mind. Complex information technology infrastructure will not change overnight, but over the course of a generation, the United States has a real opportunity to engineer its way out of some of the most problematic vulnerabilities of today's technology.

The government must also strengthen its human capital. The Pentagon has increased the number of its trained cybersecurity professionals and deepened their training. This includes a formal certification program that is graduating three times as many cybersecurity professionals annually as a few years ago. Following industry practices, the Pentagon's network administrators are now trained in "ethical hacking," which involves employing adversarial techniques against the United States' own systems in order to identify weaknesses before they are exploited by an enemy.

Even as the U.S. government strengthens its cadre of cybersecurity professionals, it must recognize that long-term trends in human capital do not bode well. The United States has only 4.5 percent of the world's population, and over the next 20 years, many countries, including China and India, will train more highly proficient computer scientists than will the United States. The United States will lose its advantage in cyberspace if that advantage is predicated on simply amassing trained cybersecurity professionals. The U.S. government, therefore, must confront the cyberdefense challenge as it confronts other military challenges: with a focus not on numbers but

on superior technology and productivity. High-speed sensors, advanced analytics, and automated systems will be needed to buttress the trained cybersecurity professionals in the U.S. military. And such tools will be available only if the U.S. commercial information technology sector remains the world's leader—something that will require continuing investments in science, technology, and education at all levels.

Making use of the private sector's innovative capacity will also require dramatic improvements in the government's procedures for acquiring information technology. On average, it takes the Pentagon 81 months to make a new computer system operational after it is first funded. Taking into the account the growth of computing power suggested by Moore's law, this means that by the time systems are delivered, they are already at least four generations behind the state of the art. By comparison, the iPhone was developed in 24 months. That is less time than it would take the Pentagon to prepare a budget and receive congressional approval for it.

It takes the Pentagon 81 months to make a new computer system operational once it is first funded. The iPhone was developed in just 24 months.

To replicate the dynamism of private industry, the Pentagon is developing a specific acquisition track for information technology. It is based on four principles. First, speed must be a critical priority. The Pentagon's acquisition process must match the technology development cycle. With information technology, this means cycles of 12 to 36 months, not seven or eight years. Second, the Pentagon must employ incremental development and testing rather than try to deploy large complex systems in one "big bang." Third, the U.S. military must be willing to sacrifice or defer some customization in order to achieve speedy incremental improvements. Fourth, the Defense Department's information technology needs—which range from modernizing nuclear command-and-control systems to updating word-processing software—demand different levels of oversight. An approach to information technology acquisition that embodies these principles is essential to the U.S. military's effectiveness when it comes to cyberdefense.

William J. Lynn III

ENTERING A NEW ERA

THE DAUNTING challenges of cybersecurity represent the beginning of a new technological age. In this early hour, the United States' greatest strength is its awareness of the transformation. Today's predicament calls to mind an urgent letter written to President Franklin Roosevelt on the eve of another new technological era. Dated August 2, 1939, it read in part, "Certain aspects of the situation which has arisen seem to call for watchfulness and, if necessary, quick action on the part of the Administration. I believe therefore that it is my duty to bring to your attention the following facts and recommendations." The letter was signed, "Yours very truly, Albert Einstein." Einstein's warning that breakthroughs in nuclear fission might make possible an atomic bomb led Roosevelt to launch the Manhattan Project, which helped prepare the United States for the atomic era.

The cyberthreat does not involve the existential implications ushered in by the nuclear age, but there are important similarities. Cyberattacks offer a means for potential adversaries to overcome overwhelming U.S. advantages in conventional military power and to do so in ways that are instantaneous and exceedingly hard to trace. Such attacks may not cause the mass casualties of a nuclear strike, but they could paralyze U.S. society all the same. In the long run, hackers' systematic penetration of U.S. universities and businesses could rob the United States of its intellectual property and competitive edge in the global economy.

These risks are what is driving the Pentagon to forge a new strategy for cybersecurity. The principal elements of that strategy are to develop an organizational construct for training, equipping, and commanding cyberdefense forces; to employ layered protections with a strong core of active defenses; to use military capabilities to support other departments' efforts to secure the networks that run the United States' critical infrastructure; to build collective defenses with U.S. allies; and to invest in the rapid development of additional cyberdefense capabilities. The goal of this strategy is to make cyberspace safe so that its revolutionary innovations can enhance both the United States' national security and its economic security.

Not Ready for Prime Time

Why Including Emerging Powers at the Helm Would Hurt Global Governance

Jorge G. Castañeda

Few matters generate as much consensus in international affairs today as the need to rebuild the world geopolitical order. Everyone seems to agree, at least in their rhetoric, that the makeup of the United Nations Security Council is obsolete and that the G-8 no longer includes all the world's most important economies. Belgium still has more voting power in the leading financial institutions than either China or India. New actors need to be brought in. But which ones? And what will be the likely results? If there is no doubt that a retooled international order would be far more representative of the distribution of power in the world today, it is not clear whether it would be better.

The major emerging powers, Brazil, Russia, India, and China, catchily labeled the BRICs by Goldman Sachs, are the main contenders for inclusion. There are other groupings, too: the G-5, the G-20, and the P-4; the last—Brazil, Germany, India, and Japan—are the wannabes that hope to join the UN Security Council and are named after the P-5, the council's permanent members (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States). Up for the G-8 are Brazil, China, India, Mexico, and South Africa. The G-8 invited representatives of those five states to its 2003 summit in Evian, France,

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and from 2005 through 2008, this so-called G-5 attended its own special sessions on the sidelines of the G-8's.

Others states also want in. Argentina, Egypt, Indonesia, Italy, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, and South Africa aspire to join the UN Security Council as permanent members, with or without a veto. But with little progress on UN reform, none of them has been accepted or rejected (although China is known to oppose admitting Japan and, to a lesser degree, India). After the G-8 accommodated the G-5, other states, generally those close to the countries hosting the summits, also started to join the proceedings on an ad hoc basis. When the global economic crisis struck in 2008, matters were institutionalized further. The finance ministers of the G-20 members had already been meeting regularly since 1999, but then the heads of state started participating. Today, the G-20 includes just about everybody who wishes to join it: the P-5 and the P-4, the G-8 and the G-5, as well as Argentina, Australia, the European Union, Indonesia, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, and Turkey. Still, despite the express wishes of some—and because of the tacit resentment of others—the G-20 has not replaced the G-8. Earlier this year, the smaller, more exclusive group met at a luxury resort in Muskoka, a lake district in Canada, while the larger assembly was treated to demonstrations and tear gas in downtown Toronto.

There is some overlap in this alphabet soup. France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States belong to both the P-5 and the G-8; China is in the P-5, the G-5, and the G-20; Brazil and India desperately want to join everything in sight. At the end of the day, the world's inner sanctum will be expanded to include only the few states that possess the ambition to enter it and at least one good reason for doing so—such as geographic, demographic, political, or economic heft. That means the shortlist boils down to Brazil, China, Germany, India, Japan, and South Africa.

BRIC-A-BRAC

THE CHIEF rationale for inviting these states to join the world's ruling councils is self-evident: they matter more today than they did when those bodies were created. India will soon be the most populous nation on earth, just before China. In current dollars, Japan is the world's second-

largest economy, with China and Germany gaining on it rapidly. Brazil combines demographic clout (it has about 200 million inhabitants) with economic power (a GDP of almost $1.6 trillion) and geographic legitimacy (Latin America must be represented), and in fact, it has already begun to play a greater role in international organizations such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Africa cannot be altogether excluded from the world's governing councils, and only South Africa can represent it effectively.

Germany and Japan are a case of their own. The two defeated powers of World War II already work closely with the permanent members of the UN Security Council (when it comes to policy having to do with Iran, for example, Germany acts together with the P-5, forming the P-6), and both belong to the Nuclear Suppliers Group, which promotes the enforcement of nuclear nonproliferation by monitoring exports of nuclear material, among other things. Germany is participating in the NATO operation in Afghanistan (as it did in the mission in Kosovo in the late 1990s); Japan supported the U.S.-led invasion and occupation of Iraq with logistical assistance on the high seas. The values and general conduct of these two highly developed democracies are indistinguishable from those of the powers already at the helm of international organizations. These states would thus provide additional clout and talent to the Security Council—the only membership at stake for them—if they joined it, but they would hardly transform it. Meanwhile, since including Germany and Japan and not others is unimaginable, for now they will have to accept the status quo: de facto participation in lieu of formal membership.

The argument for admitting Brazil, China, India, and South Africa to the helm rests on the general principle that the world's leadership councils should be broadened to include emerging powers. But unlike the case for Germany and Japan, this one raises some delicate questions. Over the past half century, a vast set of principles—the collective defense of democracy, nuclear nonproliferation, trade liberalization, international criminal justice, environmental protection, respect for human rights (including labor, religious, gender, ethnic, and indigenous peoples' rights)—have been enshrined in many international and regional treaties and agreements. Of course, this system is not without problems. A Eurocentric, Judeo-Christian tint pervades—a flaw one can acknowledge

without approving of female circumcision, child soldiers and child labor, or amputation as a punishment for robbery—and the Western powers have often flagrantly and hypocritically violated those values even while demanding that other states respect them.

The United States has been an especially reluctant participant in the current world order. It has opposed the International Criminal Court, the Kyoto Protocol, and the convention to ban antipersonnel land mines, and it has undermined progress in the Doha Round of international trade negotiations by refusing to suspend its agricultural subsidies. Still, the world is a better place today thanks to the councils and commissions, the sanctions and conditions that these values have spawned—from the human rights mechanisms of the UN, the European Union, and the Organization of American States (OAS) to the International Criminal Court; from the World Trade Organization to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT); from international cooperation on combating HIV/AIDS to the International Labor Organization's conventions on labor rights and the collective rights of indigenous peoples; from UN sanctions against apartheid in South Africa and the African Union's attempt to restore democracy in Zimbabwe to the OAS' condemnation of a military coup in Honduras.

Constructing this web of international norms has been slow and painful, with less overall progress and more frequent setbacks than some have wished for. Many countries of what used to be called the Third World have contributed to parts of the edifice: Mexico to disarmament and the law of the sea; Costa Rica to human rights; Chile to free trade. But now, the possible accession of Brazil, China, India, and South Africa to the inner sanctum of the world's leading institutions threatens to undermine those institutions' principles and practices.

WEAK LINKS

Brazil, China, India, and South Africa are not just weak supporters of the notion that a strong international regime should govern human rights, democracy, nonproliferation, trade liberalization, the environment, international criminal justice, and global health. They oppose it more or less explicitly, and more or less actively—even though at one time most of them joined the struggle for these values: India wrested its independence from the United Kingdom, South Africa

fought off apartheid, and Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (known as Lula) opposed the military dictatorship in Brazil.

Consider these states' positions on the promotion of democracy and human rights worldwide. Brazil, India, and South Africa are representative democracies that basically respect human rights at home, but when it comes to defending democracy and human rights outside their borders, there is not much difference between them and authoritarian China. On those questions, all four states remain attached to the rallying cries of their independence or national liberation struggles: sovereignty, self-determination, nonintervention, autonomous economic development. And today, these notions often contradict the values enshrined in the international order.

It is perfectly predictable that Beijing would support the regimes perpetuating oppression and tragedy in Myanmar (also known as Burma) and Sudan. The Chinese government has never respected human rights in China or Tibet, and it has always maintained that a state's sovereignty trumps everything else, both on principle and to ward off scrutiny of its own domestic policies. Now that China wants to secure access to Myanmar's natural gas and Sudan's oil, it has used its veto in the UN Security Council to block sanctions against those states' governments.

India's stance—to say nothing of Brazil's or South Africa's—is not much better. India once promoted democracy and human rights in Myanmar, but in the mid-1990s, after seeing few results, it started to moderate its tone. In 2007, when the military junta in Myanmar cracked down more violently than usual on opposition leaders, dissenters, and monks, New Delhi issued no criticism of the repression. It refused to condemn the latest trial and conviction of the opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi and opposed any sanctions on the regime, including those that the United States and the European Union have been enforcing since the mid-1990s. India has its reasons for responding this way—reasons that have little to do with human rights or democracy and everything to do with Myanmar's huge natural gas reserves; with getting the junta to shut down insurgent sanctuaries along India's northeastern border; and, most important, with making sure not to push the Myanmar regime into Beijing's hands. New Delhi's official support for what in 2007 it called "the undaunted resolve of the Burmese people to achieve democracy" has been more rhetorical than anything else.

India has also adopted a problematic approach toward refugees and Tamil Tiger ex-combatants in Sri Lanka. Today, a year after the civil war in Sri Lanka ended, more than 100,000 of the Tamil Tigers' supporters (and, by some accounts, as many as 290,000) remain in displaced persons camps that are virtual prisons. According to Human Rights Watch, India—together with Brazil, Cuba, and Pakistan—blocked a draft resolution by the UN Human Rights Council that would have condemned the situation; instead, it supported a statement commending the government of Mahinda Rajapaksa. New Delhi has been looking the other way, knowing full well that Sri Lanka would have bowed under pressure from India to allow displaced Sri Lankans to return home. There are perfectly logical explanations for India's stance, including the fact that India has its own social and political problems in the southern state of Tamil Nadu; the Indian politician Sonia Gandhi's husband, Rajiv, was assassinated there by a Tamil suicide bomber in 1991. New Delhi prefers to turn a blind eye toward the Sri Lankan government's violations of human rights rather than risk taking a principled stand on an issue too close to home.

One could argue, of course, that this kind of cynical pragmatism is exactly what the Western powers have practiced for decades, if not centuries. France and the United Kingdom in their former colonies, the United States in Latin America and the Middle East, even Germany in the Balkans—all readily sacrificed their noble principles on the altar of political expediency. But the purpose of creating a network of international institutions, intergovernmental covenants, and nongovernmental organizations to promote democracy and human rights was precisely to limit such great-power pragmatism, as well as to ensure that authoritarian regimes do not get away with committing abuses and that civil society everywhere is mobilized in defense of these values. India's stance does nothing more to advance these goals than does China's. In fact, given its prestige as the world's largest democracy and founder of the Non-Aligned Movement, it might be undercutting them even more when it fails to uphold them.

This last point is even truer for South Africa. No other African country enjoys such moral authority as South Africa does, thanks to Nelson Mandela's struggle against apartheid and his work on behalf of national reconciliation. But the African National Congress remains a socialist, anti-imperialist national liberation organization, and Mandela's

successors at the head of the party and the country, Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma, still basically endorse those values. Partly for that reason, the South African government opposed censuring the government of President Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe even after it cracked down especially brutally on the Zimbabwean opposition following the contested elections of March 2008. Mbeki, who was then president, was unwilling to challenge his former national liberation comrade and the principal goal of not intervening in neighbors' affairs. Working through the African Union and the South African Development Community, Pretoria did help broker a power-sharing deal between the government and the opposition in Zimbabwe. But as an April 2008 editorial in *The Washington Post* argued, Mugabe managed to stay in office thanks to the support of then South African President Mbeki.

The South African government, like nearly every regime in Africa, is wary of criticizing the internal policies of other countries, even if they are undemocratic or violate human rights. Unlike other African states, however, South Africa is a thriving democracy that aspires to a regional and even an international role. So which is it going to choose: nonintervention in the domestic affairs of its neighbors in the name of the passé ethos of national liberation and the Non-Aligned Movement or the defense—rhetorical at least and preferably effective—of universal values above national sovereignty, as would befit a new member of the world's ruling councils?

BRAZILIAN LULABIES

And which way will it be for Brazil, for whose leaders the issues of democracy and human rights were once especially dear? Like his predecessor, Lula opposed the military dictatorship that ruled Brazil between 1964 and 1985. At the time, he was an advocate of human rights, free and fair elections, and representative democracy; he often sought out foreign governments to support his cause and censure the people who were torturing members of the Brazilian opposition. But since he has been in office, he has not paid much heed to these issues. Although he has repeatedly flaunted Brazil's entry into the great-power club, he has been dismissive of the importance of democracy and human rights throughout Latin America, particularly in Cuba and Venezuela, and in places as

far afield as Iran. He has reinforced the Brazilian Foreign Ministry's tendency to not meddle in Cuba's internal affairs. Earlier this year, he traveled to Havana the day after a jailed Cuban dissident died from a hunger strike. Speaking at a press conference, he practically blamed the prisoner for dying and said he disapproved of that "form of struggle." Just hours later, he posed, beaming, for a photograph with Fidel and Raúl Castro.

Lula also gave Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad a hero's welcome in Brasília and São Paulo (the latter home to a majority of Brazil's significant Jewish community) just a few months after Ahmadinejad stole his country's 2009 election and the Iranian government violently suppressed the resulting public demonstrations. Within a few months of that visit, Lula traveled to Tehran. To Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez's increasingly heavy hand, Lula has also turned a blind eye. He never questions the jailing of political opponents; crackdowns on the press, trade unions, and students; or tampering with the electoral system in Venezuela. Brazilian corporations, especially construction companies, have huge investments there, and Lula has used his friendship with Chávez and the Castro brothers to placate the left wing of his party, which is uncomfortable with his orthodox economic policies. He systematically cloaks his pragmatic—some would say cynical—approach in the robes of nonintervention, self-determination, and Third World solidarity.

Recently, Brazil seems to have changed its tune somewhat, moving slightly away from its traditional stance of nonintervention after a coup in Honduras last year. When Honduran President Manuel Zelaya was ousted from office in June 2009, Lula suddenly became a stalwart defender of Honduras' democracy. Together with allies of Zelaya, such as Raúl Castro, Chávez, and the presidents of Bolivia, Ecuador, and Nicaragua, Lula convinced other members of the OAS, including Mexico and the United States, to suspend Honduras from the organization. Lula subsequently granted Zelaya asylum in the Brazilian embassy in Tegucigalpa, allowing him to mobilize his followers and organize against the coup's instigators from there. But since Porfirio Lobo Sosa was chosen to be Honduras' new president in free and fair elections late last year and several Latin American countries and the United States have recognized his government, Brazil's enduring support for Zelaya has increasingly come to seem intransigent and quixotic. One wonders whether Lula's position expresses the reflexive solidarity of a state that

once suffered military coups itself, signals a new willingness to stand up for democratic principles, or is yet another concession to Chávez and his friends in an effort to quiet the restless and troublesome left wing of Lula's party by defending its disciple in Tegucigalpa. But this much seems clear: Brazil's first attempt to take a stance on an internal political conflict in another Latin American country did not turn out too well, and Brazil does not yet feel comfortable with leaving behind its traditional policy of nonintervention in the name of the collective defense of human rights and democracy.

IT'S THE BOMB!

THESE STATES' ambivalence on so-called soft issues, such as human rights and democracy, tends to go hand in hand with their recalcitrance on "harder" issues, such as nuclear proliferation. With the exception of South Africa, which unilaterally gave up the nuclear weapons it had secretly built under apartheid, Brazil, China, and India have opposed the international nonproliferation regime created by the NPT in 1968. India has not deliberately helped or encouraged other countries with their nuclear ambitions. But it has never ratified the NPT, and the very fact that it went nuclear in 1974 led Pakistan, its neighbor and enemy, to do the same in 1982. Pakistan has since become one of the world's worst proliferators, thanks to the shenanigans of the rogue nuclear scientist A. Q. Khan. India cannot rightly be faulted for the actions of Pakistan, but it can be for not signing the NPT, for not doing more to assist the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and for not sanctioning states that aspire to get the bomb. It has coddled Tehran even as Tehran has seemed increasingly determined to build a nuclear weapon; it has repeatedly rejected imposing sanctions. In opposing the last batch in June of this year, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh stated that Iran had every right to develop a peaceful nuclear industry and that there was scant evidence that any military intent was driving its program. He did not need to say that India is developing an important energy relationship with Iran and is seeking to build gas and oil pipelines from Iran all the way to New Delhi.

China, for its part, has an "execrable" record on proliferation, according to *The Economist* earlier this year—or rather it did until it joined the NPT in 1992 (after that, it at least nominally began to improve).

The Chinese government helped Pakistan produce uranium and plutonium in the 1980s and 1990s, and it gave Pakistan the design of one of its own weapons. Beijing has not been especially constructive in trying to hinder North Korea's efforts to acquire nuclear weapons, and it has been downright unhelpful regarding Iran, systematically opposing or undermining sanctions against Tehran and threatening to use its veto on the UN Security Council if the Western powers go too far. Its recent decision to sell two new civilian nuclear power reactors to Pakistan will ratchet up the nuclear rivalry between India and Pakistan and undercut the work of the Nuclear Suppliers Group by making it easier for Islamabad to build more bombs.

Neither China nor India can be counted on to defend the nonproliferation regime. Both states seem too attached to the recent past, especially to the notion that they, huge developing nations once excluded from the atomic club, were able to challenge the nuclear monopoly held by the West and the Soviet Union thanks to the genius, discipline, and perseverance of their scientists. Not that there is anything wrong with being faithful to the past. But perhaps those states that remain faithful to the past best belong there—and not among those that will build a new international order.

Nostalgia is not the problem when it comes to Brazil. Brazil cannot be counted on when it comes to nuclear nonproliferation either, but for reasons having less to do with its past than its future. In the 1960s, it signed the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which banned nuclear weapons from Latin America, and in the 1990s, together with Argentina, it agreed to dismantle its enrichment program. When it finally ratified the NPT, in 1998, Brazil was perceived as a strong supporter of nonproliferation. But this May, eager to cozy up to Iran and wanting to be treated as a world power, it suddenly teamed up with Turkey to propose a deal that would lift sanctions on Iran if Iran took its uranium to Turkey to be enriched. Tehran nominally accepted the arrangement; the rest of the world did not. Lula and Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan claimed that the arrangement simply replicated a proposal previously put forth by the P-6 and that Obama supported their effort. Washington nonetheless called for stronger sanctions against Iran. Twelve of the UN Security Council's 15 members, including China and Russia, voted for the sanctions; only Brazil and Turkey opposed them. (Lebanon abstained.)

In the end, the episode was widely seen as a clumsy scheme to get Tehran off the hook and a gambit by Lula to get the world to take Brazil more seriously. (Turkey was also deemed to be a spoiler, but at least it has real interests in the Middle East.) What Lula achieved instead was to show that Brazil is still more interested in Third World solidarity than in international leadership. Worse, now some are speculating that Brazil is laying the groundwork to resurrect its own nuclear program.

One might say that in behaving in these ways, the emerging powers of today are acting no differently from the established powers—and that this is the best proof that they have come of age. They are rising powers, and—just like the states that came before them—they act increasingly on the basis of their national interests, and those national interests are increasingly global and well defined. But unlike the existing global players, they are not subject to enough domestic or international safeguards, or checks and balances, or, mainly, pressure from civil society—all forces that could limit their power and help them define their national interests beyond the economic realm and the short term. Their discourse and conduct may seem to be as legitimate as those of the traditional powers, but they are in fact far more self-contradictory. On the one hand, the rising powers still see themselves as members of and spokespeople for the developing world, the Non-Aligned Movement, the world's poor, and so on; on the other hand, they are staking their reputations on having become major economic, military, geopolitical, and even ideological powers, all of which not only distinguishes them from the rest of the Third World but also involves subscribing to certain universal values.

TO BE OR NOT TO BE

The stance of these countries on climate change also illustrates this persistent ambivalence about what role they are ready to assume. Brazil, China, and India are among the world's top emitters of carbon dioxide (China and India are among the top five). Last December, at the Copenhagen conference on climate change, they, along with South Africa (and Sudan, which was chairing the UN's Group of 77, or G-77, a coalition of developing nations), put forward a position that they said reflected the interests and views of "the developing nations." Building on a statement they had made at the 2008 G-8 summit, they called for assigning states'

responsibilities for fighting climate change according to states' capacities. They believe that reducing emissions is above all the responsibility of the developed countries. They are willing to do their share and reduce their own emissions, they say, but rich countries will have to do more, such as make deeper, legally binding emissions cuts and help the most vulnerable nations pay for the expenses of mitigating and adapting to the effects of global warming. Their case rests on a strong foundation: after all, it was over a century of the rich countries' industrial growth and unrestricted emissions that led to climate change, and the poorer countries are only now beginning to develop strongly. Placing proportional limits on the emissions of all states, the reasoning goes, would amount to stunting the economic growth of developing countries by imposing on them requirements that did not exist when the developed countries were first growing.

Perhaps, but this argument also raises the question of whom these countries are speaking for and what role they envision for themselves. Brazil's emissions are mainly the byproduct of extensive agricultural development, deforestation, and degradation; India's, like China's, come from industrialization, which both countries claim they have a right to pursue despite the pollution it causes. These are not traits common to the vast majority of the world's poor nations. On the eve of the Copenhagen summit, Jairam Ramesh, India's environment minister, described India's position clearly: "The first nonnegotiable is that India will not accept a legally binding emission cut. . . . We will not accept under any circumstances an agreement which stipulates a peaking year for India." He did say that India was prepared to "modulate [its] position in consultation with China, Brazil, and South Africa" and to "subject its mitigation actions to international review." But he added, apparently in all earnestness, that India's acceptance of such a review would depend on how much "international financing and technology" the country got.

Do the emerging powers identify more with the rich polluters whose ranks they want to join or with the poor nations, which are both potential victims of and contributors to climate change? The groups overlap (the rich nations also are victims, and the poor ones also pollute), and Brazil, China, India, and South Africa have much in common with both groups, but they cannot be part of both at once. For now, these states seem to have chosen to side with the poor countries. Partly because of that decision, the Copenhagen summit failed, and the Cancún climate

summit scheduled for the end of 2010 will probably fail, too. Marina Silva, a former environment minister under Lula who is running for president against her former boss' chosen candidate, seems to have grasped the contradiction in Brazil's official position more clearly than Lula. She has made the case that Brazil should do more. "It must admit global goals of carbon dioxide emissions reduction," she said a few weeks before the Copenhagen summit last year, "and contribute to convincing other developing countries to do the same."

Some candidates for emerging power status are beginning to understand this, but just barely. Mexico, for example, had originally subscribed to the joint stance of Brazil, China, India, and South Africa on emissions caps in 2008 and 2009, but by the time of the Copenhagen summit, it realized that its $14,000 per capita income (in 2008 purchasing parity prices) placed it closer to the states of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (to which it already belongs) than to those of the G-77 or the Non-Aligned Movement (to which it does not belong) and stopped signing their common documents. Similarly, during the Doha Round of trade negotiations, Mexico grasped that its myriad free-trade agreements and low levels of agricultural exports put it in the camp of the industrialized nations rather than the camp of Brazil, China, India, and South Africa. Those states presented something of a common front on behalf of, as Lula put it, "the most fragile economies," although Brazil was more interested in opening up agricultural markets and China and India were more concerned with protecting small farmers. But these are exceptions, like Turkey's attempt to join the European Union, accepting all of its conditions regarding values and institutions. None of the emerging countries, democratic or otherwise, richer or poorer, more integrated into regional groups or not, has truly undergone its political or ideological aggiornamento.

PAY TO PLAY

The ongoing discussion about whether emerging powers should be admitted to the helm of the world geopolitical order emphasizes the economic dimension of their rise and its geopolitical consequences. Not enough attention has been paid to the fact that although these countries are already economic powerhouses, they remain political and diplomatic

lightweights. At best, they are regional powers that pack a minuscule international punch; at worst, they are neophytes whose participation in international institutions may undermine progress toward a stronger international legal order. They might be growing economic actors, but they are not diplomatic ones, and so as they strive to gain greater political status without a road map, they fall back on their default option: the rhetoric and posturing of bygone days, invoking national sovereignty and nonintervention, calling for limited international jurisdiction, and defending the application of different standards to different nations.

Given this, granting emerging economic powers a greater role on the world stage would probably weaken the trend toward a stronger multilateral system and an international legal regime that upholds democracy, human rights, nuclear nonproliferation, and environmental protection. An international order that made more room for the BRICs, for Mexico and South Africa, and for other emerging powers, would be much more representative. But it would not necessarily be an order whose core values are better respected and better defended.

The world needs emerging powers to participate in financial and trade negotiations, and it would benefit immensely from hearing their voices on many regional and international issues, such as the killings in Darfur, instability in the Middle East, repression in Myanmar, or the coup in Honduras. For now, however, these states' core values are too different from the ones espoused, however partially and duplicitously, by the international community's main players and their partners to warrant the emerging powers' inclusion at the helm of the world's top organizations.

These states still lack the balancing mechanisms that have helped curb the hypocrisy of great powers: vibrant and well-organized civil societies. This lack is more obvious in some countries (China, South Africa) than in others (Brazil, India), but there is a fundamental difference between the terms of their inclusion into the inner sanctum and that of those countries that are already there (although this difference obviously applies to Russia also). Before a serious debate takes place within these countries regarding their societies' adherence to the values in question, it might not be such a good idea for them to become full-fledged world actors. Maybe they should deliberate more prudently over whether they really want to pay in order to play, and the existing powers should ponder whether they wish to invite them to play if they will not pay.

Return to Table of Contents

Reviews & Responses

MORTEZA NIKOUBAZL/REUTERS

Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan meeting with Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in Tehran, March 2006

Unlike other Muslim countries in the Middle East, Iran and Turkey have at least a century's worth of experience struggling for political freedom. This means that they share some fundamental values with the United States.

Review Essay

An Unlikely Trio

Can Iran, Turkey, and the United States Become Allies?

Mustafa Akyol

Reset: Iran, Turkey, and America's Future. BY STEPHEN KINZER. Times Books, 2010, 274 pp. $26.00.

Insanity, it is often said, is doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results. When it comes to the Middle East, writes Stephen Kinzer, a veteran foreign correspondent, Washington has been doing just that. Hence, in *Reset: Iran, Turkey, and America's Future*, he proposes a radical new course for the United States in the region. The United States, he argues, needs to partner with Iran and Turkey to create a "powerful triangle" whose activities would promote a culture of democracy and combat extremism.

This is, of course, a counterintuitive argument. At the moment, Iran, with its radical ideology and burgeoning nuclear program, is one of Washington's biggest headaches. And although Turkey is a long-time U.S. ally, the U.S.-Turkish relationship has recently been tested. Last June, for example, Turkey's representative on the UN Security Council voted against U.S.-backed sanctions on Iran. These days, most of Washington is asking, "Who lost Turkey?" rather than envisioning more extensive cooperation with it.

Yet Kinzer's U.S.-Iranian-Turkish alliance is a long-term project, and the idea has ample grounding in the modern history of the region. Unlike other Muslim countries there, Kinzer shows, Iran and Turkey have at least a century's worth of experience struggling for political freedom, during which they "developed an understanding of democracy, and a longing for it." This means that they share some fundamental values with the United States. Moreover, Iran and Turkey have educated middle classes—bases for strong civil

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societies. The two countries even share strategic goals with the United States: a desire to see Iraq and Afghanistan stabilized and radical Sunni movements such as al Qaeda suppressed.

CARROTS ARE FOR DONKEYS

Still, Kinzer's power triangle could not emerge in today's world. Iran, he writes, "would have to change dramatically" and turn into a democracy before such an alliance could be formed. How that would happen—a truly daunting question—is unclear, but in the meantime, Kinzer proposes a twofold strategy: engage with the current regime as effectively as possible and wait for the day when the country's democratically minded (and, as he calls them, "reliably pro-American") masses make their way to power.

Engagement, of course, is already the Obama administration's stated policy, but Kinzer urges Washington to be bolder, that is, to launch "direct, bilateral, comprehensive, and unconditional negotiations" with Tehran. Nixon's diplomatic breakthrough with communist China, he reminds readers, came at a time when Beijing was supplying weapons to North Vietnamese soldiers, who were using them to kill Americans. "Nixon did not make good behavior a condition of negotiation," Kinzer notes. "He recognized that diplomacy works in precisely the opposite way. Agreement comes first; changes in behavior follow."

Kinzer also criticizes the tone of current U.S. diplomacy, which does not give the Iranians what he thinks they are really looking for: "respect, dignity, a restoration of lost pride." This makes a so-called carrot-and-stick approach to Tehran counterproductive. That "may be appropriate for donkeys," Kinzer writes, "but not for dealing with a nation ten times older than [the United States]." The key to turning Iran from foe to friend is not to make Iran's regime feel more threatened; it is to make it feel more secure.

Even then, there are many imponderables about Iran, and the current regime may be unwilling to partner with the United States no matter the tone of U.S. overtures. Kinzer's only advice here is for the United States to avoid being emotional, "do nothing that will make that partnership more difficult to achieve when conditions are right," and, if negotiations do begin, make "no concessions to Iran's regime that weaken Iranians who are persecuted for defending democratic values." Yet Kinzer leaves unclear how that delicate balance could be maintained and offers little guidance for policymakers looking for a more practical road map.

CLASH WITHIN A CIVILIZATION

The other leg of Kinzer's proposed triangle, the U.S.-Turkish partnership, is much more realistic, having already been institutionalized by decades of cooperation between the two countries, and deserves closer attention. Although Turkey's supposed shift away from secularism toward Islamism has raised eyebrows in the West, it should not. In fact, Turkey's new path may actually increase the benefits of the U.S.-Turkish relationship, as Kinzer passionately argues.

To understand why, one must abandon the standard narrative about Turkey's recent history. According to that story, Turkey was once the sick man of Europe, trapped in religious obscurantism. Then, Kemal Atatürk came along with westernizing reforms and took the nation on a

great secular leap forward. Unfortunately, however, the forces of darkness survived underground and have recently reemerged in the guise of the quasi-religious Justice and Development Party (AKP).

At the heart of this story is a battle between Western enlightenment and obscurantism. But in fact, Turkey's real dichotomy has always been between its westernizers and its modernizers. Whereas the westernizers, led by Atatürk, sought to remodel Turkey into a fully European nation, emphasizing cultural westernization and secularization, the modernizers called for political and economic reform but insisted on preserving the traditional culture and religion at the same time.

After winning control of the country after World War I, the westernizers imposed a top-down cultural revolution and used their tight grip on power to transform Turkey, in the words of their own witty dictum, "for the people, in spite of the people." They ordered citizens to wear Western clothing, such as the brimmed hat, and listen to Western music, such as opera, and they disbanded almost all religious institutions. But only a small part of the population embraced these radical changes, convincing the revolutionaries that democracy had to be abandoned in favor of benevolent authoritarianism.

The modernizers, on the other hand, championed democracy and favored reforming Turkey through economic development, calling for free trade and private enterprise. Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, who came to power in 1950 in the country's first free elections, soon became their icon. He halted the cultural revolution, eased the repression of religion, and presided over an economic boom—affording him three electoral victories in a row.

But his efforts ran afoul of the westernizers, and he was executed in 1961 by a pro-Atatürk junta. In the 1980s, the modernizers' torch was picked up by Prime Minister (and later President) Turgut Özal, and more recently, it was picked up by the AKP, which has been in power since 2002.

Of course, the AKP's founders, including the current prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, originally arose from a third force in Turkish politics—Islamism. But over time, they reformed, both out of a sense pragmatism and because of the increasingly liberal outlook of their base, the growing Islamic middle class. And despite their leftover religious rhetoric, the AKP rejects true Islamists' most basic goal—the creation of an Islamic state.

The differences between the westernizers and the modernizers have influenced Turkish foreign policy. The modernizers have never shared the westernizers' ideological distaste for the East and began opening up to it after the Cold War. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union dominated the Balkans, the Caucasus, and the Middle East, leaving Turkey feeling isolated and surrounded by enemies. When the Soviet Union fell, then President Özal began to visit many Arab and Central Asian capitals and set up business exchanges. At the same time, he maintained close ties with the United States and other NATO allies.

After Özal's death, in 1993, Turkey suffered a "lost decade" of unstable coalition governments; an indirect coup, when the prime minister resigned due to military pressure; and two terrible economic crises. The country was left with very little capacity for, or interest in, independent activity

abroad. That changed in 2002, when the AKP came to power and immediately faced a fateful decision: whether to allow U.S. troops to use Turkish territory to invade Iraq. Caught between a crucial ally and an unpopular war, the AKP government somewhat hesitantly favored opening Turkish borders to the troops. But Turkey's AKP-majority parliament, to the surprise of the United States and many others, said no.

Although Ankara was at first unsure whether it had done the right thing, an almost nationwide consensus soon emerged that the war in Iraq was disastrous and Turkey had done well to stay out of it. For its refusal to support the invasion of Iraq, Turkey enjoyed rising popularity across the Middle East, boosting not only the prestige of Turkey's diplomats there but also the economic fortunes of its businesspeople, who were suddenly much more attractive partners to those in the Middle East.

The country's recent vote against UN sanctions on Iran should be seen in this context. The Turks have learned that they can gain—both in standing and economically—by declining to join the United States when it acts in ways that seem needlessly aggressive. Although Turkey has many of the same foreign policy goals as the United States, it prefers to achieve them through the kind of soft power it displayed recently in its dealings with Iran. In May, Brazil and Turkey convinced Iran to sign a nuclear-exchange deal similar to the ultimately unsuccessful one the United States had helped broker six months before. Rather than praising the deal, Washington balked and pressed for sanctions anyway. This move surprised Erdogan, who believed that U.S. President Barack Obama had written him and Brazil's president, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, in April to ask them to

negotiate just such an agreement. Although the Obama administration claims that the Turks misinterpreted the letter, many in Turkey nonetheless believe that whereas Ankara has remained true to Obama's initial calls for peaceful engagement, Obama has given in to the U.S. Congress' more hawkish tone.

BAD NEWS, GOOD NEWS

Far from being a fleeting creation of the AKP, as some assume, this new, independent-minded Turkey is here to stay. For the rise of the AKP is much more a result of changes in Turkish society than their cause. The new Muslim entrepreneurial middle class, which emerged thanks to Özal's free-market revolution of the 1980s, already outnumbers and economically outperforms the staunchly secular old elite. It is this class that makes up the modernizers' base, and its vision is likely to guide Turkey in the years to come.

These Turkish modernizers are neither socialists like Venezuela's Hugo Chávez, who wants to put an end to the capitalist system, nor radical Islamists in the same vein as Iran's Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who wants to destroy Israel. In fact, for several years, Erdogan tried to enhance Turkey's diplomatic ties with Israel, denouncing anti-Semitism, visiting Tel Aviv, welcoming Israeli companies to do business in Turkey, hosting Israeli President Shimon Peres, and initiating indirect peace talks between Israel and Syria. The rift came only at the end of 2008, when Israel launched catastrophic strikes against Gaza—which was seen as an insult to Erdogan, who had hosted then Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert for peace talks only four days before the attack. The rift widened in June after Israel's lethal raid on a Gaza-bound Turkish aid ship.

As Turkey's foreign minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, has often articulated, what the AKP seeks is a peaceful and prosperous Middle East integrated through trade and investment. These goals are very much in line with those of the United States. The difference is one of style, and Turkey will continue to diverge from the United States if Washington tries to realize its vision with hard power instead of the soft power that Ankara wields.

Whether this is good or bad news for the United States depends on how one envisions U.S. foreign policy objectives. Should the United States seek as many loyal, unquestioning allies as possible in a perpetual hard-power game? Or can it rely on independent, diplomatically inclined partners to promote security and prosperity in an increasingly complex world?

If it seeks the latter, this new Turkey will be an asset, as Kinzer notes. The fact that Turkey "has escaped from America's orbit," he writes, has given Turkey prestige that will be beneficial to both it and the United States. Now, "Turkey can go places, engage partners, and make deals that America cannot."

FROM ZERO TO HERO

Beyond diplomacy, Turkey's most valuable contribution to the troubled region might well be its synthesis of Islam, democracy, and capitalism. For years, the West assumed that westernizer-ruled Turkey offered just that model. But as Kinzer explains, "For most of Turkey's modern history, the Muslim world has seen [the country] as an apostate," having "no religious legitimacy" and acting "as Washington's lackey." Now, by becoming more Muslim, modern, and

independent, Turkey has finally become appealing to Arabs. Indeed, a staggering 75 percent of those surveyed in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, the Palestinian territories, Saudi Arabia, and Syria named Turkey as a model for the synthesis of Islam and democracy in a recent survey by the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation, a liberal Turkish think tank.

No wonder Turkish products have become popular in the Middle East in recent years and Arab tourists have flooded Istanbul. Although they are banned by some conservative clerics, Turkish soap operas are hits on Arab television stations, and they promote a more flexible and individualistic form of Muslim culture. Turkish entrepreneurs, meanwhile, have invested billions in Middle Eastern countries. And the Sufi-inspired Gülen Movement, led by Fethullah Gülen, a popular Turkish cleric, has opened over 1,000 schools from Asia to Africa, with the goal of creating a generation of students well versed in the secular sciences and a distinctively Turkish form of Islam.

All this should be refreshing, not alarming. Turkish Islam has always been more flexible than other forms of the faith, such as Saudi Wahhabism. In the past few decades, moreover, it has become even more liberal as the Turkish middle class has grown more individualistic and welcoming of reformist theology. One Turkish commentator recently observed in his column in the Islamic daily newspaper *Yeni Safak* that the young generation wants to hear about "the Qur'an and freedom," rather than "the Qur'an and obedience."

Of course, Turkey is far from perfect. The country's two-century-long struggle to become a modern, democratic nation is hardly complete. The AKP has contributed notably to the effort, through economic and political reforms that serve not only conservative Muslims but also non-Muslim minorities, but there is still much to do. Erdogan faces an election next year and will need to show himself to be more tolerant of dissent to win it. He needs to be careful to avoid appearing too close to Iran, Hamas, or other Islamists at the risk of damaging Turkey's credibility in the West—a balance that President Abdullah Gül, a former AKP foreign minister, has been more diligent in tending to. Meanwhile, the whole country must work to solve its most fatal domestic problem: the 25-year-long armed conflict with Kurdish nationalists. Since a military solution has proved unsuccessful, engagement along the lines of the British with the Irish Republican Army may now be the only option, but so far, the AKP's initiatives have been too timid and the opposition's stance too unhelpful.

In his book, Kinzer points to such domestic problems and reminds the reader that Turkey needs to develop further before it can become an influential global actor. But he says that the United States also needs to change by becoming more modest on the global stage. Americans, he suggests, need to realize that "they lack some of the historical and cultural tools necessary to navigate effectively through the Middle East and surrounding regions." If they accept this truth and admit they need help, "Turkey becomes America's next best friend."

Turkey is ready to play that role, so this part of Kinzer's power triangle is quite feasible. But the potential for Iran to complete it is, for now, constrained by powerful political obstacles. For, as Kinzer puts it, "the flame of freedom still burns in Iran—although, unlike in Turkey, it is not allowed to burn in public."

Review Essay

Hydraulic Pressures

Into the Age of Water Scarcity?

James E. Nickum

Water: The Epic Struggle for Wealth, Power, and Civilization. BY STEVEN SOLOMON. HarperCollins, 2010, 596 pp. $27.99.

Bottled and Sold: The Story Behind Our Obsession With Bottled Water. BY PETER H. GLEICK. Island Press, 2010, 211 pp. $26.96.

Running Out of Water: The Looming Crisis and Solutions to Conserve Our Most Precious Resource. BY PETER ROGERS AND SUSAN LEAL. Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, 245 pp. $25.00.

Although warnings that water crises, even water wars, are pending have a long history—and a long history of being overblown—there are increasing signs that the management of water resources worldwide is now reaching a tipping point. Many lakes and rivers are vanishing, and the quality of those that remain is deteriorating. Ground-water supplies are under pressure from overuse and pollution. Some fish populations are accumulating anthropogenic toxins; others threaten to disappear altogether (remember Atlantic cod?). Climate change may already be rearranging rainfall and glacial melting patterns, making life in arid areas increasingly untenable and intensifying floods in the already wet, and more populous, regions.

Water experts have long quipped that when the problem is not too much water, it is too little water, or water that is too dirty. Increasingly, however, the problem also seems to be that water is in the wrong hands. According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, nearly 70 percent of the water used worldwide goes to irrigation, rarely the most productive use for it. As economies and people shift toward cities and the

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demand for industrial and household water grows, the pressure on supplies is building. Some water must also be set aside for the environment, for instance, to maintain the ecosystems of river deltas. Meanwhile, nearly one billion people still lack access to minimally safe drinking water, and over 2.6 billion live without proper sanitation, a critical factor for children's survival.

Cracks are also showing in the world's water infrastructure. The massive inventory of dams, subsidized irrigation networks, and urban water and sewage systems built over the last half century is aging, poorly maintained, and underfunded. Cash-strapped governments and taxpayers are disinclined to pay the high costs of repairing or replacing these overstressed facilities, even while they expect them to continue to operate.

With most of the world's watercourses shared by several countries, water management can be a major source of tension, especially between the countries upstream, which often claim to have sovereign rights over the water while it is on their territory, and the countries downstream, which feel that they are left having to make do with unpredictable supplies of less and less clean water than they are entitled to. Water disputes are legion: among others, there are those between the United States and Mexico over the Colorado River, between India and Bangladesh over the Ganges and Brahmaputra rivers, between China and neighboring Southeast Asian states over the Mekong River, and between Egypt and Ethiopia over the Nile River.

According to the Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database, which is maintained by Oregon State University, outright wars over water have been rare, and cooperation over water management has occurred in surprising places—for example, between India and Pakistan, under the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty. Yet the potential for instability remains real. According to the Pacific Institute's "Water Conflict Chronology," there is a "long and distressing" history of violence over fresh water, especially at the subnational level. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon warned at the 2008 World Economic Forum, in Davos, that stress on water resources was a destabilizing factor around the world, from Darfur to the United States, Colombia to South Korea. One cannot completely grasp the complexity of Israeli-Palestinian relations, for example, without understanding that the Gaza Strip and the Jordan River basin have both some of the world's fastest-growing populations and some of the world's lowest amounts of water per capita.

Water issues are almost never only about the water; they involve an ever-expanding list of other matters. Population growth and improved lifestyles are major drains on water supplies, especially in emerging economies. Snowbirds flock to dry climates expecting the golf courses and lush lawns of wetter regions. The world's growing middle class is consuming more beef and more dairy goods, products that require much more water than other foods: it can take up to 75 times as much water to produce one pound of beef as it does to produce one pound of wheat. Water's fortunes have also been bound up with energy matters since the invention of the watermill. Pumping water from underground or moving it over mountains takes enormous amounts of energy: one-fifth of California's power today goes to watering Southern California. Conventional energy

generation requires water for cooling. And now dams are rapidly being built throughout the world to provide clean energy.

Given the complexity of these issues, it is little surprise that three new books all agree that the world is facing serious water crises and yet have very different ideas about how to address them. Steven Solomon, for whom water management has long been a maker or breaker of civilizations, argues that it is becoming even more critical in this "age of scarcity" to trust the efficiency of the market. In contrast, Peter Gleick looks at the market warily and indicts the commercialization of bottled water for threatening the reliable provision of clean and inexpensive tap water by public utilities. And Peter Rogers and Susan Leal see promise in some of the innovative user-backed public-private arrangements that local government agencies worldwide have undertaken to address simultaneously water scarcity and revenue shortfalls. These three views differ on important points, especially when it comes to deciding what roles the public and private sectors should play. Still, Solomon, Gleick, and Rogers and Leal all agree that the world's water problems are increasingly linked, often in complicated ways, to other crises concerning people, food, health, and the environment. They also agree that no universal fix can be applied to such site-specific problems: scarcity here, flooding there, pollution everywhere. And reflecting an understanding common among water experts around the world, they make clear that solving the world's current water problems will require thinking across intellectual, geographic, administrative, and disciplinary boundaries that have long seemed impermeable and developing new forms of governance.

WATER POWERS

Solomon's book is an ambitious 500-plus-page history of leading civilizations that argues that states' ability to make the best use of water resources has been the key to distinguishing winners and losers in "the epic struggle for wealth, power, and civilization." Drawing both on the historian Karl Wittfogel's theory that despotic, "hydraulic" societies, with their large government irrigation and flood-control works, are bound to clash with liberal democratic, "non-hydraulic" societies and on Fernand Braudel's even more sweeping geopolitical history of civilizations, Solomon claims that "preeminent societies have invariably exploited their water



resources in ways that were more productive, and unleashed larger supplies, than slower-adapting ones." He lines up the usual examples of hydraulic giants, mostly from ancient times: Pharaonic Egypt, the Indus Valley civilization, Mesopotamia, China during the construction of the Grand Canal. But he also links the use of water to the preeminence of major non-hydraulic societies, among them the seafarers of the Mediterranean and of the Islamic world, Europe's global mariners after 1492, and the steam-powered British Empire. He casts American history in terms of the United States' exploitation of its own and other countries' water, from the wet East's conquest of the arid West to the building of the Erie and Panama Canals. Major waterworks have continued to be built since, starting in the 1930s with the Hoover Dam.

Having linked water to power, in despotic and democratic systems alike, Solomon defines the prospects for countries today in terms of their access to and uses of water. He divides states between the water haves and the water have-nots. He then argues that water will become more valuable than oil and that as that happens, the Middle East will suffer, Asia's rising giants will falter, and the now-fading democratic and industrial West will find new opportunities to prolong its dominance.

Solomon contends that fresh water is the Achilles' heel of both China and India: the factor that "will determine whether they lose their ability to feed themselves and cause their industrial expansions to prematurely sputter." Indeed, those two economic juggernauts have not yet been able to cope with water overuse and water degradation, and as they themselves already know, these problems are major challenges to their political and governance systems. Solomon also rightly indicates that how China and India, together home to almost

40 percent of the world's inhabitants, address these challenges will be of critical interest to the rest of the world.

But why should food self-sufficiency matter in an open world economy? Solomon's argument reflects a long-standing concern in some circles that at some point other states are going to have to feed China. This seems at variance, however, with Solomon's faith in the power of the market: a wealthy China (or India) will be able to buy the food or the farmland it needs from other countries. Solomon's basic thesis, that the rise and fall of civilizations hinges on water, is also ultimately unconvincing. A deterioration in water infrastructure or in maritime power is more often a symptom of a state's other problems, particularly fiscal or economic, than a cause of its decline.

Solomon argues that the West will fare best in the face of water scarcity because it is the region most likely to be able to overcome the "inefficiencies, waste, and political favoritism" characteristic of "the government command systems" that have "controlled water use in almost every society through the centuries." It can succeed through "greater reliance upon the self-interested, profit motive of individuals organized by the politically indifferent market"—which market, Solomon adds without flinching, is "anchored in a pricing mechanism for valuing water that reflects both the full cost of sustaining ecosystems through externally imposed environmental standards and a social fairness guarantee for everyone to receive at affordable cost the minimum amounts necessary for their basic needs." This is a world in which the forces of the market are unleashed but kept from doing harm by rational regulators presumably insulated from political imperatives.

The profit motive would be a trustworthy guide if the world ran as in an economics textbook, but in real life, the market is not politically indifferent and self-interest rarely takes adequate account of environmental standards or social fairness. If anything, it is a surfeit of invisible hands that is depleting aquifers and leaving contaminants to run off from farms and highways. A classic example that Solomon misses in his otherwise fascinating section on New York City's water system is the story of how in 1799, just two years before becoming vice president of the United States, Aaron Burr twisted a state charter intended to create a water company to set up instead what is now JPMorgan Chase. The move may have been of lasting benefit for the financial system, but the city was left having to find another way to fund the expansion of its waterworks.

Solomon, a former financial reporter, places too much faith in the particular "governing model" that will "redeploy the existing water resources from less to more productive hands." Vested interests and entitlements are inflexible, both domestically and internationally, especially where legal systems are strong. Authoritarian systems certainly have their rigidities, as Solomon rightly notes, but their ability to overlook the niceties of property rights allows them to make major shifts in the use of natural resources. Over the past decade, for instance, the Chinese government has redeployed massive amounts of water from low-productivity agriculture to high-productivity industry and for use in homes. So it is rash to assume that the Western market model will prevail over the Chinese or the Indian market muddle (or vice versa), or that these models will not evolve.

MESSAGE IN A BOTTLE

Gleick's lively book on the booming bottled-water industry and its "war on tap water" illustrates why one might not want to trust market forces to redeploy fresh water to its most valued uses. Americans now drink an average of 30 gallons of bottled water per person each year—20 times as much as they did 30 years ago—and usually from plastic bottles that they may or may not bother to recycle. These days, a liter of bottled water is more valuable, or at least higher priced, than a liter of oil. Last year, on the campus where I teach in Tokyo, vending machines were offering plastic bottles of Masafi "natural mineral water" from the United Arab Emirates—this despite the fact that Japan's tap water is among the best treated in the world and that Japan's per capita water availability is 3,383 cubic meters per year, whereas the UAE's is just 58 cubic meters per year. Masafi is both testimony to the wonders of global trade and a reason for pause.

The success of Masafi and Perrier and Fiji and Coca-Cola in the market for water certainly give Gleick considerable pause. Gleick is the head of the Pacific Institute, which publishes the series The World's Water, the definitive reference on fresh-water uses worldwide, and a leading advocate of recognizing access to a minimum level of safe water as a human right. Given the scope of Gleick's previous work, this book's focus on bottled water might seem remarkably narrow. And it would be if one considered only the water. But for Gleick, "the arguments for and against bottled water are more than simply environmental or economic. [They] have deeper psychological under-

pinnings, philosophical and ideological implications, and social subtexts about public rights versus private goods, the human right to water, free markets, the appropriate role of governments, and conflicting visions of the future." Addressing these questions will require far more than giving free rein to the market.

For both Solomon and Gleick, the world is now radically changing the ways in which it deals with water, and the ways in which it does so will reveal a lot about everything else. But unlike Solomon, Gleick envisions an approach to water management that tries to harmonize relations between humans and nature, between governments and the market, between the privileged and the marginalized. Ultimately, for Gleick, "access to affordable safe tap water would be universal and bottled water would become unnecessary." However, the "anti-tax, anti-government, and anti-regulation" philosophies that Gleick condemns may prevail for a while longer and "continue to cripple municipal infrastructure of all kinds and weaken government enforcement of water-quality protections."

GOOD TILL AFTER THE LAST DROP

Rogers and Leal share Gleick's concern over bottled water, but they focus on finding "workable solutions" for fixing a wide range of water problems. Even where political positions are deeply entrenched—California, they say, "treats water politics like a blood sport"—solutions can often be found by thinking outside the box. Their excellent thumbnail introduction to the economics of water makes clear why the market cannot adequately allocate water resources. As they point out, water is a "fugitive resource," that is, a different good at different stages of the hydrologic cycle. At times (when in the form of a cloud, a river, or a lake), water is an open-access resource; at others (as reserves in a dam or as sewage), it is a public good; at others still (as tap or irrigation water), it can be privatized and sometimes even marketed, say, into bottled water. Rogers, a professor of environmental engineering and city planning at Harvard and an advocate of reforming U.S. federal water policies, and Leal, a former head of the San Francisco Public Utilities Commission, focus mostly on the public-goods problems that cannot be solved, and are sometimes exacerbated, by the market's invisible hand. Presenting a wide range of both private and government-initiated efforts to manage water resources, they offer a kind of how-to manual based on best practices. Perhaps reflecting Leal's background, they focus primarily on actions taken by municipal utilities. But they also look at the water-management policies of individual states along the Colorado, Indus, Mekong, and Nile rivers and around other transboundary river basins.

The great strength of Rogers and Leal's book is its inclusion of cases that are about the unmentionable side of water: sewage. Industries around the world have long recognized the economic and environmental benefits of reusing water, but the public utilities have lagged behind. Even after it is treated, sewage water is usually considered something that should be disposed of in the least harmful manner. Treating sewage is also costly. In the United States alone, according to the authors, "investment in sewer infrastructure falls short by more than $20 billion" every year. Once the infrastructure is in place, it is hard to maintain, and compared to

developing more water supplies, building and keeping up sewers is a difficult sell to policymakers and users.

As Rogers and Leal argue, however, sewage is waste only so long as it is treated as waste; it can be a resource. Some of their book's most interesting cases are about how to turn wastewater into an asset. Treated sewage is increasingly becoming a low-cost alternative to more traditional water supplies: it has been used to recharge ground-water reserves in Orange County, California, and to help generate geothermal power in northern California. Japan is arranging to send its sewage water to Australian mines to supplement scarce local water supplies. And in Singapore, wastewater is so thoroughly treated that the high-tech industry uses it in processes that require highly pure water. The book also implies that if bold action is necessary and sometimes requires huge investments and large projects, it also calls for more than that. Engagement on the part of the public, especially the people who will foot the bills for increased usage and buy the public bonds that will finance new sewerage infrastructure, is also needed. Whether in California or Singapore or elsewhere, government agencies thus need to explain to the public what problems need fixing, why, and how.

FLOWING UPHILL

Solomon trusts market forces; Gleick distrusts them; Rogers and Leal think they can be harnessed alongside the state's power to good effect. Given enough time, economics does seem to wind up dictating how water gets used, and not necessarily in twisted ways. Water is increasingly being used to irrigate high-value crops instead of low-value ones, and it is being redirected from farms to cities. In an open international system, trade not only expands national economies but also, in good Ricardian fashion, allows them to escape the limitations of local water supplies. Food grown in wetter areas can be exported to drier ones, allowing the local water to be used for higher-priority uses. The point of the 1,200-mile Grand Canal was to bring grain from the wet southern part of China to the dry north, which allowed water indigenous to the north to be stored for later use or left in the Yellow River in order to limit silt buildup and so prevent flooding. A similar logic lies behind the current rush by China and various Middle Eastern countries to purchase farmland in water-have countries, such as Brazil.

Nonetheless, it bears repeating that economics does not necessarily yield socially or even politically optimal solutions. As water experts say, water flows uphill to money. The rich and powerful, frequently the urban and industrial, have the biggest pumps. And there often is an inverse relationship between economic rationality and political rationality: the economic laws of scarcity push prices up even as the political laws of scarcity give officials a reason to keep prices down. Another complication is that water problems are irremediably connected, sometimes as a symptom and sometimes as a cause, to many other issues: globalization, demographics, governance, energy, health, the role of women and children, the environment. The world's water problems reflect all the world's problems.

Review Essay

Interdependency Theory

China, India, and the West

Simon Tay

Awakening Giants, Feet of Clay: Assessing the Economic Rise of China and India. BY PRANAB BARDHAN. Princeton University Press, 2010, 192 pp. $24.95.

Playing Our Game: Why China's Rise Doesn't Threaten the West. BY EDWARD S. STEINFELD. Oxford University Press, 2010, 280 pp. $27.95.

In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, the economies of North America and Europe remain fragile while those of Asia continue to grow. This is especially true in the cases of China and India, which both boast near double-digit rates of growth and have therefore inspired confidence around the region. But too many commentators discuss China and India with breathless admiration—extrapolating, for example, that growth will continue at a breakneck pace for decades. In doing so, they treat emerging economies as if they were already world powers, echoing the hubris that preceded the Asian currency crisis of 1997–98.

Pranab Bardhan's *Awakening Giants, Feet of Clay: Assessing the Economic Rise of China and India* is a welcome corrective to that view. It succinctly summarizes the challenges facing China and India, including environmental degradation, unfavorable demographics, poor infrastructure, and social inequality—threats that the leaders of China and India understand. Even as others have lavished praise on China, and Chinese citizens have grown stridently nationalistic, Chinese President Hu Jintao and others in the current leadership have been cautionary. As Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao said in 2007, the country's development is "unsteady, unbalanced, uncoordinated, and unsustainable." In India, meanwhile, although the government has orchestrated campaigns to highlight the country's

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growth and reform, its plans to develop roads and other infrastructure are a prominent and expensive recognition of the country's enduring gaps.

A more contentious claim offered by Bardhan is that internal reform—not the global market—has been the key driver of both countries' growth. Rather than focusing on India's information technology sector or China's export-led industrialization, Bardhan highlights less glamorous domestic sectors. Examining the rural economy—in which a majority of Chinese and Indians work—he concludes that growth is driven from below. He shows, for example, how China's steepest reductions in poverty had already happened by the mid-1980s, before the country began attracting sizable foreign trade and investment. The main causes of China's decline in poverty, Bardhan argues, were investments in infrastructure and reforms to town and village enterprises, which are predominantly agricultural.

The book thus suggests that the fates of China and India are in their own hands—and do not depend on the West, as many assume. If that is correct, then these giants can continue to grow despite the global economic crisis, towing much of Asia along with them. This would have great implications for geopolitics and economics. To the contrary, however, neither China nor India can ignore external conditions.

GIANT FEUDS

One of the external circumstances affecting both China and India is their bilateral relationship—and whether it will develop in a healthy or an antagonistic way. Although China and India cooperate in various intergovernmental bodies and trade more than ever—Chinese-Indian trade increased from $3 billion in 2001 to $40 billion in 2007—there are various ways in which Asia's awakening giants might step on each other's feet of clay. Bardhan's book does not address this topic.

The nadir of Chinese-Indian relations was the brief, one-sided war between the two countries in 1962, which resulted in a humiliating defeat (and the loss of more than 3,000 troops) for India. Relations have improved since then, but elements of cooperation coexist with competition and suspicion. Various geostrategic disputes separate Beijing and New Delhi, including a number of sensitive disagreements about areas along their 2,200-mile border. Tibet shares a long border with India, and when the region is restive, as it has been in recent years, China suspects Indian instigation. This makes disputes over remote Himalayan points—such as Arunachal Pradesh, an Indian state claimed by Beijing—loom large, as does China's recently intensified criticism of Indian actions in and around Kashmir.

There are also newer sources of tension, including competition over Indian Ocean sea-lanes and the exploration of outer space. There is even tension over the very trade ties that increasingly link the two countries economically. In 2009, India hiked tariffs on telecommunications imports from China by as much as 200 percent in order to limit the flow of Chinese goods into that sector, which New Delhi considers both economically and strategically important.

Underlying these tensions is a power gap. Rising simultaneously, the two Asian giants compete for markets, natural resources, commercial investment, and political influence in Asia and worldwide. Depending on how one measures, China's economy is three or four times

as large as India's. And whereas China is India's largest trading partner, India ranks only tenth among China's trading partners. Yet in government ministries in New Delhi and corporate towers in Mumbai, Indian elites typically refuse to concede India's status as number two.

Of course, there are forces—especially the Association of Southeast Asian Nations—that seek to promote Asian regional cooperation and weaken the appeal of competition between Asian states. But although it hosts regional summits that include officials from China and India as well as officials from its member states, ASEAN is an association of only small and medium-sized economies, so it lacks the economic heft to direct regional integration. Therefore, although China and India may make shows of solidarity in the ASEAN forum and elsewhere, they will continue to compete economically, politically, and otherwise.

ASIAN LODESTAR

A major factor in the Chinese-Indian competition—and in its perceived significance for the wider world—is that the two countries have such different political systems. Their trajectories, therefore, offer insights into the prospects for development under authoritarianism and under democracy. In addressing this point, Bardhan rightly cautions against the simplistic conclusion that authoritarianism is superior to democracy with regard to growth. Yet he echoes simplistic characterizations of the subject, writing, for example, "India's experience suggests that democracy can also hinder development in a number of ways" and "in China, there is more decisive policy initiative and execution than in India." The real debate, especially in the wake of the recent crisis, is over what mix of democratic jockeying and authoritarian decisiveness makes economies most robust.

The challenge for Beijing and New Delhi is to combine power and legitimacy. Only then can the Chinese and Indian governments take measures that may be unpopular in the short run or damaging to some politically connected sectors but necessary for long-term progress: stimulating job growth, alleviating poverty, protecting the environment, or other vital tasks.

One hears often of a "Beijing consensus" but rarely, if ever, of any Indian model of governance. Indeed, India's case appears to be sui generis, especially since the modern Indian state was born a democracy—unlike other postcolonial states, such as South Korea, which were or remain autocratic. Moreover, New Delhi has not traditionally sought to influence the political practices of other Asian states (lest its own domestic issues become vulnerable to intervention by foreigners). Asia therefore lacks a strong homegrown exemplar of successful economic development under democracy. Indonesia might become such a model, as it has been transitioning to democracy since Suharto's fall in 1998 and now has annual growth rates of four to six percent. But, for now, autocratic China remains Asia's lodestar.

This concerns many in the West who warn against China's model of state capitalism, criticize its human rights abuses and censorship, suspect Beijing of pursuing a manipulative currency policy, and generally see China as a risen dragon seeking domination. According to this view, China's economy has opened and globalized but its politics remain frozen

around the Communist Party. This, in turn, suggests that the Chinese state will remain radically different from, and even opposed to, the liberal states of the West.

WESTERN RULES

Edward Steinfeld's book *Playing Our Game: Why China's Rise Doesn't Threaten the West* offers a different perspective on China's rise. The changes in China's economic and political systems are not contradictory, Steinfeld argues, but are more or less in sync. This, he argues, is because of "institutional outsourcing" from the global system: globalization brings with it commercial discipline and requires states to institute rules in order to foster change and anchor progress.

Having been influenced by foreign investors and experts, the Chinese government and business community have deliberately altered China's commercial environment, especially with regard to legal institutions and industrial-labor relations. For example, in 2007, the National People's Congress enacted a labor contract law that provides individual workers with far more job security than they had under the preexisting laws, which dated back to 1994. China remains a far cry from having the sort of labor unions and collective bargaining that are taken for granted elsewhere, but, as Steinfeld correctly argues, Chinese labor practices are moving away from their revolutionary roots and are increasingly consonant with Western standards.

Meanwhile, argues Steinfeld, the role of the Communist Party within China's political system has changed radically in recent decades. Today, politics are primarily determined not by contests for power between the party and different segments

of society but by partnerships between government forces and reform elements outside the party. Ordinary Chinese people, Steinfeld argues, have gone from being mere subjects to being citizens. Because of this, the Chinese government has to proceed cautiously: to preserve the party's central role, officials must find allies outside the party, including among activists and civil-society elements, that could otherwise threaten the party's monopoly on official power. To Steinfeld, this means that China is evolving in much the same way that other modernizing nations did, including not just South Korea and Taiwan but also the United Kingdom and the United States. Increasingly liberal politics are ahead, he argues, even if the Communist Party will remain central and there will be ebbs and flows along the way.

"China today is growing not by writing its own rules. . . . It is playing our game," Steinfeld writes. That game is globalization, and its dominant rules are set predominately by the West. If this is correct, China will increasingly become a responsible stakeholder in the existing global order. The country, then, does not need to be contained; globalization will take care of that.

Such analysis may breed complacency. First, China may not follow established rules. Beijing has had high-profile difficulties with Google over the past months, and the CEO of General Electric, Jeffrey Immelt, recently commented that although his company had ramped up investments in China, he was not sure that Chinese officials "want any of us to win or any of us to be successful." Furthermore, established rules might be unable to accommodate some of the unprecedented issues raised by Chinese growth. Take monetary policy: What China has done in accumulating massive financial reserves is similar to what other Asian states did during their development, but those states had far smaller economies. China's accumulation of reserves might threaten the crisis-plagued global financial system, especially given the complex matter of whether Beijing sets policy based on political reasons as much as economic ones.

The state's decisive role in the Chinese economy allowed it to respond bluntly and effectively to the recent global financial crisis. But, as the financier George Soros and others have rightly warned, there are substantial dangers that China's brand of state capitalism may give too little regard to the market and to humanistic values. Steinfeld regards such concerns as throwbacks to a past era, before China began acting as an authoritarian liberalizer in the mold of other East Asian states. He argues, for example, that the attempt of the China National Offshore Oil Corporation to purchase U.S.-based Unocal in 2005—which some critics in the United States argued was motivated by a strategic effort to secure Chinese access to energy—was merely a corporate decision aimed at modernizing a major business. CNOOC, he points out, was publicly listed in Hong Kong and had been working with Western consultants to achieve global scale and standing.

These insights are useful, but perceptions matter, and many U.S. policymakers viewed CNOOC's actions as a case of Chinese leaders using corporate cover for their pursuit of national security goals. This is one reason why China's rise continues to trigger suspicion in Asia, the United States, and elsewhere.

THE INDISPENSABLE NATION

Many Americans are concerned that in a "post-American world," as the *Newsweek* editor Fareed Zakaria put it, a rising Asia and a worried and weary United States will ignore each other or interact acrimoniously. But, as Steinfeld argues, Asia's fate is tied by globalization to the West.

Before the economic crisis, there seemed a reasonable case to be made that Asia could decouple from the West—that increased economic integration among Asian states could keep the region growing even if U.S. consumers stopped buying Asian goods. As the crisis mounted in 2008, however, it became clear that Asia and the West are not decoupling: when U.S. demand fell sharply, it immediately hurt production across Asia, especially in China.

But some efforts are already under way to limit Asian economies' reliance on U.S. markets by increasing Asian states' own domestic consumption and developing new financial mechanisms to keep Asian savings in Asia and away from the U.S. Treasury. For example, under the recently enacted Chiang Mai Initiative, Asian governments (including the members of ASEAN, plus China, Japan, and South Korea) pledged over $120 billion for currency swaps aimed at ensuring currency stability across the continent. And as of this year, ASEAN and China are united in a free-trade zone that is the world's largest combined market, with over 1.8 billion people. (In addition, various bilateral trade agreements have crisscrossed Asia for years.)

Steinfeld's book explains why even such reforms separate Asian economies from Western ones only marginally. As China has captured the central role in global production networks, Steinfeld points out, its economic growth has unleashed great innovative capacity in U.S. companies. To be sure, the economic crisis has made some U.S. actors, such as labor unions, increasingly critical of globalization, but major U.S. companies have long recognized that trade and investment in Asia are essential to their ability to innovate and stay ahead.

There are many additional factors outside the scope of Steinfeld's book that also demonstrate the interdependence of Asia and the West—especially in terms of regional security. The United States remains essential to a range of issues in the region, including the stability of the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Strait, disputes over control of the South China Sea and over human rights in countries such as Myanmar (also known as Burma), and the future of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Asia currently has no local substitute for U.S. influence, and indeed, old and unsettled Asian rivalries could reignite if any one power tried to assert itself too forcefully. The rise of Asia is far from a truly continental affair; the region is not united. Policymakers in Washington and across Asia, therefore, should continue to welcome strong U.S. influence in the region.

Responses

Islamism, Unveiled

From Berlin to Cairo and Back Again

Decoding Double Talk

PAUL BERMAN

In "Veiled Truths" (July/August 2010), Marc Lynch's suggestion that clever U.S. diplomats ought to play rival factions of the Islamist movement against one another has a ring of common sense, which I applaud, even if the idea is not exactly novel. But I worry that Lynch's one intelligent remark may lull readers into supposing that his other comments are equally sensible—for example, his judgment that Hamas is a "moderate" movement, useful as "a firewall against radicalization." But mostly, I worry that this one comment may lull readers into believing anything that Lynch writes about me or my book *The Flight of the Intellectuals*.

Lynch's complaints about me are large and various, and they rise to a climactic sentence: "Nor is he concerned that expressing extreme anti-Islamic views and embracing only those Muslims who reject Islam might help al Qaeda by antagonizing those hewing to the Muslim mainstream and perhaps convincing them that [Osama] bin Laden is right after all." If you disentangle the complexities of the gerunds and clauses in the sentence, you will see that Lynch has accused me of being an anti-Muslim extremist whose writings are fodder for terrorism. Here, I conclude, is a less than positive review. And yet what dreadful thing have I done?

It has lately been argued that the United States should "engage" with Islamists. I agree. Therefore, I have engaged with the Swiss philosopher Tariq Ramadan. I have done this by taking him seriously as a thinker, by reading his work closely, by examining his philosophical assumptions, and by arguing with him at length. This is not an incitement to terrorism. This is a way to clarify ideas and reduce misunderstandings. To be sure, my study of Ramadan's work has not aroused in me feelings of admiration. But I have laid out in full the reasons for my poor opinion, as critics, unlike diplomats, should always do.

Lynch has immersed himself in Ramadan's world of intra-Islamist debate. But I fear that in doing so, he has succumbed to a common syndrome of academic regional specialists: he has ended up adopting several of the intellectual assumptions that ought to be his topic of study. He denounces me as an unreasonable

extremist because he cannot imagine how a reasonable person could read Ramadan in a different light than he does. And he fails to notice that by taking some of the Islamists' assumptions as factual reality, he has lost the ability to make elementary judgments. His depiction of Hamas as a moderate and helpful organization can serve as one example, and I will point to another.

The name of Sheik Yusuf al-Qaradawi, an Islamic scholar and al Jazeera televangelist, pops up repeatedly in my book because it pops up still more frequently in Ramadan's major books on Islamic philosophy. Lynch judges my description of Qaradawi to be drawn "so crudely that few Muslims would recognize him in the caricature." Lynch would prefer Qaradawi to be described as "an icon to mainstream nonviolent Islamists and an object of outrage among Salafi jihadists"—which makes Qaradawi sound admirable, or at least minimally acceptable, even if, as Lynch acknowledges, Qaradawi "often takes issue with U.S. foreign policy and is certainly hostile toward Israel."

From reading Lynch, however, or from reading Ramadan (who has always treated Qaradawi as a revered mentor, even when respectfully disagreeing with him), one would never guess that Qaradawi is a genocidal anti-Semite. In Qaradawi's televised opinion, Allah inflicted Hitler on the Jews "to put them in their place." And Qaradawi has called for a renewal of Hitler's efforts: "Oh Allah, count their numbers, and kill them, down to the very last one."

Lynch observes that I describe Qaradawi as "monstrous," with the quotation marks signifying Lynch's wry opinion that I have rendered Qaradawi cartoonishly. He scoffs at my insistence on noticing a Nazi influence in Qaradawi's thinking. But Lynch is able to scoff only because, like Ramadan himself, he hides behind euphemisms—in this case, his phrase "hostile toward Israel," when what he really means is "Hitlerian."

These television speeches by Qaradawi were translated and posted online by the Middle East Media Research Institute in January 2009. A few months later, Ramadan published the most recent of his serious philosophical books, *Radical Reform*—and in this book, exactly as in the past, Ramadan repeatedly cites Qaradawi in a spirit of deference and reverence. My impulse is to be horrified. Lynch's response is to say that if someone in this debate is an extremist, it is I. Who is right? I will only observe that Lynch should not expect people with reactions like mine to pipe down anytime soon.

Lynch complains that I rely on translations, but this is not true in regard to Ramadan, whom I have read in his own language of French. Lynch writes that "Ramadan has criticized bin Laden and condemned terrorism." But Ramadan, in his untranslated book *Jihâd, violence, guerre et paix en Islam*, specifically limits his criticism to bin Laden's opinions, not addressing his actions—given that, in Ramadan's view, there is no "definitive proof" of bin Laden's role in 9/11. And Ramadan explains that Palestinian terrorists have "no recourse" but terrorism—which, to my eyes, undoes his condemnation.

In *The Flight of the Intellectuals*, my discussion of controversies over the phrase "Islamic fascism" derives from yet another untranslated book: *Sortir de la malédiction* (To Escape the Curse), by Abdelwahab Meddeb, a prize-winning French Tunisian author. My discussion of this topic

concludes with commentary on a novel by the Francophone Algerian writer Boualem Sansal called *The German Mujahid*, which pertinently asks why people shrink from noticing the obvious links between the Nazi past and the Islamist present. Lynch appears to think that Francophone writers such as Meddeb and Sansal count for nothing in the world of modern ideas—not to mention the Moroccan novelist Tahar Ben Jelloun or scholars such as the Syrian German political theorist Bassam Tibi (just to cite some writers whose work directly influenced my book).

But what makes Lynch so sure? Ramadan's single most interesting thought is his prediction that European Islam will someday prove to be the center and not just a marginal element of worldwide Islam. When that day comes, however, the truly influential thinkers and writers will turn out to be the very people whom Lynch dismisses as inconsequential—the European (and North American) liberals from Muslim backgrounds, freethinkers and pious believers alike. These people, the anti-Islamists, are right now composing brilliant and lasting works of literature and philosophy—but their achievements will never be recognized by Islamism's apologists in Western universities.

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The Nazis' Arabian Nights

JEFFREY HERF

Marc Lynch writes that Paul Berman's "obsession with Nazism is distracting, and his dissection of [Tariq] Ramadan approaches the pathological." This sentence—which dismisses concern about Nazism and makes an ad hominem attack on an accomplished public intellectual—reflects badly on Lynch and this magazine. Lynch's essay also presents more substantive issues, which merit a fuller reply.

Lynch refers to "Berman's ludicrous efforts to construct an intellectual and organizational genealogy linking Nazi Germany and contemporary Islamism." I share in this supposedly ludicrous endeavor: since 9/11, I have argued that the rhetoric and ideology of contemporary Islamism draws in part on the history of Arab and Islamist collaboration with Nazi Germany. Contemporary Islamism draws on paranoid and anti-Semitic conspiracy theories that resemble those used to justify mass murder in the 1940s. And in their hatred of Western modernity and democracy, as well as in their suppression of women, Islamists do recall the Nazi and fascist ideologues of the previous century.

These are not new arguments, nor am I alone in making them. The link between Nazism and Islamism was first explored during World War II, in reports issued by the U.S. State Department, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), and various military intelligence agencies. Mapping this intellectual lineage subsequently became a common theme in postwar scholarship. Classic works include Manfred Halpren's 1963 *The Politics and Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa*, which argued that "neo-Islamic movements are essentially fascist movements," and Lukasz Hirszowicz's 1966 *The Third Reich and the Arab East,* which revealed the enthusiasm with which Haj Amin al-Husseini, the grand mufti

of Jerusalem, regarded Nazi Germany. In recent years, German, Israeli, and U.S. scholars, some of whom have used Arabic and Iranian texts, have made additional contributions. Clear echoes of the kinds of anti-Semitic conspiracy theories that were at the heart of Nazi ideology can be found in a range of Islamist statements, such as the 1988 Hamas charter, proclamations by al Qaeda, speeches by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, and recent declarations by Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

In writing *Nazi Propaganda for the Arab World*, which documents the Third Reich's conscious propaganda campaign aimed at the Middle East and North Africa, I drew on several thousand pages of translations of Nazi Germany's Arabic-language radio broadcasts to the region. The translated collection of these texts, called "Axis Broadcasts in Arabic," was produced by a team assembled by Alexander Kirk, the U.S. ambassador to Egypt from 1941 to 1944, and later overseen by Pinkney Tuck, Kirk's successor in Cairo. The files of the U.S. embassy in Egypt were placed in the U.S. National Archives in Maryland and were declassified in 1977. For 30 years, scholars and experts on the Middle East managed to avoid making any mention of these crucial documents; it was only in 2007, when I came across the translations in the course of my research for *Nazi Propaganda for the Arab World*, that they entered the scholarly debate. If there is anything "ludicrous" about documenting the extent of Arab and Islamist collaboration with Nazi Germany, it is that scholars who study the history and politics of the modern Middle East managed for so long to avoid confronting such crucial evidence.

The history of this collaboration was not always viewed as a distraction. In the years during and after World War II, some U.S. diplomats and military officers were interested in—and worried about—this relationship and its aftereffects. In a report from June 1945, analysts at the OSS ruefully noted that "in the Near East the popular attitude toward the trial of war criminals is one of apathy. As a result of the general Near Eastern feeling of hostility to the imperialism of certain of the Allied powers . . . there is a tendency to sympathize with rather than condemn those who have aided the Axis." CIA officials were sufficiently worried that they continued to follow the activities of Husseini and other Arab and Islamist collaborators with the Nazi regime into the 1950s. Yet as the anti-Hitler coalition gave way to the altered fronts and affiliations of the Cold War—and to realist arguments about access to Middle Eastern oil—interest in the Arab and Islamist collaboration with Nazism faded into the background.

Since Lynch is unable to deny that Husseini collaborated with the Nazi regime, he repeats the common apologia, describing the collaboration as a matter of calculation rather than belief—as if this would somehow be less objectionable. In fact, by the 1930s, Husseini was already a collaborator of the heart as well as the head. He played a central role in propagating a distinctively anti-Semitic reading of the Koran and its commentaries. Rather than couch his alliance "in Islamic terms in an effort to win over mass support," as Lynch writes, Husseini won a significant following precisely because—in contrast to more moderate Arab and Palestinian leaders—he connected his opposition to

Zionist politics to the ancient hatred of the Jews that emerged from his distorted reading of Islamic texts. It was this conception of Islam that made him appealing to Hitler, Heinrich Himmler, Joachim von Ribbentrop, and other high-ranking Nazi officials. In their view, Husseini offered a point of entry for Nazi Germany into a popular current of Islamist sentiment. Yet for Lynch, this is all a "cartoonish tale."

Lynch dates the Islamic intellectual Sayyid Qutb's radicalization to the Egyptian government's repression of the Muslim Brotherhood, which gained full force after the group's failed assassination attempt on Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser in 1954. But Qutb wrote the essay "Our Struggle With the Jews"—one of the crucial links between Nazi and Islamist ideology—in the early 1950s, several years before Nasser began his crackdown. This viciously anti-Semitic text, which was published again by the Saudi government in 1970, repeats many themes from the Nazi radio broadcasts and from Husseini's ideology—namely, that Jews have always been the "enemy" of Islam and sought its destruction and that therefore they deserved the punishments inflicted by Allah and carried out by Hitler. Over the years, Qutb's essay has become a canonical text for Islamists. In 1987, Ronald Nettler, a British historian of Islam, published an English translation of the essay in a book called *Past Trials and Present Tribulations: A Muslim Fundamentalist's View of the Jews*. Somehow, this text has also escaped Lynch's notice.

Islamism has always been a hybrid ideology. Its origins can be found in the politics of the Middle East and North Africa from the 1930s to the 1950s. However, one of the key chapters of that period was also written in Nazi-era Berlin. Although Islamism has various forms of expression, groups such as al Qaeda, Hamas, Hezbollah, and the current regime in Tehran—which engage in terrorism and espouse radical anti-Semitism—are inspired by its core themes. Berman's *The Flight of the Intellectuals* raises a deeply disturbing question: Why do many intellectuals who think of themselves as liberals find it so hard to speak more plainly about Islamism, its past ties to Nazism and fascism, and its connections to terrorism today? Lynch's attack on Berman—and his dismissal of the large and growing body of evidence on Nazism's influence on Islamism in the mid-twentieth century—calls into doubt his own claims to expertise.

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Lynch Replies

Paul Berman is correct to point to European Islam as a fundamental arena for the development of new ideas and models for how Muslims can live as citizens and believers. He and I share many concerns about trends within the Muslim communities of Europe and the Middle East, even if we disagree about how to understand and counter them. Those disagreements matter. Berman errs in framing the struggle within these communities as one between Islamists and "liberals from Muslim backgrounds," which is one, but not the primary, line of contestation today. Understanding the challenge of how Muslims

in Europe and throughout the world will decide to participate in politics and society requires a sense of the ongoing struggle among Salafists, Islamists, and a vast middle ground of politically motivated but non-Islamist Muslims. Berman's call to embrace figures widely viewed as hostile by most Muslims and his demonization of those seen as mainstream feeds the most dangerous narratives of a war between the West and Islam; whatever his intentions, Berman is likely to empower the violent extremists whom we both hope to marginalize and defeat.

Yusuf al-Qaradawi, the influential Qatar-based Islamist, exemplifies both our disagreement and its stakes. Indeed, Qaradawi has voiced extremely hostile views of Israel, and such rhetoric has made him an intensely controversial figure in Europe and the Arab world. But his views, particularly during the bloody years after the outbreak of the al Aqsa intifada, in 2000, are unfortunately well within the Arab mainstream. To understand why so many Arabs and Muslims do not view Qaradawi as an extremist requires exactly the kind of immersion in intra-Muslim debates that Berman denigrates. Most Muslims judge Qaradawi not by his views on Israel but rather by his influential redefinition of the "Islamic awakening," his doctrinal arguments against juridical extremism, his fatwas in support of democracy, and his antipathy to al Qaeda and to Salafi jihadism. Knowing all this does not excuse Qaradawi's views on Israel, but it does explain why reducing him to those views will strike most Muslims—and academic specialists—as an unacceptable caricature and why Tariq Ramadan's admiration for him is not the smoking gun that Berman claims.

Jeffrey Herf takes exception to my depiction of Berman's account of the Nazi influence on the Islamic world as "ludicrous." He protests that his recent book, *Nazi Propaganda for the Arab World*, offers substantial evidence in support of Berman's claims. It does not. Through an analysis of newly studied U.S. embassy documents, Herf's book does offer fascinating details on the content of German propaganda broadcasts to the Middle East. But few students of propaganda and strategic communications would be so bold as to assume that a message sent is a message received. In order to prove that this propaganda decisively shaped the evolution of political Islam or attitudes in the Middle East today, one would have to look closely at the evolution of ideas and trends within contemporary Islamism.

This is where Herf, like Berman, falls short. It is not sufficient to search in U.S. government archives or to rely on an English translation of an essay by Sayyid Qutb to discover the ideas and influences of contemporary Islamism. It would be better to learn Arabic and read Qutb's work in the original and become immersed in the vast ocean of commentaries and debates that have consumed Islamist political thought over many decades. Similarly, it would be useful to travel to the region and talk to Islamists, ask about their influences and their priorities, observe their political behavior and interactions, and read their published and unpublished documents. One could even read the mountains of scholarship written about contemporary Islamists in English. But Herf writes about Islamism in the Arab world while citing no documents or literature in Arabic and while footnoting

virtually none of the enormous secondary literature on the subject. This will not do.

Were there Nazi influences on the Middle East in the 1940s? Of course. The Germans, like the Allies, realized the strategic significance of the region and sought to mobilize support where they could. Arabs perceived a common threat posed by the United Kingdom and France—along with expanding Jewish immigration to Palestine—and some sought assistance from Berlin. As the conflict over Palestine escalated, many Arabs and Muslims became attracted to European ideas—including, sadly, anti-Semitic ones—which took root in new ground. But as *The Arabs and the Holocaust*, a recent book by Gilbert Achcar, a Lebanese academic, makes clear, the argument for a decisive Nazi influence on contemporary Islamism remains thin. The suggestion that the rhetoric of the World War II era in some way validates the inflammatory concept of "Islamic fascism" simply does not hold up.

Ultimately, the historiographic debate is not the point. No matter what lay in the hearts of Haj Amin al-Husseini or Hasan al-Banna, founder of the Muslim Brotherhood—or in the hearts of the millions of Arabs and Muslims who have mobilized around the issues those two men raised—those days are long past. Those arguments have little relevance to the more urgent question of how to best grapple with today's multifaceted and rapidly evolving Islam. It is not surprising that few Islamists or Muslims—or academics, for that matter—feel the need to return to the Nazi era to understand today's problems.

The attempt to draw a straight line from Hitler to today's Islamists leads directly to the kind of overgeneralization found in Herf's response, in which al Qaeda, Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Iranian regime are conflated despite the vast differences in their origins, ideologies, methods, beliefs, and memberships. In arguing that Islamists resemble the Nazis in their hatred of democracy, Herf is seemingly unaware that Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Muslim Brotherhood routinely participate in elections and that Islamists—including Qaradawi—have developed elaborate theoretical justifications in favor of democratic participation.

That sort of misreading of Islamism has very serious costs: it misinforms publics, misguides policymakers into making potentially tragic mistakes, alienates Muslims who must be integrated into Western societies, and empowers the extremists opposed to such peaceful coexistence. Preventing such unnecessary tragedies should be a top priority for scholars and policymakers alike.

Recent Books on International Relations

Political and Legal

G. JOHN IKENBERRY

The Frugal Superpower: America's Global Leadership in a Cash-Strapped Era. BY MICHAEL MANDELBAUM. PublicAffairs, 2010, 224 pp. $23.95.

U.S. foreign policy has entered an era increasingly defined by debt and deficits. This provocative little book looks at the numbers and concludes that retrenchment is unavoidable. Mandelbaum paints a gloomy portrait of the massive and unsustainable budget deficits that have been generated in the last decade by generous tax cuts, expanded federal programs, and the war in Iraq—pressures that, as Americans age and entitlement spending expands, will only get worse. These accumulated liabilities will begin to impinge on the United States' foreign policy spending and geopolitical commitments. It will be a new situation for U.S. policymakers, who have not had to think in terms of economic costs since the 1940s. Mandelbaum calls the impending scarcity of foreign policy resources an "unfortunate development," given the United States' long-standing role as a provider of global economic and security leadership. Not just American elites but the world, too, will need to adjust to the contraction of Washington's global role—and Mandelbaum believes that this could lead to renewed great-power conflict as China, Russia, and other states compete to fill the vacuum. But he leaves as an open question what commitments and global roles the United States will need to cut.

Follies of Power: America's Unipolar Fantasy. BY DAVID P. CALLEO. Cambridge University Press, 2009, 188 pp. $30.00.

Calleo argues that American foreign policy elites after the Cold War, instead of guiding the world to a stable system of balance, restraint, and shared leadership, quickly became enamored with the idea of "global hegemony." Clinton-era foreign policy focused on economic hegemony and the expansion of NATO, and the George W. Bush administration recast the pursuit of unipolar dominance in terms of the "war on terror," militarizing its diplomacy and transforming the United States from the "world's favorite protector into its leading disturber of the peace." Calleo singles out the neoconservatives for criticism, but he also thinks that the "unipolar fantasy" is a more general feature of the American political imagination. Due to the United States' declining

economic and soft power, he concludes that the gap between grand visions of hegemonic dominance and national power will only grow. The book's most interesting arguments are about Europe and its role in redirecting Washington toward the pursuit of a more collaborative—or even confederal—interstate system in which a coalition of power centers takes the lead. *Follies of Power* provides one of the most elegant statements yet in favor of a U.S. strategy of retrenchment. But it fails to reflect on the liberal features of U.S. hegemony—support for rules and an open world system—which are still in demand.

Grand Strategies: Literature, Statecraft, and World Order. BY CHARLES HILL. Yale University Press, 2010, 384 pp. $27.50.

Hill, a career diplomat who now teaches grand strategy at Yale, has written a fascinating book that has the feel of a life's work. He journeys through the Western literary and philosophical canon in search of insights about power, order, and strategy. At each stop along the long arc of world history, Hill pauses to consider the thoughts of poets, playwrights, novelists, and essayists—Homer, Thucydides, Virgil, Cervantes, Machiavelli, Shakespeare, Defoe, Rousseau, Schiller, Dickens, Nietzsche, and many more—who illuminated the grand political developments of their day. (In *Gulliver's Travels*, to take one example, Jonathan Swift reflected on the various types of states at a time when the future of the modernizing state was uncertain.) Hill affirms the intellectual endeavor of looking at the world through a literary lens—seeing literature as a "tutor of statecraft"—as much as the strategic insights that specific texts might yield. At a deeper level, the book is about the fragility of order and the struggle of statesmen to balance, restrain, and legitimate state power.

ConUNdrum: The Limits of the United Nations and the Search for Alternatives. EDITED BY BRETT D. SCHAEFER. Rowman & Littlefield, 2009, 400 pp. $34.95.

Twenty-six years ago, the Heritage Foundation published *A World Without a U.N.*, a portrait of a severely flawed organization. In this new volume, the think tank has again assembled experts to assess the UN—and the diagnosis has not improved much. Its activities, budgets, and personnel have continued to expand, but serious reform efforts have failed. The chapters catalog the body's dysfunctions and disappointments when it comes to military intervention, peacekeeping, the environment, human rights, and the advocacy of economic and social rights. Some of the contributors acknowledge the unique role that the UN plays as a multilateral organization with universal membership, particularly in areas such as human rights and public health. Kim Holmes makes a striking contribution in advancing the notion of "smart multilateralism," arguing that U.S. policymakers should engage multilaterally only when it advances well-defined U.S. interests and promotes freedom. One theme that unites the volume is the need for the United States to work more closely with other democracies inside and outside the UN to isolate despotic states while giving greater voice to the American values of markets and freedom. Just how to reconcile this goal with the goal of strengthening global institutions to cope with the world's proliferating economic, social, and environmental problems, however, requires more reflection.

Recent Books

Economic, Social, and Environmental

RICHARD N. COOPER

America's Global Advantage: US Hegemony and International Cooperation. BY CARLA NORRLOF. Cambridge University Press, 2010, 292 pp. $85.00 (paper, $32.99).

There is a widespread belief that the era of U.S. global dominance is rapidly giving way to a multipolar system. Norrlof disagrees. In this carefully argued treatise, she contends that despite a gradual decline in its relative economic size, the United States still possesses three critical features that give it "positional advantages" over all other states: the largest domestic economy, the key world currency, and the strongest military. Although some observers think that the United States' hegemonic burdens outweigh any benefits, she suggests otherwise: Washington actually reaps more than it pays out in the provision of public goods. Drawing on "hegemonic stability theory," which was developed by Charles Kindleberger, Robert Gilpin, and others in the 1970s and 1980s, Norrlof argues that the United States has incentives to use its dominant position to organize and maintain an open economic system, providing security and access to markets for other states while enjoying a steady stream of economic benefits for itself. With the special role of the dollar, the United States has been able to externalize the costs of macroeconomic adjustment, and its global military presence reinforces the perceived stability of the dollar and the U.S. market. Thanks to the mutually reinforcing logics of trade, money, and security, Norrlof argues, even a gradual decline in the United States' global market share would not undermine its primacy.

On the Brink: Inside the Race to Stop the Collapse of the Global Financial System. BY HENRY M. PAULSON, JR. Business Plus, 2010, 496 pp. $28.99.

As the U.S. secretary of the treasury from July 2006 to January 2009, Paulson was at the center of the recent financial storm and, along with Federal Reserve Chair Ben Bernanke, responsible for preventing it from becoming an economic catastrophe. Here he provides a fast-paced insider's account of his attempts to stay ahead of rapidly moving developments, especially during the second half of 2008. Whether these efforts succeeded or failed, they tended to be cliffhangers. The story is presented as a personal chronology of events, with occasional asides to provide the reader with background on persons, firms, agencies, and the legal limitations to action. The result is a fascinating picture of how Washington functions during a time of crisis, complicated in this case by an election campaign and a reluctance by many Republicans—including Senator John McCain—to cooperate with a pragmatic Republican administration.

The End of the Free Market: Who Wins the War Between States and Corporations? BY IAN BREMMER. Portfolio, 2010, 240 pp. $26.95.

Perhaps the most enduring consequence of the recent financial crisis will be to slow the worldwide trend toward market capitalism. The alternative is not Soviet-

style central planning, which is incapable of allocating resources in a modern economy, but state capitalism. Under this model, semiautonomous enterprises, often owned by governments, are guided in their strategic and sometimes even their operational decisions by their political masters. Although the usual goal for these enterprises is to create jobs, when profitable, they can finance the state. As this interesting book demonstrates, state capitalism is nothing new, but it has been given new longevity. Bremmer explains how the model has taken hold in China, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and other Arab Gulf states, which he contrasts with developing countries, such as Egypt and India, that have begun to rely more on markets. (Europe, surprisingly, is not covered.) The title aside, Bremmer believes that market capitalism has compelling advantages over state capitalism, especially its flexibility and capacity for innovation. Provided it is well managed, market capitalism will predominate in the long run, especially in functioning democracies, where state capitalism is hard to sustain against private enterprise. But state capitalism will not give way easily or quickly where it serves the interests of those in power.

The Great Brain Race: How Global Universities Are Reshaping the World. BY BEN WILDAVSKY. Princeton University Press, 2010, 248 pp. $26.95.

The widespread recognition of the importance of human capital has led one country after another to plow more resources into higher education, with some even explicitly aspiring to establish world-class universities that emulate leading British and U.S. universities. Wildavsky argues that the latter objective will be extremely difficult to achieve, even over decades, but that the effort to increase access to higher-quality education, based on merit and performance rather than personal connections, will be beneficial all around. He addresses all aspects of the internationalization of universities—students, faculty, branch campuses, financing, and even curricula—and contends that the combination of research and teaching, although sometimes a source of tension within universities, has been a resounding success. Americans should not fear advances abroad, he points out, since these will only add to the stock of public knowledge and enlarge the possibilities for innovation, which makes everyone better off.

Piracy: The Intellectual Property Wars From Gutenberg to Gates. BY ADRIAN JOHNS. University of Chicago Press, 2010, 640 pp. $35.00.

Against Intellectual Monopoly. BY MICHELE BOLDRIN AND DAVID K. LEVINE. Cambridge University Press, 2008, 312 pp. $30.00.

The first use of the term "piracy" to refer to the theft of intellectual property was in seventeenth-century England, and today it can mean anything from bootlegging a DVD to reproducing patented drugs. Johns, a historian, has written an erudite treatment of the origin and evolution of this type of piracy. Offering a dispassionate account of the interaction between the illegal diffusion of intellectual property and its defense, he observes that this evolution continues. The whole idea of intellectual property, he even speculates, may well end within the foreseeable future.

In *Against Intellectual Monopoly*, the economists Boldrin and Levine argue

boldly and forthrightly that patents and copyrights are unnecessary evils—legal monopolies without merit—and should be abolished altogether. Remarkably, they have found no empirical evidence that patents and copyrights live up to their stated rationale of encouraging discovery and literary production (which is not to say that there might not be particular examples). They do find a great deal of evidence, however, that the introduction of patents and copyrights actually inhibits discovery and innovation—and even discouraged musical composition in the United Kingdom of the nineteenth century. That these laws have been foisted on poor countries by Europe and the United States through international trade negotiations is a matter of serious concern for the authors.

Misadventures of the Most Favored Nations: Clashing Egos, Inflated Ambitions, and the Great Shambles of the World Trade System. BY PAUL BLUSTEIN. PublicAffairs, 2009, 368 pp. $27.95.

Trade negotiations are usually tedious affairs, full of picky details of intense interest only to those most directly affected by their outcome. Hours, even days, can be spent in disagreement over the exact wording of clauses. The still unfinished Doha Round of international trade negotiations, which began in late 2001 after a failed attempt in Seattle two years earlier, has been plagued by such disagreements since the beginning. Blustein, a journalist, captures both the broad thrust for trade liberalization and the numerous minidramas during Doha Round negotiations up through the failed ministerial meeting of July 2008. It is a sad tale of the triumph, so far, of particularistic interests and anxieties over a broad vision that almost all the parties have insisted they desire. Blustein concludes with a well-deserved swipe at the recent proliferation of bilateral preferential trade agreements, which have diverted attention from multilateral liberalization.

The Tenth Parallel: Dispatches From the Fault Line Between Christianity and Islam. BY ELIZA GRISWOLD. Farrar, Strauss & Giroux, 2010, 336 pp. $27.00.

Taming the Gods: Religion and Democracy on Three Continents. BY IAN BURUMA. Princeton University Press, 2010, 142 pp. $19.95.

Both *The Tenth Parallel* and *Taming the Gods* are concerned with the perceived growing role of religion as a problem in international affairs. The tenth parallel is the circle of latitude several hundred miles north of the equator, which happens to correspond to some of the "hot spots" in U.S. foreign policy—Nigeria, Sudan, Somalia, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines. Griswold uses this geographic device to argue that these countries are not only arid, poor, and war-torn but also the scene of the new ideological fault line between a resurgent Islam and evangelical Christianity. And she documents how what are often considered religious conflicts are also about land, water, oil, and other natural resources. Since ethnicity, religion, and economic livelihood sometimes coincide, however, conflicts over seemingly secular concerns are shaped by religious ideas, values, and doctrines, too.

Buruma chooses the countries he knows best—the United States, the Netherlands, China, and Japan—to make general observations about religion, democracy, and secularism. The "God gap" between Europe and the United States, as he sees

it, is more apparent than real, since people everywhere are trying to cope with a globalizing world by turning to fixed racial, religious, or national identities. Here, he is correct; fundamentalists of all stripes offer quite modern constructions of religion, and this is what distinguishes their brand of religion from those of traditional religious leaders and institutions (indeed, the conflict between the two types is one of Griswold's themes). Buruma also restates the liberal case that religion can threaten democracy and extends it to Asian religions. For liberals like him, John Locke, Baruch Spinoza, David Hume, and Alexis de Tocqueville are the great heroes of reason, toleration, and enlightenment. But, as the historian Michael Burleigh has shown, the story of religion and politics even in Europe has a far more complicated plot line than what Buruma allows. And it is remarkable that the discussions between the atheist philosopher Jürgen Habermas and Joseph Ratzinger (which took place before Ratzinger became Pope Benedict XVI) on a more nuanced understanding of religion, reason, and democracy figure nowhere in the book.

SCOTT M. THOMAS

Military, Scientific, and Technological

LAWRENCE D. FREEDMAN

The Father of Us All: War and History, Ancient and Modern. BY VICTOR DAVIS HANSON. Bloomsbury Press, 2010, 272 pp. $25.00.

For Hanson, war is a constant that will never go away. As a classicist with an interest in the contemporary, he sees continuities in why and how wars are fought. This is something that should be taken seriously, he believes, because it usually matters who wins and because the pain and suffering that wars inevitably cause is likely to be greater if generals and their political masters are clueless about its conduct. In the first, and best, essay in this lively collection, Hanson deplores the tendency of universities since the Vietnam War to treat war studies with the same distaste with which they treat war, as if oncologists should be viewed with suspicion given their fascination with cancer. Acknowledging his rather old-fashioned focus on strategy and battle, he is somewhat bemused by academic writing on war that is concerned with such matters as gender and identity. He makes his point by citing the responses of students taught in a night class at Fresno State, in California, whose down-to-earth responses to Thucydides ("I bet he killed a few to write like that") he clearly prefers to the postmodern analyses of the Ivy League. As with any collection, the pieces are uneven, but the writing is always elegant and erudite.

Be Very Afraid: The Cultural Responses to Terror, Pandemics, Environmental Devastation, Nuclear Annihilation, and Other Threats. BY ROBERT WUTHNOW. Oxford University Press, 2010, 304 pp. $29.95.

It is hard to get threats right, to find the right balance between scaremongering and complacency, between panic and passivity. Wuthnow considers how Americans have responded to seemingly existential perils, including nuclear weapons, terrorism, the millennium bug, the avian flu, and global

warning. He traces how threats, first described by governments, the media, and experts, eventually seep into literature and movies, such as Nevil Shute's *On the Beach* or Al Gore's *An Inconvenient Truth*. This thoughtful account explains how official responses become institutionalized in organizations and professional bodies that have an interest in describing a threat in ways they can manage. Drawing on "terror management theory" from the field of psychology, Wuthnow finds that the public feels a need to do something, even something inconsequential and inappropriate, in response—from charitable giving, vigils, and demonstrations to violence against members of those communities supposedly responsible, as after 9/11.

War Stories: The Causes and Consequences of Public Views of War. BY MATTHEW A. BAUM AND TIM J. GROELING. Princeton University Press, 2009, 352 pp. $70.00 (paper, $26.95).

The prejudices of the media inevitably affect debate on foreign affairs, but their impact is as much eccentric as biased. Editorial judgments reflect convictions about what is newsworthy, which often involves highlighting conflict and dissent. This can be frustrating for governments, but they have the advantage of being able to frame issues to suit their policies. Meanwhile, the public, which knows and cares little about international affairs, must work out who they trust and what they want to understand. In this landmark study, Baum and Groeling reveal how foreign policy messages are conveyed and undermined. With a cascading set of hypotheses and a demanding methodology, at times the argument just gets too complicated. Nonetheless, perseverance is rewarded. Using the Iraq war as their main case, the authors show how governments can take advantage of the "elasticity of reality"—at least until it becomes too difficult to fit awkward events into their preferred narratives. This limits the durability of any "rally round the flag" effect. Indeed, *War Stories* demonstrates that bipartisanship may become an even more elusive goal, not only because of the evident divisions among the elite but also because of the fragmentation of the new media, which lets the public choose their opinion sources without too great a risk of being challenged.

Irrational Security: The Politics of Defense From Reagan to Obama. BY DANIEL WIRLS. Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010, 256 pp. $60.00 (paper, $30.00).

Buying National Security: How America Plans and Pays for Its Global Role and Safety at Home. BY GORDON ADAMS AND CINDY WILLIAMS. Routledge, 2009, 348 pp. $135.00 (paper, $44.95).

Instead of reaping the peace dividend anticipated at the end of the Cold War, the United States now spends as much on defense as the rest of the world put together, even though its current enemies are insurgents and much weaker states—not another superpower. Wirls provides a brisk and highly critical account of how this happened, starting with Ronald Reagan, noting the caution of George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton in the face of dire warnings about the dangers of assuming that the world had become a safer place, and then dwelling on the profligacy of George W. Bush. Wirls' target is what he sees as a built-in bias for spending on the military without any proper debate over whether the money is well spent. After a decade of frustrating

military campaigns, and with the country facing such a staggering budget deficit, Wirls gives ammunition to those who believe that the Pentagon's budget is a prime target for cuts.

Anybody seeking to get a grip on defense budgets and the associated expenditures on diplomacy, foreign aid, intelligence, and homeland security should start with the authoritative description by Adams and Williams of how these budgets are put together. It is hard to imagine that anyone will ever do a more thorough job making sense of the bewildering complexity of the relevant processes. When it was formed in 2003, the Department of Homeland Security, to take one example, brought together 22 disparate agencies, all with their own approaches—a challenge with which it is still struggling. Alarmingly, this is just a snapshot of a system that is, as Adams and Williams regularly remark, "in flux." They are aware of the strains on the process and have suggestions for improvement and reform, but with such complexity there will always be opportunities for parochial influences.

The United States

WALTER RUSSELL MEAD

The Icarus Syndrome: A History of American Hubris. BY PETER BEINART. Harper, 2010, 496 pp. $27.99.

As a former editor of *The New Republic*, Beinart stands well within the tradition he sets out to examine: that of progressives who seek to express liberal ideas in U.S. foreign policy. This legacy is complex and mixed; the liberal intellectual Walter Lippmann had more lives, ideologically speaking, than a cat. Progressives such as John Dewey and Charles Beard had the rare gift of being dogmatic, judgmental, and wrong on almost every major issue in American foreign policy during their lives. On the other hand, those such as George Kennan and Reinhold Niebuhr, who broke with core progressive ideals (Kennan did not much like democracy), often understood the world more clearly than either liberal internationalists or neoconservatives. Not all of this book is of equal value; editors have a ghastly habit of asking thinkers to make books of intellectual history "relevant" by ending with contemporary political analysis and, worse, prescription, and Beinart's concluding chapter is, intellectually, an anticlimax. The book is strongest when Beinart is examining the foundations of progressivism; the analyses of Lyndon Johnson and George W. Bush are less original and less masterly than the handling of U.S. foreign policy between 1913 and 1941. Nevertheless, with this book Beinart vindicates his standing as one of the major thinkers of his generation on the United States' world role.

National Security Strategy. BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES. White House, 2010, 52 pp.

The Obama administration's first national security strategy paper is less a strategy paper than a statement of faith and a wish list. This was to be expected. The administration has its share of bright academics and think-tankers, people who often believe that the relationship between theory and policy is much closer than it is. They will, of course, learn better, like all those who have preceded them on the downward path from the

sunny uplands of the academy to the meat grinder of history. Meanwhile, this document provides helpful insight into the mindset of the Obama administration in its early days. Although it contains what many will feel is an unseemly number of disparaging references to the last administration, in its transformational and Wilsonian ambitions (on issues such as nonproliferation), it is a document the Bush team can admire. Judging from the evidence here, the current administration shares the neoconservative belief that the world is ready to be fundamentally reshaped under U.S. leadership; the Obamans disagree violently with the Bushies on the nature of the reshaping and the tactics required to get there, but there is little sign here that the administration plans to draw in the United States' horns.

Henry Clay: The Essential American. BY DAVID S. HEIDLER AND JEANNE T. HEIDLER. Random House, 2010, 624 pp. $30.00.

Henry Clay is not only an also-ran in nineteenth-century presidential politics; today, he is an also-ran in American political memory. One of the triumvirate of statesmen (along with his colleagues and rivals John Calhoun and Daniel Webster) who competed with Andrew Jackson and one another to dominate the political stage between the War of 1812 and the Compromise of 1850, Clay (like Calhoun and Webster) never became president but seemed greater and more consequential than many of the relative nonentities who occupied the White House in those years. Clay was a polarizing figure; revered by some and loathed by others, he was the chief spirit of the Whig Party and a great advocate of what he called the American system of high tariffs, designed to build a world-class industrial economy in the United States. Historians have a hard time making him a compelling figure, and although the Heidlers have written a useful and clarifying account that is a pleasure to read, they have not created the kind of electrifying biography of Clay that could explain his appeal and importance to the twenty-first century. Until that book is written, this one will serve readers as a sound introduction to a major American figure.

Progressivism: A Very Short Introduction. BY WALTER NUGENT. Oxford University Press, 2009, 160 pp. $11.95.

Nugent's book accomplishes three important things in very few pages. First, it provides an irreproachable and clear summary of the conventional view of the American Progressive movement and its historical importance. Second, it shows that a serious scholar can produce a short book that is well written and makes its points effectively and completely. The world needs more books like this one, and Oxford University Press should be commended for producing this series of "very short introductions." Finally, *Progressivism* shows the limits of the conventional approach to the Progressive movement. Nugent is too close to the Progressives to see them whole; like most treatments of the movement, his book is written in part to pass the torch on to new generations. Although there is much to honor in Progressive history, upper-middle-class white progressivism (in both its northern and southern wings) had a much more complex

relationship with both populism and urban labor movements than Nugent seems willing or able to describe. The study of progressivism will have reached a satisfactory point when a book as brief, clear, and elegantly organized as Nugent's can present a more nuanced picture of this vitally important element of U.S. history.

The Best of the Best: Becoming Elite at an American Boarding School. BY RUBÉN A. GAZTAMBIDE-FERNÁNDEZ. Harvard University Press, 2009, 312 pp. $29.95.

This account, by a young Harvard-trained anthropologist, of two years of field study at an elite New England boarding school (code-named "Weston" in the book) vividly demonstrates how an anthropologist's assumptions largely determine what he or she sees in the field. Gaztambide-Fernández went to Weston believing that attendance at such a school conferred a kind of permanent elite status on its students. As any of his subjects could have told him, this is wrong. These days, admission to an elite boarding school is simply one of the first steps in a long and uncertain process, and status anxiety—mostly centered on the quest for admission to an elite college—haunts both the students and their parents. Unfortunately, Gaztambide-Fernández's status obsession prevents him from examining more interesting questions. The reader learns nothing about what these students are taught, how they respond to it, or what ideas and values catch their imaginations. The author has wasted an immense opportunity, but perhaps in the end one should turn to novelists rather than anthropologists to explain the devious and complex processes that shape social life.

Western Europe

ANDREW MORAVCSIK

Europe 2030. EDITED BY DANIEL BENJAMIN. Brookings Institution Press, 2010, 155 pp. $18.95.

The challenges that the European Union faces today are legion: to promote deep economic interdependence, stabilize cross-national finance, resolve regulatory disputes, manage transnational environmental externalities, and coordinate foreign policy. They are also those every country will soon face, if it does not already. This volume collects the insights of some of the most thoughtful academics, politicians, and policy analysts about Europe's long-term trajectory. Their views are idiosyncratic, as one might expect looking two decades into the future—but all the more interesting as a result. Although the contributors rightly reject lurid scenarios of Islamization or the appeasement of terrorists as groundless, one might argue that this book (like most analyses of Europe these days) is more pessimistic than the facts warrant. It dwells on Europe's squandered potential in security and economic cooperation. Yet the EU has enlarged to 27 members, introduced the euro, established its own security forces, formed a single market, and dissolved borders in the Schengen area. What region of the world has achieved more in the past two decades?

The Transatlantic Economy 2010: Annual Survey of Jobs, Trade, and Investment Between the United States and Europe. BY DANIEL S. HAMILTON AND JOSEPH P. QUINLAN. Center for Transatlantic Relations, 2010, 172 pp. Free online.

Many observers write off the "old continent"

as less and less relevant to American prosperity. Asia, they say, is the future. Hamilton and Quinlan's annual report, based on detailed surveys of economic activity, is crammed with data belying the conventional wisdom. It is not just that many U.S. regions and cities still depend primarily on European trade. More important, in the modern global economy, foreign investment is a deeper form of economic integration than trade, dwarfing the movement of goods and services. Up to three-quarters of U.S. foreign direct investment remains directed toward Europe. Research and development, closely connected to investment, moves primarily across the Atlantic as well. These patterns are particularly pronounced in the service sector, a harbinger of the new economy. The authors also find that the financial crisis has made Europe even more attractive, with U.S. firms actually divesting from China. An analysis of portfolio investments and money markets would have made the argument more persuasive. Still, no geopolitician or political economist can afford to ignore this case for the continued predominance of the $4.3 trillion transatlantic economy.

NATO: In Search of a Vision. EDITED BY GÜLNUR AYBET AND REBECCA R. MOORE. Georgetown University Press, 2010, 256 pp. $29.95.

How many volumes have been devoted to the old chestnut: Wither NATO? As the transatlantic alliance enters its seventh decade, few authors can avoid drowning in the clichés of the genre. In a single concluding paragraph, this book states that NATO is in crisis, faces new challenges, and lacks a grand strategic vision, and that it must therefore develop a common threat assessment, craft a new consensus, establish a comprehensive approach to civil-military relations, work closely with other international institutions, and forge new global partnerships. Yet beneath the generalities, there are gems. No recent volume is a better guide to the historical legacies that created the current institutional structure of NATO, the policy dilemmas of the Balkans a decade ago and of Afghanistan today, the complex and ambiguous diplomatic relations between NATO and Russia, and the various schemes for enhancing cooperation within the organization.

The Politics of Welfare State Reform in Continental Europe: Modernization in Hard Times. BY SILJA HÄUSERMANN. Cambridge University Press, 2010, 300 pp. $89.00 (paper, $29.99).

Conventional wisdom, among both political commentators and scholars, views European welfare systems as overgenerous given Europe's demographic and fiscal pressures yet unreformable due to political pressure from voters. In fact, over the past decade, France, Germany, and other western European countries have substantially reformed their labor markets, unemployment benefits, family policies, welfare systems, and pension schemes—the last of which is the subject of this book. Why would the French and the Germans not block any reduction in existing privileges, just as Americans stymie Social Security reform? Häusermann shows that welfare can be reformed by exploiting cross-cutting alliances among social groups in an increasingly complex labor market. Governments can carefully balance cutbacks with expansions in benefits, such as child-care assistance, for other constituencies. Successful reform coalitions

mobilize outsiders against insiders, more skilled against less skilled workers, professionals against wageworkers, women against men, and service-sector workers against industrial workers. This book is not easy reading, but it is essential for those interested in the future of the welfare state, Europe's greatest modern political achievement.

Corporate Governance, Competition, and Political Parties: Explaining Corporate Governance Change in Europe. BY ROGER M. BARKER. Oxford University Press, 2010, 270 pp. $99.00.

The continental system of corporate governance, in which insider shareholders dominate company ownership, has traditionally differed from the Anglo-American model, in which a broad base of shareholders and institutional investors wield more power. But recently, Europe's system has moved substantially closer to that of the United Kingdom and the United States. Barker credits this shift not to right-wing ideology, since more often than not, it was left-wing parties that engineered the necessary legal changes. Instead, he argues, although right-wing parties were linked to the old system, left-wing parties used reform to attract new support from business. In addition to his econometric evidence, Barker offers an intriguing comparison of Germany and Italy to support his view—although one wonders whether the rise of the service sector, the diversification of labor forces, and cross-class alliances might provide a more compelling explanation. Still, Barker's book contains interesting evidence that Europe's corporate landscape is anything but stagnant.

Western Hemisphere

RICHARD FEINBERG

Learning to Salsa: New Steps in U.S.-Cuba Relations. BY VICKI HUDDLESTON AND CARLOS PASCUAL. Brookings Institution Press, 2010, 176 pp. $24.95.

This volume describes the lessons for U.S. policy toward Cuba drawn from six simulations, wherein participants imagined that they were gathered in the West Wing or its Havana equivalent. Especially intriguing are the mock deliberations between Cuban President Raúl Castro and his closest advisers as they ponder how to free up the Cuban economy without loosening their grip on power. The contributors emphasize that notwithstanding the restrictive Helms-Burton Act of 1996, the White House retains considerable power to lift sanctions and permit a wide range of commercial, educational, and cultural exchanges. It could, to take one idea, license U.S. companies to exploit Cuban oil and gas reserves, thereby reducing Cuban dependence on Venezuela's Hugo Chávez. Like most committee reports, there are internal contradictions and unresolved dilemmas—whether, for example, Washington should proceed unilaterally or link the pace of reform to reciprocal Cuban gestures. But *Learning to Salsa* is replete with doable ideas and should be required reading in the real West Wing.

Declining Inequality in Latin America: A Decade of Progress? EDITED BY LUIS F. LÓPEZ-CALVA AND NORA LUSTIG. Brookings Institution Press, 2010, 253 pp. $34.95.

Latin America is infamous for its yawning

gaps between the very rich and the very poor. It is big news, therefore, that this deeply entrenched disgrace is showing signs of reversal. Over the last decade, according to the number-crunching economists assembled in this book, inequality measurably declined in 12 of 17 countries. The volume attributes this to two factors: the massive expansion of elementary schooling during the past decades, which narrowed the earnings gap between high-skilled and low-skilled workers, and carefully targeted government programs that transferred cash to the poor. (Democratization has helped, too.) The persistence of this redistributive momentum will depend, the editors contend, on progressive tax reforms. This is an important, evidence-rich study that directly challenges the notion that globalization inevitably widens income gaps in developing nations.

Left Behind: Latin America and the False Promise of Populism. BY SEBASTIAN EDWARDS. University of Chicago Press, 2010, 296 pp. $29.00.

Twenty years ago, Edwards and Rudiger Dornbusch explained how populist largess and misconceived state intervention in Latin America led inevitably from initial euphoria to lasting regret. Updating his classic argument, Edwards rips into the Venezuelan caudillo Hugo Chávez and predicts his inevitable demise. But Edwards' real targets here are the run-of-the-mill policymakers who have failed to tackle the deeper institutional reforms—ranging from building efficient judiciaries to demanding quality education—required for growth. An exacting grader, the UCLA professor bestows an A only on his native Chile and suggests that a mere handful of other Latin American countries—Colombia, Costa Rica, and Peru—will likely dislodge vested interests (such as corrupt corporate monopolies and entrenched teachers' unions) and sufficiently advance reforms. At a time when Latin America's democratic strides and financial resilience suddenly compare favorably on a world scale, the author's anguish seems off key.

Democratic Governance in Latin America. EDITED BY SCOTT MAINWARING AND TIMOTHY R. SCULLY. Stanford University Press, 2010, 440 pp. $85.00 (paper, $29.95).

In this collection, some of Latin America's brightest policymakers join with leading social scientists to explain the region's success stories. But the contributors quarrel over whether there exist generally applicable guidelines for progress. The editors (with Jorge Vargas Cullell) mine large databases to dissect successful democratic governance across nine dimensions; not surprisingly, Chile, Costa Rica, and Uruguay score high, Guatemala and Haiti low. A contrary piece by Francisco Rodríguez pokes holes in statistical methods that seek to derive universal truths by manipulating large sets of data from many countries. The volume's most compelling essays are those written by veterans of public service. Now governor of Chile's central bank, José de Gregorio details the policies behind his nation's top-notch performance and is not shy about defending basic economic principles. Another exceptional Chilean practitioner-scholar, Alejandro Foxley, foresees a world of networked innovation nations—Australia, Finland, Israel, Malaysia, South Korea, and, yes, Chile—in which

they all share best practices while each selects its own competitive industry cluster. In a particularly pithy contribution, the Brazilian statesman Fernando Henrique Cardoso reaffirms the role of decisive leadership in altering the paths of history.

Social Capital in Developing Democracies: Nicaragua and Argentina Compared. BY LESLIE E. ANDERSON. Cambridge University Press, 2010, 344 pp. $85.00 (paper, $27.99).

Despite being a poor, agrarian society, Anderson argues, Nicaragua is progressing toward democracy because Nicaraguans possess the right civic virtues: inclinations toward mutual cooperation with and trust in their fellow citizens. More controversially, Anderson claims that the Sandinista revolution—arising from grass-roots organizations and advancing ideals of social justice—greatly enhanced that social capital. She argues that Argentina, in contrast, despite its relative wealth, is less democratic than it ought to be because Argentines—especially the political heirs to Juan Perón's semi-fascism—are distrustful and hence not inclined to democratic participation and peaceful compromise. Still, Argentine checks and balances have restrained the authoritarian tendencies of Perón's followers—a demonstration that states can construct "institutional capital," such as strong parliaments and legal systems, that resist tyranny. Skeptical readers may find Anderson's empirical tests a bit thin, but *Social Capital in Developing Democracies*, always spirited and stimulating, is a valuable addition to the literature on the multiple pillars of democratic development.

Eastern Europe and Former Soviet Republics

ROBERT LEGVOLD

The Greengrocer and His TV: The Culture of Communism After the 1968 Prague Spring. BY PAULINA BREN. Cornell University Press, 2010, 264 pp. $65.00 (paper, $24.95).

Between 1968, when Moscow planted its boot athwart the Prague Spring, and 1989, when the Velvet Revolution overthrew the communist government in Czechoslovakia, the Czechoslovak regime went about cowing society in the name of "normalization." Accounts that focus on the civic group Charter 77, the spread of dissidence, and the petty revolts of a sullen population would lead one to believe that this did not work. But Bren argues that it was largely successful. In fact, the average Czech or Slovak—Václav Havel's greengrocer—settled into the regime's imposed "quiet life." They were joined by a good portion of the country's cultural elite, who could not bear to stop painting, singing, playing, and acting. Doing the history of passivity and accommodation is not easy, and Bren proceeds ingeniously by exploring the subtle buying into the system by the vast viewing audience that embraced the lives of the characters on popular television serials, lives redolent of what "normalization" meant. Then, in a particularly revealing step, she examines the awkward response to reruns of some of the most popular of these serials in the aftermath of what she calls Czechoslovakia's "late communism."

Let Our Fame Be Great: Journeys Among the Defiant People of the Caucasus. BY OLIVER BULLOUGH. Basic Books, 2010, 528 pp. $28.95.

Not many people have heard of the Circassians or know of their horrific end in 1864, when the imperial Russian military literally drove them into the sea from the upper Black Sea coast, including much of contemporary Abkhazia. Pockets of the survivors' descendants are spread across Jordan, Syria, even Israel, and in particular Turkey—and some are in various corners of the North Caucasus. Bullough has visited many of these communities and vividly conveys what remains of their historical memory and cultural legacy, weaving their story into a detailed history of what actually happened. It is a story seriously misremembered on the Russian side of the Caucasus, in part because of romanticized nineteenth-century accounts by the likes of Aleksandr Pushkin and Mikhail Lermontov. Bullough also examines the fate of other peoples from the region—the Karachays, the Balkars, and the Chechens—covering Stalin's deadly depredations, the mass deportations to Central Asia during World War II, the violent colonization of the nineteenth century, and, completing the litany, Russia's recent wars in Chechnya. What makes the book particularly compelling, however, is not the macro statistics or the composite history but rather the poignant tales of the individuals Bullough met on his travels.

Russian Orientalism: Asia in the Russian Mind From Peter the Great to the Emigration. BY DAVID SCHIMMELPENNINCK VAN DER OYE. Yale University Press, 2010, 312 pp. $40.00.

The author's focus is not on the Russian mind writ large or even the mind of the ruling elite but rather on that of the generations of academic Orientalists from the eighteenth century on. Peter, Catherine, their nineteenth-century successors, and members of the court paid close attention to these scholars when it suited their foreign policy ambitions or cultural fads. And important Russian writers and composers, from Aleksandr Borodin to Leo Tolstoy, played with Asian themes. From Peter's time to the Bolshevik Revolution, for Russian intellectuals, "the Orient" signified the South—Islam, the Turks, and the Persians. Russian interest in East Asia began with the Mongol conquerors in the thirteenth century, focused more in the eighteenth century on Catherine's taste for chinoiserie in her summer palaces, and then became more serious in the late nineteenth century as Russia embarked on its last stage of imperial expansion. Throughout, the dialogue had much more to do with the place and function of the Near East in Russia's sense of identity. The book's major contribution is an in-depth three-century study of the emergence and evolution of Orientalism within the Russian academy.

Rock and Roll in the Rocket City: The West, Identity, and Ideology in Soviet Dniepropetrovsk, 1960–1985. BY SERGEI I. ZHUK. Johns Hopkins University Press and the Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2010, 464 pp. $65.00.

It may come as a surprise, but in Leonid Brezhnev's day, the youth of Dniepropetrovsk, Ukraine, a closed missile-manufacturing city far from the cosmopolitan circles of Moscow and St. Petersburg, knew all about Deep Purple's lead vocalist, Ian Gillan, and, for that matter, the stars of nearly every

other American and British rock band. Try as they might—and try they did—the thought police made little progress in channeling teenage interest away from such, as one ex-KGB official put it, "ideological anti-Soviet pollution." Zhuk, who grew up in Ukraine as part of the Beatles generation, details his cohort's intricate knowledge of the Western rock scene, smuggled Western movies, and, among schoolchildren, Western adventure classics. Officialdom had a reason to care. Even if the mania over Western youth culture was not a revolt against political realities, it did represent an effort to avoid them by creating a sphere of meaning free of outside authority. Zhuk's deft exploration of this cultural scene has the texture of real life in the last decades of Soviet communism, and because members of the generation he writes of are now leaders of a new Ukraine and a new Russia, it has a distinct contemporary relevance.

Skeletons in the Closet: Transitional Justice in Post-Communist Europe. BY MONIKA NALEPA. Cambridge University Press, 2010, 324 pp. $83.99 (paper, $25.99).

Among the various puzzles raised by the way the once socialist countries of eastern Europe transitioned to another model, one of the more interesting concerns retribution against those from the upper ranks of the ancien régime. Why did the retribution not come quickly and harshly? And why, when it eventually came, was it in most cases comparatively gentle? Mobilizing a good portion of political science's methods and theoretical forms, Nalepa offers a simple but far from obvious explanation. Outcomes were the result not of popular pressures but of careful calculations on the part of old, successor, and oppositional elites. Oppositional elites trod warily because of "skeletons in the closet," that is, for fear of exposing who among them had collaborated with the old regime—the Polish president Lech Walesa, who allegedly was a police informant from 1970 to 1976, being a prime example. Successor elites, when back in power but facing its loss, crafted limited lustration laws to preempt something more severe in the future.

Taming Ethnic Hatred: Ethnic Cooperation and Transnational Networks in Eastern Europe. BY PATRICE C. MCMAHON. Syracuse University Press, 2007, 256 pp. $45.00.

Instead of ethnic violence, which is the focus of much of the academic literature on eastern Europe, McMahon shifts attention to what she claims has been far more prevalent: cases of ethnic cooperation. Given the bloody outcome in Yugoslavia, many easily assumed that much of eastern Europe, with its mottled map of ethnicities, would quickly degenerate into bloodshed, too. That it did not even in countries that seemed prime candidates, such as Latvia and Romania, her primary cases, owes, she argues, to a new phenomenon in international politics: the existence of international organizations and nongovernmental organizations, which have deflated the potential for violence. She does not claim that this spider web of "transnational networks" deserves all the credit or that its influence came only from the benchmarks it set and the dialogues it imposed. The argument is more thoughtful, incorporating the complex bottom-up dynamic by which a loose conglomeration of outside institutions fostered domestic forces that defused tensions.

Middle East

L. CARL BROWN

The Unspoken Alliance: Israel's Secret Relationship With Apartheid South Africa. BY SASHA POLAKOW-SURANSKY. Pantheon, 2010, 336 pp. $27.95.

The title *The Unspoken Alliance* brings to mind Sylvia Crosbie's 1974 book, *A Tacit Alliance: France and Israel From Suez to the Six-Day War* (which treated Israel's collusion with the United Kingdom and France to attack Egypt in 1956), or Trita Parsi's more recent book, *Treacherous Alliance: The Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran, and the United States*. All states engage in secret diplomacy, but Israel offers some of the most shocking examples. In this book (written by an editor at this magazine), the reader finds the Israel that emerged in the wake of the Holocaust linked decades later in off-the-books diplomacy to an apartheid South Africa led by Nazi sympathizers. That Israel had good relations with and sold weapons to South Africa during the two or so decades before the end of apartheid in the early 1990s was no secret, but the full dimensions of what amounted to an "unspoken" military alliance of nuclear proportions have only now come to light. Polakow-Suransky's dogged research efforts earned him access to South Africa's hitherto secret archives, and his equally dogged seeking out of all who would receive him has produced a compelling history. Although he deplores Israel's ties to the apartheid regime, Polakow-Suransky has treated the handful of officials in the two countries implementing that alliance fairly, even empathetically. He drops his guard only when he refers to "the ever sanctimonious Shimon Peres." How important were these secret ties? By 1979, South Africa had become Israel's largest arms customer, and the total military trade between the two countries reached an estimated $10 billion during the last two decades of the apartheid regime.

Eclipse of the Sunnis: Power, Exile, and Upheaval in the Middle East. BY DEBORAH AMOS. PublicAffairs, 2010, 256 pp. $25.95.

Approximately one in six Iraqis, Amos reports, became a refugee or was displaced during the war and chaos following the 2003 U.S. invasion. "The equivalent number in terms of the American population would be fifty million men, women and children," she writes. Amos bring intimacy to this powerful statistic with close-up accounts of killings and kidnappings; middle-class Iraqi women in Damascus reduced to prostitution; the awkward, probably hypocritical, and certainly failed effort of Nouri al-Maliki's government to induce a return of refugees; and more. She weaves into the story of these millions of displaced Iraqis, who are disproportionately Christian and Sunni, an overview of the changing regional power balance and of an Iraq, now seven lean years after Saddam Hussein, segregated by sect, with a devastated infrastructure, and largely bereft of its professional and cultural middle class.

Beware of Small States: Lebanon, Battleground of the Middle East. BY DAVID HIRST. Nation Books, 2010, 496 pp. $29.95.

The Ghosts of Martyrs Square: An Eyewitness Account of Lebanon's Life Struggle. BY MICHAEL YOUNG. Simon & Schuster, 2010, 336 pp. $26.00.

In today's Middle East, where most

diplomacy can be filed under Arab-Israel, Sunni-Shiite, or religio-political, Lebanon, a small state made up of religious minorities (Sunni, Shiite, Christian, and Druze) is fated to be a vulnerable bit player. Hirst presents a history of Lebanon's regional diplomacy since the late nineteenth century while concentrating on the period since the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. He is tough on all parties but consistently harsh on Israel.

Young's book is best appreciated as a meditation on the distinctive Lebanese cluster of religious communities that falls short of being a viable state. Focusing on the years since the 2005 assassination of the Sunni political leader Rafiq Hariri, Young is as harsh on Hezbollah and Syria as Hirst is on Israel. He suggests that buried in Lebanon's much maligned sectarian pluralism is the potential for moving toward a more liberal and modern polity. That will not be easy: his table of short biographies includes 33 Lebanese figures, exactly one-third of whom have been assassinated.

Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History. BY THOMAS BARFIELD. Princeton University Press, 2010, 400 pp. $29.95.

Those who have suspected that the "graveyard of empires" label does not quite capture Afghanistan in international politics past and present will find in this book the comprehensive coverage they seek. Barfield, an anthropologist and old Afghanistan hand, has written a history of Afghanistan that weaves in geography, economics, and culture (think tribes, rural-urban dichotomies, value systems) while maintaining a focus throughout on Afghan rulers' relations with their own people and the outside world. The many peoples, places, and dates cited make for a dense book. (Although there are useful maps, a timeline would have helped.) But it is lightened by many breaks in the narrative to address broad themes or make intriguing comparisons, such as likening patrimonial Afghanistan to medieval Europe. Barfield's Afghanistan is not frozen in amber. He describes a country whose state-building efforts were not unlike those of other Muslim polities in modern times but came later and produced less change. It is a country whose ruler must "convince the Afghans that he is not beholden to foreigners, even as he convinces these very same foreigners to fund his state and military."

The Muslim Revolt: A Journey Through Political Islam. BY ROGER HARDY. Columbia University Press, 2010, 208 pp. $26.50.

A journey needs a vade mecum, and this little book fits the bill in size and substance for a journey through political Islam. It contains not maps, illustrations, and statistics but interpretations of the many visits and interviews across the Muslim world that Hardy clocked as a journalist over the past three decades. To these he adds summary histories of political Islam in many diverse countries. *The Muslim Revolt* is not confined to the Middle East. It covers Sudan, Pakistan, and Southeast Asia, which, it should be remembered, contains the world's largest Muslim country—Indonesia. Hardy even treats the Muslim minority in Thailand and makes a passing reference to the Philippines. Especially compelling is his separate chapter on Muslims in Europe. Succinct and readable, this account demonstrates the regional and ideological diversity of political Islam even while explaining Muslims' malaise vis-à-vis the West.

Asia and Pacific

ANDREW J. NATHAN

Myth of the Social Volcano: Perceptions of Inequality and Distributive Injustice in Contemporary China. BY MARTIN KING WHYTE. Stanford University Press, 2010, 264 pp. $80.00 (paper, $27.95).

Accepting Authoritarianism: State-Society Relations in China's Reform Era. BY TERESA WRIGHT. Stanford University Press, 2010, 264 pp. $70.00 (paper, $24.95).

The Chinese have become more passionate believers in the American dream than Americans themselves, to judge by the findings of a nationwide survey conducted by Whyte in 2004. Although China is one of the most unequal countries in the world, most Chinese believe that wealth goes to those who work hard and that everyone has a fair chance to get ahead. The consensus holds across most sectors of society and is strongest among the group that is objectively most disadvantaged: rural residents. Whyte conjectures that this is because all groups, and the peasants in particular, are so much better off now than under Mao. Widespread rejection of the past and faith in the future, he believes, help power China's economic dynamism and generate support for the political system.

Wright synthesizes existing research on why it is rational for each major sector of the Chinese populace to accept the political status quo. The better-off groups feel privileged and beholden to the system, the middle groups expect the rising tide to lift their boats, and the worst-off groups depend on the state for benefits, no matter how inadequate. Despite the farmers' inferior, castelike status, which has improved only marginally since Mao, these workers depend on the state for access to land, are drawn away from their home communities by the lure of factory jobs on the coast, and have no way to link their local protests to create a national movement. As Wright sees it, each group accepts authoritarianism for its own reasons. Whyte and Wright agree, however, that political stability is a tightrope act, vulnerable to misstep if and when the state ceases to deliver.

Edwin O. Reischauer and the American Discovery of Japan. BY GEORGE R. PACKARD. Columbia University Press, 2010, 368 pp. $32.50.

Edwin Reischauer was a pioneering American scholar of Japan at Harvard from 1938 to 1981, with time off to serve as U.S. ambassador to Tokyo under Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson. As ambassador, he took the first steps toward putting the U.S.-Japanese relationship on a more equal footing after the occupation. This gracefully written, compassionate biography by Reischauer's former student and cultural attaché throws light on some of the perennial issues of scholarship and diplomacy—how to balance objectivity with engagement, how to interpret one culture for members of another, how to combine loyalty in public service with dissent, and how to reconcile professional ambition with family obligations. Packard discusses State Department infighting over China, Japan, and Vietnam; exposes the small-mindedness of academic controversies; and dismembers the once flourishing literature on "the Japan threat."

The Korean War: A History. BY BRUCE CUMINGS. Modern Library, 2010, 320 pp. $24.00.

Cumings takes a broad view of his subject, covering not just the Korean War itself but also its origins in civil strife before and during the U.S. occupation, the political and cultural drivers of U.S. policy, the politics of forgetting in the subsequent half century, the painful recovery of repressed truths in recent years, and the war's legacies in both Koreas and in the United States. He sees the war as a continuation of the long struggle by Korean nationalists against Japanese domination and Korean collaborationism, both of which were resurgent under the United States' post–World War II occupation. He exposes the racist attitudes the occupiers brought to Korea and the military atrocities they carried out. Today, he believes, North Korea continues to wage the anticolonial struggle that the rest of the world, blinded by old stereotypes of savage "Asiatics," has never understood. The failure to understand history contributes to the inability of Washington and Pyongyang to understand each other. Cumings covers these difficult topics in a sure-footed style, providing insights that are always stimulating, if not always convincing. More than a reworking of existing literature (including his own previous monographs), the book is full of new discoveries from archival research.

India, Pakistan, and the Bomb: Debating Nuclear Stability in South Asia. BY SUMIT GANGULY AND S. PAUL KAPUR. Columbia University Press, 2010, 152 pp. $21.50.

India and Pakistan declared themselves to be nuclear powers after they conducted weapons tests in 1998. This book is set up as a debate between the two authors over whether nuclearization has created a barrier to escalation during crises between the two nations—the so-called nuclear stability theory, drawn from the U.S.-Soviet Cold War experience—or whether it has instead created a shield for Pakistani adventurism and a risk of Indian overreaction. Analyzing past and present behavior by the two states, they try to apply the lessons of history to the future. Ganguly and Kapur agree that the two sides have managed their conflicts since 1998 without escalation but disagree on the extent to which this was due to nuclear deterrence. They also agree that the presence of nuclear weapons would make a failure to manage a crisis more catastrophic but disagree about whether nuclear arms increase or reduce the likelihood of such a failure. As for policy recommendations, the authors think India should refrain from developing ballistic missile defenses and that Pakistan should rein in its militant groups.

Vietnam: Rising Dragon. BY BILL HAYTON. Yale University Press, 2010, 272 pp. $30.00.

Hayton, a journalist for the BBC, was expelled from Vietnam in 2007 for his reporting on dissidents. While there, he seems to have figured out how all the gears mesh in this Southeast Asian paradox, where economic dynamism exists alongside political control, corruption alongside discipline, and a youth culture alongside a nanny state. Hayton reports how a network of elite families flourishes symbiotically within a secretive Communist Party apparatus, how a society intoxicated by consumerism is gingerly managed by a panoptic security bureaucracy, and how media workers and censors test one

another's limits. According to Hayton, foreign foundations that think they are supporting governance reforms are instead solidifying the "law-based state," a euphemism for one-party rule. Although he doubts the regime can keep control of an increasingly complex society, he does not claim to know when or how change will happen.

Underground Front: The Chinese Communist Party in Hong Kong. BY CHRISTINE LOH. Hong Kong University Press, 2010, 372 pp. $35.00.

Contrary to the expectations of many, Hong Kong has retained much of its liberal identity since the handover to China from the United Kingdom in 1997. The rule of law still applies, the media are still relatively free, and enough pro-democratic politicians are elected to the legislature to block proposed constitutional changes. Nevertheless, the influence of the Chinese Communist Party has been growing since 1997. Yet despite its being in effect the ruling party, it continues to remain underground. Loh, a former legislator and the leader of a Hong Kong think tank, breaks new ground in charting the history of the party in Hong Kong. Beijing's relations with the local party branch, she finds, have not always been harmonious, most recently when it failed to anticipate the huge demonstrations in 2003, which blocked state security legislation. But the party has been successful in co-opting the business elite and in winning elections. At issue now is how it will apply "united front" tactics to gain support for its version of elections for Hong Kong's leader and legislature.

MICHAEL B. YAHUDA

Africa

NICOLAS VAN DE WALLE

The Strange Alchemy of Life and Law. BY ALBIE SACHS. Oxford University Press, 2009, 320 pp. $45.00.

Justice Sachs retired last year from South Africa's Constitutional Court, following a 15-year term during which the court helped define the judicial contours of the post-apartheid state. A lawyer for the clandestine African National Congress who barely survived an assassination attempt in 1988, he would go on to help draft the current constitution. This memoir mixes personal reminiscences with commentary on contemporary South Africa, and also includes brief but eloquent disquisitions on his legal philosophy and excerpts from his most famous decisions. His arguments about the nature of judging and the role of dignity in the law will attract the attention of legal experts. Meanwhile, anyone with an interest in South Africa will appreciate Sachs' justification for explicitly including socioeconomic rights in the South African constitution and his analysis of the logic behind the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Some readers will disagree with his interpretations, arguing, for example, that the commission's work was undermined by contradictory objectives and inconsistent application and largely failed in its mission of reconciliation. Nonetheless, Sachs emerges from his narrative as an empathetic and humanistic judge deeply committed to a democratic South Africa. And besides, it is hard not to like a man who admits to doing his best thinking in the bathtub.

Christianity, Politics, and Public Life in Kenya. BY PAUL GIFFORD. Columbia University Press, 2009, 276 pp. $90.00.

A longtime observer of Christianity in Africa, Gifford has written a keen survey of the ideas and actions of Christian organizations and their leaders in Kenya. After analyzing the Catholic Church and mainstream Protestant churches, he examines the newer, lesser-known faiths making inroads in Africa, from the various Pentecostal churches to the syncretic churches that combine Christian and traditional African spiritual views. One of the book's main findings concerns the extent to which religion is linked to politics in Kenya. The mainstream churches' major role in promoting democratization in the early 1990s, it turns out, has been the exception. For the most part, the churches have been complacent about the country's social and economic ills, their laudable focus on the provision of social services notwithstanding. Gifford writes convincingly about the nature of Kenyan theology and various doctrinal issues, but the more notable contribution of this first-rate study derives from his focus on churches as social and political actors.

Identity Economics: Social Networks and the Informal Economy in Nigeria. BY KATE MEAGHER. James Currey, 2010, 224 pp. $34.95.

Within development circles, conventional wisdom has it that successful manufacturing sectors often develop in low-income countries thanks to identity-based social networks made up of producers working together. These networks are said to generate the social capital that can be used to overcome many of the shortcomings of underdevelopment. Meagher's careful

study of two such networks in southwestern Nigeria—of small, undercapitalized garment and shoe manufacturers—suggests that the advantages for producers within the networks are being undermined by an increasingly dysfunctional state. Meagher shows that these networks, whose roots go back to the colonial era, bring in hundreds of millions of dollars in revenue and export their goods to states throughout West Africa. But in recent years, they have proved vulnerable to Asian imports and have largely failed to develop economies of scale, invest in new machinery, or generate new lines of production; these networks, it turns out, stifle innovation and consolidation, even as they protect their members. Informed by theory as well as sustained fieldwork, Meagher's study is a useful antidote to the purveyors of magic-bullet solutions for African development. It should be read by anyone interested in Africa's industrialization.

The International Relations of Sub-Saharan Africa. BY IAN TAYLOR. Continuum, 2010, 192 pp. $110.00 (paper, $29.95).

Given Africa's poor economic performance, it is easy to dismiss the region as marginal. In this up-to-date and always readable introduction to Africa's international relations, Taylor argues that, on the contrary, Africa has often played a significant role on the global stage, and he provides many examples of how African leaders are able to manipulate the international system to pursue their own interests. They play the great powers off against one another, they leverage access to the region's substantial natural resources, and they take advantage of the region's economic failures to get foreign aid. Surveying the relationship between each of the world's major powers and Africa and discussing the region's international economic relations, the book also includes an especially incisive chapter on China's recent forays into the region and another one on recent British policies there. Although it is presumably targeted at an undergraduate audience, it will appeal to most interested readers.

Democratization in Africa: Progress and Retreat. 2nd ed. EDITED BY LARRY DIAMOND AND MARC F. PLATTNER. Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010, 392 pp. $60.00 (paper, $30.00).

Read together, the essays collected here provide a broad and sophisticated survey of the state of democratic politics in Africa. The volume's best general essays contribute both to democratic theory and to public policy, and its 15 country case studies are informative introductions to recent (and woefully underreported) political developments in the region. Almost all African countries moved to multiparty electoral politics in the early 1990s, but only a handful can be unambiguously characterized as democracies today. As a result, the view of the continent that emerges from these surveys is mixed, with encouraging democratic progress in some countries balanced out by failure and stagnation in others. Although constitutionalism and democratic institutions have undeniably strengthened over the course of two decades of competitive electoral politics, much political power remains personalized and unaccountable. Africans generally appear to be supportive of democratic forms of government, yet the region's enduringly mediocre economic performance and the failures of its state institutions threaten that support.

Letters to the Editor

Edward Kaufman and Howard Berman on ending Washington's overreliance on the military; Karen Tse, Kenneth Neil Cukier, Tiernan Mennen, and Vivek Maru on international legal reform; and others

SEND IN THE CIVILIANS

To the Editor:

U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates ("Helping Others Defend Themselves," May/June 2010) calls failing states "the main security challenge of our time." Given this strategic reality, the U.S. government must change its approach to the national security challenges of the future.

Gates outlines ways to improve the advising and mentoring capacity of the Defense Department; the U.S. government needs to take this a step further by building a complementary capacity within its civilian agencies. The State Department's ability to partner with the military on stabilization and conflict-prevention programs should be expanded, as should its efforts to partner with foreign governments to improve their governance capacities.

In the Senate, I have advocated for programs, such as joint civilian-military training prior to deployments in Afghanistan, that would foster greater cooperation between the State Department and the Pentagon. Such coordination is essential, because the wars of the future will likely involve counterinsurgency, which relies on the military to clear and hold and on civilians to build and transfer.

The U.S. military has been transforming to address new threats and the defense budget has been rebalanced, but these efforts must be complemented by a stronger civilian capacity to engage in counterinsurgency alongside the military. Congress should therefore support efforts to help civilian and military leaders work in concert around the world.

First, Congress must make structural changes, particularly regarding the national security budget. Gates' proposal for a pooled interagency fund for building partner capacity and stabilization capabilities should receive serious consideration. Congress also must provide the State Department with more flexible and discretionary funding streams so that diplomats can respond to crises rapidly, just as military officers are able to dispense Commander's Emergency Response Program funds quickly.

The U.S. government must also better train foreign police. The State Department's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs has had success in training civilian law enforcement agencies around the globe, but its model has not worked in Afghanistan. The United States needs a more robust civilian approach to partnering with foreign law enforcement and defense counterparts. Something so critical should not be an afterthought or be contracted out to private companies.

A major challenge to interagency cooperation is the discrepancy between the size of civilian and military staffs. The United States needs more diplomats and development professionals to serve around the world—especially in Afghanistan, where there are nearly 100,000 U.S. soldiers but barely 1,000 U.S. civilians. The fiscal year 2011 budget resolution is shortsighted in cutting $4 billion from the president's $58.5 billion international affairs budget; this would mean fewer resources for U.S. civilians deployed around the world, including in war zones. Although Congress must carefully weigh budgets in a difficult economic environment, it should not do so at the expense of national security interests.

Finally, just as Gates advocates for building stronger security partnerships with foreign governments, so should the United States build foreign governance capacity by creating civilian advising and mentoring programs. These would allow experts to work in foreign ministries, parliaments, provinces, and municipalities to improve governance, economic development, and the rule of law. The State Department's Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization has been charged with standing up the Civilian Response Corps, which—if properly resourced—would be a natural home for such teams. It should recruit and train the best and brightest among the federal work force, foster interagency coordination, promote best practices, and be on the frontlines of defending U.S. national security interests. So far, unfortunately, it has fallen short of meeting these goals.

The U.S. government cannot afford to think of national security only in military terms. The more it integrates its civilian and military capacities, the better able it will be to defend the nation.

EDWARD E. KAUFMAN
U.S. Senator, D–Del.

To the Editor:

In advocating that the U.S. military "play a leading role in bringing economic growth to devastated countries," Carl Schramm ("Expeditionary Economics," May/June 2010) hits on the right problem but the wrong solution. He is correct to note that the military "often cannot accomplish its long-term missions by force of arms . . . alone" and that "economic growth is critical to establishing social stability." It is also true that policymakers often underestimate the importance of entrepreneurship in stimulating economic growth. But it is civilian, not military, forces—principally the U.S. Agency for International Development—that should lead in this regard, and it must be strengthened so that it can do so.

Since the initial, chaotic days of Operation Iraqi Freedom, it has become starkly evident that the U.S. government lacks the capacity to conduct large-scale stabilization and reconstruction operations in conflict zones. In response, the Department of Defense and the Department of State have pushed to enhance civilian reconstruction capabilities and reduce the military's involvement in such missions.

Schramm ignores this development and calls for the military to expand its role in areas in which it has no expertise and for which it is particularly ill suited. This is exactly the type of mission creep that Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mike Mullen have pleaded to avoid. And it is why the House Foreign Affairs Committee

is overhauling the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.

What is needed, instead of a military doctrine of "expeditionary economics," is a civilian-led peacebuilding corps that can operate in conflict zones and help local communities lay the foundations for robust economic growth. Such efforts are not the core competency of the U.S. military, nor should they be—any more than the United States' civilian development professionals should conduct kinetic military operations.

HOWARD BERMAN
U.S. Congressman, D-Calif.

LAW FOR THE GLOBAL POOR

To the Editor:

Although Gary Haugen and Victor Boutros ("And Justice for All," May/June 2010) rightly highlight the importance of public justice systems in developing countries, their analysis begs for a rejoinder in two critical areas.

First, the article paints an overly bleak picture of the difficulties in fostering legal rights because the authors view the situation from a macro perspective and as frozen in time. Seen from the ground and over time, a different picture emerges; the situation is not so hopeless. Indeed, the very problems that Haugen and Boutros cite are symptomatic of the substantial progress taking place: the poor in developing countries are gaining an expectation of justice, and a new generation of justice defenders are pushing the limits—hence causing the ugly backlash against them.

Second, the article overlooks the economic dimensions of abuse. In countries with embryonic judicial systems, torture is simply an inexpensive form of criminal investigation; coerced confessions relieve ill-trained and ill-funded police from having to build cases based on evidence.

After a decade of work in more than 15 countries, International Bridges to Justice—a nonprofit group that works with governments and local law associations to improve judicial systems—has found that once one has access to legal support, one's rights are immediately more secure. And such support—via legal-aid centers, for example—need not be costly. Recognizing this transforms the problem of legal rights from a political to an economic issue and creates a fresh opening for it to be addressed. Activists and policymakers can "out-finance" abuses by raising money for the establishment of infrastructure for legal aid. This would put police, prosecutors, and judges on notice that a backstop exists to prevent abuse.

The most important resource for fostering the rule of law already exists: defense lawyers. They are the shock troops for upholding legal rights, yet they are also the most vulnerable to retaliation. Legal reforms will stick only if local practitioners are supported.

KAREN I. TSE
Founder and CEO, International Bridges to Justice
KENNETH NEIL CUKIER
Member, Board of Directors, International Bridges to Justice

To the Editor:

Gary Haugen and Victor Boutros argue convincingly for a new, third-generation approach to international human rights that focuses on the enforcement of laws at the country level.

But their assertion that no human rights organizations or government agencies measure success by their "ability to bring

effective law enforcement to local communities in the developing world" is simply untrue. Donors, multilateral institutions, and civil-society organizations have been supporting national-level justice reform for over a decade.

In Bolivia, for example, the U.S. Agency for International Development has invested over $20 million since 1998 in criminal justice system reform, including establishing a public defender's office. This has resulted in improved case-processing times and fewer instances of prolonged pretrial detention. USAID also helped establish legal-advice and community-mediation centers that have assisted over 150,000 people in some of the country's poorest areas.

In the British government, the Department for International Development stated in a white paper last year that "access to security and justice will be treated as an essential public service, on a par with health and education." The DFID committed to tripling its spending in this area, to 130 million pounds ($195 million) per year.

Strengthening the rule of law through justice system reform is not a perfect science. There are many necessary and complementary approaches—from training judges in complex areas of law to redrafting poorly constructed constitutions to providing legal-aid services to indigent defendants. It is essential to empower local citizens and not overstate the ability of Western lawyers to swoop in, solve individual cases, and make a lasting impact.

This year, the Open Society Justice Initiative, the World Bank's Justice for the Poor program, and other international donors are launching the Legal Empowerment of the Poor initiative. Recognizing

the critical role of civil society and local ownership, the initiative will work with local groups to support community paralegal programs and other grass-roots justice reform efforts.

TIERNAN MENNEN

Senior Project Manager, Legal Empowerment of the Poor, Open Society Justice Initiative

VIVEK MARU

Counsel, Justice Reform Group, World Bank

A NATO RED CARPET FOR MOSCOW

To the Editor:

Charles Kupchan ("NATO's Final Frontier," May/June 2010) rightfully draws attention to the difficulties associated with letting Russia join NATO. But he does not address the prickliest question: Does Russia even want to be a part of NATO? Most high-ranking Russian officials say no. But their responses leave room for maneuver.

In the past, Russia's ambassador to NATO, Dmitry Rogozin, has suggested that NATO is more likely to join Russia than vice versa. In a recent interview, however, he chose to emphasize that it is divisions among NATO allies—not reluctance among Russians—that would prevent Russia from ever being considered for membership. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, for his part, has defended the achievements of the NATO-Russia Council, a body established in 2002 to promote cooperation between Moscow and the alliance. Although he has rejected the idea of Russia joining NATO, he has premised his position on the fact that "nobody has invited [Russia] to join." As Russia's idea for a European security treaty—which has so far gotten a cool reception—suggests, the Russian leadership is interested in integrating with Western states to some degree, or at least in erasing Cold War–era dividing lines.

It is up to NATO to offer membership to Russia, and success or failure will depend on how seriously the gesture is framed. For Moscow, a tacit precondition for its joining would be that it be on a par with the United States, not treated as Europe's embarrassing cousin. Russia would also likely demand a comprehensive bargain that linked its membership to the renegotiation of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty (which Moscow suspended in 2007) and to a sustainable diplomatic solution to Georgia's territorial disputes. NATO could make such an offer—even as soon as its November summit in Lisbon.

DARYL MORINI

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By Thanassis Cambanis

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